India as Kingmaker

India as Kingmaker
Status Quo or Revisionist Power

Michael O. Slobodchikoff and

Aakriti A. Tandon

University of Michigan Press

Ann Arbor
Copyright © 2022 by Michael O. Slobodchikoff and Aakriti A. Tandon
All rights reserved

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First published December 2022

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Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data

Names: Slobodchikoff, Michael O., author. | Tandon, Aakriti A., author. |

Michigan Publishing (University of Michigan), publisher.
Title: India as kingmaker : status quo or revisionist power / Michael O. Slobodchikoff and
Aakriti A. Tandon.
Description: Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2022. | Includes bibliographical
references (pages 153–­161) and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022024361 (print) | LCCN 2022024362 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780472075669 (hardcover) | ISBN 9780472055661 (paperback) |
ISBN 9780472220755 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: India—­Foreign relations—­21st century. | Geopolitics—­
India. | Neutrality—­India. | Balance of power. | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE /
International Relations / Diplomacy | POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National &
International)
Classification: LCC DS449 .S59 2022 (print) | LCC DS449 (ebook) |
DDC 327.54—­dc23/eng/20220629
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022024361
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022024362

Cover images courtesy Shutterstock.com / T. Lesia; and Shutterstock.com / PO11

To our children, Nicholas, Ayaansh, and Aashna.
May you all grow up to see a time that is less prone
to conflict than the current one.
Contents

List of Tables ix
List of Figures xi
Acknowledgmentsxiii

Part 1. India’s Place in the Global Order

1 • India as a Kingmaker 3

2 • The Challenge to the Global Order 11

3 • 
Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences
for the Global Order 36

Part 2. India’s Relationship with Status Quo Powers

4 • India-­US Relations 65

5 • Indo-­European Relations 82

6 • Indo-­Japanese Relations 99

Part 3. India’s Relationship with Revisionist Powers

7 • Indo-­Russian Relations 113

8 • Indo-­Chinese Relations 128

viii • Contents

9 • 
India’s Place in the World Order:
Revisionist or Status Quo Power? 140

References153

Index163

Digital materials related to this title can be found on

the Fulcrum platform via the following citable URL:
https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12330581
Tables

1 Categories of Great Powers 22

2 Status Quo vs. Revisionist Powers 37
3 Institutionalized Cooperation Scores 50
4 Cooperative Relationship Scores 51
5 Status Quo vs. Revisionist Powers 58
6 Indo-­US Bilateral Treaties 74
7 Lodestone Treaties between India and the US 75
8 Level of Institutionalization in the Indo-­US Relationship 79
9 India-­EU Cooperation 88
10 India-­UK Cooperation 91
11 India-­France Cooperation 94
12 India-­Germany Cooperation 97
13 India-­European Powers Cooperation 97
14 India-­Japan Cooperation 104
15 India-­Japan Cooperation Scores 106
16 India-­Russia Cooperation 121
17 India-­Russia Cooperation Scores 122
18 India-­Russia Lodestone Treaties 122
19 India-­China Cooperation 136
20 India-­China Lodestone Treaties 137
21 Cooperation Scores between India and Great Powers 146
22 Cooperation Scores between India and Status Quo Powers 147
23 Cooperation Scores between India and Revisionist Powers 148
24 Categorization of Status Quo vs. Revisionist Powers 149
Figures

1 International Order 14
2 Bipolar International Order 17
3 Global and Regional Hierarchical Order 18
4 Treaty Nesting 48
5 Treaty Network 48
6 India–­South Africa Treaty Network 49
7 India-­EU Treaty Network 49
8 Indo-­US Treaty Network 76
9 Indo-­EU Treaty Network 87
10 Indo-­UK Treaty Network 89
11 Indo-­France Treaty Network 94
12 Indo-­Germany Treaty Network 95
13 Indo-­Japanese Treaty Network 105
14 Indo-­Russia Treaty Network 122
15 Indo-­China Treaty Network 156
Acknowledgments

Writing a book is a true labor. Writing a book during a pandemic is close to

impossible. While all of our lives have been facing uncertainty and upheaval,
we fully recognize that it wouldn’t have been possible to complete this task
without help from many different people. To our spouses, Tatyana and Anuj,
we are eternally thankful. They not only provide support in terms of allowing
us to work on this project, but they are sounding boards for our ideas, and
while they might be rolling their eyes having heard the details of this project
so many times, we are truly thankful for each of you.
For their eternal and selfless love and support we thank our parents and
sisters, who continue to shower us with positive feedback whether near or
far. We are also grateful to our respective institutions, Troy University and
Daemen College, for providing us with support that helped to bring this
work to fruition.
We are also very thankful for the work of the editorial staff at the Univer-
sity of Michigan Press. Thank you to Elizabeth Demers and Haley Winkle
for all of their support and willingness to help this project along. Thank you
to the anonymous reviewers for all of your comments that have made this
book much better. Also, a special thank you to the Executive Board of the
University of Michigan Press. All of your questions and the dialogue that
ensued helped clarify this book and strengthened the arguments within.
Several students helped to make this project a reality. Thank you to Billy
Hines, Alicia Rodriguez-­Castillo, Christian Knight, Zachary Greene, Kenny
Luker, and Leandro Guimaroes Froes for all of your help in coding treaties
and helping to research these treaties.
xiv • Acknowledgments

Finally, we would like to thank the Ministry of External Affairs of India

for maintaining the full texts of all of their treaties and keeping this list acces-
sible and transparent. The ability to analyze each of the treaties and deter-
mine the relationship between the treaties was invaluable to this project. We
hope that all states move to this model of transparency in terms of reporting
the texts of all of their treaties and agreements.
Part 1 • India’s Place in the Global Order
1 • India as a Kingmaker

The presence of global anarchy is fundamental to international relations. The

absence of a global government to ensure set rules and behaviors creates
uncertainty in the relationship between states. However, that does not mean
that global anarchy is static. Great powers are able to establish and enforce
rules of interaction among states within the space in which they are able to
project their power. A hegemonic power that is able to project its power
globally can create a global order and the rules of interaction within that
order. Following World War II, the United States became a superpower and
created a liberal economic order and rules-­based regime. Similarly, the Soviet
Union created its own order and established rules to be followed within its
sphere of influence. This is a classic bipolar system, where each superpower
has control over a specific region of the globe and has created an order and
rules to follow for that region. Hegemonic stability theory argues that there
is less uncertainty and less violence between states where there is one hege-
monic power that establishes a global order. Following the end of the Cold
War, the United States became a unipolar power, and the liberal order that it
had established following World War II was expanded globally. States that
were once a part of the Soviet bloc now followed the global order established
by the United States.
Not all states, however, are happy with the global order established by the
hegemon. States that are dissatisfied with the global order may gather enough
power to challenge the hegemonic state and thus the global order. These revi-
sionist states actively want to revise the global order and challenge the global
power. States that support the global order are called status quo states. In
other words, they are happy with the current global order and do not wish to
change or revise the current global order as they may stand to benefit from
the status quo.

3
4 • India as Kingmaker

Power transition theory posits that when a revisionist state has amassed
enough power to challenge the hegemonic state, then conflict will ensue. The
reason for this is that the global hegemon does not want to relinquish con-
trol of the world order, and the revisionist state is eager to create an alterna-
tive world order. According to power transition theory, this is when we are
likely to see massive conflict between states such as world wars. For example,
one of the common explanations of World War I and World War II has to do
with the fact that Great Britain was the global hegemon, and Germany was a
revisionist power. As a rising Germany amassed enough power to challenge
the global order, it did so by invoking conflict against Great Britain in World
War I and World War II. However, Germany was not powerful enough to
defeat the global order established by Great Britain. While emerging victori-
ous, Great Britain was severely weakened during the world wars and was
unable to continue maintaining the global order following World War II.
The United States quickly stepped into the vacuum and created the liberal
global order.
Following the end of the Cold War, the United States expanded the lib-
eral order in the absence of any challengers. However, over time, states
became dissatisfied with the liberal order and more specifically with the rules
established by the United States. Specifically, over time, China and Russia
became increasingly dissatisfied with the liberal global order. According to
power transition theory, in addition to being dissatisfied, revisionist states
must also have enough power to challenge the current hegemon. The rise of
China’s power, and the alignment of Russia’s and China’s positions against
the United States, is challenging the current global order. Great powers in
the global system must now make their preferences known. Are the great
powers in favor of revising the current global order, in other words, in becom-
ing revisionist powers, or are they in favor of maintaining the current global
order, in other words, in remaining status quo powers? Many of the great
powers have already aligned themselves accordingly. For example, Great Brit-
ain, France, and Germany have aligned themselves with the current global
order. They are classic status quo powers. On the other side, Russia and China
are aligned and are revisionist powers. One of the great powers that is an
enigma is India. India can play a crucial role in determining the direction of
the global order. Will India be a status quo power and thus support the
United States in maintaining the current global order, or will India be a revi-
sionist power and support China’s and Russia’s attempts to revise the current
global order? Officially, India has declared that it is a nonaligned power. This
means that India has declined to form formal alliances with either the United
States or Russia. Also, India has chosen to maintain close ties with both the
 India as a Kingmaker • 5

United States and Russia. Given India’s rising power and status in the inter-
national system, it is in the position to become a kingmaker. If the United
States wants to retain the current global order, it must convince India to sup-
port the current order. If China and Russia wish to effectively challenge the
global order, they must convince India to support the revisionist position. In
this book, we examine India’s place in the global order and determine India’s
preferences as to whether it is more likely to support the current order or
more likely to support the revisionist powers. In other words, we determine
whether India is a status quo or revisionist power. India’s nonaligned status
makes this a difficult, albeit interesting task. We now turn to a discussion of
India’s nonaligned status.

Nonalignment

Independent India’s first prime minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, was the
architect of modern India. As India grappled with its newfound role and
responsibilities as a sovereign state, he exercised disproportionate influence
on many aspects of policy making, of which foreign policy was one promi-
nent area. Nascent India’s foreign policy was largely shaped by Nehru and
his ideals and ideology. Nehru was considered to be an idealist and an inter-
national statesman and he believed in India’s manifest destiny to join the
group of great powers. Working to that end, he intentionally shaped India’s
foreign policy to be unique and worth emulating by other developing states.
By the time India was coming into its own as a newly independent coun-
try, the Cold War had begun between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Nehru consciously fabricated an approach based on the principles of
nonalignment that would prevent India from becoming depending on either
the First World (capitalist democratic) or Second World (socialist auto-
cratic) states. While India had much in common with the democratic states
of the Global North, geopolitically it was within the Soviet Union’s sphere of
influence. This conflict probably prevented India from showing strong sup-
port for any one ideology. Also, having just completed a century long strug-
gle to attain its independence, India’s leaders did not want to jeopardize its
independence by creating formal linkages with any great power. As a result,
unlike several former colonies in Africa that continue to have military ties
with France, India steadfastly avoided covert and overt efforts by the United
Kingdom to pursue formal military ties with its former colonial ruler.
As a newly independent country, India was undergoing growing pains; it
was attempting to shape its political economy with the twin goals of achieving
6 • India as Kingmaker

economic development and the eradication of social problems. Nehru believed

that it was in India’s best interest to maintain friendly relations with all the
major powers; there was much to gain in terms of foreign aid by playing the
neutrality card. As long as India remained genuinely neutral, it would not be
considered a threat by any one side. On the contrary, because of its size and
strategic position, both the United States and the Soviet Union would attempt
to woo India by offering generous foreign aid, technology transfers, and so
forth, which would aid in India’s much-­needed industrial development.
It was Nehru’s strong desire to refrain from becoming entangled in great
power conflict as well as his efforts at internal diplomacy that gave birth to the
Non-­Aligned Movement. Nehru, along with the leaders of Egypt and other
Third World (nonaligned, developing) countries, together formed the Non-­
Aligned Movement.
The Non-­Aligned Movement provided India with a platform to relay its
message to the world. It also provided India with an opportunity to practice
its leadership skills and portray its great power aspirations to the interna-
tional community. While India had good intentions and used righteous lan-
guage to reprimand major power states when they committed human rights
abuses or neglected their global social responsibilities, it was criticized for
not always living up to these ideals itself, both domestically and in its interac-
tions with neighboring states in South Asia.

The Non-­Aligned Movement’s Lingering Legacy

While the Non-­Aligned Movement eventually lost its fervor and rationale for
existence, Nehruvian idealism and nonalignment continued to inform Indian
foreign policy. The country is only now witnessing the first generation of schol-
ars, academics, and politicians who are far enough removed from Nehru’s era to
question the value of nonalignment in India’s foreign policy and are willing to
break with this approach and undertake a new guiding philosophy.
Nehru, as India’s first prime minister and external affairs minister, care-
fully controlled the creation and delivery of foreign policy. Nehru’s princi-
ples of idealistic internationalism, self-­reliance, nonalignment, swadeshi (‘of
one’s own country,’ i.e. made in India), and nondogmatic socialism were the
underlying basis on which India’s foreign policy was created (Ogden 2014).
The process of foreign policy formulation in India remains ad hoc and
opaque, consisting of the Prime Minister’s Office and a close group of trusted
advisors. Thus, individual leaders continue to wield a significant amount of
 India as a Kingmaker • 7

influence vis-­à-­vis defining the country’s national interests and the direction of
its foreign policy. This is not to say that there hasn’t been continuity in preserv-
ing foreign policy principles with the regular change in leadership that the
democratic process brings approximately every five years. However, this conti-
nuity is the result of chance rather than careful planning. It is partly because the
Indian National Congress party continued to dominate the Indian electorate
and stay in power for the first 50 years of India’s independence. The first non-­
Congress-­led government came to power in 1998. Congress’s near domination
of the Indian electorate and election process ensured continuity, rather than
change, as the norm in the foreign policy creation circles.
Atal Bhiari Bajpayee (from the Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP) was the
first prime minister from outside the Indian National Congress to serve a full
five-­year term. His administration brought fresh insight, infused new vigor,
and provided new direction to India’s trajectory. It was during the BJP’s ten-
ure that India successfully tested the nuclear bomb and joined an elite group
of states by becoming a nuclear power. India was an unwelcome member to
this closed group of nuclear weapons states, but India remained resolute in
defying other major powers and insisted that its territorial rivalry with Paki-
stan over the issue of Kashmir as well as the nuclear status of neighboring
China, which had defeated India in an interstate war in 1962, justified India’s
quest for nuclear deterrence. It is these external threats and their influence on
India’s security policy that will be the prime subject of the next chapter.
Politicians, bureaucrats, and some scholars and members of the media con-
tinue to play lip service to nonalignment as the ideology guiding India’s inter-
actions with other states in the international system, specifically the major
powers. However, nonalignment is fast receding as a foreign policy principle in
India. Nehruvian idealism has been replaced by realpolitik thinking among the
top brass of the country’s administrators. Today, India continues to adhere to
certain Nehruvian ideals such as a preference for multipolarity, equality for all
states irrespective of the size of their economy and military, respect for state
sovereignty as well as human rights, and the utility of international institutions
in helping to appease problems of trust and coordination that are inherent in
international relations. However, India and its leaders are increasingly cogni-
zant of the role of material capabilities and the preponderance of power poli-
tics and they are willing participants in a system where inequality is rampant, in
bilateral interactions as well as in multilateral institutions. In spite of the fact
that India has such an interest in international relations, India is hampered by
its relations with the states located in its region. We now turn to a discussion of
India’s place as a regional power.
8 • India as Kingmaker

India as a Regional Power

India is the most powerful of the states in South Asia. While many of the
states in the region struggle with economic growth, India has witnessed mas-
sive economic growth in the last two decades. Along with economic growth,
the size of India’s population has also exploded. However, India has fragile
and tense relations with the other states in the region. In fact, India has many
territorial conflicts with neighboring states. The most well-­known rivalry in
the region is between India and Pakistan. It is between two nuclear states that
often have militarized disputes in Kashmir, a contested border region between
India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan lay claim to Kashmir, and often
hostilities between both countries erupt into military conflict. This territorial
conflict has led to two major wars between India and Pakistan in 1947 and
1965, with a limited war breaking out in 1999. In February 2019, conflict
again broke out between India and Pakistan when Indian forces came under
attack in Kashmir, killing several troops. India responded by aerial bombing a
Pakistani base. Pakistan shot down an Indian aircraft and even captured an
Indian pilot. While tensions continued to escalate, India sent more paramili-
tary forces into Kashmir. While the situation did not devolve into full-­scale
war, the situation and border conflict remain unresolved and could devolve
into war should conflict break out again.
The conflict between India and Pakistan is not the only major border
conflict affecting India. India and China also have a contested border region
between the two states. In 1962, both sides fought a war over the contested
region, resulting in India’s humiliating defeat. Since 1962, tensions have been
simmering between the two states, threatening to escalate into a larger con-
flict. In 2020, tensions escalated into armed confrontation with both India
and China accusing each others’ militaries of shooting at each other. While
an agreement was struck in 1999, where both sides agreed not to use guns or
explosives in the contested area, nevertheless armed conflict broke out in
2020, resulting in casualties for both sides. Tensions continue to boil over the
contested territory, yet both sides try to keep a full military conflict from
erupting. Both sides trade with each other, and China is one of India’s largest
trading partners, meaning that the economy of both states would suffer
should a war break out. Despite their cooperation in trade, both India and
China remain wary of each other. For example, when Russia wanted to invite
India to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China only agreed to
allow India to become a member if Pakistan were also allowed membership,
ensuring a type of power balancing within the organization.
Despite India’s border conflicts, India remains committed to having rela-
 India as a Kingmaker • 9

tionships with other states in the region as well as globally. India is not only
committed to bilateral relations with other states but also to being involved
in multilateral institutions. One example of this is the Free and Open Indo-­
Pacific Strategy. This is a strategy begun by Japan as a method of providing an
alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and to counter China’s influ-
ence in the region. Four states, known as the “Quad” (the United States,
Japan, India, and Australia) have come together to discuss cooperation and
develop regional infrastructure projects.
Despite being involved in the Quad process and the Free and Open Indo-­
Pacific Strategy, India remains reluctant to fully embrace it, knowing that
doing so would alienate China. Thus, India is left to tread the line between
cooperation with China, balancing China’s regional power, and cooperating
with the current global hegemon and status quo powers.
India is an important player in the quest for creating a new global order
for the 21st century. China recognizes the importance of India’s power and
status. If China can convince India to become a full revisionist power, then
the revisionist powers will be successful in wresting control of the global
order. The United States, in return, understands India’s importance in main-
taining the current global order and retaining the status quo. In this way,
India is truly a kingmaker. If India chooses to become a revisionist power, the
global order will witness change. Whereas, if India chooses to be a status quo
power, China’s bid to challenge the current global order would be unsuccess-
ful. In this book, we examine India’s bilateral relations with the major status
quo and revisionist powers to determine where India’s preferences lie in
determining the future of the global order.
This book is separated into three sections. Part 1 discusses India’s place in
the global order. Part 2 discusses India’s relations with the status quo states,
while part 3 discusses India’s relations with revisionist powers. In chapter 2,
we delve into the concepts of world order and how world order is created. We
examine the current world order established by the United States following
World War II, and categorize global powers as either status quo or revision-
ist. In chapter 3, we describe the methodology that we use to determine
India’s preferences toward the global order. We examine India’s bilateral trea-
ties with status quo and revisionist states as an indicator of the country’ pref-
erence toward the global order.
Part 2 of the book is an analysis of India’s relationships with the great
status quo powers. Thus, chapter 4 examines the relationship between the
United States and India. While the United States has stated that it has made
a pivot to Asia and that its relationship with India is a priority, we examine
the bilateral relationship to determine the accuracy of this view.
10 • India as Kingmaker

India has a special relationship with the United Kingdom, one of the big-
gest allies of the United States, and one of the strongest proponents of the
liberal order. Because of the United Kingdom’s colonial past in India, with
chapter 5 we examine their bilateral relationship to determine the level of
cooperation between those two states and whether or not their relationship
indicates support for the liberal order. The European Union is also a strong
ally and proponent of the liberal order. Two of the major powers within the
European Union are France and Germany. Therefore, in addition to examin-
ing India’s relationship with the UK, chapter 5 focuses on the bilateral rela-
tionships between India and France and India and Germany as well as India’s
relationship with the EU.
In chapter 6 we turn to examine status quo states in Asia. Specifically, we
focus on India’s relationship with Japan. Japan is a longtime ally of the United
States and a supporter of the liberal order, and has been increasingly con-
cerned with the rise of China’s power in the region. India’s relationship with
Japan will indicate its openness to maintaining the liberal order.
In part 3, we begin to examine India’s relationships with revisionist pow-
ers. Thus, in chapter 7 we focus on its relationship with Russia. Given that
India had close ties with the Soviet Union, it is important to examine its ties
with Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union to see if India’s prefer-
ence is for revising the liberal order. In chapter 8 we examine India’s relation-
ship with China. This could be more of a problematic relationship as India
and China have had border disputes and a rivalry. However, if India is truly a
revisionist state, it will have a cooperative relationship with China. Finally, in
chapter 9, we determine India’s preference toward the liberal order. We offer
not only a determination of India’s preference but also provide policy recom-
mendations for how to proceed in bilateral relationships with India for both
the status quo and revisionist states.
2 • The Challenge to the Global Order

The concept of hierarchical power distribution in the global order has long
been a central component of international relations. Initially, global order
was seen as being a reflection of order created by states within their own geo-
graphical boundaries. For example, Huntington ([1968] 2006) argues that
order is the most important factor for a state’s survival. What he means by
order is a regime’s ability to control and maintain stability within its geo-
graphical borders. He states that the type of government is not as important
as internal order. Governments or regimes create institutions, which estab-
lish order and stability. Rapid social change in societies, coupled with the
inability of institutions to meet the new demands of society, leads to a lack of
order and stability. While order and stability seem to be synonymous for
Huntington, it is important to note several important aspects of his under-
standing of the concept of order. Order is not a static concept. It is rather an
evolving concept that depends upon the interaction between society on the
one hand and institutions and rules on the other. Order creates predictability
for its citizens. The rules and institutions that provide order also provide pre-
dictability and the ability for citizens to effectively operate in the system to
achieve their personal goals. It should be noted that not all personal goals are
alike, but rather the order that the system provides shapes the goals that indi-
viduals can have within the political system. While different regimes estab-
lish different institutional arrangements within their borders, the goal of
each regime is to establish and maintain order.
While Huntington (1968) focused on the concept of intrastate order, the
concept of interstate or international order is a very important topic of con-
cern among international relations scholars. In fact, Ikenberry (2011, 22)
argues that the problem of order is the central problem of international rela-
tions. More specifically, he states that the main questions in understanding

11
12 • India as Kingmaker

the concept of order is how it is devised, how it breaks down, and how it is
created. In this book, we will examine how order is created at the global level
and the role of regional powers in maintaining or challenging that global
order. We argue that regional powers are the lynchpins in maintaining global
order as established by the hegemon. They are the ones that are responsible
for helping to adhere to the rules established by the global hegemon, and
must in turn not only adhere to those rules but also enforce them through
their interactions with other states. Global order begins to break down when
the regional great powers begin to challenge those rules, leading to a change
in the hierarchical power structure among states in the global system. In the
South Asia region, India is a regional great power, and is central to ensuring
that the global rules are adhered to and enforced in the region. In this chap-
ter, we will define the concept of international order, discuss how interna-
tional order applies to regional power structures and regional order, and then
examine the regional order in South Asia.

Conceptualizing International Order

According to hegemonic stability theory, global anarchy is part of the fun-

damental nature of the global system. There is no world government, and
thus states must provide for their own security. However, theorists believe
that anarchy is not static. Instead, they argue that if a state is able to become
a hegemonic power, that state will be able to establish rules by which the
rest of the states in the global system must abide. The hegemon can enforce
the rules either through the use of overwhelming force or through ostra-
cization by not allowing states that do not follow the rules the ability to
trade with other states in the global system. While the hegemonic power
benefits by creating the rules, weaker states in the system also benefit by
receiving both security and economic benefits from the hegemonic states.
Thus, the states understand their roles within the global system, and the
hegemon provides benefits to those states provided they operate within the
rules established by the hegemon. Specifically, for scholars such as Gilpin
(1981), the power of a hegemonic state creates both global stability and
operative rules of interactions that reflect the preferences of the hegemonic
state. More specifically, a hegemonic state will institutionalize a system of
rules and institutions that preserve and advance its goals and values.
Both realist and hegemonic stability theorists understand the concept of
international order in fundamentally different ways due to their assumptions
of the nature of the global system. Realists understand global anarchy as a
 The Challenge to the Global Order • 13

static concept that cannot be overcome, whereas hegemonic stability theo-

rists believe that global anarchy is a given, but is not static. It can be overcome
if there is a powerful enough state that can establish order. Therefore, schol-
ars who have studied the concept of order have noted that there are basically
two different ways to conceptualize global order in international relations.
Realists, such as Waltz (1979, 89–­92), state that international order is basi-
cally synonymous with the structure of the international system. Other real-
ist scholars view international order as being synonymous with stability,
which can only be achieved when there is a balance of power in the interna-
tional system (Walt 1985). Specifically, Acharya (2007) argues that one way
in which to conceptualize order is to examine the relative power capabilities
of all of the states and assess the distribution of power. This is a descriptive
and static conceptualization of order, which does not take into account the
effect of order upon other states. It instead takes a snapshot of each state’s
power at a given time, giving a limited understanding of the global order
based on the behavior of states.
There is a second way of conceptualizing international order that exam-
ines not only power distribution but also takes into account the rules estab-
lished within the global order. Acharya (2007) states that international order
is an increase in the level of stability and predictability within the interna-
tional system. This conceptualization of global order is an outcome-­oriented
approach that is concerned more with stability and predictability than with
the power distribution of states within the international system. Hegemonic
stability theorists conceptualize international order in this way. They are
concerned with the goal of establishing an order instead of just reflecting the
international power structure.
Hegemonic stability theorists argue that a concentration of power in a
specific state will inherently create order. In fact, the more powerful a state,
the more likely it is to be able to create and maintain order. This is due to the
fact that the hegemonic power has enough power to enforce its goals and
rules. More specifically, hegemonic states actively strive to establish order to
ensure that their goals are achieved and their rules are followed by the inter-
national system. When a hegemonic state is able to create an order, the order
allows the hegemonic state to benefit through trade, and in exchange offers
military protection and predictability in interactions to weaker states that
are willing to accept the global order. Thus, Bull (2012, 8) argues that inter-
national order will sustain the primary goals of international society. In other
words, if a hegemonic state is able to establish order, then it can create and
sustain the primary goals of international society. Other scholars have noted
that the institutionalization of a system of order is driven by the desire to
14 • India as Kingmaker

Fig. 1. International Order

organize the system to preserve the goals and values of the hegemonic state
(Stewart-­Ingersoll and Frazier 2012).
Ultimately, international order must be understood as a hegemonic state’s
rules and norms that are accepted by weaker states within the international
system. Weaker states must abide by these rules and norms to receive benefits
from the global hegemon. In other words, international order is a hierarchi-
cal relationship where the hegemon specifically establishes government
through rules, principles, and institutions that govern the interactions
between states (see fig. 1). More specifically, Stewart-­Ingersoll and Frazier
(2012, 18) argue that international order is made up of the “governing
arrangements among the units of a system, including their rules, principles
and institutions, which are designed to make interactions predictable and to
sustain the goals and values that are collectively salient.” Thus, an interna-
tional order includes both a purpose and an organized means through which
it is achieved, and the salient interests will be asymmetrically representative
of the most influential actors in the system. This is especially so when the
hegemonic power can effectively use coercive powers to ensure compliance
with the international order.
As stated earlier, one of the benefits of creating an international order is
that it makes interactions between states in that order more predictable
(Stewart-­Ingersoll and Frazier 2012). The hegemonic state establishes inter-
national order to benefit its own interests, namely trade and sustaining its
own goals and values, whereas weaker states are interested in accepting the
international order so that they have increased predictability in their interac-
tions with the hegemonic state as well as with other states within the interna-
tional order. Ideally, according to Bull (2002, 16–­18), international order
should contribute to four main rules, specifically, maintaining the status quo
 The Challenge to the Global Order • 15

of the system of states (especially in regard to internal sovereignty), protect-

ing the independence of states by recognizing territorial autonomy, trying to
promote the absence of war between states, and ensuring that agreements
between states in the global order are upheld. However, the specific rules
that the hegemonic state institutes in creating international order depend on
the goals and norms of the hegemonic power.
It should be noted that international order provided by a hegemon allevi-
ates the problem of anarchy in international relations. Weaker states are not
faced with the security dilemma, because as long as they play by the rules
imposed by the hegemon, they can depend on predictability in interactions
as well as the hegemon’s protection of their independence and territorial
autonomy.

International Order in a Bipolar System

The preceding discussion has focused on defining an international order

where there is one global hegemon that is able to establish international
order. A single state is able to become so powerful that it is able to establish
the global order. This is often referred to as a unipolar system. For example,
the United Kingdom was able to achieve global hegemonic status during
the 19th century. Between 1815 and 1914, it established the order known
as the Pax Britannica, where it set up a liberal trade empire. States had to
abide by the rules set up by the British. In return, the British helped to sup-
press piracy and allow trade not only between the British and weaker pow-
ers but also between the weaker states in the global system. The United
Kingdom was able to achieve unprecedented wealth by trading with other
states, yet to ensure that trade routes were not disrupted by piracy, which
would have diminished that wealth, the British had to ensure that their
navy was strong enough to defeat any pirates that were a hindrance to global
trade. The fact that the British navy fought pirates ensured that other states
could also take advantage and gain wealth through trade. Thus, it was in the
weaker states’ interests to accept the British global order. In other words, as
long as weaker states did not challenge the hegemonic power, the global
order remained intact. Pax Britannica was able to last approximately a
whole century.
Pax Britannica lasted until the rapid industrialization period of the early
20th century when Germany, Japan, and the United States became able to
challenge the United Kingdom’s status as the global hegemon. Germany,
especially, wanted to challenge the United Kingdom as the global hegemon,
16 • India as Kingmaker

and rapidly increased its spending during this period. While the United
Kingdom was still the global hegemon, Germany was a revisionist state in
that it wanted to revise the global power hierarchy and no longer wanted to
be bound by the global order established by the United Kingdom. Germany’s
actions as a revisionist power led to its creation of alliances with other pow-
ers to try to balance against the power of the United Kingdom and to an
effort to install itself as the global hegemon. Instead, World War I ensued,
and a period of time more closely resembling a multipolar system came
about. With the defeat of Germany in World War I, the United Kingdom
tried to reestablish its dominance as the global hegemon, but was not able to
fully achieve dominance again. Instead, Germany remained a revisionist
state, and in part due to the harsh treatment that it received at the end of
World War I, it was not long before Germany again challenged the global
hierarchy through war. This led to World War II, which was devastating to
the whole European continent. Most of the European states suffered great
losses of life, economy, and power, and the United Kingdom could no longer
even attempt to reinstate itself as the global hegemon.
Following World War II in 1945, two states emerged as being the most
powerful in the global system. The United States and the Soviet Union had
differing ideological views, and quickly set up an international order in each
of their spheres of influence that reflected that ideology. They established
rules and institutions that created order over their respective spheres of influ-
ence, with most of Western Europe falling under the order that the United
States established, while Eastern Europe fell under the order established by
the Soviet Union (see fig. 2). Figure 2 shows the makeup of the international
order during the Cold War period. Both hegemonic powers attempted to
expand their order over more of the system while limiting the other hege-
mon’s ability to do so. In the United States, the government developed a
policy of containment to try to prevent the spread of communism around
the world. Both hegemonic states would attempt to weaken the other
through proxy conflicts, attempting to decrease the other states’ power. The
United States fought in Korea, where China and the Soviet Union helped
the North Koreans. Similarly, the United States fought in the Vietnam War
against the North Vietnamese, who were aided by the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Union, on the other hand, fought to fully establish communism in
Afghanistan, and the United States aided the Muhajedin, who were fighting
against the Soviets. Basically, both states tried to prevent each other from
increasing the number of states that fell within each sphere of influence and
thus the international order established within that sphere. Both sides
attempted to prevent direct confrontation with each other, especially follow-
 The Challenge to the Global Order • 17

Fig. 2. Bipolar International Order

ing the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, understanding that a direct confronta-
tion would lead to nuclear war and the distinct possibility of mutual
destruction.
The preceding discussion has focused on the global system. Lemke (2002)
argues that the global power hierarchy is often replicated at the regional level.
More specifically, he states that regional great powers create a hierarchical
regional structure that falls under the global hierarchical structure. In other
words, while there is one global hegemon, regional powers that accept the
rules established by the global hegemon are given the authority both to
enforce the global rules and to establish a regional order by which the weaker
states in a given region must abide. This regional hierarchical structure is very
similar to the global hierarchical model. This is called the multiple hierarchy
model. Therefore, we can adapt Lemke’s (2002) model to determine how
regional and international order are related (see fig. 3).
In the hypothetical example provided in figure 3, there is one global hege-
mon and two regional hegemons from different regions. Each of the two
regional hegemons must create its own regional order, and the weaker
regional states must follow the regional order established by the regional
hegemons. In this hypothetical example, the regional hegemons must enact
their regional order so that it does not conflict with the global order estab-
lished by the global hegemon. There will thus be subtle differences in the
regional orders established by regional powers in their respective regions.
Further, we use the concept of regional hegemon according to Lemke (2002)
and Slobodchikoff (2014) to denote the strongest regional power. This is not
the way that Mearsheimer (2001) conceptualizes the term “regional hege-
mon.” Whereas Mearsheimer (2001) argues that a regional hegemon can
have global reach and is the most powerful in different regions, Lemke
(2002) and Slobodchikoff (2014) distinguish between a global hegemon
18 • India as Kingmaker

Fig. 3. Global and Regional

Hierarchical Order

and a regional hegemon. According to Lemke (2002) and Slobodchikoff

(2014), a regional hegemon is the strongest power in a specific region,
whereas the global hegemon is the strongest power globally. When the
United States has more power than India, for example, the United States
would be the global hegemon and India would be the regional hegemon in
South Asia. Thus, in a unipolar system, there is a single global hegemon, and
each region has its own regional hegemon. In a bipolar system, there are two
hegemons that control their blocs, and there are regional hegemons support-
ing the hegemon in control of their bloc. In a multipolar system, there is no
global hegemon, merely regional hegemons vying for control.
During the Cold War, the bipolar global and regional hierarchies would
look similar to figure 3, except there would be two global hegemons. The
regional hegemons in each sphere of influence would establish regional
order that would comply with the global order established by its global
hegemon.
 The Challenge to the Global Order • 19

The Problem of Reach

In a unipolar system, it is assumed that the global hegemon is able to

project enough power to cover the entire system. However, this doesn’t
take into account geography and the fact that there are some places
where a hegemon cannot realistically project its power. For example, it
would be incorrect to assume that the United States can project just as
much power in Sri Lanka as it does in Mexico. Therefore, some schol-
ars have argued that power projection can be measured geographically,
and that it is possible to determine where a hegemon is not able to
project its power (Boulding 1962; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Lemke
2002). Further, there are certain geographical zones that are referred
to as power vacuums, where hierarchical relationships between states
do not dominate (Rhamey, Slobodchikoff, and Volgy 2015). In these
geographical zones, there is no global order imposed by the global
hegemon, but rather there is jockeying among regional powers to
establish a regional order that may or may not be nested within the
global order.
In geographical spaces where there is a global power vacuum, regional
powers will try to establish their own rules, principles, and institutions. These
may or may not mirror the order established by the global hegemon, since
the hegemon would not be able to enforce the global rules. Further, since the
global hegemon would not have the reach to be able to establish rules and
predictability, it is more likely that low-­level conflict between regional states
would occur. Regional powers would be more likely to enter into conflict
over the right to develop the regional rules, principles, and institutions and
thus establish regional order.
Once regional order is established within a hierarchical global power vac-
uum, then the hierarchical structure of order will resemble figure 3, minus the
global order. There would just be a regional hierarchical structure of order, with
weaker states within the region following the order established by the regional
hegemon instead of the global order established by the global hegemon.
The whole preceding discussion has focused on the creation of global
order according to hegemonic stability theory in both a unipolar and a
bipolar system. Ultimately, the key to hegemonic stability theory is that
the systemic power structure cannot change. In other words, the systemic
rules remain in effect providing that the hegemon can enforce them. If
there is a change in the systemic power structure, where the hegemon
loses the ability to enforce the rules that it has established, then the sys-
tem becomes more anarchic and thus unstable. It is important to note
that hegemonic stability is in direct conflict with neorealism in that
20 • India as Kingmaker

hegemonic stability theory argues that the global system is most stable
under a unipolar system, whereas neorealism argues that the global sys-
tem is most stable under a bipolar system. However, it is natural to ques-
tion what happens as the global hegemon begins to lose its share of power
in the systemic power structure.

