1. Disbarment case filed by Pauline S. Moya against Atty. Roy S.

Oreta for immorality, gross

misconduct, and acts of violence.
2. The parties were initially high school batchmates, they reconnected years later and began a
romantic relationship despite both being legally married to other people.
3. November 2023, Respondent atty oreta move in with the plaintiff, but their relationship quickly
turned abusive. Respondent become abusive towards the the plaintiff and her children.
4. Respondent also was extravagant towards others but neglectful towards the plaintiff and her
family.
5. The abuse escalated over time, with instances of physical violence, verbal insults, and
manipulation. The plaintiff tried to leave the relationship multiple times, but the respondent
would beg for forgiveness and promise to change, only to continue the abusive behavior.
The abuse culminated in a severe physical attack, leading to the woman's decision to end the
relationship.
6. In this regards, the Plaintiff resorted to the following remedies,
1. BPO Barangay Protection Order
2. TPO Temporary Protection Order

The TPO was later on become permanent.

7. The respondent argue that, he never intended to bring disgrace to the legal profession and
attributes his actions to being emotionally vulnerable at the time due to personal issues.
8. He describes how he and the complainant found comfort in each other due to their similar
situations and eventually decided to live together, assuming the roles of a husband and
father to her children.
9. The respondent refutes claims that he did not contribute financially to the household,
detailing how he covered expenses such as utilities, phone bills, cars, groceries, tuition fees,
and household appliances. He also addresses instances of conflict in their relationship,
denying allegations of verbal or physical abuse towards the complainant.
10. he also mentions the complainant's behavior and relationships with other men, highlighting
instances of manipulation and threats made towards the respondent.
11. The respondent acknowledges his regrets for his actions and promises to be more careful in
his future interactions.

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines –

Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP–CBD)

1. By its Report and Recommendation26 dated December 12, 2014, the IBP-CBD
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
2. It held that complainant and respondent openly admitted their cohabitation as husband and
wife while they were still legally married to their respective spouses. The fact that both of
them were then separated de facto from their respective spouses was inconsequential.
3. As for the charges of sexual, physical, psychological, economic abuse, and unconsented
taking of her nude pictures and videos of their lovemaking, the IBP-CBD found that
complainant failed to substantiate the same.

Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines –

Board of Governors (IBP–BOG)
 1. in April 2015, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors recommended that a
lawyer be disbarred due to misconduct. The respondent then asked for a reconsideration of
the decision, requesting a lesser penalty like a reprimand or a fine. He explained that he
regretted his actions, ended the improper relationship in 2010, and had been living a moral
life since then. In October 2017, the IBP reduced the penalty to a three-year suspension
instead of disbarment, considering the lawyer's remorse and the fact that he had ended the
relationship. As of May 28, 2021, no further appeals had been made, but the case was sent to
the court for a final decision because the IBP's decision was only a recommendation.

Sc ruling

Our Ruling

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law
through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar may be withdrawn where circumstances
concretely show the lawyer's lack of essential qualifications30 including good moral character.

Indeed, good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession,
but it must also remain intact to maintain one's standing in this exclusive and honored society. There
is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more
imperative than that of law.31

A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the Bar.
They must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach
anywhere and at all times.32 The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which respondent
vowed to uphold, clearly affirms this kind of conduct,33 viz.:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

It is thus, expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be of good moral
character, but must also be seen to be leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards
of the community.34 Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to these standards.

Complainant sufficiently proved her

claim of physical abuse.
In disbarment cases, the complainant bears the burden of proof to satisfactorily prove the allegations
in his or her complaint through substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.35

Here, the Court does not agree with the finding of the IBP–CBD that complainant failed to prove her
accusation of physical abuse against respondent.

In her Reply-Affidavit, complainant recalled the harrowing incidents she suffered in the abusive
hands of respondent:

68. [On] March 14, 2010[,] me and Roy had an argument that ended up to our
very first physical fight then. I incurred bruises in this fight, and it was my very first
physical abuse in my entire life. My parents never hit me or slap me, nor did Jun. I
was never traumatized until this earth-shattering clay with Roy. We already had
some misunderstanding[s] those days because of the tremendous throwing of foul
words of Roy with me in front of my kids and friends. Then, we started to argue more
because Roy wanted to leave the house with his mother without telling me that he
will leave, nor tell me where they will proceed on that day. So, I went to my room
and tried to change my clothes. Plain and simple. Roy followed me and locked the
door and pulled the pants I was half wearing already. Making me f[a]ll [to] the floor,
with my hands, then became reddish and painful. I picked up my pants again and
tried to wear it for several times, but Roy kept on pulling my pants, thus making me
f[a]ll to the floor so many times. I decided to get a new pants or shorts or anything
that I can wear so that I can leave my room instantly. But, [sic] Roy started to throw
me against my bed and bed frame for several times. I asked Roy to stop hurting me
and let me leave my room at once. I also asked Roy to stop throwing me or else I
will start fighting back too.

69. x x x He held my hands so tightly so that I cannot fight him back after I
showed Roy the reddish hands I had and the bruises I got from the throwing he did
to me. I would try to get my hands freed from his hard grip on my hands and arms. x
x x Contrary to what he claims that he never hit me nor slap me, there was a second
time on April 22, 2010 which I will recap later on.

