The Nanjing Massacre and The Traumatic Memory of Nanjing Residents
The Nanjing Massacre and The Traumatic Memory of Nanjing Residents
Zhang Lianhong
To cite this article: Zhang Lianhong (2017) The Nanjing Massacre and the traumatic
memory of Nanjing residents, Chinese Studies in History, 50:4, 258-265, DOI:
10.1080/00094633.2017.1404785
none defined
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The Nanjing Massacre of 1937 is a historical tragedy that is hard to erase from Nanjing Massacre; Nanjing
the collective memory of Nanjing residents. Since 1982, the Nanjing Massacre residents; survivors;
Memorial Hall and other monuments have been established as a Chinese traumatic memory
response to the Japanese revision of their high school history textbooks, and
these facilities have opened a mnemonic channel for the Nanjing people to
link history to reality. In the Nanjing people’s traumatic memory, the historical
facts of the Nanjing Massacre of the contemporary nationalistic sentiments
are entangled and symbiotic. Many survivors have profound factual memory
of the massacre, yet they have shown tolerance and forgiveness to the
victimizers. While their memory has transcended the primitive stage of
retaliation, the traumatic memory of mankind should be transformed into
invaluable resource of the human endeavor to pursue peace.
Since the 1980s, with the abrupt debacle of the Cold War international order after World War II,
distinct memories and interpretations of wartime trauma have gradually evolved into a large
hindrance between the aggressor nation and the victims in the invaded or colonized nations. The
search for a common wartime memory has been an important topic that concerns people from all
walks of society. Nevertheless, due to the different war experiences of people on both sides of the
war and the impacts of the Cold War and nationalist sentiments, the Chinese and the Japanese have
developed distinct memories of war atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre. Apparently, seeking the
common traumatic memory inflict by the Sino-Japanese War has become the key to the construction
of the two countries’ friendship.
In the last several years, I have been conducting questionnaire-based surveys and interviews
centering on the Nanjing Massacre’s social psychological impact on Nanjing residents, and the topics
have covered the factual cognition and emotional memory of the massacre. Based on the empirical
study, in the present article I attempt to discuss the traumatic memory of the Nanjing people from
the perspective of the victims.
Zhang Lianhong is a professor at the Research Center for the Nanjing Massacre, Nanjing Normal University.
Translation © 2017 Taylor & Francis, Inc., from the Chinese text “Nanjing datusha yu Nanjing shimin de chuangshang jiyi” by Guo Wu.
Originally published in Jianghai xuekan [Jianghai academic journal], 2003, 1.
© 2017 Taylor & Francis
CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 259
Western Blocs were in Cold War standoff, the Chinese government advocated Sino-Japanese
rapprochement to counterbalance the pressure of both camps, and the effort was also influenced
by the ultra-leftist ideology of the People’s Republic of China in the 1950s and 1960s. As a result,
the Nanjing people’s memory of the massacre was suppressed by the political forces in the Maoist era.2
After the news about the Japanese revision of history textbook in 1982 reached China, the Japanese
denial of the aggressive nature of the Sino-Japanese war and the historicity of the Nanjing Massacre
enraged Nanjing people, who wrote to the municipal government and news media, urging the
government to establish museums and monuments and write history “for the sake of history as well
as future; for the Nanjing people, the Chinese people, and all peace-loving people around the world.”
In the letter, Nanjing citizen Gong Shiming asked, “In order to let our children have a better
sense about what invasion and enslavement mean, why can’t Nanjing start building museum and
monument as soon as possible?” He went on to say, “This is not only for the commemoration of
the dead, but also, and more importantly, for future generations not to oblivious of the past.”3
In response to the citizens’ demand, Jiangsu provincial government and Nanjing municipal govern-
ment endorsed the series of projects of museum-building, monument erection, and historical writing
in October 1983. On December 13 that same year, at the 46th anniversary of the fall of Nanjing in 1937,
local people went to the site of massacre, Jiangdongmen, to witness the groundbreaking ceremony of
the Massacre Memorial Hall, which was completed ahead of schedule on August 15, 1985, the 40th
anniversary of the Japanese surrender, and open to the public as a venue for preserving public memory.