Global Order and Power Transition Theory

The answer to the question of what happens as a hegemonic state loses rela-
tive power in the systemic power structure is addressed by power transition
theory. Specifically, power transition theorists argue that conflict is more
likely as the global hegemon loses power relative to other states in the sys-
tem (Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1981; DiCicco and Levy 1999).
It is important to note that power transition theory identifies the hegemon
and a revisionist state. The revisionist state must be dissatisfied with the
status quo and the rules established by the global hegemon. In contrast, a
status quo state is a state that accepts the global order and is happy with the
order and rules established by the hegemonic state. It does not seek to over-
turn or challenge the global order. The revisionist state, however, does not
want to accept the order established by the global hegemon. The revisionist
state will work to overturn the international order in two ways. First, the
revisionist state must increase its own power vis-­à-­vis the global hegemon,
and, second, the revisionist state will ally itself with other revisionist states
to attempt to balance the power of the hegemonic power and bring about
change in the international order. In other words, not only must a revision-
ist state be dissatisfied with the status quo and the systemic rules of behav-
ior, it must increase its power relative to the global hegemon while also ally-
ing with other revisionist powers.
Similar to hegemonic stability theory, power transition theory argues
that the most stable global system is unipolar. For example, power transition
theorists would argue that the United States was the undisputed global hege-
mon immediately after World War II, and that the Soviet Union was a dis-
satisfied state that wished to challenge the United States’ hegemonic status
(Wohlforth 1994). In fact, some scholars have noted that the Soviet Union
was never in fact a bipolar power (Wohlforth 1994), and others have found
that the most stable and peaceful periods during the Cold War were where
there was a higher level of hegemonic power than during periods of relative
power parity (Volgy and Imwalle 1995).
According to Lemke (2002), power transition theory applies at the
 The Challenge to the Global Order • 21

regional level as well. The regional hegemon establishes the regional order
nested within the global order, and the weaker states choose to be either
status quo states, accepting the regional order, or revisionist states that
would work to overturn the regional order. At the global level, it is impor-
tant to examine the great powers and regional hegemons to determine
which states are status quo states and which states are revisionist states. At
the regional level, it is important to examine the weaker states to determine
if they are status quo or revisionist states. The reason it is important to know
this is because while the global and regional hegemons establish their
respective orders, the order is only stable as long as the powerful states
within the order accept the order as being legitimate. In other words, if a
global hegemon establishes an international order and the regional hege-
mons do not accept the legitimacy of the international order, then the
regional hegemons will ally themselves with other powerful revisionist
powers in an effort to change the international order. Similarly, the powers
in a regional order must accept the regional order established by the regional
hegemon for that order to be stable. Some powerful states may look to the
hegemonic power to entice them to accept the international order. These
states are not fully status quo, but neither are they fully revisionist. They
lean toward the status quo (see table 1). Similarly, a state can lean toward
being a revisionist state, but it needs more enticement by the revisionist
states to be fully revisionist. Finally, a state can choose not to ally itself with
any other powers, or to ally itself with all of the major powers (both status
quo and revisionist) in the international order. This is an undecided state.
Table 1 categorizes the choices that regional powers must make in accepting
or attempting to reject the international order.
The second half of the 20th century and the first two decades of the 21st
century saw a prolonged period of great change in the international order.
The international order evolved from a multipolar system at the end of World
War I, to a bipolar system arising from the ashes of World War II, to a unipo-
lar system following the end of the Cold War. We now turn to a discussion of
the evolution of the global order following the end of World War II to the
emergence and subsequent decline of the power of the global hegemon in the
international order.

Evolution of the Global Order after World War II

World War II left most of the European powers as shells of the powers that
they had been at the turn of the 20th century. Only two powers emerged
Table 1. Categorization of Status Quo vs. Revisionist Power
Solid Status Quo Leans Status Quo Undecided Leans Revisionist Solid Revisionist
Institutionalized Institutionalized Either no institu- Institutionalized Institutionalized
Cooperative Cooperative tionalized coop- Cooperative Cooperative
Relationship Relationship erative Relationship Relationship
with US with US relationships with Russia with Russia
OR
Institutionalized
Cooperative
Relationship with
both the United
States (major sta-
tus quo power)
and Russia (major
revisionist power)
Institutionalized Ad hoc or Insti- Ad hoc or Institutionalized
Cooperative tutionalized Institutionalized Cooperative
Relationship Relationship Relationship Relationship
with UK with EU with China with China
Institutionalized Ad hoc or Insti- Lacks Institu-
Cooperative tutionalized tionalized Coop-
Relationship Relationship erative Relation-
with France with France or ship with US
Germany
Institutionalized Ad hoc or Insti-
Cooperative tutionalized
Relationship Relationship
with Germany with Japan
Institutionalized
Cooperative
Relationship
with EU
Institutionalized
Cooperative
Relationship
with Japan
Lacks Institution-
alized Coopera-
tive Relationship
with Russia
 The Challenge to the Global Order • 23

that were strong enough global powers to establish international order. Spe-
cifically, the United States and the Soviet Union both had enough power to
establish an international order, yet neither power was strong enough to
defeat the other. While both powers had allied themselves with the other
Allied powers during World War II, both Washington and Moscow real-
ized that by the end of the war they would be the only two global powers
left standing.
At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, US president Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the prime minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill,
and Soviet premier Josef Stalin discussed the post–­World War II world. Each
leader had his own agenda that he wanted to see enacted. Roosevelt wanted
Soviet agreement to join the United States in the war against Japan. Churchill
wanted an agreement that would ensure free and fair democratic elections
across all of Europe. Stalin wanted to establish spheres of influence for the
great powers, which would allow the creation of buffer states; this would
protect the Soviet Union from another attack from Germany the way Russia
had been invaded by Germany in World War I and the Soviet Union had
been invaded in World War II.
In addition, all of the leaders wanted to ensure that Germany would no
longer be a threat in the future. Thus, they began to discuss the partitioning
of Germany into occupation zones. Each major power would receive a part
of Germany to control. Since French general Charles de Gaulle had not been
invited, Stalin insisted that a French partition of Germany would have to
come out of the United States’ and United Kingdom’s sections.
To gain concessions from both Churchill and Roosevelt, Stalin agreed to
allow Eastern European states to create democratic institutions according to
democratic principles. It was extremely important to Churchill that all of
Central and Eastern Europe, especially Poland, establish democratic institu-
tions. Even though Stalin agreed to this, he reiterated to both leaders how
important it was to the security of the Soviet Union that Poland not be able
to serve as a corridor for attack from a Western power. Poland had been twice
used as a corridor to attack the Soviet Union (once during World War I,
when it was the Russian Empire, and the second time when Adolf Hitler
invaded the Soviet Union during World War II).
To alleviate Stalin’s concerns, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to use the
basic structure of the communist provisional government that had been
installed by Stalin, but they argued that the provisional government had to
be reorganized according to democratic principles. Stalin agreed to this
point. Further, he agreed to Roosevelt’s request that the Soviet Union join
the war against Japan a couple of months after the end of the war against
24 • India as Kingmaker

Germany in exchange for postwar concessions from the United States, which
Roosevelt accepted. Despite being attacked domestically for the Yalta agree-
ment, both Churchill and Roosevelt insisted that Stalin could be trusted to
fulfill his side of the agreement.
Following the conference at Yalta, it quickly became clear that Stalin
would not fulfill his end of the agreement in Poland. In fact, the United
States ambassador to the Soviet Union cabled Washington and stated that he
was concerned that Stalin’s plans for Poland were nothing short of totalitari-
anism, and not in the least bit democratic. Roosevelt had to agree that he had
been mistaken in his trust of Stalin, and that he could no longer believe that
Stalin was an ally of the United States.
Relations between the former allies continued to sour after the war, with
the Soviet Union continuing to install communist governments in Eastern
Europe while consolidating its power. The Soviets were driven by the desire
to create their sphere of influence and a buffer zone, thus protecting them
from possible attack from powerful Western European countries. One of the
important aspects of Soviet control was dismantling any democratic ele-
ments and ensuring that the states in the region would owe their allegiance
to the Soviet hegemonic state. In other words, the Soviet Union was in the
process of establishing a regional order, with it being the regional hegemon,
and the weaker states having to accept the rules and the order.
During this period, the United States and the United Kingdom were also
working to create their own vision of a world order, that of a liberal interna-
tional order. While the Soviets had reluctantly agreed to join the United
Nations providing that they had a way to veto significant decisions through
the United Nations Security Council, the rest of the liberal international
order was designed to favor the United States and its ideology. The United
Kingdom, which had been the global hegemon, began to cede more and
more of its status to the United States, relinquishing its right to establish the
regional order to Washington.
At the heart of the new liberal order established by the United States was
the rights of the individual and the spread of democracy. All of the institutions
established by the Bretton Woods system were designed to help the liberal ide-
ology spread through monetary institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. The basic belief during the immediate aftermath
of World War II was that not only was it imperative that another world war not
break out, but that the United States had to assert its power globally as opposed
to what it had done after World War I by withdrawing from the global order
and its position of prominence as a hegemon. After World War II, the United
States embraced its position as the regional hegemon in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Similar to the Soviet Union, Washington realized that it needed to
 The Challenge to the Global Order • 25

maintain a sphere of influence and to ensure that it maintained its hegemonic

power within that sphere of influence.
By 1946, it became apparent that there was a definite break between the
former allies. Two regional hegemons had emerged with competing visions
of a global order. In a famous speech in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill
emphatically stated, “The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of
world power. It is a solemn moment for the American democracy” (Churchill
2009). This statement established the regional hegemony of the United
States. His most famous statement from the speech was the following:

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has
descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of
the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin,
Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these
famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call
the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only
to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing
measure of control from Moscow. (Churchill 2009)

This speech was a rallying cry to the American public, urging them to stay in
the position of power as the regional hegemon, and urging Washington and
the American public that it had to remain in Europe as the only alternative to
the communist ideology propagated by Moscow. Further, Churchill made it
clear that he thought that Moscow was not interested in a war against the
United States and its British allies, but that it only respected military strength
from its ideological adversary, and thus Washington had to prepare for a long
ideological struggle against a determined foe. The speech heralded a new
chapter in the post–­World War II era, that of a bipolar system.
Churchill’s speech was just a reiteration of a policy that Washington was
developing, understanding that it had to ensure its newly acquired hege-
monic status. In February 1946, George Kennan, an official in the United
States Embassy in Moscow, answered a query from the United States Depart-
ment of State, in which the embassy staff was asked how to develop policy
toward the Soviet Union following World War II. In what became known as
the “Long Telegram,” George Kennan wrote that the seeds of the destruction
of the Soviet Union lay within communism itself. He stated that the only
way communism could be dangerous is that it could spread to other coun-
tries and thus remain a viable ideology. If it was isolated and not allowed to
spread, he believed that it would self-­destruct (Kennan [1946] 1991).
Kennan’s “Long Telegram” helped create a policy toward the Soviet
Union that became known as “containment.” His telegram to Washington
26 • India as Kingmaker

had instilled a fear in policy makers that if communism spread to one coun-
try, that it would then spread to another country. This became known as
domino theory, in which one state falling to communism would lead to
another falling, to another falling, until communism had spread so far that it
would become impossible to defeat the ideology. While Kennan’s telegram
urged that the United States use trade and money to bolster capitalist mar-
kets to ensure that they would not fall to communism, policy makers believed
they needed to use both economic and military means to prevent the spread
of communism.
Ultimately, both Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech and Kennan’s “Long
Telegram” heralded a new type of war, one that was not fought directly, but
one in which there was severe competition, an arms race, dueling collective
security organizations, and proxy wars to prevent the ideological opponent
from gaining an upper hand in a struggle for hegemonic domination. In
short, these two events illustrated the beginning of the Cold War between
two regional hegemons, the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Cold War was remarkable for the fact that the two great powers
never fought directly against each other. Instead, there was fierce competi-
tion to ensure that other states in the system would accept the order estab-
lished by each of the regional great powers. In Europe, the United States
established the Marshall Plan to reconstruct Germany following World War
II. This ensured that the United States would be active in Europe. Further,
the establishment of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) as a
collective security organization achieved three major objectives for both the
United States and Western Europe. First, it kept the United States active and
engaged in Western Europe. Second, it kept the Soviet Union out of Western
Europe, ensuring that it could maintain its regional order. Finally, it ensured
that Germany would not be able to increase its power again to the point that
it would be dangerous enough to begin a new world war.
In the rest of the world, the United States and the Soviet Union com-
peted to convince other states to accept their respective regional orders.
Weaker states were often forced to choose to align themselves with one
power or the other. This competition between the regional powers was often
intense, leading to proxy wars, where each side would aid regional actors in
conflicts against the other regional hegemon. For example, in Vietnam, the
Soviet Union aided the North Vietnamese against the South Vietnamese
allied with the United States. While the Soviet Union did not actively deploy
many military forces, they did send special forces as consultants and supplied
the North Vietnamese with weapons to use against the United States mili-
tary. Similarly, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the United
 The Challenge to the Global Order • 27

States sent military advisers and weapons to aid the Mujahidin in their con-
flict against the Soviet army.
Interestingly, the weaker states also used the bipolar system to their
advantage. Weaker states discovered that they could play the great powers off
each other to achieve their own goals (Cooley 2012). As long as they didn’t
overstep their negotiating ability, they could create a bidding war between
the two powers to determine their global alignment. However, once they had
aligned themselves, they couldn’t easily switch loyalties.
Ultimately, on each continent, the great powers competed against each
other in an effort to defeat their adversary. These states were vital to main-
taining the global power of each hegemon. Therefore, in a sense, the states
could request benefits from the rival hegemons, knowing that they were in a
sense playing kingmaker. However, they knew that there would still be two
rival powers and that the bipolar system was unlikely to change. Further,
regional states that maintained a rivalry with another regional state often
chose to align themselves with opposing rival hegemons in an effort to gain
power in their own strategic rivalry. For example, in South Asia, India main-
tained better relations with the Soviet Union, choosing to buy their weapons
and cooperate more closely with the Soviets than with the United States.
Pakistan, India’s regional rival, chose to align itself more closely with the
United States than with the Soviet Union. Both India and Pakistan looked
for an advantage in their alignment that would help them gain an advantage
over the other rival.
On March 11, 1985, history was made in the Soviet Union. The Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union elected Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev as
the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union. His election set in motion a tumultuous set of events that
would profoundly impact the whole world. While Yuri Andropov had advo-
cated for Gorbachev to succeed him as the general secretary, the Central
Committee was very wary of giving the reins of power to someone who was
born after the Russian Revolution and the Russian Civil War. They believed
that he did not have the same ties to the revolutionary philosophy that his
predecessors possessed. Therefore, when Andropov died, the Central Com-
mittee elected Konstantin Chernenko as general secretary. Chernenko was
part of the old elite, and had lived through the Revolution and Civil War.
Chernenko was very old and terminally ill, however. His election was consid-
ered a compromise between those who wanted Gorbachev and those who
were reluctant to let someone who had not lived through the Revolution and
Civil War lead the country.
The election of Chernenko over Gorbachev to replace Andropov illus-
28 • India as Kingmaker

trated the generational gap between the party elite and the younger succes-
sors. It had long been noted that the party elite was getting older, yet was
reluctant to relinquish power, and thus a power struggle between the genera-
tions was inevitable (Bialer 1982). Chernenko was seen as a chance for the
older party elite to determine whether or not Gorbachev would be suitable
to lead in a new era. However, Chernenko was only in power for 13 months
before he died. Thus, on March 11, 1985, the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union decided to elect Gorbachev as the new general secretary of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, realizing that
it was time to usher in a new era for the Soviet Union while hoping that he
wouldn’t upset the balance of power too greatly.
Gorbachev’s ascension to the position of general secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a critical turn-
ing point in the history of the Soviet Union. Unlike his predecessors, Gor-
bachev recognized the fact that the Soviet Union had stagnated and was not
evolving toward the ideal communist state envisioned by Vladimir Lenin.
The economy had stagnated under Leonid Brezhnev, and continued its stag-
nation under Andropov and Chernenko. Gorbachev recognized that the
Soviet Union would destroy itself unless the economy was revitalized.
According to Gorbachev, one of the main problems with the economy
was the fact that the people no longer worked hard to build their country.
They had grown complacent, and no longer had the drive to ensure the sur-
vival of Soviet ideals. He recognized that the planned economy of the Soviet
Union had to be reformed to increase productivity instead of maintaining
stagnation. He argued that there was little incentive for the workers to pro-
duce more than they were supposed to according to quotas established by the
government. If they produced more than the quota, they were punished by
receiving a higher quota for the next time period. If they did not produce
their quota, they were punished by the government. Therefore, the incentive
for the workers was to produce just enough to fulfill the quota without tak-
ing any initiative to try to increase productivity. Further, he argued that the
incentive structure of the Soviet Union not only stifled productivity but also
encouraged workers to turn to alcoholism as they no longer strived to
improve the Soviet Union. In turn, the increase in alcoholism in the Soviet
Union only aggravated the country’s productivity problem.
In short, Gorbachev realized that a massive rebuilding of the Soviet econ-
omy was the only way to save the Soviet Union from certain demise. In fact,
Gorbachev saw this as the only way to reach the ideals of the Russian Revolu-
tion (Gorbachev 1987a, 1987b). Thus, in 1986, Gorbachev instituted a new
set of reforms that he called “perestroika,” literally translated as restructuring.
 The Challenge to the Global Order • 29

However, Gorbachev realized that he would face significant opposition to

his perestroika reforms from the political elites, and thus instituted reforms
that would make perestroika more accessible and transparent to the masses,
which would in turn make the reforms so popular that the political elite
would not be able to oppose the reforms (Gibbs 1999; McNair 2006). Spe-
cifically, the transparency associated with perestroika was referred to as “glas-
nost,” which comes from the old Russian word for voice. Thus, glasnost gave
voice to reforms underway in the Soviet Union.
The Cold War continued until approximately 1988, when both the
United States and the Soviet Union both decided to negotiate to end the
conflict (Matlock 2004). Both US president Ronald Reagan and Soviet pres-
ident Mikhail Gorbachev had developed enough of a relationship that they
had built up enough trust to begin the process of negotiating the end of the
Cold War. The most important shift that occurred was a shift in ideological
thinking that the two rival ideologies were inevitably on a collision course.
Reagan no longer saw communism as a threat, and Gorbachev came to
believe in self-­determination.
In November 1989, groups of Germans gathered at the Berlin Wall,
demanding to be allowed through the checkpoints to visit West Berlin. The
border guards were confused as they did not have specific orders about how
to handle the groups of people. They began to let people through the check-
points. As word got out, more and more people gathered at the wall. People
began to climb the wall and call to others on the other side of the wall. A wall
that had once served as a symbol of the “Iron Curtain” and the separation
between the two international orders established by the United States and
the Soviet Union was taken down. Very quickly after the collapse of the wall,
Germany was reunited.
Due to Germany’s past history in World War I and World War II, both
the United States and the Soviet Union were concerned about the unifica-
tion of Germany. Discussions between the three parties centered upon what
would happen to the soldiers stationed in Germany. Neither the Soviet
Union nor the United States wanted there to be no presence of foreign
troops in Germany to ensure that Germany would not remilitarize. Instead,
Gorbachev agreed to withdraw Soviet forces from East Germany and allow a
unified Germany to join NATO providing that NATO not expand further
east than the borders of Germany. President George H. W. Bush, Secretary
of State James Baker, and German chancellor Helmut Kohl all verbally
assured Gorbachev that NATO would not expand beyond Germany’s bor-
ders (Sarotte 2010).
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, states that had been in the Soviet sphere
30 • India as Kingmaker

of influence in Central and Eastern Europe began to assert their indepen-

dence from Soviet control. Very quickly, the Soviet Union lost control of
these satellite states and began to retreat to its own borders. Just two short
years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet Union collapsed. Gorbachev
was deposed as president of the Soviet Union, and in its stead were 15 newly
independent states. Only one hegemon was left standing. Almost overnight,
the global system went from bipolar to unipolar.
In the United States, euphoria over the collapse of the Soviet Union led
many policy makers to assume that the United States had won the Cold War
and had not negotiated its cessation. Further, the collapse of the Soviet
Union led to a scenario where no country could effectively stand up to US
hegemony. Whereas previously Washington had to court weaker states to
convince them to join the liberal order, following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Washington no longer had to court or listen to its allies. It was the
only hegemonic power with no competition. It no longer had to have the
support of the regional powers. Instead, Washington believed that, since it
was the global hegemon with the only surviving order, all of the other states
would remain content with the world order. It believed that even those states
that had been a part of the Soviet regional order would be content to join
and support the liberal order. Indeed, through the last decade of the 20th
century, Washington’s calculations were correct. The vast majority of the
states in the global system adapted to the liberal order including Russia (the
successor state to the Soviet Union).
Fearing a resurgent Russia, many of the Central and Eastern European
states were extremely enthusiastic about joining the liberal order. They
quickly moved to convert command economies into market economies, and
began to request NATO membership. Despite the fact that NATO’s main
purpose had been to protect Europe from the threat of the Soviet Union and
that the Soviet Union no longer existed, the United States seriously began to
consider expanding the Atlantic alliance. Any verbal promises about not
expanding NATO further east than Germany’s borders were long forgotten,
as the United States, as the global hegemon, believed that it had the right and
the duty to spread democracy and security to states that were formerly a part
of the Soviet Union’s regional order.
Over the vocal opposition of the Russians, NATO proceeded to expand
to the east. The Russians did not have the power to stop it. Russia had pro-
posed to the United States a conference on European security that could cre-
ate a new organization responsible for collective security in Europe that
would involve both the Russians and the Americans, but Washington
rejected such an offer. Moscow believed that Washington was relegating it to
 The Challenge to the Global Order • 31

a minor regional power status unlike the power that it had wielded at the
height of the Cold War when Washington was concerned with Moscow’s
actions. Moscow began to sour on the global order, but it did not have
.

enough power to become a revisionist state.

During this period, China was continuing to grow into an economic jug-
gernaut. Although it was concerned with the political and democratic aspects
of the liberal order, Beijing accepted many economic aspects of the liberal
order, recognizing that it needed to take an active role in the global economy
even if it actively avoided many of the political and democratizing aspects of
the liberal order (Slobodchikoff 2017a).
On September 11, 2001, the United States came under attack. Terrorists
hijacked planes and used them as missiles against the World Trade Center in
New York City (a symbol of the United States’ economic hegemony) and the
Pentagon in Washington, DC (a symbol of the United States’ military hege-
mony). While Washington had begun a very slight retrenchment during the
first part of George W. Bush’s presidency in 2001, the attacks of September
11 illustrated to policy makers that the United States had no choice but to
become even more engaged in the world and take the war against terror to
the terrorists instead of waiting for the terrorists to directly attack the United
States. During this period, the Bush Doctrine was formed in which President
Bush stated that it was time for states to directly choose. Either they would
support the United States and accept the liberal order or they would be con-
sidered to be against the United States and the liberal order, and thus be
considered enemies. In fact, in January, 2002, Bush directly named three
countries as the Axis of Evil, or states that actively were against the United
States and the liberal order. These states were North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.
While Washington needed allies to help in the war on terror in Afghan-
istan, it needed these allies for specific purposes. For example, Washington
needed Moscow’s help to negotiate the use of airbases in Central Asia from
which to conduct operations and maintain supply routes. Washington
needed Pakistan and its intelligence services to help determine the location
of the terrorists in Afghanistan. However, Washington was very goal ori-
ented. It needed results, and was less willing to provide for the needs of
allied states within the liberal order. Ideology was no longer important.
Instead, expediency and necessity began to control Washington’s foreign
policy. It no longer took into account the views of other states, instead
moving with a determination that, since it was the hegemonic power, its
decisions would be final.
Following the terrorist attacks in 2001, Russian president Vladimir
Putin offered to cooperate with Washington on counterterrorism and
32 • India as Kingmaker

sharing intelligence that would lead to defeating Al Qaeda and other ter-
rorist groups. Moscow had its own issues with Islamic terrorism, especially
from the breakaway region of Chechnya. Moscow also agreed to allow
overflights of its territory by American aircraft in the war against the Tali-
ban in Afghanistan. This was unprecedented, as just a few years earlier,
Moscow would have ordered any US military plane shot down if it had
entered Soviet airspace.
Cooperation between the two former adversaries was relatively short lived.
President George W. Bush announced that the United States would withdraw
from the Anti-­Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The ABM Treaty had been one
of the most important cooperative treaties between the Soviet Union and the
United States. Signed in 1972, the ABM Treaty prohibited either state from
constructing missile defenses against long-­range nuclear weapons. The idea was
that if both powers retained the ability to destroy the other side with nuclear
weapons, then neither side would be willing to do so because it would be mutu-
ally assured destruction. Withdrawing from the ABM Treaty was taken as fur-
ther evidence that Washington no longer believed that Russia was a great
power that was worthy of respect in the global order. Instead, this action sig-
naled that Washington believed Russia to be a weak regional power that had
no place in the global hierarchy of power. The United States allowed the ABM
Treaty to expire in June 2002 without it being renegotiated.
During the period following the September 11 attacks, Washington lost
sight of geopolitics, and the importance of state actors, instead focusing on its
conflict with nonstate actors. Washington’s power as a global hegemon was in
decline, and it no longer focused as much attention on maintaining the liberal
order. For example, the US decided that it could use the September 11 attacks
as an excuse to invade and defeat Iraq, an old adversary. Iraq had long been a
problem for the United States, and there were those in Washington who
argued that it had to be dealt with before it became a direct threat.
The events of September 11, 2001 had conditioned Washington to be more
aggressive in its foreign policy by trying to prevent a possible crisis through
force rather than having to react to a crisis after having been attacked. Bush
argued that it was better to invade and take control of the weapons of mass
destruction that Saddam Hussein was thought to possess than be taken by sur-
prise by an attack from those weapons within the US. Thus, despite interna-
tional pressure not to invade, the United States and several allies, including the
United Kingdom and countries in Eastern Europe, chose to invade Iraq.
The following year, in 2004, NATO again expanded, this time to include
the Baltic states, which had once been part of the Soviet Union. Moscow again
raised a significant protest, but again was unable to muster enough power to
 The Challenge to the Global Order • 33

prevent NATO from expanding. Despite Moscow’s protests, NATO began

holding talks with Georgia in 2005 on the likelihood of Georgia joining the
alliance, and in February 2005, both states signed a Partnership for Peace
Agreement, which began the process of bringing Georgia into the alliance.
Further, in 2008, the Bucharest Summit promised Georgia eventual member-
ship in NATO. Also, in 2008, Ukraine officially requested a NATO Member-
ship Action Plan, which is the first formal step to joining NATO.
It should be noted that not all of the NATO member states were in agree-
ment about pursuing rapid expansion of NATO. While the United States
and Poland were actively pushing to expand NATO, both France and Ger-
many were worried about Russian opposition and were worried that Russia
would treat expansion as a threat to its own security, and that this would
cause serious problems in their relations with Russia in the future.
Ultimately, US foreign policy during this period was very US centric,
with little regard for the desires or concerns of traditional allies. Washington
was not concerned about the fact that other states in the international order
were becoming more and more disillusioned with the liberal international
order, and states such as Russia became revisionist states, with an active
agenda of trying to create an alternative to the liberal order.
Russia was not the only state that became dissatisfied with the global
order. China also had been increasingly showing signs of becoming dissatis-
fied with the global order and unipolarity. China had been challenging the
United States in the South China Sea, and had been expanding its influence
in Central and South America as well as in Africa. Officially, both China and
Russia had stated that they favored a multipolar system as opposed to the
unipolar system with the United States at its helm. In fact, on May 15, 1997,
the Russian and the Chinese permanent UN diplomatic missions presented
an official declaration for the United Nations Security Council and General
Assembly of an intent to create a multipolar world and thus create a new
international security structure.1
Despite using rhetoric claiming that they were in favor of a multipolar
system, neither Russia nor China could directly take on US power. They each
had to begin to challenge US power at the periphery, such as Moscow orches-
trating efforts for Kyrgyzstan to force American troops to leave the Manas
Airbase in that country or Beijing creating new islands in the South China
Sea. However, even working together, Moscow and Beijing would not be
strong enough to directly challenge US power. They had to work within the
confines of existing organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organi-

1. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/234074?ln=en
34 • India as Kingmaker

zation as well as an effort to convince other countries to join them in an

effort to balance against US power to create a multipolar system.
One of the main countries that both Beijing and Moscow had to target
was India. India was the classic status quo power. Despite having allied itself
with Moscow during the Cold War, India had received prominence during
both George W. Bush’s and Barack Obama’s presidencies as Washington
sought to keep its hegemonic status. The United States realized that it had to
overcome decades of adversarial US foreign policies. Both Bush and Obama
realized that they needed India and its growing economy as an important ally
to prevent China and Russia from developing too much power and more
importantly the ability to challenge the unipolar system.
Russia and China also recognized the importance of India and gaining
India as a valuable ally in countering American hegemony. If there was to be
a viable challenge to US hegemony, Moscow and Beijing had to convince
India that it needed to ally itself with them. Beginning in 2002, the leaders of
the three states have held yearly summits to increase cooperation between
the three states. In fact, the tripartite meetings in 2017 reiterated that all
three states were interested in creating a global system based on international
law and moving toward a multipolar system.2
While India very much prefers the status quo, it also has a lifelong pen-
chant for multilateralism (that first began under the leadership of Nehru as
independent India’s first prime minister). Similar to China, with the excep-
tion of grave human rights violations, India prefers noninterventionism in
the domestic affairs of other states. If and when intervention is carried out,
India has supported a multilateral coalition versus unilateral actions by
superpowers. The United States has preferred a unilateral course of action in
international affairs for the past few decades; it has exercised force without
the consent of the United Nations. The United States has also bullied smaller
powers economically as well as politically.
While Russia and China are indeed dissatisfied states in the current
global order, India is still in play for both the United States on one side and
Russia and China on the other. Indeed, it has become the lynchpin in deter-
mining the future of the global system. However, it is not obvious which
powers are supported by India. India’s support is vital for the United States if
it wants to maintain the liberal order. As General Michael Hayden, former

2. C. Uday Bhaskar, “Russia-­India-­China Meeting Shows a Multipolar World Order Is

Taking Shape,” South China Morning Post, December 15, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/com​
ment/insight-opinion/article/2124329/russia-india-china-meeting-shows-multipolar-world​
-order
 The Challenge to the Global Order • 35

director of both the US Central Intelligence Agency and the National Secu-
rity Agency, stated, “There is now a battle for the formation of the next global
order. Russia and China are battling to create a new global order, while the
United States is fighting to continue its primacy in the liberal order.” In fact,
in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2017), the
United States recognizes the importance of India in the global order, stating,
“We welcome India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger stra-
tegic and defense partner. We will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation
with Japan, Australia, and India” (White House 2017). However, despite
India’s centrality to determining the viability of the global order, it is unclear
as to where India stands in relation to the global order. India has publicly
acknowledged the importance of its relationships with both the United
States and Russia. It is a member of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa), and a founding member of the New Development Bank. In
fact, India was the first state to propose the New Development Bank as an
alternative to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group.
India is also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which
is a regional cooperation organization that focuses on security and terrorism,
but has expanded to the economy and trade. The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization has also been accused of undermining US interests in Central
Asia and not spreading democratic values and not valuing human rights
(Commission on Security and Operation in Europe 2006).
In this book, we examine India’s place in the global order. Specifically, we
examine whether it is a status quo power and content with the current world
order, or a revisionist power that is interested in allying itself with other revi-
sionist powers to balance against the United States and the liberal world
order. It is possible to ascertain India’s preference by examining its bilateral
relationships with those great powers that are status quo states as well as
those powers that are revisionist states. Using treaties and treaty networks,
we find that India leans revisionist, but is not fully so. It still seems to be in
the process of determining its position in the world order, and is allowing
other states to court support from India.
In chapter 2, we examine the methodology that we use to determine
India’s standing in the global order. We specifically explain why we examine
bilateral treaties, and introduce the concepts of treaty nesting and treaty net-
works. Understanding the relationships between the bilateral treaties is
essential to determine the level of cooperation between India and other
states, thus providing a way of determining the level of India’s support for the
global order.
3 • Treaty Networks and Determining State
Preferences for the Global Order

In the previous chapter, we discussed the importance of the global order and
India’s place as a major power within that global order.1 As a major power,
India has a central role to play in helping to determine whether the current
liberal global order is maintained in its current form or if the current chal-
lenge to the global order presented by China and Russia will be successful. To
determine this, we have to determine India’s preference for the status quo or
revisionism. Is it a status quo power that aligns itself with the United States
and its liberal allies in protecting the liberal global order, or is it a revisionist
power that will help to hasten a change in the global order? Table 2 catego-
rizes current major powers as either status quo or revisionist along with their
positions in the global hierarchy. The powers that support the status quo tend
to support the United States through UN votes, join multilateral organiza-
tions supported by the United States such as NATO, and support the United
States by sending military and aid and sometimes troops to its armed conflicts
such as in the war in Iraq or Afghanistan. In fact, most of the status quo pow-
ers have been supporters and allied with the United States since the end of
World War II, when the United States became a hegemonic power. These
states were allied with the United States in the bipolar system during the Cold
War, and they continued to remain allied with United States in the post–­
Cold War order when the United States became the unilateral global
hegemon.
In contrast to the status quo powers are the revisionist powers. These are
1. There has been much debate over whether India is a regional power, an emerging power,
or a great power. For more on this debate, see Nayar and Paul (2003) and Pardesi (2015). For
the purpose of our study, we argue that whether India is an important regional power, an
emerging power, or a current great power, India is instrumental in helping to decide the future
of the global order. Thus, for this study, we maintain that India is an important power.