70. x x x My kids saw my bruises, my friends Daisy, Jay[,] and Susie came over
and saw themselves the bruises too. My father and brother saw the bruises too on
that very agonizing and upsetting day for us. The next day, even our batchmates
saw the said bruises. Three days after, Roy came back and begged for my kids to
leave me in my bedroom so he can talk to me. At first, my kids[,] specially AAA and
BBB were hesitant to leave my room for Roy might be hitting me again. x x x

xxxx

73. [On] April 22, 2010[,] Roy left early this day [while] I stayed in the house for I
will be having a meeting nearby. I had a meeting with some of our batchmates
regarding our past activities and since I was an officer[,] I needed to attend this
meeting. And this was the reason why I wanted Roy to just tell the so-called no
partner party that he cannot attend, for we will have a meeting, or we can only stay
for a while in that party. x x x Anyway, as expected[,] Roy went to that party without
me x x x When I went home, I slept at the living room initially, but he pulled my cell
phone from me to the extent that it fell into pieces. He just want to read my cell
 phone that time, so I left him with my phone and went to my kids['] room because I
could already smell that he would be violent again.

74. x x x We argued and I reiterated why he can afford to still attend the party I
was doubting so much and even attended without me. He attended this party without
even prioritizing our relationship that was in a bad condition at that time. On the
other hand, I attended our own meeting wherein Roy was also supposed to be
present as part of the team. He said that, why am I angry for attending the party. I
reiterated that it was not because he attended the party but I was mad because of
the manner the message was sent to him. It is as if I was the only one not invited,
because both the parts of the women cannot really attend and that the wife of the
other man was out of town. x x x. In addition, the text message contained that Roy
has to pick up the other woman and bring her home too. Such a surprising lines [sic]
that I know any partner or wife would ask why that kind of text message.

75. x x x Then to my shock, Roy slapped me on my face. I was astonished. I

cried and tried to leave the room due to fear that he might do hit me again. He pulled
me and threw me on the bed again but I stood up and then he slapped me again. I
stood up once more and went to the door. He blocked the doorway, so I tried to pull
his left hand by my left hand while my right hand tried to push his elbow too.
Unfortunately, since we were both perspiring due to our fight, I slipped my right hand
and accidentally scratched his left arms[sic] by my right finger nails. I apologized and
said that he knew my hand only slipped and I did not mean to scratch him. Besides,
I was never physical with him at all. I was shocked again that Roy got his cellphone
beside the drawer and took a photo shot on his left arms. I asked what was his
purpose and why the shot? [H]e never replied but instead he slapped and threw me
again for the third time.36

xxxx

To prevent respondent from further laying his hand on her and her children, she applied for and after
due proceedings before the barangay, was issued a BPO. Notably, the issuance of a BPO is not
ministerial in nature. It is issued only after the punong barangay is convinced that an imminent
danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur.37

She, too, initiated before the Regional Trial Court-Branch 94, Quezon City a petition for issuance of
a PPO via Civil Case No. Q-10-67984. We refer to the factual findings of the trial court, as borne in
its Decision dated January 5, 2012, thus:

The facts are undisputed. Respondent inflicted physical harm not only to
petitioner but also to the latter's youngest child as well.

The incidents that transpired on March 14, 2010 and April 23, 2010 cannot be
discounted. Respondent slapped petitioner for no reason at all. She was thrown
against the wall and into her bed by respondent. The arguments that ensued on
those dates led to physical abuse as petitioner incurred bruises. The bruises were
seen by Susan Salumbides and petitioner's daughter, BBB.

Also, not only did respondent commit violence against petitioner in

contemplation of RA 9262, but likewise commit the same to petitioner's children.
BBB experienced [firsthand] the temerity of respondent to unleash verbal abuses.
 She likewise witnessed how respondent inflicted "harm" on her youngest sibling,
DDD.

The Barangay Protection Order dated August 8, 2010 issued by Barangay

Sangandaan, Quezon City bolstered petitioner's contention that she suffered abuses
in the hands of respondent. Petitioner narrated in full the abuses she experienced in
the hands of respondent for the last seven (7) years, culminating [i]n the physical
abuses inflicted to her on April 23, 2010.

Until the last moment, petitioner considered talking things over with respondent.
However, the incident that transpired in respondent's office, wherein he shouted for
no reason at all towards petitioner upon seeing her, and eventually blaming her for
his performance at work, broke the camel's back. Petitioner was humiliated by
respondent in front of other people. Not knowing what to do, petitioner just cried and
left.

These instances, to say the least, added emotional and psychological stress not
only to petitioner but to her children as well. The acts of violence employed by
respondent to petitioner caused the latter physical, emotional[,] and psychological
distress that made her and her family paranoid and wary upon the sight of
respondent. These cannot be countenanced for the same violate the basic precepts
enshrined in Section 2 of RA 9262, that is, guaranteeing full respect to human rights
and valuing the dignity of women and children.

Respondent was given the chance to refute the allegations imputed against him.
His counsel thoroughly examined every witness and piece of evidence presented by
petitioner. However, when the time to present his evidence came, he opted not to.
This actuation of respondent prevented the court from hearing his side of the story.

WHEREFORE, the Temporary Protection Order issued on September 23, 2010,

under Republic Act 9262, otherwise known as "Anti Violence Against Women and
their Children Act of 2004" is hereby made PERMANENT with some modifications, x
xx

xxxx

SO ORDERED.38

Verily, respondent slapped complainant, repeatedly slammed her against the wall and on the bed,
and threw her to the floor. Complainant suffered bruises which were seen by her friends and children
who could only feel sorry for her. Respondent, too, would call complainant "puta" or ''pokpok" and
brazenly declare "nanlalake kasi mommy mo" in front of her children. These are established facts.

There is no cogent reason why the Court should depart from these factual findings which are matters
of judicial record. The same speak volumes of respondent's repeated physical abuse not only toward
complainant but her children, as well. Notably, the trial court heard the parties' respective positions
and had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and determine their credibility up close. We also
note that respondent chose not to refute the damning inculpatory evidence of his physical and verbal
abuse toward complainant and her family despite ample opportunity given him. At any rate, the
decision in the civil case already attained finality, a fact which respondent does not deny.
To be sure, the issuance of a protection order requires preponderance of evidence39 or that
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to
it.40 Preponderance of evidence in civil cases is greater than substantial evidence required in
disbarment proceedings such as the case at bar.41 Thus, the judicial truths established by the trial
court should also be deemed established here.

