1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 932 OF 2021

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1190 of 2021)

RANDHEER SINGH Appellant(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF U.P. & ORS. Respondent(s)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 933 OF 2021

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4237 of 2021)

J U D G M E N T

Indira Banerjee, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal is against a judgment and order dated

15th December, 2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at

Allahabad dismissing the application of the Appellant under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’).

3. As recorded in the judgment and order impugned, the

application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. had been filed for

quashing of proceedings in Crime Case No.5973/2020 (State v. Rajan

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by

Kumar) under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal
SUNIL KUMAR
Date: 2021.10.11
15:17:42 IST
Reason:

Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‘I.P.C.’), Police Station

Shahpur, District Gorakhpur pending in the Court of the Additional

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Chief Judicial Magistrate, IIIrd District Gorakhpur and also to

quash the charge sheet dated 18th January, 2020 and summoning order

dated 26th June, 2020. The High Court has, in detail, recorded the

arguments of the applicants which are very briefly summarised

hereinbelow :-

(i) The case lodged was false and baseless;

(ii) Charge-Sheet had been submitted without proper investigation

and evidence;

(iii) No prima facie case was disclosed against the applicants.

4. It is the case of the Appellant that one Arjun Dev and his

wife Bela Rani were recorded as Bhumidhar of Plot No. 971M area

918 Aire (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plot in question’) and

that they had executed a registered Power of Attorney in favour of

the Applicant No.1 Rajan Kumar, who has since died.

5. It is said that on the basis of the said Power of Attorney,

the said Rajan Kumar (since deceased) executed sale deeds in

favour of the Appellant and his family members on 16th July, 2014,

1st August, 2014, 6th August, 2014 and 23rd July, 2014, pursuant to

which, the name of the Appellant and others were mutated in the

Revenue records.

6. From the facts, as recorded in the judgment and order under

appeal, it appears that during the mutation proceedings, one Smt.

Beena Srivastava had filed objections before the Naib Tehsildar

but the same were rejected and the property was duly mutated in
 3

favour of the Appellant and his family members by an order dated

28th February, 2015.

7. Smt. Beena Srivastava filed an Original Suit No. 971 of 2014

for cancellation of the Power of Attorney dated 4th June, 2014 and

the sale deeds executed by Rajan Kumar (since deceased) in favour

of the Appellant and his family members but that suit was

dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

by order dated 18th September, 2015.

8. The order dated 18th September, 2015 was challenged in First

Appeal No.531 of 2015 before the High Court. That appeal was

partly allowed by an order dated 26th November, 2015 with a

direction on the Trial Court to return the plaint of the plaintiff

for presentation before the appropriate Court.

9. Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court dated 26th

November, 2015, Smt. Beena Srivastava, approached this Court by

filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2848 of 2016 which had

been dismissed by an order dated 8 th September, 2016. From the

judgment and order impugned, it appears that it had been submitted

before the High Court that Chandra Prakash Srivastava and Smt.

Beena Srivastava had also filed a Contempt Application No. 706 of

2016 which had been dismissed by an order dated 10th February,

2016. Before the High Court, it was submitted that when Beena

Srivastava could not get any relief from the Trial Court right

upto this Court, she filed a Writ Petition No. 12275 of 2016 which
 4

had also been dismissed by an order dated 28th March, 2016. The

said Beena Srivastava’s son, Dr. Virat Swaroop Saxena also filed a

contempt application which had been dismissed by an order dated

29th July, 2016.

10. Pursuant to the order dated 28th March, 2016 passed by the

High Court in Writ Petition No.12275/2016, the Appellant

instituted Original Suit No.608 of 2016 in the Court of Civil

Judge, Senior Division, Gorakhpur for permanent injunction in

respect of the plots in question. It appears that by an order

dated 12th April, 2016, temporary injunction had been granted in

favour of the Appellant. This is recorded in the judgment and

order under appeal.

