HGN 4136

Francisco Suarez, S.J.

On Real Relation
(Disputatio Me1taphysica XLVII)

A Translation from the Latin, with an

lntroductio n and Notes

by

John P~ Doyle
Professor of Philosophy
St. Louis University

-~
MARQUEITE
UNIVERSITY

PRESS
 © 2006 Marquette University Press
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201-3141
All rights reserved. To Mary Gale
www.marquette.edu/ mupress/
My Devoted Wife o.fForty-Three Years,
the Loving Mother of Our Children
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data and Dear Grandmother of Their Children,
Suarez, Francisco, 1548- 1617.
(Disputationes mecaphysicae. 47. English & Latin]
with Affection & Gratitude.
O n real relation = (Disputatio metaphysica XLYII) I Francisco Suire-L; a translation from
the Latin, with an incroduction and notes, by John P. Doyle.
p. cm. - (Medieval philosophical texts in uanslacion ; no. 42)
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and indexes.
!SBN- 13: 978-0-87462-245-4 (pbk.: alk. paper)
ISBN- I 0: 0-87462-245-X (pbk. : alk. paper)
l. Relacion (Philosoph y) 2. O ncology. 3. Transcendencals. I. Doyle, John P., 1930- II.
Title. Ill. Mediaeval philosophical texts in translation ; no. 42.
B785.S823057 l 3 2006
l l l- dc22
2006003693

9 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the
American National Standard for Informarion Sciences-
Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48- l 992.

rzllll - ~ Agsoc1ation of Amr.ric~m

r-f-""-f:_J University Presses

MAl\l,JUtiTTE UNIVERSITY PRES~

..11\.WliOK t. IJ
 Contents
I. INTRODUCTION:
A. Suarez, the Man, his Work, and his Place in the
1-Iistory of Philosophy ............................................................................. 9
B. Suarez as a Disciple of Aristotle......................................................... 16
C. Relation in Aristotelian Philosophy .................................................. 19
1. Principal Places in which Aristotle treats the Category of Relation:
Categories, c. 7 and Metaphysics V, c. 15 .............................................. 19
2. A Wider Overview .............................................................. ........... 19
3. Some Connected Issues....................................... ........................... 2 1
(a) The Aristotelian Division of Being ............................................ 22
(b) The Nature of the Categories .................................................... 22
(c) Relation and the Last Six Categories .......................................... 24
D. Suarez on Relation
1. Two chief places in the Disputationes metaphysicae: ......................... 26
Disputation 47 and Disputation 54, Section 6. The Dividing Line
between Real Being in the Categories and Being of Reason ............ 26
2. Some other places in the Disputationes........................................... 26
3. Some Theological Concerns-Christian Dimensions both in Suarez's
sources and in his own Doctrine-especially Trinity and Incarnation 27
E. Summaries of the Sections of Disputation 47 .................................... 28
II. Translator's Notes
The Terminology of Relation ................................. ............................... 33
III. DISPUTATION FORTY-SEVEN: "About Created Real Relations"- ..
English Translation ............................................................................ 37
Section I. Whether Relation Is a True Category of Real Being,
Different from Other Categories? ...................................................... 40
Section II. Whether a Categorical Relation Is Actually and Really
Distinguished from All Absolute Beings? ........................................... 57
Section Ill. How Many Kinds of Relation Exist?
And Which Is Truly Categorical? ....................................................... 79
Section IV. How Does a Categorical Relation Differ from a
Transcendental One? .......................................................................... 91
Section V. What Is the Essential Definition of a Categorical Relation? . 107
Section VI. About t he Subject of a C ategorical Relation ....................... 117
Section VII. About the Foundation of a Categorical Relation and
about the Reason for That Foundation ............................................ 123
Section VIII. About the Terminus of a Categorical Relation ....... .......... 133
8 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47. On Real Relation

Section IX What Distinction Must There Be becween the Foundation and

the Terminus of a Relation? .............................................................. 143
Section X Whether Three Kinds of Relatives Were Correctly Divided on a Introduction
Threefold Basis by Aristotle? ............................................................ 149 A. Suarez, the Man, His Work, and
Section XI. About the First Kind of Relations, Based on His Place in the History of Philosophy. 1
Number or Unity .. ........................................................................... 163 Although this is ground well traveled, both by others and by me in earlier
Section XII. About the Second Kind of Relations, publications, it is I think useful to travel it once more for readers who are
Based on Potency or Action ............................................................. 177 comparatively unaquainted with Suarez and his work.
Section XIII. About the Third Kind of Relations, Francisco Suarez was born at Granada in Spain on January 5, 1548. In
Based on the Character of Measure .................................................. 185 1561, he enrolled at the University of Salamanca, where he began his study of
Section XN. Is the Mentioned Division Sufficient, and Law, an interest he would have for the rest of his Life. In 1564 he entered the
Does It Comprehend All Relations? ................................................. 191 Jesuits, i.e., the Society of Jesus, which had been founded thirty years before
Section XV. Whether All the Relations of the Third Kind, and Only by St. Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556). In October 1566, following two years
T hese, Are Non-Mutual?-Where We Discuss the Rdations of God of philosophical education, he began to study theology, still at Salamanca. In
to Creatures......................... ................................................................. 197 this study, the best known and most important of his teachers was the Do-
Section XVI. ls the Formal Terminus of a Relation Another Relation or minican, Juan Mancio (1497-1576), who was, fourth in succession after the
Some Absolute C haracter?-Where Incidentally Various Questions famous Francisco de Vitoria (1492/3-1546), holding Salamanca's principal
Are Also Explained .......................................................................... 219 chair ( Cdtedra de Prima) of theology.
Section XVI!. In What Way the Category "Toward Something" Can Be In 1570 Suarez started to teach philosophy, first at Salamanca and then at
Ordered under One Supreme Genus.-Where We Also Discuss the Segovia. He was ordained a priest in March 1572, and he continued to lecture
Individual D istinction of Relations .................................................. 245 in philosophy until, in September 1574, at the Jesuit College, Valladolid, h e
Section XVIII. What Are the Properties of a Relation? .......................... 263 began what would be his life's work as a theology teacher for the Society. In
IV. DISPUTATION FORTY-SEVEN: "De Relationibus Realibus Creatis" time after, he taught theology at Avila (1575), Segovia (l 575), Valladolid again
-A Latin Transcription ...................................... ..... ........................... 267 (1576), Rome (1580), Alcala (1585), and Salamanca (1593). In 1597, at the
V. Persons Mentioned by Suarez in the Forty-Seventh D isputation ......... 407 request of King Philip II, he accepted the principal chair of theology at the
VI. Bibliography....................................... ................................... ........... 411 University of Coimbra, where in 1612 he published the distillate of his legal
VII. Index ofNames ............................................................................... 419 teaching in his treatise, "On Laws," (De legibus). He remained at Coimbra
VIII. Subject lndex ................................................................................. 423 until his retirement in 1615. On 25 September 1617, he died in Lisbon.

I For details of Suarez's life, see Raoul De Scorraille, S.]., Frttnfois Suarez de la Com-
pagnie de fems, 2 vols., Paris, 1911-13. In English see Joseph Fichter, Man ofSpain,
Francis Suarez, New York, 1940. For a shorter but yet reliable source, cf. P. Monnot,
"Suarez, Franyois. I. Vie et oeuvres," in Dictionnafre de Theologie Catholique, XIV,
20 parrie (Paris, 1941) cols. 2638-2649. For more recent presentations, cf. Jorge J.E.
Gracia, "Francisco Suarez: The Man in History," The American Catholic Philosophi-
cal Quarterly, LXV (1991), pp. 259-266; Carlos Norefia, "Suarez and the Jesuits,"
ibid., pp. 267-286, and John P. Doyle, "Suarez, Francisco," Routledge Encyclopedia
ofPhilosophy (London/New York: Routledge, 1998), vol. 9, pp. 189-196. Also see
Jacob Schmutz: "Francisco Suarez, S.J." at http://www,ulb.ac.be/philo/scholasti-
con/nornenS .htrn#suarez.
10 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation fntroduction 11
Beyond his teaching, Suarez engaged in theological and political debates. different authors.4 Not surprising in a work on metaphysics, Aristotle (384-322
the most famous of these was the controversy De auxiliis ("On the Helps BC) was most mentioned, a total of 1735 times, while St. T homas Aquinas
[for Salvation]"). Between Jesuits and Dominicans, debate here centered on was next, cited 1008 times.5 However, Suarez does not just recite opinions;
God's foreknowledge and causality, grace and human freedom . Suarez, with he is always an independent thinker who Faithfully reports as many positions
his fellow Jesuits, St. Robert BeUarmine (1542- 1621) and Luis Molina (1535- as he can and gives fair treatment both to those h e accepts and to those he
1600), allowed for divine prerogatives but also ch ampioned human free will. rejects.6
Less metaphysical was the dispute between the Republic of Venice and the In the first Disputation (Opera omnia, Paris: Vives [1856]: vol. 25, pp. 1-64),
papacy about the limits of papal jurisdiction. In the course of this dispute he tells us that the object of metaphysics is "being insofar as it is real being. "
Suarez in 1607 composed (but did not publish) a pro-papal treatise entitled, Sharpening this, he follows Aristotle7 to exclude from that object both being
"On Ecclesiastical Immunity Violated by the Venetians. " 2 Praising his effort, of reason and incidental being (i.e. ens per accidens). In a way then that reflects
Pope Paul V [Camillo Borghese (1552-1621), pope (1 605-1621)], in the year Avicenna's (980- 1037) w1derstanding of Aristotelian metaphysics, the precise
of its composition, said that the work showed its author to be "an outstanding object of metaphysics abstracts from existence and transcends all categories,
and pious doctor" (Doctor eximius ac pius). From this came the honorific title genera, species and differences to embrace everything real, which is to say
Suarez h as received in the history of Scholasticism-"Doctor eximius," "the mind-independent.
Outstanding Doctor." T he second part and second volume of the Disputationes goes on in D isputa-
Suarez's published writings, which fill 26 volumes in their most accessible tion 28 (Vives: vol. 26, pp. 1-21) to divide being between infinite and finite.
editio n,' were mainly theological and normally corresponded to some area In Disputation 29 (pp. 2 1-60), Suarez demonstrates the existence of God in a
of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1274). O utside this quasi-deductive manner from the common concept of being. After an inves-
T homistic framework are the two volumes of the Disptttationes metaphysicae tigation of the divine nature in D isputation 30 (pp. 60-224), Disputation 31
("Metaphysical Disputations"), which were published at Salamanca in 1597. (pp. 224-312) begins treatment of finite being with a denial of the Thomistic
Suarez's most important and most influential work, the volumes rehearse his real distinction of essence and existence in creatures. In Disputation 32 (pp.
own and other Scholastics' thought on myriad questions, arranged systematically 312-329), substance and accidents are considered in a general way and over
in the form of fifty-four "Disputations," which deal with topics in metaphys- the next four Disputations (pp. 329-491) substance is treated in detail while
ics. the various categories of accident are treated in Disputations 37 to 53 (pp.
Any reader will be struck by the work's phenomenal display of learning. In 491-1014). Real relation is the subject matter ofthe forty-seventh Disputation,
the just mentioned edi tion, it contains almost 2000 quarto pages, which, from which is our concern now.
a word count of a sample page, I estimate to contain more than 1.4 million T he whole of the Disputationes concludes in D isputation 54 (pp. 1014-
words. After stating each problem, Suarez searched the history of philosophy 1041) with a systematic discussion of "beings of reason" (entia rationis), which
and theology for solutions that had been offered to it. With as many as twenty- are divided into negations, privations, and mind-dependent relations-all of
two opinions listed in connection with a single question, almost every available which are, once more in the wake of Aristotle, outside the real being, which
Greek, Arabic, Patristic, and especially Scholastic writer has been cited, often is the object of metaphysics.
many times. AI; a rule, these citations are from original sources and exact ref- AI; for Suarez's place in the history ofphilosophy, it is fair to say that through
erences are given. One historian has counted 7709 citations, referring to 245 his selection of issues and persons before himself he largely shaped the trans-

4 Cf. Jesus lturrioz, S.J., "Fuentes de la metaflsica de Suarez," Pensamiento, numero

extraordinario (Madrid, 1948), pp. 31-89, esp. p. 39.
2 T he work was finally published by Mgr. J.-B. Malou, bishop of Bruges, as the 4th 5 Ibid., p. 40.
Treatise in a volume entitled: R.P. Francisci S11arezii, Opuscula sex inedita, Parisi 6 For an appraisal of this side of Suarez by a great modern historian of philosophy,
Bruxelles: P. Gueau, 1859. cf. Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd edition (Toronco: Pontifical
3 Opera Omnia, Paris: L. Vives, 1856-1866; plus two volumes (27 and 28) of indices, Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 99.
1878. 7 Cf. Metaphysics 6.4. 1027b33- l 028a3.
 12 Francisco Suarez; Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Introduction 13
mission of tha t history. In this, he had enormous authority among Catholic
the Calvinist tradition of German 15 and Dutch 16 schools, for both metaphys-
Scholastics, even for writers who disagreed wit h him.• As might be expected,
ics11 and law. 11Through the Calvinist tradition that influence passed from the
however, he was most influential among his Jesuit Order- broth ers.9 Pari passu
Neth erland s, by way of the U niversity of Cambridge, even to colonial New
with the growth and activity of the Society of Jesus,'" Suarez's metaphysics
spread from the Catholic schools of Spain, Portugal, and Italy to northern
E uropean countries. 11 Beyond Catholicism, it crossed to t he Lutheran univer- GomsgmNscha.ft, Milnscer i.W.: Aschendorff, 1928, 25 1-325; Ernst Lewalter,
sities of Germany, 12 where the Diputationes metaphysica~·. of which seventeen Spanische-jesuitische r'nd detttschluthel'ische Metaphysik des I 7 Jahrhunderts, Darm-
editions appeared between 1597 and 1636, 13 was studied, by those especially stadt: W issenschafdiche Buchgesellschafr, 1967 (reprint of Hamburg, 1935), Max
who embraced what had been Philip Melanchthon's ( 1497-1560) conciliatory Wundc, DiedeutscheSchulmetaphysikdes I 7jahrhtmderts,Tubingen:J.C. Mohr, 1939,
attitude toward philosophy. 14 In similar way, Suarez had major influence in and J. Iriarte, "La proyecci6n . ..." Among chose in the Lutheran university world
influenced by Suarez, we may mention especially, Jacob Martini (1570-1649), who
authored: "Mecphysical Divisions and Questions, in which almost all Distinctions
8 For example, John Poinsot {a.k.a. John of St. T homas, O ..P. [1589-1644)) in his
of Metaphysical Terms are accurately Explained so chat principally Questions from
Cursus philosophicus has cited Suarez 167 times; c£ Joannis a Sancto Thoma, O.P.,
Francisco Suarez and Clemens Tim pier are partly Answered, partly Examined, and
Curmsphilosophicus Thomisticus, ed. B. Reiser, O.S. B. (Tauri ni: Marietti, 1930-37),
partly Refuted" (Partitiones et quaestiones metaphysicae, in quibu.r fore tel'minorum
romus III, pp. 492-5.
metaphysicorum distinctiones accurate explicantm; ut et praecipue quaestiones ex Fr.
9 Among those he influenced in the seventeenth-century, we can mention: Pedro
Sual'etz et Cl. Timplero partim resolvuntur, panim examinantur et refntantw; Wit-
Hurtado de Mendoza (1578- 164 J), Francisco de Oviedo (1602-165 1), Rodrigo de
tenberg, 1615). and Christoph Scheibler (1589-1653), who was nicknamed "the
Arriaga (1592-1667), Sylvester Mauro (16 19-1687), and Luis de Lossada (1681-
Protestant Suarez" and whose chief work was an Opus metaphysicwn, published
1748). Hurtado, for example, refers to Suarez as "the brigh test light not only of
at G iessen in 16 17 and then later in 1633 at Oxford, a work which was used by
the Society and of Spain, but even of the whole Church." (... P. Fl'ancisc. Suarez
Spinoza among others.
clal'issimum no11 so/um Societatis, et Hispaniae lumen, sed eti1im Ecclesiae totius, ... );
15 For example, in Heidelberg, Sceinfurc, Herborn, Marburg (Calvinist from 1605 to
cf Universa philosophia, Metaphysica, Prooemium, disp. l , Sf:c. 1, n. 48, nova editio
1624), Leyden, Franeker, etc. Among chose influenced here co some degree by Suarez
(Lugduni: Sumpt. L. Prose Heredis Rovilli, 1624), p. 700.
were Bartholomaeus Keckermann (1572-1609) and ClemensTim pier ( 1567-1624),
1OIn the year of its foundation the Society had just ten members. When St. Ignatius
who is actually at pains to separate himself from Suarez on the central poinr of the
died in 1566, that numbr had grown to 1000. In 1580, it was 5000, and by 1600,
object of metaphysics, which for Timpler is "every intelligible" (omne intelligibile)
the Order numbered 13, 112 members, in 436 houses, spread through 37 provinces;
rather than "being insofar as it is real being."
cf E.L. Lampe, "Counter Reformation," New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York:
16 For chis, c£ Paul Dibon, Laphilosophie neerlandaise au siecle d'o1; tome1· L'en.reignment
McGraw-Hill, 1967), vol. IY, p. 387.
philosophique dans ies universites alepoque p,.tcartesierme (1575-1650), (Paris/Am-
11 On the northern expansion ofthe Jesuits, see Bernhard Duhr, Geschichteder}esttiten in
scerdarn/Londres/New York, 1954), p. 42: "La Disputatio, si florissante dans Jes
den Landern deutscher Ztmge, Vols. I and II, Freiburg im B.: Herder, 1907-1913.
universites medievales, a survecu a la Renaissance et Suarez apparait, a la fin du 16<
12For example, in Helmstedc, Jena, Marburg (Lutheran until 1605 and after 1624),
sil:cle, comme w1 ma!cre inconcesce en cec art cradi tionnel. Ou trouverait-on en
G iesscn, etc.
effec examen plus exhauscif des arguments et forme syllogiscique plus rigoureuse
13 For chis, seeJoaqufn 1riarce, S.J., "La proyecci6n sobre Europa de una gran mecaf!sica,
clans la solution de la question que clans les Disp11tatio11es metaphysicae du jesuice
o Suarez en la filosoffa de los dias del Barocco," Razon y Fe, numero excraordinario
espagnol?"
(1948), 229-65, p. 236. Iriarte regards chis astounding diffusion of Suarez's 2000
17 For Suarez's influence in the Netherlands with special regard to the metaphysical
page work as perhaps unique in the history of philosophy and he compares it with
demonstration of God's existence and further knowledge of divine attributes, see
the early edicions of Descartes's Meditationes: ""Descartes, por ejemplo, en todo el
Asa Goudriaan, Phiiosophische Gotteserkenntnis bei Sudrez und Descartes in Zusam-
siglo XVII alcanz6 cuacro ediciones de! conjunro total de sus Obras filos6ficas. Y
menhang mit der niederlandischen reformierten Theoiogie und Philosophic des I 7.
de sus 'Medicaciones Metaf!sicas,' por separado, en ese misrno siglo (1641-1700),
jahrhunde,.ts (Leiden/Boscon/Koln: Brill, 1999), esp. pp. 1-167.
nueve ediciones. Meditaciones que no son sino un foUeco, despues de todo," ibid,
l 8For Suarez as a forerunner here of tl1e famous Dutch jurisprudent, Hugo Grotius,
note 6.
see: Paola Negro, "lntomo alle fonti scolastiche in Hugo Grotius," in Dalla prima
14 For rn uch of this, see: Karl Eschweiler, "Die Philosophic der spanischen Spatscho-
a/la seconda Scoiastica, a cura di A. Ghisalberci (Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domeni-
lastik auf der Universicacen des l 7 Jahrhunderts," in Spanische Forschungen der
ca no, 2000), pp. 200-25 1, esp. 207-208, 2 17-2 18, 228-236, and 250-251.
14 Francisco Sutirez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Introduction 15

England," where Suarez the hisrorian and the thinker was well known and [Jisputationes, of which he is believed to have owned a copy. 21 Gottfried
Wbii
important for philosophical and theological development. Wilhelm Leibniz (1649-1716) boasted that when he was young he had read
In all probability, it was Suarezian metaphysics that Rene Descartes (1596- Suarez "like a novel."" Again, Leibniz's independent disciple, Christian Wolff
1650) first learned from his Jesuit teachers at La Fleche. 20 While he is short (1679- 1754), whose Onto!ogia was for Immanuel Kant ( 1724-1804) a para-
on explicit citations, Descartes has on at least one occasion referred to the digm of pre-critical metaphysics, 2.l says that it was "Francisco Suarez, of the
Society ofJesus, who among Scholastics pondered metaphysical questions with
I 9'fhus, the Venice, 1605 edition of the Disputationes is listed by Arthur 0. Norton, particular penetration." 2·1 Beyond all doubt Wolff was in his own metaphysics
in his "Harvard Iexr-Books and Reference Books of the Seventeenth Century," very much in debt to Suarez. 25 In the nineteenth century, Arthur Schopen-
Publications ofthe Colonial Society ofMasstichusetts, vol. 28 (April, 1933), p. 429. hauer (1788-1860) often cited Su<lrez's doctrine rhat a final cause moves not
Again, Thomas G. Wright (Literary Culture in Early New England, 1620-1730 [New according to its real being but through its "being known" (esse cognitum), 26 and
Haven: Yale University Press, 1920]) lists (p. 276) a copy of the "Metaphysicarum in his main work, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Schopenhauer labels
Disputationes" in the Harvard College Catalogue of 1723, plus (p. 271) a copy of the Disputationes "an authentic compendium of the whole Scholastic tradi-
Scheibler's [dubbed "the Protestant Suarez" by his contemporaries], Synopsis Phi-
tion."27 Again, Franz Brentano (1838-1917), in his 1862 work on the various
losophiae, as among the books originally bequeathed by John Harvard to Harvard
meanings of being according to Aristotle, has recommended the Disputationes
College. Also, cf.: "Joseph Cooke ([Harvard] A.B. 1660), a few days before his
graduation 'suis addidit' the Metaphysicae Disputationes of Suarez, ... ", San1uel Eliot
Morison, Harvard C'o!lege in the Seventeenth Century (Ca1nbridge: MA, Harvard
University Press, 1936), p. 253; and: "The Reverend Benjamin Bunker of Malden
2i ErienncGilson, BeingandSonze Philosophers, 2'" cdition (Toronto: Pontifical Institute
1

otMediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 109.

[Massachuserts) left in 1669 about 80 volumes on religion and theology (includ- 22Sec Vita Leibnitii a seipso, in Foucher de Careil, Nouvelles lettres et opuscles intdits
ing Suarez's Metaphysica), ... "idem, The lnte!lectnal Life of Colonial New England de Leibnitz (Paris, 1857), p. 382-383; as cited by L. Mahieu, Frrmrois Suarez, sa
(Ithaca: Great Seal Press, second printing 1961), p. 139; Morison cites his authority philosophie et /es rapports q1/el/e a avec sa theologie (Paris, 1921 ), p. 517-518. Also
for this as "Ms. Middlesex Probate Court Files, docket 3508. While much of such cf. E Menard, S.J., "Con11nent Leibniz se trouva place clans le sillagc de Suarez,"
evidence is sporadic or even anecdotal, it confirn1s the influence of Suarez on sev- Archives de Philosophie, XVIII, cahier 1 (Paris, 1949), pp. 7-32; Menard (esp. pp.
enteenth-century Harvard and New England and it fits well with the view of Perry 22-30) has 1nuch of interest to say about Suarez's Disputationes in the Protestant
Miller:" ... though Puri ran literature abounds with conde1nnations ofscholasticis1n, universities ofGcnnany. On the relation between Leibniz and Suarez \Vi th particular
altnost no limits can be set to its actual influence." Perry Miller, The Neu; E'ngland reference to the doctrine of individuation, sec J .-F. Courtinc, Suarez et le syst(rne de
Mind: The Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press, 1954), p. 104. For !a n1!tt1physique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), esp. pp. 496-519.
tnore confirn1ation of the place of Suarez, see Nonnan Fiering, Moral Philosophy 2.JCf. Gilson, Being .. ., p. 119.
at Seventeenth-Century Harvard (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 24Cf. C. Wolff, Phi!osophia prinu1 sive ontologia, I, 2, 3, IL 169 (Francofurti et Lipsiac,
1981),p.120. 1736), p. 138.
200n this, cf.: "Descartes, who was educated by the Jesuits, certainly studied Sutfrels 25Cf Gilson, Being .. ., pp. l 12-120. On Suarezian metaphysics as it passes through
work, and a considerable an1ount of the frame\vork for rhe Meditations (particularly Wolff to Kant, sec rhe excellent work of Ludgcr I-Ionnef(:lder, Scientia Transcendens:
the reasoning in the ~fhird Meditations) bears the clear imprint of Suarez's ideas." Dieforrna!e Bestirnmung derSeiendheit und Realitiit in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters
R. Ariew/J. Cottingham/T. Sorell (eds.), Descartes' Meditations. Background Sonrce und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus-Sudrez-Woljf-Kant-Peirce), (Hamburg: Felix
Materials (Cambridge, 1998), p. 29, as cited by A. Goudriaan, Philosophische Got- Meiner Verlag, 1990), esp. pp. 200-381.
teserkenntnis .. ., p. l, nore 2. 26For this, see M. Frischciscn-KOhler and Willy Moog, Die Phi!osophie der Neuzeit
20bisCf. Reply to the Fourth Objections, where Descartes cites Suarez, DM IX, 2, 4; bis zunz Ende des xviii jahrhunderts, in Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte
in Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Ada1n-Tannery (1897 sq.), VII, 235; also see Leonard der Phi/osophie, 14 Auflage, vol. 3 (Basel: Schwabe, 1957), p. 215.
Gilen, S.J., "Ober die Beziehungcn Descartes' zur zeitgenOssischen Scholastik," 27Cf Arthur Schopenhauers siinuliche \\7erke, ed. P. Deussen, I (Munchcn, 1911), l 34,
Scho!astik, XXXII (1957), esp. p. 54, n. 71. For some influence of Suarez on the 148, 181, 500; cited by Nikolaus Junk, Die Bewegnngslehre des Franz Suarez (Inns-
esse objectivurn doctrine of Descartes, cf. J.-F. Courtine, "La doctrine carttsienne bruck/Leipzig: F. Ranch, 1938), p. 13. Let us also note that in Dberweg, volume
de l'idCe et ses sources scolastiqucs," in Les catlgories de l'ftre: Etudes de philosophie III, \VC read that Suarez's doctrine of the end tnoving by its "being known" (esse
ancienne et medievale (Paris: PUF, 2003), pp. 241-65. cogniturn) strongly influenced Schopenhauer.
16 Francisco Stdrez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Rel-1ttion Introduction 17
nzetaphysictteto anyone who \.van ts to understand tnedieval views on Aristorle.w adhere to Aristotelian philosophy wherever possible, and (2) the emphasis on
And finally here, for the twentieth-century Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) Aristotle in the Ratio studiornm (1599), which was from its adoption the guid-
Su<irez was rhc main source through which Greek ontology passed fron1 the ing rule of Jesuit studies in philosophy. 31 While the Disputationes metaphysicae
middle ages to usher in the metaphysics and the transcendental philosophy of
was published before the final version of the Rtttio appeared, nevertheless, the
n1odern tin1es. 29 In this vein, he has written: discussions leading to its adoption, in which discussions Suarez tookson1e part,
reflected both Ignatius' wishes and the actual practice of the Jesuits.
Direct influence on the devdop1ncnt of rnodern inctaphysics \Vas exercised
Su<lrez's Disputationes tnetaphysicae \vas perhaps the broadest and deepest
by one theologian and philosopher who, in the l 61h century, with quite spe-
stream through which medieval Aristotelianisrn flowed into the theoretical
cific theological intentions, set hin1sdf the task of interpreting Aristotelian
philosophy of modern times. Almost without exception the citations of Aris-
n1etaphysics anew: the Spanish Jesuit Franz Suarez. Suarez's significance as
a theologian and philosopher is far from being acknowledged to the extent totle in the Disputationes are accurate. But three things more should be said.
merited by this thinker) who rnust be placed even above Aquinas in tenns One is Suarez's criticism of the earlier use of Aristotle and the techniques of
of his acumen and independence of questioning. His significance for the Aristotelian cotnmentaries, as well as his expressed intention to present meta-
developn1ent and fOrn1ation of 1nodern Inetaphysics is not 111erely fonnal in physics in a more systematic (but yet obviously an Aristotelian way). This we
the sense that under his influence the discipline of metaphysics took shape in find in the prologue to Disputations I and 2, where it seems reminiscent of
a specific form. Just as in1portant is his n1ouldingofthe problen1s concerning St. Thomas' prologue to the Summa Theologiae, in which the Angelic Doctor
content, problen1s which then rea\vakened in modern philosophy. 30 has criticised the con1n1on practice of commenting on texts, the most notable
of which was the Sentences of Peter the Lombard.'"
B. Some Thoughts on Suarez as a Disciple of Aristotle Two is the fact that Suarez, while ever respectful of Aristotle, is not his slav-
As mentioned, Suarez has cited Aristotle over 1700 times in the course of the ish fol!o\ver. He is very much aware of the number and variety of Aristotelian
Disputationes. But any consideration ofSuarez as a disciple and commentator on commentators who wrote before himself. And while he usually does follow or
Aristotle should begin with a brief adversion to the Doctor eximius' background at least find support in Aristotle's text, he knows that the pagan Aristotle will
as a Jesuit. Two things especially stand out here: (I) St. Ignatius' own regard not always jibe with his own intention of presenting a Christian philosophy. For
for Aristotle and his desire that the members of his Order be trained in and that reason, he is at times very willing to express his own opinion-regardless
of \vhat Aristotle n1ight have thought.J3 In this, the Doctor exhnius was not at
odds with the rule for a Professor of Philosophy stated in the Ratio of 1599:
28 For this, sec Brentano, Von der n1annigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristote!es
(Frciburg im Brcisgau: Herder, 1862, reprint: Hildesheim: G. Ohns, 1960), p. 3,
In 1nattcrs of any i1nportance let hirn not depart frorn 1\ristode unless so1ne-
n. 6; translated by Rolf George: On the Several Senses oj'Being in Aristotle (Berkeley:
thing occurs which is foreign to the doctrine which acade1nies cvery\vherc
University of California Press, 1975), p. 150, n. 6.
approve of; much 1nore if it is opposed to the orthodox faith, and if there
29Sein undZeit (Halle: M. Nien1cycr, 1941 ), p. 22, tr. J. McQuarric and E. Robinson,
Being and Time (New York: Harper, 1962), p. 43; also cf.: Die Frage nach dem Ding
(Tiibingen: M. Niemeyer, 1962), p. 77. For some of what is involved in this, see
n1y article, "Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics," The Modern Schoohnan, 49 31 On this, see Edward A. Fitzpatrick, St. Ignatius and the Ratio Studionun (New York
(1972), pp. 201-220. On the question of the relation between Su:\reis metaphysics and London: McGraw-Hill, 1933), pp. 22, 107, 168, and 171. Forthe latest English
and Heidegger's "onto-theo-logical" conception of tnetaphysics, cf. A. Goudriaan, translation of the Ratio, cf: Claude N. Pavur, S.J., Ratio atque lnstitutio Studiorun1
Phi!osophische Ciotteserkenntnis .. ., esp. 8~ 10. Societatis jesu: The Official Plan for Jesuit Education, St. Louis: Institute fOr Jesuit
30 Martin Heidegger, The }imdamenta! Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Sources, 2005.
Solitude, translated by William McNeil! and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington and 32For this, cf. S. Thornae Aquinatis, Stttnma Theologiae, Prologus, in Opera 01nnia,
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 51; for the original Gennan, cf. tomus iv (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotra, S.C. De Propaganda Fidei, 1888),
Heidegger, Die Gnmdbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit---Einsamkeit, in p. 5.
Gesamtausgabe, II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923-1944, Band 29/30 (Frankfurt am 33Cf. e.g., DM20, !, nn. 24-6, vol. 25, pp. 751-53: DM29, I, n. 8, vol. 26, p. 23;
N1ain: Vittorio Klostennann, 1976), p. 78. DM30, 16, n. 56, pp. 202-203; and ibid., 17, n. 5, p. 208.
18 Francisco Suarez: lvfetaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Introduction 19
are any argun1ents of this or any other philosopher against the faith, he will
et involuntario)/'9 his treatise "On the c;oodness and Malice of Hu111an Acts"
endeavor earnestly to refute thern according to the Lateran Council. 34
(f)e bonitate et nuditia hurnttnorurn actuurn), 40 as well as his theological writings
on divine grace41 and the sacrarnents. 42
Three is the important and often overlooked fact that Suarez attached to his
Disptttationesa rn.oderarely sized con1Inentary (per rnodu1n quttestionis) on the first
12 books of Arisrotle's ~Metaphysics. This commentary, labeled a "Most Ample C. Relation in Aristotelian Philosophy-
Index to the Metaphysics of Aristotle" (Index locup!etissimus in Mett1physicam A Broad Overview
Aristotelis), of which I recently published a translation, is very valuable for its 1. There are two main places in which Aristotle has dealt with the category
cross references to the Disputationes, and is also useful to determine Suarez's of relation. These are: (a) Ctttegories, Chapter 7, and (b) Metaphysics, Book V,
understanding of and faithfulness to the text of Aristotle. 35 Unfortunately, with Chapter 15. As will become apparent, these places will be central for Suarez's
regard to relation it adds nothing beyond the forty-seventh Disputation. 36 rreattnent of relation in Disputation 47.
More on Suarez's attitude to Aristotle as 'Nell as his transn1ission of Aris- 2. At the lowest level of reality, as Aristotle perceives it, there is potency or
totelianism can be gleaned from any of his other works. These include his matter. 43 Here we have Aristotle's answer to Parmenides and also the basis on
"Treatise on the Soul" (Tractatus de Anima), 37 which while it is not a literal which he will make motion intelligible-more, that is to say, than the flux of
commentary on Aristotle's de Anitna does for the most part present Aristotle's Heraclitus or Crarylus. To explain: Parrnenides left us with a stark choice "is
docrrine, even if it is in a benign way when that doctrine sometimes goes asrray or is not (fon v T] OUK fon v)," 44 a choice which Aristotle sidesteps with the
(as for example, with respect to the immortality of the soul). Among other recognition of potency. Things are not only what they are but also what they
writings that are suffused with Aristotle's doctrine are his work "On Laws" (De are able to be. Able to be is nothing in comparison with the actual reality of a
legibus);" his treatise "On the Voluntary and the Involuntary" (De voluntario thing, but it is not the absolute nothing of Parmenides' "is not." Again, as we
shall see presently, the recognition of the potential will permit an intellectual
mastery of motion which will overcome the unintelligible flux of Heraclitus.
34Cf. Fitzpatrick, St. Ignatius ... , p. 168.
For us now the most important point is that potency or matter is not an
35 ln the Index and the Disputations, Suarez was using only the first 12 books of the
absolute reality or being. Instead, while it obviously transcends the category of
Metaphysics. While this was conunon in the Middle Ages, by Suarez's tin1e books l 3
relation, matter is relational. Aristotle tells us that it is among the class of things
and 14 \Vere widely available. Also fron1 the Index we can see that he uses Fonseca's
which are "toward something" (np6c; n). 45 This is to say that matter exists only
translation for the early books of the jVfetaphysicsand then relies on older translations
by William ofMoerbeke (ca. 1470-1538), Cardinal Bessarion (ca. 1403-1472), and as relative to a counterpart actuality or form. Its reality is encompassed and
John Argyropolous (ca. 1415-1487) for the rest. He refers to Fonsecis edition as confined by form, which form is being for Aristotle. But not only its reality;
"elegant" (Index locupletissirnus, I, c. 7, vol. 25, p. iv) and in those passages from also matter's ability to be understood and to be explained are relative to form.
Jvfetaphysics V, c. 15, \vhich he has translated in Disputation 47 he has followed 10 illustrate: bronze is matter for the statue not as it is bronze-for precisely
Fonseca. But as for Fonseca's cornn1entary, he can take it or leave it in different as such it is form-but rather only insofar as it is able to become a statue, or is
contexts, as will be apparent fron1 reading Disputation 47.
36Thus, \virh regard to !vfetaphysics, V, c. 15, the Doctor exirniu.s says: "We treat this 39Cf. e.g. Disputation V, "On Circu1nstances," vol. 4, pp. 233-41.
Chapter at great length in Disputation 47, and therefore there is no need to note 40Cf VivCs edition, vol. 4, pp. 277-454. In this work and others it is not so much a
anything now." For this, cf Francisco SuJ.rez,A CornmentaryonAristotle'sMetaphysics question of Suarez citing Aristotle as it is \vorking within his 1netaphysics, psychol-
(Index locupletissirnus in Metaphysicarn Aristotelis), translated front the Latin with an ogy, ethics, and theory of scientific dernonstration.
lntroducrion and Notes by John P. Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 41 For exa1nple, cf the VivCs edition, volu1nes 7. 8, and 9.
2004), p. 93. 42Cf. Vives volumes 2-23.
37For a critical edition, cf. Cotnrnentaria una curn quaestionibu.s in libros Aristote!is 430n this equivalence, cf. "u.l.riv oe .l.eyw ~ pl] c60E n oucrcx ivEpydcx,
de Anirnrt, lntroducci6n y edici6n cr!tica por Salvador C:astellote, Torno 1 Madrid: &uv<ipEl foc't cOOE n" Metaphysics 8.l.1042a27; cf. ibid. 14.4.1092a3; ibid.
Sociedad de estudios y publicaciones, 1978; tomo II: Madrid: Labor, 1981; tomo 8.6.1045a33.
Ill: Madrid, Fundaci6n Xavier Zubiri, 1991. 44 Fr. 8, l. 16; DKI, 236.
38Cf. VivCs edition, volumes 5 and 6. 45"en cwv npoc; n 1j u.l.r( Physics 2.2.194b9-10.
20 Francisco Suircz: Jvfetaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Introduction 21
in potency to be fonned as a statue. Accordingly, if one is going to understand confining, specifying, and explanatory reality required for superficial or ac-·
or explain bronze as n1aterial he must relate it to the statue. cidenral change. Once 1nore, 11<nvcver, we have not reached totally absolute
'fhe next level is that of change or rnore particularly motion itself, which reality. Again the reality of accidents is relational, material, or potential. Even
Aristotle, in opposition to the flux of Heraclitus and Cratylus, defines as "the the so-called "absolute" accidents of quantity and quality54 are real only in
act of a being in potency precisely insofar as it is in potency.)) 46 Motion (or relation to substance. That is to say that there is no absolute quantity apart
change more broadly) is a kind of µE~a~u n, a "middle something" between from a quantified substance nor any absolute quality except in a qualified
potency and actuality. It is imperfect actuality. Further, motion is not an substance.
absolute-there is no rnorion apart fron1 rhings. 47 The other side of this is The next level is that of substance, which is in some way absolute when
that motion or change, like potency, while not in the category of relation compared with accidents-but, again, not totally absolute. For at this level,
is nevertheless relational. Most obviously, it is what it is, or it is specified or the substance in question is still rnatcrial, subject to change, and to that ex-
nan1ed, in relation to its terminus. 48 Fron1 another angle, since act is equated tent potential, and relative rather than absolute. Therefore, we have not here
with form and form is equated with being49 (in the sense that there is no act reached an ultimate absolute reality but rather one which calls out for some
beyond form 50-and that to be is to be something 51 stable, definite, fixed, completion beyond itself.
formal, or even form itself'')-motion or change, far from an unintelligible At this point we emerge from immanence to transcendence. The comple-
flux, can be thought of as "the act of a form in matter, precisely insofar as it is tion called for is causal and comes only at the level of immaterial, that is
in matter," "the form of a form in matter precisely insofar as it is in rnatter," purely formal, purely actual, and purely absolute substance. This is the l~vel of
"the being of a being in potency precisely as it is in potency/' or, stretching Aristotle's "separate substance." Separate from matter or potency and with all
beyond anything which Aristotle ever said explicitly, as "the being of a being lesser and lower grades of reality or being depending on it, separate substance
in relation precisely insofar as it is in relation." is independent of all else.
In contrast to potency as well as to motion or change, the next level is But going back to real being in the categories, let us say that while purely
comparatively absolute. This is the level of accidental actuality or form-the absolute reality is found only when we arrive at the ultimate prime mover or
level"' of the categories of accident. At this level we have the encompassing, at least at separate substance, there are before that three comparatively absolute
------- levels. These are material substance, quantity and quality, which in compari-
46"i) 'WU liuv<ipEt OV1'0<; evtEAEXEt, ti 'WtOUtOV, KlVT]Ol<; fonv," Physics son with relation, and the last six categories that in various ways presuppose
3.L20lal0. or include relation, have a measure of independence. Thus, relation, action,
47"ouK fon Iii nc; Kiv!]otc; ncxp& t& npaypcxrn." Physics 3.L200b32.
passion, time, place, position, and possession-are all either imn1ediately or
48Cf. "p&Hov yap Eic; il ~ e~ OU KtVEltext civor1<i(Etext ii pEtcxPoAij" Physics
mediately relational. But then going farther back to the distinction of real be-
5.L224b7-8.
49 Cf. Metaphysics 9.8.1050a4-7. ing from beings of reason and the evident ability which human beings have
50 This is unlike the wdl known view of St. Thornas Aquinas that "to be is the actual- to relate different items, the core question becomes that of the reality of the
ity of all fonns" (esse est actualitas ornniurn Jorniarunz); cf De potentia VII, 2, ad 9; category of relation. !fit is not real, but rather mind-dependent, what does that
Summa 7/Jeol. 1, 3, 4; ibid.,], 4, 1, ad 3; ibid., I, 5, l; and Compendium theologiae, say about Aristotle's category doctrine and still more about the constitution of
c. 11. reality itself? If relation is not real, anterior to any hurnan consideration, how
51 In this way, there is no difference between sorr1crhing and being so1nething, e.g. "one can we conceive even the relational character of quantity, quality, and material
rnan," "man," and "being 1nan" are all the sa1ne; cf "TaVTO yCtp ElS' clvSpwTTOS substance, as \Vell as that of 1natter and rnotion-let alone that of the last six
Kat iOv iiv9pl01TO<; Kat liv8plOTTOS" (Metttphysics 4.2. 1003b26-27. categories? If, on the other side, relation is real anterior to our consideration,
52 Cl~ e.g. Metaphysics 7.7.1032bl-2, where form (cllioc;) is called the essence (tot( what is its reality and how can it be conceived? How can it be distinguished
~v Eivat) and the prin1ary being (npwtfi oUaia) of each thing. For some of what
from its mind-dependent image which is a being of reason? In Section 2 of
is involved here, cf. Joseph Owens, C.SS. R., The Doctrine ofBeing in the Aristotelian
the forty-seventh Disputation we have Suarez's choice and answer to this all
Metaphysics, third edition (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978),
pp. 466-8,
53 Or, better, "levels." 54Cf. DM 39, 1, n. 4, voL 26, p. 506; ibid., n, 18, p. 510.
22 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation 23
Introduction
important question of the reality of a categorical relation. In the sixth Section in the categories is being in the n1ost irnportant vvay (Kup{wc;). 62 Excluded
of Disputation 54, he will return to the issue and deal at more length with from metaphysical consideration were incidental being and being as true. 63
relations of reason. Since potentiality and actuality are found throughout the categories and since
3. There are some connected issues here. The first of these is the common actuality is prior to potentiality, the concern of metaphysics was thus focused
Aristotelian division of being into real being and being of reason. I1nmediately . l be1ng.
on actua I categonca . 64
following is Aristotle's doctrine of the categories and the basic question about (b) This immediately raises a question, which, at least from the time of
their nature which Aristotle left for his disciples. This question will embrace Simplicius (fl. ca. 529 AD), Aristotle's interpreters asked about the nat.ure of
the role of the knower and namer, as well as of knowledge, predication, and
his categories. As raised by Simplicius the issue was whether the categones are
denomination in the constitution of the categories, and it wil1 center on rela- meant to be divisions of simple terms (anAai ¢wvcxt), of simple concepts
.
rion and the last six categories of action, .
passion, . " pace,
rune, I " d'tSpos1non,
..
(air/..& votjµa'tcx), or of things themselves (np&yftCX'tCX, ancx). 65 This ques-
and possession (habitus). tion, which was known to the Latins from Boethius (ca. 480-524) on, 66 was
(a) Background here is furnished by the Aristotelian divisions of being in
Metaphysics V (A), Chapter 7, and in Metaphysics VI CE), Chapter 2. In the 62 Ibid. 4. !027b3 l.
first of these places, Aristotle has divided being into "incidental being" or "be- 63See esp. Metaphysics 6.4. I 027b34-1028a3; ibid. 11.8. I 065a22-24.
ing by accident" (1:0 av KCX't& auµPEP1'JKO,) and "being per se" (1:0 av Ka8' 64 For this, cf. Theo I<obusch, Sein undSprache: Historische Grundlegungeiner Ontologie
CXU't0). 57 He has gone on to subdivide being per se according to the various der Spmche (Leiden/New York: E.J. Brill, 1987), p. 25.
categories of being ([Ka't&] 1:& GXtlflCX'tCX 'tij' KCX'tl']yopia,) 58 and centrally 65 Cf In Aristote!is Categorias, ed. Karol us Kalbfleisch, in Cornnzentaria in Aristotelem
to distinguish such from "b e1ng . " we;
as true (LO' ov ' aAT] ' ) ."59 Th en h e h as
' ' 8 ec; Graeca, VIII (Berlin, 1907), p. 9, 8; and Simplicius, Commentaire s11r !es Categories
60 d' Aristote. 7hzduction de Guillaurne de Moerbeke, prologus, ed. A. Pattin, Corpus
distinguished being in potency from being in act. In Metaphysics VI, Chap-
Latinunz Cornmentarionun in Aristotelem Graeconun VII, Paris/Louvain: Pub!.
ter 2, he has spoken of four members under being "as said in an unqualified
Universitaires/Nauwelaerts 1971, 12-18; for a wider study, ef Philippe Hoffmann,
way" (1:0 ov 1:0 aTIAW' AqopEVOV). These are: (!)incidental being (1:0 av
"Les Analyses de I' enoncC catCgories ct parties du discours selon les comtnentatcurs
Ka't& auµPEP1'JKO,); (2) being as true (1:0 av c;i, aA1']8e,); (3) being in the nCoplatoniciens," in Theories de la phrase et de la proposition de Pia ton aAverroes, Cd.
categories, and (4) being as potential and actual. 61 Of these members, being P. BUttgen et al. (Paris: Editions Rue d'Ulm, 1999), pp. 209-48. While Simplicius
is rnost associated \Vith this problern, its roots go farther back in Greek thought.
On this) cf Alain de Libera, La quere!le des universllttx de P!aton ti. la fin du Moyen
Age (Paris: F.ditions du Seuil, 1996), p. 48, who traces it at least to Clement of
55 Or "when" (q11a11do).
Alexandria (ca. 150-215), Stromata, VIII, 8, 23, and who has cited on this]. Pepin,
560r "where" (11b1).
"C!Crncnt d'Alexandrie) !cs Categories d'Aristote et le Fragrnent 60 d'I-leraclite," in
57 Metaphysics 5.7.1017a7-8. P. Aubcnque (Cd.), C.,oncepts et Cattgories dans la penste antique (Paris: Vrin, 1980),
58Ibid., 1017a23. In the following sentence Aristotle has listed substance and seven
pp. 271-84, esp. 271-9. De Libera himself is at pains to link this problem with
categories of accident. His on1ission of the last two categories of disposition and that of "the universals" in the Middle Ages. Also here, on the role of Siinplicius
possession has been noted by Suarez, who has cited Averroes {Cf In lib. Metaphys. and some of his predecessors, especially Plotinus, cf. Frans A.J. De Haas, "Context
V, t. 14 [ed. Venetiis, 1574] fol. I I 7ra) to the effect "that these two categories are of and Strategy of Plotinus' 'freatise on the Genera of Being (Enn. VI 1-3 [42-441",
little importance and [worthy] of alrr1ost no consideration, and therefore" [Suarez in Aristote!e e i suoi esegeti neoplatonici: Logica e ontoiogia ne!!e interpretazioni greche
continues] '\ve discuss rhen1 (onlyl most briefly in Disputations 52 and 53 of this e arabe, Atti del Convegno Internazionale Ro1na, 19-20 Otrobre 2001, a cura di
work." DM, Index locupletissimus, V, c. 7, q. 4, vol. 25, p. xxi; cf. Francisco Suarez, Vincenza Celluprica c Cristina D'Ancona, con la collaborazione di Riccardo Chi-
A Commentary 011 Aristot!es Metaphysics .. ., p. 88. Also see, DM 48, [pro!.], n. I, aradonna (Napoli: Istituto peril Lessico lntellcrtualc Europco c Storia ddlc Idec,
vol. 26, p. 867. 2004), pp. 37-53.
59lbid., 1017a31-35. 66" ct: A.M.S. Boethius, In CategoriasAristotelis libri q11at11or !, PL 64, I 59C-161A,
60"en 1:0 dvat Gl]µCXtVEt KCXt 1:0 av 1:0 µEV ouvaµEt, 1:0 o' eV'tEAEXEt(): as cited by Dominik Perler, "Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality: A
... "ibid., 1017a35-bl. 'fcxt Edition with Introductory Re1narks," Archives d'f!istoire doctrinale et littiraire
61 See Metaphysics 6.2. I 026a33-b2. d11 Moyen Age, 61 (1994), p. 253, note 9.
24 Francisco Suarez: Jvfetaphysical Disputation 47, On Rea! Relation 25
Introduction
surely in the mind of Suarez and has in1portance for his doctrine of relation, but which seen1s to transcend all categories. Is it a real being or is it n1erely
especially inasmuch as the central question of Disputation 47 concerns the ·id dependent'· Or is it both'· And if so, how are these two themselves con-
1n11 - . . .
reality of relation and in Disputation 54, Section 6, the basic premiss 1s the ected or related? Specifically, is there one-, even un1vocal, notion of relation
rr1ind-dependcnt character of sotne relations. This goes right along \Vtth the nhat covers the span between real and n1erely rational relations, or is there
Doctor exbnius' espousal of \vhat looks like a nominalistic position on \Vhat a :10 thing more than a community of name between them? As for the six ulti-
relation adds to its foundation and also a passage in which he has denied the extra
niate categories, following St. l~ho1nas Aquinas, 69 Suarez denies that the last
mental reality of all the categories, save substance, quantity, and quality. 67
four can found relations, 70 and in opposition to Duns Scotus 71 and others, 72
(c) While Simplicius' question concerns all the categories, it has particular
fuses to reduce them to relation,7 3 except perhaps to a relation as a manner
application to the category of relation68 and then to the last six categories _of
~ef speaking (that is, a relation secundum diet)." But neverrheless, relation is
action, passion) tirr1e, place, disposition, and possession. Are these ca~egones
deeply embedded in them. 75 Thus "passion" may be identified with change or
real beings, independent of human knowers and namers or are they JUSt the
opposite, arising in the wake of human considerations and their linguistic ex-
pressions? Again, the question centers on relation, which is listed as a category 69 Jn d11odecim Iibros Metaphysicorum Aristote!is expositio, V, I. 17, ed. M. R. Cathala ct
R. Spiazzi (Taurini: Marietti, 1950), p. 266, n. 1005. For treatment of St. Tho1nas'
position on the last six categories, cf.. A. K:e1n~cl, La doctr~ne ~e la 1:efati~n chez~aint
67 Ct: "Next l will explain that, as is clear fro1n tnetaphysics, no category offers of
Thorn as, Expose historique et systt1nattque, (,hapure X.,'{ (Pans: L1branc Philosoph1quc
itself its own entity, distinct from all the rest, except substance, quantity, and quality.
J. Vrin, 1952), pp. 426-52.
But all the other [categories) are modes of these." (Deinde ita declaro, quia, ut ex
70Cf: DM 47, Section 11, nn. 4 and 11, below.
Metrtphysica constat, nullunz praedican1entu1n affirt per se entitrttetn sua1n, disti:1ctr.tn1 71 For Scotus' doctrine of extrinsically advenient relations here, sec Quaestiones Quodli-
1tb otnnibus reliquis, nisi substantia, quantitas, aut qualitas; reliqua autern ornn1a sunt hetales, XI, art. 4, n. 34, in Obras def Doctor Sutiljuan Duns Escoto, cdicion bilinglie,
modi istomm; ... ) Suarez, De Eucharistia, Disp. 47, s. 1, n. 4, vol. 22, p. 45. With this Cuestioncs cuodliberalcs, introducci6n, resUn1cnes y versi6n de Felix Alluntis,
we rnay con1pare and contrast, William of Ockhan1's view that only the caregor~cs O.F.M. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Amores Cristianos, 1968), pp. 416-417; and John
of substance and quality have distinct real things corresponding to rhen1; see, for Duns Scotus, God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions, translated with and
cxatnplc, his interpretation of Aristotle: "He wished also to say that every thing is Introduction, Notes) and Glossary by Felix Alluntis, O.ENL and Allan B. Wolter,
either a substance or a quality." ( Voluit etiarn ponere quod 01nnis res vel est substantia O.F.lvi. (Washington, D.C:. The Catholic University of Arnerica Press-reprint
vel qualitas.) Guillclmi de Ockham, Summa Logicae, P. I, c. 45, ed. P. Boehner, G. of Princeton University edition of 1975), p. 266. Also, cf Mark G. l1enninger,
Gal, et S. Brown (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974), p. 144, II. 156-7; also: "However, Relations, Medieval Theories 1250-1325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 105.
there arc certain things in the category of quality which do not signify things distinct 72Sce, for example, Walter Chatton and Pseudo~Richard of Ca1npsall, as reported by
fro1n substance, in such way that such a thing is not a substance, fOr examples: Armand Maurer, The Phiwsophy ofWilliam ofOckham in the Light ofits Principles
'whiteness' and 'blackness,' 'color,' 'knowledge,' 'light,' and things of this kind." (10ronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1999), p. 54, note l 23. For
(Sunt aute1n quaedan1 in genere qualitatis quae irnportant res distinctas a substantia, exact references to Walter and Ps-llichard on each of these categories, cf. the notes
ita quod quod i!la res non est substantia, sicut sunt 'albedo' et 'nigredo: 'color: 'scientia' given by the editors ofOckha1n's Sumrna Logicae (St. Bonaventure, 1974), cc. 57-
'!ux,' et huiusmodi.) ibid., c. 55, p. 180, II. 14-16. On Ockham's doctrine here, see 62, pp. 183-193. For St. Albert the Great, Giles of Rome, and other Scholastics
Gyula K1i1na, "Ockhan1's Se1nantics and the Ontology of the Categories," in The on the relative character of the last six categories, cf. A. Krempel, La doctrine de la
Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge: Cambridge relation ... , pp. 432-6.
University Press, 1999), pp. 118-42. 73Cf. DM 50, 12, n. 2, vol. 26, p. 966; DM51, 1, n. 6, p. 974, and DM52, 1, n. 3,
68 In the wake of Plotinus (205-27), who contrasts the Stoic reduction of relation to p. 1007.
something n1erely rational to his O\Vll realistic understanding (cf. Enneads VI, 1, 6- 74 Cf. DM 39, l, n. 4, vol. 26, p. 506; ibid., n. 18, p. 510. On relation secundum dici,
9), Si1nplicius tells us that sorne doubt whether relation is a reality or only a spoken cf. Div[ 47, Section 3, below.
term (Jn Aristotelis Categorias, c. 7, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, p. 169, 11. 1-2). Simplicius 75Sce DM 47, Prologue, and Section 1, n. 6, belo,v. On this, cf St. "fho1nas: "'When'
hiinself defends the reality of relation not less than that of the other categories. consists in son1e kind of relation to tin1e. Indeed, 'where' [is related] to place. 'Posi-
Indeed, \vithout real relations substance and the other categories would not be tion' in1plies an order of parts and 'habit' [implies] a relation of one having to \vhat
categories or have any cornrnuniry with respect to one another (ibid.,11. 10-12). is had." (Quando consistit in aliquali relatiorze ad temp its. Ubi vero, ad locunz. Positio
26 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation 27
Introduction
motion 76 and just as evidently exhibit the relational character we have noted in at Book Five, Chapter 11 ;76 his discussion-in the context of his treatment
that. Any counterpart "action" would appear to be nothing more than passion of distinction--of relation and its terminus; 79 his discussion of relation in
as considered to be related to an agent from which it stems. "Time" evidently the context of truth; 60 various points he makes about relation in treating
involves a compound relation inasmuch as it is nothing more than the num- transcendental goodness; 81 his contrast of finite created relations and infinite
bering of motion according to before and after. "Place" likewise as connoting divine relations as regards the essences in which they are found; 82 the divine
the first surface of the containing body is again a kind of relational µE't'a~u relations of paternity and filiation as dissimilar; 83 or within a context of his
n-"something between" the container and the contained. "Disposition" also discussion of quantity, a further discussion of the characters of "measure" and
seems relational in its core as nothing else but an order of parts among them- "measured ,"64 etc.
selves. And, finally, "Possession" or "Habitus" seems to be something relative 3. As may be gathered from some of the examples just mentioned, there
between a human haver and what he has or possesses. are Christian dimensions of relation both in Suarez's sources and in his own
At very least, without pinning the matter down at all points, it is safe to teaching. These are linked particularly with the doctrines of the Trinity and
say that relation is central to any overall understanding of Aristotle's doctrine the Incarnation. On both these themes, besides what he has said in the Dis-
of the categories and even more to any understanding of his wider doctrine putationes, 65 he has written special works, which contain much on the subject
beyond.
of relation.
Thus, he has left us "Twelve Books on the Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity,"
D. Suarez on Relation filling almost 300 pages in the first volume of his Opera omnia. 86 Of special
1. As I have mentioned, there are two principal places in the Disputationes interest here is the character of relation inasmuch as it is constitutive of the
metaphysicae in which Suarez treats relation. These are the present Disputation persons of the Trinity. 87 Or again, the doctrine that each divine person is a
47 and then Disputation 54, Section 6. The obvious dividing line between subsisting relation; 66 that there are only four real relations in God; 69 equality,
them is that between real being in the categories and "being as true" which by not inequality, but rather diversity among divine relations; 90 as well as various
Suarez's time has come to be identified with being of reason. 77 But even as we other matters.
say this, it is important once again to note that real relation extends beyond
the category of relation and also that in the Second Section, Paragraph 22,
of Disputation 47 Suarez will come exceedingly close to a reduction of real 78See Index ... , V, c. 11, q. l, vol. 25, p. x.xii; Francisco Suarez, A Commentary ... , pp.
relation to a simple act of the knower, that is, a connotation. 89-90.
2. There are other places in the Disputationes where in various ways Suarez 79DM7, 2, n. 26, vol. 25, p. 270.
has touched upon relation. While I have not explored them all in the present 80DM 8, 2, nn. 3-9, vol. 25, pp. 278-9.
work, they do frequently shine added light on this work. For examples, let 81 For example, cf. DM IO, 1, nn. 3-5, vol. 25, p. 329; ibid., 3, nn. 11-15, pp. 350-
51.
me mention his treatment of "prior and posterior" in the Index locupletissimus
82DM28, 2, nn. 5,6, 8-13, vol. 26, pp. 9-12.
83DM29, 3, nn. 16-17, vol. 26, p. 53.
84DM 40, 3, nn. 9-10, vol. 26, pp. 540-41.
autem ordinem partium importat. Habitus autem relationem habentis ad habitum.) 85As regards relation and the Trinity, cf. DM 7, 2, n. 27, vol. 25, p. 270; DM IO,
In XII libros Metaph., V, l. 17, n. 1005. 3, nn. 16-18, pp. 351-2; DM28, 2, nn. 5,6, 8-13, vol. 26, pp. 9-12; DM29, 3,
76Cf. Aristotle's dictum that motion is in the mobile; Physics 3.3.202al3-14; also, nn. 16-17, vol. 26, p. 53; and DM 47, 4, n. 21, below. As regards relation and the
ibid., 3.l.20lal0-bl5. Incarnation, see, e.g.: DM 47, 4, n. 9, below.
77For some of the history of this identification, cf. Theo Kobusch, "Ens inquantum 86Cf. Tractatus de sanctissimo Trinitatis mysterio, in duodecim libros divisus, in Opera
ens und ens rationis: ein aristotelisches Problem in der Philosophie des Duns omnia, vol. l, pp. 531-822.
Scotus und Wilhelm von Ockham," in Aristotle in Britain during the Middle Ages: 87Cf. ibid. VII, c. 7, nn. 9-10, vol. l, pp. 706-707.
Proceedings ofthe International Conference at Cambridge, 8-11 April 1994 organized 88Ibid., V, c. 2, n. 3, p. 655.
by the Societe internationale pour l'etude de la philosophie medieva!e, edited by John 89Ibid., V, c. 2, n. 2, p. 654.
Marenbon (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996), pp. 157-175, esp. 158-9. 90Ibid., III, c. IO, nn. 10-11, p. 610.
28 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Introduction 29
The work on the Incarnation, in the form of Commentaries and Disputa-
3. The Aristotelian division of relative beings, based on a threefold founda-
tions on the Third Part of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas,
tion (Sections 10-15).
takes up three full volumes (17, 18, and 19) of the Vives edition of the Opera.
4. The question of whether one relation can be the terminus of another
Historically, it was the first of Suarez's published works, the first tome of which
(Section 16).
appeared at Alcala in 1590. 91 After two years, he completed the work with a
5. The structure of the category of relation (Section 17).
second tome, this time titled, "On the Mysteries of Christ's Life." 92 Central
6. The properties of relation (Section 18).
items here concern the sonship of Christ in relation to the Virgin Mary and
And then descending to the different Sections in turn:
to God the Father as well as the maternity of Mary and the paternity of God
with respect to Christ. 93 Of particular interest in this work, and perhaps in
Section I
the Treatise on the Trinity as well, is Suarez's view that a categorical relation is
Beginning with the issue of the real existence of relation, Suarez enumer-
a mode or a formality, which is added to its foundation. 94 As we shall see, the
ates up to five reasons for doubting such existence (paragraphs 1-7). He then
doctrine given below in Section 2 of Disputation 47 is in direct contradiction
presents three different opinions: (1) there are no true real relations (paragraph
to this view.
8); (2) relations exist, but they do not constitute a special category of being
(paragraph 9); and (3) in created things there are real relations, which make
E. Summaries of the Sections of Disputation 47. up a proper and special category (paragraph 1O). This last is the most accepted
This portion of my Introduction owes much to the summary given by Sergio
opinion and it is demonstrated by the teachings of the Catholic Faith and by
Rabade Romeo and his associates in their edition with Spanish translation of
rational arguments (paragraphs 11-15).
the Disputationes metaphysicae. 95 As they correctly lay it out, the Forty-Seventh
Disputation can be articulated as follows:
Section II
1. Relation in general-its existence, its essence, and its division (Sections
This is the key Section, in which the reality of a relation is directly addressed.
1-4).
It is first necessary to clarify how a real categorical relation is distinguished
2. Categorical Relation-its essential definition, its subject, foundation, and
from substance and all absolute accidents in order to explain the reality and
terminus (Sections 5-9).
the nature of created relations (paragraph 1). In this regard, Suarez presents
and rejects four different opinions (paragraphs 2-10). He then lingers with
another opinion-held by many, especially Nominalists-which defends a
91 C£ Commentariorum ac disputationum in tertiam partem divi Thomae. Tomus primus, distinction of reason with a basis in reality between relation and its absolute
Compluti: P. Madrigal, 1590. In this volume, Suarez commented on the first 26 foundation (paragraphs 11-17). Next, without approving the distinction between
questions of the Third part of the Summa of St. Thomas. the "being in" and the "being toward" of a relation, he admits the indicated
92 This may be found in volume 19 of the Vives edition. It concerns Questions 27 to Nominalist opinion (paragraph 22). Finally, he answers the arguments of the
59 of the Third Part of the Summa. other opinions (paragraph 23) and the arguments remaining from Section 1
93 C£ e.g. Commentarii et disputationes P. Francisci Suarez e Societate }esu, in Tertiam (paragraphs 24-25).
Partem D. Thomae, a Quaestione vigesima septima ad quinqugesimam nonam, Q. 35,
a. 5, Disputatio XII ("On the Relations which from the Nativity of Christ follow
between Him and His Mother"-De Relationibus quae ex Christi nativitate inter eum
Section III
et matrem consequuntur.), vol. 19, pp. 200-208. In the course of this Disputation, The Third Section treats the divisions of relation (paragraph 1). The first
Suarez has treated the maternity of Mary and the dual sonship of Christ. division is into real relation and relation of reason. It is only real relation which
94Cf. ibid., in Qu. 2, art. 8, p. 328; ibid., Disp. 8, s. 3, n. 21, p. 354; and Disp. 11, constitutes the category "toward something" (paragraphs 2-5). The second
s. 2, n. 16, p. 440. Also, see Tractatus de Trinitate, VII, c. 4, n. 7, vol. 1, p. 698. division is into relatio n "according to being said" and relation "according to
95 C£ Francisco Suarez, Disputaciones metaflsicas, edicion y traduccion de Sergio being" (paragraphs 6-9). T be third division is into transcendental relation and
Rabade Romeo, Salvador Caballero Sanchez y Antonio Puigcerver Zanon, 7 vols. categorical relation (paragraphs 10-13).
(Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1960-1966), vol. 6, pp. 631-4.
30 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
31
Introduction
Section IV Section IX
Suarez tells us that it is very difficult to explain the difference between
For a real relation it is necessary that the foundation and the terminus, for-
categorical and transcendental relations (paragraph 1). It is possible to think
mally considered, be distinguished with a real distinction, although this does
of some differences that should be rejected (paragraphs 2-8). Others can be
not have to be equal in all cases (paragraphs 1-6).
admitted (paragraphs 9-15). From this the inference is that the category "to-
ward something" includes only relations that are categorical in a proper sense
Section X
(paragraph 16). The remaining paragraphs (17-21) of this Section contain the
Suarez proposes to examine the division which Aristotle has made of rela-
reply to a difficulty raised in Section 1.
tion looking at a threefold foundation (paragraph 1). Having first explained
the Aristotelian doctrine (paragraphs 2-4), he raises the two main questions
Section V
which arise with respect to that doctrine: ( 1) whether each one of the members
In this Section the Doctor eximius explains the essence and the proper defi-
of the stated division is designated in a fitting manner, and (2) whether the
nition of a categorical relation (paragraphs 1-4), and also explains as well as
division includes the whole range of categorical relations. With regard to the
resolves the difficulties which the mentioned division encounters (paragraphs
first, there are various arguments which present difficulty (paragraphs 5-10),
5-13).
and the same is true with regard to the second (paragraph 11). Nevertheless,
the two questions are answered in the sense of approving the division which
Section VI Aristotle has made (paragraphs 12-16).
This short Section is limited to proving that a categorical relation requires
a subject, a foundation, and a terminus (paragraphs 1-6). Section XI
It is necessary to answer each one of the difficulties of the preceding Section
Section VII (paragraph 1). Beginning with the first class of relations, which is founded on
As was said in the just preceding Section, a categorical relation needs a unity (paragraphs 2-3), it is affirmed that a relation of unity can be founded
foundation (paragraph 1), which in some way is distinguished from the sub- on the realities of all the categories (paragraph 4) and there is explained the
ject of a relation (paragraphs 2-3). This foundation can be either an accident sense in which one relation can be the foundation of another (paragraphs
or the substance itself (paragraphs 4-9). Although the question is discussed, 5-13). In passing, he explains to which class relations of identity, similarity,
Suarez prefers not to separate a foundation from a reason for being founded and equality belong (paragraphs 14-15). The Section ends by affirming that
(paragraphs 10-14). generic unity can found a real relation (paragraphs 16-19) and by indicating
the characteristics of relations of the first class (paragraphs 20-21).
Section VIII
For a categorical relation there is also required a real terminus (paragraph Section XII
1). But must this terminus exist in actuality? There are reasons to doubt that In order to treat the second class of relations (paragraph 1), the problem is
(paragraph 2), and one author has thought that a terminus that is real and re- raised of whether all the relations of this class are real (paragraph 2). Suarez
ally existing is not necessary (paragraph 3). Suarez maintains the contrary, and replies by setting up some distinctions (paragraphs 3-4). He concerns himself
in so doing he follows the common opinion of philosophers and theologians then with the proximate foundation of paternity (paragraphs 5-6), and of
(paragraphs 4-7). He answers the arguments of Gregory ofRimini (paragraph the relation of agent (paragraphs 7-8), whether it is in act (paragraph 9) or in
8), and he rejects the opinion that the terminus belongs to the essence of a potency (paragraphs 10-14).
relation (paragraphs 9-12). Finally, he affirms that not even by the absolute
power of God can a relation remain without a terminus (paragraphs 13-14). Section XIII
Regarding the third class ofrelatioos, founded upon the character of measure
(paragraph 1), Suarez presents and resolves a difficulty about the authentic
thought of Adstode (paragraph 2-9).
32 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation 33
Introduction
Section XIV its correlative (paragraphs 7-8), that the relative in general has a terminus in
Is the Aristotelian division sufficient and adequate? (paragraph 1). To answer general which corresponds _to it (paragraph 8), and that the common character
this question, Suarez indicates how all real relations are reduced to the three f terminus does not constitute a proper category (paragraph 10). Afterwards,
kinds, which make up the stated division (paragraphs 2-8). ~e raises the question of the contraction of the supreme genus of relatives into
its inferiors (paragraphs 11-14), the question of the origin of th~ essential
Section XV and specific difference of relations (paragraph 15), and the question of the
After indicating the double sense in which non-mutual relations can be taken simultaneity of various relations-which differ only numerically-in the same
(paragraph 1), Suarez makes a division between reciprocal and non-reciprocal subject (paragraphs 16-23). He ends the Section by rejecting an opinion about
relations (paragraph 2) and raises a difficulty in their regard (paragraphs 3-7). the relation that a son has with respect to a father and a mother (paragraphs
To resolve this difficulty, he affirms that there are some non-mutual relations, 24-28).
which are properly found in the third Aristotelian class of relations (paragraph Section XVIII
8). Then he replies to opposing arguments (paragraphs 9-12) and resolves dif- This is the shortest Section. It designates as properties of all relatives: not
ficulties proposed at the beginning (paragraphs 13-15). Next, he presents the having a contrary; being susceptible of more or less; receiving the designation
opinion of the Nominalists about relations in God from time (paragraph 16) of "convertibles"; being simultaneous in nature; and also being simultaneous
and, against them, denies that such relations are real (paragraphs 17-29). in knowledge and definition (paragraphs 1-6).

Section XV7
II. Translator's Notes
This Section concerns the question of whether the formal terminus of one
The hardest task for me translating the Forty-Seventh Disputation came from
relation is another relation or has an absolute character (paragraph 1). Having
the terminology which Suarez employed to designate relation. Thus, he used
explained the title of the Section (paragraph 2), Suarez presents and explains
a roughly synonymous variety of names and expressions which I had to bear
different opinions (paragraphs 3-5). He crystallizes his thought in the follow-
in mind. 96 These, and the translations I normally gave them, included: "Ad
ing assertions: (1) in non mutual relatives, the reason why one extreme is the . ") ; "Rela tto
aliquid' ("Toward someth mg . " (" L'..e
0 . ") ; "Respectus" ("Respect") ;
lanon
terminus of the relation of the other is not a relation that is opposite to that of
"Habitudo" ("Disposition" or"Relation"); "Habitudoad' ("Disposition toward");
the other, but the very entity itself or a property of that terminus (paragraphs
"Ordo" ("Order"); "Ordinare" ("to order"); "Comparatio" ("Comparison" or
6-13); (2) In mutual relations, the raison d'etre of a terminus is also some
"relation"); "Referre" ("to refer" or "to relate"); and "Se habere ad' ("to have
absolute character that constitutes the formal foundation of the opposite rela-
oneself toward," "to have themselves toward," or "to be related"). 97 For the
tion (paragraphs 14-22). With this an answer is given to the bases of the other
opinions, explaining the sense in which relatives are simultaneous in nature,
in knowledge, and in definition (paragraphs 23-34), and finally treating of the 96Note that Krempel, in the chapter (6) he has devoted to the Thomistic terminol-
ogy of relation, has remarked that "in order to convey the idea of relation, Saint
termini of the divine relations (paragraphs 35-38), and of relative opposition
Thomas has made use of a score of terms" (Pour traduire l'idee de relation, saint
(paragraphs 39-40).
Thomas dispose d'une vingtaine de termes.); cf. La doctrine de la relation ... , p. 127.
97Prior to Suarez, the only attempt to distinguish among "relatio," "respectus," and
Section XVII "habitudo" which I have found was that given by the Scotist, Anthony Trombetta,
It is proposed to treat the structuring of the category, "toward something" 0.F.M. (1436-1517), against the background of the Scotistic distinction of intrin-
(paragraph 1). The first difficulty is in knowing how all relatives can be reduced sically and extrinsically advenient relations. Trombetta's almost unintelligible text
to one single genus (paragraph 2). There is accepted the possibility ofone single I have transcribed and translated as follows: "... properly and correctly speaking,
supreme genus which includes all relatives (paragraph 3) and there is adduced according to the way of the Subtle Doctor [i.e. Duns Scotus] a respect which is
the solution which some offer to the motive for doubting (paragraphs 4-5). essentially in the category of relation is called a relation. But respects which are
This solution is probable even though it supposes a false basis (paragraph 6). outside the category of relation are called dispositions and respects and not properly
Suarez affirms that the relative in general is not in an order to another as to relations. For this it should be noted that these have themselves in order: relative,
relation, respect, and disposition, among which the character [or formality] of
34 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Introduction 35
most part, when I thought it would help the reader, I enclosed the Latin word could, I looked to the context for help. But that still left me at times rather
or phrase (usually in nominative case) within parentheses. queasy about the results.
Yet other problems came from various forms of "real," "really," or "in the Add to these: "per se," which in different places I translated: "through itself,"
nature of things." Thus, Suarez used "realis, reale," "realiter," "ex natura rei," "essentially," "necessarily," or "directly." 98 And then, there was every Latin
"in rerum natura," "in re," "in re ipsa," "ex re ipsa,", "in ente reali," "a parte rei," translator's nightmare: "ratio"-which depending on contexts and nuances I
etc., interchangeably or in ways that were impossible to distinguish. At the same rendered as: "reason," "reasoning," "argument," "concept," "nature," "character,"
time, I was very much aware of levels of reality-existential, essential, actual, "feature," "aspect," "facet," etc. etc.
possible, or intentional-which might need to be distinguished. Wherever I A second hard task was furnished by Suarez's references, especially his cross-
references to other places in Disputation 47 or in the Disputatationes metaphy-
relative is most basic. Hence every relative is a relation. Or it includes a relation. sicae as a whole. In this last connection, particularly difficult was his practice of
For a relative [thing] beyond the relation which it includes also includes something
referring to places "above" and "below." While usually it was possible to locate
absolute, which is said to be referred through that relation. But a relation does not
these places, at times I was not able with certainty to identify the passage to
include something absolute. Likewise, every relation is a respect, and not every
which Suarez was referring. I did the best I could, but on occasion I simply
respect is a relation, because a relation is an intrinsically advenient respect which
could not fix on the passage which he had in mind.
arises from the nature of a foundation when a terminus has been posited. However,
a respect is something common to an intrinsically advenient respect and also to one The only other thing which I would now remark is that throughout the
which is extrinsically advenient. Likewise, every respect is a disposition, but not work I did take the liberty of breaking Suarez's often interminable paragraphs
every disposition is a respect. For between a subject and a proper attribute there is down into more manageable and, I hope, more intelligible ones.
a disposition and yet there is not a respect. Likewise, circumscribing all relations, For all of this, as well as for the often hesitant and tenuous character of my
there is some disposition of the Divine Essence to its Attributes (such as [a disposi- translation, I ask the reader's indulgence.
tion] of a foundation to what is founded), and yet this is not a respect, since it is
repugnant to the [divine] Essence as Essence chat it be referred to something. From
this it follows that speaking properly about relation only an intrinsically advenient
respect is a relation according to the way of the Doctor." (... proprie relationes. Pro quo
est notandum quod ista se habent per ordinem relativum: relatio, respectus et habitudo,
inter quas rationes ratio relativi est infima. Unde omne relativum est relatio vel includit
relationem. Relativum enim ultra relationem qua(m) includit, etiam includit aliquod
absolutum, quod denominatur referri per ipsam relationem; sed relatio non includit
aliquod absolutum. Similiter omnis relatio est respectus, et non omnis respectus est relatio,
quia relatio est respectus intrinsecus adveniens, qui oritur ex natura fundamenti, posito
termino. Respectus autem est quiddam commune ad respectum intrinsecus advenientem
et etiam extrinsecus advenientem. Similiter omnis respectus est habitudo, non omnis
habitudo est respectus; quia inter subiectum et propriam passionem est habitudo; et ta-
men non est respectus. Similiter, circunscriptis omnibus relationibus, essentiae divinae
ad attributa est aliqua habitudo (qua/is est fundamenti ad fundatum), et tamen non
est aliquis respectus, quia repugnat essentiae ut essentia est ad aliquid referri. Ex quo
sequitur quod loquendo proprie de relatione, solum respectus intrinsecus adveniens est
relatio secundum viam Doctoris.) MagistriAntonii Trombete in tractatum formalitatum
Scoti sententia, Art. I, Venetiis, 1505, fol. 3ra. On Scotus' doctrine of intrinsically
and extrinsically advenient relations, which Suarez rejects, see OM 47, Section
16, paragraph 17, below. For Krempel tracing distinctions in the Thomistic use 98In this connection, let me call the reader's attention to OM 47, Section 2, n. 9,
of "respectus," "habitudo," "proportio," "ordo," and similar terms, cf. La doctrine de below, where I have noted Suarez's use of "primo," "per se," and "essentialiter" in
relation .. ., pp. 101-114. one series.
Disputation 47
English Translation
 In General about Real Relation
After the two preceding categories (genera) 1 ofquantity and quality, Aristotle,
in Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter 15, 2 treats of "toward something" (ad aliquid)
not because it is more perfect in entity than all of the six last categories-for
Averroes (Commentator), in [his commentary] on the Metaphysics, Book 12,
comment 19, 3 says that among all the categories relation has the least entity, 4
the truth of which will be evident from what will be said. Therefore, Aristotle
does not seem to have observed an order of perfection, but rather an order of
doctrine, since the doctrine that pertains to this category is more universal and
also because it is in a certain way necessary for knowing the other categories
inasmuch as they seem in large part to consist of a relation. 5 Add also that
very many relations follow closely upon quantity and quality. Therefore, with

For Suarez noting the equivalence at times of "genera" and "categories," cf. DM 39,
2, n. 29, vol. 26, p. 518'.
2 C£ Metaphysics 5.15.1020b26-1021bl 1.
3 Cf. Averrois Commentaria et Introductiones in omnes Li bros Aristotelis cum eorum ver-
sione Latina (Venetiis: Apud Junctas, 1562), vol. 8, fol. 306ra. It may be noted that
Averroes here says that relation is of such minimal being that some have regarded
it as a matter of second intention; c£ "quidam reputaverunt ipsam esse ex secundis
intellectis" ibid. This, of course, would be to cross the line which Aristotle has in
effect drawn between being in the categories and being as true.
4 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 14.1.1088a 23-4.
5 An "order of doctrine" (ordo doctrinae) is something that Suarez often mentions
throughout his works but to my knowledge he has not described it at length. The
text here is instructive for its understanding. In his "Most Ample Index to the
Metaphysics of Aristotle" (Index Locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis), which
is joined to the Disputationes metaphysicae, he seems to equate the order of doctrine
with "proceeding from things more known to those which are less known" and says
"that method is everywhere repeated by Aristotle, and to explain it is the proper task
of a logican"; c£ Index, VII, c. 4, vol. 25, p. xxxi. There he has also distinguished
between an order of doctrine for things in themselves, in which metaphysics will
be first, and an order of doctrine for us, in which the teaching of metaphysics will
come last. For the Aristotelian base of the order of doctrine as it is understood here
in Disputation 47, cf. Posterior Analytics l .2. 72al. For much the same understanding
as Suarez has here, see John of St. Thomas, Natura/is philosophiae, I. pars, qu. 1, art.
3, in Ioannis a Sancto Thomae, O.P., Cursus philosophicus thomisticus, nova editio a
P. Beato Reiser, O.S.B. (Taurini: Ex Officina Domus Editorialis Marietti, 1933),
tom. II, 20-22, who also regards it as an order in which we move from things more
universal and confused (which are more known to us) to the more particular and
distinct.
 40 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation 41
Section 1
regard to relation we shall in _general see ~rst wl~ether i exists, wl~a t it is/ and wward" (esse ad}-as Aristotle says that relatives are those whose whole being
how many and what propernes or causes JC has, and rhen, more in pai:t1cular,
is to be toward something else. 9
we shall discuss the principal kinds of telations as well as their foundations
2. Second.-Secondly, because a particular relative designation that comes
and termini.
Ip. 7821 anew to something, does not change that thing nor in reality make it be other
than before, for, as Aristotle says in Book 5 of the Physics, Text 10, a relation
comes without the change of a thing. 10 Therefore, a relation puts nothing in
Section I
such a thing. The consequence is evident: because it is impossible to understand
Whether Relation Is a True Category {genus) ofReal Being,
that something real is newly added to some subject and that this [subject] not
Distinct from the Rest [of the Categories}. be really different than it was before. For, if something is added to it, it has
Uirious Reasons for which Almost Every Problem something that it did not have before, but this very thing is to be different than
Regarding This Category Is Proposed. before. Moreover, what some people reply, [namely] that [this thing] does not
1. First.-There can be a first reason for doubting inasmuch as relation gain "something" but rather "toward something," seems indeed to be a game
precisely as such (relatio ut relatio) puts nothing real in a thing that is said to of words. For I ask whether that "toward something" is something. For, if it is,
be related (re.fem); therefore, it cannot constitute a real category (genus) of then he who gains "toward something" also gains something. Therefore he is
being. The consequence is evident, because a real category is founded upon in another way and is changed. 11 But if"toward something" is not something,
a real being, which exists or posits something in the nature of things. But a then it is nothing, and this is the point intended.
relation, insofar as it is given in created things (for this is the way in which /col. bl
we are now treating it), cannot be something real in the nature of things, if it 3. Third.-Thirdly, this is further explained. For a relation, as a relation,
does not put such in the thing itself that is related. For neither does it posit is nothing apart from what is absolute. Therefore, it is simply nothing. The
anything in the terminus [of the relation], as is self-evident, even though it may consequence is evident. For when we ask whether a relation is something real,
perhaps presuppose [something], about which [we will speak] later; nor does it we are concerned with it insofar as it is distinguished or prescinded from ab-
exist (manet) in itself, since it is not a substance. Therefore, if it puts nothing solute things. Otherwise, how will it be a distinct category (genus) of being?
in the thing itself that is related, it is absolutely nothing real. The antecedent But the antecedent is proven: because if we posit, for example, two real white
is proven: first, because "toward" (ad) [precisely] as "toward" does not express things, they, by virtue of the absolute qualities that they have, are similar be-
a real characteristic (ratio), both because univocally and in an entirely proper tween themselves. Therefore, they have that relative designation 12 (denominatio
way it fits relations of reason, 8 and also because "toward" as "toward" prescinds relativa) by virtue of absolutes existing or taken together, without any other
from "being in" (esse in); therefore, as such it puts nothing real in anything. real addition. Therefore, a relation adds nothing real to absolute things.
Otherwise, in line with its own proper and ultimate character (ratio) it would Both consequents are manifest: for if a relation is something, it is only on
include "being in" (inesse), which is repugnant (quod repugnat). Therefore, a account of that relative denomination (denominatio relativa) 13 that seems to
relation puts nothing in a thing that it relates. The consequence is clear: for intervene between those absolutes. If, therefore, that denomination is taken
relation precisely as such (relatio ut relatio) entails nothing more than "being
9 For this, see Categories 7.8a31-32.
lOCf. Physics 5.2.225bl 1-13.
6 On this, cf. Aristotle, Posterior Anaf:ytics I. I. 71al1-13, who says there are two ways 11 Here Suarez's grammar is inconsistent. Literally, his passage would translate: "he
in which something must be known prior to its scientific consideration. First, we who newly has 'toward something' also newly has something; therefore, he has
must know that it is. And, second, we must know what it is. himself in another way and it has been changed."
7 See Section 6, below. 12That is, "similar".
8 This position, which Suarez himself will oppose, is that which will be later em- 13 For some indication of the ambiguity (between naming and what is named) of
braced as the basis for a unified Semiotics which will bridge between natural and Suarez's "denominatio" here, see my article: "Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic
conventional signs; for this, cf. Section 3, n. 2, note 13, below. Denomination in the Work of Francis Suarez, S.J.," Vivarium, XXII, 2 (1984), pp.
121-160.
42 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 1 43
only from absolutes, whatever else is added is imaginary (jictitium). Moreover, [foundation] and the co-existence of something else be precisely denomina~ed
the antecedent is proven: because, if two white things have been posited in in this way, without the addition of any relative thing. Therefore, a relation
reality, whether you mentally separate every other real thing added to them, (respectus) of this kind is nothing real apart from what is absolute.
or whether we posit that this 14 be separated or impeded by the absolute power 5. Fourth.-In fourth place, we can argue (and this is a second principal
of God, 15 those two things will still remain similar between themselves. Nor reason for doubting), that, even if we grant that a relation is something real, it
can the mind conceive anything else, because they necessarily retain a formal still cannot constitute a new category of being, different from other categories.
unity, 16 and to be similar is nothing else than to have qualities of the same This is proven: for an order to another is intrinsically included in every real
form (ratio). concept of created being. For, from its inception, every created being, insofar
But if someone answers that this is truly said about things that are funda- as it is such, even substance itself, entails a relation (habitudo) of essential
mentally, but not formally similar, he will certainly be begging the question. dependence with respect to uncreated being, and therefore, it is analogically
For this is what we intend, namely, that there is not any other denomination being or substance in comparison with that. 19 Likewise, eve~ accide~t en~ai~s
present except that which is called fundamental. For this is enough in order an essential relation (habitudo) to a subject, because of which [relation] lt ts
that those things be truly similar, and that other formal denomination either said to be "a being of a being" (entis ens) rather than [simply] "a being" (ens).
is nothing or, at most, it is a consideration of reason. Again, in the case of individual categories of accidents, there are found indi-
4. This last is confirmed: for in this way many comparable denominations vidual relations. For quantity, insofar as it is continuous, entails an essential
are preserved without any intrinsic addition in the thing that is denominated. relation to the termini by which it is continued, and conversely, a point and
For in this way God is called creator or lord from time; 17 and in this way a other similar termini entail an essential relation to the parts whose termini they
column is said to be right or left; and likewise a wall is said to be seen, etc. 18 are. And among qualities, a potency entails an essential relation to its object;
By the same reasoning, therefore, every similar denomination can be preserved and with regard to knowledge, and consequently, with regard to habits and
without the addition of a relation that is something real. disposition, Aristotle, in the Chapter about Quality, says that they are "toward
But if someone says that in the stated examples there is no foundation from something. " 20
tb.e side of the things denominated, we shall answer that perhaps this is not 6. However, he adds, being "toward something" at generic levels (secundum
altogether true, which we will afterwru·ds explain, and also it is not satisfactory, rationes genericas) of knowledge, but not at specific levels;for knowledge, he says,
for if something thac does not have a foundation can be denominated relatively is toward the knowable (scibile), but grammar as such is not toward something else
from positing something else even though nothing real is added to it, then (adaliud). 21 But this immediately is false. For, even though the names perhaps
much more could a thing that has /p. 783/ some foundation, by virtue of that are not so dearly imposed, nevertheless, in reality just as knowledge in general
entails a relation (habitudo) to the knowable, in the same way this knowledge
14 That is, "every other real thing." [is related] to this object. Moreover, this hardly matters for the present dif-
150n Suarez on the absolute versus the ordinary power of God, c£ DM 30, s. 17, ficulty, since the genus and the species belong to the same category. Therefore,
nn. 32-36 (vol. 26, 216-218). For discussion of the absolute and the ordinary if this specific knowledge is a quality, then knowledge in general is a genus in
power of God in the Scholastic tradition up to Luther, see Richard P. Desharnais, the category of quality. Therefore, since it is also "toward something," it will
The History of the Distinction between God's Absolute and Ordained Power and Its be impossible that those things that are "toward something" be located in a
Influence on Mrmin L1,ther, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University special category.
of America: Washington, D.C., 1966. Also, c£ Mary Anne Pernoud, "The Theory However, what Aristotle immediately adds seems much less satisfactory,
of the Potentia Dei according to Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham," Antonianum, 47 namely, that it is not unreasonable for the same thing to be located both under
(1972), pp. 69-95.
16For Suarez on formal unity, see DM6, l, vol. 25, pp. 201-206. 19For Suarez's teaching on analogy here, cf. my article: "Suarez on the Analogy of
17 For this c£ Disp. Metaphys., disp. 30, sec. 5, no. 5 (Vol. 26, p. 87); ibid., disp. 47, Being," The Modern Schoolman, XLVI, pp. 219-249 and 323-341.
sec. 15, no. 26 (p. 846). 20Cf. Categories 8.1 la23-24.
18 For examples, a voice is said to be heard, an odor is said to be smelled, or a texture 21 Ibid., 1la25-30. Also, see Marcello Zanatta, Aristotele, Le Categorie, terza edizione
is said to be felt. Such designations add nothing real to the things designated. (Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizwli, 2000), pp. 627-31.
44 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section I 45
quality and also "toward something," if they both are fitting for it. 22 For the said to be in our manner of speaking and not in reality, the same may be said
same thing cannot be essentially placed in diverse categories. But knowledge, of every similar denomination, and no probable way will be left for stating
for example, is not only accidentally but also essentially "toward something". that relations of this kind are real, because they are for the most part gathered
This is first because its whole entity is intrinsically /col. bl ordered toward from denominations of this kind. But if the other choice is taken, one must
the knowable, as Aristotle says in the Chapter, "Toward Something"; 23 and explain what inclinations (habitudo) of this kind are or how they are distin-
second, because otherwise, if knowledge were only accidentally related to the guished from relations or why relations (relatio) of a different character from
knowable, knowledge itself would not be placed under the category "toward these inclinations (habitudo) are necessary. 29
something," but rather that relation that comes to it accidentally [would be And in this there is indicated another answer, and its difficulty. 30 For it is
so placed], which is contrary to Aristotle, in the same [work], the Chapter, usually said that in the mentioned things belonging to other categories there
''About Quality."24 are included transcendental relations (respectus), but not genuine categorical
And the same difficulty is pressing with regard to the last six categories, 25 relations, which constitute a special category (genus). However, in regard to a
which, in the opinion of all, include some relation (relatio). Thus, with re- division of this sort we must immediately ask: why is it necessary to multiply
gard to position (situs), 26 Aristotle says this in the Categories, 27 and about the these diverse kinds of relation (respectus)? For ifa transcendental (transcendens)3 1
others we will speak in their own places. 28 Therefore, this character, "toward relation (respectus) is true and real, it suffices for all relative denominations that
something," is transcendent, and is included in every entity, especially in every are not /p. 784/ purely extrinsic denominations. Therefore, it is superfluous
created entity. Therefore, it does not constitute a particular category (genus). to fashion other relations (relatio). At this point, it will be necessary to explain
7. Two answers are usually given to this last difficulty. The first is that all what kind of distinction there is between relations (respectus) of this kind, or
these [examples] that we have enumerated in the other categories are relative why one constitutes a special category and another does not.
only "according to being said" (secundum dici). But those alone that make up
a special category are relative "according to being" (secundum esse). But this
~rious Opinions Are Proposed.
answer will be easily refuted, if we ask what is meant by "relative according 8. First.-These seem to be the principal difficulties that generally occur with
to being said." For, either those [examples] of which we are so speaking are
regard to real relation. But others that could have been offered with regard to
named as though they were relative, even though they have in reality no incli-
the particular kinds of relation are proposed below. Therefore, because of these
nation (habitudo) among themselves, or certain things are so named, which
difficulties there can be two ways of speaking. The first is, that there are no
do have in reality some relation, but of another nature than a real relation.
genuine real relations, but all denominations that are explained in the manner
The first cannot be said, one, because knowledge is not only in a manner of
of relations are taken from absolutes themselves or from their co-existence.
speaking but also in reality ordered in its being to what is knowable (scibile),
Averroes in Metaphysics, Book 12, Comment 19, 32 and Avicenna in Book 3,
and a power is [really ordered] to its object, and likewise with regard to other
Chapter 10 of his Metaphysics3 3 present this opinion, and Aureoli-according
examples. Also, two, because if these relative denominations or locutions are

29 This is a passage to note for a subtle distinction between "habitudo" and "rela-
22Cf. Categories c. 8.l la37-8. tio."
23Cf. Categories, c. 7.7b23-34. 30This would then be a fifth difficulty.
24Ibid., 8.8b29. 31 We may note that Suarez, in time before Kant, often uses "transcendental" (transcen-
25 That is: action, passion, place, time, position, and possession-the so-called "sex dentalis) and "transcendent" (transcendens) interchangeably. On this, cf. Rolf Darge,
principia" (six principles) of medieval philosophy. Sudrez' transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition (Leiden/Boston:
26 For Suarez on position, cf. DM 52, ed. Vives vol. 26, pp. 1006-1011. Brill, 2004), esp. 66-70.
27Cf. Categories, c. 7, 6b2-3. 32Cf. Commentaria ... (Venetiis: ApudJunctas, 1562), vol. 8, fol. 306rab. Note that
28 Thus, action will be treated explicitly in DM48, vol. 26, pp. 867-97; passion in DM Averroes here "presents" this opinion, which is not his own.
49, pp. 897-912; duration and time, or "when" (quando), in DM 50, pp. 912-72; 33 For this, see Avicenna Latinus: Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, I-IV,
place or "where" (ubz) in DM5l, 972-1006; and possession or having (habitus), in Tr. 3, c. 1o, edition critique de la traduction latine medievale, par S. Van Riet
DM53, 1011-14. (Louvain: E. Peeters/Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), p. 178.
46 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 1 47
to Capreolus in [his Defensiones] Book l, Distinction 30, Question I-has
1;4o Henry [of Ghent], in Quodlibet3, Question 4 41 and Quodlibet9, Question
followed it. 34 342-not only because of philosophical reasons, but also because this opinion
9. Second.-Another opinion can be that there are indeed real relations in
is better fitted for explaining the mystery of the Trinity and may seem to be
things, but that they do not constitute a special category of being, but rather
very much confirmed from that.
that they are a kind of transcendental condition, which can be included in
11. For Christian Faith teaches that in God there are three real relations,
all beings. Soto, in the beginning of [his treatment of] the category, "toward
constituting and distinguishing divine persons 43-from which an evident ar-
something," relying on Albert and Alexander [of Aphrodisias] in the same
gument is made that the concept of relation as such, without adding .that it is
context, has attributed this opinion to Zeno and earlier philosophers before created or uncreated, is not imaginary (fictitium) and that for some thmg to be
Plato. 35
related is not an extrinsic denomination resulting from a mental comparison
10. Third.-But now the received opinion, [which is] a kind of common
only, 44 but /col. b/ it is something real, since it is something real in God.
philosophical axiom, is that in created things there are real relations, which
And from this it is further, with great probability, inferred that it can also be
constitute a genuine and special category. This was the opinion of Plato, 36 and
something real in created things. For it would be repugnant to created things
Aristotle followed him, and all his interpreters, Averroes, Simplicius, and the either because of their perfection or because of their imperfection. The first
rest of the Greeks and the Latins, followed Aristotle. And the theologians fol-
cannot be said, for if relation is not incompatible with the supreme perfection
lowed these, [e.g.] St. Thomas, in [Summa Theologiae], Part l, Question 13,
of God, why will it be incompatible with the perfection of a creature?
Article 7; 37 Question 28, Articles 1 and 2, 38 and frequently elsewhere, as well
You say: because that relation of God is substantial, but in a creature it must
as Capreolus39 and others, in [Sentences commentaries], Book l, Distinction
be accidental. But against this, in fact, it is not more repugnant to a relation
33; Gregory [of Rimini], extensively in [Book I], Distinction 28, Question
as such that it be accidental than that it be substantial. For just as an accident
entails being in another, so a substance entails being in itself. If, therefore, with
this latter feature (ratio) there can be joined "being toward another" (esse ad
aliud), much more [can it be joined] with the former. And, otherwise, a real
accident is not repugnant to a creature as such; therefore, neither will such a
relation be repugnant to it, which [relation], even though it is accidental, is
34 For the arguments of Aureoli, c£ Johannis Capreoli, Tholosani, Ordinis Praedi-
something real. But neither can it be repugnant on account of imperfection,
catorum, Thomistarum Principis, De.fensiones theolugiae divi Thomae Aquinatis,
In I Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 1, de novo editae cura et studio RR. PP. Ceslai Paban et 40 For this, c£ Gregorii Ariminensis OESA, Lectura super primum et secundum Sen-
Thomae Pegues, ejusdem ordinis in Conventu Tholosano Professorum, (Turonibus: tentiarum (Tomus III, ed. A.O. Trapp et V. Marcolino, Berlin/New York: Walter
Sumptibus Alfred Cattier, Bibliopolae Editoris, 1900), tomus II, pp. 284-88. It is
de Gruyter, 1984), In I Sent. dist. 28-32, qu. 1 additionalis, et q. l, pp. 79-115.
worth noting that Suarez, like many other late Scholastic authors, usually knows
41 Cf. Henrici Goethals a Gandavo, Quodlibeta (Parisiis: Vaenundantur ab lodoco
Aureoli through Capreolus.
Badio Ascensio, 1518; reprint, Louvain: Bibliotheque S.J., 1961), Quodl. III, q. 4,
35 For this, c£ Dominici Soto Segobiensis, Praedicatoriae Familiae Theologi, ac
fol. 51r0.
Philosophi praestantissimi, In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis Categorias, librosque de
42C£ Henrici de Gandavo, Quodlibet IX, qu. 3, ed. R. Macken (Leuven: University
Demonstratione, Absolutissima Commentaria ... , in librum Praedicamentorum Aris- Press, 1983), pp. 46-51.
totelis, cap. vii (Venetiis: Ex Officina Dominici Guerraei et lo. Baptistae, fratrum, 43 See esp. the Decree for the Jacobites at the Council of Florence, February 4, 1442,
1587-reprinted Frankfurt: Minerva G.M.B.H., 1967), p. 195. in Henricus Denzinger et Adolfus Schonmetzer, S.J., Enchiridion symbolorum defi-
36C£ Sophist 255C. nitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, editio xxxii (Barcinone/Friburgi/
37 C£ Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia, iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P.M. Romae/ Neo-Eboraci: Herder, 1963), n. 1330, p. 337. In a note here, the editors
edita, tomus IV (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, S.C. de Propaganda Fide, of the Enchiridion tell us that this fundamental Trinitarian doctrine seems to have
1888), pp. 152-5. been first enunciated by St. Anselm of Canterbury, De processione Spiritus Sancti,
38Ibid., pp. 318-319, and 321-322. c. 1, ed. F.S. Schmitt, in S. Ans. Cant. Opera omnia, vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1946), pp.
39 C£ De.fensiones, In I Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. l, ed. Paban-Pegues, tom. II, pp. 282- 180-181.
310. 44 Note here what is a mind-dependent understanding of extrinsic denomination.
48 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 1 49
for a relation as a relation does not entail imperfection. But if something to those absolute things, of which the universe is comprised. For, even if the
of imperfection be added to it, from the very fact that it is accidental, such elements and the heavens were to be constituted in another order, the absolute
imperfection is not outside the range of being. Therefore, by this theological things themselves would be the same. The order, therefore, that they now have
argument it seems to be effectively proven that real relations (respectus) can be is something accidental to them. And [this order] is not something fashioned
and are de facto given in created things. by the mind (ratio), for it is self-evidently in things themselves, and it tends
12. But this is usually proven by arguments derived only from natural to the great perfection of the universe, as Aristotle witnesses in Metaphysics,
reasoning, especially from relative ways of speaking and from denominations Book 12, Text. 52. 47 And it is only a relation, which necessarily belongs to
that exist in things themselves apart from any fashioning by the intellect, 45 its own category, because it is not part of the intrinsic nature of any absolute
and that therefore are necessarily founded in some real being. However, they thing, nor can it be indicated to which of the other categories it may belong
are not founded in something absolute; therefore, in something relative; or be reduced.
therefore, there is some real relative being in things. The antecedent is clear Nevertheless, this proofis subject to those difficulties that have been mentioned
in these denominations: greater, lesser, equal similar, near, far, father, son, and as part of what is to be discussed. For the order belonging to the perfection of
the like. For all of these plainly entail a reference (habitudo) to something else, the universe is so great that individual bodies have been constituted in their
without which they can neither be nor be understood, and they exist in things natural places, which is indeed something absolute in those individuals, and
themselves, as seems self-evident. in everything together it entails their co-existence. But that there follows on
13. But how great is the force of these proofs we will see in what follows. this a particular accident, which is a real relatio (relatio), seems to make no
For the second, [that is], the natural argument for the most part depends upon difference as regards the perfection of the universe.
solutions ofarguments that we cannot give before we explain many things about
the distinction and division of relations (relatio). However, the theological argu- The Resolution ofthe Question.
ment does not seem sufficiently efficacious for showing categorical relations, 15. Nevertheless, we are supposing that the third and common opinion48
since divine relations are outside every category. But if God were in the category is true and certain in philosophy, which we are now confirming especially by
of substance, those relations, by the fact that they are personalities of divine authority. But its reason and demonstration should most of all be taken from
nature, would belong or be reduced to that same [category of substance]-just those [already mentioned] relative denominations, adding two things.
as created personalities or substances /p. 785/ belong to that very category. 46 The first is that those [denominations] are such that they are accidental to
Hence, the argument from parity (argumentum a similt), for example, from absolute created things, and they can be varied in some subject without the
divine to created paternity, is not very effective; for divine paternity does not loss of its absolute form, which is clear enough in almost all the examples cited
result from or follow on generation, but rather constitutes the person who is above. 49 The second is that these are not merely extrinsic denominations I col.
the principle of generation. Therefore, that uncreated personality, inasmuch as bl, and in this there is difficulty, but it depends upon what will be said below.
it is substantial, can be thought to be quasi-transcendental, that is, intimately For it is necessary first to explain the mode of entity of such relations (relatio)
included in the adequate concept ofsuch a being or [such] a personal substance. and denominations.
Accordingly, from those relations it does not seem possible to infer categori-
cal relations, but at most real transcendental relations intimately included in
some beings.
14. But another way to show the relations in question is usually taken es-
pecially from the order of the universe, which [order] is something accidental

45 For this more mind-independent notion of denomination, cf. my earlier cited

47 Cf. Metaphysics 12.10.1075al 1-24. Also, see Avicenna, Liberde primaphilosophia,
article, 'Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis
Tr. 3, c. 10, ed. Van Riet, pp. 178-9.
Suarez, S.J."
48That there are real created relations.
46 For this, cf. Suarez, DM 34, s. 1, ed. Vives, vol. 26, pp. 348-53.
49Cf. This Section, nn. 4, 6, and 12.
 Seeton II.
Whether a Real Categorical Relation Is Distinguished
Really, or Modally and
"From the Nature of the Thing" (ex natura ret), 1
From Substance and All Absolute Accidents. 2
1. This question is extremely necessary in order to explain in what sense
created relations are something real and what they are as well as what entity
they have. And in its regard there are different opinions.

The First Opinion, Which Posits a Real Distinction, ls Rejected.

2. The first [opinion] teaches that a real relation is always something really
distinct from its subject and its foundation. This is the opinion of the older
Thomists: Capreolus, in [Defansiones], Book I, Distinction 30, Question 1; 3
Cajetan, [In Summam Theologiae], Part l, Question 28, Article 2; 4 Ferrara
[commenting on] Contra Gentiles, Book 4, Chapter 14, 5 who base themselves
on the words of St. Thomas in the same places and in Question 8, Article 1
of the De Potentia, 6 and Book l, Distinction 33, Question I, Article 1 [of his
Sentences commentary], 7 in which passage he has placed the difference between
a created and an uncreated relation in the fact that the first is not identified
with the substance, but it is another thing and it produces a composition with
that {substance], which is not so in the case of an uncreated relation.

For the various distinctions involved here, c£ OM 7, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 250-61.
2 "Absolute accidents" here are quality and quantity. All the others are relational.
3 For this, cf. Defensiones, In I Sent., d. 30, q. l, a. l, ed. Paban-Pegues, tom. II, pp.
282-310.
4 C£ Thomas de Vio, O.P., Commentaria in Summam Theologiae I, q. 28, a. 2, nn.
8-10, in S. Thomae Opera, tomus IV (1888), pp. 323a.
5 C£ Franciscus de Sylvestris Ferrariensis, Commentaria in Summam contra gentiles,
IV, c. 14, nn. 12-13, in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia, tomus XV (Ro-
mae: Apud Sedem Commissionis Leoninae; Typis Riccardi Garroni, 1930), pp.
62a-63a.
6 C£ S. Thomae Aquinatis, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, q. 8, a. l, ad 5,
editio ix, cura P. Bazzi et al. (Taurini: Marietti, 1953), p. 215b.
7 C£ S. Thomae Aquinatis, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lom-
bardi, I, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, editio nova cura R.P. Mandonnet, O.P., Tomus I (Parisiis:
P. Lethielleux, 1929), p. 765.
52 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 2 53

However, this opinion, understood ofa proper and rigorously real distinction, a real distinction, but at most a modal one, 13 especially when the separation
such as exists among entities that are completely distinct from one another, 8 is not, so to say, convertible, as is the case in the present instance. For, even
has no very probable basis. For what is put forward by these authors about the though the foundation can remain without the relation, still the relation can-
separability of a relation from its foundation, 9 or about the different changes not in any way remain without the foundation.
that can take place in these, at most prove a distinction "from the nature of From this a weighty argument can be taken against this [first] part, and
the thing" (ex natura ret)-if indeed they prove anything, since perhaps it is against the whole of the above opinion. I add, moreover, that this sign in the
more probable that they do not even show that, as we will see in treating the
present case is not enough to indicate a modal distinction that is actual and
following opinions.
real (ex natura rei). For, even though a relative denomination may be taken
From the arguments of these opinions and from the proofs of our own
away with the foundation remaining and with the terminus removed, neverthe-
opinion this [first] opinion will also be sufficiently refuted, although in order
less, with both remaining, it cannot be taken away. Therefore, from that sign
to reject it those [arguments] that were proposed in the beginning of the
one cannot effectively conclude that a relation is something distinct from the
preceding Section can be enough. For those, I think, sufficiently demonstrate
foundation that is taken away from it when that denomination ceases, because
that a relation is not a thing that has in itself an entity that is distinct from all
that denomination can include or connote the concomitance or the coexistence
absolute entities.
of the other extreme and therefore can cease, not because something is taken
away from the foundation, but because something is taken away from the
Insofar As It Agrees with the Above [Opinion], terminus.
the Opinion ofScotus Is Rejected. Accordingly, if some relations are inseparable from their foundations, it is,
3. And the same judgment must be passed on the opinion of Scotus in therefore, because their termini must 14 exist, and therefore when the founda-
[the Ordinatio] Book 2, Distinction 1, Question 3 [sic], 10 and in Book 3, tions are posited, it is necessary that relative denominations arise. For example,
Distinction 8, Question 1, 11 as regards that part in which it agrees with the if by some impossible stroke (si per impossibile), a created essence could re-
preceding [opinion]. 12 For he distinguishes certain relations (relatio) that can main, with God not existing, the relation of the creature to him would cease.
in no way be separated from their foundations, for example, the relation of Therefore, the fact that it cannot now be separated is not only because of its
[being] a creature, from other [relations] that can be separated, for example, identity with the foundation, but also because of the intrinsic necessity of the
the relation of likeness. And these latter, he says, are really distinguished from terminus. Therefore, conversely, from the fact that other relations cease, when
their foundations, because of that separation. But the former, he says, are not their termini are taken away, a real (ex natura ret) distinction is not correctly
to be distinguished, for, while they are inseparable, there is no other sign of a inferred, unless it is shown from elsewhere that the destruction alone of that
real distinction, nor does its necessity appear from anything else. However, as terminus does not suffice for that.
regards the first part, it has already been shown that that sign does not indicate
Durandus' Opinion in This ls Not Proven.
8 For this, cf. DM7, s. l, n. 1, vol. 25, p. 250. 4. Accordingly, Durand us, in [his Sentences commentary], Book l, Distinc-
9 For example: two white men have a relation of similarity which is founded in their tion 30, /col. bl Question 2, uses another distinction, namely, that there are
whitenesses. Take one man away and ipso facto the relation of similarity in the first certain relations (relatio) that are true dispositions (habitudo) and real respects
man perishes even though its foundation of whiteness remains in him. Thus, the (respectus), following upon their foundations essentially (per se), or accidentally,
relation is separable from its foundation. as [for example] inherence follows essentially (per se) the nature of an accident,
10C£ Ioannis Duns Scoti, O.M., Quaestiones in lib. 11 Sententiarum, II, d. 1, q. 4, in and to touch or to be touched follows accidentally (per accidens) on quanti-
Opera omnia (Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Durand, 1639), tomus vi, pars i, p.
60; idem, Ordinatio II, d. 1, q. 5, in]oannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia, VII (Civitas
Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1973), pp. 101-104, nn. 200-205.
11 Idem, Quaestiones in III Sent., d. 8, q. un. (editio 1639), tomus vii, pars i, p. 213.
12 That is, to the degree in which it affirms a real distinction between a relation and 13 On a modal distinction, c£ DM7, l, nn. 16-20, vol. 25, pp. 255-7.
its foundation. 14 Literally: "cannot not" (non possunt non).
54 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 2 55
fied bodies; but there are others that are only relative denominations, as [for
extreme in a certain place, apart from any other respect that is really (ex natura
example] to be equal and to be similar. IS
rez) distinct. For I am supposing that we are talking about a purely quantitative
He says, therefore, that these latter [relations] are not distinguished in reality
touch. For a physical touch adds something else, although not only a relation
from their foundations, nor do they add anything beyond the existence and
but the physical action of one thing upon another. Therefore, a quantitative
the concomitance of both absolute extremes-from which mutual coexistence
touch is nothing else than a certain nearness between two quantities and their
he says there are taken those denominations that he says, nevertheless, pertain
termini, in such way /p. 787I that no other quantity is interposed. But this
to the category of relation (relatio) and suffice in order to constitute it. I 6 And
belongs to two bodies by the very fact that they exist in such places or spaces,
we will see about this part later. I?
without the addition ofany mode or respect that is really (ex natura ret) distinct,
But about the prior respects (respectus) he says that they are distinguished
at least according to the doctrine of Durand us himself
really from their foundations, Is in which [saying] he agrees with the preceding
For the same arguments that can prove this with regard to likeness, prove
opinions and he uses the same foundation, namely, the sign of the separability
it about touch and about any nearness or distance, namely, that positing two
of the foundation from such a respect (respectus). 19 About this sign, it has already
bodies in such places, and prescinding either by the intellect, or by divine
been said that at most it can show a modal distinction, nor does Durandus
power, from every other thing or real mode, it is impossible that those bod-
intend anything more, as will easily be clear to anyone reading him. He differs
ies not touch each other. Therefore, the argument is the same with regard to
only in the use of words--calling that [distinction] real because it is found in this denomination. And universally it is the same about every respect, which
things themselves. is said by accident to follow on a foundation. For that will be by accident be-
5. But with regard to this part of Durandus's opinion, one should note a cause it is the kind of denomination that requires the co-existence of another
certain subdivision of the first member, or of a real relation (habitudo), which
extreme, which [co-existence], however, that foundation does not require of
he briefly touches upon in that part, and one should consider also the examples itself, as is plainly clear in the mentioned example about touch. Therefore,
by which he explains both members. For a certain respect (respectus), he says, that denomination can be taken from a co-existence of extremes without any
follows by accident on its foundation, for example, touch upon quantity.
other respect in reality (in re ipsa) distinct from the extremes. Or if that is not
Another follows directly (per se), as, for example, inherence (inesse) follows on only a denomination, but also an intrinsic reference (habitudo), the same will
quantity. And either respect, he says, is to be distinguished from its founda- be so in all those [cases] that Durandus posited in the second member of his
tion. 20
principal distinction.
But in the first member and the example, 21 it does not seem that Durandus 6. In regard to the other member22 concerning a respect (respectus) that di-
is speaking consistently. For by what reason does he say that things are called
rectly (per se) follows upon a foundation, and about the example of inherence
similar or equal? Not by the addition of some respect that is really (ex natura
- by the word "respect" (respectus) there can be signified that very mode of
rei) distinct, but only by the co-existence of each extreme and a denomina- inherence, or of union, or some categorical relation (relatio) that has arisen
tion arising from that. Consequently, it should be said that two bodies touch from this. 23 In the first sense, it is true that that respect is distinguished really
one another by a denomination that has arisen from the co-existence of each (ex natura rez) from the form or the thing whose mode it is, which is called
the foundation of such a respect-something that has often been said above24
15For this, see D. Durandi, a Sancto Porciano, O.P., In Petri Lombardi Sententias by us and has been confirmed by the same argument.
Theologicas Commentariorum libri 1111, I, d. 30, q. 2, n. 14 (ed. Venetiis: Ex Typo- However, what Durandus says, namely, that this respect (respectus) does not
graphia Guerraea, 1571; reprint: Ridgewood, NJ: Gregg Press, 1964), vol. 1, f. 84v make for a composition in any way with its foundation, is false, as was often
ab.
16Ibid., n. 17, f. 85ra.
17 Cf. this Section, n. 6. 22 See paragraph 4, just above.
18Durandus, In I Sent., d. 30, q. 2, 23 Here we note Suarez himself struggling with the terminology of relation and we
19Ibid., n. 14, f. 84vb. can sympathize with him.
20Ibid. 24Cf., e.g., DM7, 1, nn. 17-19, vol. 25, pp. 255-7; and DM34, 4, n. 33, vol. 26, p.
21 That is, "to touch and being touched."
377.
56 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 2 57
said above, treating about the distinctions ofthings 25 and about the composition
a thing in itsel£ Javellus, in Metaphysics, Book 5, Question 22, 30 and Soto, 31
of nature and supposite, 26 as well as in other places. But this respect (respectus)
about the category "toward something" (ad aliquid), Question 2, 32 seem to
is not categorical, but rather transcendental, because that mode of union or of
hold this opinion. However, they call this distinction not modal but formal,
inherence is not something that results from a foundation and a terminus, but
but still they think it is actually in things before any consideration of the intel-
is an absolute mode that can be directly (per se) caused by some action, even
lect. Fonseca, however, in [his commentary on] Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter
though intimately and essentially it includes a transcendental respect ~o wh~t
15, Question 2, Section 5, says indeed that a categorical relation (relatio) is
can be united (ad unibilia), which is also touched upon above and which wtll
distinguished from its foundation by a formal distinction in such way that it
be explicitly clarified below, partly in this Disputation27 and partly wh~n we
has its own essential and existential being (esse essentiae et existentiae), which is
dispute about action. 28 Consideration, I col. bl therefore, of that respect m the
distinct from the being of the foundation. Yet he denies that that distinction
stated sense is of no importance for the present question.
is real, or modal, or one of reason only, but [says] that it is another kind of
But if we are talking about a categorical respect that is thought to result
"middle" (media), which he indicates is less than a real distinction but more
between an inherent form and its subject, and in general between those things
than a modal [distinction]. 33 Moreover, he seems to constitute its diversity in
that are united, the reasoning about such a respect will be the same as that the fact that in a modal distinction the mode does not have its own being that
about touching (contactus), likeness, and other similar instances, namely, that
is distinct from the being of the thing whose mode it is, 34 but in this formal
this is not a thing nor a real mode that is really (ex natura ret) distinct from
the extremes, but it is only a mutual denomination that has arisen in the ex-
tremes from their co-existence under such a manner of existing. This can be 30 C£ Chrysostomi Iavelli Canapicii, In omnibus Metaphysicae libris quaesita testualia
easily shown by applying the reasoning developed above. 29 Therefore, speaking metaphysicali modo determinata: in quibus clarissime resolvuntur dubia Aristotelis et
properly about a categorical respect (respectus), this distinction ofDurandus is Commentatoris, eaque ut plurimum decisa habentur iuxta Thomisticum dogma ... , V,
also not necessary, but it must be said that every categorical relation (relatio) q. 22 (Venetiis: Apud Haeredes Ioannis Mariae Bonelli, 1576), fols. 118v-122r.
31 Here I am following the reading, "Sotus," from the Salamanca, 1597 and the Mainz,
either is or is not something distinct.
1605 editions of the Disputationes rather than that of the Vives edition which er-
roneously gives "Scotus." Cf. R.P Francisci Suarez Societatis lesu, Metaphysicarum
A Fourth Opinion Is Explained: Disputationum, tom us posterior (Salmanticae: Apud Ioannem et Andream Renaut,
About a Modal or a Formal Distinction ofa Relation 1597), d. 47, s. 2, n. 7, vol. 2, p. 542a, and Francisci Suarez, e SocietateJesu, Meta-
From Its Foundation. physicarum Disputationum, tomus posterior (Moguntiae: Excudebat Balthasarus
7. There is, therefore, a fourth opinion, which affirms that a real relation Lippius, Sumptib. Arnold Mylii, 1605), d. 47, s. 2, n. 7; vol. 2, p. 501b. For the
(relatio) is always actually distinguished from its subject and its foundation, same reading of "Sotus," see also R. Patris Francisci Suarez, e Societate Jesu, Meta-
but not altogether really as thing from thing, but modally as a real mode from physicarum Disputationum (Venetiis: Apud Haeredes Melchioris Sessae, 1610), d.
47, 2, n. 7; vol. 2, p. 501 b. Although in this place the pagination of the Mainz and
Venice editions is running very dose together, this is not entirely true over the whole
of the Disputationes. Thus the Venice edition has five indices at the beginning of
the first volume while Mainz has them all at the end of volume two. Again, even
though the page references here are the same, the last line of 50la in the Mainz
25 For Suarez's treatment of distinctions, see DM7, ed. Vives, vol. 25, pp. 250-274. edition has become the first line of 501 in the Venice edition.
For an English translation, c£ Francis Suarez, On the Vttrious Kinds ofDistinctions
32 C£ D. Soto, In librum Praedicamentorum, c. vii, q. 2, ed. Venetiis, 1587, pp. 215-
(Disputatio VII), tr. Cyril Vollert, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1947. 16.
26 For this, c£ DM 34 ("About First Substance or Supposite and its Distinction from
33 For this, see Pedro Fonseca, S.J ., Commentarii in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis
Nature"), vol. 26, 347-423.
Stagiritae, V, c. 15, q. 2, s. 5 (4 vols., Cologne, 1615-29. [reprint, Hildesheim: G.
27See Section 12, below.
Olms, 1964]), vol. 2, col. 818. In this place, Fonseca has also cited the passages
28 28 For this, see DM 48 (''.About Action"), vol. 26, pp. 867-97; esp. Sections 1-4 (pp.
from Javellus and Soto which Suarez has mentioned here.
868-93). 34 On modes in Fonseca, c£ Commentaria in Metaph., V, c. 6, q. 6, s. 2, vol. 2, col.
29C£ this Section, n. 3. 400.
58 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 2 59
distinction, both extremes have their own being. Again, in this [formal distin~­ (essentialiter) 39 constituted by a referential character alone, in such a way that
tion], each extreme is a genuine entity, but in a modal distinction the mod~ ts on this score (ex hoc capite) it is not unreasonable that such an entity be alone
not an entity. Hence, most of all, he bases his opinion on the fact that a relation without the entity of a foundation-or indeed it has such a mode of entity
(relatio) has its own being that is distinct from the being of its foundation. For that it intrinsically demands to be joined to its foundation, and as in its own
the being of the foundation is absolute, whereas the being of a relation (rela~io) way affecting that, so that it cannot be otherwise by any potency.
is a being that consists /p. 788/ in a disposition (habitudo) toward somethmg If the first is said, it is evidently concluded to be a true and proper thing,
else (ad aliud), as is clear from Aristotle's definition. 35 in an altogether real way distinct from its foundation-which this opinion
8. But, first of all, I do not understand (percipio) this middle distinction does not admit. But if the second is said, the distinction will not be other
between real and modal, which is a genuine actual distinction in reality and than modal, supposing that it is actually in reality. Therefore, just as between
much greater than a distinction of reason inasmuch as it is said to he even those two [things] a medium cannot be thought, so neither between those two
greater than modal. [This is], first, because i~ a modal distinc~io.n, jus~ as a distinctions in reality (ex natura ret) can a medium be imagined (excogitart).
mode is in reality distinguished from that thmg whose mode it is, so 1t has For either the extremes of the distinction can be mutually separated in reality
some being of its own, equally and proportionately distinct from the being of (in re), and one in turn can be conserved without the other, and thus there is
that thing, as was explained when we were treating of existence. 36 Again, just an entirely proper and rigorous real distinction /col. b/-or only one extreme
as a mode is something existing in things, so it can be said to possess some can be separated and remain without the other, but not conversely, and we
entity, insofar as by this word there is signified ~~atever is n~t nothing. ~~t
37
call this distinction modal. However, apart from these two ways there is no
because its entity is of such a nature and condmon that by itself (per se) it is other, for if each extreme is really inseparable from the other there will be a
not able immediately and directly (per se) to constitute a real being, but it distinction of reason but not [a distinction] in reality (ex natura ret).
necessarily must be joined and identified with some being, which it may affect Therefore, since in the present instance the foundation and the relation are
and modify, it is thus called not a thing, but the mode of a thing. not mutually separable, as is self-evident to all inasmuch as a categorical rela-
9. From this then it is clear that among distinctions in reality (ex natura tion can in no way be understood without its foundation, there cannot be a
ret) there can be no medium between one that is [simply] real and one that greater or another distinction, which is actually real, between a relation and
is modal, as has been said in general above in the seventh Disputation. 38 And its foundation, besides one that is modal. Therefore, even though the men-
in particular it is explained (declaratur) now in the matter of which we are tioned authors use other words, calling this distinction "formal," nevertheless,
treating. For a real relation, precisely from the fact that it has its ow~ prop~r it is necessary that they are speaking of a modal [distinction], if they are still
being and is something distinct from its foundation, does not have 1t th.at it understanding their opinion to be about an actual distinction that exists in
is an entity or a real mode. For that is common to both. Therefore, precisely things themselves. For some of them do not sufficiently explain this very thing,
from that source there is not enough basis to conclude to a greater than as we will say below. 40
modal distinction nor to another degree of entity besides that which is found
in real modes. Accordingly, either a real relation has that kind of entity that The Opinion in Question Is Argued Persuasively.
can be understood to be immediately (primo), directly (per se) and essentially 10. But the principal basis of this opinion, so explained about a modal
distinction, is that which is taken from the mark of separation. For its foun-
35 C£ Categories 8. l la23-24. dation is so separable from the relation that it can remain in reality without
36 For this, c£ DM31, 11, nn. 30-33, vol. 26, pp. 281-2; for an English translation, c£ that [relation]; therefore, it is necessary that they be distinguished in reality,
Francis Suarez, On the Essence ofFinite Being as such, On the Existence ofthat Essence at least modally, according to the principles stated above in Disputation 7. 41
and their Distinction, translated from the Latin with an Introduction, by Norman
J. Wells (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1983), esp. pp. 170-173.
37 Cf. DM7, l, n. 19, vol. 25, p. 257. Also for chis extended notion of being asap-
plicable to a mode, see Fonseca, Commentaria in Metaph., V, c. 6, q. 6, s. 2, vol. 2, 39Here we may note the difference among "primo," "per se," and "essentialiter."
col. 400. 40C£ n. 15, this Section.
38 Cf. DM7, 1, n. 21, vol. 25, p. 257. 41 For this, see DM7, 2, nn. 6-10, vol. 25, pp. 263-5.
60 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 2 61
42
Secondly, this is sufficiently confirmed by the argument that a relation has Therefore the intrinsic and relative form from which it is taken is in some way
its own being (esse), which intrinsically consists in a disposition (habitudo) really distinct from all absolute forms, at least with a modal distinction.
toward another. Therefore, it is necessary that in reality itself (in re ipsa) it be And this opinion, explained in this way and confirmed, is more probable
distinguished from absolute being (esse). Thirdly, I explain it in this way: for than the others, which posit in reality some actual distinction between a rela-
when with only one white thing existing, for example, which heretofore was tion and its foundation. And if this is once asserted in the case of some rela-
similar to nothing, there comes to be another white thing, either that first has tions, by a logical argument it must be posited in all created and categorical
some real relative being that it did not have before, or it has nothing new. This [relations], because there is no sufficient reason to use any distinction, as can
second cannot be said, for otherwise a relation is nothing real; for if it was be understood from what was said against Scotus and Durand us. 47
nothing before and if afterwards it receives no real being, it never is anything.
Therefore, that relative being that is added must necessarily be distinct from
A Fifth Opinion Denying an Actual Distinction .
that to which it is added, at least by a modal distinction. For if one thing ex-
In Reality ofa Relation from its Foundation.
isted and the other did not yet exist, and afterwards it is added or arises, they
12. Still, there is another opinion, extremely opposite to these, 48 which denies
cannot be one and the same in reality.
that a relation is in reality (in re) distinguished with some actual distinction
11. Fourthly: for when one thing is said to be similar to another, or one man is
from its absolute foundation, but [says that it is distinguished] with only some
said to be the father of another, either these are merely extrinsic denominations,
distinction of reason having some basis in things.
or they are intrinsic. The first cannot /p. 789/ be said. Therefore, necessarily
Many theologians teach this opinion, especially the Nominalists, in [their
the second must be said. Therefore, some intrinsically denominating form is
Sentences commentaries] I, dist. 30; [c£] Ockham, [in this place] at question
necessary. Therefore, that must necessarily be distinct in reality, at least mod-
1, 49 and at dist. 31, question 1; 50 Gregory [of Rimini], at dist. 29, question
ally, from the thing denominated.
2, article 2;5 1 and Giles [of Rome)5Ibis is clearly of the same opinion in [Sent.]
The minor43 is proven first: for if it were an extrinsic denomination, it would
I, dist. 26, question 4, when he says a relation has no proper being beyond
not be relative, because it would be an application of an extrinsic form to a
the being of [its] foundation, nor does it have any composition joined to that
denominated subject rather than a disposition of that subject to an extrinsic
[et]-which cannot be true, except by reason of a complete identity in the
terminus. Secondly, [the minor is proven] because for this reason a denomina-
thing itself (in re ipsa). Silvester [Mazzolini a.k.a. Prierias, 0.P.] plainly /col.
tion of "clothed," or of "circumscribed by place," 44 or even of "agent," is not
b/ holds the same view, in his Conflati {ex angelica doctore S. Thoma}, Question
relative with a proper categorical relation (respectus). Thirdly, it is [proven]
1, Dubium 1, 52 where he says that a relation is the same thing as its proximate
with more difficulty: for otherwise there would not be a less real relation of
foundation. And although he adds that they are distinguished formally, he ,
the creator to a creature than of any created agent to its effect; for an extrinsic
denomination can be equally present.
Likewise, the second consequence45 is clear, because that is called an intrinsic 47Cf. this Section, nn. 3-6, above.
denomination which is taken from an intrinsic form. The final consequence46 48 That is, the first four opinions presented.
is based upon something, which has been often repeated, [namely], that this 49 Cf. Guillelmi de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio, d.
30, q. l, in Opera theologica, vol. 4, ed. Girardus I. Etzkorn et Franciscus E. Kelley
denomination can be lost and acquired anew, preserving every absolute form.
(St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1979), pp. 309-310.
50Cf. ibid, d. 31, q. un, p. 400.
51 Cf. Gregorii Atiminensis, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum (Tomus
42 Here for the sake of meaningful English, I have changed Suarez's active voice to a III, ed. Trapp et Marcolina, Berlin/New York, 1984), In I Sent. dist. 28-32, qu. 2,
passive voice construction. Additio 142, pp. 154-5.
43 That is for one thing to be similar or for one man to be father are merely extrinsic 51 bis Cf. Egidii Romani, Primus Sententiarum, correctus a reverendo magistro Augus-
denominations. tina Montifalconio (Venetiis: Impressus sumptibus et expensis heredum quondam
44That is, "located." Octaviani Scot., 1521), In Sent. I, d. 26, quaestio principalis secunda, fol. 141 va.
45 That is, that some intrinsically denominating form is needed. 52 The work here is Silvestro Mazzolini, Conjlati ex angelico doctore S. Thoma, Perusie:
46 That is, that form must be distinct in reality from the thing denominated. Per Hieronymum quondam Francisci Chartularii, 1519, of which I have found one
62 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 2 63

