Communication

Theory

Communication
Theory

Arthur A. Raney Fourteen:

Four

November
2004
Expanding Disposition Theory:
Reconsidering Character Liking, Pages
348–369
Moral Evaluations, and Enjoyment

In an attempt to expand the scope of the disposition theory of drama and to

further explore the enjoyment of media entertainment, this article reexamines
how viewers form and maintain strong feelings toward media characters. To
that end, schema-theory literature is employed to offer possible alternative pro-
cesses by which these bonds are first formed. Secondly, the article investigates
the ways that viewers seek to perpetuate and defend those strong feelings for
the sake of enjoyment. Several attitude and perception theories are examined to
further inform our understanding of enjoyment. Finally, the article considers
the potential implications on the disposition theory of drama and on our under-
standing of media enjoyment in general.

We want to enjoy watching films and television. No doubt, as media

consumers, we want to get a lot more out of these media experiences as
well: accurate weather reports, thoughtful analysis of current affairs, a
snapshot of our (and others’) culture, to see just how much of our ward-
robe is out of style, and on and on. Nonetheless, simply put: We often
want to enjoy—and to enjoy thoroughly at that—what we are watch-
ing. Who can blame us? The ritual of television and film viewing in-
volves a tremendous investment of time, attention, and mental and emo-
tional energy, often to the neglect of other, more pressing matters like
laundry, exercise, and scholarly writing. Consequently, we desire a guar-
anteed return on our investment; we want to think and feel that our
energy has been well spent. So, we seek out media products we think
will help us reach this ultimate goal of enjoyment. The purpose of this
paper is to further examine enjoyment and the steps that we as viewers
often take to help ensure that we will experience it.
The exact nature of enjoyment has yet to be fully determined. Most
scholars agree that the concept, at least as it is used in relation to media
entertainment, has not been fully explicated. Regardless, most of us know
enjoyment when we see it, or better yet, when we feel it. For our pur-
poses, media enjoyment can be conceptualized as the sense of pleasure

Copyright © 2004 International Communication Association

348
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Expanding Disposition Theory

that one derives from consuming media products. From past experi-
ences, we tend to know which types of media fare are most likely to
generate those feelings of pleasure. So, when we are in need (or in want)
of enjoyment, we tend to know where to turn. Several perspectives from
entertainment studies describe and explore this practice: selective expo-
sure (e.g., Klapper, 1960; Sweeny & Gruber, 1984; Vidmar & Rokeach,
1974), uses and gratifications (e.g., Johnson, 1995; Perse, 1986; Turow,
1974; Vincent & Basil, 1997), and mood management (e.g., Biswas, Riffe,
& Zillmann, 1994; Christ & Medoff, 1984; Knobloch & Zillmann, 2002).
Although a theory that can ultimately predict whether an individual
will like or dislike a particular program, film, narrative, or character
does not exist, disposition-based theories of media enjoyment can serve
as useful guides in understanding how and why people enjoy these things.
Disposition-based theories (for a comprehensive summary, see Raney,
2003) contend that enjoyment of media content is a function of a viewer’s
affective disposition toward characters and the story line outcomes as-
sociated with those characters. The theories predict that enjoyment in-
creases when highly liked characters experience positive outcomes, when
highly disliked characters experience negative outcomes, or both. Con-
versely, enjoyment decreases when beloved characters encounter misfor-
tune or when hated characters meet with success. More about the theo-
ries is provided below, but at this point it is enough to note the ultimate
importance of character liking to the enjoyment process.
With this in mind, this article will first explore how, and perhaps why,
viewers form strong feelings toward characters in the first place. To that
end, I will briefly examine how, according to disposition theories, view-
ers form affiliations with characters, and I will offer possible alternative
or additional ways that these bonds are formed. Second, I will investi-
gate the ways that viewers seek to perpetuate and defend those strong
feelings for the sake of enjoyment. In doing so, I will examine how sev-
eral attitude and perception theories might inform our understanding of
enjoyment. Finally, I will discuss potential implications of disposition-
based theories on our understanding of media enjoyment in general and
on our lives in the nonfiction world.

Loving and Hating Characters: Keys to Enjoyment

The first disposition-based theory—the disposition theory of humor—
was developed by Zillmann and Cantor (1972) to describe how listeners
or readers come to appreciate jokes that involve the disparagement of a
particular person or group. The principles of the disposition theory of
humor were applied subsequently to the appreciation of drama and sports,
yielding the disposition theory of mirth or drama (Zillmann & Cantor,

349
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Communication
Theory

1976) and the disposition theory of sports spectatorship (Zillmann,

Bryant, & Sapolsky, 1989), respectively. Entertainment scholars have
applied the key concepts of the theories to examine the enjoyment of
fright-inducing entertainment (Hoffner & Cantor, 1991a; Oliver, 1993),
action films (King, 2000), reality-based programming (Oliver, 1996),
crime-based fiction (Raney & Bryant, 2002), and news programming
(Zillmann, Taylor, & Lewis, 1998). Differences between these media
contents dictate subtle differences in the application of the theories,
thereby rendering efforts to develop a more general disposition theory
of media content somewhat problematic. For that reason, the following
discussion may be more applicable to certain genres than others. This
discussion will primarily focus on the broadly defined genre of drama;
therefore, the use of the term disposition theory throughout is used in
relation to the enjoyment of dramatic entertainment.
As noted above, the disposition theory of drama posits that enjoy-
ment of media content is a function of a viewer’s affective disposition
toward characters and the outcomes experienced by those characters in
the unfolding narrative. Simply stated, the theory predicts that enjoy-
ment increases when liked characters experience positive outcomes or
when disliked characters experience negative ones. Conversely, enjoy-
ment suffers when liked characters experience negative outcomes and/or
disliked characters experience positive ones. Support for the disposition
theory of drama—closely associated with the disposition theory of mirth
(Zillmann & Cantor, 1976) and the moral sanction theory of delight
and repugnance (Zillmann, 2000)—is abundant (Hoffner & Cantor,
1991a; Oliver, 1993, 1996; Raney, in press, 2002; Raney & Bryant,
2002; Zillmann & Bryant, 1975; Zillmann & Cantor, 1977).
According to the theory, the feelings that viewers hold toward the
characters portrayed are of utmost importance to enjoyment. Disposi-
tion theory contends that viewers form alliances with characters in drama
on a continuum of affect from extremely positive through indifference
to extremely negative. Because these alliances have been most often con-
ceptualized as emotional reactions, the affiliations formed toward me-
dia characters have typically been described as affective dispositions.
More simply stated, as drama viewers, we like and cheer for certain
characters, while despising and rooting against others. However, our
social nature requires that the selection of favored and unfavored char-
acters not be capricious; our emotional side-taking must be morally jus-
tified. To do so, it has been proposed that viewers act as “untiring moral
monitors” who continually render verdicts about the rightness or wrong-
ness of a character’s actions (Zillmann, 2000). Thus, disposition theory
contends that when viewing a drama, we come to like characters whose
actions and motivations we judge as proper or morally correct while we

