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 TRIAL
OF

THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE

THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL

NUREMBERG
14 NOVEMBER 1945 — OCTOBER
1 1946

PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY

19 4 7
This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the juris-
diction of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.

"Sd ©04

lt. S. SWEKlNÏENUtNf Uf UUUWlj^Ht

.OCT 20 mi
 VOLUME IV

OFFICIAL TEXT
I N THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

PROCEEDINGS
17 December 1945 — 8 January 1946
 CONTENTS

Twenty-first Day, Monday, 17 December 1945,

Morning Session 1

Afternoon Session 29

Twenty-second Day, Tuesday, 18 December 1945,

Morning Session 66
Afternoon Session 99

Twenty-third Day, Wednesday, 19 December 1945,

Morning Session 132
Afternoon Session 161

Twenty-fourth Day, Thursday, 20 December 1945,

Morning Session 194
Afternoon Session 228

Twenty-fifth Day, Wednesday, 2 January 1946,

Morning Session 253
Afternoon Session 286

Twenty-sixth Day, Thursday, 3 January 1946,

Morning Session 308
Afternoon Session 340

Twenty-seventh Day, Friday, 4 January 1946,

Morning Session 374
Afternoon Session 407

Twenty-eighth Day, Monday, 7 January 1946,

Morning Session 440
Afternoon Session 475

Twenty-ninth Day, Tuesday, 8 January 1946,

Morning Session 506
Afternoon Session 539
 TWENTY-FIRST DAY
Monday, 17 December 1945

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): I have

four announcements to make on behalf of the Tribunal. I will read
those announcements now and they will be posted upon the board
in the defendants' counsel's Information Center in German as soon
as possible.
The first announcement is this:
The attention of the Tribunal has been drawn to publications
in the press of what appear to have been interviews with some of
the defendants in this case, given through the agency of their
counsel. The Tribunal considers it necessary to state with the
greatest emphasis that this is a procedure which cannot and will
not be countenanced. Therefore, counsel are warned that they
should observe the highest professional standards in such matters
and should not use the opportunity afforded to them of conferring
freely with their clients to act in any way as intermediaries
between the defendants and the press, and they must exercise the
greatest professional discretion in making any statement on their
own behalf.
The Tribunal recognizes that in a trial of this kind, where the
public interest is world-wide, it is in the highest degree important
that all those who take part in the trial in any capacity whatever
should be aware of their responsibility to see that nothing is done
to detract from the proper conduct of the proceedings.
The press of the world is rendering a very great service in
giving publicity to the proceedings of the Tribunal, and the
Tribunal feels that it may properly ask for the co-operation of all
concerned to avoid anything which might conflict with the impartial
administration of justice.
The second announcement that I have to make is this:
The Tribunal understands that the counsel appointed under
Article 9 of the Charter are in doubt whether they have been
appointed to represent, the groups and organizations charged in the
Indictment as criminal or to represent individual applicants who
have applied to be heard under the said article.
The Tribunal directs that counsel represent the groups and
organizations charged, and not the applicants. As the Tribunal has

1
17 Dec. 45

already directed, counsel will be entitled to call as witnesses

representative applicants and may also call other persons whose
attendance may be ordered by the Tribunal. Application to call
any witness must be made in the ordinary way. The evidence of
such witnesses and the arguments of counsel must be confined to
the question of the criminal nature of the group or organization.
Counsel will not be entitled to call evidence or to discuss any
question as to the individual responsibility of particular applicants,
except in so far as this may bear upon the criminal character of
the organizations. Counsel will be permitted, as far as possible,
to communicate with applicants in order to decide what witnesses
they wish to apply to call.
The third announcement is this:
The Chief Prosecutor for the United States has requested the
Tribunal to make a change in its formal order which provided
that only such portions of documents which are read in court would
be admitted as evidence. In order to meet the needs, so far as
possible, of the members of the Tribunal, of the Prosecution, and
of counsel for the defendants to have before them all the evidence
in the case, the Tribunal, having carefully considered the request,
makes the following order:
All documents may be filed in court. The Tribunal shall only
admit in evidence, however:
1. Documents or portions of documents which are read in court;

2. Documents or portions of documents which are cited in court,

on the condition that they have been translated into the respective
languages of the members of the Tribunal for their use and that
sufficient numbers in German are filed in the Information Center
for the use of Defense Counsel.
This does not apply to the documents of which the Court will
take judicial notice, in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter;
and the Prosecution and the defendants will be at liberty to read
those documents or to refer to them without reading them.
Trial briefs and document books may be furnished to the
Tribunal if sufficient copies thereof are, at the same time, filed
for Defense Counsel in the Information Center. As far as possible,
these should be furnished in advance of their introduction in court.
In order to permit the Interpretation and Translation Division to
make translations in time, it is suggested that all documents be
submitted to the division at least 5 days before they are to be
offered in evidence.
This is the fourth announcement:
The Tribunal has passed upon a number of applications for
witnesses. Some have been granted, subject
of these to their
evidence being relevant. Some have been declined. And in some

2
 17 Dec. 45

cases orders have been made that the witness be alerted; that
is to say, that if he can be located, he be advised to hold himself
in readiness to come here as a witness, if the application is granted.
It the desire of the Tribunal to secure for the defendants
is
those witnesses who are material and relevant to their defense. To
prevent the unnecessary prolonging of the Trial, however, it is
clear that the witnesses whose testimony is irrelevant or merely
cumulative should not be summoned. At the conclusion of the
Prosecution's testimony, the Tribunal shall hear from defendants'
counsel as to which of the witnesses granted or alerted they think
necessary to bring here to testify. At that time, the Tribunal may
hear from them further as to any witnesses that have been
declined, if in view of the case, it then appears to the Tribunal
that the testimony of such witnesses is material and not cumulative.
Counsel appearing for any defendant may question any other
defendant as to any relevant matter, and may interrogate him as
a witness for that purpose. If the other defendant takes the stand
in his own behalf, the right shall be exercised at the conclusion
of his testimony.
Examination of witnesses called by other defendants: The same
person has been asked as a witness by a number of defendants
in some cases. It is only necessary that such witness be called to
the stand once. He may then be interrogated by counsel for any
defendant as to any material matter.
That is all.

I call on counsel for the United States.

CAPTAIN SAMUEL HARRIS (Assistant Trial Counsel for the
United States): May it please the Tribunal, we are resuming the
presentation of evidence of the conspirators' plans for German-
ization and spoliation.
The next general subject upon which we propose to introduce
evidence is the conspirators' plans for the spoliation and
Germanization of the Soviet Union.
As Mr. Alderman has shown, the invasion of the Soviet Union
was the culmination of plans meticulously laid by the conspirators.
We wish now to introduce evidence upon the conspirators' plans
for the exploitation and Germanization of the Soviet Union after
their anticipated conquest. The Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet
Union will demonstrate what the execution of these plans meant
in terms of human suffering and misery. We submit that the few
exhibits which we propose to offer at this time will show the
following:
1. The conspirators planned to remove to Germany all foodstuffs

and raw materials from the south and southeast of the Soviet Union
over and above the needs of the Nazi invading forces and the

3
17 Dec. 45

absolute minimum
necessary to supply the bare needs of the people
in these particular regions,who produced the materials which were
to be removed to Germany. This region had previously supplied
the northern area of the Soviet Union, which the conspirators called
the forest zone. The latter zone embraced some of the leading
industrial areas of the Soviet Union, including Moscow and
Leningrad.
2. They deliberately and systematically planned to starve
millions of Russians. Starvation was to be accomplished by the
following means:
a. As indicated under point 1, products from the south and
southeast of the Soviet Union, which ordinarily were sent to the
industrial regions of the north, were to be forcibly diverted to
Germany. Moreover, all livestock in the industrial regions was to
be seized for use by the Wehrmacht and the German civilian
population. The necessary consequence was that the population of
the northern regions would be reduced to starvation.
b. They established the following order of priority in which
food produced by the Russians would be allocated:
First, the combat troops; second, the remainder of troops in
enemy territory; third, troops stationed in Germany; fourth, the
German civilian population; and lastly, the population of the
occupied countries.
Thus even Russians in the food surplus area of the Ukraine,
who were not essential to the production of products for the
German war machine, were to be systematically starved.
3. They planned the permanent destruction of all industry in

the northern area of the Soviet Union in order that the remnants
of the Russian population would be completely dependent upon
Germany for their consumer goods.
4. They planned to incorporate a part of Galicia and all of

the Baltic countries into Germany and to convert the Crimea, an

area north of the Crimea, the Volga territory, and the district
around Baku into German colonies.
I now turn to the specific items of proof.
I first evidence Document Number EC-472, Exhibit
offer in
Number USA-315. This document is offered for the particular
purpose of showing the status and functions of the Economic Staff
East, Group La. The exhibit which we shall next offer in evidence
was prepared by this organization. Document Number EC-472 is
a directive issued by Defendant Göring's office for "The Operation
of the Economy in the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories." It is
the second edition and it is dated Berlin, July 1941. The first
edition was obviously published some time before July 1941. The
document was found among the captured OKW
files at Fechenheim.

4
 17 Dec. 45

Under this directive, Defendant Goring established the Economic

Executive Staff East, which was directly responsible to him, and
under it created the Economic Staff East. The Economic Staff East,
in turn, was subdivided into four groups: The Chief of the Economic
Staff, Group La, Group W, and Group M. I now quote from Page 2,
lines 7-9 of the English text; in the German text it is at Page 7,
lines 7-9. I quote:
"Group La. Sections for nutrition and agriculture, allotment
of agricultural products, provision of food supplies for
all
the Army, in accordance with the competent army services."
next offer in evidence Document Number EC-126, which is
I
Exhibit Number USA-316. This is a report dated 23 May 1941,
which was before the invasion of the Soviet Union. It was found
among the captured files of the OKW. It is entitled, "Economic
Policy Directives for Economic Organization East, Agricultural
Group." It was prepared by the Economic Staff East, Group La,
the Agricultural Group, which as shown by the exhibit introduced
a moment ago, was an important part of the organization which
Defendant Goring established to formulate plans for the economic
administration of Russia.
The underscoring in the English text merely reflects the under-
scoring in the original.
The document begins by a recitation of facts pertaining to the
production of agricultural products in the Soviet Union. It states
that the grain surplus of Russia is determined by the level of
domestic consumption and that this fact affords the basis upon
which the planners must predicate their actions and economic
policy. I now quote from the sixth and seventh paragraphs of
Page 2 of the English text. The German text is the last three lines
of Page 3 and the first five lines of Page 4. I quote:
"The surplus territories are situated in the black soil district
(that is in the southand southeast) and in the Caucasus. The
deficit areasare principally located in the forest zone of the
North (podsol-soil district). Therefore, an isolation of the
black soil areas will in any case place greater or lesser
surpluses in these regions at our disposal. The consequences
will be cessation of supplies to the entire forest zone,
including the essential industrial centers of Moscow and
Leningrad."
Next, I quote from the last 11 lines of Page 2 and all of Page 3
of the English text. The German text begins in the middle of
line 6 of Page 5 and continues through to line 29 of Page 6. I quote:
"This" —the cessation of supplies
— "means:
"1. All industry in the deficit area, particularly the manufac-
turing industries in the Moscow and Leningrad regions as

5
17 Dec. 45

well as the Ural industrial regions will be abandoned. It

may be assumed that these regions today absorb an annual
5 to 10 million tons from the food production zone.
"2. The Trans-Caucasian oil district will have to be excepted,
although it is a deficit area. This source of oil, cotton,
manganese, copper, silk, and tea must continue to be supplied
with food in any case, for special political and economic
reasons.
"3. No further exception, with a view to preserving one or
the other industrial region or industrial enterprise, must be
permitted.
"4. Industry can only be preserved insofar as it is located in
the surplus region. This applies, apart from the above-
mentioned oil field regions in the Caucasus, particularly to
the heavy industries in the Donets district (Ukraine). Only
the future will show to what extent it will prove possible to
maintain in full these industries, and in particular the
Ukrainian manufacturing industries, after the withdrawal of
the food surplus required by Germany.
"The following consequences result from this situation, which
has received the approval of the highest authorities, since it
is in accord with the political tendencies (preservation of the
Little Russians, preservation of the Caucasus, of the Baltic
provinces, of White Russia, to the prejudice of the Great
Russians) :

"I. For the forest zone:

"a) Production in the forest zone (the food-deficit area) will
become 'naturalized,' similar to the events during the World
War and the Communist tendencies of the war, and so forth
— namely, agriculture in that territory will begin to become
a mere 'home production.' The result will be that the
planting of products destined for the market, such as flax
and hemp in particular, will be discontinued; and the area
used therefor will be taken over for products for the
producer (grain, potatoes). Moreover, discontinuance of fodder
deliveries to that area will lead to the collapse of the dairy
production and of pig-producing in that territory,
"b) Germany is not interested in the maintenance of the
productive power of these territories, except for supplying
the troops stationed there. The population, as in the old
days, will utilize their land for growing their own food. It
is useless to expect grain or other surpluses to be produced.
Only after many years can these extensive regions be
intensified to an extent that they might produce genuine
surpluses. The population of these areas, in particular the

6
 17 Dec. 45

urban population, will have to face most serious distress from

famine. It will be necessary to divert the population into
the Siberian spaces. Since rail transport is out of the
question, this too, will be an extremely difficult problem,
"c) In this situation, Germany will only draw substantial
—
advantages by quick, non-recurrent seizure that is, it will
be vitally necessary to make the entire flax harvest
available for German needs, not only the fibers but also
the oleaginous seeds.
"It will alsobe necessary to utilize for German purposes the
livestock which has no fodder base of its own that is, it —
will be necessary to seize livestock holdings immediately and
to make them available to the troops, not only for the
moment but in the long run, and also for exportation to
Germany. Since fodder supplies will be cut off, pig and
cattle holdings in these areas will of necessity drastically
decline in the near future. If they are not seized by the
Germans at an early date, they will be slaughtered by the
population for their own use, without Germany getting
anything out of it."
That is the end of that particular quotation. Our next quotation
isfrom the first paragraph of Page 4 of the English text. The
German text is at Page 7, the last two words of line 26 down
to the beginning of line 31:
"It has been demanded by the Führer that the reduction of
the meat ration should be ended by fall. This can only be
achieved by the most drastic seizure of Russian livestock
holdings, particularly in areas which are in a favorable
transport situation in relation to Germany."
In the interests of expedition, Your Honors, I am omitting some
sections from this last exhibit, which I had originally intended
to quote.
I skip now to line 29 of Page 4 of the English text, beginning
with the underscored words "in the future" and quote to line 48.
In the German text it is at Page 8, third line from the bottom,
continuing' to line 17 of Page 9:

"In the future, southern Russia must turn its face towards
Europe. Its food surpluses, however, can only be paid for if
it purchases its industrial consumer goods from^Germany or

Europe. Russian competition from the forest zone must,

therefore, be abolished.
"It follows from all that has been said that the German
administration in these territories may well attempt to
mitigate the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly
will take place and to accelerate the return to primitive

7
17 Dec. 45

agricultural conditions. An attempt might be made to

intensify cultivation in these areas by expanding the acreage
under potatoes or other important food crops giving a high
yield.However, these measures will not avert famine. Many
tens of millions of people in this area will become redundant
and will either die or have to emigrate to Siberia. Any
attempt to save the population there from death by starvation,
by importing surpluses from the black-soil zone, would be at
the expense of supplies to Europe. It would reduce
Germany's staying power in the war and would undermine
Germany's and Europe's power to resist the blockade. This
must be clearly and absolutely understood."
I next quote from Page 5, lines 18 to 30 of the English text.
The German text is at Page 12, lines 1 to 11.

"I. Supplies for the Army:

"Germany's food situation in the third year of war demands,
imperatively, that the Wehrmacht, in all its provisioning,
must not live off Greater German territory or that of
incorporated or friendly areas from which this territory
receives imports. This minimum aim, the provisioning of the
Wehrmacht from enemy territory in the third year and if
necessary in later years, must be attained at any price. This
means that one-third of the Wehrmacht must be fully
provisioned by French deliveries to the army of occupation.
The remaining two- thirds (and even slightly more in view of
the present size of the Wehrmacht) must without exception
be provisioned from the Eastern areas."
I now
quote from Page 8 of the English text, the last nine
lines. The German text is at Page 18, lines 15 to 22:
Thus it is not important, under any circumstances, to
((

preserve what has existed; but what matters is a deliberate

turning away from the existing situation and introducing
Russian food resources into the European framework. This
will inevitably result in an extinction of industry as well
as a large part of the people in what so far have been the
food-deficit areas."

It is impossible to state this alternative in sufficiently hard and

severe terms.
#
My next quotation is from the first 10 lines of Page 9 of the
English text. The German text is at Page 19, lines 11 to 20:

"Our problem is not to replace intensive food production in

Europe through the incorporation of new space in the East,
but to replace imports from overseas by imports from the
East. The task is two-fold:

8
 17 Dec. 45

"1. We must use the Eastern areas for overcoming the food
shortages during and after the war. This means that we
must not be afraid of drawing upon the capital substance of
the East. Such an intervention is much more acceptable from
the European standpoint than drawing upon the capital
substance of Europe's agriculture."
Finally, I quote from the remainder of Page 9 to the end oi
the penultimate paragraph of the English text. The German text
appears at lines 24 to 31 of Page 19:
"2. For the future New Order, the food-producing areas in
the East must be turned into a permanent and substantial
complementary source of food for Europe, through intensified
cultivation and resulting higher yields.
"The first-named task must be accomplished at any price,
even through the most ruthless cutting down of Russian
domestic consumption, which will require discrimination
between the consuming and producing zones."
It is submitted, Your Honors, that this document discloses, on
its face, a studied plan to murder millions of innocent people
through starvation. It reveals a program of premeditated murder
of millions of innocent people through starvation. It reveals a
program of premeditated murder on a scale so vast as to stagger
the human imagination. Major Elwyn Jones, of the British
Delegation, will subsequently show that this plan was, in effect,
the logical culmination of general objectives clearly announced by
Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf. Each defendant in the box was fully
aware of these general objectives when he committed the acts
with which he is charged.
I next introduce in evidence a document no less damaging than
the one I have just quoted. This document is Number L-221, which
is Exhibit Number USA-317. This is a top-secret memorandum,
dated 16 July 1941, of a conference at the Fiihrer's headquarters,
concerning the war in the East. It seems to have been prepared
by Defendant Bormann because his initials appear at the top of
Page 1. It was captured by the United States Counter-intelligence
branch. The text of the memorandum indicates that the conference
was attended by Hitler, Lammers, and Defendants Goring, Keitel,
.

Rosenberg, and Bormann.

The exhibit is particularly important for the light it throws
upon the conspirators' plans to germanize conquered areas of the
Soviet Union. It is important also for its disclosure of the utterly
•

fraudulent character of the whole Nazi propaganda program. It

shows how the conspirators sought to deceive the entire world;
how they pretended to pursue one course of action when their
aims and purposes were to follow precisely the opposite course.

9
17 Dec. 45

I quote from Page 1 of the English text, beginning at

first
line 14 ofPage 1 and continuing through to line 22 of Page 2.
The German text is at Page 1, beginning with the last paragraph
and continuing through to line 19 of Page 3. I quote:
"A. Now it was essential that we did not publicize our aims
before the world, also there was no need for that; but the
main thing was that we ourselves knew what we wanted.
By no means should we render our task more difficult by-
making superfluous declarations. Such declarations were
superfluous because we could do everything wherever we
had the power, and what was beyond our power we would
not be able to do anyway.
"What we told the world about the motives for our measures
ought to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We
ought to act here in exactly the same way as we did in the
cases of Norway, Denmark, Holland, .and Belgium. In these
cases, too, we did not publish our aims; and it was only
sensible to continue in the same way.
"Therefore, we shall emphasize again that we were forced
to occupy, administer, and secure a certain area; it was in
the interest of the inhabitants that we provided order, food,
traffic, and so forth, hence our measures. Nobody shall be
able to recognize that it initiates a final settlement. This
—
need not prevent our taking all necessary measures shooting,
desettling, et cetera —
and we shall take them.
"But we do not want to make any people our enemies
prematurely and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as
though we wanted to exercise a mandate only. At the same
time we must know clearly that we shall never leave those
countries. Our conduct therefore ought to be:
"1) To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement,
but to prepare for it only in secret; 2) To emphasize that
we are liberators.
"In particular: The Crimea has to be evacuated by all
foreigners and to be settled by Germans only.
"In the same way the former Austrian part of Galicia will
become Reich Territory. Our present relations with Romania
are good, but nobody knows what they will be at any future
time. This we have to consider, and we have to draw our
frontiers accordingly. One ought not to be dependent on
the good will of other people. We have to plan our relations
with Romania in accordance with this principle.
"On principle, we have now to face the task of cutting up
the giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able:

10
 -

17 Dec. 45

First, to dominate it; second, to administer it; and third, to

exploit it.

"The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our

front.This partisan war again has some advantage for us;
it enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us.
"Principles: Never again must it be possible to create a
military power west of the Urals, even if we have to wage
war for a hundred years in order to attain this goal. Every
successor of the Führer should know security for the Reich
exists only if there are no foreign military forces west of
the Urals. It is Germany who undertakes the protection of
this area against all possible dangers. Our iron principle is

and has to remain: We must never permit anybody but the

Germans to carry arms."
I next quote from Page 3, lines 19 to 31 of the English text.
In the German text this is at the last 13 lines of Page 5:
"The Führer emphasizes that the entire Baltic country will
have to be incorporated into Germany.
"At the same time, the Crimea, including a considerable
hinterland (situated north of the Crimea), should become
Reich territory; the hinterland should be as large as possible.
"Rosenberg objects to this because of the Ukrainians living
there.
"(Incidentally: It occurred to me several times that Rosenberg
has a soft spot for the Ukrainians; thus he desires to
aggrandize the former Ukraine to a considerable extent.)"
Departing from the text for just a moment, it may be noted
parenthetically that this was the only aspect of the program
outlined by Hitler at this meeting to which Rosenberg objected
in any way. Resuming the quotation:
"The Führer emphasizes furthermore that the Volga colony,
have to become Reich territory, also the district
too, will
around Baku; the latter will have to become a German
concession (military colony)."
Thus the program, as outlined by the conspirators at this
meeting of 16 July 1941, called for the unlawful incorporation of
a part of Galicia and all of the Baltic countries into Germany and
for the unlawful conversion of the Crimea and areas north of it,
the Volga territory, and the district around Baku, into German
colonies.
In further support of this point, I invite the attention of Your
Honors to Document Number 1029-PS, already introduced in
evidence by Mr. Alderman as Exhibit Number USA-145. This
document was not included in our document book, Your Honors,

11
17 Dec. 45

but has been read into the record by Mr. Alderman, Pages 1202
and 1203 (Volume III, Page 357). This document is entitled,
"Instructions for a Reich Commissar in Ostland."
THE PRESIDENT: Where are you quoting from?
CAPT. HARRIS: Sir, it is not included in our document book,
but it is in the record. In the German text, the original of which
we have here, it is at Pages number 2 and 3:
"The aim of a Reich Commissar for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
—
and White Ruthenia" last two words added in pencil "must —
be to strive to achieve the form of a German protectorate
and then transform the region into part of the Greater
German Reich by germanizing racially possible elements,
colonizing Germanic races, and banishing undesirable
elements. The Baltic Sea must become a Germanic inland sea
under the guardianship of Greater Germany."
I now offer in evidence Document Number EC-3, which is
Exhibit Number USA-318, which was likewise found among the
captured OKW files at Fechenheim. This document, Your Honors,
is offered as direct proof of the fact, to which we have previously
referred, that even in the food-surplus areas of the occupied regions
of the Ukraine the conspirators planned to allocate food on a basis
which left virtually nothing for those persons who were not
engaged in the compulsory production of commodities for the
German war machine. This document, as well as Document Number
EC-126, which was introduced a few moments ago, and others we
offer should, it is submitted, be read in the light of the explicit
provision in Article 52 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, that
requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from
municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of
occupation.
I first quote from our Page 3, lines 21 to 23 of the English text
of EC-3. In the German text it is Page 13, lines 1 to 3. The particular
document from which I am quote is a top-secret
about to
memorandum, dated 16 September 1941, concerning a meeting of
German military officials presided over by Defendant Goring. This
is our Page 3, Sir, lines 21 to 23 of EC-3. The memorandum was
signed by General Nagel, liaison officer between Defendant Göring's
Four Year Plan office and the OKW. I now quote:
"At this conference which was concerned with the better
exploitation of the occupied territories for the German food
—
economy, the Reich Marshal" Goring "called attention to —
the following:"
I next quote from the first two paragraphs of Page 4 of the

English text. The German text is at Page 13, the third and fourth
paragraphs:

12
 17 Dec. 45

"It is clear that a graduated scale of food allocations is

needed.
"First in line are the combat troops, then the remainder of
troops inenemy territory, and then those troops stationed
at home. The rates are adjusted accordingly. The supply of
the German non-military population follows and only then
comes the population of the occupied territories."
now quote from another portion of this document, starting at
I

Page 1 of the English text. This is a memorandum, dated

25 November 1941, relating to the general principles of economic
policy in the newly-occupied Eastern Territories as prescribed
in a conference held in Berlin on 8 November 1941. This
memorandum was also written by General Nagel. It is on the
stationery of the Liaison Staff of Supreme Headquarters, Armament
Procurement Office with the Reich Marshal Goring. .

I quote from lines 13 to the bottom of Page 1.

THE PRESIDENT: Isn't this document, the part you are going
to read now, merely cumulative to EC-126, which you have just
—
read to us that economic policy directive?
CAPT. HARRIS: It affords further proof, Sir, of the conspirators'
plans to exploit the Eastern Occupied areas. I can omit it, if you
like, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: It doesn't seem to add anything.

CAPT. HARRIS: Very well, Sir. I shall pass on to the next
point.
'
On 17 July 1941 Hitler and the Defendant Keitel issued a decree
appointing Defendant Rosenberg as the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories. This was the day following the
meeting at the Führer's headquarters, which is reported in Docu-
ment Number L-221 and from which we have already quoted
at length.
The decree appointing Rosenberg as Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories is set forth in Document Number
1997-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-319; and I offer it in
evidence. I quote from Articles 2 and 4 on Page 1 of this decree.
The German text is at Pages 27 and 28, Articles 2 and 4:
"The civil administration in the newly-occupied Eastern
Territories, where these territories are not included in the
administration of the territories bordering on the Reich or
the Government General, is subject to the Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories.
"I appoint Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister
for the Occupied Eastern Territories. He will hold office in
Berlin."

13
17 Dec. 45

Defendant Rosenberg's views well fitted him for this task as

one of the chief executioners of the conspirators' plans in the Soviet
Union. His views were plainly expressed in a speech delivered
on 20 June 1940 and are set forth in Document Number 1058-PS,
now Exhibit Number USA-147. I refer Your Honors to the first
three sentences of the English text. The German text appears on
Page 8, last five lines and continuing through to line 2 of Page 9.
In the speech Defendant Rosenberg stated, and I quote:
"The job of feeding the German people stands, this year,
without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims
on the East; and here the southern territories and the
northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the
feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason
for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people
with the products of that surplus territory. We know that
this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings."
I next offer in evidence Document Number EC-347, which is
Exhibit Number USA-320. This document was likewise found
among the captured files of the OKW. It contains a set of directives
issued by Defendant Rosenberg in his capacity as Reich Minister
for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
I quote from the first two paragraphs of Page 1 of this
full
exhibit. The German text Page 39, Paragraphs 4 and 5. In
is at
these directives Defendant Rosenberg stated, and I quote:
"The principal task of the civilian administration in the
Occupied Eastern Territories is to represent the interests
of the Reich. This basic principle is to be given precedence
in all measures and considerations. Therefore, the occupied
territories, in the future, may be permitted to have a life
of their own in a form not as yet to be determined. However,
they remain parts of the Greater German living space and
are always to be governed according to this guiding principle.
"The regulations of the Hague Convention on land warfare,
which concern the administration of a country occupied by
a foreign belligerent power, are not applicable, since the
U.S.S.R. is to be considered dissolved and, therefore, the
Reich has the obligation of exercising all governmental and
other sovereign functions in the interests of the country's
inhabitants. Therefore, any measures are permitted which the
German administration deems necessary and suitable for the
execution of this comprehensive task."
THE PRESIDENT: Hasn't that been read before?
CAPT. HARRIS: Not to my knowledge, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

14
 .

17 Dec. 45

CAPT. HARRIS: Implicit in Defendant Rosenberg's statement

that the Hague Regulations are not applicable to the Soviet Union
is the recognition by him that the conspirators' actions in the Soviet
Union flagrantly violated the Hague Regulations. The statement
indicates that the conspirators were utterly contemptuous of
applicable principles of international law.
Mr. Dodd has already introduced into evidence Document 294-PS,
now Exhibit Number USA-185, in connection with the slave labor
presentation. This document is a top-secret memorandum, dated
25 October 1942, which was found in Defendant Rosenberg's files.
It was written by Bräutigam, who was a high official in Defendant
Rosenberg's Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. I should
like to quote two additional passages from this document. I quote
from the English text Page 1, the first full paragraph, line 17 to 20.
The German text is at Page 1, the first full paragraph, lines 22 to 25.
"In the East, Germany is carrying on a three-fold war: Awar
for the destruction of bolshevism, a war for the destruction
of the Greater Russian empire, and finally a war for the
acquisition of colonial territory for colonizing purposes and
economic exploitation. . .

"With the inherent instinct of the Eastern peoples, the primi-

tive man soon found out also that for Germany the slogan:
'Liberation from Bolshevism' was only a pretext to enslave
the Eastern peoples according to her own methods."
This completes, Your Honors, the list of the exhibits with respect
to the Soviet Union which we propose to introduce at this time.
As I mentioned at the outset of this presentation, these exhibits do
not disclose all of the conspirators' plans with respect to the occupied
countries but they do, we submit, show a constant pattern, a pattern
of ruthless Germanization and destruction.
In conclusion we desire to offer in evidence two documents which
disclose that German industrialists and financiers aided and abetted
Himmler in his relentless program of Germanization, exploitation,
oppression, and destruction.
I first offer in evidence Document Number EC-454, which is
Exhibit Number USA-321. This document was found in the vaults
of the Stein Bank in Cologne among the files of the banker Baron
Kurt von Schröder, by a joint British- American team, headed
by Colonel Kellam on the British side and Captain Roth on the
American side. It is a carbon copy of a letter from Von Schröder
to Himmler, dated 27 August 1943, and bears Von Schroder's initials.
I quote it in its entirety:

"My very honorable Reichsführer: With great joy I learn of

your appointment as Reich Minister of the Interior and take

15
17 Dec. 45

the liberty to extend my heartiest congratulations to you on

assuming your new post.
"A strong hand is now very
necessary in the operation of this
department; and universally welcomed, but especially by
it is

your friends, that it was you who were chosen for this by the
Führer. Please be assured that we will always do every-
thing in our power at all times to assist you in every possible
way.
"I am pleased to inform you at this opportunity that your
circle of friends has again placed at your disposal this year
a sum slightly in excess of 1 million RM
for 'your particular
tasks.' An exact list showing the names of the contributors
will be sent to you shortly.
"Again all —
my very best wishes as well as those of my
family. I remain yours in old loyalty and esteem. Heil
Hitler! Yours truly."
I next offer in evidence —
and this is the final exhibit, Your
—
Honors Document Number EC-453, which is Exhibit Number
USA-322. This document was likewise found in the Stein Bank in
Cologne by the above-mentioned joint British-American team. It
is a carbon copy of a letter from Von Schröder to Himmler, dated
21 September 1943, bearing Von Schroder's initials, with the enclosed
list of contributors ....

THE PRESIDENT: Captain Harris, on what principle do you

suggest that either of these letters can possibly be evidence in this
case?
CAPT. HARRIS: Your Honors, at the time the motion to post-
pone the Trial as to Gustav Krupp was argued before this Tribunal,
the British Chief Prosecutor specifically stated that if it should be
the decision of the Tribunal that Krupp should be dismissed, the
evidence as to the part which he, his firm, and other industrialists
played in the preparation and conduct of the war would still be
given to this Tribunal as forming part of the general conspiracy in
which these defendants were involved, with divers other persons
not now before the Court.
The evidence we are now offering, Your Honors, is precisely of
the type indicated by Sir Hartley Shawcross. It is evidence which
goes to prove the length and breadth of the general conspiracy which
is alleged in the Indictment. Evidence showing contributions to
one of the leading conspirators, a conspirator who was in the fore-
front of the unlawful program to plunder public and private prop-
erty and to germanize a large part of the world, is, it is submitted,
relevant to this proceeding. May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

16
 17 Dec. 45

CAPT. HARRIS: I quote the last letter, EC-453, in its entirety:

"Dear Reich Leader:
"I thank you very much for your kind letter of the 14th of
this month with which you made me very happy. At the same
time I am enclosing a list with the total amount of funds
made available to you by your circle of friends and totalling
1,100,000 RM. We are very glad indeed to render some assist-
ance to you in your particular tasks and to be able to
provide some small relief for you in your still further ex-
tended sphere of duties.
"Wishing you, dear Reich Leader, the best of luck, I remain
in old loyalty and esteem. Heil Hitler! Yours very truly."
I had intended, Your Honor, to quote the names of the contrib-
utors; but I shall not, if Your Honor considers it unnecessary.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it would add to the expedition
of the Trial, do you?
CAPT. HARRIS: Very well, Sir. I am exceedingly grateful to
Your Honors for your very kind attention.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Storey.
COLONEL ROBERT G. STOREY (Executive Trial Counsel for
the United States): Do Your Honors want to proceed now before
the recess?
THE PRESIDENT: No, perhaps we had better adjourn now for
10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the remainder of the

presentation during the week will be concerning the criminal
organizations. The first to be presented now is the Leadership
Corps, including some of the illustrative crimes against the churches,
against the Jews, against the trade unions, and the operation of the
"Einsatzstab Rosenberg" concerning the looting of art treasures.
On the threshold of presenting the proof establishing the crim-
inality of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party it is in point
to restate the Prosecution's theory of this case. It is this: The Nazi
Party was the central core of the Common Plan or Conspiracy
alleged in Count One of the Indictment, a conspiracy which con-
templated and embraced the commission of Crimes against the
Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity as defined and
denounced by the Charter.
The Leadership Corps, upon the evidence, was responsible for
planning, directing, and supervising the criminal measures carried
into execution by the Nazi Party in furtherance of the conspiracy.

17
 .

17 Dec. 45

More than this, as will be shown, the members of the Leadership

Corps themselves actively participated in the commission of illegal
measures in aid of the conspiracy. In the light of the evidence to
be offered this Tribunal, the Leadership Corps may be fairly
described as the brain, the backbone, and the directive arms of the
Nazi Party. Its responsibilities are more massive and comprehen-
sive than those of the army of followers it led and directed in the
assault against the peace-loving peoples of the world. Accordingly,
upon the record made in this case and now to be enlarged upon, the
Prosecution requests this Tribunal to declare that the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party is a criminal group or organization in
accordance with Article 9 of the Charter.
At this time I should like to submit to the Tribunal the docu-
ment book supporting the brief as Exhibit USA-V.
If Your Honors please —
diverting from the manuscript during —
the recess there was placed upon your bench the document book,
which has each document marked by tab and each quoted portion
embraced by red pencil marks for the assistance of Your Honors.
In addition, we have handed up two documents that have already
been introduced in evidence: An enlarged copy of this chart, more
detailed, which Your Honors have before you, and another chart, in
photostatic form, with reference to the Leadership Corps; and both
of those will be identified later.
I now proceed to present the proof relating to the composition,
the functions, and the responsibilities and powers of the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party. First, what was the Leadership Corps . .

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS

(Counsel for the Leadership Corps
of the Nazi Party): After the last meeting I received a statement
by Justice Jackson with the proposal concerning the taking of evi-
dence and the time for the discussion of certain questions which
will arise. I cannot understand the scope of these proposals, and
must therefore ask that I may at some time speak about these points
again, if it is necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, counsel will have the opportunity
of making a full argument in answer to the argument presented on
behalf of the Prosecution.
What I understood from Mr. Justice Jackson on Friday was that
he proposed that the evidence on the question of criminal organi-
zations should be presented first, and the argument presented after-
wards.
Counsel for the organizations will, as I stated this morning, have
the opportunity of calling evidence in answer to the evidence of the
Prosecution, and will also have the opportunity of making what-
ever argument they think right in answer to the evidence and argu-
ment presented on behalf of the Prosecution.

18
 17 Dec. 45

COL. STOREY: First, what was the Leadership Corps of the

Nazi Party? What persons made up its membership? What was its
size and scope?
In considering the composition and organizational structure of
the Leadership Corps it will be convenient for the Tribunal to refer
to Document Number 2903-PS, which is this exhibit on the wall and
which was introduced by Mr. Albrecht at the opening of the Trial.
And, supplementing the chart on the wall, I now offer in evidence
Document 2833-PS, Exhibit Number USA-22, which is a chart of
the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, appearing at Page 9 of a
magazine published by the Chief Education Office of the Nazi Party,
entitled The Face of the Party. It is this little photostatic copy that
you have. Later on we expect to put the big one on the wall.
These charts and the evidence to follow show that the Leader-
ship Corps constituted the sum total of the officials of the Nazi
Party. It included the Führer at the top; the Reichsleiter, on the
horizontal line; the Reich officeholders, immediately below the —
five categories of leaders who were area commanders, called the
"Hoheitsträger" or "bearers of sovereignty." They are in the red-
lettered or red-lined boxes at the bottom. They range all the way
from the 40-odd Gauleiter in charge of large districts, down through
the intermediate political leaders, the Kreisleiter, the Ortsgruppen-
leiter, the Zellenleiter, and finally, to the Blockleiter who were
charged with looking after 40 to 60 households and what may be
best described as staff officers attached to each of the five levels
of the Hoheitsträger.
Organized upon a hierarchical basis, forming a pyramidal struc-
ture^ —
as appears from the chart which Your Honors hold in your
—
hands the principal political leaders on a scale of descending
authority were:
The Führer, at the top; the Reichsleiter, as I have mentioned,
and the main office and who was the
officeholders; the Gauleiter,
district leader, with his the Kreisleiter, who was the
staff officers;
county leader, and his staff officers; the Ortsgruppenleiter, the local
chapter leader, and his staff officers; the Zellenleiter, who was the
cell leader, and his staff officers; and then, finally, the Blockleiter,
with his staff officers.
I now offer in evidence Document 1893'-PS. This is Exhibit
Number USA-323. And this, if Your Honors please, is the Organi-
zation Book of the NSDAP, the National Socialist Party. It was
edited by the Defendant, Organization Leader of the
Reich
NSDAP—the late Defendant—Dr. Robert Ley, and it is the 1943
edition. A large part of the evidence to be offered relating to the
composition of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party will be
drawn from this primer of the Nazi organizations, and I shall later

19
 .

17 Dec. 45

quote from it. And without so requesting the Tribunal each time to
take judicial notice, I shall assume, in the absence of questions, that
it is so understood. The English translation, to which we will refer,

is Document 1893-PS.

I now proceed to offer evidence on the make-up and powers of

the Reichsleitung or the Leadership Corps, which consisted of the
Reichsleiter or Reich Leaders of the Nazi Party and they are —
shown on that long horizontal list at the top of the chart the —
Hauptämter (main offices), and the Ämter, or officeholders.
The Reichsleiter of the Party were annexed to Hitler, the highest
officeholders in the Party hierarchy. All of the Reichsleiter in the
main office and officeholders within the Reichsleitung were appointed
by Hitler and directly responsible to him.
I first paragraph of Page 4, Document 1893-PS:
quote from the
"1. The Führer appoints the following political directors:
"(a) Reichsleiter and all political directors, to include the
directors of the Womens Leagues, within the Reich Direc-
torate (Reichsleitung)."
The significant fact to be grasped is that through the Reichs-
leitung perfect co-ordination of the Party and State machinery was
guaranteed. The Party manual puts it this way and I quote from —
the fourth sentence of the third paragraph of Page 20 of that docu-
ment. You will find the page number at the bottom, Page 20. It
is a very short quotation. I quote: "In the Reichsleitung the arteries
of the organization of the German people and of the German State
merge."
If Your Honors please, there is a little different translation in
that portion in your book. To prove . .

THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, please. It begins, "It is in

the Reich Directorate where the strings of the organization of the
German people and of the German State merge." Is that it?
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, that is it. This translation says, "the
arteries of the organization of the German people and of the Ger-
man State merge."
To- prove that the Reichsleiter of the Leadership Corps included
the most powerful coalition of political overlords in Nazi Germany,
it is necessary only to put in evidence their names. The list of
Reichsleiter now to be offered in evidence will include the follow-
ing defendants now on trial before this Tribunal: Rosenberg, Von
Schirach, Frick, Bormann, Hans Frank, and the late Defendant
Robert Ley.
The evidence to be introduced will show that the Defendant
Rosenberg was the leader of an organization named for him, the
—
"Einsatzstab Rosenberg" which is not shown on this chart, if Your

20
 17 Dec. 45

Honor please —
which carried out a vast program of looting and
plunder of art treasures throughout occupied Europe.
The evidence will further show that, as representative of the
Führer for the supervision of Nazi ideology and schooling, Rosen-
berg participated in an aggressive campaign to undermine the
Christian churches and to supersede Christianity by a German
National Church founded upon a combination of irrationality,
pseudo-scientific theories, mysticism, and the discredited cult of the
racial state. It will further be shown that the late Defendant Ley,
acting as the agent of Hitler and the Leadership Corps, directed the
Nazi assault upon the independent labor unions of Germany and
that before destroying himself he first destroyed the bastion of
republican society, a free and independent labor movement, replac-
ing it by a Nazi organization, the German Labor Front, or the
BAF, and employed this organization as a means of exploiting the
German labor force in the interests of the conspiracy and to instill
Nazi ideology among the ranks of the German workers.
It will be shown that the Defendant Frick participated in the
enactment of many laws which were designed to promote the con-
spiracy in its several phases.
The Defendant Frick shares responsibility for the grave injury
done by the officials of the Leadership Corps to the concept of the
rule of law by virtue of his efforts to give the color of law and
formal legality to a large volume of Nazi legislation which was
violative of the rights of humanity, such as the Nazi discriminatory
legislation designed to degrade, stigmatize, and eliminate the Jewish
people of Germany and German-occupied Europe.
Though the Defendant Bormann physically absent from the
is
dock, the evidence as to his responsibility in directing and further-
ing the course of the Nazi conspiracy is here and expands with the
record in this case. As Chief of the Party Chancellery, right under
Hitler, the Defendant Bormann was an extremely important force
in directing the activities of the Leadership Corps. As will be
shown, a decree of January 16, 1942 provided that the participation
of the Party in all important legislation, governmental appointments,
and promotions had to be undertaken exclusively by Bormann. He
took part in the preparation of all laws and decrees issued by the
Reich authorities and gave his assent to those of the subordinate
governments.
I now refer to Document 2473-PS, Exhibit Number USA-324.
You will find that the English translation contains a list of the
Reichsleiter of the NSDAP
set forth on Page 170 of this book. It
was edited by the late Defendant and Reichsleiter for Party Organi-
zation, Robert Ley. The names of the 15 Reichsleiter in office in
1943 will be found on Pages 1 and 2 of Document 2473-PS.

21
17 Dec. 45

If the Tribunal please, I will not read all of them but will call
attention only to certain of them, as follows:
Martin Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancellery; then we skip
over to Wilhelm Frick, Leader of the National Socialist fraction in
the Reichstag, shown on the big chart over at the second box from
the end on the right; Joseph Goebbels, Reich Propaganda Leader
of the NSDAP, shown also on the same level; Heinrich Himmler,
Reich Leader of the SS, the Deputy of the NSDAP for all questions
of Germandom; Robert Ley, Reich Organization Leader of the
NSDAP and Leader of the German Labor Front; Victor Lutze, Chief
of Staff of the SA; Alfred Rosenberg, representative of the Führer
for the supervision of all mental and ideological training and edu-
cation of the NSDAP; Baldur von Schirach, Reich Leader for the
education of the youth of the National Socialist Party; and then,
finally, Franz Schwarz, Reich Treasurer of the National Socialist
Party.
The principal functions of the Reichsleiter, which we might call
directors, included the responsibility of carrying out the tasks and
missions assigned to them by the Führer or by the Chief of the
Party Chancellery, the Defendant Martin Bormann. The Reichs-
leiter were further charged with insuring that Party policies were
being executed in all the subordinate areas of the Reich. They
were also responsible for insuring a continual flow of new leader-
ship into the Party.
With respect to the function and the responsibilities of the
Reichsleiter I now quote from Page 20 of Document Number
1893-PS:
"The NSDAP represents the political conception, the political
conscience, and the political will of the German nation.
Political conception, political conscience, and political will
are embodied in the person of the Führer. Based on his
directive and in accordance with the program of the NSDAP,
the organs of the Reich Directorate directionally determine
the political aims of the German people. It is in the Reich
— —
Directorate" or Reichsleitung "that the arteries of the
organization of the German people and State merge. It is the
task of the separate organs of the Reich Directorate to main-
tain as close a contact as possible with the life of the nation
through their sub-offices in the Gau ....
"The structure of the Reich Directorate is thus that the
channel from the lowest Party office upwards shows the most
minute weaknesses and changes in the mood of the people ....
"Another essential task of the Reich Directorate is to assure
a good selection of leaders. It is the duty of the Reich Direc-
torate to see that there is leadership in all phases of life,

22
 17 Dec. 45

a leadership which is firmly tied to National Socialist ide-

ology and which promotes its dissemination with all of its
energy ....

"It is the supreme task of the Reich Organization Leader to

preserve the Party as a well-sharpened sword for the
Führer."
The domination of the German Government by the top members
of the Leadership Corps was facilitated by a circular decree of the
Reich Minister of Justice, dated 17 February 1934, which established
equal rank for the offices within the Reichsleitung of the Leadership
Corps and the Reich offices of the German Government. In this
decree it was expressly provided that, " the supreme offices of the
Reich Party Directorate are equal in rank to the supreme Reich
Government authorities". The Party Manual termed the control
exercised over the machinery of the Government by the Leadership
Corps, "the permeation of the state apparatus with the political
will of the Party".
At a later stage in this proceeding it will be shown that the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party incontestably dominated the
German State and Government. The control by the Leadership
Corps of the German Government was facilitated by uniting in the
same Nazi chieftains both high offices within the Reichsleitung and
the corresponding offices within the apparatus of the Government.
For example, as shown in Document 2903-PS, Goebbels was Reichs-
leiter in charge of Party propaganda, but he was also a cabinet
minister in charge of propaganda and public enlightenment.
Himmler held office within the Reichsleitung as head of the Main
Office for Folkdom and also was Reichsführer of the SS. At the
same time, Himmler held the governmental position of the Reich
commissioner for the consolidation of Germandom, and was the
governmental head of the German police system.
As will be shown, this personal union of high office in the Leader-
ship Corps and high governmental position in the same Nazi leaders
greatly accommodated the plan of the Leadership Corps to domi-
nate and control the German State and Government.
In addition to the Reichsleiter the Party Directorate included
about 11 Hauptämter, or main offices, and about four Ämter, or
offices. As set forth in the exhibit, the Hauptämter of the Party
included such main organizations as those for personnel, training,
technology, headed by the Defendant Speer; folkdom, headed by
Himmler; civil servants, communal policy, and the like. The Ämter,
or offices, of the Party within the Reichsleitung included the office
for foreign policy under the Defendant Rosenberg which, the evi-
dence will show, actively participated in plans for the launching

23
17 Dec. 45

of the war of aggression against Norway, the Office for Colonial

Policy, the Office for Genealogy, and the Office of Racial Policy.
As will be shown by the chart of the Leadership Corps in the
folder which Your Honors have, certain of the main offices and
offices within the Reichsleitung would appear again within the Gau-
leitung, or Gau Party Directorate, and the Kreisleitung, or Party
county directorate. It is thus shown that the Reichsleiter and the
main office and officeholders within the Reichsleitung exercised,
through functional channels through the subordinate offices on lower
regional levels, a total control over the various sectors of the national
life of Germany.
up the Gauleiter. As will be seen from this
I shall next take
organizational chart of the Nazi Party now before the Tribunal as
Exhibit Number USA-2, for Party purposes Germany was divided
into major administrative regions, Gau, which in turn were sub-
divided into Kreise (counties), Ortsgruppen (local chapters), Zellen
(cells), and in Blocks (blocks). A
Gauleiter, who was the political
leader of the Gau, was in charge of each Gau or district. Each Gau-
leiter was appointed by and was directly responsible to Hitler. I
quote from Page 18 of this same document, 1893-PS, the Organi-
zation Book of the NSDAP:
"The Gau represents the concentration of a number of Party
— —
counties" or Kreise "The Gauleiter is directly subordinate
to the Führer. ..."
"The Gauleiter bears over-all responsibility to the Führer for
the sector of sovereignty entrusted to him. The rights, duties,
and jurisdiction of the Gauleiter result primarily from the
mission assigned by the Führer, and apart from that, from
detailed directives."
The responsibility and function of the Gauleiter and his staff
officers or officeholders were essentially political, namely, to insure
the authority of the Nazi Party within his area, to co-ordinate the
activities of the Party and all its affiliated and supervised organi-
zations, and to enlarge the influence of the Party over the people
and life in his Gau generally. Following the outbreak of the war,
when it became imperative to co-ordinate the various phases of the
German war effort, the Gauleiter were given additional important
responsibilities. The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich,
which was a sort of general staff for civilian defense and the mobili-
zation of the German war economy, by a decree of 1 September 1939,
1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, page 1565, appointed about 16 Gau-
leiter as Reich Defense Commissars, concerning which I ask the Tri-
bunal to take judicial notice. Later, under the impact of mounting
military reverses and an increasingly strained war economy, more
and more important administrative functions were put % on a Gau

24
 17 Dec. 45

basis. The Party Gaue became the basic defense areas of the Reich,
and each Gauleiter became a Reich Defense Commissar by a decree
of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich of 16 No-
vember 1942, 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, page 649, of which I ask
the Tribunal to take judicial notice. In the course of the war
additional functions were entrusted to the Gauleiter, so that at the
end, with the exception of certain special matters such as police
affairs, almost all phases of the German war economy were co-ordi-
nated and supervised by them. For instance, regional authority
over price control was put under the Gauleiter as Reich Defense
Commissars, and housing administration was placed under the Gau-
leiter as Gau Housing Commissars. Toward the end of the war the
Gauleiter were charged even with the military and quasi-military
tasks. They were made commanders of the Volkssturm in their
areas and were entrusted with such important functions as the
evacuation of civilian population in the path of the advancing
Allied armies as well as measures for the destruction of vital instal-
lations.
The structure and organization of the Party Gaue were sub-
stantially repeated in the lower levels of the Reich Party organ-
ization such as the Kreise, Ortsgruppen, Zellen, and Blocks. Each of
these was headed by a political leader who, subject to the Führer
principle and the orders of superior political leaders, was a sovereign
within his sphere. The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party was in
effect a "hierarchy of descending Caesars." Each of the subordinate
Party levels, such as the Kreise, Ortsgruppen, and so on, was
organized into offices, or Ämter, dealing with the various specialized
functions of the Party. But the number of such departments and
offices diminished as the Party unit dropped in the hierarchy, so
that, while the Kreis office contained all or almost all of the offices
in the Gau (such as the deputy, the staff office leader, an organi-
zation leader, school leader, propaganda leader, press office leader,
treasurer, judge of the Party court, inspector, and the like), the
Ortsgruppe had less, and the Zellen and Blocks still fewer.
The Kreisleiter was appointed and dismissed by Hitler upon the
nomination of the Gauleiter and directly subordinate to the Gau-
leiter in the Party hierarchy. The Kreis usually consisted of a single
county. The Kreisleiter, within the Kreis, had in general the same
position, powers, and prerogatives granted the Gauleiter in the Gau.
In cities they constituted the very core of Party power and organi-
zation. I quote again from Page 17 of Document 1893-PS, Page 17
of the English translation:
"The Kreisleiter carries over-all responsibility towards the
,

Gauleiter within his zone of sovereignty for the political and

ideological training and organization of the Political Leaders,
the Party members, as well as the population".

25
17 Dec. 45

The Ortsgruppenleiter was the local chapter leader. The area of

the Ortsgruppenleiter was comprised of one or more communes, or,
in a town, a certain district. The Ortsgruppe was composed of a
combination of blocks and cells according to local circumstances,
and contained up to 1,500 households. The Ortsgruppenleiter also
had a staff of office leaders to assist him in the various functional
activities of the Party. All other Political Leaders in his area of
responsibility were subordinate to and under the direction of the
Ortsgruppenleiter. For example, the leaders of the various affiliated
organizations of the Party, within his area, such as the German
Labor Front and the Nazi organizations for lawyers, students, and
civil servants, were all subordinate to the Ortsgruppenleiter. In
accordance with the Führerprinzip, the Ortsgruppenleiter, or local
chapter leaders, were appointed by the Gauleiter and were directly
under and subordinate to the Kreisleiter.
The Party manual provides as follows with reference to the
Ortsgruppenleiter, and I quote from Pages 16 and 17 of Document

1893-PS:
"As Hoheitsträger" —bearer of sovereignty
— "he is competent
for all expressions of the Party will; he is responsible for the
political and ideological leadership and organization within
his zone of sovereignty.
"The Ortsgruppenleiter carries the over-all responsibility for
the political results of all measures initiated by the offices,
organizations, and affiliated association of the Party
"The Ortsgruppenleiter has the right to protest to the Kreis-
any measures contrary
leiter against to the interests of the
Party with regard to a united political appearance in public."
The was responsible for from four to eight blocks.
Zellenleiter
He was the immediate superior of, and had control and supervision
over, the Blockleiter. His mission and duties, according to the Party
manual, corresponded to the missions of the Blockleiter. I quote
from the last paragraph of Page 15, just one line of that same
document: "The missions of the cell-leader correspond to the mis-
sions of the block-leader."
The Blockleiter was the one Party official who was peculiarly in
a position to have continuous contact with the German people. The
block was the lowest unit in the Party pyramidal organization. The
block of the Party comprised 40 to 60 households and was regarded
by the Party as the focal point upon which to press the weight of its
propaganda. I quote from Pages 13 and 14 of this same document:
"The household is the basiccommunity upon which the block
and cell system is built. The household is the organizational
focal point of all Germans united in an apartment, and includes
roomers, domestic help, et cetera The Blockleiter has

26
 .

17 Dec. 45

jurisdiction over all matters within his zone relating to the

Movement, and is fully responsible to the Zellenleiter."
The Blockleiter, as in the case of other Political Leaders, was
charged with planning, disseminating, and developing a receptivity
to the policies of the Nazi Party among the population in his area
of responsibility. It was also the expressed duty of the Blockleiter
to spy on the population. I quote from Pages 14 and 15 of this same
document:
"It is the duty of the Blockleiter to find people disseminating
damaging rumors and to report them to the Ortsgruppe, so
that they may be reported to the respective State authorities.
"The Blockleiter must not only be a preacher and defender of
the National Socialist ideology towards the member of the
Nation and Party entrusted to his political care, but he must
also strive to achieve practical collaboration of the Party
members within his block zone. . .

"The Blockleiter remind the Party members

shall continuously
towards the people and the state.
of their particular duties
The Blockleite* keeps a list (card file) about the house-
holds In principle, the Blockleiter will settle his official
business verbally, and he will receive messages verbally and
pass them on in the same way. Correspondence will only be
used in cases of absolute necessity. The Blockleiter con-
. . .

ducts National Socialist propaganda from mouth to mouth.

He will eventually awaken the understanding of the eter-
nally dissatisfied as regards the frequently misunderstood or
wrongly interpreted measures and laws of the National
Socialist Government It is not necessary for him to fall
in with complaints and gripes about possibly obvious short-
comings of any kind in order to demonstrate solidarity
A condition to gain the confidence of all people is to maintain
absolute secrecy in all matters."
It will be shown that there were in Germany nearly half a mil-
lion Blockleiter. Large though this figure may appear, there can be
no doubt that these officials were in and of the Leadership Corps
of the Nazi Party. Though they stood at the broad base of the Party
pyramid rather than at its summit, where rested the Reichsleiter,
by virtue of this fact they were stationed at close intervals through-
out the German civil population.

THE PRESIDENT: I think, Colonel Storey, it would be an

assistance to the Tribunal if you could tell us, that is, at some time
convenient to yourself, approximately how many there were of each
of these ranks in the corps.

COL. STOREY: If Your Honor please, that is the next subject.

27
17 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. STOREY: It may be doubted that the average German
ever looked upon the face of Heinrich Himmler. But the man in
the street in Nazi Germany could not have avoided an uneasy
acquaintance with the Blockleiter in his own neighborhood. As it
is the "cop on the beat" rather than the chief magistrate of the
nation who symbolizes law enforcement to the average man and
woman, so it was the Blockleiter who represented to the people of
Germany the police state of Hitler's Germany. In fact, as may be
inferred from the evidence, the Blockleiter were "little Führers"
with real and literal power over the civilians in their domains. As
proof of the authority of the Blockleiter to exercise coercion and the
threat of force upon the civil population, I quote from Document
2833-PS, which is an excerpt from Page 7 of the magazine entitled
The Face of the Party, Document 2833-PS. It is just a line of
quotation:
"Advice and sometimes also the harsher form of education is
employed if the faulty conduct of an individual harms this
individual himself, and thus also the community."
Before I get to the numbers, I wanted to deal with the Hoheits-
träger.
THE PRESIDENT: Don't you think it is time to break off?

COL. STOREY: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Until 2 o'clock.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

28
 —
17 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

COL. STOREY: Your Honors will notice that we have substi-

tuted an enlarged chart for the photostatic copy that was introduced
in evidence this morning. Another thing I would like to call Your
Honors' attention to is the fact that the other chart, the big one,
was dated 1945 and therefore did not show the Defendant Hess
because of his flight to England in 1941, and it will be recalled that
the Defendant Hess occupied the position before Bormann directly
under the Führer in the Party organization.
We nowtake up the Hoheitsträger. The Hoheitsträger, diverting
from the shown on this chart very well; and all of those
text, is
shown in black blocks constitute the Hoheitsträger, beginning with
the Führer and going down the vertical column clear down to the
Blockleiter.
Within the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party certain of the
political leaders possessed a higher degree of responsibility than
others, were vested with special prerogatives, and constituted a
distinctive and elite group within the Party hierarchy. Those were
the so-called Hoheitsträger, or bearers of sovereignty, who repre-
sented the Party within the area of jurisdiction, which is a section
of Germany, the so-called "Hoheitsgebiet." I now quote from Page 9
of the English translation of Document 1893-PS:
"Among the political leaders, the Hoheitsträger assume a spe-
cial position.Contrary to the other political leaders who have
departmental missions . the Hoheitsträger themselves are in
. .

charge of a geographical sector known as the Hoheitsgebiet"

sectors of sovereignty.
"The Hoheitsträger are:
"The Führer, the Gauleiter, the Kreisleiter, the Ortsgruppen-
leiter, the Zellenleiter, and the Blockleiter.
"Hoheitsgebiete are:
"The Reich, the Gau, the Kreis, the Ortsgruppe, the Zelle, the
Block.
"Within their sector of sovereignty the Hoheitsträger have
sovereign political rights. They represent the Party within
their sector. The Hoheitsträger supervise all Party offices
within their jurisdiction and are responsible for the mainte-
nance of discipline."
IfYour Honors please, that is Page 9 of the English translation, if

you find it, of 1893.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
COL. STOREY: "The directors of offices, et cetera, and of the
affiliated organizations are responsible to their respective

29
 —
17 Dec. 45

Hoheitsträger ... as regards their special missions. The

Hoheitsträger are superior to all political leaders, managers,
and so forth, within their sector. As regards personal con-
sideration, Hoheitsträger are endowed with special rights ....
"The Hoheitsträger of the Party are not to be administrative
officials but are to move in a continuous vital contact with
. . .

the political leaders of the population within their sector.

The Hoheitsträger are responsible for the proper and good
supervision of all members of the nation within their
sector
"The Party intends to achieve a state of affairs in which the
."
individual German will find his way to the Party . . .

The distinctive character of the Politische Leiter constituting the

Hoheitsträger and their existence and operation as an identifiable
group are indicated by the publication of a magazine entitled Der
Hoheitsträger whose distribution was limited by regulation of the
Reich Organization Leader to the Hoheitsträger and certain other
designated Politische Leiter. I now refer to Document 2660-PS,
which I offer in evidence; and I would like to digress from the
published manuscript and call Number 2660-PS Exhibit Number
USA-325. I would like to exhibit this book to Your Honors. This
is the book itself and it is for the Hoheitsträger, with a very limited
distribution, and I quote from the inside cover of this magazine
—
which reads as follows it is right in the beginning:
"Der Hoheitsträger, the contents of which is to be handled
confidentially, serves only for the orientation of the competent
leaders. It may not be loaned out to other persons."
Then follows a list of the Hoheitsträger and other political
leaders authorized to receive the magazine. The magazine states,
in addition, that the following are entitled to receive it I would —
like to emphasize the ones to receive it:

"Commandants, unit commanders, and 'Ordensburg' members;

The Reich, Shock Troop, and Gau speakers of the NSDAP;
the Obergruppenführer and Gruppenführer of the SA, the SS,
the NSFK"— which is the Flying Corps— "and the NSKK"
—
the Party Motor Corps "Obergebietsführer and Gebiets-
—
führer of the HJ" that is the Hitler Jugend.
The fact that this magazine existed, that it derived its name
from the commanding officers of the Leadership Corps, that it was
distributed to the elite of the Leadership Corps, in other words, that
a house bulletin was circulated down the command channels of the
Leadership Corps is probative of the fact that the Leadership Corps
of the Nazi Party was a group or an organization within the meaning
of Article 9 of the Charter.

30
 17 Dec. 45

An examination of the contents of the magazine Der Hoheits-

träger reveals a continuing concern by the Leadership Corps of the
Nazi Party in measures and doctrines which were employed through-
out the course of the conspiracy charged in the Indictment. I shall
not trouble the Tribunal nor encumber the record by offering in
evidence exhaustive enumeration of these matters; but it may serve
to clarify the plans and policies of the inner elite of the Leadership
Corps by indicating that a random sampling of articles published
and policies advocated in the various issues of the magazine from
February 1937 to October 1938 included the following:
Slanderous anti-Semitic articles, attacks on Catholicism and the
Christian religion and the clergy; the need for motorized armament;
the urgent need for expanded Lebensraum and colonies; persistent
attacks on the League of Nations; the use of the block and cell in
achieving favorable Party votes, the intimate association between
the Wehrmacht and the political leadership; the racial doctrines of
Fascism, the cult of leadership; the role of the Gaue, Ortsgruppen,
and Zellen in the expansion of Germany; and related matters all of
which constituted elements and doctrinal techniques in the carrying
out of the conspiracy charged in the Indictment.
The were organized according to the leadership
political leaders
principle. quote from the fourth paragraph of Page 2 of Docu-
I
ment 1893-PS, at the bottom of the page, and top of Page 3:
"The basis of the Party organization is the Führer idea. The
public is unable to rule itself either directly or indirectly
All political leaders stand as appointed by the Führer and
are responsible to him. They possess full authority toward
the lower echelons. . Only a man who has gone through the
. .

school of subordinate functions within the Party has a claim

to the higher Führer offices. We can only use 'Führer' who
have served from the ground up. Any political leader who
does not conform to these principles is to be dismissed or to
be sent back to the lower offices, as Blockleiter, Zellenleiter,
for further training. The political leader is not an office
worker but the political deputy of the Führer .... With the
political leader we are building the political leadership of the
State .... The type of the political leader is not characterized
by the office which he represents. There is no such thing as a
political leader of the NSBO, et cetera, but there is only the
political leader of the NSDAP."
Each political leader was sworn in yearly. According to the
Party manual the wording of the oath was as follows; and I quote
from the second paragraph on Page 3, Document 1893-PS:
"I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler; I pledge uncon-
ditional obedience to him and the Führer appointed by him."

31
17 Dec. 45

The Organization Book of the NSDAP also provides, and I quote

from Page 3, Paragraph 4, of the same document:
"The political leader is inseparably tied to the ideology and
the organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his
death or with his expulsion from the National Socialist com-
munity."
Appointment of political leaders:
With respect to the appointment of the political leaders con-
stituting the Leadership Corps of the Party, I quote from Page 4
of the Organization Book, which is Document 1893-PS:
"1. The Führer appoints the following political leaders:
u
a) Reichsleiter and all political leaders within the Reichs-
— —
leitung" Reich Party Directorate "including women's lead-
ers; b) Gauleiter, including the political leaders holding offices
in the Gauleitung" — Gau Party Directorate — "including Gau
women's leaders; c) Kreisleiter. ... »

"2. The Gauleiter appoints:

"a) The political leaders and women's leaders within the Gau
Party Directorate . b) the political leaders and the direc-
. .

tors of women's leagues in the Kreis Party Directorate;

c) Ortsgruppenleiter.
"3. The Kreisleiter appoints the political leaders and the
directors of the women's leagues of the Ortsgruppen including
"
the block and cell leaders
The power of Hoheitsträger to call upon other Party formations:
The Hoheitsträger among the Leadership Corps were entitled
to call upon and utilize the various Party formations as necessary
for the execution of the Nazi Party policies.
The Party manual provides, with respect to the power and
authority of the Hoheitsträger to requisition the services of the
—
SA and I quote from Page 11 of this same Document 1893-PS:
"The Hoheitsträger is responsible for the entire political
appearance of the Movement within this zone. The SA leader
of that zone is tied to the directives of the Hoheitsträger in
that respect .... The Hoheitsträger is the ranking represent-
ative of the Party to include all organizations within his
zone. He may requisition the SA located within his zone from
the respective SA leader if they are needed for the execution
of a political mission. The Hoheitsträger will then assign the
mission to the SA .... Should the Hoheitsträger need more
SA for the execution of a political mission than is locally
available, he then applies to the next higher office of sover-
eignty which, in turn, requests the SA from the SA office in
his sector."

32
 —
17 Dec. 45

According to the Party manual, the Hoheitsträger had the same

authority to call upon the services of the SS and NSKK as they
possessed with respect to the SA.
With respect to the authority of the Hoheitsträger to call upon
the services of the Hitler Youth (the HJ), the Party manual states,
and I quote from Page 11, the last paragraph of that translation:
"The political leader has the right to requisition the HJ"
—
that is the Hitler Jugend "in the same manner as the SA
for the execution of a political action ....
"In appointing leaders of the HJ the office of the HJ must
. . .

procure the approval of the Hoheitsträger of its zone. This

means that the Hoheitsträger can prevent the appointment of
leaders unsuited for the leadership of youth. If his approval
has not been procured, an appointment may be cancelled if he
so requests."
An example of the use of the Party formations at the call of
the Leadership Corps of the Party is provided by the action taken
by the Reichsleiter for Party Organization of the National Socialist
Party, Dr. Robert Ley, leading to the deliberate dissolution of the
Free Trade Unions on 2 May 1933. I quote from Document 392-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-326, which is a copy of the directive issued
by the Defendant Ley on 21 April 1933, reproduced on Pages 51-52 •

of the Social Life in New Germany by Professor Müller. In this

directive the late Defendant Ley directed the employment of the
SA and the SS in the occupation of trade unions and for taking trade
union leaders into protective custody. I now quote from Paragraph 6
of Page 1 of Document 392-PS. It is the third and fourth paragraph
from the bottom of the page:
"SA as well as SS are to be employed for the occupation of
trade union properties and for the taking of personalities, who
come into question, into protective custody.
"The Gauleiter is to proceed with his measures on a basis of
the closest understanding with the competent regional cell
director."
I also quote from the second paragraph of Page 2 of that same
document which reads, quoting:
"The following are to be taken into protective custody: All
trade union chairmen, the district secretaries and the branch
directors of the 'Bank for Workers, Employees, and Officials,
Incorporated,' included."
I now offer in evidence Document 2474-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-327, which is a copy of a decree issued by the Defendant
Hess as Deputy of the Führer, dated 25 October 1934, which under-
writes the authority" of the Hoheitsträger with respect to Party

33
17 Dec. 45

formations. I quote from the numbered Paragraphs 1, 5, and 6

of Page 1 of —
Document 2474-PS which reads as follows Page 1
of the English translation:
"The political leadership within the Party and its political
representation towards all offices, state or others which are
outside of the Party, lie solely and exclusively with the
— —
Hoheitsträger" bearers of sovereignty "which is to say with
me, the Gauleiter, Kreisleiter, and Ortsgruppenleiter
"The departmental workers of the Party organizations, such
as Reichsleiter, office directors, et cetera, as well as the
leaders of the SA, SS, HJ, and the subordinate affiliations,
may not enter into binding agreements of a political nature
with State and other offices except when so authorized by
their Hoheitsträger.
"In places where the territories of the units of the SA, SS,
HJ, and the subordinate affiliations do not coincide with the
zones of the Hoheitsträger, the Hoheitsträger will give his
political directives to the ranking leader of each unit within
his zone of sovereignty."
was the official policy of the Leadership Corps to establish
It
close and co-operative relations with the Gestapo. The Tribunal
will recall that the head of the German Police and SS, Himmler,
was a Reichsleiter on the top level of the Leadership Corps. Without
offering in evidence a decree issued by the Defendant Bormann as
Chief of Staff of the Deputy of the Führer, dated 26 June 1935,
I ask the Court to take judicial knowledge; and I quote:

"In order to effect a closer contact between the offices of

the Party and its organizations with the Directors of the
— —
Secret State Police," Gestapo "the Deputy of the Führer
requests that the directors of the Gestapo be invited to
attend all the larger official rallies of the Party and its
organizations."
That is from the 1935 edition, Page 143, dated the 26th June 1935,
The Decrees of the Deputy of the Führer.
With reference to the meetings and conferences among the
Hoheitsträger of the Leadership Corps, it is the contention of the
Prosecution that the members of the Leadership Corps constituted
a distinctive and identifiable group or organization. It is strongly
supported by the fact that the various Hoheitsträger were under
an absolute obligation to meet and confer periodically, not only
with the staff officers of their own staffs, but with the political
leaders and staff officers immediately subordinate to them. For
example, the Gauleiter was bound to confer with his staff officers
(such as his deputy and so forth, which included the school leader,
propaganda leader, press leader, his Gau Party judge, and so on)

34
 17 Dec. 45

every 8 to 14 days. Furthermsre, the Gauleiter was obligated to

meet with the various Gauleaders subordinate to him once every 3
months for a 3-day convention for the purpose of discussing and
clarifying Nazi Party policies and directives, for hearing basic
lectures on Party policy, and for the mutual exchange of
information pertinent to the Party's current program. The Gau-
leiter was also obligated to meet at least once a month with the
leaders of the Party formations and affiliated organizations within
his Gau area, such as the leaders of the SA, and SS, Hitler Youth,
and others. In support of these statements, I quote from Page 8
of Document 1893-PS. I don't think it is necessary to read all
of that:
"Leader conferences in the district:
"A. District Leaders."
If Your Honor please, with your permission I w£l omit the
reading of that because it was really summarized in my previous
statement. I will quote Subparagraph (d):
"(d) The bearer of sovereignty will meet at least once a
month with the leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK, HJ, as well
as the RAD and the NSFK who are within the zone, for the
purpose of mutual collaboration."
The Organization Book of the Party imposes a similar require-
ment of regular and periodical conferences and meetings upon
all the other Hoheitsträger, including the Kreisleiter, Ortsgruppen-
leiter, Zellenleiter, and Blockleiter.
The and obligatory conferences
clear consequence of such regular
and meetings by all the Hoheitsträger, both with their own staff
officers and with the political leaders and staff officers subordinate
to them, was that basic Nazi policies and directives issued by
Hitler and the leader of the Party Chancellery, the Defendant
Bormann, directly through the chain of command of the Hoheits-
träger, and functional policies issued by the various Reichsleiter
and Reich officeholders down functional and technical channels,
were certain to be notified to, received, and understood by the
bulk of the membership of the Leadership Corps.
If I may digress from my text and call attention to this chart,
you will see the dotted Unes connecting down from the Party level,
Gau level, to similar offices in the lower level.
Now I next come to the statistics relating to the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party and the evidence relating to the size of
the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. As previously shown, the
Leadership Corps comprised the sum of officials of the Nazi Party
including, in addition to Hitler and the members of the Reichs-
leitung, such as the Reichsleiter and the Reich officeholders, a
hierarchy of Hoheitsträger, which I have described, as well as the

35
17 Dec. 45

staff officers attached to the Hoheitsträger. I now offer in evidence

Document 2958-PS, Exhibit Number USA-325; and this is Issue
Number 8, 1939, of the official Leadership Corps organ Der Hoheits-
träger, similar to the one I exhibited a moment ago, and this is
for the year 1939. This shows that there were: 40 Gaue and
1 Foreign Gau, each led by a Gauleiter —that is 41; 808 Kreisleiter;
28,376 Ortsgruppenleiter; 89,378 Zellenleiter; and 463,048 Blockleiter.

However, as shown by the evidence previously introduced, the

Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party was composed not only of the
Hoheitsträger, but also of the staff officers or officeholders attached
to the Hoheitsträger. The Gauleiter, for example, was assisted by
a deputy Gauleiter, several Gau inspectors, and a staff which was
divided into main offices (Hauptämter) and offices (Ämter) including
such departments as the Gau staff office, treasury, education office,
propaganda office, press office, university teachers, communal
policy, and so forth. As previously shown, the staff office structure
of the Gau was substantially represented in the lower levels of
the Leadership Corps organization such as the Kreise, the Orts-
gruppen, and so on. The Kreise and the smaller territorial areas
of the Party were also organized into staff offices dealing with
the various activities of the Leadership Corps. But, of course, the
importance and the number of such staff offices diminished as the
unit dropped in the hierarchy; so that, while the Kreisleiter staff
contained all or most of the departments mentioned for the Gau,
the Ortsgruppe had fewer departments and the lower ones
fewer still.

Firm figures have not been found as to the total number of

staff officers, as distinguishedfrom the Hoheitsträger or political
commanders themselves, included within the Leadership Corps.
With respect to the scope and composition of the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party, the Prosecution adopts the view and
respectfully submits to this Tribunal, that in denning the limits
of the Leadership Corps, staff officers should only be included
down to and including the Kreis. Upon this basis, the Leadership
Corps of the Nazi Party did constitute the Führer, the members
of the Reichsleitung, the five levels of the Hoheitsträger, and the
staff officers attached to the 40-odd Gauleiter and the 800 or 900
Kreisleiter. Adopting this definition of the Leadership Corps, it
will be seen that the total figure for the membership of that
organization, based upon the statistics cited from the basic
handbook for Germany, amounts to around 600,000. And by
excepting the staff officers of the lower levels, as is provided in the
Indictment, and as just defined, and without prejudice to any later
individual action against those excepted, we think the figure of
around 600,000 is approximately correct.

36
 17 Dec. 45

true that this figure is based upon an admittedly limited

It is
view the membership of the Leadership Corps of
of the size of
the Nazi Party, for the evidence has shown that the Leadership
Corps, in effect, embraced staff officers attached to the subordinate
Hoheitsträger; and the inclusion of such staff officers in the
estimation of the size of the Leadership Corps, if we had so
recommended, would have been considerably enlarged so that
the final figure, if we had included staff officers to the Blockleiter,
would have been 2,000,000, in round numbers.
MR. FRANCIS BIDDLE (Member for the United States): What
reason is there for excluding them?
COL. STOREY: Forthis reason, Your Honor, a person on the
might have called on an individual laborer
last level of Blockleiter
who might have been on his staff; but he certainly did not have
the discretion that a staff leader did, for example, or the Gauleiter,
say, as a propaganda man who disseminated information down as
well as helped participate in plans and policies of the upper
organization.

The subordinate staff officers thus excluded were responsible

functionally to the higher staff officers with respect to their
particular specialty, such as propaganda, Party organization, and
so on, and to their respective Hoheitsträger with respect to discipline
and policy control and, as I mentioned, likewise such higher staff
officers participated in planning and policy and passed those policies
down through technical levels or technical channels as opposed to
command channels.
"The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party joined and participated
in the Common Plan or Conspiracy" is the next title.
The program of the Nazi Party, proclaimed by Hitler on
24 February 1920, contained the chief elements of the Nazi plan
for domination and conquest. I now quote from Document 1708-PS,
which is the Year Book for 1941, published by the Party, and
edited by the late Robert Ley. This book contains the famous
25 points of the Party which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit
—
Number USA-324. Diverting from the text I don't intend to quote
these 25 Party objectives, but only refer to a few of them, and
I quote from Page 1 of the English translation of Document
1708-PS:
Point 1:

"We demand the unification of all Germans in Greater

Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination
of peoples."
Point 2 of that program which I quote demanded unilateral
abolition of the Peace Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain:

37
17 Dec. 45

"We demand equality of rights for the German people in

respect to the other nations; abrogation of the Peace Treaties
of Versailles and St. Germain."
Point 3:

"We demand land and territory (colonies) for the sustenance

of our people and colonization by our surplus population."
Point 4:

"Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of

the race can only be one who is of German blood without
consideration of confession. Consequently, no Jew can be a
member of the race."
Point 6:

"We demand that every public office, of any sort whatsoever,

whether in the Reich, the county, or municipality, be filled
by citizens only. We combat the corrupting parliamentary
regime, office-holding only according to party inclinations
without consideration of character or abilities."
Point 22 —this is from Page 2 of the English translation of Docu-
ment 1708-PS:
"We demand the abolition of the mercenary troops and the
formation of a National Army."
—
Back to Page 1 another quotation:
"The program is the political foundation of the NSDAP and
accordingly the primary political law of the State
"All legal precepts are to be applied in the spirit of the
Party program.
"Since the taking over of power, the Führer has succeeded in
the realization of the essential portions of the Party program
from the fundamentals to the details.
"The Party program of the NSDAP was proclaimed on
24 February 1920 by Adolf Hitler at the first large Party
gathering in Munich and since that day has remained
unaltered. The National Socialist philosophy is summarized
in 25 points."
As
previously mentioned, the Party program was binding upon
the political leaders and they were under duty to support and
carry out that program.
The Party manual states, and I quote again from the middle
of Page 1 of Document 1893-PS:
"The Commandments of the National Socialists: The Führer
is always right The program be your dogma; it demands
your utter devotion to the Movement. Right is what serves
. . .

"
the Movement and thus Germany

38
 17 Dec. 45

And on Page 2 of the same document another brief quotation:

"The Leadership Corps is responsible for the complete
penetration of the German nation with the National Socialist
spirit. ..."

The oath of the political leaders to Hitler has been previously-

mentioned. In this connection the Party manual provides, and
I quote from the second paragraph on Page 3 of the same document:

"The political leader is inseparably tied to the ideology and

the organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with
his death or with his expulsion from the National Socialist
community."
While the leadership principle assured the binding nature of
program, and policies upon the entire Party
Hitler's statements,
and the Leadership Corps thereof, the leadership principle also
established the full responsibility of the individual political leader
within the province and jurisdiction of his office or position.
The leadership principle applies not only to Hitler as the
supreme leader but also to the political leaders under him and
thus permeated the entire Leadership Corps. I quote from the
middle of Page 2 of Document 1893-PS:
"The basis of the Party organization is the Führer idea
"All political leaders stand as appointed by the Führer and
are responsible to him. They possess full authority toward
."
the lower echelons. . .

The various Hoheitsträger of the Leadership Corps were, in

their respective areas, themselves Führer. I quote from the third
paragraph of Page 9 of this same document:
"Within their sector of sovereignty, the Hoheitäträger have
sovereign political rights They are responsible for the
entire political situation within their sector."
I again refer to and quote from Document 1814-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-328, which is the Party book. It is just a one-sentence
"
quotation, and it states: "The Party an Order
is of 'Führer.'
The subjugation of the entire membership of the Leadership
Corps to the fiat of the leadership principle is clearly shown in
the following passage from the Party manual; it is this same
document on Page 3:
"A anchorage for
solid the organizations within the Party
all
structure is provided and
a firm connection with the
sovereign leaders of the NSDAP is created in accordance with
the leadership principle."
Next is the subject, "The Nazi Party, directed by the Leadership
Corps, dominated and controlled the German State and Govern-
ment."

39
17 Dec. 45

The
trial brief dealing with the criminality of the Reich Cabinet
sets forth the evidence as to the identity of various ministers
comprising the Cabinet, and I shall not deal with that subject. The
presence of the Reichsleiter and other prominent members of the
Leadership Corps in the Cabinet facilitated the domination of the
Cabinet by the Nazi Party and the Leadership Corps.
And omit the next paragraph down to the law of July 14, 1933.
I

A of 14 July 1933 outlawed and forbade the formation of

law
any political parties other than the Nazi Party and made offenses
against this a punishable crime, thereby establishing the one-party
state and rendering the Leadership Corps immune from the
opposition of organized political groups. I now quote from Docu-
ment 1388-PS, that being the English translation of the "Law
against the Formation of New Political Parties" stated in Reichs-
gesetzblatt, 1933, Part I, Page 479; and I quote the first two articles
of this law, which read as follows:
"The National Socialist German Workers' Party constitutes
the only political party in Germany. Whoever undertakes to
maintain the organizational structure of another political
party or to form a new political party will be punished with
penal servitude up to 3 years or with imprisonment of from
6 months to 3 years, if the deed is not subject to a greater
penalty according to other regulations."
I will skip the next paragraph.

I now quote from Document 1398-PS, which is the English

translation of "Law to Supplement the Law for the Restoration of
the Professional Civil Service," dated 20 July 1933—1933 Reichs-
gesetzblatt, Part I, Page 518.
On 13 October 1933 "A Law
to Guarantee Public Peace" was
enacted which provided, inter alia, that the death penalty or other
severe punishment should be imposed upon any person who "under-
takes to kill ... a member of the SA or the SS, a trustee or agent
of the NSDAP out of political motives or on account of their
. . .

official activity." .

THE PRESIDENT: Where is that you were reading, 1398-PS?

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir; 1398-PS. I am in error, Sir, it is

1394-PS just previous.

THE PRESIDENT: Which article are you reading?
COL. STOREY: I am afraid I don't have the reference,
but here
is the quotation, I think it is on that one page. "A Law to
Guarantee Public Peace," and then it has to do it is Article 2, I —
—
believe Paragraph 2, Article 1.
I next refer to Document 1395-PS, which is the English trans-

lation of the Law on Security and the Unity of Party and State

40
 . —
17 Dec. 45

of 1 December and it was enacted "to secure the unity of

1933,
Party and This law provided that the Nazi Party was the
state."
pillar of the German State and was linked to it indissolubly; it
also made the Deputy of the Führer (then Hess) and the Chief of
Staff of the SA (then Röhm) members of the Reich Cabinet. I quote:
"After the victory of the National Socialist revolution the
National Socialistic German Labor Party is the bearer of the
concept of the German State and is inseparably the State. It
will be a part of the public law. Its organization will be
determined by the Führer. . .

"The Deputy of the Führer and the Chief of Staff of the SA

will become members of the Reich Government in order to
insure close co-operation of the offices of the Party and SA
with the public authorities."
This law was a basic measure in enthroning the Leadership
Corps in a position of supreme political power in Germany. For
it laid down that the Party, directed by the Leadership Corps, was

the embodiment of the State and in fact was the State. Moreover,
this law made both the Führer 's Deputy and the Chief of Staff
of the SA, which was a Party formation subject to the call of the
Hoheitsträger, Cabinet members, thus further solidifying the leader-
ship control of the Cabinet. The dominant position of the Leadership
Corps is further revealed by the provision that the Reich Chancellor
would issue the carrying-out regulations of this law in his capacity
as Führer of the Nazi Party. The fact that Hitler, as Führer of
the Leadership Corps, could promulgate rules which would have
statutory force and be published in the Reichsgesetzblatt, the proper
compilation for State enactments, is but a further reflection of the
reality of the Party's domination of the German State.
I now Document 2775-PS, which is Exhibit Number
refer to
USA-330, which the English translation of certain extracts from
is
Hitler's speeches to the 1934 and 1935 Party Congress at Nuremberg.
I quote from the second extract in Document 2775-PS, which is a

declaration by Hitler to the 1934 Party Congress and which reads

just one sentence, "It is not the State which gives orders to us, it
is we who give orders to the State."

Upon the evidence, that categorical statement of the Führer of

the Leadership Corps, affirming the dominance of the Party over
the State, cannot be refuted.
On the 30th of June 1934 Hitler, as head of the Nazi Party,
directed the massacre of hundreds of SA men and other political
opponents. Hitler sought to justify these mass murders by declaring
to the Reichstag that "at that hour I was responsible for the fate
of the German nation and the supreme judge of the German

41
 —
17 Dec. 45

people." The evidence relating to these events will be presented

at a later stage in connection with the case against the SA.
On the 3rd of July 1934 the Cabinet issued a decree describing
the murders and the massacre of 30 June 1934, in effect, as
legitimate self-defense by the State. By this law the Reich Cabinet
moved to make themselves accessories after the fact of these
murders. The domination by the Party, however, makes the
Cabinet's characterization of these criminal acts by Hitler and his
top Party leaders as state measures consistent with political reality.
I refer now to Document 2057-PS, which is the English translation
of the "Law Relating to the National Emergency Defense Measures"
of 3 July 1934, in the Reichsgesetzblatt of that year, Part I, Page 529,
and I quote the single article of that law, which reads as follows
this still has reference to the blood purge:
"The measures taken on 30 June and 1 and 2 July 1934 to
counteract attempts at treason and high treason shall be
considered as national emergency defense."
On 12 July 1934 there was enacted a law defining the function
of the Academy for refer to Document 1391-PS,
German Law. I
which is an English translation of the statute of the Academy for
German Law, 12 July 1934, 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Pages 605
and 606:
"In constant, close connection with the agencies competent
for legislation,it"—the academy— "shall further the reali-
zation of the National Socialist program in the realm of
the law."
On 30 January 1933, Hitler, the Leader of the Nazi Party and
Führer of the Leadership Corps, was appointed Chancellor of the
Reich, When President Von Hindenburg died in 1934, the Führer
amalgamated into his person the offices of Chancellor and Reich
President. I refer to Document 2003-PS, which establishes that fact,
and I do not quote. It is Reichsgesetzblatt 1934, Part I, Page 747.
Bydecree of the 20th of December 1934 Party uniforms and
institutions were granted the same protection as those of the State.
This law was entitled, "Law Concerning Treacherous Acts against
the State and Party and for the Protection of Party Uniforms."
This law imposed heavy penalties upon any person making false
statements injuring the welfare or prestige of the Nazi Party or
its agencies. It authorized the imprisonment of persons making
or circulating malicious or baiting statements against leading
personalities of the Nazi Party, and it provided punishment by
forced labor for the unauthorized wearing of Party uniforms or
symbols. I again refer to Document 1393-PS, not quoting, which
is the English translation and gives the authority.

42
 .

17 Dec. 45

Finally, by the law of 15 September 1934 the swastika flag of

the Party was made the the Reich. I refer to
official flag of
Document 2079-PS, which is the English translation of the Reich
Flag Law found in Reichsgesetzblatt 1935, Part I, Page 1145. Just
this one sentence —
the quotation, "The Reich and national flag is
the swastika flag."
The swastika was the and symbol of the Leadership Corps
flag
of the Nazi Party. By law
was made the flag of the State; a
it

recognition that the Party and its corps of political leaders were
the sovereign powers in Germany.
On 23 April 1936 a law was enacted granting amnesty for crimes
which the offender had committed "in his eagerness to fight for the
National Socialist ideals." I cite Document 1386-PS, which is the
English translation of the "Law Concerning Amnesty," Reichsgesetz-
blatt 1936, Part I, Page 378.
In furtherance of the conspiracy to acquire totalitarian control
over the German people, a law was enacted on 1 December 1936
which incorporated the entire German youth within the Hitler
Youth, thereby achieving total mobilization of the German youth.
And I Document 1392-PS, containing that law, 1936 Reichs-
cite
gesetzblatt, PartI, Page 993. The law further provided that the
task of educating the German youth through the Hitler Youth was
entrusted to the Reichsleiter of the German youth in the NSDAP.
By this law a monopoly control over the entire German youth was
placed in the hands of the top official, a Reichsleiter of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Defendant Von Schirach.
On 4 February 1938 the Führer of the Leadership Corps of the
Nazi Party, Hitler, issued a decree in which he took over direct
command of the whole German Armed Forces. I cite Document
1915-PS, 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 111. Hitler says,
"From now on, I take over directly and personally the command
of the whole Armed Forces."
By virtue of the earlier law of 1 August 1934 Hitler combined
the offices of the Reich President and the Chancellorship. In the
final result, therefore, Hitler was Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces, the Head of the German State, and the Führer of the Nazi
Party. With respect to this, the Party manual states as follows, and
I quote from Page 19 of Document 1893-PS:

"The Führer created the National Socialist German Workers'

Party. He filled it and his will, and with it he
with his spirit
conquered the power of the State on 30 January 1933. The
Führer's will is the supreme law in the Party. . .

"By authority of the law about the Chief of State of the Ger-
man Reich, dated 1 August 1934, the office of the Reich Presi-
dent has been combined with that of the Reich Chancellery.

43
17 Dec. 45

Consequently, the powers heretofore possessed by the Reich

President were transferred to the Führer, Adolf Hitler.
Through this law, the conduct of the Party and State has
been combined in one hand. By desire of the Führer, a
plebiscite was conducted on this law on 19 August 1934. On
this day, the German people chose Adolf Hitler to be their
sole leader. He is responsible only to his conscience and to
the German nation."
Adecree of 16 January 1942 provided that the Party should
participate in legislation and official appointments and promotions.
I cite as proof Document 2100-PS, which is the English translation of

a directive concerning the application of the Führer decree relating to

the Chief of the Party Chancellery, 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,
Page 35. The decree further provided that such participation should
be undertaken exclusively by the Defendant Bormann, Chief of the
Party Chancellery and Reichsleiter of the Leadership Corps. The
decree provided that the Chief of the Party Chancellery was to take
part in the preparation of all laws and decrees issued by Reich
authorities, including those issued by the Ministerial Council for
Defense of the Reich, and to give his assent to those of the Länder
—
and of the Reich governors the Länder being the German states.
All communications between the State and Party authorities, unless
within the Gau only, were to pass through Bormann's hands. This
decree is of crucial importance in demonstrating the ultimate con-
trol and responsibility imputable to the Leadership Corps for
governmental policy and actions taken in furtherance of the con-
spiracy.
On or about the 26th of April 1942 Hitler declared in a speech
that in his capacity as leader of the nation, Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces, Supreme Head of the Government, and as
Führer of the Party, his right must be recognized to compel with
all means at his disposal every German, whether soldier, judge,
State official, or Party official, to fulfill his desire. He demanded
that the Reichstag officially recognize this asserted right; and on the
26th of April 1942 the Reichstag issued a decision in which full
recognition was given to the rights of the Führer which I have just
asserted. I cite Document 1961-PS, which is the English translation
of that decision, found in 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 247.
I quote:

"At the proposal of the President of the Reichstag, on its

session of 26 April 1942, the Greater German

Reichstag has
unanimously approved of the rights which the Führer has
postulated in his speech with the following decision:
"There can be no doubt that in the present war, in which the
German people is faced with a struggle for its existence or

44
 17 Dec. 45

annihilation, the Führer must have all the rights postulated

by him which serve to further or achieve victory. Therefore,
without being bound by existing legal regulations, in his
capacity as leader of the nation, Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces, Governmental Chief and Supreme Executive
Chief, as Supreme Justice and as leader of the Party, the
Führer must be in the position to force with all means at his
—
disposal every German, if necessary whether he be a com-
mon soldier or officer, low or high,
official or judge, leading
or subordinate official of the Party, worker or employee to —
fulfill his duties. In case of violation of these duties, the
Führer is entitled, after conscientious examination, regardless
of so-called well-deserved rights, to mete out due punishment
and to remove the offender from his post, rank, and position
without introducing prescribed procedures.
"At the order of the Führer, this decision is hereby made
public. Berlin, 26 April 1942."
Hitler, himself, perhaps, best summarized the political realities
of his Germany which constituted the basis for the Prosecution's
submission that the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party and its
following effectively dominated the State. The core and crux of
the matter was stated by Hitler in his speech to the Reichstag on
20 February 1938, when he declared, in effect, that every institution
in Germany was under the direction of the Leadership Corps of the
Nazi Party.
I cite as the Prosecution's final exhibit in support of the propo-
sition that the Leadership Corps dominated the German State with
resulting responsibility, Document 2715-PS, which is the book con-
taining Hitler's speech* to the Reichstag on the 20th of February
1938, as reported in Das Archiv, Volume 47, February 1938, Pages
1441 and 1442. I quote a brief excerpt from Document 2715-PS; and
I introduce it as Exhibit USA-331:

"National Socialism has given the German people that leader-

ship which as Party not only mobilizes the nation but also
organizes it, so that on the basis of the natural principle of
selection, the continuance of a stable political leadership is
safeguarded forever. National Socialism
. . . possesses Ger-
. . .

many entirely and completely since the day when, 5 years

ago, I left the house in Wilhelmsplatz as Reich Chancellor.
There is no institution in this State which is not National
Socialist. Above all, however, the National Socialist Party in
these 5 years has not only made the nation National Socialist
but also has given itself that perfect organizational structure
which guarantees its preservation for all the future. The
greatest guarantee of the National Socialist revolution lies

45
 .

17 Dec. 45

in the complete domination of the Reich and all of its insti-

tutions and organizations, internally and externally, by the
National Socialist Party. Its protection against the world
abroad, however, lies in the new National Socialist Armed
Forces. ... In this Reich anybody who has a responsible posi-
tion is a National Socialist. Every institution of this Reich
. . .

is under the command of the supreme political leadership. . .

The Party leads the Reich politically; the Armed Forces

defend it militarily .... There is nobody in any responsible
position in this state who doubts that I am the authorized
leader of this Reich. ..."
The supreme power which the Leadership Corps exercised over
the German State and Government is pointed out by an article
published in this same authoritative magazine Der Hoheitsträger, in
February 1939. In this article, which was addressed to all Hoheits-
träger, the Leadership Corps is reminded that it has conquered the
state and possesses absolute and total power in Germany. I cite
Document 3230-PS, which is the English translation of an article
1

entitled "Fight and Order"; and I quote from this article, which
trumpets forth in what we might term as accents of Caesarism, the
battle call of the Leadership Corps in German life. I quote:
"Fight? Why
do you always talk of fighting? You have con-
quered the and if something does not please you, then
state,
just make a law and regulate it differently. Why must you
always talk of fighting? For you have every power. Over
what do you fight? Foreign politics? You have the Wehr-
—
macht it will wage the fight if fight is required. Domestic
politics? You have the law and the police which can change
everything which does not agree with y,ou."
THE PRESIDENT: Is this a good time to break off?

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir.

[A recess was taken.]

COL. STOREY: In view of the domination of the German State

and Government by the Nazi Party and the Leadership Corps
thereof as established by the foregoing and other evidence hereto-
fore recited in the previous trial briefs, it is submitted that the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party is responsible for the measures,
including the legislative enactments, taken by the German State and
Government in furtherance of the conspiracy formulated and carried
out by the co-conspirators and the organizations charged with crim-
inality in the present case.
I now skip and go to the overt acts and crimes of the Leadership

Corps. The evidence now to be presented will establish that the

46
 17 Dec. 45

membership of the Leadership Corps actively entered into a wide

variety of acts and measures designed to advance the course of the
conspiracy. The evidence will show that such participation by the
Leadership Corps in the conspiracy embraces such measures as anti-
Semitic activities, war crimes committed against members of the
Allied Forces, participation in the forced-labor program, measures
to subvert and undermine the Christian religion and persecute the
Christian clergy, the plundering and spoliation of cultural and other
property in German occupied territories in Europe, participation in
plans and measures leading to the initiation and prosecution of
aggressive war, and in general, the wide variety of measures
embracing the Crimes against the Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes
against Humanity as defined and denounced by the Charter.
The first item of evidence we have to introduce is in connection
with the participation of the Gauleiter and Kreisleiter in what the
Nazis describe as the "spontaneous uprising of the people" against
the Jews throughout Germany on 9 and 10 November 1938. We
do not intend to introduce, by diverting from the text, any evidence
formerly introduced by Major Walsh on the persecution of the Jews
but only to show the connection of a few of the Party officials in
connection with the assassination of an official of the German Em-
bassy in Paris on the 7th of November.
The evidence relating to these pogroms has been thoroughly
presented in connection with the Prosecution's evidence in other
phases of the case, particularly of the persecution of the Jews. I
shall therefore limit myself to two documents and will request the
Tribunal to recall that in the teletyped directive from SS Gruppen-
führer Heydrich, issued the 10th of November 1938 to all police
headquarters and SD districts, all chiefs of the State Police were
ordered to contact the political leaders in the Gaue and the Kreise
and to arrange with these high officials in the Leadership Corps the
organization of the so-called spontaneous demonstrations against
the Jews.
The evidence previously presented shows that pursuant to this
directive a large number of the Jewish shops and businesses were
pillaged and wrecked, synagogues set on fire, individual Jews beaten
up, and large numbers taken to concentration camps. This evidence
forcibly illustrates the employment and participation of all the
Kreisleiter and Gauleiter in illegal and inhuman measures designed
to further the anti-Semitic program which was an original and con-
tinuous objective of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party. I
simply refer again to Document 3051-PS, Exhibit Number USA-240,
and simply call Your Honors' attention to the different political
leaders that were named in that document; and I will not attempt
to read nor refer to it again.

47
 . . —
17 Dec. 45

Diverting again from the text, I want to offer at this time in

evidence . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, is it addressed to these

various ranks in the Leadership Corps?
COL. STOREY: Your Honor, I notice on the first page it is
—
addressed I am not good in German but to the State Police, to —
the SD, and to some other SD officials.
THE PRESIDENT: What has that got to do with the Leadership
Corps?
COL. STOREY: It has to do with directions to Party officials
to take part in these demonstrations. In other wqrds, through cer-
tain officials of the Leadership Corps this directive was dispatched
and directed.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you sure the State Police and SD are
any of these ranks in the Leadership Corps?
COL. STOREY: If Your Honors will refer to this original chart,
this big one, you will notice that the SA, and SS, and several of
the organizations are listed on the left-hand part of that big chart.
I think it is in the folder there on Your Honors' desk. In other
words, the close examination of that directive will show that they
were to contact different political leaders in connection with the
carrying into effect of this demonstration of the 9th and 10th of
November. That is the only purpose for which it is offered. It has
been introduced in evidence, but the reason I mention it at this
time . .

THE PRESIDENT: I can't see that it shows it. It seems to me

to be a letter from the Chief of the Security Police to all head-
quarters and stations of the State Police.
COL. STOREY: I don't have the English translation before me
at this moment, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on.
COL. STOREY: I now offer in evidence Document 3063-PS,
Exhibit USA-332. This was a report from the Chief Party Judge
Buch to the Defendant Goring, dated the 13th of February 1939,
concerning actions taken by the Supreme Party Court for excesses
in connection with the demonstrations of 9 and 10 November 1938.
I don't believe this, if Your Honors please, is in the document book
3063-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is.

COL. STOREY: I beg your pardon. I had forgotten whether it

is in here. I quote just a brief portion of it:

"When all the synagogues burned down in one night it must

have been organized in some way and can only have been
organized by the Party."

48
 .

17 Dec. 45

It is a long document, and that is the only portion I quote. I don't

have the reference to it.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What page?

COL. STOREY: I am sorry, Sir, I don't have the reference book.
THE PRESIDENT: On Page 1. As you say you don't have the
document before you, there much use referring you to it.
isn't

COL. STOREY: I gave the German text over there, Sir.

"When all the synagogues burned down in one night it must
have been organized in some way, and can only have been
organized by the Party."
The first paragraph, Page 7.

Now turn to illustrate the crimes against the Allied airmen.

I
The members of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party partici-
pated in and shared the responsibility for the murder, beating, and
ill-treatment of Allied airmen who landed in German or German-
controlled territory. Many Allied airmen who bailed out of disabled
planes over Germany were not treated as prisoners of war but were
beaten and murdered by German civilians with the active condo-
nation, indeed at the instigation, of some of the Leadership Corps
of the Nazi Party. Such a course of conduct by the Leadership .

Corps represented a flagrant and deliberate violation by the German

Government of its obligations under the Geneva Convention to pro-
tect prisoners of war against acts of violence and ill-treatment.
As shown by Document 2473-PS necessary to turn to — it is
that —which is a list of the Reichsleiter of the Nazi
Party appearing
in the National Socialist Yearbook of 1943 and by Document
2903-PS, which is this large chart, Heinrich Himmler was a Reichs-
leiter of the Nazi Party and thus a top official in the Leadership
Corps by virtue of his positions as Reichsführer of the SS and Dele-
gate for German Folkdom. I now offer in evidence an original order
signed by Himmler, Document R-110 as Exhibit Number USA-333.
It is dated 10 August 1943, and I quote:

"It is not the task of the police to interfere in clashes between

Germans and English and American terror fliers who have
bailed out."
This order was transmitted in writing to all senior executive SS
and Police officers, and orally to their subordinate officers and to
all Gauleiter. As shown in Document 2473-PS and by the chart,
Joseph Goebbels . .

THE PRESIDENT: I was only thinking that the police are not
part of the Leadership Corps, are they?
COL. STOREY: But Himmler, if Your Honor pleases, combined
the offices himself of the Reichsführer of the SS and head of the

49
17 Dec. 45

German police. He was an officer of the State; he was an officer

of the Party; and he issued this to officials of the Leadership Corps.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And your point is, this order of
Himmler's would be proof against the 600,000 members that you
have spoken of?
COL. STOREY: Not against the members, but I said against the
organization as a criminal organization, because from the top it
disseminated orders of this type through the channels of the Leader-
ship Corps.
THE PRESIDENT: But that is what I was putting to you, that
it was not through the channels of the Leadership Corps, but through
the channels of the police.
COL. STOREY: But the police, if Your Honor pleases, were con-
nected with the Leadership Corps; and Himmler stood at the top
of both. It does not show on that chart; but it is shown on the other
big chart, if Your Honors please, with reference to Goebbels, who
was a top-flight official in the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party,
by virtue of his position as Propaganda Leader of the Party. In the
issue of the Völkischer Beobachter of 29 May 1944 there appeared
an article written by Goebbels, the Reichsleiter for Party Propa-
ganda, in which he openly invited the German civilian population
to punish Allied fliers shot down over Germany. I refer to Docu-
ment 1676-PS, Exhibit USA-334, which is the issue of the Völkischer
Beobachter containing this article inciting the people to the com-
mission of War Crimes. I now quote:
"It isonly possible with the aid of arms to secure the lives of
enemy pilots who were shot down during such attacks, for
they would otherwise be killed by the sorely tried population.
Who is right here? The murderers who, after their cowardly
misdeeds, await a humane treatment on the part of their
victims, or the victims who wish to defend themselves accord-
ing to the principle: 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth'?
This question is not hard to answer."
Reichsleiter Goebbels then proceeds to answer this question in
the following language, and still quoting:
"Itseems to us hardly possible and tolerable to use German
policeand soldiers against the German people when it treats
murderers of children as they deserve."
On the 30th of May 1944 the Defendant Bormann, Reichsleiter
and Chief of the Party Chancellery, issued a circular letter on the
subject which furnishes indisputable proof that British and American
fliers, who were shot down, were lynched by the German popu-
lation. I offer this circular letter of the Defendant Bormann into
—
evidence Document 057-PS; it is up towards the top.

50
 .

17 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the original book?

COL. STOREY: Just moment, Your Honor.
a
After alleging that in recent weeks English and American fliers
had repeatedly shot children, women, peasants, and vehicles on the
highways, Bormann then states as follows in the second paragraph
of the English translation; I quote:
"Several instances have occurred where members of the crews
of such aircraft, who have bailed out or who have made
forced landings, were lynched on the spot immediately after
capture by the populace, which was incensed to the highest
degree. No police measures or criminal proceedings were
invoked against the German civilians who participated in
these incidents."
The attention of the Tribunal is particularly invited to the fact
that this letter of the Defendant Bormann is distributed through
the chain of command of the Nazi Party, expressly mentioning on
the distribution list Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, Kreisleiter, and leaders
of the incorporated and affiliated organizations of the Party. The
Defendant Bormann requested, in the first paragraph of the second
page which is found in the English translation, that the local group
leaders (Ortsgruppenleiter) be informed of the contents of his cir-
—
cular letter orally only by oral means.
The Bormann's circular letter may be seen
effect of Reichsleiter
in an order dated 25 February 1945 which I now offer in evidence;
it is Document L-154, Exhibit Number USA-335. It is an order from

Albert Hoffmann, an important member of the Leadership Corps by

virtue of his position as Gauleiter and National Defense Commis-
sioner of the Gau Westfalen-Sud. It is addressed to all county coun-
cillors, mayors, police officials, and to county leaders and county
chiefs of the Volkssturm.
"Fighter-bomber pilots who are shot down are in principle
not to be protected against the fury of the people. I expect
from all police officers that they will refuse to lend their
protection to these gangster types. Authorities acting in con-
tradiction to the popular sentiment will have to account to
me. All police and gendarmerie officials are to be informed
immediately of this, my attitude."
The obligations . .

THE PRESIDENT: Who is Hoffmann?

COL. STOREY: Albert Hoffmann was a member of the Leader-

ship Corps by virtue of his position as Gauleiter and National
Defense Commissar of the Gau Westfalen-Sud. In this connection,
if Your Honor pleases, I quote the provisions of the Geneva Con-

vention, 27 July 1929, Article 2, which provides—and I simply ask

the Court to take judicial knowledge:

51
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17 Dec. 45

"Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile power, but

not of the individuals or corps who have captured them. They
must at all times be humanely treated and protected, partic-
ularly against acts of violence, insults, and public curiosity.
Measures of reprisal against them are prohibited."

THE PRESIDENT: Is that the 1907 . .

COL. STOREY: 1929, the Geneva Convention dated 27 July

1929 — —
Article 2 and it was also ratified by Germany and the United
States. It from the foregoing quoted provisions that the
is clear
Geneva prisoners-of-war convention imposes upon its signatories the
strictest obligations to protect its prisoners of war from violence.
The evidence just presented shows that the German State violated
this provision. The evidence also proves that members of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party participated in the conspiracy
to incite the German civilian population to take part in these atroc-
ities.

Now I next turn to some illustrative crimes against foreign labor.

On September 1936 Reichsleiter of the Party Organization,
13
Dr. Robert Ley, addressed 20,000 people attending a session of the
Party Congress. The official account of the Party rally states that
the Führer was received with "enthusiastic shouts of exaltation"
when he strode through the hall with his deputy, his constant
retinue, and several Reichsleiter and Gauleiter. I am referring to
Document 2283-PS, and it is the Völkischer Beobachter of 14 Sep-
tember 1936, Page 11, which we offer as Exhibit Number USA-337.
In his speech Reichsleiter Robert Ley states that he had been mysti-
fied when the Führer ordered him in "mid-April 1933 to take over
the trade unions since I could not see any connection between
. . .

my task as organizational leader of the Party and my new task."

Ley continues by stating that very soon it became clear to him why
his responsibilities as Reichsleiter of the Party Organization and
Leader of the German Labor Front made logical his selection by
the Führer as the man to direct the smashing and dissolution of the
free trade unions; and I quote from that document:
"Very soon your decision, my Führer, became clear to me
and I recognized that the organizational measures of the Party
could only come to full fruition when supplemented by the
organization of the people, that is to say by the mobilization
of the energies of the people and by their concentration and
alignment My tasks as Reichsleiter of the Party Organi-
zation and as Leader of the German Labor Front were a com-
pletely homogeneous task; in other words, in everything I
did, I acted as Reichsleiter of the Party Organization. The
German Labor Front was an institution of the Party and was
led by it. The German Labor Front had to be organized

52
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17 Dec. 45

—
regionally and technically according to the same principles
as the Party. That is why trade union and employee associa-
tions had to be smashed unrelentingly, and the basis of con-
struction was formed, as in the Party, by the cell and the
local section."
On 17 October 1944 Reichsleiter Rosenberg sent a letter to Reichs-
leiterBormann which I introduce as Document 327-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-338, in which he informed the latter that he had sent
a telegram to the Gauleiter urging them not to interfere in the
liquidation of certain listed companies and banks under his super-
vision. Rosenberg emphasizes to Bormann that any "delay of liqui-
dation or independent confiscation of the property by the Gauleiter
would impair or destroy an organized plan" for the liquidation of
a vast amount of property.
On 7 November 1943 the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces delivered a lecture at Munich to the Reichsleiter and the
Gauleiter. I now refer to Document L-172, previously introduced
in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-34. The Chief of Staff stated
that his object was to give a review of the strategic position at the
outset of the fifth year of war; and he stated that he realized that
the political leaders in the Reich and Gau areas, in view of their
burdensome tasks in supporting the German war effort, were in
need of information he could give. He stated, in part, as follows:
"Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you a review
today of the strategic position in the beginning of the fifth
—
year of war. ... No one the Führer has ordered may know —
more or be told more than he needs for his immediate task;
but I have no doubt at all in my mind, gentlemen, that you
need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks.
It is in your Gaue, after all . that all the enemy propaganda,
. .

and the demoralization through malicious rumors that try to

find themselves a place among our people concentrate
Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice . .

you need to know the true situation; and for this reason, I
believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and
uncovered account of the state of affairs."
Reichsleiter Bormann distributed to all Reichsleiter, Gauleiter,
and leaders of Party-affiliated organizations an undated letter, which
is Document 656-PS, Exhibit Number USA-339, on the National
Socialist Party stationery, signed by Bormann, an order of the
Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht relating to self-defense by
German guard personnel and German contractors and workers
against prisoners of war. The order of the Wehrmacht referred to
states that the question of treatment of prisoners of war is con-
tinually being discussed by the Wehrmacht and Party bureaus. The
order states that should prisoners of war refuse to obey orders to

53
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17 Dec. 45

work, the guard has "in the case of the most pressing need and
danger the right to force obedience with the weapon if he has no
other means. He can use the weapon as much as is necessary to
attain his goal."
On Commissar Lohse, Reich Minister for the
18 April 1944 Reich
Occupied Eastern Territories, in a letter to Reich Youth Leader
—
Axmann I now offer in evidence Document 347-PS, Exhibit Num-
—
ber USA-340 proposed that the Hitler Youth participate in and
supervise the military education of the Estonian and Latvian youth.
Lohse states in the above letter that:
"In the military education camps the young Latvians are
trained under Latvian leaders in the Latvian language, not
because this is our ideal but because absolute military neces-
sity demands this."
Lohse further stated in the above letter, and I quote:
"... in contrast to the Germanic peoples of the West, military
education is no longer to be carried out through voluntary
enlistments but through legal conscription. The camps in
Estonia and Latvia will have to be under German leadership;
and as military education camps of the Hitler Youth, they
must be a symbol of our educational mission beyond Ger-
many's borders. I consider the execution of the military edu-
cation of the Estonian and Latvian youth not only a military
necessity but also a war mission of the Hitler Youth, espe-
cially. I would be thankful to you, Party Member Axmann,
if the Hitler Youth would put itself at our disposal with the

same readiness with which they have so far supported our

work in the Baltic area."
An
order of the Reich Minister of the Interior, Frick, dated
22 October 1938, is Document 1438-PS, of which I ask the Court
to take judicial notice, and I quote:
"The Reichsführer SS and the Chief of the German Police . .

can take the administrative measures necessary for the main-

tenance of security and order even beyond the legal limits
otherwise set on such measures."
The above order related to the administration of the Sudeten-
German territory.
In a letter dated 15 April 1943, our Document Number 407-PS,
already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-209, Gauleiter and
Plenipotentiary for the direction of labor Fritz Sauckel wrote to
Hitler advising him of the success of the forced-labor program as
—
of that date and stating that and I quote:
"You can be assured that the District of Thuringia and I will
serve you and our dear people with the employment of all
our strength."

54
 17 Dec. 45

I now offer in evidence Document 630-PS, Exhibit Number USA-

342. If Your Honor pleases, Iwould like to call to your attention
that this is on the personal stationery of Adolf Hitler, dated 1 Sep-
tember 1939. It is addressed to Reichsleiter Bouhler and Doctor of
Medicine Brandt, and it is signed personally by Adolf Hitler. I want
to quote all of that document; it is short:

"Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt are charged with the

responsibility of enlarging the authority of certain physicians
to be designated by name in such a manner that persons who,
according to human judgment, are incurable can, upon a most
careful diagnosis of their condition of sickness, be accorded
a mercy death. Signed, A. Hitler."
A handwritten note on the face of the document states: "Given to
me by Bouhler on 27 August 1940. Signed, Dr. Gürtner."
In a memorandum recording an agreement between himself and
Himmler, the Minister of Justice Thierack stated that on the sug-
gestion of Reichsleiter Bormann an agreement had been reached
between Himmler and himself with respect to "special treatment at
the hands of the police in cases where judicial sentences were not
severe enough."
I will offer Document 654-PS, Exhibit Number USA-218, which
was previously introduced, and I want to quote one portion:
"The Reich Minister of Justice will decide whether and when
special treatment at the hands of the police is to be applied.
The Reich Führer SS will send the reports, which he sent
hitherto to Reichsleiter Bormann, to the Reich Minister of
Justice."
If the views of the Reich Führer SS and the Reich Minister of
Justice disagreed, "the opinion of Reichsleiter Bormann will be
brought to bear upon the case, and he will possibly inform the
Führer."
In the above note it is further stated:
"The delivery of from execution of their
asocial elements
sentence to the Reich Führer of SS to be worked to death:
Persons under preventative arrest, Jews, Gypsies, Russians
and Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences,
Czechs and Germans with more than 8-year sentences,
according to the decision of the Reich Minister of Justice.
First of all the worst asocial elements amongst those just
mentioned are to be handed over. I shall inform the Führer
of this through Reichsleiter Bormann."
With respect to the "administration of justice by the people,"
he continues:

55
 —

17 Dec. 45

"This is to be carried out step by step ... as soon as

possible I shall rouse the Party particularly to co-operate
in thisscheme by an article in the Hoheitsträger. " ' '

And Your Honors have already seen copies of that publication.

I now skip Paragraphs 16 and 17.
A letter RSHA
(which is the Reich Security Main Office)
from
November 1942, which is Document L-316,
to police chiefs, dated 5
—
Exhibit Number USA-346 this was addressed to all police chiefs
recites an agreement between the Reich Führer SS and the Reich
Minister of Justice, approved by Hitler I call the attention of —
Your Honors to the red border around this original, and then
having the Party seal on it —provides that the ordinary criminal
procedure was no longer to be applied to Poles and members of
the Eastern populations. The agreement provided that such people,
including Jews and Gypsies, should henceforth be turned over to
the police. The principles applicable to a determination of the
punishment of German offenders, including appraisal of the motives
of the offender, were not to be applied to foreign offenders. I quote
from Page 2 of the document:
"The offense committed by a person of foreign extraction is
not to be regarded from the view of legal retribution by way
of justice but from the point of view of preventing dangers
through police action.
"From this it follows that the criminal procedure against
persons of foreign extraction must be transferred from justice
to the police.
"The preceding statements serve for personal information.
There are no objections if the Gauleiter are informed in
the proper form, should the need arise."
I now skip Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the text. I next refer to
Document 1058-PS, previously introduced in evidence as Exhibit
Number USA-147.
In a speech to a gathering of persons intimately concerned with
the Eastern problem, on 20 June 1941, Reichsleiter Rosenberg stated
that the southern Russian territories and the northern Caucasus
would have to provide food for the German people. I quote Rosen-
berg's words:
"We see absolutely no obligation on our part to feed the
Russian people, also, with the products of that surplus
territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any
feelings."

THE PRESIDENT: We have already had that read to us twice.

COL. STOREY: I am sorry, Sir. I did not hear it. Strike it from
the record.

56
 17 Dec. 45

I now refer to Document R-114. I believe it is the last one

in the book, Exhibit Number USA-314.

Gauleiter Wagner, of the German-occupied areas of Alsace,

prepared plans and took measures leading to the expulsion and
deportation of certain groups within the Alsatian civilian population.
His plans called for the forcible expulsion of certain categories of
so-called undesirable persons as a means of punishment and com-
pulsory Germanization. The Gauleiter supervised deportation
measures in Alsace from July to December 1940 in the course
of which 105,000 persons were either expelled or prevented from
returning. A memorandum, dated 4 August 1942, of a meeting
of high SS and police officials convened to receive the reports
and plans of the Gauleiter relating to the Alsatian evacuations,
states that the persons deported were mainly "Jews, Gypsies, and
other foreign racial elements, criminals, asocial and incurably
insane persons, as well as Frenchmen and Francophiles." The
memorandum further states the Gauleiter stated that the Führer
had given him permission "to cleanse Alsace of all foreign, sick,
or unreliable elements"; and that the Gauleiter emphasized the
political necessity of further deportations. The memorandum further
records that the SS and police officials present at the conference
approve the Gauleiter's proposals for further evacuation.
Inow skip over to the next paragraph, 24.
A memorandum by Reichsleiter Bormann of a conference called
by Hitler at his headquarters, 16 July 1941, which is Document
L-221, Exhibit Number USA-317. I'm sorry, I believe that one was
quoted this morning. The only purpose in referring to it is in
connection with the Reichsleiter. I believe Captain Harris quoted
from that document this morning, and I'll not read the quotation.
I call attention to the fact, however, that this conference was
attended by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Reich Minister Lammers, Field
Marshal Keitel, the Reich Marshal, and Bormann and lasted about
20 hours. The memorandum states that discussion occurred with
respect to the annexation by Germany of various parts of conquered
Europe. The memorandum also states that a long discussion took
place with respect to the qualifications of Gauleiter Lohse, who was
proposed by Rosenberg at this conference, as Governor of the
Baltic States.
Discussion also occurred, according to the memo, with respect
to the qualifications of other Gauleiterand commissioners for the
administration of various areas of Occupied Russia. Goring stated,
according to the memorandum, that he intended to appoint Gau-
leiter Terboven for "exploitation of the Kola Peninsula; the
Führer agrees."

57
 . .

17 Dec. 45

believe the next portion has been quoted, too. I now pass
I
to the participation of theLeadership Corps in the suppression of
the Christian Church and persecution of the clergy and cite some
illustrative crimes.

The evidence relating to the systematic effort of the defendants

and co-conspirators to eliminate the Christian churches in Germany
has been previously introduced in U.S.A. Exhibit Book H by Major
Wallis with respect to the Nazi efforts to eliminate the Christian
Church. The evidence now to be presented is limited to proving
and pointing out the responsibility of the Leadership Corps of the
Nazi Party and the members thereof for illegal activities against
the Christian Church and clergy.
The Defendant Bormann issued a secret decree to all Gauleiter
entitled, "Relationship of National Socialism and Christianity." And
—
that is Document D-75 it is up toward the top, I believe, Your
—
Honor Exhibit Number USA-348. In this decree Reichsleiter Bor-
mann flatly declares that National Socialism and Christianity are
incompatible and that the influence of the churches in Germany
must be eliminated. I quote from pertinent portions of this decree
beginning with the first paragraph thereof, top of Page 3, which
reads as follows:
"National Socialist and Christian concepts are irreconcilable. . .

Our National Socialist ideology is far loftier than the

concepts of Christianity which, in their essential points, have
been taken over from Jewry. For this reason, also, we do
not need Christianity. ... If therefore, in the future our
,

youth learn nothing more of this Christianity whose doctrines

are far below ours, Christianity will disappear by itself. . .

It follows from the irreconcilability of National Socialist and

Christian concepts that a strengthening of existing confessions
and every assistance to originating Christian confessions is
to be rejected by us. A
differentiation between the various
Christian confessions is not to be made here. For this reason,
also, the thought of an erection of an Evangelical National
Church by merger of the various Evangelical churches has
been definitely given up, because the Evangelical Church
is just as inimical to us as the Catholic Church. Any
strengthening of the Evangelical Church would merely react
against us. . .

"For the first time in German history, the Führer consciously

and completely has the leadership of the people in his own
hand. With the Party, its components, and attached units, the
Führer has created for himself and thereby the German Reich
Leadership, an instrument which makes him independent of
the Church. All influences which might impair or damage

58
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17 Dec. 45

the leadership of the people, exercised by the Führer with

the help of the NSDAP, must be eliminated. More and more
the people must be separated from the churches and their
organs, the pastors. Of course, the churches must and will,
seen from their viewpoint, defend themselves against this
loss of power. But never again must an influence on leadership
of the people be yielded to the churches. This influence must
be broken completely and finally.
"Only the Reich leadership and, by its direction, the Party,
itscomponents and attached units have a right to leadership
of the people. Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers,
seers, and other fakirs are eliminated and suppressed by the
state, so must the possibility of Church influence also be
totallyremoved. Not until this has happened does the state
leadership have influence on the individual citizens. Not until
then are people and Reich secure in their existence for all
the future."
I next offer in evidence Document 070-PS, towards the beginning,
Exhibit Number USA-349, which is a copy of a letter issued from
Bormann's office, dated 25 April 1941, to the Defendant Rosenberg
in his capacity as the Führer's representative for the supervision
cf the entire mental and ideological training and education of the
NSDAP. In this letter Bormann's office states that the measures
have been taken leading to the progressive cancellation of morning
prayers and other religious services and their substitution by Nazi
mottoes and slogans. I quote from the first paragraph of Docu-
ment 070-PS:
"We are inducing schools more and more to reduce and
abolish morning religious Similarly the confessional
services.
and general prayers in several parts of the Reich have
already been replaced by National Socialist mottoes. I would
be grateful to know your opinion on a future National
Socialist morning service instead of the present confessional
morning services which are usually conducted once per week."
In a letter from Reichsleiter Bormann to Reichsleiter Rosenberg
dated 22 February 1940, Document 098-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-350, which I offer in evidence, Bormann declares to Rosen-
berg that the Christian religion and National Socialism are
incompatible. Bormann cites, as examples of hostile . .

THE PRESIDENT: Would you take care to give us the number

of the document.
COL. STOREY: I beg pardon, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: This is 098-PS.

COL. STOREY: Document 098-PS.

59
17 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: The one before you referred to was 070-PS.

COL. STOREY: Yes— 070-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Before that, D-75?
COL. STOREY: That's correct. With Your Honor's permission,
rather than to quote the whole document I have summarized it
here. Bormann's letter cites as examples the hostile divergence
between Nazism and the churches, the attitude of the latter on
the racial question, celibacy of the priests, monasteries and
nunneries. Bormann further declares that the churches could not
be subjugated through compromise but only through a new
philosophy of life as prophesied in Rosenberg's writings. Bormann
proposes the creation of a National Socialist catechism in order
to give that part of the German youth which declines to practice
confessional religion a moral foundation and to lay a moral basis
for National Socialist doctrines, which are gradually to supplant
the Christian religions. Bormann suggests that some of the Ten
Commandments could be merged with the National Socialist
catechism and states that a few new commandments should be
added, such as: "Thou shalt be courageous; Thou shalt not be
cowardly; Thou shalt believe in God's presence in the living nature,
animals, and plants; Thou shalt keep thy blood pure;" et cetera.
He concludes that he considers the problem so important that it
should be discussed with the members of the Reich directorate
as soon as possible.
And now one quotation from the fifth paragraph on the first
page of that translation. I would like to quote Paragraph 5 of the
first page:
"Christianity and National Socialism are phenomena which
originated from entirely different basic causes. Both differ
fundamentally so strongly that it will not be possible to
construct a Christian teaching which would be completely
compatible with the point of view of the National Socialist
ideology; just as the communities of Christian faith would
never be able to stand by the ideology of National Socialism
"
in its entirety
And then I quote from the last paragraph on Page 5 of that
document:
"The Führer's deputy finds it necessary that all these
questions should be thoroughly discussed in the near future
in the presence of the Reich leaders" — —
Reichsleiter "who are
especially affected by them. ..."
I next offer in evidence Document 107-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you suggest that the Blockleiter would
have to be present at that discussion?

60
 .

17 Dec. 45

COL. STOREY: Your Honor, in connection with the policy

directives, the Führerprinzip goes from the top to the bottom; and
if that policy is adopted, they may, by directive, send it as far as

the Blockleiter. He says to discuss it in connection with the Reichs-

leiter, who are the Party directors; and I assume that, if the Party
directors establish it as a policy, then they were to issue appro-
priate directives to the other subordinate members. Mr. Lambert
has suggested also that it would not be possible to discuss this
matter with all the Leadership Corps and therefore they discussed
it with the Party directors.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Does that show they did discuss
it with the directors?
COL. STOREY: No, Sir, that doesn't follow; but it shows that
it was a subject of discussion for the board of directors of the
Nazi Party.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the question is, who are the
directors?
COL. STOREY: Five or six of them sit here; a total of 16.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but I thought that you were asking us
to declare the whole of the organization down to the Blockleiter
as criminal.
COL. STOREY: That is true, Your Honor, but this is one
evidence, one instance of the criminality of the organization and
we cannot prove at each stage that all of them knew about it. We
are trying to select different offenses and different crimes that were
committed within the Party.
Document 107-PS, Exhibit USA-351, which we now offer in
evidence,is a circular letter, dated 17 June 1938, addressed by the
Defendant Bormann as Reichsleiter and Deputy of the Führer to
all Reichsleiter and Gauleiter. Bormann's a copy letter encloses
of rules, prepared by Reichsleiter certain
Hierl, setting forth
restrictive regulations with respect to participation of the Reich
Labor Service in religious celebrations. I quote pertinent portions
of the directions issued by Reichsleiter Hierl, beginning with the
first paragraph in the list of directions in Document 107-PS, on
Page 1 of the English translation:
"The Reich Labor Service is a training school in which the
German youth should be educated to national unity in the
spirit of National Socialism. . .

"What religious beliefs a person has is not a decisive factor,

but it is decisive that he first of all feels himself a German.

"All confessional discussions are forbidden in the Reich Labor

Service because it disturbs the comrade-like harmony of all
the Labor Service men and the Labor Service women.

61
17 Dec. 45

"This is also the reason why all participation of the Reich

Labor Service in revivals and other meetings and festivals
of religious character are impossible."
The Tribunal will appreciate that the position of the Defendant
Bormann, as Deputy of the Führer of the Leadership Corps of the
Nazi Party and Chief of the Nazi Party Chancellery, and the
position of the Defendant Rosenberg, as the Fiihrer's representative
for the whole spiritual and philosophical education of the Nazi
Party, give to the views of these defendants on religion and
religious policy the highest official backing. The anti-Christian
utterances and policies of these two defendants reveal a community
of mind and intention amongst the most powerful leaders of the
Party which was amply confirmed, as the evidence will show, by
the actual treatment of the churches since 1933 and throughout
the course of the conspiracy. I now offer in evidence Document
2349-PS, Exhibit Number USA-352, which is an excerpt from the
book The Myth of the 20th Century, written by the Defendant
Rosenberg. I quote from that document:
— —
"The idea of honor national honor is for us the beginning
and the end of our entire thinking and doing. It does not
admit of any equal-valued center of force alongside of it,
no matter of what kind, neither Christian love, nor the
Free-Masonic humanity, nor the Roman philosophy."
I now offer in evidence Document 848-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-353, which is a Gestapo telegram, dated 24 July 1938, dis-
patched from Berlin to Nuremberg, dealing with demonstrations
and acts of violence against Bishop Sproll in Rottenburg. The
Gestapo office in Berlin wired its Nuremberg office a teletype
account received from its Stuttgart office of disorderly conduct and
vandalism carried out by Nazi Party members against Bishop
Sproll. I quote from the fourth paragraph of Page 1 of the English
translation of Document 848-PS, which reads as follows:
"The Party, on 23 July 1938, from 2100 on, carried out the
third demonstration against Bishop Sproll. Participants, about
2,500-3,000, were brought from outside by bus, et cetera. The
Rottenburg populace again did not participate in the
demonstration. This town took a rather hostile attitude
toward the demonstrations. The action got completely out
of hand of the Party member responsible for it. The
demonstrators stormed the palace, beat in the gates and
doors. About 150 to 200 people forced their way into the
palace, searched through the rooms, threw files out of the
windows, and rummaged through the beds in the rooms of
the palace. One bed was ignited. The Bishop was with
. . .

Archbishop Gröber of Freiburg and the ladies and gentlemen

62
 17 Dec. 45

of his menage in the chapel at prayer. About 25 to 30 people

pressed into this chapel and molested those present. Bishop
Gröber was taken for Bishop Sproll. He was grabbed by the
robe and dragged back and forth."
The Gestapo official in Stuttgart added that Bishop Gröber
desired "to appeal to the Führer and to Reich Minister of the
Interior Dr. Frick," and the Gestapo official added that he had
rendered a detailed report of the demonstration after suppressing
counter mass meetings.
On 23 July 1938 the Reich Minister for Church Affairs, Kerrl,
sent a letter to the Minister of State and Chief of the Präsidium
Chancellery, Berlin, stating that Bishop Sproll had angered the
population by abstaining from the plebiscite of 10 April. I now
offer in evidence Document 849-PS, Exhibit Number USA-354. In
this letter Kerrl stated that the Gauleiter and Governor of Würt-
temberg had decided that in the interest of preserving the State's
authority and in the interest of quiet and order, Bishop Sproll
could no longer remain in office. I quote from the third paragraph
of the first page of the Document 849-PS:
"The Reich Governor had explained to the Ecclesiastical
Authority that he would no longer regard Bishop Sproll as
head of the Diocese of Rottenburg on account of his
refraining from the election in the office and that he
desired Bishop Sproll to leave the Gau Württemberg-Hohen-
zollern because he could assume no guarantee for his personal
safety; that in the case of the return of the Bishop of Rotten-
burg he would see to it that all personal and official inter-
course with him on the part of State offices as well as the
Party offices and the Armed Forces would be denied."
Kerrl further states in the above letter that his deputy had
moved the Foreign Office, through the German Embassy at the
Vatican, to urge the Holy See to persuade Bishop Sproll to resign
his Bishopric. Kerrl concludes by stating that should the effort to
procure the Bishop's resignation prove unsuccessful, "the Bishop
would have to be exiled from the land or there would have to
be a complete boycott of the Bishop by the authorities."
On 14 July 1939 the Defendant Bormann in his capacity as
Deputy ofthe Führer issued a Party regulation which provided
that Party members entering the clergy or undertaking the study
of theology would have to leave the Party. I now offer in evidence
Document 840-PS, Exhibit Number USA-355; and this is a copy
of a regulation by Bormann, relating to the admission of the clergy
and students of theology into the Party. I quote from the last
paragraph of the English translation, which reads — I quote. "I

63
 17 Dec. 45

decree that in the future Party members who enter the clergy or
who turn to the study of theology have to leave the Party."
In this directive Bormann
also refers to an earlier decree, dated
% 9 February which he had ruled that the admission of
1939, in
members of the clergy into the Party was to be avoided. In this
decree, also, Bormann refers with approval to a regulation of the
Reich Treasurer of the Party, dated 10 May 1939, providing that
"clergymen as well as other fellow Germans who are also closely
connected with the Church cannot be admitted into the Party."
I now offer in evidence Document 3268-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-356, which contains excerpts from the Allocution of His
Holiness Pope Pius XII to the Sacred College, June 2d, 1945. In
this address His Holiness, after declaring that he had acquired an
appreciation of the great qualities of the German people in the
course of 12 years of residence in their midst, expressed the hope
that Germany could "rise to new dignity and a new life once it
has laid the satanic specter raised by National Socialism and the
guilty have expiated the crimes they have committed." After
referring to repeated violations by the German Government of the
Concordat concluded in 1933, His Holiness declared; and I quote
from the last paragraph of Page 1 of the English translation of
Document 3268-PS:
"The struggle against the Church did, in fact, become ever
more bitter; there was
the dissolution of Catholic organi-
zations; the gradual suppression of the flourishing Catholic
schools, both public and private; the enforced weaning of
youth from family and Church; the pressure brought to bear
on the conscience of citizens, and especially of civil servants;
the systematic defamation, by means of a clever, closely-
organized propaganda, of the Church, the clergy, the faithful,
the Church's institutions, teachings, and history; the closing,
dissolution, confiscation of religious houses and other eccle-
siastical institutions; the complete suppression of the Catholic
press and publishing houses ....
"In the meantime the Holy See itself multiplied its represen-
tations and protests to governing authorities in Germany,
reminding them, in clear and energetic language, of their
duty to respect and fulfill the obligations of the natural law
itself that were confirmed by the Concordat. In these critical
years, joining the alert vigilance of a pastor to the long-
suffering patience of a father, our great predecessor, Pius XI,
fulfilled his mission as Supreme Pontiff with intrepid courage.
"But when, after he had tried all means of persuasion in vain,
he saw himself clearly faced with deliberate violations of a
solemn pact, with a religious persecution masked or open but

64
 17 Dec. 45

always rigorously organized, he proclaimed to the world on

Passion Sunday 1937 in his Encyclical, Mit brennender Sorge,
that National Socialism really was: the arrogant apostasy
from Jesus Christ, the denial of His doctrine and of His work
of redemption, the cult of violence, the idolatry of race and
blood, the overthrow of human liberty and dignity ....
"From the prisons, concentration camps, and fortresses are
now pouring out, together with the political prisoners, also
the crowds of those, whether clergy or laymen, whose only
crime was their fidelity to Christ and to the faith of their
' fathers or the dauntless fulfillment of their duties as priests.
"In the forefront, for the number and harshness of the treat-
ment meted out to them, are the Polish priests. From 1940 to
1945, 2,800 Polish ecclesiastics and religious were imprisoned
in that camp; among them was the Auxiliary Bishop of
Wloclawek, who died there of typhus. In April last there
were left only 816, all the others being dead except for two
or three transferred t® another camp. In the summer of 1942,
480 German-speaking ministers of religion were known to be
gathered there; of these, 45 were Protestants, all the others
Catholic priests. In spite of the continuous inflow of new
internees, especially from dioceses of Bavaria, Rhenania and
Westphalia, their number, as a result of the high rate of
mortality, at the beginning of this year did not surpass 350.
Nor should we pass over in silence those belonging to occu-
pied territories, Holland, Belgium, France (among whom the
. Bishop of Clermont), Luxembourg, Slovenia, Italy. Many of
those priests and laymen endured indescribable sufferings for
their faith and for their vocation. In one case the hatred of
the impious against Christ reached the point of parodying on
the person of an interned priest, with barbed wire, the
scourging and the crowning with thorns of our Redeemer."
THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps it would be time now to
adjourn.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 18 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

65
 TWENTY-SECOND DAY
Tuesday, 18 December 1945

Morning Session

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, before adjourning yester-

day afternoon, Your Honors properly asked a question or two about
Documents 3051-PS and 3063-PS, to which I think I have an answer
that will help the Tribunal. Your Honors will recall, with reference
to Document 3051-PS —
I believe it might be of assistance to turn to
that document.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
COL. STOREY: Your Honors asked yesterday afternoon, since
thishad to do with the SD and the SS, how the Party was involved.
And I should like to quote Paragraph Number 1 on Page 2 of the
English translation, which answers this question, and I am quoting:
"The Chiefs of the State Police or their deputies, upon
receipt of this teletype, must get in contact by telephone
with the political administration (Gauleitung or Kreisleitung)
having jurisdiction over their districts and must arrange a
joint meeting with the appropriate inspector or commander
of the Order Police to discuss the organization of the demon-
stration. At these discussions the political leaders are to be
informed that the German Police have received from the
Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police the follow-
ing instructions, in accordance with which the political leaders
should adapt their measures."
That had to do with the preparation for the general anti-Jewish
uprisings.
Now, with reference to Document 3063-PS, which follows just
below that one, if Your Honor pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. STOREY: That, if you recall, Your Honor, was a report
from the Supreme Party Court Justice Buch to the Defendant
Goring concerning punishment for the uprisings that followed the
9th and 10th of November demonstration. I should like to quote
the portion signed by the Defendant Goring. It is, I believe, the
second page of the English translation. It is dated "Berlin,
22 February 1939":
"Dear Party Member Buch:

66
 18 Dec. 45

"I thank you for forwarding the report of your special court
on the proceedings concluded up to now concerning the ex-
cesses on the occasion of the anti-Jewish incidents of 9 and
10 November 1938, of which I have taken cognizance. Heil
Hitler! Yours, signed, Goring."
And then, passing, Your Honor, to Page Number 1, immediately
following, of the English translation, I think the next two para-
graphs will answer Your Honor's question. I quote:
"On the evening of 9 November 1938 the Reich Propaganda
Director, Party Member Dr. Goebbels told the Party leaders
assembled at a reunion in the old town hall in Munich that in
— —
the districts" Gaue "of Kurhessen and Magdeburg-Anhalt
anti-Jewish demonstrations had taken place, during which
Jewish shops were demolished and synagogues were set on
fire. The Führer, at Goebbels' suggestion, had decided that
such demonstrations were not to be prepared or organized
by the Party; but so far as they originated spontaneously,
they were not to be interfered with either. Besides that,
Party Member Dr. Goebbels interpreted the sense of the con-
tents of the teletype of the Reich Propaganda Administration
November 1938. ."
of 10 . .

THE PRESIDENT: What does "12:30 to 1 o'clock" mean there?

COL. STOREY: That is the time of the teletype message, I
assume, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
COL. STOREY: "It was probably understood by all the Party
leaders present, from the oral instructions of the Reich Propa-
ganda Director, that the Party should not appear outwardly
as the originator of the demonstrations but in reality should
organize and execute them. Instructions in this sense were
—
telephoned immediately thus a considerable time before
—
transmission of the first teletype to the headquarters of
—
their districts"— Gaue "by a large part of the Party mem-
bers present."
Now Your Honors properly asked yesterday afternoon how the
Blockleiter would be affected. Your Honors will recall that, in the
instructions to the Blockleiter defining his offices, it was stated that
his instructions would be received orally and they would be trans-
mitted orally and never to use writing except in extreme cases.
Therefore I say that these quoted portions clearly indicate that the
Party was in fact used in connection with these famous 9 and
10 November 1938, anti-Jewish demonstrations.
Now, reverting back to the text where I left off yesterday after-
noon: The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party participated in the
confiscation of church and religious property.

67
18 Dec. 45

I offer in evidence Document 072-PS, which is Exhibit Number

USA-357, a letter dated 19 April 1941 from Reichsleiter Bormann
to Reichsleiter Rosenberg. This letter exposes the participation of
the Gauleiter in measures relating to the confiscation of religious
property.
I now quote from the last paragraph of Page 1 of the English
translation of Document 072-PS, which reads:
"The and art objects of the monasteries confiscated
libraries
in the Reich were to remain for the time being in these
monasteries insofar as the Gauleiter had not directed other-
."
. wise. . .

On 21 February 1940 the Chief of the Security Police and SD,

Heydrich, wrote a letter to Reichsführer SS Himmler, proposing
that certain listed churches and monasteries be confiscated for the
accommodation of so-called "racial Germans."
The Tribunal, of course, will recall Himmler's position.
After pointing out that on political grounds outright expro-
priation of religious property would not be feasible at the time,
Heydrich suggested certain specious interim actions with respect
to the church properties in question, to be followed progressively by
outright confiscation.
I now offer in evidence R-101(a) — it is right towards the end of
Your Honor's Exhibit— as Exhibit USA-358.
If Your Honors please, there are several of those documents
under R-101, and at the bottom you will notice they are labeled
"a, v "b," and "c." The first one is R-101(a), and I quote the first
five paragraphs on Page 2 of the English translation:

"Enclosed is a of church possessions which might be avail-

list
able for the accommodation of racial Germans. The list,
which I beg you to return, is supplemented by correspondence
and illustrated material pertinent to the subject.
"For political reasons, expropriation without indemnity of the
entire property of the churches and religious orders will
hardly be possible at this time.
"Expropriation with indemnity or in return for assignment
of other lands and grounds will be even less possible.

"It is therefore suggested that the respective authorities of

the orders be instructed that they make available the mon-
asteries concerned for the accommodation of racial Germans
and remove their own members to other less populous mon-
asteries."
There is a marginal note opposite this paragraph that, translated,
means "very good."