however, immediately makes it clear enough that this is only a distinction of the reasoning made above, namely, that otherwise a likeness could not come
reason, from a diversity of concepts, insofar as the same thing taken alone is to anything without its mutation, which argument is probative both of a real
conceived absolutely, but with something else posited, it is conceived relatively, mode, which is really distinct and also of a genuine reality. Hence also this
with simply nothing added or varied with respect to the thing itself (rem ipsam). opinion is founded upon the dictum of the Philosopher, in Physics, Book 5,
But Hervaeus [Natalis, O.P.] teaches and treats this opinion more expressly Text 10, 58 that a relation comes to a thing, with that thing itself remaining
and better, [Sent.] I, dist. 30, art. 1 [sic],5 3 and Quodlibet7, question 15, 54 and unchanged. And in a similar way the same opinion is taken from Anselm, in
Quodlibet 10, question 1;55 who also has declared that these relative denomina- the Monologium, Chapter 24, 59 to which place we will refer below6° when we
tions are taken from the association (consortia) of several absolute things, and treat more at length of non-mutual relations (relationibus); and a very similar
not from special (peculiaribus) entities, or really distinct modes, 56 which they [opinion is found] in Augustine, On the City of God [sic], Book 5, Chapter
add to those absolute things themselves. 16. 61 Finally, the words ofDamascene, in his Dialectics, Chapter 52 [sic], lend
13. And this opinion has a basis in St. Thomas, Opusculum 48, Chapter 2, support to this opinion: '1t is necessary that those things which are said "toward
which concerns "toward something" (ad aliquid), where he says as follows: something" (ad aliquid), be first reduced to another category as they are separately
"But when I say that the likeness of Socrates has his whiteness as a foundation, considered, and then afterwards as having a disposition (habitudinem) and affection
it should not be understood that the likeness ofSocrates is some thing in Socrates to something else, [be reduced} to those things that are to be referred to something.
other than that whiteness itself, but it is only that whiteness itselfas it is related to Indeed, it is necessary that something first be without a disposition and relation
the whiteness ofPlato as to a terminus." 57 And this he immediately confirms by and then to consider a disposition in it. '1'i 2 This opinion of Damascene, I think,

copy listed as owned by Bowdoin College, Maine, which I have not been able to
see.
53 Cf. Hervei Natalis Britonis, In quatuor libros sententiarum, Commentaria, In I Sent., Parisio rum: Apud J.P. Christophorurn Ballard et Nicola um Sirnart, 1719), p. 536a.
d. 29, q. l, ad 2 (Parisiis: Apud Viduam Moreau, 1647), p. 126a. The obvious lesson to draw from this it that Hervaeus had great influence here
54 For this, see: Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibetum VII, q. 15, in Quolibeta Hervei: on Suarez.
subtilissima Hervei Nata/is Britonis theologi acutissimi quolibeta undecim cum octo 58 Cf. Physics 5.2.225bll-13; also, see Metaphysics ll.12.1068all-13. For Suarez's
ipsius profandissimis tractatibus infra per ordinem descriptis. Quorum omnia: demptis recognition of the dependence of Metaphysics, Book 11, on the Physics, cf. DM,
tantum quatuor quolibetis: nunc primum impressa: atque in lucem prodita faerunt: Index locupletissimus, Lib. XI, vol. 25, pp. lx-lxi, an English translation in: Francisco
summaque diligentia castigata. Additis quampluribus in margine notabilibus: necnon Suarez, A Commentary onAristotle's Metaphysics (Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam
eleganti tabula: que secundum alphabeti ordinem omnes principales quaestiones mirifice Aristotelis), translated from the Latin with an Introduction and Notes by John P.
demonstrat. Tractatus VIIL videlicet. De beatitudine. De verbo. De eternitate mundi. Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004), pp. 203-206.
De materia celi. De relationibus. De pluralitate formarum. De virtutibus. De motu 59 Cf Monologi.um, Cap. 25, in Obras Comp/etas de SanAnselmo, traducidas por prirnera
angeli (Venetiis: Georgiurn Arrivabenurn, 1513; rep., Ridgewood, NJ: Gregg Press, vez al castellano. Texto latino de la edici6n critica del P. Schmitt, O.S.B. (Madrid:
1966), fol. 143va. Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1952), vol. 1, p. 258. In this place, Anselm says
55 Cf. ibid, QuodlibetumX, q. l, fols. 169vb-170rb. that God is unchanged even though creatures, which are related co Hirn, may come
56In passing, let us note this refusal to regard a relation as a mode of its founda- and go.
tion. 60Cf. Section 15, n. 16.
57 For this, see the spurious work, Summa totius logicae Aristotelis, Tract. V, c. 2, in 61 Actually, this should be De Trinitate, V, c. 16, n. 17, in Obras de San Augustin
S. Thomae Aquinatis, 0.P., Opuscula omnia, genuina quidem necnon spuria melioris en edicion bilingiJe, tomo V, Tratado sobre la Santlsima Trinidad, prirnera versi6n
notae debito ordine collecta cura et studio R.P. Petri Mandonnet, O.P., Tomus quintus, espafiola, introducci6n y notas de! Padre Fr. Luis Arias, O.S.A., segunda edici6n
opusculaspuria (Parisiis: Surnptibus P. Lethielleux, 1927), p. 50. It is noteworthy that (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1956), pp. 426-29.
this work, which was falsely attributed co St. Thomas in the 1570 Editio Princeps 62 Cf. St. John Damascene, Dialectica, Chapter 50, in IOANNOY TOY aAMA!:KH-
of his works, has been afterwards attributed by Quetif-Echard as likely belong- NO!, TA EYPIEKOMENA IlANTA, Sancti Patris Nostri, Joannis Darnasceni,
ing to Hervaeus Natalis; cf. Jacobus Quetif et Jacobus Echard, Scriptores Ordinis Monachi, et Presbyteri Hierosolyrnitani, Opera omnia, opera et studio P. Michaelis
Praedicatorum recensiti, notisque historicis et criticis illustrati, tom us prim us (Lutetiae Lequien, in Patrologia Graeca, vol. 94 (Paris: Apud J.P. Migne, 1860), col. 631 C.
64 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 2 65
must be understood about non-subsisting relations, because the reasoning is
But if the first is said, it is proven that that distinct mode and the advent that
different about those which are subsisting. 63
is now imagined are found without a foundation, since a true likeness remains
14. The principal arguments for this [last] opinion are those by which the
without these. It is a sign therefore that this denomination70 is taken only from
other opinions, which posit a distinction in reality (in re), a~e disproven. ~or
these absolutes, which co-exist and hold themselves in the same way.
with these set aside, this opinion is concluded to from a sufficient enumeration
Hence, as I was saying above, 71 the fact that through the removal of the
of parts.
terminus that denomination ceases is no argument that the likeness is some
Second, [it is concluded to] from the matter itself (ex re ipsa), Ip. 7901 be-
real mode that is really distinct from the whiteness, but it is an argument only
cause this distinction of reason and this way of denomination suffices for all
that the terminus itself is in reality distinct from the foundation and that it in
things that are said relatively of absolute things, as the arguments posited in
some way concurs or is necessary in order to complete such a denomination.
the first place at the beginning of the preceding Section seem also to prove. But
For it is enough that when that is removed the denomination ceases, even if
if this is enough, it is superfluous to add anything more; for a distinction or a
no reality is taken away from the thing denominated. Therefore, from the
multiplication of things or of real modes should not be fashioned or asserted
'hout necessity
. or sufjli' inseparability of a relation, when the foundation and the terminus are posited,
wit c1ent reason. 64
there is rather inferred a real identity in every way, or (what is the same) there
15. In the third place, we can turn around that argument about separabil-
is inferred that a relative denomination adds nothing beyond all the absolute
ity. 65 For positing two white things, for example, it is impossible even with
things.
absolute power66 to bring it about that they are not similar. Therefore, this
16. How Some May Deny That the Foundation Is Changed by the Acquisition of
denomination [of "similar"] is not taken from some thing or real mode67 that
a Relation.-ln the fourth place, the argument that one thing becomes similar
is really distinct from both white things taken together. Otherwise, why would
or equal to another without any change in itself [simply] by the positing of
it be contradictory (repugaret) for God to take away that mode, if it is in reality
the other, carries great weight (urget). For whether similarity is a thing /col.
distinct, or why could he not impede the resultance (resultantiam) of such a
bl entirely distinct or a real mode that is really distinct, it cannot come anew
mode? For if this is with respect to a distinct thing, it is some sort of efficiency,
to something without a change of that thing.
which cannot be without the influence of God. Therefore, God could suspend
Some answer that a relative (respectivum) mode does not suffice, for the reason
his influence and block that resultance.
that it is not something but "toward something" (ad aliquid), and because the
Some, such as [Francis of] Mayronnes, in [his Sentences commentary], Book
whole foundation from which that relation possesses its entity already pre-exists
I, Distinction 29, Question 2, 68 convinced by the argument69 concede this. But
in the thing. But this is not satisfactory, because those words, namely, that a
then I ask whether those two white things remain similar or not? This latter
relation is not something but "toward something" either involve contradiction
cannot be mentally conceived, since they retain the same unity in whiteness.
(repugnantiam), or they are extremely equivocal and not at all relevant.
For if"not to be something" is taken absolutely and transcendentally (transcen-
63 That is about the relations which are constitutive of divine persons. On such rela- denter), it clearly follows that relation is nothing, and to be toward something
tions, cf. Suarez, De sanctissimo Trinitatis mysterio III, c. 9, n. 16, vol. l, p. 606. is nothing real, as I argued above. 72 But if"to be something" is taken in a more
Also, cf. below, n. 21, this Section. restricted way, so that it is the same as to be a thing or an absolute mode, the
64 This, of course, is a version of "Ockham's razor." On the role of the razor in Ock- question is begged, and the argument is not solved but rather avoided. For,
ham cf. Armand Maurer, "Ockham's Razor and Dialectical Reasoning," Mediaeval even though a relation is not something absolute, if it is, however, something
Studies, vol. 58 (1996), pp. 49-65. Again, note the refusal here to reduce a relation real, [something] new, and really distinct from everything that existed before,
to a mode of its foundation.
then by reason of that a thing is truly, properly, and intrinsically other than it
65 Cf. n. 4, this Section.
was in fact before. Therefore, it is truly changed. 73
66 That is, even by the Absolute Power of God.
67 Again, a relation is not simply an added mode.
70That is, "similar."
68Cf. Francisci de Mayronis, 0.M., In quatuor libros Sententiarum, I, 29 (Venetiis:
71 Cf. n. 3, this Section.
Impensa heredum domini Octaviani Scoti, 1520), f. 89v.
72Cf. Section l, nn. 1-3, above.
69 That is, about separability.
73 This, of course, will contradict Aristotle, in Physics 5.2.
66 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 2 67
Neither again does it suffice in order to avoid a change that the whole foun- real change, not indeed through a genuine action but through an intrinsic ema-
dation of a relation pre-exist, because we did not say that the thing is changed nation (dimanationem). 76 But [they say] that Aristotle did not speak generally
on account of the foundation, but on account of that which is added to the
foundation, which is said to be something real and really distinct from that
[foundation]. Hence, according to this opinion, it cannot logically be said that 76 "Dimanatio" is literally "an emanation or a flowing out 0£" For example, in DM
a relation has its own proper or modal entity formally from that foundation, 18, Sections 3 and 7, Suarez regards water growing cold as a "natural resultance or
but at most [only] radically, insofar as the relation flows from that foundation emanation" (resultantia naturalis, dimanatio naturalis). Generally, such is the flow-
when the terminus is posited. 74 But this does not exclude a true change, since ing of a property from a substantial form. In this emanation, there is according
to Suarez (DM 18, 3, n. 7 [vol. 25, 617]) a certain efficiency which is a separate
something new and distinct happens in the thing, even if it remains intrin-
and distinct action from the original action whereby the substance, here water, is
sic.75
generated (ibid., n. 8). Consequently, it requires a proximate principle, namely, the
17. How They Explain Aristotle Who Say That the Foundation Is Changed substance itself which is the term of the prior act of generation (ibid.). Nevertheless,
through the Resultance (resultantiam) ofa Relation.-Hence, some finally say the action of resultance does not take place without the concurrence of the First
that through the advent (adventum) of a new relation (re'4tionis) or of a relative Cause (ibid., n. 13 [p. 619]). Indeed, more than this, since such natural resultance
denomination there is produced in the thing itself that is related a genuinely is entirely intrinsic to the complete thing involved, e.g. water, and since in a certain
sense it belongs to the complete production of that thing, it is customary to attri-
bute it to the generating cause and not in any way to the thing itself except insofar
74This seems to be the position which St. Thomas has taken in his commentary on as this latter takes the place of the generator and is, as it were, his instrument; c£
Physics 5.2; c£: "Hence it must be said that if someone through his own chang- "... natural resultance is completely intrinsic and in a certain way belongs to the
ing becomes equal to me, while I do not change, that equality was first in me in complete production of the thing. For it tends only to constituting the thing in
some way, as in its root from which it has real being. For from the fact that I have the connatural condition which is due to it by virtue of generation; ... Hence, it is
such a quantity, it belongs to me that I am equal to all those who have the same common also as a rule to say that natural resultance is attributed to the generator,
quantity. When, therefore, someone newly receives that quantity, that common and is not from an intrinsic form or property, except inasmuch as such takes the
root of equality is determined in regard to that person and then nothing comes place of the generator and as, as it were, his instrument." (... resultantia naturalis est
to me anew from this that I begin to be equal to another through his changing." omnino intrinseca, et quodammodo pertinet ad consummatam rei productionem, quia
(" Unde dicendum est quod si aliquis per suam mutationem efficiatur mihi aequalis, solum tendit ad constituendam rem in connaturali statu per se sibi debito ex vi genera-
me non mutato, ista aequalitas primo erat in me quodammodo, sicut in sua radice, ex tionis; ... Unde etiam communiter dici so/et naturalem resultantiam tribui generanti,
qua habet esse reale: ex hoc enim quod habeo ta/em quantitatem, competit mihi quod et non esse a forma vel proprietate intrinseca, nisi quatenus vicem obtinet generantis,
sim aequalis omnibus illis, qui eamdem quantitatem habent. Cum ergo aliquis de novo et est quasi intrumentum ejus.") DM 18, 3, n. 26 (25, p. 619); also ibid., 7, n. 18
accipit illam quantitatem, ista communis radix aequalitatis determinatur ad istum: (633); 7, n. 26 (638). Other examples of such dimanation would be in motion of
et ideo nihil advenit mihi de novo per hoc quod incipio esse alteri aequalis per eius the heavens or the natural downward motion of a stone; c£ " ... the same thing,
mutationem.") S. Thomae Aquinatis, In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio, therefore, can happen in the case of local motion; and in this way heaven [i.e. the
cura et studio P.M. Maggiolo, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1954), V, l. 3, p. 330, n. 667. heavenly spheres] can be moved not by anything else than by itself through its own
For a parallel passage, c£ S. Thomae Aquinatis, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum form as some innate power, just as downward motion results in a stone from its
Aristotelis expositio, ed. Cathala-Spiazzi (Taurini: Marietti, 1950), XI, l. 12, p. 561, intrinsic gravity." (" ... idem ergo accidere potest in motu locali; atque ita dici potest
n. 2385. For places in which St. Thomas speaks of powers as rooted in the essence coelum non ab alio quam a seipso moveri per formam suam aut aliquam virtutem in-
of the soul, see: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14, a. 5; ibid., q. 22, a. 10, ad natam, ex qua talis motus resultat, sicut motus deorsum resultat in lapide ex intrinseca
2, and Summa Theologiae, I, q. 77, a. 8. Note also that St. Thomas understands gravitate.") DM29, 1, n. 7 (vol. 26, p. 23). In this last passage, Suarez presupposes
such powers to flow from the soul or to "result" from it; c£ Summa Theologi.ae, I, the Aristotelian distinction between natural and violent motion. Obviously, in a
q. 77, a. 6 and 7, esp. ad 1. case of violent motion there is an external mover required; c£ DM 18, 7, n. 20
75 This would seem at variance with the text from St. Thomas' commentary on the (25, 636). But in the case of natural movement it would seem that the principle of
Physics, just recorded in the immediately preceding note. However, for a resolution movement is intrinsic. For this reason, such thinkers as Duns Scotus, Gregory of
of this, see the text cited from St. Thomas' commentary on the Metaphysics, i.e., Rimini, John Buridan, and Albert of Saxony, have conceived the motions of heavy
XI, l. 12, n. 2385. and light bodies to their respective natural places to be instances of self-movement
68 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 2 69
about just any change as that is most commonly understood, but about that [change] that comes about through a proper action and passion.
(ibid., n. 21). On the other hand, St. Thomas and his disciples have held that even However, even though this answer proceeds in a logical way, given the opin-
here the motion is to be principally attributed to an external cause, namely, the ion in question, and [even though] it can be easily defended in order to escape
original generator of the heavy or light body in question (ibid). This Suarez calls from Aristotle's assertion in the cited place from Physics, Book 5, 77 nevertheless
"the common opinion" (communis sententia) and his own final option is to accept considered by itself, it indeed says something that is most difficult to believe
it in a qualified sense: ''And this opinion when it is correctly explained is true; ... " Ip, 7911 and [something that is] founded upon no evident sign or experience,
("Et haec sententia recte explicata vera est-, ... )proximate intrinsic cause of such move- namely, that as often as someone newly becomes white or hot, there blossoms
ment: "It must be said, therefore, that as often as an inanimate thing tends to its in all the other hot or white things that exist in the world something new and
natural place, intrinsic gravity or levity is the proximate, but not the main, principle real, which truly and properly inheres in each one. For as seems sufficiently
of that motion." ("Dicendum est ergo, quotiescumque res inanimata tendit in suum proven above, 78 for those bare denominations, "similar," "equal," and the
locum naturalem, intrinsecum gravitatem vel levitatem esse principium proximum, non like, that advent (resultantia) of a new real mode and entity is not necessary.7 9
vero principale, illius motus") ibid., n. 23 (637); "But, nevertheless, it should finally But apart from this indication (signo) there is no other from which it can be
be added that this natural motion is principally to be attributed to the generator,
inferred. Therefore, it is imagined gratuitously and without probability.
who has given the form, and by means of that, the gravity by which the motion
results; just as to one projecting and impressing an impetus there is attributed the Add that whatever that change or acquisition of that new real mode or entity
motion which flows from that. For just as an impressed impetus, even though it is, it cannot be without efficiency, at least by way of resultance (resultantiae),
is a true motive power, and has in itself sufficient force for that motion, but is not because every change, in the manner in which it is such, includes a proportion-
moved except as an instrument of, and in place of, the one projecting, so gravity ate action. I ask, therefore, whether that efficiency is from the terminus itself
does not move except as the instrument of, and in place of, the one generating." upon the foundation or from that very foundation upon itself by a natural
("Nihilominus tamen, addendum est ultimo, hunc motum naturalem principaliter esse resultance (resultantiam)?
tribuendum generanti, qui formam, et mediante ilia, gravitatem indidit a qua motus The first [alternative] is asserted by no one; nor is it probable. For how
resultat; sicut projicienti et imprimenti impetum tribuitur motus qui ab illo manat. would a terminus act simultaneously on almost infinite things that are so very
Quia ut impetus impressus, licet sic vera virtus motiva, et in se habeat sufficientem vim distant? Again, [it is not probable], because if a relation were to come about in
ad ilium motum, nihilominus non movetur nisi ut instrumentum projicientis, et vice this way, nothing would be lacking to it that would not come about through
ejus, ita gravitas non movet nisi ut instrumentum generantis, et vice ejus.") ibid., n. a genuine action and directly (per se) from an extrinsic agent. Finally, because
26 (p. 638). So understood, natural motion then does not violate the Aristotelian
a relation belongs intrinsically to a thing, when a foundation and a terminus
principle, "Whatever is moved is moved by another." However, as in the case ofwater
growing cold, to verify the principle here will involve its extension from the physical are posited, it does not, therefore, depend upon the efficacy of an extrinsic
plane of motion to the metaphysical plane ofsubstantial generation; cf "Hence that agent.
dictum ofAristotle: 'Everything which is moved, is moved by another,' although it is The second [alternative] also can be disproven: for such efficacy, even if it is
understood about what is proximately and essentially moving is not always verified from an intrinsic principle, will be through a proper action and consequently
about another subject, nevertheless, when it is indifferently understood about some
mover, either proximate, or remote, particular or universal, it will always be found moveri ab aliquo supposito distincto, vel (ut terminis metaphysicis utamur) quodlibet
that every moveable thing is moved by some distinct subject, or (to use metaphysi- patiens pati ab aliquo efficiente suppositaliter distincto. Hoc tamen demonstrari non
cal terms) every thing which is acted upon is acted upon by some efficient [cause] po test per medium pure physicum, sedper metaphysicum, scilicet, quia nulla causa agens
which is 'suppositally' distinct. However, this cannot be demonstrated by a purely particularis habet a se virtutem agendi, sed ab alio supposito, neque etiam potest per
physical medium, but by one which is metaphysical, namely, because no particular se agere sine concursu superioris causa, ut infra constabit ex his quae de Deo et prima
agent cause has the power to act from itself, but [has it] from another subject and causa dicemus.") ibid., n. 52 (p. 8). Note here that rather than using the principle
it cannot act without the concurrence of a superior cause, as will be shown below Whatever is moved is moved by another to prove the existence of God, Suarez uses God
from from we will say about God or the First Cause."(" Unde illudAristotelis: Omne and the Divine Concursus to show the universal applicability of this principle.
quod movetur, ab alio movetur, quamvis intellectum de proximo movente et per se, non ??That is: Physics 5.2.225bl 1-13.
semper verificatur de alio supposito, tamen indiffirenter intellectum de aliquo movente, 78 Cf this Section, nn. 5, 12, 14, and 15, above.
siveproximo, sive remoto, particulari, autuniversali, semper invenietur quodlibet mobile 79 Once more, note that a real relation is not simply an added mode.
70 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 2 71
through a proper change. For although such resultance (resultantia) exists only foundation, because it necessarily belongs to it, even before its terminus exists or
when the terminus is posited, that will be only because the terminus is either independently from the terminus. But indeed "being toward" is distinguished
a necessary condition in order that the relation result or a kind of specifying really, and therefore it can result from the foundation, once the terminus is
object (objectum specijicans), without which [the relation] cannot exist. posited.
But this does not prevent that the resultance, which comes about from the 19. How Many Inconsistencies Arise from the Presented Opinion.-First.-
foundation, be through a proper action, which comes about in such a subject Wherefore, this opinion involves many impossible things that cannot be suf-
apart from any other action which may then intervene in that [subject]. For ficiently understood. First, it follows from it that in one and the same relation
example, a descent downwards naturally results from the gravity of a stone, there must be actually and really distinguished "being in" and "being toward. "85
when every impediment is removed, and nevertheless it comes about through For "being in" is said to be in reality (in re) the same and not distinct from the
a proper action and change. foundation, but "being toward" is said to be actually distinct in reality (in re)
Lastly, an argument often touched on above has a place here: that such re- from the foundation. Therefore, "being in" and "being toward" will be actually
sultance and any efficiency whatever cannot exist without the concurrence of distinct from one another, because things that are so compared to one third
God, 80 which [concurrence] he can suspend. Yet even though we stipulate that thing that one is the same with that, while the other is not, cannot between
he is suspending that [concurrence], and that consequently no real resultance themselves be the same. 86 But [this] consequent is impossible, because "being
occurs, still we understand things to be similar or equal, when such extremes in" and "being toward" are related (comparantur) as superior and inferior, or
are posited. Therefore, there is no indication that such a resultance or change as common or transcendent and a mode that determines or modifies that 87
takes place. 81 which cannot be distinct in reality, as was taught above. 88
/col. bl 20. Second.-There is a second inconsistency: because it follows [from this
position] that the "being toward" of a real created relation as such is not an
An Opinion Is Treated That Distinguishes between the ''Being in" accident of anything and consequently it does not constitute a genuine real
And the ''Being toward" ofa Relation. accident-which is against the nature (ratio) of this category. The consequence
18. Accordingly, others, 82 for the purpose of answering this difficulty, 83 use is clear, because that "being toward" does not essentially include "being in,"
a certain distinction. And this can be adduced as the sixth opinion in the
present question we are treating about the distinction of a relation and its 85 For a position which is prima facie close to this, but which does not make the ap-
foundation. plication under discussion here, c£: "... to be in something is one thing; to be toward
In a relation, then, they distinguish "being in" and "being toward," and they something is another" (" ... aliud enim est esse in aliquo, aliud esse ad aliquid,")
say that a relation [considered] according to "being in" does not result properly Franciscus Toletus, S.J., Commentaria in lib. Categoriarum Aristotelis, Cap. VII, q.
nor blossom (pullulare) from the foundation, but it results only according to 2 (Coloniae Agrippinae, In Officium Birckrnannica, Sumptibus H. Myli, 1615),
"being toward" as "toward," and therefore, the foundation is not changed by p. 249. On Toletus, c£ my entry, "Toletus, Franciscus (1533-96)," in Routledge En-
such a resultance, 84 because a thing is changed only by that which is new in it,
cylopedia ofPhilosophy (London/New York: Routledge, 1998), IX, pp. 433-435.
86For Suarez, in another place, having difficulty with the range of the principle
and thus according to "being in." From this distinction it clearly comes about
of comparative identity which is operative here, see his Tractatus de Sanctissimo
that a relation, according to "being in," is not really distinguished from its
Trinitate IV, c. 3, vol. l, pp. 622-4. Also see: DM 7, 3, n. 8, vol. 25, p. 274. On
this difficulty, c£ Pedro Descoqs, S.J., lnstitutiones Metaphysicae Genera/is: Eliments
80Cf. DM 18, 3, n. 13 (vol. 25, 61). d'ontologie, tomus primus(Paris: Beauchesne, 1925), pp. 470-72; A. Michel, "Rela-
81 Suarez's position thus is that no resultance or any other change is required in the tions divines," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, tome XIII, deuxieme partie
thing which comes to be related. (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1937), esp. cols. 2155-56; and Jose Hellin, "Principia de
82 For a possible identification of these unidentified "others," see Suarez, De Sanctis- identidad comparada," Espiritu, 24 (1975), pp. 135-142.
simo Trinitatis mysterio V, c. 1, n. 7, vol. 1, 654, in which place a similar opinion 87 Suarez's point here is that "being in" is the common or transcendent mark of all
to attributed to certain "Thomists." accidents, while "being toward" introduces a particular restriction for one kind of
83 See nn. 17 and 20, this Section. accident.
84Which, then, agrees with Aristotle, Physics, 5.2. 88 C£ n. 15, this Section.
72 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 2 73
since it is really distinguished and prescinded from that. Again, if tha~ "being
something real. But nevertheless, true "being in," which constitutes a real ac-
toward" were an accident of something, it would affect that something and
cident, is real. Therefore, in like manner, we should philosophize about true
would come to it anew, and then the difficulty we are treating returns, namely,
"being toward," which doubtless is a certain real thing. Hence it happens that
that from the advent (resultantia) of that "being toward" Ip. 7921 the thing or
it must be necessarily or intrinsically subsisting-which cannot be said about
the foundation from which it results would be changed.
the relation, on which we are focused, which is accidental or intrinsically inher-
But they say that "being toward" as "toward" is not anything real, and s~
ing. Therefore, if the "being toward" of a real relation is something distinct in
it is not strange that it is not an accident; neither does it inhere, nor does it
reality (ex natura rez) from the foundation of such a relation, also "being in"
change the relative thing that it denominates. But this is not said either truly
which is proper and intrinsic to such a relation will be distinct, or conversely,
or logically, if we are using univocal terms, 89 and especially acc~rdi~g to t~e
if no "being in" of a relation is distinguished really from its foundation, then
mentioned opinion, which supposes a real relation to be someth1~g 1~ real1~
neither is any "being toward" distinguished.
itself (in re ipsa) that is in things and to some extent (secundum alzquzd suz) 1s
Hence, I finally argue that it is impossible that a relation as regards "being
distinguished in reality (in re ipsa) from the foundation. For, althoug~ ~f one
toward" result from its foundation, as something real that is from the nature
is speaking of "being toward" as it is attributed to relations of reason, 1t 1s not
of things distinct from that, unless that real thing, whatever it may be, is
something real, nevertheless, as I will show below, that is only equivocally, or
somewhere inherent (alicubi insit). For either it exists in itself, and then it will
at most according to a certain analogy of proportionality, 90 called "being to-
be subsistent, or it is sustained by something, and then it will inhere in that.
ward," about which we are not talking now, but [rather we are talking] about
Therefore, either it inheres in the terminus, which self-evidently cannot be
a true "being toward," which constitutes a real category of accident. But this
said, or it inheres in its proper subject or foundation, and then such "being
[latter] must be something real; otherwise, how could it constitute a true real
toward" will be distinguished /col. bl from that, also according to its own "be-
accident? Or how could a relation be an intrinsic form referring its subject to
ing in," which it intrinsically includes. Therefore, that distinction is useless for
a terminus, if it would not affect that [subject] according to its own proper
explaining the present matter. Moreover, through it the difficulty mentioned 92
character and consequently also according to that very "being toward"?
is not avoided, [namely], that through a resulting relation the thing related
21. This is confirmed, because with regard to this the argument (ratio) is
will be changed in some way, if a relation according to a proper real being is
almost the same as it is about "being in." For, as it is attributed to beings of
something in the nature of things actually distinct from its foundation.
reason, 91 it can be taken either equivocally or analogically. For in this way
blindness is said to be in an eye; therefore, as such, "being in" does not mean
When It Is Appropriately Explained, the Fifth Opinion Is Approved.
89That is, using the terms consistently in the same sense. 22. Therefore, among these opinions, the one that is most proven is the
90 For Suarez, an analogy of proportionality is one which involves a comparison fifth, which Hervaeus and some other Thomists have taught, from the sense
between two relations. For example, when one speaks of a "smiling meadow" by of which the Nominalists scarcely separate themselves-and Aristotle and St.
comparing the verdure of a meadow with the smile of a man, the verdure is said to Thomas are much in favor of it, as we have seen. 93 However, this opinion is to
be related to the meadow as a smile is to a man; cf. DM28, 3, n. 11, vol. 26, p. 16. be interpreted so that it not be understood that the formal character of a rela-
And "... every genuine analogy of proportionality includes something metaphorical tion is nothing or that a relative denomination is merely extrinsic, taken from
and improper." ibid. For other places where Suarez has explicitly mentioned the some absolute form. For according to this [understanding] the real category
extrinsic and improper character of metaphor, cf. DM 8, 7, nn. 21 and 22, vol. of relation (ad aliquid) would be demolished and destroyed. But it must be
25, pp. 302-03; DM 32, 2, n. 13, vol. 26, p. 323; and DM 39, 3, n. l, p. 523. For
understood that relation indeed entails some form that is real and intrinsi-
proportionality as "a relation ofa relation," for example, the likeness in being double
cally denominating a proper relative thing (relativum), which [relative thing]
which is involved between four and eight in respect to three and six; c£ Section 11,
it constitutes [as relative].
n. 6, below.
91 For Suarez on beings of reason, see Disputation 54, vol. 26, pp. 1014-1041; for
an English translation, c£ Francisco Suarez, S.J., On Beings ofReason (De Entibus
92C£ n. 17, this Section.
Rationis) Metaphysical Disputation LIV, translated from the Latin, with an Introduc-
93 C£ n. 13, this Section, where, it may be recalled, Suarez has cited the pseudo-
tion and Notes, by John P. Doyle, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995.
Thomistic work, the Summa totius Aristotelis logicae.
74 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 2 75
However, it is not some thing or mode, 94 physically distinct from every Reply to the Bases of the Other Opinions.
absolute form, but it is in reality some absolute form, not however taken 23. Therefore, the bases of the first, second, third, and sixth opinions have
absolutely, but as respecting another [form], which the relative denomination been touched upon among those things that had to be presented and opposed,
includes or connotes. 95 Thus, for example, similarity is some real form existing and they have been answered. Neither /p. 793/ does any other argument oc-
in the thing that is denominated "similar," but it is not, however, in reality cur, which in their favor could produce any difficulty, to which there is need
distinct from whiteness, with regard to that which it posits in the thing that to respond. Therefore, only the arguments of the fourth opinion99 remain to
is called similar, but only with regard to the terminus that it connotes. And be answered.
thus, similarity is in reality not other than that whiteness itself as respecting And indeed, the first [argument], about the separability of a relation from
another whiteness as it is of the same or similar character. its foundation has already been answered. For we deny that a relation is ever
And this distinction of reason is enough, both for diverse forms of speaking separated from its foundation as regards something real that is intrinsic to it.
and also for a distinction ofcategories. For, as we have said above, 96 a categorical But it happens only that the terminus may be separated or destroyed, and
distinction is sometimes only a distinction of reason with some foundation when this is removed the relative denomination also ceases-not because some
in reality, as, for example, with regard to action and passion, 97 and as we will part of a thing or some real mode is taken away from that relative [thing], but
say below with regard to other categories. 98 And this opinion will be made because the relative denomination includes in some way the terminus, without
more dear both from the solution of the arguments [against it] and also in which it does not remain actually, but only fundamentally, or in proximate
the following Sections. aptitude.
To the second [argument] the answer is that the being of a relation is not in
reality different from the being of its foundation; however, they are conceptu-
ally distinguished insofar as that being is conceived as in some way including
94Again, let us note Suarez's refusal to reduce a relation to a mode which is added to or connoting the terminus to which it refers.
its foundation. To the third [argument] I answer: when one white thing newly comes into
95 For some wider historical background here, cf. Paul Vincent Spade, "Ockham's existence, nothing real is newly added to another white thing, as has been stated
Distinction between Absolute and Connotative Terms," Vivarium, 13 (1975), pp. and proven. Nor does it follow from this that a relation oflikeness is nothing;
55-76. Also, c£ Mark G. Henninger, S.J., Relations, Medieval Theories 1250-1325 rather it follows only that it is not something distinct from the whiteness,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), esp. Chapter 7, "Relative Terms as Connotative:
which was hitherto in such a white thing. But when it is further objected that
William of Ockham," pp. 119-49.
before there was in that thing no likeness and that afterwards there is a like-
96C£ DM 39, s. 2, nn. 22-23, vol. 26, pp. 516-517, in which place there is, among
other references, one to De veritate, I, a. 1, where St. Thomas has laid out his doctrine ness, and that therefore either the likeness is nothing real or that something
regarding the distinction of categories and most especially regarding the transcen- real is newly in that white thing: the answer lies in denying the consequence
dental attributes of being. From this, and many places in Suarez, we can conclude with respect to both parts. For besides those two choices, there is also a third,
that the same kind of distinction, which is operative here between a relation and namely, that something real exists anew, not in the thing that was white before,
its foundation, will suffice for a distinction of categories and also for a distinction but in a terminus that has newly become white, a terminus that in some way
between being and its transcendental properties, as well as among those properties that reality that is likeness includes or connotes under the aspect and concept
themselves. Again, on the Suarezian doctrine of transcendentals, c£ Rolf Darge, of likeness and not under the aspect of whiteness. 100
Sudrez' transzendentale Seinsauslegtmg ... (2004), whose special merit is to show that To the fourth [argument] 101 the answer is that those denominations are, as
the core distinction which Suarez finds between being and its transcendental prop- is correctly proven there, not merely extrinsic. Accordingly, we concede that
erties does not require a Scotistic "absolutely simple" (simpliciter simplex) concept a denomination of this kind is from some intrinsic form, but as including or
of being that would be differentiated by modes which would be outside it.
97Cf. Aristotle, Physics 3.3.202b19-22; also see Metaphysics l 1.9.1066a30-34. 99See n. 10, this Section.
98 He is talking here about time, place, disposition, and possession. For the distinction 100 For this position, c£ Hervaeus Natalis, Quolibet 1, q. 9, ed. Zimara, fol. 21rb-va;
of reason with a foundation in reality that is involved in the distinction of the last Quolibet 2, q. 7, fol. 47vb.
six categories, c£ DM39, 2, nn. 21-23, vol. 26, pp. 516-517. 101 Cf. n. 11, this Section.
76 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 2 77
connoting some other extrinsic [form] in an extrinsic terminus. For this reason,
that are true and real, which is enough to constitute [different] categories. 107
the ultimate consequence is denied, namely, that this form denominating in this
Hence, all the proofs that are brought forward in the third argument are use-
way with respect (habitudo) to something extrinsic, must be really (ex natura
ful for explaining how a real relation does not add [another] thing to absolute
ret) distinct, at least modally, from every absolute form. For with an extrinsic
things or a real mode that is really (ex natura ret) distinct from those [absolute
terminus presupposed, that absolute form itself in reality (secundum rem) is
things], 108 but they are not at all valid for concluding that a relation of this
enough to give such a denomination, which can be taken away or can cease
kind is completely nothing.
by the simple removal of the extrinsic terminus, as has been said.
25. Something To Note.-But two things should be avoided in those argu-
/col. bl
ments. The first is that when it is said that a relative denomination arises from
the co-existence of a number of absolutes without any real addition, it should
The Arguments Remaining from the First Section Are Answered.
not be understood that this denomination is equally and simultaneously taken
24. First.-Second.-Third.-Also from what has been said in this Section
from a number of absolute forms, one of which is intrinsic and another ex-
many of the arguments are resolved that were proposed at the beginning of the
trinsic. But it must be understood that that denomination requires indeed an
preceding Section. 102 For with regard to the first, 103 it has now been explained
association (consortium) or a co-existence of such things or /p. 794/ forms, but
how the "being toward" of a real and accidental relation is something in the
in each extreme it is taken from a form that is proper insofar as this respects
thing itself that is said to be referred. And it is false that "being toward" is said
~noth~r [~o~m]-which as such has the character of a relation, even though
univocally about relations of reason and real [relations]. Likewise, it is false
m reality it is not other than that absolute form itself.
that true "being toward" can be prescinded from "being in" so that it does
Second, (on account of the example that is there brought forth about God
not intrinsically include that, in the way in which we have said above 104 that
insofar as he is denominated lord, creator, etc.) care should be taken lest one
modes of being cannot be so prescinded from being that they do not include
think that denominations of this kind are of the same manner and character in
that [being] in themselves.
all things. For that cannot be true, according to the common opinion, which
Again, with respect to the second argument, 105 namely, that a relation may
distinguishes relations as mutual and non-mutual, which distinction would
come without a change of the foundation, sufficiently many things have been
be null if all the denominations in question were in the same manner in all
said. For we concede that from this it is correctly concluded that a relation is
extremes. However, it is not easy to explain what this diversity is, according to
not something really distinct from its foundation, but not that it is not some-
the doctrine and the opinion that we are defending. Therefore, about this matter
thing real.
Hence, [in reply] to the third [argument] 106 the first consequence is denied
(that is, a relation is nothing apart from absolutes, therefore, it is simply 107 For example, c£ the distinct categories of action and passion.
nothing) if in the antecedent the words "apart from" indicate an actual real 108 !his ~octrine, which is consistent throughout this Section and throughout
distinction. For although a relation is not something distinct in reality from Disputation 47, contrasts sharply with what Suarez has said in his earliest work,
absolutes, it can be something that is distinct rationally. Neither does it matter on the relation of union in the Incarnation; c£: "... thus this question coincides
that a relation as a relation is prescinded from absolute things, because it is not with the general metaphysical question about the distinction of a relation from its
prescinded as something fashioned by the mind nor even as something precise foundation, ... But, indeed, I think that there is some real distinction, not, to be
and distinct in reality, but as something that is true and real but prescinded sure, as of things which are entirely distinct, but as of diverse formal features, or of
a mode and a thing of which it is a mode." (... sic coincidit quaestio haec cum generali
only by reason. For often there is a distinction of reason between extremes
quaestione metaphysica de distinctione relationis a suo fandamento ... Ego vero sentio
esse quidem distinctionem aliquam ex natura rei, non quidem tanquam rerum ominino
102 C£ Section 1, nn. 1-3.
distinctarum, sed tanquam formalium rationum diversarum, seu tanquam modi, et rei
103 Ibid., n. 1. cujus est modus.), Commentaria ac disputationes in Tertiam Partem D. Thomae, scilicet,
104 C£ e.g. DM 2, 5, n. 8, vol. 25, p. 95; and DM 32, 1, nn. 13-19, vol. 26, pp.
Opus de Incarnatione, Qu. 2, art. 8, in Opera omnia, vol. 18, p. 328; ibid., Disp. 8,
315-18.
s. 3, n. 21, p. 354; and Disp. 11, s. 2, n. 16, p. 440. Also, see Tractatus de Trinitate,
105 Ibid., n. 2.
VII, c. 4, n. 7, vol. 1, p. 698. Evidently, the Doctor eximius has undergone some
106 Ibid., n. 3.
development here on his central understanding of the reality of relation.
78 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real ReUition

we will compose a special Section below. 109 Now we are only saying that when
in a thing denominated there is some proper and proportionate foundation
of such a denomination, then it results from a proper real relation, but when Section III.
it is attributed to a thing without such a foundation, then the denomination How Many Kinds of Relation There Are, and
is extrinsic or conceptual. Which Is Truly Categorical.
1. This question is proposed because of the difficulty that was touched upon
in the fourth argument advanced in the First Section. 1 In order to answer this,
some distinctions of relatives must be put forward and explained, so that putting
aside those things that do not pertain to this category, we may conclude how
there could be a genus of real accident that would be diverse from other [genera
of accidents] and constituting a genuine category, "toward something."

The First Division ofRel.ation into Real and Rational.

2. Relation is usually divided into that which is real or that which is only
rational, which some interpret such that they teach that the categorical genus,
"toward something" (Ad aliquid) includes both relations and that this division
is therefore univocal, indeed that it is a division of a genus into its species.
This opinion St. Thomas seems to favor in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 28, a. l,
where he says this: '1t must be taken into account that only in those things that
are said 'toward something' are some found to be according to reason only and not
according to reality." 2
Therefore, he feels that those things that are related only according to reason
are truly and univocally "toward something." I col. bl For ifit were a case simply
of an equivocal or an analogous denomination, some things [which would
be] only according to reason would be found in other categories, for example,
blindness in [the category of] quality, and similar things in other categories.
The same position can be taken from [St. Thomas] article 2 of the same ques-
tion [i.e. Summa I, q. 28), 3 from Question 13, article, 7; 4 from Qµodlibet I,
art. 2 [sic]; 5 Quodlibet IX, art. 5 [sic]; 6 De Potentia, question 2, article 5,7 and
often elsewhere.

1 C£ Section 1, n. 5, above.
2 Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia, tomus IV, p. 318b.
3 Cf. ibid., p. 32la.
4 Cf. ibid., pp. 152b-153a.
5 Cf. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Quaestiones de Quolibet, I, q. 2, a. 1, in Opera omnia,
tomus xxv, vol. 2 (Roma: Commissio Leonina, 1996), p. 178b.
6 Cf. ibid., IX, q. 2, a. 4, in Opera omnia, tomus xxv, vol. I, p. 96b.
7 Cf. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, q. 2, a. 5, ed. ix, cura Bazzi et al., p.
109 That is, Section 15. 35b.
80 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 3 81
In line with this, Cajetan [a.k.a. Tommaso de Vio, O.P.], at the mentioned a real relation, a relation of reason can be neither known nor defined without
places in the First Part [of Summa Theologiae] evidently thinks that "being a disposition to something else.
toward" is said univocally of both a real and a rational relation. 8 Earlier Ca-
preolus [John Capreolus, O.P.] seems to have taught the same thing in [his
Only Real Rel.ations Make Up the Category, "Toward Something. "
Defansiones ... ], I, dist. 33 [sic], question 1, 9 and De~a [Diego de Deza, O.P.
3. Nevertheless, we have to say, that only real relations make up the category,
(d. 1523)] appears to follow [him] there, at question l, note 4. 10 Also [the
"toward something." This is evident enough from what has been taught above 14
same is found in] Ferrara [Franciscus de Sylvestris Ferrariensis], [commenting
with regard to the concept of being and its division into nine supreme categories
on] Summa contra Gentiles, IV, chapter 14, 11 and more explicitly, in Soncinas
[of accident]. For we have shown that being not only is not univocal between
[Paulus Barbus Soncinas, O.P.], Metaphysics V, question 26, conclusion 2 12-who
real being and being of reason, but it also does not have one concept even
bring forward other texts of St. Thomas. Their basis is that the definition of analogously common to these, but that it is equivocal or at best analogous with
relatives that Aristotle has given and the properties that follow upon that, fit
an analogy of proportionality. 15 And for this reason also we say the object of
both relations of reason and also real relations. 13
metaphysics is not being as common to real being and being of reason, but to
This is clear, because those things are said to be relative whose whole being
real being only; 16 and this also we have shown to be divided into ten supreme
is such as "to have itself toward another." But this is entirely and most properly
kinds. 17 Since, therefore, relations ofreason are not real beings, and consequently
fitting for relations of reason. For although the being of these is more imperfect
not true beings, they cannot belong to the category, "toward something."
and diminished than the being of real relatives, nevertheless, their being, such
I add, further: they cannot have a univocal /p. 795/ agreement with real
as it is, consists entirely in a disposition (habitudo) toward something else, just
relations, if we suppose these to be true real beings, as was supposed above 18
as properly as does the being of a real relation. Thus it turns out that, just like
from the common opinion and will be gradually explained and proven in
the discussion of this subject. But the reason is that since a being of reason is
nothing, it cannot have a true likeness or agreement with real being, on which
8 Cf. Commentaria in Summam Theologiae I, q. 28, a. l, nn. 6-7, in S. Thomae Opera, agreement the univocity and the unity of a concept is ordinarily based. There-
tomus IV (1888), pp. 319b-20a; ibid., In I, q. 13, a. 7, n. 10, p. 155b. fore, there cannot be any true and essential concept common to real being
9 Cf. Defensiones, In l Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, ed. Paban-Pegues, tom. II, pp. 310-
and being of reason. Hence, Soncinas, in Metaphysics IV, questions 5 and 6, 19
312.
rightly approves the dictum of Hervaeus (although by a typographer's error
lOCf. Didaci Deza, 0.P., Nouarum dejfensionum doctrine ... Beati Thome de Aquino
it is attributed to Henry [of Ghent]2°) in Quodlibet 3, q. l, article one-at
super primo libro sententiarum questiones profundissime ac vtilissime, I, d. 33, q. l,
a. 3, not. 4 (Hispali: Arte et Ingenio Iacobi Kronberger, 1517), tom. I, fol. 237v- the end: ''Being" cannot be univocal between real being and being ofreason, any
238r. more than "man" can be univocal between a living and a dead man.21 But this
11 Cf. Commentaria in Summam contra gentiles, IV, c. 14, n. 18, in S. Thomae Aqui- dictum has the same measure of truth with respect to being in common and
natis, Opera omnia, tomus XV (1930), pp. 64b-65b. with respect to the particular kind of being that is relation. For just as a being
12Pauli Soncinatis, 0.P., Quaestiones metaphysicales acutissimae, V, q. 26 (Venetiis, of reason is not a true, but rather a fictitious being, so a relation of reason is
1588; reprinted: Frankfurt: Minerva, 1967), p. 86b.
13 In the seventeenth century, this position will be again taken up by John ofSt. Thomas
and it will become for him the basis of a unified semiotic bridging between natural 14Cf. esp. DM 39, 3, nn. 12-15, vol. 26, pp. 526-8.
and conventional signs. For this, see John Deely, in Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic 15Cf. Section 2, note 62, above.
ofjohn Poinsot. Interpretive Arrangement by John N. Deely in consultation with 16Cf. DM l, 1, n. 26, vol. 25, p. 11; ibid., n. 6, pp. 3-4.
Ralph Austin Powell (Berkeley, 1985), pp. 44-5, n. 2; also see Deely, Introducing 17Cf. DM 32, 1, nn. 4-5, vol. 26, p. 313.
Semiotic: its History and Doctrine (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 18Cf. Section 1, n. 15.
esp. pp. 168-73; idem, Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of 19Pauli Soncinatis, O.P., Quaestiones metaphysicales ... , V, q. 5 (Venetiis, 1588), p. lOb
Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn ofthe Twenty-first Century (Toronto/Buf- and q. 6, p. 11.
falo/London: University ofToronto Press, 2001), esp. pp. 371, 440-2, 464, 476, 20 Ibid. p. 1Ob.
694, and 724. 2!21 Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibetum III, q. l, a. 1 (Venetiis, 1513), fol. 68vb.
82 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 3 83

not a true relation but one that is fictitious or, as it were, fashioned by the of reason. Neither can it be understood in them more than in others of what
intellect. kind would be that concept abstracting from real being and being of reason,
4. An Objection Is Met.-Someone perhaps will say: this is true as regards the or of what kind could be the contraction or the determination of such a
integral and complete concept of relation, about which the argument advanced concept to real being through a real mode and to being of reason through a
proceeds, because in this kind of concept of a real relation there is included rational mode.
the fact that it is a true being and a real accident; however, [the argument] 5. Only Real Relation Is Properly "Toward Something. "-The Text ofSt. Thomas
does not proceed in the same way with regard to the precise concept of that Explained.-Therefore, it should be said that only a real relation is truly and
mode, or constituent of relation, which is signified through this expression, properly "toward something," while a relation of reason is not, but is conceived
"to be toward'; for such a concept of its nature prescinds from the character[s] "as if" (ac st) it were "toward something." And therefore, only real relations
(ratione) of being and of accident. belong to the category proper. Relations of reason, however, are not to be
The cited authors seem to have spoken in this sense, and Henry seems to placed in a real category, but they are to be explained by analogy and propor-
agree with them in Quodlibet9, question 3, where he has argued most obscurely tion to real relations, as we will say more in detail in the final Disputation of
about this subject. But among other things he says: "To be toward another" of this work. 24 Nor does St. Thomas intend to oppose this in the cited texts. For
itself admits no distinction or diversity, whether it might be in God or in crea- he has never said either that a relation of reason is univocally a relation in the
tures, in relations according to reality or in relations according to reason. 22 same way as a real relation or that "being toward another" is not something
However, against this evasion the argument made has the same force. For real in a real relation. But he has said only that the nature of a real relation is
that "being toward," insofar as it is a mode that is constitutive of a real rela- such that by a likeness and proportion to it beings of reason can be fashioned
tion, is either itself also a real mode, or it is only a being of reason. This second in the manner of relations by the intellect with some foundation in reality,
cannot be said, for otherwise a real relation will not have a real proper and rather than in the manner of quantity or quality, etc.
formal constitutive [principle], which implies a contradiction. For how can a This, he says, results from the fact that relation as relation signifies only a
real being as such be constituted through what is not real? respect toward another. In this context, the word "only" does not exclude con-
About this matter, we have said much above at Disputation 2, treating of the comitants; hence it cannot exclude the transcendental character (rationem) of
modes that contract being. 23 However, if that "being toward" in a real relation being, or of accident if the relation is accidental. But because a relation, insofar
is a real mode, again I ask whether in a relation of reason it is also a true and as it is precisely conceived or signified as it is "toward something," is neither
real mode or only one fashioned by the intellect? /col. bl The first cannot be conceived nor signified /p. 7961 explicitly as inhering, St. Thomas, therefore,
said, because it contradicts a relation of reason, of whose essence it is not to says that as such it expresses only a respect toward another-not because in
entail a disposition existing in reality but [only] in the mind's comparison or reality it is not something in itselfor something existing in a subject but because
denomination. Again, [it cannot be said] because it implies a contradiction in conceiving or signifying it in this way nothing else is expressed. Therefore,
that a fictitious being, existing only objectively in the intellect, be constituted it also happens that beings of reason can be conceived according to the mode
by a mode that is real and existing in reality itsel£ Thus, that "being toward" of relation, not because in such a [conceived] relation there is a real relation,
in a relation of reason is a pure being of reason. Therefore, just as a common or a real "being toward," such as there is in a real relation, but because it is
or univocal concept cannot be granted between real being and being of reason, conceived after the manner of or in proportion to that. Hence, St. Thomas
or between a real relation and a relation of reason, according to the complete himself, after he said that relation according to its proper rationale (rationem)
concept of relation, so neither can "being toward," conceived precisely as signifies only a respect to something else, adds that this respect sometimes is in
such, signify one common and univocal concept for the "being toward" of a reality itself, but sometime it is only in the apprehension ofthe reason comparing
real relation and of a relation of reason. For there cannot be a truer likeness one thing with another. 25
and agreement between these than between any other real beings and beings

24Cf. DM54, s. 6, in Opera omnia, vol. 26, pp. 1039-41.

22Cf. Henrici de Gandavo, Quodlibet IX, qu. 3, ed. R. Macken (1983), p. 55. 25For this, see Summa Theologiae I, q. 28, a. 1, in Opera, tomus IV, p. 318b. While
23Cf. DM2, 2, n. 21, vol. 25, p. 77; ibid., 6, nn. 7-12, pp. 100-102. St. Thomas does not use the word "univocal" here, in another place he equates the
 84 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Re/,ation
Section 3 85
But to the argument of that opinion [i.e. of the Thomists] it is easy to reply:
consists; therefore, a relation "according to being said" is the same as a rela-
by denying that the proper rationale of relation is truly found in a relation of
tion of reason.
reason, because in such a relation there is neither a true disposition (habitudo)
8. The True Essence ofa Relation "According to Being Said. ''.._But, neverthe-
nor a true "being toward something," but it is only apprehended "as if" it were
less, this division is not commonly understood in this way. For a relation of
"toward something."
reason, in that way in which it is, is thought to be a relation "according to the
being," which is proportionate to itself, as is clear with regard to the relation
A Second Division ofRelation: '51.ccording to Being Said" of genus and species, as well as similar [relations]. For in that way in which
And ''According to Being" these are thought, they not only are said, but they also are "toward something."
6. There is a second division of relation into relation "according to being" And, conversely, a relation "according to being said" is not limited to a rela-
(secundum esse) and [relation] "according to being said" (secundum dici). This tion of reason, but is said of any real thing whatever whose being is absolute
division has its basis in Aristotle, the Chapter on "Toward Something," where and [which at the same time] is explained by us only by way of a disposition
he first gives the definition common to relatives "according to being said" 26 [toward] (habitudinis) or a relative relation [sic]. For in this way we say that
and then gives the proper definition of relatives "according to being. " 27 A re- divine omnipotence is relative "according to being said," not on account of a
lation, then, "according to being said" is usually defined as something that is relation of reason that we imagine in it, but because we conceive it and explain
conceived, explained, or said in the manner of a respect (per modum respectus), it, only with the concomitance of something else to which it is in potency and
although in reality it does not have a true respect. But a relation "according to by way of its having a disposition toward that thing.
being" is said to be one that in fact has true being with a disposition to another Hence, even though it may be true that this way of saying or speaking pre-
[thing]. supposes a way of conceiving, nevertheless, that way of conceiving is not such
7. Relation "According to Being Said" As It Is Explained by Some.-From this, that from it there necessarily results or is apprehended a relation of reason. For
some, not without probability, have thought that a relation "according to being it is not a reflex or a comparative concept, but rather it is a direct concept of an
said" is the same as a relation of reason. Henry [of Ghent] in his Quodlibet 3, absolute thing, which is, however, imperfectly conceived in the manner of those
Question 4, indicates this from Avicenna saying, in Book 3 of his Metaphys- things that have a disposition toward other things. In this way of conceiving,
ics, that a relation "according to being said" is one which has being only in there is not attributed to that object that is known any disposition [toward],
the intellect and belongs to things that are not simply and absolutely "toward either real or rational, but only from the side of the one conceiving there is a
something" but only insofar as they are conceived by the intellect. 28 And this concept produced by a certain imitation and analogy with concepts of rela-
seems reasonable. For as we conceive, so do we speak. But relations "according tive things. For example, when we conceive a spiritual thing in the manner of
to being said" are called such only because they are so said or explained by something corporeal, we do not attribute real corporeityto an object; otherwise,
us as if they were relations, even though they are not. Therefore, that /col. bl the conception would be false. Again, we do not imagine or think some being
way of speaking about these relations presupposes our way of conceiving, from of reason in that object; for, of what sort would that be? Therefore, we only
which it arises that these are doubtless conceived by us with a relation and a conceive one thing by analogy with another. So then sometimes we conceive
disposition [toward] or in the way of a relation and a disposition [toward], an absolute thing in the manner of something relative, and we speak of it as
even though truly and in reality they do not have a disposition [toward]. But though it were relative, and therefore it is said to be relative only "according
it is in this that the rationale (ratio) and the essence of a relation of reason to being said."
Hence, it is clear that relations only "according to being said" are outside the
phrase "according to its proper rationale" (secundum propriam rationem) with being
genus of relation, and they cannot essentially Ip. 7971 belong to the category,
predicated "univocally'' (univoce); cf. ibid., q. 16, a. 6, p. 213a.
26 Categories c. 7.6a36-7. "toward something." Indeed, under that character they belong to no category;
27Ibid., 8a31-32. for from the fact that a thing is imperfectly conceived or said by us it does
28Cf. Henricus a Gandavo, Quodlibet. III, q. 4 (ed. 1518), fol. 51rN. For Avicenna, not receive a special nature by virtue of which it must be located in a special
see Avicenna Latinus: Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, I-IV, Tr. 3, c. category. And therefore, Aristotle, in the category "toward something," as Bo-
10, edition critique par S. Van Riet (1977), p. 182, ll. 72-3. ethius and others note in that place, after the exclusion of the first definition
86 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 3 87
of relatives, which was common even to relatives "according to being said," we cannot conceive things as they themselves are. I further add that sometimes
added a second [definition)29 that is proper to relatives "according to being". it happens that a thing even perfectly conceived cannot be known without the
9. Relations ':According to Being Said" Are Diverse from Ca~egorical an~ Tr~~­ concomitance of other things, even if they are outside its essence, not because
scendental [Relations}.-To be sure, there are some who thmk that this divi- of a disposition [toward] or a dependence, but because of another higher
sion of relation "according to being said" and "according to being" coincides connection in the nature of a cause that is eminently containing its effects. In
with another division of relation into transcendental and categorical, in such this way, theologians say that God cannot be perfectly seen or comprehended
way that only a transcendental relation is a relation "according to being said," unless creatures are known in Him-about which [we speak] elsewhere.
whereas every relation "according to being" is categorical (we are speaking of A Third Division: Between Transcendental and Categorical Relation.
created [relations]). 1O. Thirdly and principally, relations which are real and "according to be-
But even though this opinion seems to be carried about in the mouths of ing" are divided into transcendental and categorical, which division is most
almost all, it is not proven to me. For I think that transcendental relations include of all necessary in order to conclude and to explain what we intend in the
in reality and, in their being true and real, dispositions [toward] (habitudines), present Section. For up to now it is clear only that a relation that belongs to
which I will show a little below. However, relations that are only "according this category, "toward something," must be real and "according to being." But
to being said," when they are taken properly and with rigor, are distinguished now it remains to be seen whether every relation of this kind belongs to this
from all relations "according to being," whether these are transcendental or category. Indeed, from the fourth argument that was proposed in the First
categorical. For they do not require in a thing that is so conceive~ or relati~ely Section it is dear that not every disposition [toward] that is real and "accord-
denominated any true disposition toward, which by reason of its own bemg ing to being" can belong to one definite category. And therefore this division
belongs to that thing, but [they require] only a denomination from our way is being proposed by which it is signified that there is a certain mode of real
of conceiving and speaking, as we have explained. disposition [toward], which has a particular and definite mode of being, which
Thus, in the posited example about the power of God, it is more probable constitutes a particular category of being, and categorical relations are of this
that it does not include even a transcendental respect, albeit [that power] may kind. But besides these there are other also true and real dispositions [toward],
be called relative "according to being said." Therefore, a relation "according which essentially belong to various and indeed almost all categories (genera)
only to being said" is not the same as a transcendental rel~ti?n: Indeed, i~ is of beings, which are then called "transcendental" and are distinguished from
even [sharply] distinguished (condistinguitur) from that, 1f 1t is taken with categorical [relations] because they do not belong to a certain category but
precision, as it should be taken. I am adding this, because a transcendental rather wander through all [categories].
relation can also be called a relation "according to being said," since we also 11. First of all, then, this division as so explained needs to be shown with
speak of it in the manner of relatives. Indeed, a categorical relation will also regard to its individual members. To be sure, as was said in the First Section,
be a relation "according to being said," since it too is said with a disposition from the traditional division of the categories and from the common opinion
toward something else. In order, therefore, that the division be properly made, of all, we are presupposing that there are some categorical relations. But that,
a relation "according to being said" must be taken with exclusion and precision besides these, there are transcendental relations, /p. 798/ which are not only
in such way that only in that "being said" (diet) it seems to have a disposition "according to being said," but also true and real dispositions [toward] "ac-
[toward], but in "being" (esse) it has no [disposition toward], either transcen- cording to being," is sufficiently proven by induction and by the discussion
dental or categorical. formulated in that fourth argument proposed in the First Section. 30
You say: if a thing is so absolute that in its being /col. bl it has rio disposi- And this can be confirmed; for in the category of substance matter and
tion [toward], even one that is transcendental, why will it be necessary that it form have between themselves a true and real disposition [toward], which
be conceived or said with a disposition, since each thing can be conceived in is essentially included in their proper being, and therefore one is defined by
that way in which it is apart from everything that is outside its essence? The reference (habitudo) to the other, and from this they receive their specifica-
answer is: this often results from our imperfect way of conceiving inasmuch as tion. The same reasoning is valid with respect to accidental potencies that are

29Cf. Categories c. 7.8a31-32. 30 Cf. Section l, n. 5, above.

88 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 3 89
essentially and immediately (per se primo) instituted for and ordered toward [Duns] Scotus, in [his Sentences commentary] Book 4, Distinction 12, the only
their acts. It is also the case with regard to operative habits, about which it Question [sic]3 3-that respects of this kind follow upon absolute things, but
was shown above that by their nature they are specified through a disposition they do not belong to the intrinsic nature of those things. 34 For this reason,
toward their acts or objects, because without doubt they include in their be- Scotus denies that aptitudinal inherence is of the essence of an accident, since
ing a true disposition toward their acts, and through the medium of these, [that inherence] is a true respect. 35 According to this reply, these respects would
toward their objects. 31 Therefore, these transcendental respects (respectus) are not be outside the range of the category, "toward something." Hence, they
true and following upon the real being of those things to which they belong. could not properly be called "transcendental," nor could they be distinguished
Therefore, just as the induction that was made is based upon more common from categorical [relations], because it is not against the nature of a definite
and more received opinions, so also this doctrine should be regarded as one category that things contained in it follow from things of other categories, if
which is commonly approved by the [Scholastic] Doctors. [those categories] are not of the essence of those things but are rather proper-
Especially in its favor one should note the words of St. Thomas in [Summa ties following them.
theologiae], Part 1, Question 28, Article 1, where he writes as follows: "Those However, we may better reply with Cajetan, [in his Commentary on] De Ente
things that are said 'toward something' signify according to their proper nature et essentia, Chapter 7, Question 15 [sic], that it is not against the concept of an
only a respect to something else, which respect indeed is sometimes in the very absolute thing that in its essential rationale it include a transcendental respect
nature of things (in ipsa natura ret), as for example when any two things are that is proportioned to its nature. 36 For, in fact, aptitudinal inherence is not a
according to their nature ordered to each other and have an inclination to one property following upon the nature of an accident, but it is its intrinsic essence,
another. Arid relations of this kind have to be real. For instance, in a heavy as was shown above. 37 Rather it is, indeed, probable that in created beings
body there is an inclination and an order to the middle place [in the universe]; there is none so absolute that it does not intimately include in its essence some
hence there is a certain respect in that heavy body with regard to the middle transcendental respect, at least insofar as it is a being by participation, which
place. Arid the situation is similar in the case of other things of this kind. "32 depends upon a Being by essence. For, even though the actual dependence is
This reasoning of St. Thomas is equally and especially valid as regards a tran- something that is really distinct from created being itself, nevertheless, that
scendental respect. For in that case especially there are found things that are aptitude and necessity of depending is intrinsic and essential to that [created
ordered to one another. Indeed, the example of St. Thomas is best understood being]. Moreover, it does not seem that it can be conceived or exist without
and verified about a transcendental respect. For an inclination of gravity and a transcendental respect and a disposition toward that on which it depends,
a propensity to the middle place does not belong to the category of relation, in which [transcendental] respect the potentiality and imperfection of created
but [rather to the category] of quality. For it is the proper essence of such a being as such seem most of all to consist.
quality. 13. But whatever may be the case about complete beings, such as whole sub-
12. Objection.-First Response.-A Truer Response.-You will say: no real stances, especially those that are simple and immaterial, which among created
respect is included in the concept of an absolute thing; but this transcendental beings seem to be most of all absolute--out of all the others, which are called
respect is included in the concept of an absolute thing; therefore, it is not a incomplete-there is none so absolute that it does not essentially include some
true respect "according to being," but only according to our mode of speak- transcendental respect. Arid the reason is that all those things of their nature
ing and conceiving. For on this argument they are most of all dependent who have been made to be toward another or on account of another. For matter is
feel about these transcendental respects /col. bl in such way that they think
they consist only in words. Indeed, some reply-and this can be taken from 33 In the 1639 edition of Duns Scotus' Opera omnia, there are six questions comprising
this Distinction; cf. tomus viii, pp. 698-785.
31 On habits as specified by acts, and acts in turn by objects, cf. DM 44, 8, n. 15, vol. 34Cf. Quaestiones in IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1 (editio 1639), tomus viii, p. 711.
26, p. 685; on habits taking their species and unity from acts, cf. ibid., s. 7, pp. 35Cf. ibid., pp. 719-24.
679-681. For some wider implications of this doctrine, cf. John P. Doyle, "Suarez 36Cf. Thomae de Vio, Caietani, Ordinis Praedicatorum, In De Ente et Essentia D.
on the Unity of a Scientific Habit," The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Thomae Aquinatis commentaria, c. 7, q. 16, cura et studio P.M. -H. Laurent (Taurini:
65 (1991), pp. 309-331. Marietti, 1934), n. 136, p. 222.
32 Cf Summa Theologiae I, 28, a. 1, in Opera, tomus IV, p. 3 l 8b. 37 DM 37, 2, n. 9, vol. 26, p. 495.
90 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation

on account of form, while form is in order to actuate matter and to complete

the composite, and an accident is for a substance, potency is for act, an act
is on account of an object, and likewise as regards the rest. Moreover, each
thing receives a mode of entity which is accommodated Ip. 799 I to its primary
Section IV.
purpose and constitution. Therefore, since all these things are essentially and How a Categorical Respect Differs
immediately (per se primo) ordered to other things, they thus receive a mode From a Transcendental Respect.
of entity such that they intimately include a disposition toward another, and 1. But there occurs a great difficulty: to explain the difference between these
this is a proper transcendental disposition or respect. So, among real, true, two orders of respects, and consequently [great difficulty] to explain the reason
and "according to being" (secundum esse) dispositions [toward] there are some why it is necessary besides transcendental respects to admit [ones which are]
which are transcendental, which cannot be reduced to a definite category and categorical.
which thus are distinguished from categorical [relations].
Some Differences are Proposed between the Respects in Question.
2. Therefore, various differences can be imagined among respects ofthis kind.
The first, which includes several [others], is that a transcendental relation (relatio)
does not require those conditions that a categorical relation demands, which
[conditions], as we will see below, are principally three. First: that a categorical
relation requires some real absolute foundation, for example, likeness [requires]
whiteness, or paternity [requires] the power of generating or [actual] genera-
tion. Second: that it requires a terminus that is real and really existing. Third:
that it requires a real distinction, or at least one that is "from the nature of the
thing" (ex natura ret) 1 between the foundation and the terminus. However,
a transcendental respect essentially (per se) requires none of these conditions.
For the divine knowledge, to give an example, entails a transcendental dispo-
sition toward the divine essence, as toward its proper object, and divine love
[entails the same] toward divine goodness, and nevertheless, there is among
them no distinction "from the nature of the thing," but one of reason only.
Again, a transcendental respect does not always require a real terminus, but
sometimes it can be toward a fictitious being or a being of reason, or toward
some extrinsic denomination. For example, the concept or the thought of a
being of reason or of a privation, as such entails a transcendental disposition
toward that object, which, however, is not a real being.
Often also this transcendental respect, even if it is toward a real terminus,
still does not require the real existence of that [terminus]. For example, the

On its face, the difference here seems to be between a distinction among really
existing things and a distinction between facets or formalities of the same thing.
That is to say that a distinction "from the nature of the thing" (ex natura ret) is a
Scotistic-like formal distinction. That would be a distinction which Suarez himself
would not accept, but one which he would include here for the sake of the argu-
ment.
92 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 4 93
scientific knowledge of a future eclipse /col. bl entails a real transcendental Again, the examples introduced are false. For God's knowledge or love do
disposition toward that [eclipse], even though this does not exist. And the not entail a real respect, even a transcendental one to God himself as to their
same is true in any knowledge at all of a possible object, and in the case of a primary object, but rather that knowledge and love are most absolute apart
potency with respect to a non-existing act. Finally, this transcendental respect
from every real respect, since essentially and immediately (per se primo) they
requires no foundation; for the transcendental respect of matter to form has
have no respect to any object outside themselves. Hence, just as in that case
no foundation, but rather is intimately included in matter itsel£ And the
same is true of the respect of form to matter, of knowledge to an object, and the act and its object are distinguished only conceptually, so the only respect
of similar things. The reason is evident: for this transcendental respect does of the act to its object is a conceptual one. And the general reason is that since
not come to some thing that is already constituted in its essential being, but a respect and a disposition [toward] are like a certain tendency toward another
it is a kind of difference (quasi differentia) constituting and completing the thing, there cannot be a true and real respect of the same thing toward itself,
essence of that thing whose respect it is said to be. And, therefore, just as that without an intervening distinction [within that thing], at least one which is
thing, inasmuch as it is absolute, does not require another foundation in order "from the nature of the thing" (ex natura rei).
to exist-besides its proper subject, if perhaps it is an accidental entity-so 5. In What way a Transcendental Respect Can Be Terminated at a Being ofRea-
also this transcendental respect does not pre-require another foundation, but son. Some Transcendental Respects Require the Existence oftheir Termini.-But,
rather it constitutes the thing itself, which can be the foundation of other what is further said, namely, that there can sometimes be a transcendental
categorical relations. respect toward a being of reason, is indeed true when that respect is toward
3. And from this another difference can be gathered. For a categorical relation something that is in the mode of an object, for which objective being (esse ob-
is a certain accidental form, coming to a foundation that is fully constituted in jectivum) is enough in order that it can have the character of a terminus of a
its essential and absolute being, to which [being] it is compared as a complete transcendental disposition [toward]. And by the same reasoning the other part
form in its own accidental category (genere), affecting [that being] and refer- also is true, namely, that a transcendental respect can sometimes tend to a real
ring it to something else. But a transcendental respect is not compared as an thing or essence not actually existing, because for the character of an object
accident nor as a complete form to that thing that it is proximately actuating essential being (esse essentiae) is often enough, apart from existential being (esse
and of which it is a respect. But it is compared as an essential difference, and existentiae).
consequently something that is an incomplete being in that category (genere) However, it is not always true that no transcendental respect requires a real,
to which that thing that it actuates and completes belongs. And it does not i.e. a really existing, terminus. For, first of all, an act of vision or of created
properly refer that thing to another as ordered or related to that other by way intellection that is intuitive and natural entails a transcendental disposition
of a metaphysical difference. toward an actually existing thing, and it cannot be or be conserved without
that. Second, an actual mode of union entails a transcendental respect to a
Objections against the Stated Differences. terminus or rather the extreme of the union, in which it requires both reality
4. But these differences are in part not true, and in part they do not seem and actual existence, in such way that a real actual union can neither be nor
satisfactory. For what is said in the first difference, [namely] that a transcen- be understood unless the thing with which there is the union actually exists,
dental respect of the same thing to itself is found only by reason of a distinc- as was often indicated above. 3 Again, action as action, and passion as passion,
tion of reason, is not true. Otherwise, it could also be said that the identity entail transcendental respects to a real actually existing agent or patient, without
of a thing with itself is a transcendental respect and that for it a distinction of which they could neither be nor be understood. And finally, a creature, apart
reason is enough. But if you say that there is required a "distinction of reasoned from any categorical relation, from the fact alone that it is a participated and
reason" (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae), 2 which is founded in reality, at least it dependent being entails an essential transcendental disposition toward /col. bl
follows that between a generic and a specific character there is a real /p. 800/ an actually existing first cause and being by essence. It is not therefore of the
transcendental respect of act and potency, because a genus and a difference are essence of a transcendental respect that it not require real and actual existence
distinguished conceptually with a foundation in reality.

3 Cf. e.g. DM16, 1, n. 24, vol. 25, p. 574. On various meanings of"union," cf. ibid.,
2 For this, c£ DM7, I, nn. 4-5, vol. 25, p. 251. 15, 6, n. 10, p. 521.
94 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 4 95
in its terminus. Therefore, from that difference alone the conclusion is that accident they do not have that [foundation], but they immediately belong to
among transcendental respects there are some that do not require a real or such accidents. For example, the relation of knowledge to a knowable object
actually existing terminus, even as there are others that may have and demand
belongs to the knower by the medium of the knowledge, but it is in the knowl-
a terminus of this kind, in the case of which that second difference has no edge immediately. Therefore, in the need of a foundation there seems to be no
place. distinction between transcendental and categorical respects.
6. But if you say that the difference consists in the fact that a transcendental 8. An Objection against the Last Mentioned Dif.forence.-Finally, the last
respect of itself does not require such a terminus, although for some particular
difference also is hard to explain. For either a respect is compared to a form
reason it can have that, but a categorical respect, from its full nature demands
or to an essence proximately constituted by that [form], or to the subject of
a terminus of this kind, one can object against this that this doctrine supposes
such a form. If the comparison is made in the first way, a respect, whether
that among respects to termini that really exist certain ones are transcendental
categorical or transcendental, is essential to the form or the essence constituted
and others are categorical, and they differ in the reason why they require such a by it, 5 and it is compared to that [form or essence] in the manner of a differ-
terminus. But it is indeed this very thing that we are asking and that does not
ence that constitutes it. Hence, also speaking of the supreme genus itself of
seem to be sufficiently explained, namely, of what sort is this diverse character
categorical relation, it is said to be constituted by that very "being toward" as
in these respects that are demanding a similar terminus and what need is there by an essential mode that determines a common accidental character and is
to multiply these [respects]? For that distinction of transcendental respects formally and essentially constituting such an essence. Therefore, in this there
having real or not real, existing or not existing, termini seems sufficient to is no difference between a transcendental and a categorical respect.
explain all dispositions [toward] of things. But if the comparison is made in the second way, just as a categorical re-
7. Moreover, what was asserted about a real foundation is not less obscure spect is accidental to some subject, also a transcendental respect can be so.
and uncertain. First of all, because not every categorical relation requires a real For example, the respect of knowledge to an object, even though it is essential
foundation that is really (ex natura rei) distinct from its subject, but only that to the knowledge, is however accidental to the knower. Hence, even though
[relation] that belongs to a substance by some mediating accident, as is dear,
that respect, considered metaphysically, is not a physical form referring [its]
for example, with regard to a relation of specific identity between two men or subject to something else, but is rather a difference constituting some form,
souls, which relation is thought to be categorical and is immediately founded
nevertheless, that form that is constituted by such a respect is a respective
upon a substantial nature itself, about which [we will speak] more at length physical form that refers the subject to its terminus. For a respective form
below. 4 cannot inform some subject as its ultimate form (secundum ultimam rationem
Second, a categorical relation that belongs to a substance by means of an
suam) unless it refers that subject to the terminus that that form in its own
accident, even though as compared to the substance, may be said to have an- way respects. For example, in the case of gravity, which we brought up above
other proximate foundation, namely, that accident by the medium of which from St. Thomas, 6 just as gravity is an inclination to the lowest place, in which
it belongs to the substance, nevertheless, with regard to that accident itself, it it includes a transcendental respect to that place, so by affecting and inform-
belongs to that immediately and without any other foundation, as, for example, ing the heavy thing itself it inclines that thing, and this is to relate (referre) it
likeness [belongs] to whiteness; otherwise, it would be necessary to proceed to toward the center [of the universe]. And the same is true about any potency
infinity. But the same thing is found proportionally in transcendental relations; and any knowledge, and the like.
therefore, there is no distinction. It is very obscure and difficult, therefore, from these differences to gather
The minor [premiss] is explained: for if there are transcendental relations the proper concepts of a transcendental and a categorical relation, as well as
included in substances themselves, these [relations] /p. 801/ do not require
another foundation. However, there are many others that do not belong to 5 Here Suarez changes his expression from "ipsam" (whose antecedent is "formam")
substances, except by the medium of accidents, and those [relations] also have a to "ipsum" (whose antecedent should be "respectus"). However, the sense demands
foundation with respect to a substance, although with respect to a [mediating] that the antecedent in both instances be "formam" or "formae" depending on the
context.
6 See Section 3, n. 11. For St. Thomas, c£ Summa Theologiae I, 28, 1, in Opera, tomus
4 C£ below: Section 7, n. 5; Section 9, n. 4; Section 16, n. 12. IV, p. 318b.
96 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 4 97
their I col. b/ distinction, and the true necessity to admit categorical apart from paternity, even though it is called categorical, respects a certain kind of terminus
transcendental relations. that is caused or produced by a father, and the same is so with regard to other
[respects].
Another Difference Given by Cajetan
Between the Respects in Question Is Explained. The Stated Distinction Is Defended and Proven.
9. In another way, therefore, Cajetan, in his little work on De Ente et essentia, 10. To the first argument the answer is that it suffers from equivocity. For
Chapter 7, Question 15 [sic], touching on this division of real respects into a categorical relation is said to respect something else as purely a terminus
transcendental and categorical, explains the difference between them from inasmuch as in regard to that thing it exercises no other task except that of
the side of their termini. For a categorical respect, he says, is one that respects respecting only. But in this way it cannot be said that motion, or action, or
its terminus purely under the character of a terminus. But a transcendental passion, is a pure respect to a terminus. /p. 802/ For the disposition of a mo-
[respect] respects something else, not purely as a terminus, but under a cer- tion to a terminus is a disposition to the way through which that terminus is
tain other definite character of subject, or object, or of efficient [cause], or of constituted in being. Hence it does not involve a disposition to a terminus
end.7 This difference seems better suited for explaining this matter, inasmuch as [to something that is] only to be respected, but as [to something] to be
as every respect takes its species from its terminus, or from that thing toward constituted through that (per ipsum) [motion]. And thus it does not respect
which it tends. Therefore, if there is any distinction between these two orders [something] as purely a terminus in the sense spoken 0£ And the same is true
of respect, it seems that it should be taken from the termini. proportionately of action and passion. However, the hypostatic union is said
It is not, however, easy to explain how the designated difference is a general by theologians to pertain to the Word as a pure terminus, so that by that term
one and in what it properly consists or what is implied by it. The reason for "pure" they exclude all proper causality that the Word as such has with regard to
the difficulty as regards the first part is that motion, action, and passion entail such a union. Nevertheless, the Word is not purely the terminus of that union
a transcendental respect to a terminus, and yet they respect it only under the in the sense in which we are speaking here about the terminus of a categorical
pure character of a terminus. Likewise, the hypostatic union, 8 for example, relation. For that union, as it is a real mode of human nature does not respect
entails a transcendental disposition toward the divine Word, and still it respects the Word in any way whatever, but it really conjoins human nature to that
that Word only under the pure character of a terminus. But the reason for Word and really attains the Word itself as the other extreme of that union on
the difficulty with regard to the second part is that every respect, if it is taken which it intimately and really, although without proper causality, depends. In
abstractly and in general, only entails a disposition to something else under the this way, therefore, it universally belongs to a form or to an absolute mode that
character of a terminus by abstracting from other characters. If, however, it is includes a transcendental respect that it exercises some real function in regard
taken in a restricted way, for instance as it is such or such a respect, whether to that to which it entails a respect, either by causing, or uniting, or represent-
that is transcendental or categorical, it entails a disposition to a certain kind ing that thing, or by causing some other similar thing, and for this reason it
of terminus, which may be either a cause, or an effect, or an object, or may is said to not respect that thing as purely a terminus. However, a categorical
have some other particular character of terminus. For example, the respect of relation respects a terminus in such a way that in its regard it exercises no other
task except purely to respect, as is dear in the similitude of one white thing
7 Cf. Cajetan, In De Ente et Essentia, ed. Laurent, n. 13(), p. 222. to another, and in this way it is said to be proper to such a relation to respect
8 This is the substantial union of Divine and human nature in the one hypostasis or something else as purely a terminus.
person, which is Jesus Christ, the Son of God. On this, see Henricus Denzinger et 11. From this the reply is also clear to the second argument, in which again
Adolfus Schonmetzer, S.J ., Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de there is an equivocity. For to respect something else as purely a terminus is
rebus fidei etmorum, editio xxxii (Barcinone/Friburgi/Romae/ Neo-Eboraci: Herder,
not to respect a terminus abstractly and in general as seems to be supposed
1963), n. 302, p. 108. Also, c£ A. Michel, "Hypostatique (Union)," in Dictionnaire
in the argument. For it is clear that categorical relations that are specific and
de theologie catholique, tome septieme (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1927), cols. 43 7-568.
For Suarez on the hypostatic union, c£ esp. Tertia pars Summae Theologiae Doctoris of diverse natures tend also to termini that are specific and of diverse natures.
Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, cum commentariis et disputationibus P. Francisci Suarez e However, it is common to all of those that, with regard to those termini even
Societate]esu, disp. 8, in Opera omnia, vol. 17, pp. 328-370. as they are such, they exercise no other task beyond respecting them [i.e. the
98 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47. On Real Relation Section 4 99
termini]. And, therefore, they always respect them purely as termini, even if following Disputation, 12 which will be the first about the six last categories, on
they respect them under their own natures. This is different in the case of a account of which Scotus seems most of all to have invented that distinction.
transcendental respect, as has been explained. Therefore, this difference explained But that it be phrased in these words is not necessary for us, and the matter
in this way seems to be true and universal and seems to correctly explain the itself is not limited to the six last categories, but it is found also in other [cat-
proper task of a categorical relation, which is to formally relate (referre) or to egories], as we will see there.
respect (respicere) something else, [which differs] from the task and function 13. Therefore, the reason for this distinction between categorical and tran-
of a transcendental respect, which is to constitute a form or a nature /col. bl scendental relations is that a categorical relation is not set up in the nature of
causing something or operating in some way in regard to the thing to which things in order to perform some particular task, but it is said only to ~ccom­
it entails a disposition, or conversely. pany other things for this, so that some things respect one another by vutue of
some character or real foundation that is presupposed in them. And therefore
Another Difference Is Inferred from the Preceding [One]. such a relation is nothing else but a respect that arises when a foundation and
12. And from this there arises another difference that is commonly accepted, a terminus are posited, but it is never directly (per se) produced. However, a
which although it may seem to be aposteriori, does, nevertheless, contribute to transcendental respect belongs to some form or entity, or mode of being, insofar
explaining the nature of these respects. Thus, a categorical respect is such that as it has been by nature directly instituted and ordered to some particular task
of its nature it is not directly (per se) intended, and therefore it never directly that can be directly intended by some action. Therefore, that respect also Ip.
(per se) occurs by virtue of the action of some agent. But, if the foundation 803/ can be directly produced by an action as included in a form that entails
and the terminus are posited, it follows, as Aristotle (with whom in this the such a respect. For since such a form in its own specific concept includes that
rest agree) attests in Book 5 of the Physics. 9 However1 a transcendental respect respect, that respect cannot be less directly intended or less directly pro~uced
often is directly in a most special way intended by nature, and therefore the than the form itself, because the action and intention of the agent duectly
form that essentially includes such a respect often comes to be formally as well tends toward the whole form up to its specific character.
as directly and immediately (per se primo) by a proper action. Through heating,
for instance, heat comes to be as inhering, in which there is intimately included Another Difference between the Respects in Question.
a transcendental respect. 10 And by the action of seeing there is produced an 14. And from this also it comes about that a pure categorical relation is never
act that includes a transcendental disposition toward an object. And by a uni- a principle of acting, both because, just as it never directly (per se) comes to
tive action there is produced a mode of union that includes a transcendental be, so also it never directly acts; and also because, as we have said, it is not
disposition toward [the parts] that are unitable. And the same can be seen in by nature instituted on account of some special task that is necessary for the
many other instances. , being or the becoming of a thing, but it is only a certain respect that results
And this same thing is perhaps what Scotus distinguished with regard to consequently, whereas principles of acting are directly instituted and ordered
extrinsically and intrinsically occurring relations, when he said that an action toward a special task. However, a form that entails a transcendental respect,
can be directly terminated at the former, but not at the latter, which alone are even according to its proper respective character, is often directly a principle
categorical. 11 About this division, phrased in these words, we will speak in the of acting, as is clear with regard to knowledge, a power, and the like.

A Fourth Difference, and an Explanation of the Others.

9 C£ Physics 5.2.225bl 1-13. 15. Finally, from what has been said it is understood that a categorical re-
10 That is, the relation of inherence.
spect must be conceived as a certain minimal and accidental form that does
11 Cf. Duns Scotus, In IV Sent., d. 13, q. 1, nn. 9-11 (ed. Lugduni, 1639), tomus
not give a subject any being except to respect something else, and it does not
viii, p. 793; ibid., d. 6, q. 10, p. 352; In III Sent. d. 1, q. l, nn. 14-15, tomus vii,
pars prima, p. 23; and Questiones Quodlibetales, q. 11, a. 4, n. 34, in Obras del serve for anything more in nature. However, a transcendental respect must
Doctor Sutil Juan Duns Escoto, edicion bilingiie, Cuestiones Cuodlibetales, ed. Felix not be conceived as some whole form whose function is only to refer, but it is
Alluntis, O.F.M. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1968), a. 4, n. 34, pp.
416-17. 12For this, c£ DM 48, l, nn. 2-8, vol. 26, pp. 868-70.
100 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 4 101

an essential mode or a difference of some form or entity, insofar as it has been knowable (scibile), I confess that the answers there, which were taken from
instituted directly and immediately (per se primo) for causing or operating in Aristotle, in the Chapter on Quality, 16 do have great difficulty. For the first
some manner with regard to other things, or conversely, insofar as it depends [answer] seems sufficiently disproved by the objections made there, which
essentially upon another thing. [objections] can be confirmed by the testimony of the same Aristotle, in Book
And according to this way of explaining these respects, the difference treated 4, Chapter 1, Place 4, of the Topics, where he generally says that genus and
above can be reduced to the same sense, because a transcendental respect is species must be in the same division, namely, categorical, and in particular he
always intrinsic and essential to some entity, comprehending also under "entity'' uses the example of "toward something" (Ad aliquid): For (he says) the genera
real modes. 13 However, a categorical relation has the proper and particular ofthose things that are 'toward something' must have species that are also 'toward
character of an accident. And so also the two other differences taken from something,' and conversely. 17 He says the same about quality, and he repeats the
the side of the foundation and the reality or existence of the terminus can be same in the Topics, Book 6, 18 Chapter 4, Place 39, 19 where he says as follows:
reduced to an acceptable sense. "Furthermore, in those things that are ''toward something" we must consider that
ifa genus is assigned in relation to something, a species also is assigned to that same
Which Relations Belong to the Category, "Toward Something. " thing, for example, opinion and the object of opinion (opinatum) and a certain
16. Finally, from these differences it is concluded thattranscendental respects, opinion with regard to a certain object ofopinion ... 20 Moreover, if it is not so as-
even if they are truly /col. bl in things according to their proper being, do signed, it is clear that an error has been made. "21 And the same is evident from
not belong to some one special category, because those things or natures or the rules stated by Aristotle in theAntepredicaments, 22 Chapter 3, 23 especially
essences to which they belong are ordered to various tasks that are sometimes
utterly diverse, and therefore they are reduced to various categories, according
to their diverse conditions and natures. And therefore the category, "toward
something," embraces only those relations that properly and in a special way
are called categorical; for all of these agree among themselves and are distin-
guished from the others in their special way of purely referring the thing that
they affect. And therefore generally they also agree in the way in which they
begin to be by the co-existence of the extremes or of the foundation and the
terminus, and in other conditions that they require, as will be clearer from the
discussion in the foJlowing Section. 16Cf. Categories c. 8.8b25-lla38.
17This is not an exact quotation, but it does seem to summarize the doctrine of Topica
4.1.120b36-12la9. However, in opposition to Suarez's "conversely'' (e converso), cf.
Response to the Fourth Difficulty Left from the First Section.14
Topica 4.4.124b15-23.
17. Science: 15 Whether according to Aristotle It Belongs to the Category ofRela-
18 Here the Vives edition, which R.abade et al. follow, reads "5." But I am following the
tion.-It Is Necessary That Single Sciences Be Referred to Single Objects.-Also
Salamanca, 1597, Mainz 1605, and Venice 1609 editions to read "6." The Venice
from what has been said, the difficulty touched upon in the fourth argument 1751 edition has "5."
of the First Section has been resolved. For those respects on the basis of which 19Cf. Aristotle, Topica 6.9.147a24-28.
the induction was there made are all transcendental, and as such we say they 20 There is an omission or an ellipsis here which Suarez has made in the text ofAtistotle
do not belong to a special category. Hence in that special example that was which has not been marked in any edition of the Disputationes metaphysicaewhich
mentioned in that place about knowledge insofar as it entails a respect to the I have seen.
21 Suarez, with the omission noted just above, has here followed the translation of
the Topics by Abraham de Balmes, as given in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Com-
13 For the Suarezian doctrine of modes, see J.I. Alcorta, La Teor{a de los modos en mentariis (Venetiis: Apud Junctas, 1562-74), vol. 1, p. 3, fol. 104vb.
Suarez, Madrid: CSIC-lnstituto Luis Vives, 1949. 22 The Antepredicaments are Chapters 1-4 of Aristotle's Categories.
14That is, Section l, n. 5. 23 Chapter 3 oftheAntepredicamentswas, in medieval translations, entitled: De Regulis,
150r "knowledge." i.e. ''.About Rules."
102 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 4 103

this: Genera which are not posited subalternately24 do not have the same differ- something." 28 For in accord with that [definition] he added in the same place
ences. 25 that habit, disposition (dispositio), and knowledge are "toward something." 29
And in the present case, it is sufficiently evident from the matter itself. For But afterwards he does not approve of that definition, and therefore he should
every /p. 804/ science, in line with its proper and specific character, entails a not be thought to approve all things that follow from it, even though he may
proper disposition toward its own proper object. For what Soto, explaining that suggest how one should speak in accord with it.
passage of Aristotle, says in the case of the category of quality, that although But neither is the other answer satisfactory, that is, that these are relatives
knowledge as such entails a disposition to a knowable object (scibile) as what only "according to being said" (secundum diet), for it is sufficiently manifest
is measurable to a measure, nevertheless, particular knowledges do not entail that in the proper being of these things there is included a respect. Therefore,
proper relations of something measurable to their objects, 26 this, I say, is false the true response is that which has been proposed in the last place in the same
and contrary to the explicit words of Aristotle in the mentioned place from fourth argument, namely, that knowledge, and other things of this kind, in line
Book 6 of the Topics, as well as against evident reason. For just as the truth of with their essential nature do not entail a categorical respect, but one which is
knowledge in general is measured from a knowable object in general, so the transcendental only, and therefore as such they do not belong to the category,
truth of this knowledge [is measured] from this knowable object. Likewise, "toward something." But insofar as there can be added to knowledge some
because a determinate knowledge takes its species from a disposition to its pure accidental respect, which is outside its essence, as such it does not belong
own object, therefore, not only as knowledge but also as such a knowledge, it to /col. b/ the category of quality, but [to that of] "toward something." In this
entails a respect to such a knowable object. sense the second answer of Aristotle could also be explained.
18. Accordingly, it must be said that Aristotle did not approve that first 19. What Is the Reason to Posit Categorical Relations.-But there was a last
answer, and therefore he added a second, namely, that the same thing that is answer, which was produced through a questioning in that fourth argument,
knowledge is located in different categories, namely, [the category] of quality namely, why it is necessary to add and to admit accidental and categorical
and of"toward something," at least under different aspects; for under one and respects of this kind, besides transcendental ones. For if the arguments by
the same aspect one thing cannot be put in different categories.27 But even which it is usually proven by the [Scholastic] doctors that there are real rela-
against this answer the objections added above press very much, and therefore tions are carefully considered, they certainly very much prove that there are
some feel that Aristotle there did not voice his own opinion but spoke ac- in things respects of this kind, i.e. according to being (secundum esse), as may
cording to the opinion of those who embraced the first definition of relatives, most of all be seen from St. Thomas, in [Summa Theologiae] Part l, Question
which he gave in the Chapter, "Toward Something," namely, that all things 13, Article 7, 30 and Question 28, Articles 131 and 2; 32 and [Duns] Scotus, in
that are in any way said "toward something" belong to the category, "toward [his Sentences commentary], Book 2, Distinction l, 33 and from others cited
above. But that besides transcendental relations there are categorical ones that
are distinct from these does not seem possible to demonstrate.
24 That is, one "under" (sub) "another" (altero). Aristotle give the examples of"animal" Nevertheless, the common consensus of philosophers is enough that we
and "knowledge" as two genera which are not subordinate to one another. Accord- should not in any way back away from that opinion. Moreover, the reason for
ingly, the differences of "animal," which are "footed," "two-footed," "winged", introducing and admitting respects of this kind was that we find many acci-
"aquatic," etc. will not be differences for "knowledge". Thus, while we may find dental respective predications that are not taken from transcendental respects
"two-footed animals" we will never find "two-footed knowledges."
25C£ "Twv h€pwv yEvwv Kat µ~ im' clAAT]Aa TErnyµ€vwv ETEpm Tel\ ElBEL
28Ibid., c. 7.6a36-37.
Kat al OLa<j>opal, ... " Categories3. l b16-17. Suarez's translation here is not exact. 29Ibid., 6b2-3.
Its source seems to be Domingo Soto, In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis Categorias, 30 Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia, torn us IV, p. 153a.
librosque de Demonstratione, Absolutissima Commentaria ... , in librum Praedicamen- 31 Ibid., p. 318b.
torum Aristotelis, cap. ii (Venetiis 1587), p. 195. 32Ibid., p. 321b.
26For this, c£ D. Soto, In librum Praedicamentorum, c. viii, ed. Venetiis, 1587, p. 33 C£ Quaestiones in lib. fl Sententiarum, II, d. l, q. 4, in Opera omnia (l 639), torn us
227a. vi, pars i, p. 60; idem, Ordinatio II, d. l, q. 5, in Opera omnia, VII (1973), pp.
27Cf. Categoriesc. 8.lla20-38. 101-104, nn. 200-205.
104 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 4 105
alone, for example, to be a father, [or to be] similar, equal, etc. Neither have
accident is constituted. Therefore, in this way a sufficient reason seems to be
they arisen from some apprehension or fiction of the i~tellect, but rat~er f~om
given both for the aforesaid division and for the constitution of the category,
things themselves in which there are forms from wh1c~ s~ch deno?11?at10ns
"toward something."
and predications arise. Neither again are such de?o~mation~ extnns1~, t~at
21. Divine Re/,ations-Of What Kind They Are.-But in this place there
is, derived from extrinsic things or forms; for a thmg is not said to be stm~lar
occurs a theological difficulty with regard to divine relations. How can the
to another thing through that which is in the other, but through that which
given doctrine be applied to them, and to which member of the mentioned
it has in itself-and so it is with the rest [of those denominations]. From this,
division should they be relegated? But this debate does not pertain to us, nor
then it is understood that denominations of this kind are derived from certain
is it necessary that everything which was said previously have an application
respects that result from the co-existence of a number of things that have a
in the case of these [divine] relations, since these relations are not accidental
sufficient foundation for that, [respects] whose sole function is to refer and to
but rather substantial.
order one thing to another, in such way that one respects another by reason
However, it is certain that they are not relations only "according to being
of some foundation that is presupposed in it. And these respects, because they
said" but rather "according to being." Nor are they properly and rigorously
have a special mode of causing, have been located in a special category.
categorical relations, since they are infinite substances and [are~ of~ high~r
20. But I add that this common opinion and its reasoning become easier
order. And therefore they cannot be located in any category. In lme with this,
and more probable if we say that these categorical relations are not new things
neither also do they have that imperfection or mode ofbeing by resultance from
or real modes that are really (ex natura ret} distinct from those things in which
a foundation and a terminus. But they are, either of themselves, like the relation
they are said to be founded, but that those things have a twofold way of de-
of a producer, for example, paternity, or they are directly (per se) produced by
nominating. One is direct (per se) and, as I may say, from their primary /p.
a proper production, or (to speak according to our way of conceiving) they are
805/ constitution, and the other is as it were resulting from the co-existence
co-produced, and formally speaking, they are directly attained through /col.
of one thing with another. The first way of denomination is either completely
bl the origins themselves, as filiation and passive procession. Those relations,
absolute, or ifit includes a respect, it will be a transcendental one, which most
therefore, are of a higher order, eminently embracing whatever perfection ~nd
often does not demand the co-existence of the other extreme to which it tends.
necessary property there is found in both a transcendental and a categorical
And when it does require that, it is not therefore because such a respect arises
respect, excluding imperfections.
as it were by accident from the co-existence of those extremes, but because the
thing itself has been essentially (per se) constituted in order to exercise some
function with regard to another thing, which function it can exercise only with
regard to an existing thing. And explained in this way, the particular difference
of transcendental relations 34 that was mentioned above is best (optima).
The second [kind of] denomination is in a particular way respective and
of an accidental kind, because the fact that one thing co-exists with another,
precisely looking at the concept and the character of the co-existence, is outside
the concept of each thing and therefore also the denomination that requires
this co-existence for no other cause except that this denomination itself results
from it, is accidental. Therefore, even though in the thing it is taken from the
same entity, nevertheless, because it is accidental, it has enough foundation
for a distinction that the intellect conceives that entity in the manner of two
forms. And finally, because that denomination is taken from things themselves,
it also is enough that by reason of it a special category of real and respective

34 That, unlike categorical relations, their being is not purely "being toward."
 Section V.
What is the Essence and the Proper Definition
Of "Toward Something" Itself or
Of a Categorical Relation.
1. The things we have up to now discussed almost entirely pertain to explain-
ing and defining the question whether there is any real categorical relation,
about which we are now treating. However, along the way we have touched
upon many things from which it will be more easy for us to explain the essence
of this relation and the definition that Aristotle accepts in this matter.

The Definition ofa Categorical Relation.

2. It must therefore be said that a relation (speaking only of one that is
categorical) is an accident whose whole being is to be toward something else,
or to have itself toward something else, or to respect something else. This
definition is taken from Aristotle, in the Categories, the Chapter, "Toward
Something," where he assigns for those things that are toward something two
definitions, which differ in only one word. The first definition is: Those things
are ''toward something" which are said to be that which they are ofother things or
toward something in some way. 1 The second is: Those things are ''toward some-
thing" whose being is to have themselves toward something. 2 Therefore, the whole
difference is in those words, "are said" (dicuntur)3. This indeed is frequently,
especially in the customary usage of philosophers, taken for the word "being,"
as Aristotle himself has said: A quality is that by which certain things are said to
be such (qua/es). And, therefore, many do not want to care very much about
a distinction or a diversity between those descriptions. Yet, nevertheless, ac-
cording to the mind of Aristotle it is dear that they are diverse and in the first
one the words "are said" (dicuntur) are taken with rigor and propriety, and
beyond that under the disjunction in that definition it is posited that those
things are "toward something" which are that which they are of others or in

C£ "Ilp6s TL 8E: Ta TOlaUTa AEyETm, oaa auTa clTTEP EaTLV hepwv Elvm
AEYETal ~ orrwaovv aX\ws rrpos ETEpov." Categories, 7.6a36-7. I have not
found a Latin translation that Suarez is exactly reproducing here.
2 C£ "cl.A.A.' foTL Ta rrp6s TL ols TO Elvm rnuT6v' foTL Tcil rrp6s TL rrws EXElV,"
Categories 7.31-2. Again, I have not found a source Latin translation for Suarez
here.
3 Here there is one word, "dicuntur" in Latin, "l..EyETm" in Greek, which requires
at least two words, "are said," to be translated into English.
108 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 5 109
some way are said to be ofothers, in such way that it is indicated that it is not that phrase, taken properly, there could be excluded relations of reason, which
of the nature of a relation that it be toward another, but that it be or be said not so much are as are apprehended to be "toward something."
[toward another]. And Aristotle wanted to correct this in the second defini- 4. What the Difference Is in the Definition ofRelation.-The second part of
tion, so that in the proper definition of the category "toward something" only that definition, 10 which takes the place of a difference, separates this category
relations "according to being" (secundum esse) and not relatives "according to from other categories of accident, for since they are absolute, they have their
being said" (secundum diet} are comprehended. Therefore, from that second being in another, but not toward another, which is proper to relation. But
definition our own [definition] is derived, or rather it is the same as that; for immediately two difficulties surface.
it is only for the sake of greater clarity /p. 806/ through a certain proportion
of genus and difference that it has been established and composed. The First Difficulty with regard to the Definition.
3. What is the Genus in the Definition of Relation-Therefore, accident is 5. The first is that the whole definition belongs [also] to transcendental
put in the place of a genus in that definition. Through this there is first of all relatives, for knowledge has its whole being toward another. To this difficulty
excluded divine relations which are not accidents but substances. Then there the usual common response is that beings of this kind have been excluded by
are excluded all created substances, which cannot be categorical relations, as Aristotle in the second definition by taking away the words "are said," which
is clear from what has been said in the preceding Section. Again, relations of were in the first [definition]. But /col. bl this response is not consonant with
reason are excluded, which properly and without qualification cannot be called the doctrine given by us in the above Section; 11 for beings of this kind, also
accidents, since an accident, said simply, is contained under real being. 4 Nei- conceived as they are in themselves, include in their essential concepts a dis-
ther do I accept what Cajetan [in commenting on Summa Theologiae] Part 1, position toward another. Therefore, they are not only said, but they also truly
Question 13, Article 7, indicates, namely, that the definition given of relatives are toward another. Therefore, even after those words, "are said," are taken
in the categories is common to relatives of reason and real relatives, because away from the definition, the definition truly belongs to those [beings of this
it has been given (he says) 5 about them insofar as they imply "toward" and in kind]. Finally, those words have been taken away solely in order to exclude
such way that they abstract from real being. 6 For this contradicts Aristotle who relatives "according to being said." However, we have shown that these are
first divided real being and posited "toward something" as one of its members 7 not simply relatives "according to being said," but also "according to being."
and then afterwards defined it. 8 Moreover, from that opinion it follows that Therefore, they have not been sufficiently excluded. Therefore, I think that
either relations of reason are placed in the category, "toward something," or transcendental respects of this kind must be excluded through that phrase:
that that definition extends more broadly than what its defines. Therefore, "whose total being is being toward another," if it is understood in the proper
although Aristotle did not explicitly posit the word "accident" in that defini- way, which we have explained at the end of the preceding Section. For those
tion, nevertheless, he tacitly understood it from the earlier division of being beings that include a transcendental respect are not so "toward another" that
into nine categories. From that, or especially because also the later phrase, their whole being is placed in a pure respect toward another, and, thus, they
namely, "being toward," taken properly and with rigor, does not pertain to do not respect another under the pure character of a terminus, but under some
relations of reason, but only [pertains to them] through a kind of analogous other character and by exercising in its regard some function for which things
imitation or proportion, as was explained above, 9 and therefore also through of this kind have been essentially (per se) constituted. But the relation that is
here defined has its whole essence in a pure respect to another, and therefore
4 In passing, we may note Suarez's realistic assessment of accidents and thus of the it particularly belongs to it that its whole being be toward another as to a pure
categories as such. terminus of such a respect or disposition.
5 While I have no doubt about Suarez's understanding here of Cajetan, I have not
found it in so many words.
6 Cf. Commentaria, in I, q. 13, a. 7, n. 10, in S. Thomae Opera, tomus IV (1888), p.
155b.
7 Cf. Categories 4.lb25-27; Metaphysics 5.7.1017a7-27.
8 Cf. Categories 7.6a36-7; and Metaphysics 5.15.1020b26-1021bl 1. lOCf. n. 2, this Section.
9 Cf. Section 3, n. 5, above. 11 Cf. Section 3, n. 9, above.
110 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 5 111

If a Relation Has a ''Being in"-How It ls Totally ''toward Another. " toAnnibaldus, Book I , Distincti n 25, Artide 4, to the T hird O bje tion, say-
6. But then there arises a second difficulty, which adds to the first, for this ing: "Evm though a relation does not posit from that respect1 6 anything absolute,
latter part of the definition seems to contradict the prior part. For if a relation stiLL it does posit something relative, and therefore a relution is a certain thing. Fm·
is an accident, its whole being cannot then consist in a disposition toward ifaccording to the cha1'acter ofrelation or respect it did not posit something, si11ce
another. For it is necessary that something of its being be in a subject, so that 11.ccording to its being by ,.eason ofwhich it posits something inherent, it wottfd not
in that way it can be an accident, since the being (esse) of an accident is "being fo LL within the category of1'efation, it would not be any kind ofbeing. "'.7 . .
in" (inesse). 7. T herefure to the tated d ifficul ty we must concede that a relation in tts
To this difficulty some reply that when a relation is said to have its whole whole being is an accident. For this character, as we have said abovc, 18 is, as it
being toward another this must be understood about the proper being of a were, rranscendental with regard co nine categories. Hence, when it is said th at
relation as such, which is being toward, and not about the being that it has in the whole being of a relation i co b toward another, the exclusive word that is
common with other accidents, which is being in. And from this has arisen the there virtually contained does not exclude concomitant thin gs or extrinsic and
opinion treated above 12 about the distinction between the "being toward" and transcendental characters. Accordingly, just as it does n exclude the character
the "being in" of a relation and (the view] that "being toward" abstracts from of real being so neither [does it exclude] the character of accidenc and of be-
every real being and of itself is univocally common to relations of reason and ing inherent. Therefore, it excludes only absolute being and indicates that the
real relations. 13 bei ng of a relation as such does not stay in the subject char in its own -way ir
However, this reply has been sufficiently refuted from what was said above 14 affects and denominates bu t rather it orders that [subj ect] to a terminus, and
against the said opinion. First, because not only is it of the nature of an ac- in this is placed the whol e formal character of a relation. T hus, even though,
cident, as it exists in a certain thing /p. 807/ that it be in it according to some similacicy, for example, according to its whole, and even relative, character,
generic or common character, but [that it be in it] also according to its proper must be con eived /col. b/ as a form that affects the thing that it denominates
[character] and insofar as it is a certain kind of form in the nature of things. as similar, nevertheless, its whole affecting of that [thing] is posited in this that
Indeed, it is impossible that a form inform or affect [anything] according to it orders that thing and refers it to another, and in this sense the whole being
a common character and not some proper character, since these characters of a relation is said to be and to have itself toward another.
are not distinguished in actual reality (a parte rei) . Second, because otherwise 8. An Objection.-It ls Resolved.-You will say: this is common to those
a relation would not give a proper formal relative effect to its subject, since forms or modes that are real and absolute and that include a transcendental
an accident does not give a formal effect except by inhering and affecting. If, respect. For knowledge so exists in and affects the knower that in its own way
therefore, a relation does not inhere (non inest) according to its proper character,
it does not confer a proper and specific formal effect. Third, because if that real l 6That is, the respect by which in the Trinity a relation distinguishes the Father from
proper being of a relation, which is said "to be toward," would not "be in," it the Son.
would be nothing real in the nature of things and, consequently, a categorical 17 For this, c£ Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Opuscula alia dubia, vol primum, Scriptum
super libris Magistri Sententiarum ad Hannibaldum Hannibal.densem Romanum,
relation according to what properly constitutes it would not be anything real.
Episcopum Cardinalem, I, d. 25, a. 4, ad 3, in Sancti Thomae Aquj natis, Opera om-
Hence, St. Thomas, correctly, in [his Commentary on the Sentences], Book 1,
nia, tomus xxii (Parmae: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1868; reprint: N ew York: Musurgia
Distinction 25, Question l, Article 4, in Reply to the Third Objection, says Publishci·s, 1950), p. 75a. For greater understanding of what is involved here, let
that a real relation, in line with its proper quidditative character, posits some- m e transL-ite the objection which is being auswered here as follows: "T he Father and
thing in that thing whose relation it is, even though that which it posits is not the Son arc d.isringuisbed only by relations. Bue a relation a regards the respect by
absolute. 15 This he has taught more at length in another work, On the Sentences which it dis inguishes docs not posir 'something' (illiquid) but 'toward omcthing'
(ad aliquid). T herefore , from the facr chat they [Father and Son] are distinguished
12C£ Section 2, nn. 18-21. by relations, they arc not said to be rhree beings (mtes) or rlirce things." ibid., p.
13C£ Section 3, n. 2. 74b. On Annibaldus and chis work which bears his name, c£ P. Mandonnet, ''.An-
14Cf. Section 2, nn. 18-21. nibal des Annibaldi," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, tome premier, deuxieme
15Cf. S. ThomaeAquinatis, Scriptum in lib. Sent., I, d. 25, q. l, a. 1, ed. Mandonnet, partie (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ane, 1931), cols. 1321-23.
tomus I, p. 613. 18C£ DM37, 1, nn. 1-5, vol. 26, pp. 491-3; and DM39, 3, nn. 17-18, pp. 528-9.
112 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47. On Real Relation Section 5 113

it orders him to a knowable object, and it cannot otherwise exercise its formal effect. Hence, it also can be said that, although, simply speaking, it is not of
effect. And the same is true about a potency, a union, and similar things. the nature of whiteness to actually constitute a white thing, nevertheless, it
This is answered by conceding that in this there is some similarity and is of the nature of whiteness, as affecting and informing a subject, to actually
proportion, on account of which these forms are said to include some respect constitute a white thing. In this way, then, in the present case, we are saying
"according to being" (secundum esse), even though it is transcendental. But the that the formal effect of a relation is to actually refer, because this is what that
difference is the same one that was mentioned above: 19 that categorical rela- relation directly, immediately, and formally confers upon the subject that in
tions consist in a pure respect, but other forms or qualities give some proper its own way it affects.
absolute being exercising some function to which their natures are ordered, 12. The Essence of Relation Is Located in the Actual Affecting (in actuali af
in which also they include some disposition [toward], and therefore they do fectione) ofa Subject.-But I add then that it is not common to eve-?' accident
not have their total being toward another as do categorical relations. to affect only in aptitude, but there are certain ones of whose essential concept
it is that they cannot exist in the nature of things without affecting, as we said
Whether the Essence ofa Re/dtion Is to Refer Actually or in Aptitude. above with regard to accidental modes. 20 Relations then are contained in this
9. But finally it can be objected that if a relation is considered abstractly, second class, because they cannot exist in the nature of things without actually
as it is a certain form that refers a subject or a foundation to a terminus, in referring, by the fact that they cannot be conserved separate from every subject,
this way it is not of its nature that it refer actually but that it be apt to refer; because, as has been shown, 21 in reality they are not distinguished from their
and, therefore, its whole being does not consist in "being toward" a terminus. proximate subjects.
The consequence is clear: because being toward a terminus implies an actual Yet there is no lack of those who teach the opposite, for example, Uohn]
exercise (so to speak) of a certain disposition toward a terminus. But the an- Major, in [his Sentences commentary], Book 4, Distinction 12, Question 3
tecedent is evident, both because the common nature of an accident is not to [sic] ;22 and Ledesma, in the First Part of Book 4, Question 28, Article 2, Doubt
actually effect [something] but rather [to do so] in aptitude, and also because
the mind can conceive a complete relation as affecting and not yet referring a 20Cf. DM 16, l, nn. 21-22, vol. 25, p. 573.
subject. In this way, the theologians also say that in God paternity is conceived 21 Cf. Section 2, above.
as constituting the first person and as it were adhering to him before referring 22 For this, see Joannes Maior, Quartus sententiarum, d. 12, q. 1 (Parisiis: Apud Ponset
him. Therefore, the nature of a relation does not consist in an actual respect. le Preux, 1509) fol. 57vb-58ra, where Major's basic argument is: "every accident
10. The answer is that the antecedent is false. For a thing is not constituted can be without a subject. This is evident inasmuch as a subject is extrinsic to an
as apt to refer by a relation as such, but rather by the proximate foundation of accident, that is, it is not a part of it nor is [the accident] essentially depending on a
a relation. Moreover, the proper formal effect of a relation is to actually refer. subject as it depends upon God. This is certain about some accidents, for example,
Otherwise, it would not be distinguished, even according to its formal nature, quantity, and the reasoning is the same for all accidents. Therefore, [God] can
from the foundation, and it would not require the coexistence /p. 808/ of a produce every accident without a subject and can conserve it apart from a subject."
(dico conclusive ... quodlibet accidens potest esse sine subiecto. Patet cum subiectum sit
terminus. Neither would its whole being truly be said to be located in a respect
extrinsecum accidenti, puta non est pars eius nee essentialiter dependet a subiecto sicut
to something else.
a Deo. De aliquibus accidentibus hoc certum est ut de quantitate et aequa est ratio in
11. In answer then to the first proof of the antecedent: first, it is one thing omnibus; ergo omne accidens potest facere sine subiecto et eum conservare extra subiec-
to consider whether the formal effect of an accident is actually to constitute tum.) Also, cf. idem, In Primum sententiarum, dd. 30-31, q. unica (Parisius: Apud.
something and another thing [to ask] whether it is of the essence of an ac- Io. Badium, 1519), fol. 89rb-va. Also see In Secundum sententiarium, d. 12, q. 2,
cident actually to exercise its own formal effect. For these two things are ed. secunda (Parisius: Apud Iohannem Granion, 1519), fol. 64rb, where Major
distinct. For we truly say that the formal effect of whiteness is to constitute says that by his absolute power God can create prime matter apart from form, j~st
a white thing actually and not only in aptitude, even though absolutely it is as "whenever there are two created things which are really distinct, and of which
not of the essential nature of whiteness that it actually impart such a formal one is not a part of the other, God can create either of them without the other and
He can conserve either of them without the other" (quandocumque duae sunt res
creatae realiter distinctae, quarum neutra est pars alterius, Deus potest quamcumque
19Cf. Section 4, n. 10. ii/arum producere sine alia, et quamcumque ii/arum conservare sine reliqua). Here, I
114 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 5 115
23
4, who say that God can conserve a created paternity, for instance, without
be located in him who has not begotten this son. Otherwise, either it would
its proper subject, either as essentially separate or in another subject. For they
constitute him a father who did not beget, or it would inhere in someone to
think that paternity is a thing that is totally distinct from other things, and
whom it would not give its own formal effect. But both of these are impos-
therefore they are speaking logically, especially with regard to the first part. For
sible.
with regard to the second [part] it appears to be impossible that this paternity
Moreover, just as it is truer that a relation is not a thing that is distinct from
its foundation, so also it is truer that it cannot be separated or essentially
am reminded of the sarcasm directed at Maior by Philip Melanchthon, which reads conserved apart from that [foundation]. But if sometimes a relation is really
in part: "I have seen the Commentaries of John Maior (about the morals of the distinguished from a remote subject, this is insofar as the proximate founda-
man I am not judging) on the Sentences of the Lombard, a man [i.e. Maior] whom tion /col. bl of the relation is some thing that is distinct from a remote subject.
they say now reigns among the theologians of Paris. Good God, what wagonloads Hence, such a relation can also be conserved separate from such a subject to
of nonsense! For how many pages does he dispute whether for horseback-riding
that degree that the thing that is its foundation can be conserved without
a horse is required? ... " (Vidi ]oannis Maioris commentarios (de moribus hominis
that subject. But then a relation that is conserved in this way affects its own
non judico) in Sententias Longobardicas [sic], quem nunc inter Lutetiae theologos
regnare aiunt: Bone Deus, quae plaustra nugarum! Quot paginis disputat, utrum ad foundation in the manner of a subject and actually refers that [foundation].
equitandum requiritur equus? ... ) Adversus furiosorum Parisiensium Theologastrorum In this manner, a consecrated quantity24 is equal to another [quantity), and a
decretum Philippi Melanthonis pro Luthero Apologia: Opera t. II, Wittenberg, 1562, separated whiteness would be similar to another [whiteness]. And so there can
p. 83; cited by Ricardo G. Villoslada, S.I., La universidad de Paris durante los estu- never be an actual relation without it actually referring to something else.
dios de Francisco de Vitoria, O.P. (1507-1522), (Romae: Apud Aedes Universitatis 13. The answer to the second prooF5 is that it is impossible to conceive a
Gregorianae, 1938), p. 138. relation with its own formal effect fully and properly conceived, without it being
23 I have not found this reference. There were two Ledesmas, both Dominicans, that conceived as actually referring-just as it is impossible to conceive whiteness,
Suarez might have seen. The first was Martin (1509-1574), who authored Com- with its formal effect fully conceived, without it being conceived as constitut-
mentaria in IV Sententiarum, 2 vols., Coimbra, 1555-1560), the first volume of ing an actual white thing, because a thing cannot be fully conceived without
which was also named: "Prima quartae" (That is, "The first of the fourth [part?]." I that which is part of its essential nature. However, it is possible sometimes that
have not seen this extremely rare volume and the problem I have beforehand is that
our intellect, conceiving some form as affecting does not distinctly, properly,
if it is a Commentary on the Sentences, it should be divided by Distinctions rather
and fully, conceive its formal effect, but only [conceives it] confusedly, staying
than by Questions, as Suarez cites it. The second Ledesma was Pedro (1544-1616),
within this common concept of affecting or inhering. For because this concept
who authored in Spanish: Primera parte de la Summa, en la qua! va cifrado todo lo
que pertenece a los sietc sacramcntos, con todos los casos y dudas morales que sepueden is quasi-transcendent and included in every mode or difference of form, the
oftecer resueltas y detmninadas, Salamanca: Juan y Andres Renaut, 1598. While this whole form, therefore, as affecting, can be conceived only confusedly with
work appeared in the year following the first appearance of Suarez's Disputationes regard to its effect. For example, if someone conceives that whiteness, in line
metaphysicae, both works had the same publisher and it is perhaps conceivable that with its total being, is a form adhering in a subject and informing that [sub-
Suarez saw the work of Pedro de Ledesma in preparation while his own work was ject], he does not indeed conceive it as actually constituting a white thing, not
being printed. However, in this case also, the divisions of the work, into separate because that is not the formal effect of whiteness, but because he is conceiving
treatises in turn divided into chapters, do not correspond to Suarez's reference here. its effect in a diminished and confused way.
The closest I have so far come to what is needed is Pedro de Ledesma, in his Tratado
de! Sacramento de! Altar, que se llama Eucharistia, Cap. VIIL De los acidentes que 24According to Catholic doctrine, in the Eucharistic consecration, the accidents,
quedan en este sacramento (page 68 of Salamanca: En Emprenta de Antonio Ramirez, including quantity and the quality of whiteness of bread, remain even though their
viuda, 1621, edition of the Primera parte), where Pedro speaks of the accidents in substrates do not. This will permit the quantity of one consecrated host to be equal
the Eucharist, which by divine power can exist apart from the substances of bread to another or the whiteness of one to be similar to that of another. On this, cf. F.
and wine. However, in this place he does not mention relation in general or pater- Jansen, "Eucharistiques (Accidents)," in Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, 5, 2c
nity in particular. For information on the two Ledesmas, c£ Gonzalo Diaz Diaz, partie (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1939, cols. 1368-1452, esp. 1418-22. For Suarez,
Hombres y documentos de la filosofia espafiola, vol. iv (Madrid: Consejo Superior de
c£ De Eucharistia, Qu. 77, aa. 1-2, Disp. 56, ss. 1-3, vol. 21, pp. 275-87.
Investigaciones Ciendficas, 1991), pp. 624-5.
25 See n. 9, this Section.
116 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation

In this way, therefore, a relation can be conceived inasmuch as in its totality

it affects or adheres in or constitutes something, even if it is not understood
as actually referring, not because the formal effect of a relation is not actually Section VI.
to refer, but because then the formal effect of a relation is not conceived with About the Subject, the Foundation, and the Terminus
a proper and adequate concept, but with one that is confused and common. Required for a Categorical Relation.
And in this way it happens for us when we conceive paternity in God as prior 1. Whether There Is a Final Cause of Relation.-Whether it has an Efficient
to the act of referring to the Son, about which matter the Theologians debate Cause.-What Is the Material Cause ofa Relation. We have explained /p. 809/
at length.
whether there is and what is a categorical relation. Now it is necessary to explain
its causes or principles, of what kind they are and how they can belong to it. 1
For since this relation is not as such (per se) intended in things, it properly
does not have a final cause, although in that way in which it is it can be said
to be on account of its formal effect or on account of its terminus.
And for a similar reason, since it is not directly made but rather results or
formally follows when the foundation and the terminus are posited, it neither
has nor requires an efficient cause, besides those that effect the foundation
and the terminus-unless someone wishes to attribute to that foundation or
terminus some efficiency with regard to relation, at least through a natural
resultance, which would be probable with respect to the foundation, if the
relation would be a mode that would be really (ex natura ret} distinct from
that. However, because we suppose the opposite to be true, therefore we do
not think that there is here an effective resultance, but a quasi-formal one.
Again, since relation itself is a certain form, it does not have another proper
and physical formal cause, but it has its own quiddity and metaphysical formal
nature, which we have already explained. It also has a terminus, which, insofar
as it is specifying, shares in a certain way the character of a form.
But the foundation and the subject seem to constitute a material cause, and
therefore in these three-the subject, the foundation, and the terminus-all
principles and causes of relations have been posited. Therefore, we must speak
of these individually, and then afterwards it will be evident how from the variety
of these, diverse genera and species of relations can be distinguished.

About the Subject ofAccidental Rel.ations.2

2. First, therefore, it must be said that every categorical relation requires some
real subject. Taken in general, this assertion is clear, for a relation is an accident,
as has been said. But every accident requires some subject. Therefore.
Again, a relation is a certain form. But every form informs something. But
that which it informs is called its subject, especially if it inheres in that and

1 For this order of proceeding, cf. the prologue to Section 1, above.

2 Said another way, this is a question of the material cause of a relation.
118 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 6 119

depends upon it-which we have shown about a relation, even as it is a rela- tions, are multiplied according to the distinction and the plurality of those
tion. foundations, but nevertheless, insofar as a relation is a certain medium and a
It is necessary, however, to note that we can speak about relation in the ab- kind of interval between two things having a disposition between themselves, 5
stract or in the concrete, just as [we can] about other accidents. So in general in this way it is one and the same for both.
the word "relation" itself is abstract and in particular so are the words "pater- 4. However, either this distinction and the whole opinion is only a matter
nity," "similarity," etc. And likewise "relative" in general is /col. bl something of words or it is unintelligible. For how can it happen that an accident that is
concrete, and in particular "father," "similar," and the like. When therefore numerically one and the same be in subjects /p. 810/ that are really distinct
we say that relation requires a subject, it is necessary to understand this about and not united among themselves, but are entirely disjointed and even sepa-
relation in the abstract; for a relative in the concrete does not properly have a rate in place? For either this relation is said to be one, with a true and proper
subject, but rather it is something that consists of a subject and a relation, if unity, like a simple form, and the argument that was made to prove that one
it is formally taken as it is relative, or as a certain composite of relation and its and the same relation cannot exist simultaneously in both extremes proceeds
subject. For sometimes the subject of a relation is customarily called a relative in this sense. Or that relation is said to be one only by a certain collection,
denominatively rather than formally, that is, as affected, not as constituted by because, that is, from both relations existing in both extremes there coalesces
a relation. Therefore, more properly and more formally it is said about what is a complete disposition and a kind of connection in both extremes, and in this
itself constituted. For that which is affected by a relation is not properly said way that relation is called one only in name, which is a way of speaking that
itself to be relative, and also it is often called the extreme of a relation, because is unusual and therefore it should be avoided. Moreover, according to that
a relative disposition is as it were enclosed between two subjects of relations, [way of speaking] it should logically be said that such a disposition, in the way
as between two extremes. in which it is one, has one subject, not simply, but by the bundling of both
extremes that are ordered to one another.
It Is Shown, against Henry, That One Relation, But if someone says that that mutual disposition of both extremes is simply
Even as Regards ''Being Toward," Can Be in Only One Subject. one, but it is not in them as in subjects but is only between them, which Henry
3. But here it can be asked whether one relation has one subject and of what indicates more, this certainly is more evidently false and less intelligible. For
sort that is. I am asking this principally because of Henry [of Ghent], who in either that interval, or mutual disposition, is something of reason only, and
his Quod/ibet 9, Question 3, thinks that a relation as regards its proper "be- thus it is irrelevant for a real relation, as Gregory [of Rimini], in [his Sentences
ing toward" is one and the same between the two extremes which are related commentary], Book l, Distinction 28, Question 1, correctly shows against
(referuntur). For a relation, according to its proper nature, is a kind of medium [Petrus] Aureoli. 6 Or it is something real, and thus it is either something that
between related extremes, and, therefore, just as Aristotle has said that the road subsists in itself, which cannot be said, or it necessarily is in some subject.
is the same from Athens to Thebes as from Thebes to Athens, 3 so Henry says But it can only be in the extremes that are related between themselves or in
that the disposition of any two extremes that relate to one another (ad invicem some one of those extremes. Or, finally; it is something abstracting from real
se habentium) is one and the same, that is, [the relation] of father to son and being and being of reason, as Henry indicates,7 and this is simply false, as was
of son to father, or of two brothers or of similar things to one another. 4 shown above. 8 And even if we were to grant that as it is in our concept it can
But if you object that the relation of a father, for example, is paternity and be abstracted, nevertheless in individual relations it would not be possible to
[the relation] of a son is filiation, and that it is always (in universum) neces- abstract. Therefore, it is necessary that in real and accidental relations there
sary that they be distinguished from their foundations, because one and the
same accident cannot be in diverse subjects, he answers as follows. Relations,
considered as existing in foundations and as insepaable from those founda- 5 Ibid., 11. 69-70; p. 53, 11. 94-97; p. 54, 11. 8-10.
6 C£ GregoriiAriminensis, Lectura ... Inf Sent. dist. 28-32, qu. l,Additio 129, tomus
III, pp. 86-7; ibid., ad 3, p. 90. Here we may note another indirect approach by
3 C£ Arisrotle, Physics 3.3.202b13-14. Suarez to Aureoli, this time through Gregory of Rimini.
4 Cf. Henrici de Gandavo, Quodlibet IX, qu. 3, ed. Macken (1983), p. 52 11. 71- 7 Cf. Quodlibet 9, q. 3, ed. Macken, p. 55, 11. 58-59.
76. 8 Cf. Section 3, n. 3, above.
120 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On &al Relation Section 6 121
be something real and accidental, and then the stated argument recurs-that
But conversely, sometimes a relation denominates a remote subject or the
it must be in some one subject.
supposit itself, and not a proximate [subject], as filiation denominates a sup-
posit, namely, a son, but not humanity, even though it is probable that it
How There Can Be Several Subordinated Subjects of One RelAtion. proximately inheres in humanity. And paternity is proximately said to be in
5. What Order Relations Observe in the Denomination ofa Subject.-Therefore, potency, and yet it does not denominate a father unless the same is supposed.
we must speak in another way and must distinguish with regard to subjects. For But the reason for this variety comes from a diversity of foundations, which
there can be several subjects of diverse character subordinated among them- sometimes are compared according to the same proportion to the termini of
selves or of the same character and equally affected immediately by a relation. relations, but sometimes according to a diverse [proportion], as will become
Therefore, in this second way it cannot happen that one relation be in several more clear below in explaining the different kinds of relations. Sometimes also
subjects, as the argument made against Henry9 proves, which [argument] is it results from this that a relation follows its own proximate foundation and
universal with regard to any accident at all that has in reality /col. bl a true denominates that, not insofar as it affects or denominates another subject, but
and proper unity. according to its own precise and abstract nature, in which way the relation of
However, in the first way there can be distinguished several subjects of one inhering belongs to an accident. But sometimes a relation follows the founda-
relation, one [subject] proximate and another remote. For example, the rela- tion only inasmuch as it affects or denominates /p. 811/ a certain subject or
tion of equality is proximately in quantity, but remotely in substance; and the supposit, but sometimes [it follows it] indifferently under both features. And
relation of similarity is proximately in quality and remotely in quantity, and this is [enough] about the subject of a relation.
even more remotely in substance. However, a relation of this kind directly and
properly affects only the proximate subject in which in its own mode it exists.
But it is related (comparatur) to a remote subject by means of the proximate one
insofar as this inheres and is sustained in that. For already above, in Disputa-
tion 14, we have shown that one accident can proximately inhere in another,
and not affect the substance in itself, but only insofar as that accident in which
the other inheres is sustained in the substance. 10 In this way then one relation
can immediately be in some accidental subject and remotely in another or
in a substance. But whether this is common in all relations, we shall see very
soon.
6. However, as regards the denomination of a re1ation 11 a certain variety
must be considered among relations. For sometimes a relation equally and in
the same way denominates a proximate and a remote subject, as quantity is
called equal, as is also a material substance, and whiteness is called similar, and
a white thing itself or also a subject, such as a man or a wall [is called similar].
But sometimes a relation denominates a proximate and not a remote subject,
as the intellect is said to be referred by a relation of potency to its own act, but
the soul1 2 is not like this. And so it is with regard to other things.

