PHILOSOPHY AND

ITS HISTORY
Aims and Methods in the Study of
Early Modern Philosophy

Edited by
MOGE S LJERKE, JUSTIN E. H. SMITH,
and ERIC SCHLIESSER
 6

Philosophical Problems in the History

of Philosophy: What Are TheyP
Leo Catana

I. Introduction
IN THE INTRODUCTION to the 1984 publication Philosophy in History,
edited by Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and �entin Skinner, the three
editors distinguish between history of philosophy and intellectual history:
the former seeks "philosophical truth" and outlines how past philosophers
have reasoned about various philosophical problems; the latter seeks "histori­
cal truth" and the "meaning" ofpast utterances.' The history ofphilosophy is
chus a problem-based discipline, whereas intellectual history is a contextual
discipline.2 The editors contend that contemporary analytic philosophers in
America and Britain perpetuare chis division in their analysis ofthe history of
philosophy: they are, the editors claim, exclusively interested in philosophi­
cal questions, not in their historical contexts.3 The editors argue that what
is outside the sphere of philosophical problems, that is, historical truth and
the contingency ofhistorical contexts, should be discovered and presented by
intellectual historians, not by historians ofphilosophy; the method ofthe lat­
ter, and their followers in analytic philosophy, is ill-suited to uncover such his­
torical contexts. 4 Hence the editors endorse a division oflabor in which both

1. Rorty, Schneewind, and Sk.inner (1984), 2, 7, IO.

2. Ibid., 3-4, 8. Grafi:on (2005) provides a survey of hisrory of ideas, later ro be called intel­
lectual history. !bid., 31: he righdy observes that the context-concept has not yet been deter­
mined accurately: "Fundamental, frequendy used concepts like 'context' -a term, in the end,
for information somehow distilled from the same sorts of text that it is usually invoked to
explicare- require far more formal analysis than they have had."
3. Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner (1984), u-12.
4. Ibid., 13-14.
II6 PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY

che history of philosophy and intellectual history are recognized as mutually

beneficia!. The purpose of che lntroduction is clearly to establish sorne sort of
peaceful interaction between che two disciplines.1 In chis chapter I reexamine
che definitions of che history of philosophy and intellectual history assumed
in che bifurcation noted earlier. I argue that che contextual task assigned to
intellectual history muse also be assigned to che history of philosophy, if it is
going to be history of philosophy at all.
I see at least three problems in che bifurcation. First, it presupposes ques­
tionable assumptions abouc che methodological cores of che two disciplines,
especially che concept of a "philosophical problem:' a theme to which I return
later.
Second, che desired institucional effect of che publication-to make use
of che results of intellectual history for che benefit of che history of phi­
losophy-remains to be seen. The bifurcation justifies intellectual history
as contextual and history of philosophy as problem-based. Although che
intended purpose was to establish sorne sort of mutual exchange between
che two disciplines, che division of labor can also be seen as an argument
in favor of a status quo. The bifurcation is chus conservative in regard to
che method practiced by historians of philosophy; it is nothing bue an open
invitation, which historians of philosophy may easily ignore. The bifurcation
is also conservative in che sense that it carries on Lovejoy 's distinction from
1936 between history of philosophy, dedicated to che history of philosophi­
cal systems, and history of ideas, dedicated to che various philosophical and
non-philosophical contexts in which certain unir-ideas manifest themselves
in che course of history; Lovejoy's "history of ideas" was nominally and
methodologically transformed into "intellectual history" in che 1960s and
1970s by Skinner and others. 6
Third, many historians of philosophy seem to remain unaffected by intel­
lectual historians' excavations of che historical contingencies and illocutionary
meanings surrounding certain texts of che pase: che former may not recognize
che philosophical relevance of che uncovered contexts, nor even of che texts
chus contextualized by intellectual historians, since both appear irrelevant
to those problems and questions accepted as fundamental to philosophy. Or
historians of philosophy may think that che locucionary meaning (not che

5. Ibid., 8-14.
6. Lovejoy (1936), 3. I have argued elsewhere that Lovejoy's distinction is rather rhetorical,
and that his understanding ofhistory ofideas is in fact relying on methodological components
borrowed from nineteenth-century history ofphilosophy; see Catana (20w ).
 Philosophical Problems II7

illocutionary) of applied terms is more relevant to their enterprise, since it has

direct relevance to che philosophical problems and arguments examined.7 Or,
finally, they may feel alienated when confronted with che linguistic, histori­
cal, and contextual method practiced by intellectual historians.
The three editors' characterization of che history of philosophy as
problem-based is not isolated. Nor is it obsolete, for it features in Tom Sorell's
lntroduction toche 2005 voiumeAnaryticPhilosophy andHistory ofPhilosophy.8
Similarly, Hans-Johann Glock, an important historian of twentieth-century
analycic philosophy, has recently argued that che historiography of philosophy
should ideally avoid what he characterizes as excessive historicism; instead, it
should aim at an account of all pase philosophy as a problem-solving enter­
prise.9 Glock emphasizes that chis problem-oriented approach to che pase is
"congenia!" to analytic philosophy.'º Many other examples could be found.

7. Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner (1984), 4, define inrellectual history as a historical disci­
pline rhat idenrifies che "meaning" of che utterances of pase philosophers. However, che con­
cept of meaning is a complex and difficult one, and sorne clarification would be useful here.
Rorry (1984), 68, defines intellectual history as a discipline examining che intencional mean­
ing of philosophical texts of che pase: "[I) nrellecrual history consists of descriptions of what
che inrellecruals were up to ar a given time, and of rheir inreraction with che rest of society."
According to Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner (1984), 12, analytic philosophers writing history
of philosophy fail to see "what Descartes and Kant were really up to." The formulation says
litt!e about che method applied in inrellecrual history, rhough ir stresses che inrenrion of che
pase philosopher and his or her intervention in a social and polirical context. (For che empha­
sis on history in history of philosophy, see also che conrributions by Mogens La:rke andJustin
Smith in chis volume). Ir does point, of course, toward Sk.inner's numerous anides from che
1960s onward in whichJohn Austin's (19u-1960) andJohn Searle's (1932-) speech-act theory
is employed on pase philosophical texts. Drawing on Austin's distinction between locutionary,
illocutionary, and perlocutionary speech acts, Skinner has argued that pase texts should be seen
as illocutionary utterances in order to be fully understood; see Skinner (2002), 7 9-86. In order
to grasp chis linguistic function, che inrellectual historian should not only understand what
is said in a pase rext, bur also che social, political, and linguisric conrext in which it appears.
Haakonssen (1996), 14, has argued thar Skinner ignores che locurionary function of philo­
sophical terms and rhat rhese play a considerable role in philosophical disciplines of che pase.
One could add to Haakonssen's criticism rhat chis locutionary funcrion is even more crucial
within philosophical disciplines ourside political philosophy, which does seek to intervene in
social and political conrexts, and which is Skinner's main interese.
8. Sorell (2005a), 1-3.
9. Glock (2008a), 869, 872-73, 875 et passim. Ibid., 873: Glock even makes che strong claim
rhat "If philosophy were transformed into a cultural science or reduced to a history of ideas,
it would no longer speak to che philosophical problems." That is, historical contextualization
would not only be irrelevanr to history of philosophy; it would dissolve history of philoso­
phy. Ibid., 873: Glock claims that philosophers worked on non-historical problems, thereby
asserting sorne sort of idealistic conception of a philosophical problem: "lnstead, rhey [great
philosophers, menrioned on 873) tackled non-historical problems and aspired to insights of a
non-historical kind."
10. Glock (2008a), 884.
II8 PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY

Although I agree with Glock's criticism of excessive historicism and appreci­

ate his accommodation of history ofphilosophy within the analytic tradition,
now beginning to write its own history, I do find that his problem concept
calls for further discussion. 11

Over the following pages I argue that the problem-based view of the
history of philosophy found in the lntroduction to Philosophy in History
is based on an unexamined concept of a philosophical problem and a ques­
tionable distinction between interna! and externa! elements in the history
of philosophy, where the problems are seen as interna! to the past philoso­
phy, the context as externa! to it. Further, I argue that if one reflects upon
the nature of philosophical problems in the history of philosophy, and if
one realizes that the assumed internal-external distinction in history of
philosophy is questionable, then historians of philosophy will be forced to
accept the historically and philologically exacting task of contextualization
usually assigned to intellectual historians. My entire discussion is premised
on the borrowed assumption that philosophy's aim is, and has always been,
to solve philosophical problems. Although I think it is sensible to approach
past philosophical texts by asking "which problems did they strive to
resolve?" I also maintain that philosophy's aim has varied throughout his­
tory and that reducing it entirely to a problem-solving enterprise is there­
fore inadequate. 12

I. The Concept ofProblem in Problem-based

History ofPhilosophy
These three mentioned publications-Skinner, Schneewind, and Rorty's
text of 1984, Sorell's of 2005, and Glock's of 2008-have two things in com­
mon. First, they do not explain the key concept in their characterization of
history of philosophy as problem-based, namely, the concept of a problem,
let alone the concept of a philosophical problem.' 3 Glock is perhaps the one
who comes closest to an explanation. He explains that these problems are

11. For che history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century analytic philosophy, see Hylton
(1990); Soames (2003); Glock (20086).
12. See Kranz et al. (1989); Hadot (1995); Condren,Gaukroger,and Hunter (2006).
13. Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner (1984), 1-14, do not define what they mean by "problem."
Sorell (2005a), 1-11 does not explain what is meant by a problem. Similarly Glock (2008a),
869, 872-73, 875,877,878,881,882,884,885,887,889,speaks of"problems" or "philosophical
problems" without explaining what they are.
 Philosophical Problems I I9

"supremely abstraer and fundamental:' and that analytic philosophers practic­

ing che problem-based history of philosophy believe that "philosophy has its
roots in problems of a special kind, and that its history is an evolution of these
problems and of their solutions."14 Nevertheless, chis explanation is opaque
and calls for further discussion.
Second, these three publications do not provide examples illustrating
how such problem-based general histories of philosophy can be written suc­
cessfully.15 One is lefi: wondering which general, problem-oriented histories
of philosophy these authors have in mind, if any. The three publications do,
however, point out a few publications, which either (a) examine a single pase
philosopher and che philosophical problems he or she struggled with (e.g.,
J. Bennett, Kant's Analytic, 1966),16 (6), approach che entire philosophical
tradition by asking one or more philosophical questions (e.g., G. E. Moore's
lectures delivered 1910-II, published in 1953 as Sorne Main Problems of
Philosophy) 17; or (e), focus on distinct philosophical problems or thinkers
across history in distinct publications.18
In these latter works we find discussions of problems bue little clarifica­
tion of what a problem is, or what its implications in various argumentative
contexts may be. If we are to improve our understanding of che problem con­
cept assumed in problem-based histories of philosophy, we have to explore
che semantics of che concept and its employment in such histories.

