OTC-25273-MS
Industry Survey of Past Failures, Pre-emptive Replacements and Reported
Degradations for Mooring Systems of Floating Production Units
E. Fontaine, A. Kilner, C. Carra, and D. Washington, AMOG Consulting; K.T. Ma, Chevron ETC; A. Phadke,
and D. Laskowski, ConocoPhillips; G. Kusinski, DeepStar®, Chevron ETC.
Copyright 2014, Offshore Technology Conference
This paper was prepared for presentation at the Offshore Technology Conference held in Houston, Texas, USA, 5– 8 May 2014.
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Abstract
The results of an industry survey of mooring line failures are presented and analyzed. The failure data
presented includes geographic location, mooring line composition, prevalent failure modes and the phase
of failure inception. At a component level, cause of failure, location along the line and time to failure are
presented. Failure data suggests that the observed increase in the number of failures is proportional to the
increase of the FPSO population, with the underlying failure rate per mooring line approximately constant
over the last ten years.
Introduction
AMOG Consulting conducted an industry survey of mooring system failures as part of DeepStar® Project
CTR11405. The aim of the industry survey was to identify and characterize the various failures that have
happened in permanent mooring systems, to act as input into the development of guidelines on Mooring
Integrity Management.
Conduct of the Survey
Survey participants included members of the DeepStar® Consortium (www.deepstar.org), together with a
range of other industry operators and contractors. The initial survey campaign, conducted as part of
DeepStar® Project CTR11405, was followed up with a series of face-to-face interviews with subject
matter experts of some survey participants.
The results of the survey were enhanced by the addition of failure data reported in the public domain,
Ma et al (2013), Majhi & D’Souza (2013), Brown et al (2005), UK HSE (2006).
The following failure event definitions were used, and it is noted that the word ‘failure’ is expanded
to include degradation and pre-emptive replacement:
● Single Line Failure Event: An occurrence of the loss of connectivity of a mooring line between
the attachment point on the vessel and the seabed, occurring at a substantially different time to
another single line failure event on that facility. Line failure events could occur during installation
and operation.
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Figure 1—Proportion of ship-shaped FPUs as a function of geographical area
Comparison between full fleet population of 178 (left) and survey population of 55 (right)
● Multiple Line Failure Event: Failure of multiple lines, including adjacent lines, occurring at or
around the same point in time.
● Pre-emptive Replacement Event: The replacement and/or repair of components in one or more
mooring lines as a result of observed degradation indicating a substantial loss of component
residual capacity. For example, a number of facilities have had severely corroded mooring chain
segments replaced prior to an actual line failure event occurring.
● Reported Degradation: A number of the survey respondents included occurrences of anomalies
recently identified through planned inspections where significant degradation was observed,
however remediation actions were still under evaluation at the time of the survey response, or the
decision was made to monitor the condition of the degraded component.
Surveyed Population / Sample Characteristics
A total of 10 operators / FPSO leasing contractors, responded to the survey, reporting a total of 61
individual failures on 43 specific units. The reported failures were associated with permanent mooring
systems of FPSOs, FSOs, Semi-submersibles, Spars and CALM Buoys. The addition of failure data drawn
from the public domain increases the sample to 107 reported failures from 73 assets (51 single line failure
events, 9 multiple line failure events, 38 pre-emptive replacement events and 9 reports of degradation).
Of the 73 assets identified by the survey and follow up literature review, 55 are “ship-shaped”, i.e.
FPSOs, FSOs or FGSOs. This paper reports that subset of the data relating to ship-shaped floating system
moorings. For comparison, data on the worldwide FPSO fleet was drawn from the 2012 Worldwide
Survey of FPSO Units, conducted by Wood Group Mustang, with a total of 178 vessels. Figure 1, shows
the geographic distribution of ship-shaped Floating Production Units (FPUs) for both the worldwide fleet
(left) and the sample (right). Figure 1 shows the survey data over-represents West Africa and the North
Sea, whilst Brazil and Asia are under-represented, as compared to the full population.
For each geographical area, Figure 2 presents the incidences of failure events, pre-emptive replacement
events and reported degradation. Figure 2 shows the North Sea has the highest number of reported failures,
as well as the highest number of reported failures relative to the number of ship-shaped FPUs in the
region. West Africa had the second highest failure rate relative to the number of facilities in the region,
as well as the highest pre-emptive replacement rate. The lower number of recorded failure and replace-
ment events in Brazil and Asia suggests an under reporting of failures in these areas, within this survey.
Figure 3 shows FPU’s by water depth, for both the worldwide fleet (left) and the sample (right).
