DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KOTA BHARU

DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM, MALAYSIA

DALAM PERKARA KEBANKRAPAN NO: DA-29NCC-212-05-2020

Ber: Amirul Syamil bin Mohamad Nizami

[No. K/P: 941127-03-6479] …Penghutang Penghakiman

Ex-Parte: Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad

[No. Syarikat: 6175-W] …Pemiutang Penghakiman

ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN

Pendahuluan

[1] Ini adalah merupakan rayuan oleh Penghutang Penghakiman ke

atas keputusan Penolong Kanan Pendaftar (“PKP”) kepada Hakim
Dalam Kamar di bawah A 56 k 1 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012
(“KKM 2012”). Ia adalah berkaitan keputusan PKP ke atas
Kandungan 36 yang menolak permohonan Penghutang
Penghakiman untuk membatalkan Notis Kebankrapan Terpinda
bertarikh 21/5/2020 (“Notis Kebankrapan tersebut”) yang telah
difailkan oleh Pemiutang Penghakiman.

[2] Notis Kebankrapan tersebut adalah berlanjutan daripada

Penghakiman yang telah direkodkan di Mahkamah Sesyen Kota
Bahru di dalam kes Guaman Sivil No : DA-A52M-233-11/2018 pada

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 25/6/2020 (“Penghakiman tersebut”). Di dalam kes tersebut,
Penghutang Penghakiman sebagai Defendan Ketiga disaman di
atas kapasiti rakan kongsi kepada satu perkongsian iaitu Defendan
Pertama bersama seorang lagi rakan kongsi iaitu Defendan Kedua.

[3] Tindakan kebankrapan telah diambil ke atas kedua-dua rakan

kongsi secara berasingan. Bagi rakan kongsi yang kedua, Kes
Kebankrapan adalah didaftarkan di atas nombor DA-29NCC-211-
05/2020 bagi jumlah penghakiman yang sama.

Bidangkuasa Mahkamah di dalam rayuan ini

[4] Kuasa mahkamah di peringkat ini telah diperjelaskan oleh

Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Tuan Haji Ahmed Abdul
Rahman v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 CLJ 241 yang
diperturunkan seperti berikut;

“With respect, in appeals to a Judge in chambers from the

decision of a Registrar of the High Court, the Judge is not
exercising appellate jurisdiction in the same sense as when
he hears appeals from judgments, decisions or orders of the
Subordinate Courts.

Such appeals from decisions of the Registrar are by way of

an actual re-hearing and the Judge treats the matter as
though it comes before him for the first time.

The Judge is therefore not confined to the points taken before

the Registrar so that the rule about new points being not

2
 generally open to an Appellant to take on appeal does not
apply.

In support, we would refer to the following passage in the

judgment of Payne J in Blundell v. Rimmer [1971] 1 AER 1072
(1076):

“I understand that the arguments before me ranged over a

wider ground than those advanced by the parties' solicitors to
the district registrar, and it was contended by Counsel for the
plaintiff that I was fettered by the proceedings before the
district registrar and confined to the arguments which were
presented to him; that no point could be raised before me
which was not raised below.

It is, I think, clear on authority that the appeal from the district
registrar is a rehearing of the application and I am entitled to
treat the matter as though it comes before me for the first time;
moreover, that I am not fettered by the previous exercise of
the district registrar's discretion, although I should, of course,
give to it the weight which it deserves.

Authority can be found for this proposition in the speech of

Lord Atkin in Evans v. Bartlam and in the notes in The
Supreme Court Practice 1970 at p. 759 para 58/1/2, p. 762
para 58/ 4/1, under RSC O. 58 rr. 1 and 4.”

[5] Mahkamah turut merujuk kes Seloga Jaya Sdn Bhd v.

Pembenaan Keng Ting (Sabah) Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 CLJ 716 yang
telah menerima pakai keputusan kes Evans v. Bartlam [1937] AC
473, yang menyatakan:

3
 "The power to set aside a judgment obtained on default of
appearance is given to the Court or a Judge under RSC Order
XIII, r. 10, and a similar power extending to judgments by
default under any rule is given by RSC O. XXVII, r. 15. It is a
power entrusted to the discretion of the Court or Judge, and
by RSC Order LIV, r. 12, the master is given jurisdiction to
exercise the discretion. As to the limits of the discretion, if any,
it may be necessary to say a word or two later. I stay only to
mention a contention of the respondent that, the master
having exercised his discretion, the Judge in chambers should
not reverse him unless it was made evident that the master
had exercised his discretion on wrong principles. I wish to
state my conviction that, where there is a discretionary
jurisdiction given to the Court or a Judge, the Judge in
chambers is in no way fettered by the previous exercise of the
master's discretion. His own discretion is intended by the rules
to determine the parties' rights and he is entitled to exercise it
as though the matter came before him for the first time. He
will, of course, give the weight it deserves to the previous
decision of the master, but he is in no way bound by it. This,
in my experience, has always been the practice in chambers,
and I am glad to find it confirmed by the recent decision of the
Court of Appeal in Cooper v. Cooper [1936] WN 205, with
which I entirely agree."

[6] Apabila ianya didengar serta diputuskan sebagai satu perbicaraan

semula, ia masih lagi tertakluk kepada keterangan-keterangan yang
ada di hadapan mahkamah ini. Perkara ini disentuh oleh Mahkamah
Rayuan di dalam kes Yu Gui v Jefferey Law Siew Su & ors [2016]
1 MLJ 102 apabila mahkamah menyatakan;

4
 “We would add that provision that an appeal is a rehearing
means it is a rehearing of what is placed in evidence before
the trial court, and the High Court intervenes in accordance
with s. 29 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 that "All civil
appeals from a subordinate court shall be by way of rehearing,
and the High Court shall have the like powers and jurisdiction
on the hearing of appeals as the Court of Appeal has on the
hearing of appeals from the High Court", and the Rules of
Court.”

