b.

Channel 7 Takeover: Rebel troops, with the support of Marcos loyalists, took control of a television station
[1] MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS (Channel 7), highlighting the presence of forces still aligned with the ousted president.
c. Marcos Spouses' Plot: The attempt by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to return secretly from Hawaii indicated
their desire to regain power, and the involvement of mercenaries raised concerns about potential violence.
d. Col. Gregorio Honasan's Coup Attempt (August 1987): Honasan, a key figure in the People Power Revolution, led
SUMMARY
a failed coup, revealing internal divisions within the military. The incident resulted in casualties and underscored
the fragility of civilian-military relations.
In 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from his presidency via the People Power Revolution and was forced into exile. After causing e. Fractious Military and Civilian Supremacy: The various coup attempts highlighted the internal conflicts within
20 years of political, economic and social disturbance in the country he seeks to 3 years after his exile. The then President Aquino the military and the potential threat they posed to civilian rule. The government faced challenges in maintaining
banned his return to the country d/t national security and public safety. The petitioners now questions WoN the President has the control over the military, and these incidents raised concerns about the stability of the fledgling democracy.
power to ban them from their return to the country? f. Communist Insurgency and the Secessionist Movement in Mindanao
4. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of the people power and clearly reinforced Aquino’s
According to the Marcoses, their right to return and reestablish their residence in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights presidency.
and International Laws (UDHR + ICCPR). Furthermore, they argued that the President has no power to impair their liberty of abode 5. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy
because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, 3 years after Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in
has authorized her to do so. alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
6. Marcos, in his deathbed, wished to return to the Philippines.
However, the respondent argued that petitioners invoke their constitutional rights in vacuo without reference to attendant 7. Aquino banned his return to the Philippines due to national security.
circumstances. The proper issue would be WoN petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines
and reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the President that such return and residence will endanger national
security and public safety. Moreover, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION
in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

The Court ruled that the President has the right to bar their return and re-establishment of residence in the Philippines because of The petitioners contend that the President is without power to As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply W/N
national security and public order. Furthermore, it held that the President has a duty, under the Consitution, to protect the people, impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to
promote their welfare, and advance the national interest. may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional
President impair their right to travel because no law has rights in vacuo without reference to attendant circumstances.
IN THIS CASE: The persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the authorized her to do so.
country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. It is also to be noted that Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is
there were already several attempts of violence against the State. If the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the They advance the view that before the right to travel may be W/N petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right
escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the
powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. must be legislation to that effect. face of the determination by the President that such return and
residence will endanger national security and public safety.

DOCTRINE Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power"
limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state
Constitution. as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in
Under the Constitution, the President has the duty to protect the people, promote their welfare, and advance the national interest.
such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself
Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, he must consider these principles among other things, and adhere to them.
Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and withholds it.
what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusio unius
est exclusio alterius." Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution
ISSUES: of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also
1. WoN Former President Marcos and his family have the right to return to the Philippines even if their return will endanger If one thing is specified, other things which may be thought to be grants the President other powers that do not involve the
national security and public safety? YES. similar to that thing are impliedly excluded execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
2. WoN Aquino has the power to bar the return of Former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines and would country's foreign relations.
therefore violate their rights guaranteed by the Constitution, UDHR, and ICCPR? YES.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific
FACTS powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive
power."
1. In 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from presidency via the People Power Revolution and was forced into exile.
2. Corazon Aquino was declared President under the revolutionary government.
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
3. Her presidency was faced with different challenges which created chaos and destabilized the country:
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
a. Manila Hotel Coup (1986): This was a failed coup attempt by political leaders loyal to Marcos. It was an early
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the
indication of resistance to the new Aquino government.
 sum of specific powers so enumerated. freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the
requirements of equally important public interests.
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right Petitioners invoke their constitutional rights in vacuo without
of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under reference to attendant circumstances. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit: individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people.
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American
equal protection of the laws. Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in
times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining
the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, If the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for
or public health, as may be provided by law. the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out
such violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its
existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: ● Primacy of the right of the State to national security
the duty of government. The preservation of the State — the fruition of the people's sovereignty — is an obligation in the highest
over individual rights.
order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from
Article 13. ● The decision to ban them was due to reasons of
that responsibility.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and national security and public safety which has
residence within the borders of each state. international precedents.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including ○ Many dictators in several countries were
his own, and to return to his country. prevented to return to their homelands [1.5] MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS – MR
In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides: Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and
SUMMARY
protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to
Article 12 defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, A motion for reconsideration was filed. This time, with the death of Marcos having occurred already, this petition seeks for the
within that territory, have the right to liberty of military, or civil service. respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents from
movement and freedom to choose his residence. implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Ferdinand Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of Philippines.
his own. life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
any restrictions except those which are provided by blessings of democracy. DOCTRINE
law, are necessary to protect national security, public
order (order public), public health or morals or the
Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with
the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos
the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country.

ISSUE: WoN the President has the power to bar them? YES.
RULING

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" PETITIONER’S CONTENTION RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION
and that " [t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." — Art. II, Secs. 4 & 5 1. To bar them is to deny them of their inherent rights to 1. MR is moot and academic as to the former president
return to their country of birth and their Bill of Rights because he has died alreayd.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under 2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino to return 2. The rights invoked by the Marcoses is in reality a right
the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. from his own country to destablize the country.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his former President Marcos
family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to
be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred
 RULING

The death of Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's
decision was rendered.

The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been
shown to have ceased.

On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Imelda Marcos
reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Ferdinand
Marcos, not Cory Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the
courts of the world."

The President has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her
to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in
the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.

Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote
the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos
at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.
 of criminal justice. importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion
[2] U.S. v. Nixon a. Privilege is derived from the supremacy of each branch within its own
Executive Privilege assigned area of constitutional duties
2. Separation of powers doctrine precludes judicial review of a President’s claim of
privilege

SUMMARY (taken from FACTS)

This case arose from the Watergate scandal, following a burglary (by seven people) at the Democrat Party headquarters in the
Watergate building complex in Washington, D.C. President Richard Nixon, who was contesting the 1972 presidential election against RULING
Democrat candidate George McGovern, sought to quash a subpoena obtained by special prosecutor Leon Jaworski, who had been
appointed to investigate the burglary. The subpoena was designed to give Jaworski access to tapes and papers that concerned On Judicial Power of Review and Justiciable Nature of Case
meetings between Nixon and people who had been indicted in connection with the burglary. There were reasonable grounds to believe 1. It must be settled that the judiciary can rule on the order being appealed from.
that this evidence contained statements that would be damaging to Nixon as well as the indicted people. 2. It must also be settled that the case before the Court is justiciable and can be ruled upon.