350
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Expanding Disposition Theory

dislike characters whose actions and motivations we judge as improper

or morally incorrect. The strength of these affective dispositions, again,
ranges on a continuum of affect and, because of our constant moral
monitoring, are subject to change as the dramatic accounts progress.
This intertwining of affective dispositions and moral judgment permits
and governs our emotional involvement in the drama.
How so? Once characters are liked, we are able to empathize with
their plights and hope for their triumph over them. In fact, the stronger
the positive feelings, the stronger our empathic reaction. Conversely,
once characters are hated, we are unable to empathize with them and
are free to wish for their demise. So, the stronger the negative affect, the
stronger the negative or counterempathic reaction. Ultimately, if the
outcomes we wish for are portrayed, then enjoyment increases (in pro-
portion to the dispositions held); if they are not portrayed, then enjoy-
ment suffers (in proportion to the dispositions held). The key here is the
disposition: Indifference (i.e., neither positive nor negative feelings) toward
a character does not trigger an emotional response to the drama. Because
pleasure is an emotional response, no emotional reactions means no plea-
sure. If we experience no pleasure, then we experience no enjoyment.
As one might then imagine, a key factor in determining emotional
reactions to characters is empathy. In fact, empathy has been repeatedly
identified as a key mechanism for enjoyment of drama (Hoffmann, 1987;
Zillmann, 1991, 1994, 2000). Researchers consistently report that viewers
with varying levels of empathy—measured as an individual-level vari-
able—differ in their reactions to media characters. For example, Raney
(2002) demonstrated that persons with higher levels of empathy were
more likely to sympathize with the victim of a dramatic media crime and
were, in turn, more likely to enjoy a presentation where the crime is
avenged. Empathy is of interest, then, only after dispositions are formed.
As Zillmann noted, “Affective dispositions toward persons or their per-
sonas virtually control empathy. . . . Empathy seems to be governed by
such morally derived dispositions” (1994, pp. 44–45).
Others have attempted to analyze the process of moral judgment that
presumably leads to dispositions in the first place. It has been noted that
the strength and even valence of affiliations held with characters vary
quite a bit between viewers. Why is this the case? The simple answer is
that we each have a unique moral makeup. Moral-developmental per-
spectives assume that people vary in the manner and sophistication with
which they approach moral reasoning (see Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1979).
Furthermore, it is thought that moral reasoning is governed and influ-
enced by a complex constellation of factors for each of us. As a result,
we think about and respond to characters differently, with differing re-
sults. Therefore, because dispositions toward dramatic characters are

351
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Communication
Theory

based on our moral evaluations of their actions and motives and be-
cause we tend to differ in the way that we make moral evaluations,
dispositions toward characters should vary between individual viewers.
In other words, viewers should not be surprised when they like certain
characters (and therefore different dramatic presentations) more (or less)
and for different reasons than their friends and vice versa. It then fol-
lows that, because enjoyment is dependent upon character liking, view-
ers might enjoy certain dramatic programs more (or less) than their
friends. In an attempt to examine further how dispositions are formed
toward media characters, a few scholars have sought to identify factors
that help govern the crucial moral judgments of characters.
Oliver (1996) found that authoritarianism was associated with greater
liking of reality-based crime dramas; others (Raney, in press, 2002; Raney
& Bryant, 2002) isolated attitudes about vigilantism and punitive pun-
ishment as predictors of crime-based drama enjoyment. In fact, Raney
and Bryant (2002) offered a model that sought to describe the process of
disposition formation in both affective and cognitive terms. The research-
ers found that both affective and cognitive variables were predictive of
moral judgments within crime-punishment entertainment, with the out-
come of those moral judgments, termed deservedness and victim sympa-
thy, respectively, predicting overall enjoyment.
To sum, dispositional affiliations are thought to be developed as a
viewer monitors the actions and motivations of characters, evaluating
the moral appropriateness of those actions and motivations through their
subjectively held moral lens. As a result, viewers either like or dislike
characters to varying degrees. The valence and intensity of those affec-
tive dispositions lead the viewers to develop anticipations about the char-
acters’ futures. For liked characters, success is hoped and failure is feared.
For hated characters, failure is hoped and success is feared. Enjoyment
then is a product of comparing those anticipations to the actual out-
comes portrayed. Thus, highly liked characters generate intensely hoped-
for outcomes that, when met, result in relief, pleasure, and enjoyment.
However, when these hoped-for outcomes are not observed or when
feared-for outcomes are observed, enjoyment suffers. This is the basic
disposition theory formula. Again, those dispositions are thought to be
a function of a viewer’s careful evaluation—that is, untiring moral moni-
toring—of the characters’ actions and motives.

Reconsidering the Disposition Formation

Process
Although we have ample support for disposition theory in its current
form, it also seems at times that our affective dispositions toward char-

352
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Expanding Disposition Theory

acters are actually formed rather quickly, without much moral monitor-
ing at all. Extensive evidence suggests that we are generally cognitive
misers, that we expend as little cognitive energy or devote as few cogni-
tive resources as necessary in most situations unless we are highly moti-
vated to do otherwise (Taylor, 1981; Taylor & Fiske, 1978). In some
cases, especially no doubt with extremely complex narratives or docu-
mentaries, viewers dedicate tremendous amounts of cognitive resources
to enjoyable media. Furthermore, most media researchers generally con-
sider audience members to be relatively active during viewing. Nonethe-
less, it seems at times that our liking and disliking of characters, or at
least our propensity to do so, is almost automatic to their introduction
into the narrative. At times, it seems that our liking precedes our moral
judgment.
In truth, the disposition literature does not seem to actually address
how dispositional valence is initially determined. Raney (2003) posited
that the use of stereotypes and archetypes might seemingly aide with
initial disposition formation, which will be argued further shortly. Fur-
thermore, perhaps it is presumptuous to think that morally monitoring
characters’ behaviors and motives is cognitively taxing, but as we seek
to better understand enjoyment as a function of our reaction to charac-
ters, it is important for us to further consider how we form dispositions
toward those characters in the first place. I contend that schema theory
literature can provide insight into this process.
Whereas cognitive social science is yet undecided on a single defini-
tion or conceptualization, most scholars generally accept the various
schema theories as accurate depictions of how people make sense of the
world that they encounter (Brewer, 1987; Fiske & Kinder, 1981; Fiske
& Taylor, 1991; Mandler, 1984; Rumelhart, 1980; Schank & Abelson,
1977; Wyer & Gordon, 1984). According to schema theories, knowl-
edge about a concept, event, sequence of events or actions, situation,
story type, or other stimuli is packaged together in memory in a tem-
plate of sorts (or schemata). Schemas, then, are knowledge structures
consisting of a network of interrelations between aspects of a stimulus
that are thought to constitute our understanding of that stimulus. This
knowledge structure subsequently serves as our “building block of cog-
nition” about the stimulus (Rumelhart, 1980). More specifically, schemas
help direct our perceptions about and guide our interpretations of a
stimulus.
Several researchers have argued that we develop story schemas or
scripts while consuming various print and electronic media narratives
(Biocca, 1991; Mandler, 1984; Potter, Pashupati, Pekurny, Hoffman, &
Davis, 2002; Rumelhart, 1980). In fact, our development of story schemas
is thought to begin in early childhood (Kintsch, 1977). Through repeated