9 See n. 4, just preceding.

10C£ DM 14, 4, nn. 6-7, vol. 25, p. 495.
11 That is, what a relation denominates rather than what is denominated as a rela-
tion.
12Which is the substrate or the subject of the intellect.
 Section VII.
About the Foundation of a Categorical Relation. 1
1. A Real Relation Requires a Real Foundation.-As regards the foundation of
a relation it must first be stated as a general rule (in communi) that every real
relation needs some real foundation. So it is supposed almost without proof
or discussion by all who write on this subject. And the reason seems to be that
a relation of itself does not have its own entity, since it has been shown that
it is not a thing that is distinct from absolutes. Therefore, it is necessary that
it have that [entity], at least identically and really, from something else. But
it does not have it from a terminus; for a terminus is something extrinsic and
distinct, whereas the entity of a thing is intrinsic. Therefore, a real relation has
its entity from a real foundation. Thus, it always requires that [foundation].
This is confirmed and more fully explained, because a relation is of such a
nature that it neither comes to be through itself, nor is it directly intended in
nature. Therefore, it follows and as it were results in a subject when a terminus
is posited. Therefore, it requires in the subject some real reason or cause on
account of which such a relation results when such a terminus is posited. That
cause then is called the real foundation of the relation.
About the Distinction ofthe Foundation from the Subject ofa Relation.
2. But in order that this assertion be more fully explained, first of all it can
be asked whether it is necessary that this foundation be in reality distinct from
the subject of the relation. However, this can be understood either about the
proximate subject ofinhesion or about the remote and as it were the fundamental
subject, which is the substance itself And indeed about the prior subject it is
certain that it is not necessary that apart from it there is another foundation
of the relation that is really distinct from it; otherwise, it would be necessary
to regress to infinity. Hence, it is certain that the relation of equality, which
exists in a quantity, even one which is separate from substance, 2 does not have
another foundation apart from that quantity. For it cannot be imagined of
what kind that is. Nor would we stop in that further foundation, for it also
would be a proximate subject and thus with respect to it we would have to
seek another foundation. Or if we were to stop in that, for a greater reason we
should stop in the quantity itsel£

Note that Suarez is still dealing here with the material causality of a relation.
2 We may relate this immediately to what was said in Section 5, n. 12, above, about
a consecrated quantity.
 124 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 7 125
The difficulty therefore concerns /col. bl the principal and fundamental
the substance, which is what St. Thomas principally intended in that place.
subject, which is to ask whether with respect to substance every real relation
Therefore, between a substance and a relation there is always interposed some
requires some accidental foundation which is distinct in the thing itself (in re
other foundation, by reason of which a relation can be a thing different from
ipsa), atleast "from the nature of the thing" (ex natura rez), 3 from that substance.
the substance itself.
For many seem to think so. And the reason can be that relation is an accident,
And this is confirmed from Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, Book 5, where when
and therefore it must belong to a substance by the medium of an accident in
enumerating the foundations of relations he always posits something distinct
which it is founded. The consequence is evident, because a relation, as was
from substance, namely, quality, action, or something of this kind. 10 It is again
said above, 4 is not distinguished in reality (a parte rez) from its proximate
confirmed because otherwise relations could be founded and based in matter
foundation. Therefore, inasmuch as it is an accident, it must be proximately
alone, which is manifestly false, expecially according to the common opinion
founded in an accident; for if it were immediately to belong to a substance, it
that denies that any accident can be in prime matter alone.
would be the same in reality (in re) with that [substance], and thus it would
not be an accident but rather a substance.
3. Therefore, St. Thomas, in De Potentia, Question 8, Article 2, in answer to
Some Relations Can Be in Reality (in re ipsa)
the First Objection, says that no relation can be the same as a substance that is Immediately Founded on Substance.
in a genus, that is, [the same] as a created substance. 5 And in Contra Gentiles, 4. Nevertheless, it must be said that it is not necessary that the proximate
foundation of a relation be some accident, or some thing, /p. 812/ or real mode
Book 4, Chapter 14, toward the end, he says that in creatures relations have a
dependent being, because their being is other than the being of a substance, 6 that is really (ex natura rez) distinct from the primary subject of the relation. ~his
and afterwards he says: "A relation which really comes to a substance has both is the common opinion, as I will say in what follows soon. But I am provmg
an ultimate and a most imperfect being; an ultimate being because not only does it first, because there is no cause or reason of this necessity. For the reasons by
it prerequire the being ofthe substance but also the being ofother accidents, from which it was proven above 11 that a real relation requires a foundation do not
prove that it is necessary that the foundation be in reality distinct from the
which the relation is caused. "7 Therefore, from the opinion of St. Thomas, a
relation always supposes in a substance another accident on which it may be subject. For, although in the subject there is required a real cause or reason on
founded. account of which when the terminus is posited the relation follows, neverthe-
Hence [in Summa Theologiae], Part 1, Question 28, Article 2, in answer less , that reason or cause can be the intrinsic nature itself of such a subject, and
.
to Objection 2, 8 he says that for a relation in creatures there is always sup- not some thing or mode that is superadded to that. For, why, just as quantity
posed something absolute, which is some thing other than the relation itself from its natural condition and nature has a sufficient reason because of which
This, according to what was said above, 9 cannot be verified by reason of the certain relations follow on it, and likewise quality, could not a substance also
proximate foundation alone. Therefore, [it is verified] at least by reason of have something similar through itself? ..
5. Hence, I argue secondly by induction. For just as two quantities or two
whitenesses are really related (referuntur) by a relation of similarity or equality,
3 Here I acknowledge some insecurity in translating. Both the phrase "in re ipsa" so two substances [may be related] by a relation of specific identity. Therefore,
and the phrase "in natura rei'' can be translated as "in reality." Or they can be this relation is in a substance without an accidental foundation that is really
rendered literally, as I have done here, as "in the thing itself" or "in the nature of (ex natura ret) distinct from that [substance]. The consequence is evident:
the thing."
both because one substance is of the same species with another not by reason
4 See Section 2, nn. 2-11, and 22-24, above.
of some accident but by reason of its own entity and proper nature, and also
5 Cf. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, q. 8, a. 2, ad 1, ed. Bazzi et al., pp. 217-
218. Of course, the Divine Substance is not in any genus; ibid. because just as between whiteness and similarity there is no medium, so there
6 Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Summa contra Gentiles, IV, c. 14, in Opera omnia, tomus is none between a substantial nature and a relation of specific identity. But the
xv (Romae: Typis R. Garrone, 1930), p. 57b. antecedent is taken from St. Thomas [in Summa Theologiae], Part l, Question
7 Ibid.
8 Cf. S. ThomaeAquinatis, Opera omnia, tomus IY, p. 32lb.
10Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15.1020b26-32.
9 Cf. Section 2, nn. 2-11, and 22-24, plus Section 4, n. 7, above.
11 Cf. Section 6, above.
126 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 7 127

28, Article l, in answer to Objection 2, 12 and it is explicitly the position of And it is evident by reason, for substance, according to itself, immediately
Aristotle in Metaphysics, Book 5, Text [sic] 15, where he is thinking in the same terminates God's creation. Therefore through itself it is immediately referred
way about identity in substance as about similarity in quality and equality in to God by a relation of creature.
quantity. 13 From this also there is taken an argument by parity of reason. For You will say that passive creation is a certain mode that is really distinct
there is as much agreement between two substances as between two whitenesses from a terminus, in which that relation can be proximately founded and not
or [two] quantities. Again, there is as much proportion, because they are equally immediately in substance. I answer first: although the whole may be conceded,
of the same order. Therefore, specific identity in a substance is as much a real nevertheless, there is no accident that is the foundation of that relation, because
relation as are similarity and equality in quantity and quality. And in this way that creative dependence is not an accident, as I have said above. 22 Moreover,
the Thomists frequently teach, [for example] Soncinas, in Metaphysics, Book although it is true that in that dependence there can be founded a certain
5, Question 35, 14 and Javelli, in Metaphysics, Book 5, Question 21. 15 proper relation, nevertheless it is not therefore excluded that the ~ubstance
6. Jn What the Relation ofCreature Is Founded.-Another example concerns itself through itself be referred causally or fundamentally to God, msofar as
the relation of creation. For, from the opinion of all, it is real and categorical, it itself by reason of its own being essentially demands that dependence and
and still it is immediately founded in a substance. St. Thomas expressly teaches terminates it through itself.
this in De Potentia, Question 7, Article 9, in answer to Objection 4, where 7. And this is confirmed in the relation ofsonship, which cannot be so founded
he says as follows: "A creature is related (refertur) according to its substance as in active or passive generation so that it is proximately in that [generation]. For
according to a cause of the I col. bl relation, but formally according to the rela- when the actual generation has been transacted, there remains the relation of
tion itself, just as something is said to be similar according to quality causally, sonship. Nor can it be founded in another accident, since there is none that
and according to similarity formally." 16 And the same thing is taken from De is its cause. It is founded, therefore, in the substance itself. But the reason is
Potentia, Question 3, Article 3; 17 and from Cajetan [commenting on Summa that the substance itself of a creature, insofar as it is creatable or generable by
Theologiae], Part l, Question 45, Article 3; 18 Ferrara [commenting on] Contra another cause, is sufficient that in it a relation can be founded, if it is created
Gentiles, Book 4, Chapter 14; 19 Soncinas, in Metaphysics, Book 5, Question or generated by such a cause.
31 ;20 and Javelli, [in Metaphysics, Book 5], Question 21. 21 8. What Accident Can Be the Same as Substance.-To the arguments to the
contrary, from what was said above about the division of being into substance
and accident, 23 the answer is that a proper physical accident cannot in reality
12C£ S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia, tomus IV, p. 319a.
(in re) be altogether the same as a substance. But a categorical accident can
13C£ Metaphysics 5.15.1021a9-12.
sometimes be distinguished only by "reasoned reason" (ratione ratiocinata), as
14C£ Pauli Soncinatis, O.P., Quaestiones metaphysicales, V, q. 35 (Venetiis, 1588), p.
is dear with regard to duration. So therefore it must be said that relations that
99a.
15 For this, cf. Chrysostomi Iavelli Canapicii, In omnibus Metaphysicae libris quaesita are proximately founded in substance are not accidents that are physical and
... , V, q. 21 (Veneriis, 1576), fol. 115r. according to their own entity, but are only categorical accidents with respect
16Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 9, ad 4, to a figure and mode of predication, inasmuch as according to their formal
ed. Bazzi et al., p. 208. nature they are outside the nature of substance, and therefore it is reasonable
17Ibid., pp. 42-44. that such relations not be distinguished in reality from substance.
18C£ Cajetan, Commentaria, in I, q. 45, a. 3, nn. 3-5, in S. Thomae Opera, tomus IV 9. But the texts cited there [above]24 from St. Thomas /p. 813/ persuade
(1888), p. 467. with probability that he thought a real relation was in some way really (ex
19 C£ Ferrara, Commentaria in Summam contra gentiles, IV, c. 14, n. 12, in S. Thomae natura ret) distinguished from its foundation, which is a probable opinion.
Aquinatis, Opera omnia, romus X'I (1930), p. 62ab. For, indeed, in Contra Gentiles, Book 4, he says the such a relation belongs to
20Cf. Quaestiones metaphysicales .. ., V, q. 31 (Venetiis, 1588), pp. 93b-94b; in this
place, Soncinas asks, "Whether a relation can be founded immediately upon a 22Cf. DM20, 4, n. 28, vol. 25, p. 777.
substance?" and he answers that some relations can be so immediately founded. 23 Cf. DM 32: "About the Division of Created Being into Substance and Accident"
21 Cf. Chrysostomi Iavelli Canapicii, In omnibus Metaphysicae libris ... , V, q. 21 (Ve- (De divisione entis creati in substantiam et accidens), vol. 26, pp. 312-29.
netiis, 1576), fol. l 16v. 24See n. 3, this Section.
128 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 7 129

a substance by the medium of another accident-which cannot be universally Indeed, as we have said, this foundation need not always be distinct in reality
true, even if that opinion is supposed; therefore it is probable to me that he is (re) /col. bl from the subject of the relation, but [distinct] by reason is enough
speaking about relations that are physically and really accidents, and therefore sometimes. For it is called the subject insofar as it is that in which the relation
perhaps he is calling that a relation which really comes to a substance. For he exists. But [it is called) the foundation inasmuch as it has a certain character
is speaking there in this way, and therefore he also gives examples in cases of on which the relation follows when the terminus is posited or insofar as the
similarity and equality, but not in other cases. relation has its entity from that.
Ferrara explains it in another way: when St. Thomas says that a relation 11. Reasons Supporting the Opposite.-But on the opposite side is the fact
pre-requires in a substance the being of other accidents, it is understood either that most often authors speak about these as about distinct things and they
according to a thing or according to a mode. 25 But this [explanation] is forced. suggest that the reason of founding is something required in the foundat~on
And it cannot be fitted to all of these relations, as is clear with regard to the itself or beyond the foundation and the terminus in order that the relat10n
relation of act and potency that is between matter and form, or the relation result. For example, for the relation of paternity there is required the action of
of substantial union, and similar [relations]. generating, which is not the foundation, because paternity does not have ~ts
To the text of Aristode, 26 the answer is that it rather proves the contrary; entity from that, since the action of generating is in the generated son, while
but in the following Section we will explain how the division of foundations paternity is in the father. It is therefore the reason of founding.
of relation given by him should be understood. To the ultimate confirmation 12. The Mind of the Author.-On this subject there can be some verbal
we concede that many relations can be proximately in matter, for example, diversity. For among authors sometimes these words appear to be confused
the relation of potency, the relation of material cause, the relation of union, of and to be taken for the same thing, while sometimes they are attributed to
creature, and similar ones. And whatever about physical accidents, about these different things. Therefore, we will first explain how the reality stands, and
categorical ones, and those that are distinct only by reason, there is nothing then we will fit the use of words [to that).
unreasonable in their being proximately in matter, as seems self-evident. Thus in every real relation there is required from the side of the subject some
thing that is by its nature apt and fitted in such way that it can found a respect
About the Reason ofFounding and a to something else, so that from that the relation proximately has its own real-
Comparison of That to the Foundation. ity in the way in which we have explained. A thing of this kind, th~refore, is
10. Arguments Proving That the Foundation and the Reason ofFounding are properly called the foundation of the relation in any genus of relat10ns. But
the Same.-But further inquiry can be made about the foundation of a rela- it does happen in the case of some relations that in addition to the whol~ ~n­
tion: whether it is the same as the "reason of founding," or whether these are tity of the subject and the foundation there is re~uired so!11e ot~er ~ondi~ion
diverse; or if they are diverse, what is the character and the necessity of each. mediating between the foundation and the termmus and m reality (m re tpsa)
But there is cause to question inasmuch as d1e fow1dation of a relation seems distinct from them in such way that among those things the relation can arise.
to be nothing other cban that by the medium of which the relation belongs And in this way there is necessary an action or a generation for the relation of
to a subject. But this very found ation is the reason of founding or of receivi ng an agent or of a father, and perhaps in the same way matter ~~pposes ~ m~de
the r lation. T herefore, these are not dfatinguished. Again [there is cause to of union for a relation of union [with form]. For that a condit10n of this kmd
question] because, if besides the foundation there would be need for another is absolutely necessary can be easily explained in the case of action. For if Pe-
reason of founding to intervene, there would be no end to these foundations ter and Paul (who are now father and son) were immediately created by God
or reasons which would have to be assigned. For there is no reason why they with all the absolute properties /p. 814/ that they now have, and if between
would rather be two, than three, or four. T herefore, we should stay with a them there were not to intervene an action of generation and of procession of
single foundation, which itself is the reason of founding. the one from the other, a relation would not have arisen between them, nor
could it come about from the absolute power [of God] that it would arise.
But now, with that condition alone added, immediately the relation results.
25 Cf. Ferrara, Commentaria in Summam contra gentiles, IV, c. 14, n. 11, in S. Thomae
Therefore, that condition is absolutely necessary. And nevertheless, it is not a
Aquinatis, Opera omnia, tomus XV, p. 62a.
26Metaphysics 5.15.1020b26-32, as cited inn. 3, this Section.
130 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 7 131