Nixon complied in part with the subpoena, releasing edited versions of dozens of conversations and parts of 20 conversations that the On the Nature of a Subpoena Duces Tecum
subpoena had named. However, he asked the federal court to quash the subpoena based on lack of necessity and the President's 1. SEE PROVISIONS TABLE BELOW.
executive privilege. Nixon's attorney also attempted to argue that courts were not qualified to hear disputes regarding these 2. A subpoena duces tecum may be issued as long as the party who asks for such subpoena proves the following: (1) that the
communications within the executive branch. The federal district court denied the request to quash, while Jaworski sought complete documents are evidentiary and relevant, (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by
compliance with the subpoena. Both parties appealed, and the Supreme Court expedited its review to hear arguments within a month. exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in
advance of trial, and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the
Recognizing the importance of unanimity, all of the Justices contributed to the opinion, which held that the judiciary branch was application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general "fishing expedition."
capable of resolving this type of dispute. They dismissed the notion that insufficient necessity had been shown for the subpoena, and a. Relevancy, Admissibility, Specificity
the opinion focused on the President's executive privilege. Nixon and his attorney had cast this privilege extremely broadly, and the 3. APPLICATION: The District Court did not err in issuing the subpoena because the tapes which contained conversations to
Court was unwilling to accept such an absolute bar to liability. They did find that a qualified privilege existed while the President is which or more of the defendant named in the indictment were party. Nixon’s motion to quash was rightfully denied.
in office, but it could not extend to all circumstances and especially not to those in which serious wrongdoing was convincingly
alleged. ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND NIXON CLAIMS (MAIN TOPIC)
1. (See Nixon Contentions above).
2. "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy
DOCTRINE
but reciprocity."
a. To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential
The President cannot shield himself from producing evidence in a criminal prosecution based on the doctrine of executive privilege, to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in
although it is valid in other situations (military, or diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets). confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of "a
workable government" and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. III.
When a claim of Presidential privilege as to materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here, not on the ground 3. Executive privilege is a presumptive privilege. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in
that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality, the the process of shaping policies and making decisions, and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except
President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and privately.
the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. a. HOWEVER, the twofold aim [of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer
b. Employing an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of law
4. APPLICATION: In this case, the President challenges a subpoena served on him as a third party requiring the production of
ISSUE: Whether or not Nixon was correct with his claim to executive privilege? materials for use in a criminal prosecution; he does so on the claim that he has a privilege against disclosure of
confidential communications. He does not place his claim of privilege on the ground they are military or diplomatic
secrets. As to these areas of Art. II duties, the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential
responsibilities. In C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 333 U. S. 111 (1948), dealing with Presidential
FACTS authority involving foreign policy considerations, the Court said:
"The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available
[SEE SUMMARY] intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable
that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken
on information properly held secret."
5. The interest in preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed, and entitled to great respect. However, we cannot conclude
US CONTENTION NIXON CONTENTION
that advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the
possibility that such conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecution.
1. They should be given There is absolute, unqualified executive privilege. 6. On the other hand, the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial
access to the tapes in 1. .Valid need for protection of communications between high Government officials and would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the court. A President's
pursuance to the goal those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties; the
 acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas the
constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair
adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts, a criminal
prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be
vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending
criminal cases.
7. We conclude that, when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial
is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
8. In addition, said tapes would undergo an in camera (in private) inspection as requested by the prosecutor. Thus, the District
Court as a very heavy responsibility to see to it that Presidential conversations, which are either not relevant or not
admissible, are accorded that high degree of respect due the President of the United States.
a. Until released to the Special Prosecutor, no in camera material is revealed to anyone.

RELEVANT PROVISION / KEY TERMS

Fed.RuleCrim.Proc.Sec. 17 (c)
(c) PRODUCING DOCUMENTS AND OBJECTS.

A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other
objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would
be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena
be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and
may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the
parties and their attorneys.

Subpoena duces tecum: court summons ordering the recipient to appear before the court and produce documents or other tangible
evidence for use at a hearing or trial

Executive Privilege: The Constitution provides an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential communications.

In camera examination: In private; a procedure calling for scrupulous protection against any release or publication of material not
found by the court, at that stage, probably admissible in evidence and relevant to the issues of the trial for which it is sought.
 may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise
[4] SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by
any other person.

DOCTRINE
JUDGMENT
Immunity from suit pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
other person on the President's behalf. The President may waive the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents,
jurisdiction. the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain status quo contained in the
Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit. RELEVANT LAWS

RULING: YES. The grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
functions free from any hindrance or distraction. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person on the President's behalf. Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

FACTS

1. Maximo Soliven wrote in the Philippine Star that President Corazon Aquino “hid under the bed” during a coup against her.
With this statement, the President sued Soliven for libel.
2. Aquino even led reporters, photographers, and television cameramen into her bedroom to show there was no place to hide
under her bed.
3. Beltran, Philippine Star’s publisher, commented that the statement was a mere hyperbole or a figure of speech, and should
not be taken as a fact.
4. However, Aquino pursued that such remark undermined her role as commander-in-chief, especially during in a time when
the country was still politically and economically unstable.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

1. That he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication.
2. To allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.
3. The reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit.
4. If criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be
a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction, This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of
court or perjury.