The principle remains true despite the dismissal of the criminal complaint for violation of RA
9262.42 Indeed, administrative cases against lawyers are distinct from and proceed independently
of civil and criminal cases.43 In other words, there need not be a predicate crime for the Court to
impose its disciplinary action on erring lawyers. The rationale is clear:

x x x disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely

civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, it
also involves neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.44

xxxx

To repeat, the dismissal of the criminal complaint for violation of RA 9262 should not therefore
preclude the imposition of disbarment on respondent for violation of Rules 1.0145 and 7.0346 of the
CPR. Disbarment on ground of final conviction of crime involving moral turpitude is one thing;
disbarment on ground of violation of CPR is another. They are separate grounds for disbarment
which the Court may deal with separately.

If at all, the dismissal of the criminal complaint against respondent only meant that complainant
failed to muster the required quantum of proof in that particular case alone. But the dismissal of the
criminal complaint did not automatically mean complainant could not prove, by substantial evidence,
respondent's abusive behavior toward her and her children. For administrative cases only require
substantial evidence to prove a claim. We emphasize the well-settled rule that a criminal case is
different from an administrative case and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the
law applicable to each case.47

Thus, in Tucay v. Tucay,48 the Court resolved to disbar Atty. Manuel Tucay for carrying on an illicit
affair with a married woman despite the pendency of a separate bigamy charge against him.
According to the Court, complainant sufficiently proved in the disbarment proceeding that
respondent had been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, though the trial court has yet
to render a verdict of conviction or acquittal in the criminal case.

In any event, Resolution dated March 12, 2013 of the Office of the City Prosecutor's Office – Quezon
City left much to be desired. We quote:
 After analysis of the allegations and the evidence adduced by the complainant
and the respondent in relation to the provisions material to this complaint, it appears
that there is no sufficient basis to indict respondent for sexual, physical,
psychological[,] and economic abuse under Republic Act No. 9262. Respondent
could not be charged for economic abuse since the evidence proves that he gave
financial support to the complainant and her children while they were living together.
x x x Neither could respondent be charged for psychological and physical abuse as
the complainant's allegations relative thereto appear to be not in accordance with
common experience and observations of mankind that is probable under the
circumstance[s]. x x x The same is true with the alleged sexual abuses – x x x. Even
if complainant has secured a Barangay Protection Order, it does not necessarily
prove that the respondent is a violent person since the alleged threat on her life
could either be imagined or real considering that the Barangay issues the Order
summarily and ex-parte or merely on the basis of the application.

xxxx

As can be gleaned, the investigating prosecutor did not show how he was supposed to have logically
and reasonably processed the case in consideration of the applicable law and the evidence on
record.

The investigating prosecutor simply concluded that the issuance of the BPO, without more, did not
prove respondent's abusive behavior. He in fact reduced the evidentiary value of the BPO as a mere
scrap of document not worthy of credence. To emphasize though, complainant was under oath when
she applied for the issuance of the BPO. More, to side with the prosecutor's disregard of the BPO is
anathema to the very State policy49 of RA 9262 – the protection of the dignity of women and
children and guaranteed respect for human rights. If the very mechanism and refuge accorded by
law to women and children are reduced to a mere scrap of paper, the following questions linger –
are we really instruments for the protection of women and children's rights? Or did we just devise a
formal mechanism to provide a picture of protection on paper?

In any case, it cannot be said that the dismissal of the criminal complaint against respondent
precludes the refiling thereof based on whatever additional evidence may later on be mustered and
presented by the complainant against him. The dismissal of the criminal complaint cannot therefore
be regarded as an accurate measure of the state of the relationship between complainant and
respondent.

On the contrary, the fact that respondent repeatedly abused her and her children which as shown,
had already been established with finality by preponderance of evidence, more than the required
quantum of substantial evidence in administrative cases against members of the bar. Hence, in
accordance with the trial court's ruling in Civil Case No. Q-10-67984, we find respondent guilty of
violating Rules 1.0150 and 7.0351 of the CPR for repeatedly abusing complainant and her children.

As for respondent's own claim of physical abuse he suffered in the hands of complainant, suffice it to
state that mere allegation, without more, cannot be given credence. At any rate, respondent's claim
of physical abuse, even if true, does not grant him the license to become abusive of complainant and
her children.

Complainant failed to
substantiate her claim of
sexual and economic abuse.
The Court nevertheless adopts the recommendation of the IBP to dismiss complainant's accusation
of sexual and economic abuse for lack of substantiating evidence.52 The trial court's Decision dated
January 5, 2012 does not bear any finding of sexual or economic abuse against respondent either.

At any rate, the receipts for groceries, provisions, utility bills, transportation, and tuition fees
submitted by respondent show that he did share in the living expenses and gave financial support to
complainant's family during their cohabitation.

But being financially supportive of complainant's family does not give respondent the right to lay a
hand on complainant and her children. Violence is never a normal occurrence in any family set up.
To justify the same is egregious and goes against the very essence of a civilized society.53 The
Court will never tolerate this kind of attitude or practice.

Respondent's illicit
relationship with
complainant eroded the
sanctity of marriage

As a member of the Bar and officer of the Court, respondent is required not only to refrain from
adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses, but also to conduct himself in such a way as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice
of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is a member of its
ranks should not only master its tenets and principles, but must also, in their lives, accord continuing
fidelity to them.54

Here, both complainant and respondent openly admitted to cohabiting as husband and wife from
November 2003 until April 2010. At the start of their cohabitation, they were still legally married to
their respective spouses. In fact, the nullity of respondent's marriage became final only in July 2004
while complainant's marriage to Carlos has not been dissolved at all.