Hujahan Penghutang Penghakiman

[7] Peguam Penghutang Penghakiman menghujahkan bahawa Notis

Kebankrapan tersebut adalah tidak sah kerana ianya berbeza
dengan jumlah serta terma Penghakiman tersebut. Ini kerana
jumlah Penghakiman tersebut menyatakan jumlah sebanyak RM
174,427.89 sedangkan Notis Kebankrapan tersebut menyatakan
jumlah sebanyak RM 181,024.11. Perbezaan ini adalah
bersandarkan kepada pengiraan pampasan ataupun ta’widh yang
dipertikaikan oleh Penghutang Penghakiman kerana ianya
bersandarkan kepada keseluruhan jumlah prinsipal iaitu sebanyak
RM 150,000.00 sedangkan terma penghakiman tersebut
menyatakan pengiraan sewajarnya ke atas baki prinsipal.

[8] Asas penghujahan Penghutang Penghakiman adalah

bersandarkan kepada subseksyen 3(1) Akta Insolvensi 1967 dan
keputusan Mahkamah Agung di dalam kes Low Mun v Chung
Khiaw Bank Ltd [1987] CLJ (Rep) 172 yang memutuskan;

5
 “The Bankruptcy Act provides expressly that the notice must
be to pay the judgment debt "in accordance with the terms of
the judgment". Thus in In Re HB [1904] 1 KB 94 a bankruptcy
notice was held to be bad if found not according to its terms
but on some agreement which modified the terms of the
judgment, and therefore not in accordance with the terms of
the judgment. Consequently, we are of the view that when you
have the judgment in the usual form that we have here, a
bankruptcy notice under the Act must require payment of
quantified sum or sums alleged to be due according to the
terms of the judgment as at the date of issue of bankruptcy
notice. The duty is on the creditor to state the correct amount
due, and there is no obligation imposed on the debtor to make
inquiries if the amount demanded is ambiguous or
unascertained. By demanding payment for unspecified sums
in the bankruptcy notice, we hold that such demand is not in
accordance with the judgment, and applying the rule of strict
construction, the notice cannot be deemed to fall within s.
3(1)(i) of the Bankruptcy Act. The amount must be quantified
because the debtor is entitled to know from the bankruptcy
notice exactly what is being claimed to be due on the whole
judgment debt and payable by him within the seven days'
period. Non-compliance with the terms of the judgment
renders the bankruptcy notice invalid, and that failure to
comply with such notice is not an act of bankruptcy, and a
bankruptcy petition founded on it must necessarily fail.”

[9] Bersandarkan kepada kesilapan ini, peguam Penghutang

Penghakiman menghujahkan bahawa Notis Kebankrapan tersebut
sewajarnya dibatalkan kerana ianya tidak sah bersandarkan kepada
keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Affin Bank Bhd v Abu

6
 Bakar Ismail [2017] 7 CLJ 282 di mana Hamid Sultan Abu Backer
HMR memutuskan;

“[18] Since we have decided to affirm the High Court decision,

we do not think it is necessary at this stage to deal with this
issue. It is well settled that the bankruptcy proceedings are
quasi criminal in nature and the strict provision of the law
and/or rules must be complied with failing which the orders
made in breach are bound to be set aside as of right and that
can also be done in collateral proceedings. (See Badiaddin
bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd
[1998] 2 CLJ 75; [1998] 1 MLJ 393). In Sobri bin Arshad v.
Associated Tractors Sdn Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ 798; [1991] 3 CLJ
(Rep) 756; [1991] 3 MLJ 32, Edgar Joseph Jr observed:

“On a concluding note, bearing in mind that bankruptcy

proceedings, if successful, would have harsh and penal
consequences, meticulous compliance with the law is often
necessary. The case of In re North ex-parte Hasluck is the
authority for the proposition that the statue relating to
bankruptcy should be construed in a manner most favourable
to the person affected."

[10] Selanjutnya peguam Penghutang Penghakiman menghujahkan

bahawa Notis Kebankrapan tersebut adalah terlalu tinggi dan tidak
adil kerana Pemiutang Penghakiman telah turut memulakan
tindakan ke atas Defendan Kedua dengan memulakan tindakan
kebankrapan bagi jumlah yang sama di dalam penghakiman
tersebut. Peguam Penghutang Penghakiman menghujahkan
bahawa memandangkan di dalam Penghakiman tersebut tidak
menyatakan tanggungan ketiga-tiga Defendan adalah secara

7
 bersama-sama ataupun berasingan, maka ketiga-tiga mereka
hendaklah bertanggungan secara bersama-sama dan oleh itu
liabiliti juga dikongsi bersama-sama.

[11] Hujahan ini bersandarkan kepada penghakiman Mahkamah

Rayuan di dalam kes Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan
Pekerja v Edwin Cassian a/l Nagappan @ Marrie [2020] 1 LNS
226. Di dalam kes tersebut, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan;

“[12] Turning to the consent judgment, we can do no better

than reiterate the settled law in the words of Mary Lim JCA
in Sumathy (supra ) at para [12] of the judgment:

12. It is the argument of both appellants that while the

respondent may be entitled to enter judgment for the same
single sum, which the respondent did, the liability of each of
them is necessarily joint. This is because, the summary
judgment that was entered has not specified that both
appellants are jointly and severally liable for that single sum.
Where the judgment is silent or has not specified that liability
is joint and several. The liability is necessarily joint. Where
liability is joint, each of the appellants as defendant, shares that
liability equally – see In Re Dato Elamaran M Sabapathy; ex p
RHB Bank Bhd [2011] 10 CLJ 262. And so, when it comes to
enforcing the judgment, the respondent has a right to enforce
only half the judgment sum against each appellant. The
respondent is not entitled to enforce the full sum against both
of them, certainly not at the same time.