353
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Communication
Theory

exposure, we learn how similar stories are constructed, how typical ac-
tions relate to one another, how scenes and settings are constructed, and
how themes are repeated, among other things. Over time, a viewer de-
velops various schema structures that are activated when a subsequent
media text is encountered. These structures then guide expectations about
and interpretation of the ongoing narrative and the characters involved.
Many cognitive psychologists argue that, functionally, schemas pro-
vide for cognitive economy (Fiske & Kinder, 1981). In other words,
because of our aforementioned tendency toward cognitive misership,
we construct schemas to help minimize the processing energy needed to
understand narratives. Mental resources can be saved if well structured
and easily accessible scripts can provide mental shortcuts to our ulti-
mate goal of understanding—and for our purposes, enjoying—media
entertainment.
Thus, for example, when viewers sit down to watch a dramatic film,
they tend not to come empty-handed, or empty-headed, as the case may
be. Viewers activate existing story schema (or scripts) that guide them in
their interpretation of the narrative. Those scripts—developed over time
through encountering a variety of narratives—contain information that
enables viewers to understand quickly various elements of, and to form
expectations about, the narrative accordingly. That is, schemas provide
viewers with the cognitive pegs upon which to hang their initial inter-
pretations and expectations of characters.
Most contend that some form of conflict—often dichotomized as good–
evil, right–wrong, happiness–sadness, staying true to yourself–selling out,
exhilaration–safety—is at the heart of drama. It makes sense then that
viewers of drama, at the outset, expect to encounter opposing and often
irreconcilable sides in a conflict within the narrative, with characters
representing each side. Thus, for example, viewers of a courtroom drama
expect to encounter a character or characters representing forces of good
(or order, peace, justice, civility) battling a character or characters repre-
senting forces of evil (or disorder, unrest, injustice, lawlessness). These
expectations guide interpretations of characters that are encountered in
the narrative. Of course, writers and directors use stereotyping, context,
music, and a variety of other methods to assist the viewer in making
these interpretations rather quickly. As a result, viewers of drama are
generally able to classify characters as good or bad (or whatever
macrotheme is being explored) almost instantaneously. Therefore, to add
some clarity to disposition theory, the initial determination of disposi-
tional valence for a character may require few or no moral consider-
ations for the viewer at all. Existing schemas help guide initial character
interpretation. Therefore, we can typically identify almost immediately
which characters we should and will presumably like and dislike.1

354
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Expanding Disposition Theory

With this in mind, it further stands to reason that the viewer’s range
of affective response that can be experienced for any one character is
theoretically limited. If schemas, in fact, allow viewers quickly to sort
through and classify relevant characters as good or evil, then it stands to
reason that those characters will subsequently be evaluated through that
typological lens. To use an example from a crime-based drama, police
officers are typically portrayed as good characters, while drug dealers
are typically portrayed as bad characters. As a result, although the range
of a viewer’s affective reaction to a character can be theorized to exist
along a continuum of affect from extremely positive through indiffer-
ence to extremely negative, as with the disposition theory of drama,
story schemas provide moral-judgmental shortcuts that limit the appli-
cation of the full affective continuum to characters. Consequently, view-
ers need only evaluate police officers as good characters and drug deal-
ers as bad characters. Moral judgment therefore is abridged; the stan-
dard of comparison is restricted to one end of the theorized continuum.
So, it seems reasonable that viewers form affiliations with certain char-
acters on an affective continuum that extends only from extremely posi-
tive to indifference, based on the expectations that they are the protago-
nists and thereby morally acceptable. The opposite is the case for an-
tagonists. In other words, it seems possible that schemas prejudice view-
ers to evaluate certain characters in certain and predictable ways. As a
result, the demands on moral judgment can be quite limited.
However, it should be noted that the intensity of the affective responses
to characters—though arguably limited in range—should still be gov-
erned by moral considerations and the associated individual-differences
factors previously identified in the disposition literature. That is, empa-
thy and various moral evaluation factors still influence how positively
or negatively the feelings of liking are experienced by the viewer. Simply
stated, moral considerations no doubt still apply to dispositional affilia-
tions; again we have much evidence for this. Additionally, although be-
yond the scope of disposition theory, it seems reasonable that mood
(mood theory, see Zillmann, 1991), ability, or willingness to attend to
the narrative (elaboration likelihood model of persuasion; see Petty,
Priester, & Briñol, 2002), preexisting attitudes about genre (selective
exposure, see Zillmann & Bryant, 1985), motivation for viewing (uses
and gratifications, see Rubin, 2002), and other factors would also influ-
ence this process. However, if schemas in fact prejudice evaluations of
characters such that good characters are expected to be—or better yet,
should be—liked, and bad characters should be disliked, then it seems
that in some situations the affective evaluation of a character (e.g., po-
lice officer is liked) precedes the moral judgment (e.g., police officer is
moral and therefore liked).

355
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Communication
Theory

What I am proposing here is an extension, not a contradiction, of

disposition theory. In some cases, moral judgment may indeed precede
affect, as the theory in its current form contends. In fact, the way that
initial dispositions toward media characters are formed may vary across
time, between individual viewers, or among specific contents and pre-
sentation styles. That is, at times and for some viewers affect may pre-
cede judgment, whereas for others the opposite holds true. These propo-
sitions would seem readily testable by measuring the valence and strength
of attitudes toward characters at different points of a media presenta-
tion. Interested scholars are encouraged to pursue such theory-testing
work, but the influence and importance of schemas in initial disposition
formation seems reasonable.

Moral Judgment or Moral Justification?

If schemas lead viewers to expect that good characters will do good
things and that bad characters will do bad things, then it seems reason-
able to assume that viewers use those expectations as lenses through
which they interpret characters and their actions. In other words, view-
ers might not always consider the moral merits of each behavior and
motivation displayed by a character, as disposition theory currently con-
tends. True, some viewers at some times do evaluate each act in relation
to their own moral codes. Evidence from enjoyment studies supports
this. However, at other times viewers perhaps interpret a good character’s
actions or motivations as good, regardless of the specific behaviors or
motivations, and vice versa for bad characters. That is, good characters,
having been quickly identified as such by the viewer, might benefit from
the presumption that their actions, and moreover their motivations, are
morally upright. As a result, viewers prejudge, interpret, or assimilate
their actions accordingly.
For example, Clint Eastwood’s film character Dirty Harry and Chuck
Norris’s title character, Walker, from the television series, Walker, Texas
Ranger both used unconventional techniques while performing their law
enforcement duties. Although some citizens surely favor extending the
acceptable boundaries of force when police apprehend criminals, we
can assume that most are opposed to police brutality. However, both of
these fictional characters routinely and famously used excessive force
when dealing with criminal suspects. If an actual police officer used similar
tactics, (s)he would generate public outcry for law enforcement reform,
be (ideally) dismissed from the force, and prosecuted.
Of course, the fictional nature of these presentations gives viewers
license to “suspend their disbelief” and permit unrealistic acts to take
place for the sake of enjoyment. Furthermore, because one of the enjoy-

356
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Expanding Disposition Theory

able features of those types of presentations is seeing justice restored (cf.