foundation, understanding by that word, 27 that in which and from which the extra, 29 even though in God there is a true principle of efficiently causing, a
relation proximately has its own entity. Hence, it has come about that such a real relation in God himself does not however result, because that principle
condition has been called the reason offounding, either because there is not any is not an apt foundation of that relation, as we will say below. 30 Therefore,
other special name by which it may be named, besides that common one by if a created efficient principle is an apt foundation, it is necessary that there
which it is called a necessary condition, or because that condition is as it were be designated in it some intrinsic connatural reason on account of wh~c~ it
ultimately or proximately required in order that the relation bud forth (pullelet). is by nature an apt foundation of a real relation, as, for example, that it 1s a
In actual reality, however, it is not so much called the reason of founding as a principle essentially ordered to action or something of this kind, about which
necessary condition. For the nature (ratio) of some thing is properly said to be we will see below. 31
that which has some direct (per se) influence on that thing, especially formal 14. Accordingly, with respect to the issue itself, it is clear that in every foun-
or effective [influence] according to reality or reason. To be sure, this condi- dation there is present an essential and intrinsic reason of founding. Again, it
tion in the present [instance] does not have such influence for the relation of is clear that these two items are not physically distinct in the thing itself; but
paternity, since it is outside the father himself and has no proper causality on rhey are metaphysically or conceptually (ratione) 32 djstinguished in. order to
him. Therefore it is more properly a necessary condition. explain features of things, and in rhis way they can also be deno?1"1at.ed ~y
13. However, this is not general in all relations that, in order to arise, they different words. But we, however, are indLtding these reasons of foundmg m
require similar conditions that are really (ex natura rez) distinct from founda- the foundations lest we seem to multiply things. Hence, certain people speak
tions and termini actually existing. For between two white things, by whatever in this way that they say that a foundation, formally speaking, is n~t, for e~­
they have been made, wherever they exist, and whatever other conditions they ample, absolutely a quality but a quality "as one" (ut unam); see H~s~ale~s1s
may have, there immediately arises a relation of similarity; and the same is [i.e. Diego Deza], in [his Commentary on the Sentences], Book 1, D1stmctto~
true about the relation of knowledge (scientia) to the knowable (scibile), 28 and 13, Question l, Article 3, Notabile 4. 33 But when it is present, we call this
about similar things. And so, a reason of founding of this kind, even though necessary condition by this common name. But now there occurre? here. the
we call it by this word, "condition," is not necessary in all relations. question about the distinction of foundations or reasons of founding, given
However, it is common to all foundations of relation that they have some by Aristotle, in Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter 15. 34 However, because this de-
35
natural property, or condition, by reason of which they are apt for founding mands more extended discussion, we will treat of it in its own Section, after
the relation, which property with respect to such a foundation can be called that which follows.
the reason of founding. So, for example, it is natural to created knowledge that
it be measurable by a knowable, by reason of which it can found a relation to
that [knowable]. Similarly, to a certain kind of form, for example, whiteness,
it is natural that it have a certain kind of formal unity such as another form of
the same species can also have. This, then, is the reason why such a form can
found a relation of similarity.
And io this way in the relation of paternity, or of any created agent, it shotud
also necessarily be though that there is some /col. b/ reason of founding that
essentially (per se) belongs to the foundation itsd£ For let us posit that such a 29That is to say, God's action with regard to things outside Himsel£
foundation is the principle itself, wheth r proximate or principal, ofan efficient 30Cf. Section 15, nn. 17-20, below.
causation. In this very principle some reason must be considered on account 31 Cf. Section 15, n. 16, below.
of which it can be the foundation of a relation. For in the divine action ad 32 Here and elsewhere, one may note the affinity for Suarez of "metaphysical" and
~~~" . .
27That is, "foundation." 33Cf. D. Deza, O.P., Nouarum deffinsionum doctrine ... Beatt Thome de Aquino ... , l,
28 We sh uld note that "scientia" and "scibile" can be translated as here by "knowledge" d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, not. 4 (Hispali, 1517), tom. I, fol. 132r.
alld "lmowable" or more narrowly as "science" and "the scientific object" or "the 34C£ 1020b26-32.
scienlifically knowab.le." 35That is, Section 10, below.
 Section VIII.
About the Terminus of a Categorical Relation.
1. A Real Relation Requires a Real Terminus.-First of all, it must be said that
for a categorical relation some real terminus is necessary. This assertion, taken
in general, is common to almost all, and it can be easily inferred from the
intrinsic character of a relation. For since its essence is to be (se habere) toward
another according to its essential being, in this there is included a terminus.
And since this relation is categorical and real, its terminus must be real. But
in the conditions to be explained /p. 815/, which are required on the side of
the terminus for the being of a relation, and in what way a terminus of this
kind concurs with the essence of relation, there are usually treated many things
which we should briefly indicate and explain. 1

Whether an Actually Existing Terminus Is Required.

2. The Reason for Doubting.-The first [question] is whether the terminus
of a real categorical relation need be a real actually existing terminus. And the
reason for the difficulty is that, as was said above, 2 there can be a real transcen-
dental order to a thing that does not exist, indeed, to that which is not a true
being, but rather a being of reason. What therefore does a categorical relation
have that it cannot respect a similar terminus?
And this is confirmed and explained, since knowledge respects a knowable
equally when it does not exist and when it exists, because knowledge abstracts
from singular things and from existence. 3 Likewise, the productive is related
(refertur) to the producible, as Aristotle says in the Metaphysics, Book 5, 4 but
the producible as such does not require existence. Again, an image, and a
phantasm, and like things, equally represent an existing and a non-existing
thing, and an existing whiteness is as similar in essence to another possible
whiteness as to an existing one, for it has the same agreement in nature and
essence with that. Similarly, the effect of a final cause equally depends on an
existing and a non-existing end.
Finally, an a priori reason can be that neither on the part of a relation, nor
on the part of a terminus, nor from the task of terminating, does this actual
existence of the terminus seem necessary. The first is evident, because a relation

Here, for the sake of readable English, I have changed Suarez's passive voice con-
struction to one that is active.
2 Cf., e.g., Section 4, n. 2, above.
3 This is especially true of that kind of knowledge which is science.
4 Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.1020b30.
134 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Re/,ation Section 8 135

has its entity from the foundation; therefore, from that viewpoint this suffices his Metaphysics. 9 And all the Thomists think the same, [for example]: Cajetan
for the existence of the relation. The second is clear, because to actually termi- and Ferrara at the cited places; 10 Soncinas, in Metaphysics, Book 5, Question
nate only expresses an extrinsic denomination from the disposition of another 27; 11 and Capreolus, in [Defensiones], Book 1, Distinction 7, Question 2 12 and
thing to the thing that is said to terminate [that other thing]. Therefore, from more extensively in Distinctions 13 13 and 20. 14 [For the same, see]] Scotus
that point of view, such a denomination can fall upon a non-existing thing. and others, in [commenting on the Sentences], Book l, Distinction 13; 15 and
3. The Opinion ofSome.-And in [his Commentary on the Sentences] Book [Francis of] Mayronnes, Distinction 29, Questions 6 and 8, 16 who, however,
1, Distinction 28, Question 23 [sic], Gregory [ofRimini] follows this opinion, makes use of a certain distinction. For he says that to non-being there can
who also adds that, conversely, non-being can also be really related (refem) to be a fundamental relation, but not a formal relation. But through this latter
being. 5 For he thinks that real relatives are always mutual-which foundation he understands a categorical relation, and thus he himself explains himself,
[of his opinion] is false, as we shall see below. And that consequent, which he where he openly consents to the stated assertion. But what he understands
infers, is extremely improbable. For who can understand that what is actually by a fundamental relation, he does not explain. However, if (as it appears) he
nothing is referred by a real relation, or how can an accident exist without a understands some transcendental respect, his opinion is not displeasing to me.
real subject? For already above 17 we have shown that real transcendental relations can be
Finally, nothing is actually real, unless it actually exists. Therefore, neither not only to non-existing termini, but also [to termini] that are not real beings
can a relation be actually real unless it belongs to an actual existent /col. bl, according to essence. 18 And the arguments of Gregory also sufficiently prove
because it cannot otherwise exist, unless it also subsists. Therefore, regarding this. For a potency that is directly and immediately (per se primo) ordered
a real correlative, the opinion that it can be a non-being is improbable, as is to an act has without doubt a transcendental order to that [act], even if it is
clear also from the two preceding Sections. But as regards a terminus it is less possible and not yet existing. Knowledge also has a relation to the knowable
improbable. (scibile), 19 which, essentially speaking, not only does not necessarily exist, but
is also something universal that abstracts from singulars, [something] which
It Is Shown That an Actually Existing Terminus Is Required. cannot exist in that way.
4. Nevertheless, it must be said that for a categorical relation a terminus that
is real and really existing is necessary. This is the common opinion, both of
the philosophers and interpreters of Aristotle in the Categories, the Chapter, 9 C£ S. Thomae Aquinatis, Quaest. disp. de potentia Dei, q. 3, a. 3, ad 5, ed. Bazzi et
"Toward Something" and in the Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter 15, and also of al. (1949), p. 44a. For Avicenna, see Avicenna Latinus: Liber de philosophia prima
the theologians, as it clear from St. Thomas, [in Summa Theologiae], Part l, sive scientia divina, I-IV, Tr. 3, c. 10, ed. S. Van Riet (1977), p. 183, 11. 96-98.
Question 13, Article 7, where he says that all relations that are between being IOC£ Cajetan, Commentaria, in I, q. 13, a. 7, n. 5, in S. Thomae Opera, tomus IV
and non-being are [relations] of reason, because reason forms them when it (1888), p. 154b; Ferrara, Commentaria, In Contra gentiles, II, c. 12, n. 3, in S.
apprehends non-being as a certain extreme. 6 [He has said] the same in Ques- Thomae Opera, tomus XIII (1918), p. 29lab.
tion 28, Article 1, in reply to Objection 2 [sic] ,7 and in Contra Gentiles, Book 11 Cf. Quaestiones metaphysicales .. ., V, q. 27, p. 87b.
12Cf. Defensiones, In I Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 2, ed. Paban-Pegues, tom. i, pp. 296 and
2, Chapter 12, Argument 3, 8 and De Potentia, Question 3, Article 3, in reply
297.
to Objection 5, where he adduces Avicenna, in Tractate 3, the last Chapter, of 13C£ ibid., I, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, tomus ii, pp. 56b-57a.
14C£ ibid., d. 20, q. 1, a. un., p. 168.
15Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 13, q. un., in Opera omnia, tomus v (ed. Vat.,
1959), pp. 120-21, n. 99.
5 For this, cf. Gregorii Ariminensis, Lectura ... In I Sent. dist. 28-32, qu. 3; tomus 16C£ In quatuor libros Sententiarum, I, 29, qq. 6 and 8 (Venetiis, 1520), fF. 91 va-92ra
III, pp. 166-170. and 92vb-93rb.
6 Cf. Summa Theologiae I, 13, 7, in Opera omnia, tomus IV, p. 153a. 17See Section 4, n. 2, above.
7 Cf. ibid., p. 3 l 9a. 18 Here, Suarez has in mind the difference between a possible thing and a pure fiction,
8 C£ S. Thomae Aquinatis, Summa Contra Gentiles II, c. 12, in Opera omnia, tomus such as a goatstag, a chimera, or something like a square circle.
xiii (Romae: Typis Riccardi Garroni, 1918), p. 290b. 190r "the scientifically knowable".
136 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 8 137

5. Some Arguments Are Laid Out, by Which the Assertion Is Usually Proven.- will be true of acts of the will, insofar as they can be employed with regard to
Therefore, it is not easy to bring forth convincing arguments that /p. 816/ beings of reason, or, if the opinion of Scotus22 is true, because beings of reason
might prove the stated assertion in the case of categorical relations. For those can be made through them. Finally, that also in its own way can be extended
that are commonly and usually brought forth seem to proceed equally about to habits that are proportioned to those acts inasmuch as they essentially (per
transcendental [relations], as, for example, that no real being can be ordered se) entail an order to the same objects. Therefore, in all of these there is found
to non-being. Again, because otherwise it could be ordered to a being of this /col. bl disposition, because of a transcendental order to an object.
reason, which is repugnant, since a being of reason depends upon a fiction of But other things, which cannot have beings of reason for objects, cannot
the intellect. Again, because a relation is a kind of nexus between extremes, it have a real transcendental disposition toward them. For, as we have shown
therefore cannot be real unless it is between real extremes. above, 23 a transcendental disposition is always in accordance with some real
These arguments, and similar ones, if they are efficacious have a place in function, which actively or passively may be reduced to some kind of cause.
the case of transcendental respects. However, it is clear that they do not have But with regard to a being of reason no real function can be exercised, except
cogency in their instance, because it is not repugnant that a real being have a insofar as it is taken in the role of an object. 24
transcendental order to a non-actual being. First, because a power can have Finally, a categorical relacion is not properly a nexus or a union, but only
an order to a possible being, although it does not respect that according to its something like a tendency that can only be excrinsicaUy terminated at some-
possibility alone, but in an order to [its] act, in such way, however, that the very thing else, and, therefore, on this score, it is nor repugnant that it be of a being
disposition of the power is prior to and independent of the actual existence co a non-being. Therefore, just as these arguments are dissolved in the case of
of the act or of the object. Likewise, non-being, insofar as it can be thought, transcendental relations, so they seem to be solvable in the case of categorical
can also terminate a transcendental disposition of thought or of knowledge ones.
toward itsel£ And in this way, although non-being of itself does not seem apt 7, An Argt.tment Proving the Assertion.- Therefore, some proper argumenr
to be a terminus of a real disposition, nevertheless, insofar as some action can must be sought, which proceeds in a special way with regard to categorical rela-
be exercised with respect to it, that action itself, or a habit or a power, which tions. And first indeed we can argue from accepted principles as regards these
are principles ordered to that action, can entail a transcendental disposition to relations: co wit, that a relation and its terminus are simultaneous in time, and
a thing that does not exist. And for a similar reason some act of the intellect that when the correlative or the terminus is removed the relation is removed,
can entail a transcendental respect to some being of reason, 20 because, that is, and that when the terminus is posited, if the foundation is presupposed, the
this can be a sufficient object of such an act. And therefore for a disposition relation arises. For these are all taken from Aristotle and from common opinion.
of this kind not only is there no problem that a being of reason is something But all of these suppose the real existence of the terminus, for they include the
fashioned by the intellect, but also in this very fact that transcendental disposi- co-existence of the extremes, which supposes the existence of both.
25
tion is founded. However, a proper argument should be taken from what was said above
6. But it is correctly proven by that argument that no other things can have ab u the being (esse) and essence of this [kind of] relation, namely, chat it
transcendental dispositions toward beings of reason besides those acts of the consists in a pure respect and does not naturally have any other function , and,
mind by which those very beings of reason are thought or imagined, under therefore, it is nor directly (per se) intended, bur it is merely resulting, as a kind
which I include some acts of the imagination insofar as through them imagi-
nary and impossible beings can be fashioned and represented. 21 And the same treatment of Suarez on imagination, c£ J.B. South, "Francisco Suarez on Imagina-
tion," Vivarium, 39 (2001), 119-158.
20This can be even to a pure fiction. 22For this, cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 1, q. 1, tomus vii (ed. Vat., 1973), p. 8,
21 Note this extension of the power of imagination to produce even impossible ob- n. 15; pp. 18-19, n. 32; p. 21, n. 36. For Suarez's rejection of the will as productive
jects. On this c£: DM 54, 2, n. 18, in Opera, vol. 26, pp. 1023-4; and Suarez, De of such items, cf. DM 54, 2, n. 17, vol. 26, p. 1023.
Trinitate, IX, c. 2, n. 11, in vol. l, p. 725. For a wider context here, see my essay, 23Cf. Section 3, n. 11, and Section 4, n. 11, above.
"Gedankendinge bei den)esuiten des 17. Jh.," in Jmagination-Fiktion-Kreation: 240n causes of beings of reason, see DM 54, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 1018-26; esp. ibid., n.
Das ku!turschaffende vermogen der Phantasie, hrsg. von Thomas Dewender und l, p. 1018.
Thomas Welt (Milnchen/Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2003), pp. 213-228. For a general 25Cf. Section 4, n. 10, above.
138 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 8 139

of accident to things besides all that which from themselves and from an inten- But now in this place the question suggests itself: of what sort should this
tion of nature belongs to them. For from the nature of this relation so explained form and reason for terminating be, and especially whether it is absolute or
it is plainly inferred that it as such does not exist unless the co-existence of its relative (respectiva). But because this question is more extensive and supposes
foundation and terminus are supposed, from which [co-existence] it results. many things that are to be treated in the following Section, it will therefore,
This is both because it does not have the mode of production of natural things be discussed after that.
and also because only for this reason can it have the character of an accident.
For other respects that can be toward non-beings are essential and belong to How the Terminus Is ofthe Essence ofa Relation Is Deduced
the categories of those things of which they are essential differences. From What Has Been Said.
This argument has some efficacy, even in the opinion of those who think 9. The Opinion ofSome.-The Opinion ofOthers.-But from the aforesaid
that this relation is some mode that is really distinct from its foundation and refutation and its argument it can be first understood that a real terminus of
terminus. For these easily fit to themselves this discussion that has been made. this kind in some way belongs to the essence of a relation, although in this
Only for them it is difficult to give the nature /p. 817/ of such an entity or there is some diversity among authors, [a diversity] which is more in the way of
distinct mode. But in [the context of] our opinion [the argument] can be more speaking than in reality (in re). For certain ones absolutely deny that a terminus
cogent, for if a categorical relation in reality (in re) is nothing else than the is of the essence of a I col. bl relation, as [for example] Francis of Mayronnes,
foundation itself, as it accidentally gives a relative denomination, then it cannot in [his Sentences commentary], Book 1, Distinction 29, Question 5; 26 which
give that in reality unless the terminus co-exists. For every other denomination in part also Soncinas thin.ks in his Metaphysics, Book 5, Question 33; 27 and
either will be completely absolute and essential, and consequently, at most it Cajetan, in his De Praedicabilibus, the Chapter on Species.~ 8 A?d the rea~on
will be transcendentally relative (respectiva), or it will not be a denomination can be because a terminus is completely outside that relation itself and is a
taken from those things themselves alone, but from a comparison ofour reason. thing that is distinct from that. Therefore, it cannot be of the essence of that
Because of this then, for a categorical relation a terminus that is real and really [relation], because what is of the essence is completely intrinsic and the same as
existing is always necessary. the thing of whose essence it is. But others say that a terminus is of the essence
of a relation, which is the common opinion of the Peripatetics, as [in the place
The Arguments of the Opposite Opinion Are Refuted. cited just] above, Cajetan says, 29 and [also] Nifo, in his Metaphysic.1, Book 5,
8. But the arguments of the opposite opinion, if they are carefully considered, Disputation 16. 30 And the reason is because the whole being of a relati~n is to
proceed only with regard to a transcendental respect, and now the difference be toward a terminus; therefore, a terminus is of the essence of a relation.
between that and a categorical relation has been sufficiently explained. Hence, 10. The At~thod· Opinion.-Nevertheless as I have said, there can hardly
the answer to the last argument is that a real terminus is required for a categori- be disagreement on the face. For a terminus is nor an intdnsic pare, neither
cal relation from the nature and the mode of such a relation, which consists a genus nor an intrinsic difference of a relation. Hence, it can n~t. be of ~ts
only in a pure respect that has arisen from the co-existence of the extremes. essence in d1e mentioned sense; and in this all agree. Moreover, it 1s certam
Hence, even though it is true that the actual termination itself posits nothing
in the terminus, it, nevertheless, necessarily supposes in that terminus an entity 26Cf. Jn quatuor libros Sententiarum I, d. 29, q. 5 (Venetiis, 1520), f. 91ra-va.
that is so proportioned that from its being posited together with the terminus 27Cf. Qi.tat!stiones metaphysicale•s ... , V, q. 33. pp. 96-97a.
the relation can arise, and [it supposes] that the relation itself have a kind of 28For this, possibly c£ Thomas de Vio Cardinalis Caietanus (1469- '1534), cripta
object to which it can relate (respicere). philo.rophim: Cormnentai·ia in Porphyrii Isagogen n~ PrfUldi~~1ne11t~ Ari~;otclis, c. l,
Accordingly, just as we said about the foundation that in it there could be ed. Jsnardus M. Marega, OJ>. (Romae: Apud lnsututum Angcl1cum , 1934), P·
conceptually (secundum rationem) distinguished the thing that founds the rela- 30.
tion and the reason or the aptitude of founding, so on the part of the terminus 29 Cf. ibid., p. 31.
there can be distinguished a thing or a form of the terminus and a reason for 30Cf. A. Nifo, in DilucidariumAugustini Niphi, Suessani Philosophi solertissimi, Meta-
terminating that is in such a form. physicarum disputationum, in Aristotelis Decem et quatuor Libros Metaphysicorum,
L. V, disp. 16 (Venetiis: Apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1559; reprint: Frankfurt am
Main: Minerva, 1967) pp. 155-6.
140 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 8 141

that a categorical relation, as such, exists only while it is respecting or tending difference is that a categorical relation, from its peculiar and proper nature
toward a terminus, and its essence consists in this. Hence, under that aspect, requires an actually existing terminus, both in order that it result from that
it can be said in some way to include in its essence the terminus, because it [terminus] in its own genus and also that it respect that [terminus] under the
cannot be separated from that, nor can it be conceived according to its proper precise aspect of terminus. But a transcendental relation neither results from
concept unless the terminus is included in such a concept. And in this sense a terminus, properly speaking, nor does it respect it under the precise aspect
all the ancients have spoken, who, for this reason, do not so much say that the of terminus, but always with some other added character of object, of cause,
terminus is of the essence as that it is of the quidditative concept of a relation, or some other similar thing. And thus there is in some way a more intrinsic
which Cajetan 31 and Soncinas 32 also admit. . and formal disposition to a terminus, especially one that exists, in a categorical
11. A Categorical Relative Can Be De.fined Only by an Order to a Termi- relation than in a transcendental respect.
nus.-These33 correctly infer that a relation cannot be defined according to
its proper character unless the terminus of the relation is stated in the defini- Even by the Absolute Power [of God},
tion; for a thing should be so defined as it essentially is. But the essence of a A Re!Ation Cannot Remain without a Terminus.
relation is such that it cannot be separated from a terminus; therefore, neither 13. Secondly, the question is resolved: whether the dep endence of a relation
can its definition be separated from a terminus; therefore, it must necessarily upon the exjstence of its terminus is so great that not only &om its nature do~
include in itself a terminus. And in this, Mayronnes [as cited] above 34 is not it require that [dep endence], but that even by the absolute power [of G od] tt
thinking correctly; for he seems to say that a relation can be defined without cannot be conserved without it. For this seems difficult to believe, inasmuch
the addition of a terminus, in which he is also dissenting from Scotus, as is as since they are distinct things, as we are supposing, and the foundation does
dear from the same [Scotus] in [commenting on the Sentences], Book 1, Dis- not intrinsically compose the relation, and it does not have a real influence
tinction 30. 35 But it should be carefully observed, that we have always been on that [relation], no sufficient reason can be given on account of which God
speaking about the terminus of a relation and not about a correlative, in such could not conserve a relation without a terminus.
way that we are abstracting from the question whether the correlative itself is Nevertheless, it still must be said that a categorical relation cannot by any
the terminus, which [question] we will treat below. 36 And there we will also power be conserved as such without its actual termi~us. Almost ~l writers
see whether this can also be extended to a correlative as such, even if it is not teach this. But the reason is that in the formal effect itself of a relat10n there
a formal /p. 818/ terminus. And again there we will also solve the problem is involved in some way a real and actual terminus.
that is occurring here, whether a terminus is prior in cognition to a relation However, it has been shown above37 that a relation cannot be conserved in
and in what way correlatives can be simultaneous in cognition and definition reality (in rerum natura) if it is not exercising its formal effect. Therefore, a
without committing a [vicious] circle. relation cannot actually be conserved without its actual terminus. The conse-
12. Transcendental Respects, How They Respect a Terminus.-Lastly, it should quence is clear, because a formal effect cannot be c~nserved without all t~in~s
be observed, that this doctrine is in some way general, also for transcendental that are directly (per se) and essentially required for lt. /col. bl But the ma~or is
respects. For those also, and the forms or entities of whose essence they are, evident, because the formal effect of a relation is actually to refer to a termmus;
cannot be adequately and essentially defined without the addition of that thing but in this effect there is included the terminus itself; just as motion or action
that they respect, which under that aspect can be called a terminus. But the cannot exist without a proper terminus, by the fact that [each of these] is an
actual way toward that [terminus].
31 Cf. Cajetan, Commentaria in Porphyrii Isagogen .. ., c. 1, ed. Marega, p. 30. 14. And this is far more easy to understand in [line with] our opinion, namely,
32Cf. Quaestiones metaphysicales ... , V, q. 33, p. 96b. that a relation is not a thing or a real mode that is distinct from the foundation
33 That is, Cajetan and Soncinas.
and added to it, but it is the very entity of the foundation as so denominating
34Cf. n. 9, this Section.
a subject. For since that denomination is purely respective, it consists only
35Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 30, q. 1-2, in Opera omnia, tomus vi (ed. Vat., 1963), p. 183,
n. 35. in a certain disposition that has arisen from the co-existence of a terminus.
36See Section 9, n. 3; Section 15, n. 13; and Section 16, nn. 3, 8, 9, 23, 32, 33, 34,
35, and 39, below. 37Cf. Section 5, n. 6.
142 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation

Therefore, it is not strange that such entity of the foundation could in no way
confer that denomination unless the co-existence of the terminus be posited.
And thus there is easily solved the reason for doubt to the contrary. For there Section IX.
is no entity here present that God could not conserve without another that is What Distinction Is Necessary
really distinct. For he can conserve the whole entity of the foundation without Between a Foundation and a Terminus?
the terminus. He cannot, however, conserve that entity under such a character 1. This question is also easily resolved from what has been said up to now.
and denomination, because according to that it involves the terminus itself. For certain people think that a real distinction is necessary between them.
Indeed, in the thing itself it adds nothing distinct besides the co-existence of For example, Soncinas, in his Metaphysics, 1 who indicates that there must be a
the terminus.
distinction in every way, so that it is not enough that they be distinguished as a
whole and a part. This is principally based upon the fact that otherwise a whole
continuum would be related by infinite real relations of diverse proportions of
greater inequality to infinite proportional parts, which is unreasonable. Hence,
with a similar argument, St. Thomas, in Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 12,
Argument 3, proves that one quantity cannot be referred by a real relation to
a possible greater quantity, because otherwise it would have at once infinite
relations since numbers or greater quantities can be multiplied to infinity. 2
2. But others think that no distinction in reality is necessary, which can
especially be seen in a relation of identity of the same thing with itself. For
just as much as properly and really (a parte ret}, without any fiction of the
intellect, some being is the same as itself, so it is diverse from something else,
or similar to another thing. Therefore, just as much is the one a real relation
as is the other. And Ip. 819/ some think this most of all [is true] if the same
thing happens to be the foundation in diverse subjects. So, for example, if the
same whiteness were to be in two men, they say that they would be related
between themselves by a real likeness, because the foundation is distinguished
from the terminus that terminates, even if it is not distinguished from the
reason itself of terminating. And Scotus thinks this, in [commenting on the
Sentences], Book l, Distinction 31, 3 and in Quodlibetal Q}'estion 6. 4

1 Cf. Quaestiones metaphysicales, V, q. 26, p. 87a.

2 Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Summa contra Gentiles, II, c. 12, in Opera omnia, tomus
xiii (Romae: Typis R. Garrone, 1918), p. 290b.
3 I do not find Scotus making this precise point in this cited place; c£ Ordinatio I,
d. 31, q. un., tomus vi (1963), pp. 208-208, nn. 12-15.
4 Cf. Duns Scotus, Quaestiones quodlibetales, q. 6, a. 2, ad 2, in Obras de! Doctor Sutil,
edicion bilingii.e, Cuestiones cuodlibetales, introducci6n, resumenes y versi6n de Felix
Alluntis, 0.F.M. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1968), n. [27] 65, p.
237.
144 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 9 145

The Resolution. distinct, this is most of all true about the subjects or the proximate foundations
3. But it must be said that for a real relation it is necessary that the founda- in which the relations proximately exist. For to them do they proximately give
tion and the terminus as such <formaliter sumptus) be distinguished in reality their own proper and formal dispositions. Therefore, this distinction is most
(in re ipsa). This is the opinion of St. Thomas, [in Summa Theologiae], Part of all required between those foundations of opposite relations, and co~se­
I, Question 42, Article l, in reply to Objection 3, 5 where, for this reason, he quently also between the relations themselves, and finally between a relation
denies that the equality among the divine persons is a real relation. He also and a terminus.
denies that the same thing is related to itself by a real relation, and all Thomists
foHow this. And that some distinction in reality (in re) is required between real How Great the Aforesaid Distinction Must Be.
correlatives is almost a self-evident principle in metaphysics. For correlatives 4. But it can be asked how great this distinction must be. Briefly, however, I
are considered to be really opposite [to one another], but the same thing is think that it is not necessary that it be equal in all cases, but it must be thought
not opposed to itself; therefore, it is necessary that correlatives be really (in re) to be according to the nature of the foundations and the manner of the relations.
distinguished in some way. Hence, it is necessary also that real opposite rela- For often this distinction must be real and supposital, 9 as in the relation of
tions be really distinct in some way, both because of their opposition, and also father and son. For, because such relations are founded upon a real procession
because each relation is in reality the same as its own extreme, as was shown of one supposit, and one supposit can proceed only from another supposit,
above. 6 Therefore, if the extremes are distinct, so also are the relations. therefore, such a relation requires a real distinction of supposits. And likewise,
Accordingly, if the terminus of a relation is an opposite relation, it is suf- a relation of specific identity requires a real distinction of substantial natures,
ficiently inferred from this that the relation and the terminus must be really and consequently also of supposits, apart from miracles. And the same is true,
distinct. But if the formal terminus of a relation is some absolute form, it must with proportion observed, about a relation of equality or oflikeness. For they
also be concluded that they are distinguished in reality (in re). For a formal require a real distinction of such forms, and ~onsequ~ntly, a real (ex nat~ra.rez)
terminus of this kind can only be the foundation of the opposite relation, as I [distinction] of subjects. But for some relations I thmk that a modal d1stmc-
will say below. 7 But it is not less necessary that the foundation of one relation tion is enough. For, just as there is a true efficiency or an emanation between a
be distinguished from the opposite relation than that those opposite relations thing and a mode, so there can also be a true relation. A~a~n, becaus~ a "':o.dal
themselves [be distinguished]. Therefore. distinction is a true distinction, and it suffices for opposltlon or a d1sposmon
The minor [premiss] is proven: because the relation and the foundation are (habitudinem), on account of which there is a necessary distinction between
really (in re) the same. Therefore, inasmuch as a relation is distinguished from a relation and its terminus.
an opposite relation, so much is the foundation of one relation distinguished 5. But it can be asked, on account of the argument of Soncinas 10 about an
in reality from the opposite of that [relation]. Therefore, it is also equally infinity of relations, whether a distinction between whole and parts is enough.
distinguished from the foundation of the opposite relation. Again, because Hence, it could be said that although a distinction between a whole and a part,
not only relations, but also the extremes or the subjects of relations must be insofar as it is in some way real, is greater than a modal distinction, neverthe-
distinct in reality, because a real and true disposition cannot be understood to less, insofar as the extremes are not so distinct, but one is included in the other,
exist between things that are not distinguished in reality, since every disposition it is less sufficient for founding a real relation. But this is difficult to believe,
[toward], as is dear from the term itself, 8 postulates extremes. But extremes first, because absolutely that distinction is truly in reality and it is Ip. 82.0/
involve a plurality, and, consequently, some /col. bl real distinction. greater than a modal one. Again, [it is difficult to believe] because a matenal
Finally, this is contained in the very definition of relatives that they must or a formal cause seem really to be related (referrt) to their effect, which is the
be toward another. But if the subjects of opposite relations must be mutually composite itself, from which, however, they are distinguished only as. a part
from a whole. Again, [it is difficult] because two halves of the same contmuum
5 C£ S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia, tomus IV, p. 436ab.
seem to be related between themselves by a real relation of equality. For in
6 Cf. Section 2, nn. 12, 13, and 22.
7 Cf. Section 10, n. 14; and Section 11, nn. 3, 9-10.
8 Note this for comment on the meaning of "habicudo." In this context, at least, it 9 "Supposital" seems equivalent to "individual."
is a "disposition" with the added implication of one extreme "toward" another. 10 See n. l, this Section.
146 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 9 147

reality (in re) they are truly distinguished, and not as including and included, under that aspect they could be related with a real relation. But an argument
but as distinct, and if they were only contiguous, they would be related by a cannot be taken from this with respect to the divine relations insofar as they
real relation. However, a union by continuation cannot impede this relation. are terminating (as in our way we may say) the same essence of God, because
For the union is greater between a thing and a mode or between matter and they do not terminate [that essence] through a union but rather by a most
form, because a union does not take away all distinction. But if those halves simple identity.
are related between themselves with a real relation, the same will be true about
their halves related between themselves, and thus also there follows an infinity
of relations. Nor does there seem to be anything unreasonable that in a con-
tinuum there may thus be infinite relations just as there are infinite points or
parts, because relations add nothing real to foundations themselves.

The Solution of the Arguments.

6. The Same Thing Is Related to Itselfonly by a Relation ofReason.-Whether
Two Things Which Are White with the Same Whiteness Are Relatives through a
Real Relation ofLikeness.-Through these [remarks], therefore, an answer is
given to the prior opinion. But to the posterior [opinion] 11 we deny that the
identity of the same thing with itself is a real relation; but rather it is one of
reason only. Moreover, that a thing be said to be the same as itself without a
relation of reason is either false, because a comparison ofthe intellect is necessary
by which the same thing is compared to itself in such a way as if it were two
extremes, or indeed if this comparison be excluded, there is in reality (in re)
only the thing itself and the denial of a distinction that only this very identity
of the thing can add, as was seen above in Disputation 8 [sic]. 12
And I think the same about the genuine likeness between two white subjects,
if they were to have a numerically same whiteness, because that agreement that
they would have in whiteness would rather be an identity in a numerically
same form. In order that this may be better understood, we can in that case
distinguish agreement in the form of whiteness or in a union with the same
form. The first agreement is a certain identity and, therefore, it is not a real
relation. But the latter [agreement] can be a likeness and a relation, because
even though the form is the same, the union with diverse subjects is neces-
sarily diverse, and, therefore, in its regard there is a sufficient distinction in
order that a likeness or a real relation can be founded. For example, if there
were two humanities united to the Divine Word, there seems to be no /col.
bl doubt that they would be truly similar in the hypostatic union, 13 which
would not be numerically the same in them, but rather distinct, and therefore

11 See n. 2, this Section.

12For this, see DM7, 3, n. 2, vol. 25, pp. 271-2.
13Cf. Section 4, note 4, above.
 Section X.
Whether Three Kinds of Relations on Three Foundations
Were Correctly Distinguished by Aristotle.
1. In this Section we must examine the doctrine of Aristotle in Metaphysics,
Book 5, Chapter 15, where treating of "toward something," he reduces all
classes of relatives to three, which he distinguishes from three foundations or
reasons of founding a relation. 1

Aristotle's Division and Doctrine Are Proposed.

2. Which Relations Aristotle Locates in the First Class.-ln the first class he
puts those relations that he says are founded in unity or multitude, which af-
terwards he subdivides into various species. 2 For in unity he says are founded
equality, similarity, and generally the identity of those things whose substance
is one. For those things are called similar that have one quality; [those are
called] equal that have one quantity; while [those are called] the same that
have one substance, which can be understood either properly and with rigor
about substance or generally about essence, which we will see below. 3 But in
number he says are founded all relations that in some way are said according
to quantity and that recede from unity; for example, all proportions among
unequal numbers, whether those [proportions] are indicated in an indefinite
or general way, such as: exceeding, multiple, etc., or definitely, such as: double,
triple, etc. Therefore, even though these relations can also be found among
continuous quantities, they are, nevertheless, said to be founded in number
inasmuch as they require diversity in quantity. And by the same reason, all
relations of dissimilarity, distinction, and the like, pertain to the same foun-
dation, because they are in some way founded in number; for here unity and
number are not taken with rigor for quantity, but more generally. To be sure,
it must be taken into account that Aristotle always speaks of these relatives in
the plural, for speaking most properly, both opposite relations of this class are
those that require in their foundation either a number or Ip. 821/ some unity
of several things (for this unity must be so understood). Therefore, if we speak
of singular relations, each one requires a foundation, not that it simply be a
number, but that with another it compose a number or has unity.

1 Cf. Metaphysics 5.l 5.1020b26-32.

2 Ibid., 1020b33-102la14.
3 Cf. n. 6, this Section.
150 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section JO 151

3. Which Relations Are in the Second Class.-In the second class Aristotle And a third [is founded] in future action, as (he says) ''what is going to do" [in
puts those relatives that are founded on the potency of acting and suffering, 4 relation] "to what will be done," 10 which contains a difficulty that will need to
or on the actualizations (actiones) of those, which he then distinguishes into be treated below. 11
various species, which he takes in part either from the fact that the relations 4. What Relations Are in the Third Class.-In the third class Aristotle puts
are founded only in the power, abstracting from the action, or as they are relations that he calls of the measurable to the measure, as (he says) are the
subject to action. And he uses as examples: able to heat and heatable, heating relations of knowledge to the knowable (scibile), of intellect to the intelligible,
and heated. 5 and of sight to the seeable. 12 However, he indicates a difference to be noted
In these, it is necessary to note two things: one is that when Aristotle puts (which gives occasion for serious questions) between this class and the two
a real relation between a potency and a possible, he never speaks of a possible previous ones. For in the previous ones (he says) each relative is said "toward
effect taken objectively, as Gregory [of Rimini] cited above seems to have something" /col. bl because that toward which each one is is said to be other,
thought, who from this example of Aristotle concluded that there are real rela- and not because another [is said to be] toward it. But, in the third class, even
tions to termini that do not exist but which are possible. 6 But Aristotle openly though one of the relatives is said to be "toward something" because it truly
speaks about a passive potency or a heatable subject, as he explains in these is toward something else, the other [relative], however, which corresponds to
words: ':And in a word, the active [in relation} to the passive/ and below: "But it, is not said to be toward something because it truly is toward another, but
the active and the passive are saidfrom active and passive potency and the actions rather because another is toward it. For example, knowledge and the know-
ofpotencies, such as, what can heat [in relation} to what can be heated. 'll able (scibile), although they are said toward another, [this is] nevertheless in a
From this, secondly, one must consider that to be a real terminus of a rela- different way. For knowledge is so said, because it truly is toward another; but
tion of an active potency as such, abstracting from action, is something other the knowable is certainly not [so said], but only because knowledge is toward
than the terminus of an active potency as it is existing under action or as it it. And the same is true about the intellect and the intelligible, and in similar
is acting. For the first terminus is a passive potency, and otherwise it cannot cases. This difference Aristotle did not prove by any argument, but hands it
be a real terminus. But the second is the effect itself, as now fl.owing from an on as obvious.
acting potency. But again, Aristotle adds that this relation that is founded on
a potency under action is varied according to various differences of time. 9 For Is the Division Properly Given?
one is founded in present action, for example, the relation of building, heating, 5. What Reasons Engender Di.fficulty.-First.-This is Aristotle's division
etc. Another [is founded] in past action, for example, the relation of a father. and his doctrine, about which two things principally occur to be explained, in
which [things] various difficulties are broached. First, whether the individual
4 Or, "being acted upon." members of the division are properly designated. Second, whether the division
5 C£ ibid., 102lal4-26. Note that Suarez's Latin words here: "calefactivum," "cal- is adequate for categorical relation in such way that it sufficiently embraces the
efactibile," "calefaciens," and "calefactum" can be rendered adjectivally, as I have whole range of that relation.
done here, or substantively, as "what can heat," "what can be heated," "what is As regards the prior question, a first reason for doubting is that relations of
heating", and "what is heated." the first class do not seem to be real; therefore. The antecedent is proven first
6 Cf. Gregorii Ariminensis, Lectura ... In I Sent. dist. 28-32, qu. 3, tomus III (1984), with regard to relations of unity, because that unity in which they are founded
p. 167. is not real, but a matter of reason only; therefore, a relation founded on that
7 C£ '\mt oA.ws TO TIOLTJTlKOV rrpos TO rra9T]nK6v." Metaphysics 5.15.1020b30. cannot be real. The [new] antecedent is clear, because that is not numerical
For his translation here, Suarez is following Fonseca: In Metaphys. V, c. 15, tomus
unity, for this founds an identity of the same thing with itself, which, as we
II, col. 784.
have said above, is a relation of reason. 13 Therefore, it is specific unity or another
8 "Tel OE 7TOLT]TlKcl Kat rra9T]TlKcl KaTa ouvaµLv TIOLT]TlK~V Kat EVEpyE(as
TclS TWV ouvaµEWV, olov TO 9EpµavnKOV rrpos TO 9EpµavTOV OTl ouvaTaL, 10"To rroLfjaov rrpos To rroLT]a6µEvov" ibid., 23 .
... " ibid., 1021al4-17. Again, Suarez is following Fonseca's translation: In Metaphy. 11 C£ Section 12, n. 2, below.
V, c. 15, tomus II, col. 788.
12Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.102la26-b2.
9 Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.102la21-25. 13C£ DM7, 3, n. 2, vol. 25, p. 272.
 152 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section JO 153
14
higher unity, but every other, besides numerical, unity is a unity of reason.
to have conceded this, when he said: "those things are the same, of which there
Nor does it matter if someone says that formal unity is real; for this also is not
is one substance," 20 that is, an essence, and he locates all these in this class. Nor
real except insofar as it is in reality (in re) the same as numerical [unity], even
does it matter if someone understands by the term "substance" not the essence
though they are distinguished by reason. Hence, [formal unity] is multiplied
but a proper substance, since at least for equal reason a sufficient argument is
in things as much as is numerical unity itself, as was seen above. 15 Therefore, it
taken. For two actions or two places (ubt), are as similar as two whitenesses.
cannot be the foundation of a real relation any more than numerical unity.
But the falsity of the consequent is proven inasmuch as from it the fact woul~
And this is confirmed and explained: for the unity that is the foundation of
come about that two relations of the same species, for example, two paterni-
a relation must be a unity of several things, since the unity of each one as such
ties, are related by a real relation of similitude; for the argument is completely
does not found a relation to another; therefore, it must be a unity of several
the same. But the consequent is false, because a relation cannot be founded
things. But every unity of several things that are distinct in reality (in re) is a
upon a relation. Otherwise, in every relation there would be infinite relati~ns;
unity of reason. Therefore.
for just as the first founds the second, so also the second could found a third.
You will say that this is true of, as it were, positive and universal unity,
For it will be similar, or dissimilar, or distinct, from the others, and the same
however, a negative unity, by which one thing is not other than another in
will be true of the third with respect to a fourth, and so to infinity. Secondly,
some form or property, does exist in things themselves. For in this way /p.
it follows that between two quantities of two feet there are two real relations,
822/ some Thomists answer, [for example], Capreolus, in [DefCnsiones], Book
the one of identity, insofar as they are of the same essence, and the other .of
l, Distinction 30, Question 1; 16 Soncinas, in Metaphysics, Book 5, Question
equality, insofar as they are of the same size. And the first could be lost wh.ile
34; 17 and Cajetan, [commenting on] De Ente et essentia, Question 7 [sic]. 18
the second would remain; for between a two-foot and a three-foot quantity
But against this, since a negation or a privation cannot found a real relation
there is a similarity /col. bl of essence, although there is not equality. Likewise,
any more than a being of reason [can]-since a privation taken according to
it should be said that an intensified and an abated heat are related by one real
itself is also a being of reason and posits nothing real in things-therefore it
relation of identity in essence and another of dissimilarity by intension, and
cannot found a real relation.
similar things, which seem absurd. .
And this argument seems also to prove that a relation founded on number
7. Thirdly it follows that not only a specific similarity but also a genenc or
cannot be real, because its proximate reason of founding is a kind of negation,
analogous one can found a genuine real relation. For the argume~t is propo.r-
for a number or a multitude is established by a distinction, but a distinction
tional. For even though a generic similarity is not as great as a specific one, still
or a division formally consists in a negation, as was seen above. 19 And this is
it is a true similarity and unity. Therefore, it will found a real relation, although
made plain by examples. For inequality, for instance, is proximately founded
not of the same character nor perhaps as perfect. Again, [this is so] because if
in the fact that this quantity does not have something that another has. But
a generic unity, because of various specific differences, is not :nou~h ~o~ this
this is a negation. Likewise, dissimilarity is proximately founded in the fact
relation, neither would a specific unity suffice, because of vanous mdividual
that this quality does not have the essence that another has, and conversely.
differences; for they keep the same proportion in real identity and a distincti?n
6. Second.-! argue in a second principal way: for if specific unity is a suf-
of reason. The argument, therefore, is the same. Thus, just as a specific umty
ficient foundation for a relation, many absurd things follow. The first is that
founds a relation of reason, so does a generic [unity].
between things of the individual categories, insofar as they are of the same
The consequent is false, both because things that are distinct in species,
species, there arises a relation ofidentity or ofsimilarity. Aristotle himself seems
even though they agree in genus, are simply dissimilar rather th~n si~ilar, as
for example, whiteness and blackness, and also becaus otherwise, since the
14 For example, generic, or analogical; cf. Metaphysics 5 .6.10 l 6b3 l-32.
15 Cf. DM 6, 1, nn. 8-12, vol. 25, pp. 203-204. agreements and differences of things can be multi~l i~ ':° u1fini~ .th~ou~
16Cf. Defansiones, In I Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 1, ed. Paban-Pegues, tom. II, pp. 299b- abstractions of the intellect, also the relations of suniJanty or dissumlamy
300a. would be infinite in one thing, either with respect to another with which it
17Cf. Quaestiones metaphysicales .. ., V, qq. 34-35, pp. 97-99a. agrees in a specific difference and in all superior predicates, or with respect to
18Cf. In De Ente et Essentia, c. 4, q. 6, ed. Laurent, n. 60, p. 93.
19Cf. DM 4, 6, nn. 2-3, vol. 25, p. 135.
20Metaphysics 5.15.102lal 1.
154 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section JO 155
diverse things, insofar as it is similar in species to one and [similar] to another
another. And, therefore, there is a greater reason for doubting in the case of
in a proximate or remote genus.
these absolute forms than in these that include a transcendental respect. For in
And the same difficulty, with proportion observed, is found in relations that
these latter it can be understood in some way that without a real addition the
are said to be founded in number or in disagreement. For one relation will be
same respect, under different aspects, is both transcendental and categorical.
to a thing that is distinct in the ultimate species, and others will be to various
However, in the former absolute things it seems that in no way there can be
things that are diverse in one or another genus, which things can be multiplied
understood a real disposition [toward], if nothing intrinsic is added to them,
almost to infinity. as in fact it is not added. Therefore, this first class of relations seems at least
I add also that it seems incredible that all the proportions that arithmeticians more to contain relations of reason, or extrinsic denominations, and modes
see among numbers are real. This is both because no one adequate subject of of speaking that have arisen from various comparisons by our intellect among
such a relation can be assigned, since a whole number does not have in real-
diverse things, rather than true and real dispositions [toward]. . .
ity a true and real unity, and also because they seem to be comparisons and 9. Fourth.-There is a fourth difficulty as regards the second class, m which,
considerations of the intellect rather than real dispositions [toward]. However, in order that we may begin from the more difficult things, what Aristotle says
Aristotle counts all these equally as species contained under this class. 21 seems plainly false, [that is], that the relation of a cause that is about .to cause
8. A Third Difficulty against the First Class of Relations.-There is a third to its future effect is under this class. 23 For that cannot be a real relation.
principal difficulty with regard to the same class. For either relations of this
This is first, because the terminus is not actually existing; for what is future
kind /p. 823/ are some things or real modes that are added to those absolute does not yet exist. Indeed, it is not yet becoming; otherwise, it would not be
forms themselves or they are not. The first cannot be said, as was generally said
a relation of a cause about to operate, but rather of [a cause] that is operating.
above 22 about this whole category. And in a special way about this class the two
It is second, because the reason of founding /col. b/ or the necessary condition,
first difficulties here proposed seem sufficiently to prove that, because infinite namely, the action, does not yet exist. But that this con?ition is neces.sary is
modes are multiplied in the same thing, which modes are not only unneces-
dear, because otherwise there would in no way be a relation of one actmg, or
sary, but they can neither be understood nor reduced to some definite concept
of one about to act, but only of one able to act.
(certam rationem). Again [it cannot be said], because unity among things of Then it is also difficult [to understand] in what way a relation founded upon
this kind is not something other than the things themselves. Why therefore
a past action is real. This is first, because that action does not ~xist n~w; there-
will a feature (ratio) result from this as something different? But if there are
fore it cannot be the foundation or the reason of some relation. It 1s second,
no modes that are distinct in reality (in re) there cannot be real dispositions
bec~use the fact that Peter, for instance, generated Paul is only an extrinsic
[toward], but a mere co-existence of several absolute things of certain condi- denomination from a past action; how, therefore, can a real intrinsic respect be
tions. founded on that? This is most of all because that denomination is said equally
This is proven, because a real disposition [toward] cannot belong to a thing
unless either it is intrinsic to it and from itself, or it is added to it. In the pres-
whether the generated son is alive o r not; for it is always tr~e to sar that Pet~r
generated Paul. [ndeed, if we attend. to th~ ~~de of ~eala.ng, he 1 cal led his
ent case, however, when one whiteness becomes similar to another there is
fa ther in che same way. And from chis agam 1t is also diffic ult [co understand]
not added to it an intrinsic real disposition [toward], since if it were added, that a relation of agent, even a present relation, is real in the agent himself,
it would be really (ex natura ret) distinct, for an addition in reality cannot be since an action is not in an agent24 and consequently it denominates the agent
understood without a distinction between that which is added and that to
extrinsically. . .
which it is added. Again, neither is that disposition [toward] intrinsic and And this is confirmed, because Aristotle says that in the third class the relat10n
essential to whiteness, both because it can absolutely be without that and also of a knowable object (scibilis) is not real, from the fact that a thing is called
because every intrinsic and essential disposition [toward] of an absolute thing
knowable through a disposition of knowledge toward it. B~t also ~n a?e?t
25
is transcendental. But one whiteness has no transcendental disposition toward is in this way denominated through the disposition of an action, which 1s m

23Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.1021a14-19.

21 Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.1020b33-102la14.
24Cf. Aristotle, De Anima 3.3.426a9-10.
22Cf. Section 2, nn. 7-9, above.
25Metaphysics 5.15.1021a29-32.
156 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section JO 157

a patient, toward the principle itself of acting. Therefore, for an equal reason, perfection, or moral goodness (honestas), of love is measured from a lovable
there will not result in that principle of acting any relation that will be intrinsic object, certainly in this way a relation of measure will be present between every
to the agent itself effect and cause, either a formal [cause], which is the intrinsic measure of the
Finally, about the relation of an agent in potency, as such, it can also be perfection of a thing, or efficient, exemplar, or final [causes], which can be
doubted, at least when the principle of acting is essentially (per se) instituted extrinsic measures. And, of one genus, the more imperfect species are related
for that task. For then it does not have a transcendental disposition to a thing to a supreme species by a relation of what is measured to their measure'.
in potency or to a possible effect. Therefore, neither will it have a categorical Moreover, a relation of union seems to belong to none of the aforement10ned
[disposition toward these]. The consequence is based upon the third difficulty classes. For, most of all, [it would seem to belong] to the first class (because
proposed above. 26 about the other [classes] it appears there can be no doubt). But neither can it
10. Fifth.-There is a fifth difficulty with regard to the third class, in which belong to that. For the agreement or the unity of which we were speakin~ in
it can be first doubted about the distinction assigned by Aristotle between this that place is one thing, but a union or conjunction, which can b~ of thmgs
class and the others. But this requires a special Section, which we will treat altogether distinct, as the relation of union, for example, of humanity and the
below. 27 [divine] Word, and other similar ones, is something else. There is almost a
Now there is a particular difficulty: in what way the character of a measure similar difficulty about relations of contact, nearness, and distance, and finally
can be the foundation of a real relation, since that character of a measure is about relations of final, formal, and material cause. For all of these do not have
not real, but one of reason only, as was shown above, when we were treating those foundations. 30
of quantity. 28 But if you say that in that place we were talking about a mea-
sure of quantity, but here we are talking about a measure of truth, this rather The Division Given by Aristotle ls Defended.
increases the difficulty. For much less can this character of measure be real, as 12. These are the principal difficulties which occur in regard to the division
is clear because knowledge or a judgment of the intellect is equally measured in question, notwithstanding which, Aristotle's doctrine or division should be
by an existing or a non-existing object. 29 Again, the measuring is not Ip. 824/ embraced and fittingly explained, which [doctrine or division] all of his inter-
some action, nor is it something real (aliquid rez), as will be clear when we are preters and writers of metaphysical questions follow, and theol.ogians also: as
discussing individual categories. is clear from St. Thomas, [in Summa Theologiae], Part 1, Question 13, Arucle
7, 3t and Question 28, Article 1, 32 and Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapters 11 and
Is the Division in Question Sufficient? 12;33 in which places Cajetan34 and Ferrara35 discuss many things about these
11. Sixth.-There is a sixth and last difficulty inasmuch as all relations do relations, [and] Capreolus and Hispalensis, in Book l, partly in Distinction
not seem to be sufficiently included under these three classes. For there are
others that do not seem to be less real than those that are contained in the
aforementioned classes. This assumption is clear first about the relation of
appetite to the appetible, and of all things that are contained under this kind,
as for example, [the relation] oflove to the lovable, of desire to the desirable,
etc. For, as is clear, these relations are not founded in unity or in action. Nei-
ther [are they founded] on the character of measure, for in love there is not a
truth that is measured by a lovable object. But if you say not the truth, but the 30That is, unity, action-passion, and measure.
31 Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia, tomus IV, pp. 152-154.
26Cf. n. 8, this Section. 32Ibid., pp. 318-319.
27Cf. Section 15, below. 33Cf. Opera omnia, tomus XIII (1918), pp. 287 and 290-91.
28 Cf. DM 40, 3, n. 6, vol. 26, pp. 539-40. 34Cf. In Summam Theo/. I, 13, 7, in S. Thomae, Opera omnia, tomus N (1888), PP·
29 For some background here, cf. my article: "Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth 154-57; ibid., I, 28, l, pp. 319-320.
(l)," Vivarium, XXV (1987), pp. 47-75; and (2) Vivarium, XXVI (1988) pp. 51- 35 Cf. Commentaria in Contra Gentiles, II, cc. 11 and 12, in S. Thomae Opera, tomus
72. XIII, pp. 287-90 and 291-92.
158 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 10 159

19 36 and partly in Distinctions 30 37 I col. bl and 31, 38 where also does Scotus39 even self-evident. Rightly, therefore, that distinction of relations is taken from
and other theologians, and in other places cited above. their distinction.
Apart from the authority of Aristotle, the basis is that relations belonging to 14. You will say: rather the distinction of relations should have been taken
singular things of these classes are real, as is clear from the common consent ofall from their termini. For things that have an essential disposition toward another
philosophers and what has been said above about the entity of these relations. 40 take their specification from that, for example, motions from their termini,
For if these are real relations, [this is true of] especially similarity or paternity powers and habits from their objects.
or of the relation of knowledge to a knowable, which are relations belonging to The answer is first that this is true about a specific and ultimate distinction;
the three classes in question, for if these relations are not real and categorical, however, a generic, or a subalternate, distinction can sometimes be taken
what kind could there be that could rationally be thought to be such? from elsewhere. The answer is second that in that distinction formal termini
This, therefore, is enough in order that these three classes be placed in the are not left aside, but they are either expressly, or at least implicitly, signified
category, "toward another," whether there are some relations of reason that to be in those three classes. For when a relation /p. 825/ of the first class is
are analogous (habeant proportionem) with these classes, or not. For if they do said to be founded in unity, it is included in this that it is also terminated at
not exist, it will be evident enough that these classes are entirely real, whereas another, insofar as it is in some way one. For, as I will show below, that which
if they do exist, they will not pertain directly to these classes as these divide is the foundation of a relation in one relative to another is also the reason of
the category, "toward something," but they will have a certain analogy or terminating the relation of the other. 42 And, by a similar reasoning, when in
proportionality4 1 with these. the second class it is said that a relation is founded in a potency, by this very
13. However, that these classes in relative character are distinct among fact, it is indicated also to be terminated at a potency, or at an effect if the
themselves, seems first known sufficiently from the denominations themselves relation is founded not in a bare potency but as such is under action. For in
that they impart; for they are very much diverse. Then the matter itself is best this way a relation of an active potency is terminated at one that is passive, and
explained by Aristotle from the foundations themselves or from reasons of vice versa. But the relation of an acting potency is terminated at its effect.
founding. For since one of the principal causes of a relation is its foundation However, in the third class, it is more clearly evident that a relation of a
(since, indeed, it has its entity from that), there can be no greater indication of measurable is terminated at a measure. Therefore, that distinction is not so
the distinction of relations than a distinction offormal and especially proximate taken from foundations, without termini also being included. For, since these
foundations, about which we must speak. For a remote foundation, or rather are two principles that are in their own way intrinsic to relations, neither can
a subject, does not essentially (.per se) so concur for a relation, and therefore its be excluded from the constitution and distinction of those relations. But the
distinction is not in this way a sufficient foundation for distinguishing rela- foundation is quasi-material, whereas the terminus is quasi-formal, because it
tions. But that the foundations of those three classes are completely distinct is is the ultimate thing toward which the relation tends.

About the Sufficiency ofthe Stated Division.

36For Capreolus, possibly cf. Defensiones, In I Sent., d. 19, q. un., ed. Paban-Pegues, 15. The First Rettsott ofSujficiency.- To How Many Difficulties the Asserted
tom. II, p. 151 b. I have not been able to find the reference in Hispalensis. Reason of Sufficiency Is Subject.-Finally, all the cited authors teach that this
37Cf. Capreolus, Defensiones, In l Sent., d. 30, q. l, a. l, ed. Paban-Pegues, tom. division is sufficient and embracing all species of relations that can belong co
II, p. 282b. For Hispalensis, see Nouarum dejfensionum doctrine ... Beati Thome de rhe category, "toward something." But the reason of its sufficiency St. Thomas
Aquino ... , I, d. 30, q. 1, fols. 214rb-215rb. gives in [his commentary on] Metaphysics, Book 5, Lecmre 17-for in three
38Cf. Capreolus, Defensiones, In I Sent., d. 31, q. 1, a. l, ed. Paban-Pegues, tom. II, ways on ly is it possible that one thing be ordered to another. These are, irher
pp. 318-319. For Hispalensis, see Nouarum deffinsionum doctrine ... Beati Thome according to being (esse) insofar as one thing depends in being on another,
de Aquino ... , I, d. 31, q. l, fol. 230va. and in this way there is the third class, or according to active and passive unity,
39Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 1, in Opera omnia tom. v (ed. Vat., 1959), pp. 265-303; ibid. insofar as one thing receives from another, or confers something on another,
dd. 30-31, tom. vi (1963), pp. 169-222.
40Cf. Section 2, n. 22, above.
41 Cf. Section 2, note 62, above. 42C£ Section 16, n. 20-21, 31, 35, and 36.
160 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section JO 161
and in this way there is the second class; or insofar as the quantity of one thing and sometimes less perfect, as is seen also in the case of the intellect and the
can be measured by another, and in this way there is the first class. 43 intelligible. Then, even though he asserts that these three classes sufficiently
But this reasoning is difficult. For a disposition to something else accord- divide the foundations of relations, he does not however give a reason for the
ing to dependence in being, if it is taken generally, seems to pertain more to sufficiency, nor does he by virtue of that explanation explain their distinc-
the second class, since an effect depends in being upon its cause. But if it is tion among themselves. For potency and act also are compared as perfect
taken according to a special mode of dependence on an object, which is that and imperfect, and potency can be said to be measured by act, insofar as it is
of knowledge or of a potency, in this way there must be distinguished as many proportioned and commensurate to that act-because of which potencies are
modes of relatives as there are modes of dependences. For why rather does that also said to be specified by acts.
mode of dependence constitute a special class of relatives and not others? Therefore, I think that Aristotle did not have any other reason for the suf-
Again, it seems false that quantity, as it has the character of a measure, founds ficiency besides a certain induction by which he understood that no relation
the first /col. bl class. This is first because Aristotle is not assigning there the was found that could not be reduced to some one of the stated heads, which
character of measure, but ofunity or number, which is a very different character. cannot better become evident than by responding to the difficulties mentioned.
For when two quantities are called equal, one is not the measure of the other, For if we find no relation which does not have one of those foundations, it
nor vice versa, nor is this looked at between them, but rather the character of will be sign enough for us that the division is sufficient.
unity. And the same a fortiori is true about similarity or identity, and therefore, /p. 826/
as we have said, unity there is not taken quantitatively, but more generally. It
is true also, second, because the character of a measure is not essentially (per
se) apt for founding a real relation, since it is only an extrinsic denomination
of reason, as was mentioned above. 44
16. The Second Reason ofSufficiency.-How Many Difficulties There Are in
/t.-Alexander of Hales, in the same place, indicates a reason for this distinc-
tion, when he says that the division has been taken from three universal modes
of being, which are: the same and the other, with regard to the first [class];
potency or act, with regard to the second [class]; and (he says) the perfect or the
imperfect, with regard to the third [class], in the way in which the imperfect
is measured by the perfect and the diminished by the complete. And because
these three modes sufficiently vary the nature of the foundations, there are,
therefore, three species of relation. 45
But what he says is difficult, namely, that the third member is taken from
a mode of being insofar as it is perfect or imperfect. For, although a sense is
referred to a sensible according to that class, it is not measured by that [sen-
sible] as the imperfect by the perfect, but it is said to be measured only as by a
specifying terminus, which can sometimes be more perfect, sometimes equal,

43C£ S. Thomae Aquinatis, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio,

ed. Cathala-Spiazzi, V, l. 17, p. 266, n. 1004.
44C£ DM 40, 3, n. 8, vol. 26, p. 540.
45Cf. [Pseudo] Alexandri de Ales, O.M. [actually, Alessandro Bonini, aka Alexander
ofAlexandria (ca. 1270-1314)], In duodecimAristote!is Metaphysicae Iibros di!ucidis-
sima expositio, V, t. 20 (Venetiis: Apud Simonem Galignanum de Karera, 1572), ff.
138b-139a. Note that in this edition folio 139 is erroneously labeled as "143."
 Section XI.
About the First Class of Relations,
Founded in Number or Unity.
1. For the sake of greater clarity, we will respond almost with individual
Sections to the individual difficulties proposed in the Section above. 1
2. To the first [difficulty]2 then the answer is that it is one thing to speak
about two relations of two extremes that are said to be founded in unity, but
another thing [to speak] of each of them. For each of two relations of simili-
tude, for instance, is founded in one quality insofar as it is in itself one by a
formal unity, not indeed with regard to that which unity adds beyond being,
for that is a negation, and therefore it cannot found a real relation, as the
argument correctly proves, but with regard to that positive character of being
that underlies that negation.
But speaking of both relations of two extremes, they are said to be founded
in their unity, because the reason why those two relations simultaneously
arise, when those two extremes are posited, is not only because the individual
extremes have such a unity between themselves, but also because that unity is
of the same nature in both, which is the same as saying that therefore they are
related between themselves because they have a real agreement. And although
this agreement is not some real unity of the two extremes between themselves,
as is also correctly assumed in the argument, speaking of proper and formal
unity, however, there is given in reality a foundation of that unity, whether with
regard to a negation, or with regard to a unity of reason, and that foundation
is enough in order that such relations arise in those extremes.
3. And in a similar way we must respond to the second part about relations
that are founded in multitude, distinction, or diversity. For, although because
of that argument it has seemed to many that those relations are not real, but
are rather [relations] of reason inasmuch as they do not have a real proximate
foundation or a formal terminus, nevertheless, when one is speaking in accord
with the common opinion and in a reasonable way (consequenter), it is more
truly said that the argument is the same about these relations and about those
that are founded in unity. For just as distinction includes negation, so also
does unity. 3 And, conversely, just as the negation that unity entails supposes
an entity, which can be the foundation of a relation, so also a real distinction

1 That is, Section 10, just preceding.

2 Ibid., n. 5.
3 For this, cf. DM 4, l, n. 12, vol. 25, p. 118. Also, see Darge, Sudrez'transzendentale
Seinsauslegung ... , pp. 199-216.
164 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 11 165

is between real extremes, in which the negation there included is founded. In 5, Lecture 17, completely excludes the last four categories, in such way that
those [extremes] /col. b/, therefore, as they are such, a real relation also could they cannot be foundations of relations, "~ecause'." he says, "the~ ratherfolio~
be founded. relation than they are able to cause relation. 9 But it can be explamed that this
Hence, in the examples brought forth there, although it is true that in a rela- is understood about those categories according to their own proper IP· 827 /
tion of inequality one extreme lacks some part of the magnitude of the other natures, but not insofar as they have a proportion or an agreement with others
extreme, still, the relation is not founded formally in that lack, but rather in in the character of unity or of distinction.
the fact that this quantity is so great and that is so great. And the same is true
of dissimilarity. For it presupposes two essences, one of which is not the other. How One Relation Can Found Another.
However, it is not proximately founded in that negation, but in those essences 5. The First Opinion.-But there is a greater difficulty about relation~ them-
themselves insofar as according to their formal unities they are essentially more selves, in which a second general difficulty is suggested: whether~ relauon can
than one. be founded on a relation? For it is the opinion of many that a relation can never
This is clarified by an example: for light and dark also have dissimilarity be founded on a relation. St. Thomas thinks this way, in [Summa Theologiae],
as regards that negation, since the form of light is not in one which is in the Part l, Question 42, Article 4 [sic]; 10 and Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter
other. But, nevertheless, there is no real relation of dissimilarity between them, 13;11 and De Potentia, Question 7, Article 11; 12 and in [commenting on the
because from the side of the second extreme4 there is neither the foundation Sentences], Book l, Distinction 3 [sic], 13 Question 1, Article l. 14 And more
nor the positive formal terminus of such a relation. frequently the Thomists follow that, [for example], Soncinas, in Metaphys.ics,
Book 5, Question 29, in Reply to Objection 1; 15 and Ferrara, [commentmg
A Relation of Unity Can Be Founded in Things ofall Categories. on] Contra Gentiles, Book 4, Chapter 11. 16 The pri~ci~al basis is the .Po.int
4. In the second difficulty, 5 many things are touched which could raise about a process to infinity that would follow froi:n this. Just as. for a similar
particular questions. Nevertheless, let us quickly pass through them, lest we reason there cannot be an action toward an action, nor a motion toward a
delay too much in explaining the most minute things. First, therefore, there is motio~, and universally proceeding from the formal effect to the form, if the
a question about whether a relation of similarity and other [relations] of this form itself in some way participates the effect or its denomination, we must
kind can be founded in only quantity and quality, or also in things of other make a stand in that, so that it is such through itself This is usually said in
categories. And indeed about substance we have already seen in the preced- another way, in proceeding from a "which" (quorl) to a "by which'' (quo), ~e
ing Section that the argument is the same on this score as about quantity and must stand in the "by which" (quo). Therefore, since it is a relation by which
quality. And the argument made there seems to me to conclude about any something relative is related, we must stop with that in such way that it is not
thing or mode or entity whatever, especially if such are absolute, that we might related by another relation.
for the moment omit relations. For why are two heats 6 really similar-and
as such they are really related-and not two heatings,7 or two places (ubt), 8
9 Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Jn duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio,
and any other similar things. Again, between two actions there is a true and
ed. Cathala-Spiazzi, V, l. 17, p. 266, n. 1005.
positive contrariety. But this is a relation, which belongs to this class. For it IOCf. Summa Theologiae I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 4, in Opera, tomus N, p. 436b.
is founded in a sort of special mode of distinction. Therefore, as regards the 11 C£ S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia, tomus XIII, p. 293a. .
other categories beyond "toward something," we easily concede the inference 12 C£ Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 11, ed. P. Bazzi et al., P· 212; also
made there. Neither against this consequent, as regards this part, is anything see ibid., a. 9, ad 2, p. 208b. .
there objected. It is true that St. Thomas, [commenting on] Metaphysics, Book 13Here, the Vives, the Salamanca, 1597, the Mainz, 1605, and the Vemce, 1610,
editions all read "3" instead of the correct "31."
4 That is, the dark. 14C£ S. ThomaeAquinatis, Scriptum in lib. Sent., I, d. 31, q. l, a. l, ed. Mandonnet,
5 C£ Section 10, n. 6, above. tomus i, p. 719.
6 Which would be in the category of quality. 15C£ Quaestiones metaphysicales .. ., V, q. 29, p. 92a.
7 Which would be in the category of action. 16Cf. Commentaria in Contra Gentiles N, c. 11, n. 25, tomus XV, p. 45b.
8 Which would be in the category of place. 17Cf. Section 10, n. 6, above.
166 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 11 167

And this can be confirmed by a theological argument. For otherwise among On the Six Principles, Question 10. 24 The basis was touched upon by us in the
the divine relations there would be a variety of real relations, namely, of real aforesaid difficulty. For no sufficient reason appears on account of which a
distinction and quasi specific dissimilarity in the relative character, and of likeness between two paternities is not as much a true relation as between two
generic similarity in the same [character], and other [relations] of this kind, whitenesses, since in reality (in re ipsa) they have the same manner of agree-
which is against the common teaching of theologians, who acknowledge only ment and of formal unity, and they are also denominated in the same way as
four real relations in God. 18 alike. For if someone wants to say that two paternities are denominated similar
6. The Second Opinion.-Scotus, in [his Sentences commentary], Book 2, only fundamentally or negatively, that is, because they do not have a diverse
Distinction l, Questions 4 and 5, 19 and in Book 4, Distinction 6, Question character, he who so responds /col. bl presents an occasion that about any
10, 20 holds a contrary opinion. Lychetus and Mayronnes follow him in these similar things the same can be said, or he needs to give a sufficient reason for
places, 21 as does Mayronnes also in Book l, Distinction 29, Question 4; 22 the difference [in this case], which certainly does not appear.
Antonio Andreas, in Metaphysics, Book 5, Question 13 [sic], 23 and the book The same argument is valid about the relation ofdissimilarity, which can exist
between paternity and the relation of science, for example. Again, arithmeti-
18These would be the relations of paternity, filiation, spiration, and spiratus. The cians posi a proportionality founded on two proportio~s, for just ~ fou~ is
relation of paternity would be constitutive of the Father; filiation would constitute
to eight, so three is to six. But a proportion is only a relation. P~opomo~alt~,
the Son; spiration would be the mutual love of the Father and Son, which would
therefore, seems to be nothing else than a likeness of proportions, which 1s
give rise to the Holy Spirit (the one breathed forth [spiratus].
a relation of a relation. 25 And this argument seems certainly to prove, speak-
19Cf. Ordinatio II, d. 1, q. 4-5, in Opera omnia, tomus vii (ed. Vat., 1973), p. 119,
n. 239; pp. 133-4, nn. 268-71. ing logically (conseqttenter), that one relation can be really related to ar1other
20Cf. Quaestiones in IV Sent., d. 6, q. 10, in Opera omnia (1639), tomus viii, pp. through relations that bdong to rbis first <lass. Therefore just as the one and
353-4. the many transcend all categories, so also relations of this first kind can be
21 Actually, Lychetus did not comment of Book IV of Scotus' Commentary on the found in things of aU categories not so that they are of the essence of those
Sentences. For this, see the briefletter, dated May 14, 1636, of Fr. Ioannes Bap- things, but as founded on those things themselves.
tista a Campanea, Minister General of the Ordo Minorum to the Irish Franciscan, 7. A Third Opinion, Which Reconciles the Two Preceding One.r.-But ~ome
Anthony Hickey, which is given in the front matter of Tome 8 of Ioannis Duns try to bring these opinions to an agreement, both because of the authonty of
Scoti, Doctoris subtilis, Ordinis Minorum, Quaestiones in Lib. IV. Sententiarum, St. Thomas and on account of the force of the reasons. For they say that one
Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Durand, 1639. As for Mayronnes: I cannot find relation can be really related to another, not, however, by another relation, but
him directly commenting on Scotus' text here, i.e. In IV Sent., d. 6, q. 10. Instead,
by itself in order that a process to infinity be avoided and that the same thing
he comments up to only Scotus' Question 9; cf. Francis of Mayronnes, In quatuor
be simultaneously "that by which'' (quo) and "which'' (quorl}. And in this way
libros Sententiarum IV, d. 6, q. 4 [sic] (Venetiis, 1520), f. 182ra.
22Cf. In quatuor libros Sententiarum l, d. 29, q. 4 (Venetiis, 1520), f. 90ra. Here the
Vives, the Salamanca, 1597, and the Mainz, 1605, editions of Suarez read: "q.
6." in places added to it. Antonio Andreas did author a Questiones su~~r xii libros fv!eta-
23 For this, cf. [Pseudo] Scotus [aka Antonio Andreas, O.M.], In XII libros Metaphysi- physicae Aristotelis, ed. Venice: Johannes et Gregorius de Gregorns, 1495, which I
corum Aristotelis expositio, V, q. 11, in Ioannis Duns Scoti, Opera omnia (Lugduni, have seen, but in which the point in question is not made.
1639), tomus iv, p. 635a. On Antonio Andreas as author of the Expositio here, cf. 24 For this, cf. Antonio Andreas, O.F.M., Scriptum super librum Sex principiorum, ed.
E. Gilson, jean Duns Scot: Introduction ases positions fondamentales (Paris: Librai- Joannes Maria Mapellus Vincentinus (Venetiis, 1508), fol. 52vab; I can find no
rie Philosophique ]. Vrin, 1952), p. 674. It is noteworthy that while Suarez does obvious division of this work into Questions. For a critical edition of the original
not have this reference exactly correct, he was aware that Antonius Andreas had book, On the Six Principles, cf. A. Heysse, Liber de sex principiis. Gilberto Porretano
some role in the preparation of the Expositio attributed to Scotus; cf. DM, Index ascriptus, in Op11.rcula et texttlS, Mi.inster i. W. 1929 (revised 1953); cf. c. 4, pp.
locupletissimus, X, c. 4, vol. 25, p. lv b. In this he anticipates Luke Wadding and his 18-19, for the passage on which Anroni,o is commenting here. On the incorrect
colleague, Cavellus (i.e. Hugh McCaughwell), who, in a "Judgment" (fudicium) character of the ascription of the book ro Gilbert de la Porree, cf. L. Minio-Paluello,
prefixed to tome N of the 1639 edition of Scotus's Opera omnia, has asserted that Magister Sex Principiorum, in: Studi Medievali, terza serie, VI (1965), 123-155.
Scotus authored the Expositio while Antonio Andreas corrected it, ordered it, and 25That is, a likeness in relation.
168 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 11 169

a relation is not properly founding a relation, since the relation that is related 9. And this is confirmed, for when one relation is said to be really related
and that by which it is related are not different. to another, but not through another relation, either this is understood to be
However, conceptually, it can be said to found, insofar as it is distinguished not through another that is distinct either in reality or by reason, and this is
according to reason into that which is related and that by which it is related. evidently proven to be false by the argument that has been made. For what can
Cajetan favors this opinion, [commenting on Summa Theologiae], Part 1, be a greater distinction of reason than that which is from termini of diverse
Question 42, Article 1, based on the words of St. Thomas, in answer to Ob- characters and which is enough that one relation be accidental to the other?
jection 4, which are as follows: "One relation is not related to another through Or the meaning is that it is not related by another relation that is really distinct
some other relation. "26 About this, Cajetan adds, that from this condition of but [by one which is distinct] by reason only, and this is not something special
a relation, namely, that it is not founded upon another relation, it does not to a relation. For above29 we said that relations by which absolute things are
follow that relations of relations are not real, but that they are not other than related are distinguished only by reason from their absolute foundations.
their foundations. 27 From this, he adds that if the divine relations were not Or if someone contends that an absolute foundation is related by a relation
otherwise to have identity in [the divine] nature, they could be related by a that is real and really distinct, but one relation can be related by a real relation
real relation of equality. But then the equality of the Son to the Father would that is, however, not really distinct, first he is supposing something false, and
be filiation itself, and of the Father to the Son, paternity itsel£28 then it is necessary that he give some reason for this difference, which up to
8. The Opinion ofthe Author.-However, this opinion does not seem to be now no one has given. For what certain people say: that a relation is the most
totally sustainable. For, in order that a form be by itselfsufficient to receive some minute entity and, therefore, that it cannot found another [relation] that is
denomination, or (as they say) in order that it have itself as "by which" (quo) really distinct, is not satisfactory. This is because, first, the relation that is
and "which" (quod), it is necessary that that denomination Ip. 828/ be both of founded is also of the most minute entity, and then, second, because the first
the same character as the form in question and also intrinsic and inseparable relation is now supposed to be founded in the absolute thing. And, therefore,
from it, as is clear in the case of action, which comes to be by itself inasmuch it is not strange that it could found another proportionate [relation], just as
as the nature of action is that it come to be, when through it something comes also motion or time is of a sufficiently diminished entity and, nevertheless,
to be, and in the case of quantity which is intrinsically by itself quantified. can found a relation.
But if one relation is really related to another, often that respect [to the 1O. Therefore, it seems that we must distinguish. For there are certain respects
other] is of a very different character from the proper character and formal intimately included in relations themselves and inseparable from those relations
effect of such a relation, and it is extrinsic and accidental to that. Therefore, themselves according to their proper natures. But others are accidental. The
that relation cannot through itself be so related, but [it is so] rather through first are [ordered] only toward proper termini or toward opposite relations;
another relation. The minor is proven: because the formal character and effect but the second are toward other termini, which are simply accidental to the
of paternity is to relate to a son. When, however, this [paternity] is said to be being of such a relation.
similar to another paternity, if it is really related to that, this is a formal effect of An example may be in paternity, which, by the very fact that it relates a
a very diverse character, since it tends toward a terminus of a diverse character, father to a son, intrinsically and inseparably includes an opposition with son-
and it has a reason of founding that is also of a diverse character. Again, this ship, and consequently also a distinction. For a distinction is like something
denomination, "similar," is accidental to paternity. For if there were no other superior that is included in opposition. Opposition, however, is something
paternity in the world, it would not be denominated as similar, nor would it that is included in correlation. But a relation (respectus) of one paternity to
be related in that way. Therefore, when it is so related, it is related not by itself another in the feature of being similar is not so included in the proper nature
but by another relation. of paternity. And one paternity is an accidental and extrinsic terminus with
respect to the other paternity.
26Summa Theologiae I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 4; in Opera omnia, tomus IV {1888), p.
436b.
27Cf. Commentaria, in I, 42, 1, n. 9; tomus IY, 437b.
28Ibid. 29 Cf. Section 2, n. 22.
170 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 11 171
11. Therefore, about the first relations (respectibus), 30 what Cajetan says31 is tion corresponding to it to which it itself is similar. And this is at most what
fitting enough, namely, that although in all of those a same relation is related, the examples34 of action, motion, and the like, prove.
it is related not by another relation but by itself, since in its full nature it 13. But if the objection is pursued to the effect that any relation is capable of
includes all those. However, about relations of the second kind, I do not see another relative denomination of a diverse nature, for a relation of similitude
how it can reasonably (consequenter) be denied that one relation can be related can be dissimilar to another [relation] and vice versa, I answer that relations
through another and therefore can in itself found the other. For it does not that are founded in the same absolute foundation, since they are only rationally
seem that it can be denied that a relation is also really related in that way, as distinguished, can mutually so relate to and denominate themselves. Hence,
the arguments that were made prove. Moreover, it cannot be said that in that inasmuch as those denominations of diverse characters are finite, it is not
way it is related through itself, as what we have said against the last opinion necessary because of them to admit infinite relations or a process to infinity.
argues persuasively. But about divine relations 35 the reasoning is different, because excluding the
But from this I further add that just as above I explained St. Thomas' de- identity of the [divine] essence, in which there is not founded a real relation
nying that relations are founded on the four last categories, so also can it be but rather one of reason, they do not have among themselves a true and real
explained as regards relations [themselves]. For relations, in line with their likeness, but rather distinction and dissimilarity, which they [each] include in
proper and intrinsic nature, are not related by a relation which is distinct from their proper relations. Therefore, they are not related among themselves by
themselves, nor do they found such a relation. However, insofar as in some way another relation, but by themselves. But this discussion belongs in another
they participate, or agree with quantity, in unity or multitude, in this way it is place.
not unreasonable that they be related by a relation of similarity, and by others About Relations ofIdentity, Similarity, and Equality.
like that, and the bases of the second opinion seem to prove only this. 14. Third, in that difficulty% it is asked what is a proper relation of identity,
12. IfOne Relation Founds Another, Whether It Is Necessary To Regress to lnjin- of similarity, and of equality, and whether they can belong to the same thing in
ity.-However, to the argument about a process to infinity, 32 first, it can be diverse respects. To this we must briefly say that a relation ofidentity is properly
answered that there is no great problem admitting it in relations, as we said essential identity, less than numerical, in order that we may now abstract from
above in regard to the relations of parts or points. But here it may seem to have specific and all superior [identities], about which [we will speak] soon. This is
some greater difficulty, because between the foundation and the relation there clear from Aristotle who says that those things are the same whose substance,
is an /p. 829/ essential (per se) order. However, in things that are essentially that is, essence, is one. 37 Therefore, to the argument made there it should be
ordered it does not seem possible to proceed to infinity, as Aristotle teaches conceded that two qualities, as they are of the same essential species /col. bl,
in Book 2 [of the Metaphysics]. 33 One can answer, indeed, that this is true in are properly related with a relation of identity. For there is the same nature
the case of things that are distinct in reality, but not in the case of those that in them that is in other beings of the same species. Consequently, therefore,
are distinguished by reason. it should also be said that a proper relation of similarity (looking at the thing
Secondly, [the argument] can be answered by denying the process to infinity, itself, whatever about the use of words) is that which belongs to qualities by
because we must stand with that relation that receives the same denomination reason of intension, but a relation of equality is that which belongs to quanti-
that the foundation gives and necessarily and intrinsically brings that with ties by reason of actual extension.
itsel£ So, for example, although paternity is related by similarity, and that Finally (what further explains this matter) it should be admitted that in
similarity is similar to another of the same species, it is not necessary that it the same quality the relation of identity that is founded in its essence as such
be similar by another relation, but by itself, because that denomination is of is one thing, but the relation of similarity, founded in a unity of intension,
the same nature, and it brings that nature intrinsically with itsel£ For it is not is another, so that this is separable from that because a unity of essence can
possible to relate one paternity to another that is similar without another rela- remain without an intension. Indeed, also conversely, although in respect to
30See n. 10, just preceding. 34Cf. n. 9, this Section.
31 Cf. n. 7, this Section. 35Cf. n. 5, this Section.
32C£ Section 10, n. 6, above. 36C£ Section 10, n. 6, above.
33 C£ Metaphysics 2.2.994al-b31 . 37Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.102lal 1.
172 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 11 173

another whiteness one whiteness cannot be similar in intension without also of the question (argumentandum) 41 show this in a fairly probable way. Nor
being one in essence, nevertheless, with respect to blackness a whiteness and a does it matter that things that are different in species are without qualifica-
blackness [each] as eight degrees can be called similar in their mode or grade tion rather called dissimilar than similar. For from this it follows only that a
of intension, even if they are dissimilar or, rather, diverse in essence. Neither relation of generic similarity, precisely taken, is not, so to speak, as potent for
is it a problem for relations of this kind to be multiplied, especially if it is true denominating as a specific relation of similarity or dissimilarity. Nevertheless,
that things or real modes that are really distinct are not multiplied because it does impart its own denomination, that is, of a certain kind of similarity,
of this. namely, generic.
15. And we should think in the same way about relations of equality and 17. However, it seems probable enough that these relations of similarity in
specific identity in continuous quantity. For there is the same proportional species or genus are properly diverse only with regard to diverse things, or when
reasoning as is explained in the stated argument. However, I say in continuous each is adequate to its terminus as well as to its proper and formal foundation.
quantity, because in numbers a relation of equality and of specific identity do So, for example, although two men may be similar in species and genus, it
not seem diverse, because two couples (binari1), for example, from their proper is not necessary that they be related by a double real relation, because in one
essential characters have equality, and it is not possible, not only in reality but adequate relation, namely, of specific similarity, both respects are included,
also by reason, that the relation of specific identity between them be separated because that relation as it exists in reality (in re), is not founded solely on an
from the relation of equality. And the reason seems to be that discrete quantity ultimate difference, but it is founded in a particular form that gives a particular
does not have another proper essence or species apart from such actual exten- specific being. However, the relation by which a man is similar to a horse in
sion, or numerability, and in its case a species of such a kind is not separable the nature of animal is diverse in kind (specie) from that by which one man is
from a multitude of such a kind. This is otherwise in continuous quantity, for similar to another. However, that also includes every other relation of similar-
keeping its proper essential extension it can exist in a greater or lesser size. ity that can be imagined between a man and a horse as in the superior degrees
included in the nature of an animal. And proportionally in the same way we
Whether a Generic Unity Founds a Real Relation. should philosophize in other instances. And thus there is easily avoided not only
16. It Is Affirmatively Answered.-Fourthly, it is asked in that argument, 38 an infinity, but also a too great multitude of relations, for they are multiplied
whether relations of this first class, which pertain to unity, are founded on only according to the multitude and the formal distinction of termini or of
specific unity alone, or also /p. 830/ in generic [unity]. And although either unities.
side can be easily discussed, as was suggested there, and conjectures could be 18. Whether an Analogical Unity Founds a Categorical Relation.-But it can
multiplied against both sides, nevertheless, briefly I think it should be said that be rightly asked: whether a relation of this kind can sometimes be founded
not only specific unity, but also generic, suffices for a relation of similarity. on an analogical unity, especially on that /col. bl which involves one objective
This is the explicit opinion of St. Thomas, [in Summa Theologiae], Part 1, concept intrinsically belonging to each of the analogates. For as regards other
Question 28, Article 1, in Reply to Objection 2, where he says: "The relation modes of analogy, it is certain that this does not suffice for a real relation,
which is implied by this word, 'same: is a relation of reason only, if it is taken as because [that imagined relation] is not founded upon some proper similarity,
simply the same; however, it is otherwise when some things are said to be the same but on [one that is] metaphorical, which principally comes about through a
not.in number, but in the nature ofa genus or a species. "39 Antonio Andreas, in comparison by our intellect. But in the first kind of analogy it is not improbable
[his commentary on] the Metaphysics, Book 5, Question 13 [sic], in Reply to that there can be among the analogates a real relation that is founded upon
Objection 3, 40 also follows this. And the reasons presented within the statement such a unity, because among the extremes [that is, the analogates] there is some
real agreement. 42 Hence, St. Thomas sometimes indicates that the effects of
38Cf. Section 10, n. 7, above.
39Cf. Summa Theologiae I, q. 28, a. l, ad 2, in Opera, tomus IV, p. 319a. 41 See Section 10, n. 7, above.
40For this, cf. [Pseudo] Scotus [aka Antonio Andreas, O.M.], In XII libros Metaphysi- 42 Here we may note the realistic character of the objective concept which intrinsically
corum Aristotelis expositio, V, q. 12, in Ioannis Duns Scoti, Opera omnia (Lugduni, belongs to a number of real things. While at times, in different contexts, Suarez
1639), tomus iv, pp. 643b, 644b, and 646a. Also, see: Questiones super xii libros seems undecided or even vacillating about the mental or extramental status of the
Metaphysicae Aristotelis, V, q. 14, ad 3 (Venice, 1495), fol. 26rab. objective concept, it should be noted here how he contrasts it with a merely meta-
174 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 11 175
God are related to God by some real relation of likeness or of image, as can be otherwise, in any unity whatever there would arise a special entity or a mode
gathered from [Summa Theologiae], Part 1, Question 4, Article 3, in Reply to that, taken essentially (per se), would be one relation and would with others
Objection 4, 43 together with what Cajetan in an acute way notes there. 44 Again compose one [relation] only /p. 831/ "to a certain degree" (secundum quid), in
[this is indicated] from the same St. Thomas, in Part 1, Question 93, Article that way in which a number is one. But this cannot be, because in no unity,
l, in Reply to the Last Objection, 45 and in De Potentia, Question 7, Article 6, taken essentially, is there a reason or a basis from which such a mode results.
where he says that there are in creatures various relations to God, insofar as he But if a relation is not some mode that is really added to its foundation, it
produces them diverse from himself, although in some ways like to himsel£ 46 is easily understood that a number, in the way in which it is in things, and
Antonio Andreas, as cited above, 47 also thinks the same. according to the imperfect unity that it has, can be compared and related in
19. Lastly, in this difficulty48 there is a question as to whether these rela- the way of one extreme to another number as equal or double, or in some
tions, as they are properly founded in multitude and have their place among other similar way. For the foundation of that relation in particular numbers
various numbers, are real relations or only denominations from comparisons is nothing other than a discrete quantity itself, as it has a certain unity, or a
that our intellect makes. And, indeed, if we note the common way of speak- diversity from another [discrete quantity], and that [first] quantity in reality
ing of Aristotle and other philosophers, there is no doubt that they think in (in re) is the relation itself insofar as it can give a denomination to a subject in
the same manner about these relations as about other real ones that belong to an order to a similar or dissimilar terminus.
this first class. For denominations of equality or of inequality are taken in the
same way from things themselves. Of What Kind Are the Rel.ations That Belong to the First Cl.ass.
However, if a relation is a thing or a mode that is really (ex natura ret) distinct 20. In reply to the third difficulty, 50 it must be said that it is not necessary
from its foundation, it is difficult to explain such a real relation as founded that a relation of this first kind be either really (realiter) added to the foundation
in two things or in three things. For it cannot be truly one and simple in a itself, as something really (ex natura ret) distinct from that, or a mere extrinsic
totality of two things. For in what subject would it be? Neither indeed can denomination from the co-existence of the other extreme. For between these
it be in one unity rather than in another, since there is no reason for dispar- two a medium can be found, namely, that there be an intrinsic denomination
ity, nor [can it be] in all together, since one accident cannot as a whole be in that includes the co-existence of another extreme to which it entails a disposi-
many subjects at the same time, and in each of them, as is self-evident. This
tion.
is especially because no unity is double or triple in such way that there can be However, when it is asked about this disposition, whether it is presupposed
in it alone the whole relation of double or triple. But neither can it be partly intrinsically in the foundation, even when the terminus does not exist (al-
in one subject and partly in another; otherwise, it would not be truly one though in that case it does not have the nature of a categorical relation, but
and simple, but rather composite in the same way as a number. 49 However, of a transcendental one), or whether it is added anew when the terminus is
it cannot be composed in that way, if a relation is a thing or a distinct mode; posited, it must be said that it is not presupposed properly under the character
of a disposition [toward] or a relation, either categorical or transcendental.
phorical term. This has enormous ramifications for analogy and for being itself, For, as was correctly proven in that third difficulty, 51 the foundation of this
both real (actual or possible), or merely intentional (e.g. impossible objects). first class does not essentially (per se) include a transcendental disposition [to-
43Summa Theologiae I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 4, in Opera omnia, tomus N, p. 54b. ward]. Therefore, no formal disposition is presupposed intrinsically in such a
44C£ Cajetan, Commentaria, in I, 4, 3, n. 5, in S. Thomae, Opera, tomus IV, p. foundation, and also it is not really and intrinsically added, when a terminus
55a. is posited.
45C£ Summa Theologiae I, q. 93, a. 1, ad 3, in Opera omnia, tomus V (Romae, 1889), 21. It must be said, therefore, that this disposition is presupposed fundamen-
p. 402ab.
tally and quasi-inchoatively by virtue of the foundation, but it is completed by
46Cf. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 6, ed. viii revisa, P. Bazzi et al.
the positing of the terminus. "Is completed," I say, not by an extrinsic addition,
(Taurini: Marietti, 1949), p. 202; ibid., ad 5.
47C£ n. 16, this Section.
48C£ Section 10, n. 7, above. 50C£ Section 10, n. 8, above.
49 That is: a number is composed of units. 51 Ibid.
176 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation

but only by the extrinsic positing of the terminus. For the foundation itself is
apt of itself to give a relative denomination of this kind, and for this reason it
is said to contain a quasi-inchoate relative /col. b/ disposition. In order, how- Section XII.
ever, that it actually give that denomination, it requires an actually existing About the Second Class of Relations
terminus, and therefore, when the terminus is posited, that denomination is
Founded in Potency and Action.
immediately completed, without another intrinsic and real addition. But the
1. Concerning the second class of relations many things are touched on in
relative disposition in the present case is not anything other than this same
the fourth difficulty that was stated above. 1 Speaking in general about these
relative denomination, or the form itself, insofar as it is actually giving that relations, it is certain that they are real and categorical. For this is the way that
[denomination]. However, what condition is necessary in the foundation, in all the Doctors think, and this is the way they explain Aristotle. For if between
order that on its part it be apt to give this denomination, we will say in the
some extremes all things necessary for a relation of this kind2 concur, [it will
following Section. And [this suffices] up to now for the first member of that
be] especially between these, as can be evident from what has been said and
division. 52
as will be more evident from what will be said. But in particular there are two
[questions] that have difficulty here. The first is whether all the relations that
Aristotle, for example, numbers in that class are truly real and categorical. The
second is what is the proper foundation of such relations.

Whether All Re/,ations ofthe Second C/,ass Are Real.

2. Concerning the first part, the first objection is surely difficult, which in
the fourth difficulty3 is made against that member that pertains to relations
founded in future action, which are said to be: "between that which is going
to do and that which will be done." For these are Aristotle's words. 4 But the
objection that is made, as I see it, concludes that such a relation cannot be
real, for lack of a terminus and of a proximate required condition. Hence, I
think it must be said that not all the examples that Aristotle has posited there
are in rigor about real and categorical relations. For he himself does not in
that place intend to give a proper and rigorous coordination of the category,
"toward something," but rather to explain all modes of relatives and to reduce
them to certain heads, whether they are proper real relatives or only imitate
those, according to our Ip. 832/ way of speaking.
And this can be confirmed. For in the same place he says that to this sec-
ond class certain relatives belong, which are said according to a privation of
potency, for instance, the impossible, 5 and similar things. However, it is clear

Cf. Section 10, n. 9, above.

2 That is, one which is real and categorical.
3 Ibid.
4 Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.102la23.
5 This is worth noting, especially in view oflater debate among 17th century Jesuits;
on this, cf. my article: ''Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: A
Seventeenth-Century Debate about Impossible Objects," The Review ofMetaphysics,
52 That is, the first of the three classes of categorical relations. XLVIII (1995), pp. 771-808.
178 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 12 179
that these are not true real relatives, since the privation of a potency is not a that on each principle there follows a relation that is fitted to that [principle],
real foundation. Therefore, they are put in this class only through a certain because the argument is equal with regard to both. For a relation of potency,
reduction. Accordingly, I think the same should be said about relations that taken absolutely and abstracting from act, exists in both. Therefore, also in
are said to be founded in future action. each of them, as it is under its own act, some relation follows.
3. But about a relation that has arisen from a past action, which lacks an
However, I think that a proper relation of paternity is that which proximately
actually existing terminus, we must think otherwise. For that relation is real
is in the substance itself by means of a principal principle. For in a begot-
and categorical, and it endures as long as the effect and the cause actually exist, ten supposit, the relation of sonship without doubt immediately affects the
as the common opinion holds. For in that case there are present real extremes
substance itself, or even the supposit itself, as many wish, about which I have
that are apt to be able to have between them a real order6 (for we are treating
treated atlength in the Second Tome of[my commentary on] theThird Part. 8
now of created causes) and already there has been placed in reality all things
Therefore, since these relations correspond proportionately to themselves, the
that are necessary for that order or relation, as will become evident in solving
relation of paternity also proximately affects a substantial principle, and it is
the proposed difficulty. identified with that.
4. In this, first of all, the question is how a relation that remains can be Again, because with every really distinct accident excluded, even if by the
founded in a past action, which now does not exist. It must be said that it is [absolute] power of God there remains [both] a substantial supposit that has
not founded in that as in a proper foundation in which it exists or from which generated 9 and [also] that which has been generated, 10 the relation of paternity
it has its entity, but which is the reason of founding such a relation, or, as we endures (otherwise, there would then be no reason for positing that [relation])
said above,7 the condition required in order that such a relation result. However,
since that man [who has generated] truly and properly will be called a father. 11
it is not such that the relation depends on it as if in becoming and in being, That, therefore, is a sign that this relation is intimately within the substance
and, therefore, it is not strange that when the action has been completed the itsel£ Finally, this is most of all in agreement with its mode of denominating;
relation may remain. But that condition is required, not only because through for it denominates only that supposit which is principally acting.
it the necessary terminus for such a relation is posited as regards its absolute 6. One Who Has Generated, If He Be Deprived of his Son, Does Not Remain
entity only. For it could be posited in reality (in rerum natura) through another
a Father. However, this relation of paternity will not remain after the son has
action which would not have been enough in order that the said relation would died, as is falsely assumed in that fourth difficulty. 12 Neither truly and properly
arise. It is, therefore, necessary because through it a cause has exercised influ- will he who has lost his sons [sic] be said to be, but rather to have been a father,
ence unto such an effect. From this influence [the cause] remains ordered to
which is true not only in philosophical rigor, but also seems to be observed
that effect and respectively denominated from the relation that arises, or from
in common language. Wherefore, it is not the same to be a father as to have
its own power of acting insofar as in a special way it exercised influence into
generated. For the latter is an extrinsic denomination from a past action, and
that effect.
therefore it endures, even if the one generated is dead, but the former is a
relative denomination, which includes the co-existence of the extremes.
About the Proximate Foundation ofPaternity.
5. Hence it is usually debated in what principle such a relation inheres proxi-
mately and with what it is identified: whether, that is, it exists in proximate
and accidental or in principal and substantial potency. For many think it is
in a proximate principle, or in the potency of generating, which can become
probable by evident arguments. Others, /col. bl however, think a principal and 8 For this, see Suarez, Commentaria ac disputationes in tertiam partem D. Thomae,
substantial principle identifies this relation with itsel£ But perhaps it is true scilicet, opus de Incarnatione, d. 49, s. 2, nn. 3-4, in Opera omnia, vol. 18, pp. 484b-
485a; ibid., nn. 7-8, p. 486a; ibid., s. 3, n. 5, p. 502b; ibid., n. 32, p. 512a.
6 Note here that for Suarez reality is first found at the level of an aptitude for existing; 9 That is to say, a father.
c£ OM 3, 2, n. 4, vol. 25, p. 108b. On this see my article: "Suarez and the Reality IO That is to say, a son.
of the Possibles, The Modern Schoolman, 46 (1967), pp. 29-40.
11 That is to say he will, without any addition, have the relation of paternity.
7 Cf. Section 7, n. 12, above.
12Cf. Section 10, n. 9, above.
180 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
•
Section 12 181

Whether the Relation ofan Agent Inheres in That [Agent}. not, nevertheless, properly relate the supposit itself that is acting, because it
7. From this it is afortiori evident (which is further touched on in that fourth does not denominate that as that in which it is, but as that from which it is.
difficulty 13) that the relation of one actually acting and generating is also real. And so it can only be said that it flows from the agent with respect to the
For if this is true after a past action, why not more so while the action is pres- terminus. But that is only remotely a respect of the agent himself, as will be
ent and enduring? more dear from the following question.
But two questions can be asked here. One is whether this relation is intrinsi-
cally inhering in the agent himself, 14 or only extrinsically denominating [him], Is a Relation the Same in an Agent While an Action Endures and
just as the action itsel£1 5 For it seems Ip. 833/ this latter is enough for a real When That {Action} Has Been Completed?
relation, and is more in line with the denomination of such a relation. For 9. An Affirmative Reply.-But again it can be asked 18 whether this relation
action itself is real and really denominates an agent, and in this very denomi- of an actual or a present agent is the same both in species and in number with
nation there is included a certain transcendental disposition toward an effect, the relation of a past agent, for example, with paternity. For certain people
for action as action relates to (respicit) a terminus, as we shall say below. 16 think they are diverse, and Aristotle seems to favor that, when he says that
Therefore, similarly, a relation could be real, even though it denominates the these relations are varied according to times. 19 And this can be founded in a
agent himself, only extrinsically and by the medium of an action, as related to diverse way of denominating. For one denominates the agent as actual while
a terminus or to his effect. the other denominates him as one who has acted. Therefore, it seems that one
8. Nevertheless, it must be said that a proper relation, which through itself relation endures only /col. bl as long as the action [endures] and at its ceasing
relates an agent or a generating cause, from the instant in which he actually another arises.
generates, is intrinsic and immediately inhering in him. First, indeed, because if, However, I think, in a father, for example, (and the same is true in similar
after a past action, there remains in an agent cause, a relation that is intrinsically cases) it is more truly the numerically same relation that arises in the very mo-
adhering to him, much more will such a relation result and inhere also while ment in which he generates and remains for as long as such a father endures
the action itself is enduring. Then, because, as St. Thomas teaches, in Contra with a son. For if we argue theologically, who will say that the Most Blessed
Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 13, although in other forms extrinsic denomina- Virgin, in the first instant in which she conceived Christ, had one relation of
tions are found, "by relation," says St. Thomas, "it is not found that something mother, and then immediately lost that and acquired another?
is denominated as though externally existing, but rather as inhering." Hence, Moreover, the action of generating is the reason or the condition that, when
he adds: "Someone is denominated a father, only from a paternity that exists in posited, a relation ofpaternity results; therefore, I ask whether it is such a reason
him." 17 The reason for this seems to be that what extrinsically denominates is or condition that the relation of paternity depends on it in becoming and in
related to that which it denominates rather than relates that. And in this way being conserved, or not? For if it does not depend in being conserved, then
action is related to an agent rather than it relates that [agent], even though when the action of generating is over the same paternity will remain, because
it is the occasion or the condition in order that a relation result in the agent. there is no reason that it be varied. For the cessation of the action, since it is
Therefore, although it is true that action itself is related to a terminus, it does a certain privation, is not a sufficient reason for a new real relation to result.
Neither can a past action be the reason for such a new relation, because that
13Ibid. action, when it existed, already had its proportionate relation, while as past
14While the Latin would admit the translation of"itself" or "himself" I prefer "him- it adds only the mentioned privation. Therefore, it is better and more easily
self," here and in what follows, in order to keep a better focus on the antecedents said that that relation is one and the same, and in fact it remains afterwards,
of both intensive and reflexive pronouns. because it does not depend in being conserved upon the action as such, but
15 On the extrinsic denomination involved in action, cf. my article, "Prolegomena' to
on a foundation and a terminus, which were explained in the preceding para-
a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suarez, S.J .," Vivarium,
graph. Therefore, paternity as such includes neither a denomination of past
xxii (1984), pp. 121-60, esp. pp. 138-9.
16Cf. DM 48, 2, nn. 16-19, vol. 26, pp. 878-9.
17Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Summa contra Gentiles, II, c. 13, in Opera omnia, tomus 18This is the second question which was indicated inn. 7, this Section.
xiii (Romae: R. Garrone, 1918), p. 293a. 19Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.1021a21.
 182 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 12 183
nor of present, but it simply refers to him who has being from that man who
they agree in the generic character of potency, under which character they are
is denominated a father, abstracting from the fact that the action, through
not related with a proper relation of an agent potency to a patient, but by a
which he has that being, exists or does not exist. For these denominations, as
relation of similarity with respect to the generic character. Therefore, that pro-
including these temporal respects, are rather from that action itself as present portion is not a true unity. But if by analogy it is so called, it is of a far different
or as past. character than the unity which founds the first class of relatives. Therefore, this
relation belongs not to the first but to the second class, and it differs from the
About the Relation ofan Agent in Potency. other which was explained above, 23 because this one follows the character of
10. Lastly, in this same fourth difficulty, 20 it is asked that we explain of what a potency taken precisely, while that one [follows that character] insofar as it
kind is the relation of an agent in potency, about which we have already said is under act. Hence, this is terminated at a passive potency as such, but that
that it cannot be real and categorical in an order to a merely possible effect [is terminated] at an effect.
as such, but in an order to some real passive, and actually existing, potency, 12. Which Potencies Are Related by a Real Relation That Is Founded upon Action
because it cannot have any other real terminus. However, in this way all things or Passion.-But a further question is whether this relation is found in every
necessary for a real relation are present. active and passive power, whether this is of a proper potency of the category
But some say that this relation does not belong to this second class of rela- of quality24 or is of every other category or of a transcendental character. And,
tions, but rather to the first, since it is not founded Ip. 834/ in action, but certainly, with regard to essentially and immediately (per se primo) ordered
precisely in the proportion that exists between two faculties, so that one can categorical potencies, in order that one act upon another or that the other be
act upon the other and the other can be acted upon (patz) by the one, which acted upon by the one, it is not hard to understand that they are most apt for
proportion is a kind of unity and, therefore, seems to belong to the first reason founding a relation between themselves, as long as they are in reality (in re ipsa)
of founding. distinct, because by the very fact that they exist they mutually have respect to
11. But this opinion is not in agreement with Aristotle, who in the case of one another, by reason of a transcendental order that they have between /col.
this second member never said that relations founded in action belong to it, bl themselves, by reason (I say) of that as a proximate foundation.
but rather at the beginning of the chapter said: "Other things" (i.e, are called However, I have said, "as long as they are in reality distinct," since a potency
"toward something") "like able to heat to the heatable, able to cut to the cuttable, that is simultaneously active on itself and passive from itself, even if it is a
and in one word the active to the passive, "ll in which he has made no mention proper and categorical potency, and has both features essentially and imme-
of action and passion but of potencies only. But afterwards he has joined them diately from its constitution, cannot have following them a real relation, in
both together, saying: "Active andpassive are saidfrom active andpassive potency default of the distinction that is necessary for this relation. Hence, neither does
and the actions ofpotencies." 22 such a potency have those features through transcendental dispositions of the
Moreover, a relation that is of an agent potency to a patient is not founded same thing to itself, but through a certain eminent disposition to its own act,
in unity, but in a power to act. For that unity that is the reason of founding in which it respects under both features. But if such a potency, as active, requires
the first class consists in some real and formal agreement between those things another co-principle in order to act on itself, as the intellect needs a species, 25
that are said to be similar or the same. But between an agent potency and a then according to that [co-principle] it could be really related to itself alone,
patient such unity and agreement is not present, except perhaps inasmuch as in the character of active to passive, not, however, by reason of its own proper
and intrinsic activity, on account of the reason mentioned regarding identity.
20Cf. Section 10, n. 9.
21 Cf. Ta 8' ws To 8EpµavnKov rrpos To 8EpµavTov Kat To TµT]nKov rrpos 23Cf. Section 10, n. 2.
TO TµllTOV, Kal oA.ws TO TTOLT]TLKOV TTpos TO rra8T]VTLKOV . ... ,"Metaphysics
24For potency as the second species of the category of quality, cf. Categories 8.9114-
5.15 .1020b28-30. Here Suarez follows the Latin translation of Fonseca: In Metaphys. 27.
V, c. 15, tornus II, col. 784.
25That is a species intelligibilis, which originates from the object of intellection. On
22Cf. "Ta 8€ TTOLT]TLKa Kal TTa8T]TLKa KaTa 8vvaµtv TTOLT]TLK~V Kal rra8T]TLK~V six tasks of the intelligible species as a co-principle of intellection; cf. Suarez, De
Kat EVEpydas Tas Twv 8vvaµEWv, .. .,"ibid., 1021a14-16. Again, Suarez here Divina Substantia, II, c. 12 ("Whether God is seen through a created species" [An
reproduces the Latin of Fonseca: In Metaphys. V, c. 15, tornus II, col. 788. videatur Deus per speciem creatam]), nn. 5-13, in Opera, vol. 1, pp. 87-9.
184 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation

However, where a sufficient distinction is present, and the coordination of the

potencies is intrinsic and natural, there is no doubt that all things necessary
for a real categorical relation (respectum) are in concurrence, if the extremes Section XIII.
co-exist. About the Third Class of Relation
13. What kind ofActive or Passive Power can be related by a Relation of the Founded in the Character of Measure.
Second Class.-But it must be further added that this relation should not be 1. It remains that we explain what is asked in the fifth difficulty, 1 namely, how
restricted to this kind of potency, but it is present among all created things relations of the third class are said to be founded in the character of measure.
(for about God I will speak below26) that, for whatever reason, have a real For almost all authors speak in this way and they take it from Aristotle in this
power to act and to suffer27 among themselves. This is evident, both from the place. 2
general way in which Aristotle speaks, and also from his examples, which also
include other kinds of potencies, and also again from the common opinion A Difficulty ls Proposed about the Mind of the Philosopher.
of interpreters 28 and philosophers. 2. If, however, Aristotle is read carefully, he does not seem to be saying that
Finally, also [it is evident] because in order that a categorical relation be these relations are founded on the character of measure, but among other
present, it is not always necessary that a transcendental relation be supposed examples by which he explains this class (modum) one is of measurable to
in its foundation, as was said in the solution of the third difficulty. Therefore, measure. For his words are: "Others like measurable to measure, and knowable
it is enough in the case proposed that one power (virtus) be of the same order (scibile) to knowledge, and sensible to sense," 3 where he does not state any founda-
with another power (potentia), and that by its nature it have a force of acting, tion for these relations, but only, after he has used those three examples, does
which is to have as it were a certain physical dominion over that, in order that he propose this third class of relation. Neither can it be said that in those first
from this there can arise a categorical respect or a relative denomination. words, "like measurable to measure," he is explaining the common character
14. And from this finally it is understood that the term, "potency," must not of these relations while he is using the other items as examples and species of
in this second foundation be taken strictly, as it is distinguished from "habit." this class. For this cannot be fitted to the context.
For a habit also, inasmuch as it is a power to perform its acts, is by Aristotle This is first because Aristotle did not say, "like knowable to knowledge," but
usually included under the name of an active potency, 29 as has been noted [said] only copulatively, "and knowable to knowledge." Also, second, because
often above, 30 and, as such, it can /p. 835/ be the foundation of a real relation, if he had used these latter words for an example of the prior [relations], 4 he
not indeed, to an object, 31 for this pertains to the third class, but either to an should not have said, "like knowable to knowledge," but rather, "like knowledge
act which it effects or to the potency into which it can effect-which feature to knowable." But he did not say that, but (something that should be carefully
(ratio) pertains to this second class, as is clear by a parity of reasoning (ratio) considered) he does say that the measurable to the measure, the knowable to
from what has been said. knowledge, and the sensible to sense, are [all] related in the same way. However,
the knowable is not related to knowledge as is the measurable to the measure.

26Cf. Section 15, nn. 15-22, below. Cf. Section 10, n. 10, above.
270r, "be acted upon." 2 That is, Metaphysics 5.15. On this third class of relation, with particular reference
28 That is, principally, commentators on Aristotle. to knowledge, in Aristotle and St. Thomas, cf. Horst Seidl, "Bemerkungen zu
29 Actually, it is customary for Aristotle to distinguish between habit and potency; cf. Erkenntnis al Massverhaltnis bei Aristoteles und Thomas von Aquin," in Mensura,
e.g. Topics 4.5.125b20; Categories 8.8b26-9a27. For the closest text which I have Mass, Zahl Zahlensymbolik im Mittelalter; Miscellanea Mediaevalia, Band 16/ 1,
found for an identification of habit and potency, with which identification Suarez herausgegeben von Albert Zimmermann (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter,
himself disagrees, cf. Metaphysics 5.12.1019a26-28. 1983), pp. 32-42.
30 Cf. DM 42, l, n. 3, vol. 25, p. 608. For Suarez's detailed refutation of this, cf. ibid., 3 Cf. "Ta 8' ws To µETpT)Tov rrpos To µETpov Kal. €maTT)Tov rrpos €maT~µriv
4, nn. 7-14, pp. 617-619. Kal ala0T)TOV rrpos ataeriaw." Metaphysics 5.15.1020b30-32. Here, Suarez again
31 For the meaning of "object" here, cf. Section 13, n. 9, and Section 14, nn. 3, 4, follows the Latin of Fonseca: In Metaphys. V. c. 15, tomus II, col. 784.
and 6, below. 4 That is of measurable to measure.
 186 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 13 187
For in the way in which the character of measure can be found between these, someone were ofa mind to reduce every relation that is founded in a proportion
knowledge is rather measured by the knowable, than vice versa. to the first class, he could say that the relation of knowledge belongs to that
Add to this, that in this third class Aristotle seems to make no mention of the [class]. For it consists in a certain adaptation and proportion to its object.
relations of knowledge to the knowable, or of sense to the sensible, but only 5. But still objection can be made. For, according to this interpretation, a
of the opposite relations (so to speak), namely, of the knowable to knowledge, relation between the measure and the measurable will be intrinsic and real in the
and of the sensible to sense, to which he adds the relation of measurable to I col. measure; but in the measurable it will only be one of reason, or by denomina-
b/ the measure as similar to those. Therefore, he has not placed the common tion, toward the measure itself, which is against the common opinion /p. 836/
character of this third class in its being founded on the character of a measure, and against reason. For that which is measured is inferior and thus it is itself
but in some other character that is common to the measurable, the knowable, ordered to the measure, rather than vice versa. This is also clear by induction.
and other things of this kind. For science (scientia 8) is measured by a scientific object (scibilz} and, therefore,
3. All of this can be confirmed from the way in which Aristotle afterwards the relation is in the science itself, and cognition is measured in truth by an
explains this third class of relations. For he posits no other common character object, and a creature [is measured] in its being or truth of being from a divine
except that other relatives are called relative through the relations that they idea, and all these relations are in those things themselves that are measured.
have in themselves, but these alone receive the denomination of relative because I answer that Aristotle makes the same judgment about the measurable as
other things are said to be toward them, and he repeats the same examples, about the scientifically knowable (scibilz} and the intelligible; and about all
namely; measurable, knowable, intelligible, although he explains only this last, he says that they are said "toward something," because something other is said
saying: "For also the intelligible signifies that the intellect is occupied with it." 5 toward them. 9 However, Aristotle seems to be speaking about the measurable
Hence, interpreting this text of Aristotle in a simple way, he does not seem to by an extrinsic and superadded measure, not by an intrinsic adaptation or
posit in this third class any new real relation that is intrinsically within and proportion, such as is found in the examples that are adduced to the contrary.
relates its subject, but only certain relative denominations, taken from rela- For that intrinsic commensuration consists only in a certain similarity or
tions that exist in opposite extremes. Therefore, although knowledge to the adaptation (so to speak), or in a dependence or specification, and in this way
knowable, and the knowable to knowledge, are said relatively, there belongs it is reduced to the first or the second class of relations. In this way also an
to this third class of relatives, according to the mind of Aristotle so explained, image is commensurate with an exemplar by reason of similarity and an effect
only the relation or denomination of the knowable itself, howsoever that may [is commensurate] to a cause, by reason of dependence or also similarity. But
be. However, the relation of knowledge to a knowable [object] seems not to be extrinsically a thing is said to be measurable, just as also knowable, or visible,
located by Aristotle in this third class for the reason that knowledge is not said because its quantity can be manifested through the application of an extrinsic
[to be] in a relative way from the fact that something else is related to it, but measure. And in this way, Aristotle says that a thing is said to be measurable
rather because in itself it truly has a respect toward something else. However, by the relation of something else to itself, because, that is, its quantity can
Aristotle puts in the third class only those things that are called relative because become known through a measure.
other things are related to them. 6. Neither does it matter whether the measure is quasi-natural or from hu-
4. But if you ask: according to this exposition, to which class of relation man institution. For in both ways a thing is formally measurable only through
does the relation of knowledge to the knowable, and of sense to the sensible, an extrinsic potency and denomination, even though the foundation, or the
etc., belong, the answer could be that that is the relation of a certain effect to proportion, which is presupposed for such measurability, is often something
its cause in some genus, and thus it is reduced to the second class, as we will intrinsic, and it can be the foundation of some real relation of another kind.
directly say6 in a similar case, when we are solving the sixth difficulty. 7 Or, if So also the visible presupposes some real and intrinsic foundation in a visible

5 C£ "To TE yap BLaVOT]Tov aT]µa(vEL on fonv auTou Bu:ivow, ... " Metaphys- 8 Here I am translating "scientia" as "science" in order to allow a distinction from
ics 5.15.102la31. Again, the Latin here is that of Fonseca: In Metaphys. V, c. 15, "cognition'' which immediately follows.
tomus II, col. 792. 9 Cf. "To BE µETPTJTOV KUl TO ETTLUTT]TOV Kal TO BLaVOT]TOV T<!l clAAO rrpos
6 C£ Section 14, n. 6, below. avTo AEyEU9aL rrpos TL AEYOVTaL." Metaphysics 5.15.1021a30. For the Latin,
7 C£ Section 10, n. 11, above. c£ Fonseca: In Metaphys. V, c. 15, tomus II, col. 792.
188 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 13 189
object, and indeed the active force of the species, by reason of which [force] it
simply, it seems to have much basis, and relying on reason, it could probably
is really related to sight by a relation belonging to the second class. And also in
be defended. Nevertheless, we still do not wish to abandon the common opin-
quantitative measures, which are designated through human institution, there
ion, which holds that this third mode of relatives constitutes a third class of
is presupposed some foundation of extension and of some real proportion,
real relations that are really existing in one extreme, and they essentially and
which has some true relation joined to it, belonging however to the first class, immediately (per se primo) relate that [extreme] to the other, which is not in
because it is not other than the relation of equality or inequality. So, therefore,
turn related by a proper real relation that it has in itself, but only terminates
that a thing is formally measurable, entails only the relation of something
the relation of the first (alterius), and is denominated from this. For that
else to it, insofar as by the application of a measure its quantity can /col. bl
there are some relations of this kind is both evident by induction in the case
become known, even though fundamentally something intrinsic is supposed
of knowledge and the knowable, and the like, and also will be treated more
in the measurable thing.
extensively in a following Section. 14
7. Finally, one can object that from the stated exposition it follows that a
But that these constitute a class that is diverse from the rest, and that they
certain member from those three that were enumerated by Aristotle does not
require a foundation of a different kind, seems directly (per se) probable from
contain real relations but only ones of reason, and, therefore, they are without
the fact /p. 837/ that they have a very diverse way of relation (habitudo). For
cause included among those things which are truly "toward something." The
just as from effects we know causes, so we can understand that a foundation
consequence is dear, because according to the stated exposition, in the third from which an intrinsic relation arises in both extremes is of a diverse nature
class there are only those relations that belong to the relatives not by the fact from that which can found a relation in only one extreme.
that they themselves are related, but by the fact that other things are related
Finally, this foundation is called measure and the measurable, because these
to them. However, those relations are of reason only. relations are most of all founded in certain things that have their perfection
The answer is that (whatever may be the case about these relations of reason, commensurate with other things and as such are related to those same things,
whether such are necessary in extremes of this kind, which we will see below10) even if there is not in them a similar or proportionate foundation of a cor-
Aristotle is not here treating of these relations, but about the various modes in
responding relation.
which things are denominated relative from things themselves. Accordingly, he
9. From this the solution to the fifth difficulty 15 is easily clear, because in this
distinguishes two general modes, namely, that certain things are denominated
instance measure is not taken as it entails a disposition to our knowledge, that
because they themselves are related, but others [are so denominated] because
is, insofar as it is a medium which we can use in order to know the quantity
other things are related to them. And again, he divides the first member 11 from
of something else, either a mass or a perfection, in the way that we have said
the double foundation of quantity or unity and of potency, and in this way the
above that the character of measure does not add any real nature (rationem) 16
three modes of relatives are constituted. And thus it happens that, according
to things. But measure is taken for a real terminus or an object, to which some
to this interpretation, those three modes of relatives are not three classes of
thing expresses a disposition insofar as it is adapted or is commensurate with
real relatives. 12 For the third mode does not add a new class of relation, but it it, in the way that knowledge is compared to the knowable, and judgment to
only states a special mode of denomination that redounds from some relations a thing known, and it is the same regarding other things. Therefore, this com-
of other classes toward their termini.
mensuration is nothing real besides a transcendental disposition of such things
to their objects, but that is a sufficient foundation for a categorical relation. Nor
Resolution.
does it matter that the terminus or the object that is said to have the character
8. This whole opinion and the interpretation of this text has been proposed
of a measure, can sometimes not exist. For then a categorical relation will not
only for the sake of debate (disputatio), 13 since in Aristotle's text, looked at
arise. But we say only that in such a thing there is sufficient foundation for a
lOCf. DM54, 6, n. 4, vol. 26, p. 1040.
debate.
11 That is, things denominated relative because they themselves are related.
14See Section 15, below.
12 Here, Rabade et al. read "relations"
IS Cf. Section 10, n. 10, above.
13Note that there is nothing acrimonious about the word "disputatio" as Suarez is 16Here Rabade et al. translate "rationem" as "relaci6n." Even if I were to agree with
using it here. It simply signifies something in the nature of classroom discussion or
the sense of that, I cannot find it in the Latin of any edition that I have seen.
190 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation

special relation, which will be real, if the extremes exist and if whatever else
is necessary concurs.
Section XIV.
Is the Stated Division Sufficient and
Does It Include All Relations?
1. This is the second principal doubt proposed above in regard to this divi-
sion, in which we must explain what was asked in the sixth difficulty raised in
Section 10: 1 how all real relations are reduced to these three modes.

About the Re/,ation ofAppetite to the Appetible

And ofLove to the Lovable.
2. But first of all it was asked of what sort is the relation of appetite to the
appetible and /col. bl of love to the lovable. For although Aristotle has given
examples in the cases of sense and intellect, he has said nothing about appetite
and love. St. Thomas, however, touching on this point in [his Sentences com-
mentary], Book l, Distinction 30, Article 3, in reply to Objection 3, says that
the nature of the relations of knowledge to the knowable and of love to the
beloved is diverse. 2 ''For" {he says) "the former is real in only one extreme, but
the latter [is real} in both. '!! And he gives the reason: because the former has a
foundation in knowledge, but not in the knowable, by the fact that that relation
is founded in the apprehension of the thing according to the spiritual being
that it has in the knower, not in the thing known. But the relation of love is
founded upon the appetite of the good. The good, however, is not only in the
soul but also in things, [according to] Metaphysics, Book 7 [sic], Text 8, 4 and
thus this relation has a real foundation in both extremes and, therefore, the
relation also is real in both. In this opinion, St. Thomas has followed Avicenna,
in Book 3 of his Metaphysics, Chapter 10. 5
3. However, St. Thomas does not explain in which of the members posited
by Aristotle this foundation of the relation oflove to its object, and vice versa,
should be placed. For it cannot be placed in this third class, because about this
whole class Aristotle universally says its relation is only in one extreme, while the
other [extreme] is said in a relative way only because something else is related

1 See Section 10, n. 11, above.

2 Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Scriptum in lib. Sent., I, d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3, ed. Man-
donnet, tomus I, pp. 708-709.
3 I cannot find these exact words in the text of St. Thomas. Yet, Suarez here, and in
the rest of this paragraph, is accurately reporting Thomas's opinion.
4 Cf. Metaphysics 6.4.1027b26-7.
5 Cf. Avicenna Latinus: Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, I-IV, Tr. 3, c.
10, ed. S. Van Riet (1977), p. 175, 11. 51-55.
192 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 14 193
to it. Neither, again, could it belong to the second class, because an object is
in Metaphysics, Book 9, Chapter 7, [sic] he has said that act is more knowable
not related (comparatur) to love or to an appetite, as a passive potency, nor as
than potency. 8 Indeed, these remarks can be true of intelligibility only insofar
the effect of some action, but only as an object or a subject matter (materia
as it is founded in things themselves.
circa quam), in which it is similar to knowable and sensible object~. Perhaps,
However, if sometimes the reason for apprehending a knowable object can
therefore, it will be said to be reduced to the first mode, because love ts founded
be extrinsic, also the reason for loving is often extrinsic to the object itself, as
upon some agreement and proportion. However, as I said above, 6 while t~eating
is evident in the love of a means on account of an extrinsic end-therefore,
of active and passive potency, that is not the way of agreement or of umty t~at
in regard to both there is the same proportion. But if we are talking about
founds the first class of relations. Then, also, the same manner of proport10n
the knowable and the appetible, or about the known and the loved, insofar as
is found between knowledge or sensation and an object-indeed much more,
they are such, both are completed through an extrinsic denomination from a
insofar as knowledge is said to come about through a kind of assimilation.
potency or an act, which can easily be evident from what we have said above,
4. Moreover, it is not apparent why knowledge or sensation are said to be
in the Tenth Disputation, about goodness. 9
measured from an object, and not also love. For the perfection of love is not
Finally, if we consider transcendental relations (habitudines), neither object
less measured from an object, in a certain way for an even greater reason, since
as it really is in itself entails a transcendental relation to potencies or acts of
love tends toward things as they are in themselves. Nor is it enough to say
understanding or loving, but, contrariwise, only the potencies or the acts
that the foundation of this third class is the measure of truth, because this is
entail relations to their objects. Thus we should speak of them with the same
not an adequate foundation, since in sensation there is not a formal truth of
proportion. Therefore, just as /col. bl the knowable is said to be related only
cognition. Nor is the intellect /p. 838/ itself, insofar as it is a potency, measured
because something else is related to it, so also is the lovable.
with regard to truth by an intelligible object, but insofar as it is an entitative
perfection. Then, if the measure of truth is a sufficient foundation, why not
Whether between Every Effect and Cause
the measure of the honesty or the goodness of love? Therefore, I see no suf-
ficient reason why the relation oflove should not be placed in this third class, There Is a Relation ofMeasure.
nor why it should be denied that, according to this class of foundation and 6. Therefore, according to this opinion, which seems more probable, it must
relation, there is among all those that have a relation (habitudo) to objects and be said to the sixth difficulty 10 that those relations that pertain to acts, habits,
are specified by those [objects] a special agreement by reason of which they and potencies of desiring (appetendz) with respect to objects belong to this