Shallow water corresponds to water depths less than 100 m, intermediate between 100 and 350 m, deep
OTC-25273-MS 3
Figure 2—Reported incidences of failure and replacement events identified for ship-shaped FPUs by location
Figure 3—Proportion of ship-shaped FPUs as a function of water depth
Comparison between full fleet population (left) and survey population (right)
water between 350 and 1000 m and ultra deep water greater than 1000 m. Figure 3 shows the survey
contains a higher proportion of intermediate and deep water responses, and a lower proportion of
ultra-deep and shallow responses, as compared to the worldwide FPSO fleet.
Figure 4 shows mooring system type for both the worldwide fleet (left) and the sample (right). Figure
4 shows that the internal turret category is over represented in the survey data, as compared to the full
population. Otherwise the sample is representative of the FPSO Fleet for other mooring system types.
Analysis of Survey Failure Data
Figure 5 shows reported events by type, with single line failures the most represented category (42%),
closely followed by pre-emptive replacement (39%). The mooring engineer’s nightmare, multiple line
failures, represented 8% of the reported events. Figure 6 shows the effect of reported failures on
production, with 19% of failures leading to production shutdown. If the 48% of failure events with an
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Figure 4 —Proportion of ship-shaped FPUs as a function of mooring configuration
Comparison between full fleet population (left) and survey population (right)
Figure 5—Failure event type
Figure 6 —Effect of failure events on production
unknown production effect were allocated proportionately, around one third of failure events would lead
to production shut down. If only the DeepStar® FPSO survey results are considered, then 14 events
resulted in production shutdown whilst 27 events did not (with 6 unspecified). All multiple line failure
events resulted in production shutdown, whilst a third of single line failure events and a fifth of
pre-emptive replacement events resulted in production shutdown.
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Figure 7—Root cause of failure
Figure 8 —Proportion of failure associated to each project phase
Figure 7 shows causation for the reported failure events. The most prevalent reported causes of failure
were fatigue and corrosion, which together represent 45% of failures. Installation failures represent 16%,
with the residual comprising mechanical damage, design issues, manufacturing defects, overload and
unknown/unreported.
Figure 8 sets out the phase of the mooring system lifecycle most likely associated with failure
inception, 19% of the reported failures were due to design causes, with another 22% due to installation
causes, 6% due to construction/manufacturing causes, 49% due to damage sustained, or maintenance
failures, during operations and the remaining 4% unknown.
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Figure 9 —Failures by component type versus reported mooring line make up
Figure 10 —Component types associated with single line failure events
The raw survey responses were not always definitive with respect to the phase of the mooring’s
lifecycle in which the error/action causing the failure occurred. It is likely that the operations phase may
be over-represented in this regard as this phase was chosen for all cases where there was an absence of
definitive evidence that the failure was related to other phases.
Figure 9 shows the mooring component reported as failing or being replaced (left) and the survey
mooring line composition (right). Figure 9 shows that chain sections are the most reported failed/replaced
component, with 46% of failure events being associated with chain sections. Chain is also the most
represented component in the reported mooring systems, being present in at least 76% of the surveyed
systems. Failures associated with wire rope accounted for 31%, which is represented in at least 47% of
reported systems, and therefore proportionately more likely to be associated with mooring failure. This is
unsurprising as wire rope is more easily damaged during installation than chain (e.g. bird caging or
kinking due to compression or over-bending). Connectors were associated with 6% of reported failures.
Given such components are present in all mooring systems, connectors and other such elements are
proportionately less likely to be associated with a failure than either wire rope or chain.
Figure 10 through Figure 13 show the breakdown of component type associated with single-line failure,
multi-line failure, pre-emptive replacement and degradation. Based on Figure 10 and 11, single line failure
events are mostly due to chain (54%), while multiple line failure was dominated by steel wire rope (60%)
rather than by chain (13%). It is interesting to observe a similar pattern for Figure 12 and 13, where
pre-emptive replacements were mostly for chain (58%) and degradation were mostly reported from wire
rope (57%).
OTC-25273-MS 7
Figure 11—Component types associated with multiple line failure events
Figure 12—Component types associated with pre-emptive replacement events
Figure 13—Component types associated with reported degradation events
Figure 14 shows the prevalent failure modes for chain and wire. Chain failures were dominated by
corrosion and fatigue. Wire rope failures were dominated by damage during installation. The significant
difference in event based (installation damage, mechanical damage, extreme loading) and time based
(corrosion, fatigue) failure modes between chain and wire rope suggests that there may be an opportunity
to optimize the types of control measures employed at the appropriate lifecycle phases such that these
threats can be eliminated or reduced, as well providing the opportunity for optimizing the inspection
regimes that mooring components utilizing these components are subject to. All reported polyester failures
were caused by mechanical damage during operations as a result of unintended contact.
