Mark Anderson - Victor Warner - A-Z Guide To Boilerplate and Commercial Clauses-Bloomsbury (2017)
Mark Anderson - Victor Warner - A-Z Guide To Boilerplate and Commercial Clauses-Bloomsbury (2017)
In previous editions of The A–Z of Boilerplate Clauses, the precedents have been
available separately on a CD-ROM.
For the new 4th edition, the precedents are available to download electronically
from www.bloomsburylawonline.com/boilerplate.
They are password-protected and the password is BJG36hzP.
They can be downloaded individually or in totality.
If you have any problems downloading the precedents or have any questions,
please contact Bloomsbury Professional customer services on 01444 416119 or
by email at [email protected].
For a Licence agreement relating to the use of this Data, please see overleaf
at p vi.
vi
The goal we set for the first edition of the A–Z Guide to Boilerplate and Commercial
Clauses, back in the 1990s, was that it should be a useful source of information
across the main areas covered by boilerplate clauses.
As the title states, this is the fourth edition, but the goal remains equally true
this time around – to provide a sourcebook of:
• precedent material;
• the key reasons for including a particular boilerplate or commercial
clause;
• the essential legal principles underpinning a boilerplate or commercial
clause; and
• practical points to consider when drafting or understanding a boilerplate
or commercial clause.
So what is new? As in previous editions, we continue to add to individual
sections, by providing more guidance and example wording, and taking
account of new statute and case law.
Since the third edition, several new legislative measures have appeared, such
as the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the Trade Secrets Directive (2016/943) and
the General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679). They have modified or
added to existing law, of course, but not to the extent that substantial new or
additional wording will be necessary for a mainstream commercial contract
(as far as we can tell at present!).
The same applies to the many cases on boilerplate clauses which have been
reported since the third edition; too many to be listed here. Many of these
cases concern the meaning of a contract clause (or words within a clause).
A couple of examples will suffice:
• a force majeure clause is a classic boilerplate provision and a topic which,
as far as significant new case law is concerned, appeared to have fallen
asleep for several years. Then there is one new case which helps focus
attention on the meaning of ‘beyond reasonable control’;
• the perennial classic, the entire agreement clause. If it includes wording
such as ‘supersedes … any prior written or oral representations’ then it is
not enough, normally, to exclude liability for pre-contract representations.
Even if new cases don’t affect how clauses of this kind should be worded, it is
valuable to see how the court interprets them.
vii
viii
Driftwood: Oh that’s the usual clause. That’s in every contract. That just says,
uh, it says, uh, if any of the parties participating in this contract is shown not
to be in their right mind, the entire agreement is automatically nullified …
That’s what they call a ‘sanity clause’.
Fiorello: Ha, Ha, Ha, Ha, Ha. You can’t fool me. There ain’t no Sanity Clause!
‘A Night at the Opera’, Marx Bros. (MGM Studios, 1935)
ix
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Acquisition of Land Act 1981 Companies Act 2006 – contd
s 23(4)............................................... 455 s 47..................................................... 128
Arbitration Act 1996............. 63, 64, 65, 69, 70, 112................................................... 17
71, 72, 73, 78 287................................................... 496
Pt I (ss 1–84)..................................... 70 442(2)............................................. 455
s 1(a).................................................. 63 735................................................... 263
2(1)................................................. 70 Pt 25 (ss 859A–894).......................... 543
3....................................................... 70 s 860................................................... 536
4(1), (2).......................................... 65 861(4)............................................. 405
9–11, 24, 43..................................... 65 871(1)............................................. 536
67, 68............................................... 65, 72 875................................................... 536
69(1)............................................... 71 1159........................................ 16, 17, 18, 19,
91..................................................... 72 20, 21, 22, 24
Sch 1.................................................. 65 (1)(a)–(c)............................... 24
Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1160................................................. 22
1971................................................ 458 1161............................................... 16, 22, 23
Bills of Sale Act 1878............................. 536 (5)........................................... 19, 664
Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment 1162............................ 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 26
Act 1882......................................... 536 (2)(a), (b)............................... 26
Capital Allowances Act 2001 (c)...................................... 27
s 466................................................... 311 (d)...................................... 26
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act (4)(a)...................................... 27
1982................................................ 452 (5)........................................... 19
s 32, 33............................................... 446 1173................................................. 16
42..................................................... 496 Sch 6.................................................. 24
Companies Act 1948 para 1–3........................................ 24
s 725................................................... 481 4–8........................................ 25
Companies Act 2006.... 17, 21, 31, 32, 126, 9, 10...................................... 26
127, 128, 263, 264, Sch 7.................................................. 24, 25
265, 266, 274, 426, para 1, 2........................................ 26
494, 645 3............................................ 26, 27
s 3....................................................... 263 4, 5........................................ 27
33..................................................... 221 6–8........................................ 27, 28
39..................................................... 124, 645 9–11...................................... 28
40............................................ 124, 128, 645 Competition Act 1980........................... 662
(1)............................................... 126 Competition Act 1998........................... 662
(2)............................................... 645 Consumer Credit Act 1974................... 422, 656
43..................................................... 124 s 100................................................... 286
44.............................................. 31, 128, 263 Consumer Rights Act 2015.... 194, 195, 196, 197,
(2), (3)........................................ 265 199, 203, 204, 208,
(5)............................................... 269 211, 286, 300, 371
(6), (7)........................................ 268 Pt 2 (ss 61–72).......................... 195, 196, 200
(8)............................................... 264 s 3(3)................................................. 196
45(1)............................................... 263 9....................................................... 204
46............................................ 263, 264, 266 (2), (3).......................................... 197
(2)............................................... 266 10..................................................... 204
xxv
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Consumer Rights Act 2015 – contd Contracts (Rights of Third Parties)
s 11..................................................... 204 Act 1999 – contd
(4)............................................... 196 s 2....................................................... 223
12............................................ 196, 201, 204 6....................................................... 221
13–17............................................... 204 7(1)................................................. 219
28..................................................... 204 (4)................................................. 220
(2), (3)........................................ 204 8....................................................... 228
29..................................................... 204 10..................................................... 220
30..................................................... 203 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
31..................................................... 200, 204 1988................................................ 404, 405
(2), (3)........................................ 205 s 3....................................................... 404
34–37............................................... 204 11(1)............................................... 404
36..................................................... 201 92(1)............................................... 311
37..................................................... 196 119D, 225........................................ 311
41..................................................... 204 Corporate Bodies’ Contracts Act 1960
47..................................................... 200, 204 s 1....................................................... 124
(2)............................................... 205 Corporation Tax Act 2009.................... 405
49..................................................... 205 s 921................................................... 311
50..................................................... 205 County Courts Act 1984........................ 420
(3)............................................... 196, 201 s 74..................................................... 420
51, 52............................................... 205 Data Protection Act 1998............ 249, 250, 251,
57..................................................... 200, 205 252, 253, 254,
(4), (5)........................................ 205 255, 656
62..................................................... 200 s 1(1)................................................. 251
(2), (3)........................................ 195 2....................................................... 251
(4)............................................... 371 4(4)................................................. 251
(6)............................................... 195 Sch 2.................................................. 252
63..................................................... 200 Sch 3.................................................. 252
64(1)............................................... 199 Finance Act 1999................................... 562
(2)............................................... 195, 199 s 112................................................... 562
(3), (4)........................................ 195 Finance Act 2000
(5)............................................... 199 s 129(2), (3), (5)............................... 563
65(1)............................................... 200 Sch 34
68, 71............................................... 195 para 4............................................ 563
Sch 2.......................................... 199, 200, 288 Finance Act 2003
para 1............................................ 211 s 42(2)(b), (c)................................... 563
(b)....................................... 551 43..................................................... 563
2, 3........................................ 211 (1), (3)........................................ 563
4............................................ 211, 288 48(1)(a).......................................... 563
5, 6........................................ 211 76(3)............................................... 563
7–14...................................... 212 85..................................................... 563
15.......................................... 212, 213 125................................................... 562
16.......................................... 213 Sch 13................................................ 562
17.......................................... 213, 299 Finance Act 2009
18–21.................................... 213 s 129(2)(a)........................................ 563
22–25.................................... 214 Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981
Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 s 9(1)(g)............................................ 136, 257
s 2....................................................... 446 Freedom of Information Act 2000....... 57, 349,
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 350, 352, 353, 355,
Act 1999..................... 2, 3, 19, 87, 90,206, 356, 357, 358, 359,
218, 219, 220, 221, 360, 361, 362
222, 223, 224, 225, s 22, 40............................................... 349
226, 227, 228, 229, 41..................................................... 351, 352
569, 668 42..................................................... 349
s 1....................................................... 229 43............................................ 349, 353, 354
(1)................................................. 218, 220 Sch 1.................................................. 356
(a)............................................ 218, 222 Health and Safety at Work etc Act
(b)................................... 218, 219, 222, 1974................................................ 655
227, 228 Insolvency Act 1986.............................. 426
(2)........................................ 218, 222, 226, s 123................................................... 397
227, 228 252................................................... 393
(3)................................................. 222, 230 253................................................... 394, 397
(5)................................................. 220 264................................................... 393
xxvi
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Insolvency Act 1986 – contd Limited Liability Partnerships Act
s 267, 268........................................... 397 2002................................................ 30
273, 286........................................... 394, 397 s 1(2)................................................. 31
Interpretation Act 1978.............. 274, 425, 426, 3....................................................... 31
463, 464, 612 Local Government Act 1972
s 5............................................. 273, 427, 429, s 1, 20, 73........................................... 612
453, 612 Misrepresentation Act 1967................. 296, 304
6....................................................... 427, 429 s 3.............................................. 301, 303, 318,
17..................................................... 71, 429 329, 331
(2)(a).......................................... 22, 425 Partnership Act 1890..................... 30, 392, 435
21, 22............................................... 430 s 9....................................................... 435
23..................................................... 71 Patents Act 1977.................................... 405, 662
(3)............................................... 22, 425 s 30 (6).............................................. 42
Sch 1......................................... 273, 427, 429, 40, 41............................................... 660
453, 612 68..................................................... 310
Sch 2 130(1)............................................. 311
Pt I (paras 1–5)............................. 430 Powers of Attorney Act 1971................ 364
para 5(a)................................... 612 s 1....................................................... 261
Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 (1)................................................. 364
s 19(2)............................................... 178 4....................................................... 368
Land Registration Act 2002.................. 261 (1)................................................. 364
s 18, 21............................................... 261 Sale of Goods Act 1979............... 120, 203, 205,
25(1)............................................... 261 314, 316, 318,
Late Payment of Commercial Debts 332, 333, 533,
(Interest) Act 1998........................ 420, 422 534, 626, 630
s 1....................................................... 421 s 3(2)................................................. 124
2(1)................................................. 420 8....................................................... 502
(5)................................................. 421 10..................................................... 504
3....................................................... 420 (1), (2)........................................ 621
4, 5, 5A............................................ 421 13..................................................... 332
6....................................................... 420 14..................................................... 291, 332
8(1)................................................. 421 Pt III (ss 16–26)................................ 630
9....................................................... 421 s 16............................................ 626, 627, 630
(3)................................................. 421, 422 17............................................ 533, 626, 630
13..................................................... 422 (1), (2)........................................ 627
Law of Property Act 1925 18........................................... 505, 626, 627,
s 41..................................................... 621 630, 631
49(2)............................................... 286 r 1–4........................................... 631
52(1)............................................... 261 5............................................... 631, 632
53..................................................... 573 19..................................................... 626, 632
61..................................... 427, 429, 453, 463 20..................................................... 626, 632
71(1A)............................................. 264 (1), (4)........................................ 627
72..................................................... 263 20A.................................................. 630
74A(1)(a)........................................ 264 21(1)............................................... 537
(b)....................................... 266 25(1)............................................... 537
(2)............................................. 266 61..................................................... 626
104................................................... 261 Stamp Act 1891
109(1)............................................. 261 s 122................................................... 562
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Supply of Goods and Services Act
Provisions) Act 1989...................... 263 1982................................................ 205, 318
s 1(2)(a)............................................ 264 s 14..................................................... 621
(b)............................................ 263, 264 15..................................................... 502
(2A)............................................... 264 18 r 1............................................... 533, 534
(3)........................................ 265, 267, 268 Trade Marks Act 1994........................... 405
(b)............................................ 266 s 29(1)............................................... 311
(4)................................................. 265 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977......... 194, 195,
(4A)............................................... 264 315, 317, 318, 320,
2........................................... 42, 50, 573, 588 321, 324, 333, 345,
Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) 372, 381, 398, 551
Act 1943......................................... 338 s 1....................................................... 327
Limitation Act 1980.............................. 12 (2)................................................. 318
s 5....................................................... 263 2....................................................... 332
29, 30............................................... 11 (1)................................................. 317, 331
xxvii
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Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 – contd Union with Scotland Act 1706
s 2(2)................................................. 317 art 1.................................................... 612
3............................................... 317, 325, 549 Value Added Tax Act 1994................... 405
(1)................................................. 321 s 1, 4................................................... 633
4....................................................... 321 19(2)............................................... 504
6(1)................................................. 318 31..................................................... 633
(3)................................................. 324 44(1)............................................... 636
7(3), (4).......................................... 324 47, 59............................................... 635
8....................................................... 301 Sch 9.................................................. 633
11..................................................... 320, 329 Sch 10
(1)............................................... 318 para 2............................................ 636
(4)............................................... 319, 400 3(7)....................................... 636
13..................................................... 549
24..................................................... 320
26..................................................... 318 NEW ZEALAND
Sch 1.................................................. 318 Contracts (Privity) Act 1982
Sch 2................................. 319, 320, 324, 330 s 4....................................................... 228
xxviii
page page
Cancellation of Contracts made in Consumer Contracts (Information,
a Consumer’s Home or Place Cancellation and Additional
of Work etc Regulations 2008, Charges) Regulations 2013 – contd
SI 2008/1816................................. 196 Sch 1.................................................. 201
Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/ Freedom of Information Act (Environ-
3132................................................ 35, 437 mental Information) Regulations
Pt 6 (rr 6.1–6.52).............................. 35 2004, SI 2004/3391....................... 350, 359
r 6.4(4).............................................. 481 Land Registration Rules 2003, SI 2003/
6.11(1), (2)..................................... 35 1417
6.12, 6.15, 6.16................................ 36 r 74, 75, 98, 206–209......................... 261
6.32, 6.33......................................... 35 Late Payment of Commercial Debts
6.36, 6.37......................................... 35 (Rate of Interest) (No 3) Order
PD 6B................................................. 35 2002, SI 2002/1675....................... 421
r 16.6.................................................. 550 Limited Liability Partnerships
44.3(2)............................................ 66 (Application of the Companies
Commercial Agents (Council Direc- Act) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/
tive) Regulations 1993, SI 1993/ 1804
3053................................................ 30 reg 4................................................... 124, 263
reg 2(1)............................................. 427 Overseas Companies (Execution of
3, 4............................................... 371 Documents and Registration
Companies (Model Articles) Regula- of Charges) Regulations 2009,
tions 2008, SI 2008/3229 SI 2009/1917................................. 263, 266
Sch 1 Unfair Arbitration Agreements
art 49............................................. 265 (Specified Amount) Order 1999,
Consumer Contracts (Information, SI 1999/2167
Cancellation and Additional art 3.................................................... 72
Charges) Regulations 2013, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
SI 2013/3134........................ 196, 201. 202 Regulations 1999, SI 1999/2083.. 72,
reg 6(1), (2)...................................... 201 194, 195, 196,
7, 9, 10, 13................................... 201 206, 209, 324
28(1)–(3).................................... 202
xxix
A
AIB Group (UK) plc (formerly Allied Irish Banks plc & AIB Finance Ltd) v Martin
[2001] UKHL 63, [2002] 1 WLR 94, [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 209.............................. 435, 437
Adelphi (Estates) Ltd v Christie (1984) 47 P & C R 650, (1984) 269 EG 221, [1984]
1 EGLR 19.......................................................................................................................... 276
Afovos Shipping Co SA v R Pagnan & Fratelli (The Afovos) [1983] 1 WLR 195, [1983]
1 All ER 449, [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 335........................................................................... 456
African Export-Import Bank v Shebah Exploration & Production Co Ltd [2016] EWHC 311
(Comm), [2016] 2 All ER (Comm) 307, [2016] 2 BCLC 412........................................ 323
Agricultural, Horticultural & Forestry Industry Training Board v Aylesbury Mushrooms
Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 190, [1972] 1 All ER 280................................................................... 189, 190
Ailsa Craig Fishing Co Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd (The Strathallan) [1983] 1 WLR 964,
[1983] 1 All ER 101, [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 183 (Note).................................................. 327, 331
Air Transworld Ltd v Bombardier Inc [2012] EWHC 243 (Comm), [2012] 2 All ER
(Comm) 60, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 349................................................. 291, 292, 315, 317, 332
Aktion Maritime Corpn of Liberia v S Kasmas & Brothers (The Aktion) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 283.............................................................................................................................. 82
Alexander v Webber [1922] 1 KB 642..................................................................................... 285
Alexander v West Bromwich Mortgage Co Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 496, [2017] 1 All ER 942,
[2017] 1 All ER (Comm) 667.......................................................................... 511, 514, 515, 516
Allardyce (Keith) v Roebuck (Philip) [2004] EWHC 1538 (Ch), [2005] 1 WLR 815,
[2004] 3 All ER 754........................................................................................................... 619
Alpha Lettings Ltd v Neptune Research & Development Inc [2003] EWCA Civ 704,
(2003) 147 SJLB 627......................................................................................................... 608, 609
Aluminium Industrie Vaasen BV v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 676, [1976]
2 All ER 552, [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 443.................................................................. 533, 534, 535
Amble Assets LLP (in administration) v Longbenton Foods Ltd (in administration)
[2011] EWHC 3774 (Ch), [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 764............................................... 285
Amin Rasheed Sjipping Corpn v Kuwait Insurance Co (The Al Wahab) [1984] AC 50,
[1983] 3 WLR 241, [1983] 2 All ER 884.......................................................................... 441
Anglo-American Asphalt Co Ltd v Crowley, Russell & Co Ltd [1945] 2 All ER 324............. 96
Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB (The Antaios) [1988] AC 191,
[1984] 3 WLR 592, [1984] 3 All ER 229.......................................................................... 117, 597
Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG [1991] 2 AC 339, [1990] 3 WLR 810, [1990] 3 All
ER 481................................................................................................................................ 534
Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619, [2015] 2 WLR 1593.......... 216, 316, 390, 504
Aspen Insurance UK Ltd v Pectel Ltd [2008] EWHC 2804 (Comm), [2009] 2 All ER
(Comm) 873, [2009] Lloyd’s Rep IR 440........................................................................ 243
AstraZeneca UK Ltd v Albermarle International Corpn [2011] EWHC 1574 (Comm),
[2011] 2 CLC 252, [2011] All ER (D) 162 (Jun)................................... 147, 151, 374, 484, 491
Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571........................................................................................ 554
Ault & Wiborg Paints Ltd v Sure Services Ltd (The Times, 2 July 1983).............................. 112
Avraamides v Colwill [2006] EWCA Civ 1533, , [2007] BLR 76, [2006] All ER (D) 167
(Nov).................................................................................................................................. 222, 230
Axa Sun Life Services plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 133, [2012] Bus
LR 203, [2011] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1.............................................................................. 296, 305, 549
B
BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd v Dolphin Drilling Ltd [2009] EWHC 3119 (Comm),
[2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 192.................................................................................................. 136, 138
BP Oil UK Ltd v Lloyds TSB Bank plc [2004] EWCA Civ 1710, [2005] 1 EGLR 61, [2004]
1 All ER (D) 336 (Dec)..................................................................................................... 486, 490
xxxi
BSkyB Ltd v HP Enterprise Services UK Ltd (formerly t/a Electronic Data Systems Ltd)
[2010] EWHC 86 (TCC), [2010] BLR 267, 129 Con LR 147......................................... 296, 304
Beecham v Smith (1858) El Bl & El 442, 120 ER 574............................................................. 434
Bennett v Bennett [1952] 1 KB 249, [1952] 1 All ER 413, [1952] 1 TLR 400...................... 554
Bensley v Burden (1830) 8 LJ (OS) Ch 85.............................................................................. 525
Berkeley v Hardy (1826) 5 B & C 355, 108 ER 132................................................................. 128
Bespoke Couture Ltd v Artpower Ltd (No 4) [2006] EWCA Civ 1696, (2004)
150 SJLB 1463........................................................................................................... 598, 600, 605
Beta Investment SA v Transmedia Europe Inc [2003] EWHC 3066 (Ch), [2003] All ER
(D) 133 (May).......................................................................................................... 112, 575, 582
Bikam OOD v Adria Cable Sarl [2013] EWHC 1985 (Comm).............................................. 11
Bikam OOD v Adria Cable Sarl [2012] EWHC 621 (Comm)................................................ 315
Blackpool & Fylde Aero Club Ltd v Blackpool Borough Council [1990] 1 WLR 1195,
[1990] 3 All ER 25, 88 LGR 864....................................................................................... 189
Blue Metal Industries Ltd v RW Dilley [1970] AC 827, [1969] 3 WLR 357, [1969] 3 All
ER 437................................................................................................................................ 275
Bominflot Bunkergesellscahft für Mineralole mbH & Co KG v Petroplus Marketing AG
(The Mercini Lady) [2010] EWCA Civ 1145, [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 522, [2011]
1 Lloyd’s Rep 442.............................................................................................................. 317
Bond Worth Ltd, Re [1980] Ch 228, [1979] 3 WLR 629, [1979] 3 All ER 919.................... 536
Bonython v Australia [1951] AC 201, 66 TLR (Pt 2) 969, [1948] 2 DLR 672....................... 246
Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products Ltd [1981] Ch 25, [1979] 3 WLR 672,
[1979] 3 All ER 961........................................................................................................... 536
Bottin (International) Investments Ltd v Venson Group plc [2004] EWCA Civ 1368,
[2004] All ER (D) 322 (Oct)............................................................................................ 471, 480
Boufoy-Bastick v University of West Indies [2015] UKPC 27, [2015] IRLR 1014................. 454
Bravo Maritime (Chartering) Est v Alsayed Abdullah Mohamed Baroom (The Athinoula)
[1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 481.................................................................................................. 512
Bridgewater’s Settlement, Re [1910] 2 Ch 342....................................................................... 525
British Electrical & Associated Industries (Cardiff) Ltd v Patley Pressings Ltd [1953]
1 WLR 280, [1953] 1 All ER 94, (1953) 97 SJ 96............................................................. 339
British Fermentation Products Ltd v Compair Reavell Ltd [1998] TCC 577........................ 323
British Gas Trading Ltd v Eastern Electricity (The Times, 2 November 1996).................... 90
British Waggon Co v Lea & Co; Parkgate Waggon Co v Lea & Co (1880) 5 QBD 149......... 566
Bunge Corpn v Tradax Export SA [1981] 1 WLR 711, [1981] 2 All ER 540, [1981]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 1.................................................................................................................. 620
Burford UK Properties Ltd v Forte Hotels (UK) Ltd (formerly Trusthouse Forte)
[2003] EWCA Civ 1800, (2004) 148 SJLB 145, [2003] NPC 159................................... 146
C
C Czarnikow Ltd v Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego Rolimpex (CHZ) [1979] AC 351,
[1978] 3 WLR 274, [1978] 2 All ER 1043........................................................................ 148
CDV Software Entertainment AG v Gamecock Media Europe Ltd [2009] EWHC 2965
(Ch)................................................................................................................................... 216
Cadogan Petroleum Holdings Ltd v Global Process Systems LLC [2013] EWHC 214
(Comm), [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 26, [2013] 1 CLC 721................................................... 286
Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd 2000 SLT 1123, [2000]
Lloyd’s Rep IR 249, 2000 GWD 3-84................................................................................ 81
Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v R [1952] AC 192, [1952] 1 All ER 305, [1952] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 1.................................................................................................................................. 316, 381
Capitol Films Ltd (in administration), Re; Rubin v Cobalt Pictures Ltd [2010] EWHC 2240
(Ch)................................................................................................................................... 30
Cartwright v MacCormack [1963] 1 WLR 18, [1963] 1 All ER 11, [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
328...................................................................................................................................... 454
Channel Island Ferries Ltd v Sealink UK Ltd [1998] Lloyd’s Rep 323................................. 343
Chartbrook Homes Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2007] EWHC 409 (Ch), [2007] 1 All
ER (Comm) 1083, [2007] 2 P & CR 9; aff’d [2008] EWCA Civ 183, [2008] 2 All ER
(Comm) 387, [2008] 11 EG 92 (CS); revs’d [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 AC 1101,
[2009] 3 WLR 267............................................................................................................. 276, 504
Chemidus Wavin Ltd v Société pour la Transformation et l’Exploitation des Resines
Industrielles SA [1978] 3 CMLR 514, [1977] FSR 181................................................... 554
Cheverny Consulting Ltd v Whitehad Mann Ltd [2007] EWHC 3130 (Ch)........................ 297
Chilingworth v Esche [1924] 1 Ch 97, [1923] All ER Rep 97................................................ 286
xxxii
Chrion Corpn v Murex Diagnostics Ltd (No 2); Chrion Corpn v Organon Teknika Ltd
(No 12) [1996] FSR 153, )1997) 37 BMLR 28, (1996) 19 (3) IPD 19018..................... 447
City & General (Investment) Ltd v Razama Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1568.................... 106, 178, 180
City Inn (Jersey) Ltd v Ten Trinity Square Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 156, [2008] 10 EG 167
(CS), [2008] NPC 28......................................................................................................... 276
City Inn Ltd v Shepherd Construction Ltd [2003] BLR 468, 2003 SLT 885......................... 146
Clerical Medical & General Life Assurance Society v Fanfare Properties Ltd (unreported,
2 June 1981)...................................................................................................................... 177
Clough Mill Ltd v Martin [1985] 1 WLR 111, [1984] 3 All ER 982, (1985) 82 LSG 1075... 535,
536
Coca-Cola Financial Corpn v Finsat International Ltd (The Ira) [1998] QB 43, [1996]
3 WLR 849, [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 274............................................................................. 550
Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1968] FSR 415, [1969] RPC 41...................................... 155, 352
Cohen v Nessdale Ltd [1982] 2 All ER 97............................................................................... 581
Columbia Tristar Home Video (International) Inc v Polygram Film Internatonal BV
(formerly Manifesto Film Sales BV) [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 385............................... 96, 98
Commercial Management (Investments) Ltd v Mitchell Design & Construct Ltd
[2016] EWHC 76 (TCC), 164 Con LR 139...................................................................... 323
Communication Technology Investments Ltd v International Environmental
Management Ltd [2005] EWHC 3292 (Ch).................................................................... 524
Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn Group Ltd (t/a Osiris) [1991] BCC 484,
[1993] BCLC 603.............................................................................................................. 537
Compass Group UK & Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest) v Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust
[2012] EWHC 781 (QB), [2012] 2 All ER (Comm) 300; rev’sd [2013] EWCA Civ 200,
[2013] BLR 265, [2013] CILL 3342........................................................................ 118, 374, 375
Confetti Records v Warner Music UK Ltd [2003] EWHC 1274 (Ch), [2003] ECDR 31,
[2003] EMLR 35................................................................................................................ 575, 580
Connaught Restaurants Ltd v Indoor Leisure Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 501, [1994] 4 All ER 834,
[1993] 46 EG 184.............................................................................................................. 550
Co-operative Group Ltd v Birse Developments Ltd (in liquidation) [2014] EWHC 530
(TCC), [2014] BLR 359 153 Con LR 103........................................................................ 83
Cornfoot v Royal Exchange Assurance Corpn [1904] 1 KB 40............................................. 454
Cornish v Midland Bank plc [1985] 3 All ER 513, [1985] FLR 298, (1985) 135 NLJ 869... 42
Cott UK Ltd v FE Barber Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 540.................................................................. 428
Courtauld’s Application, Re [1956] RPC 208......................................................................... 309
Criterion Properties plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC [2004] UKHL 28, [2004]
1 WLR 1846, [2004] BCC 570.......................................................................................... 30
Cryer v Scott Bros (Sudbury) Ltd (1986) 55 P & CR 183....................................................... 177
Cutlan v Dawson (1897) 14 RPC 249....................................................................................... 593
D
DB Rare Books Ltd v Antiqbooks (a limited partnership) [1995] 2 BCLC 306................... 116
DMA Financial Solutions Ltd v BaaN UK Ltd [2000] All ER (D) 411................................... 575, 583
DRC Distribution Ltd v Ulva Ltd [2007] EWHC 1716 (QB)................................................. 152
Dairy Containers Ltd v Tasman Orient Line CV (The Tasman Discoverer) [2004] UKPC 22,
[2005] 1 WLR 215, [2004] 2 All ER (Comm) 667.......................................................... 315
Dais Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC [1956] AC 696, [1956] 3 WLR 37, [1956] 2 All
ER 145................................................................................................................................ 338
Dalkia Utilities Services plc v Celtech International Ltd [2006] EWHC 63 (Comm)....... 118, 120,
597
Damon Compania Naviera SA v Hapag-Lloyd International SA (The Blankenstein)
[1985] 1 WLR 435, [1985] 1 All ER 475, [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 93................................ 82
Dany Lions v Bristol Cars Ltd [2014] EWHC 817 (QB), [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 403,
[2014] Bus LR D11............................................................................................................ 485
Data Direct Technologies Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc [2009] EWHC 97 (Ch), [2009] All
ER (D) 198 (Jan).............................................................................................................. 512, 546
Davies v Collins [1945] 1 All ER 247....................................................................................... 566
Davstone Estate Ltd’s Leases, Re; Manprop Ltd v O’Dell [1969] 2 Ch 378, [1969]
2 WLR 1287, [1969] 2 All ER 849.................................................................................... 554
Dawson International plc v Coates Paton plc [1990] BCLC 560........................................... 111
Days Medical Aids Ltd v Pihsiang Machinery Manufacturing Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 44
(Comm), [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 991, [2004] 2 CLC 489.......................................... 112
Decro-Wall v Practitioners in Marketing Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 361, [1971] 2 All ER 216,
(1970) 115 SJ 171.............................................................................................................. 610
xxxiii
Deepak Fertilisers & Petrochemicals Ltd v Davy McKee (London) Ltd [1999] 1 All ER
(Comm) 69, [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 387, [1999] BLR 41................................................. 296, 302
Denmark Productions Ltd v Boscobel Productions Ltd [1969] 1 QB 699, [1968]
3 WLR 841, [1968] 3 All ER 513...................................................................................... 338
Department of Health v ICO (EA/2008/0081; 18 November 2008).................................... 351
Derry City Council v Information Commissioner (EA/2006/0014; 11 December 2006).... 351
Dies v British & International Mining & Finance Corpn [1939] 1 KB 724........................... 285, 286
Dodds v Walker [1981] 1 WLR 1027, [1981] 2 All ER 609, (1981) 42 P & CR 131.............. 455, 463
Dolphin Maritime & Aviation Services Ltd v Sveriges Angartygs Assurans Forening
[2009] EWHC 716 (Comm), [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 473, [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
123...................................................................................................................................... 219
Dominion Corporate Services Ltd v Debenhams Properties Ltd [2010] EWHC 1993
(Ch), [2010] 23 EG 106 (CS), [2010] NPC 63................................................................ 117, 597
Don King Productions Inc v Warren (No 1) [1998] 2 All ER 608, [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
176, [1998] 2 BCLC 132; aff’d [2000] Ch 291, [1999] 3 WLR 276, [1999] 2 All
ER 218................................................................................................................................ 83
E
EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan [1999] All ER (D) 1163, [1998-99] Info
TLR 384.................................................................................................................... 296, 301, 303
ENE Kos 1 Ltd v Petrolio Brasiliero SA Petrobas (The Kos) [2012] UKSC 17, [2012]
2 AC 164, [2012] 2 WLR 976............................................................................................ 117, 597
EPI Environmental Technologies Inc v Symphony Plastic Technologies plc
[2004] EWHC 2945 (Ch), [2005] 1 WLR 3456, [2005] FSR 22; aff’d [2006] EWCA Civ
3, [2006] 1 WLR 495............................................................................................... 158, 161, 171
Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Cresswell [2004] EWCA Civ 602, [2004] 2 All ER (Comm)
244, [2004] 1 CLC 926...................................................................................................... 146, 151
Earl of Lonsdale v A-G [1982] 1 WLR 887, [1982] 3 All ER 579, (1983) 45 P & CR 1......... 215
Elpis Maritime Co Ltd v Marti Charter Co (The Maria D) [1992] 1 AC 21, [1991]
3 WLR 330, [1991] 3 All ER 758...................................................................................... 43
Emeraldian Ltd Partnership v Wellmix Shipping Ltd (The Vine) [2010] EWHC 1411
(Comm), [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 301, [2010] 1 CLC 903................................................. 343
Ener-G Holdings plc v Hormell [2012] EWCA Civ 1059, [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 1162,
[2012] CP Rep 47.............................................................................................................. 471
Etablissements Chainbaux SARL v Harbormaster Ltd [1955] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 303................ 620
Exmek Pharmaceuticals SAC v Alkem Laboratories Ltd [2015] EWHC 3158 (Comm),
[2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 239.................................................................................................. 449
Exxonmobil Sales & Supply Corpn v Texaco Ltd [2003] EWHC 1964 (Comm), [2004]
1 All ER (Comm) 435, [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 686........................................................... 297
F
F Goldsmith (Sicklesmere) Ltd v Baxter [1970] Ch 85, [1969] 3 WLR 522, [1969] 3 All
ER 733................................................................................................................................ 495
Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117, [1986] 3 WLR 288, [1986] 1 All ER 617.. 407
Fairstate Ltd v General Enterprise & Management Ltd [2010] EWHC 3072 (QB), [2011]
2 All ER (Comm) 497, 133 Con LR 112.......................................................................... 524
Famous Army Stores Ltd v Meehan [1993] 1 EGLR 73, [1993] 09 EG 111.......................... 550
Farstad Supply A/S v Enviroco Ltd [2011] UKSC 16, [2011] 1 WLR 921, [2011] 3 All
ER 451................................................................................................................................ 17
Fastframe Ltd v Lohinski (unreported, 3 March 1993).......................................................... 549, 551
Fell v Goslin & Morgan (1852) 7 Exch 185, 155 ER 909........................................................ 433
Figgis, Re; Roberts v MacLaren [1969] 1 Ch 123, [1968] 2 WLR 1173, [1968] 1 All
ER 999................................................................................................................................ 456
Fillite (Runcorn) Ltd v APV Pasilac Ltd (The Buyer, July 1995)........................................... 321
Firma C-Trade SA v Newcastle Protection & Indemnity Association (The Fanti) [1991]
2 AC 1, [1990] 3 WLR 78, [1990] 2 All ER 705............................................................... 382
First National Bank plc v Thompson [1996] Ch 231, [1996] 2 WLR 293, [1996] 1 All
ER 140................................................................................................................................ 525
Fitzroy House Epworth Street (No 1) Ltd v Financial Times Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 329,
[2006] 1 WLR 2207, [2006] 2 All ER (D) 463 (Mar)...................................................... 116, 118
Fitzroy Robinson Ltd & Mentmore Towers Ltd;; Fitzroy Robinson Ltd v Good Start Ltd
(No 3) [2009] EWHC 3365 (TCC), [2010] BLR 165m 128 Con LR 103...................... 420
Floor v Davis (Inspector of Taxes) [1980] AC 695, [1979] 2 WLR 830, [1979] 2 All
ER 677................................................................................................................................ 275
xxxiv
Fomento (Sterling Area) Ltd v Selsdon Fountain Pen Co Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 45, [1958]
1 All ER 11, [1958] RPC 8................................................................................................ 95, 96
Force India Formula One Team Ltd v Ethad Airways PJSC [2010] EWCA Civ 1051,
[2011] ETMR 10, (2010) 107 (40) LSG 22...................................................................... 638
Francotyp-Postalia Ltd v Whitehead [2011] EWHC 367 (Ch)............................................... 555, 558
Frank W Clifford Ltd v Garth [1956] 1 WLR 570, [1956] 2 All ER 323, (1956)
100 SJ 379.......................................................................................................................... 554
Frans Maas (UK) Ltd v Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd [2004] EWHC 1502 (Comm),
[2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 783, [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 251..................................... 315, 317, 330
Fraser v Thames Television Ltd [1984] QB 44, [1983] 2 WLR 917, [1983] 2 All ER 101.... 484
Freeman v Read (1863) 4 B & S 174, 122 ER 425................................................................... 464
Frontier International Shipping Corpn v Swissmarine Corpn Inc (The Cape Equinox)
[2005] EWHC 8 (Comm), [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 528, [2005] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 390.............................................................................................................................. 343
G
Galbraith v Mitchenall Estates Ltd [1965] 2 QB 473, [1964] 3 WLR 454, [1964] 2 All
ER 653................................................................................................................................ 286
Gallaher International Ltd v Tlais Enterprises Ltd [2008] EWHC 804 (Comm)................. 524, 597
Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd [1974] AC 689, [1973]
3 WLR 421, [1973] 3 All ER 195...................................................................................... 551
Gillespie Bros & Co Ltd v Roy Bowles Transport Ltd [1973] QB 400, [1972] 3 WLR 1003,
[1973] 1 All ER 193........................................................................................................... 316, 381
Global Container Lines Ltd v Black Sea Shipping Co [1997] CLY 4535.............................. 374
Globe Motors v TRW LucasVarity Electric Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 396, [2017]
1 All ER (Comm) 601, [2016] CLC 712.......................................................................... 31, 47
Glolite Ltd v Jasper Conran Ltd (The Times, 28 January 1998)............................................ 597
Glyn v Margetson & Co [1893] AC 351......................................................................... 512, 515, 516
Goodinson v Goodinson [1954] 2 QB 118, [1954] 2 WLR 1121, [1954] 2 All ER 255........ 554
Government of Gibraltar v Kenney [1956] 2 QB 410, [1956] 3 WLR 466, [1956] 3 All
ER 22.................................................................................................................................. 70
Grant v Maddox (1846) 15 M & W 737, 153 ER 1048............................................................ 454
Granville Oil & Chemicals Ltd Davies Turner & Co Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 570, [2003]
1 All ER (Comm) 819, [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 356........................................................... 296, 319
Graves v Masters (1883) Cab & El 73....................................................................................... 126
Great Eastern Shipping Co Ltd v Far East Chartering Ltd [2011] EWHC 1372 (Comm),
[2011] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 309.................................................................................................. 222
Great Elephant Corpn v Trafigura Beheer BV [2013] EWCA Civ 905, [2013] 2 All ER
(Comm) 992, [2014] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1.............................................................................. 343
Griffon Shipping LLC v Firodi Shipping Ltd [2013] EWHC 593 (Comm), [2013] 2 All ER
(Comm) 246, [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 50........................................................... 243, 284, 285, 286
Guyot v Thomson [1894] 3 Ch 388......................................................................................... 593
H
HHR Pascal BV v W2005 Puppet II BV [2009] EWHC 2771 (Comm), [2010] 1 All ER
(Comm) 399...................................................................................................................... 618
HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] UKHL 6, [2003]
1 All ER (Comm) 349, [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 61.................................................... 296, 317, 331
Hadley Design Associates v City of Westminster [2003] EWHC 1617 (TCC), [2004] TCLR 1,
[2004] Masons CLR 3....................................................................................................... 323
Hagee (London) Ltd v Co-operative Insurance Society (1992) 63 P & CR 362, [1992]
1 EGLR 57, [1991] NPC 92.............................................................................................. 238
Hall v Burnell [1911] 2 Ch 551................................................................................................ 284, 285
Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576, [2004] 1 WLR 3002,
[2004] 4 All ER 920........................................................................................................... 66
Hammond v Haigh Castle & Co Ltd [1973] 2 All ER 289, [1973] ICR 148,
[1973] IRLR 91.................................................................................................................. 456
Harold Wood Brick Co Ltd v Ferris [1935] 2 KB 198............................................................. 618
Harrison v Shepherd Homes Ltd [2011] EWHC 1811 (TCC), (2011) 27 Const LJ 709;
aff’d [2012] EWCA Civ 904, 143 Con LR 69, [2012] 3 EGLR 83.................................... 208
Hart v Middleton (1845) 2 Car & K 9, 175 ER 4..................................................................... 453
Hashwani v Jivraj [2009] EWHC 1364 (Comm), [2010] 1 All ER 302, [2009] 2 All ER
(Comm) 778...................................................................................................................... 555
xxxv
Haughland Tankers AS v RMK Marine Gemi Yapin Sanayii ve Deniz Tasimaciligri Isletmesi
AS [2005] EWHC 321 (Comm), [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 679, [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
573............................................................................................................................. 484, 485, 489
Heath v Crealock 1(1874-75) LR 10 Ch App 22..................................................................... 525
Hector Whaling Ltd, Re [1936] Ch 208.................................................................................. 456
Henrich Hirdes GmbH v Edmund [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 546............................................... 457
Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804, [1995] 4 All ER 473, (1995)
92 (7) LSG 35.................................................................................................................... 352
Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire County Council [1978] 3 All ER 262, 65 LGR 735.... 83
Hendry v Chartsearch Ltd (1998) CLC 1382, (2000) 2 TCLR 115....................................... 82
Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 485,
[1984] 2 All ER 152, [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 422............................................................... 535, 536
Hickman v Haynes (1874-75) LR 10 CP 598........................................................................... 638
Higher Education Funding Council for England v ICO & Guardian News & Media Ltd
(EA/2009/0036; 13 January 2010).................................................................................. 352
Hillel v Christoforides (1991) 63 P & CR 301......................................................................... 285
Hinton v Sparkes (1867-68) LR 3 CP 161................................................................................ 285
Hiscox Syndicates Ltd v The Pinnacle Ltd [2008] EWHC 145 (Ch), [2008] 5 EG 166
(CS).................................................................................................................................... 106
Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corpn v Kloeckner & Co AG [1990] 2 QB 514, [1990]
3 WLR 634, [1989] 3 All ER 513...................................................................................... 550
Household Fire & Carriage Accident Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) 4 Ex D 216........... 470
Howe v Smith (1884) 27 Ch D 89............................................................................................ 285
Hughes v Pendragon Sabre (t/a Porsche Centre Bolton) [2016] EWCA Civ 18, [2017]
1 All ER (Comm) 173, [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 311........................................................... 31
Humble (Grace) v Hunter (1848) 12 QB 310, 116 ER 885................................................... 82
Hydraulic Engineering Co Ltd v McHaffie Goslett & Co (1878) 4 QBD 670....................... 459
I
IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Rockware Glass Ltd [1980] FSR 335....................... 104, 105, 111, 112
IFE Fund SA v Goldman Sachs International [2006] EWHC 2887 (Comm), [2007]
1 Lloyd’s Rep 264, [2006] All ER (D) 268 (Nov)............................................................ 323, 332
Inntrepreneur Pub v East Crown [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611, [2000] 3 EGLR 31, [2000]
41 EG 209........................................................................................................................... 295, 302
International Asset Control Ltd (t/a IAC Films) v Films Sans Frontieres
SARL [1999] EMLR 268, [1998] All ER (D) 476............................................................ 620
Internet Broadcasting Corpn Ltd (t/a NETTV) v MAR LLC (t/a MARHedge)
[2009] EWHC 844 (Ch), [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 112, [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 295..... 316
Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society (No 1) [1998]
1 WLR 896, [1998] 1 All ER 98, [1998] 1 BCLC 531............................................ 216, 280, 524
J
JIS (1974) Ltd v MCP Investment Nominees I Ltd (Construction of Lease)
[2003] EWCA Civ 721, (2003) 100 (24) LSG 36............................................................. 276
J Lauritzen AS v Wijsmuller BV (The Super Servant Two) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1............. 339
JP Morgan Chase Bank (formerly Chase Manhattan Bank) v Springwell Navigation Corpn
[2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm), [2008] All ER (D) 167 (Jun)............................... 318, 323, 331
JSC BTA Bank Ablyazov [2011] EWHC 2506 (Comm).......................................................... 36
Jackson Distribution Ltd v Tum Yeto Inc [2009] EWHC 982 (QB), [2009] All ER (D) 107
(May).................................................................................................................................. 593, 608
Jet2.com Ltd v Blackpool Airport Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 417, [2012] 2 All ER (Comm)
1053, [2012] 1 CLC 605.......................................................................................... 105, 106, 115
John Connor Press Associates Ltd v Information Commissioner (EA/2005/0005;
25 January 2006)............................................................................................................... 354
Johnson v The Edgeware etc Rly Co (1866) 35 Beav 480, 55 ER 982.................................... 215
Joint London Holdings Ltd v Mount Cook Land Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1171, [2006 2 P &
CR 17, [2005] 3 EGLR 119............................................................................................... 216
Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corpn Ltd [1942] AC 154,
[1941] 2 All ER 165, (1941) 70 Ll L Rep 1...................................................................... 338
K
Kall Kwick Printing (UK) Ltd v Rush [1996] FSR 114........................................................... 555
Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v Belships Co Ltd Skibs A/S [1939] 2 All ER 108, (1939)
63 Ll Rep 175..................................................................................................................... 485
xxxvi
L
Laemthong International Lines Co Ltd v Artis (The Laemthong Glory) (No 2)
[2005] EWCA Civ 519, [2005] 23 All ER (Comm) 167, [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 688...... 222, 230
Lafarge (Aggregates) Ltd v Newham London Borough Council [2005] EWHC 1337
(Comm), [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 577................................................................................. 454
Lancrest Ltd v Asiwaju [2005] EWCA Civ 117, [2005] L & TR 22, [2005] 1 EGLR 40........ 619
Landlord Protect Ltd v S Anselm Development Corpn Co Ltd [2008] EWHC 1582 (Ch),
[2008] 28 EG 113 (CS), [2008] NPC 82.......................................................................... 216
Lee-Parket v Izett (No 2) [1972] 1 WLR 775, [1972] 2 All ER 800, (1972) 23 P & CR 301.... 147
Lemmerbell Ltd v Britannai LAS Direct Ltd [1999] L & TR 102, [1998] 3 EGLR 67,
[1998] 48 EG 188.............................................................................................................. 470
Leofelis SA v Lonsdale Sports Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 640, [2008] ETMR 63, (2008)
158 NLJ 1041..................................................................................................................... 117, 597
Levison v Fairn [1978] 2 All ER 1149...................................................................................... 216
Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposal Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85, [1993]
3 WLR 408, [1993] 3 All ER 417................................................................................. 81, 83, 551
Linggi Plantations Ltd v Joagtheesa [1972] 1 MLJ 89............................................................ 284
Little v Courage Ltd [1995] CLC 164, (1994) 70 P & CR 469............................................... 373
Lockett v A & M Charles Ltd [1938] 4 All ER 170.................................................................. 433
London & Regional Investments Ltd v TBI plc [2002] EWCA Civ 355................................ 373
London Regional Transport v Wimpey Group Services Ltd (1987) 53 P & CR 356, [1986]
2 EGLR 41, (1986) 280 EG 898........................................................................................ 503
M
MSAS Global Logistics v Power Packaging Inc [2003] EWHC 1393 (Ch)............................ 620, 624
MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2016] EWCA Civ 789, [2017]
1 All ER (Comm) 483, [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 494........................................................... 374
MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising [2016] EWCA Civ 553,
[2017] QB 604, [2016] 3 WLR 1519................................................................................ 31, 47
MacArdle, Re [1951] Ch 66..................................................................................................... 262
McCausland v Duncan Lawrie Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 38, [1996] 4 All ER 995, (1997) 74 P &
CR 343................................................................................................................................ 50
McCrone v Boots Farm Sales Ltd 1981 SC 68, 1981 SLT 103................................................. 321, 327
McMillan Williams (a firm) v Range [2004] EWCA Civ 294, [2004] 1 WLR 1858, [2004] All
ER (D) 335 (May)............................................................................................................. 66
Mamidoil-Jetoil Greek Petroleum Co SA v Okta Crude Oil Refinery AD (No 3)
[2003] EWCA Civ 1031, [2003] 2 All E (Comm) 640, [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 635......... 341, 343
Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749, [1997]
2 WLR 945, [1997] 3 All ER 352...................................................................................... 470
Margerison v Bates [2008] EWHC 1211 (Ch), [2008] 3 EGLR 165...................................... 276
Martin-Baker Aircraft Co Ltd v Canadian Flight Equipment Ltd [1955] 2 QB 556, [1955]
3 WLR 212, [1955] 2 All ER 722, (155) 72 RPC 236...................................... 334, 593, 609, 610
Mayson v Clouet [1924] AC 980, [1924] 3 WWR 211............................................................. 285
Mendll v Smith (1943) 112 LJ Ch 279..................................................................................... 420
Mikeover Ltd v Brady [1989] 3 All ER 618, (1989) 21 HLR 513, (1990) 59 P & CR 218..... 433
Millichamp v Jones [1982] 1 WLR 1422, [1983] 1 All ER 267, (1983) 45 P & CR 169........ 484
Ministry of Sound (Ireland) Ltd v World Online Ltd [2003] EWHC 2178 (Ch), [2003]
2 All ER (Comm) 823....................................................................................................... 340
Mitas v Hyams [1961] 2 TLR 1215........................................................................................... 263
Mitsui Construction Co Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong 1(1986) 33 BLR 14.................................. 280
Monde Petroleum v WesternZagros Ltd [2016] EWHC 1472 (Comm), [2017] 1 All ER
(Comm) 1009, [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 229........................................................................ 374
Moon, ex p Dawes, Re (1886) 17 QBD 275............................................................................. 523, 525
Multiplex Construction (UK) Ltd v Cleveland Bridge UK Ltd [2006] EWHC 1341 (TCC),
107 Con LR 1..................................................................................................................... 373
Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v Marden [1979] Ch 84, [1978] 2 WLR 535, [1978] 2 All
ER 489................................................................................................................................ 246
xxxvii
Multi Veste 226 BV v NI Summer Row Unitholder BV [2011] EWHC 2026 (Ch), 139 Con
LR 23, [2011] 33 EG 63.................................................................................................... 620, 624
Mylcrist Builders Ltd v Buck [2008] EWHC 2172 (TCC), [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 259,
[2008] BLR 611................................................................................................................. 208, 209
N
National Bank of Saudi Arabia v Skab (unreported, 23 November 1995)............................ 550
National Grid v Mayes [2001] UKHL 20, [2001] 1 WLR 864, [2001] 2 All ER 417............. 243
Navigators & General Insurance Co v Ringrose [1962] 1 WLR 173, [1962] 1 All ER 97,
[1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 415.................................................................................................. 612
Newfoundland v Newfoundland Rly Co (1888) 13 App Cas 199........................................... 551
Newland Shipping & Forwarding Ltd v Toba Trading FZC [2014] EWHC 661 (Comm)... 117, 597
Nisshin Shipping Co Ltd v Cleaves & Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 2602 (Comm), [2004] 1 All
ER (Comm) 481, [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 38...................................................................... 222, 226
Nittan (UK) Ltd v Solent Steel Fabrications Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 633.......................... 495
Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014, [1940] 3 All ER 549...... 566
Norbury Natzio & Co Ltd v Griffiths [1918] 2 KB 369, (1918) 87 LJ KB 952....................... 433
O
OTV Birwelco Ltd v Technical & General Guarantee Co Ltd [2002] EWHC 2240 (TCC),
[2002] 4 All ER 668, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 1116...................................................... 495
Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc [2009] UKSC 6, [2010] 1 AC 696, [2009]
3 WLR 1215....................................................................................................................... 195, 199
Okolo v Secretary of State for the Environment [1997] 4 All ER 242, [1997] JPL 1009,
[1998] COD 8.................................................................................................................... 455, 464
Omar v El-Wakil [2001] EWCA Civ 1090, [2002] 2 P & CR 3, (2001) 98 (30) LSG 40........ 285
Overseas Medical Supplies Ltd v Orient Transport Services Ltd [1999] 1 All ER (Comm)
981, [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 273, [1999] CLC 1243.................................................. 319, 322, 324
Owen v Wilkinson (1858) 5 CB NS 526, 141 ER 213.............................................................. 434
Oxford Gene Technology Ltd v Affymetrix Inc [2001] IP & T 93, [2000] IP & T 1006...... 90, 91,
92, 93
Oxonica Energy Ltd v Neuftec Ltd [2008] EWHC 2127 (Pat); aff’d ]2009] EWCA Civ
668.................................................................................................................... 216, 275, 276, 279
P
Page v Combined Shipping & Trading Co Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 656, [1996] CLC 1952,
[1999] Eu LR 1.................................................................................................................. 371
Pagnan SpA v Tradax Ocean Transportation SA [1987] 3 All ER 565, [1987] 2 Lloyd’s
Rep 342.............................................................................................................................. 511, 515
Panoutsos v Raymond Haldy Corpn of New York [1917] 2 KB 473....................................... 638
Patel v Brent London Borough Council (No 3) [2004] EWHC 763 (Ch), [2005] 1 P &
CR 20, [2004] 3 PLR 74.................................................................................................... 114
Peachdart Ltd, Re [1984] Ch 131, [1983] 3 WLR 878, [1983] 3 All ER 204........................ 536
Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ
386, [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 511, [2006] 1 CLC 582.......................................................... 13
Pegler Ltd v Wang (UK) Ltd (No 1) [2000] BLR 218, 70 Con LR 68, [2000] ITCLR 617...... 323
Pera Shipping Corpn v Petroship SA (The Pera) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 363........................ 215
Peter Pan Manufacturing Corpn v Corsets Silhouette Ltd, [1964] 1 WLR 96, [1963] 3 All
ER 402, [1963] RPC 45..................................................................................................... 96
Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA [2004] All ER (D) 10 (Feb)...................................... 575
Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 891, [2006]
1 Lloyd’s Rep 121.............................................................................................................. 372, 373
Phillips Petroleum Co (UK) Ltd v Enron (Europe) Ltd [1997] CLC 329............................ 105, 113
Phoenix Media Ltd v Cobweb Information (unreported, 16 May 2000).............................. 118, 597
Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827, [1980] 2 WLR 283,
[1980] 1 All ER 556........................................................................................................... 316
Pips (Leisure Productions) Ltd v Walton (1982) 43 P & CR 415.......................................... 111
Pitt v PHH Asset Management Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 327, [1993] 4 All ER 961, (1994) 68 P &
CR 269................................................................................................................................ 374
Plymouth Corpn v Harvey [1971] 1 WLR 549, [1971] 1 All ER 623, 69 LGR 310................ 263
Port Line Ltd v Ben Lin Steamers Ltd [1958] 2 QB 146, [1958] 2 WLR 551, [1958] 1 All
ER 787................................................................................................................................ 87
Poulton v Moore [1915] 1 KB 400........................................................................................... 525
Price v Bouch (1986) 53 P & CR 257, [1986] 2 EGLR 179, (1986) 279 EG 1226................. 177
xxxviii
Primus Build Ltd v Pompey Centre Ltd [2009] EWHC 1487 (TCC), [2009] BLR 437,
[2009] All ER (D) 14 (Jul)............................................................................................... 474
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Ayres [2007] EWHC 775 (Ch), [2007] 3 All ER 946,
[2007] L & TR 35.............................................................................................................. 219
Q
QR Sciences Ltd v BTG International Ltd [2005] EWHC 670 (Ch), [2005] FSR 43........... 484, 493
QR Sciences Ltd v BTG International Ltd (Supplemental Judgment) [2005] EWHC 1500
(Ch)................................................................................................................................... 493
Quest 4 Finance Ltd v Maxfield [2007] EWHC 2313 (QB), [2007] 2 CLC 706................... 13, 215
R
R v North & East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughan [2001] QB 213, [2000]
2 WLR 622, [2000] 3 All ER 850...................................................................................... 189
R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p Association of Metropolitan Authorities
[1986] 1 WLR 1, [1986] 1 All ER 164, (1985) 17 HLR 487............................................ 189
RJB Mining (UK) Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers (1995) [1995] IRLR 556............. 457
RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Muller GmbH & Co KG (UK Production)
[2010] UKSC 14, [2010] 1 WLR 753, [2010] 3 All ER 1................................................ 577, 585
RWE npower Renewables Ltd v JN Bentley Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 150,
[2014] CILL 3488.............................................................................................................. 511
R (on the application of Capenhurst) v Leicester City Council [2004] EWHC 2124
(Admin), (2004) 7 CCL Rep 557, [2004] ACD 93.......................................................... 189
R (on the application of Mercury Tax Group) v R & C Comrs [2008] EWHC 2721
(Admin), [2009] STC 743, [2009] Lloyd’s Rep FC 135......................................... 236, 267, 268
Rackham v Peek Foods Ltd [1990] BCLC 895........................................................................ 111
Rainy Sky SA [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900, [2012] 1 All ER 1137.......................... 216, 316
Rank Xerox Ltd v Lane (Inspector of Taxes) [1981] AC 629, [1979] 3 WLR 594, [1979]
3 All ER 657....................................................................................................................... 238
Rasbora Ltd v JCL Marine Ltd [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 645...................................................... 82
Ray v Classic FM plc [1998] ECC 488, [1999] ITCLE 256, [1998] All ER (D) 105.............. 404
Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1963] AC 691,
[1963] 2 WLR 439, [1963] 1 All ER 545.......................................................................... 454
Registrar of Companies v Radio-Tech Engineering Ltd [2004] BCC 277............................. 455
Rhodia International Holdings Ltd v Huntsman International LLC [2007] EWHC 292
(Comm), [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 577, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 325.............................. 106
Rice (t/a the Garden Guardian) v Great Yarmouth Borough Council [2003] TCLR 1,
(2001) 3 LGLR 4, [2000] All ER (D) 902........................................................................ 117, 597
Richardson v Cartwright (1844) 1 Car & K 328, 174 ER 833................................................. 126
Right, on the demise of William Jeffrys v Bucknell (Henry) (1831) 2 B & Ad 278,
109 ER 1146....................................................................................................................... 525
Robson v Drummond (1831) 2 B & Ad 303, 109 ER 1156..................................................... 82
Rohlig (UK) Ltd v Rock Unique Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 18, [2011] 2 All ER (Comm)
1161.................................................................................................................................... 549
Rossetti Marketing Ltd v Diamond Sofa Co Ltd [2011] EWHC 2482 (QB), [2012] 1 All
ER (Comm) 18, [2012] Bus LR 571................................................................................. 427
Royal Albert Hall Corpn v Winchillsea (1891) 7 TLR 362..................................................... 433
Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain [1999] QB 674, [1998] 2 WLR 538, [1997]
2 All ER 929....................................................................................................................... 554
Rust Consulting Ltd (in liquidation) v PB Ltd (formerly Kennedy & Donkin Ltd)
[2010] EWHC 3243 (TCC), [2011] 1 All ER (Comm) 951, 135 Con LR 69; aff’d
[2011] EWCA Civ 899, [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 455, 137 Con LR 92......................... 524
Rust Consulting Ltd (in liquidation) v PB Ltd (formerly Kennedy & Donkin Ltd)
[2011] EWCA Civ 1070, [2012] BLR 427, 144 Con LR 63............................................. 524
Ruttle Plant Hire Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
[2009] EWCA Civ 97, [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 444, [2009] BLR 301......................... 421
Ryanair Ltd v SR Technics Ireland Ltd [2007] EWHC 3089 (QB)........................................ 297
S
St Albans City & District Council v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481,
[1997-98] Info TLR 58, [1997] FSR 251.......................................................................... 319, 321
Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v Bristol Rovers (1883) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 160.............. 105
Saltman Engineering Co Ld v Campbell Engineering Co (1948) [1963] 3 All ER 413
(Note), (1948) 65 RPC 203.............................................................................................. 158
xxxix
Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd [1995] FSR 654........................................ 321, 327
Samarenko v Dawn Hill House Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1445, [2013] Ch 36, [2012]
3 WLR 638......................................................................................................................... 619
Sargent v Macepark (Whittlebury) Ltd [2004] EWHC 1333 (Ch), [2004] 4 All ER 662,
[2004] 3 EGLR 26............................................................................................................. 178
Satyam Computer Services Ltd v Upaid Systems Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 487, [2008] 2 All
ER (Comm) 465, [2008] 2 CLC 864................................................................................ 297
Savill Bros Ltd v Bethell [1902] 2 Ch 523............................................................................... 215
Scottish Coal Co Ltd v Danish Forestry Co Ltd [2009] CSOH 171, 2010 GWD 5-79........... 373
Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] AC 446, [1962] 2 WLR 186, [1962] 1 All
ER 1.................................................................................................................................... 87
Seager v Copydex Ltd (No 1) [1967] 1 WLR 923, [1967] 2 All ER 415, [1967] RPC 349... 173
Seakom Ltd v Knowledgepool Group Ltd [2013] EWHC 4007 (Ch)................................... 82
Seay v Eastwood [1976] 1 WLR 1117, [1976] 3 All ER 153, (1976) 120 SJ 734.................... 274
Sere Holdings Ltd v Volkswagen Group UK Ltd [2004] EWHC 1551 (Ch)......................... 297
Shaker v Vistajet Group Holding SA [2012] EWHC 1329 (Comm), [2012] 2 All ER
(Comm) 1010, [2012] All ER (D) 141 (May)......................................................... 372, 373, 377
Sheffield District Rly Co v Great Central Rly Co (1911) 27 TLR 451.................................... 111, 112
Shell UK Ltd v Total UK Ltd; Colour Quest Ltd v Total Downstream UK Ltd
[2010] EWCA Civ 180, [2011] QB 86, [2010] 3 All ER 793........................................... 242, 243
Silver Queen Maritime Ltd v Persia Petroleum Services plc [2010] EWHC 2867 (QB).267
Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D 247................................................................................... 92
Smith v The Hull Glass Co (1852) 11 CB 897, 138 ER 729.................................................... 126
Smith v South Wales Switchgear Ltd; Smith v UMB Chrysler (Scotland) Ltd [1978]
1 WLR 165, [1978] 1 All ER 18, 1978 SC (HL) 1............................................................ 381
Société Italo-Belge pour le Commerce et l’Industrie SA (Antwerp) v Palm & Vegetable
Oils (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (The Post Chaser) [1982] 1 All ER 19, [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
695, [1981] Com LR 249.................................................................................................. 619
Sonat Offshore SA v Amerada Hess Development & Texaco (Britain) [1988] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 145, 39 BLR 1, [1987] 2 FTLR 220........................................................................... 343
Soper v Arnold (1889) 14 App Cas 429................................................................................... 284
Southway Group Ltd v Wolff (1991) 57 BLR 33, 28 Con LR 109, [1991] EG 82 (CS)......... 566
South West Water Services Ltd v International Computers Ltd [1999] BLR 420, [1999]-
[2000] Info TLR 1, [1998-99] Info TLR 154.......................................................... 321, 322, 329
Spenborough UDC’s Agreement, Re [1968] Ch 139, [1967] 2 WLR 1403, [1968] 1 All
ER 959................................................................................................................................ 334
Springwell Navigation Corpn (a body corporate) v JP Morgan Chase Bank (a body
corporate) (formerly known as Chase Manhattan Bank) [2010] EWCA Civ 1221,
[2010] 2 CLC 705.............................................................................................................. 11
Square Mile Partnership Ltd v Fitzmaurice McCall Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1690, [2007]
2 BCLC 23, [2006] All ER (D) 262 (Dec)........................................................................ 524
Staunton v Wood (1851) 16 QB 638, 117 ER 1025................................................................. 459
Steiglitz v Egginton (1815) Holt NP 141, 171 ER 193............................................................ 128
Stephen v Scottish Boat Owners Mutual Insurance Association (The Talisman) [1989] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 535, 1989 SC (HL) 24, 1989 SLT 283.......................................................... 114
Steria Ltd v Sigma Wireless Communications Ltd [2008] BLR 79, 118 Con LR 177,
[2008] CILL 2544.............................................................................................................. 216
Stevenson & Sons v Maule & Son 1920 SC 335, 1920 1 SLT 237........................................... 566
Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] QB 600, [1992] 2 WLR 721, [1992] 2 All
ER 257........................................................................................................................ 324, 549, 551
Stockloser v Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476, [1954] 2 WLR 439, [1954] 1 All ER 630................ 285
Styles v Wardle (1825) 4 B & C 908, 107 ER 1297.................................................................. 457
Superior Overseas Development Corpn & Phillips Petroleum (UK) Ltd v British Gas
Corpn [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 262...................................................................................... 116
Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd (No 1) [2000] 1 WLR 1177, [2003] 1 All ER 320,
[2000] BCC 642................................................................................................................. 83
T
T & N Ltd (in administration) v Royal & Sun Alliance plc [2003] EWHC 1016 (Ch),
[2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 939, [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 106............................................. 276
TSG Building Services plc v South Anglia Housing Ltd [2013] EWHC 1151 (TCC),
[2013] BLR 484, 148 Con LR 228.................................................................................... 375
Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd (No 1) [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555... 315
xl
Tajik Aluminium Plant v Hydro Aluminum AS [2005] EWCA Civ 1218, [2006] 1 WLR 767,
[2005] 4 All ER 1232......................................................................................................... 64
Tarkin AG v Thames Steel UK Ltd [2010] EWHC 207 (Comm)........................................... 619
Tatung (UK) Ltd v Galex Telesure Ltd (1988) 5 BCC 325..................................................... 537
Tele2 International Card Co SA v Post Office Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 9, [2009] All ER (D)
144 (Jan)............................................................................................................................ 638
Telewest Communications plcl v C & E Comrs [2005] EWCA Civ 102, [2005] STC 481,
[2005] BTC 5125............................................................................................................... 82
Terrell v Mabie Todd & Co [1952] 2 TLR 574, (1952) 69 RPC 234, [1952] WN 434.......... 111, 115
Tersons Ltd v Stevenage Development Corpn [1965] 1 QB 37, [1964] 2 WLR 225, [1963]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 333.............................................................................................................. 215
Thomas Witter Ltd v TBB Industries Ltd [1996] 2 All ER 573.................... 296, 300, 302, 303, 304
Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd; Associated Portland
Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd v Tolhurst [1903] AC 414....................................... 566
Tradigrain SA v Intertek Testing Services (ITS) Canada Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 154, [2007]
1 CLC 188, [2007] Bus LLR D32...................................................................................... 315
Triodos Bank NV v Dobbs [2005] EWCA Civ 630, [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 588, [2005] All ER
(D) 364 (May)................................................................................................................... 50, 52
Trow v Ind Coope (West Midlands) Ltd [1966] 3 WLR 1300, [1967] 1 All ER 19, (1966)
110 SJ 964; aff’d [1967] 2 QB 899, [1967] 3 WLR 633, [1967] 2 All ER 900................. 456, 457
Truegold International Ltd v Questrock Ltd [2010] EWHC 966 (Ch)................................. 486
Tudor Grange Holdings Ltd v Citibank NA [1992] Ch 53, [1991] 3 WLR 750, [1991] 4 All
ER 1.................................................................................................................................... 331
Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393, 121 ER 762............................................................. 262
U
UBH (Mechanical Services) Ltd v Standard Life Assurance Co (The Times, 13 November
1986).................................................................................................................................. 105, 113
UR Power GmbH v Kuok Oils & Grains Pte Ltd [2009] EWHC 1940 (Comm), [2009] 2
Lloyd’s Rep 495, [2009] 2 CLC 386................................................................................. 147
United Bank of Kuwait Ltd v Hammoud; City Trust Ltd v Levy [1988] 1 WLR 1051, [1988]
3 All ER 418, (1988) 138 NLJ Rep 281............................................................................ 127
United Scientfic Holdings v Burnley Borough Council [1978] AC 904, [1977] 2 WLR 806,
[1977] 2 All ER 62............................................................................................................. 619
V
Valilas v Januzaj [2014] EWCA Civ 436, [2015] 1 All ER (Comm) 1047, 154 Con LR 38.... 617
W
W v Edgell [1990] 1 Ch 359, [1990] 2 WLR 471..................................................................... 352
WW Gear Construction Ltd v McGee Ltd [2010] EWHC 1460 (TCC), 131 Con LR 63,
(2011) 27 Const LJ 39....................................................................................................... 146
Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, [1992] 2 WLR 174, [1992] 1 All ER 453............... 372, 373, 376,
485, 574
Walker v Great Western Rly Co (1866-67) LR 2 Exch 228...................................................... 126
Wallis Son & Wells v Pratt & Haynes [1911] AC 394, [1911-13] All ER Rep 989.................. 316, 317
Watford Electronics v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm)
696, [2001] IP & T 588.................................................... 295, 296, 301, 302, 303, 319, 321, 329
Watson v Mid Wales Rly Co (1866-67) LR 2 CP 593............................................................... 551
Weldtech Equipment Ltd, Re [1991] BCC 16, [1991] BCLC 393......................................... 537
White v John Warrick & Co Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 1285, [1953] 2 All ER 1021, (1953)
97 SJ 740............................................................................................................................ 315
Whitehead Mann Ltd v Cheverny Consulting Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1303, [2007] 1 All ER
(Comm) 124...................................................................................................................... 573
William Hare Ltd v Shepherd Construction Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 283, [2010] BLR 358,
130 Con LR 1..................................................................................................................... 395, 426
Winn v Bull (1877) 7 Ch D 29.................................................................................................. 573
Woodroffe v Box [1954] ALR 474, 28 ALJ 90 (Australian High Court)................................ 484
Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573, [1993]
2 WLR 702, [1993] 2 All ER 370...................................................................................... 285
xli
Y
Yewbelle Ltd v London Green Developments Ltd (Knightsbridge Green Ltd Pt 20
defendant) [2006] EWHC 3166 (Ch), [2007] 1 EGLR 137, [2006] All ER (D) 122
(Dec).................................................................................................................................. 114, 115
Youell v Bland Welch & Co Ltd (No 1) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127......................................... 215
Young v Schuler (1883) 11 QB 651.......................................................................................... 43
Yuanda (UK) Co Ltd v WW Gear Construction Ltd [2010] EWHC 720 (TCC), [2011]
1 All ER (Comm) 550, [2010] All ER (D) 157 (May)..................................................... 322, 422
xlii
1 ‘Lesser importance’ means clauses which are often not the focus of a business person: that is provi-
sions other than those which concern what a party is to supply, what price a party will pay or charge
for it or when a party will be supplying it.