By living together as husband and wife despite the subsistence of their respective marriages, both
complainant and respondent openly gave the impression that a married man or woman may very
well cohabit with individuals beside their lawful spouses. And although the decree of nullity of
respondent's marriage became final in July 2004, his continuous cohabitation with complainant until
April 2010 did not diminish his liability. For he knew full well that complainant's marriage with Carlos
has not been severed at all.

Nor did his covetous desires for complainant, nay, his so-called unconditional love for her justify his
flagrant violation of our penal laws on adultery and concubinage. His illicit relationship with
complainant undeniably eroded the sanctity of marriage and the protection accorded to such vital
institution by the Constitution itself.

Respondent attempts to throw all the blame on complainant by painting her as a gold digger and
woman of ill-repute. But complainant's moral fitness is simply not what is at stake here; it is
respondent's fitness to continue as a member of the Bar which hangs in the balance.

In Samaniego v. Ferrer,55 respondent claimed he was not entirely to blame because complainant
knew he was married, yet, she chose to continue their illicit affair. The Court ruled, however, that
complainant's complicity in the immoral act could not mitigate, let alone, negate respondent's liability.
Whether complainant was in pari delicto with respondent is wholly immaterial to the issue of
respondent's liability here.
For cohabiting with a married woman for almost seven (7) years, respondent violated Rule
1.01,56 Canon 7,57 and Rule 7.0358 of the CPR. His liability, therefore, is not diminished just
because during their first year of cohabitation, his own marriage got annulled. He may have become
single again but complainant with whom he cohabited remained married to her husband all
throughout their cohabitation.

Respondent must be
sanctioned for using
offensive language and
insolence.

Lastly, we remind respondent that lawyers must refrain from using offensive language not only in
writing pleadings but also in their public and private dealings.59 Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the CPR
decrees:

CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.

RULE 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Here, respondent described complainant as a woman of ill-repute who lent him a hand to hold and
shoulder to lean on. Given his vulnerable state at that time though, he could not resist complainant
as "even a saint would [have been] tempted at the sight of an open door."

Respondent's use of double entendre does not escape us, and we are offended. Such distasteful
language is not welcome. True, a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, but it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.60

The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but
not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. To emphasize, lawyers are licensed officers of the
court who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly at all times, in all places.61

The use of intemperate and highly derogatory language in pleadings is punishable by direct
contempt. In fact, offensive and disrespectful observation is an act of direct contempt or contempt
in facie curiae which could be summarily punished without hearing.62

The power to punish for contempt, however, should be exercised on the preservative and not the
vindictive principle and on the corrective rather than retaliatory idea of punishment.63 The Court,
therefore, resolves to admonish respondent to deter him from using uncalled for derogatory remarks.

In the same vein, respondent must also be held accountable for displaying insolence in his
pleadings. Although he signified his remorse for his indiscretion, he continues to exude a high
degree of arrogance just the same. In fact, we find his so-called apology to the legal profession to be
less than sincere. He even had the temerity to claim that he is worthy of commendation and praise
for ending his illicit relationship with complainant. But the Court does not give medals to
philanderers, abusers, and cheats. Nor do we exalt those who gaslight and manipulate their
respective partners. Quite the reverse, we have consistently upheld the high moral standard required
of all members of the bar. For a lawyer's moral fiber is a thread that tethers him or her to the legal
profession.

In Washington v. Dicen, (Washington)64 the Court found Atty. Dicen guilty of violating Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 of the CPR for his use of language which not only maligned complainant's character, but
also imputed a crime on her, i.e., that she was committing adultery against her husband who was, at
the time, living in the United States. In his pleadings before the IBP, Atty. Dicen referred to
complainant as a "lunatic'' who was on a "crazy quest for revenge" against him. In the same
pleading, Atty. Dicen also called complainant "a puppet and a milking cow" of her paramour Martin.

Similarly, we find respondent guilty of violating Canon 865 and Rule 8.0166 of the CPR for his
insolence and use of offensive language in his pleadings.

Penalties

a. Violation of Rules 1.0167 and 7.0368 of the CPR – Physical Abuse

In recent years, domestic violence has begun to emerge from behind closed doors and drawn
shades which have traditionally hidden it from public scrutiny. With its severity and pervasiveness
now known, all elements of government must play its role to eradicate this social ill.69 For its part,
Congress has enacted the VAWC law to guarantee protection to women and children who are
among the most vulnerable sectors of society. But we, too, have a role to play in this lofty campaign.
We are uniquely positioned to mold behavior and culture through the cases we resolve. With the
prompt and proper resolution of domestic abuse cases, we send a strong message that acts of
abuse against women and children will not be tolerated but condemned.

No person should be subjected to physical abuse. The VAWC law, nonetheless, gives special
protection to women and children who are the "usual victims" of violence and abuse which flows
from the unequal power relationship between women and men and the widespread gender bias and
prejudice against women.70 The State's policy of affording special protection to women and children
who are victims of violence and child abuse is unequivocal and is a policy that the Court fully
supports.71

The most protection, though, goes to children as their growth and development may be negatively
affected by such trauma brought about by physical abuse on their person. But bearing witness to
abuse carries the same risk of harm to children's mental health and have the same serious and life
changing effects as being abused directly.72 The abuses suffered by complainant are therefore
comparable to the psychological trauma inflicted on her children who bore witness thereto. For
nothing could be more painful than seeing one's beloved mother being subjected to physical abuse
and verbal degradation by none other than the man whom she considered as her partner in life.