[13] In this case, the BN and CP were premised on the

2nd defendant's liability in respect of the whole sum under the

8
 consent judgment; which premise was founded on the joint and
several liability of the 2nd defendant under the consent
judgment.

[14] Applying the settled law to these facts, it can only be

concluded that the foundation underlying the BN and CP was
defective as the amount claimed in question is for the whole
judgment sum and not for the portion owed by the
2nd defendant pursuant to the consent judgment. Shorn of that
foundational basis, the BN and CP cannot stand and were
correctly set aside by the SAR and whose decision was
correctly affirmed on appeal by the learned judge.”

Hujahan Pemiutang Penghakiman

[12] Peguam Pemiutang Penghakiman sebaliknya menghujahkan

bahawa jumlah yang dinyatakan di dalam Notis Kebankrapan
adalah jumlah terhutang termasuk pampasan/ta’widh yang
diperintahkan di dalam Penghakiman tersebut yang dihitung setakat
tarikh Notis Kebankrapan iaitu pada 21/5/2020. Ia dihujahkan
selaras dengan seksyen 3(1) Akta Insolvensi 1967. Pengiraan
pampasan/ta’widh yang dipertikaikan oleh Penghutang
Penghakiman adalah bagi tempoh bermula dari 5/9/2018 iaitu tarikh
notis penamatan dan pembatalan pembiayaan hingga 21/5/2021. Ia
sepertimana yang telah diekshibitkan sebagai “P2” di dalam afidavit
di Kandungan 22.

[13] Pemiutang Penghakiman turut menghujahkan bahawa jumlah

pampasan/ta’widh tidak dapat dinyatakan di dalam Penghakiman
kerana ianya berakru sehingga hutang Penghutang Penghakiman

9
 dijelaskan. Hujahan Pemiutang Penghakiman adalah bersandarkan
kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes P Mukundan
a/l PK Kunchu Kurup v Daniel a/l Anthony [2018] 4 MLJ 249
yang telah memutuskan seperti berikut;

“[21] No doubt the judgment did not quantify the interest and
the costs, which could not in fact be quantified at that point of
time simply because interest of 8% per annum continues to
accrue until full settlement of the sum of RM1,250,000 and
costs had not been taxed. However, as at the date of the
bankruptcy notice, interest was capable of quantification and
was indeed quantified by the judgment creditors. The
calculation which was at 8% per annum from 9 May 2011 until
4 December 2012 (the date of full settlement) was as per the
judgment dated 19 September 2011. As for costs of RM8,400,
it was ascertained after taxation (see Allocatur at appeal
record vol. 2: p. 102 ).

[22] The amount demanded from the judgment debtors was

thus quantified, capable of execution and was in accordance
with the judgment. The amount stated in the bankruptcy notice
was the correct sum owing as at the date of the notice.”

[14] Berkaitan isu yang kedua, peguam Pemiutang Penghakiman

menghujahkan bahawa Penghakiman tersebut dimasuki ke atas
Penghutang Penghakiman berdasarkan statusnya sebagai rakan
kongsi Defendan Pertama dan merujuk kepada Akta Perkongsian
1961, Penghutang Penghakiman adalah berliabiliti bersama dengan
pengkongsi yang lain dan ini termasuk disaman bersama.
Pemiutang Penghakiman menegaskan bahawa Pemiutang
Penghakiman hanya mempunyai satu kausa tindakan di bawah

10
 kontrak bersama dan membawa satu tindakan mahkamah sahaja
terhadap pekongsi-pekongsi dan penghakiman ke atas mana-mana
pengkongsi akan menghalang tindakan ke atas pekongsi yang lain.

[15] Walaubagaimanapun adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam Pemiutang

Penghakiman bahawa ia tidak menghadkan liabiliti setakat
pegangan peratusan saham di dalam perkongsian. Ia berdasarkan
kepada penghakiman Abdul Malik Ishak H (pada ketika itu) di
dalam kes Anchor Marketing Sdn Bhd v Chellam Joe Vetha
Thya Singh [1999] 7 CLJ 392 yang menyatakan;

“The correct statement of the law may be stated as follows.

Whenever there is a joint liability or an alternative liability and
whatever area of substantive law the liability is concerned with, the
judgment against one will prevent the instituting of fresh
proceedings against the other in the case of joint liability, and
likewise the judgment against one will prevent the further
proceedings against the other or the instituting of fresh proceedings
against the other in the case of alternative liability”

Analisa dan dapatan Mahkamah

Isu Pertama; Sama ada jumlah tuntutan di dalam Notis Kebankrapan

adalah selaras dengan Penghakiman dan mematuhi sekyen 3 Akta
Insolvensi 1967

[16] Bagi isu pertama, mahkamah menurunkan Penghakiman tersebut

sepertimana yang diekshibitkan sebagai AS-1 di Kandungan 20
seperti berikut;

11
 “Defendan-defendan hendaklah membayar kepada Plaintif seperti
berikut :

(a) Jumlah sebanyak RM174,427.89 setakat 18 Oktober

2018;

(b) Pampasan/ta’widh pada kadar 1% setahun ke atas

jumlah baki principal (pokok) dari tarikh pembatalan
hingga tarikh Penghakiman atau tarikh matang (yang
mana terdahulu) dan, selepas itu pada kadar semasa
Pasaran Wang Islam Bank ke atas baki principal (pokok)
pembiayaan perdagangan hingga tarikh pembayaran
penuh; dan

(c) Kos tindakan ini sebanyak RM3554.00 dibayar oleh

Defendan kepada Plaintif.”