What the contract drafter should not do is just include a ‘standard’ set of
boilerplate clauses in the agreement without considering whether they are
appropriate for the particular transaction. When preparing a suitable set of
clauses, the contract drafter needs to understand why each boilerplate clause is
useful, when it is important to include it and the potential legal consequences
of including or not including it. A related point is that the wording of some
‘standard’ clauses needs modification from time to time in light of detailed
and continuing judicial scrutiny and interpretation. Entire agreement and
assignment clauses are just two of the more recent examples. Other clauses are
sometimes added because of changes in the law (such as following the passing
of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999).
This book aims to provide guidance on the purpose and effect of boilerplate
clauses that are in common use. It also covers a selection of other contract
clauses, that are typically classified as ‘boilerplate’, but are nevertheless
frequently encountered in many types of commercial agreement (for
example, confidentiality clauses). The main purpose of this book is to discuss
why such clauses are used, discuss drafting issues that arise, and provide
practical samples of commonly used precedents. Also included are extracts
from judgments where particular clauses have been defined, analysed or
interpreted.
The main part of this book consists of approximately 80 topics arranged
in alphabetical order, starting with ‘Acknowledgments’ and ending with
‘Warranties’. Also included is a set of typical boilerplate terms in a form in
which they might be found in a lengthy commercial agreement (see the
‘Boilerplate Agreement’ in Appendix A).
What is ‘boilerplate’?
In this book, the term ‘boilerplate’ is used broadly to mean contract terms that
are often found in commercial agreements, almost irrespective of the subject
matter of the agreement. Usually these terms are found towards the end of
the agreement, after the ‘interesting’ commercial terms that are concerned
with the main purpose of the transaction. Sometimes, boilerplate terms are
concerned with the operation of the agreement as a legal document (eg law
and jurisdiction, notice and interpretation clauses). In other cases, they clarify
the rights and obligations of the parties (eg force majeure, assignment and
waiver clauses). In all cases, it is important to be aware of their purpose and
legal effect.
The safe answer is ‘it all depends’. For example, a force majeure clause may
be thought essential in a contract involving a country where a civil war is likely
to take place, but irrelevant to most contracts for the purchase of stock items
from a shop. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a few generalisations as to
Some readers may be curious as to the origins of the term ‘boilerplate’ and
its meaning. It appears that the term was in common use in the United States
for many years, used both in a legal and non-legal context (in the latter
case, used principally by journalists). It seems that the expression originated
in nineteenth century newspaper production in the United States. Local
newspapers used to incorporate sections of national news that were sent to the
local newspaper office by train, already typeset and ready for printing on metal
drums. The metal drums were known as boilerplate. Boilerplate text became
a name for standard text that was slotted into the newspaper along with more
tailored, local news.
10
• the parties may acknowledge that one party did not make any pre-contractual
representations about the quality or nature of a product supplied by that
party, when in fact that party did make such statements; or
• the parties may agree that an amount that one party owes to another is
different to what is stated in the contract or is owed.
Drafting issues
• What is not an ‘acknowledgment’? Acknowledgments are not to be confused
with:
• warranties or representations; or
• statements made in recitals; or
• acknowledgments of a claim for the purposes of the Limitation Act
1980, s 29. The effect of this particular type of acknowledgment is that
the time limit for a party to bring a claim under a contract is ‘reset’
(when a party acknowledges the claim of the other party or makes a
payment and the acknowledgment is made in writing) (Limitation
Act 1980, s 30).
• Effect of warranties, recitals and acknowledgments:
• Warranties. If a party warrants that a statement is true, then that party
is positively asserting the statement. The other contracting party may
rely on it and may also be able to sue the party making the statement
for breach of contract if the statement turns out to be untrue. But if
a party merely acknowledges a statement, then that party will not be
liable for breach of a warranty if the statement is untrue. However,
that party may be unable to claim that it was not aware of the stated
fact at a later date (that is the party may be estopped from denying
that it made the acknowledgment).
Although the giver of an acknowledgment may not be able to
deny making it, the precise legal effect of the acknowledgment
will be dependent on the wording used in the agreement and the
circumstances. A court will wish to come to its own view as to the
true nature of a statement made by a party, as to whether it is an
acknowledgment, warranty, representation etc.
• Recitals. Recitals are not usually legally binding and their aim is to set
out the background to an agreement. However, some recitals, rather
11
12
• indicating that some document, thing or financial matter has been sent,
received or taken place:
eg, that a payment has been sent or received; an application required to be
made (to a regulatory or registration authority) has been made; or a letter
has been sent or received;
eg, that a notice sent by one party is assumed to be received by another
party a certain number of days after it is sent;
Precedent 3—Franchisee
The Franchisee acknowledges:
1 that he has been advised by the Franchisor to discuss his intention to
enter into this agreement with other franchisees of the Franchisor and
to seek other appropriate independent advice; and
2 that his decision to enter into this agreement has been taken solely on
the basis of the personal judgement and experience of the Franchisee
having taken such independent advice.
13
and undertake to act in accordance and comply with its terms. Terms de-
fined in that letter shall have, when used in this letter, the same meanings.
We acknowledge and confirm to the Agent on behalf of the Bank that:
1 no rights of counterclaim, rights of set-off or any other equities what-
soever have arisen in our favour against the Company in respect of
the Account Funds or the debts represented by them or any part of
them and we will not make any claim or demands or exercise any
rights of counterclaim, rights of set-off or any other equities what-
soever against the Company in respect of the Account Funds or any
part thereof;
2 we have not, as at the date hereof, received any notice that any third
party has or will have any right or interest whatsoever in or has made
or will be making any claim or demand or taking any action whatso-
ever against the Account Funds or the debts represented thereby or
any part thereof;
3 we undertake that, in the event of our becoming aware at any time
that any person or entity other than the Agent has or will have any
right or interest whatsoever in the Account Funds or the debts rep-
resented by them or any part of them, we shall forthwith give written
notice of the terms thereof to the Agent; and
4 we have made the acknowledgments and confirmations and have
given the undertakings set out in this letter in the knowledge that they
are required by the Agent in connection with the security which has
been constituted by the Company in favour of the Agent as agent for
the Bank under the Deed.
This letter shall be governed by English law.
14
15
Drafting issues
• General points:
• in the UK there is no standard definition as to the meaning of an
affiliate;
• accordingly, the parties should define the meaning of affiliates in
their agreement;
• UK companies legislation contains no definition of ‘affiliate’;
• often (although not always) other companies in the same group of
companies as a contracting party are defined as its affiliates.
• Use of statutory definitions:
• many definitions of ‘affiliate’ in agreements use the meanings of
certain words found in the Companies Act 2006 (the text of these is
found at the end of this section):
• s 1159. ‘subsidiary’, ‘holding company’ and ‘wholly owned
subsidiary’ are defined in the Companies Act 2006; and
• ss 1161, 1173. ‘parent undertaking’, ‘subsidiary undertaking’,
‘parent company’, ‘undertaking’ and ‘group undertaking’ are
also defined. These sections appear in a section dealing with
various accounts matters and provide a wider definition than
under ss 1159 etc. They were originally introduced following the
introduction of EC Seventh Directive on Group Accounts;
16
17
bound by the contract and will not have enforceable contractual rights
under it.
A contract drafter, when drafting a clause referring to affiliates or group
companies, should consider the following points:
• if a party is referred to as a member of a group, and the contract states
that references to the party include references to the group, are the
group and all its members parties to the agreement?
• is the term ‘affiliate’, ‘group’ (or whichever term is used) defined in
the contract? Will the definition make use of terms such as ‘subsidiary’
and ‘holding company’? If so, is the intention that the statutory
definitions set out in ss 1162 (wider definition) and 1159 (narrower
definition) of the Companies Act 2006 apply (see below)?
If the wider definition is used (s 1162) then persons who, although
not incorporated, can claim a dominant influence over a party to the
agreement may be able to claim a benefit under the contract;
• are the affiliates/group companies named as parties (such as in the
Parties clause) and will they sign the contract?
• will a (named) party to the agreement have the authority to act (and be
stated in the contract to have that authority to act) as the agent of the
other affiliates/group of companies, and accordingly be able to sign
the contract on behalf of each of the affiliates/members of the group?
• if group companies are to be parties to an agreement (either by
reference or by explicitly stating their names), it is important to be
clear which of the parties has rights or obligations under particular
clauses of the contract. If more than one party has such obligations, do
the obligations give rise to joint, several or joint and several liabilities
on the parties concerned (see Joint and several liability)?
• the above issues will need addressing on a case-by-case basis.
The above points deal with defining the meaning of an affiliate in
general terms. However, in a particular deal it may only be relevant that
one company would come within the meaning of ‘affiliate’, not all the
possible companies within the group of companies of which a party is a
member. For example, one party may wish to disclose some confidential
information to the other party, and the other party is a member of a
group of companies. Given the nature of confidential information or the
proposed deal, only one other member of the group of companies will
need to see that confidential information. The disclosing party may wish
to restrict the meaning of affiliate to that one other member of the group
of companies of which the other party is a member (see Precedent 2).
18
The following are some of the more common situations when one or more of
the parties to an agreement might wish to make use of a definition of ‘affiliate’:
• in a confidentiality clause: where confidential information is disclosed by
one party to another party, the other party will be able to disclose the
confidential information of the first party to its affiliates;
• that the affiliates of one party can (also) enforce an obligation imposed
on another party;
• that under some types of licence agreements where royalty payments are
involved, the receipts generated by a party will include that of its affiliates;
• that warranties and/or indemnities provided by one party to another
party will also extend to the affiliates of the other party (and the clause
will sometimes extend to the affiliate having the right to bring an action
against the party in breach of the indemnity etc);
• that a party is permitted to assign its rights and/or obligations to an
affiliate (without the consent of the other party in an assignment clause);
• that an affiliate is included as a person who has the right to enforce some
or all of the provisions of an agreement under a Contracts (Rights of Third
Parties) Act 1999 clause.
Other phrases/words are sometimes used instead of, or in addition to,
‘affiliates’, such as ‘associated companies’.
19
20
21
22
23
Section 1159
1 Introduction
The provisions of this Part of this Schedule explain expressions used in section
1159 (meaning of ‘subsidiary’ etc) and otherwise supplement that section.
2 Voting rights in a company
In section 1159(1)(a) and (c) the references to the voting rights in a company
are to the rights conferred on shareholders in respect of their shares or, in the
case of a company not having a share capital, on members, to vote at general
meetings of the company on all, or substantially all, matters.
3 Right to appoint or remove a majority of the directors
(1) In section 1159(1)(b) the reference to the right to appoint or remove
a majority of the board of directors is to the right to appoint or remove
directors holding a majority of the voting rights at meetings of the board
on all, or substantially all, matters.
(2) A company shall be treated as having the right to appoint to a directorship
if—
(a) a person’s appointment to it follows necessarily from his appointment
as director of the company, or
(b) the directorship is held by the company itself.
(3) A right to appoint or remove which is exercisable only with the consent
or concurrence of another person shall be left out of account unless no
other person has a right to appoint or, as the case may be, remove in
relation to that directorship.
24
25
Section 1162
1 Introduction
The provisions of this Schedule explain expressions used in section 1162
(parent and subsidiary undertakings) and otherwise supplement that section.
2 Voting rights in an undertaking
(1) In section 1162(2)(a) and (d) the references to the voting rights in an
undertaking are to the rights conferred on shareholders in respect of
their shares or, in the case of an undertaking not having a share capital,
on members, to vote at general meetings of the undertaking on all, or
substantially all, matters.
(2) In relation to an undertaking which does not have general meetings at
which matters are decided by the exercise of voting rights the references
to holding a majority of the voting rights in the undertaking shall be
construed as references to having the right under the constitution of the
undertaking to direct the overall policy of the undertaking or to alter the
terms of its constitution.
3 Right to appoint or remove a majority of the directors
(1) In section 1162(2)(b) the reference to the right to appoint or remove
a majority of the board of directors is to the right to appoint or remove
directors holding a majority of the voting rights at meetings of the board
on all, or substantially all, matters.
(2) An undertaking shall be treated as having the right to appoint to a
directorship if—
(a) a person’s appointment to it follows necessarily from his appointment
as director of the undertaking, or
(b) the directorship is held by the undertaking itself.
(3) A right to appoint or remove which is exercisable only with the consent
or concurrence of another person shall be left out of account unless no
26
other person has a right to appoint or, as the case may be, remove in
relation to that directorship.
4 Right to exercise dominant influence
(1) For the purposes of section 1162(2)(c) an undertaking shall not be
regarded as having the right to exercise a dominant influence over
another undertaking unless it has a right to give directions with respect
to the operating and financial policies of that other undertaking which
its directors are obliged to comply with whether or not they are for the
benefit of that other undertaking.
(2) A ‘control contract’ means a contract in writing conferring such a right
which—
(a) is of a kind authorised by the articles of the undertaking in relation to
which the right is exercisable, and
(b) is permitted by the law under which that undertaking is established.
(3) This paragraph shall not be read as affecting the construction of section
1162(4)(a).
5 Rights exercisable only in certain circumstances or temporarily incapable of
exercise
(1) Rights which are exercisable only in certain circumstances shall be taken
into account only—
(a) when the circumstances have arisen, and for so long as they continue
to obtain, or
(b) when the circumstances are within the control of the person having
the rights.
(2) Rights which are normally exercisable but are temporarily incapable of
exercise shall continue to be taken into account.
6 Rights held by one person on behalf of another
Rights held by a person in a fiduciary capacity shall be treated as not held by him.
7
(1) Rights held by a person as nominee for another shall be treated as held by
the other.
(2) Rights shall be regarded as held as nominee for another if they are
exercisable only on his instructions or with his consent or concurrence.
8 Rights attached to shares held by way of security
Rights attached to shares held by way of security shall be treated as held by the
person providing the security—
(a) where apart from the right to exercise them for the purpose of preserving
the value of the security, or of realising it, the rights are exercisable only
in accordance with his instructions, and
27
(b) where the shares are held in connection with the granting of loans as part
of normal business activities and apart from the right to exercise them for
the purpose of preserving the value of the security, or of realising it, the
rights are exercisable only in his interests.
9 Rights attributed to parent undertaking
(1) Rights shall be treated as held by a parent undertaking if they are held by
any of its subsidiary undertakings.
(2) Nothing in paragraph 7 or 8 shall be construed as requiring rights held
by a parent undertaking to be treated as held by any of its subsidiary
undertakings.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph 8 rights shall be treated as being exercisable
in accordance with the instructions or in the interests of an undertaking if
they are exercisable in accordance with the instructions of or, as the case
may be, in the interests of any group undertaking.
10 Disregard of certain rights
The voting rights in an undertaking shall be reduced by any rights held by the
undertaking itself.
11 Supplementary
References in any provision of paragraphs 6 to 10 to rights held by a person
include rights falling to be treated as held by him by virtue of any other
provision of those paragraphs but not rights which by virtue of any such
provision are to be treated as not held by him.
28
29
Existence of a partnership
Whether or not a partnership exists between two persons is always a question
of fact, which does not depend solely on the documents they have executed or
even the express statements they have made.
Where a relationship has all the properties of a partnership, an express
written provision by the parties denying the existence of a partnership may be
insufficient to prevent one being held to exist. The definition of a partnership
is that set out in the Partnership Act 1890:
‘the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common
with a view of profit’.
30
31
Joint venture
There is no English statute on joint ventures comparable to the Companies
Acts for companies. The expression ‘joint venture’ has no specific legal
meaning under English law, unlike the position in some other countries. In
practice, joint ventures are:
• set up as partnerships; or
• set up as a company in which each of the joint venturers is a shareholder.
Sometimes each joint venturer will own 50% of the issued share capital of
the company, although the precise shares of ownership (as well as other
aspects of their relationship) are subject to the agreement of the joint
venturers; or
• established by two separate parties collaborating on a project by providing
resources (human, financial etc), without there being a separate legal
entity.
A clause dealing with denials of agency and partnership will also often include
a denial that the parties are involved in a joint venture in case joint venture has
a meaning that implies legal obligations, such as with a partnership.
Drafting issues
32
are not normally addressed in this type of boilerplate provision (but are
considered further in Capacity).
33
34
A party may require that any documents that are issued by a court in relation
to legal proceedings are not sent to that party but to someone else. Court rules
permit this in certain circumstances.
Drafting issues
• Legal issues
• The Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), SI 1998/3132, (see CPR 6) governs
the service of documents in legal proceedings;
• if a contract contains a provision providing that if a claim is made
concerning the contract, any claim form issued in relation to that
claim may be served as specified in that contract, then the claim form
is deemed to be served if it is served by the method specified in the
contract: CPR 6.11(1);
• if a claim form needs serving outside the United Kingdom then it may
be necessary to obtain the permission of the court (under CPR 6.36)
unless it falls into a category where permission is not required (under
CPR 6.32 or CPR 6.33): CPR 6.11(2);
• the rules for determining whether a party needs to obtain the
permission of the court is found in CPR 6.36 and CPR 6.37. In
addition, Practice Direction 6B to this CPR needs consideration (the
detailed provisions of which are beyond the scope of this book);
Readers should obtain specialist advice and/or consult standard legal
books such as the Civil Court Practice);
35
• the contract to which the claim relates being entered into within
the jurisdiction with or through the foreign party’s agent; and
• Appointment of an agent
• the provision should deal with the extent of the appointment of the
agent, such as:
• If the agent fails to notify the party who appointed the agent that
proceedings are served, then there should be wording that such
failure does not affect the validity of the service (see Precedent 2);
• if the agent takes an excessive amount of time to notify the party that
appointed the agent, then there should be wording specifying a time
limit when service is deemed effective (see Precedent 3).
• Although an Agents for service clause aims to deal with the situation where
a party (which is not based in the United Kingdom) agrees a method of
service out of the jurisdiction by means of an agent, it may still be regarded
as invalid under a foreign law, and therefore the ability to proceed in
other ways should be retained (see Precedent 4).
36
This type of clause is not normally linked to or used by other clauses except:
• where a party is based outside England and Wales (or the United Kingdom),
the other party to the agreement should check that the address given in
the Parties clause is the address to be used for notices (including for the
service of proceedings);
• the Notices clause may include provisions of an Agents for service clause or
will need to be amended to reflect the fact that particular types of notices
(such as the service of proceedings caused by an Agents for service clause)
are dealt with elsewhere by their own clause.
37
38
39
The purpose of these clauses is for each party to state (formally) that they
consent to the provisions of the agreement and to record the party’s signature
signifying that fact. This section deals only with contracts and other documents
that do not need signing as deeds. See Deeds for the legal requirements to
execute a deed.
Execution clause
The execution clause appears immediately before the signature block
and formally states the parties’ consent to the terms of the agreement and
sometimes that the signatures that follow are those of the parties. The
execution clause (for contracts) is not a legal requirement or otherwise
needed, but the usual practice is to include it in conventionally drafted
agreements. The execution clause:
‘is not necessary for the validity of the agreement but is added merely to preserve
the evidence of its due execution. For this reason it may be of importance and,
except in instruments relating to registered land, it should never in practice be
omitted…’: Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents, vol 12(2), para 18, 3103.
40
Signature block
The signature block is the place in the agreement where the parties sign:
• to indicate their consent to the provisions of the agreement; and
• to indicate that the agreement is coming into operation (immediately or
at some later date).
Parties do not always sign the agreement themselves, and may appoint others
to sign on their behalf, for example:
• agents;
• directors or authorised officers for a company;
• employees; or
• the solicitors or other advisers of a party.
If this is the case then the signature block should contain wording that the
person signing is signing on behalf of someone or somebody else.
It is possible to sign agreements ‘under hand’ or as a deed. The legal
requirements for deeds are discussed in Deeds.
Drafting issues
41
• The placement of the signature block. It is up to the parties which spot in the
agreement they choose to sign. However,
• the placing of the signature(s) otherwise than at the end of the
document; and/or
• having the signature block clause drafted in other than one of the
conventional ways
may not be acceptable to some parties.
• Does an agreement need signing (at all)? Except in a few instances there is no
legal requirement for the parties to a contract to sign it. But a real signature
indicates (among other things) that the party signing is signifying their
consent to the provisions of the agreement.
Although a party need not sign a contract, it must be named (or otherwise
identified) as a party to the contract to be able to enforce it or use it as a
defence. Eg, a bank does not usually sign a guarantee that it receives.
There are, however, exceptions to this principle. Eg:
• a contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land needs
to be in writing, but also has to be signed by or on behalf of each party
(Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s 2);
• an assignment or mortgage of a patent must be in writing and signed by
or on behalf of the assignor or mortgager (Patents Act 1977, s 30(6)).
• Witnessing a signature
• A contract (unless signed as a deed) does not need to have the
signatures of the parties (or their authorised representatives)
witnessed. However, signatures are sometimes witnessed:
Eg, a bank taking a personal guarantee will require a solicitor to
witness the signature of the guarantor together with a statement
on the guarantee to indicate that the solicitor has explained its
effect to the guarantor before the guarantor signed: Cornish v
Midland Bank plc [1985] 3 All ER 513;
• signature blocks in some civil law countries are drafted in a way so that
two persons sign for each party, and sometimes one person is said to
be witnessing the signature of another party (rather than two people
signing the agreement);
• in the United States, some commercial agreements have execution
clauses, and then there is wording where the lawyer for that party is
indicating (by the lawyer’s signature or initials) that the agreement is
approved as to form.
• One person signing for more than one party. When a person signs in two or
more capacities (eg as principal and as agent of another, or as an officer
or authorised signatory of two parties (ie a party entering a contract and
the party’s parent acting as a guarantor)) then the person:
42
• should sign for each party (ie if signing for two parties then the person
should sign twice, and accordingly there should be two signature
blocks, one for each party); or
• should sign once and the signature block should reflect that the
signature covers more than one party. A single signature is legally
effective if it is stated to be in both capacities or there is evidence that
the signatory intended it to be a double signature (Young v Schuler
(1883) 11 QBD 651; Elpis Maritime Co Ltd v Marti Charter Co Inc
[1992] 1 AC 21, [1991] 3 All ER 758, HL, in which Young v Schuler was
distinguished).
• Adding the date to the execution clause. Some lawyers hold the view that an
execution clause in modern format for contracts should not state the
date. Rather the date should just be stated at the head of the agreement
once all parties have signed. However, in the case of agreements signed
on different dates, perhaps without the assistance of lawyers, it is
suggested that it can be helpful to include a line to enter the date after
the signatures.
The traditional English practice is that the execution and signature block
clauses are normally located after all the other provisions of the agreement
(including the schedules or annexes). However, for some agreements, the
execution and signature block clauses appear at the end of the agreement, but
before the schedules. There is no particular legal significance to this, other
than convention.
43
By convention, the names of the parties that appear in the signature block
should be their full names as they appear in the Parties clause, and not the
‘defined’ names. Eg, if the full name of a party is Jane Smith (UK) Drivers
Limited, and the defined name is ‘Chauffeur’, the former name rather than
the latter should appear. However, standard form agreements will often use
the defined name of a party in the signature block.
signature signature
print name print name
job title job title
date date
signature signature
description
address
44
If only director is signing then this signature block will need to be adapt-
ed to indicate that the director’s signature is witnessed (and remove the
wording ‘[director][company secretary]’s signature’.
45
Or
46
The parties to an agreement are usually free to decide when and how they can
change the agreement’s provisions. The purpose of an amendment clause is
to determine:
• whether, and the extent to which, one or more of the parties to an
agreement can amend an agreement; and
• the procedure the party or parties must follow to vary the provisions of an
agreement.
An agreement can contain provisions that, for example, can:
• specifically permit one or more of the parties to vary some or all of the
provisions of the agreement; or
• forbid any amendment without the consent of the parties.
In the latter case, the parties are free, subsequent to entering into the agreement,
of course, to vary it as they wish, provided all parties give their consent.
An amendment clause specifying whether the parties can or cannot vary the
agreement provisions (and if possible in what circumstances it can occur, the
procedure etc) is desirable to avoid arguments that the agreement has been
varied by the conduct of the contracting parties.
The intention of including such a provision in an agreement is to clearly state
if and how the parties may vary the provisions of the agreements, sending a
strong signal that the subsequent conduct of the parties (be it what they say or
do) will not vary what they have agreed in writing. However, recent court cases
have indicated that the subsequent conduct or an oral agreement is sufficient
to vary or amend an agreement, even if the agreement contains wording such
as that of the precedents set out below (eg Globe Motors v TRW Lucas Varity
[2016] EWCA Civ 396; MWB Business Exchange Centres v Rock Advertising
[2016] EWCA Civ 553). Given the approach of the courts, a party may be less
able to rely on such wording if another party asserts that some conduct or
oral agreement has in fact led to a variation or amendment. A party may ask
what is the value of including such a provision if it can be so easily overridden
by a court. It will still be necessary for the party who argues that there is an
amendment or variation to demonstrate that what has occurred qualifies as
an intention to create legal relations and meets the other criteria for making a
47
binding contract. However, the mere inclusion of such wording is not enough
to prevent changes in the provisions subsequently, as a court will look at the
objective intentions of the parties. Perhaps the true value of this wording is
that it expresses the intention of the parties at the time they entered into their
agreement, as well as their intention on how they expected the relationship to
operate during the life of the agreement. The wording may also be used by the
party who wishes to argue or defeat any claim by the other party that there has
been an amendment or variation.
Drafting issues
• Are amendments or variations to an agreement permitted at all? For an
agreement that is not of long duration and/or provides for the supply of
a fixed quantity of (defined) goods or services then it is not likely that the
parties will need to vary or amend the agreement (and Precedents 1, 2 or
3 should be used).
• Who needs to agree to vary or amend the provisions of an agreement?
• both parties need to agree; or
• one party can impose an amendment or variation on any part of the
agreement; or
• one party can impose an amendment or variation in relation to
specific clauses in the agreement or in relation to particular issues;
eg, a party supplying goods or services over a long period under an
agreement may wish to increase the prices at particular intervals
without obtaining the agreement of the other party.
• one party can impose an amendment or variation, subject to the
other party having a limited period of time to object, otherwise the
amendment or variation takes effect; or
• one party can impose an amendment or variation but it must not be
such as to materially affect the provisions of the agreement or the
outcome of the agreement;
eg, an agreement to provide a manufactured product might have a
provision allowing the manufacturing party to amend the specifications
so long as the amendment does not change the functions of the
finished product, its size, maintenance etc. The manufacturer may
need to buy materials from a third party supplier and these may be
subject to small variations. If the manufacturer makes an electronic
product and has a third party supply the covers for the product, the
third party may from time to time, in each batch of covers, make the
colour very slightly different.
• Which provisions of an agreement it is possible to amend or vary? Is it possible to
amend or vary:
• all the provisions of an agreement?
• only some provisions of the agreement?
48
49
This clause is not normally linked to or used by other clauses. However, if there
is a specified form of amendment (such as a precedent letter or amending
50
51
Case analysis
Triodos Bank NV v Dobbs [2005] EWCA Civ 630, [2005] All ER (D) 364
(May)
Facts
1 D entered into a guarantee on two loan agreements (original agree-
ments) between a bank and a company.
2 The original agreement provided:
‘2.4 The Bank may at any time as it thinks fit and without reference
to the Guarantor:
2.4.1 grant time for payment or grant any other indulgence or
agree to any amendment, variation, waiver or release in
respect of an obligation of the Company under the Loan
agreement.’
3 The bank and the company subsequently entered into three further
loan agreements (increasing and extending the amount of loans), the
first two each of which were stated to be replacements for the earlier
agreements.
4 The bank eventually called in the loan and asked D to pay under the
guarantee.
5 D argued that the guarantee only applied to the original agreement
and not to the further loan agreements despite the fact that the guar-
antee was expressly referred to in the three latter loan agreements.
Held
1 The court held that the third loan agreement was not an amendment
or variation of the original loan agreement and was not in the scope of
the original agreement: That the third loan agreement made was ‘so
different from the original agreement [that it] cannot be an ‘amend-
ment or variation’ of the initial contract.’ (para 14). The loan agree-
ment ‘imposes new and different obligations …obligations which
cannot be said to be by way of variation or amendment of any ob-
ligation under or pursuant to the [original] agreement. And there can
52
53
54
The timing and method of the announcement may need careful handling so
as not to adversely impact on the parties’ respective businesses. Eg:
• a merger between two companies might lead to job losses. An untimely
announcement by one party, before the other party has consulted with
employees, may cause problems, in terms of both employee relations and
compliance with employment law requirements to consult with one’s
employees before taking decisions on redundancies; or
• the release of test results on a product (such as a drug going through
clinical trials or a new technological product) that is not performing as
expected. A premature announcement by one party, before the other
party has consulted with other licensees and regulatory authorities, may
cause adverse press and media interest, regulatory investigation and
investors (and potential investors) to try to disassociate themselves from
one or more of the parties;
• premature release of information about a new product. An announcement
of details about a new product too early may lead to problems about when to
release or on releasing the product into the market. For example, it might
lead competitors to launch rival products or copies (if the competitors can
make the rival products quickly enough). Another consequence (given
that much production of products is now done by contractors) is that
competitors may ‘buy up’ the contractor’s production facilities and thus
stop the party making the announcement either to get the product made
in time or have to pay a much higher price than expected. Also, too early
an announcement may lead to consumer demand that cannot be satisfied
in a timely fashion (ie too long a lead-time before the product is actually
available) and thus cause negative comment.
In such cases, the parties may wish to agree a strategy for (and agree the text
of) public announcements during their negotiations. The final wording for
each stage of the agreement (where appropriate) can be attached to the
agreement as a schedule.
The use of an Announcements clause can be particularly important for:
• public companies, where the information could be price-sensitive
(ie affect the share price), or the agreement has to be notified to the Stock
Exchange under the Listing Rules; or
• companies subject to close regulatory scrutiny or control; or
• companies whose activities are subject to close media scrutiny or criticism.
Drafting issues
55
56
This clause is not normally linked to or used by other clauses. However, since
this clause concerns the possible release of information (some of which
may be confidential), it may have implications for clause(s) dealing with
confidentiality.
In some cases, it may be appropriate to make an Announcements clause subject
to the obligations of confidentiality.
If a party is a public authority for the purposes of the Freedom of Information
Act 2000, then any restriction on making an announcement may not be effective.
The duty of the public authority to release information following a request is
likely to override any contractual wording (unless the requested information is
subject to any permitted exceptions/exemptions under the Act).
57
as required by law or by The London Stock Exchange (in which case the
parties shall consult with each other on the form of the announcement)
without the prior written approval of the Investor.
58
59
An appointments clause is usually the main clause describing the main or key
obligations or purpose of the agreement. For example:
• in a contract for the manufacture of goods, it will be the clause that states
that the manufacturer will be making the goods and the purchaser is
buying them;
• in a contract for the provision of services it will be the clause stating that
a party will be providing the services and that the other party will pay
for them.
The use of the word ‘appointment’ is not required but is conventional within
certain types of agreement. An agency agreement is simply a special form
of services agreement where the conventional drafting practice is to use the
word ‘appointment’. The essential element is that the agent (or other service
provider) is agreeing to provide services and the client/customer/principal
as the case may be is agreeing to their performance (in a more conventional
services agreement with the words such as ‘in consideration of the Client
paying the Price’ or similar wording)
60
Drafting issues
This clause is usually the first clause in the Main Commercial Provisions of an
agreement (usually immediately after the definition section).
61
62
Background
The purpose of arbitration ‘is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an
impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense’ (Arbitration Act
1996, s 1(a)). The purpose of an arbitration clause in a contract is to enable
the resolution of a dispute between some or all of the contracting parties with
final and binding effect by an impartial third person or panel of persons,
acting in a judicial manner. The arbitrator’s authority is derived from the
agreement of the parties concerned.
The drafting of an arbitration clause assumes that the parties wish to use an
alternative method (arbitration) to resolve their dispute rather than use the
courts. Whether the parties wish to do this instead of resorting to litigation is
clearly a question that the parties will need to address first.
Clients sometimes have a vague impression that arbitration is cheaper, quicker
and more user-friendly than litigation in the courts. Even with the passing of
the Arbitration Act 1996 arbitration is not necessarily a cheaper or quicker
option than litigation. There are advantages of using arbitration:
• the parties can choose their own person to deal with their dispute (an
arbitrator who is experienced in the sector or the field in which the parties
operate);
• the parties, subject to the requirements of the 1996 Act, can decide on
their own procedure and timescale (and consequently, if the parties co-
operate, can make arbitration speedier than using the courts);
• the parties can keep their dispute and any result or award of the arbitration
confidential.
Some disadvantages:
• the cost of hiring an arbitrator (often at a daily rate or a fixed fee, which
is likely to be high for someone who is experienced or with sufficient
authority). This is likely to be even more expensive if there is more than
one arbitrator. For use of the English court system there is normally one
63
court fee (with some additional fees for various stages in the litigation),
regardless how long a case takes;
• the costs of ‘running’ the arbitration, which might include the hiring of
arbitration rooms, travel and accommodation expenses for the arbitrator
(and any other persons needed to help or work with the arbitrator, such
as someone to record or make a note of the proceedings);
• the delays involved in getting busy arbitrators to find free time in their
diaries for hearing dates; and
• the likelihood of appeals being made to the court if a party does not like
the decision of an arbitrator.
64
Arbitral institutions
In certain commercial fields, bodies have been set up to provide an
arbitration framework with specialised rules of procedure, services and staff.
Examples include the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the London Court
of International Arbitration and the ICC International Court of Arbitration.
Where parties agree to refer any dispute to such a body, the form of referral
clause drawn up by that body should be used.
65
Summary
An agreement to submit to arbitration amounts to a voluntary surrender of a
party’s right to pursue its remedy for breach of contract through the courts.
Therefore the parties need to give careful consideration as to whether to
include a clause to that effect in a contract. The party being advised must be
made fully aware of its future obligation, in the event of a dispute arising, to
submit to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and accept the award, however much
66
the party may feel aggrieved at that future time. This is particularly so where
the right of appeal to the court on a question of law is excluded.
For this reason, arbitration clauses are usually to be found in agreements in
which the parties are more or less on an equal footing, and which confirm
and formalise their desire to co-operate in a project or transaction. Typical
examples might be: shareholders’ agreements, joint ventures, research and
technical aid agreements, partnership deeds and certain contracts for services.
In these types of transaction, the parties will often wish differences to be settled
quickly and inexpensively, and with a minimum of animosity or publicity. An
arbitration clause may not be appropriate where one of the parties has, by the
very nature of the transaction, the upper hand, as in an agency or franchise
agreement, or contract of employment, or financing and loan agreement. Of
course, each case must be treated on its merits.
Drafting issues
67
Other terms may also be appropriate, eg stating that the expert’s costs are
to be borne equally by the parties.
• How long should the arbitration agreement be? The contract drafter is faced
with some difficult choices when drafting an arbitration clause. If the
clause is to deal with every possible aspect it could become longer than
the main commercial provisions of the agreement. Instead, parties tend
to include a relatively short arbitration clause in the commercial contract,
and rely on the legal framework provided by the Arbitration Act 1996.
They may then choose to supplement these provisions with a more
detailed arbitration agreement, if and when a dispute arises.
• Should a single arbitrator be appointed or a panel of two or three? A three-person
arbitration will be more expensive than using a single arbitrator and
may be more time-consuming (particularly if the hearing extends over
several days and the arbitrators’ diaries are full, in which case hearing
dates may end up being several months apart). On the other hand, it may
lead to a better decision, and be less likely to be affected by the personal
views of an individual. A multi-person arbitration panel may include both
persons skilled in the subject matter of the dispute and lawyers with an
understanding of the underlying contract law.
• How should the arbitrator be chosen? Should the parties agree between
themselves who the arbitrator should be or, if they cannot agree after a
certain period of time, should someone be designated to act as appointing
authority at the request of either party to the agreement? In many general
transactions the custom is to appoint the President of the Law Society or
of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, but it may be more appropriate
to designate an official of a body relevant to the subject matter of the
agreement with a view to obtaining the appointment of a person with
specialist knowledge of the subject area of the dispute. It should be first
ascertained whether the association in question is willing to act.
It should also be checked whether the appointing body has a panel of
arbitrators that it will invariably recommend and, if so, what criteria
are used for including people on that panel. It is understood that some
organisations may have rather short lists of ‘self-selected’ individuals who
are members of the organisation.
Where a three-person arbitration panel is to be used, it is sometimes
agreed that each party will select one of the arbitrators, and the two
selected arbitrators will select the third arbitrator. Or (as a variation on
this theme) there may be a two-person panel, with referral to an umpire
chosen by the two arbitrators if they are unable to agree.
In the majority of agreements, and where both parties are domiciled in
the UK, the parties will agree to refer disputes to a sole arbitrator, leaving
the choice of arbitrator to be agreed on by themselves, eg:
‘any dispute … shall be referred to the decision of a single arbitrator to be
agreed upon between the parties.’
68
Where there are more than two parties to the agreement, as, say, in
many partnership agreements, it is more practical to provide for a third-
party appointment as soon as a dispute has arisen, since to obtain the
agreement of all the parties on an appointment might well be difficult and
time-consuming. However, in such a case the precise ‘trigger’ for the third
party reference should be specified, ie by request of one/two parties. Eg:
(dentists’ partnership agreement)
‘… shall be referred to an arbitrator to be nominated on the request
of any partner by the Secretary for the time being of the British Dental
Association.’
A longer form, for more complex situations, can be seen in Precedent 11.
Alternatively, future disputes may be referred to a tribunal of three
arbitrators, two to be appointed by the parties and the third to be
appointed by those appointees. In such a case, the award of any two of the
arbitrators is binding on the parties. Eg:
‘Any dispute or difference between the parties in connection with this
agreement shall be referred to arbitration in [London] by a tribunal
of three arbitrators. Each party shall appoint one arbitrator. The third
arbitrator shall be appointed by the arbitrators so appointed or, failing
agreement, by (appointing authority).’
69
70
It is customary to add:
‘or any re-enactment or modification of such Act for the time being in
force.’
It could be argued that these words are not strictly necessary by virtue
of the Interpretation Act 1978, ss 17 and 23, but it may be felt safer to
insert them. However, wording of this nature is redundant and should be
omitted where (as is often the case) a general interpretation clause in the
agreement provides for modifications to legislation.
To avoid any doubt as to the place of arbitration, the parties may agree to
be specific, eg:
‘The arbitration shall take place in [London].’
• Excluding the right of appeal to the court. Section 69(1) of the Arbitration Act
1996 provides that parties to arbitral proceedings may appeal to the court
on a question of law arising out of an award ‘unless otherwise agreed by
the parties’. Parties who wish to exclude this right of appeal and thus avoid
the attendant delay and expense sometimes incorporate the following
wording in the arbitration clause:
‘and the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on all the
parties.’
71
It is not safe to assume that the inclusion of such words will be held to
amount to an exclusion agreement for the purposes of the Act. The
agreement to exclude should be clearly stated; words such as the following
are sometimes used:
‘The parties agree to exclude any right of application or appeal to the
English courts concerning any question of law arising in the course of the
arbitration.’
See above.
Consumer issues
72
73
74
75
order to try and resolve the dispute. If the dispute or difference is not
resolved as a result of such meeting either party may (at such meet-
ing or within 14 days of its conclusion) propose to the other in writing
that structured negotiations be entered into with the assistance of a
neutral adviser or mediator (‘Neutral Adviser’) before resorting to liti-
gation.
3 The parties will within [14] days of the appointment of the Neutral
Adviser meet with him in order to agree a programme for the ex-
change of any relevant information and the structure to be adopted
for the negotiation to be held in London. If considered appropriate
the parties may at any stage seek assistance from [CEDR] to provide
guidance on a suitable procedure.
6 Failing agreement, any of the parties may invite the Neutral Adviser
to provide a non-binding but informative opinion in writing as to the
merits of the dispute and the rights and obligations of the parties.
Such opinion will be provided on a without prejudice basis and will
be private and confidential to the parties and may not be used in evi-
dence in any proceedings commenced pursuant to the terms of this
agreement without the prior written consent of all the parties.
8 Nothing contained in this Clause [no] shall restrict either party’s free-
dom to commence legal proceedings to preserve any legal right or
remedy or protect any proprietary or trade secret right.
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77
5 Expert or arbitrator
Unless the Dispute is of such a nature that it is not capable of be-
ing referred to an arbitrator or both Parties agree (or are deemed to
agree) that a Specialist should act as an expert, the reference will be
made to him as an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act 1996.
6 Experts
Where a Specialist is to act as an independent expert:
6.1 each Party may within [10] Working Days of his appointment
make written representations which will be made to him and
copied to the other Party;
6.2 each Party will be given a further [5] Working Days to give him
written comment on those representations;
6.3 the Specialist will be at liberty to call for such written evidence
from the Parties and to seek such legal or other expert assis-
tance as he may [reasonably] require;
6.4 the Specialist will not take oral representations from a Party
without allowing to both Parties the opportunity to be present
and to give evidence and to cross-examine each other;
6.5 the Specialist will have regard to all representations and evi-
dence when making his decision which will be in writing [but he
will not or and he will] be required to give reasons for his deci-
sion;
6.6 the Specialist will use all reasonable endeavours to publish his
decision within [6] weeks of his appointment.
7 Costs
The liability for paying all costs of referring a Dispute to a Specialist
under this Clause, including costs connected with the appointment of
the Specialist [and or but not] the legal and other professional costs
of any Party in relation to a Dispute, will be decided by the Specialist.
78
words, in total, and each side shall simultaneously send a copy of its
statement of case to the Expert.
4 Each Party may, within 30 days of the date of exchange of statement
of case pursuant to paragraph 3 above, serve a reply to the other
side’s statement of case of not more than 10,000 words. A copy of
any such reply shall be simultaneously sent to the Expert.
5 The Expert shall make his decision on the said questions on the basis
of written statements and supporting documentation only and there
shall be no oral hearing. The Expert shall issue his decision in writing
within 30 days of the date of service of the last reply pursuant to para-
graph 4 above or, in the absence of receipt of any replies, within 60
days of the date of exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 above.
6 The Expert’s decision shall be final and binding on the Parties.
7 The Expert’s charges shall be borne equally by the Parties.
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80
Introduction
These words refer to the assignment of the rights and the transfer of the
obligations of a party under a contract to another party. The term ‘assignment’
also has other meanings, which are not considered here (eg, the assignment
of a patent means the transfer of legal title to the patent, distinguished from a
licence under the patent).
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Meaning of a novation
Where there is both an assignment of rights and a transfer of obligations
(with the consent of the other party), there will be, in effect, a novation of
the contract. Novations normally require the agreement of all three parties:
the transferor, the transferee and the other contracting party (Rasbora Ltd v
JCL Marine Ltd [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 645; The Blankenstein [1985] 1 All ER 475;
The Aktion [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 283). There would seem to be nothing to
prevent the parties to a contract agreeing, as a term of the contract, that rights
and obligations of one party under a contract may in the future be transferred
to a third party.
It is possible to novate:
• only part of an agreement (see Telewest Communications plc v Customs and
Excise Commissioners [2005] EWCA Civ 102, Seakom Ltd v Knowledgepool
Group Ltd [2013] EWHC 4007 (Ch));
• an agreement by acquiescence (ie agreement is or may be inferred from
the conduct of a party) (see Telewest Communications plc v Customs and Excise
Commissioners [2005] EWCA Civ 102), and that ‘the less the significance
of the change to the customer, the more readily can acquiescence be
inferred by conduct’ (from the judgment). This might mean that it is
not necessary to enter into a formal agreement. It is possible to effect a
novation by a supplier notifying a customer that it wishes to transfer its
rights and obligations under the contract to a new supplier, and by the
customer making payment to the new supplier.
82
also Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire County Council [1978] 3 All ER 262
and Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposal Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85,
[1993] 3 All ER 417 on the effectiveness of non-assignment clauses).
The court in Hendry distinguished contractual assignments from lease
assignments where if there was an assignment of a lease, such an assignment
may still be valid despite prohibition and allow the lessor to sue the assignee
on other covenants in the lease.
If a contract contains a prohibition of assignment of contractual rights (or
where there is no prohibition but the contract involves rendering personal
services), but there is in fact such an assignment, the assignment will be
ineffective at law. However it might be effective in equity as a declaration of
trust between the assignor and the assignee (Don King Productions Inc v Warren
[1998] 2 All ER 608; affirmed in Don King Productions Inc v Warren [1999] 2 All
ER 218, CA; applied in Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd [2003] 1 All ER 320), and
it is clear that the parties had the intention to create a trust because to do
so was the sole method of transferring the benefit of a contract (Co-operative
Group Ltd v Birse Developments [2014] EWHC 530 (TCC)). The effectiveness
and extent of an assignment in equity is beyond the scope of this book, and is
not without controversy.
Drafting issues
83
• Can a party or the parties transfer some or all obligations and/or assign some or
all rights?
Eg, an assignment of rights and transfer of obligations is often permitted
where a corporate re-organisation is taking place (sale of part or all of the
business of the assignor) and is usually subject to the condition that the
assignee complies with the provisions of the agreement (see Case analysis
below).
• Can only some of the rights and/or obligations be assigned/transferred? Eg:
• the business relating to a party, or all or some assets;
• the business or assets to which the agreement relates;
• the business or assets within a particular area/technical or business
field.
• Is consent required? Is the consent of the other party required to assign
rights and/or transfer obligations (see Precedent 1);
• Who needs to provide consent? Is the consent of only one of the contracting
parties required?
Eg, where the agreement is more ‘personal’ to one of the parties, but
less so to the other, eg a contract for services or an agency or franchise
agreement, it is common to provide for assignment by one party only, and
to prohibit any type of assignment by the other (see Precedent 2).
• What type of consent needs to be provided? If one party is permitted to assign
its rights or transfer his obligations, what type of consent is required by the
other party?
• the other party has no right to refuse consent: the party proposing the
assignment has the right to assign its rights or transfer its obligations,
but is required to ask for the consent of the other party;
• the other party has an absolute right to refuse to provide consent: for any
assignment of rights or transfer of obligations to take place, the other
party must give specific consent;
• the other party can only refuse consent if ‘reasonable’ to do so.
There is a special rule in property leases that if something may
not be done ‘without the landlord’s consent’, it may be implied
that such consent may not be unreasonably withheld. However, no
such term is normally implied into a commercial contract. If the
contract states something may be done by one party only with the
other party’s consent, and if it is desired that such consent may not
be unreasonably withheld, wording such as in Precedent 3 may be
added.
The agreement might then also provide: ‘This agreement and all
rights under it may be assigned or transferred by [Party A]’. The
potential effect of this provision should be realised by party B, perhaps
84
85
to allowing transfer of ‘all the party’s rights and obligations’ and prohibits
other transfers or assignments. Alternatively, a party may wish to allow more
limited assignments, in which case the wording will need to be adapted.
• Is assignment allowed between companies in a group or to an affiliate? Assignment
clauses sometimes specifically allow assignment to a member of the group
of companies of which the assignor is a part or to an affiliate. In some
cases, it may be appropriate to state that if the assignee or affiliate leaves
the group, the agreement will be assigned back to the original assignor
contracting party. A related topic is wording that states that a reference
to a party includes that party’s successors and assigns (see Successors and
assigns).
• Will any assignment or transfer affect any third party contracts? If a party wishes to
assign a particular business activity it may have an effect on the third party
contracts it has entered into. For example, a software developer develops
specialist business accounting software. It enters into a contract to develop
software for a customer. While it is doing so, it decides it no longer wishes to
be in the business of developing business accounting software and obtains
the consent of the customer to assign its rights and transfer its obligations
to another software developer. In order for the new software developer to
develop the business accounting software it may need licences to utilities
which the original developer licensed from third parties. The software
developer may not be able to assign those third party licences to the new
software developer, and if this issue is not dealt with before assignment, the
new software developer may not be able to obtain licences to the third party
software necessary to continue developing the accounting software for the
customer whether at all or at a price it can afford.
If the customer’s consent to the assignment is necessary then these matters
will need checking before permitting the assignment. If issues such
as the above examples are flagged then the customer and the software
developer may need to enter into a further agreement which addresses
the issues directly and specifically. For example, rather than the software
developer being permitted to assign its rights and transfer its obligations,
it is permitted to sub-contract the work to the new software developer with
regard to the contract between the customer and the software developer.
This clause will stand alone, although in some cases its impact can reach quite
far where one of the parties is contemplating assigning its rights or transferring
its obligations, particularly:
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87
Precedent 9—One party free to assign – limited power for other party
1 [Party B] undertakes throughout the term not to assign, charge or oth-
erwise deal with this agreement in any way without the consent of
[Party A]. In the case of an intended assignment by [Party B] such
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld in the following circum-
stances [set out particular circumstances eg: The proposed assignee
shall agree directly with [Party A] to be bound by the terms of this
agreement].
2 [Party A] may assign, charge, transfer or otherwise deal in any or all of
its rights and obligations under this agreement and [Party B] consents
to all such dealings.
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89
Case analysis
90
The word ‘business’ was given a wide interpretation, and it was held that
transference only of some patent licences, patents, notebooks and a few
items of equipment could amount to a business.
Sometimes clauses of this kind refer to ‘all or part of its business’ or ‘all
of its business’. The dangers in such wording, in the light of the Oxford
Gene Technology case, should be noted, because what might be consid-
ered the ‘business’ can have little to do with the common-sense meaning
of the wording or may not cover all of the business being transferred. In
drafting terms, if the word ‘business’ does not refer to all of the business
of one of the parties, then what might be transferred should be consid-
ered and then separately defined in an agreement, rather than being con-
strued by a court as happened in this case.
The case is worth examining in some detail as it provides an example
where the wording of a fairly standard boilerplate clause was interpreted
in a way that is not straightforward. It is also notable for a number of other
reasons:
1 the court carried out a detailed analysis of several clauses in a com-
mercial agreement, interpreting the clause in light of the wording of
other clauses;
2 the wording of several clauses was closely considered; and
3 the meaning of what is considered to be a ‘business’ was examined.
The claimant was the owner of certain patents, and it granted a licence
under them to the third defendant to develop and exploit them (including
making products, and manufacturing and selling them). The assignment
clause provided:
‘LICENSEE’S [the third defendant, Beckman Coulter Inc] rights under this
agreement and the licences herein granted shall pass to any person, firm or
corporation succeeding to its business in products licensed hereunder as a
result of sale, consolidation, re-organisation or otherwise, provided, such per-
son, firm or corporation shall without delay, undertake directly with LICENSOR
[the claimant, Oxford Gene Technology Ltd] to comply with the provisions of
this agreement and to become in all respects bound thereby in the place and
stead of LICENSEE.’
91
Could they have assigned them after only a few months of research? The
incomplete research is no more a ‘business’ than a half-built factory and
probably less.
‘… the business begins broadly when the sales start. I do not think, however,
that the line is that sharp. If a factory existed, and samples were on trial, that
might have been enough to constitute a business in embryonic form. To some
extent the question is one of degree. What I am clear about however, is that
whatever was passed, or supposed to be passed, to the [first and second de-
fendant] did not amount to the transfer of a business.’
The Court of Appeal rejected the submissions put forward by the claim-
ant that the meaning of the phrase ‘business in products’ meant that the
third defendant had products that were available for sale, and had moved
on from mere research and development. The Court of Appeal interpret-
ed the assignment clause by examining one of the recitals to the licence
agreement:
‘[the third defendant] is in the business of designing, developing, manufactur-
ing and selling bioanalytical instrument systems and it is interested in acquiring
rights in and to the Licensed Patent Rights and related Technical Information’
(the “Second Recital”).’
92
93
Introduction
If a party under a contract is liable to make payments to another party, and
those payments need calculating by reference to some variable factor, then
often the contract will include provisions to allow the receiving party to have
the right to audit the records kept by the paying party. The variable factors
may include such things as the number of sales made, number of products
sold or the work carried out by the paying party.
Such clauses are common, for example:
• in intellectual property licence agreements, such as a patent licence where
a royalty is payable, which is dependent on the number of sales of licensed
products or the price received on these sales by the licensee;
• in agency and distribution agreements where the agent or distributor
is responsible for selling the products of the principal, and where the
commission or other payments of the agent or distributor is dependent
on the amount of sales of the products.
Typically, such a clause will refer to:
1 an obligation on a party (such as a licensee or agent) to keep accounting
and other records. In more sophisticated agreements such an obligation
might go on to state the type of information the party will need to keep
and the format in which it must keep it;
2 the right of the other party to inspect those records or to have a third
party to inspect the records (such as an independent accountant); and
3 an obligation on the party required to keep the records for a particular
length of time (and the period may extend beyond the termination of the
parties’ agreement) as well as an obligation to send periodic reports to the
other party.
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Drafting issues
(Note: Much of the case law is found in old decisions regarding patent licences,
ie not reflecting modern realities of the commercial world or the increased
importance of other forms of intellectual property, such as the many different
types of copyright.)
• Refusal to allow auditing and/or inspection. If the party who is to allow
inspection refuses, what are the consequences to be? If the consequences
are not clearly specified, then a refusal to do so where there is a clear
obligation to allow auditing of the licensee’s activities under a licence may
entitle the licensor to terminate the licence (Fomento (Sterling Area) Ltd v
Selsdon Fountain Pen Co Ltd [1958] 1 All ER 11, [1958] 1 WLR 45, HL);
• What records are to be examined?
• Can the party providing the records impose a restriction on what
records are to be inspected? or
• Will the party who will carry out the audit be able to demand other
information and/or books that it believes are relevant? It appears that
95
the position is that the auditing party can demand other information
unless the contract specifies otherwise (Fomento (Sterling Area) Ltd
v Selsdon Fountain Pen Co Ltd [1958] 1 All ER 11, [1958] 1 WLR 45,
HL; Peter Pan Manufacturing Corpn v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1963] 3 All
ER 402, [1964] 1 WLR 96).
• Does the party maintaining the records also need to obtain records
from third parties if its records are based on the records of the third
parties? In some circumstances there may be an obligation on the
party to do so (Columbia Tristar Home Video (International) Inc v Polygram
Film International BV (formerly Manifesto Film Sales BV) [2000] 1 All ER
(Comm) 385 and see Case analysis below).
• Making copies of records. Can the auditing party make copies of the
information and books inspected and disclose these to others?
• Accuracy/relevancy of records. Is there an obligation on the party keeping
records for them to reveal how any calculations or payments made were
arrived at? Is there an obligation that the records must always be up
to date?
• How long can the right to inspect continue? Case law indicates that if a
contractual obligation permits a grantor to inspect accounts then it will
ordinarily continue in force even if the agreement is terminated (Anglo-
American Asphalt Co Ltd v Crowley, Russell & Co Ltd [1945] 2 All ER 324).
In that case the licensee was ordered to allow inspection for six years back
from the date of the writ, although royalty statements and payments had
been accepted by the licensor throughout the life of the agreement.
• Who should pay the cost of auditing? A licensee will wish to discourage over-
zealous auditing at its expense. Some auditing clauses make provision
for the licensor to pay the cost of the audit, or for these to be shared
between licensor and licensee, unless the shortfall is more than a certain
percentage.
• Who can carry out an inspection and/or audit? Who will actually carry out the
auditing and inspection; can anyone from the licensor do so, or should it
be an accountant? The party being inspected may not wish the other party
to see its premises, or allow the other party to see what else it might be
working on if it is particularly (commercially) sensitive or confidential.
If only an accountant should do so, should the accountant be independent
of the licensor, and should they have an appropriate professional
qualification?
• Confidentiality. Is the accountant required to keep all information learned
or utilised during an inspection and/or audit confidential? Will the
accountant (before they gain access) have to enter into a confidentiality
agreement? Will the accountant be under restriction as to what they
can pass on to the party instructing him? Eg, only such information as
is necessary to confirm or deny the accuracy of any financial statement
which is being provided by the party being inspected/audited.
96
• What records are to be kept (and how should they be kept)? Should the books
and records be kept separately from the other accounting records of the
licensee? For what period should they be kept?
This clause is often part of the Payments clause or closely references it and
makes use of various definitions relating to what is provided, sold or licensed
under an agreement, and the descriptions of various sums (eg, in an agreement
where royalties are payable, then there may be definitions of Gross Receipts,
Net Receipts and so on).
97
Case analysis
Facts
1 D granted C a ‘sole and exclusive’ licence of video rights to films ac-
quired or controlled by D.
2 C paid an advance and royalties for each film.
98
3 C was aware that D was not the producer of the film and that the pro-
duction costs for licensed films were incurred by third parties.
4 Clause 17 related to the keeping of records:
‘Accounting:
(a) Licensee shall maintain complete books and records with respect to the
videograms and will render to Owner, on a calendar quarter basis (within sixty
(60) days of the end of each quarter commencing with the quarter by which the
first revenues are received by Licensee, a true and correct statement in rea-
sonable detail of Gross Receipts and of Royalties (“statements”) … Any state-
ment not objected to within twenty-four (24) months of receipt by Owner shall
be deemed true and correct and binding upon Owner. (b) Owner shall have the
right for a period of two (2) years from the rendering of each statement, upon
reasonable notice … and for no longer than twenty (20) days, to examine and
to take copies and extracts from Licensee’s books and records as they pertain
to the Videograms, for the purpose of determining the accuracy of the state-
ments … if any such audit reveals a discrepancy of 10% or more of the sums
then shown to be due to Owner, Licensee shall pay the reasonable costs of the
audit …’
‘(d) Owner shall maintain complete books and records with respect to
the Actual Negative Cost of each of the Programs and the P&A expended in
connection with the Theatrical Release of each of the Programs. With regard to
the P&A, Owner shall render to Licensee on a monthly basis (within sixty (60)
days of the end of each month) commencing with the period during which the
theatrical distributor first expends P&A [Prints and Advertising], a true and cor-
rect statement of the P&A expended … Licensee shall have the right upon rea-
sonable notice but no more often than once a year and for no longer than thirty
(30) days to examine Owner’s books and records pertaining to Actual Negative
Costs and the P&A statements for the purpose of determining the accuracy of
statements furnished in connection therewith …
(e) any amounts revealed to be due and owing to either party as a result of an
audit by such party shall be payable on demand by the other party with interest
…’
Held
9 The CA held that D’s obligation to ‘maintain complete books and re-
cords’ extended:
(i) to obtaining documents from third parties; or
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100
the fact that the documents would be substantial in number would be neither
here nor there. The question of bulk might well be influential in whether or not
C decided to take advantage of its right of audit in respect of ANC (particularly
bearing in mind the rarity of production costs being lower than the budgeted
costs on the basis of which the advances were paid); however, it is not in my
view an indication of whether C wished to reserve to itself a right of audit if it
subsequently wished to question individual items of production costs.’
101
Absolute obligations
Qualified obligations
102
In these cases, the amount of effort that Party A needs to use to fulfil the
obligation is qualified by use of the phrases ‘best endeavours’ or ‘reasonable
endeavours’. Failure to complete by the stated date, in the above two examples,
will only be a breach of contract if it is possible to show that Party A has not
used the amount of effort needed to meet a best endeavours or reasonable
endeavours obligation.
In the event of a dispute, the use of a qualified obligation leaves the decision to
someone (whether the parties or a judge) to determine if a party has fulfilled
an obligation using the requisite amount of effort. The reasons for including a
qualified obligation rather than an absolute obligation are varied. For the party
under the obligation, the desire to avoid being bound by a definite obligation
is obvious: avoiding a possible breach if it cannot fulfil the obligation for a
reason outside of its control or where it is just more difficult to complete the
task which is the subject matter of the obligation. Many suppliers of goods and
services are now dependent on third parties in order to fulfil their obligations
to purchasers of the goods and services.
