lu ya ng zho u

Nationalism and Communism

as Foes and Friends
Comparing the Bolshevik and Chinese Revolutionaries

Abstract
Sociologists have noted that the ideological inclusiveness of nationalism varies. By
comparing the Bolshevik and Chinese communist revolutionary elites, this article explains
that such variation depends on the social strength of nationalism. A strong nationalism is
(a) undergirded by a widely diffused national culture that can socialize most radical elites
into the nation; (b) kept institutionally open to broad social strata so that lower classes can
form a nationalist identity through participation; and (c) universally believed to be
a geopolitically feasible anti-colonial revolution so that radical elites can think of
engagement as worthwhile and necessary. Using a comparative biographical method
probing both nationalists and communists, this article demonstrates that nationalism in
Tsarist Russia was far weaker than in post-imperial China. In the former, the nationalist
movement excluded communists while, in the latter, communists were incorporated.
Therefore, the two communist parties had different understandings of Marxism.

Keywords: Revolution; Nationalism; Empire; Russia; China.

S O C I O L O G I S T S view nationalism as an intellectually ambiguous

and politically powerful movement that can be combined with a wide
range of ideologies. This article, by comparing the Bolshevik and the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) revolutionaries over the making of
their national identities, challenges this assumption, arguing that the
inclusiveness of nationalism varies across contexts. The variation does
not stem from the intellectual character of nationalism. Nor can it be
explained by structural ethnic homogeneity and macro geopolitical
dynamics. Rather, the inclusiveness of nationalism depends on its social
strength, which means (a) there is a penetrative national culture that
socializes the potential radical elites into one nation; (b) the nationalist
movement is institutionally open to broad social strata; (c) the anti-
colonial revolution is widely viewed as geopolitically feasible. Where

313
Luyang Zhou, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown Univer-
sity [[email protected]]
European Journal of Sociology, 60, 3 (2019), pp. 313–350—0003-9756/19/0000-900$07.50per art + $0.10 per page
ªEuropean Journal of Sociology 2020. doi: 10.1017/S0003975619000158

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 luyang zhou

nationalism bears these social strengths, communists became part of

nationalist movement. Otherwise, communists were more likely to
frame themselves as anti-nationalist universalists to preserve empire.
Drawing on biographical data of the leading Bolshevik and CCP
leaders as well as their respective domestic rivalries, this article demon-
strates that nationalism was stronger in post-imperial China than in pre-
Bolshevik Russia. Chinese nationalism was not only congruent with
a homogeneous Han culture, but was also a progressive and amorphous
movement open to broad social strata. Moreover, it was undergirded by
a strengthening belief that the huge size of its territory and population
enabled China to be free of all colonial rule by foreign powers. Such
a strong nationalism, thus, came to be engaged in both the CCP and the
Kuomintang of China (KMT). In comparison, the social bases of
nationalism in Russia were much weaker. Many non-Russian groups were
not socialized into their native culture and viewed nationalist separation as
unnecessary. Although there was an intensifying Russian nationalism, it
was confined within narrow social groups, mainly officers, state bureau-
crats, and elite literati, while most lower-class Russians either loathed or
could not participate in it. Anti-colonialism did not have appeal either.
Peripheral nations tended to think of separation as unfeasible given the
overwhelming superiority of the core in both military and economic realms.
This article makes three contributions. First, it challenges the widely
accepted opinion that nationalism, for its intellectual amorphousness and
organicity, is compatible with any well-designed ideology. Second, this
article develops a comparative biographical method, which addresses the
question of how a society’s macro structure (linguistic conditions, state-
hood, economy, geopolitics, etc.) interact with agency. By comparing
communists with liberals, nationalists, and conservatives, this method
shows how a strong nationalism can penetrate most social groups while
a weak one can only reach some and block the rest. Third, compiling
a huge biographical dataset that draws materials from original Russian and
Chinese sources, this article bridges a gap of comparative historical
sociology by analyzing Russia and China with the original source materials.
The article is made up of five parts. The first section reviews
sociological discussion of the varied inclusiveness of nationalism. The
second provides an outline of the theory of the social strength of
nationalism. The third part is a note of method and data. The fourth
section is the empirical core, elaborating how Russia and China
differed along the three dimensions. The fifth part is a conclusion
summarizing the major arguments, and discussing the generalizability
to other communist states.

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

Potency of Nationalism

Sociologists have widely argued that nationalism is a potent trend

that has fundamentally reshaped the modern world. “Potency” means
transcendency––any movements, either liberal, socialist, or conservative,
fascist, have to present themselves through nationalism. Nationalism
can be either eastern or western, good or bad, civic or ethnic, liberal or
authoritarian, but these are all nationalism [see Todorova 2015].
There are multiple explanations for the potency of nationalism.
Classic sociological accounts focus on the social bases that allow
nationalism to dominate, such as the level of industrialization [Gellner
1983], mass literacy and communication [Anderson 1991], state capac-
ity [Breuilly 1994], and the world cultural template [Meyer et al. 1997].
A more cultural explanation differently argues that nationalism has
unique intellectual characters. Unlike liberalism and socialism, nation-
alism does not have complex theoretical systems. Nor has it produced
great thinkers like Hobbes, Tocqueville, Marx, or Weber [Anderson
1991: 5]. Such intellectual vagueness, thus, enables nationalism to evade
empirical testing and retain resilience. In this sense, it resembles
religion, serving as the base of transition from one ideology to another
[Kemp 1999: 209-211]. In terms of form, nationalism is an “operative
ideology” [Malesě vić 2006: 93-94]. It does not offer normative blue-
prints, but rather engages in natural and transcendent components that
individuals must use regardless of ideological positions, such as
language, folk culture, or traditional symbols. This feature allows
nationalism to succeed religion in becoming a secure ontological base
in a secularized world [Haugaard 2002: 126-127, 133-134].
These theses, either social or intellectual, are complicated when
nationalism encounters communism. While, intellectually, commu-
nism was designed to counter nationalism, politically (unlike anar-
chism and cosmopolitanism), it achieved state power over a vast
territory of the earth, across which its compatibility with nationalism
varied greatly. These distinctions make communism a valid indicator
in testing the inclusiveness of nationalism.
Scholars of nationalism have noted that the relationship between
nationalism and communism varies. In some contexts, nationalism
remained as the master frame, with communism included as an
organizational model for national economic development [Szporluk
1991]. Nationalists have also borrowed the class language of commu-
nism to access and mobilize the masses, as illustrated by many anti-

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 luyang zhou

colonial movements [Katznelson 1986: 65; Lipset 1972: 77]. Given the
conceptual ambiguity of nation, an inclusive nationality can also be
cultivated in the name of the common class interests of multiple ethnic
groups [Liu 2014: 122-125]. However, in other contexts, nationalism
came to be subordinate to communism. In these situations, the
communist movements and states tactically tap nationalist sentiment
but, in principle, position it in secondary status. Although territory
may be demarcated alongside national lines, the real ruling apparatus
is centralized, never allowing any national fragmentation [Connor
1984: 534-545]. Brutal repression is used against nationalism, both
among majority and minority groups [Dunlop 1985; Graziosi 2017;
Martin 2001: 456, 478, 469].
This disparity raises questions about most sociological explana-
tions. The existence of variation shows that the intellectual character
of nationalism does not guarantee inclusiveness or, to put it more
precisely, the intellectual character needs some social preconditions to
function. Nor do most classic social explanations, which highlight
modernity, fit the communist world—a somewhat homogeneous
domain characterized by common underdevelopment.
The only explanations that seem to hold with the internal variation
within the communist world are multiethnicity, institution, and geo-
politics. There are accounts that in multiethnic regions nationalism is
weaker and more likely to be subordinate to class universalism
[Gellner 1997: 56-58; Riga 2008 and 2012; Seton-Watson 1964: 3-
12, 25-28]. In terms of institution, it is argued that nation-states that
exclude significant ethnic groups are mostly likely to suffer civil wars
[Wimmer 2013 and 2018]. There are also theses that geopolitical
conflicts tend to intensify nationalism by delineating out-groups [Hall
and Male
sevic 2013; Hutchinson 2017: 50; Tilly 1994]. These theories
are relevant to three significant variations within the communist
world: revolution spreading from ethnically heterogenous regions to
homogeneous ones, from dynastic empires to post-dynastic polities,
and from a former imperialist center to colonial societies.
Yet, these accounts are also deficient in that they do not explain
why, within the same society, certain groups are more nationalistic
than others, why the nationalist movement of one society might be
more inclusive than another, and why the same groups may become
more nationalistic or less nationalistic overtime. They thus cannot
explain why ethnic heterogeneity does not propel political groups to
bear more aggressive assimilative positions, why nationalism can also
exclude ethnic natives, and why geopolitical threats frighten people to

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

abandon nationalist resistance. To bridge these gaps, one must move

beyond structure and diffused cultural patterns to consider agency. An
agency-based perspective is entailed.