Indeed, the risk of post-traumatic stress disorder from domestic violence is high because it is a
betrayal by someone who is supposed to be a protector; it happens in a place which is supposed to
be safe; and is usually done at a time when children are totally dependent on their parental figures,
hence, powerless.73 This type of trauma is a double-edged sword that cuts deep. Aside from
scarring the impressionable minds of children, it also imprints the idea that violence is a normal set
up in families. Then such abuse breeds a new generation of abusers, ad infinitum. This should not
be the case.

The Court's full support to the protection of women and children extends to the cleansing of its ranks
of officers with audacity to lay their hands on women and children. Even without a conviction for
violation of the VAWC Law, the Court can make the hammer fall, and heavily74 when, as in this
case, complainant sufficiently established by substantial evidence, her claim of abuse not only on
her person, but also on her children.

Indeed, lawyers and judges alike should be at the forefront in combatting domestic abuse and
mitigating its effects. But rather than become a vanguard against violence on women and children,
respondent chose to be the perpetrator thereof. The Court, therefore, deems it proper to impose the
supreme penalty of disbarment on respondent for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR, for
repeatedly laying his hand not only on complainant but on her children, too – an act which the Court
abhors the most.

The noble legal profession is simply no place for abusers. We do not coddle violators of the VAWC
law, nor do we allow them to tarnish our collective dignity. We have all vowed to uphold the
protection of women and children when we took our sacred oath. This involves the imposition of
administrative penalties, including the supreme penalty of disbarment, when our own officers of the
Court violate this sworn duty.

b. Violation of Rule 1.01,75 Canon 7,76 and Rule 7.0377 of the CPR – Immoral Conduct

Maintaining an illicit relationship is an immoral conduct punishable by either suspension or

disbarment depending on the circumstances of the case. For a lawyer to be disbarred on ground of
immorality, the conduct complained of must be grossly immoral or so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.78

In Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza,79 respondent got disbarred for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR
for abandoning his legitimate family in order to live with another married woman. His children
pleaded with him to avoid displaying his paramour in public but their pleas went unheeded. This
caused one of his children to suffer depression and attempt suicide. Despite the pain he had caused
his family, respondent showed no remorse for his actions.

In Narag v. Atty. Narag,80 Dantes v. Atty. Dantes,81 Bustamante-Alejandro v. Atty.

Alejandro,82 and Guevarra v. Atty. Eala,83 the Court resolved to disbar respondents for abandoning
their legitimate spouses and maintaining illicit affairs.

Another. In Tucay v. Atty. Tucay,84 Villatuya v. Atty. Tabalingcos,85 Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty.

Celera,86 and Dr. Perez v. Atty. Catindig,87 the Court has invariably imposed the penalty of
disbarment against lawyers who entered into bigamous marriages.

Yet in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr., (Ferancullo)88 the Court merely suspended Atty. Sancho M.
Ferancullo, Jr. from the practice of law for two (2) years for his intimate relationship with a woman
other than his wife. We held that in the absence of any exacerbating circumstance such as
abandonment of the lawful spouse, the ultimate penalty of disbarment would not be imposed.

Ferancullo applies here. Notably, when complainant and respondent started living together in
November 2003, respondent was already separated from his wife, so was complainant from her
husband. There is, therefore, no issue of abandonment or bigamous relationship here. As
in Ferancullo, we also find that in the absence of any of these exacerbating circumstances,
respondent's two (2) year suspension from the practice of law would suffice.

In view of the earlier imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment, however, the penalty of
suspension here is rendered nugatory. A disbarred lawyer may no longer be suspended from the
practice of law.
c. Violation of Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the CPR – Insolence and Use of Derogatory
Language

In accordance with Washington,89 respondent is admonished for his insolence and use of
derogatory remarks against complainant and use of indecent language in his pleadings in the
present case.

Let this be a reminder to all lawyers to resist the temptation brought about by the sight of an open
door no matter how vulnerable they are, lest they live a life of regret like herein respondent. Indeed,
lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
including honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. They are at all times subject to the watchful public eye
and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct – both public and private – fail
this scrutiny like respondent have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized.90

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds Atty. Roy Anthony S. Oreta liable for:

1) Physical abuse in violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law effective
upon receipt of this Decision, and his name ORDERED stricken off in the Roll of
Attorneys;

2) Gross immorality in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7, and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, hence, SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years. Considering, however, that respondent has already been
disbarred, this penalty may no longer be imposed;

3) Violation of Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

for his derogatory and indecent remarks in his pleadings for which he
is ADMONISHED; and

4) Violation of Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

for displaying insolence and arrogance in his pleadings for which he
is ADMONISHED.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal record in the

Office of the Bar Confidant.

Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

CAGUIOA, J.:

I dissent.

There is no question that the Court should fully support the State's policy to protect the vulnerable
members of society, including women and children. Neither do I dispute the ponencia's sentiments
that the Court should maintain the integrity of the legal profession by expelling members who abuse
and assault. women. Indeed, the Court should "not coddle violators of the [Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act (Anti-VAWC Act)]",1 there being no justification for domestic
violence. However, the Court's duty to discipline lawyers is circumscribed by the basic principle that
the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and only for clear cases of misconduct.2 In this
regard, the lawyer remains innocent of the charges until the complainant successfully discharges the
burden of proof through substantial evidence.3 This burden cannot be reversed under the misplaced
notion of championing women's rights.

The records here clearly show that not only is the complaint unsubstantiated, but respondent was
able to refute the allegations against him. This is precisely where this dissent proceeds from — that
in this particular case, there is a dearth of evidence to support the factual conclusions of
the ponencia. Thus, I dissent from the majority in ruling to disbar Atty. Roy Anthony S. Oreta (Atty.
Oreta) for his purported acts of violence. I submit that for his illicit affair during the subsistence of his
and complainant Pauline S. Moya's (Moya) respective marriages, the more appropriate penalty is
suspension from the practice of law.

I.