Goldstein, 1998), it is reasonable to expect that viewers allow and, in
fact, wish for displays of severe retribution in response to injustice. In
addition to these claims, however, I propose that we as viewers also
extend moral propriety to dramatic characters because we like them a
great deal, and we desperately want to see them succeed. That is, be-
cause we like characters and we, on some level, know from past media
experiences that enjoyment comes from seeing them prosper, we tend to
read their actions in a way that helps us view them as prosperous: We
interpret their actions as morally appropriate and rightly motivated. Simi-
larly, we assume the worst of characters that we dislike. By cultivating
and maintaining those positive and negative feelings toward characters,
we are able to help create a situation in which enjoyment is most likely
to flourish. Therefore, I propose that in addition to continuing to like
characters because they are moral, as disposition theory suggests, view-
ers also at times judge characters to be good and moral because they
like them.
This is not to suggest that liked characters are given complete and
limitless sanction to act in any way they desire. Characters can lose their
favored or unfavored status if their behaviors or motivations signifi-
cantly violate associated expectations, based on initial disposition for-
mation. For example, if the seemingly perfect mother and devoted wife
is subsequently shown to be abusive, then the disposition toward the
character would surely switch from positive to negative. The same is
true for a character, like Ebenezer Scrooge or Jerry Maguire, whose mis-
erable and often hateful life is transformed through circumstances. Al-
though the latitudes of moral propriety can theoretically be extended
only so far, in many cases story scripts guide us to identify and like the
heroes and heroines and to dislike the villains. Then, with this schematic
lens in place, the viewer interprets the behaviors and motivations as
either morally proper or improper accordingly.
Why might this be the case? I contend that viewers hold expectations
that liked characters will be motivated by goodness and justice and will
therefore act in a morally upright and justifiable manner whereas hated
characters will be otherwise motivated and will accordingly act in a
morally unjustifiable manner. These expectations prejudice our inter-
pretations of a character’s behavior, enabling us as viewers, without much
moral deliberation, to accept or to approve of, or in some cases, to jus-
tify the behaviors of a liked character. Similarly, those expectations al-
low the viewer to condemn readily the actions of a hated character. Thus,
because a good and liked character is expected to be morally justified in
her or his actions, then those actions are interpreted as such. Again,
viewers are motivated to react in this way because of an expectation or

357
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Communication
Theory

strong desire to enjoy the narrative. As a result, viewers often spend

more time justifying or condemning a character’s actions in line with the
dispositions held, rather than actually engaging moral reasoning to evalu-
ate individual acts. Too much moral scrutiny of characters could be
cognitively taxing or dissonance inducing, thereby detracting from en-
joyment. So, with the dispositional valence in place to serve as a guide,
the behaviors and motivations of many media characters are simply in-
terpreted in line with their corresponding valence rather than scruti-
nized one by one.
Previous research has shown, however, that viewers evaluate charac-
ter behaviors in light of their own moral code, with implications for
dispositions and enjoyment. So what is the basis for the current, seem-
ingly contradictory, proposition? The literature dealing with attitudes
and person perception offers a reasonable place to start, given that re-
searchers for decades have noted how viewers often think about or treat
media characters similar to the way they interact with people in reality
(Hoffner & Cantor, 1991b; Horton & Wohl, 1956; Rosengren &
Windahl, 1972; Rubin & Perse, 1987). First, it is generally held that we
evaluate more favorably—which can reasonably be associated with “lik-
ing”—those with whom we share some commonality. In turn, we view
people perceived to be similar to us, that is, members of our in-group,
with attitudinal and perceptual bias (Brewer, 1979; Levine & Campbell,
1972; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Sumner, 1906/1940).
We tend to show partiality, or so-called in-group favoritism, to those we
perceive to be similar to us; in fact we often “exaggerate and intensify
everything in our own folkways which is peculiar and which differenti-
ates them from others” (Sumner, 1906/1940, p. 13). Similarly, in an
effort to maintain cognitive consistency (cf. Festinger, 1957), we often
selectively perceive attitudes held by and situations involving liked par-
ties as favorable and similar to our own (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Cadinu
& Rothbart, 1996; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969; Smith & Henry, 1996;
Tajfel, 1970). This is a classic example of Heider’s (1958) balance theory:
When confronted with a situation in which a liked party displays an
attitude or behavior counter to our expectations and beliefs (i.e., creates
an imbalance), we attempt to reestablish cognitive harmony and bal-
ance, including, among other strategies, reinterpreting their behavior
and attitude in a more favorable light. The reason for this, in line with
Heider, is that liked persons are expected to have favorable attributes in
general (Wyer & Lambert, 1994). When it appears that they do not, we
find ways to alleviate the dissonance caused by the observation.
Furthermore, attribution theory literature suggests that we constantly
attempt to understand the causes for people’s behavior. The attribution
research indicates that members of groups are more likely to think that

358
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Expanding Disposition Theory

the successful and positive behaviors of their fellow group members are
due to internal, or dispositional, factors such as their personality, char-
acter, or value system, while thinking that their failures and negative
behaviors are due to situational factors. This tendency is referred to as a
group-serving bias or group attribution error (Allison & Messick, 1985;
Taylor & Doria, 1981). Hamilton (1998) further argued that, once es-
tablished, the impression that we hold of a person is of great importance
in evaluating subsequent behaviors. As a result, liked parties are assumed
and expected to be rightly motivated: When they succeed, it is because of
who they are; if they fail, then something external to the person is to blame.
This tendency to give moral amnesty to others in certain circumstances
has been examined in other literatures. Bandura identified the process
by which otherwise unacceptable behaviors, without regard to group
membership, are permitted, accepted, and defended as moral disengage-
ment (Bandura, 1986, 1991, 1999, 2001, 2002). As moral agents, we
control the application of our moral codes. They can be more strenu-
ously or leniently applied given a situation. By selectively activating and
disengaging the sanctions that typically regulate conduct, individuals
can permit and accept conduct that would otherwise be judged as inap-
propriate. To alleviate cognitive distress during these instances in which
typical self-censure or others-condemnation is disengaged, we rely on a
variety of cognitive strategies. As Bandura explained,

The disengagement may center on redefining harmful conduct as honorable by moral

justification, exonerating social comparison, and sanitizing language. It may focus on
agency of action so that perpetrators can minimize their role in causing harm by diffu-
sion and displacement of responsibility. It may involve minimizing or distorting the harm
that flows from detrimental actions; and the disengagement may include dehumanizing
and blaming victims of the maltreatment. (Bandura, 2002, p. 102)

This helps explain how religious extremists can kill in the name of dei-
ties (moral justification). Armies can “service targets” (sanitizing lan-
guage). Guards can “just carry out orders” (displacement of responsibil-
ity). Students can plagiarize because “everybody does it, and it doesn’t
hurt anyone” (minimizing harm). All of these are arguably examples of
moral disengagement in the real world. Not only can the acts be carried
out because the individual performing them has morally disengaged from
the situations, but third-party observers who give moral assent to the
actions can also be said to have morally disengaged. Therefore, other
fervent followers can applaud the religious killings because they too be-
lieve that the divine has commanded it (moral justification). Citizens
can support wars where targets are serviced (sanitizing language). Ju-
rors can find innocent guards who were just following orders (displace-