Case Selection, Method, and Data

The Bolshevik and Chinese communist revolutions are a suitable

pair of cases to compare the inclusiveness of nationalism. Both
occurred in late-developing societies with limited industrialization,
mass education, and state capacity [Bianco 2018: 3-7]. Both revolu-
tions carried Marxist ideology. Both started in the aftermath of
dynastic empires when nationalism was growing as part of a worldwide
trend—in Russia the Russian Whites/Monarchist as well as non-
Russian separatist ones, while in China the anti-Qing revolution of
1911 and its extension in the 1910s-1920s, followed by the war with
Japan (1931-1945). However, the relationship of the two parties to
nationalism was rather different. The Bolshevik aspired to establish
a socialist empire wherein nations’ rights were recognized but
restrained. This “empire of nations” negated core Russian national-
ism and did not carry an inclusive Greater Russian (Rossiiskii)
connotation. Nor were its non-Russian republics entitled to real
self-governance. By contrast, the CCP started with and adhered to
Chinese nationalism. It sought to establish a Chinese socialist nation-
state and viewed communist ideology as an instrument to hasten this
process. With an intense identity with Chinese nationalism, it came to
interpret all ethnic groups as part of an inclusive “Chinese Nation”
[Brudny 1998: 7; Fitzgerald 1996; Johnson 1962; Martin 2001; Riga
2012; Slezkine 1994: 434-435; Wright 1961]. In other words, nation-
alism caged the CCP but failed to include the Bolshevik.
As demonstrated in the preceding section, macro-level structure
and diffused cultural patterns cannot explain the diversity of political
groups within a society, demonstrating the differentiated levels of
coverage and penetration of nationalism. Therefore, this analysis
breaks down “society” into competing groups to see how each could
or could not resist nationalism. Explanations are drawn from the
individual information of group members which, in aggregation with
the information of other groups, commonly reflect the general differ-
ences of the two polities. Put briefly, viewing leftism as the most likely
resistant to nationalism, this article compares two societies to see in

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 luyang zhou

each how far nationalist movement can extend toward the left-end of
a society’s ideological spectrum.
This article undertakes an agency-based approach by using bio-
graphical analysis for two reasons. First, ideology was largely a design
of the leading elites of revolutionary movements, rather than based on
the vote or consent of the rank-and-file. Second, so far as the
Bolshevik and the CCP cases are concerned, biographical data for
the leading elites are quite complete, allowing for numerical testing
and deep interpretative analysis.
Alongside the article’s conceptualization of nationalism—cultural
socialization, institutional participation, and geopolitical thinking of
revolution—this analysis looks into very specific aspects of the
communists’ biographies: their exposure to national cultures and
competing ideological options, their confrontation with or engagement
in nationalist movements, and their estimations and analyses of the
prospect of ongoing nationalist revolutions. Such analysis, thus,
entails a comprehensive investigation, encompassing not only indi-
viduals’ static social backgrounds such as ethnicity, family, and
education, but also their dynamic experiences, including travel,
radical writings, military conscription, war command, and mobiliza-
tion toward the masses. In this sense, the article is not a traditional
prosopography that merely aggregates demographical information.
This article narrows its focus to the leading communist elites, the level
of central committee members of 1917-1923 and 1945-1956. In total, 94
Bolsheviks and 77 CCP leaders1 are analyzed, the real makers of
revolutions and socialist states. The biographical analysis includes two
parts. Where data is detailed, analysis focuses on detailed internal working.
This analysis offers causal mechanisms, for example, weak attachment to
native language and culture yields vulnerability to the socialist idea.
Where data is brief, biographical information is aggregated to test the
mechanisms seen in certain individuals. Such a combination of interpre-
tative and numerical description helps overcome the brevity of biograph-
ical information on certain communists to access “common characteristics
of a historic group” [Verboven, Carlier and Dumolyn 2007: 39-41].
In terms of non-communist elites, this article compares the contempo-
raries to communist power seizure, including nationalists, rightists, liberals,
1
The Soviet Union was formally estab- Central Committee in April of the same year.
lished in December 1922, but the complete The CCP announced the foundation of the
structure of the Supreme Soviet took shape People’s Republic of China in October 1949,
with the national chamber (added in Febru- but the civil war did not cease until 1955.
ary 1923) and the first Soviet Constitution Economic nationalization was completed in
which was approved by the Communist Party 1956.

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

and conservatives for their central committee members or equivalents.

Such aggregation has several methodological functions. First, the data of
non-communist elites, especially that reflecting their ideas, help correct the
collective bias concealed in communists’ narratives. Second, aggregating
individuals’ backgrounds helps us understand why the communists saw
Marxism as a solution either to containing or cultivating nationalism.
Most data are drawn from primary sources, including memoirs,
autobiographies, diaries, chronicles, correspondences, and anthologies, as
well as archives. Secondary biographies such as dictionaries and ency-
clopedias are cited only when primary sources are unavailable. Yet, there
is also a special note that secondary biographies are not less useful than
primary ones. As archives in the Soviet Union and China are not widely
open, the authors of officially edited biographies (usually writing teams)
are often the only scholars who can access certain primary sources, and
their works do contain many informative details lacking in available
autobiographical works. Most materials are in original Russian and
Chinese. Such a comparison of Russian and Chinese revolutions based
on original materials has not yet been attempted by sociologists in this
area, although there is fine research on both sides [Riga 2008; Xu 2013].
Finally, this article compares the Bolshevik and the CCP revolu-
tions in a somewhat unsymmetrical manner. Although both empires
were multiethnic, Russia was far more integrated than China. No
major ethnic group existed that could be long left isolated to pursue its
separate political agenda, including Transcaucasia and Central Asia.
Very differently, the CCP revolution unfolded in a much more
homogeneous political space. Once the Qing empire collapsed,
peripheries entered de facto independence and remained so for nearly
four decades, while China proper became an enclosed theatre until
1949. Therefore, my analysis of the CCP revolution focuses on its
relationship with Chinese nationalism, while the Bolshevik part must
consider all consisting nationalities.

The Bolshevik Revolution: Alienation from Nationalism

The Bolshevik movement precisely embodied its social setting—

a modern empire where multiple ethnic groups with underdeveloped
nationhood lived together. The 94 Bolshevik elites came from more
than 14 different nationalities, with up to a half (46) being ethnically
non-Russian, primarily Jews, Ukrainians, Baltics, and

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 luyang zhou

table a1–
bolshevik travel

Imperial Capitals: 38%

St Petersburg 21 Moscow 15
Non-Russian Capital Cities: 18%
Tiflis 6 Vilno (Vilnius) 4
Kiev 3 Riga 2
Almaty 2
Industrial or Commercial Centers: 29%
Odessa 3 Ivanovo-Vozneshchenskii 3
Kazan 4 Kharkov 3
Saratov 2 Nizhni Novgorod 2
Samara 2 Rostov 1
Omsk 1 Chita 1
Lugansk 1 Kursk 1
Ufa 1 Orel 1
Simferopol 1 Briansk 1
Foreign Cities: 2%
L’viv 1 Geneva 1
Counties: 13%
Total: 94

Sources: Coding from biographical data.

Note: This table considers the largest city in which the Bolsheviks had been
working or studying before his or her conversion to socialism. Given that many had
stayed in more than one, I consider only the first city he or she visited.

Transcaucasians [Goriachev 2005]. Mainly students and industrial

workers, this group had extensive experiences of imperial diversity.
Nearly 39% were working or studying in St Petersburg or Moscow,
while another 40% had similar lives at multiethnic cities like Kazan,
Kiev, Kharkov, Vilno, and Tiflis (see Table A1). A few, such as
Grigorii Zinov’ev, Lenin’s oldest disciple since 1903, grew up in
small towns, but lived for a long time in the multiethnic Russian
emigre communities of Western Europe [Granat 1989: 143-144].