68
 18 Dec. 45

"The final expropriation of these properties thus placed at

our disposal can then be carried out step by step in the course
of time."
On 5 April 1940 the Security Police and Security Service SS sent
a letter to the Reich Commissar for the consolidation of Germandom,
enclosing a copy of the foregoing letter from Heydrich to Himmler
of 21 February 1940, proposing the confiscation of Church proper-
ties. The letter of 5 April 1940 is included in the Document R-101(a),
just introduced in evidence; and I quote from the second sentence
of the first paragraph thereof, on Page 1 of the English translation
of Document R-101(a):
"The Reich Leader SS has agreed to the proposals made in
the enclosed letter and has ordered the matter to be dealt
with by collaboration between the Chief of the Security Police
and Security Service and your office."
I now offer in evidence Document R-101(c), Exhibit USA-358.
This is a letter dated July 30, 1941, written by an SS Standarten-
führer whose signature is illegible, to the Reich Leader of the SS.
The letter supplies further evidence of the participation of the
Gauleiter in the seizure of church property. I quote from the first
three paragraphs of the English translation of Document R-101(c),
at the bottom of the page:
"With reference to the report of 30 May 1941, this office
considers it its duty to call the Reich Leader's attention to
the development which is taking place in the incorporated
Eastern countries with regard to seizure and confiscation of
church property.
"As soon as the Reich laws on expropriation became effective,
the Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter in the Reichsgau Warthe-
land adopted the practice of expropriating church real estate
for use as dwellings and paying the appraised value into
blocked accounts.
"Moreover, the East German Agricultural Administration,
Limited, reports that in the Warthegau all church-owned real
estate is being claimed by the local Gau administration."
I next offer in evidence Document R-l 01(d), which immediately
follows Exhibit Number USA-358 already in evidence. This is a
letter from the Chief of Staff of -the Main Office to Himmler, dated
30 March 1942, dealing with the confiscation of church property.
The letter evidences the active participation of the Party Chancel-
lery in the confiscation of religious property.
In this letter the Chief of Staff, Main Office, reports to Himmler
concerning the policy of the SS in suspending all payment of rent
to monasteries and other church institutions whose property had
been expropriated. The letter discusses a proposal made by the

69
18 Dec. 45

Reich Minister of the Interior, in which the Party Chancellery prom-

inently participated, to the effect that the church institutions should
be paid amounts corresponding to current mortgage charges on the
premises without realizing any profit. The writer further suggests
that such payments should never be made directly to the eccle-
siastical institutions but rather should be made to the creditors of
the institutions.
I now quote from the fourth sentence on Page 3 of that docu-
ment, the English translation, whereby such an arrangement would
be in line with "the basic idea of the settlement originally worked
out between the Party Chancellery and the Reich Minister of the
Interior."
I understand the Reich Minister of Interior for 1933-1944 was
the Defendant Frick.
The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party participated in the
suppression of religious publications and interfered with free reli-
gious education.
In a letter dated 27 September 1940 Reichsleiter and Deputy of
the Führer Bormann transmitted to the Defendant Rosenberg a
photostatic copy of a letter from Gauleiter Florian dated 23 Sep-
tember 1940, which expresses the Gauleiter's intense disapproval, on
Nazi ideological grounds, of a religious pamphlet entitled, The
Spirit and Soul of the Soldier, written by a Major General Von
Rabenau.
I now offer in evidence Document 064-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-359. It is an original letter signed by Rosenberg attaching the
copy of that matter. It contains Defendant Bormann's letter to
Rosenberg, dated 27 September 1940, transmitting the Gauleiter's
letter of 23 September 1940 to the Defendant Hess, in which the
Gauleiter urges that the religious writings of General Von Rabenau
be suppressed. In his letter to the Defendant Hess, Gauleiter
Florian discusses a conversation he had with General Von Rabenau
at the close of a lecture delivered by the General to a group of
younger Army officers at Aachen. This conversation illumines the
hostile attitude of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party towards
the Christian Churches. I quote from the second sentence of the
second paragraph of the second page of the Gauleiter's letter to the
Defendant Hess, which appears on Page 2 of the English trans-
— —
lation the second paragraph and I quote:
"After he had affirmed the necessity of the churches, Rabenau
said, with emphasized self-assurance, something like the fol-
lowing:
" 'Dear Gauleiter, the Party is making mistake
after mistake
Obtain for me the neces-
in the treatment of the churches.
sary powers from the Führer and I guarantee that I shall

70
 .

18 Dec. 45

succeed in a few months in establishing peace with the

churches for all time.'
"After this catastrophic ignorance, I gave up the conver-
sation
"Dear Party Member Hess, the reading of Von Rabenau's
pamphlet, The Spirit and Soul of the Soldier, has reminded
me again of this. In this brochure Rabenau affirms as before
the necessity of the Church straightforwardly and clearly,
even though he is shrewdly careful. He writes on Page 28:
'There could be more examples; they would suffice to show
that a soldier in this world can scarcely get along without
thoughts about the next one.' Because Von Rabenau has a
false spiritual basis, I consider his activities as an educator
in spiritual affairs dangerous; and I am of the opinion that
his educational writings are to be dispensed with, by all
means, and that the publication section of the NSDAP can
and must forgo these writings . .

"The churches with their Christianity constitute a danger

against which a struggle absolutely must be carried on."
That the Party Chancellery shared with the Gauleiter hostility
to the Christian Churches is further revealed by the Defendant
Bormann's instruction to the Defendant Rosenberg, set forth in
Bormann's letter of transmittal, that Rosenberg take action on the
Gauleiter's recommendation that the General's writings be sup-
pressed.
I now offer evidence Document 089-PS, Exhibit Number
in
USA-360, which a letter from the Defendant Bormann, as Deputy
is
of the Führer, to the Defendant Rosenberg, dated 8 March 1940,
enclosing a copy of Bormann's letter of the same date to Reichs-
leiter Amann. Amann was a top-member of the Leadership Corps
by virtue of his position as Reichsleiter for the Press and Leader
of the Party publishing company. In this letter to Amann Bormann
expresses his dismay and dissatisfaction that only 10 percent of the
3,000 Protestant periodicals in Germany have ceased publication for
what are described as "paper saving" reasons. Bormann then advises
Reichsleiter Amann that "the allocation of any paper whatsoever
for such periodicals is blocked."
I now refer to this Document 089-PS; and I quote the second
paragraph of Bormann's letter to Amann, which appears on the
first page — —
the second paragraph of the English translation:
"I urge you to see to it, any re-allocation of paper to be
in
considered later, that religious writings, which according to
experiences so far gathered, possess very doubtful value for
strengthening the power of resistance on the part of the

71
 . . .

18 Dec. 45

people toward the external foe, receive still sharper restric-

tions in favor of literature politically and ideologically more
valuable."
I next offer in evidence Document 101-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-361, which is a letter from the Defendant Bormann, again to
Reichsleiter Rosenberg, dated the 17th January 1940, expressing the
Party's opposition to the circulation of religious literature to the
members of the German Armed Forces. Among the soldiers of the
United Nations the proposition that there are no atheists in the fox-
holes received a wide and reverent acceptation. However, in this
document there is a contrary meaning, and I quote from Page 1 of
the English translation, which reads:
"Nearly all the districts" —that is Gaue — "report to me regu-
larly that the churches of both confessions are as active as
ever in ministering spiritually to members of the Armed
Forces. This finds expression especially in the fact that sol-
diers are being sent religious publications by the pastors of
their home parishes. These publications are, in part, very
well written. I have repeated reports that these publications
are being read by the troops and thereby exercise a certain
influence on their morale.
"I have at that time sought, by contacting at once the Gen-
eral Field Marshal, the High Command of the Armed Forces,
and Party Member Reichsleiter Amann, to restrict consider-
ably the production and shipment of publications of this type.
The result of these efforts remained unsatisfactory. As Reichs-
leiterAmann has repeatedly informed me, the restriction of
these pamphlets by means of the paper rationing cannot be
achieved because the paper used for the pamphlets is being
purchased on the open market. . .

"If the influencing of the soldiers by the Church is to be

effectively combatted, this will be accomplished only by pro-
ducing many good publications in the shortest possible time
under the supervision of the Party. . .

"Also, at the last meeting of the Deputy Gauleiter comments

were made on this matter to the effect that such publications
are not available in sufficient quantities. . .

"I maintain that necessary that in the very near future

it is

we transmit to the Party Service Offices, down to the Orts-

gruppenleiter, a list of additional publications of this sort
."
which should be sent to our soldiers by the Ortsgruppen. . .

The Leadership Corps also participated in measures leading to

the closing and dissolution of theological schools and other religious
institutions. I now offer in evidence Document Number 122-PS, Ex-
hibit Number USA-362, which, again, is a letter from the Defendant

72
 18 Dec. 45

Bormann to the Defendant Rosenberg in his capacity as the Führer's

Representative for the Supervision of Spiritual and Ideological
Schooling and Education of the NSDAP. This letter is dated
17 April 1939 and transmits to Rosenberg an enclosed photostatic
copy of a plan suggested by the Reich Minister for Science, Edu-
cation, and Popular Culture for the combining and closing of cer-
tain specially listed theological faculties. In his letter of transmittal
the Defendant Bormann requested Reichsleiter Rosenberg to take
cognizance and prompt action with respect to proposed suppression
of religious institutions. I now quote from the next to the last para-
graph on Page 2 of the English translation, in which the plan to
suppress the religious institutions is summarized, and which reads:
"To recapitulate, this plan would mean, in addition to the
closing of the theological faculties at Innsbruck, Salzburg, and
Munich, which has already taken place, and the contemplated
transfer of the faculty of Graz to Vienna, the elimination of
four Catholic theological faculties:
"a) The abolition of three more Catholic theological faculties
or higher schools and of four evangelical theological faculties
in the winter semester 1939-1940;
"b) the abolition of one more Catholic and of three more
1

evangelical theological faculties in the near future."

From the foregoing evidence the inference is irresistible that
the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party shares a responsibility for
the measures taken to subvert the Christian Churches and perse-
cute the Christian clergy, both in Germany and in German-occupied
territories of Europe. The evidence just offered, together with that
previously presented by the Prosecution, demonstrates that there
was a general participation by the Leadership Corps, ranging from
the Reichsleiter to the Gauleiter, adhered to by the rank and file,
in the deliberate program undertaken to undermine Christian reli-
gion. We stress the significance of the appointment of the Defendant
Rosenberg, whose an ti- Christian views are open and notorious, as
the Führer's "delegate" or "representative" for the whole spiritual
and philosophical education of the Nazi Party. It was precisely
this position which gave Rosenberg his seat in the Reichsleitung (the
general staff of the Party), comprising all the Reichsleiter. But
emphasis is placed, not merely upon the fact that anti-Christs such
as the Defendants Bormann and Rosenberg held directive positions
within the Leadership Corps, but upon the further fact that their
directives and orders were passed down the chain of command of
the Leadership Corps and caused the participation of its member-
ship in acts subversive to the Christian Church.
In Document Number D-75, which I believe has been intro-

duced previously —and I am just going to quote one line from

73
 .

18 Dec. 45

it —the Defendant Bormann "Nazism and Christianity are

stated,
irreconcilable concepts." The defendant was never more
right, but
he erred grievously by his prophecy as to which of the two would
first pass away.

I next turn to the responsibility of the Leadership Corps for the

destruction of free trade unions and the imposition of the conspira-
torial control over the. productive labor capacity of the German
nation.
The evidence relating to the responsibility of the Nazi conspira-
tors for the destruction of the independent trade unions has been
previously introduced in evidence in the U.S. Exhibit G, which was
the document book containing the evidentiary materials relating to
the destruction of the trade unions. The brief evidence which I
shall now present is offered to prove the responsibility of the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party for the smashing of the inde-
pendent unions and the imposition of conspiratorial control over
the productive labor capacity of the German nation.
Soon after the seizure of power, prominent members of the
Leadership Corps participated in the smashing and dissolution of
the independent trade unions of Germany. The Defendant Robert
Ley, precisely by virtue of his office as Reich Organization Leader
and Reichsleiter in the Leadership Corps, was directed by Hitler,
in mid-April 1939, to smash the independent unions.
I will pass on now to Document 392-PS, Exhibit Number USA-
326; and I quote, beginning at the top of Page 1 of the English
translation:
"On Tuesday, 2 May 1933 the co-ordination action against
. . .

the free trade unions begins ....

"The essential part of the action is to be directed against the
General German Trade Union League (ADGB) and the Gen-
eral Independent Employees' Federation (AFA-Bund). Any-
thing beyond that which is dependent upon the free trade
unions is left to the Gauleiter's judgment.
"The Gauleiter are responsible for the execution of the
co-ordination action in their individual areas. The action
will be carried out by the National Socialist Factory Cell
Organization. . .

"The Gauleiter is to proceed with his measures on the basis

of the closest agreement with competent Gau or regional
factory cell directors
"In the Reich, the following will be occupied:
."
"The headquarters of the unions. . .

Then it lists a number of offices, and I previously quoted who was

to be taken into protective custody.

74
 . . —
18 Dec. 45

The next provision:

"Exceptions are granted only with the permission of the Gau-
leiter. . .

"It is understood that this action is to proceed in a strongly

disciplined fashion. The Gauleiter are responsible for holding
the direction of the action firmly in hand. Heil Hitler!"
—
signed "Dr. Robert Ley."
The Defendant Ley's order for the dissolution of the independent
trade unions was carried out as planned and directed. Trade union
premises all over Germany were occupied by the SA and the unions
dissolved. On the 2d of May 1933 the official NSDAP press service
reported that the National Socialist Factory Cell Organization
(NSBO) had "eliminated the old leadership of free trade unions"
and taken over their leadership.
I now offer in evidence Document 2224-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-364, which is Pages 1 and 2 of the 2d of May 1933 issues of
the National Socialist Party Press Agency. I quote from Para-
graph 5 of Page 1 of the English translation:
"National Socialism, which today has assumed leadership of
German labor, can no longer bear the responsibility for
leaving the men and women of the German working class,
the members of the largest trade organization in the world,
the German trade union movement, in the hands of people
who do not know a fatherland called Germany. Because of
that, the National Socialist Factory Cell Organization has
taken over the leadership of the trade unions. The NSBO has
eliminated the former leadership of the free trade unions of
the General German Trade Unions League, and of the Gen-
eral Independent Employees' Federation. . .

"On 2 1933 the NSBO took over the leadership of all

May
trade unions; all trade-union buildings were occupied and
most stringent control of financial and personnel matters of
the organizations has been set up."
As shown by this evidence, the assault on the independent unions
was directed by the Defendant Ley, in his capacity as Reichsleiter
in charge of Party organization, assisted by the Gauleiter and Party
formations, and included the seizure of trade-union funds and prop-
erty. In this connection I offer in evidence Document 1678-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-365. This document is a report of a speech
by Reichsleiter Ley on the 11th of September 1937 to the fifth
annual session of the German Labor Front. In this speech Ley
shamelessly corroborates the confiscation of the trade-union funds.
I quote from Paragraph 4 of Page 1 of the English translation:

"Once I said to the Führer: 'My Führer, actually I am stand-

ing with one foot in jail, for today I am still the trustee of

75
18 Dec. 45

the comrades Leipart and Imbusch; and should they some day
ask me to return their money, then it will be found that I
have put it into buildings or otherwise spent it. But they
shall never again find their property in the condition in which
they handed it over to me. Therefore I should have to be
convicted.'
"The Führer laughed then and remarked that apparently I
extremely well in this condition.
felt
."
"It was very difficult for us all. Today we laugh about it . .

The plan of the Nazi conspirators to eliminate the free trade

unions was advanced by the enactment, on 19th May 1933, of a law
which abolished collective bargaining between workers and em-
ployers and replaced it with a regulation of working conditions by
labor trustees appointed by Hitler. I refer to Document 405-PS,
which is the text of the law, 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 285.
After providing in Section 1 for the appointment by Hitler of
trustees of labor, this law provides, and I quote from Section 2 of
the English translation of Document 405-PS:
"Until a new revision of the social constitution, the labor
trustees are to regulate the conditions for the conclusion of
labor contracts. This practice is to be legally binding for all
persons and replaces the system founded on combinations of
workers, of individual employers, or of combinations of
"
employers
Having destroyed the independent unions and collective bargain-
ing, the next step of the Nazi conspirators was to secure the Nazi-
fication in the field of industrial relations. I refer to Document
Number 1861-PS, which is the text of the law of 20 January 1934,
1934 Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 45. This law was entitled the "Law
Regulating National Labor"; and it imposed the leadership principle
upon industrial enterprisers and provided, in Section I, Paragraph 1,
that the enterpriser should be the leader of the plant and the work-
ers would constitute his followers. I now quote from Section I,
Paragraph 2, of the first page of Document Number 1861-PS:
"The leader of the plant has full authority over the employees
in all matters concerning the enterprise, as far as they are
covered by this law.
"He is responsible for the well-being of the employees. The
employees owe him loyalty in keeping with the principles of
factory solidarity."
The trade unions having been dissolved and the leadership
principle superimposed upon the relationship of management and
labor, the members of the Leadership Corps joined in and directed
measures designed to replace the independent unions by the Ger-
man Labor Front, the DAF, an affiliated Party organization. On

76
 18 Dec. 45

the very day the Nazi conspirators seized and dissolved the free
trade unions, the 2d of May 1933, they publicly proclaimed that a
"United Front of German Workers" would be formed with Hitler
as honorary patron at a workers' congress on the 10th of May 1933.
I quote from the next to the last paragraph of Page 2 of Document

2224-PS, which was a release of the Nazi Party Press Agency:

"The National Socialist Party Press Agency is informed that
a great Workers' Congress will take place on Wednesday,
10 May, in the Prussian House of Lords in Berlin. The United
Front of German Workers will be formed there. Adolf Hitler
will be asked to assume the position of honorary patron."'
The Nazi conspirators employed the German Labor Front, the
DAF, as an instrument for propagandizing its millions of compulsory
members with Nazi ideology. The control of the Leadership Corps
over the German Labor Front was assured not only by the desig-
nation of Reichsleiter of the Party Organization Ley as head of the
DAF, but by the employment of a large number of Politische Leiter,
or political leaders, charged with disseminating and imposing Nazi
ideology upon the large membership of the DAF. I now cite Docu-
ment 2271-PS, Exhibit Number USA-328, which is the Party Organi-
zation Book referred to yesterday, Pages 185-187; and I quote from
the first page of the English translation, the first paragraph:
"The NSBO is a union of the political leaders of the NSDAP
in thê German Labor Front.
"The NSBO is to undertake the organization of the German
Labor Front.
"The duties and responsibilities of the NSJSO have passed
over to the German Labor Front.
"The political leaders who have been transferred from the
NSBO to the German Labor Front guarantee the ideological
education of the DAF in the spirit of the National Socialistic
idea."
Now, if Your Honors please, in addition to the evidence heretofore
presented, the Prosecution submits that it is another evidence of
crime that the Leadership Corps of the NSDAP was responsible for
the plundering of art treasures by the Defendant Reichsleiter Rosen-
berg's "Einsatzstab Rosenberg." The definition of "Einsatzstab" is
a "special staff," and I am told that the word "Einsatz" means "to
give action to." In other words, it was a task force, a special staff.
This subject, diverting from the text, had been prepared in con-
nection with the general subject of "Plundering of Art Treasures";
and I shall now turn to the document books of the "Plundering of
Art Treasures," because the citations now will be in this small book.
I now pass to Your Honors Document Book W; and, may I say,
diverting from the text, that the trial address, which is very brief,

77
 18 Dec. 45

has, as I have been told by the Translating Division, been translated

into all four languages; and, as I understand, Colonel Dostert will
distribute it to all parties in their native languages.
Also by way of explanation, in the beginning there is one
reference here to the plundering of art treasures in the occupied
portion of Poland which does not bear directly upon this subject
but does on the general conspiracy; and I thought, in the interest of
time, that we might follow the presentation, because it is very brief.

May it please the Tribunal, the sections of the Indictment which

are to be proved at this point are those dealing with the plunder
of public and private property under Count One, the Common Plan
or Conspiracy. It is not my purpose to explore all phases of the
ordinary plunder in which the Germans engaged. However, I would
bring to the attention of the Tribunal and of the world the defend-
ants' vast, organized, systematic program for the cultural impover-
ishment of virtually every community of Europe and for the enrich-
ment of Germany thereby.
Special emphasis will be placed on the activities of the Einsatz-
stab Reichsleiter Rosenberg; and the responsibility of the Leadership
Corps in this regard is a responsibility that is shared by the Defend-
ants Rosenberg, Goring, and Keitel, and by the defendant organi-
zations; the General Staff, High Command, Gestapo, the Security
Service, and the SS.
Before I deal with the plunder of the cultural treasures by the
Einsatzstab Rosenberg, I wish to reveal briefly the independent
plundering operations conducted in the Government General of
Occupied Poland by authority of the Defendant Goring and under
• the supervision of the Defendant Frank, the Governor General.
In October 1939 Goring issued a verbal order to a Dr. Mühlmann
asking him to undertake the immediate securing of all Polish art
treasures. Dr. Mühlmann himself gives evidence of this order in
Document Number 3042-PS found in the document book last intro-
duced as Exhibit USA-375.
THE PRESIDENT: Are the documents in Book W?
COL. STOREY: Book W; yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: I was asking whether the documents in

Book W are placed in order of number in PS?
COL. STOREY: They are; yes, Sir; and the first one is found
on the first page. I beg your pardon; 3042 would be in numerical
order toward the end, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: I have it. I was merely asking for general
information.

78
 18 Dec. 45

COL. STOREY: These are consecutive. I would like to offer

this affidavitand to read it in full. In short, it was obtained in
Austria. Kajetan Mühlmann states under oath:
"I have been a member of the NSDAP since 1 April 1938.
I was Brigadier General" — —
Oberführer "in the SS.
"I was never an illegal Nazi.
"I was the special deputy of the Governor General of Poland,
Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the
Government General, October 1939 to September 1943.
"Goring, in his function as chairman of the Reich Defense
Committee, had commissioned me with this duty.
"I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor
General, Hans Frank, to take into custody all important art
treasures which belonged to Polish public institutions, private
collections, and the Church. I confirm that the art treasures
mentioned were actually confiscated; and it is clear to me
that they would not have remained in Poland in case of a
German victory, but they would have been used to comple-
—
ment German artistic property." Signed and sworn to by
Dr. Mühlmann.
On the 15th of November 1939 Frank issued a decree, which
is published officially in The Law of the Government General,
(1773-PS, Exhibit USA-376). It is E 800, Article 1, Section 1. It is
not in the document book. It is just a short quotation of which
we ask the Tribunal to take judicial knowledge. Quoting:
"All movable and stationary property of the former Polish
State .will be sequestered for the purpose of securing all
. .

manner of public valuables."

In a further decree of 16 December 1939, appearing as E 845
of the samepublication, Frank provided that all art objects in
public possession in the Government General were to be seized for
the fulfillment of public tasks of common interest, insofar as they
had not already been seized under the decree of 15 November. The
decree provided that, in addition to art collections and art objects
belonging to the Polish State, there would be considered as owned
by the public, those private collections which have not already
been taken under protection by the Special Commissioner, as well
as all ecclesiastical art property.
On the 24th of September 1940 Frank decreed that all property
seized on the basis of the decree of 15 November 1939 would be
transferred to the ownership of the Government General; and this
decree is found as E 810 of the same publication.
It is impossible for me to furnish this Tribunal a complete
picture of the vastness of the program for the cultural impoverish-
ment of Poland carried out pursuant to the directives, as I cannot

79
18 Dec. 45

read into therecord the 500-odd masterpieces catalogued in

Document 1233-PS (Exhibit USA-377) or the many hundreds of
additional items catalogued in Document 1709-PS (Exhibit US A-3 7 8).
Now Document 1233-PS, which I hold in my hand, is a finely bound,
beautifully printed catalogue, in which Defendant Frank proudly
lists and describes the major works of art which he had plundered
for the benefit of the Reich. This volume was captured by the
Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Division of the 3rd United
States Army and was found in Frank's home near Munich. The
introductory page describes the thoroughness with which the Gov-
ernment General stripped Poland of its cultural possessions. That
is quoted in Document 1233-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you hand that up?

COL. STOREY: I am quoting now from the introductory page,
the English translation, the first paragraph. I might say by way
of explanation, that this book lists the valuable art treasures by
titles. I now quote from the introductory page:

"By reason of a decree of 16 December 1939 by the Governor

General of the occupied Polish territories, the Special Com-
missioner for collecting objects of art and culture was able
to collect within 6 months almost all of the art objects of
the country, with one exception: a series of Flemish tapestries
of the Castle of Krakow. According to the latest information
these are now in France, so that it may be possible to secure
these later."
Leafing through this catalogue, we find that it included
references to paintings by German, Italian, Dutch, French, and
Spanish masters; rare illustrated books; Indian and Persian
miniatures; woodcuts; the famous Veit Stoss hand-carved altar
(created here in Nuremberg and purchased for use in Poland);
handicraft articles of gold and silver; antique articles of crystal,
glass, and porcelain; tapestries; antique weapons; rare coins and
medals. These articles were seized, as indicated in the catalogue,
from public and private sources, including the national museums
in Krakow and Warsaw, the cathedrals of Warsaw and Lublin, a
number of churches and monasteries, university libraries, and a
great many private collections of Polish nobility.
I wish now to offer in evidence the catalogue bearing our
—
Number 1233-PS it is the one just introduced in evidence and —
the document bearing our Number 1709-PS. This latter report, in
addition to listing the 521 major items described in the catalogue,
lists many other items which, though generally no less important
from an artistic standpoint, were considered by the Germans to be
of secondary importance from the point of view of the Reich.

80
 18 Dec. 45

It is interesting to note with what pains the Defendant Frank

attempted to conceal his real purpose in seizing these works of art.
The cover of the catalogue itself states that the objects listed were
secured and safeguarded. Strangely enough, it was found necessary
to safeguard some of the objects by transporting them to Berlin
and depositing them in the depot of the Special Deputy or in the
safe of the Deutsche Bank, as is indicated on Page 80 of Document
1709-PS, Exhibit USA-378. The items referred to as having been
transported to Berlin are listed in the catalogue of objects safe-
guarded and their numbers are 4, 17, 27, 35, and so on. Thirty-one
extremely valuable and world-renowned sketches of Albrecht Dürer,
taken from the collection of Lubomirski in Lemberg (Lvov), were
likewise safeguarded. At Page 69 of this report, Dr. Mühlmann
states that he personally handed these sketches to Goring, who took
them to the Führer at his headquarters.
Numerous objects of art: paintings, tapestries, plates, dishes, as
well as other dinnerware, were also safeguarded by Frank, who
had the Special Deputy deliver these objects to an architect for
the purpose of furnishing the castle at Krakow and the Schloss
Kressendorf, which were the residences of the Governor General
Frank. It was apparently Frank's belief that these items would
be safer in his possession, used to grace his table and dazzle his
guests, than they would be in the possession of the rightful owners.
There is no doubt whatever that virtually the entire art
possession of Poland was seized for the use of Germany and would
never have been returned in the event of German victory. Dr.
Mühlmann, a noted German art authority, who directed the seizure
program for the period of 4 years and was endowed by Frank with
sufficient authority to promulgate decrees generally applicable
throughout the territory, has stated the objectives of the program
in no uncertain terms in the affidavit to which I have just referred.
So much for Poland.
I now direct the attention of the Tribunal to the activities of
the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, an organization which planned and
directed the looting of the cultural treasures of nearly all Europe.
To obtain a full conception of the vastness of this looting program,
it will be necessary to envision Europe as a treasure-house in

which is stored the major portion of the artistic and literary product
of two thousand years of Western civilization. It will further be
necessary to envision the forcing of this treasure-house by a horde
of vandals bent on systematically removing to the Reich these
treasures, which are, in a sense, the heritage of all of us, to keep
them there for the enjoyment and enlightenment of Germans alone.
Unique in history, this art-seizure program staggers one's •

imagination and challenges one's credulity. The documents which

I am about to offer in evidence will present undeniable proof of

81
18 Dec. 45

the execution of the policy to strip the occupied countries of the

accumulated product of centuries of devotion to art and the
pursuit of learning.
May I digress here a moment and state that we are not going
to offer all the documents and all the details because our Soviet
and French colleagues will offer a great many of the detailed
documents in support of their case on War Crimes.
I now offer in evidence Document 136-PS as Exhibit USA-367.
And that is an order of Hitler dated the 29th of January 1940
which set into motion the art-seizure program that was to envelop
the continent. I now offer the original. I call Your Honors' attention
to this original, being signed by Adolf Hitler, and I believe it is
in the famous Jumbo type. I quote the order in its entirety. It
is very short:
"The 'Hohe Schule' is to become the center for National
Socialistic research, indoctrination, and education. It will be
established after the conclusion of the war. I order that
the already initiated preparations be continued by Reichs-
leiter Alfred Rosenberg —
especially in the way of research
and setting up of the library.
"All sections of the Party and State are required to co-operate
with him in this task."
Although the above order makes no specific mention of the
seizure of art properties, by the 5th of November 1940 the program
had extended beyond its original scope to include the seizure of
Jewish art collections.
I now offer in evidence Document Number 141-PS (Exhibit
USA-368), which is a certified copy of an order signed by Goring,
dated 5 November 1940, in which the Defendant Goring states;
and I quote:
"In conveying the measures taken until now for the securing
of Jewish art property by the Chief of the Military
Administration, Paris, and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg the . . .

art objects brought to the Louvre will be disposed of in the

following way:
"1. Those art objects the decision as to the use of which
the Führer will reserve for himself;
"2. Those art objects which serve the completion of the Reich
Marshal's collection;
"3. Those art objects and library materials which seem useful
for the establishment of the Hohe Schule and for the program
of Reichsleiter Rosenberg;
"4. Those art objects which are suitable for sending to the
"
German museums

82
 —
18 Dec. 45

Thus, early in 1940, 11 months after the initiation of the

program for establishment of the library for ideological research,
the original purpose had been expanded so as to include the seizure
of art works not only for the benefit of research but for the
delectation of the Führer and Goring and the enhancement of the
collections of German museums.
Impelled as they were by the perfidious dream of subjugating
a continent, the Nazi conspirators could not content themselves
merely with the exploitation of the cultural riches of France and
rapidly extended their activities to the other occupied countries.
I now offer in evidence Document Number 137-PS as Exhibit
USA-379. That is a copy of an order signed by the Defendant
Keitel, dated 5th of July 1940, and I should like to read that brief
order in full:
"To: The Chief of Army High Command, Chief of the Armed
Forces in the Netherlands.
"Reichsleiter Rosenberg has suggested to the Führer that:
"1. The state libraries and archives be searched for documents
valuable to Germany.
"2. The Chancelleries of the high Church authorities and
the lodges be searched for political maneuvers directed
against us and that the material in question be seized.
"The Führer has ordered that this suggestion be followed
and that the Gestapo, supported by the archivists of Reichs-
leiter Rosenberg, be put in charge of the searches. The Chief
of Security Police, SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich, has been
informed. He will communicate with the competent military
commanders in order to execute this order.
"These measures will be executed in all regions of the
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France occupied
by us.
"It is requested that subordinate services be informed.
"Chief of High Command of the Armed Forces," —signed
"Keitel."
From the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France the
Einsatzstab's activities ultimatelywere expanded still further to
Norway and Denmark. I now offer in evidence Document 159-PS,
Exhibit USA-380, which is the copy of an order signed by Utikal,
Chief of the Einsatzstab, dated the 6th of June 1944, from which
it is seen that a special mission of the Einsatzstab was sent to

Norway and Denmark.

As the German Army penetrated to the East, the fingers of
the Einsatzstab reached out to seize the cultural riches thus made
available to them; and their activities were extended to the

83
18 Dec. 45

Occupied Eastern Territories, including the Baltic States and the

Ukraine, as well as to Hungary and Greece. I now offer in evidence
Document 153-PS, Exhibit USA-381, ,being a certified copy of a
letter from Rosenberg to the Reich Commissioner for the East and
Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, dated 27 April 1942. The
subject of the letter is stated to be as follows: "Formation of a
Central Unit for the Seizure and Securing of Objects of Cultural
Value in the Occupied Eastern Territories." In the last paragraph
of that document, I quote:
"With the Commissioners of the Reich a special department
within Department II (political) will be set up for a limited
time for the seizure and securing of objects of cultural value.
This department is under the direction of the appropriate
head of the main group of the 'Einsatzstab Reichsleiter
Rosenberg for the Occupied Territories.'"
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a good time to break
off for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]

COL. STOREY: Activities were initiated in Hungary as indicated

by 'Document Number 158-PS, Exhibit USA-382, which I now offer
in evidence. This was a copy of a message initialed by Utikal,
Rosenberg's Chief of Staff. The first paragraph of this document
states:
"The Einsatzstab of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the Occupied
Territories has dispatched a Sonderkommando under the
direction of Einsatzstabsführer Dr. Zeiss, who is identified by
means of his Service Book Number 187, for the accomplish-
ment of the missions of the Einsatzstab in Hungary outlined
in the Führer's Decree of 1 March 1942."
I now offer into evidence Document Number 171-PS, Exhibit
USA-383, which
an undated report on the "Library for
is
Exploration of the Jewish Question." The fifth paragraph states:
"The most significant book collections today belonging to the
Library for Research on the Jewish Question are the
."
following. . .

The ninth item of the list which follows refers to "Book collections
from Jewish Communities in Greece (about 10,000 volumes)."
It was only natural that an operation conducted on so vast a
scale, extending as it did to France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, the Occupied Eastern Territories,
the Baltic States, the Ukraine, Hungary, and Greece, should call
upon a multitude of other agencies for assistance. Among the other
agencies co-operating in the plunder program were several of
those which stand indicted here as criminal organizations. The

84
 18 Dec. 45

co-operation of the Wehrmacht High Command was demanded by

the Hitler order of 1 March 1942, which I now offer in evidence
as our Document 149-PS, Exhibit USA-369, which is signed
personally by Adolf Hitler and is also in the Jumbo type. The
order decrees the ideological fight against the enemies of National
Socialism to be a military necessity and reaffirms the authority
of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg to conduct searches and seizures of
suitable material for the Hohe Schule. The fifth paragraph states:
"The directives concerning co-operation with the Wehrmacht
were given to the Chief of the OKW with the approval of
Reichsleiter Rosenberg."
While I am on that document, which is referred to later, I
should like to read the other portions. I call attention of Your
Honors to the distribution. It is distributed to all duty stations
of the Armed Forces, the Party, and the State. It says:
"Jews, Freemasons, and related ideological enemies of
National Socialism are responsible for the war which is now
being waged against the Reich. The co-ordinated ideological
fight against those powers is a military necessity. I have
therefore charged Reichsleiter Rosenberg to carry out this
task in co-operation with the chief of the OKW. His Einsatz-
stab in the Occupied Territories is authorized to search
libraries, record offices, lodges, and other ideological and
cultural institutions of all kinds for suitable material, and
to confiscate the said material for the ideological task of the
NSDAP and the later scientific research work of the Hohe
Schule. The same regulation applies to cultural assets which
are in possession of or the property of Jews, or ownerless,
or not clearly of unobjectionable origin."
The final passage is:
"The necessary measures within the Eastern territories under
the German Administration are determined by Reichsleiter
Rosenberg in his capacity as Reichsminister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories."—Signed— "Adolf Hitler."
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I think the Tribunal would
find convenient, and it would save time, if the documents, when
it

they are referred to, were read in full insofar as you want to read
them, rather than returning to read one passage and then
returning to a document later on.
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir. May I explain why that was, Sir? I
was trying to fit in this presentation with the Leadership Corps.
It was quoted in two places and I didn't notice it until I started.

THE PRESIDENT: What I am saying is that I think it is much

easier to follow the documents if all the parts of the document

85
 18 Dec. 45

which you wish to read are read at one time, rather than to read
one sentence, then come back to another sentence, and then
possibly come back to a document for a third sentence. I don't
know whether that will be possible for you to do.
COL. STOREY: We will try to work it out that way, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
COL. STOREY: Co-operation of the SS and the SD is indicated
from Rosenberg to Bormann dated 23rd of April 1941,
in a letter
Document Number 071-PS, Exhibit USA-371, which I now offer in
evidence. This letter states in the fifth sentence of the first
numbered paragraph:
"It is self-evident that the confiscations are not executed by
the Gauleitung, but that they are conducted by the Security
Service as well as by the police."
Farther down in the same paragraph it is stated:
has been communicated to me in writing by a Gauleiter
"It
that the Reich Security Main Office of the S S has requested
the following from the library of a confiscated monastery:
The Catholic Handbook, Albertus Magnus, Edition of the
Church Fathers, History of the Popes by L. von Pastor, and
other works."
The second and last paragraph stated that:
"I should like to remark in this connection that this affair
has already been settled on our side with the Security
Service (SD) in the most co-operative fashion."
The Defendant Goring was especially diligent in furthering the
purposes of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, a diligence which will be
readily understood in view of the fact that he himself directed
that second in priority only to the demands of the Führer were
to be "those art objects which served the completion of the Reich
Marshal's collection." That is Goring.
On May 1, 1941 Goring issued an order to all Party, State, and
Wehrmacht services, which I am now offering into evidence as
1117-PS, Exhibit USA-384. That is an original bearing Göring's
signature. This order requested all Party, State, and Wehrmacht
services —and I now quote:
support and assistance to the Chief
"... to give all possible
The above-
of Staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg's Einsatzstab
mentioned persons are requested to report to me on their
work, particularly on any difficulties which might arise."
On 30th of May 1942 Goring claimed credit for a large degree
of the success of the Einsatzstab. I offer in evidence a captured
photostatic copy of a letter from Goring to Rosenberg, showing
Göring's signature, which bears our Number 1015(i)-PS, which I

86
 18 Dec. 45

offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-385. The last paragraph of this

letter states as follows:
"... On the other hand I also support personally the work of
your Einsatzstab wherever can do so, and a great part of
I

the seized cultural objects can be accounted for by the

fact that I was able to assist the Einsatzstab with my
organizations."
If Ihave tried the patience of the Tribunal with numerous
details as to the origin, the growth, and the operation of the
art-looting organization, it is because I feel that it will be impossible
for me to convey to you a full conception as to the magnitude
of the plunder without conveying to you first, information as to
the vast organizational work that was necessary in order to enable
the defendants to collect in Germany cultural treasures of
staggering proportions.
Nothing of value was safe from the grasp of the Einsatzstab.
In view of the great experience of the Einsatzstab in the complex
business of the organized plunder of a continent, its facilities were
well suited to the looting of material other than cultural objects.
Thus, when Rosenberg required equipment for the furnishing of
the offices of the administration in the East, his Einsatzstab was
pressed into action to confiscate Jewish homes in the West. Docu-
ment 'Number L-188, which is Exhibit USA-386 and which I now
offer in evidence, is a copy of a report submitted by the director
of Rosenberg's Office West, operating under the Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern Territories. I wish to quote at some length from
this document and I call the Tribunal's attention to the third
paragraph on Page 3 of the translation:
"The Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg was charged with
—
the carrying out of this task" that is, the seizure of art
—
properties "in the course of this seizure of property. At
the suggestion of the Director West of the Special Section
of the Einsatzstab, it was proposed to the Reichsleiter that
the furniture and other contents of the unguarded Jewish
homes should also be secured and dispatched to the Minister
for the Occupied Eastern Territories for use in the Eastern
Territories."
The last paragraph on the same page states:
"At the confiscated furniture and goods were dis-
first all
patched tothe administrations of the Occupied Eastern
Territories.Owing to the terror attacks on German cities
which then began and in the knowledge that the bombed-out
persons in Germany ought to have preference over the
Eastern people, Reich Minister and Reichsleiter Rosenberg
obtained a new order from the Führer according to which

87
18 Dec. 45

the furniture, et cetera, obtained through the 'M Action' was

to be put at the disposal of bombed-out persons within
Germany."
The report continues with a description of the efficient methods
employed in looting the Jewish homes in the West (top of Page 4
of translation):
"The confiscation of Jewish homes was carried out as follows:
When no records were available of the addresses of Jews
who had fled or departed, as was the case, for instance, in
Paris, so-called requisitioning officials went from house to
house in order to collect information as to abandoned Jewish
—
homes. They drew up inventories of those homes and sealed
them. ... In Paris alone, about twenty requisitioning officials
requisitioned more than 38,000 homes. The transportation
of these homes was completed with all the available vehicles
of the Union of Parisian Moving Contractors who had to
provide up to 150 trucks, 1,200 to 1,500 French laborers daily."
If Your Honor pleases, I am omitting the rest of the details
of that report because our French colleagues will present the
details later.
Looting on such a scale seems fantastic. But
I feel I must refer
to another statement, forthough the seizure of the contents of over
71,000 homes and their shipment to the Reich in upwards of 26,000
railroad cars is by no means a petty operation, the quantities of
plundered art treasures and books and their incalculable value, as
revealed in the document I am about to offer, will make these
figures dwindle by comparison.
I next refer to the stacks of leather-bound volumes in front of

me, to which the Justice referred in his opening statement.

These 39 volumes which are before me contain photographs of
works of art secured by the Einsatzstab and are volumes which
were prepared by members of the Rosenberg staff. All of these
volumes bear our Number 2522-PS, and I offer them in evidence
as Exhibit USA-388.
I am passing to Your Honors eight of these volumes, so that

— —
each one of you they are all different might see a sample of
the inventory. I call Your Honors' attention to the inside cover
page. Most of them have an inventory, in German, of the contents
of the book; and then follow true photographs of each one of these
priceless objects of art, separated by fine tissue paper.
There are 39 of these volumes that were captured by our forces
when they overran a part of southern occupied German areas.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything known about the articles
photographed here?

88
 18 Dec. 45

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir; I will describe them later. I believe

each one of them is identified in addition to the inventory.

THE PRESIDENT: I meant whether the articles—the furniture

or pictures themselves, have been found.
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, most of them were found in an under-
ground cavern, I believe in the southern part of Bavaria; and these
books were found by our staff in connection with the group of
U.S. Army people who have assembled these objects of art and
are now in the process of returning them to the rightful owners.
That is where we got these books.
I should like to refer, while Your Honors are looking at these,
just to the aggregate totals of the different paintings. Here are the
totals as shown by Document 1015(b)-PS, which is in the document
book. As they are totalled, I don't think Your Honors need to
follow the document; you can continue looking at the books if
you like.

"Up to 15 July 1944 the following had been scientifically

inventoried:
"21,903 Works of Art:
"5,281 paintings, pastels, water colors, drawings; 684
miniatures, glass and enamel paintings, illuminated books
and manuscripts; 583 sculptures, terra cottas, medallions, and
plaques; 2,477 articles of furniture of art historical value;
583 textiles (tapestries, rugs, embroideries, Coptic textiles);
5,825 objects of decorative art (porcelains, bronzes, faience,
majolica, ceramics, jewelry, coins, art objects with precious
stones); 1,286 East Asiatic art works (bronzes, sculpture,
porcelains, paintings, folding screens, weapons); 259 art works
of antiquity (sculptures, bronzes, vases, jewelry, bowls,
engraved gems, terra cottas)."
The mere statement that 21,903 art 'works have been seized does
not furnish an adequate conception of their value. I refer again
to the statement in the document "The extraordinary artistic and
intrinsic value of the seized art works cannot be expressed in
figures," and to the fact that they are objects of such a unique
character that their evaluation is entirely impossible. These 39
volumes are by no means a complete catalogue. They present, at
the most, pictures of about 2,500 of the art objects seized; and I
ask you to iznagine that this catalogue had been completed and
that, in the place of 39 volumes, we had 350 to 400 volumes. In
other words, if they were prepared in inventory form as these
39 volumes, to cover all of them it would take 350 to 400 volumes.
We had arranged, Your Honor, to project just a few of these
on the screen; but before we do that, which is the end of this

89
18 Dec. 45

part of the presentation, I should like to call Your Honor's

attention to Document 015-PS. It is dated April 16, 1943. It is a
copy of a letter from Rosenberg to Hitler. The occasion for the
writing of this letter was the birthday of the Führer, to com-
memorate which, Rosenberg presented some folders of photographs
of pictures seized by the Einsatzstab. And I imagine, although
we have no authentic evidence, that probably some of these were
prepared for that occasion. In the closing paragraph of the letter,
Document 015-PS, Exhibit USA-387, he says:
"I beg of you, my Führer, to give me a chance during my
next audience to report to you orally on the whole extent
and state of this art-seizure action. I beg you to accept a
short, written, preliminary report of the progress and extent
of the art-seizure action, which will be used as a basis for
this later oral report, and also to accept three volumes of the
provisional picture catalogues which, too, show only a part
of the collection at your disposal. I shall deliver further
catalogues, which are now being compiled, as they are
finished."
Rosenberg then closes with this touching tribute to the aesthetic
tastes of the Führer, tastes which were satisfied at the expense of
a continent, and I quote:
"I shall take the liberty during the requested audience to
give you, my Führer, another 20 folders of pictures with the
hope that this short occupation with the beautiful things of
art, which are so near to your heart, will send a ray of
beauty and joy into your care-laden and revered life."
THE PRESIDENT: Will you read all the passage that you
began, five lines above that, beginning with the words, "These
photos represent ."? . .

COL. STOREY: "These pjiotos represent an addition to the

collection of 53 of the most valuable objects of art delivered
some time ago to your collection. This folder also gives only
a weak impression of the exceptional value and extent of
these objects of art, seized by my service command" Dienst-
— —
stelle "in France and put into a safe place in the Reich."
If Your Honors please, at this time we would like to project
on the screen a few of these photographs. The photographs of
paintings which we are now about to project on the screen are
taken from a single volume of the catalogue and are merely
representative of the many volumes of pictures of similar works.
The other items, photos of which are to be projected, were picked
from various volumes on special subjects. For example, the Gobelin
tapestry which you are about to see is merely one picture from an
entire volume of tapestry illustrations. Each picture that you will

90
 18 Dec. 45

see is representative of a number of volumes of similar pictures,

and each volume from which these single pictures were taken
represents approximately a tenth of the total number of volumes
which would be necessary to illustrate all the items actually
plundered by the Einsatzstab. We will now have the slides, just
a few of them.
[Photographs were projected on the screen in the courtroom.]
This first picture is a "Portrait of a Woman," painted by the
Italian painter Palma Vecchio.
The next picture is a "Portrait of a Woman" by the Spanish
painter Velasquez.
This picture is a "Portrait of Lady Spencer" by the English
painter Sir Joshua Reynolds.
This picture is a painting by the French painter Watteau.
This is a painting of "The Three Graces" by Rubens.
This is a "Portrait of an Old Woman" by the famous painter
Rembrandt.
This painting of a young woman is by the Dutch painter
Van Dyck.
Now this picture is a sample of 16th century jewelry in gold
and enamel, decorated with pearls.
This is a 17th century Gobelin tapestry.
This picture is of a Japanese painting from the catalogue
volume on East Asiatic art.
This is an example of famous china.
This is a picture of a silver-inlaid Louis XIV cabinet.
The last picture is of a silver altarpiece of the 15th or 16th cen-
tury, of Spanish origin.
I call your attention again that each of the pictures you have
to
just seen merely representative of a large number of similar items
is
illustrated in the 39-volume catalogue which is in itself only parti-
ally complete. There is little wonder that the Fuhrer's occupation
with these beautiful things of art, which were nearest to his heart,
should have sent a ray of beauty and joy into his revered life.
I doubt that any museum in the world, whether the Metropolitan
in New York, the British Museum in London, the Louvre in Paris,
or the Tretiakov Gallery in Moscow, could present such a catalogue
as this; in fact, should they pool their treasures, the result would
certainly fall short of the art collection that Germany amassed for
itself, at the expense of the other nations of Europe. Never in history
has a collection so great been amassed with so little scruple.
It is refreshing, however, to know that the victorious Allied
armies have recovered most of such treasures, .principally hidden

91
18 Dec. 45

away in salt mines, tunnels, and secluded castles; and the proper
governmental agencies are now in the process of restoring these
priceless works of art to their rightful owners.
I Document 154-PS, which is a letter dated
shall next refer to
the 5th of July 1942 from Dr. Lammers, Reich Minister and Chief
of the Chancellery, to the highest Reich authorities and services
directly subordinate to the Führer. This letter states and imple-
ments the Hitler order that was introduced in evidence and explains
that the Führer delegated authority to Rosenberg's staff to search
for and seize cultural property by virtue of Reichsieiter Rosen-
berg's position as representative of the Führer for the supervision
of the whole ideological and political education of the NSDAP.
The Tribunalwill recall, however, that it is by virtue of holding
this office that Defendant Rosenberg occupied a place within the
Reichsleitung, or Party Directorate of the Leadership Corps. That
is Exhibit USA-370, and it is simply offered for the purpose of show-

ing the address to the highest Reich authorities and services directly
subordinate to the Führer.
In a letter to the Defendant Bormann, dated the 23rd of April
1941, theDefendant Rosenberg protested against the arbitrary remov-
al by the SD and other public services of property from libraries,
monasteries, and other institutions; and he proposed that, in the
claims by the SD and his representative, the final regulation as to
the confiscation should be made by the Gauleiter. This letter has
been offered previously as 071-PS; and I quote, beginning with the
next to the last sentence at the bottom of Page 1 of the English
—
translation I am sorry, Your Honor, that is in the other book.

THE PRESIDENT: You cited 071-PS this morning.

COL. STOREY: Yes, and I will forego that at the moment,
Sir,
Your Honor, because it refers back to the other book. Finally, in
connection with the presentation of this subject, I submit that the
summary of evidence establishes that the defendants and the con-
spirators,Rosenberg and Bormann, acting in their capacity as polit-
ical leaders of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party and as
members thereof, participated in the Conspiracy or Common Plan
alleged in Count One of the Indictment and committed acts
constituting the crimes alleged. Accordingly we submit: (1) The
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party is a group or organization in
the sense in which those terms are used in Article 9 of the Charter;
(2) The defendants and conspirators, Rosenberg and Bormann, com-
mitted the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter, and in that
capacity as members of the political leaders of the Leadership Corps
of the Nazi Party.
It was at all times the primary and central design and purpose
of the Leadership Corps of theNazi Party to direct, engage, and

92
 18 Dec. 45

participate in the execution of the conspiracy which contemplated

and involved the commission of the crimes as defined in Article 6
of the Charter.

And I should like now to call attention again to a chart which

was identified in the beginning —
by Major Wallis; it was
I believe
taken from the publication which is entitled The Face of the Party.
This chart emphasizes, more clearly than I can state, the total and
thorough control over the life of the German, beginning at the age
of 10 at the bottom of the chart and continuing through the various
categories on up through.
Notice the age of 10 to 14, the Jungvolk. Then it goes to the
Adolf Hitler School on the right, 12 to 18. The Hitler Jugend, 15 to 18;
the SA, the NSKK, NSFK, 19 to 20. And then the labor service over
at the left. And then again to the SA, SS, NSKK, NSFK; and then
into the Wehrmacht, and on up through to the top box on the left
of the top row of men, the political leaders of the NSDAP. And
then finally all of those buildings up there, as I understand, are the
academies of the NSDAP. And then finally at the top to the political
leaders of the German Volk, showing the evolution. This is the
final exhibit, and with that I close the presentation of the Leader-
ship Corps. The next presentation is the Reich Cabinet (the Reichs-
regierung). We will take just a few moments.
If Your Honors please, there is one thing Colonel Seay called my
attention to. I simply refer to it for the record. In one of the pre-
vious documents, 090-PS, Exhibit USA-372, which is in the other
document book, there was a statement that clearly established that
the expenses of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, that is, the staffs opera-
tional expenses, were financed by the Nazi Party.

If the Tribunal please, I now offer Document Book X, which

I believe has been passed to Your Honors; and also Colonel Dostert's
staff has prepared a chart of the Reichsregierung in different lan-
guages, and I believe Your Honors have copies. There is one copy
here in German that I shall be glad to pass to counsel who are
especially concerned with this case. They have one copy in German.
I don't know who it is . . .

THE PRESIDENT: You mean counsel for the Reich Cabinet?

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir. May I say also, by preliminary refer-
ence, that we examined the records in the collection office this
morning and only one letter of intervention has been filed on behalf
of the Reich Cabinet and that was by the Defendant Keitel.

We will now consider the Reichsregierung. Some preliminary

remarks about this group have already been placed before the Tri-
bunal by Mr. Albrecht in his comments upon the government chart.
It will be necessary, however, for sake of coherence, to repeat briefly

93
 —
18 Dec. 45

some of the statements made by him, and therefore we beg the

indulgence of the Tribunal.
The Reichsregierung, meaning Reich Cabinet, unlike most of the
other groups named in the Indictment, was not especially created
by the Nazi Party to carry out or implement its nefarious schemes
—
and purposes. The Reichsregierung commonly referred to as the
—
Cabinet had, before the Nazis came to power, a place in the
constitutional and political history of the country. As with other
cabinets of duly constituted governments, the executive power of
the realm was concentrated in that body. The Nazi conspirators
realized this only too well. Their aim for totalitarian control over
the State could not be secured, they realized, except by acquiring,
holding, and utilizing the top-level machinery of the State. And
this they did. Under the Nazi regime the Reichsregierung gradually
became a primary agent of the Nazi Party with functions and poli-
cies formulated in accordance with the objectives and methods of
the Party itself. The institution of the "Reichsregierung" became
at first gradually and then with more rapidity — polluted by the
infusion of the Nazi conspirators into the Cabinet. Many of them
—
16 to be exact sit before you today in the dock. There was no
plan, scheme, or purpose, however vile or inhuman or illegal in any
sense of the word, that was not clothed with the semblance of
legality by the Nazi Reichsregierung. It is for that reason that we
— —
will ask this Tribunal after the proof has been offered to declare
that body, as defined in the Indictment, to be a criminal organi-
zation. The proof will be divided into two main categories, the first
of which will tend to establish the composition and nature of the
Reichsregierung under the Nazis, as well as delineating briefly its
—
functions and powers, while the second will tend to establish and
—
conclusively we believe the reasons why the brand of criminality
should be affixed to that group.
The term "Reichsregierung" literally translated reads "Reich
Government." Actually, as we said, it was commonly taken to refer
to the ordinary Reich Cabinet. In the Indictment the term "Reichs-
regierung" is defined to include not only those persons who were
members of the ordinary Reich Cabinet, but also persons who were
members of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich
and the Secret Cabinet Council. However, the really important sub-
division of the three —
is —
as the proof will show the ordinary Cabi-
net. Between and the other two there was in reality only an
it

artificial distinction. There existed, in fact, a unity of personnel,

actions, functions, and purposes that obliterated any academic
separation. As used in the Indictment, the term "ordinary Cabinet"
means Reich Ministers, that is, heads of departments of the central
government, Reich Ministers without portfolio, State Ministers acting

94
 18 Dec. 45

as Reich Ministers, and other officials entitled to take part in

meetings.
I might state here that altogether there were 48 persons who
held positions in the ordinary Cabinet. Seventeen of them are
defendants before the Tribunal. Bormann is absent. Of the remain-
ing 31, eight are believed to be dead.
Into the ordinary Cabinet were placed the leading Nazi collab-
orators, the trusted henchmen; and then, when new governmental
agencies or bodies were created either by Hitler or the Cabinet
itself, the constituents of these new bodies were taken from the
roles of the ordinary Cabinet.
In 1933 when the first Hitler Cabinet was formed on the 30th of
January, there were 10 ministries that could be classified as depart-
ments of the Central Government. I have here a typed copy of the
minutes of the first meeting of that Cabinet. These were found in
the files of the Reich Chancellery and bear the typed signature of
one Weinstein, who was described in the minutes as responsible for
the protocol, the counsellor of the ministry. That document already
appears in Document Book B; but I again refer the Tribunal to
Page 4 of the translation, which is Document 351 as shown in your
document book and contains a list of those present.
THE PRESIDENT: 351-PS?
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, 351-PS, Exhibit USA-389.
The 10 ministers referred to therein are set forth. They are:
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Defendant Von Neurath;
Reich Minister of the Interior, the Defendant Frick; Reich Minister
of Finance, Von Krosigk; Reich Minister of Economy and Reich
Minister of Food and Agriculture, Dr. Hugenberg; Reich Minister
of Labor, Seldte; Reich Minister of Justice— no name is given the —
post was filled 2 days later by Gürtner; Reich Defense Minister
Von Blomberg; and the Reich Postmaster General and Reich Minister
for Transportation, Von Eltz-Rübenach.
In addition you will note that the Defendant Goring was there
—
as a Reich Minister he had no portfolio then —and as Reich Com-
missar for Aviation. Dr. Gereke was there as Reich Commissar for
Procurement of Labor. Two State Secretaries were present: Dr. Lam-
mers of the Reich Chancellery and Dr. Meissner of the Reich Pres-
idential Chancellery.

THE PRESIDENT: In the copy I have the Defendant Goring

appears as the Reich Minister for Aviation.
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir. I mentioned that he appears as Reich
Minister and as Reich Commissar for Aviation.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see. I was reading from the first two
pages of the document. You were reading from Page 4?

95
18 Dec. 45

COL. STOREY: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. STOREY: I am informed that the Ministry was created
later, but it is given as Reich Commissar for Aviation.
In addition the Defendant Funk was present as Reich Press Chief,
and the Defendant Von Papen was present as Deputy of the Reich
Chancellor and Reich Commissar for the State of Prussia.
Not long after that date new ministries or departments were
created into which leading Nazi figures were placed. On 13 March
1933 the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda was
created. The decree setting it up appears in the 1933 Reichsgesetz-
blatt, Part I, Page 104, our Document 2029-PS.

I assume that the Court will take judicial notice of the laws and
decrees, as we have mentioned in the previous proceeding.
The late Goebbels was named as Reich Minister of Popular
Enlightenment and Propaganda.
On 5 May 1933 the Ministry of Air (Reichsgesetzblatt 1933,
Part I, Page 241, our Document 2089-PS). On 1 May 1934 the
Ministry of Education. I refer to 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,
Page 365, our Document 2078-PS. On 16 July 1935 the Ministry
for Church Affairs (1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 1029, our
Document 2090-PS). The Defendant Goring was made Air Minister;
Bernhard Rust, Gauleiter of South Hanover, was named Education
Minister; and Hans Kerrl named Minister for Church Affairs.
Two ministries were added after the war started. On 17 March
1940 the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions was established
(1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 513, our Document 2091-PS).
The late Dr. Todt, a high Party official, was appointed to this post.
The Defendant Speer succeeded him. The name of this department
was changed to "Armaments and War Production" in 1943 (1943
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 529, our Document 2092-PS). On
17 July 1941, when the seizure of the Eastern Territories was in
progress, the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories was
created. The decree appointing the Defendant Rosenberg to the
post of Minister of this department has already been received in
evidence as Exhibit USA-319.
During the years 1933 to 1945 one ministry was dropped that —
of Defense which was later called "War". This took place in 1938
when, on 4 February, Hitler took over command of the whole
Armed Forces. At the same time he created the "Chief of the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces" or, in other words, the
Chief of the OKW. This was the Defendant Keitel. The decree
accomplishing this change is published in the 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, at Page 111. It appears in our document book as 1915-PS,

96
 18 Dec. 45

and Iwould like to quote a brief portion of that decree. It begins

at the bottom of the second paragraph:
—
"He" referring to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the
—
Armed Forces "is an equal in rank to a Reich Minister.
"At the same time, the Supreme Command takes the respon-
sibility for the affairs of the Reich Ministry of War; and by
my order, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces exercises the authority formerly belonging to the Reich
Minister."
Another change in the composition of the Cabinet during the
years in question should be noted. The post of Vice-Chancellor was
never refilled after the Defendant Von Papen left on 30 July 1934.
In addition to the heads of departments that I have outlined, the
ordinary Cabinet also contained Reich Ministers without portfolio.
Among these were the Defendants Hans Frank; Seyss-Inquart;
Schacht, after he left the Economics Ministry; and Von Neurath,
after he was replaced as Minister for Foreign Affairs. There were
other positions that were also an integral part of the Cabinet. These
were: the Deputy of the Führer, the Defendant Hess, and later his
successor; the Leader of the Party Chancellery, the Defendant Bor-
mann; the Chief of Staff of the SA, Ernst Röhm, for 7 months
prior to his assassination; the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lam-
mers; and, as v/e have already mentioned, the Chief of the OKW,
the Defendant Keitel. These men had either the title of, or the
rank of, Reich Minister. I have already read portions of the law
creating the Chief of the OKW where his importance in Cabinet
affairs is delineated. The importance of the Defendants Hess and
Bormann will soon be expounded, while that of the Chief of the
Reich Chancellery, Lammers, will also soon become self-evident.
But there were others, such as State Ministers acting as Reich
Ministers. Only two persons fell within this category: the Chief of
the Presidential Chancellery, Otto Meissner; and the State Minister
of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Karl Hermann Frank.
In addition, the Indictment names as belonging to the ordinary
Cabinet "others entitled to take part in Cabinet meetings." Many
governmental agencies were created by the Nazis between the years
1933 and 1945, but the peculiarity of such creations was that in
most instances such new posts were given the right to participate
in Cabinet meetings. Here the list is long but significant. Thus
those entitled to take part in Cabinet meetings were: the Com-
manders-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy, the Reich Forest
Master, the Inspector General for 'Water and Power, the Inspector
General of German Roads, the Reich Labor Leader, the Reich Youth
Leader, the Chief of the Foreign Organization in the Foreign Office,
the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich

97
18 Dec. 45

Ministry of the Interior, the Prussian Finance Minister, and the

Cabinet Press Chief.
These, then, were the posts and some of the personnel in the
ordinary Cabinet. They were all positions of such common knowl-
edge and notoriety that the Tribunal can take judicial notice. Fur-
ther, they all appear on the chart entitled "Organization of the
Reich Government," which was authenticated by the Defendant Frick
and is in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-3, which Mr. Alb recht
introduced on the second day of the Trial. They are also provable
by laws and decrees published in the Reichsgesetzblatt and by
notices in the semi-official monthly publication entitled Das Archiv,
which was edited by an official of the Ministry of Popular Enlighten-
—
ment and Propaganda all of which, I submit, are within the judi-
cial notice purview of the Tribunal. The persons who held these
posts in the ordinary Cabinet varied between the years 1933 to 1945.
Does Your Honor wish to adjourn at 12:45?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, perhaps we had better.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

98
 18 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the persons who held

these posts in the ordinary Cabinet varied between the years 1933
and 1945. Although it is not incumbent upon us to prove who they
were, since the group and not the individuals are under consider-
ation, nevertheless their names are already before this Tribunal in
the original governmental chart, Exhibit Number USA-3. Since it
will be of interest to the Tribunal to see what persons and 17 of —
—
them are defendants here held what positions in the Cabinet, a
table has been prepared which lists all the departments and posts
I have mentioned and the incumbents thereof during the years 1933
to 1945. The German equivalents of the titles are also shown; and
with the permission of the Tribunal, I will now distribute this table
to the members of the Tribunal. Copies have likewise been filed in
the defendants' Information Center. The table also is annotated with
—
citations to sources verifying the facts shown all of which, how-
ever, were of common knowledge during the period in question.
Diverting from the text: This is simply prepared for the con-
venience of the Tribunal in connection with the studying of the
briefs and the documents. As I said at the outset, the proof will
show that there was only an artificial distinction between the
ordinary Cabinet, the Secret Cabinet Council, and the Council of
Ministers for the Defense of the Reich. This is evidenced in the
first instance by the unity of personnel between the three sub-
divisions.
Thus, on 4 February 1938 Hitler created the Secret Cabinet
Council. Your Honors will refer to this big chart, you will notice
If
under 1938 there is a red line pointing down to the Secret Cabinet
Council created during that year. This decree appears in the 1938
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, at Page 112. It is in our document book,
Document 2031-PS, and I should like to quote from this document.
It begins with the opening paragraph, Document 2031-PS, under
the Laws and Decrees Section. I quote:
"To advise me in directing the foreign policy I am setting up
a Secret Cabinet Council. As President of the Secret Cabinet
Council nominate Reich Minister Baron von Neurath. As
I
members I nominate:
of the Secret Cabinet Council
"Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop;
Prussian Minister President, Reich Minister of the Air,
Supreme Commander Air Forces, General Field Mar-
of the
shal Hermann Goring; the Führers Deputy, Reich Minister
Rudolf Hess; Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda, Dr. Joseph Goebbels; Reich Minister and Chief
of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Hans Heinrich Lammers;" —that
99
 —
18 Dec. 45

is shown at the top immediately under Hitler "Supreme —

Commander of the Army, Colonel General Waither von
Brauchitsch; Supreme
of Commander
the Navy, Grand
Admiral Dr. Raeder; Chief Supreme Command of the
of the
Armed Forces, General of the Artillery Wilhelm Keitel."
It will be noted that every member was either a Reich Minister
or, as in the case of the Army, Navy, and OKW heads, had the rank
and authority of a Reich Minister.
On 30 August 1939 Hitler established the Council of Ministers
for Defense of the Reich, better known
as the Ministerial Council
coming down from the year 1939, the Ministerial Defense Council.
This was the so-called war cabinet. The decree appears in the 1939
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, at Page 1539. I now refer to Document
2018-PS of the Laws and Decrees, and I quote Section Number 1:
"(1) A Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich shall be
formed out of the Reich Defense Council as a standing com-
mittee;
"(2) The standing members of the Ministerial Council for
Defense of the Reich shall include:
"General Field Marshal Goring as chairman; the Fuhrer's
— —
Deputy" the Defendant Hess "the Plenipotentiary General
for Reich
— Administration" who —
was the Defendant
Frick "the Plenipotentiary General for
— Economy" the —
Defendant Funk "the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
— —
Chancellery" Dr. Lammers "the Chief of the High Com-
—
mand of the Armed Forces" who was the Defendant Keitel.
"(3) The chairman may draw on any other members of the
Reich Defense Council as well as other personalities for
advice."
it will be seen that all were also members of the ordinary
Again
Cabinet. But this use of the Cabinet as a manpower reservoir from
whom the trusted collaborators were selected becomes particularly
poignant when we consider the actions of the Nazi conspirators
which were not published in the Reichsgesetzblatt, which were con-
cealed from the world, and which were part and parcel of their
conspiracy to wage aggressive war. It will have been noted that the
decree setting up the Ministerial Council contained this language,
the one to which I have just referred:
"A Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich shall be
formed out of the Reich Defense Council as a standing com-
mittee ." . . . —
also Subparagraph 3 of the same one "The —
chairman may draw on any other members. ." . .

There is evidence already before this Tribunal establishing the

creation —by the Cabinet—on 4 April 1933 of this really secret war-
planning body. I refer the Tribunal to Exhibit USA-24, which

100
 18 Dec. 45

appears in our document book as Document 2261-PS. That docu-

ment contains the unpublished Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935.
As to the membership of that Council when first created, I have
here a copy of the minutes of the second session of the working
committee of the delegates for the Reich defense, dated 22 May 1933,
and signed by the Defendant Keitel. It appears in our document
book as EC-177, Exhibit USA-390. The composition of the Reich
Defense Council appears on Page 3 of the original, and also on
Page 3 of the translation:

THE PRESIDENT: I thought you were going to refer to 2261-PS.

COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, I just referred to it as
being an exhibit already in evidence and said that it was one of
the unpublished Reich defense laws. That was the only purpose in '

referring to it.

The quotation is from Page 3 of the translation, beginning at the

top of the page:
"Composition of the Reich Defense Council:
"President, Reich Chancellor; Deputy, Minister of the Reichs-
wehr; Permanent Members, Minister of the Reichswehr, Reich
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Reich Minister of the Interior,
Reich Minister of Finance, Reich Minister of Economic Affairs,
Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda,
Reich Air Ministry, Chief of the Army Command Staff, Chief
of the Navy Command Staff, and —
as the case may be the —
remaining Reich Ministers, other personalities, for example,
leading industrialists, et cetera."
All but the Chiefs of the Army and Navy Command Staff were,
then, component parts of the ordinary Cabinet. The composition of
this Defense Council was changed in 1938. I refer the Tribunal to
Exhibit USA-36, which appears in our document book as Number
2194-PS. This contains the unpublished Reich Defense Law of 4 Sep-
tember 1938.

I now quote from Paragraph 10, entitled "The Reich Defense

Council," which is found at Page 4 of the copy of the law in the
original; and I now quote from Page 6 of the English translation,
the top of the page:
"(2) The Führer and Reich Chancellor is chairman in the
Reich Defense Council. His permanent deputy is General
Field Marshal Goring; he has the authority to call conferences
of the Council. Permanent members of the Council are:

"Reich Minister of Air and Supreme Commander of the Air

Force, the Supreme Commander of the Army, the Supreme
Commander of the Navy, the Chief of the OKW, the Führer's

101
18 Dec. 45

Deputy, the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancel-

lery, thePresident of the Secret Cabinet Council, the Pleni-
potentiary General for the Reich Administration, the Pleni-
potentiary General for Economics, the Reich Minister for
Foreign Affairs, the Reich Minister of the Interior, the Reich
Minister of Finance, the Reich Minister for Public Enlighten-
ment and Propaganda, the President of the Reich Bank Direc-
torate.
"The other Reich Ministers and the Reich offices directly sub-
ordinate to the Führer and the Reich Chancellor will be con-
sulted if necessary. Further personalities may be called as
the case demands."
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, it would help me if you
explained to me what conclusions you are asking us to draw from
these documents.
COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, we were trying to show
the progressive domination of the Reich Cabinet by the defendants
and the members of this group, so that, as Your Honors will see
as we later go ahead, they could pass laws and decrees secretly, by
circulatory process or at the will, in effect, of the defendants. I realize
it is a little detailed, but we are trying to show the composition

and how it was set up, and the conclusions will be drawn later.
By that time the Supreme Commanders of the Army and Navy
had been given ministerial rank and authorized to participate in
Cabinet meetings. I cite 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 215.
May we at this time call the attention of the Tribunal to
two members of the Defense Council who will also appear in the
Ministerial Council under the same title: the Plenipotentiary for
Administration and the Plenipotentiary for Economy. The former
post was held by the Defendant Frick, while the latter was first
held by the Defendant Schacht and then by the Defendant Funk,
who signed the decree in that capacity. These facts are verified by
the Defendant Frick in Exhibit Number USA-3, which is the Nazi
governmental organization chart previously referred to.
As we will later show, these two posts had many of the other
ministries subordinated to them for war-planning aims and pur-
poses. They, together with the Chief of the OKW, formed a power-
ful triumvirate, —
known as the "Three-Man College" that is shown
—
in the three boxes down from 1935 to 1938 which figured promi-
nently, as the proof will disclose, in the plans and preparations to
wage aggressive war. And the incumbents of these positions were
Cabinet members: the Defendants Frick, Funk, and Keitel.
This utilization of the ordinary Cabinet as a supply center for
other governmental agencies and the cohesion between all of the
groups is perhaps quickly seen on the chart which is shown.

102
 —
18 Dec. 45

The points I have been making are illustrated on the chart. We

are not offering this chart in evidence, although all facts thereon
already have been or will be proved. The chart is also designed
to depict —
to the left of the line running down the right center
the chronological development of the offshoots of the ordinary
Cabinet. Thus in the main box entitled "Reich Cabinet" which —
—
appears directly under Hitler certain dates appear.
I believe I will skip the part that describes those lines because
it is self-evident.

The Ministerial Defense Council was created in 1944; the

Delegate for Total War Effort was Goebbels. These agencies were,
next to Hitler, the important Nazi functionaries. In every case,
as the chart shows, they were occupied by persons taken from the
ordinary Cabinet. The arrow running from the Reich Defense
Council to the Ministerial Defense Council is intended to reflect
the fact, shown previously, that the latter was formed out of the
former. We will, for other points of this presentation, refer again
to the chart, especially to that portion to the right, which relates
to ministries.

The unity, cohesion, and inter-relationship of the subdivisions of

the Reichsregierung were not the result of a co-mixture of
personnel alone. It was also realized by the method in which it
operated. The ordinary Cabinet consulted together both by meetings
and through the so-called circulation procedure. Under this proce-
dure, which was predominantly used when meetings were not held,
drafts of laws prepared in the individual ministries were distributed
to the other Cabinet members for approval or disapproval.

The man primarily responsible for the circulation of drafts of

laws under this procedure was Dr. Lammers, the Leader and Chief
of the Reich Chancellery. I have here an affidavit executed by
him concerning that technical device, which we offer in evidence
as Exhibit USA-391, Document 2999-PS. It is short and I should
like to quote all of it:

"I, Hans Heinrich Lammers, being first duly sworn, depose

and say:
"I was Leader of the Reich Chancellery from 30 January
1933 until the end of the war. In this capacity I circulated
drafts of proposed laws and decrees, submitted to me by the
minister who had drafted the law or decree, to all members
of the Reich Cabinet. A
period of time was allowed for
objections, after which the law was considered as being
accepted by the various members of the Cabinet. This
procedure continued throughout the entire war. It was
likewise followed also in the Ministerial Council for

103
18 Dec. 45

— —
Defense of the Reich." Signed "Dr. Lammers" — and sworn
to before Lieutenant Colonel Hinkel.
As an illustration of how the circulation procedure worked, I
have here a memorandum dated 9 August 1943, which bears the
facsimile signature of the Defendant Frick and is addressed to the
Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery. Attached to the
memorandum is a draft of the law in question and a carbon copy
of a letter dated 22 December 1943, from the Defendant Rosenberg
to the Reich Minister of the Interior, containing his comments on
the draft. I now offer Document 1701-PS as Exhibit USA-392, and
I call Your Honors' attention to the big red border around the
enclosure. The quoted portion is from Page 1 of the translation
and Page 1 of the original. Quoting:
"To the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
in Berlin (W8). For the information of the other Reich
Ministers. Subject: Law on the Treatment of Asocial Ele-
ments of Society. Referring to my letter of 19 March 1942,
55 enclosures.
"The draft of the Law on the Treatment of Asocial Elements
of Society having been completely rewritten, I am sending
the enclosed new draft with the consent of the Reich Minister
of Justice, Dr. Thierack, and ask that the law be approved
in the circulatory manner. The necessary number of copies
is attached."
The same procedure was followed in the Council of Ministers
when that body was created; and the decrees of the Council of
Ministers were also circulated to the members of the ordinary
Cabinet.
I have here a carbon copy of a memorandum found in the files of
the Reich Chancellery by the Allied armies and addressed to the
members of the Council of Ministers, dated 17 September 1939 and
bearing the typed signature of Dr. Lammers. It is Document
1141-PS, Exhibit USA-393. From the English translation, the last
paragraph just above Dr. Lammers' signature, I quote:
"Matters submitted to the Ministerial Council for Defense of
the Reich have heretofore been distributed only to the
members of the Council. I have been requested by some of
the Reich Ministers who are not permanent members of the
Council to inform them of the drafts of the decrees which
are being submitted to the Council, so as to enable them to
check those drafts from the point of view of their respective
offices. I shall follow this request so that all of the Reich
Ministers will in the future be informed of the drafts of
decrees which are to be acted upon by the Ministerial Council
for Defense of the Reich. I therefore request that 45 additional

104
 18 Dec. 45

copies of the drafts, as well as of the letters which usually

contain the arguments for the drafts, be added to the
folders submitted to the Council."
Von Stutterheim, who was an official of the Reich Chancellery,
comments on this procedure at Page 34 of a pamphlet entitled
The Reich Chancellery, which I now offer in evidence, Document
2231-PS . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I don't understand what the

importance of the last document is.

COL. STOREY: The last document, if Your Honor pleases, is in

further evidence of the approval of laws and of the passing of
laws by a circulatory process.
THE PRESIDENT: We already have that in Dr. Lammers'
affidavit.

COL. STOREY: It might be considered strictly cumulative, if

thatis what Your Honor has in mind.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if it is cumulative, we don't really

want to hear it.
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir; I will ask then that it be stricken from
the record. I had really overlooked the fact that it was cumulative.
Miss Boyd and Commander Kaplan tell me that the Document
Number 2231-PS is probably also corroborative of the same process:
and I will, therefore, not offer it.
I have already stated that for a time the Cabinet consulted
together through actual meetings. The Council of Ministers did
likewise, but those members of the Cabinet who were not already
members of the Council also attended the meetings of the
Ministerial Council. And when they did not attend in person they
were usually represented by State Secretaries of the Ministries.
We have here the minutes of six meetings of the Council of
Ministers of the 1, 4, 8, and 19 September 1939, also of the 16 Oc-
tober and 15 of November 1939. These original documents were
found in the files of the Reich Chancellery. I offer them in
evidence as Document 2852-PS, Exhibit USA-395. It will only be
necessary to point, for our purposes, to a few of the minutes. I
call the attention of the Tribunal to the meeting held on the
1st of September 1939, which is probably the first meeting since
the Council was created on the 30th August 1939; and I read
—
from that document showing who was present beginning at the —
top of the English translation:
"Present were the permanent members of the Ministerial
Council for Defense of the Reich:
"The Chairman, General Field Marshal Goring; the Führer's
—
Deputy, Hess;" for some unknown reason a line appears

105
 .

18 Dec. 45

through the name Hess —

"the Plenipotentiary General for
Reich Administration, Dr. Frick; the Plenipotentiary General
for Economy, Funk; the Reich Minister and Chief of the
Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers; and the Chief of the High
Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel, represented by Major
General Thomas."
These were the regular members of the Council. Also present
were the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, Darré, and
—
seven State Secretaries naming the secretaries. These State
Secretaries were from the several ministries or other supreme
Reich authorities, as, for example, to name a few: Körner was the
Deputy of the Defendant Goring in the Four Year Plan; Stuckart
was in the Ministry of the Interior; Landfried was in the Ministry
of Economics; Syrup was in the Ministry of Labor. These later
positions appear on the government chart which is already in
—
evidence. Another meeting of the Council I will skip that one.
And then there came the names of nine State Secretaries . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Colonel Storey, the last docu-

ment showed only that certain members of the Cabinet came to
a Cabinet meeting. Did it show any more than that?
COL. STOREY: It shows no more than that. I was just going
on a farther to show that an SS Gruppenführer
little was present
also, and other people were present.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What would that show?

COL. STOREY: In other words, that they called in these sub-
ordinate people, as in the meeting of the ministers.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What would that show?
COL. STOREY: Well, it just shows the permeation of the Party
and the subordinate agencies, showing they could use the Reich
Cabinet for whatever purpose they wanted and to devise laws any
way they wanted. They called in these subordinate people, in these
subordinate positions, to sit with them when they were passing
Cabinet measures. I can also call Your Honors' attention to the
Ministerial Council for Defense. It was supposed to be a ministerial-
rank Cabinet meeting; and as I just started to show, they called
in SS Gruppenführer Heydrich to this meeting.
THE PRESIDENT: There can be no doubt, can there, that there
was a Reich Cabinet?
COL. STOREY: No, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: And that the Reich Cabinet made decrees

by this circulatory method? There is no doubt about that.

COL. STOREY: That is right, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: What does this document add to that?

106
 18 Dec. 45

COL. STOREY: It shows who participated, and how they went

out into the Party ranks to bring others, but I will omit the rest
of the references to these other individuals.

THE PRESIDENT: But we have had ample evidence before,

haven't we, as to who formed the Reich Cabinet?
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir. Well, I will skip the rest of the
references to other people who participated, and pass over to
Page 23 of the record. Before leaving these minutes and as
indicative of the activities of the Reichsregierung, I would like to
direct the attention of the Tribunal to some of the decrees passed
and the minutes discussed at these meetings. At the first meeting
of 1 September 1939, 14 decrees were ratified by the Council. Of
this group I call the attention of the Tribunal to Decree Number 6,
appearing on Page 2 of the translation, and I quote:
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you gave us the number,
did you?
COL. STOREY: beg your pardon, Sir. It is the Reichsgesetz-
I

blatt, I, Page 1681, which we ask the Tribunal to take judicial

of
notice. That decree was about the organization of the administra-
tion and about the German Security Police in the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia. That appears in the translation of 2852-PS.
Another one that was passed is dated 19 September 1938, on Page 6
of the translation; and I quote from the bottom of the page:
"The Chairman of the Council, General Field Marshal Goring,
made comments regarding the structure of civil administra-
tion in the occupied Polish territory. He expressed his inten-
tions regarding the economic evacuation measures in this
territory. Then the questions of decreasing wages and the
questions of working hours and the support of members of
families of drafted workers were discussed."
There are a number of miscellaneous points of discussion
appearing, and in Paragraph 2 of the minutes I quote the following
as it appears on Page Number 7:

"The chairman directed that all members of the Council

regularly receive the situation reports of the Reichsführer SS.
Then the question of the population of the future Polish
Protectorate was discussed and the housing of Jews living
in Germany."
I call the attention of the Tribunal to the minutes of
Finally,
the meeting of 15 November 1939, Page 10 of the translation,
where, among other things, the treatment of Polish prisoners of
war was also discussed.
Wesubmit that this document not only establishes the close
working union between agencies of the State and Party, especially

107
18 Dec. 45

with the notorious SS, but also tends to establish, as charged in

the Indictment, that the Reichsregierung was responsible for the
policies adopted and put into effect by the Government, including
those which comprehended and involved the commission of crimes
referred to in the Indictment. But a mere working alliance would
be meaningless unless there was power. And the Reichsregierung
had the power. Short of Hitler himself, it had practically all the
power a government can exercise. The Prosecution has already offered
evidence on how Hitler's Cabinet and the other Nazi conspirators
secured the passage by the Reichstag of the "Law for the Protection
of the People and the Reich" of 24 March 1933, which has been
previously referred to in Document 2001-PS, which law vested the
Cabinet with legislative powers even to the extent of deviating
from previously existing constitutional law; how such powers were
retained even after the members of the Cabinet were changed; and
how the several states, provinces, and municipalities, which had
formerly exercised semi-autonomous powers, were transformed into
the administrative organs of the central government. The ordinary
Cabinet emerged all-powerful from this rapid succession of events.
The words of the Defendant Frick are eloquent upon that achieve-
ment. Here is an article in Document 2380-PS, which I offer in
evidence as Exhibit USA-396; and it is from the 1935 National
Socialist Yearbook. I quote from Page 213 of the original, and it
is on Page 1 of the English translation, the second paragraph:

"The relationship between the Reich and the States has been
put on an entirely new basis never known in the history of
—
the German people. It gives to the Reich Cabinet" Reichs-
—
regierung "unlimited power; it even makes it its duty to
build a completely unified leadership and administration of
the Reich. From now on there is only one national authority:
that of the Reich. Thus, the German Reich has become a
unified state; and the entire administration in the states is
carried out only by order of, or in the name of, the Reich.
The state borders are now only administrative-technical
'
boundaries, but no longer boundaries of sovereignty. In calm
determination, the Reich Cabinet realizes step by step,
supported by the confidence of the entire German people, the
great longing of the nation: the creation of the unified
National Socialist German State."
THE PRESIDENT:
Colonel Storey, that document seems to
me be merely cumulative. You have established, and other
to
counsel on behalf of the United States have established, that the
Reich Ministers had power to make laws, and the question is
whether you have given any evidence as to the criminal nature
of the Reich Cabinet.

108
 . .

18 Dec. 45

COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, again it was included

for the purpose of connecting one of the defendants here . .

THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out was that it was

merely cumulative.
COL. STOREY: Yes, all right, Sir. It may be strictly cumulative.
I willomit the next reference, which will probably also be
cumulative and turn over to . .

THE PRESIDENT: The same document, you mean?

COL. STOREY: No, Sir. There is another document that I was
going to offer, Number 2849-PS. There is a quotation from another
book; it probably bears on the same point. I will omit it also. The
next is a reference to the Ministerial Council's being given
legislative power. I don't believe that that has been introduced
—
before that the Council itself was given legislative powers. That
is in Article 2 of the decree of 30 August 1939, Document 2018-PS.
The ordinary Cabinet continued to legislate throughout the war.
Obviously, because of the fusion of personnel between the
Ministerial Council and the ordinary Cabinet, questions were bound
to arise as to what form should lend its name to a particular law.
Thus Dr. Lammers, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery and a
member of both agencies, wrote a letter on 14 June 1942 to the
Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration about this question.
This next document, if the Court please, it may not be necessary
to read. It just shows that both agencies continued to legislate side
by side, and it would really be cumulative evidence. There were
others that possessed legislative powers, besides the ones I have
mentioned. Hitler, of course, had legislative power. Goring, as
Deputy of the Four Year Plan, could and did issue decrees that
had the effect of law. And the Cabinet delegated power to issue
laws which could deviate from the existing law to the Plenipoten-
tiaries of Economy and Administration and the Chief of the OKW,
—
the so-called "Three-Man College" the Three-Man College having
authority to legislate. This was done in the war-planning law, the
Secret Defense Law of 1938, Document 2194-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-36. These three officials, Frick, Funk, and Keitel, however,
were, as we have proved, also members of the Council of Ministers,
as well as being part of the ordinary Cabinet. It can therefore
be readily said, in the language of the Indictment, that the Reichs-
regierung possessed legislative powers of a very high order in the
system of German government and that they exercised such powers
has in part already been demonstrated. I simply refer to that to
—
show that it was a secret Cabinet law without quoting that the —
executive and administrative powers of the Reich were concentrated
in the central Government primarily as the result of two basic Nazi
—
laws that reduced the separate states called Länder to mere —

109
18 Dec. 45

geographical divisions. If Your Honor pleases, these laws are cited,

and I believe it would be cumulative evidence if we undertook to
chronicle the laws. I pass to the part at the bottom of Page 29.
There were other steps taken towards centralization. Let us see
what powers the ordinary Cabinet would wield as a result. We
have here a publication published in 1944, which was edited by
Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart, State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of
the Interior, and Dr. Harry von Rosen-von Hoewel, another official
with the title of "Oberregierungsrat" in the Reich Ministry of the
Interior. It is entitled Administrative Law, and I offer it as
Document 2959-PS, Exhibit USA-399. It details the powers and
functions of all the ministers of the ordinary Cabinet, from which
I will select but a few to illustrate the extent of control vested
in the Reichsregierung. The quotation is from Page 2 of the
translation and Page 66 of the original: "The Reich Ministers. There
are at present 21 Reich Ministers, namely " May I say that the

only purpose in offering this is to show what each minister had

jurisdiction over and to what his authority extended; for example,
—
the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs it details what he handles.
The Reich Minister of the Interior follows in detail on the matters
entrusted to his jurisdiction, and so on.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, may I ask you what has that
to do with the criminality of the Reich Cabinet?
COL. STOREY: The point, as I see it, again though it may be
cumulative, Your Honor, is to show how these defendants, and the
others with them, formed the ministries, formed these councils,
so that they could give semblance of legality to any action they
determined to take, whether they were in session or not and
according to the dictates of the respective Ministers; in other words,
showing a complete domination.
THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought that was amply shown
already.
COL. STOREY: All right, Sir, I'll pass further reference. I'll
skip over all the rest of the laws and go to Page 35 of the record,
in reference to the criminality and the particular crimes. We now
come to the second phase of the proof against the Reichsregierung,
tending to establish the criminal characteristics. As the proof of
all phases of the Prosecution's case is received, the Tribunal will
note more and more the relationship such evidence bears to the
Reichsregierung and their resultant responsibility therefor. Here we
will direct the Court's attention to some prominent elements of
the evidence that brands the group. First, it cannot be stressed too
frequently that under the Nazi regime the Reichsregierung became
a criminal instrument of the Nazi Party. In the original Cabinet
of 30 January 1933, there were only three Cabinet members who

110
 18 Dec. 45

were members of the Party: Goring, Frick, and Hitler. I have

already shown that as new ministries were added prominent Nazis
were placed at their head. On 30 January 1937 Hitler executed
acceptance into the Party of those Cabinet members who were
not already members of the Nazi Party. This action is reported
in the Völkischer Beobachter, South German edition, 1 February
1937; it is Document Number 2964-PS, Exhibit USA-401, and I
quote from Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the English translation:
"In view of the anticipated re-opening of the rolls for Party
membership, the Führer, as the first step in this regard,
personally carried out the enlistment into the Party of the
members of the Cabinet who so far had not belonged to it;
and he handed them simultaneously the Gold Party Badge,
the supreme badge of honor of the Party. In addition, the
Führer awarded the Gold Party Badge to Colonel General
Baron von Fritsch; Generaladmiral, Dr. Raeder; the Prussian
Minister of Finance, Professor Popitz; and the Secretary of
State and Chief of the Presidential Chancellery, Dr. Meissner.
The Führer also honored with the Gold Party Badge the
Party members State Secretary Dr. Lammers, State Secretary
Funk, State Secretary Körner, and State Secretary General
of the Air Force Milch."
It was possible to refuse the Party membership thus conferred.
Only one man did this, however, Von Eltz-Rübenach, who was the
Minister of Posts and Minister of Transport at the time. I have
here an original letter, dated 30 January 1937, from Von Eltz-
Rübenach to Hitler, and it is in his own personal handwriting. I
offer it in evidence as Document 1534-PS, Exhibit USA-402; and
I quote the entire document:

"Berlin (W8), 30 January 1937, Wilhelm Street, 79

"My Führer:
"I thank you for the confidence you have placed in me during
the 4 years of your leadership and for the honor you do me
in offering to admit me into the Party.
"My conscience forbids me, however, to accept this offer. I
believe in the principles of positive Christianity and must
remain faithful to my God and to myself. Party membership,
however, would mean that I should have to countenance,
without protest, the increasing violent attacks by Party
officers on the Christian confessions and on those who wish
to remain faithful to their religious convictions.
"This decision has been infinitely difficult for me, for never
in my life have I performed my duty with greater joy and
satisfaction than under your wise state leadership.
"I ask to be permitted to resign.

Ill
 .

18 Dec. 45

"With German greetings, yours very obediently, Baron

von Eitz."
But the Nazis didn't wait until all members of the Cabinet . .

THE PRESIDENT: Was Baron von Eitz permitted to resign?

COL. STOREY: Yes. As I understand, Your Honor, every one
of them was a member, except this one; and he declined and
—
resigned which was accepted. The Nazis didn't wait until all
members of the Cabinet were Party members. Shortly after they
came to power, they quickly assured themselves of active
participation in the work of the Cabinet. On 1 December 1933
the Cabinet passed a law securing the unity of Party and State.
That has been introduced previously and I will not refer to it any
more. It is referred to here as our Document Number 1395-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Why is Baron von Eitz shown as a member
of the Cabinet in 1938?
COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, the "1938" simply refers
to the time the Secret Cabinet Council was created. It does not
have to do with when any of these people came to the Cabinet.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see.

COL. STOREY: In other words, all these arrows show that these
different agencieswere created during those years.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I follow it.

COL. STOREY: I say, for Your Honors' information, that in

this list of all of the Cabinet members and the members of the
Reichsregierung from 1933 his name is shown in the list that we
handed to Your Honors.

THE PRESIDENT: Up to 1937?

COL. STOREY: No, Sir; from 1933 down to 1945 his name is
listed.If Your Honors will recall, we handed in a separate list
and it does contain the Baron's name, with the authority of his
appointment, et cetera.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean that is a mistake?

COL. STOREY: No, Sir; it is not a mistake.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, he didn't resign?
COL. STOREY: He did resign; but Your Honor asked if his
name was shown up here and I said that in the separate list
showing the list of all members of the Reichsregierung, from 1933
to 1945, the Baron's name was included and the proper reference
is made in this separate list for Your Honors' guidance.

I have here a copy of an unpublished decree signed by Hitler,

dated 27 July 1934. It is Document D-138, Exhibit USA-403; and

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 18 Dec. 45

it is in the section of "Laws and Decrees," if Your Honor pleases,

and I offer it in evidence. This is a decree of Adolf Hitler:
"Idecree that the Führer's Deputy, Reich Minister Hess, will
have the capacity of a participating Reich Minister in con-
nection with the preparation of drafts for laws in all Reich
administrative spheres. All legislative work is to be sent to
him when it is received by the other Reich Ministers con-
cerned. This also applies in cases where no one else par-
ticipates except the Reich Minister making the draft. Reich
Minister Hess will be given the opportunity to comment on
drafts suggested by experts. This order will apply in the
same sense to legislative ordinances. The Fuhrer's Deputy
in his capacity of Reich Minister can send, as representative,
an expert on his staff. These experts are entitled to make
statements to the Reich Ministers on his behalf." Signed by —
Hitler.

The Defendant Hess himself has some pertinent comment to

make regarding his right of participation on behalf of the Party.
And I now offer in evidence Document D-139, Exhibit USA-404.
This is an original letter signed by Rudolf Hess and is dated the
9th of October 1934, on the stationery of the National Socialist
Party; and it is addressed to the Reich Minister for Enlightenment
of the People and Propaganda. I now quote the entire document:

"By a decree of the Führer dated 27 July 1934, I have been

granted the right to participate in the legislation of the Reich
as regards both formal laws and legal ordinances. This right
must not be rendered illusory by the fact that I am sent
the drafts of laws and decrees so late and am then given a
time limit with the result that it is impossible for me to deal
with the material concerned within the appointed time. I must
point out that my participation means taking into account
the opinion of the National Socialist Party as such and that,
in the case of the majority of drafts of laws and decrees, I
consult with the appropriate departments of the Party before
making my comment. Only by proceeding in this manner can
I do justice to the wish of the Führer as expressed in the
decree of the Führer of 27 July 1934. I must therefore ask
the Reich Ministers to arrange that drafts of laws and decrees
reach me in sufficient time. Failing this, I should be obliged
in the future to withhold my agreement to such drafts, from
the beginning and without giving the matter detailed
attention, in all cases where I am not given a sufficiently
—
long period for dealing with them. Heil." Signed Rudolf Hess.
A handwritten note appears attached to the letter. It reads,
and I quote from Page 2 of the translation:

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18 Dec. 45

"Berlin, 17 October 1934.

"1. The identical letter seems to have been addressed to all
Reich Ministers. In our special field the decree of 27 July
1934 has hardly become applicable so far. A reply does not
seem called for.
"2. File. By order"—signed— "R."
participating powers of Hess were later broadened. I now
The
refer to Document D-140, Exhibit USA-405; and it is a letter dated
the 12th of April 1938 from Dr. Lammers to the Reich Ministers.
I offer it in evidence and quote from the English translation,
Paragraph 3:

"Under the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the first decree

concerning reconstruction of the Reich, of February 2d, 1934
(Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 81), the Führer's Deputy will also
participate in the approval by Reich Ministers of laws and
legislative ordinances of Länder. Where the Reich Ministers
have already at an earlier date been engaged in the
preparation of such laws or legislative ordinances or have
participated in such preparation, the Führer's Deputy likewise
becomes participating Reich Minister. Laws and legislative
decrees of the Austrian State are equally affected hereby."
Signed — "Dr. Lammers."
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, may I ask you what those
three documents are supposed to prove?
COL. STOREY: In the first place, Your Honor, the one I have
just referred to shows that they passed laws over conquered
—
territory that one related to Austria. The one signed by Hess, just
before, gives him almost unlimited power as regards both formal
and legal ordinances and over administrative districts; and in
addition, I think, Your Honor, the most important point is that
Hess says: You must send them to me long enough in advance so
that I may consult with the Party and the appropriate Party
members and get their reaction.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that relied upon as evidence of crim-
inality, that he took the trouble to find out what other ministers
thought?
COL. STOREY: I think it is a part of the general conspiracy
showing the domination of Party and State by the Nazi Party and
particularly the Leadership Corps.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought I had already said that it appeared
to —
us and I think I speak on behalf of all the Tribunal that that —
matter had been amply proved and that we wished you to turn
to the question of criminality of the Reich Cabinet.

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COL. STOREY: May I assume, Your Honors, that we need to

offer no further proof that the Party itself had to do with the
making of these laws as suggested by the Defendant Hess? I thought
it was incumbent upon us to prove that the Party dominated this
Cabinet, and particularly the Leadership Corps.
THE PRESIDENT: You are dealing now with the Reich Cabinet,
and I think the Tribunal is satisfiedthat the Reich Cabinet had full
powers to make laws.
COL. STOREY: I think that we go a little step further and
undertake to show, if we have not already shown, that the way
—
and manner in which they did it by consulting the Party was —
criminal. Now, I have some other laws to cite here in corroboration
of that; but, if the Tribunal is satisfied, I don't see any use in
citing them.
THE PRESIDENT: I the Tribunal would imagine
don't think
that they made laws without consulting somebody. Perhaps it
would be a convenient time to break off for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]

COL. STOREY: If Your Honors please, when we adjourned we

were speaking of these laws that had been passed; and certainly
I do not want to offer any cumulative evidence or any that is

not necessary. I therefore am briefly referring to the laws which

we propose to offer now.
The Party, as Your Honors will recall, had 25 fundamental
points which they had set out to achieve, as introduced in evidence
yesterday. Those points, Your Honors will recall, related to
everything from the abrogation of the Treaties of Versailles and
St. Germain to the obtaining of greater living space, and so forth.
Now, we propose to cite to Your Honors various decrees and
laws passed by this Cabinet carrying into effect what we contend
were the criminal purposes of the Party, and to show that the Reich
Cabinet was asked by the Party to give semblance of legality to
their alleged criminal purposes. That is the only reason we expect
to chronicle or to mention the laws that were passed in pursuance
thereof. And I shall proceed, as Your Honors suggest, by simply
listing a group of the laws that seek to establish the co-called
25 points of the Nazi Party. Perhaps, with Your Honors' permis-
sion, I will just refer to a few of them as being indicative of the
type of laws that were passed to further their 25 points.
For example, in implementation of this point the Nazi Cabinet
enacted, among others, the following laws:
The law of February 3, 1938, concerning the obligation of Ger-
man citizens in foreign countries to register. That is cited in the
Reichsgesetzblatt.

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18 Dec. 45

The law of the 13th of March 1938; relating to the reunion of

Austria with Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: These were all passed by the Reich Cabinet,
were they?
COL. STOREY: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, aren't you going to cite the laws?
COL. STOREY: Yes, but I was going to show them as illustra-
tive; that is the 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 237.

The law of November 21, 1938, for the reintegration of the Ger-
man Sudetenland with Germany, 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,
Page 1641.
The incorporation of Memelland into Germany, March 23, 1939,
Part I, Page 559, of the 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt.
With reference to Point 2 . .

THE PRESIDENT: Would you give me the place where the

25 points are set out? Have you got a reference to that?
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir; it appears in Document 1708-PS, in
Document Book A.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
COL. STOREY: And I believe we referred to it yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: That is sufficient.

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir.

Now, as an illustration, Point 2 of that Party platform which, —
as Your Honors will recall, demanded the cancellation of the
Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain the following acts of the —
Cabinet in support of this part of the program may be mentioned:
Proclamation of October 14, 1933 to the German people concern-
ing Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Dis-
armament Conference, 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 730.
Law of March 16, 1935 for the establishment of the Wehrmacht
and compulsory military service, 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,
Pages 369 to 375.
Now, with reference to Point 4 of the Party platform, which said:
"Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of
the race can only be one who is of German blood without
consideration of confession. Consequently, no Jew can be a
member of the race."
That is Point 4.

Among other Cabinet laws, this point was implemented by the

law of July 14, 1933 for the recall of naturalization and deprivation
of citizenship of these people, 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 480.

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 18 Dec. 45

The law of April 7, 1933, which said that persons of non-Aryan

descent could not practice law, 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,
Page 188.
The law of April 25, 1933, restricting the number of non-Aryans
in schools and higher institutions of learning, 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, Page 225.
The law of September 29, 1933, excluding persons of Jewish
blood from the peasantry, 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 685.
Another one, March 19, 1937, excluded Jews from the Reich
Labor Service, 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 325.
There is another one of July 6, 1938, prohibiting Jews from
participating in six different types of businesses, 1938 Reichsgesetz-
blatt, Part I, Page 823.
Point 23 of that Party platform proclaimed, "We demand legis-
lative action against conscious political lies and their broadcasting
through the press. ..."
To carry out this point I give a few of the Cabinet laws that
were passed. One of September 22, 1933, which established the
Reich Culture Chamber, 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 661.
One concerning editors, of October 4, 1933, 1933 Reichsgesetz-
blatt, Part Page 713.
I,

Another one with reference to restrictions as to the use of the

theater, on May 15, 1934, 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 411.
Now, passing from those illustrative laws, the ordinary Cabinet
in fact enacted most of the legislation which set the stage for and
put into execution the Nazi conspiracy described under Count One
of the Indictment. Many of these laws have been referred to previ-
ously by the Prosecution. All of the laws to which I shall refer or
have referred were enacted specifically in the name of the Cabinet.
A typical introductory paragraph reads, and I quote: "The Reich
Cabinet has enacted the following law which is hereby promul-
gated." In other words, that shows it is a Cabinet law.

THE PRESIDENT: That applies to all the ones you have just
given us?
COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir. That is a typical heading.
In connection with the acquiring of control of Germany, under
Count One of the Indictment, I refer to some of the following laws.
Here is a law of the 14th of July 1933 against the establishment
of new parties. I believe I referred to that yesterday. That is 1933
Reichsgesetzblatt, PartI, Page 479.

Another of 14 July 1933 provided for the confiscation of property

of Social Democrats and others, 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,
Page 479.

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18 Dec. 45

I have already referred to that law of 1 December 1933 which

consolidated the Party and the State, which is found in 1933 Reichs-
gesetzblatt, Part I, Page 1016. In the course of consolidating the
control of Germany these laws were enacted, and I give a few
illustrations: 21 March 1933, creating special courts that is in 1933 —
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 136; law of the 31st of March 1933
for the integration of all the states into the Reich, 1933 Reichs-
gesetzblatt, Part I, Page 153.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that. Integration of what?

COL. STOREY: Integration of the states— that is the separate
states into the Greater Reich.

Here is one of 30 June 1933, eliminating non-Aryan civil servants

or civil servants married to non-Aryans, 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, Page 433; then the law of the 24th of April 1934 creating
the People's Court, 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 341 and —
that was the same court Your Honors saw functioning in one of the
movies exhibited last week.
Here is the law of 1 August 1934, uniting the office of President
and Chancellor, 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 747.
I am not introducing all of them or referring to all of them.
Here a law of the 18th of March 1938 that provides for the
is
submission of one list of candidates to the electorate of the entire
Reich, 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 258.
Nazi extermination of political internal resistance in Germany
through the purge of their political opponents and through acts of
terror, which are set forth in Paragraph III(D) 3(b) of Count One,
was facilitated or legalized by the following Cabinet laws, trans-
lations being found in Document Book F, which has previously been
submitted. I will just refer to a few of these as they are translated
in that book.
Here one of 14th of July 1933 that prohibits the establishment
is
of new and contains a penal clause. That is found in 1933
parties
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 479. Here is one of 20th Decem-
ber 19 . .

THE PRESIDENT: You have already given that one.

COL. STOREY: I believe so; yes, Sir.

Here is a law of the 3rd of July 1934 concerning measures for
emergency defense of the State, and which legalized their own
purge. That is in 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 529.
Here is a law of the 20th of December 1934 on treacherous acts
against the State and Party and for protection of the Party uni-
forms, 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 1269.

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 18 Dec. 45

Here is one of the 24th of April 1934 that makes the creation of
a new, or continuance of existing, political Parties an act of treason,
1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 341.
Here is one of the 28th of June 1935 that changes the Penal
Code, 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 839.
Here is the final one I will mention: 16 September 1939, per-
mitting second prosecution of an acquitted person before a special
court, the members of which were named by Hitler, 1939 Reichs-
gesetzblatt, Part I, Page 1841.
Now, next are some laws that related to the extermination of
the Trade Unions, which I have already cited, and they are in Docu-
ment Book G. I will not refer to them. Then the laws abolishing
—
collective bargaining I have referred to those; I will pass them.
In fact, even the infamous Nuremberg Laws of September 15,
1935, although technically passed by the Reichstag, were never-
theless worked out by the Ministry of the Interior. This is verified
by a work of Dr. Franz A. Medicus, Ministerialdirigent, published
in 1940. It is Document 2960-PS, Exhibit USA-406. I would like
to refer to the paragraphs at Page 62 of the original publication,
and translated in our Document 2960-PS. Beginning the first para-
graph:
"The work of the Reich Ministry of Interior forms the basis
for the three 'Nuremberg Laws' passed by a resolution of the
Reichstag on the occasion of the Reich Party Meeting of
Freedom.
"The 'Reich Citizenship Law' as well as the 'Law for the
Protection of German Blood and German Honor' opened
extensive tasks for the Ministry of the Interior not only in
the field ... of administration. The same applies to the
'Reich Flag Law' that gives the basis for the complete revi-
sion of the national flags."
A few decrees of the Council of Ministers which similarly sup-
plied the legal basis for the criminal acts and conduct of the con-
spirators, about which the Tribunal has already heard and will hear
more, relate to those of August 5, 1940, which imposed a discrim-
inatory tax on Polish workers in Germany, and that is in 1940
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 1077; also the law of 4 December
1941, which imposed penal measures against the Jews and the Poles
in the eastern occupied countries, 1941 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,
Page 759. The last one was concerning the employment of Eastern
Workers, which I referred to this morning.
Almost immediately upon Hitler's coming into power, the Cabi-
net commenced to implement the Nazi conspiracy to wage aggres-
sive war. Three of the documents that establish this point have
already been introduced in evidence. They are EC-177, 2261-PS,

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18 Dec. 45

and 2194-PS, respectively. Document EC-177, which is Exhibit

USA-390, is a long copy of the minutes; and I beg the indulgence
of the Tribunal for referring to it again. It is EC-177 . .

THE PRESIDENT: Is it in this book?

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, EC-177. Your Honors, I didn't intend
to quote from that. I am simply referring to it as being the minutes
of the second session of the working committee of the delegates for
Reich defense and being signed by the Defendant Keitel.
Document 2261-PS
consists of a letter dated the 24th of June
1935. That transmits a copy of a secret, unpublished defense law
of 21 May 1935 and also a copy of a decision of the Reich Cabinet
of the same date, in the Council for Defense of the Reich. These
have been previously introduced, but they are illustrative laws
passed by this Cabinet.
Document 2194-PS also transmits a copy of the secret, un-
published Reich Defense Law, 4 September 1938.
I will skip down to the laws passed by the Reich Defense Coun-
cil, on Page 50, for the record.
The Reich Defense Council was a creation of the Cabinet. On
4 April 1933 it was decided to form that agency. The decision of
the Cabinet attached to Document 2261-PS, which is Exhibit USA-24,
Page 4 of the translation, Paragraph 1, proves that fact. The two
secret laws contained in Document 2261-PS, as well as 2194-PS,
were passed by the Cabinet; nor was this a case of one group
setting up an entirely distinct group to do its dirty work. The
Cabinet put itself into the picture. This might have been a diffi-
cult task to accomplish before the Nazis assumed power, but with
the Nazis in control, things could move swiftly; and I now refer
again to Document EC-177, but I will not undertake to quote from
that, although the quotation is set out here.
Thereonly one point in that connection which would not be
is
cumulative. It is Page 5 of the translation and Page 8 of the original
of EC-177, on the question of security and secrecy, that I think
would be pertinent to the criminal nature. I quote:
"The question has been brought up by the Reich Ministries.
The secrecy of all Reich defense work has to be maintained
very carefully. Communications with the outside, by mes-
senger service only, has been settled already with the Min-
istry of Posts, Ministry of Finance, Prussian Ministry of the
Interior, and the Reichswehr Ministry. Main principle of
security: no document must be lost, since otherwise enemy
propaganda would make use of it. Matters communicated
orally cannot be proved; they can be denied by us in Geneva.
Therefore the Reichswehr Ministry has worked out security

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directives for the Reich Ministries and the Prussian Ministry

of the Interior."

I will skip the next reference. I believe I will skip over to the
affidavit of Defendant Frick, on Page 60.
THE PRESIDENT: What is that?

COL. STOREY: It is,- if Your Honor pleases, Document 2986-PS.

It Exhibit USA-409. It is the original affidavit, signed by the
is
Defendant Frick. I believe Defendant Frick sums up pretty well
how the work was carried on.
"I, Wilhelm Frick, being first duly sworn, depose and say:

"I was Plenipotentiary General for the Reich Administration

from the time when this office was created until 20 August
1943. Heinrich Himmler was my deputy in this capacity.
Before the outbreak of the war my task as Plenipotentiary
General for Reich Administration was the preparation of
organization in the event of war, such as, for instance, the
appointment of liaison men in the different ministries who
would keep in touch with me. As Plenipotentiary General
for Reich Administration I, together with the Plenipotentiary
General for Economy and the OKW, formed a so-called 'Three-
Man College.' We were also members of the Reich Defense
Council, which was to plan preparations and decrees in case of
war, which later were published by the Ministerial Council for
Defense of the Reich: Since, as soon as the war had started,
everything would have to be done speedily and there would
be no time for planning, such war measures and decrees were
prepared in advance. All one then had to do was to pull out
of the drawer the war orders that had been prepared. Later
on, after the outbreak of the war, these decrees were enacted
by the Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich." Signed —
and sworn to by Dr. Wilhelm Frick, on the 19th of Novem-
ber 1945.
To sum up this particular phase of the proof, the Cabinet by its
own decision and its own laws created a large war-planning body
—
the Reich Defense Council the members of which were taken 'from
the Cabinet. Within the Council they set up a small working com-
mittee, again composed of Cabinet members and certain defense
officials, a majority of whom were appointed from the Cabinet
members. And to streamline the action, they placed all of its
—
ministries except Air, Propaganda, and Foreign Affairs into the —
groups headed respectively by the Plenipotentiaries for Economy
and Administration, and the OKW; and everything was organized
in and for the greatest of secrecy.
That is this Three-Man College.

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Now, in conclusion, if Your Honor pleases, I would like at this

time to summarize briefly the proof concerning the Reichsregierung.
From 1933 to the end of the war, the Reichsregierung com-
prised the dominant body of influence and leadership below Hitler
in the Nazi Government. The three subdivisions were included in
the term Reichsregierung in the Indictment: the ordinary Cabinet,
the Secret Cabinet Council, and the Council of Ministers for De-
fense of the Reich. Yet in reality there existed only an artificial,
illusory boundary between the three.

The predominant subdivision was, of course, the ordinary Cabi-

net, which was commonly referred to as the Reichsregierung. In
it were the leading political and military figures in the Nazi Govern-
ment. Seventeen of the 22 defendants before this Tribunal were
integral parts of the ordinary Cabinet.
I should like now to name these defendants and to indicate the
positions they held in the Reichsregierung:
Martin Bormann, Leader of the Party Chancellery; Karl Dönitz,
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; Hans Frank, Reich Minister with-
out Portfolio; Wilhelm Frick, Minister of the Interior, Plenipoten-
tiary for Reich Administration; Walter Funk, Minister of Economics,
Plenipotentiary for Economy; Hermann Goring, Minister for Air,
Reich Forest Master; Rudolf Hess, Deputy of the Führer; Wilhelm
Keitel, Chief of the OKW; Constantin H. K. von Neurath, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, President of the Secret Cabinet Council; Franz
von Papen, Vice-Chancellor; Erich Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy; Joachim von Ribbentrop, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Alfred Rosenberg, Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories;
Hjalmar Schacht, Acting Minister of Economics, Reich Minister
without Portfolio, President of the Reichsbank, Plenipotentiary for
War Economy; Baldur von Schirach, Reich Youth Leader; Arthur
Seyss-Inquart, Reich Minister without Portfolio; and finally, Albert
Speer, Minister for Armaments and War Production.
From the ordinary Cabinet there came not only the members of
the Secret Cabinet Council and the Council of Ministers for Defense
of the Reich, but also the members of the war planning group, the
Nazi secret Reich Defense Council. When it was deemed essential
for the purposes of the conspiracy to wage aggressive war, that
power was concentrated in a few individuals. Again these indi-
viduals were drawn from the ordinary Cabinet. Thus the Pleni-
potentiaries for Economy and Administration were also Ministers
of the ordinary Cabinet, and they were also members of the Reich
Defense Council and Ministerial Council.
Under them were grouped practically all the ministers of the
ordinary Cabinet.

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Where political considerations of foreign policy required that

another select group be chosen to act as advisors, the secret Cabinet
was created and populated with members of the ordinary Cabinet.
The Reichsregierung was dominated by the Nazi Party through
the control exercised over its legislationby the Deputy of the
Führer, Hess, and later by the Leader of the Party Chancellery,
Bormann. Party control was also effected through the individual
membership of all members and the union of various key Cabinet
and Party positions in one man. As a result of this fusion of the
Party and State, an enormous concentration of political power was
gathered into the Cabinet.
The laws enacted by the Cabinet established the framework
within which the Nazi conspirators established their control of Ger-
many, set forth in Count One of the Indictment, by virtue of which
they were enabled to commit the crimes alleged in Counts One,
Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment. The Cabinet enacted harsh
penal laws, discriminatory laws, confiscatory laws, in violation of
the principles of justice and humanity. Decrees enacted by the
Ministerial Council during the war clothed the criminal acts of the
Nazi conspirators with a semblance of legality. As an instrument
of the Party, the Cabinet effectively implemented the notorious
points of the Party program. Finally, the Cabinet, almost imme-
diately upon the coming into power of Hitler, became a war-plan-
ning group through its establishment in 1933 of a Reich Defense
Council and its active participation in the schemes and plans for
waging aggressive war.
It istherefore most respectfully submitted that, by virtue of all
of the foregoing, the Reichsregierung, as denned in Appendix D,
Page 35, of the Indictment, should be declared a criminal group
within the meaning of Article 9 of Section II of the Charter.
That concludes, if Your Honor pleases, this presentation, and the
next subject is the SA. It will take just about a couple of minutes
to be ready for that.

May it please the Tribunal, I passed up Document Book Y, which

contains the English translations of the documents relied upon in
this presentation.

The organization which I shall now present for your consider-

ation isthe Sturmabteilung, the organization which the world
remembers as the "Brown Shirts" or "Storm Troops," the gangsters
of the early days of Nazi terrorism. It came to be known in later
years as the SA, and I shall refer to it in that manner in the course
of my presentation.

The SA was the first of the organizations conceived and created

by the Nazis as the instrument and weapon to effectuate their evil

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objectives, and it occupied a place of peculiar and significant im-

portance in the scheme of the conspirators. Unlike some of the other
organizations, the functions of the SA were not fixed or static. On
the contrary, it was an agency adapted to many designs and pur-
poses, and its role in the conspiracy changed from time to time
always corresponding with the progression of the conspiracy
through its various phases towards the final objective: abrogation
of the Versailles Treaty and acquisition of the territory of other
peoples and nations. If we might consider this conspiracy as a pat-
tern, with its various parts fitting together like the pieces of a jig-
saw puzzle, we would find that the piece representing the SA
constituted a link in the pattern vitally necessary to the presen-
tation and development of the entire picture.
The SA participated in the conspiracy as a distinct and separate
unit having a legal character of its own. This is shown by Docu-
ment 1725-PS, which is tabbed in the document book, of which the
Court will take judicial notice. It is an ordinance passed in March
1935, Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 502. It declares that the SA
and certain other agencies were thereafter to be considered "com-
ponents" of the Nazi Party. This ordinance further provided in
—
Article 5 and it is on the second page of the English translation,
right after the word "Article 5" —
I quote, "The affiliated organi-

zations can have their own corporate identity."

Similarly the Organization Book of the Nazi Party characterizes
the SA as an "entity." Document 3220-PS, which I now offer, is an
excerpt from the 1943 edition of the Organization Book, Page 358
of the original, and I quote from the English translation. It is there
declared:
"The Führer prescribes the law of conduct and commands its
use. The Chief of Staff represents the SA as a complete entity
on the mandate of the Führer.
I am sure the evidence will demonstrate and characterize the SA

as an entity and organization having a legal character of its own.

This evidence will show that, while the SA was composed of many
individual members, these members acted collectively and cohesively
as a unit. They were closely bound and associated together by many
common factors, including: uniform membership standards and dis-
ciplinary regulations; a common and distinctive uniform; common
aims and objectives; common activities, duties, and responsibilities;
— —
and probably the most important factor of all a fanatical adher-
ence to the philosophies and ideologies conceived by the Nazi con-
spirators.
This is partially demonstrated by Document Number 2354-PS,
which again is simply an excerpt from the Organization Book; and
it is found on Page 7 of the English translation. It provides that

124
 18 Dec. 45

membership in the SA was voluntary but that the SA man should

withdraw if "he can no longer agree with SA views or if he is not
in a position to fulfill completely the duties imposed upon him as
a member of the SA."
The SA man was well schooled in the philosophies, attitudes,
and activitieswhich he was expected and required to adopt and
reflect in his daily life. Cohesion of thought and uniformity of
action with respect to such matters was in part obtained by the
publication and distribution of a weekly periodical entitled Der
SA-Mann (The SA Man). This publication was principally devoted
to the creation and fostering of the various aspects of Nazi ideology
which constituted the doctrinal motives of many of the conspirators.
May I digress from my text and say to the Tribunal that we
have here on the table all of these publications, beginning with the
year 1934, up through and including the year 1939. The official
weekly newspaper entitled Der SA-Mann, meaning The SA Man,
published in Munich, had wide distribution and was on sale at news
stands and distributed throughout Germany and occupied countries.
In addition, Der SA-Mann served to report upon and document
the activities of the SA as an organization and those of its constitu-
ent groups. I shall have occasion at a later point to refer to certain
portions of this publication for the consideration of the Tribunal.
The general organizational arrangement or plan of the SA will
be demonstrated to the Tribunal by the documents which will subse-
quently appear. At this point I may say simply that this proof will
show that the SA developed from scattered bands of street ruffians
to a well-knit, cohesive unit organized on a military basis with mili-
tary training and military functions and, above all, with an aggres-
sive, militaristic, and warlike spirit and philosophy. The organization
extended throughout the entire Reich territory and was organized
vertically into local groups and divisions. Horizontally, there were
special units including military cavalry, communications, engineer,
and. medical units. Your Honors will observe the chart that I will
introduce officially a little later on the wall. Co-ordination of these
various groups and branches was strictly maintained by the SA
headquarters and operational offices, and those offices were located
in Munich.
The relationship between the SA and the NSDAP is the next
subject.
The case against the SA is a strong one and its basis or foun-
dation consists of its significant and peculiar relationship and affil-
iation with the Nazi Party and the principal conspirators.
It is submitted that a relationship or association among the
alleged conspirators constitutes important and convincing evidence
of their joint participation in an established conspiracy; and this

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18 Dec. 45

principle is particularly applicable because the affiliation between

the SA and the Nazi leaders was closely maintained and adhered to
and was adapted to the purpose of enabling the conspirators to
employ the SA for any use or activity which might be necessary in
the course of effectuating the objectives of the conspiracy.
Thus we find that the SA was, in fact, conceived and created by
Hitler himself in the year 1921 at the very inception of the con-
spiracy. Hitler retained direction of the SA throughout the period
of the conspiracy, delegating the responsibility for its leadership to
a Chief of Staff. Hitler, in fact, was often known throughout Ger-
many as OSAF, or "Oberster SA Führer," or, translated, meaning
the highest SA Führer.
The Defendant Goring was an early member of the SA and he
maintained a close affiliation with it throughout the course of the
conspiracy.
The Defendant Hess participated in many of the early battles of
the SA and was leader of an SA group in Munich.
The Defendants Frank, Streicher, Von Schirach, and Sauckel each
held a position of Obergruppenführer in the SA, a position cor-
responding to the rank of Lieutenant General; and the Defendant
Bormann was a member of the staff of the SA High Command.
The close relationship between the SA and the leaders of the
Nazi Party is demonstrated by the fact that the Hoheitsträger of
the Nazi Leadership Corps were authorized to call upon the SA for
assistance in carrying out particular phases of the Party program.
This was established yesterday by Document 1893-PS, which, Your
Honors will recall, I quoted from a number of times in connection
with the presentation of the Leadership Corps. It was declared in
that excerpt, Page 11 of the English translation, as Your Honors will
recall, that the Hoheitsträger were empowered to call upon the SA
for the execution of political missions connected with the movement.
This responsibility of the SA to the Party is also shown by Docu-
ment 2383-PS, which is an ordinance for the execution of the Hitler
decree, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-410. I quote
from Page 3 of the English translation. If Your Honors will turn
to Page 3 of the English translation, it is the fourth paragraph on
Page 3:
"The the NSDAP, with exception of the SS, for
affiliates of
whom provisions apply, are subordinated to the
special
Hoheitsträger politically and for assignment to duty. Respon-
sibility for the leadership of the units rests in the hands of
the unit leader."
It was
in accordance with such authority, as proved yesterday
in the Leadership Corps presentation, that the SA was used in the
seizure of trade union properties.

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 18 Dec. 45

In addition the SA demonstrated its close affiliation to the Nazi

Party by participating in various ways in election proceedings. This
is shown in Document 2168-PS, which is a pamphlet entitled The SA,
which is Exhibit USA-411; and this pamphlet depicts the history
and general activities of the SA, written by an SA Sturmführer
named Bayer upon orders from SA headquarters. In that pamphlet,
and I quote on Page 4 of the English translation, down towards the
bottom of the page, the last paragraph, beginning on line 3:
"The labor and the struggle of the SA was not in vain. They
stood at the foremost front of election contests."
Adolf Hitler himself, on the 2d of September 1930, took over the
leadership of the SA as the Supreme SA Führer. He himself guided
his SA in the fateful election fight of the year 1930.
Further evidence of the interest and participation of Nazi leaders
SA is to be found in these five bound volumes,
in the activities of the
which consist of the issues of the SA newspaper, Der SA-Mann,
from the year 1934 to 1939 inclusive; and I should like at this time
to ask that each of these bound volumes be marked for identification,
because each of them will be referred to from time to time during
this presentation. They will begin with Exhibit USA-414, 415, 416,
417, and 418 and they are referred to by appropriate document num-
bers, which I will refer to when the quoted portions come in the
English translation.
Throughout these volumes there appear photographs portraying
the participation of Nazi leaders in SA activities. I should like at
this time to describe a few of the photographs, and I will indicate
the page numbers upon which they appear.
If Your Honors please, we set out a number of these pictures
and a number of photographs; but I should like, at this time, to
exhibit to the Tribunal and pass into evidence one of the photo-
graphs appearing in the January 1937 issue. It is a photograph of
Goring at the ceremonies held upon the occasion of his being made
Obergruppenführer of the Feldherrnhalle Regiment of the SA on
the 23rd of January 1937, and we offer in evidence the photo-
graph and the page of the newspaper. We will pass it up to Your
Honors if you would like to see it. We offer it in evidence.
Another photograph of Goring, leading the Feldherrnhalle Regi-
ment of the SA in parade on the 18th of September 1937, is shown
at Page 3. The other photograph was at Page 3 of the 1937 January
edition of the SA-Mann.
I call the attention of Your Honors to a few of the other photo-
graphs that appear. There is a photograph of Hitler greeting Hühn-
lein, bearing the caption, "The Führer greets Corps Führer Hühnlein
at the opening of the International Automobile Fair — 1935." That
is dated the 23rd of March 1935, at Page 6.

127
 18 Dec. 45

Here is another photograph of Himmler and Hühnlein, who was

the Führer of the NSKK, and Lutze, who was Chief of Staff of the
SA, bearing the caption, "They lead the soldiers of National Social-
ism," 15th of June 1935, Page 1.
Another photograph of Hitler at an SA ceremony, carrying the
SA battle flag; and the picture bears the caption, "As in the fighting
years, the Führer, on the Party Day of Freedom, dedicates the new
regiments with the Blood Banner," 21 September 1935, Page 4.
I pass on. Here is a photograph of Goring in the SA uniform,
reviewing SA marching troops, under the caption, "Honor Day of
the SA," 21 September 1935, Page 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, is there any doubt that Hitler
and Goring were members of the SA?
COL. STOREY: No, Sir; but the purpose in showing those photo-
graphs, if Your Honors please, was t© show the militaristic character
of the SA. If there is no question about that and it is cumulative,
then I will pass on.
The work of the SA
did not end with the seizure by the Nazis
of the German Government, but affiliation between the SA and the
Nazi leaders was continued after the acquisition by the Nazis of the
control of the German State. The importance of the SA in connec-
tion with the Nazi Government and control of Germany is shown
by the law of December 1, 1933. I have already referred to that,
that is, the union of Party and State. However, there is one para-
graph that has not been quoted before, if Your Honors please, and
I would like to call Your Honors' attention to it. It is our Document
1395-PS, and it appears in the English translation on Page 1, and
I quote Article 2:

"The Führer's Deputy and the Chief of Staff of the SA become

members of the Reich Government in order to insure close
co-operation of the offices of the Party and SA with the public
authorities."
Similarly, in Document 2383-PS, which I referred to a moment
ago—I will simply refer to it—that is 2383-PS, Page 11, the last
paragraph:
"The Party and State offices must support the SA in this
program and value the certificate of award of the SA
training
defense medal accordingly."
That the Nazis at all times possessed complete control of the SA
is shown by the so-called Röhm Purge of June 1934. Evidence con-
cerning this matter is to be found in the Völkischer Beobachter of
1 July 1934, at Page 1. I will not quote from that.

Röhm had been Chief of Staff of the SA for several years and
•
was responsible for the development of the SA into a powerful
organization with definite programs and objectives.

128
 18 Dec. 45

Members SA were required to take a personal oath of

of the
fidelity to But when his policies conflicted with those of the
him.
Nazi leaders, he was removed and murdered and replaced by Victor
Lutze. This drastic action was accomplished without revolt or dis-
sension in the ranks of the SA and with no change in the objec-
tives or program of the organization. The SA remained "a reliable
and strong part of the National Socialist Movement" and I am —
quoting; this is Document 2407-PS, Exhibit USA-412, the English
translation of the Völkischer Beobachter. It is the last paragraph in
the English translation, just above the name "Adolf Hitler." I will
say for the translators that the quotation is included in our text.
If we might go on, I quote:

"It is my wish that the SA be built up as a reliable and

strong part of the National Socialist movement, full of obe-
dience and blind discipline. They must help to create and
form the new German citizens."
The importance of the SA in the Nazi plan for the utilization
of the people of Germany shown
in Hitler's pronouncement, "The
is
Course for the German," which appears in the issue of Der SA-Mann
of the 5th of September 1936, at Page 22. It is our Document
3050-PS, Exhibit Numbers USA-414 and USA-418; and it is at
Page 29 of the English translation— Page 29 of Document 3050-PS,
the paragraph in the middle of the page; and I quote:
"... the young boy will enter the Jungvolk, and the adolescent
will enter the Hitler Youth; the young man of the Hitler
Jugend will go into the SA, the SS, and other units, and the
SA and SS men will one day enter into the labor service and
from there the Army, and the soldier of the Volk will return
again into the organization of the Movement, of the Party,
into the SA and SS, and never again will our Volk decay as
it once had decayed."

And so we
see that at all times during the conspiracy the rela-
tionship between the SA and the Nazi Party was such that the SA
was constantly available to the conspirators as an instrument to
further their aims. The SA was created by the conspirators at the
inception of the Nazi movement. It was at all times subject to the
direction of Adolf Hitler. Seven of the defendants held positions
of leadership and responsibility in the organization, and at all times
the SA was subject to the call of the Hoheitsträger. The SA stood
at the forefront of the election fights; and co-operation between the
offices of the Party, of the SA, and of the State was assured by law.

And so it was declared by Victor Lutze, the former Chief of

Staff of the SA, in a pamphlet entitled The Nature and Tasks of
the SA; and it is our Document Number 2471-PS. The original we
offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-413; and I quote from the top of

129
18 Dec. 45

Page 1 of the English translation, 2471-PS. I believe I will read

that whole paragraph, the first paragraph on the top of the page:
"Before touching the real subject matter, I must tell you first,
in order to clear up any uncertainty about my own position,
that I never speak primarily as a member of the SA, but as
a National Socialist, since the SA cannot be independent of
the National Socialist movement but can only exist as a
part of it."

should next like to present to the Tribunal evidence which will

I
demonstrate the principal functions and activities performed by the
SA pursuant to the relationship which I have described above and
in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy. These activities
may be logically classified or divided into four distinct phases or
aspects, each of which, I might add, corresponds with a particular
phase in the progression of the conspiracy toward the objectives
alleged in the Indictment.
The first phase consists of the use of the SA and its members
as the instrument for the dissemination of ideology and fanaticism of
the Nazis throughout Germany. The employment of the SA for this
purpose continued throughout the entire period of the conspiracy as
will, I am sure, be apparent from the evidence.
The second phase relates to the period prior to the Nazi seizure
of power. During this period the SA was a militant and aggressive
group of fighters or gangsters whose function was to combat, phys-
ically and violently, all opponents of the Party.
The third phase relates to the period of several years following
the Nazi seizure of power. During this period the SA participated
in various measures designed to consolidate the control of the Nazis,
including such Nazi-inspired programs as the dissolution of the
trade unions, the persecution of the Church, and the Jewish perse-
cutions to which I have already alluded. During this period they
continued to serve as a force of political soldiers whose purpose was
physically to combat members of political parties which were con-
sidered hostile or opposed to the Nazi Party.
The fourth aspect of the SA activities consisted of its employ-
ment as an agency for the building up of an armed force in Ger-
many in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and for the preparation
of the youth of Germany —mentally and physically—for the waging
of an aggressive war.
I should now like to discuss what I consider the highlights of
the evidence relating to these four phases.
The first phase is in connection with the dissemination of
ideology.
The first function of the SA consisted of its responsibility to
disseminate the doctrines and ideologies, acceptance of which was

130
 18 Dec. 45

necessary for the fulfilment of the Nazi objectives. From the very-
start the Nazi leaders emphasized the importance of this mission.
During the course of the conspiracy the SA undertook many duties
and responsibilities, but one responsibility which remained constant
throughout was that of being propagandist of the National Socialist
ideology. •

I now refer, Your Honors, to the English translation of Docu-

ment 2760-PS, Exhibit USA-256, which is an excerpt from Mein
Kampf, and it is shown at Page 5 of the translation of the docu-
ment. This is the third paragraph on Page 5 of the document,
quoting:
"As the directing idea for the inner training of the Sturm-
abteilung, the intention was always dominant, aside from all
physical education, to teach it to be the unshakeably con-
."
vinced defender of the National Socialist idea. . .

I might add that Hitler's pronouncement as to the function of the

SA in this respect became, in effect, the guiding principle of SA
members, for Mein Kampf was taken to express the basic philosophy
of the SA.
In Document Number 2354-PS, which is an excerpt from the
Organization Book of the Party, on Page 1 of the English trans-
—
lation it is quoted in the text I quote Paragraph 1:—
"Education and training, according to the doctrines and aims
of the Führer as they are set down in Mein Kampf and in
the Party program, for all phases of our living and of our
."
National Socialist ideology. . .

—
This same document the Organization Book of the Party —refers
to the SA's function as the propagandist of the Party.
I believe the next one, if Your Honor pleases, would simply be
cumulative of what we have already referred to. I next refer to an
article . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a convenient time to

break off.

COL. STOREY: All right, Sir.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 19 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

131
 —

TWENTY-THIRD DAY
Wednesday, 19 December 1945

Morning Session

DR. FRITZ SAUTER

(Counsel for the Defendant Von Schirach):
Mr. yesterday a table depicting
President, the construction
of the Reich Cabinet, one of the accused organizations, was
shown on the screen here. On this chart the Defendant Von Schirach
was also listed under the heading, "Other participants in the
meetings of the Cabinet." The Defendant Von Schirach has
explained to me and asked me to inform the Tribunal that he
never took part in any meeting of the Reich Cabinet, that he was
never named a member of the Reich Cabinet, and that he never
had a part in any decision of the Reich Cabinet.
THE PRESIDENT: The point that you are taking seems to the
Tribunal to be premature. This is not the stage at which you
are to argue the question whether your client is a member of the
Reich Cabinet or not. The argument upon the whole question will
take place after the evidence and after the Prosecution have had
the opportunity of putting forward their arguments as to the
criminal nature of the Reich Cabinet. You or other counsel on
behalf of those concerned will be able to put forward your
arguments. We do not desire to hear arguments now about the
criminal nature, but to hear the evidence. Is that clear?
DR. SAUTER: Yes. I shall then return to this point during the
examination of witnesses, and prove that the Defendant Von
Schirach was never a member of the Reich Cabinet. Thank you.
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, yesterday afternoon we
had just started on the participation of the SA in the first point
the dissemination of ideology or propaganda. In an article which
appeared in Der SA-Mann, at Page 1 of the issue of January 1934,
which is Document 3050-PS; and I refer to Page 25 of the English
translation, if Your Honor pleases, the portion shown in red
—
brackets it is dated the 6th of January 1934:
"The new Germany would not have been without the SA
man; and the new Germany would not go on existing if the
SA man would now, with the feeling of having fulfilled his
duty, quietly, unselfishly, and modestly step aside, or if the
new State would send him home much like the Moor who has
done his duty. On the contrary, the SA man, following the

132
 . —
13 Dec. 45

will of the Führer, stands as a guarantor of the National

power and will remain
Socialist revolution before the gates of
standing there at For gigantic missions still await
all times.
fulfillment which would not be thinkable without the
presence and the active co-operation of the SA.
"What has been accomplished up till now, the taking over of
the power in the State and the ejection of those elements
which are responsible for the pernicious developments of the
postwar years as bearers of Marxism, liberalism, and
Capitalism, are only the preliminaries, the springboard, for
the real aims of National Socialism.
"Being conscious of the fact that the real National Socialist
construction work would be building in an empty space
without the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler, the Movement
and the SA man as the fighting bearer of its will, primarily
have directed all of their efforts thereupon, to achieve the
platform of continued striving and to obtain the foundation
or the realization of our desires. . .

"Out of this comes the further mission of the SA for the

completion of the German revolution: First, to be the
guarantor of the power of the National Socialist State against
all attacks from without as well as from within; second, to
be the high institute of education of the people for the living
National Socialism."
The function of SA as the propagandist of the Party was more
than a responsibility which SA took unto itself. It was the
responsibility recognizedby the law of Germany. From Document
1395-PS, which is the copy of the law entitled, "Law on Securing
the Unity of Party and State," which I have referred to before
and it was promulgated by the Reich Cabinet in 1933 I desire —
to read Article 3, on Page 1 of the English translation:
"The members ©f the National Socialist German Labor Party
and the SA, including their subordinate organizations, as the
leading and driving force of the National Socialist State,
will bear greater responsibility toward the Führer, people,
and State. In case they violate these duties they will be
subject to special jurisdiction by Party and SA. The Führer
may extend these regulations in order to include members
of other organizations."
Thus were the SA members the ideology bearers of the Nazi
— —
Party the soldiers of an idea to use the expression employed by
the Nazi writers. And permit me to emphasize that the SA was
the propagandist agency, the principal agency employed by the
conspirators to disseminate their fanaticism among the people of
Germany.

133
 —
19 Dec. 45

I need hardly point out the importance of this function to the

successful effectuation of the conspiracy, for it is self-evident that
the Nazis could not have carried their conspiracy to the stages
which they did, had not the minds of the people of Germany been
cruelly and viciously influenced and infected with their evil
ideologies.
I now proceed to the other functions of the SA which I
mentioned previously. The next is its use in the early stages of
the conspiracy as the "strong-arm" of the NSDAP. In the early
stages of the Nazi movement, the employment of the SA as the
propagandist instrument of the Party, involved and was combined
with the exercise of physical violence and brutality.
As said by Hitler in Mein Kampf — and this excerpt appears at
Page 4 of Document 2760-PS, Page 4 of the English translation,
Exhibit Number USA-256:
"The young Movement, from the first day, espoused the stand-
point that its idea must be put forward spiritually, but that
the defense of this spiritual platform must, if necessary, be
secured by strong-arm means."
I will read the rest of that paragraph:
"Faithful to belief in the enormous significance of the
its
new seems obvious to the Movement that for the
doctrine, it

attainment of its goal no sacrifice can be too great."

And so, in the early days of the Nazi movement, so that the
Nazis might better spread their fanatical philosophies, the SA was
employed as a terroristic group, in order to gain for the Nazis
possession and control of the streets. That is another way of saying
that it was a function of the SA to beat up and terrorize all political
opponents. The importance of this function is indicated in Docu-
ment 2168-PS, Exhibit Number USA-411, which was written by
SA Sturmführer Bayer on orders from SA headquarters. I refer
to Page 3 of the English translation of Document 2168-PS, the
third paragraph from the bottom:
"Possession of the streets is the key to power in the State
for this reason the SA marched and fought. The public would
never have received knowledge of the agitative speeches of
the Reichstag faction and its propagandists or of the
little
desiresand aims of the Party if the martial tread and battle
song of the SA companies had not beat the measures for the
truth of a relentless criticism of the state of affairs in the
governmental system. They wanted the young Movement to
keep silent. Nothing was to be read in the press about the
labor of the National Socialists, not to mention the basic aims
of its platform. They simply did not want to awaken any
interest in it. However, the martial tread of the SA took

134
 19 Dec. «
care that even the drowsiest citizens had to see at least
the existence of a fighting troop."
The importance of the work of the SA in the early days of
the Movement was indicated by Goebbels in a speech which
appeared in Das Archiv, October 1935. This is our Document
3211-PS, Exhibit Number USA-419. It is on the first page of the
English translation:
"The inner-political opponents did not disappear due to
mysterious unknown reasons, but because the Movement
possessed a strong arm within its organization; and the
strongest arm of the movement is the SA. The Jewish
question will not be solved separately but by laws which we
enact, for we are an anti- Jewish government."

Specific evidence of the activities of the SA during the early

period of the Nazi movement, from 1922 to 1931, is found in a
series of articles appearing in Der SA-Mann entitled, "SA Battle
Experiences Which We Will Never Forget." Each of these articles
is an account of a street or a meeting-hall battle waged by the SA
against a group of political opponents in the early days of the
Nazi struggle for power. These articles demonstrate that during
this period it was the function of the SA to employ physical violence
in order to destroy and subvert all forms of thought and expression
which might be considered hostile to the Nazi aims or philosophy.
A
number of such articles have been translated, and the titles
are sufficiently descriptive to constitute evidence of the activities
of the SA in the early stages of the movement. I should like to
quote from a few of these titles by giving the page reference of
this big newspaper volume.

—
Here is one of 24 February 1934, Page 4 the title: "We Subdue
the Red Terror." From the 8th of September 1934, Page 12; the
article is entitled: "Nightly Street Battles on the Czech Border."
From 6th of October 1934, Page 5: "Street Battle in Chemnitz."
Another one of 20 October 1934, Page 7—the title: "Victorious SA."
I will skip several of them. Here is one of 26 January 1935,
—
Page 7 the title: "The SA Conquers Rastenburg." Another on
23 February 1935, Page 5: "Company 88 Receives Its Baptism of
Fire." One of 20 October 1934, Page 7—the article is: "SA against
Sub-humanity." Finally, I mention the one of 10 August 1935,
Page 10— the title is: "The Blood Sunday of Berlin." And then
there is a portrait in the article of 11 September 1937, Page 1,
which symbolizes the SA man as the master of the streets.
For an example of the nature of these articles, one appeared
in the Franken edition of the SA-Mann for 30 October 1937, Page 3.
It is entitled: "9 November 1923 in Nuremberg," and I should like

135
19 Dec. 45

to quote from Pages 14 and 15 of Document 3050-PS, which is

an English translation of this article:
"We stayed overnight in the Colosseum (that means Nurem-
berg). Then in the morning we found out what had happened
in Munich. 'Now a revolution will also be made in Nurem-
berg', we said. All of a sudden the police came from the
Maxtor police station and told us that we should go home,
that the Putsch in Munich had failed. We did not believe
that and we did not go home. Then came the State Police
with fixed bayonets and drove us out of the hall. One of us
then shouted: 'Let's go to the Cafe Habsburg!' By the time
we arrived, however, the police again had everything
surrounded. Some shouted then, 'The Jewish place will be
stormed. Out with the Jews!' Then the police started to
. . .

beat us up. Then we divided into small groups and roamed

through the town, and wherever we caught a Red or a Jew
we knew, blows ensued.
"Then in the evening we marched, although the police had
forbidden it, to a meeting in Fürth. In the Hornschuch
promenade the police again attempted to stop us. It was all
the same to us. In the next moment we attacked the police
in our anger so that they were forced to flee. We marched
on to Geissmann Hall. There again they tried to stop us. But
the Landsturm, which was also there, attacked the policemen
like persons possessed and drove them from the streets.
After the meeting we dissolved and went to the edge of
town. From there we marched in close column back to
Nuremberg. In Willstrasse, at the Plärrer, the police came
again. We simply shoved them aside. They did not trust
themselves to attack, for that would have meant a blood
bath. We decided beforehand not to take anything from
anyone. In Fürth, too, they had already noticed that we
were up to no good. A large mass of people accompanied
us on the march. We marched with unrolled flags and sang
so that the streets resounded: Comrade reach me your hand;
we want to stand together; even though they have false
impressions, the spirit must not die; swastika on the steel
helmet, black- white-red armband; we are known as Storm
Troop (SA) Hitler!"
I skip to the use of the SA to consolidate the power of
now
the Party. The third function of the SA was to carry out various
programs designed to consolidate Nazi control of the German State,
including particularly the dissolution of the trade unions and the
Jewish persecutions.
The SA groups were employed to destroy political opposition by
force and brutality wherever necessary. An example of this is

136
 19 Dec. 45

shown in Document Number 3221-PS, Exhibit Number USA-422;

and that is an original affidavit made in the State of Pennsylvania,
in the United States of America, by William F. Sollman, which we
now quote in its entirety:

"William F. Sollman, Pendle Hill School, Wallingford, Penn-

sylvania, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and
says: From 1919 until 1933 I was a Social Democrat and a
member of the German Reichstag. Prior to March 11th, 1933,
I was editor-in-chief of a chain of daily newspapers with my
office inCologne, Germany, which led the fight against the
Nazi Party.
"On March 9th, 1933, members of the SS and SA came to my
home Cologne and destroyed the furniture and my per-
in
sonal records. At that time I was taken to the Brown House
in Cologne, where I was tortured, being beaten and kicked for
several hours. I was then taken to the regular government
prison in Cologne, where I was treated by two medical doc-
tors and released the next day. On March 11th, 1933, I left
Germany. (Signed and sworn to)."