[17] Berdasarkan kepada seksyen 3 Akta 360, salah satu perbuatan

penghutang yang akan menyebabkan kebankrapan adalah apabila
Notis Kebankrapan mengkehendaki penghutang untuk membayar
hutangnya atau jumlah yang diarahkan dibayar selaras dengan
penghakiman atau perintah beserta faedah yang dinyatakan
jumlahnya (quantified) ke tarikh sesuatu Notis Kebankrapan
diisukan. Subseksyen 3(1)(i) tersebut adalah seperti berikut;

“(1) A debtor commits an Act of bankruptcy in each of the

following cases:

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 (i) if a creditor has obtained a final judgment or final order
against him for any amount and execution thereon not having
been stayed has served on him in Malaysia, or by leave of the
court elsewhere, a bankruptcy notice under this Act requiring
him to pay the judgment debt or sum ordered to be paid in
accordance with the terms of the judgment or order with
interest quantified up to the date of issue of the bankruptcy
notice, or to secure or compound for it to the satisfaction of
the creditor or the court; and he does not within seven days
after service of the notice in case the service is effected in
Malaysia, and in case the service is effected elsewhere then
within the time limited in that behalf by the order giving leave
to effect the service, either comply with the requirements of
the notice or satisfy the court that he has a counter-claim, set
off or cross demand which equals or exceeds the amount of
the judgment debt or sum ordered to be paid and which he
could not set up in the action in which the judgment was
obtained or in the proceedings in which the order was
obtained…”

[18] Ia adalah sepertimana keputusan Mahkamah Agung di dalam kes

Low Mun (supra) sepertimana yang dirujuk oleh peguam
Penghutang Penghakiman. Kes ini turut dirujuk dan diikuti oleh kes
J Raju a/l M Kerpaya v Commerce International Merchant
Bankers Bhd [2000] 3 CLJ 104 di mana Gopal Sri Ram HMR
memutuskan;

“In our judgment, the following propositions may be distilled

from a rationalisation of the authorities we have thus far
discussed.

13
 1. When determining an issue under the Act, it is incumbent
upon the court to accord its provisions a strict construction.

2. The consequence of such an approach to construction is

that a bankruptcy notice that requires a debtor to pay a
judgment debt otherwise than in accordance with the terms of
the judgment founded is null and void ab initio. Hence, a
debtor does not commit an act of bankruptcy if he makes
default upon such a notice.

3. A challenge on the ground that a bankruptcy notice requires

a debtor to pay a judgment debt otherwise than in accordance
with the terms of the judgment may be taken at any time after
service of the notice……”

[19] Mahkamah berpandangan, berdasarkan kepada prinsip yang

diputuskan ini, jumlah tuntutan di dalam Notis Kebankrapan perlulah
jumlah yang telah dinyatakan jumlahnya dan jumlah tersebut
hendaklah yang mematuhi Penghakiman yang telah diperolehi oleh
Pemiutang Penghakiman.

[20] Mahkamah Agung di dalam kes Lim Boon Peng v United Leasing
Co. Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 270 menegaskan;

“Much had been said about the requirement that the amount
quantified in the body of the notice must be correct sum owing
as at the date of the bankruptcy notice.”

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[21] Di dalam Notis Kebankrapan, terjelas satu jumlah yang telah
dinyatakan dan oleh itu, pertimbangan mahkamah adalah sama ada
jumlah yang dinyatakan di dalam Notis Kebankrapan tersebut
adalah yang mematuhi Penghakiman tersebut.

[22] Pemiutang Penghakiman menjelaskan pengiraan jumlah yang

dinyatakan melalui ekshibit P2 di dalam afidavit di Kandungan 22.
Mahkamah telah meneliti pengiraan tersebut dan mendapati
bahawa ianya adalah mengikuti terma di dalam Penghakiman
tersebut seperti berikut;

(a) Pada kadar 1% setahun:-

(i) ke atas jumlah prinsipal RM172.60
RM150,000.00 dari
5.9.2018 hingga
16.10.2018
(ii) ke atas jumlah baki
prinsipal RM90,000.00 RM187.40
dari 17.10.2018 hingga
31.12.2018
(iii) ke atas jumlah baki
prinsipal RM90,000.00 RM433.97
dari 1.12019 hingga
tarikh penghakiman
25.6.2019

(b) pada kadar semasa RM2,258.25

Pasaran Wang Islam Bank
ke atas jumlah baki
prinsipal RM90,000.00 dari
26.6.2019 hingga

15
 25.6.2019 hingga
21.5.2020 tarikh notis
kebankrapan

Jumlah pampasan/ta’widh setakat RM3,052.22

21.5.2020

[23] Mahkamah berpandangan hujahan Penghutang Penghakiman

berkaitan jumlah prinsipal adalah berkurangan kepada RM
90,000.00 sahaja telah diperjelaskan oleh Pemiutang Penghakiman
di perenggan 3 Kandungan 22 sepertimana yang telah dinyatakan
di atas.

[24] Penghutang Penghakiman sebaliknya tidak menawarkan pengiraan

jumlah yang sewajarnya pada pengiraan Penghutang
Penghakiman. Mahkamah Agung di dalam kes Datuk Lim Kheng
Kim v Malayan Banking Berhad [1993] 2 MLJ 298, melalui
penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Agung Mohamed Dzaiddin telah
menyatakan;

“It is,... necessary that the affidavit in question should, on the

face of it, show a counterclaim, set-off, or cross demand which
equals or exceeds the amount of the Judgment debt, and
which the debtor could not have set up in the action in which
the judgment or order was obtained.' The Supreme Court in
that case went on to further say that "We are concerned here
with the contents of the said affidavit. It merely denies and
disputes that the appellant was indebted to the respondent in
the sum of RM2,603,913.28, but fails to disclose that he has

16
 a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand, etc. against the
respondent, which he is required to depose under s. 3(1)(i) of
the Bankruptcy Act ('the Act') and provided for in Form 7.
Following the above decision and in the face of the above
affidavit, we are of the opinion that the said affidavit cannot
operate as an application to set aside the bankruptcy notice
within the contemplation of s. 3(1)(i) of the Act, and the case
should have been treated as if no affidavit under r. 95 had in
fact been filed.”