RATIO

1. The grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
2. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person on the President's behalf.
3. An accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
4. There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President
 5. City Engineer Gestuevo sent letter to the District Engineer Javier advising him of the demolition of the Canal-Cover Project.
[6] OMBUDSMAN V. DUTERTE 6. Justice Secretary Gonzales opined that the erection, construction, alteration, repair or demolition of structures requires a
building permit from the building official. HOWEVER, the lack of permit does not make the structure subject to immediate
demolition.
○ REASON: Section 103 of the National Building Code - allows these structures to be “legalized” once they conform
SUMMARY to the rules and regulations and are later issued the proper permits and certificates
7. Justice Secretary Gonzales further added that under Section 216 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Rep. Nograles filed a complaint for grave abuse of authority against City Eng. Gestuveo, City Admin. Avisado, Chief of the Drainage National Building Code, it is the DPWH that determines if a structure is a nuisance per se and that it may be demolished
Maintenance Unit Jimlani and a complaint for grave misconduct against City Mayor Duterte, City Admin. Avisado, City Eng. Gestuveo, only upon the failure of the structure to comply with the order of the building official or the Secretary of DPWH.
City Legal Officers Atty. Raño and Atty. Quitain, and Chief Jimlani. This is for the reason that the said people demolished the 8. Rep. Nograles filed a complaint for grave abuse of authority against City Eng. Gestuveo, City Admin. Avisado, Chief of the
Canal-Cover Project without complying with the requirements of: 1) 15-day notice and 2) demolition permit. Drainage Maintenance Unit Jimlani and a complaint for grave misconduct against City Mayor Duterte, City Admin. Avisado,
City Eng. Gestuveo, City Legal Officers Atty. Raño and Atty. Quitain, and Chief Jimlani.
The Office of the Ombudsman found the city officials guilty of simple neglect of duty and imposed the penalty of suspension from 9. Office of the Ombudsman found the city officials guilty of simple neglect of duty and imposed the penalty of suspension
office for 6 months. Later on, they corrected the offense to simple misconduct. However, CA ruled that since the project was not a from office for 6 months.
nuisance per se, the city officials could not be held liable for simple misconduct. The basis for this was Section 477 of LGC which states ○ They later corrected the offense to simple misconduct.
that the city engineer shall also act as the local building official, thus, a permit from the said official was unnecessary for the 10. City Officials filed a Petition for Review with the CA arguing that their demolition was not simple misconduct since the
demolition. project was a nuisance per se that caused flooding in the city.
11. CA found that since the project was not a nuisance per se, the city officials could not be held liable for simple misconduct.
FOCUS ON THIS: While the case was pending, Duterte was elected as the President of the Philippines. As a result, the Office of the ○ REASONS:
Solicitor General filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review for the following reasons: 1) respondents did not commit simple i. Section 477 of LGC: City engineer shall also act as the local building official, thus, a permit from the
misconduct; 2) Duterte enjoyed immunity from suit; and 3) penalty had already been moot since city officials were no longer holding said official was unnecessary for the demolition.
local public offices. ii. City Engineer’s declaration of the project as dangerous as well as his letter informing DPWH of the
planned demolition and its representatives’ active participation constituted sufficient compliance
However, the Office of the Ombudsman asserted that the case had not been rendered moot. Furthermore, it pointed out that the with the requirement of a permit under Sec. 216 of the IRR of the NBC.
immunity of the President from suit is only applicable during his/her tenure and the effect of merely suspending the proceedings. 12. Office of the Ombudsman and Rep. Nograles filed their Motion for Reconsideration.
13. While the case was pending, Duterte was elected as the President.
14. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review for the following reasons: 1) respondents
DOCTRINE did not commit simple misconduct; 2) Duterte enjoyed immunity from suit; and 3) penalty had already been moot since city
officials were no longer holding local public offices.
15. However, the Office of the Ombudsman asserted that the case had not been rendered moot. Furthermore, it pointed out
President is immune from suit during his or her tenure in office. The immunity only covers liability from suit to free the President that the immunity of the President from suit is only applicable during his/her tenure and the effect of merely suspending
from any hindrance that may cause inability to perform his or her functions and to protect the dignity of the office. While the the proceedings.
President cannot be held liable for civil, criminal, and administrative infractions while in office, suits of this nature could be held in ○ Immunity does not equate to impunity.
abeyance until after the President's term ends. 16. Since both offices had contradictory arguments, the Office of the Ombudsman was represented by its Office of Legal Affairs
instead.

ISSUE: WoN the petitions be dismissed in view of the doctrine of presidential immunity? YES. (See relevant jurisprudence table)
CONTENTIONS AS TO THE PRESIDENT’S IMMUNITY
But also because the officials were really not guilty of simple misconduct (PROCEED TO LAST 2 HEADERS SA RATIO)
OMBUDSMAN’S CONTENTION SOL-GEN’S CONTENTION

The immunity of the President from suit is only applicable during Duterte enjoyed immunity from suit
FACTS his/her tenure and the effect of merely suspending the
proceedings.
1. A Canal-Cover project by Representative Prospero Nograles was made to secure the residents and children from any
untoward accident, prevent the disposal of garbage and clogging of the canal, and prevent the emission of foul odors.
○ Also included the improvement and beautification of the public park where the canal cover was located CONTENTIONS AS TO THE CASE ITSELF
2. Garbage could not be drained which impeded the flow of water because the concrete flooring was constructed on top of
the drainage canal. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION
3. The Davao City Government informed DPWH of the problem which then created several manholes on the concrete flooring
but the problem remained. Ombudsman: The Canal-Cover Project was constructed by the
4. City Legal Officers Atty. Raño and Atty. Quitain issued a legal opinion stating that the Canal-Cover Project was a nuisance ● Sec. 216 of the IRR of the NBC was applicable since the project was DPWH on top of a main drainage canal and that
obstructing the free passage of water and that it was constructed on top of the city’s drainage system without permit from funded by the national government. As such, the respondents clearly the concrete cover was named “Nograles Park” in
the local building official. failed to comply with the 15-day notice requirement when it violation of the Local Government Code which
○ Also mentioned that since the project as a nuisance per se, it may be summarily demolished demolished the project requires the approval of the Board Members for
 ● Not a nuisance per se because it did not affect the safety and property the naming and construction of public parks. The privilege of immunity does not do away with our fundamental ideal of accountability from public officers. The immunity only
of persons nor was it injurious to the rights of property or the health covers liability from suit to free the President from any hindrance that may cause inability to perform his or her functions and to
and comfort of the community protect the dignity of the office. While the President cannot be held liable for civil, criminal, and administrative infractions while in
office, suits of this nature could be held in abeyance until after the President's term ends.
Nograles: After the Ombudsman found them guilty of
● Same reasoning with Ombudsman + simple misconduct
● While Sec. 477 of the LGC provides that the city engineer shall act as Their demolition was not simple misconduct since
the local building officer, Secs. 203 and 207 of the IRR of the NBC the project was a nuisance per se that caused
provides that the city engineer’s decisions and orders are subject to flooding in the city.
review by the Secretary of the DPWH.

AS TO SOLICITOR GENERAL’S REPRESENTING THE REPUBLIC

● Their client is the Filipino people. It is not the President’s personal counsel.
● The Office of the Ombudsman may investigate and prosecute cases of all public officers including the President.
● It was therefore imperative for the SolGen to inform the Office of the Ombudsman first before filing the Motion to Withdraw

AS TO THE ISSUE IF THE PROJECT WAS A NUISANCE PER SE

● The Canal-Cover project is not since it did not injure or endanger the health and safety of others.