36
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 37

Table 2. Status Quo vs. Revisionist Powers

Status Quo Powers Revisionist Powers
United States of America (Global Hegemon) China (Challenging for Hegemonic Status)
United Kingdom (Major Power) Russia (Major Power)
France and Germany Iran (Major Regional Power)
(Major European Powers)
Japan (Major Regional Power)

powers that are actively seeking to revise the global order and create a multi-
polar systemic order as opposed to a unipolar order (Basrur 2011). As table
2 shows, the main revisionist powers are China, Russia, and Iran. China is
actively attempting to challenge the United States’ hegemonic status through
its Belt and Road Initiative. Russia, with a rival to the United States, is also
seeking to revise the global order. While Russia does not have the power to
challenge the power of the United States, it can assist China in Beijing’s
efforts to challenge the global order. Finally, while Russia and China are
major global powers, Iran is a regional power with the ability to challenge the
status quo powers within its region.
The question naturally arises as to India’s position within this framework.
Is India a status quo power, or is it a revisionist power? We argue that India’s
foreign policy preferences and thus its position within the global order are
determined by its levels of cooperation with either status quo or revisionist
states. If India has higher levels of institutionalized cooperation with status
quo states than with revisionist states, then it is a status quo power. If India
maintains a higher level of institutionalized cooperation with revisionist
powers than with status quo powers, then India is a revisionist power. To
determine India’s level of institutionalized cooperation with both status quo
and revisionist powers, we must first determine a measure of institutional-
ized cooperation. To do this, in this chapter, we will discuss treaties, treaty
networks, and measures of institutionalized cooperation. Finally, we will
address the methods and measurements for determining whether India is a
status quo or a revisionist power.

Cooperation

International relations has often examined the global order as being one in
which states are the fundamental actors. This is important, as it means that
fundamentally the global order is a self-­help system. In other words, states
38 • India as Kingmaker

are responsible for their own actions and their own security. One important
debate in international relations is why states would choose to cooperate in
the first place. If indeed the world is a self-­help system, and states can only
rely on themselves to provide for their own security, then why would they
cooperate with other states, which might in turn bolster the security of
other states while negatively affecting one’s own state security. Realists
focus on the fact that the world system is anarchic, meaning that there is no
world government that controls the behavior of states. In other words, there
is nothing requiring other states to help to provide security to any other
states in the global system. Specifically, they see global anarchy as creating a
zero-­sum game between states: if a state gains any power, other states will
lose power. In other words, power is finite, and all of it is relative. States are
always gaining and losing power vis-­à-­vis other states in the system. What
this creates is an intense competition between states, where even issues on
which two states can cooperate can lead to both states being wary of coop-
eration out of fear that the other state will gain more power relative to the
given state. Each state looks to maximize its own power interests while try-
ing to minimize the amount of power that any other state could gain
through the interaction (Grieco, Powell, and Snidal 1993). The competi-
tive nature of such a zero-­sum game is also known as relative gains. Relative
gains further typify a zero-­sum game in that any interaction between states
is viewed as a competition and game where there can only be one state that
wins. Relative gains make it not beneficial for a state to cooperate with any
other state, even if both states might benefit from that cooperation; each
state is worried about the amount that other states benefit in comparison to
the amount that the state would benefit by cooperating at all. The scholars
who believe strongly in the existence of relative gains are very skeptical
about the possibility of institutionalized cooperation between states, and
that even though cooperation on individual issues may be possible, it will
last only until the power dynamic between the two states shifts. This is a
very pessimistic view of states’ abilities or desires to cooperate on any issue
area. It is important to note that scholars who view the world through this
spectrum view every interaction as power-­based, and thus all interactions
must be examined through an understanding of the changing power
dynamics that each interaction brings.
In contrast to scholars who believe in relative gains, other scholars tend to
view interactions between states not as a zero-­sum game, but rather as a
positive-­sum game. In other words, states that choose to cooperate can both
benefit from the interaction as opposed to one state gaining more power
than another state. States do not have to be concerned about the power
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 39

dynamics of interacting with other states; rather, the states can maximize
their own benefit from cooperating, realizing full well that the cooperating
state is also benefitting from the interaction (Keohane and Martin 1995;
Snidal 1991). Scholars who view interactions from this perspective believe in
absolute gains. In other words, rather than being worried about the effect of
cooperation on the other state, states can be more driven to cooperate to
ensure that the state benefits. It should be noted that scholars who believe in
absolute gains do not view every interaction as being power-­driven, and often
discount the relative power dynamics between states. Interactions between
states are able to be mutually beneficial, which allows cooperation between
states. Interestingly, while scholars who believe in relative gains consistently
argue that cooperation in security matters is very difficult to realize among
states, scholars who believe in absolute gains focus on showing that coopera-
tion is possible between states involving trade. Thus, although the two theo-
retical perspectives seem diametrically opposed to one another, they actually
may not be. It could be that cooperation between states is merely more diffi-
cult when states are addressing security issues, whereas issues of trade might
be much less contentious, and more easily lead to cooperation between states.
Despite the difficulty in overcoming the relative gains problems, states
still continue to cooperate on many different issues. They cooperate with
other states on issues such as trade and security. Cooperation between states
is built through both bilateral (between two states) and multilateral (involv-
ing three or more states) relationships. Some scholars have noted that coop-
eration is easier to achieve through trade than through security because all
states involved in trade benefit from cooperation (Keohane 2005). Scholars
such as Keohane (2005) have noted that cooperation between states is
incredibly important because it creates a long-­term relationship that not
only benefits the states that are cooperating but also constrains state behav-
ior. States that have built long-­term relationships through cooperation are
much less likely to resolve disputes with those states through military con-
flict (Slobodchikoff 2013). Instead, they are much more likely to resolve
their disputes through peaceful means and negotiation. It is important to
note that power dynamics are important features of cooperation. In power
symmetric relationships, it is easier to cooperate as relative equals, whereas in
power asymmetric relationships, the stronger power can coerce less powerful
states and require cooperation on certain issues such as trade. For example,
the Soviet Union’s regional hegemonic status forced neighboring Finland to
engage in a multifaceted relationship despite the fact that Finland was
extremely suspicious of Soviet intentions and wary of Soviet foreign policy
(Slobodchikoff 2013; Korhonen 2010).
40 • India as Kingmaker

States must make the determination whether or not they should cooper-
ate with other states. This is not an easy decision, but rather one that must be
made strategically. On the one hand, they may be able to achieve gains that
would normally not be attainable without cooperation. On the other hand,
they must be able to trust that states will adhere to cooperative agreements
and must be wary of how much to cooperate. In situations of power asym-
metry, where one state is much more powerful than the other state, the
weaker power must be warier of cooperating due to the ability of the more
powerful state to coerce the weaker state. However, the weaker states also
have more to gain through cooperation than they do by not cooperating.
Therefore, weaker states must be very strategic in the decision making pro-
cess as to whether or not to cooperate. Cooperation is easier with states that
have shared ideologies. Thus, states are likelier to build cooperative relation-
ships with states that share their own preferences and beliefs than with states
that don’t. For example, the United States is much more likely to build a
cooperative relationship with the United Kingdom than with Senegal. We
now turn to a discussion of the actors involved in creating cooperative
relationships.

Actors in Cooperation

International relations scholars have often delineated domestic politics

from international relations. They argue that comparative politics studies
domestic politics, while international relations focuses only on the relation-
ship between states. Thus, they should be considered as separate entities
and should be studied separately (Walt 1985; Waltz 1979). Scholars have
more recently challenged this notion by arguing that domestic politics and
international relations are mutually reinforcing and thus linked (Goldstein
and Gowa 2002; Goldstein 1996; Henisz and Mansfield 2006; Milner
1999; Moravcsik 1997; Putnam 1988). For example, Moravcsik (1997)
argues that internal interest groups fight for dominance over preferences.
When domestic interest groups are able to set the domestic agenda accord-
ing to their preferences, a state’s foreign policy will reflect those preferences.
Thus, the domestic preferences in turn constrain a state’s foreign policy.
In contrast to Moravcsik (1997), Putnam (1988) argues that a two-­level
game exists between foreign policy and domestic policy. Since policy makers
are beholden to voters and domestic constituencies, they can use foreign
affairs to satisfy their domestic constituencies while at the same time being
constrained in their own foreign policy preferences by domestic constituen-
cies. Moreover, a state’s foreign policy preferences can also have a profound
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 41

effect on a state’s domestic constituencies and their policy preferences. In

other words, a feedback loop develops between both levels.
National elites have been known to use international relations and inter-
national events to pursue a domestic agenda. One example of this was that
President Reagan really wanted to push for trade liberalization. Although a
Democratic Congress opposed liberalizing trade, the Reagan administration
constructed treaties with Canada that forced Congress to approve free trade
between Canada and the United States (Goldstein 1996). When Reagan
signed the treaties, he effectively put pressure on Congress to act so that they
would not upset their domestic constituencies. Once the United States had
signed the treaties, domestic industries were told that protectionist measures
could not be used to protect industries due to the requirement to abide by
treaty obligations.
In contrast to US domestic industry pushback, the Canadian govern-
ment was happy to enter into free trade agreements with the United States to
limit the preferential treatment of US companies by the US government. The
Canadian government worried that Canadian companies would not be able
to effectively compete with American companies if American companies
received preferential treatment from the US government (Goldstein 1996).
Despite the fact that the new treaties with Canada sometimes came into con-
flict with US preferences, the US has upheld its agreements with Canada.
While the Trump administration tried to renegotiate the treaties, the admin-
istration has continued to abide by these treaties. The government has chosen
to abide by those treaties even when it was not in their best interests to do so.
Even though it would have been far better for US businesses and US interests
to violate the treaties, the government nevertheless felt constrained by the
treaties and agreed to abide by them (Goldstein 1996).
The example of treaties constraining hegemonic behavior is by no means
unique. In fact, the United States has often been constrained by international
treaties, and despite the fact that it would be more logical to violate the trea-
ties in the short term, the United States has often abided by those treaties. It
has done so even when it has not benefited in the short term (Mattli and
Büthe 2003). For example, Mattli and Büthe (2003) have argue that the
United States has often been at a disadvantage when making agreements
with the European Union as well as with individual European countries over
standards. These agreements have often put the United States at a disadvan-
tage and yet the United States has agreed to these standards in the hopes that
it would lead to future agreements that would be more beneficial to the
United States. More importantly, the United States continues to abide by
most of those treaties even if it is not in its interests to do so. In other words,
42 • India as Kingmaker

international agreements set the stage for future cooperation, and a hege-
monic power must have a longer view of a relationship than merely one or
two agreements. The hegemon must gamble that a specific agreement, even
if it is not to the hegemon’s advantage, may lead to future agreements that
are, and in the long term the hegemon will benefit tremendously from the
overall relationship.
It is generally accepted that hegemonic states will not allow themselves to
be constrained by agreements. In fact, this argument runs counter to many
realist arguments against the effectiveness of treaties. Downs, Rocke, and
Barsoom (1996) argue that the reason there is such a high rate of compliance
with international agreements is because the most powerful countries want
to comply with those treaties. In other words, if powerful states did not want
to comply with a treaty, they wouldn’t. Instead, they would either renegotiate
the treaty or just ignore the treaty in the first place. In the case of multilateral
treaties, powerful states would try to convince other states not to comply
with a treaty and thus render the treaty moot.
One example of this was during George W. Bush’s administration when
the United States tried to get other states to agree to sign bilateral nonsur-
render agreements, where those states would never turn over American sol-
diers to the International Criminal Courts (Kelley 2007). According to Kel-
ley (2007), Washington was unhappy with the fact that American soldiers
could be tried by international courts, rendering the US ineffective at pro-
tecting its own military. Thus, it pressured other states to sign these nonsur-
render agreements but ultimately was forced to abandon its pressure as most
of the states refused to sign the nonsurrender agreements. Ultimately, Kelley
(2007) finds that even with extreme hegemonic pressure, international agree-
ments are not only abided by, they are also likely to constrain the behaviors
of other states that do not wish to adhere to the original agreement. Interna-
tional agreements are considered extremely important, and even if they can
be violated, the repercussions for doing so are often very expensive as states
will refuse to enter into future agreements with those states that often violate
previously signed agreements.

Design Features of Bilateral Relations

It is important to note that strong and weak states both believe that cooperation
is in their best interest. However, the fact that it may be in their best interest
does not ensure their cooperation. There are myriads of obstacles to coopera-
tion. One of the major obstacles to cooperation is mistrust. Weaker states are
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 43

very concerned with the fact that they cannot trust stronger states to abide by
agreements. After all, there is nothing preventing a stronger state from only
cooperating when it is in the interest of the stronger state, but as soon as it is no
longer in the interest of the stronger state to cooperate it can cease to do so.
There is very little that a weaker state can do to prevent a stronger state from
violating previous agreements. Weaker states are also concerned with power
asymmetry and the inability of weaker states to enforce agreements. Despite
these obstacles, weaker states can use legalization and treaty nesting as ways to
combat mistrust and power asymmetry (Slobodchikoff 2013).
Legalization of treaties and agreements is a very important strategy by
states to try to constrain states from violating the agreements. The strategy of
legalization of treaties and the use of laws to govern the interaction between
states has seen a large rise in usage by states since the 1990s (Goldstein et al.
2000). Legalization is a type of institutionalization. Specifically, legalization
has three basic components. Obligation means that states are bound by rules
and international law. Precision means that international rules clearly and
unambiguously define and lay out rules of conduct for states to abide by.
Delegation is the ability of states to appoint arbiters, resolve disputes, and
make further rules (Abbott et al. 2000, 401).
Many relations between states are characterized by mistrust. It is often
very difficult, especially in the beginning stages of a relationship, to trust
another state to abide by its agreements and not violate them. Thus, states
must first begin to cooperate on agreements that are mutually beneficial and
relatively easy to accomplish. As states fulfill their obligations and adhere to
prior agreements, states can begin to slowly build trust. In other words, states
must begin to cooperate and by proving their ability to abide by agreements,
they build trust with other states (Kydd 2000, 2001). Interestingly, as states
begin to develop more complex agreements and agreements on more com-
plex issues, they often choose to further legalize new agreements. One of the
methods of doing this is through treaty nesting where a treaty specifically
references a prior treaty, which reinforces both treaties and makes it more
difficult to violate those treaties. If one of the treaties that is nested within a
previous treaty is violated, then both treaties are violated. This raises the cost
to a state of violating a given treaty that is nested within other treaties (Slo-
bodchikoff 2013). In other words, in addition to legalization, states often
turn to other design features such as treaty nesting to overcome mistrust and
lack of cooperation. Treaty nesting is a specific strategy that is used by states
to tie different treaties together by specifically citing prior treaties in new
treaties, which makes both treaties stronger (Willerton, Slobodchikoff, and
Goertz 2012; Willerton, Goertz, and Slobodchikoff 2015).
44 • India as Kingmaker

Both legalization and treaty nesting are extremely important in overcom-

ing both mistrust and power asymmetry in relationships. However, both of
these design features require the use of treaties. Legalization refers to the
constraints and the requirements of individual treaties upon the signatories
of the treaty, while treaty nesting refers to the actual links between the trea-
ties themselves. It is important, however, to understand the basic aspects of
treaties and agreements themselves to further illustrate the methods that are
used to overcome constraints to cooperation.

Treaties and Agreements

States will tend to cooperate only if it is in their best interest to do so. It is

very difficult to force states to cooperate if they do not want to. States are
rational actors and thus are not likely to violate their own interests and
cooperate if it would not be in their interest to cooperate. As former Finn-
ish foreign minister Keijo Korhonen once stated, “Even the most powerful
state in the world cannot protect all of its citizens without the help of other
states; cooperation is a necessity for all states who wish to have an interna-
tional presence” (Korhonen 2010).
It is important to note that treaties and agreements need to be clearly
defined before any analysis is undertaken. What types of agreements
should be used to analyze a relationship clearly? In terms of international
law, treaties refer to any legally binding written agreements between states
(Carter, Trimble, and Weiner 2007; Sinclair 1984). The Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties establishes a comprehensive list of rules on
treaty construction, interpretation, and termination. States can also sign
other agreements such as memoranda of understanding and joint press
releases, which, while not legally binding, are often indicators of the level
of cooperation between states.
Due to the fact that treaties and agreements are legally binding, it is natu-
ral to wonder why states would enter into an agreement or treaty in the first
place. After all, entering into a treaty and agreement constrains a state’s future
behavior. However, it is precisely because it is constraining that both sides
would want to enter into such an agreement. Entering into such agreements
and then violating them will prove a state’s untrustworthiness and limit
future cooperation. It is often better for states to abide by treaties so that
future treaties and agreements may be more beneficial even if current agree-
ments and treaties are not. Moreover, certain treaties and agreements possess
dispute settlement mechanisms that can help when there is a dispute between
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 45

signatories. Many modern treaties are specifically designed to have dispute

settlement mechanisms and to be in force for a finite length of time to ensure
cooperation and ultimately force the signatories to abide by the provisions of
the agreements and treaties.
It should be noted that treaties and agreements are negotiated. This
means that negotiators will specifically argue over the correct wording of a
treaty or agreement. Language matters and specific word usage matters.
Thus, it’s extremely important, especially for weaker states, to ensure that the
words agreed to in a treaty will not bind them in ways that are unacceptable.
Ultimately, legally binding treaties and the use of treaty nesting establish a set
of rules for cooperation between states as well as an acceptance by states of
specific rules established by global powers. The global hegemon is responsi-
ble for creating order and other states must choose whether or not to abide
by that global order (Slobodchikoff 2014). States that use treaty nesting
within an established order are more likely to work to protect that order than
they are to challenge that order. In other words, states that have higher levels
of institutionalized cooperation with hegemonic powers are status quo pow-
ers. If they have higher levels of institutionalized cooperation with revision-
ist powers, then that state could be considered to be revisionist.
Treaties establish a set of rules for cooperation between states within a
global order. They are a necessary component of international relations by
which both strong and weak states must abide if they are to be able to con-
tinue to cooperate with other states. For weak states, treaties provide protec-
tion from stronger states, while still providing the opportunity to cooperate
with stronger states. One example of this was in 1948 when the Soviet Union
insisted on negotiating a friendship treaty with Finland. Moscow wanted to
both station Soviet troops in Finland and to make Finland a satellite state
much like Hungary and Romania. Due to the power asymmetry between
Finland and the Soviet Union, the Finns realized that they had no choice but
to cooperate with the Soviet Union. However, they also realized that they
could ensure that the language in the treaty was acceptable to them and help
guide the relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland. Thus, the
Finns insisted on using specific language in the treaty with the Soviet Union
to ensure that they would not become a satellite state of the Soviet Union
(Korhonen 2010). The Soviet Union was stretched thin following World
War II, and could not just send troops to invade Finland. Therefore, if Mos-
cow wanted to station troops in Finland, it had to get Helsinki to agree to
allow those troops through the treaty of cooperation.
Treaties establish a pattern of behavior on which other states rely and vio-
lating treaties creates a large reputational cost. Often treaties are the result of
46 • India as Kingmaker

negotiated compromise. For example, the friendship treaty between the

Soviet Union and Finland signed in 1948 included a lot of compromise on
the specific wording of the treaty. Specifically, the Finns insisted upon spe-
cific wording that stated that Moscow would only send troops to Finland
should the Finns not be able to defend themselves. The importance of the
wording meant that the Finns could keep out Soviet troops while stating to
the Soviet Union that Soviet troops would be welcome if Finland was about
to be invaded by Western troops. The Finns argued that they could protect
themselves but would be quick to call upon aid from Moscow should it
become necessary. As this example shows, Finland, a weaker state, was able to
insist upon specific language that protected the Finns from becoming a satel-
lite state. Moscow, on the other hand, was willing to adopt specific language
in the treaty as a conciliatory gesture due to the fact that it was extremely
important for Moscow to have the treaty in the first place. Thus, it should be
kept in mind that weaker states often play a very important role in develop-
ing treaties and receive gains that are more than they would receive based
upon their relative power capabilities.
While it is easy to focus on the importance of a single treaty, each indi-
vidual treaty is not created in a vacuum. Each subsequent treaty is at least
somewhat influenced by previous treaties as well as the relationship between
the signatories. This is even more accurate when examining treaty nested-
ness, because the treaties themselves state the relationship between previous
treaties and the treaty that is nested within them. In other words, an indi-
vidual treaty is a single attempt at cooperation. Nested treaties, on the other
hand, show the institutionalization of treaties. In fact, the more nesting that
occurs in a relationship, the more institutionalized the relationship, and thus
the more difficult it is to destroy the relationship through conflict (Slobod-
chikoff 2013). We now turn to a discussion of treaty nesting, treaty architec-
ture, and building relationships.

Treaty Nesting

Prior work on treaty nesting has focused on examining how treaties interact
with one another. Specifically, the idea is that since treaties are negotiated,
each treaty is not totally separate from previous treaties that have been
negotiated. Further, since treaties are the building blocks of a relationship,
each treaty provides a foundation for a relationship. The earliest studies of
treaty nesting used nesting to provide more of a qualitative analysis of spe-
cific treaties in the bilateral relationship between states given high levels of
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 47

mistrust. Specifically, Willerton, Slobodchikoff, and Goertz (2012) focused

on examining the bilateral relationships between Russia and Turkmenistan
and between Russia and Georgia to see how nesting was used to overcome
mistrust. Using network analysis, Willerton, Slobodchikoff, and Goertz
(2012) examined the architecture of the bilateral relationship. Creating a
hypothetical example, we demonstrate how treaty architecture is shown
(see fig. 4).
In figure 4, Treaty A is nested in both Treaty B and Treaty C. In other
words, both Treaty B and Treaty C specifically mention Treaty A within the
respective treaties. However, Treaty B is not nested in Treaty C. There is no
tie between them. Further, as figure 4 shows, Treaty A is a central treaty in
the relationship between Treaty A, Treaty B, and Treaty C. We have set the
node (Treaty A) to its degree centrality score. This is why the node of Treaty
A is larger than Treaty B and Treaty C. Figure 4 begins to show the treaty
architecture, with Treaty A being the most central treaty and thus the most
important treaty in the relationship. In figure 5, each of the treaties is nested
in the other two treaties (see fig. 5). In other words, there is no single treaty
that is central to the relationship. Rather, all of the treaties have equal cen-
trality scores. Thus, the treaty architecture is slightly different.
Slobodchikoff (2013) built upon the work by Willerton, Slobodchikoff,
and Goertz (2012). He examined Russia’s relationship with each of the for-
mer Soviet states excluding the Baltic states. He built upon the fact that by
using network analysis to examine treaties, scholars would be able to see the
architecture of a bilateral relationship. Using treaty network analysis, he was
able to show which treaties were the most central in a relationship. These
treaties were the lodestone treaties, and were the most important in the bilat-
eral relationship. Further, he was able to show how treaties were tied to each
other. He built upon the idea that an individual treaty is an attempt at coop-
eration while nested treaties are attempts at institutionalizing the
relationship.
Slobodchikoff (2013) speculates that the more the treaties are tied to one
another, the more stable the cooperative relationship. For example, figure 6
shows an ad hoc relationship between India and South Africa (see fig. 6).
Several treaties are tied to each other, but there seems to be more of an ad hoc
relationship since there are several different subnetworks that are not tied
together. In other words, there is some cooperation, but the cooperation is
specific to certain issue areas and does not possess institutionalized coopera-
tion. In contrast, figure 7 shows a relationship that seems to be less ad hoc
and more institutionalized (see fig. 7). It shows the relationship between
India and the EU as a supranational organization. It indicates that there is
48 • India as Kingmaker

Fig. 4. Treaty Nesting

Fig. 5. Treaty Network

much more institutionalization in the relationship, especially in the subnet-

work located on the left-­hand side of the figure.
To determine the quality of a relationship, Slobodchikoff (2013) devel-
oped a new measure of a cooperative relationship between two states as being
the number of treaty ties divided by the total number of treaties. Using this
measure over time, he was able to determine the quality of institutionaliza-
tion of the bilateral relationship. Let’s examine a hypothetical relationship
between two states (see table 3). As table 3 shows, in each decade of the rela-
tionship, the two states sign five treaties. Since treaties are cumulative, the
total number of treaties would be the number of treaties signed in a specific
decade plus all of those signed in the preceding decades. Further, the number
of ties also increases in the same way. The measure of institutionalized coop-
eration in a given decade is the total number of ties up to that given decade
divided by the total number of treaties signed over that same period of time.
It is incredibly important that the exact same time period be examined when
comparing institutionalized cooperation scores. More specifically, there
should be a specific time (T0) from which the measurement occurs to ensure
that appropriate comparisons can be made. In our analysis, we are specifically
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 49

Fig. 6. India–­South Africa Treaty Network

Fig. 7. India-­EU Treaty Network

interested in the post–­Cold War period as after the end of the Cold War is
the time in which unipolarity and the United States’ supremacy begins. Thus,
all of our comparisons begin after the end of the Cold War. While we under-
stand that there was a relationship between the states examined prior to the
end of the Cold War, beginning our analysis at the end of the Cold War is the
best way to be able to compare the quality of bilateral relationships.
It is important to establish a baseline for determining the quality of a
50 • India as Kingmaker

Table 3. Institutionalized Cooperation Score

Years N Treaties N Ties Cooperation Score
1980s 5 1 .2
1990s 5 3 .4
2000s 5 8 .8
2010s 5 10 1.1
Totals 20 22 1.1

bilateral relationship. A measure of less than 1 indicated a relationship that

was ad hoc. In other words, there were attempts at cooperating but few
attempts at institutionalizing that cooperation. A measure greater than 1
indicated that there was institutionalized cooperation (see table 4). Table 4
shows the different classifications of the quality of the bilateral relationship.
Again, if the number of treaty ties divided by the number of treaties signed
exceeds 1, the relationship is a cooperative one. If the number of treaty ties
divided by the number of treaties signed is equal to 1, the relationship is on
the brink of institutionalized cooperation. If the number of treaty ties
divided by the number of treaties signed is less than 1, then it indicates an ad
hoc relationship. This does not mean that there is no relationship, but that
there has been little effort toward institutionalizing the relationship. An ad
hoc relationship can occur because there is really no need to develop a long-­
term institutionalized relationship. Often, an ad hoc relationship occurs
either at the very beginning of a relationship or if there are only one or two
issue areas that require cooperation. Similarly, an ad hoc relationship can
develop if either one of the states deeply mistrusts the other state and only
wants very limited cooperation.
Finally, Slobodchikoff (2013) showed that the higher the institutional-
ized cooperation score, the less likely there is to be conflict between the two
states. In other words, the more institutionalized the cooperation, the more
likely there is to be peaceful relations between the states and the better the
bilateral relationship.
Treaty nesting as a tool in building bilateral and multilateral relationships
is not unique to the post-­Soviet region. Scholars have used treaty nesting and
treaty networks to study the quality of the relationships between China and
Russia (Ambrosio 2017) and China and the European Union (Slobodchikoff
2017a). Further, treaty networks have been used to study the quality of rela-
tionships between states and de facto states (Ambrosio and Lange 2016).
In South Asia, treaty networks have been used to study the quality of the
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 51

Table 4. Measure of Cooperative Relationship

Cooperative Relationship Ties/Treaties > 1
Neutral Relationship Ties/Treaties = 1
Ad hoc Relationship Ties/Treaties < 1

relationship between India and Russia (Slobodchikoff and Tandon 2017)

and India and Pakistan (Tandon and Slobodchikoff 2019; Slobodchikoff
and Tandon 2019). Specifically, Tandon and Slobodchikoff (2019) show
how India and Pakistan are able to build a relationship through treaty net-
works despite the fact that both states are rivals. While India and Pakistan
remain rivals, they argue that both states have been able to build some trust
over time and, through the use of treaty nesting, have decreased the likeli-
hood of a major militarized conflict between the two states.
Treaty networks are not only important tools to understanding a bilateral
relationship between states, they can also be useful in showing the hierarchi-
cal structure of global and regional order and show how involved a given
state is within the global or regional order. For example, Slobodchikoff
(2014) shows how Russia was able to establish a regional order using treaty
nesting. Moscow used both bilateral and multilateral treaties to establish and
secure the regional order. He argues that the states that accepted the regional
order were more willing to engage with Russia to get benefits provided by the
hegemon. In exchange for the benefits provided by the regional hegemon,
the states agreed to abide by the rules established by the great power. Slobod-
chikoff and Aleprete (2020) further showed that Russia’s attempts to create
a regional order and integrate the post-­Soviet space were effective in that the
states that were most committed to the regional order were more likely to
align themselves politically with Moscow.
It is important to note that treaty networks are able to illustrate regional
and global order. States that align themselves within the regional order are
more likely to institutionalize their cooperation with the great powers of that
order (Slobodchikoff 2014). In the case of the Russian regional order,
Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Belarus were the most willing to try to integrate
fully within the regional order while Georgia was the least willing. That did
not mean that there was no cooperation with Georgia, merely that Moscow
and Tbilisi had a much more ad hoc level of cooperation, cooperating when
necessary but not working to institutionalize cooperation. We now turn to a
discussion of the global order in South Asia, and the importance of India to
that global order.
52 • India as Kingmaker

India’s Place in the Global Order

The end of World War II ushered in a new era of bipolarity. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union began a new era of competition with each state
trying to woo other states into joining into an alliance with them. This was a
global competition by both powers to try to not only increase their own
power but also to decrease the power of their adversary. In South Asia, both
the Soviet Union and the United States tried to gain the support of the
regional great powers. Pakistan allied itself with the United States while India
allied itself more with the Soviet Union. In keeping an arms race between the
two superpowers going, the United States sold arms to Pakistan while the
Soviet Union sold arms to India. In this way, both India and Pakistan were
able to keep up their regional rivalry by becoming players in the global rivalry.
In other words, the regional rivalry mirrored the global rivalry.
India and Pakistan fought over Kashmir and used the arms bought from
their benefactors against each other. Once both states gained nuclear weap-
ons, their regional rivalry became even more important to the global hierar-
chy. A war between the two states would threaten to bring in both the Soviet
Union and the United States into a regional conflict and have profound
implications for stability in the region and around the world. Despite the
fact that the rivalry occasionally heated up, it did not force the coalition
partners into a larger conflict.
In 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist and a bipolar world order
became unipolar. Moscow tried to retain its trade ties with India especially
through the sales of arms. Washington, on the other hand, sensed a new mar-
ket and tried to improve ties with India. However, Washington also had to be
cognizant that it did not want to hurt its relationship with Pakistan. There-
fore, Washington cautiously tried to improve relations with New Delhi.
Instead of competing ideologically and continuing the Cold War, Moscow
and Washington renewed a competition for economic gains especially in the
defense industry. However, Washington did not believe that it needed New
Delhi to maintain its unipolarity. In fact, Washington believed that the era of
geopolitics and competition over the global order had been won. In other
words, Washington did not need to ask for support from New Delhi; rather,
that support would be a given.
Following September 11, 2001, Washington developed the idea that
either you were with us or you were against us. They didn’t need to compete
with rivals or aid their allies; rather, the allies needed to show their support
for Washington and its foreign policy. Pakistan began to gain increased
importance during the subsequent war on terror, and New Delhi was no lon-
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 53

ger of any strategic importance to Washington and the maintenance of the

unipolar system. All of Washington’s attention was focused on first Afghani-
stan and then Iraq. There was very little room for strategic thinking and for a
long-­term foreign policy that would need the support of New Delhi.
China’s rapid rise in power in the latter part of the first decade of the 21st
century was a concern for Washington, and President Obama declared a
pivot to Asia in terms of a strategic shift in foreign policy. Obama stated that
for too long US foreign policy had been focused on Europe, and that it was a
time for a fundamental shift away from a Eurocentric foreign policy towards
a more Asia-­centered foreign policy. He recognized that this was necessary
to compete with China and to try to maintain supremacy in Asia. However,
it was more difficult to achieve this shift than to state it. In fact, there was
actually very little shift in terms of subsequent substantive agreements
between Washington and New Delhi (Slobodchikoff and Tandon 2017).
Moscow continued to dominate the military defense industry in its agree-
ments with New Delhi. However, New Delhi officially remained neutral and
insisted that it would not be exclusive in its agreements. In fact, New Delhi
stated that it welcomed a better relationship with Washington while not sac-
rificing its relationship with Moscow.
Starting in 2007 at the Munich security conference, Russian president
Vladimir Putin outlined a growing list of complaints with the United States
as the global hegemon. For the first time, he publicly stated that it was time
to move from a unipolar system to a multipolar system and that Russia, while
not directly opposing the United States, would aid in helping a transition
from unipolarity to multipolarity. Putin argued that it was time for the
United States to take into account the ideas and the positions of other coun-
tries and to stop acting as though Washington’s opinion was the only one
that mattered. In other words, Putin was tired of not being taken seriously
and not having a seat at the table when it came to strategic interests that
affected the whole world. He believed that Moscow deserved to play an
important role as a great power and that the US should not be so dismissive
of other countries and their strategic interests. He stipulated that the US dis-
counted Russia as being merely a regional power and thus not important
when decisions affecting the international community were taken. Putin per-
ceived this as arrogance on the part of the United States and at that point
began to challenge the global order established by the United States.
In 2008, Moscow invaded Georgia in an effort to maintain its regional
sphere of influence and to ensure that NATO would not spread by accepting
Georgia as a member state. Washington was very surprised by Moscow’s
actions. However, Putin was indicating that he had his own form of the
54 • India as Kingmaker

