Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 20, Number 1—Winter 2006 —Pages 221–234

Anomalies
Utility Maximization and Experienced
Utility
Daniel Kahneman and Richard H. Thaler

Economics can be distinguished from other social sciences by the belief that
most (all?) behavior can be explained by assuming that rational agents with stable,
well-defined preferences interact in markets that (eventually) clear. An empirical
result qualifies as an anomaly if it is difficult to rationalize or if implausible
assumptions are necessary to explain it within the paradigm. Suggestions for future
topics should be sent to Richard Thaler, c/o Journal of Economic Perspectives, Grad-
uate School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637 or
具[email protected]典.

Introduction

The assumption that utility is always maximized allows often surprising infer-
ences about the nature of the desires that guide people’s ever-rational choices. This
methodology has had many uses and undeniably has charm for economists, but it
rests on the shaky foundation of an implausible and untested assumption. In this
column, we discuss a version of the utility maximization hypothesis that can be
tested—and we find that it is false.
Our analysis begins with a distinction between two senses of the term utility.
Decision utility has also been called “wantability”; it is inferred from choices and used
to explain choices. In contrast, experienced utility refers to the hedonic experience

y Daniel Kahneman is Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Professor of Public

Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, both at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. Richard
H. Thaler is Ralph and Dorothy Keller Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science
and Economics and Director of the Center for Decision Research, Graduate School of Business,
both at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
222 Journal of Economic Perspectives

associated with an outcome. This is the meaning of utility that Jeremy Bentham
introduced, and it was mostly retained by the economists of the nineteenth century.
Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics (1871), for example, was quite explicit about this,
and even defined happiness as the temporal integral of momentary experienced
utility. But the notion of utility as an aspect of experience essentially disappeared
from economic discourse at the beginning of the twentieth century, when utility
came to be construed as decision utility.
In the older interpretation of utility, the question of whether choices maximize
utility has a simple meaning: do people choose the options that they will most
enjoy? In modern decision theory, which ignores the distinction, the question is
quite different: are preferences consistent with each other and with the axioms of
rational choice? A long series of modern challenges to utility theory, starting with
the paradoxes of Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961) and including framing effects,
have demonstrated inconsistency in preferences. This column reviews empirical
challenges to utility maximization, which return to the old question of whether
preferences optimize the experience of outcomes; for an early treatment along
these lines, see Kahneman (1994). Much of this work has focused on a necessary
condition for utility-maximizing choices: an ability of economic agents to make
accurate, or at least unbiased, forecasts of the hedonic outcomes of potential
choices. The research we review shows that this condition is not satisfied: people do
not always know what they will like; they often make systematic errors in predicting
their future experience of outcomes and, as a result, fail to maximize their expe-
rienced utility.
We assume that when making a choice at time t0, the consumer makes a
forecast of the utility of an outcome that will be experienced at a later time t1. These
forecasts of utility, which we call hedonic forecasts, may be explicit (and thus
observable) or implicit, in which case they must be inferred from the agent’s
choices at t0. Systematic errors of hedonic forecasting can be demonstrated in
several ways: by comparing hedonic forecasts with direct measures of experienced
utility; by creating situations in which choices lead to demonstrably inferior expe-
riences; and by showing that hedonic forecasts or choices are influenced by factors
that are clearly irrelevant.
Consider the example of a very hungry shopper (he missed lunch) doing his
weekly shopping at a grocery store late one Monday afternoon. If his current state
of hunger induces him to buy an overly large dinner portion for consumption later
in the week (on a day when he will eat his normal lunch at the office) then he has
made a forecasting error that has led to a bad choice. As we illustrate below, such
forecasting errors can arise for a variety of reasons. Most hedonic forecasting is
done intuitively rather than carefully considered, and forecasts are susceptible to
the biases found in other intuitive judgments (Kahneman, 2003; Gilovich, Griffin
and Kahneman, 2004). Unlike the products of deliberate and conscious reasoning
activity (such as the process that produces the answer to the question 17 ⫻ 24 ⫽ ?),
intuitive judgments express impressions (or feelings or immediate preferences)
 Daniel Kahneman and Richard H. Thaler 223