In the meanwhile, the Nanjing municipal government erected 13 monuments in various massacre sites
in the suburbs of Nanjing, and later, four additional monuments were added. The channel that could
drain the flow of traumatic memory was finally constructed after the forceful advocacy of Nanjing
residents, who were provoked by the remarks of some Japanese who denied historical facts.
Since its completion, the Massacre Memorial Hall has served as an indispensable channel where
historical memory and reality meet, in addition to as a site for mourning and commemoration. Every
Qingming festival when the Chinese sweep the graves of their ancestors, many Nanjing people,
particularly the massacre survivors, would go to the Memorial Hall to present flowers. One survivor
named Tang Shunshan rode his tricycle to go to the Hall to put wreath every year. Every year on
December 13, the provincial and municipal governments hold grand mourning ceremonies. According
to statistics, the Memorial Hall receives an average of 500,000 visitors per year and the number of
visitors was around 10 million in 18 years since its opening. In a questionnaire survey I conducted
November 13, 2001, 105 of 408 interviewed Nanjing residents had visited the Memorial Hall once
and 122 had been there more than once. According this ratio, it is arguable that more than half of
Nanjing residents have been to the Memorial Hall at least once. In addition to the Memorial Hall,
the monuments scattering around the city were anther memory channel. Among the 408 interviewed
Nanjing residents, 107 could name one memorial monument, 65 could name two, and 87 (21.3% of the
total) could name none. The result shows that nearly 80% of the Nanjing residents knew the Nanjing
Massacre monuments. In this city, the Memorial Hall and multiple monuments as sites of public
memory can take you to the depth of its historical trauma.
Besides physical memorial buildings, many cultural factors may also invigorate the traumatic
memory of Nanjing people and thus open the mnemonic channel. These instances include Japanese
right-wing politicians’ repeated denial of Nanjing Massacre, Japanese leaders’ paying tribute to the
Yasukuni Shrine, the lawsuits of Azuma Shiro 東史郎 and Li Xiuying李秀英, and the discovery of
the diaries of John Rabe. As a matter of fact, any contemporary event pertinent to Nanjing Massacre
or the Japanese militarism, large or small, would touch the nerve of the Nanjing people. In their
traumatic memories, historical facts and contemporary nationalistic sentiments are entangled.
molecular biology.4 Applying this theory to the analysis of traumatic memory, I would think the
narrative memory indicates self-conscious memory of historical facts, whereas non-narrative memory
may be understood as subconscious, emotional memory. In other words, the historical-factual
memory and the emotional memory are the two inseparable components that cannot be mutually
supplanted in traumatic memory. Yet, how have changing times and the influence of national
emotions and state policies shaped the Nanjing people’s emotional and historical memories of the
Nanjing Massacre?