Prior to the organization of the Gestapo on a national scale, local

SA meeting-places were designated as arrest points; and the SA
members were employed in the taking into custody of Communists
and other persons who were actually or supposedly hostile to the
Nazi Party. This activity is described in Document Number 1759-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-420, which is an original affidavit made by
Raymond H. Geist. Mr. Geist was formerly United States Consul
in Berlin. He is now in Mexico City. I should like to quote from
a portion of his affidavit, the first being on Page 5 of the English
translation, about the middle of the page, starting:

"At the beginning of the Hitler regime, the only organization

which had meeting-places throughout the country was the
SA (Storm Trooper). Until the Gestapo could be organized
on a nati®nal scale, the thousands of local SA meeting-places
became the arrest points. There were at least 50 of these in
Berlin. Communists, Jews, and other known enemies of the
Nazi Party were taken to these points, and if they were
enemies of sufficient importance they were immediately trans-
ferred to the Gestapo headquarters. During 1933 and 1934,
when the Gestapo became universally organized, the SA were
gradually eliminated as arresting agents, and the SS were
incorporated as administrative and executive officials into
the Gestapo. By the end of 1934, the SA had been fairly
well eliminated and the SS, the members of which wore
elegant black suits and were therefore called Elite Guards,
became almost identical as functionaries with the Gestapo."

137
 .

19 Dec. 45

I now pass to Page 7 of this same document, Page 7 of the Eng-

lish translation. It begins . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, does that mean that the SA

were eliminated for the purpose of arrest or for other purposes too?

Sir. As I understand, Sir, the SA reached

COL. STOREY: No,
its height of popularity in 1934 and immediately after the Röhm
purge began to decline. In the meantime, the SS, which originated
out of the SA, was growing and became really the strong part and
grew and prospered after that. So I think the evidence will show
that after 1934 the SA started a rapid decline in its importance.
Now, on Page 7 of the English translation I should like to quote
a part of the consul's report, beginning in the middle of the page:
"Another American, Herman I. Roseman, made an affidavit
which stated:
"'Yesterday, March 10th, 1933, in the afternoon about 4:30,
I came out of KDW
with my fiancée, Fräulein Else Schwarz-
lose, residing in Wilmersdorf (giving the address). A man in
SA uniform stepped on my toe purposely, obviously offended
me and said "Pardon." I said "Bitte," and walked ahead. He
then followed me and kicked me saying, "Na und?" A police-
man saw this and walked ahead, paying no attention to attacks
made on me. Then I took my passport out of my pocket,
showed it to the second policeman, and said that I was an
American citizen, but he walked ahead, obviously not able to
afford me protection, or at least being unwilling. The SA man
continued to attack me, struck me in the face, wounded me
over the eye, and continued to do me bodily harm. During
this attack, all the time my walking along, we reached another
policeman, and I applied to him, showing my passport and
said, "Iam an American and am entitled to protection." He
shrugged his shoulders and said "What can I do?" By this
time the SA man had obviously inflicted enough attack upon
me and walked away.
" 'Upon my appeal, the policeman brought my fiancée and me

to the station house at 13 Bayreuth erstrasse. My fiancée and

I reported to the officer in charge. He heard the story and
said that he was sorry, but that there was nothing to do. My
face was bleeding. The policeman said that he had orders
not to interfere in any affair in which an SA man took part.
I then asked him what I could do to protect myself. He said
that there was nothing to do but to wait until the situation
was better. He added that the police were absolutely power-
less, and were under the direction of the SA, and that there
were SA Sturm Abteilungen in the police itself. Thereupon
"
I departed. . .
.'

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 19 Dec. 45

Now on the next page, on Page 8, is another American, Mrs.

Jean Klauber, and I quote from her affidavit:
"On the night of Friday, March 10, 1933, she and her husband
had retired for the night when they were awakened by a
prolonged ringing of their apartment bell. They heard
pounding upon the street door and a demand for immediate
entry and a concurrent threat to break the door down. The
street door was opened by the janitor's wife; and a party of
four or five men entered and went at once to the apartment
of the deponent, where they again rang and pounded on the
door. Mr. Klauber asked who was there and was answered,
'The police.' He opened the door and a party of four or five
men in brown uniforms, one wearing a dark overcoat and
carrying a rifle, pushed in, jostling Mr. and Mrs. Klauber
aside. One asked Mrs. Klauber where the telephone was and
she indicated the room where it was to be found and started
to go there. Thereupon, she was knocked down by one of
them. They went on to the bedroom where Mr. and Mrs.
Klauber followed them, and there they demanded their pass-
ports. Mr. Klauber went to the wardrobe to get his and was
stopped, being asked by the intruders whether he was carry-
ing any weapons. Being clothed only in pajamas, his denial
was accompanied by a gesture indicating his garb. He then
turned to the wardrobe, opened it, and reached for one of his
four suits hanging therein where he thought the passport
was, and was immediately attacked from behind by all but
one of the intruders, who beat him severely with police clubs,
the one with the overcoat and rifle standing by. Remarks
were shouted such as, 'look! Four suits, while for 14 years
we have been starving!' Mrs. Klauber tried to inquire the
reason for their actions, and was answered, 'Jews. We hate
you. For 14 years we have been waiting for this, and tonight
we will hang many of you.'
"When the intruders stopped beating Mr. Klauber he was
unconscious, and they again demanded the passports of Mrs.
Klauber. Mrs. Klauber found her American passport and her
German passport (required by local authorities as the wife of
a German citizen and issued by the police at Munich after her
arrival here); and the intruders took both in spite of Mrs.
Klauber's protests that she was American. She then searched
for her husband's passport, laid hold of his pocketbook, and
in her excitement offered it to them. Though full of money
they refused it, and again demanded the passport. Mrs.
Klauber then found it and handed it over.
"Then the intruders returned to the unconscious Mr. Klauber,
saying, 'He hasn't had enough yet,' and beat him further.

139
19 Dec. 45

Then they left, saying, 'We are not yet finished,' and just as
they departed, one of them said to Mrs. Klauber, 'Why did
you marry a Jew? I hate them,' and struck her on the jaw
."
with his police club. . .

That is the end of the affidavit.

Now continuing, the next paragraph is the statement of the
U.S. Consul:
"I personally can verify that the police had been instructed
not to interfere; and that is, that there was official sanction
for these activities. Affidavits taken from numerous victims
attest this fact. I had become acquainted with the two police
officers stationed at the corner of Bellevuestrasse and Tier-
gartenstrasse near where the Consulate General was located;
these officers told me that they and all the other police offi-
cers had received definite instructions not to interfere with
the SA, the SS, or the Hitler Youth."
In addition, SA members served as guards at concentration
camps during this consolidating period and participated in the
persecution and mistreatment of persons imprisoned therein. I now
refer to Document 2824-PS, which is a book entitled, Concentration
Camp at Oranienburg. It is Exhibit Number USA-423. This was
by an SA-Sturmbannführer named Schäfer, who was the com-
mander of the concentration camp at Oranienburg. I quote the
excerpt on the first page of the English translation, reading:

"The most trusted SA men of long service were selected in

order to give them homes in the camp, since they were the
permanent camp guards, and in such a manner we created a
cadre of experienced guardsmen who were constantly pre-
pared to be employed."
Further evidence concerning the operation of the concentration
camps by the SA is found in Document 787-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-421. This is a report to Hitler from the public prosecutor of
Dresden concerning the nolle-prossing of one Vogel, who was
accused of mistreatment of persons imprisoned in the concentration
camp. I quote from that report:
"On 14 March 1935 the prosecuting authority in Dresden has
indicted Oberregierungsrat Erich Vogel in Dresden on
. . .

account of inflicting bodily injury while in office. The follow-

ing subject matter is the basis of the process:
"Vogel belongs to the Gestapo office of the state of Saxony
since its foundation and is chief of Main Section II, which
formerly bore the title ZUB (central section for combatting
subversive movements). In the process of combatting efforts
inimical to the State, Vogel carried out several so-called
'borderland actions' in the year 1933 in which a large number

140
 19 Dec. 45

and persons who had become

of politically unreliable persons
political prisoners in theborder territories were taken into
protective »custody and brought to the Hohnstein protective
custody camp. In the camp unusually severe ill-treatment of
the prisoners has been going on at least since the summer of
1933. The prisoners were not only, as in the protective
custody camp Bredow near Stettin, beaten into a state of
unconsciousness for no reasons with whips and other tools,
but were also tortured in other ways, as for instance with a
drip-apparatus, especially constructed for the purpose, under
which the prisoners had to stand so long that they came away
with serious purulent wounds on the scalp. The guilty SA
leaders and SA men were sentenced to punishments of 6 years
to 9 months of imprisonment by the main criminal court of
the provincial court in Dresden on 15 May 1935 . .Vogel,
.

whose duties frequently brought him to the camp, took part

in this mistreatment, insofar as it happened in the reception
room of the camp during completion of the reception formal-
ities and in the supply room, during issuing of the blankets.
In this respect it should be pointed out that Vogel was gen-
—
erally known to the personnel of the camp exactly because
of his function as head of the ZUB —and his conduct became
at least partly a standard for the above-named conduct of
the SA leaders and men."
I to read the remainder of that quotation. I am sorry,
want
I have it here. That is a little portion there that should be
don't
read immediately following my statement, and then I started I will —
skip to the quotation just below there:
"Vogel stayed in the reception room a long time and watched
these proceedings without doing anything about them. In his
presence for instance, the SA man Mutze dealt such blows to
one man, without provocation, that he turned around on him-
self. As already stated, Vogel not only took no steps against
this treatment of the prisoners, but he even made jokes about
it and stated that it amused him the way things were popping

here.
"In the supply room, Vogel himself took a hand in the beating
amid the general severe mistreatment. The SA men there
employed whips and other articles and beat the prisoners in
such a manner that serious injuries were produced, the pris-
oners became partly unconscious and had to lie in the hospital
a long time. Vogel was often present in the supply room
during the mistreatment. At least in the following cases he
personally participated actively in these mistreatments."
And then skipping down:

141
19 Dec. 45

"... the prisoner was laid across the counter in the usual
manner, held by the head and arms, and then beaten for
fast
a considerable time by the SA men with whips and other
articles. Along with these, Vogel himself took part in the
beating for a time, and after this mistreatment slapped him
again, so that the prisoner appeared green and blue in the
face. The prisoner is the tinsmith Hans Kühitz, who bore the
nickname 'Johnny.' Upon his departure, Vogel gave the head
of the supply room, Truppführer Meier from 5 to 6 Reichs-
mark with the stated reason that the SA men 'had sweated
so.' The money was then distributed by Meier to those SA
comrades who had taken part in the mistreatment."
Another activity of the SA during the days just following the
Nazi seizure of power was to act as auxiliary police. This is shown
in Document 3252-PS, Exhibit Number USA-424. This publication
is a book written about Hermann Goring.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, is that a document which

shows on its face that the man was punished for this conduct?
COL. STOREY: I think it does; yes, Sir. I think it does.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that fact ought to be stated.

COL. STOREY: I believe it is stated, Sir. You see in the begin-
ning it says that the prosecuting authority in Dresden had indicted
Vogel on account of bodily injury, and I thought it stated that he
had been punished.
THE PRESIDENT: The document does appear to state it, but
I think you ought to state it in court. The document ends up with — *

Paragraph 3.

COL. STOREY: It does state that he was punished. The pur-

pose of introducing it was to show what actually took place.
I now turn to Document 3252-PS. As I have just mentioned,
the book is entitled, Hermann Goring, the Man and His Work by
Erich Gritzbach, in which it is declared that the ranks of the Secu-
rity Police were strengthened by the SA and which was characterized
as the most reliable instrument of the Movement. I should like to
quote on the first page of Document 3252-PS, the English trans-
—
lation it is the fourth paragraph:
"The present reorganization of the Protection Police is hardly
noticed by the public. Its ranks are strengthened by the SA,
the most reliable instrument of the Movement. The auxiliary
police has given effective aid by its fighting spirit in the
struggle against the Communists and other enemies of the
State, not only to Goring but has, driven by its National
Socialist desire for a new spirit within the executive police,
assisted in the rigid organization."

142
 19 Dec. 45

I now skip to the SA participation in the Jewish pogrom of

10-11 November 1938 shown by Document 1721-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-425. This is a confidential report of the SA-Brigadeführer to
his group commander, dated 29 November 1938. In the English
translation, starting at the beginning without reading the addresses,
it is to SA Group Electoral Palatinate (Kurpfalz) Mannheim:

"The following order reached me at 3 o'clock on 10 November

1938.
"On the order of the Gruppenführer, all Jewish synagogues
within the 50th Brigade are to be blown up or set on fire
immediately.
"Neighboring houses occupied by Aryans are not to be dam-
aged. The action is to be carried out in civilian clothes.
Rioting and plundering are to be prevented. Report of exe-
cution of orders to reach the brigade Führer or office by 8:30.
"I immediately alerted the Standartenführer and gave them
the most exact instructions; the execution of the order began
at once. I hereby report that the following were destroyed
"
in the area of
Then there follows a list of 35 synagogues that were destroyed.
I just refer to a few of them:
"1) The synagogue at Darmstadt, Bleichstrasse, destroyed by
fire 4) The synagogue at Gräfenhausen, interior and fur-
—
nishings wrecked." And then under "Standarte 145" "The —
synagogue at Bensheim, destroyed by fire."
And then the next four items are synagogues destroyed by fire. In
Standarte 168 eight synagogues are shown to have been destroyed
by fire. In Standarte 86 the synagogue in Beerfelden was blown up;
and then follow several others where the furnishings were wrecked.
In Standarte 221 the synagogue and chapel in Gross-Gerau was
destroyed by fire, and the next one torn down and the furnishings
destroyed. And then it is signed by the Führer of Brigade 50, by
the signature which is illegible, "Brigadeführer."
In connection with the persecution of the Jews, we again find
the SA performing its function of propaganda agency for the Nazis.
In this connection it was the function of the SA to create and foster
among the people an anti-Jewish spirit and sentiment without which
the terrifying Crimes against Humanity perpetrated against the
Jewish race certainly would not have been tolerated by any civilized
peoples. Substantial and convincing evidence of this function is to
be found in these bound volumes of Der SA-Mann. Throughout the
period covered by these volumes, there appeared in this publication
article after article consisting of the most cruel and vicious sort of
anti-religious propaganda designed to engender and foster hatred
and hostility toward the Jewish race.

143
19 Dec. 45

I will simply refer to a fewof the titles appearing. On 27 July

1935, at Page 4, the title "Finish up with the Jew." That is
is
shown, if Your Honor pleases, in Document 3050-PS, Pages 16 to 18
there listed. In the issue of 2 February 1935, Page 5, "The Jewish
World Danger"; on 20 July 1935, Page 4, "Jewish Worries"; on 1 June
1935, Page 1, "Jews Are Not Wanted Here." And then follows a
statement:
"Then, also, outside of the last German village the sign will
stand, 'Jews Are Not Wanted Here'; and then, finally, no Ger-
man citizen will again cross the threshold of a Jewish store.
To achieve this goal is, among others, the mission of the
SA man as the political soldier of the Führer. Next to his
word and his explanations shall stand his example."
Then further on, 17 August 1935, Page 1, "God Save the Jews."
Then another, of 5 October 1935, Page 6, the title "The Face of the
Jew" (with a portrait of a Jew holding the hammer and sickle).
I will just refer to one or two more of them. Here is one on
23 November Ï935, Page 2, the title, "The Camouflaged Benjamin-
Jewish Cultural Bolshevism in German Music." Here is one of
2 —
January 1937, Page 6 a hideous-looking picture the title being —
"Romania to the Jews?" I give the final quotation, the last one,
3 February 1939, Page 14, the title being "Friends of World Jewry:
Roosevelt and Ickes."
The impressive thing about all these articles is the fact that it
was not intended that the philosophies expressed in them should be
confined to members of the SA; on the contrary, the plan was to
educate the members of the SA with this iniquitous philosophy,
and for the SA in turn to be employed for its dissemination into
t-he minds of the German people. This fact is demonstrated in the
introduction to a series of anti-Jewish articles in the paper of
5 December 1936, at Page 6. I will just read the title. It is found
on Page 28 of the same document and the title is as follows:
"Gravediggers of World Culture." Also on that same Page, 28,
I quote this statement:

"We suggest that the comrades especially take notice of this

series of articles and see 'that they are further circulated."
In addition, intensive campaigns were conducted to persuade the
public to purchase and read Der SA-Mann and the various issues
were posted in public places so that the general public might read
them. Der SA-Mann itself contained several photographs which
show particular issues posted upon street bulletin boards; and there
are several photographs showing advertising displays, one of which,
—
for example, reads as follows this is in the issue of 31 October
1936: "Der SA-Mann belongs in every house, every hotel, every inn,
every waiting room, and every store." Also in the issue of 24 August

144
 19 Dec. 45

1935, at Page 3,was a group picture of SA men on trucks and

there
in front of the trucks were large signs, one of which read, "Read
Der Stürmer and you will know the Jew." On the same page of
the publication I mentioned there is a photograph of what appears
to be a public rally, at which there is displayed a large poster
reading, "He who knows the Jew, knows the devil!"
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, the Tribunal expressed their
view yesterday that they did not desireto hear cumulative evidence.
Isn't this rather cumulative?
COL. STOREY: I agree with Your Honor that possibly it is.
I am trying
to draw the line on it. I will omit the rest of them.
Now we will pass to the final phase of the function of the SA
in the conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now for
10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]

COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, I have just started into

the function of the SA in the conspiracy, that of its participation
in the program for preparation for warfare.
In this connection, Your Honors asked this morning a question
about the arresting and police activities of the SA, and I mentioned
that they had declined after 1934. For fear there was some
misapprehension, I would like to state that as a police organization
and as an arresting agency they declined steadily after 1934.
We go now into the phase where they went into military prep-
arations, the next phase; and that is the phase with which I deal
now. If Your Honor pleases, I have here an official government
publication issued by the Government in 1943, the title
British
being, The Nazi Party and Organizations; and I should like to
quote as to the organization and membership of the SA from that
publication. It is the most authoritative that I have been able to
find, and I would like to quote briefly from it:
"The SA was founded in 1921 as a para-military organization
to protect Nazi meetings and leaders, to throw out inter-
rupters and hecklers, to fight political enemies, and to provide
pre-military training at a time when the legal 'Reichswehr'
was limited to 100,000 men. Their highest leader is Hitler
himself; his deputy is called the Stabschef (Chief of Staff)
of the SA; from 1930 till June 1934 it was Röhm; from then
onwards till his death in May 1943, Victor Lutze; since
August 1943, Wilhelm Schepmann. In January 1933 the SA
had only 300,000 members. After the seizure of power, its
strength increased quickly; at present it has a membership
of 1,500,000 to 2,000,000." (JN-4)

145
19 Dec. 45

Now, the date of this is 1943. We again find the SA employed

to inculcate a particular Nazi ideology into the minds of the people
of Germany. At this point it was the function of the SA to prepare
Germany mentally for the waging of a vicious and aggressive war.
At
all times, and especially during the period from 1933 to 1939,
SA leaders emphasized to SA members the duty and responsibility
of creating and fostering a militaristic spirit throughout Germany.
In 1933 Hitler established the so-called SA sports program; and
at that time, according to Sturmführer Bayer, in his pamphlet
which I have previously introduced in evidence as 2168-PS on —
—
Page 6 of the English translation it is just one sentence, and I
quote:
"... commissioned to increase and to preserve the warlike
power and the fighting spirit as the expression of the soldier-
like attitude of a people."

In 1937 Hitler renewed the so-called sports program and, as

recited in Document 3050-PS, which is the English translation of
these newspaper articles, on Page 12, he made a statement "for
the fostering of a military spirit."
The Organization Book of the Party is to the same effect, in
Document 3220-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-323. I quote
—
from a portion of that document Paragraphs 1 to 3 on Page 1 of
the English translation, beginning at the first paragraph:
"While the political organization of the NSDAP has to carry
out the political leadership, the SA is the training and
education instrument of the Party for the realization of an
ideologically soldier-like attitude.
"In conformity with the directives of the Führer given at
the Reich Party meeting of freedom, the SA is, as the
voluntary political soldiery, the guarantor of the National
Socialist movement, of the National Socialist revolution, and
of the resurgence of the German people.

"Consequently, the young German in the SA is being

inculcated in the first instance from the standpoint of ideology
and character, and trained as the bearer of the National
Socialist ideas.
"Equally significant is a suitable education and training
which the SA members have accomplished within the yearly
classes which have completed their military service. This
prevails until the age they and all their spiritual, mental,
and physical powers are ready for use in maintaining the
Movement, the people, and the State. They should find their
best home in the SA. All that which could divide them
economically, culturally, professionally, or because of origin

146
 19 Dec. 45

isbeing overcome in the SA by the spirit of comradeship

and manly dignity.
"In that manner the SA is developing a decisive factor on
the path to a popular community. Its spirit should radiate
with soldierly tradition and the possibility of application on
all existing units outside of the movement. Their guardian-
ship is thus an important mission of the SA."
A number of articles which were obviously designed to serve
as war propaganda material have been translated, in other cases
only the titles, the titles themselves being so comprehensive that
they disclose the nature and substance of the articles. I should like
to refer to a few of these titles on this subject. They are shown on
the English translation of 3050-PS and they are listed on Page 1.
On the question of the Nazi Lebensraum philosophy: The issue
of 5 January 1935, Page 13, the article "The German Living Space";
the issue of 10 October 1936, Page 15, "Our Right, Our Colonies";
another, of 14 October 1938, Page 3, the title "Space and Folk";
"Colonies for Germany," 2 January 1937, Page 4. I should like to
quote briefly from that article. I believe that it is on Page 2 of the
English translation, 3050-PS:
"The German Ambassador in London, Herr Von Ribbentrop
recently,on occasion of a reception in the Anglo-German
Fellowship .has renewed, in a speech which dealt with all
. .

problems from a high level, the indubitable claim of Ger-

many for the restitution of its colonies which had been
snatched away.
"Shortly thereafter the Reich Bank president and Reich
Minister of Economics, Dr. Schacht, published in the English
magazine, Foreign Affairs, a detailed article on the German
colonial problem."
That is on Page 2, I believe, of the English translation.
"For the rest Dr. Schacht laid out the categorical demand
that Germany must, in order to solve the problem of its raw
materials, get colonies which must be administered by Ger-
many .and in which the German standard currency must be
in circulation."
Now, the next group are articles dealing with the Versailles
Treaty, and I will quote only from a few of them on Page 3 of
that same translation. Here is one of 7 April 1934, Page 14, "What
is the Situation Regarding Our Battle for Equal Rights?". Another
is entitled, "The Dictate of Versailles," 30 June 1934, Page 15. The

article reads in part:

"The dictate of Versailles established the political, eco-
nomical, and financial destruction of Germany in 440 art-
— —
fully one could also say devilishly devised paragraphs;

147
19 Dec. 45

this work of ignominy is a sample of endless and partly

contradictory repetitions in constantly new forms. Not too
many have occupied themselves with this thick book to a
great extent, for one could only do it with abomination."

Another title is 7 July 1934, Page 15, "The Unbearable Limita-

tions on our Fleet." Another one: 19 January 1935, Page 13,
"Versailles after 15 Years." This article reads in part:
"This terrible word 'Versailles', since a blind nation ratified
it, has become a word of profanity for all those who are
infatuated with the spirit of this enormous production of
hatred. The Versailles dictate is German fate in the fullest
sense of the word. Every German bore up under the
operation of this fate during the past 15 years. Therefore,
every last German must also grasp the contents of this
dictate so that one single desire of its absolute destruction
fills the whole German Volk."

I shall omit the other quotation. The last one I shall refer to
is February 1937,quoting "Versailles Will Be Liquidated"; and
that, if Your Honor pleases, is the last paragraph on Page 4 of the
English translation:
"The National Socialist movement has again achieved a victory,
for upon its flag since the beginning of the fight stands: The
liquidation of the Versailles Treaty. For this fight the SA
marched year after year."
A third group of articles describing preparations for war,
purportedly being carried on by other nations, are found on Page
5 of that same document, and I shall refer to just a few of them:
The issue of January 26, 1935, Page 14, "Military Training of
English Youth," showing pictures of Eton students wearing the
—
traditional Eton dress tall hats and frock coats marching with —
rifles; another one is "The Army of the Soviet Union," dated
16 March 1935, Page 14; another one, 4 April 1936, Page 13, "The
Red Danger in the East"; another one, 29 August 1936, Page 10,
"Russia Prepared for World War"; another one, 19 June 1937,
Page 7, "Red Terrorism Nailed Down."
I shall pass the rest of them.
Now, the next is the SA participation in the aggressive war
phase of the conspiracy —the
preparation by SA of the youth of
Germany for participation in aggressive warfare. I hardly think
I need emphasize that one of the most important steps in carrying
out the conspiracy was the training of the youth of Germany in
the' technique of war and their preparation physically and
spiritually for the waging of aggressive war. To the SA was
delegated this most important responsibility. I have here Docu-
ment Number 3215-PS, Exhibit Number USA-426, which I offer

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 19 Dec. 45

in evidence; and it is an excerpt from Das Archiv and contains

Hitler's characterization of the task of the SA in this respect. It is
on Page 1 of the English translation of 3215-PS. I start the reading
where it says:
"Already in 1920 by the founding of the National Socialist
Sports Section (SA) the Führer established the extensive
mission of this SA at that time by declaring in the protocol
of its charter. 'The Sports Section (SA) shall one day be
. . .

the bearer of the military thought of a free people.' "

In the same sense the Führer said in his book, Mein Kampf:
"Give the German nation 6 million bodies perfectly trained
with the love of the father-
in sport, all fanatically inspired
land and trained to the highest offensive spirit, and a national
state will, if necessary, have created an army out of them
."
in less than 2 years. . .

The military character of the SA

demonstrated by its organi-
is
zational composition. I on the wall, which is our
refer to the chart
Document Number 2168-PS. It is taken from this book, being the
pamphlet of the SA Sturmführer; and the chart is taken from the
official book. I simply refer to the chart and call to the attention
of Your Honor that it was organized into units closely correspond-
ing to those of the German Army. As the Tribunal will see, the
organizational scheme consisted of divisions; at the top in that
pyramidal structure the division, next the brigade, the regiment,
the battalion, the company, the platoon, and the squad.
In addition, there were special units and branches, over to the
right as Your Honor will notice, including cavalry, signal corps,
engineer corps, and medical corps. There were also, as Bayer
pointed out in his pamphlet, three officer training schools. Similarly,
SA members wore distinctive uniforms adapted to military
functions, bore arms, and engaged in training, forced marches, and
other military exercises.
SA members, moreover, were governed by general regulations
which closely resembled service regulations of an armed force.
They are contained in Document Number 2820-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-427, which I offer in evidence. If Your Honor pleases, they are
found at Page 3 of the translation. I will simply refer to a few of
them. These regulations provide for punishment, designating them
as penal regulations, for disobedience of orders and infractions of
regulations. The punishments which are provided demonstrate the
militaristic character of the SA and include the following: Repri-
mand in private; reprimand in presence of superiors and announce-
ment thereof at formations; prohibition of the right to wear service
uniform; house arrest, et cetera.

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Preparation for war through the SA training program was

commenced in Germany as early as 1933, but the scope of this
program was not made public because of the fact that it actually
constituted a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. The strict
secrecy with which the program was surrounded is shown in Docu-
ment D-44, Exhibit Number USA-428, which I offer in evidence.
—
On Page 1 of the English translation this is from the Supreme
Command SA, Chief of Staff
of the —and it has to do with publi-
cations on the SA:
"Further to my instruction Z II 1351/33 dated 11 July 33,
I find cause to ask all SA authorities to exercise the greatest
caution with regard to any publicity given to the SA service
not only in the press but also in the information and news
sheets of the individual SA units.
"Only during the last few days the Reich Ministry
of the
Interior at request of the Foreign Office has given
the
strict instructions to all Reich authorities according to which
the most severe control is to be exercised on all publications
which might give other countries an occasion to construe
German infringements of the terms of the Versailles Treaty.
"As is known from the Geneva negotiations, our opponents
have piled up material, collected in Germany and submitted
to them, which they use against us on every occasion during
the conferences.
"From this point of view, the information sheets circulating
among the subordinate SA units cause the liveliest concern.
I hold all higher SA leaders responsible that any such
internal information sheets appearing in the district of their
command are submitted to the most stringent control before
they go into print; and I feel compelled to draw attention
to the liability to prosecution for treason, as pronounced in
official instructions issued in the last few days, in cases
where such reports, printed no doubt in good faith, are
published and therefore exposed to the danger of falling into
the wrong hands.
"On principle, pictures of the special technical units of the
SA in particular of the motorized, signal, and
and SS,
possibly also of the air squads which now exist outside these
formations, are forbidden, such pictures enabling other coun-
tries to prove the alleged formation of technical troop units."
Similarly, secrecy was provided for in the order assigning a
Wehrmacht January 1934 to assist in the SA
officer to the SA in
training program. This Document, 2823-PS, Exhibit Number USA-
429, which is a copy of a memorandum of SA headquarters dated
January 1934, designates an officer of the Wehrmacht to assist in

150
 —
19 Dec. 45

the military training of SA members, and it goes on to provide

and quote from Paragraph 7 of the English translation:
I

'Tor the purpose of camouflage, Lieutenant Colonel Auleb

will wear SA uniform with the insignia of rank according
to more detailed regulations of the Supreme SA leader."
The military training program of the SA was for many years
conducted under the guise of a sports program. This plan was
created by Hitler as early as 1920 by the founding of what he
called the sports program. The fact that the so-called sports program
was in reality closely associated with, and in fact a means of
providing, military training for the German youth is shown by
the following characterization of the program by Lutze, the Chief
of Staff of the SA, in an article written in 1939. I now refer to
Document 3215-PS, Exhibit Number USA-426; and I quote excerpts
of the English translation on Page 2:
"The decrees issued by the Führer to the SA in 1935 about
the renewal, in 1936 regarding the bestowal of the diploma
and in 1937 about the repetition of the yearly exercises of
the SA sport badge, all served this goal. Parallel to this
decree of the Führer for physical strengthening and military
indoctrination, adequate measures were taken within the
SA, regarding organization and drilling. Out of the idea
that the preservation and the advancement of the military
power of our people must be specially fostered by military
and physical exercises, resulted a particular and systematic
training in these fields.
"In 25 troop schools and in three Reichsführer schools of the
SA 22,000 to 25,000 officers and noncommissioned officers
were trained yearly since 1934 in special educational courses
until they possessed the education and examination certif-
icates. In clearly outlined training directives, the training
goals which had to be achieved yearly were given and at
the same time the yearly Reich competitive contests were
established. Hand in hand the training of the Führer Corps
and the corresponding organizational measures and the
training at the front proceeded on the broadest basis."
In connection with the military training of the sports program,
I to Document 2354-PS, Exhibit Number USA-430, which
refer
demonstrates the tests and standards required for obtaining the
—
sports award Page 2 of the English translation. I am not going
to read all of it, if Your Honor pleases, but just refer to a
few of them:
"Group II: Military sports; 25-kilometer march with pack;
firing ofsmall-caliber arms; aimed throwing of hand
grenades, 200-meter cross-country race with gas masks over

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19 Dec. 45

four obstacles; swimming or bicycle riding; basic knowledge

of first aid in case of accidents."
I will pass the others.
In 1939 the SA sports program was formally recognized in a
decree issued by Hitler as a military training program, and the
SA was openly declared to be an agency "for pre- and post-
military training, that is, for military training prior to and
following service in the Wehrmacht. I have Document Number
2383-PS ...

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, you have just drawn our

attention to a Document Number 3215-PS, which shows that from
1934 onwards, 25,000 officers and noncommissioned officers were
trained by the SA.

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Isn't that sufficient to show the military

nature of the organization?
COL. STOREY: I think so. This was just the decree of Hitler.
May I just refer to it by reference for the record? I will not read
the decree.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on; what are you referring to?
COL. STOREY: Document 2383-PS, Page 11 of the English
contains a copy of the decree legalizing the training
translation,
program for pre- and post-military training.
It would have been one thing for the SA to conduct a military
training program for its members, but the SA program was not
confined to its members. The entire youth of Germany was
enlisted into a feverish program of military training.

I refer to a quotation in Document 2354-PS from the same

organization book, which is at Page 2 of the English translation,
in which the Chief of Staff Lutze said, and I quote briefly:
"In order to give conscious expression to the fostering of a
valiant spirit in all parts of the German people, I further
decide that this SA sports badge can also be earned and
worn by persons who are not members of the movement
insofar as they comply racially and ideologically with the
National Socialist requirements."
Document 2168-PS shows that responsibility for conducting this
nation-wide program was lodged in the operational main office
of the SA. Page 8 of the English translation says, and I quote:
"The latter has, on the basis of the SA sport badge, to
prepare a thorough physical training of the bodies of all
Germans capable of bearing arms. In order to reach this

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 19 Dec. 45

goal, it has to organize body exercises and sporting advance-

ment so that the masses of the people will be included by-

it and will be kept fit to bear arms until old age. This
martial preparedness must not be achieved only by physical
and mental training but also with regard to character and
ideology."
1 pass from that phase now.
Document 3215-PS isan excerpt from Das Archiv, and I refer
to Pages 2 to 3 of the English translation beginning at the bottom
of Page 2, and I quote-:

"Next to the companies of the SA were the SA sport badge

associations, in which entered all the nationals who were
capable of bearing arms and who were prepared to
voluntarily answer the call of the SA for the preservation
of military proficiency. Up till now about 800,000 nationals
outside the SA could successfully undergo the physical
betterment as well as the political-military indoctrination of
the SA on the basis of the SA badge."
The military program of the SA was not that of a mere
marching and drill society; it embraced every phase of the
technique of modern warfare. This is particularly demonstrated
by consideration of the articles on military training which appeared
publicly throughout the issues of the SA-Mann. I should like to
refer to only a few of the titles, and they are set out on Pages 8
and 10 of Document 3050-PS. It is a great, long list, and I will
only refer to five or six.

There is one of them, 17 February 1934, Page 7, "Pistol

Shooting"; 21 April 1934, Page 13, "What Every SA Man Must
Know about Aviation"; 19 May 1934, Page 13, "Chemical Warfare";
2 June 1934, Page 14, "Modern Battle Methods in the View of
the SA Man"; 4 August 1934, Page 13, "The Significance of Tanks
and Motors in the Modern War." I will omit references to the
remainder.
Similarly, the issues of the SA-Mann contain many photographs
and articles demonstrating and portraying SA
participation in
military exercises, including forced marching, battle maneuvers,
obstacle runs, small-caliber firing, and so on. I simply refer these
to Your Honors, and they are shown on Pages 11 to 13 of Docu-
ment Number 3050-PS. Just one or two titles: 24 August 1935,
Page "The SA Is and Remains the Shock Troop of the Third
2,
Reich." Here is one showing the connection with the Wehrmacht:
2 September 1938, Page 1, "The SA and the Wehrmacht," with
pictures of SA men on field maneuvers throwing hand grenades.
I will omit the rest of those.

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19 Dec. 45

Convincing evidence demonstrating the participation of the SA

in the conspiracy is found in the fact that care was taken at all
times to co-ordinate the military training of the SA with the
requirements of the Wehrmacht. This is shown by Document
2821-PS, Exhibit Number USA-431, Page 1 of the English "

translation, quoting:
"Permanent between the Reich Defense Ministry and
liaison
the of the SA
Supreme Commander has been assured."
. . .

Another document, 3215-PS, which is an excerpt from Das

Archiv, sets forth the co-operation and collaboration with the
Wehrmacht and specialized military training; and it was stated
in a speech of the Chief of Staff of the SA, Document 3215-PS,
Page 2 of the English translation, Exhibit Number USA-426:
"In the course of this development also, special missions for
military training were placed on the SA. The Führer gave
the SA the cavalry and motor training and appointed SA
Obergruppenführer Litzmann as Reich Inspector with the
mission of securing the cavalry recruits and the require-
ments of the German Wehrmacht through the SA. In close
co-operation with parts of the Wehrmacht, special certificates
were created for the communications, engineer, and medical
units which, like the cavalry certificate of the SA, are valued
as a statement of preference for employment in said units."
Your Honor, we have two or three more quotations about co-
operation with the Wehrmacht, but I believe they would be
cumulative, and I will omit them. I will refer only to Document
2383-PS, Exhibit Number USA-410, Page 11. I will read a portion
of the decree:
"The Führer: In amplification of my decrees of 15 February
1935 and of 18 March 1937 regarding the acquisition of the
SA sports insignia and the yearly repetitive exercises, I
elevate the SA sports badge to the level of the SA military
badge and make it a basis for pre- and post-military
training. I designate the SA as the standard bearer of this
training."
I skip now to Page 48 for the record.
specialized training given SA members, in accordance with
The
the requirements of the technical branches of the Wehrmacht, is
described by SA Sturmführer Bayer, in Document Number
2168-PS, Exhibit Number USA-411; and it is Page 13 of the
English translation:
"On onë side, the young SA man who enters the Armed
— —
Forces" Wehrmacht "from his branch comes prepared with
a multitude of prerequisites which facilitate and speed up
training in technical respect; while on the other side, those

154
 19 Dec. 45

very soldiers who, having served, return out of the Armed

Forces into the SA keep themselves, by constant practice,
in a trained condition physically and mentally and impart
their knowledge to their fellows.

"Thus they contribute a considerable portion to the enhance-

ment of the armed strength and fighting spirit of the
German people."
And then skipping down: "The SA each year is able to furnish
many thousands of young trained cavalrymen to our Wehrmacht."
T will omit the rest of that.
I call attention now to an issue of the SA-Mann dated
simply
3 February 1939, at Page 3, which contains a photograph of Chief
of Staff Lutze addressing a group of SA men. This photograph
bears the caption, "We will be the Bridge between the Party and
the Wehrmacht."
The second reference shows a photograph of General Brauchitsch
and Chief of Staff Lutze reviewing an SA unit.
Now, I pass to Document 3214-PS, which is Exhibit Number
USA-432. There is only one page of it. Quoting:
"It was announced that SA men and Hitler Youths liable to
military service can fulfill their military duties in the SA
Regiment Feldherrnhalle, whose commander is General Field
Marshal, SA Obergruppenführer Göring. The regiment, for
the first time, was employed as Regiment of the Luftwaffe
in the occupation of the Sudetenland under its leader and
. . .

regimental commander, SA Gruppenführer Reimann."

THE PRESIDENT: Up to now you have brought evidence to
our notice showing that the SA was voluntary. This shows it was
conscripted. When did it become conscripted?
COL. STOREY: As I understand, Your Honor, if you joined the
SA you got out of conscription, but once you were in it they could
use you as desired. In other words, the SA was a voluntary
organization.
THE PRESIDENT: That is the evidence you have given up
to date.

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, when did it become liable to conscription

or used as a substitute for conscription?
COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, may I ask Mr. Bur dell
to answer that question? He has been working on it.
MR. CHARLES S. BURDELL (Assistant Trial Counsel for the
United States): If Your Honor pleases, there never was conscription

155
19 Dec. 45

in the SA. As this —

document shows Document 3214-PS service —
in the Feldherrnhalle Regiment of the SA took the place of con-
scription. This first sentence in Document 3214-PS, which reads,
"It was announced that SA men and Hitler Youths liable to military
service can fulfill their military conscription in the SA Regiment
Feldherrnhalle ..." means, as I understand it, that SA men who are
conscripted, that is SA men who are drafted after they have joined
the SA, may serve their conscription by remaining in the SA or by
transferring to the Feldherrnhalle Regiment of the SA.
The next paragraph of Document Number 3214-PS designates
the requirements that must be fulfilled before the SA man can
join this Feldherrnhalle Regiment, but if he fulfills those require-
ments he may join that regiment, and having done so, that serves
the purpose or serves the function of conscription in the Wehrmacht.
I hope that answers Your Honor's question.
COL. STOREY: In view of the above we would expect the SA to
have been used as a striking force in the first steps of the aggressive
war launched by Germany and as a basis for so-called commando
groups, and such was the case. SA units were among the first of the
Nazi military machine to invade Austria in the spring of 1938, as
was proudly announced in an article appearing in the SA-Mann
of 19 March 1938, Page 10, the article entitled, "We Were There
First."
The SA participation in the occupation of the Sudetenland is also
shown by Document Number 3036-PS, Exhibit Number USA-102;
and that is an affidavit by Gottlob Berger, a former officeholder
in the SS, who was assigned to the Sudeten German Free Corps.
I quote Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the affidavit:
"1. In the 1938 I held the rank and title of Oberführer
fall of
in the SS. In mid-September I was assigned as SS liaison officer
with Konrad Henlein's Sudeten German Free Corps at their
headquarters in the castle at Donndorf outside Bayreuth. In
this position I was responsible for all liaison between the
Reichsführer SS Himmler and Henlein" Your Honors will — —
recall Henlein was the leader in the Sudetenland "and in
particular, I was delegated to select from the Sudeten Germans
those who appeared to be eligible for membership in the SS
or VT
(Verfügungstruppe). In addition to myself, liaison
with Henlein included an Obergruppenführer
officers stationed
from the NSKK, whose name I have forgotten, and SA Ober-
gruppenführer Max Jüttner, from the SA. In addition,
Admiral Canaris, who was head of the Abwehr,OKW
appeared at Donndorf nearly every 2 days and conferred
with Henlein."

156
 19 Dec. 45

Your Honors will recall that the Abwehr was the intelligence
organization.
"2. In the course of my official duties at Henlein's head-
quarters I became familiar with the composition and activities
of the Free Corps. Three groups were being formed under
Henlein's direction: One in the Eisenstein area, Bavaria; one
in the Bayreuth area; one in the Dresden area; and
possibly a fourth in Silesia. These groups should be
composed only of refugees from the Sudetenland who
had crossed the border into Germany, but they
actually contained Germans with previous service in
the SA and the NSKK (Nazi Motor Corps) as well. These
Germans formed the backbone of the Free Corps. On paper
the Free Corps had a strength of 40,000 men .... Part of the
equipment furnished to Henlein, mostly haversacks, cooking
utensils, and blankets, was supplied by the SA."
The adaptability of the SA to whatever purpose was required
of it demonstrated by its activities subsequent to the outbreak
is
of the war. During the war the SA continued to carry out its military
training program, but it also engaged in other functions. Its wartime
activities are set out in Document 3219-PS, which is Exhibit Number
USA-433, and Document 3216-PS, Exhibit Number USA-434, which
are excerpts from Das Archiv.
I quote first, briefly, from Document 3219-PS, the whole text
exclusive of the heading:
'The Chief of Staff of the SA, Wilhelm Schepmann, gave
further orders to increase the employment of the SA in the
homeland war territories, according to the requirements of
total war. This was done in numerous business conferences
with leaders of the SA divisions.
"As a result of these conferences as well as of measures al-
ready carried out earlier for the totalization of the war
employment, the SA has placed 86 percent of its professional
leader corps at the disposal of the front, even though the
war missions of the SA have increased in the fields of pre-
military training, the SA penetration into new territorial
parts of the Reich, the air-war employment, the city and
country guard, et cetera, during wartime.
"The SA as a whole has given at present 70 percent of its
millions of members to the Wehrmacht. ,,
I call attention of Your Honors to the statement of the member-
ship of August 26, 1944. I quote briefly from Document Number
3216-PS, the English translation, just one sentence:
"By command of the Chief of Staff of the SA, the SA unit
'General Government' was established, the command of which

157
19 Dec. 45

was taken over by Governor General, SA Obergruppenführer

Dr. Frank."
I next offer in evidence an affidavit, being Document Number
3232-PS, Exhibit Number USA-435, by Walter Schellenberg:
"From the beginning of 1944 on, the SA also participated in
many of the functions which had previously been entrusted
only to —
the SS, the Sipo, and Army for instance, the guard-
ing of concentration camps, of prisoner-of-war camps, super-
vision of forced laborers in Germany and occupied areas.
This co-operation of the SA was planned and arranged for by
high officials in Berlin as early as the middle of 1943."
This concludes my presentation of the principal points of
evidence concerning the participation of the SA in the conspiracy,
but before I conclude, I should like to present to the Tribunal a
few points which establish the participation in the conspiracy by
Defendant Goring in his capacity as an SA member or leader.
In 1923 Goring became commander of the entire SA. This is
shown in the pamphlet, The SA, which is already in evidence, and
the notation concerning Göring's command appears at Page 2 of the
translation, which I do not intend to quote but simply refer to.

Göring's intention to employ the SA as a terroristic force to

destroy political opponents is shown by a speech made by him on
3 March 1933, at a Nazi demonstration in Frankfurt. It is Document
Number 1856-PS, Exhibit Number USA-437. It is an excerpt from
a book entitled, Hermann Goring, Speeches and Essays. I quote
what Goring said:

"Certainly I shall use the power of the State and the police
to the utmost, my dear Communists, so you won't draw any
false conclusions; but the struggle to the death, in which my
fist will grasp your necks, I shall lead with those down
there who are the Brown Shirts."
The importance of the SA under Goring in the early stages of
the Nazi movement is shown by Document Number 3259-PS,
Exhibit USA-424; and it is an English translation from the same
document book. This is a letter written to Goring by Hitler, and
I quote the letter:

"My dear Goring:

"When in November 1923, the Party tried for the first time
to conquer the power of the State, you, as commander of the
SA, created within an extraordinarily short time that in-
strument with which I could dare that struggle. Most
pressing necessity had forced us to act, but by a wise provi-
dence at that time we were denied success. After receiving

158
 19 Dec. 45

a grave wound, you again entered the ranks as soon as

circumstances permitted as my most loyal comrade in the
battle for power. You contributed essentially to creating the
basis for the 30th of January. Therefore, at the end of the
year of the National Socialist revolution, I desire to thank.

you wholeheartedly, my dear Party comrade Goring, for the

great services you have rendered to the National Socialist
revolution and consequently to the German people.
"In cordial friendship and grateful appreciation, yours, Adolf
Hitler."

Although Goring did not retain command of the SA, he at all

times maintained close affiliation with the organization. This is
shown by the photographs of Goring participating in the activities
which I have already introduced in evidence. Similarly, in 1937
Goring became the commander of the Feldherrnhalle Regiment of
the SA. The Tribunal will recall, also, my reference to the partic-
ipation of that regiment in the occupation of the Sudetenland.
Now, the evidence considered in the foregoing sections
finally,
of this demonstrates the participation of the SA as an
brief
organization in the conspiracy alleged in Count One. Thus, the
SA was first employed by the conspirators to destroy, by force and
brutality, all opponents of National Socialism and to gain possession
of the Thereafter, upon the seizure of control by the
streets.
NSDAP, the SA was used to consolidate and to strengthen Nazi
power, and cruelly to persecute and destroy all so-called "enemies
of the state/' including Jewry and the Church. During the period
from 1934 to 1939, the SA was employed for the actual preparation
and training of the German people for war and participated in
aggressive warfare.
The SA was at all times employed by the conspirators to promote
and disseminate the ideology of the Nazi Government throughout
Germany, and particularly, to perform the function of disseminating
an ti- Je wish propaganda and creating and fostering a militaristic
and warlike spirit among the people of Germany.
Thus, at
all times during the course of its existence, the functions
of the SA
corresponded to, and were designated to promote, the
progression of the conspiracy through its various phases; and the
conclusion, we think, is irresistible, that the SA was an organization
devoted exclusively to the task of assisting the defendants and their
co-conspirators in carrying out the objectives in the conspiracy.
Thus, in this sense, SA, as well as its members, were in fact
co-conspirators and participants in a conspiracy which contemplated
and involved Crimes against the Peace and Crimes against Hu-
manity and War Crimes.

159
19 Dec. 45

That concludes the presentation of the SA, Your Honor, and the
next is the SS, by Major Farr.

Do Your Honors want to go ahead with that now?

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn then, until
2 o'clock.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

160
 a

19 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

MAJOR WARREN F. FARR (Assistant Trial Counsel for the

United States): May it please the Tribunal, the next organization to
be dealt with is the SS. The document books in this case are let-
tered "Z." For convenience in handling the book because of the
bulk of documents, we have divided them into two volumes. I shall
in referring to a document number refer to the volume in which
that document appears.
About a week or 10 days ago there appeared in a newspaper
circulated in Nuremberg, an account of a visit by that paper's cor-
respondent to a camp in which SS prisoners of war were confined.
The thing which particularly struck the correspondent was the one
question asked by the SS prisoners. Why are we charged as war
criminals? What have we done except our normal duty?
The evidence now to be presented to the Tribunal will, we
expect, answer that question. It will show that just as the Nazi
— —
Party was the very heart the core of the conspiracy, so the SS
was the very essence of Nazism. For the SS was the elite group
of the Party, composed of the most thorough-going adherents of the
Nazi cause, pledged to blind devotion to Nazi principles, and pre-
—
pared to carry them out without any question and at any cost —
group in which every ordinary value has been so subverted that
its members can ask, "What is there unlawful about the things we
have done?"
During the past weeks the Tribunal has heard evidence of the
conspirators' criminal program for aggressive war, for concentration
camps, for the extermination of the Jews, for enslavement of for-
eign labor and illegal use of prisoners of war, for deportation and
Germanization of inhabitants of conquered territories. Through all
this evidence the name of the SS ran like a thread. Again and again
that organization and its components were referred to. It is my
purpose to show why performed a responsible role in every one
it

—
of these criminal activities, why it was and, indeed, had to be —
criminal organization.
The creation and development of such an organization was,
indeed, essential for the execution of the conspirators' plans. Their
sweeping program and the measures they were prepared to use, and
did use, could be fully accomplished neither through the machinery
of the Government nor of the Party. Things had to be done for
which no agency of Government and no political party, even the
Nazi Party, would openly take full responsibility. A specialized
type of apparatus was needed, an apparatus which was to some
extent connected with the Government and given official support
but which, at the same time, could maintain a quasi-independent

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19 Dec. 45

status, so that all its acts could be attributed neither to the Govern-
ment nor to the Party as a whole. The SS was that apparatus.
Like the SA, it was one of the seven components or formations of
the Nazi Party referred to in the "Decree on the Enforcement of the
Law for Securing the Unity of Party and State" of 29 March 1935,
published in the Reichsgesetzblatt for that year, Part I, Page 503.
That decree will be found in our Document 1725-PS. I shall not
read it. I assume that the Court will take judicial notice of it. The
status of the SS, however, was above that of the other formations.
As the plans of the conspirators progressed, it acquired new func-
tions, new responsibilities, and an increasingly more important place
in the regime. It developed during the course of the conspiracy into
a highly complex machine, the most powerful in the Nazi State,
spreading its tentacles into every field of Nazi activity.
The evidence which I be directed, first, towards
shall present will
showing very briefly the origin and early development of the SS;
second, how it was organized, that is, its structure and its com-
ponent parts; third, the basic principles governing the selection of
its members and the obligations they undertook; and finally, its
aims and the means used to accomplish them, the manner in which
it carried out the purposes of the conspirators, and thus is a respon-

sible participant in the crimes alleged in the Indictment.

The history, organization, and publicly announced functions of

the SS are not controversial matters. They are not matters to be
learned only from secret files and captured documents. They were
recounted in many publications circulated widely throughout Ger-
many and the world, official books of the Nazi Party itself and
books, pamphlets, and speeches by SS and State officials published
with SS and Party approval. Throughout the presentation of the
case I shall frequently refer to five or six such publications, trans-
— —
lations of which in whole or in part appear in the document books.
Although I shall quote portions of them, I shall not attempt to read
them all in full, since I assume that the contents of such author-
itative publications may be judicially noticed by the Tribunal.
Now to take up the origin of the SS. The first aim of the con-
spirators — as the evidence already presented to the Court has shown
was to gain a foothold in politically hostile territory, to acquire
mastery of the streets, and to combat any and all opponents with
force. For that purpose they needed their own private, personal
police organization. Evidence has just been introduced in the case
against the SA, showing how that organization was created to fill
such a role. But the SA was outlawed in 1923. When Nazi Party
activity was again resumed in 1925, the SA remained outlawed. To
fill its place and to play the part of Hitler's own personal police,

small mobile groups known as protective squadrons (Schutzstaffeln)

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 19 Dec. 45

were created. This was the origin of the SS in 1925. With the rein-
statement of the SA in 1926, the SS for the next few years ceased
to play a major role. But it continued to exist as an organization
within the SA, under its own leader, however, the Reichsführer SS.
This early history of the SS is related in two of the authoritative
publications to which I have referred: The first is a book by
SS Standartenführer Gunter d'Alquen, entitled Die SS. This book,
a pamphlet of some 30 pages, is an authoritative account of the
history, mission, and organization of the SS, published in 1939. As
indicated on its frontispiece, it was written at the direction of the
Reichsführer SS, Heinrich Himmler. Its author, SS Standarten-
führer Gunter d'Alquen was the editor of the official SS publication
Das Schwarze Korps. This book is our Document Number 2284-PS.
I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-438. The passage to
which I refer will be found on Pages 6 and 7 of the original and
on Page 1 of the translation.
I shall not now read that passage.
The second publication is an article by Himmler entitled,
"Organization and Obligations of the SS and the Police." It was
published in 1937 in a booklet containing a series of speeches or
essays —
by important officials of the Party and the State known as
National Political Course for the Armed Forces from 15 to 23 Jan-
uary 1937. The article by Himmler, to which I refer, appears on
Pages 137-161 of that pamphlet. Large extracts from it make up
our Document Number 1992(a)-PS. I offer the essay by Himmler as
Exhibit Number USA-439. The passage to which I referred appears
on Page 137 of the original and Page 1 of the translation, our Docu-
ment 1992(a)-PS. I shall have occasion to quote from both these
publications, but with respect to this matter of history, I assume
that these references to the pertinent passages in them are enough.
As early as 1929 the conspirators recognized that their plans
required an organization in which the main principles of the Nazi
system, specifically the racial principles, would not only be jealously
guarded but would be carried to such extreme as to inspire or
—
intimidate the rest of the population an organization in which,
also, there would be assured complete freedom on the part of the
leaders and blind obedience on the part of the members. The SS
was built up to meet this need. I quote from D'Alquen's book,
Die SS, at Page 7; this passage appears in our Document Number
2284-PS at Page 4 of the translation, Paragraph 4:
"On the 6th January 1929 Adolf Hitler appointed his tested
of
comrade of long standing, HeinrichHimmler, as Reichsführer
SS. Heinrich Himmler assumed charge therewith of the entire
Schutzstaffel totalling at that time 280 men with the express
and particular order of the Führer to form this organization

163
 —
19 Dec. 45

into an elite troop of the Party, a troop dependable in every

circumstance.
"With this day the real history of the SS begins as it stands
before us today in all its deeper essential features, firmly
anchored in the National Socialist movement. For the SS
and its Reichsführer, Heinrich Himmler, its first SS man, have
both become inseparable in the course of these battle-filled
years."
Carrying out Hitler's directive, Himmler proceeded to build
up out of this small force of men an elite organization to use —
—
D'Alquen's words composed of "the best physically the most . . .

dependable, and the most faithful men" in the Nazi movement.

. . .

I read another passage from D'Alquen at Page 12 of the original,

Page 6 of the translation, Paragraph 5:

"When the day of seizure of power had finally come, there
were 52,000 SS men, who in this spirit bore the revolution in
the van, marched into the new state which they began helping
to form everywhere, in their stations and positions, in pro-
fession and in service, and in all their essential tasks."

The conspirators now had the machinery of government in their

hands. —
The initial function of the SS that of acting as private
—
army and personal police force was thus completed. But its mis-
sion had in fact really just begun. That mission is described in the
Organization Book of the NSDAP for 1943. The pages from that
—
book dealing with the SS Pages 417 to 428 are translated in our —
Document Number 2640-PS. The organization's book has already
been offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-323. The passage
to which I refer appears on Page 417 of the original and on Page 1,
Paragraph 2, of the translation:

"Missions. The original of the SS is

and most eminent duty
to serve as the protectors of the Führer. decree of the By
Führer the sphere of duties has been enlarged to include the
internal security of the Reich."

This new mission— protecting the internal security of the regime

was somewhat more colorfully defined by Himmler in his pam-
phlet The SS as an Anti-Bolshevist Fighting Organization, published
in 1936. It is our Document Number 1851-PS. I offer this document
in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-440. The definition to which
I refer appears in the original at the bottom of Page 29 of the orig-

inal, on the third page of the translation, middle of the paragraph:

"We shall unremittingly our task, the guaranty of the

fulfill
security of Germany from the interior, just as the Wehrmacht
guarantees the safety of the honor, the greatness, and the
peace of the Reich from the exterior. We shall take care that

164
 19 Dec. 45

never again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the Jewish-

Bolshevistic revolution of sub-humans be able to be kindled
either from within or through emissaries from without. With-
out pity we shall be a merciless sword of justice for all those
forces whose existence and activity we know, on the day
of the slightest attempt, may it be today, may it be in decades
or may it be in centuries."
This conception necessarily required an extension of the duties
of the SS into many fields. It involved, of course, the performance
of police functions. But it involved more. It required participation
in the suppression and extermination of all internal opponents of
the regime. It meant participation in extending the regime beyond
the borders of Germany; and therefore came to mean eventually
participation in every type of activity designed to secure a hold
over those territories and populations which, through military con-
quest, had come under German domination.

The expansion of SS duties and activities resulted in the creation

of severalbranches and numerous departments and the eventual
development of a highly complex machinery. Those various branches
and departments cannot be adequately described out of the context
of their history.That description I hope will emerge fully as evi-
dence of the activities of the SS is presented. But it may be
appropriate to anticipate; and at this point, to say a word about
the structure of the SS.
For this purpose, a glance at a chart depicting the organization
of the SS as it appeared in 1945 may be
There are being
helpful.
handed to the Tribunal small copies of this chart,two in English,
one in French and one in Russian. In addition, there are handed
eight larger copies of the chart in the original German, bearing on
it the photostat of the affidavit of Gottlob Berger, formerly Chief of

the SS Main Office, who examined the chart and stated that it cor-
rectly represented the organization of the SS.

I now offer in evidence the chart of the Supreme and Regional

Command of the SS, as Exhibit Number USA-445.
At the very top of the chart is Himmler, the Reichsführer SS,
who commanded the entire organization. Immediately below run- —
ning across the chart and down the right hand side, embraced
—
within the heavy line are the 12 main departments constituting
the Supreme Command of the SS. Some of these departments have
been broken down into the several offices of which they were com-
posed, as indicated by the boxes beneath them. Other departments
have not been so broken down. It is not intended to indicate that
there were not subdivisions of these latter departments as well.
The breakdown is shown only in those cases where the constituent

165
 —a
19 Dec. 45

offices of some department may have a particular significance in

this case.

These departments and their functions are described in two

official Nazi publications. The first is the Organization Book of the
NSDAP for 1943, our Document Number 2640-PS, already intro-
duced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-323. The description,
which I shall not read now, appears on Pages 419-422 of the original
and Pages 2 to 4 of the translation. The second is an SS manual,
which bears the title, The Soldier Friend-Pocket Diary for the Ger-
—
man Armed Forces Edition D, Wajfen-SS. It was prepared at the
direction of the Reichsführer SS and issued by the SS Main Office
for the year ending 1942. It is our Document Number 2825-PS.
I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-441. The description

to which I refer appears on Pages 20 to 22 of the original and

Pages 1 and 2 of the translation. I will later have occasion to read
the description of the functions of some of the departments in full.
But I assume that the Court will take judicial notice of the entire
passages to which I have referred. In addition, the departments are
listed in a directory of the SS, published by one of the main depart-
ments of the SS. This document was found in the files of the Per-
sonal Staff of the Reichsführer SS, the first department from the
left of the chart. It is entitled Directory for the Schutzstaffel of the
NSDAP, 1 November 1944. It is marked "restricted" and bears the
notation "Published by SS Führungshauptamt," (Command Office of
the General SS), which is the fifth box from the left. It is our
Document Number 2769-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Num-
ber USA-442. It is simply a list of the names of the departments
and offices with their addresses and telephone numbers, and corrob-
orates the statements in the two earlier publications to which
I referred.
Returning now to the chart —following down the central spine
from the Reichsführer SS to the regional level we come to the —
Higher SS and Police Leader, commonly known as HSSPF, the
Supreme SS Commander in each region. I shall refer to his func-
tions at a later point.Immediately below him is the breakdown of
the organization of the Allgemeine or General SS. To the left are
—
indicated two other branches of the SS the Death's-Head Units
(Totenkopf Verbände) and the Waffen-SS. To the right, under the
HSSPF, is the SD. All of these components, together with the
SS Police regiments, are specifically named in the Indictment
Appendix B, —
Page 36 as being included in the SS.
Now a word as to these components. Up to 1933 there were no
such specially designated branches. The SS was a single group —
group of "volunteer political soldiers." It was out of this original
nucleus that the new units developed.

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 19 Dec. 45

The Allgemeine, that is, General SS, was the common basis, the
main stem, out of which the various branches grew. It was com-
posed of all members of the SS who did not belong to any of the
special branches.
It was the backbone of the entire organization. The personnel
and officers of the main departments of the SS Supreme Command
were members of this branch. Except for high ranking officers and
those in staff capacities in the main offices of the SS Supreme Com-
mand, its members were part-time volunteers. As the evidence will
show, its members were utilized in about every phase of SS activity.
They were called upon in the anti- Jewish pogroms of 1938; they
took over the task of guarding concentration camps during the war;
they participated in the colonization and resettlement program. In
short, the term "SS" normally meant the General SS.
It was organized on military lines as will be seen from the chart,
ranging from district (Oberabschnitt) and sub-district (Abschnitt)
down through the regiment, battalion, company, to the platoon.
Until after the beginning of the war it constituted numerically the
largest branch of the SS. In 1939 D'Alquen, the official SS spokes-
man, said, and I quote from his book, our Document Number 2284-PS,
Page 9, Paragraph 3, of the English translation, and Page 18 of the
original document:
"The strength of the General SS, 240,000 men, is subdivided
today into 14 38 divisions, 104 infantry regiments,
corps,
19 mounted regiments, 14 communication battalions, and
9 engineer battalions, as well as motorized and medical units.
This General SS stands fully and wholly on call as in the
."
fighting years. . .

Similar reference to the military organization of the General SS

will be found in Himmler's speech, "Organization and Obligations
of the SS and the Police," our Document Number 1992(a)-PS, at
Page 4 of the translation, and in the Organization Book of the
NSDAP for 1943, our Document Number 2640-PS, at Pages 4 and 5
of the translation.
Members however, with the exception of certain
of this branch,
staff personnel, to compulsory military service. As the
were subject
result of the draft of members of the General SS of military age
into the Army, the numerical strength of presently active members
considerably declined during the war. Older SS men and those
working in or holding high positions in the main departments of the
Supreme Command of the SS remained. Its entire strength during
the war was probably not in excess of 40,000 men.
The second component to be mentioned is the Security Service
of the Reichsführer SS, almost always referred to as the SD. Himmler
described it in his speech, "Organization and Obligations of the SS

167
 " I

19 Dec. 45

and the Police" —our Document Number 1992(a)-PS. I quote a pas-

sage from Page 8, last paragraph of the translation, Page 151 of the
original, Paragraph 3:

"I now come to the Security Service (SD); it is the great

ideological intelligence service of the Party and, in the long
run, also that of the State. During the time of struggle for
power it was only the intelligence service of the SS. At that
time we had, for quite natural reasons, an intelligence service
with the regiments, battalions and companies." I interpolate; —
he refers there to the regiments, battalions and companies of
—
the General SS. "We had to know what was going on on the
opponent's side, whether the Communists intended to hold up
a meeting today or not, whether our people were to be sud-
denly attacked or not, and similar things. I separated this
service already in 1931 from the troops —
I note that it appears in the mimeographed translation as 1941;
but, as will appear from a passage on the next pages of the trans-
lation, it was 1931 to which he was referring.
"...from the units of the General SS, because I considered it
to be wrong. For one thing, secrecy is endangered, then the
individual men, or even the companies, are too likely to dis-
cuss everyday political problems."
Although, as Himmler put it, the SD was only the intelligence
service of the SS during the years preceding the accession of the
Nazis to power, it became a much more important organization
promptly thereafter. It had been developed into such a powerful
scientific espionage system under its chief, Reinhard Heydrich, that
on 9 June 1934, just a few weeks before the bloody purge of the SA,
it was made by decree of the Defendant Hess, the sole intelligence
and counter-intelligence agency of the entire Nazi Party. I refer
in support of that statement to D'Alquen's book, Die SS, our Docu-
ment Number 2284-PS, at Page 11 of the translation. I shall not
pause to quote that passage. The organization and numbers of the
SD, as they stood in 1937, were thus described by Himmler I quote —
again from his article, "Organization and Obligations of the SS and
the Police," our Document Number 1992(a)-PS, at Page 9 of the
translation, second paragraph, Page 151 of the original, Paragraph 4:

"The Security Service was already separated from the troop

in 1931 and separately organized. Its higher headquarters
coincide today with the Oberabschnitte and Abschnitte" —
refer to the Abschnitte and Oberabschnitte indicated on the
—
chart "and it has also field offices, its own organization of
officials, and a great many command posts, approximately
3,000 to 4,000 men strong, at least when it is built up."

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19 Dec. 45

Up to 1939 its headquarters was the SS Main Security Office

(Sicherheitshauptamt) which, as I shall shortly show, became amal-
gamated in 1939 in the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) one of
the SS main departments shown on the chart before you the sixth —
box from the left.
The closer and closer collaboration of the SD with the Gestapo
—
and Criminal Police which eventually resulted in the creation of
this RSHA —
and the activities in which the SD engaged in partner-
ship with the Gestapo will be taken up in the presentation of the
case against the Gestapo. The SD was, of course, at all times an
integral and important component of the SS. But it is more practi-
cable to deal with it in connection with the activities of the whole
repressive police system with which it functioned.
The third to be mentioned is the Waffen-SS the
component —
combat arm —
the SS created, trained, and finally utilized for
of
purposes of aggressive war. The reason underlying the creation of
this combat branch was described in our Document Number 2640-PS,
the Organization Book of the Nazi Party for 1943. It appears on
Page 427a of the original, Page 5, Paragraph 7 of the translation:
"The armed SS originated out of the thought: to create for
the Führer a selected, long-service troop for the fulfillment
of special missions. It should make it possible for members
of the General SS, as well as for volunteers who fulfill the
special requirements of the SS, to fight in the battle for the
realization of the National Socialist idea with weapon in hand
in unified groups partly within the framework of the Army."

The term "Waffen-SS" did not come into use until after the
beginning of the war. Up to that time there were two branches of
the SS composed of full-time, well-trained, professional soldiers:
The so-called SS Verfügungstruppe, translatable perhaps as SS
Emergency Troops, and the SS Totenkopf Verbände (the Death's-
Head Units). After the beginning of the war, the units of the
SS Verfügungstruppe were brought up to division strength, and new
divisions were added to them. Parts of the SS Death's-Head Units
were formed into a division, the SS Totenkopf Division. All these
divisions then came to be known collectively as the Waffen-SS.

Let me now trace that development. I quote again from the

Organization Book of the Nazi Party for 1943, our Document Num-
ber 2640-PS, Page 427b of the original, Page 5, last paragraph of the
translation:
"The origin of the Waffen-SS goes back to the decree of
17 March 1933 establishing the Stabswache with the original
strength of 120 men. Out of this small group developed the
later-called SS Verfügungstruppe," —SS Emergency Force

169
19 Dec. 45

"the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. In the course of the war,

these groups grew into divisions."
THE PRESIDENT: Major Farr, is it necessary to go into this
degree of detail about the organization of the SS?
MAJOR FARR: Sir, it seemed to me that it is highly important
to knowexactly what the organization with which we are dealing
is. There has been, I understand, a suggestion made to the Court
that certain portions of this organization are not criminal. It is con-
tended by some that the part they played was a perfectly innocuous
one; and it seems to me that before we can determine whether the
organization as a whole is criminal, whether any portion of it is
severable, then we must know what the organization is.

THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn't

it be possible to leave that question
to evidence in rebuttal, the defendants are setting up that any
if

particular branch of the SS is not criminal?

MAJOR FARR: If we adequately lay the basis for our case now,
it maynot be necessary for us to make any rebuttal. We may
satisfy the defendants that there is nothing to the contention that
any portion of the SS is a lawful portion. The point I am par-
ticularly trying to make now is: There has been a good deal of con-
tention that the Waffen-SS is severable; that whatever may be said,
for example, about the SD or the Death's-Head Units, the Waffen-SS
is something different, the Waffen-SS is part of the Army. I think
it is important to establish at the outset that the Waffen-SS is as

much a part of the SS, as integral a part of the whole organization,

as any of the other branches. I propose, therefore, to show the
development of the Waffen-SS, growing out of the SS Emergency
Troops, and to call to the attention of the Tribunal evidence showing
how the Waffen-SS is an integral part of the SS as a whole.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you must take your own course.

MAJOR FARR: The Verfügungstruppe were described in a

top-secret Hitler order dated the 17th of August 1938. It is our
Document Number 647-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number
USA-443. That document will be found in Volume I of the docu-
ment book. I quote from Section II of that order, which appears on
Page 2 of the translation at the top the page and also on Page 2 of
the original:
"II. The Armed Units of the SS.
"A. The SS Verfügungstruppe.
"1. The SS Verfügungstruppe is neither a part of the Wehr-
macht nor a part of the police. It is a standing armed unit
exclusively at my disposal. As such and as a unit of the
NSDAP, its members are to be selected by the Reichsführer

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 19 Dec. 45

SS according to the ideological and political standards which

Ihave ordered for the NSDAP and for the Schutzstaffeln. Its
members are to be trained and its ranks filled with volunteers
from those who are subject to military service, having finished
their duties in the obligatory labor service. The service period
for volunteers is 4 years. It may be prolonged for SS Unter-
führer. Special regulations are in force for SS leaders. The
regular compulsory military service (Paragraph 8 of the law
relating to military service) is fulfilled by service of the same
duration in the SS Verfügungstruppe."
Iwant to quote a further short passage from that decree which
willbe found on Page 3 of the translation in the middle of the page
and on Page 5 of the original order:
"III. Orders in case of Mobilization.
"A. The employment of the SS Verfügungstruppe in case of
mobilization is a double one.
"1. By the Supreme Commander of the Army within the war-
time army. In that case it comes completely under military
laws and regulations, but remains a unit of the NSDAP
politically.
"2. In case of necessity in the interior according to my orders;
in that case it is under the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the

German Police.
"In case of mobilization I myself will make the decision about
the time, strength, and manner of the incorporation of the SS
Verfügungstruppe into the wartime army; these things will
depend on the internal political situation at that time."
—
Immediately after the issuance of this decree and the Court will
recall it was issued in August of 1938 —
this militarized force was
—
employed with the Army for aggressive purposes the taking over
of the Sudetenland. Following this action feverish preparation to
motorize the force and to organize new units such as antitank,
machine gun, and reconnaissance battalions were undertaken pursu-
ant to further directives of the Führer. By September 1939 the
force was fully motorized; its units had been increased to division
strength and it was prepared for combat. These steps are described
in the National Socialist Yearbook for the years 1940 and 1941.
I offer in evidence Pages 365 to 371 of the 1940 yearbook. It is our

Document Number 2164-PS. It bears Exhibit Number USA-255.

I offer Pages 191 to 193 of the 1941 yearbook, which is our Docu-
ment Number 2163-PS, as Exhibit Number USA-444. Since the
yearbook is an official publication of the Nazi Party, edited by
Reichsleiter Robert Ley and published by the Nazi Party publishing
company, I assume that the Court will take judicial notice of the
contents of these exhibits.

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19 Dec. 45

After the launching of the Polish invasion and as the war

progressed, still further divisions were added. The Organization
Book of the Nazi Party for 1943, our Document Number 2640-PS,
lists some eight divisions and two infantry brigades as existing at
the end of 1942. I refer to Page 427b of the original, Page 5, last
paragraph of the translation. This was no longer an emergency
force. It was an SS army and hence came to be designated as the
Waffen-SS. Himmler referred to this spectacular development of
this SS combat branch in his speech at Posen on 4 October 1943 to
SS Gruppenführer. That speech has already been introduced in
evidence at an earlier stage in the case, as Exhibit Number USA-170.
It is our Document Number 1919-PS.

I shall quote from that speech, Page 51 of the original, Page 2

of the translation, second paragraph, headed "The SS in Wartime."
I quote:
"Now I come to our own development, to that of the SS in
the past months. Looking back on the whole war, this develop-
ment was fantastic. It took place at an absolutely terrific
speed. Let us look back a little to 1939. At that time we were
a few regiments, guard units, 8,000 to 9,000 strong that is, —
not even a division, all in all 25,000 to 28,000 men at the out-
side. True, we were armed, but we really only got our artil-
lery regiment as our heavy arm 2 months before the war
began."
I continue, quoting from the same speech a passage found on

Page 8 of the English translation and on Page 104 of the original.

The passage in the translation appears at about the middle of
,the page.

"In the hard battles of this year, the Waffen-SS has been
welded together in the bitterest hours from the most varied
divisions and sections out of which it was formed: Bodyguard
units' '
—
Leibstandarte —
" military SS Verfügungstruppe
'
'
— —
"Death's-Head Units, and then the Germanic SS. Now when
our Divisions 'Reich,' 'Death's-Head,' the Cavalry Division,
and 'Viking' were together, everyone knew in these last
weeks: 'Viking' is at my side, 'Reich' is at my side, 'Death's-
Head' is at my side. Thank God, now nothing can happen
to us."

The transformation of small emergency forces into a combat

army did not result in a separation of this branch from the SS.
Although tactically under the command of the Wehrmacht while
in the field, it remained as much a part of the SS as any other
branch of the organization. Throughout the war it was recruited,
trained, administered, and supplied by the main offices of the SS

172
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19 Dec. 45

Supreme Command. Ideologically and racially its members were

selected in conformity with SS standards.
I shall read a passage relating to the recruiting standards of the
Waffen-SS published in the SS Manual, The Soldier Friend, our
Document Number 2825-PS, which appears on Page 7 of the Eng-
lish translation, first paragraph on Page 36, Paragraph 2 of the
original. I quote:
"Today at last is the longed-for day of the entrance examina-
tions where the examiners and physicians decide whether or
not the candidate is ideologically and physically qualified to
do service in the Waffen-SS. Everyone has acquainted him-
self with the comprehensive Manual for the Waffen-SS . .

the principal points are as follows: 1. Service in the Waffen-

SS counts as military service. Only volunteers are accepted.' "
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What is the purpose of reading
evidence? What has what you just read got to do with what
all this
you are presenting?
MAJOR FARR: Sir, I want to prove, as I said a moment ago,
one thing first: that the Waffen-SS is an integral, component part
of the SS. I want to establish that it is completely administered and
controlled by the Supreme Command of the SS. That is one thing.
The second thing I want to prove is this: that service in the
Waffen-SS voluntary service just as membership in the Allgemeine
is
SS or Death's-Head Units is voluntary service. It is true that there
were some instances towards the close of the war when a few men
were conscripted into the Waffen-SS but that was the exception and
not the rule. In quoting from the recruiting standards of the
Waffen-SS appearing in this booklet, which was published in 1942
and which indicate that at that time service in the Waffen-SS was
open only to volunteers, I think I am serving the purpose of proving
one of the two points which I think ought to be established.
x I want may, one further paragraph from that trans-
to read, if I

lation. I paragraph indicating that service is volun-

shall read the
tary. Now I want to read the third requirement, which shows that
service was open only to persons who could meet the ideological
and other standards of the SS as a whole.
If the Tribunal is satisfied on the point that service in the
Waffen-SS is essentially voluntary and that the Waffen-SS is an

integral part of the SS, I do not want to impose further by reading

further evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: think the Tribunal is satisfied on both those

I

points, up to the present time, that it is voluntary and is an integral

part of the SS.

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19 Dec. 45

MAJOR FARR: Ifthe Court is satisfied on both those points,

I shall not pursue, any further, the introduction of this particular
evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: It may, as you say, be possible to show that
there were some members conscripted into it at a later date, but we
have not had that evidence yet.
MAJOR FARR: No, Your Honor, you have not.
All I want to show is that the normal thing is that it is voluntary
and that the Waffen-SS is an integral part of the whole organization.
If the Court is completely satisfied on that point I shall proceed no
further with the description of the Waffen-SS.
I shall pass on now then, to a description of the SS Totenkopf
Verbände (the Death's-Head Units), which are the fourth component
to be mentioned.
The origin and purpose of the Totenkopf-Verbände were suc-
cinctly described by D'Alquen in his book, Die SS, our Document
Number 2284-PS. I shall read from Page 10 of the English trans-
lation, Paragraph 5, a passage that appears on Page 20 of the
original, Paragraph 3:
"The SS Death's-Head Units form one part of the garrisoned
SS. They arose from volunteers of the General SS who were
recruited for the guarding of concentration camps in 1933.
Their mission, aside from the indoctrination of the armed
political soldier, is the guarding of enemies of the state who
are held in concentration camps. The SS Death's-Head Units
obligate their members to 12 years' service. They are com-
posed mainly of men who have already fulfilled their duty to
serve in the Wehrmacht. This time of service is counted
toward the service obligation in the SS Death's-Head Units."
—
Since the Death's-Head Units like the SS Verfügungstruppe
were composed of well-trained professional soldiers, they were also
a valuable nucleus for the Waffen-SS. The secret Hitler order of
17 August 1938, Document Number 647-PS, which has already been
introduced in evidence, provided for the tasks of the SS Totenkopf
Verbände in the event of mobilization. The Totenkopf Verbände
were to be relieved from the duty of guarding concentration camps -

and transferred as a skeleton corps to the S S Verfügungstruppe.

I quote from that order, a passage found on Page 5 of the trans-
lation, Paragraph 4; Page 9 of the original. I quote:
"5) Regulations for the case of the Mobilization.
"The SS Totenkopf Verbände form the skeleton corps for the
reinforcement of the SS Totenkopf Verbände (Polizeiverstär-
kung) and will be replaced in the guarding of concentration
camps by members of the General SS who are over 45 years
of age and have had military training."

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 19 Dec. 45

If I may
point out to the Court, the purpose in offering that bit
of evidence is toshow that the foundation was laid for having the
Allgemeine SS (the General SS) take over the duties of guarding
concentration camps after the war had started. The Totenkopf
Verbände were originally created for that purpose. When the war
came they went into the Waffen-SS and their duties were taken
over by members of the General SS.
The final component which was specifically referred to in the
Indictment is the SS police regiments. I shall very shortly turn to
the steps by which the SS assumed control over the entire Reich
police. Out of the police special militarized forces were formed
originally known as SS police battalions and later expanded to
SS Police Regiments.
I shall quote from Himmler's Posen speech, our Document
Number 1919-PS, Page 3 of the translation, next to the last para-
graph; Page 59 of the original. I quote:
"Now with the tasks of the regular uniformed
to deal briefly
police —
and the Sipo they still cover the same field. I can see
that great things have been achieved. We have formed roughly
30 police regiments from police reservists and former
members of the police —police
officials, as they used to be
called. The average age in our police battalions is not lower
than that of the security battalions of the Armed Forces. Their
achievements are beyond all praise. In addition, we have
formed police rifle regiments by merging the police battalions
previously drawn up of the 'savage peoples.' Thus, we did
not leave these police battalions untouched but blended them
in the ratio of about 1 to 3."
The results of this blend of militarized SS police and "savage
peoples" will be seen in the evidence which I shall later introduce
relating to extermination actions conducted by them in the Eastern
—
Territories exterminations which were so eminently successful and
ruthlessly conducted that even Himmler could find no words ade-
quate for their eulogy.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

MAJOR FARR: Each of the various components which I have

described played its part in carrying out one or more functions
of the SS. The personnel composing each differed. Some were part-
time volunteers; others professionals enlisted for different periods
of time. But every branch, every department, every member, was
an integral part of the whole organization. Each performed his
assigned role in the manifold tasks for which the organization had

175
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19 Dec. 45

been created. No better witness to this fact could be called upon

than the Reichsführer SS whose every endeavor was to insure the
complete unity of the organization. I quote his words, taken from
his Posen speech, our Document 1919-PS, Exhibit Number USA-170.
I read from Page 103 of the original, third line from the bottom
of the page, from the English translation, Page 8:

"It would be an evil the main offices, in performing

day if

their tasks with the best,but mistaken, intentions made

themselves independent by each having a downward chain of
command. I really think that the day of my overthrow would
be the end of the SS. It must be, and so come about, that this
—
SS organization with all its branches the General SS which
is the common basis of all of them, the Waffen-SS, the regular
uniformed police, the Sipo, with the whole economic ad-
ministration, schooling, ideological training, the whole question
of kindred is, even under the 10th Reichsführer SS, one bloc,
one body, one organization."
And continuing about the middle of Page 8 of the translation
and at the bottom of Page 104 of the original speech:
"The regular uniformed police and Sipo, General SS and
Waffen-SS, must now gradually amalgamate, too, just as
this is and must be the case within the Waffen-SS. This
applies to matters concerning filling of posts, recruiting,
schooling, economic organization, and medical services. I am
always doing something towards this end, a bond is constantly
being drawn around these sections of the whole to cause
them to grow together. Alas, if these bonds should ever be
—
loosened, then everything you may be sure of this would —
sink back quickly into its old insignificance within one
generation."
I now turn to the underlying philosophy of the SS, the principles
by which its members were selected and the obligations imposed
upon them. To understand this organization the theories upon
which it was based must be kept clearly in mind. They furnish the
key to all its activities. It is necessary, therefore, to consider them
in some detail.
The fundamental principle of selection was what Himmler called
that of blood and elite. The SS was
be the living embodiment
to
of the Nazi doctrine of the superiority of Nordic blood the —
carrying into effect of the Nazi conception of a master race. To
put it in Himmler 's own words the SS was to be a "National
Socialist Soldier Order of Nordic Men." In describing to the Wehr-
macht the reasons behind his emphasis on racial standards of
selection and the manner in which they were carried out he said

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 19 Dec. 45

and I quote from our Document 1992(a)-PS, Page 1 of the trans-

lation, last paragraph, Page 138, Paragraph 1 of the original:
"Accordingly, only good blood, blood which history has
proved to be leading and creative and the foundation of
every state and of all military activities, only Nordic blood,
can be considered. I said to myself that should I succeed in
selecting from the German people for this organization as
many people as possible, a majority of whom possess this
desired blood, in teaching them military discipline and, in
time, the understanding of the value of blood and the entire
ideology which results from it, then it will be possible
actually to create such an elite organization which would
successfully hold its own in all cases of emergency."
—
Further on, on Page 5 of the translation I beg your pardon,
on Page 4 of the translation, first line, Page 140 of the original,
bottom paragraph, he says, referring to the method by which
applicants were selected:
"They are very thoroughly examined and checked. Of 100 men
we can use on the average 10 or 15, no more. We ask for
the political record of his parents, brothers and sisters, the
record of his ancestry as far back as 1750, and naturally the
physical examination and his record from the Hitler Youth.
Further, we ask for a eugenic record showing that no
hereditary disease exists in his parents and in his family."
THE PRESIDENT: I don't seem to get the point of this. We
have already been told that the SS was a corps d'elite, and all
this is showing the details of the choice.

MAJOR FARR: That is correct; it is showing the details of

the choice,

THE PRESIDENT: But that has nothing to do with its being

a criminal organization, has it?

MAJOR FARR: I think it has, Your Honor. I want to make

again, if I may, two points. The very essence of this organization
was that of race. Its racial standards of selection had two purposes:
One, making it an organization which would be an aristocracy
not only for Germany, but which would be in a position to
dominate all of Europe. For that purpose, not only were strict
racial standards imposed for selection, but a great drive was made
to perpetuate the SS stock, to build up a group of men who would
be in a position to take over Europe when it was conquered.
There was nothing questionable about that aim. Himmler
explicitly said time and time again: "What we are after is making
ourselves the superclass which will be able to dominate Europe
for centuries." That was one of the fundamental purposes of the

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19 Dec. 45

SS, and it was a purpose which was not kept by Himmler to

himself, but a purpose which was explained and publicly announced
again and again.
THE PRESIDENT: You haven't yet shown us where it was
announced, have you?
MAJOR FARR: I have not, Sir, and I am coming to that very
shortly; but wanted first to show Your Honor what the racial
I

basis of selection was. That is, one aspect of the racial selective
process. The second is this: The negative side of the racism. Not
only did Himmler intend to build up an elite which would be
able to take over Europe, but he indoctrinated that elite with
hatred for all "inferior," to use his word, races.
Now, think unless it is clearly understood that that is the
I
basis of the SS, we cannot understand the organization. I am
quite prepared, if the Tribunal desires, not to go further into a
discussion of the detail of the process of selection. I do think it
important that I quote Himmler's own statement what his aims —
were. And also I quote to the Tribunal the publicly announced
basis for selection.

With the Tribunal's permission then, I would like to quote one

passage from the Organization Book for the Nazi Party, which
explains the racial basis on which the SS was founded. That is
our Document Number 2640-PS, which has already been introduced
in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-323. I quote from Page 417
of the German text and from Page 1 of the translation, fourth
paragraph, entitled "Selection of Members." And I quote this
because this is not a hidden pronouncement. This is what the
official Nazi Party publication said the SS was:

"Selection of members.
"For the fulfillment of these missions a homogeneous, firmly
welded fighting force has been created, bound by ideological
oaths, whose fighters are selected out of the best Aryan
humanity.
"The conception of the value of the blood and soil serves as
directive for the selection into the SS. Every SS man must
be deeply imbued with the sense and essence of the National
Socialist movement. He will be ideologically and physically
trained so that he can be employed individually or in groups
in the decisive battle for the National Socialist ideology.

"Only the best and thoroughbred, Germans are suited for

commitment in this battle. Therefore it is necessary that an
uninterrupted selection is maintained within the ranks of
the SS, first roughly, then with more and more scrutiny."

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 19 Dec. 45

Now I would like to proceed to quote a paragraph on the same

page, three paragraphs down, with respect to obedience. It appears
on Page 418 of the original, second paragraph. I quote:
"Obedience is unconditionally demanded. It arises from the
conviction that the National Socialist ideology must reign.
He who possesses it and passionately supports it, submits
himself voluntarily to the compulsion of obedience. Therefore,
the SS man is prepared to carry out blindly every order
which comes from the Führer or is given by one of his
superiors even if it demands the greatest sacrifice of himself."
There are stated the two fundamental principles of the SS:
(1) racial selection, (2) blind obedience.
Now, let me state what Himmler conceived that this organization
was to be used for. I quote from his address to the officers of the
SS Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler" on the Day of Metz, our Document
Number 1918-PS, Exhibit Number USA-304. I quote from Page 12
of the original document, the middle of the page, from the trans-
lation Page 3, last paragraph. I will begin the translation with
the third sentence of that paragraph:
"The ultimate aim for these 11 years during which I have
been the Reichsführer SS has invariably been the same: To
create an order of good blood which is able to serve
Germany, which unfailingly and without sparing itself can
be made use of because the greatest losses can do no harm
to the vitality of this order, the vitality of these men, because
they will always be replaced; to create an order which will
spread the idea of Nordic blood so far that we will attract
all Nordic blood in the world, take away the blood from
—
our adversaries, absorb it so that never again looking at
it —
from the viewpoint of the grand policy will Nordic
Germanic blood in great quantities and to an extent worth
mentioning fight against us. We must get it and the others
cannot have it. We never gave up the ideas and the aim
conceived so many years ago. Everything we have done has
taken us some distance further on the way. Everything we
are going to do will lead us further on the way."
Now, one further quotation from the same document, which
shows very explicitly why there was the building up of this order
of Nordic blood, appears on Page 3 of the translation, the same
document from which I have just quoted, about the middle of the
first paragraph. It appears on Page 11 of the original speech, about
the middle of the page. That is the speech to the officers of the
SS Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler":
"Please understand we would not be able to hold the great
Germanic Reich which is about to take shape. I am convinced

179
 . . .

19 Dec. 45

that we can hold it, but we have to prepare for that. If

once we have not enough sons, those who come after us will
have to A nation which has an average
become cowards.
of four sons per family can venture a war; if two of them
die, two transmit the name. The leadership of a nation
having one or two sons per family will have to be faint-
hearted in any decision, on account of their own experience,
because they will have to tell themselves: We cannot afford
it. Look at France, which is the best example. France had
to have her line of action dictated by us."
Domination of Europe through a Nazi elite required more, how-
ever, than a positive side of racism . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that one of the crimes you

allege, domination of Europe through an elite?

MAJOR FARR: One of the crimes alleged is a conspiracy to

dominate Europe, preparation for aggressive war, leading to the
ultimate colonization of Europe for the benefit of the conspirators.
One of the instruments, we submit, used for carrying out that
policy was the SS. The conspirators began at the very beginning
the creation of the SS, to build it up so that it would be the elite
through which Germany would be able to dominate and rule the
conquered territories.
We think that this conception of the SS has played a vital part
in the conspiracy. It has bearing on the whole program of the
conspirators. Now, this certainly, in itself . .

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but, Major Farr, what you have to

show not the criminality of the people who used the weapon
is
but the criminality of the people who composed the weapon.
MAJOR FARR: I think I have to show two things, certainly
the criminality of the persons who composed the weapons, but it
seems to me I must also show that that weapon played a part
in the conspiracy because the Indictment alleges . .

THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought you had shown that

over and over again, that the SS were a part of the weapon. If
there was a criminal conspiracy, then the SS were one of the
weapons which were used by the conspirators. But what you have
got to show in this part of the case is that the persons who formed
that weapon were criminal and knew of the criminal objects
of the SS.

MAJOR FARR: quite agree I have to show that. I suppose I

I
have showing that the persons involved knew of
to show, before
the criminal aims of the organization, what those criminal aims
were. I was simply attempting to show the Tribunal that one of

180
 19 Dec. 45

those aims which I submit as criminal was a plan to dominate

Europe, and that the SS was one of the means by which that was
to be done.
Now, this is just one aspect of the SS criminality. I am quite
ready not to proceed any further with the point if the Court
already has the point, and thinks that the evidence of that aspect
of its criminality is sufficient. I certainly do not want to labor
the point too hard.
I now proceed further with the -point as to the building up of

the SS as a racial elite to take over; but I do think one other thing
is important, and that is the negative side of that racism: the hatred
for other races. And Himmler made some very striking points along
that line as to what the SS was to be taught. I quote from his Posen
speech, that is, our Document 1919-PS. The passage in question
appears on Page 23 of the original speech, middle of the page, and
will be found on Page 1 of the English translation, third paragraph.
I quote:

"One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS man.
We must be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members
of our own blood and to nobody else. What happens to a
Russian, to a Czech, does not interest me in the slightest."
The next few sentences from that same paragraph have already
been read into evidence, and I shall not repeat them. But I do want
to quote, in the same paragraph, the conclusion that Himmler draws
from what he just said. This sentence is about seven lines from the
bottom of the paragraph, beginning:
"That is what I want to SS and what I believe
instill into this
I have instilled in them as one of the most sacred laws of the
future."
Now these principles —
that is, the conception of being an elite
which was over Europe and the conception of hatred towards
to take
inferior races, which was instilled in the SS —
these were principles
which were publicly reiterated over and over again so that the
newest recruit was thoroughly steeped in them.
I quote from Himmler's Kharkov speech, which appears in the
same Document 1919-PS.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Can't you just give us the meaning
of the speech without quoting from it; can you just refer to it?
MAJOR FARR: I will be very glad to do that, if the Court will
take judicial notice of it. I will refer you to the passage I have in
mind. The passage in question appears on Page 14 of the trans-
lation, about 15 lines from the bottom of the page; it appears on
Page 17 of the original, at about the middle of the page.

181
 I

19 Dec. 45

In that passage, after having talked at great length about the

racial struggle, Himmler —
commanding officers and he is
tells his
making this speech to the commanding officers of three divisions
—
of the Waffen-SS he tells his officers that the thing which he wants
so thoroughly instilled into every recruit in the organization that
he becomes saturated with it, is the necessity of the SS standing
firm and carrying on the racial struggle without mercy.
—
On the same point one further quotation if the Tribunal will
—
bear with me and I think this is important because this, again, is
a public quotation, found in the Organization Book of the Party.
That is our Document Number 2640-PS. It is a very short passage,
appearing on Page 418 of the original and Page 1 of the English
translation, the third paragraph from the end of the page in the
translation:
"He openly and unrelentingly fights the most dangerous ene-
mies of the State: Jews, Freemasons, Jesuits, and political
clergymen."
Now these were the fundamental principles of the SS: racial
superiority and blind obedience. A
necessary corollary of these two
principles was ruthlessness. The evidence that we will introduce
on these activities will show how successfully the SS learned .the
lesson it was taught.
The SS had to, and did, develop a reputation for terror which
was carefully cultivated. Himmler himself publicly attested it as
early as 1936 in his pamplet, The SS as an Anti-Bolshevist Fighting
Organization, our Document 1851-PS, which has already been intro-
duced into evidence as Exhibit Number USA-440. I quote two
sentences which appear at Page 29 of the original pamphlet and on
Page 4 of the translation, the first two sentences:
"I know that there are some people in Germany who become
sick when they see these black coats. We understand the
reason for this and do not expect that we shall be loved by
too many."
The role which the SS was required to play demanded that it
remain constantly the essence of Nazism and that its elite quality
should never be diluted.
As evidence that even in 1943 the SS standards were still being
maintained, I offer in evidence a letter written to the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner by Himmler. This letter is our Document Number
2768-PS. It is a letter from the Reichsführer SS, written at his field
command post and bearing the date 24 April 1943. I offer it as
Exhibit Number USA-447. I quote from the first paragraph of
that letter:
"Referring again to the matter which we discussed some time
—
ago that is, the admission of Sipo officials into the SS—

182
 19 Dec. 45

wish to clarify again: I want an admission only if the follow-

ing conditions, are fulfilled:
"1. If the man applies freely and voluntarily;
by applying strict and peace-time standards, the appli-
"2. If,

cant fits racially and ideologically into the SS, guarantees

according to the number of his children a really healthy
SS stock, and is neither ill, degenerate, nor worthless."
Then, continuing with the third paragraph:
"I beg you not only to act accordingly in the future, but
especially also that numerous admissions into the ranks of
the SS in the past be re-examined and revised according to
these instructions."
Now I have appended this to indicate to the Tribunal the normal
manner in which a man became a member of the SS. That is dis-
cussed by Himmler in our Document 1992(a)-PS, at Page 142 of the
original and Page 5 of the translation. If the Court thinks that it
can take judicial notice of that passage, I shall not venture to read
it. What it does is to describe how a young man comes into the SS
normally, at the age of 18, serves an apprenticeship and receives his
instructions ideology, takes the SS oath, receives the SS
in SS
dagger, and how
long he remains in the General SS. I will not
venture to read that paragraph, since I assume that the Court will
take judicial notice of it..
I do think it may be worth
quoting the very brief oath which
the SS man That oath is quoted in the Waffen-SS recruiting
takes.
pamphlet, entitled The SS Calls You, our Document Number 3429-PS,
which I offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-446. The oath
appears on Page 18 of that pamphlet, and on Page 2 of the trans-
lation, in the middle of the page. I quote the oath:

"The Oath of the SS Man:

"I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, as Führer and Reich Chancellor,
loyalty and bravery; I vow to you, and to those you have
named to command me, obedience unto death, so help me
God."
I turn now to a consideration of the activities of the SS, the
manner in which
carried out the purposes of the conspirators and
it
performed its function of guarding the internal security of the Nazi
regime. The proof of the elite Nazi quality and thorough reliability
— —
of the SS the test by which it won its spurs occurred on June 30,
1934, whenparticipated in the purge of the SA and other oppo-
it
nents or potential opponents of the Nazi regime. That was the first
real occasion for the use of this specialized organization which could
operate with the blessing of the Nazi State, but outside the law.

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19 Dec. 45

I offer in evidence an affidavit by the Defendant Wilhelm Frick,

signed and sworn to here in Nuremberg on 19 November 1945. It
is our Document Number 2950-PS. I offer it as Exhibit Number

USA-448. I shall quote a portion of that affidavit, beginning about

the middle of the first paragraph of the affidavit, the 10th line in
the original. I quote:
—
"Many people were killed I don't know how many who —
actually did not have anything to do with the Putsch. People
who just weren't liked very well were killed, as for instance,
Schleicher, the former Reich Chancellor. Schleicher's wife was
also killed; as was Gregor Strasser, who had been the Reichs-
leiter and second man in the Party after Hitler. Strasser, at
the time he was murdered, was not active in political affairs
any more. However, he was against the Führer in the elec-
tions of November 1932. The SS was used by Himmler for
the execution of these orders to suppress the Putsch."
It was in recognition of its services in this respect that the SS
was elevated to the status of being a component of the Party equal
in rank to the SA, and other similar ranking. I ask the Court to
take judicial notice of a passage which appears on Page 1 of the
Völkischer Beobachter of July 26, 1934. It is our Document Number
1857-PS, Exhibit USA-412. I shall read the translation of that
passage, which is very brief:
"The Reich Press office of the NSDAP announces the follow-
ing order of the Führer:
"In consideration of the great meritorious service of the SS,
especially in connection with the events of 30 June 1934, I
elevate it to the standing of an independent organization
within the NSDAP. The Reichsführer SS, like the Chief of
Staff, is, therefore, directly subordinate to the highest SA
leader."
By action on June 30th, the SS proved itself. It was, there-
its
fore, the type of organization which the conspirators wanted for the
first necessary step in their program, the acquisition of control over
the police, because one of the first steps essential to the security of
any regime is control of the police. The aim of the conspirators was
to fuse the SS and the police; to merge them into a single, unified,
repressive force.
I turn now
to the consideration of the development whereby the
SS and the police became intermingled. Shortly after the seizure of
power the conspirators began to develop, as a part of the State
machinery, secret political police forces, originating in Prussia in
the Gestapo established by decree of the Defendant Goring in 1933;
and development will be dealt with in the case against the
this
Gestapo. By 1934 the Reichsführer SS had become the chief of these

184
 19 Dec. 45

secret political police forces in all the states of Germany except

Prussia, and deputy chief of the Prussian Gestapo. In that capacity
he with members of the SS until a virtual
infiltrated these forces
identity of membership of the SS and the Gestapo was achieved.
On 17 June 1936, by the "Decree on the Establishment of a Chief
of the German Police," published in the Reichsgesetzblatt for 1936,
Part I, Pages 487 and 488, our Document Number 2073-PS, of which
I assume the Court will take judicial notice, the new post of Chief
of the GermanPolice was created in the Ministry of the Interior.
Under the terms of the decree Himmler was appointed to this post
with the title of "Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police
in the Ministry of the Interior."
The combination of these two positions, that of leadership of the
SS and head of all the police forces in the Reich, was no accident
but was intended to establish a permanent relation between the two
bodies and not a mere transitory fusion of personnel. The signifi-
cance of this combination of these two positions was referred to by
Hitler in his secret order of 17 August 1938 on the organization and
mobilization of the SS, our Document Number 647-PS, which I
introduce in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-443 and from which
I will now quote just the preamble, which will be found on the
first page of our Document Number 647-PS and at the beginning of
the original order. I quote:
"By means of the nomination of the Reichsführer SS and
Chief of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior
on June 17, 1936 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 487), I have created
the basis for the unification and reorganization of the German
Police. With this step the Schutzstaffeln of the NSDAP, which
were under the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German
Police even up to now, have entered into close connection
with the duties of the German Police."
Upon his appointment Himmler immediately proceeded to reor-
ganize the entire police force, designating two separate branches:
(1) The regular uniformed police force (Ordnungspolizei, or Orpo,
as they were called by their abbreviated title); and (2) the so-called
Security Police, or as they came to be known by their abbreviated
title, Sipo. The Security Police was composed of all the criminal
police in the Reich and all the Gestapo. This reorganization was
achieved by the decree assigning functions to the Office of the Chief
of the German Police, published in the Reichsministerialblatt for
1936, Pages 946-948, our Document Number 1551-PS. Of that decree
I assume the Court will take judicial notice.

To be head of the Sipo, that is, of the Criminal Police and the
Gestapo, Himmler appointed Reinhard Heydrich, who was at that
time the Chief of the SD, the SS intelligence agency to which I have

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already referred. Thus, through Himmler's dual capacity as Reichs-

führer SS, and as Chief of the German Police, and through Heydrich's
dual capacity as head of the SD and of the Security Police, a unified
personal command of the SS and Security Police Forces was achieved.
But further steps towards unification were taken. In 1939 the
Security Police and the SD, which up to that time was only an
agency of the SS, were both combined in a single department: the
Reich Security Main Office, commonly referred to as RSHA. An
important point to be observed is this: This newly created depart-
ment, RSHA, was not a mere department of the Government. It
was a dual thing. It was simultaneously an agency of the Govern-
ment, organizationally placed in the Ministry of the Interior, and
at the same time, one of the principal departments of the SS, organi-
zationally placed in the Supreme Command of the SS. This division
in the SS is shown by the chart before you; RSHA being indicated
by the sixth block from the left of the chart. But it was not merely
the Gestapo and Criminal Police which came under the sway of the
SS; the regular uniformed police as well were affected. Like the
RSHA, the department of the Regular Police (the Ordnungspolizei)
was also not merely a department in the Ministry of the Interior,
but also simultaneously in the Supreme Command of the SS. Its
position in the SS is indicated by the seventh block on the chart,
on the left.
Now this unity of command between SS and Police was not a
mere matter of the highest headquarters. It extended down to the
operating level. The Court will observe from the chart that the
Higher SS and Police Leader in each region, who was directly sub-
ordinate to Himmler, had under his command both the Security
Police (Sipo) and the regular uniformed police (Ordnungspolizei);
and also that these forces, Sipo and Orpo, were not only under com-
mand of the Higher SS and Police Leader, but as indicated by the
blue line, were also under command of the RSHA, and the Depart-
ment of the Ordnungspolizei, and the SS. Thus you have organi-
zationally a unity of command over the SS and the police. This
organization was not the only way by which unity was achieved.
Unity of personnel was also achieved. Vacancies occurring in the
police forces were filled by SS members. Police officials who were
in the force were able to join the SS; and schools were operated by
the SS for the police, as well as for the SS officials.

These measures are described in Himmler's article "Organization

and Obligations of the SS and the Police," our Document Number
1992(a)-PS. They are also described in an authoritative book on the
police, entitled The German Police, the book published in 1940,
written by Dr. Werner Best, a ministerial director in the Ministry
of the Interior, and a department head in the Security Police. It

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bears on the imprimatur of the Nazi Party, and the book

its fly-leaf
is listed in the list of National Socialist bibliography.
official
Chapter 7 from that book is our Document Number 1852-PS. I offer
this book in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-449.
Through this unity of organization and personnel, the SS and the
police became identified in structure and in activity. The resulting
situation was described in Best's book, which I have just offered in
evidence, our Document Number 1852-PS, as follows. I quote from
Page 7 of that document, Paragraph 5; from the original book,
Page 95, Paragraph 3:
"Thus the SS and the police form one unit, both in their
structure and in their activity, although their individual
organizations have not lost their true individuality and their
position in the larger units of the Party and State administra-
tion which are concerned with other points of view."
Through the police, the SS was in a position to carry out a large
part the functions assigned to it. The working partnership
of
between the Gestapo, the Criminal Police, and the SD under the
direction of the Reichsführer SS resulted in the end in repressive
and unrestained police activity. That will be dealt with in the case
against the Gestapo. In considering that evidence, the Tribunal will
bear in mind that the police activities there shown were one aspect
of SS functions, one part of the whole criminal SS scheme. I shall
not, therefore, consider here evidence relating strictly to the police
functions of the SS.
Control over the police was not enough. Potential sources of
opposition could be tracked down by the SD. Suspects could be
seized by the Criminal Police and the Gestapo, but these means
alone would not assure the complete suppression of all opponents
and potential opponents of the regime. For this purpose concen-
tration camps were invented. The evidence already presented to the
Tribunal has shown what the concentration camp system involved,
and the end result of that system was graphically illustrated in the
moving pictures displayed about 10 days ago. The responsibility of
the SS in that system is a topic to which I now turn.
The requirement for the camps was guard and adminis-
first
trative personnel. Part-time volunteer members of the Allgemeine
SS were originally utilized as guards; but part-time volunteers
could not adequately serve the needs of the extensive and long-
range program that was planned. So beginning in 1933 full-time
professional guards units, the Death's-Head Units, which I have
already described, were organized. During the war, members of
the General SS resumed the function of guarding camps, which they
had initially undertaken when the camps were created. The Tri-
bunal will recall the provisions of the Hitler order which I read

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a few moments ago, directing the substitution of General SS mem-

bers to the Death's-Head Units in the event of mobilization. It is
unnecessary to repeat the evidence of wholesale brutality, torture,
and murder committed by SS guards. They were not the sporadic
crimes committed by irresponsible individuals but a part of a
definite and calculated policy, a policy necessarily resulting from
SS philosophy, a policy which was carried out from the initial
creation of the camps.
Himmler bluntly stated the SS view as to the inmates of the
camps and Obligations of the SS and
in his article, "Organization
the Police," Exhibit Number USA-439, our Document 1992(a)-PS.
I quote from Page 7 of the translation, last paragraph; from Page 148
of the original, third paragraph:

"It would be extremely instructive for everyone —to some

members of the Wehrmacht could give the opportunity to
I —
inspect such a concentration camp. Once you have seen it, you
are convinced of the fact that no one has been sent there
unjustly; that it is the offal of criminals and freaks. No better
demonstration of the laws of inheritance and race, as set forth
by Dr. Guett, exists than such a concentration camp. There
you can find people with hydrocephalus, people who are
cross-eyed, deformed, half Jewish, and a number of racially
inferior products. All that is assembled there. Of course, we
distinguish between those inmates who are only there for a
few months for the purpose of education and those who are
to stay for a long time. On the whole, education consists only
of discipline, never of any kind of instruction on an ideological
basis, for the prisoners have, for the most part, slave-like souls
and only very few people of real character can be found
there."

Then, omitting the next two sentences, he continues with this

striking remark:

"Education thus means order. The order begins with these

people living in clean barracks. Such a thing can really be
accomplished only by Germans; hardly another nation would
be as humane as we are. The laundry is frequently changed.
The people are taught to wash themselves twice daily and to
use a toothbrush, a thing with which most of them have been
unfamiliar."

Having heard the evidence and seen the pictures as to con-

ditions in concentration camps, this Tribunal can appreciate how
grim and savage that callous jest was. He made no such pretense
in his speech to his own Gruppenführer at Posen, our Document
1919-PS, Exhibit Number USA-170. I quote from Page 43 of the

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 19 Dec. 45

original, last paragraph; from Page 2 of the translation, the first

full paragraph.
"I don't believe the Communists could attempt any action, for
their leading elements, like most criminals, are in our con-
centration camps. And here I must say this: We shall be
able to see after the war what a blessing it was for Germany
about humanitarianism, we
that, in spite of all the silly talk
imprisoned all this criminal sub-stratum of the German
people in concentration camps. I'll answer for that."
But he is not here to answer.
Certainly there humanitarianism" in the manner
was no "silly
in which SS men performed Just as an illustration,
their tasks.
I should like to examine their conduct, not in 1944 or 1945, but
1933. I have four reports relating to the deaths of four different
inmates of the concentration camp Dachau between May 16 and
May 27, 1933. Each report is signed by the Public Prosecutor of
the District Court in Munich and is addressed to the Public
Prosecutor of the Supreme Court in Munich. These four reports
show that during that 2-week period in 1933, at the time when the
concentration camps had barely started, that S S men had murdered
— a different guard each time an inmate of the camp. —
Now I don't want to take the time of the Tribunal to read
that evidence if it feels that it is a minor point. The significance
of it is this: It is just an illustration of the sort of thing that
happened in the concentration camps at the earliest possible date,
in 1933. I am
prepared to offer those four reports in evidence
and to quote from them, if the Tribunal thinks that the point is
not too insignificant.
THE PRESIDENT: Where are they?
MAJOR FARR: They are right here. I will offer them in
evidence. The first is our Document Number 641-PS. It is a report
dated 1 June 1933 and relates the death of Dr. Alfred Strauss, a
prisoner in protective custody in Dachau. I offer it in evidence as
Exhibit Number USA-450. I shall read a few paragraphs from that
report, beginning with Paragraph 1:

"On May 24, 1933, the 30-year-old, single, attorney-at-law,

Dr. Alfred Strauss from Munich, who was in the concentra-
tion camp Dachau as a prisoner under protective custody, was
killed by two pistol shots from SS Man Johann Kantschuster
who escorted him on a walk, prescribed for him by the camp
doctor, outside the fenced part of the camp.
"Kantschuster gives the following report: He himself had to
urinate; Strauss proceeded on his way. Suddenly Strauss
broke away towards the bushes located at a distance of about

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19 Dec. 45

6 meters from theline. When Kantschuster noticed it, he

fired two shots at the fugitive from a distance of about
8 meters; whereupon Strauss collapsed dead.
"On the same day, May 24, 1933, a judicial inspection of the
locality took place. The corpse of Strauss was lying at the
edge of the wood. Leather slippers were on his feet. He wore
a sock on one foot, while the other foot was bare, obviously
because of an injury to this foot. Subsequently an autopsy
was performed. Two bullets had entered the back of the head.
Besides, the body showed several black and blue spots and
also open wounds."

Skipping now to the last paragraph of the report:

"Ihave charged Kantschuster today with murder and have
made application for the opening and execution of a judicial
preliminary investigation as well as for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against him."
That is the first of the four reports. The significance is that
you have, one after the other, murders committed within a short
space of time. And, in each instance, an official report by the camp
commander or the guard as to the cause of death which was
completely disproved by the facts.
The second report, a report dated 1 June 1933, relates to the
death of Leonhard Hausmann, another prisoner in Dachau. It is
our Document 642-PS and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number
USA-451.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you need read the details.

MAJOR FARR: I will offer it without reading it.

The third report which I shall offer is dated 22 May 1933. It

relates to the death of Louis Schloss, an inmate of Dachau, and is
our Document 644-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Number
USA-452.
The fourth document, our Number 645-PS, dated 1 June 1933,
Dachau prisoner.
relates to the death of Sebastian Nefzger, another
I offer this in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-453.
These four murders committed within the short space of 2 weeks
in the spring of 1933, each by different SS guards, are but a few
examples of S S activities in the camps at that very early date.
Many similar examples from that period and later periods could
be produced.
Indeed, that sort of thing was officially encouraged. I call the
Tribunal's attention to the disciplinary Regulation for the Dachau
Concentration Camp, our Document 778-PS, which has already been
introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-247. I want to

190
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19 Dec. 45

read the fourth paragraph of the introduction to those rules, a

passage which was not read when the document was originally
introduced. The fourth paragraph on the first page of the translation
and of the original is as follows:
"Tolerance means weakness. In the light of this conception,
punishment will be mercilessly handed out whenever the
interests of the Fatherland warrant it. The fellow country-
man who is decent but misled will never be affected by these
regulations. But let it be a warning to the agitating politicians
and intellectual provocateurs, regardless of which kind: Be
on guard not to be caught, for otherwise it will be your neck
and you will be silenced according to your own methods."
Those regulations were issued in 1933 by SS Führer Eicke, who,
it be noted, was the commandant of the SS Totenkopf Ver-
is to
bände.
Furnishing guard and administrative personnel was not the only
function of the SS with relation to the camps. The entire internal
management of the camps, including the use of prisoners, their
housing, clothing, sanitary conditions, the determination of their
very right to live, and the disposal of their remains, was controlled
by the SS. Such management was first vested in the Leader of the
SS Death's-Head Units who had the title of Inspector of Concen-
tration Camps. This official was originally in the SS Hauptamt
represented on the chart by the second box from the left.
During the courseof the war, in March 1942, control of concen-
tration camps was transferred to another of the departments of the
SS Supreme Command, the SS Economic and Administration
Department, commonly known as WVHA. That department is
indicated on the chart by the 3rd box from the left. And the Court
will note under the top box the breakdown "Concentration Camps"
which in turn is broken down into "Prison," "Labor," "Medical," and
"Administration."
That change was announced in a letter to Himmler, dated
30 April 1942, from the Chief of WVHA. The letter is our Document
Number R-129 and it has already been received in evidence as
Exhibit Number USA-217. I shall not quote from that letter now.
This shift of control to WVHA, the economic department of the
SS, coincided with a change in the basic purposes of the concen-
tration camps. Political and security reasons, which previously had
been the ground for confinement, were abandoned; and the camps
were frankly made to serve the slave-labor program. The Tribunal
will recall the evidence relating to that program which was
presented last week by Mr. Dodd. I shall not deal at any length
with the matter again, except to summarize the principal facts

191
19 Dec. 45

bearing on SS responsibility which were demonstrated by that

evidence.
To satisfy the increased demands for manpower it was not
enough to work the inmates of the camp harder. More inmates had
to be obtained. The SS, through its police arm, was prepared to
satisfy this demand, as through the WVHA it was prepared to work
those who were already in the camp.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any figures you can give the
Tribunal as to the total numbers in the SS and the total numbers
who were employed on concentration camps? If you gave us the
total number of the SS and the total number employed in concen-
tration camps, we should see what the proportion was.
MAJOR FARR: I can only give you these figures: I
think I
earlier quoted some figures from D'Alquen
in his book published
in 1939, in which he said that the total strength of the General SS
was about 240,000. That is the General SS, which was not at that
time engaged in the guarding of concentration camps. The Toten-
kopf Verbände (the Death's-Head Units) at that time consisted of
some three or four regiments at the most. They were the guards;
so that of the personnel who were employed in actual guard duty
there were, in 1939, about three or four regiments.
The Court will recall that after the war had started, the Toten-
kopf Verbände were no longer employed in that duty and that the
members of the General SS took it up. How many were employed
is something that is difficult to estimate. The concentration camp
program was constantly expanding; and of course, as more camps
were added more personnel was needed. I can't give the Tribunal
figures on the number of persons involved in guarding the camps,
but one of the matters I think significant is this: We have not
only guards, we have administrative personnel; we have the whole
of the WVHA which, as I want to show by evidence, had complete
control of the management of the concentration camps. The
members of the staff office, WVHA, were derived from the General
SS; so you have on the one hand the guard personnel, Death's-Head
Units up to 1939, and then you have after 1939 more guards from
the Allgemeine SS. You have, after 1939, more guards from the
General SS and also administrative personnel from WVHA.
I do not have figures on how many persons were engaged in one
or another phase of the concentration camp activities. You have, of
course, the SD and Security Police 'involved in it, insofar as they
went out and seized victims. You have WVHA, the entire adminis-
trative personnel of that section involved in it, insofar as they
handled administrative matters.
Some conception of the number of persons who must have been
engaged in the activity may be gained from noting the number of

192
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19 Dec. 45

persons involved in a camp. I have a document, a report by WVHA

in August 1944, which reports the number of prisoners who were
then on hand in the camps and the new arrivals who were expected.
That document is our Document Number 1166-PS, which I will now
offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-458.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we had better go into that

tonight. What will you be dealing with tomorrow?
MAJOR FARR: Tomorrow, Sir, I intend to offer evidence show-
ing how WVHA and other SS personnel were involved in the
control of every phase of the concentration camp program. That is
the first thing. The second thing is to point out the role that the
SS played in the persecution of the Jews and their extermination;
not with a view to repeating the substantive evidence to show that
such acts took place, but to show how many components, how many
parts, of the organization were involved in that program.
Then I SS with respect to prepa-
shall consider the role of the
rations aggressive war and the Crimes against Peace
for —
—
relatively brief discussion and then pass on to the role that the
SS played in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, set out
in Counts Three and Four of the Indictment; and finally, the role of
the SS in the colonization program.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonization?
MAJOR FARR: That may be an unfortunate word. Perhaps I
should have said Germanization program, a program of resettlement,
evacuation, colonization, and exploitation of the conquered terri-
tories.

Those, I think, are the four main functions of the SS which remain
to be considered; and I shall endeavor not to go again into the sub-
stantive crimes which have already been shown to the Tribunal, but
—
to try to show how almost every department in fact, every depart-
—
ment of the SS and every component was involved in one or
— —
more and mostly more of these crimes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hopes that you will be able to
confine yourself to the reading of evidence which is not cumulative,
MAJOR FARR: I have that in mind and I don't intend to do
that except to show the figures and components of the SS which
were involved in various programs.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 20 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

193
 .

TWENTY- FOURTH DAY

Thursday, 20 December 1945

Morning Session

MAJOR FARR: May please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal

it
rose yesterday, we were
discussing the number of persons who
might be involved in the concentration camp program with which
the SS was concerned. Nothing better illustrates the integrated
character of the whole organization than the concentration camp
program.
WVHA, one of the departments of the Supreme Command,
handled the administration and control of that camp program and
dealt with the victims once they were in the camp. They were
assisted by the Death's-Head Units, who furnished the guard per-
sonnel for the camps, and subsequently by the Allgemeine SS, which
took over guard duties during the war.
RSHA played a part in the concentration camp program the —
—
police arm of the SS because through it the victims were appre-
hended and taken to the camps. Thus the SD appears in the picture,
the personal staff, the first department of the Supreme Command,
sort of the top office of the whole organization, and naturally it had
much to do with the work of all subordinate departments.
Thus when the question is asked how many persons in the SS
had something to do with the concentration camp program, it is a
question which I think it is impossible to answer. You may point
out how many persons were involved in the Death's-Head Units,
who originally furnished the guard details; you might estimate
how many persons were in the Allgemeine SS, but to say just what
percentage of the whole organization was involved in that program,
is something which I find myself unable to do.

I had just pointed out . .

THE PRESIDENT: Can you say that one or another branch of

the SS provided the whole of the staff of the concentration camps?
MAJOR FARR: By the staff, I take it, you mean guards at the
camp, the camp personnel. You cannot do that. For example, the
Death's-Head Units originally started off as being the units which
furnished all the guard personnel. Subsequently, their task was
taken over by members of the Allgemeine SS.
THE PRESIDENT: Those are both branches of the SS?

194
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20 Dec. 45

MAJOR FAHR: Both are branches, yes. Now with respect to the
camp commandants, for instance, normally all high ranking officers
in the SS were members of the Allgemeine SS, so doubtless such
personnel would be drawn from that branch. It is certainly not
beyond question that some members of the Waffen-SS may have
been called on to act as guards in certain camps. I do not think
that you can say that there is no component of the SS which may
not have had some of its personnel involved in the program.
THE PRESIDENT: That wasn't exactly what I meant. What I
meant was: Could you say that one or other branches of the SS
furnished the whole staff of the concentration camps?
MAJOR FARR: I don't think I can say that. I think I could
say this . .

THE PRESIDENT: What other organization was it that fur-

nished a part of the staff of the concentration camps?
MAJOR FARR: You mean an organization other than the SS?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MAJOR FARR: I know of none.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the answer would be "yes" then?

MAJOR FARR: I thought Your Honor was referring to any one
branch of the SS which was concerned alone with that. The SS, so
far as I know, is the only organization which played a part in the
concentration camp picture, except at the very end of the war when
I think, as Colonel Storey said yesterday, some members of the SA
were also involved as guard personnel of concentration camps.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know the total personnel
at the end of the war?
MAJOR FARR: Of the entire SS?
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes.
MAJOR FARR: That is something you would have to estimate.
I quoted to the Tribunal yesterday the figures that D'Alquen gave as
the strength of the Allgemeine SS in 1939. He said then that there
were about 240,000 men in the Allgemeine SS. There were, at that
time, about four regiments of Death's-Head Units, several other
regiments of the Verfügungstruppe, a few thousand personnel
involved in the SD, so that I should say in 1939 you had about
250,000 to 300,000 members of the SS. With the outbreak of the
war, the Waffen-SS was built up from a few regiments of the Ver-
fügungstruppe to about 31 divisions at the end of the war, which
probably would mean that the Waffen-SS by 1945 had had some
400,000 to 500,000 persons involved. I take it that 400,000 to 500,000
members of the Waffen-SS would be in addition to personnel of the

195
20 Dec. 45

Allgemeine SS, who were subject to compulsory military service in

the Wehrmacht. So that, if I had to estimate, I would say that
probably some 750,000 persons would be the top figure of personnel
who had been involved in the SS from the beginning, but that is an
estimate.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then you have no breakdown to
show how many of those were civilians, clerks, stenographers, sol-
diers, and so on?

MAJOR FARR: No. When we are talking about SS members,

we are not talking about stenographers who worked in the office,
who were not members of the SS. By S S members, we mean per-
sonnel who took the oath and appeared on the membership list,
either as a member of the Allgemeine SS, the Death's-Head Units,
or the Waffen-SS. I would think that my figure of 750,000 was a
figure including members of the SS, Allgemeine SS, the Totenkopf
Verbände, and the Waffen-SS.
I was pointing out the shift of control of concentration camps
to WVHA in 1942, which was coincident with the shift in the basic
purpose of the camps, which heretofore has been concerned with
custody of individuals for political and security reasons. Now the
basic purpose of the camps was to furnish manpower, and I now
want to point out to the Court the agencies of the SS which were
involved in that manpower drive.
The Tribunal has already received evidence of an order which
was issued in 1942, shortly after the transfer to WVHA
of concen-
tration camp control, directing Security Police to furnish at once
35,000 prisoners qualified for work in the camps. That order is
our Document 1063-PS, and was received in evidence as Exhibit
Number USA-219.
Thirty-five thousand prisoners were, of course, merely the begin-
ning. The SS dragnet was capable of catching many more slaves.
I offer in evidence a carbon, typewritten copy of a directive to
all the departments of the SS Supreme Command, issued from
Himmler's field headquarters on August 5, 1943. It is our Document
Number 744-PS. I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-455. That
directive appears on Page 2 of the translation. It implements an
order signed by the Defendant Keitel directing the use of all males
captured in guerilla fighting in the East for forced labor. The Keitel
directive appears on Page 1 of the translation.
I shall read only the Himmler directive appearing on Page 2 of
the translation. The Tribunal will note that it is addressed to every
main office of the SS Supreme Command. I read that list of addres-
sees of the directive:
"(1) Chief of the personnel staff of Reichsführer SS; (2) SS
Main Office; (3) Reich Security Main Office; (4) Race and

196
 20 Dec. 45

Resettlement Main Office; (5) Main Office, Ordinary Police;

(6) SS Economic Administrative Main Office; (7) SS Personnel
Main Office; (8) Main Office SS Court; (9) SS Supreme Com-
mand, Headquarters of the Waffen-SS; (10) Staff Headquarters
of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of Ger-
manism; (11) Main Office Center for Racial Germans;
(12) Office of SS Obergruppenführer Heissmeyer; (13) Chief
of the anti-partisan combat. ..."

I point out to the Court that every one of the main offices

appearing on the chart is a recipient of that directive. The next

addressees are the Higher SS and Police Leaders in the various
regions. ,

I continue to quote the body of the directive:

"Referring to Item 4 of the above-mentioned order, I order
that all young female prisoners capable of work are to be
sent to Germany for work, through the agency of Reich Com-
missioner Sauckel.
"Children, old women, and old men are to be collected and
put to work in the women's and children's camps established
by me on estates, as well as on the border of the evacuated
area."
In April 1944 the SS was called on to produce even more
—
laborers this time 100,000 Jews from Hungary. The Tribunal will
recall the minutes of the Defendant Speer's discussion with Hitler
on April 6 and 7, 1944, which were found in our Document R-124
at Page 36 and were read to the Court in evidence as Exhibit Num-
—
ber USA-179 minutes in which Speer referred to Hitler's statement
that he would call on the Reichsführer SS to produce 100,000 Jews
from Hungary.
The source of manpower had not been tapped. To Jews,
last
deportees, women, and children, there was added the productive
power of prisoners of war. It was through the SS that the con-
spirators squeezed the last drop of labor from such prisoners.
I refer to a statement by the Defendant Speer which appears
in our Document R-124 at Page 13 of the translation, the document
itselfhaving already been introduced in evidence as Exhibit Num-
ber USA-179. The statement is found at Page 7, last paragraph of
the original, Page 13 of our Document R-124, the next to the last
paragraph on Page 13. That appears in Volume 2 of the document
book. I quote:
"Speer: 'We have to come to an arrangement with the Reichs-
führer SS as soon as possible so that PW's he picks up are
made available for our purposes. The Reichsführer SS gets
from 30,000 to 40,000 men per month.' "

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20 Dec. 45

In order to insure SS control over the labor of prisoners of war,

the Reichsführer SS was finally appointed as head of all prisoner-
of-war camps on 25 September 1944. I offer in evidence the letter
referring to his appointment. It is our Document 058-PS. It is
Exhibit Number USA-456. It will be found in Volume 1 of the docu-
ment book. That letter is a circular letter from the Director of the
Party Chancellery dated 30 September 1944 and signed "M. Bor-
mann." I quote, beginning with the first paragraph of that letter:
"1. The Führer has ordered under the date of 25 September
1944:
" 'The custody of all prisoners of war and interned persons,

as well as prisoner-of-war camps and installations with

guards, are transferred to the Commander of the Reserve
"
Army from 1 October 1944.'

Passing to Paragraph 2 of the letter, I shall read Subparagraphs

(a) and (c); I quote:
"2. The Reichsführer SS has commanded:

"(a) In my capacity as Commander of the Reserve Army, I

transfer the affairs of prisoners of war to SS Obergruppen-
führer and General of the Waffen-SS, Chief of Staff of the
Volkssturm, Gottlob Berger."
Skipping now to Subparagraph (c):
"(c) The mobilization of labor of the prisoners of war will be
organized in joint action of SS Obergruppenführer Berger and
SS Obergruppenführer Pohl with the appropriate offices for
allocation of labor.
"The strengthening of security in the field of prisoner-of-war
affairs is to be accomplished between SS Obergruppenführer
Berger and the Chief of the Security Police, SS Obergruppen-
führer Dr. Kaltenbrunner."
Thus the SS finally took over direction and control of prisoner-
of-war-camps.
So impressive were the results obtained from SS concentration
camp labor that in 1944 the Defendant Goring called on Himmler
for more inmates for use in the aircraft industry. The Tribunal will
recall his teletype to Himmler, our Document 1584-PS, Part 1, which
was read in evidence by Mr. Dodd as Exhibit Number USA-221.
Let me now read Himmler's reply to that teletype. It is our Docu-
ment 1584-PS, Part 3, and will be found on Page 2. I offer it in
evidence as Exhibit Number USA-457. I quote the beginning of
that letter:
"Most Honored Reich Marshal:
"Following my teletype letter of 18 February 1944, I herewith
transmit a survey on the employment of prisoners in the avi-
ation industry.

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 20 Dec. 45

"This survey indicates that at the present time about 36,000

prisoners are employed for the purposes of the Air Force. An
increase to a total of 90,000 prisoners is contemplated.
"The production program is being discussed, established, and
executed by the Reich Ministry of Aviation and the chief of
my Economic Administrative Main Office, SS Obergruppen-
führer and General of the Waffen-SS Pohl.
"We assist with all the forces at our disposal.
"The task of my Economic Administrative Main Office, how-
ever, is not solely fulfilled with the allocation of the prisoners
to the aviation industry, as SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl and
his assistants take care of the required working speed through
constant control and supervision of the work-groups (Kom-
mandos) and therefore have some influence on the results of
production. In this respect I may suggest consideration of the
fact that in enlarging our responsibility through a speeding-up
of the total work, better results can definitely be expected."
I pass now to the last two paragraphs of the letter, which will
be found on the next page of the translation:
"The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation
industry to subterranean locations requires further employ-
ment of about 100,000 prisoners. The plans for this employ-
ment on the basis of your letter of 14 February 1944 are
already under way.
"I shall keep you, most honored Reich Marshal, currently
informed on this subject."
Incidentally, I might call to the Tribunal's attention the fact
that S S Obergruppenführer Pohl, who was head of the WVHA, was
also a general of the Waffen-SS, which goes to show that there is
no manner in which you can characterize functions in the SS.
The extent to which the number of prisoners was increased
through SS efforts is illustrated by our Document 1166-PS, which
I offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit Number USA-458. That

document is from Office Group D of WVHA, dated 15 August

a report
1944. I page of that report, beginning:
shall read the first
"With reference to the above-mentioned telephone call, I am
sending herewith a report on the actual number of prisoners
for 1 August 1944 and of the new arrivals already announced,
as well as the clothing report for 15 August 44.
"(1) The actual number on 1 August 44 consisted of: a) male
prisoners, 379,167; b) female prisoners, 145,119.
"In addition, there are the following new arrivals already
announced:
"1) From the Hungary program (anti-Jewish action), 90,000;
2) from Litzmannstadt (police prison and ghetto), 60,000;

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20 Dec. 45

3) Poles from the Government General, 15,000; 4) convicts

from the Eastern Territories, 10,000; 5) former Polish officers,
17,000; 6) from Warsaw (Poles), 400,000; 7) continued arrivals
from France approximately 15,000 to 20,000.
"Most of the prisoners are already on the way and will be
received into the concentration camps within the next few
days."
This intensive drive for manpower to some extent interfered
with the program which WVHA had already undertaken to exter-
minate certain classes of individuals in the camps. I offer a photo-
staticcopy of a letter from WVHA, dated 27 April 1943, our Docu-
ment 1933-PS. It is Exhibit Number USA-459. The letter is
addressed to a number of concentration camp commanders, is signed
by Glücks, SS Brigade Führer and Major General of the Waffen-SS.
I read the letter:

"The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police has

decided after consultation, that in the future only mentally
sick prisoners may be selected for action 14-F-13 by the
medical commissions appointed for this purpose.
"All other prisoners incapable of working (tubercular cases,
bedridden cripples, et cetera) are to be basically excepted
from this action. Bedridden prisoners are to be drafted for
suitable work which they can perform in bed.
"The order of the Reichsführer SS is to be obeyed strictly in
the future.
"Therefore requests for fuel for this purpose are unneces-
sary."
The action "14-F-13" is not defined in the letter, but it is per-
fectly apparent what it means. Every human being, bedridden,
crippled, no matter what his physical condition, from whom any
work at all could be extracted was to be excepted from the action.
Only the insane, from whom nothing could be expected, were to
suffer the action. What could the action be? It is perfectly apparent.
The action was extermination.
The SS, however, was to some extent enabled to achieve both
goals: that of increased production and of elimination of undesir-
ables. The Tribunal will recall the agreement between Minister of
Justice Thierack and Himmler on September 18, 1942, our Document
654-PS, which was read in evidence by Mr. Dodd as Exhibit Number
USA-218. I am not going to quote again from that document but
will remind the Tribunal that the agreement provided for the
delivery of anti-social elements after the execution of their sen-
tences to the Reichsführer SS to be worked to death.
The conditions under which such persons worked in the camps
were well calculated to lead to their death. Those conditions were

200
 20 Dec. 45

regulated by the WVHA. As an illustration of WVHA

management,
I call the Court's attention to our Document 2189-PS, which I offer
in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-460. It is an order directed to
commandants of concentration camps, dated 11 August 1942, and
bearing the facsimile signature, which does not appear on the
translation but does appear on the original, of SS Brigade Führer
and General of the Waffen-SS Glücks, who was Chief of Office
Group D of WVHA. That is Document Number 2189-PS. I will read
the body of that letter:
"The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police has
ordered that punishment by beating will be executed in
concentration camps for women by prisoners under the
ordered supervision.
"In order to co-ordinate this order the Main Office Chief S S
of the Economic Administration Main Office, SS Obergruppen-
führer and General of the Waffen-SS Pohl, has ordered,
effective immediately, that punishment by beating will also be
executed by prisoners in concentration camps for men.
"It is forbidden to have foreign prisoners execute the punish-
ment on German prisoners."

Even after their death the prisoners did not escape the manage-
ment of WVHA. I refer the Court to our Document 2199-PS, a letter
to commanders of concentration camps dated 12 September 1942 and
signed by the Chief of the Central Office Group D of WVHA, SS
Obersturmbannführer Liebehenschel. I offer this as Exhibit Number
USA-461. I shall read the body of that directive, which appears on
Page 1 of the translation. I quote:
"According to a communication of the Chief of the Security
Police and the SD, and conforming to a report of the Chief of
the Security Police and the SD in Prague, urns of deceased
Czechs and' Jews were sent for burial to the home cemeteries
within the Protectorate.
"In view of different events (demonstrations, erecting of post-
ers inimical to the Reich on urns of deceased inmates in the
halls of cemeteries of the home communities, pilgrimages to
the graves of deceased inmates, et cetera) within the Pro-
tectorates, the delivery of urns with the ash remnants of
deceased nationals of the Protectorate and of Jews is hence-
forth prohibited. The urns shall be preserved within the
concentration camps. In case of doubt about the preservation
of the urns oral instructions shall be available at this agency."
The SS indeed regarded the inmates of concentration camps as
its personal property to be used for its own economic ad-
own
vantage. The Tribunal will recall that as early as 1942 the Defendant

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Speer recognized that the SS was motivated by the desire for

further profits when he suggested to Hitler that the SS receive a
share of the war equipment produced by concentration camp labor
in ratio to the working hours of the prisoners. I refer to our
Document R-124, at Page 36, which was read into evidence by Mr.
Dodd as Exhibit Number USA-179. The Führer agreed that a 3 to
5 percent share should satisfy the SS commanders. Himmler
himself frankly admitted his intention to derive profits for SS
purposes from the camp in his Metz speech to the officers of the
SS Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler," our Document 1918-PS, Exhibit
—
Number USA-304 the passage in question being found at the top
of Page 3 of the English translation and on Page 10 of the original
German, 7 lines from the bottom. The passage begins:
"The apartment-building program, which is the prerequisite
for a healthy and social basis of the entire SS, as well as
of the entire leadership corps, can be carried out only when
I get the money for it from somewhere. Nobody is going to
give me the money. It must be earned, and it will be earned
by forcing the scum of mankind, the prisoners, the professional
criminals, to do positive work. The man guarding those
prisoners serves harder than the one on close-order drill. The
one who does this and stands near these utterly negative
—
people will learn within 3 to 4 months and we shall see.
In peacetime, I shall form guard battalions and put them
on duty for 3 months only. They will learn to fight the inferior
beings; and this will not be a boring guard duty, but if the
officers handle it right, it will be the best indoctrination on
inferior beings and inferior races. This activity is necessary,
as I said, 1) to eliminate these negative people from the German
people; 2) make them work once more for the great national
community by having them break stones and bake bricks, so
that the Führer can again erect his grand buildings; and 3)
to in turn invest the money, earned soberly this way, in
houses, in ground, in settlements, so that our men can have
houses in which to raise large families and have many
children. This in turn is necessary because we stand or die
with this leading blood of Germany; and if the good blood is
not reproduced, we will not be able to rule the world."
One final aspect of SS control over concentration camps remains
to be mentioned. That is its direction of the program of biological
experiments on human beings, which was carried on in the camps.
Just a few days ago another military tribunal passed judgment on
some of those who participated in the experiments at Dachau.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no date on that document you just
read, is there?

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 20 Dec. 45

MAJOR FARR: There appears to be no date on the English

translation. The originaldocument bears the notation of a speech
in April 1943.
At a later stage in this case, evidence of some of the details
of this program of experiments will be presented. It is not my
purpose to deal with those experiments from the substantive aspect.
I shall show only that they were the result of S S direction and that

the SS played a vital part in their successful execution.

The program seems to have originated in a request by a Dr.
Sigmund Rascher to Himmler for permission to utilize persons in
concentration camps as material for experiments with human beings
in connection with some research he was conducting on behalf of
the Luftwaffe. I refer to our Document 1602-PS, a photostatic copy
of a letter dated 15 May 1941, addressed to the Reichsführer SS,
and signed "S. Rascher." I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-454. I
shall quote from the second paragraph of the translation, the fourth
paragraph of the original letter. I quote:
"For the time being I have been assigned to the Luftgau-
kommando VII, Munich, for a medical course. During this
course where researches on high-altitude flights play a
prominent part (determined by the somewhat higher ceiling
of the English fighter planes), considerable regret was
expressed at the fact that no tests with human material had yet
been possible for us, as such experiments are very dangerous
and nobody volunteers for them. I put, therefore, the serious
question: Can you make available two or three professional
criminals for these experiments? The experiments are made
at Bodenständige Prüfstelle für Höhenforschung der Luft-
waffe, Munich. The experiments, by which the subjects may,
of course, die, would take place with my co-operation. They
are essential for researches on high-altitude flight and cannot
be carried out, as has been tried, with monkeys, who offer
entirely different test-conditions. I have had a very con-
fidential talk with the deputy of the Surgeon of the Air
Force, who makes these experiments. He is also of the
opinion that the problem in question could only be solved
by experiments on human persons. (Feeble-minded could
also be used as test material.)"
Dr. Rascher promptly received assurance from the SS that he
would be allowed to utilize concentration camp inmates for his
experiments.
I refer to our Document 1582-PS, a letter dated 22 May 1941,
addressed to Dr. Rascher, and bearing the stamp of the Personal
Staff of the Reichsführer SS, and the initials, "K Br," which initials
are those of SS Sturmbannführer Karl Brandt. I offer this letter

203
20 Dec. 45

as Exhibit Number USA-462. I quote the first two paragraphs of

that letter:
"Dear Dr. Rascher:
"Shortly before flying to Oslo, the Reichsführer SS gave me
your letter of 15 May 1941 for partial reply.
"I can inform you that prisoners will, of course, be gladly
made available for the high-flight researches. I have informed
the Chief of the Security Police of this agreement of the
Reichsführer SS, and requested that the competent official be
instructed to get in touch with you."
The altitude experiments were conducted by Rascher; and in May
1942 General Field Marshal Milch, on behalf of the Luftwaffe,
expressed his thanks to the S S for the assistance it furnished in
connection with the experiments.
I refer to our Document 343-PS which will be found in Volume
I of the document book. I offer an original letter, dated 20 May

1942, addressed to SS Obergruppenführer Wolff, and signed E. Milch,

as Exhibit Number USA-463. That letter, which appears on Page 2
of the translation and on Page 1 of the original German, is as
follows:
"Dear Wolff"—the German says, "Liebes Wölffchen":
"In reference to your telegram of 12 May, our sanitary
inspector reports td me that the altitude experiments carried
out by the SS and Air Force at Dachau have been finished.
Any continuation of these experiments seems not to be
necessary. However, the carrying out of experiments of
some other kind, in regard to perils on the high seas, would
be important. These have been prepared in immediate agree-
ment with the proper offices; Major Weltz (Medical Corps)
will be charged with the execution and Captain Rascher
(Medical Corps) will be made available until further orders
in addition to his duties within the Medical Corps of the
Air Corps. A change of these measures does not appear
necessary, and an enlargement of the task is not considered
pressing at this time.
"The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these
low-temperature experiments. It is urgently needed at
another place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau.
"I convey the special thanks from the Supreme Commander
of the Air Corps to the SS for their extensive co-operation.
"I remain with best wishes for you in good comradeship and
with Heil Hitler! Always yours, E. Milch."
THE PRESIDENT: Major Farr, hadn't you better read the letter
on the preceding page? It may be capable of an explanation.