that come spontaneously to mind. In the jargon of psychology, such thoughts are
labeled highly accessible.
A process of substitution is involved in many of the heuristics that govern
intuitive thinking. When people confront a difficult question, the answer to a
related question will often come to mind first. The accessible answer may be
adopted as the required answer without the individual ever becoming aware that
the wrong question has been answered (Kahneman, 2003). For example, the
choices of the hungry shopper who salivates at the sight of enticing food items may
express his current aroused state, rather than a dispassionate forecast of his
appetite on Thursday evening. In many cases, the substitute answer is only one of
the determinants of the final judgment or decision. However, the net outcome of
substitution is a directional bias, known as anchoring, toward the highly accessible
response to a question that was not asked.
We consider an individual who makes a decision at time t0 that will affect
consumption at some later time t1. The context and mental state of the individual
at t0 influences the intuitive evaluations that will come to mind when the decision
is made. If the circumstances at t1 and t0 differ, judgments and decisions that reflect
the state at t0 are likely to be biased. An early study provides a simple example.
Subjects tasted a spoonful of plain yogurt and immediately rated their experience.
They were then asked to predict how they would rate the experience of consuming
a full cup of the same yogurt. A strong anchoring effect was observed: most subjects
erroneously predicted that they would rate the experience of a full cup the same as
they had just rated the spoonful. They evidently failed to anticipate that ingesting
a substantial amount of a disliked substance is distinctly worse than a single swallow.
To be clear, we do not claim that people do not know what they like. They do,
when t1 immediately follows t0 and when the experience is familiar: we are rarely
surprised by the taste of the second spoonful from a bowl of soup. However, people
do not always know what they will like, and they are likely to err most severely when
the temporal gap is long and when the agent’s state and circumstances vary
between t1 and t0. In this column we discuss four areas in which errors of hedonic
forecasting and choice have been documented: 1) where the emotional or moti-
vational state of the agent is very different at t0 and at t1; 2) where the nature of the
decision focuses attention on aspects of the outcome that will not be salient when
it is actually experienced; 3) when choices are made on the basis of flawed
evaluations of past experiences; and 4) when people forecast their future adjust-
ment to new life circumstances.

Effects of the Current Emotional State

The “hungry shopper” example illustrates a proposition that has been system-
atically explored in numerous studies: forecasts of future hedonic and emotional
states are anchored in the current emotional and motivational state. The outcome
has been labeled a “projection bias” (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003)
224 Journal of Economic Perspectives

since consumers are seemingly projecting their current mental state onto a future
one. In particular, Loewenstein has documented what he calls a “hot-cold empathy
gap.” When aroused— by hunger, sex or anger—people mispredict how they will
behave in a “cool” state, and when cool they mispredict the influence of arousal. In
both situations they underestimate the impact of a change from their current state.
The hungry shopper is not hypothetical. It is well-established that shoppers
who are hungry tend to buy food as if they expected to remain permanently
famished (Nisbett and Kanouse, 1968), but shoppers who are given a muffin to eat
before entering the supermarket are more likely to restrict their shopping to the
items on their list (Gilbert, Gill and Wilson, 1998). The effect is easily explained:
the attractiveness of food increases with current hunger. Of course, the delicacy (or
bag of potato chips) that appears irresistibly succulent to the hungry shopper may
have lost much of its charm when it is consumed later. Similar effects have been
found for other motives. For example, Badger, Bickel, Giordano, Jacobs, Loewen-
stein and Marsch (2004) documented a projection bias in a study of heroin addicts.
Addicts who had not yet received a dose of a heroin substitute Buprenorphine
(BUP) were willing to pay significantly more for an extra dose, due to be delivered
five days later, than were addicts who had just received their dose of BUP and were
temporarily in a drug-satiated state. In a more mundane context, Colin,
O’Donoghue and Vogelsang (2004) find that catalogue shoppers ordering by
telephone are overly influenced by the current weather, and prone to buy items
they will not want later. For example, warm clothes purchased on very cold days are
more likely to be subsequently returned.
Another demonstration of projection bias is provided by Read and Van Leeu-
wen (1998), who offered office workers a choice between a healthy and an un-
healthy snack (fruit versus candy bar) to be delivered in a week, either at a time
when the workers would expect to be hungry (late afternoon) or full (right after
lunch). Some workers made this choice when they were hungry, others when full.
There are two main findings. First, workers are more likely to opt for the naughty
snack if it will be delivered when they expect to be hungry. This choice expresses a
correct hedonic forecast: hungry people are indeed more likely than sated people
to choose candy over fruit for immediate consumption. However, the workers were
also more likely to choose the unhealthy snack when they were hungry at the time of
making the choice.
The projection bias implies a violation of utility maximization, because it is
highly unlikely that the enjoyment of the snack next week will be influenced by the
level of hunger at the moment of choice. Anchoring on the present state also causes
errors if the salience of different aspects of an outcome is not the same when it is
chosen and when it is experienced. The purchase of membership in sports clubs
provides an example. The health benefits are the focus of attention at the time of
purchase, but other considerations are likely to be more salient when the question
is whether to visit the club. The failure to anticipate these shifts of salience may
contribute to many purchases of memberships by people who later make little or no
use of them (Della Vigna and Malmendier, forthcoming).
 Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility 225