Cultural Exclusion

Being a modern empire, Tsarist Russia actively sought to integrate

the territories it had conquered. The policy of Russification

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

encountered resistance in many regions, and was thus enforced in an

inconsistent and inadequate manner. Among certain groupings, Rus-
sification did gain success in preventing non-Russians from being
socialized into their own national cultures [see Wimmer 2018: 113-
155]. Still discriminated, these people aspired for a “good empire”,
where ethnicity was defined as irrelevant. This consideration led them
to affiliate with the universal socialist movement while, at the same
time, view the nationalists of their own nations as a foe.
Ukraine was a major theatre here, wherein the Russification policy
had blocked a large social group outside of the growth of Ukrainian
nationalism. Unlike Austro-Hungary which ruled Western Ukraine
with the strategy of “making Ukrainians”, in Eastern Ukraine the
Tsarist state conducted a harsh policy of Russification [Miller 2004: 10-
11; 17-18]. St Petersburg banned nationalist associations and publica-
tions, but also forbade the use of Ukrainian language in education (the
earliest Ukrainian elementary schools came into being only in the 1920s
when the Bolsheviks had seized power) [Pauly 2014: 66-67].
These policies successfully kept elite nationalist movements and
mass social unrests isolated from one another. Before 1917, peasant
rebellions and worker riots were frequent in Ukraine, but few carried
nationalistic characters [Kuromiya 1998: 65; Subtelny 2000: 233].
Nationalist movement was confined to a narrow circle of literati with
a gentry-priest background. In other words, only people who possessed
cultural capital were capable of pursuing nationalism, while those from
lower backgrounds simply assimilated into Russian culture.
The Ukrainian Bolsheviks came from the latter category: Grigorii
Petrovskii had only two years of formal schooling. Both Dmitrii Lebed’
and Vlas Chubar’ completed technical schools (uchilishche). Matvei
Muranov stopped at an even lower level [Granat: 491; Haupt and Marie
1974: 172; Kol’iak 1981: 5-6]. As to those with longer periods of schooling,
they turned to Bolshevism much earlier. Nikolai Krestinskii did possess
a bachelor’s degree, but he grew up in a Russified family with a tradition
of admiring Russian revolutionary heroes [Granat: 462]. Similarly, Dmitrii
Manuil’skii turned to socialism at the gymnasium stage [Granat: 793].
For these individuals, Russification was easy and natural. As Petrov-
skii’s case showed, a laboring migration to industrial centers easily
transformed a Ukrainian into a Russian [Kliuchnik and Zav’ialov 1970:
4-5]. In terms of reading, Ukrainian cultural materials, such as
Shevchenko’s collections, were hard to find. Even when available, people
who lacked cultural sophistication were not able to recognize its finesse,
unless they were fortunate enough to encounter advanced instructors

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 luyang zhou

[Kaganovich 1996: 27; 46-47]. The only exception was Nikolai Skrypnik,
who overtly proclaimed himself a national communist. Although he
lacked a high level of formal education, Skrypnik had informal mentors:
a knowledgeable veteran of the Polish uprising and a former Decembrist
who generously opened up his private library [Granat: 668].
On the contrary, the Russification policy had much more limited
effect on well-educated people. Out of the 19 leading Ukrainian
rightwing separatist leaders of the 1917-1918 periods, at least 14
obtained bachelors or higher levels of degrees. Two were graduates of
advanced seminaries. Others, despite a lower education, were either
literati or cultural activists2. The intellectual background of the
nationalists was also different. The leading ideologue, Dmytro
Dontsov, was educated in many countries. The icon of Ukrainian
literature, Oleha Teliha, was the daughter of a nationalistic-minded
Tsarist minister who rushed back to Ukraine soon after the fall of the
empire [Shkandrij 2015: 80-82, 176-177].
The incompleteness of Russification manifested in a different way
in Latvia, where the unevenness of linguistic Russification unfolded
not across strata but over generations. Unlike Ukraine, Latvia had
been given free rein to complete an early wave of cultural nation-
building. Local intellectuals’ efforts to modernize and spread the
Latvian language began in the 1840s and bore initial fruit in the 1870s
[Raun and Plakans 1990: 134; Zake 2007: 313-318]. In the 1880s,
however, this process was terminated, replaced by the state-led
linguistic Russification, which penetrated the elementary education
system in the 1890s [Plakans 1981: 208-209; 245-246].
The seven Latvian Bolsheviks belonged to the younger generation. Six
(Ian Berzin, Karl Danishevskii, Ivan Lepse, Ian Rudzutak, Ivar Smilga,
and Ivan Tuntul) were born around 1887 [Goriachev 2005], received
elementary education in the 1890s, and were socialized into Russian. The
sole exception was Petr Stuchka, born in 1865. His pre-university
experiences were unclear [Granat: 677], but he migrated at an early age
to St Petersburg, where he developed a firm friendship with Lenin.
On the contrary, the leaders who led the Latvian separation during
the Russian Civil War (1918-1921) came from an older generation.
Insofar as the generals, ministers and major party activists of the 1918
Republic are concerned, the majority was born prior to 1880. As in the
2
I collected the names in motyl 1980, tional background is drawn from the bio-
which analyzes the activities of the Ukrainian graphical dictionary edited by Kohut,
rightist nationalists in the 1917-1918 period. Nebesio and Yukevich in 2005.
The detailed data on these people’s educa-

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

Ukrainian case, many were cultural professionals such as writers,

journalists and historians3. Although most spoke Russian, their Latvian
identities had been forged before their linguistic Russification.
Differently, the unevenness of Russification among the Jewish
population was more of an outcome of their families’ self-selection. While
many Jews sought to assimilate into Russian culture in exchange for
security, jobs, and political rights, certain families stubbornly maintained
their own religion and languages [Gassenschmidt 1995; Karlip 2013].
The Jewish nationalists in Tsarist Russia, from Bundists to leftist
Zionists, came from the segment that actively resisted the encroach-
ment of Russification. The leading socialist-Zionists, for example, had
received a traditional education. Some studied in heder, special schools
teaching Hebrew, Yiddish, and Jewish history. Others, usually sons of
rabbis, came from families that professed Orthodox Judaism4. There
was an issue of stratification—such intellectual strands were then at
the very moment of taking shape, and engagement in such a fashion
thus entailed decent cultural capital.
The Jewish Bolsheviks, on the contrary, came from the families
that failed to resist Russification. Very few of the 15 Jewish Bolsheviks
were sons of intellectuals. The three exceptions were not assimilated
to Jewish either. Seigei Gusev had a teacher-father but grew up with
his worker-aunt [Granat: 398-399]. Radek’s parents, living in Austrian
Western Ukraine, made every effort to Germanize their son. Emel’ian
Iaroslavskii’s father was a feverish admirer of the Russian populist
tradition [Fateev and Korolev 1988: 15-16; Tuck 1988: 5-7]. In some
other cases, parents did have the will of maintaining Jewish traditions,
but lacked the capacity. Lazar’ Kaganovich was first sent by his father
to a Jewish school, but soon transferred to a Russian one, as the
former’s quality proved poor [Kaganovich 1996: 38]. Moisei Uritskii’s
mother, a busy merchant, wanted her son to maintain religiosity, but
lacked the time to achieve this [Skriabin and Gavrilov 1987: 6-7].
3
Few books or articles provide complete ple’s Group, the Folkspartei, the Jewish
information regarding the Latvian national- Democratic Group, and the labor Zionists.
ists. I drew up the list of names and collected The names are the ones commonly men-
the biographical data from roszkowski and tioned by gassenschmidt 1995, karlip 2013
kofman 2008, selecting people who were and rabinovitch 2014. The biographical
government ministers or above, generals, data are primarily drawn from these three
and major party leaders during the period books, as well as the encyclopedia edited by
1918-1923. There were 12 nationalists in Branover, Berlin and Wagner in 1998. Out of
total, on average aged 13.3 in 1890; the the 17 people referred to, at least 11 had
average age of the Bolsheviks in the same strong family backgrounds in the Jewish
year was 5.4. tradition. I also thank Morton Weinfield for
4
I collected data on the leaders of the four suggesting some additional names.
major leftist Zionists forces: the Jewish Peo-

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 luyang zhou

Institutional Exclusion

The infusion of nationalism with communism was precluded in the

second place by the exclusiveness of the majority nationalist move-
ment. In this situation, Russians, who spoke Russian well and were
familiar with Russian folk culture, could not or did not want to be
accepted into state-led Russian nationalism. That exclusion propelled
these Russians to seek “rule not in the name of Russians”.
The Tsarist state, during its final two decades, became increasingly
determined to create an “imperial ethnicity”. However, this move was
conducted as a way of reverting to boost the icons of absolutist
monarchy. Influenced by Slavophile thought, the last Tsar also
attributed the empire’s decline to the diminishing of the Orthodox
spirit [Freeze 1996; Lieven 2015].
Such a state-led nationalism affected limited segments of Russian
society. It somewhat echoed cultural Russian nationalism, an intellectual
fashion emerging among elite literati such as the Eurasianist thinkers,
Silver-Age writers, and Neo-Slav scholars [Shlapentokh 2007: 22-24;
Tolz 2015]. Another group of supporters, who were more overt, were the
Russian rightist parties. They envisioned a Russian national state where
the misery of lower-class Russians could be relieved through an in-
creasing exploitation of non-Russians [Rawson 1995]. A third stronghold
of official Russian nationalism, as is well-known, was the officer corps.
The majority of the Russian population was excluded, including the
Bolsheviks. The Russian Bolsheviks had a materialistic notion of Russia.
They viewed the unity of Russia as necessary, in that the peripheries—Don,
Baku, Turkestan, Siberia—bore natural resources, industrial bases, agricul-
tural and fishing fields, which were vital to the proletariat regimes inside and
outside of Russia [Bukharin and Preobrazhensky (1922) 1966: 195; IMTsK
1960: 49]. The Bolsheviks also justified their pursuit of a unified Russia by
asserting that the populations in these peripheries needed the “culturally
modernized” Russia to render their resources usable [OGIZ 1944: 11].
However, the Bolsheviks loathed the cultural and institutional
bases of Russian nationalism. They considered that the only role of
cultural idioms was to allow abuse and oppression to function
[Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1966 [1922]: 193-194]. As argued by
Lenin, the old Russian statehood, which the Bolsheviks had somewhat
picked up, should be suspended so as not to contaminate the pro-
letarian revolution [Fyson 1995: 194].
Such negative attitudes were more visible in these people’s artistic
tastes. They were obsessed with the dissident Russian writers of the