The above points reflect the (usual) opposing views of the parties to a
transaction. However, the parties sometimes cannot agree on the exact level
of an absolute obligation; and because they cannot agree, the parties decide
that a reasonable or best endeavours obligation (or some other wording) will
suffice as a way of making a deal. However, other than stating that a party will
use reasonable endeavours, the parties will often not go on to evaluate what
amount of effort is necessary to meet the obligation or think through some of
the issues that might occur in trying to meet the obligation. For example, if a
supplier of goods is to have an obligation to deliver the goods of the purchaser,
and the purchaser wants them to be delivered within 24 hours of order, then it
would be possible to define the obligation on the supplying party in a number
of ways:
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104
the contractual obligations on one side and the other relevant commercial
interests on the other side (UBH (Mechanical Services) Ltd v Standard Life
Assurance Co (1986) Times, 13 November and see Case analysis below);
• reasonable obligations – party under the obligation not normally required to go
against own financial interests: An obligation to use reasonable endeavours
was not breached by failing to do something where it would have been
financially disadvantageous to do so (Phillips Petroleum Co (UK) Ltd v
ENRON (Europe) Ltd [1997] CLC 329, CA and see Case analysis below);
• best endeavours obligation – the party under the obligation may be required to
go against its own financial interests: in Jet2.com Ltd v Blackpool Airport Ltd
[2012] EWCA Civ 417 a party was required to act against its own financial
interests if the nature of the deal it has entered into called for it to do so,
although the requirement does not call for the party to act against its own
financial interests where there was no expectation of achieving the subject
matter of the best endeavours obligation (see below and Case analysis);
• reasonable and best endeavours: a party under such obligations must carry on
trying to achieve or complete the subject matter of the obligation until it
is no longer possible to do so (until all reasonable efforts are exhausted
or there is no prospect of success), ie the party under the obligation must
not give up at the first attempt.
For example, if a party seeks planning permission and it is refused then
the party needs to make an appeal or take other action to obtain planning
permission if there is a reasonable chance of success in having the refusal
overturned on appeal or if another approach might obtain the necessary
permission (IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Rockware Glass Ltd [1980] FSR 335,
CA; Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v Bristol Rovers (1883) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ
160). In the latter case an obligation to ‘use all reasonable endeavours to
procure the grant of [planning permission] as soon as reasonably possible
…’ meant, as interpreted by the court, that the party under the obligation
could only stop trying to obtain the planning permission when there were
no other reasonable steps it could take. It seems the courts are prepared
to allow a party to take some account of its own interests when the party is
using its ‘reasonable endeavours’, but it is not always easy to predict how
far a court will allow self-interest to predominate in an individual case.
105
Other expressions
Drafting issues
• Avoid using ‘best endeavours’, ‘reasonable endeavours’ or ‘all reasonable efforts’
expressions. The best option is either:
• the parties should define more specifically what they are expected to
do under the contract; or
• if it is not possible to indicate specific reasonable obligations, then
refer to a recognised standard or to the standard of a third party.
Otherwise, the parties may find that the court’s view of what is expected of
them under an ‘endeavours’ undertaking is different to their own view or
that of their legal advisers.
• If it is not possible to be more specific: Sometimes, though, it is difficult to be
specific. Where an agreement will include a best or reasonable endeavours
106
107
108
109
110
4 For the purposes of this Clause [no] the expression ‘Party’ shall in-
clude the subsidiary companies of any party and any other company
controlled by that party and the employees or agents of that party
and of such subsidiary or controlled companies.
Case analysis
Best endeavours
IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Rockware Glass Ltd [1980] FSR 335, CA
In the leading case in this area, the Court of Appeal held that an under-
taking to use one’s best endeavours obliged a party to take all the steps
in a person’s power which he was capable of to bring about the desired
result, ‘being steps which a prudent, determined and reasonable owner,
acting in his own interests and desiring to achieve that result would take’.
One of the Court of Appeal judges, Buckley LJ, said the obligation was
not to be measured by reference to somebody who is under a contractual
obligation, but to someone who is acting in his own interest.
The case concerned an agreement for the sale of land under which one
party had the obligation to use its best endeavours to obtain planning
permission. Planning permission was refused and that party failed to ap-
peal against that refusal. The Court considered that if the appeal offered a
reasonable chance of success, the party was obliged to appeal.
Rackham v Peek Foods Ltd [1990] BCLC 895 and Dawson International
plc v Coates Paton plc [1990] BCLC 560
These cases concerned undertakings given by directors of a company
(eg, to use best endeavours to obtain shareholders’ approval to a sale of
111
Ault and Wiborg Paints Ltd v Sure Services Ltd (1983) Times, 2 July
It was held that an implied term in a contract that a company would use
its best endeavours to promote another’s products was to be construed
in the context of the circumstances of the contract. Such a term was not
inconsistent with the company being at liberty to promote, and promot-
ing, similar products made by competitors of the other contracting party,
but required the company to treat the other contracting party’s products
at least as well as it treated the competitors’ products.
These views expressed by the judge are obiter, as the case concerned is-
sues of restraint of trade and whether the distributorship agreement was
in breach of community law. Nevertheless, they are an interesting appli-
cation of some leading cases to a distributorship agreement.
112
Reasonable endeavours
UBH (Mechanical Services) Ltd v Standard Life Assurance Co (1986)
Times, 13 November
Rougier J held that an obligation to use reasonable endeavours ‘must be
[a] less stringent’ obligation than to use best endeavours. Where a lessee
undertook to his landlord to use reasonable endeavours, the lessee could
take into account other commercial considerations as well as his obliga-
tion to the landlord. This involved ‘a balancing act whereby [the defend-
ants] were obliged to put in one scale the weight of the contractual obli-
gation to [the plaintiffs], and in the other all relevant commercial consid-
erations’. He was also persuaded that an obligation to use ‘all reasonable
endeavours’ ‘probably’ lay between best and reasonable endeavours, but
his observations on this matter were obiter dicta. This is the only case
where it appears the court has ventured a view on the different ‘levels’ of
endeavours.
Phillips Petroleum Co (UK) Ltd v ENRON (Europe) Ltd [1997] CLC 329,
CA
In this case, on ‘reasonable endeavours’, an obligation to use reasonable
endeavours was not breached by failing to do something where it would
have been financially disadvantageous to do so.
In this case, the key clause in a gas sales agreement read as follows:
‘Article 2.2: The buyer and seller shall use reasonable endeavours to agree …
If the seller and the buyer are unable to agree prior to 25 April 1996 … then the
Commissioning Date shall be 25 September 1996 and the Run-In test shall be
conducted from 25 to 28 September 1996.’
113
The key point from this case is that if the parties are to ‘use reasonable
endeavours to agree’ then there should be:
• objective criteria as to what has to be done to meet the standard of
reasonable endeavours; and
• what factors a party can take into account.
114
115
116
or material. What is substantial or material for one party may not be for the
other party. For example, a party may have an obligation to make payments
on certain dates but makes one payment one day late. For the party making
the payment, this may amount to a small breach, but to the other it may have
serious consequences. The other party may need to pay its suppliers or to
repay loans on terms that are draconian. If it does not have sufficient reserves
then any delay in receiving payment, even by a small amount of time, could be
serious or very expensive.
117
The advantage of using words such as ‘substantial’ and ‘material’ permits the
parties to set a (rough) standard as to the level of breach that entitles a party
to terminate, although, in the event of dispute, a court will need to interpret
the precise meaning against the circumstances of the case (see Dalkia Utilities
Services plc v Celtech International Ltd [2006] EWHC 63 (Comm) and Case
analysis below). The courts will objectively judge whether a breach is material
by reference to the facts (ie not the subjective views of the parties) (see Fitzroy
House Epworth Street (No 1) Ltd v Financial Times Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 329,
[2006] 2 All ER (D) 463 (Mar); Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest)
v Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust [2012] EWHC 781 (QB)).
When considering what involves ‘materiality’ the following facts will be taken
into account: ‘…the actual breaches, the consequence of the breaches to
[the innocent party]; [the guilty party’s] explanation for the breaches; the
breaches in the context of [the a]greement; the consequences of holding [the
a]greement determined and the consequences of holding [the a]greement
continues’ (from Phoenix Media Ltd v Cobweb Information (unreported, 16 May
2000) 2004 WL 147 6680, quoted in the Compass Group etc case).
One way of addressing this for a particular obligation might be by defining
what level of failure by a party to meet an obligation would be a ‘material’
breach. For example, if a customer makes regular orders of goods and pays
for those orders against invoices then, as regards the payments the customer
needs to make, the meaning of ‘material breach’ could be defined as meaning
that the party has failed to pay a certain number of invoices or that the amount
owing is above a certain amount. A termination clause might include wording
such as:
Either party to this agreement shall be entitled to terminate this agreement
immediately by notice in writing to the other party [(but not after 90 days of the
event in question first coming to the attention of the party entitled to give the
notice)] if any of the events set out below shall occur. The events are:
(a) if the other party shall commit any material breach of any of its obligations
under this agreement and shall fail to remedy such breach (if capable of remedy)
within 30 days after being given notice by the first party so to do or…
[… other events ]; and
(x) If Party B shall fail to make any payment for Goods on any Payment Date
(“Outstanding Payment”), then this failure shall amount to a material breach for
the purposes of Clause (a), if:
(i) [3] or more Outstanding Payments together have not been paid at any one
time by Party B to Party A; or
118
Drafting issues
Some preliminary questions need consideration as to the effect of a breach:
• which obligations or terms or conditions are considered sufficiently important that
breach of them would be:
• sufficient to terminate an agreement?
• not sufficient to terminate but the breaching party should be allowed
to ‘perform’ again?
eg a termination provision allowing for notice to be given to the party
in breach specifying that the breach can be remedied within a set
number of days.
• not sufficient to terminate but the party in breach will face a sanction
so it will, eg:
• be liable to pay liquidated damages;
• be set a time limit which will be made of the essence (ie a failure
to meet the time limit will entitle the party not in breach to
terminate the contract);
• be liable (in the case of non-payment) to pay interest;
• have to allow a third party to perform some or all of its obligations
and to pay the third party.
• which failures to perform obligations or the terms and conditions will amount to
breach?
• will any of the obligations or terms or conditions, which are not
performed or not performed ‘properly’, be a breach?
• will the party obliged to perform an obligation or term or condition
only be in breach if it does not meet a standard, eg:
• where services are involved, if the party does not use reasonable
care and skill (the standard set by the Supply of Goods and
Services 1982);
119
• where goods are involved, if the goods made or supplied are not of
satisfactory quality (the standard set by the Sale of Goods Act 1979);
• does not use reasonable or best efforts or endeavours;
• does not meet some specified specification; or
• where the failure to meet the standard is ‘material’ or ‘substantial’?
• will the party be in breach but excused from any liability because there are
limitations and exclusions of liability in the agreement to cover the breach?
There is not usually a stand-alone clause stating or setting out the circumstances
when there is a breach. Provisions dealing with breach are usually found in:
• the Main Commercial Provisions, such as the core operative provisions,
which may state (either directly or by reference) the standard that a
party needs to achieve and the importance of a failure to perform or
performance of them below a required or expected standard; and/or
• in the Secondary Commercial Provisions, such as:
• the Termination clause, which will set out either:
• the general terms of what constitutes a breach (eg a material
breach of the agreement); or
• specific instances that constitute a breach (eg a failure by a party
to meet a standard set in a specification or failure to obtain
regulatory approval);
• the Warranty clauses, which will specify, in some cases, the standard
that a party is stating that they are meeting, and the consequences of
failing to meet them.
Case analysis
120
and
‘14.4. In the event of the CLIENT being in material breach of its obligations
to pay the CHARGES the COMPANY shall have the right to terminate this
Agreement immediately.’
6 It was assumed that a material breach was not the same as a repu-
diation (ie a party does not have an intention to perform the contract).
For the judge material had to be sufficiently serious so that there was
a justification for bringing the parties’ long term contract to an end
(which the judge characterised as ‘involving something of a partner-
ship endeavour between the parties’).
7 The judge held that the failure to pay was a material breach of the
defendant’s obligations to pay in the circumstances of the case.
8 The judge set out the factual circumstances which made the breach
serious enough to be ‘material’:
(a) three instalments were not paid, with the third instalment being
on just due for payment (and therefore a less serious breach
and of less significance than the other two);
(b) the failure to pay the third instalment was the third payment not
made (and all coming one after the other);
(c) there was nothing to suggest that the position as regards pay-
ment would get any better;
121
(d) that the continued failure to pay was serious and the amounts
involved were not minimal or trivial;
(e) the amount of the instalments were small (over the lifespan of
the agreement) but represented 25% of the instalments due in
the year they were due to be paid and 8.5% of the total charges
unpaid for the remainder of the initial period of the contract;
(f) that the defendant did not have the money to pay and was fac-
ing insolvency and needed a six months moratorium before it
could start paying again. The defendant’s position was that un-
less the contract was renegotiated the defendant would not be
able to continue paying in full. In effect the claimant would need
to have the power plant running for six months without pay-
ment (although the defendant would still owe the instalments for
those six months);
(g) that unless the claimant terminated the agreement it would have
to keep the power plant going for the defendant to be able to
keep on payment of the Termination Sum;
(b) ‘The reason why payment was not forthcoming in the present
case was not because of some mishap, mistake or misunder-
standing.’
(c) ‘It seems to me that a clause of this kind [ie allowing termination
for breach of a material obligation], in this context, is designed
to protect a client where the default is minimal or inconsequen-
tial or (even if it is not) is accidental or inadvertent, but otherwise
to enable a supplier such as [the claimant] to bring the period
over which it is effectively extending credit to an end where
there is a failure to keep up the payment schedule established
by the contract.’
122
(d) ‘(…in relation to the question of material breach the primary fo-
cus must, as it seems to me, be on the character of the breach
rather than the consequences to the “guilty” party if the “inno-
cent” party avails himself of his contractual remedy).’
123
Capacity
124
Authority
The question may arise whether a person who purports to sign a contract on
behalf of a contracting party (eg a person or a company) has the authority (ie,
permission) to do so.
This section considers, from a practical point of view, whether a person/
organisation has authority to enter into a contract on behalf of a contracting
party. This point has direct implications for the ‘boilerplate’ language of the
contract.
Generally, under English law persons/organisations can sign or enter into
contracts on behalf of others, without having to comply with any specific
formality or obtain a particular qualification. (The main types of statutory
provisions affecting companies and other organisations are referred to above.)
Use of warranties
Within the agreement itself, there will be wording where one or more parties
warrant that:
• they have the capacity (or are free) to enter into the agreement; and
• the person signing on behalf of a party is authorised to do so by that party
(see Precedent 3).
125
Drafting issues
Accordingly, the more senior the person in a company who signs, the
more difficult it will be for the company to disown the contract on the
basis that the person who signed it was not authorised to do so.
• Use of internal rules. Internal company rules about who has authority to
make commitments will not bind people outside the company who are
not aware of those rules.
If a very junior employee places an order with a supplier and the employer
‘honours’ the order, it may be difficult for the company to deny that the
employee has apparent authority when placing similar orders in the
future, even if the order exceeded that person’s delegated authority.
126
• Company providing notice as to who can bind the company. A company could
give notice to a customer or supplier that only certain individuals are
authorised to enter into contracts on behalf of the company. However,
this would need careful management, and would need to be periodically
restated, eg on changes of personnel within the customer’s or supplier’s
organisation. A customer or supplier who knew that an employee of the
other party was not authorised to enter into contracts at all, or the type of
contract that the customer or supplier normally enters into with the other
party, would have actual knowledge of the lack of authority and would not
normally be able to bind the other party.
• Where a person does not have authority to sign a contract. If a person does
not have actual or apparent authority to sign a contract on behalf of his
employer, nothing stated in the contract changes the position.
The inclusion of words in the contract such as:
‘the undersigned is authorised to sign this contract on behalf of
XYZ Limited’
may give a right of action against the person signing if they are not
authorised to sign, but will not make the contract binding on the company.
Nevertheless, such words are sometimes considered useful to focus the
mind of the signatory on the issue, and to prompt the signatory to check
whether they do, in fact, have such authority. However, if a company holds
out or represents that an employee or another person can enter into a
contract on its behalf it may be later stopped from denying that it did not
authorise it to do so (see eg United Bank of Kuwait Ltd v Hammoud, City
Trust Ltd v Levy [1988] 3 All ER 418, [1988] 1 WLR 1051, CA).
• Authority of directors. Although the Companies Act 2006 gives directors wide
powers to run and bind their company, a party who wishes to enter into a
contract with a company and does not obtain or seek a board resolution
may need to consider whether there are any fetters on the directors’
authority, such as:
• shareholders’ agreements;
127
128
• where indicating whether a person or job role has the authority to sign
other types of document, other than the agreement itself, a Capacity clause
might be located in the Boilerplate section of an agreement where a
general statement is sometimes included stating who is authorised to deal
with certain types of documents.
129
130
Background
The word ‘charge’ can have a number of meanings in a commercial contract,
including:
• fees or payments a party is to make under the contract, or the costs and
expenses incurred by it (see Costs and expenses); or
• legal and equitable charges (eg mortgages), as discussed in this section.
In addition, Retention of Title clauses often give rise to (legal) charges.
The following paragraphs do not consider the drafting of legal or equitable
charges, or the question of registration of charges. They instead focus on
issues relating to the wording of boilerplate clauses that deal with the subject
of charges.
The area of law of the creation, enforcement and use of legal or equitable
charges is beyond the scope of this book. Readers should consult specialist
books (such as Goode on Commercial Law (5th Edn, 2017, Penguin Books), at
Chapter 22, which sets out a summary of the available types of charges and
other forms of security available), and/or obtain specialist advice.
131
Drafting issues
132
The use of a Charges clause needs handling with care (whether as a stand-alone
clause or part of an Assignments clause). Eg, inserting such a provision into an
agreement could prevent a party obtaining a bank loan or overdraft to fund its
normal day-to-day operations, where the bank takes a charge over the fixed/
floating assets of the party. Where a party is likely to be involved in obtaining
funds, for example so that party can perform some of its obligations under an
agreement, then a default ‘no charges’ clause will clearly be inappropriate as
such. For example, a party who wishes to carry out research in order to create
a product may need to raise funds to pay for the staff, assets and facilities whilst
it is carrying out the research work. The party may need to license intellectual
property to buy equipment etc. A commercial funder will often require that
it has a charge over the intellectual property and/or assets to protect its
investment. In such a case, wording will be needed to permit charges to be
obtained/registered, and should normally be considered with the assistance
of specialist advice.
133
134
Background
The date when the parties sign an agreement may be different to when:
• an agreement comes into effect; or
• some or all of the obligations under the agreement commence.
Drafting issues
• Different commencement date and date of the agreement. Does the agreement
come into effect or some obligations commence on a different date than
when the agreement was signed?
• Suggested best practice. If so, is there:
• a definition of ‘Commencement Date’ stating a date (see Precedent
1)?
• a clause (or wording in another clause) that indicates that the
agreement takes effect or obligations commence on the date specified
in the definition of Commencement Date (see Precedent 2)?
• Is there a need for different commencement dates? Do all parts of the agreement
or all obligations commence on the same day?
135
136
Precedent 1—Definition
Commencement Date shall mean [date]
137
Case analysis
138
139
In the sale of real property or the sale of a business or the business assets,
completion is a well-understood stage in the process of sale (at least for lawyers
experienced in those type of transactions):
• sale of real property. On completion, the formal conveyance document for
the property is executed and delivered, and a number of other events
occur, eg the hand-over of keys, manuals for the operations of equipment,
guarantees provided by third parties;
• sale of a business or business assets. The completion events here may include
the execution of formal assignments of goodwill and intellectual property,
and the delivery of papers, eg accounting and company secretarial records,
as well as a number of other matters.
In effect, the formal stage in the transfer of ownership of these things occurs
upon completion.
Drafting issues
140
141
142
143
144
Background
In an agreement, the word ‘condition’ can have a number of meanings:
1 a contractual provision, breach of which entitles the other party to
terminate the contract (ie a condition distinguished from a warranty);
2 in a more general sense, any type of contractual provision;
3 a condition precedent (or pre-condition); or
4 a condition subsequent.
This section considers the last two of these meanings.
Sometimes, contracts are made on the basis that certain events must take place
before the contract, or a part or parts of an existing contract, will come into
effect; for example:
• a building contract might be made conditional upon a party obtaining
planning consent for the building works; or
• a manufacturing contract may be dependent on a buyer first raising funds
before it can place an order with the manufacturer; or
• a research and development agreement may contain an option to
negotiate, the provisions of a licence to the results of the research and
development, with the option only being triggered if the research and
development produces the expected results.
If planning consent is not obtained or the funds are not raised or the research
and development is not successful, the contract either will not come into
effect or, depending on how the condition is drafted, may be cancelled or
performance suspended.
Although the phrase ‘condition precedent’ is often used to indicate that
certain events must occur before a contract or part of a contract will come into
effect, this is not always the case. The phrase is also used (or interpreted by the
145
It is possible to make a contract on the basis that if a future event takes place
or does not take place during the life of the contract, the contract may be
terminated. This is sometimes known as a condition subsequent.
Form
146
Drafting issues
147
• will the party who is to comply with or perform the condition (as of
right or with the agreement of the other party) get an extension of
time for it to be met?
• Is it clear whether either party has any obligation to try to ensure that the condition
is met? If so, how extensive is that obligation?
Such an obligation may be implied (Kyprianou v Cyprus Textiles Ltd
[1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 60), but the extent of any implied term may be
very limited. In C Czarninkow Ltd v Rolimpex [1979] AC 351, [1978]
2 All ER 1043, HL, it was held that a clause requiring a seller to ‘obtain’
an export licence did not imply an obligation to maintain it in force.
Should the amount of effort that a party needs to use be specified (such
as using a ‘best endeavours’ or ‘reasonable endeavours’ obligation or
be more specific as to what the party needs to do)?
• What is a party liable for if it fails to meet a condition? If a party is obliged to try
to ensure that the condition is met, is that party to be liable for failure to
meet the condition?
Eg, should that party be required to reimburse the other party’s costs
in negotiating the contract?
• Is whether a condition has been met subject to the approval of another party?
A party may be responsible for obtaining permission to carry out some
activity (eg, obtaining ethics committee approval in order to carry out a
clinical trial), but once it has been obtained, should the other party have
the right to decide whether what has been obtained is satisfactory?
148
149
150
Case analysis
Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v JN Cresswell [2004] EWCA Civ 602, [2004]
2 All ER (Comm) 244)
In a reinsurance contract the underwriters required that they controlled all
negotiations of claims (see in particular sub-clause (b)):
‘CLAIMS CO-OPERATION CLAUSE
The company agree
(a) To notify all claims or occurrences likely to involve the Underwriters within
7 days from the time that such claims or occurrences become known
to them.
(b) The Underwriters hereon shall control the negotiations and settlements of
any claims under this Policy. In this event the Underwriters hereon will not
be liable to pay any claim not controlled as set out above.
Omission however by the Company to notify any claim or occurrence which
at the outset did not appear to be serious but which at a later date threatened
to involve the Company shall not prejudice their right of recovery hereunder.’
It was held by the Court of Appeal that this clause amounted to a condi-
tion precedent:
‘19. …The question then arises whether it is a condition precedent to reinsur-
ers’ liability that the opportunity to control negotiations or settlements should
be afforded to them.
20. The answer to this question is Yes, because the clause says in terms that in
the event of there being negotiations or settlements reinsurers will not be liable
to pay any claim not controlled by them. The judge [at first instance] was able
to avoid this conclusion by (inter alia) pointing out the clause did not use the
term “condition precedent” as such […]. As to that, it is not essential that the
very words “condition precedent” be used to achieve the result that reinsurers
will not be liable unless a certain event happens. Other words can be used, if
they are clear. Other words have been used which, in my view, are clear.’
‘41. …The first sentence of para (b) [of the CLAIMS CO-OPERATION CLAUSE]
does not use the language of condition precedent. Neither does the second
sentence, at any rate in the sense that there is no express reference to “condi-
tion precedent” in it. However, it does provide that in the circumstances there
contemplated the reinsurers “will not be liable to pay any claim”. Those are
strong words, if not the language of condition precedent, at any rate the lan-
guage of exclusion.’
151
‘H-Switch to Propofol
In the event that at any time BUYER reformulates or otherwise changes its
Diprivan brand to substitute propofol for the PRODUCT, BUYER will so notify
SELLER and will give SELLER the first opportunity and right of first refusal to
supply propofol to BUYER under mutually acceptable terms and conditions.’
152
should it contract for propofol with a party which was refusing to supply the
quantities of DIP which [the Claimant] wanted to build up before supply of
propofol commenced in earnest.
254. However, there is simply nothing in the contract to suggest, either
expressly or by implication, that any entitlement under clause H was contin-
gent upon supplying whatever DIP [the Claimant] asked for. The reality is that,
whilst [the Claimant] undoubtedly became disenchanted with [the Defendant]
towards the end of January 2008, because [the Defendant] would not supply
the DIP it wanted, there was no contractual term or linkage which justified
translating that disenchantment into a refusal to accept an offer from [the
Defendant] which otherwise matched the offer from the third party.’
153
154
155
Contractual provisions
Drafting issues
Typically, a confidentiality clause might cover some or all of the following
issues.
• What information is covered by the confidentiality obligation? This can include:
• information learnt about the other party’s business and commercial
affairs;
• technical information, eg manufacturing know-how, provided by one
party to the other;
• information developed under the contract by either party (eg business
information or technical information developed as a result of
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
by any such party of its said obligations provided that nothing con-
tained in this Clause [no] shall prevent any party from disclosing any
such information to the extent required in or in connection with legal
proceedings arising out of this agreement or any matter relating to or
in connection with the Company.
4 For the purposes of this Clause [no] the expression ‘party’ shall
include the subsidiary companies of any party and any other com-
pany controlled by that party and the employees or agents of that
party and of such subsidiary or controlled companies.
166
and for a subsequent period of 5 years be held confidential and shall not
be made available or disclosed in whole or in part to any third party with-
out the prior written approval of all the parties provided that any party
may without such approval:
1 make available or disclose such data and information to any affiliate
of such party upon obtaining a similar undertaking of confidentiality
but of unlimited duration from such affiliate;
2 make available or disclose such data and information to any outside
professional consultants upon obtaining a similar undertaking of con-
fidentiality but of unlimited duration from such consultants;
3 make available or disclose such data and information to any bank
or financial institution from whom such party is seeking or obtaining
finance upon obtaining a similar undertaking of confidentiality but of
unlimited duration from such bank or institution;
4 make available or disclose such data to the extent required by the
production licence or by any applicable law or the regulations of any
recognised stock exchange; or
5 disclose but not make available such data and information to any
bona fide proposed new party provided that such proposed new party
shall have previously signed an undertaking to keep such information
and data confidential in terms acceptable to the parties making the
relevant application.
167
168
1 Definitions
‘Disclosing Party’ shall mean the party to this agreement that discloses
Information, directly or indirectly to the Receiving Party under or in antici-
pation of this agreement.
‘Receiving Party’ shall mean the party to this agreement that receives
Information, directly or indirectly from the Disclosing Party.
‘Information’ shall include information provided directly or indirectly by
the Disclosing Party to the Receiving Party in oral or documentary form
or by way of models, biological or chemical materials or other tangible
form or by demonstrations and whether before, on or after the date of this
agreement.
‘Confidential Information’ shall mean:
(a) in respect of Information provided in documentary or by way of a
model or in other tangible form, Information which at the time of pro-
vision is marked or otherwise designated to show expressly or by
necessary implication that it is imparted in confidence; and
(b) in respect of Information that is imparted orally, any information that
the Disclosing Party or its representatives informed the Receiving
Party at the time of disclosure was imparted in confidence and which
is reduced to writing, marked ‘Confidential’ and sent to the Receiving
Party within 30 days of the original disclosure; and
(c) any copy of any of the foregoing; and
(d) the fact that discussions are taking place between us.
3 Exceptions
The above obligations of confidentiality shall not apply to any Information
which the Receiving Party can show by written records:
(a) was known to the Receiving Party before the Information was
imparted by the Disclosing Party; or
(b) is in or subsequently comes into the public domain (through no fault
on the Receiving Party’s part); or
169
4 Disclosure to employees
The Receiving Party undertakes to permit access to the Confidential
Information only to those of the Receiving Party’s directors and employ-
ees who reasonably need access to the Confidential Information for
the Purpose, and on the conditions that such directors and employees
shall have:
(a) entered into legally binding confidentiality obligations to the Receiving
Party on terms equivalent to those set out in this agreement (and such
obligations extend to the Confidential Information);
(b) been informed of the Disclosing Party’s interest in the Confidential
Information and the terms of this agreement; and
(c) been instructed to treat the Confidential Information as secret and
confidential in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.
The Receiving Party shall be responsible for ensuring that the Receiving
Party’s directors and employees comply with the provisions of this agree-
ment.
6 No implied rights
This agreement shall not be construed (a) to grant the Receiving Party
any licence or rights other than as expressly set out herein in respect of
170
the Confidential Information, nor (b) to require the Disclosing Party to dis-
close any Confidential Information to the Receiving Party. No warranty or
representation, express or implied, is given as to the accuracy, efficacy,
completeness, capabilities or safety of any materials or information pro-
vided under this agreement.
Case analysis
171
172
173
174
175
176
Drafting issues
177
The requirement to give or withhold consent can appear in any clause which
requires a party to agree to something before the other party can or cannot
do it.
178
179
Case analysis
City and General (Investment) Ltd v Razama Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1568
1 The claimant sold a property to the defendant. The property had
planning permission. However, the property was subject to a condi-
tion that the approval of Network Rail (‘Network Rail Condition’) was
obtained before any building work was carried out as the property
was near a railway line.
2 The contract between the claimant and the defendant required that
the claimant obtained consent from Network Rail (‘Network Rail
Consent’). The claimant had to obtain the consent prior to the com-
pletion date using its ‘entire endeavours’ to do so.
3 If the claimant failed to obtain the consent then, essentially, the
defendant kept part of the purchase money for the property. Ie a cer-
tain sum would be held by its solicitors (ie not paid over to the claim-
ant), and for every month that the consent was not forthcoming the
defendant could withdraw a proportion of that sum until the balance
was zero.
4 The Network Rail Condition was: ‘not at any time – (a) without pre-
viously submitting detailed plans and sections thereof to [Network
Rail] and obtaining their approval thereto and (b) without complying
with such reasonable conditions as to foundations or otherwise as
[Network Rail] shall deem it necessary to impose to erect or add to
any building or structures or to execute any works on any part of the
land hereby transferred’.
5 The contract between the claimant and defendant defined the mean-
ings of:
(a) ‘entire endeavour’: ‘All those actions which a prudent and de-
termined seller acting in its own interest and anxious to achieve
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181
182
183
Drafting issues
184
185
186
liabilities under this agreement notwithstanding that the other may have
exercised one or more of the rights and remedies against it.
187
Background
A provision in an agreement might sometimes state that a party must consult
with another party before taking certain actions. Eg, in certain agreements
involving intellectual property:
• in a research collaboration agreement, one party may be required to
consult with the other party when making patent applications in respect
of inventions made in the course of the research;
• in an agreement involving the licensing of intellectual property, one party
may be required to consult the other about whether and which party
should take infringement and other proceedings;
• in an agreement involving the licensing and further development and
exploitation of that intellectual property, a licensee may need to consult
on its plans and whether to grant (sub-)licences;
or in other types of agreement a party might be required not to admit any liability
or settle any claim or make any agreement with a third party without consulting
the other party to an agreement (such as in an insurance agreement).
There is case law on the extent of an obligation to consult. This case law is
in the area of public law (such as in relation to a local authority’s duty to
consult with interested parties in planning matters). Some of the principles
established are as follows.
• What amounts to consultation?
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189
Drafting issues
190
191
192
193
Background
For contracts entered into from and including 1 October 2015, there is now
one legislative measure (the Consumer Rights Act 2015, ‘CRA 2015’) that is of
principal relevance to the drafting of terms and conditions for a contract with
a consumer, and concerning:
• limitation and exclusion clauses; and
• whether a contractual provision is ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable’.
For contracts between businesses and consumers entered into prior to
1 October 2015, the old legislative regime continues to apply (involving
consideration of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Consumer
Contract Regulations 1999). Users should consult the previous edition of this
volume and the fourth edition of Drafting and Negotiating Commercial Contracts.
Although the CRA 2015 introduced several substantial changes, the legislative
regime in the Act is not fundamentally different to what has gone before,
being primarily a consolidation measure, and replaces provisions spread
through several Acts and statutory instruments. Many of the changes are
enhancements to existing rights or changes in detail, for example:
• there is now one meaning of a consumer (and it can only mean an
individual);
• digital content is specifically recognised and treated in a similar way to
goods (ie that the digital content must be of satisfactory quality);
• where there is a mixed contract (a contract for goods and services), then
the rights that apply are those that relate to what is supplied (eg the rights
and remedies available for goods apply to the goods part of the supply of
the goods and services);
• for goods there is now a tiered method of rights and remedies where goods
do not conform with a contract: first a 30-day right to reject; then a right
to repair or replacement (normally at the choice of the consumer), and
then a right to reject (the requirements are more detailed, and replace
previous, rights);
• a number of smaller changes and additions, such as:
194
• goods now must not only match any description or sample, but also
any model;
• enhancements to the rights and remedies available for the supply of
services, principally:
• what the trader says about himself or the services are now treated
as terms of the contract; and
• clear requirements for the trader to repeat performance or
reduce the price if the supply of services does not conform with
the contract.
For a detailed outline of the CRA 2015 and the changes made over previous
legislation see the companion volume, Drafting and Negotiating Commercial
Contracts (4th Edn, Bloomsbury Professional, 2016) Chapter 7. This section
assumes that the contract drafter will have an adequate understanding of
the provisions of the CRA 2015. Accordingly, this section needs to be read
together with Chapter 7 from Drafting and Negotiating Commercial Contracts.
The focus of this section remains on the drafting of contractual terms, and
principally the provisions relating to unfair terms, which are now found in the
CRA 2015, Part 2, ss 61–72, replacing the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
Regulations 1999. Most of the changes are modifications of provisions found
in the 1999 Regulations, and for convenience are set out here:
• it is now possible for any contractual term to be assessed for fairness (under
the 1999 Regulations only contractual terms which were not individually
negotiated were assessed for fairness) (CRA 2015, s 62(4));
• written contractual terms now need to be ‘transparent’, that is they need
to be legible in addition to being in plain intelligible language (the latter
being the requirement under the 1999 Regulations) (CRA 2015, ss 62(2),
62(3), 68);
• the core provisions (relating to the price and the subject matter of the
contract) are, except for consideration for fairness, now more narrowly
defined (CRA 2015, s 64), principally following on from the case of Office
of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc [2009] UKSC 6;
• in order for a core term not to be assessed for fairness, not only must it be
transparent but also it must be prominent (under the 1999 Regulations
the term needed to be in plain, intelligible language) (CRA 2015, s 64(2)–
(4)).
There are a few provisions that are new, including:
• an obligation on a court to assess the fairness of a term, whether or not
a consumer who is a party to the litigation chooses to do so (CRA 2015,
s 71);
• notices (whether contractual or not) are subject to the same part of the
CRA 2015 as unfair terms (CRA 2015, s 62(2), (6)) (formerly the Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977 applied to notices);
195
• the indicative list of terms that might be unfair has three additional items
(see appendix to this section, paragraphs 5, 12, and 14). The other terms
taken over from the 1999 Regulations remain largely unchanged.
The other substantive change is the Consumer Contracts (Information,
Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/3134, which
replaces the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 and
the Cancellation of Contracts made in a Consumer’s Home or Place of Work
etc, Regulations 2008 and also applies certain provisions of the Consumer
Rights Directive (2011/83). The 2013 Regulations apply to contracts entered
into from and including 4 June 2014. These 2013 Regulations now cover the
information that a business must provide for a consumer, whether in a shop, a
place other than a shop or at a distance, before a consumer will be bound by a
contract with a trader.
Unlike the previous legislation it replaces, the 2013 Regulations are drafted in
a consistent way, and apply to most situations in which a consumer will interact
with a trader. The 2013 Regulations also contain provisions that relate to the
right for a consumer to cancel a contract. Although the 2013 Regulations do
not directly affect the contractual provisions of a contract, like the legislative
measures they replace, they contain important rights that a trader cannot
avoid by contractual wording. A significant development is that the provisions
in the 2013 Regulations which relate to the provision of information are
now treated as a term of the contract between the consumer and the trader
(CRA 2015, ss 11(4), 12, 3(3), 37, 50(3)).
The purpose of this section is to provide some practical information
concerning the following points:
• the main factors from CRA 2015, Part 2 (the provisions relating to unfair
terms) that a contract drafter should consider when drafting an agreement
for use with consumers; and
• some points relating to drafting style and choice of words, which the
contract drafter should consider in drafting an agreement.
In addition to the authors’ Drafting and Negotiating Commercial Contracts (4th
Edn), other sources of information on the provisions of the CRA 2015 include
the authors’ volume in the Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents, Volume 7(2),
Commercial Contracts and Other Documents, Competition and Markets
Authority Unfair contract terms provisions in the Consumer Rights Act 2015
(CMA37 2015) and the explanatory notes to the CRA 2015. The latter two
should normally always be to hand when drafting the provisions of a consumer
contract.
Drafting issues
• Do not attempt to exclude or limit liability for specific provisions where it is not
possible to exclude or limit liability. It is not possible to exclude or restrict
liability for a range of implied terms under the CRA 2015, such as those
196
relating to satisfactory quality etc for goods and digital content (see below
for the full list for goods, digital content and services). Although this
might be an obvious statement, what is clear under the CRA 2015 is that
traditional methods of limiting or excluding liability are unlikely to work.
Eg, adding wording to limit the liability of a business for its breach of the
implied term of satisfactory quality would be counterproductive, ie stating
that the goods are of satisfactory quality but then limiting the business’s
liability for a breach or limiting liability to a sum of money, or excluding
any warranties.
However, there is nothing to stop a supplier defining what ‘satisfactory
quality’ means in relation to the particular goods that are being sold.
• Use the wording of the statutory provisions to indicate matters clearly
affecting quality, standard or the state of the goods (or services) being
provided. Eg, the CRA 2015, s 9(2), (3) state the factors determining
(satisfactory) quality:
• description;
• price;
• fitness for all the purposes of which goods of the kind in question are
commonly supplied;
• freedom from minor defects;
• safety;
• durability;
• public statements on the specific characteristics of the goods
made about the goods by the seller, producer or his representative
(particularly in advertising or on labelling).
• State clearly the ‘strengths’, ‘weaknesses’, ‘limitations’ and the requirements
on a customer of a product or service: the supplier should provide a more
descriptive meaning of the product or service, which can reduce or avoid
liability, ie instead of attempting to exclude or limit liability, the seller or
supplier can prevent liability arising at all (although in some cases it may
be difficult to draw a clear distinction between avoiding liability arising in
the first place and excluding or limiting liability).
Eg, where a business sells LCD monitor products (which are manufactured
or supplied by third parties) to consumers:
• instead of simply stating that goods that are ordered by a consumer
will be supplied, perhaps state the meaning of satisfactory quality;
• provide wording as follows:
‘We shall supply to you the goods that you have ordered. You should note
that certain types of monitors occasionally suffer from minor errors in
the manufacturing process. In particular, LCD monitors have one or two
pixels which appear incorrectly (“pixel errors”). Such pixel errors are in
accordance with industry standards for the manufacture of LCD monitors.
197
198
• Is the wording concerning the subject matter of the contract and the price
payable prominent? The CRA 2015 has introduced a new requirement for
a core term not to be assessed for fairness, ie the ‘core terms’ need to
be prominent in addition to being transparent (ie in plain intelligible
language and legible) if they are to be excluded from assessment as to
whether they are fair (CRA 2015, s 64(2)). Prominent will mean that the
contractual terms have to be brought to the attention of the consumer,
so that the average consumer will be aware of them (CRA 2015, s 64).
The average consumer means a person ‘who is reasonably well-informed,
observant and circumspect’ (CRA 2015, s 64(5)).
This can be done by stating the core terms prior to the parties entering into
the contract, early on in a contract or in other documents for example.
A significant difference between the CRA 2015 and previous legislation is
that a contract term cannot be assessed for fairness:
‘…to the extent that-- (a) it specifies the main subject matter of the
contract, or (b) the assessment is of the appropriateness of the price
payable under the contract by comparison with the goods, digital content
or services supplied under it’ (CRA 2015, s 64(1)).
This provision of the CRA 2015 is ‘to be narrowly interpreted as two sides
of a bargain made between the trader and the consumer (the trader
agreeing to provide goods and services and the consumer willing to pay
for them)’. The other types of price terms that appear in the indicative
list support the view that there should be a narrow interpretation of
the core exemption (from the Explanatory Notes to the CRA 2015,
para 315, following the case of Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc
[2009] UKSC 6). One consequence of this is that the contract drafter
should not attempt to bring within the scope of the core exemption
matters that will create an unfair imbalance through the use of drafting
techniques, particularly matters such as:
• cancellation provisions;
• disproportionate financial sanctions;
• exclusion clauses; or
• other matters mentioned in the indicative list set out in the CRA 2015,
Sch 2 (see CMA 37, para 3.4).
A second consequence is that the meaning of ‘price’ will also have a narrow
and restricted meaning and will not normally include such matters as:
• the timing of the payment of the price;
• the method of payment;
• any variation of the payment;
• Has the contract drafter considered the indicative list of terms (in the CRA 2015)
that are potentially unfair? Under the CRA 2015, terms in a contract need
to be ‘fair’, that is to say, they must not cause a significant imbalance in
199
the parties’ rights, which is contrary to the requirement of good faith, and
causes any detriment to the consumer (CRA 2015, s 62). This requirement
needs considering against an ‘indicative and non-exhaustive’ list of terms
that are regarded as unfair (CRA 2015, s 63 and Sch 2 and see Extracts from
legislation below).
• Has the guidance issued by the CMA been considered? The CMA provides
guidance about unfair terms generally and for specific industry sectors.
Where an agreement is being drafted, the drafter should consider:
• the general guidance on the unfair provisions, together with the
extensive set of wording held by the CMA as unfair (often with revised
wording) (see CMA 37 and the Appendix to this);
• unfair terms within particular sectors: the CMA has taken over
guidance originally issued by the now-defunct OFT on the following
(although this list has not been updated to reflect the changes
introduced by the CRA 2015, they are still of relevance):
• Guidance on unfair terms in tenancy agreements (OFT356);
• Guidance on unfair terms in health and fitness club agreements
(OFT373);
• Guidance on unfair terms in care home contracts (OFT635);
• Guidance on unfair terms in consumer entertainment contracts
(OFT667);
• Guidance on unfair terms in package holiday contracts (OFT668);
• Guidance on unfair terms in IT consumer contracts made at a
distance (OFT 672);
• Guidance on unfair terms in holiday caravan agreements
(OFT 734);
• Guidance on unfair terms in home improvements contracts
(OFT 737),
• Other statutory matters affecting contract provisions with a consumer. When
drafting an agreement, in addition to considering whether:
• the provisions are unfair (CRA 2015, ss 61–72); or
• whether the provisions exclude or restrict statutory rights and remedies
(CRA 2015, ss 31 (for goods), 47 (digital goods), 57 (services), 65(1)
(personal injury and death);
the contract drafter should also consider other matters that do not directly
affect the actual wording of the consumer contract but impact on what a
trader can do, such as:
• Will the right information be provided to the consumer prior to the consumer
entering into a contract with the trader? Unless the relevant (prescribed)
information is provided prior to the trader and consumer entering
200
into the contract then the consumer will not be bound by the contract
(2013 Regulations, regs 9, 10, and 13), and certain aspects of that
pre-contract information will be treated as a term of the contract
(CRA 2015, ss 12, 36, 50(3)). The information a trader needs to provide
is set out in Sch 1 of the 2013 Regulations and varies depending on
whether the contract is an on premises or, an off premises or distance
contract, and also whether the right to cancel is available to the
consumer. The information relates to the description of the goods or
services, details about the trader, the amount the consumer will have
to pay, details and pricing of delivery, the right to cancel and details
on how to cancel and whether the consumer has to bear the cost of
returning items, etc.
The 2013 Regulations do not apply at all (that is the requirement to
provide prescribed information or cancellation rights) to some contracts,
and only some of the information requirements apply to some types of
contracts.
The 2013 Regulations (reg 6(1)) do not apply to the part of the contract
that concerns:
• gambling;
• participating in a lottery;
• banking, credit, insurance, personal pension, investment or payment
services;
• the creation of immovable property or of rights in immovable property;
• rental of accommodation for residential purposes;
• the construction of new buildings or substantially new buildings by
the conversion of existing buildings;
• the supply of foodstuffs, beverages or other goods intended for current
consumption in a household where the supply is made by a trader
who makes regular rounds to the home, workplace or residence of the
consumer;
• package holidays and package tours;
• timeshare, and long-term holidays.
The 2013 Regulations (reg 6(2)) also do not apply at all to contracts
concluded by particular technical means (such as by a vending machine,
through a public telephone, or which are concluded by a single connection
by telephone, internet or fax, and the connection is established by the
consumer).
For some contracts the requirement to provide some or all of the
prescribed information does not apply (eg if the contract is worth less
than £42, for the supply of medicines and transport, or if the supplier is
providing services immediately and the payment the consumer is making
is less than £170) (eg 2013 Regulations, reg 7).
201
The 2013 Regulations are detailed. To set out that substantial detail so
that all of the essential matters are mentioned is outside the scope of this
book. But for the contract drafter, the detail is essential to ensure that any
contract provision does not conflict with the 2013 Regulations.
• Has the trader provided details and complied with the provisions concerning
the right to cancel?
The 2013 Regulations also cover the right of the consumer to cancel
a contract (normally 14 days after the goods are delivered to the
consumer or 14 days after the entering into the contract for services
and digital content, but extended up to 12 months if the prescribed
information is not provided). The 2013 Regulations cover such matters
as how the consumer can cancel, whether the trader can reduce
the amount it repays because of the way the consumer has handled
goods, the timing of repayments as well as setting out in detail the
circumstances when the right to cancel is lost, particularly with regard
to services and digital content (and the period for cancellation starts
earlier than goods).
For the right to cancel, the 2013 Regulations (reg 28(1)) contain a
separate list of contracts where that right does not apply:
• for on-premises contracts;
• where the consumer is paying less than £42;
• for any part of the contract that concerns supply of medicines;
• for goods and services where the supply is dependent on the
fluctuation in the financial markets (and the fluctuations are not
in the control of the trader) other than the supply of water, gas,
electricity or district heating;
• for goods or services made to the consumer’s specification;
• for the supply of alcohol other than for immediate supply and
subject to other conditions;
• where, following a request from a consumer, a supplier visits
the consumer and carries out repair or maintenance on an
urgent basis (but this will cover only the immediate repair or
maintenance and any parts necessary), but any additional services
or parts would be subject to the right to cancel (2013 Regulations,
reg 28(2));
• for contracts concluded at a public auction;
• for contracts for the supply of accommodation, transport of
goods, vehicle rental services, catering or services relating to
leisure activities where there is a specific date or specific date of
performance.
There are also some situations (rather than types of contract) where
the right to cancel does not apply (2013 Regulations, reg 28(3)):
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• goods which are sealed and are unsealed by the consumer but
are not suitable for return for health protection or for hygiene
reasons;
• audio or video records or software which are supplied sealed
(ie on physical media) and which are unsealed by the consumer;
• where goods are mixed with other items after delivery and it is no
longer possible to separate them.
• Is the supplier (or someone else, such as the manufacturer) offering guarantees?
Some traders provide a guarantee (or the manufacturer does). The
contract between the trader and the consumer may not contain the
terms and conditions of the guarantee. Whether or not the trader’s
terms and conditions contain wording concerning a guarantee,
there are provisions in the CRA 2015 regarding guarantees of which
the trader will need to take account. The CRA 2015, s 30 applies
to a guarantee that is provided with a supply of goods, and is an
undertaking offered by a person in the course of business without
extra charge. The undertaking is that if the goods do not conform
to their specification set out in the guarantee statement (or any
associated advertising) then the consumer will be reimbursed for the
price paid for the goods or the goods will be repaired, replaced or
dealt with in some other way. The main provisions that a contract
drafter needs to consider are:
• the guarantee does not apply to digital content but is not restricted
as to how the consumer obtains the goods, ie whether the goods
are sold by themselves as well as supplied under a contract for
the supply of a service. For example, when a provider of services
supplies the goods as part of providing the services (eg a plumber
fitting a new boiler);
• the guarantor should use plain intelligible language;
• the guarantee needs to contain the essential particulars for
making a claim under the guarantee together with the length
of the guarantee, its territorial scope, the contact details of the
guarantor and a statement that the statutory rights in relation to
the goods which are sold or supplied are not affected;
• the guarantee must be written in English if the goods are offered
in the United Kingdom;
• the guarantee takes effect from the date of delivery.
• Other points concerning risk and delivery. If the contract drafter is not
familiar with drafting consumer terms and conditions, the default
provisions regarding risk and delivery in the CRA 2015 are different
from those found in the Sale of Goods Act 1979. An approach where
such terms are drafted in favour of one party or another in a non-
consumer contract will not work in a consumer contract:
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204
• services (s 57):
• service to be performed with reasonable care and skill (s 49);
• the information a trader provides on its service or itself is to
be binding (s 50);
• that a reasonable price is payable (s 51);
• that there is reasonable time for performance of the service
(s 52);
The above prohibition on excluding or restricting liability also means that
a term of a contract is not binding to the extent that the term would
(ss 31(2), 47(2), 57(4)):
• exclude or restrict a right or remedy concerning liability under one of
the matters listed under the above bullet point;
• subject a right or remedy (or its enforcement) to a restrictive or
onerous condition;
• permit a trader to put a person at a disadvantage if the person pursues
a right of remedy;
• exclude or restrict rules of evidence or procedure.
A reference to restricting or excluding liability also ‘includes preventing
an obligation or duty arising or limiting its extent’ (s 31(3), s 57(5)).
The above rights and remedies are automatically treated as terms of the
contract between a consumer and a trader.
• What if it is not possible to prepare terms and conditions only for use by a consumer?
Some businesses do not trade only with consumers or may only sell a small
amount of what they offer to consumers. It may simply not be worth the
time or effort to prepare a new set of terms. At a minimum there should
be wording that the terms implied by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 are not
limited or excluded (see Precedent 1).
205
Waiver
If you do not comply with or follow any of the terms and conditions of this
contract but we choose not to do anything about this, we can still do so
(that is using any of the rights or remedies available to us) whether in rela-
tion to the specific failure to comply or following any future failure.
Communications
You may contact us by telephone, email or in writing. The details for each
of these methods of communication are found at [specify]. If you contact
us by email then you are authorising us to send you any notices, docu-
ments or other communications we need to send you under this contract
by email to the email address you used in your email. If you do not wish us
to use email please let us know.
Third parties
For the purpose of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, only
you or we can enforce any of the terms and conditions of this contract.
Any person who is not a party to this contract cannot enforce any of the
terms and conditions.
206
207
Case analysis
208
(3) The element of “detriment to the consumer” makes clear that the
Regulations are aimed at significant imbalance against the consumer,
rather than the seller or supplier.
(4) The requirement of good faith is one of fair and open dealing in which:
(a) Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly
and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate
prominence should be given to terms which might operate dis
advantageously to the customer.
(b) Fair dealing requires that a supplier should not, whether deliberately
or unconsciously, take advantage of the consumer’s necessity,
indigence, lack of experience, unfamiliarity with the subject matter
of the contract, weak bargaining position or any other factor listed
in or analogous to those listed in Sch 2 to the 1994 Regulations
(an inducement to the consumer to agree to the term, whether
goods or services were sold or supplied at the special order of
the consumer or whether the seller or supplier dealt fairly and
equitably with the consumer). The supplier should deal fairly and
equitably with the consumer.
(5) Schedule 2 to the Regulations is best regarded as a check list of terms
which must be regarded as potentially vulnerable to being unfair.
(6) Useful approaches include:
(a) assessing the impact of an impugned term on the parties’ rights
and obligations by comparing the effect of the contract with the
term and the effect it would have without it.
(b) considering the effect of the inclusion of the term on the substance
or core of the transaction; whether if it were drawn to his attention
the consumer would be likely to be surprised by it; whether the term
is a standard term, not merely in similar non-negotiable consumer
contracts, but in commercial contracts freely negotiated between
parties acting on level terms and at arms’ length; and whether, in
such cases, the party adversely affected by the inclusion of the
term or his lawyer might reasonably be expected to object to its
inclusion and press for its deletion.
(7) Where the consumer has imposed the term either by their own choice
or a choice made by their professional agent then it is unlikely that
there would be any lack of good faith or fair dealing with regard to the
incorporation of the terms into the contract.’
209
210
(The terms that are new to the Schedule (5, 12 and 14) are marked
with an asterisk.)
211
7
A term which has the object or effect of authorising the trader to dis-
solve the contract on a discretionary basis where the same facility is not
granted to the consumer, or permitting the trader to retain the sums paid
for services not yet supplied by the trader where it is the trader who dis-
solves the contract.
8
A term which has the object or effect of enabling the trader to terminate
a contract of indeterminate duration without reasonable notice except
where there are serious grounds for doing so.
9
A term which has the object or effect of automatically extending a con-
tract of fixed duration where the consumer does not indicate otherwise,
when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express a desire not to
extend the contract is unreasonably early.
10
A term which has the object or effect of irrevocably binding the consumer
to terms with which the consumer has had no real opportunity of becom-
ing acquainted before the conclusion of the contract.
11
A term which has the object or effect of enabling the trader to alter the
terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid reason which is specified
in the contract.
*12
A term which has the object or effect of permitting the trader to determine
the characteristics of the subject matter of the contract after the con-
sumer has become bound by it.
13
A term which has the object or effect of enabling the trader to alter uni-
laterally without a valid reason any characteristics of the goods, digital
content or services to be provided.
*14
A term which has the object or effect of giving the trader the discretion
to decide the price payable under the contract after the consumer has
become bound by it, where no price or method of determining the price is
agreed when the consumer becomes bound.
15
A term which has the object or effect of permitting a trader to increase the
price of goods, digital content or services without giving the consumer
212
the right to cancel the contract if the final price is too high in relation to the
price agreed when the contract was concluded.
16
A term which has the object or effect of giving the trader the right to
determine whether the goods, digital content or services supplied are in
conformity with the contract, or giving the trader the exclusive right to
interpret any term of the contract.
17
A term which has the object or effect of limiting the trader’s obligation to
respect commitments undertaken by the trader’s agents or making the
trader’s commitments subject to compliance with a particular formality.
18
A term which has the object or effect of obliging the consumer to fulfil
all of the consumer’s obligations where the trader does not perform the
trader’s obligations.
19
A term which has the object or effect of allowing the trader to transfer
the trader’s rights and obligations under the contract, where this may
reduce the guarantees for the consumer, without the consumer’s agree-
ment.
20
A term which has the object or effect of excluding or hindering the con-
sumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, in
particular by--
(a) requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not
covered by legal provisions,
(b) unduly restricting the evidence available to the consumer, or
(c) imposing on the consumer a burden of proof which, according to the
applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract.
213
22
Paragraph 11 (variation of contract without valid reason) does not include
a term by which a supplier of financial services reserves the right to alter
the rate of interest payable by or due to the consumer, or the amount of
other charges for financial services without notice where there is a valid
reason, if--
(a) the supplier is required to inform the consumer of the alteration at the
earliest opportunity, and
(b) the consumer is free to dissolve the contract immediately.
Contracts which last indefinitely
23
Paragraphs 11 (variation of contract without valid reason), 12 (determina-
tion of characteristics of goods etc after consumer bound) and 14 (deter-
mination of price after consumer bound) do not include a term under
which a trader reserves the right to alter unilaterally the conditions of a
contract of indeterminate duration if--
(a) the trader is required to inform the consumer with reasonable notice,
and
(b) the consumer is free to dissolve the contract.
Sale of securities, foreign currency etc
24
Paragraphs 8 (cancellation without reasonable notice), 11 (variation of
contract without valid reason), 14 (determination of price after consumer
bound) and 15 (increase in price) do not apply to--
(a) transactions in transferable securities, financial instruments and other
products or services where the price is linked to fluctuations in a
stock exchange quotation or index or a financial market rate that the
trader does not control, and
(b) contracts for the purchase or sale of foreign currency, traveller’s
cheques or international money orders denominated in foreign cur-
rency.
Price index clauses
25
Paragraphs 14 (determination of price after consumer bound) and 15
(increase in price) do not include a term which is a price-indexation clause
(where otherwise lawful), if the method by which prices vary is explicitly
described.
214
Background
The contra proferentem rule is a common law rule, which provides that unclear
contract wording is interpreted against the interests of the maker or the party
that benefits from the wording. The precise scope of the rule is not entirely
clear from the reported cases. There seem to be three main strands:
• in agreements concerned with the grant of rights to property, unclear
wording is interpreted against the grantor (Johnson v Edgware Rly Co
(1866) 35 Beav 480);
• in other types of agreements, unclear wording in a clause is interpreted
against the party in whose favour the clause is made, ie the party which
‘proffered’ (put forward) the wording (Savill Bros Ltd v Bethell [1902] 2
Ch 523, CA);
• as a third strand of the rule, it seems that in grants from the Crown, unclear
wording is interpreted against the grantee, ie, the rule is reversed and
the Crown has the benefit of the doubt; but it seems that this exception
only applies to grants concerned with land (Earl of Londsdale v A-G [1982]
1 WLR 887).
In relation to the second of these strands, the rule seems to be that wording
is interpreted against the party who benefits from the wording, not that the
wording will be interpreted against the party which drafted the wording (see
Pera Shipping Corpn v Petroship SA [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 363 at 356 and Youell
v Bland Welch & Co Ltd [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127 at 134). The rule will not
apply if:
• the wording is clear and unambiguous (see also Quest 4 Finance Ltd v
Maxfield [2007] EWHC 2313 (QB)); or
• the wording does not clearly benefit one party, or benefits both parties
equally; or
• the wording is a standard form of contract prepared by a representative
body (Tersons Ltd v Stevenage Development Corpn [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 333).
215
216
217
Background
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (1999 Act) made modifications
to the common law doctrine of privity of contract. It allows a person who is not
a party to a contract (‘third party’) the right to enforce certain terms of the
contract. Generally, the 1999 Act will apply to most contracts for goods and
services and the third party will have the right to enforce a term of a contract
if the contract states that it can or if a contract confers a benefit on the third
party. There are limitations and exclusions to this (see below).
In practice, since the 1999 Act came into force most contracts now include
standard boilerplate wording so that a third party cannot enforce any of the
terms of the contract.
A third party is ‘a person who is not a party to a contract’ (1999 Act, s 1(1)).
The 1999 Act allows a third party a right to enforce a term of a contract in two
situations, namely where:
• the contract states explicitly that it may do so (1999 Act, s 1(1)(a)); or
• a term of the contract purports to confer a benefit on the third party
(1999 Act, s 1(1)(b)).
This provision only applies if on the proper construction of the contract it
appears that the parties intended that the term be enforceable by the third
party (1999 Act, s 1(2)).
The word ‘benefit’ does not mean that a third party’s position is improved
if the contract is performed, but that the language used by the parties to the
contract shows that the parties had as one of the purposes of their bargain the
218
intention to benefit the third party (rather than the third party incidentally
getting a benefit from the contract being performed) (see Dolphin Maritime &
Aviation Services Ltd v Sveriges Angartygs Assurans Forening [2009] EWHC 716
(Comm), para 74, with the judge focusing on the purposive effect of the word
‘confer’ in s 1(1)(b)). In an earlier case, identified in Dolphin Maritime,
concerning the meaning of ‘purpose’, the purpose had to be a ‘predominant
purpose or intent behind the term’, which purports to confer a benefit on a
third party (Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Ayres [2007] EWHC 775 (Ch)).
This new right is in addition to any other right or remedy that the third party
may have independently of the 1999 Act (1999 Act, s 7(1)).
The 1999 Act amends the rules on privity of contract but does not abolish
them. The common law doctrine of privity of contract will continue, unaltered,
in situations where the 1999 Act does not apply. Moreover, the 1999 Act does
not prevent a third party from relying on rights that exist apart from the 1999
Act, for example claims based in tort (see 1999 Act, s 7(1)).
The doctrine of privity of contract generally provides that only the parties to a
contract (the ‘contracting parties’) can have enforceable rights and obligations
under the contract. Put another way, only a contracting party may sue another
contracting party for breach of contract. It is, in general, not enough that
a person is referred to in the text of the contract; to be contracting parties
persons must generally sign the contract or have their agent or representative
do so on their behalf. English law in this area has been fairly strict, compared
with some other countries’ laws. The 1999 Act gives greater rights to third
parties than they had under previous English law rules.
If a contract indicates that the third party can enforce a particular term then
there is no further requirement necessary for the third party to do so (unless
the contracting parties have specified some such requirement).
219
• the 1999 Act only grants rights to a third party who meets the criteria set
out in the 1999 Act (1999 Act, s 1(1)), and those rights are qualified by the
other provisions of the 1999 Act;
• it does not apply to contracts entered into before 11 November 1999 (and
before 10 May 2000 unless the parties otherwise agree) (1999 Act, s 10).
If a contract allows the third party to enforce a term of that contract by virtue
of the 1999 Act, s 1(1) then it will have available ‘any remedy that would have
been available to him in an action for breach of contract if he had been a party
to the contract’ (1999 Act, s 1(5)).
The 1999 Act provides also that the rules regarding damages, injunctions,
specific performance and other reliefs are to apply accordingly (1999 Act,
s 1(5)). A third party is provided with the same remedies as if it was one of the
contracting parties. The third party can recover damages for loss of bargain
and the principles of remoteness and mitigation which apply to the parties
would also apply to the third party.
The third party does not become a contracting party (1999 Act, s 7(4)).
220
Prior to the coming into force of the 1999 Act, B’s employees (for example)
would not have enforceable rights against A under the indemnity. B might
be able to enforce the indemnity on their behalf. Under the 1999 Act, B’s
employees may well have directly enforceable rights.
Drafting issues
The parties to a contract may need to clarify whether the contract, or any of its
terms, is intended to benefit any third parties, and if so:
• Is the subject matter of the agreement excluded by the 1999 Act? The main
excluded categories are (1999 Act, s 6):
• bills of exchange, promissory note or negotiable instrument;
• company memorandum and articles (no rights are conferred to a
third party in the case of any contract binding on a company and its
members under Companies Act 2006, s 33);
• contracts of employment;
• contracts of carriage of goods by sea, rail, road or air (except that a
third party may in reliance on that section avail himself of an exclusion
or limitation of liability clause in such a contract).
• Who are the third parties? Is the third party expressly identified:
• by name? or
• as a member of a class? or
221
222
• Are the third parties’ rights assignable? This point appears not to be specifically
addressed by the 1999 Act. If such rights are assignable, will the assignee
also be able to enforce them in the same way?
• Can the contracting parties agree to revoke a third party’s rights without the consent
of the third party?
Under the 1999 Act, once a third party is granted a right under an
agreement then such a right cannot be taken away or varied if:
• the third party has communicated its assent to the term in the
agreement with the promisor (it appears that for the assent to be
effective it can only be made to the promisor);
• the promisor is aware that the third party has relied on the term in the
agreement; or
• the promisor can reasonably be expected to have foreseen that the
third party would rely on the term in the agreement, and has in fact
relied on it (1999 Act, s 2).
• Can the third party enforce the whole of an agreement or only specific provisions?
• If a specific provision is for the benefit of a third party, can the third party have the
benefit of any allied or related clauses? Eg, if payments are to be made to the
third party, should any related payment clauses (eg specifying interest on
late payments) also apply to the third party?
223
In most cases where it is not intended to give rights to third parties, a simple
clause should be added to the ‘Boilerplate’ section of a contract stating that
the third-party rights are excluded.
224
(a) the parties may [not] rescind or vary any provision(s) of this
Agreement, including this Clause [no], at any time without the
consent of the Third Parties; and
(b) the parties may assign or otherwise transfer any or all of their
rights or obligations under this Agreement, including without
limitation their obligations to any third party, [by agreement be-
tween the parties] [in accordance with Clause [no]] and they will
not need the consent of any third party in order to do so; and
[(c) it shall be a condition precedent to any third party having any
rights under this Clause [no] that the third party in question shall
[have [executed a deed of adherence to this Agreement under
which it shall have] undertaken [to Party A] to] comply with the
provisions of [this Agreement or Clauses [insert nos as applica-
ble]] as if it were [Party B]; and]
[(d) [Party B] shall be liable to [Party A] for any failure by any third
party to comply with the provisions of Clauses [insert nos as ap-
plicable] as if [Party B] had been in breach of those provisions;
and]
(e) without limiting any other rights it may have, [Party A] shall have
available to him by way of defence or set-off against any claim
brought by a third party all those matters that would be avail-
able to [Party A] by way of defence or set-off against any claim
brought by [Party B] [as provided for in Clause [no]]; and
(f) each third party’s rights against [Party A] under this Agreement
shall be subject to the same conditions, limitations and exclu-
sions as apply to [Party B]’s rights against [Party A] under this
Agreement, [except that the third party’s rights shall also be
subject to the following conditions [state additional conditions
etc]];
(g) each third party’s rights under this Agreement are personal to
that third party and may not be assigned or otherwise trans-
ferred, in whole or in part; and
[(h) neither party shall have any liability to any third party for any
loss or damage (other than death or personal injury) resulting
from that party’s negligence, where the negligence consists of
the breach of an obligation to that third party arising under this
Agreement].
and:
D Except as provided in clause (no), this Agreement does not create any
right enforceable by any person who is not a party to it (‘Third Party’)
under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, but this clause
does not affect any right or remedy of a Third Party which exists or is
available apart from that Act.