The Nanjing people’s response to the lawsuit against Azuma Shiro was a viable case to examine
their emotional memory of the massacre. The core dispute of the lawsuit concerns the truth of the
Japanese troops’ slaughtering of the Chinese civilians during the Nanjing Massacre. To testify the
Hashimoto method of mass killing, Nanjing residents provided many material evidences. For
instance, to prove the existence of a pond in front of the Supreme Court, Nanjing people came up
with more than 60 old maps. They put tremendous energy in assisting Azuma Shiro to win the
lawsuit, and more than 60,000 people signed their names on the banner of petition.5 Nanjing
residents used various ways to show their support. A retired worker living near Guanghuamen, where
the fiercest Chinese resistance occurred in 1937, named Zhang Huaicheng 张怀成, donated his
invaluable source materials, which he had been collecting for years, to the Nanjing Massacre Research
Center at Nanjing Normal University. Pointing to a Japanese magazine named Sina 支那 that
published the poems of the Japanese general Matsui Iwane 松井石根, the main culprit of the Nanjing
Massacre, Zhang said the researchers at the research center that “I am not good at writing, but I
would like to give you the source materials that I have collected. I hope you specialists can write
articles to support Azuma Shiro.” A woman with the surname Shi, who used to work in the Dongda
Group Co., Zhuhai City, willingly provided her office building to the research center for free use,
and she herself volunteered to assist the center. Another retired old man, Li Enxiang 李恩相 from
Longpao Township, Liuhe County, wrote a long letter to the center, sharing his thoughts on the
prospectus of the Azuma Shiro case and the Chinese strategy of assistance. In the letter, Li said,
“As a retired old man, I was irritated by Azuma Shiro’s loss of the case at the Tokyo High Court.
I want to write up some suggestions for your reference. Because I cannot calm down, I cannot help
but to write excessively. Please forgive me.”6
To gain a comprehensive and unbiased understanding of the Nanjing people’s emotional reactions
to the Azuma Shiro case, I organized a group of college students to conduct a questionnaire survey to
them in January 1999. The survey was extensive, with 20 students and some professional researchers
divided into 12 investigation teams, and they reached out to the main street neighborhoods,
communities, public facilities, factories, and government buildings in the six metropolitan districts
of Nanjing. The survey distributed 480 questionnaires and collected 444 valid answers. With a high
degree of representativeness, the survey accurately reflects the Nanjing people’s historical knowledge
and emotional reaction to the Azuma Shiro case.7
The results of the survey reveal that Nanjing people mainly relied on TV, newspaper, and radio to
acquire the information about the “Azuma Shiro case,” and 56 respondents had fairly good under-
standing of the incident, 251 had basic information about what had happened, and 85 responded
by saying that they heard of it but did not know much about it. The sum of the three groups comes
to 395, making up 88.95% of the total respondents. Forty-nine respondents had zero knowledge about
the Azuma Shiro case, making up 11.05% of the total. In terms of emotional response, 91.6% of the
395 respondents demonstrated their anger, and 90.6% agreed that the decision of the Tokyo High
Court against Azuma Shiro was unfair. When answering the question that “What is your attitude
towards Azuma Shiro’s appeal to the Tokyo Supreme Court,” 90.6% of the respondents were support-
ive, and only 21 people said they did not care. To the question about the prospect of the appeal, 23.7%
believed that Azuma Shiro would lose, 40.8% thought he would win, and 30.5% thought the court
would adjourn the case on purpose. When it came to the reason why Azuma Shiro might lose, the
most-selected answer was that “Japan’s Tokyo court will not make a fair decision,” and the second
most-selected answer was that “The Chinese government and the Chinese people have not exerted
CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 261
sufficient influence.” Among the answers to the question about why Azuma Shiro had chance to win,
that “Azuma Shiro presented solid evidence” was the first choice and “The Chinese government and
the Chinese people have exerted sufficient influence” was the second choice. The choice that received
the third highest votes was “Tokyo Court will make fair decision.” Among the investigated Nanjing
residents, 84.2% clearly said that they were very concerned about how the case would be finally judged
by the Tokyo Supreme Court.8
Soon after Tokyo Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Azuma Shiro, Japanese right-wing
groups held their assembly in Osaka in January 23, 2000, claiming the “the Nanjing Massacre us
the biggest lie of the 20th century.” On April 3, 2001, Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology endorsed the history textbook compiled by right-wing groups, which was
followed by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s 小泉纯一郎 paying tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine.
All these enhanced Nanjing people’s emotional memory of the massacre. On December 13, 2001, the
64th anniversary of the massacre, I conducted another survey. This time a total of 420 questionnaires
were distributed and 408 valid questionnaires were received.9 The goal of the survey was to investigate
the Nanjing people’s understanding of the historical facts of the massacre, as well as their emotional
memories.