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

table a2–
education

Highest Levels of Education (%) Bolsheviks Kadets

Doctoral degree 2.9
Master degree 2.9
University (completed) 13.8 52.9
University (uncompleted) 5.3 2.9
Gymnasia (completed) 9.6 1.5
Gymnasia (uncompleted) 1.1 1.5
Vocational school (completed) 22.3 2.9
Vocational school (uncompleted) 3.2
Primary School 17.0
Lower 29.8
Unknown 32.4
Total 94 68

Sources: The data of the Kadets was drawn from Bolobuev 1993 and shelokhaev
1996. The name list of the leading Kadets of the 1916-1918 was obtained from
pavlov 1994. The volume does not provide a complete name list, but specifies the
names of attendees for each conference. I collected these names and found their
biographies in Shelokhaev’s dictionary. The same method was used to collect data
on the Russian rightists. The names of the most active leading elites can be seen
in the document collection GASRF 1998.

1860s and 1870s, such as Vissarion Belinsky, Nikolai Chernyshevsky,

Nikolai Dobroliubov, Alexander Herzen, Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin,
and Dmitrii Pisarev [Kirilina 2001: 16-17; Kramarov 1974: 5;
Kubiak and Usova 1982: 18; Kuibyshev 1988: 10-11; Levidova and
Salita 1969: 20; Loginov 2005: 80-81, 90-91]. These authors com-
monly despised the Russian culture as politically reactionary and
intellectually irrational. It is well-known that Vladimir Lenin was
a fan of Chernyshevsky’s novel5 [Lenin 1971: 11-12; 51-54], while
Nikolai Bukharin had been an admirer of Dmitrii Pisarev [Cohen
1973: 10-11] since his childhood, a writer who scorned that Russia’s
soil could only breed “evil Asiatic despotism”.
The Bolsheviks’ resistance to Russian nationalism reflected their
social origins. First of all, they had a generally low level of education,
which prevented them from engaging in the then emerging intellectual
fashions. While most leading elites of cultural Russian nationalism
5
Nikolai Chernyshevsky, 1989. What is to
be Done? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
translated by Michael R. Katz).

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table a3–
age

Year of Birth (%) Russian Bolsheviks Kadets Russian Rightists

1835-1844 6.1
1845-1854 9.1
1855-1864 31.0 33.3
1865-1874 10.4 51.0 33.3
1875-1884 29.2 17.0 6.1
1885-1894 58.3 6.1
1895-1904 2.1
Total 48 47 33

Sources: See the notes to Table A2.

Note: The total number of Russian Bolsheviks is 48 out of 94. Clear
information regarding their year of birth is only available for 33 Russian
rightist leaders.

were professionals such as historians, philosophers, anthropologists,

ethnographers, archeologists, and theologists, the Bolsheviks received
relatively little education (see the second column of Table A2, I list the
backgrounds of Kadets, to show the relative location of the Bolsheviks’
education).
The antipathy toward Tsarist monarchy was also a matter of
generation. Russian society underwent a profound reconstruction of
political value in the wake of the 1905 Revolution, when the massacre
smashed the Tsar’s image of “little father”. Yet, the psychological
impact varied across groups. The Russian Bolsheviks, then young,
were more likely to accept the rapidly spreading anti-monarchist
thought, in contrast to Russian rightists and constitutional liberals, of
the “father” generation (see Table A3).
Religiosity also prevented a large population from embracing state-
led Russian nationalism. From Alexander III onwards, the Romanov
House had been working on retrieving Orthodoxy as the basis for the
unity of state [Wortman 2006: 285-286], but this reversion went
against the growing trend of rapid secularization among the working
class and urban intellectuals. Many western works, such as Darwin
and Buffon, had been translated into Russian. With the help of radical
students committed to mobilization in the factories, these works were
given an atheistic interpretation and taught to workers in Sunday
Schools, Evening Schools, and other self-educational groups [Pipes
1963]. Massive migration to cities driven by rapid industrialization

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

(also see Table A1) also promoted secularization. To the young

workers who had experienced material entertainment, religion was
reminiscent of the rigid moral control they endured in their home
villages [Lieven 1983: 13].
The Russian Bolsheviks were part of the iconoclastic population.
Many were factory workers who were exposed to atheist agitation and
overtly expressed their hatred for religious education and rituals
[Frunze 1977: 25-26; Kliuchnik and Zav’ialov 1970: 16; Kol’iak
1981: 7]. The rapid expansion of linguistic Russification also created
a sharp shortage of qualified teachers. The state had to lower its
standard of selection, which allowed many radically-minded intellec-
tuals to flow into the teaching corps [Eklof and Peterson 2010]. Many
young Bolsheviks started their secularization with these teachers. For
example, Aleksei Badaev recalled that his chemistry teachers talked of
Lavoisier’s political ideas, and a geography teacher digressed to Engels’
The Condition of the Working Class in England [Pochebut and Malkin
1962: 12-14]. It was thus not surprising that most Russian Bolsheviks
abandoned religious faith at the early age of middle school or elementary
school, including Nikolai Bukharin, Evgenii Preobrazhensky, Aleksandr
Tsiurupa, Kliment Voroshilov, and Aleksandr Shliapnikov. Their bi-
ographies contain rich examples of conflicts with clerks, skipping
religious rituals, destroying Orthodox icons, and refusing to swear oath
[Allen 2015: 17-23; Davidov 1961: 8; Day, Gorinov and Preobrazhenskii
2014: 31; Granat: 26, 399, 437; Voroshilov 1968: 69-74].
The reassertion of religion also aroused a backlash among the
female socialists. Unlike their male comrades, the most prominent
Bolshevik women, such as Aleksandra Kollontai, Varvara Iakovleva,
and Elena Stasova, came from wealthier families. The intense
exposure to western culture endowed these women with a modern
feminist mindset, which made them less tolerant of the patriarchal
thought enshrined in the religious doctrines [Clements 1997: 22-23;
Granat: 784-85; Levidova and Salita 1969: 10-20; Porter 2013].
In addition to political and cultural alienation, the most institution-
alized exclusion was to be found in the realm of the military. The
Tsarist army intensified its monarchist and theological teaching after
the war with Japan [Wright 2005]. Military academies espoused
political education in parallel to professional teaching and drilling.
Nonetheless, this did not reach the socialists. Only 5 of the 46 Russian
Bolsheviks had served in the army, mostly as soldiers, including Andrei
Andreev, Grigorii Eudokimov, Daniil Sulimov, and Nikolai Uglanov
[Andreev 1985: 280; Granat: 727; Grechko 1976 12: 592; 25: 226]. The

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 luyang zhou

table a4–
class backgrounds

Father’s Occupation (%) Bolsheviks Kadets Russian Rightists

Peasant 30.9 3.4
Worker 11.7
Artisan or housekeeper 8.5
Businessman 13.8 5.9 6.9
Teacher, priest or clerk 18.1 4.4 6.9
Low-ranking official 1.1 2.9 3.4
Lawyer, professor or 6.4 8.8 3.4
doctor
High-ranking official 2.1 7.4 3.4
Capitalist or landowner 1.1 5.9 13.8
Nobility 6.4 27.9 55.2
Unknown 36.7 3.4

Total 94 68 29

Note: A fully convincing comparison should be drawn to the liberals in

Transcaucasian and Polish-Lithuanian regions, but the biographical data of the
Kadets rarely contains information regarding ethnicity. Clear information
regarding class background is available for only 43 of the 68 Kadets .

sole exception was Valerian Kuibyshev, founder of the Soviet Army’s

commissar system, who previously studied in the military corps, but
left the army after graduation [Kuibyshev 1988: 11-13].
A few factors may explain the absence of the Bolsheviks in the
Tsarist military. Since the Russo-Turkish War, a middle-school
education or equivalent was required for admission to military
academies [Persson 2010: 28-43]. This excluded many Bolsheviks
who, as shown above, were poorly educated. Ethnicity also had an
impact here. After the Russo-Japanese War, anti-Semitic discrimina-
tion became aggressive [Lohr 2003: 17-23]. “Jewish” was now defined
in racial rather than ethnic terms, which blocked the way of assimi-
̆
lation through religious conversion [Petrovskii;-Shtern 2009: 242-
248]. Jews were forbidden to enter certain military schools, and they
were also deterred by escalated physical abuse in the barracks [Haupt
and Marie 1974: 259]. In addition, the intensifying instillation of
religious-loyalism excluded many latent atheist-socialists. Escaping
conscription [Granat: 785] and refusing to swear oath [Allen 2015: 33-

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

34; Podgornyi 1966: 10] was not uncommon among the Bolsheviks.
This anti-military culture was so salient that failing to pass the
conscription test was celebrated as a huge victory.
Finally, a brief comparison of the Bolsheviks’, Kadets’, and right-
ists’ social origins shows that Russian official nationalism was confined
within a narrow social group that consisted of aged, non-professional
people from the upper level of hereditary aristocracy (see Table A4).
The Kadets were mainly middle-class, professionals, and intellectuals,
pursuing a transnational federation within which all nationalities
possessed equal status. This party was vigilant of Russian “patriot-
ism” on the ground and was concerned that a geopolitical crisis would
distract society from the pathway of democratization. To demonstrate
its transnational position, the Kadets even attempted to avoid using
“Russia” in its most inclusive form (Rossiia) (GARF 2000: 62]. For
the Bolsheviks, their collectively low social origins account for their
affinity to the ideology of warfare as a way of reorganizing the empire
not in the name of Russian.