359
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Communication
Theory

ment of responsibility). Parents can defend their children’s plagiarism

for the same reasons the students offer (minimizing harm). By not mor-
ally condemning or by being accepting of the morally improper act, re-
gardless of how insignificant or severe, we all occasionally morally dis-
engage in reality.
Moreover, we presumably engage in all of these biased and attitude-
defensive strategies from time to time out of loyalty to those whom we
love. Partiality is part and parcel with liking; by definition, we show
favoritism to those whom we favor. We like whom we like, and for the
most part we want to keep on liking them. So when they say and do
things we dislike, we pardon them, we “cut them slack,” we blame some-
thing or someone else, we defend them.
Perhaps these principles and cognitive processes are activated when
we view fiction as well. In fact, it is reasonable to expect that we use
many of these attitude-maintenance strategies with media characters.
The extant literature on identification with media characters (e.g.,
Hoffner, 1996; Hoffner & Cantor, 1991b; Reeves & Miller, 1978) indi-
cates that viewers see themselves as similar to media characters in much
the same way we do with members of in-groups in reality. This is not
surprising. A major goal of drama—in fact, all narratives for that mat-
ter—is for the audience to identify or in some way connect with the
characters. Research clearly indicates that individuals are quite willing
to display in-group tendencies, including the open display of in-group
favoritism, even in so-called “minimal group” settings (e.g., when group
members are randomly assigned a common fate or even assigned a ran-
dom group-identifying letter, see Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Cadinu &
Rothbart, 1996; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969; Smith & Henry, 1996; Tajfel,
1970). Clearly, entertainment products create minimal group situations
between the to-be-liked characters and the audience. Accordingly, view-
ers potentially view liked media characters as they would in-group mem-
bers in reality: as more favorable, open, responsible, and desirable as
friends (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969). Because of these tendencies, it is
easy to see how viewers might process in a biased manner the behaviors
and motivations of liked characters, including extending moral propri-
ety in the same way we do to those we love in reality.
Furthermore, encountering media characters could activate a process
whereby we not only create affiliations as we do in reality, but we also
seek to maintain those affective affiliations once formed. At times, those
liked media characters disappoint us: They cheat on their spouses. They
break the law. They make poor decisions. Does that necessarily mean
that we like them less? Perhaps. It is also just as possible that, given
strong positive affiliations with characters, we readily defend them. We
“cut them some slack.” We extend the boundaries of what is morally

360
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Expanding Disposition Theory

allowable or tolerable because we like them so much, and we want to

continue liking them. In fact, it would seemingly follow that the stron-
ger our affective dispositions toward a character, the more likely and
willing we would be to utilize such attitude-maintenance strategies. As a
result, viewers seemingly offer great, though surely not unlimited, moral
latitude and license to highly favored characters.

Expansion of Disposition Theory Proposed

As stated earlier, the main purpose of this article is to further examine
how and why we enjoy media entertainment. To that end, the preceding
pages include a reexamination of, and an attempt to expand on, one of
the leading explanations of media enjoyment: disposition theory. Spe-
cifically, we have investigated the process of disposition formation and
maintenance in light of several social and cognitive psychological per-
spectives. To summarize those investigations, I offer for consideration
two major propositions as addenda to disposition theory. Again, these
are offered not as contradictions but rather as complements to current
disposition theory formulation.
1. The initial formation of an affective disposition toward a character
may at times actually precede specific moral evaluations of the charac-
ter. It seems reasonable to expect that various story schema assist view-
ers in readily identifying the appropriate affective valence to be held
toward many characters. More specifically, we often know who the good
and bad characters are as soon as or even before they show up on screen.
Therefore, the initial dispositional valence for a character is often in-
stantaneously set in the mind of the viewer, and the accompanying range
of affective responses possible for that character is similarly set and
bounded to a particular end of the affective continuum. These initial
valences then govern expectations about those characters, such that pro-
tagonists are expected to act in a virtuous manner, whereas antagonists
and villains are expected to act in reprehensible ways.
2. Because viewers expect that liked characters will do good things
and disliked characters will do bad things, those expectations lead view-
ers to interpret character actions and motivations in line with the estab-
lished dispositional valences rather than to morally scrutinize each ac-
tion and motivation. Various attitude-maintenance strategies that are
used to justify or condemn the actions of in-group or out-group mem-
bers in reality would seemingly also be activated during entertainment
consumption. At times, then, viewers read or interpret the actions of
liked characters as morally proper for the sake of maintaining and de-
fending their positive attitudes about those characters. The same is doubt-
lessly the case for disliked characters as well. In doing so, we extend the

361
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Communication
Theory

latitude of moral propriety to many liked characters and, as a result, are

able to continue liking them unfettered. Again, a similar process oper-
ates in the case of disliked characters, when we perpetuate our negative
feelings toward those characters regardless of evidence that might place
them in a more favorable light. In fact, it seems reasonable that our
willingness to excuse or defend expectancy-inconsistent actions or moti-
vations increases with the strength of our dispositional intensity toward
the character.
In the remaining pages, we will consider the implications of these two
proposals on our understanding of media enjoyment.

Implications for Enjoyment

Although admittedly theoretical and process-oriented to this point, all
of the discussion has been leading back to the principal cause for seek-
ing out media entertainment in the first place: enjoyment. At this point it
is premature, if not impossible, to make declarations about when view-
ers actually form affective dispositions based on moral evaluations and
when they do not. As mentioned above, the way that viewers form
dispositions toward media characters may vary across time, between
individual viewers, and among specific content, genres, and styles.
To initially consider conditions under which the different processes
might be engaged, let us briefly examine the case of media consump-
tion as escape.
Uses and gratifications researchers consistently report that viewers
quite frequently use media for the stated purpose of escape or diversion
(Blumler & Katz, 1974; Rubin, 2002). It seems appropriate to associate
these and several other stated uses with enjoyment; that is, viewers de-
rive enjoyment from media content that allows them to escape from the
pressure of their hectic lives or escape to fictional worlds filled with
romance, fear, international intrigue, excitement, violence, and myriad
other experiences and opportunities. Furthermore, the escapism moti-
vation is logically associated with a desire to avoid cognitive taxation.
Who hasn’t overheard a video store conversation in which a patron de-
scribes his or her desire to select a film “that I don’t have to think about”?
To date, though, there has been little theoretical work to help us better
understand how mediated escape generates, facilitates, produces, or even
relates to enjoyment. In light of the previous discussion, it seems reason-
able to expect that viewers motivated to view entertainment by a need to
escape would be more likely to rely upon schemas for initial disposition
formation, less likely to morally evaluate each action and motivation,
and thus more likely to morally disengage, using Bandura’s term, and
use strategies to maintain their predispositions.