In her disbarment complaint, Moya alleges that she was in a relationship with Atty. Oreta. When they
started their relationship, she already had four children with her estranged husband while Atty.
Oreta, who was also married at that time, was similarly separated from his wife. Despite the
subsistence of their respective marriages, Moya and Atty. Oreta started living together in November
2003 until their relationship soured and ended a good seven years after, or sometime in 2010.4

According to Moya, their relationship was going well at the beginning. However, their relationship
later deteriorated when Atty. Oreta refused to contribute to the payment of the household expenses.
She claims that Atty. Oreta also became verbally and physically abusive towards her and her
children. The abuse got worse, again according to Moya, constraining her to file a complaint against
Atty. Oreta for violation of the Anti-VAWC Act with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
(OCP), and to initiate a petition for the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). While the PPO was favorably granted in favor of Moya in
a Decision5 dated January 5, 2012 of the RTC, the OCP, however, dismissed the charges of sexual,
physical, psychological, and economic abuse against Atty. Oreta in a Resolution6 dated March 12,
2013.7

After due proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines–Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD), the Investigating Commissioner recommended to suspend Atty. Oreta from the practice
of law for six months, for cohabiting with Moya while they were still married to their respective
spouses. With respect to the allegations of abuse, the Investigating Commissioner found that these
were unsubstantiated.8

The IBP-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) adopted the factual findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, but modified the recommended penalty to disbarment since Atty. Oreta had an illicit
affair with Moya during his marriage.9 Upon the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Oreta, the
recommended penalty was reduced to suspension from the practice of law for three years. Among
the considerations of the IBP-BOG in lowering the penalty were the expression of remorse and the
apology of Atty. Oreta, as well as the fact that Atty. Oreta and Moya had already parted ways.10

The ponencia disagrees with the findings of the IBP and finds Atty. Oreta guilty of violating Rules
1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for his acts of physical violence towards
Moya and her children, and for gross immorality. With respect, however, to the allegation of sexual
and economic abuse, the ponencia finds no evidence to substantiate the allegations of Moya, there
being contrary evidence to support Atty. Oreta's claim that he defrayed some expenses to support
Moya and her children.11 Lastly, the ponencia admonishes Atty. Oreta for his use of intemperate
language in his pleadings, and for his "insolence" and arrogance.12

The ponencia orders the disbarment of Atty. Oreta not because he cohabited with Moya while he
was married, but for physically abusing Moya and her children.13 The ponencia likewise finds Atty.
Oreta liable for immoral conduct and imposed the additional penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for two years.14 The ponencia ultimately deems it unnecessary to suspend Atty. Oreta in light
of the imposition of disbarment.15

II.

The imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment on Atty. Oreta is completely unwarranted. The
majority, in agreeing with the ponencia, lost sight of the basic postulate that the power to disbar must
be exercised in the preservative, and not vindictive principle. Bearing in mind the serious
consequences of disbarment, it is well-settled that the Court only penalizes lawyers when the
complainant satisfactorily discharges the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in
the complaint. Thus, even if disbarment proceedings are sui generis, and despite the lower quantum
of proof, mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.16

The ponencia relied on Cristobal v. Cristobal17 (Cristobal), a case which involved a similar allegation
of domestic violence committed by the respondent-lawyer. However, the Court in Cristobal did not
simply rely on the allegations of the complainant in finding the lawyer administratively liable. There
were other pieces of documentary evidence, including a police blotter and a medical certificate,
attesting to the injuries sustained by the complainant. There were also pictures of the injuries that
the complainant in Cristobal sustained because of the respondent-lawyer's violent acts. The Court
then concluded that there was substantial evidence to support at least three incidents of abuse
among the numerous allegations of domestic violence in the complaint. These incidents, according
to the Court, were enough to hold the respondent-lawyer liable for violating the relevant provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The situation in Cristobal simply does not obtain in this case. Here, the ponencia's finding of physical
abuse is grounded solely on the RTC's issuance of a PPO, in which it was concluded that Atty. Oreta
committed acts of violence towards Moya in separate occasions.18 The ponencia says, to which the
majority agrees, that as "matters of judicial record,"19 Atty. Oreta is deemed liable for physically
abusing Moya and her children. The abuse, continued the ponencia, was "established with finality by
preponderance of evidence"20 because the trial court acted favorably on Moya's application for a
PPO. Since the quantum of proof required in disbarment proceedings is substantial evidence, which
is of lesser degree than preponderant evidence, the ponencia concludes that Moya was able to
establish the allegations in her disbarment complaint.21

I disagree. This reasoning arbitrarily disregards the totality of the parties' evidence.

Aside from the PPO, no other corroborative evidence was presented before the IBP to objectively
support Moya's claims of abuse.22 Nor was there any proof substantiating the injuries Moya
purportedly sustained when Atty. Oreta supposedly abused her on March 14, 201023 and April 22,
2010.24 In contrast to the case of Cristobal, there were no photographs of the alleged visible
injuries, much less a medical record or medical certificate to prove Moya's claims of abuse. The
Court can only rely on the testimonial evidence on which the PPO was based - which the
complainant noticeably rehashed in the present disbarment complaint - to conclude that Atty. Oreta
inflicted physical harm on Moya and her children. Clearly, had the ponencia gone beyond the PPO,
the records would readily show that the charges against Atty. Oreta were groundless.
Moreover, a review of the records paints a different picture than what Moya presented. While they
were living together, Atty. Oreta provided substantial material support to Moya and her children. Atty.
Oreta not only paid for their daily expenses, such as groceries, utility bills and transportation, he also
supported the education of Maya's children — children, who are not his own.25 He did this for the
seven-year period he cohabited with Moya. Atty. Oreta also purchased a Nissan Livina and a Nissan
Sentra for the use of Moya and her children, as well as appliances for their home.26 The records
likewise established that when they separated, Atty. Oreta was still supporting Moya financially, as
she continued to collect the earnings of the salon owned by Atty. Oreta.27

During the PPO proceedings, Moya did not deny that Atty. Oreta had been providing her family with
financial support.28 In fact, during the mandatory conference before the Investigating Commissioner,
Moya candidly admitted that it was Atty. Oreta who would regularly bring her children to school
during the later years of their relationship.29 Significantly, Moya also admitted having had another
romantic relationship with a different man —who she likewise accused later on as abusive.
Curiously, it was Atty. Oreta who assisted Moya in filing a complaint for violation of Anti-VAWC Act
against her other paramour.30 But even with Moya's own declarations, which should have been
considered by the Court in the assessment of her credibility, the majority opted to turn a blind eye.