Weak Legitimacy

A third factor unfavorable to nationalism was the technical in-

tegration of the Tsarist Empire. This was a landed empire, which
allowed the core to rapidly deliver military forces to the peripheries in
order to repress separatist movements. It was also believed that
peripheries, due to their late-development, depended on the core for
modernization, through a common market and homogeneous linguis-
tic system. There was a wide understanding among non-Russian
intellectuals that separation from Russia would propel their home
nations back to their “medieval, Asiatic, and superstitious” past.
A major case in point here was Transcaucasia. Unlike in Baltic and
Eastern Ukraine, nationalism in this area had a solid cultural base.
Transcaucasian nationalism turned against Russia after the 1860s.
The emancipation of 1861 led to the massive bankruptcy of Georgian
nobles, leading the upper and lower classes to coalesce into a united
Georgian national movement. In Armenia, Russia’s coerced revision
of religious doctrines and subsequent confiscation of the Orthodox
Church aroused a fierce nationalist surge [Suny 1993: 62-63]. Armed
insurrections followed in reaction. However, these rebellions were
immediately repressed. The repression period following the 1905
Revolution further demoralized Transcaucasian separatism. Seeing no

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 luyang zhou

chance of success, even the most radical nationalist “Dashnaktsutiun”

removed the quest for independence from its program. The Iranian
and Turkish Revolution of 1908 offered new lessons: the resistance
of small nations against despotism had to be based on transna-
tional cooperation, especially cooperation with the majority nations
[Minassian 1996: 184-185].
The nine Transcaucasian Bolsheviks were self-conscious nationalists.
Anastas Mikoyan secretly joined the Tsarist army at the outset of the
Great War, believing that he was defending the fatherland against the
Ottomans [Mikoyan and Mikoyan 1988: 37-38]. Joseph Stalin, a poetry
enthusiast, often voiced national nostalgia and homesickness in his works
[Stalin 2013: 17-29]. He also demonstrated against his seminary teachers,
because the latter forbade students to write in Georgian and even likened
Georgians to dogs [Montefiore 2007: 46]. Grigorii Ordzhonikidze grew
up reading the Georgian patriotic literature that glorified the ancient slave
heroes who rebelled against alien rulers [Ordzhonikidze 1967: 11]. When
he studied at the St Petersburg Military Medical Academy, Ivan
Orakhelashevili led protests against the army’s rigid schedule and physical
abuse against minorities [Hoover 1986: 11]. Aleksandr Miasnikov, albeit
with few details, admitted his great affection for Armenian nationalism
[Granat: 558]. Safarov may have inherited nationalism from his Polish
mother who harbored Russophobe sentiment [Goriachev 2005: 358].
Nevertheless, Transcaucasian Bolsheviks questioned separation.
Stepan Shaumian was an Armenian nationalist but shifted to Bolshe-
vism while he was studying in a Russian-language university [Granat:
765]. Shaumian argued that the nationalism of small nations had no
future because brutal cultural repression encouraged harsh self-
censorship on part of the Armenian writers. As such, they were
impelled to evade any public topics and focus on apolitical romance.
He deemed that such writings, although in national languages and
widely spread, would be useless in forging mass nationalist conscious-
ness [Shaumian 1978:17-28].
Shaumian’s opinion was echoed by Nariman Narimanov, the
founder of the first modern Azerbaijan nationalist party. Before
October 1917, Narimanov was an active cultural worker engaged in
a wide range of occupations, including composing dramas, translating
literature, founding libraries, managing theatres and teaching at
elementary schools. He believed that continuous cultural activities
would create an enlightened Azerbaijan nation immune to Islamic
“superstitions”. Yet, year after year his efforts met with ruthless
repression, leading him to conclude that cultural work within a single

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

nation could not continue. Narimanov was also concerned that

separation from Russia would drive Azerbaijan toward Islam which,
in his mind, was opposed to modernization [Akhmedov 1988: 22-24,
42-49,62-69, 75-77].
A similar idea can be found in Stalin’s debate with Lenin. In
a letter, he suggested that the autonomy that had been given to
Transcaucasia should be abolished on the grounds that, due to the
region’s general underdevelopment, local Transcaucasian staff
lacked the expertise needed to manage the economy and safeguard
its borders. Stalin also claimed that the nationalist sentiment of local
cadres would create difficulties for Russian experts [Gatagova,
Kosheleva and Pogovaia 2005: 61-62].
Nationalism was also contained in Poland. The Russophobia that
had been active for centuries saw its moderation in the first half of the
1800s. The failure of the 1831 uprising convinced many nationalists
that armed insurrection had no future. Deterred by Russia’s over-
whelming military power, most Polish elites lapsed into pessimism,
arguing that Russia should not be openly challenged [Blejwas 1984].
Pessimism further deepened after 1861, when the Poland Question
became considered as being an internal Russian affair. Prussia and
Austria, two other players in Poland’s partition, stood with Russia
during the 1863 Uprising [Snyder 2006: 173-80], and became St
Petersburg’s allies in the Great War. Neither France nor Britain were
willing to offer substantial aid. In 1905, with no reliable friends in
Europe, the desperate Polish patriot, Jozef Pilsudski, attempted to
conspire with the remote Japanese [ibid.: 182].
Polish-Lithuanian Bolsheviks were nationalists by identity. Felix
Dzerzhinskii, the prominent founder of the Soviet secret police, grew
up in a noble Russophobe family. However, his education in the
Russian language did not quell his Polish identity; rather, it further
led him to join the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, a leading
Polish nationalist organization. However, he eventually came to view
the separatist program as unrealistic [Granat: 407-409], on the
grounds that Polish nationalism would not only solicit an immediate
state crackdown but would also arouse aversion among the Jewish and
German populaces. According to Dzerzhinskii, Poland’s liberation
could only be based on the replacement of the Tsardom by a federalist
state, which would require an empire-wide revolution in the name of
internationalism. Dzerzhinskii’s posture fit well with the experience of
the other Polish-Lithuanian Bolshevik, Vincas Kapsukas, who was
expelled from school for taking part in the Lithuanian nationalist

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 luyang zhou

movement. He then escaped to Switzerland, where he met socialists

from other countries and became an internationalist [Granat: 545-546].
In sum, in Tsarist Russia, nationalism, either Russian or non-Russian,
lacked social strength. Nationalism was influential among elites with
access to cultural capital through family tradition, linguistic training, class
inheritance, and military conscription. Beyond these narrow circles it
remained weak. The Bolsheviks, due to experiences stemming from their
ethnic roots, tended to restrain from nationalist movements and identities
to varied extents: some Bolsheviks (Jews, Eastern Ukrainians, and
Latvians) completely lost their cultural identities, whereas others (Trans-
caucasians and Poles) retained an intense attachment. Similarly, while
Russian Bolsheviks sought to preserve their dominance in a more
concealed manner, non-Russians were more likely to use socialism to
found a less ethnopolitical state. Despite these internal variations, various
groups of the Bolsheviks achieved a thin consensus of keeping nationalism
at arm’s length, which distinguished them significantly from the CCP.

CCP: Caged into Nationalism

Unlike the Bolshevik revolution, the CCP movement had a better

base to infuse with nationalism. It grew in a homogeneous ethnic
space, China proper, where the population was mainly Han Chinese
and ethnopolitics was not as central to politics as it was in Russia [Liu,
X. 2004]. (It was only in the 1950s that the CCP fully entered into
former imperial peripheries, defeated the KMT, and obtained
Moscow’s support to easily disarm the tiny groups of non-Chinese
nationalists in these regions.) Growing up in this environment, the
CCP leadership was overwhelmingly Han Chinese. There was no
practical need to interpret Marxism as a universal ideology to
transcend nationality or ethnicity. Beyond this, it was through cultural
education, political participation, and geopolitical dynamics that the
CCP was incorporated into nationalism. The following three sections
will demonstrate how these mechanisms captured both the CCP and
the KMT, China’s the two major, shaping a broad Chinese nationalist
movement in which all forces engaged.