constitute a subalternate kind of relations, with the presupposition that it is Here, he is not following Fonseca whose translation reads: "As each thing is, so
said of certain ones, namely, sensation, understanding, and knowledge. also it is true." (... ut unumquodque est, ita etiam verum est.), In Metaphys. II, c.
5. About the relation of the lovable or the loved, although Avicenna's opinion 1, tomus II, col. 386.
is probable, nevertheless, the opposite [opinion] seems more conformed to the 8 Cf. Metaphysics 9.8.1049b16-17.
doctrine of Aristotle. First, because either it will be necessary to exclude the 9 In Disputation 10, Suarez treats ofgoodness, like truth, as a property of being. There
relation oflove from this third class, which is contrary to what has been said, or is the added nuance that in goodness a double extrinsic denomination is involved,
to admit in that class mutual relations, which is contrary to Aristotle. Second, since beings, in order to be good, must be true. But, like truth, the property of
because the difference set up between knowledge and love is not satisfactory. goodness does not consist only in an extrinsic denomination: Primarily, what ?ood-
For if a knowable and a lovable object are compared with respect to founda- ness signifies is the intrinsic perfection of being, and what It further denommates
tions (so to speak), each is something intrinsic and real in the object itself is a certain "suitability" (convenientia) or "appetibility" (appetibilitas) in a being,
either for itself or to another. By the identification of being and goodness in re,
For just as a thing is good in itself, so also it is, according to its being, true
the reality of goodness is secured: by the connotation of suitability or appeti?ility
and apt to be understood. For, in this way, Aristotle has said, in Metaphysics,
the distinction of goodness and being in ratione is preserved. For some of this, cf.
Book, 2, Text 4, "Each thing is true and intelligible insofar as it is being. "7 And DM 10, 1, n. 14, vol. 25, p. 333; ibid., n. 20, p. 335; ibid. 3, n. 10, pp. 349-50;
also DM 3, 2, n. 9, pp. 109-110; ibid., n. 14, p. 111; and DM 8, prol., p. 274.
6 Cf. Section 12, nn. 10-11, above.
Again, on all of this, cf. Rolf Darge, Sudrez' transzendentale Seinsauslegung .. ., esp.
7 Cf. "wae' haaTOv ws EXEL TOD Elvm, ouTw Kat Tfjs UAT]SE(as." Metaphysics
pp. 313-85.
2. l .993b 30-31. While Suarez's version may catch Aristotle's intent, it is not exact.
lOCf. Section 10, n. 11, above.
194 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 14 195
third class, which can be founded not only in the measure of truth, but also
a same essence or formal character. Therefore, much more could a proper and
of perfection, or in the commensuration and proportion of some thing to an
real union between extremes that are real, and really distinct, found a relation
~~ . belonging to another class. Therefore, even though the numerical unity of
However, to the reply that is made there, 11 that all effects could be located m
some simple thing with respect to itself, or of a composite thing with respe~t
this class, insofar as they can be measured through their principles or causes,
to the whole composite, cannot found a real relation, nevertheless, the numeri-
it can first be answered by conceding the consequence, if in those things the
cal unity of the whole composite, insofar as in it there are united parts that
character of measure and measured is precisely considered, even if otherwise
would be otherwise really distinct, is a sufficient foundation for a real relation
they are related by a relation of dependence belonging to the second class, or
belonging to the same class. And for the same reason a relation of contact
of similarity belonging to the first. For it is not unreasonable that between two
pertains to the same class, and also a relation of nearness, inasmuch as it is as
things under diverse aspects diverse relations arise, which everyone seems to
it were a certain imperfect likeness in place. So also co-existence belongs to
say especially about the relation of something exemplified to an exemplar.
that class, inasmuch as it is a certain likeness in existing; and the same is true
Nevertheless, because besides the dependence of an effect on a cause, or
in similar cases. And, according to this way of speaking, relations of causes
the similarity between them, I think that the character of measure does not
can be so distributed that only the relation of an efficient cause belongs to
add any real relation, but rather a denomination from an order to cognition,
the second class. But relations of material and formal cause belong to the first
therefore, I do not think that there can be in that case a special real relation
[class], because the proximate reason of founding them is a union, since those
that is distinct from that which is founded in causality, or dependence, or
causes cause only by means of a union, as we have seen in their places. 14 But
similarity. And therefore a second answer lies in denying the consequence. For
the relation of final cause belongs to the third class, for the reason that of its
in this third class there are located only relations of certain things that have a
special nature it is a non-mutual relation, as we have said with probability
peculiar mode of specification from a tendency, and a quasi-commensuration,
above, in Disputation 23, and because it causes only insofar as it is the reason
to another, as to an object, or a terminus, or an intrinsic end to which they
that an effect is ordered to itself and it is commensurate with that. 15
are essentially, immediately, and intrinsically ordered, as they are potencies,
8. Or, secondly, it could be said that all relations of causes belong to the
habits, acts, and the like. For that objective termination, as such, is not some
second class. For even though Aristotle explained that especially in the case
proper similarity, as is self-evident, and also it is not a proper causality, as we
of active potency and causality, which is more evident, still, with proportion
mentioned above, in Disputation 12, Section 3, [Paragraph] Number 17; 12
observed, it can be applied to the particular causes insofar as there is in each
therefore, relations which are founded on this commensuration with an object
an aptitude to its own effect and a proper causality, by which in its own way it
do not belong to the second class of relations. Conversely, the commensuration
exerts influence on its effect, and the effect depends upon that [causality]. And
or proportion that is between an efficient cause and its effect belongs to this
in regard to material cause, this opinion seems consonant with ~i~totle, "".ho
third class, because it is either causality or effective dependence alone, or it is
puts in that class the relation of a passive potency, whose causality ~s material.
Ip. 839/ only a similarity that can be present between a cause and an effect.
Moreover, the same /col. bl reasoning seems to hold about the relation of a (so
to speak) informative potency and about its causality and about the relation
About the Re/,ation of Union.
that is founded in that. And consequently, the same will also be true about
7. To the second part of that [sixth] difficulty, 13 about the relation of union,
the relation of effects to these causes. And the same could be said about the
and similar cases, it is possible to answer in two ways. First, it can be said that
relation of an effect of a final cause as such to its cause; for from the side of the
this relation and similar ones belong to the first class of these relatives, inas-
cause I think it is more probable that, as I have said, that relation is not real.
much as a union is in fact a kind of unity, or it is like a way to unity. Indeed,
And in line with this way of answering, a relation of union that presupposes
specific or generic identity itself is also like a certain union of several things in
causality or some imitation of that, would be reduced to the second class of

11 Ibid. 14That is, in those Disputations which earlier have treated of material and formal
causes.
12Cf. Suarez, Opera omnia, vol. 25, p. 393.
15Cf. Suarez, DM23, l, n. 13, vol. 25, p. 846a. For the counterpart question about
13Cf. Section 10, n. 11, above.
how a relation may have an element of final causality, cf. ibid., 6, n. 20, p. 874a.
196 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On &al Relation

relations. But other relations, of nearness, co-existence, and the like, belong
without doubt to the first class. Therefore, I think, no relation can be found
that is not easily reduced to these classes. Section XV.
Whether Relations of the Third Class Are Non-Mutual
And Differ in This from Relations of the Other Classes.
I. Relations can be said to be non-mutual in two ways: first, according to
the specific natures of the relations; second, in a highest and most general
nature. In the first way, a relation will be called non-mutual that is not of the
same specific nature in both extremes. However, in the second way that will
be called non-mutual which is a true and real relation in one extreme, but not
in the other. The first meaning is unusual and improper; for if each extreme
is related through its own relation to the other, they are truly and properly
related mutually, even if they are related by relations of diverse natures. Hence
these relatives are rather called of diverse natures, or, as others say, "relatives of
non-equiparence." 1

The Division ofRelations of the Same or ofDissimUar Nature.

2. And thus, mutual relations are usually divided into relations of equipa-
rence and disequiparence. 2 For all relations of the second class are [relations]
of non-equiparence, because the reason of founding is in some way diverse
in the extremes, since in one it is an active potency while in the other it is a
passive potency or dependence on its cause-from which it also comes about
that the termini of such relations are of diverse characters, inasmuch as they

For Duns Scotus earlier using this terminology, cf. Ordinatio II, d. l, qq. 4-5; ed.
Vat. vol. 7 (1973), n. 205, p. 104. For its attribution to "recentiores" (i.e. more
recent authors), cf. P. Fonseca, Institutionesdialecticae II, c. 13; ed. Coimbricae, 1575,
re-edited in Pedro da Fonseca, Instituicioes dialecticas: Institutionum dialecticarum
libri octo, introdm;:ao, estabelecimento do texto, traduc;:ao e notas por Joaquim Fer-
reira Gomes (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1964), I, p. 120. For Suarez in
a different context using "disquiparent" and attributing it to others, cf. DM 29, 3,
n. 16, vol. 26, p. 53a. For him using it himself, cf. Section 17, n. 5, below.
2 Ra.bade et al. translate these as "reciprocal and non-reciprocal." In a number ofplaces,
St. Thomas has spoken of relations of equiparence. For example, cf.: "Moreover,
marriage is a relation of equiparence, since it is, as has been said, a conjunction.
Therefore husband and wife are equals in the marriage act." (Praeterea, matrimo-
nium est relatio aequiparentiae, cum sit conjunctio, ut dictum est. Ergo vir et uxor sunt
aequales in actu matrimonio.) In Sent. III, d. 32, q. I, a. 3, Sed contra. While in the
body of his reply St. Thomas has qualified this equality between husband and wife,
he basically accepts the argument here. However, I have not found him speaking
explicitly of relations of non-equiparence.
198 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 15 199

proportionately correspond to foundations, as was mentioned above 3 and will things themselves. Therefore, in each extreme it is from a proper form and a
be said more extensively below. real relation.
But relations of the first class are sometimes of the same and sometimes of 4. Secondly, because if for some cause this relation is not real in the know-
diverse natures in both extremes. For relations of unity are of equiparence /p. able object, it is either because there is no real foundation in the object itself or
840/, as Alexander of Hales correctly noted [in commenting on] Metaphysics, because to be known in such an object is not something in it, nor is it known
Book 5, Text 20, and is clear about a relation of equality, similarity, or identity. through a change of itself, but through a denomination from a form existing
But relations founded upon number or diversity according to their proper and in something else; for besides these no other probable reason occurs.
specific natures are non-equiparent, as is clear with regard to the double and But neither /col. bl of these is satisfactory. The first certainly assumes
the sub-double, as well as other proportions, which in one extreme express an something false; for an object's being intelligible or sensible has a foundation
excess and in the other a defect. 4 in things themselves and in their real properties. For light is visible because it
I say, however, "according to proper and specific natures," because they is of such a nature according to which it has the power to change a potency
can agree in a generic character and according to that can be said in a similar in a certain way; and an immaterial thing, because it is spiritual, is said to be
way about both extremes. Thus, indeed, each extreme, both the greater and actually intelligible. But the second reason concludes badly. Otherwise, also
the lesser, is said to be unequal to the other. And, likewise, whiteness is said the relation of an agent in act would not be real in that [agent] itself, because
to be dissimilar to blackness, and vice versa, although, however, it is probable without a change of itselfit becomes an actual agent, and without the addition
that the proper relations are distinct according to their own specific natures, of any absolute form that is in itself
because both the foundation and the terminus are much more diverse in one But if you say that the potency of acting itself is intrinsic, although the
than in the other. But relations of the third class are thought to be more than condition that is action is extrinsic, the same can be said about an object. For
non-equiparent, from the fact that equiparence or non-equiparence are prop- the aptitude that it be known is intrinsic, and that can be a foundation, even
erly said between real extremes. However, in this third class, Aristotle does though the condition that is actually to be known, is something extrinsic. [It
not think that there is a real relation in both extremes, and therefore they are can be said of an object] especially because the act itself of knowing or sensing
called non-mutual. has a real dependence on an object just as an action [depends] on an agent,
although not in the same class of cause.
A Difficulty Is Proposed with regard to Non-Mutual Relations. You will say that an object insofar as of itself it is apt to be known or seen
3. Therefore, the present question is understood to be about these non-mu- does not have reference (habitudo) to knowledge. But if this is understood
tual relations properly taken, in which question Aristotle's opinion is difficult about a relative categorical disposition, the question is begged-for we asking
for a double reason. The first is that it does not seem true that relations of the the reason for this. But if it is understood about a transcendental disposition,
third class are non-mutual, for if it would be true, that would be especially it was already shown above6 that this [disposition] is not always a necessary
in cases of the knowable and the sensible, but in these there is as much a true prerequisite for a categorical relation. For even in an agent the principle of
real relation as there is in knowledge and sensation; therefore, [they do not acting does not always have a transcendental disposition to an effect, as is clear
seem to be non-mutual]. The minor [premiss] is proven, because a denomi- from those things that we treated above about potency and act.7
nation of knowable, or sensible, is relative, and, indeed, essentially (per se) 5. Third is the principal difficulty: because the terminus of a relation is
"toward something," as Aristotle himself says in the same place5 and is clear another relation existing in the other extreme; therefore, it is impossible that
from reciprocation; for as knowledge is knowledge of the knowable, so the a relation be real in one extreme and not in the other. The consequence is
knowable is knowable by knowledge. But this reciprocation and correlative evident, because there cannot be a real relation without a real formal terminus.
denomination is not manufactured by the intellect, but rather has arisen from But the antecedent is clear, because relations are said to be simultaneous in

3 C£ Section 12, nn. 10-11.

4 C£ [Pseudo] Alexandri de Ales, O.M. In duodecim Aristotelis Metaphysicae libros
dilucidissima expositio, V, t. 20 (Venetiis, 1572), £ 139vab. 6 Cf. Section 12, n. 12, above.
5 Metaphysics 5.15.1021a30. 7 Cf. DM 43, 5, n. 7, vol. 26, p. 654.
200 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 15 201
nature, definition, and cognition, 8 because one is without doubt the terminus The second thing to say 12 is that these non-mutual relations essentially (per se)
of another. and as if from the proper nature of their foundation are found in the second
6. On a second score there arise no lesser difficulties. For if non-mutual class, but not at all in the other classes, except as in a material way from the
relations must be admitted, they will be found not only in the third, but also peculiar condition of some subject or extreme. I think that the opinion of Ar-
in the other classes. The antecedent is clear. For, first of all, the relation that istotle should be interpreted in this way. And the reason of the first part should
is between God and a creature in the character of efficient cause and effect be taken from the peculiar mode of specification and commensuration that
belongs to the second class, and yet it is not mutual, according to the opin- potency, habit, and the like, have to their objects. For formally it consists only
ion that is more accepted by theologians. Similarly, in the first class there are in the disposition that they have of their nature to objects, according to which
found many relations between God and creatures, such as the relation of real [disposition] they are commensurate to those. 13 But in this the object does not
distinction Ip. 841 I, or of likeness in being, or in the character of substance, have a proper causality but rather the character of a specifying terminus. For,
or intellectual degree. For, even though it is an analogous likeness, it is still even though otherwise it can be moving either actively or finally, still, as an
true and real and, as I have said above, 9 sufficient for founding a real relation. extreme of this relation it is considered under none of these characters, but it
And, nevertheless, although such a relation is real in a creature, it cannot be is solely that to which such a thing is commensurate. /col. bl But under this
in God. Again, an argument can be taken from the relation of union between aspect it itself does not concur as able to be ordered to another but only as
the [divine] Word and humanity, which is non-mutual, and still belongs to the that to which another is ordered. And, therefore, by virtue of such a reason
first or the second class. Moreover, among creatures there is a peculiar difficulty of founding there does not arise a relation in both extremes, but only in that
about the relation between a final cause and its effect, which [relation] we say which is commensurate to the other.
is non-mutual, and still it belongs to the second class. Finally, the relation of Because of this, therefore, relations of the third class from the proper formal
right and left between a man and a column is thought, in the opinion of all, to nature of their foundation are non-mutual. But in the other classes this is not
be non-mutual, and yet it does not belong to the third class, for no character found, as is dear from what has been said. For more frequently or almost always
of measure is present in that case. relations of those classes are mutual. But if sometimes they are non-mutual,
7. Therefore, on account of these and similar arguments, Gregory [of Ri- that is only because of the peculiar nature or condition of some thing, as will
mini], whom some Nominalists follow, in [his Sentences commentary], Book 1, be more clearly evident from the solutions of the arguments. 14
Distinction 28, Question 110 thinks that there are no non-mutual relations.
Whether in Non-Mutual Rela.tives Both Extremes Are Really Rela.ted.
Assertions about Non-Mutual Rela.tions. 9. Therefore, to the arguments proposed at the beginning, 15 which proceed
8. Nevertheless, two things must be said briefly. The first is that there are against the first assertion and against the first part of the second assertion,
some non-mutual relations, that is, [relations that are] real in one extreme and an answer must be given. And, indeed, Cajetan [in commenting on Summa
not in the other. This is the opinion of Aristotle, which all interpreters admit Theologiae], Part l, Question 13, Article 7, answers by conceding that even
and almost all theologians, especially St. Thomas, in [Summa Theologiae], Part in non-mutual relatives both correlatives are real, and that the knowable, for
l, Question 13, Article 7, 11 as well as other [theologians] to be cited very soon. example, is really related to knowledge. However, he puts a difference between
And this is an opinion that is received with so much consensus that philoso- these and mutual relatives in the fact that in mutuals both [extremes] are re-
phers should not call it into doubt. Its reason, however, will be dear from the lated by an intrinsic relation, but non-mutuals are not this way, but [in their
following assertion and more from the solution of difficulties. case] one extreme is really related by a relation which exists in the one and is
extrinsically denominating the other. 16
8 On this threefold simultaneity, see Section 16, n. 3, note 4, below.
9 Cf. Section 11, n. 18. 12Here Suarez has "dictum''-i.e. "thing said."
10C£ Gregorii Ariminensis, Lectura ... In I Sent. dist. 28-32, qu.l, tomus III (1984), 13Actually, Suarez has "ei" which is "to that" instead of "eis" which is "to those."
p. 108, and qu. 3, pp. 169-170, 177-180. 14 That is, the arguments in nn. 3-6, this Section.
11 C£ S. Thomae Aquinatis, Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7, in Opera omnia, tomus 15 Cf. n. 3, this Section.
I (Romae, 1888), esp. p. 153a. 16Cf. Cajetan, Commentaria, in I, 13, 7, n. 10; tomus IV, 155ab.
202 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 15 203
This answer seems to have a basis in Aristotle, first because among those 10. But this answer of Cajetan is peculiar24 and it contradicts St. Thomas,
things which are simply "toward another," he numbers the knowable as it is in Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 13, where he 25 explicitly proves that the
related to knowledge and the sensible as it is related to sensation. 17 But, as we relations of God to creatures are not some things existing outside God from
said above, only those things that are really related are without qualification which he is extrinsically denominated in a relative way. 26 But since between God
"toward something." Therefore, these 18 also are from Aristotle's opinion real and creatures the relation is non-mutual, if Cajetan's opinion were true, God
relatives. Also, second, because below, in the same chapter, he says that these also would be really related to creatures, not indeed by a real relation existing
are "toward something," because other things are said toward them, where he in God himself, but by a relation existing in a creature. Hence, in the second
does not say that these are "toward something," because [our] reason fashions argument St. Thomas explicitly takes up a principle that is contrary to Cajetan's
or considers that, but because other things are said to be toward them, which interpretation, namely, "from a relation there is not denominated something
is [something] found in reality itself. 19 Moreover, third, because a little later, else existing as it were outside, but rather inhering. "27 Here, Ferrara interprets
embracing the three classes treated in Sections above, he says that all these are well that this must be understood to be about a respective denomination, by
said to be "toward something" through themselves. Things, however, that are which something is said to be related to something else, for, by another kind
only related by reason are not related through themselves but rather through of denomination, it is not unreasonable that something be denominated by
reason. an extrinsic relation, 28 as we will say later.
Finally, because a metaphysician does not consider relations (respectus) of 11. Moreover, if the knowable is really related to knowledge by a relation
reason, 20 but, according to Aristotle, those three classes essentially (per se) be- existing in the knowledge, I ask whether this should be understood about the
long to the category, "toward something," and they also essentially (per se) fall relation by which knowledge itself is related to the knowable, or about some
under metaphysical consideration; 2 1 therefore, [the conclusion follows]. 22 And other distinct relation.
before Cajetan, /p. 842/ Gregory also in [his Sentences commentary], Book 1, The first cannot be said, because one and the same relation cannot give to
Distinction 28, Question 3, 23 seems to have taught this opinion. diverse subjects denominations ofdiverse characters, such as are knowledge and
the knowable. Nor can it relate them to opposite formal termini. Otherwise,
17Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.1020b31-32. for an equal reason, the same sonship existing in a son could intrinsically de-
18That is, "the knowable" and "the sensible." nominate the son and refer [him] to the father, and extrinsically denominate
19 This very important point should not be missed. When Cajetan and other medievals the father himself and refer him to the son. Finally, a form that is one in species
speak, for example, of our real relation to God in contrast to God's relation only of has one formal effect. But relation is a form whose formal effect is to relate
reason to us, they never mean to reduce the latter relation to a mere consideration
one thing to another; therefore, one and the same relation cannot have two
of ours. Instead, they aim to base the latter relation on a real foundation, while
respecting the non-reciprocity in reality between creatures and God. I believe that modes of relating that are of diverse characters.
Suarez's reaction to this is somewhat ambiguous. Also the second cannot be said, namely, that there are in knowledge two
20 Suarez himself considers them in a last addendum to his Disputationes metaphysicae distinct real relations, one by which the knowledge itself is related to a know-
in Disputation 54, Section 6, vol. 26, pp. 1039-41. For translation, c£ Francisco able and another by which it relates a knowable to itself. For up to now this
Suarez, S.J., On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis): Metaphysical Disputation has been said by no one, and it does not have a basis in Aristotle, but rather it
LIV, translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle contradicts him. For he says that a knowable is said to be such from the fact
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), pp. 116-22.
21 While Aristotle certainly does distinguish and treat these three classes of relation 24 That is, "idiosyncratic."
in Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter 15, I can find no precise justification there for 25 That is, Thomas.
Suarez's stress on "essentially." Or even translating "per se" as "through themselves," 26Cf. Summa contra Gentiles, II, c. 13, in Opera omnia, tomus xiii (Romae: R. Gar-
"directly," or "as such," I cannot find its exact basis in Aristotle's text. rone, 1918), p. 293a.
22Suarez here and in other places does not bother to explicitly state his obvious con- 27 Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles II, c. 13, in Opera omnia, to mus XIII, p.
clusion. 293a.
23C£ Gregorii Ariminensis, Lectura ... In I Sent. dist. 28-32, qu. 3, tomus III (1984), 28C£ Ferrara, Commentaria in Contra Gentiles II, c. 13, n. 2, in S. ThomaeAquinatis,
p. 180. Opera omnia, tomus XIII, pp. 293b-94a.
204 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Re/.ation
Section 15 205
29
that knowledge is related to it. Therefore, he does not recognize between
to itsel£ since the whole nature of knowledge is to be turned toward the know-
these another real relation apart from that by which knowledge is related to the
able, and from this it does not, essentially speaking, order that [knowable] to
knowable. Also, neither is it consonant with reason, because that plurality of
itself
~elatio~s is ?either necessary n~r does it have a foundation in that knowledge
ttsel£ smce m /col. bl that there 1s only a unique adaptation and transcendental
The First Difficulty Proposed in the Beginning ls Resolved.
disposition toward the knowable.
13. Therefore, to the first argument put at the beginning3 2 it must be said
12. It is possible to say that there are two relations that are distinct only by
that the knowable can be denominated in two ways: first, merely terminatively
reason. For, this multiplication can be easily admitted, since it is not a property
and as it were passively, and second, correlatively with knowledge. In the first
of things nor truly in reality. And it suffices for the aforementioned relative
way it is denominated extrinsically from the real knowledge, and in this way
denominations even of diverse characters, just as the same mode or the same
such a denomination can be said to be in things themselves and not to be
dependence, because of only a distinction of reason between action and pas-
fashioned by the intellect. 33 Indeed, this denomination itself is not taken only
sion, gives the diverse denominations of agent and patient, one intrinsically
from the categorical relation that is in knowledge, but also from an absolute
and the other extrinsically. 3o
form as this includes a transcendental disposition toward an object. Aristotle
However, this distinction of relations should not be admitted in the present
suggested this well enough /p. 843/ when he said that the intelligible is said
case. For even for a distinction of reason of this kind some foundation in real-
from the fact that the intellect is occupied with it. 34 For it is so occupied not
ity is needed, which is not in the present case. Hence, the example of action
only through a categorical relation, but also through its own act on which the
and passion is not similar. For in change there is a true transcendental rela-
relation follows.
tion .(habitudo) to a principle from which the change flows and to a patient
The second denomination of the knowable is relative (respectiva), and this
that 1t changes; and, therefore, there is in that change a great foundation for
is only through a relation of reason, because our mind, in order to explain
rationally distinguishing action and passion in the manner of two accidental
the relation that knowledge has to that knowable, conceives that [knowable]
forms. However, in knowledge there is no foundation for distinguishing, even
as correlative to the knowledge. The argument, therefore, proceeds only with
according to reason, relations of diverse characters.
regard to the first denomination.
Add the general reason on which is founded that principle of St. Thomas
When, however, Aristotle places the knowable, the sensible, and the like,
that a relation does not denominate extrinsically, 31 because without doubt since
among those things that are "toward something," 35 it can be first explained
its denomination is through a disposition toward another it is unreasonable
that through these he does not understand only those extremes, but also the
that ~ ~o~m tha.t so den~~inates be in that to which there is the disposition.
relation that intervenes between these and their correlatives, in whichever of
But 1f it is not m that, 1t 1s necessary that it be in that which is related, since
them there is that relation. Or secondly he can be said to posit these extremes
in a relation other extremes do not essentially occur.
among those things that are "toward something," insofar as they have denomi-
Finally, it can scarcely be conceived by the mind what there may be in
nations of this kind from certain real relations. And in the same sense, it can
knowledge by reason of which it would cause the knowable to be really related
be understood that he says that these are "toward something," because other
things are related to them. They are (I say) toward something, not as correla-
29Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.1021a29-31. tives, but as termini that are passively denominated from these relations. And
30As I have suggested previously, in Aristotelean philosophy there is one reality be- in a similar way these will be said to be essentially (per se) "toward something"
tween agent and patient. It resides intrinsically in the patient and is extrinsically
as termini essentially connected with real relations from which they receive
from. the agent. The one reality, for example, of motion is intrinsically in the thing
such denominations. Or it can be said in another way, when Aristotle says that
that 1~ mo.ved and onl~ extrinsically derived from the mover. This will ultimately
permit Aristotle and h1s followers to attain the highest point of their metaphysics these are called "toward something" because other things are said to be toward
in an "unmoved mover" that moves, as extrinsically causing motion, without itself
32Cf. n. 3, this Section.
being in motion. For more of what is involved here, cf. my article: "'Prolegomena'
33Read again note 19, in paragraph 9, this Section.
to a Study .. .," esp. pp. 138-40.
34Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.102la31.
31 Cf. Contra Gentiles II, c. 13, as cited above in notes 22 and 23, this Section.
35Ibid., 1020b31-32.
•
206
Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 15 207
them,36 this is understood causallv. For if the knowabl ch 'bl d th
l'k ak d r · e, e sens1 e, an e
~-e, are t en an conceived by llS in a correletive way, it is then because other to imply a relation to a creature are said from eternity of God, which names
t mgs are related to them and nor because they themselves are trul d eaU are sometimes said to imply a free relation (respectus) but sometimes one that
related. Y an r y
is simply necessary or natural. For example, knowledge, power, and the like,
But Grego [ f Ri · '] h
th . ry o mmi ~ays t at the same interpretation is valid, even if express a natural and necessary relation, but predestination, providence, and
b e relat10n of the ~owable is real, because it belongs to that [knowable] onl knowledgeofvision, 42 express a free or not natural relation, because, absolutely
. ecause knowl:dge is concerned with it. But this is not correctly said becaus~ speaking, they could not belong to God. And about these latter relations there
if the foundation of that relation is only the relation (habt'~udo) r' h is no doubt that they are not real in God, because from eternity they do not
thin 1 0 f kn I •· o anot er
have real termini.
g, nbame y, ow edge to the knowable, the relation founded on that
cannot e real. It is true that some theologians think that the relations of knowledge and
1.4. ~answer to the second argumenr37 is that the cause on account of power, even in God, are real and transcendental, and, therefore, that they can be
which this non-mutual relation is not real in one of the two extr . h' independent of the existence of a terminus and not be variable nor accidental
h· d 1 [ f 1 · . emes m t is
t ~-r c ass o. re at10ns] is that in one extreme, for example, in the knowable but belonging to the intrinsic substance of God. However, I chink more tnl ly
o 1ect, there ts not a real foundation for such a relation And i't i's h {something that must be treated more at length elsewhere43 ) that these do not
th · h · 11' 'bl · not enoug
at m t e mte igi e or sensible thing itself there is some r d . entail in God a true transcendental relation, 44 but are signified only "accord-
ace f h' h · · roun atton on
ounr. o w ic . It is apt to be understood or to be sensed, because that
founda~ion, considered precisely in the character of measure, is not taken as 42 "Knowledge of Vision" is the total knowledge that ad has f things that exist or
s~i::iethi~ghthha~ chan be ordered to another, but only as the terminus or the will exist in_ omc momcnr of time; cf. DM 30, 15, n. 40, vol. 26, p. 182.
o Ject Wit w ic something is comm A. d I · · .
. . h . . ensurate. ru1 , t 1erefore, rt 1s said chat 43Cf. Suarez, Di!SS. Tri11. Myst., V. c. 2, n. 2, in Opem, vol. 1, p. 655. I may be noted
~nit t er~ is ~o foundation of a relation, not because /col. b/ there is nothin rhar Rodrigo de Arriaga, .J. (1592-1667), who was broadly a foll wcr f m\rez,
m that thmg itself, but because in that thing the . fr . g rboughr that Suarez, in contrast to their fellow Jesuit, abriel Vasqucz{1549-1604),
I · h' h. re 1s no reason o · rounduig a
re at10n, w ic is req~ired for the foundation of a relation, spealcin formal! did posit transcendental relacions in God toward possible creatures; cf. "You will
of such, as was explamed above in Section 7 311 The third g 39 k y ask, whether there is given this ttansccndencal relation to an effect not only in
· · b · argument as s a
senous quest10n a out the terminus of a relation which ill . -L created causes, but also in God with respect to possible creatures. Farher Vasquez
following Section. , we w treat in me denies it, because he thinks chat God does not depend upon the possibiliry of a
monkey or of an ant. Father Suarez, to whom I subscribe, affirms iL, because f rhe
argument rhac was made, namely, rhar for God to be able. to produce crearnres is
With Regard to the Second Difficulty we Treat something essential to God, which would be lacking if creatures we.re impossible;
Ofthe Relati.ons ofGod to O't!atures. therefore, God essentially relates ro those creatures as they arc possible." (Rogabis,
15. In the second part of the argumenrs,40 first of all, the question is asked· umtm non solwn in causis creatis detw· haec relatio transcmdentalis ad effictum, sed
whether between a creature and God ch . . . al .
if. e1e is ways a non-mutual relation etiam in Deo nd creaturns possibiles. NegaJ R Varquez, quia censet non dependere Deum
even ~t seems to belong to the .first and second class of relations Th' . , a possibilitate simiae vcL formic4e. Aj]innat P. Suarez, cui mbscribo, propter 1'lttionem
theological · d · . · is 1s a
qu~t10n, an it is usually proposed in other words: wheth h fat·tam, scilicet hoc, quod est Deum posse producere creatt1ms, est emmtiale Deo; quod
names that are given ro G d hr h . er t e deficeret, si repugnarent crett.ttmu: ergo Deu.s essemiafiter ill1JS respicit ut possibilcs.)
. . G d o t oug a temporal relation to a creature express a
real relat10n lll o or f. n1 Arriaga, Physica, d. 7, . 2, n. 19, in Ctmus philosophicus (Parisiis: Apud Maninum
one o reason o y. For some names (nomina)41 that seem
Dmand, 1637), p. 287. For Vasquez, see Commmtariomm ac disprttationum in
36Ibid., 102la30.
primam partem Summae TheoLogi.ae Srmcti ThomaeAqtJinatis, Torn us prim us. Editio
37Cf. n. 4, this Section. novissima (Lugduni: Sumptibus Iacobi Cardon, 1631), In Qu. 25, a. 3, d. 104, c.
38Cf. Section 7, nn. 12-14. 6, n. 25; pp. 512-3.
39Cf. n. 5, this Section. 44At times, Suarez does seems to admit a transcendental relation to possible creatures
40Cf. n. 6, this Section. on the parrof God (c.f. e.g.: "f answer that char possibility on the part of creatures
41 "Names" or simply "terms." cannot not be taken away without taking away from God the positive perfection
of omnipotence, and immediately thereafter [the pcrfecl.ion] of knowledge and of
•
208 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 15 209
ing to being said" (secu.ndum diet) in tbe manner of rdacive things, from the
face chat they are con ceived by us in the m ann er of those things that include but from that they consequently reach or ca~ reach other ,;hings ~ithout a
similar t ranscendental relations. For, in oche r respecr:s, God is with regard to transcendental relation. Therefore, these relations are only accordmg to be-
his essence a totally absolute thing, a nd since his knowledge and his power are ing said," or, if t hey are conceived as relations "according to bein.g,". they ~re
his very essence, they also are absolute apart from every tran scend ental rela- only relations of reason, at least as long as their termini do not exist m reality
don, which also we mentioned a bove whe n we had to explain the attributes (in re). Nor does the argument proposed above proce~d in their regard'. but
of God .45 rather about certain relations that include the co-existence of a terminus,
And we further gave the reason: because the power of God is not such that which therefore belong to God from time, inasmuch as the creatures t~at are
it is essential ly and immediately (per se primo) ordered co a task outside itself, the termini of such relations exist only in time, for example, the relations of
buc it has that efficacy as it were concomirancly, speaking according to reason , creator, lord, and the like.
and without any ordering. And simJlarly, Ip. 8441 the knowledge and the will
of G od essentially and immediately are concerned only with his own essen e, The Opinion ofthe Nominalists about Real.Relati.ons in God from Time.
16. Regarding these, therefore, many theologians thmk that they ar: r:al r:la-
the whole divine realicy. " [Respondeo, ... non posse totli ii/am possibilitatem ex parte tions. Ockham holds this in [his Sentences commentary], Book l, Distmct10n
cmtumrum, q11in tollatrll' a Deopositiva pe1focti1J omm'potemiae, r1c mbinde scientiae, 30 46 as does Gabriel [Biel] in the same place, 47 Question 5, and Durandus,
et totius divini l's.re. ] De Trinitnte, IX, c. 6, no. 20, vol. 1, p. 740 and DM 30, L6, n. Q~estion 3148 as well as Gregory [ofRimini], .[Book I], Distinc~ion
28, Q~es­
42, vol. 26, p. 197). enerally ac od1er rimes, Suarez is more orchodox, denyiug all tion 3, Article 4, and Marsilius [oflnghen], m Book l, Ques~ion 32, Art~cle
transcendental (and, of eoursc, all categorical) relations in God (cf. e.g. above DM 1.49 The basis for these authors is that a real relation adds nothmg ~o a subJe~t
47, s. 4, n. 4). Suarez's ambivalence on rhis bas been noted by Diego de Alarcon, S.J. or to the other thing that is said to be related through that [relation]'. b.ut it
(1 585- 1634): "Of the e authors, some reach rhat d1e D ivine mniporence i reaJ.ly
is either a denomination from the concomitance of the extremes, or it is an
relaced by a transcendental rdacion ro any creature, so much d1at if even die smallesr
absolute thing itself that, when another co-exists, t~rough itself respects that
creature were co be lacking, God himself would also be lacking ... and somet..imes
Farhcr Suarei, dunks this way, for in Book 9 of rhe De Trinitate, Chapter 6, number [other], on account of some link or some connection found ~etween them.
20, he says that if rh · possibiliry of any crearw·e is lacking, dlere wouJd necessarily Hence, it happens that a real relation can without any in_ipe~fe~tion c~?1e anew
be lacking in od die positive per fection of omnipotence and of rhc whole divine to something, because it comes without any real and mtrmsic addition, and
realicy. Howeve1; he seems to have caught die opposite in Metaphysics, Dispurarion without composition, and consequently also without any depe~den.ce upon
30, Section 15, number 26, and in places cited above, where wirh m any others some extrinsic thing but, at most, in a certain mode of denomination. But
he reaches that there is in God no real inrrinsic relation to creatures. " (Ex quibus these are the only imperfections that can be imagine~ here; there~ore, every
Auctorib11s nonnulli docent omnipotentiam divinam l'ea!iter referri per rekieionem imperfection is excluded. Aud, in every other respect, m God all thmgs neces-
tnmscendentalem.nd quamlibet creamram; adeo ut q11alibet minima deficieme, etiam sary fo r a relation concu r. For he is the true efficient cause of a creature, and
ipse De14 deficieret ... et aliquando ita smsit P. Suarez: 11am Jib. 9 de Trinitate, c. 6, he has true powe r and action with regard to that creature. Therefore, when
n. 20, fatet:ur deficiente possibilitate alicui11s c1·eatzmte necessario defecturnm in Deo
pe1:fectionem positivam om11ipoten.tiae, et totius esse divini: oppositum tmmm videtur
docuir;-e in Metaphys. d. 30, sec. 15, n. 26 et loci.s sttprn. citatis, ubi cum mu/tis aliis
d(}cet nullam esse in Deo relationem retdem intrinsecam nd creaturas.) Prima Pars 46Cf. Guillelmi de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum ... , d. 30, q. 5, in Opera
Theologicae &hQw.sticae (Lugduni, 1633), 1h1.cc. U, disp. 2, cap. 2 (p. 96a), cited theologica, vol. 4, p. 394.
by N. ]. WeUs, "Suarez on che Ercroal Trurhs," Part II, in: The Modem Schoolman; 47C£ Gabriel Biel, In I Sent., d. 30, q. 5, a. 2, cond. 2, in Collectorium circa quattuor
LVIII (1981) , 171, n. l 20. Prof. Wdls has raised the question of Suarez having /ibros Sententiarum, Prologus et Liberprimus, collaborantibus Martino Elze et Renata
changed b.i mind on this point. But for anod1er resolution, cf above DM 47, 3, Steiger, ediderunt Wilfredus Werbeck et Udo Hofmann (Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr
n. 8, where, as here, the divine omniporence is said to be relative st1etmd11m did [Paul Siebeck], 1973), vol. l, p. 605. . .
because we cannot conceive ir or explain it otherwise; also: ibid., n. 9. 48C£ D. Durandi, a Sancto Porciano, 0.P., In Petri Lombardi Sententtas, I, d. 30, q.
45 On the Actribures of God in relati0n co His Essence, cf. DM 30, s. 6, vol . 26, pp. 3 (ed. Venetiis, 1571), vol. 1, £ 85ra-86ra. .
89-95. 49 Cf. Questiones Marsilii super quattuor Ii bros Sententiarum, I, q. 32, a. 1 (Argentmum:
Ex Officina Martini Flach, 1501), fol. 132ra-vb.
11

210 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 15 211

the other extreme [i.e. the creature] is posited, there will be in God a true real Conclusion 3, 55 and Article 2, Conclusions 2 and 3, 56 and in the same place
relation. Hispalensis [i.e. Diego Deza], Article 1;57 [St.] Bonaventure, Article l, Q~es­
And in favor of this opinion is the common way of denominating God from tion 3;5 8 Richard [of Middleton], Article 1, Question 4; 59 Scotus, Quest~on
these relations. For he is as truly and really the maker and creator of a creature 1;60 Giles [ofRome] 60 bis, Question 2; Henry [of Ghent], Quodlibet9, Question
as one man is the father of another. And the same is true about the relation of 62
1;6 1 and [Alexander] ofHales, in [Summa], Part 1, Question 35 [sic]. And the
"distinct" and "similar," etc. Therefore, either all of these relations are real in Master [of the Sentences, i.e. Peter the Lombard], in that thirtieth Distinction
God, or there is no basis for admitting real relations in creatures. seems to be of the same opinion. 63
Finally, St. AnseLn favors this opinion in theMonologium, Chapter 24 [sic], 50 And there are those who think that this opinion is so certain that the opposite
when after he has said rhat in God nothing can occur accidentally because he is contradictory of sacred doctrine. However, it is one thing to speak supposing
is invariable, objects to himself: "How is he not receptive ofan accident, rim·e that a relation is a thing or a mode that is really (ex natura rei) distinct from .a
even this very foct that he is greater than all other natures and thtlt he is dissimilar foundation or a related subject, and consequently added anew to that when It
to them seems to be accidental to him?" And he answers: "Bttt why are [God's] is newly related or begins to be relatively denominated, but it is something else
nr1tim1l immutability and the recepttwility of certain things that are called acci- to speak of a relation, supposing that it is not somethin~ distinct f~om absolute
dents incompatible, iffrom their ttssumption no variability ofmbstance follows?" things. With the first supposition having been made, 1t would without doubt
And funher on he adds mat mere ar relations of this kind. And lest be be be most absurd and generally erroneous, to say that real relations to creatures
thought to spealc about relations of reason, he adds an example in the case of in time result in God when creatures are produced or are lost when creatures
created relations. "For I" (be says) 'am neither greater nor smaller, neither equal are changed. For according to this kind of opinion, a true accident is posited
nor simila1' to ri rna11 who wilt be born a year from now. But once he has been in God, because a mode that is really (ex natura ret) distinct from a substance,
born f wiLL be able to have all these relations without any change in myself" Bu
he adds later that these things that are said to happen to a thing without any 55Cf. Defensiones, In I Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. l, ed. Paban-Pegues, torn. II, PP· 283b-
mutation, are imprope1'~1 called accidents, and therefore it is simply true that 284a.
no accident comes anew co God. 56Ibid., a. 2, pp. 312-313.
57 See Nouarum dejfensionum doctrine ... Beati Thome de Aquino .. ., I, d. 31, q. l, a.
The Opposite Opinion Is Proven. 1, fol. 214ra. .
17. But nevertheless, many and more weighty theologians deny that names 58S. Bonaventurae, Commentarius in 1 librum Sententiarum, d. 30, a. un., q. 3, m
of this kind signify in God real relations co creatW'es that belong to him from Opera omnia, tom us I (Quaracchi: ExTypographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882),
time. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, [in Summa Theowgi,ae], Part l, Ques- pp. 524-26, esp. 525b-26a. . .
tion 13,Article 7, 51 and in Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 12.52 And in these 59Cf. Ricardi de Mediavilla, 0.M. Conv., Super quatuor libros Sententrarum ~etrt
Lombardi quaestiones subtillissimae, I, d. 30, a. l, q. 4 (Brixiae, 1591; reprmt:
places, Cajecan53 and Ferrara 54 teach me same thing, as well as other Tho.mists,
Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), tomus 1, pp. 268-270.
Capreolus, in [Defensiones], Book l, Distinction 30, Question 1, Arcicl l, 60Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 30, q. 1-2, in Opera omnia, tomus vi (ed. Vat, 1963), pp. 169-
202.
60bis Cf. In Sent. I, d. 30, q. 2 (Venetiis, 1521), f.157rb.
61 Cf. Henrici de Gandavo, QuodlibetIX, qu. l, ed. Macken, pp. 3-25.
50 Cf. Monologium, Cha peer 25, in Obras Comp/etas de San Anselmo, vol. I , p. 258. 62For this, cf. Alexandri de Hales, O.M., Summa theologica, I, Pars secunda, lnqui-
51 Cf. S. ThomaeAquinatls, Summa Theologia.e I, q. 13, a. 7, in Opera omnia, tomus sitio secunda, Tractatus primus, Qu. V, membrum l, c. 4, aa. 1-2 (Quaracc~i: Ex
I (Romae, 1888), esp. p. 153a, and ad 4, p. 153b. typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924), tornus 1, pp. 554-5'. Accordmg to
52Cf. S. Thomae Aqui.natis, Summa contra Gentiles 11, c. 12, in Opera omnin, comus the "Index of Questions" in this tome, the reference here was designated under
xiii, pp. 290-91. "Question 53" in the Cologne, 1622 edition of Alexander's Summa.
53Cf. Cajetan, Commentaria, in I, 13, 7, nn. 14-18; tomus IV, 156a-157b. 63 For this, c£ Magistri Petri Lombardi, Parisiensis Episcopi, Sententiae in IV libris
54 Commentaria in Contra Gentiles, II, c. 12, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opera, tomus distinctae, Lib. I, Dist. XXX, Cap. 1, in Torn. l, Pars II (Grottaferrata [Romae]:
XIII, pp. 291-92. Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971), p. 220.
•1

212 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation 213

Section 15
which can be in that [substance] and can depart [from that substance], is an of the first opinion65 spoken in that sense, nor do they admit the aforesaid
accident. And, consequently, it is necessary to posit in God a composition of
supposition. .
substance and such a distinct mode, and finally change, potentiality, and the 20. But if we suppose that these relations are not somethmg real and act~ally
like. /p. 845/ distinct from all absolute things, neither can it be certain that these relations
18. For neither can it be said that such a relation is real and is not in a creature cannot be attributed to God nor is it a question of great importance, but aJ-
and that it really relates God himself to a creature and nevertheless is not in most about the way we speak. And certainly those who think that these relative
God but rather stands near (assistere) him, as Gilbert de la Porree thought, as denominations, which can come anew by just a change of another extreme
[Alexander] of Hales and others report. 63 bis For this is easily refuted inasmuch without any change of that thing that is said to be referred, are /col. bl_ only
as if that relation is real it needs be in some subject. Since, then, it is not in extrinsic denominations from the co-existence of the extremes, speak logically
a creature, it will be in God, unless someone imagines it to be subsistent, enough in giving these relations to God, because there is n~ pr~blem with God
which cannot be said, since otherwise it follows that there is a certain created being denominated in time from some real form that exists m a creature, as
substance st:lllding near (assistentem) God in cime, since it is a temporaJ and is evident in [his] creative action, and in other things that God does "toward
consequently a created relation. But that is learly false and uninceUigible. For 66
the outside" (ad extra). And, certainly, St. Anselm, in the place cited, seems
how could such a substance cause God co be related? Again, there wo uld also to lean very much toward this opinion, although at the end of the chapter he
be another relation in God to that subsrance, because he would be its maker, puts that way of speaking aside as uncertain. But, nevert?eless,. we abandoned
and in this way we would proceed to infinity. that opinion above as less probable and less agreeab_le with Ansto~l~.
But if it be said that that relation is subsistent, but still not with another We can now confirm this from the fact that accordmg to that [opm1on] there
subsistence than the divine, I will ask whether it is in that by a hypostatic will be no non-mutual relations. And what Aristotle says will be false, namely,
union64-to say which is so absurd that it does not need to be refuted. Or [is that certain things are called relative because others are related to them, while
it that] by identity? And then again let me ask whether this is by an identity in other things [are called relative] because they have in themselves that from
every way, which excludes even a modal distinction, and thus we are receding 67
which they are related. . . . . . .
from the hypothesis that we put forward earlier, namely, chat every real relation 21. But further, even supposing that a relat10n is somethmg mtrmsIC, but not
that comes anew is a distinct mode. Bu if we are talking about a real identity something distinct in reality (in re) and consequently making neither a :hange
wirh a modaJ d isrinction, we fall into aU che problems thac were deduced, and nor a composition, the difficulties deduced above do not follow, even if God
we do not avoid such a relation being in God not through a distinct inherence is said to be temporally related to creatures, and therefore the o~inion in.that
but by itself, just as in created substances accidental modes also affect them sense is not worthy of any censure. Hence, even among the Thomtsts, Soncmas,
68
and inhere in them. in Metaphysics, Book 5, Question 25, in reply to Objection ~, admits that .t~e
19. However, the whole certitude of this opinion in this sense is more con ~ relation of dominion that God has with respect to creatures is real, because It Is
ditioned, or [a marrer] of the consequence rather than of the consequenr. Thac founded on true real power. This also is in part what Hervaeus thi?ks, in ~his
is to say, that if the Jdadon is reaJ, such as it is supposed to be in that opinion, Sentences commentary], Book l, Distinction 30, the Single Question, Article
it cannot be in God. But because that antecedent is uncertain and perhaps 3 [sic],69 although in his way of speaking he tries to accomod~te_himself to the
false, therefore it is not enough for the conclusion to be certain insofar as it common opinion, which he explains with difficulty. An?
this is not strang:,
absolutely denies real relations of God to creatures. Neither have the authors because in fact, supposing this opinion, it is not easy to give a reason why this

65 Cf. n. 16, this Section.

63bis Cf. Alexandri de Hales, O.M., Summa theologica, I, Pars secunda, Inquisitio 66Monologium, Chapter 25.
secunda, Tractatus primus, Qu. V, membrum l, c. 3 (Quaracchi, 1924), tomus l, 67Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.1021a26-30.
pp. 552-4. For Gilbert, see Gilberti Porretae Commentaria in librum [Boethii} De 68 Quaestiones metaphysicales ... , V, q. 25, ad 4, p. 85b.
Trinitate, in Patrologia Latina, vol. 64, col. 1292. 69For this, see Hervei Natalis Britonis, In I Sent., d. 29, q. l, resp. ad 3, et ad l, 2, 3
64See Section 4, note 4, above. (Parisiis, 1647), p. 127ab.
214 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation 215
Section 15
should be denied, since no imperfection foUows in God, as is clear from what it does not seem to have any place. But in their case there is a special reason,
has been said. because they are related (comparantur) to an effect as parts that are or~ered to
22. But I do not, nevertheless, think one should abandon the way of speak- composing a whole, and in this regard they are of the same order "".1th that
ing of St. Thomas and the more weighty theologians, because, even if those [effect]. Hervaeus, [in the place cited] above, 71 has another explanat~o~, b~t
problems deduced above do not follow when we attribute to God a real relation one that is more obscure and less satisfactory, and therefore, I am om1ttmg it.
in the stated sense, God can, nonetheless, in no way be related to creatures Therefore, we assert that, in the stated sense, nothing is related to something
through his intrinsic form and entity. For this is proper to beings of the same else truly and really through an intrinsic form unl~ss it is ~f t~e same order
order, but God and a creature are of entirely diverse orders, as is self-evident. with that thing. But the reason is because a real relation consists m an ?rder of
23. But those things are said to be of the same order, which are either outside one thing to another. It is, therefore, rightly required for such a relation that
every genus and outside every dependence, such as the divine persons, or are it be between extremes of the same order.
under the same genus, such as created substances or quantities and the like, 25. And this can be confirmed from what was said about knowledge and the
or at least /p. 846/ those things that are under diverse genera, of which one knowable. For, under that aspect, they are thought to belong to diverse orders,
can be perfected by another, and vice versa, such as are the genus of created insofar as /col. bl knowledge is ordered to the knowable, but the knowable
substance and the genera of accidents compared among themselves. as such is not ordered to knowledge. However, God is much more of another
And for this reason, all created beings, as regards the present matter, are order from every creature. Therefore, through himself he is much less able
said to be of the same order (for uncreated persons, as they are related among to be really related to creatures than the kno';able [is .abl~ to be ~elated] to
themselves, do not belong to the present discussion), because, if they are of knowledge. And St. Thomas uses almost all this reasoning m the cited places
the same genus, they both have a univocal agreement among themselves, and and more extensively in De Potentia, Question 7, Article 11.
72
.
they mutually help one another in some way for the perfection or the comple- Accordingly, the divine nature, power, and other attributes are so absolute m
ment of their nature, either in an individual, or in a species, or at least in a themselves and so abstract and independent from every order of creatures, that
genus. Hence, it is the case that the causality that is found among beings of whether creatures exist or not, they relate God to creatures neither according
this kind also redounds to the perfection not only of effects but in some way to reality (secundum rem) nor according to som~ tr~e real for~ality. Hence,
also of the causes, either because they are ordered to acting or because they neither can they be truly conceived as so denommatmg o.r rel~tmg G~d, but
are preserved in the effects, at least according to species or certainly because every denomination that is conceived as relative (respectiva) m God ts only
according to genus they are perfected by a variety of differences or species. But according to our reason and mode of conceiving.
if created beings are of diverse genera, they all have among themselves some 26. Neither is it an obstacle that God is really denominated creator or lor~.
connection, either according to generic or according to specific natures, if we For he is really denominated at least extrinsically from a real action ~nd m
compare them with proportion. Therefore, in this sense, in the present case, this way he is called a creator, but intrinsically from the real power which he
we are saying that all created beings are of the same order. has in himself over a created thing and in this way he is called a lord, or from
24. This can be explained in a different way from Cajetan [commenting on knowledge or real love and in this way he is said to be knowing and loving
Summa Theologiae], Part l, Question 4, Article 3, in Reply to Objection 4, that which he makes. Finally, these denominations are real only insofar as they
where he says that those things are ofdiverse orders that have among themselves are taken from some absolute forms or quasi-forms. But insofar as they are
an essential dependence in the character of cause and effect. 70 In this way, all formally relative, they are founded only in our way of conceiving. .
creatures are related (comparantur) to God, but not among themselves, because, 27. Therefore, in answer to the principal difficulty73 posited at the begm-
even though sometimes they are caused by one another, it is not according to ning, we concede that between God and creatures there are gi~en non-m~tual
a proper essential dependence. relations, which not only belong to the third class or founda.tion of relations,
But although this explanation is probable and satisfactory with respect to but also to the first or the second [class or foundation]. Nor 1s that a problem
extrinsic causes, still, in the case of intrinsic ones, namely, material and formal,
71 Cf. Jn J Sent., d. 29, q. 1, resp. ad 3, et ad 1, 2, 3 (Parisiis, 1647), p. 127ab.
72Cf. Q;,taestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 11, ed. Bazzi et al., P· 212b.
70Cf. Cajetan, Commentaria, in I, 4, 3, n. 5; tornus IV, 54b-55a. 73 Cf. n. 6, this Section.
...

216 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 15 217

that it is not necessary that relatives of the third class be distinguished from left or the right place. This [relation] is as regards the denomination l~ke~ed i~
other [relatives] insofar as all relations in that [class] are non-mutual, while in this to non-mutual relations, because the foundation of that denommat1on is
the others they are never so, but insofar as in the third class they are always only in one extreme, and from this it redounds to the other. Therefore, non-
non-mutual, while in the others not always, but rather rarely. mutual relations are usually explained by this example, although a true and
Hence Aristotle is correctly explained, as I said-that in the third class by proper relation does not seem to be necessary in th~t ca~e. For~ mere diversity
virtue of a formal foundation or a reason of founding, the relations are non- of positions as such does not suffice for the denommat1.on of ng~t a~d le~, as
mutual. But in the first and second class, if sometimes they are non-mutual, is self-evident. But the diversity of power in that case 1s only pnvauve, smce
this results as if from a material thing or subject or quasi-subject of the relation. in the animal the power is proper, but in the column there is only a privation
For example, in the relation of cause and effect between God and creatures, if of that, and, therefore, in neither extreme does it seem to be enough for a real
we formally consider only the feature of potency and action, it can be enough relation. But if someone really wishes to defend the position that this is a real
for a mutual relation, but nevertheless in God, because of the eminence of his non-mutual relation, he may use the general response given above. /col. bl
entity, that relation is non-mutual, and the same can be said /p. 847I about a
relation of similar or distinct, and the like.
28. However, a relation between a final cause and an effect,74 if it is non-
mutual, can rightly be reduced to the third class. For means are adapted to an
end, and thus they take their species from that, and in their own way they are
measured through that.
29. About the relation of right and left between a man and a column, it is
quite doubtful whether it is real from the side of any extreme. For although the
form or the aptitude (virtus) from which the denomination has been taken is real
and existing intrinsically in an animal, but only extrinsically in the column, it
is still not very apparent why a real relation arises from this, even in the animal,
since that denomination is not founded upon some unity or quantity, as is
self-evident. Nor also [is it founded] in the character of active potency as such.
Otherwise, the relation would be mutual, since a passive potency corresponds
to that in the column, or sometimes also active [potency], is lacking because
it is not necessary that the motive power (virtus) of the right side be so great
that it suffices for moving the column. And that relation is also not founded
in some commensuration, because the right [hand] power of the animal entails
no transcendental disposition toward the column, nor is it commensurate with
that in any way. Therefore, a true reason for founding a real relation does not
seem to be present, but that denomination seems to have arisen soley from a
comparison of the intellect through a certain proportion or proportionality75
to the right and the left parts of the same man or animal. For between these
parts there is a real mutual relation taken from a diversity of positions together
with a diversity of real powers existing in both parts. And from this a similar
denomination has been transferred to an inanimate thing that occupies the

74Cf. n. 6, this Section.

75 On this, cf. Section 11, n. 6, above.
 Section XVI.
Whether the Formal Terminus of a Relation Is Another
Relation Or Some Absolute Nature (ratio).
1. This question has arisen from the preceding Section, and it is very neces-
sary in order to explain the nature of a relation, which in its own way depends
both on a foundation and on a terminus. And for this reason it falls very well
into this place; since in the two immediately preceding Sections we have ex-
plained the formal foundations of relations, it now remains in sequence that
we explain the formal terminus.

The Tide of the Question Is Explained, and

What It Is "To Actually Terminate. "
2. But it must be noted that here we are not treating of the formal denomi-
nation of a terminus as it is actually terminating but of the character or form
that is required in that thing itself that is a terminus in order that it be apt for
terminating. For under the first aspect the being of a terminus, or terminating,
is not something in a terminating thing, but it is an extrinsic denomination
taken from the fact that something else tends toward that [terminating thing].
In this way, that a wall is seen is not something in the wall, but is rather a de-
nomination from [an act of] vision relating to that [wall]. For, although the
words are different, to be seen is the same as to actually terminate vision.
But nevertheless, there is as a prerequisite in the wall some form, by which
it is constituted apt to terminate vision. In this way, then, it should be under-
stood about the terminus of a relation; for it is said actually to terminate only
because it is respected by another, which denomination is not a prerequisite
for the relation, but follows on that, as all agree. But there is necessarily sup-
posed in the terminus some character and as it were formal cause, on account
of which it is terminative (so to speak) of the relation. For not every being can
terminate any relation whatever. Therefore, in each thing there is required some
character on account of which it is apt to terminate this or that relation.
At present, then, we are asking about this formal character [that is necessary]
for terminating. And since it was said above 1 that the terminus of a relation
must be a real being, and, in order that it terminate, it necessarily requires ac-
tual existence; therefore we are further inquiring whether it must be a formally
relative or an absolute being. From this it will easily be evident in each relation

1 Cf. Section 8, n. 4, above.

220 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 16 221
whether the proportionate terminus must be such or such, an absolute or a
said below. s But they would not have any of these unless one relative were
relative being. /p. 848/
formally terminated at another. Therefore, [the conclusion follows].
The minor [premiss] 6 is proven as regards its first part:7 for if a father, for
~rious Opinions. example, as a father is not terminated at a son insofar as the son is relative, but
3. First.-On this matter there are three opinions. The first says that in all insofar as he is this man who has been begotten by that man, then the father as
relations, both mutual and non-mutual, the formal terminus must be relative. father is not simultaneous in nature with the son as son, but with this man as
Cajetan taught this [in his commentary on Summa Theologiae], Part l, Question begotten. But this man is begotten by the other prior in nature to his having
13, Article 7; 2 and Hispalensis [Diego Deza], in [his Sentences commentary], a relation of sonship to that other, because sonship is a property resulting in
Book 1, Distinction 30, Question l, Note 3, 3 seems to have spoken in line a begotten man. Therefore, a father as a father will be prior in nature to a son
with the same opinion, although he does not discuss the question, nor does
as son.
he speak explicitly about the formal character of terminating. And this part8 is confirmed because a relation as a relation depends only on
To be sure, some modern Thomists have followed this opinion. And it can a foundation and a terminus; therefore, if the formal terminus is not another
be proven first because every relative is formally terminated at its correlative; relation, it does not essentially depend on that [first relation], nor does it require
therefore, the formal character of terminating one relation is the corresponding it; therefore, of itself it is by nature prior to that. And by a similar argument
opposite relation in the other extreme. The consequence is evident, and the the other two parts9 are proven. For a relation is perfectly known when the
antecedent is proven, because relatives are simultaneous in nature, in knowl- foundation and the terminus are known, and it does not need anything else.
edge and in definition, as is clear from Aristotle, in the Chapter, "Toward Therefore, if the terminus of one relation is not another relation, the one does
Something," 4 and as will be not depend in knowledge on the other. Therefore, they are not necessarily
known simultaneously.
Again, for the same reason, in the definition of a relation there is posited
only a formal terminus, because the whole being of a relation is toward its own
2 C£ Commentaria, in I, q. 13, a. 7, n. 11, tomus IV, p. 155b. terminus. Therefore, if the terminus of one relative is not another relative, but
3 See Nouarum de.ffensionum doctrine ... Beati Thome de Aquino .. ., I, d. 30, q. 1, a.
something absolute, one relative will not be defined by another, and vice versa,
3, not. 3, fol. 222vab.
which is to be simultaneous in definition. And this is especially confirmed in
4 On simultaneity in nature, cf. Categories 7.7bl5 and ibid., 13.14b27-32. On
simultaneity in knowledge, ibid., 7.8bl3. On simultaneity in definition, ibid., the case of non-mutual relatives, in which there seems to be greater difficulty,
7.8a35-37. For the derivation and understanding of this last simultaneity, c£ esp. since otherwise, in order to know the relation of a creature, it would be I col. bl
D. Soto: "In the eighth text, Aristotle infers from this second definition [of rela- necessary to know the absolute entity of God and his nature; and, similarly, in
tion] the following corollary, namely, that if someone were to definitively know one order to know the relation of knowledge or of sensation, it would be necessary
relative he would also definitively know the other. This can be established as a fifth
property of relatives 'according to being.' The reason of the corollary is manifest:
5 Cf. nn. 20, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, and 34, this Section. In these paragraphs,
for if the whole quiddity of a relative is to be toward another, the quidditative
Suarez will raise and answer most questions about the threefold simultaneity in
definition [of that relative] cannot be unless it make explicit the terminus of that
Aristotle's text.
relation. For since a relation is between two extremes, it cannot be quidditatively
6 That is: "But they would not have any of these unless one relative were formally
known unless the extremes are known.'' (In textu octavo infertArist. hoc corollarium
terminated at another."
ex hac secunda definitione, videlicet quod si quis definite noverit unum relativorum, 7 That is: "Relatives would not be simultaneous in nature unless one were formally
definite etiam novit et reliquum. Quae potest constitui quinta proprietas relativorum terminated at another.''
secundum esse. Ratio corollarii est manifesta: Nam si tota quidditas relativi est esse ad 8 That is, the first part of the minor premiss: again: "Relatives would not be simul-
aliud, definitio quidditativa esse non potest nisi explicet terminum illius habitudinis: taneous in nature unless one were formally terminated at another."
nam cum habitudo sit inter duo extrema, quidditative cognosci non potest, nisi extremis 9 "Relatives would not be simultaneous in knowledge unless one were formally ter-
cognitis: ... ) In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis Categorias, librosque de Demonstratione minated at another" and "Relatives would not be simultaneous in definition unless
commentaria (Venice, 1587), p. 202b.
one were formally terminated at another.''
 222 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 16 223
to know the absolute nature of a knowable or a sensible object, which seems
nandt) is absolute, but it requires a relation or a concomitant correlation when
plainly false.
it actually terminates. This is without qualification true in the case of mutual
4. The Second Opinion.-The second opinion uses a distinction. For it thinks
relatives, but in the case of non-mutual ones it is only according to our way of
the same thing about mutual relations as does the preceding opinion and for
conceiving, as we will explain. And I think that this opinion is true, when it
the same reasons, but about non-mutual relations, it says that they are termi-
is formally and essentially understood. But why I am adding this will be clear
nated at something absolute and not relative, because relations of this kind
from what is to be said. For it is necessary to distinctly propose and prove this
are formally terminated at something real. But in their termini there does not opinion in the cases of both mutual and non-mutual, because it is not equally
correspond some real relative thing, but only something absolute. certain in both, although from non-mutual to mutual a solid argument may
Ferrara, [commenting on] Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 14, holds this be taken.
opinion, 1° and HispaJensis, as cited above, 11 inclines more toward it, as regards
ics s cond part, for he often says that some absolute divine attribute, namely,
The Third Opinion Is Confirmed by Two Proposed Assertions.
strength, power, or something of this kind, is the reason that God terminates
6. The First Assertion.-The Reason for the Assertion.-Therefore, I say first
the relation of a creature to himsel£ Also, Nifo, in Metaphysics, Book 5, Dis-
that in non-mutual relatives /p. 849/ the character that is in one extreme in
putation 14, follows this opinion. 12 And we will afterwards confirm it with
order to terminate the relation of the other [extreme] is not some relation
regard to non-mutual relatives, but with regard to mutual ones it has the same
that is opposite to the relation of the other, but it is the very entity or some
basis as the preceding opinion has. And there is usually added an argument
property of the terminus in question. This is proven by ~n argumen~ mad~ in
taken from the divine relations, which are mutual, and still are terminated
the second opinion, whiCh seems to me to be most efficac10us. For this relation
one in another.
has a terminus that is real and really existing. But in that terminus there does
5. The third opinion teaches that universally all relations, both mutual and not exist any real corresponding relation that is opposite to the other relation.
non-mutual, are formally terminated in an absolute. Scotus holds this, in [his
Therefore, that terminus is not rendered apt for terminating by a relation but by
Sentences co mmentary], Book l, Distinction 30, Question 1,13 i11 which place
some absolute thing. The consequence is evident from a sufficient enumeration
Lychetus and other Scocists think the same. 14 And Capreolus, [in his Defen-
of the parts; while the major and minor [premisses] have been proven above.
sionesJ Question 1, Article 2, in answer to Objection 3, 15 clearly follows it,
7. Cajetan's Evasion.-It Is Disproven.-ln order to escape the force of this
whom Soncinas, in Metaphysics, Book 5, Question 30, in reply to Objection
reasoning, Cajetan thought up an opinion that we have refuted above, 17 namely,
2, 16 imitates. For they say that d1e character of terminating (rationem termi- that even non-mutual relatives are really related to one another, although the
lOC£ Ferrara, Commentaria in Contra Gentiles, II, cc. 13-14, n. 4, in S. Thomae relation is not in both. And in this way he tries to defend [the view that] even
Aquinatis, Opera, tomus XIII, p. 294ab. an extreme in which there is no relation does not terminate the relation of an-
11 C£ this Section, n. 3. other [extreme], except insofar as it is in turn related to that. But this opinion is
12 Cf Dilucidm·ium Metaphysicarum disputation um, in Libros Metaphysicorum, L. V, both false, as we have shown, and it can contribute nothing toward explaining
disp. 14 (Venetiis, 1559) pp. 152-4. Note rhat Nifo holds the general position of the present matter. For even if we grant that the knowable is really related to
an absolute terminus but says nothing about the particular refinement of Hispalen- knowledge by a relation that exists in the knowledge itself, nevertheless, what
sis. Aristotle says is true, namely, that one of these extremes is not related to the
13C£ Ordinatiol, d. 30, q.1-2., in Operaomnia, tomusvi (ed. Vat., 1963), pp. 182-85, other except inasmuch as the other is related to it. 18 Therefore, according to
nn. 31-38; idem, Q;taestiones in fib. I Sententiarum, d. 30, q. 1 (ed. 1639), tomus reason it is first necessary to understand that the relation of knowledge is ter-
v, pars secunda, pp. 1193-4.
minated at the knowable rather than, conversely, that the knowable is related to
14Cf: Lychcws, Commenl'llritts in]. Duns Scoti, In lib. l Sententiarum, d. 30, q. 1
knowledge, since that former is as it were the cause and the foundation of this
(Lugduni, 1639), tomus v, pars secunda, p. 1195-96. Up to now, I have not found
other Scotists commencing directly in this vein.
15For this, c£ Defensiones, In I Sent., d. 30, q. l, a. 1, ed. Paban-Pegues, tom. II, p.
315a.
17Cf. Section 15, nn. 10-12.
16Cf. Quaestiones metaphysicales ... , V, q. 30, ad 2, p. 93b. 18C£ Metaphysics 5.15.1021a30.
 224 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 16 225
latter. Therefore, the character of terminating (ratio terminandt) from the side
a relation, nevertheless, the relation of a creature will be truly terminated at
of the knowable cannot be a relation by which it is related to knowledge.
God.
Moreover, although to actually terminate is, as we have said above, 19 an ex-
You will say: it is impossible that that relation not be objectively in some
trinsic denomination, the aptitude, nevertheless, for terminating a categorical
intellect, at least in a divine [intellect], whether that [divine intellect] itself
relation cannot be an extrinsic denomination from the opposite relative, because
immediately effects it or knows it as able to be produced in its own way by
the character of terminating is presupposed in a thing before every extrinsic
a human intellect. In answer: whatever of these things is true, it is irrelevant
denomination from another. For an actual termination is included in the ex-
to the matter that we are treating. For, even though that may be necessary
trinsic denomination itself Therefore, the aptitude for such a denomination
because of the infinite knowledge of God, nevertheless, essentially (per se) and
is presupposed, especially when the terminus must be a thing that is real and
formally, the relation of a creature does not demand that. For it does ~ot rel.ate
really existing. Therefore, it can in no way be understood that one extreme
to God as looking at (so to speak) a relation of reason, but as pounng bemg
is rendered proximately apt for terminating the relation of the other through
into it. 21 Hence, if it has this, it is enough that such a relation be terminated
that real relation itself that is in that other extreme, since every categorical
in him. However, a relation of reason, as it is known by the divine intellect,
relation arises, presupposing /col. bl a foundation and a terminus, not indeed
is irrelevant. And the same is true about sensation and the sensible, as well as
actually terminating but rather as apt to terminate. For as actually terminating
knowledge and the knowable. For if, by some impossibility, no intellect would
it is not presupposed but rather is constituted from the relation (habitudine)
be concerned with them, the relation of sensation would be terminated at the
of the other to it itself
sensible and that of knowledge at the knowable. Ip. 850/
8. An Opinion ofOthers Is Disproven.-Others usually answer that although
1O. But some reply that this argument proceeds correctly regarding a relation
in the knowable, for example, or in the creator there corresponds only a relation
of reason as actually existing in its own way, but nevertheless, that relation
of reason, nevertheless, the relation of knowledge or of a creature is formally
of reason, insofar as it is in proximate potency to a certain terminus is the
terminated only at its correlative as such, and, consequently, a relation of reason
character of terminating a real relation of the other extreme. But this also is
is a real character of terminating.
of no importance; for I ask: what do they understand by a relation of reason
But this answer is easily refuted from what was said above20 about the termi-
in proximate potency?
nus of a real categorical relation. For we have shown that it must be a true and
For either they understand that real foundation itself, which gives an occa-
really existing thing. This certainly is true for equal or greater reason about that
sion to the intellect that it conceive in the way of a relative that which is not
form that is the reason of terminating and about the quasi material subject of
so much a true foundation for a relation as it is the proximate cause or the
the denomination in question. For if the terminus must be real, therefore it
occasion inducing the human intellect to such a way of conceiving, a~d in ~his
must be in reality apt for terminating in the same way; otherwise, it will not
sense a relation of reason in proximate potency is only an absolute thmg exist-
be a terminus, either actually or in aptitude. Therefore, this aptitude must
ing in such a terminus, as, for example, in God there is a potency by whic~ He
belong to it through some real character existing in it.
actually exerts influence on creatures, and so it is with regard to. other thmgs.
9. This is confirmed, because a real relation exists only when the founda-
Therefore, that the relation of a creature is terminated at a relation of reason,
tion and the terminus exist. But the relation of a creature exists, and indeed
as it is only in a proximate foundation from the side of God, is indeed to be
it is terminated in God, without any relation of reason existing in God, not
terminated in something absolute that is in God.
only because a relation of reason never truly exists, but also because, in the
Or by a relation of reason in potency there is understood a relation of reason
way in which it can be, namely, objectively in an intellect, it is not necessary
itself according to its own being of essence (esse essentiae), such as it can be or,
that it actually be, that is, that it be considered as the relation of a creature is
better, be imagined in that [relation of reason]. And in this sense, that answer
terminated at the creator. For even if no intellect fashions or considers such
seems improbable to me, because that relation can only be, and there can be
imagined some being of essence (esse essentiae) in that in which the human
intellect, for example, can conceive an absolute thing in the manner of some-
19 Cf. this Section, n. 2.
20Cf. Section 8, n. 4, above.
21 That is, in a quasi-practical rather than theoretical way.
' 1

226 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 16 227

thing relative. But this is irrelevant and extrinsic to the nature and the essence creature exists. For, as the same author well argues such a relation belongs to
of the real relation of creature and also as that is terminated at its terminus. God contingently and from the outside, even after the making of the creature.
Therefore, it cannot be the character of terminating. And this is confirmed Contingent predicates, however, belong in act only when they exist, but that
and explained, because God as creator cannot terminate the real relation of [belonging in act] is proper to predicates that necessarily belong to subjects.
a creature in this way because he can be conceived by us in the manner of a Yet the answer that he employs, by limiting the subsumed proposition and by
correlative, but because truly and really he pours being into the creature by excepting these relations of reason, first seems arbitrary and then against reason.
his omnipotence. For setting aside the actual existence that is proportionate to each predicate,
Finally, in ocher cases of real termini, a bein g of essence in the ·terminus itself the predicate cannot be said to actually belong to the subject, unless either
is not enough for the relation ro arise, unless it is reduced ro existence, because because it is of its essence or, indeed, because it flows from that [essence], so
otherwise it is something potential, and simply nothing. 22 T herefore, much that it has a necessary and essential (per se) connection with that. Therefore,
less could the bei ng of essence or the potential being of a relation of reason be as often as a predicate is not of this kind, but merely contingent and resulting
enough to be the character of termina ting a real relation. from an extrinsic cause, whether it is a real predicate or one of reason, it can
11. How Fonseca Answers the Argument.- Finally, Fonseca, [in commenting in no true sense be said to actually belong when it does not exist.
on lvfetaphysics], 'Book 5, C hapter 15, Question 5 [sic], Section 4, has found And this is confirmed, for this very thing, namely, actually to belong, requires
another argumenc, in which he says that a relation of reason, even ifit does not at least the truth of a proposition. But these propositions are false: God has
actually exist, can actually belong to, for example, the creator, that is, [belong) a relation, or, He is actually related to a creature, as long as that relation in no
in irs own way, objectively in the intelle t, and /col. b/ that this is enough in way actually exists. Indeed, according to the principles of /p. 851/ Dialectic,
order chat a real relation b terminated ar it. For by the very face rhat there is such propositions cannot be truly abstracted from time, since they are simply
a real relation in a creature, a relation of reason belongs to God, even if it does contingent.
no t actually exist. But he proves that thes cwo things are separable because co 12. I add, finally, even if we grant all that is assumed in that answer, it is
be an animal accual ly belongs to a man even if he does not exisc. 23 not satisfactory, because that mode of actually belonging is not enough for the
But this answer is not any more probabl than the rest. For, first of all, what terminus of a real relation. Otherwise, an actually existing Peter could have a
it assumes, namely, that a form can actually belong even when it does not actu- real relation of specific identity with an only potentially existing Paul. For it
ally exist, eiche!' contains a great equivocation, or it is plainly false. Por, actually actually belongs to Paul that he be a man, even ifhe does not exist, because he
to belong, if it is taken properly and really, is to acrually be in [someth ing] in is intrinsically a man. Therefore, a relation of real specific identity with Peter
that way in which a form can be in [something) , namely, either by inhering, actually belongs to him, even if that relation does not actually exist. Therefore,
or by denominating, or by relating (referendo) , or in another similar respect. conversely, in order that a real relation exist in Peter, it will be enough that
However, in order that it belong actually in this way, it is necessary that it another similar one and its foundation actually belong to Paul, even though
actually exist in the way in which it can exist. But if actually to belong only he does not exist.
means the truth of a p roposition through the connection of its extremes, ab- 13. Therefore, there is no room for a subterfuge, but admitting the common
stracting from their existence, that indeed is not actually to belong, bu t rather doctrine about non-mutual relatives, it evidently follows that the terminus
[to belong] in potency, and in thatway in which in those propositions an actual of that relation is something absolute, speaking formally and essentially (per
truth can be u11demood, rhey do not h ave that [truth] except u1sofac as they se).
are actually in some intellect, as was mentioned above.24 However, I am adding these last words, because sometimes it can happen that
Moreover, when actually to belong has been taken in this sense, a relation of the terminus of some non-mutual relation is some real relation, but not one
reason cannot truly be said to actually belong to God by the very fact that a opposite to the other relation or reciprocal with it. So, for example, knowledge
of some relation, or a love that directly, essentially, and immediately, tends to
22 That is, nothing actual. some relation, is really related to that relation as to an object or a measure.
23Cf. Fonseca, Commentaria in Metaph., V, c. 15, q. 4, s. 4, vol. 2, cols. 832-3.
24 On this being of truth in propositions, cf. DM 31, 1, n. 2, vol. 26, p. 225; ibid.,
12, nn. 45-47, vol. 26, pp. 297-8.
228 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 16 229
Hence, it is dear that, just as the object of such a knowledge is a relation, so with another [father] will be in that [first father] the reason for terminating the
also the terminus of the relation of such knowledge will be a relation, but relation of the other [father] to him. In that, however, it does not behave for-
not formally as a relation that is opposite to the relation of that knowledge, mally as a relation, nor is it relatively opposed to that relation that it terminates
but rather as the [subject] matter about which the knowledge in question is through itself, but it is opposed through another relation, which it founds in
employed, and which is presupposed for its relation, and therefore, it is, as itsel£ And therefore it then behave just as if it were an absolute form, and in
it were, something material that the thing known is a relation. And in this this sense we say that the formal terminus is, essentially speaking, something
way we say that an absolute thing, or what appears to be 25 an absolute thing, absolute.
terminates a relation of this kind. [This is] finally the known or loved thing 15. This assertion is usually proven from the fact that when relation is de-
itself, of whatever sort that is. fined as an accident whose whole being is toward another, by that "other" there
You will say: what if the object known is some relation of reason? The answer cannot be understood another relation, since otherwise either there would not
is: the transcendental relation of that knowledge will also be terminated at be one supreme genus of relation, but rather two, or the same thing would be
that [relation of reason], but that knowledge will be incapable of a categorical put in its own definition.
relation to its own object, because of the lack of a real terminus. And a similar argument is that similarity in general cannot be related to some
relation, because otherwise it would be related to another similarity, since it
A Second Assertion. is a relation of equiparence. But besides similarity in general there cannot be
14. Mutual Relations Are Terminated at an Absolute.-! say, secondly, even in another similarity.
mutual relations the formal character of terminating is not an opposite relation, However, I am putting these arguments aside, both because they are derived
but rather some absolute /col. bl character, which is the formal foundation of through extrinsic means and do not explain the matter and also because they
the opposire relation. I understand this assertion essentially and formally, just touch on a difficulty that is to be treated in the following Section. Indeed, these
as I have explained the preceding one. For che general ruJe is char chat thing /p. 852/ [arguments] are more easily and fittingly explained according to our
or formal character that is in one relative the proximare reason for founding present opinion, although perhaps for that reason alone it26 is not absolutely
a relation to the other [relative], is also the proximate and formal reason for necessary.
terminating the relation of the other to it itself. 16. The First Reason for the Conclusion.-Therefore, this conclusion is proven
So, for example, if i.n Peter the proximate foundation for having iD himself first from the preceding one. For from the fact that in non-mutual relatives we
the relation ofsonship is bis who le substance insofar as it was produced through see that the relation of one extreme is not formally terminated in the relation of
a cercain generation by Paul, this same is the reason why Peter can terminate the other, we can infer that, although in mutual relatives there is a real relation
the relation of Paul's paternity co him. And, conversely, because the potency of in both extremes, one does not formally tend to the other, but simultaneously
generating in Paul, on the presupposition of such a generation as a necessary and concomitantly one tends toward the subject or the foundation of the other,
condition, is the proximate foundation of the relation of paternity, ic js also and vice versa.
therefore the proximate reason why Paul can cerminate the sonship of Peter This inference is proven: for if by some impossibility in one extreme the
toward him. relation were to be impeded, but with its whole foundation preserved, nev-
It is the same in relations of the first class. For the whiteness, which in this ertheless, the relation of the other extreme could be terminated at that [first
white thing is the foundation of its similarity with another, on account of a extreme]. Therefore, this is a sign that those two relations are simultaneous
formal unity with itself, is also the proximate reason for terminating the rela- by concomitance and not by a formal termination of one at the other. The
tion of similarity of the other to it itself. consequence is evident and the antecedent is dear. For, as was seen above, not
Therefore, if this is true, sometimes one relation can be the proximate reason only in relations of the third class, but also [in those] of the first and second
for founding another relation, as, for example, paternity [can be the reason for [classes], when one extreme is such that it cannot found a relation, it is, nev-
founding] similarity, then that paternity that in one father founds a similarity

25 Literally, "what carries itself in the manner of." 26The antecedent here seems to be "opinion."
230 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 16 231

ertheless, apt for terminating the relation of the other, as is clear in the case of be shown by examples. Therefore, that axiom (principium) must be understood
God as terminating the relation of a creature as such. about a terminus that is formal and as if in proximate first act.
Accordingly, for whatever reason it would happen that one extreme should And from this the first consequence is easily proven. For one relation does
remain with a foundation and without a relation, it will, nevertheless, still be not arise from the positing of another. For that word, "from" (ex), expresses
sufficient for terminating the relation of the other extreme. For the argument some antecedence of nature or origin. However, one categorical relation is not
is the same, because the fact that one foundation or extreme is apt, or not apt, antecedent to another relation that corresponds to it, nor does one express an
for founding its own relation is accidental with respect to the termination of origin from the other, as is self-evident in all created [relations], about which
the other [relation]. Hence, if through a precision of the intellect a relation is we are now speaking. Otherwise, they would not be simultaneous. But when
separated from such an extreme, it is understood to remain equally sufficient a relation is said to result once a foundation and a terminus are posited, the
for terminating another relation as that extreme that is not capable ofa relation. undoubted sense is that the positing of the foundation and the terminus are
Therefore, this is a sign that mutual relations are simultaneous on account of antecedent or are presupposed by an order of nature, and immediately the
concomitance and on account of the condition of the extremes, which are apt relation results from this. This is obvious from the proper character of this
for founding a relation, not on account of a formal termination of one in the utterance itself, since in the case of mutual relatives both relations result when
other which corresponds to it. the foundations and termini are posited.
17. The Second Reason for the Conclusion.-Secondly, I argue that the com- 18. A Third Reason for the Assertion.-Thirdly, I argue by confirming and
mon axiom is that, when a foundation and a terminus are posited, a categorical explaining that principle, namely, "That which in one extreme is the reason of
relation results, and not otherwise. Therefore, the terminus of one relation founding a proper relation is the reason for terminating another correlation. "For,
cannot be an opposite relation. just as the reason for founding is that through which there is given a proxi-
The antecedent is certain with the agreement of all, and it is clear from what mate cause on account of which such a thing has a relation to another, so the
was said above27 about the nature of this relation. Hence,, I col. bl although reason for terminating is that through which there is given a proximate cause
he excepts the relations that he terms "extrinsically advenient" (extrinsecus on account of which the thing is such that another can be related to it. But in
advenientes), Scotus, nonetheless, also logically denies that they belong to this cases of mutual relatives this cause is taken from the same form or character;
category. And we will show below, in the following Disputation, that those therefore.
[extrinsically advenient relations] are either non-existent or are merely other The major [premiss] seems self- Ip. 8531 evident from its terms. The minor
than transcendental ones. 28 is made clear by induction. For, just as a white thing is apt for founding a
However, it is necessary that that axiom be understood about a formal and relation of similarity, because it has whiteness, and that whiteness itself is an
proximate terminus, and one that is (so to speak) as if in first act, about which apt foundation, because it has a certain formal unity, so also the same white
we also are debating in the present question, as we have said. For it cannot thing is apt for terminating the relation of another, because it has a whiteness
be understood about a terminus that is terminating as if in second act (so to of the same character or unity with the whiteness of the other. For another
speak). For about that terminus as such, it is not true that, when it is posited white thing is not related to this one because there is a relation of similarity in
together with a foundation, a relation follows. For it itself is rather constituted this one, but because there is whiteness in this one, just as there is in the other.
in the character of a terminus actually terminating through the relation that Were it otherwise, there would not be a similarity in whiteness, but rather there
actually tends toward it and extrinsically denominates it with a terminative would be a similarity in similarity. And from this an a priori argument can
denomination. be perceived; for the similarity as such is in the whiteness, for example, and
Again, neither can it be understood about a material and remote terminus, therefore, it has place between the white things as such, and it relates them as
since when that alone is posited together with the foundation of another ex- similar. Therefore, just as from the side of one it is founded in whiteness, so
treme, it is not necessary that a relation result, as is self-evident and can easily from the side of the other it is terminated in whiteness.
19. The same is easily evident in relations of non-equiparence. For, distin-
27 Cf. Section 4, n. 2.
guishing relation formally from generation, Peter, for instance, is related to
28Cf. DM 48, 1, nn. 5-8, vol. 26, pp. 869-70. Paul as to a father, precisely because he has generated him, and not because
232 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real RelAtion Section 16 233
Paul is related to him. For staying precisely with that reason, we understand the side of the terminus of the relation of the creature, it is no other than that
that there is sufficient cause from the side of the one generating that the son God through his omnipotence has created that [creature]. And the same is
be related to him. Moreover, the cause is the same on his part why there results easily understood in mutual relations that can be in the first class, as is the
a relation of paternity in him. And the same is true about paternity itself, if relation of similarity or of distinction between a creature and God.
we assign its character from the side of its terminus. For thus the relation of However, in the third class, the reason of terminating from the side, for ex-
paternity that is in Paul is terminated at Peter, because he has been generated ample, of the knowable and of similar objects, is the entity of each one insofar
by him [i.e. Paul], and in this we precisely conceive a sufficient cause from the as in that [entity] there is a certain objective aptitude, inasmuch as a certain
side of the terminus. And thus, universally, since a relation essentially requires act, habit, or potency, can be employed in its regard, which [objective aptitude]
two things, namely, a foundation and a terminus, a reason for any relation can be named truth, or goodness, or something similar. For that aptitude is the
can be given from the side of each. And that which truly and proximately is reason that can be given from the side of the object or the terminus of such a
given from the side of the terminus is the reason for terminating, just as that relation. For knowledge therefore is employed with regard to such an object
which is given from the side of the subject is the foundation or the reason for because it has such truth or intelligibility, and the same is so with regard to
founding. other things.
20. However, the reason that can be given from the side of the terminus is 22. Why a CharacterThatCannotFoundaRelation Can Terminate [One}.-But
never another relation, if we are speaking formally and not just concomitantly if you ask why an aptitude or a character of this kind, which is not a sufficient
or identically. For although a father is related to a son only when the son is reason in itself for founding a proper relation, is a sufficient reason for termi-
related to him, this is still not the reason that can be given from the side of nating the relation of another, the answer is that this is because, for the task of
the terminus for why the father is related to the son, namely, because the son founding a relation, there is necessary an ordinability to another (so to speak)
is related to him, but rather it is precisely because [the son] was generated by from the side of the foundation itself, and thus it is necessary that they be of
him. For one relation is in no way the reason of another, neither from the side the same order. However, for terminating a relation, it is not necessary that a
of the terminus, nor from the side of the foundation; otherwise, they would terminus be ordinable to another, but that the other be /p. 854/ ordinable to
not be simultaneous in nature. For that which would be the reason of another it. And therefore a terminus can have a real aptitude for terminating even if it
as such would be /col. bl in some way first, especially since we are talking is not of the same order with the other extreme that is ordered to it.
about a real and, in its way, formal character from the side of the terminus.
This character, then, is always something else, distinct from the relation, and The Bases ofthe Other Opinions Are Met.
consequently something absolute, which in mutual relatives is not anything 23. It remains to answer the bases of the other opinions. And, first of all, it
else but that very thing that in each founds its relation; for that is the reason is denied that a relative is formally terminated at a correlative as such, which is
of terminating the relation of the other. For, when the relation is removed, no clearly evident in the case of non-mutual relatives. For where there is no cor-
other character is nearer or more necessary, as was clear enough in the induc- relative, another relative cannot be terminated at a correlative. But from this
tion that was made. we understand that even in the case of mutual [relatives], although a relative
21. An Objection Is Met.-You will say: in non mutual relatives this rule is terminated at a correlative, it is still not formally such in a way that those
cannot be observed. For in the terminus of one relative there is no real founda- relations tend between themselves and to themselves, but one tends to the
tion of any relation. The answer is that there is always understood something foundation of the other, and vice versa, as has been stated.
proportionable.
24. How Relatives Are Simultaneous in Nature.-But to the first objection,
So, for example, if the non-mutual relatives belong to the second class, as is about a simultaneity of nature, the answer is that the opposite is rather inferred
the case between the creator and the creature, the reason of terminating the from this. For a relation is posterior in nature to its terminus, as that [termi-
relation of the creature from the side of God is the very power of creating as it nus] in its first or formal act has been sufficiently constituted for terminating,
is actually influencing [the creature]. For if God were otherwise not incapable because, as we have said, a relation arises from a foundation and a terminus.
of a relation, that would have to be the foundation of a relation of the creator Indeed, some authors, who think that a relation is something distinct, think
to the creature. [This is so] further because if we want to give a reason from that it is effectively produced by a terminus. If, therefore, one relation were the
234 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 16 235
terminus of another, from the positing of the one the other would result, and
causality, but from the fact only that it exists with such an intrinsic disposition
thus they could not be simultaneous in nature. Therefore, they are said to be
(habitudo); hence, just as it is not prior in nature to having this disposition, so
simultaneous in nature when they are mutual, because when one results from
it is not prior in nature to denominating the object as seen.
a foundation and a terminus, the other results in an altogether concomitant
26. This is most ofall true when we are speaking ofthese forms in the concrete,
way, without any order of prior and posterior between them, and this is to be
that is, about [something] relative, or [someone] seeing. For, speaking about
simultaneous in nature.
abstract things, a relation can in some way be conceived as prior in nature to
But this simultaneity is founded not in their formal relation (habitudo) among
a relative-in that way in which between a form, especially one that is inher-
themselves, but in a necessary connection that they have in a foundation and a
ing, and its formal effect there can be a priority of nature. For a relation is the
terminus, inasmuch as neither can arise unless its foundation and terminus is
form of a relative. For a relation, as abstractly conceived, is properly not itself
al~eady posite~, and when these are posited, both necessarily and immediately
related to a terminus, but it is that by which a subject is related, and therefore
anse. Otherwise, the formal foundation of one is the formal terminus of the
as long as it itself is conceived as prior to actually affecting the subject, it is
other, and vice versa. From this it comes about that the foundation and the
not yet conceived as relating to a terminus. Therefore, it is not strange that as
terminus ofboth are necessarily posited in reality (in re), for, as I have explained,
such that relation itself is also prior to the denomination of the terminus as
they are the same, with the proportion changed.
terminating.
And finally, in this way, it is brought about that those relations themselves
And perhaps here can be applied the distinction that Cajetan uses elsewhere,
necessarily arise with simultaneity in duration, for, with equal necessity, both
about relation as designated (signata) or exercised (exercita). 30 For in this case
result from the terminus and the foundation as soon as these are posited, and
a relation is conceived as not yet exercising the act of relating, but according
also by nature, because they have no order between themselves. Therefore, in
to its own abstract nature. Yet, as so conceived, it is, in the case of mutual
this way, those correlatives, formally taken as they are correlatives, if they are
relations, simultaneous in nature with another opposite relation. For even
mutual, are simultaneous in nature. But if they are non-mutual /col. bl since
relations taken in the abstract arise in a completely simultaneous way when
they are not simultaneous in duration, neither can they be so in nature.
both foundations are posited.
25. Reply Is Made to an Objection.-But if indeed this comparison is made
/p. 855/
between one relative and its terminus in second act, or as it is actually termi-
27. Finally, in order to omit nothing, it could be added that even a relation
nating, they can in this way be called in a formal sense simultaneous in nature.
that is abstractly conceived tends to a terminus, although not as a "which"
For, as was said above, 29 a terminus as so terminating is formally constituted
(quod) but only as a "by which" (quo). For it is a form by which a relative
by an extrinsic denomination from the relation that tends toward it. Hence,
thing respects a terminus and as much as you may want that it be conceived
when that [relation] is posited [the terminus] is so denominated, and when
in the abstract, its essence always consists in a formal disposition toward a
~hat. is ~aken. away th~ terminus in that way ceases to be, while losing nothing
terminus. And under this consideration, although it is understood in some
mtn~s1c, as 1s self-evident. However, a relation is not prior in nature to being
way prior to [something] relative, even under that aspect it tends in its own
termmated at another; therefore, it is simultaneous in nature with the terminus
way to a terminus, and consequently denominates that [terminus] as actually
as it is terminating.
terminating not the whole relative thing but the relation itself
You will say: the relation itself is a kind of formal cause of that denomination
From these [remarks], therefore, it is evident enough how opposite relations
of an actual terminus; therefore, it is prior in nature. I answer: it is not properly
are simultaneous in nature, and also a relation and a terminus as actually ter-
a formal cause, even though on account of the denomination it is conceived
minating, but not a relation and a terminus in first act or with respect to the
b~ u~ in that way. And ~herefore, a true priority of nature is not present in
character of terminating. For in that way it can also precede in time, when
~h1s.m~tance, because, without any other causality and only because from its
the foundation in the other extreme has not been posited, and even when the
mtrms1c essence the relation respects a terminus it denominates that [terminus]
as terminating. This is just as vision denominates a thing as seen without a true
30Cf. Thomas de Vio Cardinalis Caietanus (1469-1534), Scripta philosophica, Com-
mentaria in PraedicamentaAristotelis, ed. M .-H. Laurent (Romae: Apud lnstitutum
29Cf. this Section, n. 2, above.
''.Angelicum," 1939), p. 111.
236 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 16 237
31
other extreme has been posited, it always precedes by an order of nature,
order that we may abstract from the opinions about the relation of sonship
since from that foundation the relation results, as was stated.
in Christ.
28. Therefore, to the argument of the first opinion32 the reply in form is to
And from this the other part is easily made clear, namely, from the aforesaid
deny the sequence, that is, the father as father is not sim~ltaneou~ with the
mode of independence it does not follow that relations are not simultaneous
son as he is a son, but as he is this begotten man. Indeed, JUSt as this man, as
in nature. For, if one were to properly and formally depend upon the other,
begotten, is prior in nature than he is as son, so also he is prio~ to the father as
the one would rather have to be prior in nature to the other, since that depen-
father, although he is posterior in nature to this man as begetting. And, there-
dence itself is a certain posteriority of nature. But since they have a necessary
fore, although the father as such is terminated at this. man as he is be~otten ~y
concomitance, by which one cannot be without the other, apart from any order
him, he is, nevertheless, not in nature terminated at him before there ts sonshtp
between themselves, they are, therefore, simultaneous in nature.
(filiatio) in him, not on account of a formal termination at that sonship itself,
30. How Relatives Are Simultaneous in Knowledge.-Moreover, from what has
but on account of an altogether necessary simultaneous concomitance, as was
been said, it is clear what must be said about the simultaneity of knowledge,
stated. Therefore, even though this man, as begotten, is prior in nature than he
which was demanded in the second argument of the confirmation of the op-
is as son, nevertheless, in that priority as such, paternity is not yet understood
posite position (contrarii fundamentt}. 34 For by the same proportion it must be
to be in the father. Indeed, it is also most truly said that this man, as begotten,
said that formally and immediately a relation does not depend on knowledge,
is prior in nature to a paternity being in the father; for from the positing of this
except from its terminus according to its proper character of terminating, and
terminus, with a foundation that is in the begetter, the paternity results.
not according to an opposite relation, which the argument correctly proves.
29. In answer to the confirmation, 33 I concede that formally speaking one
And this is obvious in non-mutual relatives. For in order that I know the rela-
relation does not depend upon another. However, I deny that from this it fol-
tion of servitude of a creature in regard to God, it is not necessary to know a
lows that they are not simultaneous in nature, naturally speaking.
real relation of Lord in God, since there is none. And it is also not necessary to
And the first of these, in addition to all that has been said, I confirm with a
fashion a relation of reason in God; for this does not essentially (per se) pertain
theological example, according to one opinion of St. Thoma~. ~or in ~hrist,
to the knowledge of another relation, but if it comes to be in us, it results
the Lord, according to St. Thomas, there is not a real sonshtp m relation to
from our imperfect way of knowing. For an angel, as well as God Himself,
his mother, but in the Virgin there is a real relation of /col. bl maternity to
comprehends the relation of servitude in a creature, without imagining any
Christ. This is a sign, therefore, that one of these relations does not depend
relation of reason in God.
essentially and formally on the other. Otherwise, one could not remain with-
You will say: is it not necessary to know God as Lord in order to know a
out the other, even by the absolute power [of God]. And, likewise, it is a sign
creature as servant? The answer is that it is necessary to know God as being
that one is not the formal terminus of the other, since a relation also cannot
really Lord, not relatively according to reason. But God is really /p. 856/ the
be conserved without its own terminus. All these principles are certain in the
Lord, without qualification, as St. Thomas has noted in De Potentia, Question
doctrine of St. Thomas, and therefore I think that this is a very effective ad
7, Article 10, In reply to the Fourth Objection, 35 and often in other places.
hominem argument against Cajetan and the Thomists who follow him.
This is first through his real power to coerce subjects; second, because the real
However, I say that one relation does not depend on the other "formally."
relation of servitude that is in a creature is terminated at him; and in both ways
For they can be said in some way to depend on one another "concomitantly."
it is necessary to know God as a Lord in order to know the creature's relation
For one cannot be without the other from the nature of the thing (ex natura
of servitude.
rez}, not even by the absolute power, at least unless the foundation of the other
For the first, that is, the power to coerce subjects, is from the side of God the
extreme is changed in some way and it becomes incapable of the relation, in
reason of terminating the relation of servitude, and, therefore, knowledge of
it is as it were antecedently and causally the reason of knowing the relation of
31 On priority of nature as opposed to priority of time, cf. DM 14, 3, n. 42, vol. 25, servitude. For, just as that relation arises by virtue of that terminus and foun-
p. 486.
32C£ n. 3, this Section.
34Cf n. 3, this Section.
33Ibid.
35 Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 10, ad 4, ed. Bazzi, p. 21 la.
238 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real RelAtion Section 16 239
dation, so it cannot be known, except when such a terminus and foundation relation of father, it is enough that I know that there is in the world another
are known. man who has been begotten by him, even ifl stop there and do not know the
But the second belongs to God, only by extrinsic denomination, through relation of sonship in the other extreme.
an actual respective tendency of a creature toward him. And because a rela- And according to the opinion of St. Thomas, an angel, even a bad one,
tive as such can be known only as terminated at its terminus, therefore under through its natural power saw (if it was not impeded) in the Blessed Virgin
that aspect God is known as Lord not antecedently but concomitantly. And the relation of maternity to this man, Christ, and still did not see in Christ
what has been explained in the present example has a place in the relation of the relation of sonship. Therefore, [the angel] had knowledge of one relative
a creature and in all non-mutual relations. with an intrinsic dependence on its terminus without knowledge of the cor-
31. Neither is the argument made [just] above 36 against this ofany importance. relative as such. For neither is it probable that it was necessary for the angel to
For we concede that the relation of servitude cannot be known without know- imagine another relation of reason in one extreme in order that he might be
ing some absolute character in its terminus, not only as entirely simultaneous able to know the other [relation]. Therefore, the same is true in every other
but also antecedently or causally, as I have said. 37 However, it is not necessary mutual relation, for in this regard the argument is the same for all.
that that absolute character be known exactly or insofar as it is in itself For it 33. But as regards concomitance there is some diversity. For from the nature
is enough that it be apprehended abstractly or under some confused concept, of the thing, when one mutual relation is known, the other is necessarily known
although the more perfectly it will have been known, so much the more perfect simultaneously, at least concomitantly. For just as a relation exists through a
will be the knowledge of the relation. certain resultance when the foundation and the terminus are posited, so it
All these things are easily explained in the mentioned example. For in order is known when these are known with their comparison between themselves.
to know the relation of servitude that a creature has toward God, it is neces- Because, therefore, these mutual relations simultaneously result at least through
sary to know at least in a common way that God has a certain superior power concomitance when a foundation and a terminus are posited, then for a similar
over a creature, by reason of which he can either command that [creature] or reason they are simultaneously known when the foundation and the terminus
dispose of it by his choice. And the more the extent of this power will have are known and compared between themselves. And because this is necessary
been known, the more perfectly will it be known of what kind that servitude for the knowledge of individual relations, therefore, consequently it happens
is. Neither can it happen that an angel or God himself know this servitude, that when one is known the other is concomitantly known simultaneously.
without knowing such power in himself However, it is not necessary that an In us this is necessary for a special reason, because we do not know these
angel, for example, who naturally intuits the relation of servitude in a creature, relations insofar as they are in themselves, but only by knowing and comparing
also naturally intuit the power of God in himself But it is enough that he between themselves foundations and termini. From this, moreover, it happens
know such power of God abstractly and from its effects. And much less is it that we know even those extremes that do not have a mutual relation in the
necessary to /col. bl know the whole nature of God, or his other attributes, way of mutual correlatives. And from this also it happens that where to one
formally and essentially (per se) speaking, because those [attributes] as such relation there does not correspond another real relation, we conceive a /p. 857 I
are not the reason of terminating such a relation. And in this way it is easy relation of reason, so that in this way we know concomitantly both extremes
to understand the same thing in the relation of a creature as it is an effect of in the mode of correlatives. 38
God, or [in relations] of knowledge, or sensation, and in other non-mutual But in a perfect knowledge of things as they are in themselves, that is not
[relations]. necessary as regards non-mutual relatives, as was said. But as regards mutual
32. However in mutual relatives, the argument is partly the same and partly relatives, there is the same or greater necessity, either because the relations are
diverse. For the argument is the same with regard to the formal dependence not actually distinguished in reality (a parte ret) from their own foundations, or
of knowledge on a terminus as such, and not on a correlative as such; for this if perhaps they are in reality (ex natura ret) distinguished, they are so conjoined
also is true in mutual relatives. For in order that I may know in some man the and connected with foundations simultaneously existing and compared between
themselves that the relation (respectus) of one to the other cannot be known
36Cf. n. 30, immediately preceding.
37Ibid. 38 Literally: "by way of a correlative."
240 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 16 241

without there also being known in turn the relation of the other to the one. In About the Termini of Divine Relations.
these ways, therefore, we must understand that a correlative is simultaneous 35. In reply to the ultimate argument, which was added in the second opin-
in knowledge with its terminus, or with its correlative. ion, 44 and was taken from divine relations, which are terminated at one another,
34. How Relatives Are Simultaneous in Definition.-But to the third part of the answer is first of all that the argument is not parallel. For those relations
that basis, 39 that concerned simultaneity of definition, we must respond in do not have a foundation besides themselves, because they are substantial and
entirely the same manner. For a definition is only some knowledge, if it is in subsisting from their own proper characters. And therefore it is not strange
the mind, or a sign of knowledge, and consequently of a thing known, ifit is in that just as they are founded in themselves (so to speak), and in this way each
the [spoken] word. And, therefore, relatives can be simultaneous in definition one terminates its own correlative by itself. For in this there is rather observed
only insofar as they are simultaneous in knowledge. It therefore must be said a proportional argument. For we have said that the foundation of one re~ation
in a proportional way that one relative is not defined by another correlative is the reason of termination of its correlation. So, therefore, the foundation of
but by its own terminus, that it essentially respects. divine paternity is the reason of terminating divine filiation. However, just as
Indeed, Scotus [as cited] above, thinks that this is necessary lest a circle or a the foundation of that paternity is nothing else than that paternity itself, so the
nonsense utterance (nugatio) be fallen into (committatur), ifin place of a word reason of terminating filiation is nothing other than that same [paternity].
posited in the definition there is put its definition, or lest the same thing be 36. Add that although all of this is true in reality (secundum rem), if, however,
prior and posterior to itself, since what is posited in a definition is in some these things are, according to reason and our imperfect concepts, thought as
way prior to what is defined. But these [arguments] are not very cogent, if distinct, in the way in which someone might conceive relations and founda-
those things are considered with regard to these definitions, which Aristotle tions as distinct, he should also conceive that the reason of terminating one
mentioned in an addition at Metaphysics, Book 7, Chapter 5,40 and which we relation is not another relation as such, but rather the foundation of that. So,
have noted in that place. 41 And those difficulties in the case of transcendental for example, if someone distinguishes by reason relations and origins, and with
relatives, such as matter and form, are easily insisted upon, about which there Bonaventure thinks that the persons are constituted by their origins, whereas
can also be seen what was said above, in Disputation 43, 42 the Last Section, the relations come to them and are founded in them, 45 he will consequently
at the end. 43 Not, therefore, in order to avoid these difficulties, but because say that the formal terminus of paternity, for example, is a passive origin in
of the matter itself, since each thing is defined formally and precisely through the Son. 46
that to which it has a relation (habitudo), it is true that in the definition of one But, on the contrary, the terminus of filiation is the active generation in the
relative the other extreme is not posited, except under that aspect that is neces- Father. For the Father relates to (respicit) him whom he has generated as such,
sary in it in order to terminate such a relation (relatio). But concomitantly, just and the Son indeed [relates to him] by whom he has been generated. Similarly,
as relatives are simultaneous in cognition so [they are] also in definition, and he who, with Cajetan, would distinguish paternity as conceived or as exercised,
because we more easily conceive and explain them in this way, it is, therefore, and under the first aspect would think to constitute a person, but under the
usually said without qualification that one relative is defined by another, and second to relate that [person], and then that the second aspect is founded in
vice versa. And when it is commonly said that correlatives are simultaneous in the first, may say it is consequently necessary that one relation as exercised be
definition, it must be taken in this sense. terminated in another as conceived, and vice versa.
And, indeed, whether we use those words, or others, a relation does not have
the character of a terminus as it relates to (respicit) another, but as it is in itself
39Cf. n. 3, this Section.
40Cf. 1030b14-31a14. 44Cf. n. 4, this Section.
41 Cf. Suarez, DM, Index locupletissimus, VII, c. 5, vol. 25, pp. xxxii-xxxiii; translation 45 Cf. St. Bonaventure, In Sent. I, d. 26, a. un., q. 3, in Opera, tom us I, p. 458a. On
in Francisco Suarez, A Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (Index locupletissimus in this, cf. Suarez, Tractatus de SS. Trinitate, VII, c. 6, nn. 4, 5, and 8, in Opera omnia,
MetaphysicamAristotelis), translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes vol. l, pp. 703-704; and A. Michel, "Trinite," Dictionnaire de theologie catholique,
by John P. Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004), pp. 124-5. tome 15, deuxieme partie (Paris: Letouzey etAne, 1950), cols. 1735-38.
42 "On Potency and Act." 46Cf. St. Bonaventure, In Sent. I, d. 26, a. un., q. 3, ad 1, in Opera, tomus I, p. 458ab;
43 Cf. DM 43, 6, nn. 25-6, vol. 26, pp. 662-3. ibid., d. 27, a. un., q. 2, 469b.
242 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 16 243
something that is apt to be related to (respicz) by another. And in this way also
above47 for this place. However, this opposition can be understood as either
according to our way of conceiving, by whatever reason there is distinguished
between a relation I col. bl and its terminus, or between one relation of one
there a foundation from a relation or a person /p. 858/ constituted by a rela-
extreme and another corresponding to that in the other extreme, or between
tion (respectus), there is also distinguished a reason of terminating from a
one relative and its correlative.
relation.
The first opposition is general to all relations, even non-mutual ones, as is
37. This appears more clearly in passive spiration with respect to active [spira-
clear from what has been said, and therefore, it most formally belongs to a
tion]. For the Father and the Son, besides active spiration, have their own proper
relation as such. But it consists in the fact that a relative thing as such and a
relations by which they are constituted in their own personal reality (esse), and
terminus have between themselves such a disposition (habitudo) and conditions
as so constituted they are one principle breathing forth (spirans) the Holy Spirit.
so distant, that they necessarily require a distinction between themselves. For a
From this production (speaking in our way) there results in them a relation of
relative is that which respects (respicit) [another], while a terminus is that which
active spiration, to which, therefore, it can more properly be attributed that it
is respected by another, and thus from their proper concepts they require (so
has a foundation and a reason offounding according to reason, because it neither
to speak) "otherness. ,,
constitutes a person, nor perhaps does it have a proper subsistence. And thus
40. However, the second opposition is not truly and really universal to all
it is easily understood in that case that the passive relation of spiration, which
real relations. For it does not belong to non-mutual relations, although by our
is in the Holy Spirit, is terminated not formally at the active spiration, but at
way of conceiving it can be imagined as if it did belong, which matters nothing
the Father and the Son, as they are one spirating principle, to which by our
at the moment.
mode of conceiving there comes the relation of active spiration. For the proper
However, among real and mutual relatives and the relations themselves, there
and formal reason on account of which the Father and the Son terminate, or
is present a relative opposition, which does not consist in the fact that one
can terminate, the relation of the Holy Spirit, is not because they are related
respects the other as a terminus, but in the fact that one respects as a terminus
to the Holy Spirit, but because they produce the Holy Spirit and they are its
that which is the foundation of the other, and vice versa. Or (what is the same)
one principle, from which they have it concomitantly that they are related to
that they have opposite characters, inasmuch as one relates its subject to the
that [Holy Spirit]. If, however, through something possible or impossible, we
other; the second, on the contrary, relates that other to that which was the
were to understand that that relation did not result in the Father and the Son,
subject of the first. From this they have between themselves such incompat-
as long as they would produce the Holy Spirit, that would be enough in order
ibility that both relations cannot be simultaneously in one and the same thing,
that they could terminate its relation.
because one and the same thing cannot be the foundation and the terminus
38. From this a theologian will incidentally understand how de facto the Son
with respect to the same thing. Although this mode of opposition more clearly
is distinguished from the Holy Spirit, not first through the relation of active
appears in relations of dissimilar characters, as for example betw~en paterni~
spiration, but through the filiation by which he is completely constituted in
and sonship, it, nevertheless, in its own way also belongs to relat10ns of eqm-
personal reality (esse) and is, consequently, distinguished from every other
parence. For although these are of the same species, they can in an individual
person. And nevertheless, it is true that if the Son were not to produce the
be in some way relatively opposite, because they affect their subjects according
Holy Spirit, he would not be distinguished from that, because in that case,
to opposite dispositions, from which they have an incompatibility in the same
given this hypothesis, filiation would not be a foundation of active spiration
subject. But even though this opposition is in some way of a diverse nature,
nor a reason of terminating a passive procession. And, consequently, neither
with respect to a terminus and with respect to a co-relation, still, because they
would it have with that an opposition of origin. Now, however, it truly has all
are related (se habent) concomitantly wherever they are found, they are, there-
these things, and therefore it is a sufficient principle of distinction. But let us
fore, named and judged in the manner of a unit. But a relation can be said to
leave all this to the theologians.
be opposed to one terminus terminatively, but to another relation relatively.
And this latter is as it were a formal opposition, for it is between proper forms
About Rel.ative Opposition. insofar as they mutually exclude one another from the same subject. But the
39. Finally, from what we have said in this Section, it may be understood in
what proper relative opposition consists and of what kind it is. For we left this
47Possibly, Section 9, n. 3, above.
244 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation

prior [opposition] is an incompatibility of relatives, because they demand /p.

859/ a distinction of extremes, which St. Thomas also has indicated, in De
Potentia, Question 7, Article 8, in reply to Objection 4. 48 Section XVII.
How the Category, "Toward Something," Can Be Set Up
Under One Supreme Genus through Diverse Subalternate
Genera and Species down to Individuals.
1. We have explained almost all things that have seemed necessary for un-
derstanding the essence of relation as well as its causes and formal effect (for
it does not have any other). It remains for the completion of this matter that
we say a few things about the subordination, agreement, and distinction of
those things themselves in order that the constitution of the whole category
be held, as it were, before our eyes. But now in the title of the question three
points are suggested, which are treated by others very extensively and which
should be explained very briefly by us.

About the Supreme Genus ofthe Category, Toward Something."

2. Therefore, the first difficulty is: how can all relatives be reduced to one
highest genus? And the reason for the question is that the essence of a relation
is that its being is toward something else. Therefore, a relative cannot be so
abstracted that something else does not adequately correspond to it. Therefore,
there cannot be one highest genus, but at least there must be two, which respect
one another.
The consequence is evident: because that which relates (respicit) cannot be
one and the same, both because in its definition it is contained that its being
must be other, and also because the same thing cannot be really related to itsel£
And then, finally, [this is true] because, if the essence of a relative in general
were to be related to itself, this very feature would be of the nature and essence
of any particular relation, since the essence of the superior is included in the
inferior. 1 This difficulty is common in this matter and would occasion a serious
obstacle, especially for those who think that one relative is formally related to
another correlative as such. For according to this opinion, when a relative is
said in general to be that whose being is to be toward another, it is necessary
to understand in that definition, "to another that is correlative." Therefore,
since the same thing cannot be related to itself by a real relation (about which
we are now treating), it will be necessary that there is not one supreme genus,
but rather two, which respect each other adequately and are in reality (in re
ipsa) distinct.

48 Cf. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 8, ad 4, ed. Bazzi, p. 206b. For example, "man" which is inferior to, in the sense ofless extensive than, "animal"
includes in its essence, i.e. "rational animal," what is essential to animal.
246 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 17 247
3. There Is Given One Supreme Genus of Relation.-Yet it is, nevertheless,
place [the answer] of Simplicius7 and Boethius 8 • And it can be explained in
certain that there can be given one supreme genus of all relatives. For it matters
this way, because, even though a relation in common is defined through being
not whether we speak about abstract rather /col. bl than concrete things, since toward another, it, nevertheless, exercises this being toward another only in
one can be inferred from the other. Thus if there is a most general concept of determinate relations. And, therefore, it is not necessary that, insofar as it is
real and categorical relation 2 in common, there could also be one of relative3 most abstractly conceived, it be understood to exercise the task of a relation
in common, both because of a proportional argument, and also because to in an order to another correlative that is adequate to itself, because as such
every abstract form there can correspond something composed or concrete the essence of a relation is conceived as i(in designated act (in actu signato),
that is adequate to it. But that there can be one supreme genus of relations is or as designating that in which it consists, rather than in exercised act (in actu
clear, first, from the very way of speaking about relation in common as such. exercito), that is, as exercising that disposition "toward something" in that
For this term is common to all relations and is distributed over all, because whole community. Therefore, it must rather be understood that that nature
it is said univocally and essentially (in quid) of all. Also, second, because the so abstractly conceived exercises its disposition toward another only in its
definition of relation in common is unique, and it belongs to all categorical inferiors. /p. 860/
relations. Finally, third, if someone imagines those two supreme genera of 5. This is also understood in a different way in the cases of relatives of equi-
relatives, he will find an essential agreement between them in the character parence and disquiparence. For in relatives of disquiparence, at least in their
of being toward something else. Therefore, he could abstract from them a
common specific natures, it can be understood that one common relative is
univocal and essential concept that would be common to both, in which he related to another that is equal and opposite to itself, as for example, a father
will also easily find differences outside the nature of that [concept], which are to a son, or more to less. And the reason is that since these relations are of dif-
not complete relations. Therefore, [the conclusion follows]. ferent characters, they are not conceived with one common specific concept,
4. How Some Answer the Question.-But some reply to the stated difficulty" and therefore there can be abstracted two common and equal concepts that
that in the definition of a relative in general, when it is said, "toward another," are opposite and corresponding to each other.
through that word, "another," a correlative is indeed understood, and that cannot This is otherwise in the case of relations of equiparence. For since they are of
be the very thing that is being defined as such, on account of the reason given, the same nature, they have the same common concept of species, and therefore
namely, that the same thing cannot be really related to itself And there is also there cannot correspond to such a concept another objective concept that is
not any other relative that is equally common and not contained under that common and correlatively opposite, in such way that similar is not said in
which is defined, on account of the difficulty mentioned with regard to one relation to another similar in general (in com mum), nor equal to another equal
supreme genus. Therefore, they say that through that word, "another," there in general (in communz), but only by reason of individuals in which there is
is meant individual specific correlatives or particulars of individual relations. given one equal that is distinct from another.
This is the answer of Albert, in Metaphysics, Book 5, Tractate 3, Chapter 7, 5 And about these, it is true what Augustine said in the book, On the Cat-
and On the Categories, [the Treatise] "Toward something,"6 and in the same egories, Chapter 11: "In special cases and as a rule, in order that this category be

7 For this, see Simplicii, In Aristotelis Categorias commentaria, c. 7, ed. Carolus Kal-
bfleisch, in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol viii (Berolini: Typis et Impensis
Georgii Reimeri, 1907), p. 160, II. 15-34. For an English translation, cf. Simplicius
2 Which is abstract. on Aristotle's "Categories 7-8, "translated by Barrie Fleet (Ithaca: Cornell University
3 Which is concrete. Press, 2002), p. 14. For a Latin version of which Suarez would have known, cf.
4 4 C£ n. 2, this Section. William ofMoerbeke, in: Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Categories d'Aristote, tra-
5 C£ Alberti Magni, O.P., Metaphysica V, tr. 3, c. 7, ed. B. Geyer, in Opera omnia duction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, edition critique, par A. Pattin en collaboration
Alberti Magni, tomusxvi, pars i (Monasterium Westfalorum inAedibusAschendorff, avec W. Stuyven, tome i (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1971),
1960), p. 267b. p. 218, 11. 71-92.
6 C£ B. Alberti Magni, Liber de praedicamentis, Tr. N, c. 2, in Opera omnia, ed. A. 8 Cf. An. Manlii Severini Boetii, In Categorias Aristotelis, lib. 2, in Patrologia Latina,
Borgnet (Parisiis: Vives, 1890), vol. 1, p. 226. tomus 64 (Parisiis: Apud J.-P., Migne, 1847), col. 217.
248 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 17 249
more evidently known, "toward something" is rightly said only when a singular is
7. A Relative in General ls Not toward Something Else as toward a Correla-
related to a singular. "9 It is true that Augustine immediately gives examples not tive.-And from this I further conclude that when a relative in general is defined
only in cases of relatives of equiparence, but also in those that are of diverse as being toward an other, that "other" cannot be taken as a correlative, since
names and concepts. However, in this there is no obstacle, as I have said, that there is given through that definition something that is essential to a relative
one, even in common, be understood to be related to another common cor-
as such. But it is not essential to a relative that a correlative correspond to it,
relative. And Scotus and others noted the same thing in this way, in [Sentences
neither immediately in a common concept, nor in all its particulars, as has
commentary], Book 1, Distinction 21. 10
been shown.
6. This doctrine is probable. And even though it supposes a false basis, namely,
Moreover, this is confirmed because if the "other" is the correlative itself, I
that one relative is formally terminated at its correlative, it can, nevertheless, be
ask whether it is a real correlative or one of reason or indifferently either one,
useful for explaining how correlatives can be assigned, when they are abstracted that is, according to the requirement of the inferior relations. However, none
by our concepts and conceived in common. For in this way it is correctly and
of these can be admitted. For the first two members are easily excluded, since
without doubt said that only in relations of dissimilar names and concepts can
neither of them can be universal for all relations, as is clear enough from what
one common relative correspond to another common one. But in the case of
has been said. The third [member] also is not probable: first, because otherwise
relatives of equiparence, or in the case of a relative in general (in communi),
that "other" would be taken in an extremely equivocal sense, inasmuch as a
this is not possible. For, since these are abstracted either from relatives of the
relative of reason is a relative in almost an equivocal way. Then also, second,
same nature or simply from all relatives, both relatives are conceived together because (as I said) the correspondence of a relation of reason is not from the
in the way of one according to that in which they agree, and therefore to a natures of things, and therefore it cannot belong to the essence of relation.
common relative of this kind another equal one cannot correspond. And, 8. I say, therefore, that the "other" in the stated definition expresses the
therefore, it is also rightly said about a relative of this kind when it is conceived terminus of a relation as such, which does not entail a correlative, as it is such,
in general (in communz) that it is not of its essence that there corresponds to
but another extreme, insofar as it has in itself a sufficient reason of terminat-
it, as immediately so conceived, an equal correlative. But it is enough /col.
ing-which reason is almost always absolute. And if it is sometimes a relation,
bl that when it is contracted by its inferiors, this reciprocation of relatives be
it is not as it is exercising the function of an opposite relation to the first rela-
found in those [inferiors].
tion, but insofar as it has some unity or common character similar to absolute
Moreover, speaking of a relative in general, I add that it is not of its essence
things.
that even mediately and in its inferiors it exercise the mentioned relative re-
9. A Relative in General Has a Terminus in General That Corresponds to
ciprocation. For the common concept of a categorical relation as such does
it.-Hence, I further conclude that a relation in general can be conceived /p.
not demand that another relation in another extreme correspond to it, at least
861/ as having an other to which it entails a disposition, not only in its inferi-
as it is contracted to its inferiors. For if this were of the essence of relation in
ors, but also as conceived by that most common concept. For to a relation in
general, it would have to belong to all specific relations. But this is false; for
general there corresponds also a terminus in general. Nor does it follow from
in no way does it belong to non-mutual relations. Neither is it relevant that a this that there are two supreme genera, because a terminus in general is not
relation of reason can correspond to them in the other extreme; for this does something relative as such, and therefore it does not constitute some genus in
not pertain to the essence of a real relation, since it is merely extrinsic, [result- the category, "toward something."
ing] from our imperfection. I 0. Why the Common Nature of a Terminus Does Not Constitute a Special
Category-You will say: therefore, at least it will constitute some common
genus of another category, which is plainly false, because that character of
9 C£ [Pseudo-] Augustine, Categoriae decem ex Aristotele decerptae, c. 11, in Patrologia
terminus is found (vagatur) 11 throughout all categories; indeed, it is outside
Latina, tomus 32 (Parisiis, 1841), col. 1430; on the provenance of this work, c£
[any] category, because it belongs to God himself.
ibid., cols. 1419-20. Suarez's quotation is substantially accurate but not exactly
so.
10C£ Ordinatio I, d. 21, q. un., in Opera omnia, tomus v (ed. Vat., 1959), pp. 335-6,
nn. 25-6. 11 Literally: "wanders".
250 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 17 251
The answer is to deny the consequence. For the character of terminus is not diverse foundations, which are usually considered under the terms, unity, ac-
some real character or property in things, which is in some way distinct from tion, and measure.
those things or accidental to them. Rather it is the very entity of each thing, From this it is easily understood that it is possible to proceed further under
insofar as it is apt for terminating the relation of another. This character is any one of these members. For example, in the first [we can proceed] through
quasi-transcendental, and it is incidentally not univocal, especially since it various modes of unities. And because under unity multitude is understood,
belongs to God and creatures. Hence, under that aspect it is essentially placed first, relations of unity will have to be divided from relations of multitude
in no category, but it can be reduced to the category of relatives, as something or diversity, and afterwards, according to various modes of unity or of real
added, as it is posited in their definition. multitude, relations will be divided under both genera. And the same thing
And this can be shown from a parallel (a similt) [argument]. For just as it proportionally must be said about action, and consequently also about pas-
belongs to relation in general to have a terminus, so also [it belongs to it] to sion, and of active and passive potency, or more broadly even about cause and
have a foundation. Nor does there seem to be any doubt that this character effect, if all of these are comprehended under that word. Finally, the same is
of the foundation of relations can in some way be conceived in general as true about the character of measure. For also in that class relations are varied,
adequately corresponding to relation as also conceived in general. For it is according to diverse proportions of measures and measurables.
included in the proper nature of a categorical relation as such that it supposes 12. OfWhat Sort Is the Division ofRelation into MutualandNon-Mutual.-But
a foundation, and in that [foundation] some character on account of which it from this division others arise that were also mentioned above, [and] without
arises or results. However, it is not necessary that this common character of a doubt, the division of relation into mutual and non-mutual, which has been
foundation be some category (genus), but it a quasi-transcendental character explained extensively enough.
that is found in all the categories. Hence, Aristotle attributes it to quantity, by However, from what has been said it is dear that this is not a subdivision
way of a property, that it is a sufficient foundation of equality or inequality, of any member of the preceding division. 15 But it is rather another adequate
and to quality that it be the foundation of similarity and dissimilarity 12 (for we division of relation in general, embracing under one member, that is, under
have explained those properties in this way in that place). This character of a non-mutual relation, the third member of the prior division and some other
foundation as such is not some relative character in those things, and it is also relations contained under the first two members, while under the other mem-
not some absolute character that is distinct from them, but it is the very entity ber [i.e. mutual relation] it almost comprehends the first two classes of the
of each one, inasmuch as it essentially has a certain aptitude. And, therefore, preceding division.
it is reduced by way of a property to the category of each form, and indirectly However, these two divisions could be so subordinated that relation is first
it could be reduced under that aspect to the category /col. bl of relation as its divided into that which by virtue of its formal foundation is non-mutual and
foundation. Therefore, I believe we must think about the terminus of a relation that which by virtue of its foundation or from its own genus is not such, 16 and
in this way. And this is enough about the first point. 13 this in turn may be subdivided into relation founded upon action or unity. /p.
862/ And thus we may proceed until we arrive in those two classes at relations
How the Supreme Genus ofRelatives Descends to Inferiors. between God and creatures, which are 17 non-mutual not so much from the
11. The second point of this Section 14 is how this highest genus of formal character or the reason of founding as from the peculiar nature and
relation descends, or is divided, through various genera down to the lowest condition of God. And in this way it will be easy to constitute this category
species. This matter has in great part been explained above where we have through subordinate divisions of this kind.
mentioned and explained various divisions of relation. The first and principal 13. A Dictum ofSt. ljohn] Damascene Is Explained.-But it is worthy of notice
one of these [divisions] was into three members through various, generically that St. Damascene, in his Dialectica, Chapter 50, while positing many other
divisions of relations, has omitted this one. Indeed, he indicates that this divi-

12Cf. Metaphysics 5.15.102lal 1-12. 15 That is: unity, action, and measure.
13See n. 1, this Section. 16Literally: "does not have that."
14Ibid. l 7Literally: "have it that they are."
 252 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 17 253
sion does not correctly harmonize with the nature of relatives. "For," he says,
terminus. And thus, as regards the constitution of this category, this division