[25] Keputusan Mahkamah Agung ini turut dipertimbangkan oleh Abdul

Hamid Mohamad HMT (pada ketika itu) di dalam kes Re Cheah
Wee Liam ex p Robert Teng Lye Hock [1999] 6 MLJ 615 yang
memutuskan bahawa afidavit yang tidak menyatakan jumlah yang
terbaru tidak boleh membangkitkan subseksyen 3(2) Akta 360.
Yang Arif Hakim menyatakan seperti berikut;

“Similarly, following the same judgment of the Supreme Court,

the affidavit does not attract the provisions of proviso 2(iii) of
s. 3 of the Act because, first, it does not condescend to
particulars of the amount actually due. Indeed, the affidavit
merely alleges that the amount stated in the bankruptcy notice
is not the latest amount ("bukan merupakan amaun yang
terakhir")”

[26] Selain itu di dalam kes Liew Hon Kong @ Liew Kwan Voon v
Bank Pertanian Malaysia Berhad [2019] 1 LNS 1712, Abu Bakar
Jais H (pada ketika itu) telah turut merujuk kepada kes Lim Kheng
Kim (supra) serta kes Dato’ Tio Sian Pah v Alliance Bank

17
 Malaysia Berhad [2010] 1 LNS 275 dan merumuskan seperti
berikut;

“It is trite the JD's submission that the amount claimed by the
JC is incorrect could not be simply accepted. This is because
the JD did not give and provide explanation what is the correct
amount to be claimed. Since the JD thinks the amount claimed
is wrong, the JD must state what should be the correct amount
to be claimed by the JC. Since this is not done, the JD's
contention on this issue with respect cannot be accepted.”

[27] Bersandarkan kepada keputusan-keputusan duluan ini, mahkamah

memutuskan bahawa bantahan Penghutang Penghakiman ke atas
jumlah yang telah dinyatakan di dalam Notis Kebankrapan tersebut
tidak membangkitkan sebarang alasan bagi mahkamah untuk
membatalkan Notis Kebankrapan tersebut. Sekiranya Penghutang
Penghakiman berhasrat untuk mencabar jumlah yang telah
dijumlahkan tersebut, maka Penghutang Penghakiman perlu untuk
mengemukakan secara terperinci jumlah yang didakwa oleh
Penghutang Penghakiman. Apabila afidavit yang dikemukakan
sekadar menyatakan bahawa jumlah yang dituntut oleh Pemiutang
Penghakiman adalah tidak tepat tanpa memberi butiran jumlah
yang sebenarnya, maka mahkamah tidak mempunyai pilihan selain
bergantung sepenuhnya kepada jumlah yang dinyatakan oleh
Pemiutang Penghakiman. Jumlah yang dinyatakan oleh Pemiutang
Penghakiman juga telah diperjelaskan melalui afidavit.

[28] Oleh yang demikian bagi isu ini, mahkamah tidak sependapat
dengan Penghutang Penghakiman.

18
Isu Kedua; Sama ada tuntutan Pemiutang Penghakiman adalah
terlalu tinggi dan melampaui jumlah keberhutangan Penghutang
Penghakiman

[29] Selanjutnya berkaitan tindakan bersalingan ke atas rakan kongsi

yang lain, adalah fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan bahawa
Penghakiman tersebut adalah ke atas satu perkongsian yang
tertakluk kepada Akta Perkongsian 1961. Di bawah seksyen 11
Akta Perkongsian 1967, telah dinyatakan;

“Every partner in a firm is liable jointly with the other partners

for all debts and obligations of the firm incurred while he is a
partner; and after his death his estate is also severally liable
in a due course of administration for such debts and
obligations, so far as they remain unsatisfied but subject to
the prior payment of his separate debts.”

[30] Ia dengan secara jelas memperuntukkan bahawa setiap pekongsi

adalah mempunyai liabiliti bersama ke atas hutang serta obligasi
perkongsian mereka. Mahkamah memetik Lindsey & Banks On
Partnership , 16th Edition oleh R.C I’anson Banks di mukasurat
325 yang telah menyatakan berkenaan “Extent of Liability in All
Cases” seperti berikut;

“A distinct feature of the law of partnership has always been

the unlimited liability accepted by partners for the debts and
obligations of the firm, as Lord Lindley explained:

19
 “By the common law of this country, every member of an
ordinary partnership is liable to the utmost farthing of his
property for the debts and engagements of the firm. The law,
ignoring the firm as anything distinct from the persons
composing it, treats the debts and engagements of the firm as
the debts and engagements of the partners, and hold each
partner liable for the accordingly. Moreover, if judgment is
obtained against the firm for a debt owing by it, the judgment
creditor is under no obligation to levy execution against the
property of the frim before having recourse to the separate
property of the partners; nor is he under any obligation to levy
execution against all the partners rate ably; but he may select
any one or more of them and levy execution upon him or them
until the judgement is satisfied, leaving all questions of
contribution to be settled afterwards between the partners
themselves”

[31] Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa walaupun Penghakiman

tersebut tidak menyatakan secara spesifik sama ada liabiliti bagi
Penghakiman tersebut adalah secara bersesama ataupun
berasingan, namun memandangkan kepada ianya adalah hasil dari
satu perkongsian, maka mahkamah memutuskan bahawa setiap
rakan kongsi adalah mempunyai liabiliti secara bersama-sama.
Oleh itu ia adalah terbuka kepada Pemiutang Penghakiman untuk
mengambil tindakan ke atas salah seoarang atau setiap
pengkongsi. Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Gulf Business
Construction (M) Sdn Bhd v Ishraq Holding Sdn Bhd [2010] 5
MLJ 34 telah memutuskan;

“Now, even if the court order was not made jointly and
severally against both the respondent and Tetuan Par Govind

20
 & Co, yet either one of them would still have to bear the whole
of that liability all by itself up to the limit of the judgment on the
strength of the authority of the case of Dynasty Rangers Sdn
Bhd & Anor v. Perak Meat Industries Sdn Bhd [2002] 6 CLJ
1.”