The results of the survey illustrate that regarding historical facts, 210 respondents were able to
accurately point out the year when the massacre broke out (i.e., 1937), constituting 51.5% of the total.
Eighty-seven people did not know the time of the occurrence of the massacre and 95 knew it
happened decades ago. There were 300 respondents (i.e., 73.5% of the total respondents) knew that
the victims were numbered over 300,000, and 63 said they were unclear about the number. Twelve
people said there were hundreds and thousands of victims and 13 indicated that the number exceeded
400,000. There were 344 respondents who said they knew that there were a lot of Japanese who still
refuse to admit the existence of the massacre, and 58 said they did not know the situation in Japan,
making up 14.2% of the total. As for interest in further pursuing the historical facts about the Nanjing
massacre, 321 respondents said they were willing to know more, making up 78.7% of the total; 65 said
they did not care, and 14 said they were unwilling to know. Regarding the purpose of the memorial
siren on December 13, starting from 1997, 306 respondents knew this was for memorial purposes,
making up 75.0%, and there were 73 people who said they knew nothing about it. Ten respondents
listed other reasons.
In terms of the emotional memory, 216 respondents were uncomfortable about holding wedding
ceremony and grand opening on December 13, the day when Nanjing fell to the Japanese army,
making up 52.9% of the total; 126 people were neutral; and 39 said they were not against it. There
were 171 people, or 41.9% of the total, who said that they would think of the Nanjing Massacre when
they saw Japanese tourist groups in Nanjing; 87 people said they never paid attention to this issue at
all; and 137 said they would not relate Japanese tourists to the Nanjing Massacre. When it comes to
the purchase and use of Japanese goods, 77 respondents said they would associate the goods with the
massacre, 82 said sometimes they would, and 232, or 56.8%, said they would not or they paid no
attention to the connection. For Nanjing’s use of a siren to commemorate the victims, 367 respon-
dents, or 90.0%, said they supported this way; 17 disapproved; and 15 did not care. It is notable that
346 respondents, or 84.8% of the total, said they did not have massacre victims among their families
or relatives. Fifty people, of 12.3%, said they had families or relatives who were killed during the
massacre, and other were uncertain.
The data gleaned from the previously mentioned two surveys revealed the current condition of the
Nanjing people’s emotional and factual memories of the Nanjing Massacre. To be sure, it was also
found from the survey that the variables such as age, educational level, gender, occupation, and dur-
ation of residence in Nanjing all contributed to the different memories among the respondents. For
instance, in the survey about the Azuma Shiro case, conducted in January, 1999, 49 respondents
answered “I don’t know,” and they were mainly 15 students who were under 20 years old and eight
old people above 60 years old who were nearly illiterate. Elementary and middle school students did
not have much time to read newspaper and watch TV due to heavy course load, and subsequently
262 ZHANG LIANHONG
their understanding of the suit was very limited. Moreover, my engagement with massacre survivors
suggests that the traumatic memory of them was distinct from those who did not have the real-life
experience of it.
experience during the massacre, which he had never done before. He said, “I had ten people in my
household, and seven died in the massacre. I had not brought this up for a long period, because it
made me painful. In 1997, after I watched from TV that some Japanese denied the existence of the
massacre, I couldn’t stand it anymore, so I went to the Memorial Hall by myself and told the staff
my experience.”15
To be sure, not all survivors were willing to share their traumatic memory with researchers who
were collecting source materials, and not even their families. They even hoped that the nightmarish
past could be wiped out of their memory forever, and they did not allow anyone to touch their already
fragile nerves. While conducting interviews, I also had quite a few experiences of being rejected. It was
true that some victims were trying to eschew any catalyst that might trigger their traumatic memory.
For them, the historical facts were solid, and they were infuriated by the denial of facts, but when they
faced the visiting Japanese youths, their only hope was that these Japanese young people could help
spread the truth of the massacre to more Japanese.