"a mutual disposition causes those things that are 'toward something. "'IS
must be reduced to the preceding ones.
However, either these words should not be understood about single relatives,
but about the complex of both; for that truly consists in a mutual disposition,
Whence ls the Essential and Specific Difference ofRe/,ations Derived.
but it is not necessary that such, at least real, reciprocation be present in all
15. But there could remain one question about this second point, 21 namely,
relatives. Or, if those words are applied to single relatives, the mutual disposition
whence should be derived the specific and essential distinction of relations
must be understood with proportion, because from the side of a relation it is
down to their ultimate species, namely, whether it is from a foundation or from
necessary that it tend toward something else, but from the side of a terminus
a terminus? For some so divide tasks between these two, that they say that a
[it is necessary] that it be that to which something else tends.
relation has entity from its foundation, but from its terminus it has its species
But that Damascene has omitted that division is not strange. For he has not
or essence and essential distinction. But others attribute both functions to both,
said everything that can be said about relations, and perhaps the reason was
to each in its own genus. This is not displeasing to me, but I think that both
because by our way of conceiving they are all apprehended as mutual.
ways of speaking contain truth when they are correctly e~plained. ~herefore,
14. A Division ofRelation into Those ofthe Same or ofDiverse Name.-Asecond
relations are formally and intrinsically constituted by their proper differences
division mentioned above 19 is into a relation of the same or of a diverse name,
in their proper species, and they are essentially distinguished through those
or of equiparence or disquiparence. And Damascene treats this extensively in
[species], for this is common to all things. .
the cited Chapter SO, which he subdivides into a relation of preeminence, such
However, because a relation has its whole essence in an order to a termmus,
as to be master, to be greater, to be a cause; and a relation of inferiority, such
it, therefore, takes its specification from that [terminus], as if from an ultimate
as to be a slave, an effect, or less, etc. 20 These subdivisions pertain to relations
extrinsic form, it, and therefore, through that [terminus] it is distinguished and
of disquiparence; for in relations of equiparence there cannot be that diversity
defined as was said above in Section 8. 22 But because the formal foundation
is also e~sentially and intrinsically required for a relation, it can f~rt~er be s~id
since they are of the same nature.
And perhaps there is never found among created things a relation of disqui-
to concur for the essence of a relation, as if by way of an extrmsic matenal
parence apart from that diversity. However, among divine persons it is found
cause. And in this way St. Thomas sometimes attributes this to the foundation
without pre-eminence, or inequality, unless one wants, with the Greek Fathers,
and sometimes to the terminus, as is clear from [the Summa Theologiae], Part
to call the order oforigin a dignity [oforigin], which [I treat] elsewhere. But this
3, Question 35, Article 5, 23 and Part 1, Question 32, Article 2, 24 where he
division, taken properly and with rigor, is not a division of relation in general,
simply attributes it to the terminus, because that is, as it were, ultimate and
but of mutual [relation]. For since non-mutual [relation] is not reciprocal, it
more formal with respect to a relation. See Soncinas, in Metaphysics, Book 5,
is not of the same nor of a diverse character in both extremes. [That is] unless
Question 32, 25 and the above mentioned Section 8, Number 9 [sic], 26 and
one wants to extend what he says to that /col. bl correlative denomination
Section 10, Number 14.
that is taken from a relation of reason. For in this way all correlatives will be
of the same or of a diverse denomination.
Finally, as can be evident from what has been said, this division is not given
Are There Simultaneously in the Same Subject Several Relations
through that which essentially and formally pertains to a relation of reason, That Are Diverse only in Number?
because, as we have said, one relation does not formally terminate another. 16. As regards the third point, at this place there is usually raised Ip. 863/
a question about the individuation of relations. For it is certain that, just as
Hence, neither does it give species or essential diversity to that [other]. But
when to one relation there corresponds another of the same or of a diverse
21 Cf. n. 11, this Section.
character, it is an indication of the diversity of the foundation and the formal 22Cf. Section 8, n. 11, above.
23Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia, tomus XI (Romae: Ex Typographia Poly-
18 Cf St. John Damascene, Dialectica, Chapter 50, in Patrologia Graeca, vol. 94, col. glotta, 1903), p. 356b.
630A.
24Ibid., tomus IV (1888), p. 352.
19Cf. Section 15, on. 1-2, above.
25Cf. Quaestiones metaphysicales ... , V, q. 32, p. 95.
20 Cf. Dialectica, c. 50, 630 A.
26Cf. Section 8, n. 11.
254 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 17 255
in the other categories the constitution of the categorical line descends from example, when a father generates a second son, he acquires something relative
a supreme genus down to individuals, so is it also in this [category]. But it is (respectivum) that he did not have before, something equally distinct from
controverted whether, just as for the constitution and specification of relations himself as was the paternity that he had before, for, speaking logically, the
a terminus concurs in its own way, so also [does it do so] for individuation. arguments that were made prove this. And because it is completely the same
From this depends also the answer to that common question: whether the argument, for if when Peter generated his first son, he needed a new thing or
same subject, under the same specific aspect, is related to several termini by a new mode that is real and distinct, in order that he mght be really related
a relation that is the same in number, or [is related] by diverse [relations]? I to that [son], why not also when he begins anew to be related to the second
have touched on the question, enough I think (for it is a matter not of great one? Neither indeed can it be said that the prior entity or mode is sufficient,
importance), above in Disputation 5, Section 8, where I have generally treated both because a formal effect cannot increase unless the form really increases,
the individuation of accidents and whether they can be several in number in and also because the prior relation was adequately related to the first son and
the same subject. 27 it depends on him in being and in definition and knowledge. For this relation
17. And according to the principles posited there, it can be without any as singular in number 28 is not known, except as it relates to this singular in
difficulty conceded that several relations, differing only in number, respecting number terminus, 29 as Aristotle plainly stated in the Categories, the Chapter,
diverse termini can be simultaneously in the same subject, as, for example, two "Toward Something." 30
paternities in the same man with respect to two sons. For the formal effect of 19. But now if it is once admitted that a real addition is made in a relative,
one is not entirely similar to the formal effect of another, as I declared in the when the addition of a new terminus has been made, it is perhaps only a verbal
cited place. question whether that thing added is a distinct relation or composes one with
Again, [this is so] because when one terminus is posited, there results some the pre-existing relation, just as a second degree [of heat] composes one heat
relation that entirely depends on that terminus, but when another terminus with a first [degree]. For in this way some explain the unity of this relation, lest
is added, there is added a new respect, which wiH remain even if the other they seem to multiply relations to infinity, and in order to universally defend
terminus is destroyed. Likewise, [this is so] because each terminus is the total that axiom that in one subject there is only one accident of one species.
terminus of some relation, when indeed, when that alone has been posited, However, those who speak in this way cannot sufficiently explain that unity,
some relation arises. And similar arguments can easily be multiplied, because except only denominatively by reason of one subject or supposite. For if they
of which Scotus, and others, whom I have cited in that place, embrace this are speaking logically, it is necessary that they say that the distinction between
opinion. Nor is there a difficulty of any importance in that, apart from the a paternity to a first son and that which is added when the second is begotten
general one that accidents are individuated by a subject, about which in the is as great as that which exists between that paternity itself and its foundation.
cited place we have spoken extensively enough. Therefore, if the latter are distinguished really or modally, so also are the former.
18. What Consequently Must Be Said about This Matter, If a Relation Is This is proven, because the relation of paternity to the first son is so compared
Distinct in Reality from its Foundation.-But since in this matter there can be to that which is added with respect to the second son, that that first paternity
great dissension in the way of speaking, it must be noted that we would have can be without this one added, and conversely, this added one can remain
to proceed in one way if we hold that a relation is a thing or a real mode that and constitute a father, without that first paternity. Therefore, if paternity is a
is really distinct from its foundation, but in another way if it is distinguished real and distinct mode, because it is separable from its foundation, these two
only by reason. modes will also be actually distinct in reality between themselves, because one
For according to the first opinion, it cannot be denied that when the ter- is separable from the other, and vice versa.
mini are multiplied, the respects are really increased, and that, when some Likewise, if paternity is a proper entity really distinct from a foundation,
new terminus is added, something real is added to a pre-existing relative. For those two respects also will be really distinct between themselves, as Scotus
logically and correctly teaches, because they are mutually and in turn separable.
27 For this, cf. DM 5, 8 ("Whether, because of their individuation, it is impossible for
two accidents which are only numerically diverse to be in the same subject" [An 28Literally: "as this in number."
repugnet duo accidentia solum numero diversa, esse simul in eodem subjecto ob eorum 29Literally: "as this in number terminus."
individuationem])., vol. 25, pp. 189-97. 30Cf. Categories 7.8a37-b15.
256 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 17 257
But it was shown above, in Disputation 7, that whenever two things are so
in the case of habits 35 can scarcely have place [here], and, therefore, nothing
distinguished in reality that they can in turn both remain, one without the
will be said of it.
other, and they are not otherwise the modes of some subject with which they
21. But someone could imagine the unity of this relation to several termini
have a real identity, then that is a sufficient sign of a real distinction between
in another way: not through an addition or a real composition, but through
them. 31 But the relations according to that opinion are not modes, but proper
a change of relations, in such way that each in itself is indivisible, but they
entities really distinct from their subjects, and between themselves, the respects
differ among themselves, because one has for its adequate terminus one thing,
of the father to the first son and to the second [son] are related (comparantur)
for example, one son, while a second has two [sons], and a third three [sons],
so that the former can exist without the latter and the latter [can exist] without
etc.
the former. Therefore, they are distinguished between themselves with a true
Hence, according to this opinion, when a father begets a second son, a new
real distinction.
relation is indeed acquired by that father, but it is not added to the pre-exist-
20. But with this distinction posited, no reason can be given as to why those
ing one. Rather the first one perishes and a second /col. b/ results anew, which
[respects] are not distinguished as two relations, or why they are said to be
[second] indivisibly and adequately relates that man to two sons, and not to
two degrees or two parts of one relation instead of two relations. For, first,
more or to fewer. And if he begets a third [son], he loses that [relation], and
they are not correctly equated with degrees of intension. 32 For between these
acquires another that relates to three [sons] in the same way. For it seems certain
latter degrees there is an essential subordination and in them there is a proper
that one relation can adequately relate indivisibly to several termini. For in this
composition and a union through a proper extension, or proper indivisibles, as
way in real categorical relatives a whole is related to several parts, or unity is
was explained in the preceding Disputation. 33 But those two relations do not
related to a couple (binarium) by a subduple relation. 36 And in transcendental
have an essential subordination. For one does not suppose the other nor does
[relations] the same intellect respects several intelligibles inadequately, and in
it depend upon the other, nor does each of them have some extension in itself,
relatives [of reason] the same relation of genus respects several species. So it
but it is indivisible only in an order to its own terminus. Hence, they do not
can, therefore, be understood that in any genus or species of relations there are
properly compose some quasi-continuous extension, because this [extension]
some in individual cases (in individuo) that indivisibly and adequately respect
is not composed of indivisibles. Then, no other kind of union can be imagined
several termini, which with respect to them will be partial, but from those
between those two entities, on account ofwhich they may be said to be two parts
there arises an adequate terminus, which is one by a certain collection. And,
of one relation, because they are not related between themselves as potency and
therefore, such a relation arises only when an adequate terminus is posited, but
act, nor do they have between themselves another relation (habitudo) besides
not when one or another partial [terminus] is posited. But, on the contrary,
that which is to be in the same subject. And this can be a fortiori confirmed
it is taken away or changed when a partial terminus is taken away or added,
from what we have said above about a similar unity or physical composition
because by this very fact the whole terminus is changed.
of habits. 34 Nay rather, that artificial unity or composition that is considered
22. Finally, many think in this way about the relation of one son to a father
and a mother. For that this relation, essentially speaking, is an indivisible one,
31 Cf. DM7, 2, nn. 2-3, in vol. 25, pp. 261-2. is probable from the fact that a father and a mother concur as one cause, and
32Cf. degrees of heat inn. 19, this Section. by an essentially necessary and unique action (especially if the mother concurs
33 That is, DM 46, "On the Intension of Qualities" (De intensione qualitatum), vol. 26, actively).37 Hence, when either one of the parents has died, it is necessary that
pp. 753-781. In this forty-sixth Disputation, see esp. Section l, "Whether among that relation perish. For if it indivisibly respects two parents, it cannot be di-
qualities there is an intensive range? And what is that?" (An sit latitudo intensiva
in qualitatibus, et quid ilia sit.), pp. 753-66 and Section 3, "Whether this range
the extensive increase of a habit?-where there is also [discussion] about the unity
is achieved by change or by continuous succession?" (An haec latitudo acquiratur
of a habit." (Quale sit augmentum extensivum habitus, ubi etiam de unitate habitus),
mutatione, seu successione continua.), pp. 794-99.
pp. 694-716.
34For chis, cf. DM 44, esp.: Section 9, "Whether a habit is generated by one or by
35 For some of this, see my article: "Suarez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit," The
several acts?" (An habitus uno, vet pluribus actibus generetur.), vol. 26, pp. 686-90;
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 65 (1991), pp. 309-31.
Section 10, "Whether and how a habit is increased by acts?" ( Utrum habitus per
36That is, by a relation of one to two.
actus augeatur, et quomodo.), ibid., pp. 690-94; and Section 11, "Of what kind is
37See nn. 24-28, below.
.
258 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 17 259
vided into parts, nor can the whole [relation] remain, since then it would not 25. Fonseca's Opinion Is Not Proven.-But others say that there is one relation
have an adequate terminus, nor would it relate to two [parents]. Therefore, to both parents, even if the father actively and the mother only passively concur.
the whole [relation] perishes. Therefore, it will be necessary that another arise, And at the same time they say that the relation remains completely identical
which relates to only one parent, if there is a survivor. For the son is truly and and unchanged, even if one parent dies. Fonseca says this in Metaphysics, Book
really related to that [parent]. 5, Chapter 15, Question 5, Section 3. 39
23. But although this way of speaking seems to be carefully thought out But both points are hard for me to believe. First, indeed, because if a mother
in order to speak logically within that opinion, nevertheless, it is in fact arbi- concurs only passively, then the relations of father and mother will be specifi-
trary and without basis. For what necessity is there to introduce that frequent cally diverse, since they have such distinct foundations. Therefore, it cannot
changing of relations? Otherwise, as often as a new thing would become white, happen that a single relation in a correlative corresponds to them, which St.
all other white things that previously existed would change their relations of Thomas teaches in [Summa Theologiae], Part 1, Question 32, Article 2. 40 For
similarity with respect to all and would acquire new ones. Then, why will a specifically diverse correlatives are either formally diverse termini, or they
father lose his relation to a first son, when a second is begotten, since none of indicate these; but relations have diversity from their formal termini. Again,
those things is taken away that were necessary for the being of that first relation? the relation of an effect to a cause of diverse genus is also diverse, whether that
For, notwithstanding the second son, the first is always a sufficient terminus [cause] is material, formal, or efficient. If, therefore, the causalities of father
of that /p. 865/ relation. Again, even though it is true that one relation can and mother differ as efficient and material, the relations in the effect will be
adequately respect several things, when essentially (per se) and by virtue of its diverse. Hence, supposing that opinion, I col. bl a father and a mother do not
species it requires those things in order that it result or be conserved or that it so much compose one total cause, since they are not causing in the same genus,
exercise its own formal effect, as is the case in the relation of the whole or of the as [they compose] a coJlection of several diverse causes, such as are matter and
subduple, nevertheless when a relation does not demand this of its nature, and the efficient [cause].
the termini are multiplied only by accident, as happens in paternity, filiation, Secondly, it is difficult to believe in this opinion that a relation is indivisibly
similarity, etc, it is said merely gratis that there arises one indivisible relation one with regard to a father and a mother, such that they make up one total
that adequately respects the coJlection of several termini, from the fact that or cause, and nevertheless that the same total relation remains when that adequate
especially because the several sons are produced by distinct acts of generation. terminus is removed from one side, because a relation depends upon its adequate
Why, therefore, will there result one indivisible relation which embraces both terminus. This, I explain as follows: for when one parent is removed, then that
termini? relation of son cannot have its adequate formal effect, since it cannot relate the
son to both parents. Therefore, it cannot simply have its own formal effect,
About the Relation ofa Son to a Father and a Mother. for, since it indivisibly causes that [effect], it cannot contribute a part of that
24. An Opinion ofFerrara Is Disproved-But what was said about the relation and not the whole, nor can the whole [cause] remain without contributing
of a son to two parents is also uncertain. For some think that in a son there are the whole effect, since it remains only in a subject and as inhering.
two relations, different not only in number but also in species, since they think
that the relations of a father and a mother are different in species, by the fact
that the former actively concurs while the latter [concurs] only passively. This
is what Ferrara holds, In Contra Gentiles, Book 2, Chapter 11 [sic], § Ex istis,
although he adds that those relations are formally two, but really and materi-
ally one. 38 I do not see how this is said logically, supposing that a relation is
something distinct in reality from its foundation, as he supposes.

38 For this, see Ferrara, Commentaria in Contra Gentiles, II, c. 12, V., n. 3, in S. Thomae 39Cf. Commentaria in Metaph., V, c. 15, q. 5, s. 3, vol. 2, col. 851.
Aquinatis, Opera omnia, tomus XIII, p. 292ab. 40Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia, tomus IV, p. 352.
260 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Section 17 261

26. The Opinion ofOthers.-Others, therefore, who with Galen, 41 Scotus, 42 fices in order that those respects to diverse termini be called several relations,
and still others, figure that it is probable enough that a mother concurs actively, distinct in number by that kind of distinction that has place in relations of
think that a son is related to his father and mother by two relations of the this kind, namely, "of reasoned reason." And thus there is easily removed any
same species, and that the diversity in paternal and maternal concurrence is wonder about the multiplication of relations; and all the arguments which are
only accidental. And even though a farher and a mother at once compose one usually put forward to the contrary have no difficulty, especially, when those
total efficienr cause, according to chis opinion, nevertheless, jusr as they are things are presupposed that we have said about the principle of individua-
one cause only by a collection of several partial ones, so it is enough rbat there tion. Nor in order to further this opinion in this sense is it also necessary to
correspond to rhemonecorrelarive by a collection ofseveral relations.Although multiply arguments. For apart from the fact that it is by itself probable, what
here it could be said with some probability that those relations compose one, [arguments] have been suggested are enough.
not properly by a physical unity, but as it were artificially and as fitted to the 28. Finally, in this sense, St. Thomas is not much opposed to this opinion.
unity of the terminus. But by whichever of tbese modes one thinks about the For in [Summa Theologiae], Part 3, Question 35, Article 5, in reply to Objec-
relation of a son, it matters nothing for the mentioned opinion, which we are tion 3, he says that in one son there is one relation to two parents, and two
impugning. fOl' I find no author who has said hat when a son loses one par- [relations] according to reason, and conversely he says, in several men rowing
ent, he l ses the relation that he has to both and acquires a new one by which a boat there is one relation, which cannot be understood about the unity of a
he is 1-elated only co the survivor, nor does chat have any probability. thing, since the subjects are really distinguished. 44 And in other places, although
27. In this way, therefore, it seems we should think about the multiplica- he says that in one father there is one relation to several sons, he, nevertheless,
tion of relations that djffer only in number in the same subject with_ respect says that there are in that [father] several respects. Also Hispalensis speaks in
to several adequate termini of the same nacme. This indeed is easily explained the same way, in [his Sentences commentary], Book 3, Distinction 8, Note
according to the opinion rha.t we think to be true, namely, that a relation is 3, 45 as does Capreolus in the same place, in his Solution of Arguments. 46 But
not a thing or a mode of a thing that is really distinct from ics foundacion. For these respects are not called several except on account of a distinction of rea-
it cannot be doubted that respects to really distinct termini, of which one can son. Therefore, in the same way, there can be said to be several relations. And
be without Ip. 866/ the other, and conversely, aJe distinguished "by reasoned finally, it is explained by a parallel (a simile): for the theologians call paternity
reason" (ratione ratiocinata), which has a basis in reality. Hence, just as this and active spiration in the Trinity two relations on account of a distinction
distinction suffices in order that relation constitute a special category (genus), 43 of termini even though in themselves they are distinguished only by reason.
and be rhoughc as another form [differing] from its foundacion, so also it suf- Why then is it strange that in the present case also there be said to be several
relations to several really distinct termini?
41 For a possible source of this, cf. Galen, De Semine, II, 5, translated by Phillip de
Lacy in: Galen On Semen, edition, rranslation and commcnrary (Berlin: Akadernie
Verlag, 1992), p. 183-5: "... there are man.if. Lly two kinds ofsimilarities ofoffspring
to parents; firs is rhe similariry i1-1 kind of rhe Ip. 185/ enrirc substance, when hu-
man being i produced from human being, horse from horse; ai1d here the mother
appeared to contribute the greater share. The second is the difference between
iu1imals of the same kind, belwceu human bcing and human being, between horse
and horse; and here the dominant semen was shown to make the greater contribu-
tion." At lease in the first kind of similarity here drnre is an active contribution by
the mother. Also, cf. de Lacy's noce, ibid., p. 233, P. 154, 9-10.
42Cf. Quodlibet XV, a. 1, n. 10, in Obtas del Doctor Sutii]t1an Duns Escoto, edicion
biUngUe, ed. Allumis, pp. 553-4. For aa English translation, cf.john Duns Scot11s, 44 Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia, corn us XI (Romae: Ex Typographia Poly-
Godand Creatm·es, The Q;1odlibetal Q;testions, rranslated with an lnrroduotion, Notes, glotta, 1903), p. 356b.
and Glossary by FelixAlluntis, O.F.M. and Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. (W,'lShingron: 45 I have not had access to Book 3 of Hispalensis' Commentary on the Sentences.
The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), p. 353. Therefore, I have been unable to verify this reference of Suarez.
43Cf. Section 2, n. 22, above. 46C£ Defensiones, Jn 3 Sent., d. 8, q. l, a. 3, ed. Paban-Pegues, tom. V, p. 130.
 Section XVIII.
Which Properties Are Common to All Relatives.
1. About this matter Aristotle says nothing in the Metaphysics. But in his
Logic' he has posited some properties of relatives, which it is necessary briefly to
explain, even though some of them have already been explained. However, we
could extend the discussion to the common attributes of being, especially, one
and good; for they have a special difficulty in the way in which they agree with
/col. bl relations. But about unity many things have sufficiently been said. But
concerning goodness, the question usually occurs: whether a relation expresses
a perfection. This [question] we have treated above, in Disputation 10, and
we have shown that it entails perfection just as it has entity. 2 Hence, if it is a
thing distinct from its foundation or even a real mode that is really distinct,
it is necessary that it add some perfection to that [foundation]. But if it adds
nothing real, but is distinguished only by reason, it will indeed express a real
perfection, but not one that is distinct in reality. And consequently, speaking
in an absolute way, it will not add a perfection to its foundation, but it will
express the same [perfection as its foundation] under a different aspect. Other
remaining things have been sufficiently treated in the mentioned place.

Whether a Relation Has a Contrary.

2. Going on, therefore, to the properties of relatives designated by the Phi-
losopher, the first is that a relation has a contrary. 3 For virtue is contrary to
vice. 4 But this is not designated by Aristotle from his own opinion, but as a
consequent of the first definition of relatives, which embraced all relatives "ac-
cording to being said." Rather a contrary can, therefore, be numbered among
the properties of a relation, because nothing is contrary to that, insofar as it is
such, as the Philosopher himself said in the Chapter, On Quality. 5 But relation
has its own proper kind of opposition, which was already explained.

Whether a Relation Receives More or Less.

3. The second property is that a relation receives more and less, which Ar-
istotle says belongs to certain relations, but not to all. For the double is not

1 That is, in Categories, Chapter 7.

2 On this, c£ DM 10, 3, nn. 11-18, vol. 25, pp. 350-52.
3 C£ Categories 7.6b15.
4 Ibid., 6b16.
5 C£ Categories 8.10b22.
264 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Section 18 265
6
more and less double, but the similar or the equal are said to be more and less.
relations, unless it be extended to a relation of reason. Hence, this is not the
But it must be noted that this property is attributed to a relation in another
sense of Aristotle, but rather only that according to some denomination one
way than to a quality. For it belongs to this latter, because it is truly capable of
is denominated in conjunction with the other, and vice versa.
intension and remission, as was treated in the preceding Disputation. 7 But a
For example, knowledge is said to be knowledge of the knowable, and the
relation is not in this way capable of intension. For it is not so by itself, since
knowable is said to be knowable by knowledge. 10 And therefore, Aristotle says
it not produced by itself, nor may it be [so] increased. Neither is it [capable
that this convertibility is sometimes realized in the same and sometimes in
of intension] by reason of its foundation. For even though a foundation is in-
a diverse case. 11 Hence, this property belongs more to the mode of speaking
tensified, it is not necessary that a relation be intensified. For two white things
intensified as eight are not more similar than they were earlier as four. But on about relations than to the reality, although that mode of speaking has a basis
the contrary, sometimes they become more similar through the remission of a in reality. But this is not a peculiar property of categorical relations. For it also
foundation or of a terminus, but sometimes their similarity is diminished. belongs to transcendental relatives and even to relatives of reason.
4. But this more or less is not on account of their intension, but on account 6. The fourth property is that relatives are simultaneous in nature. 12 Fifth, that
of their variation, as Fonseca noted well /p. 867/ in his [Commentary on] they are simultaneous in knowledge 13 and in definition, 14 which have already
Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter 15, Question 5, Section 2. 8 For the relation been explained by us; 15 and, therefore, with regard to the present Disputation,
of equality, for example, properly stated (and the same is true about perfect let these things suffice.
similarity) does not receive more and less, because it consists in something
indivisible. For if one of two equals increases, they do not become less equal,
but rather the equality perishes. But an inequality can be greater and lesser,
on account of greater and lesser recession from perfect equality. And in the
same way, equality or similarity said broadly and in a common way is said to
be greater and lesser. However, those relations of greater or lesser inequality are
indeed diverse and not the same thing that may be increased or diminished,
because their termini and foundations are diverse, and the proportions in which
they consist are also diverse, and thus each one in its own grade of inequalilty
consists in something indivisible. So, therefore, certain relatives are said to
receive more and less, that is, to be denominated more and less such, through
approaching or receding from a perfect terminus, not through intension or
remission.

How Relatives Are Said with Respect to Convertibility.

5. The third property is that relatives are said with respect to convertibility, 9
which some explain in this way that it is the same as being mutually related
or that to one relation there always corresponds another. But, as it evident
from what has been said, in this sense this property does not belong to all

6 Cf. Categories7.6bl9-27. Onmoreorlessequality, cf. n. 4, this Section, immediately

lOibid., 6b33-35.
following.
11 Ibid., 6b36-38.
7 For this, see the whole of Disputation 46 ("About the Intension of Qualities" [De
12Ibid., 7b15.
intensione qualitatum]), vol. 26, pp. 753-81.
13Ibid., 8b13.
8 Cf. Commentaria in Metaph., V, c. 15, q. 5, s. 2, vol. 2, cols. 848-9.
14Ibid., 8a35-37.
9 Cf. Categories 7.6b27.
15See Section 16, esp. nn. 20, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, and 34, above.
DISPUTATIO XLVII
The Latin Text
 DISPUTATIO XLVII.
DE RELATIONE REALI IN COMMUN!.
Post duo praecedentia genera quantitatis et qualitatis, tractat Aristo-
teles de ad aliquid, in V Metaph., c. 15, non quia perfectius sit in entitate sua
quam omnia sex ultima praedicamenta, cum Commentator, XII Metaph.,
com. 19, dicat relationem inter omnia genera esse minimae entitatis; quod
quam verum sit, ex dicendis constabit. Non ergo perfectionis ordinem, sed
ordinem doctrinae videtur Aristoteles observasse, tum quia doctrina ad hoc
praedicamentum pertinens universalior est; tum etiam quia est quodammodo
necessaria ad caeterorum praedicamentorum cognitionem, eo quod magna
ex parte videntur in relatione consistere. Accedit etiam quod quamplurimae
relationes ad quantitatem et qualitatem proxime consequuntur. De relatione
igitur prius in communi videbimus an sit, quid sit, et quotuplex, et quas
proprietates vel causas habeat, et deinde de praecipuis relationum generibus
earumque fundamentis ac terminis magis in particulari disseremus.
Ip. 782/
SECTIO PRIMA.
AN RELATIO SIT VERUM GENUS
ENTIS REALIS,
DISTINCTUM A RELIQUIS.
Variae rationes quibus tota fere difficultas
hujus praedicamenti proponitur.
1. Prima.-Prima ratio dubitandi esse potest quia relatio ut relatio nihil rei
ponit in re quae referri dicitur; ergo non potest constituere reale genus entis.
Consequentia est evidens, quia reale genus fundatur in ente reali, quod in
rerum natura sit seu ponat aliquid; relatio autem, prout rebus creatis tribuitur
(sic enim nunc de illa agimus), non potest aliquid rei esse in rerum natura, si
illud non ponit in re ipsa relata, quia neque in termino aliquid ponit, ut per
se notum est, licet forte supponat, de quo postea; neque in sese manet, cum
non sit substantia; ergo, si in re ipsa relata nihil ponit, absolute nihil rei est.
Probatur autem antecedens, primo, quia ad, ut ad, non dicit realem rationem,
tum quia univoce et secundum totam proprietatem suam convenit relationi-
bus rationis; tum etiam quia ad, ut ad, praescindit ab esse in; ergo ut sic nihil
rei ponit in aliquo. Alioqui secundum propriam et ultimam rationem suam
includeret inesse, quod repugnat; ergo relatio nihil rei ponit in re quam refert.
270 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 271

Patet consequentia, quia relatio ut relatio nihil aliud dicit quam esse ad, dicente similis denominatio sine additione relationis quae sit aliquid rei. Quod si quis
Aristotele relativa illa esse quorum totum esse est ad aliud se habere. dicat in exemplis positis deesse fundamentum ex parte rerum denominatarum,
2. Secundt.-Secundo, quia haec denominatio relativa adveniens alicui de respondebimus et fortasse hoc non esse in universum verum, quod postea
novo, non immutat illud nee in re ipsa facit illud aliter se habere quam antea, tractabimus, et non satisfacere, quia, si res quae non habet fundamentum
dicente Arist. V Phys., text. 10, relationem advenire sine rei mutatione; ergo denominari potest relative ex positione alterius, etiamsi nihil rei ipsi addatur,
relatio nihil ponit in tali re. Patet consequentia, quia impossibile est intelligere ergo multo magis, res quae habet /p. 783/ aliquod fundamentum poterit ex vi
aliquid rei de novo adjungi alicui subjecto, et illud non se habere in re ipsa ejus et coexistentiae alterius praecise, sic denominari, absque additione alicujus
aliter quam an tea, quia, si ei aliquid est additum, aliquid habet quod antea non rei respectivae; ergo hujusmodi respectus nihil rei est praeter absolutum.
habebat: hoc autem ipsum est aliter se habere. Quod autem quidam respondent 5. Quarta.-Quarto argumentari possumus (et est altera ratio principalis
non habere aliquid, sed ad aliquid, ludus quidem verborum esse videtur; nam dubitandi), quia, licet demus relationem esse aliquid rei, non tamen potest
interrogo an illud ad aliquid sit aliquid; nam, si est, ergo qui habet ad aliquid novum genus entis constituere, diversum areliquis. Probatur: quoniam ordo ad
de novo, aliquid etiam de novo habet; ergo aliter se habet, et mutatum est; si aliud, intrinsece includitur in omni reali conceptu entis creati. Nam imprimis
vero ad aliquid non est aliquid, ergo nihil est, et hoc intendimus. omne ens creatum, quatenus tale est, etiam ipsa substantia, dicit habitudinem
/col. b/ essentialis dependentiae ad ens increatum, et ideo est analogice ens, vel substan-
3. Tertia. Tertio declaratur hoc amplius, quia relatio, ut relatio, nihil est praeter tia, comparatione illius. Omne item accidens dicit essentialem habitudinem
absoluta; ergo simpliciter nihil est. Patet consequentia, quia, cum quaerimus ad subjectum, ob quam dicitur esse entis ens, potius quam ens. Rursus, in
an relatio sit aliquid rei, de illa agimus ut distinguitur vel praescinditur a re- singulis generibus accidentium invenire est singulas habitudines; nam quan-
bus absolutis; alioqui quomodo erit distinctum genus entis? Antecedens vero titas quatenus continua est, dicit essentialem habitudinem ad terminos quibus
probatur, quia si ponamus, verbi gratia, duo alba in rerum natura, illa, ex vi continuatur, et e converso punctus, et alii similes termini, dicunt essentialem
qualitatum absolutarum quas habent, sunt inter se similia; ergo habent illam habitudinem ad partes quarum sunt termini. Et inter qualitates potentia dicit
denominationem relativam ex vi absolutorum simul existentium seu simul essentialem habitudinem ad objectum, etde scientia, et consequenter de habitus
sumptorum, absque aliqua alia additione reali; ergo relatio nihil rei addit rebus ac dispositione, Aristot., in cap. de Qualit., fatetur esse ad aliquid.
absolutis. Utraque consequentia est manifesta, quia, si relatio aliquid est, solum 6. Addit vero, esse ad aliquid secundum rationes genericas, scientiae, verbi
est propter illam denominationem relativam quae intercedere videtur inter illa gratia, non vero secundum specificas, nam scientia (inquit) est ad scibile, gram-
absoluta; si ergo haec ipsa denominatio ex solis absolutis sumitur, quidquid matica vero ut sic non est ad aliud. Sed hoc imprimis est falsum; nam, licet forte
aliud adjungitur, fictitium est. Probatur autem antecedens, quia, positis duobus nomina non sint tam dare imposita, tamen secundum rem, sicut scientia in
albis in rerum natura, sive mente separes omne aliud reale eis additum, sive per comm uni, dicit habitudinem ad objectum sci bile in comm uni, ita haec scientia
potentiam Dei absolutam ponamus illud separari aut impediri, nihilominus illa ad hoc objectum. Deinde nihil refert ad praesentem difficultatem; nam genus
duo manebunt inter se similia, nee mens potest aliud concipere, quia neces- et species ad idem praedicamentum pertinent; ergo, si haec scientia in specie
sario retinent unitatem formalem, et nihil aliud est esse similes quam habere est qualitas, ergo scientia in communi est genus de praedicamento q~al~tat~s;
qualitates ejusdem rationis. Quod si quis res'p ondeat hoc vere dici de rebus ergo cum sit etiam ad aliquid, impossibile erit ut ea, quae sunt ad al1qmd, m
similibus fundamentaliter, non formaliter, petet sane principium; nam hoc est speciali praedicamento collocentur. Multo vero minus satisfacerevidetur, quod
quod intendimus, scilicet, ibi non esse aliam denominationem nisi hanc quae statim subdit Aristoteles, non esse absurd um idem collocari sub qualitate, et ad
appellatur fundamentalis; nam haec satis est ut illae res vere sint similes, et aliquid, si utrumque ei convenit. Quia idem non potest essentialiter constitui
illa alia formalis denominatio aut nihil est, aut ad summum est consideratio in diversis praedicamentis; scientia autem, verbi gratia, non accidentaliter
rationis. tantum, sed essentialiter est ad aliquid, tum quia tota ejus entitas intrinsece
4. Et confirmatur, nam hoc modo salvantur multae denominationes similes /col. bl ordinatur ad scibile, ut in cap. de Ad aliquid, Aristoteles fatetur; tum
absque additione aliqua quae intrinsece fiat in re denominata; sic enim dicitur etiam quia alias, si tantum accidentaliter scientia referretur ad scibile, non
Deus creator vel do minus ex tempo re; sic columna dicitur dextra vel sinistra; sic constitueretur ipsa scientia sub genere Ad aliquid, sed illa relatio, quae illi
paries dicitur visus, etc.; ergo, eadem ratione, potest sufficienter salvari omnis accidentaliter advenit, quod est contra Aristotelem in eodem c. de Qualitate.
272 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 273
Eademque difficultas urger de sex ultimis praedicamentis, quae ex omnium
ment. 19; et Avicen., lib. 3 suae Metaph., c. 10; eamque secutus est Aureolos
sententia relationem aliquam includunt, et sic de situ id expresse fatetur Ar-
apud Capreol., in 1, dist. 30, quaest. 1.
istoteles in Praedicam., et de caeteris suis locis dicemus. Ergo haec ratio Ad
9. Secunda.-Alia sententia esse po test, esse quidem in rebus relationes reales,
aliquid, transcendens est, et inclusa in omni entitate, praesertim creata; non
illas vero non constituere peculiare genus en tis, sed esse conditionem quamdam
ergo constituit peculiare genus.
transcendentem, quae in omnibus entibus includi potest. Hane sententiam
7. Duae vero responsiones dari solent ad hanc ultimam difficultatem. Prior
Zenoni et antiquioribus philosophis ante Platonem tribuit Soto in principio
est, haec omnia, quae enumeravimus in caeteris praedicamentis, solum esse
praedicamenti Ad aliquid, ex Albert. et Alexand., ibidem.
relativa secundum dici; ea vero, quae constituunt speciale praedicamentum,
10. Tertia.-Jam vero recepta sententia, et quasi philosophicum et com-
solum esse relativa secundum esse. Sed haec responsio refutabitur facile, si
mune axioma est, dari in rebus creatis relationes reales, proprium ac speciale
interrogemus quid significetur per relativa secundum dici; aut enim sic appel-
praedicamentum constituentes. Haec fuit sententia Platonis, eumque secutus
lantur res illae, de quibus ita loquimur, ac si essent relativae, cum nullam in re
est Aristoteles, et hunc omnes ejus interpretes, Averroes, Simplicius, et caeteri
habeant inter se habitudinem, aut ita appellantur quaedam res, quae habent
omnes Graeci et Latini, quos imitati sunt Theologi, D. Thomas, 1 p., q. 13,
quidem in re aliquam habitudinem, alterius tamen rationis a relatione reali.
art. 7, quaest. 28, art. 1 et 2, et saepe alias; Capreol. et alii, in 1, d. 33; Gregor.,
Primum dici non potest, tum quia scientia non solum in modo loquendi, sed
late, d. 28, q. l; Henrie., Quodl. 3, q. 4, et Quodl. 9, quaest. 3. Non solum
in re habet suum esse ordinatum ad scibile, et potentia ad objectum suum, et
propter rationes philosophicas, sed etiam quod ilia sententia aptior sit ad
sic de aliis; tum etiam quia si hae denominationes vel locutiones respectivae,
mysterium Trinitatis declarandum, et ex illo plurimum confirmari videatur.
dicuntur esse in nostro modo loquendi et non in re, idem dicetur de omnis
11. Docetenim fides Catholicaesse in Deo tres relationes reales, constituentes
simili denominatione, nee relinquetur probabilis via ad ponendas hujusmodi
et distinguentes divinas personas: ex quo fit evidens argumentum, conceptum
relationes reales, nam maxime colliguntur ex hujusmodi denominationibus.
relationis ut sic, non addendo quod creata sit vel increata, non esse fictitium,
Si vero alterum membrum eligatur, explicandum est quaenam sint hujusmodi
et rem aliquam referri non esse denominationem extrinsecam provenientem
habitudines, aut in quo distinguantur a relationibus, vel ad quid sint necessariae
ex sola comparatione mentis, sed /col. bl esse aliquid rei, quandoquidem in
relationes diversae rationis ab hujusmodi habitudinibus. Et in hoc indicatur
Deo aliquid rei est. Et hinc ulterius magna verisimilitudine colligitur, etiam
alia responsio, et difficultas ejus. Did enim solet, in praedictis rebus aliorum
in rebus creatis esse posse aliquid rei. Quia vel repugnaret rebus creatis ob
praedicamentorum includi respectus transcendentales, non vero proprias re-
perfectionem earum, vel repugnaret ob imperfectionem. Primum dici non
lationes praedicamentales, quae peculiare genus constituunt. Statim vero circa
potest, quia si relatio non repugnat summae perfectioni Dei, cur repugnabit
hujusmodi partitionem interrogandum occurrit, quid necesse sit multiplicare
perfectioni creaturae? Dices: quia ilia relatio Dei substantialis est, in creatura
hos diversos modos respectuum; nam si respectus transcendens est verus et
vero esse de bet accidentalis. Sed contra, quia relationi ut sic non magis repugnat
realis, ille sufficit ad omnes denominationes relativas, quae non /p. 784/ sunt
quod sit accidentalis, quam quod sit substantialis, quia sicut accidens dicit esse
pure denominationes extrinsecae; ergo supervacaneum est fingere alias rela-
in alio, ita substantia dicit esse in se; si ergo cum hac ratione conjungi potest
tiones. Deinde oportebit explicare quidnam discriminis sit inter hujusmodi
esse ad aliud, multo magis cum illa; et alioqui creaturae ut sic non repugnat
respectus, vel cur unus constituat peculiare genus, et non alius.
accidens reale; ergo nee repugnabit illi talis relatio, quae, etsi sit accidentalis,
aliquid rei sit. Nee vero repugnare potest ob imperfectionem, quia relatio ut
Vtiriae sententiae proponuntur. relatio non di cit imperfectionem; quod si aliquid imperfectionis ei adjungitur ex
8. Prima.-Hae videntur esse principuae difficultates quae circa relationem
eo quod accidentalis sit, talis imperfectio non est extra latitudinem rei creatae.
realem in comm uni occurrunt. Aliae vero, quae circa singula genera relation um Hoc ergo argumento Theologico efficaciter probari videtur dari posse in rebus
offerri poterant, inferius proponentur. Ob has ergo difficultates possunt esse duo creatis, et de facto dari respectus reales.
dicendi modi. Prior est, nullas esse veras relationes reales, sed denominationes
12. Argumentis autem ex sola naturali ratione desumptis probari hoc soler,
omnes quae ad modum relationum explicantur, desumi ab ipsis absolutis, vel praecipue ex locutionibus et denominationibus relativis quae in rebus ipsis
ex eorum coexistentia. Hane opinionem referunt Averroes, 12 Metaph., com- existunt, absque ulla fictione intellectus, quas proinde necesse est in aliquo
ente reali fundari; non fundantur autem in absoluto; ergo in relativo; datur
274 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 275
ergo in rebus ens reale relativum. Antecedens pater in his denominationibus,
Ratio vero ejus et ostensio potissimum sumenda est ex illis denominationibus
majus, minus, aequale, simile, propinquum, remotum, pater, filius, et similibus.
relativis, addenda duo. Primum est, illas esse tales ut accidant rebus creatis
Hae namque omnes habitudinem plane dicunt ad aliud, sine quo nee esse,
absolutis, possintquevariari in aliquo subjecto sine amissione formae absolutae,
nee intelligi possunt, et in rebus ipsis existunt, ut per se notum videtur.
quod saris constat in omnibus fere exemplis supra adductis. Secundum est, has
13. Quanta vero sit vis harum probationum, videbimus in sequentibus; nam
non esse denomin- /col. bl nationes mere extrinsecas, et in hoc est difficultas,
posterior naturalis ratio magna ex parte pendet ex solutionibus argumentorum,
pendet tamen ex infra dicendis; oportet enim prius modum entitatis talium
quas tradere non possumus, nisi prius multa de distinctione et divisione rela-
relationum et denominationum dedarare.
tionum explicemus. Argumentum autem Theologicum aliquibus non videtur
satis efficax ad ostendendas relationes praedicamentales, quia relationes divinae
extra omne praedicamentum sunt; quod si Deus esset in praedicamento sub- SECTIO II.
stantiae, ad illud idem pertinerent vel reducerentur illae relationes, eo quod Utrum relatio realis praedicamentalis distinguatur
sint personalitates divinae naturae. Sicut personalitates vel substantiae /p. 785/
realiter, vel modaliter ac ex natura rei, a substantia,
creatae ad illud ipsum praedicamentum pertinent. Unde neque argumentum
a simili, a paternitate, verbi gratia, divina ad creatam, est multum efficax, quia et omnibus accidentibus absolutis.
paternitas divina non est resultans, neque consequens generationem, sed potius 1. Haec quaestio maxime necessaria est ad explicandum quo sensu relationes
constituit personam, quae est generationis principium. Et ideo illa paternitas creatae sint aliquid reale, et quid etiam sint, quamve entitatem habeant. In
increata, sicut substantialis est, ita existimari potest quasi transcendentalis, id eaque variae sunt opiniones.
est, in time indusa in conceptu adaequato talis en tis, seu substantiae personalis.
Ex illis ergo relationibus non videntur posse colligi relationes praedicamentales, Prima opinio ponens distinctionem realem rejicitur.
sed ad summum respectus reales transcendentales intime indusi in aliquibus 2. Prima docet relationem realem semper esse rem distinctam realiter a suo
en ti bus. subjecto et fundamento. Haec est opinio veterum Thomistarum, Capreoli,
14. Alia vero ostensio dictarum relationum specialiter sumi solet ex ordine in 1, dist. 30, quaest. 1; Cajetan, 1 part., quaest. 28, art. 2; Ferrar., 4 cont.
universi, qui est accidentarium quid rebus ipsis absolutis, quibus constat Gent., cap. 14. Qui fundantur in verbis D. Thomae eisdem locis, et quaest. 8
universum; nam etsi elementa et coeli alio ordine constituerentur, res ipsae de Potent., art. 1, et in 1, dist. 33, quaest. 1, art. 1, quibus locis constituit dif-
absolutae eaedem essent; est ergo ordo, quern nunc habent, aliquid acciden- ferentiam inter relationem creatam et increatam, quod prior non identificatur
tarium ipsis. Et non est aliquid per rationem confictum, nam per se constat cum substantia, sed est alia res et facit compositionem cum ilia,, quod secus est
in rebus ipsis esse, et ad magnam universi perfectionem spectare, ut testis est in relatione increata. Haec tamen sententia intellecta de propria et rigorosa
Aristot., 12 Metaphys., text. 52; et non est nisi relatio, quam necesse est per distinctione reali, qualis est inter entitates omnino condistinctas, nullum
se ad proprium praedicamentum pertinere, quia non est de intrinseca ratione habet fundamentum satis probabile. Nam quae ab his auctoribus afferuntur
alicujus rei absolutae, nee etiam signari potest ad quod aliorum praedica- de separabilitate relationis a fundamento, aut diversis mutationibus quae in
mentorum pertineat vel revocetur. Verumtamen haec probatio eas patitur eis fieri possunt, ad summum probant distinctionem ex natura rei, si tamen
difficultates quae inter argumentandum tactae sunt, quia ordo pertinens ad aliquid probant; nam probabilius fortasse est etiam illud non ostendere, ut
perfectionem universi tantum est, ut singula corpora in suis naturalibus locis videbimus tractando sequentes opiniones. Ex quarum etiam argumentis, et ex
sint constituta, quod quidem absolutum est in singulis, et in omnibus simul probationibus nostrae sententiae haec opinio sufficienter refutabitur. Quanquam
dicit coexistentiam eorum; quod vero ad hoc consequitur peculiare accidens, ad earn rejiciendam sufficere possint ea, quae in principio sectionis praecedentis
quod sit relatio realis, nihil videtur referre ad universi perfectionem. proposita sunt; illa enim, ut opinor, sufficienter demonstrant, relationem non
esse rem in se habentem propriam entitatem realiter distinctam ab omnibus
Quaestionis resolutio. entitatibus absolutis.
15. Nihilominus tertiam et communem sententiam, ut veram et in phi-
losophia certam supponimus, quam nunc maxime auctoritate confirmamus.
276 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 277
Rejicitur opinio Scoti, quatenus superiori concordat. utriusque extremi absoluti, ex qua mutua coexistentia ait sumi denominationes
3. Atque idem judicium ferendum est de Ip. 786/ opinione Scoti, in 2, illas, quas nihilominus dicit pertinere ad praedicamentum relationis, et sufficere
dist. l, quaest. 3, et in 3, dist. 8, quaest. 1, quantum ad earn partem qua cum
ad illud constituendum. Et de hac parte posterius videbimus. De prioribus
praecedenti convenit. Distinguit enim ille quasdam relationes quae separari
autem respectibus ait distingui realiter a suis fundamentis, in quo convenit cum
nullo modo possunt a suis fundamentis, ut est relatio creaturae, ab aliis quae
praecedentibus opinionibus, et eodem utitur fundamento, scilicet, illo signo
separari possunt, ut est, verbi gratia, relatio similitudinis, et has posteriores separabilitatis fundamenti a tali respectu. De quo signo jam dictum est, ad
ait distingui realiter a fundamentis, propter ipsammet separationem; illas summum posse ostendere distinctionem modalem; neque Durandus amplius
vero negat distingui, quia cum inseparabiles sint, nullum relinquitur signum intendit, ut legenti facile patebit; solumque differt in usu vocis, appellans earn
distinctionis realis, neque aliunde apparet necessitas ejus. Verumtamen, quod realem, quia in rebus ipsis invenitur.
attinet ad priorem partem, jam supra ostensum est, illud signum non indicare 5. Quod vero attinet ad hanc partem sententiae Durandi, advertenda est
distinctionem realem, sed ad summum modalem, maxime quando separatio quaedam subdivisio prioris membri, seu realis habitudinis, quam in eadem
non est convertibilis (ut sic dicam), sicut accidit in praesenti; nam, licet fun- parte breviter attigit, et consideranda etiam sunt exempla quibus utrumque
damentum possit manere sine relatione, relatio tamen non potest ullo modo
membrum declarat. Nam quidam respectus (inquit) consequitur per accidens
manere sine fundamento. Ex quo potest non leve argumentum sumi contra hanc ad fundamentum, ut tactus ad quantitatem; alius sequitur per se, ut inesse
partem, et contra totam superiorem sententiam. Addo praeterea, hoc signum
consequitur etiam ad quantitatem, et utrumque respectum ait distingui in re
in praesenti non esse sufficiens ad indicandam distinctionem modalem, quae
a suo fundamento. Sed in priori membro et exemplo, non videtur Durandus
sit actualis et ex natura rei, quia, licet denominatio relativa tollatur manente
constanter loqui; nam qua ratione ait res dici similes vel aequales, non per ad-
fundamento, et ablato termino, tamen utroque manente auferri non potest, et
ditionem alicujus respectus ex natura rei distincti, sed per solam coexistentiam
ideo ex illo signo non concluditur efficaciter relationem esse aliquid distinctum utriusque extremi, et denominationem inde ortam, consequenter dicere deberet,
afundamento, quod ab illo aufertur quando cessat illa denominatio, quia potest duo corpora sese tangere per denominationem ortam ex coexistentia utriusque
denominatio illa includere vel connotare concomitantiam, aut coexistentiam
extremi in tali loco, absque aliquo alio respectu ex natura rei distincto. Suppono
alterius extremi, et ideo cessare, non quia aufertur aliquid a fundamento, sed enim sermonem esse de tactu pure quantitativo; nam tactus physicus aliquid
quia aufertur aliquid a termino. Unde, si aliquae relationes sunt inseparabiles aliud addit, quamvis non solam relationem, sed actionem physicam unius in
a fundamentis, ideo est quia termini earum non possunt non existere, et ideo aliud. Tactus ergo quantitativus nihil aliud est quam propinquitas quaedam
positis fundamentis necesse est ut denominationes relativae insurgant. Ut, inter duas quantitates et terminos earum, ita /p. 787/ ut nulla alia quantitas
si per impossibile manere posset essentia creata non existente Deo, cessaret
interposita sit. Sed hoc convenit duobus corporibus, hoc ipso quod in talibus
relatio creaturae ad ipsum; quod ergo nunc separari non possit, non solum est locis seu spatiis existunt, absq ue additione alicujus modi, vel respectus ex natura
propter identitatem cum fundamento, sed etiam propter intrinsecam termini rei distincti, saltem juxta doctrinam ipsius Durandi, quia eadem argumenta,
necessitatem. Ergo, e converso, ex eo quod aliae relationes cessent ablatis ter-
quae hoc probare possunt de similitudine, probant de tactu, et de quacumque
minis, non recte infertur distinctio ex natura rei, nisi aliunde ostendatur solam propinquitate vel distantia, nimirum, quia positis duo bus corporibus in tali bus
destructionem ipsius termini ad id non sufficere. locis, et praecisa omni alia revel modo reali vel per intellectum, vel per divinam
potentiam, impossibile est quin illa corpora se tangant; ergo est eadem ratio de
Durandi in hoc sententia non probatur. hac denominatione. Et in universum idem est de omni respectu, qui dicitur per
4. Quapropter Durandus, in 1, dist. 30, /col. bl quaest. 2, alia distinctione accidens consequi ad fundamentum; nam ille ideo per accidens erit, quia est
utitur, scilicet, quasdam esse relationes quae suntverae habitudines et respectus talis denominatio, quae requirit coexistentiam alterius extremi, quam tamen
reales, consequentes ad sua fundamenta, per se, vel accidentaliter, ut inhaerentia ipsum fundamentum secundum se non requirit, ut aperte constat in dicto
per se sequitur ad naturam accidentis, et tangere aut tangi consequitur per exemplo de tactu. Ergo semper potest illa denominatio sumi ex coexistentia
accidens ad corpora quanta; alias vero esse, quae solum sunt denominationes extremorum, absque alio respectu in re ipsa distincto ab extremis; vel si illa
relativae, ut esse aequale et simile. Dicit igitur has posteriores non distingui in non est sola denominatio, sed intrinseca habitudo, idem erit in omnibus illis
re a fundamentis, neque addere aliquid rei ultra existentiam et concomitantiam quas Durandus ponit in secundo membro suae principalis distinctionis.
278 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 279
6. Quod vero spectat ad aliud membrum de respectu, qui per se consequitur esse minorem reali distinctione, majorem modali. Diversitatem autem in hoc
ad fundamentum, et de exemplo inhaesionis, no mine respectus potest significari constituere videtur, quod in distinctione modali modus non habet proprium
ipsemet modus inhaesionis, seu unionis, vel relatio aliqua praedicamentalis esse distinctum ab esse rei, cujus est modus; in hac vero distinctione formali
inde exorta. In priori sensu, verum est illum respectum distingui ex natura rei utrumque extremum habet proprium esse. Item in hac utrumque extremum
a forma seu re cujus est modus, quae appellatur fundamentum talis respectus, est propria entitas; in distinctione autem modali modus non est entitas. Unde
quod a nobis in superioribus saepe traditum est, et eodem argumento confir- in hoc maxime fundat sententiam suam, quod relatio habet proprium esse
matum. Quanquam illud, quod Durandus ait, scilicet, hunc respectum nullam distinctum ab esse fundamenti; nam esse fundamenti est absolutum, et in se
compositionem facere cum suo fundamento, falsum sit, ut in superioribus tantum; esse vero relationis est esse consis- Ip. 788/ tens in habitudine ad aliud,
saepe dictum est, tractando de distinctionibus rerum, et de compositione na- ut ex Aristotelis definitione constat.
turae et suppositi, et aliis locis. Hie vero respectus non est praedicamentalis, 8. Ego tamen imprimis non percipio distinctionem hanc mediam inter re-
sed transcendentalis, quia ille modus unionis vel inhaerentiae non est aliquid alem et modalem, quae sit vera distinctio actualis in re, et multo major quam
resultans ex fundamento et termino, sed est modus absolutus, qui per se fieri distinctio rationis, cum dicatur etiam esse major quam modalis. Primo, quia
potest per actionem aliquam, quamvis in time et essentialiter includat respectum in distinctione modali, sicut modus in re ipsa distinguitur ab ipsa re cujus est
transcendentalem ad unibilia, quod etiam est in superioribus tactum, et infra ex modus, ita habet aliquod esse proprium, aeque et proportionaliter distinctum
professo dedarabitur, partim in hac disputatione, partim disputando de actione. ab esse ipsius rei, ut tractando de existentia dedaratum est. Rursus sicut modus
Con- /col. b/ sideratio ergo illius respectus in praedicto sensu nihil refert ad est aliquid in rebus existens, ita dici potest habere entitatem aliquam, prout
praesentem quaestionem. Si autem sit sermo de respectu praedicamentali, qui hac voce significatur quidquid non est nihil; quia vero talis entitas ejus est na-
resultare censetur inter formam inhaerentem et subjectum ejus, et in universum turae et conditionis, ut per se non valeat ens reale primo ac per se constituere,
inter ea quae sunt unita, eadem erit ratio de tali respectu, quae de contactu, sed necessario debet esse conjuncta et identificata alicui enti, quod afficiat et
similitudine et omnibus similibus, quod nimirum ille, nulla res vel modus modificet, ideo non res, sed modus rei appellatur.
realis sit ex natura rei distinctus ab extremis, sed solum mutua denominatio 9. Hine ergo constat nullum posse esse medium, in distinctionibus ex natura
orta in extremis ex coexistenita eorum sub tali modo existendi. Quod facile rei, inter realem, et modalem, ut in genere supra tractatum est in disputatione
ostendi potest applicando rationem superius factam. Igitur proprie loquendo septima. Et in particulari dedaratur in re de qua agimus. Nam relatio realis, ex
de respectu praedicamentali, haec etiam distinctio Durandi necessaria non eo praecise quod habeat proprium esse, et sit aliquid in re distinctum a fun-
est, sed vel dicendum est omnem relationem praedicamentalem esse aliquid damento, non habet quod sit entitas, aut modus realis; nam illud commune
distinctum, vel non esse. est utrique; ergo praecise ex illo principio non conduditur sufficienter major
distinctio quam modalis, neque aliud genus entitatis, praeter illud quod in
Quarta opinio de distinctione modali velformali modis realibus reperitur. Deinde vel relatio realis talem habet entitatem, quae
rela.tionis a fondamento exponitur. possit intelligi primo ac per se et essentialiter constituta per solam rationem
7. Est igitur quarta sententia, quae in universum affirmat relationem realem respectivam, ita ut ex hoc capite non repugnet talem entitatem solam esse
distingui actualiter a suo subjecto et fundamento, non tamen omnino realiter sine entitate fundamenti: aut vero talem habet entitatis modum, ut intrinsece
ut rem a re, sed modaliter tanquam modum realem ab ipsa re. Hane opinionem postulet esse conjunctum fundamento, et suo modo afficiens illud, ita ut per
videntur tenere Javell., 5 Metaph., quaest. 22; et Sotus, circa praedicamentum nullam potentiam aliter esse possit. Si primum dicatur, aperte concluditur
Ad aliquid, quaest. 2. Illi tamen non appellant hanc distinctionem modalem, esse veram ac propriam rem, omnino realiter distinctam a fundamento, quod
sed formalem, sentiunt tamen esse actualiter in rebus ante omnem consider- haec sententia non admittit. Si vero dicatur secundum, non erit illa distinctio
ationem intellectus. Atvero Fonseca, lib. 5 Metaph., cap. 15, quaest. 2, sect. 5, alia quam modalis, supposito quod actu sit in re. Ergo sicut inter illa duo non
affirmat quidem relationem praedicamentalem distingui afundamento, formali potest cogitari medium, ita neque inter illas duas distinctiones ex natura rei
distinctione, ita ut habeat proprium esse essentiae et existentiae distinctum potest medium excogitari. Aut enim extrema distinctionis possunt in re mutuo
ab esse fundamenti; negat tamen illam distinctionem esse realem, aut esse separari, et unum sine alio vicissim conservari, et sic est distinctio realis omnino
modalem, aut rationis tantum, sed quamdam aliam mediam, quam significat propria et rigo- /col. bl rosa; aut unum tantum extremum potest separari, et

1
280 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 281

manere sine alio, non vero e converso, et hanc distinctionem nos vocamus Secunda item consequentia dara est, quia denominatio intrinseca dicitur, quae
modalem; praeter hos autem duos modos non est alius, quia si utrumque ab intrinseca forma sumitur. Ultima vero consequentia nititur in fundamento
extremum sit inseparabile in re ab alio, erit distinctio rationis, non vero ex saepe repetito, quad haec denominatio amitti potest, et acquiri de novo,
natura rei. Cum ergo in praesenti fundamentum et relatio non sint mutuo conservando omnem formam absolutam; ergo forma intrinseca et respectiva,
separabilia, ut est per se notum apud omnes, quia nullo modo potest intelligi a qua sumitur, est in re aliquo modo distincta ab omnibus formis absolutis,
relatio praedicamentalis sine fundamento, non potest major aut alia distinctio, saltem modali distinctione. Atque haec sententia ita explicata et confirmata est
quae in re actu sit, intervenire inter relationem et fundamentum, praeterquam probabilior caeteris, quae in re ponunt distinctionem aliquam actualem inter
modalis. Quamvis ergo dicti auctores aliis vocibus utantur, appellantes hanc relationem et fundamentum. Quae si semel asseritur in aliquibus relationibus,
distinctionem formalem, tamen necesse est ut de modali loquantur, si tamen consequenti ratione ponenda est in omnibus creatis et praedicamen tali bus, quia
de actuali distinctione, quae in rebus ipsis existat, suam sententiam intelligant: nulla est sufficiens ratio ad utendum aliqua distinctione, ut ex dictis contra
nam aliqui eorum non satis hoc ipsum explicant, ut inferius dicemus. Scot. et Durandum intelligi potest.

Suadetur dicta opinio. Quinta opinio negans in re actualem

10. Praecipuum autem fundamentum hujus sententiae sic expositae de modali distinctionem relationis a fundamento.
distinctione est illud, quod ex signo separationis sumitur. Nam fundamentum 12. Nihilominus est alia sententia extreme his opposita, quae negat relatio-
est ita separabile a relatione, ut possit in re manere sine illa; ergo necesse est nem distingui in re aliqua distinctione actuali a suo fundamento absoluto, sed
ut in re ipsa distinguantur, saltem modaliter, juxta principia superius posita, tantum aliqua distinctione rationis habente in rebus aliquod fundamentum.
disputat. 7. Secundo, hoc satis apparenter confirmat illa ratio, quod relatio Hane sententiam docent multi Theologi, praesertim Nominales, in l, dist.
habet proprium esse, intrinsece consistens in habitudine ad aliud: ergo oportet 30; Ocham, quaest. 1, et dist. 31, quaest. 1; Gregorius, dist. 29, quaest. 2,
ut in re ipsa distinguatur ab esse absoluto. Terrio id declaro in hunc modum, art. 2; et in eadem sententia aperte est Aegidius in l, dist. 26, quaest. 4, dum
quia quando, existente uno tantum albo, verbi gratia, quod antea nulli erat ait, relationem nullum esse proprium habere ultra esse fundamenti, neque ali-
simile, fit aliud album, vel illud prius habet aliquod esse reale respectivum, quam compositionem ei adjunctam, quod non potest esse verum, nisi ratione
quod antea non habebat, vel nihil habet de novo. Hoc secundum dici non omnimodae identitatis in re ipsa. Eamdem plane /col. b/ tenet Sylvester, in
potest, alias relatio nihil rei est, quia si antea nihil erat, et postea nullum esse Conflato, quaest. 28, dubio 1, ubi ait, relationem esse eamdem rem cum suo
reale recipit, nunquam est aliquid; ergo illud esse respectivum, quod additur, fundamento proximo. Et quamvis addat distingui formaliter, tamen statim
necessario debet esse distinctum ab eo cui additur, saltem modali distinctione. satis dedarat, earn distinctionem solum esse rationis ex diversitate concep-
Nam si unum erat, et aliud nondum erat, et postea additur seu consurgit, non tuum, quatenus eadem res solitarie sumpta absolute concipitur, posita vero
possum esse unum et idem in re. alia, concipitur relative, nihil penitus in ea addito vel variato quoad rem ipsam.
11. Quarto, nam cum una res dicitur similis alteri, vel unus homo pater Expressius vero et melius hanc sententiam docet et tractat Hervaeus, in 1, dist.
alterius, vel istae sunt denominationes mere extrinsecae, aut sunt intrinsecae. 30, a. l, et Quodlib. 7, q. 15, et Quodlib. 10, q. 1; quia etiam dedaravit, has
Primum dici non /p. 789/ potest; ergo necessario dicendum est secundum; denominationes relativas sumi ex consortia plurium rerum absolutarum, et
ergo necessaria est aliqua forma intrinsece denominans; ergo illa necessario esse non ex peculiaribus entitatibus, aut modis ex natura rei distinctis, quos addant
debet distincta ex natura rei, saltem modaliter, a re denominata. Minor probatur ipsis rebus absolutis.
primo, quia si esset denominatio extrinseca, ut sic non esset respectiva, quia 13. Habetque haec sententia fundamentum in D. Thoma, opusculo 48,
potius esset veluti applicatio formae extrinsecae ad subjectum denominatum, cap. 2, de Ad aliquid, ubi sic ait: Cum autem dico, quod similitudo Socratis
quam habitudo ipsius subjecti ad terminum extrinsecum. Secundo, quia ob habet albedinem ejus ut fundamentum, non est intelligendum quod similitudo
hanc causam denominatio vestiti, aut loco circumdati, aut etiam agentis, non Socratis sit aliqua res in Socrate, alia ab ipsa albedine, sed solum est ipsa albedo,
est respectiva proprio respectu praedicamentali. Tertio est difficilius, quia alias ut se habet ad albedinem Platonis, ut ad terminum. Idque statim confirmat
non minus esset relatio realis creatoris ad creaturam, quam cujuslibet agentis ratione supra facta, scilicet, quia alias non posset similitudo alicui advenire
creati ad suum effectum; nam extrinsecadenominatio aeque potest intercedere. sine ejus mutatione, quae ratio tam probat de modo reali ex·natura rei dis-

I
L
282 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 283
tincto, quam de propria realitate. Unde etiam fundatur haec sententia in illo denominationem; hoc enim sufficit ut illo ablato cesset denominatio, etiamsi
dicto Philosophi, 5 Physic., textu 10, quod relatio advenit rei, ipsa immutata nihil rei auferatur a re denominata. Ergo ex inseparabilitate relationis posito
manente. Et simili modo sumitur eadem sententia ex Anselmo, in Monolog., fundamento et termino, potius infertur omnimoda identitas in re, seu (quod
cap. 24, quern locum inferius referemus latius tractando de relationibus non idem est) infertur relativam denominationem nihil rei addere supra omnes res
mutuis; et similis fere est apud Augustinum, lib. 5 de Civitate Dei, cap. 16. absolutas.
Favent denique huic sententiae verba Damasceni in sua Dialectica, cap. 52: 16. Quomodo aliqui negent mutari fundamentum per aequisitionem relatio-
Oportet ea, quae ad aliquid dieuntur, prius ad aliud praedieamentum reduci nis.-Quarto urget argumentum illud, quod res fit similis vel aequalis alteri,
tanquam separatim eonsiderata, et tune demum ut habitudinem et ajfeetionem sine ulla sui mutatione, per positionem alterius; nam sive similitudo sit res
ad alterum habentia, ad ea quae ad aliquid sunt referri; quippe prius aliquid sine /col. bl omnino distincta, sive modus realis ex natura rei distinctus, non potest
habitudine ae relatione esse neeesse est, ae tune habitudinem in ipso eonsiderare; de novo advenire alicui absque illius mutatione. Aliqui respondent, modum
quam Damasceni sententiam de relationibus non subsistentibus intelligendam respectivum non sufficere, ut ratione illius solius res dicatur mutari, quia non
existimo; nam alia est de subsistentibus ratio. est aliquid, sed ad aliquid, et quia totum fundamentum, a quo illa relatio habet
14. Rationes pro hac sententia praecipuae sunt illa, quibus aliae opiniones, suam entitatem, jam praeexistit in re. Hoc vero non satisfacit, quia illa verba,
quae distinctionem in re ponunt, improbantur; nam illis seclusis, a sufficienti scilicet, relationem non esse aliquid, sed ad aliquid, vel involvunt repugnantiam,
partium enumeratione haec sententia concluditur. Deinde ex re ipsa, /p. 790/ vel sunt valde aequivoca, et minime ad rem. Nam si non esse aliquid, absolute
quia haec distinctio rationis, et hie modus denominationis sufficit ad omnia, et transcendenter sumatur, sequitur plane relationem esse nihil, et esse ad
quae de rebus absolutis relative dicuntur, ut videntur etiam convincere rationes aliquid, nihil rei esse, ut supra argumentabar. Si vero contractius sumatur esse
primo loco positae in principio sectionis praecedentis. Si autem hoc sufficit, aliquid, ut idem sit quod esse rem vel modum absolutum, petitur principium,
superfluum est quippiam addere; nam distinctio ac multiplicatio rerum ac et non solvitur, sed eluditur argumentum. Nam quamvis relatio non sit aliquid
modorum realium fingendaaut asserenda non est absque necessitate, vel ratione absolutum, si tamen est aliquid rei, novum, et ex natura rei distinctum ab omni
sufficiente. eo quod antea erat, ergo ratione illius vere ac proprie intrinsece aliter se habet
15. Tertio, possumus retorquere argumentum illud de separabilitate; nam res, quam autem se habebat; ergo vere mutata est. Neque etiam sufficit ad
positis, verbi gratia, duobus albis, impossibile est etiam de potentia absoluta vitandam mutationem, quod totum relationis fundamentum praeexistat, quia
facere, ut non sint similia; ergo haec denominatio non sumitur ex aliqua re, non diximus rem mutari propter fundamentum, sed propter id quod additur
aut modo reali distincto ex natura rei ab utroque albo, simul sumpto. Alioqui fundamento, quod dicitur esse aliquid rei, et ex natura rei distinctum ab ipso.
cur repugnaret Deum auferre modum illum, si in re ipsa distinctus est, aut Unde juxta hanc sententiam non potest consequenter did, quod relatio habeat
cur non posset impedire resultantiam talis modi? Nam si haec est circa rem suam propriam seu modalem entitatem ab ipso fundamento formaliter, sed
distinctam, aliqualis efficientia est, quae sine influxu Dei esse non potest; ad summum radicaliter, quatenus ab ipso fundamento pullulat relatio posito
poterit ergo Deus suum influxum suspendere, et illam resultantiam impedire. termino; hoc autem non excludit veram mutationem, quandoquidem aliquid
Quod aliqui argumento convicti concedunt, ut Mairon., in 1, dist. 29, q. 2. novum et distinctum fit in re, etiamsi ab intrinseco manet.
At tune interrogo an illa duo alba maneant similia, necne; hoc posterius non 17. Admittentes mutari fundamentum per resultantiam relationis, ut explieent
potest mente concipi, cum retineant eamdem unitatem in albedine; si vero Aristotelem.-Vnde aliqui tandem fatentur, per adventum novae relationis
di~atur primum, convincitur modum illum distinctum, et resultantiam quae seu denominationis relativae fieri in re ipsa relata veram mutationem realem,
nunc fingitur, esse sine fundmento adinventa, cum sine illis maneat vera simili- non quidem per propriam actionem, sed per intrinsecam dimanationem;
tudo. Signum ergo est hanc denominationem non sumi, nisi ab his absolutis Aristotelem autem non esse locutum universe de quacunque mutatione com-
coexistentibus, et eodem modo se habentibus. Unde, ut supra dicebam, quod munissime sumpta, sed de ilia quae per propriam actionem et passionem fit.
per ablationem termini cesset illa denominatio, nullum argumentum est, Verumtamen, quamvis haec responsio consequenter procedat, supposita dicta
quod similitudo sit aliquis modus realis ex natura rei distinctus ab albedine, sententia, possitque facile defendi ad effugiendum testimonium Aristotelis in
sed solum est argumentum quod ipse terminus est in re distinctus a funda- citato loco 5 Phys., tamen per sese considerata quippiam dicit creditu difficilli-
mento, et aliquo modo concurrit, vel necessarius est ad complendam talem /p. 791/ mum, et nullo sufficienti signo aut experimento fundatum, nimirum,
284 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 285
quoties aliquis de novo fit albus aut calidus, pullulare in omnibus aliis reb~s
Ex qua distinctione plane efficitur, relationem, secundum esse in, non distin-
calidis aut albis, quae sunt in mundo, aliquid novum et reale, vere ac propne
gui ex natura rei a fundamento, quia necessario convenit illi, etiam.a~teq~am
unicuique inhaerens. Ut enim in superioribus videtur satis probatum, ad solas
terminus existat, seu independenter a termino; at vero esse ad, d1stmgm ex
illas denominationes, similis, aequalis, et hujusmodi, non est necessaria illa
natura rei, ideoque posse resultare ex fundamento, posito termino.
resultantia novi realis modi et entitatis; secluso autem hoc signo, nullum est
19. Quot inconvenientia ex allata opinione oriantur.-Primum.-Quapropter
aliud unde colligi potest; gratis ergo et sine probabilitate fingitur. Accedit quod
haec sententia multa involvit impossibilia, et quae non satis intelligi possunt.
illa qualiscunque mutatio vel acquisitio illius novi realis modi vel entitatis, non
Primum, quia ex illa sequitur, in una et eadem relatione distinguenda esse ac-
po test esse sine efficientia, saltem per mod um resultantiae, quia omnis mutatio,
tualiter et ex natura rei, esse in, et esse ad; nam esse in, dicitur esse in re idem
eo modo quo talis est, includit actionem proportionatam. Inquiro ergo an
et indistinctum a fundamento, esse autem ad, dicitur actu distinctum in re a
illa efficientia sit ab ipso termino in fundamentum, vel ab ipso fundamento
fundamento; ergo esse in, et esse ad, erunt inter se actu distincta, nam quae ita
in se ipsum per naturalem resultantiam. Primum a nemine asseritur; neque
comparantur ad unum tertium, ut unum sit idem cum illo, aliud v~ro mi~i~e,
est probabile; quomodo enim terminus ageret simul in res pene infinitas, et
neque etiam inter se possunt esse idem. Consequ~ns a~tem. est 1mposs1b1le,
quantumcunque distantes? Item, quia si ita fieret relatio, nihil ei deesset, quo-
quia esse in, et esse ad, comparantur tanquam superms et mferms, seu tanquam
minus per propriam actionem et per se fieret ab extrinseco agente. Denique
commune vel transcendens, et modus determinans seu modificans illum, quae
quia relatio intrinsece convenit rei posito fundamento et termino; non ergo
impossibile est esse in re distincta, ut in superioribus traditum est. . .
pendet ex efficientia extrinseci agentis. Secundum etiam improbari potest, quia
20. Secundum.-Secundum inconveniens est, quiasequitur, esse ad, relattoms
talis efficientia, etiamsi sit ab intrinseco principio, erit per propriam actionem,
realis creatae ut sic, non esse accidens alicujus, et consequenter non constituere
et consequenter per propriam mutationem, quia licet talis resultantia non sit
verum accidens reale, quod est contra rationem hujus praedicamenti. Sequela
nisi posito termino, id solum erit, quia terminus est aut necessaria conditio
patet, quia illud esse ad, non indudit essentialiter esse in, cum ab illo e~ na-
ut relatio resultet, aut quasi objectum specificans, sine quo esse non potest;
tura rei distinguatur et praescindatur. Item, quia si illud esse ad, esset acc1dens
hoc autem non obstat quominus resultantia, quae fit ex fundamento, sit per
alicujus, illud afficeret, et de novo ei adveniret, et ita redit difficultas quam
propriam actionem, quae in tali subjecto fit absque alia actione, quae tune in
tractamus, quod, nimirum, ex resultantia ipsius esse ad, /p. 792/ mutaret~r r~s
illo interveniat. Sicut descensus deorsum naturaliter resultat ex gravitate lapidis
seu fundamentum ex quo resultat. Sed aiunt, esse ad ut ad, non esse al1qmd
ablato impedimenta, et nihilominus fit per propriam actionem et mutationem.
reale, et ideo mirum non esse quod neque sit accidens, neque insit, neque im-
Ac denique hie habet locum argumentum saepe tactum, quod talis resultan-
mutet relativum quod denominat. Sed hoc neque est vere, neque consequenter
tia, et qualiscunque efficientia non potest esse sine concursu Dei, quern ipse
dictum, si univoce terminis utamur, et praesertim juxta dictam sentent.iam,
potest suspendere. Et quamvis ponamus illum suspendere, et consequenter
quae supponit relationem realem esse aliquid in r~ i?sa, quod in reb~s sit'. et
nullam intervenire resultantiam realem, adhuc intelligimus res esse similes, vel
secundum aliquid sui in re ipsa a fundamento d1stmguatur. Quamv1s emm
aequales, positis talibus extremis; ergo nullum signum est talem resultantiam
loquendo de esse ad, ut attribuitur relationibus rationis, illud non sit aliquid
vel mutationem intervenire.
reale, tamen, ut infra ostendam, illud solum aequivoce, vel ad summum se-
/col. bl
cundum analogiam quamdam proportionalitatis, appellatur esse ad, de quo
nunc non est sermo, sed de vero esse ad, quod reale praedicamentum accidentis
Tractatur opinio distinguens inter esse in, et esse ad relationis.
constituit; illud autem non potest non esse aliquid reale, alias quomodo posset
18. Quapropter alii, ut huic difficultati respondeant, quadam distinctione
verum accidens reale constituere? Aut quomodo posset relatio esse intrinseca
utuntur; et posset haec referri ut sexta opinio in praesenti quaestione, quam
forma referens suum subjectum ad terminum, si non afficeret illud secundum
tractamus de distinctione relationis et fundamenti. Distinguunt ergo in rela- . secundu~ ipsu~.
tione esse in et esse ad, et dicunt relationem, secundum esse in, non resultare propriam rationem suam et consequenter et1am esse ad?..
21. Et confirmatur, nam quoad hoc eadem est fere rat10 de ipso esse m;
proprie, nee pullulare a fundamento, sed resultare tantum secundum esse ad
ut ad, et idcirco non mutari fundamentum per talem resultantiam, quia res potest enim aequivoce vel analogice sumi, ut attri~uitur ent.i~us ~ati~nis; sic
enim dicitur caecitas esse in oculo; ergo ut sic, esse m, non d1c1t al1qmd reale;
non mutatur nisi per id quod de novo ei inest, atque adeo secundum esse in.
nihilominus tamen, verum esse in reale est, quod accidens reale constituit.
286 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 287
Simili ergo modo philosophandum est de vero esse ad, quod nimirum sit
rationis cum aliquo fundamento in re, ut de actione etiam et passione, et de
quippiam reale, unde fit ut necessario esse debeat aut intrinsece subsistens,
aliis praedicamentis inferius dicemus. Atque haec sententia magis declarabitur,
quod did non potest de relatione acddentali, aut intrinsece inhaerens, quod tum ex solutionibus argumentorum, tum etiam ex sequentibus sectionibus.
intendimus. Igitur, si esse ad, relationis realis est quid distinctum ex natura
rei a fundamento talis relationis, etiam esse in, proprium et intrinsecum talis
Fundamentis aliarum opinionum satisfit.
relationis, erit distinctum, vel e converso, si null um esse in relationis distinguitur
23. Fundamenta ergo primae, secundae, tertiae, et sextae opinionis, inter eas
ex natura rei 1 a fundamento,neque esse ad distinguetur. Unde tandem argumen-
referendas et impugnandas tacta sunt et soluta; ne- /p. 793/ que aliquod aliud
tor, quia impossibile est ut relatio secundum esse ad, resultet a fundamento,
argumentum occurrit, quod in favorem earum difficultatem aliquam ingerere
tanquam quid reale ex natura rei distinctum ab ipso, quin illud ipsum reale,
possit, cui satisfacere necesse sit. Solum ergo supersunt solvenda argumenta
quidquid est, alicubi insit; nam vel in se existit, et sic erit subsistens, vel ab
quartae opinionis. Et prim um quidem deseparabilitate relationis a fundamento
aliquo sustentatur, et ita illi inerit; ergo, vel inest in termino, quod did non
jam solutum est; negamus enim relationem separari unquam a fundamento
potest, ut per se notum est, vel inest in proprio subjecto seu fundamento, et
secundum aliquid reale quod ei intrinsecum sit. Sed solum contingit, separari
ita ab illo distin- /col. bl guetur tale esse ad, etiam secundum proprium esse
aut destitui terminum, quo ablato cessat etiam relativa denominatio, non quia
in, quod intrinsece includit. Est ergo vana illa distinctio ad praesentem rem
aliquid rei vel realis modi auferatur ab ipso relativo, sed quia denominatio
explicandam, nee per illam vitatur difficultas tacta, quod per relationem re-
relativa includit aliquo modo terminum, sine quo non manet actualiter, sed
sultantem mutetur aliquo modo res relata, si relatio secundum proprium esse
fundamentaliter tan tum, seu in proximaaptitudine. Ad secundum respondetur,
reale est aliquid ex natura rei actualiter distinctum a suo fundamento.
esse relationis in re non esse aliud ab esse fundamenti, ratione tamen distingui,
quatenus illudmet esse concipitur ut includens aliquo modo, seu connotans
Quinta sententia convenienter exposita approbatur. terminum quern respidt. Ad tertium respondeo, quando unum album de novo
22. Inter has ergo sententias mihi maxime probatur quinta, quam Hervaeus fit, nihil rei de novo addi altero albo, ut dedaratum et probatum est. Neque
et nonnulli alii Thomistae docuere, a quorum sensu fere nihil discrepant inde sequitur relationem similitudinis nihil esse, sed solum sequitur non esse
Nominales, etAristotelesetD. Thom. multumfavent, utvidimus. Haectamen aliquid distinctum ab albedine, quae antea inerat tali rei albae. Cum autem
sententia ita est interpretanda, ut non intelligatur, rationem formalem relationis instatur, quia prius in tali re alba non erat similitudo, et postea est similitudo;
nihil esse, aut denominationem relativam esse mere extrinsecam, sumptam ab ergo vel similitudo nihil rei est, vel aliquid rei de novo est in illa re alba: respon-
aliqua forma absoluta; juxta hunc enim sensum omnino everteretur, et e medio detur negando consequentiam quoad utramque partem; nam praeter illa duo
tolleretur reale praedicamentum Ad aliquid. Sed intelligendum est, relationem membra est aliud tertium, nimirum aliquid rei esse de novo, non in re, quae
quidem dicere formam aliquam realem, et intrinsece denominantem proprium prius erat alba, sed in termino, qui de novo factus est albus, quern terminum
relativum, quod constituit; illam vero non esse rem aliquam aut modum, ex aliquo modo indudit seu connotat illa res, quae est sfmilitudo, sub ratione et
natura rei distinctum ab omni forma absoluta, sed esse in re formam aliquam conceptu similitudinis, et non sub ratione albedinis. Ad quartum respondetur,
absolutam, non tamen absolute sumptam, sed ut respidentem aliam, quam has denominationes respectivas, non esse mere extrinsecas, ut recte ibi probatur.
denominatio relativa includit seu connotat. lta ut similitudo, verbi gratia, Unde consequenter concedimus, hujusmodi denominationem esse ab aliqua
aliqua forma realis sit existens in re, quae denominatur similis; illa tamen non forma intrinseca, includendo tamen seu connotando aliquam aliam extrinsecam
sit in re distincta ab albedine, quantum ad id, quod ponit in re, quae didtur in extrinseco termino. Ac propterea negatur ultima consequentia, nimirum,
similis, sed solum quantum ad terminum quern connotat; et ita similitudo in hanc formam sic denominantem intrinsece cum habitudine ad extrinsecum,
re non est aliud quam ipsamet albedo, ut respiciens aliam albedinem, tanquam debere esse ex natura rei distinctam, saltem modaliter, ab omni forma absoluta;
ejusdem seu similis rationis. Atque haec distinctio rationis sufficit, tum ad nam supposito termino extrinseco, ipsamet forma absoluta secundum rem
diversas loquendi formas, tum etiam ad praedicamentorum distinctionem; sufficit ad talem denominationem tribuendam, quae auferri vel cessare potest
nam, ut supra diximus, praedicamentalis distinctio interdum est sola distinctio per solam ablationem extrinseci termini, ut dictum est.
/col. bl
1 The Vives edition omits "rei".
288 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 289

Satisfit argumentis ex sectione prima relictis. de hac re erit inferius specialis sectio instituenda; nunc solum dicimus, quando
24. Primo.-Secundo.-Tertio.-Ex his etiam quae in hac sectione dicta sunt, in re denominata est aliquod proprium et proportionatum fundamentum
soluta manent multa ex argumentis propositis in principio sectionis praece- talis denominationis, tune provenire ex propria relatione reali; quando vero
dentis. Nam quod ad primum attinet; jam explicatum est quomodo ipsum attribuitur rei sine tali fundamento, tune denominationem esse extrinsecam
esse ad relationis realis et accidentalis, sit aliquid in re ipsa quae referri dicitur. seu rationis.
Falsumque est, esse ad, univoce dici de relationibus rationis et realibus. Falsum
item est, verum esse ad, posse ita praescindi ab esse in, ut illud intrinsece non
includat; ad eum modum quo in superioribus diximus, modos en tis non posse SECTIO III.
ita praescindi ab ente, quin illud in se claudant. De secundo item argumento, Quotuplex sit relatio, et quae sit vere praedicamentalis.
nimirum, quod relatio adveniat sine mutatione fundamenti, satis multa dicta 1. Haec dubitatio proponitur propter difficultatem tactam in quarto argu-
sunt; concedimus enim inde recte concludi, relationem non esse aliquid in re mento in prima sectione proposito. Ad quam expediendam nonnullae dis-
distinctum a fundamento, non tamen non esse aliquid rei. Unde ad tertium tinctiones relativorum praemittendae sunt ac declarandae, ut seclusis iis quae
negatur prima consequentia (scilicet, relatio nihil est praeter absoluta; ergo ad hoc praedicamentum non pertinent, concludamus quale possit esse genus
simpliciter nihil est), si in antecedente, ilia particula,praeter, indicet actualem accidentis realis ab aliis diversum, et proprium praedicamentum ad aliquid,
distinctionem ex natura rei. Nam licet relatio non sit aliquid in re distinctum constituens.
ab absolutis, potest esse aliquid ratione distinctum; et ideo non sequitur, quod
sit simpliciter nihil. Neque refert quod relatio ut relatio praescinditur ab ab- Prima divisio re/,ationis in reakm et rationis.
solutis, quia neque praescinditur ut aliquid per rationem confictum, neque 2. Primo ergo dividi solet relatio in earn quae realis est, vel tantum rationis,
etiam ut aliquid in re ipsa praecisum et distinctum, sed ut aliquid verum et quam aliqui ita interpretantur, ut doceant, genus praedicamenti Ad aliquid,
reale, ratione sola praecisum: saepe enim distinctio est rationis inter extrema utramque relationem sub se continere, ac propterea illam divisionem esse uni-
vera et realia, quae ad praedicamenta constituenda sufficiunt; unde probationes vocam, imo et generis in species. Cui sententiae videtur favere divus Thom. 1
omnes, quae in illo tertio argumento afferuntur, utiles sunt ad declarandum p., quaest. 28, art. l, ubi sic inquit: Considerandum est, quod solum in iis quae
quomodo relatio realis non addat rebus absolutis rem, vel realem modum, ex dicuntur ad aliquid, inveniuntur aliqua secundum rationem tan tum, et non secun-
natura rei distinctum ab ipsis, non tamen quicquam valent ad concludendum dum rem. Sentit ergo ea, quae secundum rationem tantum referuntur, vere ac
hujusmodi relationem nihil omnino esse. univoce esse ad ali- /col. bl quid: nam si tantum esset sermo de denominatione
25. Notabile.-Duo tamen in illis argumentis cavendasunt. Prim um est, cum aequivoca vel analoga, non tantum in his quae sunt ad aliquid, sed etiam in
dicitur denominatio respectiva consurgere ex coexistentia plurium absolutorum aliis generibus invenirentur aliqua secundum rationem tantum, ut caecitas in
absque ullareali additione, non esse intelligendum, illam denominationem aeque qualitate, et sic de aliis. Idem sumi potest ex art. 2 ejusdem quaestionis, et ex
ac simul sumi ex pluribus formis absolutis, una intrinseca, et altera extrinseca. quaest. 13, art. 7, et Quodlib. 1, art. 2, Quodlib. 9, art 5, etquaest. 2 de Potent.,
Sed intelligendum est, illam denominationem requirere quidem consortium, art. 5, et saepe alibi. Unde Cajetanus dictis locis primae partis, aperte sentit
seu coexistentiam talium rerum seu /p. 794/ formarum; tamen in unoquoque ipsum esse ad, univoce dici de relatione reali, vel rationis; quod antea videtur
extremo sumi a propria forma ut respiciente aliam, quae ut sic habet rationem docuisse Capreol., in primo, dist. 33, quaest. 1; et sequi videtur ibi Dec;:a, quaest.
relationis, quamvis in re non sit alia ab ipsa forma absoluta. Secundo (propter l, notab. 4; et Ferrara, 4 contra Gent., c. 14; et expressius Soncin., 5 Metaph.,
exemplum quod ibi adducitur de Deo quatenus denominatur dominus, vel quaest. 26, concl. 2, qui afferunt alia testimonia D. Thomae. Fundamentum
creator, etc.), cavendum est ne quis existimet hujusmodi denominationes esse eorum est, quia definitio relativorum, quam Aristoteles tradit, et proprietates
ejusdem modi et rationis in omnibus; id enim verum esse non potest, juxta omnes quae ad illam consequuntur, aeque conveniunt relationibus rationis, ac
communem doctrinam, quae distinguit relationes in mutuas et non mutuas, realibus. Patet, nam relativa esse dicuntur, quorum totum esse est ad aliud se
quae distinctio nulla esset, si praedictae denominationes omnes essent ejusdem habere; hoc autem omnino et propriissime convenit respectibus rationis; nam
modi in omnibus extremis. Quae autem sit haec diversitas, non est facile ad licet esse eorum sit magis imperfectum ac diminutum, quam esse relativorum
explicandum, juxta doctrinam ac sententiam quam defendimus. Quapropter realium, tamen illud esse qualecunque est, tam proprie consistit totum in
290 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation 291
Disputaton 47: Latin Text
habitudine ad aliud, sicut esse relationis realis. Unde fit ut relatio rationis nee hoc secundum did non potest, alioqui relatio realis non habebit proprium et
cognosci possit, nee definiri sine habitudine ad aliud, aeque ac relatio realis. formale constitutivum reale, quae est implicatio in adjecto; quomodo enim
potest ens reale ut sic, per id quod reale non est, constitui? De qua re diximus
Sola. rela.tio realis praedicamentum Ad aliquid constituit. multa superius disputatione 2, tractando de modis contrahentibus ens. Si
3. Nihilominus dicendum est, solas relationes reales pertinere ad constitutio- autem illud esse ad, in relatione reali est modus realis, rursus interrogo an in
nem praedicamentiAd aliquid, quod est satis evidens ex iis quae in superioribus relatione rationis sit etiam verus et realis modus, vel tantum per in tel- /col. bl
tradita sunt de conceptu entis, et de divisione ejus in novem genera summa. lectum confictus. Primum did non potest, quia repugnat relationi rationis, de
Ostendimus enim ens non solum non esse univocum ad ens reale et rationis, cujus essentia est, ut non dicat habitudinem in re existentem, sed in mentis
verum etiam non habere unum conceptum communem illis, etiam analogum, comparatione seu denominatione. Item, quia contradictionem implicat, quod
sed vel esse aequivocum, vel ad summum, analogum analogia proportionalitatis. ens fictum existens tantum objective in intellectu, per modum realem et in re
Et hac ratione etiam diximus, objectum adaequatum et directum metaphysicae ipsa existentem constituatur; est ergo illud esse ad, in relatione rationis, purum
non esse ens commune ad reale et rationis, sed ad reale tantum; et hoc etiam ens rationis. Ergo sicut non potest dari conceptus communis vel univocus ad
ostendimus dividi in decem suprema genera. Cum ergo relationes rationis non ens reale et rationis, vel ad relationem realem et rationis, ita neque esse ad, ut
sint entia realia, et consequenter nee vera entia, non possum ad praedicamen- sic praecise conceptum, potest dicere unum communem conceptum et uni-
tum Ad aliquid, quod reale est, pertinere. Addo praeterea, non posse habere vocum ad esse ad relationis realis et rationis, quia non magis potest esse inter
uni- /p. 795/ vocam convenientiam cum relationibus realibus, si supponamus haec vera similitudo et convenientia, quam inter quaelibet alia entia realia et
illas esse vera entia realia, ut supra ex communi sententia suppositum est, et rationis. Nee magis potest in his quam in caeteris intelligi qualis sit ille con-
in discursu hujus materiae paulatim declarabitur et probabitur. Ratio autem ceptus abstrahens ab ente reali et rationis, aut qualis esse possit contractio vel
est, quia cum ens rationis nihil sit, non potest habere veram similitudinem ac determinatio talis conceptus ad ens reale per modum realem, et ad ens rationis
convenientiam cum ente reali, in qua convenientia fundari solet univocatio per modum rationis.
et unitas conceptus; ergo non potest aliquis verus conceptus et essentialis esse 5. Sola relatio realis estproprie ad aiiquid.-D. Thomae locus expiicatur.-Di-
communis enti reali et rationis. Et ideo merito Soncin., 4 Metaph., q. 5 et 6, cendum ergo est solam relationem realem esse vere et proprie ad aliquid; rela-
approbat dictum Hervaei (quamquam errore typographi tribuatur Henrico), tionem autem rationis non esse, sed condpi ac si esset ad aliquid, ideoque solas
Quodl. 3, q. 1, articulo primo, in fine, non magis posse ens esse univocum ad relationes reales ad proprium praedicamentum Ad aliquid pertinere; relationes
ens reale et rationis, quam sit homo ad hominem vivum et mortuum. Habet autem rationis non constitui in reali praedicamento, sed per analogiam et
autem hoc dictum eamdem rationem veritatis in ente in communi, et in tali proportionem ad veras relationes declarari, ut magis in particulari dicemus in
ente, scilicet, relatione, quia sicut ens rationis non est verum ens, sed fictum, disputatione ultima hujus operis. Neque D. Thomas in dtatis lods oppositum
sic relatio rationis non est vera relatio, sed ficta, vel quasi per intellectum. intendit; nunquam enim dixit aut relationem rationis esse univoce relationem
4. Objectioni satisfit. Dicet fortasse aliquis, hoc verum esse de integro et cum reali, aut esse ad aliud non esse aliquid reale in relatione reali, sed solum
completo conceptu relationis, de quo procedit ratio facta, quia in hujusmodi dixit naturam relationis realis talem esse, ut per similitudinem et proportionem
conceptu relationis realis includitur, quod sit verum ens, et accidens reale; non ad illam possin ten tia rationis per mod um relation um ab in tellectu confingi cum
tamen ita procedit de praeciso conceptu ipsius modi seu constitutivi relationis, aliquo fundamento in re, po ti us quam per mod um quantitatis vel qualitatis, etc.
qui per hanc vocem significatur, esse ad, quia talis conceptus per se praescindit Quod ait, ex eo provenire, quod relatio ut relatio sol um significat respectum ad
a ratione entis et accidentis. Quo sensu videntur locuti dtati auctores, cum aliud. Ubi particula so/um non excludit concomitantia; unde neque excludere
quibusvidetursentireHenricus, Quodl. 9, q. 3, ubidehacmateriaobscurissime potest transcendentalem rationem entis, vel accidentis, si relatio acddentalis
disputat; inter alia vero ait: Esse ad aliud ex se nuilam recipit distinctionem, aut sit. Quia vero relatio quatenus praedse condpitur aut significatur ut est ad
diversitatem, sive foerit in divinis, sive in creaturis, sive in relationibus secundum aliud, non condpitur nee significatur /p. 7961 expresse ut inhaerens, ideo ait
rem, sive in reiationibus secundum rationem. Verumtamen contra hanc evasionem D. Thomas, ut sic solum dicere respectum ad aliud, non quia in re ipsa non
eamdem vim habet ratio facta; nam vel illud esse ad, prout est modus con- sit aliquid in se, vel in subjecto existens, sed quia in tali modo condpiendi et
stituens relationem realem, est etiam realis modus, vel est tantum ens rationis; significandi nihil aliud exprimitur. Et inde etiam fit ut facilius possint entia
 292 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 293
rationis secundum ill um modum habitudinis concipi, non quad in tali relatione
explicatur. Sic enim divinam omnipotentiam dicimus esse relativam secundum
sit vera habitudo, seu verum esse ad, tale quale est in relatione reali, sed quid
did, non propter relationem rationis quam in illa fingamus, sed quia illam
ad instar seu proportionem ejus concipitur. Unde idem D. Thomas postquam
dixit relationem secundum propriam rationem solum significare respectum ad non concipimus, nee explicamus, nisi cum concomitantia alterius, ad quad
aliud, subdit hunc respectum aliquando esse in ipsa natura rerum, aliquando est potentia, et per modum habentis habitudinem ad illud. Unde, licet verum
vero esse solum in apprehensione rationis conferentis unum alteri. Ad rationem sit, hunc dicendi modum seu loquendi de relatione secundum did, supponere
autem illius sententiae facile respondetur, negando propriam rationem relationis modum concipiendi, tamen ille modus concipiendi non est talis, ut ex illo
vere reperiri in relatione rationis, quia in tali relatione nee est vera habitudo, necessario resultet vel apprehendatur relatio rationis, quia non est conceptus
nee verum esse ad aliquid, sed so1um apprehenditur ac si esset ad aliquid. reflexivus, aut comparativus, sed est conceptus directus rei absolutae, imper-
fecte tamen conceptae ad modum earum rerum quae habent habitudinem ad
Secunda divisio relationis, secundum dici, et secundum esse. alia; in quo modo concipiendi non attribuitur ipsi objecto cognito habitudo
6. Secunda divisio relationis est in relationem secundum esse, et secundum ulla nee realis, nee rationis, sed solum ex parte concipientis fit conceptus per
did. Quae divisio fundamentum habet in Aristotele, cap. de Ad aliquid, ubi quamdam imitationem et analogiam ad conceptus rerum respectivarum.
prius tradit definitionem communem relativis secundum dici, postea vero tradit Sicut quando a nobis concipitur res spiritualis instar corporeae, non attribui-
propriam definitionem relativorum secundum esse. Relatio ergo secundum mus objecto corporeitatem realem, alias falsa esset conceptio, neque etiam
did, definiri solet, quod sit res quae concipitur et explicatur, seu dicitur per fingimus aut cogitamus in illo objecto aliquod ens rationis; quale enim illud
modum respectus, cum in re ipsa verum respectum non habeat; relatio autem esset? Solum ergo concipimus unam rem per analogiam ad aliam. Sic igitur
secundum esse dicitur, quae revera habet proprium esse cum habitudine ad interdum concipimus reni absolutam instar respectivae, et de ilia ita loquimur
aliud. ac si respectiva esset, et ideo dicitur esse relativa secundum did tan tum. Unde
7. Relatio secundum did ut explicetur ab aliquibus.-Ex quo aliqui, et non constat, relationes tantum secundum dici, extra genus relationis esse, nee per
sine verisimilitudine, opinati sunt, relationem secundum did, esse eamdem se posse /p. 797I pertinere ad praedicamentum Ad aliquid, imo sub ea ratione
cum relatione rationis. Quad significat Henrie., Quodl. 3, q. 4, ex Avicenna, ad nullum praedicamentum pertinere, nam, ex eo quod res a nobis imperfecte
1. 3, suae Metaph., dicente relationem secundum did, esse illam quae solum concipiatur aut dicatur, non accipit peculiarem naturam, ratione cujus debeat
habet esse in intellectu, et convenit rebus quae non sunt simpliciter et absolute in peculiari praedicamento collocari. Et ideo Aristoteles, in praedicamento Ad
ad aliquid, sed solum secundum quod ab intellectu concipiuntur. Et videtur aliquid, ut ibi Boetius et alii notarunt, exclusa priori definitione relativorum,
hoc consentaneum rationi; nam sicut concipimus, ita loquimur; relationes quae relativis etiam secundum dici communis erat, posteriorem addidit, quae
autem secundum did, non alia de causa sic appellantur, nisi quia ita a nobis propria est relativorum secundum esse.
dicuntur aut explicantur, ac si relationes essent, cum tamen non sint; ergo ille 9. Relationes secundum dici diversae sunt a praedicamentalibus et transcenden-
/col. bl modus loquendi de his relationibus supponit modum concipiendi talibus.-Sunt vere qui existiment divisionem hanc relationis secundum dici et
nostrum, ex quo nascitur, nimirum, quad hae res concipiuntur a nobis cum secundum esse coincidere cum alia partitione relationis in transcendentalem
relatione et habitudine, seu per modum relationis et habitudinis, cum vere et et praedicamentalem, ita ut relatio transcendentalis tantum sit relatio secun-
in re habitudinem non habeant; sed in hoc consistit ratio et essentia relationis dum dici; omnis vero relatio secundum esse, praedicamentalis sit (de creatis
rationis; ergo relatio secundum did, idem est quad relatio rationis. loquimur). Haec vero sententia licet in ore fere omnium circumferri videatur,
8. vera essentia relationis secundum dici.-Sed nihilominus communiter non mihi non probatur. Opinor enim relationes transcendentales includere in re
ita intelligitur haec divisio; nam relatio rationis, eo modo quo est, censetur ipsa et in suo esse veras et reales habitudines, quod paulo inferius ostendam;
esse relatio secundum esse sibi proportionatum, ut patet de relatione generis et relationes autem quae tantum sunt secundum did, proprie et in rigore sumptas,
speciei, et similibus, quia eo modo quo haec cogitantur, non solum dicuntur, distingui ab omnibus relationibus secundum esse, sive transcendentales sint,
sed etiam sunt ad aliquid. Et e converso relatio secundum did non limitatur sive praedicamentales. Non enim requirunt in re sic concepta, seu relative
ad relationem rationis, sed dicitur de quacunque reali re, cujus esse sit ab- denominata, veram aliquam habitudinem, quae ratione sui esse illi conveniat,
solutum, et a nobis non nisi per modum habitudinis seu relationis relativae sed tantum denominationem ex modo nostro concipiendi et loquendi, ut a
nobis explicata est. Ut in exemplo posito de potentia Dei, probabilius est non
294 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation 295
Disputaton 47: Latin Text
includere respectum etiam transcendentalem, etiamsi relativa secundum dici
ut in prima sectione dictum est; quod vero praeter has dentur relationes /p.
appelletur. Igitur relatio secundum dici tantum, non est idem quod relatio
798/ transcendentales, quae non sint tantum secundum did, sed verae et
transcendentalis; imo ab ilia etiam condistinguitur, si cum praedsione sumatur
reales habitudines secundum esse, satis probatur inductione et discursu facto
prout sumi debet. Quod ideo addo, quia etiam relatio transcendentalis potest
in illo quarto argumento sectione prima proposito. Et potest confirmari, na~
dici relatio secundum did, quia etiam de ea loquimur ad modum relativorum;
in genere substantiae materia et forma habent inter se ver~m et realem h~b1-
imo et relatio praedicamentalis erit relatio secundum did, quia etiam ipsa di-
tudinem essentialiter inclusam in proprio esse illarum, et 1deo una defimtur
citur cum habitudine ad aliud. Ut ergo proprie fiat divisio, sumi debet relatio
per habitudinem ad aliam, et inde accipiunt ~peci~ca~ion.em suai:i· E~demque
secundum dici, cum exclusione et praecisione, ita ut solum in ipso dici, habi-
ratio est de potentiis acddentalibus per se pnmo mst1tutls et ordmatis ad suos
tudinem habere videatur, in esse tamen nullam habeat, nee transcendentalem,
actus; et de habitibus operativis, de quibus supra ostensum est, natura sua
nee praedicamentalem. Dices: sires sit tam absoluta, ut in esse /col. bl nullam spedficari per habitudinem ad actus vel objecta, quia, nimirum, in suo esse
habeat habitudinem, etiam transcendentalem, cur necesse erit concipi vel did
includunt veram habitudinem ad actus, et illis mediantibus ad objecta; ergo
cum habitudine, cum unaquaeque res possit condpi eo modo quo est, absque
hi respectus transcendentales sunt veri et secundum esse reale earum rerum
omni eo quod est extra essentiam, ejus? Respondetur, id saepe provenire ex
quibus conveniunt. Quocirca, sicut inductio facta nititu.r in commu~ioribus,
nostro modo imperfecto concipiendi, quia non valemus condpere res prout
magisque receptis sententiis, ita haec doctrina commumter a Doctonbus ap-
ipsae sunt. Addo praeterea interdum contingere, ut res etiam perfecte concepta
probata censenda est. Praesertim vero in favorem ejus notanda sunt ver~a ~·
cognosd non possit sine concomitantia aliarum, etiam si sint extra essentiam
Thomae, 1 p., quaest. 28, art. 1, ubi sic scribit: Ea quae dicuntur ad altquid
ejus, non propter habitudinem aut dependentiam, sed propter aliam altiorem
significant secundum propriam rationem solum respectum ad aliud, qui quidem
connexionem in ratione causae eminenter continentis suos effectus, quo modo
respectus aliquando est in ipsa natu~a rei, utpote rua.ndo ~liq~ae ~uae res secun-
aiunt Theologi non posse Deum perfecte videri aut comprehendi, quin in eo
dum naturam suam ad invicem ordmata sunt, et mvicem mclmationem habet, et
cognoscantur creaturae: de quo alias.
hujusmodi relationes oportet esse reales, sicut in corpore gravi est inclina~io et ~;do
ad locum medium; unde respectus quidam est in ipso gravi respectu loci medtt, et
Tertia divisio inter relationem transcendentalem et praedicamentalem. similiter est de aliis hujusmodi. Haec enim ratio D. Thomae aeque aut maxime
10. Terrio ac praecipue dividitur relatio realis et secundum esse, in transcen- procedit de respectu transcendentali; nam secundum illum praecipue i~ve­
dentalem et praedicamentalem, quae divisio maxime necessaria est ad conclu- niuntur res ad invicem ordinatae. Et quidem exemplum D. Thomae opt1me
dendum et declarandum id quod in praesenti sectione intendimus. Hactenus intelligitur ac verificatur de respectu transcendentali; na.m gravitatis incli.nat.io
enim solum constat, relationem pertinentem ad hoc praedicamentum, Ad et propensio ad locum medium non pertinet ad praed1camentum relauoms,
aliquid, debere esse realem et secundum esse; nunc autem videndum superest sed qualitatis; nam est propria essentia talis qualitatis.
an omnis relatio hujusmodi ad hoc praedicamentum pertineat. Ex quarto vero 12. Objectio.-Prima responsio.-Verior respons.io.-Dices: nullus realis r~­
argumento in primasectione proposito constat, non omnem habitudinem realem spectus includitur in conceptu rei absolutae; sed hie respectus transcendental1s
et secundum esse, posse ad unum definitum praedicamentum spectare. Et ideo includitur in conceptu rei absolutae; ergo non est verus respectus secundum
proponitur haec divisio, qua significatur esse certum quemdam modum realis esse sed tantum secundum modum loquendi et concipiendi nostrum; hoc
habitudinis habentem particularem acdefinitum essendi modum, qui peculiare eni~ potissimum argumento nituntur, qui ita sentiunt d~ his respect~bu~ /col.
genus en tis constituit, et huj usmodi esse relationes praedicamentales. Praeter has bl transcendentalibus, ut solum in verbis consistere arb1trentur. Al1qm vero
vero esse alias habitudines veras etiam et reales, essentialiter pertinentes ad varia respondent, et sumi potest ex Scoto, in 4, d. 12, q. unica, hujusmodi respec~us
et fere ad omnia genera entium, quae propterea transcendentales dicuncur, et
consequi ad res absolutas, non vero esse de intrinseca ratione illaru~. H~c em~
a praedicamentalibus distinguuntur, quia ad certum aliquod praedicamentum de causa negat Scocus, inhaerentiam aptitudinalem esse de essentla acc1dent1s,
non pertinent, sed per omnia vagantur. quia est verus respectus. Juxta quam responsionem hi respectus ~~n esse~t
11. Imprimis ergo divisio sic explicata quoad singula membra probanda extra latitudinem praedicamenti Ad aliquid, unde nee possent d1c1 propne
est. Quod enim dentur quaedam relationes praedicamentales, ex recepta di- transcendentales, neque a praedicamentalibus condistingui, quia non est contra
visione praedicamentorum supponimus, et ex communi omnium sententia,
I rationem determinati praedicamenti, ut res in illo contentae consequantur ex

I
l
 296 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 297
rebus aliorum praedicamentorum, si non sunt de essentia earum, sed propri-
eas conditiones quas postulat praedicamentalis relatio, quae praecipue sunt
etates consequentes illas. Melius tamen respondetur cum Cajetano, de Ente et
tres, ut infra videbimus. Prima, quod relatio praedicamentalis requirit aliquod
essent., c. 7, q. 15, non esse contra rationem rei absolutae, ut in sua essentiali
fundamentum reale absolutum, ut similitudo albedinem, paternitas vim gene-
ratione includat respectum transcendentalem, suae naturae proportionatum;
randi seu generationem; secunda, quod requirit terminum realem et realiter
nam revera inhaerentia aptitudinalis non est proprietas consequens naturam
existentem; tertia, quia petit distinctionem realem, vel saltem ex natura rei, inter
accidentis, sed est intrinseca essentia ejus, ut in superioribus ostensum. Quinimo
fundamentum et terminum. At vero respectus transcendentalis nullam harum
verisimile est, in entibus creatis null um esse ita absolutum, quin in sua essentia
conditionum per se requirit. Nam divina scientia, verbi gratia, habitudinem
intime includat aliquem transcendentalem respectum, saltem quatenus est ens
per participationem, per se essentia lirer pendens ab ente per essentiam. Nam, transcendentalem dicit ad divinam essentiam, ut ad proprium objectum, et
Heer ipsa actualis dependentia sit aliquid ex natura rei discincrum ab ipso ente divinus amor ad divinam bonitatem, et tamen inter ea nulla est distinctio ex
creato, tamen ipsa apcirudo ec necessiras dependendi est in trinseca et essencialis natura rei, sed rationis tantum. Rursum transcendentalis respectus non semper
illi; non videcur autem posse concipi, aut esse sine transcendentali respeccu et requirit realem terminum, sed interdum esse potest ad ens fictum, seu rationis,
habitudine ad illud a quo pendet, in quo respectu maxime consistere videtur vel ad extrinsecam aliquam denominationem; ut conceptus seu cogitatio de
p0tentialiras et imperfectio ends creati ut tale est. ente rationis, seu privatione, ut sic, transcendentalem habitudinem dicit ad
13. Quidquid vero sit de completis entibus, ut sunt integrae substantiae, illud objectum, quod tamen ens reale non est. Saepe etiam hie transcendentalis
praesertim simplices et immateriales, quae inter creata entia videntur maxime respectus, licet sit ad terminum realem, non tamen requirit realem existentiam
absoluta, ex reliquis omnibus, quae incompleta dicuntur, nullum est ita abso- ejus, ut scientia de futura eclipsi Icol. bl dicit habitudinem realem transcenden-
lutum, ut non includat essentialiter aliquem transcendentalem respectum. Et talem ad illam, quamvis non existat; et idem est in qualibet scientia de objecto
ratio est, quia omnia illa ex natura sua sunt instituta ad aliud, seu propter aliud; possibili, et de potentia respectu actus non existentis. Denique hie respectus
nam materia est propter formam, forma vero est ad actuandam materiam et transcendentalis null um requirit fundamentum, respectus enim transcendentalis
complendum compositum, et accidens est ad substantiam, potentia ad actum, materiae ad formam nullum habet fundamentum, sed intime includitur in ipsa
et actus propter objectum, et sic de reliquis. Unaquaeque autem res accipit materia. Et idem est de respectu formae ad materiam, scientiae ad objectum,
modum entitatis accommodatum Ip. 7991 suo primario fini et institutioni; et similium. Et ratio est manifesta, quia hie transcendentalis respectus non
quia ergo omnes hae res per se primo ordinantur ad alias, ideo talem modum advenit alicui rei jam constitutae in suo esse essentiali, sed est quasi differentia
entitatis accipiunt, ut intime includant habitudinem ad aliud, et haec est propria constituens et complens essentiam illius rei, cujus respectus esse dicitur. Et ideo,
habitudo seu respectus transcendentalis; sunt ergo inter reales habitudines veras sicut illa res, cum sit absoluta, non requirit aliud fundamentum ut sit, praeter
et secundum esse, aliquae transcendentales, quae ad speciale praedicamentum proprium subjectum, si fortasse sit accidentalis entitas, ita etiam hie respectus
revocari non possunt, et ideo a praedicamentalibus distinguuntur. transcendentalis non praerequirit fundamentum aliud, sed constituit potius
ipsam rem, quae potest esse fundamentum aliarum relationum praedicamen-
talium.
SECTIO IY. 3. Atque hinc colligi potest aliud discrimen: nam relatio praedicamentalis est
Quomodo differat praedicamentalis quaedam forma accidentalis, adveniens fundamento plene constituto in suo esse
respectus a transcendentali. essentiali et absoluto, ad quod comparatur ut completa for ma in suo accidentali
1. Sed jam occurrit magna difficultas in explicanda differentia inter hos duos genere, afficiens ipsum, et referens ad aliud. Respectus vero transcendentalis
ordines respectuum, et consequenter in explicanda ratione ob quam necesse nee comparatur ut accidens, neque ut completa forma ad illam rem quam
sit praeter transcendentales respectus, praedicamentales admittere. proxime actuat, et ejus est respectus; sed comparatur ut essentialis differentia,
et consequenter ut ens incompletum in illo genere ad quod pertinet illa res
Proponuntur nonnulla discrimina inter dictos respectus. quam actuat vel constituit, eamque non proprie refert ad aliud per modum
2. Variae igitur possunt excogitari differentiae inter hujusmodi respectus. physicae formae, sed illam constituit per modum metaphysicae differentiae,
Prima, et quae plures includit, est, quia relatio transcendentalis non requirit ut ordinatam vel relatam ad aliud.
298 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 299

Objectiones contra positas differentias. respectus, ut non requirat in termino realem et actualem existentiam. Ergo ex
4. Sed hae differentiae partim verae non sunt, partim non videntur satisfacere. illo discrimine solum habetur, inter transcendentales respectus quosdam esse
Nam quod in prima differentia dicitur inveniri transcendenta1em respectum qui terminum realem vel actu existentem non requirunt, etiam si sint alii, ~ui
ejusdem rei ad seipsam propter solam distinctionem rationis, verum non hujusmodi terminum habeant et postulent, in quibus non habet locum 1lla
est; alias dici etiam posset identitatem rei ad seipsam esse transcendenta1em secunda differentia.
respectum, et ad illum sufficere distinctionem rationis. Quod si dicas requiri 6. Quod si dicas differentiam consistere in hoc, quia respectus transcendentalis
distinctionem rationis ratiocinatae, et fundatam in re, saltem sequitur, inter ex se non requirit talem terminum, licet ex peculiari aliqua ratione possit ilium
rationem genericam et specificam esse respectum rea- /p. 800/ lem transcen- habere, respectum autem praedicamenta1em ex adaequata ratione sua postulare
dentalem actus et potentiae, quia genus et differentia distinguuntur ratione hujusmodi terminum, instari contra hoc potest, quia haec doctrina supponit,
cum fundamento in re. Item exempla adducta fa1sa sunt; nam scientia vel amor inter respectus ad terminos realiter existentes, quosdam esse transcendentales,
Dei non dicit respectum realem etiam transcendentalem ad ipsum Deum, ut et alios praedicamentales, qui differunt in ratione ob quam requir~nt .talem
ad primarium objectum, sed potius illa scientia et amor sunt absolutissima ab terminum. At vero hoc ipsum est quod inquirimus, quodque non sat1s v1detur
omni respectu reali, quia per se primo non respiciunt aliquod objectum extra explicari, scilicet, quaenam sit haec diversaratio in his respectibus postulantibus
se. Unde, sicut ibi non distinguuntur actus et objectum nisi ratione, ita nullus similem terminum, et quaenam sit necessitas multiplicandi illos. Quandoqui-
intervenit respectus actus ad objectum, nisi rationis. Et ratio universalis est, quia dem distinctio illa respectuum transcendentalium habentium terminos reales
cum respectus et habitudo sit veluti tendentia quaedam ad aliud, non potest vel non reales, existentes vel non existentes, sufficiens videatur ad quascunque
inveniri verus et realis respectus ejusdem ad seipsum, nulla in re interveniente rerum habitudines declarandas.
distinctione, saltem ex natura rei. 7, Praeterea quod de fundamento reali asserebatur, non minus obscurum et
5. Respectus transcendentalis quo modo ad ens rationis possit terminari.-Re- incertum est. Primo quidem, quia non omnis relatio praedicamentalis requirit
spectus aliqui transcendentales requirunt existentiam terminorum.-Quod vero fundamentum reale ex natura rei distinctum a suo subjecto, sed sol um illa quae
ulterius dicitur, transcendentalem respectum interdum esse posse ad ens ra- medio aliquo accidente substantiae convenit, ut patet de relatione identitatis
tionis, est quidem verum, quando ille respectus est ad a1iquid, quod se habet specificae inter duos homines, vel animas, verbi gratia, quae censetur re~atio
per modum objecti, in quo sufficit esse objectivum, ut possit habere rationem praedicamentalis, et immediate fundatur in ipsa natur~substanti~i, de q~o mf~a
termini transcendentalis habitudinis. Et eadem ratione vera est etiam alia pars, latius. Deinde relatio praedicamentalis, quae convemt substant1ae med10 acc1-
nimirum, posse interdum transcendentalem respectum tendere in rem seu dente, quamvis comparata ad substantiam dicatur habere aliud fundamentum
essentiam realem, nondum actu existentem, quia etiam ad rationem objecti proximum, nempe illud accidens, quo mediante convenit substantiae, tamen
sufficit saepe esse essentiae, absque esse existentiae. Verumtamen non est in respectu ipsiusmet accidentis immediate et sine alio fundamento illi convenit,
universum verum, quod nullus respectus transcendentalis requirat terminum ut similitudo albedini; alioqui procedendum esset in infinitum. At vero idem
realem et realiter existentem; nam imprimis actus visionis vel intellectionis proportionaliter reperitur in relationibus transcendentalibus; nullum ergo est
creatae intuitivae et naturalis, dicit transcendentalem habitudinem ad rem actu illud discrimen. Declaratur minor, nam si q uae sunt relationes transcendentales
existentem, neque sine illa po test naturaliter esse aut conservari. Deinde, modus in ipsismet substantiis inclusae, illae /p. 801/ no~ requirunt al~ud f~n.dame~­
actualis unionis dicit transcendentalem respectum ad terminum seu extremum tum; tamen multae aliae sunt quae non convenmnt substant1ae, mst med1~s
unionis, in quo requirit et realitatem, et actualem existentiam, ita ut neque esse, accidentibus, et illae respectu substantiae etiam habent fundamentum, quamv1s
nee intelligi possit actualis unio realis, nisi actu existat res ad quam sit unio, respectu accidentis illud non habeant, sed immediate talibus accidentibus
ut in superioribus saepe tactum est. Actio etiam ut actio, et passio ut passio, conveniant. Ut relatio scientiae ad scibile convenit scienti mediante scientia,
dicunt transcendentales respectus ad reale agens, vel patiens actu existens, sine ipsi autem scientiae immediate inest. Ergo in necessitate funda~enti nullum
quibus neque esse, neque intelligi possent. Ac denique creatura, praecisa rela- videtur esse discrimen inter respectus transcendentales et praed1camentales.
tione praedicamenta1i, ex hoc solum quod est ens participatum et dependens, 8. Contra ultimam allatam differentiam objectio.-Vltima denique differentia
dicit essentialem habitudinem transcendentalem ad /col. bl primum efficiens, etiam est difficilis ad explicandum, nam vel respectus comparatur ad formam,
et ad ens per essentiam actu existens. Non est ergo de ratione transcendentalis vel essentiam proxime constitutam per ipsam, vel ad subjectum talis formae. Si
300 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Rela.tion Disputaton 47: Latin Text 301

priori modo fiat comparatio, tam respectus praedicamentalis quam transcenden- ad Verbum divinum, et tamen non respicit illud, nisi sub pura ratione termini.
talis, est essentialis formae, vel essentiae per ipsum constitutae, et comparatur Ratio vero difficultatis circa posteriorem partem est, quia omnis respectus, si
ad illam ad modum differentiae constituentis ipsam. Unde etiam loquendo de abstracte et in comm uni sumatur, sol um dicit habitudinem ad aliud sub ratione
ipso summo genere relationis praedicamentalis, constitui dicitur per ipsum esse termini, abstrahendo ab aliis rationibus; si vero sumatur contracte, ut est talis
ad, tanquam per essentialem modum determinantem communem rationem vel talis respectus, sive transcendentalis ille sit, sive praedicamentalis, dicit
accidentis, et formaliter ac essentialiter constituentem talem essentiam; ergo in habitudinem ad talem terminum, qui sit vel causa, vel effectus, vel objectum,
hoc non est differentia inter respectum transcendentalem et praedicamentalem. vel aliam particularem rationem termini habeat. Ut respectus paternitatis,
Si vero posteriori modo fiat comparatio, sicut respectus praedicamentalis est etiamsi praedicamentalis dicatur, respicit talem terminum, qui sit effectus vel
accidentalis alicui subjecto, etiam potest esse respectus transcendentalis; ut productus a patre, et sic de aliis.
respectus scientiae ad objectum, licet sit essentialis scientiae, est tamen ac-
cidentalis scienti. Uncle, licet ille respectus, metaphysice consideratus, non sit Positum discrimen defenditur et probatur.
forma physica referens subjectum ad aliud, sed differentia constituens aliquam 1O. Respondetur tamen ad priorem rationem, laborare in aequivoco. Nam
formam, tamen ilia forma, constituta per talem respectum, est forma physica relatio praedicamentalis dicitur respicere aliud, ut pure terminum, quia circa
respectiva, referens subjectum ad suum terminum. Neque enim potest forma illud nullum aliud munus exercet, nisi respiciendi tantum. Hoc autem modo
respectiva informare aliquod subjectum secundum ultimam rationem suam, non potest dici motus, aut actio, vel passio esse pur~s respe~tus ad termin~m;
quin illud referat ad terminum quern ipsa suo modo respicit. Ut in exemplo /p. 802/ nam habitudo motus ad terminum est habttudo v1ae, per quam 1pse
de gravitate, quod supra ex D. Thoma afferebamus, sicut gravitas est indinatio terminus in esse constituitur; unde non dicit habitudinem ad terminum, ut
ad infimum locum, in quo indudit respectum transcendentalem ad ilium, ita respiciendum tantum, sed ut constituendum per ipsum, e~ ita ~on respic~t ut
afficiendo seu informando ipsum grave, indinat illud, et hoc ipsum est referee pure terminum in praedicto sensu: atque idem est proport1onal1ter de act10ne
illud in centrum. Et idem est de quacunque potentia et scientia, et similibus. et passione; unio vero hypostatica dicitur a Theologis attingere Verbum ut
Valde ergo obscurum et difficile est, ex his differentiis proprias rationes relationis purum terminum, ut per illam particulam, purum, exdudant omnem cau-
transcendentalis et praedicamentalis, et ea- /col. bl rum discrimen, et veram salitatem propriam quam Verbum ut sic habet circa talem unionem; non est
necessitatem admittendi relationes praedicamentales praeter transcendentales tamen Verbum pure terminus illius unionis in eo sensu in quo hie dicitur de
colligere. termino relationis praedicamentalis, quiailla unio, ut est realis modus humanae
naturae, non utcunque respicit Verbum, sed realiter illi conjungit humanam
Alia differentia inter dictos respectus a Cajetano tradita expenditur. naturam, et realiter attingit Verbum ipsum tanquam alterum extremum illius
9. Aliter ergo Cajetanus, in opusc. de Ente et essent., cap. 7, quaest. 15, unionis, a quo intime et realiter pendet, quamvis sine propria causalitate. Sic
attingens hanc divisionem respectuum realium in transcendentales et praedica- igitur universaliter convenit formae, vel modo ab~olu~o includenti resp~~tum
mentales, differentiam inter illos dedarat ex parte terminorum; nam respectus transcendentalem, aliquod reale munus exercere circa illum, ad quern d1c1t re-
praedicamentalis (inquit) est, qui respicit terminum pure sub ratione termini; spectum, vel causando, vel uniendo, vel repraesentando ilium, vel aliqui~ aliud
transcendentalis autem respicit aliud, non ut pure terminum, sed sub aliqua simile efficiendo, et hac ratione dicitur non respicere illum ut pure termmum.
alia determinata ratione, vel subjecti, vel objecti, vel efficientis, aut finis. Quae At vero relatio praedicamentalis ita respicit terminum, ut circa illum nullum
differentia aptior videtur ad hanc rem dedarandam, quia omnis respectus sumit aliud munus exerceat, nisi pure respicere, ut patet in similitudine unius albi
speciem suam a termino, seu ab ea re ad quam tendit; et ideo, si quod est dis- ad aliud: et hoc modo dicitur esse proprium talis relationis respicere aliud ut
crimen inter hos duos ordines respectuum, ex terminis desumendum videtur. pure terminum. . . .
Non est tamen facile ad explicandum quomodo assignata differentia generalis 11. Unde etiam patet responsio ad alteram rattonem, m qua ettam labora-
sit, et in quo proprie consistat, seu quid per earn importetur. Ratio difficultatis tur in aequivoco. Nam respicere aliud ut pure terminum, non est .respicere
circa priorem partem est, quia motus, actio et passio dicunt transcendentalem terminum abstracte et in communi, ut videtur in argumento suppom; constat
respectum ad terminum, et tamen non respiciunt illum, nisi sub pura ratione enim praedicamentales relationes specificas et diversarum rat~onum, ten~e~e
termini. Item unio, verbi gratia, hypostaticadicittranscendentalem habitudinem etiam in terminos particulares et diversarum rationum. Omnibus tamen 1lhs

L
 302 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 303
commune est, ut circa illos terminos, etiam ut tales sunt, nullum aliud munus
talem respectum. Cum enim talis forma in proprio et specifico conceptu illum
exerceant, nisi respiciendi illos; et ideo semper eos respiciunt ut pure termi-
respectum indudat, non potest ille respectus minus esse per se intentus, aut
nos, etiamsi sub propriis eorum rationibus eos respiciant. Quod secus est in
minus per se fieri, quam ipsa forma, cum actio et intentio agentis per se tendat
respectu transcendentali, ut declaratum est. Sic ergo explicata ilia differentia,
ad totam formam, usque ad specificam rationem ejus.
vera et universalis esse videtur, recteque explicare proprium munus relationis
praedicamentalis, quod est referre formaliter seu respicere aliud, a munere et
officio respectus transcendentalis, quod est constituere formam vel naturam,
Aliud discrimen inter dictos respectus.
14. Et hinc etiam fit ut relatio pura et praedicamentalis nunquam sit prin-
/col. bl aliquid causantem, vel operantem aliquo modo circa rem ad quam
dicit habitudinem, vel e converso. cipium agendi, tum quia sicut nunquam per se fit, ita etiam ~unquam pe~ se
agit; tum etiam quia, ut diximus, non est instituta a natura ob al1~uod pecuhare
munus per se necessarium ad esse, vel fieri rei, sed solum est qmdam respectus
Aliud discrimen ex praecedenti colligitur.
ex consequenti resultans; principia autem agendi sunt per se instituta, et ad
12. Atque hinc oritur alia differentia comm uniter recepta, quae licet a poste-
peculiare munus ordinata. At vero forma dicens respectum tr~sc~~dentalem,
riori esse videatur, confert tamen ad explicandam naturam ho rum respectuum.
secundum propriam etiam rationem respectivam, saepe est prmc1pmm per se
Respectus ergo praedicamentalis talis est, ut a natura non sit per se intentus, et
agendi, ut patet de scientia, potentia, et similibus.
ideo nunquam per se fit ex vi actionis alicujus agentis, sed consequitur posito
fundamento et termino, teste Aristotele, 5 Physicorum, cui in hoc caeteri
Quarta differentia, et aliarum explicatio.
consentiunt. At vero respectus transcendentalis saepe est per sese maxime
15. Tandem ex his intelligitur, respectum praedicamentalem concipiendum
intentus a natura, et ideo forma essentialiter indudens talem respectum saepe
esse tanquam formam quamdam minimam et accide~tal:m, ~ua~ non dat
fit formaliter ac per se primo per actionem propriam; per calefactionem, verbi
subjecto aliquod esse, nisi respicere aliud, neque ad al1qmd almd m natura
gratia, fit calor, ut inhaerens, in quo intime includitur transcendentalis respec-
deservit. Respectus autem transcendentalis non est concipiendus tanquam
tus; et per actionem videndi fit actus indudens transcendentalem habitudinem
integra forma, cujus munus sit tantum referee, sed est essentialis ?1odus, seu
ad objectum; et per actionem unitivam fit modus unionis, qui includit tran-
differentia alicujus formae seu entitatis, quatenus ad causandum al1quo modo,
scendentalem habitudinem ad unibilia; idemque in multis aliis videre licet.
vel operandum circa alia, per se primo instituta est, vel e converso, quatenus
Et hoc ipsum fortasse est quod Scotus distinxit de relationibus extrinsecus et
ab alia essentialiter pendet. Et juxta hanc rationem explicandi hos respectus,
intrinsecus advenientibus, dicens, ad priores posse terminari per se actionem,
non vero ad posteriores, quae solae sunt praedicamentales. De qua divisione potest ad eumdem sensum reduci differentia s.u~eri~s ~acta'. q~od resp~ctus
transcendentalis semper est intrinsecus et essent1al1s al1cm ent1tat1, sub entttate
sub illis vocibus dicemus disputatione sequenti, quae erit prima de sex ultimis
modos etiam reales comprehendendo; relatio autem praedicamentalis habet
praedicamentis, propter quaevidetur Scotus potissimum invenisse distinctionem
propriam et peculiarem rationem accidentis. Et ita etiam possunt ad conv~ni­
illam. Quae sub illis vocibus non est nobis necessaria, et res ipsa non limitatur
entem sensum reduci duae aliae differentiae sumptae ex parte fundamentt, et
ad sex ultima praedicamenta, sed in aliis etiam invenitur, ut ibi videbimus.
realitatis, seu existentiae termini.
13. Ratio ergo hujus discriminis inter relationes praedicamentales et tran-
scendentales est, quia relatio praedicamentalis non est in rerum natura instituta
ad aliquod peculiare munus obeundum, sed ad hoc solum res alias comitari
Quae re'4tiones sint praedicamenti Ad aliquid. . .
16. Tandem ex his differen tiis concluditur, respectus transcendentales, et1ams1
dicitur, ut aliquae res sese respiciant ex vi alicujus rationis, seu fundamenti
vere sint /col. bl in rebus secundum proprium esse eorum non pertinere ad
realis, quod in ipsis supponitur, et ideo talis relatio nihil aliud est quam re-
unum aliquod speciale praedicamentum, quia res illae, ~eu na~urae, vel ~ssentiae
spectus consurgens posito fundamento et termino, nunquam autem per se fit.
quibus conveniunt, ad varia munera, et interdu~ pnmo d1versa or~t~antur,
Respectus autem transcendentalis convenit alicui formae vel entitati, aut modo
ideoque ad varia praedicamenta revocantur, juxta d1versas eorum condmon~s et
entis, quatenus a natura per se est institutus et ordinatus ad aliquod peculiare
munus, quod potest per se intendi per aliquam actionem; et ideo ille etiam naturas. Et ideo praedicamentum Ad aliquid so las illas relationes complect~tur,
respectus /p. 803/ potest per se fieri per actionem, ut inclusus in forma dicente quae proprie ac peculiariter praedicamentales appella~tur, nam omnes tlla:
inter se conveniunt, et ab aliis distinguuntur in peculian modo pure referend1
 304 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 305
rem quam af.ficiunt. Et ideo generatim etiam conveniunt in modo quo esse 18. Quare dicendum est, Aristotelem non approbasse illam primam respon-
incipiunt per coexistentiam extremorum, seu fundamenti et termini, et in sionem, et ideo addidisse secundam, nimirum, eamdem rem quae est scientia,
aliis conditionibus quas requirunt, ut ex discursu sequentis sectionis magis in diversis praedicamentis collocari, scilicet, qualitatis, et Ad aliquid, utique sub
constabit. diversis rationibus, nam sub una et eadem non potest una res in diversis prae-
dicamentis constitui. Sed contra hanc etiam responsionem non parum urgent
Responsio ad quartam difficultatem, ex sectione prima relictam. objectiones superius appositae, et ideo aliqui sentiunt Aristotelem ibi non ex
17. Scientia, an secundumAristotelem sit de genere relationis.-Singulas scientias propria sententia esse locutum, sed juxta opinionem eorum qui amplectebantur
ad singula objecta referri oportet.-Ex his etiam soluta relinquitur dif.ficultas primam de.finitionem relativorum, quam in cap. de Ad aliquid, tradiderat,
tacta in argumento quarto primae sectionis. Nam respectus illi, in quibus ibi scilicet omnia, quae ad aliquid aliquo modo dicuntur, esse de praedicamento
.fit inductio, omnes sunt transcendentales, et ut sic fatemur non pertinere ad Ad aliquid. Nam juxta illam ibidem subjunxerat, habitum, dispositionem et
speciale praedicamentum. Unde in illo speciali exemplo, quod ibi tangitur de scientiam esse ad aliquid; postea vero illam de.finitionem non approbat, et ideo
scientia, quatenus dicit respectum ad scibile, fateor responsiones ibi tactas ex neque censendus est approbare omnia quae ex illa consequuntur, quamvis in-
Aristotele, capit. de Qualitate, magnam habere difficultatem. Nam prima videtur sinuet quomodo juxta illam consequenter loquendum sit. Nee vero satisfacit
satis improbata objectionibus ibi factis, quae confirmari possunt testimoniis alia responsio, quod haec sint tantum relativa secundum did, nam suf.ficienter
ejusdem Aristotelis, 4 Topicorum, cap. 1, loco 4, ubi generatim ait, 2 genus ostenditur, in proprio esse harum rerum indudi respectum. Vera ergo responsio
et speciem in eadem divisione, scilicet praedicamentali, esse oportere, et in est illa quae ultimo loco, in eodem argumento quarto, proposita est, nimirum,
particulari adhibet exemplum de Ad aliquid: Nam genera (inquit) eorum quae scientiam, et alia hujusmodi entia secundum essentialem suam rationem non
sunt ad aliquid, oportet habere species quae sint etiam ad aliquid, et e converso; dicere respectum praedicamentalem, sed transcendentalem tantum, et ideo
et idem ait de qualitate; idemque repetit 5 Topicorum, cap. 4, loco 39, ubi sic ut sic non pertinere ad praedicamentum Ad aliquid. Quatenus vero scientiae
ait: Amplius in his quae ad aliquid sunt, comiderandum, si ad quodgenus assigna- adjungi potest aliquis purus respectus accidentalis, et extra essentiam ejus, ut
tur, et species ad illud quoddam assignatur, ut si opinio et opinatum, et quaedam sic non pertinere ad /col. bl praedicamentum qualitatis, sed Ad aliquid. Juxta
opinio ad quoddam opinatum; si autem non sic assignatur, manifestum, quoniam quern sensum posset etiam explicari secunda Aristotelis responsio.
peccatur. Idemque patet ex regulis positis ab Aristotele in Antepraedicament., 19. Quae sit ratio asserendi relationes praedicamentales. --Erat vero ultima
c. 3, praesertim illa: Genera non subalternatim posita, non habent easdem dif- replica, quae per interrogationem fiebat in illo quarto argumento, scilicet, quid
ferentias. Et in praesenti satis constat ex re ipsa; nam quaelibet /p. 804/ scientia necesse sit hujusmodi respectus accidentales et praedicamentales adjungere et
secundum propriam et speci.ficam rationem suam dicit propriam habitudinem admittere, praeter transcendentales. Si enirn attente considerentur rationes
ad suum proprium objectum. Quod enim Soto ait in praedicamento qualitatis, quibus a doctoribus probari soler, dari relationes reales, illae certe maxime
exponens ilium locum Aristotelis, licet scientia ut sic dicat habitudinem ad probant dari in rebus hujusmodi respectus reales secundum esse, ut maxime
scibile, ut mensurabile ad mensuram, tamen scientias particulares non dicere videre licet apud D. Thomam, in 1 p., quaest. 13, art. 7, et quaestione vi-
proprias relationes mensurabilis ad propria objecta, hoc (inquam) falsum est, gesima octava, articulo 1, et 2; et Scotum, in 2, dist. l, et alios supra citatos.
et contra expressa verba Aristotelis in dicto loco sexto Topicorum, et contra Quod vero praeter relationes transcendentales dentur praedicamentales ab illis
manifestam rationem. Nam, sicut veritas scientiae in communi mensuratur distinctae, non videtur posse demonstrari. Nihilominus tamen sufficit com-
ex objecto scibili in communi, ita veritas hujus scientiae ex hoc objecto scibili. munis philosophorum consensus, ut ab ea sententia nullo rnodo recedendum
Item, quia determinata scientia sumit suam speciem ex habitudine ad suum sit. Ratio autem introducendi et admittendi hujusmodi respectus fuit, quia
objectum; ergo non sol um ut scientia, sed etiam ut talis scientia, dicit respectum invenimus multas praedicationes respectivas accidentales, quae non desumun-
ad tale scibile. tur ex solis transcendentalibus respectibus, ut esse patrem, similem, aequalem,
etc.; neque etiam ortae sunt ex aliqua apprehensione aut fictione intellectus,
sed ex rebus ipsis, in quibus existunt formae, a quibus tales denominationes et
2 Here I am following the reading of Salamanca, 1597, vol. 2, p. 554, which is "air" praedicationes oriuntur. Neque etiam tales denominationes sunt extrinsecae,
rather than the Vives "agit." id est ab extrinsecis rebus aut formis desumptae, nam res non dicitur similis
306 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 307

alteri per quod in altera est, sed per id quod in se habet, et sic de caeteris. et termino, sed sunt, vel ex se, ut relatio producentis, verbi gratia, paternitas,
Hine ergo intellectum est, hujusmodi denominationes desumi a quibusdam vel per se producuntur per propriam productionem, aut (ut juxta nostrum
respectibus resultantibus ex coexistentia plurium rerum habentium ad id suf- modum concipiendi loquamur) comproducuntur, et, formal1ter loquendo,
ficiens fundamentum, quorum munus solum est referre et ordinare unam rem per se attinguntur per /col. bl ipsas origines, ut filiatio, et processio p.assiv~.
ad aliam, ita ut una alteram respiciat ratione alicujus fundamenti quod in ea Sunt ergo illae relationes altioris ordinis, eminenter complectentes qmdq.md
supponitur. Et hi respectus, quoniam peculiarem modum habent efficiendi, perfectionis et proprietatis necessariae ad ver~m resp~c~um reale1:11 r~pentur
in proprio praedicamento collocati sunt. in respectu transcendentali, et praedicamenta11, seclus1s 1mperfect10mbus.
20. Addo vero, hanc communem sententiam, et rationem ejus, faciliorem et
verisimiliorem fieri, si dicamus has relationes praedicamentales non esse novas
res, aut modos reales ex natma rei distinctos ab illis rebus in quibus fundari SECTIOV.
dicuntur, sed illasmet res duplicem habere modum denominandi: unwn per Quaenam sit essentia propriaque definitio ipsius
se, et (ut ita dicam) ex primaria /p. 805/ institutione sua; alium quasi resu1- ad aliquid, seu relationis praedic~entalis. .
tanrem ex coex.isrentia unius rei own a1ia. Prior modus denominationis vel est 1. Quae hactenus disputavimus, fere pertinent a~ exphcanda?1 et ~efi111end.am
omni no absolutus, vel, si includat respecrum, eric cranscendentalis, qui saepis- quaestionem, an sit relatio realis praedicame~talt~, de qu~ hie a~1mus; ~bu.er
sime non postu1at coexistentiam altecius extremi ad quern tendit, et quando tamen multa attigimus, ex quibus facilius nobts ent essent1am huJUS relauoms,
ilium requirit, non ideo est quia talis respectus consurgat quasi per accidens et definitionem quam Aristoteles in hac re approbat, explicare.
ex coex.istentia taliwn extremorum, sed quia calis res e t per se institura ad
actualirer exercendum aliquod munus circa aliam, quod exercere non potest Relationis praedicamentalis definitio.
nisi circa rem ex.isrentern, et hoc modo explicata, quaedam differentia relatio- 2. Dicendum ergo est, relationem (de sola praedicamentali jam est sermo)
num transcendentalium supra tacta, optima est. Posterior vero denominatio esse accidens, cujus totum esse est ad aliud esse, seu ad aliud se habere, seu
est peculiari modo respectiva, et ex suo genere accidentalis, quia quod una res aliud respicere. Haec definitio sumitur ex Aristotele, in lib. Praedicam~nt~r.,
coexistat alteri, praecise spectando conceptum et rationem coexistentiae, est c. de Ad aliquid, ubi duas designat definitiones eorum qnae sunt ad al1qmd,
extra rationem uniuscujusquerei,ec ideo denominatioetiam quae requirithanc quae solum in nno verbo differunt. Prior est, ea e~se ad aliquid, .quae id quod
coexistenriam, non ob aliam causam, nisi ut ex ea rc:sulcec calis denomjnatio, sunt, aliorum esse aut ad aliquid aliquo alio modo dtcuntur. Postenor est, ea esse
acddenta.ria est. Et ideo, 1icet in re snmatw· ab eadem encicate, tamen qui.a ad aliquid, quorum esse est ad aliquid sese habere. Tota ergo differentia est in
accidentaria est, habet sufficiens fundamentum distinctionis, ut inteUeccus verbo illo, dicuntur. Quod quidem praesertim in usu philosophorum frequenter
concipiat illam entitatem ad modwn duarurn formamm. Ac denique qnia usurpari solet pro verho essendi, ut ipsemet Aristoteles dixit, qualitatem esse,
denom i natio ilia ex rebus ipsis sumitur, sufficit etiam u t ratione illius speciale qua quales quidam dicuntur, et ideo multi vo~u~t non es~e ~dm~dum curan~um
praedicamenrum accidentis realis et r spectivi constituarur. Hoc ergo modo de discrimine aut diversitate inter illas descnpttones. N1h1lommus tamen JUXta
videtur suffi ens ratio reddi et praedkcae djvisionis, et consticutioois praedj- mentem Aristotelis constat illas esse diversas, et in priori verbum, dicuntur,
camenti Ad aliqnid. snmptum esse cum rigore et proprietate, ac praeterea sub disju~ctione in illa
21. Re/,ationes in divi11is quales.-Hic vero occurrebat difficultas theologica de definitione positum esse, ea esse ad aliquid, quae id quod sunt al~orum sun:, v:t
relationibus divinis, quomodo ad illas applicari possit doctrina data, et ad quod aliquo modo aliorum esse dicuntur, ut indicetur ~on ~sse de r~ttone relat1oms
membrum dictae division is revocandae sint. Sed baec disputatio ad nos non ut sit ad aliud, sed ut sit vel dicatur; et hoc volmt Ar1stoteles m secunda defi-
spectat, neque oportet ut praedicta omnia in illis relationibus locum habeant, nitione, corrigere, nt in propria definitione praedicamenti Ad aliquid solum
quia illae relationes non sunt accidentales, sed substantiales. Certum est tamen relationes secundum esse, et non relativa secundum dici comprehendantur. Ex
non esse relation es tan rum secund wn dici, sed secundum esse, neque esse proprie ilia ergo posteriori definitione, nostra desumpta est, vel potius eadem e~t cum
in rigore relationes praedicamentales, quia substantiaesunt in6oirae, et altioris illa; solum enim majoris claritatis gra- /p. 806/ tia per quamdam proport1onem
ordin is, ideoq ue in n uUo praedicarnento co!Jocan tur; tmde neque etiam ha bent generis et differentiae constituta et composita est.
illam imperfeccionem seu mod.um essendi per resultantiam ex fWldamenco
308 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 309
3. Quod genus in definitione relationis.-Accidens ergo positum est in ilia
intelligatur, quam in fine praecedentis sectionis declaravimus. Nam illa entia,
definitione loco generis. Per quod imprimis excluduntur divinae relationes,
quae transcendentalem respectum includunt, non sunt ita ad aliud, ut totum
quae non sunt accidentia, sed substantiae. Exduduntur deinde omnes substan-
suum esse positum habeant in puro respectu ad aliud, et idea non respiciunt
tiae creatae, quae relationes praedicamentales esse non possunt, ut ex dictis in
aliud sub pura ratione termini, sed sub aliqua alia ratione, et exercendo circa
praecedenti sectione constat. Excluduntur praeterea relationes rationis, quae
illud aliquod munus, ad quod hujusmodi res sunt per se institutae. At vero
proprie et simpliciter non possunt dici accidentia, cum accidens simplicter
relatio quae hie definitur, habet totam suam essentiam in puro respectu ad
dictum sub ente reali contineatur. Nee probo quod Cajetanus, 1 p., 13, a. aliud, et idea illi specialiter convenit, ut totum illius esse ad aliud sit, tanquam
7, significat, definitionem relativorum datam in praedicamentis communem ad purum terminum talis respectus, seu habitudinis.
esse relativis rationis et realibus, quia data est (inquit) de eis secundum quod
important ad, et ita ut abstrahunt ab ente reali. Repugnat enim hoc Aristoteli,
Si relatio habet esse in, quomodo sit tota ad aliud.
qui prius divisit ens reale, et unum ejus membrum posuit Ad aliquid, et postea
6. Sed tune insurgit secunda difficultas, quae praecedentem auget, nam haec
hoc definivit. Deinde ex ilia sententia sequitur, aut relationes rationis constitui
posterior definitionis pars videtur repugnare priori; nam si relatio est accidens,
in praedicamento Ad aliquid, aut definitionem illam latius patere quam suum
ergo non potest totum esse illius consistere in habitudine ad aliud; necesse est
definitum. Quamvis ergo Aristoteles non posuerit expresse in illa definitione
enim ut aliquid ejus in subjecto sit, ut ea ratione accidens esse possit, cum ac-
nomen accidentis, illud tamen tacite subintelligit ex priori divisione entis
cidentis esse sit inesse. Ad quam difficultatem respondent aliqui, cum dicitur
in novem genera. Eo vel maxime quod etiam illa posterior particula, scilicet
relatio habere totum suum esse ad aliud, intelligendum esse de esse proprio
esse ad, proprie et in rigore sumpta, non convenit relationibus rationis, sed
relationis, ut sic, quod est esse ad, non de esse, quod habet commune cum
tantum per quamdam analogam imitationem seu proportionem, ut superius
caeteris accidentibus, quod est esse in. Et hinc ortum habuit opinio supra
declaratum est. Et ideo per illam etiam particulam cum proprietate sumptam
tractata de distinctione inter esse ad, et esse in relationis, et quod esse ad, ut
possent relationes rationis excludi, quae non tam sunt quam apprehenduntur
sic, abstrahat ab omni esse reali, et de se commune sit univoce relationibus
esse ad aliquid.
rationis, et realibus. Verumtamen haec responsio ex superius dictis contra
4. Differentia in definitione relation is quae.-Altera pars illius definitionis, quae
praedictam sententiam saris refutata est. Primo, quia de ratione accidentis,
locum differentiae habet, separat praedicamentum hoc a reliquis praedicarnentis
prout in re ipsa existit, non solum Ip. 807/ est quad insit secundum aliquam
accidentium, nam illa cum sint absoluta, habent suum esse in alio, non vero
rationem genericam vel communem, sed etiam secundum propriam, et prout
ad aliud; quod proprium relationis. Statim vero insurgunt duae difficultates.
est talis forma in rerum natura; imo impossibile est quod forma informet vel
afficiat secundum communem rationem, et non secundum aliquam propriam,
Prima difficultas circa definitionem. cum hae rationes a parte rei non distinguantur. Secundo, quia alias relatio
5. Prima est, quia tota illa definitio competit relativis transcendentalibus, non tribueret subjecto proprium effectum formalem relativum, quia accidens
nam etiam scientia habet totum suum esse ad aliud. Ad quam difficultatem non dat effectum formalem, nisi inhaerendo et afficiendo; si ergo relatio non
communiter responderi soler, hujusmodi entia exclusa esse ab Aristotele in inest secundum propriam rationem, non confert proprium et specificum ef-
secunda definitione, auferendo verbum illud dicuntur, quod erat in prima. fectum formalem. Terrio, quia si illud esse proprium relationis, quod dicitur
Sed /col. bl haec responsio non est consentanea doctrinae a nobis traditae in esse ad, non inesset, nihil reale esset in rerum natura, et consequenter relatio
superiori sectione, nam huj usmodi entia, concepta etiam prout in se sunt, praedicamentalis secundum proprium constitutivum ejus non esset .reale q~i~.
includunt in suis rationibus essentialibus habitudinem ad aliud; non ergo Unde merito D. Thomas, in l, dist. 25, quaest. 1, art. 4, ad tertmm, dictt,
tantum dicuntur, sed vere sunt ad aliud; ergo etiam ablato a definitione verbo quad relatio realis secundum propriam quidditativam rationem ponit aliquid
illo, dicuntur, vere illis competit definitio. Denique illud verbum solum est in eo cujus est relatio, quamvis illud quad ponit, non sit absolutum. Quad
ablatum ad excludenda relativa secundum dici; ostendimus autem haec non esse latius docuit in alio opere super primum Sentent. Ad Annibaldum, dist. 25,
relativa tantum secundum dici, sed etiam secundum suum esse; ergo non satis art. 4, ad 3, dicens: Quamvis relatio non ponat ex illo respectu aliquid absolutum,
exclusa sunt. Existimo ergo hujusmodi transcendentales respectus excludendos ponit tamen aliquid relativum, et ideo relatio est quaedam res; si enim secundum
esse per illam particulam, cujus totum esse est esse ad aliud, si in ea proprietate rationem relationis sive respectus non poneret aliquid, cum secundum suum esse,
310 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 311

ratione cujus ponit aliquid inhaerens, non cada.t in genere relationis, non esse 10. Respondetur falsum esse antecedens; nam res non constituitur apta referri
aliquod genus entis. per relationem ut sic, sed per fundamentum proximum relationis; proprius
7. Igitur ad difficultatem positam concedendum est, relationem secun- autem effectus formalis relationis est actu referre. Alias nee distingueretur, etiam
dum se totam esse accidens; haec enim ratio, ut in superioribus diximus, est secundum rationem formalem, a fundamento, nee requireret coexis- /p. 808/
quasi transcendentalis respectu novem praedicamentorum. Unde, cum dicitur tentiam termini, nee vere diceretur totum esse ejus positum esse in respectu
totum esse relationis esse ad aliud, particula exclusiva ibi virtualiter contenta ad aliud.
non exdudit concomitantia, seu extrinsecas et transcendentales rationes; quare, 11. Ad primam ergo probationem antecedentis respondetur primo, aliud
sicut non excludit rationem entis realis, ita nee rationem accidentis et inhae- esse considerare an effectus formalis accidentis sit constituere actu tale, aliud
rentis. Solum ergo exdudit esse absolutum, et indicat, esse relationis ut sic non vero an de essentia accidentis sit actu exercere suum effectum formalem; haec
sistere in subjecto, quod suo modo afficit seu denominat, sed illud ordinare ad enim duo distincta sunt. Vere enim dicimus, effectum formalem albedinis esse
terminum, et in hoc positam esse totam formalem rationem relationis. Itaque, constituere actu album, et non tantum aptitudine, quanquam absolute non
licet similitudo, verbi gratia, secundum totam rationem suam etiam relativam sit de essentiali ratione albedinis, ut actu conferat talem effectum formalem.
conci- /col. b/ pienda sit ut forma afficiens rem quam denominat similem, Unde etiam dici potest quod, licet de ratione albedinis, simpliciter loquendo,
tamen tota illius affectio in hoc posita est, quod illam rem ordinat seu refert non sit constituere actu album, tamen de ratione albedinis ut afficientis et
ad aliam, et in hoc sensu dicitur totum esse relationis esse ad aliud se habere. informantis subjectum, est constituere actu album. Sic igitur in praesenti in
8. Objectio.-Dissolvitur.-Dices, hoc commune esse formis illis seu modis hoc posteriori sensu dicimus, formalem effectum relationis esse actu referre,
realibus et absolutis indudentibus respectum transcendentalem; scientia enim quia hoc est quod ipsa per se primo confect formaliter subjecto, quod suo
ita inest et afficit scientem, ut illum suo proprio modo ordinet ad objectum modo afficit.
scibile, neque aliter possit suum formalem effectum exercere; et idem est de 12. Relationis essentia sita est in actuali ajfectione subjecti.-Addo vero deinde,
potentia, unione, et similibus. Respondetur concedendo in hoc esse aliquam non omni accidenti commune esse aptitudine tantum afficere, sed quaedam
similitudinem et proportionem, propter quam hae formae dicuntur indudere esse de quorum essentiali conceptu est, ut non possint in rerum natura esse
aliquem respectum secundum esse, licet transcendentalem. Differentia vero quin afficiant, ut de modis accidentalibus in superioribus diximus. Relationes
est ilia eadem saepe tacta, quod relationes praedicamentales consistunt in puro ergo in hoc posteriori ordine continentur, quia non possunt esse in rerum
respectu; aliae vero formae vel q ualitates dan t pro pri um aliq uod esse ab sol utum, natura, quin actu referant, eo quod non possint ab omni subjecto separatae
exercendo aliquod munus, ad quod natura sua ordinantur, in quo propterea conservari, quia in re non distinguuntur a suis proximis subjectis, ut ostensum
indudunt alquam habitudinem, et ideo non ita habent totum suum esse ad est. Quanquam non desint qui contrarium doceant, ut Major, in 4, dist. 12,
aliud, sicut relationes praedicamentales. quaest. 3; Ledesm., 1 p. quarti, quaest. 28, a. 2, dub. 4; qui aiunt posse Deum
conservare paternitatem, verbi gratia, creatam sine proprio subjecto, vel per
Essentia relationis sitne apta actu vel aptitudine referre. se separatam, vel in alio subjecto. Putant enim paternitatem esse rem omnino
9. Ultimo vero objici potest, quia si relatio in abstracto consideretur, ut est distinctam a caeteris, et ideo consequenter loquuntur, praesertim quoad priorem
forma quaedam referens subjectum vel fundamentum ad terminum, sic non partem. Nam quoad posteriorem impossibile apparet quod haec paternitas
est de ratione ejus ut actu referat, sed ut sit apta referre; ergo non consistit ponatur in eo qui non genuit hunc filium; alias vel constitueret patrem eum
to tum esse ejus in esse ad terminum. Patet consequentia, quia esse ad terminum qui non genuit, vel inhaereret alicui cui non daret suum effectum formalem;
importat actuale exercitium (ut sic dicam) talis habitudinis ad terminum. An- utrumque autem impossibile est. Sicut autem verius est, relationem non esse