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Figure 14 —Cause of failure events for chain links (left) and wire rope (right)
Figure 15—Failure event location by component type
Figure 15 shows the reported location of failure events (within the mooring system) for each
component type. Almost half of the reported chain failures occurred in the upper sections and at the chain
stopper/fairlead in particular. This indicates that the behavior of chain links in this region should be
carefully evaluated during design, in order to minimize the risk of failure. Wire rope failures were most
prevalent at the terminations. This indicates that local behavior at mass/stiffness discontinuities at wire
terminations should be carefully evaluated during design, in order to reduce the risk of failure.
The reported polyester failures occurred mid-line and as noted above were due to contact with the
mooring line by a dropped or dragged object.
Figure 16 shows component age at failure. Installation failures (12%) are plotted using an age equal
to zero. Infant mortality, an issue highlighted by Ma et al (2013), can be clearly observed, with 25% of
reported failures occurring in the first 3 years after installation. The trend would be even clearer if
degradation and pre-emptive replacement were excluded from the chart. The observed peaks in failures
OTC-25273-MS 9
Figure 16 —Number of failures and pre-emptive replacements along component age
Figure 17—Number of failure events by chronicle year, exluding pre-emptively replaced/repaired
after 5 and 9 years are likely to correlate with programmed inspection activities, thereby revealing failures
that may have been present for some time. Of note is that 95% of failures occur before 18 years, with 90%
occurring before 13 years. With fatigue and corrosion being the prevalent degradation mechanisms, and
a typical mooring design life being 15–20 years, this suggests that the current industry practices can be
improved, to better address the management of mooring integrity.
Figure 17 shows the number of reported single and multiple line failure events in each year between
1997 and 2013, where such information was available. The number of individual mooring legs suffering
a failure or requiring pre-emptive replacement or repair is presented over the same period in Figure 18.
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Figure 18 —Number of individual mooring legs failed or pre-emptively replaced/repaired by year
Figure 19 —Total number of FPSO vessels by year
Of note is the increasing number of lines requiring refurbishment, which may be a direct result of the
increased focus on mooring integrity issues particularly over the last couple of years, as well as with life
extension of existing units. The pre-emptive replacements also had a high proportion of common mode
mechanisms acting across a number of lines (for example excessive corrosion of splash zone chain links
on a number of mooring legs). The corresponding cumulative number of ship-shaped FPUs composing the
worldwide fleet is shown in Figure 19.
In order to develop a base failure frequency per mooring line year, the cumulative number of exposed
mooring line years for the worldwide fleet has been calculated. By the end of 2013, the ship-hull FPU fleet
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Figure 20 —Cumulative failure events versus number of mooring leg exposure years per year since 1997
Figure 21—Single line annual failure rate per line by each year
has in total approximately 16, 000 mooring line years of exposure. Figure 20 plots both the cumulative
number of mooring failures and exposed mooring line years. Figure 20 shows that the cumulative number
of failures is approximately proportional to the number of exposed mooring line years, whereby the
increase in the number of failures that has been observed over the last ten years can be explained by the
increase in the fleet population.
An annualized failure frequency (per mooring line per year) can be obtained by counting the
cumulative failures by a given year and the cumulative number of exposed mooring line leg years to the
same point. Figure 21 shows that the failure frequency (per mooring line per year) has been nearly
constant over the last ten years. The annual rate of single line failure is of the order of 2.5 ⫻10–3 per
mooring line per year (or 2.1 ⫻10–2 per facility per year). Based on the survey results, the conditional
probability of one or more additional lines failing given that a single line has already failed was of the
order of 1/6, resulting in an annual probability of multiple line failure of ⬇3.5 ⫻10–3 per facility. This rate
is consistent with that derived by Ma et al (2013) and Smedley (2012).
Of note is the relatively high rate of pre-emptive replacement/repair, such that annual rate of an
individual mooring line requiring major refurbishment (pre-emptive replacement or repair as a result of
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Figure 22—Individual line annual refurbishment rate by each year
single or multiple line failure) is more than double the annual rate of single line failure (refer to Figure
22). As many of the pre-emptive replacement events were addressing a common failure mechanism across
a number of mooring lines, this emphasizes the importance of implementing a thorough mooring integrity
management program in order to prevent the occurrence of a multiple line failure event.
Discussion
Past mooring system integrity management practices have been typically based on industry norms and
accepted practice. The survey results presented herein indicate that these past practices have not resulted
in the reliability levels assumed in guidance codes and standards.
Annual failure rates for a single line, based on the survey results, are an order of magnitude higher than
typically assumed in mooring codes. In addition, there is clear evidence that past integrity management
practices have not prevented threats to system integrity, arising from the design, construction/
manufacturing and installation phases, from propagating through to the operations phase.