More generally, some virtuous choices that people make may involve a lack of
empathy for the future self who will have to live with the choice. In an elegant
demonstration of this phenomenon, Read, Loewenstein and Kalyanaraman (1999)
provided experimental participants with coupons that allowed them free rental of
several films. Films of two types were available: some were edifying or “highbrow”
(like Schindler’s List) while others were lowbrow and fun (Sleepless in Seattle). The
films were to be available either for the same evening or for the next day. Subjects
tended to select lowbrow movies for viewing tonight and highbrow movies for
tomorrow. The desire to improve one’s mind is apparently more salient when
choosing a movie for later, while the desire to relax is more salient when choosing
for the very near future. It is unlikely that these conflicting choices are both utility
maximizing.

Effects of the Context of Choice

The main strategy of the studies we discuss in this section involves a search for
differences between the state of the individual at time t0 and t1 , which may cause
discrepancies between the utility of a good in decision or forecast and its utility in
actual experience. Two aspects of the task that is performed at t0 have been
investigated as a source of such discrepancies: whether the task requires the
evaluation of a single good or a comparison of the values of two competing goods;
and whether a decision involves multiple goods that will be consumed at different
times.
A good may be evaluated in explicit comparison with other goods (joint
evaluation) or on its own (separate evaluation). The preference ranking of two goods
may be different when they are compared explicitly to each other (joint evaluation)
or evaluated separately, perhaps by willingness to pay or by a rating. Hsee (2000)
has documented one of the mechanisms that produce such reversals of preference:
subtle differences between goods (like two shades of purple) may be highly
noticeable when the goods are directly compared, but the same differences may be
completely undetectable when the goods are evaluated separately. The salience of
attributes of a good can therefore be quite different in joint and in separate
evaluation.
Hsee (2000) observed that the context in which consumers make choices is
likely to induce similar reversals, because consumers often make choices in joint
evaluation (for example when comparing televisions at a store), but subsequently
experience only the option they chose. He offered a compelling thought experi-
ment to illustrate the point. Imagine that you are in the market for stereo speakers
and that you are comparing various models at the home audio store. You narrow
your choice down to two similarly priced models, A and B. The A speakers sound
somewhat better than the B speakers, but are quite ugly. Which do you choose? At
the store you engage in joint evaluation, comparing one model against another.
Furthermore, your attention is likely to be focused on the quality of the sound and
226 Journal of Economic Perspectives