Cultural Inclusion

Unlike Tsarist Russia, the core of the Chinese empire was

a culturally well-established entity where the construction of

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

table b1–
education levels

Education Level CCP (%) KMT (%)

PhD 0.0 3.7
Master 0.0 7.3
Bachelor 1.3 34.9
Complete Confucian Education 1.3 2.3
Middle School (Gymnasium) 29.9 6.0
Normal School 20.8 3.2
Military-police school 11.7 27.5
Special Secondary School 14.3 2.3
Primary School 15.6 2.3
Less than Three Years 5.2 2.3
Unknown 0.0 8.3

Total 77 218*

Sources: Coding from biographies; KMTs’ data is drawn from Li 2011 and Liu G. 2005.
Note: Education information is not available for 18 KMT elites.

a common language and psychology had been going on for millen-

niums. The common written script was first created and promoted in
the 3rd century BC, which allowed elites speaking various dialects to
communicate with each other rather than build alliances along re-
gional boundaries [Wimmer 2018]. The Confucian-legal system
formed a strong psychology among literati that viewed unification as
orthodox [Zhao 2015]. Moreover, since th2e late 19th century, an
enlightened cultural nationalism had been rapidly growing, boosting
the republic and Chinese nation. This nationalism, thanks to China’s
political disunity after the Qing Empire, was transcendent and not
monopolized by any specific regime [Zhao, 2006].
The CCP leadership took shape in this historical legacy. The
communists, together with their KMT rivals, were part of a commu-
nity that used the common written conscript. Most communists had
an elementary- or intermediate-level Chinese education and barely
qualified as petty-intellectuals by the generally low standard of the
1920s-1930s. Although the CCP leadership as an entity was less
educated than its KMT counterpart (see Table B1)6, there were no
CCP equivalents to the Bolsheviks who lost their own mother tongues.
6
Given the extremely low education levels leaders were ranked in the middle and
of the population at that time, the CCP counted as petty intellectuals.

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 luyang zhou

table b2–
place of education

National Capitals: 26%

Beijing 3 Nanjing 3
Shanghai 7 Guangzhou 7
Provincial Capitals or equivalents: 45%
Changsha 10 Xiamen 1
Wuhan 6 Chengdu 1
Taiyuan 3 Xi’an 1
Chongqing 3 Nanchang 1
Tianjin 3 Guiyang 1
Shenyang 2 Dalian 1
Kunming 2
Regional Education Centers: 8%
Changde 3 Suide 2
Hengyang 1
Foreign Cities: 3%
Tokyo 1 Paris 1
Others: 18%
Total: 77

Sources: See the notes to Table B1.

It is true that within the CCP leadership there were several pro-Soviet
“internationalists”, such as Wang Ming, Li Lisan and Bo Gu, but
these were by no means figures like Karl Radek, Felix Dzerzhinsky, or
the Baltic Bolsheviks. The CCP internationalists mastered Mandarin
well for polemical writing, poetry and prose [Wu, Li and Zhu 1997: 1-
10, 350-355; Zhou and Guo 1991: 1-6]. Their pro-Soviet stances were
more of a rationally calculated strategy adopted to reinforce their
status [Yu 1997].
Nor was the CCP leadership caged in any parochial psychology.
Even before taking part in the all-China revolutionary war, most of
these future communists had traveled extensively around China
proper; they were educated and working in large cities, regional
capitals, or overseas student communities (see Table B2). Moreover,
the Bolsheviks generally moved throughout the empire’s ethnic
mosaic, which obscured their national identities. In contrast, very
few CCP leaders had any trans-ethnic experiences, except for Ulanhu
who grew up in Inner Mongolia (but was educated in Beijing), and

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

table b3–
age

Year of Birth CCP (%) KMT (%)

1874 or earlier 0.0 0.04
1875-1884 2.6 12.4
1885-1894 9.1 40.4
1895-1904 50.6 38.6
1905-1914 36.4 6.0
1915 or later 1.3 0.0

Total 77 218*

Sources: See the notes to Table B1.

Note: Information on the year of birth is not available for 5 KMT elites.

Chen Tanqiu and Li Xiannian, who were briefly in Xinjiang in the

1930s and 1940s for technical reasons.
Unlike the Bolsheviks who completed socialization under the intact
Tsarist Empire, Chinese communists grew up in the post-imperial
period when a republican, non-dynastic, and anti-Confucian sentiment
had been growing—the Imperial Civil Service Exam (Keju) was
abolished in 1905 and the Dynastic state ended in 1912. Toward the
end of the 1910s, a radical anti-traditional movement had been culmi-
nating, which discredited the whole of Chinese history as a total mistake.
While the KMT leaders had deeper memories of the imperial
culture and recurrently expressed sympathy to the Confucian past
[Jiang 1943: 49], the CCP leadership took shape when the transition
from imperial Confucianism to Chinese nationalism was close to
completion (see Table B3). More than one third of the communists
were born after the Imperial Civil Service Exam had been abolished,
and completed education at schools where teaching was modelled on
Western-style education.
The CCP had little nostalgia for the defunct empire. Zhou Enlai,
a fan of modern drama, criticized the traditional arts for romanticizing
patriarchy, despotism and patrimonialism [PDRO 1979: 24-27].
Zhang Wentian, a translator of English literature, argued that schools
should not offer any courses on Chinese history, as such courses would
“poison” the youth and hence reproduce “Asiatic despotism” [Zhang
1990b 1: 106-107]. He also suggested that research institutions hire
faculties exclusively from people who “had the background of modern
scientific training” [ibid.: 12-13]. This tendency to evade any

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 luyang zhou

restoration of the past would continue. During the 1940s War with
Japan, Mao, then the CCP’s supreme leader, was asked to provide
a definition of “Chineseness”. He invoked only the most general,
enlightened terms such as science, democracy, and mass [Mao 1993 2:
697-709].
To the CCP, nationalism was almost given. What they sought was
a better version of the prevailing Chinese nationalism, which was seen
as inadequate. Theirs was a generally progressive slogan without
concrete political and social programs [PDRO 2000 1: 19-26], only
occasionally invoked to demonstrate patriotic and heroic sentiment
[Yang 1998: 42-43]. It was also a coarse improvisation that attempted
to incorporate all “good values” without developing intellectual
coherence [Xu 1987 1: 33-35]. Often invoked by warlords, the old
military, and KMT bureaucrats, nationalism was a floating idea that
offered little in terms of reorganizing everyday life. Having been
repeated too often by too many, it was unable to serve as the
intellectual engine to drive discipline, diligence, and austerity [Bo
2008: 32-40; Dai and Zhao 2011: 8-10; PDRO 2005, 1: 33-34; PDRO
2012, l: 1, 11-13; Qiang and Li 1990: 1-5; Sitao 2010: 1-4].

Institutional Inclusion. In contrast to Tsarist Empire, where Russian

nationalism was a campaign that only involved the state apparatus and
its closest associates, Chinese nationalism, in its post-imperial period,
was an inclusive movement open to broad social strata. The revolution
of 1911, largely a reaction to the recentralization of the Manchurian
state, was based on consensus among Han elites. After the fall of the
dynastic state, political disunity promoted instrumental rationality.
Warlord states competed in the name of establishing a unified Chinese
national republic. As the old patriarchy broke down, each side sought
to absorb broad social strata, which included the future CCP leaders.
Interference by the Soviet Union in the 1920s also strengthened
institutional openness, by forcing nationalists to incorporate commu-
nists, and forcing communists to join the nationalists [Connor 1984:
77-78].
Because of this institutional openness, the CCP’s connections with
non-communist nationalists were extensive and deep. Among the
senior CCP elites, over 29 had held official positions in the KMT or
with warlords. (This number increases to 60 if we consider the high-
ranking commanders of the CCP army, see the prosopography
Jiefangjunjianglingzhuan, Xinghuoliaoyuan 1995.) These positions
ranged from high-ranking ones (division- and army-level

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

commanders, secretaries of KMT headquarters) to intermediate ones

(representatives of special departments, political commissars and staff
officers at regiment- and battalion-levels).
Most connections were forged during the mid-1920s when the
KMT was massively recruiting youths to fight warlords in North
China under the supervision of the Soviet Union; other inclusions
occurred earlier in the anti-Qing revolution or later during the Sino-
Japanese War. Almost all the CCP leaders who joined the party by
1928 identified their starting points of radicalization as the time they
became nationalists. At the level of high-ranking officers, there were
wide-ranging personal friendships between the CCP, the KMT, and
non-KMT warlords, which would be recurrently invoked to facilitate
a “united front” and cultivate nostalgia for the “heroic struggle for
national unification” [Wang (1973) 2015; Zhao 2012]. This contrasted
with Russia where the Reds and Whites had never met before 1917
and were cast into brutal armed antagonism in 1918.
The inclusiveness of the Chinese nationalist movement was
strikingly broad, in that the incorporated and incorporating came

table b4–
class backgrounds

Father’s Occupations CCP (%) KMT (%)

Peasant 59.7 10.1
Rural school teacher 9.1 5.5
Peddler or artisan 11.7 1.0
Small landlord 11.7 0.0
Low-rank officials 5.2 3.7
High-ranking officials 0.0 4.1
Lawyer, professor or doctor 1.3 1.4
Businessmen 0.0 8.7
Large landlord 1.3 6.4
Professional revolutionary 1.3 0.5
Unknown 0.0 58.7

Total 77 218*

Sources: See the notes to Table B1.