225
Case analysis
Nisshin Shipping Co Ltd v Cleaves & Company Ltd [2003] EWHC 2602
(Comm), [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 481
This appears to be the first case to deal explicitly with the 1999 Act. It was
held that:
1 if a contract is silent on how a person can enforce a provision that
confers a benefit on him/her, such silence does not mean that there
was no intention to grant any rights of enforcement; and
2 for s 1(2) of the 1999 Act to apply, there would have to be an express
clause in the contract stating that the third party should not have
rights to enforce the clause conferring a benefit on him/her.
Facts
1 The case involved a series of charterparties. Each provided for pay-
ment of commission to Cleaves.
2 Cleaves, as brokers, negotiated a number of charterparties on behalf
of Nisshin.
3 Cleaves was not a party to any of the charterparties.
4 The commission clause read:
‘A commission of 2 per cent for equal division is payable by the vessel and
owners to [ ] and [Cleaves] on hire earned and paid under this Charter, and
also upon any continuation or extension of this charter.’
226
Matters to be determined
1 Whether the clauses purported to confer a benefit on the brokers
within s 1(1)(b);
2 Whether s 1(1)(b) was disapplied by s 1(2) because the parties, on the
true construction of the clause, did not intend the term to be enforce-
able by the third party.
227
Held
As this is the first case dealing substantially with the 1999 Act it is worth
setting out in some detail how it was applied:
[21] It is accepted by [counsel], on behalf of Cleaves, that the brokers were
not parties to the arbitration agreements as a matter of construction of those
clauses. Her case is that the effect of s 8 of the 1999 Act is to impose the
arbitration clauses on the owners and the brokers as the means of enforce-
ment of the commission benefit conferred by the commission clause.
[…] However, for the purposes of the submission in relation to absence of
intention to confer a benefit, the wording of the arbitration clauses is, in my
judgment, of little or no materiality. Firstly, although the parties to the char-
terparties clearly expressed their mutual intention that their disputes should
be arbitrated, that mutual intention is entirely consistent with a mutual inten-
tion that the brokers should be obliged to recover their commission by court
action rather than by arbitration. Secondly, if, on the proper construction of
the 1999 Act, the third party is obliged to enforce the commission benefit
by arbitration, even where the agreement does not on its proper construc-
tion provide for any participants in an arbitration other than the parties to the
main contract, identification of the intention to be imputed to the parties as
to enforceability of the third party commission benefit clearly has to take this
into account. That is to say, if, as a matter of law, it makes no difference to
the broker’s ability to enforce his right to commission benefit that no express
provision is made for this in the arbitration agreement, the strength of any
inference derived from the absence of such express provision could be little
more than negligible.
[22] Secondly, it is argued by [counsel] on behalf of Nisshin that there is no
positive indication in the charterparties that the parties did intend the brokers
to have enforceable rights. There is no suggestion in those contracts that the
owners and charterers were mutually in agreement that the brokers should be
entitled to claim against the owners as if they were parties to the contract.
[23] It is to be noted that s 1(2) of the 1999 Act does not provide that sub-s 1(b)
is disapplied unless on a proper construction of the contract it appears that
the parties intended that the benefit term should be enforceable by the third
party. Rather it provides that sub-s 1(b) is disapplied if, on a proper construc-
tion, it appears that the parties did not intend third party enforcement. In other
words, if the contract is neutral on this question, sub-s (2) does not disap-
ply sub-s 1(b). Whether the contract does express a mutual intention that the
third party should not be entitled to enforce the benefit conferred on him or is
merely neutral is a matter of construction having regard to all relevant circum-
stances. The purpose and background of the Law Commission’s recommen-
dations in relation to sub-s (2) are explained in a paper by Professor Andrew
Burrows (‘The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 and its implications
for commercial contracts’ [2000] LMCLQ 540) who, as a member of the Law
Commission, made a major contribution to the drafting of the Bill as enacted.
He wrote (at 544):
‘The second test therefore uses a rebuttable presumption of intention. In
doing so, it copies the New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, s. 4, which
has used the same approach. It is this rebuttable presumption that provides
the essential balance between sufficient certainty for contracting parties
and the flexibility required for the reform to deal fairly with a huge range
of different situations. The presumption is based on the idea that, if you
ask yourself, “When is it that parties are likely to have intended to confer
rights on a third party to enforce a term, albeit that they have not expressly
conferred that right”, the answer will be: “Where the term purports to confer
228
229
Avraamides v Colwill [2006] EWCA Civ 1533, [2006] All ER (D) 167 (Nov)
In this case the issue of whether the claimants were expressly identified
(for the purposes of the 1999 Act, s 1(3)) in an agreement came under
consideration by the court.
The claimants contracted with a building company for two bathrooms to
be built. The work was not carried out satisfactorily. The assets and good-
will of the company were transferred by an agreement to the defendants
(the company being left with no assets) and there was nothing left to pay
the claimants.
The key wording from the agreement was: ‘The purchasers (sic) under-
takes to complete outstanding customer orders taking into account
any deposits paid by customers as at 31 March 2003, and to pay in the
normal course of time any liabilities properly incurred by the company as
at 31 March 2003. The Colwill loan account after adjustment to be trans-
ferred on by the partnership’.
The court relied on the word ‘express’ in C(RTP)A, s 1(3). The court held
that the use of the word ‘express’ did not allow a process of construc-
tion or implication and that although ‘customers’ were identified in the
first part of the quoted extract from the agreement as beneficiaries, as far
as the second part of the extract was concerned, it held that there was
not sufficient precision in the phrase ‘to pay in the normal course of time
any liabilities properly incurred by the company as at 31 March 2003’ to
identify the customers (claimants), and could include a large number of
unidentified classes (see in particular para 19 of the judgment).
230
Costs
The word ‘costs’ usually refers only to legal fees. The convention is that each
party in negotiating and preparing a commercial agreement usually bears its
own legal costs. Accordingly, it is often thought not necessary to include a
clause on this point.
The parties can, and may, wish to negotiate a different arrangement. If so,
then the agreement should contain a clause to state specifically what cost the
one party will bear of the other.
Property leases and investment agreements sometimes provide that the lessee
or investee will pay the legal costs of the landlord or investor in connection
with the drafting and negotiation of the contract. These are perhaps the most
common exceptions to the normal arrangement that each party bears its own
legal costs. There is, however, nothing to stop the parties agreeing that one
of them will bear the other party’s legal costs; this is a matter for commercial
negotiation.
Boilerplate language stating that each party is to bear its own legal costs is
probably most useful in situations where there is a long-established practice
that one party bears all costs, as, eg, in the case of property leases. If each
party is to bear its own costs then a clause such as in Precedent 1 might be
appropriate.
The meaning of ‘costs’ as relating only to legal costs may be limited to where
parties are represented by lawyers who will understand this limited use. It is
also possible that the meaning may be simply how the supplier of goods or
services refers to the amount that it charges for the provision of those goods
and/or services.
Expenses
231
Drafting issues
• Is the default position to apply? Ie each party will be responsible for their own
costs and expenses?
• If so, is it necessary to specify what costs and expenses? If there might be any
doubt about particular types of costs or expenses, it might be convenient
to specify them;
• If not,
• Who is to be responsible for costs and expenses?
• What costs and expenses is a party to be specifically responsible for? Is a party
to be responsible for all the costs and expenses or specific ones?
• When are the costs and expenses to be paid? Are the costs and expenses to
be paid as they arise or are they to be paid at the same time and in the
same manner as other sums due under the agreement (as specified in
the Payments clause)?
• What are the consequences if a party responsible for costs and expenses does
not pay?
Although the default position might be that each party is responsible for their
own costs and expenses, the following are some of the common situations
where one party might be responsible for another party’s costs and expenses:
• the purchaser of a business or business assets;
• a lessee will be responsible for the costs of negotiation, drafting and
granting of a lease;
• a sponsor of a research project will often be responsible for the payment
of the fees in filing, and prosecuting, a patent application;
232
• a company seeking funds from investors will be responsible for the costs
of negotiation and drafting of the investment documentation and the
transfer of the funds; or
• on formation of a company, the newly-formed company will often be
responsible for the costs incurred by the persons who incorporated it.
233
Background
If each contracting party signs one copy of an agreement and then they
exchange these copies then this is a situation where the agreement is signed in
counterparts. The result is that each party keeps the copy signed by the other
party. The agreement is made at the time of exchange of the signed copies of
the contracts.
In the traditional practice, where clients are using solicitors, the exchange of
contract process is normally undertaken by the parties’ solicitors.
It is still fairly common to find clauses in contracts on the subject of
counterparts in some areas of practice (such as in domestic and commercial
conveyancing). Note that in some conveyancing transactions (such as the
granting of leases) the meaning of a counterpart is different; there is an
original version of the document and then duplicates (called ‘counterparts’)
are made. There is a presumption that the original is the authoritative version.
Commercial practice
234
with a signature and a printed name of the person signing and/or of the
party certifying the copy. If a solicitor is acting for a party sometimes the
certification is made by that solicitor; or
• the parties use an electronic method, eg prepare or receive the final
version electronically and then, either
• sign the signature page with a manual signature and then send a
scanned copy of the signature page to the other party electronically
(for the other party to attach to the final version of an agreement); or
• sign the signature page with a manual signature and then return the
whole agreement including the scanned copy of the signature page
(either as one document or two documents) by electronic means;
• adopting either of the methods described in the previous bullet point but
signing the signature page before the final version of the agreement is
reached and then attaching the signature page to the agreement.
There are dangers to signing a signature page alone from the rest of the
agreement (whether at the time the final version is agreed or prior to the final
version being agreed). The dangers include attaching the signature page to the
‘wrong’ version of the agreement, whether by accident or design. For example:
• one party signs a signature page, scans it and then sends it alone without
the rest of the agreement to another party. The other party signs the
signature page it has received and returns it to the first party. But because
its electronic filing system is in a muddle or it simply cannot find the final
version of the agreement, it attaches the signature page to a version which
is not the final, agreed version. The first party has the final version of the
agreement and attaches its copy of the signature page to that version. But
the second party attaches its copy of the signature page of the version
of the agreement it has found. In the event of a dispute, there may be
argument about which was the final version, and a need to examine file
dates, modification dates and times of versions stored on the computers,
examination of emails with attachments for the circulations of drafts (if
any of these still exist if the dispute occurs several years after the parties
enter into the agreement);
• a variation on the above example: one party knowingly and deliberately
attaches the signature page to the wrong version of an agreement.
Perhaps at the last moment that party had to concede a point or agree
to some provision or commercial reality not in its favour and which is
not reflected in the final version, but in an earlier version. By doing so
this party may hope that at some time in the future it can use that earlier
version to its advantage against the other party. For example, by stating
or claiming some benefit or entitlement in its dealings with the other
party and hoping that the other party will not notice this. Consider this
situation: a party sells goods, and it agreed a lower purchase price. An
earlier version stated a higher price. After the agreement is signed, and
235
an order is placed, then the party selling the goods might invoice the
accounts department of the other party claiming the higher price and
quoting from the agreement. Such subterfuge may not be brought to the
attention of the persons involved in negotiating the agreement for the
other party.
These examples illustrate the dangers of exchanging signed signatures
electronically without the rest of the agreement, and was highlighted by the
case of R (on the application of Mercury Tax Group) v HM Revenue and Customs
Commissioners [2008] EWHC 2721 (Admin), [2009] STC 743. Following the
case the Law Society issued guidance on signing of documents and provision
of documents electronically. Essentially the guidance states that documents
which are deeds or relate to the sale or other disposition of land should never
be signed other than as complete documents and the signature page should
never be signed separately from the rest of the document. For other types
of documents, the Law Society sets out suggested steps parties should take.
These are set out in the companion volume, Anderson and Warner, Drafting
and Negotiating Commercial Contracts (4th Edn, 2016) at 2.1), as well as in the
authors’ The Execution of Documents (3rd Edn, 2015, Law Society).
If one of these methods is used then there is no exchange of counterparts,
and it is suggested that a traditional ‘counterparts’ clause is unnecessary.
Precedent 1 refers also to ‘duplicates’ and therefore may be useful for
commercial contracts signed as described in this paragraph. However, such
clauses are often not included in modern commercial contracts.
Drafting issues
236
237
Background
The traditional meaning of a ‘covenant’ is a promise made by deed (Rank
Xerox Ltd v Lane (Inspector of Taxes) [1979] 3 All ER 657 at 663; Hagee v Co-
operative Insurance Society [1991] NPC 92) with a secondary meaning whereby it
is applied to any promise or stipulation, whether under seal or not (Rank Xerox
Ltd v Lane (Inspector of Taxes) [1979] 3 All ER 657 at 659).
In some types of agreement covenants are frequently encountered. For
example in agreements relating to real property, where there are important
legal distinctions between positive and negative covenants. Covenants in this
sense are:
• contractual undertakings (which only affect the parties to the original
contract); and
• obligations that (in certain circumstances) may attach to the property and
bind persons who were not party to the original contract.
238
plainer English may prefer to avoid the verb ‘covenants’ and use ‘undertakes’
(or just ‘shall’) instead (even in documents that the parties are to sign as
deeds). In addition to using plainer English, the contract drafter can also state
the consequences of not fulfilling the contract undertaking, eg:
‘Party A shall pay the Price for the Goods by the Date. If Party A fails to pay the
Price by the Date then Party B has the right to terminate this Agreement, and
Party A will not receive the Goods.’
Drafting issues
• If a party wishes to use the word ‘covenant’, are there better alternatives? If the
agreement is a ‘mainstream’ commercial agreement, and depending on
the nature of the ‘promise’, should the parties instead use words such as:
• undertakes;
• represents;
• warrants.
When the word ‘covenant’ is used then it is likely that its inclusion will be
together with words such as ‘warrants’, ‘represents’ etc or in place of such
words. The word is also used in clauses dealing with exclusions and limitations
of liability.
239
240
241
Cumulative Remedies clauses are sometimes used for a slightly different reason,
namely to avoid the principle of construction known under the Latin title
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. If the contract expressly provides a remedy
in one situation, the court may infer that the same remedy is not available
in similar situations which are not mentioned. The application of this
principle of construction will depend on the view of the court as to status of
the agreement. If the court has before it a detailed and consistently drafted
agreement then it may apply the principle of construction (Shell UK Ltd v Total
242
UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 180, [2010] 3 All ER 793). However if the court
believes that a party has simply overlooked something, or if the intention
was not to exclude something, or the agreement is not well drafted or is a
collection of documents which are not entirely consistent, or the principle
does not reflect the commercial purpose of the clause, then the principle may
not apply (eg Aspen Insurance UK Ltd v Pectel Ltd [2008] EWHC 2804 (Comm);
Griffon LLC v Firodi Shipping Ltd [2013] EWHC 593 (Comm); National Grid v
Mayes [2001] UKHL 20, [2001] 1 WLR 864).
Eg, in a facilities management agreement a contractor is responsible for
maintaining the equipment. lighting, heating, air conditioning, etc. If there is
a provision that the client can terminate the agreement in the event of failure
on the part of the contractor to repair the office air conditioning within
24 hours, but there is no mention of a right to terminate in the event of a
failure to repair the office heating or lighting systems then the court might
interpret the words as impliedly not allowing the company to terminate the
contract if the heating or lighting is not repaired within 24 hours. Appropriate
‘cumulative remedy’ wording is likely to remove this risk.
Drafting issues
• Use of the word ‘cumulative’. The word ‘cumulative’ is sometimes used in such
clauses (see Precedent 1). This word may be thought rather imprecise, or
as lawyer’s shorthand. It may be better to use a phrase such as ‘in addition
to [other remedies]’ (see Precedent 4).
• Extent. Will a clause dealing with Cumulative Remedies appear
• together with wording dealing with specific remedies? or
• as a stand-alone provision, which applies to all the remedies available
to one or more of the parties under an agreement?
• Use of a ‘general’ cumulative remedy. If used, is it appropriate to include such
a clause if one of the parties wants a particular remedy for a particular
situation to be the only remedy available?
Eg a manufacturing agreement might provide that a manufacturing
party must produce a product to a very tight tolerance. However, the
manufacturer is unable to calibrate its machines to meet the requirements
of its customer. The manufacturer may not wish the customer to have
several remedies. A general cumulative remedies clause might not be
appropriate for the manufacturer and the manufacturer may wish to
ensure that one remedy is available to the customer (eg, cancellation and
not the right to sue for damages).
• What remedies should be included in a Cumulative Remedies clause? Should the
clause allow a party:
• access only to other remedies expressly provided for in the agreement;
and/or
• access to remedies which are available under general law.
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Cumulative Remedies clauses are often included with the following type of
provisions:
• Main Commercial Provisions:
• a clause that defines the core obligations of the parties:
Eg, A software developer is commissioned to write software to an
agreed specification. The agreement provides that the parties will first
negotiate and agree the terms of the specification. If the parties fail
to agree the specification then the clause might give the right to one
or more of the parties to terminate. A Cumulative Remedies clause here
could indicate that a party can also consider other remedies;
• a payment provision, which specifies that a party who is required to
pay on a certain date, and fails to do so allows the supplier either not to
perform its side of the agreement and/or to terminate the agreement.
A Cumulative Remedies clause here could say that the supplier would
be free to use other remedies (such as to sue for damages or charge
interest).
• Secondary Commercial Provisions. A Termination provision will often include
different methods of terminating an agreement (depending on different
circumstances). A Cumulative Remedies clause is often included to indicate
clearly whether remedies to terminate are in lieu of other possible
remedies.
A drafter should consider a Cumulative Remedies clause together with clauses
which limit or restrict liability and with Entire agreement clauses. With clauses
that restrict or limit liability there is also normally a ‘sweep-up’ clause which
provides that other than provided for in the agreement the parties are not
responsible for indirect loss etc. Such a clause might impact on a Cumulative
Remedies clause if one or more of the parties wished to have particular
remedies to be available. It will be necessary to include wording to address
this situation.
Similarly, with an Entire agreement clause, if the parties had discussed or
negotiated specific remedies but had not included them in the agreement,
but were relying on a generic Cumulative Remedies clause, then the specific
remedies might be excluded. Again, specific wording would need inclusion.
244
Precedent 1—General
The remedies provided in this agreement are cumulative and not exclu-
sive of any remedies provided by law.
Precedent 2—General
The remedies provided in this agreement are in addition to, and not exclu-
sive of, any remedies provided by law.
245
Background
This provision specifies the currency a party is to use when making payments
under an agreement.
Meaning of ‘pounds’
Drafting issues
246
or
‘All sums due under this agreement shall be paid in Singaporean dollars.’
247
As stated above, a currency provision will be part of a Payment clause, but will
often be seen in:
• agency, distribution or licensing agreements, where payment can be made
in other currencies; or
• agreements involving buying materials either for manufacturing or resale
where the materials are sourced from overseas.
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Background
In the context of a commercial agreement, every person or organisation
who processes the personal data of others is likely to be subject to the Data
Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998). However, for many commercial agreements,
the parties will not need to address any issues that arise under the DPA 1998,
in the agreement itself, if one or all parties will not be processing personal
data in order to fulfil one or more of its obligations under the agreement.
However, if one or all of the parties are involved in the processing of personal
data, then the other party(ies) will want re-assurance that the party(ies)
are doing so in accordance with the DPA 1998. The aim of this section is to
outline how a mainstream commercial agreement can contain a provision to
demonstrate that. If the parties wish to provide the detail of how one party will
process personal data, then a specialist agreement will be necessary, which is
outside the scope of this book.
A consideration of the requirements of the DPA 1998 is beyond the scope
of this book (in particular the requirements and duties on a person who
processes personal data (specifically the internal procedures and policies that
such a person has to have in place and must comply with), notification to the
Information Commissioner, handling subject access requests, exemptions
or a person wanting to transfer data outside of the European Economic
Area). However this section focuses on instances when some wording may be
necessary in a commercial agreement, particularly:
• When one party needs to process personal data as part of carrying out its obligations
under an agreement. If this is the case, the other party will want assurances
or undertakings that the first party is doing so in accordance with the
DPA 1998.
Eg, a company hires a consultant to carry out a survey of persons to
establish whether they are likely to buy the company’s product. The
consultant may obtain personal data from the persons surveyed but need
not pass that on to the company. In such a case the company may wish to
have reassurance that the consultant is complying with the DPA 1998. See
Precedents 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5.
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• When one party (first party) is processing personal data provided by the other party
(second party), and the first party is processing the personal data on behalf of the
second party. In such a situation the second party:
• will not only want assurances and undertakings that the first party is
processing data in accordance with the DPA 1998, but will want to
more specifically control how and what the first party is doing with the
personal data that the second party has provided; and
• may also want the first party to acknowledge or make a statement that
it is not a data controller for the purposes of the DPA 1998 (see below
for a definition of ‘data controller’).
Eg, a company has details of customers (individuals) who have bought its
products. It wishes to establish whether they are happy with the products
and hires a consultant to carry out research with the customers. The
company will pass on personal data of the customers to the consultant.
In addition to assurances and undertakings, the company may also want
to control how the consultant will use the personal data, eg only for the
purposes of the agreement, not to transport the data outside the EEA, not
to sub-contract processing of the personal data to a third party, etc. See
Precedent 6. (This example assumes that the company has the permission
of its customers to process the personal data of the customers in the way
envisaged by the example.)
From 25 May 2018, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679)
(GDPR) is due to come into force throughout the EU, which includes the
United Kingdom, despite the Brexit vote in June 2016. The GDPR introduces
major changes to the processing of personal data, most of which will not affect
the general type of provision within a mainstream commercial agreement,
which is the subject matter of this section. The meaning of personal data
under the GDPR is broadly similar to that under the DPA 1998 but:
• more types of data can amount to personal data and accordingly come
within the provisions of the GDPR (such as IP addresses); and
• sensitive personal data now includes genetic and biometric data if in
processing such data it can be used to identify an individual.
There are increased obligations on those who process personal data,
including a new ‘accountability’ principle, which requires a data controller
to demonstrate their compliance with the data protection principles (these
are similar to those found in the DPA 1998). The GDPR will require those
who process personal data to adhere to more detailed procedures, policies,
and record keeping to demonstrate how they are meeting the accountability
principle (on such matters as the purposes for processing personal data,
the categories of individuals and types of personal data processed, how long
personal data is retained, and a description of the technical, organisation
and security measures in place). The rights of data subjects are increased, so
that a limited form of a ‘right to be forgotten’ is introduced as well as ‘data
portability’ (ie that a person to whom the personal data relates has the right to
receive it ‘in structured, commonly used and machine-readable format’).
250
Key terms
251
Drafting issues
• Will a party be generating or processing personal data? If the agreement calls for
a party to generate or process personal data as part of fulfilling a specific
obligation under the agreement then the other party may wish to have an
assurance that the first party is doing so in accordance with the DPA 1998.
• Will one party be providing personal data to the other party to process on behalf
of the first? The first party will normally be acting as a data controller (see
Key terms above) as it will be controlling the way that the personal data is
processed on its behalf. The data controller remains responsible for its
processing to others (such as the Information Commissioner) and will
need to deal with subject access requests. Accordingly the data controller
will wish to know that the second party is storing, handling and processing
the personal data in a way that does not compromise the first party or
make the first party liable for breaches of the DPA 1998.
• Will a party who processes data on behalf of another party be acting as a data
controller or data processor? The obligations are greater under the DPA 1998
on a data controller than a data processor. Accordingly a person who
is only processing data in accordance with the instructions and to the
requirements of another person is unlikely to wish to be subject to the
requirements of the DPA 1998 as a data controller. Such a person is likely
to wish to have in an agreement an acknowledgment that it is not acting as
a data controller. However, in some contracts, both parties can be acting
as data controllers if they are taking their own decisions on how to process
the personal data. Each case will need examination to determine the
reality.
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253
(d) if it acts as a data controller (as defined in the [Data Protection Act
1998][General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679]) and at the date
of this Agreement, have a valid entry in the register maintained by the
Information Commissioner [as required under law][under the [Data
Protection Act 1998][General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679]].
After the date of this Agreement Party A shall maintain and renew the
registration for the period of this Agreement.
Data protection
1 The parties acknowledge and agree that in order for [Party B] to pro-
vide the Services:
(a) [Party A] shall supply data to [Party B] which is within the mean-
ing of ‘personal data’ (the ‘Party A Personal Data’) as defined
in the [Data Protection Act 1988][General Data Protection
Regulation 2016/679]; and
(b) [Party B] shall need to process the Party A Personal Data on
behalf of [Party A]; and
(c) [Party B] shall be a data processor (as defined by the [Data
Protection Act 1998][General Data Protection Regulation
2016/679]); and
(d) [Party A] shall be the data controller (as defined in the [Data
Protection Act 1998][General Data Protection Regulation
2016/679]).
2 [Party B] shall process and use the Party A Personal Data only for
the [Data Protection Purpose][purpose], in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Agreement and together with any [reasonable] instruc-
tions from [Party A].
3 [Party B] declares it shall, only to the extent necessary and only with
the necessary means required to perform the Services, process the
Party A Personal Data.
4 [Party B] shall not, except with the prior written permission of [Party
A]:
(a) transfer or process any of the Party A Personal Data outside of
the European Economic Area;
(b) sub-contract any of its obligations regarding or in relation to the
Party A Personal Data.
5 [Party B] shall employ such technical and organisation resources
and measures as are necessary to comply with its obligations under
the [Data Protection Act 1998][General Data Protection Regulation
2016/679] and to prevent any unlawful or unauthorised use or pro-
254
Statutory definitions
255
256
Drafting issues
• Agreement date stated at top of the agreement. By convention, the date of the
agreement is stated at the beginning of the agreement text, above the
names of the parties;
The exact words differ from precedent to precedent (see Precedents);
• Agreement date not typed in, but written in. By convention amongst English
lawyers, the date is left blank until all the parties to the agreement have
signed, and then it is written by hand. In some cases just the year is typed
in or just the month and year is typed in;
• If the parties’ solicitors are involved at this stage, they will usually
agree the date between them;
• If there is no doubt that the agreement will be executed on a particular
date, that date can be typed in, in advance. However, this runs the risk
that the agreement will not, in fact, be signed on that date. Misstating
the date of execution is bad practice and may amount to forgery
(Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, s 9(1)(g));
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258
259
260
Background
This section considers:
• when a document must be executed as a deed;
• some situations when parties may prefer to execute a document as a deed;
and
• the formalities for executing a document as a deed.
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262
Varying a deed
The law concerning the formalities for executing a deed is now mainly
contained in:
• the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989;
• the Companies Act 2006 (ss 44, 46);
• the Law of Property Act 1925 (s 72) (applying mainly to non-Companies
Act 2006 companies/bodies corporate);
• the Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration
of Charges) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/1917 (applying to non-UK
companies).
Note: the meaning of a ‘company’ below means a company formed or
regulated by the Companies Act 2006, including a private limited company,
public limited company, and company limited by guarantee (Companies Act
2006, ss 3 and 735). It also includes a limited liability partnership which, as far
as execution of documents is concerned, is governed by the same provisions
as a company (Limited Liability Partnerships (Application of Companies Act
2006) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/1804, reg 4), but references to director and
secretary are replaced by references to two members of the limited liability
partnership executing a document.
Use of a seal
• Individual: A seal is no longer required (Law of Property (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1989, s 1(2)(b));
• company (formed or regulated by the Companies Act 2006): A seal does not have
to be used (but can be if the company so wishes) (s 45(1));
263
• body corporate (not formed or regulated by the Companies Act 2006): A seal is still
required to execute a deed.
Execution
The document needs to be validly executed as a deed:
• by a person making it or a person authorised to execute in the name or on
behalf of that person;
• by one or more of the parties to the deed or a person authorised to execute
in the name or on behalf of the parties.
Execution formalities
The deed needs to be executed in the appropriate way. What this will mean
will depend on the type of real or legal person executing the deed. A deed
must also be delivered (see below). This applies whether the deed is being
executed by:
• the person making it,
• the parties to it, or
• a person executing in the name or on behalf of the person making it or
the parties to it (Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989,
s 1(2)(b), (4A); Companies Act 2006, ss 44(8), 46; Law of Property Act
1925, ss 71(1A), 74A(1)(a)).
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Execution by an individual
In addition to the document making clear on the face of the document that
it is intended to be a deed by the person making the deed, it is possible to
execute the deed:
• by the individual signing the deed in the presence of a witness, who attests
the signature; or
• by the deed being signed in the individual’s presence and also in the
presence of two witnesses, with the witnesses both attesting the signature.
See the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s 1(3).
265
Foreign companies
For a company incorporated outside of Great Britain in order to execute
a deed:
• it can use any manner permitted by the laws of the territory in which
the company is incorporated for the execution of documents by such a
company; or
• by two persons signing the document who, in accordance with the laws of
the territory in which the company is incorporated, are acting under the
authority (express or implied) of that company.
See the Overseas Companies (Execution of Documents and Registration of
Charges) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/1917.
Delivery of deeds
For the valid execution of a deed, the deed not only needs to be signed in the
appropriate way but it must also be ‘delivered’ (Law of Property (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1989, s 1(3)(b); Companies Act 2006, s 46; Law of Property Act
1925, s 74A(1)(b)).
For all types of companies and corporations, there is a presumption that an
instrument is delivered upon execution, unless a contrary intention is proved
(Companies Act 2006, s 46(2); Law of Property Act 1925, s 74A(2)). The
practical consequence of this presumption is that a company or corporation
that signs a document that contains wording such as ‘signed and delivered
as a deed’, will be (irrevocably) bound as soon as it signs the document (see
immediately below for more on this point).
In practice:
• deeds are either stated to be delivered upon signature; or
• delivery is not mentioned at all; or
• the parties or their lawyers agree a different date for delivery.
In the final case, the lawyers agree to date the document and then write the
date onto a physical copy of the deed (assuming that the deed is printed onto
paper and has real signatures).
266
Sometimes, deeds are signed by a party and then, by arrangement, are held in
escrow by a solicitor, so that the deed only takes effect when the solicitor states
that the deed is released from escrow and delivered. This usually happens
when some condition has been met, eg in a contract of sale, when the contract
price reaches the bank account of the seller.
Deeds that have been delivered cannot be withdrawn (including those
delivered in escrow). The only exceptions are where it is impossible for the
condition of the escrow to be fulfilled or there is wording that clearly allows a
party to withdraw the deed at its discretion.
In consequence, a document executed as a deed is a different type of
document to one executed under hand in several ways, but perhaps the
concept of ‘delivery’ is the one most persons (even lawyers who do not have
any working knowledge of the law relating to deeds) have difficulty in grasping
or understanding its implications. For example, see Silver Queen Maritime Ltd v
Persia Petroleum Services plc [2010] EWHC 2867 QB, where the lawyer working
for a commercial law firm (who acted for the defendants) was unfamiliar with
the binding consequences of a document that contained the wording such as
that set out in Precedent 1 (see Case analysis below).
Many deeds will be simply ‘delivered’ upon execution and will start
operating immediately and not be subject to the fulfilment of a condition
or requirement. However, a deed that is subject to a condition is in a way
akin to a commercial agreement that contains a condition precedent; ie the
parties are bound by the agreement although the condition precedent is not
yet fulfilled or activated. As with a commercial agreement that contains a
condition precedent, for a deed a party that signs the deed will be bound by it
as soon as they sign (ie it is delivered as soon as they sign, unless there is clear
and strong evidence that it is not delivered on signature). If the deed contains
or is subject to a condition then the party who signed the deed cannot
recall or cancel the deed (or the intention to be bound) while they wait for
the condition to be fulfilled. If a party wishes to have control of the period
between signing a deed and its delivery, then the deed will need to include
wording that gives that party the power to recall or cancel the document at its
discretion.
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and Customs Commissioners [2008] EWHC 2721 (Admin), means that such
practices are never acceptable where a deed is involved.
Where a party must or wishes to sign a document as a deed:
• a party must only sign the document as a complete document; and
• where the document is circulated it must be circulated only as a complete
document; and
• a party must never sign the signature page separately to the rest of the deed
except as indicated in the next paragraph.
There is also guidance from the Law Society in England and Wales about how
the parties should circulate by electronic means, and sign particular types of,
document (see Drafting and Negotiating Commercial Contracts, 4th Edn, 2016,
for further details). Documents that are deeds or contracts relating to the
sale of land should never be circulated other than as complete documents.
However, receiving a document as a deed by email, does not mean that the
party must print on to paper the whole document. The party can print off
just the signature page, sign that, scan it, and then return by email the other
part of the deed and the scanned, signed, signature page (ie as two separate
files) together to the other party, according to the guidance. According to the
guidance such a practice would be sufficient to satisfy the interpretation of the
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s 1(3) by the court.
268
Drafting issues
The following are some of the key issues which need to be considered if a party
is contemplating signing a document as a deed:
• Must the party sign the document as a deed? See When must a deed be used?,
above;
• Is the situation, matter or transaction one where it is normal or expected
for a document to be signed as a deed? See Situations when a deed is
sometimes preferred, above;
• Are all the necessary persons included in the deed? Are all the persons who are
placed under an obligation or who are to be parties to the deed named in
the document?
• Does the document state clearly that it is intended to be a deed? See Stating it is a
deed, above;
• Is the person signing the deed signing in the correct capacity? If a person
(individual, company, body corporate) is signing on behalf of another
person, are they using the correct form for their status? Eg:
• if an individual is signing a deed on behalf of a company or body
corporate, the individual should be signing as an individual and
having their signature witnessed;
• if a company is signing on behalf of an individual, then the company
should be signing the document in that capacity, by having a director
and the company secretary or two directors or a director in the
presence of a witness signing the document;
• Where a deed is to be executed on behalf of a person, has sufficient authority been
given or seen? Although it is now specifically permitted for a deed to be
executed on behalf of a person, the other party to the deed or a person
receiving the deed may have concerns whether the person executing the
deed has been properly authorised.
It is suggested that:
• the deed should recite that the person signing has been authorised by
the person making the deed or the relevant party to the deed;
• the signature block clause should be adapted to state that the person
signing on behalf of the person making the deed or the relevant party
to the deed has been authorised to do so; and
269
• that the person making the deed or the relevant party to the deed
should provide written authority (such as a power of attorney, board
resolution etc).
270
271
272
Background
A definitions clause provides the meaning that certain words are to have
when used in an agreement. The layout and styling of a definitions clause (if
used at all) is a matter for personal preference. However, the aim is that the
definitions aid the user(s) of an agreement in understanding the meaning
and purpose of the agreement.
273
The danger of such long definitions is that they fall subject to the legal
Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing
excludes another, see Cumulative Remedies). The fact that one situation or
factor is not defined might mean that a court would hold that it has been
deliberately excluded (see Seay v Eastwood [1976] 1 WLR 1117 at 1121).
However, it is not always possible to avoid long definitions. Eg, a definition
of intellectual property might include a large number of items because
‘intellectual property’ does not have one settled meaning, or the types of
intellectual property which are subject of the agreement might vary from
one agreement to another.
• defining more terms than are necessary. Eg:
• defining technical words when the meaning is understood by the
parties or the meaning is set by a recognised third party organisation;
or
• where the meaning is clear from the context of agreement, or
• defining words where there already exists a meaning defined by
legislation, such as:
‘month’ shall mean a calendar month (set out in the Interpretation
Act 1978); or
‘holding company’ or ‘subsidiary’ etc (set out in the Companies Act
2006)
274
• Use of ‘Unless the context requires otherwise’ or ‘where the context so admits’. The
aim of these phrases is to cover the situation where there is a defined
word, but it is used somewhere in the agreement in a sense other than
its defined meaning. Sometimes the problem is that a party to, or user
of, the agreement may not be clear as to when a defined word is being
used ‘where the context requires otherwise’ or ‘where the context so
admits’ (see Blue Metal Industries Ltd v RW Dilley [1970] AC 827, [1969]
3 All ER 437, PC; Floor v Davis [1980] AC 695, PC and Oxonica Energy Ltd
v Neuftec Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 668 and Case analysis below).
For example, if intellectual property is defined as meaning only patents
and use of the defined expression is with initial capitals (Intellectual
Property), then writing the expression in lower case might mean that
the use of the expression means something other than just patents. The
difficulty is in knowing whether the user will spot the difference and also
determining whether the drafter has not just made a mistake by failing to
use initial capitals.
The best solution, where the parties clearly wish a defined word to have a
sense other than its defined meaning, is to:
• clearly set out the meaning that it is to have in the part of the
agreement in which it will be used; or
275
Where used, the word ‘including’ will generally mean that the definition
is not self contained, and can include similar items that have the same
meaning as the defined term, in the context of the agreement (see Adelphi
(Estates) Ltd v Christie [1984] 1 EGLR 19).
276
Drafting issues
277
278
Precedent 1—Columns
Case analysis
279
2 The court applied the now famous words (at least among lawyers) of
Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich
Building Society [1997] UKHL 2, [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 912–913:
‘the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to
a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would
reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they
were at the time of the contract.’
5 Because of the poor quality of the drafting and the ambiguity in the
meaning of a definition, the court felt able to in effect rewrite part of
the contract to arrive at a meaning in keeping with good business
sense and ignore the meaning and the use of a defined term alto-
gether:
‘Initially I felt uncomfortable with ignoring the closing words “or Licensed
Patent” in the definition of Licensed Products for the purposes of deciding
what was royalty bearing. But in the end, I think that has to be done to
make rational sense of this appallingly drafted document. At least the
draftsman recognised that his definitions might not apply if the context
otherwise required, and in this instance context requires just that.’
6 In this case the failure to consider carefully the definitions used had a
clear financial impact on the amount one party would need to pay in
royalties (and which the other parties expected to receive).
280
3 The licence agreement provided that the claimant would pay royal-
ties to the defendant on the sale of ‘Licensed Products’. The defined
meaning of ‘Licensed Products’ was:
‘any product, process or use falling within the scope of claims in the
Licensed Application or Licensed Patent’.
4 After the signing of the patent and know-how licence agreement the
defendant’s patent applications proceeded through the application
processes in a number of countries. The patents granted had claims
which where narrower than those of the patent applications. (A claim
is ‘a definition in words of the invention you want to protect’ and as
set out in a patent application.)
5 The claimant took over research and its scientists developed a
commercial product (Envirox), made sales and paid royalties to the
defendant. It then developed a further product (Envirox 2) which was
outside the claims of the patents granted, at least in Europe. The
claimant refused to pay any royalties on Envirox 2.
6 However, Envirox 2 fell within the claims of the PCT application (but
not that of the granted patents).
7 Therefore the dispute between the parties and the decision in the
case fell on the precise meaning of the definition quoted above. The
judgment of the court noted that the section of the agreement con-
taining definitions (including the one quoted above in paragraph 3 of
this factual background), started with the phrase ‘unless the context
otherwise requires’, which meant that in different context a definition
could have different meanings.
8 The court noted that interpreting the quoted definition could lead to
three possible results:
(a) any product covered by the claims of the PCT patent applica-
tion (ie the widest claims); or
(b) any product covered by the claims of a PCT patent application
or a patent and therefore could be a later patent claim wider
than the claim of an application; or
(c) any product covered by the claims of a national application
when and if it superseded the PCT application, and if in turn
the national application was superseded by a granted patent,
then the claims of the granted patent. In effect the words “as the
case may be” would be added to the quoted definition above,
and the royalty payable would be dependent on the particular
patent position in each country.
9 The claimant argued that the third result applied, so that in a particu-
lar territory if a national patent with a narrower claim superseded a
PCT application, royalties would be paid only on a product that fell
within that narrower claim.
281
282
sary to tie payment to what was being licensed. The court noted that
payments not only covered the licensed patents but know-how and
the non-competition clause. Therefore in the context of the payment
of royalties the alternative of ‘or Licensed Patent’ should be read
as not being applicable and in this context it makes no sense or an
unreasonable sense. The court was initially not comfortable with dis-
regarding the phrase ‘or Licensed Patent’ in the definition of Licensed
Products for deciding what was royalty bearing, but it was necessary
to do so to make rational sense of an ‘appallingly drafted document’.
283
Background
In consumer transactions, everyone is familiar with the practice of ‘putting
down a deposit’. Deposits are often used:
• to reserve items that are purchased at a later date, or in circumstances
where a supplier must incur costs before it can supply goods or services
(eg, a tailor who orders cloth to make a suit; a builder who needs to
buy materials before being able to start building). If the customer fails
subsequently to purchase the item, the deposit is kept by the tradesperson;
• as a sum paid by a tenant to a landlord as a security against damage
to the landlord’s property. There is long-established case law as to the
circumstances when a landlord must return or can forfeit a deposit (as
well as now statutory provision for the protection of deposits for assured
tenancies).
The courts have found ways round the strict wording of contracts, when
deciding whether deposits must be returned. This section will consider some
of the drafting issues that arise in relation to deposits, particularly in the
context of commercial (ie non-consumer) transactions.
Use of a deposit
A deposit serves the dual purpose of:
• going against the price for the goods or services if the transaction for
them is completed; and
• acting as a guarantee that the buyer means business (it must be ‘earnest
money’) (Soper v Arnold (1889) 14 App CAS 429; Linggi Plantations Ltd v
Jagatheesa [1972] 1 MLJ 89 PC; Griffon Shipping LLC v Firodi Shipping Ltd
[2013] EWHC 593 (Comm)).
The general position is that if the buyer fails to pay the rest of the price or
accept the subject matter of the contract the supplier may repudiate the
contract and the deposit is forfeited to the supplier (eg see Hall v Burnell
284
[1911] 2 Ch 551). The converse is also true, that if the supplier fails to fulfil
its obligations (eg deliver goods, provide title to the goods etc) then the buyer
may repudiate the contract and recover the deposit (eg see Alexander v Webber
[1922] 1 KB 642).
285
Part payment
If the advance payment is a ‘part payment’ rather than a deposit, and
the contract is terminated; the payer of the part payment may be able
to recover some or all of it, even if the contract was terminated because of
the customer’s default. However, this will depend on the provisions of
the agreement (Cadogan Petroleum Holdings Ltd v Global Process Systems
LLC [2013] EWHC 214 (Comm)). In this case the sale of a gas plant was
to be paid for in instalments, and the seller was to retain title until all the
instalments were paid. The judge held that the instalments were not a deposit
and the rules relating to deposits did not apply. The judge also held that the
instalments were contractually agreed amounts to be paid at particular times,
and since they were not paid on a breach of contract the rules relating to
penalties also did not apply.
Whether a part-payment is returnable will depend on whether the payment
is conditional or unconditional upon performance of the contract (Griffon
Shipping LLC v Firodi Shipping Ltd [2013] EWHC 593 (Comm); Cadogan
Petroleum Holdings Ltd v Global Process Systems LLC [2013] EWHC 214 (Comm)).
If unconditional then the receiver of the part-payment can retain it.
The tradesman would, however, be able to counterclaim for any loss he had
suffered (Dies v British and International Mining and Finance Corpn Ltd [1939]
1 KB 724). In other words, it seems that to retain a ‘part payment’ one must
prove one’s loss, unlike the position with deposits.
286
Drafting issues
• Purpose of advance payment. What is the purpose of the advance payment? Eg:
• is it a means to show that the purchaser of the good or service is in
earnest? Or
• is it to enable the supplier to pay for materials that it needs to perform
the contract?
• Can the supplier retain the advance payment? If there is a default by the
purchaser, can the supplier retain the advance payment?
• in what circumstances can the supplier retain it?
• can the supplier retain all of it?
• does the supplier need to prove that it has suffered loss equal to at
least the amount of the advance payment?
• If there is only partial performance? What is to happen if some, but not all,
of the contract is performed? For example, if a contract concerns the
manufacture of goods but not all the goods are manufactured or for
some other reason the manufacturer fails to fulfil its obligations? Is the
purchaser entitled to receive the uncompleted goods?
• Deposits. If the parties wish to make the advance payment a deposit:
• at what amount is it to be set? (If set unjustifiably high, the court
might consider it to be a penalty, and order its refund in full (see the
summary of law, above).
• is retention of the deposit the supplier’s only remedy if the purchaser
fails to complete the contract? That is, will there be wording to
indicate that it is without prejudice to the other rights and remedies
specified in the contract or available under law?
287
Although many of the issues to be dealt with will concern the price and
payment, the consequence of a non-payment of a part payment or failure to
carry out obligations by any party will involve considerations concerning:
• Consequences of termination;
• Termination;
• Exemptions;
• Warranties (if any given about part payments etc).
Consumer law
This paragraph of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Sch 2, makes it clear that a
payment by the consumer which is retained by a supplier is in itself not unfair.
It is only unfair where an equivalent remedy is not provided to the consumer
where the supplier cancels the contract. What is perhaps less clear is, where
a payment is made and the supplier uses some or all of it to buy materials
etc so that it can perform the contract, and the consumer then refuses to
perform the contract but the supplier does not provide an equivalent remedy
as specified in Sch 2, para 4, whether, in these circumstances, the holding of
the advance payment/deposit is unfair.
Precedent 1—Deposit
[Party A] shall pay to [Party B] a deposit of £[ ] forthwith on signature of
this agreement. If [Party A] fails to pay the balance of the Contract Price
by [date] or seeks to terminate the Order, [Party B] may retain all of the
deposit. [[Party A] acknowledges that the amount of the deposit is rea-
sonable and that it is reasonable for [Party B] to retain all of the deposit
288
in the event of [Party A]’s default, bearing in mind [Party B]’s anticipated
costs and expenses.]
Precedent 2—Deposit
Where the Customer places a firm order for Goods to be ordered from a
manufacturer, a non-returnable deposit of one-third of the contract price
will be required from the Customer. [If the Company agrees to refund all
or part of the deposit for any reason:
(a) the refund will be by credit note or cheque at the discretion of the
Company; and
(b) the Company will be entitled to retain 10% of the contract price to
cover expenses.]
Precedent 9—Deposit
When you place your order we may require that you pay a deposit before
we will accept your order. The purpose of the deposit is to show your
firm commitment to ordering [specify]. The deposit will also be used by
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290
291
Drafting issues
Any disclaimers used in the sense meant in this section normally appear with
a Warranty clause.
The word ‘disclaimer’ itself is often not used, but other words are, such as:
• ‘admits’;
• ‘acknowledge’;
• ‘agree’;
• ‘acknowledge and agree’;
• ‘makes’, etc.
They are more often used to create the disclaimer. But the choice of wording
for this type of issue is unlikely to be determinative, as in the wording quoted
above, where ‘disclaimer’ or any of the words mentioned immediately above
are not used. The key words used are ‘waives and releases’, but in the context
of the clause (and the other clauses relating to it):
• it is clear that the only warranties etc offered are those which the seller
provides (in exchange for those implied etc by law);
• the only warranties are those found elsewhere in the agreement; and
• there is an exclusion of liability also found elsewhere in the agreement.
(See Air Transworld Ltd v Bombardier In [2012] EWHC 243 (Comm), (see
Exemption clauses)). Without clear wording it may not be immediately obvious
whether the wording used is to limit or exclude liability or to prevent the
liability arising in the first place.
292
Precedent 2—Disclaimer
The Purchaser admits that:
(a) the assets agreed to be sold have been inspected by him or on his
behalf; and
(b) he has entered into this agreement on the basis of such inspection
and not in reliance on any representation, warranty or statement
written or oral made by or on behalf of the Vendor other than replies
to written enquiries and other statements given in writing by the
Vendor’s solicitors to the Purchaser’s solicitors.
293
Background
A contract may be formed between two parties by:
• one written document; or
• a number of documents (including letters and other written terms) taken
together; or
• oral statements; or
• a mixture of oral statements and written documents.
It is therefore essential, particularly where there has been a period of
negotiation leading up to the contract, that the parties are quite clear as to
what constitutes the provisions of their agreement. They should also be clear
about whether the contract should consist of the final written agreement
alone or should also include:
• other documents (eg sales literature containing technical specifications
for goods being sold); or
• any statements made by either party, which may have induced the other to
enter the contract; or
• any other contractual documentation.
In the absence of an express provision, it will generally be a matter of
interpretation whether a document forms part of the contract and whether a
statement by a party is to be regarded as a contractual term or a representation
or as a statement having no legal effect.
A court may apply the so-called ‘parol evidence’ rule to exclude such
statements and documents from the contract, or the courts may find there is
an actionable misrepresentation or a collateral contract. In this area, it seems
that the courts have some flexibility as to which ‘principles of construction’ are
to be applied. The contract drafter may wish to try to avoid such uncertainties
by including an ‘entire agreement’ or ‘whole agreement’ clause.
294
Generally, it is in the interests of all parties that all the applicable terms
and conditions are stated in one place. There is no legal difficulty in having
a contract made up of both oral and written statements, and for written
statements not to be contained in the one document. Not doing so can cause
problems in proving, in the event of dispute, whether a particular statement
is a term of the contract at all, and also deciding which statement is the one
that is a provision of a contract, particularly if there are several statements all
dealing with the same issue.
The principal aim of an ‘entire agreement’ or ‘whole agreement’ clause is to
state that all the terms and conditions of a contract are contained within a
written agreement between the parties to the contract (eg Inntrepreneur Pub v
East Crown [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611). Most ‘entire agreement’ clauses aim to
fulfil two purposes:
• an exclusion of liability: the parties are excluding liability for any (prior)
agreements or representations not found in the agreement (that the
current agreement supersedes them); and
• (usually but not always) a statement of non reliance: the parties are stating that
they are only relying on the representations and warranties found in the
current agreement (and are not relying on pre-contract representations).
In consequence, such a clause attempts to exclude other documents or
statements from forming part of the contract. These might include, eg:
• statements made by a party’s sales representatives, which may have induced
the other party to enter into the contract; and/or
• statements provided or matters etc set out in documentation provided
during the course of pre-contract negotiations; and/or
• any documents such as sales literature or exchanges of correspondence
between the parties; and/or
• any prior agreements that the parties entered into.
Whilst, in the above examples, the seller might wish to exclude over-
enthusiastic statements from forming part of the contract, the purchaser
might well wish them to be included. Therefore, an entire agreement clause
should not be automatically included. A party might wish to include in the
contract warranties reflecting any statements made by the other party that
induced them to enter into the contract. As long as appropriate warranties are
included, that party might be content for the inclusion of an entire agreement
clause.
Entire agreement clauses have been considered effective by the courts in many
cases (see Watford Electronics v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317),
and recent cases have spelled out the reach that an entire agreement clause
can have.
295
296
Drafting issues
297
• representations;
• breach of collateral warranties;
• promises;
• conditions;
• implied terms based on usage and custom;
• other agreements, side letters etc which are related to the same
transaction.
• Do the parties wish to exclude all or some pre-contract representations? An
acknowledgment of non-reliance is likely to be effective (such as in
Precedent 1), and it may be necessary to use very clear wording. However,
this may not be the intention of the parties, or may need additional
wording to identify any specific representations that one or more of the
parties do wish to rely on, such as adding to the end of Precedent 1:
‘except for the representations set out in Schedule [ ]’.
298
as well as meetings and discussions held. One or more of the parties may wish
that some of those documents and the records or notes of such meetings and
discussions are included in an agreement. Unless there is a formal process to
document which of those documents and records are to be included or part
of the agreement, an Entire agreement may exclude them. For example, as the
negotiations proceed one party requiring that the documents and records are
included in a Warranties clause or disclosure letter.
Although an Entire agreement clause may appear (by convention) with other
boilerplate language, it is far from standard and routine wording to include
in a contract. Each element (as described under Purpose of entire agreement and
non-reliance clause) will need separate consideration.
Consumer issues
299
Case analysis
300
301
2 The Court of Appeal agreed with the judge at first instance that this
entire clause excluded liability in respect of collateral warranty (but
not misrepresentations):
‘34. As to [the entire agreement clause] Rix J was plainly correct to
hold that this excluded liability in respect of collateral warranty. The
combination of the opening words, coupled with ‘and there are not any
agreements, understandings or promises oral or written’ clearly covers
such a warranty. [Counsel for the first defendant] also submits they cover
misrepresentations; furthermore, he submits that it is highly technical to
draw a distinction between misrepresentations and collateral warranties
based on the self same representations. But we do not think the opening
words themselves exclude misrepresentations and they cannot be
brought within the specific words. In our judgment the judge was right on
his construction of art 10.16.’
2 The court held that an entire agreement clause that denied a state-
ment of contractual force did not reduce the statement’s effect as a
misrepresentation:
‘An entire agreement provision does not preclude a claim in
misrepresentation, for the denial of contractual force to a statement cannot
affect the status of the statement as a misrepresentation. The same clause
in an agreement may contain both an entire agreement provision and a
further provision designed to exclude liability eg for misrepresentation or
breach of duty.’
Watford Electronics v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317, [2001]
2 All ER (Comm) 596
1 A different approach to Thomas Witter Ltd v TBP Industries Ltd was
taken in interpreting an entire agreement clause. The entire agree-
ment clause was in similar terms (in essence) to that found in the
Witter case:
302
‘Entire Agreement. The parties agree that these terms and conditions
(together with any other terms and conditions incorporated in the Contract)
represent the entire agreement between the parties relating to the sale
and purchase of the Equipment and that no statement or representations
made by either party have been relied upon by the other in agreeing to
enter into the Contract.’
2 In this case, the court disagreed with the judge at first instance,
where that judge stated that an entire agreement clause is ‘one that
excludes liability rather than precludes liability from ever occurring’.
The Court of Appeal disagreed with this and indicated that an entire
agreement clause aims to prevent a party to whom a representation
was made from asserting that it relied upon it. The Court of Appeal
repeated passages from an earlier judgment of that court about the
effectiveness of an acknowledgement of non-reliance:
‘In my view an acknowledgment of non-reliance … is capable of operating
as an evidential estoppel. It is apt to prevent the party who has given the
acknowledgment [of non reliance] from asserting in subsequent litigation
against the party to whom it has been given that it is not true. That seems
to me to be a proper use of an acknowledgment of this nature, which, as
Mr Justice Jacob pointed out in the Thomas Witter case [Thomas Witter
Ltd v TBP Industries Ltd [1996] 2 All ER 573], has become a common
feature of professionally drawn commercial contracts.’
and
‘There are, as it seems to me, at least two good reasons why the courts
should not refuse to give effect to an acknowledgment of non-reliance in
a commercial contract between experienced parties of equal bargaining
power -a fortiori, where those parties have the benefit of professional
advice. First, it is reasonable to assume that the parties desire commercial
certainty. They want to order their affairs on the basis that the bargain
between them can be found within the document which they have signed.
They want to avoid the uncertainty of litigation based on allegations as to
the content of oral discussions at pre-contractual meetings. Second, it is
reasonable to assume that the price to be paid reflects the commercial
risk which each party – or, more usually, the purchaser – is willing to
accept. The risk is determined, in part at least, by the warranties which
the vendor is prepared to give. The tighter the warranties, the less the
risk and (in principle, at least) the greater the price the vendor will require
and which the purchaser will be prepared to pay. It is legitimate, and
commercially desirable, that both parties should be able to measure the
risk, and agree the price, on the basis of the warranties which have been
given and accepted.’
303
4 What was necessary, according to the Court of Appeal, was that limi-
tation of liability and entire agreement clauses had to be interpreted
together and in context.
5 Where the Court of Appeal differs in this case from the judge in
Thomas Witter Ltd v TBP Industries Ltd is in the emphasis the Court
of Appeal placed on the parties being able to negotiate and decide on
the terms of a contract, and that the language used in the final agree-
ment fulfils those intentions. As the court stated:
‘The importance of the entire agreement clause in the present context –
and, in particular, the importance of the acknowledgment of non-reliance
which constitutes the second part of that clause – is that the first sentence
in [the limitation of liability clause, which reads ‘Neither [Sanderson CBL]
nor [Watford Electronics] shall be liable to the other for any claims for
indirect or consequential losses whether arising from negligence or
otherwise’] has to be construed on the basis that the parties intend that
their whole agreement is to be contained or incorporated in the document
which they have signed and on the basis that neither party has relied on any
pre-contract representation when signing that document. On that basis,
there is no reason why the parties should have intended, by the words
which they have used in the first sentence of the limit of liability clause, to
exclude liability for negligent pre-contract misrepresentation. Liability in
damages under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 can arise only where the
party who has suffered the damage has relied upon the representation.
Where both parties to the contract have acknowledged, in the document
itself, that they have not relied upon any pre-contract representation, it
would be bizarre (unless compelled to do so by the words which they have
used) to attribute to them an intention to exclude a liability which they
must have thought could never arise.’
2 The judge held that the clause did not exclude liability for misrepre-
sentation, as the wording does not state that the misrepresentations
are of no legal effect, but only that they superseded and are not terms
of the contract.
3 In order for misrepresentations to have no effect, the wording used in
the clause would have needed to go further.
4 While the wording indicated above regarding superseding any previ-
ous discussions, correspondence, representations etc regarding the
subject matter of the agreement did not prevent other agreements or
collateral agreements having effect:
304
‘It did not supersede those mattes so far as there might be any liability for
misrepresentation based on them.’
5 The clause includes a reference to representation; but there is nothing
in the wording ‘that it is intended to take away a right to rely on mis-
representations’. If the entire agreement clause wished to exclude lia-
bility for negligent misrepresentation than clearer wording is needed
(which the above clause did not provide).
AXA Sun Life Services plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 133
1 In this case the entire agreement clause stated:
‘This Agreement and the Schedules and documents referred to herein
constitute the entire agreement and understanding between you and us in
relation to the subject matter thereof. Without prejudice to any variation as
provided in clause 1.1, this Agreement shall supersede any prior promises,
agreements, representations, undertakings or implications whether made
orally or in writing between you and us relating to the subject matter of
this Agreement but this will not affect any obligations in any such prior
agreement which are expressed to continue after termination.’
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306
Background
These words are most often seen in relation to:
• the appointment of agents and distributors; and
• the licensing of intellectual property rights.
Eg,
• a manufacturer may wish to appoint an agent to sell goods on behalf of
the manufacturer. The manufacturer may make the appointment on an
exclusive, non-exclusive or sole basis for a defined territory; or
• a patent owner may grant a licence to another person to exploit the patent
(ie develop products, and then make and sell them). The licence that the
patent owner can grant can be an exclusive, non-exclusive or sole licence,
defined in terms of the territory, the technical field or some activity.
307
owner could grant a further exclusive licence in a different field (ie where
the field was care homes) and the territory was also the UK.
• Sole. The grant of sole rights usually means that the grantor of the rights
will not grant the same rights to any other person, but the grantor may
exercise those rights directly.
Eg, based on the above example, the patent owner could grant a sole
licence to manufacture and sell the electronic safety product in the field
of doctors and hospitals within the UK and the patent owner could also
do so, but the patent owner would not be able to grant a licence for others
to do so.
• Non-exclusive. The grant of non-exclusive rights does not restrict the
grantor from granting similar rights to third parties and/or exercising
those rights directly.
Eg, based on the above example, the patent owner could grant several
licences allowing several persons all to manufacture and sell the electronic
safety product to doctors and hospitals within the UK.
Statutory definitions
Drafting issues
308
• Sole and exclusive licences. Sometimes exclusive licences are stated to be ‘sole
and exclusive licences’. This wording seems to be an American import. If
an exclusive licence is intended, it probably does no harm to call it a sole
and exclusive licence, and it may be useful when interpreting the contract
under foreign laws. But in contracts between English parties it is probably
better to avoid this phrase.
• Competition law issues. The grant of exclusive or sole rights is likely to
raise issues under EU, and possibly UK, competition laws. The parties
should obtain specialist advice in these areas when drafting agreements
containing the grant of such rights.
• Intellectual property issues. The grant of rights in relation to intellectual
property can raise complex law issues, on which the parties should obtain
specialist legal advice before entering into an agreement (for further
reading in this area see Anderson (Ed), Technology Transfer (3rd Edn,
2010, Bloomsbury Professional (4th edn in preparation)).
• Meaning of ‘exclusive’ for intellectual property statutes. The key point from the
statutes is that:
• all other persons; and
• the owner of the intellectual property
are excluded by the grant of the licence.
However, none of the three principal statutes relating to intellectual
property state that where a licensee is an ‘exclusive licensee’ that all the
rights in and under the intellectual property in question are licensed to
that licensee.
Therefore it is possible for there to be more than one exclusive licensee.
Eg, a licensor could license to several people the right to work the patent
if they were all licensed in different territories: Courtauld’s Application
[1956] RPC 208.
• Right to sub-license. The right to sub-license needs particular attention,
especially where the wording of the agreement does not deal with it.
309
Intellectual property
310
Note: this is the only statutory definition that requires the licence to be in
writing (and signed) for the grant of exclusive use of a licence.
There are similar definitions in s 119D (Performers’ rights) and in s 225
(Design rights).
311
‘Article 1 – Definitions
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions shall
apply:
…
(p) “exclusive licence” means a licence under which the licensor itself
is not permitted to produce on the basis of the licensed technology
rights and is not permitted to license the licensed technology rights
to third parties, in general or for a particular use or in a particular
territory;
(q) “exclusive territory” means a given territory within which only one
undertaking is allowed to produce the contract products , but where
it is nevertheless possible to allow another licensee to produce the
contract products within that territory only for a particular customer
where the second licence was granted in order to create an alternative
source of supply for that customer;
(r) “exclusive customer group” means a group of customers to which only
one party to the technology transfer agreement is allowed to actively
to sell the contract products produced with the licensed technology’.
312
[for as long as this Agreement remains in force] [or to the extent that and
for as long as the Licensed Products are within subsisting claims of unex-
pired Patents, or the Know-how is not public knowledge in the relevant
country]
313
Background
Most commercial agreements include provisions that seek to limit or exclude
liability (together known as exemption clauses). Exemption clauses come in a
variety of shapes and sizes. Eg, they may seek to do the following:
• exclude obligations that might otherwise be implied into the contract
(eg implied warranties of fitness for purpose under the Sale of Goods Act
1979);
• allow a party unilaterally to vary its obligations under the contract (eg
allow the party to supply different goods or services to those that were
ordered);
• limit a party’s remedies in the event of another party’s breach of contract
(eg prevent the party not in breach from terminating the contract);
• impose severe restrictions on the circumstances in which a party may
exercise contractual remedies (eg in a contract for the sale of goods,
requiring claims for damaged goods to be made within a short period,
such as within seven days of delivery);
• limit liability to a specified sum of money (eg to no more than the price
paid by the purchaser);
• exclude liability for certain types of losses (eg indirect and consequential
losses);
• exclude liability altogether.
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315
clearly expressed, but there is no reason why they should be judged by the
specially exacting standards which are applied to exclusion [clauses]’;
• there is no absolute principle that an exemption clause cannot cover a
fundamental breach or a complete non-performance by a party of its
obligations (see Photo Production Ltd v Securior Transport Ltd [1980] 1 All
ER 556). It is possible to do so if the wording of the exemption clauses is
clear enough, even more so with a more ‘literal’ approach now adopted
by the most senior courts interpreting contracts, following cases such as
Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900, eg ‘where the parties
have used unambiguous language, the court must apply it’ and Arnold v
Britton [2015] UKSC 36.
Accordingly, very clear language is needed to overcome the strong
inclination of the courts to interpret the words in a way which does not
completely exclude a party’s liability. Eg, in a contract for the supply
of goods, if the supplier is to exclude liability for supplying completely
different goods to those ordered, this would need stating explicitly, using
words that might well be commercially off-putting to any purchaser:
‘We may supply you with completely different goods to those you have
ordered, or supply you with no goods at all, and we will have no liability
to you for doing so’. Language of this kind goes well beyond the typical
‘legal’ language of many exclusion clauses and is rarely encountered. It
may have the effect of making the contract merely a statement of intent
rather than a legally binding contract;
• an exemption clause will not relieve a party from liability for its own
negligence (or that of the party’s ‘servants’) unless this is stated specifically
or is clearly intended by implication (see Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v
R [1952] AC 192, [1952] 1 All ER 305, PC, a Canadian case, approved in
Gillespie Bros & Co Ltd v Roy Bowles Transport Ltd [1973] QB 400, [1973]
1 All ER 193, CA). If the exemption clause does not refer to negligence
it may nevertheless be interpreted as exempting liability for negligence
if the clause uses words that imply that negligence is covered. Eg, the
exemption clause might refer to ‘all losses however caused’ or ‘from any
cause whatsoever’. If the only possible basis of liability is negligence, it may
not be necessary to refer to negligence specifically;
• an exemption clause will only cover a repudiatory breach (a deliberate
breach by a party to a contract) with the use of the clearest words, even
more so where the deliberate breach is one which insurance is unlikely
to cover (see Internet Broadcasting Corpn Ltd (t/a NETTV) v MAR LLC (t/a
MARHedge) [2009] EWHC 844 (Ch), [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 112. If
insurance is not available then (according to the judge in this case) it may
be necessary to use words such as ‘including deliberate repudiatory acts by
the Parties themselves’;
• an exemption clause that is intended to exclude a condition implied by
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 should use the word ‘condition’. Otherwise it is
necessary to use language that can only refer to a condition (see eg Wallis,
316
Son and Wells v Pratt and Haynes, HL [1911] AC 394, [1911-13] All ER Rep
989; KG Bominflot Bunkergesellschaft für Mineralole mbH & Co v Petroplus
Marketing AG (The Mercini Lady) [2010] EWCA Civ 1145, [2011] 2 All
ER (Comm) 522); Air Transworld Ltd v Bombardier In [2012] EWHC 243
(Comm);
• on public policy grounds a contracting party cannot exclude liability for its
own fraud in inducing the other party to enter into a contract (HIH Casualty
and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] UKHL 6, [2003]
1 All ER (Comm) 349). Also, a party cannot exclude liability for its own
fraud during the course of the agreement (Frans Maas (UK) Ltd v Samsung
Electronics (UK) Ltd [2004] EWHC 1502 (Comm), [2005] 2 All ER (Comm)
783).