you may assign considerable weight to small differences in this attribute. But your
task is to predict the utility you will derive from the speakers when you listen to
music at home. At home there will be just one set of speakers, so you will be
performing a separate evaluation. Small differences in sound quality will not be
noticeable without a standard of comparison. In contrast, comparison is not
required to evaluate whether an object is ugly or beautiful. Consumers are there-
fore susceptible to the mistake that Hsee described, paying too much attention to
the small (but noticeable in the store) difference in sound quality and too little
attention to appearance.
Comparative effects can arise even when the task does not explicitly require it.
Volunteers in a study conducted by Morewedge, Gilbert and Myrseth (2005) were
asked to predict how much they would enjoy eating potato chips a few minutes
later. In one experimental condition subjects could also see a chocolate bar next to
the potato chips; in another condition the chocolate was replaced by a tin of
sardines. The irrelevant foods influenced the participants’ predictions of their
future enjoyment, which was reduced by the presence of the chocolate (subjects
prefer chocolate to chips to sardines). The prediction was comparative, although
no comparison was required. Actual enjoyment of the chips, however, was com-
pletely unaffected by the irrelevant food that remained on the table. The experi-
ence of eating is focused on the food one consumes and is not comparative.
A different type of discrepancy between the context of choice and the context
of experience arises when people make a simultaneous choice about goods that will
be consumed sequentially. An example is the choice of which CDs to load into the
stack of a CD player (Read, Antonides, van den Ouden and Trienekens, 2001). The
construction of a sequence inevitably highlights the attribute of variety (in the case
of CDs, variety of singers or of types of music). However, the variety of a sequence
is usually less salient in the experience of consumption. As a consequence, people
often choose more variability than they will actually enjoy. Variety is also less salient
when the elements of the sequence are chosen one at a time than when they are
chosen all at once.
In the first demonstration of this phenomenon (Simonson, 1990), students
chose three snacks from a menu of six alternatives (like Snickers bars and Oreo
cookies), one snack for each of three class sessions. Students in the simultaneous-
choice group chose all three snacks during the first session, while the sequential-
choice group chose a single snack in each session. Simultaneous-choice subjects
typically took a different snack for each class, while sequential-choice subjects often
wanted the same snack every time. Here again, the highly accessible answer to a
question that has not been asked appears to dominate the decision. Imagining
one’s tastes in a week is cognitively more demanding than consulting one’s current
inclinations, and the unasked question is whether the participant would want three
helpings of the same snack right now, or would prefer some variety. Simonson and
Winer (1992) found similar behavior in actual purchases. Families who purchased
the same number of tubs of yogurt took more variety in flavors if they purchased
them in one shopping trip than in several trips.
 Daniel Kahneman and Richard H. Thaler 227

Read and Loewenstein (1995) introduced the term diversification bias to refer
to the excess variety-seeking in simultaneous choice. The term implies that sequen-
tial choice leads to higher experienced utility. This prediction was confirmed in
several studies in which participants reported their enjoyment of decisions made
either simultaneously or sequentially. For example, participants in a study by Read,
Antonides, van den Ouden and Trienekens (2001) chose two audio tracks (music
or comedy) either sequentially or simultaneously. They chose more variety in
simultaneous choice, but they enjoyed high-variety sets less than low-variety ones.
The authors proposed that simultaneous decisions cause the attribute of variety to
be much more salient in simultaneous choice than it will be at the time of actual
consumption. One reason for this is that two items in the same category (say albums
by U2 and the Rolling Stones, both rock bands) may appear quite similar when
considered in the broad context of all music, including jazz, classical and so on, but
will be still be quite distinctive when experienced in immediate succession.

Learning from the Past

Consumers’ choices often involve experiences they have already had, as in

visiting a restaurant with a familiar menu. Preferences and hedonic forecasts are
informed by personal memory in these cases and might therefore be expected to be
extremely accurate. Indeed, choices from a familiar menu do not yield many
hedonic surprises. However, hedonic forecasts that are based on stored evaluations
of past encounters will be biased if these memories are biased, and several sources
of such biases of remembered utility have been established. Like forecasts of the
future, evaluations of the past are anchored on the individual’s emotional state
when the evaluation is made (Stone, Broderick, Porter and Kaell, 1997). In addi-
tion, global evaluations of extended outcomes systematically overweight some parts
of the experience and underweight others. These biases produce compelling
violations of utility maximization.
Biased evaluations of past episodes were documented in a series of early
experiments in which participants reported retrospective evaluations of experi-
ences that varied in both hedonic value and duration: for example, pleasant or
horrific films, annoyingly loud sounds and painful medical procedures (Schreiber
and Kahneman, 2000). In most of these experiments, the participants also provided
a continuous or intermittent report of the quality of their current experience, using
a joystick or answering periodic questions. A robust finding of the retrospective
evaluations collected in these studies was labeled duration neglect: retrospective
evaluations of episodes were radically insensitive to variations of duration. Subjects’
retrospective evaluations of both pleasant and unpleasant experiences were well-
explained by a peak/end rule: a simple average of the quality of the experience at its
most extreme moment and at its end predicted retrospective evaluations with
substantial accuracy.
The peak/end rule violates an elementary principle of rational evaluation,
228 Journal of Economic Perspectives