11. It was the case of the applicants before the High Court,

(including Rajan Kumar, since deceased), that having failed to get

relief from the courts, Beena Srivastava brought in Ratnesh

Mishra, Smt. Afroz Athar and Abdul Gani into the picture to harass

the Appellant. We are not really concerned with these allegations

for the purpose of this appeal.

12. Suffice it to mention that the judgment and order under appeal

records the submission of the applicants that the Power of

Attorney holder of Bela Rani, namely, Rajan Kumar (since deceased)

had executed the sale deed dated 22nd June, 2017 in favour of the

Applicant No.2 (that is, the Appellant before us) after receiving
 5

the sale consideration. Later, a supplementary deed was executed

on 16.09.2017. On the basis of Sale Deed dated 22 nd June, 2017,

the name of the Appellant was mutated in the records. Further

details of what transpired are not recorded to avoid unnecessary

prolixity. Suffice it to mention that the Respondent No.2 filed an

FIR in this Court. The relevant extracts from the said FIR,

lodged on 16th September, 2017 are reproduced hereinbelow for

convenience :-

“The applicant has purchased on 21.08.2017 one house with

courtyard in which shops are also present from Smt. Afroz wife
of Ghani Athar Resident of Moh. Basharpur, Gorakhpur and
Virendra Kumar Abrol son of Ram Swarop Abrol Resident of Jail
Road Shahpur currently residing at Raghav Nagar Deoria by way of
registered Sale Deed in which one shop made by asbestos sheet
and one residential Room with Gate at back side is constructed.
……………………….
……………………..
……………………..
The said house with boundary wall & shop is registered in the
name of Afroz Athar at the Municipal Corporation and she has
been paying the applicable house Tax on the same and nobody had
interfered in her possession. In the meanwhile, Afroz Athar
was in dire need of money and proposed to sell the said Land
and house to the applicant. The Applicant purchased the said
House No. 239/B with the house and courtyard by way of Sale
Deed and as a precautinary measure also got the signatures of
the erstwhile owner Virendra Kumar Abrol on the Sale Deed so
that no dispute remains in the future. In the meantime, one
other person Rajan Kumar son of Late Ramswaroop 77 Geeta
Vatika, Shahpur Gorakhpur currently residing at Ragav Nagar
Deoria on the basis of a false Power of Attorney of Bela Rani
executed a Sale Deed to Randheer Singh son of Late Shiv Shanker
House No. 11C Divya Nagar Colony P.S Khorabar, Gorakhpur by
connivance whereas Bela Rani had no right to sell the Afroz
Athar’s House intact with Boundary wall. On the basis of the
same False Sale Deed Randheer Singh and Rajan Kumar in
association with the witnesses of the said sale deed Vishal
Sharma son of Ram Chandra & Sunil Kumar son of Sh. Rajdev, who
are Criminal natured persons, are attempting to trespass the
house by breaking open the Lock and today night have also got
written their name in my absence. When in the morning the
applicant got the knowledge of the same he went to the police
station to lodge First Information Report but due to their
influence our report could not be lodged and for which the
applicant is making this application before you. The above
stated Randheer Singh and Rajan Kumar have done this to obtain
 6

their benefit & have created a False document and by intention

to cause loss to us & to forcibly grab my house and therefore
for this reason it is necessary in the interest of justice to
registered a case against them. Hence it is prayed that the
case be registered ………….”

13. As pointed out by Mr. Sanjeev Agarwal, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of Respondent No.2, the FIR was challenged in

the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. The said writ petition was disposed of by

order dated 5th October, 2017 with the following order:

“It is contended that the dispute in respect of the

property as to whether the petitioners have any right
therein on the basis of conveyance deed executed by
power of attorney holder or the first informant has the
right is purely civil in nature and does not give rise
to any criminal liability.

Learned AGA and Sri Sudhanshu Pandey, appearing for

complainant-respondent no. 3 opposed the petition.

We have gone through the allegations contained in the

impugned F.I.R., which, prima-facie, discloses
commission of cognizable offence, as such, we are not
inclined to interfere in the F.I.R.