NUISANCE PER SE NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS

Could be summarily demolished without need of further notice May only be demolished after due notice and hearing

Affects the immediate safety of persons and property

AS TO THE ISSUE IF THE DEMOLITION FOLLOWED THE LEGAL PROCEDURE

● The law provides that the building official, in this instance the respondent City Engineer Gestuveo, may order the demolition
or abatement of dangerous buildings and structures.
● The owner of the structure is the State because it is a project of the national government under DPWH.
● IN THIS CASE: City Engineer Gestuveo sent a letter to District Engineer Javier advising him of the demolition (3 days before
the planned demolition). The permit was also unnecessary since the entity that would be issuing the permit is the same
entity carrying out the demolition.
● It would be logical to presume that notices regarding it would also be sent to the department.

RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE

DAVID V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.

It is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch
and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.

However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the
people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.

ESTRADA V. DESIERTO
 actions & statements were made outside of his official
[5] DE LIMA v. DUTERTE capacity. It submits that the immunity of the sitting President is absolute,
and it extends to all suits including petitions for the writ of amparo
She cited the cases of Clinton v. Jones & Nixon v. Fitzgerald and writ of habeas data.
TOPIC: Presidential Immunity from Suit
from the United States to support her argument that
PROVISION: Article VII, § 17 presidential immunity only covers official acts. Despite the non-inclusion of presidential immunity in Section 17,
Article VII of the 1973 Constitution from the 1987 Constitution, the
framers intended such immunity to attach to the incumbent
President.
SUMMARY

His statements constituted violations of various laws, Maintained that the immunity is based on public policy
Senator Leila M. de Lima filed a petition against President Rodrigo R. Duterte. Duterte made public statements against Senator De
particularly RA 6713, & RA 9710—not to be considered the considerations and should be respected.
Lima, including allegations of corruption and immorality. De Lima filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data, claiming that
official acts of the President worthy of protection by
these statements threatened her right to life, liberty, and security. She argued that President Duterte is not entitled to immunity from
presidential immunity from suit.
suit because his actions and statements were unlawful and made outside of his official conduct.

She contended that the habeas data proceeding does not Immunity seeks to prevent because it will surely distract the
involve the determination of civil or criminal liability, so the President from discharging his duties as the Chief Executive
DOCTRINE President's acts and statements should not be protected by
immunity. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo — the President is immune from any civil
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and or criminal case during his tenure and the only way to make him
functions free from any hindrance of distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from accountable to the people is through impeachment
requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

RULING
ISSUE: W/N the incumbent President can be haled to court even for a limited purpose under the Constitution? — NO.
NO. The petition must be dismissed even without the President invoking the privilege of immunity from suit. A careful study of the
development of the doctrine of Presidential immunity from suit shows that the presidential immunity from suit as recognized and
FACTS applied in the USA differs from the doctrine recognized in this jurisdiction.

1. On May 16, 206, Duterte was elected as the 16th president of the PH. The concept of presidential immunity is not explicitly spelled out in the 1987 Constitution. However, the Court has affirmed that
2. His key agenda was the crackdown on illegal drugs, which prompted several human rights advocates to heavily criticize there is no need to expressly provide for it either in the Constitution or in law.
the strategies and devices adopted by law enforcement agencies in pursuing the crackdown.
○ Among the vocal critics of the crackdown was Senator De Lima.
1973 CONSTITUTION
3. On August 2, 2016, De Lima delivered a privilege speech on the floor of the Senate calling a stop to the alleged
extrajudicial killings committed in the course of the crackdown, and urging her colleagues in the Senate to conduct
investigations of the alleged victims. ARTICLE VII.
4. In response, President Duterte issued a number of public statements against Sen. De Lima, including denunciations of
her corruption and immorality. SECTION 15. The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts
5. The statements prompted De Lima to initiate this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against President done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
Duterte.
○ De Lima traces this personal presidential animosity towards her to the time when she 1st encountered President
Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo — the Court steadfastly held that Presidential immunity from suit remained preserved in our current
Duterte while he was still the Mayor of Davao & she the Chairperson of the CHR investigating the existence of
system.
the so-called "Davao Death Squad."
○ De Lima concludes that taking all the public statements of the President into consideration the issuance of
While the concept of immunity from suit originated elsewhere, the ratification of the 1981 constitutional amendments and the 1987
the writ of habeas data is warranted because there was a violation of her rights to privacy, life, liberty, and
Constitution made our version of presidential immunity unique. Section 15, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, provided for immunity
security, and there is a continuous threat to violate her said rights in view of President Duterte's declaration
at 2 distinct points in time:
that he had been "listening to them, with the help of another country."
(1) The 1st sentence of the provision related to immunity during the tenure of the President, and
(2) The 2nd provided for immunity thereafter.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION OSG CONTENTION At this juncture, we need only concern ourselves with immunity during the President's tenure, as this case involves the incumbent
President. As the framers of our Constitution understood it, which view has been upheld by relevant jurisprudence, the President is
President is not entitled to immunity from suit because his Seeks the immediate dismissal of the suit. immune from suit during his tenure.
Unlike its American counterpart, the concept of presidential immunity under our governmental and constitutional system does not
distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an official act of the President. Neither does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit.
Accordingly, the concept is clear and allows no qualifications or restrictions that the President cannot be sued while holding such
office.

Soliven v. Makasiar — The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance of distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo — It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not
mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he may be
removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.

Indeed, the Constitution provides remedies for violations committed by the Chief Executive except an ordinary suit before the courts.
The Chief Executive must first be allowed to end his tenure (not his term) either through resignation or removal by impeachment.
Being a Member of Congress, the petitioner is well aware of this, and she cannot sincerely claim that she is bereft of any remedy.

Origins & Development of Presidential Immunity from Suit

Corpus Juris Civilis that Roman law recognized 2 principles connected with the development of what we now know as executive
immunity from suits — princeps legibus solutus est (the emperor is not bound by statute); and quad principii placuit legis habet (what
pleases the prince is law). These two principles remained dormant until their revival in feudal Europe, particularly in England.

In The Origins of Accountability: Everything I know about Sovereigns' Immunity, I learned from King Henry III — the origin of the
present day's concept on executive immunity from suit — the principle that is expressed in the maxim "the king can do no wrong."

Although the maxim clothed the King with immunity, equitable remedies remained available, such as the development of the
doctrine of ministerial accountability and impeachment. Due to increasing demands for the accountability of government officials
and to the eventual removal of the King's participation from political and state affairs, the immunity once enjoyed by the monarchs
started to wane.

In 1986, during the interval between the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, the Court maintained the concept of presidential
immunity.