14. Glock (2008a), 872,884.

15. Rorty,Schneewind,and Skinner (1984),1-14,do not provide an exampleofa problem-based
general hisrory of philosophy. In the same volume, one of these authors, Rorty, distinguishes
between four genres in che hisroriography of philosophy. The first of them he calls "racional
and historical reconstructions" (Rorry (1984), 49-56), claiming that it is typical of analytical
philosophers (ibid., 49). This first genre is similarly problem-based (e.g.,ibid., 51), but here
too Rorty gives no examples of such histories of philosophy that are problem-based (ibid.,
49-56).
16. Rorty,Schneewind, and Skinner (1984), 6, provide only one example of a historian of phi­
losophy, namely, J. Bennett's monograph on Kant, but here the issue is not that of writing
problem-based history of philosophy.
17. Glock (2008a), 867-97, does not give an example of a general history of philosophy that
is problem-based. He may, however, be thinking of works like Moore's Some Main Problems
of Philosophy, since he favored Moore's approach; see ibid., 884: "Moore put philosophical
difficulties clown to 'the attempt to answer questions without first discovering precisely what
question it is which you desire to answer' (1903, p. vi [the work is not mentioned in Glock's
bibliography; we find the quote in the 'Preface' to Moore, Principia ethica, 1903])." Glock also
agrees with Michael Frede's view; see Glock (2008a),877,885,889.
18. Sorell (2005a), 3, notes the series The Arguments of the Philosophers, ed. Ted Honderich
1970. For criticism of chis series,see Garber (2001),232 et passim.
I 20 PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY

The concept of a problem (Gr.problema, derived from che verbprobal­

lein, to throw or lay before; Lat.problema) dates back to Classical Greek phi­
losophy, where it was central to che methodology of philosophy. lt remained
integral in che ensuing philosophical tradition, reaching a high point in
Kantian philosophy and Neo-Kantianism.'9 One can say tentatively that a
problem consists of a disjunctive question related to a theoretical descrip­
tion in che domain of philosophy: does che entity S possess che property P
or not-P? Or, to pue it in a less narrow manner, a philosophical problem is
a complex of theories and arguments that may be paraphrased by philoso­
phers or historians of philosophy as such a disjunctive question. When one
attempts to answer such a question, difficulties arise on a theoretical leve!,
where they may concern che semantic and logical consistency between sev­
era! properties attribueed to che same entity. Difficulties may also arise on
che leve! of exemplification; how do we integrare different examples into che
theoretical description? In contemporary philosophy we rarely find a gen­
eral definition of che problem-concept, bue only instances of philosophical
problems. One example is che demarcation problem, which raises che ques­
tion of how to distinguish scientific from non-scientific disciplines: ali these
disciplines purport to present true claims aboue che world, bue which criteria
do we accept in order to separare che claims of non-scientific disciplines from
those of scientific disciplines?

2. The Concept ofProblemas It Has Been Practiced in

Problem-based Histories ofPhilosophy
This tentative explanation of a philosophical problem-a disjunctive ques­
tion related to a theoretical description-is a good match for che earliest
problem-based general histories of philosophy from che late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Here a problem is typically dealt with in a proposicional
context. Georg Gustav Fülleborn (1769-1803) seems to be che first historian
of philosophy to conceive che discipline history of philosophy as problem­
based. In his "Verzeichniss einiger philosophischen Modethematum"
20

(1799), he signposted four problems that had been dealt with by various pase

19. For che history of che problem concept, see Holzhey (1989).
20. Fülleborn (1799). For problem hisrory, see Geldsetzer (1989), cols. 14w-11. For problem
history and its origin in Bruckerian history ofphilosophy, see Catana ( 2008 ), 2.60-65. Compare
with Mann (1996), 170, who claims that problem-based history "marks a radical break with ali
earlier attempts to crear che hisrory ofphilosophy." For che alleged break, see ibid., 182.-83.
 Philosophical Problems 121

philosophers: l. Can virtue be taught? 21 11. The doctrine of probability.22 111.

On che conflict between philosophical and theological truth.23 IV. On che
souls and powers ofanimals. 24

Fülleborn was followed by a series of nineteenth- and twentieth-century

historians of philosophy: Karl Friedrich Bachmann (1785-1855), Christian
August Brandis (1790-1867), Kuno Fischer (1824-1907), Wilhelm
Windelband (1848-1915), Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), Nicolai Hartmann
(1882-1950), and Harald Hoffding (1843-1931), among others. The list of
problems varied over time. Fischer, for instance, held that philosophy's devel­
opment is determined by a stable set of philosophical problems and various
philosophers' attempts to answer them.25 He identified che following four
problems as perennial: l. The problem of che world, i.e., what is nacure? 11.
The problem ofknowledge, i.e., is human sensation objectively valid? 111. The
problem of freedom, i.e., are human beings endowed with free will? IV. The
problem of religion, i.e., which is che true religion to provide moral bliss?26
If one compares che list ofproblems with that of Fülleborn, one can discern
sorne changes, and one can also sense Fischer's interese in problems pertinent
to che Kantian philosophy that he admired.
Sorne eminent analytic philosophers adopted chis method, as in che
case of G. E. Moore in his Some Main Problems ofPhilosophy, and Bertrand
Russell in his Problems oJPhilosophy ( 1912). Moore worked on two problems:
what is che nacure of che externa! world? And what status can we assign to
general ideas? Russell too posed che question of knowledge. Hans-Johann
Glock makes che following statement about che philosophical problems dealt
with by historians ofphilosophy: "These problems are supremely abstraer and

21. Fülleborn (1799), vol. IO, 143-47.

22. Ibid., vol. 10, 147-61.
23. Ibid., vals. u-12, 204-24.
24- Ibid., vals u-12, pp. 224-25.
25. Fischer (1878-93), vol. 1, 15: "Die Menschheit ist ein Problem, das in der Geschichte immer
vollstandiger entwickelt, in der Philosophie immer deutlicher zum Vorschein gebracht, immer
tiefer begriffen wird: das ist, kurz gesagt, der ganze Inhale der Geschichte der Philosophie, ein
Inhale selbst von griifster geschichdicher Bedeutung. Erst dann sieht man die Geschichte der
Philosophie im richtigen Lichte, wenn man in ihr den Entwickelungsgang erkennt, in welchem
die nothwendigen Probleme der Menschheit mit aller Deudichkeit bestimmt und so geliist
werden, dafs aus jeder Liisung in fortscreitender Ordnung immer neue und tiefere Probleme
entspringen."
26. Ibid., vol. 1: "l. Das Weltproblem" (17-21); "II. Das ErkenntniEproblem" (21-25); "III. Das
Freiheitsproblem" (25-28); "IV. Das Religionsproblem" (28-38).
I22 PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY

fundamental, and they include questions such as 'Can we acquire genuine

knowledge?', 'How is che mind related to che body?', and 'Are there univer­
"'
sally binding moral principles? l7
lt is remarkable that the kind of philosophical problems indicated by these
authors-Fülleborn, Fischer, Moore, Russell, and Glock-to a large extent
mirror their respective intereses in contemporary philosophy. Russell's selec­
tion of past philosophers (e.g., Plato, Kant, Hume, Berkeley, Locke) reflects
his interese in che questions of knowledge that arise from his epistemologi­
cal position. Similarly, Moore's anti-idealism to a large extent determined the
problems he chose (i.e., the problem of the externa! world and the problem
of universals) and the past figures that he adduced. Other problems in the
history of philosophy, ones that did not 6t these intereses, were ignored. For
instance, in these writings of Russell and Moore we do not 6nd the question
of the truth-value of revealed truths in comparison to philosophical truths,
a central problem to early modern thinkers like Pomponazzi and Galileo.
Problem historians like Russell and Moore tend to omit an enormous range
of past philosophical problems and, at the same time, to focus exclusively on
those problems in the past that could be assimilated to their intereses in con­
temporary philosophy.
Such a procedure is perfecdy legitimare, as long as works of Moore and
Russell are not seen as general histories of philosophy. Moore and Russell
did not claim that their books were histories of philosophy covering all ques­
tions!8 Moore contended, however, that his selection of problems was not
arbitrary and not merely relative to his own intereses, but the most important
problems in philosophy!9 Moore and Russell belonged to a generation of phi­
losophers for whom the history of philosophy made up an important part of
their education, and they clearly knew the difference between a full history
of philosophy and a selective, problem-based history of philosophy.3º Perhaps
the real danger lies in the expectation that works such as those of Moore and
Russell are in fact histories of philosophy. An expectation of this kind may lead
to a denial of the possibility that there are still other problems in philosophy's

27. Glock (2008a), 872.

28. Russell (1967), vii.
29. Moore (1953), 1.
30. For history of philosophy caughc ac philosophy departments in che nineceenth and cwen­
ciech centuries, see Schneider's works lisced in che bibliography. Our underscanding of che
impacc chac nineceenth-century histories of philosophy had on cwentiech-century analycic
philosophy is scill very poor.
 Philosophical Problems 123

past, which may at first seem advantageous to sorne philosophers, at least if it

epitomizes their own problems as the problems of philosophy. However, this
selective history of philosophy may also become increasingly self-referential
and cut off from problems outside philosophy thus understood. If so, is this
selective procedure a service to philosophy? Or is it merely a short-lived ser­
vice to those philosophers thus epitomized?
I should like to make one last observation on the practice of problem his­
torians, namely, its historiographical dependence upon existing interpreta­
tions. We can find one example of this in Russell, who characterizesDescartes
as the founder of modern philosophy. This is an interpretation that emerged
with Descartes's compatriot Victor Cousin in the 1820s and 1830s. Before
then, Descartes was not seen as an epistemologist. Another example is the
conceptualization ofDescartes, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume accord­
ing to the scheme of "rationalism" versus "empiricism." This scheme was cir­
culated by lmmanuel Kant and subsequently integrated into many general
histories of philosophy. Russell accepted it without hesitation.3' Given that
contemporary philosophers (including analy tic philosophers) often premise
their discussion of philosophical problems on theories and arguments with a
historical narrative, as in the case of Russell framing his discussing of human
knowledge within an epistemological paradigm going back to Descartes, it
becomes important to those contemporary philosophers to be aware of the
historiography of the historical figure in question, if they are not to fall victim
of stereoty pes. Of course, this also applies to scholars outside philosophy who
take an interest in the history of philosophy and premise sorne of their argu­
ments on developments within the history of philosophy.
To sum up, it seems safe to assume that problem-oriented historians of
philosophy understand philosophical problems as disjunctive questions,
although different historians arrive at different lists of perennial questions-a

31. Russell (1967), 7: "Descartes (1596-1650), the founder of modern philosophy, invented
a method which may still be used with profit-the method of systematic doubt." Brucker
(1742-67), vol. 5, 200-334, did not regard Descartes in this way; according ro him, Giordano
Bruno was the founder of modern philosophy, as Brucker understood it, namely eclecticism;
see ibid., vol. 5, 38.15-20. Toe interpretation ofDescartes as the founder of modern philosophy,
insisting on epistemology and systematic doubt as the most important component in philoso­
phy, was prepared by Kantian philosophy, and first emerged properly with Víctor Cousin and
his lectures in the 1820s and 1830s, subsequent!y published in Cousin (1841), 52-60, 81 -83,
362-69, 373. In support of this view, see also Haakonssen (2004), 107. Kant (1998a), 863-65,
referred key elements in the history of philosophy to the strife between "rationalism" and
"empiricism." Russell (1967), 41, takes over these reductive and probably misleading interpreta­
tions of the history of philosophy.
124 PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY

variety suggesting the dependence of these "perennial questions" on the indi­

vidual problem historian's perspective.32
But what ontological status do these historians assign to such problems:
are philosophical problems particulars, entirely dependent upon the con­
tingent historical circumstances of philosophy, though particulars that may
variously show sorne local resemblances allowing the historian of philosophy
to compare them? Or, alternatively, are they transsubjective entities, or even
transcendent entities existing independently; entities that past philosophers
"discover" and "work on" from time to time? At chis point it may be use­
ful to add that the fact that certain questions are asked repeatedly by various
authors does not necessarily prove that the questions are transcendent; tex­
tual transmission and long-standing institucional frameworks may also pro­
vide much continuity in the questions posed. Also, ifphilosophical questions
are transcendent entities, one may ask sorne additional questions: how many
are there in all? How do we get access to them? How do we ensure that we
have a complete inventory of these problems and do not mix them up with
our own historically conditioned and time-bound questions?
Problem historians have not yet settled the question of the ontologi­
cal status of philosophical problems. Nor is chis question addressed in the
three publications mentioned earlier. Glock takes a daring line, though he
does not really give an answer to the question asked here. He claims that past
philosophers worked on non-historical problems: "Instead, they [i.e., great
philosophers] tackled non-historical problems and aspired to insights of a
non-historical kind." 33 ( Glock's italics.) The phrase "non-historical" does not
mean the same as "transcendenr;' but the two come close in meaning, and it
seems as if Glock accepts an idealistic conception of philosophical problems;
they are non-historical entities.
lt is surprising to see chis idealistic conception of problems in the his­
tory of philosophy appear in analytical philosophy, since epistemological
anti-idealism was such an important component in the classical texts of its key
figures, e.g., Moore.34 Analytical philosophers used to be fond of the empiri­
cal approach to reality, urging us to "go out in the world and look" if we want

32. For cricicism of che mechodology of problem-based hisrory of philosophy, see Gadamer
(1924); Krüger (1984).
33. Glock (2008a), 873-
34. !bid., 873: Glock argues chac che historicisc's relaciviscic argument againsc cimeless cruchs or
problems is flawed. This leaves open che implicacion chac philosophical problems are cimeless,
chough ic remains unproved.
 Philosophical Problems 125

information about it; when it comes to philosophy's past, however, it seems to

be quite another story, since then we must rely on our apparently innate ideas
about transcendent problems. lt seems incomprehensible and inconsistent
that analytical philosophers should not apply the same empiricist principle
when it comes to philosophy's past.
Let me add one last observation about the practice of problem histori­
ans. Those philosophical problems, including the terminology used to state
these problems, listed by Fülleborn, Fischer, Moore, and Glock earlier, tend
to be interna! to, and characteristic of, philosophy itself: here we rarely find
problems pertinent to non-philosophical disciplines-problems that are then
solved by philosophical tools.
The earliest of these problem historians-Fülleborn, Fischer, and Moore,
for instance-articulated this idea of philosophy as a self-contained unit by
means of the system concept: past philosophers strove to resolve these prob­
lems by means of their philosophical systems. Hence, in the early phase of
problem-based history of philosophy we find this ancillary assumption.35 This
may explain the belief among problem historians that philosophical problems
and arguments are interna! in these philosophical systems and that the philos­
opher, or historian of philosophy, need not have to look outside these systems
when analyzing and explaining these problems and arguments. If, however,
the belief is false, and if huge territories of philosophy outside the early mod­
ero period-and perhaps even much early modero philosophy itself-cannot
be explained by means of the system concept, then one must abandon the
belief that past philosophers' textual output, including their arguments, theo­
ries, and problems, can be understood and explained solely on the basis of
interna! features of the assumed system. In order to deal with this question, I
now turn to a related issue in sections 3 and 4: where did problem-oriented
history of philosophy come from, and how did it inherit its belief that prob­
lems were interna! to the system of the past philosopher?

3. Brandis Integrating the Internal-External Distinction

into a Problem-based History ofPhilosophy
In 1815, Christian August Brandis published Von dem Begriffder Geschichte
der Philosophie. This work is one of the most elaborate methodological texts

35. For che integration of che system concept into nineteench-century problem-oriented his­
rories of philosophy, see Catana (2008), 2.60-65. For Russell using che system concept in his
problem-oriented account, see Russell (1967), 57, 71, 82.-84, 90.
126 PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY

in the early phase of the history of philosophy, including the problem-based

history of philosophy. There Brandis identified "philosophy" with "systems"
of philosophy, which he called the "interna!" component. Hence, the history
of philosophical systems constitutes the "interna!" ("innern") history of phi­
losophy, whereas the history of "circumstances" ("Umstande") of the systems
constitutes the "externa!" ("ausseren") history of philosophy.
The text is divided into three parts. Having made a few remarks on the rela­
tionship between philosophy and history in the preface, Brandis defines the
concept of a "system of philosophy" in the first part.36 Here he observes that
philosophy has changed enormously throughout history,37 but he neverthe­
less contends that all past philosophies have one thing in common, namely,
that they produce systems with a unitary nature.38 In the second part Brandis
treats the "interna!" history of philosophy (this part is entitled "Von der innern
Geschichte der Philosophie"), and in the third part he treats the "externa!" his­
tory of philosophy (entitled "Von der ausseren Geschichte der Philosophie").39
In the second part he claims that the interna! history of philosophy can be
written only as an account of the philosophical systems and that this interna!
history makes up the core of the history of philosophy. 4º The system con­
cept, sometimes rendered by the synonym "Lehrgebaude" (order or system
of sciences), thus features prominently in Brandis's proposed methodology,
especially in the preface and the first and second parts. 41 In the third part
Brandis treats the externa! causes behind a philosopher's ideas, and here he
mentions the "circumstances" ("Umstande").42 In this third part the system
concept is absent. He mentions severa! examples of such circumstances: the
philosopher's personality, his (national) culture, the worldview typical of
his epoch, and linguistic conventions of his time.43 lt is noteworthy that he
does not list scientific, philosophical, or other disciplines as examples of such
externa! features, e.g., theology, astronomy, and medicine, and their relevance