However, in view of the facts and the allegations made

in the FIR, writ petition stands finally disposed of
with the direction that the petitioners shall not be
arrested in the aforesaid case crime number till
submission of police report under Section 173(2)
Cr.P.C. before the Court concerned, subject to their
cooperation in the investigation, which will go on and
shall be brought to a logical end.”

14. Mr. Agarwal, submitted that the order dated 5 th October, 2017

of the High Court disposing of the Writ Petition (Criminal

Miscellaneous) No.20919 of 2017 had not been challenged by the

Appellants and had, thus, assumed finality. It was not open to

the Appellant to reopen the same issues by filing an application

under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

 7

15. The scope of interference by the High Court under Section 482

of the Cr.P.C. is wide as recorded by the High Court by the

judgment and order impugned. The High Court itself has said that

though inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is very

wide, it has to be exercised in exceptional cases.

16. There can be no doubt that the jurisdiction under Section 482

is not exercised for the asking, it is exercised with care in

exceptional cases. The scope of interference with an FIR is much

more restricted and ordinarily the Court does not interfere under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when there is an

alternative remedy available to the applicant. Furthermore, from

the tenor of the order of the High Court rejecting the writ

petition, it is patently clear that one of the reasons why the

High Court did not intervene at that stage was that the Police

report had also not been submitted. The Police report has since

been submitted and the charge sheet has been filed. It is true

that about 12-13 witnesses have been named. However, the said

Bela Rani who executed the Power of Attorney has not even been

cited as a witness. Apparently, the said Bela Rani was not even

examined by the Investigating Authorities.

17. In this appeal, we are not concerned with the underlying civil

disputes between the parties which are the subject matter of

diverse civil proceedings which are pending between the Appellant

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and the private respondent in the concerned civil courts. All

those civil suits will obviously be decided on their own merits.

18. The only question is whether there is any criminal offence

disclosed in the FIR so far as the Appellant is concerned. When

the High Court passed its order dated 5th October, 2017, Rajan

Kumar (since deceased), the executant of the sale deed and the

Power of Attorney holder was also an applicant before the Court.

Today, there has been a change in situation, in that, criminal

proceedings against Rajan Kumar have abated since Rajan Kumar is

no longer alive. It is the case of the private respondent that the

private respondent purchased property. In the meantime, Rajan

Kumar, who is no longer alive, on the basis of a false Power of

Attorney of Bela Rani, executed a sale deed in favour of Randheer

Singh, i.e., the Appellant herein. There is only a vague averment

“by connivance”. The next part of the sentence reads “Bela Rani

had no right to sell the aforesaid plot.”

19. As recorded in the judgment and order, the property in

question has even been mutated in the name of the Appellant. Of

course, mutation records are not a document of title. Whether

Bela Rani had title, whether she validly executed a power of

attorney, whether any right has accrued to the Appellant, are

matters for the civil court to adjudicate.

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20. There is a further allegation that on the basis of the false

sale deed, the Appellant and Rajan Kumar (since deceased) in

association with the witnesses of the sale deed who are “criminal

natured persons” were attempting to trespass the house by breaking

open the lock and had got written their name in the absence of the

complainant.

21. It is interesting that a charge sheet was filed, the relevant

part whereof is extracted hereinbelow for convenience :-

“16. Brief fact of the case :

The case was successful on the basis of the plaintiff.
Further, the investigation was transferred from police
station Shahpur to the Crime Branch.
The above investigation was done by me. So for during
the investigation the statements of the witness and
sec. 420, 467, 468, 471 of IPC has been registered
against the accused.
The accused is send to the court, punished the accused
by summing.”

22. The charge sheet is totally vague. There is not even a whisper

in the charge-sheet of what transpired from the investigation

against the Appellant herein.

