COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, BOMBAY V.
GORDHANDAS BHANJI, AIR 1952 SC 16
Gordhandas Bhanji sought to establish a cinema house on a specific parcel of land in Andheri
in 1945. Notably, Andheri was not then a part of Bombay and, per prevailing regulations,
necessitated approval from the District Magistrate in the form of a No Objection Certificate
respondent filed an application on September 12, 1945, seeking such permission. However,
the District Magistrate declined the request on September 30, 1945, citing objections from the
local public and the existence of an extant cinema theatre in Andheri, deeming another
unnecessary "for the present."
Subsequently, Andheri was incorporated into Greater Bombay, shifting administrative
oversight to the Commissioner of Police. Reapplying to the Commissioner of Police, Bhanji
encountered repeated rejection based on identical grounds. Following a third attempt, the
Commissioner of Police referred the matter to the Government of Bombay for a
determination.
The Government of Bombay constituted a Cinema Advisory Committee (CAC) tasked with
advising on the desirability and licensing of cinema establishments. Notably, the Committee's
recommendations lacked binding authority over the Government. After inspecting the locale,
the CAC initially opposed the cinema's construction due to proximity to four schools. Yet,
within a month, the CAC altered its position, favouring approval.
Subsequently, the Commissioner of Police granted permission, but faced opposition from
public protests and correspondences urging the Government to block the construction.
Consequently, the Government of Bombay intervened, revoking the cinema license, and
instructing the Commissioner of Police to affect the cancellation. The Commissioner of
Police notified Bhanji of the license cancellation in response to instructions from the
Government.
The discretion vested in the Commissioner of Police under Rule 250 1 is conferred upon him
for public reasons concerning the convenience, safety, morality, and welfare of the public at
large. This enabling power, granted for public benefit, is coupled with a duty to exercise it
when circumstances warrant. This duty cannot be avoided, neglected, or evaded; its
fulfilment can be compelled under section 45 of the Rules for Licensing and Controlling
Theatres and Other Places of Public Amusement in Bombay City, 19142.
1
S 250, Rules for Licensing and Controlling Theatres and Other Places of Public Amusement in Bombay City,
1914
There was an objection raised that performance cannot be compelled for another reason. It
was argued that section 45 is limited to duties that must be performed or refrained from
"under any law for the time being in force."
Legal counsel representing Bhanji corresponded with both the Commissioner of Police and
the Government. The Commissioner of Police cited Government directives as the rationale
for the license revocation, whereas the Government attributed the decision to public protests.
Under the existing regulatory framework, the Commissioner of Police possessed
discretionary authority to grant, refuse, or revoke licenses concerning cinema establishments.
the Supreme Court of India articulated a crucial principle regarding the interpretation of
public orders issued by statutory authorities. The Court held that when a public authority
issues an order under statutory authority, such orders must be construed objectively based on
the language used in the order itself. The subsequent explanations provided by the officer
regarding their intentions or thoughts at the time of issuing the order cannot be used to
reinterpret the order.
The rationale behind this principle is that public orders are intended to have a direct and
immediate impact on the actions and conduct of those to whom they are directed. Therefore,
the validity and interpretation of such orders must be assessed solely based on the content and
language of the order when it was issued.
This principle was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election
Commissioner3, emphasizing that when a statutory functionary issues an order based on
specific grounds, the validity of the order must be assessed based on those reasons alone. It is
impermissible to supplement the original grounds with additional justifications presented
later, such as through affidavits or subsequent explanations.
The Court's reasoning underscores the importance of maintaining transparency and
consistency in the exercise of statutory powers. Allowing post hoc justifications or
explanations could potentially validate orders that were originally flawed or invalid, thereby
undermining the rule of law and the accountability of public authorities.
In its decision, the Court drew support from a passage authored by Wade and Forsyth in their
work "Administrative Law,"4 specifically under the heading "Surrender, Abdication,
2
S 45, Rules for Licensing and Controlling Theatres and Other Places of Public Amusement in Bombay City,
1914
3
(1978) 1 SCC 405
4
Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law (7th Edition) 358-359
Dictation" and the sub-heading "power in the wrong hands." The excerpt from Wade and
Forsyth underscores the principle that any arrangement whereby a power conferred upon one
authority is effectively exercised by another—either by sharing the power or submitting to
external wishes or instructions—renders the resulting decision ultra vires (beyond the
authority) and void.
This concept of improper delegation or abdication of authority reflects the courts' strict stance
on ensuring that powers granted by Parliament are exercised only by the designated or
appropriate authority. The courts are stringent in applying this principle, even condemning
administrative arrangements that may appear reasonable to those implementing them but
undermine the statutory framework.