36. Brandis (1815), 3-26.

37. Ibid., 18.
38. Ibid., 24-26.
39. For che second part, ibid., 27-68; for che chird part, ibid., 69-88.
40. Ibid., 32-35.
41. Ibid., 24-26, 32-44, 47-55, 61-62, 66-68. For "Lehrgebaude" as a synonym for "System;'
see ibid., 65-66.
42. Ibid., 70.
43. Ibid., 71-75.
 Philosophical Problems 127

to che proposicional content of che problems and arguments advanced by a

variety of pase philosophers. To Brandis, philosophy is autonomous, unitary,
and inward looking; it is a system that is self-dependent and its proposicional
content stays free of non-philosophical disciplines. One question remains,
however: where did Brandis's concept of philosophy as a system come from?
Although Brandis does not refer explicidy to Johann Jacob Brucker
(1696-1770), he clearly has Brucker and his system-concept in mind, trans­
mitted direcdy or indirecdy, when he identifies che interna! history of phi­
losophy with che history of systems.44 Brucker's Latín work Historia critica
philosophiae was first published 1742-44. lt was che most comprehensive his­
tory of philosophy written in che eighteenth century, and it provided che key
methodological concepts, che periodization, and che selection of material for
subsequent historians of philosophy in che nineteenth and twentieth centu­
ries. 45 lt even made its mark on historical disciplines outside philosophy such
as che history of ideas and che history of science. 46
In che seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, che system concept had been
widely used in scientific discourse, where it often denoted che order of che
universe, and where it also carne to denote che proper scientific method. This
latter usage Brucker transferred to che methodology of history of philoso­
phy; it became a historiographical concept.47 In Brucker's methodology for
che history of philosophy, che concept of a "system of philosophy" (Lat. sys­
tema philosophiae) was assigned a controlling role. lt was chis concept that
allowed Brucker to claim that che history of philosophy was not simply his­
tory, understood as a random collection of opinions of pase philosophers, bue
a philosophical discipline; it was "history of philosophy" (historia philoso­
phiae), not only "philosophical history" (historia philosophica). 48 Brucker did
not, to che bese of my knowledge, employ che terms "interna!" and "externa!"
or their cognates. However, his employment of che system-concept did entail
such a distinction, since it separares issues that are pertinent and chus interna!

44 . For Brandis's bibliography, see Brandis (1815), 41-42. . Compare with Mann (1996), who
does not recognize chis as a Bruckerian concept, which we also find in another problem histo­
rian highlighred by Mann, namely, Reinhold (1791), 2.3, 2.7.
45. Catana (2.008). See also Celenza (2.013).
46. For its significance to history of ideas and history of science, see Catana (2.010) and
(2.oII).
47. See Ritschl (1906).
48. For Brucker's contribution to che methodological development of che history of philoso­
phy, see Longo (2.011).
128 PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY

to che system (namely, principies and doctrines; in Latin principia and doctri­
nae) from issues that are conductive to bue still externa! to che system, namely,
che circumstances (circumstantiae) of che system. 49
What is meant by "system" and "circumstances"? The Bruckerian system con­
cept denotes a limited number of general theories, so-called principies, typically
of a metaphysical nature, from which a complex of philosophical doctrines is
deduced, covering all branches of philosophy in an internally coherent fashion.
The main task of che historian of philosophy is to reconstruct chis proposicional
network of principies and che doctrines derived from them.5 º The system's prop­
osicional complex is chus categorized as interna! (che systema developed by che
individual philosopher). This is to be distinguished from features externa! to che
system, namely, biographical and historical circumstances (che circumstantiae).
Among these circumstantiae Brucker lists che following: che philosopher's tem­
perament, his education, his teachers, his adversaries, his patrons, his lifestyle,
che people with whom he or she lived, and similar matters.5' This distinction
between systema and circumstantiae he explains in che methodological section
of che Dissertatiopraeliminaris. He is loyal to his own methodological precepts
in che accounts of individual philosophers in che remaining pare of che work,
where he typically begins by describing che circumstances of a pase thinker and
then moves on to an exposition of che thinker's system. The identification of
che system's principie, or principies, marks che kernel of che exposition.52 If we

49. Christopher Celenza has pointed me in this direction in a draft ofan arride ofhis which I
read sorne time ago and which has now appeared in Criticallnquiry (Celenza (2013)).
50. Brucker (1742-67 ), vol. 1, p. 15.w-18: "Ut itaque de sententia philosophorum sanum rec­
tumque iudicium.ferri queat, totum ex eorum scriptis systema ita eruendum est, ut ante omnia
principia generalia, quae fundamenti loco toti doctrinarum aedificio subiiciuntur, eruan­
tur, et his demum illae superstruantur conclusiones, quae ex istis fontibus sponte sua fluunt.
�emadmodum enim hoc praecipue philosophi officium est, ut ex positis quibusdam prin­
cipiis generalibus, specialia dogmata iusto nexu derivet, ita eam interpretationem merito alteri
praetuleris, quae cum coto systematis habitu et connexione convenir apteque inter se cohaeret,
etsi prima facie aliud dicere videatur." (Brucker's italics.) For the system concept in Brucker, see
Catana (2008), 50-52.
51. Brucker (1742-67 ), vol. 1, 15.29-36: "Non vero ad systemata tantum ipsa, in scriptis philos­
ophorum obvia, sed ad circumstantias quoque auctorum, temperamenti et educationis ratio­
nem, praeceptores, quos ex parte imitati sunt, adversarios, quibus sua dogmata opposuerunt,
fautores, vitae genus, quod sectati sunt, gentem unde ve! oriundi, ve! apud quam vixerunt, et
quae alia his similia attendendum est. Supra enim iam monuimus, eiusmodi circumstantias plu­
rimum habere in ipsa systemta philosophorum influxum, quae ubi negliguntur, ineluctabilem
obscuritatem pariunt." Sorne ofthese circumstantiae are also mentioned ibid., vol. 1, 11.21-30.
52. For instance, Placo's circumstantiae are discussed ibid., vol. 1, 627.1-659.21; his system of
philosophy ibid., vol. 1, 659.22-728.11. Similarly, Aristotle's circumstantiae are described ibid.,
vol. 1, 776.1-800.35; his system ofphilosophy ibid., vol. 1, 800.36-839.33.
 Philosophical Problems 129