Conclusion
The Nanjing Massacre committed by the Japanese army was one of the most notorious mass killing of
civilians in human history. It was not only an incurable pain in the heart of the Nanjing people but
also a shame of human history. In Nanjing, the channel toward the traumatic memory has been
readily open, and any incident relevant to the massacre could generate strong repercussion among
its residents. In March 1995, after Nanjing municipal government advocated the one-yuan-per-
person donation to support the phase II construction of the Memorial Hall, Nanjing residents
responded with enthusiasm. Within one month, 1 million people had participated, and the total
amount of fundraising had reached 1.6 million Yuan. In December 2000, when Shengdao Hotel
was planning to remove the massacre monument at Zhengjue Temple, it was boycotted by the resi-
dents and their decision was strongly protested. In March 2002, the proposed renaming of the Nanjing
Massacre Memorial Hall (translator’s note: into “Nanjing International Peace Center, China”) met
with strong opposition from the Nanjing people. As a vital site of public memory, the Memorial Hall
and numerous massacre monuments have already become emotional sustenance of the Nanjing
people, who turn to these sacred spaces to mourn the dead and to heal their psychological wounds.
My investigation demonstrates that with time passing by, the Nanjing people’s memory of the
massacre has surpassed the stage of seeking revenge, which has been replaced by an awareness of
introspection and self-strengthening based on the notion that “backwardness invites humiliation.”
Since the 1950s, the opinion that “it was the Japanese militarists waged the war, not the Japanese
people, who were also victims of the war” has been entrenched in the Chinese consciousness. In
the caption of the images in the museum and the text inscribed on the monuments, phrases such
as “the past not forgotten can serve as the lesson for the present,” “use history as a mirror to face
the future,” and “strive hard to revive China” appear frequently. Even in the emotional memory of
the victims, forgiveness overruled hatred. Most of the survivors share the wish that the Japanese
government and the Japanese people could fully realize what exactly happened and act to preclude
the recurrence of historical tragedy. It is evident that anti-Japanese sentiment was not the mainstream
mentality of the interviewed survivors.
Nevertheless, some activists inside Japan perceive the public memorial site such as Nanjing
Massacre Memorial Hall with their narrow nationalistic view. They see the display of the photos
about the Japanese killing of Chinese civilians as anti-Japanese political propaganda, and the
Memorial Hall as “important facility for anti-Japanese brainwashing.” In July 2002, the prefectural
council of Kagoshima passed a bill that prohibits Japanese students from visiting Nanjing Massacre
Memorial Hall if they take a China tour.16 Nowadays, when the East Asian political structure is being
rebuilt with the end of the Cold War, the mutual understanding of the past and the search for
common historical memory has become a crucial factor that affects the future direction of the
Sino-Japanese relations.
264 ZHANG LIANHONG
Nearly a century has passed since the occurrence of the massacre in Nanjing; however, the Nanjing
Massacre has not disappeared, and will never fade away from the Nanjing people’s memory. To be
sure, this bitter history not only belongs to Nanjing residents, but also to the Chinese and the Japanese
peoples. The entire world has many things to learn from it. The human society, in particular the
Japanese people, should join Nanjing residents in perceiving the war atrocities as the shared shame
of mankind, but more importantly, we should endeavor to transform the trauma in the human past
to a common asset that points to the future peaceful coexistence of the nations.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Professor Sun Zhaiwei for his suggestions for conducting research and completing this article.
Notes
1. See Mingni Weitelin [Minnie Vautrin], Diary of Weitelin (Weitelin riji). Translated by Nanjing Normal University
Center for the Study of Nanjing Massacre (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2000), 534–717.
2. See Tokushi Kasahara, Nanjing Incident and the Japanese (Nankin jiken to nihonjin: Sensō no kioku o meguru
nashonarizumu to gurōbarizumu) (Tokyo: Kashiwashobo Publishing, 2002), 232–233.