Monroe Doctrine. He was drawing a line and stating that he would not allow
NATO expansion into any of the former Soviet states with the exception of
the Baltic states, which had already joined.
In 2013, Putin again surprised the West by supporting an insurrection in
southeast Ukraine to ensure that Ukraine would not be able to join NATO
or the EU. Again, he was indicating his policy of the Monroe Doctrine
applied to the former Soviet Union. Both the invasion of Georgia and Rus-
sian actions in Ukraine showed Russia’s willingness to challenge Washing-
ton’s supremacy and begin to challenge the global order.
During this period of time, China was also beginning to challenge the
global order. However, it was doing so in a subtler way. It began to
develop economic initiatives as a contrast to Washington’s liberal order.
States were given options to receive loans from the Chinese government
without any requirements to develop liberal policies and democratic
governance. Getting such loans is especially attractive to states in Cen-
tral Asia that are more authoritarian in nature and are not happy with
adopting liberal reforms. China provided an attractive alternative for
those states. In fact, Beijing’s early efforts at providing an alternative to
the liberal global order later led to the development of the One Belt One
Road policy.
States such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS)
and others have long desired a multipolar global order, where they have a
larger say in shaping global affairs. International relations scholars have
debated whether or not the current system is unipolar with the United States
acting as a global hegemon. In terms of military power, the United States
maintains its global dominance, far outspending its rivals and competitors,
thus maintaining the largest and most well-­equipped armed forces in the
world. While the US remains the world’s largest economy, it continues to
face growing competition from rising powers like China, India, and entities
such as the European Union. Increasingly, the United States has been unwill-
ing as well as unable to handle global crises, both economic and security
related. It has been unable to thwart North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. It
has been unable to entirely eliminate the Islamic State and other extremist
fundamentalist groups. It has been a reluctant participant in the Syrian civil
war, allowing states like Russia and Turkey to take the lead in shaping the
situation on the ground. These events point to the United States’ lack of
global leadership. It can be argued that we are witnessing the transition of
global order toward a multipolar system, where a group of major powers
jointly govern and shape the rules of the system, under which other states
must operate.
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 55

According to General Michael Hayden, the former director of both

the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, the
global order is currently at an inflection point. The challenge against the
liberal order is strong enough that it is far from clear whether the liberal
order will survive (Hayden 2018). The only way that the liberal order can
survive is if enough regional great powers are committed to maintain
that order. Specifically, the regional great powers must have institution-
alized relationships with those states that are allied and committed to
maintain the global order.
Although China and Russia were in favor of a multipolar system, neither
could directly challenge US power. Russia and China also recognized the
importance of gaining India as a valuable ally in countering American hege-
mony.2 Beginning in 2002, the leaders of Russia, China and India have held
annual summits to increase cooperation between themselves. The tripartite
meetings in 2017 reiterated that all three states were interested in creating a
global system based on international law and moving toward a multipolar
system. With the rise of right-­wing nationalism in India under the Narendra
Modi administration, the three countries may find themselves more aligned
than ever before in terms of their worldview. While India prefers the status
quo, it also has a strong preference for multilateralism. India prefers nonin-
terventionism in the domestic affairs of other states. When intervention is
carried out, India has supported a multilateral coalition versus unilateral
actions by powerful states. On the other hand, the United States has increas-
ingly preferred a unilateral course of action in international affairs, some-
times in violation of international law.
While India was officially nonaligned during the Cold War, it maintained
a close friendship with the Soviet Union. India’s relations with the United
States have been much more turbulent, especially after India’s entry into the
nuclear power states club. The United States’ close ties with Pakistan, includ-
ing the provision of military and monetary aid, had further worsened Indo-­
American ties. In the last few decades, India has faced rapid economic growth
and has enhanced its military power. It is also situated strategically to coun-
ter China’s rising aggression and territorial expansion. The United States
realized that it needed India as an important ally to prevent China and Rus-
sia from developing sufficient power and ability to challenge the unipolar
system. Relations between the two started to improve during the Bush
administration and continued to steadily improve during the subsequent

2. http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2124329/russia-india-
china-meeting-shows-multipolar-world-order
56 • India as Kingmaker

Obama and Trump administrations. Today, the United States and India have
developed a much closer relation in an effort to balance the rise of China’s
power as well as to counter rising Chinese aggression in the Asia Pacific.
While there are points of cooperation and conflict in each of the above bilat-
eral relationships, India continues to preserve a balance by maintaining close
ties with both Russia and the United States. Despite several military con-
frontations and border skirmishes along the disputed territory, India and
China also continue to maintain cooperative ties, especially in the economic
domain. This further complicates the future of the current global order.
While Russia and China are indeed dissatisfied states in the current
global order, India is still in play for both the United States on one side and
Russia and China on the other. Indeed, it has become the lynchpin in deter-
mining the future of the global system. We argue that a regional great power
state like India can serve as a lynchpin in this transition from unipolarity
toward multipolarity. By choosing to side with Russia and China instead of
the United States and the European Union, India can act as a catalyst in a
global transition of power. Current trends point to increasing cooperation
between India and the United States. As the world’s largest and leading
democracies, they have much in common with each other. It is widely
expected that they will continue to cooperate economically, and India will be
crucial ally in the United States’ “pivot to” or “rebalancing in” Asia. India and
the United States share a common concern for the rise of China and its
expanding aggression in the Asia-­Pacific as well as globally. Much has been
written about the close ties developed between Modi and the Obama admin-
istration. Modi and Trump also got off to a good start at their first meeting
in June 2017 and the close economic, security, and political cooperation
between the two countries is expected to continue. The successful Indian
diaspora in the United States provides a crucial connection between the two
states. These trends suggest that India is being pulled away from the Russian
sphere of influence by the United States and is realigning its foreign policy
interests with the United States. We now turn to a discussion on the method-
ology of determining India’s place in the global order.

Measuring India’s Place in the Global Order

Using the level of bilateral cooperation measure developed by Slobod-

chikoff (2013), we can determine the quality of the relationships between
India and other countries. Further, since we know that the creation and
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 57

maintenance of the global order uses treaty nesting and treaty networks to
institutionalize the global order, it is possible to place a state within the
global order. In other words, if a state has institutionalized its relationships
with the great powers of the global order, then that state is vested within the
global order. With the US being the supreme power as the global hegemon,
the US has created the current liberal order. We can determine how vested
in the global order India is by examining the bilateral relationship between
India and the United States. However, we need to examine more than just
the relationship between India and the United States. We also need to
examine the relationship between India and the other great powers in the
global order. These major powers work to maintain the global order estab-
lished by the United States. These powers include the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, and the EU as a whole as well as Japan, which is a major
regional power. Looking at each of the relationships between India and
each of those states or organizations allows us to determine how committed
India is to the current global order.
If India is not a status quo power but rather a revisionist power, then we
should see evidence that India has more of an institutionalized relationship
with great powers that are challenging the global order. The revisionist great
powers include Russia, China, and Iran. In other words, we need to create
specific categories in which we can place India that would allow us to accu-
rately determine whether India is a status quo power or a revisionist power.
Those categories are a solid status quo power, a leaning status quo power, an
undecided power, a leaning revisionist power, or a solid revisionist power
(see table 5). We will now discuss each of these categories separately.

Solid Status Quo Power

To be a solid status quo power, a state must be allied with the other solid
status quo powers. To be termed a status quo power, the state must believe
in the ideology of the global order and be dedicated to maintaining the
status quo. As table 4 shows, if India is to be categorized as a solid status quo
power then it must develop an institutionalized cooperative relationship
with the global hegemon, the United States. However, merely having an
institutionalized cooperative relationship with the global hegemon is not
enough to be considered a solid status quo power. In addition, a solid status
quo power should also have institutionalized cooperative relationships
with the other major powers of the current global order. In other words, if
India were to be considered a solid status quo power, it should have an insti-
Table 5. Categorization of Status Quo vs. Revisionist Power
Solid Status Quo Leans Status Quo Undecided Leans Revisionist Solid Revisionist
Institutionalized Institutionalized Either no institu- Institutionalized Institutionalized
Cooperative Cooperative tionalized coop- Cooperative Cooperative
Relationship Relationship with erative Relationship Relationship
with US US relationships with Russia with Russia
OR
Institutionalized
Cooperative
Relationship with
both the United
States (major sta-
tus quo power)
and Russia (major
revisionist power)
Institutionalized Ad hoc or Institu- Ad hoc or Insti- Institutionalized
Cooperative tionalized Rela- tutionalized Cooperative
Relationship tionship with EU Relationship Relationship
with UK with China with China
Institutionalized Ad hoc or Institu- Lacks Institu-
Cooperative tionalized Rela- tionalized Coop-
Relationship tionship with erative Relation-
with France France or ship with US
Germany
Institutionalized Ad hoc or Institu-
Cooperative tionalized Rela-
Relationship tionship with
with Germany Japan
Institutionalized
Cooperative
Relationship
with EU
Institutionalized
Cooperative
Relationship
with Japan
Lacks Institution-
alized Coopera-
tive Relationship
with Russia
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 59

tutionalized cooperative relationship with the United Kingdom, France,

Germany, and the EU as a whole. While France and Germany are solid
members of the EU, nevertheless they also conduct their own security and
defense policies along with their own foreign policies related to trade. Thus,
it is important to look at the relationship between the individual states with
India as well as with the EU as an entity with India. It is important to note
that being classified as a status quo great power does not preclude institu-
tionalized cooperation between a revisionist state and the status quo power.
The status quo power may develop an institutionalized cooperative rela-
tionship with a revisionist power and yet maintain its true focus on the
maintenance and alliance between the states of the current global order.

Leaning Status Quo Power

For a state to be a leaning status quo power it must possess an institutional-

ized cooperative relationship with the global hegemon. In addition to this,
a leaning status quo power will also attempt to develop cooperative rela-
tionships with other status quo major powers in the international system.
The level of cooperation between a leaning status quo power and other
major status quo powers may not be institutionalized; this is the distin-
guishing criterion between a solid status quo power and a leaning status
quo power. Thus, in order to be termed a leaning status quo power, India
must develop cooperative relationships with France, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Japan, in addition to demonstrating institutionalized coop-
eration with the United States. Table 4 shows that the leaning status quo
power must both have an institutionalized cooperative relationship with
the global hegemon and a cooperative relationship with the other status
quo great powers in the global order.

Undecided

An undecided power does not feel strongly about aligning itself with either
the status quo powers or the revisionist powers. Therefore, as table 5 shows,
an undecided great power may either lack institutionalized cooperative
relationships with both the status quo powers or the revisionist powers, or
it may choose to develop institutionalized cooperative relationships with
both the status quo and revisionist powers. In other words, the great power
is not making a specific choice to either support the status quo or revisionist
60 • India as Kingmaker

powers. Instead, it is like a free agent that can choose to either develop no
relationship whatsoever or develop relationships with both sides.

Leans Revisionist

Contrary to status quo powers, a power that leans revisionist will believe
ideologically in the necessity of changing the current status quo. The ques-
tion of how dedicated a state is to changing the status quo is a matter of
degree. As table 5 shows, a great power that leans revisionist should at the
very least have an institutionalized cooperative relationship with Russia,
one of the most vocal revisionist powers. The state should also have a coop-
erative relationship with the other main revisionist power, China. Also, any
great power that leans revisionist would need to not have an institutional-
ized cooperative relationship with the United States. This is due to the fact
that revisionist powers by definition want to change the global order.

Solid Revisionist Power

A solid revisionist power is again by definition a powerful state that wishes

to bring about a change in the global order. However, a solid revisionist
power is much more active in trying to bring about that change than a lean-
ing revisionist power. Examples of solid revisionist powers are Russia and
China. As table 5 shows, to be considered a solid revisionist power, a great
power should have an institutionalized cooperative relationship with both
China and Russia as well as have an institutionalized cooperative relation-
ship with other revisionist states such as Iran.
Ultimately, if revisionist powers truly want to bring about change in the
global order, they will need to convince other great regional powers. India is
not the only such power, but India is an important regional power in South
Asia and a key to balancing China’s power in Asia as a whole. That is why it is
so important to determine whether India is indeed wedded to the current
status quo or if it is a revisionist power that will aid Russia and China in
developing a multipolar system. India is truly a lynchpin in the struggle to
either maintain or create a new global order. In the following sections, we
will first look at India’s relationships with the status quo powers. In the next
chapter we will specifically look at India’s relationship with the United States.
We will also examine India’s relationships with the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and the EU. These are the major states, along with the United
 Treaty Networks and Determining State Preferences for the Global Order • 61

States, upholding the current international order. After we have examined

India’s relationships with the status quo powers, we will then turn to an
examination of India’s relationships with revisionist powers. We will espe-
cially focus on India’s relationships with Russia, China, and Iran. Finally, by
comparing all of those relationships, we should be able to make a final deter-
mination about whether India is a status quo or a revisionist power and thus
the implications for the global order as a whole.
Part 2 • India’s Relationship with
Status Quo Powers
4 • India-­US Relations

United States foreign policy has often been a contest between isolationism
and interventionism. From the time of George Washington’s farewell address
as president, where he cautioned the United States to avoid foreign entangle-
ments, there has been a significant portion of policy makers who have wanted
to avoid alliances and interventionism. These policy makers have consistently
tried to focus on domestic policy to the exclusion of foreign policy. For
example, the United States was slow to enter both World War I and World
War II.
After World War II however, the United States realized the importance
of developing and maintaining international alliances. From the ashes of
World War II, two great powers emerged: the United States and the Soviet
Union. World War II had effectively destroyed the other great powers’ ability
to build an international order. In other words, the post–­World War II era
created a period of bipolarity in which the United States created a postwar
order in the West, while the Soviet Union spread communism and developed
its own regional order in Eastern Europe and Asia.
A new era of competition emerged between the United States and the
Soviet Union to spread and expand each of their regional orders. Moreover,
both states worked to prevent their opponent’s world order from growing.
This new era of competition was known as the Cold War and it was marked
by intense competition between the two states in gaining international allies
in various regions around the world. The Cold War spread from Europe to
Asia to the Americas to Africa. Very few regions were not affected by this
competition.
In South Asia, both the Soviet Union and the United States worked to
outcompete each other by recruiting more regional allies. While the United
States became closer to Pakistan, the Soviet Union developed a close rela-

65
66 • India as Kingmaker

tionship with India. Moscow’s ties to New Delhi were troublesome for the
United States, but the United States really worked to ensure its ties with
Islamabad.
The end of the Cold War brought new opportunities for US foreign pol-
icy. Both Presidents George H. W. Bush and William Clinton realized the
importance of the United States being the sole superpower as well as the
importance of the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity. Both of them argued
that the United States had won the Cold War and that the liberal order had
triumphed over communism and the Eastern Bloc. The collapse of the Soviet
Union further provided impetus for the United States to look out for its own
interests and grow its power further vis-­à-­vis the other states in the global
order. Clinton especially believed that the US economy was a global one, and
looked for new ways to open new markets. Additionally, Clinton believed
that NATO should expand because not only was NATO’s chief mission over,
but this was an act that would be relatively low cost in terms of security guar-
antees for the United States. While Moscow argued that the US had prom-
ised not to expand NATO, there was really nothing that Moscow could do to
prevent this expansion from taking place.
In response to the Clinton administration’s global expansion and
increased interventionism, the George W. Bush administration initially tried
to retreat and impose a new era of isolationism. During the campaign for
president, Bush said that he was not into nation-­building and instead wanted
to focus on domestic policy. He argued that the United States had won the
Cold War and that it was now time to focus inward rather than outward.
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 made Bush pivot from a
more isolationist president to one of the most interventionist presidents in
the history of the United States. Bush began to use the military to pursue
terrorists abroad and believed very strongly in the conviction that either
states had to support the United States or that they were against the United
States. Nuance was not a part of this new strategy. However, the Bush admin-
istration did see the importance of alliances and especially regional alliances
in the regions where there was a lot of terrorist activity. Thus, the United
States worked very hard to strengthen the relationship between Washington
and Islamabad in an attempt to have Pakistan help the United States in the
war on terror broadly, but more specifically in the war in Afghanistan against
the Taliban. New Delhi was not a priority for Washington during this period;
while it was not ignored, relations with Islamabad were deemed to be more
strategically important than those with New Delhi.
During the Obama administration, there was a renewed effort to reach
 India-­US Relations • 67

out to traditional allies and nontraditional allies in an effort to show the

world that the US was not willing to continue a unilateral foreign policy, but
rather was committed to maintaining the liberal order. The rise of China
during this time was troubling for the United States as Washington realized
that China was not a proponent of the liberal order. Obama tried to work
with China, believing that cooperation with China would lead to a liberal-
ization of China and would tie China in with the liberal order. However,
China chose carefully in which areas to cooperate and was very wary about
being tied to the liberal order. It didn’t actively resist the liberal order, but it
did keep the liberal order at a distance. Publicly, it did not denounce the lib-
eral order, but privately Beijing worked toward the time that it could help
usher in a new era of multipolarity. Obama realized that China was not only
a global threat but also a significant regional threat to stability. Thus, he cre-
ated a pivot to Asia in which the United States would focus on relations with
many of the states in the region, trying to balance increasing Chinese influ-
ence. Thus, according to official policy, Washington stated that it wanted to
increase the level of cooperation and alliance with New Delhi.
After the 2016 election in the United States, newly elected president
Donald Trump began a new era of retrenchment and withdrawal from exter-
nal alliances. He believed that the United States was not benefiting as much
as it should have from those alliances. Specifically, Donald Trump believed
that the European powers in NATO were not paying their share and were
relying upon the United States to provide for their defense and their security.
He believed that the problem with this was that the United States was forced
to defend Europe while Europe was able to spend on their economies and
expand their domestic economies to compete more effectively with the econ-
omy of the United States.
Trump believed very strongly that China was a great threat to the United
States economically. Where Obama had tried to bring China into the global
order, Trump believed that the only way to deal with China was to isolate it.
Further, he believed that the United States and China were linked together
too closely and that China was winning an economic war against the United
States. Rather than attempt to ally the United States more with states that
could stand up to China in the region, Trump attempted to raise tariffs on
Chinese products and began a trade war with China. Instead of collaborating
with India to balance against China’s growing economic power in the region,
Washington continued to pursue its goals unilaterally while discounting the
role of its allies.
The COVID-­19 crisis in 2020 exacerbated the difficulty of working with
68 • India as Kingmaker

allies. Instead of working together to try to come up with a solution to the

crisis, the Trump administration worked unilaterally to develop a vaccine
and a strategy for dealing with the crisis. The Trump administration closed
down borders and worked to continue to isolate the United States and to
begin to extricate itself from a globalized world. That did not mean that rela-
tions between India and the United States became nonexistent, but the tenor
of those relations changed. We now turn to a specific discussion of India’s
relations with the United States.
As discussed in the previous chapter, this volume aims to assess whether
India will ally with status quo or revisionist states in its quest for great power
status. Since attaining independence from the British Raj in 1947, India has
remained nonaligned and has pursued diplomatic ties with all major powers
including the United States and the Soviet Union. During the Cold War,
India assumed a leadership role in the Non-­Aligned Movement, adopting a
“Third World” approach, which included maintaining diplomatic ties, trad-
ing relationships, and receiving aid from both First World and Second World
states. In spite of its commitment to neutrality and nonalignment, over time
India developed close ties with the Soviet Union, which resulted in long peri-
ods of alienation and altercation between India and the United States.
India and the United States share several values including strong support
for democracy, the rule of law, free trade and markets, international institu-
tions, and human rights. They also face common threats, such as a rising and
increasingly aggressive China, terrorism, and religious extremism. They are
also grappling with similar challenges such as the hazards of climate change
and refugees from neighboring states. There are issues over which the two
states disagree in principle and in practice. Some notable examples of the
several topics of contention between the two states include agricultural sub-
sidies and trade restrictions, American unilateralism and interference in the
domestic affairs of other states, America’s historic support for Pakistan
including provision of weapons and technology, India’s close ties with the
Soviet Union/Russia, India’s continued ties and trade with Iran in spite of
US sanctions, and India’s rejection of the Non-­Proliferation Treaty and con-
sequent decision to become a nuclear weapons state. We elaborate on several
of these points of cooperation and contention below.
This chapter will examine Indo-­US ties with an aim to assess the level of
cooperation between India and the United States through the role of treaties
and agreements as indicators of the strength of a bilateral relationship. Bilat-
eral relations can be either ad hoc, meaning that the two states deal with
issues as they arise, or they can be institutionalized, where the relationship is
a cooperative one that has been carefully built to expand the relationship to
 India-­US Relations • 69

mutually benefit both states. States that have institutionalized bilateral rela-
tions are much more likely to resolve disputes peacefully than those states
that have an ad hoc relationship (Slobodchikoff 2013). To examine whether
the cooperation between India and the United States is institutionalized or
ad hoc, we explore the patterns of nested treaties between both countries to
assess their levels of cooperation. Using methodology developed by Slobod-
chikoff (2013, 2014), we argue that higher levels of treaty nesting in the
Indo-­American bilateral treaty network would suggest that the two states are
actively working to institutionalize their relationship.
However, we find little evidence of nesting in the treaty making pat-
terns between the United States and India. Indo-­US cooperation instead
appears to be limited to specific issue areas. Much of their cooperation is
taking place in the absence of formal agreements and can be characterized
as ad hoc. This implies that while the United States is currently courting
India as a capable and reliable ally to balance the rise of China in Asia, it
has no intentions of forming a broad partnership with India that spills over
into other issue areas. Based on the evidence examined, we do not expect
the India-­US strategic partnership to turn into a special relationship that
the United States shares with close allies such as the United Kingdom,
France, and Canada. The Indo-­American relationship is driven solely by
the rise of China’s power and will fade if the threat dissipates (unlikely in
the near future). We argue that this is a mistake on the part of the United
States because it enables India to develop deeper cooperation with rivals
such as Russia and China. In fact, in subsequent chapters we demonstrate
that India has a deeper institutionalized bilateral relationship with Russia
and China than it does with the United States. If the United States were to
focus on building a cooperative relationship with India, it would be able to
ensure that the challenge to the global order would be able to be contained.
However, if it continues the way it currently has built its relationship with
India, it may lose India when it comes time that China and Russia are pow-
erful enough to directly challenge the United States for dominance of the
global order.
We first examine the historical evolution of bilateral ties between India
and the United States. We discuss the areas of cooperation as well as the areas
of contention between the two countries. Next, we state our argument for
why we expect treaty nesting to serve as an indicator of the strength of the
bilateral relationship. We analyze the bilateral treaty network between India
and the United States from 1947 to the present. Then, we present our find-
ings that suggest that India and the United States have not institutionalized
their relationship and continue to cooperate in an ad hoc manner, suggesting
70 • India as Kingmaker

that the relationship is weak. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the

relevance of our findings for the future of Indo-­American ties.

India-­US Relations

In this section we give an overview of Indo-­US relations.1 During the Cold

War, the Soviet Union became one of India’s largest aid providers and trade
partners as well as provider of military technology and weapons.2 Thus,
while officially maintaining its political neutrality, unofficially, India was
considered to be in the Soviet sphere of influence. India and the Soviet
Union also formed a treaty of friendship in 1971, signaling to the interna-
tional community their close ties.3
Meanwhile, the United States became a close ally of India’s neighbor and
longtime rival, Pakistan. India and Pakistan have shared a troubled relation-
ship ever since the partition of India by the British rulers resulted in the cre-
ation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1947. The two countries have
fought three major wars and several militarized disputes between 1947 and
the present. The United States served as an aid donor, weapons provider, and
ally to Pakistan, thus leading to deteriorating ties between India and the
United States.4
India tested the nuclear bomb and joined the elite group of nuclear states
in 1998, further escalating tensions with the United States and much of the
Western world. Relations improved between India and the United States
only after the Bush administration removed economic sanctions and the two
countries signed a nuclear agreement in 2005.
Since the second Bush administration lifted economic sanctions on India
and entered into a nuclear treaty with it, relations between the United States
and India have been largely positive. There is growing cooperation between
the two countries in economic, political, and military domains. The strong
Indian diaspora in North America continues to strengthen cultural and eco-
nomic links between the two states. India was a key ally of the United States
as the Obama administration sought to “pivot” or “rebalance” in Asia, given
the rapid economic rise of China. The Trump administration also pursued

1. For detailed discussions of Indo-­US relations, see Kronstadt (2005), Martin and Kron­
stadt (2007), Kapur and Ganguly (2007), Ganguly (2003), and Ganguly and Scobell (2005).
2. SIPRI Arms Transfer Dataset, https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
3. Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the Government of India and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed August 9, 1971.
4. SIPRI Arms Transfer Dataset, https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
 India-­US Relations • 71

similar goals in Asia—­containing China and preserving freedom of naviga-

tion of the seas, and bolstering partnerships with regional powers such as
Australia, India, and Japan. As China has become more and more assertive in
Asia, regional powers like India have turned to external great powers like the
United States for assistance in preventing China’s domination of the region.
As stated in the US National Security Strategy document released in May
2010, “The blossoming US-­India friendship seems to be based on conver-
gence of strategic interests and shared values of rules of law.” The US and
India share a strategic partnership based on their shared values as the world’s
two largest democracies as well as the connections among their people
(White House 2010).
The 2017 US National Security Strategy states that “a geopolitical com-
petition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in
the Indo-­Pacific region. The region, which stretches from the west coast of
India to the western shores of the United States, represents the most popu-
lous and economically dynamic part of the world. The U.S. interest in a free
and open Indo-­Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our republic” (46).
The 2017 US National Security Strategy welcomes “India’s emergence as a
leading global power and stronger strategic and defense partner” and it calls
for more cooperation with the Quad—­Japan, Australia, India, and the
United States. It also pledges to “expand our defense and security coopera-
tion with India, a Major Defense Partner of the United States, and support
India’s growing relationships throughout the region” (47). “The newly for-
mulated strategy also welcomes India’s rise as a ‘leading global power’ and
emphasizes expanded defense ties with New Delhi. Notably, the framework
appears focused on pulling India more intensively into regional activities”
(Ayers 2018).
Chacko (2014) argues that power transitions bring about an “ontological”
security concern for states due to changing identities and relationships. The
United States is addressing such an ontological security concern resulting from
the rise of China and the end of American unipolarity by establishing a special
relationship with India. By establishing a close relationship with India, the
United States is able to signal the universality of American ideas and institu-
tions and enlist support for the current global order, which China is attempt-
ing to alter. Chacko (2014) further argues that while relations between India
and the United States have improved, they continue to be hampered by the
two countries’ differing worldviews as well as self-­perceptions.
It is worth emphasizing that while the diplomats from both countries pay
lip service to the shared interests and values of both countries including their
democratic regimes, as well as respect for human rights and the rule of law,
72 • India as Kingmaker

their friendship is based on common threats and joint security concerns ema-
nating from China. The two countries have started to cooperate on a much
larger scale in the last few years. This coincides with the rise of China as well
as its desire to reshape the global international order. Thus, balancing China’s
power and influence in Asia remains the top catalyst for closer Indo-­
American ties.

Data and Analysis

Methodology

We conduct a systematic analysis of all bilateral treaties between India and

the United States from 1947 to the present. India attained independence
from British rule in 1947 and began official diplomatic ties with the United
States. India and the US have signed a total of 54 bilateral treaties between
1947 and the present. The two states have created treaties on a wide range
of issues. Table 6 provides information on the total number of treaties cre-
ated in each of the categories over the period of bilateral cooperation
between India and the United States.
India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) does not include agree-
ments on defense and security in its database. India and the United States
have concluded several defense related agreements. While we discuss
these agreements and their impact on the relationship in subsequent sec-
tions of this chapter, we do not include them in the data compiled for
this chapter for reasons outlined below. It is also important to note that
most defense pacts are not efforts at building and institutionalizing rela-
tionships; rather, they are an ad hoc attempt at demonstrating military
power and conducting joint exercises between the military forces of the
states.
The MEA systematically excludes defense and security related agree-
ments from its dataset. This includes agreements for military equipment and
technology procurements as well as decisions related to joint military exer-
cises. The MEA includes all agreements that are signed at the level of foreign
minister and head of state and excludes agreements signed at the level of the
defense minister/secretary. While we have compiled information on some of
the landmark India–­US defense and related agreements, we do not include
them in the data analysis to avoid introducing any bias into the data. Some of
the defense agreements may be missing from public records and to include
some while possibly missing others may skew our findings as well as our
 India-­US Relations • 73

understanding of the relationship. It is also possible that while agreements on

some relationships such as that between India and the US are readily avail-
able, defense related information on other bilateral relationships such as
those between India and China or India and Iran may be more difficult to
come by. It is for this reason that we are relying on data made available by the
MEA without alternations and additions.
More importantly, based on our coding methodology, any treaty that is
explicitly referenced within an existing bilateral treaty is automatically intro-
duced and included in our dataset (even if it is missing from the MEA’s data-
set). For example, when an India–­US treaty explicitly references the United
Nations Convention on Drugs and Trafficking, the multilateral convention
is included in the dataset as other treaties are nested within it. We systemati-
cally apply this methodology to all treaties in all bilateral relationships in our
study. Given the above, we find that not a single existing India–­US treaty out
of the 46 bilateral treaties included in the MEA’s dataset makes any reference
to any of the defense agreements that are not included in the dataset. None
of the treaties in the dataset are nested within defense agreements. As such,
we argue that while the defense agreements represent attempts at coopera-
tion between the two states, they do not represent attempts to institutional-
ize the cooperation.
The cooperation score is the result of the total ties divided by the total
number of treaties. Thus, if defense agreements were included in our analysis,
the cooperation score would either be reduced or remain unchanged. At 0.5,
the India-­US cooperation score is firmly situated in the category of ad hoc
cooperation and is in no danger of being affected by a small number of omit-
ted agreements.
As suggested by the above data (table 6), there are only a small number of
treaties in most of the issue categories noted above. These issue categories
were provided by the government of India. As noted in table 6, the two states
have created a very small number of bilateral treaties in most of the issue
categories.5 It is surprising that the two states have only formed a single treaty
on issues that are a priority for both countries such as terrorism. There are
either only a single treaty or a small number of bilateral treaties on most
other issues including the environment, investment, illegal drug trafficking,
and agricultural cooperation. This is a lost opportunity for both states, which
seemingly have a lot of potential to cooperate on a wide range of issues. The
only issue area on which there seems to be substantial and sustained coopera-

5. It is possible to group together some of the categories referenced in table 6. For instance,
bilateral treaties in the areas of tax and investment can be reclassified as economic treaties.
74 • India as Kingmaker

Table 6. Indo-­US Bilateral Treaties

Issue Area Number of Treaties
Science/Technology 24
Cooperation 5
Diplomacy 2
Employment 1
Energy 5
Taxation 2
Health 1
Terrorism 1
Environmental 1
Economic 3
Agriculture Cooperation 1
Illegal Drug Trafficking 2
Education 1
Air Services 1
Investment 1

tion is science and technology. This broad category subsumes cooperation on

space exploration, military technology, and other related issues.

Nesting and Lodestone Treaties

India’s relationship with the United States is not at all institutionalized in

the area of treaty formation. There are only a small number of treaties that
seem central to the relationship. Below we discuss the lodestone treaties
(see table 7) in the relationship.
The Mutual Cooperation Agreement between India and United States of
America for Reducing Demand, Preventing Illicit Use of Traffic in Drugs and
for Matters Relating to Licit Trade in Opiates, Etc. (INUSA15 in fig. 8) was
signed in 1990. It is nested in the Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, both multilateral agreements. The
MOU between India and United States of America on Cooperative Measures to
Increase Awareness of and Support for Efforts to Combat Production, Distribu-
tion and Use of Illegal Drugs is nested within INUSA15 (fig. 8).
The Joint Statement on Cooperation in Energy and Environment between
India and United States of America (INUSA23 in fig. 8) was signed in 2000
and is nested within multilateral agreements including the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and Its Kyoto Protocol.
 India-­US Relations • 75

Table 7. Lodestone Treaties between India and the United States

Degree
Treaty Name Year Signed Centrality Issue Area
Mutual Cooperation Agreement between India 1990 3 Illegal Drug
and United States of America for Reducing Trafficking
Demand, Preventing Illicit Use of Traffic in
Drugs and for Matters Relating to Licit Trade
in Opiates, Etc
Joint Statement on Cooperation in Energy and 2000 3 Energy
Environment between India and United States
of America
Agreement on Science and Technology Coop- 2005 3 Science and
eration between India and United States of Technology
America
MOU between the Department of Space and 1997 3 Science and
the Department of Science and Technology of Technology
the Government of the Republic of India and
the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration and the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration of the USA for Scien-
tific Cooperation in the Areas of Earth and
Atmospheric Sciences
Amended MOU 2002 3 Science and
Technology
Agreement for Cooperation in Earth Sciences 2008 2 Science and
between India and United States of America Technology
Framework Agreement between India and 2008 3 Science and
United States of America for Cooperation in Technology
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for
Peaceful Purposes

The Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation between India and

United States of America (INUSA28 in fig. 8) was signed in 2005 and is refer-
enced by three subsequent bilateral treaties. These nested treaties include the
MOU on Agriculture Cooperation and Food Security between India and United
States of America and the Agreement between India and United States of Amer-
ica on Cooperation on a Joint Clean Energy Research and Development Centre.
We next discuss a group of four treaties that all serve as lodestone treaties
in the relationship. The small cluster of treaties in the bottom left of the net-
work map (fig. 8) all make reference to cooperation in the field of science and
technology in general and cooperation in the areas of Earth and atmospheric
sciences in particular. These four treaties are the following:
76 • India as Kingmaker

Fig. 8. Indo-­US Treaty Network

• The MOU between the Department of Space and the Department of Sci-
ence and Technology of the Government of the Republic of India and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Oce-
anic and Atmospheric Administration of the USA for Scientific Coopera-
tion in the Areas of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences (listed as INUSA32
in fig. 8) was signed in 1997.
• The Amended MOU between the Department of Space and the Depart-
ment of Science and Technology of the Government of the Republic of
India and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the USA for Scien-
tific Cooperation in the Areas of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences (listed as
INUSA33 in fig. 8) was signed in 2002.
• The Agreement for Cooperation in Earth Sciences between India and
United States of America (listed as INUSA31 in fig. 8) was signed in
2008.
• The Framework Agreement between India and United States of America
for Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful
Purposes (listed as INUSA34 in fig. 8) was signed in 2008.