[32] Di dalam kes Re Chan Tse Yuen & Co ; ex parte M Wealth

Corridor Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1828, Nadzarin Wok Nordin PK di
dalam isu yang sama telah menyatakan;

“[9] As to whether the bankruptcy proceedings is an abuse of

the process of the court as there were 2 other bankruptcy
proceedings against the partners of the Firm i.e. being in WA-
29NCC-901-03/2019 (Bankruptcy 901) and WA-29NCC-902-
03/2019 (Bankruptcy 902) respectively which the JD submits
amounted to a duplicity, this Court holds the view that the JC
is at liberty to commence the bankruptcy proceedings against
any or all of the individual partners of the Firm whether jointly
or severally and that the same is not an abuse of court
process as it is the right of a JC to initiate whatever execution
proceedings including separate bankruptcy proceedings
against the partners of a firm wherein judgment has been
obtained against the firm. In this respect I need only quote
Sec. 11 of the Partnership Act 1974 which reads:

Every partner in a firm is liable jointly with the other partners

for all debts and obligations of the firm incurred while he is a
partner; and after his death his estate is also severally liable
in a due course of administration for such debts and
obligations, so far as they remain unsatisfied but subject to
the prior payment of his separate debts.

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 [10] It is thus self evident that in partnership law, the partners
are jointly and severally liable and thus the JC in a bankruptcy
proceedings is entitled to pursue against all or any of the
partners as it thinks fit.”

[33] Mahkamah turut berpandangan bahawa sekiranya hujahan

Penghutang Kehakiman diterjemahkan, maka ia bermaksud
tindakan ke atas rakan kongsi adalah akan terbahagi kepada
peratusan perkongsian mereka. Ini tidak menggambarkan maksud
Penghakiman tersebut yang sebenarnya dan menyukarkan
penguatkuasaan penghakiman. Ini telah disentuh di dalam kes Lim
Koon Chow v Ambank (M) Bhd [2012] 4 CLJ 624 yang menolak
permohonan Penghutang Penghakiman untuk membatalkan Notis
Kebankrapan dan Petisyen Pemiutang seperti berikut;

“[104] The JD submitted that the BN here cannot stand

against the JD in the circumstances. The BN is invalid, its non-
compliance (if at all) by the JD cannot amount to an act of
bankruptcy, and it follows that the CP being founded on an
invalid BN must also fail. In short, the BN and everything that
flows from the BN is doomed to failure. On this ground alone,
the JD argued that both the BN and CP must be set aside.

[105] As for me, I cannot see how a judgment entered against

all three defendants (D1 Compusoft Sdn Bhd, D2 Lim Koon
Chow and D4 Lim Kim Chow) cannot be enforced against
anyone one or more or all of them for the words of the
judgment when translated into English read:

22
IT IS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that the First Defendant, the
Second Defendant and the Fourth Defendant do pay the
Plaintiff:

(i) the sum of RM21,615,617.23...

[106] The JC always has a choice to decide which of the three

defendants to proceed against with respect to execution. So
in a case where D1 has been wound-up and D4 is a bankrupt
for instance, the JC would proceed to execute the whole
judgment against D2.

[107] In a case where judgment for the same amount is

entered against D3 and D5 at a later date in a separate
judgment, does it mean then that for a BN to be issued, it will
be half the judgment debt? The above example illustrates
some of the multifarious problems one would face in dividing
up the judgment by the number of defendants in the judgment
obtained. If it was intended that each of the three defendants
can only be made liable for 1/3 of the judgment debt then the
judgment must so express it. Otherwise there is no ambiguity
in reading less than what it says which is that all the three
defendants are each one of them liable for the full amount of
the judgment debt and that collectively they would not be
made liable for more than what is the judgment sum. This
does not derogate from the fact that the JC has the liberty to
decide which is the more effective and efficient way to recover
the judgment debt and that could be proceeding against just
D2 whom the JC deemed to be the man of substance. Taking
a peek at the instrument under which the other defendants
other than D1 have been sued, it appears that their liability is
under a Guarantee and Indemnity Agreement dated 30
August 1996 and as such under the Contracts Act the

23
 guarantor who had to pay can pursue his right of indemnity
from the other guarantors.”

[34] Di dalam kes Per; Saadiatul Ibrahim; ex parte Southern Asia

Special Asset Management Berhad [2015] 1 LNS 1322,
Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak permohonan untuk mengenepikan
Notis Kebankrapan di atas alasan ianya tidak membahagikan
hutang yang perlu dilunaskan di antara Penghutang Penghakiman.
Mahkamah menyatakan;

“[18] Alasan berikutnya bahawa penghakiman tidak

menyatakan tanggungan adalah bersama dan berasingan.
Oleh itu tanggungan adalah bersama dan pemiutang
penghakiman hanya boleh membankrapkan penghutang
penghakiman berdasarkan setengah (1/2) jumlah dari
penghakiman ingkar yang diperoleh oleh pemiutang
penghakiman terhadap penghutang penghakiman dan
suaminya. Di bawah diperturunkan sebahagiaan daripada
penghakiman tersebut seperti berikut:

PENGHAKIMAN

Tindakan ini setelah dipanggil pada hari ini untuk sebutan

dengan kehadiran Cik Ang Lay Ling peguam cara bagi pihak
plaintif dan defendan pertama dan kedua tidak hadir
walaupun salinan saman dan pernyataan tuntutan telah
diserahkan dengan sempurna;

MAKA ADALAH PADA HARI INI DIHAKIMI SECARA

INGKAR bahawa defendan pertama dan kedua hendaklah
membayar kepada plaintif:

24
a) jumlah sebanyak RM113,448 (Ringgit Malaysia Satu Ratus
Tiga Belas Ribu Empat Ratus Empat Puluh Lapan dan Sen
Empat Puluh Lapan sahaja) setakat 29.2.2008);

b)...

c)...