tecedens vero patet, tum quia communis ratio accidentis non est actu efficere, rem distinctam a fundamento, ita etiam verius esse non posse ab illo separatam,
sed aptitudine; tum etiam quia potest mens concipere relationem integram, ut vel per se conservari. Quod si interdum distinguitur realiter relatio a subjecto
afficientem subjectum, et ut nondum referentem. Quomodo etiam Theologi remoto, eatenus id est, quatenus /col. bl fundamentum proximum relationis est
aiunt, in divinis concipi paternitatem ut constituentem primam personam et aliqua res distincta a subjecto remoto. Unde eatenus etiam potest talis relatio
quasi adhaerentem illi, prius quam referentem; ergo non consistit ratio relationis conservari separata a tali subjecto, quatenus illa res, quae est fundamentum
in actuali respectu. ejus, potest sine illo subjecto conservari. Tune autem relatio sic conservata af-
312 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 313

ficit suum fundamentum per modum subjecti, et illud actu refert, quo modo verum supponimus, ideo non putamus ibi in cerveni re resulcan ci am effectivam,
quantitas consecrata est aequalis alteri, et albedo separata, esset similis alteri, sed quasi for malem. Rursus, cum ipsa relacio sic forma quaedam, ~10~ habet
et ita nunquam potest esse actu relatio, quin actu referat ad aliud. aliam causam formalem propriam et physicam, sed habet suam qu1dd 1tat~m,
13. Ad alteram probationem respondetur, impossibile esse concipere relatio- et rationem formalem metaphysicam, quam jam explicuimus. Habet et1am
nem cum suo effectu formali plene ac proprie concepto, quin concipiatur ut terminum, qui, quatenus specificans est, rationem quamdam formae participat.
actu referens; sicut impossibile est concipere albedinem cum suo effectu formali Fundamentum vero et subjectum causam materialem complere videntur, et
integre concepto, quin concipiatur ut constituens actu album, quia non potest ideo in his tribus, subjecto, fundamento et termino, omnia principia et causae
res integre concipi sine eo quod est de essentiali ratione ejus. Contingit tamen relation um positae sunt; ideoque de illis sigillatim dicendum est,, et inde .postea
aliquando ut intellectus noster, concipiens aliquam formam ut afficientem, constabit quomodo ex horum varietate diversa genera aut species relattonum
non concipiat distincte, proprie ac integre effectum formalem ejus, sed tan tum distingui possint.
confuse, sistendo in hac communi ratione afficendi, vel inhaerendi; nam quia
haec ratio est quasi transcendens, et inclusa in quolibet modo seu differentia De subjecto relationtmz accidentalium. .
formae, ideo potest tota forma, ut afficiens, confuse tantum concipi quoad ef- 2. Primo igiturdicendum est, omnem relationem praedicamencalem reqwr ~e
fectum suum; ut si quis concipiat albedinem secundum se totam esse formam aliquod subjectum reale. Haecassertio in communisum~~ad~aest na~ relat10
adhaerentem subjecto, et informantem illud, non quidem concipiet illam ut est accidens, ut dictum esr; omne aucem accidens reqwnc aliquod s1.tbJectum;
constituentem actu album, non quia ille non sit effectus formalis albedinis, sed ergo. Item, relatio est quaedam forma; omnis autem for~a a~iq~~d informat;
quia diminute et confuse concipit effectum ejus. Ad hunc ergo modum potest id autem quod informat, dicitur subjectum ejus, praesert1m s1 e1 mhaereat, et
concipi relatio secundum se totam ut afficiens vel adhaerens, aut constituens ab eo pendeat, quod de relatione, etiam ut relatio est, oste~dimus. Opo.rtet
quidpiam, etiamsi non intelligatur ut actu referens, non quia effectus formalis autem advertere, posse nos loqui de relatione in abstracto, vel m concreto, s1cut
relationis non sit actu referre, sed quia tune non concipitur effectus formalis de aliis accidentibus; ut in communi hoc ipsum nomen relationis abstractum
relationis proprio et adaequato concepru, sed confuso et communi. Atque ita est, et in particulari no men paternitatis, similitudinis, etc; et similiter rela~iv~m
nobis contingit, quando in divinis concipimus p acernitace m ut priorem actu in communi est /col. bl quoddam concretum, in particulari vero pater, .s1mil.e,
referendi ad Filium; de qua re latius T heologi disputant. et similia. Cum ergo dicimus relationem requirere subjectum, de relat1one t?
abstracto id intelligere oportet, nam relativum in concreto non habet propne
SECTIOVI. subjectum, sed potius ipsum est quid constans e~ subjecto et relatione,. si for-
maliter sumatur ut relativum est, seu ut compostmm quoddam ex relat10ne et
De subjecto, fundamento ac termino subjecto ejus. Nam interdum ipsum subjectum relationis did solet relativum,
ad praedicamentalem relationem requisitis. denominative potius quam formaliter, id est, tanquam affectum, non tan~uam
1. An sit aliqua causa.fi nalis relationis.-An habeat cttusam efjicentem.- Quae constitutum relatione, et ideo proprius ac formalius dicitur de ipso constttuto.
sit reltttionis causa rnaterialir.- Ex plicui- Ip. 809/ mu s an sit, et quid sit prae- Nam id quod relatione afficicur, non dici tur proprie ipsu~ re~ativu.m, se~ sub-
dicamencalis relatio; nunc oponet exponere causas vel principia ejus, quali- jectum relationis, et saepe etiam vocatur extre~um relatt~ms, qma hab1tudo
acunque sint, et quatenus ei convenire possunt. Cum enim haec relatio non sit relativa veluti claudicur inter duo subjecca relattonum, ut mter duo extrema.
per se intenta in rebus, non habet proprie causam finalem, quamvis eo modo
quo est, dici possit esse propter suum formalem effectum, vel propter suum Unam relationem, etiam secundum esse ad,
terminum. Et simili ratione, cum per se non fiat, sed resultet, vel formaliter in uno tantum subjecto esse posse, contra Henricum ostenditur.
consequatur positis fundamento et termino, nullam habetvel requirit efficientem 3. Quaeri vero hie potest an una relatio unum ha~eat subje~tum, et. quodnam
causam, praeter eas quae fundamentum et terminum efficiunt. Nisi quis velit illud sit. Quod praecipue interrogo propter Henncum, qm Quodh~. 9, q. 3,
ipsi fundamento aut termino efficientiam aliquam circa relationem tribuere, sentit relationem secundum proprium esse ad, unam et eamdem esse inter duo
saltem per resultantiam naturalem, quod esset probabile respectu fundamenti, extrema quae referuntur. Nam relatio secu~dum .propri:UU ration~~ est veluti
si relatio esset modus ex natura rei distinctus ab illo; tamen, quia contrarium ut medium quoddam inter extrema relata, et 1deo, s1cut Anstoteles d1x1t eamdem
 314 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 315
esse viam ab Athenis ad Thebas et a Thebis ad Athenas, ita dicit Henricus unam
et eamdem esse habitudinem quorumcunque duo rum extremorum ad invicem Quomodo unius relationis possint esse plura
se habentium, scilicet, patris ad filium, et filii ad patrem, vel duorum fratrum, subjecta subordinata.
aut similium inter se. Quod si objicias, quia relatio patris, verbi gratia, est pater- 5. Relationes in denominatione subjecti quern ordinem servent.-Aliter ergo
nitas, et filii filiatio, et quod in universum necesse est distingui ex fundamentis, dicendum est, et distinguendum de subjectis. Possunt enim esse plura subjecta
quia non potesr unum et idem accidens esse in diversis subjectis, respondet, diversarum rationum, et subordinata inter se, vel ejusdem rationis, et aeque
rdationes consideratas ut existentes in fundamentis, et ut inseparabiles ab il- immediate affecta relatione. Hoc igitur posteriori modo, fieri non po test ut una
lis, multiplicari secundum distinctionem et pluralicacem eorum; nihilominus relatio sit in pluribus subjectis, ut probat ratio contra Henricum facta, quae
tamen, quatenus relatio est quoddam medium et quasi intervallum duorum universalis est de quolibet accidenti habente in re /col. bl veram ac propriam
habentium inter se habitudinem, sic esse unam et eamdem utriusque. unitatem. Priori3 autem modo distingui possum plura subjecta unius relatio-
4. Verumtamen aut haec distinctio et tota opinio in solis verbis consistit, aut nis, unum proximum, et aliud remotum; ut relatio aequalitatis proxime est in
intelligibilis non est. Quomodo enim fieri potest, ut unum et idem numero quantitate, remote vero in substantia, et relatio similitudinis proxime est in
accidens sit in sub- Ip. 810/ jectis reipsa distinctis, et inter se non unitis, sed qualitate, et remote in quantitate, et adhuc remotius in substantia. Verumta-
omnino disjunctis, et loco etiam separatis? Nam vel relatio haec dicitur una, men hujusmodi relatio per se ac proprie solum afficit proximum subjectum, in
vera et propria unitate, tanquam simplex forma, et in hoc sensu procedit ratio quo suo modo inest; ad subjectum autem remotum solum comparatur medio
facta, quae convincit non posse unam et eamdem relationem simul esse in proximo, in quantum hoc in illo inest et sustentatur. Jam enim in superiori-
u~ro~ue extremo; vel dicitur illa relario una, solum collectione quadam, quia bus, disputat. 14, ostendimus posse unum accidens proxime inesse alteri, et
mm1rum ex utraque relatione exisrente in utroque extl'emo coalescit integra non attingere substantiam in se, sed solum quatenus illud accidens, cui aliud
habitudo et veluti connexio in urroque extremo, et hoc modo solo nomine inest, in substantia sustentatur. Sic igitur potest una relatio immediate esse in
vocatur ilia relatio una, qui est inusitatus modus loquendi, et ideo vitandus aliquo subjecto accidentali, et remote in alio, vel in substantia. An vero hoc
est. Et praeterea juxra ilium, consequenter loquendo, dicendum esset ralem sit universale in omnibus relationibus, statim videbimus.
habirudinem, eo modo quo w1aest, habere unum subjcctum, non simpUciter, 6. Est tamen quoad denominationem relationis consideranda quaedam
sed collectione utriusque extremi invicem ordinati. Quod si quis dicat illam varietas inter relationes: nam interdum relatio aeque vel in eodem modo
mutuamhabicudinem esse unarn simpliciter ucriusqueexu-emi, non camen esse denominat subjectum proximum et remotum, ut quantitas dicitur aequalis,
in illis ut in subjectis, sed ran rum esse inter ilia, quod magis signi£icat Henricus, et similiter substantia materialis; et albedo dicitur similis, et ipsum album,
hoc sane evidentius falsum est, minusque intelligibile; nam vel intervallwn vel etiam subjectum, ut homo, vel paries. Aliquando vero relatio denominat
illud se~ mutua habitudo est aliquid rationis tantum, et sic est impertinens subjectum proximum, et non remotum, ut intellectus dicitur referri relatione
ad relaaonem realem, ur recte conrra Au1:eolum ostendir. Gregor., in I, dist. potentiae ad suum actum, anima vero non item, et sic de aliis. Aliquando vero,
28, q. 1i vel est aliquid rei, et sic vel est a.liquid in se subsistens, quod dici non e converso, relatio denominat subjectum remotum, vel suppositum ipsum, et
potest; vel necesse est ut sir in aliquo subjecco; non potesr autem esse nisi in non proximum, ut filiatio denominat suppositum filium, non vero humani-
extremis inter se relatis, vel in aliquo eorum. Vel denique est aliquid abstrahens tatem, quamvis probabile sit proxime inesse humanitati; et paternitas proxime
ab ente reali et rationis, ut indicat Henricus, et hoc et simpliciter falsum est, ut dicitur esse in potentia, et tamen non denominat patrem, nisi ipsum sup-
supra est osrensum; et licet daremus, ut est in conceptu noscro, posse abscrahi, positum. Ratio autem hujus varietatis provenit ex diversitate fundamentorum,
nih.ilominus in singu lis relationibus non posset abstraliere; ergo netesse est ut quae aliquando secundum eamdem proportionem comparantur ad terminos
in reJationibus realibus et accidentalibus sit aliquid real.e et accidentale, et ita relationum, aliquando vero secundum diversam, ut inferius magis constabit
redit argumentum factum, quod debet esse in uno aliquo subjecto. explicando diversa genera relationum. Aliquando etiam provenit ex eo quod
relatio consequitur suum proximum fundamentum, et illud denominat, non
prout afficit vel denominat aliud subjectum, sed secundum suam praecisam et
abstractam rationem, quomodo accidenti convenit relatio inhaerendi; interdum

3 This reading is from Salamanca, 1597. The Vives edition reads "Posteriori".
 316 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 317
vero relatio consequitur fundamentum, solum prout afficit vel denominat /p.
rei a suo fundamento proximo; ergo ut sit accidens, oportet ut proxime fun-
811 I tale subjectum aut suppositum, interdum vero indifferenter sub utraque
detur in accidente; nam si immediate conveniret substantiae, esset in re idem
ratione. Et haec de subjecto relationis.
cum illa, et ita non esset accidens, sed substantia.
3. Et ideo D. Thomas, quaest. 8 de Potent., art. 2, ad primum, ait, nullam
SECTIOVII. relationem posse esse idem cum substantia, quae est in genere, id est, cum sub-
De fundamento relationis praedicamentalis. stantia creata; et in 4 cont. Gent., c. 14, versus finem, ait, in creaturis relationes
I. Relatio realis eget realifondamento.-Circa fundamentum autem relationis habere esse dependens, quia earum esse est aliud ab esse substantiae, et inferius
p~incipio ~tatuendum in communi est, omnem relationem realem indigere ait: Relatio realiter substantiae adveniens, et postremum, et imperfectissimum esse
al1quo real1 fundamento. lta supponitur fere sine probatione aut disputatione habet; postremum quidem, quia non solum praeexigit esse substantiae, sed etiam
ab omnibus scribentibus in hac materia. Et ratio esse videtur, quia relatio ex esse aliorum accidentium, ex quibus causatur relatio. Ergo ex D. Thomae sen-
se non habet propriam entitatem, cum ostensum sit non esse rem distinctam tentia, semper relatio supponit in substantia aliud accidens in quo fundetur.
ab absolutis; ergo necesse est ut habeat illam saltem identice et secundum Unde 1 p., q. 28, art. 2, ad 2, ait, in creaturis semper relationi supponi aliquid
rem. ab aliquo ali?; ~on habet autem illam a termino, nam terminus est quid absolutum, quod est alia res ab ipsa relatione. Quod juxta superius dicta non
extrmsecum et distmctum, entitas vero rei est intrinseca; ergo habet relatio potest verificari ratione solius fundamenti proximi; ergo saltem ratione sub-
realis suam entitatem a fundamento reali; ergo semper illud requirit. Et con- stantiae, quod ibi praecipue D. Thomas intendit; ergo inter substantiam et
firmatur ac dedaratur amplius, nam relatio talis est naturae, ut nee per se fiat, relationem semper intercedit aliquod aliud fundamentum, ratione cujus possit
nee. sit per se intenta in natura; ergo consequitur et quasi resultat in subjecto, esse relatio alia res ab ipsa substantia. Et confirmatur ex Aristotele, 5 Metaph.,
pos1to termino; ergo requirit in subjecto aliquam realem rationem vel cauam ubi enumerans fundamenta relationum, semper ponit aliquid a substantia
ob quam in illo resultat talis relatio, posito tali termino; illa ergo causa vocatur distinctum, nempe qualitatem, actionem, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Confirmatur
fundamentum reale relationis. secundo, quia alias in sola materia possent fundari et inniti relationes, quod
esse falsum constat, praecipue juxta communem sententiam, negantem posse
De distinctione fundamenti a subjecto relationis. in sola materia prima esse aliquod accidens.
2. Sed ut haec assertio amplius explicetur, inquiri potest imprimis, an
oporteat hoc fundamentum esse in re ipsa distinctum a subjecto relationis. Aliquae relationes possunt immediate in substantia fundari in re ipsa.
Potest autem hoc intelligi aut de proximo subjecto inhaesionis, aut de remoto 4. Nihilominus dicendum est, necessarium non esse ut fundamentum
et q.uasi fundamentali subjecto, quod est ipsa substantia. Et quidem de priori proximum relationis sit aliquod accidens, vel res aliqua, /p. 812/ aut modus
subJecto certum est non oportere ut praeter illud sit aliud fundamentum re- realis, ex natura rei distinctus a primo subjecto relationis. Haec est communis
lationis ex natura rei ab illo distinctum, alioqui esse abeundum in infinitum. sententia, ut statim referam. Earn vero probo primo, quia nulla est causa aut
Unde certum est relationem aequalitatis, quae inest quantitati, etiam separatae ratio hujus necessitatis. Rationes enim quibus supra probatum est, relationem
a substa~tia, non habere aliud fundamentum praeter ipsam quantitatem, quia realem requirere fundamentum reale, non probant necessarium esse ut illud
nee fing1 potest quale illud sit, nee sisteretur in illo alio fundamento, nam il- fundamenlum sit in re distinctum a subjecto. Quia, licet in subjecto requiratur
lu.d etiam esset subjectum proximum, et ita respectu illius quaerendum esset realis causa, vel ratio ob quam, posito termino, consequatur relatio, tamen illa
almd ~ndam~ntum; vel si in eo sistitur, majori ratione sistendum erit in ipsa ratio vel causa esse potest ipsa intrinseca natura talis subjecti, et non res aliqua,
quantttate. D1fficultas ergo est de /col. bl subjecto principali et fundamentali, vel modus ei superadditus. Cur enim, sicut quantitas ex sua naturali conditione
quod est quaerere an respectu substantiae, omnis relatio realis requirat aliquod et natura habet sufficientem rationem ob quam ad illam consequantur quaedam
fundamentum accidentale distinctum in re ipsa, saltem ex natura rei, ab ipsa relationes, et similiter qualitas, non poterit etiam substantia simile quippiam
sub.stantia. Multi enim ita sen tire videntur. Et ratio esse potest, quia relatio est habere per seipsam?
acc1dens; ergo debet convenire substantiae medio accidente in quo fundetur. 5. Unde argumentor secundo inductione, nam, sicut duae quantitates aut
Patet consequentia, quia relatio, ut supra dictum est, non distinguitur a parte albedines referuntur realiter relatione similitudinis vel aequalitatis, ita duae
substantiae, relatione identitatis specificae; ergo haec relatio inest substantiae
318 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation 319
Disputaton 47: Latin Text
absque accidentali fundamento, ex natura rei ab ilia distincto. Patet consequentia, 8. Quodnam accidens possit esse idem cum substantia.-Ad argument~ in
tum quia una substantia non est ejusdem speciei cum alia, ratione contrarium respondetur, ex superius dictis de divisione e~tis in sub~t~tlam
alicujus accidentis, sed ratione suaemet entitatis et propriae naturae; tum et accidens, proprium et physicum accidens non posse esse m re omnmo i~em
etiam quia sicut inter albedinem et similitudinem nihil mediat, ita neque inter cum substantia; accidens vero praedicamentale interdum posse sola rat10ne
substantialem naturam et relationem identitatis specificae. Antecedens vero ratiocinata distingui, ut patet de duratione. Sic ergo dicendum est, relationes,
sumitur ex D. Thoma, 1 p., quaest. 28, a. 1, ad 2; et est expresse Aristotelis, 5 quae proxime in substantia fundantur, non esse accidentia _rhysica, et quoad
Metaph., text. 15, ubi eodem modo censet de identitate in substantia, quo de entitatem suam, sed solum esse accidentia praedicamentalia, quoad figuram
similitudine in qualitate, et aequalitate in quantitate. Ex quo etiam sumitur et modum praedicationis, quia secundum ratio~em formalem suam ~unt extra
argumentum a paritate rationis; nam tan ta estconvenientiainter duas substantias, rationem substantiae, et ideo non est inconveniens quod tales relationes non
sicut inter duas albedines vel quantitates; item tanta est proportio, quia aeque distinguantur in re a substantia. .. .
sunt ejusdem ordinis; ergo tam est relatio realis identitas specifica in substantia, 9. Testimonia vero ibi citata ex D. Thom. Ip. 8131 probab1hter suadent, ill um
sicut similitudo et aequalitas in quantitate et qualitate. Et ita docent frequenter sensisse relationem realem distingui aliquo modo ex natura rei a fundamento,
Thomistae, Sonci., 5 Metaphys., q. 35; Javell.; 5 Metaph., q. 21. quae est probabilis sententia. Quia vero, in quarto contra Gentes, dicit tale~
6. Relatio creaturae in quo fondetur.-Aliud exemplum est de relatione relationem convenire substantiae, medio alio accidente, quod non potest um-
creationis, nam haec (ex sententia omnium) realis est, et praedicamentalis, et versaliter esse verum, etiam supposita illa sententia, ideo probabile mih~ est
tamen immediate fundatur in substantia. Quad docet expresse D. Thomas, ipsum loqui de relationibus, quae physi~e et realiter .accidenti~ su.nt, e~ id.e~
quaest. 7 de Potent., art. 9, ad quartum, ubi sic ait: Creatw-a refertur ad Deum fortasse earn vocat, relationem, quae realiter substantiae advenit; sic enim ibi
secundum suam substantiam, sicut secundum causam re- IcoL bl lati.onis; seamdum loquitur, et ideo etiam exempla ponit in similitudine et aequ~litate: non in alii~.
vero relationem ipsam formatiter; sicutaliquiddicitur simile seet~ndum qualitatem Aliter Ferrar. exponit, cum D. Thomas ait relationem praeexigere m substanua
causaliter, secunditm similitudinem formaliter. Et idem sumitur ex quaest. 3 de esse aliorum accidentium, intelligi vel secundum rem, vel secundum modu~.
Potent., art. 3; et ex Cajet., 1 part., q. 45, art. 3; Ferrar., 4 com. Gent., cap. 14; Sed hoc violentum est, et non potest omnibus his relationibus accommo?an,
Soncin., 5 Metapbys., q. 31; etJavell., q. 21. Et pacec ratione, quia subsrantia ut patet de relatione actus et potentiae inter ~ateri~m et ~ormam, de relauo.ne
secu ndum seipsam immediate cerminat creationem Dei; ergo per seipsam im- unionis substantialis, et similibus. Ad testimomumAnstotehs respondetur, potms
mediate refermr ad Deum relatione creaturae. Dices, creatio.nem passivam esse esse in contrarium; quomodo autem intelligenda sit divisio fundamentorum
mod.um quemdam ex natura rei distinctum a cermino, in quo potest proxime relationis ab ipso tradita, in sequenti sectione declarabimus. A? ult~mam ve.ro
fundari ilia relatio, et non immediate in substantia. Respondeo primum, licet confirmationem concedimus plures relationes posse esse proxime m matena,
to mm con edacur, nihilominus .non dari aliquod accidens quod sit fundamen- ut relatio potentiae, relatio causae materiali~, .relatio .unionis: creatura.e, et
tum illius relationis, quia iUa dependentia creativa non est accidens, ut supra similes. Et quidquid sit de accidentibus physicis, de his pr~edi~amental.ibus,
diximus. Deinde, li et verum sit in Wa dependentia posse fundari propriam et sola ratione distinctis, nullum est inconveniens esse proxime m matena, ut
quamdam relarionem, camen ideo non excludicLII quin ipsamet substantia per per se notum videtur.
seipsam referatur ca.usaliter seu fundamentalicer in Deum, quatenus ilJa ipsa,
ratione sui esse, essentialiter postulac illam dependenciam, et illam per seipsam De ratione fundandi, et comparatione illius ad fundamentum. .
terminat. 1O. Rationesprobantesfondamentum etrationemfon~andi i~em esse.~Vltenus
7. Et confirmatur in relatione filiationis, quae non potest ita fundari in vero inquiri potest circa relationis fundamentum, an. idem sit cu.m ratione fun-
generatione activa vel passiva, ut illi proxime insit, nam transacta actuali dandi, vel si haec sint diversa, quae sit utriusque ratio et necess1tas. Est autem
generatione permanet relatio filiationis. Nee potest fundari in alio accidente, causa dubitandi, quia fundamentum relationis nihil aliud esse videtur quam
quia nuJlum est quod sit causa ejus; fundatur ergo in ipsamet substantia. Ratio id quo mediante relatio convenit subjecto; sed hoc ipsum .fu.ndamentum est
autem est, quia substantia ipsa creaturae, quatenus creabilis est, vel generabilis ratio fundandi seu recipiendi relationem; ergo haec non distmg~~ntur. It~m
ab alia causa, est sufficiens ut in ea possit fundari relatio, si a tali causa, creata quia si praeter fundamentum oporteret aliam ra~io~em fun.dandi ~ntervenire,
vel genita sit. nullus esset terminus in his fundamentis vel rauombus ass1gnandis; nulla est
 320 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 321
eui':° rati~ cur magis sit duplex qu am triplex, vel quaduplex; ergo sistendum
est 111 u111co ftu1damemo, quod ipsum sit ratio fundandi. Imo, ut diximus, non est fundamentum, per hanc vocem intelligendo illud in quo, et a quo
neq~e f~ndamen ~um hoc o~ort~t sernper esse re dis-/col. bl tinctum a subjecto relatio proxime habet entitatem suam. Unde factum est ut talis conditio, ratio
~ lat1?~1s, sed r~tJone suffic1r al1quando, nam subjectum dicitur quatenus est fundandi appellata sit, vel quia non est aliud speciale nomen quo nominetur,
1d cut tnest relauo; fundamenrum vero in quantum habet talem rationem ad praeter illud commune quo vocatur conditio necessaria, vel quia illa condi-
qu~ relatio consequitur posito termino, vel in quantum ab illo habet rel~tio tio est quasi ultimo seu proxime requisita, ut relatio pullulet. Re tamen vera
ent1tatem suam. non tam proprie dicitur ratio fundandi quam conditio necessaria, quia ratio
11. Rationes oppositum suadentes.-ln contrarium vero est, quia saepissime alicujus rei proprie dicitur, quae habet aliquem influxum per se in talem rem,
auctores de his ut de distinctis loquuntur, et indicant rationem fundandi esse praesertim formalem, aut effectivum secundum rem vel rationem; haec vero
aliquid requisitum in ipso fundamento, vel ultra fundamentum et terminum conditio in presenti non habet talem influxum in relationem paternitatis, cum
ut relatio resultet. Ut ad relationem paternitatis necessaria est actio generandi: sit extra ipsum patrem, et nullam habeat in illum propriam causalitatem; est
quae non est fundamentum, quia paternitas non habet ab illa entitatem suam, ergo magis proprie necessaria conditio.
cum actio generandi sit in filio genito, paternitas vero sit in patre; est ergo ratio 13. Non est autem hoc generale in omnibus relationibus, ut requirant similes
fundandi. Similiter, licet inter duo alba albedo sit fundamentum similitudinis conditiones ex natura rei distinctas a fundamentis, et terminis actu existentibus,
proxima tamen ratio fundandi dicitur esse unitas formalis utriusque albedinis'. ut consurgant. Nam inter duo alba statim consurgit relatio similitudinis, a
Unde, cum fundamenta relationum possint esse innumera, rationes tamen quocunque facta sint, et ubicu nque existant, aut quascunque alias condition es
fundandiadtriacapitaabAristotelerevocantur,utsequentisectionevidebimus; habeant, et idem est de relatione scientiae ad scibile, et similibus. Er ita h ujus-
est ergo ratio fundandi aliquid aliud a fundamento. modi ratio fundandi, etiamsi hac voce illam conditionem appellemus, non est
12. Mens auctoris.-In hac re potest nonnulla diversitas in usu vocum, nam necessaria in omnibus relationibus. Omnibus autem fundamentis relationis
~pud aucto~es interdum hae voces confundi videntur, et pro eadem sumi, commune est ut habeant aliquam naturalem proprietatem, vel conditionem,
mterdum d1versis rebus tribuuntur; explicabimus ergo prius quo modo res ratione cujus apta sint ad fundandam relationem, quae proprietas respectu
se habeat, et deinde usum vocum accommodabimus. In omni ergo relatione talis fundamenti potest appellari ratio fundandi relationem. Ut, verbi gratia,
reali requiritur ex parte subjecti res aliqua, natura sua apta et accommodata ut scientiae creatae naturale est ut sit mensurabilis ab objecto scibili, ratione cujus
fundare possit respectum ad aliud, ut ab illa proxime habeat relatio realitatem potest fundare relationem ad illud. Similiter tali formae, verbi gratia, albedini,
suam, eo modo quo declaravimus. Hujusmodi ergo res proprie appellatur naturale est ut habeat talem unitatem formalem, q ualem habere etiam potest alia
~nd.am~ntum re.lati?nis in quocunque relationum genere. Contingit vero forma ejusdem speciei; haec ergo est ratio ob quam talis forma potest fundare
m al1qmbus relattombus, ut praeter totam entitatem subjecti et fundamenti relationem similitudinis. Atque hoc modo etiam in relatione paternitatis, vel
requiratur aliqua alia conditio medians inter fundamentum et terminum et cujuslibet agentis creati, praeter actionem ipsam, consideranda necessario, est
in re ipsa aliquo modo distincta ab ipsis, ut possit inter ea consurgere rela;io. aliqua /col. bl ratio fundandi per se conveniens ipsi fundamento. Ponamus
Atq~e hoc modo est necessaria actio vel generatio, ad relationem agentis, seu enim tale fundamentum esse ipsum principium efficiendi, sive proximum, sive
patns, et fortasse eodem modo materia supponit modum unionis ad4 rela- principale; in hoc ipso principio aliqua ratio consideranda est, ob quam esse
tion~m .uni~nis. Quod enim hujusmodi conditio sit simpliciter necessaria, possit relationis fundamentum, nam in divina actione ad extra, quamvis in
expl~can facile ~otest i? actione, nam si Petrus et Paulus (qui nunc sunt pater Deo sit verum principium efficiendi, non tamen resultat in ipso Deo relatio
et filJUs) essent 1mmed1ate creati a Deo cum omnibus proprietatibus absolutis realis, quia illud principium non est aptum fundamentum illius relationis, ut
Ip. 814( q~as n~nc hab~nt, si inter eos non intervenisset actio generationis et infra dicemus. Ergo, si principium efficiens creatum est aptum fundamentum,
~rocess1oms un~us ab alto, non fuisset inter eos exorta relatio, nee de poten- oportet ut in eo assignetur aliqua ratio intrinseca connaturalis, ob quam est
t1a absoluta fien posset ut oriretur; nunc vero, adjuncta sola illa conditione, natura sua aptum fundamentum relationis realis, ut, verbi gratia, quod est
statim resultat relatio; ergo est illa conditio simpliciter necessaria. Et tamen principium per se ordinatum ad actionem, vel aliquid hujusmodi, de quo
infra videbimus.
4 Here I am following the reading of Salamanca, 1597, vol. 2, p. 560. The Vives 14. Sic igitur, quantum ad rem ipsam constat in omni fundamento intervenire
edition here reads "ac". rationem fundandi per se et intrinsecam; constat item haec duo physice et in
 322 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 323
re ipsa non es~e distincta, metaphysice vero seu ratione distingui ad explican-
das rerum rat10nes, et hoc modo posse etiam diversis vocibus denominari. quia relatio habet entitatem suam a fundamento; ergo ex parte ejus illud sufficit
Nos vero ne videamur res multiplicare, rationes has fundandi in fundamentis ad existentiam relationis. Secundum patet, quia terminare actu, solum dicit
includimus. Unde quidam ita loquuntur, ut dicant fundamentum, formaliter denominationem extrinsecam ex habitudine alterius ad rem quae terminare
loquendo, non esse, verbi gratia, qualitatem absolute, sed qualitatem ut unam. dicitur; ergo talis denominatio potest cadere in rem non existentem, quantum
Vide Hispalens., in l, dist. 13, q. l, art. 3, notab. 4. At vero conditionem ne- est ex parte ejus.
cessariam (quando intercedit), hoc communi nomine appellamus. Jam vero, 3. Aliquorum opinio.-Atque hanc opinionem sequitur Gregor., in 1, dist.
occurrebat hie q uaestio de distinctione fundamentorum, aut ration um fundandi, 28, quaest. 23, qui etiam addit, etiam e converso non ens posse referri realiter
ab Aristotele tradita in 5 Metaph., c. 15; tamen, quia prolixiorem sermonem ad ens; putat enim relativa realia semper esse mutua, quod fundamentum
postulat, de illa instituemus propriam sectionem, post sequentem. falsum est, ut infra videbimus. Et ipsum consequens, quod infert, valde est
improbabile; qui enim intelligi potest, ut quod nihil est actu, referatur relatione
reali, aut quomodo potest accidens existere sine subjecto reali? Denique nihil
SECTIO VIII. est reale actu , nisi actu existat; ergo nee relatio potest esse realis actu, nisi sit
De termino praedicamentalis relatfonis. rei actu exis- /col. bl tentis, quia non potest aliter existere, nisi etiam subsistat .
. 1. Relatio realis terminum exigit realem.-Dicendum imprimis est, ad rela- Itaque de correlativo reali, quod possit esse non ens, improbabilis est illa opinio,
t1onem praedicamentalem necessarium esse aliquem terminum realem. Haec ut patet etiam ex duabus sectionibus praecedentibus; de termino vero minus
ass~rti~ in com~uni sumpta fere est communis omnium, et facile colligi potest improbabllis est.
ex mtnnseca rat1one relationis. Cum enim essentia ejus sit ad aliud se habere
se~undum suun_i esse essentiale, in hoc ipso includitur terminus; cumque re- Terminum actu existentem requiri ostenditur.
lat10 haec praed1camentalis et realls sit, terminum ejus realem esse necesse est. 4. Nihilominus dicendum est, ad relationem praedicamentalem necessarium
Sed ~n e~pli- Ip. 815/ candis conditionibus requisitis ex parte termini ad esse esse terminum realem et realiter existentem. Haec est sententia communis,
relatioms, et quomodo huiusmodi terminus ad essentiam relationis concurrat tam philosophorum, et interpretum Aristotelis in Praedicamentis, c. Ad aliq-
multa tractari solent, quae a nobis breviter indicanda et expedienda sunt. ' uid, et in 5 Metaph., c. 15, quam Theologorum, ut patet ex D. Thoma, 1 p.,
quaest. 13,, art. 7, ubi ait, relationes omnes, quae sunt inter ens et non ens,
An requiratur terminus actu existens. esse rationis, quia eas format ratio apprehendens non ens tanquam quoddam
2. J?ubitan~i ratio.-Primum est, an terminus relationis realis praedicamentalis extremum. Idem q. 28, art. l, ad 2, et 2 contra Gent., c. 12, rat. 3, et quaest.
req~uat termmum realem actu existentem. Et ratio difficultatis est, quia ordo 3 de Potentia, art. 3, ad 5, ubi adducit Avicennam, 3 suae Metaph., cap. ult.
real1s transcendentalis potest esse ad rem quae non existit, imo et ad id quod Et idem sentiunt omnes Thomistae, Cajet. et Ferrar., citatis locis; Soncin., 5
non e~t verum e~s, sed ens rationis, ut supra dictum est; quid ergo habet relatio Metaph., q. 27; Capreol., in l, d. 7, quaest. 2, et latius d. 13 et 20; Scot. et
praed1camental1s, cur non possit similem terminum respicere? Et confirmatur alii, in 1 d. 13; et Mairon., d. 29, q. 6, et 8, qui tamen quadam distinctione
ac declaratur, nam scientia perinde respicit scibile, quando illud non existit, utitur; ait enim relationem fundamentalem posse esse ad non ens, non vero
ac quando existit, quia scientia abstrahit a singularibus et ab existentia. Item relationem formalem. Per hanc vero posteriorem intelligit relation em praedica-
productivu.m refertur ad producibile, teste Aristotele, 5 Metaph; producibile mentalem, atque ita ipse se explicat, in quo aperte consentit assertioni positae.
autem ut sic non requirit existentiam. Item imago, et phantasma, et similia, Quid vero per relationem fundamentalem intelligat, non dedarat; si autem (ut
aeque repraesentant rem existentem, et non existentem, et albedo existens tam apparet) respectum aliquem transcendentalem intelligit, mihi non displicet ejus
est similis in essentia alteri albedini possibili, sicut existenti, nam eamdem sententia. Jam enim supra ostendimus, relationes reales transcendentales, esse
convenientiam habet cum illa, in natura et essentia. Similiter effectus causae posse ad terminos non solum non existentes, verum etiam qui non sint entia
finalis aeque p~ndet a fine existente et non existente. Ratio denique a priori realia secundum essentiam. Et hoc etiam satis probant argumenta Gregorii,
esse potest, qu1a nee ex parte relationis, nee ex parte termini, seu ex munere nam potentia, quae per se primo ordinata est ad actum, sine dubio habet
terminandi, videtur necessaria haec actualis existentia termini. Primum patet, transcendentalem ordinem ad illum, etiam possibilem et nondum existentem.
Scientia etiam habet relationem ad scibile, quod, per se loquendo, non solum
 324 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 325
non necessario existit, verum etiam est quid universale abstrahens a singularibus
quad ea modo existere non potest. ' quantum sumitur in ratione objecti. Denique relatio praedicarnentalis non est
5. Nonnullae rationes, quibus probari solet assertio, expenduntur.-Quaprop- proprie nexus aut unio, sed solum velut tendentia quaedam, quae potest solum
ter non est facile rationes convincentes adducere, quae /p. 816/ assertionem extrinsece terminari ad aliud, et idea ex hac parte non repugnat esse entis ad
positam probent in relationibus praedicamentalibus; nam quae communiter non ens. Sicut ergo hae rationes solvantur in relationibus transcendentalibus,
afferri solent, videntur aeque procedere de transcendentalibus, ut, videlicet, ita videntur solvi posse in praedicamentalibus.
quad nullum ens reale potest esse ordinatum ad non ens. Item quia alias etiam 7. Ratio assertionem convincens.-Quaerenda est ergo aliqua propria ratio,
posset esse ordinatum ad ens rationis, quad repugnat, cum ens rationis pendeat quae specialiter procedat de relationibus praedicamentalibus. Et primo quidem
ex fictione intellectus. Item quia relatio est quasi nexus inter extrema; ergo non argumentari possum us ex principiis receptis de his relationibus, nimirum, quad
potest esse realis nisi inter extrema realia. Quae rationes, et similes, si efficaces relatio et terminus sunt simul tempore, et quad ablato correlativo seu termino
sunt, locum habent in respectibus transcendentalibus. Constat autem in eis non aufertur relatio, et quod posito termino, si jam supponitur fundamentum,
habere vim, quia non repugnat ens reale habere transcendentalem ordinem ad consurgit relatio; haec enim omnia sumpta sunt ex Aristotele et communi
non en~ actu. Pri~~m •. quia potentia potest habere ordinem ad ens possibile, sententia; omnia vero illa supponunt realem existentiam termini, nam inclu-
quamv1s non resp1c1at 1llud secundum solam possibilatem ejus, sed in ordine dunt coexistentiam extremorum, quae supponit utriusque existentiam. Ratio
ad act.um'. ita t:imen ut habitudo ipsa potentiae prior sit et independens ab vero propria sumenda est ex iis quae superius dicta sunt de esse, et essentia
actual1 e~stent1a .actus vel objecti. Similiter non ens, quatenus cogitari po- hujus relationis, nimirum, quad consistit in puro respectu, neque aliud mun us
te~t, t~rmm~re ettam potest habitudinem transcendentalem cogitationis, vel habet in natura, et idea non est per se intenta, sed mere resultans, tanquam
sc1en.ttae ad 1~sum; .atq~e.ita non ens, quamvis ex se videatur ineptum, ut sit quid accidens rebus praei:er omne id quad ex se est, et ex intentione naturae
termmus real1s hab1tudm1s, tamen quatenus aliqua actio circa ilium exerceri illis convenit. Ex natura enim hujus relationis sic explicata, plane colligitur
po~est, etia~ actio ipsa, vel habitus aut potentia, quae sunt principia ordinata illum ut sic non esse, nisi supponatur fundamenti et termini coexistentia, ex
ad 1llam act1onem, ~o~sunt di~ere habitudinem transcendentalem ad rem quae qua ipsa resultat: tum quia non habet rerum naturalium modum productionis;
non est. Atque ob s1~mlem rat1.onem potest actus aliquis inrdlectus respectum tum etiam quia solum hac ratione potest habere rationem accidentis, nam
transcend~ntale~ d1cere ad. al1quod ens rationis, quia, nimirum, illud potest alii respectus qui possunt esse ad non entia, sunt essentiales, et pertinent ad
esse suffic1ens obJectum tal1s actus. Et idea ad hujusmodi habitudinem non praedicamenta earum rerum quarum sunt essentiales differentiae. Quae ratio
solum non obstat quad ens rationis sit quid fictum ab intellectu verum etiam habet aliquarn efficaciarn, etiam in eorum sententia, qui putant hanc relationem
in hoc ipso fundatur illa transcendentalis habitudo. ' esse aliquem modum in re distinctum a fundamento et termino; hi enim facile
6. Re te vero probat.ur illa ratiooe, nullas alias res posse habere transcen- sibi accommodant hanc discursum factum; solum illis difficile est ratio- /p.
~entales. habi~d~es a? entia rationis, praeter ipsosmet actus mentis, quibus 817 I nem talis entitatis aut modi distincti reddere. In nostra vero sententia
tp.sa cnt~a ra~on1:8 cog1rantur aut finguntlll', sub quibus comprehendo actus magis urgeri potest, quia si relatio praedicamentalis in re non est aliud nisi
~tqu~s i~ag1~at1on~ ~~aten~s per illos fingi possunt et repraesenrari entia ipsummet fundamentum, ut accidentaliter dans denominationem relativam,
1magmana et 1mposs1b1lta. Et idem erit de actibus voluntatis, quatenus versari ergo non potest in re ipsa dare illam, nisi coexistente termino; nam omnis alia
possunt cir~a en~ia ~ationis.; aut'. si vera est opinio Scoti, quad per eos fieri denominatio aut erit omnino absoluta et essentialis, et consequenter ad sum-
possunt ent1a rat1001s. Demque 1d etiam suo modo extendi potest ad habitus mum erit respectiva transcendentaliter, aut non erit denominatio ex solis ipsis
pro~orcionatos .his actib~ quatenus dicunt per se ordinem ad eadem objecta. rebus sumpta, sed ex comparatione nostrae rationis. Ob hanc ergo causam, ad
In l~1s ergo omn~b us repenrur haec/col. b/ babitudo, propter transcendentalem relationem praedicamentalem necessarius semper est terminus realis, et realiter
ord.mem. ad. obJeCmm; aJiae vero res, quae non possum habere pro objecris existens.
enna rattoms, non possunt habere habitudinem realem et transcendentalem
ad i1la. Qu.ia, ut supra ostendimus, habitudo transcendencalis semper est se- Rationes contrariae sententiae dissolvuntur.
cundum al1~uod munus reale, quad active vel passive ad aliquod genus causae 8. Argumenta vero oppositae sententiae, si attente considerentur, solum
reducatur; ctrca ens autem rationis nullum mun us reale ex.erceri potest, nisi in procedunt de respectu transcendentali; jam vero est sufficienter declarata dif-
ferentia inter illum et relationem praedicamentalem. Uncle ad ultimam ratio-
-
326 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 327
nem respondetur, terminum realem requiri ad relationem praedicamentalem
ex natura et modo talis relationis, quae solum consistit in puro respectu orto 11. Relativum praedicamentale nequit nisiper ordin.em ad t~rminum defi.n~ri.­
ex coexistentia extremorum. Unde, licet verum sit ipsam actualem termina- Qui merito inferunt relationem secundum propnam rat10nem ~efinm non
tionem nihil ponere in termino, tamen necessario supp net entitatem in illo, posse, quin terminus relationis in definitione ponatur, nam res s1cu~ esse es~
accom modacam ut ex positione ejus cum termino possit imurgere relatio, et sentialiter, ita definiri debet; sed essentia relationis talis est ut non poss1t absoI:1
ur ipsa relario habeat quru;i objectum in qu d p ossi t respicere. U nd e, sicu t a termino; ergo nee definitio potest a termino absol~i; erg? de~et necessano
de fu ndamenro diximus posse in eo secundum rationem distingui rem quae indudere in se terminum. Et in hoc non recte sentit Ma1ro111s supra, ~am
fimdat relationem er rationem seu aptitudu1em fund andi, ita ex parte termini videtur dicere posse relationem definiri sine .additi~n: ter.mini, i.n q~o et1am
d istingui po cesc res seu forma termi ni, er ratio terminandi, quae est in tali ab Scoto dissentit, ut pater ex eodem, in pnmo, d1stmct10ne tng~sm~a. Sed
forma. Jam vero sese hoc loco insinuabat quaesrio, qualisnam esse debet haec est attente observandum, semper nos esse locutos de termino relatioms, no~
fo rm a et ratio terminandi, er p rnesertim an sit absolu ta vel respectiva. Sed q uia de correlativo, ut abstrahamus ab illa quaestione, an ipsum correlati;u~ sit
haec quaestio prolixior est, et rnu1ta supponit tractanda sectione sequenti, ideo terminus, quam infra tractabimus, et ibi etiam videbimus an ~oc poss1t ettam
post illam disputabitur. extendi ad correlativum, ut sic, etiamsi non sit formalis term1- !P· 81.8/ n~s;
et ibi etiam solvemus difficultatem hie occurrentem, an te~mmus sit. ~nus
Quomodo terminus sit de essentia relationis, ex dictis educitur. cognitione quam relatio, et quomodo correlativa possint esse s1mul cognmone
9. Aliquorum opinio.-Aliorum sententia.-Ex praedicta vero resolutione et et definitione non committendo circulum.
ejusrationeintelligi potest primo, hujusmodi terminwnrealem essealiquo modo 12. Transcendentales respectus, utrespiciant terminum.-Ultimo ?bservandum
de essentia relationis, quanquan1 in hoc sit nonnuUa diversitas incer auctores, est, doctrinam hanc aliquo modo generalem esse ad respectus et1a~ transcen-
qua magis es t in modo loquen Ii, quam in re. Quidam enim absolute negan t dentales; nam etiam illi, et formae vel entitates de quar.u~ ess.e~tla s~nt, non
cerrninum esse de essentia re- /col. b/ lationis, ut Francisc. Maironis, in l, dist. possunt adaequate et essentialiter ~efinir! ~bsque ad~mone .illms ret, quam
49, q. 5; quod ex pa.rte etiam senti t Soncin., 5 M etaph., q. 33; et Cajer. , in respiciunt, quae sub ea ratione termmus d1c1 pores~. D1fferentia ;~ro est, ~uod
Praedica bil. , c. de Specie. Er ratio esse potest, quia terminus est omnino extra relatio praedicamentalis ex peculiari et propria rat1one sua ~equmt te~~mum
ipsam relarionem, et res ab illa condistu1cta; ergo non porest esse de essentia actu existentem, tum ut ex illo in suo genere resultet, tum ut ilium resp1c1at.sub
ejus, nam qu d est de essentia, est omniao intrinsecum, er idem cum r , de praecisa ratione termini; relatio ~e~o transcen~ental~s nee res~lt~t ex ter~mo,
cujus essentia existit. Alii vero dicunt terminum esse de essentia relationis. proprie loquendo, nee illum resp1c1t sub praec1sa ratio?e te~~1~1, sed adJ.uncta
Quae est communis Peripateticorum sententia, ut supra Cajetanus refert, et semper aliqua alia ratione objecti, aut causae, vel altenus sm~1hs. Atque 1ta ~st
Niphus, lib. 5 Metaph., disputac. 16. Et ratio est, quia totum esse relationis aJiquo modo magis intrinseca et formal.is habit~do ad termmum, praeser~1m
est esse ad terminum; ergo terminus est de essentia re!ationis. existentem, in relatione praedicamental1 quam m respectu transcendental!.
10. Sententia auctoris.- Verumtamen vix potest esse dissensio in re, ut dixi,
nam terminus non est intrinseca pars, nee genus aut differentia intrinseca re- Etiam de potentia absoluta non posse relationem man'!"e sin~ te:mino.
lationis; unde non potest esse de essentia ejus in dicto sensu, et in hoc omnes 13. Secundo resolvitur quaestio, an tanta sit dependent1~ relatioms ab. ex-
conveniunt. Certum deinde est relationem praedicamentalem, ut talis est, non istentia sui termini, ut non solum ex natura rei illam reqmra~, verum et1~m
esse nisi respiciendo et tendendo ad terminum, et in hoc consistere essentiam de potentia absoluta non possit conservari sine illa. Vi.detur emm hoc cred1tu
ejus. Uncle sub ea ratione dici potest includere aliquo modo terminwn in sua difficile, nam cum illae sint res distinctae, ut suppommus,. et funda~e~tum
essentia, quia non potest absolvi ab illo, neque secundum propriam rationem non componat intrinsece relationem, neque habeat r:alem m~uxum 1~ tllam,
concipi, quin in tali conceptu terminus indudatur. Et hoc sensu locuti sum nulla reddi potest sufficiens ratio ob quam non poss1t Deus sme termmo re-
omnes antiqui, qui propterea non tam dicunt terminum esse de essentia, quam lationem conservare. Nihilominus tamen dicendum est n?n ~osse per ulla~
esse de conceptu quidditativo relationis; quod etiam admittunt Cajetanus et potentiam conservari relationem praedicamentalem ut stc ~t~e .suo actual1
Soncinas. termino. Ita docent fere omnes scriptores. Ratio autem est, qma 1? ipso effectu
formali relationis involvitur aliquo modo terminus realis et actualis. Os~ensum
est autem supra, non posse relationem conservari in rerum natura, qum actu
 328 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 329
exerceat suum effectum formalem; ergo non potest relatio actu conservari
sine suo termino actuali. Patet consequentia, quia non potest effectus formalis referri inter se similitudine reali, quia fundamentum distinguitur a termino qui
conservari sine omnibus per se et esse.ntialiter requisitis ad ilium. /col. b/ Major terminat, etiamsi non distinguatur ab ipsa ratione terminandi. Et hoc sentit
vero pater, quia formaJis effectus relationis esr actu referre ad terminu.m; in Scot., in l, dist. 31, et in Quodl., quaest. 6.
ho au tern ffecru indudirur ipse terminus. Sicut mocus aur actio non potesc
esse sine rermino proprio, eo quod sit actualis via ad ilium. Resolutio.
14. Estqu hoc longe fucilius ad intelligendum in nosrra sententia, sdlicet, 3. Dicendum vero est, ad relationem realem necessarium esse ut fundamentun_i,
quod relacio oon sit res, aut modus real is discinctus a foodamento, et ei addirus, et terminus formaliter sumptus, in re ipsa distinguantur. Haec est sentent1a
sed sit ipsamet entiras fuodamenci, ut sic denominans subjectum. Nam cwn ilia D. Thomae, 1 part., quaest. 42, art. 1, ad 3, ubi propter hanc caus.am ~egat
denominacio sit pure respectiva, tan cum consisdt in quadam habitudine ortaex aequalitatem inter divinas personas esse relationem realem; neg~t et1am idem
coexistenria termini; ideo mirumnon estquod ralisentitasfundamenriconferre referri ad seipsum relatione reali. Et hoc sequunt~r omn~s Thom1stae: E~ q~od
nullo modo possit denom.inarionem illam, nisi posira coex:istentia termini. requiratur aliqua distinctio in re inter correlanva realta est fer.e pnnc1p1~m
Et ita facile so.lvitur ratio dubirandi in contrarium. Nulla enim hie intervenit per se notum in metaphysica. Nam correlativa censentur re~1t~r opp~s1ta;
encicas, quam Deus non posslt conservare sine alia realiter distincta; nam wtarn non opponitur autem idem sibi ipsi; oportet ergo ut correlat1va 111 ~e al1quo
encitatem fundamenti potest conservare sine tennino; non tamen potest con- modo distinguantur. Unde necesse etiam est rel~~iones reales o~pos1ta~, esse
servare illam entitatem sub tali ratione et denominatione qLtia secundum illam in re aliquo modo distinctas, tum propter oppos1t1onem, tum et1am qma un-
involvic ipsum rerminum; non tamen potest conservare illam entitatem sub aquaeque relatio in re est idem cum suo extremo: ut s~pra ~ste~sum ~st; ergo
raJi ratione er denomination quia SCCLmdum illam invoJvit ipsum rerminum; si extrema sint distincta, etiam relationes. Quocirca s1 relat10111s term111us est
imo in re ipsa nihiJ distinctum addit praerer coexistentiam termini. relatio opposita, hinc satis concluditur relationem et terminum debere in re ~sse
distincta. Si vero formalis terminus relationis est aliqua forma absoluta, etlam
concluditur debere in re distingui. Quia talis formalis terminus non p~test
SECTIO IX. esse nisi fundamentum oppositae relationis, ut infra dicam; sed non m111us
Quae distinctio necessaria sit necesse est fundamentum unius relationis distingui a relatione opposita, quam
inter fundamentum et terminum. relationes ipsas oppositas; ergo. Probatur minor, quia relati.o et funda~entum
1. Haec guaescio eriam expeditur facile ex hactenus dictis. Quidam enim sunt in re idem; ergo quantum relatio distinguitur a relattone oppos.1ta, tan-
existimanr necessariam esse inter ilia dJstinctionem rea.lem, ut Soncin., 5 tum in re distinguitur fundamentum unius relationis ab ejus oppos1t~; ergo
Metap.h., q. 29, et signfficat debere esse omnimodam distinctionem, ita u.t aeque etiam, distinguitur a fundamento rel~tionis op~ositae. Item, qma .non
non sufficiac distingui tanquam cotum et parcem. Fundatur praecipue, qwa solum relationes , sed etiam extrema seu sub1ecta relattonum debent esse ~n re
alias to tum conrin uum refenerur infinicis re.lacionibus realibus di versa rum distincta, quia non potest intelligi realis et vera hab.itu~o inter ea quae 111 re
proportionum majoris inaequalitatis ad infinitas partes proportionales, quod non distinguuntur, quia omnis habitudo, ut ex term1110 ipso consta~, postulat
est inconveniens. Unde simili argumento probat D. Thomas, 2 cont. Gent. c. extrema; extrema vero includunt pluralitatem, et consequenter al1- /~ol. b/
12, rat. 3, non posse unam quantitacem referri relation reali ad qu.antiratem quamdistinctionem rei. Denique in ipsadefinicion~ re.lativorum~occouanetur,
majorem possibilem, quia alias haberec simul relariones infinitas, cum numeri quia debent esse ad aliud. Si aucem, subjecra relation~ o:ppos1~um debe~c
vel quantitates majores possint in infinitum mulciplicati. esse inter se distincra, maxi.me. id verum hab t de sub1ect1s, seu fundarnenns
2.Alij vero putamnullam distinctionem in reesse necessariam, quodmaxime proximis, quibus re.lationes proxime insunt; n~n_i illi~ proxime p:r se conf~r.unt
videri potest in relat.ione identitacis ejusdem ad seipmm. QLtia tam proprie et a suas proprias et formales habitudines; ergo d1st111ctto haec max1me ~eqm~1tur
pa.rte rei sine fictione intellectus est aJiquod ens idem sibi sicur est diversum ab inter ipsa fundamenta oppositarum relationum, et consequenter ettam 111ter
alio, vel simile a.lceri; ergo cam est ilia relacio rea.lis, sicut alia. At Ip. 819/ que relationes ipsas, ac denique relationem et terminum.
hoc maxi.me opinantur aliqui, si contingat idem fundamenrum esse in diversis
subjecris; ut, verbi gratia, si ea.de.in a.lbedo esser in duobus hominibus, aiunt
330 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 331

Quantum oporteat esse distinctionem praedictam. est priori sententiae. Ad posteriorem vero negatur identitatem ejusde.m ad
4. Quanta vero debeat esse haec distinctio dubitari potest. Breviter tamen seipsum esse relationem realem, sed rationis tantum. Quod autem res d1cat~r
censeo non esse necessariam aequalem in omnibus, sed juxta naturam funda- eadem sibi sine relatione rationis, vel falsum est, quia necessaria est comparatto
mentorum et modum relation um pensandum id esse. Saepe enim haec distinctio intellectus, qua eadem ad seipsam ita comparatur, ac si essent duo extrema;
debet esse realis et suppositalis, ut in relatione patris et filii; nam quia tales vel certe si secludatur haec comparatio, in re solum est res ipsa, et negatio dis-
relationes fundantur in reali processione unius suppositi, et non potest unum tinctionis, quam solam potest addere haec identitas ipsa rei, ut supra, di~put.
suppositum realiter procedere, nisi ab alio supposito, ideo talis relatio requirit 8, visum est. Atque idem censeo de propria similitudine inter duo subJecta
distinctionem realium suppositorum. Et similiter relatio specificae identitatis alba, si eamdem numero haberent albedinem, quia convenientla ilia, quam in
requirit realem distinctionem naturarum substantialium, et consequenter albedine haberent, potius esset identitas in eadem numerica forma. Quod ut
etiam suppositorum, seclusis miraculis. Et idem est, proportione servata, de magis intelligatur, distinguere ibi possumus convenientiam in forma albed!nls,
relatione aequalitatis vel similitudinis; requirunt enim distinctionem realem vel in unione ad eamdem formam; prior convenientia est identitas quaedam,
tali um formarum, et consequenter etiam subjectorum, ex natura rei. Ad aliquas et ideo non est relatio realis; posterior vero potest esse similitudo et relatio,
vero relationes existimo sufficere distinctionem modalem; nam, sicut est vera quia, licet forma sit eadem, unio ad diversa subjecta necessario est di~ersa, ~t
efficientia aut emanatio inter rem et modum, ita etiam potest esse vera relatio. ideo quantum ad illam est sufficiens distinctio, ~t similitu~o. vel relat10. real1s
Item quia distinctio modalis, vera distinctio est, et sufficit ad oppositionem fundari possit. Ut si duae humanitates essent umta Verbo d1vmo, non v1detur
vel habitudinem, propter quam necessaria est distinctio inter relationem et du- /col. bl bium quin essent vere similes in unione hypostatica, quae non
terminum. esset in eis eadem numero, sed distincta, ideoque possent sub ea ratione referri
5. An vero sufficiat distinctio inter totum et partes, dubitari potest, propter relatione reali. Non potest vero hinc argumentum sumi ad relationes divinas
argumentum Soncinatis de infini tate relation um. Unde did posset quod, licet prout terminantes (ut nostro modo loquamur) eamdem essentiam Dei, quia
distinctio inter totum et partem, qua tenus aliquo modo realis est, sit major non terminant per unionem, sed per simplicissimam identitatem.
quam modalis distinctio tamen quatenus extrema non sunc ica condistincta,
sed in uno aliud includitur, minus sufficere ad fundandam relationem realem.
Sed difficile hoc creditu est, primo, quia simpliciter ilia distinctio est vere in
SECTIO X.
re, et est /p. 820/ major quam modalis. Item quia causa materialis vel formalis An tria relationum genera triplici fundamento
videntLLr realiter refeni ad suum effecrum, qui est compositum ipsurn , a quo recte fuerint ab Aristotele distincta.
ram en no n disringuuntur, nisi sicut pars a toto. Irem quia duae medietates 1. In hac sectione examinanda est doctrina Aristotelis, lib. 5 Metaph., c. 15,
ejusde m continui videntur inter se referri rdatione reali aequaliraris; nam in ubi agens deAd aliquid, ad tria genera relativorum omnia refert, quas distinguit
re vere disringuuntur, et non ut includens et indusum, sed ut condistinctae, ex triplici fundamento seu ratione fundandi relationem.
et si essent contiguae tantum, referrentur relatione reali; unio autem, per con-
tinuationem non potest hanc relationem impedire; major enim est unio inter Partitio et doctrina Aristotelis proponitur.
rem et modum, aut inter materiam et formam, quia unio non tollit omnem 2. Quas relationes in primo genere collocet Aristoteles.-ln pri~o genere
distinctionem. Quod si illae medietates inter se referuntur relatione reali, idem constituit eas relationes quas dicit fundari in unitate vel mulutudme, quod
erit de earum medietatibus inter se comparatis, et ita etiam sequitur infinitas postea subdividit in varias species; nam in unitate ait fundari aequalitate~,
relationum. Neque videtur esse ullum inconveniens, quod in continuo ita sint similitudinem, et in universum identitatem eorum quorum una est substanua.
infinitae relationes, sicut sunt infinita puncta vel partes, cum relationes nihil Nam similia dicuntur, quae habent unam qualitatem; aequalia, quae habent
rei addant ipsis fundamentis. unam quantitatem; eadem vero, quae habent unam substantiam, quod potest
intelligi vel proprie et in rigore de substantia, vel generatim de essentia, quod
Solutio argumentorum. infra videbimus. In numero vero ait fundari omnes relationes quae aliquo
6. Idem ad seipsum rationis tan tum re'4tione refertur.-Duo alba eadem albedine, modo secundum quantitatem dicantur, et ab unitate recedunt, ut sunt om~es
an relativa per relationem realem similitudinis.-Per haec ergo satis responsum proportiones inter numeros inaequales, sive illae indefinite seu generaum

l
332 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 333

significentur, ut excedens. multiplex, etc.; sive definite, ut duplum, triplum, et non quia, aliud ad ipsum; at vero in tertio genere, licet unum relativorum
etc. Unde, licet hae relationes inveniri etiam possint inter quantitates con- dicatur ad aliquid, quia vere est ad aliud, alterum vero, quod illi correspon-
tinuas, tamen dicuntur fundari in numero, quatenus requirunt diversitatem in det, non dicitur ad aliud quia vere sit ad aliud, sed quia aliud est ad ipsum.
quantitate. Atque eadem ratione ad idem fundamenrum percinent relaciones Ut scientia et scibile, quamvis ad aliud dicantur, tamen diverso modo; nam
omnes dissimilitudinis, distincrio1us, et similes, quia in numero aJiquo modo scientia sic dicitur, quia vere est ad aliud; scibile vero minime, sed solum quia
fundantur ; hie enim non sumunrur in rigore unitas ec numerus pro quanticate, scientia est ad ipsum; idemque est de intellectu, intelligibili et similibus. Quam
sed generalius. lllud enim est considerandum , Aristotelem semper loqui de differentiam nulla ratione probat Aristoteles, sed ut manifescam tradit.
his relativis in plurali, quia, propriissimc loquendo, ambae relationes oppositae
hujus generi sw1t quae requirunt in funda.mento, aur numerum aut /p. 821/
aliquam unitatem pludum (ita enim est haec uniras imelligenda). Uncle side Sitne divisio convenienter data.
singulis relationibus loquanmr, unaquaeque requirit fundamenrwn , non quod 5. Quae rationes ingerunt difficultatem.-Prima.-Haec est Aristotelis divi-
simpliciter sit numerus, sed quod cum alio componat numerum, vel habeat sio et doctrina. Circa quam duo praecipue declaranda occurrunt, in quibus
unitatem. variae difficultates attingentur. Primum, an singula membra illius divisionis
3. Quae relationes sint in secundo genere. -In secundo genere po nit Aristoteles convenienter assignata sint. Secundum, an illa divisio sit adaequata relationi
ea relativa quae fundantur in potentia agendi et patiendi, vel in actionibus praedicamentali, ita ut sufficienter totam ejus latitudinem comprehendat.
earum, quod subinde distinguit in varias species, quas partim sumit, vel ex eo Ratio dubitandi circa priorem partem est primo, quia relationes primi generis
quod relationes fundantur in sola potentia abstrahendo ab actione, vel ut sub- non videntur reales; ergo. Probatur antecedens primo quoad relationes unita-
est actioni. Et adhibet exempla, ut calefactivum et calefactibile, calefaciens et tis, quia unitas ilia in qua fundantur, non est realis, sed rationis tantum; ergo
calefactum. In quibus oportet duo advertere: unum est, cumAristoteles ponit nee relatio in ea fundata potest esse realis. Antecedens patet, quia illa non est
relationem realem inter potentiam et possibile, nunquam loqu.i de effectu unitas numeralis; nam haec fundat identitatem ejusdem ad seipsum, quae est
possibili objective sumpto, ut videtur intellexisse Gregorius in superioribus relatlo rationis, ut supra diximus; ergo est unitas specifica, vel alia superior;
citatus, qui ex hoc exemplo Aristotelis colligebat, dari relationes reales ad omnis autem alia unitas praeter numeralem est unitas rationis. Nee refert si
terminos non existentes, sed possibiles; Aristoteles autem aperte loquitur de quis dicat unitatem formalem esse realem, nam haec etiam non est realis, nisi
potentia passiva seu subjecto calefactibili, ut declarat his verb is: Et uno nomine, in quantum in re est eadem cum numerica, licet ratione distinguantur; unde
activum ad passivt4m; et infra: Activa autem etpassiva, ex potentia activ1l et pas- ita multiplicatur in rebus, sicut ipsa unitas numerica, ut in superioribus visum
siva potent:iammqite actionibm dicunt:ur, ut calefactivum ad ca/efactibile. Hine est; ergo non magis porest esse fundamentum relationis realis, quam unitas
secundo considerandwn est alium esse terminum realem relarionis potentiae numerica. Et confirmatur ac declaratur; nam unitas quae sit fundamentum
acrivae ut sic absrrahendo ab actione, a termino potentiae activae, ut subest relationis, debet esse unitas plurium; nam unitas uniuscujusque ut sic non
actioni, seu ut facientis; nam prior terminus est potentia passiva, et alioqui fundat relationem ad aliud; debet ergo esse unitas plurium; sed omnis unitas
non potest esse terminus realis; posterior vero est ipse effectus, ut jam fluens a plurium re distinctorum est unitas rationis; ergo. Dices hoc esse verum de
potentia agente. Rursus vero addit Aristoteles, hanc relationem, quae fundatur unitate quasi positiva et universali, tamen unitatem negativam, qua una res
in potentia sub actione, variari juxta varias temporis differentias; alia enim non se habet aliter quam alia in aliqua forma vel propriecate, in rebus ipsis
fundatur in praesenti actione, ut relatio aedificantis, calefacientis, etc.; alia in esse; ita enim /p. 822/ respondent aliqui Thomistae, Capreolus, in 1, dist. 30,
actione praeterita, ut relatio patris; et alia in actione futura, ut quodJacturum est quaest. 1; Soncin., 5 Metaphys., q. 34; et Cajetan., q. 7 de Ente et essentia.
(inquit) ad id quod faciendum, quod habet difficultatem infra tractandam. Sed contra, quia non magis potest negatio aut privatio fundare relationem re-
4. Qµae relari.ones sif1t in tertio genere. _-In tertio genere ponit Adstoceles alem, quam ens rationis , quia etiam privatio secundum se sumpta ens rationis
relationesquasvocatmensurabilisadmenSLtram,utsunt{inquit)relacioscientiae est, nihilque reale in rebus ponit; ergo non potest fundare relationem realem.
acl scibile, intellectus ad inrelligibile, aspectus ad specrabile. Ass.ignat autem Atque haec ratio videtur etiam probare, relationem fundatam in numero rion
notandum discrimen (quad gravibus quaesrionibus occ.asionem praebet) inter posse esse realem, quia proxima ratio fundandi ejus est aliqua negatio, nam
hoc genus et duo priora, quia in prioribus (inqu.it) utmmque relativum dicitur numerus vel multitudo distinctione constituitur; distinctio autem seu divisio
ad /col. bl aliquid, quia idipsum, ad quod unumquodque est, aliud dicitur, in negatione formaliter consistit, ut in superioribus visum est. Et declaratur
334 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Re/,ation 335
Disputaton 47: Latin Text
exemplis, nam inaequalitas, verbi gratia, in hoc proxime fundatur, quod haec convenit in differentia specifica, et in omnibus superioribus praedicatis,. vel
quantitas aliquid non habet quod habet alia; haec autem negatio est; similiter respectu diversarum, quatenus uni est similis in specie, alteri .in g~nere p_rox~mo
dissimilitudo proxime fundatur in hoc, quod haec qualitas non habet essentiam
vel remoto. Eademquedifficultas, proportioneservata, invemtur m relan~mb~s
quam alia, et e converso.
quae dicuntur fundatae in numero vel disconvenientia; nam una r~lat10 ent
6. Secunda.-Secundo principaliter argumentor, nam si unitas specifica est
ad rem distinctam in specie ultima, aliae ad varias res in uno vel al10 genere
sufficiens fundamentum relationis, sequuntur multa absurda. Prim um est, inter diversas, quae fere in infinitum multiplicari possunt. Addo etiam, incredibile
res singulorum praedicamentorum, quatenus sunt ejusdem speciei, consurgere videri, quod proportiones omnes, quas arithmetici inter numeros speculantu_r,
relationem identitatis seu similitudinis; quod ipsemetAristoteles concessissevide- sint reales, tum quia non potest assignari unum subjectum adae~uatum tal1s
tur, cum dixit, eadem esse, quorum una est substantia, id est, essentia, et ilia omnia relationis, cum totus numerus non habeat in re veram et realem umtatem; tum
collocat in hoc genere. Nee refert si quis nomine substantiae, non essentiam, etiam quia illae potius videntur comparationes et considerationes ~ntellectus,
sed propriam substantiam intelligat, quod est probabile, quia saltem a paritate quam reales habitudines; at vero Aristoteles aeque numerat omnes 1llas ut spe-
rationis sumitur sufficiens argumentum, quia tam similes sunt duae actiones,
cies sub hoc genere contentas. . . . . .
vel duo Ubi, sicut duae albedines. Falsitas autem consequentis probatur, quia 8. Tertia difficultas contra primum genus relationum.- Tema pnnc1pal1s d1f-
inde fieret, etiam duas relationes ejusdem specie!, ut duas paternitates, referri ficultas est circa idem genus, quia vel hujusmodi relatio- /p. 823! nes su.n~
relatione reali similitudinis; est enim omnino eadem ratio. Consequens autem aliquae res vel modi reales additi ipsis formis absolutis, vel ?on. :nmum dic1
est falsum, quia relatio non potest fundari in relatione; alioquin in qualibet non potest, ut superius de toto hoc p_raedicamento gen~rahter .dictum est, ~t
relatione essent infinitae relationes, nam sicut prima fundat secundam, ita et specialiter de hoc genere videntur saris probar~ du~e. pnm~e di~ficultates hie
secunda poterit fundare tertiam; nam erit similis, vel dissimilis, seu distincta
propositae, quia multiplicantur in eadem re mfimti modi, qm non ~olum
ab aliis, et idem erit de tertia respectu quartae, et sic in infinitum. Secundo necessarii non sunt, verum nee intelligi possunt, nee ad certam aliquam
sequitur, inter duas quantitates bipedales esse duas relationes reales, alteram rationem reduci. Item, quia unitas inter hujusmodi res non est aliquid aliud
identitatis, quatenus sunt ejusdem essentiae, alteram aequalitatis, quatenus ab ipsis rebus; cur ergo erit ratio ut aliquid distinct~m i~de resultet? Si vero
sunt ejusdem magnitudinis; poteritque amitti prior manente posteriore, nam non sunt modi in re distincti, non possunt esse hab1tudmes reales, sed mera
inter quantitatem bipedalem et tripedalem est si- /col. b/ militudo essentiae, coexistentia plurium rerum absolutarum talium conditionum. Probatur,
quanquam non sit aequalitas. Similiter dicendum erit, calorem intensum et quia habitudo realis non potest rei convenire, nisi vel sit ei intr~ns~~a, et e~
remissum referri una relatione reali identitatis in essentia, et altera dissimili- se, vel sit ei addita; in praesenti autem, quando una albedo fit s1m1hs alten'.
tudinis intensione, et similia, quae videntur absurda. non additur ei intrinseca habitudo realis: nam si adderetur, esset ex natura re1
7. Terrio sequitur, non tan tum similitudinem specificam, sed etiam genericam distincta; neque enim potest intelligi additio in re sine distincti.one. inter id
vel analogam fundare propriam relationem realem; est enim proportionalis quod additur, et id cui additur. Rursus neque ilia ha.bit~do est mtr~nseca ~t
ratio; nam, licet similitudo generica non sit tanta quanta specifica, tamen essentialis albedini, tum quia simpliciter potest esse sme 1lla, tum etiam q~1a
est vera similitudo et unitas; ergo fundabit relationem realem, quamvis non omnis habitudo intrinseca et essentialis rei absolutae est transcendental1s;
ejusdom rationis, nee fortasse tam perfectam. Item, quia si unitas generica una autem albedo nullam habet habitudinem transcendentalem ad aliam. Ac
non sufficiat ad hanc relationem, propter varias differentias specificas, neque
propterea est major ratio dubitandi in his formi.s absol~tis'. qu~m in. h.is ~uae
unitas specifica sufficeret, propter varias differentias individuales; nam eam- includunt transcendentalem respectum; nam in his postenonbus mtell1g1 al1quo
dem proportionem servant in identitate reali et distinctione rationis; est ergo modo potest, ut sine additione reali idem respectus sub diversis ration~bus sit
eadem ratio; ergo, sicut specifica unitas fundat relationem rationis, ita generica. transcendentalis et praedicamentalis; tamen in prioribus rebus absolut1s n.ullo
Consequens est falsum, tum quia res specie distinctae, quamvis conveniant in modo videtur posse intelligi habitudo realis, si eis nihi~ intrinse.cum add1tur,
genere, simpliciter sunt dissimiles, potius quam similes, ut albedo et nigredo; ut revera non additur. Hoc igitur primum genus relat1onum v1detur saltem
tum etiam quia alias, cum rerum convenientiae et differentiae possint in infi- magis continere relationes rationis, aut denominationes extr~nsecas, et .modos
nitum, multiplicari per intellectus abstractiones, etiam relationes similitudinis loquendi ortos ex comparationibus variis nostri intellectus mter res diversas,
vel dissimilitudinis infinitae essent in una re, vel respectu alterius, cum qua quam veras et reales habitudines.
 336 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 337
~·. ~uart~.-Quarta difficultas est circa secundum genus, in quo, ut a dif-
ficd1onbus mchoemus, falsum plane videtur quod Aristoteles ait, relationem Sitne sufficiens dicta divisio.
causae e~ectur~e ad effec~um fut_urum, esse sub hoc genere; nam illa non po test 11. Sexta.-Sexta et ultima difficultas est, quia non videntur sub his tribus
esse relat10 real1s, tum qma termmus non est actu existens; nam quod futurum membris sufficienter comprehensae omnes relationes; sunt enim aliae, quae
est, nondum est; imo nondum fit; alias non esset relatio causae operaturae, non minus reales videntur, quam quae in praedictis generibus continentur.
sed operantis. Tum etiam quia ratio fundandi, /col. bl vel conditio necessaria Assumptum patet primo de relatione appetitus ad appetibile, et omnium quae
sc.ilicet acrio, n ondum esr; qu d autem ilia condicio necessaria sit, patet, qui~ sub hoc genere continentur, ut amoris ad amabile, desiderii ad desiderabile,
al1~s nullo m~do e~ser _relatio agenris, seu acruri, sed solum potentis agere. etc. Hae namque relationes non fundantur in unitate, vel actione, ut constat;
De1:11de, est et1am difficile, quo modo relatio fund ata in acrione praereri ra, sir neque etiam in ratione mensurae, quia in amore non est veritas, quae mensura-
real1s, tum quia illa actio jam non est; ergo nee potest esse fundamentum aut tur per objectum amabile. Quod si dicas, non veritatem, sed perfectionem vel
ratio alicuj us relationis; tum etiam quia Petrum, verbi gratia, genuisse Paul um, honestatem amoris mensurari ex objecto amabili, certe hoc modo, intercedet
~t solum de~~m'.natio extrinseca ab actione praeterita; quomodo ergo potest relatio mensurae inter omnem effectum et causam, vel formalem, quae est
1~ :o ftt.n~an t~tnnse~us re~pecrns realis? Maxime quia ea denominatio aeque mensura intrinseca perfectionis rei, vel efficientem, exemplarem, aut finalem,
dictrm, s1ve filius gerutus v1var, sive non; semper enim verum est dicere, Pe- quae possunt esse mensurae extrinsecae. Et imperfectiores species unius generis
trum genuisse Paulum; imo, si modum loquendi attendamus, eodem modo referentur relatione mensurati ad supremam speciem, tanquam ad mensuram
di~itur pater ejus. Atque hinc rursus etiam est difficile, quod relatio agentis, earum. Praeterea relatio unionis ad nullum genus ex praedictis videtur perti-
ettam de praesenti, sit realis in ipso agente, cum ipsa actio non sit in agente, et nere, quia maxime ad primum (nam de aliis non videtur posse esse dubium);
consequenter extrinsece denominet agens. Et confirmatur, nam Aristoteles ait sed neque ad illud pertinet, quia aliud est convenientia et unitas, de qua ibi
in tertio genere, relationem scibilis non esse realem, eo quod res dicatur scibilis est sermo, aliud vero unio, seu conjunctio, quae potest esse rerum omnino
per ~ab~tudine~ sc~entiae ad ipsam; at vero etiam agens sic denominatur per distinctarum, ut est relatio unionis, verbi gratia, humanitatis ad Verbum, et
ha~1tudmem acttoms.q~ae.est in passo ad ipsum principium agendi; ergo, pari aliae similes. Similis fere est difficultas de relatione contactus, propinquitatis
ratto~e, no.n resultab1t m ipso principio agendi aliqua relacio intrinseca ipsi et distantiae, ac denique de relatione causae finalis, formalis et materialis; nam
agentt. Ultimo de. re~a~ione age11t~s in porentia, ut sic, etiam dubitari potest, hae omnes non habent illa fundamenta.
saltem quando pnno p1um agend1 non est per se institutum ad illud munus·
tmJC enim non habet habitudinem transcendentalem ad rem in potentia, vei Defenditur divisio ab Aristotele tradita.
effectum .possi~ilen~; ergo neque habebir praedicamentalem. Consequentia 12. Hae sunt potissimae difficultates quae circa dictam divisionem occurrunt,
fundatur m terna difficultate supra proposita. qui bus non obstantibus, amplectenda est et convenienter explicandaAristotelis
l~. <?i~inta.-Qu'.ma. d'.fficultas est circa tercium genus. In quo pdmum doctrina aut divisio, quam omnes ejus interpretes, et scriptores metaphysicarum
dub1 tan pores.t de d1scnmme assignato ab Aristotele inter hoc genus et alia; quaestionum sequuntur, et Theologi etiam, ut patet ex D. Thoma, 1 part.,
se~ hoc.pecultarem sectionem requirit, quam infra traccabimus. Nunc pro- quaest. 13, art. 7, et quaest. 28, a. 1, et 2 cont. Gent., cap. 11 et 12; quibus
pnam d1fficulratem habec, quomodo ratio mensurae possit esse fundam entum locis Cajetan. et Ferrariens. de his relationibus multa disputant; Capreol. et
relationis realis, cum ipsa ratio mensurae realis non sit, sed rationis tantum, ut Hispalens., in 1, partim d. 19, quaest. 2, et 3, partim d. 30 et /col. bl 31, ubi
supra ostensum est, tractando de quantitate. Quod si dicas ibi fuisse sermonem etiam Scot. et alii Theologi, et aliis locis supra citatis. Fundamentum praeter
de mensw·a q~antiraris, ~c autem de mensura vericaris, hoc potius auget dif- auctoritatem Aristotelis est, quia relationes pertinentes ad singula ex his ge-
fic~cat~m .qu1a ~u l.r~ mm.us potest haec ratio mensurae esse realis, ut paret, neribus sunt reales, ut patet ex communi omnium philosophorum consensu,
quta sc1entJa vel Jud1cmm mtellectus aeque mensuratur ab objecto existence et ex dictis supra de entitate harum relationum. Nam si quae sunt relationes
v~ n?n e:'istente. I~em.illa mensuratio non est Ip. 8241 accio al iqua, nee esr reales, maxime similitudo aut paternitas, aut relatio scientiae ad scibile, quae
aliqu1d re1, LLt patebtt d1scuuendo per singu la praedicamenca. sunt relationes ad tria genera dicta pertinentes, quia si hae relationes non sunt
reales et praedicamentales, quaenam esse possent, quae rationabiliter possint
tales existimari? Hoc ergo satis est ut illa tria genera in praedicamento Ad aliud
constituantur, sive sint aliquae relationes rationis, quae habeant proportionem
338 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 339

cum his generibus, sive non. Nam si non sunt, satis constabit esse haec genera De sufficientia dictae divisionis.
omnino realia; si vero sunt, non pertinebunt directe ad haec genera, ut dividunt 15. Prima ratio sufficientiae. -Quot subjecta sit difficultatibus ratio sufjicient~ae
praedicamentum Ad aliquid, sed habebunt in illis analogiam quamdam seu allata.-Tandem, quod illa divisio sufficiens sit, et complectens omnes relatio-
proportionalitatem. n um species quae ad praedicamentum Ad aliquid, pertinere possunt, omnes
13. Quod autem haec generainter se distinctasint in ratione re1ativa, prim um citati auctores docent. Rationem autem sufficientiae ejus tradit D. Thomas,
videtur satis notum ex ipsis denominationibus quas tribuunt, sunt enim valde 5 Metaph., lect. 17, quia tribus tantum modis contingit unam rem o~dinari
diversae. Deinde optime explicatur res ipsa ab Aristotele ex ipsis fundamentis, ad aliam, scilicet, vel secundum esse, secundum quod una res pendet m esse
seu rationibus fundandi; nam cum una ex potissimis causis relationis sit funda- ab alia, et sic est tertius modus, vel secundum unitatem activam et passivam,
mentum ejus, imo cum ab eo habeat entitatem suam, null um potest esse majus secundum quod una res ab alia recipit, vel alteri confert aliquid, et sic es.t se-
indicium distinctionis relation um, quam distinctio fundamentorum formalium cundus modus, vel secundum quod quantitas unius rei potest mensuran per
ac proximorum, de his enim sermo esse debet. Nam fundamentum remotum aliam: et sic est primus modus. Difficilis vero est haec ratio; nam habitudo ad
vel potius subjectum non ita per se concurrit ad relationem, et ideo distinctio aliud secundum dependentiam in esse, si generatim sumatur, magis videtur
ejus non est ita sufficiens fundamentum ad distinguendas relationes. Quod pertinere ad secundum genus, cum effectus pendeat .in esse a sua ca~sa; ~i vero
vero fundamenta illorum trium generum sint omnino distincta, etiam per se sumatur secundum peculiarem modum dependentlae, quae est sc1entiae vel
manifestum est; recte ergo ex eorum distinctione distinctio illa relationum potentiae ab objecto, sic tot essent distinguendi modi relativoru~, quot ~u~t
sumpta est. modi dependentiarum. Cur enim potius ille modus d~pendentiae const~tmt
14. Dices, po ti us fuisse sumendam distinctionem relation um ex terminis; nam peculiare genus relativorum, quam alii? Item falsum v1detur quod quant1ta~,
quae dicunt essentialem habitudinem ad aliud, ab illo sumunt specificationem, ut habet rationem mensurae, fundet primum /col. bl modum, tum qma
et consequenter distinctionem, ut motus a terminis, potentiae et habitus ab Aristoteles non assignat ibi rationem mensurae, sed unitatis vel numeri, quae
objectis. Respondetur primo, id esse verum de distinctione specifica et ultima; est longe diversa ratio; nam quando duae quant~tates dicuntur aequ~es, non
distinctionem vero genericam, seu subalternam, posse interdum aliunde sumi. est una mensura alterius, nee e converso, nee mter eas hoc attendttur, sed
Secundo responderur, in ill.a distinctione non esse praerermissos terminos ratio unitatis, et idem a fortiori est de similitudine, vel identitate, et ideo, ut
formales, ed vel expresse, vel saltem implicire significaros esse in illis tribus diximus unitas ibi non sumitur quantitative, sed generalius. Tum etiam quia
genedbus. Nam cum relatio /p. 825/ primi generis dicitur fundari in unitate, ratio m~nsurae quantitativae non est per se apta ad fundandam relationom
ibi includicur, quod terminatur etiam ad aliud, quarenus aliquo modo unum realem cum solum sit extrinseca denominatio rationis, ut supra tactum est.
est; nam, ut infra ostendam, quod in uno relativo est fundamentum relationis 16. Secunda ratio sufficientiae.-Quot in ea difficultates.-Aliam rationem
ad aliud, est etiam ratio terminandi relationem alterius. Et simili ratione, cum hujus differentiae indicat eodem loco Alexander Alensi.s, dic~ns illa~ divi-
in secundo genere dicitur relationem fundari in potentia, hoc ipso indicatur sionem sumptam esse ex tribus modis universalibus entls, qui sunt, idem et
cerminari etiam ad porentiam vel effe tum, si relatio non in nuda potentia, diversum, quoad primum; potentia vel actus, quoad secundum; et perfectum
sed uc est sub acrione fundetur; sic enim relatio pocenriae accivae rerminarur (inquit) vel imperfectum, quoad tertium, eo m~d? ~uo im~erfect~m a perf~cto
ad passivam, ere converso; relatio vero potentfae agentis terminatui' ad suum mensuratur et diminutum a completo; et qu1a istl modi suffic1enter vanant
effectum. lJ1 certio aucem genere clacius constat, relationem mensurabilis ad naturam fundamentorum, ideo sunt tres species relationis. Sed difficile est
mensuram terminari. Non est ergo illa distinctio ita sumpta ex fundamentis, quod ait, tertium membrum sumi ex modo ent.is. secundum pe~fectum vel
quin termini etiam indudantur. Cum enim haec sint duo principia suo modo imperfectum; nam, licet sensus referatur ad sens1b1le secundum ~ll~d genus,
intrinseca relationum, neutrum potest exdudi ab earum constitutione et dis- non mensuratur ab illo ut imperfectum a perfecto, sed solum d1c1tur men-
tinctione; sed fundamentum est quasi materiale, terminus vero quasi formale, surari tanquam a termino specificante, qui inter~um po.test ess~ ~erfectior,
quia est ultimum in quod tendit relatio. interdum aequalis, interdum minus perfectus, ut v1dere et1am e.st m mt~l~ectu
et intelligibili. Deinde, quamvis asserat illos tres m?do~ suffic1~nter dlVlder~
fundamenta relationum, non tamen rationem suffic1ent1ae redd1t, neque ex v1
illius explicationis declarat distinctionem eorum inter se. Nam etiam potentia
340 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 341

et actus comparantur ut perfectum et imperfectum, et potentia did potest in unitate. Nam, sicut distinctio indudit negationem, ita etiam unitas; et e
mensurari per actum, quatenus illi proportionatur et commensuratur, propter converso, sicut negatio, quam dicit unitas, supponit entitatem, quae pot:st
quod etiam dicuntur potentiae per actus specificari. Existimo ergo nullam aliam esse fundamentum relationis, ita etiam distinctio realis est inter extrema real1a,
rationem sufficientiae Aristotelem habuisse, praeter inductionem quamdam, in quibus fundatur negatio ibi indusa; in eis /col. bl ergo ut talia s~nt, poter~t
qua intellexit nullam inveniri relationem, quae ad aliquod ex dictis capitibus etiam fundari relatio realis. Unde in exemplis ibi adductis, quamv1s verum sit
revocari non possit, quod non potest melius constare, quam respondendo in relatione inaequalitatis alterum extremum carere parte aliqua magnitudinis
difficultatibus tactis. Nam si nullam invenimus relationem quae non habeat al terius extremi, tam en relatio non fundatur fo rmaliter in ea caren tia, sed in hoc
aliquod ex his fundamentis, sufficiens signum nohis erit, divisionem illam quod haec quantitas tanta est, illa vero tanta. Et ide~ est de dissimilitudine;
sufficientem esse. supponit enim duas essentias, quarum una non est al1a, non tamen fun~atur
Ip. 826/ proxime in illa negatione, sed in ipsismet essentiis, quatenus secundum ~mtates
formales plures essentialiter sunt. Quod dedaratur ~xemplo; n~m luc1du?1 ~t
SECTIOXI. tenebrosum etiam habent dissimilitudinem quoad illam negat1onem, .qma I~
uno non est forma lucis quae est in alio, et tamen non est inter ea relat10 real1s
De primo genere relationum, dissimilitudinis, quia ex parte alterius extremi, nee est fundamentum, nee
in numero vel unitate fundato. formalis terminus positivus talis relationis.
1. Ad singulas difficultates sectione superiori propositas, majoris daritatis
gratia fere singulis sectionihus respondebimus. Relatio unitatis in rebus omnium praedicamentorum fundari pote~t.
2. Ad primam igitur respondetur, aliud esse loqui de duahus relationibus 4. In secunda difficultate multa tanguntur, quae singulas possent qu~e~t1~­
duorum extremorum, quae dicuntur in unitate fundari, aliud vero de singulis nes postulare; ea tamen breviter transigemus, ne ~n explicand.is ~in.u.t1ss1?1~s
earum. Unaquaeque enim duarum relationum similitudinis, verbi gratia, fun- entibus nimium morosi simus. Primo itaque petitur an relauo s1m1htudm1s
datur in una qualitate in quantum in se est una unitate formali, non quidem et aliae huius generis fundari possint in sola quantitate, et qu~it~te, v:l ~tiam
quantum ad id quod addit unitas supra ens, nam illud est negatio, et ideo non in rebus aliorum praedicamentorum. Et quidem de substant1a Jam v1d1mu~,
potest fundare relationem realem, ut recte argumentum probat, sed quantum sectione praecedenti, eamdem esse rationem, quoad hanc partem, de quantl-
ad illam positivam rationem entis, quae substernitur illi negationi. At vero tate et qualitate. Et ratio ibi facta videtur mihi condudere de quacumque re
loquendo de ambabus relationibus duo rum extremorum, illae dicuntur fundari vel modo seu entitate, praesertim absoluta, ut interim relationes omittamus;
in unitate eorum, quia ratio cur simul consurgant illae duae relationes, positis cur enim duo calores sunt realiter similes, et ut sic realiter referuntur, et non
illis duobus extremis, non est solum quia singula extrema habent inter se talem duae calefactiones, vel, duo Ubi, et quaecumque alia similia? Item inter duas
unitatem, sed etiam quia illa unitas est ejusdem rationis in utroque, quod idem actiones est vera et positiva contrarietas; haec est autem relatio, quae ad hoc
est ac si diceretur, ideo illa referri inter se, quia habent convenientiam realem. genus pertinet; fundatur enim in peculiari quod~m r_nodo ~istinctio~is. Ita~ue
Et quamvis haec convenientia non sit aliqua unitas realis illorum duorum ex- quantum ad caetera praedicamenta, extra Ad al1qu1d, facile conced1mus illa-
tremorum inter se, ut hene etiam in argumento sumitur, loquendo de propria tionem ibi factam. Neque contra hoc consequens, quantum ad hanc partem,
et formali unitate, datur tamen in re fundamentum illius unitatis, sive quoad aliquid ibi objicitur. Verum est, D. Thomam, ~Met., lect. 17, omnino ex~ludere
negationem, sive quoad unitatem rationis, et illud fundamentum sufficit ut in quatuor ultima praedicamenta, ut non possmt esse fun.dament~ relauonum,
illis extremis tales relationes consurgant. quia magis (inquit) consequuntur relatio.nem, qu~m possz.nt relatzonem causare.
3. Et simili modo respondendum est ad alteram partem de relationibus Sed exponi potest, ut intelligatur de his praed1cament1s secundum p~o- /p.
fundatis in multitudine, distinctione vel diversitate. Nam, licet multis propter 827/ prias rationes eorum, non vero secu~d~m qu~d .hab~nt. proportionem
illud argumentum probabiliter visum sit, illas relationes non esse reales, sed aut convenientiam cum aliis in ratione umtat1s vel d1stmct1oms.
rationis, quia non habent reale fundamentum proximum, vel formalem termi-
num, nihilominus, loquendo cum communi sententia et consequenter, verius
dicitur eamdem esse rationem de his relationibus, et de illis quae fundantur
342 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 343

Una relAtio quomodo aliam fundare possit. primi modi in rebus omnium praedicamentorum inveniri possunt, non ut de
5. Prima sententia.-Major vero difficultas est de ipsismet relationibus, in essentia illorum, sed ut fundatae in ipsis.
qua insinuatur secunda et generalis difficultas, an relatio possit fundari in re- 7. Tertiasententia utrumquepraecedentem concilians.-Nonnulli vero conantur
latione. Est enim multorum sententia, relationem nunquam posse in relatione has sententias in concordiam redigere, tum propter auctoritatem D. Thomae,
fundari. lta sentit D. Thomas, 1 p., quaest. 42, art. 4, et 2 cont. Gent., c. 13, et tum propter vim ration um. Aiunt enim unam relationem posse referri realiter
q. 7 de Potent., art. 11, et in 1, d. 3, q. 1, art. 1, idque sequuntur frequentius ad aliam, non tamen alia relatione, sed seipsa, ut vitetur processus in infinitum,
Thomistae, Sonc., 5 Met, q. 29, ad 1; Ferrar., 4 cont. Gent., c, 11. Funda- et eadem sit simul quo et quod. Atque ita proprie relatio non fundat relationem,
mentum praecipuum est illud de processu in infinitum, qui inde sequeretur. cum non sit alia relatio quae refertur, et qua refertur; secundum rationem,
Sicut ob rationem similem, ad actionem non potest esse actio, nee ad motum autem potest did fundare, in quantum ipsa secundum rationem distinguitur
motus, et in universum procedendo ab effectu formali ad formam, si forma in id quod refertur, et quo refertur. Cui sententiae favet Cajet., 1 p., quaest.
ipsa aliquo modo participat effectum vel denominationem ejus, sistendum 42, art. l, fundatus in verbis D. Thomae, in solution. ad 4, quae sunt haec:
est in illa, ut per seipsam talis sit, quod aliter did solet, procedendo a quod Una relatio non refertur ad aliam per aliquam aliam relationem. Circa quae
in quo, sistendum esse in quo. Ergo cum relatio sit, qua relativum refertur, Cajetanus addit, ex hac conditione relationis, scilicet, ut non fundetur supra
sistendum est in ilia, ut non per aliam relationem referatur. Et confirmari po- aliam relationem, non sequi relationes relationum non esse reales, sed eas non
test haec sententia Theologico argumento, quia alias inter divinas relationes esse alias a fundamentis. Unde subdit, quod si relationes divinae alioqui non
plures essent relationes reales, nimirum realis distinctionis et dissimilitudinis haberent identitatem in natura, referri possent relatione reali aequalitatis;
quasi specificae in ratione relativa, et similitudinis genericae in eadem, et aliae tune vero aequalitas Filii ad Patrem esset ipsa filiatio, et Patris ad Filium, ipsa
hujusmodi, quod est contra communem Theologo rum doctrinam, qui tan tum paternitas. . . .
quatuor relationes reales in divinis agnoscunt. 8. Sententia auctoris.-Verumtamen haec sententta non v1detur posse m
6. Secunda sententia.-Contrariam sententiam tenet Scot., in 2, d. 4, quaest. universam sustineri; nam, ut forma quoad aliquam denominationem susci-
4 et 5, et in 4, d. 6, quaest. 10, quern sequuntur Lychet. et Mairon. his locis; piendam per se ipsam sufficiens sit, vel (sicut ~iu~t) ut .se habeat .ut ~uo et
item Mairon., in 4, dist. 29, quaest. 6; Ant. Andr., 5 Met., quaest. 13, et lib. quod, necesse est quod illa denomi- /p. 828/ natlo sit et ~Jusd~m rat1oms ~um
de Sex princip., quaest. 10. Fundamentum est tactum a nobis in praedicta tali forma, et intrinseca et inseparabilis ab ipsa, ut patet m acttone quae se1psa
difficultate, quia non apparet sufficiens ratio ob quam similitudo inter duas fit, quia ratio actionis est ut fiat, cum per earn fit aliquid, et in ~uantitate. qua
paternitates non sit tam vera relatio, sicut inter duas albedines, cum in re ipsa seipsa est quanta intrinsece. At vero si una relatio refertur realiter ad aliam,
habeant eumdem modum convenientiae et unitatis formalis, et eodem etiam saepe ille respectus est longe diversae rationis a propri~ ratione et effectu ~or­
modo a pane rei denominen tur similes. Nam si q ws vel ic dicere duas paternitares mali talis relationis, et est illi extrinsecus et acc1dental1s; ergo non potest 1lla
denominari similes tantum funclamencalicer, vd negative, scilicec, quia non relatio per seipsam ita referri, sed per aliam relationem. Probatur ~inor,. ~uia
habent diversam rationem, qui sic respon- /col. bl det, occasionem praebet uc formalis ratio, et effectus paternitatis est referre ad £ilium; cum vero 1psa d1c1tur
de quibuscumque rebus sirnilibus idem dici possit, vel oportet ur sufficientem similis alteri paternitati, si ad illam refertur realiter, ille est effectus formalis
rationem differentiae reddat, quae nulla certe apparet. Idem argumentum est valde diversae rationis, cum tendat ad terminum, diversae rationis, et habeat
de relatione dissimilitudinis quae esse potest inter paternitatem, et relationem rationem fundandi diversae etiam rationis. Rursus haec denominatio, similis,
scientiae, verbi gratia. Item arithmetici ponunt proportionalitatem fundatam est accidentaria paternitati; nam si in mundo non esset alia paternitas, non
in duobus proportionibus, quia sicut quatuor ad octo, ita tria ad sex; proportio denominaretur similis, nee referretur illo modo; ergo quando sic refertur, non
aucem non est nisi relatio; proporrionalitas ergo nibi l aliud esse videtur quam per seipsam, sed per aliam relationem refertur. . . . .
similirudo proporcionum, quae est relatio relationis. Atque haec argumenta 9. Et confirmatur, nam quando dicitur una relat10 refern ad aliam real1ter,
videmrn saneconviocere, con sequencer loquendo quod unarelatio possit referri non vero per aliam relationem, aut intelligitur non per aliam, nee re, nee
realiter ad aliam per relationes spectantes ad hoc primum genus. Quocirca, ratione distinctam, et hoc manifeste probatur esse falsum argumento facto;
sicut unum et multa transcendunt omnia praedicamenta, ita et relationes hujus nam quae potest esse major distinctio rationis, q~~ qua~ est ex. termi~:s di-
versarum rationum, et quae satis est ut una relat10 sit acc1dentana alten. Aut
 344 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47. On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 345
est sensus, quod non refertur per aliam relationem re distinctam, sed ratione
tantum, et hoc non est peculiare in relatione; nam supra etiam a nobis dictum 12. Si fundet una relatio aliam, an in infinitum necessario abeundum sit.-Ad
est, relationes, quibus referuntur res absolutae, non distingui nisi ratione a argumentum autem de processu in infinitum, primo responded potest non esse
fundamentis absolutis. Vel si quis contendat fundamentum absolutum referri magnum inconveniens illum admittere in relationibus, ut supra dicebamus de
rela~ione reali et in re distincta, unam vero relationem posse referri relatione relationibus partium vel punctorum. Quanquam hie videatur habere nonnul-
re~t, non t:imen in re distincta, primo supponit falsum, deinde oportet ut lam majorem difficultatem, quia inter fundamentum et relationem est ordo
altquam rattonem hujus discriminis reddat, quam hactenus nullus reddidit. Ip. 8291 per se; at in per se ordinatis non videtur posse procedi in infinitum,
Nam, quod quidam aiunt, relationem esse minutissimam entitatem, et ideo ut in lib. 2 ab Aristotele traditur. Responded vero potest id esse verum in iis
non posse fundare al~am .in .re distinctam, non satisfacit, tum quia etiam relatio, quae in re distincta sunt, non vero in iis quae ratione distinguuntur. Secundo
qua~ fundatur, ~st mmuttsstmae entitatis, tum etiam quia jam supponitur prima responderi potest negando processum in infinitum, quia sistendum est in ea
relat10 ~undata m ~bsolu~o, et ideo mirum non est quod possit fundare aliam relatione quae eamdem denominationem suscipit, quam praebet fundamen-
proporttonatam, s1cut ettam motus vel tempus est satis diminutae entitatis, et tum, et necessario ac intrinsece illam secum affert. Ut, verbi gratia, quamvis
tamen potest fundare relationem. · paternitas referatur similitudine, et ilia similitudo sit similis alteri ejusdem
. ~ O'. Disti~gu~ndum .ergo videtur: nam quidam sunt respectus in time inclusi speciei, non oportet ut sit similis per aliam relationem, sed se ipsa, quia ilia
m. ~psis relat10mb~s, et mseparabiles ab ipsis secundum proprias rationes earum; denominatio est ejusdem rationis, et intrinsece illam secum affect, quia non
al11 ~ero sunt ac~1dentarii. Priores tantum sunt ad proprios terminos vel ad potest referee unam paternitatem ad aliam similem, quin illi respondeat alia
relat10nes o~posttas; posteriores vero sunc ad alios tenninos, qui simpU iter relatio cui ipsa sit similis; et hoc ad summum probant exempla de actione et
sunt.per acc1dens ad esse talis relarionis. Exemplum sir in paternitate quae, motu, et similibus.
hoc t~s? quod refert ?a~rem ad filiw11, includir incrins ce et insepal'abiliter 13. Quod si instetur, quia quaelibet relatio est capax altedus denominationis
opposmonem cum filtattone, et consequenter etiam distinctionem· est enim relativae diversae rationis, nam relatio similitudimis potest esse dissimilis alteri,
dis~i~ctio velut~ quid superius inclusum in oppositione; oppositio ~utem est et e converso, respondeo, relationes fundatas in eodem fundamento absoluto,
qu~d tnc~us~~ m correlatione. At vero respectus unius paternitatis ad aliam in cum sola ratione distinguantur, posse mutuo sese ita referre et denominare;
r~ttone s1m1lt~, non est ita inclusus in propria ratione paternitatis, et alia pater- unde, cum illae denominationes diversarum ration um finitae sint, necessarium
mtas est ter~1~us accidentarius et extrinsecus respectu alterius paternitatis. non est propter illas admittere infinitas relationes, vel processum in infinitum.
. 11. ~e pnonbus ergo respectibus, satis consentaneum est quod Cajetanus De relationibus autem divinis alia est ratio, quia seclusa identitate essentiae,
au, ets1 secundum omnes illos eadem relatio referatur, non tamen alia relatione in qua non fundatur relatio realis, sed rationis, non habent inter se veram et
sed seipsa referri, cum in sua adaequata ratione omnes illos includat. At vero i~ realem similitudinem, sed potius distinctionem et dissimilitudinem, quam in
res~ectibus po~teriori~ generis .non video quomodo possit consequeoter negari, propdis relationibus includant; ideo non referuntur inter se alia relatione, sed
seipsis; sed haec disputatio alterius est loci.
<J.um wu rel;rno P?ss1~ r.er ali~.m referri, et ita aliam in se fundare, quia nee
videtur posse negan ~um illoettan: ~1odo relatio realiter referatur, utargumenta
facta probant; nee enam potest diet quod illo modo referatu.r per seipsam, ur De relationibus identitatis, similitudinis et aequalitatis.
persuaclent ea quae contra ultimam sence.ntiam diximus. Hine ve.ro ulrerius 14. Tertio petitur in illa difficultate, quae sit propria relatio identitatis, simili-
addo, sicut supra exponebam D. Thomam negantem relationes fundari in tudinis et aequalitatis, et an possint eidem rei convenire diversis respectibus.
quat~or ultimis praedicamentis, ita etiam exponi posse de relationibus; nam Ad quod breviter dicendum est, relationem identitatis proprie esse identitatem
relat1ones secundum propriam et intrinsecam rationem non referuntur rela- essentialem, minorem numerica, ut abstrahamus nunc ab specifica, et supe-
tione a se d.istincta, nee f~dant .illam'. ar vero prout aliquo modo participant dodbus omnibus, de quibus statim. Hoc patet ex Aristotele dicente illa esse
vel c~ nven 1. u11t c~ ~uanmare 111 unitate vel mulritudine, sic non repugnat eadem, quorum substantia, id est, essentia, est una. Quocirea ad argumentum
refern relat1one s1m1htudinis, et aliis similibus, et hoc sol um videntur probare ibi factum concedendum est duas qualitates, ut sunt ejusdem speciei es- /col.
fundamenra secundae sententiae. b/ sentialis, proprie referri relatione identitatis; nam est eadem ratio in eis quae
in caeteris entibus ejusdem speciei. Unde consequenter etiam dicendum est,
propriam relationem similitudinis (ad rem ipsam attendendo, quidquid sit de
346 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47. On Real Relation 347
Disputaton 47: Latin Text
usu vocum) esse illam quae convenit qualitatibus ratione intensionis; relatio- sumptae non esse (ut ita dicam) tam potentem ad de~o.min~ndum, sicut rela-
nem vero aequalitatis esse illam quae convenit quantitatibus ratione actualis tionem similitudinis vel dissimilitudinis specificae; mhilommus suam confert
extensionis. Denique (quod rem ipsam magis explicat) admittendum est, in denominationem, nempe talis similitudinis, scilicet, genericae. .
eadem qualitate aliam esse relationem identitatis, seu fundatam in essentia ejus, 17. Videtur autem satis probabile, has relationes similitudinis in specie vel
ut sic; aliam vero, relationem similitudinis, fundatam in unitate intensionis, genere non esse proprie diversas nisi respe~tu diversoru!11, seu quando unaquae~
adeo ut haec sit separabilis ab illa, quia potest manere unitas essentiae sine que est adaequata suo termino, et propno ac formah fundamento. Ut, v~rb1
intensione. Imo, et e converso, quamvis respectu alterius albedinis non possit gratia, licet duo homlnes sint similes in specie et genere, non est necessanum
alia albedo esse similis in intensione, quin sit etiam una in essentia, tamen ut duplici relatiooe reali referantur, quia in una. relatio~e .~dae~u~ra ut~r~ue
respectu nigredinis possunt albedo et nigredo ut octo dici similes in modo respectus includitur,5 scilicet, in rela~ione sp~ 1ficae . 1mil.1tud1rus, quia 1Lla
seu gradu intensionis, etiamsi sint dissimiles, vel potius diversae in essentia. relatio prout est in re, non fundatur 111 sola ~r nt1a ultuna, sed fun~a~~
Neque est inconveniens hujusmodi relationes multiplicari, praesertim si verum in tali form.a dame tale esse specificum. Relano tamen qua homo est s~m'.l'.s
est non propterea multiplicari res aut modos reales ex natura rei distinctos. equo in ratione animalis, diversa est in specie ab illa ~ua un~s ~o.mo ~s~ s1m1hs
15. Atque eodem modo sentiendum est de relationibus aequali.caris et identi- alteri; tamen illa etiam includit omnem aliam rel~t1onem s1.m1~1tud.m1s, ~u~e
tatis specificae in quantitate continua; est enim eadem proportionalis ratio, ut inter hominem et equum excogitari potest in grad1bus supen?nbus t~dus1s m
in dicto argumento saris declaratur. Dico autem in quancitate continua, quia ratione animalis, et sic est proportionaliter philosophandum m caetens: Atque
in numeris non videtur esse diversa relatio aequalitaris et identiratis specificae, ita evitatur facile non solum infinitas, sed etiam nimia multitudo relationum;
quia duo binarii, verbi gratia, ex propriis rarionibus essentialibus hab nc ae- solum enim multiplicantur juxta multitudinem et formalem distinctionem
qualitatem, nee po test, non sol um in re, verum etiam ratio.ne separari inter eos terminorum seu unitatum. .
relacio specincae idencitatis a relatiooe aequalitatis. Et ratio esse videtur, quia 18. Unitas analogica an fandet relationem praedicamentalem.-°:-~aen ~ero
quantitas discreta non habet aliam propriam essentiam vel speciem, praeter non immerito potest an hujusmodi relatio possit interdum fundan 1.n u~1tate
ralem actualem extensionem, seu numerabiliratem, neque ibi est separabilis analoga, in ea prae- /col. bl sertim qua dicir unum conce;~tum ~bJecnvu~ ,
talis species a tali multirudine, quod secus est in quantitate conti1rna; narn, intrinsece convenientem utrique analogatorum. Nam de al us moclis ~alo_g1ae
recinendo propriam extensionem essentialem, potest esse in majori vel minori certum est non sufficere ad relationem realem, quia non fundatur m ahqua
magnicudi11e. propria similitudine, au r 01wen ien tia r~li, sed ~o i:netaph rica, quae p:aeci pue
.fit pei' comparationem incellectus nostn. In p~1on ver.o genere analog1ae, non
An tmitas gene,.ica fimdet relationem realem. st improbabile posse inter analogata inrerven~e re.Lan~nem real~m ~ndacam
16.Affii·mativerespondetur.- Quarto q uaeritur in illo argumemo, an relationes · tal'i unitate quia inter ilia extrema est aliqua rea11s conven1eot1a. Uncle
hujus priroi modi pertinences ad unitatem fundentur in sola unitate specifica,
ttl al'
interdum D. Thomas signi.ficat effecrus Dei referri ad Dcum 1qua re anon
l .
vel etiam /p. 830/ in genecica. Et quamvis utraque pars possit facile disputari realis similicudinis vel imaginis, ur sumi potest ex 1 p., quaest. 4, art. 3, ad
ut ibi ins.i nuatum est, ec possent facile conjecturae in ucramque partem multi- 4 cum his quae ibi acute notat Cajetan.; item ex eodem D. Thoma, 1 part:,
plicari, nihilominus breviter dicendum censeo non solum unitatem spccificam, q~aest. 93, art. l, ad ult., et de Potent., quaest. 7, .art. ubi ~it esse in ~reat~ns
6:
sed etiam genericam sufficere ad aliquam relationem similicudinis. Quae est relationes varias ad Deum, prout ipse illas produc1t a se1pso d1versas, ahqual1ter
expressa sententia D. Thomae, l p., q. 26, art. 1, ad 2, ubi ait: Relatio, quae tamen sibi adsimilatas. Idem sentit Ant. Adr. supra.
importatur pa hoc nornen, idem, est relatio rationis tantum, si accipiatur sim- 19. Ultimo petitur in illa difficultate, an hae relation.es, ut fundant~r prop-
plidter idem; secus aittem est cum diCt.mtm· aliqua ettdem esse non in numero, sed rie in multitudine, et inter varios numeros versantur, smt reales relat1on~s vel
in natura generis sive speciei. Hoc etiam sequicur Ant. Andreas, lib. 5 Metaph., solum denominationes ex comparationibus quas noster intellectus fac1t. Et
quae t. 13, ad 3. Et rationes inter argwnentandum tactaesatis probabWter hoc quidem si attendamus communem modum loquendi Aristotelis et aliorum
persuadent. Neque obsrarquod1·es differentes specie pocius dicanturdissimiles
simpliciter, quam similes; nam hinc solwn sequitur relarionem similitudinis
genericae praecise 5 Here I am following Salamanca, 1597, vol. 2, p. 575, over the "inducitur" of the
Vives edition.
348 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 349

philosophorum, non est dubium quin ita censeant de his relationibus, sicut habitudo praesupponitur intrinsece in tali fundamento, neque etiam realiter
de aliis realibus quae ad hoc primum genus spectant; nam denominationes et intrinsece additur, posito termino.
aequalitatis vel inaequalitatis eodem modo ex rebus ipsis sumuntur. Si autem 21. Dicendum ergo est habitudinem illam fundamentaliter et quasi inc~~­
relatio est res vel modus ex natura rei distinctus a fundamento, difficile est ative praesupponi ex vi fundamenti, compleri autem per positionem ~ermm1;
explicare talem relationem realem in binario vel ternario fundatam, quia non compleri (inquam) non per extrinsecam additionem, sed sol um per exm~secam
potest esse vere una et simplex in toto binario; in quo enim subjecto esset? positionem termini. Nam fundamentum ipsum aptu~ est d~ ~e ad tnb.uen-
Neque enim potest esse in una unitate potius quam in alia, cum nulla sit dis- dam hujusmodi denominationem relativam, et hac rat1one dic1tu~ cont~nere
paritatis ratio, neque in omnibus simul, quia non potest unum accidens esse habitudinem /col. b/ relativam quasi inchoatam; ut tamen actu tnbuat 1llam
simul totum in multis subjectis, et in singulis eorum, ut per se constat. Maxime denominationem, requirit terminum actu existentem, et ideo posito termin?
quia nulla unitas est dupla aut tripla, ut possit in sola illa esse tota relatio dupli completur statim illa denominatio absque alia a~ditione intrinseca et reali.
aut tripli. Nee vero potest esse partim in uno subjecto, partim in alio, alias non Habitudo autem relativa in praesenti non est almd quam haec eadem de-
esset vere una et simplex, sed composita, eodem modo quo numerus. Non nominatio relativa, seu forma ipsa quatenus actu tribuens illam. Quae autem
potest autem esse illo modo composita, si relatio est res aut modus distinctus; conditio sit in fundamento necessaria, ut ex parte sua sit aptum tribuere hanc
alias in qualibet unitate consurgeret specialis entitas, aut modus, qui, per se denominationem, dicemus commodius in sectione sequenti; et hactenus de
sumptus, esset una relatio, et cum aliis componeret unam tantum /p. 831/ primo membro illius divisionis.
secundum quid, ad eum modum quo numerus est unus. Id autem esse non
potest, quia in nulla unitate per se sumpta est ratio aut fundamentum unde
talis modus resultet. At vero si relatio non est aliquis modus realiter additus SECTIO XII.
suo fundamento, facile intelligitur, numerum, eo modo quo in rebus est, et De secundo genere relationum
secundam illam imperfectam unitatem quam habet, posse per modum unius in potentia vel actione .fundat~. .
extremi comparari et referri ad alium numerum ut aequalem aut duplum, 1. Circa secundum genus relation um multa attmguntur m quarta d1fficultate
vel alio simili modo. Quia fundamentum illius relationis in singulis numeris superius posita. De quibus relationibus in communi loquendo, ce~tum est esse
nihil aliud est, quam ipsamet quantitas discreta, ut habet talem unitatem, vel reales et praedicamentales; ita enim sentiunt Doctores om~es, et 1ta e~ponunt
diversitatem ab alia, et illamet quantitas in re est ipsa relatio, quatenus potest Aristotelem. Nam si inter aliqua extrema concurrunt omma necessana ad hu-
illam, denominationem tribuere subjecto in ordine ad similem vel dissimilem jusmodi relationem, ma:xime inter haec, ur ex ructis c~nstare pot~t, et magis
terminum. patebit ex dicendis. In parciculari vero duo sunt quae hie habent ~1fficulcate~.
Primum est, an omnes relationes, quas Aristotdes gratia exempli numerat 1~
Qua/es sint re/,ationes ad primum fundamentum pertinentes. illo genere, sint vere reales et praedicamentales. Secundum est, quodnam sit
20. Ad tertiam difficultatem dicendum est, non esse necessariam ut relatio proprium fundamentum talium relationum.
hujus primi modi sit aut realiter addita ipsi fundamento, tanquam ex natura
rei distincta ab ipso, aut mera denominatio extrinseca ex coexistentla alterius An omnes re/,ationes secundi generis sint reales.
exnemi; nam inter haec duo pocesc medium inveniri, nimirum, quod sit de- 2. Circa priorem partem difficilis sane est prima objectio, quae in q~arta
nominati innjnseca indudens coex.istentiam alterius extremi ad quod dicic difficultate fit contra membrum illud de relationibus fundatis in futura actione,
habicudinem. Cum autem quaeritur de hac habirndine, an praesupponatur quae dicuntur esse, inter id quadfacturum est, et illud ~uo.d faciendum ~st; haec
intrinsece in fundamenro, etiam quando terminus non existit, licec tune non enim sunt Aristotelis verba; objectio tamen facta, ut ex1stimo, conclud1t. t~le~
habeat rationem praedicamentalis relationis, sed transcendentalis, an vero de relationem non posse esse reale.m, ex defectu termini, et proximae ~ond1t10~1~
novo addatur posito termino, dicendum est non praesupponi proprie sub requisitae. Unde dice.ndum existimo, non omnia exeI:npla qua~ Anstoceles '.bt
ratione habitudinis vel relationis, vel praedicamentalis, vel transcendentalis; posuit, esse in rigore de relationibus reilibus et praedicam~nta_iibus. lpse e~un
nam, ut recte in tertia illa difficultate probatur, fundamentum hujus primi non inteorut illo Loco tradere propriam et rigorosam coordinattonem praed1ca-
generis per se non includit habitudinem transcendentalem; nulla ergo formalis menti Ad aliquid, sed explicare omnes modos relativorum, et ad certa quaedam
..

350 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 351

capita eos revocare, sive sint propria relativa realia, sive solum ea imitentur afficit immediate ipsam substantiam, vel etiam ipsum suppositum,. ut m~lt~
secundum nos- Ip. 832/ trum loquendi modum. Et potest hoc confimari; nam volunt, de quo late tractavi in 2 tom. tertiae partis. Ergo cum hae ~elat1ones ~1b1
ibidem ait, ad hoc secundum genus pertinere quaedam relativa, quae dicuntur proportionate respondeant, etiam relatio ~aternitatis proxi.me affic.1t substant~ale
secundum privationem potentiae, ut impossibile, et similia; constat autem haec principium, eique identificatur. Item, qma separato qu~hbet acc1d:nte real1ter
non esse vera relativa realia, cum privatio potentiae non sit reale fundamentum. distincto, etiam per potentiam Dei, si maneat substanuale suppos1tum, quod
Solum ergo ponuntur in hoc genere per quamdam reductionem; idem ergo genuit, et quod genitum est, durat relatio paternitatis, ~io.qui n~lla superest
dicendum censeo de relationibus quae dicuntur fundari in actione futura. ratio ad ponendam illam; nam ille homo vere ac propruss1m~ d1cetur pater;
3. At vero de relatione exorta ex praeterita actione, quae terminum actu ergo signum est hanc relationem esse intime in ipsa substant1a. Tande~ est
existentem reliquit, aliter censendum est. Illa enim relatio realis est et praedi- hoc maxime consentaneum modo denominandi ejus, nam solum denommat
camentalis, duratque quamdiu effectus et causa actu existunt, ut habet com- ipsum suppositum principaliter operans. .
munis sententia. Nam ibi interveniunt extrema realia, et apta ut inter sese 6. Qui genuit, si privetur.filio, non reman.et~ater.-Non .maneb1t au tern ~aec
habere possint realem ordinem (agimus enim nunc de causis creatis), et fuere relatio paternitatis mortuo filio, ut falso m illa quarta d1fficult~~e assum~tur.
jam in re posita omnia, quae ad ilium ordinem seu relationem necessaria sunt, Neque vere ac proprie dicetur pater esse, ille qui orbatu~ est filus, ~ed fu1sse,
ut patebit solvendo difficultatem propositam. quod non solum in philosophico rigore verum est, sed et1am vulgan. sermone
4. In qua imprimis petitur quomodo relatio, quae manet, possit fundari observari videtur. Quapropter non est idem esse patrem, quod genmsse;. na~
in actione praeterita, quae jam non est. Dicendum vero est non fundari in haec est denominatio extrinseca ab actione praeterita, et ideo durat, enams1
ilia ut in proprio fundamento in quo insit, aut a quo habeat suam entitatem, mortuum sit genitum; altera vero est denominatio relativa, quae indudit co-
sed illam esse rationem fundandi talem relationem, vel, ut supra dicebamus, existentiam extremorum.
conditionem requisitam ut talis relatio resultet. Non est autem talis, ut ab illa
relatio pendeat quasi in fieri et in esse, et ideo nihil mirum est quod, transacta An rel.atio agentis illi insit.
actione, maneat reJatio. Est autem illa conditio requisita, non solum quia per 7. Atque hinc a fortiori constat (quod ulterius in ea quart~ difficultate
earn posirns est terminus necessarius ad talem relationem, quantum ad solam tangitur), relationem actualiter agentis seu generantis esse ~tlam realem;
ejus entitatcm absolutam; potuit enim poni in rerum natura per aliam actio- nam si hoc verum est post actionem praeteritam, cur non mag1s praese~te :t
nem, quod non satis fuisset ut insurgeret dicta relatio. Est ergo necessaria, quia durante actione? Duo vero hie inquiri possum. Unum est, an haec relat10 sit
per illam influit causa in talem effectum; ex quo influxu manet ordinata ad intrinsece inhaerens ipsi agenti, vel solum extrinsece denominans, sicut ipsa
illum effectum, et respective denominata a relatione insurgente, vel a suamet actio. Videtur enim /p. 833/ hoc posterius sufficere ad relatio~em ~eal~m,
potentia seu virtute agendi, quatenus peculiariter influxit in illum effectum. et esse magis, consentaneum denominationi t~is relation~s. ~ct10 .emm ~psa
realis est et realiter denominat agens, et in hac ipsa denommat1one mclud1tur
De fundamento proximo patenzitn.tis. transcendentalis quaedam habitudo ad effectum, quia a~tio ut acti~ terminu~
5. Unde controverti solet in quo principio proxime insit, et cum quo identifi- respicit, sicut infra dicemus; ergo similiter poterit relauo esse reabs, quamv1s
cetur talis relatio, an, scilicet, in potentia proxima et accidentali, vel in principali solum extrinsece, et media actione denominet ipsum agens, tanquam relatum
et substantiali. Nam multi censent esse in principio proximo, seu in potentia ad terminum seu effectum suum.
generandi, quod posset apparentibus argumentis fieri verisimile. Alii /col. bl 8 Nihilominus dicendum est propriam relationem, quae per se refert causam
vero existimant ipsummet principale principium et substantiale identificare age~tem vel generantem, ab eo instanti i? quo act~ g~nerat, e~se intrinseca~,
sibi hanc relationem. Fortasse tamen verum est, ad unumquodque principium et immediate inhaerentem illi. Primo qmdem , qma s1 post actionem praeter~­
sequi relationem illi accommodatam, quia est par ratio de utroque; nam relatio tam manet in causa agente relatio intrinsece adhaerens illi, multo magis ta11s
potentiae absolute sumptae, et abstrahendo ab actu, utrique inest; ergo etiam relatio resultabit et inhaerebit, etiam durante ipsa actione. Deinde, quia, ut D.
in utroque, ut est sub actu suo, aliqua relatio consequitur. Relationem autem Thomas docet, 2 cont. Gent., c. 13, licet in aliis formis inveniantur extrinsecae
propriam paternitatis existimo esse illam quae proxime inest ipsi substantiae denominationes, a relatione vero non invenitur aliquid denominari quasi exterius
medio principio principali; nam in supposito genito, filiationis relatio sine dubio existente, sed inhaerente, ait D. Thomas; unde subdit: Non enim denominatur
352 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 353

aliquis pater, nisi a paternitate quae ei inest. Cujus ratio esse videtur, quia quod De relatione agentis in potentia.
extrinsece denominat, potius refertur ad ipsum quod denominat, quam referat 10. Ultimo petitur in eadem quarta difficultate, ut explicemus qualis sit
ipsum; atque ita actio potius refertur ad agens, quam ipsum referat, quamvis relatio agentis in potentia, de qua jam diximus non posse esse realem et prae-
sit occasio ve1 conditio ut in agente resultet relatio. Quare, licet, verum sit dicamentalem in ordine ad solum effectum possibilem ut sic, sed in ordine
actionem ipsam referri ad terminum, tamen non proprie refert ipsummet ad aliquam potentiam realem passivam, et actu existentem, quia non potest
suppositum agens, quia non denominat illud ut id in quo est, sed ut a quo est; habere alium terminum realem; hoc autem modo interveniunt omnia ad re-
atque ita solum dici potest quod manat ab agente cum respectu ad terminum; alem relationem necessaria. Dicunt vero aliq ui, hanc relationem non pertinere
ille autem non est respectus ipsius agentis nisi remote, ut magis ex sequenti ad hoc secundum genus relationum, sed ad primum, quia non fundatur /p.
dubitatione patebit. 834/ in actione, sed praecise in proportione, quae est inter duas facultates, ut
una possit in alteram agere, et altera ab alia pati; quae proportio est quaedam
Sitne eadem relatio in agente dum actio durat, et ilia transacta. unitas, et ideo ad primam rationem fundandi pertinere videtur.
9. Affirmative respondetur.-Rursus enim inquiri potest an haec relatio agentis 11. Haec vero sententia non est consentanea Aristoteli, qui in hoc secundo
in actu, vel de praesenti, sit eadem et specie et numero cum relatione agentis de membro nunquam dixit, ad illud pertinere relationes in actione fundatas, sed
praeterito, verbi gratia, cum paternitate. Quidam enim putant esse diversam, potius in principio capitis dixit: Alia (scilicet dicuntur ad aliquid) utcalefactivum
et videtur favere Aristoteles, dum ait has relationes variari secundum tempora. ad calefactibile, sectivum ad sectabile, et uno nomine activum ad passivum; ubi
Potestque fundari in diverso modo denominandi; nam altera denominat ut nullam fecit mentionem actionis et passionis, sed potentiarum tantum; postea
actu agentem, altera vero ut ilium qui egit. Quare videtur una relatio solum vero utrumque conjunxit, dicens: Activa autem et passiva ex potentia activa et
durare /col. bl quamdiu durat actio, et ad desitionem ejus alteram consurgere. passiva potentiarumque actionibus dicuntur. Deinde, relatio quae est potentiae
Verius tamen existimo, in patre, verbi gratia, (et idem est in similibus) eamdem agentis ad patientem, non fundatur in unitate, quae ad fundamentum prim um
numero esse relationem, quae in ipsomet instanti, quo generat, consurgit, pertinet, sed in virtute ad agendum; illa enim unitas, quae est ratio fundandi in
et permanet quamdiu talis pater cum filio durat. Ut enim Theologice argu- priori modo, consistit in aliqua reali et formali convenientia inter ea quae similia
mentemur, quis dicat Beatissimam Virginem, in primo instanti quo Christum vel eadem dicuntur; at vero inter potentiam agentem et patientem non inter-
concepit, habuisse unam relationem matris, et immediate post amisisse illam cedit talis unitas et convenientia, nisi fortasse quatenus conveniunt in generica
et acquisivisse aliam? Deinde actio generandi est ratio vel conditio, qua posita ratione potentiae, sub qua ratione non referuntur propria relatione potentiae
resultat relatio paternitatis; interrogo ergo an sit talis ratio vel conditio ut ab agentis et patientis, sed relatione similitudinis quoad rationem genericam. Illa
illa pendeat relatio paternitatis in fieri et conservari, necne. Nam si non pendet ergo proportio non est vera unitas; quod si per analogiam ita nominetur, est
in conservari, ergo transacta ilia actione generandi, manebit eadem paternitas, longe alterius rationis ab unitate, quae fundat primum modum relativorum.
quia non est unde varietur; si autem pendet, ergo, transacta actione, transibit Quapropter haec relatio non ad primum, sed ad secundum modum pertinet,
cum ilia dicta relatio; ergo non est unde resultet alia relatio. Quia cessatio ac- differtque ab alia superius explicata, quia haec sequitur rationem potentiae
tionis, cum sit privatio quaedam, non est sufficiens ratio ut resultet nova relatio praecise sumptam, ilia vero quatenus est sub actu; unde haec terminatur ad
realis; neque actio praeterita potest esse ratio talis relationis novae, quia illa potentiam passivam ut sic, illa vero ad effectum.
actio, ut existens, jam habuit suam relationem proportionatam, ut praeterita 12. Quaenam potentiae referantur reali relatione in actione vei passione fun-
vero nihil addit nisi dictam privationem. Melius ergo et facilius dicitur illam data.-Petitur vero ulterius an haec relatio inveniatur in quacumque virtute
relationem esse unam et eamdem, manere vero postea, quia non pendet in activa et passiva, sive sit propriae potentiae de genere qualitatis, sive cujuscumque
conservari ab ipsa actione, sed a fundamente, et termino, quae in praecedenti alterius generis seu transcendentalis rationis. Et sane, de potentiis praedica-
puncto explicatasunt. Quocirca paternitas ut sic nee includit denominationem mentalibus per se primo ordinatis, ut una agat in aliam, vel altera patiatur ab
de praeterito, nee de praesenti, sed absolute refert ad eum qui habet esse ab illo altera, non est difficile ad intelligendum, quod sint aptissimae ad fundandam
qui pater denominatur, abstrahendo ab hoc, quod actio, per quam habet esse, relationem inter se, dummodo sint in re ipsa, distinctae, quia, hoc ipso quod
existat vel non existat; hae namque denominationes includentes hos temporales existunt, sese mutuo respiciunt, ratione transcendentalis ordinis quern inter
respectus, potius sunt ab ipsa actione ut praesente vel praeterita. /col. bl se habent, ratione (inquam) ejus ut proximi fundamenti. Dixi autem,
 354 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47. On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 355
dummodo in t't! si1't distincttze, nam potentia quae simul est activa in seipsam,
er passiva a seipsa, etiamsi propria potentiaac praedicamentalis sit, et utramque SECTIO XIII.
rationem per se primo babeat ex institurione sua, non potest secundum illas De tertio genere relationis in ratione mensurae fundato.
habere relarionem realem, ex defectu distinctionis quae ad hanc relationem 1. Superest ut explicemus quod in quinta difficultate petitur, quomodo ,
necessaria est. Unde neque illas rationes babet calis potentia per habitudines scilicet, relationes tertii generis dicantur fundari in ratione mensurae; ita enim
tnmscendemalesejusdem ad seipsam, sed perquamdam eminentemhabitudinem fere omnes auctores loquuntur, et sumunt ex Aristotele in hoc loco.
ad suum acrum, quern respicit sub utraque ration . Quod si ralis potentia, ut
activa, indiget alio comprincipio ad agendum in se, ur imellectus indigetspecie,
Difficultas circa Philosophi mentem proponitur.
secundum illud poterit referri realiter ad seipsam solam, in ratione activi ad
2. Si tamen Aristoteles attente legatur, non videtur dicere has relatio11es
passivwn, non camen ratione suae propriae er intrinsecae activitacis, propter fundari in ratione mensurae, sed inter alia exempla quibus hunc modum
rationem dictam de idencirate. At vero ubi intervenit sufliciens discinctio, et explicat, unum esse mensurabilis ad mensuram; verba enim ejus sunt: Ali~
alioqui esr intri11seca er 11aturaU coordinatio potenciarum, 11011 est dubium
ut mensurabile ad mensuram, et scibile ad scientiam, et sensibile ad sensum; ub1
quin concurrant omnia necessaria ad realem respectum praedicamentalem, si nullum fundamentum harum relationum dedarat, sed solum adhibitis illis
extrema coexistant.
tribus exemplis, proponit hoc tertium relationis genus. Nee potest dici, in illis
13. Quaevis virtus activa vel passiva potest referri relatione secundi generis.- primis verbis, ut mensurabile ad mensuram, explicare communem, rationem
Addendum vero ulterius est, rdationem hanc non esse coarctandam ad hoc harum relationum, alia vero esse exempla et species hujus generis; hoc enim
pocentiarum genus, sed incercedere inter omnes res creacas (nrun de Deo infra non potest accommodari contextui, tum quia Aristoteles non dixit, Ut scibile
dicam) quae quacumqne ratione habent realem virrutem agendi et paciendi ad scientiam, sed tan tum copulative, et scibile ad scientiam; tum, etiam quia si
inter se. Hoc co11stat, tum ex genera li locutione Ariscotelis, tum ex exemplis haec posteriora verba adhibuisset in exemplum priorum, non debuisset dicere,
jus, q uae alia eciam genera pocentiarum comprehendunt; tLLn1 eciam ex com- Ut scibile ad scientiam, sed potius, Ut scientia ad scibile; at vero non ita dixit,
muni sententia iuterpretum etphilosophorwn. Tum deniquequia utintercedat sed, quod attente considerandum est, eodem modo dicit referri mensurabile ad
praedicamencalis relacio, non semper nece.<>se esc suppoui in fundame11to tran- mensuram, et scibile ad scientiam, et sensibile ad sensum; at vero scibile non
scendencalem relationem, ut in solucione certiae difficulcacis dictum est. Satis refertur ad scientiam, ut mensurabile ad mensuram; nam, eo modo quo inter
ergo in proposito est, quod una virtus sit eju dem ordinis cum alia potentia, et haec ratio mensurae intervenire potest, potius scientia mensuratur per scibile,
quod natura sua habeat vim agen di, quod est habere veluti pbysicum quoddam
quam e converso. Adde, quod in hoc tertio genere nullam mentione~ :'idetur
dominium in illam, ut inde possit oriri respectus praedicamenralis, seu relativa facere Aristoteles, relationum scientiae ad scibile, vel sensus ad sens1b1le, sed
denominatio.
solum oppositarum relationum (ut sic dicam), scilicet, scibilis ad scientiam,
14. Atque hinc tandem intelligitur non debere in hoc secundo fundamento et sensibilis ad sensum, quibus adjungit relationem mensurabilis ad /col. bl
nomen pocemiae stricre sumi, ur distinguitur ab habitu, nam etiam habirus, mensuram tanquam eis similem; ergo non constituit communem rationem
quatenus vim habetagendi suos actus soletab Ariscocelesub nomi11e pocentiae hujus tertii generis, in hoc quod fundetur in ratione mensurae, sed in aliqua
activae comprehendi, uc saepe in superioribus nocanun esc, et ut sic potesc Ip. alia ratione communi mensurabili, scibili, et aliis hujusmodi.
835/ esse fundamencum relationis realis non quidem ad objeccum, nam haec 3. Quae omnia confirmari possunt ex modo quo inferius Aristoteles declarat
peninet ad tertium mod um, sed vel ad actum quern efficic, vel ad potentiam in hoc tertium genus relationum; nullam, enim aliam communem ratio11em ejus
quam efficer potest; quae ratio ad hoc secundum genus pertinec, ut ex dictis ponit, nisi quia alia relativa, per relationes quas in se habent, relativa dicun-
a pal'itate ration is constat.
tur, haec vero solum suscipiunt denominationem relativam, quia alia ad ipsa
dicuntur repetitque eadem exempla, scilicet, mensurabile, scibile, intelligibile,
quamvis solum ultimum declarer dicens: Nam et intelligibile significat,. quod ~n
eo versetur intellectus. Uncle simpliciter interpretando hanc litteramAnstotehs,
non videtur ipse in hoc tertio genere ponere novam aliquam relationem realem,
quae intrinsece insit, et referat suum subjectum, sed solum denominationes
356 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation 357
Disputaton 47: Latin Text
quasdam relativas, sumptas ex relationibus existentibus in oppositis extremis. potentiam et denominationem, quamvis fund~en~u~, ~el proportio qu~e
Quocirca, cum scientia ad scibile, et scibile ad scientiam relative dicantur, ad ad talem mensurabilitatem supponitur, saepe sit qmd mtrmsecum, et posstt
hunc tertium modum relativorum, juxta mentem Aristotelis sic expositam, esse fundamentum alicujus relationis realis alterius generis. Sicut etiam visibile
solum pertinet relatio vel denominatio ipsius scibilis, qualiscumque illa sit; supponit aliquod fundamentum reale et intrinsecum ~n objec~o visibili, .imo
relatio autem scientiae ad scibile non videtur ab Aristotele collocari in hoc tertio et vim activam specierum, ratione cujus refertur real1ter ad v1sum relattone
genere, quia scientia non dicitur relative, eo quod aliud referatur ad ipsam, sed pertinente ad secundum genus. Et in mensuris. etia~ quantitativis, quae
quia ipsa in severe habet respectum ad aliud. Aristoteles autem solum ponit designantur per institutionern humanam, suppomtur al1quod fundam~ntum
in tertio modo ea quae dicuntur relativa, quia alia referuntur ad ipsa. extensionis et alicujus proportionis realis, quae aliquam vera~ relattonei:n
4. Quod si inquiras, juxta hanc expositionem, ad quod genus relationis habet conjunctam, pertinentem tamen ad primum modum, qma no~ est al1a
pertineat ipsa relatio scientiae ad scibile, et sensus ad sensibile, etc., responderi a relatione aequalitatis vel inaequalitatis. Sic ergo rem esse mensura~1le~ for-
poterit, illam esse relationem cujusdam effectus ad suam causam in aliquo maliter solum dicit relationem alterius ad ipsam, quatenus per apphcat10nem
genere, et ita reduci ad secundum genus, ut statim in simili dicemus, solvendo mensu;ae potest no- /col. bl tificari ejus quantitas, licet fundamentaliter aliquid
sex.tam difficultacem. Vel, si cui pJacuerit omnem relationem in proportione intrinsecum in ipsa re mensurabili supponatur.
fundatam ad primum modwn revocare, dicere poterit ad illum pertinere re- 7. Ultimo objici potest, quia ex dicta expositione seq.uitur quo~dam mem-
Jationem scientiac; coosistit enim in quadam coaptatione et proporcione ad brum ex illis tribus numeratis ab Aristotele, non contmere relationes reales,
objecrum suum. sed tantum rationis, atque ita sine causa recenseri inter ea quae vere sunt ad
5. Sed adhuc potest objici, nam juxta hanc interpretationem relatio inter aJiquid. Sequela pater, quia juxtadictam expos~ti?nem, in te~tio genere tantum
mensuram et mensurabile erit intrinseca et realis in mensura; in mensurabili sunt illae relationes quae non conveniunt relattvis, eo quod ipsa referantar, sed
autem solum erit rationis, aut per denominationem, ad ipsam mensuram, eo quod alia referantur ad ipsa; illae autem relationes rationis. tantum su?t.
quod est contra communem senten- Ip. 836/ tiam, et contra rationem; nam Respondetur, quidquid sit de his relationibus rationis, an tales .smt necessanae
id quod mensuratur est inferius, et sic potius ipsum ordinatur ad mensuram, in hujusmodi extremis, quod infra videbimus, Aristotele~ hie non a~ere de
quam e converso. Quod etiam patet inductione, nam scientia mensuratur a his relationibus, sed de variis modis, quibus res denommantur relattvae ex
scibili, et ideo in ipsa est relatio, et cognitio mensuratur in veritate ab objecto, rebus ipsis. Et ita distinguit duos generales modos, .scilicet, quod q~aedam
et creatura in suo esse seu veritate essendi ab idea divina, et omnes hae rela- denominantur, quia ipsa referuntur; alia vero quia al1a referuntur a~ i~sa. Et
tiones SW1t in ipsis mensuracis. Respondeo, Aristotelem idem judicium ferre rursus primum membrum distinguit ex duplici fu~dam~nto quantttatr~, seu
de mensurabili ac de scibiu et intelligibili, et d omnibus ait dici ad aliquid, unitatis, vel potentiae, et ita constituuntur tres modi relativoru~. At~ue ita fit
quia aliud ad ipsa dicitur. Videtur aurem loqui Aristoteles de mensurabili, per ut juxta hanc interpretationern, illi tres modi relari:ormn non smt tna g~ne:a
excrinsecam et superadditam meiisw·am, non per intrinsecam coaptationem relativorum realium, nam tertius modus non addit novum genus relatioms,
vel proporcionem, quaJis invenitur inexemplis quae in contrarium afferuntur; sed dedarat solum specialern modum denominationis, quae ex aliquibus rela-
ilia enim intrinseca commensuratio non consistit nisi in quadam similitudlne tionibus aliorum generum in terminos earum redundat.
vel coaptacione (ut sic dicam), vel in dependentia aut specificatione, et sic
reducirur ad primum vel secundW11 modum rdationum. Sicuc etiam imago Resolutio.
esr commensurata exemplari ratione similicudinis, et effectus causae, ratione 8. Haec tota sententia et hujus textus interpretatio sol um disputationis gratia
dependentiae, vel etiam similitudinis. At vero extrinsece dicitur res mensu- proposita sit, quoniam in litteraAristotelis simpliciter i?specta, v~~etur haber:
rabilis, sicut et cognoscibilis, vel visibilis, quia per applicationem extrinsecae non parvum fundamentum, et in ratione stando non tmpro.babihter .defendi
mensurae potest ejus quantitas manifestari. Et hoc modo aitAristoteles rem did posset. Nihilominus ta.men nol~mus discede:e a corn~um sentent1a: quae
rnensurabilem per relationem alterius ad ipsam, quia, nimirum, per mensuram habet hunc tertium modum relattvorum constttuere tertmm genus relattonum
potest ejus quantitas notificari. realiu:U quae in uno extremo realiter insunt, illudque per se primo referu~t ad
6. Nee refert quod mensura sit quasi naturalis, vel ex institutione humana. a1iud, quod non iterum refertur per propriam relationem reale~ quam m se
Quia utroque modo res non est mensurabilis formaliter, nisi per extrinsecam ha.beat, sed terminat tantum relationem alterius, et inde denommatur. Quod
 358 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 359
enim aliquae sint hujusmodi relationes, et inductione constat in scientia et
scibili, et similibus, et in sequenti sectione id latius tractabitur. Quod vero hae ilia est realis in uno extremo tantum; haec vero in utroque. Et reddit rationem,
constituant diversum genus a reliquis, et requirant fundamentum diversae ra- quia illa habet fundamentum in scientia, non in scibili, eo quod illa relatio
tionis, ex eo videtur /p. 837I per se probabile, quod habent modum habitudinis fundatur in apprehensione rei secundum esse spirituale, quod habet in sciente,
valde diversum. Sicut enim ex effectihus cognoscimus causas, ita intelligere non in re scita; relatio vero amoris fundatur super appetitum boni; bonum
possumus fundamentum, ex quo oritur in utroque extrema intrinseca relatio, autem non est tantum in anima, sed etiam in rebus, 7 Metaph., text. 8, atque
esse diversae rationis ab eo quod in uno tantum extremo relationem fundare ita, haec relatio habet fundamentum reale in utroque extremo, ideoque relatio
potest. ~enique appellatum est hoc fundamentum, mensuraet mensurabile, q uia etiam in utroque realis est. In qua sententia secutus est 0. Thomas Avicennam,
hae relat10nes potissimum fundantur in quibusdam rebus quae perfectionem lib. 3 suae Metaph., c. 10.
suam habent aliis commensuratam, et ut sic referuntur ad ipsas, etiamsi in eis 3. Non explicat autem D. Thomas in quo ex membris positis ab Aristotele
non sit simile aut proportionale fundamentum correspondentis relationis. ponendum sit hoc fundamentum relationis amoris ad objectum suum, et e
9. Ex quo patet facile solutio ad quintam difficultatem, quia hie non sumitur converso. Nam in hoc tertio genere collocari non potest, quoniam de toto illo
mensura ut dicit habitudinem ad nostram cognitionem, scilicet, quatenus est in universum aitAristoteles, relationem ejus sol um esse in uno extremo, alterum
medium quo nos uti possum us ad cognoscendam alterius quantitatem, aut molis vero relative dici solum quia aliud refertur ad ipsum. Neque etiam pertinere
aut perfectionis; quomodo diximus supra, rationem mensurae non addere rebus poterit ad secundum genus, quia objectum non comparatur ad amorem vel ad
aliquam rationem realem. Sed sumitur mensura pro reali termino vel objecto, appetitum, ut potentia passiva, neque ut effectus alicujus actionis, sed solum
ad quod res aliqua dicit habitudinem, secundum quam illi coaptatur seu com- ut objectum seu materia circa quam, in quo convenit cum objecto scibili et
mensuratur; quomodo scientia comparatur ad objectum scibile, et judicium sensibili. Unde forte dicetur reduci ad prim um modum, quia amor fundatur in
ad rem cognitam, et sic de aliis. Quapropter haec commensuratio nihil rei est aliqua convenientia et proportione. Verumtamen, ut supra dicebam tractando
praeter habitudinem transcendental em tali um rerum ad sua objecta, illa vero est de potentia activa et passiva, non est ille modus convenientiae vel unitatis,
sufficiens fundamentum relationis praedicamentalis. Nee refert quod terminus qui fundat primum genus relationum. Et deinde idem modus proportionis
vel objectum quod dicitur habere rationem mensurae, possit interdum non invenitur inter scientiam aut sensum et objectum, imo tanto major, quanto
existere, nam tune non consurget relatio praedicamentalis; nos autem solum cognitio per assimilationem quamdam fieri dicitur.
dicimus in tali re esse sufficiens fundamentum peculiaris relationis, quae erit 4. Ac praeterea non apparet cur scientia aut sensus dicantur mensurari ex
realis, si extrema existant, et reliqua necessaria concurrant. objecto, et non etiam amor, quia non minus perfectio amoris mensuratur ex
objecto, imo quodammodo majori ratione, quia amor tendit ad res prout sunt
SECTIOXIY. in se. Nee satis est dicere fundamentum hujus tertii generis esse mensuram
veritatis, quia hoc non est fundamentum adaequatum, nam in sensu non est
Sitne sufficiens dicta divisio, formalisveritas cognitionis, necintellectus Ip. 838/ ipse, quatenus est potentia,
omnesque relationes comprehendat. mensuratur quoad veritatem ab objecto intelligibili, sed quoad perfectionem
1. Haec est secunda principalis dubitatio superius proposita circa hanc divi- entitativam. Deinde si mensura veritatis est sufficiens fundamentum relationis,
sionem, in qua explicandum est quod in sexta difficultate posita in sectione 1O cur non mensura honestatis, vel bonitatis amoris? Itaque non video suffici-
petebatur, quomodo relationes reales omnes ad hos tres modos reducantur. entem rationem, cur relatio amoris non sit in hoc tertio genere constituenda;
neque cur negandum sit, secundum hoc genus fundamenti et relationis, esse
De relatione appetitus ad appetibile, et amoris ad amabile. inter omnia ea quae habent habitudinem ad objecta, et ab eis specificantur,
2.' ~rimum autem omnium inquirebatur, qualis sit relatio appetitus ad ap- specialem convenientiam ratione cujus constituant unum genus subalternum
pet1btle, et /col. bl amoris ad amabile; Aristoteles enim, quamvis in sensu et relationum, supposito quod de quibusdam, scilicet, de sensu, intellectu et
intellectu exempla posuerit, de appetitu et amore nihil dixit. Atvero D. Thomas, scientia id affirmatur.
hunc punctum attingens in 1, dist. 30, q. 1, art. 3, ad 3, dicit, diversam esse 5. De relatione autem amabilis seu amati, quamvis probabilis sit sententia
rationem de relatione scientiae ad scibile, et amoris ad amatum. Nam (inquit) Avicennae, tamen opposita videtur conformior doctrinae Aristotelis. Primo,
quia vel oportebit relationem amoris exdudere ab hoc tertio genere, quod est
360 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47. On Real Relation 361
Disputaton 47: Latin Text
contra dicta, vel in eo admittere relationes mutuas, quod est contraAristotelem. peculiarem modum specificationis ex tend~tia'. et quasi commensuratione
Secundo, quia differentia constituta inter scientiam et amorem non satisfacit; ad aliud ut ad objectum, vel terminwn, vel mm nsecum finem ad que.m .~er
nam si objectum scibile et amabile comparentur quoad fundamenta (ut sic se primo et intrinsece ordinantur, ut sunc potentia~, ha.bitus'.ac~~s, et simiha.
dicam), utrumque est aliquid intrinsecum et reale in ipso objecto; nam sicut Illa enim terminatio objectiva ut sic non est propna ah~u~ s1mil1~udo, ut per
res est in se bona, ita etiam, est vera secundum esse, et apta ut intelligatur; nam se constat, neque etiam est propria causalitas, ut supra atttgu~us, disp. 1~·sect.
hoc modo dixit Aristoteles, 2 Metaph., text. 4: Unumquodque ita est verum et 3, num. 17, et ideo relationes, quae in hac commensurattone ad objectum
intelligibile, sicut est ens. Et 9 Met., c. 7, dixit actum esse magis agnoscibilem, fundantur, non pertinent ad secundum genus relation~m; neque ~ converso
quam potentiam; haec enim non possunt esse vera nisi de intelligibilitate, commensuratio vel proportio, quae est inter causam effic1entem ut sic a~ suum
quatenus in rebus ipsis fundatur. Quod si interdum ratio attingendi objec- effectum pertinet ad hunc tertium modum, quia illa vel est sola causal1tas seu
tum scibile potest esse extrinseca, etiam ratio amandi saepe est extrinseca ipsi depende~tia effectiva, vel est /p. 839/ tanturn similitudo, quae inter causarn
objecto, ut patet in amore medii propter finem extrinsecum; ergo quoad haec et effectum intervenire potest.
est eadem proportio. Si vero sermo sit de scibili et appetibili, aut de scito et
amato formaliter quatenus talia sunt, utrumque completur per extrinsecam De relatione unionis.
denominationem a potentia vel actu, quod facile constare potest ex iis quae 7, Ad alteram partern illius difficultatis de relati?ne union~s, _et simil~bus,
supra diximus de bonitate, disputatione decima. Denique si consideremus duobus modis responderi potest. Primo, hanc relat1onem e~ simile~ pertmere
transcendentales habitudines, neutrum objectum secundum id quod realiter ad prim um genus ho rum relativorurn, nam ~io revera est~ 1qua un1.tas, vel es~
est, dicit habitudinem transcendentalem ad potentias vel actus intelligendi aut quasi via ad unitatern; imo ipsa identit~s specili~ vel genen_ca'.es et1arn velu~1
amandi, sed sol um econ verso potentiaevel actus dicunt habitudines ad objecta; unio quaedarn plurium in eadern essent1a seu ra tt?~e forn:'alt; ei go m ~lto magis
est ergo de illis eadem proportione loquendum; sicut ergo /col. bl scibile non propria et realis unio inter extrema realia, et d1stmcta 1~ re, p~tent fund~re
dicitur referri nisi quia aliud refertur ad ipsum, ita neque amabile. relationem ad aliud genus pertinentem. Quaprop~er, hc~t umtas numer~ca
alicujus rei simplicis respectu suiipsius, vel compos1tae et~am respec~u tot~us
An inter omnem ejfectum et causam relatio mensurae intercedat. compositi, non possit fundare relationem realem, t~men ~mta~ n.umenca totms
6. Juxta hanc ergo sententiam, quae probabilior apparet, dicendum est ad compositi, quatenus in eo uniuntur partes alioqm real1t~r di~tmctae, est suf-
sextam difficultatem, relationes illas pertinentes ad actus, habitus et potentias ficiens fundamentum relationis realis ad idem genus pertment1s. At~ue e~de~
appetendi respectu objectorum pertinere ad hoc tertium genus, quod non ratione relatio contactus ad idem genus spectat, et relatio etiam propmq_mtat1~,
tan tum in mensura veritatis, sed etiam perfectionis, seu in commensuratione et quia est veluti quaedam similitudo imperfecta in loco'. sicu~ etiam coe~1stent1a
proportione alicujus rei ad objectum fundari potest. Ad replicam autem, quae ad illud genus pertinet, quia est similitudo quaed~m m ex1stendo'. et 1~e~ es~
ibi fit, quia omnes effectus possent in hoc genere collocari, quatenus per sua in sirnilibus. Et juxta hunc dicendi modurn, relat1ones causarum 1ta distnb~1
principia vel causas mensurari possunt, primo responderi potest concedendo possunt, ut sola relatio efficientis causae ad secun~urn genu~ spect~t; relat~o
sequelam, si praecise in eis consideretur ratio mensurae et mensurati, etiamsi vero causae rnaterialis et formalis pertineant ad pnmum, qu1a prox1ma rat1?
alioqui referantur relatione dependentiae pertinente ad secundum genus, aut fundandi illas est unio, quia illae causae non causant nisi media unione, ut sms
similitudinis pertinente ad primum. Quia non est inconveniens, inter duas res locis vidimus; relatio vero causae finalis ad tertium genus pe~t~net, ~o. quod
sub diversis rationibus diversas relationes consurgere, quod praesertim de rela- ex speciali ratione sua sit relatio non mutua, ut su?ra probab1hter ~ix1mus ,
tione exemplati ad exemplar omnes videntur fateri. Verumtamen, quia praeter disput. 23, et quia non causat nisi quatenus est ratio ut effectus ordmetur ad
dependentiam effectus a causa, aut similitudinem inter illa, existimo rationem, ipsam, eique comrnensuretur. .
mensurae non addere aliquam rationem realem, sed denomination em ex ordine 8. Vel secundo did posset omnes relationes causarum .pert~n~re ad se~un-
ad cognitionem, ideo non opinor posse ibi intervenire specialem relationem d ummOdum , nam ' licet Aristoteles illum praesertim exphcuent m potent1a et
realem distinctam ab illa quae fundatur in causalitate, vel dependentia, vel
. r .
causalitate activa, quae notior est, tamen, servata proporuone, app ican potest
in similitudine. Et ideo respondetur secundo negando sequelam, quia in hoc ad singulas causas, quatenus in unaquaque est aptitudo ad suum effectum,
tertio genere solum collocantur relationes quarumdam rerum, quae habent et propria causalitas, qua suo modo influit in effectum, et effectus pendet ab
 362 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation
Disputaton 47: Latin Text 363
ipsa. Et quantum ad causam materialem, videtur haec sententia consentanea
Aristoteli, qui in illo genere po nit relationem potentiae passivae, cujus causalitas quae in uno extremo dicunt excessum, in alio defectum. Dico autem, secun-
materialis est. Eadem autem /col. bl ratio esse videtur de relatione potentiae dum proprias et specificas rationes, quia in generica ratione convenire possum,
informativae (ut sic dicam) et de causalitate ejus, et de relatione in ea fundata. et secundum earn similiter did de utroque extremo; sic enim utrumque ex-
Et consequenter idem etiam erit de relatione effectuum ad has causas; idemque tremum, tam majus quam minus, didtur inaequale alteri. Et similiter albedo
did poterit de relatione effectus causae finalis ut sic ad causam suam, nam ex dicitur dissimilis nigredini, et e converso, cum tamen verisimile sit proprias
parte causae probabilis existimo il1am relationem non esse realem, ut dixi. Et relationes secundum spedficas rationes earum esse distinctas, quia et funda-
juxta hunc respondendi modum, relatio unionis, quae supponit causalitatem mentum et terminus longe diversa sunt in una quam in alia. At vero relationes
vel aliquam imitationem ejus, reduceretur ad secundum genus relation um; aliae tertii generis plus quam disquiparantiae censentur, eo quad aequiparantia vel
vero. relati~nes propinquitatis, coexistentiae, et similes, ad primum genus sine disquiparantia dicatur proprie inter extrema realia; in hoc autem tertio genere
dub10 pertinent. Nulla ergo (ut opinor) inveniri poterit relatio, quae ad haec non censer Aristoteles esse in utroque extremo relationem realem, et ideo non
genera non facile reducatur. mutuae dicuntur.

SECTIOXV. Proponitur difficultas circa relationes non mutuas.

3. De his ergo relationibus non mutuis proprie sumptis intelligitur praesens
Utrum relationes tertii generis sint non mutuae, quaestio, in qua duplici ex capite difficilis est sententia Aristotelis. Primum
et in hoc differant a relationibus aliorum generum. est, quia non videtur verum relationes tertii generis esse non mutuas, nam si
l. Duobus modis possunt relation.es dici non mutuae: primo, secundum in aliquibus verum esset, maxime in sdbili et sensibili; at in his tam est vera
specificas rationes relarionum; secundo in suprema er generalissima. Priori relatio realis, sicut in scientiaet sensu; ergo. Probatur minor, quia denominatio
modo dicecur relatio non mutua, quae non est ejusdem rationis specificae in scibilis et sensibilis, relativa est; imo, et per se ad aliquid, ut Aristoteles ipse
utroque extrema; posteriori autem modo dicetur non mutua, quae in uno in eodem loco fatetur, et patet ex reciprocatione, quia sicut scientia est scibilis
extremo est vera et realis relatio, non vero in alio. Prior significatio inusitata scientia, ita scibile est sdentia sdbile; haec autem redprocatio et correlativa
est et impropria; nam si utrumque extremum per propriam suam relationem denominatio non est per intellectum conficta, sed ex rebus ipsis orta; ergo in
refertur ad alterum, vere ac proprie referuntur mutuo, etiamsi relationibus utroque extremo est a propria forma et relatione reali.
diversarum ration um referantur. Unde haec relativa potius vocantur diversaram 4. Secundo, quia si ob aliquam causam haec relatio non est realis in objecto
rationum, vel, ut alii loquuntur, relativa disquiparantiae. scibili, aut est quia in ipso objecto non est fundamentum reale, aut quia esse
scitum in tali objecto non est aliquid in ipso, nee scitur per sui mutationem,
Divisio relationum ejusdem vel dissimilis rationis. sed per denominationem e forma existente in alio; nam praeter has nulla alia
2. Sicque relationes mutuae distingui solent in relationes aequiparantiae et probabilis ratio occurrit. Neutra /col. bl autem ex his satisfacit. Prima enim
disquiparantiae. Nam relationes omnes secundi generis, disquiparantiae sunt, falsum sumit, nam quod objectum sit intelligibile, aut sensibile, habet funda-
quia ratio fundandi esc aliquo modo diversa in extremis, nam in altero est mentum in ipsis rebus, et in realibus proprietatibus earum; lux enim visibilis
potentia activa, in alia vero potentia passiva seu dependentia a sua causa, ex est, quia est talis naturie secundum quam habet vim sic immutandi potentiam;
quo etiam fit ut termini talium relationum sint diversarum rationum, nam ilJi et res immaterialis, quia spiritualis est, dicitur actu intelligibilis. Secunda vero
proportionate respondent fundamentis, ut superius tactum est, et infra latius ratio male colligir, alias etiam relatio agentis in acru non esset real.is i.o ipso,
dicetur. Relationes vero primi generis interdum sunt ejusdem, interdum di- quia sine sui mutatione fit agens actu, et sine additione alicuius formae absolu-
versarum ~ationum in utroque extremo; relationes enim uniratis aequipa- /p. tae, quae in ipso sit. Quod si dicas ipsam pote.ntiam agendi esse intrinsecam,
840/ ranttae sunt, ut recte notavit Alexander Ale.nsis, lib. 5 Metapbys., rexr. licet conditio quae est actio, sit extrinseca, idem dici poterit de bjecto, nam
20, et pater de relatione aequalitatis, similirudinis, identitatis; relac.iones vero aptitudo ut sciatur est intrinseca, et illa potest esse fundamentum, quamvis
fundatae in numero seu diversitate secundum proprias et spedficas rationes conditio, quae est actu sdri, sit quid extrinsecum. Eo vel maxime quod ipse
sunr disquiparantiae, ut pater de duplo et subduplo, et aliis proportionibus, actus sciendi aut sentiendi habet realem dependentiam ab objecto, sicut actio
ab agente, quamvis non in eodem genere causae. Dices, objectum quatenus de
364 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 365

se est aptum sciri aut videri, non habere habitudinem ad scientiam. Sed si hoc tanta consensione recepta, ut non liceat philosophis earn in dubiu~ r~voca~e.
intelligatur de habitudine relativa praedicamentali, petitur principium, nam Ratio autem ejus constabit ex sequenti assertione, et magis ex solunombus ~if­
hujus rei rationem inquirimus. Si vero intelligatur de habitudine transcenden- ficultatum. Secundum dictum est, has relationes non mutuas per se et quasi ex
tali, jam supra ostensum est hanc non semper esse necessario praerequisitam propria ratione sui fundamenti inveniri in tertio ~en~re, in ~iis .vero minim:,
ad relationem praedicamentalem; nam etiam in agente principium agendi non nisi veluti materialiter ex peculiari conditione a11cums subiectl seu extrem1.
semper habet transcendentalem habitudinem ad effectum, ut patet ex iis quae Ita censeo esse interpretandam Aristotelis sententiam. Et ratio prioris partis
supra de potentia et actu tractavimus. sumendaest ex peculiari modo specificationis et commensur~tionis quam ha~e~t
5. Tertio est praecipua difficultas, quia terminus relationis est altera relatio potentia, habitus, et res similes, ad objecta sua. ~am forma11ter sol um co?s1sut;
existens in alio extremo; ergo impossibile est relationem esse realem in uno in habitudine quam ex natura sua habent ad obiecta, sec~ndum qu~m e1 com-
extrema, et non in alio. Patet consequentia, quia non potest relatio esse realis mensurantur; objectum vero in hoc nullam habet propnam causa11tatem, ~ed
sine formali termino reali. Antecedens vero patet, quia relationes dicuntur6 rationem termini specificantis. Nam, licet alioqui possit esse movens aut .active,
esse simul natura, definitione et cognitione, quia nimirum unum est terminus aut finaliter, tamen ut extremum hujus relationis, sub nulla harum rat10num
alterius. consideratur, sed solum est id cui talis res commensuratur. /col. b/ Su~ hac
6. Ex secundo vero capite oriuntur non minores difficultates: nam si relationes autem ratione ipsum non concurrit, ut ordinabile ad ali~d, sed s~lum ut 1.d ~d
non mutuae admittendse sunt, non tantum in tertio, sed et in aliis generibus quod aliud ordinatur; et ideo ex vi talis rationis fundand1 non orltur relauo m
invenientur. Antecedens patet, nam imprimis relatio, quae est inter Deum et utroque extremo, sed in solo illo quod alteri com~en.suratur. Hae.ergo de causa
creaturam in ratione causae efficientis et effectus, est secundi generis, et tamen relationes tertii generis ex propria ratione forma11 su1 fundament1 non m~tuae
est non mutua, juxta sententiam magis receptam a Theologis. Similiter in sunt. In aliis vero hoc non reperitur, ut ex dictis constat, quia frequentms ac
primo genere reperiuntur multae relationes inter Deum et creaturas, ut relatio fere semper relationes illorum generum mutuae sunt. Quod s~ ~iquand~ s~nt
distinctionis Ip. 841 I realis, vel similitudinis in esse, aut in ratione substantiae, non mutuae, id solum est ob peculiarem naturam vel cond1t1onem al1cuius
aut intellectuali gradu; nam, licet sit analoga similitudo, vera tamen et realis rei, ut ex solutionibus argumentorum clarius patebit.
est, et sufficiens ad fundandam relationem realem, ut supra dixi. Et tamen talis
relatio, licet in creatura sit realis, in Deo esse non potest. Item sumi potest An in relativis non mutuis utrumque extremum realiter referatur.
argumentum de relatione unionis inter Verbum et humanitatem, quae est 9. Ad argumenta ergo in primo capite proposita, ~ua~ contra priorem
non mutua, et tamen pertinet ad primum vel secundum modum. Praeterea assertionem, et contra primam partem secundae assert1oms procedunt, re-
inter creaturas est peculiaris difficultas de relatione inter causam finalem et spondendum est. Et quidem ad primum .responder Cajet., 1 ~·· q. 13, art. 7,
effectum, quam diximus esse non mutuam, et tamen pertinet ad secundum concedendo, etiam in relativis non mutu1s utrumque correlat1vum esse r.eale,
genus. Denique relatio dextri et sinistri inter hominem et columnam censetur et scibile, verbi gratia, referri realiter ad scientiam. Differentiam tamen mter
non mutua, ex sententia omnium, et tamen non pertinet ad tertium genus: haec et relativa mutua ponit in hoc, quod in mutuis utrumque refertur per
nulla enim ratio mensurae ibi intervenit. intrinsecam relationem, non mutua vero, non ita, sed alterum extremum refertur
7. Propter haec ergo et similia, Greg., in l, d. 18, quaest. 1, sentit nullas esse realiter per relationem existentem in alio, et extrinsece denominantem ~te~um.
relationes non mutuas, quern sequuntur aliqui Nominales. Quae responsio videtur habere fundamentum ~n. Aristotele, tum q~1a 1.nter
ea quae sunt simpliciter ad aliquid, numerat sc1b1le ut refertur ad sc1ent1am,
Assertiones de relationibu.s non mutuis. et,sensibile ut refertur ad sensum; non sunt autem ad aliquid simpliciter, nisi
8. Duo nihilominus breviter dicenda sunt. Prim um est, aliquas esse relationes quae realiter referuntur, ut supra dixi~us.; erg? ha~c etiam sunt .relati~~ realia
non mutuas, id est, reales in uno extremo, et non in alio. Haec est sententia ex sententia Aristotelis. Tum etiam qu1a mfenus, m eodem cap1te, dic1t haec
Aristotelis hoc loco, quam omnes expositores admittunt, et fere Theologi, esse ad aliquid, quia alia ad ipsa dicuntur, ubi non ait haec esse ad ali~uid,
praesertim D. Thom., 1 p., q. 13, a. 17, et alii statim citandi. Estque sententia quia ratio id fingit aut considerat, sed q~ia ~ia a~ ipsa dicun~ur, quo~ m re
ipsa invenitur. Tum praeterea quia paulo mf~n~s ait, ha~c ~mma per se1psa ad
6 Vives reads: "discuntur." aliquid did, complectens tria genera supenonbus secttombus tractata; quae
366 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 367

autem sola ratione referuntur, non per seipsa, sed per rationem referuntur. inter actionem et passionem tribuit denominationes diversas agentis e~ p~tie~­
Tandem quia metaphysicus non considerat respectus rationis; sed illa tria tis unam intrinsece, et aliam extrinsece. Verumtamen neque haec d1stmct10
genera per se pertinent ad praedicamentum ad aliquid, tesce Aristotde, et per reiationum admitti debet in praesenti, nam etiam ad hujusmodi distinctionem
se etiam cadunt sub metaphysicam consideration em; ergo. Et bane sentenriam rationis oportet esse aliquod fundamentum in re, quod in prae~enti nul~um est.
/p. 842/ ante Cajec. videtur docuisse Greg., in 4, d. 23, q. 3. Uncle non est simile exemplum de actione et passione, nam m mutauone est
10. Sed haec responsio Cajetani singularis est, et contradicit 0. Thom., 2 vera et transcendentalis habitudo ad principium, a quo manat, et ad passum,
cont. Gent:, c. 13, ubi ex professo probat, relationes Dei ad creaturas non quod immutat, et ideo est in ea magnum fundamentum ad dist~nguen~um
esse res aliquas extra Deum existentes, a quibus extrinsece denominetur rela- ratione actionem et passionem, ad modum duarum formarum acc1dentalmm;
tive. Cum autem inter Deum et Creaturas sit relatio non mutua, si vera esset Accedit universalis ratio, in qua fundatur illud principium D. Thomae, quad
Cajetani sentenria, eriam D us referretur realiter ad creaturas, non quidem relatio non denominat extrinsece, quia nimirum cum denominatio ejus sit per
per relarionem realem in ipso Deo existencem, sed per relationem existentem habitudinem ad aliud, repugnat formam sic denominantem esse in eo ad ~u~d
in reatura. Uncle in ratione secunda expresse sumit D. Thomas, principiwn est habitudo; quod si in eo non est, oportet ut sit in eo quad refertur, quia.1~