India and the United States first signed a memorandum of understanding

(MOU) related to space exploration in 1997 and later amended it in 2002.
 India-­US Relations • 77

These MOUs included collaboration between the government of India’s

Departments of Space and Science and Technology and the US National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Sciences in the areas of Earth and atmospheric sciences. The
two countries signed two related treaties in 2008, the Agreement for Coopera-
tion in Earth Sciences between India and United States of America and the
Framework Agreement between India and United States of America for Coop-
eration in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. The
latter is also nested within the international multilateral Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects.
None of the other treaties show any degree of nesting, indicating that they
were ad hoc agreements dealing with important issues, but not attempts to
institutionalize the relationship. As suggested by the network map (fig. 8),
most of the treaties in the Indo-­American dyad remain unlinked; the network
map is composed of various disjointed sections. This suggests that Indo-­
American bilateral cooperation is taking place is an ad hoc manner. The states
are not attempting to systematically link issues of cooperation to one another.
Issue linkage is a negotiation strategy that combines a number of issues
and makes their outcome dependent on each other. It facilitates cooperation
by increasing the bargaining range between states. States can make conces-
sions on issues that are of low priority to them but of a higher priority to
their negotiating partner, thus eliciting concessions on issues that may be of
a higher priority to them compared to their negotiation partner (Davis 2004;
Poast 2012). Research suggests that when states attempt to link seemingly
nonrelated issues during negotiations or bargaining, then the issue linkage
results in reducing the probability of treaty violation (Leeds and Savun
2007). However, in the Indo-­American bilateral relationship, the two states
are negotiating treaties in isolation; there is no spillover of cooperation from
one issue area to another.
In addition to this, when several states attempt to strengthen cooperation
by negotiating and signing a framework of cooperation, this often serves as a
lynchpin or foundation to the relationship. Such a foundational agreement
often results in becoming the lodestone treaty to the bilateral relationship.
By linking all (or most) subsequent agreements to such a lodestone treaty,
states are increasing the costs of violating individual treaties and hence reduc-
ing the probability of treaty violation, resulting in enhanced cooperation. We
find that India and the United States lack such a foundational agreement.
While they have negotiated treaties that serve as the basis for cooperation in
specific issue areas (such as scientific and technological cooperation), there is
78 • India as Kingmaker

no overarching agreement that is central to the relationship. The two states

have termed their relationship a “Strategic Partnership” but this remains an
informal term because they have not established a treaty of friendship or
cooperation to formalize this concept (unlike other bilateral relationships
such as the Indo–­Russian relationship). In other words, their strategic part-
nership does not really exist yet.

Institutionalization

Based on the methodology developed by Slobodchikoff (2013) and dis-

cussed in chapter 2, institutionalization of cooperation within a dyad is
measured as the outcomes of total ties (i.e., instances of nesting) divided by
the total number of bilateral treaties between the two states. It is important
to note that each treaty is an attempt at cooperation on a single issue. Tying
treaties together begins to institutionalize the treaty within the overall rela-
tionship, thus building cooperation within the relationship. If total ties
divided by the total number of treaties is less than 1, that means that the
number of treaties is greater than the number of ties, meaning that there is
only an attempt to cooperate on individual issue areas as opposed to build-
ing a cooperative relationship. Thus, the bilateral relationship is ad hoc.
When total ties divided by the total number of treaties is greater than 1, it
means that more effort was made at tying treaties to previous treaties, which
institutionalizes cooperation within the relationship. Thus, a cooperation
score of greater than 1 is indicative of institutionalized cooperation. Table
8 presents the level of institutionalization within the Indo-­American dyad
between 1947 and present. Throughout the course of bilateral cooperation,
the cooperation score between India and the United States has been less
than 0.5, suggesting that the dyad is in the phase of ad hoc cooperation. In
2017, the cooperation score for the Indo-­American dyad increased to 0.5.
This is interesting because it shows that both India and the United States
have started to build their relationship, but still remain in an ad hoc state.
Instead, they have reached a moderately cooperative relationship. If they
continue to tie future treaties to prior treaties, they will eventually build an
institutionalized cooperative relationship.
As depicted in the Indo-­American network map (fig. 8), the two states
have pockets of cooperation where treaties addressing specific issue areas are
nested within each other as well as within larger multilateral agreements.
However, treaty nesting is present to a limited extent; the bilateral treaty net-
work is composed of smaller isolated networks where treaties on different
issues are not linked to a foundational treaty of cooperation or to each other.
 India-­US Relations • 79

Table 8. Level of Institutionalization in the

Indo-­American Dyad from 1947 to 2017
Year Institutionalization Score
1947 0
1950 0.333
1960 0.50
1970 0.25
1980 0.187
1990 0.263
2000 0.357
2010 0.446
2017 0.50

Analysis

We study three different metrics of cooperation to determine the level of

cooperation within the Indo-­American dyad: (1) the total number of bilat-
eral treaties between the two states; (2) the range of issues over which the
two states cooperate; and (3) the institutionalization score within the dyad
(calculated by the total number of ties/total number of bilateral treaties).
We find that India and the United States have created a total of 54 bilateral
treaties between 1947 and the present. This is much fewer than the number
of treaties created between India and other states; for instance, India and
Russia have signed over 200 bilateral treaties in the same time period
whereas India and Japan have signed 80 bilateral treaties in the same time
period.
Based on information provided in table 6, India and the United States
appear to have formed treaties on a wide range of issues. However, there is
only a single treaty or a very small number of treaties in all areas of coopera-
tion, with the exception of science and technology. Much of the bilateral
cooperation between the two countries is limited to one area—­security
related cooperation. There is limited cooperation in the economic and politi-
cal spheres. This measure also suggests that cooperation between the two
countries is limited to responding to common security threats and concerns.
India and the United States have not made efforts to find additional areas of
cooperation, in spite of the potential to do so.
Our third and final measure is related to the crux of this book: the role of
nested treaties in serving to institutionalize cooperation between two states.
By explicitly nesting new treaties within existing treaties, states enhance the
probability of cooperation and reduce the probability of treaty violation.
This is so because when a state violates a treaty that is nested within previous
80 • India as Kingmaker

treaties, they are violating several treaties simultaneously. This is likely to

result in increased costs and consequences of treaty violation as compared to
violating a single, isolated treaty. As described above, we calculate the level of
nestedness or institutionalization in a dyadic relationship using the total ties
divided by the total treaties measure. When this measure is within the range
of 0–­1, it suggests ad hoc cooperation between the states, and when it is
greater than 1, it suggests that the dyad exhibits institutionalized coopera-
tion. The institutionalization score for the Indo-­American dyad is 0.50, sug-
gesting that it continues to be in the state of ad hoc cooperation.

Conclusion

This chapter begins by noting the many potential areas over which India
and the United States have the ability to cooperate, producing mutually
beneficial outcomes. These include cooperation in the dimensions of creat-
ing and supporting via resources a rules based international regime in the
areas of counterterrorism, illegal trafficking (both of drugs and human
beings), addressing climate change, maintaining liberal markets and a free
trade economy, and supporting democratic regimes . . . to name just a few.
While there has been some cooperation in many of the above-­mentioned
fields, the catalyst to speed up Indo-­American cooperation has been the rise
in China’s power as well as its aggressive actions in Asia and beyond. India
and China share a long territorial border that remains disputed; the two
countries fought a war in 1962 that was decisively won by China. While the
disputed border and associated territory remains a topic of contention,
both sides are determined to address the dispute via diplomatic means.
They continue to be trade partners and cooperate on a range of issues as
well. Economic growth and development remains a top priority for both
states and they are eager to avoid a militarized conflict that would severely
damage their economies. The two countries are also nuclear powers, which
undoubtedly serves as a deterrent against the escalation of low-­level milita-
rized disputes.
As described above, the United States has significantly enhanced its stra-
tegic and military cooperation with India in the last few years. India remains
a vital component in US efforts to balance against the rise of China. India
has the ability and the willingness to serve as a check on Chinese power and
aggression in Asia. However, it is perplexing that, in spite of the many things
that have the potential to bind India and the United States together, the two
countries have invested very little in institutionalizing their cooperation. At
 India-­US Relations • 81

present, Indo-­American cooperation remains ad hoc, suggesting that ties

between the two countries are weak. The United States has not made a suf-
ficient effort to ensure that India is firmly within the American sphere of
influence. As we demonstrate in subsequent chapters, India shares a warm
and cooperation relationship with Russia. India and China also continue to
cooperate over a range of issues, in spite of competing with each other for
strategic dominance in Asia. By studying the Indo-­American treaty networks
we find that Indo-­American ties are much weaker compared to India’s other
bilateral relationships.
Obama’s pivot to Asia, and specifically the increased level of attention
that Washington wanted to pay to New Delhi, did not fully materialize. If
the US wants to develop a better relationship with India, it really has to
begin to reach out, to cooperate in many other issue areas, and work to insti-
tutionalize the relationship. Otherwise, the relationship will continue to be
ad hoc and not effective in balancing China’s increasing power in the region.
While we end our analysis in 2017, the relationship between the United
States and India has not significantly improved since then. If the United
States wishes to improve its relationship with India, it must be willing to do
so. Further, it must be willing to recognize that a relationship with Islamabad
does not mean that it can’t have a good relationship with New Delhi. In
other words, it is possible for Washington to manage both relationships
without putting either in jeopardy. While the relationship with Islamabad
was incredibly important to maintain control in Afghanistan, the relation-
ship with New Delhi is extremely important for the future of the global
order.
5 • Indo-­European Relations

Following World War II, the world was split into a bilateral hierarchical
structure. On the one side was the Soviet Union and its allies, and on the
other side was the United States and its allies. The Soviet Union and its allies
promoted a communist ideology whereas the United States and its allies pro-
moted the liberal order. This power structure continued until the end of the
Cold War when the United States and its liberal order triumphed.
The United States relied upon many great powers to maintain its hege-
mony. Chief among those have been the Western European powers that had
been allied with the United States during the Cold War. Specifically, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom have been the closest allies of the United
States in Europe and globally. Each of these states has provided for the liberal
order, and accepted and institutionalized that liberal order. Each of these
states belongs to NATO, the collective security organization tasked with
protecting the security of the member states adhering to the liberal order.
Moreover, the European Union (EU) has further solidified the liberal order
in Europe.
As France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the EU are some of the
greatest allies of the United States and the current liberal order, it is extremely
important to examine their relationship with India. If India is a status quo
power, then it should have cooperative relationships with these powers.
However, if it has ad hoc relationships with these powers, this would be evi-
dence to suggest that India is not a status quo power and might be rather a
revisionist power.
In this chapter, we examine India’s relations with these European states.
While we recognize that the EU is not a state per se, we include the EU in
our analysis to make sure that we have accounted for economic cooperation
between India and the EU and its member states. The EU has authority to
sign its own treaties with other states and is thus considered to be an impor-
tant actor in international relations. It is important even though it does not

82
 Indo-­European Relations • 83

have its own military. We will first examine India’s relations with the EU as a
whole and then we will examine India’s relations with France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom.

Indo-­EU Relations

Prior to the end of the Cold War, India and the EU did not have much of a
relationship. With the end of the Cold War, both India and the EU began
intense cooperation. Much of the reason for this was that it was a chance to
open new markets and increase trade. The collapse of the Soviet Union
made it even more important that India develop new markets and new
trade relationships.
As the EU became more and more institutionalized and became a supra-
national organization, cooperation increased between the two countries.
However, the strategic partnership didn’t fulfill its full potential (Wülbers
2010). The EU seemed to be more concerned with issues involving its mem-
ber states than with truly creating a cooperative relationship with India.
The rise of China as a possible challenger to the global order created an
impetus for the EU to further develop relations with India. The EU recog-
nized that China’s economic power was quickly overtaking that of most of
the West and that the EU needed to balance China’s economic power
through new and deepening relationships with India (Goddeeris 2011; Jain
and Pandey 2019). China’s increased economic might made it imperative
that the EU work closely with India especially in the second decade of the
21st century ( Jain and Pandey 2019).
Even though the EU is an organization that has legal sovereignty and is able
to sign treaties, most of those treaties focus on economics rather than security.
The EU does not have its own security forces but leaves Europe’s security to
NATO and to the EU member states individually. Thus, it is not only impor-
tant to analyze the relationship between India and the EU but also to look at
the individual great powers in Europe and examine each of their relationships
with India. We first discuss India’s relations with the United Kingdom, and
then turn to India’s relations with France and Germany.

Indo-­UK Relations

One of the United States’ greatest allies in Europe is the United Kingdom.
There is a long history of relationship between the United States and the
84 • India as Kingmaker

United Kingdom. While initially the United States fought the United
Kingdom (then known as Great Britain) for independence, and again
fought against the United Kingdom in 1812, the relationship nevertheless
progressed. There was a shared history and language, and over time the rela-
tionship between the two states improved to the point that the United
Kingdom was one of the United States’ biggest supporters and best allies.
The United Kingdom has been wary of becoming too entangled in the
European continent. Despite joining the EU, the United Kingdom was wary
of becoming too reliant on Europe and did not appreciate the fact that the
EU wasn’t a supranational organization and some of the EU’s decisions were
a direct affront to British sovereignty. Instead, Britain forged closer ties with
the United States and was one of the first states to support the United States
after the terrorist attacks of September 11 and again when President George
W. Bush decided to invade Iraq. While many states in Europe were not sup-
portive of the invasion of Iraq, the United Kingdom was one of the stalwart
supporters and helped the war effort by sending military troops to Iraq to aid
the United States.
India and the United Kingdom have a long history. The United Kingdom
colonized India and it wasn’t until after World War II that India was able to
gain its independence from the UK. Because of the historical ties, it is con-
ceivable that India and the UK could have a long and positive cooperative
relationship. However, the history of colonialization also could hamper the
relationship between the two states. In this section, we examine the history
of the relationship between the two states and then later in the chapter ana-
lyze whether or not they have a cooperative relationship or an ad hoc
relationship.
As a former British colony, India shares much in common with the
United Kingdom including shared ties and common values. The British
influenced India’s democratic polity and shaped India’s political, economic,
and social institutions. India’s continued membership in the Commonwealth
is considered a token of its close association with Britain (Banerji 1977).
Nevertheless, historical associations aside, an analysis of substantive crite-
ria suggests that Indo-­British ties are not as close as they would seem from
examining the historical relationship. Today, India and the United Kingdom
share a strategic partnership. Their joint membership in the Commonwealth
has not translated into closer ties. Neither state has fully exploited the poten-
tial of the Commonwealth in realizing their domestic and foreign policy
goals (Eliott 2017). In 1947, India’s accession to the Commonwealth was
lauded because of what it would mean for the organization itself; the Com-
monwealth would be able to act as a representative for smaller developing
 Indo-­European Relations • 85

countries around the world that would not have a voice on the world stage
otherwise and, in terms of population, India represented a majority of the
Commonwealth’s citizens. For the British, the Commonwealth provided an
opportunity to continue to exert influence over and maintain close ties with
their former colonies, thus leading to enhanced prominence on the global
stage, which would be otherwise absent given their reduced economic and
military power in the post–­World War II period. While India remained a
part of the Commonwealth even after becoming a republic in 1949, it never
fully exploited the possibilities presented by the organization (Eliott 2017).
The Commonwealth also saw a diminishment in its situation in the British
political system when no preference was given to Commonwealth states in
terms of development aid provided by the Foreign Office (Eliott 2017).
Thus, while there was hope and scope for strong Indo-­British ties in the after-
math of India’s independence, due to various reasons it did not come to be.1
The level of trade between India and the UK remains quite low—­total bilat-
eral trade in 2018–­19 was valued at 9.3 billion.2

Indo-­French and Indo-­German Relations

India and France have a lot of mutual interests. First, both at times have
advocated for a more multilateral approach to the world order. They have
both been at times critical of the United States and its unilateral approach
to decision-­making. Moreover, both the French and the Indians are very
interested in scientific cooperation especially in the areas of space
exploration.
Both states have also cooperated in the area of defense. India is a very
strong market for defense products, and the French have been very eager to
deal with the Indians on this issue. Further, Indian and French scientists have
cooperated in nuclear energy and other important defense-­related indus-
tries. Trade between the two countries has increased tremendously over time.
In fact, France and India consider themselves to be strategic partners.
Similar to its relationship with France, India and Germany both claim to

1. For a detailed discussion of Indo-­British ties after 1947, see Banerji (1977) and The Ero-
sion of a Relationship: India and Britain since 1960 by Michael Lipton and John Firn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1975).
2. “India, UK Putting in Place Building Blocks for Trade Pact, Says UK High Commis-
sioner,” Hindu Business Line, January 30, 2020, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/ne​
ws/world/india-uk-putting-in-place-building-blocks-for-trade-pact-says-uk-high-commissio​
ner/article30694644.ece
86 • India as Kingmaker

have a very good relationship with each other. German and Indian relations
began in the early post–­World War II era when India was one of the first
states to recognize the Federal Republic of Germany. The leaders of both
states, Konrad Adenauer of Germany and Jawaharlal Nehru of India, were
both in very similar situations. Nehru needed to rebuild India after the long
era of colonialization, and needed to focus on industrialization. Adenauer
also needed to rebuild the Federal Republic of Germany following Germa-
ny’s defeat in World War II. Both leaders found that they could work together
rather easily to increase their cooperation (Rothermund 2010).
German companies have often found the Indian market to be lucrative
and important. In 1994, DaimlerChrysler opened up a branch in India and
called it Mercedes-­Benz India. Since that time, German companies have
cooperated with Indian engineers and Indian companies to expand their
reach in India. While India operates in a trade deficit with Germany, their
trade has increased tremendously through the 2000s (Khashimwo 2015).
We now turn to an analysis of each relationship using network analysis.

Analysis of Indo-­EU Relations

In terms of the relationship between India and the EU, there is some evi-
dence of institutionalized cooperation. For example, as figure 9 shows,
there are several issue areas that are addressed by the relationship. On the
top right-­hand side of figure 9 is a cluster of treaties that deal with space
exploration (see fig. 9). The cluster of treaties on the left-­hand side of figure
9 deal with technological innovation and trade. Because the EU mainly
focuses on economic issue areas, it is not a surprise that such a big cluster is
focused on technology and trade.
Although the first treaties between Europe and India were signed in 1971
(with the European Community, the predecessor of the EU), most of the
treaties were signed after the Treaty of Rome in the early to mid-­2000s. How-
ever, it is not until very recently that the relationship between India and the
EU qualifies as a cooperative relationship. As table 9 shows, only starting in
2019 is the relationship cooperative with a measure of 1.08. Prior to that,
there was cooperation but it was mainly ad hoc cooperation.
The two most central treaties determined by measuring treaty centrality
are the joint declaration between India and the European Union on the
Research and Innovation Center, which was signed in February 2012, and
the cooperation agreement between India and the European Community on
a partnership agreement that was focused on tariffs and trade. The partner-
ship agreement on tariffs and trade was signed in 1993.
 Indo-­European Relations • 87

Fig. 9. Indo-­EU Treaty Network

It is no surprise that most of the cooperation has to do with innovation

and trade between India and the EU. The EU has mainly focused on facilitat-
ing trade among the member states of the EU, and has looked to expand
European markets and trade overseas. What is a surprise, though, is that
there have only been a total of 25 treaties signed between the two entities.
Further, while some cooperation took place prior to the beginning of the
21st century, over 70 percent of the treaties signed between the EU and India
were signed in 2000 and beyond. In other words, India and the EU have
really begun to cooperate more fully after 2000, which was when China
began its tremendous economic growth.
Table 9 also shows that only 25 treaties have been signed between the EU
and India. This should not be a surprise, as Indo-­European cooperation takes
place not only with the EU but also with other EU member states. Specifi-
cally, Indo-­European cooperation takes place between India and the other
great powers in Europe. We now turn to analyzing the relationship between
India and the UK.

Analysis of Indo-­UK Relations

The relationship between India and the United Kingdom is a problematic

one in that it carries a lot of baggage of colonialism. On the one hand, it
would make sense to have a cooperative institutionalized relationship
88 • India as Kingmaker

Table 9. India-­EU Cooperation

Year Treaties Ties Cooperation Score
1950 —­ —­ 0
1960 —­ —­ 0
1970 —­ —­ 0
1980 4 3 .75
1990 5 4 .8
2000 8 6 .75
2010 23 20 .87
2019 25 27 1.08

between the two states because of their shared history and shared institu-
tions. On the other hand, the United Kingdom was a colonizer and ruled
India tightly, leading to resentment toward the United Kingdom by India.
Figure 10 illustrates the relationship between the two states by showing a
treaty map. It is evident by looking at this treaty map that the relationship
between the two states is very ad hoc and not institutionalized. There are
many different smaller areas of cooperation, but no large-­scale cooperation
or attempts at joining together and institutionalizing cooperation (see fig.
10). One of the most central treaties to that relationship can be seen on the
left-­hand side of figure 10. This is the Declaration between India and the UK
on Cooperation in Providing a Safer World. This declaration has to do with
terrorism and cooperation to combat terrorism.
A deeper exploration of the relationship between the two states shows
that the initial impressions given by the treaty map are accurate (see table
10). As table 10 shows, at no point in the relationship does it become coop-
erative. Instead, the relationship has always been ad hoc, and by 2019 it only
rates a .53 cooperation score. This is a little bit surprising as one would expect
a fair amount of cooperation between the two states. However, it is evident
that both states deal with issues as they come up rather than looking at a
relationship as being of strategic interest to both states, which would warrant
institutionalizing the relationship.
We find only seven instances in which a bilateral Indo-­British treaty is
nested within other bilateral Indo-­British bilateral treaties during the entire
period of study from 1947 to 2018. Also, we find 11 instances where a bilat-
eral Indo-­British treaty is nested within a multilateral convention including
the Convention on International Aviation, the United Nations Commission
on International Law, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373,
the Brahimi Report, the Bonn Agreement, the Kyoto Protocol, the United
 Indo-­European Relations • 89

Fig. 10. Indo-­UK Treaty Network

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Agreement

between the Government of India and the IAEA for the Application of Safe-
guards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities, the Statement of Civil Nuclear Coop-
eration with India, the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community, UN General Assembly Resolution of November 15, 2000, and
the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime.
None of the other treaties show any degree of nesting, indicating that
they were ad hoc agreements dealing with important issues, but not attempts
to institutionalize the relationship. As suggested by the network map (fig. 9),
most of the treaties in the Indo-­American dyad remain unlinked; the net-
work map is composed of various disjointed sections. This suggests that the
Indo-­American bilateral cooperation is taking place in an ad hoc manner.
States are not attempting to systematically link issues of cooperation to one
another. Given the low number of nested treaties, the cooperation score
between India and the United Kingdom reaches a high of .61 and is at .52 in
2018. Based on the methodology described earlier, a cooperation score less
than 1 suggests ad hoc cooperation between the two states.

Lodestone Treaties

The two lodestone treaties in this relationship are the New Delhi Declara-
tion India and United Kingdom Partnership for Better and Safer World
(listed as UKIND007 in fig. 9) and the MOU between India and the
90 • India as Kingmaker

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Co-­

Operation and the Exchange of Information for the Purposes of Combat-
ing International Criminality and Tackling Serious Organised Crime
(listed as UKIND033 in fig. 9).
The New Delhi Declaration India and United Kingdom Partnership for
Better and Safer World (listed as UKIND007 in fig. 9) was signed in 2002
and is nested within the following multilateral agreements: the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373,3 the Brahimi Report,4
the Bonn Agreement,5 and the Kyoto Protocol.6 The Delhi Declaration was
signed between Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Tony Blair to reaf-
firm the Indo-­British partnership and find new areas of cooperation between
the two countries. Signed in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in
America, the declaration condemns the attack and pledges the two states to
cooperate on counterterrorism measures, also invoking UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1373. It noted cooperation on setting up a sovereign regime in
Afghanistan, invoking the Bonn Agreement for establishing a democratic
government in Afghanistan. Other topics of cooperation noted in the decla-
ration include eliminating poverty, HIV/AIDS, sustainable development,
education, and science and technology; the UK agreed to enhance its overall
aid to India to tackle these issues. The agreement noted that bilateral trade
between the two countries had reached five million pounds in 2001, with
UK being India’s largest trading partner in Europe and the second largest in
the world. In addition to noting the rising trend of bilateral investments in
each other’s economies, the two countries pledged to enhance economic
cooperation to strengthen their friendship.
The MOU between India and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland Regarding Co-­Operation and the Exchange of Information
for the Purposes of Combating International Criminality and Tackling Seri-
ous Organised Crime (listed as UKIND033 in fig. 9) was signed in 2018
and is nested within the Agreement between the Government of India and
the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland concern-
ing the Investigation of the Proceeds and Instruments of Crime (34 in fig.
9), the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime,
and the UN General Assembly Resolution of November 15, 2000. This

3. https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf
4. Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peacekeeping, Aug 17, 2000.
5. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-­establishment
of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement), May 12, 2001, United Nations
Treaty Database.
6. http://kyotoprotocol.com/
 Indo-­European Relations • 91

Table 10. India-­UK Cooperation

Year Treaties Ties Cooperation Score
1950 —­ —­ 0
1960 2 1 .5
1970 3 1 .33
1980 3 1 .33
1990 3 1 .33
2000 8 2 .25
2010 21 13 .62
2019 36 19 .53

MOU deals with establishing a framework that helps to exchange informa-

tion such as criminal records, immigration records, and intelligence to aid
in combatting transnational crime. As demonstrated by the treaty network
map (fig. 9), both lodestone treaties are connected to each other. This sug-
gests that combatting international terrorism and organized crime is cru-
cial to both countries.
Similar to the relationship between India and the EU, India and the UK
really had very few attempts at cooperation until the early 2000s. After that,
they began to cooperate more. In fact, prior to 2000, only eight treaties had
been signed. This is a very small number, but seems very similar to the EU.
Although most of the treaties were signed after 2000, only 36 treaties were
signed. This is more than the number signed by the EU and India, but there
was less overall cooperation.
The Indo-­British bilateral treaty network suggests that the relationship is
rife with missed opportunities by both states. While there is much talk of a
strategic partnership and a “special relationship” between India and the
United Kingdom, few concrete steps have been taken by either country to
cement ties and institutionalize the relationship. In the absence of deeply
institutionalized ties, the interactions between the two countries remain ad
hoc; they sometimes achieve cooperation on issues that are significant to
both states, and more often miss the mark. For instance, India and the UK
have been discussing a free trade agreement for a long time; it may finally
become a reality in the post–­BREXIT scenario, but it has been a long time
in the making. Also, the United Kingdom has failed to capitalize on India’s
domestic market in the same way as China and other countries, in spite of
having a head start in this area. The United Kingdom has also failed to pen-
etrate India’s defense market in spite of having historical ties to the country.
The Commonwealth has failed to achieve the desired results in terms of
binding together the former colonies to the UK. While a member of the
92 • India as Kingmaker

Commonwealth, as well as a robust participant in the activities of the Com-

monwealth, India does not collaborate with the United Kingdom on its for-
eign policy; the goals of the two countries do not necessarily align in several
issue areas. The United Kingdom simply does not have the means to exercise
control over its formal colonies such as India.
The fact that the UK has not invested time and effort into creating nested
bilateral treaties with India has resulted in the lack of deeply institutionalized
ties with its former colony. Meanwhile, countries such as France have capital-
ized on the opportunity by forming a cooperative relationship with India. It
is puzzling that we find deeply institutionalized ties between India and
France and not between India and the United Kingdom. It is further puz-
zling that France has formed an extensive bilateral treaty network with India
and the two countries are cooperating over sectors such as railways and space
technology. Given its historical ties to India, as well as its advanced knowl-
edge of the Indian railway system, the United Kingdom can be presumed to
have a leading position in developing and updating India’s vast system of rail-
ways. A large proportion of this heavily populated country is dependent on
India’s sprawling and expanding system of rail transportation. Yet the United
Kingdom has failed to capitalize on this opportunity.
The implications of this are severe for the United Kingdom. By failing to
invest time, effort, and resources in maintaining close cooperation with one
of its largest and most lucrative former colonies, the United Kingdom lost
the opportunity to maintain influence over India and its foreign policy direc-
tion. Today, the United Kingdom is attempting to woo India given its eco-
nomic potential and the size of its domestic market, as well as its rising stat-
ure in the international arena. In an attempt to revive and reenergize their
current relationship, the United Kingdom is once again attempting to invoke
historical ties with India. However, it will be an uphill battle for the UK
given that there are few substantive areas with a strong base for cooperation
between the two countries.

Analysis of Indo-­French Relations

Contrary to the two cases that we have analyzed so far in this chapter,
there seems to be much more cooperation between India and France than
there has between either India and the UK or India and the EU (see fig.
11). As figure 11 shows, there are many fewer isolated nodes of coopera-
tion, and much more evidence of tying together the treaties through nest-
ing. In other words, there seems to be a much more deliberate attempt at
 Indo-­European Relations • 93

institutionalizing cooperation than there was in the other two cases we

have examined so far.
In figure 11 the size of the treaty node is set to degree of centrality. There
are two very obvious central treaties and both are in the top cluster of figure
11: INFRA055 and INFRA031. INFRA031 deals with safeguards and
management of nuclear energy, while INFRA055 deals with space and space
exploration. Even though both of these are distinct categories, they are both
linked to each other. Each of these central treaties were also nested within
major multilateral treaties. The multilateral treaties are listed by treaty name
rather than by treaty number. So it is very easy to see how the two types of
treaties are interconnected by looking at figure 11. For example, the Conven-
tion on the International Liability and Damages of Space Objects is a major
multilateral treaty that is tied to INFRA055.
Despite the fact that figure 11 shows a much more institutionalized form
of cooperation between India and France than there has been between either
India and the EU and India and the UK, when we look at table 11 we can see
that it isn’t until 2019 that India and France achieved an institutionalized
cooperative relationship. In this way, the relationship between the two states
unfolds in similar fashion to the other two that we have analyzed so far in
this chapter (see table 11). In fact, it is only after 2010 that there really is an
intense attempt to institutionalize cooperation. By 2010, the cooperation
score between the two states was only .55, whereas the cooperation score
jumped to 1.18 in 2019. The score of 1.18 between France and India is higher
than the cooperation score of 1.08 between India and the EU. Further, as
table 11 shows, almost half of the treaties between India and France were
signed during the decade following 2010. That is a tremendous number of
treaties, and it indicates the attempts by both states to institutionalize their
relationship because they really worked to link the new treaties to previous
treaties in the relationship as well as to other multilateral treaties.
In total, India and France signed 80 treaties. This is more than the num-
ber of treaties signed between India and the EU and India and the UK com-
bined. Sixty-­one treaties have been signed by both India and the EU and
India and the UK, whereas India and France have signed 80 treaties. The
number of treaties signed in addition to the number of ties and the level of
institutionalization of cooperation clearly shows the importance of France to
India and vice versa. The question, however, is whether the cooperation is
limited to issue areas in which both states have a vested interest, such as space
travel and nuclear energy, or if they have truly begun to develop a strategic
cooperative relationship. It may be too early to parse this out, as much of the
institutionalization has occurred in the last decade. However, the institu-
94 • India as Kingmaker

Fig. 11. Indo-­France Treaty Network

Table 11. India-­France Cooperation

Year Treaties Ties Cooperation Score
1950 1 1 1
1960 4 1 .25
1970 7 1 .14
1980 11 3 .27
1990 16 7 .44
2000 21 8 .38
2010 42 23 .55
2019 80 94 1.18

tionalization has overlapped with the era in which Chinese power has grown
tremendously and China has become a threat to other states in its region. In
other words, it is natural to question whether India is cooperating with
France to balance the power of China, which has been suggested by some of
the other scholars who have studied this relationship, or whether the two
states are really developing an institutionalized cooperation for their own
benefit. It is also possible that the answer to this question is some combina-
tion of the two.
Whichever the case, India and France have developed an institutional-
ized cooperative relationship that looks like it will continue into the future.
As energy needs increase and states move away from fossil fuels, nuclear
 Indo-­European Relations • 95

Fig. 12. Indo-­Germany Treaty Network

energy will become even more important. Similarly, space exploration and
resources from space such as iron from asteroids and other celestial materi-
als may become more important in the future. Thus, it looks as though
India and France will continue to cooperate and to institutionalize their
cooperation even further. We now turn to an examination of India’s rela-
tionship with Germany.

Analysis of Indo-­German Relations

Despite the fact that India and Germany have quite a few areas where they
could cooperate, figure 12 shows that they really have ad hoc cooperation
(see fig. 12). Several different nodes of treaties are tied together, but there is
no overarching structure to indicate institutionalization of the cooperative
relationship. Although there is some treaty nesting, it is clear that the rela-
tionship is not an institutionalized cooperative relationship.
One of the most central treaties of the relationship is seen on the right-­
hand side of figure 12 and is labeled INDGER 034. This is not even techni-
cally a treaty, but an MOU on the establishment of an Indo-­German tech-
nology center. This is related to industries such as the automobile industry. It
should be noted that the fact that India and Germany have an MOU as the
most central node in their cooperative relationship it is extremely important.
The most central node in a relationship should normally be a treaty since a
96 • India as Kingmaker

treaty is a legal agreement and is enforceable in international courts of arbi-

tration. An MOU, however, is not legally enforceable. That is not to say that
MOUs are not important. MOUs allow leaders and negotiators to state
information that is not legally binding, thus making the MOUs more accu-
rate and less rigid than treaties and official agreements. Thus, MOUs serve an
important function. They indicate the desires and thoughts behind specific
actions and often lay the groundwork for future cooperation. In fact, MOUs
often are negotiated as vigorously as treaties and agreements, with the biggest
difference being the legal binding of a specific treaty or agreement that the
MOU does not possess.
There are several other agreements that are also central to the relationship
but do not possess the amount of degree centrality that the MOU possesses.
Of all of the four cases discussed in this chapter, the Indo–­German relation-
ship is the only one to have an MOU with the highest measure of degree
centrality. Table 12 shows the cooperation scores for this relationship. It is
important to note that there have only been 39 treaties signed between India
and Germany. That’s more than were signed by India and the EU or India
and the UK. However, it is still much less than the number of treaties signed
by India and France.
Table 12 also shows that the relationship between India and Germany
never reaches the level required for institutionalized cooperation. In fact, the
cooperation score never even reaches .5. This means that India and Germany
really did not work on institutionalizing their relationship but focused on
specific issues of cooperation rather than building a cooperative relationship.
While Germany and India signed more treaties than either India and the EU
or India and the UK, the relationship between India and Germany still had
the lowest measure of cooperation (see table 13).
Table 13 shows all the cooperation scores of the European powers with
India over time. Only two of the relationships have achieved cooperative
relationships: India and the EU and India and France. The relationships
between India and the UK and between India and Germany failed to reach
the status of being an institutionalized cooperative relationship. Further, the
table shows that while the relationships between India and the EU and India
and France are institutionalized cooperative relationships, they only reached
the status of an institutionalized cooperative relationship by 2019. Prior to
that, all of the relationships were considered to be ad hoc. It seems that by
2019 an inflection point had been reached and that there was more of an
attempt to create a strategic relationship between India and the European
continent. However, the data are too recent to be able to make a strong deter-
mination as to either the future of the relationship or the strength of a strate-
gic alliance.
 Indo-­European Relations • 97

Table 12. India-­Germany Cooperation

Year Treaties Ties Cooperation Score
1950 1 0 0
1960 6 1 .17
1970 12 5 .42
1980 25 7 .28
1990 25 7 .28
2000 27 8 .30
2010 39 16 .41
2019 39 16 .41

Table 13. Cooperation Scores for India’s Relationship with European Powers
Year EU UK France Germany
1950 0 0 1 0
1960 0 .5 .25 .17
1970 0 .33 .14 .42
1980 .75 .33 .27 .28
1990 .80 .33 .44 .28
2000 .75 .25 .38 .30
2010 .87 .62 .55 .41
2019 1.08 .53 1.18 .41

If India is to be a status quo power, it really needs to have developed coop-

erative relationships and specifically institutionalized cooperative relation-
ships with the great powers in Europe. The reason for this is because the
European great powers are the biggest and most ardent allies of the United
States and the liberal order. In the international order, the most powerful
state and the global hegemon is the United States. Right below the United
States in the hierarchy of the international order are the European great pow-
ers. Thus, it is extremely important to determine India’s relationship with
these European states, which provides an important context for understand-
ing India’s place within the global order. Is India a status quo power or is it a
revisionist power? It is much too early in the analysis of this book to make a
final determination as to India’s position within the global order. However,
since India does not have an institutionalized cooperative relationship with
the United States, and it does not have long-­standing institutionalized rela-
tionships with most of the European powers, it is natural to be skeptical of
the idea that India is a status quo power. The fact that there is an institution-
alized level of cooperation with both the EU and France indicates that there
is a possibility that India could indeed become a status quo power. It cur-
98 • India as Kingmaker

rently is not. Instead, more analysis needs to be done to compare India’s rela-
tionship with the status quo powers to India’s relationship with the revision-
ist powers. In the next chapter, we will analyze India’s relationship with
Japan, which is the main ally of the United States in the Pacific region and a
great power in its own right. It is a regional power, and if there exists evidence
that India is trying to ally itself with the status quo powers to balance China’s
power in the region, then we should be able to see evidence of an institution-
alized cooperative relationship between Japan and India.
6 • Indo-­Japanese Relations

In 1945, the United States used two large atomic weapons to end World War
II. The atomic bombs that landed on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan not
only ended World War II, but drastically ushered in an atomic era. So many
people died in the blasts that warfare and the use of atomic weapons would
drastically change the world order.
Japan surrendered to the United States and as part of that agreement
agreed never to adopt an army or nuclear weapons. The United States in
return offered to maintain the peace and to protect the sovereignty of Japan
by protecting its security. In other words, while ensuring that the United
States would not have to face a resurgent Japan in the future, the United
States constrained itself from withdrawing from East Asia.
The United States invested heavily in the economy of Japan after the war.
While initially the Japanese economy had to be rebuilt from scratch, very
soon Japan became an economic powerhouse especially with new technol-
ogy and the automobile industry. Japan led much of the world in science and
technology and robotics. It could invest its revenues into the economy and
into building up its infrastructure rather than supporting the defense indus-
try, which was upheld by the United States.
The United States maintained its military presence in Japan and, follow-
ing the Korean War, also maintained a significant presence in South Korea.
The presence of US forces in East Asia assured that the US was heavily
invested in the region and would prevent a challenge to the global order from
emerging there. Specifically, the US military was concerned with isolating
both China and the Soviet Union.
The end of the Cold War meant that the US did not need such a heavy
military presence in East Asia. However, North Korea began pursuing
nuclear weapons and was constantly a threat to South Korea. Thus, while the
US did withdraw some forces, nevertheless it maintained an active presence
in the region.