The position I am taking in this case is not borne out of an irrational rejection of Moya's allegations of
abuse. Rather, a cursory examination of the totality of the parties' evidence reveals to me a different
conclusion — the claims of Moya are unsupported and contradicted by the records. That the
allegations of Moya were both self-serving and incredibly bare did not escape the attention of the
IBP's Investigating Commissioner. In the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation, the pertinent portion reads as follows:

Based on the evidence, this Commission is not persuaded that the complainant had proved by
substantial evidence her claim of physical, psychological or economic abuse including her cry of
rape, They are but just bare assertions. The findings in the Decision of RTC Branch 94 (for issuance
of Permanent Protection Order) are not controlling in the present administrative case. Besides, this
Commission notes that the respondent did not present evidence in that civil case. In the same
manner, [Moya's] declaration that [Atty. Oreta] videotaped their lovemaking and took nude pictures
of her was not proved [(sic)] with the quantum of evidence required in this proceedings ((sic)].31

It bears noting that the Investigating Commissioner received the parties' evidence firsthand. In
addition to finding the claims of Moya as "just bare assertions", the Investigating Commissioner aptly
observed that the PPO was issued on the sole basis of these same assertions. But as the RTC
noted in its decision granting the PPO:

Respondent was given the chance to refute the allegations imputed against him. His counsel
thoroughly examined every witness and piece of evidence presented by petitioner. However, when
time to present his evidence came, he opted not to. This actuation of respondent prevented the court
from hearing his side of the story.32

What all the foregoing clearly implies is that the favorable grant by the RTC of Moya's application for
a protection order should not have been made the basis for the disbarment of Atty. Oreta. The
majority egregiously erred when it gave more premium to the factual conclusions of the RTC over
that of the IBP, without taking into consideration how each tribunal arrived at their findings. In stark
contrast with the proceedings for the issuance of the PPO, the IBP had the benefit of receiving
controverting evidence from Atty. Oreta. To my mind, therefore, greater weight should have been
given to the IBP's factual findings as it was in a better position to assess the veracity of both parties'
submissions. At the very least, the evidence presented by Atty. Oreta should call into question
Moya's credibility.
To be sure, Moya's own admissions on the support that Atty. Oreta had consistently provided to her
and her children during their relationship, markedly runs counter to, and certainly casts doubt on, the
narrative Moya sought to establish in her disbarment complaint — that Atty. Oreta was an abusive,
selfish, and indolent partner. The majority, however, adopted the allegations of Moya hook line and
sinker despite the conspicuous inconsistencies in her testimony and the glaring absence of
independent and objective evidence to support her claim. This is grievous error on the part of the
Court. We cannot automatically dismiss a respondent's well-founded defense on the pretext of
eradicating the social ill of domestic violence. The lower threshold of substantial evidence does not
do away with Moya's burden of proving the allegations in the complaint, and in my view, she
glaringly failed to discharge this burden.

III.

But that is not all.

The factual basis for the issuance of the PPO are the very same allegations "in the criminal case for
violation of the Anti-VAWC Act. On March 12, 2013, the OCP issued a Resolution dismissing the
complaint for lack of probable cause. It found, "[a]fter analysis of the allegations and the evidence
adduced by the complainant and the respondent x x x that there is no sufficient basis to indict the
respondent for sexual, physical, psychological[,] and economic abuse."33 The relevant portions of
the OCP Resolution provide:

x x x Respondent could not be charged for economic abuse since the evidence proves that he gave
financial support to the complainant and her children while they were living together. Such support
includes electricity, water, telephone and internet bills of the complainant, among others, which were
itemized in his counter-affidavit. Neither could the respondent be charged for psychological and
physical abuse as the complainant's allegations relative thereto appear to be not in accordance with
common experience and observations of mankind that is probable under the
circumstance. Complainant herself averred that a few months after the respondent transferred to her
house, he showed his true character by spanking, hitting, [and] slapping her youngest child[,] Don[,]
and he also shouted to (sic) her daughters to the point of making them cry and yet, complainant had
to wait for several years to seek redress for her grievances, which does not speak well of the
veracity of her allegations. The same is true with the alleged sexual abuses – that respondent used
to rape her and would force her to have sex with him against her will[,] which was her "dilemma for
the longest time." If she and her children were truly suffering abuses from the respondent, she
should have evicted (sic) from her house right at the start and need not wait for seven years to pass
before she could file this complaint against him. Even if the complainant has secured a Barangay
Protection Order, it docs not necessarily prove that the respondent is a violent person[,] since the
alleged threat on her life could either be imagined or real[,] considering that the Barangay issues the
Order summarily and [ex-parte] or merely on the basis of the application. The law and jurisprudence
dictate that "evidence to be believed must be credible in itself such that common observation of
mankind can show it as probable under the circumstances.["]

xxxx

By and large, complainant's testimonial evidence, although coming from a credible source, sans any
relevant documentary support, does not appear to be credible, reasonable and in accord with human
experience tantamount to lack of probable cause.34