compare Brandis's list of "externa! features;' we see that, by and large, it coin­
cides with Brucker's list of"circumstances": they both include biographical and
historical issues in che "externa! features;' and they both identity che system as
che core of che "interna! feature." Crucially, neither counts non-philosophical
disciplines as pare of either che interna! or che externa! features; both regard phi­
losophy as an autonomous discipline whose proposicional content, arguments,
and theories are dependent upon interna! features.
Before Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae, we do not find che histo­
riographical concept of a "system of philosophy" employed in general histo­
ries of philosophy or in similar accounts of philosophy's history; che implied
internal-external distinction is therefore absent from these earlier exposi­
tions. This also applies to che accounts of Brucker's immediate forerunners,
e.g., Thomas Stanley's History ofPhilosophy: Containing the Lives, Opinions,
Actions andDiscourses ojthe Philosophers oJEvery Sect ( 1655-62), GeorgHorn's
Historiae philosophicae libri septem (1655), Gerhard Voss's De philosophia et
philosophorum sectis libri duo (1658), and Johann Joensen's De scriptoribus
historiae philosophicae (1659). The system concept and che internal-external
distinction implied in it was a methodological innovation of Brucker and his
contemporaries, which Brucker implemented at such a deep leve! of che new
discipline and which Brandis took over.
I have argued elsewhere that che historiographical concept of a system
of philosophy is an anachronistic invention of che eighteenth century. lt is
therefore inadequate in regard to Western philosophy produced before che
seventeenth century, when che corresponding methodological concept was
unknown.53 Although Brucker's historiography was met with criticism in
che nineteenth century, a considerable number of historians of philosophy
have continued to use che concept as a historiographical tool ever since,
even afi:er nineteenth-century philosophers discarded che concept as a
methodological ideal.54 Of course, it has been revised and watered down,
but in many cases it still serves as a regulative ideal. Bue che concept system
of philosophy not only misrepresents individual thinkers in vast periods of
che history of philosophy; it also creares che illusion of pase philosophy as an
autonomous and inward-looking enterprise, cut off from non-philosophical
disciplines. The anachronism of che system concept as a historiographical

53. See Catana (2008), 35-113.

54. E.g., Copleston (1985), 2.-9. See also che discussion of che historiographical concept sys­
tem of philosophy in Gadamer (1998), XVIII-XXII.
130 PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY

concept may imply that che internal-external distinction has to be refor­

mulated in a good deal of contemporary methodological discourse on che
history of philosophy.
The fact that historians of philosophy have become accustomed to learn­
ing about pase philosophers through their assumed systems invites them to
believe that these philosophers really did develop systems and that che argu­
mentative content of their philosophies is to be found within che system itself.55
This belief is caused by che introduction of che historiographical concept sys­
tem of philosophy in che eighteenth century, bue it is clearly unfounded in
regard to philosophies established before che seventeenth and ah:er che nine­
teenth centuries; as regards che three intermediary centuries, it still remains
to question whether a pase philosopher's claims about system-building is mere
rhetoric or actually translated into his philosophical practice. This Bruckerian
background informed problem-based history of philosophy, including that of
Brandis.

4. Philosophical Problems Transgressing the

Internal-External Distinction
Now lec me return to che theme of my introduction. Is che distinction between
che history of philosophy, understood as a problem-based discipline, and
intellectual history, understood as a contextual discipline, a valid one? As we
have seen, Brandis introduced che assumption to problem-oriented historians
of philosophy that philosophical problems were interna! to che philosophy,
that is, deducible solely from che system itself.
The difliculty lies in che question of what counts as "interna!" and what
counts as "externa!." Historical, biographical, sociological, cultural, and
economic circumstances are typically counted as "externa!" factors. In con­
temporary debates on philosophy's historiography, it is frequendy assumed,
following Brucker and Brandis, that che pase philosopher's social environment
is to be counted as an "externa!" factor.56 The interna! factors, by contrast, are,
first of all, che system and its proposicional structure as it produces solutions
to distinct philosophical problems. Hereby non-philosophical disciplines
have been marginalized-disciplines that inform che meaning and reference

55. E.g., Russell (1967), 57, 71, 90.

56. E.g., Glock (2008a), 884-85.
 Philosophical Problems I3I

of che terms pertinent to che problems.17 These disciplines are counced neither
among che interna! nor che externa! factors. They fall oucside che dichotomy
and chey are lefi: out of sight by che historian of philosophy following chis
method.
Ific is che cask ofche historian ofphilosophy to analyze and exhibir che phil­
osophical problems of pase philosophy, and if those problems are particulars
whose semantic content transcends philosophy as a system or self-concained
proposicional complex , chen one would have to understand not only che rel­
evant philosophical branches, bue also che relevant non-philosophical disci­
plines and cheir contribucion to che problems discussed. As mentioned earlier,
a philosophical problem can be seen as a disjunctive quescion: does che entity
S posses che property Por not-P? If we want to understand che arguments for
and against a given solucion to che problem, we need to understand che mean­
ing and reference of che cerms S and P as chey are employed in specific argu­
mentative contexts. Depending on whecher or not one accepts che universal
legitimacy of che historiographical concept system of philosophy and its basic
idea of philosophy as a self-contained unity, one of cwo options is lefi: open.
If che system concept is accepted as legitimate, che historian of philosophy
can ask "which are che principies in che system:' and chen figure out what was
che position of che pase philosopher on a specific problem. The syscem con­
cept chus offers a proposicional convenience, since it allows che historian to
remain "inside" che syscem when reconstructing che pase philosopher's solu­
tion. Even chough such reconstructions of overarching "principies" are ofi:en
arbitrary, badly documented and inconsistent, chey have been persuasive,