Note: The data available on the family backgrounds of the KMTs was very
incomplete. Information is available for only 90 of the 218 Central Executive
Committee (CEC) members, and the available information is very brief. A similar
issue is found with KMTs whose fathers were businessmen. This is partially offset
by data on education levels, which reflect family backgrounds.

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 luyang zhou

table b5–
experiences abroad (non-soviet)

CCPs KMTs
France and Belgium 9 8
Britain 0 6
United States and Canada 1 19
Germany 1 4
Japan 7 33
Italy 0 1
Turkey 0 1

Sources: See the notes to Table B1.

from very different backgrounds. Compared to Russian nationalism,

which was an enterprise of the top echelon, the Chinese nationalist
movement had much looser requirements for people’s family back-
grounds. The CCP and the KMT stood at almost two poles of society
(see Table B4). Unlike the KMT who came from upper class families, the
CCP leaders were overwhelmingly sons of peasants, rural teachers, and
artisans. Another indicator was any overseas experience. Some senior
CCP leaders had briefly studied abroad without ever obtaining any formal
degrees; their KMT counterparts had a more solid record (see Table B5).
The CCP’s conversion to communism partly stemmed from the
inclusiveness of Chinese nationalist movement. Because anyone could
join without the need to confirm to any uniformly stipulated discipline
or ideology, the movement was very loose in nature. Factionalism
existed along many types of lines, such as professional backgrounds,
school friendships, and experiences of overseas travel. The CCP’s
criticism of such fragmentation can be seen widely in their biogra-
phies. Senior officers such as Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, Dong Biwu, and
Wang Weizhou lamented that many military units that had performed
heroically in overthrowing the Qing became paralyzed after 1912 due
to infighting for territory and financial resources [EBCE 2010: 339-
345; EBCES 1984: 233-234; NDU 2007: Chapter 2]. Other partic-
ipants of the nationalist revolution, like Liao Chengzhi, Lin Boqu, Wu
Yuzhang, and Zhang Yunyi, criticized factionalism as creating dys-
function in coordination, and causing well-planned expeditions to
abort, often with intrigues and assassination [EBCE 2010: 172-80; Li
1978: 31-103; Liao 1990 1: 2-3; Lin 1984: 194-196]. Latecomers, such
as He Long, Lv Zhengcao, and Wan Yi found that the lack of

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

a coherent ideology meant that they could not discipline their troops
without resorting to banditry rule and parochial bonds [Li 1996: 62-
64; Lv 1987: 75-76; Wan 1998: 54-55]. Finally, younger CCP elites
cultivated antipathy to localism in the devastation caused by the
warlords’ anarchy [Chen 1982b: 229; Mao 2002: 33; PDRO 2004: 9-
10; Tang 1999: 9-10] as well as discrimination within the school
system [DCHTU 1979: 723-37; Mao 2002: 17-18; Sanetō 1983: 423-
437].

High Legitimacy

A third factor distinguished the CCP from the non-Russian

Bolshevik as well as most anti-colonialist movements: there was
a pervasive belief among Chinese nationalists that a successful liber-
ation was possible and thus deserved their efforts. This collective
psychology held during the war with Japan, a most precarious and
pessimistic period. It was argued that China, despite its low level of
modernization and many military defeats, could not be fully con-
quered by any foreign powers, because of its huge territorial size as
well as the competition among “imperialists”. Such optimism was
articulated into popular strategic concepts like Mao’s “protracted
war” [2002: 94-103], Jiang Baili’s “comprehensive national power”
[Setzekorn 2015: 151-152], and Jiang Jieshi’s “sacrificing space to win
time” [Huang 1978]. There was never a moment in China tantamount
to the desperate early 20th century in Poland or Transcaucasia where
the entire elite abandoned any hope for armed resistance.
In real politics the CCP, the KMT, and local strongmen competed
to make the nationalist revolution a beneficial business. As Japan’s
inability to occupy China became obvious after 1939, most nationalists
eventually switched to devote their major forces to continuing civil
war. Boosting nationalist slogans, they could either push domestic
rivals to confront the Japanese offensive or discredit these rivals by
accusing them of not forcefully fighting national enemies [Minoru and
Si-Yun 2014: Ch. 2].
The experiences of combat with Japan further convinced the CCP
elite that the war could persist. Such observations occurred very early
and extended to the end of war in 1945. In September 1938 Zhu De
pointed out that as the war moved deeper into China’s inland, Japan’s
offensive was attenuating, with previous tactics replaced by more
conservative ones, and with local maintenance falling into the hands of

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 luyang zhou

Chinese collaborator armies [Wang 2006: 198]. In a working report of

1940, Liu Shaoqi noted that, after the initial panic of 1938, both the
KMT and CCP found that they could survive in the occupied areas
and continue to exert rule and extract resources, as there were vast
territories the Japanese did not have the forces to control [PDRO
2003: 119]. In a speech in August 1942, Nie Rongzhen stated that,
while Japanese soldiers fought actively, they had to leave most military
spots to weaker collaborators and even bandits, from whom the CCP
partisans could easily seize weapons and supplies [GPD 2001 6: 99].
In May 1945, Huang Kecheng commented that thanks to the learning
and seizures during battles, the CCP army’s combat skills had
significantly improved over the past three years, completing a transi-
tion from guerrilla battles to regular warfare [GPD 2001 7: 99].
The CCP actively used nationalism to expand the party’s social
base beyond the restriction of class-struggle ideology. As Tan Zheng
stated in 1940, anti-Japanese nationalism could help overcome the
skepticism against petty-intellectuals who were viewed as part of the
bourgeoisie by peasant-origin cadres [GPD 2001 5: 3]. A similar
comment came from Luo Ruiqing, who reported that the alienation
between peasant-background revolutionaries and intellectuals was
ubiquitous and could only be resolved by invoking solidarity under
anti-Japanese nationalism [GPD 2001 5: 112].
To be compatible with a nationalist framework, the CCP’s un-
derstanding of class was ambiguous, broad, and unorthodox in
comparison with the Bolsheviks’. “Class” equated more with the
misery of the poor, rather than a strictly-defined industrial proletariat.
As Zhou Enlai and Zhang Wentian argued, nationalism as an
emerging ideology was not as familiar to the masses as the old ideas
of dynasty and emperor [PDRO 1979: 351-352; Zhang 1990b:108-
109]. It was therefore necessary to have an ideology relevant to the real
demands of the lower classes such as food, safety, and education. That
was the only way to effectively attract the masses [Zhang 1990b: 108-
109], allowing them see a clear link between their everyday lives and
the more grandiose nationalist ideal [Zhang 1990a: 1-3].
Class also conveyed a norm of “grouping and ranking”, which
could be invoked to create pressure to discipline the army by
privileging the “active” and shaming the “inactive”. This understand-
ing of class was developed by CCP leaders with military backgrounds
in managing the rank-and-file. They found that discipline in the name
of the masses with a sophisticated tactic of pressuring people was
much more effective than traditional disciplinary formats such as

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

clandestine soldier freemasonry and regular military ethics, which had

fallen in the aftermath of imperial demise [Chen 1982a; Peng 2002:
31-49; Zhu 1946: 5-13].
In sum, nationalism was stronger in China, which made its infusion
with communist revolution easier. Both the CCP and the KMT were
ethnically Hans who identified with post-dynastic values. There were
no equivalents to the Bolsheviks who had lost their native language or
culture due to assimilation. Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism, both as
a movement and an institution, was open to broad social strata. By
participating in nationalism, the CCP not only further strengthened
its identification with nationalism but also developed extensive
personal and organizational connections with the KMT. That was
unimaginable between the Bolsheviks and the Whites. Moreover,
nationalism was widely viewed as a geopolitically feasible movement
in China. The CCP, in its competition with the KMT, actively
engaged in this movement both to gain political legitimacy and resolve
its own organizational and ideological tensions. This differed funda-
mentally from the pessimism of small nations at the peripheries of the
Russian Empire where nationalists unanimously thought of armed
resistance as unfeasible. Finally, being caged within such a hegemony-
like nationalist framework, the CCP understood class in an unortho-
dox manner vis-a-vis its Bolshevik teacher. It invoked class, instead of
transcending ethnic politics, to overcome the fragmentation within
nationalism.