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 20 Dec. 45

MAJOR FARR: The letter on the preceding page, dated

31 August 1942, is also from General Field Marshal Milch, and
is addressed to the Reichsführer SS. It reads as follows:
"Dear Mr. Himmler:
"I thank you very much for your letter of the 25th of August.
I have read with great interest the reports of Dr. Rascher
and Dr. Romberg. I am informed about the current experi-
ments. I shall ask the two gentlemen to give a lecture,
combined with the showing of motion pictures, to my men
in the near future.
"Hoping that it will be possible for me to see you at the
occasion of my next visit to headquarters, I remain with
best regards and Heil Hitler! Yours, E. Milch."
Having finished his high-altitude experiments, Dr. Rascher
proceeded to experiment with methods of rewarming persons who
had been subjected to extreme cold. I refer to our Document
1618-PS, which is an intermediate report on intense chilling experi-
ments which had been started in Dachau on 15 August 1942. That
report, signed by Dr. Rascher, I offer in evidence as Exhibit
Number USA-464. I shall read only a few sentences from the
report, beginning with the first paragraph:
"Experimental procedure.
"The experimental subjects (VP) were placed in the water,
dressed in complete flying uniform, winter or summer com-
bination, and with an aviator's helmet. A life-jacket made
of rubber or kapok was to prevent submerging. The experi-
ments were carried out at water temperatures varying from
2.5° to 12° (centigrade). In one experimental series the neck
(brain stem) and the back of the head protruded above the
water, while in another series of experiments the neck (brain
stem) and the back of the head were submerged in the water.
"Electrical measurement gave low temperature readings of
26.4° in the stomach and 26.5° (centigrade) in the rectum.
Fatalities occurred only when the brain stem and the back
of the head were also chilled. Autopsies of such fatal cases
always revealed large amounts of free blood, up to a half
liter, in the cranial cavity. The heart invariably showed
extreme dilation of the right chamber. As soon as the
temperature in these experiments reached 28°, the experi-
mental subjects (VP) were bound to die despite all attempts
"
at resuscitation.
I skip now to the last paragraph of the report. I quote:
"During attempts to save severely chilled persons, it was
evident that rapid rewarming was in all cases preferable to
a slow rewarming because, after removal from the cold

205
20 Dec. 45

water, the body temperature continued to sink rapidly. I

think that for this reason we can dispense with the attempt
to save intensely chilled subjects by means of animal warmth.
—
"Rewarming by animal warmth animal bodies or women's
bodies —
would be too slow."
Although Rascher was thus of the preliminary opinion that
rewarming by women's bodies would be too slow, means for
conducting such experiments were nevertheless placed at his
disposal. I refer to our Document 1583-PS, a photostatic copy of
a letter from Reichsführer SS Himmler addressed to General Pohl,
dated 16 November 1942. I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-465.
I shall read just the first two paragraphs of that letter:

"Dear Pohl:
"The following struck me during my visit to Dachau on the
13th of November 1942 regarding the experiments conducted
there for the saving of people whose lives are endangered
through intense chilling in ice, snow, or water, and who are
to be saved by the employment of every method or means:
"I had ordered that suitable women are
to be set aside from
the concentration camp for these experiments for the
warming of those who were exposed. Four girls were set
aside who were in the concentration camp for loose morals
and because as prostitutes they were a potential source of
infection."
I think it is unnecessary for me to go on with the rest of the
paragraph, in which he expresses his dissatisfaction that a German
prostitute should be used for this purpose.
To insure the continuance of Rascher's experiments, Himmler
arranged for his transfer to the Waffen-SS. I offer in evidence a
letter which appears as our Document 1617-PS. It is a letter from
—
Reichsführer SS addressed to "Dear Comrade Milch" General Field
—
Marshal Milch dated November 1942. I offer it as Exhibit Number
USA-466. I will now read the first two paragraphs of that letter,
our Document 1617-PS. I quote:
"Dear Comrade Milch:
"You will recall that through SS General Wolff I particularly
recommended to you for your consideration the work of a
certain SS Führer, Dr. Rascher, who is a physician of the
supplementary reserve of the Air Force.
"These researches which deal with the reaction of the human
organism at great heights, as well as with manifestations
caused by prolonged chilling of the human body in cold
water, and similar problems which are of vital importance
to the Air Force, in particular, can be performed by us

206
 20 Dec. 45

with particular efficiency because I personally assumed the

responsibility for supplying asocial individuals and criminals,
who only deserve to die, from concentration camps for these
experiments."
I shall omit the next four paragraphs, in which Himmler reflects
upon the difficulties of conducting such experiments because
Christian medical circles were opposed, and pass on to the last
paragraph on the first page of the translation. That is the seventh
paragraph of the letter:
"I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, medical Officer in the
Reserve, from the Air Force and to transfer him to me to
the Waffen-SS. I would then assume the sole responsibility
for having these experiments made in this field and would
put the experiences, of which we in the SS need only a part
for the frost injuries in the East, entirely at the disposal of
the Air Force. However, in this connection I suggest that
with the liaison between you and Wolff a non-Christian
physician should be charged, who should be at the same
time honorable as a scientist and not prone to intellectual
theft and who could be informed of the results. This physician
should also have good contacts with the administrative
authorities, so that the results could really attract attention.
"I believe that this solution to transfer Dr. Rascher to the
SS, so that he could carry out the experiments under my
responsibility and under my orders, is the best way. The
experiments should not be stopped; we owe that to our
men. If Dr. Rascher remained with the Air Force, there
would certainly be much annoyance because then I would
have to bring a series of unpleasant details to you because
of the arrogance and presumption which Professor Holz-
löhner, who is under my command, has displayed in his post
at Dachau by making remarks about me to SS Colonel
Sievers. In order to save both of us this trouble, I suggest
again that Dr. Rascher should be transferred to the Waffen-
"
SS as quickly as possible
THE PRESIDENT: Is that letter from Himmler?
MAJOR FARR: Yes, Sir.
Now Rascher's experiments were by no means the only experi-
ments in which the SS were interested. Without attempting even
to outline the whole extent of the experimental program, I shall
give just one further illustration of this type of SS activity. I
refer to our Document L-103, which is a report prepared by the
chief hygienist in the Office of the Reich Surgeon of the SS and
Police, dated 12 September 1944. I offer it as Exhibit Number
USA-467. (Parenthetically I might note that the office of the Reich

207
20 Dec. 45

Surgeon SS and Police will be found in the personal staff depart-

ment, as indicated by the second box on the right-hand side of
the line leading down from the personal staff.)
I shall read a few paragraphs from this report, which is a

report prepared by the chief hygienist in the office of the Reich

Surgeon of SS and Police and signed SS Oberführer Dr. Mrugowsky.
It relates to experiments with poison bullets. Beginning with the
first paragraph, I quote:

"On 11 September 1944, in the presence of SS Sturmbann-

führer Dr, Ding, Dr. Widmann, and the undersigned, experi-
ments with aconite nitrate bullets were carried out on five
persons who had been sentenced to death. The caliber of the
bullets used was 7.65 millimeters, and they were filled with
poison in crystal form. Each subject of the experiment
received one shot in the upper part of the left thigh, while
in a horizontal position. In the case of two persons, the
bullets passed clean through the upper part of the thigh.
Even later no effect from the poison could be seen. These
two subjects were therefore rejected."
I omit the next few sentences and proceed beginning with
Paragraph 3 of the report:
"The symptoms shown by the three condemned persons were
surprisingly the same. At first, nothing special was noticeable.
After 20 to 25 minutes, a disturbance of the motor nerves
and a light flow of saliva began, but both stopped again.
After 40 to 44 minutes, a strong flow of saliva appeared. The
poisoned persons swallowed frequently; later the flow of
saliva is so strong that it can no longer be controlled by
swallowing. Foamy saliva flows from the mouth. Then a
sensation of choking and vomiting starts."
The next three paragraphs describe in coldly scientific fashion
the reactions of the dying persons. The description then continues,
and I want to quote the two paragraphs before the conclusion. It
is the last paragraph on Page 1 of the translation, the sixth
paragraph of the report:
"At the same time there was pronounced nausea. One of
the poisoned persons tried in vain to vomit. In order to
succeed he put four fingers of his hand, up to the main joint,
right into his mouth. In spite of this, no vomiting occurred.
His face became quite red.
"The faces of the other two subjects were already pale at
an early stage. Other symptoms were the same. Later on
the disturbances of the motor nerves increased so much that
the persons threw themselves up and down, rolled their eyes,
and made aimless movements with their hands and arms. At

208
 20 Dec. 45

last the disturbance subsided, the pupils were enlarged to

the maximum, the condemned laystill. Rectal cramps and
loss of urine was observed in one
of them. Death occurred
121, 123, and 129 minutes after they were shot."
The S S doctors engaged in such experiments was no
fact that
accident. consistent with an ideology and racial philosophy
It was
which, to use Himmler's words, regarded human beings as lice
and offal. But the most important factor was that the SS alone
was in a position to supply necessary human material. And it
did supply such material through WVHA. I refer to our Document
1751-PS, which is a letter from the Chief of Office Group D of
WVHA, dated 12 May 1944. I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-468.
I quote that letter. It appears in the original file on the last
page. I quote:
"There is cause to call attention to the fact that in every
case permission for assignment has to be requested here
before assignment of prisoners is made for experimental
purposes.
"To be included in this request are number, kind of custody,
and in case of Aryan prisoners, exact personal data, file
number in the Reich Security Main Office, and the reason
for detainment in the concentration camp.
"Herewith, I explicitly forbid assignment of prisoners for
experimental purposes without permission."
The translation says that the signature is illegible, but I think
it appears from the original that it is the signature of Glücks, since
he was the department chief of Department D of WVHA. It was
on the basis of being able to supply such material that the Reich
Ministry of Finance was prepared to subsidize the SS experi-
mental program. I offer in evidence a series of letters between the
Reich Ministry of Finance, the Reich Research Council, and the
Reich Surgeon of the SS and Police. They are our Document
002-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-469.
The first letter from which I shall quote appears on Page 4 of
our Document 002-PS and is from the head of the Executive
Council of the Reich Research Council, addressed to the Reich
Surgeon of SS and Police. It is dated 19 February 1943. I quote
the first three paragraphs of the letter:
"The Reich Minister of Finance told me that you requested
53 leading positions . . . for your office, partly for new research
institutes.
"After the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich has
as President of the Reich Research Council entrusted himself
with all German research, he issued directives, among other
things, that in the execution of scientific tasks important for

209
20 Dec. 45

war, the available institutions including equipment and

personnel should be utilized to the utmost for reasons of
necessary economy of effort.
"The foundation of new institutes comes therefore in question
only insofar as there are no outstanding institutes for the
furtherance of important war research tasks."
I omit the rest of the letter.

To this letter the Reich Surgeon of the SS and Police replied

on the 26 February 1943. The reply will be found on Page 2 of
the English translation. It is a letter from the Reich Surgeon SS
and Police to the head of the Executive Council of the Reich
Research Department, dated 26 February 1943. I quote the first
three paragraphs of that letter. It begins:
"My Dear Ministerial Director:
"In acknowledgment of your correspondence of 19 February
1943, I am able to reply the following to it today:
"The statement of the budget for the 53 key positions of
my office which you made the basis of your memorandum
was a veritable peace plan.
"The special institutes of the SS which are to be filled, in
part,with these positions should serve the purpose to establish
and make accessible for the entire realm of scientific research
the particular possibilities of research only possessed by
the SS."
Omitting the next two paragraphs, I continue:
"I will gladly be at your disposal at any time to discuss the
particular research aims, in connection with the SS, which I
would like to bring up after the war upon the direction of
the Reichsfuhrer SS."
Aninterview between the Reich Surgeon and Mentzel, the
author of the original letter, took place; and on the 25th of March
1943 Mentzel wrote a letter to the Reich Minister of Finance, which
will be found on Page 1 of the translation. It is a letter from the
President of the Reich Research Department, Head of the Executive
Council, to the Reich Minister of Finance, dated 25 March 1943.
The letter begins:
"In regard to your correspondence of 19 December" and
— —
then follows the serial number of the letter "to which I
gave you a preliminary communication on 19 February, I
finally take the following position:
"The Reich Surgeon SS and Police, in a personal discussion,
told me that the budget claim which he looked after is used
primarily in the pure military sector of the Waffen-SS. Since
it is established on a smaller scale for the enlarging of

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 20 Dec. 45

scientificresearch possibilities, they pertain exclusively to

such which are carried out with the material (pris-
affairs,
oners) which is only accessible to the Waffen-SS and are
therefore not to be undertaken by any other experimental
office. I cannot object therefore on behalf of the Reich
Research Council against the budget claim of the Reich
Surgeon SS and Police."
The letter is signed, "Mentzel, Ministerial Director."
Thus it was because the SS was in a position to supply material
for the program of experiments that it took the lead in that field
of endeavor.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the letter on Page 4 mean that the

Defendant Goring was President of the Reich Research Department?
MAJOR FARR: Page 4 That I understand
of the translation?
to be the case. The point of thebeing that Goring had
letter
laid down the rule that during the war there was to be no
duplication of experimental facilities. Therefore, the Reich Research
Department to whom the Minister of Finance had turned for an
opinion, asked the Reich Surgeon, "Why do you want to carry out
this program of experiments?"

THE PRESIDENT: I was only asking whether the President of

the Reich Research Department was the Defendant Goring.
MAJOR FARR: That is what is stated in the letter. I under-
stand that to be the case.
THE PRESIDENT: Then what do the words, "President of the
Reich Research Department" on Page 1 mean? Does that mean that
the letter went to the Defendant Goring?
MAJOR FARR: No. The letterhead bears the notation "Presi-
dent of the Reich Research Department," and the letter proceeds
from an office of that department, Head of the Executive Council.
The letter was addressed to the Reich Minister of Finance.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.

MAJOR FARR: I have concluded the concentration camp phase.

THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: It will perhaps be convenient that I should

announce that the Tribunal will adjourn today at 4 o'clock.
MAJOR FARR: Through its activities with respect to concen-
tration camps, the SS performed part of its mission to safeguard
the security of the Nazi regime. But another specialized aspect of

211
 —
20 Dec. 45

that mission must not be forgotten. The Tribunal will recall Himm-
ler's definition of that —
task a definition I referred to earlier the —
prevention of a Jewish-Bolshevist revolution of subhumans; in plain
words, participation in the Nazi program of Jewish persecution and
extermination.
It would be idle for me to refer again at any length to the evi-
dence relating to that program which the Tribunal heard a day or
so ago from Major Walsh. I want to call attention to just a few
documents showing how the program involved every branch and
component of the SS.
The racial philosophy of the SS, which I dealt with at the very
outset, madethat organization a natural agency for the execution
of all types of anti-Semitic measures. The SS position on the Jewish
question was publicly stated in the SS newspaper Das Schwarze
Corps, the issue of August 8, 1940, by its editor, Gunter d'Alquen,
a statement which has already been read into evidence as Exhibit
Number USA-269. It is our Document 2668-PS. I shall not repeat
that quotation in which D'Alquen says that the Jewish question will
not be solved until the last Jew has been deported, and that the
German peace which awaits Europe must be a peace without Jews.
The attempted solution of the Jewish question through the
"spontaneous" demonstrations in Germany, following the murder
of Vom Rath in November of 1938, has been presented to the Tri-
bunal. In those demonstrations all branches of the SS were called
on to play a part. I refer to the teletype message from SS Gruppen-
führer Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police and SD, issued on the
10th of November 1938. It is our Document 3051-PS. Portions of
that teletype have already been read into evidence as Exhibit Num-
ber ÜSA-240. I wish to read one further paragraph, which has not
been read. It appears on Page 2 of the translation, the fourth para-
graph. I quote:
"The direction of the measures of the Security Police con-
cerning the demonstrations against Jews is vested with the
—
organs of the State Police" by which he means the Gestapo
"inasmuch as the inspectors of the Security Police are not
issuing their own orders. In order to carry out the measures
of the Security Police, officials of the Criminal Police as well
as members of the SD, of the Verfügungstruppe, and the
Allgemeine SS may be used."
With the outbreak of the war and the march of Nazi armies over
Europe, the SS participated in solving the Jewish question in other
countries in Europe. The solution was nothing short of exter-
mination. To a large degree these wholesale murders were disguised
under the name of "anti-partisan" or "anti-guerilla" actions and
as such they included as victims not merely Jews but Soviets, Poles,

212
 —
20 Dec. 45

and other Eastern peoples. With this anti-partisan activity I shall

deal in a few moments.
I want to refer now to a few actions confined essentially to Jews.
—
To take one example the mass annihilation of Jews in gas vans
described in our document 501-PS, which was read into the record
by Major Walsh as Exhibit Number USA-288. I do not think that
that document appears in the document book, because I am not
going to read from it. I simply want to point out that these gas
vans, as appears from the letters, were operated by the Security
Police and SD under the direction of RSHA. Or to take another
example —the
report entitled, "Solution of the Jewish Question in
Galicia," our L-18, prepared by SS Gruppenführer and
Document
Lieutenant General of the Police Katzmann and rendered to SS
Obergruppenführer and General of the Police Krüger that report —
has already been received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-277.
The Tribunal will recall that the solution, which consisted in the
evacuation and extermination of all the Jews in Galicia and the
confiscation of their property, was carried out under the energetic
direction of the SS and Police Leaders with the assistance of
S S Police units. I wish to read three short items in the report which
have not already been read. The first is a text under a photograph
which appears on Page 3 of the translation and on Page 3(a) of the
original report. It is the first item on Page 3 of the translation.
I quote: "Great was the joy of the SS men when the Reichsführer
SS in person in 1942 visited some camps along the Rollbahn."
The second is a balance sheet, which appears on Page 11 of the
translation and Page 17 of the report. I read Item 3 on the balance
sheet:
"3. Amount paid over to the SS cashier: a. Camps, 6,867,251.00
zlotys; b. industrial and armament factories, 6,556,513.69
zlotys; total, 13,423,764.69 zlotys.
"Further payments to the SS cashier are effected every
month."
The third item I desire to read is the last two paragraphs of the
report found on Page 20 of the translation and on Page 64 of the
original document. I read the last two paragraphs of the report:
"Despite the extraordinary burden heaped upon every single
SS Police Officer during these actions, mood and spirit of the
men were extraordinarily good and praiseworthy from the
first to the last day.
"Due to the high personal sense of duty of every single leader
and man we have succeeded in getting rid of this plague in
so short a time."
The final example of SS participation in Jewish extermination
to which I shall call the Tribunal's attention is the infamous report

213
20 Dec. 45

by SS Brigadeführer and Major General of the Police Stroop, on

the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto, our Document 1061-PS. That
report was introduced in evidence by Major Walsh as Exhibit Num-
ber USA-275, and the Tribunal indicated that it would take the
whole report in evidence without the necessity of reading it in full.
I shall not, therefore, read any further passages; but I do want to
point out specifically two sections dealing with the constitution of
the forces which participated in that fearful action. On Page 1 of
the translation is a table of the units used.
THE PRESIDENT: It is here?
MAJOR FARR: Our Document 1061-PS. I am just going to call
your attention which were employed in this
to the table of units
action, indicating the average number of officers and men from
each unit employed per day. It will be observed that among the
units involved were the staff of the SS and Police Leader, two
battalions of the Waffen-SS, two battalions of the 22d SS Police
Regiment, and members of the Security Police. The part played by
the Waffen-SS came in for high praise from the writer of the report.
The Tribunal will recall the passage which was read by Major
Walsh in which reference was made to the toughness of the men of
the Waffen-SS, the Police, and the Wehrmacht and in which the
writer said that "considering that the greater part of the men of the
Waffen-SS had been trained for only 3 or 4 weeks before being
assigned to this action, high credit should be given to them for the
pluck, courage, and devotion which they showed."

The Tribunal has already heard Himmler's proud boast of the

part that the SS played in the extermination of the Jews. It occurs
in his Posen speech, our Document 1919-PS, and was read into the
record in the presentation of the case dealing with concentration
camps. The passage to which I refer appears on about the middle
of Page 4 of the translation and on Page 66 of the original. Since
that passage has already been read, it is unnecessary for me to
quote it again; but I do want the Tribunal to note that Himmler
stated that only the SS could have carried out this extermination
program of the Jews and that its participation in that program was
a page of glory in its history which could never be fully appreciated.

I now
turn to the manner in which the SS fitted into the aggres-
sive war program
of the conspirators and, too, its responsibility for
the Crimes against Peace which were alleged in the Indictment.
From its very beginning, it made prime contributions to the con-
spirators' aggressive war aims.
First, it served as one of the para-military organizations under
which the conspirators disguised their building up of an army in
violation of the Versailles Treaty. Second, through affiliated SS

214
 20 Dec. 45

organizations in other countries and through some of the depart-

ments in its own Supreme Command, it fostered Fifth Column
movements outside Germany and prepared the way for aggression.
Third, through its militarized units, it participated in aggressive
actions which eventually were carried out.
The Tribunal has just heard the evidence against the SA, which
demonstrated that from 1933 to 1938 the SA were militarized and
were in fact nothing but a camouflaged army. Some of that evi-
dence referred to the SS as well. The para-military character of
the Allgemeine SS is apparent. I have already described the mili-
tary character of its structure, the military discipline required of
its members, and the steps it took to enlist in its ranks young men
of military age. In addition to this volunteer army, the SS created
as early as 1933 fully armed professional units. These were the
SS Verfügungstruppe and the Death's-Head Units with which I have
dealt yesterday.
While building up the SS as a military force within Germany,
the conspirators also utilized it in other countries to lay the ground-
work for aggression. The evidence, presented by Mr. Alderman, of
the preparations for the seizure of Austria showed the part played
by the SS Standarte 89 in the murder of Dollfuss and described the
memorial plaque which was erected as a tribute to the SS men who
participated in that murder. I refer to Exhibit Number USA-59 and
USA-60, our Document Number L-273 and 2968-PS, which were
introduced by Mr. Alderman. The Tribunal will recall the sub-
sequent story of the events of the night of March 11, 1938, when the
SS marched into Vienna and occupied all government buildings and
—
important posts in the city a story unfolded in Exhibit Number
USA-61, our Document Number 812-PS, the report of Gauleiter
Rainer which was read in evidence by Mr. Alderman, and in our
Document Number 2949-PS, Exhibit Number USA-76, the record of
the telephone conversation between the Defendant Goring and
Dombrowski, which appears on Page 570 of the transcript of the
record (Volume II, Page 417).
The same pattern was repeated in Czechoslovakia. Henlein's Free
Corps played in that country the part of Fifth Column which the
Austrian SS had played in Austria, and it was rewarded by being
placed under the jurisdiction of the Reichsführer SS in September
1938. I refer to our Document 388-PS, which was read in evidence
by Mr. Alderman as Exhibit Number USA-26.
The items touched are Items 37 and 38 of the so-called
Schmundt file. Moreover, as shown by Item 36 of that file, which
Mr. Alderman read into the record, the SS had its own armed
— —
units four battalions of the Totenkopf Verbände actually oper-
ating in Czechoslovakia before the Munich Pact was signed. SS prep-
arations for aggression in Czechoslovakia were not confined to

215
20 Dec. 45

military forces. One of the departments of the SS Supreme Com-

— —
mand the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle which is represented on the
chart by the third box from the top at the extreme right was a —
center for Fifth Column activity. The Tribunal may recall the
secret meeting between Hitler and Henlein in March 1938, described
in notes of the German Foreign Office, Exhibit Number USA-95, at
which the line to be followed by the Sudeten German Party was
determined. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle was represented at that
meeting by Professor Haushofer and SS Obergruppenführer Lorenz.
And when the Foreign Office, in August 1938, awarded further sub-
sidies to Henlein's Sudeten Party, the memorandum of that recom-
mendation for further subsidies contained the significant footnote
"Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle will be informed "I refer to Exhibit
Number USA-96, our Document 3059-PS, which was read into the
record by Mr. Alderman, at Pages 789 and 790 (Volume III, Pages 75
and 76).
When at last the time came to strike, the SS was ready. I quote
from the National Yearbook for 1940, our Document
Socialist
2164-PS, Exhibit Number USA-255, on Page 1, Paragraph 2, of the
translation, Page 365 of the original, Paragraph 3:
"When the march into the liberated provinces of the Sudeten-
land began, on that memorable 1st of October 1938, the emer-
— —
gency forces" Verfügungstruppe "as well as the Death's-
— —
Head Units" Totenkopf Verbände "were along with those
in the lead."
I omit the balance of the paragraph and continue with the next
paragraph:
"The 15th of March 1939 brought a similar utilization of the
SS when it served to establish order in the collapsed Czecho-
slovakia. This action ended with the founding of the Pro-
tectorate Bohemia-Moravia.
"Only a week later, on the 22d of March 1939, Memel also
returned to the Reich upon basis of an agreement with Lithu-
ania. Again it was the SS, here above all the East Prussian
SS, which played a prominent part in the liberation of this
district."

—
In the final act in setting off the war the attack on Poland in
—
September 1939 the SS acted as a sort of stage manager. The
Tribunal will recall the oral testimony of Erwin Lahousen with
relation to the simulated attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz, by
—
Germans dressed in Polish uniform what Lahousen referred to
as one of the most mysterious actions which took place in the
Abwehr. Describing his task of getting the Polish uniforms and
equipment together, he said at Page 620 of the transcript (Volume II,
Page 450):

216
 20 Dec. 45

"These articles of equipment had to be prepared, and one day-

—
some man from the SS or the SD the name is on the official
—
diary of the War Department fetched them."
The war erupted and the Waffen-SS again took its place in the
van of the attacking forces.
During the war great use was made of the peculiar qualities
possessed by the SS, qualities not only of its combat forces but of
its other components as well. I turn now to a consideration of some
of the tasks in which the SS was engaged during the war tasks —
which embraced the commission of War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity described in the Indictment.
The Tribunal has already received in evidence our Document
447-PS as Exhibit Number USA-135. It is a directive issued by the
Defendant Keitel, on the 13th of March 1941, covering some of the
preparations made 3 months in advance for the attack on Russia.
Paragraph 2b of that directive, which was read into the record,
provided that in the area of operations the Reichsführer SS was
entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political
administration, tasks which would result from the struggle about
to commence between two opposing political systems.
One of the steps taken by the Reichsführer SS to carry out those
"special tasks" was the formation and use of so-called "anti-parti-
san" units. They were discussed by Himmler in his Posen speech,
our Document 1919-PS, at Page 3 of the translation, Paragraph 5,
Page 57 of the original, last paragraph. I read those two paragraphs
in which he discusses the anti-partisan units:
"In the meantime, I have also set up the office of the chief of
the anti-partisan units. Our comrade SS Obergruppenführer
Von dem Bach is chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered
it necessary for the Reichsführer SS to be in authoritative
command in all these battles, for I am convinced that we are
best in position to take action against this enemy struggle,
which is decidedly a political one. Except where units which
had been supplied and which we had formed for this purpose
were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have been
very successful.
"It notable that by setting up this agency by division,
is
corps, army in turn, we have gained for the SS the next
—
higher step which is the High Command of an army or even
a group, if you wish to call it that."
What the SS did with its divisions, corps, and army out of which
the anti-partisan units were formed, is illustrated in the reports
rendered as to the activities of such units. I offer in evidence the
Activity and Situation Report 6 of the task forces of the Security
Police and SD in the U.S.S.R., covering the period from the 1st to

217
20 Dec. 45

the 31st of October 1941. It is our Document R-102, and will be

found in Volume 2 of the document book. It is Exhibit Number
USA-470. The report shows that so-called "anti-partisan" activity
was actually nothing but a name for extermination of persons
believed politically undesirable and of Jews. The report is a very
carefully organized and detailed description of such extermination.
Section I describes the stations of the various task forces involved,
Section II their activities. The latter section is divided into parts,
—
each dealing with a different geographical region the Baltic area,
White Ruthenia, and the Ukraine.
Under each area the report of activities is classified under three
headings: (a) Partisan activity and counteraction, (b) arrests and
execution of Communists and officials, and (c) Jews. I shall read
only a few typical paragraphs selected almost at random.
First, to show the units involved, I quote the second and third
paragraphs of Page 4 of the translation, which also appear on Page 1
of the original:
"The present stations are:
"Task Force A, since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk; Task
Force B, continues in Smolensk; Task Force C, since 27 Sep-
tember 1941 in Kiev; Task Force D, since 27 September 1941
in Nikolaiev.
—
"The action and special commandos" Einsatz- und Sonder-
—
kommandos "which are attached to the task force continue
on the march with the advancing troops into the sectors
which have been assigned to them."
I shall now read from the section headed "Baltic area" and sub-
section labelled "Jews," beginning with the first paragraph on Page 5
of the translation, Page 8 of the original, second paragraph:
"The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of
doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still
in progress. After completion of this action there will remain
only 500 Jewesses and children in Ostland."
I skip now to the section headed "White Ruthenia," the sub-
section headed, "Partisan activity and counteraction." The para-
graph I shall read begins on Page 6, Paragraph 5 of the translation,
found on Page 11, Paragraph 1 of the original. I quote:
"In Wultschina eight juveniles were arrested as partisans and
shot. They were inmates of a children's home. They had
collected weapons which they hid in the woods. Upon search
the following were found: 3 heavy machine guns, 15 rifles,
several thousand rounds of ammunition, several hand gre-
nades, and several packages of poison gas Ebrit.
"b) Arrests and executions of Communists, officials, and crim-
inals. A further large part of the activity of the Security

218
 . —

20 Dec. 45

Police was devoted to the combatting of Communists and

criminals. Aspecial Commando in the period covered by this
report executed 63 officials, NKGB
agents, and agitators."
The subsection on arrests and executions
of Communists, offi-
and criminals in White Ruthenia ends as follows; and I read
cials,
from Page 6 of the translation, Paragraph 14, Page 12 of the original,
Paragraph 5:
"The liquidations for the period covered by this report have
reached a total of 37,180 persons."
The final item I shall quote is from the section headed "Ukraine",
under the subsection, "Jews." It will be found on Page 8 of the
translation, Paragraph 10, Page 18 of the original, next to the last
paragraph:
"In Zhitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot, because from exper-
ience they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propa-
ganda and saboteurs."
This report, the Tribunal will recall, deals with the activities
of four task forces: A, B, C, and D. The more detailed report of
Task Force A up to 15 October 1941 is our Document L-180. It has
already been introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-276
and some paragraphs were read from it. It will be referred to again
in the case against the Gestapo. I desire to read only two para-
graphs, which show the great variety of SS components in such a
task force.
I might point out to the Court that this elaborately bound report,
which the Court has already seen, has a sort of pocket-part supple-
ment in which appears a breakdown of the personnel engaged in
this action, in graphic form. I shall read the component parts which
appear on this chart in a moment. First, I will quote from Page 5
of the translation, fourth paragraph . .

THE PRESIDENT: Does that book you just put in refer to the
extermination of the Jews in Galicia?
MAJOR FARR: This is the report of Action Group A, an anti-
partisan task force which operated in the Baltic States in 1941.
The passage I will read appears on Page 5 of the translation,
Paragraph 4 and on Page 12 of the original, first paragraph; I quote:
"This description of the over-all situation shows that the
members of the Gestapo" ——
the Secret State Police "Kripo" —
—
that is the Criminal Police "and the SD" Security Service
"who are attached to the task-force group, are active mainly
in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, and to a lesser
extent, in front of Leningrad. It shows further that the forces
of the uniformed police and the Waffen-SS are active mainly
in front of Leningrad, in order to take measures under their

219
20 Dec. 45

own streaming back of the population.

officers against the
This is much
easier because the task forces in Lithuania,
so
Latvia, and Estonia have at their disposal native police units,
as described in Enclosure 1, and because so far 150 Latvian
reinforcements have been sent to White Ruthenia.
"The distribution of the leaders of Security Police and SD
during the individual phases can be gathered from Enclo-
sure 2; the advance and activities of the task force group and
the task force commands, from Enclosure 3. It should be men-
tioned that the leaders of the Waffen-SS and of the uniformed
police, who are on the reserve, have declared their wish to
stay with the Security Police and the SD." #

I now
quote from Enclosure la which was referred to, showing
the constitution of the force. This will be found on Page 14 of the
translation. It is the graphic chart which I showed the Court a few
moments ago, the translation having simply the breakdown of the
components. I quote:
"Total strength of Task Force Group A, 990; Waffen-SS, 340,
34.4 percent; drivers, 172, 17.4 percent; administration, 18,
1.8 percent; Security Service" — —
SD "35, 3.5 percent; Criminal
Police"— Kripo— "41, 4.1 percent; State Police"—Stapo— "89,
9.0 percent; auxiliary police, 87, 8.8 percent; Order Police, 133,
13.4 percent; female employees, 13, 1.3 percent; interpreters,
51, 5.1 percent; telautograph operators, 3, 0.3 percent; wireless
operators, 8, 0.8 percent."

The Tribunal
will observe that in that list there appear the
Waffen-SS, the SD, Criminal Police, the Gestapo, and the ordinary
police, all of which were part of the SS or under SS jurisdiction.

One final report of anti-partisan activity may be referred to. It

is from the General Commissar for White Ruthenia to the
a report
Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories. It is our Document
R-135, which I think is in the document book under 1475-PS two —
document numbers have been combined. That document was intro-
duced into evidence by Major Walsh as Exhibit Number USA-289,
and he read into the record the letter from the Reich Commissar
of the Eastern Territories transmitting the report in question. The
letterhe read appears on Page 1 of the translation. I desire to read
a paragraph or two from the report itself, which is found on Page 3
of the translation. It deals with the results of the police operation
"Cottbus." I quote the first paragraph:
"SS Brigadeführer, Major General of Police Von Gottberg
reports that the operation 'Cottbus' had the following result
during the period mentioned: Enemy dead, 4,500; dead sus-
pected of belonging to bands, 5,000; German dead, 59.''

220
 20 Dec. 45

I think it is unnecessary to continue further with the list. I skip to

the fourth paragraph of the report:
"The figures mentioned above indicate that again a heavy
destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492
rifles are taken from 4,500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows
that among these enemy dead were numerous peasants from
the country. The Battalion Dirlewanger especially has a repu-
tation for destroying many human lives. Among the 5,000
people suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous
women and children.
"By order of the Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat, SS Ober-
gruppenführer Von dem Bach, units of the Armed Forces
have also participated in the operation."
This is as far as I will quote.
The Tribunal will recall that SS Obergruppenführer Von dem
Bach was referred to in the Posen speech by Himmler as "our com-
rade" whom he had placed in charge of anti-partisan activity.
The activities I have just dealt with were joint activities, in
which the Gestapo, Order Police, the Waffen-SS, and SS police regi-
ments were all involved. But these units were also used individually
to carry out tasks of such a nature.
I evidence a letter from the Chief of the Command
offer in
Office of the Waffen-SS, our Document 1972-PS, as Exhibit Number
USA-471. It is a letter from the Chief of the Command Office of
the Waffen-SS to the Reichsführer SS, dated 14 October 1941; sub-
ject: "Intermediate Report on Civilian State of Emergency." I shall
read that letter; I quote:
"I deliver the following interim report regarding the commit-
ment of the Waffen-SS in the Protectorate Bohemia and
Moravia during the civilian state of emergency:
"In turn all battalions of the Waffen-SS in the Protectorate
Bohemia and Moravia were assigned to shootings and hang-
ings.
"Up till now there occurred in Prague 99 shootings and 21
hangings, in Brünn 54 shootings and 17 hangings; total: 191
executions (including 16 Jews).
"A complete report regarding other measures and on the con-
duct of the officers, noncommissioned officers, and men will
be made following the termination of the civilian state of
emergency."
It is not surprising that units of the Waffen-SS and the branches
which had thus been employed in extermination actions and in the
execution of civilians are also to be found violating the laws of
warfare when carrying on ordinary combat operations. I offer in

221
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20 Dec. 45

evidence a supplementary report of the Supreme Headquarters

Allied Expeditionary Force Court of Inquiry in regard to shooting
of allied prisoners of war by the 12th SS Panzer Division in Nor-
mandy, France, between the 7th and 21st of June 1944. It is our
Document 2997-PS, Exhibit Number USA-472. Extracts from that
report consist of the formal record of the proceedings of the Court
of Inquiry and the statement of its findings are included in the
document book under that document number. They have been
translated into German. Under Article 21 of the Charter, this Tri-
bunal is directed to take judicial notice of the documents of com-
mittees set up in various Allied countries for the investigation of
War Crimes and also of the records and findings of military or other
tribunals of any of the United Nations. This report falls squarely
within that provision. Therefore, without reading portions of the
document, I shall summarize the findings of the Court of Inquiry
which are set out on Pages 8 to 10 of the document. The court
concluded that there occurred between the 7th and the 17th of June
1944 in Normandy, seven cases of violations of the laws of war . .

THE PRESIDENT: What page?

MAJOR FARR: I am not quoting, I am summarizing what
appears on Pages 8 to 10.
There occurred seven cases oï violations of the laws of war, in-
volving the shooting of 64 unarmed Allied prisoners of war in uni-
form, many of whom had been previously wounded and none of whom
had resisted or endeavored to escape; that the perpetrators were
members of the 12th SS Panzer Division, the so-called Hitler Jugend
Division; that enlisted men of the 15th Company of the 25th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment of that Division were given secret orders to the
effect that SS troops shall take no prisoners and that prisoners are
to be executed after having been interrogated; that similar orders
were given to men of the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment of the Division and of the 12th SS Engineering and Recon-
naissance Battalions; and that the conclusion was irresistible that it
was understood throughout the division that a policy of denying
quarter or executing prisoners after interrogation was openly
approved.
Other combatants met a similar fate at the hands of other
components of the SS. I refer to the execution of Allied fliers, of
commandos and paratroopers, and of escaped prisoners of war who
were turned over to the SD to be destroyed. Evidence of these
actions will be presented in the case against the Gestapo.
Combatants who were taken prisoner encountered the SS in
.

another form. In the case against the Gestapo, evidence will be

presented of commando groups stationed in prisoner-of-war camps
to select prisoners for what the Nazis euphemistically called "special

222
 20 Dec. 45

treatment". Finally, the entire control of prisoners of war was

turned over to the Reichsführer SS. I have read in evidence this
morning our Document 058-PS which provided for the direction of
all prisoner-of-war camps by Himmler.

The final but vital phase of the conspiracy in which the SS

played a leading role must be mentioned. The permanent coloni-
zation of conquered territories, the destruction of their national
existence, and the permanent extension of the German frontier
were fundamental objects of the conspirators' plans.
The Tribunal received evidence, a day or so ago, of the manner
in which these objectives were carried out through the forcible
evacuation and resettlement of inhabitants of conquered territories,
confiscation of their properties, denationalization and re-education
of persons of German blood, and the colonization of the conquered
territoriesby Germans.
The SS was the logical agency
to formulate and carry out the
program. have read into the record already the numerous state-
I
ments made by Himmler as to SS training to play the role of the
aristocracy of the new Europe. He put those theories into practice
when he was appointed, on October 7, 1939, as Reich Commissioner
for the consolidation of German folkdom. The decree by which he
was appointed to that office, our Document 686-PS, has already
been introduced into evidence as Exhibit Number USA-305. I shall
not, therefore, read it.

To make and carry out plans for the program of evacuation and
resettlement, a new department of the SS Supreme Command was
created: Staff Headquarters of the Reich Commissioner for the con-
solidation of German nationality. That is indicated on the chart
by the fourth box from the top, on the extreme right-hand side.
The functions of this office are described in the Organization
Book of the NSDAP for 1943, our Document 2640-PS, which has
already been introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-323.
I shall read the description of the functions of that department

appearing on Page 3 of the translation, the last paragraph, and

Page 421 of the original. I quote:
"The main office of the staff of the Reich Commissioner for
the Preservation of German Nationality is entrusted with the
whole settlement and constructive planning, for inclusion
within the Reich of all those territories under the authority
of the Reich, including all administrative and economic ques-
tions in connection with the settlement, especially the deploy-
ment, of manpower for this purpose."
The colonization program had two principal objectives: First,
the destruction of the conquered peoples by exterminating them,

223
20 Dec. 45

deporting them, and confiscating their property; second, settling

racial Germans on the newly acquired land.
The extermination actions conducted by the SS, as to which
I have just introduced evidence, contributed in part to clearing the
conquered territories of persons who were deemed dangerous to the
Nazi plan. But not every undesirable could be liquidated. Mass
deportations accomplished the twin purpose of providing labor and
of freeing the land for German colonists.
Evidence as to the participation of SS agencies in deporting per-
sons to concentration camps I have already introduced.
The evacuation and resettlement program required the use of
further deporting agencies. I quote from our Document 2163-PS,
the National Socialist Year Book for 1941, Exhibit Number USA-444.
The passage in question appears on Page 3 of the translation, Para-
graph 5, and at Page 195 of the original. I quote:
"For some time now, the Reichsführer SS has had at his dis-
posal an office under the management of SS Obergruppen-
—
führer Lorenz, the National German Central Office" Volks-
deutsche Mittelstelle (VM).
"This office has the task of dealing with national German
questions and of gathering the required proofs.
"In addition to the VM, the Immigration Center Office (EWZ),
•
with the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Ser-
vice of the SS (under the management of SS Obersturmbann-
führer Dr. Sandberger) and the Settlement Staff of the Reich
Commissioner were created which, in co-operation with the
National Socialist Welfare Organization and the Reich Rail-
road Agency, took charge of the migration of national Ger-
mans."
I also offer in evidence the affidavit of Otto Hoffmann, SS Ober-
gruppenführer and general of the Waffen-SS and Police, our Docu-
ment L-49. I offer it as Exhibit Number USA-473. Hoffmann was
Chief of the Main Office for Race and Settlement in the SS Supreme
Command, until 1943. This affidavit was taken on August 4, 1945,
at Freising, Germany. I shall read Paragraph 2 of that affidavit:
"The executive power, in other words the carrying out of all
so-called resettlement actions, that is to say, sending away of
Polish and Jewish settlers and those of non-German blood
from a territory in Poland destined for Germanization, was
in the hands of the Chief of the RSHA (Heydrich, and later
Kaltenbrunner, since the end of 1942). The Chief of the RSHA
also supervised and issued orders to the so-called immigration
center, which classified the Germans living abroad who
returned to Germany and directed them to the individual

224
 20 Dec. 45

farms already freed. The latter was done in agreement with

the Staff Main Office of the Reichsführer SS."
Other SS agencies were involved in the program for deportation.
The Tribunal has already received in evidence our Document
1352-PS, as Exhibit Number USA-176. It is a report relating to the
confiscation of Polish agricultural enterprises, dated May 22, 1940,
and signed "Kusche." Portions of that document dealing with the
confiscation of Polish agricultural enterprises and the deportation
of Polish owners of the land to Germany were read into the record.
I shall read only one further paragraph showing SS personnel
involved in this action. It appears on Page 2 of the translation,
the first full paragraph; and on Page 10 of the original, Paragraph 2.
Referring to the deportation of Polish farmers, the report says;
and I quote:
"Means of transportation to the railroad can be provided:
1. By
the enterprise of the East German Corporation of Agri-
cultural Development; 2. By the SS noncommissioned officers'
school in Lublinitz and the concentration camp of Auschwitz.
"These two latter places will also detail the necessary SS men
for the day of the confiscation, and so forth."

The extent which almost all departments of the Supreme

to
Command SS were concerned with the evacuation program
of the
is shown by the minutes of a meeting on the 4th of August 1942

dealing with the deportation of Alsatians. It is our Document R-l 14,

and was received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-314. I shall
read only the list of persons and offices represented at that con-
ference, since the body of the report has been read in part into the
record already.
I start at the beginning of the document, Page 1 of R-l 14:

"Memo on meeting of 4. 8. 42. Subject: General directions for

the treatment of deported Alsatians.
"Present: SS Hauptsturmführer Dr. Stier, SS Hauptsturm-
führer Petri, R.R. Hoffmann, Dr. Scherler, SS Untersturm-
—
führer Förster;" there is a notation next to their names of
"Staff Main Office"; then— "SS Obersturmführer Dr. Hin-
richs, Chief of Estate Office and Settlement Staff, Strasbourg;
SS Sturmbannführer Brückner, Racial German Arbitration
— —
Bureau;" Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle "SS Hauptsturmführer
—
Hummitsch, Reich Security Main Office;" Reichssicherheits-
hauptamt— "SS Untersturmführer Dr. Sieder, Main Office for
Race and Settlement;"—RUS-Hauptamt— "Dr. Labes, D.U.T."
The SS not only destroyed and deported conquered peoples and
confiscated their property, it also repopulated the conquered regions

225
20 Dec. 45

with so-called racial Germans. Not all Germans were deemed reli-
able colonists, however. Those who were not were returned to Ger-
many for re-Germanization and re-education along Nazi lines.
A typical instance of the fate of such Germans is told in our
Document Number R-112, which has already been introduced in
evidence as Exhibit Number USA-309. It is a decree of the Reich
Commissioner for the consolidation of Germandom. That decree, as
the Tribunal will recall, dealt with the treatment to be accorded
so-called "Polonized" Germans. By the terms of that decree two
SS functionaries were charged with the responsibility for the
re-Germanization program: the Higher SS and Police Leaders, and
the Gestapo.
I think it is unnecessary for me to quote from that report, since
portions have already been read into evidence. I will refer the
Court specifically to Section III of the decree, which appears on
Page 7 of the translation, and to Section IV of the decree, which
appears on the same page, both of which indicate that the Higher
SS and Police Leaders and the Gestapo were responsible for the
re-Germanization actions.
In the final stage of the process, the resettlement of the con-
quered lands by racially and politically desirable Germans, still
other SS agencies participated. I quote again from our Document
2163-PS, the National Socialist Year Book for 1941, Exhibit Number
USA-444. The passage appears on Page 3 of the translation, Para-
graph 7, and on Page 195 of the original. I quote:
"Numerous SS leaders and SS men helped with untiring effort
in bringing about this systematic migration of peoples which
has no parallel in history.
"There were many authoritative and administrative difficul-
tieswhich, however, were immediately overcome due to the
unbureaucratic working procedure. This was especially
guaranteed above all by the employment of the SS.
"The procedure called 'Durchschleusung' takes 3 to 4 hours
as a rule. The re-settler is being passed through eight or
nine offices, following each other in organic order: Registra-
tion office, card-index office, certificate and photo office, prop-
erty office, and biological, hereditary, and sanitary test offices.
The latter was entrusted to doctors and medical personnel of
the SS and of the Armed
Forces. The SS Corps Areas Alpen-
land, Northwest, Baltic Sea, Fulda- Werra, South and South-
east, the SS Main Office, the NPEA"—
National Political Edu-
—
cation Institution "Vienna, and the SS Cavalry School in
Hamburg, provided most of the SS officers and SS noncom-
missioned officers who worked at this job of resettlement."

226
 20 Dec. 45

I omit the next three paragraphs and continue with the year

book's conclusion as to the SS participation in the colonization

scheme:
"The settlement, establishment, and care of the newly-won
peasantry in the liberated Eastern Territory will be one of
the most cherished tasks of the SS in the whole future."
THE PRESIDENT: This might be a good time to break off until
2 o'clock.

MAJOR FARR: Yes, Sir.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

227
20 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

MAJOR FARR: In the course of development from a group

its
of strong-arm bodyguards, some two hundred
in number, to a com-
plex organization participating in every field of Nazi endeavor, the
SS found room for its members in high places; and persons in high
places found for themselves a position in the SS.
Of the defendants charged in the Indictment, seven were very
high ranking officers in the SS. They are the Defendants Ribben-
trop, Hess, Kaltenbrunner, Bormann, Sauckel, Neurath, and Seyss-
Inquart. The vital part that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner played
in the SS, in the SD, and in the entire Security Police will be shown
by evidence to be presented after the case on the Gestapo has gone
in. With respect to the other six defendants whom I have named,
I desire to call the Tribunal's attention now to the fact of their
membership in the SS. That fact is rather a matter of judicial
notice than proof. Evidence of the fact is to be found in two offi-
cial publications which I shall now offer the Court.
The first is this —
black book the membership list of the SS as of
December 1, 1936. This book contains a list of members of the SS
arranged according to rank. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit Num-
ber USA-474 (Document Number USA-474). Turning to Page 8 of
this book, line 2, we find the following: The name "Hess, Rudolf"
followed by the notation, "By authority of the Führer the right to
wear the uniform of an SS Obergruppenführer." I now offer the
1937 edition of the same membership list as Exhibit Number USA-
475 (Document Number USA-475). Turning to Page 10, line 50, we
find the name "Bormann, Martin"; and in line with his name on the
opposite page under the column headed "Gruppenführer," the fol-
lowing date: 30 January 1937.
In the same edition on Page 12, line 56, appears the name "von
Neurath, Constantin," and on the opposite page under the column
headed "Gruppenführer," the date "18 September 1937." The other
publication to which I refer is Der Grossdeutsche Reichstag for the
fourth voting period, a manual edited by E. Kienast, Ministerial
Director of the German Reichstag. This is an official handbook con-
taining biographical data as to members of the Reichstag. It is
Document Number 2381-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit
Number USA-476. On Page 349 the following appears: "vonRibben-
trop, Joachim, Reichsminister des Auswärtigen, SS Obergruppen-
führer." On Page 360 the following appears: "Sauckel, Fritz, Gau-
leiter und Reichsstatthalter in Thüringen, SS Obergruppenführer."
On Page 389 the following appears: "Seyss-Inquart, Arthur, Dr. iur.,
Reichsminister, SS Obergruppenführer."
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of that book?

228
 a

20 Dec. 45

MAJOR FARR: This book covers the fourth voting period, begin-
ning on 10 April 1938 and covering the period up to 30 January
1947 —that the voting period covers that course of years. The
is,

edition, I think, was in 1943. I might point out that the rank of
the defendants mentioned in the 1936 and 1937 editions of the mem-
bership list of the SS may not be the final rank they held. They
were Gruppenführer at that time, but they were members of the SS,
as shown by the book.
It isour contention that the SS, as defined in Appendix B,
Page 36 of the Indictment, was an unlawful organization. As an
organization founded on the principle that persons of "German
blood" were a "master race" it exemplified a basic Nazi doctrine.
It served as one of the means through which the conspirators
acquired control of the German Government. The operations of the
SD and of the SS Totenkopf Verbände in concentration camps were
means used by the conspirators to secure their regime and terrorize
their opponents, as alleged in Count One. In the Nazi program of
Jewish extermination, all branches of the SS were involved from
the very beginning. Through the Allgemeine SS as a para-military
organization, the SS Verfügungstruppe and SS Totenkopf Verbände
as professional combat forces, and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle as
a Fifth Column agency, the SS participated in preparations for
aggressive war and, through its militarized units, in the waging of
aggressive war in the West and in the East, as set forth in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment. In the course of such war all
components of the SS had a part in the War Crimes and the Crimes
against Humanity set forth in Counts Three and Four of the Indict-
ment: the murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations in occu-
pied territory, the murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war,
and the Germanization of occupied territories.
The evidence has shown that the SS was a single enterprise —
Some of its functions were, of course per-
unified organization.
formed by one branch or department or office, some by another. No
single branch or department participated in every phase of its
activity, but every branch and department and office was necessary
to the functioning of the whole. The situation is much the same as
in the case of the individual defendants at the bar. Not all par-
ticipated in every act of the conspiracy; but all, we contend, per-
formed a contributing part in the whole criminal scheme.
The evidence has also shown that the SS was not only an organi-
zation of volunteers but that applicants had to meet the strictest
standards of selection. It was not easy to become an SS member.
That was true of all branches of the SS. Weclearly recognize, of
course, that during the course of the war, as the demands for man-
power increased and the losses of the Waffen-SS grew heavier and

229
20 Dec. 45

heavier, there were occasions when some men drafted for compul-
sory military service were assigned to units of the Waffen-SS rather
than to the Wehrmacht. Those instances were relatively few. Evi-
dence of the recruiting standards of the Waffen-SS in 1943, which
I quoted yesterday, has shown that the membership in that branch

was as essentially voluntary and highly selective as in the other

branches. Doubtless some of the members of the SS, or of other
organizations alleged to be unlawful in the Indictment, might desire
to show that their participation in the organization was a small or
innocuous one, that compelling reasons drove them to apply for
membership, that they were not fully conscious of its aims or that
they were not mentally responsible when they became members.
Such facts might or might not be relevant, if such a person were on
trial. But in any event this is not the forum to try out such matters.

The question before this Tribunal is simply this: whether the

SS was or was not an unlawful organization. The evidence has
finally ^shown what the aims and activities of the SS were. Some
of those aims were stated in publications which I have quoted to
the Court. The activities were so widespread and so notorious,
covering so many fields of unlawful endeavor, that the illegality
of the organization could not have been concealed. It was a noto-
rious fact, and Himmler himself in 1936, in a quotation which I read
to the Tribunal yesterday, admitted that when he said:

"I know that there are people in Germany now who become
sick when they see these black coats. We know the reason
and we do not expect to be loved by too many."
was, we submit, at all times the exclusive function and pur-
It
pose of the SS to carry out the common objectives of the defendant
conspirators. Its activities in carrying out those functions involved
the commission of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter.
By reason of its aims and the means used for the accomplishment
thereof, the SS should be declared a criminal organization in
accordance with Article 9 of the Charter.
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next presentation
will be the Gestapo, and it will take just a few seconds to get the
material here.
If the Tribunal please, we are now ready to proceed, if Your
Honors are.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

COL. STOREY: We first pass to the Tribunal document books
marked "Exhibit AA." Your Honors will notice they are in two
volumes, and I will try at each time to refer to which volume. They
are separated into the D documents, the L documents, the PS docu-
ments, et cetera.

230
 20 Dec. 45

The presentation of evidence on the criminality of the Geheime

Staatspolizei (Gestapo) includes evidence on the criminality of the
Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and of the Schutzstaffeln (SS), which has been
discussed by Major Farr, because a great deal of the criminal acts
were so inter-related. In the Indictment, as Your Honors know, the
SD is included by special reference as a part of the SS, since it
originated as a part of the SS and has always retained its character
as a Party organization, as distinguished from the Gestapo which
was a State organization. As will be shown by the evidence, how-
ever, the Gestapo and the SD were brought into very close working
relationship, the SD serving primarily as the information-gathering
agency and the Gestapo as the executive agency of the police system
established by the Nazis for the purpose of combatting the political
and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime.
In short, I think we might think of the SD as the intelligence
organization and the Gestapo the executive agency, the former a
Party organization and the latter a State organization but merged
together for all practical purposes.
The first subject: The Gestapo and SD were formed into a power-
ful, centralized, political police system that served Party, State, and
Nazi leadership.
The Gestapo was first established in Prussia on the 26th of April
1933 by the Defendant Goring with the mission of carrying out the
duties of the political police with, or in place of, the ordinary police
authorities. The Gestapo was given the rank of a higher police
authority and was subordinated only to the Minister of Interior, to
whom was delegated the responsibility of determining its functional
and territorial jurisdiction. That fact is established in the Preussische
Gesetzsammlung of 26 April 1933, Page 122, and it is our Document
2104-PS.
Pursuant to this law and on the same date, the Minister of
Interior issued a decree on the reorganization of the police which
established a State Police Bureau in each governmental district of
Prussia, subordinate to the Secret State Police Bureau in Berlin;
and I cite as authority the Ministerialblatt for the Internal Admin-
istration of Prussia, 1933, Page 503, and it is Document 2371-PS.
Concerning the formation of the Gestapo, the Defendant Goring
said, inAufbau einer Nation, of 1934, Page 88, which is our Docu-
ment 2344-PS, and I quote from the English translation a short
paragraph, of which Your Honors will take judicial notice, unless
Your Honors want to turn to it in full:
— —
"For weeks" this is Goring talking "I had been working
personally on the reorganization, and at last I, alone and
upon my own decision and my own reflections, created the
office of the Secret State Police. This instrument which is so

231
20 Dec. 45

feared by the enemies of the State has contributed most to

the fact that today there can no longer be talk of a Communist
or Marxist danger in Germany and Prussia."

THE PRESIDENT: What was the date?

COL. STOREY: The date? 1934, Sir.

On November 30, 1933 Goring issued a decree for the Prussian
State Ministry and the Reich Chancellor placing the Gestapo under
his direct supervision as Chief. The Gestapo was thereby established
as an independent branch of the Administration of the Interior
responsible directly to Goring as Prussian Prime Minister. This
decree gave the Gestapo jurisdiction over the political police mat-
ters of the general and interior administration and provided that
the district, county, and local police authorities were subject to the
—
directives of the Gestapo and that cites the Prussian laws of
30 November 1933, Page 413, and Document 2105-PS.
In a speech delivered at a meeting of the Prussian State Council
on 18 June 1934, which is published in Speeches and Essays of Her-
mann Goring, 1939, Page 102, our Document 3343-PS, Goring said,
and I quote one paragraph:
"The creation of the Secret State Police was also a necessity.
You may recognize the importance attributed by the new
State to this instrument of state security from the fact that
the Prime Minister, himself, has made himself head of this
department of the administration just because it is the obser-
vation of all currents directed against the new State which is
of fundamental importance."

By a decree of 8 March 1934 the regional State Police offices

were separated from their organizational connection with the
District Government and established as independent authorities of
the Gestapo. That cites the Preussische Gesetzsammlung of 8 March
1934, Page 143, our Document 2113-PS.

I now offer in evidence Document Number 1680-PS, Exhibit

USA-477. This is an article entitled "10 Years of Security Police
and the SD," published in the German Police journal, the magazine
of the Security Police and SD, of 1 February 1943. I quote one
paragraph from this article on Page 2 of the English translation,
Document 1680-PS, which is the third main paragraph:
"Parallel to that development in Prussia, the Reichsführer SS
Heinrich Himmler created in Bavaria the Bavarian Political
Police and also suggested and directed the establishment of
Political Police in the Länder other than Prussia. The unifi-
cation of the Political Police of all the Länder took place in
the spring of 1934 when Minister President Hermann Goring

232
 20 Dec. 45

appointed Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, who had mean-

while been named Chief of the Political Police in all the
Länder except Prussia, to the post of Deputy Chief of the
Prussian Secret State Police."
The Prussian law about the Secret State Police, dated 10 February
1936, thensummed up the development hitherto, and determined the
position and responsibilities of the Secret State Police in the exe-
cutive regulations issued the same day.
On 10 February 1936 the basic law for the Gestapo was promul-
—
gated by Goring as Prussian Prime Minister I refer to Document
2107-PS. This law provided that the Secret State Police had the
duty to investigate and to combat in the entire territory of the
State all tendencies inimical to the State and declared that orders
and matters of the Secret State Police were not subject to the
review of the administrative courts. That is the Prussian State law
of that date cited on Pages 21-22 of the publication of the laws
of 1936.
Also on that same date of* 10 February 1936 a decree for the
execution of the law was issued by Goring, as Prussian Prime
Minister, and by Frick, as Minister of the Interior. This decree
provided that the Gestapo had authority to enact measures valid
in the entire area of the State and measures affecting that area by —
the way, that is found in 2108-PS and is also a published law that —
it was the centralized agency for collecting political intelligence in

the field of political police, and that it administered the concen-

tration camps. The Gestapo was given authority to make police
investigations in cases of criminal attacks upon the Party as well
as upon the State.
Later, on the 28th of August 1936, a circular of the Reichsführer
SS and Chief of the German Police provided that as of 1* October
1936 the Political Police forces of the German provinces were to
be called the "Geheime Staatspolizei." That means the Secret State
Police. The regional offices were still to be described as State Police.
The translation of that law is in 2372-PS, Reichsministerialblatt of
1936, Number Page 1344.
44,
Later, on 20 September 1936, a circular of the Minister of Interior,
Frick, commissioned the Gestapo Bureau in Berlin with the super-
vision of the duties of the Political Police commanders in all the
states of Germany. That is Reichsministerialblatt 1936, Page 1343,
our Document L-297.
The law regulating and relating to financial measures in connec-
tion with the police, of the 19th of March 1937, provided that the
officials of the Gestapo were to be considered direct officials of the
Reich and their salaries, in addition to the operational expenses of
the whole State Police, were to be borne from 1 April 1937 by the

233
 —

20 Dec. 45

Reich. is shown in Document 2243-PS

That —
which is a copy of the
law March 1937—Page 325.
of 19
Thus, through the above laws and decrees, the Gestapo was
established as a uniform political police system operating through-
out the Reich and serving Party, State, and Nazi leadership.
In the course of the development of the SD, it came into
increasingly close co-operation with the Gestapo and also with the
Reichskriminalpolizei (the Criminal Police), known as Kripo,
K-R-I-P-O, shown up there under Amt V. The SD was called
upon to furnish information to various State authorities. On the
11th of November 1938 a decree of the Reich Minister of Interior
declared the SD to be the intelligence organization for the State as
well as the Party, that it had the particular duty of supporting the
Secret State Police, and that it thereby became active on a national
mission. These duties necessitated a closer co-operation between the
SD and the authorities for the general and interior administration.
That law is translated in 1638-PS.
The Tribunal has already received evidence concerning the
decrees of 17 and 26 June 1936, under which Himmler was appointed
Chief of the German Police and by which Heydrich became the first
Chief of the Security Police and SD. Even then Goring did not
relinquish his position as Chief of the Prussian Gestapo. Thus, the
decree of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of German Police that was
issued on the 28th of August 1936, which is our Document 2372-PS,
was distributed "to the Prussian Minister President as Chief of the
Prussian Secret State Police," that is, to Goring.
On 27 September 1939, by order of Himmler in his capacity as
Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, the central offices
of the Gestapo and SD and also those of the Criminal Police were
centralized in the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD
under the name of RSHA, which Your Honors have heard described
by Major Farr. Under this order the personnel and administrative
'sections of each agency were co-ordinated in Amt I and II of the
chart shown here of the RSHA. The operational sections of the SD
became Amt III, shown in the box "Amt III," except for foreign
intelligence which was placed over in Number VI. The operational
sections of the Gestapo became Amt IV, as shown on the chart, and
—
the operational sections of the Kripo that is, the Criminal Police
became Amt V, as shown on the chart.
Ohlendorf was named the Chief of Amt III, the SD inside Ger-
many, Müller was named Chief of Amt IV, and Nebe was named
Chief of Amt V, the Kripo.
On the 27th of September 1939 Heydrich, the Chief of the
Security Police and SD, issued a directive pursuant to the order of
Himmler, in which he ordered that the designation and heading

234
 20 Dec. 45

of RSHA be used exclusively in internal relations of the Reich

Ministry of Interior, and the heading "The Chief of the Security
Police and SD" in transactions with outside persons and offices. The
directive provided that the Gestapo would continue to use the
designation and heading "Secret State Police" according to the
particular instructions.
This order Document L-361, Exhibit USA-478, which we now
is
offer in evidence; and I refer Your Honors to the first paragraph
of L-361. That is found in the first volume. I just direct Your
Honors' attention to the date and to the subject, which is the amal-
gamation of the Zentralämter of the Sicherheitspolizei and of the
SD, and the creation of the four sections, and then to the words:
"... will be joined to the RSHA in accordance with the fol-
lowing directives. This amalgamation carries with it no
change in the position of these Ämter in the Party nor in the
governmental administration."
I might say here parenthetically, if the Tribunal please, that we
like to think of the RSHA as being the so-called administrative
office through which a great many of these organizations were
administered and then a number of these organizations, including
the Gestapo, maintaining their separate identity as operational
organizations. I think a good illustration, if Your Honors will recall,
is that during the war there may be a certain division or a certain

air force which is administratively under a certain headquarters,

but operationally, when they had an invasion, it may be under the
general supervision of somebody else who was operating a task
force.-So the RSHA was really the administrative office of a great
many of these alleged criminal organizations.
The Gestapo and SD were therefore organized functionally on
the basis of the opponents to be combatted and the matters to be
investigated.
I now invite the attention of the Tribunal to this chart, which
has already been identified, and I believe it is Exhibit USA-53.
— —
This chart I am in error that is the original identification number.
This chart shows the main .chain of command from Himmler, who
was the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police,
to Kaltenbrunner, who was Chief of the Security Police and SD,
and from Kaltenbrunner to the various field offices of the Gestapo
and the SD.
We now formally offer in evidence this chart, Document L-219,
as Exhibit USA-479. The chart itself is based upon the document,
which is L-219. We have photostatic copies, and you probably want
to refer to the one on the wall.
This chart, from which the one on the wall is taken, has been
certified by Otto Ohlendorf, Chief of Amt III of the RSHA, and by

235
20 Dec. 45

Walter Schellenberg, Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA, and has been

officially identified by both of those former officials.

The chart shows that the principal flow of command in police

matters came from Himmler as Reich Leader of the SS and Chief
of the German Police directly to Kaltenbrunner, who was the Chief
of the Security Police and SD and as such was also head of the
RSHA, which is the administrative office to which I have referred.
Kaltenbrunner's headquarters organization was composed of
—
seven Ämter, plus a military office the seven Ämter shown here.
Under Subsection D was Obersturmbannführer Rauff, who
handled technical matters, including motor vehicles of the SIPO
and the SD, to which we will refer later.
Amt III was the SD inside Germany and was charged with
investigations into spheres of German national life. It was the
internal intelligence organization of the police system and its inter-
ests extended into all areas occupied by Germany during the course
of the war. In 1943 it contained four sections. I would like to men-
tion them briefly. It shows their scope of authority. Section dealt A
with questions of legal order and structure of the Reich. B dealt
with national questions, including minorities, race, and health of
the people. C dealt with culture, including science, education, reli-
gion, press, folk culture, and art; and D with economics, including
food, commerce, industry, labor, colonial economics, and occupied
regions.
Now Amt IV, with which we are dealing here, was the Gestapo
and was charged with combatting opposition. In 1945, as identified
by these two former officials, it contained six sections:
1. A dealt with opponents, sabotage, and protective service,
including communism, Marxism, reaction and liberalism;
2. B dealt with political churches, sects, and Jews, including
political Catholicism, political Protestantism, other churches, Free-
masonry; and a special section, B-4, that had to do with Jewish
affairs, matters of evacuation, means of suppressing enemies of the
people and State, and dispossession of rights of German citizen-
ship; the head of the office was Eichmann;
3. C dealt with protective custody;
4. D with regions under German domination;
5. E with security;
6. F with passport matters and alien police.
Now, Amt V, which will be referred to as the Kripo, was charged
with combatting crime. For example, Subsection D was the crim-
inological institute for the Sipo and handled matters of identifi-
cation, chemical and biological investigations, and technical research.

236
 —
20 Dec. 45

Number VI was the SD outside of Germany and concerned

primarily with foreign political intelligence. In 1944 the Abwehr,
or military intelligence, was joined with Amt VI as the military
Amt. Your Honors will recall that the Witness Lahousen was in the
Abwehr. Amt VI maintained its own regional organization.
And finally, Amt VII handled ideological research among enemies
such as Freemasonry, Judaism, political churches, Marxism, and
liberalism.
Within Germany there were regional offices of the SD, the
Gestapo, and the Kripo, shown on the chart up at the right. The
Gestapo and Kripo offices were often located in the same place and
were always collectively referred to as the Sipo. You see that shady
line around refers to the collective operation of the Gestapo and
—
Kripo Gestapo, the Secret Police; and Kripo, the Criminal Police.
These regional offices all maintained their separate identity and
—
reported directly to the section of the RSHA that is, under Kalten-
—
brunner which had the jurisdiction of the subject matter. They
were, however, co-ordinated by Inspectors of the Security Police
and SD, as shown at the top of the chart. The inspectors were also
under the supervision of Higher SS and Police Leaders appointed
for each Wehrkreis. The Higher SS and Police Leaders reported
to Himmler and supervised not only the inspectors of the Security
Police and SD but also the inspectors of the Order Police and
various subdivisions of the SS.
In the occupied territories the organization developed as the
German armies advanced. Combined operational units of the Security
Police and the SD known as Einsatz Groups, about which Your
Honors will hear in a few minutes, operated with, and in the rear
of, the army. These groups were officered by personnel of the
Gestapo and the Kripo and the SD, and the enlisted men were
composed of Order Police and Waffen-SS. They functioned with
—
various army groups. The Einsatz Groups and, if Your Honors
will recall, they are simply task force groups for special projects
were divided into "Einsatzkommandos," "Sonderkommandos," and
"Teilkommandos," all of which performed the functions of the
Security Police and the SD with, or closely behind, the army.
After the occupied territories had been consolidated, these Ein-
satz Groups and their subordinate parts were formed into perma-
nent combined offices of the Security Police and SD within the
particular geographical location. These combined forces were placed
under the Kommandeure of the Security Police and SD, and the
offices were organized as a section similar to this RSHA head-
quarters. The Kommandeure of the Security Police and SD reported
directly to Befehlshaber of the Security Police and SD, who in turn
reported directly to the Chief of the Security Police and SD.

237
20 Dec. 45

In the occupied countries the Higher SS and Police Leaders were

more directly controlled by the Befehlshaber and the Kommandeure
of the Security Police and SD than within the Reich. They had
authority to issue direct orders so long as they did not conflict with
the Chief of the Security Police and SD, who exercised controlling
authority.
The above chart and the remarks concerning it are based upon
two documents which I now offer in evidence. They are Document
L-219, which is the organization plan of the RSHA of 1 October
1943, and Document 2346-PS.
Now next, the primary mission of the Gestapo and the SD was
to combat the actual and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime and
to keep Hitler and the Nazi leadership in power as specified in
Count One of the Indictment. The tasks and methods of the Secret
State Police were well described in an article which is translated in
Document 1956-PS, Volume 2 of the document book, which is an
article published in January 1936 in Das Archiv at Page 1342, which
I now offer in evidence and quote from. It is on Page 1 of the Eng-
lish translation, 1956. I will first read the first paragraph and then
the third and fourth paragraphs. That is in January 1936. Quoting:
"In order to refute the malicious rumors spread abroad, the
Völkischer Beobachter of 22 January 1936 published an article
on the origin, purpose, and duties of the Secret Police; extracts
from this read as follows: ." . .

Then skip to the third paragraph:

"The Secret State Police is an official instrument of the Crim-
inal Police authorities, whose special task is the detection of
crimes and offenses against the State, especially treason
against Land or Reich. The task of the Secret State Police is
to discover these crimes and offenses, to find the perpetrators,
and to bring them to trial. The number of criminal proceed-
ings continually pending in the People's Court for treasonable
acts against Land or Reich is the result of this work. The
second important field of operations for the Secret State Police
is the preventive combatting of all dangers threatening the
State and its leaders. As, since the National Socialist revolu-
tion, all open struggle and all open opposition to the State
and to the leadership of the State is forbidden, a Secret
State Police as a preventive instrument in the struggle against
all dangers threatening the State is indissolubly bound up
with the National Socialist Führer State. The opponents of
National Socialism were not eliminated by the prohibition of
their organizations and their newspapers, but have withdrawn
to other forms of opposition to the state. Therefore the
National Socialist State has to track down, to watch, and to

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 20 Dec. 45

render harmless the underground opponents fighting against

it,in illegal organizations, in camouflaged associations, in the
coalitions of well-meaning fellow-Germans, and even in the
organizations of the Party and the State, before they have
succeeded in actually executing any action against the inter-
ests of the State. This duty of fighting with every means this
battle against the secret enemies of the State will be spared
no Führer State, because enemy forces from their foreign
headquarters always secure the services of some individuals
in such a state and employ them in underground activity
against the state.
"The preventive measures of the Secret State Police consist
first of all in the close surveillance of all enemies of the State
in the Reich territory. As the Secret State Police cannot, in
addition to its important executive tasks, perform this sur-
veillance of the enemies of the State to the extent necessary,
there enters to supplement it, the Security Service of the
Reichsführer of the SS set up by the Führer's deputy as the
political intelligence service of the Movement, putting thereby
into the service of the security of the State a large part of
the forces of the Movement mobilized by him.
"The Secret State Police takes the necessary police preventive
measures against the enemies of the State on the basis of the
results of observation. The most effective preventive measure
is, without doubt, deprival of freedom, which is imposed in

the form of 'protective custody' if it is feared that the free

activity of the persons in question might endanger the security
of the State in any way. The use of protective custody is so
regulated by directives of the Minister of the Interior of the
Reich and Prussia and by special arrest examination proce-
—
dures of the Secret State Police that as far as preventive
action against the enemies of the State permits ample —
guarantees against the abuse of protective custody are pro-
."
vided. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, haven't we really got enough

now as to the organization of the Gestapo and its objects?

COL. STOREY: I'll omit the reading of the rest of this para-
graph.
THE PRESIDENT: I'm not sure that will satisfy me. What I was
asking is haven't we got enough about the organization of the
Gestapo now?
COL. STOREY: Your Honor, I was through with the organi-
zation. I was just going into the question of this action of protec-
tive custody, for which the Gestapo was famous, and showing how
x

239
20 Dec. 45

they went into that field of activity and the authority for taking
—
people into protective custody alleged protective custody.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that has been proved more than once
in the preceding evidence that we have heard.
COL. STOREY: There is one more law I would like to refer to,
—
that is, it's not subject to judicial review unless that has been
established. I do not know whether Major Farr did that, or not.

THE PRESIDENT: That they are not subject to judicial review?

COL. STOREY: Review, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you have told us that already this

afternoon.

COL. STOREY: The citation is in the Reichsverwaltungsblatt of

1935,Page 577, which is Document 2347-PS. I would like, if Your
Honors please, to refer to this quotation from that same law.
The decision of the Prussian High Court of Administration on
the 2d of May 1935 held that the status of the Gestapo as a special
Police authority removed its orders from the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal, and the court said in that law that the only
redress available was by appeal to the next higher authority within
the Gestapo itself.

THE PRESIDENT: think you told us that, apropos of the

I
document February 1936, where you said the Secret
of the 10th of
State Police was not subject to review by any of the state courts.

COL. STOREY: I just did not want there to be any question

about the authority. I refer Your Honors to Document 1852-PS,
which is already in evidence as Exhibit USA-449, also stating that
theory, and also Document 1723-PS. That is the decree, Your Honor,
of February 1, 1938, which relates to the protective custody and the
issuance of new regulations; and I would like to quote just one
sentence from that law:
"In order to counter all attempts of the enemies of the people
and of the State, protective custody may be ordered as a
coercive measure of the Secret State Police against persons
who, through their attitude, endanger the life and security of
the people and the State."
And the Gestapo had the exclusive right to order protective custody
and that protective custody was to be executed in the State con-
centration camps.
Now I pass to another phase where the SD created an organi-
zation of agents and informers who operated through the various
regional offices throughout the Reich and later in conjunction with

240
 20 Dec. 45

the Gestapo and the Criminal Police throughout the occupied coun-
tries. The SD operated secretly. One of the things it did was
secretly to mark ballots in order to discover the identity of persons
who cast "No" and invalid votes in the referendum. I now offer in
evidence Document R-142, second volume. I believe it is toward the
end of the document book—R-142, Exhibit USA-481.
This document contains a letter from the branch office of the SD
at Kochern to the SD at Koblenz. The letter is dated 7 May 1938
and refers to the plebiscite of 10 April 1938. It refers to a letter
previously received from the Koblenz office and apparently is a
reply to a request for information concerning the way in which
people voted in the supposedly secret plebiscite. It is on Page 1 of
Document R-142.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I am told that that has been
read before.
COL. STOREY: I did not know it had, if Your Honor pleases.
We will just offer it without reading it then.
With reference to National Socialism and the contribution of the
Sipo and the SD, I refer to an article of 7 September 1942, which
is shown in 3344-PS. It is the first paragraph, Volume 2. It is the
official journal. Quoting:

"Already before the taking over of power, the SD contributed

itspart to the success of the National Socialist revolution.
Since the taking over of power, the Security Police and the
SD have borne the responsibility for the inner security of the
Reich and have paved the way for a powerful victory of
National Socialism against all resistance."
In connection with the criminal responsibility of the SD and the
Gestapo, it will be considered with respect to certain War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity which were in the principal part
committed by the centralized political police system. The develop-
ment, organization, and tasks have been considered before. In some
instances the crimes were committed in co-operation or in conjunc-
tion with other groups or organizations.
Now in order to look into the strength of these various organi-
zations, have some figures here that I would like to quote to Your
I
Honors. The Sipo and SD were composed of the Gestapo, Kripo,
and SD. The Gestapo was the largest, and it has a membership of
about 40,000 to 50,000 in 1934 and 1935. That is an error; it is 1943
to 1945. It was the political force of the Reich.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say the date was wrong?

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, the date was wrong, it is '43 to '45, if
Your Honor pleases; 40 to 50 thousand.

241
20 Dec. 45

THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): Where are you reading from?

COL. STOREY: It is Document 3033-PS, and it is an affidavit
of Walter S'chellenberg, one of the former officials I referred to a
moment ago.
I believe, if Your Honor pleases, to get it in the record, I will
read that whole affidavit. It is Document 3033-PS, Exhibit USA-488.
I have the English translation here:

"The Sipo and SD was composed of the Gestapo, Kripo, and

SD. In 1943-45 the Gestapo had a membership of about 40,000
to 50,000, the Kripo had a membership of about 15,000, and
the SD had a membership of about 3,000. In common usage
and even in orders and decrees the term 'SD' was used as an
abbreviation for the term 'Sipo and SD.' In most cases actual
executive action was carried out by personnel of the Gestapo
in place of the SD or the Kripo. In occupied territories, mem-
bers of the Gestapo frequently wore SS uniforms with SD
insignia. New members of the Gestapo and the SD were
taken on a voluntary basis."
And then "subscribed and sworn to on the 21st of November 1945
before Lieutenant Harris."
I think I ought to say here, if Your Honors please, that it is our
information that a great many of the members of the Gestapo were
also members of the SS. We have heard various estimates of the
amount but have no direct authority. Some authorities say as much
as 75 percent, but still we have no direct evidence on that.
I now evidence Document 2751-PS, which is Exhibit
offer in
USA-482. affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks, dated
It is an
November 20, 1945. This affidavit particularly refers to the actual
occurrences in connection with the Polish border incident. I believe
it was referred to by the Witness Lahousen when he was on the

stand:
"I, Alfred Helmut Naujocks, being first duly sworn, depose
and state as follows:
"1. I was a member of the SS from 1931 to 19 October 1944
and a member of the SD from its creation in 1934 to January
1941. I served as a member of the Waffen-SS from February
1941 until the middle of 1942. Later I served in the Economics
Department of the Military Administration of Belgium from
September 1942 to September 1944. I surrendered to the
Allies on 19 October 1944.
"2. On or about 10 August 1939 the Chief of the Sipo and
SD, Heydrich, personally ordered me to simulate an attack
on the radio station near Gleiwitz, near the Polish border,
and to make it appear that the attacking force consisted of

242
 20 Dec. 45

Poles. Heydrich said: 'Actual proof of these attacks of the

Poles needed for the foreign press, as well as for German
is
propaganda purposes.' I was directed to go to Gleiwitz with
five or six SD men and wait there until I received a code
word from Heydrich indicating that the attack should take
place. My instructions were to seize the radio station and
to hold it long enough to permit a Polish-speaking German,
who would be put at my disposal, to broadcast a speech in
Polish. Heydrich told me that this speech should state that
the time had come for the conflict between the Germans and
the Poles and that the Poles should get together and strike
down any Germans from whom they met resistance. Heydrich
also told me at this time that he expected an attack on
Poland by Germany in a few days.
"3. I went to Gleiwitz and waited there a fortnight. Then
I requested permission of Heydrich to return to Berlin but
was told to stay in Gleiwitz. Between the 25th and 31st of
August I went to see Heinrich Müller, head of the Gestapo,
who was then nearby at Oppeln. In my presence Müller
discussed with a man named Mehlhorn plans for another
border incident, in which it should be made to appear that
Polish soldiers were attacking German troops .... Germans in
the approximate strength of a company were to be used.
Müller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals who
were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the
ground at the scene of the incident to show that they had
been killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to
be given fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich.
Then they were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the
assault members of the press and other persons were to be
taken to the spot of the incident. A police report was
subsequently to be prepared.
"4. Müller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to
make one of those criminals available to me for the action
at Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these
criminals was 'Canned Goods.'
"5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was
carried out on the evening preceding the German attack on
Poland. As I recall, war broke out on the 1st of September
1939.At noon on the 31st of August I received by telephone
from Heydrich the code word for the attack which was to
take place at 8 o'clock that evening. Heydrich said, 'In order
to carry out this attack, report to Müller for "Canned
Goods."' I did this and gave Müller instructions to deliver
the man near the radio station. I received this man and had

243
20 Dec. 45

him laid down at the entrance to the station. He was alive,

but he was completely unconscious. I tried to open his eyes.
I could not recognize by his eyes that he was alive, only by
his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds, but a lot of
blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian clothes.
"6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a
speech of 3 to 4 minutes over an emergency transmitter,
fired some pistol shots, and left."

And then "sworn to and subscribed to before Lieutenant Martin".

The Gestapo and the SD carried out mass murders of hundreds
of thousands of civilians of occupied countries, as a part of the
Nazi program to exterminate political and racial undesirables, by
the so-called Einsatz Groups. Your Honors will recall evidence
concerning the activities of these Einsatz Groups or Einsatz-
kommandos. I now refer to Document R-102.
If Your Honors please, I understand Major Farr introduced this
document this morning; but I want to refer to just one brief
statement, which he did not include, concerning the SD and the
Einsatz Groups and Security Police. It is on Page 4 of R-102.
Quoting:
"During the period covered by this report the stations of
the Einsatz Groups of the Security Police and SD have
changed only in the northern sector."
THE PRESIDENT: What was the document?

COL. STOREY: R-102, which was already introduced in evidence

by Major Farr, and it is in Volume 2 toward the end of the book.
There are two reports submitted by the chief of the Einsatz
Group A available. The first report is Document L-180, which has
already been received as Exhibit USA-276.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, would you not pass quite
so quickly from one document to another?
COL. STOREY: Yes, pardon me, Sir. L-180, and I want
Sir,
to quote from Page 13. on Page 5 of the English translation.
It is
It is the beginning of the first paragraph, near the bottom of the
page. Quoting:
"In view of the extension of the area of operations and of
the great number of duties which had to be performed by
the Security Police, it was intended from the very beginning
to obtain the co-operation of the reliable population in the
fight against felons, that is, mainly the Jews and Com-
munists."
And also in that same document, Page 30 of the original,
Page 8 of the English translation, quoting:

244
 20 Dec. 45

"From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish

problem in Ostland could not be solved by pogroms alone."
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that this has been read already.
COL. STOREY: I had it checked, and we did not catch that,
Your Honor. I will pass on then.
Now, if Your Honor pleases, we will pass to Document 2273-PS
next. I offer in evidence now just portions of Document 2273-PS,
which is Exhibit USA-487. This document was captured by the
U.S.S.R. and will be offered in detail by our Soviet colleagues later.
But, with their consent, I want to introduce in evidence a chart
which is identified by that document; and we have an enlargement
which we would like to put on the board, passing to the Tribunal
photostatic copies.
If Your Honor pleases, this chart is identified by the photostatic
copy attached to the original report which will be dealt with in
detail later. I want to quote just one statement from Page 2 of
the English translation of that document. It is the third paragraph
from the bottom on Page 2 of the English translation:
"The Estonian movement, formed as the
self -protection
Germans advanced, did beginto arrest Jews; but there were
no spontaneous pogroms. Only by the Security Police and
the SD were the Jews gradually executed as they became
no longer required for work. Today there are no longer any
Jews in Estonia."
That document is a top-secret document by Einsatz Group A,
which was a special projects group. This chart, of which the
photostatic copy is attached to the original in the German trans-
lation on the wall, shows the progress of the extermination of the
Jews in the area in which this Einsatzkommando group operated.
If Your Honors will refer to the top, next to Petersburg or —
—
Leningrad as we know it and down below, you will see the picture
of a coffin; and that is described in the report as 3,600 having
been killed.
Next, over at the left, is another coffin in one of the small
Baltic states showing 963 in that area have been put in the coffin.
Then next, down near the capital of Riga, you will note that
35,238were put away in the coffins; and it refers to the ghetto
there as still having 2,500.
You come down to the next square or the next state showing
136,421were put in their coffins; and then in the next area, near
Minsk and just above Minsk, there were 41,828 put in their coffins.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you sure they were put in their coffins,
the 136,000?

245
20 Dec. 45

COL. STOREY: I beg your pardon, Sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Are you sure that they were executed, the
136,000? —because there is no coffin there.
COL. STOREY: No, Sir— the bottom statement—here are the
totals from the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: These photostatic copies are different from
what you have got there.In the area which is marked 136,421
there is no coffin.

COL. STOREY: Well, I am sorry. The one that I have is a

true and correct copy of theirs.

THE PRESIDENT: Mine has not got it and Mr. Biddle's has
not got it.

COL. STOREY [Turning to an assistant.] Will you hand this

to the President, please?

THE PRESIDENT: I suppose the document itself will show it.

COL. STOREY: I and verify it. Let

will turn to the original
me have Apparently there is a typographical
the original, please.
error. If Your Honor pleases, here it is: 136,421, with the coffin.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Parker points out it is in the document
itself, too.

COL. STOREY: Yes, Sir, it is in the document itself. There

is an error on that.

The 128,000 at the bottom shows at that time there were 128,000
on hand, and the literal translation of the statement, as I under-
stand, means, "still on hand in the Minsk area."
I next refer to Document 1104-PS, Volume 2, Exhibit USA-483,
which I now offer in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, did you tell us what the
document was? There is nothing on the translation, is there, to
show what the document is.
COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, it is a report of the
special-purpose Group A, a top-secret report or the Einsatz group —
—
in other words making a record of their activities in these areas,
and this chart was attached showing the areas covered.
THE PRESIDENT: Special group of the Gestapo?
COL. STOREY: The special group that was organized of the
Gestapo and the SD in that area. In other words, a Commando
group.
As mentioned, Your Honor, they organized these special
I

Commando groups to work in and behind the armies as they

consolidated their gains in occupied territories, and Your Honor

246
 20 Dec. 45

will hear from other reports of these Einsatz groups as we go

along in thispresentation. In other words, "Einsatz" means
"special action" or "action groups," and they were organized to
cover certain geographical areas behind the immediate front lines.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but they were groups, were they, of
the Gestapo?
COL. STOREY: The Gestapo and the SD.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is part of the Gestapo.
COL. STOREY: There were some of the Kripo in it too.

Now the next document is 1104-PS, dated October 30, 1941.

This document shows on that date the Commissioner of the
territory of Sluzk wrote a report to the Commissioner General of
Minsk, in which he severely criticized the actions of the Einsatz-
kommandos of the Sipo and the SD operating in his area for the
murder of the Jewish population of that area, and I quote from
the English translation, on Page 4 of that document, beginning
at the first paragraph after the colon:
"On 27 October, in the morning at about 8 o'clock, a first
lieutenant of the Police Battalion Number 11, from Kovno,
Lithuania, appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant
of the battalion commander of the Security Police. The first
lieutenant explained that the police battalion had received
the assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews here in
the town of Sluzk within 2 days. The battalion commander
with his battalion in strength of four companies, two of which
were made up of Lithuanian partisans, was on the march
here and the action would have to begin instantly. I replied
to the first lieutenant that I had to discuss the action in
any case first with the commander. About half an hour later
the police battalion arrived in Sluzk. Immediately after the
arrival a conference with the battalion commander took place
according to my request. I first explained to the commander
that it would not very well be possible to effect the action
without previous preparation, because everybody had been
sent to work and that it would lead to terrible confusion. At
least it would have been his duty to inform me a day ahead
of time. Then I requested him to postpone the action 1 day.
However, he refused this with the remark that he had to
carry out this action everywhere in all towns and that only
2 days were allotted for Sluzk. Within those 2 days the town
of Sluzk had by all means to be cleared of Jews."
That report was made to the Reich Commissioner for the
Eastern Territories through Gauleiter Hinrich Lohse, at Riga. Your
Honors will recall that he was referred to in another presentation.

247
20 Dec. 45

Now skipping over to Page 5, the first paragraph — I would like

to quote it:

"For the regards the execution of the action, I must

rest, as
point out, my
deepest regret, that the latter almost
to
bordered on sadism. The town itself during the action offered
a picture of horror. With indescribable brutality on the part
both of the German police officers and particularly of the
Lithuanian partisans, the Jewish people, and also with them
White Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and
herded together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be
heard, and in different streets the corpses of Jews who
had been shot accumulated. The White Ruthenians were in
the greatest, anguish to free themselves from the encircle-
ment. In addition to the fact that the Jewish people, among
whom were also artisans, were barbarously maltreated in
sight of the White Ruthenian people, the White Ruthenians
themselves were also beaten with clubs and rifle butts. It
was no longer a question of an action against the Jews. It
looked much more like a revolution."
And then I skip down to the next to the last paragraph on
that same page, quoting:
"In conclusion, I find myself obliged to point out that the
police battalion looted in an unheard-of manner during the
action and that not only in Jewish houses but equally in
those of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use, such as
boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, was taken
away. According to statements of the troops, watches were
torn off the arms of Jews openly on the street and rings
pulled off their fingers in the most brutal manner. A
disbursing officer reported that a Jewish girl was asked by
the police to obtain immediately 5,000 rubles to have her
father released. This girl is said actually to have run about
everywhere to obtain the money."
There is another paragraph, with reference to the number of
copies, on the third page of the translation, to which I would like
to call Your Honors' attention —
the last paragraph on Page 3 of
the translation, quoting:
"I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy
may be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order
cannot be maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of
that sort. To have buried alive seriously wounded people,
who then worked their way out of their graves again, is such
extreme beastliness that this incident as such must be
reported to the Führer and the Reich Marshal.

248
 —
20 Dec. 45

"The civiladministration of White Ruthenia makes every

effort to win the population over to Germany, in accordance
with the instructions of the Führer. These efforts cannot be
brought into harmony with the methods described here."
Signed by the Commissioner General for White Ruthenia.
And then, on the 11th of November 1941, he forwards it on to
the Reich Minister for occupied, countries, in Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT: Who was that at that time?
COL. STOREY: The Reich Minister, I believe— at that time at
least —for the eastern occupied countries was the Defendant Rosen-
berg. I think that is correct. On the same date, by separate letter,
the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia reported to the Reich
Commissioner for the eastern countries that he had received
money, valuables, and other objects taken by the police in the
action at Sluzk and other regions, all of which had been deposited
with the Reich Credit Institute for the disposal of the Reich
Commissioner.
On 21 1941 a report on the Sluzk incident was sent
November
to the personal reviewer of thepermanent deputy of the Minister
of the Reich with a copy to Heydrich, who was the Chief of the
Security Police and the SD. That is shown on the first page of
Document Number 1104-PS.
The activities of the Einsatz groups continued throughout 1943
and 1944 under Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police
and SD. Under adverse war conditions, however, the program of
extermination was, to a large extent, changed to one of rounding
up slave labor for Germany.
I next refer to Document 3012-PS, which has heretofore been
introduced as Exhibit USA-190. This is a letter from the head-
quarters of one of the Commando groups, a section known as
Einsatz Group C, dated 19 March 1943. This letter summarizes the
real activities and methods of the Gestapo and SD, and I should
like to refer to additional portions to those previously quoted, on
Page 2 of Document 3012-PS; and I believe I will read the first
page, beginning with the first paragraph:
"It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security
— —
Service" SD "to discover all enemies of the Reich, and
fight against them in the interest of security, especially the
security of the Army in the zone of operations. Besides the
annihilation of active, avowed opponents, all other elements
who by virtue of their convictions or their past might under
favorable conditions actively appear as enemies are to be
eliminated through preventive measures. The Security Police
carries out this task according to the general directives of
the Führer, with all required severity. Energetic measures

249
20 Dec. 45

are especially necessary in territories endangered by the

activity of partisan bands. The competence of the Security
Police within the zone of operations is based on the 'Bar-
—
barossa' decrees." The Tribunal will recall the famous
"Barbarossa" code-name decrees that were issued in connec-
tion with the invasion of Russia —
"I deem the measures of
the Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during
recent times, necessary for the two following reasons:
"1. The situation at the front in my sector had become so
serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians
and Italians who were streaming back in confusion, were
openly opposing us.
"2. The strong expeditions by partisan bands, coming chiefly,
from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides
that, other partisan groups formed from the population were
appearing like mushrooms in all districts. The procurement
of arms evidently provided no difficulties at all. It would
have been inexcusable if we had observed this whole activity
without taking measures against it. It is obvious that all
such measures are accompanied by severity.
"I want to take up the significant points of these severe
measures:
"1) The shooting
of Hungarian Jews; 2) the shooting of agri-
culturalists; the shooting of children; 4) the burning to
3)
—
the ground of villages; 5)" the shooting, quoting "while —
trying to escape, of Security Service (SD) prisoners.
"Chief of Einsatz Group C confirmed once more the suitability
of the measures executed and expressed his appreciation for
the drastic steps taken. In consideration of the current
political situation, especially in the armament industry in
the fatherland, the measures of the Security Police are to be
subordinated to the greatest extent to the recruiting of labor
for Germany. In the shortest possible time the Ukraine has
to place at the disposal of the armament industry 1 million
workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our terri-
tory daily."
If Your Honor pleases, I believe the numbers have been quoted
before by Mr. Dodd. I refer on the next page to the first order, in
1 and 2 —Subparagraphs:
"1. Special treatment is to be kept to a minimum.

"2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists, and so

on, is to take place only by roster for the time being, without
arrests. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to arrest all
the close relatives of a member of the Communist Party.

250
 20 Dec. 45

Likewise members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested only

if they were active in leading positions."

The next subparagraphs have been read into evidence, 3 and 4,

in a previous presentation.
"5. The reporting of partisan bands as well as drives against
them is not affected hereby. I point out, however, that all
drives against those bands are to take place only with my
approval.
"6. The prisons are to be kept empty as a rule. We must
be aware of the fact that the Slavs interpret all soft treat-
ment on our part as weakness and that they will act
accordingly, right away. If we restrict our harsh Security
Police measures through the above orders for the time being,
it is done only for the following reason: the most important

thing is the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to

be sent into the Reich will be made. There are therefore no
written certificates of political reliability or the like to be
— —
furnished." Signed "Christensen, SS Sturmbannführer and
Commanding Officer."

I understood that Your Honor wanted to adjourn at 4 o'clock,

and believe that I can introduce one more statement. It was the
I
Einsatz Groups of the Security Police and SD that operated the
infamous death vans. Previously, Document 501-PS, which was
received as Exhibit USA-288, referred to this operation. The letter
from Becker, which is a part of this exhibit, was addressed to
Obersturmbannführer Rauff at Berlin. We now refer to Document
L-185. I simply refer to Document 501-PS as a reference to the
death vans. Document L-185, Exhibit USA-484, is the one I now
—
offer in evidence, Page 7 of the English translation L-185. It will
be observed that the chief of Amt II D of the RSHA in charge of
technical matters was Obersturmbannführer Rauff. Mr. Harris
advises me that the only point to be proved by that is that the
chief of Amt II D of the RSHA, who made this report on technical
matters, was the Obersturmbannführer Rauff; and then he refers
in the same connection to Document 2348-PS, which is Exhibit
USA-485. The previous one was to identify Rauff, and then to offer
his affidavit which is 2348-PS, second volume. Reading from the
—
beginning of the affidavit it was made on 19 October 1945 in
—
Ancona, Italy quoting:
"I hereby acknowledge the attached letter, written by Dr.
Becker ... on the 16 May 1942 and received by me on the
29 May 1942, as a genuine letter. I did on 18 October 1945
write on the side of this letter a statement to the effect
that it was genuine. I do not know the number of death
vans being operated and cannot give an approximate figure.

251
20 Dec. 45

The vans were built by the Saurer Works, Germany, located,

I believe, in Berlin. Some
other firms built these vans also.
Insofar as I am aware, these vans operated only in Russia.
Insofar as I can state, these vans were probably operating
in 1941; and it is my personal opinion that they were
operating up to the termination of the war."
If Your Honor pleases, I do not believe that we will have time
to go into the next exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the Tribunal will now
adjourn until Wednesday, the 2d of January.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 2 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]

252
 TWENTY-FIFTH DAY
Wednesday, 2 January 1946

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, when Your Honors

adjourned on 20 December we were presenting the Gestapo and
had referred to the use of the death vans by the Einsatz groups
in the eastern occupied countries and had almost concluded that
phase of the presentation. Your Honors will recall we had referred
to the use of some death vans made by the Saurer works, and
the final reference that I want to make in that connection is to
a telegram attached to Document 501-PS, which it is not necessary
to read, which establishes the fact that the same make of truck
or vans were the death vans used by the Einsatz groups.
The final document in connection with the Einsatz groups in the
Eastern Occupied Territories which we desire to offer is Document
2992-PS, and I believe it is in the second volume of the document
book. This is an affidavit made by Hermann Gräbe. Hermann
Gräbe is at present employed by the United States Government
at Frankfurt. The affidavit was made at Wiesbaden; and I offer
excerpts from the affidavit, 2992-PS, Exhibit Number USA-494.
This witness was at the head of a construction firm that was
doing some building in the Ukraine and he was an eyewitness to
the anti- Jewish actions at the town of Rovno, Ukraine, on 13 July
1942, and I refer to the part of the affidavit which is on Page 5
of the English translation. Beginning at the first:
"From September 1941 until January 1944 I was manager
and engineer-in-charge of a branch office in Sdolbunov,
Ukraine, of the Solingen building firm of Josef Jung. In this
capacity it was my job to visit the building sites of the firm.
The firm had, among others, a site in Rovno, Ukraine.
"During the night of 13 July 1942,
"

all inhabitants of the

Rovno ghetto, where there were still about 5,000 Jews, were
liquidated.
"Ishould describe the circumstances of my being a witness
and the carrying out of the
of the dissolution of the ghetto
pogrom during the night and morning, as follows:
"I employed for the firm in Rovno, in addition to Poles,
Germans, and Ukrainians, about 100 Jews from Sdolbunov,

253
Ostrog, and Mysotch. The men were quartered in a building,
5 Bahnhofstrasse, inside the ghetto, and the women in a
house at the corner of Deutschestrasse, 98.
"On Saturday, 11 July 1942, my foreman, Fritz Einsporn,
toldme of a rumor that on Monday all Jews in Rovno were
to be liquidated. Although the vast majority of the Jews
employed by my firm in Rovno were not natives of this
town, I still feared that they might be included in this

announced pogrom. I therefore ordered Einsporn at noon of

the same day to march all the Jews employed by us men —
as well as women—in
the direction of Sdolbunov, about
12 kilometers from Rovno. This was done.

"The Eldest of the Jews had learned of the departure of

the Jewish workers of my firm. He went to see the com-
manding officer of the Rovno Sipo and SD, SS Major (SS
Sturmbannführer) Dr. Pütz, as early as Saturday afternoon
to find out whether the rumor of a forthcoming Jewish
pogrom, which had gained further credence by reason of the
departure of Jews of my firm, was true. Dr. Pütz dismissed
the rumor as a clumsy lie and for the rest had the Polish
personnel of my firm in Rovno arrested. Einsporn avoided
arrest by escaping from Sdolbunov. When I learned of
this incident I gave orders that all Jews who had left Rovno
were to report back to work in Rovno on Monday, 13 July
1942. On Monday morning I myself went to see the com-
manding officer, Dr. Pütz, in order to learn, for one thing,
the truth about the rumored Jewish pogrom and secondly
to obtain information on the arrest of the Polish office
personnel. SS Major Pütz stated to me that no pogrom
whatever was planned. Moreover, such a pogrom would be
stupid because the firms and the Reichsbahn would lose
valuable workers.
"An hour later I received a summons to appear before the
area commissioner of Rovno. His deputy, Stabsleiter and
Cadet Officer Beck, subjected me to the same questions as
I had undergone at the SD. My explanation that I had sent

the Jews home for urgent delousing appeared plausible to

—
him. He then told me making me promise to keep it a
—
secret that a pogrom would, in fact, take place in the
evening of Monday, 13 July 1942. After lengthy negotiation
I managed to persuade him to give me permission to take
—
my Jewish workers to Sdolbunov but only after the pogrom
had been carried out. During the night it would be up to
me to protect the house in the ghetto against the entry of
Ukrainian militia and SS. As confirmation of the discussion

254
 —

2 Jan. 46

he gave me a document, which stated that the Jewish

employees of Messrs. Jung were not affected by the pogrom."
And this original which I hold in my hand, I will now pass
to the translator for reading. I call the attention of Your Honors
to the fact that it has the letterhead of "Der Gebietskommissar in
Rovno," and it is dated the 13th of July 1942, and it is signed
by this area commissioner. I now read this document:
— —
"The area commissioner" which means Gebietskommissar
—
"Rovno. Secret." Addressed "Messrs. Jung, Rovno.
"The Jewish workers employed by your firm are not affected
—
by the pogrom" in parenthesis "Aktion." As I understand,
that means "action."
"You must transfer them to their new place of work by
Wednesday, 15 July 1942, at the latest."
Signed by the Area Commissioner Beck. And then the stamp the —
official stamp of the area commissioner at Rovno.

Now, just the following paragraph on the original, Page 5 or 6,

I believe it is; one more paragraph I would like to read after the

reference "Original attached":

"On the evening of this day I drove to Rovno and posted
myself with Fritz Einsporn in front of the house in the
Bahnhofstrasse in which the Jewish workers of my firm slept.
Shortly after 2200 the ghetto was encircled by a large SS
detachment and about three times as many members of the
Ukrainian militia. Then the electric arclights which had been
erected in and around the ghetto were switched on. SS and
militia squads of four to six men entered or at least tried
to enter the house. Where the doors and windows were
closed and the inhabitants did not open at the knocking,
the SS men and militia broke the windows, forced the doors
with beams and crowbars and entered the houses. The people
living there were driven on to the street just as they were,
regardless of whether they were dressed or in bed. Since
the Jews in most cases refused to leave their houses and
resisted, the SS and militia applied force. They finally
succeeded, with strokes of the whip, kicks, and blows with
rifle butts, in clearing the houses. The people were driven
out of their houses in such haste that small children in bed
had been left behind in several instances. In the streets
women cried out for their children and children for their
parents. That did not prevent the SS from driving the people
along the road at running pace, and hitting them, until they
reached a waiting freight train. Car after car was filled, and
the screaming of women and children and the cracking of
whips and rifle shots resounded unceasingly. Since several

255
2 Jan. 46

families or groups had barricaded themselves in especially

strong buildings and the doors could not be forced with
crowbars or beams, the doors were now blown open with
hand grenades. Since the ghetto was near the railroad tracks
in Rovno, the younger people tried to get across the tracks
and over a small river to get away from the ghetto area.
As this stretch country was beyond the range of the
of
electric lights, it was illuminated by small rockets. All
through the night these beaten, hounded, and wounded
people moved along the lighted streets. Women carried their
dead children in their arms, children pulled and dragged
their dead parents by their arms and legs down the road
toward the train. Again and again the cries, 'Open the door!
Open the door!' echoed through the ghetto."
I any more of this affidavit. It is a very long
will not read
one. There is also a second affidavit, but the part I wanted to
emphasize is the fact that the original exemption was signed by
the area commissioner and that the SD and the SS participated
in this action.

THE PRESIDENT: Oughtn't you to read the rest of that page,

Colonel Storey?
COL. STOREY: All right, Sir. I really had eliminated that
because I thought there might be some repetition.
"About 6 o'clock in the morning I went away for a moment,
leaving behind Einsporn and several other German workers
who had returned in the meantime. I thought the greatest
danger was past and that I could risk it. Shortly after I left,
Ukrainian militia men forced their way into 5 Bahnhofstrasse
and brought seven Jews out and took them to a collecting
point inside the ghetto. On my return I was able to prevent
further Jews from being taken out. I went to the collecting
point to save these seven men. I saw dozens of corpses of all
ages and both sexes in the streets I had to walk along. The
doors of the houses stood open, windows were smashed. Pieces
of clothing, shoes, stockings, jackets, caps, hats, coats, et
cetera, were lying in the street. At the corner
house of a
lay a baby, less than a year old with his skull crushed. Blood
and brains were spattered over the house wall and covered
the area immediately around the child. The child was dressed
only in a little shirt. The commander, SS Major Pütz, was
walking up and down a row of about 80 to 100 male Jews
who were crouching on the ground. He had a heavy dog
whip in his hand. I walked up to him, showed him the
written permit of Stabsleiter Beck and demanded the seven
men whom I recognized among those who were crouching

256
 2 Jan. 46

on the ground. Dr. Pütz was very furious about Beck's

concession and nothing could persuade him to release the
seven men. He made a motion with his hand encircling the
square and said that anyone who was once here would not
get away. Although he was very angry with Beck, he
ordered me to take the people from 5 Bahnhofstrasse out
of Rovno by 8 o'clock at the latest. When I left Dr. Pütz,
I noticed a Ukrainian farm cart with two horses. Dead
people with stiff limbs were lying on the cart. Legs and
arms projected over the side boards. The cart was making
for the freight train. I took the remaining 74 Jews who
had been locked in the house to Sdolbunov.
"Several days after the 13th of July 1942 the area commis-
sioner of Sdolbunov, Georg Marschall, called a meeting of
all firm managers, railroad superintendents, and leaders of
the Organization Todt and informed them that the firms,
et cetera, should prepare themselves for the resettlement of
the Jews which was to take place almost immediately. He
referred to the pogrom in Rovno where all the Jews had
been liquidated, i.e. had been shot near Kostopol."
Finally, his signature is sworn to on the 10th of November 1945.

THE PRESIDENT: What nationality is Gräbe? ,

COL. STOREY: He is German. Gräbe was a German and is

now in the employ of the Military Government at Frankfurt the —
United States Military Government.
Your Honor, in that there is another separate
connection
affidavit attached to this whicha part of the same document,
is
which I will not attempt to read. But it has to do with the
execution of some people in another area and is along the same
line. I am not reading it because it would be cumulative, but it
is a part of this same document.

I now pass from that subject to the next subject.

The Gestapo and SD stationed special units in prisoner-of-war
camps for the purpose of screening out racial and political
undesirables and executing those who were screened out. The
program of mass murder of political and racial undesirables
carried on against civilians was also applied to prisoners of war
who were captured on the Eastern Front. In this connection I call
attention of the Tribunal to the testimony of General Lahousen,
which Your Honors will recall, of the 30th of November 1945.
Lahousen testified to a conference which took place in the summer
of 1941 shortly after the beginning of the campaign against the
Soviet Union, which was attended by himself and I want to —
emphasize this, because we will later have a document that

257
2 Jan. 48

—
emanated from this conference attended by himself, General
Reinecke, Colonel Breuer, and Müller, the head of the Gestapo. At
this conference the command to kill Soviet functionaries and Com-
munists among the Soviet prisoners of war was discussed. The
executions were to be carried out by Einsatzkommandos of the
Sipo and the SD. Lahousen further recalled that Müller, who was
the head of the Gestapo, insisted on carrying out the program and
that the only concession he made was that, in deference to the
sensibilities of the German troops, the executions would not take
place in the presence of the troops. Müller also made some con-
cessions as to the selection of the persons to be murdered; but,
according to Lahousen, the selection was left entirely to the
commanders of these screening units. I refer to Page 633 of the
official transcript (Volume II, Page 458).
Now Document 502-PS as the next exhibit, Exhibit
I offer
Number USA-486. This document is a Gestapo directive of the
17 of July 1941 —
If you will recall, Lahousen said this conference
—
was in the summer of 1941 It is addressed to commanders of the
Sipo and SD stationed in camps and provides in part as follows,
and I read from the first page of the English translation. Now,
if the Tribunal please, our colleagues, the Soviet prosecutors, will
present most of that document; and I am only going to read
enough to show that the Gestapo were the ones that took part in it.
From the beginning:
"The activation of Commandos will take place in accordance
with the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and
Security Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces as of 16 July 1941. Enclosure 1.
"The Commandos will work independently within the limits
of the camp
regulations according to special authorization
and according to the general directives given to them.
Naturally the Commandos will keep close contact with the
camp commander and the intelligence officer assigned to him.
"The mission of the Commandos is the political investigating
of all camp inmates, the separation and further treatment of:
"a. All political, criminal, or in some other way, intolerable
elements among them;
"b. Those persons who could be used for the reconstruction
of the occupied countries."
Now I skip to the beginning of the fourth paragraph:
"The Commandos must use for their work, as far as possible
at present and even later, the experiences of the camp com-
manders which the latter have collected meanwhile from the
observation of the prisoners and examination of the camp
inmates. Further, the Commandos must make efforts from

258
 2 Jan. 46

the beginning to seek out among the prisoners elements

which would appear reliable, regardless whether they are
Communists or not, in order to use them for intelligence
purposes inside the camp and, if advisable, later in the
occupied territories also.
"By use of such informers and by use of all other existing
possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated
among the prisoners must proceed, step by step, at once.
The Commandos must find out definitely in every case, by
a short questioning of those reported and possibly by
questioning other prisoners, what measures should be taken.
The information of one informer is not sufficient to
designate a camp inmate to be a suspect without further
proof. It must be confirmed in some way, if possible."
Now I skip to Page 2, the third paragraph of the English
translation, quoting:
"Executions are be held in the camp or in the
not to
immediate vicinity the camp.
of If the camps in the
Government General are in the immediate vicinity of the
border, then the prisoners are to be taken for special treat-
ment, if possible, into the former Soviet Russian territory."
And then the fifth paragraph:
"In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible
removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers
for the Einsatzgruppe into the occupied territories, the leader
of the Einsatzkommandos must make an agreement with the
nearest State Police office, as well as with the commandant
of the Security Police unit and Security Service, and beyond
these, with the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe concerned in the
occupied territories."
Proof that persons so screened out of the prisoner-of-war camps
by the Gestapo were executed is to be found in Document 1165-PS,
from which I did not intend to quote and which has been introduced
previously as Exhibit Number USA-244. Document 1165-PS which
shows that they executed those that had been screened out.
The first page of that document, without reading it, is a letter
from the camp commandant of the Concentration Camp Gross-
Rosen to Müller, who was the Chief of the Gestapo, dated the
23rd of October 1941, referring to a previous oral conference with
Müller and setting forth the names of 20 Soviet prisoners of war
executed the previous day.
—
The second page I am still referring to 1165 but not reading
—
from it, because it has been quoted from is a directive issued by
Müller on the 9th of November 1941 to all Gestapo offices, in
which he ordered that all diseased prisoners of war should be

259
2 Jan. 46

excluded from transports to concentration camps for execution,

because 5 to 10 percent of those destined for execution were
arriving in the camps dead or half dead.
I now offer Document 2542-PS, Exhibit Number USA-489, which
is in the second volume. This is an affidavit of Kurt Lindow, a
former Gestapo official, which was taken on the 30th of September
1945, at Oberursel, Germany, in the course of an official military
investigation by the United States Army; and I quote from that
document from the beginning:
"I was criminal director in Section IV of the RSHA" — I call
Your Honors' attention to the chart on the board that he was
criminal director in Section IV and head of the Subsec-
tion IV A 1— "from the middle of 1942 until the middle of
1944. I had the rank of SS Sturmbannführer.
"From 1941 until the middle of 1943, there was attached to
—
Subsection IV A 1" which is not shown on this chart, but
—
has previously been described in the beginning "a special
department that was headed by the Regierungsoberinspektor,
later Regierungsamtmann, and SS Hauptsturmführer Franz
Königshaus. In this department were handled matters con-
cerning prisoners of war. I learned from this department
that instructions and orders by Reichsführer Himmler dating
from 1941 to 1942 existed, according to which captured Soviet
political commissars and Jewish soldiers were to be executed:
As far as I know, proposals for execution of such prisoners
of war were received from the various prisoner-of-war
camps. Königshaus had to prepare the orders for execution
and submitted them to the chief of Section IV, Müller, for
— —
signature" Müller being the head of the Gestapo. "These
orders were made out so that one was to be sent to the
agency making the request, and a second one to the con-
centration camp designated to carry out the execution. The
prisoners of war in question were at first formally released
from prisoner-of-war status, then transferred to a con-
centration camp for execution.
"The Chief of the section Königshaus, was under me in
disciplinary questions from the middle of 1942 until about
the beginning of 1943 and worked, in matters of his depart-
ment, directly with the chief of Subsection IV A, Regierungs-
director Panzinger. Early in 1943 the department was dis-
solved and absorbed into the departments in Subsection IV B.
The work concerning Russian prisoners of war must then
have been done by IV B 2a. Head of Department IV B 2a
was Regierungsrat and Sturmbannführer Hans Helmuth Wolf.
"There existed in the prisoner-of-war camps on the Eastern
Front small screening teams (Einsatzkommandos), headed by

260
 2 Jan. 46

a lower ranking member of the Secret Police or Gestapo.

These teams were assigned to the camp commanders and
had the job to segregate the prisoners of war who were
candidates for execution, according to the orders that had
been given, and to report them to the office of the Secret
Police."
I will not read the remainder of that affidavit.

Passing from that phase of the case: The Gestapo and SD sent
recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps where they
—
were executed that is, prisoners of war who had escaped and
were recaptured. The Tribunal will recall that in a document
heretofore introduced, 1650-PS, was an order in which the Chief
of the Security Police and SD instructed regional Gestapo offices
to take certain classes of recaptured officers from camps and to
transport them to Mauthausen concentration camp, under the
operation known as "Kugel." That, if Your Honor recalls, means
"bullet." That is the famous "Bullet Decree" that has been pre-
viously introduced. On the journey the prisoners of war were to
be placed in irons. The Gestapo officers were to make semi-annual
reports, giving numbers only, of the sending of these prisoners of
war to Mauthausen. On the 27th of July 1944 an order was issued
from the VI Corps Area Command on the treatment of prisoners
of war. That is Document 1514-PS in the second volume, which
I offer as Exhibit Number USA-491. This document provided that
prisoners of war were to be discharged from prisoner-of-war status
and transferred to the Gestapo under certain cicumstances, and I
quote from the first page, beginning with the word "subject,"
quoting:
"Subject: Delivery of prisoners of war to the Secret State
Police.

"Enclosed in the annex Reference Decree 1. The following

summarized ruling is issued with respect to the delivery to
the Secret Police:
"1) According to Reference Decrees 2 and 3, the com-
a)
mander of the camp has to deliver Soviet prisoners of war
to the Secret State Police in case of punishable offenses and
to dismiss them from imprisonment of war, if he does not
believe that his disciplinary functions suffice to prescribe
punishment for violations committed. Report of the facts of
the case is not necessary.
"b) Recaptured Soviet prisoners of war have to be delivered
the nearest police office in order to ascertain whether
first to
punishable offenses have been committed during the escape.
The dismissal from imprisonment of war takes place upon

261
2 Jan. 46

suggestion of the police office, (Section A6 of Reference

Decree Number 4 regarding the compilation of all regulations
on the Arbeitseinsatz of prisoners of war who have been
recaptured and refuse to work.)
"c) Recaptured Soviet officers who are prisoners of war
have to be delivered to the Gestapo and to be dismissed
from imprisonment of war. (Section Al of Reference Decree
Number 4.)

"d) Soviet officer prisoners ofwar who refuse to work and

those who
distinguish themselves as agitators and exert an
unfavorable influence upon the willingness to work of the
other prisoners of war have to be delivered by the respon-
and dismissed
sible Stalag to the nearest State Police office
from imprisonment of war. (Section CI of Reference Decree
Number 4 and Reference Decree Number 5.)
"e) Soviet enlisted prisoners of war refusing to work who are
ringleaders and those who distinguish themselves as agitators
and therefore exert an unfavorable influence upon the will-
ingness to work of the other prisoners of war have to be
delivered to the nearest State Police office and to be dis-
missed from imprisonment of war. (Section C2 of Reference
Decree Number 4.)

"f)Soviet prisoners of war (enlisted men and officers) who,

with respect to their political attitude, have been sifted out
by the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and the
Security Service have to be delivered upon request by the
camp commander to the Einsatzkommando and to be dis-
missed from imprisonment of war. (Reference Decree Num-
ber 6.)

"g) Polish prisoners of war have to be delivered, if acts of

1.

sabotage are proven, to the nearest State Police office and to

be dismissed from imprisonment of war. The decision rests
with the camp commander. Report on this is not necessary.
(Reference Decree Number 7.)
"2. A report
on the delivery and dismissal from imprisonment
of war mentioned under Paragraph 1 of this
in the cases
decree to the Wehrkreis Command VI, Department for Pris-
oners of War, is not necessary.
"3. Prisoners of war from all nations have to be delivered

to the Secret State Police and to be dismissed from imprison-

ment of war, if a special order to that effect is issued by the
OKW or by Wehrkreis Command VI, Department for Pris-
oners of War.
"4. Prisoners of war under suspicion of participation in illegal
organizations and resistance movements have to be left to the

262
 2 Jan. 46

Gestapo upon request for the purpose of interrogation. They

remain prisoners of war and have to be treated as such. The
delivery to the Gestapo and their dismissal from imprison-
ment of war has to take place only by order of the or OKW
of Wehrkreis Command VI, Department for Prisoners of War.

"In case of French and Belgian prisoners of war and interned

Italian military personnel, approval of Wehrkreis Com-
mand VI, Department for Prisoners of War, has to be
— —
obtained if necessary by phone before delivery to the
Gestapo for the purpose of interrogation."
This decree was known as the "Bullet Decree." Prisoners of war
sent to Mauthausen concentration camp under the decree were
executed.
I now offer in support of that statement Document 2285-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-490. It is in the second volume. Document
2285-PS is an affidavit of Lieutenant Colonel Guivante de Saint
Gast and Lieutenant Jean Veith, both of the French Army, which
was taken on the 13th of May 1945 in the course of an official mili-
tary investigation by the United States Army. The affidavit dis-
closes that Lieutenant Colonel Gast was confined at Mauthausen
from 18 March 1944 to 22 April 1945 and that Lieutenant Veith was
confined from 22 April 1943 until 22 April 1945. I quote from the
affidavit, beginning with the third paragraph of Page 1, quoting:

"In Mauthausen 'existed several treatments of prisoners,

amongst them the 'action K or Kugel' (Bullet action). Upon
the arrival of transports, prisoners with the mention 'K' were
not registered, got no numbers, and their names remained
unknown except for the officials of the Politische Abteilung.
Lieutenant Veith had the opportunity of hearing upon the
arrival of a transport the following conversation between the
Untersturmführer Streit wieser and chief of the convoy:
" 'How many prisoners?'
" '15 but two K.'
" 'Well, that makes 13.'

"The K prisoners were taken directly to the prison where

they were unclothed and taken to the 'bathroom.' This bath-
room in the cellars of the prison building near the crematory
was specially designed for execution (shooting and gassing).
"The shooting took place by means of a measuring appara-
tus —
the prisoner being backed towards a metrical measure
with an automatic contraption releasing a bullet in his neck
as soon as the moving plank determining his height touched
the top of his head.

263
 —
2 Jan. 46

"If a transport consisted of too many 'K' prisoners, instead of

losing time for the 'measurement' they were exterminated by
gas sent into the shower room instead of water.''
I now pass namely: "The Gestapo was respon-
to another subject,
and classifying concentration camps and for
sible for establishing
committing racial and political undesirables to concentration and
annihilation camps for slave labor and mass murder."
The Tribunal has already received evidence concerning the
responsibility of the Gestapo for the administration of concentration
camps and the authority of the Gestapo for taking persons into
protective custody to be carried out in the State concentration camps.
The Gestapo also issued orders establishing concentration camps,
transforming prisoner-of-war camps into concentration camps as
internment camps, changing labor camps into concentration camps,
setting up special sections for female prisoners, and so forth.
The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the classification
of concentration camps according to the seriousness of the accusation
and the chances for reforming the prisoners, from the Nazi view-
point. I now refer to Documents 1063(a)-PS and 1063(b)-PS in the
second volume, Exhibit Number USA-492. The concentration camps
were classified as Class I, II, or III. Class I was for the least serious
prisoners, and Class III was for the most serious. Now this Docu-
ment 1063(a)-PS is signed by Heydrich and it is dated the 2d of
January 1941. I quote from the beginning with the word "subject,"
quoting:
"Subject: Classification of the concentration camps.
"The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police has
given his approval to classify the concentration camps into
various categories, which take into account the personality of
the prisoner as well as the degree of his harmfulness to the
State. Accordingly, the concentration camps will be classified
into the following categories:
—
"Category I for all prisoners charged with minor offenses
only and definitely qualified for correction; also for special
—
cases and solitary confinement Camps Dachau, Sachsen-
hausen, and Auschwitz I. The latter also applies in part to
Category II.
—
"Category la for all old prisoners conditionally qualified for
work who could still be used in the medicinal herb gardens
Camp Dachau.
—
"Category II for prisoners charged with major offenses but
still qualified for re-education and correction —
Camps Buchen-
wald, Flossenbürg, Neuengamme, Auschwitz II.
—
"Category III for prisoners under most serious charges, also
for those who have been convicted previously for criminal

264
 2 Jan. 46

same time for asocial prisoners, that is to say,

offenses; at the
those who can —
hardly be corrected Camp Mauthausen."
I call Your Honor's attention to the fact that we have been

talking about Mauthausen, where the "K" action took place.

The Chiefof the Security Police and SD had the authority to
fixthe length of the period of custody. During the war it was the
policy not to permit the prisoners to know the period of custody
and merely to announce the term as "until further notice." That
was established by Document 1531-PS, which has previously been
introduced as Exhibit Number USA-248; and the only reason for
referring to it is to show that they had the right to fix the length
of period of custody.
The local Gestapo offices, which made the arrests, maintained
a register called the "Haftbuch," and I understand Haftbuch simply
means a block or police register. In this register the names of all
persons arrested were listed, together with personal data, grounds
of arrest, and disposition. When orders were received from the
Gestapo Headquarters in Berlin to commit persons who had been
arrested to concentration camps, an entry was made in the Haftbuch
to that effect.
I now offer in evidence the original of one of these books, and
Document Number L-358, Exhibit Number USA-495. This book
it is

was captured by the 3rd Army when it overran an area; and it was
captured by the T-Force on April 22, 1945, near Bad Suiza, Ger-
many. This book is the original register used by the Gestapo at
Tomaszow, Poland, to record the names of the persons arrested, the
grounds for and the disposition made of cases during the
arrest,
period from June 1943 to 20 December 1944.
1

In the register are approximately 3,500 names of persons.

Approximately 2,200 were arrested for membership in the resist-
ance movements and partisan units. This is a very large book; and
I am going to ask the clerk to pass it to Your Honors so that you

might get a look at it. It is too big to photograph. And if Your

Honors will just turn to one of the pages, I will read what the
—
different columns provide just any one of the pages. There is a
double column. It starts on the left and goes over to the other side.
In the first column that heading is simply a number of the man
when he comes in. The next column is his name. The third column
is the family —
a brief family history and his religion. The fourth
is the domicile. The next shows the date he was arrested and by
whom—that is the fifth column. The next column, the place of arrest.
And then the next column, the reason for arrest. And then the next
is another number which is apparently a serial number for delivery.

And next to the last column is the disposition. And the final column,
remarks.

265
 .

2 Jan. 46

Now, out of the 3,500 names that are shown in that book, Your
Honors will notice a number of red marks. Those apparently meant
the ones that were shot. Of these, 325 were shot. Only 35 of that
325 had first been tried. Nine hundred and fifty out of this list were
sent to concentration camps; and 155 were sent to the Reich for
forced labor. According to this register, similar treatment was
accorded persons who were arrested on other grounds, for instance,
Communists, Jews, hostages, and persons taken in reprisal. A large
number are shown to have been arrested during raids, no further
grounds being stated.
I particularly refer Your Honors to entries 286, 287, and 288,

that is, the numbers in the first column of the register, where the
crime charged to the person arrested was "als Juden"; in other
words, he was a Jew. And by that you will find a red cross mark;
and the punishment given was death.
I now
pass from this document and simply call attention to
Document L-215, which was heretofore introduced as Exhibit Num-
ber USA-243. I don't intend to read from it unless Your Honors
want to turn to L-215. This is a file of original dossiers on 25
Luxembourgers taken into protective custody for commitment to
concentration camps. I will just refer to a sentence of the language
in the document. Quoting:
"According to the finding of the State Police, he endangers
by his attitude the existence and security of the people and
the State."
And in each case, with reference to those dossiers, that appears as
being the reason for the execution of these 25 Luxembourgers. And
in connection . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, you said execution, did

you not?
COL. STOREY: I beg your pardon —sending to concentration
camps.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. There is no evidence they were exe-
cuted?
COL. STOREY: No, they were committed to concentration
Sir;
camps. And with that same document there is
also in connection
a form provided by which the Gestapo headquarters in Berlin were
notified when the persons were received by the concentration camps.
—
Another document which has heretofore been received as
Exhibit Number USA-279, Document 1472-PS, in the second
—
volume I am simply going to refer to as a predicate for another.
That was a telegram of 16 December 1942 in which Müller reported
that the Gestapo could round up some 45,000 Jews in connection
with the program of obtaining additional labor in concentration

266
 2 Jan. 46

camps. And with reference to the same subject there is Document

1063(d)-PS, which has heretofore been offered as Exhibit Number
USA-219. Müller sent a directive to the commanders and inspectors
of the Security Police and SD and to the directors of the Gestapo
regional offices in which he stated that Himmler had ordered, on
14 December 1942, that at least 35,000 persons who were fit for
work had to be put into concentration camps not later than the end
of January.
Now, in that same connection I offer Document L-41, Volume 1,

as Exhibit Number USA-496. This document contains a further

directive from Müller dated the 23rd of March 1943 and supplements
the directive of 17 December 1942, to which I referred and in which
he states that the measures are to be carried out until 30 April 1943.
And I would like to quote from the second paragraph on Page 3
of the exhibit:
"Care must be taken, however, that only prisoners who are
fit for work are transferred to concentration camps, and
adolescents only in accordance with the given directives;
otherwise, the concentration camps would become over-
crowded, and this would defeat the intended aim."
In that same connection I offer Document 701-PS, Exhibit Num-
ber USA-497. This is a letter dated 21 April 1943 from the Minister
of Justice to the public prosecutors and also addressed to the Com-
missioner of the Reich Minister of Justice for the penal camps in
Emsland. Quoting:
"Subject: Poles and Jews who are released from the penal
institutions of the Department of Justice. Copies for the inde-
pendent penal institutions.
"1. With reference to the new guiding principles for the appli-
cation of Article 1, Section 2, of the decree of 11 June 1940,
—
Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 877 Attachment I of the decree (RV)
of 27 January 1943—9133/2 Enclosure I-III a 2/2629— the Reich
Security Main Office has directed by the decree of 11 March
1943—11 A 2 Number 100/43—176:
"(a) Jews, who Number VI of the direc-
in accordance with
tives are released from prison, are to be committed for life in
the concentration camps Auschwitz or Lublin by the head
office of the State Police competent for the district in which
the prison is located, in compliance with directions issued
about protective custody.
"The same applies to Jews who in the future are released
from prison after serving a sentence of confinement.
"(b) Poles, who in accordance with Number VI of the direc-
tives are released from prison, are to be taken, by the head
office of the State Police competent for the district in which

267
2 Jan. 46

the prison is war to a concen-

located, for the duration of the
tration camp in compliance with directions issued concerning
protective custody.
"The same applies in the future to Poles being released from
prison after serving a term of imprisonment of more than
6 months.

"In answer to the request of the Reich Security Main Office

I ask that in the future: (a) All Jews about to be released and
(b) all Poles awaiting release who have served a sentence of
more than 6 months, are to be listed to the directorate of the
State Police competent for the district for further confine-
ment and, in due time- before the end of sentence, are to be
placed at its disposal for transfer."
And the last paragraph states that this ruling replaces the
hitherto ordered return of all Polish prisoners undergoing imprison-
ment in the Old Reich condemned in the annexed Eastern territory.
The next subject: The Gestapo and the SD participated in depor-
tation of citizens of occupied countries for forced labor and handled
the disciplining of forced labor.
With reference to the presentation heretofore made concerning
forced labor, I do not intend to repeat. However, there were several
references to important positions played by the Gestapo and the SD
in rounding up persons to be brought into the Reich for forced labor
and references in two or three documents that were introduced.
I simply want to cite those documents as showing the part that the

Gestapo and SD played. Document L-61, Exhibit Number USA-177.

It is set out in this document book —
I am simply citing it —
it is a
letter of the 26th of November 1942 from Fritz Sauckel, in which he
stated that he had been advised by the Chief of the Security Police
and SD under date of 26 October 1942 that during the month of
November the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district would begin
in order to make room for the settlement of persons of the German
race. The Poles who were evacuated as a result of this measure
were to be put into concentration camps for labor as far as they
were criminal or antisocial.
The Tribunal will also recall the Christensen letter, which is our
Document 3012-PS, Exhibit Number USA-190. In that letter it is
stated that during the year 1943 the program of mass murders car-
ried out by the Einsatz groups in the East should be modified in
order to round up hundreds of thousands of persons for labor in the
armament industry. That was in Document 3012-PS, which has
heretofore been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-190. And that
force was to be used when necessary. Prisoners were to be released
so that they could be used for forced labor. When villages were

268
 2 Jan. 46

burned down the whole population was to be placed at the disposal

of the labor commissioners.
Now in that connection the direct responsibility of the Gestapo
for disciplining forced workers is shown in our exhibit, Document
1573-PS, Exhibit Number USA-498. This is a secret order signed
by Müller himself to the regional Gestapo offices on the 18th of
June 1941; and I quote from the document from the beginning. It
is addressed:
"To all offices of the State Police— to the State Police, atten-
tion SS Sturmbannführer R. R. Nosske or deputy at Aachen.
"Subject: Measures to be taken against emigrants and civilian
workers who come from the Greater Russian areas and against
foreign workers.
"Reference: None.
"To prevent the return of Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthen-
ian, Cossack, and Caucasian emigrants and civilian workers
from the territory of the Reich to the East without author-
ization and on their own initiative and to prevent attempts of
sabotage by foreign workers in German production, I decide
as follows:
"(1) The managers of the branch offices of the Russian,
Ukrainian, White Ruthenian, and Caucasian trustees office,
as well as of the relief committees and the leading members
of the Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian, Cossack, and
Caucasian emigrants' organizations, are to be notified imme-
diately that they are not allowed to leave their domicile
without permission of the Security Police until further notice.
They are, at the same time, to be told to apply the same
measures to the members who are under their care. Their
attention is to be called to the fact that they will be arrested
upon giving up their job or domicile without permission.
I request a check on the presence of branch office leaders, if
possible,by daily inquiries, on pretexts.
"(2) Emigrants and foreign workers who are specifically
charged and who are suspected of intelligence work for the
U.S.S.R. are to be arrested if the situation demands it. This
step must be prepared; it is, however, not to be executed
before the pass word 'Fremdvölker' has been transmitted by
means of 'urgent' telegram."

THE PRESIDENT: Do you think you should read the rest of that?
COL. STOREY: I don't think so, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

269
2 Jan. 46

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, I next offer in evidence

Document 3360-PS, Exhibit Number USA-499, the second volume.
Before I hand this document to the translator, I should like to
exhibit it to Your Honors. It is an original telegram that was sent
to the Gestapo office at Nuremberg. It was discovered by the
C.I.C., by Lieutenant Stevens, near Hersbruck, Germany; and Your
Honors will notice that parts of it have been burned. It was in
connection with some documents that had been buried and they
were partially burned when they were buried. This is one of the
telegrams. It is from the Secret State Police, the State Police
station at Nuremberg and Fürth, and it is dated the 12th of Febru-
ary 1944. I quote from the telegram:
"RSHA IV F 1-45/44; the Border Inspector General; urgent,
submit immediately.
"Treatment of recaptured escaped Eastern laborers." —Ost-
arbeiter.
"On the basis of an order of the RFSS, all recaptured escaped
Eastern laborers without exception are, from now on, to be
sent to concentration camps. For the purpose of reporting to
RFSS, I ask for one single report by teletype to Section IV D
(foreign laborers) on 10 March 1944 as to how many of such
male or female Eastern laborers were turned over to a con-
centration camp between today and 10 March 1944."
By these methods the Gestapo and SD maintained control over
forced labor brought into the Reich.
The next subject I go into is that the Gestapo and SD executed
captured commandos and paratroopers and protected civilians who
lynched Allied fliers.
On 4 August 1942 Keitel issued an order which provided that
the Gestapo and SD were responsible for taking counter measures
against single parachutists or small groups of them with special
missions. In substantiation I offer Document Number 553-PS as the
exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-500. I quote from the
first page of the translation, the first part of Paragraph 3:

"Insofar as single parachutists are captured by members of

the Armed Forces, they are to be delivered, after report to
the competent Abwehr office, to the nearest agency of the
Chief of the Security Police and SD without delay."
Now, if the Tribunal please, to divert from the text: Colonel
Taylor will present the Nazi High Command and a few of their
orders. This is one and there is another one with which he is going
to deal extensively. My purpose in introducing these orders now is
to show the part that the Gestapo and SD played in connection with
those orders.

270
 2 Jan. 46

The next order that I introduce is Document 498-PS, in the first

volume, Exhibit Number USA-501. That is the celebrated Com-
mando order signed by the Führer himself on the 18th of October
1942. There were only 12 copies of this made and it bears the per-
sonal, original signature of Adolf Hitler. One copy was sent to the
Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police. That order, with-
out reading it and getting down to the part from which I want to
quote, simply provides that all commandos, whether or not in uni-
form or unarmed, are to be slaughtered to the last man. I want
to read down toward the bottom, the beginning of Paragraph 4, to
show the part of the SD:
"If individual members
of such commandos, such as agents,
saboteurs, et cetera, fall into the hands of the military forces
in some other way, through the police in occupied territories
for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the
SD."
Another one of those orders is Number 526-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-502, to which I would like to refer. That document has to do
with some alleged saboteurs landing in Norway. It is dated the
10th of May 1943 and is top-secret. I quote the first paragraph as
identifying a crew:
"On 30 March 1943 on Toftefjord (70° latitude) an enemy
cutter was sighted. Cutter was blown up by the enemy.
Crew: two dead men, 10 prisoners."
That is the crew. Near the bottom of that order, the third sentence
from the bottom, is this statement: "Führer order executed by
SD" —Security Service.
We have heretofore introduced Document R-110, Exhibit Num-
ber USA-333; and that was the Himmler order of 10 August 1943
which was sent to Security Police. That order provided that it was
not the task of the police to interfere in clashes between Germans
and English and American terror fliers who had bailed out. It was
personally signed by Himmler and here is the signature. It has
been introduced in evidence, but I wanted to call the attention of
the Court to it again.
May next go to the subject, where the Gestapo and the SD
I
took civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial and
punishment? That is the so-called "Night and Fog" decree, issued
on 7 December 1941 by Hitler. That decree has not been introduced
in evidence.
I now refer to Document L-90, in the first volume, Exhibit Num-
ber USA-503. That decree under which persons who committed
offenses against the Reich or occupation forces in occupied terri-
tory, except where death sentence was certain, were to be taken
secretly to Germany and surrendered to the Security Police and SD

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for trial or punishment in Germany itself. And this is the original

from which we quote, beginning on the first page of the translation.
It is on the stationery of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of German
Police, Munich, 4 February 1942. Subject: "Prosecution of offenses
against the Reich or the occupation forces."
"I. The following regulations published by the Chief of the
High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 December
1941, are being made known herewith:
"1) The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.
After lengthy consideration, it is the will of the Führer that
the measures taken against those who are guilty of offenses
against the Reich or against the occupation forces in occupied
areas should be altered. The Führer is of the opinion that in
such cases penal servitude or even a hard labor sentence for
life will be regarded as a sign of weakness. An effective and
lasting deterrent can be achieved only by the death penalty
or by taking measures which will leave the family and the
population uncertain as to the fate of the offender. The
deportation to Germany serves this purpose.
"The attached directives for the prosecution of offenses
correspond with the Führer's conception. They have been
—
examined and approved by him." signed "Keitel."—
And then follow some of the directives and descriptions. This is
a very long document, with enclosures, and we next turn to Page 4
of the English translation, near the bottom:
"Insofar as the SS and the Police courts are competent to
deal with offenses committed under I, proceedings follow on
the same lines."
Next, in connection with the same document, on Page 20, Part 2
which is the secret letter addressed to the
of the English translation,
Abwehr, I quote from Page 2. It is the letter dated 2 February
—
1942 passing down to the words "Enclosed please find":
"1. Decree of the Führer and Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces of 7 December 1941.
"2. Executive order of the same date.
"3. Communication of the Chief of the High Command of the
Armed Forces of 12 December 1941.
"The decree introduces a fundamental innovation. The Führer
and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces orders that
offenses committed by civilians in the occupied territories and
of the kind mentioned above, are to be dealt with by the
competent military courts in the occupied territories only if
(a) the death penalty is pronounced and (b) sentence is pro-
nounced within 8 days of the prisoner's arrest.

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"Unless both these conditions are fulfilled, the Führer and

Supreme Commander does not anticipate that criminal pro-
ceedings within the occupied territories will have the neces-
sary deterrent effect.
"In all other cases the prisoners are, in the future, to be
transported to Germany secretly, and further dealings with
the offenses will take place here; these measures will have a
deterrent effect because (a) the prisoners will vanish without
leaving a trace, (b) no information may be given as to their
whereabouts or their fate."
Now, skipping the next paragraph, to the second paragraph
below:
"In case the competent military court and the military com-
mander, respectively, are of the opinion that an immediate
decision on the spot is impossible, and the prisoners are there-
fore to be transported to Germany, the counter-intelligence
offices have to report this fact directly to the RSHA in Berlin
(SW 11), Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 7, in care of Dr. Fischer,
Director of Criminal Police, stating the exact number of pris-
oners and of the groups which belong together as the case
may be. Isolated cases, where the superior commander has an
urgent interest in the case being dealt with by a military
court, are to be reported to the RSHA. A copy of the entire
report to the Reich Security Main Office is to be sent to Amt
Ausland Abwehr, Section Abwehr III.
"The RSHA on the basis of available accommodation will
determine which office of the state police has to accept the
prisoners. The latter office will communicate with the com-
petent Abwehr office and determine with it the particulars
of the removal, particularly whether this will be carried out
by the Secret Field Police, the Field Gendarmerie, or the
Gestapo itself, as well as the place and manner of the hand-
ing over of the material."
After the civilians arrived in Germany no word of the disposition
of their cases was permitted to reach the country from which they
came or their relatives.
I now offer Document 668-PS, Exhibit Number USA-504. This
isa letter of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, dated the
24th of June 1942; and I quote from the first page of the English
translation:
"It isthe intent of the directive of the Führer and Supreme
Commander of the Wehrmacht concerning prosecution of
criminal acts against the Reich or the occupation forces in
—
Occupied Territories, dated 7 December 1941," that is the

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order that I first referred to

— "to create, for deterrent pur-
poses, through the transportation into Reich territory of per-
sons arrested in occupied areas on account of activity inimical
to Germany, uncertainty about the fate of prisoners among
their relatives and acquaintances. This goal would be jeop-
ardized if the relatives were to be notified in cases of death.
Release of the body for burial at home is inadvisable for the
same reason, and beyond that also because the place of burial
could be misused for demonstrations.
"I therefore propose that the following rules be observed in
the handling of cases of death:
"a. Notification of relatives is not to take place.
"b. The body will be buried at the place of decease in the
Reich.
"c. The place of burial will, for the time being, not be made
known."
Now
passing to the next activity of the SD and Gestapo, which
was that they arrested, tried, and punished citizens of occupied
countries under special criminal procedure and by summary
methods.And I next offer in evidence Document 674-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-505.
The Gestapo and executed
arrested, placed in protective custody,
under certain circumstances. Even
civilians of occupied countries
where there were courts capable of handling emergency cases the
Gestapo conducted its own proceedings without regard to normal
judicial processes.
This document, 674-PS, Exhibit Number USA-505, is a letter
from the Chief Public Prosecutor at Katowice, dated the 3rd of
December 1941; and it is addressed to the Reich Minister of Justice,
attention Chief Councillor to the Government Stadermann or
representative in office, Berlin. The subject is "Executions by the
Police and Expediting of Penal Procedure; without order; enclosure:
1 copy of report." I quote from the beginning:

"About 3 weeks ago, six ringleaders (some of them German)

were hanged by the police in connection with the destruction
of a treasonable organization of 350 members in Tarnowskie
Gory without notification of the competent court. Such exe-
cutions of criminals have previously taken place in the Bielsko
district, too, without the Public Prosecutor having knowl-
edge of them. On 2 December 1941 the head of the State
Police at Katowice, Oberregierungsrat Mildner, reported
orally to the undersigned that he had ordered, with authority
from the Reichsführer of the SS as necessary immediate
action, these executions by public hanging at the place of

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the crime and that deterrents would also have to be continued

in the future until the criminal and actively anti-German ele-
ments in the Occupied Eastern Territories have been destroyed
or until other immediate actions, perhaps by the courts, would
guarantee equally deterrent effect. Accordingly, six leaders
of another Polish organization guilty of high treason in the
district in and around Sosnowiec were to be hanged publicly
today as an example.
"About this procedure the undersigned expressed consider-
able scruples.
"Besides the fact that such measures have been withdrawn
from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and are contra-
dictory to laws still in force, a justified emergency for the
exceptional proceedings by the police alone cannot, in our
opinion, be lawfully recognized.
"The penal justice in our district within the limits of its
competence is quite capable of fulfilling its duty of immediate
penal retribution by means of a special form of special judi-
cial activity (establishment of a so-called Rapid Special Court).
Indictment and trial could be speeded up in such a way that
between turning the case over to the public prosecutor and
the execution no more than 3 days would elapse, if the
practice of reprieve is simplified and if the decision, where
necessary, can be obtained by telephone. This was expressed
yesterday to the head of the State Police at Katowice by the
undersigned.
"We cannot believe that execution by the police of criminals,
especiallyGerman criminals, can be considered more effective
in view of the shaken sense of justice of many Germans. In
the long run they might, in spite of public deterrent, lead to
even further brutality of minds, which is contrary to the
intended purpose of pacifying. These deliberations, however,
do not apply to future legal competence of a court-martial for
Poles and Jews."
I next refer to Document 654-PS, Exhibit Number USA-218,
which has previously been introduced in evidence but bears on this
subject; and I will simply summarize, in a word, what it provided.
It states that on the 18th of September 1942 Thierack, the Reich
Minister of Justice, and Himmler came to an understanding by
which antisocial elements were to be turned over to Himmler to be
worked to death. That is in Document 654-PS, and a special crim-
inal procedure was to be applied by the police to the Jews, Poles,
Gypsies, Russians, and Ukrainians, who were not to be tried in
ordinary criminal courts. I simply refer to that document as bearing
on the same subject.