temporal monotonicity, which asserts that increasing the duration of a painful episode
does not improve its overall utility. By the peak/end rule, however, extending a
period of pain can improve its remembered utility if the peak is unchanged and the
new end is less aversive than the original. To demonstrate this result, Kahneman,
Fredrickson, Schreiber and Redelmeir (1993) paid experimental participants to
undergo three trials of an experience called the cold-pressor, in which a hand is
immersed to the wrist in painfully cold water and kept there until the experimenter
announces that it may be removed. The first two trials were conducted as follows.
In the Short trial, a hand was immersed in water at 14°C for 60 seconds. In the Long
trial, the hand was also immersed at 14°C for 60 seconds, and then over the next
30 seconds, the temperature was gradually raised to 15°C. The two trials were
separated by seven minutes, and their order was counterbalanced across subjects.
The participants continuously indicated the intensity of the pain they experienced,
using a joystick. The mean of reported pain intensity in both conditions was 8.4 on
a scale of 0 –14 after 60 seconds, which is when the Short trial ended. When the
Long trial ended, mean reported pain was only 6.5, still somewhat painful, but a
distinct improvement of the peak/end average.
Seven minutes after the second trial, the participant was asked to choose which
of the two experiences would be repeated for the third trial. Overall, 22 of
32 participants elected to repeat the Long trial, which exposed them to 30 seconds
of pain they could have avoided. The proportion of choices of the Long trial was
80 percent (17/21) among the participants who indicated diminishing pain during
the last 30 seconds of that trial. The remaining 11 participants, who had indicated
no change in pain, divided their choices about equally between the Long and the
Short trial. Both results are predicted by the peak/end rule.
Similar violations of temporal monotonicity have been observed in diverse
settings. For example, a clinical trial of colonoscopy was conducted in which half
the patients were randomly exposed to a condition in which their colonoscopy was
extended by keeping the instrument stationary for about a minute before removing
it (Redelmeier, Katz and Kahneman, 2003). The extra period was uncomfortable,
but not very painful.1 This manipulation resulted in a highly significant improve-
ment of retrospective judgments of the pain of the procedure and in a marginal
increase in the observed frequency of repeat colonoscopies within the subsequent
five years. Violations of dominance were also found in choices between episodes of
annoyingly loud noise (Schreiber and Kahneman, 2000): adding a period of mildly
reduced loudness to an unpleasant noise made it less aversive in memory and more
likely to be chosen for repetition.
The violations of temporal monotonicity in these experiments are not inten-
tional. Subjects recognize the validity of this rule and conform to it if their attention
is appropriately directed. Indeed, experimental participants prefer the Short cold-

1
These experiments were conducted before it became common practice to sedate patients heavily. We
are cheerfully able to reassure anyone being urged their doctor to undergo this procedure that “you
won’t feel a thing.”
 Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility 229

pressor trial over the Long one when the two trials are verbally described. When
they choose on the basis of their memories, however, their preferences reflect the
neglect of duration as a factor in the evaluation of past episodes.