Similar to the proceedings before the IBP, both Moya and Atty. Oreta actively participated and
presented their respective evidence before the OCP. In both proceedings, Moya's claims were
deemed incredible. The ponencia, however, perfunctorily dismisses the factual findings of the OCP,
arguing that the disbarment proceeding may proceed independently of a criminal case.35

I respectfully disagree with this kind of skewed reasoning. The Court cannot, on the one hand, argue
that the OCP's findings are immaterial to the present case, and om the other, rely on the factual
conclusions of the RTC in granting the PPO. We are not engaged in the business of cherry-picking
evidence to fit a foregone conclusion. If the Court were to take the position that the dismissal of the
criminal complaint against Atty. Oreta is not binding, neither should the Court proceed to hold him
liable on the basis of the RTC's favorable issuance of a PPO.36

While it is oft-repeated that a disbarment proceeding is sui generis, the question of Atty. Oreta's
moral fitness to continue being a member of the bar requires the Court to pass upon Moya's
allegations of abuse, and to weigh her claims against the defense of Atty. Oreta. As such, it is of little
consequence that a disbarment proceeding has a different objective than the reliefs afforded in a
criminal case or a civil action. In arriving at the conclusion that Atty. Oreta violated the relevant
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court necessarily must make a factual
finding that Atty. Oreta indeed committed acts of violence against Moya and her children. Thus, the
perceived distinction among these proceedings is wholly illusory since the factual basis for the
lawyer's administrative liability is inextricably intertwined with those already litigated in the civil and
criminal actions.

In my Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Laurel v. Delute,37 I explained the danger of rendering
conflicting rulings m different proceedings that arose from the same set of facts:

Facts are facts. There simply cannot be two versions of the same truth. To allow a resolution in this
disbarment proceeding of the alleged manipulation of respondent against his client in the execution
of the compromise agreement would create a situation where the "facts" as already established
before Civil Case No. T-2497 would now be different from the "facts" established here. This would be
unacceptable. The ineluctable consequence in such situation would mean having conflicting or
contradictory "findings of facts," that would cast a cloud of uncertainty. over Civil Case No. T-2497.

xxxx

The fear that generating conflicting "findings of facts" will unnecessarily and unwarrantedly foment
more litigation between the contending parties (i.e., between complainant and Azucena) and hence,
defeat — rather than promote — the tenets of the orderly administration of justice, is legitimate. It is
truly not hard to imagine that any "findings of facts" the Court makes in this disbarment proceeding
can and will be used by complainant in another civil litigation against Azucena as basis for having
the compromise agreement annulled. In fact, in Esquivias v. CA, while the Court held that the factual
findings in a disbarment case are conclusive only in said proceedings and not to a related action, it
acknowledged, nevertheless, that the judgment in the disbarment case may, at best, be given weight
when introduced as evidence in another case. This, in my view, is recognition that the outcome of a
disbarment case which involves a crucial issue between other parties may urge any of them to bring
an action in court to settle a controversy that rests closely on the said issue.

At the same time, should a subsequent case proceed and the trial court arrive at factual findings that
are diametrically opposed to that which the Court has come up with to support its decision in
disbarring a lawyer in a disciplinary proceeding, the unfairness against the lawyer is, at once,
palpable. In that given scenario, a lawyer would suffer the stinging effects of disbarment on the basis
of factual findings that run entirely different from a version in another case — which, I hasten to add,
would be more "truthful" if arrived at through a trial with the right of cross-examination being
available.38
Again, regardless of the purpose of the proceedings — to discipline an errant lawyer for disbarment
or to prosecute an offense for criminal actions — the case would depend on the same set of
facts. Thus, the Court cannot rely on the sole fact that a PPO was issued in favor of Moya (where
only Moya participated), and then close its eyes to the conclusions of both the IBP and the OCP
(where both Moya and Atty. Oreta actively participated) that there was insufficient basis to establish
the claims of abuse. To emphasize, the allegations of Moya rely on the same evidence in these
proceedings. However, unlike the action for the issuance of the protection order, both the IBP and
the OCP had the benefit of receiving controverting evidence from Atty. Oreta — thus, fully threshing
out the issues and the veracity of Moya's assertions. The Court should not discount these findings
and unduly place greater weight to the RTC's grant of a PPO.

In all, it bears stressing that "[t]he power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty
reasons."39 I cannot see why the Court should insist in the disbarment of Atty. Oreta when the
evidence paints a totally different picture as to what Moya claims. The Court has consistently ruled
that a lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in the complaint through substantial
evidence.40 Failing this, judiciousness dictates that the Court exercise restraint in imposing the most
severe penalty of disbarment.

That Atty. Oreta accepted the children of Moya as his very own, and treated them as his very own,
providing them financial support during their formative years, paying for their groceries and utility
bills, paying for their education, and even furnishing them with cars — these acts, to me, are acts of
love that lead me to believe the finding of the IBP that the charges of abuse were unsubstantiated, if
not totally made up and concocted.41 That Atty. Oreta eventually parted ways with Moya only
means that the love that was there had vanished. To me, these acts of love towards children not of
his own blood, should have been taken in favor of Atty. Oreta in the Court's determination of the
appropriate penalty. To me, a suspension of three years is more than sufficient especially
considering the IBP-BOG's finding that Atty. Oreta had expressed remorse.

In all, I dissent from the majority's decision to be heavy handed by imposing the penalty of
disbarment on Atty. Oreta. However, for engaging in an illicit affair prior to the nullification of his
marriage,42 I concur with the ponencia that Atty. Oreta should be held liable for gross immorality, in
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7, and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In
consideration of his expression of remorse, as well as the subsequent nullity of his marriage to his
previous spouse, I vote to suspend Atty. Oreta from the practice of law for a period of three years.