23. Even though an FIR need not contain every detail, an offence

has to be made out in the FIR itself. It is the case of the

Private Respondents that Bela Rani has no title. Bela Rani

executed a false Power of Attorney in favour of Rajan Kumar (since

deceased). Alternatively, the Power of Attorney, in itself, was a

forged document.
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24. A fraudulent, fabricated or forged deed could mean a deed

which was not actually executed, but a deed which had fraudulently

been manufactured by forging the signature of the ostensible

executants. It is one thing to say that Bela Rani fraudulently

executed a Power of Attorney authorising the sale of property

knowing that she had no title to convey the property. It is

another thing to say that the Power of Attorney itself was a

forged, fraudulent, fabricated or manufactured one, meaning

thereby that it had never been executed by Bela Rani. Her

signature had been forged. It is impossible to fathom how the

investigating authorities could even have been prima facie

satisfied that the deed had been forged or fabricated or was

fraudulent without even examining the apparent executant Bela

Rani, who has not even been cited as a witness.

25. Ms. Deepika Kalia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

State, competently argued the matter and vehemently tried to

persuade this Court not to intervene. She even sought time to

produce further documents. However, the charge-sheet speaks for

itself and there could be no question of improvement of the

charge-sheet read with the FIR, either by adducing documents or by

filing affidavit or by making oral submissions.

26. Mr. Chandra Prakash, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the Appellant cited certain judgments of this Court in Mohd.

Ibrahim & Others v. State of Bihar [(2009) 8 SCC 751]; Paramjeet

Batra v. State of Uttarakhand [(2013) 11 SCC 673]; Uma Shankar

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Gopalika v. State of Bihar & Anr. [(2005) 10 SCC 336]; Vesa

Holdings Private Limited & Anr. v. State of Kerala & Ors. [(2015)

8 SCC 293]; Robert John D’Souza & Ors. v. Stephen V. Gomes & Anr.

[(2015 (9) SCC 96]; and Kapil Agarwal & Ors. v. Sanjay Sharma &

Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 524].

27. In Mohd. Ibrahim (supra), this Court held as under :-

“19. To constitute an offence under Section 420, there should

not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the
accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived
(i) to deliver any property to any person, or
(ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a
valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and
which is capable of being converted into a valuable
security).

20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property

claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser
under such sale deed to allege that the vendor has cheated him
by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently
induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this
case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand,
the purchaser is made a co-accused.

21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the

accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or
misleading representation or by any other action or omission,
nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or
dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to
the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce
him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit
if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that
the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while
executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
first accused by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of
the second accused or the second accused by reason of being the
purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of
being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale
deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner.

22. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415

are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence
punishable under Sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the Code.

A clarification
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23. When we say that execution of a sale deed by a person,

purporting to convey a property which is not his, as his
property, is not making a false document and therefore not
forgery, we should not be understood as holding that such an act
can never be a criminal offence. If a person sells a property
knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby defrauds the
person who purchased the property, the person defrauded, that
is, the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the
fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the
purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such complaint.

24. The term “fraud” is not defined in the Code. The

dictionary definition of “fraud” is “deliberate deception,
treachery or cheating intended to gain advantage”. Section 17 of
the Contract Act, 1872 defines “fraud” with reference to a party
to a contract.
27. The term “fraudulently” is mostly used with the term
“dishonestly” which is defined in Section 24 as follows:

“24. ‘Dishonestly’.—Whoever does anything with the intention of

causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another
person is said to do that thing ‘dishonestly’.”

28 [Ed.: Para 28 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.

F.3/Ed.B.J./149/2009 dated 6-10-2009.] . To “defraud” or do
something fraudulently is not by itself made an offence under
the Penal Code, but various acts when done fraudulently (or
fraudulently and dishonestly) are made offences. These include:

(i) Fraudulent removal or concealment of property

(Sections 206, 421 and 424).
(ii) Fraudulent claim to property to prevent seizure
(Section 207).
(iii) Fraudulent suffering or obtaining a decree
(Sections 208 and 210).
(iv) Fraudulent possession/delivery of counterfeit
coin (Sections 239, 240, 242 and 243).
(v) Fraudulent alteration/diminishing weight of coin
(Sections 246 to 253).
(vi) Fraudulent acts relating to stamps (Sections 255
to 261).
(vii) Fraudulent use of false
instrument/weight/measure (Sections 264 to 266).
(viii) Cheating (Sections 415 to 420).
(ix) Fraudulent prevention of debt being available to
creditors (Section 422).
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(x) Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer

containing false statement of consideration
(Section 423).
(xi) Forgery making or executing a false document
(Sections 463 to 471 and 474).