Mispredicting Adaptation

People must sometimes predict the hedonic effect of a long-term change in life
circumstances. Social psychologists Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson originally
coined the term “affective forecasting” to describe this mental activity. Many of the
changes that people make in their life circumstances are driven by the wish to
improve their happiness or reduce their unhappiness and inevitably invoke some
idea of the hedonic effects of these circumstances. People forecast the happiness or
misery of acquaintances who marry, of couples who divorce, of professors who get
tenure and others who do not, of people who move from the Midwest to California
or others who move in the opposite direction. People also have strong intuitions
about the effects on well-being of being rich or poor, obese or athletic, old or
young. These intuitions and forecasts may be relevant to decisions about jobs,
marriage, divorce and moving to California. As Gilbert and Wilson (2000) noted,
mistakes of affective forecasting can cause erroneous choices, which they called
“miswanting.”
The central result of many explorations of affective forecasting and of intuitive
theories about well-being has been described as a “focusing illusion,” which
Schkade and Kahneman (1998) summarized by a maxim: “Nothing in life matters
quite as much as you think it does while you are thinking about it.” In other words,
there is a powerful tendency to exaggerate the importance of any aspect of life
when one focuses attention on it. The bias is easily explained. The task of evaluating
the impact of a change in life circumstances inevitably draws attention to the
distinctive aspects of the change. For example, thoughts of climate are very likely to
be salient in considering a move to California, or in evaluating a proposition such
as “people are happier in California.” But this selective focus is likely to bias
judgments, for at least two reasons: 1) as in the projection bias, forecasts made
when attention is focused on some attribute of an outcome are likely to be in error
if attention is not directed to the same attribute at the critical time in the future; and
2) affective forecasts almost always deal with outcomes that will not remain at the
focus of attention forever.
Schkade and Kahneman (1998) observed a focusing illusion in investigating a
question many of us who live in the East or Midwest have wondered about: would
we be happier if we lived in California? They polled students at two large Midwest
universities and two large southern California universities. The students were asked
a series of questions about life satisfaction, either about themselves or “a student
with your values and interests” at one of the other universities. Respondents in both
California and the Midwest believed that students in California would be signifi-
cantly happier, yet self-reported happiness was virtually identical in the two
230 Journal of Economic Perspectives

locations. The explanation is straightforward: When asked to report on their

well-being, people normally focus on more central aspects of life and pay little
attention to the climate. When they try to imagine the happiness of someone in a
different location, however, dimensions on which the regions differ will loom large.
Climate is therefore more important in affective forecasts than in actual well-
being— hence the bias.2
The focusing illusion helps resolve two central puzzles in the study of well-
being. The first puzzling observation is that people often adapt surprisingly well to
important changes in their lives, even such dramatic changes as becoming a
paraplegic or winning the lottery. These events may have large immediate effects
on well-being or misery, but the effects tend to be short-lived. The second puzzling
observation is that the first is surprising. Although adaptation is ubiquitous, it is
poorly represented in the naı̈ve theory of well-being from which affective forecasts
are drawn. Unless they knew a paraplegic personally, for example, respondents in
an experiment described by Kahneman (2000) made similar predictions of the
mood of a paraplegic, regardless of whether they were told that the individual had
been paralyzed for only a month or for a whole year. The same insensitivity to time
was observed when respondents predicted the mood of lottery winners. Here
again— unless they knew a lottery winner personally—respondents predicted the
same level of euphoria for lottery winners a month or a year after the event. In both
situations the pattern of responses was quite different for respondents who had
personal knowledge of a relevant case. Personal knowledge was not a significant
factor in predictions of the initial misery of paraplegics and the initial bliss of lottery
winners—we suspect that naı̈ve predictions of the initial emotional response to
significant events are often accurate. However, only the better-informed respon-
dents knew that the initial misery or bliss have largely dissipated within a year of the
event.
Withdrawal of attention is the main mechanism of adaptation to life changes
such as becoming a paraplegic, becoming suddenly wealthy or getting married.
Attention is normally associated with novelty. Thus, the newly paraplegic, lottery
winner or newlywed is almost continuously aware of that state. But as the new state
loses its novelty it ceases to be the exclusive focus of attention, and other aspects of
life again evoke their varying hedonic responses. Research indicates that paraple-
gics are in a fairly good mood more than half the time as soon as one month after
their crippling accident. Intuitive affective forecasts will miss this process of atten-
tional adaptation, unless they are corrected by specific personal knowledge.
Gilbert and Wilson have conducted a systematic program of research on biases
of affective forecasting, in which they reported several demonstrations of duration
bias, which is their label for the underestimation of adaptation. In a typical study,
Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg and Wheatley (1998) interviewed current and
former junior faculty members at the University of Texas. The current assistant