[19] Saya berpendapat alasan ini adalah tidak dapat

dipertahankan. Ini kerana penghakiman ingkar tersebut tidak
menyatakan dan bermaksud bahawa Tun Thamanian Bin
Shafii, defendan pertama dalam tindakan guaman dan
penghutang penghakiman sebagai defendan kedua,
membayar secara bersama (jointly ). Berdasarkan otoriti yang
telah diputuskan jika tidak dinyatakan secara bersama dan
berasingan (joint and severally liability ) tafsirannya ialah
pemiutang penghakiman boleh memilih untuk
menguatkuasakan bersama dan berasingan. Ini juga adalah
selari dengan terma perjanjian pinjaman yang ditandatangani
oleh penghutang penghakiman didalam ekshibit SBI-2 dalam
afidavit sokongan lampiran 40, yang memperuntukkan seperti
berikut:

"Section 1.0. Interpretation

(i) Where there are two (2) or more persons comprised in the
expression "the Borrower" agreements, covenants, terms,
stipulations and undertakings expressed to be made by and
on the part of the Borrower shall be deemed to be made by
and binding upon such persons jointly and severally".

25
 [20] Bagi menyokong, saya bersandarkan kes Allliance Bank
Malaysia Bhd v. Mukhhriz Mahathir & Anor [2006] 2 CLJ 723
yang menyatakan seperti berikut:

[32] The words "jointly and severally" is defined as "persons

who are jointly and severally bound render themselves liable
not only to a joint action against them, but also to a separate
actions against them individually." (see: A Dictionary of Law
L.B. Curzon )

[33] When the letters of guarantee provide for 'joint and

several' liability what they meant is that the plaintiff has a
cause of action against both the defendants as guarantors not
only to a joint action against them but also to separate action
against them individually. In such situation, the plaintiff can
proceed with one action against both of them at the same time
or 2 separate actions against both of them individually. The
effect is that, either way, the cause of action against any one
of them is not discharged if judgment is entered against the
other one. The fact that the said judgment in default dated 25
January 1005 against the 2nd defendant as well as the prayer
in the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim do not state or insert the
words "jointly and severally" does not in any way change the
position. The plaintiff's right on the cause of action against
both of the defendants either jointly or individually (ie,
severally) still survives. The plaintiff can always proceed
against the 1st defendant even though a final judgment in
default had been entered against the 2nd defendant.”

[35] Mahkamah turut berpandangan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah

Rayuan di dalam kes Sumathy Subramaniam v Subramaniam
Gunasegaran [2018] 2 CLJ 305 yang dirujuk oleh peguam

26
Penghutang Penghakiman adalah boleh dibezakan dengan kes ini.
Ini memandangkan kes Sumathy (supra) melibatkan tindakan
serentak ke atas peminjam dan penggerenti kepada satu perjanjian
pinjaman persahabatan yang tidak menyatakan dengan jelas liabiliti
peminjam dan penggerenti. Ini dapat dilihat melalui penghakiman
Mary Lim HMR (pada ketika itu) seperti berikut;

“[26] From what we can see of the summary judgment dated

4 September 2015, it is plain that it pronounces both
appellants liable and that their liability is joint. We cannot read
or infer the appellants' liability to be joint and several as such
a reading would go against the plain terms of the judgment. In
any event, there are no express terms in the loan agreement
indicating that the parties have agreed that the liability of the
borrower and the guarantor is joint and several. It would
therefore be contrary to the contractual arrangements
reached between the parties if this court were to read that the
liability of the appellants is joint and several. As co or joint
defendants, the appellants' liability though arising differently,
one as the principal borrower, the other as guarantor, is
proportionately for the same sum. That proportion must be
spelt out when demanding for payment and when presenting
a bankruptcy notice.

[27] The appellants cannot be expected to each pay the same

sum and then seek correction from the official assignee when
seeking a discharge. The existence of the two bankruptcy
notices with similar terms and the same amount drives home
the appellants' contention that these notices are indeed,
invalid. If both appellants were to pay up the same amount as
they are required to do under the bankruptcy notices, the

27
 respondent would effectively be very much overpaid. Clearly,
the sum stipulated in both bankruptcy notices are inaccurate
and do not accord with the terms of the summary judgment.”

[36] Berkaitan kes Re Dato’ Dr Elamaran a/l M Sabapathy; Ex Parte

RHB Bank Bhd [2011] 10 CLJ 262 yang dirujuk oleh peguam
Penghutang Penghakiman, memadai mahkamah menyatakan
bahawa ianya telah dipertimbang di dalam kes Lim Koon Chow
(supra) namun tidak diikuti dan dibezakan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi.
Keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi ini telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah
Rayuan pada 7/5/2013 di dalam Lim Koon Chow v Ambank (M)
Berhad Rayuan Sivil No. W-03(1M)-164-11/2011 sepertimana
dilaporkan di [2013] 1 LNS (O) 3. Walaubagaimanapun semakan
mahkamah ini mendapati tiada alasan penghakiman oleh
Mahkamah Rayuan.

[37] Manakala bagi kes Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja

(supra) adalah berbeza fakta dengan kes ini kerana ia melibatkan
penghakiman persetujuan. Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan
bahawa prinsip liabiliti secara bersesama di bawah seksyen 46 Akta
Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja 1991 tidak terpakai bagi
penghakiman persetujuan sedangkan kes di hadapan mahkamah
melibatkan satu perkongsian.