In In Re: Saturnino v. Bermudez — In a sweeping but nonetheless unequivocal manner, the Court declared that "incumbent presidents
are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure."

In Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo — petitioner Lourdes Rubrico alleged that she had been abducted, detained, and interrogated by
armed men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Even after her release, Lourdes and her family continued to be harassed
and threatened. She brought a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo seeking to proceed against named military and police
personnel and the Office of the Ombudsman. The petition impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as respondent. In the
proceedings before the CA, the CA dropped President Arroyo as a respondent. Among the issues later elevated to this Court was the
propriety of dropping the President as a party respondent. The petitioners specifically claimed that the immunity enjoyed by the
Chief Executive under the 1935 Constitution and 1973 Constitution had been removed by its non-inclusion the 1987 Constitution.

The Court upheld the exclusion of President Arroyo as a respondent, maintaining that presidential immunity from suit remained
under our system of government, despite not being expressly reserved in the 1987 Constitution, and declared that the President
could not be sued during her tenure. In addition, the decision pointed out that the petition did not allege specific presidential acts or
omissions that had violated or threatened to violate petitioners' protected rights.
 a) JMSU allows large-scale exploration of petroleum & other mineral oils by corporations wholly-owned
[7] OCAMPO v. MACAPAGAL ARROYO by foreign states in the archipelagic waters, territorial sea & EEZ clearly and undisputedly owned by
the Republic including the Spratly Islands in violation of Section 2 (1), Article XII of the 1987
TOPIC: Presidential Immunity from Suit Constitution; and
b) The JMSU is not covered and sanctioned by any of the allowable & permissible undertakings for the
PROVISION: Article VII, § 17; Article XII, § 2 EDU of natural resources under the 1987 Constitution
6. Petitioners ascribed GADALEJ to PGMA & ES Ermita for authorizing, permitting & tolerating, both expressly & impliedly,
the execution & continued implementation of JMSU.
SUMMARY

CNOOC, PETROVIETNAM & PNOC, collectively, w/ the authorization of their respective governments, signed the JMSU in the PH.
Bayan Muna Party-List Representatives, suing as legislators, taxpayers & citizens filed this present petition against President Gloria
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION
Macapagal Arroyo, ES Ermita, DFA, etc. The petitioners argue that the JMSU violates constitutional provisions on the exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources, and also argue that the President & other government officials should be held
accountable for authorizing and permitting the execution of the JMSU. The case is a mere special civil action, the purpose of which is not Argued that PGMA is not a proper respondent in the petition
to subject the president to any penalty, punishment, or damages because the president is immune from suit. Thus, she should be
for her unconstitutional acts. In addition, the exceptions to the excluded outright as a lead respondent in the case.
doctrine of immunity from suit are present, which are:
DOCTRINE (1) where the government itself violated its own laws; and
(2) to restrain the public officer from enforcing an act
Presidential immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit. Its purpose is not intended to immunize the president from liability or claimed to be unconstitutional.
accountability but to assure that the exercise of his/her duties is free from any distractions. While indeed a case against the president
can be handled by the OSG, any litigation, big or small, naturally serves as a distraction to a party-litigant. A litigant cannot simply Did not file the petition to harass PGMA. Instead, the petition was The president and her cabinet members are also not liable for the
leave the course and conduct of the proceedings entirely to his/her counsel. Simply put, the president's immunity from suit has no filed for her to perform her official duties and functions in execution of the JMSU since they are not parties to the
qualification or restriction. The president cannot be sued while holding such office. accordance with the 1987 Constitution. agreement.

Claimed that she is accountable for the execution & The JMSU was executed by PNOC, a government corporation that
ISSUE: W/N the President of the PH may be impleaded as a respondent? — NO. implementation of the JMSU because she did not repudiate the possesses a personality separate and distinct from the Republic.
act of the DOE Secretary in issuing a permit which constituted
the Republic's approval of the agreement. Under its charter, the PNOC has the power to enter into
contracts, hence the execution of the JMSU is its exclusive
FACTS Without such approval, the JMSU would not be binding on the corporate act and may not be imputed to the Republic.
Republic. Therefore, it does not matter that the PNOC is a
⚠ Take note: government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which The doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply.
JMSU → Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the South China Sea possesses a personality separate & distinct from the Republic.
PNOC → national oil company of the Republic of PH
CNOOC → state-owned oil company of the Republic of China The fact remains that even if the Parties had already signed the
JMSU, the approval of the Republic is needed to make it binding.
PETROVIETNAM → state-owned oil company of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

1. On March 14, 2005, CNOOC, PETROVIETNAM & PNOC, collectively, w/ the authorization of their respective
RULING
governments, signed the JMSU in the PH.
○ JMSU has a term of 3 years starting from the date of commencement of the implementation → Agreement Term
On Immunity of the President
2. According the the whereas clause, its execution is an expression of the Parties’ commitment “to pursue efforts to
PGMA is an improper party to the petition. Though not expressly reserved in the 1987 Constitution, the rule that the president is
transform South China Sea into an area of peace, stability, cooperation & development”
immune from suit during his/her tenure remains preserved under our system of government. It is well-understood in jurisprudence
3. The parties, therefore, desire to “engage in a joint research of petroleum resource potential of a certain area of the South
that even the framers of the present Constitution did not see the need to expressly state it in the text of the highest law.
China Sea as a pre-exploration activity”
4. The JMSU shall cover 142,886 square kilometers of the agreement area.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo — It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the president, the head of the state, if he/she can be
○ Defined & marked out by the geographic location & coordinates of the connecting points of the boundary lines.
dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Unlike the legislative and judicial branches, only one constitutes the executive
5. On May 21, 2008, Bayan Muna Party-List Representatives, suing as legislators, taxpayers & citizens filed this present
branch, hence anything that impairs his/her usefulness in the discharge of his/her duties necessarily impairs the operations of the
petition against President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, ES Ermita, DFA, etc.
government.
○ Arguing that the JMSU is unconstitutional as:
De Lima v. Duterte — Presidential immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit. Its purpose is not intended to immunize the
president from liability or accountability but to assure that the exercise of his/her duties is free from any distractions. While indeed a
case against the president can be handled by the OSG, any litigation, big or small, naturally serves as a distraction to a party-litigant. A
litigant cannot simply leave the course and conduct of the proceedings entirely to his/her counsel. Simply put, the president's
immunity from suit has no qualification or restriction. The president cannot be sued while holding such office.