2
Truth in advertising forces us to disclose that one of the authors of the California study has recently
moved to southern California, but he claims that the move was not (solely) influenced by the weather.
 Daniel Kahneman and Richard H. Thaler 231

professors were asked a series of 14 “life satisfaction” questions (“in general, how
happy are you these days. . .”) and then were also asked about how happy they
would be at various stages of their life in the event that they were either given or
denied tenure. Former assistant professors—some of whom had been promoted,
others denied—were also polled about their happiness. These were pooled into two
groups: those whose tenure decision was within the past five years, and those for
whom it had been from six to ten years ago. Current junior faculty members think
that tenure will make them very happy in the short run (first five years) and
somewhat less happy thereafter. They also think that getting denied will make them
quite miserable during the first five years, though they expect to be pretty well
recovered after that. However, actual reactions during the first five years after the
tenure decision— both favorable and unfavorable—were generally far milder than
anticipated. Gilbert et al. report similar biases in forecasts regarding the impact of
success or failure in other domains, from dating to the outcome of a political
election or a major sporting event. The conclusion from this body of research is
that people are systematically wrong in their expectations about the life circum-
stances that will increase or decrease their happiness, which in turn implies that life
choices that people make in their pursuit of happiness are also likely to be wrong.

Commentary

Utility maximization is usefully thought of as a goal. People are trying to make

choices that will, on average, make them as well-off as possible, as judged by
themselves, not others. But to maximize utility successfully, one must start by
making a forecast about how the various possible outcomes will be experienced.
And, if forecasts are systematically biased, then choices may systematically fail to
maximize utility. The studies we have reviewed here document numerous cases
where forecasts of future utility do appear to be biased.
Although many of the experimental studies we have reviewed here use inex-
pensive objects such as snacks and CDs in their designs, it would be a mistake to
think that the failure to maximize utility is a low-stakes problem. Getting the
portfolio of snacks right is an easy problem compared to forming a portfolio of
retirement investments, and the problem a young person faces in predicting her
tastes and income requirements in retirement is difficult indeed. Even the task of
choosing how to make the best of what resources are available now is a nontrivial
one that people may be getting quite wrong. For example, Tibor Scitovsky (1976)
in his classic book, The Joyless Economy, argued that consumers, especially American
consumers, mistakenly purchase too much of what he called “comforts” and too
little of what he called “pleasures.” Indeed, Americans and Europeans have reached
quite different equilibria regarding issues such as vacation time. It is certainly
possible that American workers would be happier with more vacation and less pay.
We should end on an important proviso. The fact that people sometimes fail
to maximize utility does not imply that someone else (spouses, parents, employers,
232 Journal of Economic Perspectives

governments) should usurp the right to choose. Spouses, parents, employers and
bureaucrats also make errors, and the best parents are those who let their children
make some of their own mistakes. But in some cases, those who are “in charge” can
guide and influence choices without restricting anyone’s freedom to choose,
adopting what Sunstein and Thaler (2004) call “libertarian paternalism.” One tool
of libertarian paternalists is setting default options in such a way as to help people
avoid the most common errors of utility maximization. Because of strong inertia,
and other factors, default choices are often selected even when opting out is
essentially costless. For example, an enlightened employer might gradually add
days of vacation time (and smaller pay increases) while giving employees the right
to work those extra vacation days for pay (so all options remain available). Though
workers might not select the new default option themselves if starting from scratch,
they might find themselves both taking the extra vacation days and being reluctant
to leave for another job with “less” vacation time. If so, they would have been helped
on their way to successful utility maximization.

y The authors wish to thank Dan Gilbert, Chris Hsee, George Loewenstein, Daniel Read,
David Schkade and all the editors for extremely helpful comments. Kahneman thanks the
National Institute on Ageing, the Hewlett Foundation and the Woodrow Wilson School for
Public and International Affairs at Princeton University for research support.

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279. Bruno S. Frey, Simon Luechinger, Alois Stutzer. 2010. The Life Satisfaction Approach to
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287. Krzysztof Kontek. 2010. Decision Utility Theory: Back to von Neumann, Morgenstern, and
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302. Cass R. Sunstein. 2008. Illusory Losses. The Journal of Legal Studies 37:S2, S157-S194. [Crossref]
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308. Daniel Mueller, Philipp C. Wichardt. 2007. Why Not Sell Lottery Tickets in a Pharmacy: On
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310. Daniel Kahneman, Alan B. Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, Arthur A. Stone. 2006. Would
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