It may be possible to exclude the fraud or deceit of a party’s agent in
inducing a contract, but general wording will not be sufficient. Such an
intention ‘must be expressed in clear and unmistakable terms on the face
of the contract’ (HIH case, at para 16, although the House of Lords in
this case came to no final view on this point). It is possible to exclude
liability for the deliberate wrongdoing of a party’s agent arising from the
performance of the agreement (Frans Maas (UK) Ltd v Samsung Electronics
(UK) Ltd [2004] EWHC 1502 (Comm), [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 783, see
Case analysis below). In this case it was held that the following wording,
as a matter of interpretation rather than law, was capable of covering
deliberate wrongdoing: ‘the Company’s liability howsoever arising and
notwithstanding that the cause of the damage be unexplained shall not
exceed…’
Some of the main issues that need consideration when drafting exclusion or
‘limitation of liability’ clauses are as follows. This is only a brief summary; the
detailed provisions of these laws must be considered when attempting to draft
exemption clauses.
317
Contract terms that attempt to exclude or limit liability (or a party’s remedies)
for misrepresentations made before the contract was made are of no effect,
unless they satisfy the requirement of reasonableness as stated in the Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977, s 11(1) (Misrepresentation Act 1968, s 3, as
substituted by UCTA 1977).
Drafting issues
318
319
320
party losses, and not losses suffered by the other party to the contract. It
may improve the chances of such a clause being upheld if this is made
clear. Generally, bear in mind that indemnity clauses may be caught by
the UCTA 1977, s 4 and are interpreted by the courts in a similar way to
exemption clauses.
• Where possible, do not contract on ‘standard’ terms. The best policy is for the
parties to negotiate and agree specific terms and conditions. This does not
often reflect the reality of modern commercial practice, whereby one party
will put forward their own terms and conditions and will only trade on
them and not entertain any changes (or only minor changes). A further
factor is that many contracts (even for high value standard items) are now
entered into via online contracting and the business trading that way may
not allow any other method of entering a contract with it.
The restrictions set out in UCTA 1977, s 3(1) apply ‘where one of [the
contracting parties] deals… on the other’s written standard terms
of business’. If the wording of the exemption clause was specifically
negotiated, s 3(1) will not apply (Fillite (Runcorn) Ltd v APV Pasilac Ltd
The Buyer, July 1995). However, there does not seem to be clear authority
on this point, and the UCTA 1977 appears to make no such requirement).
The meaning of ‘written standard terms of business’ is not defined or
explained in the UCTA 1977. The advantage (or disadvantage) of having
an agreement come within the meaning of a ‘written standard terms of
business’ is that, among other things, provisions that attempt to exclude
or limit liability are subject to a requirement of reasonableness. The cases
below indicate the different ways the courts have sought to address the
issue, not all of which are consistent or are necessarily based on earlier
decisions.
For example, even though some terms may have been negotiated and
agreed in an agreement, a contract may still be regarded as on written
standard terms (St Albans City and District Council v International Computers
Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481, CA, both at first instance and at appeal). See the
definition provided in McCrone v Boots Farm Sales Ltd 1981 SLT 103 (Case
analysis below).
It appears that it will be a matter of fact and degree as to whether the
terms agreed were standard terms of the party putting them forward
(Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd [1995] FSR 654 at 674),
although it may be that if the exclusion or limitation of liability clause is
not amended, then the agreement may be considered to be standard.
In Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317,
[2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 696, [2001] IP & T 588 (although a case not
directly about the use of standard terms), the fact that standard terms
were used was not a deciding fact in whether the exclusion and limitation
of liability clauses were held to be unreasonable, and this case marks a
step back from the approach found in St Albans City and District Council v
International Computers Ltd above, and in particular South West Water Services
321
Ltd v International Computers Ltd [1999] BLR 420 (see also Case analysis
below). In the Watford Electronics case the court, in effect, appeared to be
stating that where parties are of equal strength or bargaining position,
they should be allowed to decide the terms for themselves. In the South
West Water case, although the concluded contract contained terms from
each party’s standard contracts, and the fact that there had been extensive
negotiations on terms and some changes to the limitations clauses (from
an ICL contract and including South West Water, it appears, putting its
own terms forward for exclusion and limitation of liability clauses), did
not save ICL from the finding that they had used standard terms.
Overseas Medical Supplies Ltd v Orient Transport Services Ltd [1999] 1 All ER
(Comm) 981, [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 273, CA laid down some guidelines as
to whether terms provided by one party are standard terms:
• the degree to which the ‘standard terms’ are considered by the other
party as part of the process of agreeing the terms of the contract;
• the degree to which the ‘standard terms’ are imposed on the other
party by the party putting them forward;
• the relative bargaining power of the parties;
• the degree to which the party putting forward the ‘standard terms’
is prepared to entertain negotiations with regard to the terms of the
contract generally and the ‘standard terms’ in particular;
• the extent and nature of any agreed alterations to the ‘standard terms’
made as a result of the negotiations between the parties; and
• the extent and duration of the negotiations.
A simpler (or more stringent) test is that for a contract to be made on
standard terms a party needs to use those terms in almost all cases and
without alteration (other than filling details of the particular contract)
(Yuanda (UK) Co Ltd v WW Gear Construction Ltd [2010] EWHC 720 (TCC),
[2010] All ER (D) 157 (May). The only relevant factor from the list above
was the penultimate one, ie whether there was any significant difference
between the terms offered by a party and the terms of the contract actually
made. In the Yuanda case, there were two factual reasons why one party
had not dealt on the other party’s written standard terms of business. The
first was that material alterations were made to the standard terms, and
the second was that other contractors entering into contracts also did not
enter the contract on standard terms. In all cases, material changes were
made to the standard terms and conditions.
For terms to be ‘standard terms’ those terms must be used consistently
over a period for nearly all of the contracts a party enters into. However,
where the courts appear to differ is on the amount of change that needs
to be made to turn standard terms into non-standard terms:
• only minimal changes may be made (ie such as just entering the
names of the parties, the price) (such as in the Yuanda case); or
322
• more extensive changes can be made, such as the parties starting with
standard terms and negotiating these terms with only some provisions
remaining as originally proposed. In some cases, the terms that are not
changed would be sufficient to come within the meaning of standard
terms (Pegler v Wang [2000] BLR 218, Commercial Management v
Mitchell and Regorco [2016] EWHC 76 (TCC)).
For terms to be standard terms:
(a) it is not enough that a party only prefers to use them;
(b) the terms must be used as a matter of routine and are ‘intended to be
adopted or imposed without consideration or negotiation specific to
the individual case in which they were used’ (Hadley Design Associates v
City of Westminster [2003] EWHC 1617 (TCC));
(c) there must be proof that the ‘terms are invariably or at least usually
used by [a] party. It must be shown that either by practice or by express
statement a contracting party has adopted [the contract terms] as his
standard terms of business’ (British Fermentation Products Ltd v Compair
Reavell Ltd [1998] TCC 577);
(d) it is not enough that there is use of industry standard model terms
(particularly if they have been subject to extensive negotiation and
revision, and the parties have been represented by lawyers). In such
a case ‘it will require cogent evidence to raise even an arguable case
that the resulting contract is made on the written standard terms of
one of those parties. I recognise that it might, in theory, be possible to
demonstrate that one party to such negotiations has used the industry
standard form as the basis for a set of terms it treats as its own, and that
it will not in reality countenance substantive changes, but that would
be an uncommercial and highly unlikely approach’ (African Export-
Import Bank v Shebah Exploration & Production [2016] EWHC 311
(Comm)).
• Tightly define contractual obligations to state clearly the terms on which the
services or goods are being provided (separately from any wording excluding
or limiting liability). State clearly (and in detail) in a contract how a
supplier will provide goods and services as well as the limitations as to
what it is doing. Such wording should be clearly separate and distinct
from limitations and exclusions of liability wording. The aim is that the
supplier, by adding such wording, is preventing any obligations arising to
the client/customer in the first place, and therefore the supplier will not
need to have exclusion or limitation wording to cover it (see JP Morgan
Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corpn [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm),
2008] All ER (D) 167 (Jun) at para 602, following IFE Fund SA v Goldman
Sachs International [2006] EWHC 2887 (Comm), [2006] All ER (D) 268
(Nov). For example,
• if providing a service, state that the service is subject to the co-operation
of the client/customer, or subject to any third party information being
323
• Be aware that the exemption clause may be held to be invalid despite the most
careful drafting. The most a contract drafter can do is make an educated
guess as to the limits in amount and types of liability the court will find
acceptable and try to draft clear language to reflect these limits.
‘Reasonableness’
• the way in which the relevant conditions came into being and are used is
generally relevant;
324
any custom of the trade and any previous course of dealing between the
parties);
• where the term excludes or restricts any relevant liability if some condition
is not complied with, whether it was reasonable at the time of the contract
to expect that compliance with that condition would be practicable;
• whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the
special order of the customer.
In addition to the above, it is necessary also to consider the following points:
• the question of reasonableness must be assessed having regard to the
relevant clause viewed as a whole: it is not right to take any particular
part of the clause in isolation, although it must also be viewed as against a
breach of contract which is the subject of the case;
• the reality of the consent of the customer/client to the supplier’s clause
will be a significant consideration;
• in cases of limitation rather than exclusion of liability, the size of the limit
compared with other limits in widely-used standard terms may also be
relevant;
• while the availability of insurance to the supplier is relevant, it is by no
means a decisive factor; and
• the presence of a term allowing for an option to contract without the
limitation clause but with a price increase in lieu is important.
The contract drafter who is drawing up an agreement or using an existing
precedent for a party who will wish to rely on contract terms limiting or
excluding liability will need, it is suggested, to carry out a careful analysis of
the above points to ensure that contract terms will be effective (as far as one
is able to do so), especially as it will be the party relying on the contract terms
excluding or limiting liability who will have to show that they satisfied the
requirement of reasonableness (UCTA 1977, s 3).
325
326
Case analysis
Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd [1995] FSR 654 at 674
Consideration of standard terms. It would appear that in this case the fact
that one party had taken legal and other advice on the proposed terms,
and that changes were agreed, meant that the terms were not imposed on
that party who received the original standard terms from the other party.
In addition, the party putting forward the standard terms was prepared to
enter into meaningful negotiations on them, and these negotiations took
place over some length of time.
Ailsa Craig Fishing Co Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 101
The judgment concerned the interpretation of exclusion and limitation of
liability clauses in a contract for the provision of security services, with the
limitation of liability clause stating:
‘[2f] If, pursuant to the provisions set out herein, any liability on the part of
the Company shall arise (whether under the express or implied terms of this
Contract, or at Common Law, or in any other way) to the customer for any loss
or damage of whatever nature arising out of or connected with the provision of,
or purported provision of, or failure in provision of, the services covered by this
Contract, such liability shall be limited to the payment by the Company by way
of damages of a sum…’
327
4 the validity of the clause was not affected, because it was to some
extent inconsistent with another clause (dealing with exclusion of lia-
bility for certain events);
It is worth reproducing the words of Lord Wilberforce where he succinctly
set out the position:
‘Whether a condition limiting liability is effective or not is a question of con-
struction of that condition in the context of the contract as a whole. If it is
to exclude liability for negligence, it must be most clearly and unambiguously
expressed, and, in such a contract as this, must be construed contra profer-
entem. I do not think that there is any doubt so far. But I venture to add one
further qualification, or at least clarification: one must not strive to create ambi-
guities by strained construction, as I think the appellants have striven to do.
The relevant words must be given, if possible, their natural, plain meaning.
Clauses of limitation are not regarded by the courts with the same hostility as
clauses of exclusion; this is because they must be related to other contractual
terms, in particular to the risks to which the defending party may be exposed,
the remuneration which he receives and possibly also the opportunity of the
other party to insure.
It is clear, on the findings of the Lord Ordinary (Wylie), that the respondents
were negligent as well as in material breach of their contractual obligations.
The negligence consisted in a total or partial failure to provide the service con-
tracted for […]. It is arguable, in my opinion, that the failure was not total, in
that some security against some risks was provided, though not that which
was necessary to prevent the actual damage which occurred. But I do not
think that it makes a difference as regards the applicability of the clause of limi-
tation whether this is right or not, and since their Lordships in the Inner House
were of opinion that the failure was total, I will proceed on the assumption that
this was so.
[…]
This clause is on the face of it clear. It refers to failure in provision of the ser-
vices covered by the contract. There is no warrant as a matter of construction
for reading ‘failure’ as meaning ‘partial failure’, ie as excluding ‘total failure’
and there is no warrant in authority for so reading the word as a matter of law…
The appellants tried to find an ambiguity in this clause in three ways.
(1) First they relied on the finding of the Lord Ordinary, with which the Inner
House generally agreed, that there was such an inconsistency between the
provisions of [the] condition […], excluding liability, and those of [clause] 2(f) as
to create uncertainty as to the meaning of the former [clause excluding liabil-
ity]. It was this inconsistency which led the courts below to conclude against
the validity of the exclusion clause. So it was argued the same inconsistency
and the doubts engendered by it must invalidate [clause] 2(f). But this is trans-
parently fallacious. Because cl A casts doubt on the meaning of cl B, it does
not follow at all that the converse is true and that cl B casts doubt on the
meaning of cl A. Clause B must be looked at on its own, and may turn out to be
perfectly clear…
(2) It was contended that the initial words “If, pursuant to the provisions set
out herein” are ambiguous and that their ambiguity invalidates the whole sub-
clause. But I accept on this the conclusion of Lord Dunpark that the words are
“open to construction” […] The possibility of construction of a clause does
not amount to ambiguity: that disappears after the court has pronounced the
meaning.’
328
The detailed history of the negotiations and events that led to the litigation
is set out over 30 pages in the law report. However, it seems clear that if
this amount of negotiation does not lead to the conclusion that the con-
tract was not concluded on standard terms, it is difficult to see what will.
Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317,
[2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 696, [2001] IP & T 588
On the question of reasonableness, the starting point was with
UCTA 1977, s 11:
‘[31] In order to decide whether the relevant contract term was a fair and rea-
sonable one to be included having regard to the circumstances which were, or
ought reasonably to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties
when the contract was made it is necessary, as it seems to me, to determine,
first the scope and effect of that term as a matter of construction. It is neces-
sary to identify the nature of the liability which the term is seeking in order to
exclude or restrict. Whether or not a contract term satisfies the “requirement
of reasonableness” within the meaning of Section 11 of the Unfair Contract
Terms Act 1977 does not fall to be determined in isolation. It falls to be deter-
mined where a person is seeking to rely upon the term in order to exclude or
restrict his liability in some context to which the earlier provisions of the 1977
Act (or the provisions of s 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967) apply.’
329
of liability which the term was seeking to exclude or restrict. The Court
of Appeal found other contextual elements using guidelines in the Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977, Sch 2.
Frans Maas (UK) Ltd v Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd [2004] EWHC 1502
(Comm), [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 783
This case concerned the storing of a large quantity of the defendant’s
mobile telephones at the claimant’s warehouse. The relationship was one
of bailment. The bailment was governed by the standard terms of British
International Freight Association. One provision (Clause 27(A)) stated:
‘27(A) Subject to clause 2(B) and 11(B) above and sub-clause (D) below the
Company’s liability howsoever arising and notwithstanding that the cause of
the loss or damage be unexplained shall not exceed … [the various limits set
out in sub-clauses (A) to (C)]
(D) By special arrangement agreed in writing, the Company may accept liabil-
ity in excess of the limits set out in Sub-Clauses (A) to (C) above upon the
Customer agreeing to pay the Company’s additional charges for accepting
such increased liability. Details of the Company’s additional charges will be
provided upon request.’
330
does not extend to the commonplace risk in question, then there would
be a significant hole in that safety net. These considerations lend powerful
support to the proposition that the parties intended the wording to mean
what it said; “howsoever arising” meant just that—cl 27(A) scooped up [the
claimant]’s liability, “howsoever arising”, including employee wilful default.
(iv) Nothing in the authorities to which I have referred tells against such an
approach. To the contrary, this approach to cl 27(A) is consistent with both
the Securicor and the Ailsa Craig cases; commercial contracts are not to
be artificially construed and liability even for deliberate wrongdoing can be
excluded, a fortiori limited, provided appropriate wording is used. While a
suggested limitation of liability for employee wilful default does require close
scrutiny, the [HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan
Bank [2003] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 349)] case underlines that, so
far as concerns deliberate wrongdoing in the course of performance of an
admittedly valid contract, the matter is one of construction. (v) I add this; in
practical terms, one or other party was to or would be well advised to insure
against the risk of employee wilful default; the party directly at risk was [the
defendant]; all other things being equal, it was likely to be better placed than
[the claimant] to do so. The above construction of cl 27(A) would mean that
the parties had addressed this risk and left it to [the defendant] to obtain
insurance (for losses above the limit)…’
331
602. Thus terms which simply define the basis upon which services will be
rendered and confirm the basis upon which parties are transacting business
are not subject to section 2 of UCTA. Otherwise, every contract which con-
tains contractual terms defining the extent of each party’s obligations would
have to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness. A good example of this
approach is to be seen in IFE v Goldman Sachs where the claimants sought
to characterise all of the relevant terms, upon which reliance was placed, as
exclusion clauses and thus open to challenge under the legislation. However,
Toulson J concluded that they should not be characterised as a notice exclud-
ing or restricting a liability for negligence, “but more fundamentally as going to
the issue whether there was a relationship between the parties (amounting to
or equivalent to that of professional advisor and advisee) such as to make it
just and reasonable to impose the alleged duty of care”. The Court of Appeal,
as already indicated, took exactly the same approach, in characterising the
clauses as determining the basis of the relationship between the parties.’
332
7 The wording used in the above clauses does not refer to or mention
conditions at all. Although there is no mention of the word ‘condition’, the
wording in the first clause quoted above (‘all other … obligations … or
liabilities express or implied by law’) was held to include conditions:
‘29. No person reading this Article could be in any doubt that every promise
implied by law is excluded, in favour of the contractual promises set out in the
APA. It is right that there is no term which purports to exclude the buyer’s right
to reject the goods and recover the price, nor to the specific sections of the
Sale of Goods Act, but the words “all other… obligations… or liabilities express
or implied arising by law”, which the purchaser expressly waives, necessarily
include the conditions implied by the Sale of Goods Act. In my judgment these
are apt and precise words which are sufficiently clear to exclude those implied
conditions and the Article, by necessary inference does negative the applica-
tion of those implied conditions. The parties’ language is in my judgment fairly
susceptible of only one meaning […] There is no express reference to the word
“condition” but the language must necessarily be taken to refer to the implied
conditions of the Sale of Goods Act, because they are obligations and liabili-
ties “implied, arising by law”. Moreover, the illustration of the application of
this general provision in Article 4.1(B) covers any other obligation or liability
devolving on the seller, “of any nature whatsoever”, resulting from the design,
manufacture and sale of the aircraft. No buyer could be in any doubt as to the
extent of the rights he was getting and the limitation on the seller’s obligations.
What the buyer was to get was the Warranty found in the APA and its Appendix
in place of the terms implied by the Sale of Goods Act, whether conditions or
warranties.
30. Article 4.2 exempts the defendant seller from liability for consequential
losses and Article 4.3 reinforces Article 4.1 by saying that the limited warran-
ties and liabilities provided in the APA and Appendix A were expressly agreed
in the light of the agreed purchase price and the other provisions of the APA,
which must be intended primarily to refer to the Warranty in Article 15 of the
Appendix. The point is thus reinforced that the Warranty is given in substitution
for all other rights which might be implied by the Sale of Goods Act.
31. In my judgment therefore […], this is […] a case where the words used
do encompass contractual conditions implied by law and to adopt a differ-
ent construction would amount to a distortion of the words used. There is no
ambiguity in the clause. There is only one meaning which can fairly be given to
it. It is what the parties agreed and the parties […] subject to any application of
UCTA, should be kept to their bargain.’
333
Drafting issues
• Does the agreement state that it is for a fixed period? If not expressly stated, is
the length of time that the agreement is to run clear from other provisions
in the agreement? Eg is it clearly stated:
• that a party needs to complete performance of work or tasks etc by a
certain date?
• that a party needs to provide its approval or confirm that the work etc
is completed?
Depending on the agreement, even such provisions may not be sufficiently
clear as to when an agreement is to terminate. Eg, a software development
agreement might provide that the software has to be written by a certain
date or is taken as having been completed by passing an approval stage
(or deemed to pass that stage). Other provisions (such as support) may
334
continue, but are defined as not having a specific end date (eg, they will
only terminate when the party paying for support stops paying).
• What happens at the end of the fixed period? Possible alternatives include:
• all of the provisions of the agreement terminate by expiry (see
Precedent 1);
• some of the provisions of the agreement terminate;
• the agreement terminates, but some provisions continue after
termination (see Consequences of Termination).
• Is termination by expiry made subject to other forms of termination? If the
agreement may terminate earlier than at the end of the fixed period,
should the clause indicating the fixed period be made subject to earlier
termination as provided elsewhere in the agreement? For example, if a
public relations consultant is hired to provide public relations services
for a fixed period of one year with payment of the consultant’s fee made
in monthly instalments, should it be possible for the public relations
consultant to terminate earlier than the fixed period if the client does not
pay one or more instalments or becomes insolvent? If the consultant is
allowed to do so then the clause indicating the fixed term should be made
subject to the other clauses.
335
336
337
If a force majeure clause is not included in an English law contract, then the
common law doctrine of ‘frustration’ of the contract may apply. Reliance on
this doctrine may be in neither party’s interests, for a number of reasons:
• the doctrine of frustration only operates where the frustrating
circumstances are not due to the fault of either party (see Denmark
Productions Ltd v Boscobel Productions Ltd [1969] 1 QB 699 at 725, [1968]
3 All ER 513, CA at 523, 533). However, it does not follow that in all
contracts any act of negligence will deprive a party of the defence of
frustration (see Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting
Corpn Ltd [1942] AC 154 at 166, 167, 179,195, 205, [1941] 2 All ER 165 at
173, 182, 193, 199, 200, HL);
• if the contract is frustrated:
• a party may be entitled to compensation for work done prior to
termination (unless the expenditure does not result in any benefit to
the other party); and
• a party may be able to retain any payments previously made under the
contract, but this will not always be commercially appropriate; and
• a party may no longer need to pay sums which the contract provides it
needs to make;
(the position is governed by the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act
1943);
• termination of the contract may not be in either party’s interests. They may
prefer merely to suspend the contract for the duration of the frustrating
event;
• because:
• there is no definite list of frustrating events, and
• the doctrine has developed on a case-by-case basis, and
• the doctrine is interpreted in a narrow way (Dais Contractors Ltd v
Fareham UDC [1956] AC 696)
it is not possible for a party to know whether any event will definitely be a
frustrating event, if a dispute reaches the court. To illustrate the difficulty
338
with the doctrine of frustration, for example, in The Super Servant Two
[1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1, where the defendant was contracted to carry the
claimant’s oil rig in one of two barges, but that barge was destroyed due
to an accident, it was held the accident was not a frustrating event as the
defendant had chosen to use that barge.
To avoid bringing the contract to an end under the law of frustration, most
contracts include a ‘force majeure’ clause, under which the parties expressly
agree:
• to exempt one of them or each other from performance of the contract
or liability for breach of contract where the failure to perform is due to
factors beyond that party’s control; but
• that the contract continues in force during this period; and
• that the contract is ‘re-activated’ if the ‘force majeure’ situation comes
to an end (unless the contract also provides for termination, see eg
Precedent 9).
Such clauses are effective provided that they are not uncertain in their terms.
Eg a provision that ‘the usual ‘force majeure’ clauses shall apply’ was void
for uncertainty (British Electrical and Associated Industries (Cardiff) Ltd v Patley
Pressings Ltd [1953] 1 All ER 94, [1953] 1 WLR 280).
Typically, the clause will define what amounts to ‘force majeure’ (either in
general terms or with an exhaustive list of events) and provide that if ‘force
majeure’ prevents a party from performing its obligations under the contract:
• it is not to be liable or responsible for such performance; or
• the time or method of performance is to be varied or delayed; or
• the time or method or performance can be varied or delayed and then
subsequently terminated; or
• the contract is to be discharged with specified consequences.
The contract should define or state what are ‘force majeure’ events. If the
‘force majeure’ events are defined as events beyond the reasonable control
of a party, the parties should consider expanding the definition to include
disputes with employees and the acts or omissions of sub-contractors, as
these may not qualify as being beyond a party’s control (British Electrical and
Associated Industries (Cardiff) Ltd v Patley Pressings Ltd [1953] 1 All ER 94, [1953]
1 WLR 280).
339
‘Force majeure’ clauses are particularly useful in contracts that provide for a
long-term relationship between the parties or where the parties need to use
third parties (such as suppliers, sub-contractors, agents etc). In agreements
that record one single main transaction, eg most sale agreements, such a
clause may not be necessary.
340
or:
‘(including strikes or lockouts involving a party’s own employees)’.
In many areas, what a party needs to provide under a contract is in fact done
by sub-contractors; the wording may need extending to the sub-contractors
that a party will use in performing its obligations with wording such as:
‘(other than a strike or lockout induced by the party or the party’s sub-contractor
so incapacitated)’
or:
‘(including strikes or lockouts involving a party’s, or the party’s sub-contractor,
own employees)’.
The parties should also consider whether to include a provision that a party
which is subject to a force majeure event cannot benefit from a provision
excusing or delaying performance where it has instigated or initiated the force
majeure process. Eg, in Mamidoil-Jetoil Greek Petroleum Co SA v Okta Crude Oil
Refinery AD (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 1031, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 640) a
force majeure clause stated:
‘Neither party shall be responsible for damage caused by delay or failure to
perform in whole or part the stipulations of the present Agreement, when
such delay of (sic) failure is attributable to […] compliance with request of any
governmental or EC authority […] or other causes beyond the control of the
party affected[…]’
341
or:
‘the obligations of the parties shall be suspended for so long as the force majeure
event renders performance of the agreement impossible’,
with additional wording, where appropriate, requiring that all money owing
under the agreement shall be paid immediately.
Temporary stoppage
It may be in the interests of one or both parties to keep the contract alive
where the event of stoppage is likely to be temporary, eg
• in a contract for a company to manufacture goods, the manufacturer
may need parts which it obtains from third parties. There may be a delay
in the supply of the parts, because of strike by a third party supplier,
or the parts are destroyed because the ship on which they are carried
is damaged or sinks. In such a case the customer of the manufacturer
may wish to have the option to terminate the contract (and have
someone else make the goods) or keep the contract alive and wait for a
further delivery of parts, as the time in sourcing another manufacturer,
negotiating with them and the price they charge may be less attractive
than simply waiting;
• in agency or franchise agreements, where the principal or franchisor
may wish to have the option either to terminate the contract and engage
another agent or franchisee or, if this is not feasible, to wait until the
obstruction ceases and hold the original party to the agreement.
The period during which the contract may be so kept alive is a matter for
negotiation, but it is often stated to be between six and twelve months, eg:
‘Provided that this clause shall only have effect at the discretion of [Party] except
when such event renders performance impossible for a continuous period of 6
calendar months.
A clause may also contain wording that during the period the party is prevented
from fulfilling its contractual obligation it should attempt to overcome the
event or situation causing the force majeure event:
‘… the party unable to fulfil its obligations shall immediately give notice of this to
the other party and shall do everything in its power to resume full performance
… If and when the period of such incapacity exceeds [6] months then this
agreement shall automatically terminate unless the parties first agree otherwise
in writing.’
342
343
Drafting issues
344
• determining the length of time the ‘force majeure’ event has run,
such as ‘at the [complete] discretion of [name of party]’?
• Curing the force majeure event. Is the party subject to a force majeure event
required to take any steps to cure or resolve it?
• by outlining specific steps in particular circumstances?
• by using ‘reasonable’ endeavours etc?
A widely drafted Force majeure clause can impact on many other provisions of
an agreement (such as core provisions and Payment provisions). Also, a Force
majeure clause may be subject to scrutiny as to whether it is ‘reasonable’ for
the purposes of UCTA 1977. In other words, if it is drafted so widely that it
allows one party to be excused performance of its obligations without liability
it might be in effect an exclusion or liability limitation clause.
345
Precedent 8—Short form – some specific events, and others beyond the
reasonable control of a party
Neither party shall be liable for any failure or delay in performance of this
agreement which is caused by :
346
347
(b) either party may, if the delay or stoppage continues for more
than [30] continuous days, terminate this agreement with im-
mediate effect on giving written notice to the other and neither
party will be liable to the other for such termination; and
(c) the party claiming the Force Majeure Event will take all neces-
sary steps to bring that event to a close or to find a solution
by which this agreement may be performed despite the Force
Majeure Event.
[4 So long as the Force Majeure Event continues the Customer may
contract with others for the supply of any items and/or services which
the Contractor fails to supply in accordance with the terms of this
agreement.]
348
349
350
can request a copy of the contract that the commercial organisation has
entered into with a public authority from that public authority.
351
The existing law of confidence applies; ie the FOIA does not displace the
existing law regarding what information is confidential, or when and how
an obligation of confidentiality might arise (see Information Commissioner
Guidance Information Provided in Confidence (s 41), 2015). The analysis in
the guidance is based on the leading case of Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd
[1968] FSR 415 and the decisions made by the Information Tribunal and the
notices issued by the Information Commissioner. The detail of the guidance is
beyond the scope of this book (and is primarily of interest to those in a public
authority who have to decide whether the information requested by a third
party is confidential). However, one element of the test as to whether there is
an actionable breach of confidentiality in Coco was whether there is a detriment
to the confider of the information. The guidance indicates that in order for
a public authority to withhold confidential information from disclosure,
it must be able to explicitly show that there is a detriment to the confider’s
commercial interests (from the case of Higher Education Funding Council for
England v ICO & Guardian News and Media Ltd (EA/2009/0036, 13 January
2010)). The implication for a commercial organisation is that it might provide
genuinely confidential information, but it may still be disclosed if the public
authority’s analysis leads the public authority to decide that the commercial
interests of the commercial organisation are not adversely affected.
352
The FOIA does not define ‘trade secret’ (for which the existing law of
confidence is likely to apply). The guidance issued by the Information
Commissioner (Freedom of Information Act Awareness Guidance No 5: Commercial
Interests, 2008) envisages that it ‘…covers not only secret formulae or recipes,
but can also extend[s] to such matters as names of customers and the goods
they buy, or a company’s pricing structure, if these are not generally known
and are the source of a trading advantage’. The guidance indicates that
information about the design of equipment would amount to a trade secret
but details about the equipment’s state of repair would not (the latter would
not be ‘commercially sensitive’ as it does not generate profits), in effect
whether the information is for the purpose of trade. Other factors that may be
important in deciding if information will amount to a trade secret is whether
its release would harm the owner of the information or benefit rivals, and
whether the information is also publicly known and how easy is it for others to
discover or reproduce the information.
The other main part of the exemption – that the commercial interests of a
person are likely to be prejudiced – is more difficult to categorise or quantify.
The Information Commissioner and the Ministry of Justice have issued a
large body of guidance on this area (eg Freedom of Information Act Awareness
Guidance No 5: Commercial Interests, 2008). For example, the guidance notes
that information that relates to financial matters does not necessarily relate
to the commercial activity of a commercial organisation, and only the latter is
likely to come within the FOIA.
Types of information that can be caught by this exemption include:
information about a public authority’s own commercial activities, policy
development, policy implementation or procurement; the public authority’s
purchasing position, regulation (ie where the public authority has regulatory
functions) or private finance initiative/public private partnerships.
Specific types of business information that could particularly damage
commercial interests include: research and plans relating to a potentially
353
As this is a qualified exemption, once the public authority has decided that
the exemption does apply, the public authority will still be under a duty to
determine whether it is in the public interest to release the information.
354
For example:
• a commercial organisation may provide a range of pricing information
about its products to a public authority under a contract. The public
authority will need to carry out its own assessment as that if the information
is released it would impact on the ability of the commercial organisation
to successfully trade in a competitive environment, to pick one factor that
needs consideration;
• a commercial organisation might offer a special low price to a local
authority at the start of the contract. The release of that information may
impact on its ability to charge a higher price to other customers, and
therefore should not be released following a FOIA request.
However, if the request for the price information is made five years after the
commercial organisation and public authority enter into the contract, general
or specific price information may no longer bear any relation to the prices the
commercial organisation is charging for the same product or service (or the
commercial organisation may not even be providing the product or service
in question any longer or in the same way). In such circumstances the public
authority could release the information about the price, as there would be little
or no likelihood that the commercial interests of the commercial organisation
would be prejudiced.
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Drafting issues
356
• Does the public authority have to consult with the commercial organisation about
the information that the public authority proposes to release? If the commercial
organisation is given such a right:
• does it have a right to receive a copy of the information that the public
authority proposes to disclose?
• does it have adequate time to consider the information and hold
discussions with the public authority?
• does it have the right to know whether the public authority has carried
out any analysis of whether of the potential exemptions apply?
• are there to be consequences if the public authority fails to consult
with the commercial organisation?
Precedent 1 provides example wording where a public authority has to
inform a commercial organisation about the information that a public
authority proposes to disclose together with an obligation on the public
authority to consult with the commercial organisation. As noted above,
a public authority cannot contractually agree to avoid its obligations
under FOIA; and consequently may be reluctant to agree to facing any
contractual penalties or other ramifications if it fails to fulfil its obligations
under a clause such as Precedent 2. Additionally, it may be hard to
adequately measure any losses that the commercial organisation has
suffered if information it did not wish released was released and used by
a competitor to underbid the commercial organisation for future work.
• Has the commercial party (and/or the public authority) carried out an analysis
of which information in the contractual document or relating to the contract is
genuinely confidential (or affects its commercial issues)? Given that simply
stating that all information about or relating to a contract cannot be
released is unlikely to work, the commercial organisation should consider
identifying, eg the following:
• pricing information (eg which is particularly for, or only on offer to,
the public authority);
• costing information (eg what are the costs of manufacturing or
supplying goods, or the costs of obtaining or providing its services);
• information about the goods or services that are not in the public
domain (eg product specification, technical information and know-
how);
• information about how it markets, sells and promotes its (new or
existing) products and/or services;
• information about its plans for carrying on its activities in a particular
market (whether to enter a market, withdraw from a market etc).
• Will the commercial organisation and public authority separate out the information
that is genuinely confidential or genuinely harms the commercial interests of the
commercial organisation, and which is likely to be subject to an exemption from
357
release from other information? The parties should discuss and decide what
information falls into one of the exemptions. If the parties can:
• separate out the information that they consider falls into one of the
exemptions;
• place that information into a schedule; and
• write down why they consider the information falls into one of the
exemptions,
then if there is any request for that information at a later date, the public
authority can more easily justify why the applicable exemption applies.
See Precedent 3.
Eg, a commercial organisation offers a product to a public authority at a
special price (which is only available to the public authority and is very
different from the price at which the commercial organisation normally
sells such a product to the general public). The commercial organisation
operates in a highly competitive environment. If the pricing information
is placed in a schedule, together with the reasons why it will damage
its commercial interest if made public, then the parties to the contract
can demonstrate why it should not be released following a request. Ie
releasing the information to a competitor who makes a FOIA request
might enable the competitor to underbid the commercial organisation
for other contracts from other public authorities.
See above.
358
359
360
361
362
Further assurances
After completion of a transaction, one or both parties may need to take some
further action or steps. These actions or steps often involve carrying out
(sonetimes formal) tasks to implement aspects of the transaction, for example:
• on the sale or transfer of ownership of land or property: registering the changes
in ownership with the Land Registry, or equivalent in other countries;
• on the sale of a business by way of share sale, etc: notifying changes in
shareholdings and directorships with the Registrar of Companies and
other companies registries;
• on the sale or change of ownership of patents and registered trademarks: notifying
changes in ownership with patent offices and trade mark registries;
• other requirements to notify regulatory authorities, applying for
permissions or otherwise complying with statutory and/or regulatory
rules.
A Further assurances clause is often included to avoid argument or delay in
respect of such matters, as well as setting out which party has the responsibility
for carrying out these matters. Typically the clause will require one or more
parties to execute any further documents that it may need to prepare, sign
or otherwise deal with to give effect to the terms of the agreement of which
the clause forms part. Sometimes a clause, in addition to requiring a party to
execute further documents as envisaged in the previous sentence, may also
go on to empower the other party to a transaction to sign such documents in
place of the first party.
Eg, in an agreement to sell a portfolio of patents, there is often a requirement
to formally assign ownership from the seller to the buyer. The agreement
may include a provision that the parties may agree to execute formal patent
assignments (prepared by the parties) in a specified form (which they do at
the time they sign the sale agreement). After this document is signed, these
documents are then used to register the transfer of ownership with patent
offices. However, a national patent office may insist on a particular form of
assignment being executed (such as the use of its own form rather than the
form of assignment signed by the parties) as a condition of registration of the
new owner. The ‘further assurances’ clause would require the seller to execute
363
such further assignments. If the seller refused to sign these further documents,
and if the clause provided that the other party could sign in place of the seller,
then the other party could do so.
The clause may also require a party to provide assistance to the other party,
eg by signing further papers that may be required (or possibly in some cases
taking other steps).
A clause where one party has the authority to sign in the name of the other, at
least under English law, does not require any particular formality or need any
particular wording, such as:
‘In the event that [Party A] shall have failed within 14 days from receipt of a
written request from [Party B] to do any such act or execute any such instrument,
then [Party A] authorises [Party B] to do any such act or execute any such
instrument in the name of and on behalf of [Party A].’
However, as this is a simple form of permission, it can be easily countermanded
by Party A at any time in the future. Accordingly where there are particular
actions that need taking by a party at some time in the future, that party may
be asked, as security for its undertaking to perform those acts, to give a power
of attorney to the other party.
Although doing so is partly a matter of form, creating the power of attorney
creates more certainty where the party needs to rely on the wording of such a
clause. Although the power of attorney, as with the simple form of permission,
enables the other party to perform those acts in the name of the first party in
the event of the first party’s failure to do so within a certain time, it is often
coupled with wording that states it is irrevocable (see Precedent 5).
The purpose of making the power of attorney irrevocable is to ensure that the
party giving the authority to the other party to sign documents on its behalf
cannot at some later point revoke the power of attorney. Also by stating it is
irrevocable the Powers of Attorney Act 1971 operates and, to eliminate all
doubt, the wording set out in Precedent 6 together with that in Precedent 7
may be added.
Note: a power of attorney that states it is irrevocable will only be irrevocable if it
is given to secure either a proprietary interest of the donee or the performance
of an obligation owed to the attorney (see Powers of Attorney Act 1971, s 4(1)).
It will not be irrevocable if the attorney is someone other than the person who
has the relevant proprietary interest or to whom the obligation is owed.
364
365
Drafting issues
366
are often referenced online). Dealing with the formalities for transferring
ownership of patents (particularly if there are patents (or applications)
in several countries) can take years and accordingly the company may
wish to include a further assurances clause in the form as in Precedent 5.
Clearly there is a commercial issue as to whether this would be acceptable
to the inventor.
• Effort. In most cases the further assurance tasks are often not particularly
time sensitive, but if the requesting party wishes the other party to deal with
the further assurances tasks in a timely manner, words such as ‘promptly’,
‘use all reasonable endeavours’, ‘within [ ] days of being requested by
Party [ ]’ can be added.
367
368
369
370
Background
‘Good faith’ can have a number of different meanings as far as a commercial
agreement is concerned, ie:
• a (general) duty or way of behaving, which is:
• other than acting only in a party’s own interest; or
• acting in a fair way (in the sense of a concept of fair dealing);
(there are other possible ways of defining good faith);
• a specific obligation to use ‘good faith’ to do something or achieve
something.
In English law there is no general law or requirement that the parties need
to act in ‘good faith’ to each other (unlike in many civil law countries or the
United States). However there are specific situations in English law when a
party or the parties to a contract will need to show, act in or use good faith, of
which the most relevant in a commercial context are:
• contracts with a consumer (at least to the extent that the Consumer Rights
Act 2015 applies to a consumer contract, ie that a contract term is not
contrary to the requirement of good faith, rather than operation of a
contract, see s 62(4));
• the relationship between agent and principal (in commercial agency, see
regs 3 and 4 of the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations
1993, SI 1993/3053, the agent and the principal need to show good
faith in the dealings with each other; see also the case of Page v Combined
Shipping and Trading Co Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 656, CA);
• a contract of insurance (and a contract where the parties or a party needs
to show ‘utmost good faith’ (known also under its Latin name: uberimmae
fidei)).
Although the parties to a normal commercial agreement may not need to show
good faith, English law does provide specific duties or remedies, for example:
goods must be of satisfactory quality; a supplier of services must perform the
services with reasonable care and skill, as well as limiting the right to exclude
371
liability for such matters with the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977; or a party
cannot exclude its liability for its own fraud; to pick a few examples.
In specific contractual matters a party may need to use or show good faith in
its dealings with another party, although its meaning may be a specific rather
than a general obligation. For example, with a right of first refusal, good faith
can mean that the party giving the right of first refusal has to fully and fairly
disclose certain details to the receiver of the right (see Option and right of first
refusal, and Case analysis).
The English courts are generally hostile to find any obligation to do something
in good faith or an obligation on a party or parties to use good faith as binding
on a party, particularly where the obligation on a party or the parties to use
good faith is expressed in general terms. But not every use of a good faith
obligation will not be binding. An obligation to use good faith that is found in
an existing contractual relationship and where its fulfilment is referenced to
objective criteria, and accordingly it is possible to measure the obligation, can
be binding.
Principally the problem is that an obligation to do something in good
faith:
• lacks certainty; or
• means that it is not possible to judge objectivity or against objective criteria
whether a party has used good faith or not,
(eg Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128; Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro
SA [2005] EWCA Civ 891 at 116, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 121; Shaker v Vistajet
Group Holding SA [2012] EWHC 1329 (Comm)).
However, as noted above, an obligation to use good faith may be enforceable:
• where there is a subsisting contract; and
• where there are set objective criteria within which the parties need to
operate (see Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA [2005] EWCA Civ 891
at paras 115–121; Shaker v Vistajet Group Holding SA [2012] EWHC 1329
(Comm)).
In the Petromec case the judgment implies that if the court was not bound by
the decision in Walford v Miles then it may have decided that the obligation
to use good faith was binding. The judgment in Petromec referred to a key
difference between it and Walford v Miles: the parties were in a contractual
relationship, while in cases such as Walford v Miles there was no contractual
relationship.
Much of the case law turns on whether an obligation to negotiate an agreement
in good in faith is binding (which is considered in the next section).
372
Much of the hostility of the courts has focused on the obligation to negotiate
in good faith or the parties (purporting to) enter into an agreement to agree.
That is, the parties may have entered into an agreement, but may not have
been able to decide on some matters, or they have entered into a ‘working’
agreement but need at a certain point to enter into a further agreement.
Examples of both these types of situations would be:
• the parties have entered into an agreement where one party will supply
goods in certain quantities to another party, and the provisions of the
agreement state that the parties will need to negotiate the price, timing of
supply, etc;
• the parties have entered into an agreement where one party carries out
a research project funded by another. If the research project is successful
(the research project generates (economically) valuable intellectual
property) then there is a provision that the parties will negotiate the
provisions of a licence agreement so that the funding party can exploit
the intellectual property.
In both situations, the matters needing negotiation may be accompanied by
an obligation to use good faith because the parties are not able to decide on all
the points necessary to enter into an initial agreement, or a further agreement.
Sometimes they may frame their attempts with language suggesting that they
will use a certain amount of effort to achieve agreement (such as the phrase
‘negotiate in good faith’ or they will use ‘reasonable efforts to agree’).
As noted above, such expressions or agreements to agree are not enforceable
except in specific circumstances:
• a bare obligation to negotiate an agreement in good faith is not legally binding:
(Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, [1992] 1 All ER 453, HL, see Case
analysis below). This proposition will extend to where there is an existing
agreement, but certain aspects under that agreement need to be negotiated
in good faith (see Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA [2005] EWCA Civ 891,
see paras 88–92);
• an obligation to use reasonable endeavours or best endeavours to agree will also
be unenforceable: with regard to using reasonable endeavours see Multiplex
Construction UK Ltd v Cleveland Bridge UK Ltd [2006] EWHC 1341 and with
regard to using best endeavours to agree see Little v Courage Ltd (1994)
70 P & CR 469 at 476; applied in London and Regional Investments Ltd v TBI
plc [2002] EWCA Civ 355;
• using good faith obligations to reach agreement with a third party is also not
enforceable: see Scottish Coal v Danish Forestry [2009] CSOH 171; Shaker v
Vistajet Group Holding SA [2012] EWHC 1329 (Comm));
• but an agreement not to enter into an agreement with a third-party may be binding
(sometimes called a ‘lockout agreement’): an undertaking not to enter into an
373
agreement with a third party during the period of the negotiations can be
enforced under English law (see Pitt v PHH Asset Management Ltd [1993]
4 All ER 961, [1994] 1 WLR 327, CA). If the lock-out agreement contains
no express duration provisions, it may be enforceable as a contract
terminable on reasonable notice (see Global Container Lines Ltd v Black Sea
Shipping Co [1997] CLY 4535, Ch D, Transcript 1422).
The meanings of ‘good faith’ discussed above have been primarily in the
context of the parties negotiating (or attempting to negotiate) the provisions
of an agreement, usually before the existence of the agreement. However,
it is possible to have a contractual obligation of good faith in the sense of
the general duty set out at the beginning of this section. In Compass Group
UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest) v Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust
[2013] EWCA Civ 200 a duty to co-operate in good faith required that the
parties work constantly together at all levels of their relationship, including
resolving problems that occur in a long-term contract as well as not taking
unreasonable actions, which might damage their working relationship. This
case and the cases that have followed have clearly indicated that, as far as
contracts made in England and Wales are concerned, there is no overriding
concept of good faith, whether as having a specific meaning or as a general
concept, or which needs implying into a contract. Recent case law has
indicated (Monde Petroleum v Westernzagros [2016] EWHC 1472 (Comm);
MSC Mediterranean Shipping v Cottonex [2016] EWCA Civ 789):
• there is no general doctrine of ‘good faith’ that applies to English
contract law;
• that only in certain types of contracts will a duty of good faith be implied
(employment, between partners, where there is fiduciary relationship);
• that, otherwise, a duty of good faith will only be implied where:
• a contract lacks commercial or practical coherence; and
• the requirements for implying a term are met (an example of
this would be Astrazeneca UK Ltd v Albemarle International Corpn
[2011] EWHC 1574 (Comm), where an obligation to use good faith
was implied, see Option and Right of first refusal and Case analysis);
• there is case law that some long-term agreements, which involve a
close working relationship, might require the parties to perform their
obligations in good faith, but just because there are agreements of this
type is not enough to indicate that it is necessary to imply an obligation
of good faith (ie there is no special rule of interpretation for this type of
contract);
• that to recognise a general doctrine of ‘good faith’ would be out of step
with how the English courts develop solutions to problems of contractual
interpretation;
374
The judge indicated: ‘Even if there was some implied term of good faith,
it would not and could not circumscribe or restrict what the parties had
expressly agreed in Cl 13.3, which was in effect that either of them for no,
good or bad reason could terminate at any time before the term of four years
was completed’.
Although it is reasonably clear that there is no general overall concept of good
faith or that it will be implied, much of the case law is concerned with the
implication of good faith into a contract rather than a specific obligation to
use good faith, such as (in Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest) v
Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust) where:
‘3.5 The Trust and the Contractor will co-operate with each other in good faith
and will take all reasonable action as is necessary for the efficient transmission of
information and instructions and to enable the Trust or, as the case may be, any
Beneficiary to derive the full benefit of the Contract.’
Accordingly where used it will be context sensitive and will need interpreting
in the context of the case. In Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest)
v Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust it meant, according the court: ‘The
parties will work together honestly endeavouring to achieve the two stated
purposes’. With such a view expressed by the court, it is hard not to draw the
conclusion that: is this not what one would expect the parties to be doing in
375
any case (even without such wording)? In effect, although not stated by the
court, the wording adds nothing.
Drafting issues
• An obligation to use good faith to agree (or variations such as using reasonable
efforts to agree) are likely not to be binding. Avoid the use of ‘good faith’ type
expressions, whether in a non-contractual or contractual document, if no
further wording is used to define such an obligation.
• if the parties wish to use an obligation of ‘good faith’ they should be strongly
discouraged from doing so. The phrase will have no specific meaning and
where used will normally be confined to the specific obligation in which
the phrase appears.
• if the parties insist on a party or the parties being subject to a good faith obligation,
then define objective criteria as to its meaning and the circumstances in which it is
to be used. If the parties are to have an obligation to use good faith to do or
achieve something, then any wording should:
• be in a subsisting contract;
• deal with a very specific issue, and if the parties cannot agree or cannot
act in good faith then there are objective ways of dealing or measuring
the issue, such as in the Petromec case (ie not a general obligation to
act in good faith to agree); and
• set out the intended goal or result that the parties will need to achieve
when exercising an obligation to use good faith.
Case analysis
376
is simply because it lacks the necessary certainty. The same does not apply
to an agreement to use best endeavours. This uncertainty is demonstrated in
the instant case by the provision which it is said has to be implied in the agree-
ment for the determination of the negotiations. How can a court be expected
to decide whether, subjectively, a proper reason existed for the termination of
negotiations? The answer suggested depends upon whether the negotiations
have been determined “in good faith”. However, the concept of a duty to carry
on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position
of the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is
entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long as he avoids making mis-
representations. To advance that interest he must be entitled, if he thinks it
appropriate, to threaten to withdraw from further negotiations or to withdraw in
fact in the hope that the opposite party may seek to reopen the negotiations by
offering him improved terms. [Counsel for the appellants], of course, accepts
that the agreement upon which he relies does not contain a duty to complete
the negotiations. But that still leaves the vital question: how is a vendor ever to
know that he is entitled to withdraw from further negotiations? How is the court
to police such an “agreement”? A duty to negotiate in good faith is as unwork-
able in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating
party. It is here that the uncertainty lies. In my judgment, while negotiations are
in existence either party is entitled to withdraw from these negotiations, at any
time and for any reason. There can be thus no obligation to continue to negoti-
ate until there is a “proper reason” to withdraw. Accordingly, a bare agreement
to negotiate has no legal content.’
377
6 The letter of intent was not binding except for the provisions relating
to confidentiality and regarding the application, payment and refund
of the deposit.
7 The parties extended the Cut-Off Date five times. The first time it
was acknowledged that the claimant was seeking finance. The judge
assumed for the purposes of his decision that the claimant undertook
to exercise good faith and reasonable endeavours to secure written
confirmation from a financing party before the Cut-Off Date. The last
amendment provided:
‘We acknowledge that, notwithstanding the exercise of good faith and
reasonable endeavours by all relevant parties, (a) a written confirmation
from a financing party will not be obtained and (b) the agreement, execution
and delivery of the Transaction Documents will not occur by the Cut-Off
Date. We hereby agree that the Cut-Off date be extended to 23.59 CET on
Monday 17 January 2011 and that any reference to the Cut-Off Date in the
Letter of Intent be construed accordingly without prejudice to any of the
parties’ ongoing rights and obligations thereunder.’
8 The claimant argued that he had proceeded in good faith and used
reasonable endeavours to agree the Transaction Documents and
to seek written confirmation from a financing party. The defendant
argued that the defendant had not used good faith and reasonable
endeavours.
9 The judge held:
(a) That obligations of the claimant to use good faith and/or reason-
able endeavours were unenforceable: ‘There can be no doubt
that the Claimant’s agreement to proceed in good faith and to
use reasonable endeavours to agree the Transaction Documents
and obtain written confirmation from the financing party does
not give rise to an enforceable obligation in law. First, the “Non-
binding” clause expressly states that the LOI does not constitute
a binding agreement to enter into the Transaction Documents.
Second, an agreement to negotiate or agree further agreements
is unenforceable in law…Thus agreements to use reasonable
endeavours to agree or to negotiate in good faith are unenforce-
able. The reason for such unenforceability is that there are no
objective criteria by which the court can decide whether a party
has acted unreasonably and that a duty to negotiate in good faith
is unworkable because it is inherently inconsistent with the posi-
tion of a negotiating party. Agreements to reach agreement with
a third party (such as the financing party in the present case) are
also unenforceable for the same reason’ (from para 7).
(b) The judge rejected that the defendant’s argument that the use
of good faith and reasonable endeavours was a condition prec-
edent for the return of the deposit: ‘In my judgment the sug-
gested condition precedent is unenforceable in law for the same
reasons that an obligation to exercise reasonable endeavours
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379
380
‘Hold harmless’
Drafting issues
• What will the indemnifier be responsible for? To what extent will the
indemnifying party be responsible for costs incurred by or expended by
the indemnified party?
• Should there be a limit on the amount that may be payable by the indemnifier? The
indemnifier may wish to have some control over possible escalating costs,
either by stating:
• that the costs incurred must be ‘reasonable’; or
• by setting some financial or overall limit.
• When should payment be made under the indemnity?
• as they are incurred; and/or
• at a particular stage of legal proceedings (eg on commencement,
when scheduled for trial); and/or
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• Should an indemnity extend to cover other persons? Will the indemnity reach, eg:
• where there is a sale and purchase of goods, to claims by sub-buyers
and end-users.
Such a clause implies an obligation to repair or replace defective
goods even after they have been sold on by the original buyer. If the
seller is to assume this risk, the existence of appropriate insurance
cover must first be ascertained;
• employees, agents and/or representatives of the indemnified parties.
• Restrictions on the actions of the indemnified party when there is a claim. In some
cases, the indemnifier, when indicating that it will provide an indemnity,
will make it a condition that the indemnified party will:
• not act against the interests of the indemnifier;
• notify the indemnifier promptly if the indemnified becomes aware of
a claim;
• co-operate with the indemnifier in defending any claim;
• not have caused any claim under the indemnity or assisted any third
party in causing or making any claim under the indemnity;
• allow the indemnifier sole conduct of the claim.
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of its legal advisers to compromise or settle any claim) and all legal costs
or other expenses arising out of any breach of the [above warranties] or
out of any claim by a third party based on any facts which if substantiated
would constitute such a breach.
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Provided that such liability has not been incurred by the Agent through
any default in carrying out the terms of this agreement.
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or this agreement and arising during the period of this agreement, but
whenever incurred, including in particular (without limitation) all those
arising from, resulting from or connected with:
1.1 delivery, possession, use, operation, management, mainte-
nance, insurance or repossession of [the Aircraft];
1.2 loss, injury or damage sustained by the Lessee or any third
party;
1.3 any refusal by insurers to meet in full a claim under any of the
insurances;
1.4 seizure, condemnation or taking possession of [the Aircraft] by
any person organisation or state unauthorised by the Lessor
(including any payments or expenses in respect of [hijacking of
or threats against the Aircraft or its passengers, crew or cargo]
provided that no such payment shall be made without the prior
agreement of the Lessor and the appropriate insurers);
1.5 any breach or non-compliance by the Lessee of or with any of
the provisions of this agreement.
2 The Lessee further agrees to defend the Lessor against any action or
proceeding relating to any such losses as are mentioned in Clause
[1], to permit the Lessor (at its option) to become party to any such
action or proceeding and to indemnify the Lessor against all costs
(including legal costs) arising from any such defence.
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An indexation clause has the purpose of allowing one or more of the parties to
adjust prices for goods or services or salaries or wages to allow for the effect of
inflation, usually while the agreement continues in existence.
This clause deals with a different point than the amount that the supplier may
charge for goods or services for any particular order. For example, a supplier
may fix the price in the contract, by reference to a pricing list or by some other
formula allowing for the price to increase or possibly decrease (eg the price
for the goods or services increases by a set percentage on the anniversary of
the parties entering into their agreement).
The use of an indexation clause is more likely to be seen where the agreement
will run for a period of time, or where the goods that the supplier will provide
will either be supplied on a regular basis or have an extended lead time. For
example:
• if the supplier is to construct an item which will take several months from
order to delivery, and is dependent on parts from third parties, then in the
interim between the order being placed and the supplier obtaining the
parts, the parts may have increased in price if calculated taking account
for inflation;
• if the supplier provides services on a regular basis, such as so many hours’
consultancy each month, then over a long period, certain of the supplier’s
costs may increase, such as the amount it pays to its consultants etc.
Drafting issues
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raw materials if the party needs to source these during the life of the
agreement);
• the cost of items used in providing the goods and services may rise at
a greater rate than whatever index is used;
• the party providing goods or services may rely on supplies from third
parties (eg raw materials or finished products) and the third parties
can easily increase their prices, which the party providing the goods
and services cannot control or pass on to its customers.
• Where an Indexation clause is utilised:
• the date on which the indexation is to take place. Eg, the agreement may set
a date, or it may be on each anniversary of the commencement of the
agreement;
• which index should be used? Often the UK Retail Prices Index (RPI)
is used, but it might not be the most appropriate one. Eg, if the
agreement concerns the manufacturing of goods, then an index
based on manufacturing costs may be more appropriate than one
based on the price of retail sales;
• which index month should be used for the calculation?
• the method of calculation;
• what happens if the method of calculating the index changes during the life of
the contract?
• what happens if the index is abolished or replaced by another index during the
life of the contract?
• should the increase happen automatically? Does the party paying the
increase as a result of the Indexation clause have a right to object, be
consulted or terminate the agreement if unhappy about the increase
or if the increase is above a certain level?
• notice. Is the party applying the Indexation clause required to notify the
other party prior to an increase? If so, when is the party required to
do so? Eg, a party may be required to give 30 days’ notice even if the
Indexation clause takes effect the same time each year.
• worked example. As the use of calculations can cause problems for
some parties (and their lawyers) when drafting contracts, should
the clause dealing with indexation include one or more worked
examples, either within the clause itself or by referring to a schedule?
(See, for example, Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, although not a
case specifically about indexation or inflation, but one that clearly
indicates the difficulty parties (or their lawyers) have in expressing
themselves clearly when dealing with calculations). A clause dealing
with calculating the price or rate for something based on inflation is
likely to be one of these difficult areas.
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Background
Commercial agreements often include a provision to allow a party to terminate
the agreement if another party becomes insolvent, bankrupt or is liquidated.
Such provisions are often regarded as classic ‘boilerplate’ clauses, which
require little thought.
In agreements in which the parties are more at arm’s length, the following
may be sufficient to denote the degree of insolvency comprising fundamental
breach:
‘The levying of any distress or execution against (party) or the making by him
of any composition or arrangement with creditors or (being a company) the
liquidation of (party) (other than a members’ voluntary liquidation) …’
The standard form of insolvency clause for a corporate party usually runs as
follows:
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The following words, if added, will widen the effect of the clause considerably,
but may be resisted by the other party or parties:
‘… or threatens to do any of these things, or if any similar occurrence under any
jurisdiction affects [party]’.
It should be noted that in agreements drafted before the coming into force
of the Insolvency Act 1986 it was usual to refer, when specifying insolvency
events relevant to a corporate party, only to the appointment of ‘a receiver’
in respect of the party’s assets, and this form is still occasionally encountered
in forms of agreement which have not since been revised. It is essential
now to specify the officers appointable under the Insolvency Act 1986,
ie administrators and administrative receivers. Reference to receivership (to
cater for appointment eg under powers contained in a debenture) should
also be retained.
Agreements made before 1987 also commonly referred, in the case of
insolvency of an individual, to the committing of ‘any act of bankruptcy’.
This term does not occur in the Insolvency Act 1986 and no longer has any
special meaning. Reference is usually now made instead to the making of a
bankruptcy order against a party (under the Insolvency Act 1986, s 264), and
perhaps also (where a higher degree of solvency is to be maintained) to the
making of an application for an interim order (under the Insolvency Act 1986,
s 252), eg:
‘the presentation by any person against (party) of any application for an interim
order or petition for a bankruptcy order within the meaning of the Insolvency
Act 1986’.
Note, however, that the above provision is narrower in scope than the old ‘act
of bankruptcy’. The current equivalent reference will be to indebtedness at
the statutory bankruptcy level. A comprehensive provision might be worded
as follows:
‘being an individual who:
(a) is the subject of a bankruptcy petition or bankruptcy order; or
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Drafting issues
There are some commercial issues which may need consideration when
drafting or reviewing a clause which permits termination due to insolvency,
including:
• Do the parties wish the agreement to terminate in the event of insolvency of one
of them? The insolvency of a party is almost always stipulated as an event
entitling the other party to terminate the agreement. In the absence
of such a provision, the bankruptcy or winding up of one party may of
itself be insufficient to terminate the contract. It is always advisable to be
specific when framing such a provision, as under modern law insolvency
can comprise several stages.
• When can the agreement be terminated? A more central issue is when the
contract may be terminated.
Often, the drafter will wish to allow for termination prior to the
commencement of formal winding-up proceedings (in the case of a
company) or bankruptcy proceedings (in the case of an individual).
Termination clauses are sometimes very lengthy, as they try to address a
range of circumstances where the company is close to, but not yet at, the
point of formal proceedings.
• Foreign parties. ‘Termination on insolvency’ clauses tend to use formal legal
language that describes different insolvency events (eg appointment of
administrators) that are recognised by English law. In the case of contracts
with non-UK parties, the parties may require advice from lawyers in the
jurisdiction of the non-UK party as regards the appropriate language to
use to describe insolvency events in that jurisdiction.
Alternatively, a sweep-up provision may be included in the clause referring
to similar or analogous events in other jurisdictions.
• Should the agreement always terminate in the event of insolvency or bankruptcy?
Sometimes, a party will refuse to accept that, in the event of its insolvency
or bankruptcy, the contract should terminate.
Eg, a licensor licenses some intellectual property to a licensee (involved
in a ‘high-technology’ area). The licensee may regard the intellectual
property licence as a valuable asset, which in the event of insolvency the
liquidator or administrator should be allowed to sell in order to raise
money to pay creditors and shareholders. The licensee may argue in
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negotiations prior to the grant of the licence that as long as the licensor
is receiving royalties, that the licensor should not be concerned about the
licence continuing after insolvency. Moreover, the licensee may feel that it
or its directors will be vulnerable to actions from shareholders if it allows
the licence to be terminated on insolvency, particularly if the insolvency
results in a corporate restructuring that enables the company’s business to
continue (this is perhaps more of a risk with North American companies).
Of course, the licensor is likely to resist such an argument. However, this
example illustrates that there may be situations in which it is in a party’s
interests to object to a right of termination in the event of insolvency.
• Liquidators. If a company is liquidated, the liquidator has a statutory right
to reject ‘onerous contracts’. A contract provision cannot override this
right. In most cases, this is simply a fact of life, and there may be very little
point in trying to address the issue in the contract. Occasionally, though,
contracts do include provisions which seek to protect a party’s position in
the event that a liquidator seeks to reject the contract. Such provisions are
beyond the scope of this title.
• Is the right terminology used in the agreement for the type of party involved? Eg is
the terminology for a company being used when an individual is involved?
• When should termination occur? Should termination occur:
• prior to formal proceedings occurring? Or
• only at the moment they occur? Or
• at the time when a company passes a resolution for winding up? Or
• at the time when an administrator or administrative receiver is
appointed, etc?
• Should the termination refer only to specific types of insolvency? If specific forms
of insolvency are mentioned in an agreement then if the law changes and
another form of insolvency is created, and the party becomes insolvent by
that new form, then the other party may not have the right to terminate. See
the case of William Hare Ltd v Shepherd Construction Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ
283 (briefly considered in the Interpretation section).
The issues and use of a Termination for insolvency clause will fall for consideration
with other Termination provisions.
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Background
A clause concerning insurance will cover some or all of the following points:
• the warranties provided by a party as to the level and scope of insurance
cover held by that party; and/or
• the obligations a party has to insure against specified risks; and/or
• the obligations a party has to arrange for the other party to be added as a
‘named party’ under the first party’s insurance policy.