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2 Jan. 46

Another document, which I will not quote from but cite to Your
Honors, the order of November 5, 1942 issued by the RSHA; and
is
that is Document L-316, Exhibit Number USA-346. I don't think it
is necessary to quote from that except to state that
that letter
provides that the administration— in fact, the last statement in it
just before the signature provides:
"The administration of penal law for persons of alien race
must be transferred from the hands of the administrators of
justice into the hands of the police."
That is the part that connects the police with it, and I will
not quote from the document otherwise.
Now I next come to the subject where the Gestapo and the SD
executed or confined persons in concentration camps for crimes
allegedly committed by their relatives; and in that connection I
offer Document L-37 in the first volume, Exhibit Number USA-506.
That is a letter dated the 19th of July 1944—1 call Your Honor's
—
attention to the fact that it is dated in 1944 sent by the com-
mander of the Sipo and SD for the district of Radom to the
foreign service office in Tomaszow.
Parenthetically, that big Haftbuch that we introduced in
evidence has a number of cases in connection with the district of
Radom, and Your Honors will remember that it is a list of the
people in the district of Tomaszow.
The subject of this letter is "Collective Responsibility of
Members of Families of Assassins and Saboteurs." I will read
after the word "precedents":
"The Higher SS and Police Leader East has issued on 28 June
1944 the following order:
"The security situation in the Government General has in
the last 9 months grown worse to such an extent that from
now on the most radical means and the harshest measures
must be applied to the alien assassins and saboteurs. The
Reichsführer SS, in agreement with the Governor General,
has ordered that in all cases where assassinations of Germans,
or such attempts, have occurred or where saboteurs have
destroyed vital installations, not only the culprits be shot
but that also all of the kinsmen are to be executed and their
female relatives who are above 16 years old are to be put
into concentration camps. It is strictly presupposed, of course,
that the culprit or culprits are not apprehended, their
if

names and addresses be correctly ascertained. Male members

of kin include, for example: the father, sons (insofar as they
are above 16 years of age), brothers, brothers-in-law, cousins,
and uncles of the culprit. The same ruling applies to
the women. The aim of this procedure is to secure joint

276
 —
2 Jan. 46

responsibility of all men and women of the kin of the

culprit. furthermore hits most severely the family circle
It
of the political criminal. For example, this practice has
already shown, at the end of 1939, the best results in the
new Eastern territories, especially in the Warta district.
Experience shows that as soon as this new method for
combatting assassins and saboteurs becomes known to these
—
foreign people this may be achieved by oral propaganda
the female members of a kin to which members of the
resistance movement or bands belong will exert a curbing
influence."
Now the SD and Gestapo also conducted third-degree inter-
rogations of prisoners of war; and I refer to Document 1531-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-248. This document contains an order of
12 June 1942, signed by Müller, which authorized the use of third-
degree methods in interrogations where preliminary investigation
indicated that the prisoners could give information on important
facts such as subversive activities but not to extort confessions of
prisoners' own crimes.
Now I quote from Page 2 of the English translation, Para-
graph 2:
"Third degree may, under this supposition, only be employed
against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah's Witnesses, saboteurs,
terrorists, members of resistance movements, parachute
agents, asocial elements, Polish or Soviet Russian loafers,
or tramps. In all other cases, my permission must first be
obtained."
Then I pass to Paragraph 4 at the end:
"Third degree can, according to the circumstances, consist
amongst other methods, of:
"Very simple diet (bread and water); hard bunk; dark cell;
deprivation of sleep; exhaustive drilling; also in flogging (for
more than 20 strokes a doctor must be consulted)."
On the 24th of February 1944 the commander of the Sipo and
the SD for the district of Radom published an order issued by
the Befehlshaber of the Sipo and the SD at Krakow, which is
Document L-89, Exhibit Number USA-507, in the first volume. This
followed closely the provisions of the previous decree that I have
just quoted from; and I quote the first paragraph after the list of
offices on the first page:
"In view of the variety of methods used to date in intensified
interrogations and in order to avoid excesses, also to protect
officials against eventual criminal proceedings, the Befehls-
haber of the Security Police and of the SD in Krakow has
issued the following order for the Security Police in the

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2 Jan. 46

Government General, which is based on the regulations in

force for the Reich."
And
then the regulations are quoted. The significance of this
document is that it proves that as late as 1944 third-degree inter-
rogations were still being conducted by the Gestapo.
I next pass to the activity of the Gestapo and the SD as being
primary agencies for the persecution of the Jews; and I do not
intend to go into any of the evidence previously introduced, except
to refer to the participation of these organizations.
The responsibility of the Gestapo and SD for the mass exter-
mination program carried out by the Einsatz groups of the Sipo
and SD, in the annihilation camps to which Jews were sent by the
Sipo and SD, has already been considered; and I simply cite to
the Tribunal the Document 2615-PS, which has previously been
introduced and in which the number of Jews executed was referred
to by Eichmann. I simply call attention that Eichmann was head
of Section B IV of the Gestapo. That section of the Gestapo dealt
with Jewish affairs, including matters of evacuation, means of
suppressing enemies of the people and the State, and the disposses-
sion of rights of German citizenship. The Gestapo was also charged
with the enforcement of discriminatory laws, which heretofore have
been introduced.
I now invite Your Honors' attention to Document 3058-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-508. I would like to exhibit to Your Honors
that it is a red-bordered document signed by Heydrich himself and
addressed to the Defendant Goring. It is dated the 11th of November
—
1938. I pass this to the reporter and before it is passed to the
—
reporter there is an appendix attached to it to the effect that the
matter had been called to the attention of the Defendant Goring.
Now this concerns a report of activities of the Gestapo in con-
nection with the anti-Jewish demonstrations, you will recall, in
the fall of 1938. This is a report from Heydrich personally to
the Defendant Goring. It is addressed to the Prime Minister,
General Field Marshal Goring and is dated the 11th of November
1938. The previous documents showed that that activity occurred
just before —
and the order for it in connection with the Jewish
uprooting or extermination:
"The extent of the destruction of Jewish shops and houses
cannot yet be verified by figures. The figures given in the
—
reports 815 shops destroyed, 29 department stores set on
fire or destroyed, 171 dwelling houses set on fire or destroyed
— indicate only a fraction of the actual damage caused, as
far as arson is concerned. Due to the urgency of the
reporting, the reports received to date are entirely limited
to general statements such as 'numerous' or 'most shops

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 2 Jan. 46

destroyed.' Therefore the figures given will be considerably-

augmented.
"One hundred and ninety-one synagogues were set on fire
and another 76 completely destroyed. In addition, 11 parish
halls, cemetery chapels, and similar buildings were set on
fire and three more completely destroyed.

"Twenty thousand Jews were arrested, also seven Aryans

and three foreigners. The latter were arrested for their own
safety.
"Thirty-six deathswere reported and those seriously injured
were numbered at 36. Those killed and injured are
also
Jews. One Jew is still missing. The Jews killed include one
Polish national, and those injured include two Poles."
I want to call Your Honors' special attention to the paper

appended to that document:

—
"The General Field Marshal" that is Goring "has been —
informed. No steps are to be taken. By order."
It is dated the 15th of November 1938 and signed. The signature
is illegible.

Now in that same connection Heydrich was charged by the

Defendant Goring with this entire program; and we next offer
in evidence the original of that order, 710-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-509. That is an order dated the 31st of July 1941. It is
written on the stationery of the Reich Marshal of the Greater
German Reich, Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, Chairman
of the Ministerial Council for National Defense; and it is dated at
Berlin, the 31st of July 1941, and directed to the Chief of the
Security Police and the Security Service, SS Gruppenführer
Heydrich:
"Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24
—
January 1939, which dealt with arriving at through further-
—
ance of emigration and evacuation a solution of the Jewish
problem as favorable as possible, I hereby charge you with
making all necessary preparations in regard to organizational
and financial matters for bringing about a complete solution
of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in
Europe.
"Wherever other Government agencies are involved, these
are to co-operate with you.
"I charge you furthermore, to send me before long an overall
plan concerning the organizational, factual, and material
measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired
final solution of the Jewish question." — —
signed "Goring."

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2 Jan. 46

The Tribunal has already received the evidence as to what the

Jewish problem was as conceived by Heydrich
final solution of the
and executed by the Security Police and SD under him and under
the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, which was enslavement and mass
murder.
Now, finally, in this presentation, the last activity of the Gestapo
and SD to which I will refer is that these organizations were the
primary agencies for the persecution of the churches. Already
evidence has been received concerning the persecution of the
churches. In this struggle the, Gestapo and the SD played a secret
but very highly significant part.
Section C2 of the SD dealt with education and religious life.
Section Bl of the Gestapo dealt with political Catholicism, Sec-
tion B2 with political Protestantism, and Section B3 with other
churches and Freemasonry.
The Church was one of the enemies of the Nazi State, and it
was a peculiar function of the Gestapo to combat it. It issued
restrictions against church activities, dissolved church organizations,
and placed clergymen in protective custody.
I now want to offer in evidence Document 1815-PS, Exhibit
—
Number USA-510. This is a very large file this original document
— and I want to quote only portions of it. This was a file of the
Gestapo regional office at Aachen. It discloses that the purpose of
the Gestapo in combatting the churches was to destroy them, and
I want to read the first page of the English translation from the
beginning.
This is dated the "12th of May 1941, at Berlin, from the RS HA,
Section IV B 1, to all Staatspolizeileitstellen. For information: The
SD Leit- Abschnitte; the inspectors of the Sipo and SD." I under-
stand this word "Abschnitte" means sub-divisions. The subject is
"Concerning the Study and Treatment of Political Churches":
"The chief of the RSHA
has ordered that the tasks assigned
to the SD and Sipo
regarding control of the political churches,
which have hitherto been carried out jointly by the SD-
Abschnitte and Stapostellen, shall now be solely performed
—
by the Stapostellen" which I understand means regional
offices of the Gestapo.
Then it refers to the plan for the division of work issued by
the RSHA on March 1, 1941:
"In addition to combatting opposition, the Stapostellen thus
take over the entire Gegnernachrichtendienst" I understand
— "in —
that word means counter-intelligence this sphere.
"In order that the Stapostellen should be in a position to
take over this work, the Chief of the Sipo and SD has
ordered that the church specialists, hitherto employed in the

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SD-Abschnitten, shall be temporarily detailed in equal rank

to the Stapo offices and operate the 'Nachrichtendienstliche
—
Arbeit'" which means intelligence service in regard to the
Church— "On the orders of the Chief of the RSHA and in
agreement with the heads of Amt III, II, and I, those church
specialists specified in the attached list ..."

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to give us the details of this?

COL. STOREY: No, Sir, I don't think so. At any rate, if Your
Honors please, we quote from it; and it is simply a direction as
to how they will proceed.
Now
then, later, on the 22d and 23rd of September 1941, they
called a conference of these so-called church specialists attached
to the Gestapo regional offices that I have mentioned. That was
held in the lecture hall of the RSHA in Berlin. Notes were taken,
and this same document contains notes of that conference. The
program is shown; the plan is worked out in connection with the
churches. I will just read the closing statement to these so-called
church specialists; it is very short:
"Each one of you must go to work with your whole heart
and a true fanaticism. Should a mistake or two be made
in the execution of this work, this should in no way dis-
courage you, since mistakes are made everywhere. The main
—
thing is that the adversary" meaning the church "should
—
be constantly opposed with determination, will, and effective
initiative."

And then, finally, the last thing I would like to refer to in this
document is on the eighth page of the English translation, which
sets out their immediate aim and their ultimate aim:
"The immediate aim: The Church must not regain 1 inch of
the ground it has lost.
"The ultimate aim: Destruction of the confessional churches
to be brought about by the collection of all material obtained
through Nachrichtendienst activities, which will, at a given
time, be produced as evidence against the church of its
treasonable activities during the German fight for existence."
I understand that long German word means intelligence activities.

Now, if Your Honors please, this concludes the factual, docu-

mentary presentation which I shall make in connection with the
SD and Gestapo. Closely allied with it is the case against Kalten-
brunner, as the representative of these organizations, which will
be presented immediately after lunch by Lieutenant Whitney
Harris. Also, there will be one or two witnesses who will be
introduced in connection with these organizations and in connection
with Kaltenbrunner.

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With that I should like to conclude, with just these remarks:

The evidence shows that the Gestapo was created by the
Defendant Goring in Prussia in April 1933 for the specific purpose
of serving as a police agency to strike down the actual and
ideological enemies of the Nazi regime and that henceforward the
Gestapo in Prussia and in the other states of the Reich carried out
a program of terror against all who were thought to be dangerous
to the domination of the conspirators over the people of Germany.
Its methods were utterly ruthless. It operated outside the law and
sent its victims to the concentration camps. The term "Gestapo"
became the symbol of the Nazi regime of force and terror.
Behind the scenes operating secretly, the SD, through its vast
network of informants, spied upon the German people in their
daily lives, on the streets, in the shops, and even within the
sanctity of the churches.
The most casual remark of the German citizen might bring
him before the Gestapo where his fate and freedom were decided
without recourse to law. In this government, in which the rule of
law was replaced by a tyrannical rule of men, the Gestapo was
the primary instrumentality of oppression.
The Gestapo and the SD played an important part in almost
every criminal act of the conspiracy. The category of these crimes,
apart from the thousands of specific instances of torture and
cruelty in policing Germany for the benefit of the conspirators,
reads like a page from the devil's notebook:
They fabricated the border incidents which Hitler used as an
excuse for attacking Poland.
They murdered hundreds^ of thousands of defenseless men,
women, and children by the infamous Einsatz groups.
They removed Jews, political leaders, and scientists from
prisoner-of-war camps and murdered them.
They took recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps
and murdered them.
They established and classified the concentration camps and sent
thousands of people into them for extermination and slave labor.
They cleared Europe of the Jews and were responsible for
sending hundreds of thousands to their deaths in annihilation camps.
They rounded up hundreds of thousands of citizens of occupied
countries and shipped them to Germany for forced labor and sent
slave laborers to labor reformatory camps.
They executed captured commandos and paratroopers and
protected civilians who lynched allied fliers.
They took civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret
trial and punishment.

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 2 Jan. 46

They arrested, tried, and punished citizens of occupied countries

under special criminal procedures, which did not accord fair trials,
and by summary methods.
They murdered or sent to concentration camps the relatives of
persons who had allegedly committed crimes.
They ordered the murder of prisoners in Sipo and SD prisons
to prevent their release by Allied armies.
They participated in the seizure and spoliation of public and
private property.
They were primary agencies for the persecution of the Jews
and churches.
In carrying out these crimes the Gestapo operated as an
organization closely centralized and controlled from Berlin head-
quarters. Reports were submitted to Berlin and all important
decisions emanated from Berlin. The regional offices had only
limited power to commit persons to concentration camps. All cases,
other than short of duration, had to be submitted to Berlin for
approval.
The Gestapo was organized on a functional basis. Its principal
divisions dealt with groups and institutions against which it com-
mitted the worst crimes —which I have enumerated.
Thus, in perpetrating these crimes, the Gestapo acted as an
entity, each section performing its parts in the general criminal
enterprises ordered by Berlin. The Secret State Police should be
held responsible as an organization for the vast crimes in which
it participated.
The SD was department of the SS. Its criminality
at all times a
directly concerns and contributes to the criminality of the SS.
And as to the Gestapo, it is submitted that it was an organiza-
tion in the sense in which that term is used in Article 9 of the
Charter, that the Defendants Goring and Kaltenbrunner committed
the crimes denned in Article 6 of the Charter in their capacity
as members and leaders of the Gestapo, and that the Gestapo, as
an organization, participated in and aided the conspiracy which
contemplated and involved the commission of the crimes denned
in Article 6 of the Charter.
And finally, I have in my hand here a brochure published in
honor of the famous Heydrich, the former Chief of the Security
Police and SD; and I quote from a speech delivered by Heydrich
on German Police Day, 1941, of which I ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice:
"Secret State Police, Criminal Police, and SD are still
adorned with the furtive and whispered secrecy of a political
detective story. In a mixture of fear and shuddering and —

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2 Jan. 46

yet at home with a certain feeling of security because of their

—
presence brutality, inhumanity bordering on the sadistic,
and ruthlessness are attributed abroad to the men of this
profession."
Those are the words of Heydrich, who was the former head of this
organization.
Does Your Honor want to go ahead?
KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kalten-
DR.
brunner): I have just heard that during the afternoon the evidence
will concern the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. I therefore regard it
as advisable to make a motion regarding Kaltenbrunner now,
before the recess, and not in the afternoon.
My suggestion is the following:
I trial against Kaltenbrunner be postponed during
ask that the
his absence. Kaltenbrunner has only been able to be present at
a few days of the proceedings so far. The reason for his absence
is an illness which, in my opinion, is of a serious nature, for it is

obvious that in so important a trial only a very serious illness can

justify the absence of a defendant. I have no doctor's report on
his present condition. It appears to me dubious whether he will
be capable of attending the hearing at all in the future. Be that
as it may, my present suggestion that the trial of Kaltenbrunner
be postponed is not in contradiction to Paragraph 12 of the Charter.
If a defendant is alive and cannot be brought to trial in person,
then the trial can proceed against him in his absence. This is
particularly justified if the defendant is concealing himself and it
is thus his own fault if he is tried in his absence.

But Kaltenbrunner is here in prison. He did not withdraw

himself from the trial and he wishes nothing more than that he
may be able to face the accusations. But if such a defendant is
obliged to be absent through no fault of his own, then a trial that
was nevertheless carried out would hardly be consistent with justice.
Article 12 of the Charter mentions this point of justice specifically.
I all the more since
should regret the procedure of the trial
precisely now Kaltenbrunner must have an
opportunity to give
me information in my capacity as his Defense Counsel. The
particular Indictment is not even known to him; it was only
handed over just before the Christmas recess.
I do not need to emphasize how greatly the Defense's task is

made more difficult by a continuation of the trial indeed it is —

made almost impossible.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the application
which has been made on behalf of counsel for the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner and will give its decision shortly.

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The Tribunal will now adjourn until 2 o'clock.

COL. STOREY: If I may make just one statement in connection

with that, if Your Honor pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
COL. STOREY: The evidence against Kaltenbrunner will be in
connection with the part he played in these organizations; and
we thought, in the interest of time, the individual case against
Kaltenbrunner could be presented at the same time. Now, if it
were not presented in this connection, it would be within a few
days, early next week, in connection with the other individual
defendants. Counsel mentions that he probably will not be able
to be here for some time, and I thought I would make that
statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

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2 Jan. 46

Afternoon Session

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the motion

made by counsel on behalf of Kaltenbrunner, and it considers that
any evidence which you were intending to produce, which is
directed against Kaltenbrunner individually and not against the
organizations, ought to be postponed until the Prosecution come
to deal, as the Tribunal understands you do propose to deal, with
each defendant individually; and the Tribunal thinks that Kalten-
brunner's case might properly be kept to the end of the individual
defendants, and that the evidence which is especially brought
against Kaltenbrunner might then be adduced. If Kaltenbrunner
is then still unable to be in Court, that evidence will have to be
given in his absence.
COL. STOREY: If Your Honor pleases, I don't believe that the
case, as we have it prepared now, can be separated as between
the organizations and the individuals.
THE PRESIDENT: No, but if it bears against the organizations
it can be adduced now.
COL. STOREY: I understood that, but if Your Honor pleases, I
say that the preparation that we have made is in connection both
with the organizations and the individuals. In other words, it is
a joint presentation, therefore, under Your Honor's ruling, as taken,
it would have to go over until next week with the individual

defendants' cases, because we prepared it so that it will affect the

organizations as well as the defendant individually, because his
acts are in connection with what he has done with the organizations
included; in other words, we don't have it separated.
THE PRESIDENT: How will that affect you for this afternoon?
COL. STOREY: We can introduce a witness next; but if Your
Honor pleases, with reference to the witness, the witness, of course,
would affect the organizations, and incidentally would affect
Kaltenbrunner, too. I do not see how you could separate that,
except that for the witnesses this afternoon the questions could be
confined to the organizations.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, of course, all the evidence which has
been given up to date, much of it in Kaltenbrunner' s absence, has
in one sense been against Kaltenbrunner in being evidence against
the organization of which he was the head.
COL. STOREY: Colonel Amen was going to examine the witness
orally, and it is primarily against the organizations; and incidentally
it would affect Kaltenbrunner's individual liability.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like you to go

on with the evidence.

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 2 Jan. 46

COL. STOREY: Yes. It has been suggested, if Your Honor

pleases, that we might have a few minutes to confer about the
situation, about the witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish to adjourn for a few minutes?
COL. STOREY: Just a few minutes so that we can confer
because it changes our order of proof.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. STOREY: Just 10 minutes will be sufficient.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; we will adjourn now.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now hear the evidence

which the Prosecution desires to call, and insofar as it consists of
oral testimony, the Tribunal will afford counsel for Kaltenbrunner
the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses so called, at a
later stage if he wishes to do so.

HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS and SD): I was at

first appointed counsel for the members of the SS and the SD
who had made an application to be heard in these proceedings.
My duties were limited to presenting the incoming motions to the
Court in a suitable form. Not until the Tribunal made its announce-
ment of 17 December 1945, was I appointed as Defense Counsel
for the organizations of the SS and the SD. As such I have no
client or employer who could give me information or instruction
for conducting the defense. In order to obtain the needed informa-
tion I am, therefore, directed to communicate with members of
the organizations I am representing, most of whom are in prisoner-
of-war camps or are under arrest. So far, because of the shortness
of time, I have not been able, to get this information.
After 17 December 1945 thousands of motions were submitted
to me through the Court, and in the short period of time since
then I have not been able to follow the instructions they contained.
According to Article 16 of the Charter the defendant is to be
shown a copy of the Indictment and of all pertaining documents,
written in a language he understands, within a proper time prior
to the beginning of the Trial. This provision should, according to
the sense, be also applied to the indicted organizations. To serve
the Indictment on the organizations is not provided for in the rules
of procedure nor has the Tribunal so far ordered it.

In view of the very extensive work involved I personally was

not in a position to have a sufficient number of copies prepared
for distribution to the various camps in which the members of the

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2 Jan. 46

organizations are and thereby enable them to express their views

and to give me the needed information.
In view of these circumstances, for which I am not responsible
nor are the organizations which I am representing, I am not in a
position to cross-examine a witness who would be heard today,
thereby making use of the right accorded to me as Defense Counsel.
The hearing of a witness against the Defendant Kaltenbrunner
likewise concerns the organizations which I represent, the SS and
the SD. To hear such a witness at this point would mean limiting
the Defense.
therefore submit a motion to postpone the further discussion
I
of the charges against the organizations of theSS and the SD. By
visiting the camps, in which there are members of the organizations
of the SS and SD, and after discussions with them, I shall be able
to obtain the information needed for the defense. I should like to
add that thereby no delay in the proceedings would be caused; and,
I presume, this would in no way place a burden upon the Prose-

cution.

THE PRESIDENT: If you will allow me to interrupt you, I

understand your application to be that you are not in a position
to cross-examine these witnesses this afternoon and that you wish
for an opportunity similar to that which I have already accorded
to the counsel for Kaltenbrunner, to be accorded to you. You wish
for an opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses at a later stage,
is that right?

HERR BABEL: Yes. At the same time, however, I should like

to point out at this moment that, through the peculiarity of the
task that has been allotted to me, it is being made difficult to cover
questions subsequently . .

THE PRESIDENT: Let us not take up time by that. Was your

application that you might have an opportunity of cross-examining
these witnesses at a later date?
HERR BABEL: My motion had that meaning but was also for
the purpose of making the defense itself possible as a whole, which
at a time when I cannot make the necessary use of the privileges
granted me by the Charter. .

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is ready to give you the

opportunity of cross-examining these witnesses at a later date.
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER
WHITNEY R. HARRIS (Assistant
Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal,
we submit Document Book BB as a separate document book,
relating to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. This book contains
our documents, from which quotations will be made during this

288
 2 Jan. 46

presentation.Reference will be made to three or four other docu-

ments contained in the document book on the Gestapo and the SD.
During the past 3 court days, the Tribunal has heard evidence
of the criminality of the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo. The fusion
of these organizations into the shock formations of the Hitler Police
State has been explained from an organizational standpoint. There
is before the Tribunal a defendant who represents these organiza-

tions through the official positions which he held in the SS and the
German Police and whose career gives added significance to this
unity of the S S and the Nazi Police. The name of this defendant
is Ernst Kaltenbrunner.
I now offer Document 2938-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit
Number USA-511. This is an article which appeared in Die Deutsche
Polizei, the magazine of the Security Police and SD, on 15 May
1943, at Page 193, entitled, "Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the New
.

Chief of the Security Police and SD;" and I quote the beginning
of the article:
"SS Gruppenführer Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner was born the
son of the lawyer Dr. Hugo Kaltenbrunner, on 4 October
1903, at Ried, in the Inn Kreis, near Braunau. He spent his
youth in the native district of the Führer, with which his
kinsfolk, originally a hereditary scythe-making clan, had
been closely connected since olden times. Later he moved
with his parents to the little market town of Raab, and then
to Linz, on the Danube, where he attended the State Real-
gymnasium, and there he passed his final examination in
1921."

The next paragraph describes Kaltenbrunner's legal education,

his nationalistic activities, and his opposition to Catholic-Christian
Social student groups. It states that after 1928 Kaltenbrunner worked
as a lawyer candidate in Linz. The article continues; and I quote,
reading the third paragraph:
"As early as January 1934 Dr. Kaltenbrunner was jailed by
the Dollfuss Government on account of his Nazi views and
sent with other leading National Socialists into the con-
centration camp Kaisersteinbruch. He caused and led a
hunger strike and forced the government to dismiss 490
National Socialist prisoners. In the following year he was
jailed again, because of suspicion of high treason, and com-
mitted to the court martial of Wels (Upper Danube). After
an investigation of many months, the accusation of high
treason collapsed; but he was sentenced to 6 months' imprison-
ment for subversive activities. After the spring of 1935, Dr.
Kaltenbrunner was the leader of the Austrian SS, the right
to practice his profession having been suspended because of

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his National Socialist views. It redounds to his credit that

in important position he succeeded
this through energetic
leadership in maintaining the unity of the Austrian SS,
which he had built up in spite of all persecution, and
succeeded in committing it successfully at the right moment.
"After the Anschluss, in which the SS was a decisive factor,
he was appointed State Secretary for Security Matters on
11 March 1938 in the new National Socialist Cabinet of Dr.
Seyss-Inquart. A few hours later he was able to report to
the Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, who had landed at
Aspern, the Vienna airport, on 12 March 1938, 3 a.m., as the
first National Socialist leader, that the movement had achieved
—
complete victory and that" the article quotes Kaltenbrunner
— "the SS is in formation awaiting further orders.

"The Führer promoted Dr. Kaltenbrunner on the day of the

annexation to SS Brigadeführer and leader of the SS-Ober-
abschnitt Donau. On 11 September 1938 this was followed
by his promotion to SS Gruppenführer."
The Tribunal will recall evidence heretofore received; and I
refer to Page 570 (Volume II, Page 417) of the English transcript of
these proceedings, of the telephone conversation between Goring
and Seyss-Inquart, in which Goring stated that Kaltenbrunner was
to have the Department of Security. I continue quoting the last
paragraph from this article:
"During the liquidation of the Austrian National Government
and the reorganization of Austria into the Alps and Danube
Districts, he was appointed Higher S S and Police Leader
with the Reich Governors in Vienna, Lower Danube and
Upper Danube in Corps Area 17, and in April 1941 he was
promoted to Lieutenant General of Police."
Kaltenbrunner thereby became the little Himmler of Austria.
According to Der Grossdeutsche Reichstag, fourth Wahlperiode,
1938, published by F. Kienast, at Page 261, our Document 2892-PS,
Kaltenbrunner joined the Nazi Party and the SS in Austria in 1932.
He was Party Member 300179 and SS Member 13039. Prior to
1933 he was the "Gauredner" and legal adviser to S S Division 8.
After 1933 he was the leader of SS Regiment 37 and later the
leader of SS Division 8. Kaltenbrunner was given the highest Nazi
Party decorations, the Golden Insignia of Honor and the Blutorden.
He was a member of the Reichstag after 1938.
I now offer Document 3427-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit
Number USA-512. This is also an article which appeared in Die
Deutsche Polizei, the magazine of the Security Police and SD,
12 February 1943, at Page 65; and I quote:

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 .

2 Jan. 46

"SS Gruppenführer Kaltenbrunner Appointed Chief of the

Security Police and of the SD.
"Berlin, 30 January 1943.
"Upon suggestion SS and Chief of German
of the Reichsführer
Police, the Führer has appointed SS Gruppenführer and
Lieutenant General of Police Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner as
Chief of the Security Police and of the SD, as successor of
SS Obergruppenführer and Lieutenant General of Police
Reinhard Heydrich, who passed away 4 June 1942."
The Tribunal has heard frequent references made to the speech
Himmler delivered on 4 October 1943 at Posen, Poland, to Grup-
penführer of the SS, our Document 1919-PS, heretofore received
as Exhibit Number USA-170, in which with unmatched frankness
Himmler discussed the barbaric program and criminal activities of
the SS and the Security Police. Near the beginning of the speech
—
Himmler referred to and I quote merely this one sentence: "Our
comrade, S S Gruppenführer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who has suc-
ceeded our fallen friend Heydrich."
Kaltenbrunner carried out the responsibilities as Chief of the
Security Police and SD to the satisfaction of Himmler and Hitler,
for on 9 December 1944, according to the Befehlsblatt of the
Security Police and SD . .

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I interrupt just for a second? I under-

stood the decision of the Tribunal to be that the proceedings against
Kaltenbrunner were to be postponed until Kaltenbrunner is fit for
trial, and now the case of Kaltenbrunner is being discussed.

THE PRESIDENT: No, the decision, which the Tribunal indi-

cated before, was based upon the view that the evidence could be
divided between evidence which bore directly against Kalten-
brunner and evidence which bore against the organization of the
Gestapo; but when you attended before us in closed session, it was
explained that it was impossible to do that and that the evidence
was so inextricably mingled that it was impossible to direct the
evidence solely to the organization and not to include that against
Kaltenbrunner. Accordingly, the Tribunal decided that they would
go on with the evidence which the Prosecution desired to present
in its entirety but that they would give you the opportunity of
cross-examining any witnesses which might be called, at a later
date. Of course you will, in addition to that, have the fullest
opportunity of dealing with any documentary evidence which bears
against Kaltenbrunner when the time comes for you to present
the defense on behalf of Kaltenbrunner.
Do you follow that?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Certainly.

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2 Jan. 46

THE PRESIDENT: You will have the opportunity of cross-

examining any witness who is called this afternoon or tomorrow,
at a later date —
a date which will be convenient to yourself. And
in addition, with reference to any or all evidence such as is now
being presented by counsel for the United States, you will have
full opportunity at a future date of dealing with that evidence in
any way that it seems right to you to do.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes. May I just say one word more. The
misunderstanding under which I am laboring is clearly due to the
fact that was
of the opinion that
I witnesses were to be heard,
whereas I now
learn that evidence, a greater amount of it, is to be
put forward. However, as I hear that the Tribunal is also admitting
the evidence in its entirety I shall, of course, have to submit to this
decision.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Kaltenbrunner carried out the respon-
sibilities as Chief of the Security Police and SD to the satisfaction
of Himmler and Hitler, for on 9 December 1944, according to the
Befehlsblatt of the Security Police and SD, Number 51, Page 361,
our Document 2770-PS, he received, as Chief of the Security Police
and SD, the decoration known as the Knight's Cross of the War
Merit with Crossed Swords, one of the highest military decorations.
By that time Kaltenbrunner had been promoted to the high rank
of SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Police.
I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the organization chart
entitled, of Kaltenbrunner and the Gestapo and SD
"The Position
in the Police System," Exhibit Number USA-493. As Chief
German
of the Security Police and SD, Kaltenbrunner was the head of the
Gestapo, the Kripo and the SD, and of the RSHA which was a
department of the SS, and the Reich Ministry of the Interior. He
was in charge of the regional offices of the Gestapo, the SD, and
the Kripo within Germany, and of the Einsatz groups and Einsatz-
kommandos in the occupied territories.
Directly under Kaltenbrunner were the chiefs of the main offices
of the RSHA including Amt III (the SD within Germany), Amt IV
(the Gestapo), Amt V (the Kripo), and Amt VI (foreign intelligence).
I offer Document 2939-PS
as exhibit next in order, Exhibit
Number USA-513. the affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, who
This is
was chief of Amt VI of the RSHA from the autumn of 1941 to
the end of the war. I am going to read a very small portion of this
affidavit, beginning with the sixth sentence of the first paragraph:
"On or about 25 January 1943, I went together with Kalten-
brunner to Himmler's headquarters at Lotzen in East Prussia.
All of the Amt chiefs of the RSHA were present at this
meeting, and Himmler informed us that Kaltenbrunner was
to be appointed Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA)

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 2 Jan. 46

as successor to Heydrich. His appointment was effective

30 January 1943. I know of no limitation placed on Kalten-
brunner's authority as Chief of the Security Police and SD
(RS HA). He promptly entered upon the duties of the office
and assumed direct charge of the office and control over the
Amt. All important matters of all Ämter had to clear through
Kaltenbrunner. "
During Kaltenbrunner's term in office as Chief of the Security
Police and SD, many crimes were committed by the Security Police
and SD pursuant to policy established by the RSHA or upon orders
issued out of the RSHA, for all of which Kaltenbrunner was
responsible by virtue of his office. Each of these crimes has been
discussed in detail in the case against the Gestapo and SD, and
reference is here made to that presentation. Evidence now will
be offered only to show that these crimes continued after Kalten-
brunner became Chief of the Security Police and SD on 30 January
1943.

The first crime for which Kaltenbrunner

is responsible as Chief
of the Security Police and SD
the murder and mistreatment of
is
civilians of occupied countries by the Einsatz groups. There were
at least five Einsatz groups operating in the East during Kalten-
brunner's term in office.
—
The Befehlsblatt of the Security Police and SD and this is
contained in our Document 2890-PS, of which I ask the Tribunal
to take judicial notice —
contains reference to Einsatz Groups A,
B, D, G, and Croatia during the period of August 1943 to January
1945.
I shall not read from that document which contains those
excerpts, but the Tribunal will note those references to the name
"Einsatz groups," indicating that they were operating during the
time that Kaltenbrunn er was Chief of the Security Police and SD.
The Tribunal will recall Document 1104-PS, which has heretofore
been received as Exhibit Number USA-483. I will only refer in
passing to this document, which contained a lengthy and critical
report on the conduct of the Security Police in exterminating the
Jewish population of Sluzk, White Ruthenia. That report was sub-
mitted to Heydrich on 21 November 1941. Yet the same conditions
of horror and cruelty continued to characterize the operations of
Einsatzkommandos in the East while Kaltenbrunner was Chief of
the Security Police and SD. I refer to Document R-135, which has
heretofore been received as Exhibit Number USA-289; and I will
not read anything from that but simply refresh the récollection of
the Tribunal to the report of Gunther, the prison warden at Minsk,
under date of 31 May 1943, to the General Commissioner for White
Ruthenia, in which he pointed out that after 13 April 1943 the SD

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2 Jan. 46

had pursued a policy of removing all gold teeth, bridgework, and

Jews, an hour or two before they were murdered.
fillings of

The Tribunal will also recall in this exhibit the report of 18 June
1943 to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Territories describing
the practice of the police battalions of locking men, women, and
children into barns which were then set on fire.
The second crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as
Chief of the Security Police and SD, is the execution of racial and
political undesirables.

THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Harris, I think you are going

perhaps a little bittoo fast, and it is difficult for us to follow you
when you are referring so quickly to these documents.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Thank you, Sir.
The second crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as
Chief of the Security Police and SD, is the execution of racial and
political undesirables screened out of prisoner-of-war camps by the
Gestapo. The Tribunal will recall Document Number 2542-PS,
heretofore received as Exhibit Number USA-489. I believe you will
find that document in the Gestapo document book. It was intro-
duced this morning.
THE PRESIDENT: The Lindow affidavit?
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes. That is the Lindow affidavit that
indicates that the program of screening prisoner-of-war camps
continued during 1943.
The third crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief
of the Security Police and SD was the taking of recaptured
prisoners of war
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. You have not yet drawn
our attention to any specific paragraph which shows that it was
in operation after 1943; you are passing on to something else whilst
1 am looking at the document to see what I have got.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Referring specifically to the third para-

graph, if the Tribunal please, which has heretofore been read into
evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: That only says until about the beginning
of 1943.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: It says early in 1943 the department was

dissolved and absorbed into the departments in Subsection IV B.
The work concerning Russian PW's must then have been done
by IV B 2a.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, that is all you want it for, is
it not?

294
m
 2 Jan. 46

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes.

Thethird crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief
of the Security Police and SD was the taking of recaptured pris-
oners of war to concentration camps where they were executed.
I invite the attention of the Tribunal to Document 1650-PS which
has heretofore been received as Exhibit Number USA-246. This is
the secret Gestapo order, the Kugel Erlass, or Bullet Decree, under
which escaped prisoners of war were sent to concentration camps
by the Security Police and SD for execution.
This order, dated 4 March 1944, was signed and I quote: "Chief —
of the Security Police and of the Security Service, for the Chief,"
— signed — 'Müller.
'
'
'

I now offer Document L-158 as exhibit next in order. This is

Exhibit Number USA-514. I am not going to read this document
since similar to the previous document offered, but I do wish
it is

to refer to the marked passages. First: "On 2 March 1944 the Chief
of the Security Police and SD, Berlin, forwarded the following
OKW order/' Then follows the statement that upon recapture
certain escaped prisoners of war should be turned over to the
Chief of the Security Police and SD. The document goes on to
—
say and I quote, "In this connection the Chief of the Security
Police and SD has issued the following instructions." Detailed
instructions follow concerning the turning over of such prisoners
to the commandant of Mauthausen under the operation Bullet.
—
Further, this order states, and I quote this is at the very end of
the order:
"The list of the recaptured officers and non-working non-
commissioned officer prisoners of war will be kept here by
IV A 1. To enable a report to be made punctually to the
Chief of the Sipo and SD, Berlin, statements of the numbers
involved must reach Radom by 20 June 1944."
I recall the attention of the Tribunal to Document 2285-PS,
which was received this morning as Exhibit Number USA-490.

THE PRESIDENT: Has that Document L-158 already been put

in evidence?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: No, Sir, I have just put in those portions.
I have just put the document in evidence at this time, Sir. The
document has not been read in its entirety for the reason that the
contents, other than the quoted portions, are substantially the same
as Document 1650-PS which has been read at length.

THE PRESIDENT: You say it is the same as Document 1650-PS?

LT.COMDR. HARRIS: It is, Sir, substantially the same. It
relates to the same subject. It was, however, addressed to a

295
2 Jan. 46

different party, and I particularly wish to place before the Tribunal

the last paragraph which has been quoted and read into evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: The last paragraph does not mean very much
by itself, does it?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Very well, Sir. Then, if the Tribunal

will permit it, I would like to read the document in its entirety.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that Document 1650-PS has
got these Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 in it?
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes, Sir. That is exactly what I do
mean, Sir.
I recall the attention of the Tribunal to Document 2285-PS,
which was received in evidence this morning as Exhibit USA-490.
That was the affidavit of Lieutenant Colonel Gast and Lieutenant
Veith of the French Army who stated that during 1943 and 1944
prisoners of war were murdered at Mauthausen under the Bullet
Decree. I am sure the Tribunal will recall that document.
The fourth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as
Chief of the Security Police and SD was the commitment of racial
and political undesirables to concentration camps and annihilation
camps for slave labor and mass murder. Before Kaltenbrunner
became Chief of the Security Police and SD on 30 January 1943,
he was fully cognizant of conditions in concentration camps and of
the fact that concentration camps were used for slave labor and
mass murder. The Tribunal will recall from previous evidence that
Mauthausen Concentration Camp was established in Austria and
that Kaltenbrunner was the Higher SS and Police Leader for
Austria. This concentration camp, as shown by Document 1063(a)-
PS, which was received this morning as Exhibit Number USA-492,
was classified by Heydrich in January 1941 in Category III, a camp
for the most heavily accused prisoners and for asocial prisoners who
were considered incapable of being reformed. The Tribunal will
recall that prisoners of war to be executed under the Bullet Decree
were sent to Mauthausen. As will be shown hereafter, Kalten-
brunner was a frequent visitor to Mauthausen Concentration Camp.
On one such visit in 1942 Kaltenbrunner personally observed the
gas chamber in action. I now offer Document 2753-PS as exhibit
next in order, Exhibit Number USA-515. This is the affidavit of
Alois Höllriegl, former guard at Mauthausen concentration camp.
The affidavit states, and I quote:
"I, Alois Höllriegl, being first duly sworn, declare:
was a member of the Totenkopf SS and stationed at the
"I
Mauthausen Concentration Camp from January 1940 until the
end of the war. On one occasion, I believe it was in the fall
of 1942, Ernst Kaltenbrunner visited Mauthausen. I was on

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 2 Jan. 46

guard duty time and saw him twice. He went down

at the
into the gaschamber with Ziereis, commandant of the camp,
at a time when prisoners were being gassed. The sound
accompanying the gassing operation was well known to me.
I heard the gassing taking place while Kaltenbrunner was
present.
"I saw Kaltenbrunner come up from the gas cellar after the
—
gassing operation had been completed." signed "Höllriegl."
—
On one occasion Kaltenbrunner made an inspection of the camp
grounds at Mauthausen with Himmler and had his photograph taken
during the course of the inspection. I offer Document 2641-PS as
exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-516. This exhibit con-
sists of two affidavitsseries of photographs. Here are the
and a
original photographs in my
hand. The original photographs are the
small ones, which have been enlarged, and those in the document
book are not very good reproductions, but the Tribunal will see
better reproductions which are being handed to it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: As the whole accusation against Kalten-

brunner personally has nevertheless been brought forward, I feel
bound to make a motion on a matter of principle. I could have
made this motion this morning just as well. It concerns the question
of whether affidavits may be read or not. I know that this question
has already been the subject of consultation by the Tribunal and
that the Tribunal has come to a definite decision on this question.
When I make this question again a matter for decision, it is for a
special reason.
Every somewhat dynamical. What was right at one time
trial is
may be wrong The greatest and most important trial in
later.
history depends in many important points on the mere reading of
affidavits which have been taken by the Prosecution exclusively,
according to its own maxims.

The reading of affidavits is not satisfactory in the long run. It

is becoming, from hour to hour, more necessary to see, to hear for

once, a witness for the Prosecution and to test his credibility and the
reliability of his memory. Many witnesses are standing, so to speak,
at the door of this courtroom, and they need only to be called in.
To hear the witness at a later stage is not sufficient; nor is it cer-
tain that the Tribunal will permit a hearing on the same evidential
subject. therefore oppose the further reading of the affidavits just
I
announced. The spirit of Article 19 of the Charter should not be
killed by the literal interpretation.

THE PRESIDENT: Is your application that you want to cross-

examine the witness or is your application that the affidavit should
not be read?

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2 Jan. 46

DR. KAUFFMANN: The latter.

THE PRESIDENT: That the affidavit should not be read?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you referring to the affidavit of Höll-
riegl, Document 2753-PS?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that the affi-
davit,which is upon a relevant point, upon a material point, is evi-
dence which ought to be admitted under Article 19 of the Charter;
but they will consider any motion which counsel for Kaltenbrunner
may think fit to make for cross-examination of the witness who
made the affidavit if he is available and could be called.
[To Lieutenant Commander Harris.] You were dealing with these
photographs, were you not?
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes, Sir. They have been offered in evi-
dence as the exhibit next in order, and I wish to refer to the first
affidavit accompanying them, which appears in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: It being the affidavit of Alois Höllriegl.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You had handed up the affidavit at
the same time, had you not?
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Yes, Sir, I did, Sir. That affidavit states,
and I quote:
"I was a member of the Totenkopf SS and stationed in the
Mauthausen Concentration Camp from January 1940 until
the end of the war. I am thoroughly familiar with all of the
buildings and grounds at Mauthausen Concentration Camp.
I have been shown Document 2641-PS, which is a series of
six photographs. I recognize all of these photographs as hav-
ing been taken at Mauthausen Concentration Camp. With
respect to the first photograph I positively identify Heinrich
Himmler as the man on the left, Ziereis, the commandant of
Mauthausen Concentration Camp in the center, and Ernst
Kaltenbrunner as the man on the right."
THE PRESIDENT: He does not say, does he, at what date the
photographs were taken?
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: No, Sir, I have no evidence as to what
date the photographs were taken, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Just that Kaltenbrunner was there?
LT.COMDR. HARRIS: Just that Kaltenbrunner was there, at
some time, in the company of Ziereis and Himmler.

298
 2 Jan. 46

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: With full knowledge of conditions in,
and the purpose of, concentration camps, Kaltenbrunner ordered or
permitted to be ordered in his name the commitment of persons to
concentration camps.
I offer as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number
Document L-38
USA-517. This an affidavit of Hermann Pister, the former com-
is
mandant of Buchenwald concentration camp, which was taken on
1 August 1945 at Freising, Germany, in the course of an official
military investigation by the United States Army, and I quote from
it as follows, beginning with the second paragraph:

"With exception of the mass delivery of prisoners from the

concentration camps of the occupied territory, all prisoners
were sent to the Concentration Camp Buchenwald by
—
order of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt" Reich Security
—
Main Office "Berlin. These orders for protective custody
(red forms) were in most cases signed with the name 'Kalten-
brunner.' The few remaining protective custody orders were
signed by 'Förster.' "
I now offer Document 2477-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit
Number USA-518. This is the affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, former
Chief of Department IVAlb in the RSHA. This document reads in
part as follows, and I quote, beginning with the second paragraph:
"The right of taking into summary protective custody belongs
to the directors of the State Police Directorates or State Police
Offices; previously for a period of 21 days; later, I think, for
a period of 56 days. Custody exceeding this time had to be
sanctioned by the competent Office for Protective Custody in
the RSHA. The regulations for protective custody or the
signing of the protective custody order could only be issued
through the Director of the RSHA as Chief of the Sipo and
SD. All regulations and protective custody orders that I have
seen bore a facsimile stamp of Heydrich or Kaltenbrunner.
As far as I can remember, I have never seen a document of
this kind with another name as signature. How far and to
whom the Chief of the Sipo and SD possibly gave authority
for the use of his facsimile stamp, I do not know. Perhaps
the Chief of Amt IV possessed a similar authority. The
greater part of the Protective Custody Office was transferred
to Prague. Only one staff remained in Berlin."

I now offer Document 2745-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit

Number USA-519. This is an order, under date of 7 July 1943, which
was found at the former office of the section of the Gestapo which
handled protective custody matters in Prague. It was an order to

299
2 Jan. 46

the Prague office to send a teletype message to the Gestapo office

in Köslin ordering protective custody of one Ratzke, and her com-
mitment to the concentration camp at Ravensbriick for refusing to
work. The order carried the facsimile signature of Kaltenbrunner
and I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the original which has
that facsimile for the arrest. Orders of this type were the basis for
the orders actually sent out to the Prague office, which carried the
teletype signature of Kaltenbrunner. At the bottom of the page the
Tribunal will note the facsimile stamp of Kaltenbrunner.
next refer to Document L-215, which has heretofore been
I
received as Exhibit Number USA-243. I believe the Tribunal will
recall this document, which has heretofore been received in evidence,
and which contains 25 orders for arrest issued out of the Prague
office ofthe RSHA to the Einsatzkommando of Luxembourg, all of
which carry the typed signature of Kaltenbrunner. And the Court
—
will remember and I am holding up the original document that —
these arrest orders were the red forms which the commandant of
Buchenwald referred to in his affidavit as being the forms which he
saw coming from RSHA committing persons to Buchenwald.
The concentration camps to which persons were committed,
according to Document L-215, by Kaltenbrunner, included Dachau,
Natzweiler, Sachsenhausen, and Buchenwald.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of it?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: The most of these, Sir, were in 1944.

1 believe they are all in 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear on the document does it?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: It does appear, Sir, on the original docu-

ment, yes. The page of this translation is a summary of all of
first
these. There is only one of the dossiers which has been translated
in full, and the date on that one is 15. 2. 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I see.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Among the grounds specified on these
orders carrying the typed signature of Kaltenbrunner were, quoting:
"Strongly suspected of working to the detriment of the Reich;
spiteful statements inimical to Germany, as well as aspersions
and threats against persons active in the National Socialist
movement; strongly suspected of aiding deserters."
I now offer Document 2239-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit

Number USA-520. This is a file of 42 telegrams sent by the Prague

office of theRSHA to the Gestapo office at Darmstadt, and they all
carry the teletype signature of Kaltenbrunner. These commitment
orders were issued during the period from 20 September 1944 to
2 February 1945. The concentration camps to which Kaltenbrunner

300
 2 Jan. 46

sent these people included Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück, Buchen-

wald, Bergen-Belsen, Flossenbürg, and Theresienstadt. Nationalities
included Czech, German, French, Dutch, Italian, Corsican, Lithu-
anian, Greek, and Jews. Grounds included refusal to work, religious
propaganda, sex relations with PW's, communist statements, loafing
on the job, working against the Reich, spreading of rumors detri-
mental to morale, "action Gitter," breach of work contracts, state-
ments against Germany, assault of foremen, defeatist statements,
and theft and escape from jail.
Not only did Kaltenbrunner commit persons to concentration
camps, but he authorized executions in concentration camps. I now
offer Document L-51 as exhibit next in order, Exhibit USA-521.
This is the affidavit of Adolf Zutter, the former adjutant of Maut-
hausen Concentration Camp, taken in the course of an official mili-
tary investigation of the United States Army, on 2 August 1945, at
Linz, Austria. This affidavit states, and I am quoting from Para-
graph 3:

"Standartenführer Ziereis, the commander of Camp Maut-

hausen, gave me a large number of execution orders after
opening the secret mail, because I was the adjutant and I had
to deliver these to Obersturmführer Schulz. These orders of
execution were written approximately in the following
."
form. . .

There follows in the affidavit a description of the order for exe-

cution issued by the RSHA to the commander of the Concentration
Camp Mauthausen. I omit quoting that description and continue at
the next paragraph:
"Orders for execution also came without the name of the
court of justice. Until the assassination of Heydrich, these
orders were signed by him or by his competent deputy. Later
on the orders were signed by Kaltenbrunner, but mostly they
were signed by his deputy, Gruppenführer Müller.
"Dr. Kaltenbrunner, who signed the above-mentioned orders,
had the rank of SS general —Obergruppenführer—and was
the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office.
"Dr. Kaltenbrunner is about 40 years old, height about 1.76
to 1.80 meters, and has deep fencing scars on his face.
"When Dr. Kaltenbrunner was only a Higher SS and Police
Leader in Vienna, he visited the camp several times; later
on as the Chief of Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) he
visited the camp, too, though this occurred much less fre-
quently. During these visits, the commander usually received
him outside the building of the camp headquarters and
reported. Concerning the American military mission, which

301
2 Jan. 46

landed behind the German front in the Slovakian or Hun-

garian area in January 1945, I remember when these persons
were brought to Camp Mauthausen. I suppose the number of
the arrivals was about 12 to 15 men. They wore a uniform,
which was American or Canadian, brown-green color shirt
and tunic and cloth cap. Eight or 10 days after their arrival
the execution order came in by telegraph or teletype. Stan-
dartenführer Ziereis came to me into my office and told me,
'Now Kaltenbrunner has given the permission for the exe-
cution.' This letter was secret and had the signature 'signed,
Kaltenbrunner.' Then these people were shot according to
martial law and their belongings were given to me by Ober-
scharführer Niedermeyer."
The fifth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief
of the Security Police and SD was the deportation of citizens of
occupied territories for forced labor and the disciplining of forced
labor.
I am sure the Tribunal will recall, without referring to it, Docu-
ment 30 12-PS, which has heretofore been received as Exhibit Num-
ber USA-190. That was the letter from the head of the Sonder-
kommando of the Sipo and SD, which stated that the Ukraine would
have to provide a million workers for the armament industry and
that force should be used where necessary. That letter was dated
19 March 1943.
Kaltenbrunner's responsibility for the disciplining of foreign
labor is shown by Document 1063-PS, which has heretofore been
received as Exhibit Number USA-492. No part of this letter has
been read into the record. This letter dated 26 July 1943 was
addressed to Higher SS and Police Leaders, commanders and inspec-
tors of the Sipo and SD, and to the chiefs of Einsatz Groups B and D.
The Tribunal will recall that Einsatz Groups A, B, C, and D,
operating in the East, carried out the extermination of Jews and
Communist leaders. This document proves Kaltenbrunner's control
over Einsatz Groups B and D. This document is signed "Kalten-
brunner." The first paragraph provides as follows:
"The Reichsführer SS has given his consent that besides con-
centration camps, which come under the jurisdiction of the
SS Economic and Administration Main Office, further labor
reformatory camps may be created for which the Security
Police alone is competent. These labor reformatory camps are
dependent on the authorization of the Reich Security Main
Office, which can only be granted in case of urgent need
(great number of foreign workers, and so forth)."
I now offer Document D-473 as exhibit next in order, Ex-
hibit Number USA-522. It should be right at the beginning of the

302
 2 Jan. 46

document book. This letter signed "Kaltenbrunner" was sent by

him under date of 4 December 1944 to regional offices of the Crim-
inal Police.
The Tribunal will recall that Kaltenbrunner's responsibility
covered the Criminal Police as well as the Gestapo. It provides in
part, and I quote, reading at the beginning of the letter:
"According to the decree of 30 June 1943, crimes committed
by Polish and Soviet-Russian civilian laborers are being
prosecuted by the Directorates of the State Police and even
in those cases where for the time being the Criminal Police
had, within the sphere of its competence, carried on the
inquiries. For the purpose of speeding up the process and in
order to save manpower, the decree of 30 June 1943 is altered,
and the Directorates of the Criminal Police are authorized as
from now on to prosecute, themselves, the crimes they are
inquiring into, within the sphere of their competence, insofar
as they are cases of minor or medium crimes."
I begin with the second paragraph:
"The following are available to the Criminal Police as a
means of prosecution:
"Police imprisonment Admission into a concentration camp
. . .

for preventive custody as being antisocial or dangerous to the

community."
And next to the last paragraph:
"Their stay in the concentration camp is normally to be for
the duration of the war. Besides this, the Directorates of the
Criminal Police are authorized to hand over Polish and Soviet-
Russian civilian laborers in suitable cases and with the
agreement of the competent Directorates of the State Police
to the Gestapo's penal camps for the 'education for labor.'
Where the possibilities of prosecuting an individual case are
insufficient because of the peculiarity of the case, the case is
to be handed over to the competent Directorate of the State
Police. Signed: Dr. Kaltenbrunner."
In addition to sending foreign workers to Gestapo labor camps,
Kaltenbrunner punished foreign workers by committing them to
concentration camps. I offer Document 2582-PS as exhibit next in
order, Exhibit Number USA-523.
This is a series of four teletype orders committing individuals to
concentration camps. I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the
second order dated 18 June 1943 under which the Gestapo at Saar-
brücken was ordered to deliver a Pole to the Concentration Camp
Natzweiler as a skilled workman and to the third teletype dated
12 December 1944 in which the Gestapo at Darmstadt was ordered

303
2 Jan. 46

to commit a Greek to the Concentration Camp Buchenwald because

he was drifting around without occupation and to the fourth tele-
type dated 9 February 1945 in which the Gestapo at Darmstadt in
Bensheim was ordered to commit a French citizen to Buchenwald
for shirking work and insubordination. All of those orders are
signed Kaltenbrunner.
I offer Document 2580-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Num-
ber USA-524. This document contains three more of these red form
orders for protective custody, all signed Kaltenbrunner. The first
one shows that a citizen of the Netherlands was taken into protec-
tive custody for work sabotage, and the second one shows that a
French citizen was taken into protective custody for work sabotage
and insubordination, both under date of 2 December 1944.
The sixth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief
of the Security Policeand SD is the executing of captured com-
mandos and paratroopers and the protecting of civilians who lynched
Allied fliers.

The Tribunalwill recall, I am sure, without referring to it, the

Hitler order of 18 October 1942 which was introduced this morning,
Document 498-PS, Exhibit Number USA-501, to the effect that com-
mandos, even in uniform, were to be exterminated to the last man
and that individual members captured by the police in occupied
territory were to be handed over to the SD.
I now offer Document 1276-PS as exhibit next in order, Exhibit
Number USA-525. This is an express top-secret letter from the
Chief of the Security Police and SD signed "Müller," by order, to
the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, in which the Chief of
—
the Security Police and SD states and I quote from the third para-
graph of the second page of the English translation:
"I have instructed the Befehlshaber of the Security Police
and the SD in Paris to treat such parachutists in English
uniform as members of the commando operations in accord-
ance with the Fuhrer's order of 18 October 1942 and to
inform the military authorities in France that there must be
corresponding treatment at the hands of the Armed Forces."
This letter was dated 17 June 1944. That executions were carried
out by the SD pursuant to the said Hitler order of 18 October 1942
while Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Security Police and SD, is
indicated by Document 526-PS heretofore received as Exhibit Num-
ber USA-502. That was the order introduced this morning; I am
sure the Tribunal recalls it.
The policy of the police to protect civilians who lynched Allied
flierswas effective during the period that Kaltenbrunner served as
Chief of the Security Police and SD. I now offer Document 2990-PS

304
 2 Jan. 46

as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number USA-526. This is an affi-

davit of Walter Schellenberg, the former Chief of Amt VI of the
—
RSHA, and provides in Paragraph 7 this is all I'm going to read
from the affidavit:
"In 1944, on another occasion but also in the course of an
Amts-chef conference, I heard fragments of a conversation
between Kaltenbrunner and Müller. I remember distinctly the
following remarks of Kaltenbrunner:
" 'All offices of the SD and the Security Police are to be

informed that pogroms of the populace against English and

American terror fliers are not to be interfered with. On the
"
contrary, this hostile mood is to be fostered.'
The seventh crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as
Chief of the Security Police and SD is the taking of civilians of
occupied countries to Germany for secret trial and punishment, and
the punishment of civilians of occupied territories by summary
methods. The fact that this crime continued after 30 January 1943
is shown by Document 835-PS, which is offered as exhibit next in
order, Exhibit Number USA-527. This is a letter from the High
Command of the Armed Forces to the German Armistice Commis-
sion under date 2 September 1944. The document begins, and
I quote:
"Conforming to the decrees referred to, all non-German civil-
ians in occupied territories who have endangered the security
and readiness for action of the occupying power by acts of
terror and sabotage or in other ways are to be surrendered
to the Security Police and SD. Only those prisoners are
excepted who were legally sentenced to death or were serv-
ing a sentence of confinement prior to the announcement of
these decrees. Included in the punishable acts which endanger
the security or readiness of action of the garrison power are
those also of a political nature."
The eighth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief
of the Security Policeand SD is the crime of executing and confining
persons in concentration camps for crimes allegedly committed by
their relatives. That this crime continued after 30 January 1943 is
indicated by Document L-37, heretofore received in evidence as
Exhibit Number USA-506. That was received this morning. It is
the letter of the Commander of Sipo and SD at Radom, dated
'

19 July 1944, in which it was stated that the male relatives of assas-
sins and saboteurs should be shot and the female relatives over
16 years of age sent to concentration camps. I refer again to Docu-
ment L-215, which has heretofore been received in evidence as
Exhibit Number USA-243, and specifically to the case of Junker,

305
2 Jan. 46

who was ordered by Kaltenbrunner to be committed to Sachsen-

hausen Concentration Camp by the Gestapo "because as a relative
of a deserter, he is expected to endanger the interest of the German
Reich if allowed to go free."
The ninth crime forwhich Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief
of the Security Police and SD is the clearance of Sipo and SD pris-
ons and concentration camps. I refer the Tribunal to Document
L-53, which was received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-291.
This was the letter from the Commander of the Sipo and SD,
Radom, dated 21 July 1944, in which it is stated that the Com-
mander of the Sipo and SD of the General Government had ordered
all Sipo and SD prisons to be cleared and, if necessary, the inmates
to be liquidated. I now offer Document 3462-PS as exhibit next in
order, Exhibit Number USA-528. This is the sworn interrogation
of Bertus Gerdes, the former Gaustabsamtsleiter under the Gau-
leiter of Munich. This interrogation was taken in the course of an
official military investigation of the U.S. Army. In this interrogation
Gerdes was ordered to state all he knew about Kaltenbrunner. I am
only going to read a very small portion of his reply, beginning on
the third paragraph of Page 2:
"Giesler told me that Kaltenbrunner was in constant touch
with him because he was greatly worried about the attitude
of the foreign workers and especially inmates of Concentra-
tion Camps Dachau, Mühldorf, and Landsberg, which were in
the path of the approaching Allied armies. On a Tuesday in
the middle of April 1945 I received a telephone call from
Gauleiter Giesler asking me to be available for a conversation
that night. In the course of our personal conversation that
night, I was told by Giesler that he had received a directive
from Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner, by order of the
Führer, to work out a plan without delay for the liquidation
of the concentration camp at Dachau and the two Jewish
labor camps in Landsberg and Mühldorf. The directive pro-
posed to liquidate the two Jewish labor camps at Landsberg
and Mühldorf by use of the German Luftwaffe, since the con-
struction area of these camps had previously been the targets
of repeatedenemy air attacks. This action received the code
name of 'Wolke A-l.' "
I now pass to the second paragraph on Page 3, continuing to
quote from this interiogation:
"I was certain that I would never let this directive be carried
out.As the action Wolke A-l should have become operational
already for some time, I was literally swamped by couriers
from Kaltenbrunner and moreover I was supposed to have
discussed the details of the Mühldorf and Landsberg actions

306
 2 Jan. 46

in detail with the two Kreisleiter concerned. The couriers,

who were in most cases SS officers, usually SS Untersturm-
führer, gave me terse and strict orders to read and initial.
The orders threatened me with the most terrible punishment,
including execution, if I did not comply with them. However, I
could aiways excuse my failure to execute the plan because of
bad flying weather and lack of gasoline and bombs. Therefore,
Kaltenbrunner ordered that the Jews in Landsberg be
marched to Dachau in order to include them in the Dachau
extermination operations, and that the Mühldorf action was
to be carried out by the Gestapo.
"Kaltenbrunner also ordered an operation 'Wolkenbrand' for
the Concentration Camp Dachau, which provided that the
inmates of the concentration camp at Dachau were to be
liquidated by poison with the exception of Aryan nationals
of the Western Powers.
"Gauleiter Giesler received this order direct from Kalten-
brunner and discussed in my presence the procurement of the
required amounts of poison with Dr. Harrfeld, the Gau health
chief. Dr. Harrfeld promised to procure these quantities when
ordered and was advised to await my further directions. As
I was determined to prevent the execution of this plan in any
event, I gave no further instructions to Dr. Harrfeld.
"The inmates of Landsberg had hardly been delivered at
Dachau when Kaltenbrunner sent a courier declaring the
Action Wolkenbrand was operational.
"I prevented the execution of the 'Wolke A-l' and 'Wolken-
brand' by giving Giesler the reason that the front was too
close and asked him to transmit this on to Kaltenbrunner.
"Kaltenbrunner therefore issued directives in writing to
Dachau to transport all Western European prisoners by truck
to Switzerland and to march the remaining inmates into Tyrol,
where the final liquidation of these prisoners was to take
place without fail."

THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 3 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]

307
 TWENTY- SIXTH DAY
Thursday, 3 January 1946

Morning Session

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: If the Tribunal will recall, at the end of

the last session we had finished reading a portion of the sworn
interrogation of the Gaustabsamtsleiter under the Gauleiter of
Munich and had touched on the point where he said that Kalten-
brunner issued directives to Dachau to transport Western European
prisoners by truck to Switzerland and to march the remaining
inmates into Tyrol.
I now offer, as exhibit next in order, the first five pages of the
interrogation report of Gottlob Berger, Chief of the head office
of the SS, made under oath on 20 September 1945, in the course
of these proceedings. You will find these pages at the end of the
document book and this is offered as Exhibit Number USA-529.
These pages have been translated into German and made available
to the defendants.

THE PRESIDENT: Does it have a number?

LT. COMDR. HARJRIS: It has no PS number, Sir. It is at the
very end of the document book. I wish to read only one question
and answer from these pages; and I refer to Page 3 of the exhibit,
the last question and answer on that page:
"Q: Assuming, only for the purposes of this discussion, that
these atrocities that we hear about are true, who do you think
is primarily responsible?

"A: The first one, the commandant; the second one, Glücks;
because he was practically responsible for all the interior
direction of the camps. If one wants to be exact, one would
have to find out how the information service between the
camp commandant and Glücks actually operated. I want to
give you the following example:
"During the night of the 22d and 23rd of April, I was sent to
Munich by plane. As entered the city, I met a group of
I
perhaps 120 men dressed in the suits of the concentration
camps. These people made a very miserable impression on
me. I asked the guard who was with them, 'What about these
men?' He told me that these men were marching by foot to
the Alps. Firstly, I sent him back to Dachau. Then I wrote

308
 3 Jan. 46

a letter to the commandant to send no more people by foot

to any place but, whenever the Allies advanced any further,
to give over the camp completely. I did that on my own
responsibility and I told him that I came straight from Berlin
and that I can be found in my service post in Munich. The
commandant or his deputy telephoned at about 12 o'clock and
told me that he had received this order from Kaltenbrunner
after he had been asked by the Gauleiter of Munich, the
Reichskommissar .
." (Document Number USA-529)
.

The tenth crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible as Chief

of the Security Police and SD is the persecution of the Jews. This
crime, of course, continued after 30 January 1943; and evidence
has heretofore been received that the persecutions continued until,
and were accelerated toward, the end of the war. Kaltenbrunner
took a personal interest in such matters, as is indicated by Document
2519-PS, which is offered as exhibit next in order, Exhibit Number
USA-530. This exhibit consists of a memorandum and an affidavit;
and I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the affidavit. Quoting
from the affidavit:
"I, Henri Monneray, being first duly sworn, depose and say
that since 12 September 1945 I have been and I am the
member of the French staff for the prosecution of Axis
criminality and have been pursuing my official duties in this
connection in Nuremberg, Germany, since 12 October 1945.
"In the course of my official duties, at the instruction of
the French Chief Prosecutor, I examined the personal
documents of the defendants ..."
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all of this? What is
the object of this affidavit?

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: To show that this document was derived

from the personal effects of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner.
THE PRESIDENT: From the personal possession?
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: From the personal possession.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well, you can leave out the immaterial
parts.
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: Very good, Sir. Passing to the last
sentence of the affidavit:
"Said Document 2519-PS is the document which I found in
the envelope containing Kaltenb runner's personal papers."
I now read the memorandum, quoting:

"Radio message to Gruppenführer SS Major General Vegelein,

Headquarters of the Führer, through Sturmbannführer SS
Major Sansoni, Berlin.

309
 —
3 Jan. 46

"Please inform the Reichsführer SS and report to the Führer

that all arrangements against Jews, political, and concen-
tration camp internees in the Protectorate have been taken
care of by me personally today. The situation there is one
of calmness, fear of Soviet successes, and hope of an occupation
by the Western enemies. Kaltenbrunner."
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is not dated?
LT. COMDR. HARRIS: This is not dated.
The eleventh crime for which Kaltenbrunner is responsible is the
persecution of the churches. It is unnecessary to present specific
evidence that this crime continued after 30 January 1943, since this
was one of the fundamental purposes of the Security Police and
SD, as has already been shown.
These are the crimes for which the Defendant Kaltenbrunner
must answer. As to his intent, there is no need to go outside the
record before this Tribunal. On December 1, 1945, in these proceed-
ings the Witness Lahousen was asked on cross-examination, "Do
you know Mr. Kaltenbrunner?"
After describing his meeting with Kaltenbrunner on a day in
Munich when a university student and his sister were arrested and
executed for distributing leaflets from the auditorium, Lahousen
—
said and I wish to refer only to two sentences on Page 724 of the
—
transcript (Volume III, Page 29) quoting:
"I can easily reconstruct that day. It was the first and last
time that I saw Kaltenbrunner, with whose name I was famil-
iar. Of course Kaltenbrunner mentioned this subject to
Canaris, who was completely shattered because of what hap-
pened that day and was still under the painful impression
and thank God there are still witnesses available who can
testify to this. When discussing the matter Kaltenbrunner
was very much to the point, but at the same time he was
quite cynical about it. That is the only thing I can tell you
about this matter."
Kaltenbrunner was a life-long fanatical Nazi. He was the leader
of the SS in Austria prior to the Anschluss and played a principal
role in the betrayal of his native country to the Nazi conspirators.
As higher SS and Police Leader in Austria after the Anschluss, he
supervised and had knowledge of the activities of the Gestapo and
the SD in Austria. The Mauthausen Concentration Camp was
established in his jurisdiction and he visited it several times. On
at least one occasion he observed the gas chamber in action. With
this knowledge and background he accepted, in January 1943,
appointment as Chief of the Security Police and SD, the very
agencies which sent such victims to their deaths. He held that office

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 3 Jan. 46

to the end, rising to great prominence in the SS and the German

Police and receiving high honors from Hitler. Like other leading
Nazis, Kaltenbrunner sought power; to gain it, he made his covenant
with crime.
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, next wiU be some wit-
nesses,and Colonel Amen will handle the interrogation. Colonel
Amen.
COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN
(Associate Trial Counsel for
the United States): May it please the Tribunal, I wish to call as a
witness for the Prosecution, Mr. Otto Ohlendorf.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you spell it, please?
COL. AMEN: O-h-l-e-n-d-o-r-f, the first name being Otto. Your
Lordship will note that his name appears under Amt III on the
chart on the wall.
THE PRESIDENT: What did you say appeared?
COL. AMEN: The name of this witness appears under Amt III
of the chart,RSHA, the large square, the third section down.

THE PRESIDENT: Amt III. Oh, yes; I see it.

[Witness Ohlendorf took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Otto Ohlendorf, will you repeat this oath
after —
me: "I swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient that —
I —
will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing."
[The witness repeated the oath.]
COL. Amen: Will you try to speak slowly and pause between
each question and answer.
OTTO OHLENDORF (Witness): Yes.
COL. AMEN: Where were you born?
OHLENDORF: In Hohen-Egelsen.
COL. AMEN: How old are you?
OHLENDORF: Thirty-eight years old.
COL. AMEN: When, if ever, did you become a member of the
National Socialist Party?
OHLENDORF: 1925.
COL. AMEN: When, if ever, did you become a member of the
SA?
OHLENDORF: For the first time in 1926.
COL. AMEN: When, if ever, did you become a member of the
SS?
OHLENDORF: I must correct my answer to the previous
question; I thought you were asking about my membership in the SS.

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3 Jan. 46

COL. AMEN: When did you become a member of the SA?

OHLENDORF: In the year 1925.
COL. AMEN: When, if ever, did you join the SD?
OHLENDORF: In 1936.
COL. AMEN: What was your last position in the SD?
OHLENDORF: Chief of Amt III in the RSHA.
COL. AMEN: Turning to the chart on the wall behind you, will
you tell the Tribunal whether you can identify that chart in any way.
OHLENDORF: I have already seen this chart. I worked on it,

and I can identify it as accurate.

COL. AMEN: What, if anything, did you have to do with making
up that chart?
OHLENDORF: This chart was made up during my interrogation.
COL. AMEN: For the information of the Tribunal, that is Ex-
hibit Number USA-493, the chart of which the witness speaks.
OHLENDORF: I didn't understand you.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal whether that chart
correctly portrays the basic organization of the RSHA, as well as
the position of Kaltenbrunner, the Gestapo, and the SD in the
German Police system?
OHLENDORF: This chart represents the organization of the
RSHA. shows the correct position of the
It SD departments, of the
State Police, and of the Secret Police.
COL. AMEN: Referring once more to the chart, please indicate
your position in the RSHA and state for what period you continued
to serve in that capacity.

[The witness pointed to Amt III on the chart.]

COL. AMEN: What were the positions of Kaltenbrunner, Müller,

and Eichmann in the RSHA, and state for what periods of time each
of them continued to serve in his respective capacity?

OHLENDORF: Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei

and the SD; as such, he was also Chief of the RSHA, the internal
organizational term for the office of the chief of the Sicherheitspolizei
and the SD.
Kaltenbrunner occupied this position from 30 January 1943 until
the end of the war. Müller was Chief of Amt IV, the Gestapo. When
the Gestapo was established, he became Deputy Chief, and as such
he logically became Chief of Amt IV of the RSHA. He occupied
this position until the end of the war. Eichmann occupied a position
in Amt IV under Müller and worked on the Jewish problem from

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 3 Jan. 46

approximately 1940 onwards. To my knowledge, he also occupied

this position until the end of the war.

COL. AMEN: Did you tell us for what period of time you con-
tinued to serve as Chief of Amt III?

OHLENDORF: I was part-time Chief of Amt III from 1939 to

1945.

COL. AMEN: Turning now to the designation "Mobile Units"

with the Army shown in the lower right hand corner of the chart,
please explain to the Tribunal the significance of the terms "Ein-
satzgruppe" and "Einsatzkommando."
OHLENDORF: The concept "Einsatzgruppe" was established
an agreement between the Chiefs of the RSHA, OKW, and
after
OKH, on the separate use of Sipo units in the operational areas.
The concept "Einsatzgruppe" first appeared during the Polish
campaign.
The agreement with the OKH and OKW, however, was arrived
at only before the beginning of the Russian campaign. This agree-
ment specified that a representative of the Chief of the Sipo and
the SD would be assigned to the army groups, or armies, and that
this official would have at his disposal mobile units of the Sipo
and the SD in the form of an Einsatzgruppe, subdivided into
Einsatzkommandos. The Einsatzkommandos would, on orders from
the army group or army, be assigned to the individual army
units as needed.

COL. AMEN: State, if you know, whether prior to the campaign

against Soviet Russia, any agreement was entered into between
the OKW, OKH, and RSHA?

OHLENDORF: Yes, the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos,

as Ihave just described them, were used on the basis of a written
agreement between the OKW, OKH, and RSHA.
COL. AMEN: How do you know that there was such a written
agreement?
OHLENDORF: I was repeatedly present during the negotiations
which Albrecht and Schellenberg conducted with the OKH and
OKW; and I also had a written copy of this agreement, which was
the outcome of these negotiations, in my own hands when I took
over the Einsatzgruppe.
COL. AMEN: Explain to the Tribunal who Schellenberg was.
What position, if any, did he occupy?
OHLENDORF: Schellenberg was, at the end, Chief of Amt VI in
the RSHA; time when he was conducting these negotiations
at the
as the representative of Heydrich, he belonged to the Amt I.

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 3 Jan. 46

COL. AMEN: On approximately what date did these negotiations

take place?
OHLENDORF: The negotiations lasted several weeks. The agree-
ment must have been reached about 1 or 2 weeks before the
beginning of the Russian campaign.
COL. AMEN: Did you yourself ever see a copy of this written
agreement?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Did you have occasion to work with this written
agreement?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: On more than one occasion?
OHLENDORF: Yes; in all questions arising out of the relation-
ship between the Einsatzgruppen and the Army.
COL. AMEN: Do you know where the original or any copy of
that agreement is located today?
OHLENDORF: No.
COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection,
please explain to the Tribunal the entire substance of this written
agreement.
OHLENDORF: First of all, the agreement stated that Einsatz-
gruppen and Einsatzkommandos would be set up and used in the
operational areas. This created a precedent, because until that
time the Army had, on its own responsibility, discharged the tasks
which would now fall solely to the Sipo. The second was the
regulation as to competence.
THE PRESIDENT: You're going too fast. What is it that you
say the Einsatzkommandos did under the agreement?
OHLENDORF: I said, this was the relationship between the
Army and the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos. The
agreement specified that the army groups or armies would be
responsible for the movement and the supply of Einsatzgruppen,
but that instructions for their activities would come from the Chief
of the Sipo and SD.
COL. AMEN: Let us understand. Is it correct that an Einsatz
group was to be attached to each army group or army?

OHLENDORF: Every army group was to have an Einsatzgruppe

attached to The army group in its turn would then attach the
it.

Einsatzkommandos to the armies of the army group.

COL. AMEN: And was the army command to determine the area
within which the Einsatz group was to operate?

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 3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: The operational area of the Einsatzgruppe was

already determined by the fact that it was attached to a specific
army group and therefore moved with it, whereas the operational
areas of the Einsatzkommandos were then fixed by the army
group or army.
COL. AMEN: Did the agreement also provide that the army
command was to direct the time during which they were to
operate?
OHLENDORF: That was included under the heading "move-
ment."
COL. AMEN: And also to direct any additional tasks they were
to perform?
OHLENDORF: Even though the Chiefs of the Sipo and SD
Yes.
had the right them on their work, there
to issue instructions to
existed a general agreement that the army was also entitled to
issue orders to the Einsatzgruppen, if the operational situation
made it necessary.
COL. AMEN: What did this agreement provide with respect to
the attachment of the Einsatz group command to the army
command?
OHLENDORF: I can't remember whether anything specific was
contained in the agreement about that. At any rate a liaison man
between the army command and the SD was appointed.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall any other provisions of this written
agreement?
OHLENDORF: I believe I can state the main contents of that
agreement.
COL. AMEN: What position did you occupy with respect to this
agreement?
OHLENDORF: From June 1941 to the death of Heydrich in June
1942, I led Einsatzgruppe D, and was the representative of the
Chief of the Sipo and the SD with the 11th Army.
COL. AMEN: And when was Heydrich's death?
OHLENDORF: Heydrich was wounded at the end of May 1942,
and died on 4 June 1942.
COL. AMEN: How much advance notice, if any, did you have
of the campaign against Soviet Russia?
OHLENDORF: About 4 weeks.
COL. AMEN: How many Einsatz groups were there, and who
were their respective leaders?

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3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: There were four Einsatzgruppen, Group A, B, C,

and D. Chief of Einsatzgruppe A was Stahlecker; Chief of Ein-
satzgruppe B was Nebe; Chief of Einsatzgruppe C, Dr. Rasche, and
later, Dr. Thomas; Chief of Einsatzgruppe D, I myself, and later
Bierkamp.
COL. AMEN: To which army was Group D attached?
OHLENDORF: Group D was not attached to any army group,
but was attached directly to the 11th Army.
COL. AMEN: Where did Group D operate?
OHLENDORF: Group D operated in the Southern Ukraine.
COL. AMEN: Will you describe in more detail the nature and
extent of the area in which Group D originally operated, naming
the cities or territories?
OHLENDORF: The northernmost city was Cernauti; then south-
ward through Mohilev-Podolsk, Yampol, then eastward Zuvalje,
Czervind, Melitopol, Mariopol, Taganrog, Rostov, and the Crimea.
COL. AMEN: What was the ultimate objective of Group D?
OHLENDORF: Group D was held in reserve for the Caucasus,
for an army group which was to operate in the Caucasus.
COL. AMEN: When did Group D commence its move into Soviet
Russia?
OHLENDORF: Group D left Duegen on 21 June and reached
Pietra Namsk in Romania in 3 days. There the first Einsatz-
kommandos were already being demanded by the Army, and they
immediately set off for the destinations named by the Army. The
entire Einsatzgruppe was put into operation at the beginning
of July.
COL. AMEN: You are referring to the 11th Army?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: In what respects, if any, were the official duties
of the Einsatz groups concerned with Jews and Communist com-
missars?
OHLENDORF: On the question of Jews and Communists, the
Einsatzgruppen and the commanders of the Einsatzkommandos were
orally instructed before their mission.
COL. AMEN: What were their instructions with respect to the
Jews and the Communist functionaries?
OHLENDORF: The instructions were that in the Russian opera-
tional areas of the Einsatzgruppen the Jews, as well as the Soviet
political commissars, were to be liquidated.

COL. AMEN: And when .you say "liquidated" do you mean

"killed?"

316
 3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: Yes, I mean "killed."

COL. AMEN: Prior to the opening of the Soviet campaign, did
you attend a conference at Pretz?
OHLENDORF: Yes, it was a conference at which the Einsatz-
gruppen and the Einsatzkommandos were informed of their tasks
and were given the necessary orders.
COL. AMEN:Who was present at that conference?
OHLENDORF: The chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen and the com-
manders Einsatzkommandos and Streckenbach of the
of the RSHA
who transmitted the orders of Heydrich and Himmler.
COL. AMEN: What were those orders?
OHLENDORF: Those were the general orders on the normal
work of the Sipo and the SD, and in addition the liquidation order
which I have already mentioned.
COL. AMEN: And that conference took place on approximately
what date?
OHLENDORF: About 3 or 4 days before the mission.
COL. AMEN: So that before you commenced to march into Soviet
Russia, you received orders at this conference to exterminate the
Jews and Communist functionaries in addition to the regular profes-
sional work of the Security Police and SD; is that correct?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Did you, personally, have any conversation with
Himmler respecting any communication from Himmler to the chiefs
of army groups and armies concerning this mission?

OHLENDORF: Yes. Himmler told me that before the beginning

of the Russian campaign Hitler had spoken of this mission to a con-
—
ference of the army groups and the army chiefs no, not the army
chiefs but the commanding generals —
and had instructed the com-
manding generals to provide the necessary support.
COL. AMEN: So that you can testify that the chiefs of the army
groups and the armies had been similarly informed of these orders
for the liquidation of the Jews and Soviet functionaries?
OHLENDORF: I don't think
it is quite correct to put it in that
form. They had no orders for liquidation; the order for the liqui-
dation was given to Himmler to carry out, but since this liquidation
took place in the operational area of the army group or the armies,
they had to be ordered to provide support. Moreover, without such
instructions to the army, the activities of the Einsatzgruppen would
not have been possible.
COL. AMEN: Did you have any other conversation with Himmler
concerning this order?

317
3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: Yes, in the late summer of 1941 Himmler was in

Nikolaiev. the leaders and men of the Einsatzkom-
He assembled
mandos, repeated to them the liquidation order, and pointed out
that the leaders and men who were taking part in the liquidation
bore no personal responsibility for the execution of this order. The
responsibility was his, alone, and the Führer's.
COL. AMEN: And you yourself heard that said?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Do you know whether this mission of the Einsatz
group was known to the army group commanders?
OHLENDORF: This order and the execution of these orders were
known to the commanding general of the army.
COL. AMEN: How do you know that?
OHLENDORF: Through conferences with the army and through
instructions which were given by the army on the execution of
the order.
COL. AMEN: Was the mission of the Einsatz groups and the
agreement between OKW, OKH, and RSHA known to the other
leaders in the RSHA?
OHLENDORF: At least some of them knew of it, since some
of the leaders were also active in the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatz-
kommandos in the course of time. Furthermore, the leaders who
were dealing with the organization and the legal aspect of the
Einsatzgruppen also knew of it.

COL. AMEN: Most of the leaders came from the RSHA, did
they not?
OHLENDORF: Which leaders?
COL. AMEN: Of the Einsatz groups.
OHLENDORF: No, one can't say that. The leaders in the Ein-
satzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos came from all over the Reich.

COL. AMEN: Do you know whether the mission and the agree-
ment were also known to Kaltenbrunner?
OHLENDORF: After his assumption of office Kaltenbrunner had
to deal with these questions and consequently must have known
details of the Einsatzgruppen which were offices of his.
COL. AMEN: Who was the commanding officer of the 11th Army?
OHLENDORF: At first, Ritter von Schober; later, Von Manstein.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal in what way or ways
the commanding officer of the 11th Army directed or supervised
Einsatz Group D in carrying out its liquidation activities?
OHLENDORF: An order from the 11th Army was sent to Niko-
laiev stating that liquidations were to take place only at a distance

318
 3 Jan. 46

of not less than 200 kilometers from the headquarters of the com-
manding general.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall any other occasion?
OHLENDORF: In Simferopol the army command requested the
Einsatzkommandos in its area to hasten the liquidations, because
famine was threatening and there was a great housing shortage.
COL. AMEN: Do you know how many persons were liquidated
by Einsatz Group D under your direction?
OHLENDORF: In the year between June 1941 to June 1942 the
Einsatzkommandos reported 90,000 people liquidated.
COL. AMEN: Did that include men, women, and children?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: On what do you base those figures?
OHLENDORF: On reports sent by the Einsatzkommandos to the
Einsatzgruppen.
COL. AMEN: Were those reports submitted to you?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you saw them and read them?
OHLENDORF: I beg your pardon?
COL. AMEN: And you saw and read those reports, personally?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And it is on those reports that you base the figures
you have given the Tribunal?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Do you know how those figures compare with the
number of persons liquidated by other Einsatz groups?
OHLENDORF: The figures which I saw of other Einsatzgruppen
are considerably larger.
COL. AMEN: That was due to what factor?
OHLENDORF: Ibelieve that to a large extent the figures sub-
mitted by the other Einsatzgruppen were exaggerated.
COL. AMEN: Did you see reports of liquidations from the other
Einsatz groups from time to time?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And those reports showed liquidations exceeding
those of Group D; is that correct?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Did you personally supervise mass executions of
these individuals?

319
3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: I was present at two mass executions for pur-

poses of inspection.
COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal in detail how an
individual mass execution was carried out?
OHLENDORF: A local Einsatzkommando attempted to collect
allthe Jews in its area by registering them. This registration was
performed by the Jews themselves.
COL. AMEN: On what pretext, if any, were they rounded up?
OHLENDORF: On the pretext that they were to be resettled.
COL. AMEN: Will you continue?
OHLENDORF: After the registration the Jews were collected
at one place; and from there they were later transported to the
place of execution, which was, as a rule an antitank ditch or a
natural excavation. The executions were carried out in a military
manner, by firing squads under command.

COL. AMEN: In what way were they transported to the place

of execution?

OHLENDORF: They were transported to the place of execution

in trucks, always only as many
as could be executed immediately.
In this way it was attempted to keep the span of time from the
moment in which the victims knew what was about to happen to
them until the time of their actual execution as short as possible.
COL. AMEN: Was that your idea?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And after they were shot what was done with the
bodies?
OHLENDORF: The bodies were buried in the antitank ditch or
excavation.
COL. AMEN: What determination, if any, was made as to whether
the persons were actually dead?
OHLENDORF: The unit leaders or the firing-squad commanders
had orders to see to this and, if need be, finish them off themselves.
COL. AMEN: And who would do that?
OHLENDORF: Either the unit leader himself or somebody
designated by him.
COL. AMEN: In what positions were the victims shot?
OHLENDORF: Standing or kneeling.
COL. AMEN: What was done with the personal property and
clothing of the persons executed?
OHLENDORF: All valuables were confiscated at the time of the
registration or the rounding up and handed over to the Finance

320
 3 Jan. 46

Ministry, either through the RSHA or directly. At first the clothing

was given to the population, but in the winter of 1941-42 it was
collected and disposed of by the NSV.
COL. AMEN: All their personal property was registered at the
time?
OHLENDORF: No, not all of it, only valuables were registered.
COL. AMEN: What happened to the garments which the victims
were wearing when they went to the place of execution?

OHLENDORF: They were obliged to take off their outer gar-

ments immediately before the execution.
COL. AMEN: All of them?
OHLENDORF: The outer garments, yes.
COL. AMEN: How about the rest of the garments they were
wearing?
OHLENDORF: The other garments remained on the bodies.
COL. AMEN: Was that true of not only your group but of the
other Einsatz groups?
OHLENDORF: That was the order in my Einsatzgruppe. I don't
know how was done in other Einsatzgruppen.
it

COL. AMEN: In what way did they handle it?

OHLENDORF: Some of the unit leaders did not carry out the
liquidation in the military manner, but killed the victims singly by
shooting them in the back of the neck.
COL. AMEN: And you objected to that procedure?
OHLENDORF: I was against that procedure, yes.
COL. AMEN: For what reason?
OHLENDORF: Because both for the victims and for those who
carried out the executions, it was, psychologically, an immense bur-
den to bear.
COL. AMEN: Now, what was done with the property collected
by the Einsatzkommandos from these victims?
OHLENDORF: All valuables were sent to Berlin, to the RSHA
or to the Reich Ministry of Finance. The articles which could be
used in the operational area, were disposed of there.
COL. AMEN: For example, what happened to gold and silver
taken from the victims?
OHLENDORF: That was, as I have just said, turned over to
Berlin, to the Reich Ministry of Finance. *

COL. AMEN:How do you know that?

OHLENDORF: I can remember that it was actually handled in
that way from Simferopol.

321
3 Jan. 46

COL. AMEN: How about watches, for example, taken from the
victims?
OHLENDORF: At the request of the Army, watches were made
available to the forces at the front.
COL. AMEN: Were all victims, including the men, women, and
children, executed in the same manner?
OHLENDORF: Until the spring of 1942, yes. Then an order
came from Himmler that in the future women and children were
to be killed only in gas vans.
COL. AMEN: How had the women and children been killed
previously?
OHLENDORF: In the same way as the men—by shooting.
COL. AMEN: What, if anything, was done about burying the
victims after they had been executed?
OHLENDORF: The Kommandos filled the graves to efface the
signs of the execution, and then labor units of the population
leveled them.
COL. AMEN: Referring to the gas vans which you said you
received in the spring of 1942, what order did you receive with
respect to the use of these vans?
OHLENDORF: These gas vans were in future to be used for the
killing of women and children.
COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal the construction
of these vans and their appearance?
OHLENDORF: The actual purpose of these vans could not be
seen from the outside. They looked like closed trucks, and were so
constructed that at the start of the motor, gas was conducted into
the van causing death in 10 to 15 minutes.
COL. AMEN: Explain in detail just how one of these vans was
used for an execution.
OHLENDORF: The vans were loaded with the victims and driven
which was usually the same as that used for
to the place of burial,
the mass executions. The time needed for transportation was suffi-
cient to insure the death of the victims.
COL. AMEN:How were the victims induced to enter the vans?
OHLENDORF: They were told that they were to be transported
to another locality.
COL. AMEN: How was the gas turned on?
OHLENDORF: I am not familiar with the technical details.
COL. AMEN: How long did it take to kill the victims ordinarily?
OHLENDORF: About 10 to 15 minutes; the victims were not
conscious of what was happening to them.

322
 3 Jan. 46

COL. AMEN: How many persons could be killed simultaneously

in one such van?
OHLENDORF: About 15 to 25 persons. The vans varied in size.
COL. AMEN: Did you receive reports from those persons operat-
ing these vans from time to time?
OHLENDORF: I didn't understand the question.
COL. AMEN: Did you receive reports from those who were work-
ing on the vans?
OHLENDORF: I received the report that the Einsatzkommandos
did not willingly use the vans.
COL. AMEN: Why not?
OHLENDORF: Because the burial of the victims was a great
ordeal for the members of the Einsatzkommandos.
COL. AMEN: Now, will you tell the Tribunal who furnished
these vans to the Einsatz groups?
OHLENDORF: The gas vans did not belong to the motor pool
of the Einsatzgruppen but were assigned to the Einsatzgruppe as a
special unit, headed by the man who had constructed the vans. The
vans were assigned to the Einsatzgruppen by the RSHA.
COL. AMEN: Were the vans supplied to all of the different Ein-
satz groups?
OHLENDORF: I am not certain of that. I know only in the case
of Einsatzgruppe D, and indirectly that Einsatzgruppe C also made
use of these vans.
COL. AMEN: Are you familiar with the letter from Becker to
Rauff with respect to these gas vans?
OHLENDORF: I saw this letter during my interrogation.
COL. AMEN: May it please the Tribunal, I am referring to
Exhibit 501-PS, Exhibit USA-288, being a letter already in evidence,
a letter from Becker to Rauff.
[Turning to the witness.] Will you tell the Tribunal who
Becker was?
OHLENDORF: According to my recollection, Becker was the
constructor of the vans. It was he who was in charge of the vans
of Einsatzgruppe D.
COL. AMEN: Who was Rauff?
OHLENDORF: Rauff was group leader in Amt II of the RSHA.
Among other things, he was at that time in charge of transportation.
COL. AMEN: Can you identify that letter in any way?
OHLENDORF: The contents roughly correspond to my expe-
riences and are therefore probably correct.
[Document 501-PS was handed to the witness.]

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3 Jan. 46

COL. AMEN: Will you look at the letter before you and tell us
whether you can identify it in any way?
OHLENDORF: The external appearance of the letter as well as
the initial "R" (Rauff) on it, and the reference to Zwabel or Fabel
who took care of transportation under Rauff, seems to testify to the
letter's authenticity. The contents roughly correspond to the ex-
periences which I had at that time.
COL. AMEN: So that you believe it to be an authentic document?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you now lay it aside on the table there?
Referring to your previous testimony, will you explain to the
Tribunal why you believe that the type of execution ordered by
you, namely, military, was preferable to the shooting-in-the-neck
procedure adopted by the other Einsatz groups?
OHLENDORF: On the one hand, the aim was that the individual
leaders and men should be able to carry out the executions in a
military manner acting on orders and should not have to make a
decision of their own; it was, to all intents and purposes, an order
which they were to carry out. On the other hand, it was known to
me that through the emotional excitement of the executions ill-
treatment could not be avoided, since the victims discovered too
soon that they were to be executed and could not therefore endure
prolonged nervous strain. And it seemed intolerable to me that
individual leaders and men should in consequence be forced to kill
a large number of people on their own decision.
COL. AMEN: In what manner did you determine which were the
Jews to be executed?
OHLENDORF: That was not part of my task; but the identifi-
cation of the Jews was carried out by the Jews themselves, since
the registration was handled by a Jewish Council of Elders.
COL. AMEN: Did the amount of Jewish blood have anything
to do with it?

OHLENDORF: I can't remember the details, but I believe that

half -Jews were also considered as Jews.

COL. AMEN: What organizations furnished most of the officer

personnel of the Einsatz groups and Einsatzkommandos?
OHLENDORF: I did not understand the question.
COL. AMEN: What organizations furnished most of the officer
personnel of the Einsatz groups?
OHLENDORF: The officer personnel was furnished by the State
Police, the Kripo, and, to a lesser extent, by the SD.
COL. AMEN: Kripo?

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 3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: Yes, the State Police, the Criminal Police and,

to a lesser extent, the SD.
'
COL. AMEN: Were there any other sources of personnel?
OHLENDORF: Yes, most of the men employed were furnished
by the Waffen-SS and the Ordnungspolizei. The State Police and
the Kripo furnished most of the experts, and the troops were
furnished by the Waffen-SS and the Ordnungspolizei.
COL. AMEN: How about the Waffen-SS?
OHLENDORF: The Waffen-SS and the Ordnungspolizei were
each supposed to supply the Einsatzgruppen with one company.
COL. AMEN: How about the Order Police?
OHLENDORF: The Ordnungspolizei also furnished the Einsatz-
gruppen with one company.
COL. AMEN: What was the size of Einsatz Group D and its
operating area as compared with the other Einsatz groups?
OHLENDORF: I estimate that Einsatzgruppe D was one-half or
two-thirds as large as the other Einsatzgruppen. That changed in
the course of time, since some of the Einsatzgruppen were greatly
enlarged.
COL. AMEN: May it please the Tribunal, I have other questions

relating organizational matters which I think would clarify

to
some of the evidence which has already been in part received by
the Tribunal; but I don't want to take the time of the Tribunal
unless they feel that they want any more such testimony. I thought
perhaps if any members of the Tribunal had questions they would
ask this witness directly, because he is the best informed on these
organizational matters of anyone who will be presented in Court.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal does not think

that necessary to go further into the organizational questions
it is
at this stage, but it is a matter which must be really decided by
you because you know what the nature of the evidence which you
are considering is.
So far as the Tribunal is concerned, they are satisfied at the
present stage to leave the matter where it is. But there is one
aspect of the witness' evidence which the Tribunal would like you
to investigate, and that is whether the practices of which he has
been speaking continued after 1942, and for how long.
COL. AMEN: [To the witness.] Can you state whether the liqui-
dation practices which you have described continued after 1942 and,
if so, for how long a period of time thereafter?

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3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: I don't think that the basic order was ever

revoked. But I cannot remember the details at least not with —
—
regard to Russia which would enable me to make concrete state-
ments on this subject. The retreat began very shortly thereafter,
so that the operational region of the Einsatzgruppen became ever
smaller. I do know, however, that other Einsatzgruppen with
similar orders had been envisaged for other areas.
COL. AMEN: Your personal knowledge extends up to what date?
OHLENDORF: I know
that the liquidation of Jews was pro-
hibited about six of the war. I also saw a
months before the end
document terminating the liquidation of Soviet commissars, but I
cannot recall a specific date.
COL. AMEN: Do you know whether in fact it was so terminated?
OHLENDORF: Yes, I believe so.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunalwould like to know the number
of men in your Einsatz group.
OHLENDORF: There were about 500 men in my Einsatzgruppe,
excluding those who were added to the group as assistants from
the country itself.

THE PRESIDENT: Including them, did you say?

OHLENDORF: Excluding those who were added to the group
from the country itself.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you know how many there would be in

other groups?
OHLENDORF: estimate that at the beginning there were seven
I
to eight but, as I said, this number changed rapidly
hundred men;
in the course of time, since the Einsatzgruppen themselves acquired
new people or succeeded in getting additional personnel from the
RSHA.
THE PRESIDENT: The numbers increased, did they?
OHLENDORF: Yes, the numbers increased.
COL. AMEN: Now, here are perhaps just a half dozen of these
questions I would like to ask, because I do think they might clear
up, in the minds of the Tribunal, some of the evidence which has
gone before. I shall be very brief, if that is satisfactory to the
Tribunal.
[Turning to the witness.] Will you explain the significance of the
different widths of the blue lines on the chart? (
OHLENDORF: The thick blue line between the position of
Himmler as Reichsführer SS and Chief Police and
of the German
the RSHA is designed to show the identity of the offices of the
chiefs of the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD in their tasks. The RSHA

326
 3 Jan. 46

treated both ministerial questions of leadership and individual

executive questions, that is to say, matters of the Sipo and the
SD. From the legal administrative point of view, however, the
organizational scheme shows an illegal state of affairs in that the
RSHA as such never actually had official validity. The formal, legal
position was different from that shown on this chart. Party and
State offices with different authority were amalgamated. Under
this designation RSHA, no directives or laws or orders could be
issued on a legal basis, because the State Police, in its ministerial
capacity, was still subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior,
whereas the SD, despite this set-up, was an organ of the Party.
Therefore if I wanted to reproduce this administrative scheme
accurately, I should, for example, have to put in place of Amt IV,
the Amt "Political Police", a part of the former Hauptamt Sicher-
heitspolizei. This Amt "Political Police" existed formally to the
very end and had sprung from the Police Department of the
Ministry of the Interior. Also, the Secret State Police Amt, the
Central Office of the Prussian Secret State Police, the head office
of all the political police offices of the different Länder, continued
to exist formally.

Thus, ministerial questions continued to be dealt with under the

heading of the Minister of the Interior. So far as it was necessary
to emphasize the formal competence of the Ministry of the Interior,
this was indicated in the heading "Reich Minister of the Interior"
with the filing notice "Pol," the former designation of the Police
Department of the Ministry of the Interior, together with the
appropriate filing notice of the competent department of the former
Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei; for example, filing notice "Pol-S"
meant Sicherheitspolizei; "V" meant Amt Verwaltung und Recht
(Administration and Law).
The RSHA was therefore nothing more than a camouflage
designation which did not correctly represent the actual state of
affairs but gave the Chief of the Sipo and the SD, as a collective
designation for the Chief of the Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei and
the Chief of the SD Hauptamt (an office which existed until 1939),
the opportunity of using one or the other letterhead at any time.
At the same time it gave him the opportunity of an internal
amalgamation of all forces and the opportunity of a division of
the spheres of work on
a practical, effective basis. But the State
offices in this Amt
did remain in a way dependent on the Ministry
of the Interior, and similarly the departments of the SD remained
departments of the Party.
The SD Hauptamt, or the RSHA, had formally only the signifi-
cance of an SSMain Office, in which the SS members of the Sipo

327
3 Jan. 46

and the SD belonged to the SS. But the SS, that is to say, Himm-
ler,as Reichsführer SS, gave these State offices no official authority
to issue orders.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that I follow altogether what
you have been saying; but is what you have been saying the
reason why you are shown on the chart as concerned with Amt III,
which refers, apparently, only to inside Germany, while, according
to your evidence, you were the head of Einsatz Group D, which
was operating outside Germany?
OHLENDORF: The fact that I led an Einsatzgruppe had nothing
to do with my position as Chief of Amt III. I led the Einsatzgruppe
as an individual and not as Chief of Amt III; and in my capacity
as leader of an Einsatzgruppe, I entered into a completely new
function and assumed an office completely separate from my pre-
vious one.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. And did it involve that you left
Germany and went into the area invaded in the Soviet Union?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you now explain the significance of the dotted
blue lines, as compared with the solid blue lines on the right-hand
side of the chart?
OHLENDORF: The solid lines indicate a direct official channel
for orders, whereas the dotted lines signify that there was, as a
rule, no direct channel.

COL. AMEN: Was the term "SD" ever used to include both the
Sipo and the SD?
OHLENDORF: In the course of years the term "SD" was used
more and more It came to be established as an
incorrectly.
abbreviation for Sipo and SD, without actually being suitable for
that. "SD" was originally simply a designation for the fact that
someone belonged to the SS through the SD Main Office. When
the SD Main Office was dissolved and was taken over into the
RSHA, the question arose whether the designation SD, which was
also worn as insignia on the sleeve of the particular SS man,
should be replaced by another insignia or a new abbreviation, e.g.,
RSHA. That was not done because the camouflage of the RSHA
would thereby have been endangered. But when, for example, I
read in a Führer order that in France people were to be turned
over to the SD, that was a case in point of the false use of the
designation SD, because there were no such offices in France and
the SD, insofar as it functioned in departments, e.g., Amt III, had
no executive power but was purely an intelligence organ.
COL. AMEN: Briefly, what was the relationship between the SS
and the Gestapo?

328
 3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: The relationship between the SS and Gestapo

was this: The Reichsführer SS, as such, took over the tasks of
the Police and attempted to link the State Police and the SS more
closely, that is to say, on the one hand to employ only members
of the State Police who were eligible for the SS and, on the other
hand, to use the institutions of the SS, e.g., education and training
of the younger generation by the Waffen-SS, in order in this way
to supply recruits for the State Police. This amalgamation was
later extended by Himmler in an attempt to bring about the same
relationship between the SS and the Ministry of the Interior, i.e.,
the whole internal administration.
COL. AMEN: About how many full-time agents and honorary
auxiliary personnel did the SD employ?
OHLENDORF: Yes, well, in this connection, too, one cannot use
the term SD; one must distinguish here between Amt III and
Amt VI. Amt III, as the interior intelligence service, had about
3,000 salaried members, including men and women. On the other
hand, the interior intelligence worked essentially with
service
honorary members, that is, with men and women who put their
professional experiences and the experiences in their surroundings
at the disposal of the interior intelligence service. I would judge
their number to be roughly 30,000.
COL. AMEN: Will you briefly give the Tribunal a general
example of how a typical transaction was handled through the
channels indicated on the chart?
OHLENDORF: First, a general example, invented to make
things clear. Himmler heard that more and more saboteurs were
being dropped from planes into Germany and were endangering
transportation and factory sites. He informed Kaltenbrunner in the
latter's capacity as Chief of the Sipo and instructed him to draw
the attention of his organs to this state of affairs and to take
measures ensuring that these saboteurs would be seized as soon
and as completely as possible.
Kaltenbrunner instructed the chief of Amt IV, that is, the State
Police, to prepare an order to this effect for the regional offices.
This order was drawn up by the competent authorities in Amt IV
and was either transmitted by Müller directly to the State Police
offices in the Reich or —
and this is more probable on account of
the importance of the question and the necessity to bring the order
at the same time to the attention of the other offices of the Sicher-
heitspolizei —
or he gave it to Kaltenbrunner, who signed it and
sent it to the regional offices in the Reich.
An order of this sort laid down, for example, that the State
Police offices were to report the measures they were taking as
well as their results. These reports went back through the same

329
3 Jan. 46

channels from the regional offices to the competent authorities in

Amt IV, from there to the Chief of Amt IV, from there to the
Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei, Kaltenbrunner, and then to the
Chief of the German Police Himmler.
COL. AMEN: And, finally will you give a specific example of a
typical transaction handled through the channels indicated on the
chart?
OHLENDORF: take the example of the arrest of the leaders
I
of the leftist parties after the events of the 20th of July: This
order was also transmitted from Himmler to Kaltenbrunner;
Kaltenbrunner passed it on to Amt IV and an appropriate draft
for a decree was formulated by Amt IV, signed by Kaltenbrunner,
and sent to the regional offices. The reports were returned from
the subordinate offices back to the higher offices along the same
channels.
COL. AMEN: May it please the Tribunal. The witness is now
available to other counsel. I understand that Colonel Pokrovsky
has some questions that he wishes to ask on behalf of the Soviets.
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the
U.S.S.R.): The testimony of the witness is important for the clari-
fication of questions in a report on which the Soviet Delegation is
at present working. Therefore, with the permission of the Tribunal,
I would like to put a number of questions to the witness.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, you said that you were present
twice at the mass executions. On whose orders were you an
inspector at the executions?
OHLENDORF: I was present at the executions on my own
initiative.

COL. POKROVSKY: But you said that you attended as inspector.

OHLENDORF: I said that I attended for inspection purposes.
COL. POKROVSKY: On your initiative?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did one of your chiefs always attend the
executions for purposes of inspection?
OHLENDORF: Whenever possible I sent a member of the staff
of the Einsatzgruppe to witness the executions, but this was not
always feasible since the Einsatzgruppen had to operate over great
distances.
COL. POKROVSKY: Why was some person sent for purposes
of inspection?

OHLENDORF: Would you please repeat the question?

COL. POKROVSKY: For what purpose was an inspector sent?

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 3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: To determine whether or not my instructions

regarding the manner of the execution were actually being
carried out.
COL. POKROVSKY: Am I to understand that the inspector was
to make certain that the execution had actually been carried out?
OHLENDORF: No, it would not be correct to say that. He was
to whether the conditions which
ascertain I had set for the
execution were actually being carried out.
COL. POKROVSKY: What manner of conditions had you in
mind?
OHLENDORF: Exclusion of the public; 2. Military execution
1.

by a firing-squad;Arrival of the transports and carrying out of

3.

the liquidation in a smooth manner to avoid unnecessary excite-

ment; 4. Supervision of the property to prevent looting. There may
have been other details which I no longer remember. At any rate,
all ill-treatment, whether physical or mental, was to be prevented
through these measures.
COL. POKROVSKY: You wished to make sure that what you
considered to be an equitable distribution of this property was
effected, or did you aspire to complete acquisition of the valuables?

OHLENDORF: Yes.*
COL. POKROVSKY: You spoke of ill-treatment. What did you
mean by ill-treatment at the executions?
OHLENDORF: If, for instance, the manner in which the execu-

tions were carried out caused excitement and disobedience among

the victims, so that the Kommandos were forced to restore order
by means of violence.
COL. POKROVSKY: What do you mean by "restore order by
means of violence"? What do you mean by suppression of the
excitement amongst the victims by means of violence?
OHLENDORF: If, as I have already said, in order to carry out
the liquidation in an orderly fashion it was necesssary, for example,
to resort to beating.

COL. POKROVSKY: Was it absolutely necessary to beat the

victims?
OHLENDORF: I myself never witnessed it, but I heard of it.

COL.POKROVSKY: From whom?

OHLENDORF: In conversations with members of other Kom-
mandos.
* Only the first half of the preceding question, originally spoken in Russian, was transmitted
to the witness in German by the interpreter. The answer of the witness, therefore, refers
only to this first half of the question.

331
3 Jan. 46

COL. POKROVSKY: You said that cars, autocars, were used for
the executions?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know where, and with whose
assistance, the inventor, Becker, was able to put his invention into
practice?
OHLENDORF: I remember only that it was done through Amt II
of the RS HA; but I can no longer say that with certainty.
COL. POKROVSKY: How many were executed in these cars?
OHLENDORF: I did not understand the question.
COL. POKROVSKY: How many persons were executed by means
of these cars?
OHLENDORF: I cannot give precise figures, but the number was
—
comparatively very small perhaps a few hundred.
COL. POKROVSKY: You said that mostly women and children
were executed in these vans. For what reason?
OHLENDORF: That was a special order from Himmler to the
effect that women and children were not to be exposed to the mental
strain of the executions; and thus the men of the Kommandos,
mostly married men, should not be compelled to aim at women and
children.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did anybody observe the behavior of the
persons executed in these vans?
OHLENDORF: Yes, the doctor.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you know that Becker had reported
that death in these vans was particularly agonizing?
OHLENDORF: No. I learned of Becker's reports for the first

time from the letter to Rauff, which was shown to me here. On

the contrary, I know from the doctor's reports that the victims were
not conscious of their impending death.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did any military units— I mean, Army
units —take part in these mass executions?
OHLENDORF: As a rule, no.
COL. POKROVSKY: And as an exception?
OHLENDORF: I think I remember that in Nikolaiev and in Sim-
feropol a spectator from the Army High Command was present for
a short time.
COL.POKROVSKY: For what purpose?
OHLENDORF: I don't know, probably to obtain information per-
sonally.
COL. POKROVSKY: Were military units assigned to carry out
the executions in these towns?

332
 3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: Officially, the Army did not assign any units for
this purpose; the Army as such was actually opposed to the liqui-
dation.
COL. POKROVSKY: But in practice?
OHLENDORF: Individual units occasionally volunteered. How-
ever, at themoment I know of no such case among the Army itself,
but only among the units attached to the Army (Heeresgefolge).
COL. POKROVSKY: You were the man by whose orders people
were sent to their death. Were Jews only handed over for the exe-
cution by the Einsatzgruppe or were Communists "Communist —
officials" you call them in your instructions —
handed over for exe-
cution along with the Jews?
OHLENDORF: Yes, activists and political commissars. Mere
membership in the Communist Party was not sufficient to persecute
or kill a man.
COL. POKROVSKY: Were any special investigations made con-
cerning the part played by persons in the Communist Party?
OHLENDORF: No, I said on the contrary that mere membership
of the Communist Party was not, in itself, a determining factor in
persecuting or executing a man; he had to have a special political
function.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you have any discussions on the mur-
der vans sent from Berlin and on their use?
OHLENDORF: I did not understand the question.
COL. POKROVSKY: Had you occasion discuss, with your
to
chiefs and your colleagues, the fact that motor vans had been sent
to your own particular Einsatzgruppe from Berlin for carrying out
the executions? Do you remember any such discussions?
OHLENDORF: I do not remember any specific discussion.
COL. POKROVSKY: Had you any information concerning the
fact that members of the execution squad in charge of the executions
were unwilling to use the vans?

OHLENDORF: I knew that the Einsatzkommandos were using

these vans.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I had something else in mind. I wanted
to know whether you
received reports that members of the execution
squads were unwilling to use the vans and preferred other means
of execution?

OHLENDORF: That they would rather kill by means of the gas

vans than by shooting?
COL. POKROVSKY: On the contrary, that they preferred exe-
cution by shooting to killing by means of the gas vans.

333
 .

3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: Yes, I have already said that the gas van . .

COL. POKROVSKY: And why did they prefer execution by

shooting to killing in the gas vans?
OHLENDORF: I have already said, in the opinion
Because, as
Einsatzkommandos, the unloading of the corpses
of the leader of the
was an unnecessary mental strain.
COL. POKROVSKY: What do you mean by "an unnecessary -

mental strain"?
OHLENDORF: As far as I can remember the conditions at that
time —the picture presented by the corpses and probably because
certain functions of the body had taken place leaving the corpses
lying in filth.
COL. POKROVSKY: You mean to say that the sufferings en-
dured prior to death were clearly visible on the victims? Did I
understand you correctly?
OHLENDORF: I don't understand the question; do you mean
during the killing in the van?
POKROVSKY:
COL. Yes.
OHLENDORF: I can only repeat what the doctor told me, that
the victims were not conscious of their death in the van.
COL. POKROVSKY: In that case your reply to my previous
question, that the unloading of the bodies made a very, terrible
impression on the members of the execution squad, becomes entirely
incomprehensible.
OHLENDORF: And, as I said, the terrible impression created
by theposition of corpses themselves, and by the state of the vans
which had probably been dirtied and so on.
COL. POKROVSKY: I have no further questions to put to this
witness at the present stage of the Trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecutor for the French Republic
desire to put any questions to the witness?
M. FRANÇOIS DE MENTHON" (Chief Prosecutor for the French
Republic): No.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the counsel for Kaltenbrunner desire to
cross-examine now or at a later date?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Perhaps I could ask a few questions now
and request that I be allowed to make my cross-examination later,
after consultation with Kaltenbrunner.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KAUFFMANN [Turning to the witness.]: How long have you
known Kaltenbrunner?
OHLENDORF: May I be allowed to sit? May I sit down?

334
 3 Jan. 46

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

OHLENDORF: I saw Kaltenbrunner for the first time during the
•
journey from Berlin to Himmler' s headquarters at the time when
Kaltenbrunner was to be appointed Chief of the Sipo and SD.
Before that, I only knew of his existence.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You did not know him?
OHLENDORF: I only knew of his existence.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you come into personal contact with
Kaltenbrunner in private or official discussions after his appoint-
ment as Chief of the RSHA?
OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his views on the Jewish ques-
tion, for example?
OHLENDORF: No, I don't know his particular views on this
question.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his attitude in the church
question?
OHLENDORF: In the question of the church he repudiated the —
anti-church course followed in Germany ^ We agreed that an under-
standing had to be reached with the church.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his attitude on the liquidation
of civilian prisoners, parachutists, and so on?
OHLENDORF: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know that Kaltenbrunner made spe-
use the SD, in order to supply the criticism lacking
cial efforts to
at the Führerstab?
OHLENDORF: Yes, that was the task of the SD even before
Kaltenbrunner, and he also gave his material support to this task.
THE PRESIDENT: A little bit more slowly.
OHLENDORF: It was the task of the SD even before Kalten-
brunner came, and he approved and materially supported this
tendency.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Doyou know, either directly or indirectly,
that Kaltenbrunner had no authority to give executive orders, for
example, that he had no authority to send people to concentration
camps or release them from concentration camps, that all these
things were handled exclusively by Himmler and
Müller?
OHLENDORF: I think this question is too general to be answered
in a concrete way, itmust be divided up.
If you ask whether Kaltenbrunner could order
executive actions,
I must answer in the affirmative. If you then name Himmler and
Müller to the exclusion of Kaltenbrunner, I must point out that in

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the organization of theRSHA Müller was Kaltenbrunner's subordi-

nate; and consequently orders from Himmler to Müller were also
orders to Kaltenbrunner, and Müller was obliged to inform Kalten-
brunner of them.
On the other hand, it is certain that, particularly in regard to
the concentration camps, the final decision on dispatch to them or
release from them was really made by Himmler. I can say with
—
absolute certainty in this connection the expression "to the last
—
washerwoman" was often used that Himmler reserved the final
decision for himself. Whether Kaltenbrunner had any authority at
all in this regard, I cannot say definitely.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you personally see the original orders

and original signatures of Kaltenbrunner ordering the liquidation
of sabotage troops and so on?

OHLENDORF: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Doyou know, either directly or indirectly,
that after Heydrich's death a change, which to be sure was not a
formal change, took place and that another and milder course was
followed by Kaltenbrunner?
OHLENDORF: I couldn't answer that question with concrete
proof.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then I will leave that question, and come

to another. Did Kaltenbrunner know that you were an Einsatz
leader in the East?
OHLENDORF: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Who gave you this order?

OHLENDORF: Heydrich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Heydrich gave it to you? Then it was before
this time?

OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.

DR.KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions at the moment.
THE TRIBUNAL (Major General T. I. Nikitchenko, Member for
the U.S.S.R.): Witness Ohlendorf, can you answer up to what date
the Einsatzgruppe under your command was operating?
OHLENDORF: The staff of the Einsatzgruppe went as far as the
Caucasus and then returned. As far as I can remember, a combat
command (Kampfkommando) was formed out of it under the name
"Bierkamp," and that was used in fighting the partisans. Then,
I think, the Einsatzgruppe was entirely disbanded, Bierkamp went

into the Government General and took a large number of his men
with him.

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 3 Jan. 46

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko) : What did the group do

after Bierkamp left?

OHLENDORF: I think I can say that the Einsatzgruppe ceased

to exist from the Caucasus. It took over tasks
after the retreat
similar to those of the Wehrmacht under the immediate command
of the Commander of the Sicherheitspolizei in the Ukraine and par-
ticularly under the command of the Higher SS and Police Leaders
in the Ukraine.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In other words, it merely
carried out its activities in different surroundings under different
leadership, and that was all the difference. Such functions as were
performed by the Einsatzgruppe in the past continued to be carried
out in new surroundings.
OHLENDORF: No, it actually became a combat unit.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What does that mean?
Against whom were the military actions directed?
OHLENDORF: Within the scope of operations directed against
the partisan movement.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Can you say more partic-
ularly what this group was actually doing?
OHLENDORF: After the retreat?
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): When you say that the
function of this group changed when it conducted operations against
the partisans.
OHLENDORF: I have no concrete experiences myself. It was
probably used for reconnaissance against the partisans and also in
combat.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But did it carry out any
executions?
OHLENDORF: I can no longer say that definitely for this period,
for the unit now entered territories in which that sort of activity
was out of the question.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): In your testimony you said
that the Einsatz group had the object of annihilating the Jews and
the commissars, is that correct?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): And in what category did
you consider the children? For what reason were the children
massacred?
OHLENDORF: The order was that the Jewish population should
be totally exterminated.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Including the children?

337
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3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko) : Were all the Jewish chil-
dren murdered?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But the children of those
whom you considered as belonging to the category of commissars,
were they also killed?
OHLENDORF: I am not aware that inquiries were ever made
after the families of Soviet commissars.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did you send anywhere
reports on the executions which the group carried out?
OHLENDORF: Reports on the executions were regularly sub-
mitted to the RSHA.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): No, did you personally
send any reports on the annihilation of thousands of people which
you effected? Did you personally submit any report?
OHLENDORF: The reports came from the Einsatzkommandos
who carried out the actions, to the Einsatzgruppe and the Einsatz-
gruppe informed the RSHA.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Whom?
OHLENDORF: The reports went to the Chief of the Sipo per-
sonally.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Personally?
OHLENDORF: Yes, personally.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What was the name of this
police officer? Can you give his name?
OHLENDORF: At that time, Heydrich.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): After Heydrich?
OHLENDORF: I was no longer there then, but that was the
standing order.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am asking you whether
you continued to submit reports after Heydrich's death or not?
OHLENDORF: After Heydrich's death I was no longer in the
Einsatz, but the reports were, of course, continued.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Do you know whether the
reports continued to be submitted after Heydrich's death or not?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Yes?
OHLENDORF: No, the reports. .

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Was the order concerning

the annihilation of the Soviet people in conformity with the policy

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of the German Government or the Nazi Party or was it against it?

Do you understand the question?
OHLENDORF: Yes. One must distinguish here: The order for
the liquidation came from the Führer of the Reich, and it was to
be carried out by the Reichsführer SS Himmler.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko) But was it in conformity
:

with the policy conducted by the Nazi Party and the German Gov-
ernment, or was it in contradiction to it?
OHLENDORF: A policy amounts to a practice so that in this
respect it policy laid down by the Führer. If you were to ask
was a
whether this activity was in conformity with the idea of National
Socialism, then I should say "no."
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am talking about the
practice.

THE PRESIDENT: I understood you to say that objects of value

were taken from the Jewish victims by the Jewish Council of Elders.
OHLENDORF: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Did the Jewish Council of Elders settle who
were to be killed?
OHLENDORF: The Jewish Council of Elders determined who
was a Jew, and then registered the Jews individually.
THE PRESIDENT: And when they registered them did they
take their valuables from them?
OHLENDORF: That was done in various ways. As far as I
remember, the Council of Elders was given the order to collect
valuables at the same time.
THE PRESIDENT: So that the Jewish Council of Elders would
not know whether or not they were to be killed?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 5 minutes past 2.

[A recess was taken until 1405.]

339
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3 Jan. 46

Afternoon Session

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When you spoke of the written

agreement between the leaders of the Einsatz groups and the Army,
do you know whether or not the functions and purposes of the
Einsatz groups were described in the agreement? Did the agreement
say what the groups were going to do?
OHLENDORF: I no longer remember that. In any case the task
of liquidation was not mentioned.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you understand the question?
OHLENDORF: Yes. I cannot quite remember whether there was
a general clause in the agreement about the tasks and activities of
the Security Police in the operational area, but I am certain that
it contained nothing regarding the task of liquidation.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You stated that there had been
a general order for the liquidation of all Jews. Was that order in
writing?
OHLENDORF: No.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know who gave the order?
OHLENDORF: Is this question with regard to the activities of
the Einsatzgruppen?
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes.
OHLENDORF: Regarding the Einsatzgruppen, the order came
first via Himmler, Heydrich,
and Streckenbach to the Einsatzgruppen
and then was repeated a second time by Himmler personally.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did a similar order go to the
Army?
OHLENDORF: I know of no such order to the Army in this form.
THE PRESIDENT: Now do any of the defendants' counsel wish
to cross-examine this witness?
DR. OTTO NELTE
(Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Witness, you
said that several of the Russian campaign,
weeks before the opening
there were conferences regarding the tasks of the Einsatzgruppen
and the Einsatzkommandos. Were you personally present at these
conferences?
OHLENDORF: May I briefly correct this by saying that the main
subject was not the
tasks of the Einsatzgruppen but the set-up
within the operational area . .

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. Will you repeat that, please?

OHLENDORF: May I make a correction by saying that, accord-
ing to my recollection, the main subject was not the tasks of the

340
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3 Jan. 46

Einsatzgruppen but the establishment of these mobile organizational

units for activities within the operational area of the Army.

DR. NELTE: In other words, this concerned tasks within the

sphere of the Army?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: You written agreement was con-
testified that the
cluded between the on the one hand and the OKW and OKH
RSHA
on the other. Are you familiar with the difference in authority
between the OKW and the OKH?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Who was present from the OKW at these con-
ferences?
OHLENDORF: I cannot mention any one name because I per-
sonallywas not present at these conferences, but these conferences
were conducted by Heydrich on the one hand and by his deputy,
Schellenberg, on the other.
DR. NELTE: Schellenberg also spoke on this question in an
affidavit presented here, but he mentioned Quartermaster General
Wagner as the official with whom he had to deal. Can you remem-
ber now whether this was also the case at the conferences to which
you are referring?
OHLENDORF: At any rate the name of Quartermaster General
Wagner one of the few names mentioned which I remember in
is
connection with these conferences.
DR. NELTE: Is it known to you that Quartermaster General
Wagner had nothing to do with the OKW as an institution?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
DR. NELTE: I take it that you cannot therefore name any per-
sonalitywho might be regarded as representative of the OKW?
OHLENDORF: No, I cannot. I merely said that I remembered
that is, I have in my mind's eye the letterhead OKW-OKH.
still —
I took this double heading to mean that essential negotiations with

Canaris were probably being carried out, that arrangements with

Canaris were therefore included in this agreement, and that this
accounted for the letterhead OKH plus OKW, which, to me as well,
had appeared unusual, since the OKH, per se, was naturally in
charge of all movement and supply.
DR. NELTE: A joint letterhead OKW-OKH, as such, did not, of
course, exist. In your case then it could have been only a type-
written copy?
OHLENDORF: I can still visualize a mimeographed sheet.

341
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3 Jan. 46

DR. NELTE: Do you know which signatures were on this docu-

ment which you visualize?
OHLENDORF: I cannot remember, I am sorry.

DR. NELTE: One of the judges already put the question that
orders would naturally result from an agreement of this kind. Is
the name of the OKW, or the signature perhaps, included in any
one such order?
OHLENDORF: Now I do not understand what kind of orders
you mean.
DR. NELTE: When an agreement is made between two different
organizations such as the RSHA on the one hand and, shall we say,
the OKH
on the other, then the office entrusted with the execution
of that which has been agreed upon must be informed thereof in a
form known as an "order" in military parlance. Is such an order
known to you as originating from the OKW?
OHLENDORF: Please understand that no such orders from the
War Office or the OKW were received by me. I should have had
only orders or wishes expressed by the Army.
DR. NELTE: By the Army or by your superior command?
OHLENDORF: No. I am speaking now ... If I think of the
Armed Forces . .

DR. NELTE: Therefore, there was no connection of any kind

between you, as leader of the Einsatzgruppe, and the OKW as such?
OHLENDORF: No immediate connection. I know very well that
individual reports reached the OKW through official channels.
DR. NELTE: If you know that, can you tell me to which office?
Because, after all, OKW covered a great many.
OHLENDORF: I should assume they eventually reached Canaris.
DR. NELTE: I thank you.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet):
Witness, in your position as Chief of the SD, you will probably
have some idea about the trustworthiness of the members of the
Reich Cabinet and about the secrecy in which very important mat-
ters were kept. Please answer this question: whether the order
which has been discussed today regarding the liquidations, in your
opinion, originated in the Reich Cabinet and whether this order, in
your opinion, was made known to the individual members of the
Reich Cabinet?
OHLENDORF: I am convinced that both questions are to be
answered in the negative.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to ask the witness a few more
questions on behalf of the Defendant Speer, since counsel for the

342
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Defendant Speer is absent and I, as a colleague, have taken over

this task.
Witness, is it known to you that the Defendant Speer, contrary
to Hitler's orders, took measures to prevent the destruction of
industrial and other installations?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
DR. KUBUS CHOK: That these measures also extended beyond
the interior of Germany to the then still-occupied area of Upper
Silesia, et alia?

OHLENDORF: I believe that the date when I learned about this

was so late that, although applicable to some small areas in the
West, it any area in the East.
no longer applied to
DR. KUBUSCHOK: One more question which you might per-
haps know about. Do you know that the Defendant Speer prepared
an attempt on Hitler's life in the middle of February of this year?
OHLENDORF: No.
DR.KUBUSCHOK: Do you know that Speer undertook to turn
Himmler over to the Allies so that he could be called to account
and possibly clear others who were innocent?
OHLENDORF: No.
DR.KUBUSCHOK: This question will perhaps be answered in
the affirmative by another witness.
Are you well informed regarding the events of the 20th of July?

OHLENDORF: To a considerable extent.

DR.KUBUSCHOK: Is it known to you that the circle of plotters
of 20 July had also planned to keep the Defendant Speer as head of
his Ministry?

OHLENDORF: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know any details about that?
OHLENDORF: From the participants in the plot of the 20th of
July merely learned that they had considered him, on a drafted
I
organizational scheme, as continuing in his post as head of the
armament ministry.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, do you believe that this intention
of the plotters of the 20th of July was due to the fact that the
Defendant Speer, in view of his activities, was considered not only
in these circles but even elsewhere merely as an expert and not as
a politician?
OHLENDORF: The question is very hard to answer. It is very
not to be considered a politician if one has been so closely
difficult
connected with those authorities of the Reich who made the final

343
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political decisions and has perhaps been an essential contributor to

the suggestions and proposals from which the decisions evolved. On
the other hand, Minister Speer was known or believed not to be
purely a politician.
DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for the Gestapo): Witness, do
you know that in April 1933 the Gestapo was created in Prussia?
OHLENDORF: I do not know the month, but I do know the year.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know what was the purpose of creating
this institution?

OHLENDORF: To fight political opponents potentially dangerous

to the State.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know how this institution, which was
intended originally for Prussia only, was extended to the rest of
the Reich?
OHLENDORF: Either in 1933 or in 1934 the institution of the
Political Police was created in all of the Länder. These Political
Police agencies were officially subordinated in 1934, as far as I
remember, to the Reichsführer SS as Political Police Chief of the
Länder. The Prussian Secret State Police Office represented the
first central headquarters. After the creation of the Main Office of
the Security Police the command tasks were delegated by Himmler
to Heydrich who carried them out through the Main Office of the
Security Police.
DR. MERKEL: Who created and instituted the Gestapo in the
individual Länder?
OHLENDORF: I cannot give you an answer to this question.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know whether before 1933, in the area
which then constituted the Reich, there had existed a similar insti-
tution, a political police force?

OHLENDORF: Yes, that existed, as far as I remember, at Police

headquarters in Berlin, for instance; and I believe it was Depart-
ment IA. At any rate political police organizations did exist.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about the sphere of activ-
ities of this organization which existed before 1933?
OHLENDORF: Yes. They were the same; at any rate their activ-
ities were fundamentally the same.
DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about the personnel of
the Gestapo, which on the whole, was a new institution and conse-
quently not constituted merely by a transfer of personnel already
in existence.
OHLENDORF: When I became acquainted with the State Police
it was certainly true that the nucleus of expert personnel had been

344
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taken from the Criminal Police and the majority of the leading men
in the State Police offices, that is, in the regional offices of the State
Police, had risen from the ranks of the civil administration, possibly
also from the Police administrations of the various Länder (Länder-
polizei ver waltungen), and that they had, in part, even been detailed
from the civil administration. The same was also true for the
—
experts within Amt IV the Gestapo.
DR.MERKEL: You say the majority of the officials were detailed?
OHLENDORF: I did not say the majority were detailed, but I
said "in part."

DR. MERKEL: Detailed in part? Was it possible for any of these

members of the Gestapo to resist being taken over into the Gestapo
if they did not wish it, or was it not?
OHLENDORF: I would not affirm that a definite resistance was
possible. Some them might have succeeded, by cunning, in avoid-
of
ing it had they not wanted to go. But if one was detailed to such
an office from the civil administration, then, as an official, one
simply had to obey. As an official one had to.
DR. MERKEL: The members of the Gestapo evidently consisted
almost exclusively, or exclusively, of civil service officials? Do you
know anything about that?
OHLENDORF: That probably was no longer the case during the
war. But as a rule it should be assumed that they were officials
insofar as the specialists were concerned. Some of them, of course,
while in training, were not yet officials and others again were
engaged merely as employees or, especially, as assistants.
DR. MERKEL: Can you tell me the approximate number of the
members of the Gestapo towards the end of the war?
OHLENDORF: I estimate the total organization of the Gestapo,
including the regional offices and the occupied territories, at about
30,000.

DR. MERKEL: There was therefore within the Gestapo a con-

siderable percentage of officials who were merely administrative
officials and had nothing to do with operational functions?

OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.

DR.MERKEL: And what was the percentage of these adminis-
trative officials who performed purely administrative functions?
OHLENDORF: We must, in the first instance, take into con-
sideration that this number included the assistants, as well as the
women; and I cannot give you any figures off hand. But it is certain
that a proportion of one specialist to three or four persons not
employed in a functional capacity could not be considered excessive.

345
3 Jan. 46

DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about who was respon-

sible for the direction and administration of the concentration
camps?
OHLENDORF: It was Obergruppenführer Pohl.
DR.MERKEL: Did or did not the Gestapo have anything to do
with the direction and with the administration of the concentration
camps?
OHLENDORF: According to my knowledge, not.
DR. MERKEL: Therefore, no members of the Gestapo were
active or in any way involved in the measures carried out in the
concentration camps?
OHLENDORF: As far as I could judge from a distance, only
investigating officials of the State Police were active in the concen-
tration camps.

DR. MERKEL: Did the Gestapo in any way participate in the

mass executions undertaken by your Einsatzgruppe which you
described this morning?
OHLENDORF: Only to the same extent as every other person
present in the Einsatzgruppe.

DR. MERKEL: I ask the Tribunal to give me the opportunity

of questioning this witness again after the return of the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner, since I am obliged to rely exclusively on information
received from Kaltenbrunner.
THE PRESIDENT: I think that the Tribunal will be prepared to
allow you to put further questions at a later stage.
DR. MERKEL: Thank you.
PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for the General Staff
and the High Command of the German Armed Forces): Witness, you
mentioned the negotiations which took place in the OKW, which
later led to an agreement between OKW and OKH on the one side,
and the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) on the other. I am
interested in this point: Can you assert that during the negotiations
for this agreement there was mention of the extermination and the
killing of Jews?

OHLENDORF: I cannot say anything concrete on this particular

subject, but I do not believe it.

DR. EXNER: You do not believe it?

OHLENDORF: No.
DR. EXNER: In addition you have told us that the Commanding
General of the 11th Army knew about the liquidations, and I should

346
 3 Jan. 46

like to ask you: Do you know anything regarding the commanding

generals of the other armies?
OHLENDORF: In general they must have been informed through
the speech of the Führer before the beginning of the Russian cam-
paign.
DR. EXNER: That is a conclusion that you have drawn?
OHLENDORF: No, not a conclusion that I have drawn; it
it is
is merely a report on the contents of the speech which, according to

Himmler's statement, Hitler had made to the commanding generals.

DR. EXNER: Now you have spoken about directives given by
the Commanding General of the 11th Army. What kind of direc-
tives were they?
OHLENDORF: I first spoke about the commanding general in
the Nikolaiev incident, that is, about the order given at that time
that the liquidations should take place 200 kilometers away from the
headquarters of the High Command of the army. The second time,
I did not speak about the commanding general of the army but

about the High Command of the army at Simferopol, because I

cannot say, with any certainty, who had requested the competent
Einsatzkommando at Simferopol to speed up the liquidations.
DR. EXNER: That is the very question I should like to put to
you: With whom in the 11th Army did you negotiate at that time?

OHLENDORF: I, personally, did not negotiate at all with anyone

on this subject, as I was not the person directly concerned with
these matters; but the High Command of the Army negotiated with
the competent local Einsatzkommando either through the respon-
sible army office, which at all times was in touch with the Einsatz-
kommandos, namely the I-C or the I-CAO, or else through the staff
of the OQ.

DR. EXNER:Who gave you orders for the advance?

OHLENDORF: The orders for the advance came, as a rule, from
the Chief of Staff.
DR. EXNER: From the Chief of Staff? The Commanding Gen-
eral of the army at the time referred to was Von Manstein. In this
case was there ever an order signed by Von Manstein?
OHLENDORF: I cannot remember any such order; but when the
advance was being discussed there were oral consultations with
Von Manstein, the Chief of Staff, and me.
DR. EXNER: When the advance was being discussed?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
DR. EXNER: You said that the Army was opposed to these
liquidations. Can you state how this became evident?

347
3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: Not the Army, but the leaders were inwardly

opposed to the liquidations.
DR. EXNER: Yes; but
mean, how did you recognize that fact?
I

OHLENDORF: In our conversations. Not only the leaders of the

Army were opposed to the liquidations but also most of those who
had to carry them out.
DR. EXNER: I thank you.
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant
Schacht): Were you acquainted with the personal records on Reichs-
bank President Schacht kept in your department?
OHLENDORF: No.
DR. KRAUS: Do you know
why, after the 20th of July 1944, the
former Reichsbank President Schacht was arrested and interned in
a concentration camp?
OHLENDORF: Probably the occasion of the 20th of July was
favorable also for the conviction at last of Reichsbank President
Schacht, who was known to be inimical to the Party, inasmuch as
by means of witnesses or other methods he could be brought to trial
in connection with the events of the 20th of July.

DR. KRAUS: Then Defendant Schacht was known to your people

as being inimical to the Party?
OHLENDORF: Yes, at least from 1937-1938 on.
DR. KRAUS: Since the year 1937 or 1938? And you also sus-
pected him of participating in Putsche?
OHLENDORF: Personally I did not suspect this, because I was
not concerned with these matters at all. He was mainly under
suspicion because of his well-known enmity. But, as far as I know,
this suspicion was never confirmed.

DR. KRAUS: Can you tell me, who caused Schacht to be arrested?
OHLENDORF: That I cannot say.
DR. KRAUS: Then you don't know whether the arrest was
ordered by the Führer, by Himmler, or by some subordinate
authority.
OHLENDORF: I don't think the order could possibly have come
from any subordinate authority.
DR. KRAUS: Then you assume that it had been ordered by
the Führer?
OHLENDORF: At least by Himmler.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Goring): Witness,
if I understood you correctly, you said: At the beginning of 1933,

348
 3 Jan. 46

after the seizure of power by Hitler, the Gestapo was created in

Prussia; but before that time there had already existed in Prussia
an organization with similar tasks, for instance at the Police head-
quarters in Berlin with Department IA, with the difference that this
organization was opposed to National Socialism, whereas now the
contrary is true. But its task was likewise to keep political oppo-
nents under observation and if need be to arrest them, and thus to
protect the State from these political opponents.
OHLENDORF: Yes.
DR.STAHMER: You said further that in 1933, after the seizure
of power, a political police with identical tasks was also instituted
in all the other Länder.
OHLENDORF: Yes, in the year 1933-1934.
DR.STAHMER: This political police, which existed in the various
Länder, was then centralized in 1934 and its direction handed over
to Himmler?
OHLENDORF: It was not at first centralized, but Himmler did
become Chief of Police of all the Länder.

DR. STAHMER: Now one more question. Did the Prussian

Gestapo play a leading the other Länder were con-
role, as far as
cerned, as early as 1933 or only after Himmler took over the leader-
ship in 1934?
OHLENDORF: I do not believe that the Prussian State Police,
which after all was under the leadership of Reich Marshal Goring,
became, at that time, the competent authority for the other Länder
as well.

FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for

Defendant Dönitz): I am speaking as the representative of the
counsel for Defendant Grossadmiral Raeder.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, you just mentioned a speech
of the Führer before the army commanders, in which the Führer is
supposed to have given instructions to the commanders regarding
the liquidation of Jews. Which conference do you mean?
OHLENDORF: A conference which must have taken place
shortly before the Russian campaign with the commanders of the
army groups and the armies at the Führer's quarters.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were the comanders of
the various branches of the Armed Forces absent?
OHLENDORF: I do not know that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Were you yourself pres-
ent at this conference?

349
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3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: No. I have recounted this conference on the basis

of a conversation I had with Himmler.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did this conversation
with Himmler take place in a large circle of people or was it a
private conversation?
OHLENDORF: It was a private conversation.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did you have the im-
pression that Himmler stated facts, or do you consider it possible
that he wished to encourage you in your difficult task?
OHLENDORF: No. The conversation took place much, much
later and did not spring from such motives, but from resentment at
the attitude of certain generals of the Armed Forces. Himmler
wanted to say that these generals of the Armed Forces could not
disassociate themselves from the events that had taken place, as
they were just as responsible as all the rest.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: And when did this con-
versation with Himmler take place?
OHLENDORF: In May 1945, at Flensburg.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Thank you.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, with regard to the command channels
at the disposal of the RSHA
for the execution of its orders and
measures and for the transmission of these orders to tactical organi-
zations, such as the SD and the concentration camps, did the RSHA
possess its own command channels or did it rely on the channels of
the Leadership Corps organization, that is, were these orders for-
warded via the Gauleitung and the Kreisleitung?
OHLENDORF: I know nothing about it. I consider it entirely
out of the question.
DR. SERVATIUS: You consider it entirely out of the question
that the Gauleitung and the Kreisleitung had been informed? How
was it, for instance . .

OHLENDORF: One moment, please. You asked me whether

these orders passed through these channels. You did not ask me
whether they had been informed.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were these offices informed of the orders?
OHLENDORF: The and the SD
inspectors, the Gestapo leaders,
leaders were all considered as police or political agents (Referenten)
of the Gauleiter or the Reichsstatthalter; and these office chiefs had
to report to the Gauleiter on their respective fields of activity. To
what extent this was done, I am unable to judge. It depends on the
activities and on the degree of co-operation between the Gauleiter
and these offices, but in any case it is inconceivable that the State

350
 3 Jan. 46

Police could carry on these activities for any length of time without
the knowledge of the responsible Party organizations.
DR. SERVATIUS: Does this also hold for reports from lower to
For the activities
higher units? of the concentration camps?
OHLENDORF: The concentration camps were not subordinate
I am convinced, since these were purely affairs
to the State Police.
was no such close connection between the
of the Reich, that there
Gauleiter and the concentration camps as there was between the
Gauleiter and the permanent activities of the State Police.
DR. SERVATIUS: I also represent the Defendant Sauckel. Do
you know of the impressment of foreign workers by the SS? For-
eign workers who, as a matter of fact, came from the concentration
camps?
OHLENDORF: Only superficially.

HERR BABEL: Witness, this morning you mentioned the figures

of 3,000and 30,000 for the Security Service. I should now like to
know for certain how these figures are to be understood. Do the
3,000 members of the SD whom you mentioned this morning
represent the entire personnel of the SD at that time, or did they
represent only those members who were employed in the field with
the mobile units also mentioned by you this morning?
OHLENDORF: No, it represented the total personnel including
women
employees and auxiliaries.

HERR BABEL: Including employees and women auxiliaries.

And —
the 30,000 which we also discussed were they honorary mem-
bers (ehrenamtliche Mitglieder) employed only in the interior of
Germany?
OHLENDORF: Yes; as a rule, in any case.
HERR BABEL: And who, for the most part, belonged neither
to the SS nor to the Party?
OHLENDORF: Yes.
HERR BABEL: How large were the mobile units of the SD
employed in these executions?
OHLENDORF: The SD had no mobile units but rather only indi-
vidualmembers of the SD detailed to outside organizations. The
SD, as a separate entity, did not act independently anywhere.
HERR BABEL: In your opinion and judging by your own
experience, how many of these detailed personnel were there?
OHLENDORF: The figure was quite small.
HERR BABEL: Will you please give an approximate figure.