3. Sun Zhaiwei, Nanjing Massacre (Nanjing dashusha) (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1997), 639–640.
4. Shikuier, Kendaier, Toushi jishi (Memory: From Mind to Molecules). Translated by Hong Lan (Taipei: Yuanliu
chuban gufen youxian gongsi, 2001), 53. The narrative memory is the memory of facts, ideas, and events, which
can be expressed by speech and visualization. While the non-narrative memory is also empirical, it is expressed not
by recalling but by behavioral change. The latter is considered as subconscious.
5. Zhu Chengshan, Yamauchi Sayoko eds., Dongshilang riji an tuji (Album of the Azuma Shiro Case) (Beijing: Xinhua
chubanshe, 2000), 142–179.
6. “Li Enxiang zhi Nanjing shifan daxue Nanjing datusha yanjiu zhongxin de xin” (Li Enxiang’s Letter’s the Nanjing
Massacre Research Center at Nanjing Normal University), dated January 16, 1999, archived in the Center.
7. The respondents included workers; students; civil servants; educational, academic, and medical personnel; social
service workers; military personnel; and retirees. Among them were 89 students, 57 civil servants, 117 workers,
63 educational and medical workers, 9 soldiers and officers, 31 self-employed people, 33 service providers, and
44 engaged in other unspecified industries. The age of the respondents varied: 59 people were under 20 years
old, 120 were between 20 and 30 years old; 86 were between 31 and 40 years old, 70 were between 41 and 50 years
old, 51 were between 51 and 60 years old, and 58 were above 60 years old. The educational level of the respondents
was put into four categories: 34 of them had received elementary school education or were illiterate; 96 had
received middle school education, 144 had a high school diploma, and 166 had been to an institution of higher
education. There were two respondents who did not reply to the question about education. In terms of gender
ratio, there were 245 men and 199 women, which can be considered appropriate.
8. Xinhua ribao, Xinhua Daily, January 22, 1999.
9. The respondents included students and workers (white collar and freelance), and the distribution was reasonable.
Among the 408 people, 209 were men and 109 were women. The number of respondents aged between 20 and 40
years old was 193, constituting 47.3% of the total, and 36 were younger than 20 years old, constituting 8.8% of the
total number. There were 93 people who were between 40 and 60 years old, and 86 people were above 60 years old.
In terms of educational level, 156 people received higher education, 97 had high school education, 92 were middle
school graduates, and 61 had elementary school education or were illiterate. One hundred and eighty-five of the
408 respondents identified themselves as Nanjing natives (45%). Among others, 76 said they had been living in
Nanjing for over 20 years, 27 for more than 10 years but less than 20 years, 79 for under 10 years, and 35 for
no more than 10 years. The latest statistics shows that by March 2002, there were 480,000 nonpermanent residents
living in Nanjing. It is notable that some respondents had lived in Nanjing for a brief period.
10. Liaoningsheng dang’an guan (Lianning Provincial Archives), “Mantie dang’an zhong youguan Nanjing datusha
de yizu shiliao, xu (Historical Source Materials Concerning the Nanjing Massacre in the Archives of Southern
Manchuria Railway Co., sequel),” Minguo dang’an (Republican China Archives), no. 3, 1994.
11. This is lack of accurate statistics of the number of the survivors of the Nanjing Massacre. In 1997, Nanjing
Municipal Board of Education and the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall organized more than 10,000 students
to track down and interview the survivors. The students, in the form of summer camps, visited 15 districts and
counties and 153 townships, and interviewed the old people in 29,456 households. They identified 2,630 massacre
survivors, victims, and witnesses. My own follow-up investigation shows that there were still many villages and
street neighborhoods that had not be covered by the students. Thus, the number 2,630 may be seen as a minimum
number.
CHINESE STUDIES IN HISTORY 265