A clause stating that the one party is to insure against a risk does not mean that
party is liable for any losses associated with that risk. Insurance clauses should
not be used as a substitute for statements as to which of the contracting parties
bears the risk of a particular event happening. The ability of a party to insure
against a risk is a factor to be taken into account by the court when assessing
whether an exemption clause is ‘reasonable’ under the Unfair Contract Terms
Act 1977. See further Exemption.
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Drafting issues
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401
2.2 the insurer shall notify [Party A] in the event of any late premium
payment by, or any breach of the terms of such insurance on
the part of, [Party B];
3 not to cause or permit any breach of any such insurance nor any other
insurance in respect of the Location.
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403
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405
Know-how and trade secrets are not strictly forms of property in their own
right, although they are often treated as a form of intellectual property and
are often licensed in the same ways as intellectual property (eg the technical
and practical information on how to work a patent is licensed together with
the right to use patent). However, they both lack universally recognised
definitions.
It may be more accurate to describe them both as information which
may be protected under the law of confidence. The terms could be used
interchangeably, and a definition of ‘confidential information’ could equally
be valid. As noted in the previous sentence, what is most important is the form
of protection they attract, which is the law of confidence, not the actual term
used in an agreement.
The term ‘know-how’ often covers technical and practical information and
one legislative definition which is broadly consistent with this is found in the
Technology Transfer Regulation (EC Commission Regulation 772/2004):
‘“know-how” means a package of non-patented practical information, resulting
from experience and testing, which is:
(i) secret, that is to say, not generally known or easily accessible,
(ii) substantial, that is to say, significant and useful for the production of the
contract products, and
(iii) identified, that is to say, described in a sufficiently comprehensive manner
so as to make it possible to verify that it fulfils the criteria of secrecy and
substantiality.’
For example, a company may create an invention (a new form of product).
They protect this invention with a patent. They wish to license the patent
to others who will actually manufacture the product and sell the product.
The company making the invention may have carried out testing on how to
manufacture the product, including how to set up machinery quickly and
how to mix, eg, chemicals together, and how to use materials in the most
economical way. It was not necessary to include any of this information in
the patent applications. This information will be of use to a manufacturer (as
such information will allow the manufacturer to save time in getting ready to
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The purchaser or licensee of intellectual property may wish to carry out a due
diligence exercise to establish the extent, validity and enforceability of the
rights in question and seek to back this up, so far as possible, with warranties
from the vendor or licensor. These warranties will be designed primarily to
cover the risk that there are no restrictions on using the intellectual property
needed to operate the business and that, where necessary, continued
registration of those rights has been effected and the appropriate fees paid.
Examples of intellectual property warranties are given in Warranties, below.
Drafting issues
The following are a few of the drafting and commercial issues that may need
to be considered when addressing intellectual property issues in a commercial
agreement:
• Type of definition to be used? What type of intellectual property will be created,
used, licensed, transferred or is the subject matter of the agreement?
• should a ‘generic’ (or possibly no) definition of intellectual property be used?
In routine agreements or agreements whose focus is not the creation,
use, transfer etc of intellectual property then it may be appropriate
not to add a definition of intellectual property;
• should the agreement include an all-encompassing definition? In some
agreements, where one party wishes to own or control all creation or
use of intellectual property, an all-encompassing definition might be
appropriate.
A possible danger here is that any definition used may not be
encompassing enough as types of intellectual property are introduced,
ie a court could hold that the definition sets out all the intellectual
property that is covered by the agreement and no more. This is more
likely to be a problem where the agreement covers the creation or
use of intellectual property outside of the UK. However, wording can
be added to extend the coverage such as: ‘and all other intellectual
property rights’;
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property’)? Who owns any intellectual property that arises during its
execution (often called ‘foreground intellectual property’)?
• Non-intellectual property type agreements. Where an agreement does not have
intellectual property as its focus, but it is likely that some intellectual
property will be used or created, there should be:
• a definition of the types of intellectual property to be used in the
agreement;
• a statement that the intellectual property existing at the start of the
agreement, and used during the course of an agreement, belongs to
the party who introduces it;
• a statement dealing with who owns the intellectual property generated
during the course of the agreement (often called ‘foreground
intellectual property’);
• a statement as to the purposes for which the background and
foreground intellectual property can be used, eg only for the purposes
of the agreement.
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(If the user wishes to further specify the meaning of a patent the wording
‘[ ]’ may be used. It is also possible to include the complementary defini-
tion of ‘Work’)
‘Work’ shall mean any and all literary and artistic works, materials, docu-
mentation, medical or other information and/or software that the Creator
may be commissioned [by Party A] from time to time to generate or may
provide to Party A including without limitation the items described in the
Schedule.
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2 Any new Material created jointly by the parties shall save to the extent
that it embodies Intellectual Property Rights belonging to either party
at the date of its creation belong to the parties jointly and:
(a) where in the course of creating any Material to which this sub-
clause [2] applies any Intellectual Property Rights are brought
into existence such Intellectual Property Rights shall belong to
the parties jointly and the parties shall at their joint expense take
all reasonable steps necessary to protect the same by apply-
ing for UK patents and UK registered designs and such foreign
rights corresponding to them or registrations of them as may be
reasonable;
(b) if at any time during the subsistence of this agreement any
Intellectual Property Rights belonging to the parties jointly are
infringed by a third party then unless the parties agree jointly
to take action in respect of such infringement either party may
in the joint names of the parties on behalf of the parties as joint
owners take all reasonable steps necessary to enforce the joint
Intellectual Property Rights of the parties provided that the
party taking such action shall indemnify the other party against
all legal costs and expenses incurred in connection with such
action (including any costs or damages awarded to such third
party). Both parties shall use all steps and provide all informa-
tion and assistance reasonably required for the purpose of such
proceedings. Any sums recovered as a result of proceedings
taken to enforce the joint Intellectual Property Rights of the par-
ties shall after deduction of all legal fees and other expenses
incurred in connection with such proceedings by the parties be
divided equally between the parties.
3 Each party hereby grants a licence to the other to use its Intellectual
Property Rights in accordance with this agreement.
4 Each party agrees not to use any of the Intellectual Property Rights
belonging to the other party save for the purpose of this agreement.
5 On termination of this agreement each party shall:
(a) deliver up to the other party all materials provided by the other
party together with any copies of any of them which remain in its
possession power or control;
(b) within 7 days destroy any materials created for the purposes of
this agreement which embody any of the Intellectual Property
Rights of the other party to this agreement.
6 If either party believes that any third party is infringing any Intellectual
Property Rights in [the Product] it shall notify the other party of such
belief. If either party wishes to take action against any third party
for infringement of any of that party’s Intellectual Property Rights in
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[the Product] it shall give notice of such proposed action to the other
party.
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421
that a contractual rate is less than the statutory rate does not mean by
itself it is not a substantial remedy (see Yuanda (UK) Co Ltd v WW Gear
Construction Ltd [2010] EWHC 720 (TCC)). In this case some observations
were made about the rate of interest in relation to what amounted to
substantial remedy:
• interest rates can vary, with the base rate at the date of the judgment
being very different to that when the LPCD(I)A 1998 was passed;
• the LPCD(I)A 1998 does not automatically substitute the statutory
rate of interest for that found in a contract; it only does so if the
contractual rate does not amount to a substantial remedy;
• the statutory rate could be considered as penal, as at the date it was set
it was double the base rate; and
• that in commercial cases coming before the courts the interest rate
on damages was typically between 1% and 3% (usually at the lower
percentage).
On the facts of the case, and using the criteria found in the LPCD(I)
A 1998, s 9(3), an interest rate of 0.5% over base rate was not a substantial
remedy;
• that the statutory interest will also apply to any assignee of the creditor or
other change in the identities of either party (LPCD(I)A 1998, s 13).
Drafting issues
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• What other rights does the party receiving payment have where a payment is late?
In addition (or sometime in the alternative), a party has other rights,
such as:
• the right to withhold performance of the agreement (or further
aspects of the agreement);
• the right to terminate the agreement (under Termination provisions).
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Drafting issues
Amendment/replacement of statutes
• Interpretation Act 1978. The Interpretation Act 1978 provides that where
an Act repeals and re-enacts a previous enactment then a reference to
that enactment in a document is taken as a reference to its re-enacted
version, with or without modification (Interpretation Act 1978, ss 17(2)
(a), 23(3)). This will apply unless there is a contrary intention and will
apply in any deed or other instrument or document
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Note: the wording in the 1978 Act is likely to apply only to a limited range
of changes to legislation: that is the repeal and re-enactment of an enactment
(and is unlikely to cover anything other than an Act, and not subordinate
legislative measures such as Statutory Instruments). However, it is likely to
apply to an agreement, as it covers any form of ‘instrument’ or document.
• Catering for amendments and modification. However, most of the changes
to legislation are not made by repeal and re-enactment, but by way of
amendment and modification. Accordingly, where specific statutes
are referred to in an agreement it is necessary to make wider provision
than under the 1978 Act and cater expressly for amendment and other
modification of statutes as well as repeal and replacement, eg:
‘Reference to any statute or statutory provision includes a reference to:
(a) that statute or statutory provision as from time to time amended,
extended, re-enacted or consolidated’.
• Covering further amendments. It will also be necessary to make clear that the
provision covers future amendment, repeals etc:
‘whether before or after the date of this agreement’.
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found that the words used in the agreement were clearly expressed and
could not be used to cover the new way for a party to become insolvent.
• Persons/singular/plural.
• He/she/singular/plural. For the sake of brevity and to avoid any
confusion, it is usual to make provision to the effect that in the
agreement ‘he’ includes ‘she’ and ‘it’ and vice versa, thus avoiding
any need to use the awkward ‘he or she’, ‘he or it’ etc throughout the
agreement.
The Interpretation Act 1978, s 6, provides similar wording. But this
meaning is only for the purposes of any Act (see Rossetti Marketing Ltd
v Diamond Sofa Company Ltd [2011] EWHC 2482 (QB) for an example
of the use of the Act to interpret the word ‘Principal’ in reg 2(1) of
Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993, where it
was held that it could also mean the agent acting for more than one
principal; ie it would not be interpreted as only referring to a single
principal).
• Person also means a corporate body. To make the point abundantly clear,
the agreement should state that reference to a person also includes a
corporate body. Eg:
‘Unless the context otherwise requires words denoting the singular shall
include the plural and vice versa and words denoting any one gender
shall include all genders and words denoting persons shall include
bodies corporate, unincorporated associations and partnerships.’
is in the form of capitalising the first letter of the word ‘Clause’. This is
a matter of personal preference, but can aid finding where references
are made to clauses or schedules. Where there is any doubt about which
agreement is being referred to it is possible to add wording such as:
‘of this Agreement’
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example given here, a party giving a warranty that they have complied with
statutory and regulatory requirements might wish to exclude any references to
changes in the law etc in the Interpretation clause.
Section 5—Definitions
In any Act, unless the contrary intention appears, words and expressions listed
in Schedule 1 to this Act are to be construed according to that Schedule.
429
Schedule 1
‘Person’ includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate.
430
2 Words denoting the singular number only shall include the plural and
vice versa. Words denoting any gender include all genders and words
denoting persons shall include firms and corporations and vice versa.
3 Unless the context otherwise requires reference to any clause, sub-
clause or schedule is to a clause, sub-clause or schedule (as the case
may be) of or to this agreement.
4 The headings in this document are inserted for convenience only and
shall not affect the construction or interpretation of this agreement.
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Background
The question whether an undertaking given by two or more persons is:
• ‘several’; or
• ‘joint’; or
• both ‘joint and several’
is in general one of interpretation and depends on the intention of the
parties as evidenced by the terms of their agreement (Fell v Goslin (1852) 7
Exch 185).
Joint promisees
Several liability
By contrast, where there is ‘several’ liability, the liability is owed by each person
separately and each can be sued separately (eg, Mikeover Ltd v Brady [1989]
3 All ER 618, CA).
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Where two or more persons make joint and several promises, each person
making a promise will have a joint and several liability (all persons are jointly
promising and each party is separately promising) so that each person
will have a joint and a several liability (eg, King v Hoare (1844) 13 M &
W 494 AT 505; Beecham v Smith (1858) EB & E 442; Owen v Wilkinson (1858)
5 CB NS 526). Accordingly, it is possible to sue one of them, some of them or
all of them.
The recipient of an undertaking given by two or more persons will generally
wish the liability to be ‘joint and several’ as this gives the recipient the most
flexibility in deciding who to sue and from whom to obtain satisfaction of
the undertaking. For example, if a person is buying advertising services, and
the provider of the services (design of the adverts, production of the artwork
for the adverts, printing, buying of space in various media) are all divided
into separate companies, then the person ideally would like that all of these
separate companies are jointly and severally liable for the performance of
the various obligations they are under, particularly if only one of the group
of companies had any substantial trading history or assets. In the event of a
dispute, the person could pick and sue the company in the group which had
the most substantial assets.
Where more than one party is stated to have an obligation under a clause of
a contract, a simple way of ensuring that they have joint and several liability
in respect of that obligation is to use the wording in Precedent 1. In more
complex situations, separate clauses providing for joint and several liability
may be appropriate.
Drafting issues
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• If there is to be joint and several liability, should this be for all the obligations
under the agreement or just a particular obligation? If limited to a particular
obligation, then the Joint and Several Liability clause should probably be
located in the same clause as the clause in which the obligation appears.
Also the agreement might contain wording to make it clear that the joint
and several liability only applies to that obligation and not generally to the
agreement.
• Do the obligations refer to a definition of a single party, but in fact there is more
than one party coming within the meaning of that definition? If so, should
they have joint and several liability? Eg, a contract may provide that two
accountants are hired to provide specialist tax advice to a company. They
do not otherwise work together, but they are each experts on slightly
different areas of tax law. The contract may have a party clause stating:
‘1. Jane Elizabeth Smith of [address]; and
2. Sara Eliza Jolly of [address].
(together the ‘Accountant’).’
And with the main obligation clause stating:
‘The Accountant shall perform the Services including delivery of a final
report to the Company by 1 January 2018.’
In such a case, such wording may not make it clear whether the two
accountants are jointly responsible for the obligation, or jointly and
severally responsible. Best drafting practice would be to avoid such
ambiguity in defining the parties and make clear with explicit wording
whether the parties each have the obligation to perform it and what their
liability is in relation to that obligation (eg joint, several, joint and several
or only on the party who is to perform it).
In some standard form contracts it may not always be possible. In such a
case as the example above, if the intention is that all the persons/parties
coming within the definition of an ‘Accountant’ are to have joint and
several liability, then if there is an Interpretation clause there might appear
in addition to the other wording the following:
‘a reference to the ‘Accountant’ shall be a reference to any one of the
persons named in [eg the party clause] and/or all of them and any obligation
on or to be carried out by the Accountant shall be joint and several on the
persons referred to at [eg the party clause].’
See AIB Group (UK) plc (formerly Allied Irish Banks plc and AIB Finance Ltd) v
Martin [2001] UKHL 63, [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 209, which deals with
the reach of a joint and several liability clause (that of imposing liability
on one person for another’s debt), and see Case analysis below.
• Are the parties carrying out an obligation under an agreement as partners? If the
parties who are carrying out an obligation under an agreement are partners
(within the meaning given under the Partnership Act 1890) then, unless
the agreement says otherwise, the 1890 Act assumes that the partners would
have joint liability while they remain partners (1890 Act, s 9).
435
The issues relating to joint and several liability arise, for example, in
construction contracts where several contractors make a joint bid for the
contract. A party that is contracting with several other parties acting together
will invariably wish to insert a clause stating that liability is to be joint and
several, as this will give the first party the ability to proceed against the most
solvent and accessible of the co-contractors. This is a particularly useful facility
if any of the contractors is not a UK resident.
The advisers of the co-contractors may need to exercise care in the wording of
any ‘joint and several’ obligations. They may, for example, wish to limit joint
and several liability to breach of warranty or indemnity only and not extend
it to all the obligations under the agreement, some of which the contractors
may not be in a position to fulfil. Any one contractor may have no control over
the other contractors’ activities or method of operation and it may therefore
be dangerous for it to accept a joint and several liability clause such as in
Precedent 4.
436
Precedent 4—Short form – joint and several obligations (eg contract for
services)
Each member of [Party] acknowledges that such member is individually
contracted to the Company and that references to [Party] in this agree-
ment shall be deemed to refer to each member and that all obligations on
the part of [Party] in this agreement are joint and several obligations on
the part of each member.
Consumer issues
Case analysis
AIB Group (UK) plc (formerly Allied Irish Banks plc and AIB Finance Ltd) v
Martin [2001] UKHL 631, [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 209
1 The defendants (M and G) were partners whose business was the
purchase and development of property.
437
2 One of the defendants (M) borrowed money from the bank and the
partners jointly borrowed money from the bank.
3 All this borrowing was restructured and for the joint borrowing the
claimant granted to the defendants a joint mortgage (on the standard
form of the claimant) (Joint Mortgage).
4 The Joint Mortgage defined the borrowers (M and G) as ‘the
Mortgager’.
5 The interpretation clause of the Joint Mortgage dealt with the situa-
tion when there is more than one person within the definition of the
Mortgager:
‘[it] shall be construed as referring to all and/or any one of those persons
and the obligations of such persons hereunder shall be joint and several’
7 The claimant bank called in the loans and wished to enforce the cov-
enant and argued that defendants were liable for the Joint Mortgage
and also each of them liable for the other indebtedness as well (under
other loan agreements with the bank). Defendant M argued that he
should not be liable under the covenant for the debt of G.
8 The House of Lords (as did the lower courts) held that M was liable
for the debt of G, and that the true meaning of the covenant, read-
ing it together with the interpretation clause, was that the parties
were jointly and severally liable, which included M being liable for G’s
debts to the bank as well:
‘[39] …The [covenant] starts with a joint covenant by Mr Gold and Mr
Martin. It is not three separate covenants, one by them jointly and one by
each of them individually. It is a single joint covenant. Their liability under
this joint covenant is declared to be joint and several. This deals with the
effect of their joint covenant. It does not turn a single covenant into three
covenants.
[40] But the critical issue is not whether Mr Gold and Mr Martin, as well
as jointly covenanting to pay, have severally covenanted to pay. The
critical issue is what have they covenanted to pay? Under sub-cl (1)
they have covenanted to pay “all sums of money … advanced to the
Mortgagor by the Bank”. The mortgagor means the two of them and/
or each of them. So they have covenanted to pay all sums of money
advanced by the bank to the two of them and/or to each of them.
I do not understand how any process of construction can avoid the
conclusion that they have covenanted to pay the sums advanced by the
bank to Mr Martin alone as well as the sums advanced by the bank to
them jointly.
[41] The point is the same under sub-cl (2). Mr Gold and Mr Martin have
covenanted to pay or discharge “all other indebtedness and/or liabilities
438
whatsoever of the Mortgagor to the Bank’ ie ‘of the two of them and/
or each of them”. So they have covenanted to pay or discharge the
indebtedness of Mr Martin to the bank as well as their joint indebtedness
to the bank.’
439
Drafting issues
For agreements prepared in more than one language, consider the following
points:
• Which language version prevails? If the agreement exists in different
languages, it is desirable to state which is the authoritative version, in the
event of a difference in meaning between the different versions.
• Amendments. If there are to be any amendments to the agreement then
the agreement should state that any amendments are made in the same
language as the original.
440
441
442
Background
A clause relating to law and jurisdiction indicates:
• which legal system applies to an agreement or a dispute concerning or
related to the agreement; and
• which country’s court will hear any dispute concerning or arising from the
agreement.
If the agreement concerns only English parties, as well as rights and obligations
arising or taking place only in England, a law and jurisdiction clause will often
be unnecessary. In practice, a law and jurisdiction clause is often seen as
‘default’ boilerplate wording and is included as a matter of course.
443
Example one
It is possible to construct a contract that involves several countries. For
example:
• a company incorporated in Germany wishes to supply goods to a company
incorporated in England;
• representatives of the German and English companies meet in France and
enter into the contract in France;
• the German company purchases the goods from a Russian manufacturer
for delivery to South Korea;
• the English company arranges for payment through a subsidiary based in
the United States to a subsidiary of the German company;
• the payment is made from a bank in New York;
• the English company subsidiary is incorporated in Delaware and the
German subsidiary is incorporated in California;
• the payment is made into the German subsidiary company’s French bank
account.
If the contract does not specify which country’s laws apply and which country’s
courts can hear any dispute then it may be difficult to decide (if the parties do
not agree) which is the correct law or court.
Example 2
Two parties wish to hold negotiations as to whether one party will grant a
licence to some intellectual property it owns to the second party. Prior to their
substantive negotiations commencing, the parties wish to sign a confidentiality
agreement, as the first party will have to disclose confidential information and
know-how relating to the intellectual property in order for the second party to
know whether it wishes to take a licence. After signature of the confidentiality
agreement the first party discloses the confidential information to the second
party. The second party misuses the confidential information (such as using
it for a purpose other than as permitted in the confidentiality agreement or
makes it publicly available).
If the confidentiality agreement includes an exclusive jurisdiction clause
(eg exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts) and the misuse of the
confidential information takes place outside of England, then the first party
may not be able to take action directly in the courts of the jurisdiction where
the other party has misused it. The first party may need to obtain a court order
in England and then seek to enforce that court order in the courts of the
other jurisdiction. In such a case, first obtaining a court order in England and
then having to engage the procedures within the other country to have the
judgment of the English court recognised may lead to substantial delay and
expense.
444
There are a number of legislative measures that deal with which court
has jurisdiction over a matter. The main measure on how jurisdiction is
determined where one or more of the parties are within the EU is the Brussels
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
(recast). The Brussels Regulation deals (in simple terms) with disputes within
the EU, and besides contractual disputes also ranges over matters other than
those which are the subject matter of this book. In the absence of the parties
choosing which country’s courts will have jurisdiction over a matter, then the
Regulation provides as follows:
• a person who is domiciled in a member state needs to be sued in that
member state (regardless of their nationality) (Art 4);
• it is possible to sue a person who is domiciled in one member state in
another member state in specific situations, such as where a matter
involves a contract. In such a case it is possible to use the courts ‘of the
place of performance of the obligation’, which will normally mean in the
courts of the place:
(a) where goods are delivered (or supposed to be delivered) under a
contract for the sale of goods, and for the place of performance of
the obligation in question (Art 7(1)(a));
(b) where services are provided (or ought to have been provided) under
a contract for the provision of services (Art 7(1)(b)).
There are rules for deciding in which member state a person is domiciled who
is not a national of a member state, or which member state’s court will have
jurisdiction where a defendant is not domiciled in any member state.
The above states how jurisdiction is dealt with where the parties do not choose
which country will have jurisdiction. However, the Brussels Regulation does
give the parties the freedom to choose which member state’s courts will have
jurisdiction (whether or not any of the parties are domiciled in that member
state), and whether the jurisdiction is exclusive or non-exclusive. If they do
make that choice then the chosen court will normally have jurisdiction (and by
default the jurisdiction will be exclusive unless the parties decide otherwise).
There are a number of conditions for the parties’ choice to be valid, including
(Brussels Regulation, Art 25):
• that their agreement is not ‘null and void as to its substantive validity
under the law of the member state chosen to have jurisdiction’; and
• that the agreement is in writing or evidenced in writing, or accords with
a practice that the parties have established between themselves or (for
international trade and commerce) accords with usage which is commonly
known for contracts of the type the parties entered into.
445
Exclusive jurisdiction
Non-exclusive jurisdiction
If the parties specify that any dispute will be subject to the ‘non-exclusive’
jurisdiction of the English courts, it will be possible to bring proceedings in
a foreign court on a matter over which that court has jurisdiction. Where
cross-border rights (eg, intellectual property rights) are the subjects of the
agreement, it may be in the owner’s interest to insist on the inclusion of this
term in order to reserve the right to take protective action abroad. If the
possessor of confidentiality wishes to obtain an urgent injunction (eg, to
prevent disclosure of the confidential information), it is desirable to reserve
the right to bring interim proceedings in the other party’s ‘home’ jurisdiction.
For parties domiciled in the EU, and for most types of contract made after
17 December 2009, the matter of which country’s law applies will be governed
by the Rome I Regulation (Regulation 593/2008) (except for Denmark
where the Rome Convention continues to apply). The Rome I Regulation
applies directly in England (ie it does not need implementation by an Act of
Parliament or a statutory instrument). The Rome Convention (which applied
to contracts entered into after 1 April 1991) also deals with the question of
which law is to govern the obligations of the parties in the absence of an
express provision in the contract (the Convention was brought into force by
the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, s 2).
In essence, both the Regulation and the Convention allow the parties to
a contract to choose which country’s law applies to a contract. The Rome
I Regulation provides, as far as choice of law is concerned, that:
• the parties are free to choose the law of the contract (whether expressly or
to be established by the provisions of their contract or the circumstances
of the case) (Art 3(1)). The latter point may arise where they have not
chosen a particular country’s law but their choice is clear because they
446
For contracts where the parties are not located in the EU, there is no
international law or convention which universally applies to both law and/
or jurisdiction. The law will depend on how a particular country decides such
matters; for example, the law governing the contract for a particular country
may be based on where the parties are, or where a party is located, where the
contract is performed or the country in which the contract is entered into.
The main international convention (primarily only in relation to goods), the
United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods 1980, will
not normally apply to UK-based parties as the UK is not a signatory to this
convention.
It should be noted that specifying which law governs the contract will not
necessarily override the laws of another country that may affect the contract,
particularly where such laws are concerned with public policy issues. Eg, in a
contract between English and United States parties in which the law of the
contract is stated to be that of a US state, English competition laws may still
apply (see the Chiron v Organon cases, eg Chiron Corpn v Murex Diagnostics Ltd
(No 12); Chiron Corpn v Organon Teknika Ltd (No 12) [1996] FSR 153, CA).
447
Drafting issues
• Is one or more of the parties located outside England and Wales? If so, then the
law of the agreement should be clearly stated in order to avoid the default
rules under the Rome I Regulation, any international treaty or another
country’s legal system applying (to the extent possible).
• Is the law of another country to apply? If so,
• are there consequences or issues that might affect the agreement if
this is so, eg, whether some wording which might be binding under
another country’s laws would not be binding in England and Wales
(eg, wording that the parties are to negotiate in good faith will
generally not be binding under English law, but might be binding in
some civil law countries);
• is a party’s insurer content with non-English law applying? Eg, some
insurers will not provide cover (or subject the party insured to extra
conditions, or will limit the cover they provide if the insurer provides
it at all) if a contract is entered into with a party based in the United
States (or Canada) or which may be subject to US jurisdiction or the
law of a US state.
• If another country’s law applies, is the jurisdiction expressed to be non-exclusive? If
the law is other than England and Wales and if the agreement provides for
exclusive jurisdiction in that country’s law then an English party may be
prevented from taking any litigation steps outside that jurisdiction. A non-
exclusive jurisdiction may permit an English party to take appropriate
litigation steps in England or another country;
• Should the jurisdiction be expressed to be non-exclusive even if the law is that of
England and Wales? If:
• one of the parties is not based in England and Wales; and/or
• some of the activities under the agreement are to take place outside
of England and Wales; and/or
• some of the assets of a party are based outside of England and Wales,
then it might be appropriate to have non-exclusive jurisdiction.
Eg, if an English company grants a software licence to a licensee which
operates in France, and the licensee operates outside of its licence, it may
be easier for the licensor to obtain an injunction or other remedies in
France with a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, or if an English company
448
The Boilerplate section of the agreement will normally be the location for a
Law and jurisdiction clause.
• If a party is not based in England and Wales, but the law of England and
Wales applies to the agreement, then it may be appropriate to appoint an
English agent for the service of court documents on the overseas party, see
Agents for service.
449
• If the parties to a contract choose a law other than that of England and
Wales and an English party has insurance (eg, professional indemnity
insurance or is required under the contract to provide insurance cover
for certain incidents arising under the contract), the insurance policy may
have been entered into on the basis that the law of England and Wales will
apply, see Insurance.
450
out of the said courts may without prejudice to the rules of service of
such courts be served by delivering such proceedings in an envelope
addressed to the party to be served at the address for such party set
out in this contract.
451
[3 These submissions shall not affect the right of any party to take
Proceedings in any other jurisdiction nor shall the taking of
Proceedings in any jurisdiction preclude any party from taking
Proceedings in any other jurisdiction.]
[4 These submissions shall not affect the right of any party to take
Proceedings with a view to obtaining interim relief in any other juris-
diction.]
452
Month
Generally a month means a calendar month. This is provided:
• by the Law of Property Act 1925, s 61, and applies to all deeds, contracts
and other instruments governed by UK law unless the contract otherwise
requires;
• by the Interpretation Act 1978, s 5, Sch 1, and applies to legislation;
• at common law ‘month’ meant calendar month only in bills of exchange
and other commercial documents. Otherwise it meant ‘lunar month’
(Hart v Middleton (1845) 2 Car & Kir 9, 10).
Note that ‘calendar month’ does not necessarily mean a month which
commences on the first day of a month, but can mean a month commencing
on any date (see General principles of calculation in months below).
Year
Unlike ‘month’, which has a statutory definition, ‘year’ is not defined.
Consequently the agreement should state clearly what is meant by a year. Eg, in
an agreement there might be an expression such as ‘year of this Agreement’.
Does this mean:
• a year from a specified date? or
• the year in which the date of execution occurs? or
453
• the year in which the agreement commenced (ie a date prior to the date
of execution)? or
• the period of 1 January to 31 December (ie a calendar year)?
To avoid any uncertainty, the expression ‘year of this Agreement’ is sometimes
defined in the contract. Without a definition it may mean either a calender
year or a period of 365 days (366 days in a leap year) starting from another
date, depending on the context. It is possible also that a year (regardless of
when the period of year begins) may be for a length other than 365 days, such
as where ‘year’ has a particular meaning within a particular industry, trade etc
(eg Grant v Maddox (1846) 15 M & W 737; Boufoy-Bastick v The University of West
Indies [2015] UKPC 27). In the latter case, a year was held to be the length of
an academic year.
Day
The word ‘day’ may mean:
• a calendar day, from midnight to midnight; or
• a period of 24 consecutive hours, depending on the context (see for
example, Cornfoot v Royal Exchange Assurance Corpn [1904] 1 KB 40, CA,
distinguished in Cartwright v MacCormack [1963] 1 All ER 11, [1963]
1 WLR 18, CA); or
• a ‘working day’, which is normally understood as a (complete) calendar
day that is not a holiday, and not just the working hours of a day (Reardon
Smith Line Ltd v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1963] AC 691,
[1963] 1 All ER 545, HL); or
• a ‘conventional day’ which begins at a defined time and ends 24 hours
later (Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
[1963] AC 691, [1963] 1 All ER 545, HL); or
• a ‘business day’, which is sometimes understood to mean the days on
which a bank is open for business, while ‘working days’ will normally
mean Monday to Friday but not Christmas, Easter and bank holidays
(Lafarge (Aggregates) Ltd v Newham London Borough Council [2005] EWHC
1337 (Comm), [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rept 577 even though one of the parties
regularly carried out work on a Saturday).
Quarters
If reference is made to quarters of a year in an agreement (eg where a royalty is
to be paid quarterly) then the agreement should state which quarterly periods
are to be applied (eg, 1 January to 31 March, 1 April to 30 June). If the periods
are not stated, a court may interpret the contract as referring to the traditional
quarterly periods used in landlord and tenant law, which end on a ‘quarter
day’. The ‘usual quarter days’ (as distinct from another set of quarter days that
were used in the distant past) are:
454
Ends of months
A notice which lasts for a month or several months and which is served on the
last day of a month will expire on the corresponding day in the following day
455
Served on expires
31 January 28 February (29 February in leap year)
28 February 28 March
30 April 30 May
31 May 30 June
30 June 30 July
The following clauses clarify some intended meanings for days, months and
years:
‘Day’ means a period of 24 hours expiring at midnight
‘Month’ means the period of a calendar month from [date]
‘Year’ means a period of 365 days from [date] (or, where that period includes a
29 February, 366 days)
At what time does a period expire? Fractions of a day are normally excluded.
Eg, if a month’s notice must be given, the period will expire on midnight on
the last day of the month (see Re Figgis, Roberts v MacLaren [1969] 1 Ch 123,
[1968] 1 All ER 999). Therefore, ‘where a person under an obligation to do
a particular act has to do it on or before a particular date he has the whole of
that day to perform it’ (Afovos Shipping COSA v Pagnan [1983] 1 All ER 449,
[1983] 1 WLR 195, HL).
However, a provision which requires the giving of ‘at least’ or ‘not less than’ a
specified number of days’ notice is often interpreted as requiring that number
of ‘clear’ days, excluding not only the date on which a notice is served but also
that on which it expires (see, eg, Re Hector Whaling Ltd [1936] Ch 208 on what
is now the Companies Act 2006, s 320(1), (3)).
456
2 QB 899, [1967] 1 All ER 19; affd [1967] 2 QB 899, [1967] 2 All ER 900,
CA, considered in RJB Mining (UK) Ltd v NUM [1995] IRLR 556, CA). ‘Until’
a specified date includes that date (Henrich Hirdes GmbH v Edmund [1991] 2
Lloyd’s Rep 546, per Hirst J).
it seems that the date set out at the head of the agreement will be used as the
reference point, even if the parties have mis-stated the date of execution of the
agreement (Styles v Wardle (1825) 4 B & C 908).
However, in this context it is not entirely clear whether the stated number of
months is to run from the date of the agreement or the day after. It may be
better to use phrases such as:
• ‘on or before’,
• ‘from and excluding’,
• ‘from and including’,
• ‘to and including’ etc,
which specify which dates to apply.
In some agreements drafted by US lawyers the interpretation clause defines
exactly what is meant by expressions such as ‘until’. American drafters also
use the term ‘through’ as in ‘through March 1st’ which means ‘up to and
including 1 March’. To avoid ambiguity (or lack of understanding on the part
of the commercial parties), the drafter may prefer to avoid the expressions
in the left-hand column, below, and use instead the words in the right-hand
column.
Some agreements define periods by the use of phrases such as ‘business day’
or ‘business hours’, etc. One meaning of such phrases relates to the activities
of banks and some definitions specifically relate, eg business hours as to the
457
hours that a particular type of bank (and sometimes a specific locality such
as the City of London) is open for business on a day. This is not always a
common understanding, and such phrases (if used) should be defined to state
specifically the days and times referred to, particularly if the parties operate
in different industries or countries. What might be a conventional business
day or business hours in one country or for a particular type of business may
be very different for another. For example, a firm of traditional lawyers in a
country with a high level of formality and tradition may be different to the
supplier of security software, who works 24 hours a day.
An agreement may specify that something is done on a day other than a public
holiday or bank holiday (such as the meaning of ‘business day’ above). Eg a
supplier of goods may be under an obligation to make deliveries of goods on a
business day. If the meaning of a holiday is not defined, then the following can
provide guidance:
• there is no statutory definition of a public holiday that is generally
applicable;
• a public holiday, where defined, will normally include:
• non-statutory holidays: Good Friday, Christmas Day;
• Bank holidays: for England: Easter Monday, the last Monday in May,
the last Monday in August, 26 December (if it is not a Sunday),
27 December (in a year in which 25 or 26 December is a Sunday).
For Scotland: New Year’s Day (if it is not a Sunday or, if it is a Sunday,
3 January), 2 January (if it is not a Sunday or, if it is a Sunday,
3 January), Good Friday, the first Monday in May, the first Monday
in August, 30 November (if it is not a Saturday or Sunday or, if it is a
Saturday or Sunday, the first Monday following that day), Christmas
Day, if it is not a Sunday or, if it is a Sunday, 26 December).
For Northern Ireland: 17 March (if it is not a Sunday or, if it is a
Sunday, 18 March), Easter Monday, the last Monday in May, the last
Monday in August, 26 December (if it is not a Sunday), 27 December
(in a year in which 25 or 26 December is a Sunday).
See the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971.
The above applies within the UK; for a contract with party incorporated or
operating in another country the days that are public (or religious) holidays
and where no work is normaly done are likely to be different.
458
Expressions of time are used extensively throughout agreements, but are most
frequently seen in the following types of clauses:
• in the Definitions, such as:
any definition for the length of the agreement:
459
‘“Contract Period” shall mean the period of 180 days from and including
the Commencement Date’
‘“Business Day” shall mean any day other than Saturday, Sunday, bank or
other public holiday in England and Wales’;
• Payment, concerning the periods for when payments are due, such as:
‘the Purchaser shall make payment within 30 days of the Agreement’;
• Reporting, provisions requiring a party to provide reports within a certain
period;
• in Secondary Commercial Provisions, such as:
• Confidentiality, which specify the length of time confidentiality
obligations will continue:
‘The provisions of this Clause 5 shall survive termination of this
Agreement for a period of 5 years’;
• Warranties, stating, eg, the length of any warranties which are given
and time limits on enforcing or claiming under them;
• Termination, stating the period in which an agreement can terminated
or a breach can be remedied;
‘A Party may terminate this Agreement at any time on 90 days’ notice’;
460
461
462
Case analysis
463
464
Definitions of ‘net sales value’ (or similar expressions, eg ‘net invoice price’)
are often included in intellectual property licence agreements and other
agreements where payments are calculated by reference to the amount paid of
a party’s sales of goods (such as agency or distribution agreements).
The concept of a net sales price or value implies that in calculating the amount
payable to a licensor or principal, the licensee, agent or distributor may deduct
certain items from the amount payable. Typically, items such as VAT, carriage
and insurance charges are deducted. A typical simple definition is seen in
Precedent 1. The list of what is a permitted deduction will vary from industry
sector to industry sector and will also depend on the bargaining position of
the parties.
The practical aim behind including such wording is to make it clear what the
licensee, agent or distributor can deduct from the amount it needs pay to
licensor or principal, both in terms of specific items and amounts. The bigger
aim behind such a clause is as a type of anti-avoidance measure, particularly
where intellectual property is involved.
For example, a company develops technology which can render web pages
more quickly. The company (the Licensor) licenses the technology to other
software companies (OSC), such as those who make operating systems. The
technology is embedded in the web browser that comes with the operating
system. The Licensor licenses the technology on the basis that the Licensor
receives a percentage royalty based on the price that the OSC sell each copy of
their operating system.
If the OSC decide to give the operating system away (make it freely available
as a download) then there are no sales. Or perhaps the OSC decide to create
a subsidiary which will be responsible for the development and sale of the
operating system with the OSC sub-licensing the technology to the subsidiary.
Again there is also no sale as such. Unless there are provisions to deal with
these situations the Licensor will receive no royalties. However it will continue
to be under an obligation to license their technology.
To deal with this, and other situations, the definition of net sales value attempts
to prevent the ways that some licensees have tried to avoid paying royalties.
The ‘bigger picture’ purpose of this type of clause is:
465
• to make sure that the licensor is paid for the grant of a licence and the use
of its intellectual property;
• to prevent the licensee avoiding making payments for the licence, such
as by:
• making no charge for the products or items that contain the licensed
intellectual property:
• making no charge for the products or items that contain the licensed
intellectual property, but charging for items, products or services
that are related to or need the licensed intellectual property (such
as if a product that contains the licensed intellectual property needs
servicing or maintenance, and the licensee charges for the servicing
or maintenance, but not for the product itself);
• transferring the licensed intellectual property to a company within
the group of companies of which the licensee is a member (ie there is
no sale);
• selling items or products that contain the licensed intellectual
property at below its market price; and
• to require that the licensee can only deduct sums from the amount it pays
to the licensor for specific items it has actually charged its (the licensee’s)
customers.
The use of a net sales value is normally based on the proposition that the
payment mechanism for which it is used is a royalty or other type of payment
per unit sold or made. Not all types of licensing, agency or distribution
agreement are suited to that method of payment calculation. The discussion
of other methods is beyond the scope of this book (but see Anderson,
Technology Transfer, 4th Edn, forthcoming).
Drafting issues
Where a party is using a Net Sales Value clause then depending on the
negotiating position and strengths of the parties, some of the following points
may also need consideration:
• What specific items can the licensee deduct? What is specifically deductible will
vary from industry to industry but normally focuses on costs of actually
making the sale of the licensed product (eg if the agreement concerns the
licensing of intellectual property that leads to the sale of a product), and
would include:
• the cost of packaging, insuring and delivering goods;
• any VAT or other similar sales tax that the licensee needs to pay;
• any other taxes or duties etc that the licensee needs to pay (eg the
licensee may need to pay import taxes on importing the goods into a
particular country);
466
• any trade discounts a licensee needs to offer (as well as any credits it
receives).
• What income or price will be used as the basis for the deductions in a Net Sales
Value definition? A licensee, in order to minimise royalty payments, could
deliberately sell no products, but give them away or sell them in return
for some other non-monetary payment, or sell them at a deliberately
low price so that the price equalled the amount of deductions in a Net
Sales Value definition. To meet this point the Net Sales Value will often
include wording whereby the price is set against the invoiced price of the
goods if sold to someone unrelated to the licensee in an arm’s length
transaction. This aims to add an element of objectivity to the price set by
the Licensee.
• A cap on the amount deducted? Although the categories stated in Precedent
1 are measurable, the licensor or principal may wish to include a cap on
the amount of deductions that the licensee/agent/distributor can make.
Possible ways of addressing this include:
• a general restriction so that the permitted deductions are no more
than the level found in the industry or markets in which the licensee
operates (ie are not more than the usual amounts or are average or
reasonable amounts that are deducted), or
• setting a maximum percentage deduction on the amount that a
licensee may deduct from the sale price of the licensed products.
• Does the Licensee receive income that is not derived from sales of licensed products?
A licensee may not in fact make any goods but derives all or some of its
income by granting sub-licences or from carrying out further development
work involving the licensed intellectual property (if the agreement involves
the granting of intellectual property rights). It is possible a licensee may
not in fact grant any sub-licences at all but still receive income related to
the licensed rights. For example, a third party may pay for the licensee
to carry out further research work and/or take an option to obtain a
licence in case the research work proves successful. There are other ways
in which a licensee may derive ‘income’ from having a licence. If these
types of income are normally obtained by a licensee then a Net Sales Value
definition will not be appropriate, rather a definition of Net Receipts
should be the basis for the calculation of royalties (see Precedent 3 for a
very simple version of a Net Receipts definition).
467
A Payment clause will normally apply the definition of a Net Sales Value clause
(see Precedent 2). In a licence agreement the royalty will be calculated using
the definition of Net Sales Value. The greater the amount of deductions, the
smaller the figure available to calculate a royalty.
In licence agreements the Net Sales Value clause can assume significance,
because of the amount of deductions that a licensee might wish to include.
Wording included in the definition of Net Sales Value as to what expenses and
payments are allowable can permit a licensee to deduct greater amounts and
thus reduce the royalty payable to the licensor.
468
469
Many lawyers consider a Notices clause is one of the most important ‘boilerplate’
clauses to be included in a commercial agreement.
There is much case law relating to the service, and the timing, of notices. The
great majority relate to landlord and tenant law. In some cases, mistakes in
the entering of details within a notice (such as inserting the wrong date of
termination) will not make the notice ineffective (see eg, Mannai Investment
Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] 2 WLR 945, HL – putting the
wrong date was held to be an ‘immaterial error which would not have misled
a reasonable recipient’). But where the mistake is deliberate or the error was
not apparent (such as sending the notice to a wrong party – see Lemmerbell Ltd
v Britannai LAS Direct Ltd [1998] 3 EGLR 67, CA – or to the wrong address) the
notice will not be effective.
However, where the form and content of the notice or the requirement for
a notice at all is specified by law then any type of mistake in or concerning a
notice makes the notice ineffective. This is likely to be on the basis that the
courts interpret compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements more
strictly than where commercial and other types of contracts are concerned.
In most commercial agreements it is not normally necessary to send notices
to comply with statutory or regulatory requirements. But they can sometimes
arise, for example in situations such as:
• in a sale/purchase of a business, the formal transfer of ownership will
need submitting to the Land Registry;
• in the licensing of some types of intellectual property (particularly with
patents, where prosecuting or maintaining in force a patent requires the
submission of forms, documentation and fees by particular dates).
There are also rules concerning the service and effectiveness of notices when
a contract is formed (the postal rule: Household Fire and Carriage Accident
Insurance Co Ltd v Grant (1879) 4 Ex D 216, CA), and in administrative (such
as judicial review proceedings), employment and civil proceedings, which are
outside the scope of this book.
Drafting issues
• Whether only certain forms of writing are permissible. The parties may specify
that only certain forms of communication will constitute ‘writing’
(although a clause indicating that a notice may be sent by a particular
470
method may be sufficient indication that the notice itself may be prepared
in a way suitable for that form of communication). Eg:
‘Any notice … shall be writing (which will include a letter written by hand
or which is printed or which is prepared in a form suitable for sending by
electronic mail)’.
• Whether personal delivery is permitted. ‘Personal delivery’ has a particular
meaning, it does not mean that an individual delivers the notice but
rather that the notice is delivered (ie handed over) to a person. In the
case of a corporate body, personal delivery will normally mean leaving the
notice with someone authorised to receive it (such as a receptionist) (see
Bottin (International) Investments Ltd v Venson Group plc [2004] EWCA Civ
1368, [2004] All ER (D) 322 (Oct), para 47). Where a party is an
individual, ‘personal delivery’ will normally mean handing the notice
to the individual (Ener-G Holdings plc v Hormell [2012] EWCA Civ 1059).
A notice put through a letterbox or left at an unattended reception is
unlikely to equate to ‘personal delivery’. These meanings of personal
delivery will apply if not further defined or explained in the wording used
in a notices clause. For example, if the parties wish that a notice which
is served personally is sufficiently delivered by leaving at the reception
desk or by putting the notice through a letterbox, then the notices clause
should include wording to that effect.
If parties are to work together on a project or in partnership, whether
or not they are corporate bodies, then this simple direct method of
giving notice should not be overlooked. To omit it may cause subsequent
confusion, both as to whether due notice has in fact been given and as to
the time of delivery (see below).
‘Any notice … shall either be delivered personally or …)’.
For a corporate body, if a party wishes to make sure that a notice must
be brought to the attention of a more senior member of staff (such as
a director or senior manager) then the notices clause should use clear
wording to that effect. This may be difficult if it is not possible to easily
reach a director or a senior manager, who might work from an office
which is located within a building protected by security measures (such
as with serviced offices or multi-occupancy office blocks, where in order
to get into the building through security gates requires the permission of
the corporate body itself). Lawyers, when asked to deliver notices, usually
employ specialist process servers for such tasks, who will be experienced
in reaching the right person.
• Whether the notice can be sent by post. Until the advent of electronic mail, it
was common to send documents by post and to provide for the sending
of notices by post, usually first class post within the UK, or airmail from
overseas:
‘Any notice … shall be sufficiently given to any party if sent in a letter by
first-class or airmail pre-paid post.’
For particularly important notices the parties might specify that the notice
has to be sent by recorded delivery or another method.
471
• Whether the notice may be sent by email. In many commercial agreements the
sending of notices by email is the default position, and even more so in
situations where a party is resident overseas, or where it is necessary to
communicate promptly with the other party. Obviously, it is for the parties
to specify what communication systems are acceptable to them, but where,
as is usual, all currently available forms of message are specified it should
be ascertained that each party has the means to receive them. An example
in point is the use of facsimile machines. The presence of such machines
in organisations is becoming uncommon; nowadays they are likely to be
found only in larger organisations, and such an organisation may only
have one machine so it will take extra effort for a received facsimile to be
passed onto the intended recipient.
The following simple form of wording might be inserted:
‘Any notice … shall be sent … by electronic mail’.
472
• Does the notices clause state the address(es) to which a party needs to send any notice?
Any notice should state the correct and current address of the recipient
to which a notice should be sent. For postal purposes, this will usually be
the address of the party set out at the beginning of the agreement. But a
party may change its address, particularly during an agreement intended
to run for some time. Accordingly a notices clauses should provide for the
possibility of a change of address, eg:
‘… for notice sent by post, to the address of the party receiving such notice
as set out at the head of this agreement, and for notices sent by electronic
mail to the electronic mail address set out below in Clause [no], or as
notified between the parties for the purpose of this clause’.
or (alternate form):
473
474
sending, or, in the case of a notice sent to or from overseas by air mail,
[7] business days (being business days in the place to which the notice
is sent) after the date of sending’.
• Should the same address (and person) be used for all notices? For some types of
agreements or situations it may not be appropriate for a party to send all
notices and other documents to the same person or address of the other
party. This will be especially relevant where a party is a large organisation
(which is spread over several sites) or the agreement is long term.
For example, it may be more appropriate to send a notice concerning:
• an invoice, statement etc for the attention of the accounts department;
• delivery of goods to the delivery department; but
• breaches or termination to the chief executive, another senior
manager or in-house counsel.
475
A Notices clause will have application throughout any agreement and all types
of agreement.
476
477
478
2 Each of the parties shall notify the other of any change of address or
number within 48 hours of such change.
3 The Party X may serve any such notice by hand upon the Party Y at
[the Premises] (whether or not the Party Y appears to be in occupa-
tion of [the Premises] at the time of such service) whereupon in the
event of any conflict between service by hand and service by any
other means such service by hand shall prevail.
479
Case analysis
Key facts
The case involved the interpretation of a notices clause in a commercial
agreement (a share purchase agreement).
1 The defendants gave a number of warranties to the claimants. If there
was a breach of a warranty and the claimants wished to bring a claim
for such a breach, clauses in the agreement set out a procedure
which started with the serving of a notice on the defendants:
[From Clause 3 of the share purchase agreement]
(h) A Warrantor shall be liable for breach of a Warranty …. only if notice of a
claim is given to him, specifying such details of the event or circumstance
giving rise to such claim as are available to the Investor and estimating
(if capable of estimation by the Investor) its quantum, prior to the third
anniversary of Completion.
….
(o) No claim under the Warranties shall be deemed to have been made
unless notice of such claim was made in writing to the Warrantors
specifying such detail[s] of the event or circumstances giving rise to
such claim as are available to the Investor and an estimate (if capable
of preparation by the Investor) of the total amount of the Warrantors’
liabilities therefore claimed.
(p) Any claim in respect of which notice shall have been given in
accordance with Clause 3(o) above shall be deemed to have been
irrevocably withdrawn and lapsed (not having been previously satisfied
settled or withdrawn) if proceedings in respect of such claim have not
been issued and served on the Warrantors not later than the expiry of the
period of 12 months after the date of such notice.’
480
3 A notice under Clause 3(o) was served on the defendants (to simplify
the facts of the case) by leaving the notice with the receptionist at the
defendants’ registered office.
Held
1 The Court of Appeal repeated points made by the judge at first
instance that the notice clause would not be interpreted by refer-
ence to:
(i) CPR 6.4(4): requiring personal service of a document on a com-
pany by leaving it with a person holding a senior position in the
company, or
(ii) to the Companies Act 1948, s 725, where service of a docu-
ment is by leaving it at or sending it to the company’s registered
office,
as neither had been incorporated into the share purchase agreement.
2 The Court of Appeal disagreed with the judge at first instance by stat-
ing that service could be effected by leaving the notice at the reg-
istered office of the defendants. The Court of Appeal noted that a
specific address was provided in Clause 19:
‘46. …There is nothing in clause 19 to require that the personal delivery to
a party which is a company has to be at the company’s registered office,
still less anything to suggest that personal delivery can be effected merely
by leaving the document in question somewhere in the building which is
the registered office. That gives no meaning to “personally”.’
3 The Court of Appeal agreed with the judge that a notice which is per-
sonally served can be left with a receptionist, as such a person is
authorised to receive, inter alia, letters:
‘47. The judge went on to say that service at the registered office by leaving
it with the receptionist was sufficient. Apart from the superfluous reference
to the registered office, on the particular facts that conclusion is in my
judgment correct. I agree with [counsel for the defendant] when he says
that personal delivery of a notice to a company is effected by delivering
the notice to somebody authorised to receive it. I disagree with him when
he says that the only person to have such authority is somebody in a
senior position in the company. The function of a receptionist ordinarily
is to receive people visiting, and letters or parcels being delivered to, the
employer of the receptionist. In the present case there was in evidence
the witness statement of the process server […], who delivered the […]
notice to the receptionist; that was accepted on the receptionist’s express
assurance that it would come to the attention of a director. As the judge
481
pointed out, the Defendants did not adduce any evidence as to what
happened to the […] notice after it was left with the receptionist. It is to be
inferred that it did come to the attention of a director. In my judgment, the
[…] notice was delivered personally to Venson.’
482
What is an ‘option’
An option is a contractual right for one party (the option holder) to elect
to bring into force a term of an agreement. Usually, the option will arise in
specific circumstances and will continue for a specified period and will be
exercisable on pre-agreed terms or when particular circumstances occur.
For example, an option clause may grant the option holder:
• a right to purchase land if a landowner decides to sell it;
• a right to buy or sell shares if a company decides to allot more shares; or
• a right to take a licence to intellectual property generated under an
agreement.
To develop the final example, under a research agreement, a pharmaceutical
company agrees with another company or organisation (researcher) to
pay for research into a new treatment. The agreement may provide that if
the researcher receives or achieves a particular goal then the company can
exercise an option to either:
• immediately acquire an intellectual property licence to the results of the
research. The provisions of the licence may have been agreed at the time
the research agreement was entered into and the exercise of the option
simply gives the company the immediate right to a licence; or
• give the pharmaceutical company the right to negotiate the provisions
of the licence (and subject to the researcher and the pharmaceutical
company agreeing, the pharmaceutical company can then acquire a
licence). On exercise of the option, the parties will negotiate the provisions
of the licence (including duration, price, scope of the licence, etc).
Options are sometimes confused with rights of first refusal (sometimes also
known as a ‘first option’ or ‘pre-emption’). A right of first refusal is exercisable
only if the grantor of the right elects to make the right available. In other
words it is the right to be given the opportunity to acquire what is the subject
483
matter of the right of first refusal if the granter of the opportunity decides to
do so, see Astrazeneca UK Ltd v Albemarle International Corpn [2011] EWHC 1574
(Comm), [2011] All ER (D) 162 (Jun) and see Case analysis. Eg, under a
franchise agreement, the franchisee may be granted a specified territory
(Territory A) in which to exploit the franchise. The franchisee may wish to
have an opportunity to acquire a neighbouring territory (Territory B).
• Option. If the franchisee is granted an option to acquire Territory B, then
on the exercise of that option (depending on the detailed terms of
the option), the franchisee may elect to purchase Territory B during a
specified period.
• Right of first refusal. On the other hand, if the franchisee is granted a right of
first refusal over Territory B, it has no automatic right to acquire Territory
B if the franchisor does not make it available. A right of first refusal over
Territory B might provide, for example, that if the franchisor negotiates
terms with a third party for Territory B, then the franchisor must give the
franchisee an opportunity to match those terms. If the franchisee does
match the terms, the franchisor must grant Territory B to the franchisee
rather than the third party. Sometimes, contracts include both options
and rights of first refusal over the same opportunity.
The terms on which the right of first refusal is offered need to be sufficiently
certain so that the party having the right of first refusal can accept them and
enter into a contract, Accordingly, the right of first refusal amounts to ‘…a
right to receive a contractual offer on terms which the party who has granted
the right of first refusal is prepared to accept, even though the detailed terms
of any contract may require further negotiation and might ultimately not
eventuate in a contract at all’ (Astrazeneca UK Ltd v Albemarle International
Corpn [2011] EWHC 1574 (Comm), [2011] All ER (D) 162 (Jun), see Case
analysis). The party providing the right of first refusal must not only provide
a contractual offer, it also must be making a bona fide offer, ie where it sets
a price for the thing which is the subject matter of the right of first refusal,
the price must be one ‘…which, in good faith, it considers to be one which a
genuinely interested offeree would be prepared to consider’ (QR Sciences Ltd v
BTG International Ltd [2005] EWHC 670 (Ch)).
The wording used by the parties (whether they call their document, clause
etc an ‘option’ or a ‘right of first refusal’) is not determinative as to whether
it is an option or a right of first refusal. A court may interpret a document
labelled an option as a right of first refusal and vice versa (see Woodroffe v Box
[1954] ALR 474, 28 ALJ 90, Australian High Court; Fraser v Thames Television
Ltd [1984] QB 44, [1983] 2 All ER 101).
A date specified for the exercise of an option must be strictly complied with
otherwise the option will lapse (see eg Millichamp v Jones [1983] 1 All ER 267,
[1982] 1 WLR 1422; Haugland Tankers AS v RMK Marine Gemi Yapim Sanayii
484
Drafting issues
485
or more parties may have assigned their interest in the agreement which
contains the option. The assignee(s) may not be the parties envisaged or
contemplated at the time of exercise. Also, in the event of a dispute, the
courts may interpret the option strictly so that an assignee may not be
permitted to exercise the option (see BP Oil UK Ltd v Lloyds TSB Bank Ltd
[2004] EWCA Civ 1710, [2004] 1 All ER (D) 336 (Dec)) but it is likely
to depend on the words found in the agreement and the surrounding
circumstances (Truegold International Ltd v Questrock Ltd [2010] EWHC 966
(Ch)).
• On how many occasions can the option be exercised? If not clear from the
circumstances, can the option only be exercised once or can it be exercised
on subsequent occasions?
• What happens if the option is not exercised? If the right to exercise an option
arises and the option holder fails to exercise do they lose the right to
exercise after a specific period of time (the option is said to lapse)? Or
will the right to exercise it again exist generally or when some specific
circumstances arise?
Options
Options and option agreements are widely used. In an agreement that deals
with matters of substance other than the option, the following provisions may
need attention.
• Notices. If any notices are required to be given, do they need to be in a
particular form? The required form is sometimes attached as a schedule
to an agreement.
• Payment. If a specific payment is to be made on grant or exercise of
the option, are any ‘normal’ payment provisions to apply (payment on
invoice, set number days to pay) or are particular requirements to apply
here (ie payment with exercise of the option means the payment must be
in the bank account of the grantor of the option on the exercise date)?
• Termination. In what circumstances will the option terminate? Eg an option
may terminate (eg ‘lapse’) if it is not exercised by the option holder or
terminate on it being exercised if the parties are unable to come to an
agreement (see Precedent 1).
486
487
2.5 The right to exercise the Option shall terminate forthwith upon
the director being adjudicated bankrupt.
2.6 The Option shall lapse on the earliest of the following dates:
(a) [insert final exercise date];
(b) the expiry date of any period during which the Option
may be exercised;
(c) the date on which the Director ceases to be a director of
the Company;
(d) the date on which a resolution is passed or an order is
made by the court for the compulsory winding up of the
Company; or
(e) the date on which the Director does or omits to do any-
thing as a result of which he ceases to be the legal and
beneficial owner of the Option.
3 Exercise of Option
The Option shall be exercisable in whole or in part [(but if in part then in
respect of not less than [insert minimum percentage] of the Option Shares
or the balance of the Shares comprised in the Option)] by notice in writing
given by the Director to the Company.
488
Case analysis
Facts
1 C (as buyer) and D (as builder) entered into a contract whereby
D designed, built and delivered to C an oil tanker (hull 63).
2 On the same date as the above contract the parties entered into an
option agreement granting C the option to buy an additional, identical
vessel.
489
Held
1 The judge [(Langley J)] stated that the option agreement did not use
the word ‘exercise’ but referred to C ‘declaring’ the option and paying
the fee.
2 He held that the use of the word ‘simultaneously’ was much stronger
than (eg) ‘upon giving notice’: ‘The notice and payment must be given
and made at the same time and so, I think, usually as part of a single
process in this case of exercising the option.’
3 Further, the use of the term ‘Commitment Fee’ also suggested that
the payment of the fee was required in order to secure D’s commit-
ment to the contract. Accordingly, the offer contained in the option
could not be accepted without the payment of the Commitment Fee
at the same time.
4 Therefore the option had not been exercised validly.
BP Oil UK Ltd v Lloyds TSB Bank Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1710, [2004] 1 All
ER (D) 336 (Dec)
Facts
1 The defendant bank was the tenant under a lease of office premises.
The claimants were two BP companies and a Mobil company (the ‘Oil
Cos’).
2 The terms of the head lease prevented D from granting an underlease
of a part in the way the Oil Cos desired. Accordingly, the Oil Cos took
an assignment of the lease on terms that D entered into an option
agreement that granted the Oil Cos an option to put the lease back on
to D for no consideration (a ‘put option’). The put option was personal
and non-assignable.
3 At the time of the option agreement the Oil Cos were in partnership,
but this later had to be determined due to competition reasons. The
arrangements included Mobil’s release of its interest in the lease and
the Oil Cos assigned the lease to the two BP companies.
490
4 The Oil Cos served notice on D to exercise the put option. D refused
to take the lease back on the grounds that the assignees were not the
original ‘tenant’ under the lease. The Oil Cos disagreed and issued
proceedings.
5 At first instance the judge held (i) that there was not a valid exercise of
the put option and (ii) the option might still be validly exercised if the
lease was reassigned to the Oil Cos. The parties both appealed on
the aspects adverse to them.
Held
1 On a true construction of the option agreement, the Oil Cos were
defined as ‘the purchaser’. The option necessarily involved the pur-
chaser being the tenant. Thus the exercise was invalid and would be
whilst only two were tenants.
2 The option could be exercised if the lease had been reassigned back
to the original three companies by the date of exercise of the option.
Facts
1 The claimant sells an anaesthetic. During the life of the agreement
between the parties the claimant manufactured an ingredient of the
anaesthetic (propofol) by distilling material (2,6 Di-isopropyl-phenol
(DIP)) made by the defendant.
2 The parties entered into a supply agreement in 2005, which was ter-
minated in 2008.
3 At the time the parties entered into the supply agreement, the claim-
ant was already contemplating ceasing distilling DIP, and buying
propofol direct.
4 The supply agreement contained a clause reflecting 3 (the clause
is reproduced below). That if the claimant did wish to directly buy
propofol rather than distilling it then the defendant would have a right
of first refusal to supply propofol.
5 The meaning of the clause and what it covered was the heart of the
dispute between the parties. The defendant claimed that the claimant
was in breach of the clause, and accordingly that the defendant could
terminate the agreement. The claimant argued that the meaning of
the clause had a different meaning to that given by the defendant
and that the claimant gave plenty of opportunities to the defendant to
match an offer made to the claimant by a third party for the supply of
propofol.
The clause dealing with a right of first refusal
491
‘H-Switch to Propofol
In the event that at any time BUYER reformulates or otherwise changes
its Diprivan brand to substitute propofol for the PRODUCT, BUYER will so
notify SELLER and will give SELLER the first opportunity and right of first
refusal to supply propofol to BUYER under mutually acceptable terms and
conditions.’
Held
1 The irreducible minimum for a right of first refusal was that it confers a
right to obtain the subject matter of the right:
‘it confers a right to be given an opportunity to match any third party
offer which the grantor of the right might be otherwise minded to accept,
and, in the event that the grantee matches the offer, to be awarded the
business to which the offer relates. That construction of the right of first
refusal is supported by a number of authorities, which, albeit all at first
instance, seem to me to support [what is the above] irreducible minimum.’
492
8 The clause containing the right of first refusal contains the phrase
‘under mutually acceptable terms and conditions’ and the court
explored what is to happen once the grantee has accepted the con-
tractual offer or has matched the third party offer that the grantor is
willing to accept. It is still possible for there to be no binding contract
because there is difficulty between the parties on the detail of what
will be supplied. The court held that in such circumstances:
‘… what the grantor is not entitled to do is to act in bad faith in relation
to such detailed negotiations, declining ultimately to enter a contract with
the grantee and then enter into a contract on essentially the same terms
with a third party.’
493
Drafting issues
• Numbering and paragraphing. Conventionally, each party is described in a
separate paragraph and numbered, as in Precedent 1.
Often an agreement will have a shortened form of the name for referral
purposes later in the agreement, such as in Precedent 1 (eg ‘IBM’
for International Business Machines). Alternatively the parties are
more usually referred to by their ‘roles’ in the agreement. If a party is
manufacturing products then it is referred to in the agreement as the
‘Manufacturer’. This is often used where one party is entering a particular
type of agreement on a frequent basis. Such an approach helps to reduce
the number of changes needed for it to be made into a standard form of
agreement.
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
Some contracts:
(1) fail to state a price a party will be paid for undertaking contractual
obligations at all, or
(2) state a price or rate for the party undertaking of the contractual obligations,
but then fail to state when or how that price or rate is to be paid.
In the first case, the courts may infer that the seller of goods or supplier of
services should be paid a reasonable amount, for example:
• for goods, where the price of the goods is not stated the buyer must pay a
reasonable price (Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 8); and
• for services, where the price for the services is not stated there is an implied
term that the party contracting with the supplier will pay a reasonable
charge (Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, s 15).
For (2) a court may be prepared to interpret such a contract as requiring
payment within a reasonable period. However, it is always better to state
specifically what the payment terms are to be.