concrarium interpretarioni Cajetani, scilicet, ti relatione non dcnominm·i aliud relatione non concurrunt per se alia extrema. Denique vix potest mente conc1p1
quasi exterius existente, sed inhaerente. Ubl bene Ferrariensis iocerpretatur, id quidnam sit in scientia, ratione cujus facia~ scibile ad se realiter referri, cum
inteJUgendwn esse de denominatione respecriva, qua dicitur aliquid referri ad tota ratio scientiae sit versari circa scibile, et mde non habeat, per se loquendo,
aliud, nam alio genere denomination is non est inconveniensaliquid denominari illud ad se ordinare.
relacione extrinseca, ut postea dicemus.
11. Praecerea, si scibile refercur reaHter ads ien ti am per relation em existen cem Solvitur prima difficultas in prin.cif io p~oposit~.
insciencia, interrogo an hoc incelligendum sit de relatione, quaipsamet scientia 13. Ad primum ergo argumentum in princ1p10 ~oSlt~m d1cen~um ~st,
refercur ad scibile, vel de aliqua alia relatione distincta. Prim um dki non p test, scibile dupliciter posse denominari: primo, mere termma~1ve et qua~1 passive;
quia una et eadem relatio non potest dare diversis subjectis donominariones secundo correlative ad scientiam. Primo modo denommatur extrmsece ab
diversarum ration um, quales sunt scienriae et scibilis; nee potest referee eas ad ipsamet ~cientia reali, atque ita talis denominat~o dici potes~ ess~ in rebus i~sis,
oppositos terminos formales; alias pari ratione eadem filiatio exiscens in filio et non esse per intellectum conficta. Imo hae~ ips~ de?ommat~o non ~umitur
possec filium denominare intrinsece et referre ad pauem, et par:rem ipsum solum ex relatione praedicamentali, quae est m sc1enua, sed et1am ex ~psamet
extrinsece denominare patrem, et referre illum ad fiJium. Denique una form.a forma absoluta, ut includente transcendentalem habitudinem ad obiectum;
specie unum habet fonnalem effectllrn; sed relatio est forma, cujus effeccus quod satis insinuavit Aristoteles /p. 843/ cum dixit, intelligi~ile did eo q~od
formalis est refene unwn ad aliud; ergo una et cadem relatio non potesc habere in eo versetur intellectus; versatur enim non per solam relat10nem praedica-
duos modos referendi divel'Sarum rationum. Neque etiam dici pocest secun- mentalem, sed per proprium actum ad quern consequitur r~latio. Se~un~a
dwn, nemp esse in scientia duas relationes reales discinctas, aliam, qua ipsa denominatio scibilis est respectiva, et haec solum est per relauonem rat1oms,
scientia refercur ad scibile, aliam, qua referc scibile ad se; ho enim a nemine quia mens nostra ad explicandam ill~m rela~ion.em, quam scientia habet ad
hactenus dictum est, et non habet fundamentum in Aristorde, sed potius ei ipsum scibile, concipit illud ut correlativum scientiae .. Argument~n_1 ergo so~u.m
repugnat; dici enim scibile dici ex eo quod sciencia refertw· ad ipsum; n n procedit de priori denominatione. Cu~ a~tem .Anstoteles.' sc1b1le, sensibile
ergo agnos it inter haec aliam relarionem realem, nis.i qua scientia refertm ad et similia ponit inter ea quae sunt ad al1qmd, pnmo expom potest, quo~ per
scibile. Nee etiam est consonum racioni, quia ilia pluralitas relation um neque haec non intelligat tantum haec extrema, sed relationem intervenientem m~e~
est necessaria, neque habet fwidamentum in ipsa scientia, cum in /col. bl ea haec, et sua correlativa, in quocumque eorum sit illa relatio; vel secu~do die~
tantum sit unica coaptatio et habitudo transcendentalis ad scibile. po test, ponere haec extrema inter ea quae su~t a~ aliquid., quatenus hujusmod1
12. Dici potest esse duas relaciones solum ratione distinctas; haec enim denominationes habent a quibusdam relatiombus realibus. Et eod~m sensu
muJciplicatio cum non sit rerum, nee prnprie in re, facile admitti potest, et intelligi potest quod ait, haec esse ad aliquid, quia alia referuntur a~ ipsa; e~se
sufficit ad praedictas denominationes respectivas eciam diversarum rarionwn; (inquam) ad aliquid, non tanquam correlativa, se~ tanquam termmi passive
sicut idem modus seu eadem dependencia propter solam discinctionem rationis denominati ab his relationibus. Et simili modo dicentur haec esse per se ad
368 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Re'4tion 369
Disputaton 47: Latin Text
aJiquid tanquam termini per se connexi cum relationibus realibus, a qu.ibus secundum di i, significari ad modu.111 reruro respectivarnm, eo quod a nobis
tales denominaciones recipiunt. Vel aliter eciam dici potest, cum air Arisroteles concipiantur ad modum earum rerum qua similes '.·espectus transcendenr.~es
haec dici ad a.liquid, quia alia djcuotur ad ipsa, intelligi causaliter, nam si sci- in ludunt. AJioqui enim D us, quantum ad essennam sua~, e~ res omnino
bile, sensibile, t sirnilia, correlative sumantur et concipiantLu· a nobis, ideo esr absoluta, cwnque ejus scientia et pocentia sit ipsame es~ent1a eJUS, ab~o~utae
quia alia refemnrur ad ipsa, non quia ipsa vere ac realiter refel'antur. Sed dicir eciam unt ab omni respectu cranscendentali, quad et:Iam, upra tet1g1m~s
Gregorius eamdem interpretationem habere locum, etiamsi relatio scibilis sit inter explicanda altributa Dei. Ee racionem eciam reddidimus, quia potentLa
realis, quia ei non convenit, nisi quia scientia versatur circa illud; sed hoc non Dei non est talis, ut sit per se primo ordinata ad opus extra s , sed earn effi-
recte dicitur, q uia si fun dam en tum illi us relationis est tan tum ha.bi tudo al terius, cacitatem ha.bet quasi concomitanter, secundum rationem loquendo, et abs~ue
scilicet scientiae ad scibile, non potest relatio in ea fundata esse realis. ulla ordinatione. Et simi- /p. 844/ liter scientia Dei et voluntas pe~ se pnmo
14. Ad secw1dum argumentum respondetur, causam, ob quam haec relacio non versantur nisi circa suam essentiam, inde vero consequenter at~mgunt vel
non mutua in altero extrema non est realis in hoc tertio genere, esse quia in attingere possunt reliqua sine trancendentali respectu. s.unt ergo ht respectus
uno ex:tremo, verbi gratia, in objecto scibili non est fundamentum real.e calis aut secundum dici tantum; aut, si concipiantur ut relat1ones secundu~ esse,
relarionis. Neque saris est quad in ipsa re inrelligibili aut sensibili sit aliquod sunt tantum relationes rationis, saltem quamdiu termini in re non ~x1stunt.
fundamennun, ob quod apta sir intelligi aut senciri, quia illud fundamencum Neque de bis procedit argumentum sup ra p~o~osic~rn, sed de qwbus~am
praecise consideratum in racione mensurae, non accipitur ut a.liquid ordinabile respectibus qui indudunt coexistentiam termini.' ~u1 ~ropterea convenmnt
ad aliud, sed sol um ut terminus vel objectum cui aliquid commensuratur; et Deo extempore, quia creamrae, quae sunt term1ru calm~ ~espe~tu~tm, non
icleo di imr in illo non esse fundamencum relationis, non quia /col. b/ nihil rei existunt nisi ex cempore, ut sunt relationes creatoris, dom111t, et s1m1les.
sit in ipso, sed quia in ilia re nulla est ratio fundandi relation em quod requiri-
tur ad fundamenmm relationis, formalirer de illo loquendo, prout explicatum Opinio Nominalium de relationibtts 1·eal.ilms f!ei ex tern.pore.
est supra, sect. 7. Tertium argumentum petit difficultatem gravem d.e termino 16. De his ergo multi Theologi existimanr esse relat1ones reales. It~ tenet
relationis, quam rractabimus sectione sequenti. Ocham, in l, d. 30; et ibi Gahr., quaest. 5; Durand., q. 3; Gregor., dist. 28,
q. 3, art. 4; Marsil., in 1, q. 32, arr. I. Fundamen~m. l1orurn auctorum est'.
Circa secundam difficultatem tractatu.r de relationibus Dei ad creatu.ras. qui.a relatio realis nihil rei addic subjecto .seu ~ten re1 quae per ~ refem
15. In secunda pane argumentorum petitur imprimis difficultas, an inter dicimr sed vel est denominado ex oncom1tant1a exrremorum, vel est 1p~amet
creaturam ad Deum sit semper relario non mutua, etiamsi ad primum et se- res abs~luta quae, coexistence alia, per seipsam illam respicit propter al1qu~d
cundum genus relacionum pertinerevideantur. Quae est quaestio Theologica, vinculurn, vel aliquam connexionem inter eas inventam. Und~ fit ut r~l~no
et aliis verbis proponi so ler, an nomina, quae Deo tribuntur extempore per realis possirabsque ullaimperfection~advenire ~c~i de nova, qu1aadvenit~me
relacionem ad creatw·am, di cant in Deo relationem realem, vel ration is tan tum. addicione ulla reali et intrinseca, et sme compostttone, et conseq~entC: et1am
Aliquaenim nomina, quaevidencur impornu:e relationemad creaturam dicuntur sine ulla dependentia in aliqua re extrinseca, sed ad summ.um tn ~alt ~odo
d Dea ex aerernitate, quae interdum dicuntur importare respectum l.iberum, denominationis; solum autem hae imperfectiones possunt hie exc~g1tan; er~o
interdum vero simpliciter necessarium, seu naturalem; ut scientia, potencia, exduditur omnis imperfectio; et alioqui in Deo concurrunt omnia necess~na
et similes, dicunt respectum natttralem et necessarium; praedestinacio au tern, ad relationem; nam est vera causa efficiens creaturae, et h~b~t veram potentta~
providentia, ec s iencia vision is dicunt respeccum llberwn seu non naturalem, ·
et acaonem ·
cuca illam·, ei·go , posito altero extrema, ent m Deo vera relat10 .
quia, absolute loquendo, possent Deo non convenire. Et de his relacionib us realis. Favetque hu.ic sentenciae communis modus denominandl Deum e~ his
non duhium est quin non sint reales in Deo, quia ex aeternitate non habent · ·b . tam enim vere ac realiter esr effector aut creator creaturae, sicut
re Iat1oru us, . · T
rea.les terminos. Verum estaliquosTheologos existimare, respectwn scientiaeet unus homo est pater alterius, et idem est de relacione distinct!, s1m1 1s, etc.;
pote.ntiae, eciam in Deo, esse reales ttanscendentales, ideoque posse esse inde- ergo vel omnes istae relationes sunt in Deo reales, aut n~lwn es. fundame.ntum
pendenres ab existentia termini, ec non essevariabiles, nequeaccidentales, sedde ad admittendas relationes reales in creataris. Favet de111que hu1csen~ent1m J?·
intrinseca substantia Dei. Verius tamen existimo (quod alibi latius cractandam Anselm us, in Monolog., cap. 24, ubi cum dixisset Deo nihil posse acc1dere, qma
est) haec non dicere in Deo verum respecrurn transcendemalem, sed tantwn est invariabiHs, objicit sibi: Qµ.omodo non est par- /col bl ticeps accidentis, cum
370 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 371
et hoc ipsum quod maior est omnibus aliis naturis, et quod illis dissimilis est, illi creata; at illud est pla ne fals um et in in telligibjle; q uomodo en i~ ralis ~u~stan cia
vid.eatur 11cddere?Et respond et: Sed quid repugnant quommdam quae acciden.tia referre posset Deum ? Item etiam ad illam substanriam essct alia rel~t1o in ~eo,
dicuntur. msceptibilitns, et natimtlis incommutabilitas, si ex eonem asmmptione q uia esset fuctor ejus, et sic procederetur in infinitum. Q uod si d.1cat~r ill::un
1mlla m bstantiae conscquitur val'iabilitas? Et subdic info rius hujusmod i esse relationem esse subsistentem, no n tamen alia subsistentia nisi divma, m terro-
relatio nes. Er ne existimetur loqui de rd ationibus racionis, exemplum addit gabo an in ea sit per unio nem hypostacicam: quod di cerc tam absurdurn ~sse~,
in relationibus creatis. Nam ego (inquit) nee major, vel minor, nee aequalis vel lLt impugn andum non sit; vel per iden tirarem: et un.c ~u rs~, quaerarn an id sit
similis sum homini post annum nascituro; omnes autem relationes has illo nato per omnimodam identitatem, quae excl udat eciam dist1~ ~onern mo~alem'.et
habere potero sine omni mei mutatione. Addit vero inferius, haec quae sine sic recedicur ab hypothesi quam praemisimus, quod, n~irum, om~1s rel~tto,
mutatione rei accidere dicuntur, improprie did accidentia, et idea simplidter realis de novo adveniens sit modus distinctus. Si vero sit sermo de 1denmate
verum esse, Deo nullum accidens de nova advenire. reali cum distinctione modali, inciditur in omnia inconvenientia illata, et non
evitatur quin talis relatio insit Deo non per inhaerentiam disti?ctam, se~ per
Contraria sententia probatur. seipsam, sicut etiam in substantiis creatis modi accidentales ipsas afficmnt,
17. Nihilominus tamen plures et graviores Theologi negant hujusmodi eisque inhaerent. . . . .
nomina significare in Deo relationes reales ad creaturas, quae ex tempore 19. Verumtamen tota certitudo huJUS sententiae m hoc sensu m~g1s e.st
ei conveniunt. Haec est sententia D. Thomae, 1 p., q. 13, art. 7, et 2 cont. conditionata, seu consequentiae, quam consequentis, videli~et quod s1 .relatto
Gent., cap. 12; et idem docent his lads Cajet. et Ferrar., et reliqui Thomistae; realis sit, qualis in ea sententia supponitur, non ~otest esse l~ Deo; q~1a vero
Capreolus, in l, d. 30, q. 1, art. l, concl. 3, et art. 2, cond. 2 et 3, et ibidem antecedens illud incertum est et fortasse falsum, ideo non sat1s est ut illa con-
1-fapalens., an. l ; Bonav., art. 1 quaest. 3; Richa rd .. art, l, q. 4; Scorus, q. l ; dusio sit certa, prout absolute negat relationes reales Dei ad cr~aturas. Neq~e
Aegid., quaes c. 2; H enrie., Quodlib. 9, guaest. l; et Alens., l p., q. 35; et in auctores primae sententiae in eo sensu locuti sunt, nee praed1ctam suppos1-
eadem sentenci a viderur esse Magister, i.n ili a distinctione t rigesim a. E t unt qui tionem admittunt.
cxistiment han semen ti am cam cercam esse, u t al cera repugnecsacrae doctrinae. 20. Si vero supponamus has relationes non esse aliquid rei actu distinc~u~
Verumtamen aliud est loqui supponendo relationem esse rem vel modum ex ab omnibus absolutis, nee potest esse certum has relationes non posse tnbu~
natura rei distinctum a funclru:pento, seu subjecto relato, et consequenter ei de Deo, nee est quaestio magni momenti, sed fere de modo loquend~. Et sane qm
novo acldi cum, quando de novo refertUJ, seu relat ive denominari incipi t; aliud putant has denominationes relativas, quae po~sunt ~e no~o advemre p.er ~o.lam
vero est loqui de rdatione, supponenclo non esse aliquid distincrum a rebus mutationem alterius extremi sine ulla mutauone eJUS re1 quae refem d1c1tur,
abso lucis. Facta priori suppositione, sine dubio esset absurdissimwn, ac fore esse /col. bl tantum denominationes extrinsecas ex coexistentia :xtremorum,
erroneum dicere, resulcare in D eo relationes reales ad creatmas ex tempore, satis consequenter loquunmr t ribuendo has relationes D eo, qu1~ n~llum ~st
quando creaturae producancur, vel amitti , cum creatur:ae mutantur. Quia inconveniens D eum ex tempore denominari ab aliqua form a reali existence m
ju:xra hujusmodi sementiam ec ponicur in D ea verwn accidens, quia modus creatUia, ut patet in actione creaciva, et in aliis quas Deus ad extra o pera.cw. t
ex natura rei distincws a substantia, q ui poces t inesse illi, er abesse, accidens certe D .Anselmus, citato loco, in hancsententiam mulcum propendere v1d: rur,
est; et consequenter necesse est ponere in Deo compositionem ex substantia quanquam in fine capitis modum illum loque.ndi. ut incert~m praeterm.tttat.
et tali modo distincto, ac denique mutationem et potentialitatem, ac similia. Nihilominus tamen earn sententiam supra rehqmmus ut mmus probabilem,
Ip. 845/ minusque consentaneam Aristoteli; q~uod nunc ex eo confirmare po~sumus,
18. Neque enim did potest talem relationem esse realem, et non esse in crea- quod juxta illam nullae erunt relationes .non. mutuae· falsum~ue en~ quod
tura, et referre realiter ipsum Deum ad creaturam, et nihilominus non inesse Aristoteles ait, quaedam dici relative, qwa alia referw1tur ad ipsa, al1a vero
Deo, sed assistere illi, ut Gilbert. Porret. cogitavit, ut Alensis et alii referunt. quia ipsa in se habent unde referantur. . . . .
Refutatur enim hoc facile, nam si illa relatio realis est, in aliquo subjecto esse 21. Ulterius vero etiam supponendo relauonem esse quid mtrmsecum, no~
necesse est; cum ergo non sit in creatura, erit in Deo. Nisi quis fingat esse tamen quid distinctum in re, et consequenrer nee mutatio~em .n~c compos1-
subsistentem, quod did non potest, alias sequitur esse quamdam substantiam tionem faciens, non sequuntur inconvenientia prius illata, et1ams1dicatur1?eus
creatam assistentem Deo ex tempo re, cum, sit relatio temporalis et consequenter ""tempore referri .cl creaturru;, et ideo iUa opinio in <O .emu non"' ~
372 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 373

aliqua censura. Unde etiam interThomistas, Soncinas, 5 Metaph., quaest, 25, habet Hervaeus supra, sed obscuriorem, minusque satis~acientem, et id~o earn
ad 4, admittit, relationem dominii, quam Deus habet ad creaturas, esse realem, omitto. In dicto ergo sensu asserimus nihil referri ad almd vere ac real1ter p~r
quia fundatur in vera potentia reali; quod etiam ex parte opinatur Hervaeus, intrinsecam formam, nisi sit ejusdem ordinis cum eo. Ratio autem est, qma
l, dist. 30, quaest. unica, art. 3, licet in modo loquendi conetur sese accom- relatio realis consistit in ordine unius rei ad aliam; merito ergo ad talem rela-
modare communi sententiae, quod difficile explicat; nee id est mirum, quia tionem requiritur, ut sit inter extrema ejusdem ordinis. .
revera non est facile rationem reddere cur hoc negandum sit, supposita ilia 25. Potestque hocconfirmari exdictis de scientia et scibili, .na~, sub ~a rat10ne
sententia, cum nulla imperfectio sequatur in Deo, ut ex dictis constat. censentur esse diversorum ordinum, quatenus /col. bl sc1ent1a ordmatur ad
22. Nihilominus tamen non censeo esse recedendum a modo loquendi D. scibile scibile autem ut sic non ordinatur ad scientiam; multo autem magis est
Thomae et graviorum Theologorum, quia, etiamsi illa incommoda supra illata Deus ~terius ordinis ab omni creatura; ergo multo minus est per seipsum realiter
non sequantur attribuendo Deo relationem realem in dicto sensu, nihilominus referibilis ad creaturas, quam scibile ad scientiam. Et hoc fere discursu utitur
tamen malo modo per intrinsecam formam et entitatem suam referri possit D. Thom. citatis locis, et latius in quaest. 7 de Potentia, art, 11. Divina, ergo
ad creaturas. Hoc enim est proprium entium ejusdem ordinis; Deus autem et natura, potentia, et reliqua attributa, tam sunt absol~ta in se, tamqu~ abstra~ta
creatura omnino sunt diversorum ordinum, ut per se satis constat. et independentia ab omni ordine creaturarum, ut s1ve creatura~ existant, s1ve
23. Dicuntur autem esse ejusdem ordinis ea, quae vel sunt extra omne ge- non nee secundum rem, nee secundum aliquam veram formal1tatem realem
nus, et extra omnem dependentiam, ut divinae personae, vel sunt sub eodem refe;ant Deum ad creaturas. Un de necvere possunt concipi ut sic denominantes
genere, ut substantiae creatae, vel quantitates, et similia; vel certe /p. 846/ vel referentes Deum, sed omnis denominatio quae ut respectiva concipitur in
quae sunt sub diversis generibus, quorum unum potest perfici per aliud, et, Deo ad creaturam, est tantum secundum rationem et modum concipiendi
e converso, ut sunt genus substantiae creatae, et genera accidentium inter se nostrum.
comparata. Et hac ratione, omnia entia creata, quantum ad praesens spectat, 26. Neque obstat quod Deus denominetur realiter creator .aut J:?o~i~us;
dicuntur esse ejusdem ordinis (personae enim increatae, ut inter se referuntur, denominatur enim realiter, extrinsece quidem ab actione real1, et sic d1c1tur
non pertinent ad praesentem disputationem), quia, si sint ejusdem generis, et creator; intrinsece vero a potestate reali quam in se habet sup~r .rem c~eatam,
habent inter se univocam convenientiam, et mutuo se aliquo modo juvant ad et sic dicitur Dominus, vel a scientia, aut amore reali, et sic d1c1tur sc1ens vel
perfectionem vel complementum suae naturae, vel in individuo, vel in specie, amans id quod facit. Denique hae denominationes non sunt reales, nisi p~out
vel saltem in genere. Unde fit ut etiam causalitas, quae inter hujusmodi entia sumuntur ab aliquibus formis, vel quasi formis absolutis; prout vero relanvae
intercedit, redundet in perfectionem non solum effectuum, sed aliquo modo formaliter sunt, tantum fundantur in modo concipiendi nostro. .
etiam causarum, vel quia ad agendum ordinantur, vel quia in effectibus conser- 27. Ad principalem ergo difficultatem in principio positam, conced.1mus
vantur saltem secundum speciem, vel certe quia secundum genus perficiuntur inter Deum et creaturas dari relationes non mutuas, quae non sol um pertment
varietate differentiarum aut specierum. Si vero entia creata sint diversorum ad tertium genus seu fundamentum relationum, sed etiam .ad pri~um ve~ s~­
generum, omnia habent inter se aliquam connexionem, aut secundum rationes cundum. Neque id est inconveniens, quia non oportet relattva tertn ge~ens ~~
genericas, aut secundum specificas, cum proportione eas comparando. In hoc hoc distingui ab aliis, quod in eo omnes relationes sin~ non mutuae, et ~n al~~s
ergo sensu dicimus in praesenti, omnia entia creata esse ejusdem ordinis. nunquam, sed in hoc quod in tertio genere semper smt non mut~ae, m alus
24. Aliter id exponi potest ex Cajetano, I parte, quaest. 4, art. 3, ad 4, ubi vero non semper, sed potius raro. Unde etiam recte exponitur. Ar.1stoteles, ~t
ait, ea esse diversorum ordinum, quae habent inter se essentialem dependen- dicebam, quod in tertio genere ex vi formalis fundamenti seu rat1on~s f~ndand1,
tiam in ratione causae et causati; quo modo comparantur omnes creaturae ad relationes sunt non mutuae; in primo vero et secundo genere, s1 al1quando
Deum, non tamen inter se, quia, licet interdum ad invicem causentur, non sunt non mutuae, provenit quasi ex materiali re aut subjecto, vel quasi subjecto
tamen secundum propriam dependentiam essentialem. Sed haec expositio, relationis; verbi gratia, in relatione causae et effectus inter D~u~ et creaturas,
licet sit probabilis, et quoad causas extrinsecas satisfaciat, tamen in intrinsecis, si formaliter solum consideremus rationem potentiae et actmnts, potest esse
scilicet, materiali et formali, non videtur habere locum; sed in eis est specialis sufficiens ad relationem mutuam; tamen in Deo, propter eminentiam suae
ratio, quia comparantur ad effectum, ut partes quae ad componendum totum entitatis, relatio illa est non mutua; et idem dici /p. 847/ potest de relatione
ordinantur, et quoad hoc sunt ejusdem ordinis cum illo. Aliam expositionem similis aut distincti, et similibus.
374 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 375

28. Relatio autem inter causam finalem et effectum, si non mutua est, re- Exponitur quaestionis titulus, et quid sit actu ter:rzinare. . .
duci merito potest ad tertium genus; coaptantur enim media fini, et sic ab eo 2. Est autem advertendum, hie nos non agere de formali denommauone
speciem sumunt, et suo modo per ilium mensurantur. termini ut actu terminantis, sed de ratione seu forma, quae in ipsa re, quae est
29. De relatione autem dextri et sinistri inter hominem et columnam, satis terminus, requiritur ut sit apta ad terminandum. Nam sub priori ratio~e es~e
dubium est an sit realis ex parte alicujus extremi. Nam, licet forma seu virtus termini seu terminare, non est aliquid in re terminante, sed est denommatto
a qua ilia denominatio sumpta est, realis sit, et intrinsece existens in animali, extrinseca, sumpta ex eo quod aliud tendat in ipsam. Si cut, parietem esse vis um,
columna vero tan tum extrinsece, tamen non saris apparet cur inde oriatur relatio non est aliquid in pariete, sed est denominatio a visione respici~nte ips~m;
realis, etiam in animali, cum illa denominatio non fundetur in unitate aliqua nam idem est videri, quad actu terminare visionem, licet voces diversae smt;
seu quantitate, ut per se constat. Neque etiam in ratione potentiae activae ut sic; nihilominus tamen praerequiritur in pariete aliqua forma, qua con~tituitur ~pt~s
alias relatio esset mutua, quia illi correspondet in columna potentia passiva, vel ad terminandam visionem. Sic ergo intelligendum est de termmo relatioms;
interdum etiam activa deficit, quia non oportet ut virtus motiva partis dextrae dicitur enim actu terminare, solum quia respicitur ab alio, quae denominatio
tan ta sit, ut ad movendam columnam sufficiat. Neque etiam fundatur illa relatio non est praerequisita ad relationem, sed, consequens ~d illa~, in quo ?mnes
in aliqua commensuratione, quia virtus dextra animalis nullam habitudinem conveniunt. Necessario vero supponitur in termino aliqua rauo et quasi causa
transcendentalem dicit ad columnam, neque illi commensuratur ullo modo. formalis, ob quam est terminativus (ut sic dicam) relationis, quia non ~~ne
Non ergo videtur intervenire vera ratio ad fundandam relationem realem, sed ens potest terminare quamcunque relationem; ergo in unoquoq~e requmtur
videtur ilia denominatio orta ex sola comparatione intellectus per quamdam aliqua ratio, ob quam est natum te~~inare han~ .vel i~l'.1111 relauonem: ha~c
proportionem seu proponionalitatem ad dexcram ec sirusrram partem ejusdem ergo rationem formalem terminandi m praesenti mqummus. Et quomam m
hominis vel ani malis. Nam i nrer has partes est relatio realis mutuasum pta ex di- superioribus dictum est, terminum relationis deb~re ~sse ~~s reale, et, ut actu
versi tatesi tuu m, ClLm dlversirarevirmtum realium in utraque parteexistencium; terminet, requirere actualem existentiam, ideo ulten~s mqumm.us. an debeat esse
et hinc similis denominatio rranslata est ad rem inanimatam, locum siniscrum ens formaliter relativum vel absolutum; ex quo facile constabit m unaquaque
vel dextrum occupantem. Quae quoad denominationem in hoc assimilatur relatione, an proportionatus terminus debeat esse tale ens absolutum, vel tale
relationibus non mutuis, quia fundamentum illius denominationis solum est relativum. /p. 848/
in uno extrema, et inde redundat in aliud; idea solent hoc exemplo declarari
relationes non mutuae, quamvis vera ac propria relatio realis non videatur ibi ~riae Sententiae.
necessaria. Quia sola diversitas situum ut sic non sufficit ad donominationem 3, Prima.-Sunt ergo in hac re tres sententiae. Prima affirmat in omnibus
dextri et sinistri, ut per se constat; diversitas autem virtutis ibi, non est nisi relationibus, tam mutuis quam non mutuis, formalem terminum d~bere e~se
privativa, quia iJ1 animali est propda virtus, in columna vero tanrum est privatio relativum. lta docuit Cajet., 1 part., quaest. 13, art. 7; et Hispalens., m l, dist.
iUius, et ideo in neuuo ex:rremo viderm sufficere ad relationem realern. Quod si
30, quaest. 1 , notab. 3, videtur secundum ea~de~ sentent'.am lo~ui, quamvis
quis omnino velit defendere iUam esse relacionem realem non mutuam, utatur
nee quaestionem disputer, neque de formalt ratione termmandi ex~resse lo-
generali responsione superius posit.a. /col. b/
quatur. Nonnulli vero ex modern is Thom.is tis bane se~ten tiam. secutl sunt. Et
potest probari primo, quia quodlibet relaavum forrnalite~ cermmatur ad.suum
SECTIOXVI. correlativum; ergo formalis ratio terminandi unam relauonem est relauo op-
Utrum fomzalis terminus relationis sit altera relatio, posita correspondens in alcero extremo. Conseq~~tia evidens ~~t; et ancecedens
vel aliqua ratio absoluta. probatur, quia relativa sunt simul nanira, cognmone ~t ~efinmone, ut canst.a~
1. Haec quaestio suborta est ex sectione praecedente, et est per se valde exAristotele, c. de Ad aliquid, et inferius dicetur; sed nihil ho rum haberent ms1
necessaria ad explicandam naturam relationis, quae tum ex fundamento, tum unum relativum ad aliud formaliter terminaretur; ergo. Probatur minor quoad
ex termino, suo modo pendet; et ob hoc etiam optime in hunc locum cadit, primam partem, quia si pater, ver~i gratia, ut ~ater no.n terminatur ad filium,
nam in duabus sectionibus proxime praecedentibus explicuimus formalia ut filius est relativus, sed ut est hie homo gemtus ab 1llo, ergo pater ut pater
fundamenta relationum; superest ergo ut consequenter formalem terminum non est simul natura cum filio ut filio, sed cum hoc homine ut genito; at vero
declaremus. hie homo prius natura est genitus ab alio, quam habeat relationem filiationis
376 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 377

ad ipsum, quia filiatio est proprietas resultans in homine genito; ergo pater, ut in relationibus mutuis, et non mutuis, quia non est aeque certa in utrisque,
pater, erit prius natura quam sit filius ut filius. Et confirmatur haec pars, quia quamvis ex non mutuis ad mutuas non leve argumentum sumatur.
relatio, ut relatio, non pendet nisi ex fundamento et termino; ergo, si formalis
terminus non est altera relatio, per se non pendet ab ilia, nee requirit illam; Tertia Sententia duobus assertionibus propositis confirmatur.
ergo ex se est prior natura quam ilia. Similique argumento probantur aliae 6. Prima assertio.-Ratio pro assertione.-Dico ergo primo, in relativis non
duae partes, quia relatio perfecte cognoscitur cognito fundamento et termino, mutuis /p. 849/ ratio quae est in uno extremo ad terminandam relationem
et aliud non requirit; ergo si terminus unius relationis non est alia relatio, non alterius, non est aliqua relatio opposita relationi alterius, sed est ipsa ~ntitas, vel
pendet una in cognitione ab alia; non ergo simul necessario cognoscuntur. proprietas aliqua absoluta talis termini. Probatur argumen~o facto m sec.unda
Rursus ob eamdem causam in definitione relationis solum ponitur terminus sententia, quod mihi videtur efficacissimum, nam haec re~at~o hab~t tern~mum
formalis, quia totum esse relationis est ad suum terminum; ergo si terminus realem et realiter existentem; sed in illo termino nulla ex1sut relat10 real1s cor-
unius relativi non est aliud relativum, sed aliquid absolutum, non definietur respondens opposita alteri relationi; ergo, ille terminu~ non per relationem, se.d
unum relativum per aliud, et e converso, quod est esse simul definitione. Et per aliq uam rem absolutam constituitur aptus ad t~rmmandum. ~onseq uentla
confirmatur hoc specialiter in relativis non mutuis, in quibus videtur esse est evidens a sufficienti partium enumeratione; maJOr autem et mmor probatae
major difficultas, quia alias ad cognoscendam relationem creaturae, opor- /col. sunt in superioribus. . .
b/ teret cognoscere entitatem Dei absolutam et naturam eius, et similiter ad 7, Ejfogi.um Cajetani.-Improbatur.-Ut Cajetan~s effugeret v1~ ~UJUS
cognoscendam relationem scientiae, vel sensus, oporteret cognoscere naturam rationis, excogitavit sententiam quam supra refutav1mus, qu~d, nu~1rum,
absolutam objecti scibilis vel sensibilis, quod videtur plane falsum. etiam relativa non mutua realiter invicem referantur, quamv1s relat10 non
4. Secunda opinio.-Secunda sententia distinctione utitur, nam de relationibus utrique insit, atque ita conatur defendere, etiam illud extremu~, in q~~ ~on
mutuis idem sentit quod praecedens sententia, propter easdem rationes. De est relatio, non terminare relationem alterius, nisi quatenus ad 1llud v1c1ss1m,
non mutuis autem affirmat terminari ad absolutum, et non relativum, quia refertur. Sed ea sententia et falsa est, ut ostendimus, et ad praesentem rem
hujusmodi relation es terminantur formaliter ad aliq uid reale; in terminis autem explicandam nihil conferee potest. Nam et~i demus sc~b~le re.ferri realiter ad
earum non correspondet aliquid reale relativum, sed absolutum tantum. Hane scientiam per relationem in ipsa scientia ex1stentem, mh~lomm.us ver~?1' es.t,
sententiain tenet Ferrar., 2 cont. Gent., c. 14, et in ea, magis indinat, quoad quod Aristoteles dixit, unum ex his extremis no.n refern ad almd,. nlSI .qma
posteriorem partem ejus, Hispalensis supra, nam saepe ait, aliquod divinum aliud refertur ad ipsum; ergo prius secundum rat1onem necesse est mtell1ge~e
attributum absolutum, scilicet, virtutem, potentiam vel aliquid hujusmodi, relationem scientiae terminari ad scibile, quam vicissim scibile referri ad sc1-
esse rationem, quod Deus terminet relationem creaturae ad ipsum. Hane etiam entiam, cum illud prius sit veluti causa, seu fundamentum, hujus posterioris;
sententiam sequitur Niphus, 5 Metaph., disp. 14. Eamque quoad relativa non ergo ratio terminandi ex parte scibilis non potest ess~ ilia relatio .qua refer~ur ~d
mutua nos postea confirmabimus; quoad mutua vero eadem habet fundamenta, scientiam. Praeterea licet terminare actu, ut supra d1cebamus, sit denommatto
quae praecedens sententia. Et addi solet argumentum sumptum ex relationibus extrinseca, tamen aptitudo terminandi relationem prae~ica~entale~ no~
divinis, quae mutuae sunt, et tamen una ad aliam terminatur. potest esse denominatio extrinseca ab op~osito relati~o, qut~ ratio term1~a~d1
5. Tertia sententia universaliter docet omnes relationes, tam mutuas quam supponitur in re ante omnem denominat1onem a~ al10 e~tn~seco; nam ~n tp-
non mutuas, terminari ad absolutum formaliter. Hane tenet Scot., in 1, dist. samet denominatione extrinseca induditur actual1s termmat10; ergo aptitudo
36, q. l, ubi Lychetus et alii Scotistae idem sentiunt. Et earn plane sequitur supponitur ad talem denominationem, maxime quando terminus esse debet
Capreol., quaest. l, art. 2, ad 3, quern imitatur Soncin., 5 Metaph., quaest. res realis et realiter existens. Quocirca intelligi nullo modo potest, quod unum
30, ad 2. Aiunt enim absolutum esse rationem terminandi, requirere tamen extremu~ constituatur proxime aptum ad terminandam relationem .alteri~s,
relationem seu correlationem concomitantem quando actu terminat, quod est per ipsammet relationem realem, quae est in altero extremo, cum omms rel~t10
simpliciter verum in relativis mutuis; in non mutuis autem solum secundum praedicamentalis consurgat, praesuppositis /~ol. bl fundamento, et ter~mo,
nostrum modum concipiendi, ut explicabimus. Atque hanc sententiam censeo non quidem actu terminante, sed apto ad t.ermma~du~, na~ ut actu termmans
esse veram, formaliter ac per se intellectam; cur autem hoc addam, ex dicen- non supponitur, sed constituitur ex altenus hab1tudme ad tpsam.
dis constabit; oportet enim sententiam hanc distincte proponere et probare
378 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 379

8. Improbatur aliorum sententia.-Alii respondere solent, quamvis in scibili, gratia, in Deo est potentia, qua actu influit in creaturam, et sic de aliis; igit~r
verbi gratia, vel creatore non respondeat nisi relatio rationis, nihilominus quod relatio creaturae terminetur ad relationem rationis, ut tantum est m
relationem scientiae aut creaturae non terminari formaliter nisi ad suum cor- fundamento proximo ex parte Dei, revera est terminari ad aliquid absolutum,
relativum ut sic, et consequenter relationem rationis esse rationem terminandi quod est in Deo. Aut per relationem rationis in potentia intelligitur ~psame~
realem. Sed haec responsio facile refutatur ex dictis supra de termino relationis relatio rationis secundum suum esse essentiae, quale in ea esse, vel potms fing1
realis praedicamentalis; ostendimus enim debere esse rem, veram, et realiter potest, et hoc sensu improbabilis mihi videtur illa respon~io, ~uia il~a relatio in
existentem. Quod sane aequali vel majori ratione, verum est de forma illa quae tan tum esse po test, et in ea fingi potest aliquod esse essentiae, m qua m telle~tus,
est ratio terminandi, ac de subjecto quasi materiali talis denominationis; nam verbi gratia, humanus potest concipere rem absolutam per mo~um relat.1va~;
si terminus debet esse realis, ergo eodem modo debet esse in re ipsa aptus ad sed hoc est impertinens et extrinsecum ad naturam et essent1am relatioms
terminandam, alioqui non erit terminus, neque actu, neque aptitudine; ergo realis creaturae, et ut ipsa terminetur ad suum terminum; ergo non potest esse
haec aptitudo debet ei convenire per rationem aliquam realern in ipso exis- ilia ratio terminandi. Et confirmatur ac declaratur, nam Deus ut creator non
tentem. ideo potest terminare relationem realem creaturae, quia potest a nobis concipi
9. Et confirmatur, quia relatio realis non existit nisi existentibus fundamento per modum correlativi, sed quia vere ac realiter influit esse7 in.creatu~am. per
et termino; sed relatio creaturae existit, et revera terminatur ad Deum, nulla omnipotentiam suam. Denique in aliis terminis realibu~, et m relat10~1?~s
existente in Deo relatione rationis, non solum quia relatio rationis nunquam mutuis, non sufficit esse essentiae in ipso termino ut relat10 consurgat, nlSl sit
vere existit, sed etiam, quia, eo modo quo esse potest, nimirum objective in redactum ad existentiam, quia alias est potentiale quid, et simpliciter nihil; ergo
in tellectu, non est necesse illam actu esse, id est, considerari, ut relatio creaturae multo minus poterit sufficere esse essentiae vel potentiale relationis rationis,
terminetur ad creatorem; narn etiamsi null us intellectus talem relationem fingat ut sit ratio terminandi relationem realem.
aut consideret, nihilominus relatio creaturaevere terminabitur ad Deum. Dices, 11. Fonseca ut solvat argumentum. -- Aliam denique responsionem adinvenit
impossibile esse quin ilia relatio sit objective in aliquo intellectu, saltem divino, Fonseca, lib. 5, c. 15, quaest. 5, sect. 4, ubi dicit, posse relationem rationis
sive ipse illam immediate efficiat, sive cognoscat ut factibilem suo modo ab actu convenire, verbi gratia, creatori, etiamsi actu non existat, suo modo, id est,
intellectu humano. Respondetur, quidquid horum verum sit, esse impertinens objective in intellectu, atque /col. bl hoc satis esse ut ad illam possit. term~na~i
ad rem de qua agimus, quia, licet id sit necessarium ex infinita scientia Dei, relatio realis; nam, hoc ipso quod relatio realis est in creatura, relatio rat10ms
tamen per se ac formaliter id non postulat relatio creaturae, quia non respicit creatoris actu convenit Deo, etiamsi actu non existat. Quod autem haec duo
Deum ut speculantem (ut sic loquar) relationem rationis, sed ut influentem separabilia sint, probat, quia homini actu convenit ~sse ani~al, e~ia~si non
esse in ipsam; unde si hoc habeat, hoc sufficit ut talis relatio terminetur ad existat. Sed haec responsio non est probabilior caetens. Nam 1mpnm1s, quod
ipsum; relatio autem rationis ut scita ab intellectu divino, est impertinens. assumit, posse formam actu convenire, quando actu non existit, .aut ~agna~
Et idem est de sensu et sensibili, et scientia et scibili, nam si per impossibile continet aequivocationem, aut est plane falsum. Nam actu. convemre, st pr~~no
nullus intellectus de illis consideraret, relatio sensus terminaretur ad sensibile et realiter sumatur, est actu inesse eo modo quo forma messe potest, sc1ltcet
et scientiae ad scibile. /p. 850/ aut inhaerendo, aut denominando, aut referenda, vel alia simili ratione; quod
10. Sed respondent aliqui, argumentum hoc recte procedere de relatione autem hoc modo actu convenit, necesse est quod actu existat, eo modo quo
rationis ut actu existente suo modo, nihilominus tamen ipsam relationem existere potest. Quod si actu convenire sol um dicit veritatem propositionis per
rationis, quatenus est in proxima potentia talis termini, esse rationem termi- connexionem extremorum abstrahentium ab existentia, illud revera non est
nandi relationem realem alterius extremi. Sed hoc etiam nullius momenti est; actu convenire, sed potius in potentia, et eo modo quo in illis propositionibus
interrogo enim, quid intelligant per relationem rationis in potentia proxima. intelligi potest actualis veritas, illam non habent, nisi prout sunt actu in aliquo
Aut enim intelligunt ipsum fundamentum reale, quod praebet occasionem intellectu, ut in superioribus tactum est. Et praeterea, sumpto hoc modo, ~ctu
intellectui, ut per modum relativi illud concipiat, quod non tam est verum convenire, non potest vere dici relatio rationis actu convenire Deo, hoc ipso
fundamentum relationis, quam proxima causa vel occasio inducens humanum
intellectum, ad talem modum concipiendi, et in hoc sensu relatio rationis in
7 Here I am following Salamanca, 1597, vol. 2, p. 588, to introduce "esse" which is
potentia proxima non est nisi res absoluta in tali termino existens, ut, verbi
lacking in the Vives edition.
380 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 381

quod creatura existit, quia, ut bene idem auctor argumentatur, talis relatio scitum sit aliqua relatio rationis? Respondetur: etiam relatio transcendentalis
contingenter et ab extrinseco convenit Deo, etiam post effectionem creaturae; illius scientiae terminabitur ad illam, erit tamen incapax illa scientia relationis
at praedicata contingentia non conveniunt actu nisi quando existunt, sed illud praedicamentalis ad suum objectum, propter defectum termini realis.
est proprium praedicatorum, quae necessario conveniunt subjectis. Responsio
vero quam adhibet, limitando subsumptam propositionem, et excipiendo has Assertio secunda.
relationes rationis, primum videtur voluntaria, deinde contra rationem; nam, 14. Relationes mutuae ad absolutum terminantur.-Dico secundo:, etiam
seclusa actuali existentia unicuique praedicato proportionata, non potest did in relationibus mutuis formalis ratio terminandi est non relatio opposita, sed
praedicatum actu convenire subjecto, nisi vel quia est de ejus essentia, vel certe aliqua Jatio abso- /col. b/ lllta, quae est fundament~ for~ale relationis op-
quia ab illa manat, ut necessariam connexionem et per se cum illa habeat; ergo posirae. Hane assertionem intelligo per se ac form~ter, s1eut praecedente~
quotiescunque praedicatum non est hujusmodi, sed mere contingens, et ab explicavi: generalis enim regula es illam rem s.eu ra~onem forn~em, qua~ rn
extrinseca causa proveniens, sive, sit praedicatum reale, sive rationis, in nullo uno relativo mutuo est proxima ratio ftUldandi relauonem ad al1ud, esse eu~
vero sensu potest dici actu convenire, quando actu non existit. Et confirmatur, proximam et formalem raciooem terminandirelatio~:m alteri~s adse. ~t ;er~1
nam hoc ipsum, scilicet, actu convenire, requirit saltem veritatem propositionis; gralia, si in Petro proximum fund amen tum habendi in se relat1. nem filiar1onis
sed hae propositiones sunt falsae, Deus habet relationem, vel, actu refertur ad est tota substantla ejus quatenus producca per talem gene~·auonem a P~ul~,
creaturam, quamdiu illa relatio nullo modo actu existit; imo, juxta principia haee eadem est ratio ob quam Petrus potest terminare relat1onem patermtatts
dia- /p. 851/ lecticae tales propositiones non possunt vere abstrahi a tempore, Pauli ad ipsum; et e converso, quia in Paulo potentia generandi, supposit~ ta~i
cum simpliciter contingentes sint. generatione ut conditione necessaria, est proximum fundamentum rela~onlS
12 Addo denique, etiamsi demus totum id quod in illa responsione sumitur, parerniratis ideo etlam est proxima ratio, .ob .quam .Pa~lus p~rest terminare
non satisfacere, quia ille modus actu conveniendi non sufficit ad terminum filiationem Petri ad ipsum. Idem est in relaaonibus pnm1 genens, nam albedo,
relationis realis. Alias Petrus actu existens posset habere relationem realem quae in hoc albo est fundamentum similitudinis ad aliu~, ob U~[~t~m :o~­
identitatis specificae ad Paul um potentia tantum existentem, quia actu convenit malem cum ipso, est eciam proxima ratio terminandi relattonem s1m1li~dlllls
Paulo quod sit homo, etiamsi non existat, quia ab intrinseco est homo; ergo alterius ad ipsum. Quocirca si verum est, interdum posse ~na~ relat10n~m
etiam actu conveniet illi relatio realis identitatis specificae cum Petro, etiamsi esse proximam rationem fundandi aliam relationem, ut, verb1 gra~1a'. ~ater.mtas
illa relatio actu non existat; ergo, e converso, ut relatio realis existat in Petro, similitudinem, tune illa paternitas quae in uno patre fundat s1m1htudmem
satis erit quod alia similis et fundamentum ejus actu conveniat Paulo, licet non ad aliud, erit in illo ratio terminandi relationem alterius ad se; in eo tamen
existat. non se gerit formaliter ut relatio, neque opponirw· ~elative illi rel~tioni, quam
13. Nullus est ergo tergiversationi locus, sed, admissa communi doctrina de terminat per seipsam, sed opponitur per aliam relat1onem, quam m se ~u~dat,
relativis non mutuis, evidenter sequitur terminum illius relationis esse aliquid et ideo tune perinde se gerit ac si esset forma absolu.ra, er in hoc sensu d1c1mus
absolutum, formaliter ac per se loquendo. Addo autem haec ultima verba, quia formalem terminum esse aliquid absolutum, per se loquendo.
interdum po test con tingere, uttermin us alicuius relationis non m utuae sit aliq ua 15. Solet autem haec assertio probari ex eo quod, cum relatio definitur esse
relatio realis, non tamen opposita alteri relationi, nee reciproca illi. Ut, verbi accidens cujus totum esse est ad aliud, per illud aliud non potes~ in~elligi altera
gratia, scientia de aliqua relatione, aut amor qui directe ac per se primo tendat relatio, quia alias vel non daretur unum supremum genus relattoms, sed du?,
in aliquam relationem, refertur realiter ad illam relationern ut ad objectum seu vel idem poneretur in definitione sui ipsius. Et simile argu'.11entum e~t q~1a
mensuram; unde constat quod, sicut objectum talis scientiae est relatio, ita similitudo in communi non potest referri ad aliquam relat10nem, qma alias
etiam terminus relationis talis scientiae erit relatio, non tamen formaliter ut referretur ad aliam similitudinem, cum sit relatio aequiparantiae; at praeter
relatio opposita relationi illius scientiae, sed potius ut materia circa quam talis similitudinem in communi non potest esse alia similitudo. Verumtamen haec
scientia versatur, et quae supponitur ad relationem ejus, et ideo veluti materiale argumenta praetermitto, tum quia per extrinseca desumuntur, e.t rem non d~­
quid est, quod illa res scita sit relatio. Et hoc modo dicimus, rem absolutam clarant; tum etiam quia attingunt difficultatem tractandam sect10ne sequent!;
terminare hujusmodi relationem, seu quae per modum absolutae se gerat; quae /p. 852/ quidem facilius et commodius expedientur juxta hanc nostram
denique res ipsa scita vel amata, qualiscunque illa sit. Dices: quid si objectum
382 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 383

sententiam, quamvis fortasse ob earn solam causam non sit simpliciter neces- denominantem ipsum denominatione terminativa. Rursus nee potest intelligi de
sana. termino materiali et remoto, quia illo tan tum posito cum fundamento alterius
16. Prima ratio conclusionis.-Primo ergo probatur haec conclusio ex prae- extremi non est necesse resultare relationem, ut per se constat, et facile potest
cedenti, nam ex eo quod in relativis non mutuis videmus relationem unius exemplis ostendi; ergo intelligendum est illud principium de termino formali,
extremi non terminari formaliter ad relationem alterius, colligere possumus, et quasi in actu primo proximo. Et hinc facile probatu.r ~rima c~nsequen~i~,
quod, licet in relativis mutuis sit relatio realis in utroque extremo, una non quia una relatio non consurgit ex positione alterius, qu1a 1lla partt~ula ex dtc~t
tendit in aliam formaliter, sed simul et concomitanter una tendit in subjectum antecessionem aliquam naturae vel originis; unaautem relatio praed1camental1s
seu fundamentum alterius, et e converso. Probatur haec illatio, nam si per non antecedit alteram relationem sibi correspondentem, neque una dicit ex
impossibile in altero extremo impediretur relatio, conservato toto fundamento altera originem, ut per se constat in omnibus creatis, de quibus loquimur; alias
ejus, nihilominus relatio alterius extremi posset ad illud terminari; ergo signum non essent simul. Cum autem relatio dicitur resultare positis fundamento et
est illas duas relationes esse simul per concomitantiam, et non per formalem termino, sensus indubitatus est, positionem fundamenti et termini antecedere,
terminationem unius ad aliam. Consequentia est evidens, et antecedens patet, seu praesupponi ordine naturae, et inde statim resultar~ relatio~e~, quo~ e.x
quia, ut in superioribus visum est, non solum in relationibus tertii generis, sed proprietate ipsius locutionis manifestum est, et ex re 1~sa, qma .1~ relat1v1s
etiam secundi et primi, quando unum extremum tale est, ut non possit fundare mutuis utraque relatio simul resultat, positis fundamentls et termm1s.
relationem, nihilominus est aptum ad terminandam relationem alterius, ut 18. Tertia assertionis ratio.-Tertio argumentor confirmando et declarando
patet in Deo ut terminante relationem creaturae ut sic; ergo quacumque ra- illud principium, scilicet: Id quod in unoquoque extrem.o est ratio fun~ndi pr~­
tione contigerit, alterum extremum manere cum fundamento et sine relatione, priam relationem, est ratio terminandi alteram correlationem. Nam, s1cut rat10
nihilominus mane bit sufficiens ad terminandam relationem alterius extremi; est fundandi est ilia, per quam convenienter redditur proxima causa, ob quam
enim eadem ratio, nam quod unum fundamentum, seu extremum sit aptum talis res habet relationem ad aliud, ita ratio terminandi est illa, per quam red-
necne ad fundandam propriam relationem, est per accidens ad terminationem ditur proxima causa, ob quam res est talis, ut ad ipsam altera referri possit;
alterius. Unde, si per intellectus praecisionem separetur relatio a tali extremo, haec autem causa ex eadem forma vel ratione sumitur in relativis mutuis; ergo.
intelligitur manere aeque sufficiens ad terminandam aliam relationem, ac illud Major videtur per /p. 853/ se nota ex terminis. Minor declaratur inductione;
extremum, quod non est capax relationis. Ergo signum est relationes mutuas nam, sicut album aptum est ad fundandam relationem similitudinis, quia habet
esse simul propter concomitantiam, et propter conditionem extremorum, quae albedinem, et ipsa albedo est aptum fundamentum, quia habet talem unitatem
apta sunt ad fundandam relationem, non propter formalem terminationein formalem, ita etiam idem album est aptum ad terminandam relationem alterius,
unius relationis ad aliam sibi correspondentem. quia habet albedinem ejusdem rationis vel unitatis cu~ ~be~.ine ~t~rius. No.n
17. Secunda ratio conclusionis. -Secundo argumentor, quia commune axioma enim aliud album refertur ad hoc, quia in hoc est relat10 s1m1htudm1s, sed qma
est, posito fundamento et termino, resultare relationem praedicamentalem, in hoc est albedo, sicut est in alio, alioqui non esset similitudo in albedine,
et non alias; ergo terminus unius relationis non potest esse relatio opposita. sed esset similitudo in similitudine. Et hinc potest percipi ratio a priori, nam
Antecedens certum est omnium consensu, et constat ex supra dictis de natura similitudo ut sic est in albedine, verbi gratia; versatur ergo inter alba ut sic, et
hujus relationis. Unde etiam Scotus, /col. bl licet excipiat relationes quas vo- ea refert ut similia; ergo sicut ex parte unius fundatur in albedine, ita ex parte
cat extrinsecus advenientes, tamen consequenter negat illas pertinere ad hoc alterius terminatur ad albedinem.
praedicamentum, et nos infra ostendemus, i1las vel nullas esse, vel non nisi alias 19. Idem facile constat in relationibus disquiparantiae; nam Petrus, verbi
a transcendentalibus, disputatione sequenti. Necesse est autem axioma illud gratia, ideo refertur ad Paulum ut ad patrem, quia g~nuit ipsum, et.non quia
intelligi de termino formali et proximo, et quasi in actu primo (ut sic dicam), Paulus refertur ad ipsum, formaliter distinguendo relat1onem a generat10ne; nam
de quo etiam nos in praesenti quaestione disputamus, ut diximus. Non enim praecise in ea ratione sistendo intelligimus esse sufficientem causam ex p~rte
potest intelligi de termino terminante quasi in actu secundo (ut ita loquar). generantis ut filius referatur ad ipsum. Eadem est autem causa ex par~e eJUS'.
Nam de illo termino ut sic, non est verum quod illo posito cum fundamento ob quam in ipso resultat relatio paternitatis. Et id:m est d~ ipsa pa~ern.1tate, s1
sequatur relatio, nam potius ipse constituitur in ratione termini actu termi- rationem ejus ex parte termini reddamus; ideo emm re~at10 pa~ermtat1s, q~ae
nantis per ipsammet relationem ut actu tendentem in ipsum, et extrinsece est in Paulo, terminatur ad Petrum, quia genitus est ab ipso, et m hoc praec1se
384 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 385

concipimus sufficientem causam ex parte termini. Atque ita in universum, est ordinabilitas ad aliud (ut sic dicam) ex parte ipsius fundamenti, atque
cum relatio essentialiter requirat duo, scilicet fundamentum et terminum, ex ita requirit quod sint ejusdem ordinis. Ad terminandam autem relationem,
parte utriusque potest reddi ratio ujuscunque relationis, et illa, quae vere et non est necesse ut terminus sit ordinabilis ad aliud, sed ut aliud sit /p. 854/
proxime redditur ex parte termin i ut sic, est ratio terminandi, sicut quae red- ordinabile ad ipsum, et ideo potest terminus habere realem aptitudinem ad
ditur ex parte subjecti, est fundamenram , seu ratio fundandi. terminandum, etiamsi non sit ejusdem. ordinis cum alio extremo, quod ad
20. Ratio autem, quae ex parte termini reddi potest, nunquam est altera ipsum ordinatur.
relatio, si formaliter loquamur, et non tantum concomitanter vel identice.
Q uanquarn eni m pater non referatu rad fi lium, nisi cum 61ius referturad ipsum , Aliarum opinionum fundamentis satis.fit. . . .
non ta.men haec es racio quae ex parre termini reddi poss it, cu r pater referatur 23. Ad fundamentaaliarum opinion um respondendum superest. Et 1mpnm1s
ad filium , scilicet, quia filius refertur ad ipsum, sed praecise quia genitus est negatur relativum formaliter terminari ad correlativum ut si~, quod manifeste
ab ips ; nam una rdatio nullo modo est ratio alcerius, nee ex parte cerminj , constat in relativis non mutuis, quia ubi non est correlanvum, non potest
nee ex pane fandamenti, alias non essent simul natura; iUa enim , quae essec alterum relativum ad correlativum terminari. Inde vero intelligimus, etiam in
ratio alrerius, ur sic es- /col. b/ set aliquo modo ptima, maxime cum sit sermo mutuis, quamvis relativum ad correlativum terminetur, no~ tamen formaliter,
de ratione reali et formali suo modo ex pane termini. Ratio ergo haec sernper ita ut relationes ipsae inter se et ad se tendant, sed una tend1t ad fundamentum
est aliq uid aliud distinctum a relatione, -t consequenter aliquid absolutum, alterius, et e converso, ut declaratum est.
quod non est aliud in rdativis mutuis nisi illud ipsum quod in u11oquoqu e 24. Relativa quomodo sint simul natura.- Ad primam vero obje~tione~,
fund at relation em ejus, nam iUud est ratio termfoandi refo.tionem alterius. Qui a de simultate naturae respbndetur, potius inde inferri oppositum, qu1a relano
praecisa relati ne, uuJla alia ratio est propinqufor, neque magis necessaria, ut est posterior natura quam terminus ejus, ut in actu primo seu formali. ad
in ind ucti ne facra satis declaratum est. terminandum sufficienter constitutus est, quia ex fundamento et termmo
21. Objectionisatisfit.- Dices: in relativis non mutuis non potesc haec regula consurgit relatio, ut diximus. Imo aliqui auctores, qui opinantur rela~ionem
servari , quia u1 termino Lmius relativi non estfundamencum reale alicujus rela- esse quid distinctum, putant effective fieri a termino. Si ergo una relano esset
rionis. Respondetu.r, semper ime!Jigi aliquid proportionabile. Uc, verbi graria, terminus alterius, ex positione unius resultaret alia, et ita non posse~t esse
si rel.aciva non mu tu a sin t secundi generis, ut est inter creatorem et creaturam, simul namra. Oicuntur ergo simul natura, quando mutuae sunt, qma cum
ratio termlnandi relation em creaturae ex parte Oei, est ipsa potenti a creandi ut resultat una ex fundamento et termino, resultat alia omnino concomitanter
actu inAuens. Quiasi alioqui Deus non esset illcapax relationis, illamet deberet absque ullo ordine prioris et posterioris inter se, et hoc est esse si?1"ul natura.
esse fundamen tum rdationis crea roris ad creaturam. Et quia si vellin us racionem Fundatur autem haec simultas, non in formali habitudine earum mter se, sed
reddere ex parte termini relarionis creaturae, non est alia, nisi quia D eus per in necessaria connexione quam habent in fundamento et termino, quia neutra
suam omnipo centiam creavit illa m. Et idem facile intelligitur in relarionibus insurgere potest, nisi jam positis suo fundamento et termino, et illis pos~tis
mutuis, quae esse possunt in primo gene.re, ut est relatio similitudinis, aut dis- ambae statim necessario consurgunt. Et alioqui formale fundamentum unms
tincrion is inter crea:tu ram et cum. In rertio autem genere, ratio termin andi ex est formalis terminus alterius, et e converso; ex quo fit ut necessario simul sint
par te scibilis, verbi gratia, et similium objectorum, est uniuscujusque entitas, posita in re fundamentum et teri:iinas utriusque,. nam sl1;°t ead.em'.com mutata
prout ill ea est quaed am apt itudo objectiva, ut circa illam possit talis actus, proporcione, u t explicui; atqu tta tandem effi c1tur ut 1p~ae rda~ones neces-
vel habitus, aut potentia versari, quae potest nominari veritas auc bonitas, vel sario simul consurgant, et duratione, quia unaque aequal1 necess1ta~e resultat
quid simile; ilia enim aptitudo est ratio quae reddi potest ex parte objecti, seu ex tel,'mino et fundamento quamprimum ponuntur, et natura, quia nullam
termini talis relationis; ideo enim scientia versatur cirea tale objectum, quia inter se habent ordinem. Hoc igitur modo correlativa ipsa formaliter sumpta,
talem habet veriracem , seu incelligibilitatem, et sic de aliis. ut correlativa sunt, si sint mutua, sunt simul natura; si vero sint non mu- I col.
22. Ratio quae nequit fundare relationem cur terminare possit.-Quod si in- bl tua, cum n eque duratione sint si~ul, nee natur~ esse ~ossunt. .
quiras cur hujusmodi aptitudo vel ratio, quae non est sufficiens ad fundandam 25. Ocettl'ritul'objectioni.-Atvero s1 haec comparat1? fiat mter ~nu~ ~elattvum
in se propriam relationem, sit sufficiens ratio ad terminandam relationem et terminum ejus in actu secundo, seu ut actu termman~em, sic ~ic1 po~sunt
alterius, respondetur causam esse, quia ad fundandam relationem necessaria simul natura formaliter, quia, ut supra dictum est, termmus ut stc termmans
386 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 387

formaliter constituitur per extrinsecam denominationem a relatione, quae in extremo semper antecedit ordine naturae, quia ex illo fundamento resultat
illum tendit; unde ilia posita sic denominatur, et ilia ablata desinit esse hoc relatio, ut declaratum est.
modo terminus, nihil intrinsecum amittendo, ut per se notum est. Relatio 28. Ad argumentum ergo primae sententiae respondetur in forma negando
autem non prius natura est, quam terminetur ad aliud; est ergo simul natura sequelam, nimirum, patrem ut patrem non esse simul natura c~m filio ut.fi-
cum termino ut terminante. Dices: ipsa relatio est veluti causa formalis illius lius est, sed ut est hie homo genitus; imo sicut hie homo, ut genitus, est pnus
denominationis termini actualis; ergo est prior natura. Respondeo, non esse natura quam ut filius, ita etiam est prius natura quam pater ut pater, quamvis
proprie causam formalem, licet propter denominationem ad eum modum sit posterius natura quam hie homo ut generans. Et ideo, quamvis pater ut sic
a nobis concipiatur, et ideo non intercedere ibi veram prioritatem naturae, terminetur ad hunc hominem ut a se genitum, nihilominus non prius natura
quia relatio sine alia causalitate, solum quia ex intrinseca sua essentia respicit terminatur ad ipsum quam in ipso sit filiatio, non propter terminationem
terminum, illum denominat terminantem. Sicut visio denominat rem visam formalem ad ipsam filiationem, sed propter simultaneam concomitantiam
sine vera causalitate, sed ex eo solum, quod est cum tali intrinseca habitudine; omnino necessariam, ut dedaratum est. Quapropter, licet hie homo, ut genitus,
unde sicut non prius natura est quam habeat illam habitudinem, ita non prius sit prius natura quam ut filius, tamen in illo priori ut sic nondum intelligi~ur in
natura est quam denominet objectum visum. patre paternitas; imo verissime etiam dicitur, prius n~t~ra esse .hunc h~~mem
26. Quod maxime verum est loquendo de his formis in concreto, id est, de ut genitum, quam in patre sit paternitas, nam ex poslttone huJuS termm1 cum
relativo, aut vidente; nam, loquendo de abstractis, potest aliquo modo concipi fandamento, quod est in generante, resultat paternitas.
relatio, ut prior natura quam relativum, eo modo quo inter formam praesertim 29. Ad confirmationem concedo, formaliter loquendo, unam relationem
inhaerentem, et effectum ejus formalem, potest esse prioritas naturae. Nam non pendere ab alia, nego·tamen inde sequi non esse simul natura, naturali~er
relatio est forma relativi; relatio enim abstracte concepta proprie non refertur loquendo. Et horum primum, praeter omnia dicta, c?nfirm~ Theolo?1co
ipsa ad terminum, sed est qua subjectum refertur, et ideo quamdiu ipsa con- exemplo, juxta quamdam opinionem D. Thomae, nam m Chnsto Dommo,
cipitur ut prior quam afficiens actu subjectum, nondum concipitur ut referens secundum D. Thomam, non est realis filiatio ad matrem, in Virgine vero est
ad terminum, et ideo mirum non est quod ut sic sit etiam prior ipsa relatio, realis relatio ma- /col. bl ternitatis ad Christum; signum est ergo unam ex his
quam denominatio termini terminantis. Et fortasse hie potest applicari dis- relationibus non pendere essentialiter et formaliter ab alia; alias non posset
tinctio, qua utitur alias Cajetanus, de relatione signata vel exercita, nam tune una manere sine alia, etiam de potentia absoluta; et similiter est signum unam
concipitur relatio, ut nondum exercens actum referendi, sed secundum suam non esse formalem terminum alterius, quia etiam non potest relatio sine suo
abstractam rationem. Adhuc tamen sic concepta, est simul natura cum altera termino conservari. Quae omnia principia sunt certain doctrina D. Thomae,
relatione opposita, in relationibus mutuis, quia etiam relationes in abstracto et ideo censeo hoc argumentum valde efficax ad hominem contra Cajetanum,
sumptae omnino simul consurgunt, posito utroque fundamento. et Thomistas qui eum sequuntur. Dico autem formaliter non pendere unam
Ip. 8551 relationem ex alia; nam concomitanter possunt did aliquo modo invicem
27. Denique ut nihil omittamus, addi posset, etiam relationem abstracte con- pendere, quia non potest esse una sine alia ex natura rei, imo nee. de potenti.a
ceptam, licet non ut quod, saltem ut quo, tendere in terminum, nam est forma absoluta, saltem nisi aliquo modo mutetur fundamentum altenus extremt,
qua relativum respicit terminum, et quia quantumvis in abstracto consideretur, et fiat incapax relationis, ut ab opinionibus de relatione filiationis in Christo
semper ejus essentia consistit in formali habitudine ad terminum. Et sub hac abstrahamus. Atque hinc facile dedaratur altera pars, nimirum, ex praedicto
consideratione, quamvis intelligitur aliquo modo prior quam relativum, etiam modo independentiae non sequi, relationes non esse simul natura. Nam potius
sub ea ratione tendit suo modo in terminum, et consequenter denominat illum si proprie ac formaliter una ab alia penderet, non posset. n~n esse una pri~r
actu terminantem, non integrum relativum, sed relationem ipsam. Ex his ergo natura alia, quia ipsamet dependentia est quaedam postenontas natur~e; q~1a
satis constat quomodo relationes oppositae sint simul natura, et relatio etiam vero habent necessariam concomitantiam, qua non potest esse una sme al1a,
et terminus ut actu terminans, non vero relatio, et terminus in actu primo, seu absque ullo ordine inter se, ideo sunt simul natura. . .
quantum ad rationem terminandi; sic enim etiam tempore antecedere potest, 30. Relativa ut sint cognitione simul. --Ex his praeterea constat qmd d1cendum
quando fundamentum in alio extremo non est positum, et posito etiam alio sit de simultate cognitionis, quod in secundo argumento contrarii fundamenti
petebatur. Nam eadem proportione dicendum est, formaliter et immediate
388 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 389

relationem no n pendere in cognitione, nisi a suo termino semndum propriam naturaliter intuetur relationem servitutis, naturaliter etiam intueatur potentiam
rationem terminandi, et non secundum relation em oppositarn , quod recte pro bat Dei in seipso, sed satis est quad abstractive et ex effectibus cognoscat tale~
argumentum. Et in relarivis non mut uis es t manifestwn, nam u cognoscam Dei potentiam. Multoque minus necesse est co- /col. bl gnoscere totam De1
relationem servi tutis creamrae ad D eum, non oportet cognoscere relationem naturam, vel alia attributa, formaliter ac per se loquendo, quia illa ut sic non
realem domin i in D eo, quia nuJla est; necque etiam necesse est fingere rela- sunt ratio terminandi talem relationem. Atque ad hunc modum facile est idem
tionem ration is in Deo; hoc enim non per inet per se ad cognitionem alterius intelligere in relatione creaturae, ut est effectus Dei, vel scientiae, aut sensus,
relation is, sed si in nob is fi e, provenit ex imperfecto modo cognoscendi oostro; et in aliis non mutuis.
Angelus enim, et D eusips comprehendir in reatura relationem serviru tis, nul- 32. Atvero in relativis mutuis partim eadem est ratio, partim diversa. Est enim
lam fingentes in Deo relationem rationis. Dices: nonne necesse est cognoscere eadem ratio quantum ad formalem dependentiam cognitionis a termino ut sic,
Deum ut dominum, ad cognoscendam creaturam ut servam? Respondetur et non a correlativo ut sic; hoc enim etiam in relativis mutuis verum est. Nam
necessarium esse cognoscere Deum ut dominum realiter, non relative secundum ut cognoscam in aliquo ho mine relation em patris, satis est ut cognoscam esse in
rationem. Est au rem D eus realicer /p. 856/ dominus simpliciter, ut quaest. 7 mundo alium hominem ab illo genitum, etiamsi ibi sistam, et non cognoscam
de Potenc., art. 10, ad 4, et saepe alias, 0 . Thomas notavit: primo per potes- in alio extrema relationem filiationis; et j uxta opinionem D. Thomae, Angelus,
tatem realem coercendi subditos; secundo, quia ad ipsum rerminatur relatio etiam malus, per virtutem naturalem (si non impediebatur) intuebatur in beata
realis servirutis, quae est in crearura; et utrnque modo necesse est cognoscere Virgine relationem maternitatis ad hunc hominem Christum, .e~ tamen n?n
D eum ut d.ominum ad cognoscend.am Jelationem seJVitutis creatmae. N am intuebatur in Christo relationem filiationis; ergo habebat cog01t10nem unms
primum, id est, potestas coercendi subditos, est ex parte Dei ratio terminandi relativi cum intrinseca dependentia ab ejus termino, sine cognitione corelativi
relationem servitutis, et idea cognitio ejus quasi antecedenter et causaliter est ut sic. Nee enim probabile est, necessarium fuisse Angelo fingere aliam rela-
ratio cognoscendi relationem servitutis; nam, sicut illa relatio consurgit ex vi tionem rationis in uno extrema, ut alteram valeret cognoscere; idem ergo est
illius termini et fundamenti, ita cognosci non potest, nisi cognito tali termino in qualibet alia relatione mutua, nam quoad hoc eadem est omnium ratio ..
et fundamento. At vero secundum convenit Deo per actualem tendentiam 33. Quoad concomitantiam vero est nonnulla diversitas, quia ex natura re1,
respectivam crearurae in ipsum , denominatione tantum extrinseca, et quia cognita una relatione mutua, necessario simul cognoscitur alia, saltem concomi-
non potest cognosci relativum ut sic, nisi ut cerminatum ad suum terminum, tanter. Nam sicut relatio est per quamdam resultantiam, posito fundamento
ideo sub ea ratione non anrecedenter, sed concomitanter cognosci tW' D eus ut et termino, ita cognosci tLLr cogni tis illi , cum comparatione eorum inter se.
dominus. Acque hoc, quod in ho exemplo declaratum est, habet 1ocwn in Quia ergo hae relationes mutuae saltem per concomitanriam simul resultant
relatione creaturae, et omnibus non mutuis. positis fw1darnento et termino, ideo consimili rarione si1nu1 cognoscuntur
31. Neque ratio superius facta contra hoc est alicujus momenti; concedimus cognicis et inter se coUatis fundamento et cermino; et quia ho necesse est. ad
enim non posse cognosci relationem servitutis non cognita in termino aliqua singularum relatiomtm cognitiouem, ideo consequenter fit ut, una cogm ta,
ratione abso1uta, non tantum omnino simul, sed etiam antecedenter seu cau- sirnul concomitanter cognoscatur alia. Quod in nobis speciali racione neces-
saliter, uc dixi.; non est ramen necesse ut illa ratio absoluta exacte, aut prouc sarium est, quia non cognoscimus has relati.on es p rout in se sunt, sed sol um
in se esr, cognoscanir, nam satis est quod abstractive, vel sub aliqua confusa cognoscendo et inter se conferendo fundamenta et terminos; ex quo praeterea
ratione apprehendarur, quanquam quo terminus perfectius fuerit cognitus, oritur ut etiam illa extrema, quae non habent mutuam relationem, per mod um
eo perfectior erit cognitio relacionis. Quae omnia facile dedarantur in dicta correlativorum mutuorum cognoscamus; et inde etiam fit ut ubi uni relationi
exemplo, nam ad cognoscendam relationem servitutis quam creatura habet ad non correspondet altera relatio realis, nos concipiamus re- /p. 857/ lationem
Demn, necesse esr salcem in communi cognoscere Deum habere superiorem rationis, ut ita concomitanter cognoscamus utrumque extremum per modum
quamdam pocestatem in creaturam, racione cuj us po test aut illi praecipere, aut correlativi. In cognitione autem perfecta rerum, prout in se sun t, id non est
de Ula disponere suo arbitrio, et quanto ampli tudo hujus pocentiaemagis fu erit necessarium quoad relativa non mutua, ut dictum est. Quoad relariva vero
cognita canto perfuctius cognoscetur qualis sit ilia servirus; nee fieri potest ut mutua, est eadem vel major necessitas, aut quia relaciones non distinguunn~r
Angelus vel D eus ipse cognoscat ha.11c servitucem, nisi cognoscendo in ipso actu a parte rei a suis fundamentis, aut si fortasse distinguuntur ex natura re1,
calem potentiam. Non oportet autem ttt Angelus, verbi gratia, qui in crearura sunt ita conjunctae et connexae cum fundamentis simul existentibus, et inter
 390 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 391
se collatis, ut non possit cognosci respectus unius ad aliud, quin cognoscatur 36. Adde, quamvis haecvera sint secundum rem, si tamen secundum rationem
etiam vicissim respectus alterius ad alterum. His ergo modis imelligendum vel imperfectos conceptus nostros cogitemur haec ut distincta, eo modo quo
est correlativum esse simul cognitione cum suo termino, vel cum suo cor- quis conceperit relationes et fundamenta ut distincta, debere etiam concipere
relativo.
rationem terminandi unam relationem, non esse aliam relationem ut sic, sed
34. Rekttiva quomodo sint simul definitione.-Ad tertiam autem partem fundamentum illius. Ut, verbi gratia, si quis ratione distinguat relationes et
illius fundamenti, quae erat de simultate definitionis, eodem prorsus modo origines, et cum Bonaventura sentiat personas originibus constitui, relationes
respondendum est. Nam definitio non est nisi cognitio quaedam, si in mente autem eis advenire, et in eis fundari, consequenter dicet formalem terminum
sit, vel signum cognitionis, et consequenter rei cognitae, si sit in voce; et idea paternitatis, verbi gratia, esse passivam originem in Filio; e contrario vero
in tantum possum relativa esse simul definitione, in quantum sum simul cog- terminum filiationis esse generationem activam in Patre; respicit enim Pater
nitione. Est igitur proportionali modo dicendum, unum relativum, formaliter eum quern genuit ut sic, et Filius enim a quo genitus est. Similiter qui cum
loquendo, non definiri per aliud correlativum, sed per suum terminum, quern Cajetano distinxerit paternitatem ut conceptam, vel ut exercitam, et sub priori
essentialiter respicit. Imo Scotus supra existimat hoc esse necessarium ne com- ratione senserit constituere personam, sub posteriori vero referre illam, et ita
mittatur circulus aut nugatio, si loco nominis positi in definitione ponatur hanc posteriorem rationem fundari in priori, dicat necesse est consequenter,
ejus definitio, aut ne idem sit prius et posterius seipso, quia quod ponitur in unam relationem ut exercitam, terminari ad aliam ut conceptam, et e converso.
definitione, est aliquo modo prius definito. Sed haec non admodum cogunt, Et quidem sive utamur illis vocibus, sive aliis, relatio non habet rationem ter-
si considerentur quae de his definitionibus per additum attigit Aristoteles, 7 mini, ut aliud respicit, sed ut in se est aliquid, quod ab alio aptum est respici;
Metaph., c. 5, et quae ibi notavimus; instanturque facile illa incommoda in atque ita etiam secundum modum concipiendi nostrum, quacunque ratione
relativis transcendemalibus, ut sum materia et forma, de quo videri etiam distinguatur ibi fundamentum a relatione, vel persona cons- Ip. 858/ tituta, a
possum supra dicta, disput. 43, sect. ult., in fine. Non ergo propter vitanda respectu, distinguitur etiam ratio terminandi a relatione.
haec incommoda, sed propter rem ipsam, quia unumquodque definitur for- 37. Quad darius apparet in spiratione passiva respectu activae, nam Pater
maliter ac praecise per id ad quod habet habitudinem, verum est in definitione et Filius praeter spirationem activam habent proprias relationes quibus in suo
unius relativi per se non poni aliud extremum, nisi sub ea ratione quae in illo esse personali constituuntur, et sic constituti, sunt unum principium spirans
necessaria est ad terminandam talem relationem. Concomitanter vero, sicut Spiritum sanctum; ex qua productione (loquendo more nostro) resultat in eis
relativa sum simul cognitione, ita etiam definitione, et quia nos facilius ita illa relatio spirationis activae, cui propterea magis proprie attribui potest, quod
concipimus et explicamus, ideo simpliciter did solet unum relativum definiri habeat fundamentum et rationem fundandi secundum rationem, quia neque
per aliud, et e converso. Atque in hoc sensu accipiendam est cum communiter constituit personam, nee fortasse habet propriam subsistemiam. Atque ita ibi
dicitur correlativa esse simul definitione. facile intelligitur relationem passivam spirationis, quae est in Spiritu Sancto,
terminari non ad spirationem activam formaliter, sed ad Patrem et Filium, ut
De terminis divinarum relationum. sunt unum principium spirans, cui nostro modo concipiendi advenit relatio
35. Ad ultimam rationem, quae in secunda sententia addebatur, sumptam spirationis activae. Quia propria ac formalis ratio ob quam Pater et Filius
ex relationjbus divinis, quae invicem terminantur, respondetur imprimis esse terminant, vel terminare possum relationem Spiritus sancti, non est quia
disparem rationem, quia illae relationes non habent fundamentum praeter referuntur ad Spiritum sanctum, sed quia producunt Spiritum sanctum et sum
seipsas, eo quad sint substantiales et subsistentes ex propriis rationibus, et idea unum principium ejus, unde concomitanter habent ut ad ipsum referantur.
mirum non est quad, sicut seipsis fundantur (ut ita loquar), ita unaquaeque Si tamen, per possibile vel impossibile, intelligeremus non resultare in Patre
seipsa terminet suum correlativum. Quia potius in hoc servatur proportionalis et Filia illam relationem, dummodo producerent Spiritum sanctum, id satis
ratio; diximus enim fundamentum unius relationis esse rationem terminandi esset ut possent terminare relationem ejus.
correlationem ejus; ita ergo fundamentum paternitatis divinae est ratio termi- 38. Ex quo obiter intelliget Theologus quomodo de facto Fili us distinguitur
nandi divinam filiationem; tamen sicut fundamentum illius paternitatis nihil ab Spiritu sancto, non primo per relationem spirationis activae, sed per fili-
est praeter paternitatem ipsam, ita ratio terminandi filiationem nihil etiam est ationem per quam complete constituitur in esse personali, et consequenter
praeter ipsam. distinguitur a qualibet alia persona. Et nihilominus verum est, quad si Filius
392 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 393

non produceret Spiritum sanctum, non distingueretur ab illo, quia tune, posita ideo per modum unius nominantur et judicantur. Dici vero potest ~elatio
illa hypothesi, filiatio non esset fundamentum spirationis activae, nee ratio opponi termino terminative, alteri vero relationi relative. Et haec postenor est
terminandi processionem passivam; et consequenter neque haberet cum illa quasi formalis oppositio, nam est inter proprias formas quat:nus se. mutuo
oppositionem originis; nunc autem vere habet haec omnia, et ideo est sufficiens excludunt ab eodem subjecto; prior vero proprie est repugnanua relauvorum,
principium distinctionis; sed haec Theologis relinquamus. quia postulant dis- /p. 859/ tinctionem extremorum, quod significavit etiam
D. Thomas, q. 7 de Potentia, art. 8, ad 4.

De oppositione relativa. SECTIO XVII.

39. Tandem ex his quae in hac sectione diximus, intelligere licet in quo con-
sistat, et qualis sit propria oppositio relativa; hoc enim supra in hunc locum Quomodo praedicamentum Ad aliquid sub u~o supremo
remisimus. Potest autem intelligi haec oppositio aut inter rela- /col. bl tionem genere, per diversa genera subalterna et species usque
et terminum ejus, aut inter relationem unam unius extremi, et alteram cor- ad individua constitui possit.
respondentem illi in alio extrema, seu inter unum relativum, et correlativum 1. Explicuimus fere omnia quae ad intelligendam essentiam r~lat~onis, et
ejus. Prior oppositio est generalis omnibus relationibus, etiam non mutuis, ut causas ejus, et formalem effectum (non enim habet al~m~), necessana ~isa ~unt;
constat ex dictis, et ideo formalissime convenit relationi ut sic. Consistit autem superest ad hujus rei complementum, ut de subordmati~ne, con:en1en:1a, ~t
in hoc, quod relativum ut sic et terminus, habent inter se talem habitudinem, distinctione ipsarum pauca dicamus ut ita t.oti~s praed1ca~e~t~ c~nstltutlo
et conditiones ita distantes, ut necessario requirant inter se distinctionem, nam quasi prae oculis habeatur~ Tria autem pun~ta m t~t~lo quaesu~ms msmuantur,
relativum est id quod respicit, terminus autem est id quod respicitur ab alio, quae ab aliis latissime tractantur, et a nob1s brev1ss1me exped1enda sunt.
atque ita ex propriis rationibus requirunt alietatem (ut sic dicam).
40. Atvero posterioroppositio non est universalis omnibus relationibus realibus De supremo genere praedicamenti Ad aliquid.
vere ac secundwn rem; nam 8 relacionibus non mutuis non convenit, quamvis 2. Prima ergo difficultas est, quomodo possint om.nia rel~tiv~ ad unu~ genus
modo nostro concipiendi fingi posset ac si conveniret, quod ad praesens nihil summum reduci. Et ratio dubitandi est, quia essentla relat10ms est, ut eJUS esse
cefert Liter relaciva aucemrealia et mutua, ac relationes ipsas, intercedjt relativa sit ad aliud; ergo non potest ita relativum abstrahi, quin ei aliud a~a~quate
oppositio, quae non consistit in hoc quod una respiciat aliam ut terminum, sed correspondeat; ergo non potest dari unum genus summum, sed ~t m1~1mum
in hoc quod unum respiciat ut terminum id, quod est fundamentum alterius, debent esse duo, quae se invicem respiciunt. Patet consequent1a, qu1a non
et e converso, seu (quod idem est), quia habent oppositas rationes, nam una potest esse unum et idem id quod respicit, tum quia in i~sa delini~one con:
refert suum subjectum ad aliud, alia vero, e contrario, refert illud aliud ad id tinetur, quod debet esse aliud, rum etiam quia '.l~~ pocest 1de~ real1ter re~em
quod erat subjectum alcerius. Ex quo talem inter se habent repugnantiam, ad seipsum. Tum denique quia si essencia relat1v1 m co'.1'1n~uru ~set re'.ern ad
ut non possint ambae rdaciones uni ec eidem simul inesse, quia non potest s , hoc ipsum esset de ratione et esseotia cujusvis relaaorus paJtt~ulans.' cum
unum et idem esse fundamencum et terminus respectu ejusdem. Qui modus essentia superioris in inferiori includa ur. Quae difficultas vu1garJS est~ hac
oppositionis licet darius appareat in relationibus dissimilium rationum, ut mareria, etmagnumfacessitn.egotium, iis praesertim qui putant unum relatt~um
inter paternitatem et filiationem, tamen etiam suo modo convenit relationibus formaliter referri ad alterum correlativum ut sic; nam juxta hanc sentent1am,
aequiparantiae, quia licet sint ejusdem speciei, possunt in individuo esse ali- cum dicitur relativum in communi esse id cujus esse est esse ad aliud, necesse
quo modo oppositae relative, quia afficiunt sua subjecta secundum oppositas est subintelligi in definitione, ad aliud correlativum; ~nde c~m non po~sit idem
habitudi nes, ex quo repugnan tiam ha bent in eodem subjecto. Quam vis autem referri ad se relatione reali, de qua agimus, necessanum ent ut non sit unum
haec oppositio aliquo modo sit diversae rationis, respectu termini, et respecru supremum genus, sed duo, quae se invicem et adaequate respiciant, sintque
correlationis, tamen quia concomitanter se habenc ubicunque inveniuntur
in re ipsa distincta. . . .
3. Unum supremum genus rclationis dat1~r.-N1h~ommus c~me~ certum
8 Here the Vives edition inserts "quid," which is lacking in Salamanca, 1597, vol. 2, est posse dari unum supremwn genus omniu.m rela.uvorum; nil erurn. refe~~
p. 594. de abstra tis po- /col. bl ti us quam de concretts loqu1, et ex uno potest mfem
394 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 395

aliud. Nam, si datur generalissimus conceptus relationis realis et praedicamen- tivus communis et oppositus correlative, ut simile non dicitur ad aliud simile
talis in communi, poterit etiam dari relativi in communi, tum ob rationem in communi, nee aequale ad aliud aequale in communi, sed solum ratione
proportionalem, tum etiam quia omni formae abstractae potest respondere individuorum, in quibus datur unum aequale distinctum ab alio. Et de his
constitutum, seu concretum illi adaequatum. Quod vero possit dari unum verum habet quod dixit Augustin us in lib. Categoriar., cap. 11, specialiter ac
supremum genus relationum, patet, tum ex ipso modo loquendi de relatione regulariter, ut haec categoria manifestius dignoscatur, non recte dici ad aliquid,
in communi, ut sic, nam hie terminus communis est omnibus relationibus, et nisi cum singulare ad singulare refertur. Verum est statim ponere Augustinum
pro omnibus distribuitur, quia de omnibus univoce dicitur, et in quid. Tum exempla non sol um in relativis aequiparantiae, sed etiam in eis quae diverso rum
etiam quia definitio relationis in communi unica est, et omnibus relationibus sunt nominum et rationum; tamen in his nihil impedit, ut dixi, quominus
praedicamentalibus convenit. Tum denique quia si quis fingat duo ilia genera unum etiam in communi ad aliud commune correlativum referri intelligatur.
suprema relativorum, inter illa inveniet convenientiam essentialem in ratione Et in hunc modum hoc notavit Scotus, in l, d. 21, et alii.
essendi ad aliud; ergo ab eis abstrahere poterit conceptum univocum et es- 6. Haec doctrina probabilis est, et licet supponat unum fundamentum falsum,
sentialem utrique communem, in quo etiam facile inveniet differentias extra nimirum, unum relativum terminari formaliter ad suum correlativum, nihilo-
illius rationem, quae non sint completae relationes; erqo. minus potest esse utilis ad explicandum quomodo possint correlativa assignari,
4. Ut solvant aliqui rationem dubitandi.-Ad difficultatem autem positam quando nostris conceptibus abstrahantur, et in communi concipiuntur; sic
respondent aliqui, in definitione relativi in communi cum dicitur esse ad aliud, enim recte sine dubio dicitur, non nisi in relationibus dissimilium nominum
per illud aliud, intelligi quidem correlativum, et illud non posse esse ipsum- et rationum posse unum relativum commune alteri communi respondere; in
met, quod definitur, ut sic, propter rationem factam, quod non potest idem relativis autem aequiparantiae, aut in relativo in comm uni non posse, quia cum
realiter ad se referri. Nee etiam esse aliquod aliud relativum aeque commune, haec abstrahantur vel a relativis ejusdem rationis, vel simpliciter ab omnibus
et non contentum sub eo quod definitur, propter difficultatem tactam de uno relativis, unite concipitur utrumque relativum per modum unius secundum
supremo genere. Aiunt ergo per iliud aliud, importari singula correlativa spe- id in quo conveniunt, et ideo non potest hujusmodi relativo communi aliud
cifica, vel particularia singularum relationum. Quae est responsio Alberti, 5 aequale correspondere. Et ideo etiam de hujusmodi relativo in communi
Metaph., tractat. 3, cap. 7, et in praedic. Ad aliquid, ibique, Simplicii et Boetii. concepto recte dicitur non esse de essentia ejus, ut immediate illi sic concepto
Potestque ita exponi, quia, licet relatio in comm uni definiatur per esse ad aliud, respondeat aequale correlativum, sed satis /col. bl esse ut dum contrahitur ab
tamen non exercet hoc esse ad aliud nisi in determinatis relationibus, et ideo inferiora, in eis inveniatur haec relativorum reciprocatio. Imo addo, loquendo
non est necesse ut, quatenus abstractissime concipitur, intelligatur exercere de relativo in communi, non esse de essentia ejus ut etiam mediate et in in-
munus relationis in ordine ad aliud correlativum sibi adaequatum, quia ut sic ferioribus exerceat dictam reciprocationem relativam, quia communis ratio
potius concipitur essentia relationis quasi in actu signato, seu designando id in relationis praedicamentalis ut sic non postulat ut ei saltem ut contractae ad
quo consistit, quam in actu exercito, id est, exercendo illam habitudinem ad inferiora respondeat altera relatio in alio extrema; nam si hoc esset de essentia
aliquid, in tota ilia communitate. Potius ergo intelligendum est iliam rationem relationis in comm uni, omnibus relationibus specificis deberet convenire; at hoc
sic abstracte conceptam non exercere suam habitudinem ad aliud, nisi in suis falsum est, nam relationibus non mutuis minime convenit. Nee refert quod eis
inferioribus. /p. 860/ possit respondere relatio rationis in alio extrema, quia hoc non spectat ad es-
5. Quod etiam diverso modo intelligitur in relativis aequiparantiae et disqui- sentiam relationis realis, cum sit mere extrinsecum ex imperfectione nostra.
parantiae, nam in relativis disquiparantiae, saltem in communibus rationibus 7. Relativum in communi non est ad aliud tamquam ad correlativum.-Atque
specificis, potest intelligi, unum relativum commune referri ad aliud sibi aequale hinc ulterius colligo, cum relativum in communi definitur esse ad aliud, illud
et oppositum, ut patrem ad filium, majus ad minus. Et ratio est, quia cum hae aliud non posse accipi pro correlativo, quia per iliam definitionem traditur
relationes sintdiversarum ration um, non concipiuntur uno conceptu comm uni aliquid essentiale relativo, ut sic, non est autem essentiale relativo ut ei r:spo~­
specifico, et ideo possum abstrahi duo conceptus communes aequales, et sibi deat correlativum, neque immediate et in communi concepto, neque m sms
oppositi ac correspondentes. Quod secus est in relationibus aequiparantiae; particularibus omnibus, ut ostensum est. Quod pra~terea confirmatur,. q~ia
nam cum sint ejusdem rationis, habent eumdem communem conceptum si aliud est ipsum correlativum, quaero an sit correlat1vum reale, aut rat10ms,
specierum, et ideo non potest tali conceptui respondere alius conceptus objec- vel alterutrum indifferenter, seu juxta exigentiam inferiorum relationum; nihil
396 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 397

autem horum dici potest. Nam duo prima membra facile excluduntur, quia enim has proprietates ibi declaravimus). Quae ratio fundamenti ut sic non est
neutrum eorum potest esse universale omnibus relationibus, ut saris constat in eis aliqua ratio respectiva, neque etiam est aliqua ratio absoluta distincta
ex dictis. Tertium etiam non est verisimile, tum quia alias illud aliud valde ab ipsis, sed est ipsamet entitas uniuscujusque, quatenus per se habet t~em
aequivoce sumeretur, cum relativum rationis fere aequivoce relativum sit; tum aptitudinem, et idea ad praedicamentum uniuscujusque formae reduc1tur
etiam quia (ut dicebam) correspondentia relationis rationis non est ex naturis per modum proprietatis, et indirecte posset reduci sub ea .ratione ad prae?i~­
rerum, et ideo non potest ad essentiam relationis pertinere. / col. bl mentum relationis tanquam fundamentum ejus; ita ergo de relat1on1s
8. Dico igitur, illud aliud in dicta definitione dicere terminum relationis ut termino existimandum censeo. Atque haec sint saris de primo puncto.
sic, qui non dicit correlativum, ut tale est, sed aliud extremum, prout in se
habet sufficientem rationem terminandi, quae ratio fere semper est absoluta; et Quomodo supremum genus relativorum ad inferiora descendat.
si interdum est aliqua relatio, non tamen ut exercet mun us relationis oppositae 11. Secundus punctus hujus sectionis est, quomodo hoc summum genus
alteri relationi, sed prout in se habet aliquam unitatem, vel similem rationem relationis per varia genera usque ad infimas species descendat, seu dividatur.
communem rebus absolutis. Quae res magna ex parte declarata est in superioribus, ~n quibus va~ias div~­
9. Refativum in communi habettemzinum in commt.mi sibirespondentem.-Unde siones relationis attigimus et explicavimus. Quarum pnma ac praec1pua fu1t
infero ulterius, relationem in communi posse conci- /p. 861/ pi ut habentem trimembris, per varia fundamenta genere diversa, quae sub his nominibus
aliud ad quod dicat habitudinem, non solum in suis inferioribus, sed etiam unitatis, actionis et mensurae recenseri solent. Ex quo facile intelligitur, sub
ut conceptam illo communissimo conceptu, nam relationi in communi cor- quolibet horum membrorum ulterius p~ocedi pos~e, verbi g~atia, .i~ primo. per
respondet etiam terminus in communi. Neque inde sequitur dari duo genera varios modos unitatum, et quia sub umtate multttudo submtelhg1tur, pnmo
suprema, quia terminus in communi non est aliquod relativum ut sic, et ideo dividendae erunt relationes unitatis a relationibus multitudinis seu diversitatis,
non constituit, in praedicamento Ad aliquid, aliquod genus. et postea, juxta varios modos unitatis aut multitudinis realis, dividentur etiam
10. Ratio commimis termini tier propri1em non comfitt1at praedicamentum. sub utroque genere relationes. Idemque proportionaliter dicendum est de ac-
-Dices: ergo salcem conscituet communealiquod genus alterius praecUcarnenti, tione, et consequenter etiam de passione, et de potentia activa et passiva, vel
quod est plane falsum, quiailla ratio termini vagatur peromniapraedicamenca, latius etiam de causa et effectu, si haec omnia sub ilia voce comprehenduntur.
imo et extra praedicamentum, quia ipsi Deo convenit. Respondetur negando Ac denique idem est de ratione mensurae, nam etiam in eo gen~~e variantur
consequentiam, quia ratio termini non est in rebus aliqua ratio vel proprietas relationes, juxta diversas proportiones mensurarum et mensurab1lmm.
realis aliquo modo distincta ab ipsis, vel accidens ipsis, sed est ipsamet entitas 12. Divisio relationis in mutuam et non mutuam, qualis.-Ex hac autem
uniuscujusq ue rei, quatenus apta est ad terminandam relationem alterius. Quae divisione insurgunt aliae, quae in superioribus etiam tactae sunt, nimirum,
ratio est quasi transcendentalis, et forte non est univoca, praesertim cum in divisio relationis in mutuam et non mutuam, quae satis late declarata est. Ex
Deum et creaturam conveniat. Unde sub earacione in nullo praedicamento per dictis tamen constat hanc non esse subdivisionem alicujus membri praecedentis
se ponitur, sed reduci porestad praecUcamenrum relativorum, tanquamquoddam divisionis, sed potius esse aliam adaequatam divisionem relationis in comm~ni,
additum, i uc ponitur in definicione eonl111. Pocestque hoc a simili declarari, complectentem sub uno membro, scilicet'. sub re!atione non mutua, t~rt~um
quia sicut convenit relationi in communi habere terminum, ita et habere fun- membrum prioris divisionis, et nonnullas alias relat10nes contentas sub pnonbus
damentum; nee videtur dubium quin haec ratio fundamenti relationum possit membris; sub altero autem membro comprehendentem fere prima duo genera
aliquo modo in communi concipi tanquam adaequate respondens relationi praecedentis divisionis. Possent autem hae duo divisiones ita subordinari, ut
etiam in comm uni conceptae, quia in propria natura relationis praedicamentalis prius dividatur relatio in earn, quae ex vi fundamenti formalis est non mutua,
ut sic includitur, quod supponat fundamentum, et in eo rationem aliquam ob et earn quae ex vi fundamenti seu ex genera suo id non habet, et haec rurs~s
quam consurgat seu resultet. Non est autem necesse ut haec communis ratio subdividatur in relationem fundatam in actione, vel unitate, /p. 862/ et sic
fundamenci sir aliquod genus, sed est ratio quasi transcendenralis, quae vagacur procedatur, donec in illis duobus generibus perveniatur ad rel~tiones ~nt~r
per omnia praedicamenca. Uncle Aristoteles quamitari attribuit per modum Deum et creaturam, quae non tam ex formali ratione fundamentl seu rat10n1s
proprietacis, quad sit sufficiens fundamentum aequalitatis vel in aequaliracis, fundandi, quam ex peculiari natura et conditione Dei habent quod sint non
qualitaci vero, quod sir fundamentum similitudinis, vel dissimiUrudinis (ita
398 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47. On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 399

mutuae, et ita facile erit per subordinatas divisiones hujusmodi praedicamen- Differentia essentialis et specifica reLttionum unde sumenda.
tum constituere. 15. Una camen poterat superesse quaestio circa hunc secundum punctum,
L3. D. Damasceni dicmm explicatur.- lllud enim animadversione <lignum videlicet, uncle sit sumenda distinctio spedfica et essentialis relationum usque
est, Divum Damascenum, in sua Dialectica, c. 50, cum alias plures relationum ad ultimas species, an, scilicet, ex fundamento vel ex termino. Aliqui e~im ita
divisiones ponat, hanc praetermisisse, imo significare, non recte consenrice distribuunt inter haec duo munera, ut dicant a fundamento habere relanonem
han djvisionem um relacivorum natura, siqttidem (ait) mut1ta habititdo ea entitatem, a termino autem speciem seu esseo tiam et distinctionem essentialem.
quae ad aliquid s1mt ~f/frit. Verumcamen haec verba vcl non sunt intelligenda Alii vero utrumque munus utrique attribuunr, unicuique in uo genere .. Quod
de singulis relativis, sed de complexu utriusque; ille enim vere consistit in rnihl non displicet; existimo tam en u trumque dicendimodum recte ex~hcatum
mutua habirudine; non est autem necesse ut ralis reciprocatio salrem realis in continere veritatem. Itaque formaliter et intrinsece relationes consmuuntur
omnibus l'elativis interveniat; vd si ilia verba applicentm· ad singula relaciva, suis propriis differentiis in propriis speciebus, et per eas esse~tialiter distin-
mutua ha.bitudo intelligenda est cum prnportione, quia ex parte rdationis guuntur, hoc enim commune est omnibus rebu~. Tame~, qma t~tam s~am
necesse est ut ad aliud tendat, ex pa.rte vero termini ut sit id ad quod aJiud essentiam habet relatio in ordine ad terminum, ideo ab 1llo quasi ab ultima
tendit. Quod vero Damascenus illam divisionem praetermiserit, mirum non forma extrinseca sumit suam specificationem, et ideo per illum distinguitur et
est, quia non omnia dixi.t, quae de relation ibus dici possum, et fortasse causa definitur, ut supra dictum est, sect. 8. Quia vero etiam fundamentum formale
fuit, quia, nostro modo concipiendi omnes apprehendW1rur ut mutuae. est per se et intrinsece requisitum ad relationem, potest. di.ci eti3;°1 concurr~re
14. Divisio relationis in cjusdem vel diversae appelkztionis.- Altera divisio ad essentiam relationis, quasi per modum causae matenal1s extnnsecae. Et ita
supra tacta est in relationem ejusdem vel diversae appel lationis, seu aeqwpa- D. Thomas interdum hoc tribuit fundamento, interdum termino, ut patet ex
rantiae vel disquiparantiae, et hanc late craccat Damasc., dicto cap. 50 1 quam 3 parte , quaest. 35, art. 5, et 1 parte, q. 32, art. 2, ubi simplicite~ id. trib~it
subdividjc in relationem praecellentiae, ut esse dominum, esse majus, esse termino, quia ille est quasi ultimum et magis formale respectu relat10ms. V1de
causam; et relation.em inferioritatis, ut esse servum, effeccum, aut minus, ere., Soncin., 5 Metaph., quaest. 32, et supra dicta, sectione 8, num. 9, et sect. 10,
quae subdivisiones ad relaciones disquiparantiae percinent, namin relationibus n. 14.
aequiparentiae, cum sint ejusdem rarionis, non potest esse ilia diversicas. Et
fortasse inter res creatas nunquam .reperitur relatio disquiparentiae, absque Sintne plures reLttiones solo numero diversae simul in eodem. subj~ct~.
ilia divers.itace; tamen inter personas divinas invenirur sine praecellentia, vel 16. Circa tertium punctum occurrebat hoc /p. 863/ loco quaestlo de md1-
inaequalicace, nisi quis velit cwn Patribus Graecis ipswn ordinem originis viduatione relationum; certum est enim quod, sicut in caeteris praedicamentis
dignicatem appellare; de quo ilias. Haec autem divisio, in cigore et proprietate constitutio lineae praedicamentalis descendit a supremo genere usque ad
sumpta, non est divisio relationis in communi, sed mutuae; nam non mucua individua, ita etiam in hoc; controversum autem est an, sicut ad essentialem
cum non sit reciproca, non est ejusdem nee diversae rationis in utroque ex- constitutionem et specificationem relationum concurrit suo modo terminus,
trema. Nisi quis velit sermonem extendere ad earn denomi- /col. bl nationem ita etiam ad individuationem. Ex quo pendet etiam decisio illius vulgaris
correlativam, quae ex relatione rationis sumitur; sic enim omnia correlativa quaestionis, an idem subjectum sub eade~ rat~one speci~ca referatur _ad plures
erunt ejusdem vel diversae denominationis. Denique haec divisio, ut ex dictis terminos eadem numero relatione, vel d1vers1s. Quaest10nem suffic1enter, ut
constare potest, non datur per id quod per se ac fom;iaHter pertinet ad ratio- existimo (est enim res non magni momenti) attigi supra, disp. 5, sect. 8, ubi
nem relarionis, quia, ut diximus, w1a relatio formaliter non erminat alteram; de individuatione accidentium, et an possint esse plura numero in eodem
uncle neque cl.at il1i speciem auc essentialem diversitatem: quando autem uni subjecto, generatim tractavi. . .
relationi altera respondet ejusdem vel diversaerarionis, est indicium diversitatis 17. Et juxta principia ibi posita, sine ulla d1fficultate conc_ed1 potest~ plur~s
fundamenti ac termini formalis, et ita, quod attinet ad constitutionem hujus relationes solo numero differences, respicientes diversos termmos, esse s1mul m
praedicamenti, haec divisio ad praecedentes revocanda est. eodem subjecto, ut, verbi gratia, duas paternitates in eodem ?om~ne. r~spectu
duorum filiorum. Quia effectus formalis uni.us non est omnmo s1m1hs effec-
tui formali alterius, ut citato loco dedaravi. Item quia , posito uno termino,
resultat aliqua relatio, quae omnino pendet ab illo; addito vero alio termino,
 ,.
400 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47. On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text 401

additur novus respectus, qui manebit etiamsi alter terminus destruatur. Item est modus realis distinctus, quia est separabilis a fundamento, etiam isti duo
quia unusquisque terminus est totalis terminus alicujus relationis, quando modi erunt inter se actu distincti ex natura rei, quia unus est separabilis ab alio,
quidem illo solo posiro consurgit aliq ua rela cio. Et similes rationes posslllu et e converso. Et similiter, si paternitas est propria entitas realiter distincta a
facile m ultiplicari, propter quas Scotus, et alii , quos ibi citavi, hanc opinio- fundamento, etiam illi duo respectus erunt inter se realiter distincti, ut recte et
nem amplectun tur. N eque in ea est diRicultas alicujus momenti, p raeter eam consequenter docet Scot., quia sunt mutuo et vicissim separabiles. Ostensum
generalem, qua d accid nt ia individuancur ex subj ecro, de qua ciraco loco satis est autem supra, disp. 7, quandocumque duo ita distinguuntur in re, ut vicis-
fuse dictum es t. sim /p. 864/ et unum sine alio, et alterum sine altero manere possit, et alioqui
18. Quid consequenter dicendum hac super re, si relatio est distincta in re a non sunt modi alicujus subjecti, cum quo habeant identitatem realem, tune
fandamento.-Quoniam vero in hac re potest magna ex parte dissensio esse in illud esse sufficiens signum distinctionis realis inter illa. Sed relationes, juxta
modo Joquendi, advertendum est, aliter procedendum esse si teneamus relatio- illam sententiam, non sunt modi, sed propriae entitates realiter distinctae a
nem esse rem, vel modum realem ex natura rei distinctum a fundamento, aliter subjectis, et inter se ita comparantur respectus patris ad primum filium, et ad
vero si solum ratione distinguitur. Nam juxta priorem sententiam, non potest secundam, ut et prior sine posteriori et posterior sine priori existere possit;
consequenter negari quin, multiplicatis terminis, realiter augeantur respectus, et ergo distinguuntur inter se vera distinctione reali.
quin, addito novo termino, aliquid reale addatur praexistenti relativo. Ut cum 20. Posita autem hac distinctione, nulla ratio reddi potest cur illae non
pater generat secundum filium, aliquid respectivum acquirit quod antea non distinguantur ut duae relationes, vel cur dicantur esse duo gradus, vel duae
habebat, aeque distinctum ab ipso, ac erat Paternitas quam antea ha- /col. bl partes unius relationis, et non potius relationes duae. Primum enim no~ rec~e
bebat, quia hoc convincunt, consequenter loquendo, rationes factae. Et quia est aequiparantur gradibus intensionis; nam inter hos gradus est subordmano
omnino eadem ratio, nam si Petrus cum genuit primum filium, indiguit nova per se et in eis est propria compositio et unio per propriam latitudinem, vel
re, aut novo modo reali distincto, ut ad i1lum realiter referretur, cur non etiam propria indivisibilia, ut praecedenti disputatione dedaratum est; illae autem
quando de nova incipit referri ad secundum? Neque enim dici potest priorem duae relationes non habent subordinationem per se; neque enim una per se
entitatem aut modum sufficere, tum quia non potest effectus formalis crescere, suppo nit alteram, vel ab ilia pendet, neque habet unaquaeque earum latitudinem
nisi realiter crescat forma; tum etiam quia prior relatio adaequate referebat ad aliquam in se, sed est mere indivisibilis in ordine ad suum terminum; unde
primum filium, et ab illo pendet in esse, et in definitione et cognitione; non neque proprie componunt aliquam latitudinom quasi continuam, quia haec
enim cognoscitur haec relatio ut haec numera, nisi ut referens ad hunc numero non componitur ex indivisibilibus. Deinde, nullum aliud genus unionis inter
terminum, ut aperte Aristoteles declaravit in Praedicam., c. de Ad aliquid. illas duas entitates excogitari potest, ob quam dicantur esse duae partes unius
19. Jam vero si semel admittatur fieri additionem realem in relativo, facta relationis, quia neque inter se comparantur ut potentia et actus, neque habent
additione novi termini, fortasse est solum de nomine quaestio, an illud addi- inter se aliam habitudinem, praeter earn quae est esse in eodem subjecto. Et
tum sit distincta relatio, vel componat unam cum praexistente, sicut secundus hoc a fortiori confirmari potest ex his quae supra diximus de simili habituum
gradus cum primo componit unum calorem; ita enim aliqui explicant unita- unitate vel compositione physica. Imo ilia unitas vel compositio artificiosa,
tem hujus relationis, ne videantur in infinitum relationem multiplicare, et ut quae in habitibus consideratur, vix potest habere locum, in relationibus, et
universe defendant illud axioma, in uno subjecto tantum esse unum accidens ideo de illa nihil tractatur.
unius speciei. Verumtamen qui sic loquuntur, non possum satis illam unitatem 21. Alio vero modo posset quis excogitare unitatem hujus relationis ad plures
explicare, nisi tantum denominative, ratione unius subjecti seu suppositi. Nam terminos, non per additionem aut compositionem realem, sed per mutationem
si consequenter loquantur, necesse est ut dicant, tantam esse distinctionem relationum, ita ut unaquaeque in se sit indivisibilis; differunt tamen inter se,
inter paternitatem ad primam filium, et id quod additur patri, genito secundo, quia una habet pro adaequato termino unam rem, verbi gratia, unum filium,
quanta est inter paternitatem ipsam et fundamentam ejus; itaque si haec dis- alia vero duos, alia tres, etc. Unde juxta hanc sententiam, quando pater secun-
tinguuntur realiter vel modaliter, etiam ilia. Probatur, quia relatio parernitatis dum filium generat, nova quidem relatio ei acquiritur, non tamen praeexistenti
ad primttm 6Jjwn ira comparatur ad id quad additur respectu secundi lilii, additur, sed prior perit, et alia de /col. bl novo resultat, quae indivisibiliter et
ut possit ilia paterniras esse sine hoc addito, et e converso possit manere hoc adaequate refert ill um hominem ad duos filios, et non ad plures nee pauciores:
additum, et constituere pauem, sine ilia prima parernitate; ergo si paternitas et si generet tertium, amittet illam, et acquiret aliam referentem ad tres eodem
 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47. On Real Relation 403
402 Disputaton 47: Latin Text

.modo. Quod enim una relatio po sit adaequate respicere plures rerminos in- De rel.atione filii ad patrem et matrem.
divisibilicer, certum vi.detur; sic enirn in relativis realibus praedicamentalibus 24. Ferrariensis opinio improbatur.-Quod vero dicebatur de relatione ~lii ad
tocum refertur ad plures partes, vel unitas ad binarium relatione subdupli; et duos parentes, etiam est incertum. Nam aliqui putant in filio esse duas rela~10nes,
i11 ua.nscendentalibus idem intellectus respicit plura intelligibilia inadaequate, non solum numero, sed etiam specie differentes, quia existimant relauonem
et in relativis eadem relario generis respicit pJures species. Sic ergo inrelJigi patris et matris etiam specie differre, eo quad ille active, haec tantum passive
pocest in quocunque genere veJ specie relacionum dari aJiquas in individuo, concurrat. lta tenet Ferrar., 2 contra Gent., c. 11, § Ex istis, quanquam addat,
indivisibiliter, er adaequace respicientes plmes cerminos, qui respectu lllarum illas relationes esse duas formaliter, unam vero realiter seu materialiter; quad
erwu partiales, ex. illis vero consurget terminus adaequarus, qui sic unus col- non video quomodo consequenter dicatur, supponendo relationem esse quid
le rione quadam; er ideo talis relatio non consurgit nisi posito ada quato distinctum in re a fundamento, ut ille supponit.
cermin.o, non vero posito uno vel altero partiali; e concrario vero aufercur seu 25. Fonsecae opinio non probatur.-Alii vero dicunt esse una~ relationem
mutatur ablato vel addito quocunque termino partiali, quia hoc ipso mutatur ad utrumque parentem, etiamsi pater active et mater solum passive conc~rrat'.
terminus totalis. et simul aiunt, eamdem omnino relationem, et immutatam manere, euams1
22. Tandem hoc modo opinantur multi de re1atione unius filii ad patrern et alter parens moriatur. Ita Fons., lib. 5 Metaph., cap. 15, quaest. 5 sect. 3. Sed
matrem. Nam quad illa relatio, per se loquendo, sit una indivisibilis, inde fit utrumque est mihi difficile cred iru. Primum qu.ide~i quia si mater ~o l~ pas-
probabile, quad pater et mater concurrunt ut una causa, et per se nocessaria, sive concurrit, ergo relationes patris et matris ad fil1um erunt specie diversae,
et unica actione (praesertim si mater concurrit active). Unde alterutro parente cum habeant fundamenta adeo distincta; ergo fieri non potest ut eis respondeat
morruo, necesse est illam relationem perire, quia si indivisibil.iter tespiciebar unica relatio in correlativo, quod docet D. Thomas, 1 parte, q. 32, art. 2. Quia
duos, nee potest dividi in parces, nee tota manere, cum jam non habeat adae- correlativa specie diversa vel sunt termini formaliter diversi, vel eos indicant;
quatum terminum, nee referat ad duos; perit ergo tota; necessarium ergo erit relationes autem habent diversitatem ex terminis formalibus. Item relatio ef-
ut oriatur alia, quae ad unum tantum parentem referat, si superstes sit; nam fectus ad causam diversi generis etiam est diversa, sive ilia materialis sit, sive
vere ac realiter ad illum refertur filius. formalis, sive efficiens; si ergo causalitates patris et matris differant.' ut effici~ns
23. Sed licet hie modus dicendi ad consequenter loquendum in ilia sententia et materialis, relationes in effectu erunt diversae. Unde, illa sententla suppostta,
videaturacuteex:cogitarus, tam en reveraestvoluntarius etsinefundamento. Quae /col. b/ pater et mater non tam componu.nt unam _causam totalem,. cum non
est enim necessitas introducendi illam frequentem mucationem relationum? causent in eodem genere, quam collectionem plur1um ~usa~um d1':'ers~r~m
Alias quo ties nova res alba fierec, mutarenrcaeteraomnia alba, quaeaoteaerant, generum, qualia sunt materia et efficiens. Secundo, est diffiale credJtu 1Jl ilia
suas relationes similitudinis respectu omnium, et novas acqllirerent. Deinde, seotentia quod relacio sit una indivisibiliter ad patrem ec matrem, ut compJent
cur pater amittet relationem ad prim um filium, genito secundo, cum nihil eo- ltnatn causam totalem, et ta.men quod eadem relatione integra rnaneat, ablato
rwn tollatur, quae ad esse illius relatio11is necessaria erant? Quia, non obstante illo adaequato term ino exaltera parte, quiarelacio pend et ex term ino adaequato.
secun lo filio, prior semper est sufficiens terminus illius /p. 865/ relationis. Quod ita declaro, quia, ablato uno paren:te jam ilia filii rel~tio non p~test
Item quarnvis verwn sir, posse unam relationem respicere plura adaequate, habere suum adaequatum effectum formalem, cum non po stt referre fi11um
quando per se t ex vi suae speciei iJla requirit ut resulret vel coos rvetur, seu ad utrumque parentem; ergo absolute non potest habere effecrnm formal.em
ut exerceac suum effecmm formalem, ut est in relatione totius aut subdupli, suum, quia, cum iodivisibiliter ilium causet, non porestconferre parcem CJUS,
tamen quando relatio non postwar hoc ex sua ratione, et termini solum per et non totwn, nee potest rota mane.re quin conferat totum effectum, cum non
accidens multiplicancur, ut conringit in paternitate, filiatione, similitudine, etc., maneat nisi in subjecto, et inhaerens. .. .
mere gratis dicitur coosurgere unam indivisibilem relationem, quae aclaequate 26. Aliorum opinio.-Alii ergo, qui cum Galeno, Scoto, et alus, saus proba-
respiciat collectionem plurium terminorum, eo vel maxime quod plures filii biliter censent matrem active concurrere, existimant £ilium referri ad patrem
distinctis generacionibus producuntuJ·; cur ergo resultabit una indivisibilis et matrem duabus relationibus ejusdern speciei, et quia d.iversitas in concursu
relatio complectens utrumqu.e terminum? paterno et materno accidentalis tantum est. Et quamvis pater et ~ater simuJ
componant una.m causam totalem efficientem, juxta hanc_ s~nten~am, t~men
sicut 11011 sunt una causa, nisi collectione plurium parttahum, 1ta atlS esr
 405
404 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Disputaton 47: Latin Text

ut illis correspondeat unum correlativum collectione plurium relationum. SECTIO XVIII.

Quanquam hie P?sset c~m ali~ua probabilitate dici illas relationes componere
Quaenam proprietates communes sint omnibus relativis.
unam, non propne phys1ca umtate, sed quasi artificiali, et accommodata unitati
1. De hac re nihil Aristoteles dicit in Metaphysica; in Dialectica vero nonnul-
termini. Quocunque vero ex his modis de relatione filii sentiatur nihil refert
a~ di~tam.sententiam, quam impugnamus; null um enim auctoren: invenio qui
las posui t rdativorum proprietares, quas breviter exponer op rret, quanquam
eam m al iquae jam explicatae sint. Possemus autem sermonem excendere ad
dixent, filmm cum orbatur altero parente, amittere relationem quam habet ad communiaen tis attributa, pcaesercim uoum ec bonum; nam pecuJiarem habent
utrumque, et novam acquirere, qua ad solum superstitem referatur, neque id difficul tatem in modo quo relaci ni- /col. b/ bus conveniunr. Sedde uni tare jam
habet ullam verisimilitudinem.
saris mttl ta dicta sunc. C irca boo i catem ver ccurrebat illa quaescio an relatio
27. lta ergo sentiendum videtur de multiplicatione relation um solo numero dicat perfectionem, quam supra tractavimus, disp. 10, et ostendimus ita dicere
dif~erentium i.n e?dem subjecto respectu plurium terminorum adaequatorum
perfectionem, sicut habet entitatem. Unde si est res distincta a funda~ento,
et .e~usdem r~t1oms. Quod quidem juxta sententiam, quam veram existimamus, vel etiam modus realis ex natura rei distinctus, necesse est ut perfect1onem
sc1hcet, relat10nem non esse rem aut modum ex natura rei distinctum a funda- aliquam realem illi addar; si vero nihil rei addic, sed sola ratione cUstinguitur,
~e~to, faciliu~ expeditur. Quia dubitari non potest quin respectus ad terminos
perfectionem quidem realem di cet, non tamen in re distinctam; et conse-
d'. ~nctos realiter, quorum unus potest sine /p. 866/ alio esse, et e converso, quenter, simpliciter loquendo, non adder perfectionem suo fundamento, sed
d1stmguantur ratione rariocinata, quae habet fundamentum in re. Unde sicut
h~ec distincrio su.fficic, ut relatio constituat peculiare genus, et censeatur' quasi dicet eamdem, sub diversa ratione. Caetera in dicto loco saris tractata sunr.

al.ta forma a fundamento, ita etiam sufficit ut illi respectus ad diversos terminos An relatio contrarium habeat.
dt~antur p.lures ~el~tiones numero distinctae eo genere distinctionis, quad in
2. Deveniendo ergo ad proprietates relacivorum a Ph ilosopho assignatas, prima
huJusmod1 relatiombus locum habet, scilicet rationis ratiocinatae. Et ita facile
est, quod relari babeat contra rium; oam. virtus vitio contraria est. Sed haec
tollitur .admira~.io. de multiplicarione relationum, et omnia argumenta, quae in non assignatur ab Acistotele ex propria sentcntia, sed tanquam consequens ex
contranu~ O~J~ '. sol~1~ t, difficultatem. non habent, praesertim his suppositis, prima definitione relativorum, quae omnia re.lativa secundum dJci co rnplecte-
quaede.pn~c1p10 mdiv1duationis diximus; nequeetiamad persuadendamhanc
batur. Pocius ergo contrarium numerari potest inter proprietates relationis,
sentent1~ m hoc.s~ns.~ oportet.ra~iones multiplicare, nam praeterquam quad quod i\li, quatcnus talis est, nihil est concrarium, ut idem Philosophus dixerat
per se satts est vens1m1hs, quae msmuatae sunt, sufficiunt.
in c. de Qualit. Sed habet relatio suum proprium oppositionis genus, quod
28. Denique in hoc sensu non multum repugnat D. Thomas huic sententiae;
nam 3 parte, quaest. 35, art. 5, ad 3, ait in uno filio esse unum relationem jam explicatum est.
ad d~~s parenres, ~t duas ~ec undum rationem, et e converso ait, in pluribus
An ·relatio magis au,t mi mLS suscipiat.
hom1~1bus t1:ah e11abus mwun, esse unam relationem, quad non potest intelligi
3. Secunda proprietas est, quod relatio suscipit magis t min u , quam cUcit
de umtate re1, cum subj ecca realiter cUstinguantur; et aliis locis, licet dicat in
Ariscoceles convenire quibusdam relationibus, non omnibus; nam duplum non
uno patre esse unam relationem ad plures filios, dicit tamen in eo esse plures
est magis et minus duplum, simile aucem vel aequale d.icinu magis et minus.
respe~t~s. Et ~odem modo loquitur Hispalens., in 3, dist. 8, notab. 3, et Cap-
Sed est adverrendu.m, aliter tribui hanc proprietatem relacioni quam qua.litati;
reol.: 1~1de1:1, m solu~. ar~wnent. Non vocantur autem illi respectus plures nisi
huic enim convenit, qttia vere est intensibilis et remissibilis, ut praecedenti
ob d1stmct1onem rat1oms; ergo eodem modo, dici possunt plures relationes.
d.ispu cacione tractatum est. Relatio vero non est ita intensibilis, quia nee per
Et tandem declaratur a simili; nam Theologi
se, cum per se non fiat, nee augeatur; nee ratione fundamenfr nam, Jj~et
simplicitervocant paternitatem et spirationem activam in divinis duas relationes
fundamentum intendacur, non necesse esr inrendi l'elacionem; non sunt erum
pr~pter disti?ctionem te.rminorum, etiamsi in se ratione tantum distinguantur;
magis similia duo alba intensa ut octo, quam antea cum erant ut quat~or; e
quid ergo m1rum quad m praesenti dicantur etiam plures relationes ad plures
contrario vero interdum fiunt magis similia per remissionem fundamentt, aut
terminos realiter distinctos?
termini, aliquando vero minuitur similitudo.
406 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation

4. Hoc vero magis aut minus in relationibus non est propter intensionem
earum, sed propter variationem, ut bene notavit Fonsec., Ip. 867I lib. S Met.,
c. IS, q, S, sect. 2 . Relatio enim aequaliracis, verbi , grat ia, proprie dictae (et PERSONS MENTIONED BY SUAREZ
Albert the Great, St., 0.P. (ca. 1200-1280)-Dominican theologian, Bishop of Re-
idem est de p erfecta similitudine) non suscipit magis et mi nus, quia in indi-
gensburg, and teacher of St. Thomas Aquinas. .
visibili consistit; nam s.i ex duobus aequalibus alrerum crescat, non fium minus
Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. ca. 200)-Commentator on the works of Aristotle.
aaqualia, sed perit aequalitas; inaequalitas vero esse potest major et minor, Alexander of Hales, O.F.M. (ca. 1186-1245)-Franciscan theologian at the University
propter majorem et minorem recessum a perfecta aequalitate; et eodem modo
of Paris.
aequalitas vel similitudo late et vulgari modo dicta dicitur major et minor; ta- Anselm, St. (1033-1109)-Theologian, Archbishop of Canterbury, author of Proslo-
men illae relationes majoris vel minoris inaequalitatis revera sunt diversae, et gion and Monologium. ..
non eadem, quae augeatur vel minuatur, quia termini et fundamenta earum Antonio Andreas (d. ca. 1320)-A disciple of Duns Scotus whose own wntmgs were
sunt diversa, et proportiones in quibus consistunr sunt etiam diversae, atque mingled with those ofhis master.Amongotherworks, Antonio authored,:'Ques~i?ns
ita unaquaeque in suo gradu inaequalitatis in indivisibiH consistit. Sic ergo on the 12 Books of the Metaphysics" and was the probable author of the Expos1t10n
dicunmr quaedam relativa suscipere magis et minus, id est, denominari magis of the 12 Books of the Metaphysics," which was attributed co Duns Scorus in the
et minus talia per accesswn vel recessum ab uno perfecta termino, non per 1639 Wadding edition of Scotus's Opera omnia. . .
Aquinas, St. Thomas (1225-1274)-Dominican and foremost philosopher-theolog1an
intensionem aut remissionem.
of the Middle Ages.
Aristotle (384-322 BC)-Greek philosopher, disciple of Plato, called "The Philosopher"
Quomodo relativa ad convertentiam dicantur. (Philosophus) by the Latins . .
S. Tertia proprietas est, quod relativa dicuntur ad convertentiam, quam aliqui Augustine of Hippo, Saint (354-430)-Bishop of Hippo, most important Lann
ita exponunt, ut idem sit quod mutuo referri, seu quod uni relationi semper theologian and Church Father. . ,
correspondeat alia. Sed, ut constat ex dictis, in hoc sensu non conveniet haec Averroes (aka Ibn Rushd [1126-1198])-Arabic philosopher, commented onAr1stotle s
proprietas omnibus relationibus, nisi extendatur ad relationem rationis. Unde works for which he was called by the Latins as "the Commentator" ( Commenta-
non est hie sensus Aristotelis, sed solum quod secundum aliquam denomina- w~. .
tionem unum denominetur cum adjunctione alterius, et e converso, ut scientia Avicenna (aka Ibn Sina [980-1037]-Arabic philosopher, renowned for learnmg and
dicitur scibilis scientia, et scibile dicitur scientia scibile; et ideo ait Aristoteles, medical skill; author of numerous scientific, religious, and philosophical works,
hanc convertentiam interdum in eodem, interdum in diverso casu fieri. Unde including an original presentation of Aristotelian metaphysics.
Biel, Gabriel (1410?-95)-Philosopher and theologian at Tiibingen, follower of
haec proprietas magis pertinet ad modum loquendi de relationibus quam ad
rem, quanquam ille modus loquendi in re habeat fundamentum. Non est Ockham's nominalism.
Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus (ca. 480-524/5)-Christian Latin philosopher
autem haec proprietas peculiaris relationum praedicamentalium; nam etiam and theologian, translated and commented on logical writings of Aristotle, author
convenit relativls transcendentalibus, imo et relativis rationis. of "On the Consolation of Philosophy" (De consolatione philosophiae).
6. Quarta proprietas est, quod relativa sunt simul natura. Quinta, quod sint Cajetan (aka Thomas de Vio, O.P. [1469-1534])-Cardinal, theologian, Mas~er
simul cognitione et definitione, quae jam sunt a nobis expositae; et ideo de General of the Dominicans, and principal commentator on the Summa Theologr.ae
praesenti disputatione haec sufficiant. of St. Thomas Aquinas " .
Capreolus,Joannes, O.P. (1380-1444)-Thomisticcommentacor, known as the Prmce
ofThomists" (Princeps thomistarum). .
Damascene, St. John (d. 780)-Christian archbishop of Damascus, theologian, author
of "On the Orthodox Faith'' (De fide orthodoxa) and "Dialectic" (Dialectica).
Durandus of Saint Pour<;:ain, O.P. (ca. 1275-1334)-Dominican theologian, Bishop
of Meaux, important figur in early 14th cencury theology at ~aris.
Ferrara, [Francis Sylvesterof] Ferrara, O .P. (1 474-1528)-Tbcol gian, Master G~neral
of the Dominicans, and principal commcnracor on the Swnma contra Gentiles of
St. Thomas Aquinas.
 409
408 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Persons Mentioned by Sudrez

Fonseca, Pedro da, S.J. (1548- 1599)-Jesuit philosopher, edited and tra11slaced the Silvester [Mazzolini a.k.a. Prieria , 0.P. (ca. 145 - 1523)J-Dom'.Dican the~logian.
Metn.pl~y.rics of Aristoclc. He was himself known as "che Portuguese Arismtle." Taught ac Rome. Was opponent of Marti11 Luther. His thcolog1~ works m~ude
Francis of Mayronncs, O.F.M. (ca. 1280-1325)-Fransciscan theologian, a pupil of a famous S1lmma Summrmun quae S;/vestritLa diciwr, Compendmm Capr~olt, and
Du.ns ScoLUs, whom he iacerpreccd in an often i.ndepen.dcnt way. Conjlatttm ex sa 11cto Thoma, which last wa cited in Secci n 2 f Disputau n 47 '.
iles of Rome (aka Aegidiu Romanus, O.S.A. [ca. 1244/7-1316))-Phil sophcr Simplicius (ca. 490-560)-Neoplatonist philosopher. ~e lase h~ad of the Placomc
and theologian, a pupil of St. Thomas Aquinas, and larer Archbishop ofBourgcs. Academy in Athens. Author of important commemancs on Anstotle. .
Commented on Aristotle at the University of Pari before 1300. Soncinas, Paltl, O.P. (d. 1494)- Dominican philosopher, author of a much cited
Gregory ofRimini, O.S.A. (d. 1358)-Theologian, Minister General of the Augustin- "Metaphysical Questions" ( Quacstio11es metaphysical~s). .
ians, influenced by nominalism. Soto, Domingo de, O.P. (1494-1560)- Dominican philosopher and theologian .
Henry of Ghent ( 1217?-1293)- Belgia n, secular mast r of theology at Paris, influenced Among other works, I e authored commentaries n the lsagoge of Porphyry, as wcll
by St. Augustine and Avicenna, opposed on many poinrs by Duns Scotus. as the Categories and the Posterior Anaf:reics of Arisl tle.
Hervaeus Natal is, O.P. (aka Hcrv6 Ned6lcc [d. 1323])-Dominican theologian, Mas-
ter General of his Order, author of various worh including a "Treatise on Second
lncemions" (Tractatus de secmulis intemionibtis).
Hispalcnsis (aka.Diego Deza 0. P. [1444-1523]-Professor ofTheology at Salamanca,
Archbishop of Seville (l 505), patron of Christopher Columbus. His chief work was
Defimsioms Doctoris A11gelici, S. Th. Aquinatis (Seville, 1491).
]avclli, Chcysosrom, O.P. (cl. ca. 1538)-Philosophcr and theologian. He often fol -
lowed the opinions of Hcrvaeus Nata.Us.
Lychetus, Francis, O.F.M. (d. 1512)-Franciscan philosopher and theologian, principal
commentator on the works of Duns Scotus.
Marsilius oflnghen (ca. 1340-1396)-Philosopher and theologian at Paris and then
at Heidelberg. He was the first to receive a Magister's degree in Theology at Hei-
delberg.
Nifo, Agostino, (ca. 1470-1538)-Italian professor of Philosophy. Taught at Padua,
Naples, and Pisa. Commented on Averroes and Aristotle, especially the Metaphys-
ics.
Ockha.m, William of (ca. 1285 -1349)-Most important philosopher of the 14th
century. Principal medieval nominalist.
Petrus Aureoli (ca. 1280-1322)-Franciscan, Archbishop ofAix, regarded as nominal-
ist precursor of Ockham.
Plato (428-348 BC)-Greek philosopher, disciple of Socrates, and teacher of Aris-
totle.
Pseudo-Alexander of Hales (AlessandJO Bonini, O.P.M. [ca. 1270-1314])-Author
of a commentary on Aristotle' Metaphysicswblch was published at Venice in 1572
erroneously under the name of AJexandcr of HaJcs.
Peter the Lombard (ca. 1095-1160)-Bi hop of Paris autl1or of che "Smtmces," which
became the standard text for thco.logical instruction ac medieval universicies. As a
condicion for graduation all Masters of Theology were required ro write commen-
raries on th e Sentences of Perer ~he Lomba.rd.
Richard of Middlecon, O.F.M. (ca. 1249-1300/8)-Franciscan theologian.
Scotus,John Dw1s ( 1266- 1308)-"The Subtle Doctor," themostimportant Franciscan
philosopher and rhcologian.
 Bibliography
General Bibliographies
Iturrioz, J., "Bibliografla suareciana," Pensamiento, numero extraordinario (Madrid,
1948), 603ff.
Santos-Escudero, C., "Bibliograffasuarecianade 1948a1980," CuadernosSalmantinos
de Fi/1Jsofla, 7 (1980) , 337-75.
Schmutz, Jacob, avec la collaboration de Salvador Castellote Cubells, Francisco Sudrez,
S.j. (1548-1617: BibLiographie Genel'llle, Madrid, Derniere actualisation: 21 juillet
2003: at (hnp://www.ulb.ac.be/philo/scholasticon/bibsuarez.htm).

Latin Edition Principally Used in this Work

Suarez, Franciscus, S.J., Opera omnia, 26 vols., Paris: L. Vives, 1856-1866; plus two
volumes of indices, 1878.
Disputationes Metaphysicae (originally: 1597), Vols. 25-26 of Opera omnia (Vives),
reprinted: Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1965.

Spanish Translation of the Disputationes Metaphysicae

Francisco Su:ircz, Disputaciones mutaflsicas, 7 vols.. cdici6n y traducci n de Sergio
Rabade Romeo, Salvador Caballero Sanchez y Antonio Puice.rvcr Zan6n, Madrid:
Editorial Gredos, 1960-1966.

Various English Translations

from the Disputationes Metaphysicae
Suarez, Francisco, On the ~rious Kinds ofDistinctions (Disputatio 'VI[), tr. Cyril Vollert,
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1947.
_ _ _ _ ,On Formal and Universal Unity (Disputatio V[), tr. James F. Ross, Mil-
w<i.ukce: Marquette Onivcrsicy Press, 1964.
---~ Dirputatio V I11dividuaL Unity and its Principk, rr. Jorge J.E. Gracia, in
Sudtez ori !ndividuatiori, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982.
_ _ ___, On the Essencq ofFinite Bqing as Such, on the Existence ofthat Er.rmcc and
their Distinction (Disputatio XXXJ) , rra.nslated from the Latin with an Intr duction
by Norman J. Wells, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1983.
_ _ _ _ , The Metaphysics of Good and Evil according to Sudrez: Metaphysical Dis-
putations X and XI and Selected Passages ftom Disputation XXII and Other WOrks,
Translation with Introduction, Notes, and Glossary, byJorge J.E. Gracia and Douglas
Davis Milnchcn: Philosophia Verlag, 1989.
_ _ _ _ , On Efficient Causality:Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19, translated
by Alfred J. Preddoso, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
 412 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Bibliography 413
_ _ __, On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis): Metaphysical Disputation _ _ _ _, Introducing Semiotic: its History and Doctrine, Bloomington: Indiana
IJV. translated from the Lacin wirh an Introduction and Notes by John P. Doyle, University Press, 1982.
Milwauke : Marquerce University Press, 1995.
- - - - • Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy
- - - - • On Creation, Co11servatio11, a11d Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations from Ancient Times to the Turn ofthe Twenty-first Century, Toronto/Buffalo/London:
20, 21, a11d22, Translation, Nares, and Introduction by Alfred]. Freddoso, South
University ofToronto Press, 2001.
Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2000.
De Libera, Alain, La querelle des universaux de Platon a /,a fin du Moyen Age, Paris:
The Metaphysical Demonstration of the &istence of God (Metaphysical Editions du Seuil, 1996 .
.Disputntiom 28-29), translated and edited by John P. Doyle, South Bend, Indiana: Denzinger, Henricus, and Adolfus Schonmetzer, S.J., Enchiridion symbolorum deftni-
Sr. Augusrin ·'s Press, 2004.
tionum et declarationum de rebus ftdei et morum, editio xxxii, Barcinone/Friburgi/
_ _ _ _ , A Commentt11y ofAristotle's lvfct4j>lzysics (Index locupletissimus in Meta- Romae/ Neo-Eboraci: Herder, 1963.
physicam Aristotelis), trnnslatcd from the Larin wi-i:h an Illtroduction and Notes by Dibon, Paul, Laphilosophie neerlat1d11ise ausiecled'or, tome 1· L'enseignmentphilosophique
John P. Doyle, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004.
a
dans /es universites Lepoque precartesienne (1575-1650), Paris/Amsterdam/Lon-
dres/New York, 1954.
Further Reading Doig, James C., "Suarez, Descartes, and the Objective Reality of Ideas," The New
Alcorta, J.1., La Teorla de los modos en Sudrez, Madrid: CSIC-Instituro Luis Vives, Scholasticism, 51 (1977), pp. 350-71.
1949. Doyle.John P., The MetaphysfralNat.ttre ofthe Pl'ooffor God's Exirmzce acc()rdingto Francis
Bannad1, Klaus, "Relarione11: IhreTheorie in dersparmirrelalterlichen Theologie und bei Suarez, S.j, unpublished Ph.D. diss rtation, University ofToronto, 19 6.
Lu rhe1;" Freibttrger Zeitschrift fil1· Philosophie und Theologie, 47 (2000): 101-126. _ _ _ _ , "Suarez on the Reality of the Possibles," The Modem Schoolman, 44
Batun, M., "Relacion. lII Neuzeit," in Historisches WOrtcrbuch der Philosophie, Band 8 (1967): 29-40.
(Basel: Schwabe, 1971), cols. 595-602. _ _ _ _ , "Suarez on the Analogy of Being," The Modern Schoolman, 46 (1969):
Bos, Egbert P., "Francis ofMeyronnes on Relation and Transcendentals," in Miscellanea 219-249; 323-341.
Mediaevalia, Band 30: Die Logik des Transcendentalen (Festschrift far Jan A. Aertsen _ _ _ _ , "Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics," The Modern Schoolman, 49
zum 65. Geburtstag), ed. M. Pickave, pp. 32-36. (1972): 201-220.
Burns,]. Patout, ''.Action in Suarez," The New Scholasticism, 38 (1964): 453-72. ____ , "Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis
Copleston, Frederick, S.J., A History ofPhilosophy, vol. 3: Ockham to Suarez, West- Suarez, S.J.," Vivarium, 22, 2 (1984): 121-160.
minster, MD: Newman Press, 1953. _ _ _ _ , "Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth," Vivarium, 25, 1 (1987): 47-75;
Courtine, Jean-Fran~ois, Suarez et le systeme de la metaphysique, Paris: Presses Univer- 26, 1 (1988): 51-72.
sitaires de France, 1990. _ _ _ _ , "Suarez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit," The American Catholic
- - - - • "La doctrine cartesienne de l'idee et ses sources scolastiques," in Les Philosophical Quarterly, 65 (1991): 309-31.
categories de l'etre: Etudes de philosophie ancienne et medievale (Paris: PUP, 2003), _ _ _ _ ,"Suarez, Francisco," Routledge Encyclcpedia ofPhilosophy (London/New
pp. 241-65. York: Roudedge, 1998), vol. 9, pp. 189- 196.
Cronin, Timothy, S.J., Objective Being in Descartes and in Suarez, Rome: Gregorian _ _ _ _ , "Gedankendinge bei denJesuiten des 17. Jh.," inlmagi.nation-Fiktion-
University Press, 1966. /(reation: Das kultrmchajfemk ~rmogen dcr Phrmtasie, hrsg. von Thomas Dewender
Darge, Rolf, Sudrez' transzendentale Seinsauslegungunddie Metaphysiktradition, Leiden/ und Thomas Welt (Miinchen/Leipzig: K.G. Saur, 2003), pp. 213-228.
Boston: Brill, 2004. Erler, M., "Relation. I Antike," in Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie, Band 8
Decone, Jos, "Rdario a Modus Essendi: The Origins of Henry of Ghent's Definition (Basel: Schwabe, 1971), cols. 578-86.
o£Rdation," lntemationa/}oitrnal ofPhilosojJhical Studies, 10 (2002): 309-336. Eschweiler, Karl, "Die Philosophie der spanischen Spatscholastik auf der Universitaten
. , "Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent on rhc Reality of a Real Relacion," des 17 Jahrhunderts," in Spanische Forschungen der Gorresgesel!schaft, Munster i.W.:
m Documenti e Studi ml/a Jh1dizione jilosoficn medieval.e, 7 (1996): 183-211. Aschendorff, 1928, 251-325
Deely, J~1tn, 1i·actat'!-5 de ~ignis: The Semiotic ofJohn Poinsot. lnterprecive Arrange- Ferrater Mora, Jose, "Suarez and Modern Philosophy," Journal ofthe History ofIdeas,
ment ll1 consulraaon w1d1 Ralph Austin Powell, Berkeley: University of California 14 (1953): 528-43.
Press, 1985. Fichter, Joseph, Man a/Spain: Francis Suarez, New York: Macmillan, 1940 (A readable
biography in English).
414 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Bibliography 415

Fitzpatrick, Edward A., St. Ignatius and the Ratio Studiorum {New York and London: Honnefelder, Ludger, Scimtia tmnscmd~m: Die formate Bestimmung der Seiendh~it
McGraw-Hill, 1933 und Realitat in der Metaphysik du Mittelalters und der Neuzeit, Hamburg: Felix
Giacon, C., "Suarez, Francisco," Enciclopedia Filosofica, IV {Venezia/Roma: lnstituto Meiner Verlag, 1990. .
per la Collaborazione Culturale, 1957), cols. 1025-30. Iriarte, Joaqu{n, S.J., "La proyecci6n sobre Europa de una gran metafls1ca, o Suarez en
Gilson, Etienne, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd edition, Toronto: Pontifical Institute la filosofla de los dias del barocco," Razon y ft, 138 (1948): 229-65.
of Mediaeval Studies, 1952, especially pp. 96-120. Iturrioz, Jesus, S.J., Estudios sobre la metaflsica de Francisco Sudrez, Madrid: Ediciones
Goudriaan, Asa, Philosophische Gotteserkenntnis bei Sudrez und Descartes in Zusam- Fax, 1949. . .
menhang mit der niederliindischen reformierten Theologie und Philosophie des 17. _ _ _ _ ,"Fuentes de la metaflsica de Suarez," Pensamiento, numero extraordmano
jahrhunderts, Leiden/Boston/Kain: Brill, 1999. {Madrid, 1948): 31-89
Grabmann, Martin, "Die 'Disputationes Metaphysicae' des Franz Suarez in ihrer Jansen, Bernhard, S.J., "Die Wesenart der Metaphysik des Suarez," Scholastik, 15
methodischen Eigenwart und Fortwirkung," in Mittelalterisches Geistesleben, Vol. (1940): 161-85.
I, Milnchen: Hueber, 1926. Jansen, F., "Eucharistiques (Accidents)," in Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, 5, 2<
Gracia, Jorge J.E., editor, Francisco Sudrez, special issue, American Catholic Philosophical partie (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1939, cols. 1368-1452 . .
Quarterly, 65, 3 (1991). {Contains articles on various aspects of Suarez's work.) Junk, Nikolaus, Die Bewegungslehre des Franz Suarez, Innsbruck/Le1pz1g: F. Rauch,
Guy, Alain, "L'analogie de l'etre selon Suarez," Archives de Philosophie, 42 (1979): 1938. . ".
275-294. Klima, Gyula, "Ockham's Semantics and the Ontology of the Cat.egones, m .The
Heidegger, Martin, The Fundamental Concepts ofMetaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. Paul Vincent Spade {Cambridge: Cambndge
translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington and Indianapolis: University Press, 1999), pp. 118-42.
Indiana University Press, 1995. Kobusch, Theo, Sein und Sprache: Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache,
_ _ _ _ , Die Grundbegri.ffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit, in Leiden/New York: E.J. Brill, 1987.
Gesamtausgabe, 11 Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923-1944, Band 29/30, Frankfurt am , "Ens inquantum ens und ens rationis: ein aristotelisches Problem in der
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. --Ph-i-lo_s_o_phie des Duns Scows w1d Wilhelm von Ockham," in Aristotle in Bri~ain
Hellin, Jose, S.J., La analogia de/ ser y el conocimiento de Dios en Sudrez, Madrid: during the Middle Ages: P1weedi11gs of the Intemn.tiontll Conference at Ca":brzdg~,
Graficas Uguina, 1947. 8-11 April 1994 organized by the Societ! intemationale pour l'etude de la phzlosophte
_ _ _ _ , "Sohre el transito de la potentia activa al acto segun Suarez," Razon yfe, medievale, edited by John Marenbon (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996), pp. 157-17~
138 {1948): 353-407. Krempel, A., La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas, Paris: Librarie Philosoph1que
_ _ _ _ ,"El ente real y los posibles en Suarez," Espiritu, X (1961): 146-163. ]. Vrin, 1952.
_ _ _ _ , "Obtenaci6n de! concepto de! ente, objeto de la metaflsica," ibid., 17 Lewalter, Ernst, Spaiiische-jemitische und deutschlutherische Metaphysi~ des 17]ahrhun-
(1961): 135-154. derts, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967 {reprint of Hamburg,
_ _ _ _ ,"El concepto formal segun Suarez," Pensamiento, 18 {1962): 407-432. 1935).
_ _ _ _ , "Esencia de la relaci6n predicamental segun Suarez," Las Ciencias, 23 Marion, J.-L., "Entre analogie et principe de raison: la causa. sui," in J.-M.' Be~ss~de
(1958): 648-96. and J .-L. Marion (eds), Descartes. Objecter et repondre (Parts: Presses Umvers1ta1res
_ _ _ _ , "Principio de identidad comparada," Espiritu, 24 (1975): pp. 135-42. de France, 1994), pp. 305-334.
Henninger, Mark G., S.J., Relations, Medieval Theories 1250-1325, Oxford: Clarendon Mathieu, V., "Relazione," Enciclopedia Filosofica, IV {Venezia/Roma: Instituto per la
Press, 1989. Collaborazione Culturale, 1957), cols. 26-38.
Hoeres, W., "Francis Suarez and the Teaching of]ohn Duns Scotus on Univocatio entis," Mesnard, P., S .] ., "Comment Leibniz se trouva place dans le sillage de Suarez," Archives
in john Duns Scotus (1265-1965), ed. J.K. Ryan and B.M. Bonansea, Washington, de Philosophie, XVIII {1949): 7-32. . .
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1965. Michel, A., "Relations divines," Dictionnaire de Theologze Catholzque, tome XIII,
Hoffmann, Philippe, "Les Analyses de I'enonce categories et parties du discours selon deuxieme partie (Paris: LetouzeyetAne, 1937), cols. 2135-56.. .
!es commentateurs neoplatoniciens," in Theories de la phrase et de la proposition _ _ _ _ , "Hypostatique (Union),'' in Dictionnaire de theologze catholtque, tome
de Platon aAverroes, ed. P. Bilttgen et al. {Paris: Editions Rue d'Ulm, 1999), pp. septieme {Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1927), cols. 437-568.
209-48.
416 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Bibliography 417

_ _ _ _ , "Trinite, La theologie latine du VI0 au XX.0 siecle," Dictionnaire de Scorraille, Raoul de, S.J., Franrois Suarez de la Compagnie de Jesus, 2 vols., Paris:
Thlologie Catholique, tome XV, deuxieme partie (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1950), Lethielleux, 1912-13. (still the definitive biography of Suarez).
cols. 1702-1830. Seigfried, Hans, Wahrheit und Metaphysik bei Suarez, Bonn, 1967.
Mojsisch, B., "Relation. II Spatantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance," in Historisches South, J.B., "Francisco Suarez on Imagination," Vivarium, 39 (2001): 119-158 . .
Worterbuch der Philosophie, Band 8 (Basel: Schwabe, 1971), cols. 586-95. Spade, Paul Vincent, "Ockham's Distinction between Absolute and Connotative
Monnot, P., "Suarez, Frans:ois. I. Vie et oeuvres," in Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, Terms," Vivarium, 13 (1975): 55-76.
XIV, 2 partie (Paris, 1941) cols. 2638-2649.
0 Varii, Suarez en el cuarto centenario de su nacimiento (1548-1617), Pemamiento, 4,
Morison, Samuel Eliot, Harvard College in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: MA, numero extraordinario, Madrid, 1948.
Harvard University Press, 1936. Vezzosi, Giovanni, "Sulla relazione in San Tommaso: In dialogo con Krempel," Sapi-
Negro, Paola, "Intorno alle fonti scolastiche in Hugo Grotius," in Dalla prima al/a enza, 54 (2001): 489-96.
seconda Scolastica, a cura di A. Ghisalberti (Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Wells, Norman J., "Suarez, Historian and Critic of the Modal Distinction between Es-
2000), pp. 200-251 sential Being and Existential Being," The New Scholasticism, 36 (1962): 419-444.
Neid!, Walter M., Der Realitiitsbegriffdes Franz Suarez nach den Disputationes Meta- _ _ _ _ ,"Old Bottles and New Wine: A Rejoinder to J.C. Doig," The New Scho-
physicae, Milnchen, 1966. lasticism, LIII (1979-80): 515-23 .
Norefia, Carlos G., "Ockham and Suarez on the Ontological Status of Universal
Concepts," The New Scholasticism, LV (1981): 348-62.
- - - -. , "Suarez on the Eternal Truths, I and II," The Modern Schoolman, 58
(1980-81): 73-104 and 159-174. ,, .
_ _ _ _ , "Suarez on the Externality and Internality of Relations," Cuadernos ., "Material Falsity in Descartes, Arnauld, and Suarez, journal ofthe Hts-
Salmantinos de Filosofla, X (1983): 183-95.
----
tory ofPhilosophy, 22 (1984): 25-50.
_ _ _ _ ,"Heidegger on Suarez: The 1927 Marburg Lectures," International Philo- Werner, Karl, Franz Suarez und die Scholastik der letzten ]ahrhunderts, 2 vols., Re-
sophical Quarterly, 23:92 (1983): 407-24. gensburg, 1889. .
_ _ _ _ , "Suarez and Spinoza: the Metaphysics of Moral Being," Cuadernos Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17 jahrhunderts, Tubmgen: J.C. Mohr,
Salmantinos de Filosofla, 12 (1985): 163-82. 1939
_ _ _ _ ,"Suarez and the Jesuits," ibid.: 267-86. Zabalza Goicoecheandla, Miguel Angel, "RelaciOn" en Leibniz: significado y usos, Pam-
Owens, Joseph, C.Ss.R., The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, third plona: EUNATE, 1995.
edition (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978).
_ _ _ _ ,"The Real Distinction of a Relation from its Immediate Basis," in Sum-
maries ofPanel Discussions, American Catholic Philosophical Association, 3:Jh Annual
Meeting, April 20-21, 1965, Denver Colorado, pp. 14-20.
Pavur, Claude N ., S.J ., Ratio atque Institutio Studio rum Societatis ]esu: The Official Plan
for Jesuit Education, St. Louis: Institute for Jesuit Sources, 2005.
Pernoud, Mary Anne, "The Theory of the Potentia Dei according to Aquinas, Scotus
and Ockham, Antonianum, 47 (1972): 69-95.
Rast, Max, S.J., "Die Possibilienlehre des Franz Suarez," Scholastik, 10 (1935): 340-
68.
Robinet, A., "Suarez dans l'oeuvre de Leibniz," Cuademos Salmantinos de Filosofla,
VII (1980): 269-84.
_ _ _ _ ,"Suarez im Werk von Leibniz," Studia Leibnitiana, XIII (1981): 76-96.
Roig Gironella, Juan, S.J., "La analogla del ser en Suarez," Espiritu (Barcelona), 36:
95 (1987): 5-47.
Schmutz, Jacob, "La doctrine medievale des causes et la theologie de la nature pure,"
Revue Thomiste, 101(2001):217-264.
Schneider, Marius, O.F.M., "Der angebliche philosophische Essentialismus des Suarez,"
WissenschaftundWeisheit, 24 (1961): 40-68.
 Index of Names
Abraham de Balmes, 101 Boethius, 23, 247, 407
Albert the Great, 25, 407 Brentano, F., 15
Albert of Saxony, 67 Brown, S., 24
Alcorta,J., 100, 412 Buridan, J., 67
Alluntis, F. 25, 98, 143, 259-260 Biittgen, P., 23
Annibaldus Annibaldensis, 111
Anselm, St., 47, 63, 210 Caballero, S., 28
Antonio Andreas, 166, 174, 407 Cajetan (aka Tommaso de Vio), 51, 80,
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 10-11, 16, 20, 89, 96, 108, 126, 135, 139-140,
24,25,27,42,46,51,62,66-67, 152, 168, 170, 174,201-203,210,
73-74, 79-80,83,88,95, 103, 110, 214,220,223,235-236,241,275,
124-128, 134, 143-144, 157, 159, 333,337,347,407
164-165, 167-168, 170, 172-174, Capreolus, J., 46, 51, 80, 135, 152,
180, 185, 191, 197,200,203-204, 157-158,210,222,261,333,370,
210,213,215,236-237,239,244, 407
253,259-260,407-408,416 Castellote, S., 18, 411
Argyropolos, J., 18 Cathala, M.D., 24
Arias, L. 63 Cavellus (aka Hugh MacCaugwell), 166
Ariew, R, 14 Celluprica, V., 23
Aristotle, 78, 11, 15-22, 24-26, 30-31, Chiaradonna, R., 23
3941,43-44,46,49,58,63,6566, Clement of Alexandria, St., 23
6870, 7374,80,84-85,98, 100- Cottingham, J., 14
103, 107-109, 118, 125-126, 128, Cratylus, 19
131, 133-134, 137, 149-152, 154-
158, 160-161, 170-171, 174, 177, Damascene, St. John, 63, 251-252, 407
181-182, 184-189, 191-192, 195, D'Ancona, C., 23
198,200-205,213,216,220-221, Darge, R., 45, 74, 163, 193, 412
223,240,247,250,255,263,265, De Haas, F., 23
407-409,412,415 De Libera, A., 23, 413
Arriaga, R, 12, 207 Denzinger, H., 47, 96, 413
Aubenque, P., 23 Descartes, R., 1214, 412-415, 417
Augustine, St. 63, 247-248, 407-408, Descoqs, P., 71
412 Dewender, T., 136, 413
Averroes (aka Commentator), 16, Diaz Diaz, G., 114
22-23,39,45-46,269,272-273, Dibon,P., 13,413
407-408,414 Doyle, J., 3, 9, 18, 63, 72, 88, 202, 240,
Avicenna, 11, 45, 49, 84, 135, 191-192, 412413
292,407-408 Duhr, B., 12
Duns Scotus, John, 25-26, 33, 67, 89,
Bazzi, P. 51, 79, 124, 126, 135, 165, 98, 103, 135, 137, 143, 197, 259,
174,215,237,244 407-409,414-415
Bellarmine, R., 10 Durandus de SaintPoun;:ain, 53-56, 61,
Bessarion, N., 18 209,276-278,407
Boehner, Ph., 24
420 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation 421
Index
Echard, J., 62 John Major, 113 Norton, A., 14 Spade,P.,24, 73,415,417
Eschweiler, K., 12, 413 Junk, N., 15, 415 Oviedo, F., 12 Spiazzi, R., 24
Etzkorn, G., 61 Owens, J., 20, 416
Kalbfleisch, K., 23-24 Timpler, C., 13
Ferrara (aka Franciscus de Sylvestris Keckermann, B., 13 Paban, C., 46 Toletus, Franciscus (Francisco de To-
Ferrariensis), 51, 80, 126, 128, 135, Kelley, F., 61 Parmenides, 19 ledo), 71
165,203,222,258,289,408 Klima, G., 24, 415 Pattin, A. 23, 247 Trapp, A., 47, 61
Fichter, J., 9, 413 Kobusch, T., 22, 26, 415 Paul V, Pope, 10 Trombetta, A., 33
Fiering, N., 14 Krempel, A., 2425, 33-34, 415, 417 Pavur, C., 16, 416
Fitzpatrick, E., 1617, 414 Pegues, T. 46 Van Riet, S., 45, 49, 84, 135, 191
Fonseca, Pedro da, 18, 57-58, 150, 182, Lampe, E., 12 Pepin, J., 23 Vasquez, G., 207
185187, 193, 197,226,258,264, Laurent, P. M.H., 89, 96, 152, 235 Perler, 0., 23 Vollert, C., 56, 411
278,379,408 Ledesma, Martin de, 114 Pernoud, M. 42, 416
Francis of Mayronnes, 64, 135, 139, Ledesma, Pedro de, 114 Peter the Lombard, 17 Walker, N., 16, 414
166,408 Leibniz, G., 1415, 415-417 Petrus Aureoli, 119, 408 Walter Chatton, 25
Lequien, M., 63 Philip II, King, 9 Welt, T., 15, 136, 413
Gabriel Biel, 209, 407 Lewalter, E., 13, 415 Plato, 46, 62, 407-408 Wells, N., 58, 208, 411, 417
Gal, G., 24 Lossada, L. de, 12 Poinsot, J. (aka John of St. Thomas), 12, William of Ockham, 2425, 74, 408
Galen, 259 Lychetus, F., 166, 222, 376, 408 39,80,412 Wolff, C., 1415
George, R,15 Luther, M., 42, 409, 412 Porphyry, 409 Wolter, A., 25, 260
Ghisalberti, A., 13, 416 Puigcerver, A., 28 Wright, T., 14
Gilen, L., 14 Macken, R., 47, 82, 118-119, 211 Wundt, M., 13, 417
Giles of Rome, 25, 61, 211, 408, 412 Maggiolo, P., 66 Quetif, J., 62
Gilson, E., 11, 14-15, 166, 414 Malou, J.B., 10 Zannata. M., 43
Goudriaan, A., 13-14, 16, 414 Mancia, J., 9 Ra.bade Romeo, S., 28, 101, 188-189,
Gracia,]., 9, 411, 414 Mandonnet, P., 51, 62, 110-111, 165, 197,411
GregoryofRimini, 30, 46, 61, 67, 119, 191 Reiser, B., 12, 39
134, 150,200,206,209,408 Marcolina, V., 47, 61 Richard of Campsall, 25
Grotius, H., 13, 416 Marega, M., 139-140 Robinson, E., 16
Marenbon, J., 26, 415
Heidegger, M., 1516, 413-414, 416 Marsilius oflnghen, 209, 408 Scheibler, C., 1314
Hellin, J., 71, 414 Martini, J., 13, 209 Schmitt, F. 47, 63
Henry of Ghent, 47, 81, 84, 118, 211, Maurer, A., 25, 64 Schmutz, J., 9, 411, 416
408,412 Mauro, S., 12 Schonmetzer, A., 47, 96, 413
Heraclitus, 19 McNeill, W., 16, 414 Schopenhauer, A., 15
Hervaeus Natalis, 23, 62, 75, 81, 408 McQuarrie, J., 16 Scorraille, R de, 9, 417
Hispalensis (aka Diego Oeza), 80, 131, Melanchthon, P., 12, 114 Seidl, H., 185
157158,211,220,222,261,376, Michel, A., 71, 96, 241, 415 Silvester (Mazzolini aka Prierias, O.P.),
408 Miller, P.,14 61,409
Hoffmann, P., 23, 414 Moerbeke, William of. 18, 23, 247 Simplicius, 2224, 46, 247, 273, 409
Hurtado de Mendoza, P., 12 Molina, L., 10 Soncinas, 8081, 126, 135, 139140, 143,
Monnot, P., 9, 416 152, 165,213,222,253,327,371,
Ignatius of Loyola, St., 9, 12, 16-17, Morison, S., 14, 416 409
414 Sorell, T., 14
Iriarte, J., 12-13, 415 Negro, P., 13, 416 Soto, 0., 46, 57, 102, 220, 273, 304,
lturrioz, J., 11, 411, 415 Nifo, A., 139, 222, 408 409
Javellus, Chrysostomus, 57 Norefia, C., l, 416 South, J., 137, 412, 417
 Index of Subjects
Absolute and relative, 7, 19-21, 29, 32 Categorical versus Transcendental Rela-
Absolute Accidents, 29, 51, tion, 7, 29,
Absolute Power of God, 30, 42, 64, 129, Categorical Relation, 7, 21, 28-30,
141, 179, 236 51,55-57,59-60,86-87,91-95,
Abstract and Concrete Speaking of Rela- 97-100, 107, 110, 117, 123, 133-
tion, 118 135, 137-138, 140-141, 151, 173,
Accident, 11, 20, 22, 30, 43, 47, 49, 175, 184, 190, 199,205,224,228,
53-55, 71-72, 79,81-83,89-90, 230-231,248,250
92,94-95, 100, 104, 107-113, 117- Categories, 7, 11, 19-26, 31, 39-41,
121, 124-125, 127, 134, 138, 174, 43-45,49,58, 74, 76, 79,81,84,
179,210-212,229,255,258 86-87,89,99-102, 107-109, 111,
Action, 8, 21-22, 24-25, 44, 55-56, 134, 138, 152, 156, 164-165, 167,
66-70, 74, 76,93,96-99, 125, 129- 170, 183-184,220,246-247,249-
131, 136, 141, 150-151, 155-156, 250,253,255,263-264,409,412,
159, 164-165, 168, 171, 177-183, 414-415
192, 199,204,209,213,215-216, Causes of a Relation, 158
250-251,257,412 Change or Mutation and relation, 19-
Active and Passive, 150, 159, 182-183, 20, 63, 65-73, 76
192,251 Christ, 2728, 96, 181, 236237, 239
Active and Passive Potency, 150, 182, Classes of Relatives, 149
192,251 Coexistence of Absolutes, 154, 195-196
Actual Existence, 93, 133, 136, 219, Conditions for Categorical Relation, 91,
227 129-131, 133, 155, 228
Agent, 25, 31, 60, 68-69, 93, 98-99, Connotation, 26, 193
129-130, 155-156, 180-183, 199, Continuum, 143, 145-146, 328
204 Contrary, 30, 32, 44, 102, 127-128,
Analogical Unity as founding a Relation, 142, 166, 187, 192,203,241,243,
173 257,260,263-264
Analogy, 43, 72, 81, 83, 85, 158, 173- Convertibility, 264-265
174, 183, 413 Coordination, Constitution, or Genus
Antepredicaments, 101 of the Category of Relation, 177,
Appetite, 156, 191-192 245-253
Appetible, 156, 191, 193 Correlatives, 140, 144, 201, 205, 234,
Aptitudinal Inherence, 89 239-240,246,248,252,259
Aristotle's Divisions of Being, 22, 39, Creator, 42, 60, 77, 209-210, 215, 224,
Arithmeticians, 154, 167 226,232,270,288,369,373,379
Creatures, relation to God, 63, 174,
Being of Reason, 7, 11, 21, 26, 81-83, 200,214,224-225
85,91,93, 119, 133, 136-137, 152
Being in and being toward, 29, 70-71, Definitions (first and second) of Rela-
110 tion, 7, 28-29,
Blessed Virgin Mary, 5, 27-28, 42, 181, Dependence in Being, 160
239,416 Desiring, 19 3
424 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation 425
Index
Disposition toward, 33, 58, 60, 80, 231-232,236,239,241-242,247, Incarnation, 77 Measure, 8, 21, 27, 31, 81, 102, 151,
84-93,96,98, 102, 109-110, 112, 254-261,407 Infinity, 143, 145 156-157, 159-160, 185-190, 192-
137, 144, 154-156, 159, 175, 180, Filiation or Sonship, 105, 118, 120, Inherence, 53-56, 89, 98, 212 194, 200, 206, 227, 250-251
204-205,216,235,247 168-169,221,228,236-237,239, Intellect and the Intelligible, 151, 161 Measuring, 156
Disquiparence, 247, 252 242,258 Intelligible Species, 183 Middle Distinction, 58
Distance, 55, 157 Final Cause, 107, 117, 133, 157, 195, Intension and/or Remission, 153, 171- Modal Distinction, 53-54, 57-61, 145,
Distinction between a Foundation and a 200,216 172, 256, 264 212,417
Subject of a Relation, 30 First Class of Relations (founded in Intrinsic Denomination, 60, 175 Mode,28,49,55-59,62-65,69, 71,
Distinction between a Relation and its number or unity), 154, 163 73, 75-77,82-83,87-88,90,93,
Foundation, 29, 52, 61 Formal Cause, 117, 145, 157, 195, 219, Knowable, 4344, 95, 100, 102, 112, 95,97-99, 104-105, 115, 117, 120,
Distinction of the Reasoned Reason, 29, 234 130, 133, 135, 151, 155, 158, 125, 127-129, 138, 141, 145-146,
Distinction of Reason, 29, 58-59, 61, Formal Distinction, 56-9, 91, 158-159, 185-187, 189, 191-193, 198-199, 155, 160, 164, 172, 174-175, 179,
64, 74, 76,92, 153, 169,204,261 173 201-206,215,222-225,233,265 188-189, 192, 194,201,204,209,
Distinction of Categories, 74 Formal Effect of a Relation, 112-113, Knower, 21, 26, 95, 111, 191 211-212,215,227,237,239,242-
Divine Action ad extra, 130 116, 141 Knowledge (or Science), 13, 21, 24, 243,254-255,260,263,265
Divine Concurrence, 70, 412 Formal Unity, 42, 130, 152, 163, 167, 32,39,43-44,91-93,95,99-103, More or Less, 32, 263-264
Divine Word, 96, 146, 157, 200 228,231 109, 111, 130, 133, 135-136, 151, Mother, 5, 28, 32, 181, 236, 257-260
Divine Persons, 63, 144, 214, 252 Foundation of a Relation, 8, 28-32, 155-156, 158, 160, 185-187, 189, Motion, 19-20, 25, 67-68, 96-97, 141,
Divine Relations, 104-105 112, 123, 125, 128, 130, 152, 159, 191-192, 198-199,201-208,215, 165, 169, 171,204
Division of Categorical Relation, 7, 28, 163,206,232 220-221,223-225,227-228,233, Mutual and non-Mutual Relations, 32,
30, Future Action, 151, 177-178 237-240,255,265 54,56,77, 119, 166, 192, 197,200-
Dominion of God, 213 Knowledge and the Knowable, 43-44, 201,216,220,222-223,228-235,
General and Particular Relation, 118, 100, 130, 135, 151, 185-187, 189, 238-239,243,251-252
Efficient Cause, 107, 157, 194, 200, 245-254 191, 193, 198-199,201-206,215,
209 Generic Similarity, 153, 166, 173 223-225,233,265 Nearness, 48, 55, 157, 195-196
Equality,27,31,66, 120, 123, 125- Generic Unity as Founding a Relation, Knowledge ofVision, 207 Negative Unity, 152
126, 128, 144-145, 149, 153, 168, 172-173 Nominalists, 31, 61, 73, 200, 209
171-172, 174, 188, 197-198,250, Genus and Species, 85, 101, 173 Last Six Categories, 7, 21-22, 24-25, Number, 8, 17, 77, 103, 149, 152, 154,
264 Genus of Relation, 85, 229, 246, 250, 44, 74,99 160, 163, 172-175, 181, 194, 197-
Equiparence, 197-198, 229, 243, 257 Light, 12, 24-26, 67, 164, 199 198, 208, 253-255, 258, 260
247-248,252 Goatstag, 135, 177, Likeness, 52, 55-56, 62-65, 72, 75,
Essential Being, 9293, 133 God's relation to creatures, 8, 209-211 81-83,91,94, 143, 145-146, 167, Objects, existing and non existing,
Eucharist, 114 God's Knowledge and Love, 215 171, 174, 195,200 91-92
Existential Being, 57, 93, 417 Goodness, 18, 26, 91, 157, 192-193, Lord,42, 77,209,215,236-238 Objective Being, 93, 412
Extremes of a Relation, 32, 118, 233,263 Love,91,93, 156-157, 166, 191-193, Objective Termination, 194
177-179, 184, 197-201,204-206, Grammar, 41, 43 215,227 One Relation founded upon another, 31
209-210,213,215,216-217 Gravity, 6768, 70, 88, 95 Lovable, 156157, 191-193 Operative Habits, 88
Extrinsic Denomination, 41, 4748, 60, Greater or lesser, 48, 198, 210, 252 Order of Doctrine, 39
77, 91, 134, 155, 160, 175, 179- Master and Slave, 252 Order of the Universe, 48
180, 193,219,224,234,238,413 Hypostatic Union, 9697, 146 Maternity, 2728, 236, 239 Order to a Terminus, 253
Extrinsically Occurring (or Arriving) Material Cause, 117, 128, 157, 195, Ordinable, 233
Relations, 98, 230 Identity, 31, 53, 61, 65, 71, 92, 94, 253,259
125-126, 143, 145-147, 149, 151- Matter and Form, 87, 128, 146, 240 Passion, 21-22, 24-25, 44, 68, 74, 76,
Father, 27, 32, 48, 60, 97, 103, 111, 153, 160, 168, 171-172, 183, 195, Measurable, 102, 130, 151, 159, 93,96-97, 182-183,204,251
115, 118, 121, 129-130, 145, 150, 198,212,227,255 185-189 Past Action, 150, 155, 178-181
155, 166, 168-169, 179-182,203, Imagination, 136-137, 417 Paternity,27,31,48,91,97, 105, 112,
207-208,210,221,228-229, Impossible Objects, 136, 174, 177 114-116, 118, 121, 129-130, 158,
 427
426 Francisco Suarez: Metaphysical Disputation 47, On Real Relation Index
166-170, 178-181,228,232,236, Relative "according to being said," 44, Subsisting Relations, 63, 241
241,243,254-255,258,261 85-86 Substance, 11, 20-24, 29-30, 40, 43,
Patient, 93, 156, 182-183, 204 Relatives as distinguished from Rela- 47--48,51, 56,67,87,90,94, 120,
PotencyandAct, 92, 128, 161, 199, tions, 118 123-128, 149, 153, 164, 171, 179,
240,256 Remote Subject of a Relation, 115, 120, 200,207,210-212,214,228,259
Potency and Habit, 184, 201 Resultance, 64, 66-67, 69-70, 105, Supposit, 120-121, 145, 179.
Power, 207 117, 239 Summa totius /ogicae Aristotelts, 62, 73
Predestination, 207 Right and Left, 200, 216-217
Privation, 91, 152, 177-178, 181, 217 Terminology of Relation, 7, 33, 55
Providence, 207 Science, 100, 102, 130, 133, 167, 187 Terminus of a Relation, 8, 140, 144,
Process to Infinity, 94, 143, 146, 165, Second Class of Relations (founded in 150, 199,206,219,249-250
167, 170-171, 173, 212 action and passion), 31, 177, 182, Third Class of Relations (between the
Productive and Producible, 133 187, 194, 196,206 measurable and the measure), 31,
Properties of Relatives, 263 Semiotic, 80 186-187,206
Proximate Foundation of a Relation, Sense and Sensible, 198 Touching, 56, 96, 191
112, 125 Separability of a Relation, 52, 75 "Toward Something," 8, 19, 29, 3233,
Sight and the Seeable, 151, 188 39,41,43--44,46,57-58,62--03,
Quantity, continuous and discrete, 172, Similarity, 31, 52, 65, 73-74, 111-112, 65, 71, 79-81,83-89,93, 100-104,
175 118, 120, 125-126, 128, 130, 149, 107-109, 111, 134, 149, 151, 158-
152-153, 158, 160, 164, 166, 170- 159, 164, 177, 182, 186-188, 198,
Real and Rational Relation, 29, 173, 183, 187, 194, 198,228-229, 202,205,220,245-249,251-252,
Real Relations, 7, 24, 27-29, 31, 45--49, 231,233,250,258-259,264 255
76, 80-81, 83, 103, 110, 135, Simultaneity in Definition, 32, 220- Trinity, 7, 2728, 47, 111, 261
143-144, 150, 153, 158, 166, 174, 221, 240 Truth, measure of, 81, 102, 156, 192-
188-189, 191,203,205,209-212, Simultaneity in Nature, 32, 220, 193
243,251 233-234
Real Distinction, 11, 21, 30, 51-54, Simultaneity in Knowledge, 32, 220, Union, 55-56, 77, 93, 96-98, 112,
57-59, 76-77,91, 143-145, 163, 237-240 128-129, 137, 146-147, 157, 194-
166,200,255-256,416 Son, 12,32,48,96, 111, 115-116, 195, 200, 256, 415
Reason of Founding, 30, 128-131, 152, 118, 121, 129, 145, 151, 155, 166, Unity of a Composite, 174, 195,
155, 168, 178, 182, 195, 197, 201, 168-169, 179, 181,203,221,232, 256-257
206,216,231,242,251 236,241-242,247,254-260 Univocity and Relations, 79-83, 250
Relation as Least in Being or Entity, 39 Species, 11, 43, 79, 85, 88, 96, 101-
Relations as Principles of Acting, 99, 102, 117, 125, 130, 139, 149-150, Whiteness, 24, 52, 62, 64--05, 74-75,
156, 199,204 152-154, 157, 159-160, 170-173, 91,94, 112-113, 115, 120, 125,
Relations founded in Multitude, Dis- 181, 183, 185, 188,203,214,216, 130, 133, 143, 146, 153-154, 172,
tinction, or Diversity, 149, 152, 158, 243,245,247,250,252-253,255, 198,228,231
163, 174,251 257-258,260,271,289,304,313, Will and Beings of Reason, 137
Relations in God, 8, 27, 31, 166, 331-332,335,337,339,346,355,
207-209 393,397,399,402
Relations of Reason, 21, 40, 72, 76, Species lntelligibilis, 183
80-81, 83, 108-110, 134, 155, 158, Specific Similarity, 153, 173,
163, 188,204,209-210,227 Spiration, 166, 242, 261
Relative "according to being", 44, 85-86 Subject Matter, 11, 192, 228
Relative Denomination, 41, 53, 65--06, Subject of a Relation, 30, 118, 121, 123
73, 75, 77, 138, 171, 176, 179, 184, Subordinated Subjects of a Relation,
186 120