362
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Expanding Disposition Theory

In fact, is it possible that the viewing motivation of escapism is really

just an expression of a desire to morally disengage for the sake of enjoy-
ment? In addressing this question, we must be vigilant to maintain the
meaning of the term as previously used. It seems reasonable to suggest
that dramatic fare gives people the opportunity to put off or set aside the
strict moral code that governs their daily lives, that is, to suspend disbe-
lief. In other words, people find enjoyment or pleasure in disengaging
their rigid moral systems (or perhaps in relaxing the typical boundaries
of their moral propriety). This surely may be the case. However, this use of
the term moral disengagement is slightly different from our previous use.
More in line with the initial conception, viewers may find enjoyable
in and of itself the specific opportunity to escape to a world where they
can offer unbridled support to and justification for a favored party. In
other words, enjoyment may be associated with the ability to give virtu-
ally limitless moral sanction to someone we like. Perhaps we as viewers
like to applaud the triumph of a beloved hero simply because we like it
when loved ones triumph, period. Likewise, we might love to see the
defeat of a hated foe simply because we would hate to see them succeed.
On a base level, we enjoy the feeling we get from cheering for a friend to
win at any cost, including any cost to moral judgment. Fiction often just
offers viewers the opportunity to escape from a world of constant moral
monitoring to one where good triumphs over evil, where the lovers over-
come all odds and end up together, and where everyone lives happily
ever after. Quite often, we as viewers take that opportunity and do so.
We exercise our rights as cognitive misers. We trade our lens of moral
scrutiny for one of partiality and favoritism. We do not think; we feel.
We allow the story schemas we have developed over time to guide our
interpretations of character and plotlines. We go on liking the charac-
ters we favor regardless of what they do. We form emotion-contingent
expectations about characters, root for those we love, and root against
those whom we despise. So, in times when viewing is driven primarily
by a desire to escape, it would seem that the current propositions about
disposition theory might more appropriately describe the processes that
lead to enjoyment.
Also, the propositions that are forwarded here suggest a link between
selective perception and enjoyment. For our purposes, selective percep-
tion refers to the tendency to reinterpret media messages in a way that
serves to maintain existing beliefs and attitudes (Oliver, 2002). Evidence
for the selective perception phenomenon is widespread, especially in the
political communication and news literatures (e.g., Bothwell & Brigham,
1983; Peffley, Shields, & Williams, 1996).
The seminal investigation of selective perception and entertainment
media is Vidmar and Rokeach’s (1974) examination of All in the Family

363
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Communication
Theory

viewers. The researchers found that highly prejudiced viewers interpreted

the program as sympathetic to the prejudiced character Archie Bunker,
whereas low-prejudiced viewers thought the program favored the politi-
cally progressive and decidedly unbigoted character Mike. Although the
researchers did not observe significant differences between the two groups
in terms of overall enjoyment (likely a reflection of a ceiling effect), they
did note, “Even more important is the finding that high prejudiced per-
sons were likely to watch All in the Family more often than low preju-
diced persons” (p. 46). In other words, those who had to reinterpret the
satirical content of the show for the sake of their own enjoyment were
its most likely viewers.
Clearly, the highly prejudiced viewers enjoyed the show because they
liked Archie and his politics and because they thought he won in the
end. For these viewers selective perception—which is necessarily char-
acterized by use of the attitude-maintenance strategies described above—
became a necessary criterion for enjoyment. That is, their enjoyment of
the show was dependent upon their desire and willingness to reinterpret
the actions and motivations of their preferred character. Although this is
an extreme example, this may be the case for many of us when we view
entertainment products. Our desire to enjoy a program or film is so
important that we are willing to go to great lengths to ensure that it is
experienced.
Let me offer one final point about the potential implications of enjoy-
ing media products in this way. If viewers, in fact, morally disengage for
the sake of drama enjoyment, it seems reasonable to question the effects
of such, especially in our contemporary media-rich environment. Does
readily justifying the actions and motivations of characters in the fic-
tional world enable or encourage us to do the same more often in real-
ity? If we can and are willing to quickly stretch our real-world moral
code for the sake of enjoyment, it seems reasonable to think that we can
become conditioned to do so in real-world situations as well. Does the
practice of moral disengagement that we participate in regularly with
media fare serve as a training ground of sorts for moral disengagement
in the real world? If so, our lack of moral reasoning in some fictional
situations possibly prepares us to morally disengage in reality. Surely,
disinhibition effects (Bandura, 1973, 1986, 1991) are an expression of
this; in fact, Bandura argued that moral disengagement facilitates disin-
hibition. Similarly, desensitization effects can be reasonably conceptu-
alized as the loss of moral sensitivity following media exposure.
At any rate, it is fair to say that the boundaries between the real and
fictional worlds can potentially become blurred when moral consider-
ations are minimized for the sake of enjoyment. Many of us have en-
countered situations in which these ideas resonate: People describe how

364
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Expanding Disposition Theory

similar their life is to a sitcom. A student of mine recently admitted to

wondering what soundtrack would be playing if his bicycle ride to school
were captured in a movie. Jurors in the recent mistrial of former Tyco
CEO Dennis Kozlowski said that their deliberation sessions were “like a
reality show” (O’Donnell, 2004). In fact in some instances, it appears
that the fictional world serves as the standard by which reality is judged.
Life is best when it mirrors fiction. Fiction allows us, on some level, to
fantasize about our lives as a movie, filled with drama, minimal conse-
quences, and happy endings. It allows us to encounter characters whom
we quickly see as similar to ourselves in some ways but who, unlike us,
live carefree and dream-like lives. Because these media friends find hap-
piness and fulfillment so easily, we hope and perhaps come to expect
that our own lives are or should be more like theirs. In an attempt to
make those hopes a reality, we begin interpreting our reality more like
fiction. We know we enjoy doing so in the movies, so perhaps we gain
hope that we can more enjoy our own lives by doing likewise in reality.
It makes sense that people would want the real world to look like the
fictional one. In fact, one might argue that the trend in reality program-
ming is more about hoping the real world looks like the fictional one
rather than visa versa. Differentiating fantasy from reality has until now
really been about identifying fantasy as such. Today, one might wonder
if—because of the ways that we have come to enjoy media products—
we need to consider more the identification and distinction of reality
from fantasy.