351
3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: I place the figure at an average of about two to

three SD experts per Einsatzkommando.
HERR BABEL: I should like to know the total strength of the
SS. Do you know anything about that?
OHLENDORF: No, I have no idea at all.

HERR BABEL: No Did any units of the Waffen-SS

idea at all.
'

and other subordinate SS groups in any way participate in the

Einsatzgruppen?
OHLENDORF: As I said this morning, in each Einsatzgruppe
there was, or rather there should have been, one company of
Waffen-SS.
HERR BABEL: One company. And what, at that time, was the
exact strength of one company?
OHLENDORF: I do not know about the Waffen-SS serving with
the other Einsatzgruppen, but I estimate that my particular group
employed approximately 100 men of the Waffen-SS.
HERR BABEL: Were Death's-Head Units (Totenkopf Verbände)
also employed?
OHLENDORF: No.
HERR BABEL: Was the Adolf Hitler Bodyguard (Leibstandarte
Adolf Hitler) employed in any fashion?
OHLENDORF: That was purely a matter of chance. I cannot
name a single formation from which these Waffen-SS had been
taken.
HERR BABEL: Another question that was touched upon this
morning: When was the SD created and what, at first, were its
duties?
OHLENDORF: As far as I know, the SD was created in 1932.
HERR BABEL: And what were its duties at that time?
OHLENDORF: so to speak, the Intelligence Corps
It constituted,
of the Party. They were supposed to give information about Party
opponents and, if necessary, to thwart them.
HERR BABEL: Did these duties change in the course of time,
and, if so, when?
OHLENDORF: Yes, after the seizure of power, the combatting
one of their principal
of political opponents was, in certain spheres,
duties and supplying the required information on certain individuals
was considered an important factor. At that time an intelligence
service, in the true sense of the word, did not yet exist; the real
evolution of the SD machine within the field of home intelligence
service only followed as from 1936-1937. From that time on the

352
 3 Jan. 46

work changed from the observation of individuals to technical

matters. With the 1939 reorganization, when the Main Office of the
SD was dissolved, the handling of political opponents was com-
pletely eliminated from the work of the SD, which work was there-
now consisted in observ-
after limited to technical matters. Its duties
ing the effects of the measures carried out by the leading author-
ities of the Reich and the Länder and in determining how the circles
affected reacted to them; in addition, they had to find out what
the moods and attitude of the people and its various classes of
society were during the course of the war. It was, as a matter of
fact, the only authority offering criticism within the Reich and
reporting facts from an objective point of view to top levels. It
should also be pointed out that the Party did not, at any stage,
legitimize this work until 1945. The only legitimation for this criti-
cal work came from Reich Marshal Goring, and that only after the
war, for he could in this way draw the attention of the other
departments, at meetings of the Reich Defense Council, to faulty
developments. This expert critical work became, in fact, after 1939
the main function of the SD home intelligence service.
HERR BABEL: Another question. To what extent were units of
the SD employed for duty in the concentration camps?
OHLENDORF: I would ask you at all times to distinguish
between the SD home service (SD-Inland) with the head office of
Amt III, and the SD service board (SD- Ausland). I cannot give you
any information about the SD service board; but the chief, Schellen-
berg, is present in this courthouse. As far as Amt III is concerned,
I know of no single case in which the SD home service had

representatives or anything at all to do with concentration camps.

HERR BABEL: Now, a question concerning you personally. From

whom did you receive your orders for the liquidation of the Jews
and so forth?And in what form?
OHLENDORF: My duty was not the task of liquidation, but I
did head the staff which directed the Einsatzkommandos in the field,
and the Einsatzkommandos themselves had already received this
order in Berlin on the instructions of Streckenbach, Himmler, and
Heydrich. This order was renewed by Himmler at Nikolaiev.
HERR BABEL: You personally were not concerned with the
execution of these orders?
OHLENDORF: I led the Einsatzgruppe, and therefore I had the
task of seeing how the Einsatzkommandos executed the orders
received.
HERR BABEL: But did you have no scruples in regard to the
execution of these orders? ,

353
3 Jan. 46

OHLENDORF: Yes, of course.

HERR BABEL: And how is it that they were carried out
regardless of these scruples?
OHLENDORF: Because to me it is inconceivable that a sub-
ordinate leader should not carry out orders given by the leaders of
the state.
HERR BABEL: This is your own opinion. But this must have
been not only your point of view but also the point of view of the
majority of the people involved. Didn't some of the men appointed
to execute these orders ask you to be relieved of such tasks?

OHLENDORF: I cannot remember any one concrete case. I

excluded some whom I did not consider emotionally suitable for
executing these tasks and I sent some of them home.
HERR BABEL: Was the legality of the orders explained to these
people under false pretenses?
OHLENDORF: I do not understand your question; since the
order was issued by the superior authorities, the question of legality
could not arise in the minds of these individuals, for they had sworn
obedience to the people who had issued the orders.
HERR BABEL: Could any individual expect to succeed in evading
the execution of these orders?
OHLENDORF: No, the result would have been a court-martial
with a corresponding sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, do you wish to re-examine?
COL. AMEN: Just a very few questions, Your Honor.
[Turning to the witness.] What organization furnished the sup-
plies to the Einsatz groups?
OHLENDORF: The Reich Security Main Office (RSH A) furnished
the equipment.
COL. AMEN: What organization furnished weapons to the Ein-
satz groups?
OHLENDORF: The weapons were also furnished through the
RSHA.
COL. AMEN: What organization assigned personnel to the Ein-
satz groups?

OHLENDORF: The Organization and Personnel Department of

the RSHA.
COL. AMEN: And all these activities of supplies required per-
sonnel in addition to the operating members?
OHLENDORF: Yes.

354
 3 Jan. 46

COL. AMEN: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: That will do; thank you.
[The witness left the stand.]
COL. AMEN: The next witness to be called by the Prosecution is
Dieter Wisliceny. That witness will be examined by Lieutenant
Colonel Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.
[The witness, Wisliceny, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
DIETER WISLICENY (Witness): Dieter Wisliceny.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath: "I swear by
God —the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth— and will withhold and add nothing."
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: Please speak slowly and pause between
questions and answers.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR. (Assist-
How old are you?
ant Trial Counsel for the United States):
WISLICENY: I am 34 years old.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Where were you born?
WISLICENY: I was born at Regulowken in East Prussia.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were you a member of the NSDAP?
WISLICENY: Yes, I was a member of the NSDAP.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Since what year?
WISLICENY: I entered the NSDAP first in 1931, was then struck
off the list and entered finally in 1933.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were you a member of the SS?
WISLICENY: Yes, I entered the SS in 1934.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were you a member of the Gestapo?
WISLICENY: In 1934 I entered the SD.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: What rank did you achieve?
WISLICENY: was promoted to SS Hauptsturmführer.
In 1940 I

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Do you know Adolf Eichmann?

WISLICENY: Yes, I have known Eichmann since 1934.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Under what circumstances?
WISLICENY: We joined the SD about the same time, in 1934.
Until 1937 we were together in the same department.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: How well did you know Eichmann per-
sonally?
WISLICENY: We knew each other very well. We used the
I also knew his family very well.
intimate "du," and

355
3 Jan. 46

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was his position?

WISLICENY: Eichmann was in the RSHA, a section chief in
Amt IV, Gestapo.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Do you mean Section IV or a sub-

section, and, if so, which subsection?
WISLICENY: He ran Section IVA4. This department comprised
two subsections: one for churches and another for Jewish matters.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: You have before you a diagram showing
the position of Subsection IVA4b in the RSHA.
WISLICENY: Yes.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did you prepare this diagram?
WISLICENY: Yes, I made the diagram myself.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Does it correctly portray the organi-
zational setup showing the section dealing with Jewish problems?
WISLICENY: Yes, this was approximately the personnel of the
section at the beginning of 1944.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Referring to this chart and the list of

leading personnel as shown in the lower section of the paper, were
you personally acquainted with each of the individuals named
therein?
WISLICENY: Yes, I knew all of them personally.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the particular mission of

IVA4b of the RSHA?
WISLICENY: This Section IVA4b was concerned with the Jewish
question for the RSHA. Eichmann had special powers from Grup-
penführer Müller, the Chief of Amt IV, and from the Chief of the
Security Police. He was responsible for the so-called solution of the
Jewish question in Germany and in all countries occupied by
Germany.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were there distinct periods of activity
affecting the Jews?
WISLICENY: Yes.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Will you describe to the Tribunal the
approximate periods and the different types of activity?
WISLICENY: Yes. Until 1940 the general policy within the
section was to settle the Jewish question in Germany and in areas
occupied by Germany by means of a planned emigration. The second
phase, after that date, was the concentration of all Jews, in Poland
and in other territories occupied by Germany in the East, in
ghettos. This period lasted approximately until the beginning of

356
 .

3 Jan. 46

1942. The thirsl period was the so-called "final solution" of the
Jewish question, that is, the planned extermination and destruction
of the Jewish race; this period lasted until October 1944, when
Himmler gave the order to stop their destruction.

[A recess was taken.]

LT. COL. BROOKHART: When did you first become associated

with Section IVA4 of the RSHA?
WISLICENY: That was in 1940. I happened to meet Eichmann . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was your position?

WISLICENY: Eichmann suggested that I go to Bratislava as
adviser on the Jewish question to the Slovakian Government.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Thereafter how long did you hold that
position?

WISLICENY: I was at Bratislava until the spring of 1943; then,

almost a year in Greece and later, from March 1944 until December
1944, I was with Eichmann in Hungary. In January 1945 I left Eich-
mann's department.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: In your official connection with Section
IV A4, did you learn of any order which directed the annihilation of
all Jews?

WISLICENY: Yes, I learned of such an order for the first time

from Eichmann in the summer of 1942.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Will you tell the Tribunal under what
circumstances and what was the substance of the order?
WISLICENY: In the spring of 1942 about 17,000 Jews were
taken from Slovakia to Poland as workers. It was a question of an
agreement with the Slovakian Government. The Slovakian Govern-
ment further asked whether the families of these workers could not
be taken to Poland as well. At first Eichmann declined this request.
In April or at the beginning of May 1942 Eichmann told me that
henceforward whole families could also be taken to Poland. Eich-
mann himself was at Bratislava in May 1942 and had discussed the
matter with competent members of the Slovakian Government. He
visited Minister Mach and the then Prime Minister, Professor Tuka.
At that time he assured the Slovakian Government that these Jews
would be humanely and decently treated in the Polish ghettos. This
was the special wish of the Slovakian Government. As a result of
this assurance about 35,000 Jews were taken from Slovakia into
Poland. The Slovakian Government, however, made efforts to see
that these Jews were, in fact, humanely treated; they particularly

357
 . .

3 Jan. 46

tried to help such Jews as had been converted to Christianity. Prime

Minister Tuka repeatedly asked me to visit him and expressed the
wish that a Slovakian delegation be allowed to enter the areas to
which the Slovakian Jews were supposed to have been sent. I trans-
mitted this wish to Eichmann and the Slovakian Government even
sent him a note on the matter. Eichmann at the time gave an evasive
answer.
Then at the end of July or the beginning of August, I went to
see him in Berlin and implored him once more to grant the request
of the Slovakian Government. I pointed out to him that abroad
there were rumors to the effect that all Jews in Poland were being
exterminated. I pointed out to him that the Pope had intervened
with the Slovakian Government on their behalf. I advised him that
such a proceeding, if really true, would seriously injure our prestige,
that is, the prestige of Germany, abroad. For all these reasons I
begged him to permit the inspection in question. After a lengthy
discussion Eichmann told me that this request to visit the Polish
ghettos could not be granted under any circumstances whatsoever.
In reply to my question "Why?" he said that most of these Jews
were no longer alive. I asked him who had given such instructions
and he referred me to an order of Himmler's. I then begged him to
show me this order, because I could not believe that it actually
existed in writing. He . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Where were you at that time? Where

were you at the time of this meeting with Eichmann?
WISLICENY: This meeting with Eichrnann took place in Berlin,
Kurfürstenstrasse 116, in Eichmann's office.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Proceed with the answer to the previous
question. Proceed with the discussion of the circumstances and the
order.
WISLICENY: Eichmann told me he could show me this order in
writing would soothe my conscience. He took a small volume of
if it

documents from his safe, turned over the pages, and showed me a
letter from Himmler to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD.
The gist of the letter was roughly as follows:
The Führer had ordered the final solution of the Jewish question;
the Chief of the Security Police and the SD and the Inspector of
Concentration Camps were entrusted with carrying out this so-called
final solution. All Jewish men and women who were able to work
were to be temporarily exempted from the so-called final solution
and used for work in the concentration camps. This letter was
signed by Himmler himself. I could not possibly be mistaken since
Himmler's signature was well known to me. I . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: To whom was the order addressed?

358
 3 Jan. 46

WISLICENY: To the Chief of the Security Police and SD, that

is, to the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Was there any other addressee on this
order?
WISLICENY: Yes, the Inspector of Concentration Camps. The
order was addressed to both these offices.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did the order bear any classification
for security purposes?
WISLICENY: It was classified as "secret."

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the approximate date of this

order?
WISLICENY: This order was dated April 1942.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: By whom was it signed?
WISLICENY: By Himmler personally.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: And you personally exàmined this
order in Eichmann's office?
WISLICENY: Yes, Eichmann handed me the document and I
saw the order myself.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Was any question asked by you as to
the meaning of the words "final solution" as used in the order?
WISLICENY: Eichmann went on to explain to me what was
meant by this. He said that the planned biological annihilation of
the Jewish race in the Eastern Territories was disguised by the
concept and wording "final solution." In later discussions on this
subject the same words "final solution" appeared over and over
again.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Was anything said by you to Eichmann
in regard to the power given him under this order?
WISLICENY: Eichmann told me that within the RSHA he per-
sonally was entrusted with the execution of this order. For this
purpose he had received every authority from the Chief of the
Security Police; he himself was personally responsible for the
execution of this order.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did you make any comment to Eich-
mann about his authority?
WISLICENY: Yes. It was perfectly clear to me that this order
spelled death to millions of people. I said to Eichmann, "God grant
that our enemies never have the opportunity of doing the same to
the German people," in reply to which Eichmann told me not to be
sentimental; it was an order of the Fiihrer's and would have to be
carried out.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Do you know whether that order con-
tinued in force and under the operation of Eichmann's department?

359
3 Jan. 46

WISLICENY: Yes.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: How long?
WISLICENY: This order was in force until October 1944. At
that time Himmler gave a counter order which forbade the annihi-
lation of the Jews.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Who was Chief of the Reichssicherheits-
hauptamt at the time the order was first issued?
WISLICENY: That would be Heydrich.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did the program under this order
continue with equal force under Kaltenbrunner?
WISLICENY: Yes; there was no diminution or change of any
kind.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: State, if you know, how long Kalten-
brunner knew Eichmann.
WISLICENY: From various statements by Eichmann I gathered
that Kaltenbrunner and Eichmann had known each other for a long
time. Both came from Linz, and when Kaltenbrunner was made
Chief of the Security Police, Eichmann expressed his satisfaction.
He told, me at that time that he knew Kaltenbrunner very well
personally, and that Kaltenbrunner was very well acquainted with
his family in Linz.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did Eichmann ever refer to his friend-
ship or standing with Kaltenbrunner as being helpful to him?
WISLICENY: Yes, he repeatedly said that, if he had any serious
trouble,he could at any time go to Kaltenbrunner personally. He
did not have to do that very often, since his relations with his
immediate superior, Gruppenführer Müller, were very good.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Have you been present when Eichmann
and Kaltenbrunner met?
WISLICENY: Yes; once I saw how cordially Kaltenbrunner
greeted Eichmann. That was in February 1945 in Eichmann's office
in Berlin. Kaltenbrunner came to lunch every day at Kurfürsten-
strasse 116; there the chiefs met for their midday meal with Kalten-
brunner; and it was on one such occasion that I saw how cordially
Kaltenbrunner greeted Eichmann and how he inquired after the
health of Eichmann's family in Linz.
WISLICENY: In connection with the administration of his office,
do you know to what extent Eichmann submitted matters to
Heydrich and later to Kaltenbrunner for approval?
WISLICENY: The routine channel from Eichmann to Kalten-
brunner lay through Gruppenführer Müller. To my knowledge,
reports to Kaltenbrunner were drawn up at regular intervals by

360
 3 Jan. 46

Eichmann and submitted to him. I also know that in the summer of

1944 he made a personal report to Kaltenbrunner.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did you have an opportunity to examine
files in Eichmann's office?
WISLICENY: Yes; I frequently had occasion to examine the files
in Eichmann's office. I know that he handled with special care any
files which had to do with questions concerning his own special task.
He was in every respect a confirmed bureaucrat; he immediately
recorded in the files every discussion he ever had with any of his
superiors. He always pointed out to me that the most important
thing was for him to be covered by his superiors at all times. He
shunned all personal responsibility and took good care to take
—
shelter behind his superiors in this case Müller and Kalten-
—
brunner when it was a question of responsibility for his actions.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: In the case of a typical report going
from Eichmann's department through Müller, Kaltenbrunner, to
—
Himmler have you seen copies of such reports in Eichmann's file?
WISLICENY: Yes, of course there were many such copies in the
files. The regular channel was as follows: Eichmann had a draft
made by a specialist or he made it himself; this draft went to
Gruppenführer Müller, his department chief; Müller either signed
this draft himself or left the signing to Eichmann. In most cases,
when reports to Kaltenbrunner and Himmler were concerned,
Müller signed them himself. Whenever reports were signed by
Müller without any alteration they were returned to Eichmann's
office, where a first copy and one carbon copy were prepared. The
first copy then went back to Müller for his signature, and thence it
was forwarded either to Kaltenbrunner or to Himmler. In individual
cases where reports to Himmler were involved, Kaltenbrunner
signed them himself. I myself have seen carbon copies with Kalten-
brunner's signature.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Turning now to areas and countries in
which measures were taken affecting the Jews, will you state as to
which countries you have personal knowledge of such operations?
WISLICENY: First, I have personal knowledge of all measures
taken in Slovakia. I also know evacuation of
full particulars of the
Jews from Greece and especially from Hungary. Further, I know
about certain measures taken in Bulgaria and in Croatia. I naturally
heard about the measures adopted in other countries, but was
unable to gain a clear picture of the situation from personal obser-
vation or from detailed reports.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Considering the case of Slovakia, you
have already made reference to the 17,000 specially selected Jews
who were sent from Slovakia. Will you tell the Tribunal of the other
measures that followed concerning Jews in Slovakia?

361
3 Jan. 46

WISLICENY: I mentioned before that these first 17,000 laborers

were followed by about 35,000 Jews, including entire families. In
August or the beginning of September 1942 an end was put to this
action in Slovakia. The reasons for this were that a large number
—
of Jews still in Slovakia had been granted either by the President
—
or by various ministries special permission to remain in the
country. A further reason might have been the unsatisfactory
answer I gave the Slovakian Government in reply to their request
for the inspection of the Jewish camps in Poland. This state of
affairs lasted until September 1944; from August 1942 until Sep-
tember 1944 no Jews were removed from Slovakia. From 25,000 to
30,000 Jews still remained in the country.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: What happened to the first group of
17,000 specially selected workers?

WISLICENY: This group was not annihilated, but all were

employed for enforced labor in the Auschwitz and Lublin Concen-
tration Camps.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How do you know this?

WISLICENY: I know this detail because the Commandant of

Auschwitz, Hoess, made a remark to this effect to me in Hungary
in 1944. He told me at that time that these 17,000 Jews were his
best workers in Auschwitz.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the name of that Com-
mandant?
WISLICENY: The Commandant of Auschwitz was Hoess.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: What happened to the approximately
35,000 members of the families of the Jewish workers that were also
sent to Poland?
WISLICENY: They were treated according to the order which
Eichmann had shown me in August 1942. Part of them were left
alive if they were able to work; the others were killed.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How do you know this?

WISLICENY:I know that from Eichmann and, naturally, also
from Hoess, during conversations in Hungary.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: What proportion of this group remained
alive?
WISLICENY: Hoess at that time, in a conversation with Eich-
mann at which I was present, gave the figure of the surviving
Jews who had been put to work at about 25 to 30 percent.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Referring now to the 25,000 Jews that
remained in Slovakia until September of 1944, do you know what
was done with those Jews?

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3 Jan. 46

WISLICENY: After the outbreak of the Slovakian insurrection

in the fall of 1944 Hauptsturmführer Brunner, one of Eichmann's
assistants, was sent to Slovakia. Eichmann refused to grant my
wish to go to Slovakia. With the help of German police forces and
also with forces of the Slovakian Gendarmerie, Brunner assembled
these Jews in several camps and transported them to Auschwitz.
According to Brunner's statement, about 14,000 persons were
involved. A small group which remained in Camp Szered was, as
far as I know, sent to Theresienstadt in the spring of 1945.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: What happened to these Jews after
they were deported from Slovakia, this group of 25,000?
WISLICENY: I assume that they also met with the so-called
final solution, because Himmler's order to suspend this action was
not issued until several weeks later.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Considering now actions in Greece
about which you have personal knowledge, will you tell the Tri-
bunal of the actions there in chronological sequence?
WISLICENY: In January 1943 Eichmann ordered me to come to
Berlin and told me
that I was to proceed to Salonika to solve the
Jewish problem there in co-operation with the German Military
Administration in Macedonia. Eichmann's permanent representative,
Sturmbannführer Rolf Günther, had previously been to Salonika.
My departure had been scheduled for February 1942. At the end of
January 1942 I was told by Eichmann that Hauptsturmführer Brun-
ner had been nominated by him for the technical execution of all
operations in Greece and that he was to accompany me to Salonika.
Brunner was not subordinate to me; he worked independently. In
February 1942 we went to Salonika and there contacted the Military
Administration. As first action . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Whom in the Military Administration

did you deal with?
WISLICENY: War Administration Counsellor (Kriegsverwal-
tungsrat) Dr. Merten, Chief of the Military Administration with the
Commander of the Armed Forces in the Salonika- Aegean Theater.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: I believe you used 1942 once or more in
reference; did you at all times refer to 1943 in dealing with Greece?
WISLICENY: That is an error. These events occurred in 1943.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: What arrangements were made through
Dr. Merten and what actions were taken?
WISLICENY: In Salonika the Jews were first of all concentrated
There were in Salonika about 50,000
in certain quarters of the city.
Jews of Spanish descent. At the beginning of March, after this
concentration had taken place, a teletype message from Eichmann

363
3 Jan. 46

to Brunner ordered the immediate evacuation of all Jews from Salo-

nika and Macedonia to Auschwitz. Armed with this order, Brunner
and I went to the Military Administration; no objections were raised
by the Military Administration, and measures were prepared and
executed. Brunner directed the entire action in Salonika in person.
The trains necessary for the evacuation were requisitioned from the
Transport Command of the Armed Forces. All Brunner had to do
was to indicate the number of railway cars needed and the exact
time at which they were required.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were any of the Jewish workers
retained at the request of Dr. Merten or the Military Administration?
WISLICENY: The Military Administration had made a demand
for about 3,000 Jews for construction work on the railroad, which
number was duly delivered. Once the work was ended, these Jews
were returned to Brunner and were, like all the others, dispatched
to Auschwitz. The work in question came under the program of the
Todt Organization.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the number of Jewish wor-
kers retained for the Organization Todt?
WISLICENY: Three to four thousand.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Was there any illness among the Jews
that were concentrated for transport?
WISLICENY: In the camp proper, that is, the concentration
camp, there were no special cases of illness; but in certain quarters
of the city inhabited by the Jews typhus was prevalent and other
contagious diseases, especially tuberculosis of the lungs.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: What, if any, communication did you
have with Eichmann concerning this typhus?
WISLICENY: On receipt of the teletype concerning the eva-
I got in touch with Eichmann on the telephone
cuation from Salonika,
and informed him of the prevalence of typhus. He ignored my
objections and gave orders for the evacuation to proceed imme-
diately.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Altogether, how many Jews were col-
lected and deported from Greece?
WISLICENY: There were over 50,000 Jews. I believe that about
54,000 were evacuated from Salonika and Macedonia.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: What is the basis for your figure?
WISLICENY: I myself read a comprehensive report from Brun-
ner to Eichmann on completion of the evacuation. Brunner left
Salonika at the end of May 1943. I personally was not in Salonika
from the beginning of April until the end of May, so that the action
was carried out by Brunner alone.

364
 3 Jan. 46

LT. COL. BROOKHART: How many transports were used for

shipping Jews from Salonika?
WISLICENY: From 20 to 25 transport trains.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: And how many were shipped in each
train?
WISLICENY: There were at least 2,000, and in many cases 2,500.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: What kind of railway equipment was
used for these shipments?
WISLICENY: Closed freight cars were used. The evacuees were
given sufficient food to last them for about 10 days, consisting
mostly of bread, olives, and other dry food. They were also given
water and various other sanitary facilities.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Who furnished this railway trans-

portation?
WISLICENY: Transport was supplied by the Transport Com-
mand of the Armed Forces, that is, the cars and locomotives. The
food was furnished by the Military Administration.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: What did the Subsection IVA4 have to
do with obtaining this transportation, and who in that subsection
dealt with transportation?
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, you need not go into this
in such great detail.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: If Your Honor pleases, this particular
question, I have a bearing on the implications involv-
believe, will
ing the military; I can cut down on the other details.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you spent some considerable time in
describing how many of them were concentrated. Whether it was
60,000 or how many were kept for the Todt Organization all those —
details are really unnecessary.
BROOKHART: Very well, Sir.
LT. COL.
THE PRESIDENT: I mean, you must use your own discretion
about how youcut down. I don't kriow what details or what facts
you are going to prove.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: If Your Honor pleases, this witness, as
he has testified, is competent to cover practically all details in these
Balkan countries. It is not our wish to add cumulative evidence,
but his testimony does furnish a complete story from the Head
Office of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt through the field operations
to the final solution.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is he going to prove about these
50,000 Jews?
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Their ultimate disposition at Auschwitz,
as far ashe knows.

365
3 Jan. 46

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can go on to what ultimately hap-

pened to them then.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Yes, Sir.
[Turning to the witness.] What was the destination of these
transports of Jews from Greece?
WISLICENY: In every case Auschwitz.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: And what was the ultimate disposition
of the Jews sent to Auschwitz from Greece?
WISLICENY: They were without exception destined for the
so-called final solution.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: During the collection period were these
Jews called upon own subsistence?
to furnish their
WISLICENY: I did not quite understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, does it matter, if they
were "brought to the final solution" which I suppose means death?
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Your Honor, this witness will testify
that 280,000,000 drachmas were deposited in the Greek National
Bank for the subsistence of these people and that this amount was
later appropriated by the German Military Administration. That is
all I have hoped to prove by this question.

[Turning to the witness.] Is that a correct statement of your

testimony?
WISLICENY: Yes. The cash which the Jews possessed was taken
away and put into a common account at the Bank of Greece. After
the Jews had been evacuated from Salonika this account was taken
over by the German Military Administration. About 280,000,000
drachmas were involved.
LT. ÇOL. BROOKHART: When you say the Jews taken to Ausch-
witz were submitted to the final solution, what do you mean by that?
WISLICENY: By that I mean what Eichmann had
explained to
me under the term they were annihilated
"final solution," that is,

biologically. As far as I could gather from my conversations with

him, this annihilation took place in the gas chambers and the bodies
were subsequently destroyed in the crematories.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: If Your Honor pleases, this witness is
able to testify as to actions in Hungary, involving approximately
500,000 Jews.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, then. You must use your own discre-
tion. I your case for you.
can't present
LT. COL. BROOKHART: I have no desire to submit cumulative
evidence.
[Turning to the witness.] Turning to actions in Hungary, will
you briefly outline the actions taken there and your participation?

366
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3 Jan. 46

WISLICENY: After the entry of the German troops into Hun-

gary Eichmann went there personally with a large command. By
an order signed by the head of the Security Police, I was assigned
to Eichmann's command. Eichmann began his activities in Hungary
at the end of March 1944. He contacted members of the then Hun-
garian Government, especially State Secretaries Endre and Von
Baky. The first measure adopted by Eichmann in co-operation with
these Hungarian Government officials was the concentration of the
Hungarian Jews in special places and special localities. These meas-
ures were carried out according to zones, beginning in Ruthenia and
Transylvania. The action was initiated in mid-April 1944.
In Ruthenia over 200,000 Jews were affected by these measures.
Consequently, impossible food and housing conditions developed in
the small towns and rural communities where the Jews were assem-
bled. On the strength of this situation Eichmann suggested to the
Hungarians that these Jews be transported to Auschwitz and other
camps. He insisted, however, that a request to this effect be sub-
mitted to him either by the Hungarian Government or by a member
thereof. This request was submitted by State Secretary Von Baky.
The evacuation was carried out by the Hungarian Police.
Eichmann appointed me liaison officer to Lieutenant Colonel
Ferency, entrusted by the Hungarian Minister of the Interior with
this operation. The evacuation of Jews from Hungary began in
May 1944 and was also carried out zone by zone, first starting in
Ruthenia, then in Transylvania, northern Hungary, southern, and
western Hungary. Budapest was to be cleared of Jews by the end
of June. This evacuation, however, was never carried out, as the
regent, Horthy, would not permit it. This operation affected some
450,000 Jews. A second operation was then . .

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Before you go into that, please, will

you tell the Tribunal what, if anything, was done about organizing
an Einsatz group to act in Hungary on the Jewish question?
WISLICENY: At the beginning of March 1944 a so-called Einsatz-
gruppe, consisting of Security Police and SD, was formed at Maut-
hausen near Linz. Eichmann himself headed a so-called "Sonder-
Einsatz-Kommando" to which he detailed everybody who had held
any position in his department. This Special-Action Commando was
likewise assembled at Mauthausen. All questions of personnel
devolved on the then Standartenführer, Dr. Gesenke, leader of the
Einsatzgruppe. In technical matters Eichmann was subordinate only
to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: What was the meaning of the desig-

nation "Special- Action Commando Eichmann" in relation to the
movement into Hungary?

367
 .

3 Jan. 46

WISLICENY: Eichmann's activities in Hungary comprised all

matters connected with the Jewish problem.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Under whose direct supervision was
Special-Action Commando Eichmann organized?
WISLICENY: I have already said that in all matters of per-
sonnel and economy Eichmann was subordinate to Standartenführer,
Dr. Gesenke, leader of the Einsatzgruppe. In technical matters he
could give no orders to Eichmann. Eichmann likewise reported
direct to Berlin on all the special operations undertaken by him.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: To whom?

WISLICENY: Either to Gruppenführer Müller, or, in more im-
portant cases, to the Chief of the Security Police and SD, that is,
to Kaltenbrunner.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: During the period in which Hungarian
Jews were being collected, what, if any, contact was made by the
Joint Distribution Committee for Jewish Affairs with Eichmann's
representative?

WISLICENY: The Joint Distribution Committee made efforts to

contact Eichmann and
to try to ward off the fate of the Hungarian
Jews. I myself established this contact with Eichmann, since I
wanted to discover some means of protecting the half million Jews
in Hungary from the measures already in force. The Joint Distribu-
tion Committee made certain offers to Eichmann and in return
requested that the Jews should remain in Hungary. These offers
were mainly of a financial nature. Eichmann felt himself, much
against his will, obliged to forward these proposals to Himmler.
Himmler thereupon entrusted a certain Standartenführer Becher
with further negotiations. Standartenführer Becher then continued
the negotiations with Dr. Kastner, delegate of the J.D.C. But Eich-
mann, from the very first, endeavored to wreck the negotiations.
Before any concrete results were obtained he attempted to present
us with a fait accompli; in other words, he tried to transport as
many Jews as possible to Auschwitz.
THE PRESIDENT: Need we go into all these conferences? Can't
you take us on to the conclusion of the matter?
LT. COL. BROOKHART: The witness is inclined to be lengthy
in his answers. That has been true in his pre-trial examination.
I will try . .

THE PRESIDENT: You are examining him.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Yes, Sir.
Was there any money involved in the meeting between Dr. Käst-
ner and Eichmann?

368
 . —
3 Jan. 46

WISLICENY: Yes.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: How much?
WISLICENY: In the first conversation Dr. Kastner gave Eich-
mann about 3 million pengoes. What the sums mentioned in further
conversations amounted to, I do not know exactly.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: To whom did Dr. Kästner give this
money and what became of it?
WISLICENY: It was given to Eichmann, who then turned it over
to his financial agent; the sum was in turn handed to the com-
mander of the Security Police and the SD in Hungary.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: These actions that you have described,
involving approximately 450,000 Jews being moved from Hungary
were there any official communications sent to Berlin concerning
these movements?
WISLICENY: Yes, as each transport left, Berlin was informed
by teletype. From time to time Eichmann also dispatched a compre-
RSHA and to the
hensive report to the Chief of the Security Police.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Now with reference to the Jews that
remained in Budapest, what, if any, action was taken against them?
WISLICENY: After Szalasi had taken over the Government of
Hungary . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Brookhart, we have not yet heard,

have we, what happened to these Jews from Hungary? If we have,
I have missed it.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: I will ask that question now, Sir.

[Turning to the witness.] What became of the Jews to whom

you have already referred — approximately 450,000?
WISLICENY: They were, without exception, taken to Auschwitz
and brought to the final solution.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Do you mean they were killed?

WISLICENY: Yes, with the exception of perhaps 25 to 30 per-

cent who were used for labor purposes. I here refer to a previously
mentioned conversation on this matter between Hoess and Eichmann
in Budapest.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Turning now to the Jews remaining in

Budapest, what happened to them?
WISLICENY: In October-November 1944 about 30,000 of these
Jews, perhaps a few thousand more, were removed from Budapest
and sent to Germany. They were to be used to work on the con-
struction of the so-called Southeast Wall, a fortification near Vienna.
They were mostly women.

369
3 Jan. 46

They had to walk from Budapest to the German border almost —

200 kilometers. They were assembled in marching formations and
followed a route specially designated for them. Their shelter and
nutrition on this march was extremely bad. Most of them fell ill
and lost strength. I had been ordered by Eichmann to take over
these groups at the German border and direct them further to the
Lower Danube Gauleitung for labor purposes. In many cases I
refused to take over these so-called workers, because they were
completely exhausted and emaciated by disease. Eichmann, how-
ever, forced me to take them over and in this case even threatened
to turn me over to Himmler to be put into a concentration camp if
I caused him further political difficulties. For this same reason I
was later removed from Eichmann's department.
A large proportion of these people then died in the so-called
Lower Danube work camps from exhaustion and epidemics. A small
percentage, perhaps 12,000, was taken to Vienna and the surround-
ing area, and a group of about 3,000 was taken to Bergen-Belsen,
and from there to Switzerland. Those were Jews who had been
released from Germany as a result of the negotiations with the J.D.C.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Summarizing for the countries of
Greece, Hungary, —
and Slovakia approximately how many Jews
were affected by measures of the Secret Police and SD in those
countries about which you have personal knowledge?

WISLICENY: In Slovakia there were about 66,000, in Greece

about 64,000, and in Hungary more than half a million.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: In the countries Croatia and Bulgaria,
about which you have some knowledge, how many Jews were thus
affected?

WISLICENY: In Bulgaria, to my understanding about 8,000; in

Croatia I know of only 3,000 Jews who were brought to Auschwitz
from Agram in the summer of 1942.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: Were meetings held of the specialists
on the Jewish problem from Amt IVA, whose names appear on this
sheet to which we made reference earlier?
WISLICENY: Yes. Eichmann was accustomed to calling a large
annual meeting of experts in Berlin. This meeting was usu-
all his
ally in November. At these meetings all the men who were work-
ing for him in foreign countries had to report on their activities.
In 1944, so far as I know, such a meeting did not take place, because
in November 1944 Eichmann was still in Hungary.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In connection with the Jews about

whom you have personal knowledge, how many were subjected to
the final solution, that is, to being killed?

370
 3 Jan. 46

WISLICENY: The exact number is extremely hard for me to

determine. I have only one basis for a possible estimate, that is a
conversation between Eichmann and Hoess in Vienna, in which he
said that only a very few of those sent from Greece to Auschwitz
had been fit for work. Of the Slovakian and Hungarian Jews about
20 to 30 percent had been able to work. It is therefore very hard
for me to give a reliable total.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: In your meetings with the other spe-

cialistson the Jewish problem and Eichmann did you gain any
knowledge or information as to the total number of Jews killed
under this program?
WISLICENY: Eichmann personally always talked about at least
4 million Jews. Sometimes he even mentioned 5 million. According
to my own estimate I should say that at least 4 million must have
been destined for the so-called final solution. How many of those
actually survived, I am not in a position to say.
LT. COL. BROOKHART: When did you last see Eichmann?
WISLICENY: I lastsaw Eichmann towards the end of February
1945 in Berlin. At that time he said that if the war were lost he
would commit suicide.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: Did he say anything at that time as to

the number of Jews that had been killed?
WISLICENY: Yes, he expressed this in a particularly cynical
manner. He said he would leap laughing into the grave because
the feeling that he had 5 million people on his conscience would be
for him a source of extraordinary satisfaction.

LT. COL. BROOKHART: The witness is available for other

counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other prosecuting counsel wish
to examine the witness?
MR. G.D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom):
My Lord, I have no desire to ask any questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Soviet prosecutor wish to ask any
questions?
COL. POKROVSKY: At this stage the Soviet Union does not
wish to ask any questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the French prosecutor?
[There was no response.]
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you mentioned the impressment of
the Jews for labor and named two cases, one of Jews from Slovakia
who were brought to Auschwitz and put to work if they were fit
for it; then later you spoke of those Jews who were brought from

371
3 Jan. 46

Hungary to the Southeast Wall. Do you know whether the Pleni-

potentiary General for the Allocation of Labor Sauckel had any
connection with these actions, whether this happened on his orders,
and whether he otherwise had anything to do with these matters?
WISLICENY: As far as the Jews from Slovakia were concerned,
the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor had nothing
to do with these matters. It was a purely internal affair for the
Inspector of Concentration Camps who employed these Jews for his
own purposes. Concerning the impressment of Jews for the con-
struction of the Southeast Wall, I cannot definitely answer this
question. I do not know to what extent the construction of the
Southeast Wall was directed by the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor. The Jews who came up from Hungary for this
construction work were turned over to the Lower Danube Gau-
leitung.

DR. SERVATIUS : I have no further questions to ask the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Any other?

HERR BABEL: Witness, you mentioned measures taken by the
Security Police and the SD; and you spoke about these organizations
several times in your testimony. Is this merely an official designa-
tion or are we to conclude from your statement that the Security
Service (the SD) as such, participated in some way?
WISLICENY: The actions mentioned were executed by Amt IV,
that the Gestapo. If I mentioned the Chief of the Security Police
is,

and the SD, I did so because it was the correct designation of this
office and not because I wished to mention the SD as such.

HERR BABEL: Did the SD then participate, in any way, in the

measures against the Jews mentioned by you: 1) to what extent,
and 2) in what manner?
WISLICENY: The SD as an organization was not involved. Some
of the leaders, including me, who worked with Eichmann, came
—
from the SD; but they had been detailed to Amt IV to the Gestapo.
HERR BABEL: Did former members SS and SD who
of the
later became active in the Gestapo still remain members of their
original organization, or were they now members of the Gestapo?

WISLICENY: No, they still remained with the SD.

HERR BABEL: And were they acting as members of the SD or
were they carrying out orders of the Gestapo?

WISLICENY: We belonged to the Gestapo for the duration of

our assignment. We merely remained on the SD payroll and were
taken care of as members of their personnel. Orders were received
—
exclusively from the Gestapo from Amt IV.

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 3 Jan. 46

HERR BABEL: In this connection I should like to ask one more

question. Could an outsider ever know his way about in this maze
of offices?

WISLICENY: No; that was practically impossible.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other of the defendants' counsel
who wishes to cross-examine this witness? Colonel Amen, do you
wish, or Colonel Brookhart, does he wish to re-examine the witness?
COL. AMEN: No further questions, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That will do.
[The witness left the stand.]
COL. AMEN: It will take about 10 minutes, Sir, to get the next
witness up. I had not anticipated we would finish quite so quickly.
Do you still want me to get him up this afternoon?
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any other witnesses on these
subjects?
COL. AMEN: Not on this subject, Sir. I have two very brief
witnesses: one on the written agreement, concerning which testi-
mony was given this morning, between the and and OKW OKH
—
the RSHA a witness who can answer the questions which the
members of the Tribunal asked this morning, very briefly; and one
other witness who is on a totally different subject.
THE PRESIDENT: On what subject is the other witness?
COL. AMEN: Well, he is on the subject of identifying two of
the defendants at one of the concentration camps. I don't like to
mention these names to the Defense unless you wish me to.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then you will call those two wit-
nesses tomorrow?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Lordship. I don't think either of them
will takemore than 20 minutes apiece.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then you will go on with the
evidence against the High Command?
COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 4 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]

373
 TWENTY-SEVENTH DAY
Friday, 4 January 1946

Morning Session

COL. AMEN: I would like to call as a witness for the Prose-

cution Walter Schellenberg.
[The witness, Schellenberg, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Is your name Walter Schellenberg?
WALTER SCHELLENBERG (Witness): My name is Walter
Schellenberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath: "I swear by God—
—
the Almighty and Omniscient that I will speak the pure truth and —
will withhold and add nothing."
[The witness repeated the oath.]
COL. AMEN: Speak slowly and pause between the questions and
the answers.
Where were you born?
SCHELLENBERG: In Saarbrücken.
COL. AMEN: How old are you?
SCHELLENBERG: Thirty-five years.
COL. AMEN: You were a member of the NSDAP?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And of the SS?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes; the SS also.
COL. AMEN: And of the Waffen-SS?
SCHELLENBERG: And the Waffen-SS.
COL. AMEN: And the SD?
SCHELLENBERG: And the SD.
COL. AMEN: What was the highest office you held?
SCHELLENBERG: The highest rank I held was that of SS
Brigadeführer in the SS, and of major general in the Waffen-SS.
COL. AMEN: You were Chief of Amt VI?
SCHELLENBERG: I was Chief of Amt VI and Military.
COL. AMEN: During what period of time?

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SCHELLENBERG: I was made Deputy Chief of Amt VI in July

1941, and the final confirmation of my appointment as Chief was in
June of 1942.
COL. AMEN: State briefly the functions of Amt VI of the RSHA.
SCHELLENBERG: Amt VI was the political secret service of
the Reich and worked principally in foreign countries.
COL. AMEN: Do you know of an agreement between OKW,
OKH, and the RSHA concerning the use of Einsatz groups and
Einsatzkommandos in the Russian campaign?
SCHELLENBERG: At the end of May 1941 conferences took
place between the then head of the Security Police and the Quarter-
master General, General Wagner.
COL. AMEN: And who?
SCHELLENBERG: The Quartermaster General of the Army,
General Wagner.
COL. AMEN: Did you personally attend those conferences?
SCHELLENBERG: I kept the minutes of the final conferences.
COL. AMEN: Have you given us the names of all persons present
during those negotiations?
SCHELLENBERG: The negotiations took place principally
between Obergruppenführer Heydrich, who was then the Chief of
the Security Police and the SD, and the Quartermaster General of
the Army.
COL. AMEN: Was anyone else present during any of the nego-
tiations?

SCHELLENBERG: Not during the negotiations themselves, but

at a later meeting other persons took part.
COL. AMEN: And did those negotiations result in the signing
of an agreement?
SCHELLENBERG: A written agreement was concluded.
COL. AMEN: Were you there when the written agreement was
signed?
SCHELLENBERG: I kept the minutes and I saw both gentle-
men sign.

COL. AMEN: By whom was this agreement signed?

SCHELLENBERG: It was signed by the then Chief of the
Security Police, SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich, and the Quarter-
master General of the Army, General Wagner.
COL. AMEN: Do you know where the original agreement, or
any copy thereof, is located today?
SCHELLENBERG: No, that I cannot say. I know nothing
about that.

375
4 Jan. 46

COL. AMEN: But you are familiar with the contents of that
written agreement?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes; for the most part I recall that.
COL. AMEN: To the best of your knowledge and recollection,
please tell the Tribunal exactly what was contained in that written
agreement.
SCHELLENBERG: The first part of this agreement began with
the quotation of a basic decree by the Führer. It read in the
introductory clause somewhat as follows:
For the safety of the fighting troops in the Russian campaign
that is now expected to start, all means are to be used to keep the
rear safe and protected. On the basis of this consideration every
means is to be used to break any resistance. In order to support
the fighting units of the Army, the Security Police and the Security
Service are also to be called in for this task.
If I remember correctly, as a special example of something to
be protected, the safeguarding of the so-called great routes of supply,
also called "Rollbahnen," was mentioned.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall anything else contained in that
agreement?
SCHELLENBERG: In the second part of this agreement the
organization of the army groups was mentioned.
COL. AMEN: And what was said about that?
SCHELLENBERG: And the corresponding organization of the
Einsatz groups and the Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police
and the SD. Four different sectors were mentioned.
I remember the following: First, the front area; second, the

—
operational zone it was also divided into an army group area and
a rear army group area; third, the rear army area; and fourth, the
area where the civil administration (Reichskommissariat) was to
be set up.
In these different areas, the division of subordination and com-
mand was clearly defined. In the front areas or fighting areas, the
Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police and the SD were tactically
and operationally under the command of the Army; that is, they
were completely under the command of the Army.
In the operational zones only operational subordination should
apply and this same rule should apply in the rear army area. In
the zone intended for the civil administration (Reichskommissariat)
the same conditions of subordination and command were to apply
as in Reich territory.
In a third part it was explained what was meant by tactical and
operational, or rather only the concept "operational" was explained

376
 4 Jan. 46

in detail. By"operational" was meant the subordination to the

branches of the Army in respect to discipline and supplies. Special
mention was made of the fact that the operational subordination
also included all supplies —
especially supplies of gasoline, food, and
the making available of technical routes for the transmission of
intelligence.

COL. AMEN: Have you now told us everything which you recall
about that agreement?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes; I cannot remember anything else con-
tained in the agreement.
COL. AMEN: If Your Honor pleases, that is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the English Prosecution have any ques-
tions to ask?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the
United Kingdom): No.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Russian Prosecution have any ques-
tions to ask?
COL. POKROVSKY: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the French Prosecution have any ques-
tions to ask?
[There was no response.]
THE PRESIDENT: Do the defendants' counsel wish to ask any
questions?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it correct that Dr. Kaltenbrunner was
your superior?
SCHELLENBERG: Dr. Kaltenbrunner was my immediate superior.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Until what time?
SCHELLENBERG: From the 30th of January of 1943 until
the end.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know his attitude towards the main
themes of National Socialism, for instance, the treatment of the
Jews or the treatment of the Church?
SCHELLENBERG: I personally did not have a chance to con-
verse with him on these problems. What I know about him is the
result of my own few personal observations.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you see original orders from Kalten-
brunner dealing with the execution of saboteurs, the confinement
of people in concentration camps, and the like?

SCHELLENBERG: No. I heard him give only oral orders in

—
respect to this commands which he gave to the Chief of the State
Police, the Chief of Amt IV of the RSHA.

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4 Jan. 46

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did Kaltenbrunner ever indicate to you that

he had agreed with Himmler that everything concerning concen-
tration camps and the entire executive power was to be taken away
from him and that only the SD, as an intelligence service, was to
be entrusted to him and that he wanted to expand this intelligence
service in order to supply the criticism that was otherwise lacking?
SCHELLENBERG: never heard of any such agreement, and
I
what I found out later to be the facts is to the contrary.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, since you have given a negative answer,
I must ask you the following question, in order to make this one
point clear: Which facts do you mean?
SCHELLENBERG: I mean, for instance, the fact that after the
Reichsführer SS very reluctantly agreed, through my persuasion,
not to evacuate the concentration camps, Kaltenbrunner by getting —
—
into direct contact with Hitler circumvented this order of Himm-
ler's and broke his word in respect to international promises.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Were there any international decisions in

—
respect to this decisions which referred to existing laws or deci-
sions which referred to international agreements?
SCHELLENBERG: I would like to explain that, if through the
intermediary of internationally known persons, the then Reichs-
führer SS promised the official Allied authorities not to evacuate
the concentration camps, owing to the general distress, this promise
was binding according to human rights.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What do you mean by evacuate?
SCHELLENBERG: Arbitrarily to evacuate the camps before the
approaching enemy troops and to scatter them to other parts of Ger-
many still unoccupied by the enemy troops.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was your opinion?
SCHELLENBERG: That no further evacuation should take place,
because human rights simply did not allow it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: That the camps should therefore be sur-

rendered to the approaching enemy?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know that your activity, too, could
tyring suffering to many people, to people who were per se innocent?
SCHELLENBERG: I did not understand the question. Will you
please repeat it?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you ever think that your activity, too,
and the activity of your fellow-workers was a cause for the great
— —
suffering of many people let us say Jews even though these
people were innocent?

378
 .

4 Jan. 46

SCHELLENBERG: I cannot imagine that the activity of my

office could cause any such thing. I was merely in an information
service.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then your information service had no con-
nection at all with such crimes.
SCHELLENBERG: No.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then Kaltenbrunner, too, would not be
guilty in regard to this point?
SCHELLENBERG: Certainly; because he was, at the same time,
Amt IV of the State Police.
the Chief of
DR. KAUFFMANN: I asked "in regard to this point," and by
that I meant your sector.
SCHELLENBERG: I only represented the Sector Amt VI and
Amt Military.
DR. KAUFFMANN: But Kaltenbrunner, at the same time, was
Amt VI?
Chief of
SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the RSHA.
Eight departments, as you probably know, were under him. I was at
the head of one or two of them, namely, Amt VI and Amt Military.
These two offices had nothing to do with the executive power of the
State Police.
DR.KAUFFMANN: Then, if your department . .

THE PRESIDENT: What I understood you to say was that you

were only in a branch which was an information center; is that
right?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And that Kaltenbrunner was your imme-
diate chief; is that right?
SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the RSHA.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he was the Chief not only of your
branch but of the whole organization.
SCHELLENBERG: Yes, that is correct.
DR. KAUFFMANN: should like to question this witness later
I
on, after I have talked with Kaltenbrunner.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the summer of 1943 were you in Ankara?
And did you, on this occasion pay a visit to the German Embassy?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you during this visit criticize German
foreign policy in various respects, and did you mention that it was
absolutely advisable to establish better relations with the Holy See?
Did Herr Von Papen then answer, "That would be possible only if,
in accordance with the demands that I have made repeatedly, the

379
4 Jan. 46

Church policy is revised completely and the persecution of the

Church ceases"?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes, the gist of the conversation is correct;
and I spoke with the then Ambassador Von Papen to this effect.
DR. ALFRED THOMA
(Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): You
said a little while ago that, with respect to authority, the same
regulations applied in the area of the civil administration as in the
Reich.
SCHELLENBERG: I said they were to apply.
DR.THOMA: Please answer my question again.
SCHELLENBERG: I will repeat: I described the agreement
which contained the provision that in the areas intended for civil
administration (Reichskommissariat) the same relations between the
Army and the Security Police and the SD, in regard to subordi-
nation and command, were applicable as in the Reich.
DR. THOMA: Do you know how that was done in practice?
SCHELLENBERG: No, later on I did not concern myself with
these questions any more.
DR.THOMA: Thank you.
HERR BABEL: You were a member of the SS and of the SD,
and in leading positions . . -

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state, for the purposes of the record,
which organization you appear on behalf of?
HERR BABEL: I represent the organization of the SS and SD.
[Turning to the witness.] In the RSHA there were departments
of the Security Police and the SD. How were these two departments
interrelated, and what was the purpose of the SD?
SCHELLENBERG: That is a question that I cannot answer with
one sentence.
HERR BABEL: I can withdraw the question for the moment and
ask a concrete one: Was the SD used with the "Einsatzgruppen" in
the East? To what extent? And for what tasks?
SCHELLENBERG: believe that most of this work in the East
I
was undertaken by the Security Police, that is, by the Secret State
Police and the Criminal Police and that only supplementary con-
tingents were formed from the personnel of the SD.
HERR BABEL: How large were these contingents? How large
was the SD?
SCHELLENBERG: I believe that I can estimate the figures:
Excluding female employees, the State Police perhaps 40,000 to —
45,000; the Criminal Police— 15,000 to 20,000; the SD of the interior,
that is, Amt III with its organizational subsidiaries 2,000 to 2,500; —
and the SD outside Germany, that is my Amt VI about 400. —
380
 4 Jan. 46

HERR BABEL: And how was the SD used in the East with the
Einsatz groups.
SCHELLENBERG: I cannot give you the particulars, as that was
a concern of the personnel administration and it depended entirely
upon the instructions of the then Chief of the Security Police.
HERR BABEL: Did the figures you mentioned include only the
male members of the SD, or were the female employees also
included?
SCHELLENBERG: Only male members. I excluded the female
employees.
HERR BABEL: Yesterday a witness gave us approximately the
same figure of 3,000, buthe included the female employees in this
figure.
SCHELLENBERG: I mentioned a figure of 2,000 to 2,500 for the
SD in the interior.
HERR BABEL: What was the organizational structure of the
Waffen-SS?
SCHELLENBERG: As for the organizational structure of the
Waffen-SS, cannot give you a detailed reply that
I is reliable as I
did not deal with this question.
HERR BABEL: You were a member of the Waffen-SS and of
the SD?
SCHELLENBERG: I was merely appointed a member of the
Waffen-SS in January 1945, so to speak by higher orders, because I
had many military units under my command and I had to be given
a military rank through the Amt Military.
HERR BABEL: Do you know whether that also happened to a
large extent in other cases?
SCHELLENBERG: That question is beyond me.
HERR BABEL: Thank you.
COL. AMEN: Do you know of any particular case in which
Kaltenbrunner had ordered the evacuation of any one concentration
camp, contrary to Himmler's wishes?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal about that?
SCHELLENBERG: I cannot give you the exact date, but I believe
it was in the beginning of April 1945. The son of the former Swiss
President, Muesi, who had taken his father to Switzerland, returned
by car to the Buchenwald Concentration Camp, in order to fetch a
Jewish family which I myself had set free. He found the camp in
process of being evacuated under the most deplorable conditions.
When he had, 3 days previously, driven his father to Switzerland,
he was given definite assurance before he left that the camps would

381
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4 Jan. 46

not be evacuated. Since this assurance was also intended for General
Eisenhower, he was doubly disappointed at this breach of promise.
Muesi, Jr., called on me personally at my office. He was deeply
offended and reproached me bitterly. I could not understand what
had happened; and I at once contacted Himmler's secretary, pro-
testing against this sort of procedure. Shortly after, it was admitted
that the facts as depicted by Muesi, Jr., were true, although it was
still incomprehensible, because Himmler had not given these orders.
I was assured that everything would be done to put an immediate
halt to the evacuations. This was confirmed on the telephone per-
sonally by Himmler a few hours later. I believe it was on the
same day, after a meeting of office chiefs, that I informed Kalten-
brunner of the situation and expressed my profound concern at this
new breach of international assurances. As I paused in the conver-
sation, the Chief of the State Police, Gruppenführer Müller,
interrupted and explained that he had started the evacuation of the
more important internees from the individual camps 3 days ago on
Kaltenbrunner 's orders. Kaltenbrunner replied with these words:
"Yes, that is correct. It was an order of the Führer which was
also recently confirmed by the Führer in person. All the
important internees are to be evacuated at his order to the
south of the Reich."
He then turned to me mockingly and, speaking in dialect, said:

"Tell your old gentleman Muesi, Sr.) that there are still
(i.e.

enough left in the camps. With that you too can be satisfied."
I think this was on 10 April 1945.
COL. AMEN: That is all, may it please the Tribunal.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko) Can you say now what the :

RSHA were?
functions of the
SCHELLENBERG: That I cannot answer in one sentence. I
believe . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko) : Be brief, be brief! What

were the aims?
SCHELLENBERG: The RSHA was a comprehensive grouping of
the Security Police, that is, the State Police . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): know about this organi- We

zation on the basis of the documents which are at the disposal of the
Court, but what were its functions?
SCHELLENBERG: I just wanted to explain its functions. Its
functions consisted of security, that is, State Police activity, of
Criminal Police activity, and of intelligence activity at home and
abroad.

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 4 Jan. 46

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko) Would it be correct to for-

:

mulate the functions as follows: To suppress those whom the Nazi

Party considered its enemies?
SCHELLENBERG: No, I think this statement is too one-sided.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko) But all these functions
:

were included?
SCHELLENBERG: They were, perhaps, a certain part of the
activities of the State Police.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Had this part of the func-

tions, then, been changed after Kaltenbrunner took office?

SCHELLENBERG: No, there was no change.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Had those functions, to
which you referred just now, been changed since the time that Kal-
tenbrunner took office as Chief of the Security Police?
SCHELLENBERG: The functions, as I formulated them, did not
change after Kaltenbrunner assumed office.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I have one more question:

What were the aims and purposes of the Einsatz groups which were
to have been created on the basis of the agreement between the SD
and the High Command?
SCHELLENBERG: As I mentioned before, in the first part of
the agreement made at that time it was laid down that the rear
must be protected and all means used to repress any resistance.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): To repress or to crush
resistance?
SCHELLENBERG: The words were, "All resistance is to be
crushed with every means."
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): By what means was the
resistance to be suppressed?
SCHELLENBERG: The agreement did not mention or discuss
this in any way.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): But you know what means
were used for that suppression, do you not?
SCHELLENBERG: Later I heard that because of the bitterness
of the struggle, harsh means were chosen, but I know this only by
hearsay.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What does it mean more
exactly?
SCHELLENBERG: That in partisan fighting and in encounters
with the civilian population many shootings took place.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko) : Including children?

383
 .

4 Jan. 46

SCHELLENBERG: I didn't hear about that.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko) You didn't : hear about it?

[There was no response.]

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko) That is all. :

SIR DAVID M AXWELL-FYFE Since Your Lordship was good

:

enough to ask me whether I wanted to put any questions, I have had

some further information and I should be very grateful if the
Tribunal would be good enough to allow me to ask one or two
questions.
[Turning to the witness.] Would you direct your mind to a con-
versation between the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, Gruppenführer
Nebe, and Gruppenführer Müller, in the spring of 1944, in Berlin
at Wilhelmstrasse 102.
SCHELLENBERG: Yes.
SIR DAVIDM AXWELL-FYFE: With what was that conver-
sation concerned?
SCHELLENBERG: This conversation, as far as I could gather—
for I —
took no part in it concerned the subsequent covering for the
shooting of about 50 English or American prisoners of war. The gist
of the conversation was, as far as I remember, that there had
evidently been an inquiry from the International Red Cross as to
the whereabouts of 50 English and American prisoners of war. This
request for information by the International Red Cross appears to
have been passed on to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD
by way of the Foreign Office. From the conversation I could . .

SIR DAVID M AXWELL-FYFE : Was it already in the form of

a protest against the shooting of prisoners of war?
SCHELLENBERG: I believe it was lodged in the form of a
protest, since from fragments of this conversation I gathered that
there was a discussion as to how the shooting of these prisoners of
war, which had already taken place, could be covered up or
disguised.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : Did Kaltenbrunner discuss this
with Müller and Nebe?
SCHELLENBERG: Kaltenbrunner discussed this matter with
Müller and Nebe, but I heard merely fragments of the conversation.
I heard, incidentally, that they meant to discuss the details in the
course of the afternoon.
SIR DAVID M
AX WELL-FYFE Did you hear any suggestion
:

put forward as to what explanations should be given to cover the

shooting of these prisoners?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes, Kaltenbrunner himself offered these
suggestions.

384
 4 Jan. 46

SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: What were the suggestions?

SCHELLENBERG: That the majority should be treated as indi-
vidual cases, as "having perished in air raids"; some, I believe,
because they "offered resistance," that is, "physical resistance,"
while others were "pursued when escaping."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean— shot while trying
to escape?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes, shot in flight.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And these were the excuses
which Kaltenbrunner suggested?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes, these were the excuses that Kalten-
brunner suggested.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to try and
remember as well as you can about these prisoners. Does any
number remain in your mind? Can you remember any number of
prisoners that they were discussing or how these explanations arose?
About how many?
SCHELLENBERG: I remember only that the number "50" was
mentioned over and over again, but what the actual details were I
cannot say because I just caught fragments of the conversation. I

could not follow the whole conversation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the number "50" remains
in your mind?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes, I heard "50."
SIRDAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you remember anything of
the place or the camp in which these people had been, who were
said to have been shot?
SCHELLENBERG: I cannot tell you under oath. There is a
possibility that might add something I heard afterwards. I believe
I

it was Breslau, but I cannot say it exactly, as a fact.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And can you remember any-
thing of what service the people belonged to? Were they Air Force
or Army? Have you any recollection on that point?
SCHELLENBERG: I believe they were all officers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were officers?
SCHELLENBERG: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you cannot remember what
service?
SCHELLENBERG: No, that I cannot tell you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful to the Tri-
bunal for letting me ask these questions.

385
4 Jan. 46

COL. AMEN: That is all for this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the witness can go then.
[The witness left the stand.]
COL. AMEN: I wish to call as the next witness, Alois Höllriegel.
[The witness, Höllriegel, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
ALOIS HÖLLRIEGEL (Witness): Alois Höllriegel.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath: "I swear by God—
the Almighty and Omniscient that — I will speak the pure truth —and
will withhold and add nothing."
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You can sit down if you want to.
COL. AMEN: What position did you hold at the end of the war?
HÖLLRIEGEL: At the end of the war I was Unterscharführer
at Mauthausen.
COL. AMEN: Were you a member of the Totenkopf SS?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes; in the year 1939 I was drafted into the SS.
COL. AMEN: What were your duties at the Mauthausen Concen-
tration Camp?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I was until the winter of 1942 with a guard com-

pany, and stood guard. From 1942 until the end of the war I was
I

detailed to the inner service of the concentration camp.

COL. AMEN: And you therefore had occasion to witness the
extermination of inmates of that camp by shooting, gassing, and so
forth?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, I saw that.
COL. AMEN: And did you make an affidavit in this case to the
effect that you saw Kaltenbrunner at that camp?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And that he saw and was familiar with the
operation of the gas chamber there?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Did you also have occasion to see any other impor-
tant personages visiting that concentration camp?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I remember Pohl, Glücks, Kaltenbrunner, Schi-
rach, and the Gauleiter of Styria, Uiberreither.
COL. AMEN: And did you personally see Schirach at that con-
camp at Mauthausen?
centration
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Do you remember what he looks like so that you
could identify him?

386
 4 Jan. 46

HÖLLRIEGEL: I think that he has probably changed a little in

recent times, but I would certainly remember him.
COL. AMEN: How long ago was it that you saw him there?
HÖLLRIEGEL: That was in the fall of 1942. Since then I have
not seen him.
COL. AMEN: Will you look around the courtroom and see
whether you can see Schirach in the courtroom?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Which person is it?
HÖLLRIEGEL: In the second row, the third person from the left.

COL. AMEN: The affidavit to which I referred was Exhibit Num-

ber USA-515.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the PS number?
COL. AMEN: 2753-PS.
[Turning to the witness.] I now show you a copy of Document
Number 2641-PS and ask you whether you can recognize the place
where those individuals are standing?
HÖLLRIEGEL: As far as can be seen from the picture, it is a
quarry. Whether it is at Mauthausen or not one cannot determine
exactly, because the view is too small.
COL. AMEN: Would you repeat that answer please?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Certainly. As far as can be seen from this
picture, it not possible to say definitely if this is the Wiener-
is
Graben quarry which adjoined Mauthausen. It might easily be
another quarry. A larger range of vision is required. But I think
that visits were often made there. I assume that this is the Wiener-
Graben quarry.
COL. AMEN: Very good. Just lay the picture aside for the time
being. Did you have occasion to observe the killing of inmates of
the concentration camp by pushing them off a cliff?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what you saw with
respect to that practice?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I remember, it was in 1941. At that time I was
with a guard company on the tower which closed off the area of the
Wiener-Graben quarry. I was able to observe in the morning about
six to eight prisoners who came with two SS men. One was Haupt-
scharführer Spatzenöcker and the other, Unterscharführer Eden-
hofer; they moved about and made strange gestures . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Wait, you are going too fast. You should go
slower.

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4 Jan. 46

HÖLLRIEGEL: I saw that they were approaching the precipice

near the quarry. I saw from my watchtower that these two SS men
were beating the prisoners and I realized immediately that they
intended to force them to throw themselves over the precipice or
else to push them over. I noticed how one of the prisoners was
kicked while lying on the ground, and the gestures showed that he
was supposed to throw himself down the precipice. This the pris-
oner promptly did under the pressure of the blows presumably —
in despair.
COL. AMEN: How steep was the precipice?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I estimate it to be 30 to 40 meters.
COL. AMEN: Was there a term used amongst you guards for this
practice of having the prisoners fall from the top of the precipice?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, in Mauthausen Camp they were called
paratroopers.
COL. AMEN: The witness is available to other counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Russian Prosecutor or the French
Prosecutor or any defense counsel have any questions?
DR. SAUTER: Witness, I am interested in the following points:
You now that in 1939 you were taken into the SS?
said just
HÖLLRIEGEL: That is true; on the 6th of September . .

DR. SAUTER: One moment; please repeat your answer.

HÖLLRIEGEL: That is right. On the 6th of September 1939 I

was taken into the SS at Ebersberg near Linz.

DR. SAUTER: Had you no connection at all with the Party
before then?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes. In April 1938 I enlisted in the civilian SS,
because I was out of work during the entire previous period of the
Schuschnigg Government and without any support, and consequently
I thought, I would join the civilian SS; there I would get work in

order to marry my wife.

DR. SAUTER: Then, if I understood you correctly, you were
drafted into the SS in 1939, because you had already voluntarily
enlisted in the civilian SS in the spring of 1938?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot say that exactly. Many were drafted
into the Armed Forces, into the Air Force, and into the General SS.
DR. SAUTER: Are you an Austrian?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Then at that time you lived in Austria?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, in Graz.
DR. SAUTER: Then I should be interested in a certain point in
regard to the Defendant Von Schirach. You saw the Defendant
Von Schirach at Mauthausen. How often did you see him there?

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 4 Jan. 46

HÖLLRIEGEL: I can remember quite clearly—once.

DR. SAUTER: Once?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Was Von Schirach alone at Mauthausen, or was
he together with other people?
HÖLLRIEGEL: No. Von Schirach was accompanied by other
gentlemen. There was a group of about 10 people, and among them
I recognized Von Schirach and Gauleiter Uiberreither.

DR. SAUTER: There are supposed to have been 20 persons at

leastand not 10 on that occasion.
HÖLLRIEGEL: I did not know at that time that I might have to
use these figures; I did not count them.
DR. SAUTER: This point is important to me, because the Defend-
ant Schirach told me it was a visiting inspection, an official inspec-
tion tour of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, as a result of a
meeting of the economic advisors of all six Gaue of the Ostmark.
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes, I naturally did not know why he came to
the camp, but I remember that this group came with Von Schirach
and Schutzhaftlagerführer (Protective Custody-Camp Leader) Bach-
meyer. At any rate I could see that it looked like an inspection.
DR. SAUTER: Did you know that this inspection was announced
in thecamp several days before and that certain preparations were
made in the camp because of this inspection?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember any specific preparations but
I do remember it was in the evening. I can't tell you the exact time;
it was the time of the evening roll call. The prisoners had assem-

bled for roll call and all the hands on duty also had to fall in. Then
this group came in.

DR. SAUTER: Did you or your comrades not know on the day
before that this inspection would take place the very next day?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember that.
DR. SAUTER: And did it not strike you that certain definite
preparations had been made in this camp?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I cannot remember noticing that any prepa-
rations had been made.
DR. SAUTER: I have no further questions to ask this witness.

DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER Defendant Seyss-

(Counsel for
In quart): Witness, you described an incident which, judged by the
concepts of civilized people, cannot be termed anything but mur-
—
der that is, the hurling of people over the side of the quarry. Did
you report this incident to your superiors?

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4 Jan. 46

HÖLLRIEGEL: These incidents happened frequently and one

can take it that the chances were a thousand to one that the
superiors knew about them.
DR. STEINBAUER: In other words, you did not report this. Is
it true that not only the internees but also the guards were for-
bidden under pain of death to report incidents of this sort to a
third person?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no other question.
COL. AMEN: Would you just look at that picture again?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you look at it carefully and tell me whether
that is the quarry underneath the cliff which you have just des-
cribed?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes. As far as I can tell from this picture, and
I assume with a 100 percent degree of accuracy that it is the quarry
Wiener-Graben; but one would have to see more, more background,
to decide whether it is really this quarry. One sees too little, but I
think quite certainly . .

COL. AMEN: Do you recognize the individuals whose faces

appear in the picture?
HÖLLRIEGEL: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal the ones which you do
recognize?
HÖLLRIEGEL: I recognize of course Reichsführer SS Himmler
first of next to him the commandant of Mauthausen Concen-
all,
tration Camp Ziereis and way to the right I recognize Kaltenbrunner.
COL. AMEN: That is all, may it please the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can go and we will adjourn for
10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]

COL. STOREY: the Tribunal please, the next and final subject
If
of the criminal organizations is the General Staff and High Com-

mand, to be presented by Colonel Taylor.

COLONEL TELFORD TAYLOR (Associate Trial Counsel for the
United States): Your Lordship and members of the Tribunal, the
Indictment seeks a declaration of criminality, under Articles 9 to 11
of the Charter, against six groups or organizations; and the last one
listed in the Indictment is a group described as the General Staff
and High Command of the German Armed Forces.
At first sight these six groups and organizations seem to differ I

rather widely one from another, both in their composition and in

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their functions. But all of them are related, and we believe that
they are logically indicted together before the Tribunal because
they are the primary agencies and the chief tools by means of which
the Nazi conspirators sought to achieve their aims. All six of them
were either established by, controlled by, or became allied with the
Nazis; and they were essential to the success of the Nazis. They
were at once the principal and indispensable instruments: The
Party, the Government, the Police, and the Armed Forces. It is my
task to present the case in chief against the General Staff and High
Command group.
Now, in one respect this group is to be sharply distinguished
from the other groups and organizations against which we have
sought this declaration. For example, the Leadership Corps of the
— —
Nazi Party of the NSDAP is the Leadership Corps of the Party
itself, the Party which was the embodiment of Nazism and which was
the instrument primarily through which Hitlerism rode to full power
and tyranny in Germany. The SA and the SS were branches to —
—
be sure, large branches of the Nazi Party. The German Police
did, indeed, have certain roots and antecedents which ante-
dated Hitlerism; but it became 99 per cent a creature of the Nazi
Party and the SS. The Reich Cabinet was in essence merely a com-
mittee or series of committees of Reich Ministers; and when the
Nazis came to power, quite naturally these ministerial positions
were filled for the most part by Nazis. All these groups and organi-
zations, accordingly, either owe their origin and development to
Nazism or automatically became Nazified when Hitler came to power.
Now, that is not true of the group with which we are now con-
cerned. I need not remind the Tribunal that German armed might
and the German military tradition antedate Hitlerism by many
decades. One need not be a graybeard to have very vivid personal
recollections of the war of 1914 to 1918, of the Kaiser, and of the
"scrap of paper." For these reasons I want to sketch very briefly,
before going into the evidence, the nature of our case against this
group, which is unique in the particulars I have mentioned.
As German defeat in 1918 and the Treaty of Ver-
a result of the
sailles,the size and permissible scope of activities of the German
Armed Forces were severely restricted. That these restrictions did
not destroy or even seriously undermine German militarism, the last
few years have made abundantly apparent. The full flowering of
German military strength came about through collaboration; col-
laboration between the Nazis on the one hand and the career leaders
—
of the German Armed Forces the professional soldiers, sailors, and
airmen.
When Hitler came to power, he did not find a vacuum in the
field of military affairs. He found a small Reichswehr and a body

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of professional officers with a morale and outlook nourished by

German military history. The leaders of these professional officers
constitute the group named in the Indictment, the General Staff and
High Command of the German Armed Forces. This part of the case
concerns that group of men.
Now, needless to say, it is not the Prosecution's position that it
is a crime to be a soldier or a sailor or to serve one's country as a
soldier or sailor in time of war. The profession of arms is an
honorable one and can be honorably practiced. But it is too clear
for argument that a man who commits crimes cannot plead as a
defense that he committed them in uniform.
It is not in the nature of things, and it is not the Prosecution's
position that every member of this group was a wicked man or that
they were all equally culpable. But we will show that this group
not only collaborated with Hitler and supported the essential Nazi
objectives, but we will show that they furnished the one thing
which was essential and basic to the success of the Nazi program
forGermany; and that was skill and experience in the development
and use of armed might.
Whydid this group support Hitler and the Nazis? I think Your
Honors will see, as the proof is given, that the answer is very
simple. The answer is that they agreed with the truly basic objec-
tives of Hitlerism and Nazism and that Hitler gave the generals the
opportunity to play a major part in achieving these objectives. The
generals, like Hitler, wanted to aggrandize Germany at the expense
of neighboring countries and were prepared to do so by force or
threat of force. Force, armed might, was the keystone of the arch,
the thing without which nothing else would have been possible.
As they came to power and when they had attained power, the
Nazis had two alternatives: either to collaborate with and expand
the small German Army, known as the Reichswehr, or to ignore the
Reichswehr and build up a separate army of their own. The generals
feared that the Nazis might do the latter and accordingly were the
more inclined to collaborate. Moreover, the Nazis offered the
generals the chance of achieving much that they wished to achieve
by way of expanding German armies and German frontiers; and
so, as we will show, the generals climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon.
They saw it was going in their direction for the present. No doubt
they hoped later to take over the direction themselves. In fact, as
the proof will show, ultimately it was the generals who were taken
for a ride by the Nazis.
Hitler, in short, attracted the generals to him with the glitter of
conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically; and,
as the war proceeded, they became his tools. But if these military
leaders became the tools of Nazism, it is not to be supposed that

392
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they were unwitting or that they did not participate fully in many
cf the crimes which we will bring to the notice of the Tribunal. The
— —
willingness and, indeed, the eagerness of the German professional
officer corps to become partners of the Nazis, will be fully developed.
Your Lordship, there will be three principal parts to this presen-
tation. There will be first a description of the composition and
functioning of the General Staff and High Command group as
denned in the Indictment; next, the evidence in support of the
charges of criminality under Counts One and Two of the Indictment;
finally, the evidence in support of the charges under Counts Three
and Four.
The members of the Tribunal should have before them three
document books which have been given the designation "CC." The
first of these books is a series of sworn statements or affidavits
which are available to the Tribunal in English, Russian, and French
and which have been available to the defendants in German. The
second and third books are the usual type of document books,
separated merely for convenience of handling. The second book
contains documents in the C- and^L-series, and the third book, in
the PS- and R-series. For the convenience of the Tribunal we have
had handed up a list of these documents in the order in which they
will be referred to.
The Tribunal should also have one other document, and that is
a short mimeographed statement entitled, "Basic Information on the
Organization of the German Armed Forces." That has also been
handed up Russian, and French and has been made
in English,
available to the defendants' Information Center in German.
So I turn first to the description of the group as defined in the
Indictment.
During the first World War there was an organization in the
German Armed Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name,
the German General Staff or Great General Staff, persists in the
public mind; but the Grosse Generalstab no longer exists in fact.
There has been no such single organization, no single German Gen-
eral Staff, since 1918; but there has, of course, been a group of men
responsible for the policy and the acts of the German Armed Forces,
and the fact that these men have no single collective name does not
prevent us from collecting them together. They cannot escape the
consequences of their collective acts by combining informally instead
of formally. The essence of a general staff or a high command lies,
not in the name you give it, but in the functions it performs; and
the men comprised within the group as we have defined it in the
Indictment do constitute a functional group, welded together by
common responsibility, of those officers who had the principal
authority and responsibility under Hitler for the plans and opera-
tions of the German Armed Forces.

393
4 Jan. 46

Let us examine the general structure and organization of

first
the German Armed Forces and then look at the composition of the
group as specified in the Indictment. As I just mentioned, we have
prepared a very short written exposition of the organization of the
German Armed Forces, which we have handed up to the Tribunal.
That document contains a short sketch setting forth the basic history
and development of the Supreme Command of the German Armed
Forces since 1933 and the structure as it emerged after its reorgani-
zation in 1938. It also contains a simple chart which, in a few
moments, will be displayed at the front of the courtroom. It also
contains a short glossary of German military expressions; and it
contains a comparative table of ranks in the German Army and in
the SS, showing the equivalent ranks in the American Army and
the equivalent ranks for the German Navy and the British Navy.
I may say that military and naval ranks differ slightly among the
principal nations, but that by and large they follow the same gen-
eral pattern and terminology.

When the Nazis came to power in 1933, the German Armed

Forces were controlled by a Reich Defense Minister, who at that
time was Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg. Under Von Blom-
berg were the Chief of the Army Staff, who at that time was
Von Fritsch, and of the Naval Staff, the Defendant Raeder. Owing
to the limitations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles,
the German Air Force at that time had no official existence what-
ever. The Army and Naval Staffs were renamed "High Command"
— Oberkommando des Heeres and Oberkommando der Kriegs-
marine— from which are derived the initials by which they are gen-
erally known, OKH and OKM.
In May 1935 at the time that military conscription was intro-
duced in Germany, there was a change in the titles of these offices;
but the structure remained basically the same. Field Marshal
Von Blomberg remained in supreme command of the Armed Forces,
with the title of Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch assumed the title Commander-
in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
The German Air Force came into official and open existence at
about this same time, but it was not put under Von Blomberg. It
was an independent institution under the personal command of the
Defendant Goring who had the double title of Air Minister and
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
I will now ask that that chart be displayed, please.
This chart, Your Honors, has been certified and sworn to by three
principal German generals and the affidavits with reference to it
will be introduced in a few moments. It shows the organization,

394
 4 Jan. 46

the top organization, of the Armed Forces as it emerged in 1938

after the reorganization which I will now describe.
In February 1938 Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch were both
retired from their positions and Blomberg's ministry, the War Min-
istry, was wound up. The War Ministry had contained a division
or department called the Wehrmachtsamt, meaning the Armed For-
ces Department; and the function of that department had been to
co-ordinate the plans and operations of the Army and Navy. From
this Armed Forces Department was formed a new over-all Armed
Forces authority known as the High Command of the German Armed
— —
Forces that is the box in the center, right under Hitler known in
German as Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, and usually known by
the initials OKW.
Since the Air Force, as well as the Army was subordinated to
OKW, co-ordination of all Armed Forces matters was vested in the
OKW, which was really Hitler's personal staff for these matters.
The Defendant Keitel was appointed Chief of the OKW. The most
important division of the OKW, shown just to the right, was the
Operations Staff, of which the Defendant Jodl became the chief.
Now, this reorganization and the establishment of OKW was
embodied in a decree issued by Hitler on the 4th of February 1938.
This decree appeared in the Reichsgesetzblatt, and I invite the
Court's attention to it by way of judicial notice (1915-PS). Copies
are available; and I would like to read the decree, which is very
short, into the transcript. I quote:
"Command authority over the entire Armed Forces is from
now on exercised directly by me personally."
THE PRESIDENT: Where do we find it?
COL. TAYLOR: That is not a document, Your Honor, because it

isa decree from the Reichsgesetzblatt and subject to judicial notice;

but copies are available here if the Tribunal cares to look at it.
I will continue with the second paragraph of this decree:
"The Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry
with its functions becomes the High Command of the Armed
Forces and comes directly under my command as my military
staff.

"The head of the Staff of the High Command of the Armed

Forces is the Chief of the former Armed Forces Department,
with the title of Chief of the High Command of the Armed
Forces. His status is equal to that of a Reich Minister.
"The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over
the affairs of the Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the High
Command of the Armed Forces, as my representative, exer-
cises the functions hitherto exercised by the Reich War Minister.

395
4 Jan. 46

The High Command of the Armed Forces is responsible

in peacetime for the unified preparation of the defense of the
Reich in all areas according to my
directives."
Dated at Berlin, 4 February 1938; signed by Hitler, by Lam-
mers, and by Keitel.
Underneath the OKW come the three supreme commands of the
three branches of the Armed Forces: OKH, OKM, and the Air Force.
The Air Force did not receive the official designation OKL until 1944.
The Defendant Raeder remained after 1938 as Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy, but Von Fritsch, as well as Blomberg, passed out of
the picture; Von Fritsch being replaced by Von Brauchitsch as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army. Goring continued as Commander-
in-Chief of the Air Force. In 1941 Von Brauchitsch was replaced as
—
Commander-in-Chief of the Army that is .the first box in the left
—
column by Hitler himself; and in 1943 Raeder was replaced as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Navy by the Defendant Dönitz. The Defend-
ant Goring continued as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force until
the last month of the war.
OKW, OKH, OKM, and OKL each had its own staff. These four
staffs did not have uniform designations. The three staffs of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force are the three boxes in a horizontal line
next to the bottom. The staff of the OKW
is the little box to the
right at the top, bearing the names of Jodl and Warlimont.
— —
In the case of OKH that is the Army the staff was known as
the Generalstab or the General Staff. In the case of OKW, it was
known as the Führungsstab or Operations Staff, but in all cases
the functions were those of a general staff in military parlance.
It will be seen, therefore, that in this war there was no single
German General Staff; but, rather, that there were four, one for
each branch of the service and one for the OKW as the over-all
inter-service Supreme Command.
So we come to the bottom line on the chart. Down to the bottom
line we have been concerned with the central staff organization at
the center of affairs. Now we pass to the field. Under OKH, OKM,
and OKL come the various fighting formations of the Army, Air
Force, and Navy, respectively.
In the Army army field formation was known to the
the largest
Germans, as indeed among the nations generally, as an army
it is
group, or in German "Heeresgruppe." Those are shown in the box
in the lower left hand corner. An army group or Heeresgruppe con-
—
trols two or more armies in German, "Armeen." Underneath the
armies come the lower field formations, such as corps, divisions, and
regiments, which are not shown on the chart.
In the case of the German Air Force, the largest formation was
known as an air fleet or "Luftflotte," and the lower units under the

396
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4 Jan. 46

were called corps, "Fliegerkorps" or "Jagdkorps"; or divi-

air fleet
sions,"Fliegerdivisionen" or "Jagddivisionen." These lower for-
mations again we have not shown on the chart.
Under the OKM were the various naval group commands, which
controlled all naval operations in a given area with the exception
of the high seas fleet itself and submarines. The commanders of the
fleet and the submarines were directly under the German Admiralty.

So we may now examine the group as defined in the Indictment;

the group against which the Prosecution seeks the declaration of
criminality. It is defined in Appendix B of the Indictment. The
group comprises, firstly, German officers who held the top positions
in the four supreme commands which I have just described and,
secondly, the officers who held the top field commands.
Turning first to the officers who held the principal positions in
the supreme commands, we find that the holders of nine such
positions are included in the group. Four of these are positions
of supreme authority: The Chief of the OKW, Keitel; the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army, Von Brauchitsch, later Hitler; Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder, and later Dönitz; Commander-
in-Chief of the Air Force, Goring, and later Von Greim.
Four other positions are those of the chiefs of the staffs to those
four oommanders-in-chief The Chief of the Operations Staff of the
:

OKW, Jodl; the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Haider, and
later others; the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force,
Jeschonnek, and later others; the Chief of the Naval War Staff.
The ninthposition is that of Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff
of OKW. Throughout most of the war that was General Warlimont,
whose name is shown under Jodl's on the chart. The particular
—
responsibility of Jodl's deputy was planning strategic planning
and for that reason his office has been included in the group as
defined in the Indictment.
The group named in the Indictment includes all individuals who
held any of those nine staff positions between February 1938 and
the end of the war in May 1945. February 1938 was selected as the
opening date because it was in that month that the top organization
of the German Armed Forces was reorganized and assumed sub-
stantially the form in which you see it there and in which it per-
sisted up until the end of the war.
Twenty-two different individuals occupied those nine positions
during that period, and of those 22, 18 are still living.

Turning next to the officers who held the principal field com-
mands, the Indictment includes, as members of the group, all com-
manders-in-chief in the field who had the status of Oberbefehlshaber
in the Army, Navy, or Air Force. The term "Oberbefehlshaber"

397
4 Jan. 46

rather defies literal translation into English. Literally, the com-

ponents of the word mean "over-command-holder;" and we can
perhaps best translate it as "commander-in-chief."
In the case of the Army, commanders of the army groups and
armies always had the status and title of Oberbefehlshaber. In the
Air Force the commanders-in-chief of air fleets always had the
status of Oberbefehlshaber, although they were not formally so
designated until 1944. In the Navy officers holding the senior regional
commands and, therefore, in control of all naval operations in
a given sector had the status of Oberbefehlshaber.
Roughly 110 individual officers had the status of Oberbefehls-
haber in the Army, Navy, or Air Force during the period in ques-
tion. All but approximately a dozen of them are still alive. The
entire General Staff and High Command group, as defined in the
Indictment, comprises about 130 officers, of whom 114 are believed
to be still living. These figures, of course, are the cumulative total
of all officers who at any time belonged to the group during the
7 years and 3 months from February 1938 to May 1945.
The number of active members of the group at any moment is,
of course, much smaller. It was about 20 at the outbreak of the war
and it rose to about 50 in 1944 and 1945. That is to say, that at any
—
one moment of time in 1944 the group the active group would —
have consisted of the nine individuals occupying the nine staff
positions and about 41 Naval, Air Force, or Army commanders-
in-chief.
The structure and the functioning of the German General Staff
and High Command group has been described in a series of affida-
vits by some of the principal German field marshals and generals.
These affidavits are included in Volume I of Document Book CC.
I want to state briefly how these statements were obtained.

In the first place two American officers who were selected for
their ability and experience in interviewing high-ranking German
prisoners of war were briefed by an intelligence officer and by the
Trial counsel on the particular problems presented by this part of
the case, the organizational side of the German Armed Forces. These
officers were already well versed in military intelligence and were
fluent in German. It was emphasized that the function of these
interrogating officers was merely to inquire into and establish the
facts with respect to the organization of the Armed Forces, to
establish facts on which the Prosecution wanted to be accurately
informed.
The German generals to be interrogated were selected on the
basis of the special knowledge which they could be presumed to
possess by reason of the positions which they had held in the past.
After each interview the interrogator prepared a report, and from

398
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this report such facts as appeared relevant to the issues before the
Tribunal were extracted and a statement embodying them was
prepared. This statement was then presented to the German officer
at a later interview in the form of a draft, and the German officer
was asked whether it truly reproduced what he had said and was
invited to alter it in any way he saw fit. The object was to procure
the most accurate testimony on organizational matters that we could.
I will take up these affidavits one by one, and I think the mem-
bers of the Tribunal will see that they fully support the Prose-
cution's description of the group and conclusively establish that this
group of officers was, in fact, the group which had the major respon-
sibility for planning and for directing the operations of the German
Armed Forces.
The Soviet and French Judges have copies in French and Rus-
sian, and the Defense has copies in German.
The first of these affidavits is that of Franz Haider, who held
the rank of "Generaloberst" or colonel general —the equivalent of
a four-star general in the American Army. His affidavit will be
Exhibit Number USA-531 (Document 3702-PS). Haider was Chief
of the General Staff of OKH. That would be the box second from
the bottom on the left-hand side. He was Chief of the General Staff
of the OKH from September 1938 to September 1942. He is, accord-
ingly, a member of the group and well qualified by his position to
testify as to the organization. His statement is short, and I will read
it in full:
"Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in
Germany was vested in the head of the State, who prior to
the 2d of August 1934, was Field Marshal Von Hindenburg
and thereafter, until 1945, was Adolf Hitler.
"Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the
three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time head
of the State), that is to say, the Army, Navy, and the Air
Force. In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by
a relatively small group of high-ranking officers. These officers
exercised such supervision on the basis of their official instruc-
tions and by virtue of their training, their positions, and their
mutual contacts. Plans for military operations of the German
Armed Forces were prepared by members of this group,
according to the instructions of the OKW, in the name of
their respective commanding officers and were presented to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same
time the head of the State).
"The members of this group were charged with the respon-
sibility of preparing for military operations within their

399
4 Jan. 46

competent fields, and they actually did prepare for any such
operations as were to be undertaken by troops in the field.
"Prior to any operation, the respective members of this group
were assembled occasionally and given appropriate directions
by the head of the State. Examples of such meetings are the
speech by Hitler to the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939
prior to the Polish campaign and the conference at the Reich
Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian cam-
paign.
"The composition of this group and the relationship of its
members to each other were asshown in the attached chart.
This was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of
the German Armed Forces. Signed: Haider."
chart to which reference is made is the chart which is at the
The
front of the room and which was attached to the affidavit. The two
meetings referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavit are
covered by documents which will be introduced subsequently.
1 next offer a substantially identical statement by Von Brauchitsch,
which will be Exhibit Number USA-532 (Document 3703-PS). Von
Brauchitsch held the rank of field marshal and was Commander-
—
in-Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941 therefore also a member
of the group. I need not read his statement, since it is practically
the same as that given by Haider; but I will ask that it be set forth
in full in the transcript at this point. The only difference between
the two statements is in the last sentence of each. Haider states that
the group described in the Indictment "was, in effect, the General
Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces," whereas
Von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently, saying, "In the hands
of those who filled the positions shown in the chart lay the actual
direction of the Armed Forces." Otherwise, the two statements are
identical.
[The document referred to above is as follows:]
"Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs
in Germany was vested in the head of State who prior to
2 August 1934 was Field Marshal Von Hindenburg and there-
after until 1945 was Adolf Hitler.
"Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the
three branches of the Armed Forces subordinate to the
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (at the same time
head of State), that is to say, the Army, the Navy, and the
Air Force. In practice supervision within this field was exer-
cised by a relatively small group of high ranking officers.
These officers exercised such supervision on the basis of their
official instructions and by virtue of their training, their posi-
tions, and their mutual contacts. Plans for military operations

400
 — s

4 Jan. 46

of the German Armed Forces were prepared by members of

this group according to the instructions of the and were OKW
presented to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
(at the same time head of State).

"The members of this group were charged with the respon-

preparing for military operations within their com-
sibility of
petent fields and they actually did prepare for any such
operations as might possibly be undertaken by troops in the
field.

"Prior to any operation, members of this group were assem-

bled occasionally and given appropriate directions by the head
of State. Examples of such meetings are the speech by Hitler
to the commanders-in-chief on 22 August 1939 prior to the
Polish campaign and the conference at the Reich Chancellery
on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign.
"The composition of this group and the relationship of its
members to each other were as shown in the attached chart.
In the hands of those who filled the positions shown in the
chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces." Signed —
"Von Brauchitsch."
Now, the Tribunal will see from these affidavits that the chart
which is on display Court and which is contained
at the front of the
in the short expository statement has been laid before Von Brau-
chitsch and Haider and that these two officers have vouched for
it under oath as an accurate picture of the top organization of the

German Armed Forces. The statements by Von Brauchitsch and

Haider also fully support the Prosecution's statement that the
holders of the positions shown on this chart constitute the group in
whom lay the major responsibility for the planning and execution
of all Armed Forces matters.
I would now like to offer another affidavit by Haider which sets
forth some of the matters of detail to which I adverted in describing
the group. It is quite short. Affidavit Number 6, which becomes
Exhibit USA-533 (Document 3704-PS)— and I shall read it in full
into the transcript:

"The most important department in the OKW

was the
Operations Staff, in much the same way as the General Staff
was in the Army and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in
the Navy. Under Keitel there were a number of departmental
chiefs who were equal in status with Jodl but, in the planning
and conduct of military affairs, they and their departments
were less important and less influential than Jodl and Jodl'
staff.

401
4 Jan. 46

"The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections.

Of these the most important was the section of which Warli-
mont was chief. It was called the National Defense Section,
and it was primarily concerned with the development of
strategic questions. From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though
charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of
the OKW Operations Staff.

"There was during World War II no unified General Staff

such as the Great General Staff which operated in World
War L
"Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were
worked out by the group of high ranking officers described in
my statement of 7 November (in the Army, the General Staff
of the Army; and in the Air Force, the General Staff of the
Air Force).
"Operational matters of the Navy were, even in World War I,
not worked out by the Great General Staff but by the Naval
Staff. Signed: Haider."

The Tribunal will note that this affidavit is primarily concerned

with the functions of the General Staffs of the four commands of
OKW, OKL, OKH, and OKM and fully supports the inclusion in the
group of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services, as well as the
inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy Chief of the OKW staff because
of his strategic planning responsibilities.

I have just one other very short affidavit covering a matter of

detail. The Tribunal will remember that the highest fighting for-
mation in the German Air Force was known as an air fleet or Luft-
flotte and that all commanders-in-chief of air fleets are included in
this group. That is the box in the lower right-hand corner. The
commanders of air fleets always had the status of Oberbefehlshaber,
but they were not formally so designated until 1944. These facts
are set forth in an affidavit by the son of Field Marshal Von Brau-
chitsch. His son had the rank of Oberst, or colonel, in the German
Air Force and was personal aide to the Defendant Goring as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Air Force. His affidavit is Number 9 and
becomes Exhibit Number USA-534 (Document 3705-PS). It reads
as follows:
"Luftflottenchefs have the same status as the Oberbefehls-
haber of an army. During the war they had no territorial
authority and, accordingly, exercised no territorial juris-
diction.
"They were the highest troop commanders of the Air Force
them and were directly under the com-
units subordinate to
mand of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

402
 4 Jan. 46

"Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation Befehls-

haber and from then on that of Oberbefehlshaber. This change
of designation carried with it no change in the functions and
responsibilities that they previously had."
Your Honor, that concludes the description of the composition
of the group and the personnel of it. The staff of the Tribunal have
referred to me two inquiries which have been addressed to the Tri-
bunal by counsel for the group and it seemed to me it might be
appropriate if I disposed of those inquiries now as to the compo-
sition of the group. The letters were turned over to me 2 days ago.
The first is from Hofrat Düllmann, and he has asked whether the
group, as defined in the Indictment, is contingent upon rank, whether
itincludes officers holding a definite rank such as field marshal or
"Generaloberst."
The answer to that is clearly "no." As has been pointed out, the
criterion of membership in the group whether one held one of
is
the positions on the chart up there; and one would be in the group
if one held one of the positions, no matter what one's rank. Rank

is no criterion. In point of fact, I suppose everybody in the group

held at least the rank of general in the German Army, which is the
equivalent of lieutenant general in ours.
He has also asked whether the group includes officers of the
so-called General Staff Corps. The answer to that is "no." There
was in the German Army a war academy, and graduates of the war
academy were in the branch of service described as the General
Staff Corps. They signed themselves, for example, "Colonel in
Generalstab." They functioned largely as adjutants and assistants
to the chief staff officers. I suppose there were some thousands of
—
them two or three thousand, but they are not included in the group.
Many of them were officers of junior rank. They are not named in
the Indictment, and there is no reason and no respect in which they
are comprehended within the group as defined.
The other letter of inquiry is from Dr. Exner, who states that
he is in doubt as to the meaning of Oberbefehlshaber and goes on
to state that he believes that Oberbefehlshaber includes commanders-
in-chief in theaters of war, the commanders-in-chief of army groups,
and the commanders-in-chief of armies. That is quite right. Those
are the positions as shown on the chart.
Let us now spend a few minutes examining the way this group
worked. In many respects, of course, the German military leaders
functioned in the same general manner as obtained in the military
establishments of other large nations. General plans were made by
the top staff officers and their assistants in collaboration with the field
generals or admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the
plans. A decision to wage a particular campaign would be made,

403
4 Jan. 46

needless to say, at the highest level; and the making of such a deci-
sion would involve political and diplomatic questions, as well as
purely military considerations. When, for example, the decision was
made to attack Poland, the top staff officers in Berlin and their
assistants would work out general military plans for the campaign.
These general plans would be transmitted to the commanders of the
army groups and armies who would be in charge of the actual cam-
paign; and then there would follow consultation between the top
field commanders and the top staff officers at OKWand OKH,
in order to revise and perfect and refine the plans.
The manner in which this group worked, involving as it did the
interchange of ideas and recommendations between the top staff
officers at OKWand OKH, on the one hand, and the principal field
commanders on the other hand, is graphically described in two
statements by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. That is Affidavit
Number 4, which will be Exhibit Number USA-535 (Document
3706-PS). I invite the Tribunal's attention to these and will read
them into the transcript. The statement of 7 November 1945:
"In April 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military
preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work
was immediately begun to prepare an operational and deploy-
ment plan. This was then presented to Hitler and approved
by him, as amended by a change which he desired. After the
operational and deployment orders had been given to the two
commanders of the army groups and the five commanders of
the armies, conferences took place with them about details,
in order to hear their desires and recommendations. After
the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of keeping in
close and constant touch with the commanders-in-chief of
army groups and of armies by personal visits to their head-
quarters, as well as by telephone, teletype, or wireless. In
this way I was able to obtain their advice and their recom-
mendations during the conduct of military operations. In fact,
it was the accepted policy and common practice for the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army to consult his subordinate
commanders-in-chief and maintain a constant exchange of
ideas with them.
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff
communicated with army groups and through them, as well
as directly, with the armies; through army groups on strategic
and tactical matters; directly on questions affecting supply
and administration of conquered territory occupied by the
armies. An army group had no territorial executive power.
It had a relatively small staff, which was concerned only
with military operations. In all territorial matters it was the

404
 4 Jan. 46

Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and not of the army group,

who exercised executive power. Signed: Von Brauchitsch."
There follows:
"Supplement to the statement of 7 November 1945:
"When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization
of his political objectives through military pressure or
through the application of military force, the Commander-in-
Chief of the Army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first
received an appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral
command. Operational and deployment plans were next worked
out in the OKH. After these plans had been presented to
Hitler, generally by word of mouth, and had been approved
by him, there followed a written order from the OKW
to the
three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meanwhile the
OKH began to transmit the operational and deployment plans
to the army groups and armies involved.
"Details of the operational and deployment plans were dis-
cussed by the OKH with the commanders-in-chief of the army
groups and armies and with the chiefs of staff of these com-
manders. During the operations the OKH maintained a
constant exchange of ideas with the army groups by means
of telephone, radio, and courier. The Commander-in-Chief of
the Army used every opportunity to maintain a personal
exchange of ideas With the commanders of army groups,
armies, and lower echelons by means of personal visits to
them.
"In the war against Russia the commanders of army groups
and armies were individually and repeatedly called in by
Hitler for report. Orders for all operational matters went
from the OKH to army groups, and for all matters concerning
supply and territorial executive power from the OKH directly
to the armies. Signed: Von Brauchitsch."
—
The Oberbefehlshaber in the field, therefore and in the case
of the Army that means the commanders-in-chief of army groups
—
and armies participated in planning and directing the execution of
the plans, as those affidavits show. The Oberbefehlshaber were
also the repositories of general executive powers in the areas in
which their army groups and armies were operating. In this
connection I invite the Court's attention to Document 447-PS, which
is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-135, this being
a directive of 13 March 1941 signed by Keitel and issued by the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. This directive sets out
various regulations for the operations against the Soviet Union
which were actually begun a few months later on 22 June. The
documents, Your Honor, are in numerical order in Document

405
4 Jan. 46

Books and III. Document Book II contains C and L; Document

II
Book contains PS; and this, being 447-PS, will be in Document
III
Book III in numerical order within the PS's. And within that Docu-
ment, under Paragraph I, the paragraph entitled "Area of Operations
and Executive Power" ("Vollziehende Gewalt"), the Tribunal will
find Subparagraph 1, in which the following appears that is Page 1—
of the translation, Paragraph 2:
"It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the
Government General an area of operations. However, in
accordance with the unpublished Führer orders from 19 and
21 October 1939, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army shall
be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution
of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops.
He may transfer his authority to the commanders-in-chief" —
that, in the original German, is Oberbefehlshaber "of the
—
army groups and armies. Orders of that kind have priority
over all other obligations and over orders issued by civilian
agencies."
Your Honors will see that this executive power, with priority
over civilian agencies, was vested in the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army with authority to transfer it to commanders-in-chief of army
—
groups or armies to the members of the group as defined in the
Indictment.
Further on in the document, under Subparagraph 2(a), the docu-
ment —
states that is the fourth paragraph, on Page 1 of the
document:
"The area of operations of the Army created through the
advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and
the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as
possible. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has the right
to exercise the executive power" —
vollziehende Gewalt "in —
this area, and may transfer his authority to the commanders-
in-chief" —
Oberbefehlshaber —
"of the army groups and
armies."
THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

406
 4 Jan. 46

Afternoon Session

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in closed

session to consider matters of procedure, and there will therefore
be no public session tomorrow.
COL. TAYLOR: Your Lordship, I have just one more document
dealing with this subject of the structure of the group before
passing on to the substantive charges of criminality.
This document C-78, which is already in evidence as Exhibit
is
Number USA-139. That will be found in Volume II of the document
book. This document is the official command invitation to partic-
ipate in the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941,
8 days prior to the attack on the Soviet Union. This is one of the
meetings that was referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavits
by Haider and Von Brauchitsch, which were read into the record
this morning. It is signed by Colonel Schmundt, the chief Wehr-
macht adjutant to Hitler, and is dated at Berchtesgaden, 9 June 1941.
It begins:

— —
"In re: Conference Barbarossa" that being the code for the
attack on the Soviet Union "the Führer and Supreme Com-
mander of the Armed Forces has ordered reports on Bar-
barossa by the commanders of army groups and armies and
naval and air commanders of equal rank."
That is, as the Tribunal will see once again, the very group
specified in the bottom line of the chart on the wall, army groups,
armies, naval, and air commanders of similar rank.
This document likewise includes a list of the participants in this
conference, and I would just like in closing on this subject to run
through that list to point out who the participants in this con-
ference were and how closely they parallel the structure of the
group as we find it in the Indictment. The Tribunal will see that
the list of participants begins at the foot of Page 1 of the translation:
General Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, who was the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and a member
of the group; General
Haider, who was Chief of the Army Staff and a member of the
group; then three subordinates, who were not members of the group:
Paulus, Heusinger, and Gyldenfeldt.
Navy: Captain Wagner, who was Chief of the Operations Staff,
Operations Division of the naval war staff, not a member of the
group. On the air side: General Milch, State Secretary and General
Inspector of the Air Force, again not a member of the group;
Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force and a mem-
ber of the group; and two of his assistants.

407
4 Jan. 46

Passing over the page to the OKW, High Command of the Armed
Forces, we find Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, all members of the group,
were present, with an assistant from the General Staff.
Then four officers from the office of the adjutant, who were not
members of the group.
Then we pass to the officers from the field commands: General
Von Falkenhorst, Army High Command, Norway, member of the
group; General Stumpff, Air Fleet 5, member of the group; Rund-
stedt, Reichenau, Stülpnagel, Schober, Kleist, all from the Army, all
members of the group.
Air Force: General Lohr, Air Fleet 4, member of the group.
General Fromm and General Udet were not members. One was
director of the home forces, commander of the home forces, and
the other the Director General of Equipment and Supply', G.A.F.
The Navy: Raeder, a member of the group; Fricke, chief of the
naval war staff, and a member of the group; and a personal assist-
ant who was not a member; Carls, Naval Group North, a member
of the group, likewise Schmundt.
Then from the Army: Leeb, Busch, Küchler, all members of the
group as Oberbefehlshaber; Keller, a member of the group; Bock,
Kluge, Strauss, Guderian, Hoth, Kesselring, all members of the
group.
And it will accordingly be seen that except for a few assisting
officers of relatively junior rank, all the participants in these consul-
tations were members of the group as defined in the Indictment and
that in fact the participants included almost all the members of the
group who were concerned in the impending operation against the
Soviet Union.
I have now concluded the first part of the presentation, to wit,
the description of the General Staff and High Command group
and its composition and structure and general manner of function-
ing. I turn now to the charges levelled against this group in the
Indictment.
Appendix B charges that this group had a major responsibility
for the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of the illegal
wars set forth in Counts One and Two and for the War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity detailed in Counts Three and Four.
In presenting the evidence in support of these charges we must
keep in mind that under the Charter the group may be declared
criminal in connection with any acts of which an individual defend-
ant who was a member of the group may be convicted.
The General Staff and High Command group is well represented
among the individual defendants in this case. Five of the individual
defendants, or one-quarter of the individuals here, are members of
the group.

408
 4 Jan. 46

Taking them in the order in which they are listed, the first is the
Defendant Goring. Goring is a defendant in this case in numerous
capacities. He is a member of the General Staff and High Command
group by reason of having been Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force from the time when the Air Force first came into the open
and was officially established until about 1 month prior to the end
of war. During the last month of the war he was replaced in this
capacity by Von Greim, who committed suicide shortly after his
capture at the end of the war. Goring is charged with crimes under
all Counts of the Indictment.

The next defendant who is a member of the group is

listed
Keitel. He andthe remaining three defendants are, all four of them,
in this case primarily or solely in their military capacities, and all
four of them are professional soldiers or sailors.
Keitel was made chief of the High Command of the German
Armed Forces, or OKW, when the OKW
was first set up in 1938
and he remained in that capacity throughout the period in question.
He held the rank of Field Marshal throughout most of this period,
and in addition to being the Chief of the OKW, he was a member
of the Secret Cabinet Council and of the Council of Ministers for
the Defense of the Reich. Keitel is charged with crimes under all
four Counts.
The Defendant Jodl was a career soldier. He was an Oberst-
leutnant, or lieutenant colonel, when the Nazis came to power and
ultimately attained the rank of Generaloberst or colonel general.
He became the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht and
continued in that capacity throughout the war. He also is charged
with crimes under all four counts.
^
The other two defendants who are members of this group are
on the nautical side. The Defendant Raeder is in a sense the senior
member of the entire group, having been Commander-in-Chief of
the German Navy as early as 1928. He attained the highest rank
in the German Navy, Grossadmiral. He retired from the Supreme
Command of the Navy in 1943, in January, and was replaced by
Dönitz. Raeder is charged under Counts One, Two, and Three of
the Indictment.
The was a relatively junior
last of the five defendants, Dönitz,
officer when the Nazis came to power. During the early years of
the Nazi regime, he specialized in submarine activities and was in
command of the U-boat arm when the war broke out. He rose
steadily in the Navy and was chosen to succeed Raeder when the
latter retired in 1943. He then became Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy and attained the rank of Grossadmiral. When the German
Armed Forces collapsed near the end of the war, Dönitz succeeded

409
4 Jan. 46

Hitler as head of the German Government. He is charged under

Counts One, Two, and Three of the Indictment.
Four of these five defendants are reasonably typical of the group
as a whole. We must except the Defendant Goring who is primarily
a Nazi Party politician nourishing a hobby for aviation as a result
of his career in 1914-18. But the other four made soldiering or
sailoring their life work.They collaborated with and joined in the
most important adventures of the Nazis, but they were not among
the early Party members. They differ in no essential respects from
the other 125 members of the group. They are, no doubt, abler men
in certain respects. They rose to the highest position in the German
Armed Forces, and all but Jodl attained highest rank.
But they and as represent-
will serve as excellent case studies
atives of the group, and we can examine their ideas as they have
expressed them in these documents and their actions, with fair
assurance that these ideas and actions are characteristic of the other
group members.
I turn first to the criminal activities of the General Staff and
High Command group under Counts One and Two of the Indict-
ment, their activities in planning and conspiring to wage illegal
wars. Here my task is largely one of recapitulation. The general
body of proof relating to aggressive war has already been laid
before the Tribunal by my colleague, Mr. Alderman, and the distin-
guished members of the British Delegation.
Many
of the documents to which they drew the Tribunal's atten-
tion showed that the defendants here who were members of the
General Staff and High Command group participated knowingly and
wilfully in crimes under Counts One and Two. I propose to avoid
referring again to that evidence so far as I possibly can, but I must
refer to one or two of them again to focus the Tribunal's attention
on the part which the General Staff and High Command group
played in aggressive War Crimes.
Now it is, of course, the normal function of a military staff to
prepare military plans. In peacetime, military staffs customarily
concern themselves with the preparation of plans for attack or
defense based on hypothetical contingencies. There is nothing crim-
inal about carrying on these exercises or preparing these plans.
That is not what the defendants and this group are charged with.
We will show that the group agreed with the Nazi objective of
aggrandizing Germany by threat of force or force itself, and that
they joined knowingly and enthusiastically in developing German
armed might for this purpose. They were advised in advance of the
Nazi plans to launch aggressive wars. They laid the military plans
and directed the initiation and carrying on of the wars. These
things we believe to be criminal under Article 6 of the Charter.

410
 4 Jan. 46

Aggressive war cannot be prepared or waged without intense

activity on the part of all branches of the armed forces, and par-
ticularly by the high-ranking officers who control these forces. To
the extent, therefore, that German preparation for and the waging
of aggressive war are historical facts of common knowledge, or are
already proved, it necessarily follows that the General Staff and
High Command group, and the German Armed Forces, participated
therein.
This is so notwithstanding the effort on the part of certain Ger-
man military leaders to insist that until the troops marched they
lived in an ivory tower unwilling to see the direction to which their
work led.

The documents to which I will refer fully refute this, and more-
over some of these men now fully admit they participated gladly
with the Nazis, because the Nazi aims coincided closely with
*

their own.

I think that the documents which Mr. Alderman read into the
transcript already adequately reflect the purposes and objectives of
the German General Staff and High Command group during the
period prior to the absorption of Austria. During this period
occurred, as is charged in the Indictment, firstly, secret rearmament,
including the training of military personnel, the production of
war munitions, and building of an air force; secondly, the Goring
announcement on 10 March 1935 that Germany was building a mili-
tary air force; thirdly, the law for compulsory military service of
16 March 1935, fixing the peacetime strength of the German Army
at 500,000; and finally, and fourthly, the reoccupation of the Rhine-
land on 7 March 1936 and the refortification of that area.
Those particular facts do not require judicial proof. They are
historical facts,and likewise the fact that it would have been im-
possible for the Nazis to achieve these things without co-operation
by the Armed Forces is indisputable from the very nature of things.
Mr. Alderman described to the Tribunal and read from numerous
documents which illustrate these events. He included numerous
documents concerning the secret expansion of the German Navy in
violation of treaty limitations, under the guidance of the Defendant
Raeder.
He also read the secret Reich Defense Law, Document 2261-PS,
already in the record as Exhibit Number USA-24, which was adopted
on the same day that Germany unilaterally renounced the armament
provisions of the Versailles Treaty. He read Von Blomberg's plan,
—
dated 2 May 1935, for the reoccupation of the Rhineland that is
—
Document C-159, Exhibit Number USA-54 and Blomberg's orders
under which the reoccupation was actually carried out.

411
4 Jan. 46

All these events, by obvious inference, required the closest

collaboration between the military leaders and the Nazis. I need
not labor that point further.
But it is worth while, I think, to re-examine one or two of the
documents which show the state of mind and the objectives of the
German military leaders during this early period. One document
read from by Mr. Alderman which reflects the viewpoint of the
German Navy on the opportunities which Nazism accorded for
rearmament so that Germany could achieve its objectives by force
or threat of force is a memorandum published by the High Com-
mand of the German Navy in 1937, entitled The Fight of the Navy
against Versailles. That is Document C-156, Exhibit Number USA-41.
The Tribunal will recall that this memorandum, this official publi-
cation of the German Navy, stated that only with the assistance of
Hitler had it been possible to create the conditions for rearmament.
The Defendant Jodl has stated this, better than I could possibly put
it, in his speech to the Gauleiter on 7 November 1943. That is in
Document L-172, Exhibit Number USA-34, from which Mr. Alder-
man read at length.
Nor were the high-ranking German officers unaware that the
policies and objectives of the Nazis were leading Germany in the
direction of war. I invite the Court's attention to Document C-23,
which already in the record as Exhibit Number USA-49. This
is
consists ofsome notes made by Admiral Carls of the German Navy
in September 1938. These notes were written by Admiral Carls by
way of comment on a "Draft Study of Naval Warfare against Eng-
—
land" and they read in part as follows that will be found, Your
Lordship, on Page 3 of the translation of Document C-23:
"There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.

"1. If, according to the Führer' s decision, Germany is to

acquire a position as a world power guaranteed by its own
strength, she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but
also secure naval communications and secure access to the
ocean.
"2. Both requirements can be fulfilled only in opposition to
Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as
world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by
peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world
power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making corre-
sponding preparations for war.
"3. War against England means at the same time war against
the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well,
and a large number of countries overseas; in fact, against one-
half to one-third of the whole world.

412
 4 Jan. 46

"It can be justified and have a chance of success only if it is

prepared economically as well as politically and militarily,
and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet
to the ocean."
Let us turn to the Air Force, having seen what the viewpoint
of the Navy was. Parts of the German Air Staff during this pre-
war period were developing even more radically aggressive plans
for the aggrandizement of the Reich. Document L-43, Exhibit Num-
ber GB-29, is a study prepared by the chief of a branch of the Gen-
eral Staff of the Air Force called the Organization Staff. The study
in question is a recommendation for the organization of the German
Air Force in future years up to 1950. The recommendation is based
on certain assumptions, and one assumption was that by 1950 the
frontiers ofGermany would be as shown on the map which was
attached as an enclosure to this study. There is only one copy of
the map available, Your Honor.
The Court will note on this map that Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland
are all included within the borders of the Reich. The Court will
—
also note, at Page 2 of the Document itself that is L-43 —
that the
author envisaged the future peacetime organization of the German
Air Force as comprising seven group commands, four of which lie
within the borders of Germany proper at Berlin, Braunschweig,
Munich, and Königsberg, but the three others are proposed to be at
Vienna, Budapest, and Warsaw.
Before turning to particular acts of aggression by the German
Armed Forces, I want to stress once more the basic agreement and
harmony between the Nazis and the German military leaders. With-
out this agreement on objectives there might never have been a war.
In this connection I want to direct the Tribunal's attention to an
affidavit Number 3 in Document Book I, which will be Document
3704-PS, Exhibit Number USA-536, by Von Blomberg, formerly
Field Marshal, Reich War Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the
German Forces until February 1938.
I will read the affidavit into the transcript:
"From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three essential terri-
torial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were
the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr, and Memel.
"I, myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers,
believed that these three questions, outstanding among which
was the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be
settled some day, if necessary by force of arms. About 90 per-
cent of the German people were of the same mind as the
officers on the Polish question. A war to wipe out the outrage
perpetrated by the creation of the Polish Corridor and to

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4 Jan. 46

lessen the threat to separated East Prussia, surrounded by

Poland and Lithuania, was regarded as a sacred duty, though
a sad necessity. This was one of the chief reasons behind
the partially secret rearmament which began about 10 years
before Hitler came to power and was accentuated under Nazi
rule.
"Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to
Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler, since he pro-
duced the results which they desired. After this time some
generals began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in
the power of his judgment. However, they failed as a group
to take any definite stand against him, although a few of them
tried to do so and as a result had to pay for this with their
lives or their positions.
"Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces, in January 1938, Hitler asked
me to recommend a successor. I suggested Goring, who was
the ranking officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of
patience and diligence. I was not replaced as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces" by any officer, but Hitler per-
sonally took over my function as Commander. Keitel was
recommended by me as a chef de bureau. As far as I know,
he was never named Commander of the Armed Forces but
was always merely a 'chief of staff' under Hitler and in effect
conducted the administrative functions of the Ministry of War.
"At my
time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler and therefore
was good understanding between
qualified to bring about a
Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself desired
and had furthered as Reichswehrminister and Reichskriegs-
minister. To do the opposite would have led to a civil war,
for at that time the mass of the German people supported
Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But it is
the truth.
"As far as I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler's meas-
ures. He became a willing tool in Hitler's hands for every
one of his decisions.
"He did not measure up to what might have been expected
of him."
The statement by Von Blomberg which I have just read is paral-
leled closely insome respects by an affidavit by Colonel General
Blaskowitz. That is Affidavit Number 5 in Volume I of the docu-
ment book Exhibit Number USA-537. Blaskowitz commanded an
army in the campaign against Poland and the campaign against
France. He subsequently took command of Army Group G in
southern France and at the end of the war he was in command of

414
 4 Jan. 46

Army Group H, which had retreated beyond the Rhine. The first
three paragraphs of his affidavit are substantially identical with the
first three paragraphs of Von Blomberg's; and since they are avail-
able in all languages, for expedition I will start reading with Para-
graph 4, where the affidavit is on a different subject:
"After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the
Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through
diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and
England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a
matter of fact, we felt that if political negotiations came to
nothing the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war,
that is, not only with Poland herself but also with the West-
ern Powers.
"When in themiddle of June I received an order from the
OKH to prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that
this war came even closer to the realm of possibility. This
conclusion was only strengthened by the Führer's speech on
22 August 1939 at the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to
be an actuality. Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 Sep-
tember 1939 the members of my staff who were engaged in
preparations participated in various discussions which went
on between the OKH and the army group. During these dis-
cussions such matters of a tactical, strategical, and general
nature were discussed as had to do with my future position
as Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Army during the planned
Polish campaign.
"During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno
operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army; and he, as well as the Führer,
visitedmy headquarters. In fact, it was common practice for
commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be
asked from time to time for estimates of the situation and for
their recommendations by telephone, teletype, or wireless, as
well as by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief
thus actually became advisers to the OKH in their own field,
so that the positions shown in the attached chart embrace that
group which was the actual advisory council of the High
Command of the German Armed Forces."
The Tribunal will note that the latter part of this affidavit, like
those of Haider and Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the
structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command
group as described by the Prosecution. The Tribunal will also note
that the Von Blomberg affidavit and the first part of the Blaskowitz
affidavit make it clear beyond question that the military leaders of
Germany knew of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the

415
 —

4 Jan. 46

expansion of the Armed Forces beyond the limits set by treaties.

The objectives which they had in mind are obvious, and in these
documents and affidavits we see the Nazis and the generals in agree-
ment upon the basic objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or
threat of force and collaborating to build up the armed might of
Germany, in order to make possible the subsequent acts of aggres-
sion. We turn now to an examination of those particular acts of
aggression which have already been described to the Tribunal in
general, with the particular purpose of noting participation in these
criminal acts by the General Staff and High Command group.
I may say, Your Lordship, that in going over this material, in
order' to save time I propose to read from a very few documents.
There are large numbers of documents. Accordingly, when I cite
them I think there is probably no need for the Tribunal to try to
find them in the documents before it. Most of them are documents
already in evidence and I propose to cite them for purposes of
recapitulation, without reading very much.
The Tribunal Alderman read into the tran-
will recall that Mr.
script portions of 386-PS, Exhibit Number USA-25,
a document,
consisting of notes by Colonel Hossbach on a conference which was
held in the German Chancellery in Berlin on the 5th of November
1937. Hitler presided at this conference, which was a small and
highly secret one; and the only other participants were the four
principal military leaders and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the
Defendant Neurath. The four chief leaders of the Armed Forces
Blomberg, who was then Reich Minister of War, and the commanders-
in-chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces: Von Fritsch
for the Army, Raeder for the Navy, and Goring for the Air Force
were present. Hitler embarked on a general discussion of Ger-
many's diplomatic and military policy and stated that the conquest
of Austria and Czechoslovakia was an essential prehminary "for the
improvement of our military and political position" and "in order
to remove any threat from the flanks."
The military and political advantages which were envisaged
included the acquisition of a new source of food, shorter and better
frontiers, the release of troops for other tasks, and the possibility
of forming new divisions from the population of the conquered
territories. Blomberg and Von Fritsch joined in the discussion and
Von Fritsch stated that he was making a study to investigate "the
possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with
special consideration for the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system
of fortifications."
The following spring, in March 1938, the German plans with
respect to Austria came to fruition. Mr. Alderman has already read
into the record portions of the diary kept by the Defendant Jodl.

416
 4 Jan. 46

The portion here in question, Document 1780-PS, Exhibit Number

USA-72, of this diary shows the participation of the German mili-
tary leaders in the absorption of Austria. As is shown by Jodl's
diary entry for 11 February 1938, the Defendant Keitel and two
other important generals were present at the Obersalzberg meeting
between Schuschnigg and Hitler, and the purpose is shown clearly
by the entry which recites that:
"... in the evening and on 12 February General Keitel with
General Von Reichenau and Sperrte at the Obersalzberg,
Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put
under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours
Schuschnigg signs protocol."
The General Von Reichenau referred to there was at that time
the head commander of Wehrkreis 7, one of the military districts
into which Germany was divided. He subsequently commanded the
10th Army in Poland and the 6th Army in France and was a mem-
ber of the group as denned in the Indictment. Sperrte, who was in
Spain during the civil war and then commanded Luftflotte 3, the
3rd German Air Fleet, practically throughout the war, was also a
member of the group. Two days later Keitel and other military
leaders were preparing proposals to be submitted to Hitler which
would give the Austrian Government the impression that Germany
would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg agreement was ratified
in Vienna.
These proposals are embodied in a document dated February 14,
1938, 1775-PS, Exhibit Number USA-73, and signed by Keitel. Por-
tions of Keitel's proposals to the Führer are as follows:
"1) Take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luft-
waffe. No movements or redeployments.
troop
"2) Spread false but quite credible news which may lead
to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria:
a) — —
through V-men" that means agents "in Austria, b) through
our customs personnel at the frontier, c) through travelling
agents."
Going down the document to 4), Keitel proposed:
"4) Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in
Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich.
"5) Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers
of the mountain troops near the frontier.
"6) Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February
14 in the Service Command Headquarters VII in order to
carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW."
As Jodl's diary shows under the entry for 14 February, these
deceptive maneuvers were very effective and created in Austria the

417
4 Jan. 46

impression that these threats of force might be expected to create.

About a month later armed intervention was precipitated by
Schuschnigg's decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered
mobilization in accordance with the pre-existing plans for the inva-
sion of Austria, these plans being known as "Case Otto," in order
to absorb Austria and stop the plebiscite. Jodl's diary under the
entry for 10 March 1938 tells us as follows on Page 2:
"By surprise and without consulting his ministers Schuschnigg
ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring
a strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan
or preparation.
"Führer determined not to tolerate it. The same night,
is
March he calls for Goring. General Von Reichenau is
9 to 10,
called back from Cairo Olympic Committee, General Von
Schober is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise-
Horstenau, who is with Gauleiter Bürckel in the Palatinate."
The General Von Schober referred to succeeded General Von
Reichenau as Commander of Wehrkreis 7 and later was Commander
of the 11th Army in Russia and was a member of the group as
defined in the Indictment.
The invasion of Austria differs from the other German acts of
aggression in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed
in advance. This is the case simply because the invasion was pre-
cipitated by an outside event, that being Schuschnigg's order for the
plebiscite. But, although for this reason the element of deliberately
timed planning was lacking, the foregoing documents make clear
the participation of the military leaders at all stages.
At the small policy meeting of November 1937, when Hitler's
general program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was outlined, the
only others present were the four principal military leaders and
the Foreign Secretary.
In February Keitel, Reichenau, and Sperrle were all present to
help subject Schuschnigg to the heaviest military pressure. Keitel
and others immediately thereafter worked out and executed a pro-
gram of military threat and deception to frighten the Austrian
Government into acceptance of the Schuschnigg protocol. When the
actual invasion took place, it was, of course, directed by the military
leaders and executed by the Armed Forces, and we are indebted to
the Defendant Jodl for a clear statement of why the German mili-
tary leaders were only too delighted to join with the Nazis in bring-
ing about the end of Austrian independence.
In his lecture in November 1943 to the Gauleiter, which appears
in Document L-172, which is Exhibit Number USA-34, Jodl ex-
—
plained this is Page 5, Paragraph 3 of the translation:

418
 4 Jan. 46

"The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only

fulfillment of an old national aim, but also had the effect
both of re-inforcing our fighting strength and of materially
improving our strategic position. Whereas until then the
territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing
way right into Germany(a wasp waist in the direction of
France and air base for the Allies, in particular Russia)
Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Her own
strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was
bound to fall a victim to any vigorous attack before effective
aid from the West could be expected to arrive."
The foregoing extract from speech makes a good transition
to the case of Czechoslovakia
—Jodl's
"Case Green," or "Fall Grün." pro-
I

pose to treat this very briefly. Mr. Alderman has covered the gen-
eral story of German aggression against Czechoslovakia very fully
and the documents he read from are full of evidence showing the
knowing participation in this venture by Keitel, Jodl, and other
members of the group.
Once again the Hossbach minutes of the conference between
Hitler and the four principal military leaders, Document 386-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-25, may be called to mind. Austria and
Czechoslovakia were then listed as the most proximate victims of
German aggression. After the absorption of Austria, Hitler as head
of the State and Keitel as Chief of all the Armed Forces lost no
time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia. From this point
on nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt file, Docu-
ment 388-PS, Exhibit Number USA-26, and Jodl's diary, both of
which have been read from extensively. These two sources of infor-
mation go far, I think, to demolish what is urged in defense of the
military defendants and the General Staff and High Command
group. They seek to create the impression that the German generals
were pure military technicians, that they were not interested in or
not informed about political and diplomatic considerations that —
they prepared plans for military attack or defense on a purely
hypothetical basis. They say all this in order to suggest that they
did not share and could not estimate Hitler's aggressive intentions,
that they carried out politically conceived orders like military
automatons, with no idea whether the wars they launched were
aggressive or not.
When these arguments are made, Your Honor, may I respect-
fully suggest: Read the Schmundt file and read General Jodl's diary.
They make it abundantly clear that aggressive designs were con-
ceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals, that the military
leaders were fully posted on the aggressive intentions and fully

419
4 Jan. 46

informed on the political and diplomatic developments, that, indeed,

German generals had a strange habit of turning up at diplomatic
foregatherings; and indeed, if the documents did not show these
things, a moment's thought must show them to be true.
Ahighly successful program of conquest depends on armed
might. It cannot be executed by an unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant
military leadership. It has, of course, been said that war is too
important a business to be left to soldiers alone; and this is no doubt
true, but it is equally true that an aggressive diplomacy is far too
dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and
support, and no doubt some of the German generals had qualms
about Hitler's timing and the boldness of some of his moves. Some
of these doubts are rather interestingly reflected in an entry from
Jodl's diary which has not yet been read.

That is Document 1780-PS again—the entry for 10 August 1938.

It appears on Page 4 of the translation of 1780-PS:
"10 August 1938. The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air
Forces groups, Lieutenant Colonel Jeschonnek, and I are or-
dered to the Berghof After dinner the Führer makes a speech
.

lasting for almost 3 hours, in which he develops his political

thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Führer's
attention to the defects of our preparations, which are under-
taken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate.
This applies especially to the remarks of General Von
Wietersheim, in which, to top it off, he claims to quote from
General Adams that the Western fortifications can be held for
only 3 weeks. The Führer becomes very indignant and flares
up, bursting into the remarks that in such a case the whole
Army would not be good for anything. 'I assure you, General,
the position will be held not only for 3 weeks, but for 3 years.'
"The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately
enough is held widely within the Army General Staff, is based
—
on various reasons. First of all, it" the General Staff "is —
prejudiced by old memories and feels responsible also for
political decisions instead of obeying and executing its mili-
tary mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion,
but the vigor of the soul is lacking, because in the end they
do not believe in the genius of the Führer. One does perhaps
compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows down-
hill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense
political damage, for the opposition between the generals'
opinion and that of the Führer is common talk, but may also
constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have
no doubt that this, as well as the morale of the people, will

420
 —
4 Jan. 46

encourage the Führer enormously when the right moment

comes."
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we break off now for 10 minutes?

[A recess was taken.]

COL. TAYLOR: The extract from the Jodl diary from which I
have just read may indeed show that some of the German generals
at that time were cautious with respect to Germany's ability to take
on Poland and the Western Powers simultaneously; but, nonetheless,
the entry shows no lack of sympathy with the Nazi aims for con-
quest. And there is no evidence in Jodl's diary or elsewhere that
any substantial number of German generals lacked sympathy with
Hitler's objectives. Furthermore, the top military leaders always
joined with and supported his decisions, with formidable success in
these years from 1938 to 1942.
So, if we are told that German military leaders did not know
that German policy toward Czechoslovakia was aggressive or based
on force or threat of force, let us remember that on 30 May 1938
—
Hitler signed a most secret directive to Keitel already in the
transcript, Document 388-PS, Exhibit Number USA-26 —
in which he
stated clearly his unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by
military action in the near future.
The Defendant Jodl was in no doubt what that directive meant.
He noted in his diary, the same day, that the Führer had stated his
final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and had initiated mili-
tary preparation all along the line.

And the succeeding evidence, both in the Schmundt file and in

the Jodl diary, shows how these military preparations went forward.
Numerous examples of discussions, plans, and preparations during
the last few weeks before the Munich Pact, including discussions
with Hungary and the Hungarian General Staff, in which General
Haider participated, are contained in the Jodl diary and the later
items in the Schmundt file. The day the Munich Pact was signed,
—
the 29th of September, Jodl noted in his diary Document 1780-PS
the entry for 29 September:
"The Munich Pact is signed, Czechoslovakia as a power is out.
Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2d and
7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German
character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius
of the Führer and his determination not to shun even a world
war have again won the victory without the use of force. The
hope remains that the incredulous, the weak, and the doubtful
people have been converted and will remain that way."

421
 —
4 Jan. 46

Plans for the liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia

were made soon after Munich. Ultimately the absorption of the
remainder was accomplished by diplomatic bullying, in which the
Defendant Keitel participated, for the usual purpose of demon-
strating that German armed might was ready to enforce the
—
threats as shown by two documents already in, and which I need
not read: Document 2802-PS, Exhibit Number USA-117; and2798-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-118.
Andonce again the Defendant Jodl, in his 1943 lecture, Docu-
ment L-172, Exhibit Number USA-34, tells us clearly and inone
sentence why the objective of eliminating Czechoslovakia lay as
close to the hearts of the German military leaders as to the hearts
of the Nazi:

"The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn

of 1938 and the spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia
rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way
that it then became possible to consider the Polish problem
on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises."
And
this serves to recall the affidavits by Blomberg and Blasko-
witz, from which I have already read. The whole group of German
staff and front officers believed that the question of the Polish
Corridor "would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force
of arms," they told us. "Hitler produced the results which all of us
warmly desired," they have told us.
I turn now to Poland. The German attack on Poland is a partic-
ularly interesting one from the standpoint of the General Staff and
High Command. The documents which show the aggressive nature
of the attack have already been introduced by Colonel Griffith-Jones
of the British Delegation. I propose to approach it from a slightly
different angle, inasmuch as these documents serve as an excellent
case study of the functioning of the General Staff and High
Command group as defined in the Indictment.
This attack was carefully timed and planned, and in the docu-
ments one can observe the staff work step by step. Colonel Griffith-
Jones read from a series of directives from Hitler and Keitel,
embodied in Document C-120, Exhibit Number GB-1, involving "Fall
Weiss", which was the code word for the plan of attack on Poland.
—
That is a whole series of documents, and the series starts C-120
with a reissuance of a document called, "Directive for the Uniform
Preparation for War by the Armed Forces."

We
have encountered reissued directive pre-
this periodically
viously. That was a sort of form for standing instructions to the
Armed Forces laying out what their tasks during the coming period
would be.

422
 4 Jan. 46

In essence these directives are: Firstly, statements of what the

Armed Forces must be prepared to accomplish in view of political
and diplomatic policies and developments and; secondly, indications
of what should be accomplished diplomatically in order to make the
military tasks easier and the chances of success greater. They con-
stitute, in fact, a fusion of diplomatic and military thought and they
strongly demonstrate the mutual interdependence of aggressive
diplomacy and military planning.
Note the limited distribution of these documents, early in April
1939, in which the preparation of the plans for the Polish war is
ordered. Five copies only are distributed by Keitel: One goes to
Brauchitsch at OKH; one to Raeder at OKM; one to Goring at OKL;
and two to Warlimont in the planning branch of OKW.
Hitler lays down that the plans must be capable of execution by
1 September 1939; and, as we all remember, that target date was
adhered to. The fusion of military and diplomatic thought is clearly
brought out by a part of one of these documents which has not
previously been read; that is Document C-120, Subdivision D, and
it is to be found at Page 4. The sub-heading is "Political Require-
ments and Aims":
"German relations with Poland continue to be based on the
principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however,
change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the
same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude
towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary,
notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland.
"The aim, then, will be to destroy Polish military strength
and create in the East a situation which satisfies the require-
ments of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be
proclaimed a part of the Reich territory at the outbreak of
the conflict, at the latest.
"The political leadership considers it its task in this case to
isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to
Poland only.
"The development of increasing internal crises in France and
the resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situ-
ation in the not too distant future.
"Intervention by Russia, so far as she would be able to do
this, cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because
this would imply Poland's destruction by Bolshevism.
"The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly
by German military exigencies.
"On the German side Hungary cannot be considered a certain
ally. Italy's attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis."
Sub-heading 2, "Military Conclusions":

423
4 Jan. 46

"The great objectives in the building up of the German

Armed Forces will continue to be determined by the antago-
nism of the Western Democracies. Fall Weiss constitutes only
a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not
to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary
prerequisite for a military settlement with the Western
opponents.
"The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even
after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting
the war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid
successes.
"The entire situation will require, however, that precautions
be taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German
North Sea coast, as well as the air over them."
Let no one suggest that these are hypothetical plans or that the
General Staff and High Command group did not know what was in
prospect. The plans show on their face that they are no war game.
But, to clinch this point, let us refer briefly to Mr. Alderman's so-
called "pin-up" document on Poland, Document L-79, Exhibit
Number USA-27. These are Schmundt's notes on the conference in
Hitler's study at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, on 23 May 1939,
—
when Hitler announced and I quote just one sentence:
"There is, no question of sparing Poland, and we
therefore,
are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable
opportunity."
Note who was present besides Hitler and a few military aides:
The Defendant Goring, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; the
Defendant Raeder, Navy; the Defendant Keitel, OKW; Von Brau-
chitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army; Colonel General Milch,
who was State Secretary of the Air Ministry and Inspector General
of the Luftwaffe; General Bodenschatz, Göring's personal assistant;
Rear Admiral Schniewind, Chief of the naval war staff; Colonel
Jeschonnek, Chief of the Air Staff; Colonel Warlimont, Planning
Staff. All of them, except Milch, Bodenschatz, and the adjutants,
are members of the group.
So far these documents have shown us the initial and general
planning of the attack on Poland. These general plans, however,
had to be checked, corrected, and perfected by the field commanders
who were to carry out the attack.
I offer Document C-142, which will be Exhibit Number USA-538.

This document was issued in the middle of June 1939, and in this
document Von Brauchitsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
passed on the general outlines of the plan for the attack on Poland
to the field commanders-in-chief — to the Oberbefehlshaber of army
groups and armies —so that the field commanders could work out

424
 4 Jan. 46

the actual preparation and deployment of troops in accordance with

the plans. This is from Page 1 of the translation, and I quote:
"The object of the operation is to destroy the Polish Armed
Forces. High policy demands that the war should be begun
by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results. The
intention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is to pre-
vent a regular mobilization and concentration of the Polish
Army by a surprise invasion of Polish territory and to
destroy the mass of the Polish Army which is to be
. . .

expected to be west of the Vistula-Narev Line."

I skip to the next paragraph:
"The army group commands and the army commands will
make their preparations on the basis of surprise of the
enemy. There will be alterations necessary if surprise should
have to be abandoned. These will have to be developed
simply and quickly on the same basis; they are to be prepared
mentally to such an extent that in case of an order from the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army they can be carried out
quickly."

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that document?