99
100 • India as Kingmaker

Japan is a central piece of the United States’ strategy to maintain the

global order in East Asia. While Japan is not a traditional great power, never-
theless it is a strong ally of the United States, a regional economic power-
house, and an important piece to maintaining the US’s position of primacy
in the world. Thus, if India were to be a status quo power, it would need to
develop a cooperative relationship with Japan and work with Japan to limit
China’s growth and power. We now turn to an examination of the relation-
ship between India and Japan to see how cooperative their relationship is.

History of Indo-­Japanese Ties

While literature on the early history of the relationship between the India
and Japan is scarce, Aripta Mathur’s book India-­Japan Relations: Drivers,
Trends and Prospects is likely the best effort at detailing the historical rela-
tionship. Mathur (2012) explains that Japan and India first established con-
tact during the sixth century and that the spread of Buddhism was the com-
mon link that led to this meeting. As a common cultural characteristic, this
allowed the relationship between the states to grow and expand and in the
eighth century the first Indian Buddhist bishop was permanently placed in
Japan (Mathur 2012). Religion would remain the main point of contact
between the two states for the next millennia.
By the late 19th century, growing animosity between Western colonial
governments and their Asian subjects would further bind the two states
together. Throughout Asia, only Japan, Thailand, and Nepal escaped colo-
nial rule by Western powers. This resulted in growing unrest in the region,
culminating in the development of Pan-­Asianism or the idea of Asian nation-
alism (Mathur 2012). Pan-­Asianism developed in Japan in the latter part of
the 19th century as a counter to Western hegemony. Due to colonization by
Western powers, Japan became convinced that the only way to preserve
Asian cultures and nations was to present a united front against Western
encroachment. Stolte and Fischer-­Tiné (2012, 70) state that “Japan became
the forerunner of an alternative Asian modernity.” During this period, Indi-
ans created youth organizations in Japan where Asian nationalism was
espoused. Indians attempted to gain the support of Japan in its quest for
independence and the idea of an “Asian association of states” under the lead-
ership of Japan was first put forth and many members of the Indian National
Congress began to call for a unified India, China, and Japan (Stolte and
Fischer-­Tiné 2012, 12). Upset by the influence the Japanese were having on
 Indo-­Japanese Relations • 101

Indian youth, the British banned Indian students from visiting Japan with-
out British consent.
Relations between India and Japan remained solid even as Japan became
a colonial power in its own right and Indian nationalism began to grow in
the shadow of Japanese pan-­Asianism. India so looked to Japan as a role
model of nationalism that when the swadeshi movement, the precursor of
Modi’s “Make in India” campaign, aimed at freeing India from foreign goods,
was implemented in 1905, Japanese goods were exempted (India Today
2015). Mathur (2012, 6) states that “a prominent Indian newspaper Kesari
clearly called on people to choose Japanese goods over all other foreign man-
ufactured ones.” The Japanese victory over Russia in the Russo-­Japanese War
was seen as a model of how Asian states should deal with European coloniz-
ers (Mathur 2012). “Indian leaders like Gandhi, Nehru, Gopal Krishna
Gokhale and Bal Gangadhar Tilak were all unanimous in their jubilation
over Japanese victory” (Mathur 2012, 5). While the 1910 occupation of
Korea, the 21 demands made to China at the end of World War I, and later
the attack on Manchuria did put strains on the relationship due to Japan’s
increasing imperialism, trade and diplomacy between the two nations never
halted (Stolte and Fischer-­Tiné 2012). During this time frame, trade between
the two nations was high due to the Japanese spinning industries’ need for
cotton and India’s ability to produce the commodity. This was disrupted
briefly by the Sino-­Japanese War and, in 1934, a trade war between the two
states erupted due to Japanese import restrictions (Farley 1939). Regardless
of the tensions, the two states remained relatively close throughout World
War II even as Japan attacked India in the Battle of Kohima and Imphal in
which Indian nationalists and Japanese troops were defeated by British and
Royal Indian forces (Mathur 2012). The ties between India and Japan were
most lavishly expressed in 1946 during the International Military Tribunals
for the Far East when Indian judge Radha Binod Pal became the only one of
11 Allied justices to find Japan’s military leaders not guilty of war crimes
(Onishi 2007). The significance of this to the Japanese people cannot be
underestimated as a monument was erected in Japan to the judge in 2005.
Additionally, in 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe addressed the Indian con-
gress stating that “Justice Pal is highly respected even today by many Japanese
for the noble spirit of courage he exhibited during the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East” (Onishi 2007, 4).
During the Cold War, Japan and India’s relationship was tense at times as
India tilted toward the Soviet Union and Japan toward the United States.
Additionally, Japan was upset with Indian proliferation and nuclear tests in
102 • India as Kingmaker

1974 due to its natural antinuclear status (Mathur 2012). However, not all
was dark for the two states during this time. Japanese money and technology
began to pour into India in the 1980s as Suzuki Motor Company partnered
with Indian carmaker Maruti to form Maruti Suzuki India, which built
plants and manufactured the Maruti 800 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan
2018). The car became known as the car that changed India due to the fact
that it was affordable, reliable, and for the first time Indians could travel long
distances quickly and efficiently (Kalavalapalli, Raj, and Shah 2014). This
was one bright point in an otherwise lackluster period in Indian-­Japanese
relations. Following the Cold War, the 1990s were actually worse with Japan
cutting off all aid to India in 1998 due to Indian nuclear tests and demanding
that India join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Chengappa 2000).
Regardless, the 21st century would usher in a new age in Indo-­Japanese rela-
tions as Chinese hegemony in the region began to become a greater threat.

Modern Indo-­Japanese Relations

Beginning in 2000, coinciding with the rapid rise to power in China, a new
relationship between India and Japan blossomed as Japanese prime minis-
ter Yoshiro Mori visited India where the Japan-­India Global Partnership
was signed. This was an all-­inclusive economic and security partnership
that aimed to encourage security, stability, and prosperity in Asia. For the
first time Japan used the term “Global Partnership” in relation to any state
other than the United States (Ghosh 2008). One important event in 2000
that marked growing military cooperation between India and Japan was the
visit of Indian defense minister George Fernandes, the first visit by an
Indian defense minister to Japan in the nation’s history (Ghosh 2008). This
showed a new military component to Indian-­Japanese relations. That same
year, the Indian and Japanese coast guards conducted joint exercises and
command exchanges and, in 2002, India and the United States began the
annual Malabar naval exercises, where Japan has become a regular partici-
pant (Lynch 2017). In 2006 and 2007, the global partnership was expanded
to further encompass defense and cover new areas such as nuclear energy
and was upgraded to strategic partnership (Ghosh 2008). It was during this
time that the two nations decided to hold annual defense meetings. While
naval exercises have become routine over the past two decades, in 2018,
India and Japan launched joint land exercises for the first time, ushering in
a new era of Indo-­Japanese military relations. Indian colonel Aman Anand
stated that the exercises were “yet another step in deepening strategic ties
 Indo-­Japanese Relations • 103

including closer defense cooperation between the two countries” (Panda

2018, 6). More recently, India and Japan have decided to hold a two plus
two dialogue between their defense and foreign ministers. The growing
special relationship between India and Japan is being driven by a number of
factors including the desire to build an Asian strategic framework that can
balance the rise of China (Basu 2014; Brewster 2010; Mukherjee 2018;
Narayanan 2016; Panda 2012, 2014; Paul 2012; Yoshimatsu 2019; Rajago-
palan 2020). The creation of strategic partnerships and security coopera-
tion shows that India and Japan are balancing against China as China con-
tinues to grow as a hegemonic force in the region (Chadha 2020). This
becomes further evident through a comprehensive look at the treaties that
have been signed by India and Japan since the end of World War II.
Despite the strategic importance of balancing Chinese regional power,
India and Japan have nevertheless formed a special relationship that is not
only designed to balance Chinese power but is an important strategic alli-
ance that benefits both states regionally and economically (Baruah 2016).
While President Obama promised a pivot to Asia, the Trump administration
reached out to improve relations with North Korea, started a trade war with
China, and began withdrawing from its alliance with Japan. Thus, the rela-
tionship between India and Japan is even more important if they seek to bal-
ance the power of China. They can no longer rely only on the United States,
but must work together to ensure regional security.
We now turn to an analysis of the relationship between India and Japan
to determine if their cooperation is institutionalized or ad hoc. We conduct
a systematic analysis of all bilateral treaties between India and Japan between
1947 and 2018. The two countries have signed a total of 79 bilateral treaties
during this time period.1 To provide some context, India has signed 168
bilateral treaties with its close ally Russia, 163 treaties with China, and 58
with the United States in the same period. Thus, the total number of treaties
between India and Japan is not an anomaly in either direction. We limit our
analysis to all bilateral treaties signed between India and Japan. Multilateral
treaties are included in the network map (fig. 13)2 only when they are explic-
itly referenced by a bilateral agreement, that is, when a bilateral treaty is
nested within it.
Table 14 provides a comparison of the levels of cooperation based on
1. The first bilateral treaty between India and Japan was not signed until 1952, the Treaty
of Peace Between India and Japan.
2. The node sizes in figure 13 are set according to degree centrality. Thus, the larger the
treaty node, the more central the treaty is to the bilateral relationship. These treaties are the
lodestone treaties of the relationship.
104 • India as Kingmaker

Table 14. Indo-­Japanese Cooperation Issue Areas

Issue Category Number of Treaties
Agricultural Cooperation 2
Aid 1
Air Services 1
Biodiversity 1
Cooperation 14
Commerce 2
Climate Change 1
Communication 2
Culture 2
Economic and Technical Assistance 7
Education 4
Energy 10
Investment 1
Health Care Cooperation 3
Law 1
Olympic Cooperation 1
Railways 1
Security Cooperation 1
Science and Technology 8
Social Security 1
Space Cooperation 2
Tourism 1
Taxation 5
Trade 2
World War II Ending 1

treaties between India and Japan. As in any bilateral relationship, the Indo-­
Japanese relationship starts with a score of 0, which suggests the absence of
any cooperation. However, over the next few decades, the total ties/total
treaties score quickly jumps, finally crossing the threshold of 1 in 2018. As
explained above, states with a ties/treaty score of less than 1 are considered to
demonstrate ad hoc cooperation and states with a ties/treaty score greater
than 1 are considered to demonstrate institutionalized cooperation. Interest-
ingly, India and Japan have entered a phase of institutionalized cooperation.

Indo-­Japan Treaty Network

Figure 13 provides a network map of all Indo-­Japanese treaties. Each treaty

is represented as a node on the network map. When one treaty is nested
 Indo-­Japanese Relations • 105

Fig. 13. Indo-­Japan Treaty Network

within another treaty, the connection between the two treaties is repre-
sented by an arrow linking the two treaties. The higher the number of trea-
ties nested within a treaty, the larger the size of the node representing that
treaty. As depicted in the network map, there is a high density of nesting
within the Indo-­Japanese treaty network. There are also several large nodes;
these are the lodestone nodes that are most significant to the relationship.
Table 14 provides information on the category of issues over which the two
states have negotiated agreements. Table 15 provides information on the
cooperation score (the total number of ties/total number of treaties) for the
Indo-­Japanese dyad. Table 15 also provides information on the number of
bilateral treaties formed in each decade.

Lodestone Treaties

Below we discuss the lodestone treaties in the relationship. The lodestone trea-
ties are calculated using the degree centrality measure. Each lodestone treaty is
also prominently depicted in the network map presented in figure 13.
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between India and Japan
(Treaty Number INDJPN36 in fig. 13): This treaty signed by the two coun-
tries in 2011 seeks to “promote trade and investment through the establish-
ment of clear and mutually advantageous rules as well as regulatory coopera-
106 • India as Kingmaker

Table 15. Indo-­Japanese Cooperation Score

Year Cooperation Score Number of Treaties
1950s .25 4
1960s .273 7
1970s .273 0
1980s .231 2
1990s .231 0
2000s .846 13
2010s 1.10 53
2018 1.10 79

tion.” This economic partnership agreement was designed to deal with new
challenges and opportunities resulting from globalization, provide access to
new markets, contribute to expanding trade and investment, and enhance
the mutual ties between India and Japan. It also reiterated the commitment
of both states to economic liberalization and sustainable economic develop-
ment, social development, and environmental protection. Fourteen subse-
quent treaties are nested within this agreement, making it the most central to
the bilateral relationship. This also suggests that economic cooperation
remains the pillar of Indo-­Japanese cooperation.
Joint Statement between India and Japan on the Occasion of the Fourth
Meeting of the Japan India Energy Dialogue (Treaty Number INDJPN24 in
fig. 13): This joint statement between the diplomats of India and Japan “rec-
ognized the need to facilitate cooperation between the industries of the two
countries in order to expand bilateral energy cooperation on a commercial
basis” and secured cooperation in the sectors of energy conservation, coal
and electricity, renewable energy, and oil and natural gas. The 2010 state-
ment also established a working group to facilitate cooperation in nuclear
energy, recognizing the importance of nuclear energy in meeting the energy
demands of both countries. Thirteen subsequent bilateral treaties are nested
within this agreement, suggesting that (nuclear) energy cooperation is one of
the primary areas of cooperation between India and Japan.
Joint Statement by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and Prime Minis-
ter Dr. Yukio Hatoyama on New Stage of India-­Japan Strategic and Global Part-
nership (Treaty Number INDJPN22 in fig. 13): This agreement signed in
2009 is also a joint statement by the prime ministers of both countries, reiterat-
ing the India-­Japan global and strategic partnership. This agreement expressed
the importance of Japanese official development assistance toward poverty
eradication, infrastructure development, tacking environmental concerns, and
 Indo-­Japanese Relations • 107

human resource development in India. Several individual projects covering a

wide range of industries were listed within the document.
Joint Statement Vision for India Japan Strategic and Global Partnership in
the Next Decade (Treaty Number INDJPN32 in fig. 13): This joint state-
ment concluded the negotiation of an India Japan Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement aimed at boosting trade and investment between the
two countries. The statement also discusses cooperation on nuclear energy;
Japan’s investment in boosting India’s infrastructure, including smart cities;
and common challenges such as terrorism. The two leaders also discussed
cultural linkages and academic people-­to-­people exchanges between India
and Japan. They reaffirmed their commitment to the East Asia Summit as
well as to ensuring Afghanistan’s transition to a stable, democratic state. They
also reaffirmed their resolve to address UN reforms, climate change negotia-
tions, and the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.
India and Japan Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership
Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo Pacific Region and the
World (INDJPN61 in fig. 13): This 2015 agreement seeks to transform the
Indo-­Japanese strategic and global partnership into a deep, broad, and
action-­oriented partnership, with an emphasis on economic cooperation,
infrastructure development, and sustainable development. A large number
of issues were recognized as avenues for cooperation including transfer of
defense technology from Japan to India, US-­Japan-­India trilateral talks, and
India’s participation in US Malabar naval exercises, which would provide
additional capabilities to address challenges in the Indo-­Pacific region. In
addition to security led cooperation, the agreement also reiterated that the
two countries shared values and common cultural traditions including Bud-
dhism and the “ideals of democracy, tolerance, pluralism and open society.”
The two leaders also reiterated their commitment to a “peaceful, open, equi-
table, stable, and rule-­based order in the Indo-­Pacific region and beyond.”
Issues such as terrorism, reform of the United Nations, and strengthening
regional institutions received special mention within the document, seeking
to showcase their priorities.
Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partner-
ship between India and Japan (Treaty Number INDJPN20 in fig. 13): This
joint statement also addresses a number of issues that are salient for both
states including cooperation in the economic, security, academic, and cul-
tural sectors.
Agreement between India and Japan for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy (Treaty Number INDJPN71 in fig. 13): This agreement sets
out the conditions under which both states will cooperate in the develop-
108 • India as Kingmaker

ment and use of peaceful nuclear energy including the exchange of scientific
information, supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology, and the
provision of services on matters related to design, construction, support of
operation, maintenance of material/equipment within the scope of the
agreement.

Analysis and Implications

Based on the information provided in table 14, India and Japan cooperate
over a wide range of issues. The issues most central to their bilateral rela-
tionship are economic cooperation including trade and investment, energy
cooperation including nuclear energy, scientific and technological exchange,
and a desire to balance against the rise of China. In addition to this, the two
states also cooperate on issue such as health care, education, environment,
transportation and communication, and outer space exploration. The net-
work map (fig. 13) suggests that there are various subnetworks significant
to the relationship: economic cooperation, nuclear energy cooperation,
and strategic cooperation that spell out their joint vision of a peaceful and
prosperous Asia.
As described above, while the two states have always sought to cooperate
with each other, their treaty patterns witnessed a large increase after 2010 (as
described in table 14). In fact, a majority of the treaties in this bilateral rela-
tionship (53) were negotiated and have entered into force between 2010 and
the present. This suggests that the pace of cooperation between India and
Japan has dramatically increased in the past decade, which also witnessed the
rise of China as a global power. China’s policies and actions in the South
China Sea have also become more aggressive in this time period. China’s Belt
and Road Initiative seeks to connect old trade routes between Asia, the Mid-
dle East, and Europe. However, infrastructure projects related to this initia-
tive are seen as a form of extending China’s influence and control over a large
part of the continent and beyond. This has naturally united India and Japan
and brought them closer together to balance the rise of Chinese hegemony
in Asia as well as globally. Both states seek a multipolar system and prefer a
multilateral approach to addressing regional and global concerns. As demo-
cratic states, India and Japan seek to build a rules-­based system in Asia as well
as to strengthen regional institutions that can set standards for behavior,
monitor compliance to mutually agreed upon rules, arbitrate and settle dis-
putes between states and other parties, enable and encourage trade and
investment, and strengthen overall cooperation between states in the region
 Indo-­Japanese Relations • 109

(India and Japan Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership Work-
ing Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo Pacific Region and the World,
2015). Many of the lodestone treaties in this relationship are focused on eco-
nomic ties including trade, investment, aid, and collaboration on infrastruc-
ture projects. India and Japan cooperate over a range of issues. Thus, while
balancing the rise of China has served as a catalyst in enhancing Indo-­
Japanese cooperation, their ties are not limited to containing the rise of Chi-
nese hegemony and aggression in the region. As discussed above in their
joint statement, both states seek to advance the status of the region, resulting
in an Asia first strategy. Since treaties serve as signals of a state’s intention
toward other states in the international system as well as their foreign policy
preferences, both India and Japan have avoided overtly mentioning China as
an aggressor or rival in their joint statements.

Conclusion

An in-­depth analysis of the Indo-­Japanese treaties provides insights on the

nature as well as the future of this relationship. India and Japan have been
natural allies and friends given the similarity in their political systems, their
shared cultural linkages in the form of Buddhism, and the potential for eco-
nomic exchange given the complementary nature of their markets. More
recently, they have a common desire to prevent China’s aggressive actions
and policies in the Indo-­Pacific region. The two states have forged close ties
by creating opportunities for cooperation over a wide range of issues. The
issues most central to their efforts at cooperation are economic interactions
including trade and investment, scientific and technological cooperation,
and energy cooperation (including nuclear energy). In addition to treaty
formation, India and Japan have created a number of opportunities for
cooperation, such as elevating their bilateral relationship to the level of a
strategic and global partnership, including summit level meetings annually
and cooperating via Asian regional institutions such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). India and Japan do not overtly men-
tion balancing the rise of China as their primary goal in any of their bilat-
eral treaties. However, as noted above, the India and Japan Vision 2025
Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and
Prosperity of the Indo Pacific Region and the World clearly outlines their
vision for a “peaceful, open, equitable, stable and rule-­based order in the
Indo-­Pacific region and beyond.” Although India’s nonaligned policy has
prevented it from forming a security alliance with Japan, both states are
110 • India as Kingmaker

continuing to bolster security cooperation by conducting a number of joint

military exercises that also include additional states such as the United
States and Australia. Thus, India and Japan have walked a fine line in signal-
ing their intentions to cooperate and balance the rise of China without any
overt threats or aggression toward China. They have invested in a multitude
of areas to ensure that they are prepared to contain Chinese aggression in
the region.
Part 3 • India’s Relationship with
Revisionist Powers
7 • Indo-­Russian Relations

An Overview of the Relationship

Despite massive losses, the Soviet Union was one of only two states that
were powerful enough to survive World War II as a great power. While the
Soviet Union and the United States had been allies during World War II,
once the conflict ended, a new era of competition emerged between the
two distinct ideologies. On the one hand, the United States believed in lib-
eralism and capitalism. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, believed in
communism. Both of those ideologies were in direct conflict and created an
ideological battlefield where the two states competed for superiority.
The invention of the atomic bomb by the United States heralded a new
age where conventional war gave way to the possibility of nuclear holocaust.
The Soviet Union was quick to recognize the power of the atomic bomb and
worked to create its own nuclear program. While the United States was tech-
nically more powerful than the Soviet Union, nevertheless the Red Army
had captured a large part of Eastern Europe and had numerical superiority
over American troops stationed in Europe.
This Cold War era, as it came to be known, was bipolar. Both the Soviet
Union and the United States did not fight each other directly, but via proxy
wars between their allies. For example, the Soviet Union supported the
North Vietnamese and the United States fought with the South Vietnamese
in the Vietnam War. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the United States supported
the Mujahedeen, which actively fought against the Soviet Union.
During the Cold War, Europe was essentially partitioned between the
United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union controlled much of
Eastern Europe, establishing puppet governments that also served as buffer
states from future potential attacks from the West. The Soviet Union also
controlled East Germany and East Berlin. The United States and its allies
remained in Western Europe, with Germany being partitioned between East
and West. The Soviet Union established the Warsaw Pact as a collective secu-

113
114 • India as Kingmaker

rity organization to ensure the security of the Soviet Union and its allies in
Europe. The United States and its allies established NATO. Both organiza-
tions were responsible for protecting their member states from attack by the
other organizations’ member states.
In the rest of the world, the Soviet Union and the United States com-
peted for influence among the other powers. For example, in East Asia, Japan
allied itself with the United States while China initially allied itself with the
Soviet Union. Similarly, in South Asia, India was closer to the Soviet Union
while Pakistan allied itself with the United States. Despite the fact that India
officially remained nonaligned, for all intents and purposes it maintained
close ties with the Soviet Union.
The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed a reset to occur in India’s for-
eign policy. It could build a new relationship with both Russia and the
United States. Russia, as the successor state to the Soviet Union, agreed to
abide by all of the previous treaties signed by the Soviet Union. However,
Moscow also realized that it needed to develop a new relationship with New
Delhi that was less ideologically driven and geared more toward mutual
cooperation.
Despite the fact that Russia was a much weaker state than the Soviet
Union had been, Russia still inherited nuclear weapons as well as a very pow-
erful defense industry from the Soviet Union. Russia also developed exper-
tise in space exploration including its involvement in the International Space
Station. Thus, there were avenues of cooperation between Moscow and New
Delhi. However, New Delhi also had traded with the United States during
the Cold War and wanted to improve its relations with the United States in
the post–­Cold War era.
In this chapter, we first examine the relationship between Moscow and
New Delhi, taking into account the historical relationship between both
states. We then turn to analysis of the relationship through the use of treaty
networks to determine the quality of the relationship between the two states
and more specifically whether or not the two states have an institutionalized
relationship. If India is a status quo power, we would expect there to be ad
hoc cooperation between India and Russia. In contrast, if India is a revision-
ist power, we should see evidence of institutionalized cooperation between
the two states.

Indo-­Russian Ties

India and Russia have developed a special and privileged partnership. In

2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin bestowed the highest state decora-
 Indo-­Russian Relations • 115

tion of Russia—­the Order of St Andrew the Apostle—­on Indian prime

minister Narendra Modi for “his distinguished contribution to the devel-
opment of a privileged strategic partnership between Russia and India and
friendly ties between the Russian and Indian people” (Dipanjan 2019).
Indo-­Russian ties have been very close since the start of the bilateral rela-
tionship.1 While remaining nonaligned, India maintained close ties with the
Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. While it was leaning toward the
Soviets, India also accepted aid from and conducted trade with the United
States as well as with European powers. In 1971, India and the Soviet Union
signed a Treaty of Friendship that further enhanced their relationship.
Russia has been India’s largest arms supplier and has also provided India
with much-­needed support on the global stage on sensitive issues such as
Kashmiri independence and India’s decision to become a nuclear weapons
state. Not only did Russia not condemn India’s actions in the above situa-
tions but also blocked UN Security Council resolutions aimed against India,
which were often initiated by the United States and supported by France and
the United Kingdom.2 As a result, the Soviet Union/Russia has proven to be
a long-­term reliable ally to India. More recently, Russia has supported India’s
abrogation of Article 370 of its constitution, thus revoking the special auton-
omy status of Jammu and Kashmir. India also suspended the statehood of
Jammu and Kashmir and instituted a communications blackout to prevent
riots, backlash, and violence in the region. While these actions were severely
condemned by countries around the world, Russia has remained supportive
of India’s domestic policy. Russia has also expressed support for India’s asser-
tion that the dispute over Kashmir should be handled bilaterally between
India and Pakistan without the interference of external actors. India has also
refused to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine or participate in interna-
tional sanctions against the country. The two states have rarely criticized each
other’s policies in public, thus providing each other unequivocal support on
the global stage. In 2000, India and Russia elevated their relationship to a
strategic partnership and have continued to hold annual bilateral summit-­
level meetings between the leaders of the two states.3
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, India contributed to the
revival of the Russian defense industry by continuing to purchase heavy mili-
tary equipment from Russian firms. Russia provided India with sensitive and

1. For a detailed account of Indo-­Russian ties through history, see Budhwar (2007) and
Kundu (2008).
2. Dipanjan (2019).
3. Declaration of Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Russian
Federation, October 3, 2000. India Bilateral Treaties and Agreements. Retrieved from Minis-
try of External Affairs India: https://mea.gov.in/TreatyList.htm?1
116 • India as Kingmaker

advanced equipment that the United States and other countries were unwill-
ing to provide. Russia has helped India acquire nuclear-­propelled submarines
and a military aircraft carrier; it has also provided assistance in building the
Brahmos supersonic anti-­ship and land attack missile.4
While India has diversified its arms procurement system by also purchas-
ing from the United States, France, and Israel, a majority of India’s defense
systems remain Russian based. The path dependency generated due to the
heavy investment that India has already made in Russian-­based defense sys-
tems suggests that India is unlikely to abandon existing systems and change
to American-­based defense systems in the near future. India seeks to con-
tinue to import the latest military technology from Russia since the United
States has been unwilling to share sensitive technology or to provide certain
types of advanced weapons to India.5 It is worth noting that a majority of the
defense systems of Pakistan (which remains India’s top rival) are American
manufactured. It is therefore also unlikely that the United States will be shar-
ing the same equipment and technology with India. India and Russia have
also formed agreements to undertake the joint production of military equip-
ment, in support of the “Make in India” campaign.
India and Russia have been involved in several joint military exercises as
well: the tri-­services exercise INDRA and Russia’s Tsentr military exercises
(which India was first invited to in 2019) are annual exercises in the Indo-­
Pacific.6 The two countries have attempted to enhance cultural ties including
joint educational programs, student exchanges, and language skills.7
India and Russia continue to cooperate in multilateral forums including
the UN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the BRICS, the Russia-­
India-­China informal grouping, and so forth. The two sides have held annual
summit-­level meetings that have alternated between India and Russia start-
ing in 2000. In addition to joint annual summits, leaders of the two countries
often hold summit-­level meetings on the sidelines of other global forums
such as the G-­20 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.8
4. India Russia Relations, Ministry of External Affairs, http://mea.gov.in/Portal/Foreign-
Relation/India_Russia_May.pdf
5. Cara Abercrombie, “Removing Barriers to US-­ India Defense Trade,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, January 10, 2018. https://carnegieendowment
.org/2018/01/10/removing-barriers-to-u.s.-india-defense-trade-pub-75206
6. Press Information Bureau, “Curtain Raiser—­Ex Tsentr 2019,” https://pib.gov.in/Press-
ReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1584258 (accessed November 9, 2019).
7. Ministry of External Affairs, “Indian Students Studying in Foreign Countries,” https://​
data.gov.in/resources/country-wise-indian-students-studying-abroad-december-2020-minist​
ry-external-affairs (accessed March 10, 2022).
8. “India-­Russia Relations,” May 2017, http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_
Russia_May.pdf
 Indo-­Russian Relations • 117

The biggest impediment to stronger ties between India and Russia is their
lack of meaningful trade outside of the defense sector.9 Indo-­Russian trade
remains at around 1 percent of their overall trade.10 Total bilateral trade
between India and Russia in 2016 amounted to US$ 7.71billion (this was a
decline of 1.5% from 2015). Total bilateral trade is 2017 was US$10.17 bil-
lion; in 2018 it was US$11 billion.11 India-­Russia trade, while low, has
remained consistent. In September 2019, the leaders of the two countries
pledged to triple bilateral trade to US$30 billion by 2025.12 While both
countries have repeatedly discussed and attempted to increase trade in non-
defense areas, it has not materialized. However, the two states have increased
investment in each other’s economy. Russia has invited India to invest in the
Russian Far East (RFE); Indian delegations comprising business associations
and politicians have identified diamond cutting, petrochemicals, wood pro-
cessing, and tourism as potential areas of interest for Indian investment in
the RFE.13 Energy is also a key area of economic cooperation between the
two countries. Mutual investments between India and Russia are at approxi-
mately $11 billion currently, with both sides promising to increase invest-
ments to $30–­$50 billion by 2025 (Volodin 2017). Heavy sanctions placed
on Russia by the West in the aftermath of the 2015 Ukraine crisis may fur-
ther enhance India’s value as a market for Russian products and as a destina-
tion for Russian investments. Prime Minister Modi’s “Make in India” initia-
tive will provide additional opportunities for Russian industries to invest in
Indian economy sectors such as civil aviation, defense equipment, and rail-
ways (Volodin 2017).
Both India and Russia are wary of the emergence of a bipolar global order
led by the United States and China, which would reduce the space for strate-
gic maneuverability for both countries. Thus, it is crucial for the leaders of
both countries to reinvent and reinvigorate the Indo-­Russian relationship
(Kaura 2019). India is also concerned about the growing closeness between
Russia and China. However, many scholars argue that the Russian-­Chinese
relationship is an alliance of convenience (Kaura 2019). In the realm of eco-
9. Nivedita Kapoor, “India-­Russia Relations: Beyond Energy and Defence,” Observer
Research Foundation Issue Brief No. 327, December 2019.
10. Russia Direct, “How to Take Russia-­India Economic Ties to the Next Level,” https://
russia-direct.org/opinion/how-take-russia-india-economic-ties-next-level (accessed October
25, 2019).
11. Nivedita Kapoor 2019.
12. Sudha Ramachandran, “What’s India Doing in Russia’s Far East,” Diplomat, October
19, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/whats-india-doing-in-russias-far-east/
13. Ministry of External Affairs, “Visit of Deputy Prime Minister of Russia to India,”
https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31453/visit+of+deputy+ (accessed September
26, 2019).
118 • India as Kingmaker

nomic power, multiple poles of power have emerged with the balance of
power system back in place. We see India and Russia engaging in economic
cooperation, both to balance the United States and China and to prevent
any one state becoming the hegemonic power (Volodin 2017).
Russia’s ties with the West have severely deteriorated since Russia’s annex-
ation of Crimea in 2014. While the EU remains one of Russia’s largest trad-
ing partners, heavy American sanctions as well as falling oil prices have stag-
nated the Russian economy and its ability to wield influence in Eastern
Europe, Central Asia, and beyond. Russia has increasingly turned to China
as a source of investment in the far eastern part of the country and has
become its top oil supplier. However, given the power imbalance between
Russia and China, Russia has increased its bilateral cooperation with India
for two crucial reasons. First, India serves to counterbalance China’s power
and dominance in Asia.14 Second, given the background of American sanc-
tions, Russia wants to solidify ties with eastern middle powers such as China
and India to avoid economic and political isolation and to attempt to revise
the global economic order.
India’s interest in the Russian Far East is driven partially by economic
interests and partially by strategic interests. In addition to enhancing India’s
role in RFE development, the two countries are also exploring the viability
and efficiency of the Chennai-­Vladivostok sea route, which will halve the
time and distance to Russia compared to the Suez Canal route through
Europe.15 Such a route would also increase India’s presence in the Chinese-­
dominated South China Sea and counter China’s efforts to build the Belt
and Road Initiative. Currently, China accounts for two-­thirds of the invest-
ment in the RFE while India has extended a $1 billion line of credit for
development in the RFE.16

14. Roy Chaudhary Dipanjan, “Russia Seeks to Balance China in Far East; Woos Indian
Investments,” Economic Times, July 24, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/
defence/russia-seeks-to-balance-china-in-far-east-woos-indian-investments/article-
show/70366045.cms?from=mdr
15. “Translation of Prime Minister’s Speech in Plenary Session of 5th Eastern Economic
Forum,” September 5, 2019, https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31798/Transl​
ation_of_Prime_Ministers_speech_in_Plenary_Session_of_5th_Eastern_Economic_For​
um_September_05_2019
16. Roy Chaudhary Dipanjan, “Russia Seeks to Balance China in Far East; Woos Indian
Investments,” Economic Times, July 24, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/
defence/russia-seeks-to-balance-china-in-far-east-woos-indian-investments/article-
show/70366045.cms?from=mdr
 Indo-­Russian Relations • 119

Disagreements in the Relationship

The growing cooperation and the formation of a strategic partnership

between India and the United States has the potential to destabilize Indo-­
Russian ties but so far that has not happened. The United States has also
become a major arms supplier to India, and threatens to replace Russia as
India’s largest defense supplier. In this chapter, we argue that Indo-­Russian
ties are deeply institutionalized and unlikely to be altered in the near future.
However, in retaliation for India’s growing cooperation with the United
States, Russia has lifted an arms embargo over Pakistan and has chosen to
enter into a defense trade with Pakistan.17 Russia and Pakistan have also
engaged in joint military exercises. India protested against the growing
closeness between Russia and Pakistan and expressed its discontent at Rus-
sia sharing the same class of weapons with Pakistan that had also been sold
to India, thus undermining India’s military advantage over Pakistan.18 In
response to this, Russia scaled back its defense trade with Pakistan.19 How-
ever, Russia continues to supply arms to both Pakistan and China, which
remain India’s largest rivals.
The Russia-­China relationship is growing increasingly cooperative. The
two countries have engaged in joint military exercises including the first ever
joint air patrol of the South China Sea.20 Russia is also providing China with
modern weaponry. Hence it remains in India’s best interest to maintain close
ties with Russia and continue to collaborate with Russia on defense-­related
matters so as to balance China’s military advantage.
In this chapter, we analyze Indo-­Russian ties by studying the pattern of
bilateral treaty formation between the two countries. We first study the type
and number of treaties concluded between the two countries. Next, we study
patterns of treaty nesting or ties between individual treaties that link them to
one another. Then we present information on lodestone treaties that are cru-
cial to the relationship. And we analyze the findings and their implications
17. Iwanek Kryzstof, “Russia’s Looming Arms Sale to Pakistan Sets Up a Dangerous
Game,” The Diplomat, May 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/russias-looming-arms-
sale-to-pakistan-sets-up-a-dangerous-game/
18. Kryzstof, “Russia’s Looming Arms Sale to Pakistan Sets Up a Dangerous Game.”
19. Snehesh Alex Phillip, “Russia Rejects Pakistan Request for 50,000 AK Rifles, Assures
India of No Deals in Future,” Print, July 17, 2019, https://theprint.in/defence/russia-rejects-
pakistan-request-for-50000-ak-rifles-assures-india-of-no-deals-in-future/264004/
20. Franz-­Stefan Gady, “China, Russia Conduct First Ever Joint Strategic Bomber Patrol
Flights in Indo-­ Pacific Region,” The Diplomat, July 23, 2019, https://thediplomat.
com/2019/07/china-russia-conduct-first-ever-joint-strategic-bomber-patrol-flights-in-indo-
pacific-region/
120 • India as Kingmaker

for the future of the Indo-­Russian relationship. We find a high level of treaty
nesting in the Indo-­Russian treaty network, suggesting that the relationship
is deeply institutionalized and unlikely to deteriorate in the near future. We
conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for India’s future
alignment patterns.