Drafting issues
502
503
504
• whether the records are available for inspection by the party or only
an agent of the other party.
• Ownership of goods. A Payment clause may also deal with the ownership of
property of goods sold and when it passes in relation to goods (often the
supplier of goods will wish to retain ownership until it receives payment
and/or it has cleared funds). Also the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 18
provides detailed rules as to when property passes (unless the parties to
an agreement have agreed otherwise) (see Title (or property) and risk).
• Sending of invoices, use of order numbers etc. Do invoices need sending to a
particular location quoting a reference number?
• Guaranteeing of payment etc. Does the seller/supplier require that payment
of the price for the goods or services is guaranteed by a third party? If this
is required, then the agreement will need to include provisions making
the guarantor a party to it as well as the precise provisions of the guarantee
itself. The alternative is that the parties enter into a separate agreement
with the guarantor dealing only with the guarantee. For example, will
the seller/supplier wish the other party to enter into a parent company
guarantee or have some form of insurance to cover a default of the other
party in making payment?
A Payment clause will often contain, where appropriate, the following other
payment-related clauses such as:
• Currency (where payment may be made in a currency other than pounds
sterling or payment may be made in more than one currency);
• Interest (where the amount of interest and how and when it will be made is
specified in the event of a late payment);
• Net Sales Value (this definition might be added where a royalty is payable
and the permitted deductions from the invoiced value of goods and
services are specified before the royalty is calculated); and
• Time of the essence (if there is a ‘generic’ boilerplate Time of the essence clause
in the Boilerplate section of an agreement, and the clause relates to the
timing of payment).
Also Termination provisions may specify exactly what is to happen in the event
of non- or late payment in addition to general or other specific provisions
505
506
Precedent 8—Long form (eg payment for goods for long term supply of
goods)
1 The Prices for the Goods are set out in the [Price List][website] of the
Seller.
2 The Seller shall have the right to increase the Prices on each anniver-
sary of the date of this Agreement at [specify percentage][by some
specified external reference, such as the Retail Prices Index].
507
3 The Buyer shall make payment to the Seller within [[ ] days of the date
of the Seller’s invoice][[ ] days of the end of the month following the
month in which the invoice is dated].
4 The Seller may submit an invoice for the Goods [on Delivery][at any
time after Delivery of the Goods].
5 Where the Seller delivers the Goods in instalments the Seller shall
have the right to submit to the Buyer an invoice for each instalment.
The Buyer shall pay the invoice for each instalment in accordance
with Clause 3 above.
6 The Buyer shall pay all sums due under this Agreement, without any
discount, deduction, set-off or counterclaim whatsoever.
7 If the Buyer shall fail to make any due payment to the Seller, the Seller
shall have the right, without prejudice to any other right or remedy
(a) not to make further deliveries [under this Agreement][under this
Agreement and any other agreements that the Parties have
entered into or will enter into];
(b) to charge the Buyer interest on late payments on a daily basis at
a rate equivalent to [3]% above the base lending rate of [name]
Bank plc then in force;
(c) to require that the Buyer pays in advance for [any further orders
of Goods][ any further deliveries of the Goods if the Goods are
supplied in instalments];
[8 Time for payment of all sums payable by the Buyer under this
Agreement shall be of the essence.]
9 When making a payment the Buyer shall state the invoice number
and any order or instalment number on any documentation which
accompanies the payment.
508
(a) if the price is higher, then we will offer you the option to either
pay the higher price or to cancel your order;
(b) if the price is lower, we will charge you the lower price.
4 Our prices are shown inclusive of VAT [at the current rate of 20%].
5 You will need to make payment for the goods at the time you place
your order (although we will not charge your debit or credit card until
we accept your order). By placing your order you are giving your per-
mission to charge the debit or credit card you used when placing your
order.
6 We only accept payment by [debit or credit card][and we do not
accept cheques].
509
Often an agreement:
• consists of several, clearly identifiable and separate parts;
ie, such as a part containing standard provisions and another part with
specifically negotiated provisions;
• is amending another agreement;
• is amended by another agreement;
• consists of one or more schedules; or
• contains some provisions which to some extent overlap with other
provisions in the same agreement.
There may be inconsistency or conflict between one part of the agreement or
clause and another. Or even if there is not a (direct) inconsistency or conflict,
but when the parts of the agreement(s) are read together, there may be doubt
as to the meaning of the agreement or a provision.
Eg, an agreement may consist of a set of standard provisions and then a
separate section, which consists of specifically negotiated provisions. Some of
the provisions cover the same issue but do so in different ways. If this is the
case, it may not be clear which prevails.
A Priority of terms clause will help to indicate clearly which:
• part of an agreement; or
• which agreement; or
• which provision of an agreement
takes precedence over the other.
Although the purpose of a Priority of terms clause is clear, that purpose must
be set against how the courts interpret the meaning of inconsistency. If there
is a Priority of Terms clause it appears that the courts will be willing to find
one clause inconsistent with another, although the bar is still high in order
for a court to do so. For a contractual term to be inconsistent with another it
must contradict or be in conflict with another so that ‘effect cannot be fairly
given to both clauses’, or to put it another way, that inconsistency will only
510
occur ‘when the provisions cannot sensibly be read together’ (Pagnan SpA v
Tradax Ocean Tansportation SA [1987] 3 All ER 565, CA, applied in Alexander
v West Bromwich Mortgage Co Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 496 and see Case analysis).
Although the decision in Pagnan SpA indicates that no preference should be
given by a court to finding or not finding inconsistency, however, the likely
reality is that the courts will operate on the following basis:
1 that all the provisions are terms of a contract; and
2 if there is ambiguity between contract terms in one part of a contract to
another; and
3 it is not possible to reconcile them; then (and only then)
4 will a Priority of Terms clause come into effect (eg RWE Npower Renewables
Ltd v JN Bentley Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 150).
One consequence of this is that if a court can resolve any perceived ambiguity
then, even if there is a Priority of terms clause, it will be of no use. In effect it
will be ignored by the court. A second consequence is that a contract drafter
needs to thoroughly go through different parts of a contract to determine
whether provisions do overlap or conflict with each other, and either amend
the wording which is overlapping or conflicting or make it clear which clause
is subject to another.
Drafting issues
Either the entire agreement clause will need amending to make it clear
that the agreement under consideration is to be read together with
other agreements or use extra wording to specifically refer to the other
agreements.
• If there is another document or agreement which is referred to etc, to what extent
is it relevant to the agreement, and which is to prevail (if at all)? Where the
provisions of some other document are to prevail, the parties must make
themselves aware of those provisions in detail and as to their effect.
511
512
513
Case analysis
Key facts
1 The claimant obtained a ‘buy to let’ mortgage from the defendant.
2 An offer document (Offer of Loan) indicated that the mortgage was
for 25 years, with the interest rate fixed for a period until June 2010
and then the interest would be variable, tracking the Bank of England
base rate, with a premium of 1.99%. The Offer to Loan document
also stated that standard terms and conditions applied.
3 The defendant’s standard mortgage conditions (Conditions) allowed
the defendant (in summary):
1 to vary the rate; and
2 to require repayment on one month’s notice.
4 The claimant argued that the Conditions were inconsistent with the
provisions of the Offer to Loan document, and that the provisions
in the Conditions were not terms of the contract. The judge at first
instance disagreed with the claimant.
514
515
516
517
Clause 1
‘These Mortgage Conditions incorporate any terms contained in the Offer
of Loan. If there are any inconsistencies between the terms in the Mortgage
Conditions and those contained in the Offer of Loan then the terms contained
in the Offer of Loan will prevail.’
Clause 5
‘5.1 Interest is payable by you .. .at the rate or rates specified in your Offer of
Loan Letter which, except during any period in which interest is expressed to
be at a fixed rate, may be varied by the [Lender] at any time for any of the fol-
lowing reasons:
if there has been, or we reasonably expect there to be in the near future, a
change in the Bank of England Base Rate or in interest levels generally;
[…]
if investment interest rates have increased or decreased;
to reflect market conditions generally;
at the end of any period during which any fixed rate or concession or alterna-
tive rate (such as the Bank of England Base Rate) is in force;
[…]
to reflect a change in the way the Property is used or occupied;
to make sure our business is carried out prudently, efficiently and competi-
tively’.
518
Clause 14
‘14 You may be obliged by us to repay the Loan in full together with any
accrued interest and unpaid Charges and we will become entitled to exer-
cise all the powers conferred on us under Condition 15 of these Mortgage
Conditions immediately if any of the following events occur:
we give you one month’s notice requiring such repayment;
any Payment remains unpaid for longer than one calendar month;
you are in breach of any of the other obligations or conditions contained in
these Mortgage Conditions;
the Property becomes subject to a Compulsory Purchase Order;
you are made bankrupt;
you enter into an arrangement with or for the benefit of your creditors or pro-
pose to do so;
you die or become incapable of managing your affairs;
you do anything which may damage or reduce the value of the Property or you
fail to perform any obligation (whether to pay money or otherwise) imposed
upon you as the owner of the Property;
[…]’.
519
520
Property transactions
Drafting issues
521
522
The purpose of a recital is to explain the background to, or some facts about
or relating to, an agreement, eg:
• to set out the history of the negotiations or the relationship between the
parties;
• to explain the status of the agreement and its relationship to other related
agreements.
Eg, if the agreement is an amending agreement then the recitals would
provide details of the original agreement (title, date entered into etc) and
recite the amending agreement is amending the original agreement;
• any resources, skills, experience etc that one or more of the parties are
bringing to the agreement.
Eg, state that a party who provides legal services has lawyers who have
experience in dealing with matters, transactions or disputes which relate
to subject matter of the agreement;
• to describe the nature and effect of the agreement;
• to describe how a party is related to a third party.
Eg, a party may be a subsidiary of another company (that is not a party
to the agreement, but may have provided a guarantee in a separate
agreement);
Recitals are not normally intended to be legally binding. It is bad drafting
practice to include substantive provisions, eg obligations on the parties, in the
recitals.
There is case law on the legal effect of recitals. This case law may not bind a
court in an individual case, as the intended legal effect of a provision set out
in a recital is a matter of interpreting the individual contract. It is best to avoid
the risk by including all substantive provisions only in the main body of the
agreement. Older case law has formulated three rules concerning the legal
effect of recitals (see Re Moon, ex p Dawes (1886) 17 QBD 275, CA at 286):
• if the recitals are clear and the operative part is ambiguous, the recitals
govern the construction;
523
• if the recitals are ambiguous and the operative part is clear, the operative
part must prevail;
• if both recitals and the operative part are clear, but they are inconsistent
with each other, the operative part is to be preferred.
Recent cases have not departed from these propositions developed in the
19th century. See Communication Technology Investments Ltd v International
Environmental Management Ltd [2005] EWHC 3292 (Ch) for a modern example
where the judge was prepared to use a recital to interpret an operative clause
(but found it unnecessary to do so as the operative clause in question was not,
in the judge’s view, ambiguous); Gallaher International Ltd v Tlais Enterprises Ltd
[2008] EWHC 804 (Comm), paras 992–1001, where the judge held that the
operative provisions were clear and therefore it was unnecessary to consider
the recitals.
Accordingly, there is a strong presumption that a recital will not be used in
interpreting the provisions of an agreement or contain any binding obligations
on one or more of the parties to an agreement, particularly if the agreement
is of a formal type (eg such as a document which is only concerned with the
assignment of intellectual property or contains the provisions of a guarantee)
and is prepared by a lawyer on behalf of a client). See Fairstate Ltd v General
Enterprise and Management Ltd [2010] EWHC 3072 (QB), [2011] 2 All ER
(Comm) 497, where the judge stated:
‘… a recital [is] not an operative provision. In a formal contract such as this,
which has been drafted by a lawyer, the section containing the recitals is not the
part of the agreement in which the substantive obligations are usually expressed.
It is therefore inherently unlikely that the parties intended any of the matters
recited to give rise, by itself, to a substantive obligation’.
524
Drafting issues
are avoided, if all that is meant is that the parties are willing to sign the
agreement of which the recitals form a part, since such words could be
misunderstood as referring to a pre-existing agreement.
525
• Wording that should be included where recitals are used. Wording that the
parties are:
‘willing’
or
‘wish’
or are
‘considering’
etc
to enter into an agreement or undertake an obligation are used (see
Precedent 4 for the recital clauses for the appointment of a consultant).
• Commencing a Recitals clause: A Recitals clause is normally headed with the
following words:
WHEREAS
or
RECITALS
or
BACKGROUND
A Recitals clause will be normally located immediately after the Parties clause.
526
exclusion and limitation of liability clauses, a party may make a claim for pre-
contract misrepresentation citing the matters set out in the Recitals clause.
527
Drafting issues
When drafting a reporting clause, the following points will need consideration:
• What information should the report contain?
• Should the agreement contain a general statement that a report is provided as
and when required?
Eg, in a routine consultancy agreement, where a consultant is
providing a limited amount of advice or assistance and only a short
note or report is required, a general statement may be sufficient.
• Should the agreement include a provision that the report(s) contain specific
information?
Eg, where an agent is appointed to sell a product, the principal will
wish to know how well the agent is doing, such as the amount of sales,
who the agent is selling to, at what price the goods are being sold, and
so on.
• Should only particular types of information be supplied?
Eg, should a sales report list only the amount of sales, or should it
name the customers (which in certain situations may give rise to
competition law problems)?
528
529
530
531
532
Background
Under a retention of title clause, a seller of goods seeks to retain ownership
(property) of the goods until it receives payment for the goods. The wish to
retain ownership in such a circumstance will continue even if the seller has
delivered the goods to the buyer.
Principally under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 property in goods passes from
the buyer to the seller when the parties intend it to (determined by their
contract, the circumstances of the case or their conduct) (Sale of Goods Act
1979, s 17).
A retention of title clause will usually vary the general rule found in the Sale
of Goods Act 1979, s 18, rule 1 (which will apply unless the parties express
a different intention and make their choice about when property passes in
goods). This rule provides that ownership of the goods will pass to the buyer
at the time the contract is made, irrespective of whether the buyer has paid for
the goods or the seller has delivered the goods. This rule will apply as long as
the goods are in a deliverable state. The parties are free to vary or dis-apply the
rule (as a retention of title clause seeks to do).
From a seller’s point of view, it is particularly important to retain ownership
of goods where the buyer becomes bankrupt or goes into liquidation before
paying for them. Other than in the simplest cases, retaining title to goods can
lead to complex legal issues and difficulties, some of which are summarised
below. The more ambitious types of clause will often create a charge over the
goods, which will be void unless registered (where it is possible to register
it). In most cases it is impractical to register a charge in respect of every sale.
Within particular industries (such as construction, see eg, ‘Who owns unpaid
goods?’ Construction Law, July 2005, p 20) there are also difficulties upon which
expert advice should always be sought.
Retaining title to goods has resulted in much discussion and comment (see eg,
Aluminium Industrie Vaasen BV v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd [1976] 2 All ER 552,
[1976] 1 WLR 676, CA (the Romalpa case)). The limits on the efficacy of such
533
provisions will need careful explanation to the seller, proceeding from basic
principles.
Firstly, what is retention of title and what is its significance? It is the right of the
seller to retain ownership of the goods sold until payment, notwithstanding
that the seller has parted with possession of the goods to the buyer. As a
general rule, where the parties have entered into a contract for the sale of
goods and where goods are in a deliverable state, under the Sale of Goods Act
1979, the ownership of the goods will pass to the buyer at the time the contract
is made, irrespective of whether the buyer has paid for the goods or the seller
has delivered them (Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 18, rule 1).
Obviously retaining ownership in goods delivered to the buyer, but not paid
for, is an extremely important right in the event of the buyer becoming
bankrupt or going into liquidation. In the event of an insolvency and an
insolvency practitioner who disposes of the goods or interferes with them,
the seller could bring legal proceedings against the practitioner for wrongful
interference with the goods and claim damages for their market value.
There are, however, a number of practical problems, as are discussed below.
In particular, many types of retention of title clauses create a charge over the
goods and (in the case of a corporate buyer) that charge will be void unless
registered with the Registrar of Companies. Registration is often considered
not practical.
534
535
If the goods sold have only suffered minor adaptation, then there is some
prospect of asserting a valid claim (see Hendy Lennox Ltd v Grahame Puttick
Ltd above). If the process goes further than this so that the goods lose their
original identity, then the courts are likely to hold that the true nature
of the arrangement between the parties with regard to such downstream
products was not one of sale and purchase, but that the buyer was creating
a charge over goods supplied to secure sums owing to the seller (see
Re Peachdart Ltd [1984] Ch 131, [1983] 3 All ER 204; Borden (UK) Ltd v
Scottish Timber Products Ltd [1981] Ch 25, [1979] 3 All ER 961, CA). This
charge would only be effective in law as against a limited company buyer
if registered as such at Companies House under the Companies Act 2006,
ss 860, 875. If the buyer is not a company incorporated in the UK or not
a company at all but an individual, an organisation incorporated by Royal
Charter etc then it would not be possible to register any type of charge.
Wording such as in Precedent 8 may be appropriate to be included in sale
conditions.
It is, however, extremely unlikely that either the buyer or the seller
would have taken the trouble to register unless the contract is financially
significant or important to one of the parties.
• Creation of a charge: Clauses such as a product clause or a tracing clause (and
as discussed in the last two bullet points) are likely to be interpreted as
an equitable charge over the goods supplied (as the legal ownership of
the goods passes to the buyer) (re Bond Worth Ltd [1979] 3 All 919) and
accordingly the seller has no longer any legal title to the goods s/he has
sold (see Clough Mill Ltd v Martin [1984] 3 All ER 982 at 990). As noted
above, a failure to register will make the charge void against a liquidator
or an administrator or a creditor of a company (Companies Act 2006,
s 871(1)).
Drafting issues
• Retain full title. A retention of title clause should retain both the legal and
equitable or beneficial title to goods.
• Equitable or beneficial title only is to be retained. If the debtor:
• is a company, will a charge be registered with the Registrar of
Companies under the Companies Act 2006, ss 860 and 875?
• is an individual, will the requirements of the Bills of Sale Acts 1878
and 1882 be complied with?
• Is it set out clearly what a purchaser can do with the goods? It must be made
clear whether the purchaser can:
• re-sell the goods; or
• intermingle them with other goods; or
536
A simple Retention of title clause will often be included with Payment provisions.
A lengthier version is often set out separately as part of the Boilerplate section
of an agreement.
In addition to the points made above, the use of a Retention of title clause will
often require the consideration of the following:
• Risk. A retention of title clause often comes coupled with wording that
states which party shall be responsible for the risk if something happens to
the goods (and when they become responsible for the risk, such as when
the parties enter into a contract, or when goods are ready for delivery (but
still the possession of the seller) or on physical delivery to the buyer). See
Precedents 2 and 4, and Title (or property) and risk.
537
538
539
until payment of all such money and the Buyer shall be a mere bailee of
the goods.
540
541
6 The entire proceeds of such goods shall be held in trust for the
Franchisor and shall not be mingled with any other money paid into
any overdrawn bank account and shall at all times be identifiable as
the Franchisor’s money.
7 The Franchisee warrants that it is not at the time of entering into this
agreement insolvent and knows of no circumstance which would
entitle any creditor to appoint a receiver or to petition for winding up
or to exercise any other rights over or against its assets.
542
543
• a list of key staff (and their qualifications and experience) who are to
perform a service; and sometimes
544
Terminology
There is no special significance in the use either of the term ‘schedule’ or the
term ‘annex’; but what is more important is to state clearly the legal status
of any documents attached to the main part of the agreement. Other terms
used include ‘annexures’ and ‘appendices’. Wording such as that set out in
Precedent 1 is commonly (and should be) included in the main body of the
agreement with regard to the legal status of a schedule or schedules.
Drafting issues
• Does the agreement contain more than one schedule? Are the schedules clearly
and separately identifiable, eg Schedule 1, Schedule 2? Is the identification
or numbering schemes used consistently throughout the agreement?
• Is the status of the schedule(s) clearly stated? If the schedules contain
obligations, is there clear wording in the main part of the agreement to
that effect? Eg:
• there might be a short statement in the main part of the agreement
that the provisions relating to certain obligations are dealt with in a
schedule; or
• a particular clause might in outline state the main obligation, and
then refer to a schedule containing more detailed provisions relating
to the main obligation, eg:
‘The Client shall pay the Price in accordance with the provisions of
Schedule 2’ (with the Schedule setting out the timing of payment, what
happens if payment is not made, VAT etc).
• Are there any schedules which are not attached to the agreement but are referred
to in the agreement. What is their status? An agreement may make reference
to a schedule which is not attached to the agreement. As with any other
schedule, its status (as to whether it is part of the agreement or not) needs
making clear.
For example, a long-term supply of services contract states that the
services the supplier will provide are in accordance with those set out in a
document which is available from the supplier on request or are displayed
on the supplier’s website. The benefit to the supplier is that the specific
support services it offers are set out in one place, and if they change,
the details will need changing only in one place (such as the supplier’s
website). It would not need, therefore, to inform all customers/clients
about the change (unless the contract required this). The agreement
might include a definition:
‘Services shall means the services set out on the Supplier’s website at
http://www.extra1services.eu/services.htm [in the document named
‘Services we provide’ [dated [ ]][version [ ]].’
545
As noted above, the status of this type of document needs stating clearly.
Additionally, as its provisions are not ‘fixed’ in a physical document and
can be changed by the supplier (without notice), the agreement should
state precisely whether:
• the services described in this separate document are those in the
version of a document at a particular date (ie at the date of the
agreement); or
• the supplier may vary the details of the services as described in the
document named [ ] which the supplier may vary from time-to-time.
• If there is more than one schedule, is there any overlap in the issues they deal
with? This is a slightly different issue to that of whether there is an overlap
between a clause in an agreement and a clause in the schedule, but rather
if provisions in two schedules overlap or conflict (for which see Priority of
terms).
Eg an agreement may contain a number of schedules, such as in a
software licence and maintenance agreement, where one schedule deals
with the specific software licensed (including licence fee information
and whether upgrades are covered) and another with the maintenance
of that software (and the annual costs of doing so). The wording in each
may overlap on one issue or may not be clear as to a particular outcome.
For example in one recent case (Data Direct Technologies Ltd v Marks
and Spencer plc [2009] EWHC 97 (Ch), [2009] All ER (D) 198 (Jan)) it
was not clear whether the annual maintenance fee was automatically
renewed (as provided in one schedule) or whether the licensee had
to opt to have it renewed (as provided in another schedule), or which
schedule was to prevail. There was wording in the agreement that
the provisions of one schedule would prevail over the terms of the
agreement, but there was not wording as to which schedule should
prevail over the other.
The clause indicating that the schedules are part of the agreement usually
appears in the Boilerplate section of an agreement or together with other
provisions in an Interpretation clause.
The actual schedules will either appear:
• after the last clause of the substantive provisions (such as after the
Boilerplate section) but before the execution and signature block clauses;
or
• after the execution and signature block clauses.
The second alternative is more common in agreements drafted in the United
States.
546
Usage
547
Linkage
If the schedules include any obligations a Priority of Terms clause may need to
be included to indicate which part of the agreement will prevail in the event of
a conflict or overlap in provisions.
548
Set-off in general
A set-off refers to the following type of situation:
• Party A is under an obligation to pay a sum under a contract to Party B;
• before Party A makes payment it deducts part of that sum before paying
the balance to Party B.
This might occur because Party B owes Party A some money or has not
performed some obligation to Party A as required under the contract. A set-off
is in effect a deduction.
There are situations where a party can retain a sum or some other right or
benefit under the contract. For example:
• where the contract provides for the retention of a sum (ie is it ‘held back’).
The contract can provide that a party will not pay part of the total price
until the contract work is successfully completed; or
• where the title to goods is retained by the seller until the price for those
goods has been paid. See Retention of title for this topic.
The advantages to a party to a contract to whom money is owed under that
contract being able to set the debt off against sums owed by it to the other
party are both practical and procedural (see further 42 Halsbury’s Laws of
England (4th Edn) para 401 ff).
In general, whether there is power to set-off amounts owing will depend on the
bargaining strength of the parties during negotiation. A seller of goods, for
example, will obviously want a clause prohibiting set-off by the buyer, whereas
buyers will wish to retain such a right.
A set-off clause is valid as long as it satisfies the requirement of reasonableness
under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, s 3 (as extended by s 13) (see
eg Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer and Co Ltd [1992] QB 600, [1992] 2 All
ER 257, CA (an equipment supply contract); Fastframe Ltd v Lohinski (3 March
1993, unreported), CA (a franchise agreement); Axa Sun Life Services plc
v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 133; Rohlig (UK) Ltd v Rock Unique
Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 18). Accordingly, a party must take care, in all the
circumstances, to avoid producing an agreement that is too one-sided.
549
Drafting issues
• Should a party have the right to set off sums owed?—no right of set-off. Where
payments are to be made in full, with no set-off, this must be expressly
stated in the clearest possible terms.
Eg, a supplier of goods or services may wish that the purchaser will not
have a right to set-off.
• What situations should a no set-off provision cover? A statement that a party
cannot deduct any sum may not cover all situations, and some provisions
cover other possible ways. Therefore, it is usual also to rule out ‘counter-
claims’, as that term is wider in scope than ‘set-off’ and may comprise
a non-monetary claim, such as a claim for an injunction or specific
performance.
Eg, a provision that payments must be made without any discount,
deduction, set-off or counterclaim whatsoever has been held to be valid
(see Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpn v Kloeckner & Co AG [1990]
2 QB 514, [1989] 3 All ER 513, applied in Coca-Cola Financial Corpn v
Finsat International Ltd [1998] QB 43, [1996] 3 WLR 849, CA, but
distinguished in National Bank of Saudi Arabia v Skab (23 November 1995,
unreported)).
The word ‘set-off’ does not need to be used. For example, a lease which
provided that rent should be paid ‘without deduction’ had the effect of
excluding by agreement any right of set-off (see Famous Army Stores Ltd
v Meehan [1993] 1 EGLR 73). But there are also contrary decisions: a
provision in a lease that rent was to be paid ‘without any deduction’ was
insufficient to exclude a tenant’s right of equitable set-off (Connaught
Restaurants Ltd v Indoor Leisure Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 834, [1994]
1 WLR 501).
• Express right of set-off. Where one or both parties are to have the right to
set-off debts owing to the other, it is nevertheless preferable, to avoid any
550
The Payment clause will normally include the Set-off clause. Alternatively the
Set-off clause might be located separately in the Boilerplate section.
Consumer issue
551
552
dated, [Party A] may set-off the amount of such liability against any sum
that would otherwise be due to [Party B] under this agreement.
553
554
There is also the so-called ‘blue pencil test’ developed by the courts. In
certain circumstances the offending words (ie those containing the unlawful
provision) are struck from the clause and if the remaining words of the clause
make sense as a contractual provision, the remaining words will remain (and
continue to operate) (eg Kall Kwick Printing (UK) Ltd v Rush [1996] FSR 114;
Hashwani v Jivraj [2009] EWHC 1364 (Comm), [2010] 1 All ER 302). However,
by doing so, the rest of the contract cannot be modified or be affected by the
effect of applying the ‘blue pencil test’ (Francotyp-Postalia Ltd v Whitehead
[2011] EWHC 367 (Ch), which applied the first three bullet points above, and
see Case analysis below).
Otherwise, the entire clause containing the unlawful provision is removed
from the contract. If the unlawful provision forms a major part of the purpose
of the contract, the whole contract may, in extreme cases, be held invalid.
Drafting issues
555
• Providing for negotiation to take place if a clause is severed. Where the parties
are on an equal footing and would wish the agreement to stand despite
the deletion of a clause (eg in a joint venture type of agreement) they may
provide for future negotiation to resolve the problem, although this is
unlikely to be enforceable:
‘in the event of any such deletion the parties shall negotiate in good
faith in order to agree the terms of a mutually acceptable and satisfactory
alternative provision in place of the provision so deleted’.
556
557
Case analysis
558
carrying on the Business and any other territory (in the UK) covered (in
relation to the supply of Products) by the Franchisor and/or any dealer or
distributor of the Franchisor;”
to:
“For the purpose of this clause 21 the “Restricted Area” means the
Territory;”
559
Clauses 21 and 33
21 POST-TERMINATION COVENANTS
21.1 The Franchisee agrees that it shall not for the period of one year after the
expiration or termination of this agreement (howsoever arising) whether itself
or together with any other person firm or company directly or indirectly:-
21.1.1 be engaged interested or concerned in the Restricted Area in any
capacity in any business venture which is competitive with the Business as
previously carried on pursuant to this agreement (or with the business in the
Restricted Area of any other franchisee, dealer or distributor of the Franchisor).
For the purpose of this clause 21 the “Restricted Area” means the Territory, the
territory (in the UK) of any other franchisee of the Franchisor carrying on the
Business and any other territory (in the UK) covered (in relation to the supply of
Products) by the Franchisor and/or any dealer or distributor of the Franchisor;
21.1.2 be engaged interested or concerned in the Restricted Area in the supply
of the Products or any goods competitive with the Products;
21.1.3 solicit in the Restricted Area customers or former customers of the
Business (being persons who are at the date of termination a customer of the
Business or who have been a customer of the Business during the period of 12
months prior to termination, and such customers shall include any person to
whom Products have been supplied by the Franchisor pursuant to this agree-
ment) for the purposes of supplying them with goods competitive with the
Products nor divert or seek to divert any custom (for Products) in the Restricted
Area from the Franchisor or any other franchisee, dealer or distributor of the
Franchisor nor to solicit any of their respective customers for Products;
[…]
21.2 The Franchisee shall procure that none of its employees (involved to any
material extent in the sales and/or marketing of the Products) senior managers
or directors (including without limitation the Individual(s)) shall: (a) for a period
of one year after the expiration or termination of this agreement howsoever
arising, or (b) in the case that any such person ceases to be connected with the
Franchisee during the period of this agreement, for a period of one year after
he ceases to be so connected:-
560
561
Background
Certain types of written agreement and other ‘instruments’ attract stamp duty
(Finance Act 1999, s 112). An ‘instrument’ is ‘every written document’ (Stamp
Act 1891, s 122). Where a document attracts stamp duty the contract should
state which party will be responsible for having the document stamped.
Although a matter for commercial negotiation, usually it is the purchaser who
wishes to rely on the stampable document in court, and it will be that party who
will pay the stamp duty. A court will not admit documents which are stampable
but have not been stamped. Also there are penalties for late stamping.
Intellectual property
562
563
• Exemptions:
• sales and leasebacks of property;
• certain transactions involving partnerships;
• transfers involving public bodies or their wholly-owned companies; or
• compliance with planning obligations;
• Reliefs:
• group relief;
• acquisition relief;
• reconstruction relief;
• disadvantaged relief; or
• charities relief.
Guidance should always be sought before claiming any exemption or relief.
Drafting issues
• Does the document/instrument attract stamp duty? Stamp duty is now payable
only in limited circumstances (see above). Advice should always be sought
in circumstances where stamp duty is likely to apply;
• If stamp duty or SDLT is payable, who is to pay the stamp duty? Will convention
be followed as indicated (ie the purchaser will pay) or will the parties
provide otherwise? Where convention is followed then wording such as in
Precedent 1 might be used;
• Does the present agreement rely on or is it linked to other transactions? In
such circumstances, it may be appropriate to include a warranty in the
agreement that prior transactions have been duly stamped. A clause to
this effect might be in the form of Precedent 2.
See above.
564
565
Background
A sub-contract occurs where a party to an agreement (the contractor)
arranges for another person (the sub-contractor) to perform some or all of
the contractor’s obligations under an agreement. However, the contractor:
• remains responsible for the performance of those obligations which the
sub-contractor will perform; and
• remains (contractually) liable if the sub-contractor fails to perform those
obligations (unless the contract specifies otherwise).
In this context, the term ‘sub-contract’ has a meaning similar to ‘delegation’
although delegation has a broader meaning (eg the right of a board of
directors to delegate authority to senior management).
If the sub-contractor does not carry out the obligation properly, the customer
will be entitled to sue the contractor.
566
Drafting issues
• Does a party need to sub-contract some or all of its obligations? Does a party need
to have some of its obligations performed by a third party, or simply wishes
to have the option to do so?
Nowadays many industries rely extensively on the use of sub-contractors.
Building is perhaps the most obvious, but many others will too. Accordingly,
a general prohibition may be unrealistic or cause difficulties later on.
For example: a catering company which a customer hires to cater an event
may obtain:
• the waiting staff from an agency; and
• the food from a company that cooks food for events; and
• cutlery and linen service etc from a supplier of such things.
In effect, the engaged catering company being no more than a number
of office workers whose role is to co-ordinate the activities of all the sub-
contractors. A party when it is entering into a transaction with another
company may wish to consider whether, in the circumstances, having a
blanket no-subcontract clause is appropriate. In these circumstances
attention may be better focussed on specifying the standards that the
various sub-contractors will need to meet and the detail of how the
catering company will meet its obligations so that everything works on the
day of the event.
• If one party will allow another to sub-contract obligations, on what terms and
conditions will it do so?
• will there be a general provision allowing one party to sub-contract?
Or
• will there be a provision which specifies what particular tasks and/or
obligations a party can sub-contract?
Eg, a software developer may need to sub-contract the writing of a
particular routine to another software developer who has expertise with
those types of routines. The agreement could specify that only that aspect
of the software development can be sub-contracted, but no other.
Bear in mind that if there is confidential information involved, then it
might not be appropriate for this to be passed on to a sub-contractor (see
further below).
• Can the party who wishes to sub-contract obligations choose the sub-contractor
without consulting the customer?
• Does the client wish the contractor to carry out its obligations personally? If
there is a particular person that a client wishes to carry out the tasks/
obligations under an agreement, then a no sub-contracting provision may
be insufficient, as it will not deal with the circumstances when that person
is no longer available. Eg:
567
568
then the other party will wish that such obligations are also imposed
on the sub-contractor.
If the contractor has sub-contracted in breach of an obligation to the
customer not to do so, then the customer may wish to terminate the
agreement. If this is the case then clear wording may be necessary (rather
than just a non-sub-contracting clause) together with more detailed
termination wording.
In appropriate cases, the customer may require that any provisions as
between the contractor and the sub-contractor include a right for the
customer to directly enforce any provisions. Accordingly, the contract
between the contractor and the sub-contractor will need not to use a
‘standard’ Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 clause, but one which
allows the customer to directly enforce some or all of the provisions of the
sub-contract.
569
• if the clause dealing with sub-contracting does not deal with the issue
of liability of the sub-contractor, etc then the Exemption clauses should
address this issue.
Terms allowing or preventing sub-contracting are also found as part of a clause
dealing with assignment (see Assignment).
570
gations. You will also not be relieved from liability for the performance of
those obligations.
571
572
By convention all documents that relate to negotiations for the sale of land
contain the words ‘subject to contract’ (other than the formal contract,
which is executed). Such wording is no longer necessary following the
implementation of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989,
s 2. This section provides that many land transactions cannot come into
existence until a written contract is signed by parties (or on their behalf). (See
Extracts from legislation, below, for the wording of s 2.)
Despite the clear wording of the Act, documentation relating to land
transactions is almost always marked ‘subject to contract’. This is often for no
other reason than the avoidance of doubt, but also to ensure that any possible
ancillary but binding contract will not come into operation, such as an option,
lockout agreement, or an equitable interest. For example, in Kinance v Mackie-
Conteh [2004] EWHC 998 (Ch), [2004] 19 EGCS 164 a lender provided £50,000
to a borrower. The borrower agreed to give a charge over a house (as security).
The agreement to provide the charge did not comply with s 2 of the 1989 Act.
It was held that the agreement was sufficient to create an equitable charge and
was enforceable for the purposes of the Law of Property Act 1925, s 53.
573
• Heads of agreement; or
• Heads of terms; or
• Term sheet; or
• Letter of intent; or
• Comfort letter; or
• Memorandum of understanding, or
• Memorandum of agreement.
None of these are indicative of whether they are binding or not, unless the
document itself spells out if it is binding or not. Best practice will be to label
them with the phrase ‘subject to contract’ at a minimum, or to use clear
wording as to the nature and effect of such a document. Better still is to set out
in more detail:
• the purpose of the document;
• that it is not intended to create legally binding obligations;
• the circumstances in which legally binding obligations will arise (such that
a binding agreement will only come into being on signing of an agreement
containing all of the terms and conditions); and
• that the parties are under no legal obligation to each other regarding
the document they have signed (so far) and that they need not continue
negotiations, and are free to withdraw from negotiations.
Precedents 2 and 3 are examples.
For parties that are wholly based in England there is not normally any
obligation to continue negotiations once started, nor any penalties if they
wish to withdraw from negotiations (whether or not the parties have labelled
their negotiations or documents with a phrase such as ‘subject to contract’).
Documents such as those listed above and any negotiations, or any wording
that the parties use in order to attempt to reach agreement (such as using
reasonable endeavours to reach agreement, or use good faith to reach
agreement) are not normally binding, for lack of certainty (eg Walford v Miles
[1992] 2 AC 128, HL).
However, if a party operates or is incorporated in another country, the position
can be different, such as if a party pulls out of negotiations after the parties
have reached a certain stage or have signed a preliminary document, such as
a letter of intent
Drafting issues
574
575
In either case it may not be clear as to the extent to which any document
such as a ‘head of terms’ or any provisions within it is, or are, binding on
the parties or if the activities are not dealt with in the heads of agreement
document whether the carrying out of those activities or any agreed
payment for them is binding (and on what precise terms).
Clear wording should be added to set out which is which. This point is
considered further below.
• Is the document with a party who is not based in England and Wales? Where the
transaction is wholly within England and Wales (eg with English parties
and with performance to take place in England and Wales etc), some
of the provisions in Precedent 2 may be unnecessary. In international
contracts, the law in some countries in Continental Europe may provide
that a party is liable if it withdraws from negotiations without good reason
after a defined stage, eg after signature of a Heads of Terms.
• Is wording being used that could allow a binding contract to come into effect? If
there is wording in the document, eg ‘subject to survey’, then if the thing
or task which is specified is undertaken it may be held that a binding
contract has come into effect.
• Is the pre-contract documentation to contain some binding obligations? If the
parties wish their negotiations and any negotiation to be ‘subject to
contract’ but nevertheless wish some provisions to be binding, should
the binding provisions and the other non-binding provisions be located
in the same document? For example, the parties wish to keep their
negotiations secret and confidential, and also possibly prevent one party
to the negotiations negotiating with a third party for a defined period.
The parties will wish to make these matters binding. They both might be
included with a document that is ‘subject to contract’, and the wording
of the document might make it clear that these provisions are binding.
Rather than put all of these matters together in one document it might be
better to create one document which only has binding provisions (such as
a separate confidentiality agreement) and to put the non-binding matters
in a second document, and to link to the two by reference to each to
other.
576
Despite any wording in such a document, if the parties act differently to the
wording, then a court may decide, objectively, that there is a contract. Perhaps
the real danger will be not that there is a contract but determining what its
terms and conditions are. They may be different to what the parties agreed
while they were negotiating ‘subject to contract’ (or that is recorded in their
‘subject to contract’ document). The case of RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei
Alois Muller GmbH & Company KG (UK Production) [2010] UKSC 14 (see Case
analysis below) is a perfect illustration of this. In this case, three different
courts came to different conclusions on whether there was a contract and what
its terms and conditions were.
The best position is always to not start performing any obligations until
the terms and conditions of a full contract are agreed. As the judgment in
RTS Flexible stated:
‘The different decisions in the courts below and the arguments in this court
demonstrate the perils of beginning work without agreeing the precise basis
upon which it is to be done. The moral of the story is to agree first and to start
work later.’
In the event that the parties agree to start performing some or all of the
obligations of a proposed contract a court is likely to look at the following
points to establish whether there is a contract between the parties:
• examining what the parties have communicated to each other and what
they have agreed and whether the result of the examination leads to the
view that the parties intended to create legal relations and what is agreed
is sufficient to form a contract;
• whether it is possible to waive any requirement in any document (such as
a draft version of the agreement) that a contract can only come into being
by complying with a particular formality (such as by signing a final version
of the agreement). Such a waiver may be by conduct;
• the stage the parties have arrived in their negotiations regarding the terms
and conditions they have agreed, before they started work;
• in the circumstances of a particular case it may be commercially unrealistic
to assume the parties did not intend to create legal relations;
• in creating a legally-binding relationship it is not necessary for the parties
to agree all the provisions that are of economic or other significance (ie it
is not a condition precedent that all or specific points need agreement
before the parties can enter into binding legal relationships).
In essence, the court will take an objective view of what the reality is of the
position the parties are in, irrespective of the documentation generated by
the parties and what they have said or communicated to each other. From a
commercial point of view, having a third party (a judge) decide on whether
there is a contract, or what its terms and conditions are, and what one party
will have to pay is likely to disappoint one or more of the parties.
Best practice is always for the parties to explicitly enter into a contract on
specifically agreed terms and conditions prior to starting any work. However,
577
this approach will not always be possible. The reality is that the commercial
imperatives of a deal make such an approach impossible. The parties may
simply wish to get on with performing it but cannot agree all the detailed terms
and conditions, or there may be commercial or financial imperatives that force
them to get on with performing the subject matter of the proposed contract.
In the face of such factors, the second best approach is that if there are parts of
the subject matter of the proposed contract that need performing first, then
the parties specifically agree that those aspects of the deal be performed and
they reach agreement on the status and the terms and conditions of those
discrete aspects in the document which are ‘subject to contract’. For example:
• the supply of manufacturing plant may first call for the supplier to carry
out a survey, or
• the creation of a software program may first require the supplier to analyse
what software the putative licensee is using and how the putative licensee
uses it and/or write a specification; or
• an advertising agency may need to discuss with the putative client the details
of the proposed advertising campaign (details about a product’s launch,
target audience, etc) and prepare a report with its recommendations.
All of these might form a discrete project before the ‘main’ part of the project
needs to start operating or the terms and conditions of it are agreed (ie making
and installing the equipment, writing the software or creating the adverts and
purchasing advertising space respectively).
Location in agreement
The phrase ‘subject to contract’ will normally appear at the top of a document.
Additional wording such as in the Precedents is normally seen in documents
such as ‘heads of agreement’ or other documentation which are purely for
the basis of negotiation, rather than documents which contain the draft of the
final wording of an agreement.
See above.
578
or
‘Subject to contract. This document (or any other document) or any negotia-
tions are not intended to create a legally binding relationship between us.’
or
‘Subject to contract. A contract will only come into existence when a written
agreement is signed by us and you.’
579
Case analysis
Facts
1 C was the owner of the copyright in a music track.
2 D wished to use the music track on a compilation disk called ‘Crisp
Biscuit’.
3 After negotiations, D sent to C a facsimile headed ‘Re Crisp Biscuit –
Subject to Contract’.
4 At the bottom of the facsimile were words stating ‘Read and Agreed’
and a space for signature by C.
5 C signed the facsimile and sent it back to D.
6 C then sent the music track to D, stating it was a ‘cleared track’ and
with an invoice.
7 The invoice stated that the music track was ‘Licensed to “Crisp
Biscuit”. Granted for 3 years non-exclusive’.
8 Before payment was tendered and before any longer form agreement
was entered into C wished to stop D using the music track and rene-
gotiate payment. But D had already used the music track and had
had some compilation disks manufactured.
9 D contended that despite the wording ‘subject to contract’ that there
was a binding contract.
Held
1 The judge held that there was no binding agreement and that the
words ‘subject to contract’ as used in the facsimile had the normal
meaning (that is there was no binding agreement):
‘91. […] practices within the music industry cannot, in my judgment,
change the law. I consider that I must decide, as a matter of construction
of the deal memo in this particular case, whether a legally binding
contract was created. I am unpersuaded that the phrase “subject to
contract” has a meaning within the music business which is precisely
the opposite of the meaning that it bears in general commerce, and
particularly in relation to land contracts. Nor am I persuaded that a
document that looks like a bilateral contract (apart from the heading
“subject to contract”) can properly be construed as an option. The
580
4 As to the sending of the music track and the invoice, the judge
held that:
‘100. So far as the delivery of the track and the sending of the invoice are
concerned, there is, I think, more force in [the defendant’s] point. In the
ordinary way, once negotiations are begun “subject to contract”, that label
governs all subsequent communications between the parties unless the
label is expunged by express agreement or necessary implication (Cohen
v Nessdale Ltd [1982] 2 All ER 97). I do not see any evidence that the
“subject to contract” label was expunged by express agreement. Was it
expunged by necessary implication? […]that the sending of an invoice,
together with the track, is regarded in the music licensing business, as an
offer capable of acceptance. Having regard to the fact that [the facsimile]
had been signed, the offer must, by necessary implication, be an offer to
581
contract on the terms of the signed [facsimile]. On that footing, if the offer
is accepted, it seems to me that the “subject to contract” label on the deal
memo is expunged by necessary implication.’
5 The judge found that in this case the ‘subject to contract label’ had
been lifted:
‘I consider that signing of the [facsimile], and the sending of the cleared
track plus the sending of the invoice did amount to a representation that
the licence had been granted. To put it another way, it was a representation
that the “subject to contract” label attached to the facsimile could be
disregarded.’
Facts
1 C lent D a sum of money against a promissory note.
2 C and D also entered into an agreement where D pledged as collat-
eral all of its shares in another company, E.
3 The loan was not repaid.
4 C auctioned the shares.
5 But C was unable to control E effectively.
6 Negotiations took place regarding the repayment of the loan.
7 A document was produced entitled ‘Heads of Agreement—subject to
more complete documentation’.
8 It provided, among other things:
(a) that the transfer of shares would continue without interruption;
and
(b) that the parties would use their best endeavours to negotiate
and agree a final settlement within 90 days.
9 This document replaced another document entitled ‘Settlement
Agreement—subject to contract and without prejudice’.
10 Negotiations collapsed.
Issue
Did the Heads of Agreement have binding effect? D argued that the Heads
of Agreement was binding and required the parties to reach some form of
agreement. C argued that the use of the words ‘Heads of Agreement’
meant the same, in effect, as ‘subject to contract’ or alternatively that
there was an ‘agreement to agree’.
582
Held
1 There were provisions in the document which were not conditional
and were to be implemented.
2 These provisions included survival of agreement clause, entire agree-
ment clause and ‘term and law’ clauses.
3 These provisions were held to be inconsistent with the document
being not binding.
4 The use of the words ‘subject to more complete documentation’ did
not stop the document having binding effect if the document as a
whole was intended to have binding effect.
5 But the effect of the ‘heads of agreement’ document, although bind-
ing, was binding to a limited extent: that of the parties to use their
best endeavours to negotiate to try to agree a settlement, but the par-
ties were not bound to enter into a more specific form, or indeed any
form of actual agreement. At the end of the period of negotiation, the
parties were unable to agree.
DMA Financial Solutions Ltd v BaaN UK Ltd [2000] All ER (D) 411
Facts
1 D produced a software program called Coda.
2 D wished to outsource training for the Coda computer program to C.
3 C and D had satisfactory dealings in the past.
4 Negotiations began, held by meeting, then email and telephone and
a further meeting. Apparently all the provisions of a contract were
agreed.
5 After the last meeting D sent a fax with what D thought was the
agreed position between the parties. C and D spoke the next day to
agree minor changes in the date for payments.
6 D consulted with their parent company and communicated with C by
message to indicate ‘there are no problems on the agreement. The
US team are studying the legal details. All should proceed as planned,
by the end of the month’.
7 Then the parent company spoke with C on 16 December 1998, and
agreed one minor change to the fax that was sent.
8 D was apparently supposed to produce an agreement but did not
do so.
9 C and D started implementing the ‘agreement’.
10 Eventually a standard form agreement was produced by D and sent
to C, but differed from what had been agreed.
583
Held
1 The judge found that there was a binding contract:
‘51. […] C submits that the change agreed on the telephone on
16 December 1998 […] was the last change to be made, and that there
was then a fully binding agreement concluded between DMA and BaaN.
I agree with him. There was nothing left unresolved, and there was nothing
missing which was essential. The parties did expect that the agreement
would be translated into a formal document drawn up by lawyers, […]
I consider on the facts of this case that this expectation did not mean
that there was not yet a binding contract. I also agree with [C] that the
existence of an agreement is confirmed by the way that the parties were
acting. […] stopped providing proprietary training itself, and supplied
to DMA everything which DMA needed from it (including the assistance
of BaaN personnel) to be able to provide the training itself BaaN had
announced that DMA was taking over the proprietary training role, and
BaaN passed on to DMA enquiries from customers about it.’
‘52. For the foregoing reasons I conclude that there was a binding
contract formed between DMA and BaaN, and that it came into effect on
16 December 1998.’
584
was not a contract at all, probably because it would have been void for
uncertainty? An example would be if some crucial element, like the price
payable by DMA to BaaN for the training rights, was left over for future
negotiation and agreement. I stress, however, that, if there was some point
which was not raised in the negotiations but (and this is the critical matter)
it was not an essential point, that would not prevent a contract from having
been concluded. That remains so even if the point would in all probability
have been covered by a written agreement, drafted by lawyers, had the
matter gone to the stage of a written agreement. An example of this would
be a proper law clause. BaaN’s lawyers would undoubtedly have put such
a clause in a draft written agreement, and I imagine that DMA would not
have jibbed at signing an agreement merely on the ground that it had in it
a proper law clause which had not featured in the earlier negotiations. But
the fact that the negotiators did not deal with the proper law would not in
any way be fatal to their having reached a binding contract.’
3 The judge went through the course of negotiations and listed the mat-
ters which were discussed and agreed:
(i) the subject matter of the (proposed) contract: the provision by
C of training for users of the Coda proprietary software systems;
(ii) withdrawal by D from proprietary training;
(iii) territory;
(iv) duration;
(v) price and payment dates;
(vi) accreditation;
(vii) use of D’s materials;
(viii) access to and use of D’s staff;
(ix) passing on customer enquiries;
(x) promotion and endorsement by D of C’s training courses
in order to reach his conclusion that the essential provisions of an
agreement were in place.
RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Muller GmbH & Company KG
(UK Production) [2010] UKSC 14
1 The parties entered into a letter of intent for the supply of machinery
by the claimant to the defendant (project). The letter of intent con-
tained some binding and non-binding provisions. The letter of intent
included the price to be paid for the whole project.
2 The claimant commenced work on the project almost immediately
after the signature of the letter of intent.
3 The letter of intent provided that the parties were to negotiate the full
terms of a contract within a period of four weeks from the date of the
letter of intent. The full terms of the agreement were to be based on
the defendant’s standard template agreement.
585
4 The defendant was to pay the expenses of the claimant prior to the
signing of the full contract.
5 The full terms of the contract were not agreed within the four-week
period.
The parties continued to negotiate the terms of the contract and the
expiry period of the letter of intent was extended by agreement.
6 Eventually the terms of the contract were agreed (on 5 July with some
variations on 20 August), but the parties never signed it.
7 The claimant carried on working throughout the period.
8 The template contract contained a provision that a contract would
only come into existence when signed by the parties (Clause 48).
9 Essentially the issue before the court was whether there was a bind-
ing contract and what were the terms on which it was concluded. The
problem was particularly acute, as work started before the negotia-
tions were concluded or a final contract was signed.
10 The court held that the terms on which such work was being carried
out were not necessarily the same as those terms agreed ‘subject to
contract’:
‘[45] The general principles are not in doubt. Whether there is a binding
contract between the parties and, if so, upon what terms depends upon
what they have agreed. It depends not upon their subjective state of mind,
but upon a consideration of what was communicated between them by
words or conduct, and whether that leads objectively to a conclusion that
they intended to create legal relations and had agreed upon all the terms
which they regarded or the law requires as essential for the formation
of legally binding relations. Even if certain terms of economic or other
significance to the parties have not been finalised, an objective appraisal
of their words and conduct may lead to the conclusion that they did not
intend agreement of such terms to be a pre-condition to a concluded and
legally binding agreement.
[46] The problems that have arisen in this case are not uncommon, and
fall under two heads. Both heads arise out of the parties agreeing that the
work should proceed before the formal written contract was executed in
accordance with the parties’ common understanding. The first concerns
the effect of the parties’ understanding (here reflected in cl 48 of the
draft written contract) that the contract would ‘not become effective
until each party has executed a counterpart and exchanged it with the
other’--which never occurred. Is that fatal to a conclusion that the work
done was covered by a contract? The second frequently arises in such
circumstances and is this. Leaving aside the implications of the parties’
failure to execute and exchange any agreement in written form, were the
parties agreed upon all the terms which they objectively regarded or the
law required as essential for the formation of legally binding relations?
Here, in particular, this relates to the terms on which the work was being
carried out. What, if any, price or remuneration was agreed and what were
the rights and obligations of the contractor or supplier?
[47] …in a case where a contract is being negotiated subject to contract
and work begins before the formal contract is executed, it cannot be said
586
that there will always or even usually be a contract on the terms that were
agreed subject to contract. That would be too simplistic and dogmatic an
approach. The court should not impose binding contracts on the parties
which they have not reached. All will depend upon the circumstances…’
11 The court held that there was a binding agreement and that an under-
standing between the parties that there would only be a binding con-
tract on signature of a final contract was waived by their conduct. In
effect the final version of the unsigned agreement was made without
the ‘subject to contract’ understanding:
‘[55] In our judgment [in a subject to contract … case, the question is
whether the parties have nevertheless agreed to enter into contractual
relations on particular terms notwithstanding their earlier understanding
or agreement. Thus, in the Galliard Homes case Lindsay J, giving the only
substantive judgment in the Court of Appeal, which also comprised Evans
and Schiemann LJJ, at 236 quoted with approval the statement in Megarry
and Wade The Law of Real Property (5th edn, 1984) pp 568–569 that it
is possible for an agreement ‘subject to contract’ or ‘subject to written
contract’ to become legally binding if the parties later agree to waive that
condition, for they are in effect making a firm contract by reference to
the terms of the earlier agreement. Put another way, they are waiving the
‘subject to [written] contract’ term or understanding.
[56] Whether in such a case the parties agreed to enter into a binding
contract, waiving reliance on the ‘subject to [written] contract’ term or
understanding will again depend upon all the circumstances of the case,
although the cases show that the court will not lightly so hold.
…
[86] … Had the parties agreed to be bound by the agreed terms without
the necessity of a formal written contract or, put another way, had they
agreed to waive that requirement and thus [Clause 48]? We have reached
the conclusion that they had. The circumstances point to the fact that
there was a binding agreement and that it was not on the limited terms
held by the judge. The price had been agreed, a significant amount of
work had been carried out, agreement had been reached on 5 July and
the subsequent agreement to vary the contract so that […] the variation
was agreed subject to contract. The clear inference is that the parties
had agreed to waive the subject to contract clause, viz cl 48. Any other
conclusion makes no commercial sense. RTS could surely not have
refused to perform the contract as varied pending a formal contract being
signed and exchanged. Nobody suggested that it could and, of course, it
did not. If one applies the standard of the reasonable, honest businessman
suggested by Steyn LJ, we conclude that, whether he was an RTS man
or a Müller man, he would have concluded that the parties intended that
the work should be carried out for the agreed price on the agreed terms,
including the terms as varied by the agreement of 25 August, without the
necessity for a formal written agreement, which had been overtaken by
events.
[87] By contrast we do not think that the reasonable honest businessman in
the position of either RTS or Müller would have concluded as at 25 August
that there was no contract between them or that there was a contract on
some but not all of the terms that had been agreed on or before 5 July as
varied by the agreement of 25 August. …[I]nstead of signing the contract
the parties here simply let sleeping dogs lie or, […] neither party wanted
the negotiations to get in the way of the project. The project was the
587
588
Use in general
Contracts sometimes include a provision stating that references to a
contracting party include its ‘successors and assigns’. These references are
typically included as part of the definitions of the parties, or in a separate
boilerplate clause. Provisions of this kind are often useful for at least two
reasons:
• to avoid any doubt as to whether the agreement is only referring to the
original contractual party in particular clauses. Eg, if the contract includes
an indemnity against losses suffered by a party to the contract, does that
indemnity apply to losses suffered by an assignee of that party?
• to clarify whether the agreement is intended to be binding on and ‘endure
to the benefit of’ a party’s successors in title. This is particularly relevant to
contracts with individuals, where there may be uncertainty as to whether
the contract is intended to benefit and bind the estate of that individual,
following the individual’s death. It may also be relevant to a company’s
successors in title, eg following a merger. However, most UK company
reorganisations are structured in such a way that a completely separate
entity, rather than a ‘successor in title’ acquires the company’s assets or
shares. In practice, there would probably be an assignment or novation of
the company’s contracts.
589
Drafting issues
Wording that a party includes its successors and assigns is normally included
with the relevant Parties clause. Where an agreement calls for detailed wording,
then the clause will contain that wording.
590
591
592
Background
Most commercial agreements include provisions allowing for their termination
in particular circumstances (such as if a party is in breach of some or all of its
obligations). If the agreement does not contain express provisions, a court
may imply a provision allowing termination on reasonable notice. This will
depend on how a court will interpret the contract. There are some general
principles that a court is likely to follow, such as:
In any agreement with obligations of a continuing nature, one party will wish
to be able to terminate the agreement if the other party is in serious default,
such as if a party is not paying for the goods and/or services it receives.
While common law provides that one party may rescind the contract where
the other party has committed a serious or fundamental breach by defective
performance or has repudiated the contract, it is best for the parties to specify
expressly for the circumstances in which either party may treat the contract as
at an end. In the absence of such a provision, it is not always clear whether a
particular breach would entitle the innocent party to rescission; each contract
will be interpreted on a case-by-case basis.
593
• termination as a consequence:
Often, it will be appropriate to include clauses that deal with what is to happen
after termination occurs, that is describing the consequences of termination.
Some terms (eg confidentiality provisions) may survive or there may be various
matters that can only happen after the agreement is terminated (eg if a patent
licensee has made products up to the date of termination, it may have stock
left but not sold; the ‘consequences of termination’ clause can deal with what
is to happen to the stock, such as the licensee being allowed to sell it after the
date of termination) (see Consequences of termination).
The drafter may wish to include wording in the termination clause stating
that the right of termination is without prejudice to any other right or remedy
that the terminating party may have. This is to avoid the argument that, for
example, terminating the contract on grounds of breach is the terminating
party’s only remedy, and that the party is prevented from claiming damages
for the breach.
594
Typically a commercial agreement will set out the specific circumstances when
a party can terminate an agreement. Although the particular circumstances
will vary from contract to contract, the following are the common situations:
• a failure to make a payment: eg:
‘Without prejudice to any other right or remedy it may have, either party
may terminate this agreement at any time by notice in writing to the other
party (‘Other Party’). The notice to take effect as specified in the notice:
(a) where the Other Party fails to pay any amount due under this
agreement in full within [5] days of any due date and fails to remedy such
failure within [3] days of receipt of written notice to do so’;
595
To indicate the level of seriousness but not specify any particular type of
breach is to state that a party may terminate for the other party’s breach, but
the breach has to be more than minor, ie it must be significant, but without
further specifying what will constitute a breach. The words most often used
are that the breach must be a ‘material’ or ‘substantial’ breach. The objective
is to stop the party not in breach terminating the agreement where the other
party has failed to perform an obligation, but that party’s breach is of an
insignificant or a minor nature. For example:
• a party provides social media and public relations services, which includes
making a specific number of tweets on behalf of a client every week; and
• the party is under an obligation that ‘the Supplier shall provide to the
Client a Report by 6pm each Friday during the Period’. The Report needs
to state the number of tweets made and responses generated by those
tweets;
• during the course of the year on two occasions the party fails to provide
the reports until the Monday morning (ie 2 of 52 occasions, 4%
approximately);
• the client never reads the reports until the middle of the next week.
To avoid doubt as to whether these two failures are sufficiently serious to
amount to a breach, and whether a delay of one working day is serious enough
to entitle the party not in breach to terminate the agreement, the agreement
should include clear wording, such as:
‘The Supplier shall provide to the Client a Report by 6pm each Friday during the
Period (‘Deadline’). If the Supplier shall fail to provide the Reports on 2 or more
occasions by the relevant Deadline during the period, then the Client shall have
the right to terminate this Agreement.’
If the supplier has multiple obligations to fulfil and if the parties needed to
specify the circumstances as to when a breach would be sufficient for the party
not in breach to terminate for each obligation, then their agreement would
be significantly lengthened or more detailed. As mentioned above, another
approach is to specify that a party may terminate in more general terms; that
the party not in breach can only terminate if the other is in ‘material’ or
‘substantial’ breach of any obligation; such as:
‘Without prejudice to any other right or remedy it may have, either party may
terminate this agreement at any time by notice in writing to the other party
(“Other Party”). The notice to take effect as specified in the notice:
(a) if the Other Party shall commit any [material][substantial] breach of any
of its obligations under this agreement and shall fail to remedy such breach (if
capable of remedy) within 30 days after being given notice by the first party so to
do or…’
Such a clause does not specify further the meaning of ‘material’ or ‘substantial’.
If the parties do not wish to specify the meaning of ‘material’ or ‘substantial’,
then if there is a dispute as to whether the breach by one party is sufficiently
serious (ie that it comes within the meaning of ‘material’ or ‘substantial’),
596
then in order to entitle the other party to terminate, the following are likely to
be the factors that a court will take into account:
• the clauses in the agreement under consideration;
• the length of the agreement;
• the breaches that have happened;
• for the party not in breach, what are the consequences;
• what explanation the party in breach can provide for the breaches;
• the importance or relevance of the breaches in the context of the
agreement;
• the consequences of terminating the agreement; and
• the consequences of permitting the agreement to continue.
See Glolite Ltd v Jasper Coran Ltd (1998) Times, 28 January; Phoenix Media Ltd v
Cobweb Information (16 May 2000, unreported); Gallagher International Ltd v Tias
Enterprises Ltd [2008] EWHC 804 (Comm). Where an agreement specifies that
a party may terminate for a material breach, that wording does not mean that a
breach has to be at the same level of seriousness as a repudiatory breach (Dalkia
Utilities Services plc v Celtech International Ltd [2006] EWHC 63 (Comm)).
The parties may choose not to qualify the word ‘breach’ with the words
‘material’ or ‘substantial’ or not to define more precisely whether any breach
or whether a specific number of instances will entitle the party not in breach
to terminate the agreement (eg if the parties just state that a ‘breach’ of the
agreement will entitle the party not in breach to terminate). In such a case,
the courts have taken two divergent approaches:
• one is that a breach must in effect amount to a repudiatory breach in order
to entitle the party not in breach to terminate the agreement (Antaios
Compania SA v Salen AB [1988] AC 191; Rice (t/a the Garden Guardian) v
Great Yarmouth Borough Council [2000] All ER (D) 902; Dominion Corporate
Services Ltd v Debenhams Properties Ltd [2010] EWHC 1993 (Ch));
• the other is that courts should give effect to the words used in a contract;
if the parties have included a provision that one party can terminate if
the other party is in breach, then the court should give effect to that
provision, and not import a meaning into the word ‘breach’ which is
equivalent or matches that of a repudiatory breach (Leofelis SA v Lonsdale
Sports Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 640; ENE Kos 1 Ltd v Petrolio Brasiliero SA (No 2)
[2012] UKSC 17; Newland Shipping and Forwarding Ltd v Toba Trading
FZC [2014] EWHC 661 (Comm).
Although the second approach appears to be the more current, the clear
message is that the parties should specify the seriousness of the breach which
will entitle a party not in breach to terminate (through phrases such as
‘material breach’ or ‘substantial breach’) or by setting a particular and specific
level of failure.
597
Drafting issues
598
599
• when can notice be given? Eg, the notice may only be given at a certain
time, for example:
• Does any notice that a party gives clearly indicate that the party is terminating the
agreement or does the agreement need additional wording to that effect? Another
way of putting the question is whether, at the end of a notice period will
the agreement terminate automatically or does the party giving notice
have to formally indicate that the agreement is at an end? If this is the case
then Artpower Ltd v Bespoke Couture Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1696 illustrates
the dangers of not using clear wording (and is based on a termination
clause similar to Precedent 12). See Case analysis below. Perhaps, the
practical outcome from this case is: (i) to add wording to this type of
clause, which indicates that the agreement will terminate automatically
without the party not in breach having to do anything further; (ii) that the
notice that the party not in breach sends to the party in breach states that
the agreement will terminate at the end of the period by which the party
in breach has to remedy the breach; and (iii) the initial notice should
state explicitly that if the breach is not remedied then the agreement will
terminate automatically.
600
601
against the other party arising prior to such termination (including without
limit the provisions of Clause [no] below).
602
603
1 on the occurrence of any of the following events and any such event
shall be a fundamental breach of this agreement:
1.1 failure to pay any amount due under this agreement in full within
[5] business days of the due date and to remedy such failure
within [3] business days of receipt of written notice to do so;
1.2 failure to comply with the terms of any Default Notice as defined
in Clause [no] within the time stipulated;
2 if [either party or (specify party)] goes into liquidation either compul-
sory or voluntary (save for the purpose of reconstruction or amalgama-
tion) or if an administrator, administrative receiver or receiver is appointed
in respect of the whole or any part of its assets or if [either party or (spec-
ify party)] makes an assignment for the benefit of or composition with its
creditors generally or threatens to do any of these things or any judgment
is made against [either party or (specify party)] or any similar occurrence
under any jurisdiction affects such party.