Effective integrity management requires a more detailed understanding of the failure modes and
degradation mechanisms that may be applicable to each component in the mooring system. This
understanding must take a life-cycle point of view, such that control measures to prevent or mitigate the
effect of these failure modes/degradation mechanisms can be applied at the appropriate stage and their
effectiveness verified. In particular, integrity management must be considered much earlier in the design
process, such that the required control measures can be integrated into the final design outcomes and the
subsequent construction/manufacturing and installation processes. This detailed understanding of failure
modes and degradation mechanisms ultimately flows through into the operations phase, where inspection
activities can be properly specified to verify system condition and the effectiveness of any control
measures being relied upon. The high infant mortality rate underlines the importance of detailed as-built
and as-installed records for both critical components and the overall mooring system.
The survey results confirmed herein the importance of understanding the effect location has on the
failure modes and degradation mechanisms that act upon a mooring component at that location. The
threats to integrity for a chain section are quite different for the chain links located in or next to a chain
stopper or in the thrash zone compared to links in the suspended or ground chain sections of a mooring
leg. Treating all links of a chain section in a similar manner without specific consideration of their location
and associated degradation mechanisms can substantially increase the risk of line failure. The selection of
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particular components at specific locations within a mooring system should be carefully considered, as the
ability to inspect and determine the condition of a component whilst in service may be not be possible
given current technology.
The industry’s understanding of a number of the degradation mechanisms effecting mooring systems
has been significantly advanced in recent times, through JIPs such as the Chain OPB Fatigue JIP and the
SCORCH JIP. The application of this improved understanding of specific degradation mechanisms at the
design phase should decrease the rate of mooring failure, by reducing the risk of these failure modes
propagating into the operations phase or remaining undetected.
Conclusions
Through the auspices of DeepStar® Project CTR11405 Moring Integrity Guidelines Development, a more
detailed survey of mooring system failures has been undertaken. When combined with other public
domain information, failure event data was obtained for 55 ship-shaped floating production units. A more
comprehensive series of survey questions was devised to further explore the degradation mechanisms
associated with the failed components. Actual instances of mooring line failure as well as pre-emptive
replacement of degraded components were considered, with over 80 failure events being identified. Of
these, some 35 single line failure events were reported along with 7 multiple line failure events.
The survey results revealed the following key findings:
● Almost half of all failure events were associated with chain, two-thirds of which were fatigue or
corrosion related.
● Steel wire rope accounted for another third of all failure events, with 40% of these events occurring
during installation.
● The phase at which mooring system integrity threats are introduced, with over half the failure
events being associated with causes arising out of design, construction/manufacturing and instal-
lation phase issues.
● The high infant mortality of systems is confirmed, with over a third of failure events occurring
between installation and the third year of operation.
● Designing for fatigue and corrosion degradation is important, as almost half the failure events are
associated with these mechanisms.
● The component location within the mooring system has a strong influence on the degradation
mechanisms that may act upon that component.
● Mooring integrity management program needs to be properly formulated, as over 35 pre-emptive
replacements have been performed to date, in many instances to address common mode failure
mechanisms.
Most importantly, overall annual rates of multiple line failure were found to be around of 3.5 ⫻10–3
per facility, indicating that there are opportunities for improvements in the application of mooring
integrity practices. Much greater consideration of mooring integrity issues needs to be given during the
design phase, such that any threats to mooring system integrity can be minimized across the entire life
cycle of the facility.
Acknowledgements
This work was funded and performed for DeepStar® Phase XI CTR 11405 Deepwater Technology
Development Project by principal contractor AMOG. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of
the authors and do not represent those of the DeepStar® Consortium (www.deepstar.org) or its partici-
pants. The authors would like to acknowledge the technical guidance and contributions of the DeepStar®
Floating Systems Committee chaired by Paul Devlin and the working committee of CTR 11405,
championed by Amal Phadke, Derrick Laskowski and K.T. Ma and thank DeepStar® for permission to
publish and present the results of the study.
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The authors also would like to acknowledge all the mooring experts that have contributed to the survey
by providing direct information or insight, including K.T. Ma (Chevron), A. Phadke (ConocoPhillips), P.
Smedley (BP), D. L’Hostis (TOTAL), A. Newport (SBM), F. Legerstee (BW Offshore), P. Ferreira
(Maersk Oil), A. Duggal (SOFEC), G. Baxter (Marathon Oil), S. Majhi (KBR), S. Bhattacharjee
(ExxonMobil).
Mr. Kanishka Jayasinghe is acknowledged for his help in data processing and the preparation of the
figures contained within this paper.
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