Concluding Thoughts
The purpose of this project was to examine further how and why we
enjoy media entertainment by reexamining how we form and maintain
affective dispositions toward media characters. The relationships between
affect, moral evaluations, schemas, attitude maintenance strategies, and
moral disengagement—in particular as those relationships help produce
the enjoyment of drama—are certainly complex. The current project is
not offered as a complete explanation of those various relationships and
contingencies, but as fodder for future theory development and research.
Empirical analyses of the proposals herein are encouraged.
For instance, as noted above, the proposition that, at times, affect
may precede moral evaluation of media characters could readily be tested
by measuring the valence and strength of dispositional affiliations at
different times across a narrative. Similarly, examinations into how charac-
ter and story schemas develop are warranted, especially in relation to the
role of moral evaluations in the formation of archetypical character schemas.
At what age or level of media exposure do we begin to develop the ability

365
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Communication
Theory

to identify readily different character types? What key pieces of informa-

tion must be conveyed in order for us to make those identifications?
Furthermore, researchers are encouraged to further investigate how
and to what extent viewers are willing (or able) to extend moral propri-
ety to liked characters. How much is too much? What would a highly
liked character have to do to become disliked? Again, because we differ
in moral makeup, this answer would differ across persons, as well as
time and genre presumably. Thus, continued explorations into individual
difference variables affecting enjoyment are warranted. With that in mind,
some scholars have started measuring a person’s tendency to morally
disengage as a personality variable. For example, Bandura and colleagues
found that males are more likely to morally disengage than females
(Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; McAlister, Bandura,
Morrison, & Gussendorf, 2003). Males are also more likely than fe-
males to produce aggressive thoughts while morally disengaging
(Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001). Differ-
ences in education level, age, ethnicity, and region have also been associ-
ated with differences in level of moral disengagement (McAlister et al.,
2003). Furthermore, one’s tendency to morally disengage seems dynamic
over time, as one study reported greater likelihood of disengaging after
the 9/11 attacks than before (McAlister et al., 2003).
This raises the question: Is the tendency to morally disengage predic-
tive of exposure to certain types of media content that encourage, or
even require, moral disengagement for the sake of enjoyment? It seems
reasonable to expect that if some individuals are more likely to morally
disengage than others, perhaps that tendency is driven by some perceived,
or even unrealized, benefit or gratification received from doing so. If
this is the case, then it is reasonable to connect this gratification derived
from the act of moral disengagement to enjoyment experienced when
doing so during media consumption. This specific proposition, of course,
might be extremely difficult to examine empirically. However, because
we can measure the tendency to morally disengage as an individual differ-
ence variable, we should be able to correlate that with media exposure or to
use it as a predictor of enjoyment of certain media forms and formats.
More than anything, additional research and theorizing about how
and why we enjoy what we enjoy is desperately needed as the impor-
tance of media entertainment continues to grow worldwide. It is true:
We really want to enjoy media products. It is our responsibility as enter-
tainment scholars to find out what that means exactly.

Author Arthur A. Raney (PhD, University of Alabama) is an assistant professor in the Department of
Communication at Florida State University. He would like to thank Mary Beth Oliver, Marina
Krcmar, Laura Arpan, Jennings Bryant, and David Roskos-Ewoldsen for their invaluable feedback
during the writing process.

366
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Expanding Disposition Theory

1
Some narratives are indeed quite complex and can potentially work against existing schemas. Note
For example, some programs and films portray a typically good character (e.g., police officer,
judge, doctor, minister) as bad, and visa versa. Some narratives actually, through a surprise revela-
tion, will switch bad characters to good during the midst of the action, or visa versa. Although
outside our current discussion, I would contend that the novelty of such presentations, although
arguably requiring more cognitive resources and vigilant moral monitoring by viewers, can actually
add to enjoyment.

Allison, S. T., & Messick, D. M. (1985). The group attribution error. Journal of Experimental References
Social Psychology, 21, 563–579.
Bandura, A. (1973). Aggression: A social learning perspective. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Bandura, A. (1991). Social cognitive theory of moral thought and action. In W. M. Kurtines & J. L.
Gewirtz (Eds.), Handbook of moral behavior and development: Theory, research and applica-
tions (Vol. 1, pp. 71–129). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetuation of inhumanities. Personality and
Social Psychology Review [Special Issue on evil and violence], 3, 193–209.
Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. Annual Review of Psychology
(Vol. 52, pp. 1–26). Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews.
Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal of
Moral Education, 31, 101–119.
Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., & Pastorelli, C. (1996). Mechanisms of moral
disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
71, 364–374.
Bandura, A., Caprara, G. V., Barbaranelli, C., Pastorelli, C., & Regalia, C. (2001). Sociocognitive
self-regulatory mechanisms governing transgressive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 80, 125–135.
Billig, M., & Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour. Euro-
pean Journal of Social Psychology, 3, 27–52.
Biocca, F. (1991). Television and political advertising. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Biswas, R., Riffe, D., & Zillmann, D. (1994). Mood influence on the appeal of bad news. Journal-
ism Quarterly, 71, 689–696.
Blumler, J. G., & Katz, E. (1974). The uses of mass communications: Current perspectives on
gratifications research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Bothwell, R. K., & Brigham, J. C. (1983). Selective evaluation and recall during the 1980 Reagan-
Carter debate. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 13, 427–442.
Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 307–324.
Brewer, W. F. (1987). Schemas versus mental models in human memory. In P. Morris (Ed.), Model-
ing cognitions (pp. 187–197). London: Wiley.
Cadinu, M. R., & Rothbart, M. (1996). Self-anchoring and differentiation processes in the mini-
mal group setting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 661–677.
Christ, W. C., & Medoff, N. J. (1984). Affective state and selective exposure to and use of televi-
sion. Journal of Broadcasting, 28, 51–63.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Fiske, S. T., & Kinder, D. R. (1981). Involvement, expertise, and schema use: Evidence from politi-
cal cognition. In N. Cantor & J. F. Kihlstron (Eds.), Personality, cognition, and social interac-
tion (pp. 171–190). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Goldstein, J. H. (1998). Why we watch: The attractions of violent entertainment. New York: Ox-
ford University Press.
Hamilton, D. L. (1998). Dispositional and attributional inferences in person perception. In J. M.
Darley & J. Cooper (Eds.), Attribution and social interaction: The legacy of Edward E. Jones
(pp. 99–114). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.
Hoffmann, M. L. (1987). The contribution of empathy to justice and moral judgment. In N. Eisenberg