Indo-­Russian Treaty Network

To analyze the strength of the Indo-­Russian bilateral relationship, we study

three metrics: the total number of treaties in the Indo-­Russian treaty net-
work, the range of issues over which the two countries cooperate, and the
cooperation score resulting from treaty nesting in the network.
India and Russia have signed a total of 217 bilateral treaties from 1947 to
2018. Thus, there are a higher number of treaties present in the Indo-­Russian
relationship compared to the Indo-­US bilateral network. Table 16 presents
information on the type of treaties created within this relationship.
India and Russia have signed a large number of treaties over a large range
of issues. The two countries have created 64 treaties on issues related to coop-
eration.21 The broad category of cooperation includes treaties that discuss
peace, friendship, and the formation of a strategic partnership between the
two countries. It also includes treaties that discuss their joint vision for the
global hierarchy, the global economy, and Asia. Some of these treaties serve
as the foundation over which the bilateral relationship is built. As we discuss
in later sections of this chapter, several treaties make explicit reference to the
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (1971) as well as the Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation (1993).
The second highest number of treaties is on issues related to science and
technology (30), followed by trade (23), economic and technical assistance
(18), energy (15), and space cooperation (14). In addition to this, the two
states cooperate on a number of other issues (see table 16). This is in stark
contrast to the extent of cooperation that exists between India and the
United States.
As depicted in figure 14, the Indo-­Russian treaty map is extremely dense
with a high number of ties between the treaties. There are very few isolated
treaties in the network; most treaties are connected to at least one other
treaty and several treaties are connected to two or more treaties. As the treaty

21. While this is a broad category, the issue areas are provided by the Government of
India’s Ministry of External Affairs.
 Indo-­Russian Relations • 121

Table 16. Indo-­Russian Treaties, 1947–­2019

Issues Number of Treaties
Cooperation 64
Science and Technology 30
Trade 23
Economic and Technical Assistance 18
Energy 15
Space Cooperation 14
Education 6
Air Travel 6
Agriculture 4
Drug Trafficking 3
Tourism 3
Oil 3
Terrorism 3
Investment 2
Environment 2
Legal Assistance 1
Crime 1
Health 1
Transfer of Prisoners 1
Communication 1
Audio Video Coproduction 1
Currency Rate 1
Taxation 1

map in figure 14 demonstrates, there is an extremely high degree of treaty

nesting within the Indo-­Russian bilateral relationship.
Table 17 presents information on the evolution of the cooperation score
in the Indo-­Russian relationship. As discussed in the methodology section,
the cooperation score within a bilateral relationship is measured by dividing
the total number of treaties with the total number of ties in a relationship
(Slobodchikoff 2013). A score of less than 1 suggests ad hoc cooperation and
a score greater than 1 suggests institutionalized cooperation (Slobodchikoff
2013). The cooperation score between India and Russia crosses the threshold
of 1 in 2010 as the total number of ties surpasses the total number of treaties.
This Indo-­Russian relationship is currently in the phase of institutionalized
cooperation as the cooperation score remains greater than 1. Below, we dis-
cuss the treaty network map as well as the key treaties in the relationship.
Table 18 presents all the lodestone treaties in the Indo-­Russian treaty net-
work in their order of importance. Below we discuss each of these lodestone
treaties in depth.
Fig. 14. Indo-­Russia Treaty Network

Table 17. Indo-­Russian Bilateral Cooperation Score

Year Treaties Ties Cooperation Score
1950 0 0 0
1960 12 8 .6667
1970 35 15 .4375
1980 58 38 .5926
1990 65 39 .6094
2000 107 70 .654
2010 176 189 1.074
2018 217 236 1.09

Table 18. Lodestone Treaties in the Indo-­Russian Treaty Network

Treaty Number Name Number of Ties
IND-­RUS147 Joint Declaration between India and Russia 16.00
IND-­RUS090 Declaration of Strategic Partnership between 14.00
India and Russian Federation
IND-­RUS114 Agreement between India and Russia on 13.00
Cooperation in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space
IND-­RUS064 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 11.00
between India and Russia
IND-­RUS107 Declaration between India and Russia on 9.00
Global Challenges and Threats to World
Security
IND-­RUS195 Strategic Vision for Strengthening Coopera- 8.00
tion in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
between India and Russia
IND-­RUS036 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation 7.00
between India and Russia
 Indo-­Russian Relations • 123

• The Joint Declaration between India and Russia (IND-­RUS147 in fig.

14) was signed in 2008. It has 16 ties with other treaties in the network;
it is nested within 5 bilateral treaties and 11 multilateral treaties. This
treaty is nested within the ASEAN Regional Forum on Security, Asia
Cooperation Dialogue, UN Security Council Resolution 1737, UN
Security Council Resolution 1747, UN Security Council Resolution
1803, UN Security Council Resolution 1835, UN Security Council
Resolution 242, UN Security Council Resolution 338, UN Security
Council Resolution 1397, UN Security Council Resolution 1515; and
the Annapolis Conference. In addition to this, it is also nested within 5
bilateral Indo-­Russian treaties including the Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation between India and Russia (1993); Declaration on Strate-
gic Partnership between India and Russian Federation (2000); Proto-
col between India and Russia on Holding “Year of Russia in India” in
the Year 2008 and “Year of India in Russia” in the Year 2009 (2007);
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the
Government of the Russian Federation on Reciprocal Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights on the Field of Military–­Technical Coop-
eration (2005); and Agreement between India and Russia on Coopera-
tion to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics, Psychotropic Sub-
stances and Their Precursors (2007).
• The Declaration of Strategic Partnership between India and Russian Fed-
eration (IND-­RUS090 in fig. 14) was signed in 2000 and is nested
within four previous bilateral treaties. It has 14 ties within the network;
10 subsequent Indo-­Russian bilateral treaties reference this declaration
and are nested within it. The declaration is nested within the Treaty of
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between India and Russia (1971),
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between India and Russia
(1993), an Intergovernmental Agreement (1992), and the Moscow
Declaration on the Protection of the Interests of Pluralistic States
(1994).
• Agreement between India and Russia on Cooperation in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space (IND-­RUS114 in fig. 14) was signed in 2004. It
has 13 ties within the treaty network; it is nested within two bilateral
Indo-­Russian treaties—­the Agreement between India and Russian on
Co-­Operation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful
Purposes (1994) and the Agreement on the Protection of Confidential
Materials (2000)—­as well as one multilateral treaty, the Convention
on International Liability on Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972).
Ten subsequent bilateral Indo-­Russian treaties are nested within this
124 • India as Kingmaker

agreement on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space. As

depicted in table 16, India and Russia have signed a total of 14 treaties
on space exploration, most of which are connected to, or nested within,
each other.
• Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between India and Russia (IND-­
RUS064 in fig. 14) was signed in 1993. It has 11 ties to other treaties
within the network. It is nested within the Treaty of Peace, Friendship
and Cooperation between India and Russia (1971). Ten subsequent
bilateral Indo-­Russian treaties are nested within this agreement.
• Declaration between India and Russia on Global Challenges and
Threats to World Security (IND-­RUS107 in fig. 14) was signed in
2003. It is nested within the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
between India and Russia (1993), the Declaration of Strategic Part-
nership between India and Russian Federation (2000), the Moscow
Declaration on the Protection of the Interests of Pluralistic States
(1994), the Moscow Declaration between India and Russian Federa-
tion on International Terrorism (2001), the MOU between India and
Russia on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism (2002), and the
Delhi Declaration on Further Consolidation of Strategic Partnership
between India and Russia (2002). It is also nested within the follow-
ing multilateral agreements: the United Nations Millennium Decla-
ration, United Nations Resolution 57/145, UN Resolution 1373,
and the Bonn Agreement.
• Strategic Vision for Strengthening Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy between India and Russia (IND-­RUS195 in fig. 14)
was signed in 2014. It is nested within the Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation between India and Russia (1993); the Agreement
between India and USSR on Cooperation in the Construction of a
Nuclear Power Station in India (1988); the MOU between India and
Russia concerning Broader Scientific and Technical Cooperation in
the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (2010); the MOU
between India and Russia on Cooperation in Information Technol-
ogy (2010); the Agreement between the Government of Republic of
India and the Government of Russian Federation on Cooperation in
the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes (2010); and the
General Framework Agreement for KKNPP (Kudankulam Nuclear
Power Plant) (2014).
• Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between India and Russia
(IND-­RUS036 in fig. 14) was signed in 1971. It is nested within the
Trade Agreement on Trade between India and Russia (1970).
 Indo-­Russian Relations • 125

There are several other treaties in the treaty network with five or six ties.
As a point of comparison, there is not a single treaty in the Indo-­US relation
that has more than four ties to other treaties in the network.

Institutionalization of Ties—­Analysis

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, regular annual summit-­level meetings

alternating between India and Russia have been held between the leaders of
the two countries starting in 2000. A large number of bilateral agreements
are typically signed at these summit-­level meetings, ranging from weapons
procurement to trade and investment. About 50 business agreements were
signed at the 2019 EEF summit level meeting between Prime Minister
Modi and President Putin. It is a fair criticism that India does not always
follow through on agreements concluded and signed by its leaders. Often a
lack of resources or a change in priorities by a new administration leads to a
policy shift. However, Indian policy vis-­à-­vis Russia has not seen a dramatic
shift in spite of changes in the administration and leadership. Given the
sheer magnitude of agreements concluded between the two countries, even
a small proportion of them leading to concrete actions would result in sev-
eral points of cooperation between the two countries.
Various ministerial-­level bilateral visits are also held between the two
states. Two Inter-­Governmental Commissions—­one dealing with trade and
scientific cooperation, and another on military cooperation—­meet annually.
The Inter-­Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation
co-­chaired by the Ministers of Defense of Russia and India also review
defense cooperation between the two countries regularly.22
In reference to Indo-­Russian ties, India’s Ministry of External Affairs
states, “India has longstanding and wide-­ranging cooperation with Russia in
the field of defence. India-­Russia military technical cooperation has evolved
from a buyer-­seller framework to one involving joint research, development
and production of advanced defence technologies and systems. BrahMos
Missile System as well as the licensed production in India of SU-­30 aircraft
and T-­90 tanks, are examples of such flagship cooperation.”23
Russia has assisted India in building its first nuclear power plant and the

22. See https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Russia_unclassified_bilateral_brief_

January_2013.pdf
23. “India-­
Russia Relations,” May 2017, http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/
India_Russia_May.pdf
126 • India as Kingmaker

two countries are cooperating to build several more nuclear power plants in
India. India and Russia are also cooperating to build a nuclear power plant in
Bangladesh.24 In addition to this, India and Russia are also looking to coop-
erate to build nuclear power plants across third party states in Africa and the
Middle East.25
India’s first satellite, Aryabhatt, launched into space with the help of a
Russian Soyuz capsule from a Soviet space station in 1975. In 2007, the two
countries signed a Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space. “In 2015, the space agencies in both countries signed an
MOU on the expansion of cooperation in the field of the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes. An agreement was signed between
C-­DAC and GLONASS for cooperation in technologies based on satellite
navigation. On 15 October 2016, ISRO and Roscosmos signed an MOU to
establish ground measurement gathering stations for GLONASS and NavIC
in India and Russia. Both sides are also exploring the possibility of coopera-
tion in manned space flight.”26 Russia is currently assisting India in its maiden
human space mission, Gaganyaan.27
In addition to the above, several people-­to-­people initiatives—­various
efforts to deeply institutionalize ties—­are conducted by the governments in
both states.28

Conclusion

The strength of India-­Russia ties lies in the scope and magnitude of their
defense ties and the desire of both countries to establish a multipolar global
order. The disagreements between the two powers are insubstantial and can

24. Roy Choudhary Dipanjan, “India, Russia, Bangladesh Sign Tripartite Pact for Civil
Nuclear Cooperation,” Economic Times, March 1, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes​
.com/news/defence/india-russia-bangladesh-sign-tripartite-pact-for-civil-nuclear-cooperati​
on/articleshow/63127669.cms
25. Palash Ghosh, “Russia, India May Cooperate to Build Nuclear Plants in Middle East,
Africa,” IB Times, February 9, 2020, https://www.ibtimes.com/russia-india-may-cooperate-
build-nuclear-plants-middle-east-africa-2918741
26. “India-­
Russia Relations,” May 2017, http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/
India_Russia_May.pdf
27. “India, Russia Hold Talks to Boost Space Cooperation,” Indian Express, July 12, 2019,
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-russia-hold-talks-to-boost-space-cooperation​
-5827059/
28. “India-­
Russia Relations,” May 2017, http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/
India_Russia_May.pdf
 Indo-­Russian Relations • 127

be addressed by continued diplomatic efforts by leaders on both sides. The

two countries have remained close allies and have offered each other unwav-
ering support on the global stage, especially in times of crises. The changing
nature of global polarity brought about by the rise of China and the decline
of American power will require India and Russia to rejuvenate their ties.
India and Russia have expended a lot of resources (including human
resources) toward the development of their strategic partnership. The two
countries consult on a wide range of issues and often are on the same side in
multilateral forums such as the BRICS, the G-­20, and the United Nations.
The relationship is marked by trust on both sides to stand by each other and
to refrain from criticizing each other’s domestic and foreign policies in a pub-
lic forum. While this bilateral relationship is largely driven by defense and
security, the two countries have made efforts to boost trade and investment
in each other’s economy. More importantly, they have also created a frame-
work of cooperation by creating a series of agreements, several of which are
nested within each other. This has led to deeply institutionalized ties that are
likely to withstand changing global hierarchies and shifts in global power.
The Indo-­Russian relationship is unlikely to weaken in the near future. Given
the analysis in this chapter, we expect it to remain stable and strong.
India and Russia maintain a strong institutionalized bilateral relation-
ship. Both states have discussed at various times the need to move from a
unilateral global order to a multilateral global order. While India believes
this, as we have seen in the previous section of the book, India has continued
to maintain a relationship with the United States and its allies. However, it
should be clear that India’s relationship with Russia is extremely problematic
if the United States needs India’s help to maintain the status quo in the cur-
rent global order. Russia, on the other hand, is in a strong position to con-
vince India to support a change in the global order. The relationship between
India and Russia is strong enough that it should only continue to grow stron-
ger. The window to woo India away from a strong relationship with Russia
and to entice it to become a solid status quo power has closed. Contrary to
that, Russia has not fully convinced India to completely turn away from a
relationship with the United States and its allies. If the relationship between
Russia and India grows stronger, however, that is a distinct possibility. To
further assess India’s preferences in terms of the global order, one must not
only examine India’s relationship with Russia but also India’s relationships
with other revisionist powers such as China. In the next chapter we examine
India’s relationship with China.
8 • Indo-­Chinese Relations

It is widely speculated that the global leadership void left behind by the
United States will be filled by states like China, Germany, and others. Multi-
lateral institutions and forums such as NATO and the G-­20 are adjusting to
the current political landscape where the United States seems disinterested
in leading and other states are scrambling to maintain stability. States such as
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and others have long
desired a multipolar global order, where they have a larger say in shaping
global affairs.
International relations scholars have debated whether or not the current
system is unipolar, with the United States acting as a global hegemon. In
terms of military power, the United States maintains its global dominance,
far outspending its rivals and competitors, thus maintaining the largest and
best-­equipped armed forces in the world. While the US remains the world’s
largest economy, it continues to face growing competition from rising pow-
ers like China, India, and the European Union.
Increasingly, the United States has been unwilling as well as unable to
handle global crises, both economic and security related. It has been unable
to thwart North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. It has been unable to entirely
eliminate the Islamic State and other extremist fundamentalist groups. It has
been a reluctant participant in the Syrian civil war, allowing states like Russia
and Turkey to take the lead in shaping the situation on the ground. These
events point to the United States’ lack of global leadership.1 It can be argued
that we are witnessing the transition of global order toward a multipolar sys-

1. While the book is a study through 2017, that the US has not been able to achieve vic-
tory in Afghanistan, and has showed more global leadership during the Ukraine War, but still
has not been able to regain its leadership role that it had at the end of the Cold War.

128
 Indo-­Chinese Relations • 129

tem, where a group of major powers jointly govern and shape the rules of the
system under which other states must operate.
In previous chapters, we have argued that a state like India could serve as
a lynchpin in this transition from unipolarity toward multipolarity. By
choosing to side with Russia instead of the United States, India can act as a
catalyst in a global transition of power. Current trends point to the increas-
ing cooperation between India and the United States. As the world’s largest
and leading democracies, they have much in common with each other. It is
widely expected that they will continue to cooperate economically, and India
will be a crucial ally in the United States’ “pivot to” or “rebalancing in” Asia.
India and the United States share a common concern for the rise of China
and its expanding aggression in Asia-­Pacific as well as globally. Much has
been written about the close ties developed between the Modi and Obama
administrations. Modi and Trump also developed close ties, and the close
economic, security, and political cooperation between the two countries is
expected to continue. The successful Indian diaspora in the United States
provides a crucial connection between the two states. These trends suggest
that India is being pulled away from the Russian sphere of influence by the
United States and is realigning its foreign policy interests with the US.
However, all of these current analyses ignore the historic nature of the ties
between India and China. If India and China have institutionalized coopera-
tion, then it is likely that India is a solidly revisionist state. However, if China
and India possess an ad hoc relationship, it might be possible for India to be
a status quo power. By analyzing the nature of treaty formation between
these dyads, we arrive at the conclusion that India and China do not have a
cooperative relationship, but have managed to address areas of mutual con-
cern to avoid short-­term conflict.

Challenging US Hegemony

We have discussed the challenge to US hegemony posed by Russia in the

previous chapter. Like Moscow, Beijing had its own reasons for challenging
US hegemony. By 2010, China had grown into an economic power. The
reforms that were instituted by Deng Xiao Ping had effectively created a
modified capitalist economy. Interestingly, Beijing learned from Gor-
bachev’s attempted reforms in the Soviet Union, and realized that they
would not be successful in reforming both the political and economic sys-
tems. They saw that as people got more political freedoms, they began
demanding more changes, and this led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
130 • India as Kingmaker

Instead of following the Soviet reform model, Beijing focused only on eco-
nomic reforms. They chose not to reform the political system, but contin-
ued to maintain a strong hold over the political system.
In 2010, China’s economy was the second most powerful economy in the
world, surpassing Japan. Beijing dominated trade and began to loan money to
several countries, including the United States. China had been increasingly
showing signs of becoming dissatisfied with the global order and unipolarity.
China had also been challenging the United States in the South China Sea, and
had been expanding its influence in regions including Central and South
America as well as Africa. Officially, both China and Russia had stated that
they favored a multipolar system as opposed to the unipolar system with the
United States at its helm. In fact, on May 15, 1997, the Russian and the Chi-
nese permanent UN diplomatic missions presented an official declaration to
the United Nations General Assembly of an intent to create a multipolar world
and thus create a new international security structure.2
Despite using rhetoric claiming that they were in favor of a multipolar sys-
tem, neither Russia nor China could directly take on US power. They each had
to begin to challenge US power at the periphery, such as Moscow orchestrating
efforts for Kyrgyzstan to force American troops to leave the Manas Airbase in
Kyrgyzstan or Beijing creating new islands in the South China Sea. However,
even working together, Moscow and Beijing would not be strong enough to
directly challenge US power. They had to work within the confines of existing
organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and convince
other countries to join them in an effort to balance against US power to create
a multipolar system. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was a way to
manage regional tensions between Beijing and Moscow. The two states began
to work together in Central Asia, and while the Shanghai Cooperation Orga-
nization did not completely end competition between the great powers, it nev-
ertheless helped manage the competition.
Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative focused on economic expansion and
globalization for China. Beijing invested heavily in infrastructure projects in
many other states, while not demanding political changes. In other words,
the Belt and Road Initiative became a competitor of the International Mon-
etary Fund and the World Bank. In directly competing with these organiza-
tions, Beijing provided a distinct choice for states looking to improve their
infrastructure. States were attracted to the Belt and Road Initiative because
they did not have to make political changes to their regimes. Beijing profited
from these arrangements since, instead of requiring political changes, it

2. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/52/plenary/a52-153.htm
 Indo-­Chinese Relations • 131

required states to allow Chinese companies to work on the infrastructure

projects, and often used those projects as collateral if the countries could not
pay back loans that the Chinese provided. For example, the Chinese accepted
the Port of Mombasa as collateral from Kenya for helping to build up the
infrastructure of the port.
One of the main countries that Beijing needed to target was India. India
was the classic status quo power. Despite having allied itself with Moscow
during the Cold War, India had received prominence during both President
Bush’s and President Obama’s presidencies as Washington sought to keep its
hegemonic status. The United States also realized that it had to overcome
decades of adversarial US foreign policies against India. Both President Bush
and President Obama realized that they needed India and its growing econ-
omy as an important ally to prevent China and Russia from developing
power preponderance and more importantly the ability to challenge the
existing global hierarchy.
Russia and China also recognized the importance of India and of gaining
India as a valuable ally in countering American hegemony. If there was to be
a viable challenge to US hegemony, Moscow and Beijing had to convince
India that it needed to ally itself with them. Beginning in 2002, the leaders of
the three states have held annual summits to increase their cooperation. In
fact, the tripartite meetings in 2017 reiterated that all three states were inter-
ested in creating a global system based on international law and moving
toward a multipolar system.3
While India very much prefers the status quo, it also has a lifelong pen-
chant for multilateralism (which first began under the leadership of Nehru as
independent India’s first prime minister). Similar to China, with the excep-
tion of grave human rights violations, India prefers noninterventionism in
the domestic affairs of other states. If and when intervention is carried out,
India has supported a multilateral coalition versus unilateral actions by
superpowers. The United States has preferred a unilateral course of action in
international affairs for the past few decades; it has exercised force without
the consent of the United Nations. The United States has also bullied smaller
powers economically as well as politically.
While Russia and China are indeed dissatisfied states in the current
global order, India is still in play for both the United States on one side and

3. C. Uday Bhaskar, “Russia-­India-­China Meeting Shows a Multipolar World Order Is

Taking Shape,” South China Morning Post, December 15, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/com​
ment/insight-opinion/article/2124329/russia-india-china-meeting-shows-multipolar-world​
-order
132 • India as Kingmaker

Russia and China on the other. Indeed, it has become the lynchpin in
determining the future of the global system. In this chapter, we examine
relations between India and China to determine whether or not India is
indeed still in play and whether or not the United States can continue to
maintain its global hegemonic status and thus the unipolar system, or if
India has allied itself with Russia and China and truly supports change
toward a multipolar system.

India-­China Ties

The Indo-­Chinese relationship can be understood as a geostrategic struggle

with increasing commercial ties and cooperation (Malone 2011, 129). Both
states are engaged in a struggle to dominate the Indian Ocean region as well
as Central and East Asia. India and China have tried to improve bilateral
ties that are at present largely hinged on economic cooperation. They have
also worked to cooperate in multilateral institutions such as the talks to
combat global climate change. Nevertheless, relations between the two
countries undergo periods of “coolness” as their economies continue to
grow rapidly. Moreover, India is increasingly being courted by the United
States and other Western states as a counterbalance to China’s strength and
aggression (Malone 2011).
Historically, China has allied with Pakistan given their mutual interests
vis-­à-­vis India. Through the Cold War, a global rivalry emerged involving the
United States, Pakistan, and China on one side and India and the Soviet
Union on the other. It is only recently that the United States has forged
closer ties with India, given Pakistan’s unreliable and lackluster performance
as an ally. India’s strong commitment to democracy, multilateral interna-
tional institutions, and peaceful growth and development are appealing to
the United States as a trustworthy partner in Asia. India and the United
States also share a strong passion for countering rising extremism and global
terrorism. Thus, snapshot images of the current global interactions suggest
growing closeness between India and the United States and rising animosity
and competition between the India and China. However, these snapshot
images are devoid of historical context and provide an incomplete picture of
the status of ties between India and China and India and the United States.
For instance, “the bilateral interactions of the 1980s and the early 1990s cre-
ated a foundation for future cooperation and institutionalization of efforts
to find a permanent settlement to the border dispute” between India and
China (Malone 2011, 138). The year 2006 was declared to be the India-­
 Indo-­Chinese Relations • 133

China friendship year and the two states engaged in a yearlong exchange of
diplomatic personnel and cultural programs. China also overtook the United
States as India’s largest trading partner starting in 2013.

Recent Developments in the Relationship

In 2017, the Doklam incident, a 73-­day military standoff over border dis-
putes in the trilateral region between Bhutan, China, and India, took place.
Since then a series of visits by high-­level personnel including a meeting
between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi
Jinping on the sidelines of the September 2017 BRICS summit in the Chi-
nese city of Xiamen have taken place. A series of Track 1 meetings have
been set up including a China-­India strategic economic dialogue held in
April 2018 as well as a likely visit by Chinese commerce minister Zhing
Shanto to discuss WTO related issues. There has been a steady improve-
ment of ties between India and China since the Doklam incident; both
states are working to reduce tensions and return to normalcy.
India and China are increasingly seen as rivals vying for regional hege-
mony in the Asian sphere. Most conflict theories are based on the notion
that two rising powers with rapidly growing economies and aspirations to
become major global powers cannot coexist peacefully within Asia. India is
suspicious of encirclement by China, or the “string of pearls” strategy that
attempts to choke India by isolating it and cutting off connections to various
trade routes—­this is based upon China’s attempts to create military and
naval bases and control strategic ports such as Gwadar in Pakistan and Ham-
bantota in Sri Lanka. China is wary of the Quad alliance of India, Japan,
Australia, and the United States, which it considers to be an attempt to
encircle China. India and China have differences over issues such as the
China–­Pakistan economic corridor and China’s continuous blocking of
efforts at the United Nations to declare Jaish-­e-­Mohammad leader Masood
Azhar a global terrorist. In spite of these differences trade between the two
countries increased by 18percent in 2017. After the Doklam incident there
was a discussion on boycotting Chinese goods, and India imposed antidump-
ing duties on 98 Chinese commodities.
There are several points of cooperation between the two states as well. A
statement issued by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs after the visit of
Indian foreign minister Vijay Gokhale to China in February 2018 suggested
enhanced engagement between the two states. India recently supported Chi-
na’s bid for the vice presidency of the Financial Action Task Force, an inter-
134 • India as Kingmaker

national watchdog organization that seeks to combat money laundering and

the financing of terrorism. In response, China supported the US bid to place
Pakistan on the gray list for having engaged in terror sponsorship (as long
accused by India). It is worth noting that the United States was interested in
nominating Japan for the role of vice president of the organization. However,
India’s support was crucial in tilting the balance in favor of China. Evidence
such as this lends support to our argument about India serving as the lynch-
pin in the systemic shift toward a multipolar global order.
Cooperation with China is very desirable for India for reasons outlined
below. India believes that China can exert pressure on Pakistan to eliminate
support of terrorist organizations such as LeT and JeM. China has considerable
influence over Pakistan due to its economic investments in the country.4 India
is also looking to court Chinese investment in states such as Gujarat, West Ben-
gal, and Maharashtra, among others. India and China share common ground
on climate change and on international tariffs on trade. The 2019 move by
President Trump to impose trade tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum and
exhibit protectionism, thereby starting a global trade war, is unpopular with
both India and China, whose economies are heavily dependent on exports.
Both India and China want to make the 21st century the Asian century.
Several different arguments can be made with regard to the future rela-
tionships between India, China, and the United States. We use evidence-­
based arguments to project the future ties between these parties. India has
attempted to delicately balance its newly emerging friendship with the
United States along with its economic ties and dependence on China. India
is also rapidly increasing its military expenditures and bolstering its naval
presence in the Indian Ocean region to counterbalance China’s assertive role.
While it is generally expected that India will aid the United States in coun-
tering China’s rise and aggression in Asia and beyond, we argue that Sino-­
Indian ties are actually far more institutionalized that Indo-­American ties.
As a result, we expect that while India will attempt to balance China, it will
not adopt an aggressive posture vis-­à-­vis China.

Data and Analysis

In this chapter we analyze Indo-­Chinese treaties from India’s founding to

2019. India’s freedom from the United Kingdom is the best point to begin

4. While Pakistan was also reliant on American foreign aid and the United States exerted
pressure on Pakistan to not sponsor terrorism, it failed to have much impact.
 Indo-­Chinese Relations • 135

the analysis, and ensures that all of the bilateral treaties that have been
signed by India and China are included in the analysis. Similar to India,
China had a change in its regime in 1949, meaning that it is a natural start-
ing point to examine the relationship.
As mentioned previously, a Treaty A is considered to be nested under
Treaty B if it explicitly makes a reference to the earlier treaty. A tie between
two treaties is considered to be present when one explicitly references the
other, that is, it is nested within the other. A relationship is considered to
have institutionalized cooperation when the total number of ties in the rela-
tionship is equal to or greater than the total number of bilateral treaties
between the two states. It is considered to have ad hoc cooperation when the
total number of ties is less than the total number of bilateral treaties between
the two states. Table 19 provides the cooperation levels between India and
China and shows that while there is cooperation, it is not institutionalized
cooperation, but rather ad hoc cooperation.
It is interesting to note that most of the bilateral treaties were signed in
the last two decades of the analysis. This coincides with the rise of Chinese
power in the region, and is evidence that India is at least attempting to coop-
erate with China instead of fully balancing against it. In contrast to the rela-
tionship between India and Japan, India is cautious with institutionalizing
its cooperation with China. In other words, India is cooperating with both
China and Japan, but has not fully aligned itself with either state.
More importantly, India and Russia have signed a total of 49 bilateral
treaties between 1992 and 2015. India and China have signed a comparable
47 treaties in the same time period. However, India and the United States
have signed a mere 9 treaties in the same time period. This data suggests that
it is premature to jump to the conclusion that India is drifting from the Soviet
sphere of influence and growing closer to the United States. It is also difficult
to argue that India will ally with the United States to balance against the rise
of China and potentially help to counter China’s aggression in hot spots such
as the South China Sea or its influence in Central and East Asia.