On Constitutionality
The Court held that the JMSU involved the exploration of the country's natural resources and did not comply with Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution, which requires that the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources should be under the full
control and supervision of the State. Hence, ruled unconstitutional & void.

1987 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE VII

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

ARTICLE XII

SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve
its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming,
with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.
 [9] CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PETITIONER’S CONTENTION

EO 284 adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
SUMMARY exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely:
1. The Vice President (may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII: “The Vice-President
may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.”); and
This case involves the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284, which allows members of the cabinet, their undersecretaries, and
2. The secretary of justice (as an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII: “A Judicial
assistant secretaries to hold multiple positions in the Government. The petitioners argue that this violates Section 13, Article 7 of the
and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
1987 Constitution, which prohibits the president, vice president, members of the cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding
Chairman,
any other office or employment during their tenure. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, stating that the exception to
3. The Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
the prohibition must be expressly provided in the Constitution itself. The Court clarified that ex-officio positions held by cabinet
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”)
members without additional compensation and positions required by their primary functions are not considered “any other office”
within the prohibition.

DOCTRINE RULING

The prohibition in Section 13, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution against members of the cabinet, their deputies, and assistants from NO. It has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
holding any other office or employment during their tenure is absolute and applies specifically to these officials. The exceptions to this adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.
prohibition must be expressly provided in the Constitution itself, and not in Section 7, Article 9-B, which applies to all appointive
officials. The prohibition does not apply to ex-officio positions or positions required by the primary functions of the official’s office. Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the
government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies,
and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition in Art VII, Sec 13 of the Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and ➔ The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
assistant secretaries are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Art IX-B, Sec 7(2) of particular instances cited in the Constitution itself,
the same? – NO.
INTENT OF THE FRAMERS:
The intent of the framers of the constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as
FACTS holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. As compared to other prohibition found in the
Constitution which provides restriction only to office or employment in the government and GOCCs or their subsidiaries, Article VII
Section 13 provides absolute disqualification embracing and covers both public and private office or employment unless otherwise
● The petitioner seeks for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon
provided by the Constitution itself.
C. Aquino on July 25, 1987 on grounds that:
➔ This prohibition is proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by
➢ The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. The reason is that because they exercise more power and,
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure as provided in
therefore more cheeks and restraints on them are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in their case.
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
● The respondent interpreted that:
(1) Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7 is “reasonably valid and constitutionally firm,”; and
(2) Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently Article 9-B, Section 7(2) It is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to appointive public officials
constitutional.
● According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,” the only exceptions Article 7, Section 13 It is meant to be the exception applicable particularly to the President, Vice President, Cabinet
against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: Members, and their deputies and assistants.
(1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and
(2) The Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. The
● While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment during their tenure
petitioner insisted that because of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” used in Section 13 of Article
when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution.
● Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution.
● Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B on the Civil Service
Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply and
Executive Order No. 284 is thus null and void as it is repugnant to Art VII, Section 13. It was noted, however, that the prohibition
cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the
against the holding of any other office or employment by the President, Vice President, Cabinet members, and their deputies or
Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.
assistants during their tenure (provided in Sec 13, Art VII) does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by the
● Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in the Constitution” in Section
primary functions of the officials concerned who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity as provided by law.
13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are
concerned.
 RELEVANT PROVISIONS, CONCEPTS, AND JURISPRUDENCE

“Ex-officio.” — it means “from office; by virtue of office.” It refers to an “authority derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.” Also denotes an “act done in an official character,
or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.” An ex-officio member
of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.

Art VII Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.

Art IX-B Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

NOTES FROM POLI REV:

Petitioner challenged EO284, issued by then Pres. Cory which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold in addition to his primary position, not more than 2
positions in the govt and govt corporations. The EO further stated that the limitation would not apply to ad-hoc bodies, or to boards,
councils or boards of which the President is chairman.

EO was declared unconstitutional. Although Sec.7, Art.IX-B contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government for both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission saw it fit to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Art.VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. The
intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding
other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
 [10] FUNA V. AGRA PETITIONER’S CONTENTION RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION

1. Section 13, Article VII does not distinguish 1. That Agra's concurrent designations as the Acting Secretary of
SUMMARY between an appointment or designation of a Justice and Acting Solicitor General were only in a temporary
Member of the Cabinet in an acting or capacity, the only effect of which was to confer additional
temporary capacity or in a permanent duties to him. Thus, as the Acting Solicitor General and Acting
Dennis Funa alleged that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Alberto Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the
capacity. Secretary of Justice, Agra was not "holding" both offices in the
resignation of Agnes Devanadera. Three days after, President GMA designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent
2. That Acting Secretaries, being nonetheless strict constitutional sense.
capacity. Funa commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations.
Members of the Cabinet, are not exempt from 2. That an appointment, to be covered by the constitutional
the constitutional ban. prohibition, must be regular and permanent, instead of a mere
3. ​That the position of the Solicitor General is not designation.
DOCTRINE an ex officio position in relation to the position 3. Even on the assumption that Agra’s concurrent designation
of the Secretary of Justice, considering that constituted "holding of multiple offices," his continued service
The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or the OSG is an independent and autonomous as the Acting Solicitor General was akin to a hold-over;
designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13 is to prevent the office attached to the DOJ. 4. That upon Agra's designation as the Acting Secretary of
concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the 4. That the fact that Agra was extended an Justice, his term as the Acting Solicitor General expired in
Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. appointment as the Acting Solicitor General view of the constitutional prohibition against holding of
shows that he did not occupy that office in an multiple offices by the Members of the Cabinet;
ex officio capacity because an ex officio 5. That the OSG's independence and autonomy are defined by
position does not require any further warrant the powers and functions conferred to that office by law, not
ISSUE: Did the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate or appointment. by the person appointed to head such office.
the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants?