604
2 fails to comply with any of the provisions of this agreement and (in
the case of a failure capable of being remedied) does not rectify such
non-compliance within [14] working days of the [Owner’s] written
notice of such failure; or
then (and in any such case) the [Owner] may, without prejudice to any
other of its rights or remedies and without being liable to the [Licensee]
for any loss or damage which may be occasioned, give written notice to
the [Licensee] terminating this agreement with immediate effect.
2 if the Assignee fails to comply with the terms of any default notice
within the time stipulated;
Case analysis
605
606
This letter also did not state specifically that the defendant would ter-
minate the agreement or that termination would take place.
5 A further letter stated (‘December letter’):
‘Pending that return date, Bespoke will undertake (notwithstanding and there-
fore without prejudice to its contention that the Licence Agreement will termi-
nate on 10 December 2004) …’
This letter was not primarily concerned with the breach of the agree-
ment or termination and also did not specifically state that the agree-
ment would terminate.
6 In the High Court the judge held that the word ‘may’ in Clause 9.3
(‘This Agreement may be terminated’) did not introduce a require-
ment that the defendant needed to take any further steps. The agree-
ment would terminate automatically because notice had been given
in Clause 9.3(a). His view was supported, he argued, by the wording
in Clause 9.3(c) (‘upon notice with immediate effect if’).
7 The Court of Appeal disagreed. The Court of Appeal found that the
wording used in Clause 9 gives the right to a party to terminate, but
the party does not have to do so:
‘[13] In my judgment cl 9.3 confers a right on the party, if he wishes to do so, to
terminate the agreement in the circumstances described in that clause. But he
is not bound to take that step…
[14] In my judgment, the party who was not in breach had to take some positive
step to bring the agreement to an end. He had to communicate his election to
the other party if he chose to take that course. I do not think it is necessary to
decide whether that party had to do so by a notice … or alternatively whether
he was able to make his election in the case of a breach which was capable of
remedying before the period of 30 days for remedying that breach had expired.
On that basis, the question is whether the letters sent by Bespoke’s solicitors
amounted to notice of termination of the agreement.
607
Jackson Distribution Ltd v Tum Yeto Inc [2009] EWHC 982 (QB),
[2009] All ER (D) 107 (May)
1 The claimant was a distributor of sports and fashion items.
2 The defendant produced a sports product.
3 Their negotiations, and the preparation of different drafts of a written
agreement, concerned the appointment of the claimant as the sole
distributor of the defendant’s product in the UK.
4 The judge held there was an agreement between the parties but the
provisions were not reflected in any draft agreement, particularly
those in relation to when their agreement could be terminated (the
terms, such as they were, were set out in an exchange of emails).
5 The judge also held that the notice period would need to be for a rea-
sonable period, given that it was a business relationship and unlikely
to be one which would last for ever. The judge needed to determine
what notice period was reasonable.
6 The factors the judge held which were important on deciding on the
period of notice (relying partly on the earlier case of Alpha Lettings
Ltd and Neptune Research and Development Inc [2003] EWCA Civ
704):
(a) the degree of formality in their relationship;
(b) whether the distributor was prevented in competing with the
product which is the subject matter of the agreement;
(c) the length of the parties’ relationship;
(d) whether the distributor needed to make any (substantial) invest-
ment (eg money or time) at the start of the relationship to build
up knowledge/business;
(e) what percentage of the distributor’s turnover represented the
sale of product;
(f) whether sales of the product in question were influenced by
seasonal factors;
(g) whether further investment was required or made (after the ini-
tial investment);
608
609
“It is the common experience that people, who are prepared to put up
capital for the development of new business, do run risks.”
It follows from this that while initial capital investment and business
expenses out of the ordinary run of things may well be relevant to the
amount of notice, ordinary and recurring expenditure is unlikely to have
much relevance.
33. It must not be forgotten that every distributorship is a bilateral con-
tract. There was some debate before us as to the appropriate implied
obligation of a supplier in the position of [the defendant] in the present
case but, in the end, both parties were prepared to agree that it was
necessary to imply a term that [the defendant] would accept and fulfill
orders placed by [the claimant] in respect of both standard and special
valves if such valves were in [the defendant]’s current range and were
ordered in reasonable quantities. The existence of this implied term is,
of course, of great importance when it comes to assessing any dam-
ages for breach of contract on the part of [the defendant] for giving an
unreasonably short period of notice, once such breach is proved. But
there will have been a correlative obligation on [the claimant], the extent
of which was not debated before us, but is most likely to have been that
[the claimant] were under an implied obligation to use their best reason-
able endeavours to promote the sale of [the defendant]’s valves in the
United Kingdom. The concept of a party to a contract being obliged to
use his best endeavours to promote the products of the other party after
notice of termination has been given (by whomsoever it may be given
and in whatever circumstances) is a difficult one and must also militate in
favour of a shorter rather than a longer period of notice.
36. We were not referred to any English authority apart from Martin-
Baker Ltd v Canadian Flight and Murison [1955] 2 QB 556 and Decro-
Wall v Practitioners in Marketing Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 361. The first case
concerned the distributorship in Canada of ejector seats from aircraft
which had been manufactured and patented by Mr Martin Baker. The
main issue was whether the agreement, which was in writing and pro-
vided that the distributor could not sell products of other suppliers which
might compete with those of the supplier, was terminable by any notice
at all or was intended to be permanent. It is not surprising to modem
eyes that McNair J decided that it was terminable on reasonable notice;
he held that such reasonable notice was a period of 12 months. Decro-
Wall was much relied on by the judge in the present case and was case
of a distributorship of French tiles in which the Court of Appeal held that
a twelve month notice was appropriate. But there are three major distinc-
tions between that case and the present. First, as in Martin-Baker, there
was an express provision that the distributor was not to sell any goods
competing with those of the supplier; secondly, the French tile business
constituted 83% of the distributor’s turnover, unlike the 20% of turnover
in the present case; thirdly, although (as in the present case) there was
substantial initial investment (“expensive spadework”) in launching and
promoting a new product in the United Kingdom, the agreement was
terminated only three years after it began before any real reward for the
initial expenditure could be reaped. In this case, there had been ample
opportunity for the reward of initial investment to be earned. One way of
regarding cases such as Decro-Wall might be to treat them as belonging
to a category of case in which there is an implication that the agreement
must exist for a reasonable time before any notice can be given. That
would, however, not be open to us in this case.’
610
Introduction
Background
In an agreement, a territory definition is normally for use where:
• an activity is permitted in or restricted to a particular country or a number
of countries; and/or
• an obligation needs performing in a particular country.
The use of a territory definition is likely to occur where the agreement requires
the performing of obligations or activities in a country or countries other than
the country or countries in which the parties to the agreement are based. For
example:
• an agreement concerning a supplier of goods in France selling and
delivering one order of goods to an English company is unlikely to
need a territory definition (the clause or schedule dealing with delivery
instructions will normally be sufficient); however
• an agreement concerning the licensing of intellectual property between
a French owner of copyright material and an English distributor of that
copyright material is likely to need a territory definition to indicate in
which countries the English distributor is licensed to distribute the
copyright material. For example, the owner might grant a licence to
the English distributor with a territory definition which covers all EU
countries other than France, as the owner wishes to license the copyright
to a French distributor. Without a definition of territory it will not be
clear in which countries the English distributor can distribute the owner’s
copyright material; or
• an agreement between a French supplier of goods, who wishes to appoint
agents to obtain orders for those goods in various countries, will wish
to define clearly the geographical areas in which each agent can work,
usually to avoid overlaps or disputes between agents and between agents
and the supplier.
Territory and the UK, Great Britain, Britain, British Isles etc
There are several countries and islands (and legal systems) which comprise
the territory for the UK. If an agreement includes a territory definition of UK
611
The term ‘European Union’ is the latest label for the member countries
(following the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009). Other labels
in the past have included the European Economic Community (EEC) and the
European Community (EC). Currently there are 28 members and this may
increase given past activity. A number of countries are seeking membership
(currently Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro,
Serbia and Turkey – although there is now considerable doubt over the final
country ever becoming a member). There is also the likelihood, that the
number of member states will decrease, following the Brexit vote in June 2016,
612
if or when the United Kingdom (or even, possibly, only parts of the UK) leave
the EU.
Agreements can use any of these labels in a territory definition without
additional wording to specify which countries are included. There is also a
distinction between full and associate membership.
The other main grouping within Europe is the European Economic Area,
which consists of the EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein and
Norway.
Drafting issues
• Is the territory clearly defined? There is often not a clear meaning of such
phrases or words as:
• Europe;
• North America;
• South America;
• Caribbean basin;
• Asia;
• Russia;
• Africa,
often because there is no settled meaning of the extent of the areas covered
by these words. For example, ‘Europe’ can mean the countries of the EU,
any number of the countries in the EU or could include countries outside
the EU. There is also the issue of where ‘Europe’ exactly starts; for example,
would Europe include the Russian Federation (parts of which are far more
distant from a country such as Poland than Kazakhstan is from Poland).
Another example is ‘Russia’, does the meaning just mean the Russian
Federation or the countries within the former Soviet Union, or if the
Russian Federation decides to annex part of neighbouring countries?;
The safest course in a definition of a territory is normally to list the
countries.
• At which date is the meaning of territory to be used? Should the countries
included, or the extent of territory covered by a country or description,
be taken as that:
• at the date the agreement is entered;
• at the date any rights etc are granted or obligations are entered into;
• at the date any dispute arises.
An example is given in Precedent 3 of how it is possible to deal with this
issue.
613
614
Precedent 7—World
Territory shall mean the world [and outer space if particular forms of
technology are being licensed] but not including [names of
specific countries].
615
Precedent 9—Europe
Europe shall mean the following countries (whether or not they are
members of the European Union or any other treaty).
616
Background
If a provision of a contract is stated to be ‘of the essence’ to the contract, and
if there is a breach of that provision then the party who is not in breach will
have the right to terminate the contract. Another way of saying the same thing
is to state that a provision is an ‘essential term’ or a ‘condition’ of the contract.
A clause dealing with payments is the type of obligation where the user of an
agreement will most frequently encounter ‘of the essence’ wording, such as:
‘The Company shall pay the Price to the Consultant within 30 days of this
Agreement and the time for payment shall be of the essence.’
617
‘The Manufacturer shall make the Goods in accordance with the Specifications
and in accordance with the dates set out in the Specification. If the Manufacturer
fails [for any reason] to make the goods within the tolerances set out in the
Specification then the Customer shall have the right to terminate this Agreement
in accordance with Clause [ ].’
Although phrases such as ‘of the essence’ or ‘time is of the essence’ are the
conventional phrases commonly seen, the contract drafter does not need to
use such wording to make a time or other obligation ‘of the essence’ (Harold
Wood Brick Co Ltd v Ferris [1935] 2 KB 198). It is possible to use other wording
or phrases for a time stipulation, such as:
• that the obligation is a condition or it is a condition precedent. These
are sufficient to be of the essence of a contract (HHR Pascal BV v W2005
Puppet II BV [2009] EWHC 2771 (Comm));
618
• the wording used for the time stipulation is emphatic and the clause
which contains the time stipulation concerns the exercise of rights
and the contract does not contain any wording which indicates that
the parties have a contrary intention (Tarkin AG v Thames Steel UK Ltd
[2010] EWHC 207 (Comm));
• wording that does not require compliance with a specific period or time,
but indicates compliance has to occur ‘immediately’ or ‘as soon as possible’
(Société Italo-Belge pour le Commerce et l’Industrie SA v Palm and Vegetable Oils
(Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, The Post Chaser [1982] 1 All ER 19).
What is important is not the words that the parties use in their contract, but
whether (i) the intention of the parties is to create a condition; and (ii) the
wording they have used in the context of the contract is sufficient to amount
to a condition (the breach of which would amount to a repudiatory breach so
that the party not in breach would have the right to terminate the contract).
619
Mercantile contracts
Where there is a mercantile contract, time being of the essence will be
more readily applied (Bunge Corp v Tradax Export SA [1981] 1 WLR 711 at
716); particularly time for performance, eg, where there is a fixed date for
undertaking an obligation or task and the date is essential, such as in:
• sale of goods;
• sale of shares;
• opening of a letter of credit;
• a charterparty.
For recent examples, see:
• International Asset Control Ltd (t/a IAC Films) v Films Sans Frontieres
SARL [1998] All ER (D) 476, CA;
• Msas Global Logistics v Power Packaging Inc [2003] EWHC 1393 (Ch),
[2003] All ER (D) 211 (Jun); where a clause in an agreement concerning
the time for completion of the sale of the entire share capital of a business
was found to be of the essence (see Case analysis below);
• Multi Veste 226 BV v NI Summer Row Unitholder BV [2011] EWHC 2026
(Ch); where a provision requiring a party to provide a bank guarantee
was not of the essence in the circumstances of the case (see Case analysis
below).
Making time of the essence when the contract does not expressly provide
that a provision is ‘of the essence’
A clause in an agreement may not state that it is ‘of the essence’ or that it is
a condition. However, it is possible for it to be so where a party is under an
obligation and is in breach of that obligation. When this occurs, the party not
in breach can send a notice to the party in breach. The notice can specify a
(reasonable) period within which the party in breach needs to perform the
obligation (eg make a payment, make a delivery etc). Such a notice in these
circumstances will be of the essence.
Where a provision is of the essence and the party in whose favour that
provision is drafted does not enforce a breach of that provision, then the party
not in breach will need to make it of the essence again, ie by sending a notice
giving the party a reasonable period to comply (unless the giving of reasonable
notice would not be of any use to the party in breach) (Etablissements Chainbaux
SARL v Harbormaster Ltd [1955] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 303).
Statutory provision
In contracts relating to:
• goods: in relation to the sale of goods:
620
Drafting issues
• Not essential to use the words ‘of the essence’ for a provision to be of the essence.
It is not essential to use the words ‘of the essence’ in a contract, but it
is desirable. However, by the use of such words, the parties are clearly
signalling their intention to others (such as to a judge).
If the words ‘of the essence’ are not used, the parties should use clear
words as to the meaning of the provision if it is to be an ‘of the essence’
type of provision, eg:
• by stating that the provision is a condition; or
• by stating that the party who is entitled to the benefit of the obligation
contained in the provision can terminate the agreement.
• If time is to be of the essence, the consequences of failing to meet the set time
should be spelt out:
• by indicating that the time to meet or undertake an obligation or task
is ‘of the essence’; or
• better still, to indicate clearly what is to happen if that time is not met
(eg that the agreement will automatically terminate or some other
thing will happen or not happen).
• If time for performance is to be of the essence. Are all times and dates given in
the agreement to be of the essence (see Precedent 2) or just for particular
clauses (see Precedent 3)?
The following types of clauses will usually have wording in them to indicate
that time is of the essence:
621
• Completion dates.
622
623
Case analysis
Msas Global Logistics v Power Packaging Inc [2003] EWHC 1393 (Ch),
[2003] All ER (D) 211 (Jun)
A clause in an agreement for the sale of the entire share capital of busi-
ness read:
‘[Clause] 4.2 Completion will take place at the offices of the Purchaser’s
Solicitors at such date and time as the Vendor and the Purchaser agree follow-
ing the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions set out at clause 3.1.1 to 3.1.4
but in any event no later than 10th January 2003 (unless the Vendor and the
Purchaser shall agree otherwise).’
The time period was held to be of the essence. After reviewing a number
of authorities relating to share sales, the judge said:
‘43. Ultimately, as it seems to me, the question is one of the interpretation
of the particular contract, the words used being set in the factual context in
which the contract is made and regard being had to the subject matter of the
contract. In the present case, in my judgment, time was of the essence of the
provisions of Clause 4.2. It seems to me that the very wording of Clause 4.2
is indicative of that – the more so, when set in the context of the provisions of
Clause 3.2 and 3.4 which to my mind […] reinforce the view that completion
was being required to take place by close of 10th January 2003 at the latest
(unless, of course, the parties otherwise agreed). That time is of the essence
of the provisions of clause 4.2 is also consistent with […] with the guarantors’
obligations and the warranties contained in the UK Agreement.
44. Moreover, such a conclusion, is, I think, strongly supported here by the
subject matter of the contract. What was being sold here was not just a parcel
of shares in a private company: it was the entirety of the shares, legal owner-
ship of which would give effective control of PEOL (and, hence, its subsidiar-
ies). In effect, the whole business was being sold as a going concern…’
Although time was held to be of the essence, it was found on the facts of
the case that the waiver in Clause 4.2 operated.
624
has never been of the essence. To my mind this is a strong indication that time
was not of the essence of cl 2.5. Moreover, the stringency of time being of the
essence is that purported performance one day late would amount to a repu-
diatory breach. I cannot see that the reasonable reader of the [Agreement],
armed with the background knowledge of the parties at the date of the con-
tract, would have concluded that delivery of the bank guarantees on the sixth
business day after notice of satisfaction of the Council Pre-Condition would
have such serious consequences as to entitle [the Claimant] to terminate the
[Agreement] forthwith. I therefore reject the submission that time was of the
essence of the obligation to deliver the bank guarantees.’
625
626
• Ownership in goods cannot pass until they are ascertained (Sale of Goods
Act 1979, s 16). Once they are ascertained, ownership will pass at such
time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred (s 17(1)).
The intention of the parties is derived from the terms of the contract, the
conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case (s 17(2)). Unless
the parties to an agreement agree otherwise, the Act provides five rules
for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which the
property in the goods is to pass to the buyer (s 18).
• The risk in the goods will only pass when the ownership is transferred
to the buyer, even if the goods are not delivered (s 20(1)). Note:
for consumers, risk does not pass until the goods are delivered to the
consumer (s 20(4)), which means, for a consumer, that the goods are
physically in the consumer’s possession.
This is no more than an outline; for further commentary on these matters
readers should obtain advice or consult the standard works on the subject
of sale of goods, for example Goode on Commercial Law (5th Edn, 2016,
LexisNexis).
If the parties wish to alter the statutory provisions as to when title and risk
should pass then the parties will need to draft specific clauses. A seller of
goods:
• will often not wish the title (ownership) in the goods to pass until it has
received payment, even if it has physically delivered the goods to the
buyer; but
• will wish that the risk in the goods passes to the buyer as soon as it has
delivered the goods.
See further Retention of title. For simple clauses dealing with the issue of passing
of risk see below.
Introductory points
Where contracts involve the export of goods, parties often agree to allocate risk
and title using a series of standard terms laid down in INCOTERMS, a series
of pre-defined commercial terms published by the International Chamber of
Commerce. The latest version of INCOTERMS is the 2010 edition. Besides
title and risk, INCOTERMS address a number of other areas such as:
• risk of loss (and thus responsibility for insurance) and who is responsible
for obtaining it;
• obtaining import/export licences;
• where the seller is to make delivery to;
627
• what notice period must be given by the seller that delivery has taken
place.
The most commonly encountered INCOTERMS are ‘Free on Board’ (FOB),
‘Cost Insurance and Freight’ (CIF) and ‘Ex-Works’ (EXW).
628
A clause dealing with when risk is to pass will often be included with Payment
provisions or with a Retention of title clause. Alternative precedents to the
ones below are included under those sections concerning when ownership is
to pass.
629
630
631
(4) Paragraph (3) above applies also (with the necessary modifications) where
a bulk is reduced to (or to less than) the aggregate of the quantities due to
a single buyer under separate contracts relating to that bulk and he is the
only buyer to whom goods are then due out of that bulk.
20 Passing of risk
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller’s risk until the
property in them is transferred to the buyer, but when the property in
them is transferred to the buyer the goods are at the buyer’s risk whether
delivery has been made or not.
(2) But where delivery has been delayed through the fault of either buyer
or seller the goods are at the risk of the party at fault as regards any loss
which might not have occurred but for such fault.
(3) Nothing in this section affects the duties or liabilities of either seller or
buyer as a bailee or custodier of the goods of the other party.
(4) In a case where the buyer deals as consumer or, in Scotland, where there is
a consumer contract in which the buyer is a consumer, subsections (1) to
(3) above must be ignored and the goods remain at the seller’s risk until
they are delivered to the consumer.
632
Background
In general, Value Added Tax (VAT) is charged on all supplies of goods
and services (including anything treated as being goods or services, such as
intellectual property) made in the UK by a taxable person in the course or
furtherance of the supplier’s business, unless the supplies are exempt (Value
Added Tax Act 1994 (VATA 1994), ss 1, 4. VATA 1994 derives from Council
Directive (EC) 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax, which
has been amended several times. Transfers and assignments of intellectual
property are classified as a chargeable supply, and are not in the category of
exempt supplies (see VATA 1994, s 31, Sch 9).
The purpose of a clause concerning VAT is to specify clearly whether any
payments a person needs to make under an agreement are inclusive or
exclusive of VAT. In the absence of any provision to the contrary, a payment
will be deemed to be inclusive of any VAT, if it is chargeable.
If there is a payment that relates to a taxable supply, HM Revenue and Customs
(HMRC) will still treat payment as including VAT and require the supplier to
account for the VAT element to them.
Drafting issues
633
long-term supply of goods may take place during a period when there is a
change (such as increase in rates).
• Is the supplier of the goods or services registered for VAT? Most commercial
contracts are likely to be between parties whose turnover exceeds the
threshold where registration is compulsory (at the date of this volume, the
figure is an annual turnover of £85,000), however, a purchaser/customer
may want reassurance that its supplier is registered for VAT purposes, will
maintain its registration and will properly account to HMRC for VAT. This
type of issue may be addressed by appropriate warranties, as well as the
purchaser/customer carrying out its own checks with HMRC.
A Value Added Tax clause would normally be included with payment terms
provisions in the Main Commercial Provisions of the agreement.
634
The Price is exclusive of VAT which shall be due at the rate ruling on the
date of VAT invoice.
635
636
Background
In the law of contract, the term ‘waiver’ is most commonly used to denote
the granting of a concession by one party to a contract. The concession
will concern the party making the concession not insisting on the precise
performance by the other party of an obligation under the contract. A party
can make the concession either before or after any breach of the contractual
provision to which the concession relates (see generally 9(1) Halsbury’s Laws
of England (4th Edn Reissue), para 1025 ff). There are other meanings of a
‘waiver’ (including a rescission of a contract or a variation of a contract).
A party may make the concession by:
• a formal document (and supported by consideration): if made in this way it
will be:
• a variation of the agreement (if occurring before breach); or
• an accord and satisfaction or a release (if occurring after breach),
ie the parties agreeing to release the party in breach from having to
perform the obligation; or
• implication based on a party’s conduct: an implied waiver may arise where there
is a positive and intentional act of concession by a party with knowledge of
all relevant circumstances, and where the other party acts in reliance on
that concession. A waiver that is not supported by consideration can still
be binding on the parties to an agreement, where:
• the person granting (grantor) the waiver does so unequivocally; and
• the person is granting a forbearance or concession (with the
forbearance/concession relating to the grantor not insisting on
precise performance of a provision in the contract); and
• the other party relies on the unequivocal waiver;
then the grantor may be prevented from going back on it (‘estopped’ in
legal language).
The courts have considered the precise effect of a waiver granted in this
way (ie one which is not supported by consideration) in many cases.
637
However, each case will invariably turn on its own facts. For example,
there is case law that indicates:
• (unsurprisingly) that a buyer was not able to refuse delivery of
goods that were made later than provided for in the contract
where the buyer had asked the seller to do so (eg Hickman v Haynes
(1875) LR 10 CP 598);
• (where a different conclusion was reached) that a party (first party)
can let the other party (second party) to a contract believe that the
second party could perform its obligations under the contract in a
different way to that set out in the contract. However the first party
could still reject this different performance on the part of the second
party. Where this occurs the first party must then allow the second
party a reasonable amount of time to comply with the provisions of
the contract (if still possible to do so or it is not equitable to refuse the
second party time to do so) (see eg Panoutsos v Raymond Haldy Corpn of
New York [1917] 2 KB 473, CA).
Where a party breaches the provisions of a contract, the party not in breach
has a number of options. The party not in breach may:
• take action against the defaulting party for breach of contract (such as
repudiating the contract or making a claim for damages);
• complain about the breach, but take no action; or
• ignore the breach (just let the performance of the contract continue).
If the party not in breach does nothing about the breach, or takes a long
time to react to it, it may lose any right to take action in respect of that
breach. The party not in breach may also find that its ability to take action
in respect of similar breaches in the future is compromised, as that party
may be taken as having affirmed the contract (Tele2 International Card Co
SA v Post Office Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 9; Force India Formula One Team Ltd v
Ethad Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 1051). This is because a waiver clause does
not deal with termination, or how a party (if it chooses to) may terminate
an agreement when another party breaches a contract. If another party is
in breach then the party not in breach has to take action in respect of the
breach (such as notifying the party in breach) by using the provisions in the
agreement concerning termination, because a waiver clause ‘does not deal
at all with the issue of election of whether or not to exercise a contractual
right. The general law demands that a party which has a contractual right
to terminate a contract, must elect whether or not to do so’ from Tele2
International Card Co SA v Post Office Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 9, [2009] All ER
(D) 144 (Jan).
638
The principal aim of a waiver clause is to deal with the type of situation
indicated above, ie that if a party fails to take action in respect of a breach of
the other party then it does not lose its rights to take action in respect of:
• a current breach; and/or
• any subsequent breaches.
Waiver clauses
Waiver clauses usually perform one of two functions (and sometimes both):
• it will make it clear that any failure or delay in exercising a right under
the agreement will not constitute a waiver of that right. This is the most
common type of clause (see Precedent 1):
‘Where the agreement has as its main purpose one single transaction, it
can provide that due performance of the contract does not automatically
release the parties from their duties under it.’
639
Drafting issues
Most waiver clauses in agreements are concerned with ensuring that any
action (or inaction) by a party to not use its rights under an agreement will not
constitute a waiver, whether for the current breach or any further breaches by
another party:
• Should there be a provision concerning a waiver at all in the agreement? If the
agreement is concerned with one transaction then dealing with situations
where there is a failure by one or more parties may not be appropriate,
especially where there are other provisions which spell out the
consequences of failure to perform an obligation. In such cases, it might
be made clear in other provisions that the agreement will be terminated
or deemed terminated. However, if the agreement is concerned with one
transaction but the transaction takes place over a lengthy period (or is
broken down into clearly identifiable sections or events) then a waiver
clause may be of use to one or more of the parties;
• Should a waiver only come into existence with a particular formality or when a
particular condition arises? In addition to the normal wording found in
a ‘no waiver’ clause, additional wording may be used to state that any
situations which amount to waiver must be confirmed or noted in writing
(see Precedent 6 for an example).
A Waiver and/or Release clause will usually be located in the Boilerplate section
of an agreement.
640
Waiver
Precedent 1—Short form – no waiver
No failure or delay by any party to exercise any right, power or remedy will
operate as a waiver of it nor will any partial exercise preclude any further
exercise of the same, or of some other right, power or remedy.
641
Releases
Precedent 10—Short form
[Party A] releases [Party B] from all his obligations under the (document).
642
643
Background
A warranty is a statement of a fact, forming part of the contract, which the
party giving the warranty asserts to be true.
Many commercial contracts contain warranties by one or both parties. These
may include warranties as to matters that are central to due performance of
the contract but are only in the knowledge of one party, or which only that
party has records or details of, and which the other party cannot (or cannot
easily) verify.
The exact nature of the content of the warranties will depend on the
transaction the parties are entering into. For example:
• in an agreement for the sale of a business: the seller will usually warrant that it
has conducted the business properly, that it has not infringed any statutory
restrictions, and that the accounts give a true and fair picture of the state
of affairs of the business, as well as warranties on a wide range of other
subjects;
• in a licence of intellectual property: the licensor may warrant that it is the
absolute owner of the licensed property and that it is not aware of any
third-party rights over it.
Whereas some types of warranty are specific to the individual transaction,
others are common to many types of commercial agreement. An example of
the latter category will include that a party has the capacity/power to enter
into the agreement.
Warranties as to:
• a party’s ability (capacity) to enter into an agreement of the type in
question (see Precedents 1 and 2), and
• to the ‘good standing’ of each party,
are sometimes inserted in commercial agreements
644
Capacity
For most types of commercial contract involving UK corporate parties, it is
possible to address the matter of whether a corporate party has capacity in
ways other than providing a warranty.
For companies incorporated under a Companies Act, the need to have
a warranty of capacity is even less necessary, as the current Companies Act
makes it hard for one party to claim a lack of capacity to another as:
• a provision in the company’s constitution (normally meaning its articles
of association) which indicates that the company lacks capacity to carry
out a particular act cannot be used to challenge the validity of that act
(Companies Act 2006, s 39);
• any limitation in a company’s constitution will not limit the power of the
company’s directors to bind the company (or the ability of the directors
to authorise others to do so) to any act or transaction (Companies Act
2006, s 40). This is subject to a proviso that a person (who is a party to the
act or transaction) deals with the company in good faith. There are some
conditions, including that the person is not required to find out whether
there are any limitations on the powers of the directors for example
(Companies Act 2006, s 40(2)).
In addition to the provisions of the Companies Act 2006, a party can undertake
an independent due diligence exercise, including such activities as:
• checking available public registers (eg searches at the Registrar of
Companies, etc);
• obtaining copies of the other party’s registers, minutes and resolutions as
well as copies of (significant) agreements entered into;
• obtaining credit checks (from companies providing such services);
• obtaining parent company guarantees (if relevant);
• obtaining warranties or undertakings from third parties who have provided
information or carried checks for the other party (such as accountants,
lawyers etc).
These checks (or the inclusion of warranties) can be in addition to other
commercial provisions that a party might wish to include in an agreement
such as:
• withholding payment of some of the sum payable to the other party
until:
• the other party has completely performed its obligations; or
645
Good standing
A warranty of good standing does not have a defined or accepted meaning as
such. It is different to warranties relating to capacity, as when asked for or used
often deals with the following points:
• that a party is indicating what type of legal entity it is (such as whether it is
a company, limited liability partnership etc);
• that the party has the right to be of the type of legal entity it has stated
(and it is validly entitled to be of that type of legal entity);
• that the party is current as regards its obligations to file documents, has
complied with registration formalities and deadlines, and otherwise
complies with the law for the country where the party is incorporated or
otherwise required to register its presence.
An example of a warranty of good standing might be:
‘Party A warrants that it is a [private limited company] which is incorporated
in England and Wales and at the date of this Agreement is up-to-date with its
requirements as to its filings and submissions to the Registrar of Companies of
England and Wales and is in good standing and validly exists under the laws of
England and Wales.’
646
schedule to the agreement and for that party to give in the agreement an
overall warranty as to the truth and accuracy of the warranties in the schedule.
The purchaser in such a situation may wish to provide, for the avoidance of
doubt, that its remedies are to continue to be available after completion, and
also, to avoid any presumption of waiver, that its remedies should in no way be
affected by any knowledge as to the vendor’s affairs obtained by the purchaser
on investigation or otherwise (see Precedent 7).
The vendor will often wish to put a time limit on the warranties, or to exclude
minor claims below a specified value or to put a cap on its total liability for
breach of warranty. It is also common to exclude from the scope of the
warranties matters specifically disclosed by the warrantor to the warrantee.
Typically, the disclosed matters are set out in a document known as a disclosure
letter. These are all matters for commercial negotiation.
‘Knowledge’ warranties
A party giving warranties will commonly seek to limit the warranties to matters
that are within its knowledge. Eg, the seller of a patent may be unwilling to
warrant that there are no third-party rights which would prevent the buyer
of the patent from manufacturing the products claimed in the patent, not
least because there is often an 18-month delay before a (European) patent
application is published; the seller may therefore be unaware of relevant
third-party applications. Instead, the seller might be willing to warrant that
no such third-party rights exist as far as it is aware. Because, even beyond the
grant of a patent, it is still possible for a third party to come forward and assert
that its rights have been infringed, and if the assertion results in litigation, a
court may agree with the third party that the seller’s patent infringes the third
party’s intellectual property.
Under English law and practice, there are two main types of ‘knowledge’
warranty:
• a warranty that ‘to the best of the warrantor’s knowledge, information and
belief’ something is true, for example:
‘X warrants that to the best of its knowledge, information and belief it is
not a party to any current legal proceedings’;
• a warranty that ‘as far as the warrantor is aware but without conducting
any investigations’ something is true, for example:
‘X warrants that as far as it is aware, but without having conducted any
searches or investigations, it is not a party to any current legal proceedings’.
The first type of warranty will often be understood as implying that the
warrantor has conducted appropriate investigations and taken all reasonable
steps to find out whether the warranted statement is true, but this is less
onerous than an unqualified warranty that the statement is true.
Sometimes the drafter intends to give the latter type of knowledge warranty
and uses words such as ‘as far as A is aware’ but then fails to mention
647
specifically that searches, enquiries etc have not been made. Some lawyers
take the view that by omitting such words the warrantor is in effect giving a
‘best of knowledge’ type of warranty.
Finally, it is recommended that the phrase
‘to the warrantor’s knowledge …’
Drafting issues
648
• Are there ‘standard’ types of warranties that should be provided? In some types
of agreements there may be standard sets of warranties that mainstream
commercial parties expect to see. Eg, in:
• sale of shares or business agreement;
• agreements relating to tax matters, etc
there are often extensive sets of ‘standard’ warranties.
General warranties
Precedent 1—Warranty as to power to enter agreement
Each of the parties warrants that it has power to enter into this agreement
[and has obtained all necessary approvals to do so].
649
650
[This clause will need additional wording to exclude all other warranties,
and conditions etc implied by law etc.]
651
652
653
654
655
4 The Company has complied in all respects with the provisions of the
Data Protection Act 1984 and all regulations made under that Act and
has established procedures to ensure continued compliance with all
such legislation.
5 The Company has not received any notice from either the Data
Protection Registrar or a data subject alleging non-compliance with
the data protection principles or prohibiting the transfer of data nor
has any individual claimed or will have the right to claim compensa-
tion from the Company under the Data Protection Act 1984 for loss or
unauthorised disclosure of data.
6 No consumer credit agreement or consumer hire agreement made by
the Company as creditor or owner or in respect of which it is the sup-
plier under a debtor-creditor supplier agreement or linked transaction
has been made in breach of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 or the
regulations made under that Act.
656
1 It is the exclusive legal and beneficial owner of all rights, title and
interest in [the Patents] and there are no liens, encumbrances or other
charges over any of them.
2 Schedule [no] is a complete listing of all patents and patent applica-
tions [and other intellectual property] of which the Owner is aware
relating to (specify) (‘the Technology’).
3 The Owner is entitled to license [the Patents] to [the Licensee] and
has not previously licensed or assigned them or entered into any
agreement relating to them or to the Technology, which might affect
its ability to license [the Patents] to [the Licensee] in accordance with
the provisions of this agreement or enter into this agreement or which
would be inconsistent with the Owner’s warranties and obligations
under this agreement.
4 It is registered as the proprietor of [the Patents] (or, in the case of
patent applications, as the applicant), all registrations and filings nec-
essary to preserve the rights of the Owner have been made and are
in good standing, and the Owner has not done or omitted to do any-
thing which may cause [the Patents] to lapse prematurely or be the
subject of a compulsory licence.
5 It is not aware of any allegation or claim that it is not entitled to [the
Patents] or to be registered as the exclusive owner of them.
6 [The Patents] are (or will be upon grant) valid and enforceable.
7 There are no allegations or proceedings, pending or threatened,
which assert that development, manufacture, use or sale of any
[Licensed Product] infringes or will infringe third-party rights or which
challenge the validity or enforceability of [the Patents].
8 The development, manufacture, use or sale of any [Licensed Product]
will not infringe any third-party rights.
9 It has made a full and complete disclosure to [the Licensee] of all
third-party relationships which may affect [the Licensee’s] full and
complete exercise of rights under this agreement.
10 There is no information known to the Owner concerning any of the
[Licensed Products] which indicates that [it may not be completely
safe for administration to humans or that] the development and
exploitation of the [Licensed Products] would not be commercially
successful, or which might otherwise affect [the Licensee’s] decision
to enter into this agreement other than information disclosed to [the
Licensee] in writing [and attached to this agreement].
11 In the event of the Owner becoming aware of any information which
might affect its ability to give the warranties and representations set
out above it shall promptly notify [the Licensee].
657
658
Marks are registered in the name of the Vendor in all classes of goods
covering the products sold under the relevant Trade Marks by the
Vendor and:
1.1 no third party is in a position to prevent the use of the Trade
Marks on the type of products now sold by or in respect of [the
Business] as currently operated by the Vendor;
1.2 no third party is entitled to use names (with or without any asso-
ciated design or device) which include the Trade Marks or words
or devices similar to them on any goods within the classes in
which the Trade Marks are registered or are now used or to do
anything which would or might otherwise infringe any of the
rights belonging to the Vendor;
1.3 the Trade Marks have full force and effect and are not the sub-
ject of and are not vulnerable to any proceedings for cancella-
tion or rectification;
1.4 all registration and renewal fees have been fully paid up to [the
date of this agreement or the date of completion] in respect of
the Trade Marks and all other requirements of the Trade Marks
Registry have been complied with.
2 The Vendor is the unincumbered and sole beneficial owner of the
applications for trade marks (‘the Applications’) set out in Part II of
Schedule [no]. Each Application has been validly made and is valid
and subsisting at the date of this agreement and there is no reason
why the Applications should not be granted.
3 The Vendor is the unincumbered sole beneficial owner of the trade
names set out in Part III of Schedule [no] as well as the trade name
represented by its corporate name (collectively referred to as ‘the
Trade Names’). The Trade Names are registered in the name of the
Vendor in all jurisdictions where they are used and are required to be
registered.
4 After its registration (if registered) each of the Trade Marks was used
within two years of its registration and has not since been unused for
any period exceeding two years.
5 The Trade Marks and the Trade Names are all subsisting and nothing
has been done or omitted to be done whereby any person will be able
to seek the cancellation or rectification or any other modification of
the registration of any of the Trade Marks or the Trade Names in any
jurisdiction.
6 There is and has been no infringement of any of the Trade Marks or
Trade Names by any third party.
7 None of the Trade Marks, the Trade Names or the names or words
the subject of the Applications as used in [the Business] infringes the
rights of any third parties.
659
B: KNOW-HOW
All know-how is adequately documented and to the extent that the know-
how is confidential or important to the manufacture of [the Products] or
the provision of services by [the Business] no part of the same has been
or will be disclosed to any third party by the Vendor, its officers, employ-
ees or agents.
660
661
Other warranties
Precedent 19—Warranty as to non-infringement of competition laws
The Vendors warrant and represent to the Purchaser that no agreement,
practice or arrangement carried on by the Vendor and relating to the
Business or its Assets:
1 has the object or effect of the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the UK contrary to the Competition Act 1998 or is
or has been the subject of any enquiry, investigation or proceeding in
respect of the same; or
2 is or has been the subject of an enquiry, investigation, reference or
report under the Competition Act 1998 or any previous legislation
relating to monopolies or mergers or the Competition Act 1980.
662
RECITALS:
A This is a made-up Agreement, designed to illustrate some common
boilerplate clauses. It includes a selection of the clauses that are to be
found in this book. It is unlikely that all of the following clauses would
be found in a single agreement.
B The boilerplate provisions in clause 7 have been set out in alphabetical
order to make it easier to cross refer to the sections of this book which
discuss those clauses. In practice, boilerplate clauses are usually grouped
in a more logical sequence, eg by putting 7.1, 7.4 and 7.22 together.
C Before using any of these clauses it is recommended that readers refer to
the section of the book in which the clause is discussed.
IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
1 Definitions
In this Agreement, the following words shall have the following meanings,
unless the context requires otherwise:
663
2 Project
2.1 DEF shall perform the Project within the Territory. DEF shall use its best
endeavours to complete the Project and deliver a final report to ABC no
later than (date).
2.2 DEF shall send to ABC every six months during the continuation of
this Agreement and within 30 days of its termination for any reason, a
written report giving details of its activities under this Agreement over
the previous six month period. The report shall be substantially in the
form of, and give details of the matters described in, Schedule 1.
2.3 Copyright and other intellectual property in any reports, data and other
materials prepared by DEF in the course of the Project shall vest in
ABC. To the extent that such copyright and intellectual property does
not automatically vest in ABC pursuant to this clause 2.3, DEF hereby
assigns and agrees to assign by way of present and, where possible, future
assignment, all such copyright and intellectual property to ABC. (See
further clause 7.12.)
3 Payments
3.1 In consideration for DEF undertaking the Project, ABC shall pay DEF
the Price, in accordance with the provisions of Schedule 2. Payment of
the Price shall be due within 30 days of the date of DEF’s invoice.
3.2 All sums due under this Agreement:
(a) are exclusive of Value Added Tax which where applicable will be
paid by ABC to DEF in addition;
(b) shall be made by the due date, failing which DEF may charge ABC
interest on late payments on a daily basis at a rate equivalent to
31% above the base lending rate of [ ] Bank plc then in force;
664
4.2 Subject to any earlier termination under this clause 4, this Agreement shall
continue in force until the [second] anniversary of the Commencement
Date when it shall terminate automatically by expiry.
4.3 Without prejudice to any other right or remedy it may have, either of
the Parties shall be entitled to terminate this Agreement immediately
by notice in writing to the other Party [(but not after 90 days of the
event in question first coming to the attention of the Party entitled to
give the notice)] if any of the events set out below shall occur. The said
events are:
(a) if the other Party shall commit any [material] breach of any of its
obligations under this Agreement and shall fail to remedy such
breach (if capable of remedy) within 30 days after being given
notice by the first party so to do; or
4.4 ABC may terminate this Agreement at any time on 90 days in writing
to DEF.
(b) each Party shall return to the other Party any documents in
its possession or control which contain or record any of the
confidential information of the other Party; and
665
5 Confidentiality
(Note this is a very brief clause; more detailed provisions will be appropriate if
valuable confidential information is involved)
5.1 Each Party shall keep confidential (a) the terms of this Agreement and
(b) any and all confidential information that it may acquire in relation to
the business or affairs of the other Party. Neither Party shall use the other
Party’s confidential information for any purpose other than to perform
its obligations under this Agreement. Each Party shall ensure that its
officers and employees comply with the provisions of this clause 5.
5.2 The obligations on a Party set out in clause 5.1 shall not apply to any
information which:
(a) is publicly available or becomes publicly available through no act
or omission of that Party; or
(b) a Party is required to disclose by order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
5.3 The provisions of this clause 5 shall survive any termination of this
Agreement for a period of 5 years from termination.
666
7 General
7.1 Agency, partnership etc
This Agreement shall not constitute or imply any partnership, joint
venture, agency, fiduciary relationship or other relationship between the
Parties other than the contractual relationship expressly provided for in
this Agreement. Neither Party shall have, nor represent that it has, any
authority to make any commitments on the other Party’s behalf.
7.3 Announcements
No Party shall issue or make any public announcement or disclose
any information regarding this agreement unless prior to such public
announcement or disclosure it furnishes all the Parties with a copy
of such announcement or information and obtains the approval of
such persons to its terms. However, no Party shall be prohibited from
issuing or making any such public announcement or disclosing such
information if it is necessary to do so to comply with any applicable law
or the regulations of a recognised stock exchange. The Parties agree to
the issue of a press release substantially in the form attached as Annex A,
upon and following signature of this Agreement by both Parties.
7.4 Assignment
Subject to the following sentence, neither Party may assign, delegate,
sub-contract, mortgage, charge or otherwise transfer any or all of its
rights and obligations under this Agreement without the prior written
agreement of the other Party. A Party may, however, assign and transfer
all its rights and obligations under this agreement to any person to which
it transfers all of its business, provided that the assignee undertakes in
writing to the other Party to be bound by the obligations of the assignor
under this Agreement.
667
668
DEF shall execute such documents and give such assistance as ABC may
require:
(a) to secure the vesting in ABC of all rights in [the Copyright];
(b) to uphold ABC’s rights in [the Copyright]; and
(c) to defeat any challenge to the validity of, and resolve any questions
concerning, [the Copyright].
7.13 Insurance
ABC undertakes and agrees:
(a) to maintain and pay all premiums in respect of a comprehensive
insurance policy (in terms approved by DEF issued by an insurer
[nominated] or [approved] by DEF in respect of (describe
location) (‘the Location’) (excluding its main structure) and all
the items stored there;
(b) to note on such policy that:
(i) DEF shall be covered by such policy in respect of all claims
arising from activities at the Location which are risks covered
by such policy; and
(ii) the insurer shall notify DEF in the event of any late premium
payment by, or any breach of the terms of such insurance on
the part of, ABC; and
(c) not to cause or permit any breach of any such insurance nor any
other insurance in respect of the Location.
7.14 Interpretation
In this Agreement unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) words importing any gender include every gender;
(b) words importing the singular number include the plural number
and vice versa;
(c) words importing persons include firms, companies and corporations
and vice versa;
(d) references to numbered clauses and schedules are references to
the relevant clause in or schedule to this Agreement;
(e) reference in any schedule to this Agreement to numbered
paragraphs relate to the numbered paragraphs of that schedule;
(f) any obligation on any Party not to do or omit to do anything is to
include an obligation not to allow that thing to be done or omitted
to be done;
669
(g) any Party who agrees to do something will be deemed to fulfil that
obligation if that Party procures that it is done;
(h) the headings to the clauses, schedules and paragraphs of this
Agreement will not affect the interpretation;
(i) any sum payable by one party to the other will be exclusive of VAT
which will, where it is chargeable, be paid in addition to the sum in
question at the time when the sum in question is due to be paid;
(j) any reference to an enactment includes reference to that enactment
as amended or replaced from time to time and to any subordinate
legislation or byelaw made under that enactment.
7.15 Language
This Agreement is made only in the English language. If there is any
conflict in meaning between the English language version of this
Agreement and any version or translation of this agreement in any other
language, the English language version shall prevail.
7.17 Notices
(a) Any notice to be given under this Agreement shall be in writing
and shall be sent by first class mail or air mail, or by fax or e-mail
(confirmed by first class mail or air mail), to the address of the
relevant Party set out at the head of this Agreement, or to the
relevant fax number set out below, or such other address or fax
number as that Party may from time to time notify to the other
Party in accordance with this clause 7.17. The fax numbers of the
Parties are as follows: ABC: [44] 1234 567 890; DEF: [999] 1234
123 456.
(b) Notices sent as above shall be deemed to have been received three
working days after the day of posting (in the case of inland first
class mail), or seven working days after the date of posting (in the
case of air mail), or on the next working day after transmission
(in the case of fax messages, but only if a transmission report is
generated by the sender’s fax machine recording a message from
the recipient’s fax machine, confirming that the fax was sent to
the number indicated above and confirming that all pages were
successfully transmitted).
(c) In proving the giving of a notice it shall be sufficient to prove that
the notice was left, or that the envelope containing the notice was
670
671
signature signature
date date
672
A Agency—contd
Acknowledgment non-existence of, 33–34
meaning, 11 precedents, 33–34
account bank, from, of receipt of letter, purpose of clause, 29
13–14 relevant contracts, 29
acknowledges and agrees, 12 signing of agreement, role in, 32–33
contents, 10 Agent for service
contractual estoppel, 11 address for notices, 37, 38
conveyance to contain, 14 appointment of, 36, 37
copyright information, display of, 15 drafting issues, 35–36
deeds, for production of, 14 failure to perform duties, 36, 37
drafting issues, 11–12 legal issues, 35–36
effect, 12 linkage of clause, 37
examples, 13–15 location of clause in agreement, 37
exclusion as, 11 notices clause, 37
fact, confirmation of, 10, 13 precedents, 37–39
false underlying fact, effect, 12 process agent, appointment of, 38–39
form, 10 purpose of clause, 35
franchisee, by, 13 service of documents—
generally, 10–11 address for, 38
group undertaking as, 17 drafting issue, as, 35–36
incorrect or false facts, as to, 10–11 effective, 37–38
interpretation, 12 methods of, 37
linkage and use of clause, 12–13 time limit, 37
location of clause in agreement, 12 use of clause, 37
non-commercial matters, in, 10 Agreement see Contract
precedents, 13–15 Agreement to enter see also Execution clause;
purpose, 10–11 Signature block
state of affairs, confirmation of, 13 purpose of clause, 40
transfer to contain, 14 Alternative dispute resolution see also
use of, 10–11, 12–13 Arbitration
Advance payment see Deposit; Part payment drafting issues, 67–72
Affiliate generally, 66
meaning, 16, 17, 19, 20 ignoring recommendation to use, 66
drafting issues, 16–18 precedents, 73–80
linkage of clause, 19 unsuitable, where, 66
location of clause in agreement, 18 Amendment
party to agreement, as, 17 accidentally made, whether having legal
precedents, 19–21 effect, 49
purpose of reference to, 16 case analysis, 52–53
statutory definitions, use of, 16–17 consideration for making, 50
use of definition, 19 drafting issues, 48–50
Agency effect on other parts of contract, 49
meaning, 29 form or procedure for, 49
agent: meaning, 29–30 formalities required, 51
assertion of relationship, 34 informally made, whether having legal
contractual relationship only, 33 effect, 49
drafting issues, 32–33 instrument in writing, by, 51
exclusion of other relationships, 32–33 interest in land, sale or other disposition
existence of, 29–30 of, 50
linkage and use of clause, 33 interest rate, altering, 51
location of clause in agreement, 33 linkage of clause, 50–51
no undisclosed principal, 34 location of clause in agreement, 50
673
Amendment—contd Appointment—contd
methods of making, 49 precedents, 61–62
oral agreement, effect, 47 purpose of clause, 60
parties needing to agree to, 48 service provider, of, 62
permissible, whether, 48 services, of party to provide services, 61
persons authorised to make, 49 Arbitration see also Alternative dispute
precedents, 51–52 resolution
provisions subject to, 48 advantages, 63
purpose of clause, 47–48 appeal from, excluding, 71–72
recording changes, 49 arbitral institutions—
separate document, changes made by, 50 list of, 65
specifying clauses to be altered, 51–52 reference to, 74
subsequent conduct, effect, 47 arbitrator—
third parties, effect on, 50 disputes for consideration by, 70
use of clause, 50–51 expertise or qualification, whether
value of clause, 48 needed, 69
Announcements method of choosing, 68–69
agreement, whether needed, 56 need for, 67
approval— single or more than one, 68, 69
generally, 57 sole, 73
new company investment agreement, specialist, 77–78
57–58 two arbitrators and umpire, 73–74
sale agreement, 57 confidentiality issues, 65
sale of assets of business in receivership, consumer issues, 72
58 disadvantages, 63–64
share transaction, 58 disputes for consideration, 70
benefits accruing from— drafting issues, 67–72
certain companies, for, 55 effect of agreement to submit to, 66–67
generally, 54 enforceability issues, 65
confidentiality, and, 57 expert—
consent, whether required, 56 appointment, 78–79
drafting issues, 55–56 final determination by, 74–75
employees etc making, 56 need for, 67
linkage and use, 57 rather than arbitrator, use of, 64, 67
location of clause in agreement, 56 use of, 67–68
necessary to make, whether, 56 generally, 66–67
no announcements, 58 international arbitrations—
permitted, whether, 55 enforcement, 65–66
persons allowed to make, 56 language and law in, 71
precedents, 57–59 international contracts, 65–66
press release, agreed form of, 58 length of agreement, 68
public authority, party being, 57 linkage and usage, 72
purpose of clause, 54–55 location of clause in agreement, 72
restrictions on, 56 management levels, reference through,
software, for development and release of, 74–75
59 multi-arbitrator agreement, 69, 79–80
subsequent use, whether permitted, 56 post-termination issues, 72
text, whether included with agreement, 56 precedents, 73–80
timing and method of— procedural rules, adoption of, 70–71
generally, 55–56 purpose of clause, 63
importance of, 55 senior representatives, reference to, 75–76
wording, agreement as to, 56 specialist expert, involvement of, 77–78
Appointment statutory provisions, applicability, 65
acceptance of, 61 types of contracts found in, 67
agent, of, 62 Assignment and novation
clear wording, 61 agreement, assignees bound by, 89
consideration, existence of, 61 assignment—
contents of clause, 60 affiliate, to, 86
definitions, use of, 61 between companies in a group, 86
drafting issues, 61 limited, 87
generally, 60 limited power of, 88–89
length of, 61 one party free to assign, 88
linkage and use, 61 permissible, whether, 83
location of clause in agreement, 61 prohibition see prohibition on below
674
675
676
677
678
679
Currency—contd Deed—contd
location of clause in agreement, 247 execution—contd
payment in full, following fall in value of clause as to, 270–272
sterling, 246 company, by, 265
pounds: meaning, 246 complete documents, only of, 267–268
precedents, 248 corporation, by, 266
provision not specified, 246 delivery of deed, 266–267
purpose of clause, 246 director not an individual, where, 268
relevant currency, 246–247 foreign company, by, 266
sample clause, 248 formalities, 263, 264–265
specified currency— generally, 264
right to specify, 248 individual, by, 265
whether payment only permitted in, 247 purchaser, document in favour of, 269
whether clause needed, 246 linkage and use, 270
location of clause in agreement, 270
D precedents, 270–272
Data protection preference for, where, 262–263
agreement, data processing as part of purchaser, document in favour of, 269
obligations under, 249 purpose of clause, 261–269
circumstances, relevant, 249–250 requirement to use, where, 261
compliance with statute, clause as to, requirements to create, 263–265
253–255 seal, use of, 263–264
data controller: meaning, 251, 256 statement as to nature of, 264
data processing principles, use of, 251–252, statutory provisions, 264
256 variation of, 263
data processor: meaning, 251, 256 Definitions
drafting issues, 252 case analysis, 279–283
linkage and use, 252 drafting issues, 277–278
location of clause in agreement, 252 introductory wording in clause, 278
party processing data on behalf of party laying out of clause, 278
providing data, 250 location of clause in agreement, 277
personal data: meaning, 251, 255 matters to avoid when defining or using
persons subject to DPA 1998, 249 clause, 274–275
precedents, 253–255 matters to consider when defining or using
purpose of clause, 249–252 clause, 275–276
sensitive data: meaning, 255–256 organisation where grouped together,
statutory definitions, 255–256 278
Date of agreement persons using agreement, need to consider
meaning, 257 identity of, 278
all parties not signing on same day, 258 precedents, 279
drafting issues, 257–258 purpose of clause, 273–276
linkage and use, 259 reasons for use of clause, 273
location in agreement, 257, 259 recognition of defined word, 277
precedents, 259–260 Deposit see also Part payment
purpose of clause, 257 advance payment as, 287
reasons for dating, 258 consumer law, effect, 288
starting date different, where, 257 drafting issues, 287
written not typed, 257–258 linkage and use, 288
Deed location of clause in agreement, 268
capacity, person acting in more than one, part payment, as—
268 appropriation, loan agreement, 289
delivery— clause, 289
condition fulfilled, when, 271 sale conditions, 289
deed dated, when, 270, 271 share option price not to be, 289
signed, when, 270, 271 part payment distinguished, 285, 287
subject to condition, 271–272 partial performance, consequences, 287
documents free from escrow, delivery of, 272 payment clause, provision in, 290
drafting issues, 269–270 payment of, 288–289
escrow— precedents, 288–290
assignment of rights free from, 272 purpose of clause, 284–287
delivery of documents free from, 272 purpose of payment, 287
execution— refund—
capacity, person acting in more than consumer rental agreement, 289
one, 268 supplier’s warranty, 289
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
R Recital—contd
Reasonable endeavours see also Best precedents, 527
endeavours presumptions as to, 524
absolute obligations, examples of, 102 purpose of clause, 523–525
all— real property transactions, use in, 525
avoidance of expression, 106 transfer of registered land, 525
case law, 105–106 unintended consequences, 525
generally, 105–106 wording to be used in, 526, 527
avoidance of expression, 106 Records
best endeavours, compared with, 104–105 auditing and inspection of—
case analysis, 113–115 agreements, examples of, 94
delivery, for, 110 books see inspection of books below
dispute resolution, 109, 110 case analysis, 98–101
drafting issues, 106–107 confidentiality, 96
employees, retention of, on sale of business, contents of clause, 94
110 drafting issues, 95–97
installation, to achieve, 110 examinable records, 95–96
lease renewal, agreement as to, 109 licensing agreement, 97, 98
location of clause in agreement, 108 linkage and use, 97
other expressions, use of, 106 location of clause in agreement, 97
precedents, 108–111 parties required to keep records, 95
purpose of clause, 102 patent licensing agreement, 98
qualified obligations, examples of, 102–104 persons permitted to carry out, 96
time of essence unnecessary, where, precedents, 97–98
110–111 purpose of clause, 94–95
Receipts refusal, consequences, 95
meaning, 520 variable factors allowing for, 94
acknowledgment of sum paid, 522 inspection of books—
drafting issues, 521 generally, 97
evidence as to payment, 521 licensing agreement, 97
identifying thing or payment, 521 patent licensing agreement, 98
information necessary to perform services, licensing agreement—
of, 522 inspection of books, 97
location of clause in agreement, 522 inspection of records, 98
necessity for clause, whether, 521 Release see Waiver and release
patent renewal fees, payment of, 522 Reporting
precedents, 522 completion of agreement, on, 530
property transactions, in deed involving, confidentiality, 529, 530
521 consequences of termination, 530–531
purpose of clause, 520–521 drafting issues, 528–529
statement as to fulfilment of obligation, 521 expiry of agreement, on, 530
types of agreement in which clause appears, format of report, 529
520 frequency of information, 529
uses of clause, 520–521 information required, 528
Recital linkage and use, 529–531
admissible background for interpretation location of clause in agreement, 529
of contract, as, 524 other than in writing, 529
binding obligations, avoidance of, 525 ownership of reports, 530
case law on legal effect, 523–525 precedents, 531–532
commencement of clause, 526, 527 purpose of clause, 528
consultant, appointment of, 527 receiver of information, rights of, 529
drafting issues, 525–526 reports—
effect— consultancy or advice, provision of, 532
case law on, 523–525 intellectual property in, ownership of,
generally, 11–12 531
rules from case law, 523–524 licensee of software, sales by, 532
estoppel, and, 525 provision of—
inappropriate, where, 525 fixed periods, at, 531
interpretive aid, as, 524 on request, 531
layout considerations, 526 sales by agent, distributor etc, 531–532
legally binding, whether, 523 termination of agreement, on—
linkage and use, 526–527 generally, 530
location of clause in agreement, 526 return or destruction of information,
necessity for clause, whether, 525 530–531
689
Reporting—contd S
third parties, reports from, 529 Schedule
types of agreement required in, 528 agreement, whether part of, 544
Retention of title attachment or index distinguished, 544
meaning, 534 contents, 544
agreement, effect of breaches on, 538 drafting issues, 545–546
all monies clause, 535 linkage, 548
beneficial title, 536 location of clauses in agreement, 546
change to goods, retention in case of, more than one, agreement containing—
535–536 identification, 545
charge over goods— overlap on issues dealt with by, 546
creation of, 533, 534, 536 not attached to agreement but referred to
duty to register, 543 in agreement, 545–546
clarity, need for, 536–537 numbering, 548
classification of clauses, 534 precedents, 548
current account clause, 535 purpose of clause, 544–545
drafting issues, 536–537 status, clear statement as to, 545
equitable title, 536 terminology, 545
extension of seller’s rights, clause providing usage, 547
for, 535–536 Set-off and retention
fiduciary relationship, establishing, 535 retention—
franchise supply agreement, 541–542 generally, 549
full title, whether, 536 sum of money, 549
generally, 533 title to goods see Retention of title
goods losing original identity, 536 set-off—
identification of goods, need for, 537 meaning, 549
importance of retaining ownership, 533, 534 availability of defence, 550
interest payment in case of, 538 buyer’s clause, 553
legal problems arising, 535–536 consumer contract, and, 551
linkage and use, 537–538 court rules, under, 550
location of clause in agreement, 537 drafting issues, 550–551
long-term supply agreement, 540, 542–543 express right of, 550–551
payment in case of, 538 extending right of, 551
precedents, 538–543 generally, 549
principle, 533–534 guarantee agreement, 552
product clause, 535–536 linkage and use, 551
purpose of clause, 533–536 loan agreement, 553
recovery of possession on buyer’s premises, location of clause in agreement, 551
535 no right to, 550, 552
reprocessing of goods, right of, 537 precedents, 552–553
risk, need to consider which party bears, purpose of clause, 549–550
537 right to, 550, 552–553
sale of goods agreement, 539–540, 540–541 sale agreement, 553
termination of agreement under clause, seller’s clause, 552
538 situations covering no set-off provision,
time for passing of property, 533 550
tracing clause, 535–536 types of situation envisaged, 549
tracing of proceeds clause, 535 validity of clause, 549
variation of statutory rule, operating as, 533 waiver, 552
warranty that goods not subject to, 538 Severance and invalidity
Right of first refusal see Option and right of blue pencil test, 555
first refusal case analysis, 558–561
Rights contract failing, circumstances in which, 555
disregarded, where, 26, 28 drafting issues, 555–556
exercisable in certain circumstances, 25, 27 effectiveness of clause, matters ensuring,
fiduciary capacity, held by person in, 25, 27 554
held by one person on behalf of another, example of clause, 561
25, 27 illegality, question of, 555
holding company, attributed to, 25 implications of severance, 557
legislative provisions as to, 25–26 judicial approach to, 554–555, 558–561
parent undertaking, attributed to, 28 linkage and use, 556–557
shares held by way of security, attached to, location of clause in agreement, 556
25, 27–28 negotiation after severance of clause, 556,
temporarily incapable of exercise, 25, 27 557
690
691
Subsidiary—contd Termination—contd
definition— consequences of see Survival of terms
alternative wording, use of, 17 insolvency, for see Termination for
extracts from legislation, 21–22 insolvency
intention of parties, relevance, 17 Termination for breach
statutory, 16, 20–21 case analysis, 605–610
legislation relevant to— categories of termination provision, 594
definitions, 21–24 cause, for, whether permitted, 598–599
supplementary provisions, 24–26 cause, without, whether permitted, 599–600
location in agreement of clause as to, 18 circumstances for, consideration of, 601
member of: meaning, 17 common law rights, 593, 598
statutory definition— consequences of termination, clauses to
generally, 16, 21–22 cover, 594
power to amend, 22 corporate insolvency, 603, 605
undertaking— default, for, 605
fellow: meaning, 23 drafting issues, 598–600
legislative provisions as to, 26–28 effluxion of time, by see expiry of
statutory definition, 16, 22–23 agreement, on below
wholly-owned, statutory definition, 16, 22 expiry of agreement, on—
Successors and assigns see also Assignment and clauses, 602
Novation fixed term, where, 602
assignment clause, wording as part of, 591 generally, 600
associates, assignees etc, party to include, matters to be clarified, 600
592 express provision, need for, 598
binding nature of agreement on, 592 failure to remedy breach, 603–604
drafting issues, 590 fault, without, 601–602
foreign parties, effect of involvement, 590 fixed period of time agreement, following
indemnity, increase or alteration of, 590 expiry, 600, 602
location of clause in agreement, 590 generally, 603
operation of law, effect, 590 importance of including clause in contract,
party clause, wording with, 591 593
party to include, 591–592 insolvency, 603–605
power to assign, 592 judicial approach to, 593
precedents, 591–592 licensing agreement, 602
prohibitions on assignment— linkage and use, 601
contradiction of, avoiding, 590 liquidation, 603
no inclusion or cross-reference to, 591 location of clause in agreement, 601
purpose of clause, 589 misconduct, 605
use of clause— multi-party agreement, by one party to, 602
generally, 589 non-payment, 603–605
UK and USA, in, 589 non-performance, 604–605
Survival of terms non-remedy of breach, 603
accrued rights, survival of, 186 notice of—
completion, after, 187 form and content, need to consider, 601
consequences of termination, 186 ineffective service, 601
continuance for lengthy period etc, 183 whether effective to terminate, 600
documents etc, whether need to return, 184 obligations of a continuing nature, breach
drafting issues, 184–185 of, 593
limited time, for, 183 patent assignment, 605
linkage and usage, 185–186 points to consider, 598–599
liquidation, termination arising from, 183 precedents, 601–605
location of clause in agreement, 185 purpose of clause, 593–598
materials etc, whether need to return, 184 quality of breach, specifying, 595–598
non-survival of terms, 186 reasons for—
onerous contract, right to reject, 183 generally, 595–598
precedents, 186–187 important obligation, failure to fulfil, 595
purpose of clause, 183 insolvency of party, 595
rights up to termination, 186 payment, failure to make, 595
types of clauses that survive, 185–186 seriousness of see serious breach, for
winding-down phase, whether need for, 184 below
specified date, failure to meet, 595
T relation of termination clauses to each
Termination other, 600
breach see Termination for breach remedies available following, 594, 598
692
693
694
695