Conclusion

This article identifies three social conditions that strengthen the

inclusiveness of nationalism: complete cultural coverage over a pop-
ulation, widely open institutional access to lower classes, and high
legitimacy based on an optimistic estimation of the feasibility of anti-
colonial separation. Under strong nationalism, communists had to
become nationalists to seize power; under weak nationalism, large
social groups were either unwilling or unable to engage in the
nationalist movement, becoming instead the foes of nationalism. By
comparing the Bolsheviks and the CCP, this article argues that there
was no intellectual incompatibility between nationalism and Marxism.
Although this article uses biographical data, it by no means asserts
that the stances of individuals remained static. Rather, there were clear

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 luyang zhou

changes over time, across which the theses of this article still hold.
Some factors saw fluctuations in the short term. For example,
institutional openness varied. It diminished in the KMT’s China of
1927-1937, which promoted the CCP in order to boost an interna-
tionalist support for minorities’ separation from China. However,
such divergence did not go as far as the Bolsheviks of 1917 [Connor
1984: 69-76]. Geopolitics was volatile too. As the Bolsheviks eventu-
ally settled down after seizing power, they came to believe that the
allies’ intervention would be limited. That led them to tap popular
Russian nationalist sentiment so as to win the support of the middle
classes, intellectuals, and former officers [Agursky 1987: 238-264].
The congruence between ethnicity and political identities was more
complicated. The CCP made its concept of the Chinese nation vaguer
in the 1940s as its guerrilla zones expanded to incorporate many
minorities [Huang 2017: 179-80, 205-11]. As for the USSR, the
process took longer. The 1930s would see a nationalist surge in
Ukraine, where local language had been developed for years and
political national consciousness was taking shape [Graziosi 2017: 457-
458, 463]. In general, the non-Russians would gain in national
languages and identities thanks to the Affirmative Action Empire in
the 1920s and 1930s [Martin 2001]. Such efforts of making “national”
were to pave way for the rise of nationalism in the 1980s [Brubaker
1996: 13-22]. They also partly explain why the Soviet Union did not
end up with a new empire.
The three mechanisms also apply beyond Russia and China to the
broader communist world, although these countries were more
affected by external power dynamics. In general, Eastern Europe
was closer to Russia. Because of the massive ethnic dislocation
originating in the Versailles rearrangement, interwar Eastern Europe
was still at the very beginning stage of nation-building. The notions of
“patriotic nations” [for patriotism and ethnonationalism, see Connor
2003], such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and even Romania and
Albania, were somewhat artificial, and thus remained contested by
more organic identities such as religion and ethnonationalism
[Bartlova 1995: 168; Pesic 1996: 5-6]. To avoid ethnopolitics tearing
apart the revolution, it was thus not uncommon for communist
organizations of the interwar period to carry anti-nationalist tones,
even at the expense of alienating themselves from the public [Gilberg
1990: 45-46].
Institutional openness saw a change over time. While they were not
yet seized by fascist movements as in Germany and Italy, most

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 nationalism and communism as foes and friends

interwar Eastern European states refused to incorporate communists,

viewing the latter as Jewish conspirators or Moscow’s fifth column
[Mann 2004: 241-244, 270]. This partly justified the Comintern’s
insistence on banning communist parties from any form of collabora-
tion with nationalists, a situation that differed from the KMT’s China
of the early 1920s and 1940s. This landscape fundamentally changed in
the aftermath of World War II. To penetrate and control those
multiparty coalitional governments, communist parties actively made
themselves seem nationalistic so that they could attain legitimacy and
popularity, although such efforts would later put them into conflict with
Moscow and neighboring countries after complete takeover [Rychlık
1995: 192-193]. This is part of the reason why there was not a second
universal “union” in the Eastern European bloc.
Geopolitics also mattered here. One common concern of the
Eastern European nations was the encroachment of adjacent powers
[Sohrabi 2018: 848-849]. This concern had driven nationalists to
restrain themselves so that they could build alliances with other
“oppressed people” [Bartlova 1995: 168-171]. After communist take-
over, such anxiety transitioned into fear of the Soviet Union. Fearful
of provoking Moscow, Eastern European regimes such as Poland,
Romania, and Bulgaria discreetly suppressed nationalist expressions
from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s. They not only denounced
history, but also minimized the use of terms that connoted indepen-
dence, such as “national economy” and “national culture” [Petrescu
2009]. It was not until after the death of Stalin that they started to
develop a patriotism that involved substantial native cultural idioms,
albeit still in a moderate manner [Kunicki 2012; Stanciu 2013].
The situation in East Asia was quite different, and generally similar
to that of China. Both North Korea and Vietnam were ethnically
homogeneous societies, reinforced by long histories of political state-
hood. It was thus unlikely that any significant section of the
population would manage to escape from the caging of native culture.
Institutional openness was narrow in the past, as colonial repression
was harsh. This changed after World War II, when both communist
parties were supported by their patrons and competed with nation-
alists for popularity, reframing themselves as nationalists [Armstrong
2017: 443-48; Quinn-Judge 2017: 415-424]. Unlike most Eastern
European countries that fell into the unilateral dominance by Russia,
the two East Asian nations were an “intermediate belt”, giving them
a card to play between Moscow and Beijing. Since the two “big
brothers” had been lapsing to antagonism, North Korea and Vietnam

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 luyang zhou

gained resources from both while at the same time retaining consider-
able autonomy [Armstrong 2017: 457-460; Quinn-Judge 2017: 430-
434].
The case of Cuba is similar to that of East Asia. The communist
leadership was homogeneous, taking shape after independence from
Spain. The nationalist regimes before 1959 were more inclusive than
in interwar Eastern Europe. Communists were initially persecuted but
were eventually incorporated in the 1930s and 1940s, a process shaped
by the alliance between Washington and Moscow. This continued
after the revolution. When anti-American nationalists overthrew the
pro-US Batista regime, the communists integrated and self-reorgan-
ized into a communist party. In terms of geopolitics, like Vietnam,
Korea, and to some extent Romania and Albania, Cuba made good use
of its geographical proximity to the US and its political proximity to
the Soviet Union, which allowed it to avoid being a satellite of either
country [Gleijeses 2017: 381-382].

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R
esum
e Zusammenfassung
Les sociologues ont observe que le degre Wie Soziologen festgestellt haben, kann die
d’inclusion ideologique du nationalisme est ideologische Einbindung des Nationalismus
susceptible de varier. En comparant les elites sehr unterschiedlich verlaufen. Der Vergleich
revolutionnaires bolcheviques et communis- zwischen den revolution€aren Eliten des Bol-
tes chinoises, cet article explique que cette schewismus einerseits und des chinesischen
variation depend de la force sociale du natio- Kommunismus anderseits verdeutlicht, dass
nalisme. Un nationalisme fort est (a) sous- die soziale St€arke des Nationalismus der
tendu par une culture nationale amplement Ausl€ oser f€
ur derartige Schwankungen ist. Ein
diffusee qui socialise l’essentiel des elites starker Nationalismus wird 1. durch eine weit-
radicales au sein de la nation ; (b) il est verbreitete nationale Kultur gest€ utzt, die den
maintenu institutionnellement ouvert a de Großteil der radikalen Eliten innerhalb der
larges couches de la population afin que les Nation sozialisieren kann; 2. ist er institutionell
classes inferieures puissent, a travers leur f€
ur viele soziale Schichten offen, so dass Un-
participation, se forger une identite nationa- terschichten durch ihre Teilhabe eine nationa-
liste ; et (c) il est universellement considere listische Identit€at bilden k€ onnen; und 3.
comme une revolution anti-coloniale realiste, versteht er sich grunds€atzlich, aus geopoli-
d’un point de vue geopolitique, afin que les tischer Perspektive, als eine realistische, anti-
elites radicales percxoivent leur engagement koloniale Revolution, die f€
ur radikale Eliten ein
comme utile et necessaire. En utilisant une lohnendes und notwendiges Engagement dar-
approche biographique comparee des natio- stellt. Die vergleichende biographische Meth-
nalistes et communistes, cet article montre ode zwischen Nationalisten und Kommunisten
que le nationalisme en Russie tsariste etait zeigt auf, dass der Nationalismus im zaristi-
beaucoup plus faible que dans la Chine post- schen Russland viel schw€acher ausgepr€agt war
imperiale. Alors qu’en Russie, le mouvement als im postimperialen China. W€ahrend in
nationaliste excluait les communistes, en Russland die nationalistische Bewegung die
Chine il les integrait. Il ressort de l’analyse Kommunisten ausschloss, integrierte sie sie in
que les deux partis communistes avaient des China. Schlussendlich kann festgestellt wer-
conceptions differentes du marxisme. den, dass die beiden kommunistischen Parteien
unterschiedliche Vorstellungen vom Marxis-
Mots-cles : Revolution ; Nationalisme ; Em- mus hatten.
pire ; Russie ; Chine.
Schl€
usselw€
orter : Revolution; Nationalismus;
Kaiserreich; Russland; China.

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