RULING: YES. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was
unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. RATIO

1. The evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice
FACTS President, members of the Cabinet, ​their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment
in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity.
March 2, PGMA appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Devanadera in order to 2. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" refer only to those particular instances such as the Secretary of
2010 vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province. Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
3. To hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which
March 5 PGMA designated as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity. implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
4. ​The Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation.
April 7 In his capacity as taxpayer, a concerned citizen, and a lawyer, the petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and 5. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
prohibition to assail the designation of respondent Hon. Alberto C. Agra for his position as then Acting Secretary of appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of
Justice and Acting Solicitor General at the same time. Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
FUNA’S Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations are prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. That 6. To construe differently is to "open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification
VERSION during the pendency of the suit, President Aquino III appointed ​Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and
of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the President's power of appointment in the guise of
Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010.
temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of
government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations."
AGRA’S On January 12, 2010, Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when GMA designated him as the Acting
VERSION Solicitor General in place of Devanadera who had been appointed as Secretary of Justice. That on March 5, 2010, GMA
designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her
resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections. That he APPLICATION TO THE CASE
then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of his
successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General.
1. Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII. He could not validly hold any other office or employment during
his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
● Funa founded his arguments that he advanced in Funa v. Ermita and rested his grounds of challenge mainly on the
pronouncements in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary and Public interest Center, Inc. v. Elma. The only difference
is that the appointments challenged in this case were in acting or temporary capacities.
 2. Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly
authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the
other.
3. It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was "allowed by law or the primary functions of
his position." To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, he needed to establish herein that his concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.
However, he failed to do so.
4. The primary functions of the OSG are not related or necessary to the primary functions of the DOJ. Considering that the
nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one person
to retain both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra's designation as the
Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to be void for being in
violation of the express provisions of the Constitution.

JUDGMENT

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari and prohibition; ANNULS AND VOIDS the designation of Hon. Alberto C.
Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice in a concurrent capacity with his position as the Acting Solicitor General for being
unconstitutional and violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; and DECLARES that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was a de
facto officer during his tenure as Acting Secretary of Justice.

RELEVANT LAWS/ JURISPRUDENCE

GR Section 7, Article IX-B. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office
or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

XPN Section 13, Article VII. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested
in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

Public Interest Center, Inc v. Elma: The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under the
Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied
by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of the officials' offices.

Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary: The phrase “the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants” referred
only to heads of various executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, and did not extend to other public
officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.
 ineligibility for the Presidency. when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino
[11] Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC ➔ The burden to prove that she is not a natural-born citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
Topic: Qualifications for the Presidency & Vice-Presidency Filipino citizen is on the respondents. Otherwise (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May
stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a 2016 Elections.
natural-born citizen of this country. ➔ Foundling → not a natural-born FIlipino citizen.
➔ Customary international law dictates that foundlings International law does not confer natural-born status
are entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.
ISSUE: W/N the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate citizens of the country where they are found. ➔ Ergo: not qualified for reacquisition of Filipino
a false material representation. — NO. Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a Citizenship under RA 9225
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. ➔ Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a
➔ As a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that
FACTS repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to status when she became a naturalized American
reacquire her natural-born status. citizen.
➔ The official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy ➔ Natural-born citizenship must be maintained from
● Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro by Edgardo Militaar. Parental care and
the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of birth.
custody over the petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife. Three days after,
the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as
Emiliano reported and registered Grace Poe as a foundling and was given the name “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair Residency
Militar.”
and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan Petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her
● When Grace Poe was 5 years old, FPJ and Susan Roces filed a petition for her adoption. Thus, her name was changed to
RTC. She believed that all these acts reinforced her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
position that she is a natural-born citizen of the in the country for only six (6) years and six (6) months as of May
● Susan Roces discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled Grace’s adoption failed to
Philippines. 2013 Elections.
secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner’s new name and the name of her adoptive
➔ Maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, ➔ Fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of
parents. Without delay, Lola Flora executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer’s omission which she submitted to the
she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in the the Constitution as her residence could only be
OCR-Iloilo. OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
Philippines as demonstrated by her children's counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she
● 1986-1991 - Registered as a voter, applied and was issued a Philippine Passport, enrolled in UP but left for abroad to study in
resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act.
Boston College.
a condominium unit in San Juan City and the
● 1991 - Married in the Philippines, then thereafter left for the US.
construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills. TATAD, CONTRERAS, VALDEZ: since the Philippines adheres to
● 2001 - Became a naturalized American citizen.
➔ Insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage,
● 2004 - Quit her job.
of choice in the Philippines even before she renounced particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born
● July 2004 - Went back to the PH to help in FPJ’s candidacy.
her American citizenship as long as the three Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of
● December 2004 to February 2005 - Went back to the PH because FPJ was dying, then FPJ died. So, she arranged the funeral
determinants for a change of domicile are complied natural-born status.
and the settlement of FPJ’s estate.
with. 100 She reasoned out that there was no ➔ Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international
● First quarter of 2005 - Decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines.
requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is conventions or treaties to support her claim that
● February 2006 - Quick trip to the US for the disposal of the family’s remaining household belongings.
a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of foundlings have a nationality. → not self-executory
● March 2006 - Grace’s husband officially informed the US Postal Service of the family’s change and abandonment of their
choice.
address in the US. The family home was eventually sold.
➔ Reiterated that the period appearing in the residency TATAD, CONTRERAS, VALDEZ: questioned petitioner's lack of
● April 2006 - Husband resigned from his job in the US. Early 2006 - They bought a 509-sqm lot in QC where they built their
portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake made in intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that
family home.
good faith. her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.
● July 2006 - Grace took her Oath of Allegiance to the PH pursuant to RA 9225.
● August 2006 - Registered as a voter and secured a PH passport. ➔ petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator
● October 6, 2010 - Appointed as MTRCB Chairperson. October 20, 2010 - Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the US. that she had only been a resident of the Philippines for
● October 21, 2010 - Took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13
● July 2011 - Executed an oath or affirmation of renunciation of nationality of the US. May 2013 Elections operates against her.
● December 2011 - US Vice Consul issued to Grace a certificate of loss of nationality of the US.
● October 2012 - Grace filed her COC for Senator wherein she answered 6 years and 6 months to the question of period of
● COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10)-year
residence in the PH.
● October 2015 - Petitioner filed her COC for the 2016 Presidential Elections. In her COC she declared that she is a residency requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the PH would be 10 years and 11 months. been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May
● This triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her. 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines.
● Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23 December
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

➔ Petitions filed against her are basically petitions for Citizenship

quo warranto as they focus on establishing her ELAMPARO: Petitioner committed material misrepresentation RULING
NO. The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of before the 2016 elections, is true.
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National ➔ The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines before the day of the
Elections. elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the
Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the
FOUNDLING STATUS Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in these
➔ The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE. cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
➔ there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. ➔ Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to
➔ Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that the Philippines for good.
her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are ➔ As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of
Filipinos. residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which
◆ Majority of the population in Iloilo at the time she was born were FIlipinos. was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised
◆ She was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
◆ All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President of the Republic, the
municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from
than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample root to fruits.
probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos.
➔ As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. The deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
➔ Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption
confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
➔ Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.
◆ UDHR → right to nationality
◆ UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
◆ ICCPR → every child shall have a nationality
➔ The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and
ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the
application of our present naturalization laws.
➔ Unratified, but generally accepted principles:
◆ Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under
which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth.”
◆ UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness → a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found.
➔ Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law. In
particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of
them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues
passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting
through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
➔ The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of
the Philippines.