COL. TAYLOR: The date of that document is the middle of June

1939; I believe it is the 15th or 14th of June 1939. The date is on
the original.
The next document is 2327-PS, which will be Exhibit Number
USA-539. It is signed by Blaskowitz. It is dated 14 June 1939, and
it shows us an Oberbefehlshaber at work in the field planning an

attack. Blaskowitz at that time was Commander of the 3rd Army

Group and he became Commander-in-Chief of the German 8th
Army during the Polish campaign. I read some extracts from this
document found on Page 1 of the translation:
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Army has ordered the work-
ing out of a plan of deployment against Poland which takes
into account the demands of the political leadership for the
opening of war by surprise and for quick success.
"The order of deployment by the High Command of the
Army, known as Fall Weiss, authorizes the 3rd Army Group
(in Fall Weiss 8th Army headquarters) to give necessary
directions and orders to all commands subordinated to it for
Fall Weiss."
I skip to Paragraph 7 on Page 1:

"The whole correspondence on Fall Weiss has to be conducted

under the classification 'top secret.' This is to be disregarded
only if the content of a document, in the judgment of the

425
 —
4 Jan. 46

chief of the responsiblecommand, is harmless in every way

even in connection with other documents.
"For the middle of July a conference is planned where details
of the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be
ordered later on. Special requests are to be communicated to
3rd Army Group before 10 July."
That is signed, "The Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army Group,
F. Blaskowitz."
I skip to Page 2 to read one further extract under the title at the
top of Page 2 of the translation, "Aims of Operation Fall Weiss":
"The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish mobili-
be opened by surprise with forces which are for
zation, is to
the most part armored and motorized, placed on alert in the
neighborhood of the border. The initial superiority over the
Polish frontier guards and surprise, both of which can be
expected with certainty, are to be maintained by quickly
bringing up other parts of the Army as well as by counter-
acting the marching up of the Polish Army.
"Accordingly, all units have to keep the initiative against the
foe by quick action and ruthless attacks."
Finally, a week before the actual attack on Poland, and when all
the military plans are laid, we find the group as defined in the
Indictment all in one place, in fact, all in one room. On August
23 the Oberbefehlshaber assembled at Obersalzberg to hear Hitler's
explanation of the timing of the attack and for political and diplo-
matic orientation from the head of the State. This speech has already
been read from at length. It is found in Document 798-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-29; and I pass over it, .except to note and emphasize
that it is addressed to the very group defined in the Indictment as
the General Staff and High Command group. It is, incidentally, the
second of the two examples referred to in the affidavits by Haider
and Brauchitsch, Numbers 1 and 2, which I read previously.
We have now come to the point where Germany actually launched
the war. Within a few weeks, and before any important action
on the Western Front, Poland was overrun and conquered; German
losseswere insignificant.
The three principal territorial questions mentioned in the Blom-
berg and Blaskowitz affidavits were all solved. The Rhineland had
been reoccupied and fortified; Memel was annexed; the Polish Cor-
ridor had been annexed. And a good deal more, too: Austria, a part
of the Reich; Czechoslovakia occupied; all of western Poland in
German Germany was superior in arms and in experience
hands.
to her Western enemies, France and England.
Then came the 3 black years of the war, 1939, 1940, and 1941,
when German armed might swung like a great scythe from north

426
 4 Jan. 46

to south to east: Norway and Denmark; the Low Countries; France;

Italy became an ally ofGermany; Tripoli and Egypt; Yugoslavia
and Greece; Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria became allies; the
western part of the Soviet Union overrun.
I would like to deal as a whole with this period from the fall of
Poland in October 1939 to the attack against the Soviet Union in
June of 1941. In this period occurred the aggressive wars in vio-
lation of treaties, as charged in the Indictment, against Norway,
Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece.
I cannot improve on or add much to the presentation of these
matters by the British Delegation. From the standpoint of proving
Crimes against Peace, our case is complete. But I would like to
review this period briefly from the military standpoint and view it
as the German military leaders viewed it. And of one thing we may
be sure: neither the Nazis nor the generals thought during this
period in terms of a series of violations of neutrality and treaties.
They thought in terms of a war, a war of conquest, a war for the
—
conquest of Europe. Neutrality, treaties, non-aggression pacts these
were not the major considerations. They were annoying obstacles,
and devices had to be formed and excuses manufactured to fit the
circumstances.
Von Blomberg has told us in his affidavit, which I have read,
that after 1939 some generals began to condemn Hitler's methods
and lost confidence in his judgment. Which particular Hitler methods
some of the generals condemned is not stated, but I think the Tri-
bunal will not hear any substantial evidence that many of the gen-
erals condemned the march of conquest during the years 1939 to
1941. In fact the evidence is rather that most of the generals were
having the time of their lives during those years.
Six weeks after the outbreak of war and upon the successful
termination of the Polish campaign, 9 October 1939, there was issued
a memorandum and directive for the conduct of the war in the
West. This is Document Number L-52, and becomes Exhibit Num-
ber USA-540. It is not signed. It was distributed only to the four
service chiefs, Keitel, Brauchitsch, Goring, and Raeder. From the
wording there is every indication that it was issued by Hitler. I will
read the pertinent extracts, starting with Page 2 of the document,
about two-thirds of the way down in the first paragraph, starting
with the words, "The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war":
"The aim of the Anglo-French conduct of war is to dissolve or
—
disintegrate the 80-million-state" meaning Germany "again
—
so that in this manner the European equilibrium, in other
words, the balance of power which serves their ends, may be
restored. This battle, therefore, will have to be fought out by
the German people one way or another. Nevertheless, the

427
4 Jan. 46

very great successes of the first month of the war could serve,
in the event of an immediate signing of peace, to strengthen
the Reich psychologically and materially to such an extent
that from the German viewpoint there would be no objection
to ending the war immediately, insofar as the present achieve-
ment with arms is not jeopardized by the peace treaty.
"It is not the object of this memorandum to study the pos-
sibilities inthis direction, or even to take them into con-
sideration. In this paper I shall confine myself exclusively to
the other case: the necessity to continue the fight, the object
of which, as already stressed, consists, insofar as the enemy
is concerned, in the dissolution or destruction of the German
Reich. In opposition to this the German war aim is the final
military dispatch of the West, that is, destruction of the power
and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to
oppose the state consolidation and further development of the
German people in Europe. As far as the outside world is
concerned, however, this internal aim will have to undergo
various propaganda adjustments, necessary from a psycho-
logical point of view. This does not alter the war aim. It is
and remains the destruction of our Western enemies."
I now pass to Page 3 of the translation, Paragraph 2, and the
subheading "Reasons":
"The successes campaign have made possible
of the Polish
first of all a war on
a single front, awaited for past decades
without any hope of realization; that is to say, Germany is
able to enter the fight in the West with all her might, leaving
only a few covering troops in the East. The remaining Euro-
pean states are neutral either because they fear for their own
fates or lack interest in the conflict as such or are interested
in a certain outcome of the war, which prevents them from
taking part at all, or at any rate too soon. The following is
to be firmly borne in mind. ..."
At this point I interpolate that here follows a succession of
references to countries, and I pass to Belgium and Holland at the
foot of Page 3:
"Belgium and Holland: Both countries are interested in
preserving their neutrality but incapable of withstanding
prolonged pressure from England and France. The preser-
vation of their colonies, the maintenance of their trade, and
thus the securing of their interior economy, even of their
very life, depend wholly upon the will of England and France.
Therefore in their decisions, in their attitude, and in their
actions both countries are dependent upon the West in the
highest degree. If England and France promise themselves a

428
 4 Jan. 46

successful result at the price of Belgian neutrality, they are

at any time in a position to apply the necessary pressure.
That is to say, without covering themselves with the odium
of a breach of neutrality, they can compel Belgium and Hol-
land to give up their neutrality. Therefore, in the matter of
the preservation of Belgo-Dutch neutrality, time is not a factor
which might promise a favorable development for Germany."
The final paragraph to be read is as follows:
"The Nordic States: Provided no completely unforeseen
factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be
assumed. The continuation of German trade with these
countries appears possible even in a war of long duration."
Six weeks later, on 23 November 1939, our group as defined in
— —
the Indictment the Oberbefehlshaber again assembled, as found
in Document Number 789-PS, already in the record as Exhibit Num-
ber USA-23, and heard from Hitler much of what he had said pre-
viously to the four service chiefs. This speech, part of which is
already in the record, contains other portions, not previously read,
which are now of interest; and the first extract which I would like
to read is on Page 2 of the translation, about half-way down in
Paragraph 1, starting with the words, "For the first time in history
we have to fight only on one front ..." I quote:
"For the first time in history we have to fight only on one
front; the other front is at present free. But no one can know
how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long
time whether I should strike first in the East and then in the
West. In principle I did not organize the Armed Forces in
order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me.
Sooner or later I wanted to solve the problem. Inevitably it
was decided that the East was to be annihilated first. If the
Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority
of our Armed Forces. The most glorious experience in our
history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and material.
Now the Eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is
a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now
the situation is as follows: The opponent in the West lies
behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to
grips with him. The decisive question is: How long can we
endure this situation?"
Passing to Page 3 of that document, line 3:
"Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is
favorable now; in 6 months it might not be so any more."
The final passage on Page 4 of the translation, in the long para-
graph about half-way down, beginning, "England cannot live with-
out its imports. We can feed...":

429
4 Jan. 46

"England cannot live without its imports. We can feed our-

selves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts
will bring England to her knees. However, this can occur
only if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult
decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved.
My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German
people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now.
I risk the loss of this achievement. I have to choose between
victory or destruction. I choose victory.
Greatest historical
choice, to be compared with the decisionof Frederick the
Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to
the heroism of one man. Even there, the closest advisers were
disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Frederick
the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870
were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall
attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest
moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is
meaningless. No one will question that when we have won.
The arguments we will choose for the breach of neutrality
shall not be as idiotic as they were in 1914. If we do not
break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without
attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it
possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The
question as to whether the attack will be successful, no one
can answer. Everything depends upon favorable providence."
Thereafter the winter of 1939 and 1940 passed quietly, the winter
of so-called "phony war."
The General Staff and High Command group all knew what the
—
plan was they had all been told. To attack ruthlessly at the first
opportunity; to smash the French and English forces; to pay no heed
to treaties with, or neutrality of, the Low Countries. "Breaking of
the neutrality of Holland and Belgium is meaningless. No one will
question that when we have won." That is what Hitler told the
Oberbefehlshaber. The generals and admirals agreed and went
forward with their plans.
Now it is not true that all the steps in this march of conquest
were conceived by Hitler and that the military leaders embarked
on them with reluctance and misgivings. To show this we need only
hark back for a moment to what Major Elwyn Jones told the Tri-
bunal about the plans for the invasion of Denmark and Norway.
The Tribunal will recall that Hitler's utterances in October and
November, which I have just read, although they are full of threaten- •

ing comments about France and England and the Low Countries,
contain no suggestion of 'an attack on Scandinavia. Indeed, Hitler's
memorandum of 9 October, from which I read Document L-52,

430
 4 Jan. 46

affirmatively indicates that Hitler saw no reason to disturb the situ-

ation to the north, because he said that unless unforeseen factors
appeared the neutrality of the northern states could be assumed.
Trade could be continued with those countries even in a long war.
But a week previously, on the 3rd of October 1939, the Defendant
Raeder had caused a questionnaire to be circulated within the Naval
Staff seeking comments on the advantages which might be gained
from a naval standpoint by securing bases in Norway and Denmark.
That document is C-122, Exhibit Number GB-82. And another docu-
ment introduced by Major Elwyn Jones, Document C-66, which is
Exhibit Number GB-81, shows that Raeder was prompted to circulate
this questionnaire by a letter from another admiral named Carls, who
pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast
by Germany. Admiral Carls, Rolf Carls, later attained the rank of
Admiral of the Fleet and commanded Naval Group North and in
that capacity is a member of the group as defined in the Indictment,
as well as Raeder.
The Tribunal will also recall that the Defendant Dönitz, who
at that timewas submarines, replied to the question-
flag officer of
naire from Raeder on 9 October 1939. The document in question is
Document C-5, Exhibit Number GB-83. And Dönitz replied that
from his standpoint Trondheim and Narvik met the requirements
for a submarine base, that Trondheim was better, and that he pro-
posed the establishment of a U-boat base there. The next day
Raeder visited Hitler, and this visit and certain subsequent events
are described in a document which has not previously been intro-
duced.
Now, Your Honors, owing to a confusion in numbering, the Ger-
man document isC-71, but the translation appears in your books in
Document L-323, and that will be Exhibit Number USA-541. The
translation will be found in L-323, the middle of the page, entitled,
"Entry in the War Diary of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy,
naval war staff, on 'Weserübung'," that being the code name for the
operation against Norway and Denmark. Diary entry for 10 Oc-
tober 1939:
"First reference of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy,
when visiting the Führer, to the significance of Norway for
sea and air warfàre. The Führer intends to give the matter
consideration.
"12 December 1939. Führer received Q and H" those being—
presumably Quisling and Hagelin.
"Subsequent instructions to the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces to make mental preparations. The Command-
er-in-Chief of the Navy is having an essay prepared which
will be ready in January."

431
 —
4 Jan. 46

I may interpolate. The translation of the next sentence is somewhat

in error and should read:
"With reference to this essay Kapitän zur See Krancke is
working on 'Weserübung' at OKW."
—
"During the time which followed H" Hagelin "maintained —
contact with the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy. His aim was to develop the Party Q" Quisling —
"with a view to making it capable of action and to give the
Supreme Command of the Navy information on the political
developments in Norway and military questions. In general
he pressed the speeding up of preparations, but considered
that it was first necessary to expand the organization."
1 think that is all I need read of that.

Another document, which is Document C-64, Exhibit Number

GB-86, already in the record, shows that on 12 December the Naval
War Staff discussed the Norwegian project with Hitler I am not —
—
going to read from that document, Your Honors at a meeting which
the Defendants Keitel and Jodl also attended. In the meantime
Raeder was in touch with the Defendant Rosenberg on the pos-
sibilities of using Quisling; and Major Elwyn Jones very properly
pointed out to the Tribunal the close link between the service chiefs
and the Nazi politicians. As a result of all this, on Hitler's instruc-
tions, Keitel issued an OKW directive on 27 January 1940 stating
that Hitler had commissioned him to undertake charge of prepara-
tions for the Norway operation, to which he then gave the code
name Weserübung.
On 1 March 1940 Hitler issued the directive setting forth the
general plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. That is
Document C-174, Exhibit Number GB-89, which Major Elwyn Jones
put in the record. The directive was initialed by Admiral Kurt
Fricke, who at that time was head of the operations division of the
naval war staff and who at the end of 1941 became Chief of the
naval war staff and in that capacity is a member of the group as
defined in the Indictment. So, as these documents make clear, the
plan to invade Norway and Denmark was not conceived in Nazi
Party circles or forced on the military leaders; on the contrary, it
was conceived in the naval part of the General Staff and High Com-
mand group, and Hitler was persuaded to take the idea up. Treaties
and neutrality meant just as little to the General Staff and High
Command group as to the Nazis.
As to the Low Countries, neither Hitler nor the military leaders
were disturbed about treaty considerations. The Tribunal will
remember that at a conference between Hitler and the principal
military leaders in May 1939, as shown in Document L-79, Exhibit
Number USA-27, already in the record, when the intention to attack

432
 4 Jan. 46

Poland was announced, Hitler, in discussing the possibility of war

with England, said that the Dutch and Belgian air bases must be
occupied by armed force. "Declarations of neutrality will be ignored."
And later, in his speech to the Oberbefehlshaber in November 1939,
Hitler said that they must first invade the Low Countries and "no
one will question that when we have won."
Accordingly, one can well imagine that the winter of 1939 and
1940 and the early spring of 1940 was a period of very intensive
planning in German military circles. The major attack in the West
through the Low Countries had to be planned and the attack on
Norway and Denmark had to be planned. The Defendant Jodl's
diary for the period 1 February to 26 May 1940, Document 1809-PS,
Exhibit Number GB-88, contains many entries reflecting the course
of this planning. Some of the entries have been read into the record
and others are now of interest.
The Tribunal will see from these entries which have already
been read that during February and early March there was con-
siderable doubt in German military circles as to whether the attack
on Norway and Denmark should precede or follow the attack on the
Low Countries and that at some points there even was doubt as to
whether all these attacks were necessary from a military standpoint.
But the Tribunal will not find a single entry which reflects any
hesitancy from a moral angle, on the part of Jodl or any of the
people he mentions, to overrun these countries.
I will make several references now to Document 1809-PS and
several of the entries in it. I do not plan to quote verbatim from
any one of them. The Court will note that on 1 February 1940 Gen-
eral Jeschonnek, the Chief of the Air Staff and a member of the
group as defined in the Indictment, visited Jodl and made a sugges-
tion that it might be wise to attack only Holland, on the ground
that Holland alone would offer a tremendous improvement for Ger-
many's aerial warfare.
On 6 February Jodl conferred with Jeschonnek, Warlimont, and
Colonel Von Waldau, and what Jodl calls a "new idea" was proposed
at this meeting: That the Germans should carry out only "Action H"
(Holland) and the Weser Exercise (Norway and Denmark) and should
guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war.
I suppose the German Air Force may have felt that the occu-
pation of Holland alone would give them sufficient scope for air
bases for attacks on England and that if Belgium's neutrality were
preserved the German bases in Holland would be immune from
attack by the French and British armies in France. If, to meet this
situation, the French and British should attack through Holland and
Belgium, the violation of neutrality would be on the other foot. But
whether or not this new idea made sense from a military angle, it

433
4 Jan. 46

appears to be a most extraordinary notion from a diplomatic angle.

It was a proposal to violate without any excuse the neutrality of
three neighboring small countries and simultaneously to guarantee
the neutrality of a fourth. What value the Belgians might have
attributed to a guarantee of neutrality offered under such circum-
stances, it is difficult to imagine; and in fact, the "new idea" pro-
jected at this meeting seems a most extraordinary combination of
cynicism and naïveté.
In the meantime, as Jodl's diary shows, on 5 February 1940 the
"special staff" for the Norway invasion met for the first time and
got its instructions from Keitel. On
21 February Hitler put General
Von Falkenhorst in command
the Norway undertaking; and
of
Jodl's diary records that "Falkenhorst accepts gladly."

On
26 February Hitler was still in doubt whether to go first to
Norway or the Low Countries, but on 3 March he decided to do
Norway first and the Low Countries a short time thereafter. This
decision proved final. Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April
and the success of the adventure was certain by the 1st of May.
The invasion of the Low Countries took place 10 days later.
So France and the Low Countries fell, Italy joined the war on
the side of Germany, and the African campaign began. In October
1940 Italy attacked Greece. The Italo-Greek stalemate and the
uncertain attitude of Yugoslavia became embarrassing to Germany,
particularly because the attack of the Soviet Union was being
planned and Germany felt she could not risk an uncertain situation
at her rear in the Balkans.

Accordingly, it was decided to end the Greek situation by coming

to Italy's aid, and the Yugoslavian coup d'état of 26 March 1941
brought about the final German decision to crush Yugoslavia also.
The documents have already been introduced by Colonel Phillimore,
and there is little that I need to add for my present purpose. The
decisions were made; the Armed Forces drew up the necessary
plans and executed the attacks. The onslaught was particularly
unmerciful and ruthless against Yugoslavia for the special purpose
of frightening Turkey and Greece. The final deployment instruc-
tions were issued by Brauchitsch and appear in Document R-95,
Exhibit Number GB-127, which has not been read before. Two
extracts from this are of interest. These extracts are very short:
"The political situation in the Balkans having changed by
reason of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be
considered an enemy even should it make declarations of
loyalty at first.

"The Führer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore

to destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible."

434
 4 Jan. 46

And turning to Paragraph Number 5, the "Timetable for the

Operations":
"On 5 April as soon as sufficient forces of the Air Forces are
available and weather permitting, the Air Forces should attack
continuously by day and night the Yugoslav ground organi-
zation and Belgrade."
The German attack on the Soviet Union I have little more to
say about. The documents showing the aggressive nature of the
attack have been put in by Mr. Alderman. I suppose it is quite pos-
sible that some members of the General Staff and High Command
group opposed Barbarossa as unnecessary and unwise from a mili-
tary standpoint. The Defendant Raeder so indicated in a memoran-
dum he wrote on 10 January 1944, Document C-66, Exhibit Number
GB-81. C-66 is the translation and the only document I propose to
read on this subject, from which a few extracts are of interest.
The quotation starts at the very outset of the Document C-66:
"At thistime the Führer had made known his 'unalterable
decision' to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all
remonstrances. After that further warnings, if no new situ-
ation had arisen, were found to be, according to previous
experiences, completely useless. As Chief of naval war staff I
was never convinced of the 'compelling necessity' for Bar-
barossa."
And passing to the third paragraph:
"The Führer very early had the idea of one day settling
accounts with Russia; doubtless his general ideological atti-
tude played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once
stated that he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic
power; they would then have to be diverted in the direction
of the Persian Gulf. The advance of the Russians against
Finland and the Baltic States in 1939-1940 probably further
strengthened him in this idea."
And passing to the very end of the document, Paragraph 7, Page 4:

"As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compul-

sion. If thereby a difference of opinion arises between 1 SKL
—
and myself" that, if I may interpolate, is a division of the
—
naval war staff having to do with operations "it is perhaps
because the arguments the Führer used on such occasions
(dinner speech in the middle of July to the officers in com-
mand) to justify a step he had planned usually had a greater
effect on people not belonging to the inner circle than on
those who often heard this type of reasoning.
"Many remarks and plans indicate that the Führer calculated
on the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn

435
4 Jan. 46

whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (Gen-

of 1941,
was very skeptical."
eral Staff)
That, to be sure, indicates division of opinion as to the military
chances of a rapid success, but the part last quoted indicates that
other members of the group favored Barbarossa and Raeder's memo-
randum actually says and substantiates what Blomberg's affidavit
says: That some of the generals lost confidence in the power of Hit-
ler's judgment, but that the generals failed as a group to take any
definite stand against him, although a, few tried and suffered
thereby. Certainly the High Command took no stand against Hitler
on Barbarossa and the events of 1941 and 1942 do not suggest that
the High Command embarked on the Soviet war tentatively or with
reservations, but rather with ruthless determination backed by care-
ful planning. The plans themselves have all been read and cited to
the Court previously.
That concludes the evidence on the criminal activities of the
group under Counts One and Two. The documents written by the
military leaders are not the writings of men who were reluctant to
plan and execute these manifold wars.
want to make clear again the nature of the accusations against
I

this group under Counts One and Two. They are not accused on the
ground that they are soldiers. They are not accused merely for
doing the usual things a soldier is expected to do, such as making
military plans and commanding troops. It is, I suppose, among the
normal duties of a diplomat to engage in negotiations and confer-
ences, to write notes and aide-memoire, to entertain at dinner par-
ties, and cultivate good will toward the government he represents.
The Defendant Ribbentrop is not indicted for doing these things.
It is the usual function of a politician to draft regulations and
decrees, to make speeches. The Defendants Hess and Frick are not
indicted for doing those things.
an innocent and respectable business to be a locksmith; but
It is
it is none the less a crime, if the locksmith turns his talents to picking
the locks of neighbors and looting their homes. And that is the
nature of the charge under Counts One and Two against the defend-
ants and the General Staff and High Command group. The charge
is that, in performing the functions of diplomats, politicians, soldiers,
sailors, or whatever they happened to be, they conspired, and did
plan, prepare, initiate, and wage illegal wars and thereby committed
crimes under Article 6 (a) of the Charter.
It is no defense for those who committed such crimes to plead
that they practice a particular profession. It is perfectly legal for
military men to prepare military plans to meet national contingen-
cies, and such plans may legally be drawn whether they are offen-
sive or defensive in a military sense. It is perfectly legal for military

436
 4 Jan. 46

leaders to carry out such plans and engage in war, if in doing so

they do not plan and launch and wage wars which are illegal because
they are aggressive and in contravention of the Charter.
I am very far from saying that there may not be individual cases,
involving some individual members of this group, where drawing
the line between legal and illegal behavior might involve some diffi-
culties. That is not an uncommon situation in the legal field. But
I do not believe that there is any doubt or difficulty here, before
this Tribunal, as to the criminality of the General Staff and High
Command group as a group under Counts One and Two, or as to
the guilt of the five defendants who are members of the group.
In the case of the Defendants Goring, Keitel, and Jodl, the evi-
dence is voluminous and their participation in aggressive plans and
wars is more or less constant. The same is true of Defendant Raeder,
and his individual responsibility for the aggressive and savage
attack on Norway* and Denmark is especially clear. The evidence so
far offered against Dönitz is less voluminous for the reason that he
was younger and not one of the top group until later in the war.
But numerous other members of the General Staff and High
Command group, including its other leaders, are shown to have
participated knowingly and wilfully in these illegal plans and wars:
Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and his Chief of
Staff, Haider; Warlimont, the deputy of Jodl. In the nature of things
these men knew all that was going on and participated fully, as the
documents show. Reichenau and Sperrle helped to bully Schuschnigg;
Reichenau, and Von Schober, together with Goring, were imme-
diately sent for by Hitler when Schuschnigg ordered the plebi-
scite. At a later date we have seen Blaskowitz as an Oberbefehls-
haber in the field, knowingly preparing for the attack on Poland;
Field Marshal List educating the Bulgarians for their role during
the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece; Von Falkenhorst "gladly"
accepting the assignment to command the invasion of Norway and
Denmark. On the air side, Jeschonnek has been recorded proposing
that Germany attack Norway, Denmark, and Holland and simul-
taneously assuring Belgium that there is nothing to fear. On the
naval side, Admiral Carls, member of the group, foresees at an
early date that German policy is leading to a general European war,
and at a later date the attack on Norway and Denmark is his brain-
child; Krancke, later one of the group, is one of the chief planners
of this attack; Schniewind is in the inner circle for the attack on
Poland; Fricke certifies the final orders for Weserübung and a few
months later proposes that Germany annex Belgium and northern
France and reduce the Netherlands and Scandinavia to Vassalage.
Most of the 19 officers I have mentioned were at that time mem-
bers of the group, as defined, and the few who were not, subsequently

437
 —

4 Jan. 46

became members. At the final conference for Barbarossa 17 addi-

tional members were present and at the two meetings with Hitler,
at which the aggressive plans and the contempt for treaties were
fully disclosed, the entire group was present.

The military defendants will perhaps argue that they are pure
technicians.This amounts to saying that military men are a race
apart from and different from the ordinary run of human beings
men above and beyond the moral and legal requirements that apply
to others, incapable of exercising moral iudgment on their own
behalf.
What we are discussing here is the crime of planning and waging
aggressive war. It stands to reason that that crime is committed
—
most consciously and culpably by a nation's leaders the leaders in
all the major fields of activity which are necessary to and closely
involved in the waging of war. It is committed by propagandists
and publicists. It is committed by political leaders, by diplomats,
by the chief ministers, by the principal industrial and financial
leaders. It is no less committed by the military leaders.

In the nature of things, planning and executing aggressive war

is accomplished by agreement and consultation among all these
types of leaders. And if the leaders in any notably important field
of activity stand aside or resist or fail to co-operate, then the pro-
gram will at the very least be seriously obstructed. That is why the
principal leaders in all these fields of activity share responsibility
for the crime, and the military leaders no less than the others.
Leadership in the military field, as well as in other fields, calls for
moral wisdom as well as technical astuteness.
I do not think that the responsible military leaders of any
nation will be heard to say that their role is that of a mere janitor,
or custodian, or pilot of the war machine which is under their
command and that they bear no responsibility whatsoever for the
use to which that machine is put.
The prevalence of such a view would be particularly unfortunate
today, when the military leaders control forces infinitely more
powerful and destructive than ever before. .Should the military
leaders be declared exempt from the declaration in the Charter that
planning and waging aggressive war is a crime, it would be a
crippling, if not a fatal blow to the efficacy of that declaration.

Such is certainly not the view of the United States. The Prose-
cution here representing the United States believes that the profession
of arms is a distinguished profession. We believe that the practice
of that profession by its leaders calls for the highest degree of
integrity and moral wisdom no less than for technical skill. We
believe that, in consulting and planning with the leaders in other

438
 .

4 Jan. 46

the military leaders must act in accord-

fields of national activities,
ance with international law and the dictâtes of the public
conscience. Otherwise the military resources of the nation will be
used, not in accordance with the laws of modern society, but in
accordance with the law of the jungle. The military leaders share
responsibility with other leaders. I use the word "share" advisedly.
Obviously the military leaders are not the final and exclusive
arbiters, and the German military leaders do not bear exclusive
responsibility for the criminal holocaust which was committed. But
the German military leaders conspired with others to undermine and
destroy the conscience of the German nation. The German military
leaders wanted to aggrandize Germany and, if necessary, to resort
to war for that purpose.
As the Chief Prosecutor for the United States said in his opening
statement, the German military leaders are here before you because
they, along with others, mastered Germany and drove it to war.
Your Lordship, that concludes the evidence under Counts One
and Two, and if this would be a convenient stopping point . .

THE PRESIDENT: You have another branch of the argument?

COL. TAYLOR: Counts Three and Four, Your Honor, which will
take considerable time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 7 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]

439
 TWENTY- EIGHTH DAY
Monday, 7 January 1946

Morning Session

COL. TAYLOR: May it please the Coûrt, Sir, when the Court
rose on Friday I had completed that part of the presentation on
Counts One and Two. I now turn to that part of the Indictment
which charges that the General Staff and High Command group had
a major responsibility for the War Crimes and Crimes against Hu-
manity involved in the execution of the Common Plan or Conspiracy
set forth in Counts Three and Four of the Indictment. For purpose
of brevity I shall refer to these crimes simply as War Crimes.
The presentation of thedocuments under this part of the case
should take all or the better part of the morning session. At the
conclusion of that, I propose to call a single witness, one witness,
Erich von dem Baeh-Zelewski, whose testimony on direct examination
should not exceed 25 or 30 minutes. After that, I shall take possibly
10 minutes to conclude, and that will be the entire presentation.
On propose to show that members of the
this part of the case I

General Staff and High Command group, including the defendants

who are members of the group, ordered and directed the commission
of War Crimes, and thereby participated in the commission of War
Crimes in their official capacity as members of the group. I also
propose to show, in certain instances, the actual commission of War
Crimes by members of the German Armed Forces as a result of
these orders or as a result of other orders and arrangements made
by members of the General Staff and High Command group which
controlled the German Armed Forces. However, I do not propose
to make a full showing of War Crimes committed by the German
Armed Forces. The full presentation of the evidence under Counts
Three and Four will be made, pursuant to agreement among the
Chief Prosecutors, by the French and Soviet Delegations, and a
substantial amount of the evidence to be presented by them will be
relevant to the charges against the General Staff and High Command
group.
We will at this time show the Tribunal that the General Staff
and High Command became wedded to a policy of terror. In some
cases, the evidence of this policy is in documentary form, and we
will present the activating papers which were signed by, initialed
by, and circulated among the members of the group. In other
instances, where the actual crimes were committed by others than

440
 7 Jan. 46

members of the German Armed Farces, where, for example, prisoners

of war were handed over to and mistreated by the SS or SD, we
will show that in those cases members of this group were well
aware that they were assisting in the commission of War Crimes.
We will sho w that many crimes committed by the S S and SD were
committed with the knowledge and necessary support of the General
Staff and High Command group.
The first matter which I will take up relates to the killing, in
violation of international law and the rules of war, of Allied com-
mandos, paratroopers, and members of military missions, and the
first document to which I wish to refer is 498-PS, which will be
Exhibit USA-501.
This story starts with the order embodied in that document,
which is an order issued by Hitler on 18 October 1942, and which
Mr. Storey has already mentioned in the presentation of charges
against the Sicherheitsdienst. The order begins with a recital that
Allied commandos were using methods of warfare alleged to be
outside the scope of the Geneva Convention, and thereafter proceeds
to specify the methods of warfare which German troops should use
against Allied commandos, and the disposition which should be made
of captured commandos.
This order is one of the two basic documents in the story. I will
read it in full:
"1. For some time our enemies have been using in their war-
fare methods which are outside the international Geneva Con-
ventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior
of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are par-
tially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries.
From captured orders it is divulged that they are directed not
only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners
on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the
latter, as prisoners, represent a burden in the further pursuit
of their purpose or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally,
orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has
been demanded in principle.
"2. For this reason it was already announced, in an addendum

to the Armed
Forces communiqué of 7 October 1942, that in
the future, Germany, in the face of the sabotage troops of the
British and their accomplices, will resort to the same proce-
dure, that is, that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the
German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.
"3. I therefore order:
"From now on all enemies on so-called commando missions in
Europe or Africa, challenged by German troops, even if they
are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops,

441
7 Jan. 46

whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be

slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference
whether they are landed from ships and airplanes for their
actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if
these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared
to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on
principle. In each individual case full information is to be
sent to the OKW for publication in the communiqué of the
Armed Forces.
"4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents,
saboteurs, et cetera, fall into the hands of the Armed Forces
by some other means, through the police in occupied territo-
ries, for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to
the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW
stockades, for instance, et cetera, is strictlyprohibited, even if
this is only intended for a short time.
"5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any soldiers
who, in the course of normal hostilities, large-scale offensive
actions, landing operations, and airborne operations, are cap-
tured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this
order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after
battles at sea, or to enemy soldiers trying to save their lives
by parachute after air battles.
"6. I will hold responsible under military law, for failing to
carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either
have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about
this order, or acted against this order when it was to be
executed."
It is signed Adolf Hitler, and the Tribunal will note that this
order was issued by OKW
in 12 copies, and the distribution shown
on the second page included the three Supreme Commands, Army,
Sea, and Air, and the principal field commands.
Now, the same day Hitler issued a supplementary order, that is,
Document 503-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-542. This was issued
for the purpose of explaining the reasons why the basic order was
issued. In this explanation, Hitler gave a rather different set of
reasons for the issuance of the order and pointed out that Allied
commando operations had been extraordinarily successful in the
destruction of rear communications, intimidating laborers, and
destroying important war plants in occupied areas. This is the
other basic document; and while I need not read it in full, I would
like to read substantial excerpts, starting with the first paragraph
at the top of the page:
1
'Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and
—
sabotage troops" then in parentheses was a cross reference

442
 7 Jan. 46

to the order which I have just read — "a supplementary order

of the Führer is enclosed.
"This order is intended for commanders only and must not,
under any circumstances, fall into enemy hands.

"The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the

receiving bureaus.
"The bureaus named in the distribution list are held re-
sponsible for the return and destruction of all distributed
copies of this order and copies made thereof."
It is signed, "The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces,
by order of Jodl."
Thereafter follows a distribution list and then the supple-
mentary order itself, signed by Hitler. I will start reading the first
two paragraphs of the supplementary order which appear at the
bottom of Page 1 of the translation:
"I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the de-
struction of enemy sabotagetroops and to declare non-com-
pliance with these orders severely punishable. I deem it
necessary to announce to the competent commanding officers
and commanders the reasons for this decree.
"As in no previous war, a method of destruction of com-
munications behind the front, intimidation of the populace
working for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-
important industrial plants in territories occupied by us has
been developed in this war."
I propose to skip to the bottom of Page 2, the last two paragraphs
on Page 2 of the translation:

"The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary

weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is
cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric
power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many
thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the con-
struction of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight
at the front and so contribute to serious damage of the home-
land as well as to bloody losses of the fighting soldiers.
"Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the
adversary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but
at the same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they
can, according to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While
they themselves have orders ruthlessly to remove any German
soldiers or even natives who get in their way, they run no
danger of suffering really serious losses in their operations,
since at the worst, if they are caught, they can immediately
surrender and thus believe that they will theoretically fall

443
7 Jan. 46

under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There is no

doubt, however, that this is a misuse in the worst form of the
Geneva agreements, especially since part of these elements
are even criminals liberated from prisons, who can rehabili-
tate themselves through these activities.
"England and America will therefore always be able to find
volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can
truthfully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life
for them. At worst, all they have to do is successfully to
commit their attacks on people, traffic installations, or other
installations and, upon being encountered by the enemy, to
capitulate.
"If theGerman conduct of war is not to suffer grievous
damage through these incidents, it must be made clear to the
adversary that all sabotage troops will be exterminated,
without exception, to the last man.
"This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is
nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore,
that a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows
itself to be captured, expecting to be treated according to the
rules of the Geneva Convention. It must, under all cir-
cumstances, be ruthlessly exterminated.
"The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces
communiqué and laconically state that a sabotage,
will briefly
terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exter-
minated to the last man.
"I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subor-
dinate to them, as well as individual commanders, not only to
realize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out
this order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned
officers who fail through some weakness are to be reported
without fail or, if the circumstances require it, e. g. if danger
is imminent, to be at once made strictly accountable. The
homeland, as well as the fighting soldier at the front, has the
right to expect that behind their backs the essentials of nour-
ishment as well as the supply with war-important weapons
and ammunition remains secure.
"These are the reasons for the issuance of my decree.
"If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation,
initially to spare one man or two, then they are to be shot
immediately after interrogation."
Your Lordship, the next is Document C-l 79, which will be Exhibit
USA-543. As this document shows, 10 days later on 28 October 1942
and while the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the

444
 7 Jan. 46

German Navy, the naval war staff in Berlin transmitted its copy of
the basic order of 18 October to the lower naval commands. The
copy distributed by the Navy and the covering memorandum from
the naval war staff show clearly the secrecy which surrounded the
dissemination of this order; and I read the first sheet of this docu-
ment only, the cover sheet:
"Enclosed please find an order of the Führer regarding anni-
hilation of terror and sabotage units. This order must not be
distributed in writing by flotilla leaders, section commanders,
or officers of this rank. After verbal notification to subordinate
sections, the above officers must hand this order over to the
next higher section, which is responsible for its withdrawal
and destruction."
Passing over to Page 3 of this document, at the very end we find
a similar admonition in the notice for distribution, at the very end
of the document; I read:
"These instructions are not to be distributed over and above
the battalions and the corresponding staffs of the other ser-
vices. After notification, those copies distributed over and
* above the regimental and corresponding staffs of the other
services must be withdrawn and destroyed."
The next document, Your Lordship, is C-178, which becomes
Exhibit USA-544. This document is dated 11 February 1943, which
was 12 days after the Defendant Dönitz had become Commander-in-
Chief of the German Navy. On that day, this memorandum was
circulated within the naval war staff in order to clear up certain
misunderstandings as to the scope of the basic order of 18 October
1942. This document, of which I will read the first four paragraphs,
indicates why the earlier order had been treated as such a secret
matter and also directs that all naval commanders and officers who
failed to carry out the order, or to instruct their units concerning
the order, would run the risk of serious court-martial penalties. I'll
read the first four paragraphs only:
"From the notice given by the 3rd Section of the Naval Oper-
ations Staff on 1 February 1943 it has been discovered that
the competent departments of the General Staff of the Army,
as well as those of the Air Force Operations Staff, have a
wrong conception regarding the treatment of saboteurs. A
telephone inquiry at the 3rd Section of the Operations Staff
proved that this naval authority was not correctly informed
either.
"In view of this situation, referenceis made to Paragraph 6
of the
— —
Führer Order of 18 October 1942" and then a cross-
reference^ "according to which all commanders and officers
who have neglected their duty in instructing their units about

445
7 Jan. 46

the order referring to treatment of saboteurs are threatened

with punishment by court-martial.
"The first Führer order concerning this matter of 18 October
1942 was given the protection of top secret merely because it
stated therein (1) that according to the Führer' s views, the
spreading of military sabotage organizations in the East and
West may have tremendous consequences for our whole
conduct of the war, and (2) that the shooting of uniformed
prisoners acting on military orders must be carried out even
after they have surrendered voluntarily and asked for pardon.

"On the other hand, the annihilation of sabotage units in

battle is not at all to be kept secret; but on the contrary, to
be currently published in the OKW reports. The purpose of
these measures to act as a deterrent will not be achieved if
those taking part in enemy commando operations would not
learn that certain death and not safe imprisonment awaits
them. As the saboteurs are to be annihilated immediately,
unless their statements are first needed for military reasons,
it is necessary that not only all members of the Armed Forces ,

must receive instructions that these types of saboteurs, even

if they are in uniform, are to be annihilated but also all
departments of the home staff, dealing with this kind of
questions, must be informed of the course of action which has
been ordered."
I will call the Tribunal's attention to the two reasons given in

that quotation for keeping secret from the public knowledge of the
fact that uniformed prisoners would be shot, even after they had
surrendered and asked for pardon. This shows a clear awareness
that that was in direct contravention of the Hague and Geneva
Conventions.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, did you read the paragraph
beginning, "Practical difficulties "?
. . .

COL. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. I'll read that.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you should.

COL. TAYLOR: "Practical difficulties may develop because of

the definition of the term 'sabotage units.' The annihilation and
destruction, according to Paragraph 5 of the Führer Order of
18 October 1942, do not apply to troops participating in large-
scale landing operations and large-scale airborne operations.
The criterion is to be found in that, in the latter case, an open
battle takes place, whereas, for instance, 10 or more people
who land by sea or air, or drop by parachute not to fight an
open battle but to destroy either a factory, a bridge, or a

446
 7 Jan. 46

railway installation, would fall into the category of those who

must be annihilated."
The next document, Your Honor, is 508-PS, which will be
Exhibit USA-545. Now, the Hitler order of 18 October 1942 was
actually carried out in a number of instances, of which we have the
documentary proof for several. Document 508-PS shows that during
the night of 19-20 November 1942, a British freight glider crashed
near Egersund, in Norway. The glider carried a British commando
unit of 17 men, of whom three were apparently killed in the crash.
All were in British uniform. Fourteen survivors were executed in
accordance with the Hitler Order the evening of 20 November. In
proof of this I will read certain extracts from 508-PS, beginning on
Page 1 of the translation, the paragraph numbered "1)":
"1.Following supplementary report is made about landing of
"
a British freight glider at Egersund in the night of . . .

It reads November 11 in the translation, but Ibelieve in the

original it was November 20; that is a typographical error.
"a) No firing on the part of the German defense.
"b) The towing plane (Wellington) crashed after touching the
ground; 7-man crew dead. The attached freight glider also
crashed; of the 1 7-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage
force. Führer Order has been carried out."

I pass to Page 3 *of the translation, on which page appear two

teletype messages. I wish to read the first two paragraphs at the
top of the page:
"On 20 November 1942 at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15
kilometers northeast of Egersund. It is a British aircraft
(towed glider) made of wood without engine. Of the 17-
member crew three are, dead, six are severely, the others are
slightly, wounded.
"All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve insignia.
Furthermore, following items were found: 8 knapsacks, tents,
skis, and radiosender, exact number still unknown. The glider
carried rifles, light machine guns and machine pistols, number
unknown. At present the prisoners are with the battalion in
Egersund."
Passing to the second teletype message, the first paragraph:
"Beside the 17-member crew extensive sabotage material and
work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose
was absolutely proved. The 280th Infantry Division ordered
the execution of the action according to the Führer Order. The
execution was carried out toward the evening of 20 November.
Some of the prisoners wore blue ski-suits under their khaki

.447
7 Jan 46

uniforms which had no insignia on the sleeves. During a short

interrogation the survivors have revealed nothing but their
names, ranks and serial numbers."
I pass to the last paragraph of that teletype, at the foot of Page 3
of the translation:

"In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the

crew, the Armed Forces Commander of Norway has issued an
order to the district commanders, according to which the
—
interrogations by G-2" that was I. C. in the German "and
—
— —
by BDS" police "are important before the execution of the
Führer Order; in case of Paragraph Number 4 of the Führer
Order, the prisoners are to be handed over to the BDS."
Your Lordship, the next document is 512-PS, Exhibit USA-546.
This document recites three specific instances where the Hitler
Order was carried out in Norway and especially emphasizes the
desirability of taking individual commandos prisoner for inter-
rogation. I read from Document 512-PS, dated 13 December 1942:

"According the last sentence of the Führer Order of

to
18th October, individual saboteurs can be spared for the
time being in order to keep them for interrogation. The
importance of this measure was proved in the cases of the
Glomfjord, 2-man torpedo Drontheim, and glider plane Sta-
vanger, where interrogations resulted in valuable knowledge
of enemy intentions. Since in the case of Egersund the sabo-
teur was liquidated immediately and no clues were obtained;
therefore, Armed Forces Commander refers to the above-
mentioned last sentence of the Führer Order calling for liqui-
dation only after a short interrogation."
One final document from the Norwegian Theater of War is

relative.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, what does "RK" in the last

paragraph mean? The first words of the last paragraph?

COL. TAYLOR: Red Cross (Rotes Kreuz).

THE PRESIDENT: So they had a protest from the Red Cross?
COL. TAYLOR: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: And "BDS"?

COL. TAYLOR: That is "Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei
(Sipo)."
Document 526-PS which is Exhibit USA-502, dated 10 May 1943,
Colonel Storey has already brought to the Tribunal's attention in
connection with the presentation against the Sicherheitsdienst. I will
first read the opening sentences:

448
 7 Jan. 46

"On 30 March 1943, in Toftefjord (degree of latitude 70), an

enemy cutter was sighted. Cutter was blown up by enemy.
"Crew: 2 dead and 10 taken prisoners.
"Cutter sent from Scalloway (Shetland Isles) by the Nor-
wegian Navy."
Passing to the word "Purpose":
"Purpose: Building of an organization for the sabotaging of
and troop billets and
strong-points, battery positions, staff
bridges.
"Assigner of mission in London: Norwegian Major Munthe.
"Führer Order executed by Sicherheitsdienst (Security Serv-
ice).

"Wehrmacht communiqué of 6 April announces the following

about it: 'In northern Norway an enemy sabotage unit was
engaged and destroyed on approaching the coast.' "
Now, shifting to the Italian Theater of War, I call the Court's
attention to 509-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-547. This document
is dated 7 November 1943; and is a telegram from the Supreme
Commander in Italy to OKW; and it shows that on 2 November 1943
three British commandos, taken prisoner near Pescara in Italy, were
given "special treatment" (sonderbehandelt), which as the Court
knows from previous evidence in the case, meant death. What hap-
pened to the nine remaining prisoners of war in the hospital, we do
not know.
I have one more document from the Italian Theater, 2610-PS,
Exhibit USA-548. This specifically shows the carrying out of Hit-
ler's orders. It consists of an affidavit, dated 7 November 1945, by
Frederick W. Roche, a major in the Army of the United States.
Major Roche was the Judge Advocate of an American Military Com-
mission which tried General Anton Dostler, formerly Commander
of the 75th German Army Corps, for the unlawful execution of
15 members of the United States Armed Forces. I will read from
this affidavit:

"Frederick W. Roche, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

"I am major in the Army of the United States. I was the
a
Judge Advocate of the Military Commission which tried Anton
Dostler for ordering the execution of the group of 15 United
States Army personnel who comprised the 'Ginny Mission.'
This Military Commission, consisting of five officers, was
appointed by command of General McNarney, by Special
Order, Number 269, dated 26 September 1945, Headquarters,
Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army,
APO 512.

449
7 Jan. 46

"The Military Commission met at Rome, Italy, on 8 October

1945, and proceeded with the trial of the case of the United
States versus Anton Dostler. The trial of this case consumed
4 days, and the findings and sentence were announced on the
morning of 12 October 1945. The charge and specification in
this case are as follows:
"Charge: Violation of the law of war.
"Specification: In that Anton Dostler, then general, command-
ing military forces of the German Reich, a belligerent enemy
nation, to wit the 75th Army Corps, did, on or about 24 March
1944, in the vicinity of La Spezia, Italy, contrary to the law
of war, order to be shot summarily, a group of United States
Army personnel consisting of two officers and 13 enlisted men
who had then recently been captured by forces under General
Dostler, which order was carried into execution on or about
26 March 1944, resulting in the death of the said 15 members
of the Army of the United States —
" and a list of names
follows.
"I was present throughout the entire proceeding. I heard all
the testimony and I am familiar with the records in this case.
The facts developed in this proceeding are as follows:
"On the night of 22 March 1944 two officers and 13 enlisted
men of the 2677th Special Reconnaissance Battalion of the
Army of the United States disembarked from some United
States Navy boats and landed on the Italian coast near Sta-
zione di Framura. All 15 men were members of the Army of
the United States and were in the military service of the
United States. When they landed on the Italian coast, they
were all properly dressed in the field uniform of the United
States Army and they carried no civilian clothes. Their mis-
sion was to demolish a railroad tunnel on the main line
between La Spezia and Genoa. That rail line was being used
by the German forces to supply their fighting forces on the
Cassino and Anzio beachhead fronts. The entire group was
captured on the morning of 24 March 1944 by a patrol con-
sisting of Fascist soldiers and a group of members of the Ger-
man Army. All 15 men were placed under interrogation in
La Spezia and they were held in custody until the morning
of 26 March 1944, when they were all executed by a firing
squad. These men were never tried nor were they brought
before any court or given any hearing; they were shot by
order of Anton Dostler, then general commanding the 75th
German Army Corps.
"Anton Dostler took the stand in this case and testified, by
way of defense, that he ordered the 15 American soldiers to

450
 7 Jan. 46

be shot pursuant to the Hitler Order of 18 October 1942 on

commando operations, which provided that commandos were
to be shot and not taken prisoners of war, even after they
had been interrogated. He also testified that he would have
been subject to court-martial proceedings if he did not obey
the Hitler Order.
"The following is a true copy of the findings and sentence in
the case of the United States against Anton Dostler, as these
findings and sentence appear in the original record of the
trial and as they were announced in open court at Rome,
Italy, on 12 October 1945:
"Findings: General Dostler, as President of this Commission
it is my duty to inform you that the Commission, in closed

session and upon secret written ballot, at least two-thirds of

all the members of the Commission concurring in each finding
of guilty, finds you of the specification and of the charge:
Guilty.
"Sentence: And again in closed session and upon secret writ-
ten ballot, at least two-thirds of all the members of the Com-
mission concurring, sentences you: To be shot to death by
musketry."
Now the order of 18 October 1942 remained in force, so far as
we know, until the end of the war. I wish to offer 506-PS, which
will be Exhibit USA-549. This document is dated 22 June 1944. It
is initialed by Warlimont, and in it the OKW
made it where the
commando operation was undertaken by only one person. I will
read the single paragraph of the order:
"The Operations Staff agrees with the view taken in the letter
of the army group judge to the Supreme Commander South-
west of 20 May 1944. The Führer Order is to be applied even
if the enemy employs only one person for a task. Therefore,

it does not make any difference if several persons or a single

person take part in a commando operation. The reason for

the special treatment of participants in a commando operation
is that such operations do not correspond to the German con-

cept of usage and customs of warfare."

The Allied landing in Normandy early in June 1944, in the course
of place, raised among the
which large-scale airborne operations took
Germans the question as to how far the Hitler Order would be
applied in Normandy, and in France behind the German lines. I
direct the Court's attention to Document 531-PS, which will be
Exhibit USA-550. The memorandum is dated 23 June 1944 and is
signed by Warlimont. Warlimont's memorandum starts by quoting

451
7 Jan. 46

a teletype received from the Supreme Command in the West, in-

quiring what should be done about applying the Hitler Order to
airborne troops and commandos.
I would like to read a small part of the teletype, beginning at
the beginning:
"Supreme Command West; teletype message Number 1750/44;
top secret; 23 June 1944.
"The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been
carried out according to the order referred to."
If I may interpolate here, the order referred to is shown in the
cross-reference to the Führer Order of 18 October 1942.
"With the large-scale landing achieved, a new situation has
arisen. The order referred to directs, in Paragraph 5, that
enemy soldiers who are taken prisoner in open combat or
surrender within the limits of normal combat operations (such
as large-scale landing operations and undertakings) are not to
be treated according to Paragraphs 3 and 4. It must be
established in a form easily understood by the troops how far
the concept 'within the limits of normal combat operations,
et cetera' is to be extended."

Then I pass down to Subparagraph D and read the first sentence of

that subparagraph.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you ought to read the latter part

of "C."

COL. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I think it is all summarized in the

one sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: The last sentence is the one that I mean.
COL. TAYLOR: "Considerable reprisals against our own pris-
oners must be expected if its contents become known."
Then, continuing with "D":
"The application of Number 5 for all enemy soldiers in uni-
form penetrating from the outside into the occupied western
territories is held by the Supreme Command West to be the
most correct and clearest solution."
Accordingly, as it is there shown, the Supreme Command in the
West directed that Paragraph 5, which is the paragraph under which
the orders for execution are not to be applied, should be utilized in
the West.
At the foot of the page is the position taken by the Armed Forces
Operational Staff, the recommendation they were making:
"1. The Commando Order remains basically in effect, even
after the enemy landing in the West.

452
 7 Jan. 46

"2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect that

the order is not valid for those enemy soldiers in uniform

who are captured in open combat in the immediate combat
area of the beachhead by our troops committed there, or who
surrender. Our troops committed in the immediate combat
area means the divisions fighting on the front line as well as
reserves up to and including corps headquarters.
"3.Furthermore, in doubtful cases, enemy personnel who
have fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the
SD, upon whom it is incumbent to determine whether the
Commando Order is to be applied or not.
"4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units com-
mitted in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner
with the order concerning the treatment of members of com-
mando undertakings of 18 October 1942, along with the above
explanation."
The final document on this episode, or inquiry, is 551-PS, which
becomes Exhibit USA-551, and this is the actual order of 25 June
1944, constituting OKW's reply to the inquiry from the Supreme
Command West, signed by Keitel, initialed by Warlimont and Jodl.
I will read beginning with:

"Subject: Treatment of commando participants.

"1. Even Anglo-Americans in France, the
after the landing of
order of the Führer on the annihilation of terror and sabotage
units of 18 October 1942 remains fully in force.
"Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of
the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in
the most forward lines, as well as of the reserves up to the
corps commands, according to Number 5 of the basic order of
18 October 1942, remain exempted.
"2. All membersof terror and sabotage units, found outside
the immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all
parachutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they
are to be turned over to the SD.
"3. All troops committed outside the combat area of Nor-
mandy are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy
terror and sabotage units briefly and succinctly, according to
the directives issued for it.
"4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily
how many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner.
This applies especially also to undertakings by the military
commanders. The number is to be published daily in the
Armed Forces communiqué to exercise a frightening effect, as

453
7 Jan. 46

had already been done toward previous commando undertak-

ings in the same manner."
Your Lordship, there is just one further development in connec-
tion with this order, this basic order, and that was -that in July 1944.
The question was then raised within the German High Command as
to whether the order should be applied to members of foreign mili-
tary missions with special regard to the British, American, and
Soviet military missions which were co-operating with Allied Forces
in Southeastern Europe, notably in Yugoslavia. A long document
signed by Warlimont, which is 1279-PS, and becomes Exhibit USA-
552, embodies the discussions which were had at OKW. I think I
need not read from this document, and merely wish to point out
that the Armed Forces operational staff recommended that the order
should be applied to these military missions and drew up a draft
to this effect. I would, however, like to read 537-PS, which is Exhibit
USA-553. This is the order which actually resulted from these dis-
cussions. It is dated 30 July 1944. I will read that in full:
"Subject: Treatment of members of foreign 'Military Missions'
captured together with partisans.
"In the areas of the High Command Southeast and South-
west, members of foreign so-called 'Military Missions'
(Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the
course of the struggle against partisans shall not receive the
treatment as specified in the special orders regarding the
treatment of captured partisans. Therefore they are not to
be treated as prisoners of war but in conformity with the
Führer's order concerning the annihilation of terror and sabo-
tage troops of 18 October 1942.
"This order shall not be transmitted to units subordinate to
the corps commands and the equivalent staffs of the other
branches of the Armed Forces, and is to be destroyed after
being made known.
"The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Keitel." t
Pursuant to this order, approximately 15 members of an Allied
military mission to Slovakia were executed in January 1945, as is
shown by Document L-51, which is already in the record as Exhibit
USA-521, and which has been read in full by Lieutenant Harris.
I will not read it again.
This concludes the presentation of documents with respect to the
order of the 18th of October 1942 and its subsequent enforcement
and application. I can pass from here to another subject.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes now.

[A recess was taken.]

454
 7 Jan. 46

COL. TAYLOR: Your Lordship, the order I have just been dis-
cussing operated chiefly in the Western Theater of War. This was
natural, since Germany occupied almost the entire western coast
of Europe from 1940 until the last year of the war, and during that
period land fighting in Western Europe was largely limited to com-
mando operations.
I want to pass now to the Eastern Front, where there was large-
Poland and the Soviet Union, from 1941 on.
scale land fighting in
Here the German forces were fighting among a hostile population
and had to face extensive partisan activities behind their lines. I
propose to show here that the activities of the German Armed Forces
against partisans and against other elements of the population became
a vehicle for carrying out Nazi political and racial policies and a
vehicle for the massacre of Jews and numerous segments of the Slav
population which were regarded by the Nazis as undesirable. I will
show that it was the policy of the German Armed Forces to behave
with the utmost severity to the civilian population of the occupied
territories; and that its military operations, particularly against
partisans, were so conducted as to advance the Nazi policies to
which I have referred.
I will show that the Armed Forces supported, assisted, and acted
in cooperation with theSS groups to which reference has been made
in the presentation by Major Farr and Colonel Storey.
I do not plan to make a full or even partial showing of war
crimes on the Eastern Front. That will be done by the Soviet Dele-
gation. Nor do I plan to retrace the ground covered by Colonel
Storey and Major Farr during their presentation of the evidence
against the SS, SD, and Gestapo, except to the extent necessary to
clarify the relations between these organizations and the German
Armed Forces and to demonstrate their close collaboration in the
occupied territories of Eastern Europe.
The first document to which I will make reference is Document
C-50, which will be Exhibit USA-554; and it will show that these
policies of severity were determined upon and made official even
before the invasion of the Soviet Union took place. This document
consists of an order by Hitler dated 13 May 1941 and two covering
transmittal sheets of subsequent date. I ask the Tribunal to note
on Page 4 of the translation that the order is signed by Keitel, the
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, and also to
note the distribution, which appears at the foot of the second sheet,
showing the distribution to the principal staff sections. The order
itself begins on the third page, and that is where I propose to read.
The document is entitled, "Order concerning the exercise of martial
jurisdiction and procedure in the area 'Barbarossa' and special mili-
tary measures":

455
7 Jan. 46

"The application of martial law aims, in the first place, at

maintaining discipline.
"The fact that the operational areas in the East are so far-
flung, the battle strategy which this necessitates, and the
peculiar qualities of the enemy, confront the courts-martial
with problems which, being short-staffed, they cannot solve
while hostilities are in progress and until some degree of
pacification has been achieved in the conquered areas, unless
jurisdiction is confined, in the first instance, to its main task.
"This is possible only if the troops themselves take ruthless
action against any threat from the enemy population.
"For these reasons I herewith issue the following order effec-
tive for the area 'Barbarossa' (area of operations, Army rear
area, and area of political administration):
"I. Treatment of offenses committed by enemy civilians.
"1. Until further notice the military courts and the courts-
martial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy
civilians.
"2. Guerillas should be disposed of ruthlessly by the military,
whether they are fighting or in flight.

"3. Likewise all by enemy civilians on the

other attacks
Armed Forces, members, and employees, are to be sup-
its
pressed at once by the military, using the most extreme
methods, until the assailants are destroyed.
"4. Where such measures have been neglected
or were not at
first persons suspected of criminal action will be
possible,
brought at once before an officer. This officer will decide
whether they are to be shot.
"On the orders of an officer with the powers of at least a bat-
talion commander, collective drastic measures will be taken
without delay against localities from which cunning or mali-
cious attacks are made on the Armed Forces, if circumstances
do not permit of a quick identification of individual offenders.
"5. It is expressly forbidden to keep suspects in custody in
order to hand them over to the courts after the reinstatement
of civil courts.
"6. The commanders of the army groups may, by agreement
with the competent naval and air force commanders, reintro-
duce military jurisdiction for civilians in areas which are
sufficiently pacified.
"For the area of the political administration this order will
be given by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces.

456
 7 Jan. 46

"II. Treatment of offenses committed against inhabitants by-

members of the Armed Forces and its employees.
"1. With regard to offenses committed against enemy civilians
by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees prosecution
is not obligatory, even where the deed is at the same time a
military crime or offense.
"2. When judging such offenses, it must be borne in mind,
whatever the circumstances, that the collapse of Germany in
1918, the subsequent sufferings of the German people, and the
fight against National Socialism which cost the blood of
innumerable supporters of the movement, were caused pri-
marily by Bolshevistic influence and that no German has for-
gotten this fact.
"3. Therefore, the judicial authority will decide in such cases
whether a disciplinary penalty is indicated, or whether legal
proceedings are necessary. In the case of offenses against
inhabitants it will order a court-martial only if maintenance
of discipline or security of the forces call for such a measure.
This applies, for instance, to serious offenses originating in
lack of self-control in sexual matters or in a criminal dispo-
sition and to those which indicate that the troops are threaten-
ing to get out of hand. Offenses which have resulted in sense-
less destruction of billets or stores or other captured mate-
rial, to the disadvantage of our forces, should as a rule be
judged no less severely.

"The order to institute proceedings requires in every single

case the signature of the judicial authority.
"4. Extreme caution is indicated in assessing the credibility
of statements made by enemy civilians.
"III. Responsibility of military commanders of the troops.
Within their sphere of competence military commanders are
personally responsible for seeing that:
"1. Every commissioned officer of the units under their com-
mand is instructed promptly and in the most emphatic manner
on principles set out under I, above.
"2. Their legal advisers are notified promptly of these instruc-
tions and of verbal information in which the political inten-
tions of the High Command were explained to the com-
manders-in-chief.
"3. Only those court sentences are confirmed which are in
accordance with the political intentions of the High Com-
mand.
"IV. Security. Once the camouflage is lifted, this decree will
be treated as 'most "
secret.'

457
7 Jan. 46

Your Lordship, the next document will be C-148, Exhibit USA-

555. Less than 3 months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the
instructions which I have just read were amplified and made even
more drastic. Document C-148 is an order dated 16 September 1941,
signed by Keitel, widely distributed, as is shown on the second
sheet where the distribution is listed. This order is of general appli-
cation in all theaters of war, but from its contents it is clearly of
primary importance for the Eastern Front. I read, beginning at the
start of the order:

"Subject: Communist insurrection in occupied territories.

"1. Since the beginning of the campaign against Soviet Russia,
Communist insurrection movements have broken out every-
where in the area occupied by Germany. The type of action
taken is growing from propaganda measures and attacks on
individual members of the Armed Forces into open rebellion
and widespread guerilla warfare.
"It can be seen that this is a mass movement centrally directed
by Moscow, which is also responsible for the apparently trivial
isolated incidents in areas which up to now have been other-
wise quiet.
"In view of the many political and economic crises in the
occupied areas, it must, moreover, be anticipated that nation-
alist and other circles will make full use of this opportunity
of making difficulties for the German occupying forces by
associating themselves with the Communist insurrection.
"This creates an increasing danger to the German war effort,
which shows itself chiefly in general insecurity for the occu-
pying troops, and has already led to the withdrawal of forces
to themain centers of disturbance.
"2.The measures taken up to now to deal with this general
Communist insurrection movement have proved inadequate.
The Führer has now given orders that we take action every-
where with the most drastic means, in order to crush the
movement in the shortest possible time. Only this course,
which has always been followed successfully throughout the
history of the extension of influence of great peoples, can
restore order.
"3. Action taken in this matter should be in accordance with
the following general directions:
"a. Itshould be inferred in every case of resistance to the
German occupying forces, no matter what the individual cir-
cumstances, that it is of Communist origin,
"b. In order to nip these machinations in the bud the most
drastic measures should be taken immediately and on the

458
 7 Jan. 46

first indication, so that the authority of the occupying -forces

may be maintained and further spreading prevented. In this
connection it should be remembered that a human life in the
countries concerned frequently counts for nothing, and a
deterrent effect can be attained only by unusual severity. The
death penalty for 50-100 Communists should generally be
regarded in these cases as suitable atonement for one German
soldier's death. The way in which sentence is carried out
should still further increase the deterrent effect.
"The reverse course of action, that of imposing relatively
lenient penalties and of being content, for purposes of deter-
rence, with the threat of more severe measures does not accord
with these principles and shall not be followed."
Unless the Court desires the next paragraph read, I will pass to
Page 2, at the very end of the document, Paragraph Number 4:

"The commanding officers in the occupied territories shall

see to that these principles are made known without delay
it

to all military establishments concerned in dealing with Com-

—
munist measures of insurrection" Signed "Keitel." —
Your Lordship, the next document will have the Exhibit Number
USA-556, and it has been given the number D-411. It also has the
designation UK-81. It is the last document in Document Book 2.
This is a set of documents which includes a directive, dated 10 Oc-
tober 1941, by Field Marshal Von Reichenau, who was the Com-
mander-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the German 6th Army then
operating on the Eastern Front. Reichenau, who died in 1942, was
therefore a member of the group as defined in the Indictment; and
here is what he had to say. I begin reading at Page 5 of the
translation:
"Subject: Conduct of troops in Eastern Territories.
"Regarding the conduct of troops towards the Bolshevistic
system, vague ideas are still prevalent in many cases. The
most essential aim of war against the Jewish-Bolshevistic
system is a complete destruction of their means of power and
the elimination of Asiatic influence from the European cul-
ture. In this connection the troops are facing tasks which
exceed the one-sided routine of soldiering. The soldier in the
Eastern Territories is not merely a fighter according to the
rules of the art of war, but also a bearer of ruthless national
ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been in-
flicted upon German and racially related nations.
"Therefore, the soldier must have full understanding for the
necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry.

459
7 Jan. 46

The Atfmy has to aim at another purpose, that is the anni-

hilation of revolts in the hinterland, which as experience
proves, have always been caused by Jews.
"The combatting of the enemy behind the front line is still
not being taken seriously enough. Treacherous, cruel parti-
sans and unnatural women are still being made prisoners of
war; and guerilla fighters dressed partly in uniforms or plain
clothes and vagabonds are' still being treated as proper sol-
diers and sent to prisoner-of-war camps. In fact, captured
Russian officers talk even mockingly about Soviet agents
moving openly about the roads and very often eating at Ger-
man field kitchens. Such an attitude of the troops can only
be explained by complete thoughtlessness, so it is now high
time for the commanders to clarify the meaning of the pres-
ent struggle.
"The feeding of the natives and of prisoners of war who are
not working for the Armed Forces from army kitchens is an
equally misunderstood humanitarian act, as is the giving of
cigarettes and bread. Things which the people at home can
spare under great sacrifices and things which are being
brought by the command to the front under great difficulties
should not be given to the enemy by the soldier, not even if
they originate from booty. It is an important part of our
supply.
"When retreating the Soviets have often set buildings on fire.
The troops should be interested in extinguishing fires only as
far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets.
Otherwise, the disappearance of symbols of the former Bol-
shevistic rule, even in the form of buildings, is part of the
struggle of destruction. Neither historic nor artistic con-
siderations are of any importance in the Eastern Territories.
"The command issues the necessary directives for the securing
of raw materials and plants essential for war economy. The
complete disarming of the population in the rear of the
civil
fighting troops is imperative, considering the long and vul-
nerable lines of communication. Where possible, captured
weapons and ammunition should be stored and guarded. Should
this be impossible because of the situation, the weapons and
ammunition will be rendered useless. If isolated partisans are
found using firearms in the rear of the Army, drastic meas-
ures are to be taken. These measures will be extended to
that part of the male population who were in a position to
hinder or report the attacks. The indifference of numerous
allegedly anti-Soviet elements, which originates from a 'wait-
and-see' attitude, must give way to a clear decision for active

460
 7 Jan. 46

collaboration. If not, no one can complain about being judged

and treated as a member of the Soviet system.
"The fear of the German counter measures must be stronger
than the threats of the wandering Bolshevistic remnants.
Being far from all political considerations of the future, the
two tasks:
soldier has to fulfill
"1. Complete annihilation of the false Bolshevistic doctrine of
the Soviet State and its armed forces.
"2. The pitiless extermination of alien treachery and cruelty
and thus the protection of the lives of German military per-
sonnel in Russia.
"This is the only way to fulfill our historic task to liberate
the German people once and forever from the Asiatic-Jewish
danger. Signed: Von Reichenau, Oberbefehlshaber."
The Tribunal will note the sheet immediately preceding Rei-
chenau^ order. That is Sheet Number 4 of the translation, which is
a memorandum dated 28 October 1941. It shows that Reichenau's
order met with Hitler's approval and was thereafter circulated by
order of the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army.
The Tribunal will also note from the first sheet, the very top
sheet in the several ensuing, that Reichenau's order was thereafter
circulated down to divisional level, and was received by the 12th
German Infantry Division on 27 November 1941.
These being the directives and policies prescribed by the German
military leaders, it is no wonder that the Wehrmacht joined in the
monstrous behavior and activities of the SS and SD on the Eastern
Front.
Colonel Storey described to the Tribunal the formation of units
known as Einsatzgruppen by the Sipo and SD, which were sent out
to operate in and behind the operational areas on the Eastern Front,
in order to combat partisans and to cleanse and pacify the civilian
population. Major Farr and Colonel Storey both* presented to the
Tribunal a large amount of evidence showing the manner in which
these units operated.
I want to refer back briefly to a few of these documents in order
to trace the participation of the Armed Forces in those circumstances.
Colonel Storey read at length from 3012-PS, which is Exhibit
USA-190, dated 19 March 1943. It is a directive from the command-
ing officer of one of these groups. This directive praised and
justified such activities as the shooting of Hungarian Jews, shooting
of children, and the total burning of villages and directed that in
order not to obstruct the procuring of slave labor for the German
armament industry, "as a rule no more children will be shot."
Major Farr read from R-102, which is Exhibit USA-470, a report
covering the work of the Einsatzgruppen in the German occupied

461
7 Jan. 4G

territories of the Soviet Union during the month of October 1941.

This report states cynically on Page 7:
"Spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by
pogroms on the part of the population against the remaining
Jews have not been recorded on account of the lack of ade-
quate instructions."
shows as clearly as the human eye can see that pacification
It
and anti-partisan activities became mere code words for the exter-
mination of Jews just as much as Weserübung was the code word
for the invasion of Norway and Denmark.

We
have seen from the documents quoted a few moments ago
that theGerman Army received some similar policies and directives.
It only remains to show that in the field the Army and the SS
worked hand in glove.
The Tribunal will recall the document quoted by Major Walsh,
1061 -PS, already in evidence as Exhibit USA-275. It describes the
destruction of the Warsaw ghetto; and at this time I merely want
to call attention to one paragraph appearing at Page 6 of the trans-
lation, the third paragraph from the bottom of the page, where the
author of the document stresses the close cooperation between the
SS and the Army. I read that one paragraph and quote:
"The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the
Waffen-SS, Police, and Wehrmacht became; they fulfilled their
duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together
as models and examples of soldiers. Their combat duty often
lasted from early morning until late at night. At night search
patrols with rags wound round their feet remained at the
heels of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently
they caught and killed Jews who used the night hours for
supplementing their stores from abandoned dug-outs and for
contacting neighboring groups or exchanging news with them."
To the same general effect is R-135, Exhibit USA-289, which is
a report dated 5 June 1943 by the German General Commissioner
for Minsk. Major Fair read from this report, describing an anti-
partisan operation in which 4,500 enemies were killed: 5,000
suspected partisans and 59 Germans. The cooperation by the German
Army is shown in the following excerpt, and I will begin reading
at the bottom of Page 3 of the translation:

"The figures mentioned above indicate that again a heavy

destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492
rifles are taken from 4,500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows
that among these enemy dead were numerous peasants from
the country. The battalion Dirlewanger especially has a repu-
tation for destroying many human lives. Among the 5,000

462
 7 Jan. 46

people suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous

women and children.
"By order of the chief of anti-partisan units, SS Obergruppen-
führer Von dem Bach, units of the Wehrmannschaften have
also participated in the operation. SA Standartenführer Kunze
was in command of the Wehrmannschaften, among whom
there were also 90 members from my office and from the
District Commissariat of Minsk. Our men returned from the
operation yesterday without losses."
I need not read the rest of that. The next paragraph shows again
the participation of the Armed Forces personnel.
The SS Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach, referred to in this
quotation, will be a witness later in the day, and in this connection
I want to call the Court's attention to 1919-PS, Exhibit USA-170,

which is Himmler's speech on October 4, 1943 to a gathering of SS

generals at Posen. In this speech Himmler mentioned the appointment
of Von dem Bach be chief of all anti-partisan units, and I would
to
like to read one paragraph from Page 3 of the document merely for
purpose of identification of the witness:
"Chief of the anti-partisan combat units:
"In the meantime I have also set up the department of the
Chief of the anti-partisan combat units. Our comrade SS
Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan
combat units. I considered it necessary for the Reichsführer
SS to be in authoritative command in all these battles, for I
am convinced that we are best in a position to take action in
which is decidedly a political one. Except where
this struggle,
the units which had been supplied and which we had formed
for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the
front, we have been very successful."
There is one further document which has already been introduced
from which I wish to read new material. That is L-180, which is
already in evidence as Exhibit USA-276. It is the report of Einsatz-
gruppe A, covering the period up to 15 October 1941. I think the
excerpts which I will read will make clear beyond doubt the partici-
pation of the German military leaders and Armed Forces in the
activities of these Einsatzgruppen. I read first from Page 2 of the
translation, the top of the page:
"Einsatz Group A, after preparing their vehicles for action,
proceeded to their area of concentration as ordered on 23 June
1941, the second day of the campaign in the East. Army Group
North, consisting of the 16th and 18th Armies and Panzer
Group 4, had started the advance the day before. Our task
was to establish hurriedly personal contact with the com-
manders of the armies and with the commander of the army

463
7 Jan. 46

rear area. It must be stressed from the beginning that co-

operation with the Armed Forces was generally good; in some
cases, for instance with Panzer Group 4 under Colonel General
Höppner, it was very close and almost cordial. Misunderstand-
ings which cropped up with some authorities in the first
days were cleared up mainly through personal discussions,"
This ends that particular extract. I read next a series of extracts,
of which the first is at the bottom of Page 2:
"Similarly, native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start
pogroms against Jews during the first hours after the entry,
though this inducement proved to be very difficult. Following
out orders the Security Police was determined to solve the
Jewish question with all possible means and most decisively.
But it was desirable that the Security Police should not put
in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since
the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even
German circles. It had to be shown to the world that the
native population itself took the first action by way of natural
reaction against the suppression by Jews during several
decades and against the terror exercised by the Communists
during the preceding period."
Next
I pass to Page 4 of the translation, about half way down
the page, the middle of the first complete paragraph:
"After the failure of purely military activities, such as the
placing of sentries and combing through the newly occupied
territories with whole divisions, even the Armed Forces had
to look out for new methods. The Einsatz group undertook
the search for new methods as an essential task. Soon, there-
fore, the Armed Forces adopted the experiences of the
Security Police and their methods of combatting the partisans.
For details I refer to the numerous reports concerning the
struggle against the partisans."
I pass next to Page 6 under "Instigation of self-cleansing actions":
"Considering that the population of the Baltic countries had
suffered very heavily under the government of bolshevism
and Jewry while they were incorporated in the U.S.S.R., it was
to be expected that after the liberation from that foreign
government, they (that is, the population themselves) would
render harmless most of the enemies left behind after the
retreat of the Red Army. It had to be the duty of the Security
Police to set in motion these self-cleansing movements and to
direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish
the purpose of the cleansing operations as quickly as possible.
It was no less important, in view of the future, to establish
the unshakeable and provable fact that the liberated population

464
 .

7 Jan. 46

themselves took the most severe measures against the bolshe-

vist and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direc-
tion by German authorities could not be found out.
"In Lithuania this was achieved for the first time by partisan
activities inKovno. To our surprise it was not easy, at first,
to set in motion an extensive pogrom against the Jews.
Klimatis, the leader of the partisan unit mentioned above,
who was used for this purpose primarily, succeeded in starting
a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small
advanced detachment acting in Kovno and in such a way that
no German order or German instigation was noticed from
the outside. During the first pogrom in the night from 25 to
26 June, the Lithuanian partisans did away with more than
1,500 Jews, setting fire to several synagogues or destroying
them by other means and burning down a Jewish dwelling
district consisting of about 60 houses. During the following
nights 2,300 Jews were eliminated in a similar way. In other
parts of Lithuania similar actions followed the example of
Kovno, though smaller and extending to the Communists who
had been left behind.
"These self-cleansing actions went smoothly because the Army
authorities, who had been informed, showed understanding
for this procedure. From the beginning it was obvious that
only the first days after the occupation would offer the oppor-
tunity for carrying out pogroms. After the disarmament of
the partisans the self-cleansing actions ceased necessarily."
I pass to Page 10 of the translation, toward the bottom un «er
"Other jobs of the Security Police":
"Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the lunatic asylums
necessitated operations of the Security Police."
Passing to the next paragraph:
"In some cases authorities of the Armed Forces asked us to
clean out, in a similar way, other institutions which were
wanted as billets. However, as interests of the Security Police
did not require any intervention, it was left to the authorities
of the Armed Forces to take the necessary action with their
own forces."
I pass on to Page 17 of the translation, the paragraph at the top
of the page: "But it was decided ..."

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, did you read Paragraph 5 (1)

on Page 10?
COL. TAYLOR: 5 (1) on Page 10? I read the first passage, Your
Honor. If you would like it in full . .

THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps you might go to the end of it.

465
7 Jan. 46

COL. TAYLOR: "Occasionally the conditions prevailing in the

lunatic asylums necessitated operations of the Security Police.
Many institutions had been robbed by the retreating Russians
of their whole food supply. Often the guard and nursing per-
sonnel had fled. The inmates of several institutions broke out
and became a danger to the general security; therefore, in
Aglona (Lithuania) 544 lunatics, in Mariampol (Lithuania) 109
lunatics, and in Mogutowo, near Luga, 95 lunatics were
liquidated."
Passing back to Page 17, the first paragraph on that page:
"When it was decided extend the German operations to
to
Leningrad and also to extend the activities of Einsatz Group
A to this town, I gave orders on 18 July 1941, to parts of Ein-
satzkommandos 2 and 3 and to the staff of the group to
advance to Novosselje, in order to prepare these activities and
to be able to advance as early as possible into the area around
Leningrad and into the city itself. The advance of the forces
of Einsatz Group A, which were intended to be used for
Leningrad, was effected in agreement with and on the express
wish of Panzer Group 4."
The final quotation from this document is Page 18, last paragraph:
"Einsatzkommandos of Einsatz Group A of the Security Police
participated from the beginning in the fight against the
nuisance created by partisans. Close collaboration with the
Armed Forces and the exchange of experiences which were
collected in the fight against partisans, brought about a thor-
ough knowledge of the origin, organization, strength, equip-
ment and system used by the Red partisans as time went on."
Now, in the light of these documents, I would like to turn to
some of the remaining affidavits which are before the Tribunal in
Document Book I. These affidavits have been furnished by respon-
sible officials in both the Wehrmacht and the SS and fill in much of
the background for the documents.
Affidavit Number 12 is an affidavit by Schellenberg, which in
view of the fact that its contents have been covered in Schellenberg's
and Ohlendorfs testimony, I do not propose to read. It covers much
of the same ground, and I see no reason to take the time of the
Tribunal by reading it. I should like to have it considered, subject
to the usual rule that Schellenberg can be questioned on any of
these matters by the Defense. The affidavit itself is available in
French and Russian as well as in English and in German for the
Defense, so I will pass over that one.
I turn to Affidavit Number 13, which will be Exhibit USA-558,
Document Number 3711-PS. Schellenberg's affidavit will be Exhibit
USA-557, Document Number 3710-PS; Number 13 is 558. This is an

466
 7 Jan. 46

affidavit by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the German Army,

who worked in the War
History Section of the OKW
from 1941 to
1945. It sheds considerable light on the relations between the Wehr-
macht and the SS at the top with respect to anti-partisan warfare.
I will read the affidavit:

"I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section of

the OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.
"Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I
remember the following from my knowledge documents
of the
of the Operations Staff of the OKW from my con-
as well as
versations in the Führer's headquarters with Major General
Walter Scherff, the Führer's appointee for the compilation of
the history of the war.
"Counter-partisan warfare was originally a responsibility of
Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces to
handle this matter.
"In the years 1942 and 1943, however, counter-partisan war-
fare developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of
the OKW had to give it special attention. In the Army
Operations Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW, a
specific officer was assigned the development of counter-
partisan warfare as his special task. It proved necessary to
conduct extensive operations against the partisans with Wehr-
macht troops in Russian, as well as Yugoslavian territory.
Partisan operations for a long while threatened to cut off the
lines of communication and transport routes that were nec-
essary to support the German Wehrmacht. For instance, a
monthly report concerning the attacks on the railroad lines
in occupied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone
from 800 to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during that
period causing among other things the loss of from 200 to 300
locomotives.
"It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was con-
ducted with cruelty on both sides. It was well known that
reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities whose
inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of supporting
them. It is beyond question that these facts must have been
known to the leading officers in the Operations Staff of the
OKW and in the Army's General Staff. It was further well
known that Hitler believed that the only successful method
of conducting counter-partisan warfare was to employ cruel
punishments as deterrents.
"I remember that, at thetime of the Polish revolt in Warsaw,
SS Gruppenführer Fegelein reported to Colonel General

467
7 Jan. 46

Guderian and Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS

Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the German side."
Now, the foregoing documents and the testimony of Ohlendorf
and Schellenberg relate to the arrangements which were made
between the OKW, OKH, and Himmler's headquarters with respect
to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively that these arrange-
ments were made jointly and that the High Command of the Armed
Forces was not only fully aware of, but was an active participant
in, these plans.
Turning now to the field, I would like to read three statements
by General Hans Röttiger, which will be Affidavits Numbers 15 and
16: Exhibit USA-559, Document Number 3713-PS; and USA-560,
Document Number 3714-PS. General Röttiger attained the rank of
general of panzer troops, the equivalent of a lieutenant general in
the American Army, and was Chief of Staff of the German 4th
Army, and later of Army Group Center on the Eastern Front,
during the period of which he speaks.
The first statement is as follows:
"As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June
1943, to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I
often had occasion to concern myself officially with anti-
partisan warfare. For the execution of these operations the
troops received orders from the highest authority, as for
example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These
operations were carried out by troops of the army group and
of the army, as, for example, security battalions.
"At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were
issued through official channels, only a few prisoners were
taken. In accordance with orders Jews, political commissars,
and agents were delivered up to the SD.
"The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was
very high in comparison with our own losses. From the docu-
ments which have been shown to me I have now come to
realize that the order from the highest authorities for the
harshest conduct of the anti-partisan war can only have been
intended to make possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and
other undesirable elements by using for this purpose the
military struggle of the Army against the partisans."
The second statement:
"Supplementary to my first declaration of 8 December 1945,
I declare:
"As stated orally on 28 November 1945, my then commander
I
of the 4th Army instructed his troops many times not to wage
war against the partisans more severely than was required at
the time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed

468
 7 Jan. 46

to the annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring

about a surrender Apart from humanitarian reasons
failed.
we necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners, since very
many of them could very well be used as members of native
volunteer units against the partisans.
"Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans, there
was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the
population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing
them to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way
the women, too, were continually urged to get their men back
from the forests or to keep them by other means from joining
the partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the
spring of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared
of partisans. Only on its boundaries, and then only from time
to time, were partisans in evidence when they crossed into
the area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army
was obliged on this account, on the orders of Army Group
Center, to give up security forces to the neighboring army to
the south."
The third statement by Röttiger, Number 16:

"During my
period of service, from May 1942 to June 1943,
as Chief of Staff of the 4th Army of the Army Group Center,
SD units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the
purpose of counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It
was clear later on that these SD units were causing great
disturbances among the local civilian population, with the
result that my commanding officer therefore asked the com-
mander of the Army Group, Field Marshal Von Kluge, to
order the SD units to clear out of the front-line areas, which
took place immediately. The reason for this, first and fore-
most, was that the excesses of the SD units, by way of exe-
cution of Jews and other persons, assumed such proportions
as to threaten the security of the army in its combat areas
because of the infuriated civilian populace. Although in gen-
eral the special tasks of the SD units were well known and
appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest
military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as
possible because of the danger which existed for our troops,
as I have mentioned above."
I would like now to offer one final document, the last document,
1786-PS, which will be Exhibit USA-561. This is an extract from
the war diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operational
Staff, dated 14 March 1943. I propose to read the last two paragraphs,
which deal with the problem of shipping of suspected partisans to
concentration camps in Germany.

469
7 Jan. 46

The Tribunal will see, from the extracts which I will read, that
the Army was chiefly concerned with preserving a sufficient severity
of treatment for suspected partisans without at the same time
obstructing the procurement of labor from the occupied territories.
I will read the last two paragraphs:

''The Quartermaster General, together with the Economic

Staff East, has proposed that the deportees should be sent
either to prison camps or to reformatory labor camps in their
own area and that deportation to Germany should take place
only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious
cases.
"In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, this proposal
does not take sufficient account of the severity required and
leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the
'peaceful population' which has been called upon to work. He
recommends, therefore, transportation to concentration camps
in Germany which have already been introduced by the
Reichsführer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to
introduce for the Armed Forces in the case of an extension to
the province of the latter. The High Command of the Armed
Forces therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who
are not to be executed should be handed over to the compe-
tent Higher SS and Police Leader, and orders that the dif-
ference between 'punitive labor' and 'being set to labor in
Germany' be made clear to the population."
Finally, I would like to offer a group of four affidavits which
show that the anti-partisan activities on the Eastern Front were
under the command of and supported by the Wehrmacht, and that
the nature of these activities was fully known to the Wehrmacht.
The first of these is Affidavit Number 17, Exhibit USA-562, Docu-
ment Number 3715-PS by Ernst Rode, who was an SS Brigadeführer
and major general of the Police, and was a member of Himmler's
personal command staff from 1943 to 1945:
"I, Ernst Rode, was formerly Chief of the Command Staff of
the Reichsführer SS, having taken over this position in the
spring of 1943 as successor to former SS Obergruppenführer
Kurt Knoblauch. My last rank was Major General of Police
and of the Waffen-SS. My function was to furnish the forces
necessary for anti-partisan warfare to the Higher SS and
Police Leaders and to guarantee the support of Army Forces.
This took place through personal discussions with the leading
officers of the Operations Staff of the OKW
and OKH, namely
with General Warlimont, General Von Buttlar, Colonel Gen-
eral Guderian, Colonel General Zeitzler, General Heusinger,
later General Wenk, Colonel Graf Kielmannsegg and later,

470
 7 Jan. 46

Colonel Von Bonin. Since anti-partisan warfare also was

under the sole command of the respective army group com-
—
mander in operational areas for instance, in Army Group
—
Center under Field Marshal Kluge and later Busch and since
police troops for the most part could not be spared from the
Reich Commissariats, the direction of this warfare lay prac-
tically always entirely in the hands of the Army. In the same
way orders were issued not by Himmler but by the OKH.
SS and Police troops transferred to operational areas from the
Reichskommissariate to support the army groups were likewise
under the latter's command. Such transfers were frequent
and therefore resulted in harm to anti-partisan warfare in
the Reichskommissariate. According to a specific agreement
between Himmler and the OKW and OKH, the direction of
individual operations lay in the hands of the troop leader who
commanded the largest troop contingent. It was therefore
possible that an Army general could have SS and Police under
him; and, on the other hand, that army troops could be placed
under a general of the SS and Police. Anti-partisan warfare
in operational areas could never be ordered by Himmler. I
could merely request the OKH to order it, until 1944, mostly
through the intervention of Generalquartiermeister Wagner
or through State Secretary Ganzenmüller. The OKH then
issued corresponding orders to the army groups concerned for
compliance.
"The severity and cruelty with which the intrinsically diaboli-
cal partisan warfare was conducted by the Russians had
already resulted in Draconian laws being issued by Hitler for
its conduct. These orders, which were passed on to the troops
through the OKW and OKH, were equally applicable to army
troops as well as to those of the SS and Police. There was
absolutely no difference in the manner in which these two
components carried on this warfare. Army soldiers were
exactly as embittered against the enemy as were those of the
SS and Police.
"As a result of this embitterment orders were ruthlessly car-
ried out by both components, a thing which was also quite
in keeping with Hitler's desires or intentions. As proof of
this,the order of the OKW and OKH can be adduced which
directed that all captured partisans, for instance, such as Jews,
agents, and political commissars, should without delay be
handed over by the troops to the SD for special treatment.
This order also contained the provision that in anti-partisan
warfare no prisoners except the above-named be taken. That

471
7 Jan. 46

was carried on by army troops merci-

anti-partisan warfare
and to every extreme, I know as the result of discus-
lessly
sions with army troop leaders, for instance with General Her-
zog, Commander of the 38th Army Corps, and with his Chief
of Staff, Colonel Pamberg, in the General Staff, both of whom
support my opinion. Today it is clear to me that anti-partisan
warfare gradually became an excuse for the systematic anni-
hilation of Jewry and Slavism."
Your Lordship, I am told that I misread and said "Hitler" instead
of "Himmler".
I next wish to offer another and shorter statement by Rode,
which shows that the SD Einsatzgruppen were under Wehrmacht
command. This is Number 18, Exhibit USA-563; Document Num-
ber 3716-PS:
"As far as I know, the SD
Einsatz groups with the individual
army groups were completely subordinate to them, that is to
say tactically as well as in every other way. The commanders
were therefore thoroughly cognizant of the missions and
operational methods of these units. They approved of these
missions and operational methods because, apparently, they
never opposed them. The fact that prisoners, such as Jews,
agents, and commissars, who were handed over to the SD,
underwent the same cruel death as victims of so-called puri-
fications, is a proof that the executions had their approval.
This also corresponded with what the highest political and
military authorities wanted. Frequent mentions of these
methods were naturally made in my presence at the OKW
and OKH; and they were condemned by most SS and Police
they were condemned by most army officers.
officers, just as
On such occasions I always pointed out that it would have
been quite within the scope of the authority of the command-
ers of army groups to oppose such methods. I am of the firm
conviction that an energetic and unified protest by all field
marshals would have resulted in a change of these missions
and methods. If they should ever assert that they would then
have been succeeded by even more ruthless commanders, this,
in my opinion, would be a foolish and even cowardly dodge."

I would like next to read the final affidavit, Number 24, in Docu-
ment Book 1.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Taylor, unless you are going to con-

clude this particular part, I think we had better adjourn now.
COL. TAYLOR: I will conclude with two affidavits, Your Honor,
but it will take probably 10 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if that will conclude it, go on.

472
 7 Jan. 46

COL. TAYLOR: It will conclude it. Firstly, Affidavit Number 24,

which becomes Exhibit USA-565, Document Number 3718-PS. This
is by Colonel Bogislav von Bonin, who, at the beginning of the
Russian campaign, was a staff officer with the 17th Panzer Division:
"At the beginning of the Russian campaign, I was the first
General Staff officer of the 17th Panzer Division which had
the mission of driving across the Bug, north of Brest-Litovsk.
Shortly before the beginning of the attack my division
received, through channels from the OKW, a written order
of the Führer. This order directed that Russian commissars
be shot upon capture without judicial process immediately
and ruthlessly. This order extended to all units of the Eastern
Army. Although the order was supposed to be relayed to
companies, the commanding general of the 37th Panzer
— —
Corps General of Panzer Troops Lemelsen forbade its being
passed on to the troops because it appeared unacceptable to
him from military and moral points of view."
That brings us to the final affidavit, Number 20, Exhibit USA-
564, Document Number 3717-PS, which is by Adolf Heusinger, Gen-
eralleutnant in the German Army, and from 1940 to 1944 Chief of
the Operations Section at OKH. I read:
"1. From
the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940,
I was I-a of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from
autumn 1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.
"When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he
gave General Staff of the Army the func-
to the Chief of the
tion of advising him on all operational matters in the Russian
theater.
"This made the Chief of the General Staff of the Army respon-
sible for allmatters in the operational areas in the East, while
the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the opera-
—
tional areas, for instance all troops security units, SS units,
—
Police stationed in the Reich commissariats.
"All Police and SS units in the Reich commissariats were also
subordinate to the Reichsführer SS. When it was necessary
to transfer such units into operational areas this had to be
done by order of the Chief of the OKW. On the other hand,
corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were
ordered by the OKW
with the concurrence of the Chief of the
General Staff of the Army.
"The Higher SS and Police Leaders normally had command
of operations against partisans.If stronger army units were
committed together with the SS and Police units within
operational areas, a higher commander of the Army could be
designated commander of the operation.

473
7 Jan. 46

"During anti-partisan operations within operational areas all

forces committed for these operations were under the com-
mand of the commander of the respective army group.
"2. Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on
counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW—
Keitel
— to the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation
with Himmler. The OKH
was responsible merely for the
transmission of these orders to army groups, for instance,
such orders as those concerning the treatment to be accorded
to commissars and Communists, those concerning the manner
of prosecuting by courts-martial army personnel who had
committed offenses against the population, as well as those
establishing the basic principles governing reprisals against
the inhabitants.
"3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the
treatment of the local populace, as well as anti-partisan war-
fare in operational areas in pursuance of orders from the
OKW, was the responsibility of the Quartermaster General of
the OKH.
"4. It had always been my
personal opinion that the treatment
of the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan
warfare in operational areas presented the highest political
and military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying
out their plans, namely, the systematic extermination of Slav-
ism and Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I always
regarded these cruel methods as military insanity, because
they only helped to make combat against the enemy unneces-
sarily more difficult."
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until a quarter past 2.

[A recess was taken until 1415 hours.]

474
 7 Jan. 46

Afternoon Session

COL. TAYLOR: Will Your Lordship swear the witness?

THE PRESIDENT: What is his name?
COL. TAYLOR: Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski.
dem Bach-Zelewski, took the
[The witness, Von stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
ERICH VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI (Witness): Erich von dem
Bach-Zelewski.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you take this oath: "I swear by God—the
—
Almighty and Omniscient that I will speak the pure truth and —
will withhold and add nothing."
[The witness repeated the oath.]
COL. TAYLOR: May I remind the witness to speak very slowly,
and to keep his answers as short as possible? Can you hear me?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: Were you a member of the SS?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: What was the lastrank you held in the SS?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: SS Obergruppenführer and Gen-
eral of the Waffen-SS.
COL. TAYLOR: Did you serve in the 1914-18 war?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes. I was at the front from
1914 to 1918, was wounded twice, and received the Iron Cross, First
and Second Class.
COL. TAYLOR: Did you remain in the army after the end of the
last war?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, I stayed in the 100,000-man

army.
COL. TAYLOR: How long did you remain in the army?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Till 1924, when I took my dis-
charge.
COL. TAYLOR: Did your military activities then stop?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, I was battalion leader in the
Border Defense, and subsequently I took part in maneuvers with
the Wehrmacht until the campaign against Poland.
COL. TAYLOR: Did you join the Nazi Party?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: In what year?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: In the year 1930.

475
7 Jan. 46

COL. TAYLOR: What branch of the party did you join?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The Allgemeine-SS.
COL. TAYLOR: What were your activities in the SS prior to
the outbreak of the war?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I established the Allgemeine-SS
Border Defense in the districts of Schneidemühl and Frankfurt-an-
der-Oder, and from 1934 I was Oberabschnittsführer in East Prussia
and afterwards in Silesia.
COL. TAYLOR: Were you a member of the Reichstag during this
period?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, I was a member of the
Reichstag from 1932 right up to the end.
COL. TAYLOR: Did you take any active part during this war,
before the campaign against the Soviet Union?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, not before the campaign
against Russia.
COL. TAYLOR: What was your rank at the beginning of the war?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: At the beginning of the war I
was SS Gruppenführer and lieutenant general.
COL. TAYLOR: And when were you promoted?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I was promoted on 9 November
1941 to SS Obergruppenführer and general of the Waffen-SS.
COL. TAYLOR: What was your position after the beginning of
the campaign against the Soviet Union?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Would you please repeat the
question; it was not quite clear.
COL. TAYLOR: What was your position, your function, at the
beginning of the war against the Soviet Union?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: At the beginning of the cam-
paign against Russia I served as Higher SS and Police Leader in the
central sector of the Russian Front, in the rear zone of Army Group
Center.
COL. TAYLOR: Was there a similar SS official in the rear zone
of each army group?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, in each army group, North,
Center, and South, there
was a Higher SS and Police Leader.
COL. TAYLOR: Who was the commander of Army Group Center?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The commander of Army Group
Center was, in the beginning, General Field Marshal Von Bock, and
laterGeneral Field Marshal Kluge.
COL. TAYLOR: Who was the Armed Forces commander in the
rear zone of Army Group Center?

476
 7 Jan. 46

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: General of the Infantry Von

Schenkendorff.
COL. TAYLOR: Was he directly subordinate to the commander
of the army group?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: Who was your immediate superior in the SS?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Heinrich Himmler.
COL. TAYLOR: And who was your immediate superior in the
rear zone of the army?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: General Von Schenkendorff.
COL. TAYLOR: What was your principal task as Higher SS and
Police Leader in central Russia?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: My principal task was fighting
partisans.
COL. TAYLOR: Are you generally familiar with the operations
of the so-called Einsatzgruppen of the SD?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: Did these units play any important part in large-
scale anti-Russian operations?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.
COL. TAYLOR: What was the principal task of the Einsatz-
gruppen?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The principal task of the Ein-
satzgruppen of the Sicherheitspolizei was the annihilation of the
Jews, gypsies, and political commissars.
COL. TAYLOR: Then what forces were used for large-scale anti-
partisan operations?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: For anti-partisan activities for-
mations of the Waffen-SS, of the Ordnungspolizei, and above all, of
the Wehrmacht were used.
COL. TAYLOR: Please describe the nature of these regular army
units that were used for anti-partisan operations.
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: These units of the Wehrmacht
were composed, in the first place,of the security divisions in the
rear zone, just behind the battle front; then there were the so-called
Landesschützen battalions which were independent units under the
orders of the Wehrmacht commanders; and there were also Wehr-
macht formations used for the defense of certain installations such
as railways and landing grounds and other military objectives.
Moreover, as from 1943 or 1942, there were the so-called "alarm
units" composed of formations in the rear zone.

477
7 Jan. 46

COL. TAYLOR: Until what date did you remain Higher SS and
Police Leader for central Russia?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I was Higher SS and Police
Leader for central Russia until the end of 1942, with occasional
interruptions when I was at the front and with one interval of about
6 months when I had an illness. At the end of 1942 I was appointed
Combat Units.
Chief of Anti-Partisan
COL. TAYLOR: Was this position of Chief of Anti-Partisan
Combat Units created specially for you?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: To whom were you directly subordinate in this
new capacity?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Heinrich Himmler.
COL. TAYLOR: Were your functions in this new capacity
restricted to any particular part of the Eastern Front?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No. My sphere of activity com-

prised the entire Eastern zone.
COL. TAYLOR: What was the general nature of your duties as
Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: First of all, I had to establish an
intelligence center at Himmler's headquarters to which all reports
in connection with partisan activities were dispatched, where they
were evaluated, and then forwarded to the competent authorities.
COL. TAYLOR: In the course of your duties did you confer with
the commanders of army groups and armies on the Eastern Front?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: With the commanders of the
army groups, not of the armies, and with the district commanders
of the Wehrmacht.
COL. TAYLOR: Did you advise these commanders with respect
to the methods which should be employed to combat partisans?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: Will you name some of the commanders with
whom you personally conferred?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I am quoting from memory,
without giving a complete General of Cavalry Bremer, Wehr-
list:

macht commander in the East; General Field Marshal Küchler, com-

manding general of Army Group North; the commanding generals
of Army Group Center, Kluge and Busch; the Wehrmacht com-
mander in the Ukraine, General of the Luftwaffe Kitzinger; General
Field Marshal Freiherr von Weichs, commanding general in Serbia,
at Belgrade; and General Kügler, Wehrmacht commander in the
Trieste area.

478
 7 Jan. 46

COL. TAYLOR: What proportion of Wehrmacht troops was used

in anti-partisan operations ascompared to Police and SS troops?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Since the number of Police and
SS troops was very small, anti-partisan operations were undertaken
mainly by Wehrmacht formations.
COL. TAYLOR: Were the anti-partisan troops usually com-
manded by Wehrmacht officers or by SS officers?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: It varied, depending mostly on
the individual area; in the operational areas Wehrmacht officers
nearly always commanded, but an order existed to the effect that
the formation, be it Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS or Police, which supplied
the most troops for a particular operation, had command of it.
COL. TAYLOR: Did the highest military leaders issue instruc-
tions that anti-partisan operations were to be conducted with
severity?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: Did the highest military authorities issue any
detailed instructions as to the methods to be used in anti-partisan
operations?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.
COL. TAYLOR: What was the result, in the occupied territories,
of this lack of detailed directives from above?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: This lack of detailed directives
resulted in a wild state of anarchy in all anti-partisan operations.
COL. TAYLOR: In your opinion, were the measures taken in
anti-partisan operations far more severe than the circumstances
warranted, or were they not?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Since there were no definite
orders and the lower commanders were forced to act independently,
the operations varied according to the character of the officer in
command and the quality of the troops. I am of the opinion that the
operations often not only failed in their purpose but even overshot
their mark.
COL. TAYLOR: Did these measures result in the unnecessary
numbers of the civilian population?
killing of large
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
COL. TAYLOR: Did you report these excessive measures to the
commanders of the army groups and other Wehrmacht officers with
whom you worked?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: This state of affairs was gener-
ally known. There was no necessity to make a special report about
it, since every operation had immediately to be reported in all
detail, and was known to every responsible leader.

479
7 Jan. 46

COL. TAYLOR: Were any effective steps taken by the higher

military authorities orby the commanders of army groups to stop
these excesses?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I remember that General Von
Schenkendorff in particular made innumerable reports in this con-
nection and discussed them with me; both of us forwarded them
through our service channels.
COL. TAYLOR: Did these reports by General Von Schenkendorff
have any effect?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.
COL. TAYLOR: Why not?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Quartermaster General Wagner
certainly attempted to effect a changeby suggesting that more rigid
supervision be imposed on the troops, but he did not succeed in his
purpose.
COL. TAYLOR: Was an order ever issued by the highest author-
ities, that German soldiers who committed offenses against the
civilian population were not to be punished in the military courts?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, this order was issued.

COL. TAYLOR: Was this order an obstacle to correcting the

excesses of the troops?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, in my opinion this order
prevented the orderly conduct of operations, since one can train
troops only if one has adequate disciplinary powers and juris-
diction over them and is able to check excesses.

COL. TAYLOR: What decorations did you win during the war?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: war I received the clus-
In this
ters to the Iron Cross I and II, the German Cross in gold, and the
Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross.
COL. TAYLOR: Your Lordship, the witness is available for
examination by others.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Soviet Prosecutor wish to ask any
questions?
COL. POKROVSKY: With your permission, I wish to ask a series
of questions.
[Turning to the witness.] What forces of the Police and SS were
at your disposal in 1941 and 1942, when you were Chief of the
Police and SS in the rear zone of Army Group Center?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Directly under my command in
1941 were one police regiment of the Regular Police, and occasion-
ally, for about 2 or 3 months at a time, one SS cavalry brigade.

480
 7 Jan. 46

COL. POKROVSKY: Was the Einsatzgruppe B, headed by Nebe,

under your command?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you or did you not receive Nebe's
reports?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Not directly, but I managed to
see them.
COL. POKROVSKY: What do you know of the activities of Ein-
satzgruppe B?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Einsatzgruppe B was located in
Smolensk, and operated in precisely the same way as all the other
Einsatzgruppen. One heard everywhere in conversation that the
Jews were being rounded up and sent to ghettos.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you report to the commands of the
operational groups on the activities of Einsatzgruppe B?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I asked for information on the

activities of Einsatzgruppe B directly through Schenkendorff, from

the L C. of Army Group Center.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you know of the order issued by the
commander of the 6th Army, General Reichenau, regarding the par-
tisan movement?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Would you be good enough to
repeat the name; was it General Von Reichenau?
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes.
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, I know of that. I think
it was in 1941, —
but I am not certain it might have been in
—
1942 when General Von Reichenau sent to all the Wehrmacht com-
manders an order approving the actions taken against the Jews and
partisans.
COL. POKROVSKY: In 1943 or later were there, under your
command, units or companies specially selected to combat the par-
tisan movement?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: In 1943, as Chief of Anti-Par-
tisan Combat Units, I had no direct authority to issue orders, since
I was head of the central office, but I did lead some operations
wherever the authority of two commanders overlapped.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know anything about the existence
of a special brigade consisting of smugglers, poachers, and persons
released from prison?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: When all the troops really suit-
able for anti-partisan warfare had been withdrawn, an anti-par-
tisan battalion under the command of Dirlewanger was formed and

481
7 Jan. 46

attached to Army Group Center at the end of 1941 or the begin-

ning of 1942. This battalion was gradually strengthened by the
addition of reserve units until it reached the proportions, first, of
a regiment and, later, of a brigade. This "Dirlewanger Brigade"
consisted for the most part of previously convicted criminals; offi-
cially it consisted of so-called poachers, but it did include real crim-
inals convicted of burglary, murder, et cetera.

COL. POKROVSKY: How do you explain the fact that the Ger-
man Army Command so willingly strengthened and increased its
forces by adding criminals to them and then using these criminals
against the partisans?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I am of the opinion that this
step closely connected with a speech made by Heinrich Himm-
was
ler at Weselsburg at the beginning of 1941, prior to the campaign
against Russia, when he spoke of the purpose of the Russian cam-
paign, which was, he said, to decimate the Slav population by
30 million, and that it was in order to achieve this purpose that
troops of such inferior caliber were introduced.
COL. POKROVSKY:Is it correct then to say that the character
of the troops used by the commanders to fight the partisans had
been given careful consideration? Did they receive precise instruc-
tions how to treat the population and how to fight against the
partisans? I am now referring to the proposed and officially sanc-
tioned extermination of the population.
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, I think this purpose was a
decisive factor in the selection of certain commanders and for-
mations.
COL. POKROVSKY: By what means and by what measures
were Wehrmacht units brought in to fight the partisans? Were they
specially recruited or were they used from time to time according
to some set plan?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I think that on the whole there

was no So-called large-scale operations were ini-

definite set plan.
tiated, planned, and executed by headquarters. Anti-partisan fight-
ing, however, was mostly of a spontaneous nature, since every lower
commander was own area free of partisans and
obliged to keep his
own initiative.
thus had to act on his
COL. POKROVSKY: You said that in very many cases generals
and officers of the Wehrmacht personally headed the operations
against the partisans. Can you give us some concrete facts and the
names of some of the generals and officers?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I didn't fully understand the
meaning of the question. The names of commanders?

482
 7 Jan. 46

COL. POKROVSKY: You have told us that certain operations

-

during the struggle against the partisans were conducted by officers

and generals of the Wehrmacht, and I now ask you if you can name
some of the officers and generals?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, some of the generals I have
already mentioned. In addition I remember Major General Hart-
mann, in central Russia. One large-scale anti-partisan operation
was either led by him or at least directed by him from his head-
quarters. I also remember Colonel General Reinhardt in whose rear
zone there were important partisan groups, I might even say that
there was not a single general in the rear zone who did not partici-
pate in the struggle against the partisans. I cannot, of course,
remember all the names; but if I hear them mentioned, I can tell
you whether or not they participated.
COL. POKROVSKY: Could you tell us what undertaking was
commanded by General Ackmann?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, I cannot remember that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Were there any general orders relating to
prisoners of war, the civilian population, or the partisans?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Unfortunately there were no
general instructions which clearly stated how the partisans or the
population were to be treated. That was the complaint I made:
That no instruction was issued on the treatment of the partisans
and that we were not even told who was to be considered a partisan.
When anything happened and the German Wehrmacht was attacked,
there were never clear orders on what was to be done by way of
reprisals.
COL. POKROVSKY: Am I to understand that in the absence of
direct orders commanders were given a clear field and had the right
to declare any person they wished a partisan and treat him accord-
ingly?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The commanders certainly had
to and could act and decide independently. No precise control was
possible in individual cases, but the activities of all the troops used
were always clearly known to the High Command, because the indi-
vidual reports of the troops contained all details of the counter
measures taken against the partisans —that is, they had to contain
the number of partisans killed in combat, the number of partisans
shot, of partisan suspects shot, and the number of our own losses.
At the same time captured weapons had to be listed in detail, so
that each leader could therefore see clearly how an operation worked
out in practice.
COL. POKROVSKY: That means that each commander decided
for himself whether there was any reason to suspect a man and
to execute him?

483
7 Jan. 46

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know of any order prescribing the
seizure of hostages and the burning of villages as a reprisal for
abetting the partisans?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No. I do not think that written
orders to that effect were ever issued, and it is precisely this lack
of any orders which I considered a mistake. It should, for instance,
have been definitely stated how many people could be executed as
a reprisal for the killing of one, or of 10 German soldiers.
COL. POKROVSKY: Am I to understand that if certain com-
manders burned villages as a punitive measure against the local
population, they, the commanders, would be acting on their own
initiative?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes. These steps would be taken
by a commander on his own initiative. Nor could his superior offi-
cers do anything against it, since orders emanating from the highest
authorities definitely stated that if excesses were committed against
the civilian population in the partisan areas, no disciplinary or
juridical measures could be taken.
COL. POKROVSKY: And can we assume that the same applied
to the seizure of hostages?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Well, I think that the question

of hostages did not arise at all in the anti-partisan struggle. The
hostage system was more common in the West. At any rate the
term "hostage" was not used in anti-partisan warfare.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know anything about the forcible
abduction and deportation to Germany of minors between 14 and
18 years of age?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Naturally, I do not remember

details such as the age groups, but when I was appointed Chief of
Anti-Partisan Combat Units, I welcomed an order, issued at my
suggestion, forbidding indiscriminate reprisals of the troops and
decreeing that in future captured partisans and partisan suspects
would no longer be shot but would be brought to the Reich by the
Sauckel organization.
COL. POKROVSKY: If I understood you you replied
correctly,
to a question of my colleague, the American Prosecutor, by saying
that the struggle against the partisan movement was a pretext for
destroying the Slav and Jewish population?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was the Wehrmacht Command aware of
the methods adopted for fighting the partisan movement and for
destroying the Jewish population?

484
 7 Jan. 46

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The methods were known gen-

and hence to the military leaders as well. I do not, of course,
erally,
know whether they were aware of the plan mentioned by Himmler.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you personally take part in any con-
ferences with generals of the Wehrmacht during which the methods
of anti-partisan warfare were clearly and plainly discussed?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The methods as such were dis-

cussed in detail and knowledge of them was taken for granted, but
it was not mentioned at these discussions that such and such a

number of persons were to be shot. That would be a wrong con-

clusion.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have told us that the Germans
intended to destroy the Slav population in order to reduce the
number of Slavs to 30 million. Where did you get this figure and
this order?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I must correct that: Not to
reduce to 30 million, but by 30 million. Himmler mentioned this
figure in his speech at the Weselsburg.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you confirm the fact that actually all
the measures carried out by the German commanders and by the
Wehrmacht in the occupied Russian territories were directed to the
sole purpose of reducing the number of Slavs and Jews by
30 million?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The meaning of that is not quite
clear to me. Did the Wehrmacht know that the Slav population
was to be diminished by 30 million? Would you please repeat the
question, it wasn't quite clear?
COL. POKROVSKY: I asked: Can you actually and truthfully
confirm that the measures taken by the Wehrmacht Command in
the district administrative areas then occupied by the Germans were
directed to the purpose of diminishing the Slavs and Jews by
30 million? Do you now understand the question?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I believe that these methods
would definitely have resulted in the extermination of 30 million if
they had been continued, and if developments of that time had not
completely changed the situation.
COL. POKROVSKY: I have no further questions to put to the
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Defense have any questions?
DR. EXNER: Witness, you said you were chief of anti-partisan
operations, didn't you?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat
Units.

485
T Jan. 46

DR. EXNER: Well, if such chaotic conditions really existed, why

didn't you alter the system?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Because I was never given the
requisite authority.

DR. EXNER: I beg your pardon?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Because I was never given
authority. Icould not issue orders, I had no disciplinary powers,
and I was not an appointing authority for military courts.
DR. EXNER: Then did you make a report on the existing con-
ditions to your superior officers?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Every day. I had a permanent

staff at Himmler's headquarters.
DR. EXNER: Did you suggest any changes?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Persistently.

DR. EXNER: And why were these changes never realized?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I think I have already expressed
myself quite clearly on this point: because I think that these
changes were not desired.
DR. EXNER: You also, as you have informed us, reported to
your superior authorities on the number of enemy dead, wounded,
and prisoners after each operation. Tell me what, approximately,
was the proportion of enemy prisoners to the enemy dead?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The figures varied in each case.
I cannot generalize, but it was a fact that prisoners usually far
outnumbered the enemy dead.
DR. EXNER: The prisoners outnumbered the dead?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, but only in the years after
the order allowing prisoners to be taken.
DR. EXNER: The system was harsher at first, you say, and
milder later on?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, it was milder insofar as we
now had definite orders stating where the prisoners were to be
brought and to whom they were to be turned over. There were no
such orders in the beginning.
DR. EXNER: Can you name any orders which you received from
military authorities, dealing in any way with the annihilation of
millions of Slavs?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Ialready gave my answer to that
question to the prosecutor when I said that a written order to that
effect did not exist.

486
 7 Jan. 46

DR. EXNER: Do you know that the reports which you sent to
Himmler on the actions which you had carried out were submitted
by Himmler directly to the Führer?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: May I reply to that in some
detail? At had a permanent staff at Himmler's headquarters.
first I
My chief of staff was there permanently while I was at the front.
—
Between the Wehrmacht offices that is, OKW and OKH and my —
own staff there was constant and organized interchange of reports,
for reports on partisan activities did not always reach me first, since
from some operational areas the channel for reports was through
the OKH. Therefore the Wehrmacht sent me as many reports as
I sent to the Wehrmacht. These reports were collected in my staff,
and were daily sent to Himmler who forwarded them again.
DR. EXNER: To whom?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI The gentlemen of the Wehrmacht
:

have confirmed to me, here in prison, that these reports were

submitted during strategic conferences.
DR. EXNER: Can you tell me whether Jews participated in the
partisan groups?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: There is no question but that
in individual partisan groups Jews did participate, in numbers corre-
sponding to the size of the Jewish population.
DR. EXNER: In individual groups? Was it not more in the nature
of an exception?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, it was definitely an excep-
tion.

DR. EXNER: That is why I do not quite understand how actions

taken against the partisans were to lead to the extermination of the
Jews.
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I did not say that; I was speaking
earlier of the Einsatzgruppen of the Sicherheitspolizei.
DR. EXNER: Oh, I see, that is different. Do you know anything
about the Dirlewanger regiment?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: That was the Dirlewanger Bri-
gade, which I described in detail to the prosecutor a short time ago.
DR. EXNER: Yes. Was that brigade at any time under your
command?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, in 1941.
DR. EXNER: Was it a formation of the Army or the SS?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, it was not a formation of the
Waffen-SS; it was supplied by the Allgemeine SS, that is, by the
Berger office.

487
7 Jan. 46

DR. EXNER: Can you tell me who was present at Himmler's

speech at the Weselsburg?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: About 12 Gruppenführer were
present, Iname them if you like.
can
DR. EXNER: You mean Gruppenführer . . .

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Gruppenführer of the SS.

DR. EXNER: Were any officers of the Wehrmacht present?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.
DR. EXNER: Thank you very much.
DR. KRAUS: You were present in Königsberg on the 18th of
August 1935 when the former President of the Reichsbank, Schacht,
made a speech at the Eastern Fair (Ostmesse)?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
DR. KRAUS: What was your position at that time?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I was Oberabschnittsführer.
DR. KRAUS: Were you present at the speech in your official
capacity?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, as Oberabschnittsführer of
the SS.
DR. KRAUS: And you suddenly left the room in the middle of
the speech, as a protest?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, in the middle of the speech
I left the room.
DR. KRAUS: In protest?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
DR. KRAUS: Then you did not agree with the speech?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I did not leave on account of the
speech but as a protest.
DR. KRAUS: As a protest against the contents of the speech?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKJ: No.

DR. KRAUS: May I ask, then, why you protested?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: well known that in East
It is
Prussia I conducted a violent campaign against the then Gauleiter
Koch, which led to his suspension. Koch and I were bitterly opposed
and I could not therefore understand why Reich Minister Schacht,
who God knows did not belong to Koch's school of thought, should
take pains to pay compliments to this man, whom I knew to be
corrupt.
DR. KRAUS: Were you protesting, then, against the attitude of
Herr Schacht or that of Herr Koch?

488
 7 Jan. 46

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I think Herr Schacht must have

known that itwas a protest against Koch. In any case I had it

explained to him later, and we finally settled the matter amicably
through mediators.
DR. KRAUS: I see. Thank you.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you said that a change was made
regarding the treatment of partisans, and that it was ordered that
the partisans were to be placed into the labor service. Where did
this order originate?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I cannot give you detailed in-
formation about this, I only know that Herr Sauckel himself went
around in the East and made long speeches to the effect that it
would be best if these men who were captured in partisan warfare
were placed in the labor service through his organization.
DR. SERVATIUS: I asked where this order originated. Did it
originate with Himmler or, as you described it, with the Sauckel
organization?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No. The Sauckel organization
could, of course, never issue orders relating to partisan warfare.
I presume that the Sauckel organization suggested the order, but of
course it had to originate with Himmler or the OKW.

DR. SERVATIUS: What do you know of the Sauckel organi-

zation? Where did it exist?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I know only what was generally
known: namely, that this organization existed for the purpose of
bringing manpower into the Reich for work in the armament
industry.
DR. SERVATIUS: You spoke of an organization; but you don't
know anything about this organization, do you?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, I don't mean it in your sense,
a large independent organization; that is not what I mean. But it
was obvious that a man who was responsible for the whole of
manpower must have an organization at his disposal. I beg your
pardon, it was a mistake on my part.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then you do not know that Sauckel had no
executive power at all and that he was not provided with an
administrative machine of his own.
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, I don't know that.

THE PRESIDENT: want the attention of the defendants' counsel.

I
What I want to that unless counsel and the witnesses
say is this,
speak slowly and make adequate pauses between the questions and
the answers, it is impossible for the interpreters to interpret prop-
erly, and the only result is that the questions and answers do not

489
7 Jan. 48

come through to the Tribunal, nor do the defendants' counsel get

the benefit of the true meaning of the answers which have been
given in the examination-in-chief, and everything that you may
think you gain by rapidity of cross-examination, you lose by the
inadequacy of the translation. I will repeat, that you should pause
at the end of your sentences and at the end of your questions, so as
to give the interpreter's voice time to come through.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, you said that from 1942 onwards you
were Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units. As such, it was your
duty to fight the partisans in the East?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, that is correct, in the East.
DR. STAHMER: Now, you said that it was not quite clear what
was to be understood by the term "partisan"; the concept of "par-
tisan" was never during the entire period clearly denned. Is that
correct?
VON DEMBACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, the sense of that is correct.
In my opinion a distinction should be drawn between partisans and
partisan suspects. The troops did not always make this distinction.
A partisan was a man carefully selected and trained by the enemy.
He was also very well armed. I always insisted that this concept
was not vague, but concrete. If fire is opened from a wood, a house,
or a village, it is not correct to say that everyone in the wood,
house, or village is a partisan; for this reason: The tactics of the
partisans were to disappear rapidly after a successful action; they
relied on the element of surprise inherent in this method of warfare.
If the troops took their counter measures without being specially
trained and without exact knowledge of this concept of "partisan,"
then they would conclude from the fact that they had been fired on
from a village, that all the inhabitants were partisans. In my view,
a partisan can be considered as such only if he is encountered or
captured with a weapon in his hand. If he has no weapon, he cannot
be considered a partisan.
DR. STAHMER: Now, what did you do in a positive way to
clarify this concept of "partisan"?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: As I have already said, ever

since 1941, even before I was Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units,
not only but also General Von Schenkendorff, continually sent
I
numbers memoranda containing suggestions. Moreover, in the
of
Russian Army Group Center, for instance, we organized schools for
fighting partisans, where the troops were to be trained along these
lines. Schenkendorff and I, together, worked out a series of regu-
lations for fighting partisans, but they were never published.
Immediately after I was appointed Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat
Units, that is, in the beginning of 1943, my staff began to prepare

490
 . —
7 Jan. 46

a new series of regulations for fighting partisans. Many months

passed, however, before these regulations were finally published, in
1944, when they were already practically useless.

DR. STAHMER: Who issued these regulations?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: These regulations were published
by the Wehrmacht, in the form of an ordinary Wehrmacht directive.
DR. STAHMER: They were issued by the Wehrmacht?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: They came out in 1944.

DR.STAHMER: What were their contents?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: They were entitled, Regulations
for the Fighting of Partisans (Bandenkampf Vorschrift).
DR.STAHMER: What were their contents?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: They comprised the whole of
partisan warfare; thus they contained reconnaissance, operational
details, differences between small-scale, medium-scale, and large-
scale operations.

DR. STAHMER: Since these partisan combat regulations did not

appear beforé 1944, was it not your task, as you had all anti-partisan
forces in the whole East, to instruct your forces directly on their
conduct?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: In the first place, as I have said,
I had no authority Consequently, I could only make
to issue orders.
suggestions. Secondly, closely organized anti-partisan forces never
existed; it was an empty name which they were given. Any kind
and number of formations would be assigned for anti-partisan war-
fare whenever necessary. It is wrong to say that I had troops at my
disposal for the sole purpose of fighting the partisans. Moreover
—
and I should like to emphasize that the document appointing me
Chief of Anti-Partisan Combat Units stated as follows: Anti-partisan
operations will be commanded either by the Higher SS and Police
Officer, or the competent Wehrmacht commander in their respective
areas. According to that directive, my own task was only that of an
inspector, in spite of my continuous request for authority to issue
orders.

DR. STAHMER: I don't quite understand . .

THE PRESIDENT: You must go slowly and you must pause

between your sentences.
DR. STAHMER: As general of the Waffen-SS you must have had
power to issue orders?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I had authority only to issue
orders when I personally conducted an operation.

491
7 Jan. 46

DR. STAHMER: But you were appointed, as you said, to fight

the partisans and you must have had combat units for the purpose?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, I had no such units.
DR. STAHMER: Then how did you conduct your fight against
the partisans?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: In each case, I went to the
respective commander, discussed the operation with him and asked
for the necessary troops, unless they were put at my disposal, as it
often happened, by the OKW
or the OKH
directly.
DR. STAHMER: You asked for troops, unless they were put at
your disposal. But then these troops assigned to you were under
your command, were they not?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, only if I personally com-
manded the operation. Otherwise, as I said, either the competent
general of the Wehrmacht or, in the area of the civil government,
the higher SS and police Leader commanded the operation. It was
expressly noted in the directive containing my appointment as Chief
of the Anti-Partisan Combat Units, that I could request authority
to command an operation only if the authority of two higher SS and
police leaders or of two Wehrmacht commanders overlapped, thus
calling for a higher authority to handle the conflicting responsibilities.
DR. STAHMER: Did you never personally command an operation?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, I conducted one operation
in 1943.
DR. STAHMER: In what way?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: This undertaking took place in
the fall of 1943, in the region of Idrizza Polotsk. I first flew to the
Army Group Center and talked the matter over with the then chief,
General Krebs. Then I went on to Army Group North and discussed
the same matter with Field Marshal Küchler. Küchler organized all
the troops of the S S and Police and also the Wehrmacht formations
in the rear areas into a so-called corps under the command of
Jaeckel. The Army Group Center did the same with its own forces,
and also formed a corps under the command of the Higher SS and
Police Leader in the area. I myself, with my staff, was in command
of both, and Colonel Von Mellenthin of the OKH was assigned to
me as liaison officer. Then I conducted the enterprise personally. In
the meantime the front had been broken through in foggy weather,
and I made the independent decision of turning against the Red
Army forces which had broken through; thus my units became the
front line.
DR. STAHMER: You said a little while ago that you had been
decorated with the Knight's Cross. Did you receive this decoration
for this undertaking alone?

492
 7 Jan. 46

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, as I said before, I was

already at the front in the year 1941. Again and again I was with
the fighting units: In 1941 at Moscow, in 1942 at Velikie-Luki, and
later at Koebel, at Warsaw during the uprising in Warsaw; and
from 1944 onwards I commanded an SS corps.
DR. STAHMER: Did you not know that you were particularly
commended by Hitler and Himmler and decorated mainly for your
ruthless and efficient actions in the war against the partisans?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No. I received no decoration for

the waragainst the partisans. I received all my decorations,
beginning with the clusters to the Iron Cross II, at the front and
from the Wehrmacht. I will gladly give you names.
DR. STAHMER: The Brigade Dirlewanger was an SS brigade,
wasn't it?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: The Brigade Dirlewanger did not

belong to the Waffen-SS. It was an organization which could possibly
be classified as part of the Allgemeine-SS. It was not supplied and
kept up by the Waffen-SS, but by the Berger office.
DR. STAHMER: Was the commander of the Brigade Dirlewanger
a member of the SS?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: you
yourself suggest that
Didn't criminals
should be organized and used for fighting the partisans?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.
DR. THOMA: Witness, do you know that the civil government in
White Ruthenia often protested against the manner in which the
anti-partisan activities were carried on?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
DR. THOMA: The authority was subordinate to the Reich
civil
Commissioner, and he in turn was subordinate to Rosenberg as
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, is that correct?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
DR. THOMA: If I understood y ou correctly, you disapproved of
.

the manner in which the fighting against partisans was carried on,
involving many innocent people; and you disapproved also of the
existence of the Dirlewanger Regiment and of the speech of Reichs-
führer SS Himmler?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.
DR. THOMA: How could you then reconcile it with your con-
science to remain chief or inspector of anti-partisan units and also
head of such Einsatzgruppen?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I was never chief of Einsatz-
gruppen.

493
7 Jan. 46

THE PRESIDENT: The question had not come through then on

the interpreter's voice before you began to answer. You must give
greater pauses between the question and answer.
DR. THOMA: How did you reconcile it with your conscience to
remain inspector of the anti-partisan forces in the East?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Not only could I reconcile that
with my conscience, but I actually strove to obtain this position
because in the years 1941 and 1942 I saw, together with Schenken-
dorff, that things could not continue as they were. General
Schenkendorff, my immediate superior, recommended me for the
position.
DR. THOMA: But you knew that you could not achieve anything
with these suggestions?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, I couldn't know that. What
I realize and acknowledge today, I could not possibly have known
then.
DR. THOMA: At any rate, you achieved nothing?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I don't think that; my opinion is
rather that someone else had been in my position, the disaster
if

would have been greater.

DR. THOMA: Do you believe that Himmler' s speech, in which
he demanded the extermination of 30 million Slavs, expressed only
his personal opinion; or do you consider that it corresponded to the
National Socialist ideology?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Today I believe that it was the
logical consequence of our ideology.
DR. THOMA: Today?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Today.
DR. THOMA: What was own opinion at that time?
your
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: It is difficult for a German to
fight through to this conviction. It took me a long time.
DR. THOMA: Then how is it that a few days ago a witness,
namely, the Witness Ohlendorf, appeared here and admitted that
through the Einsatzgruppen he had killed 90,000 people, but told the
Tribunal that this did not harmonize with the National Socialist
ideology?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I am of a different opinion. If for
years, for decades, a doctrine is preached to the effect that the Slav
race is an inferior race, that the Jews are not even human beings,
then an explosion of this sort is inevitable.
DR. THOMA: Nevertheless the fact remains that, together with
whatever attitude towards life you had at that time, you also had
a conscience?

494
 7 Jan. 46

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: And today, too—for that reason

I am here.
[Dr. Exner approached the lectern.]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, are you cross-examining on behalf

of some other defendant, or what?
DR. EXNER: I should like to ask two or three questions which
my client put to me as important during the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: You have already cross-examined, have you
not?
DR. EXNER: Yes, but I now have three new questions. We were
not able to prepare ourselves for this cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on.

DR. EXNER: Witness, you said an order was issued in the year
1944 regarding anti-partisan warfare. During the recess, I found in
the document book of the Prosecution, under 1786-PS, mention of a
combat directive on partisan warfare, dated 27 November 1942. Do
you know of this?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.
DR. EXNER: But it must exist, since it is mentioned here.
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I don't know it.

DR. EXNER: Do you know of a Russian directive for partisan

warfare?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, that existed.
DR. EXNER: Could you give us information on the contents of
this directive?What were the combat methods prescribed?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I no longer remember it.

DR. EXNER: Do you know where this directive is available?

VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.
DR. EXNER: Thank you.
THE TRIBUNAL One moment. Do you know how
(Mr. Biddle):
many members of the Wehrmacht were used at any one time in this
anti-partisan activity? What was the largest number of the troops?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: Large-scale undertakings were
those carried out with one division or more. I believe the largest
number of troops for a single operation might have been three
divisions.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I mean all the troops on the

Eastern Front at any one time used in these anti-partisan activities?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: cannot answer that, because
I

these troops my direction. Operations

were never together under
were conducted simultaneously, large-, small-, and medium-scale

495
7 Jan. 46

operations were being carried out everywhere at the same time.

Reports of such operations came in every day.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know how many Einsatz-
gruppen were used?
VON DEM BACH-ZELEWSKI: I know of three, one for each
army group.
THE PRESIDENT: [To Colonel Taylor.] You don't want to re-
examine?
COL. TAYLOR: No, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may go.

[The witness left the stand.]
COL. TAYLOR: Your Lordship, that concludes the evidence
under Counts Three and Four of the Indictment and I have only a
few more words by way of general conclusion.
I ask the Tribunal to bear in mind that the German High
Command is not an evanescent thing, the creature of a decade of
unrest, or a school of thought or tradition which is shattered and
utterly discredited. The German High Command and military
tradition have in the past achieved victory and survived defeat.
They have met with triumph and disaster, and they have survived
through a singular durability.
An eminent American statesman and diplomat, Mr. Sumner
Welles, has written, and I quote from his book The Time for
Decision, Page 261:
.that the authority to which the German people have so
.

often and so disastrously responded was not in reality the

German Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of today, but the
German General Staff. Whether their ostensible ruler is the
Kaiser, or Hindenburg, or Adolf Hitler, the continuing loyalty
of the bulk of the population is given to that military force
controlled and guided by the German General Staff."
I think that this emphasizes the historical importance of the
decision which this Tribunal is called on to make. But we are not
now indicting the German General Staff at the bar of history, but
on specific charges of crimes against international law and the
dictates of the conscience of mankind, as embodied in the Charter
which governs this Court.
The picture we have seen is that of a group of men with great
power for good or evil, who chose the latter, who deliberately set
out to arm Germany to the point where the German will could be
imposed on the rest of the world, and who gladly joined forces with
the most evil forces at work in Germany. "Hitler produced the
results which all of us warmly desired," we are told by Blomberg
and Blaskowitz, and that is obviously the truth. The converse is no

496
 7 Jan. 46

furnished Hitler with the means and

less clear; the military leaders
the might which were necessary to his survival, to say nothing of
the accomplishment of those purposes which seemed to us so
ludicrously impossible in 1932 and so fearfully imminent in 1942.
I have said that the German militarists were inept as well as
persistent. Helpless as Hitler would have been without them, he
succeeded in mastering them. The generals and the Nazis were
allies in 1933. But it was not enough that the generals should be
his voluntary allies; Hitler wanted them permanently and completely
under his control. Devoid of political skill and principle, the generals
lacked the mentality or morality to resist. On the day of the death
of President Hindenburg, in August 1934, the German officers swore
a new oath. Their previous oath had been to the Fatherland; now
it was to a man — Adolf Hitler. Later the Nazi emblem became part
of their uniform, the Nazi flag their standard. By a clever process
of infiltration into key positions, Hitler seized control of the entire
military machine.
We will no doubt hear the generals ask what they could have
done about it. We will hear that they were helpless, and that to
protect their jobs and families and lives, they had to follow Hitler's
decisions. No doubt this became true, but the generals were a key
factor in Hitler's rise to complete power and a partner in his criminal
aggressive designs. It is always difficult and dangerous to withdraw
from a criminal conspiracy. Never has it been suggested that a con-
spirator may claim mercy on the ground that his fellow conspirators
threatened him with harm, should he withdraw from the plot.
In many respects the spectacle which the German General Staff
and High Command group presents today is the most degrading of
all the groups and organizations before this Court. They are the
bearers of a tradition not devoid of valor and honor; but they emerge
from this war stained both by criminality and ineptitude. Attracted
by the militaristic and aggressive Nazi policies, the German generals
found themselves drawn into adventures of a scope they had not
foreseen. From crimes in which almost all of them participated
willingly and approvingly were born others in which they partic-
ipated partly because they were too ineffective to alter the governing
Nazi policies and partly because they had to continue collaboration
to save their own skins.

Having joined the partnership, the General Staff and High Com-
mand group planned and carried through manifold acts of aggression
which turned Europe into a charnel house and caused the Armed
Forces to be used for foul practices, foully executed, of terror,
pillage, and wholesale slaughter. Let no one be heard to say that the
military uniform shall be a cloak, or that they may find sanctuary

497
7 Jan. 46

by pleading membership in the profession to which their actions

were a disgrace.
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal pleases, the next subject will be
the presentation of supplemental evidence concerning the persecution
of the churches as presented by Colonel Wheeler.

COLONEL LEONARD WHEELER, JR. (Assistant Trial Counsel

for the United States): Your Honors, the material now to be sub-
mitted comprises, first, supplemental proof on the suppression of the
churches within Germany: the Evangelical churches, the Catholic
Church, and the Bibelforscher (or Bible students); and second,
acts of suppression in the annexed and occupied territories, Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland. A large part of this proof will be from
the official files of the Vatican.
I now submit to the Court United States Trial Brief (supple-H
mental), on "Suppression of the Christian Churches in Germany and
in the Occupied Territories," and Document Book H
(supplemental),
containing English translations of all the documents referred to in
the supplemental brief, or to be referred to in my oral presentation.
I shall take up first the supplemental proof on the suppression of the
churches in Germany.
Hitler announced in March 1933 a distinction in his policy toward
politics and morals on the one hand and religion on the other. I
offer in evidenceDocument Number 3387-PS, Exhibit Number USA-
566. This is a speech by Hitler to the Reichstag on March 23, 1933,
quoted in the Völkischer Beobachter, for March 24, 1933, Page 1,
Column 5 of the German newspaper. I quote from this speech:
"While the Government is determined to carry through a
politicaland moral purging of our public life, it is creating
and insuring the requisites of a truly religious life. The
Government sees in both Christian confessions the factors most
important for the maintenance of our Volkstum. It will
respect agreements concluded between them and the Länder.
However, it expects that its work will meet with like appre-
ciation. The Government will treat all other denominations
with objective justice. However, it can never condone that
belonging to a certain denomination or to a certain race should
be regarded as a license for the commission or toleration of
crime. The Government will devote its care to harmony
between Church and State."
Toward the Evangelical
churches, the Nazi conspirators proceeded
with caution, and an appearance of legality. They set up a
at first
new constitution of the German Evangelical Church, which intro-
duced the innovation of a single Lutheran Reich Bishop, who
assumed all the administrative functions of the old agencies of the

498
 7 Jan. 46

churches. I refer to Document Number 3433-PS, the Decree concern-

ing the Constitution of the German Evangelical Church, dated July
14, 1933, appearing in the Reichsgesetzblatt, 1933, Part I, Page 471,
and request that the Court take judicial notice of it.

It is too well known to require documentation that the new Reich

Bishop, Bishop Müller, heeded the voice of his Nazi masters. One of
his first steps was to maneuver the Evangelical Youth Association
into the Hitler Jugend under the Defendant Von Schirach in Decem-
ber 1933. In proof of this I refer to Document Number 1458 (a) PS, =
already in evidence as part of Document Book D. This is an excerpt
—
from Von Schirach's book, The Hitler Youth Idea and Formation.
By 1935 it had become evident that more than persuasion by the
Reich Bishop was necessary. Consequently the Nazi conspirators
promulgated a number of public laws which, under innocent sound-
ing titles, gradually wove a tight net of state control over all the
affairs of the Evangelical churches. We ask that the Court take
judicial notice of these laws published in the Reichsgesetzblatt.
These may be briefly summarized as follows:
3434- PS, "Law concerning Procedure for Decisions in Legal
Affairs of the Evangelical Church," dated 26 June 1935, signed by
Hitler and Frick, appearing in 1935 in Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,
Page gave the Reich Minister of the Interior, the Defendant
774. This
Frick, when
question was raised in a civil lawsuit, sole authority to
determine the validity of measures taken in the Evangelical state
churches, or in the German Evangelical Church since May 1, 1933.
3435- PS, "First Ordinance for Execution of the Law concerning
Procedure for Decisions in Legal Affairs of the Evangelical Church,"
dated July 3, 1935, appearing in 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page
851. This implemented the earlier law, by setting up an Office for
Decisions with three members appointed by the Reich Minister of
the Interior.
3466-PS, "Decree to Unite the Competences of Reich and Prussia
in Church Affairs," dated July 16, 1935, signed by Hitler, published
in 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 1029. This transferred to
Reich Minister without Portfolio Kerrl the Church Affairs hitherto
handled by the Reich and Prussian Ministries of the Interior and
for Science, Education, and Training of the Population.
3436- PS, "Law for the Safeguarding of the German Evangelical
Church," dated 24 September 1935, published in the 1935 Reichs-
gesetzblatt, Part I, Page 1178, signed by Hitler and the Minister for
Church Affairs, Dr. Kerrl. This empowered the Reich Minister of
Church Affairs to issue ordinances with binding legal force.
3437- PS, "Fifth Decree for Execution of the Law for the Safe-
guarding of the German Evangelical Church," dated 2 December

499
 —
7 Jan. 46

1935, published in 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 1370. This

prohibited "Organs of Church Leadership" in the Evangelical
churches from filling pastorates, engaging clerical assistants, exam-
ining and ordaining candidates of the state churches, visitation,
publishing of the banns, and collection and administration of church
dues and assessments.
This series of laws culminated on June 26, 1937, in Document
Number 3439-PS, the "Fifteenth Decree for the Execution of the
Law for Security of the German Evangelical Church," dated June 25,
1937, published in 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 697. By this,
the Reich Minister for Church Affairs, Kerrl, established a finance
department for the churches to supervise the administration of all
church property, the budget, and the use of budget funds and to
regulate salaries and allowances of officials, clergy, and employees.
Thus, before the outbreak of the war, the Nazi conspirators had
the Evangelical churches tied hand and foot physically and adminis-
tratively, if not spiritually.
Against the Catholic Church with its international organization
the Nazi conspirators launched a most vigorous and drastic attack
again at first, however, cloaked under a mantle of co-operation and
legality. A concordat signed by the Defendant Von Papen, one of
the foremost Catholic laymen in Germany, was concluded between
the Reich Government and the Vatican on July 20, 1933. It is
printed in the 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, Page 679 to Page 690,
and contained in Document Number 3280 (a)-PS. I ask the Court to
take judicial notice of it. I quote Article 1:
"The German Reich guarantees freedom of profession and
public practice of the Catholic religion.
"It acknowledges the right of the Catholic Church, within
the limit of those laws which are applicable to all, to manage
and regulate its own affairs independently and, within the
framework of its own competence, to publish laws and
ordinances binding on its members."
Other articles which, being matters of common knowledge, I
assume need not be read into the record, formulated basic principles
such as freedom of the Catholic press, of Catholic education, and of
Catholic charitable, professional, and other organizations.
The proposal for the concordat came from the Reich, and not
from the Vatican. I refer to Document Number 3268-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-356, excerpts from the Allocution of Pope Pius XII to
the Sacred College on June 2, 1945, already read into evidence. I
quote from Page 1 of the English mimeographed excerpts, Page 1
of the German translation, third paragraph, which has not previously
been read, "In the spring of 1933 the German Government asked
the Holy See to conclude a concordat with the Reich."

500
 7 Jan. 46

The present Pope, Pope Pius XII, then Cardinal Pacelli, negotiated
and signed the concordat on behalf of the Vatican. As Archbishop
Pacelli he had previously been Papal Nuncio in Germany for
12 years.

Relying upon the Nazis' assurances, particularly Hitler's speech

of March 23, 1933 above quoted (3387-PS), the Catholic hierarchy
revoked its previous opposition against Catholics becoming members
of the National Socialist Party. I offer in evidence Document Number
3389-PS, Exhibit USA-566, a pastoral letter, dated March 23, 1933,
from the Bishop of Cologne, and I quote from the Völkischer Be-
obachter for March 29, 1933 Page 2 Columns 2 and 3:
"The Archbishop of Cologne, Cardinal Schulte, announces to
the Archdiocese of Cologne a declaration of the Bishops'
Conference at Fulda, which states:
"The bishops of the diocese of Germany, in their dutiful
solicitude to keep the Catholic faith pure and to protect the
inviolable aims and rights of the Catholic Church, have
adopted, for weighty reasons during the last years, an attitude
of opposition toward the National Socialist movement, through
prohibitions and warnings, which were to remain in effect
as long and as far as those reasons remained valid.
"It should now be recognized that there are public and
solemn declarations issued by the highest representative of
—
the Reich Government who at the same time is the author-
—
itarian leader of that movement which acknowledge the
inviolability of the teachings of the Catholic faith and the
unswerving mission and rights of the Church and which
expressly guarantee the full validity of the legal pacts con-
cluded between the several German Länder and the Church.
"Without lifting the condemnation, implied in our previous
measures, of certain religious and ethical errors, the Episco-
pate now believes it can be confident that those general
prohibitions and warnings prescribed need no longer be
regarded as necessary."
The Catholic Center Party, yielding to these assurances and to
pressure, was dissolved on July 5, 1933. I refer toDocument Number
2403-PS, already in evidence as part of U. S. Document Book B,
an excerpt from Documents of German Politics, the official Nazi
publication, a document of which the Court can take judicial notice;
and I quote from the last five lines of Page 1 of the English trans-
lation, appearing on Page 55 of the original German text, which
states:

"Also the parties of German Catholicism which were supposed

to be most deeply rooted, had to bow to the law of the New

501
 . —
7 Jan. 46

Order. On July 4, 1933, the Bavarian People's Party (Docu-

ment 27), and on July 5, 1933, the Center Party (Document 29),
published an announcement of their dissolution."
In spite of these evidences of confidence and co-operation or sub-
mission on the part of the Catholics, the Nazi conspirators almost
immediately commenced a series of violations of the concordat. I
offer in evidence Document Number 3476-PS, Exhibit USA-567,
being the Papal Encyclical, "Mit brennender Sorge" in German —
by Pope Pius XI on March 14, 1937, and also ask the Tribunal to
take judicial notice of all of it. I quote from the one-page English
excerpt . .

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 3476 or 3466?

COL. WHEELER: 3476.
THE PRESIDENT: We don't seem to have that.
COL. WHEELER: That may be a mistake, Sir, for 3563; the
number was changed. The part of it which is in English in the
Document Book, Sir, 'is under 3280-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: 3280?
COL. WHEELER: The difficulty is that the German original
game in after the translation had been made from another source.
THE PRESIDENT: 3280(a)-PS?
COL. WHEELER: 3280 without the (a). It's just a couple of
paragraphs.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes; I see.
COL. WHEELER: These are found on Page 2, Paragraph 2, of
the German which is in evidence now, which was secretly
original,
reproduced at Fulda from copies smuggled into Germany from
Rome, and read definitely from pulpits all over Germany. I quote:
"It discloses intrigues which from the beginning had no other
aim than a war of extermination. In the furrows in which
we had labored to sow the seeds of true peace, others, like the
enemy in Holy Scripture (Matt, xiii, 25), sowed the tares of
suspicion, discord, hatred, calumny, of secret and open
fundamental hostility to Christ and His Church, fed from
a thousand different sources and making use of every avail-
able means. On them and on them alone and on their silent
and vocal protectors rests the responsibility for the fact that
now, on the horizon of Germany, there is to be seen, not the
rainbow of peace, but the threatening storm clouds of de-
structive religious strife.
"Anyone who has even a grain of a sense of truth left in his
mind and even a shadow of a feeling of justice left in his
heart will have to admit that, in the difficult and eventful

502
 7 Jan. 46

years which followed the concordat, every word and every

action of Ours was ruled by loyalty to the terms of the
agreement; but also he will have to recognize with surprise
and deep disgust that the unwritten law of the other party
has been arbitrary misinterpretation of agreements, circum-
vention of agreements, weakening of the force of agreements
and, finally, more or less open violation of agreements.
."
"Only 10 days after the Concordat was signed . . .

THE PRESIDENT: None of this is in our book.

COL. WHEELER: That's not in your book?
THE PRESIDENT: Not what you've been reading. The first
paragraph, down to the words "destructive religious wars" is in our
book. The rest isn't in it.
COL. WHEELER: I think there must have been an error today
then, Sir.There was a second edition of that 3280, which contains
the second paragraph. I'll have that substituted as soon as this is
over.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
DR.ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Frank): The United
States Prosecution said earlier in the proceedings that a certain
part of the material now being presented as evidence in the question
of the opposition to the churches was made available by the Vatican.
The Defendant Hans Frank has just sent me some questions which
I do not want to withhold from the Tribunal. The questions are
these:
1. Is the Vatican a Signatory to the Charter of the International

Military Tribunal?
2. Did the Vatican deliver the material in an accusatory capa-

city?
3. Has the Vatican, acting as a co-prosecutor, identified itself

with the principles of these proceedings?

The Defendant Hans Frank adds by way of explanation that his
continued membership in the Roman Catholic Church depends on
the reply to these questions.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it desirable that the Tribunal under-
stand your objections. The first question that you ask is: Is the
Vatican a Signatory to the Charter? Is that right?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Your second question was what? What was
your second question?
DR. SEIDL: The second question is: Whether the Vatican sub-
mitted the material which is now being presented, acting as
co-prosecutor?

503
7 Jan. 46

THE PRESIDENT: And your third?

—
DR. SEIDL: The third question is and it is addressed directly
to the Prosecution —
whether the Vatican, as prosecutor, has identified
itself with the principles upon which this Trial is being conducted?

[There was a pause in the proceedings while the Judges conferred.]

THE PRESIDENT: In the opinion of the Tribunal the obser-
vations which have just been made by counsel on behalf of the
Defendant Frank are entirely irrelevant, and any motion which
they were intended to support is denied. The Prosecution will
therefore continue.
COL. WHEELER: I now offer in evidence the first of a number of
documents which the Vatican has supplied to the Prosecution in this
case from its own files and which authoritatively state the acts of
suppression of the Church by the Nazi conspirators. This first
Vatican document, which deals in part with acts of suppression
within Germany, is Document Number 3261-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-568, a verbal note of the Secretariat of State of His Holiness
the Pope to the German Embassy, dated January 18, 1942. I read
the certificate accompanying this document:

"The Vatican, November 13th, 1945.