367
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Communication
Theory

& J. Strayer (Eds.), Empathy and its development (pp. 47–80). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Hoffner, C. (1996). Children’s wishful identification and parasocial interaction with favorite char-
acters. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 40, 389–402.
Hoffner, C., & Cantor, J. (1991a). Factors affecting children’s enjoyment of a frightening film
sequence. Communication Monographs, 58, 41–62.
Hoffner, C., & Cantor, J. (1991b). Perceiving and responding to mass media characters. In J. Bryant
& D. Zillmann (Eds.), Responding to the screen: Reception and reaction processes (pp. 63–
101). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Horton, D., & Wohl, R. R. (1956). Mass communication and para-social interaction. Psychiatry,
19, 215–229.
Johnson, D. D. (1995). Adolescents’ motivations for viewing graphic horror. Human Communica-
tion Research, 21, 522–552.
King, C. M. (2000). Effects of humorous heroes and villains in violent action films. Journal of
Communication, 50(1), 5–24.
Kintsch, W. (1977). On comprehending stories. In P. Carpenter & M. Just (Eds.), Cognitive pro-
cesses in comprehension (pp. 33–62). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Klapper, J. T. (1960). The effects of mass communication. New York: Free Press.
Knobloch, S., & Zillmann, D. (2002). Mood management via the digital jukebox. Journal of Com-
munication, 52, 351–366.
Kohlberg, L. (1981). Essays on moral development. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
Levine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. (1972). Ethnocentrism: Theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and
group behavior. New York: Wiley.
Mandler, J. M. (1984). Stories, scripts, and scenes: Aspects of schema theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
McAlister, A. L., Bandura, A., Morrison, T. C., & Gussendorf, J. (2003). Mechanisms of moral
disengagement in support of military force: The impact of 9/11. Unpublished manuscript.
O’Donnell, J. (2004, April 4). Tyco jurors: Reports of discontent overblown. USA Today [Online
edition]. Retrieved on May 8, 2004, from http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/manu-
facturing/2004–04–04-tyco-jurors2_x.htm.
Oliver, M. B. (1993). Adolescents’ enjoyment of graphic horror: Effects of attitudes and portrayals
of victim. Communication Research, 20, 30–50.
Oliver, M. B. (1996). Influences of authoritarianism and portrayals of race on Caucasian viewers’
responses to reality-based crime dramas. Communication Reports, 9, 141–150.
Oliver, M. B. (2002). Individual differences in media effects. In J. Bryant & D. Zillmann (Eds.),
Media effects: Advances in theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 507–524). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Peffley, M., Shields, T., & Williams, B. (1996). The intersection of race and crime in television news
stories: An experimental study. Political Communication, 13, 309–327.
Perse, E. M. (1986). Soap opera viewing patterns of college students and cultivation. Journal of
Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 30, 175–193.
Petty, R. E., Priester, J. R., & Briñol, P. (2002). Mass media attitudes change: Implications of the
elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In J. Bryant, & D. Zillmann (Eds.), Media effects:
Advances in theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 155–198). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Potter, W. J., Pashupati, K., Pekurny, R. G., Hoffman, E., & Davis, K. (2002). Perceptions of
television: A schema. Media Psychology, 4, 27–50.
Rabbie, J. M., & Horowitz, M. (1969). Arousal of ingroup-outgroup bias by a chance win or loss.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 269–277.
Raney, A. A. (2002). Moral judgment as a predictor of enjoyment of crime drama. Media Psychol-
ogy, 4, 305–322.
Raney, A. A. (2003). Disposition-based theories of enjoyment. In J. Bryant, J. Cantor, & D. Roskos-
Ewoldsen (Eds.), Communication and emotions: Essays in honor of Dolf Zillmann (pp. 61–84).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Raney, A. A. (in press). Punishing media criminals and moral judgment: The impact on enjoyment.
Media Psychology.
Raney, A. A., & Bryant, J. (2002). Moral judgment and crime drama: An integrated theory of
enjoyment. Journal of Communication, 52, 402–415.
Reeves, B., & Miller, M. M. (1978). A multidimensional measure of children’s identification with
television characters. Journal of Broadcasting, 22, 71–86.
Rest, J. (1979). Development in judging moral issues. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Rosengren, K. E., & Windahl, S. (1972). Mass media consumption as a functional alternative. In
D. McQuail (Ed.), Sociology of mass communication (pp. 166–174). Middlesex, UK: Penguin.

368
 14682885, 2004, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2004.tb00319.x by Thapar University, Wiley Online Library on [11/01/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Expanding Disposition Theory

Rubin, A. M. (2002). The uses-and-gratifications perspective in media effects. In J. Bryant & D.

Zillmann (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 525–548). Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Rubin, A. M., & Perse, E. M. (1987). Audience activity and soap opera involvement: A uses and
effects investigation. Human Communication Research, 14, 246–268.
Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building block of cognition. In R. J. Spiro, B. C. Bruce, &
W. F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension: Perspectives in cognitive psy-
chology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and education (pp. 33–58). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Schank, R., & Abelson, R. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding An inquiry into human
knowledge structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). Intergroup conflict and
cooperation: The Robbers Cave experiment. Norman, OK: University Book Exchange.
Smith, E. R., & Henry, S. (1996). An in-group becomes part of the self: Response time evidence.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 635–642.
Sumner, W. G. (1906/1940). Folkways: A study of the sociological importance of usages, manners,
customs, mores, and morals. Boston: Ginn.
Sweeny, P. D., & Gruber, K. L. (1984). Selective exposure: Voter information preferences and the
Watergate affair. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 1208–1221.
Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. Scientific American, 223, 96–102.
Taylor, D. M., & Doria, J. R. (1981). Self-serving and group-serving bias in attribution. Journal of
Social Psychology, 113, 201–211.
Taylor, S. E. (1981). The interface of cognitive and social psychology. In J. H. Harvey (Ed.), Cogni-
tion, social behavior, and the environment (pp. 189–211). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Taylor, S. E., & Fiske, S. T. (1978). Salience, attention, and attribution: Top of the head phenom-
ena. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental and social psychology (Vol. 11, pp. 249–
288). New York: Academic Press.
Turow, J. (1974). Talk-show radio as interpersonal communication. Journal of Broadcasting, 18,
171–179.
Vidmar, N., & Rokeach, M. (1974). Archie Bunker’s bigotry: A study in selective perception and
exposure. Journal of Communication, 24(1), 36–47.
Vincent, R. C., & Basil, M. D. (1997). College students’ news gratification, media use and current
events knowledge. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 41, 380–392.
Wyer, R. S., & Gordon, S. E. (1984). The cognitive representation of social information. In R. S.
Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 73–150). Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Wyer, R. S., & Lambert, A. J. (1994). The role of trait constructs in person perception: A historical
perspective. In P. G. Devine, D. L. Hamilton, & T. M. Ostrum (Eds.), Social cognition: Impact
on social psychology (pp. 109–142). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Zillmann, D. (1991). Empathy: Affect from bearing witness to the emotion of others. In J. Bryant
& D. Zillmann (Eds.), Responding to the screen: Reception and reaction processes (pp. 135–
167), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Zillmann, D. (1994). Mechanisms of emotional involvement with drama. Poetics, 23, 33–51.
Zillmann, D. (2000). Basal morality in drama appreciation. In I. Bondebjerg (Ed.), Moving images,
culture, and the mind (pp. 53–63). Luton, UK: University of Luton Press.
Zillmann, D., & Bryant, J. (1975). Viewer’s moral sanction of retribution in the appreciation of
dramatic presentations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11, 572–582.
Zillmann, D., & Bryant, J. (1985). Selective exposure to communication. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
Zillmann, D., Bryant, J., & Sapolsky, B. S. (1989). Enjoyment from sports spectatorship. In. J. H.
Goldstein (Ed.), Sports, games, and play: Social and psychological viewpoints (2nd ed., pp.
241–278). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Zillmann, D., & Cantor, J. (1972). Directionality of transitory dominance as a communication vari-
able affecting humor appreciation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24, 191–198.
Zillmann, D., & Cantor, J. (1976). A disposition theory of humor and mirth. In T. Chapman & H.
Foot (Eds.), Humor and laughter: Theory, research, and application (pp. 93–115). London:
Wiley.
Zillmann, D., & Cantor, J. (1977). Affective responses to the emotions of a protagonist. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 155–165.
Zillmann, D., Taylor, K., & Lewis, K. (1998). News as nonfiction theater: How dispositions to-
ward the public cast of characters affect reactions. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Me-
dia, 42, 153–169.

369