REPATRIATION
➔ The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that natural-born
citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in
line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree
that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with
the Congress' determination.
➔ COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET where the
phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship.

RESIDENCY
➔ Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016
elections, is true.Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day
 ○ On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with
[14] Tecson v. Lim Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G.R. No. 161824,
Topic: Tenure in office, election, terms of office likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that
would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
● The other petitions, later consolidated with G.R. No. 161824, would include G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
SUMMARY Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. 'Fernando Poe, Jr.'), and
Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G.R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, otherwise known as FPJ, filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Philippines. He a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
represented himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner Victorino X. Fornier initiated a petition to disqualify FPJ Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to
on the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural born Filipino citizen resolve the basic issue on the case.
when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan
Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and
to have the COMELEC deny due course or to cancel FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact
(i.e.,that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code in PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the OEC and in relation to Article 69 of the OEC. The
other petitions in this consolidated petition also challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and assert that only the Supreme Court Petitioners Tecson, et al.,in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue (i.e., citizenship) on the case. the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

DOCTRINE "The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly
brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held. Petitioner Fornier invoked the following provisions, all from the Omnibus Election Code:

"Section 78.Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.— A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
ISSUE:
1. W/N The Court possesses the jurisdiction to try a case questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency required under Section 74 hereof is false"
or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
2. W/N The Court possesses the jurisdiction to review decisions of the COMELEC regarding disqualification cases. "Section 52.Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections"

FACTS
In relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
● On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President in the forthcoming national elections, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. RULING — ISSUE #1
● Victorino X. Fornier, filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born NO. The primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. → docketed as Petitioners Tecson, et al.,in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of
SPA No. 04-003 the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the
● Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions — first, Allan F. Poe contracted a Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent. "The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
● The COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc.
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any "Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from
tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such
the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory lower courts as may be established by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution. involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election
protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e.,to dislodge the winning It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of, by
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a
promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise — proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.

"Rule 12. Jurisdiction.— The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

"Rule 13. How Initiated.— An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto.A petition for quo
warranto shall not include an election protest.

"Rule 14. Election Protest.— Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by
filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of
the winner."

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the "President" or "Vice-President",of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who
would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a
post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would
not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.

Accordingly, G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al.,vs. Commission on Elections, et al.," and G.R. No. 161634, entitled
"Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

RULING — ISSUE #2

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads:
 Constitution.
[15] MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

RULING
SUMMARY
NO. The petitioner’s arguments fail to elucidate on the scope of the rules the Supreme Court is allowed to promulgate. The concept of
This is a petition filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an this adjunct of judicial power is very restrictive. In this case, the well-settled principles of constitutional construction were used as a
illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4 (7) of Article 7 of the Constitution. In his petition to declare the establishment of the PET guide.
unconstitutional, Atty. Macalintal invoked the Supreme Court’s ruling on the unconstitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission 1. Verba Legis — it dictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
(PTC). He stated therein that if the President cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court cannot likewise create the PET in the absence except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
of an act of legislature. 2. Ratio legis et anima — where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers.
3. Ut magis valeat quam pereat — the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
The Court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather
DOCTRINE than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an “awesome” task, includes the means On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET. But neither does it preclude, much
necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. less prohibit, otherwise. It entertains divergent interpretations.

The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of The Supreme Court's constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving our country's highest public officials,
the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department. and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise
thereof.

The exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the rule- making power adjunct
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitution of PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional and violates Section 4 (7) thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner would interpret it.
of Article 7 and Section 12 of Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution. — NO. ➔ The establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential
context of the PET in the country cannot be denied.
➔ Hence, Article 7, Section 4 (7) of the Constitution is an innovation.
FACTS ★ The precursors of the present Constitution did not contain similar provisions and instead vested upon the
legislature all phases of presidential and vice-presidential elections. Unless the legislature enacted a law creating
Atty. Romulo Macalintal filed a petition questioning the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and an institution that would hear election contests in the Presidential and Vice-Presidential race, a defeated
unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article 7 of the Constitution. While Atty. Macalintal concedes that the Supreme Court is “authorized candidate had no legal right to demand a recount of the votes cast for the office involved or to challenge the
to promulgate its rules for the purpose,” he chafes at the creation of a “separate tribunal” complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a ineligibility of the proclaimed candidate.
set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate. ➔ Presidential and vice presidential contests were non-justiciable.

Atty. Macalintal’s averment is supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of Presidential Electoral Tribunal (refer to the provisions APPLICATION TO THE CASE
table). The petitioner acknowledged that the invoked constitutional provision does allow the “appointment of additional personnel.”
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an “awesome" task, includes the means
Furthermore, the petitioner highlights the decision in Buac v. COMELEC, which declared that necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.
“Contests involving the President and the Vice President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET in the exercise
of quasi-judicial power.” We cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant
experience, is not unwarranted.
Macalintal reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members ➔ A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the Constitution readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme
thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article 8 of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of Court sitting en banc.
other courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. ➔ In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative
of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
provision for the Supreme Court “to promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
(1) That he has legal standing to file the petition given his averment of transcendental importance of the issues raised therein;
(2) That the creation of the PET, a separate tribunal from the Supreme Court, violates Section 4, Article 7 of the Constitution; The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral
and tribunals of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of
(3) That the PET, being a separate tribunal, exercises quasi-judicial functions contrary to Section 12, Article 8 of the Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
 ➔ The different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are constitutional bodies, independent of
the three departments of government — Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary — but not separate therefrom.
➔ They are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary;
but they are constitutional bodies.
➔ The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It
is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully
complies — not unlawfully defies — the constitutional directive.
➔ The COMELEC, HRET, and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are,
nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power.

The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND JURISPRUDENCE

Article 7, Section 4 of the Constitution:

“The Supreme Court, sitting in en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

Article 8, Section 12 of the Constitution:

“The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.”

2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules):

(1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices are designated as
"Chairman and Members," respectively;
(2) Rule 8 (e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees and confidential employees of every member
thereof;
(3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of the Tribunal" with the appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy
Clerk of the Tribunal who, at the discretion of the PET, may designate the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the
Tribunal; and
(4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct from the Supreme Court seal.

Tecson v. COMELEC
“The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests while concurrently
acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.”