"I, Domenico
Tardini, Secretary of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical
Affairs, hereby certify that the attached document, consisting
of nine printed pages and entitled, 'Verbal note of the Secre-
tariat of State of His Holiness to the German Embassy,'
January Pages 3-11, is a true and correct translation
18th, 1942,
into the English language from the Italian language of a
carbon copy of a document now in the possession of the Sec-
retariat of State of His Holiness, the original of which was
dispatched to the German Embassy." Signed "Domenico — —
Tardini."
The paper in the document book, Your Honors, is a mimeo-
graphed copy of the same printed document which we received from
the Vatican. We did not have enough printed documents to make
them in the document books.
On Page 2 of the English mimeographed text of this verbal note.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 —
appearing on Page 2 of the German translation,
Paragraphs 3 and 4 —
the Papal Secretary of State describes, I quote:
"Measures and acts which gravely violate the rights of the
Church, being contrary not only to the existing concordats
but to the principles of international law ratified by the
Second Hague Conference ..."
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say you were reading the third
paragraph?

504
 7 Jan. 46

COL. WHEELER: Yes, Your Honor. It is the third full paragraph

on Page 2. It starts in the middle of the paragraph with the last
word on the seventh line of the third paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: It is very difficult for us to find it if you
don't tell us it begins in the middle of the paragraph.
COL. WHEELER: The last word of that line is "measures". It's
the seventh line of the paragraph beginning "Yet, despite this keen
desire," Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
COL. WHEELER: " but often— and
. . . this is much more
—
grave to the very fundamental principles of Divine Law
both natural and positive."
The next paragraph specifies these measures. I quote:
"Let it suffice to recall in this connection, among other things,
the changing of the Catholic state elementary schools into
undenominational schools; the permanent or temporary clos-
ing of many minor seminaries, of not a few major seminaries,
and of some theological faculties; the suppression of almost
all the private schools and of numerous Catholic boarding
schools and colleges; the repudiation, decided upon unilater-
ally, of financial obligations which the State, municipalities,
and so forth, had towards the Church; the increasing diffi-
culties put in the way of the activity of the religious orders
and congregations in the spiritual, cultural, and social field,
and above all the suppression of abbeys, monasteries, convents,
and religious houses in such great numbers that one is led to
infer a deliberate intention of rendering impossible the very
existence of the orders and congregations in Germany."
The Nazis did not overlook other sects or denominations in their
efforts to suppress Christian religion in Germany. They persecuted
the "Bibelforscher" or Bible students . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, if you are going on to another

church, it would be better to break tomorrow morning.
off until

[The Tribunal adjourned until 8 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]

505
 TWENTY-NINTH DAY
Tuesday, 8 January 1946

Morning Session

COL. WHEELER: The Nazis did not overlook other sects or

denominations in their suppress Christian religion in
efforts to
Germany. They persecuted the Bibelforscher or International Bible
Students as well. There has already been introduced and read into
evidence Document Number D-84, Exhibit Number USA-236, showing
that members of this sect were not only prosecuted in the courts,
but also seized and sent to concentration camps, even after serving
or remitting of their judicial sentences.
In Document Number 2928-PS, Exhibit Number USA-239, in-
cluded in U.S. Document Book A, further evidence of persecution
of Bibelforscher appears.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you are going a little bit fast. We

are not going to refer to D-84?
COL. WHEELER: I am not going to read from it, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you go to 2928-PS?

COL. WHEELER: 2928-PS; it is in the document book, Sir. This
document isan affidavit by Matthias Lex, Vice President of the
national union of shoemakers. In describing his experience in
Dachau Concentration Camp he says, and I quote from the third
page of his affidavit:
"I include in the political prisoners the International Bible
Students" —
Bibelforscher —
"whose number I estimate at
over 150."
I want to read further from the last line of that page and the
next few lines of the next page:
"The following groups were kept entirely isolated: The
members of the so-called 'punishment companies,'
—
" Straf- —
kompanien "those who were in a concentration camp for a
second time, and after about 1937 also the 'Bibelforscher'.
Members of the 'punishment companies' were such prisoners
who had committed disciplinary or slight offenses against the
camp regulations. The following groups lived separately but
could mix with the other groups during the day, either while
working or while strolling through the camp:

506
 8 Jan. 46

"Political prisoners, Jews, anti-socials, gypsies, felons, homo-

sexuals, and, before 1937, also the International Bible
Students."
I refer also to Document Number 1531 -PS
not in the—this is
document book —Exhibit Number USA-248, which
already in is
evidence. This was an order by the RSHA in 1942 authorizing
third-degree methods against Jehovah's Witnesses. That was read
by Colonel Storey.
I nowturn to acts of suppression in the annexed and occupied
territories.In Austria Bishop Rusch of Innsbruck has written an
illuminating report on this subject. I offer this sworn statement
in evidence, Document 3278-PS, Exhibit Number USA-569. This
is a report on the fighting of National Socialism in the Apostolic
Administration of Innsbruck-Feldkirch, of Tyrol and Vorarlberg.
In this the Bishop declares, and I start on the first page of the
English text and of the German translation:
"After having seized power, National Socialism immediately
showed the tendency to exclude the Church from publicity."
The expression 1
'publicity" —this was written in English by the
Bishop — evidently means "public activities." I continue with the
quote:
"At Corpus Christi in 1938 the customary solemn procession
was forbidden. In the summer of the same year all eccle-
siastical schools and kindergartens were disbanded. Daily
newspaper and weekly reviews of Christian thinking were
likewise removed. In the same year all kinds of ecclesiastical
organizations, especially youth organizations such as Boy
Scouts, were disbanded, all activity forbidden.
"The effect of these prohibitions came soon: The clergy took
opposition against them, they could not do otherwise. Then
a great wave of priest arrests followed. About a fifth of
them were eventually arrested. Reasons for arrests were:
"1. The 'pulpit-paragraph.' When Party actions were men-
tioned or criticized even in the humblest manner.
"2. The practice of taking care of young people. A specially
heavy prohibition was given in November 1939. Children's
or youth's mass or services were forbidden. Religion or faith
lessons were not allowed to be given in the church except
lessons of preparing for first Communion or confirmation.
Teaching of religion at school was very often forbidden
without any reason.
"The priest, according to his conscience, could not follow this
public proscription and this explained the great number of

507
8 Jan. 46

arrests of priests. Finally, the priests were arrested on

account of their 'caritative' work. It was, for instance, for-
bidden to give anything to foreigners or prisoners. A priest
was arrested because he gave a cup of coffee and bread to
two hungry Dutchmen. This 'caritative' act was seen to favor
elements foreign to the race.
"In 1939 and 1940 a new activity began. Cloisters and abbeys
were seized, disbanded, and many churches belonging to
them closed. Among these two convents were disbanded: the
cloister of the Dominican Sisters of Bludenz and that of the
'Perpetual Adoration' of Innsbruck. In the latter the Sisters
were dragged, one by one, out of the cloister by the Gestapo.
In the same way ecclesiastical property such as association-
houses, parish and youth homes were seized. A list of these
closed churches, disbanded cloisters, and ecclesiastical insti-
tutions is attached.
"Despite all these measures the results were not satisfactory.
Then were not only arrested, but also deported to
priests
concentration camps. Eight priests of Tyrol and Vorarlberg
have been imprisoned, among them the Provicar Monseig-
neur Dr. Charles Lampert. One died there on account of the
ill-treatment, the others returned. Provicar Lampert was
released but required to remain in Stettin, where later he
was re-arrested and executed in November 1944, after having
been condemned to death by secret proceedings."
There is attached to this report a three-and-a-half-page list
entitled, "List of churches, convents, monasteries, and ecclesiastical
objects of Tyrol and Vorarlberg seized —that is, confiscated —and
of the institutions, confessional schools, et cetera, disbanded." Unless
the Tribunal requires it, I shall not read these names.

I offer in evidence Document 3274-PS, Exhibit Number USA-570,

received from Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna and authenticated by
him. This is the first joint pastoral letter of the Archbishops and
Bishops of Austria after liberation, dated October 17, 1945. I quote
from Page 1, second paragraph of the English and German texts,
which sums up the Nazi conspirators' campaign in Austria:
"A war which has raged terribly and horribly, like none
other in past epochs of the history of humanity is at an end.
. .At an end also is an intellectual battle, the goal of which
.

was the destruction of Christianity and Church among our

people; a campaign of lies and treachery against truth and
love, against divine and human rights, and against inter-
national law."
I quote further from the fourth and following paragraphs:

508
 8 Jan. 46

"Direct hostility to the Church was revealed in regulations

against orders and monasteries, Catholic schools and insti-
tutions, against religious foundations and activities, against
the ecclesiastical recreation centers and institutions; without
the least rights to defend themselves they were declared
enemies of both people and state and their existence destroyed.
"Religious instruction and education of children and adoles-
cents were purposely limited, frequently entirely prevented.
They encouraged in every manner all efforts hostile to
religion and the Church and thus sought to rob the children
and youth of our people of the most valuable treasure of
holy faith and of true morality born of the Spirit of God.
Unfortunately the attempt succeeded in innumerable cases to
the permanent detriment of young people.

"Spiritual care of souls in churches and ecclesiastical houses,

in hospitals and other institutions was seriously obstructed.
It was made ineffectual in the Armed Forces and in the Labor
Service, in the transfer of youth to the country and, beyond
that, even in individual families and among numerous persons,
to say nothing of the prohibition of spiritual ministration to
people of another nationality and of other races.
"How often was the divine service as such, also sermons,
missions, Communion days, retreats, processions, pilgrimages,
restricted for the most impossible reasons and made entirely
impossible!
"Catholic literature, newspapers, periodicals, church papers,
religious writings were stopped, books and libraries destroyed.
"What an injustice occurred in the dissolution of many
Catholic societies, in the destruction of numerous church
activities!

"Individual Catholic and Christian believers, whose religious

confession was allegedly free, were spied upon, criticized on
account of their belief, scorned on account of their Christian
activity.How many religious officials, teachers, public and
private employees, laborers, businessmen, and artisans, in-
deed, even peasants were put under pressure and terror!
Many lost their jobs, some were pensioned off, others dis-
missed without pension, demoted, deprived of their real pro-
fessional activity. Often enough such people who remained
loyal to their convictions were discriminated against, con-
demned to hunger or tortured in concentration camps.
Christianity and the Church were continually scorned and
exposed to hatred.

509
8 Jan. 46

"The apostasy movement found every assistance. Every

opportunity was used to induce many to withdraw from the
Church."
In assessing responsibility for these acts of suppression in
Austria, the Court will recall that the Defendant Von Schirach was
Gauleiter of Vienna from 1940 to 1945.
I now come to the acts of suppression in Czechoslovakia, where,
the Court will recollect, the Defendant Von Neurath was Reich
Protector for Bohemia and Moravia from 1939 to 1943 and was
succeeded by the Defendant Frick. These acts have been summarized
in an official Czech Government report. I refer to Document 998-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-91, already in evidence. These are excerpts
not previously read or referred to from the "Czech Official Report
for the Prosecution and Trial of the German Major War Criminals
by the International Military Tribunal Established according to
the Agreement of the Four Great Powers, of August 8, 1945."
Since this is an official government document or report of one of
the United Nations, I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of
it under Article 21 of the Charter and I suggest that I be permitted

to summarize rather than read it.

It —
describes the maltreatment of Catholic priests 487 of whom
were sent —
to concentration camps as hostages dissolution of reli-
gious orders, suppression of religious instruction in Czech schools,
suppression of Catholic weeklies and monthlies, dissolution of the
Catholic gymnastic organization of 800,000 members, and seizure
of Catholic Church property. It describes the entire prohibition of
the Czechoslovak National Church and confiscation of all its prop-
erty in Slovakia and its crippling in Bohemia.
The report describes the severe restriction on freedom of
preaching by the Protestants and the persecution and imprison-
ment and execution of ministers and the suppression of Protestant
Church youth organizations and theological schools and shows the
complete subordination and later dissolution of the Greek Orthodox
Church. It states that all Evangelical education was handed over
to the civil authorities and many Evangelical teachers lost their
employment.
The repressive measures adopted by the Nazi conspirators in
Poland against the Christian Church were even more drastic and
sweeping.
The Vatican documents now to be introduced describe perse-
cutions of the Catholic Church in Poland in three areas: First, the
incorporated territories, especially the Warthegau; second, the
Government General; and third, the incorporated Eastern territories.
The Court will recall that the incorporated territories comprised
territories adjacent to the old Reich, chiefly the Reich District

510
 8 Jan. 46

Wartheland or Warthegau, which included particularly the cities

of Poznan and Lodz and the Reich district Danzig-West Prussia.
The occupied Polish territories which were organized into the
Government General comprised the remainder of Poland, seized
by the German forces in 1939 and extending to the new boundary
with the Soviets formed at that time. This included Warsaw and
Krakow. After the Nazis attacked the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in June 1941, the parts of old Poland lying farther to
the east and then overrun were included in the so-called Occupied
Eastern Territories.
For the purpose of tying the defendants' responsibility for the
persecutions occurring in their respective areas, the Court will bear
in mind that the Defendant Frick was the official chiefly respon-
sible for the reorganization of the Eastern territories. The Defendant
Frank was head of the Government General from 1939 to 1945. The
Defendant Seyss-Inquart was Deputy Governor General there from
1939 to 1940. And the Defendant Rosenberg was Reich Minister
for the Occupied Eastern Territories from July 17, 1941 to the end.
I now offer in evidence Document Number 3263-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-571, headed, 'Memorandum of the Secretariat of
'

State to the German Embassy regarding the religious situation in

the 'Warthegau,' October 8, 1942." This document bears a certif-
icate of authenticity from the Vatican signed by the Papal
Secretary of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs corresponding t®
that accompanying Document 3261-PS, read in evidence a few
minutes ago. Unless the Court requires otherwise, I suggest that
it is not necessary to read each of these certificates, which are all

similar one to another. I quote from Document 3263-PS, the first

paragraph:
"For quite a long time the religious situation in the region called
'Warthegau' gives cause for very grave and ever-increasing
anxiety. There, in fact, the Episcopate has been little by little
almost completely eliminated; the secular and regular clergy
have been reduced to proportions that are absolutely inade-
quate, because they have been in large part deported and
exiled; the education of clerics has been forbidden; the
Catholic education of youth is meeting with the greatest
opposition; the nuns have been dispersed; insurmountable
obstacles have been put in the way of affording people the
help of religion; very many churches have been closed;
Catholic intellectual and charitable institutions have been
destroyed; ecclesiastical property has been seized."
On March 2, 1943 the Cardinal Secretary of State addressed to
the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of the Reich, a
note setting forth in detail the persecution of bishops, priests, and

511
8 Jan. 46

other ecclesiastics and the suppression of the exercise of religion

in the occupied Polish provinces. This document is so explicit and
so authoritative that deserves extensive quotation. I accordingly
it

offer it in evidence: Document Number 3264-PS, Exhibit Number

USA-572. It is headed, "A Note of His Eminence the Cardinal
Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister of the Reich about the
religious situation in the 'Warthegau' and in the other Polish
provinces subject to Germany." It bears a Vatican certificate of
authenticity like that of Document 3261-PS. It is signed, "L. Card.
Maglione," meaning "Luigi Cardinal Maglione." I quote from this
note, starting with Page 1, the third paragraph of the English
mimeographed text and of the German translation:
"The place where, above all, the religious situation, by its
unusual gravity, calls for special consideration is the terri-
tory called the 'Reichsgau Wartheland.'
"Six bishops resided in that region in August 1939; now
there is left only one. In fact, the Bishop of Lodz and his
auxiliary were, in the course of the year 1941, confined first
in a small district of the diocese and then expelled and exiled
in the 'Generalgouvernement.'

"Another bishop, Monseigneur Michael Kozal, Auxiliary and

Vicar General of Wloclawek, was arrested in the autumn of
1939, detained for some time in a prison in the city and
later in a religious house in Lad, and finally was transferred
to the concentration camp at Dachau.

"Since His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Gniezno

and Poznan and the Bishop of Wloclawek, who had gone
away during the period of military operations, were not
allowed to return to their Sees, the only bishop who now
remains in the 'Warthegau' is His Excellency Monseigneur
Valentine Dymek, Auxiliary of Poznan; and he, at least up
to November 1942, was interned in his own house."
I pass now to Page 2, fourth paragraph of the English text,
the fifth paragraph of the German text:
"If the lot of their Excellencies the Bishops has been a
source of anxiety for the Holy See, the condition of an
immense number of priests and members of religious orders
has caused it, and still causes it, no less grief.
"In the territory now called 'Warthegau' more than 2,000
priests exercised their ministry before the war; they are now
reduced to a very small number.
"According to accounts received from various quarters by the
Holy See, in the first months of the military occupation not
a few members of the secular clergy were shot or otherwise

512
 8 Jan. 46

— —
put to death, while others some hundreds were imprisoned
or treated in an unseemly manner, being forced into
employments unbecoming their state and exposed to scorn
and derision.

"Then, while numbers of ecclesiastics were exiled or con-

strained in some other way to take refuge in the 'General-
gouvernement,' many others were transferred to concentration
camps. At the beginning of October 1941 the priests from the
dioceses of the 'Warthegau' detained in Dachau already num-
bered several hundreds; but their number increased con-
siderably in that month following a sharp intensification of
police measures which culminated in the imprisonment and
deportation of further hundreds of ecclesiastics. Entire
'Kreise' (districts) remained thus completely deprived of
clergy. In the city of Poznan itself the spiritual care of some
200,000 Catholics remained in the hands of not more than
four priests.
"No less painful was the fate reserved for the regular clergy.
Many religious were shot or otherwise killed; the great
majority of the others were imprisoned, deported, or expelled.
"In the same way far-reaching measures were taken against
the institutions preparing candidates for the ecclesiastical
state. The diocesan seminaries of Gniezno and Poznan, of
Wloclawek, and of Lodz were closed. The seminary in Poznan
for the training of priests destined to work among Polish
Catholics abroad was also closed.
"The novitiates and houses of formation of the religious
orders and congregations were closed.

"Not even the nuns were able to continue their charitable

activities without molestation. For them was set up a special
concentration camp at Bojanowo, where towards the middle
of 1941 about 400 sisters were interned and employed in
manual labor. To a representation of the Holy See made
through the Apostolic Nunciature in Berlin (Memorandum
N. 40.348 of June 11th, 1941) your Reich Ministry for Foreign
Affairs replied in the Memorandum Pol. Ill 1886 of Septem-
ber 28 of the same year that it was only a question of a
temporary measure, taken with the consent of the Reich
lieutenant for Wartheland, in order to supply the lack of
housing for Polish Catholic sisters. In the same memorandum
it was admitted that as a result of reorganization of charitable

institutions many Catholic sisters were without employment.

"But, in spite of the fact that this measure was declared to

be temporary, it is certain that towards the end of 1942 some

513
8 Jan. 46

hundreds of nuns were still interned at Bojanowo. It is

established that for some time the religious were deprived
even of spiritual help.
"Likewise in the matter of education and religious instruction
of youth no attention was paid in the 'Warthegau' to the
rights of the Catholic Church.
"All the Catholic schools were suppressed."
THE PRESIDENT: Who was the Foreign Minister of the Reich
at the time that document was sent?
COL. WHEELER: It was the Defendant Von Ribbentrop.
Iturn to Page 4, the 10th paragraph of the English text, Page 5,
4th paragraph of the German text:
"The use of the Polish language in sacred functions, and even
in the Sacrament of Penance, was forbidden. Moreover and —
this is a matter worthy of special mention and is at variance
with the natural law and with the dispositions accepted by
—
the legal systems of all nations for the celebration of mar-
riage between Poles the minimum age limit was fixed at
28 years for men and 25 years for women.
"Catholic Action was so badly hit as to be completely
destroyed. The National Institute, which was at the head of
the whole Catholic Action movement in Poland, was suppressed;
as a result all the associations belonging to it, which
were flourishing, as well as all Catholic cultural, charity, and
social service institutions, were abolished.
"In the whole of the 'Warthegau' there is no longer any
Catholic press and not even a Catholic bookshop.
"Grave measures were repeatedly taken with regard to
ecclesiastical property.
"Many of the churches closed to public worship were turned
over to profane uses. From such an insult not even the Cathe-
drals of Gniezno, Poznan, Wloclawek, and Lodz were spared.
Episcopal residences were confiscated, the real estate belong-
ing to the seminaries, convents, diocesan museums, libraries,
and church funds were confiscated or sequestered."
I pass now to the third full paragraph on Page 5, a two-line
paragraph:
"Even before ecclesiastical property was affected, the allow-
ances to the clergy had been abolished."
Now, reading from Page 6, the fourth full paragraph of the
English text:
"The administrative regulations published by the lieutenant's
office for the application of the ordinance of September 13th,

514
 8 Jan. 46

1941 made the situation of the Catholics in that region still

more difficult.

"For example, on November 19, 1941 came a decree of the

Reich lieutenant by which among other things it was set forth
that, as from the previous September 13th, the property of
the former juridical persons of the Roman Catholic Church
should pass over to the 'Römisch-katholische Kirche deutscher
Nationalität im Reichsgau Wartheland' insofar as, on the
request of the above-mentioned 'Religionsgesellschaft' such
property shall be recognized by the Reich lieutenant as 'non-
Polish property.' In virtue of this decree practically all the
goods of the Catholic Church in the 'Warthegau' were lost."
Now I pass to Page 7, the second full paragraph:
"If we
pass from the 'Warthegau' to the other territories
in the East, we unfortunately find there, too', acts and
measures against the rights of the Church and of the
Catholic faithful, though they vary in gravity and exten-
sion from one place to another.
"In the which were declared annexed to the
provinces
German Reich and joined up with the Gaue of East
Prussia, of Danzig West Prussia and of Upper Silesia, the
situation is very like that described above in regard to semi-
naries, the use of the Polish mother-tongue in sacred func-
tions, charitable works, associations of Catholic Action, the
separation of the faithful according to nationality. There, too,
one must deplore the closing of churches to public' worship,
the exile, deportation, the violent death of not a few of the
clergy (reduced by two-thirds in the diocese of Culma and by
at least a third in the diocese of Katowice), the suppression
of religious instruction in the schools, and above all the com-
plete suppression in fact of the Episcopate. Actually, after the
Bishop of Culma, who had left during the military operations,
had been refused permission to return to his diocese, there
followed in February 1941 the expulsion of the Bishop
of Plock and his auxiliary, who both died later in captivity;
the Bishop, the venerable octogenarian Monseigneur Julian
Anthony Nowowiejski, died at Dzialdowo on May 28th, 1941,
and the auxiliary, Monseigneur Leo Wetmanski, 'in a transit
camp' on October 10th of the same year.
"In the territory called the 'Generalgouvernement,' as in the
Polish provinces which had been occupied by Soviet troops
in the period between September 1939 and June 1941, the
religious situation is such as to cause the Holy See lively
apprehension and serious preoccupation. Without pausing to
describe the treatment meted out in many cases to the clergy

515
8 Jan. 46

(priests imprisoned, deported, and even put to death), the

confiscation of ecclesiastical property, the closing of churches,
the suppression even of associations and publications of simply
and exclusively religious character, the closing of the Catholic
secondary and higher schools and of the Catholic University
of Lublin, let it suffice to recall two series of specially grave
measures: those which affect the seminaries and those which
weigh on the Episcopate.
"When the buildings of the various seminaries had been com-
pletely or in part occupied, the intention for some time
—
(November 1940 February 1941) was to reduce these in-
stitutions for the training of priests to two—those of Krakow
and Sandomierz; then the others were permitted to reopen,
but only on condition that no new students were admitted,
which in practice inevitably means that all these institutions
will soon be closed."
I skip one paragraph here.
"Mention has several times been made of ecclesiastics deported
or confined in concentration camps. The majority of them
were transferred to the Altreich, where their number already
exceeds a thousand."
THE PRESIDENT: What was the "Altreich"?
COL. WHEELER: The Altreich is the Old Reich of Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
COL. WHEELER: "When the Holy See asked that they should
be liberated and be permitted to emigrate to neutral countries
of Europe or America (1940), the petition was refused; it was
only promised that they should all be collected in the con-
centration camp at Dachau, that they should be dispensed
from too hard labor, and that some should be permitted to
say Mass, which the others could hear.
"The treatment of the ecclesiastics interned at Dachau, which,
for a certain time in 1941 was in fact somewhat mitigated,
worsened again at the end of that year. Particularly sorrow-
ful were the announcements which for many months in 1942
came from that camp of the frequent deaths of priests, even
of some young priests among them."
I pass by two paragraphs.

"Polish Catholics are not allowed to contract marriage in the

territory of the Altreich; just as requests for religious in-
struction or instruction in preparation for confession and Holy
Communion for the children of these workers are, in prin-
ciple, not accepted."

516
 .

8 Jan. 46

What happened to complaints —even from the Vatican —as to

religious affairs in the overrun territories is disclosed in Document
Number 3266-PS, Exhibit Number USA-573, which I now offer in
evidence. This is a letter from the Cardinal Archbishop of Breslau
to the Papal Secretary of State, dated December 7, 1942. It bears
a Vatican authentication similar to those already read.

This letter lays at the door of the Party Chancellery the respon-
sibility for determining the policy and exercising final authority
on religious questions in the occupied territories. I quote from
Page 1, the first paragraph of this letter, and remind the Court
that the Defendant Bormann was at that time Chief of the Nazi
Party Chancellery and that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner was the
Chief of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the RSHA. I quote from
Document 3266-PS, beginning with the sixth line:
"About some of the gravest injuries inflicted on the Church,
I not only protested on each occasion as the individual in-
cident occurred, but I also made a most formal protest about
them in globo in a document which, as spokesman of the
Hierarchy, I sent to the supreme ruler of the State and to the
ministries of the Reich on December 10th, 1941. Not a word
by way of answer has been sent to us.
"Your Eminence knows very well the greatest difficulty in
the way of opening negotiations comes from the overruling
authority which the 'National Socialist Party Chancery' exer-
cises in relation to the Chancery of the Reich and to the single
Reich ministries. This 'Parteikanzlei' directs the course to be
followed by the State, whereas the ministries and the Chan-
cellery of the Reich are obliged and compelled to adjust their
decrees to these directions. Besides, there is the fact that the
'supreme office for the security of the Reich,' called the
'Reichssicherheitshauptamt' enjoys an authority which pre-
cludes all legal action and all appeals. Under it are the 'secret
offices for public security,' called 'Geheime Staatspolizei' (a
title shortened usually to Gestapo), of which there is one for
each province. Against the decrees of this central office
and of the secret offices there is no appeal through the courts,
and no complaint made to the ministries has any effect. Not
infrequently the councillors of the ministries suggest that they
have not been able to do as they would wish to because of
the opposition of these Party offices. As far as the executive
power is concerned, the organization called the SS, that is,
'The Schutzstaffeln der Partei,' is in practice supreme. . .

"On a number very grave and fundamental issues we have

of
also presented our complaints to the supreme leader of the

517
8 Jan. 46

Reich, the Führer. Either no answer is given, or it is appar-

ently edited by the above-mentioned Party Chancery, which
does not consider itself bound by the Concordat made with
the Holy See."
I now offer in evidence Document Number 3279-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-574. This is an excerpt from Charge Number 17
against the Defendant Hans Frank, Governor General of Poland,
entitled, "Maltreatment and Persecution of the Catholic Clergy in
the Western Provinces," submitted by the Polish Government under
the terms of Article 21 of the Four-Power- Agreement of August 8,
1945. This gives further figures indicating the extent of the perse-
cution of priests. I quote:
"The extract attached hereto and dealing with the 'General
Conditions and Results of the Persecution' is taken from the
text of Charge 17, Page 5, Paragraph IV, of the Polish Govern-
ment against the defendants named in the Indictment before
the International Military Tribunal, subject: 'Maltreatment
and Persecution of the Catholic Clergy in the Incorporated
Western Provinces of Poland.' It is a true translation into
English of the original Polish.
"It is submitted herewith to the International Military Tri-
bunal in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter of the
Court."
Signed: "Dr. Tadeusz Cyprian, Polish Deputy Representative
on the United Nations War Crimes Commission in London,
signing on behalf of the Polish Government and of the Main
Commission for Investigation of German War Crimes in Po-
land, whose seal I hereby attach."
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you need read such certificates
as that.

COL. WHEELER: This is the only one, Sir, that I have. I now
read from this extract:
"General Conditions and Results of the Persecution:
"11. The general situation of the clergy in the Archdiocese of
Poznan in the beginning of April 1940 is summarized in the
following words of Cardinal Hlond's second report:
"Five priests shot; 27 priests confined in harsh concentration
camps at Stutthof and in other camps; 190 priests in prison or
in concentration camps at Bruczkow, Chludowo, Goruszki,
Kazimierz, Biskupi, Lad, Lubin, and Puszczykowo; 35 priests
seriously ill in consequence of ill-treatment; 122 parishes
entirely left without priests.
"12. In the Diocese of Chelmno, where about 650 priests were
installed before the war, only 3 percent were allowed to stay,

518
 8 Jan. 46

the 97 percent of them were imprisoned, executed, or put into

concentration camps.
"13. By January 1941 about 700 priests were killed, 3,000 were
in prison or concentration camps."
I refer also to Document Number 3268(a)-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-356, excerpts from the allocution of Pope Pius XII to the
Sacred College June 2, 1945, which has already been introduced into
evidence and read from extensively. I shall not read from that
again. This gives some very revealing figures concerning the priests
and lay brothers confined in the concentration camp at Dachau.
The Tribunal will recall, from the previous reading of this docu-
ment, the imprisonment of 2,800 priests and lay brothers in Dachau
alone from 1940 to 1945, of whom all but about 800 were dead by
April 1945, including an auxiliary bishop.
This document presents a forceful summary of the principal steps
in the struggle of the Nazi conspirators against the Catholic Church.
In summation the Prosecution submits that the evidence presented
to the Court proves that the attempted suppression of the Christian
churches in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland was an
integral part of the defendants' conspiracy to eliminate internal
opposition and otherwise to prepare for and wage aggressive war
and shows the same conspiratorial pattern as their other War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity.
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, before we present the
subject of individual defendants, by agreement with our British
colleagues, Major Elwyn Jones will now present a brief subject
entitled, "Aggression as a Basic Nazi Idea."
MAJOR F. ELWYN
JONES (Junior Counsel for the United King-
dom) : please the Tribunal, it is now my duty to draw to the
May it

Tribunal's attention a document which became the statement of

faith of these defendants. I refer to Hitler's Mein Kampf. It is per-
haps appropriate that this should be considered at this stage of the
Trial just before the Prosecution presents to the Tribunal the evi-
dence against the individual defendants under Counts One and Two
of the Indictment, for this book, Mein Kampf, gave to the defend-
ants adequate foreknowledge of the unlawful aims of the Nazi
leadership. It was not only Hitler's political testament; by adoption
it became theirs.
This book, Mein Kampf, might be described as the blueprint of
Nazi aggression. Its whole tenor and content enforce the Prose-
cution's submission that the Nazi pursuit of aggressive designs was
no mere accident arising out of the immediate political situation in
Europe and the world which existed during the period of Nazi
power. Mein Kampf establishes unequivocally that the use of

519
8 Jan. 46

aggressive war to serve their aims in foreign policy was part of the
very creed of the Nazi Party.
A great German
philosopher has said that "ideas have hands and
feet." It became the deliberate aim
of these defendants to see to it
that the ideas, doctrines, and policies of Mein Kampf should become
the active faith and guide for action of the German nation, and
particularly of its malleable youth.

As my American colleagues have already submitted to the Tri-

bunal, from 1933 to 1939 an extensive indoctrination in the ideas of
Mein Kampf was pursued in the schools and universities of Ger-
many, as well as in the Hitler Youth under the direction of the
Defendant Baldur von Schirach and in the SA and SS and amongst
the German population as a whole by the agency of the Defendant
Rosenberg.
A copy of this book Mein Kampf was officially presented to all
newly married couples in Germany, and I now hand to the Tribunal
such a wedding present from the Nazis to the newlyweds of Ger-
many and for the purposes of the record it will be Exhibit GB-128
(Document Number D-660). The Tribunal will see that the dedication
on the flyleaf of that copy reads:
"To the newly-married couple, Friedrich Rosebrock and Else
née zum Beck, with best wishes for a happy and blessed mar-
riage. Presented by the Communal Administration on the
occasion of their marriage on the 14th of November 1940. For
the Mayor, the Registrar."
The Tribunal will see, at the bottom of the page opposite to the
contents page, that that edition of Mein Kampf, which was the 1940
edition, brought the number of copies of Mein Kampf published to
6,250,000. This was the scale upon which this book was distributed.
It was blasphemously called "the bible of the German people".

As a result of the efforts of the defendants and their confeder-

ates, this book poisoned a generation and distorted the outlook of a
whole people.
As the SS General Von dem Bach-Zelewski indicated yesterday,
ifyou preach for years, as long as 10 years, that the Slav peoples
are inferior races and that the Jews are subhuman, then it must
logically follow that the killing of millions of these human beings
is accepted as a natural phenomenon.
From Mein Kampf the way leads directly to the furnaces of
Auschwitz and the gas chambers of Maidanek.
What the commandments of Mein Kampf were I shall seek to
indicate to the Tribunal by quotations from the book, which are set
out in the extracts which I trust are now before the Tribunal.

520
 8 Jan. 46

Those extracts are set out in the order in which I shall, with the
Tribunal's permission, refer to them.
Now these quotations fall into two main categories. The first
category is that of general expression of Hitler's belief in the neces-
sity of force as the means of solving international problems. The
second category is that of Hitler's more explicit declarations on the
policy which Germany must pursue.
Most of the quotations in the second category come from the last
three Chapters, 13, 14, and 15 of Part II of Mein Kampf, in which
Hitler's views on foreign policy were expounded. The significance
of that fact will be realized if the Tribunal looks at the German
edition of Mein Kampf. The Tribunal will observe that Part II of
Mein Kampf was first published in 1927, that is to say, less than
2 years after the Locarno Pact and within a few months of Ger-
many's entry into the League of Nations. The date of the publication
of these passages, therefore, brands them as a repudiation of the
policy of international co-operation embarked upon by Stresemann
and as a deliberate defiance of the attempt to establish, through the
League of Nations, the rule of law in international affairs.
First I place before the Tribunal some quotations showing the
general views held by Hitler and accepted and propagated by the
defendants about war and aggression generally. The first quotation,
from Page 556 of Mein Kampf, reads:
"The soil on which we now live was not a gift bestowed by
Heaven on our forefathers. But they had to conquer it by
risking their lives. So also in the future our people will not
obtain territory and therewith the means of existence as a
favor from any other people, but will have to win it by the
power of a triumphant sword."
On Page 145 Hitler revealed his own personal attitude to war.
Of the years of peace before 1914 he wrote:
"Thus I used to think it an ill-deserved stroke of bad luck that
I had arrived too late on this terrestrial globe, and I felt

chagrined at the idea that my life would have to run- its course
along peaceful and orderly lines. As a boy I was anything
but a pacifist and all attempts to make me so proved futile."
Generally, Hitler wrote of war in this way. On Page 162 we find:
"In regard to the part played by humane feeling, Moltke
stated that in time of war the essential thing is to get a deci-
sion as quickly as possible and that the most ruthless methods
of fighting are at the same time the most humane. When
people attempt to answer this reasoning by 'highfalutin' talk
about aesthetics, et cetera, only one answer can be given. It
is that the vital questions involved in the struggle of a nation

521
8 Jan. 46

for its existence must not be subordinated to any aesthetic

consideration."
How faithfully these precepts of ruthlessness were followed by
the defendants the Prosecution will prove in the course of this Trial.
Hitler's assumption of an inevitable law of struggle for survival
linked up in Chapter 11 of Book I of Mein Kampf, with the doctrine
of Aryan superiority over other races and the right of Germans, in
virtue of this superiority, to dominate and use other peoples as
instruments for their own ends. The whole of Chapter 11 of Mein
Kampf is dedicated to this master race theory, and, indeed, many
of the later speeches of Hitler, his addresses to his generals and so
forth, were mainly repetitive of Chapter 11.
If the Court will look at the extract from Page 256, it reads as
follows:
"Had not been possible for them to employ members of the
it

inferior race which they conquered, the Aryans would never

have been in a position to take the first steps on the road
which led them to a later type of culture; just as, without the
help of certain suitable animals which they were able to tame,
they would never have come to the invention of mechanical
power, which has subsequently enabled them to do without
these beasts. ...
"For the establishment of superior types of civilization the
members of inferior races formed one of the most essential
prerequisites
Andin a later passage in Mein Kampf, at Page 344, Hitler applies
these general ideas to Germany:
"If in its historical development the German people had pos-
sessed the unity of the herd by which other people have so
much benefited, then the German Reich would probably be
mistress of the globe today. World history would have taken
another course, and in this case no man can tell if what many
blinded pacifists hope to attain by petitioning, whining, and
crying may not have been reached in this way: namely, a
peace which would not be based upon the waving of olive
branches by tearful misery-mongering of pacifist old women,
but a peace that would be guaranteed by the triumphant
sword of a people endowed with the power to master the
world and administer it in the service of a higher civilization."
In these passages which I have quoted, the Tribunal will have
noticed Hitler's love of war and scorn of those whom he described
as pacifists. The underlying message of the whole of this book,
which appears again and again, is: Firstly, that the struggle for
existence requires the organization and use of force; secondly, that

522
 8 Jan. 46

the Aryan German is superior to other races and has the right to
conquer and rule them; thirdly, that all doctrines which preach
peaceable solutions of international problems represent a disastrous
weakness in the nation that adopts them.
Implicit in the whole of the argument is a fundamental and arro-
gant denial of the possibility of any rule of law in international
affairs.

the light of the general doctrines of Mein Kampf that I

It is in
invite the Tribunal to consider the more definite passages in which
Hitler deals with specific problems of German foreign policy.
The very first page of the book contains a remarkable forecast
of Nazi policy. It reads —Page 1, Column 1:

"German Austria must be restored to the great German

motherland; and not, indeed, on any grounds of economic cal-
culation whatsoever. No, no. Even if the union were a matter
of economic indifference, and even if it were to be dis-
advantageous from the economic standpoint, still it ought to
take place. People of the same blood should be in the same
Reich. The German people will have no right to engage in
a colonial policy until they shall have brought all their chil-
dren together in one state. When the territory of the Reich
embraces all the Germans and finds itself unable to assure
them a livelihood, only then can the moral right arise from
the need of the people, to acquire foreign territory. The
plough is then the sword; and the tears of war will produce
the daily bread for the generations to come."
Hitler in this book also roundly declares that the mere restoration
of Germany's frontiers as they were in 1914 would be wholly insuf-
ficient for his purposes. At Page 553 he writes:
"In regard to this point I should like to make the following
statement: To demand that the 1914 frontiers should be re-
stored is a glaring political absurdity that is fraught with
such consequences as to make the claim itself appear criminal.
The confines of the Reich as they existed in 1914 were
thoroughly illogical because they were not really complete,
in the sense of including all the members of the German
nation. Nor were they reasonable, in view of the geographical
exigencies of military defense. They were not the consequences
of a political plan which had been well considered and
carried out, but they were temporary frontiers established in
virtue of a political struggle that had not been brought to a
finish; and indeed, they were partly the chance result of cir-
cumstances."
In further elaboration of Nazi policy, Hitler does not merely
denounce the Treaty of Versailles; he desires to see a Germany which

523
8 Jan. 46

is a worldpower with territory sufficient for a future German people,

of a magnitude which he does not define.
In the next quotation, from Page 554, the first sentence reads:
"For the future of the German nation the 1914 frontiers are of
no significance."
And in the third paragraph the Court sees:
"We National Socialists must stick firmly to the aim that we
have set for our foreign policy, namely, that the German
people must be assured the territorial area which is necessary
for it to exist on this earth. And only for such action as is
undertaken to secure those ends can it be lawful in the eyes of
God and our German posterity to allow the blood of our people
to be shed once again; before God, because we are sent into
this world with the commission to struggle for our daily bread,
as creatures to whom nothing is donated and who must be able
to win and hold their position as lords of the earth only
through their own intelligence and courage.
"And this justification must be established also before our
German posterity, on the grounds that for each one who has
shed his blood the life ofa thousand others will be guaranteed
to posterity. The territory on which one day our German
peasants will be able to bring forth and nourish their sturdy
sons will justify the blood of the sons of the peasants that has
to be shed today. And the statesmen who have decreed this
sacrifice may be persecuted by their contemporaries, but
posterity will absolve them from all guilt for having
demanded this offering from their people."
Then, the next quotation; Hitler writes at Page 557:
"Germany will either become a world power or will not
continue to exist at all. But, in order to become a world
power, it needs that territorial magnitude which gives it the
necessary importance today and assures the existence of its
citizens."
And, finally, he writes:
"... we must take our stand on the principles already men-
tioned in regard to foreign policy, namely, the necessity of
bringing our territorial area into just proportion with the
number of our population. From the past we can learn only
one lesson, and this is that the aim which is to be pursued
in our political conduct must be twofold, namely: (1) The
acquisition of territory as the objective of our foreign policy,
and (2) the establishment of a new and uniform foundation
as the objective of our political activities at home, in accord-
ance with our doctrine of nationhood."

524
 8 Jan. 46

Now these passages from Mein Kampf raise the question: Where
did Hitler expect to find the increased territory beyond the 1914
boundaries of Germany? To this Hitler's answer is sufficiently
explicit. Reviewing the history of the German Empire from 1871 to
1918, he wrote in an early passage of Mein Kampf, at Page 132:
"Therefore, the only possibility which Germany had of carry-
ing a sound territorial policy into effect was that of acquir-
ing new territory in Europe itself. Colonies cannot serve this
purpose so long as they are not suited for settlement by
Europeans on a large scale. In the nineteenth century it was
no longer possible to acquire such colonies by peaceful means.
Therefore, any attempt at such a colonial expansion would
have meant an enormous military struggle. Consequently, it
would have been more practical to undertake that military
struggle for new territory in Europe rather than to wage war
for the acquisition of possessions abroad.
"Such a decision naturally demanded that the nation's
undivided energies should be devoted to it. A policy of that
kind, which requires for its fulfillment every ounce of avail-
able energy on the part of everybody concerned, cannot be
carried into effect by half measures or in a hesitant manner.
The political leadership of the German Empire should then
have been directed exclusively to this goal. No political step
should have been taken in response to considerations other
than this task and the means of accomplishing it. Germany
should have been alive to the fact that such a goal could have
been reached only by war, and the prospect of war should
have been faced with calm and collected determination.
"The whole system of alliances should have been envisaged
and valued from that standpoint."
And then this is the vital sentence:
"If new territory were to be acquired in Europe, it must have
been mainly at Russia's cost, and once again the new German
Empire should have set out on its march along the same road
as was formerly trodden by the Teutonic Knights, this time
to acquire soil for the German plough by means of the German
sword and thus provide the nation with its daily bread."
To this program of expansion in the East, Hitler returned again
at the end of Mein Kampf. After discussing the insufficiency of
Germany's pre-war frontiers, he again points the path to the East
and declares that the 'Drang nach Osten' (the drive to the East) must
be resumed; and he writes:
"Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a line
through the line of conduct followed by pre-war Germany in
foreign policy .... We put an end to the perpetual Germanic

525
8 Jan. 46

march towards the south and west of Europe and turn our
eyes towards the lands of the East. We finally put a stop to
the colonial and trade policy of pre-war times and pass over
to the territorial policy of the future.
"But when we speak of new territory in Europe today we
must principally think of Russia and the border states subject
to her."
Now was shrewd enough to see that his aggressive designs
Hitler
in the East might be endangered by a defensive alliance between
Russia, France, and England. His foreign policy, as outlined in
Mein Kampf, therefore was to detach England and Italy from France
and Russia and to change the attitude of Germany towards France
from the defensive to the offensive.
The final quotation from Mein Kampf comes from Page 570:
"As long as the eternal conflict between France and Germany
is waged only in the form of a German defense against the
French attack, that conflict can never be decided, and from
century to century Germany will lose one position after
another. If we study the changes that have taken place, from
the 12th century up to our day, in the frontiers within which
the German language is spoken, we can hardly hope for a suc-
cessful issue to result from the acceptance and development of
a line of conduct which has hitherto been so detrimental for us.
"Only when the Germans have taken all this fully into account
will they cease allowing the national will-to-live to wear
itselfout in merely passive defense and will rally together for
a last decisive contest with France. And in this contest the
essential objective of the German nation will be fought for.
Only then will it be possible to put an end to the eternal
Franco-German conflict which has hitherto proved so sterile.
"Of course it is here presumed that Germany sees in the suppres-
sion of France nothing more than a means which will make it
possible for our people finally to expand in another quarter.
Today there are 80 million Germans in Europe. And our
foreign policy will be recognized as rightly conducted only
when, after barely a hundred years, there will be 250 million
Germans living on this continent, not packed together as the
coolies in the factories of another continent, but as tillers of
the soil and workers whose labor will be a mutual assurance
for their existence."
I submit, therefore, that, quite apart from the evidence already
submitted to the Tribunal, the evidence of Mein Kampf, taken in
conjunction with the facts of Nazi Germany's subsequent behavior
towards other countries, goes to show that from the very first
moment that they attained power, and indeed long before that time,

526
 8 Jan. 46

Hitlerand his confederates, the defendants, were engaged in planning

and preparing aggressive war as is alleged against them in this
Indictment.
Events have proved in the blood and misery of millions of men,
women, and children that Mein Kampf was no mere literary exercise
to be treated with easy indifference, as unfortunately it was treated
before the war by those who were imperiled, but was the expression
of a fanatical faith in force and fraud as the means to Nazi
dominance in Europe, if not in the whole world. The Prosecution's
submission is that, accepting and propagating the jungle philosophy
of Mein Kampf, the Nazi confederates who are indicted here deliber-
ately pushed our civilization over the precipice of war.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

SIR DAVID MAX WELL-FYFE May : it please the Tribunal, the

.
next stage of the Prosecution is the presentation of the cases against
the individual defendants under the Counts One and Two of the
Indictment. Before that is begun the chief prosecutors for the United
States and Great Britain wish, with the permission of the Tribunal,
to make four points perfectly clear:
The object of this part of the case is to collect for the benefit,
first, of the members of the Tribunal and, secondly, of the Defense

Counsel concerned, the evidence against each defendant under Counts

One and Two which has been presented by the American and British
Delegations.Otherwise it would be easy among the many docu-
ments already before the Court to miss relevant pieces of evidence
which the Tribunal might wish to consider and to which the defend-
ants may wish to make a reply.
This does not meanthat the case against these defendants has in
any way ended. Vital and important parts of the case remain
concerning the actual atrocities, both War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity. The evidence in regard to these will shortly be presented
by the French Delegation and the Delegation of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and when the massive documentation of these
crimes is placed before the Court, the French and Soviet Delegations
will have the opportunity of relating them to the individual defend-
ants in the dock.
It has been the desire of all the chief prosecutors to delimit as
clearly as possible the evidence under the respective Counts of the
Indictment. The documents in evidence, however, were not written
with a view to this Trial, and therefore many of them inevitably deal
with offenses under more than one Count. It is by reason of this
alone that some overlapping and repetition necessarily exists.

527
8 Jan. 46

Similarly it may occur that as the French and Soviet cases are
developed documents may come to light which bear on the common
plan or the initiation of wars of aggression or on other material con-
nected with Counts One and Two. The American and British Delega-
tions will welcome any addition to the evidence on these parts of the
case which such documents may provide and gladly receive such
reinforcement from their French and Soviet colleagues.
With this explanation, and I am very grateful to the Tribunal for
allowing me to make it, I call on my friend Mr. Albrecht to com-
mence this part of the case.

THOMA: Colonel Wheeler in his accusation concerning the

DR.
oppression of the Christian churches in the Eastern territory also
named the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the
Defendant Rosenberg, and held him responsible. I have, however,
neither in the speech of the Prosecution nor in the document book,
found any proof that such persecution of the Church also took place
in the territories administered by Rosenberg. I wish rather to direct
the attention of the Tribunal to Document 1517-PS, in which there
is a note signed by Rosenberg concerning a discussion on questions
of the East. This document contains the following statement made
by Rosenberg, "The Führer agrees with Rosenberg's Edict of
Tolerance."
THE PRESIDENT: Am I to understand that you are making a
motion at this stage?

DR. THOMA: I have a request to make to the Prosecution: that

it should, if possible, subsequently substantiate its charge against
Rosenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Is your point that this Document 1517-PS
has not yet been in, or what is your point?

DR. THOMA: To my knowledge this document has already been

(

submitted, and that was in connection with Hitler's opinion that the
Crimea question should be cleared up completely. But in my present
request I am concerned with the fact that the Prosecution stated that
in the Government General and likewise in Warthegau and in the
Eastern countries, and in the areas administered by the Defendant
Rosenberg as well, persecution of the Church took place. The Prosecu-
tion has produced documents concerning the first three territories,
but as far as the latter territory is concerned, I have learned of no
such documents being either in the document book or in the personal
presentation made by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you must understand that the Tribunal
are not at this stage accepting everything that has been said by the
Prosecution. You will have full opportunity when you present the
case on behalf of the Defendant Rosenberg to present any documents

528
 8 Jan. 46

which may be relevant and to comment upon any documents which

have been cited by the Prosecution and to make any argument that
you think right; but this is not the appropriate time to make any
such argument. We are still considering the case for the Prose-
cution, and you will have full opportunity hereafter. Do you
understand?
DR. THOMA: Then I ask the High Tribunal to consider my
present explanation as a statement.
THE PRESIDENT: We will do so, but it is not convenient for
Counsel for the Defense to intervene with statements of this sort;
otherwise each one of the defendants' counsel might be doing it all
the time. We must ask you therefore to withhold such statements
until your time comes to answer the case for the Prosecution.

MR. RALPH G. ALBRECHT (Associate Trial Counsel for the

United States): May it please the Tribunal, I have been charged by
the Chief of Counsel for the United States with the duty of pointing
out, on the basis of evidence already admitted and of additional
evidence that will be offered, the individual responsibility of some
of these defendants for the crimes specified in Counts One and Two
of the Indictment.
When these defendants chose to abandon everything that had
been recognized as good in German life and affirmatively par-
ticipated in the work of achieving the objectives of the Party, we
submit that they well knew what National Socialism stood for. They
knew of the program announced by the Nazi Party and they also
had knowledge of Nazi methods. The official NSDAP program with
its 25 points was open and notorious. Announced and published to
the world in 1920, it was published and republished and adverted
to throughout the years. The Nazis made no secret of their inten-
tions to make the Party program the fundamental law of the
German State. The Nazis made no secret of their intentions gener-
ally. For all to read there was Mein Kampf, the product of the
warped brain of the Führer, and there were the prolific writings
and utterances of many other leaders who rose to prominence, some
of whom are not sitting in the defendants' box. And Hitler himself
had announced that the Nazis would use force if necessary to
achieve their purposes.
Among these conspirators there were those who, like the
Defendants Hess, Rosenberg, and Goring, were associated with
Hitler since the very inception of the conspiracy. These men were
among the original planners. They were the men who subsequently
set the pace and cast the mould for the future. But there were also
other conspirators (the balance of the defendants in the dock fit
into this category), who voluntarily joined the conspiracy later.

529
 8 Jan. 46

While these men may be characterized perhaps as cruel, callous,

or inhuman, they certainly may not be called dull or stupid. They
knew, and had had the opportunity to observe, the manifestations
of Nazi violence and Nazi methods as the pattern of the swastika
developed. They knew the nature of what they were getting into.
Therefore they must be presumed to have had the desire to partic-
ipate^ — —
and participate they did voluntarily, and so we submit
that it may not validly be inferred that they did not join the stream
of the conspiracy with their eyes open, scienter, as the conspiracy
gathered momentum and developed into a rushing torrent.
Much evidence has already been admitted by the Tribunal of
the overt acts of these defendants, as well as of their fellow con-
spirators. We shall make no effort at this time to present an exhaus-
tive recital of all crimes planned or initiated by these defendants
for which they must bear full responsibility beyond peradventure.
The world already knows more of the evil deeds of these men and
of their co-conspirators than the Prosecution possibly could hope
to establish within the reasonable limits of time and of men's
patience. At this point we shall attempt to focus attention merely
to illustrative criminal conduct of the individual conspirators.
There is an advantage to proceeding, we submit, as we propose
to do, with the permission of the Tribunal, to show in outline the
extent to which these defendants have become implicated in the
serious charges against them. In the case of many of these con-
spirators, a recital of their crimes will relate to their planning of
several of the categories of crimes described in Counts One and Two
of the Indictment. We shall draw these various threads together
and show, as I have said, the outline of the completed proof, as it
were, within Count One of the Indictment, against the individual
conspirators.
Thus, on behalf of the United States, I shall commence to show
how some of these defendants fit into the broad stream of the
Common Plan or Conspiracy to wage aggressive war and the extent
of their individual responsibility for their acts in pursuance of that
conspiracy.
First of all, we mention the late Defendant Robert Ley who, by
recourse to self-destruction, has escaped all punishment for his
participation in the conspiracy.
Next we mention Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, the
action against whom has been severed from this proceeding.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that documentary proof has
been offered and will be offered in support of the allegations of the
Indictment that implicate both Ley and Krupp as co-conspirators,
for whose crimes the remaining defendants also must accept
responsibility.

530
 8 Jan. 46

Next we consider the Defendant Fritz Sauckel. The case against

Sauckel has been completely stated and supported by a wealth of
damning evidence by my learned colleague Mr. Dodd in his presen-
tation of the case on slave labor. We submit that it is unnecessary to
add anything further to the case against Sauckel to demonstrate
how completely he filled his place in the stream of the conspiracy.
The next defendant to be considered is Albert Speer. Like his
fellow-conspirator Sauckel, Speer is deeply implicated as a member
of the conspiracy and much of the case against him has been
presented by Mr. Dodd in the case on slave labor. But, unlike
Sauckel, Speer's criminal activity went substantially beyond the
realm of slave labor. His was one of the master minds in the plan
for the systematic robbery and spoliation of the lands overrun by
the German war machine. Documentary proof of Speer's partic-
ipation in the spoliation practices in the countries of Western
Europe, as well as in the Occupied Eastern Territories, will be
presented subsequently by our learned colleagues, the Chief Prose-
cutor representing the Soviet Union and the Chief French Prose-
cutor, under the remaining Counts of the Indictment. This is essen-
tially the case that proves Speer to have been a member of the
conspiracy.
There is, I would like to
however, one additional exhibit that
was received only a few days
offer into evidence at this time. It
ago from the Ministerial Document Center at Kassel and it is a
dossier maintained on the Defendant Speer in the offices of the
Reichsführer SS. I offer this file as Exhibit Number USA-575. It
is our Document 3568-PS and I shall read from the dossier. I shall

read from the letter dated the 25th of July 1942, from the second
paragraph:
"Reich Minister Speer was enrolled as an SS man on the
personal staff of the Reichsführer SS under SS Number 46104,
with effect from the 20th of July 1942, by order of the Reichs-
führer SS."
And I think that is all I need to read from that letter. But I
should like to call the Tribunal's attention to the annexed document,
which is a questionnaire, and right at the beginning of the same it
is related that Albert Speer was in the SS since the autumn of 1932,
and his membership number in the Party was 474481.
I next mention the Defendant Ernst Kaltenbrunner, whose case
has been completely presented in connection with the presentation
on the Gestapo and the SD as criminal organizations. We submit
that further proof is not needed to prove how completely this
enemy of his own fatherland, Austria, had been carried along in
the stream of the conspiracy.

531
8 Jan. 46

We
pass then to the case of perhaps the most important con-
spirator on trial before this Tribunal —
the Number Two Nazi, the
Nazi who stood next to the Führer himself, the Nazi who was in
some respects even more dangerous than the Führer and other
leading Party leaders.
We say that he was more dangerous because, unlike many
leading Nazis, including Hitler, who were morally and socially on
the fringes of society before the Nazi Party rode to success in
1933, this conspirator was known to come of substantial family
which had furnished officers to the army and important civil
servants to the country in the past. Moreover, he was possessed of
substantial appearance, an ingratiating manner, a certain affability.
But all of these facets of character were but deceptions, because
they helped to conceal the man's core of steel, his vindictiveness,
his cruelty, his lust for self-adornment, self-glorification, and power.
This man was most dangerous, furthermore, because the
outward characteristics to which I have called attention and which
he has to some extent demonstrated here in the presence of the
Tribunal were useful in deceiving the representatives of foreign
states who, in their concern, sought to learn from him the true
intentions of the Nazi State which, by its repeated floutings of its
international commitments, had so seriously disturbed the tranquil-
lity of the world since 1933.

And think that the record should show how throughout the
I

earlier stages of this Trial, thatis, before the nature of the docu-

—
mentary evidence offered by the Prosecution too grim and almost
—
implausible much of the benevolence of this conspirator, his ever-
ready smile and ingratiating manner, were daily in evidence in this
chamber. His ready affirmation, by a pleasant nod for all to see,
of the correctness of statements made or the contents of documents
offered by counsel, his chiding shake of the head when he disagreed
with such facts were commonplace.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think the Tribunal is interested in
this, Mr. Albrecht.
MR. ALBRECHT: I shall pass on, then, with the presentation,
with the permission of the Tribunal, and I shall give an account of
certain facts already established by the documents in evidence; and
with the permission of the Tribunal I shall not, unless it is so
wished, refer to the exhibit numbers or citations of most of the old
evidence that I shall allude to. These are all set forth in the trial
brief that has already been distributed.
Against the background of this factual account, into which we
have drawn the main threads of the case already presented that
show the complicity of the Defendant Goring, we shall offer certain

532
 8 Jan. 46

additional documentary evidence which we believe necessary to

demonstrate Göring's connection and responsibility for certain
phases of the conspiracy.
I should have said before, if Your Honors please, that there have
been distributed and are now before you three volumes of document
books bearing the letters "DD," which contain substantially all the
documents, new as well as old, bearing on the individual respon-
sibility of this defendant.

We shall first deal with the individual responsibility of this

conspirator for Crimes against Peace. These crimes include Göring's
participation in the acquisition and consolidation of power in Ger-
many, the economic and military preparations for war, and the
waging of aggressive war.
For more than two decades Göring's activities extended over
nearly every phase of the conspiracy. He was one of the con-
spirators associated with Hitler from the very beginning. A member
of the Party since 1922, he participated in the Munich Putsch of
November 1923 at the head of the SA, a Nazi organization shown to
have been committed to the use of violence.
Goring fled the country after the Putsch in order to escape
arrest. After his return he became more than a commander of street
fighters. He was designated Hitler's first political assistant. A
measure of the man may be gleaned from an exhibit already in
evidence, namely, Gritzbach's official biography of Goring, in which
are recorded his dealings with the Brüning Government, his
attempts to break down the barrier around President Von Hinden-
burg, and his coup as Reichstag President in September 1932 in
procuring a vote of no confidence against the Von Papen Govern-
ment just before the Reichstag was dissolved.
Göring's writings show him not to be backward in taking credit
for his efforts to advance the cause of the Party. Full credit has
also been accorded him by Hitler, and Goring has boasted that no
titleand no decoration could make him so proud as the designation
given to him by the German people, and I quote, "the most faithful
paladin of our Führer." That short quotation, may it please the
Court, comes from our Exhibit Number USA-233, our Document
2324-PS.
With the advent of the Nazis to power in January 1933 Goring
became acting Minister of the Interior and Prime Minister of Prus-
sia. In these capacities he proceeded promptly to establish a regime
of terror in Prussia designed to suppress all opposition to the Nazi
program.
His chief tool in that connection was the Prussian Police, which
remained under his jurisdiction until 1936. As early as February

533
8 Jan. 46

1933, he directed the entire police force to render unqualified

assistance to the para-military organizations supporting the new
government, such as the SA and the SS, and to crush all political
opponents with firearms, if necessary, and regardless of the conse-
quences. The Tribunal will take judicial notice of the directives of
the 10th and 17th of February 1933, which are cited on Page 7 of
our brief and which appear in that collection of decrees known as
the Ministerialblatt für die Preussische Innere Verwaltung of 1933.
Göring has frequently and proudly acknowledged his personal
responsibility for the crimes committed pursuant to orders of this
character, and I recall his words which he uttered before thousands
of his fellow Germans:
"Each bullet which leaves the barrel of a police pistol now is
my bullet. If one calls this murder, then I have murdered;
I ordered all this, I back it up. I assume the responsibility

and I am not afraid to do so."

That quotation, may it please the Tribunal, comes from our
Exhibit Number USA-233, already in evidence, our Document
2324-PS.
Soon became Prime Minister of Prussia, in pursuance
after he
of the conspiracy, Göring began to develop the Gestapo or Secret
State Police, the details of which organization of terror were
presented to the Court by my learned colleague, Colonel Storey. As
early as the 26th of April 1933, he signed the first law officially
establishing the Gestapo in Prussia; and, pursuant to a decree which
he signed, he named himself Prime Minister, Chief of the Prussian
Secret State Police.
Göring was undoubtedly an efficient conspirator. He was
impatient to consolidate the power of the Party at home. Already
in spring 1933 the concentration camps were established in Prussia.
Men and women, so-called "Marxists" and other political opponents,
taken into custody by the Gestapo were thrown into concentration
camps without trial. Göring said, "Against the enemies of the state
we must proceed ruthlessly." That statement appears in our Docu-
ment 2324-PS, which is already in evidence as Exhibit Number
USA-233.
The rangeof political terrorism under his leadership was almost
limitless. A
glance at a few of his police directives in those early
days will indicate the extent and thoroughness with which every
dissident voice was silenced. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial
notice of some of these decrees in the same collection I mentioned
a short while ago, entitled the Ministerialblatt für die Preussische
Innere Verwaltung, and we have cited these decrees on Pages 9
and 10 of our brief. These include:

534
 8 Jan. 46

A directive of the 22d of June 1933, which required all officials

to watch the statements of civil servants and to denounce to the
Defendant Goring those who made critical remarks. The failure to
make such reports was to be regarded as proof of hostile attitude.
Then there was the directive of the 23rd of June 1933, which sup-
pressed all activities of the Social Democratic Party, including
meetings and the party press, and ordered the confiscation of its
property. There was the directive of the 30th of June 1933, which
directed the Gestapo authorities to report to the Labor Trustees
on the political attitude of the workers. There was the directive of
the 15th of January 1934, which ordered the Gestapo and the
frontier police to keep track of émigrés, particularly political
émigrés and Jews residing in neighboring countries, and to arrest
them and to put them in concentration camps if they returned to
Germany.
The essential ruthlessness of Goring is further illustrated by a
well-known bloody episode. After the elimination of the forces of
the opposition, the Nazis felt it necessary to dispose of non-conform-
ists within their own ranks. This they accomplished in what has
become known as the Röhm Purge of the 30th of June 1934. The
Defendant Frick, a chief conspirator in his own right, stated in that
connection, in an affidavit, that many people were murdered who
had nothing to do with the internal SA revolt, but who were "just
not liked very well."

Göring's role in this sordid affair was related less than 2 weeks
after the event by Hitler in a speech to the Reichstag, and I would
Number USA-576 our Document
like to offer in evidence as Exhibit
3442-PS, in which contained the speech of Hitler made on the
is

13th of July 1934 in the Reichstag. It is published in Das Archiv,

Volume 4, at Page 505. I quote:

"Meanwhile Minister President Goring had already received

my instructions that in case of a purge he was to take analo-
gous measures at once in Berlin and in Prussia. With an iron
fist he beat down the attack on the National Socialist State

before it could develop."

With the accession of the Nazis to power Goring at once assumed
a number of the highest and most influential positions also in the
Reich. The proof already presented on the composition and func-
tions of the Reich Cabinet and of the offices held by Goring shows
him to have been, in fact, the most important executive of the
Nazi State.
A member of the Reichstag since 1928 and its President since
1932, he was a member of the Cabinet from the beginning as Reich

535
8 Jan. 46

Minister without Portfolio. Shortly thereafter he received the port-

folio as Reich Minister for Air. When, in an early meeting, the
Cabinet discussed the pending Enabling Act, which gave the
Cabinet plenary powers of legislation, he offered the suggestion that
the required two-thirds majority might be obtained simply by
refusing admittance to Social Democratic delegates. I offer in
evidence, as Exhibit Number USA-578, our Document 2962-PS,
which contains the minutes of that meeting. If Your Honors will
note, that meeting was held on the 15th of March 1933, and there
were present, besides the Defendant Goring, the Defendants Von
Papen, Von Neurath, Frick, and Funk. I read from Page 6 of that
document:
"Reich Minister Goring expressed his conviction that the
Enabling Act would be passed with the necessary two-thirds
majority. Possibly a majority could be obtained by banishing
several Social Democrats from the hall. Possibly the Social
Democrats would even refrain from voting on the Enabling
."
Act. . .

In with the unmasking of a secret Luftwaffe, Goring

1935,
became Commander-in-Chief. He sat as a member and the
its
Führer's Deputy on the Reich Defense Council, established by the
secret law of the 21st of May 1933. The purpose of that Council was,
as stated by the Defendant Frick in an affidavit that is in evidence
— and I quote:
"To plan preparations and decrees in case of war, which later
on were published by the Ministerial Council for the Defense
of the Reich."
His assumption of ever greater responsibility seemed limitless.
In 1936 Goring was made Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan,
whereby he acquired plenary legislative and administrative powers
over all German economic life. In 1938 he became a member of the
Secret Cabinet Council, which had been established to act as "an
advisory board in the direction of foreign policy."
The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, created in
powers of the Cabinet
1939, took over, in effect, all of the legislative
which had not been reserved otherwise, and Goring became its

chairman.
His efficient and ruthless services were recognized by Hitler in
1939, when he designated Goring as his successor, as heir apparent
to the "New Order."
In April 1936 Goring was appointed Coordinator for Raw Mate-
rialsand Foreign Exchange and empowered to supervise all State
and Party activities in these fields. I offer in support of that fact,
as Exhibit Number USA-577, our Document 2827-PS, which is an

536
 8 Jan. 46

excerpt from Rühle, Das Dritte Reich. I read from the fourth para-
graph of the excerpt, if Your Honor pleases, which is an excerpt
from a decree signed by Hitler, and it reads as follows:
"Minister President, Colonel General Goring will take the
measures necessary for the accomplishment of the tasks given
to him and has the authority to issue decrees and general
administrative directives. He, for this purpose, is authorized
to question and issue directives to all authorities, including
the highest Reich authorities, and all agencies of the Party,
its formations and attached organizations."

In this capacity Goring convened the War Minister, the Defend-

ant Schacht as Minister of Economics and President of the
Reichsbank, and the Finance Minister for the Reich and the State
of Prussia to discuss inter-agency problems connected with war
mobilization. At a meeting of this group on the 12th of May 1936,
when the question of the prohibitive cost of synthetic raw material
substitutes arose, Goring decided:

"If we have war tomorrow we must help ourselves by

substitutes. Then money will not play any role at all. If that
is the case, then we must be ready to create the prerequisites
for that in peacetime."

A few days later, on the 27th of May meeting of the

1936, at a
same group Goring opposed any limitations dictated by orthodox
financial policies. He said that "all measures are to be considered
from the standpoint of an assured waging of war."

The well-known Four Year Plan was proclaimed by Hitler at

the 1936 Nuremberg Party Day. Goring was appointed Plenipoten-
tiary in charge of the program, which was intended to achieve
national self-sufficiency. Furthermore, Goring commented in 1936
that his chief task as Plenipotentiary was "to put the whole economy
on a war footing within 4 years." I would like to offer into evidence,
as Exhibit Number USA-579, our Document EC-408, so that I may
direct the Tribunal's attention to a memorandum, dated the 30th
of December 1936, of the Defense Division of the Wehrmacht,
entitled, "Memorandum on the Four Year Plan and Preparation
of the War Economy"; and in the third paragraph of the translation,
or at Page 2, in the middle of Paragraph Number 3 in the German
original, there is the statement registered in the protocol, in the
memorandum, that:

"Minister President General Goring, as Commissioner for the

Four Year Plan, by authority of the Führer and Reich Chan-
cellor, granted 18 of October 1936.

537
8 Jan. 46

"As regards the war economy, Minister President, Colonel

General Goring sees it as his task 'within 4 years to put the
economy in a state of readiness for war.' "
entire
The exhibit from which I have just read is of interest because
of another document that has just been brought to the attention of
the Prosecution. It is a note for the" files, dated December 2, 1936,
written in longhand on the letterhead of "Minister President General
Goring," and is in the handwriting of Colonel Bodenschatz, Göring's
Chief of Staff. I offer this memorandum as Exhibit Number
USA-580. It is our Document 3474-PS, and I direct the Tribunal's
attention to the fact that the date of this document is the 2d of
December 1936. That was a conference, apparently, at which all
the chief officers and generals of the Air Force, the German Air
Force, met. Besides the Defendant Goring, there were General
Milch, General Kesselring, Rüdel, Stumpfï, Christiansen, and all the
top commanders of the Air Force, and I read:
"World press excited about the landing of 5,000 German
volunteers in Spain. Official complaint by Great Britain; she
gets in touch with France.
"Italy suggests that Germany and send, each, one
Italy
division ground troops to however, necessary
Spain. It is,

that Italy, as interested Mediterranean power, issue a political

declaration first. A decision can be expected only within a
few days.
"The general situation is very serious. Russia wants the war.
England rearms speedily. Command therefore: Beginning
—
today 'höchste Einsatzbereitschaft' " apparently the translator
did not see fit to translate those words, which mean the
—
"highest degree of readiness" "regardless of financial diffi-
culties. Goring takes over full responsibility."

"Peace until 1941 is desirable. However, we cannot know

whether there will be implications before. We are already in
a state of war. It is only that no shot is being fired so far."
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a convenient time to
break off.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

538
 8 Jan. 46

Afternoon Session

MR. ALBRECHT: May it please the Tribunal, two important

conferences which have already been adverted to by the Prose-
cution show clearly how the Defendant Goring inspired and directed
the preparation of the German economy for aggressive war. On
the 8th of July 1938 he addressed a number of the leading German
aircraft manufacturers and laid the groundwork for a vast increase
in aircraft production. He stated that war with Czechoslovakia was
imminent and boasted that the German Air Force was already
superior in quality and quantity to the English. He said that:
"... if Germany wins the war. Then she will be the greatest
power in the world, dominating the world market, and
Germany will be a rich nation. For this goal, risks must be
."
taken. . .

That quotation, may it please the Court, is taken from Document

R-140, Exhibit Number USA-160.
A few weeks after the Munich Agreement, on the 14th of
October 1938, at another conference held in Göring's office, he
made the statement that Hitler had instructed him to organize
a gigantic armament program which would make insignificant all
previous achievements. He indicated that he had been ordered to
build as rapidly as possible an air force five times as large, to
increase the speed of army and navy rearmament, and to con-
centrate on offensive weapons, principally heavy artillery and
heavy tanks; and at that meeting he proposed a specific program
designed to accomplish those ends. That is a short summary of
facts which appear from Exhibit Number USA-123 already in
evidence, our Document 1301-PS.
In his dual role as Reich Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief
of the German Air Force it was Göring's function to develop the
Luftwaffe to practical war strength. As early as the 10th of March
1935, in an interview with the correspondent of the London Daily
Mail, the mask of hypocrisy was removed and Goring frankly
announced to the world that he was in the process of building a
true military air force.
Two months later, in a speech to 1,000 Air Force officers, Goring
spoke in a still bolder vein. I offer in evidence from Exhibit
—
Number USA-437, our Document 3441-PS which is Göring's Reden
—
und Aufsätze another excerpt that has not yet been read in
evidence, from Page 242. Goring said:
"I repeat: I intend to create a Luftwaffe which, if the hour
should strike, shall burst upon the foe like a chorus of
revenge. The enemy must have the feeling of being lost
already before having fought."

539
 —
8 Jan. 46

In the same year, on the 16th of March 1935, he signed his name
to the conscription law which provided for compulsory military
service and constituted an act of defiance on the part of Nazi
Germany in violation of the Versailles Treaty. The Tribunal will
take judicial notice of that decree, which is our Document 1654-PS,
from which I shall not read, with the permission of the Tribunal
the Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces; it is cited in
1935 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 369.
As is demonstrated by the affidavit of Ambassador Messersmith
already in evidence, Göring's statements during this period left
no doubt in the minds of Allied diplomats that Germany was
engaged in full mobilization of air power for an impending war.
Goring was in fact the central figure in German preparation for
military aggression. In German économie development, too, he
held the key positions throughout the pre-war period. Although
he held no official position in the field of foreign affairs, as the
Number Two Nazi, history records that he was prominent in all
major phases of Nazi aggression between 1937 and 1941.
In the Austrian affair Goring was the prompter and director of
the diplomatic "tragicomedy" enacted before a shocked but silent
world.
The Tribunal is familiar with Göring's complicity in the aggres-
sion against Austria. However, some additional documents have
just come to our notice which show that Goring not only partic-
ipated actively, but may even have been in direct charge of the
German plan about the Austrian Anschluss. I will offer
to bring
the first our Document 3473-PS, as Exhibit
of these documents,
Number USA-581. I shall not read from that exhibit, if Your
Honors please, but I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal
to the letter from Keppler, who was one of Göring's agents,
addressed to the Defendant Goring. It is dated the 6th of January
1938. From its context it would seem that a valid inference can
be drawn that Goring was already active in the Austrian matter
in 1937. Our prior evidence brought him into the picture much
later. The Prosecution believes this document to be of great
significance, as it shows that the Defendant Seyss-Inquart actually
had Göring's mandate to carry out the orders of the Nazi con-
spirators in Vienna. The document itself will be read and discussed
in the presentation of the case showing the individual responsibility
of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart; and I shall not take the time of
the Tribunal at this time.
The second document I wish to introduce is Exhibit Number
USA-582, our Document 3472-PS. This exhibit would seem to show
that the conspirators attempted to create the impression that the
Anschluss, when it took place, was achieved by "legal" means. The

540
 8 Jan. 46

command apparently was given the members of the NSDAP in

Austria to keep "hands off" in order to permit the deviltry to be
worked out by the official Reich agencies, that is, through the
Defendant Goring and, presumably, the Defendant Von Papen, by
direct contact with the Austrian officials.
I read from that document:
"Yesterday information reached me to the effect that Landes-
leiter Leopold" —
and may I interrupt for a moment to point
out that the word "Landesleiter" is the title of the leader
of the Nazi community in Austria
—
"also on his part has
started negotiations with Chancellor Schuschnigg. Thereupon
I have asked the Foreign Office to investigate the truth of

this information and, in case it is true, to take care that such

negotiations are not held because they would merely
disturb the proceedings of the other negotiations.
"Just now I got word from the Foreign Office that they
received a report from the embassy in Vienna confirming the
facts. I therefore would like to know whether it would not
be more appropriate to forbid Landesleiter Leopold and the
other members of the country's leadership to negotiate with
Chancellor Schuschnigg as well as with any Austrian Govern-
ment authorities as to the execution of the pact of the 11th
of July 1936, unless it is done after contacting and in agree-
ment with the authorities in charge in the Reich."
Now below, if I may call the attention of the Tribunal to the
note that appears in this letter. It is written in blue pencil, and,
while the translator has not indicated the initial below that note,
it is a large "G"; and I have no doubt that that note was written

by the Defendant Goring. It reads:

"Agreed, Minister Hess or Herr Bormann can give this order
best! Keppler ought to ask therefore by telephone!"
If I may direct your attention to the upper right corner, there
is another note in pencil, "Transmitted to Herr Keppler on the
11th of February 1938 by Fräulein Ernst;" and it is signed with
initial "G," which in this case, however, we are quite sure is the
initial of Miss Grundmann, who was one of Göring's secretaries.

The third document I offer as Exhibit Number USA-583, our

Document 3471 -PS. The first letter of this exhibit is written by
the same Keppler to the same Bodenschatz mentioned a short while
ago, but who is now a general. I shall not read from this exhibit,
with the permission of the Tribunal, but I shall briefly summarize
it. This letter and the annexes show that Leopold, the Nazi Landes-
leiter in Austria, was apparently not completely amenable to the
orders given by Berlin and pursued his own methods for
accomplishing an Anschluss. The second annex to this letter,

541
8 Jan. 46

addressed to Keppler, who appears from this letter to have been

an SS Gruppenführer, shows that prominent Nazis had declared
themselves in favor of a Major Klausner to succeed Leopold as
Landesleiter; and I would like to call the Tribunal's attention to
the fact that in the left margin of the covering letter appear some
red crayon marks in the characteristic color employed on several
occasions, to our knowledge, by Goring; and they would seem to
show that Goring personally had seen these documents and that
General Bodenschatz had brought them to his attention. In any
event these letters again demonstrate that Goring was one of the
principal conspirators in the Austrian affair.
When the time finally came, on 11 March 1938, to consummate
the Anschluss, Goring was in complete command. Throughout the
afternoon and evening of that day he directed by telephone the
activities of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart and of the other Nazi
conspirators in Vienna. The pertinent portions of these telephone
conversations, it will be remembered, were read into the record.
It will be recalled that early on the same evening of 11 March
he dictated to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart the telegram which the
latter was to send to Berlin, requesting the Nazi Government to
send German troops to "prevent bloodshed." Two days later he
was able to call the Defendant Ribbentrop in London and gleefully
relate to him of his success and that "this story that we had given
an ultimatum is just foolish gossip."
If I may
interrupt for a moment, that passage I just alluded to
was read into the record at Page 581 (Volume II, Page 424).
Similarly, Goring played an important role in the attack on
Czechoslovakia. In March of 1938, at the time of the Anschluss,
he had given a solemn assurance to the Czechoslovakian Minister
in Berlin that the developments in Austria would in no way have
a detrimental influence on the relations between Germany and
Czechoslovakia and he had emphasized the continued earnest
endeavor on the part of Germany to improve these relations. In
this connection Goring had used the expression, "Ich gebe Ihnen
mein Ehrenwort" ("I give you my word of honor").
That expression was read previously into the record at Page 962
(Volume III, Page 192).
On the other hand, in his address to German airplane manufac-
turers on the 8th of July 1938, which I have already mentioned,
he made his private views on this subject, which were hardly
consistent with his solemn official statements, abundantly clear.
On the 14th of October 1938, shortly after the Munich Agree-
ment, at a conference in the Air Ministry, Goring stated that the
Sudetenland had to be exploited with all means and that he
counted upon a complete industrial assimilation of Czechoslovakia.

542
 —
8 Jan. 46

Meanwhile, as proof before the Tribunal shows, he was deceiving

the representatives of the puppet Slovakian Government to the
same end.
In the following year, with the rape of Czechoslovakia complete,
Goring frankly stated what Germany's purpose had been throughout
the whole affair. He explained that the incorporation of Bohemia
and Moravia into the German economy had taken place, among
other reasons, in order to increase the German war potential by
exploitation of the industry there.
Goring was also a moving force in the later crimes against the
peace. As the successor designate to Hitler, chief of the air forces
and economic czar of Greater Germany, he was a party to all the
planning for military operations of the Nazi forces in the East and
in the West.
In the Polish affair, for example, it was Goring who, on the
31st of January 1935, gave assurances to the Polish Government
through Count Czembek, as revealed in the Polish White Book, of
which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, that "there should
be not the slightest fear in Poland that on the German side it"
—
meaning the German-Polish alliance "would not be continued in
the future." Yet, 4 years later, Goring helped to formulate plans
for the ruthless invasion of Polish territory.
In respect to the attack upon the Soviet Union, the documents
already introduced prove that plans for the ruthless exploitation
of Soviet territory were made months in advance of the opening
of hostilities. Goring was placed in charge of this army of spoliation,
whose mission was that of "seizing raw materials and taking over
all important concerns."

But these specific instances cited are merely illustrative of

Göring's activities in the field of aggressive war. On Pages 20, 21,
and 22 of our brief there appears a list of documents by no —
—
means exhaustive previously offered by the Prosecution, which
demonstrate Göring's knowledge of and continued participation in
the Nazi war program.
We turn now to Göring's responsibility for planning and his
participation in the procurement of forced labor, the deportation
and enslavement of residents of occupied territories, the employ-
ment of prisoners of war in war industry, the looting of works of
art, and the Germanization and spoliation of countries overrun by
the Nazis.
Evidence previously introduced has detailed the slave labor
program of the Nazi conspirators and has shown its two purposes,
both of them criminal. The first was to satisfy the labor require-
ments of the Nazi war machine by forcing residents of occupied
countries to work in Germany. The second purpose was to destroy

543
 —
8 Jan. 46

or weaken the peoples of the occupied territories. It has been

shown that millions of foreign workers were taken to Germany,
for the most part under pressure and generally by physical force;
that these workers were forced to labor under conditions of
indescribable brutality and degradation; and that often they were
used in factories and industries devoted exclusively to the produc-
tion of munitions of war.
Goring was at all times implicated in the slave labor program.
Recruitment and allocation of manpower and determination of
working conditions were included in his jurisdiction as Plenipoten-
tiary for the Four Year Plan, and from its beginning a part of
the Four Year Plan Office was devoted to such work. I ask the
Tribunal in this connection to take judicial notice of our Document
1862-PS, Ordinance for the Execution of the Four Year Plan, dated
18 October 1936, which appears in 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,
Page 887, and with the permission of the Tribunal I shall not read
the same.
Soon after the fall of Poland Goring began the enslavement of
large numbers of Poles. On 25 January 1940 the Defendant Frank,
the Governor General of Poland, reported to Goring on his direc-
tive for the:
"Supply and transportation of at least 1 million male and
female agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich
among them at least 750,000 agricultural workers of which
at least 50 percent must be women in order to guarantee
agricultural production in the Reich and as a replacement
for industrial workers lacking in the Reich."
This is taken from our Exhibit Number USA-172, our Document
Number 1375-PS.
That orders for this enormous number of workers originated
with the Defendant Goring is clear from statements in the
Defendant Frank's diary for 10 May 1940, already introduced in
evidence.
For the harsh treatment given those workers when they reached 1

Germany the Defendant Goring is also responsible. On 8 March

1940, as Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan and as Chairman
of the Cabinet Council for the Defense of the Reich, he issued a
directive entitled, "Treatment of Male and Female Civilian Workers
of Polish Nationality in the Reich." I refer to our Document R-148
as proof of that fact. I shall not introduce it at this time into
evidence, with the permission of the Tribunal, as it will be intro-
duced by the Soviet prosecution at a later date.
On29 January 1942 the division for the employment of labor
in the Four Year Plan office issued a circular, signed by Dr.
Mansfeld, the general delegate for labor employed in the Four Year

544
 8 Jan. 46

Plan office, addressed to various civilian and military authorities

and I quote, "any and
in the occupied territories, explaining that,
all .methods
. . must be adopted" to force workers to go to
. . .

Germany. I shall not read from our exhibit, if the Tribunal please,
but I would like to offer in evidence Document 1183-PS as our
Exhibit Number USA-585. This is a circular letter dated the 29th of
January 1942 of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan.
It has been shown previously that on 21 March 1942 Hitler
promulgated a decree appointing the Defendant Sauckel Pleni-
potentiary General for manpower, directing him to carry out his
tasks within the framework of the Four Year Plan, and making
him directly responsible to Goring as head of the Four Year Plan.
On 27 March 1942 the Defendant Goring issued his important
enabling decree in pursuance of the decree of the Führer of
21 March 1942. The Tribunal has already judicially noted this
decree, which is our Document 1666-PS.
Since the Defendant Sauckel was an authority under the Four
Year Plan, the Defendant Goring retains full responsibility for the
enormous war crimes committed by Sauckel as Plenipotentiary
General for manpower. These crimes have been the subject of our
presentations on slave labor and on the illegal use of prisoners
of war.
It was also proven during those presentations that the Nazi
conspirators ordered prisoners of war to work under dangerous
conditions and in the manufacturing and transportation of arms
and munitions of war, in violation of the laws of war and of
Articles 31 and 32 of the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 on
prisoners of war. The Defendant Goring had a part in all these
crimes.
At a conference on 7 November 1941, the subject of which was
the employment of citizens of the Soviet Union, including prisoners
of war, it appears from a memorandum signed by Körner, who
was State Secretary to the Defendant Goring as Plenipotentiary
for the Four Year Plan, that Goring gave certain ruthless directives
for the use of Soviet citizens, both prisoners of war and free Soviet
workers, as laborers. I refer to our Document 1193-PS which, with
the permission of the Tribunal, I shall not offer in evidence at this
time and which will be offered by the Soviet Prosecution.
In a set of top-secret notes of outlines laid down by Goring in
what was apparently the same conference of 7 November 1941,
which are already in evidence, the following facts appear:
1) That, of a total of 5 million prisoners of war, 2 million were
employed in war industries;
2) That it was better to employ PW's than unsuitable foreign
workers;

545
8 Jan. 46

3) That Poles, Dutchmen, et cetera, should be seized if necessary

as PW's and employed as such, if work through free contract
cannot be obtained.
These facts, if Your Honors please, appear in our Document
1206-PS, which was submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number
USA-215.
In a secret letter from the Reich Minister of Labor to the
presidents of the regional labor exchange offices, already in
evidence, it is furthermore recorded that upon the personal order
of the Reich Marshal, the Defendant Goring, 100,000 men are to
be taken from among the French PW's not yet employed in the
armament industry and assigned to the airplane armament industry
and that gaps in manpower supply resulting therefrom are to be
filled by Soviet PW's.

has also been introduced showing the organized,

Evidence
systematic program of the Nazi conspirators for the cultural
impoverishment of every country in Europe. The continuous connec-
tion of the Defendant Goring with these activities has been
substantiated.
In October 1939 the Defendant Goring requested Dr. Mühlmann
to undertake immediately the "securing" of all Polish art treasures.
In his affidavit, already offered, Dr. Mühlmann states that he was
the special deputy of the Governor General of Poland, the
Defendant Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the
Government General from October 1939 to September 1943, and
that the Defendant Goring, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Reich Defense Council, had commissioned him with this duty.
Mühlmann also confirms that it was the official policy of the
Defendant Frank to take into custody all important art treasures
which belonged to Polish public institutions, private collections, and
the Church, and that such art treasures were actually confiscated.
It appears also from a report made by Dr. Mühlmann on 16 July
1943 on his operations that at one time 31 valuable sketches by the
artist Albrecht Dürer were taken from the Polish collection and
personally handed to the Defendant Goring who took them to the
Führer' s headquarters.
The part played by Goring in the looting of art by the Einsatz-
stab Rosenberg has been shown. We refer to Exhibit Number
USA-368, which is our Document Number 141-PS, which is an
order dated 5 November 1940, already read in evidence, in which
Goring directs the chief of the Military Administration in Paris and
the Einsatzstab Rosenberg to dispose of the art objects brought to
the Louvre in the following priority:
"1) Those art objects as to the use of which the Führer has
reserved the decision for himself;

546
 8 Jan. 46

"2) Those art objects which serve to complete the Reich

Marshal's collection;
"3) Those art objects and library stocks, which seem of use
for the establishment of the Hohe Schule and for Rosenberg's
sphere of activities;
"
"4) Those art objects suitable for German museums
In view of the high priority afforded by the foregoing order to
the completion of the defendant's own collection, it is not surprising
to find that Goring continued to aid the operations of the Einsatz-
stab Rosenberg. It has been established that on 1 May 1941 Goring
issued an order under his own signature to all Party, State, and
Wehrmacht services, requesting them to give all possible support
and assistance to the chief of staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg.
By May 1942 the Defendant Goring was able to boast of the
assistance which he had rendered to the work of the Einsatzstab
Rosenberg. In our Document 1015(i)-PS which has been read in
evidence on Page 1678 of the record (Volume IV, Page 87), he is
shown writing to the Defendant Rosenberg that he personally
supports the work of the Einsatzstab wherever he can do so and
that accounted for the seizure of such a large number of art objects
because he was able to render assistance to the Einsatzstab.
Thus, the Defendant Göring's responsibility for the planning of
the looting of art, which was actually accomplished by the Einsatz-
stab Rosenberg, would seem clear.
Details of the execution of both the Germanization and spolia-
tion policies in both the Western and Eastern countries occupied
by the German armies will be presented subsequently by the French
and Soviet Delegations. The responsibility of the Defendant Goring,
in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, as Pres-
ident of the Cabinet Council for the Defense of the Reich, and in
other capacities, will be further demonstrated by that evidence.
The plans of the Nazi conspirators with respect to Poland have
been shown by evidence already offered. The Nazis purported to
incorporate the four western provinces of Poland into the German
Reich. In the remaining portions occupied by them they set up
the Government General. It has been shown that the Nazis
planned to germanize the so-called incorporated territories ruth-
lessly, by deporting the Polish intelligentsia, Jews, and dissident
elements to the Government General for eventual elimination, by
confiscating Polish property, by sending those so deprived of their
property to Germany and by importing German settlers.
as laborers,
It was specifically planned to exploit the people and material
resources of the territory within the Government General by taking
whatever was needed to strengthen the Nazi war machine, thus
impoverishing this region and reducing it to a vassal state.

547
8 Jan. 46

The Defendant Goring, together with Hitler and Lammers and

with the Defendants Frick and Hess, on 8 October 1939 signed the
decree by which certain parts of Polish territory were incorporated
into the Reich.
Purporting to act by virtue of the foregoing decree, Goring, as
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, signed an order on
30 October 1939 concerning the introduction of the Four Year Plan
in the Eastern territories.
In his directive dated 19 October 1939 (Document Number EC-41Ô,
Exhibit Number USA-298) Goring stated that the task for the
economic treatment of the various administrative regions would
differ, depending on whether a country was to be incorporated
politically into the German Reich or whether the Government
General was involved, which, in all probability, would not be
made a part of Germany. He went on to say:
"In the first mentioned territories the reconstruction and
expansion of the economy, the safeguarding of all their
production facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well
as a complete incorporation into the Greater German
economic system at the earliest possible time. On the other
hand there must be removed from the territories of the
Government General all raw materials, scrap materials,
machines, et cetera, which are of use for the German war
economy. Enterprises which are not absolutely necessary for
the meager maintenance of the bare existence of the popula-
tion must be transferred to Germany, unless such transfer
would require an unreasonably long period of time and would
make it more practical to exploit those enterprises by giving

them German orders to be executed at their present location."

From the foregoing documents the complicity of the Defendant
Goring in the plans for the ruthless exploitation of Poland appears
clear. But his fine hand also may be found behind the remainder
of the Nazi plans for Poland. As an illustration, it was the
Defendant Goring who signed, with Hitler and the Defendant
Keitel, the secret decree of 7 October 1939 which entrusted Himmler
with the task of executing the Germanization program. That secret
decree was read into evidence at Pages 1522-23 (Volume III,
Page 583).
Evidence already introduced has shown from the mouths of
Himmler, the Defendant Frank, and others just what this appoint-
ment involved in human suffering and degradation.
Similarly, it was the Defendant Goring who, by virtue of his
powers as Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, issued a decree
on 17 September 1940 concerning confiscation in the incorporated
Eastern territories. This decree applied to "property of citizens of

548
 8 Jan. 46

the former Polish State within the territory of the Greater German
Reich including the incorporated Eastern territories." I ask the
Court to take judicial notice of our Document 1665-PS, which is an
"Order concerning Treatment of Property of Nationals of the
Former Polish State," cited in 1940 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I,
Page 1270. I shall read from this document:
"Article I.

"1) Property of nationals of the former Polish State within

the area of the Greater German Reich, including annexed
Eastern territories, is subject to confiscation, administration
by commissioner and sequestration in accordance with the
following regulations."
I now skip to Article II.

"1) Confiscation will be applied in case of property belong-

ing to: a) Jews; b) persons who have fled or who have
absented themselves for longer than a temporary period.
"2) Confiscation may be applied: a) If the property is needed
for the public good, especially for purposes of national defense
or the strengthening of German folkdom; b) if the owners
or other persons entitled to it immigrated into the area of the
German Reich after 1 October 1918."
I skip now to Article IX, the first part:
"1) Sequestered property can be confiscated in favor of the
Reich by the competent office ... if the public weal, partic-
ularly the defense of the Reich or the consolidation of the
German nationality, requires it."

Evidence has also been introduced by the United States showing

the extent to which the spoliation of Soviet territory and resources
and the barbarous treatment inflicted on Soviet citizens were the
result of pians long made and carefully drawn up by the Nazis
before they launched their aggressive war on the Soviet Union. The
Nazis planned to destroy the industrial potential of the northern
regions occupied by their armies and so to administer the produc-
tion of food in the south and southeast, which normally produced
a surplus of food, that the population of the northern region would
inevitably be reduced to starvation because of diversion of such
surplus food to the German Reich. It has been shown also that the
Nazis planned to incorporate Galicia and all of the Baltic countries
into Germany and to convert the Crimea, an area north of the
Crimea, the Volga territory, and the district around Baku into
German colonies.
By 29 April 1941, almost 2 months prior to the invasion of the
Soviet Union, it appears that Hitler had entrusted the Defendant
Goring with the over-all direction of the economic administration

549
8 Jan. 46

in the area of operationsand in the areas under political administra-

tion. further appears that Goring had set up an economic staff
It
and subsidiary authorities to carry out this function.
The form by Goring and the duties
of this organization created
of its various sections appear more clearly in a set of directives
"for the operation of the economy in the newly occupied Eastern
territories" issued by Goring, as Reich Marshal of the Greater
German Reich, in June 1941. These directives are contained in
the important Green Portfolio which, curiously enough, was printed
by the Wehrmacht. By the terms of these directives it is stated that:
"The orders of the Reich Marshal cover all economic fields,
including nutrition and agriculture. They are to be executed
by the subordinate economic offices. ..."
An Economic Staff East was charged with the execution of
orders transmitted to it from higher authority. One subdivision of
this staff, the agricultural section, was charged with the following
functions:
"Nutrition and agriculture, the economy of all agricultural
products, provision of supplies for the Army in co-operation
with the army groups concerned."
Excerpts from the Green Portfolio have already been admitted
as Exhibit Number USA-315, but I will offer at this time without
reading some additional excerpts in support of the facts that have
just been related. I would like to offer, as Exhibit Number USA-587,
our Document 1743-PS. This is another copy of the Green Portfolio,
and I want to offer this portfolio to show to the Tribunal that these
directives were originally published in June 1941. Document EC-472,
which is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-315, was a
revised edition published in July 1941. In other words, the economic
plan for the invasion was ready when the Wehrmacht actually
marched into the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.
As appears from the foregoing directives, it was a subdivision
of the economic organization set up by the Defendant Goring, the
agricultural section of the Economic Staff East, which rendered a
report on 23 May 1941, containing a set of policy directives for the
exploitation of Soviet agriculture. It will be recalled that these
directives contemplated abandonment of all industry in the food
deficit regions, with certain exceptions, and the diversion of food
from the food surplus regions to German needs, even though
millions of people would inevitably die of starvation as a result.
Those directives have already been read into evidence at Page 1558
(Volume IV, Page 5).
Minutes of a meeting at Hitler's headquarters on 16 July 1941,
kept by the Defendant Bormann, have also been read in part in
evidence. It was at this meeting that Hitler stated that the Nazis

550
 8 Jan. 46

never intended to leave the countries then being occupied by their

armies, that although the rest of the world was to be deceived on
this point, nevertheless, "this need not prevent us from taking all
— —
necessary measures shooting, desettling, et cetera and we shall
take them." That quotation, may it please the Tribunal, was taken
from our Exhibit USA-317, our Document L-221. Then Hitler
discussed making the Crimea and other parts of the Soviet Union
into German colonies. The Defendant Goring was present and
participated in this conference.
As a final illustration it appears from a memorandum dated

16 September 1941, which is our Exhibit Number USA-318, that

Goring presided over a meeting of German military officials
concerned with the better exploitation of the occupied territories
for the German food economy. In discussing this topic, the
Defendant Goring said:
"In the occupied territories on principle only those people are
to be supplied with an adequate amount of food who work
for us. Even if one wanted to feed all the other inhabitants,
one could not do it in the newly occupied Eastern areas. It is,
therefore, wrong to funnel off food supplies for this purpose
if it is done at the expense of the Army and necessitates

increased supplies from home."

From the foregoing documents participation of the Defendant
Goring in the Nazi plans for committing wholesale War Crimes in
occupied territories is, we submit, clear.
I turn now Göring's planning and his participation in
to
inhumane acts committed against civilian populations before and
during the war. It has been shown that shortly after becoming
Prime Minister of Prussia in 1933, Goring created the Gestapo in
Prussia, which became a model for that instrument of terror as it
was extended to the rest of Germany. Concentration camps were
established in Prussia in the spring of 1933 under his administra-
tion, and these camps were then placed in the charge of the Gestapo,
of which he was chief.

The extent to which Goring and the other Nazi conspirators

employed these institutions as agencies for the commission of their
crimes already appears from the evidence. In 1936 Himmler became
chief of the German Police. Thereafter Goring was able to devote
his attention chiefly to the task of creating the German Air Force
and to the task of
preparing the nation economically for aggressive
war. However, he continued to be concerned with these institutions
of his creation. An example of this is shown in our Document
1584(I)-PS, already introduced as Exhibit Number USA-221, which
is a teletype sent by Goring to Himmler in which he requested

the latter to place at his disposal as great a number of concentration

551
8 Jan. 46

camp inmates as possible, as the situation of air warfare made the

subterranean transfer of industry necessary.
In his reply Himmler advised Goring by teletype that a survey
on the employment of prisoners in the aviation industry showed
that 36,000 were being employed for the purposes of the Air Forces
and that an increase to a total of 90,000 prisoners was being '

contemplated.
Evidence has been introduced as to medical experiments
performed on human beings at the concentration camp at Dachau
and the part played by Field Marshal Milch, State Secretary and
deputy to the Defendant Goring as Air Minister, for whose acts the
latter must bear full responsibility. It is abundantly clear from
letters written by Milch to General Wolff on 20 May 1942 and to
Himmler in August 1942, both of which have been read in evidence
at Page 1850 of the record (Volume IV, Page 204, 205), our
Document 343-PS.
Finally, I turn to Göring's participation in and planning for
elimination of all members of the Jewish race from the economic
life of Germany and in the planned extermination of all Jews from
the continent of Europe.
In 1935 the Defendant Goring, as President of the Reichstag,
made a speech urging that body to pass the infamous Nuremberg
race laws. I offer, as Exhibit Number USA-588, our Document
3458-PS, which is an excerpt from Rühle, Das Dritte Reich, Page 257.
Goring said:

"God has created the races. He did not want equality and
therefore we energetically reject any attempt to falsify the
concept of race purity by making it equivalent with racial
equality. We have experienced what it means when a people
has to live in accordance with the laws of an equality that is
alien to its kind and contrary to nature. For this equality
does not exist. We have never acknowledged such an
idea and therefore must reject it also, as a matter of
principle, in our laws, and we must acknowledge that purity
of race which nature and providence have destined."

Again, to show his official attitude, as revealed on 26 March

1938 in a speech in Vienna, I offer, as Exhibit Number USA-437, our
Document 3460-PS, starting with Page 348. Goring said:
"I must address myself with a serious word to the city of
Vienna. The city of Vienna can no longer rightfully be called
a German city. So many Jews live in this city. Where there
are 300,000 Jews, you cannot speak of a German city.
"Vienna must once more become a German city, because it
must perform important tasks for Germany in Germany's

552
 8 Jan. 46

Ostmark. These tasks lie in the sphere of culture as well as

in the sphere of economics. In neither of them can we, in the
long run, put up with the Jew.
"This, however, should not be attempted by inappropriate
interference and stupid measures but must be done system-
atically and carefully. As Delegate for the Four Year Plan,
I commission the Reichsstatthalter in Austria jointly with the

Plenipotentiary of the Reich to consider and take any steps

necessary for the redirection of Jewish commerce, i.e., for
the Aryanization of business and economic life, and to
execute this process in accordance with our laws, legally but
inexorably."
Acting within the framework of economic preparation for
aggressive war, the Nazi conspirators then began the complete
elimination of Jews from economic life preparatory to their
physical annihilation. The Defendant Goring, as head of the
Four Year Plan, was in active charge of this phase of the
persecution.
The first step in his campaign was the decree of 26 April 1938,
requiring registration of all Jewish-owned property. Both Goring
and the Defendant Frick signed that law. It is already in evidence.
I beg the Tribunal's pardon. I would like the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of that decree, which is our Document 1406-PS and
cited as 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 414.

Now, armed with the information thus secured, the Nazi

conspirators were fully prepared to take the next step. The killing
of Vom Rath, a German Legation secretary in Paris on 9 November
1938, was made the pretext for widespread "spontaneous" riots,
which included the looting and burning of many Jewish synagogues,
homes, and shops, all carefully organized and supervised by the
Nazi conspirators. The Defendant Goring was fully informed of the
measures taken. The teletype orders of 10 November 1938 given
by Heydrich are already in evidence and were read at Page 1405
of the record (Volume III, Page 500). Aletter which Heydrich wrote
to Goring on the following day has also been read. It is our
Document 3058-PS, Exhibit Number USA-508. In it Himmler
summarizes the so-called "spontaneous" riots that had taken place.
He reported the day after the riot that insofar as the official reports
from the district police were concerned he was able to state that
815 shops were destroyed, 171 dwelling houses set on fire or
destroyed, and that all this indicates only a fraction of the actual
damage caused, as far as arson is concerned. He also said that:
"Due to the urgency of the reporting, the reports received to
date are entirely limited to general statements, such as

553
 .

8 Jan. 46

'numerous' or 'most shops destroyed'. Therefore" — says

Heydrich — "the figures given will be considerably augmented.
"One hundred and ninety-one synagogues were set on fire
and another 76 completely destroyed. In addition 11 parish
halls, cemetery chapels, and similar buildings were set on
fire

"Twenty thousand Jews were arrested. . .

"Thirty-six deaths were reported and those seriously injured

were also numbered at 36."

Immediately after these so-called "spontaneous" riots of

9 November, Goring acted as chairman of a meeting at the Reich
Ministry of Air devoted to the Jewish question, which also was
attended by the Defendant Funk and other conspirators. The
stenographic report on that meeting is an extraordinary document,
and it does not make pretty reading. It is our Document 1816-PS,
which has already been offered as Exhibit Number USA-261.
I should like to read certain passages that have not as yet been

read into the record. I read from the top of first page, the first
two paragraphs of Page 1 of the German original; Goring speaks:
"Gentlemen, today's meeting is of a decisive nature. I have
received a letter written on the Fuhrer's order by the Stabs-
leiter of the Fuhrer's deputy, Bormann, requesting that the
Jewish question be now uniformly comprehended and solved
one way or another. And yesterday once again the Führer
requested me by phone to take co-ordinated action in the
matter.
"Since the problem is mainly an economic one, it is from the
economic angle that it will have to be tackled. Naturally a
number of legal measures will have to be taken which fall
into the sphere of the Minister for Justice and into that of
the Minister of the Interior; then certain resulting propaganda
measures shall be taken care of by the office of the Minister
for Propaganda. The Minister of Finance and the Minister
for /Economic Affairs shall take care of problems falling
intd^jtheir respective departments."
measures to effect the Aryanization of Jewish business
Specific-
were then discussed. A representative of German insurance
companies wah ^called in to assist in the solving of the difficulties
created by the fact that most of the Jewish stores and other property
destroyed in the rioting were, in fact, insured, in some cases, ulti-
mately by foreign insurance companies. All present were agreed
that it would be unfortunate to pass a law which would have the
effect of allowing foreign insurance companies to escape liability.
The Defejrant Goring then suggested a characteristic solution, and

554
 8 Jan. 46

I pass to Page 10. In German it is the third full paragraph on

Page 3/11. Goring said:
"No, I don't even dream of refunding the insurance companies
the money. The companies are liable. No, the money belongs
to the State. That's quite clear. That would indeed be a
present for the insurance companies. You made a wonderful
Petitum there. You'll fulfill your obligations; you may
count on that."
superfluous to quote further from the extensive discussion of
It is
all phases of persecution of the Jews that took place at this meeting.
It is sufficient to point out that on the same day the Defendant
Goring, over his own signature, promulgated three decrees putting
into effect the most important matters decided at this meeting. In
the first of these decrees a collective fine of 1 billion Reichsmarks was
placed on all German Jews. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice
of that decree, which is our Document 1412-PS and appears in 1938
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 1579. .

The second decree entitled, "A Decree on Elimination of Jews

from German Economic Life" barred Jews from trades and crafts.
I ask the Tribunal to notice judicially that decree, which is our
Document 2875-PS, cited in 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 1580.
The third decree entitled, "Decree for the Restoration of the
Appearance of the Streets of Jewish Economic Enterprises" took care
of the insurance question raised in the morning's meeting by provid-
ing that insurance due to the Jews for various losses sustained by
them was to be collected by the State. I ask the Court to notice
judicially that decree also. It is our Document 2694-PS and appears
in 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 1581.

THE PRESIDENT: Shall we break off for 10 minutes there?

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Albrecht, the Tribunal thinks that

methods, which are really methods which we have alrea(
under consideration, might be presented in a more summï^way
than you have been dealing with them, and if you caJBpossibly
shorten the matters with which you are dealing now fryaRimmariz-
ing more than you are, it will be more useful to the Tribunal and
will save time. JÊk »

MR. ALBRECHT: My Lord, I think I am practfiflly through with

this point. At any event I think I shall not have to take more than
5 or 10 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, but I may say that the same
observation will apply to those who follow.

%
555
8 Jan. 46

MR. ALBRECHT: May it please the Tribunal, the material I

alluded to before the recess, we feel, is merely illustrative of the
energetic manner in which the Defendant Goring took part in driving
the Jews from economic life at this period. Two other documents
would seem to be pertinent on this point.
I would like to offer our Document 069-PS as Exhibit Number

USA-589, which is a circular letter dated 17 January 1939 signed by

the Defendant Bormann, distributing a directive of the Defendant
Goring with respect to certain discriminations to be applied in the
housing of the Jews. I will be content with that summarization, if
the Court please, and I do not intend to read further from that
document.
The second document I desire to offer is our Document 1208-PS,
which I offer as Exhibit Number USA-590. That is an order of the
Defendant Goring as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, dated
10 December 1938, prescribing the manner in which exploitation of
Jewish property is to be undertaken and warning that any profit
resulting from the elimination of Jews from economic activity is to
go to the Reich.
There is no need, I believe, to read excerpts from the document,
except that I do wish to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact
that Göring's letter is addressed to
the chief agencies of the Reich,
all
to all the political leaders and leaders
of the affiliated organizations
of the Party, to all Gauleiter, to all Reichsstatthalter (or governors),
and to the various local heads of the German Länder and subdivi-
sions thereof.
As the German armies moved into other countries, the anti-
Jewish laws were extended, often in a more stringent form, to the
occupied territories. Many of the decrees were not signed by the
Defendant Goring himself, but were issued on the basis of decrees
signed by him.
Nevertheless, in his capacity as Commissioner for the Four Year
Plan or as Chairman of the Ministerial Council for National Defense,
the Defendant Goring himself signed a number of anti-Jewish
decrees for occupied territories, including the decrees enumerated on
Pages 47 and 48 of our brief, of which I ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice.
During the later years of the war the program of the Nazi conspir-
ators for the complete physical annihilation of all Jews in Europe
achieved fury. While the execution of this anti-Jewish pro-
its full
gram was for the most part handled by the SS and the Security
Police, the Defendant Goring remains implicated to the last in the
final efforts to achieve a Nazi "solution" of the Jewish problem.
On 31 July 1941 he wrote a letter to the conspirator Heydrich,
which is the final document to which I wish to draw the Tribunal's

556
 8 Jan. 46

attention. It is a fitting climax to our presentation on this

defendant. The reason why it was addressed to the notorious Heyd-
rich, the predecessor of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, need not strain
our imagination. This document is our Document Number 710-PS,
which has already been admitted as Exhibit Number USA-509, in
connection with the case on the Gestapo. While it has already been
read into evidence, with permission of the Court, I would like to
close my presentation with the reading of that letter. Goring writes
to Heydrich:

"Complementing the task that was assigned to you on

24 January 1939, which dealt with arriving at thorough further-
ance of emigration and evacuation solution of the Jewish
problem, as advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you to
make all necessary organizational and practical preparations
for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish question
in the German sphere of influence in Europe.

"Wherever other governmental agencies are involved, these

are to co-operate with you.
"I charge you furthermore to send me, before long, an over-all
plan concerning the organizational, factual, and material
measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired final
solution of the Jewish question."
The presentation made to the on the individual
Tribunal
responsibility of the Defendant Goring has been intended to be
merely illustrative of the mass of documentary evidence which
reveals the leading part played by this conspirator in every phase
of the Nazi conspiracy. Thus, we submit that the responsibility of
Goring for the crimes with which he has been charged under Count
One and Count Two of the Indictment has been established.
May it please the Tribunal, this completes the presentation on
the individual responsibility of the Defendant Goring. We will now
proceed with the arrangement made with the British Delegation on
the presentation showing the individual responsibility of the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, if
the Tribunal would be good enough to look at Appendix A of the
Indictment on Page 28 of the English text (Volume I, Page 69) they
will find the particulars relating to this defendant, and they will find
that the allegations regarding him fall into three divisions.
After reciting the offices which he held, the appendix of the
Indictment goes on to say that the Defendant Ribbentrop used the
foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connec-
tion with the Führer in such a manner that he promoted the acces-
sion to power of the Nazi conspirators as set forth in Count One of

557
8 Jan. 46

the Indictment and permitted the preparation for war set forth in
Count One of the Indictment.
In the second section he participated in the political planning
and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and
wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assur-
ances as set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment.
In accordance with the Führer Principle, he executed and
assumed responsibility for the execution of the foreign policy plans
of the Nazi conspirators, as set forth in Count One of the Indictment.
Then the third section: He authorized, directed, and participated
in War Crimes, as set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and
the Crimes against Humanity, set forth in Count Four of the Indict-
ment, including, more particularly crimes against persons and
property in occupied territories. I hope that it might be useful to
the Tribunal if I follow the order of these allegations in the Indict-
ment as we collected the evidence for each of these in turn; I there-
fore proceed to deal first with the allegation that this defendant
promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators.
The Tribunal knows already that the defendant held various
offices and these are usefully collected in his own certified statement,
which has already been put in as Exhibit Number USA-5, Document
2829-PS. And I think it would be convenient if I very briefly
explained the different activities and offices of the defendant which
are dealt with in that list. It will be seen from that list that he
became a member of the Nazi Party in 1932, but, according to the
semi-official statement in Das Archiv-, he had begun to work for the
Party before that time. That semi-official statement goes on to say
that he succeeded in extending his business connections to political
circles, having joined in 1930 the service of the Party. At the time
of the final struggle for power in the Reich, Ribbentrop played an
important, if not strikingly obvious part in the bringing about of the
decisive meetings between the representatives of the President of
the Reich and the heads of the Party, who had prepared the entry of
the Nazis into power on 30 January 1933. Those meetings, as well
as those between Hitler and Von Papen, took place in Ribbentrop's
house in Berlin-Dahlem.
This defendant was therefore present and active at the inception
of the Nazi securing of power. After that, for a short period, he was
adviser to the Party on questions of foreign affairs. His title was
first "Adviser to the Führer on matters of foreign policy" and he
later became representative in matters of foreign policy on the staff
of the deputy. This was followed by membership in the Reichstag
in November 1933 and in the Party organizations he became an Ober-
führer in the SS and was subsequently promoted to Gruppenführer
and to Obergruppenführer. Thereafter he attained official govern-
ment positions.

558
 8 Jan. 46

On the 24th of April 1934 he was appointed delegate of the Reich

Government on matters of disarmament. That was after Germany
had left the disarmament conference. In this capacity he visited
foreign capitals. He was then given a more important and certainly a
more resounding title: the German Minister Plenipotentiary at
Large; and it was in that capacity that he negotiated the Anglo-
German Naval Agreement of 1935.
In 1936, after the Nazi Government had re-occupied the Rhine- ja
land contrary to the treaties of Versailles and Locarno, the mattestem
was brought before the Council of the League of Nations, and &k\{
defendant addressed the Council in defense of the action of 33jB^-
many. His next position began on 11 August 1936, when <f&^ was
appointed Ambassador in London. He occupied that positâm|f6r a
period of some 18 months, and his activities there, whili^naving
their own interest, are not highly relevant to the matters now before
the Tribunal. But during that period, in the capacity which he still
had as German Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, he signed the
original Anticomintern Pact with Japan in November 1936 and also
the additional pact by which Italy joined it in 1937.
Finally, so far as this part of the- case is concerned, on 4 February
1938 this defendant was appointed Foreign Minister in place of the
Defendant Von Neurath and simultaneously was made a member of
the Secret Cabinet Council (Geheimer Kabinettsrat) established by
decree of Hitler of that date. That takes us up to the period of his
holding the office of Foreign Minister, and his actions in that capa-
city will be dealt with in detail later on.
I refer the Tribunal without reading further, because L have
already summarized it, to the extract from Das Archiv, which is
Document D-472, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-130; also to. the,
membership extract of the SS, which consists in the examination o£A
the descent of SS leaders and which I insert as Exhibit GB-131. * -

Again I shall not trouble the Tribunal with the details. It shows
his rank, which I have already mentioned. There is no question of
any honorary rank. It is simply stated to be the rank of Gruppen-
führer, and of course, it gives his ancestry in detail, in order to deal
with the laws which related to that subject. It also deals with his
adoption in order to secure the prefix of "von," but the defendant
has now to deal with much more serious things than barren contro-
versies with the Almanack de Gotha.
The only new document which I put before the Tribunal in this
part of the case is Exhibit GB-129, Document 1337-PS, which shows
the establishment of the Secret Cabinet Council and the membership
of the Foreign Minister. These are the activities of this defendant
in the earlier part of his career, and in the submission of the Pros-
ecution they show quite clearly that he assisted willingly, deliberately,

559
 —
8 Jan. 46

intentionally, and keenly in bringing the Nazis into power and

into the earlier stage of their obtaining control of the German State.
I now come to the second allegation in the Indictment, that this
defendant participated in political planning and preparation with
the Nazi conspirators for wars of aggression and wars in violation
of international treaties, agreements, and assurances; and again it
might help the Tribunal if I took these quite shortly, in order of
aggression, and stated briefly the constituent allegations that we
make and the references to matters before the Tribunal, referring
the Tribunal only to any new document which shall come along.
The first is the Anschluss with Austria, and there the Tribunal
will remember that the Defendant Ribbentrop was present at a meet-
ing at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938, at which Hitler and
Von Papen met the Austrian Chancellor Von Schuschnigg and his
Foreign Minister, Guido Schmidt. The Tribunal will find the official
account of that interview in Document 2461-PS, which I put in as
Exhibit GB-132. What the Tribunal will find, I submit, is the truth-
ful account of the interview in Exhibit Number USA-72, Document
Number 1780-PS, which is the diary of the Defendant Jodl; and the
relevant entries are those for 11 and 12 February 1938. They are
—
extremely short, and I shall read if the Tribunal will be kind
enough to allow me, they do show quite clearly the case for the
—
Prosecution about the pressure that was used in Chancellor Schu-
schnigg's interview. It is at the foot of the first page in the Docu-
ment Book; Document 1780-PS is the number.
And on the 11th of February the Defendant Jodl writes:
"In the evening and on 12 February General K" Keitel —
"with General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzberg.
Schuschnigg, together with G. Schmidt are being put under
the heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours
Schuschnigg signs protocol.
"13 February: In the afternoon General K"—Keitel— "asks
Admiral C" —Canaris— "and myself to come to his apartment.
He tells us that the Fuhrer's order is to the effect that mili-
tary pressure, by shamming military action, should be kept
up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers
are drafted and submitted to the Führer by telephone for
approval.
"14 February: At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Führer
arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-intelligence
Office VII and initiates the different measures.
"The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is

created that Germany is undertaking serious military prep-

arations."

560
 8 Jan. 46

It is rather interesting, after reading the frank statement of the

Defendant Jodl, to look at the pale words of the official statement
which I have also put in. That is the view of the meeting with
Schuschnigg, which the Prosecution placed before this Court.
Will the Tribunal be good enough to ignore an allegation that
appears in the trial brief that this defendant visited Mussolini before
the Anschluss, as is stated by a member of his staff at that time.
It was disputed by another member. Therefore, I would rather the
Tribunal ruled it out.
The next point on which there is no dispute is the telephone con-
versation which took place between the Defendant Goring and the
Defendant Ribbentrop on the 13th of March 1938, when this defend-
ant was still in London. The Tribunal will remember that that was
dealt with fully by my friend, Mr. Alderman. It was passing on
what the Prosecution submits is a completely false statement: that
there was no ultimatum. The facts of the ultimatum were explained
by the earlier telephone conversations with the Defendant Goring
in Vienna. Defendant Goring then passed that on to the Defend-
ant Ribbentrop in London in order that he might propagate the
story of there being no ultimatum, in political circles in London.
That appears in the telephone conversation, which is Exhibit Num-
ber USA-76, Document 2949-PS, and, as I say, it is fully dealt with
in the transcript on Page 582 (Volume II, Page 425).
The third action which this defendant took occurred after his
return from London. Although he had been appointed Foreign Min-
ister in February, he had gone back to London to clear up his
business at the embassy and he was still in London until after the
Anschluss had actually occurred, but his name appears as a signatory
of the law making Austria a province of the German Reich. That
is Document 2307-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB-133. And
there is a reference in the Reichsgesetzblatt, which is given. These
were the actions of the defendant with regard to Austria.
Then we come to Czechoslovakia, and there you have an almost
perfect example of aggression at work in its various ways. Again I
simply remind the Tribunal of the outstanding points with the
greatest brevity. First, there is the question of stirring up trouble
inside the country against which aggression is going to be set forth.
This Defendant, as Foreign Minister, was concerned with the
stirring up of the Sudeten Germans under Henlein, and the con-
tacts between the Foreign Office and Henlein are shown in Exhibit
Numbers USA-93, 94, 95, and 96. These are Documents 3060-PS,
2789-PS, 2788-PS, and 3059-PS. They have all been read by my friend,
Mr. Alderman, but I simply give to the Tribunal their effect on them,
which is the stirring up of the Sudeten German movement in order
to act with the Government of the Reich.

561
I
8 Jan. 46

Then, after that, the Defendant Ribbentrop was present on the

28th of May 1938 at the conference with Hitler, at which the latter
gave the necessary instructions to prepare the attack on Czecho-
slovakia. That was dealt with previously on Page 742 of the tran-
script (Volume III, Page 42). And I want to put before the Tribunal
Document 2360-PS, which is a report of a speech of Hitler's in the
Völkischer Beobachter; and, if the Tribunal would be good enough
to look at it, it is a useful date to fix with regard to the aggression
against Czechoslovakia, because that was the day on which Hitler,
on his own proclamation, had decided that aggression was to take
place against Czechoslovakia. The extract which I have taken is
—
quite short and if the Tribunal would look at the extract which is
—
on Page 1, columns 5 and 6, bottom the important passage is:
"On the basis of this unbearable provocation, which was still
further emphasized by a truly infamous persecution and
terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve
the Sudeten-German question in a final and radical manner."
This was in January 1939. Then he goes on to say:
"On 28 May ... I gave the order for the preparation of military
."
steps against this state, to be concluded by 2 October. . .

The important point is that the 28th of May was the date when
the Fall Grün for Czechoslovakia was the subject of orders and it
was thereafter put into effect to come to fruition at the beginning
of October. That is the second stage: To lay well in advance your
plans of aggression. The third stage is to see that the neighboring
you trouble.
states are not likely to cause
So we on the 18th of July 1938 this defendant had a
find that
conversation with the Italian Ambassador Attolico, at which the
attack on Czechoslovakia was discussed. That is Exhibit Number
USA-85, Document 2800-PS. And there were further discussions
which are contained in Exhibits USA-86 and 87, which are Documents
2791-PS and 2792-PS.
I think it is sufficient for me to say to the Tribunal that the effect
of these documents is that it was made clear to the Italian
Government that the German Government was going to move
against Czechoslovakia.
The other country which was interested was Hungary, because
Hungary had certain territorial ideas with regard to parts of the
Czechoslovakian Republic.
So, on the 23rd and 25th of August, this defendant was present
at the discussions and had discussions himself with the Hungarian
politicians Imredy and Kania, and these are found in Exhibit Num-
bers USA-88 and 89, Documents 2796-PS and 2797-PS.
This defendant endeavored to get assurances of Hungarian help, and
the Hungarian Government at the time was not too ready to commit

562
I
 8 Jan. 46

itself to action, although it was ready enough with sympathy. These

are to be found in the documents which I have mentioned. And,
again, unless the Tribunal desires, I shall not read any document
that I summarize that way.

Now I have already mentioned that there had been contact with
the Sudeten Germans. That was the long-term grievance that had
to be exploited. But the next stage was to have a short-term grievance
and to stir up trouble, preferably at the fountainhead. And so, between
the 16th and 24th of September, we find the German Foreign Office,
of which this defendant was at the head, stirring up trouble in
Prague; and that is shown very clearly in Exhibits Numbers USA-97
to 101, which are Documents 2858-PS, 2855-PS, 2854-PS, 2853-PS,
and 2856-PS. I have read them in order of date. And it would be
interesting for the Tribunal to look at these. They ought to follow
quite shortly the document they have just been looking at, beginning
with Document PS-2858. You will see the sort of thing of which I
am reminding the Tribunal. Here you have the document of the
19th of September coming from the Foreign Office to the German
Embassy in Prague:
"Please inform Deputy Kundt at Conrad Henlein's request
to get in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to
start their demands for autonomy during the next day."

And the others deal with questions of arrest and the action that
would be taken against any Czechs in Germany in order to make
the position more difficult.
That was the contribution which this defendant made to the pre-
Munich crisis. After, as the Tribunal will remember, on the 29th
of September 1938, the Munich Agreement was signed. That is
GB-23, Document TC-23, which I have already read to the Tribunal.
And, after that — remind the Tribunal of an interesting docu-
I just
ment which shows the which the Wehrmacht expected
sort of action
and the advice that the Wehrmacht expected from the Foreign Office.
You have, on the 1st of October, Document C-2, which is Exhibit
Number USA-90, and that is a long document putting forward an

almost infinite variety of breaches of international law, which were

likely to arise or might have arisen from the action in regard to
Czechoslovakia; and on all these points the opinion of the Foreign
Office is sought. That, of course, remained a hypothetical question
at that time because no war resulted.
Then, if the Tribunal please, we come to the second stage in the
acquiring of Czechoslovakia: That is, having obtained the Sudeten-
land, arranging so that there would be a crisis in Czechoslovakia
which would give an excuse for taking the rest. The Tribunal will
remember the importance of this because it is the first time that the

563
8 Jan. 46

German Government went outside its own statement about not going
beyond German blood.
On that point, again, this defendant was active. On the 13th of
March, as events were moving to a climax, he sent a telegram to the
German Minister in Prague, who was under him, telling him to
"make a point of not being available if the Government there wants
to get in touch with you in the next few days." That is Exhibit Num-
ber USA-116, Document 2815-PS.
At the same time this defendant saw a delegation of pro-Nazi
Slovaks in Berlin. At a conference with Hitler, at which this
defendant was present, Tiso, one of the heads of the pro-Nazi
Slovaks, was directed to declare an independent Slovak State, in
order to assist in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. That is Exhibit
Number USA-117, Document 2802-PS, and the Tribunal might care
to compare it with a previous meeting with another Slovak, Tuka, a
month before, which is shown in Document 2790-PS, Exhibit Num-
ber USA-110. So that this defendant was assisting in the task, again,
of supporting internal trouble.
Then on the 14th of March 1939, the next day, Hacha, the
President of Czechoslovakia, was called to Berlin. This defendant
was present at the meeting and the Tribunal will remember the usual
pressure and threats which resulted in the aged President's purposing
to hand over the Czechoslovak State to Hitler. The Tribunal will
find that subject dealt with on Page 911 of the transcript (Volume III,
from Page 158), and the relevant exhibit is Exhibit Number US A-l 18,
Document 2798-PS, which is the minutes of the meeting between
Hitler and Hacha that this defendant attended. You will also find
it dealt with in Exhibit Number USA-126, Document 3061-PS, which

is the Czechoslovakian Government report.

That was the end of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The

following week this defendant signed a treaty with Slovakia which
I now put in. It is Document 1439-PS, and I put it in as Exhibit

GB-135, and the important part is Article 2, under which the

German Government was given the right to construct military posts
and installations and keep them garrisoned within Czechoslovakia.
Again, I am not going to read it at length, but I hope the Tribunal
will stop me if there are any of these documents which they would
like read instead of summarized.
In that way this defendant by the terms of that treaty, after
completely finishing Bohemia and Moravia as an independent state,
had got military control in Slovakia.
Before I pass to Poland, there is one interesting little point on
the Northern Baltic which I put before the Tribunal to show how
this defendant could hardly keep his hands out of the internal affairs
of other countries, even when it did not seem a very important

564
 .

8 Jan. 46

matter. The Tribunal will remember that on the 3rd of April 1939,
as shown in GB-4, TC-53(a), Germany had occupied the Memelland.
It would have appeared, as far as the Baltic States were concerned,
that the position was satisfactory; but if the Tribunal will look at
Document 2953-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-136, and Document
2952-PS, which I put in as GB-137, they will find that this defendant
acted in close concert with the conspirator Heydrich, who is dead,
in stirring up trouble in Lithuania with a group of pro-Nazi people
called the "Woldemaras supporters." Document 2953-PS shows that
Heydrich was passing to the Defendant Ribbentrop the request for
financial support for the . .

THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read 2953?

SIR DAVID M AXWELL-FYFE Yes, My Lord, that : is the one I
was going to read. That is a letter from Heydrich to the Defendant
Ribbentrop and it says:
"Dear Party Comrade Von Ribbentrop:
"Enclosed please find a further report about the 'Woldemaras
supporters.' As already mentioned in the previous report the
'Woldemaras supporters' are still asking for help from the
Reich. I therefore ask you to examine the question of financial
support brought up again by the 'Woldemaras supporters' set
forth on Page 4, Paragraph 2, of the enclosed report and to
make a definite decision.
"The request of the 'Woldemaras supporters' for financial
support could, in my opinion, be granted. Deliveries of arms
should not, however, be made under any circumstances."
Then, 2952-PS, the next document, is a fuller report, and at the
end of that there is added in handwriting, "I support small regular
payments, e. g., 2,000 to 3,000 marks quarterly." It is signed "W,"
who I understand to be the Secretary of State.
I merely quoted that to show the extraordinary interference,
even with comparatively unimportant countries.
Then we pass to the aggression against Poland, and again the
Tribunal has had that fully dealt with by my friend Colonel
Griffith- Jones; but again it might be useful if I just separated the
various periods so that the Tribunal would have these in mind. The
first was what one might call the Munich period, up to the end of
September 1938; and at that time no language was too good for
Poland. The Tribunal will remember the point.
The important documents showing that aspect of the case are
GB-30, which is Document 2357-PS, Hitler's Reichstag speech on the
20th of February 1938, and then GB-31, Document TC-76, which is
the secret Foreign Office memorandum of the 26th of August 1938,
and GB-27, Document TC-73, Number 40. TC-73 is the Polish White

565
8 Jan. 46

Book and 40 is the number of the document in the book. That is a

conversation between M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, and this
defendant.
Finally in this group is TC-73, Number 42, Hitler's speech at the
Sportpalast on the 26th of September 1938, in which he said that
this was the end of his territorial problems in Europe and expressed
an almost violent affection for the Poles.
Now
the next stage was between Munich and the rape of Prague,
and then —
in the next stage part of the German aggressions in
Czechoslovakia having been accomplished and parts still remaining
to be done —
there is a slight change but still a friendly atmosphere.
That begins with a conversation between this defendant and M.
Lipski, which is contained in Exhibit GB-27, Document TC-73,
Number 44.
There this defendant put forward very peaceful suggestions for
the settlement of the Danzig issue. The Polish reply is in GB-28, TC-73.
THE PRESIDENT: You did not give the date of those, did you?
SIR DAVID M AXWELL-FYFE Yes, : My
Lord. The first one is
25 October 1938; the Polish reply which says that it is unacceptable
that Danzig should return to the Reich, but making suggestions for
a bilateral agreement, is the 31st of October 1938. Between these
dates, the Tribunal will remember according to Document C-137,
Exhibit GB-33, dated the 21st of October the German Government
had made its preparation to occupy Danzig by surprise. But although
these preparations' were made, still some 2 months later, on the 5th
of January 1939, while the rape of Prague had not taken place,
Hitler was suggesting to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, a new
solution. That is contained in Document TC-73, Number-48, Exhibit
GB-34, the interview of Hitler and Beck on the 5th of January 1939.
Then this defendant saw M. Beck on the next day and said there
was no violent solution of Danzig, but a further building up of
friendly relations. That is contained in GB-35, Document TC-73,
Number 49. Not content with that, this defendant went to Warsaw
on the 25th of January and, according to the report of his speech
contained in Document 2530-PS, GB-36, talked of the continued
progress and consolidation of friendly relations; and that was capped
by Hitler's Reichstag speech on the 30th of January 1939, in the
same sort of tone, contained in GB-37, TC-73, Number 57. That was
—
the second stage the mention of Danzig in honeyed words, because,
of course, the rape of Prague had not been attained.
Then one has to remember, as one comes to the summer, the
meeting at the Reich Chancellery on the 23rd of May 1939, which is
reported in Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27. It has been
read many times to the Tribunal, and I remind them of only this

566
 8 Jan. 46

point: That that the document where Hitler makes it quite clear,
is
and states in his own
words, that Danzig has nothing to do with the
real Polish question. He had to deal with Poland because he wanted
Lebensraum in the East. That is the effect of that portion of the
—
document which has been read so often to the Tribunal that Danzig
was merely an excuse..
It is important to have in mind, if I may respectfully suggest it,
that that meeting was on the 23rd of May 1939, because there is an
—
interesting corroboration of the attitude of mind in showing how
clearly this Defendant Ribbentrop had adopted the attitude of mind
—
of Hitler in the introduction to Count Ciano's diary, which was
put in as Exhibit Number USA-166, Document 2987-PS; but I do
not think this part of the diary, the introduction, has been read
before to the Court. It is Document 2897-PS, and it comes two after
L-79, which is the "Little Schmundt" file, just after the Obersalzberg
document. It is set out in the trial brief, if the Tribunal will care
to follow it there. Count Ciano says:
"In the summer of 1939 Germany advanced her claims against
Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop
had several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had
any intention of carrying the controversy to extremes. Despite
these denials I remained unconvinced; I wanted to make sure
for myself, and on August 11th I went to Salzburg. It was in
his residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while
we were waiting to eat, of the decision to start the fireworks,
just as he might have told me about the most unimportant
and commonplace administrative matter. 'Well, Ribbentrop,'
I asked him, while we were walking in the garden, 'What do

you want? The Corridor or Danzig?' 'Not any more, .and. .

'

he stared at me through those cold Musée Grevin eyes, 'We

want war.'"
I remind the Tribunal how closely that corroborates the state-
ment that Hitler had made at his Chancellery conference on the
23rd of May: That it was no longer a question of Danzig or the
Corridor, it was a question of war to achieve Lebensraum in the East.
Then I remind the Tribunal, without citing it, that the Fall Weiss
for operation against Poland is dated the 3rd and 11th of April 1939,
which certainly shows that preparations were already in hand.
And then there is another reference in Count Ciano's diary which
also has not been read and which makes this point quite clear.
Again, if the Tribunal will take it as set out in the trial brief, I will
read it, as it has not been read before:
"I have collected the conference records of verbal transcripts
of my conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. Here I shall
note only some impressions of a general nature. Ribbentrop

567
8 Jan. 46

is evasive every time ask him for particulars of the forth-

I
coming German action.He has a guilty conscience. He has
lied too many times about German intentions towards Poland
not to feel embarrassment now over what he must tell me
and what he is preparing to do.
"The will to fight is unalterable. He rejects any solution
which might satisfy Germany and prevent the struggle. I am
certain that even if the Germans were given everything they
demanded they would attack just the same, because they are
possessed by the demon of destruction.
"Our conversation sometimes takes a dramatic turn. I do not
hesitate to speak my mind in the most brutal manner. But
this doesn't shake him in the least. I realize how little weight
this view carries in German opinion,
v "The atmosphere is icy. And the cold feeling between us is
reflected in our followers. During dinner we do not exchange
a word. We distrust each other. But I at least have a clear
conscience. He has not."
Whatever other defects there may have been about Count Ciano,
there cannot be an appreciation of the situation which is more
heavily corroborated by supporting documents than his diagnosis of
the situation in the summer of 1939.
Then we come to the next stage in the German plan, which was
sharp pressure on the claim for Danzig shown immediately after
Czechoslovakia had been finally dealt with on the 15th of March.
It is shown how closely it followed the completion of the rape of
Prague. The first sharp raising of the claim was on the 21st of
March, as shown in Exhibit GB-38, Document TC-73, Number 61.
And that developed, as the Tribunal has heard from Colonel Griffith-
Jones.
Then we come to the last days before the war, and one interesting
side light is that Herr Von Dirksen, the German Ambassador at the
Court of St. James, returned from London on the 18th of August
1939; and I put in the extract from the interrogation of the Defend-
ant Ribbentrop, which is Document D-490. I put that in as GB-138.
I do not intend to read it to the Tribunal because it can be
summarized in this way: That the Defendant Ribbentrop has cer-
tainly no recollection of ever having seen the German Ambassador
to the Court of St. James after his return. He thinks he would have
remembered him if he had seen him and he accepts the probability
that he did not see him. And there is the point, when it was well-
known that war with Poland would involve England and France,
that either he was not sufficiently interested in opinion in London
to take the trouble to see his ambassador or else, as he rather
suggests, that he had appointed so weak and ordinary a career

568
 8 Jan. 46

diplomat to London that his opinion was not taken into account,
eithèr by himself or by Hitler. In either case, he was completely
uninterested in anything which his ambassador might have to tell
him of opinion in London or the possibility of war. And I conceive
myself speaking with great moderation in putting it this way. That
in the last days before the 1st of September 1939 this defendant did
whatever he could to avoid peace with Poland and to avoid anything
which might hinder the incursion of the war which we know he
wanted. He did that, well knowing that war with Poland would
involve Great Britain and France. These details were given in full
by Colonel Griffith-Jones; I am not going through them again. But
I have, for the convenience of the Tribunal, referred to the tran-
script at Pages 1000 to 1059 (Volume III, Pages 219 to 261), and M.
Lipski summarized all that took place in his report of the 10th of
October 1939, which is Document TC-73, Number 147, which is
Exhibit GB-27.
Now theseare the actions of this defendant in the Polish matter.
I am glad to inform the Tribunal that with regard to the other
countries they are very much shorter than with regard to Poland.
I now come to Norway and Denmark. I remind the Tribunal of
the fact, if it cares to take cognizance thereof, that on the 31st of
May 1939 the Defendant Ribbentrop, on behalf of Germany, signed
a non-aggression pact with Denmark which provided that "the
German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark will under no circum-
stances go to war or employ force of any other kind against one
another." This is Exhibit GB-77, Document TC-24. And just to fix
the date, the Tribunal will remember that on the 9th of April 1940
the German Armed Forces invaded Denmark and at the same time
they invaded Norway.
With regard to Norway there are three documents which show
that this defendant was fully informed of the earlier preparations
for that act of aggression. The Tribunal will remember that my
friend, Major Elwyn Jones, did indicate with some particularity the
relations between Quisling and the Defendant Rosenberg. But
Rosenberg in this case also required the help of the Defendant
Ribbentrop and, if the Tribunal would be good enough to turn to
Document 957-PS, which I am putting in as GB-139, they will see
the first of the documents which connect this defendant with the
earlier Quisling activities.
The first one, Document 957-PS, is a letter from Defendant
Rosenberg to this defendant and it begins:
"Dear Party Comrade Von Ribbentrop:
"Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed
report to Geheimrat Von Grundherr, who will address you on
this subject. We agreed the other day that 200,000 to 300,000

569
 —
8 Jan. 46

Reichsmarks would be made immediately available for the

said purpose. Now it turns out that Grundherr states that
. . .

the second instalment can be made available only after 8 days.

But as it is necessary for Scheidt to go back immediately, I
request you to make it possible that this second instalment be
given to him at once. With a longer absence the connection
. . .

with your representatives would also be broken up, which

just now, under certain circumstances, could be very unfavor-
able.

"Therefore I think it is in everybody's interest, if Party Com-

rade Scheidt goes back immediately."
That was the 24th of February.
Now the next document, 004-PS, is a report from Rosenberg to
Hitler, and if the Tribunal will be good enough to turn to Page 4
this is —
on the Quisling activities they will find that that passage is
sufficient to show how this defendant was connected with it. This
is a report from Rosenberg to Hitler:
"Next to a financial support which was paid by the Reich in
foreign currency, Quisling, as further help, was at the same
time promised deliveries of goods which were urgently needed
by Norway, such as coal and sugar. The shipments were to be
conducted under cover of a new trade company, to be estab-
lished in Germany, or through specially selected existing
firms while Hagelin was to act as consignee in Norway.
Hagelin had already conferred with the respective Ministers
of the Nygaardsvold Government, as, for instance, the Minister
of Supply and Commerce, and had been assured permission
for the import of coal. At the same time the coal transports
were to serve possibly to supply the technical means necessary
to launch Quisling's political action in Oslo with German help.
It was Quisling's plan to send a number of selected, particularly
reliable men to Germany
for a brief military training course
in a completely isolated camp. They were then to be detailed
as area and language specialists to German special troops,
who were to be taken to Oslo on the coal barges to accomplish
a political action. Thus Quisling planned to get hold of his
leading opponents in Norway, including the King, and to
prevent all military resistance from the very beginning.
Immediately following this political action and upon an
official request of Quisling to the Government of the German
Reich, the military occupation of Norway was to take place.
All military preparations were to be completed previously.
Though this plan contained the great advantage of surprise, it
also contained a great number of dangers which could possibly
cause its failure. For this reason it received a quite dilatory

570
 —
8 Jan. 46

treatment, while at the same time it was not disapproved as

far as the Norwegians were concerned.
"'In February, after a conference with General Field Marshal
Göring, Reichsleiter Rosenberg informed the Ministerial Di-
rector in the office of the Four Year Plan, Wohlthat, only of
the intention to prepare coal shipments to Norway to the
named confidant Hagelin. Further details were discussed in
a conference between Wohlthat, Staff Director Schickedanz,
and Hagelin. Since Wohlthat received no further instructions
from the General Field Marshal, Foreign Minister Von Ribben-
—
trop after a consultation with Reichsleiter Rosenberg
consented to expedite these shipments through his office.
Based on a report of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Führer it
was also arranged at this conference to pay Quisling through
Scheidt as liaison 10,000 English pounds per month for the
next 3 months, commencing on the 15th of March, to support
his work."

This was paid through Scheidt, the man who was mentioned before.

Now the other document, D-629, is a letter from Defendant Kei-

tel tothe Defendant Ribbentrop, dated the 3rd of April 1940. I need
trouble the Tribunal only with the first paragraph. The Defendant
Keitel says:
"Dear Herr Von Ribbentrop:
"The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been,
by command of the Führer, long in preparation by the High
Command of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the
Wehrmacht has therefore had ample time to occupy itself
with all the questions connected with the carrying out of this
operation. The time at your disposal for the political prep-
aration of this operation is, on the contrary, very much
shorter. I believe myself, therefore, to be acting in accordance
with your ideas in transmitting to you herewith, not only
these wishes of the Wehrmacht which would have to be
fulfilledby the Governments in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stock-
holm for purely military reasons, but also I include a series of
requests which certainly concern the Wehrmacht only in-
directly but which are, however, of the greatest importance
for the fulfillment of its task."
Then he proceeds to ask that the Foreign Office get in touch with
certaincommanders. The important point for which I read it to the
— —
Tribunal as far as I know, for the first time is that there we have
the Defendant Keitel saying quite clearly that the military occupation
of Denmark and Norway has been long in preparation. And it is
interesting when one looks back to the official life of Ribbentrop,

571
8 Jan. 46

which is contained in the archives and is Document D-472. I am

quoting a sentence only because of the interesting contrast:
"With the occupation of Denmark and Norway on the 9th of
April 1940 only a few hours before the landing of British
troops in these territories, the battle began against the
Western Powers."
Then it goes on to Holland and Belgium.
quite clear that, whoever else had knowledge or whoever
It is
else was
ignorant, this Defendant Ribbentrop had been up to his
neck in the Quisling plottings, and it is made clear to him well a
week before the invasion started, that the Wehrmacht and the
Defendant Keitel had long been preparing this particular act of
aggression.
I think, My Lord,
that is really all the evidence on the aggression
against Norwaybecause, again, the story was put forward fully by
my friend, Major Elwyn Jones.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 9 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]

572
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