Eduardo Frei, The Alliance that Lost its Way, 1967

Elected President of Chile in 1964, Eduardo Frei had initially been supportive of the Alliance for
Progress. However, as his frustrations grew he took up an invitation from Foreign Affairs to explain
how he thought the program had failed to live up to its promise.

The Alliance for Progress is committed to the achievement of a revolution which, as a political
instrument, should be placed at the service of democratic ideas and the interests of the majority so that it
will bring forth a substantial change in the political, social and economic structures of the region. This
change must be swift, and the responsibility for bringing it about belongs not just to a group of leaders or
to a technocratic élite but to the whole of society…

Latin American public opinion received the Alliance with enthusiasm; it was regarded as the beginning of
a period which would open enormous possibilities for the economic and social development of Latin
America. At the same time it marked the end of an unhappy period in which, as President Kennedy said,
North Americans had not always grasped the significance of the Western Hemisphere’s common mission.
In fact, the Alliance was essentially a Latin American conception which became reality because it was
accepted by the United States and specially by President Kennedy, who understood it and injected new
life into it.

In spite of its limitations, the Charter of Punta del Este had an immediate and significant impact. In the
first place, from a political point of view it was clearly seen that the United States supported basic change.
As a result, economic and political interests became active in opposition. An unholy alliance of the
extreme Right and Left took form to prevent the Charter’s implementation. The reactionaries, mindful of
their vested interests, maintained that the Alliance was a utopian and unrealistic program; the Marxist
groups described it as an instrument of imperialism, useless for bringing about the needed change.
Though using different reasons and channels, both were in accord—neither for the first time nor for the
last. The victims have been the Latin American people, because this collusion prevented the reforms
necessary for instituting a rapid and authentic democratic process in the hemisphere.

Thus started a long controversy on the nature of the Alliance. Its ideas have been interpreted and
reinterpreted; its objectives, principles and achievements have been openly and covertly distorted.
Moreover, governments which had accepted and wanted to put the Punta del Este program into operation
were either overthrown or found themselves threatened by the reactionary forces of the continent or by
the violence of the extreme left.

This has resulted in many divergent opinions being formed about the Alliance. Some regard it as a
scheme to finance corrupt governments uninterested in reforming anything; others think of it as a program
to make the rich richer. To the landed, industrial and financial oligarchies, the Alliance represents a
danger because, by placing an exaggerated emphasis on social revolution, it deters foreign investors. To
others, emergency aid is only a way of propping up a false stability which in turn prevents the working
class from truly understanding its situation and opportunities, thus retarding the real revolution. Many
others, especially those representing governments, complained that the work of the Alliance was being
slowed up by the requirement that planning and reform precede the granting of aid…

Other criticisms have been made, but the ones that really matter have come from those effectively
committed to the ideals of the Alliance—those who have expressly given it their backing or have
supported national or international policies which coincide with the objectives of the Alliance.
Has the Alliance achieved these objectives? Has it preserved democracy and helped to implement
substantial changes? Unfortunately the answer is negative; the Alliance has not achieved the expected
success. It cannot be said that since 1961 there has been a consolidation of democratic régimes in Latin
America. On the contrary, various forces have threatened democratic governments, seeking either to
overthrow them or to prevent the implementation of their programs. Nor have structural reforms taken
place at the expected rate.

This does not mean that the Alliance has failed. It has brought about many beneficial changes. Under its
auspices there have been advances in education, in public health services, in communal improvement, in
the development of rational economic programs and in better understanding between Latin America and
the United States. But these constructive achievements could have been secured simply with the financial
assistance of the United States, plus, of course, the demand that these additional resources should be used
rationally by the recipient countries. The problem is that what was fundamental to the Alliance for
Progress—a revolutionary approach to the need for reform—has not been achieved. Less than half of the
Latin American countries have started serious programs of agrarian reform. Drastic changes in the tax
system are even scarcer, while the number of genuinely democratic régimes, far from increasing, has
actually declined. In other words there has been no strengthening of the political and social foundations
for economic progress in Latin America. This is the reason why the ultimate objective of the Alliance—
the formation of just, stable, democratic and dynamic societies—is as distant today as it was five years
ago. Several experiences indicate that economic progress alone does not suffice to ensure the building of
truly free societies and peaceful international coexistence. The problem does not stem solely from the
inadequate flow of internal financial resources. What has been lacking is a clear ideological direction and
determination on the part of the political leaders to bring about change. These two factors are intimately
related and they involve the collective political responsibility of all the members of the Alliance.

Many Latin American governments have used the Alliance as a bargaining lever to obtain increases in U.
S. aid precisely so as to avoid changing their domestic situation. These governments have committed
themselves to internal reforms which later they knowingly allowed either to become a dead letter, or
worse, to be completely controlled or used for the benefit of those in power.

For some of those who signed the Charter of Punta del Este, the important fact was the promise of the
United States to help find $20 billion for Latin America. The reforms and the structural changes were
regarded only as marginal conditions, clearly less important than the increase in financial aid. That is why
the meaning of the Alliance was distorted and its origins often forgotten. To avoid compulsory reforms—
in other words, to avoid revolution—the Latin American right wing willingly coöperated with the
Marxists in regarding the Alliance as a creation of the United States exclusively. From this position they
made unfair demands on the United States, destroying the true meaning of the national effort to
accomplish the tasks of the Alliance. The Alliance ceased to be mentioned or studied in Latin America
except when it involved a commitment on the part of the United States, while in the United States the
Executive, Congress, the intellectuals and even public opinion accepted it as a vital task—but a distorted
task because, unfortunately, the United States also fell into the trap.

It is unnecessary to point out names or dates, but at some stage the imaginative, dynamic commitment of
countries united by a common ideal was gone. The name, Alliance for Progress, became yet another label
for all forms of aid. Uncoördinated emergency loans became “Alliance loans;” technical and financial aid
freely given to dictatorships was also “Alliance aid.” The Alliance in fact became just one more source of
assistance instead of a concerted program of mutual coöperation. Even though the aid retained its
financial value, its ideological significance was completely lost. The flow of dollars given by the United
States was carefully watched, but there was no equivalent effort on the part of Latin Americans to reform
and become more democratic. Hence the Alliance has not reached the people of Latin America for whom
it was created.
This is one of the most serious criticisms made of the Alliance: that the people have not been able to
participate in it. Could it have been otherwise? The people are grateful for the assistance received, but
they have no sense of belonging to the scheme. The revolutionary awareness of the Latin American
people has evolved in such a way that it can now be considered as a norm—giving direction to their
principal activities. The Alliance has failed to channel this awareness, and it has not provided the needed
leadership; in fact, it does not belong in this revolutionary mainstream.

The Latin American institutions which collaborate with the Alliance do not include trade unions, student
federations, peasant leagues, cooperatives, etc., yet it is vital that such organizations should take part in an
enterprise which is essentially popular and whose success depends fundamentally on its capacity to satisfy
the demands made by the community. From a political point of view this is one of the weakest aspects of
the Alliance; its task is to carry through a revolution which will bring about economic and social
development, and for this it is absolutely necessary that the people as a whole be committed to it. The
loyal participation of the community in this effort to build an egalitarian society is the only way in which
the objective can be achieved. This is why the Alliance must incorporate all sectors of society in its work
of transformation.

Eduardo Frei Montalva, “The Alliance that Lost its Way,” Foreign Affairs 45, 3 (April 1967) 437-448.