Network Analysis

While table 19 provides information on the levels of institutionalized

cooperation over time, it does not provide information on which issue areas
are significant to each dyad. To determine this, we use network analysis to
study the patterns in these dyads. The more times a specific treaty is men-
tioned by other treaties, the more significant it becomes to the bilateral rela-
136 • India as Kingmaker

Table 19. Levels of Cooperation between India and China, 1954–­2019

Year Treaties Ties Cooperation Score
1950 0 0 0
1960 3 1 .333
1970 3 1 .333
1980 3 1 .333
1990 11 2 .182
2000 45 19 .475
2010 112 58 .518
2019 161 87 .540

Fig. 15. Indo-­China Treaty Network

tionship. The size of a treaty on the network map is representative of its

significance to the bilateral relationship. The network map presents infor-
mation on which treaties are connected to each other, as well as which trea-
ties are central to the network; the degree centrality measure can help iden-
tify the lodestone treaties, which are the most central to the relationship.
We present three different network maps: figure 15 presents the Indo-­
Chinese treaty network.
In figure 15, the Indo-­Chinese treaty map, there are small pockets of
institutionalized cooperation. There are a group of treaties that are cross-­
referenced by each other; India and China build upon Treaty 10 and Treaty
18—­all security related treaties signed afterward explicitly reference these
 Indo-­Chinese Relations • 137

Table 20. Lodestone Treaties in Sino-­Indian Relationship

Treaty Number Name Number of Ties
INPRC133 MOU between India and China on 5.00
Strengthening Cooperation on Trans
Border Rivers
INPRC057 Declarations on Principles for Relations and 5.00
Comprehensive Cooperation between
India and China
INPRC113 Agreement between India and China on 5.00
Establishment of a Working Mechanism
for Consultation on Indo-­China Border
Affairs
INPRC021 Agreement of Science and Technology 5.00
Cooperation between India and China
(December 22, 1988)
IPPC International Plant Protection Convention 5.00
INPRC066 Agreement between India and China on 5.00
Political Parameters and Guiding Princi-
ples for the Settlement of India-­China
Boundary Question

lodestone treaties. In addition to this, there has been some attempt to build
institutionalized cooperation on border trade. The network map suggests
that India and China have signed several treaties on a wide range of issues
including water sharing rights, intellectual property rights, border disputes,
and trade and economic cooperation. However, they have not managed to
link these divergent interests under the umbrella of one lodestone treaty.
Although there is a lot of cooperation going on in this dyad, this cooperation
has not been fully institutionalized. While Indo-­Chinese cooperation is ad
hoc, it does demonstrate a greater degree of cooperation than the Indo-­
American dyad. If we were to rank order these dyads in terms of their strength
or levels of cooperation the Indo-­Russian dyads would lead the way followed
by the Indo-­Chinese dyad, with a score of .540. The Indo-­American dyad
would come in last due to the lack of engagement between India and the
United States with respect to bilateral treaties. Not only do they have a very
small number of bilateral treaties, they also make no attempt to link new
treaties to previous ones.
Table 20 shows a list of the lodestone treaties and their degree centrality
scores, which indicates how central they are to the relationship. Based on this
analysis, it is clear that India has a much more cooperative relationship with
Russia than with India. While India and the US may continue to cooperate
138 • India as Kingmaker

in the future, at present India remains firmly within the Russian sphere of
influence. The United States should not count on India being willing to give
up such a cooperative relationship with Russia to support the US over Rus-
sia. While India can continue to pursue cooperation with the United States
on specific issues in an ad hoc manner, the data do not indicate that India’s
relationship with Russia will do anything but continue to grow stronger.
India voted to abstain in a UN General Assembly vote to condemn Russia
for invading Ukraine in 2022, further solidifying its ties to Russia.

Conclusion

The United States continues to spend much more on its military than most
other countries combined. This hard power capability allows the US to
continue to try to maintain its global hegemony and the unipolar system.
However, as Nye (2003) correctly points out, hard power is not sufficient to
maintain hegemony. The United States must work on its diplomacy and
soft power to spread and maintain its global influence.
Both Russia and China have demonstrably argued against American
hegemony, and have begun to actively challenge the United States. While
neither Beijing nor Moscow is strong enough to challenge Washington
alone, they have begun to form a bilateral alliance and to work together
through multilateral institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Orga-
nization. However, even through bilateral and multilateral alliances, Bei-
jing and Moscow can only challenge the United States directly within their
own regions of power. For example, Moscow is currently challenging US
hegemony in Ukraine, while Beijing challenges Washington in the South
China Sea.
However, if the Sino-­Russian alliance can begin to show the world an
attractive alternative to the liberal global order, then the United States will
begin to lose its hegemonic status. That is why India is the lynchpin to the
global order. If India chooses to ally itself with Moscow and Beijing, then
other countries will begin to follow suit and directly challenge US hegemony,
thus leading to a multipolar system. However, if India allies itself with Wash-
ington, the Sino-­Russian challenge will wither before it has had a chance to
become a serious challenge to US hegemony.
The Sino-­Indian relationship is not wholly cooperative. Yet Beijing and
New Delhi have worked hard to improve their relations. Their relationship is
close to being a cooperative one. Should China and India be able to overcome
their differences and continue to cooperate, the Sino-­Indian relationship
 Indo-­Chinese Relations • 139

should become just as strong as the Russo-­Indian relationship. If the relation-

ship does become stronger, then it will be at a cost to the US-­Indian relation-
ship, which will then lead to a very strong challenge to the liberal order.
Ultimately, we predict that the Sino-­Indian relationship will continue to
strengthen, and within the next couple of decades we shall see direct evi-
dence of a direct challenge to US hegemony. The question that will be raised
then is whether the US will be willing to peacefully accede to a multipolar
system as Trump has seemed to suggest when pressed about the US commit-
ment to defend Europe, or whether the US will use its hard power to preserve
the unipolar system, in which case a global conflict could ensue.
9 • India’s Place in the World Order

Revisionist or Status Quo Power?

The world order is currently undergoing a transition. It is directly under

attack by revisionist powers such as China and Russia. Following the end of
the Cold War, the United States was at the height of its hegemony. The bipo-
lar system that had survived after World War II had given way to a new uni-
polar system with the US as the only superpower. The end of the Cold War
saw euphoria and the idea that liberalism and the liberal order had truly tri-
umphed. Politicians in the United States and Europe began to think of Rus-
sia as the vanquished enemy, and believed that there would no longer be any
challenge to the liberal order.
The expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe and some of the former
Soviet states began to alienate the Russians. While Russian president Boris
Yeltsin tried to curry favor with the West, other politicians in Russia began to
resent the fact that Russia was no longer treated as a great power and lamented
the loss of power and prestige that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet
Union. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union did leave Moscow in a
very weak position and it was unable to convince Washington not to pursue
NATO expansion or other initiatives that Moscow believed were not in its
own interests.
Moscow’s lack of power and influence allowed Washington to believe
that it did not need to request advice from other great powers. In fact, US
supremacy led to a sense that the US would act in its own interests and that
other countries would follow the US lead because of its supremacy. After all,
the United States spent more on its military than all of the other states
combined.
In the early 1990s, Moscow’s ally, Serbia, was embroiled in a civil war fol-
lowing the breakup of Yugoslavia. The Russians supported Serbia, whereas
Washington supported the Bosnians. Russian volunteers went to Serbia to

140
 India’s Place in the World Order • 141

fight against the Bosnians in a perceived war in defense of Orthodox Chris-

tianity. The United States supported Bosnia, and later supported the Kos-
ovar Muslims in their attempts to separate from Serbia.
Despite these issues, the Yeltsin administration still tried to cooperate
with Washington and seek its support. In other words, it was more impor-
tant for the Yeltsin administration to gain the support of the West than it was
to adhere to its own strategic interests in the region. Yeltsin’s actions alien-
ated many policy makers in Russia, and stimulated resentment among Rus-
sians toward the West. Many politicians had been used to having a “seat at
the table” and at least having their interests considered. During the Soviet
era, they believed that the West feared Soviet power and thus did not take
actions that would deliberately provoke Moscow. However, the Clinton
administration’s view of US supremacy made it very clear that Russia was to
be considered a weak regional power and not a great power that had any right
to help in the decision-­making process in the global order.
Following September 11, 2001, the Bush administration further pursued
a unilateral foreign policy. The administration adopted the Bush Doctrine,
which stated that countries were either with the US or they were against the
US. There was no place for consultation and negotiation. The US was going
to take an American–­centered approach to foreign policy and to protecting
its interests. While the Russians initially saw the period following September
11 as a chance to cooperate with the United States and improve the relation-
ship between the two countries, the Bush administration was not as inter-
ested in developing close ties and was hesitant to trust Russia. Further, Wash-
ington pursued such policies as withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and
pursuing missile-­defense systems in violation of many of the agreements of
the Cold War era.
These actions by the Bush administration served to further enrage Rus-
sian policy makers and helped create a sense of nostalgia for the Soviet Union
and a rise of Russian nationalism. The Russians felt as though they had once
been a great power and that they were now being discounted. This really
angered the Russians, and Russian president Putin used it to his great advan-
tage. In fact, at the 2007 Munich security conference, Putin shocked the
United States and the West by presenting a list of complaints about US hege-
mony and openly beginning to call for a specific shift to multilateralism from
US unilateralism (Slobodchikoff 2017b).
By 2013, relations between the two countries became even more hostile.
Ukraine became embroiled in a conflict between East and West over the
West’s spreading influence. The EU offered Ukraine a special cooperation
agreement to form a relationship that would eventually lead to membership
142 • India as Kingmaker

in the EU. Moscow was very apprehensive about this possible agreement and
attempted to coerce Ukraine into not signing the agreement. They did this
by offering to forgive debts incurred by Ukraine to Russia and by offering
natural gas at extremely low prices. Brussels, on the other hand, offered the
possibility of making it easier to access European markets for Ukrainian
goods as well as many other benefits that the EU offered.
Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych was truly on the horns of a
dilemma. The public in Kyiv and much of western Ukraine was very much in
favor of signing the Association agreement with the EU. However, the south-
eastern part of Ukraine was Russian speaking and much more in favor of
maintaining close ties with Russia. Yanukovych was faced with a zero-­sum
game. If he signed the Association agreement with the EU, he risked the
access to gas that Ukraine had as well as alienating Moscow. If he chose not
to sign the Association agreement, then Ukraine would have less debt and
access to natural gas, but limited access to European markets or the wealth
that eventual membership in the EU would bring. At first he said that he was
going to sign the agreement, and then he decided against signing it.
When he announced that he was not going to sign the Association agree-
ment, protests began in Kyiv against the president and his decision. These
protests were aided by the West, and Western diplomats provided food and
counsel to the protestors. While the Russians accused Washington of
fomenting revolution in Ukraine, Washington argued that it was merely sup-
porting peaceful protesters and aiding them in the exercise of freedom of
speech.
The protests continued, mainly in Maidan Square in Kyiv, and eventually
led to violence. Protesters were shot and the protests began to turn toward
revolution. During this period Moscow again accused Washington of direct
interference, but Washington denied these claims. What is clear is that
Washington had developed a plan for a transition of government from Yanu-
kovych to other leaders, such as Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who were deemed to be
more palatable to the West.
Ultimately, the protests led to the escape of Yanukovych and a new gov-
ernment in Kyiv. The new government in Kyiv said that they would revisit
the Black Sea Fleet treaties between Russia and Ukraine, and, in response,
Russia sent in special forces to Crimea to maintain its military presence
there. In a disputed referendum, Crimea voted to join the Russian Federa-
tion and secede from Ukraine. For the actions of Moscow, the United States
and the EU imposed sanctions on Moscow and called for the immediate
withdrawal of Russian troops and Crimea’s return to Ukraine.
Following the events in Crimea, a rebellion started in the Donbas region
 India’s Place in the World Order • 143

of Ukraine. Washington accused Moscow of stoking the insurrection and

providing military troops to aid in a battle of secession. Moscow denied this,
and further sanctions were imposed by Washington on Moscow. The seces-
sion of the Donbas region led to a very violent civil war in which civilians
were often targeted by both secessionist and government forces. Moscow
recognized the right of the Donbas region to secede from Ukraine, but did
not attempt to annex the Donbas the way it had annexed Crimea.
The fighting between Russia and the West over Ukraine led to a fissure
between the two and a possible new cold war between Russia and the United
States. The biggest difference between the Cold War era and the era right
after the Ukrainian crisis was that ideology was not a major driving factor in
the opposition. Rather, Moscow sought its opportunity to begin to challenge
the liberal ideology and the global order developed by the United States.
Moscow did not supply an immediate ideological choice between the liberal
order and one proposed by Moscow. Instead, Moscow proposed an alterna-
tive to the liberal order, which was an order based on multilateralism.
Russia was not the only state that was dissatisfied with the liberal order.
China had also become disenfranchised with the liberal order. While China
viewed trade and economic cooperation as being very important, it also was
very wary of any agreements that would lead to political changes or chal-
lenges to the regime in Beijing. Thus, Beijing was willing to loan money to,
and actively seek economic cooperation with, both the United States and its
allies in Europe, but it was very wary of any political entanglements.
Beijing had increasingly loaned money to the United States, and financed
a lot of its debts. In 2008, Beijing had bought a fair amount of mortgages.
Millions of people later defaulted on these mortgages, which led to the great
recession of 2008. Even though Beijing did suffer some economically, its
economy continued to grow. Its economy rivaled that of the United States,
and it began to build up its military as well. Increasingly, it began to chal-
lenge the United States in the East Asian region, specifically in the South
China Sea.
Economically, China began to challenge the United States by developing
alternatives to the liberal institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank. The Chinese alternatives were through the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as through BRICS (Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, China, and South Africa). One of those institutions, the East
Asian Development Bank, was set up to be a direct competitor of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The East Asian Development
Bank loaned money to governments and rather than demand that demo-
cratic regime changes be made, it made no political requirements for receiv-
144 • India as Kingmaker

ing the funds. Instead, among the stipulations were that Chinese companies
would have to work on the infrastructure projects and would be paid for
them. If states were not able to repay their debts, then China would take over
the infrastructure as a forfeit of collateral.
During this period of time, China developed the New Silk Road project.
The idea behind this new project was to open up a new era of trade that
would not be reliant upon the United States, but rather would allow
increased trade between Beijing and many other parts of the world. This new
project morphed into the One Belt One Road Initiative. Washington
accused Beijing of using the One Belt One Road Initiative and the Confu-
cius centers in Western Europe and the United States to challenge or begin
to challenge the global liberal order.
The crisis in Ukraine served to increase cooperation between Russia and
China. While they had started cooperating using the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, they still were often rivals in Central Asia and had even fought
a border conflict prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, as Rus-
sia’s actions were met with sanctions from the West, Beijing refused to sup-
port those sanctions and officially took a neutral position on Russia’s actions
in the Crimea and Ukraine.
As Russia became more isolated, it sought to cooperate more with
China, which was mutually beneficial. China began to invest more in the
Russian economy, and the two countries began to work more closely mili-
tarily. Beijing saw this as an opportunity to gain a solid ally that was already
opposed to the global liberal order. Moscow, on the other hand, saw more
opportunities to open up the Chinese market to Russian goods as well as
buy electronics and other consumer goods so that it did not have to rely on
goods from the United States and the European Union. Further, Chinese
power had grown enough that Russia was concerned with such a powerful
neighbor so close to them, and by allying themselves with China they pre-
vented a hostile neighbor.
When Donald Trump came to power in 2016, he further isolated China
and began a trade war, using tariffs to try to stop the Chinese economy from
becoming so powerful. These actions only further enhanced Sino-­Russian
cooperation and further allied the two powers. Both powers officially claimed
their support for multilateralism and the end of the current global order. In
other words, they identified themselves as revisionist powers interested in a
shift from unipolarity and US primacy to multipolarity and a new global order
that would be renegotiated with the great powers. Thus, the revisionist powers
have established a stark choice for other states to follow. The revisionist powers
are not strong enough yet to fully take on the liberal order. However, they do
 India’s Place in the World Order • 145

present an alternative to the liberal order, and if they can gain enough allies to
challenge the world order, the order would have to change.
The current state of the world order is one that is under attack and it is
unclear whether or not it can survive. To survive, it must maintain the good-
will and support of the great powers that accept the current world order.
These are not only global great powers but also regional great powers. Fol-
lowing Lemke’s hierarchical model of regional power, it is important that
both global and regional powers support the global order or else the global
order will fall.
Revisionist powers, on the other hand, must convince enough of those
global and regional great powers to be willing to change the global order and
move in a multipolar direction. In other words, these regional and global
great powers become important lynchpins to either maintaining or changing
the global order. India is just such a great power. While some scholars have
argued about whether or not it is a regional great power or a global great
power, India is in a position to serve as a kingmaker in determining the fate
of the global order. In this book we have examined India’s relationships with
both status quo powers (the United States, the EU, the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, and Japan) and the main revisionist powers (Russia and
China). Using network analysis measures and measures of cooperative rela-
tionships developed by Slobodchikoff (2013, 2014), we are able to deter-
mine whether India is more supportive of the status quo or whether it is a
revisionist power.
It should be noted that India has continually professed its neutrality
while simultaneously claiming to want to better its relationship with the
United States and Western Europe while at the same time also pursuing a
relationship with Russia. While India has not withdrawn support for the
current global order, it has also argued and pushed for changes that would
alter the current global hierarchy as well as the structure and composition of
multilateral institutions. While India’s foreign policy remains officially neu-
tral, we seek to examine the country’s true leanings. In order to do so, we
examine India’s bilateral ties with other great powers—­both status quo and
revisionist.
In this chapter, we first provide the details of the analysis of India’s bilat-
eral ties by examining India’s relationships with both status quo and revision-
ist states. Then we look at India’s relationships with each of those groups
separately to determine whether or not there is evidence to show that India
is either a revisionist or a status quo power. Finally, we use the rubric that we
developed earlier in the book to make a final determination on India’s status
in the global order and what this means for the future of the global order.
146 • India as Kingmaker

Table 21. Cooperation Scores between India and the Great Powers
Bilateral Relationship Cooperation Score Power Status in Global Order
India-­France 1.18 Status Quo
India-­Japan 1.1 Status Quo
India-­Russia 1.09 Revisionist
India-­EU 1.08 Status Quo
India-­China .54 Revisionist
India-­UK .53 Status Quo
India-­US .50 Hegemon
India-­Germany .41 Status Quo

As table 21 shows, India has a highly cooperative relationship with four

out of the eight states. The relationship between India and the United States,
the global hegemon, has a low cooperation score. In fact, the bottom three
states are status quo states. In contrast, the top two states ranked by levels of
cooperation score are also status quo states. The first is India’s relationship
with France, as they share many interests in science and technology, nuclear
energy, and defense. Similarly, India has a very cooperative relationship with
Japan. Indo-­Japanese ties are cemented by the need to balance the rise of
China in Asia. However, it is interesting to note that the relationship between
China and India has a higher cooperation score than that between the
United States and India.
Unfortunately, as shown in table 21, there is little indication as to whether
India’s foreign policy aligns itself more with the status quo powers or the
revisionist powers. To delve deeper, we examine each bilateral relationship in
depth. We first start with the status quo powers and then examine India’s
relationship with the revisionist powers.

Is India a Status Quo Power?

If India were a status quo power, we would expect that it would have insti-
tutionalized cooperative relationships with many of the major powers sup-
porting the status quo. Specifically, the most important state would be the
United States, and we should see evidence of institutionalized cooperative
relationships with other developed democracies such as the United King-
dom, France, Germany, and Japan. However, we don’t see evidence of insti-
tutionalized cooperation between India and the United States. Neither do
we find evidence of institutionalized cooperation between India and the
United Kingdom nor India and Germany. As table 22 shows, India has
 India’s Place in the World Order • 147

Table 22. Cooperation Scores for Status Quo Powers

Year US EU UK France Germany Japan
1950 .33 0 0 1 0 .25
1960 .50 0 .50 .25 .17 .27
1970 .25 0 .33 .14 .42 .27
1980 .19 .75 .33 .27 .28 .23
1990 .26 .80 .33 .44 .28 .23
2000 .36 .75 .25 .38 .30 .85
2010 .45 .87 .62 .55 .41 1.10
2019 .50 1.08 .53 1.18 .41 1.10

developed institutionalized cooperation with the EU (1.08), France (1.18),

and Japan (1.10). India maintains only ad hoc cooperation with the United
States (.50), the United Kingdom (.53), and Germany (.41).
Of the status quo powers, India has the highest level of cooperation with
France with a cooperation score of 1.18. India also has a high level of coop-
eration with Japan with a measure of 1.08. It is interesting to note that India
reached an institutionalized cooperative relationship with Japan earlier than
it reached an institutionalized cooperative relationship with any of the other
status quo powers. By 2010, India had institutionalized its cooperation with
Japan, whereas India institutionalized its cooperation with France only in
2020. India’s cooperation with the EU is also institutionalized with a mea-
sure of 1.08. It also took until 2020 to reach an institutionalized relationship
with the EU.
Based on this analysis, India does not meet the criteria for a status quo
power. In fact, we can determine that it is not a status quo power. However,
it is not clear whether India is a revisionist power.
As table 23 shows, the Indo-­Russian cooperation is institutionalized with
a score of 1.09, while the Sino-­Indian cooperation is not institutionalized
with a score of .54. This is not enough to indicate that India is a revisionist
power, but it certainly indicates India’s close historical ties with a revisionist
power, Russia. While India and China are strategic rivals, they also attempt
to cooperate on several issues. The Indo-­Chinese cooperation score is higher
than the Indo-­British and Indo-­German cooperation scores. It is interesting
to note that both table 22 and table 23 show that India institutionalized its
cooperation with both Japan and Russia by 2010, but those were the only
two countries in the analysis with which India developed a cooperative rela-
tionship by 2010. Japan is a regional actor and a status quo power, while Rus-
sia is a revisionist power. In other words, even when looking at the status quo
148 • India as Kingmaker

Table 23. Comparison of India’s Relationship with

Revisionist Powers
Year Russia China
1950 0 0
1960 .6667 .333
1970 .4375 .333
1980 .5926 .333
1990 .6094 .182
2000 .654 .475
2010 1.074 .518
2019 1.09 .540

and revisionist powers individually, India appears to have developed a self-­

interested foreign policy without regard to the global order. To further inves-
tigate whether or not India is a status quo or revisionist state, we now turn to
the rubric developed earlier in the book to classify India’s status in the global
order.
Table 24 shows the rubric that would enable a categorization of India as
either a status quo or a revisionist power. It has five possible categories: solid
status quo power; leans status quo; neutral; leans revisionist; and solid revi-
sionist power. We will go through each of the categories to determine which
category best fits India’s status in the global order.
To qualify as a solid status quo power, table 24 indicates that India should
have an institutionalized cooperative relationship with each of the status quo
great powers (see table 24). We find that this is not the case. While India has
an institutionalized cooperative relationship with France, the EU, and Japan,
it does not have an institutionalized cooperative relationship with the most
important state in the status quo powers, which is the United States, nor
does it have an institutionalized cooperative relationship with Germany or
the United Kingdom. Thus, it is safe to argue that based on our methodology
India cannot be classified as a solid status quo power.
To be classified as a power that leans status quo, India must have institu-
tionalized cooperation with the United States, and develop ad hoc coopera-
tion with the other major powers that are status quo. India does not have an
institutionalized cooperative relationship with the United States, but it does
have an institutionalized cooperative relationship with the EU, France, and
Japan. This would certainly lead us to state that India might lean status quo.
However, with the exception of Germany, India’s relationship with the
United States is one of the least institutionalized of all of the relationships
examined in this book. Therefore, we determine that India does not lean sta-
tus quo.
Table 24. Categorization of Status Quo vs. Revisionist Power
Solid Status Quo Leans Status Quo Undecided Leans Revisionist Solid Revisionist
Institutionalized Institutionalized Either no institu- Institutionalized Institutionalized
Cooperative Cooperative tionalized cooper- Cooperative Cooperative
Relationship Relationship ative relationships Relationship Relationship
with US with US OR with Russia with Russia
Institutionalized
Cooperative
Relationship
with Russia
(Revisionist) and
the United States
(Status Quo).
Institutionalized Ad hoc or Institu- Ad hoc or Institutionalized
Cooperative tionalized Rela- Institutionalized Cooperative
Relationship tionship with EU Relationship Relationship
with UK with China with China
Institutionalized Ad hoc or Lacks Institution-
Cooperative Institutionalized alized Coopera-
Relationship Relationship tive Relationship
with France with France or with US
Germany
Institutionalized Ad hoc or Institu-
Cooperative tionalized
Relationship Relationship
with Germany with Japan
Institutionalized
Cooperative
Relationship
with EU
Institutionalized
Cooperative
Relationship
with Japan
Lacks Institution-
alized Coopera-
tive Relationship
with Russia
150 • India as Kingmaker

To be classified as an undecided or neutral power, we would have to dem-

onstrate that India maintains cooperative relationships with all of the great
powers regardless of whether they are status quo or revisionist, or that they
don’t have an institutionalized cooperative relationship with any of the great
powers. This category is important because India claims neutrality in its for-
eign policy. India has not entirely jettisoned its nonaligned historical
approach and continues to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy. However,
there is evidence that India is not undecided according to the definition and
classification provided. It does not have an institutionalized cooperative rela-
tionship with the United States (the main status quo power), but does have
an institutionalized cooperative relationship with Russia, which is a revision-
ist state.
Table 24 also indicates that to be classified as a solid revisionist power,
India would have to have institutionalized cooperative relationships with
both China and Russia. India does have an institutionalized cooperative rela-
tionship with Russia, but not with China. India’s cooperation score with
China is .54, which is better than its cooperation score with the United
States, but it is not an institutionalized cooperative relationship. As a result,
Indo-­Chinese cooperation can be termed ad hoc. Further, it is important to
note that the cooperation score is higher for India’s relationship with China
than it is for India’s relationship with the United States. The score does not
qualify this bilateral relationship as institutionalized cooperation. However,
given that the cooperation score between India and China is higher than that
between India and the United States, India has a better relationship with
China (a country that it has had conflictual relations with in the past) than
with the United States (the leading status quo power). Based on our method-
ology, India is classified as a state that leans revisionist.
That is not to say that India has turned its back on the global order, merely
that it leans more revisionist than status quo at this time. In other words, India
is still in play for both the status quo and revisionist powers. Both China and
the United States need to work on their relationships with India to convince
India to side with them in the current challenge to the global order. This is
especially true for the United States, as Washington has one of the lowest lev-
els of cooperation with India (0.5). It is only slightly lower than the Indo-­
Chinese cooperation score, but given the India-­China rivalry, one would
expect that if India were more interested in being a status quo power then its
cooperation score with the US would be higher than that with China.
Ultimately, there is still much diplomacy that needs to take place. Despite
the rhetoric of the United States turning and pivoting to Asia, the data show
that this has not happened. If the United States wants to maintain its posi-
 India’s Place in the World Order • 151

tion as the global hegemon and maintain the current world order then it has
a lot of work to do to gain the trust of New Delhi and really begin to institu-
tionalize a cooperative relationship. At this point, the United States cannot
count on India’s support in a competition for the world order, but it also
cannot completely discount India’s support in the future. Similarly, while
China has attempted to improve its relationship with India, it still has a lot
of work ahead if it wants to convince India to join a challenge to the global
order. India seems much more inclined to support multilateralism, but yet is
still concerned about Chinese dominance in the region. It is also concerned
that if China were to gain dominance, we would not see multipolarity, but
would witness either a new bipolar system where the US and China would be
the dominant powers, or, if the challenge to the global order is successful,
possibly even a unipolar system where China would take the place of the
United States as global hegemon.
The global order is currently at an inflection point and the battle to main-
tain it is underway. There is no guarantee of a shift in the global order nor is
there a guarantee that the current global order will remain. There are many
challenges to the current global order and those challenges are both internal
and external. We have seen a rise of nationalism internally in the United
States and within its allies that has shaken the stability of the global order.
The rift between Russia and the United States as well as the rift between the
United States and China have further created cleavages between those pow-
ers. One thing is absolutely clear, and that is that India will play a prominent
part in deciding what the new global order will look like. That is not to say
that India will be the only state that will have significant input in determin-
ing the next global order, merely that it will be one of the most important
states that will have significant input in determining the next global order.
The next decade of the 21st century will be decisive in determining whether
or not the current global order can survive. This study should be expanded to
other regional great powers in different regions of the world to determine
their status in the global order. At that point it would be possible to make a
determination of the likelihood of survival for the current global order.
While the global order’s two strongest powers, the United States and
China, are currently locked in a battle to determine the next global order,
India continues to become stronger. It is not inconceivable that within the
next century India could become one of the most powerful states in the sys-
tem. However, currently India is not vying for control of the global order.
Instead, it is content with holding an important seat at the table of powerful
states and its status as kingmaker for the next hegemon who will create the
new global order.
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Index

Baker, James, 29 Germany, 4, 10, 15–­16, 23–­24, 26,

bipolar system, 3, 15, 17–­21, 25, 27, 30, 29–­30, 33, 57, 59, 60, 82–­83, 85–­86,
36, 52, 65–­66, 113, 117, 140, 151 95–­97, 113, 128, 145–­48
Brazil, 35, 54–­55, 128, 143 Great Britain (United Kingdom), 4–­5,
BRICS, 35, 54–­55, 116, 127–­28, 133, 10, 15–­16, 23–­24, 32, 40, 57, 59, 61,
143 69, 82–­84, 87–­92, 115, 134, 145–­48
Bush, George W., 31–­32, 34, 42, 55, 66, global anarchy, 3, 12–­13, 38
70, 84, 131, 141 global order, 3–­5, 9, 11–­13, 15–­25, 31–­
Bush, H. W., 29 37, 45, 51–­57, 59–­61, 66–­67, 69, 83,
Bush doctrine, 31, 141 97, 99–­100, 117, 126–­28, 130–­31,
134, 138, 141, 143–­46, 148, 150–­51
China (People’s Republic of ), 4–­5, 8–­10, Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich, 27–­30,
16, 31, 33–­37, 50, 53–­58, 60–­61, 129
67–­73, 80–­81, 83, 87, 91, 94, 98–­
103, 108–­10, 116–­19, 127–­38, 140, hegemon, 3–­4, 9, 12–­21, 24–­27, 30–­32,
143–­51 34, 36–­37, 39, 41–­42, 45, 51, 53–­55,
Churchill, Winston, 23–­26 57, 59, 82, 97, 100, 102–­3, 108–­9,
Clinton, William J., 66, 141 118, 128–­29, 131–­33, 138–­39
Cold War, 3–­5, 16, 18, 20–­21, 26, 29–­31, Hegemonic stability theory, 3, 12–­13,
34, 36, 49, 52, 55, 65–­66, 68, 70, 82–­ 19–­20
83, 99, 101–­2, 113–­15, 131–­32, 140–­
41, 143 Iran, 31, 37, 57, 60–­61, 68, 73
iron curtain, 25–­26
European Union (EU), 10, 41, 47, 50, 54,
56–­59, 60, 82–­88, 91–­93, 96–­97, 118, Japan, 9–­10, 15, 23, 35, 57, 59, 71, 79,
128, 141–­42, 144–­48 98–­110, 114, 130, 133–­35, 145–­48

First World, 5, 68 Kashmir, 7–­8, 52, 115

France, 4–­5, 10, 33, 57, 59, 61, 69, 82–­83, Kennan, George, 25–­26
85, 92–­97, 115, 116, 145–­48 Korea, PRK (North Korea), 16, 31, 54,
Free and Open Indo Pacific Strategy, 9, 71 99, 103, 128

163
164 • Index

long telegram, 25–­26 space (exploration and cooperation), 74–­

77, 85–­86, 92–­93, 95, 104, 108, 114,
Modi, Narendra, 55, 56, 101, 115, 117, 120–­24, 126
125, 129, 133
multipolar system, 7, 16, 18, 21, 33–­34, terrorism/counterterrorism, 31–­32, 35,
37, 53–­56, 61, 67, 108, 126, 128–­32, 68, 73–­74, 80, 88, 90–­91, 107, 121,
134, 138–­39, 144–­45, 151 124, 132, 134
Third World, 6, 68
NATO, 26, 29–­30, 32–­33, 36, 44, 53–­54, treaties, 9, 32, 35, 37, 41–­48, 50–­51, 68–­
66–­68, 82–­83, 114, 128, 140 69, 72–­75, 77–­80, 82–­83, 86–­89, 91–­
Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal, 5–­7, 34, 56, 86, 97, 103–­6, 108–­9, 114–­15, 119–­25,
101, 131 134–­37, 142; loadstone treaties, 47,
Non-­aligned Movement (NAM), 5–­7, 68 74–­75, 89, 91, 105, 109, 119, 121,
nuclear energy, 89, 93–­94, 102, 106–­9, 136–­37
124–­26, 146 treaty nesting, 35, 43–­46, 50–­51, 57, 69,
nuclear weapons, 7, 8, 17, 32, 52, 54, 68, 78, 95, 119–­21
70, 99, 101, 102, 107, 113–­16, 128 treaty networks, 35, 37, 50–­51, 57, 81,
114
Obama, Barack, 34, 53, 55–­56, 66–­67, Trump, Donald, 41, 56, 67–­68, 70, 103,
70, 81, 103, 129, 131 129, 134, 139, 144
One Belt One Road (OBOR), 54, 144
Ukraine, 33, 54, 115, 128, 138, 141–­44
Pakistan, 7–­8, 27, 31, 51–­52, 65–­66, 68, unipolar system, 3, 15, 18–­21, 30, 33–­34,
70, 114–­16, 119, 132–­34 37, 49, 52–­56, 66, 71, 128–­30, 132,
Power Transition theory, 4, 20 138–­40, 144, 151
Putin, Vladimir, 31, 53–­54, 114, 125, 141 United Nations, 24, 33, 56, 73–­74, 88,
90, 107, 124, 127, 130–­31, 133
Quad (the), 9, 35, 71, 133 United States, 3–­6, 9–­10, 15–­16, 18–­20,
23–­27, 29–­37, 41–­42, 49, 52–­61, 65–­
Russian Federation (Russia), 4–­5, 8, 10, 72, 74–­84, 97–­103, 110, 113–­20,
23, 30–­37, 47, 50–­51, 53–­58, 60–­61, 127–­35, 137–­38, 140–­51
68–­69, 79, 81, 101, 103, 114–­32, 135,
137–­38, 140–­51 Vietnam, 16, 26, 113

Scientific Cooperation, 75–­76, 85, 125 World War II, 3–­4, 16, 20–­26, 29, 36, 45,
Second World, 5, 68 52, 65, 82, 85–­86, 99, 101, 103, 113,
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 140
(SCO), 8, 35, 55, 116, 130, 138,
143–­44 Xi Jinping, 133
South Africa, 35, 47, 49, 54–­55, 128, 143
Soviet Union, 3, 5–­6, 10, 16, 20, 23–­30, Yalta agreement, 23–­24
32, 39, 45–­46, 52, 54, 65–­66, 68, 70, Yeltsin, Boris, 140–­41
82, 99, 101, 113–­15, 129, 132, 140–­
41, 144