(xii) Fraudulent cancellation/destruction of valuable

security, etc. (Section 477).

(xiii) Fraudulently going through marriage ceremony

(Section 496).

It follows therefore that by merely alleging or showing that a

person acted fraudulently, it cannot be assumed that he
committed an offence punishable under the Code or any other law,
unless that fraudulent act is specified to be an offence under
the Code or other law.

Section 504 of the Penal Code

29. The allegations in the complaint do not also

make out the ingredients of an offence under Section
504 of the Penal Code. Section 504
refers to intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of
peace.
The allegation of the complainant is that when he enquired with
Accused 1 and 2 about the sale deeds, they asserted that they
will obtain possession of land under the sale deeds and he can
do whatever he wants. The statement attributed to Appellants 1
and 2, it cannot be said to amount to an “insult with intent to
provoke breach of peace”. The statement attributed to the
accused, even if it was true, was merely a statement referring
to the consequence of execution of the sale deeds by the first
appellant in favour of the second appellant.

Conclusion

30. The averments in the complaint if assumed to be true, do

not make out any offence under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 504 of
the Code, but may technically show the ingredients of offences
of wrongful restraint under Section 341 and causing hurt under
Section 323 IPC.”

28. In Paramjeet Batra (supra), this Court held that :-

“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the

Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used
sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice.
Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends
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upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential

ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be
judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil
transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High
Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil
nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a
situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact,
adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not
hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of
process of the court.”

29. In Uma Shankar Gopalika (supra), this Court found that the

complaint, in that case, did not disclose any criminal offence at

all, much less any offence under Section 420 or Section 120B IPC.

The case was purely a civil dispute between the parties for which

remedy lay before the civil Court.

30. In Vesa Holdings Private Limited (supra), this Court held :-

“13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil
wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy
may be available to the complainant that itself cannot be a
ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether
the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence
of cheating or not. In the present case there is nothing to show
that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of
the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for
an offence under Section 420 IPC. In our view the complaint does
not disclose any criminal offence at all. The criminal
proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala
fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The
superior courts while exercising this power should also strive
to serve the ends of justice. In our opinion, in view of these
facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount
to an abuse of the process of the court and the High Court
committed an error in refusing to exercise the power under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the
proceedings.”

31. In Robert John D’Souza (supra), this Court held :

“12. As far as the offence of cheating is concerned, the same is

defined in Section 415 IPC, for which the punishment is provided
under Section 420 IPC. Section 415 reads as under:
 15

“415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person,

fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so
deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to
consent that any person shall retain any property, or
intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or
omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he
were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or
is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’.

Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a

deception within the meaning of this section.

Illustrations
***”
From the above language of the section, one of the
essential ingredients for the offence of cheating is
deception, but in the present case, from the contents of
the complaint it nowhere reflects that the complainant
was deceived or he or anyone else was induced to deliver
the property by deception. What was done, was so
reflected in the resolutions, and sale deeds.

13. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao

Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234]
a three-Judge Bench of this Court has laid down the law as
to quashment of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC as
follows: (SCC p. 695, para 7)

“7. The legal position is well settled that when

a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be
quashed, the test to be applied by the court is
as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as
made prima facie establish the offence. It is
also for the court to take into consideration any
special features which appear in a particular
case to consider whether it is expedient and in
the interest of justice to permit a prosecution
to continue. This is so on the basis that the
court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose
and where in the opinion of the court chances of
an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore,
no useful purpose is likely to be served by
allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the
court may while taking into consideration the
special facts of a case also quash the proceeding
even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”
 16

15. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal [(2007)

12 SCC 1 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 259] , this Court in paras 25
and 46 has observed as under: (SCC pp. 10-11 & 16)

“25. Reference to the following cases would

reveal that the courts have consistently taken the
view that they must use this extraordinary power to
prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice.
The English courts have also used inherent power to
achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed
that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect
its process from abuse. In Connelly v. Director of
Public Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR
1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)] Lord Devlin stated
that where particular criminal proceedings
constitute an abuse of process, the court is
empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to
proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in Director of
Public Prosecutions v. Humphrys [1977 AC 1 : (1976)
2 WLR 857 : (1976) 2 All ER 497 (HL)] stressed the
importance of the inherent power when he observed
that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an
abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive
and vexatious that the Judge has the power to
intervene. He further mentioned that the court's
power to prevent such abuse is of great
constitutional importance and should be jealously
preserved.
******
46. The court must ensure that criminal
prosecution is not used as an instrument of
harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with
an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On
analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the
opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable
to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern
the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent
jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482
CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when it is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in
the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases.
In view of the settled legal position, the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained.”

16. In view of the above discussion and the facts and

circumstances of the case, we are of the view that none of
the offences for which the appellants are summoned, is made
out from the complaint and material on record. We further
find that it is nothing but abuse of process of law on the
part of the complainant to implicate the appellants in a
criminal case after a period of twelve years of execution
of registered sale deeds in question, who is neither party
to the sale deeds nor a member of the Society. Therefore,
 17

we allow the appeal and set aside the orders passed by the
High Court and that of the courts below. Accordingly, the
order passed by the Magistrate summoning the appellants in
the criminal complaint filed by Respondent 1, in respect of
the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 420
IPC, also stands quashed.”

32. In Kapil Agarwal (supra), this Court observed that Section 482

is designed to achieve the purpose of ensuring that criminal

proceedings are not permitted to generate into weapons of

harassment.

33. In this case, it appears that criminal proceedings are being

taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment against a purchaser.

It is reiterated at the cost of repetition that the FIR does not

disclose any offence so far as the Appellant is concerned. There

is no whisper of how and in what manner, this Appellant is

involved in any criminal offence and the charge sheet, the

relevant part whereof has been extracted above, is absolutely

vague. There can be no doubt that jurisdiction under Section 482

of the Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly for the purpose of

preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses

criminal offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation

and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are

present or not has to be judged by the High Court. There can be no

doubt that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have

 18

a criminal texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether

the dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of criminal

offence. In such a situation, the High Court should not hesitate

to quash the criminal proceedings as held by this Court in

Paramjeet Batra (supra) extracted above.

34. The given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a

criminal offence. Only because a civil remedy is available may

not be a ground to quash criminal proceedings. But as observed

above, in this case, no criminal offence has been made out in the

FIR read with the Charge-Sheet so far as this Appellant is

concerned. The other accused Rajan Kumar has died.

35. The appeal is, thus, allowed. The impugned judgment and order

of the High Court is set aside and the proceedings in Crime Case

No.5973/2020 are quashed as against the Appellant.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 933 OF 2021

36. Leave granted.

37. The issues involved in this appeal are identical to the issues

involved in Appeal No. 932 of 2021 disposed of earlier today. We

may add that in this case, the Appellants are only witnesses to

the sale deed and there is not a word anywhere in the FIR about

these witnesses except the vague averment that they acted in

collusion.

38. For the reasons discussed in Criminal Appeal No. 932 of 2021,

this appeal is also allowed and Crime Case No.5973 of 2020 is set

aside so far as these Appellants are concerned.

 19

……………………………………………,J.
(Indira Banerjee)

……………………………………………,J.
(J.K. Maheshwari)
New Delhi;
September 02, 2021.