[38] Mahkamah turut menegaskan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah

Rayuan di dalam kes Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan
Pekerja (supra) ini telah pun ditolak oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan

28
 sepertimana yang dilaporkan di dalam kes Lembaga Kumpulan
Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Edwin Cassian Nagappan [2021] 7
CLJ 823 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah membenarkan
rayuan serta memutuskan seperti berikut;

“Furthermore, there is a notable absence of terms creating

"joint" liability in the judgment itself. Even if such a term had
been inserted that would not entitle the courts to conclude that
liability is somehow halved between the two obligors or
promisors. Given the prevailing interpretation of s. 44 of the
EPF Act, merely inserting the word "jointly" in the consent
judgment would not suffice to halve liability as there must be
express words to that effect to state that the liability of the joint
promisors is to be borne in equal proportions. Moreover, such
halved liability should take root from the original promise
whereby the liability of a promisor for a debt owed to a creditor
is expressly stated to be only half of the debt. If we are to
accept the premise that "joint and several liability" cannot be
read into the judgment due to an absence of such words, it
similarly follows that a silent judgment cannot automatically
be inferred to impose "joint" liability where there is no such
mention. This is especially so when the liability that arises is
explicitly stipulated by statute. In the circumstances, liability
under the consent judgment must necessarily be both joint
and several in light of our discussion above.”

[39] Secara kesimpulannya bagi isu ini mahkamah turut tidak bersama
dengan peguam Penghutang Penghakiman bagi merumuskan
bahawa tuntutan Pemiutang Penghakiman adalah terlalu tinggi dan
melampaui jumlah keberhutangan Penghutang Penghakiman.

29
Kesimpulan

[40] Di atas premis ini, mahkamah dengan ini menolak rayuan

Penghutang Penghakiman dengan kos sebanyak RM 5,000.00
tertakluk kepada fi alokatur.

Bertarikh: 20 hb. September, 2021

(DATUK MOHAMAD ABAZAFREE BIN MOHD ABBAS)

Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman
Mahkamah Tinggi (2) Kota Bharu,
Kelantan

30
Pihak-pihak:

Bagi Pihak Penghutang

Penghakiman : Tetuan Abdul Razak Muhidin & Associates
Peguambela dan Peguamcara
Tingkat 1 (Timur) Kompleks YAKIN
Jalan Gajah Mati
15000 Kota Bharu, Kelantan.

Bagi Pihak Pemiutang

Penghakiman : Tetuan Soo Thien Ming & Nasrah
Peguambela dan Peguamcara
Menara Bangkok Bank,
Berjaya Central Park, 105, Jalan Ampang
50450 Kuala Lumpur.

Tarikh Bicara : 30hb. Jun, 2021

Tarikh Keputusan : 06hb. September, 2021

31
Kes-kes yang Dirujuk
 Tuan Haji Ahmed Abdul Rahman v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd
[1998] 1 CLJ 241
 Seloga Jaya Sdn Bhd v. Pembenaan Keng Ting (Sabah) Sdn Bhd
[1994] 2 CLJ 716
 Evans v. Bartlam [1937] AC 473
 Yu Gui v Jefferey Law Siew Su & ors [2016] 1 MLJ 102
 Low Mun v Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd [1987] CLJ (Rep) 172
 Affin Bank Bhd v Abu Bakar Ismail [2017] 7 CLJ 282
 Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Edwin Cassian a/l
Nagappan @ Marrie [2020] 1 LNS 226.
 P Mukundan a/l PK Kunchu Kurup v Daniel a/l Anthony [2018] 4
MLJ 249
 Anchor Marketing Sdn Bhd v Chellam Joe Vetha Thya Singh
[1999] 7 CLJ 392
 J Raju a/l M Kerpaya v Commerce International Merchant
Bankers Bhd [2000] 3 CLJ 104
 Lim Boon Peng v United Leasing Co. Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 270
 Datuk Lim Kheng Kim v Malayan Banking Berhad [1993] 2 MLJ
298
 Re Cheah Wee Liam ex p Robert Teng Lye Hock [1999] 6 MLJ
615
 Liew Hon Kong @ Liew Kwan Voon v Bank Pertanian Malaysia
Berhad [2019] 1 LNS 1712
 Dato’ Tio Sian Pah v Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad [2010] 1 LNS
275
 Gulf Business Construction (M) Sdn Bhd v Ishraq Holding Sdn Bhd
[2010] 5 MLJ 34
 Re Chan Tse Yuen & Co ; ex parte M Wealth Corridor Sdn Bhd
[2020] MLJU 1828
 Lim Koon Chow v Ambank (M) Bhd [2012] 4 CLJ 624
 Per; Saadiatul Ibrahim; ex parte Southern Asia Special Asset
Management Berhad [2015] 1 LNS 1322
 Sumathy Subramaniam v Subramaniam Gunasegaran [2018] 2
CLJ 305
 Re Dato’ Dr Elamaran a/l M Sabapathy; Ex Parte RHB Bank Bhd
[2011] 10 CLJ 262
 Lim Koon Chow v Ambank (M) Berhad Rayuan Sivil No. W-
03(1M)-164-11/2011 sepertimana dilaporkan di [2013] 1 LNS (O) 3

32
  Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Edwin Cassian
Nagappan [2021] 7 CLJ 823

Undang-undang yang dirujuk

 A 56 k 1 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012
 Subseksyen 3(1) Akta Insolvensi 1967
 Seksyen 11 Akta Perkongsian 1961
 Seksyen 46 Akta Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja 1991

Rujukan Yang Lain

 Lindsey & Banks On Partnership , 16th Edition oleh R.C I’anson
Banks

33