Ministers and government departments have also been found to transgress this rule, despite
their expectations to the contrary, highlighting the legal doctrine's unwavering application in
administrative law. The passage underscores the significance of upholding proper authority
and decision-making processes to maintain the integrity and legality of administrative actions
within the framework of parliamentary legislation.
The legal principle reiterated in the excerpt emphasizes the importance of assessing the
validity of an administrative order based solely on the reasons articulated at the time of its
issuance. According to this principle, if a statutory functionary makes an order citing specific
grounds, the validity of that order must be determined based on the reasons explicitly
mentioned in the order itself.
The rationale behind this principle is to prevent the retrospective validation of potentially
flawed or unlawful orders through the introduction of new justifications or explanations after
the fact. Allowing fresh reasons, such as those presented in affidavits or otherwise, to
supplement the original grounds could obscure the true basis for the decision and undermine
accountability in administrative actions.
The court in this case underscores that public orders made by public authorities are intended
to have a direct and immediate impact on the conduct of those affected. Therefore, the
language used in the order itself must be the basis for interpreting and assessing its validity,
rather than subsequent explanations or interpretations offered by the issuing officer.
The analogy of orders not improving with age, akin to old wine, serves as a caveat against
attempts to retroactively justify or modify administrative decisions through post-hoc
explanations. This principle reinforces the need for transparency, consistency, and objectivity
in administrative decision-making, ensuring that the legal and procedural integrity of such
actions is preserved.
The court, drawing upon established jurisprudence, held that evasion or avoidance of a
demand for justice is sufficient to constitute a denial. In England, a refusal need not be
explicit; it is enough to demonstrate a clear determination by the party in question not to
comply with the demand5. Similarly, in the United States, a demand is not necessary if it
would be a futile formality6. The legal principle in India aligns with this approach, requiring a
demand and a substantive denial, although neither needs to be expressed explicitly. Thus, the
criteria of section 46 were satisfied in this case.
As a result, the court held the appeal substantively failed, although modifications to the High
Court's order were necessary. The High Court directed the Commissioner of Police to
"withdraw the order of cancellation" purportedly issued by him. However, the court
determined that the Commissioner did not issue such an order, and even if he had, the
directive to withdraw it would not be appropriate due to the discretionary powers vested in
him under Rule 2507.
Therefore, the court substituted the High Court's order with the following directive:
The Commissioner of Police was directed to consider the requests submitted to him for the
cancellation of the license authorized by his letter. After evaluating all relevant factors and
applying his own judgment, he is to issue a clear and definitive order either cancelling or
denying the cancellation of the said license, exercising the absolute discretion conferred
upon. This directive ensures that the Commissioner exercises his discretionary authority in a
considered and unambiguous manner, based on a comprehensive evaluation of the
circumstances surrounding the license cancellation request.
The Supreme Court, in its subsequent position on the legal principle outlined in the
referenced cases, particularly Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v.
P.C. Kakkar8, has underscored the critical importance of providing reasons for administrative
or quasi-judicial decisions. This emphasis on recording reasons serves to replace subjectivity
with objectivity in decision-making processes. The Court's rationale behind this requirement
5
Halsbury’s Laws of England (Hailsham edn) 772
6
Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 281
7
S 250, Rules for Licensing and Controlling Theatres and Other Places of Public Amusement in Bombay City,
1914
8
Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank & Ors. vs. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364
is multifaceted. First, the articulation of reasons is essential to ensure transparency and
accountability in the exercise of statutory powers. When decisions lack articulated reasons,
they present an "inscrutable face of the sphinx," rendering it exceedingly difficult for courts
to perform appellate functions or exercise judicial review effectively. The right to reasons is
fundamental in a fair judicial system, as it enables affected parties to understand why a
decision has gone against them—a key tenet of natural justice.
Furthermore, requiring the recording of reasons by administrative or quasi-judicial authorities
serves to prevent arbitrary decision-making and promotes fairness in the decision-making
process. This requirement applies universally to all decisions made by such authorities and is
not limited to decisions subject to appeal, revision, or judicial review. It is important to note
that while the reasons provided need not be as elaborate as those found in a court judgment,
they must be clear and explicit enough to demonstrate that the authority has duly considered
the relevant points of contention. Therefore, it is an essential requirement of the rule of law
that administrative or quasi-judicial orders include some articulated reasons, even if brief, to
uphold principles of fairness, transparency, and accountability in governance and decision-
making.