57. Toe phrase "non-philosophical" disciplines can mean at least two things: (a) Those disci­
plines that most contemporary philosophers accept as belonging to philosophy, bue formerly
excluded, e.g., epistemology. Such a meaning of "non-philosophical" disciplines is clearly
anachronistic and not what I mean. Cassirer chus required that che historian of philosophy
should examine a pase philosopher's views on ali major philosophical problems, for instance,
epistemology; see Cassirer (1942), 129: "For we can attribute no philosophical significance
to an accomplishment that takes no definite stand on che great antitheses of metaphysics,
epistemology, and ethics; which poses no definite problems and which maintains or rejects
no certain solutions." However, Pico himself did not count epistemology as an independent
branch in philosophy, and he certainly did not see it as a problem as philosophers carne to do
when we reach che Kantian age; see Pico (2004), 126.2-17, who alludes to four philosophical
branches, or fields, namely, logic, moral philosophy, natural philosophy, and rheology. Ibid.,
128.15-22: Pico mentions these disciplines once again. (6) By "non-philosophical" disciplines
one may mean rhose disciplines chac were not normally classified among che branches of phi­
losophy by che pase philosopher himself or by his contemporaries. I mean (6) when I speak
of "non-philosophical" disciplines. For che evolution of philosophy's alleged nature and its
branches, see Kranz et al. (1989).
I32 PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY

because they conform to the explanatory model endorsed by the system con­
cept: to those trained philosophers who have been accustomed to the system
concept as a didactic device, such a procedure may appear convincing, since
it satisfies the need to fit a past philosopher's solutions and arguments into a
system and its fundamental principies. The problem with this first option is
that it is anachronistic and misleading in regard to pre-seventeenth- and post
nineteenth-century philosophy; as regards seventeenth- to nineteenth-century
philosophy it may be anachronistic and misleading as well.
On the other hand, if the system-concept is met with skepticism and
rejected as illegitimate, then such an interna! procedure has to be abandoned:
it does not make sense to identify the meaning and references of S and P
"within" a system if there is no system that determines what is "inside" or
"outside." Then one is forced to accept a considerable amount of semantic
and disciplinary uncertainty in the reconstruction of the problems, since the
theoretical description of S and P may come not from philosophy alone but
from non-philosophical disciplines as well. Moreover, it may not be the case
that philosophy simply "imports" terminological semantics, theories, and
arguments from non-philosophical disciplines and then resolves the prob­
lems "inside" philosophy; it may also happen that philosophy "intervenes" in
non-philosophical disciplines and resolves problems raised within those dis­
ciplines. After ali, it is not only philosophers who strive to resolve problems­
theologians and other scholars and scientists do so as well. One example of
this is Galileo using biblical exegesis in order to resolve the problem of the
relationship between revealed truths and philosophical or scientific truths.58
We must therefore grasp the theoretical contributions of both philosophi­
cal and non-philosophical disciplines if we want to describe the problem at
hand accurately. We cannot assurne-at least not when working outside of
early rnodern philosophy-that the information about S and its properties
can be retrieved from the "principies" of a given system of philosophy, that
is, "internally." Unless we endorse sorne sort of episternological idealism and
believe that we, as trained philosophers, have sorne sort of privileged and a
priori access to these problems of past philosophers, we must contextualize
these problems historically and philologically if we want to understand thern
in their own right, rather than according to our own subjective projections;
there is no other way open to understand these problems or the arguments
used to resolve them. For this reason, a problern-based history of philosophy

58. Galileo (1953). For Galileo's intervention, see Finocchiaro (2.002.).

 Philosophical Problems I 33

is not incompatible with contextualization. On the contrary, a competent and

historically and philologically accurate contextualization is a necessary condi­
tion of its success. For this reason, the bifurcation articulated at the begin­
ning of chis chapter, between the problem-based but non-contextual history
of philosophy and problem-free but contextual intellectual history, is miscon­
ceived. lt is erroneous to reserve historical contextualization for intellectual
history alone, since it is indeed an integral part of the history of philosophy as
well, if it intends to examine the problems of past philosophy.
This means that philology and history are integral to the method of the
history of philosophy. This would indeed allow one to focus on the argu­
ments, theories, and problems in the texts of past philosophers-though it
will no longer be possible to understand these on the basis of an assumed sys­
tem. lnstead, it would be necessary to understand the meanings of the terms
employed, the disciplines informing the terms, the argumentative force, and
structure within which these terms are employed. lt would also be useful if
historiography were an integral part of one's training in the history of phi­
losophy, since it is far too easy to fall victim to standard narratives about past
philosophers.
According to the bifurcation stated in the 1984 lntroduction and to sorne
extent repeated by Sorell in 2005 and Glock in 2008, analytic historians of
philosophy would reject such a history of philosophy because it is contextual.
Toe way out of chis impasse is to accept that even though the history of phi­
losophy works on philosophical problems, chis does not per se exclude histor­
ical and philological contextualization. On the contrary, such an integration
of historical context (primarily understood as disciplinary and argumentative
context) would be in agreement with the desire to focus on philosophical
problems. Such a solution would not be in conflict with the anti-idealism
and empiricism pervading analytic philosophy. Nor would it violare elements
intrinsic to twentieth-century analytic thought, since the problem-based his­
tory of philosophy is not an invention of analytic philosophy, but one that
dates back to nineteenth-century philosophy.

Acknowledgments
I should like to thank the contributors at the 20n Montreal conference and
the following persons for their comments to my paper: Line Edslev Andersen,
Finn Collin, Matthew Gaetano, Mikkel Gerken, Kasper Juel Gregersen, Sofie
Moller, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Joakim Kromann Rasmussen.