DOCTRINE: Where estate of deceased persons settled.

– If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional
Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record.

G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA

JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of

Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein

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petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented

by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In
her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when
her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the
legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity
of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition,
it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and
personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of
Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of
the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The
petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his

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death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the
petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in
Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

DECISION OF THE RTC:

In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of

Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The
lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las
Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.

DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28
November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV
No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to
the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that Elise Quiazon
has not shown any interest in the Petition for letters of Administration.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent

is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).

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The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence
in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that
for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus
defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.19

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be

faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement
of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from
the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for
the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

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In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on
the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac
where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death
certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time
of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living
with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to
the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in
1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their
marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of
taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders
untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in
Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports
petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the
trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.21

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008
Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

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DOCTRINE: Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case.

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors

BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out
of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter
or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived

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together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license.

On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's
death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity
or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional
rights.

Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no

cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an
action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

DECISION OF THE RTC:

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City,

Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code
is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant

in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the
time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father

with defendant is null and void ab initio;

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 (3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of
the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's
death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the
time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family

Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied
upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment
suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment
suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to
who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is

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considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while
a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of

either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime
of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
22
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by
law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation
to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On
the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father

extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The
conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was
a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted
that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.
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Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage
does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original
rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance
be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society
as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of
the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a
void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore,
being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before
or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon
mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded
or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted
during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into
a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the
action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish
the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.

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However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the

Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case
No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

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DOCTRINE: In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children
or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by
adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by

Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville,
since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's
Employees' Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2,
2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on
John, which led to his untimely death the following day.4

John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus,
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly,

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sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626
with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union.
However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10,
20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:

We regret to inform you that we cannot give due course to your

claim because you are no longer considered as the parent of
JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO
COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.

The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation

Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La
Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the

claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.6

In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled
against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD
626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary
beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were
adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol
(Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the
Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of
adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither,

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the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary
beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away.
As the ECC ratiocinated:

Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides

(sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he
remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children,
the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are
the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a
primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent
children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income
benefit."

The dependent parent referred to by the above provision

relates to the legitimate parent of the covered member, as
provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended
Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This Commission
believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate
parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for
adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the
adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent
of the deceased.

xxxx

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 In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the
biological parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the
adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent
referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary,
who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of
the deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis
supplied)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted,
employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in
appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

The petition is meritorious.

The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record

To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim
for death benefits is that eventhough she is John’s biological mother, it was
allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive.
As intimated by the ECC:

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Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the
legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately
qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent
such proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume
him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit
being the primary beneficiary of the deceased. Thus, assuming that
appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security law, in
view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally
provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father
since he is still alive.

We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.

Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally

accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters
falling under their jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had
overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s
death certificate.13

Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father

died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the
decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As such,
it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the
adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.

The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary
to law.

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This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
death benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise.

Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that
she is no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the
implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the
relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status
of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary
beneficiary.

We disagree.

Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on

Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a
substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."

It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved

by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:

In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in
the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be
taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate
parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should,
therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether
by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should
not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of
support or assistance.

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Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental
authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and
the biological parents are not entirely eliminated.

To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to

inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family
Code:

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the

adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the

legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur withthe
adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half,
by the adopters;

xxx

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted

survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate
succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the
New Civil Code, which provides:

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 Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving
no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by
consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their
rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent
provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the
rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to
receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations,
which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of
the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot
leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata
better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by
death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have
been better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself
orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of
John’sminority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority
over the adopted child.

On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s

dependence on John can be established from the documentary evidence
submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to
John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984,
leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
"give a bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she
consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his

beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the
"Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for
work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of
beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626,
John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least
evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent.
Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death
during John’s minority, the restoration ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the
documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to
designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our
mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD
626 as a dependent parent.

All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal
basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as
a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s
minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits
under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein
petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.

DISPOSITIVE:

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010
Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No.
SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby
directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the
deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE: Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but
this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in
turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived;
the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of
sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment.

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 ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA,
guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who

together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of
the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; that Juliana married
Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another
child who died during infancy; that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the
widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; that Pablo
Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo
Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; that Pablo Santero, at the
time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six
minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

ISSUE:

Who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero — her niece
Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo
Santero)?

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RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old
Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil
Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely
a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional
rights. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions, especially
Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have conferred
illegitimate children the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of
their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to
this time does not exist.

Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits

absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss
to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of
illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon
their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may
inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or
illegitimate.

In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to
be represented are themselves illegitimate.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said

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illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees
in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of
a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further ground of resentment.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to
comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139
Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight
Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the
only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural
or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred
by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero. The word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a
statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of
the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in

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amore restrictive or limited sense – which as already discussed earlier, is
not so in the case at bar.

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is

suppressed or at least amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no
other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the
decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the
exclusion of petitioners.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed

decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE: Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain
in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of said legitimate child.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate

children. Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, petitioners herein
cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter
to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of
their father.

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OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, Petitioners, -versus-
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL- BAUTISTA, et. al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 84240, March 25, 1992, SECOND DIVISION, Paras, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children. Adela
Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres
Pascual, filed with a Special Proceeding for administration of the intestate
estate of her late husband. Later on, she filed a Supplemental Petition to
the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that
Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don
Andres Pascual.

On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an

affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the
younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual.

On October 16, 1985, all the other heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners
Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual. The said Compromise
Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the
petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary
rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle. Petitioners
thereafter filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights which was
ultimately denied by the CA. Thus, this petition.

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of
the deceased.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

NO. Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC,
supra, where this Court ruled that:

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural
tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there
is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.

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Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate
children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err
in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio
Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the
decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of

Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to
represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.

On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court

further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children. The Court
held:

Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of

illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon
their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may
inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that
the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three
named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of
legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It
may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a
legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article
982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would
allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of
his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of
Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because
Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father
or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule
and Article 992 the exception.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that
the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to
their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the
limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has
no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother.

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally, under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue
as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated
differently, in the negative.

DISPOSITIVE:

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29,
1988 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE: It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a
barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the
legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate
brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate
child. Consequently, when the law speaks of "brothers and sisters,

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to
illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters.

BENIGNO MANUEL, et. al., Petitioners, -versus- HON. NICODEMO T.

FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 117246, August 21, 1995, THIRD DIVISION, VITUG, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and

Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz,
Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this
relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years passed before Antonio
Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on,
respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.

Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In

consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of
land, was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two
other parcels of land were later bought by Juan and registered in his name.
The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have
one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-
Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter".

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On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a
Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land.
Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04
February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.

On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta

executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the
three parcels of land and the three titles in the name of Juan Manuel
were canceled and new titles were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-
Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-
respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over
the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the latter
by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These
acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the
petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments but
was dismissed, the petitioners not being the real party in interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are real party in interest?

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

NO. Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's
intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil
Code, providing thusly:

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be

succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the
entire estate.

If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews
and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the
other half.

Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction

with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato

from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to

in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between
the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects
succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives,
on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does
not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is
predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application,
however, on testamentary dispositions.

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This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family
in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. His thesis:

What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews
and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be
noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members
of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear
that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as
the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters,
cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law
speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an
illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to
the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters.

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself
is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon),
without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor
a legal heir.

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking

the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta,
the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of
Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was
properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real
"parties-in-interest" in the case, had neither the standing nor the
cause of action to initiate the complaint.

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby
DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE: Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the

subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin
Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the
aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled
to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only
validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the
entire property to herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners
and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property in the
proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share
thereof, respectively.

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, Petitioners, -

VERSUS- COURT OF APPEALS AND TEODORA DOMINGO,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997, SECOND DIVISION, Regallado, J.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The case involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners

against herein private respondent over a parcel of land with a house and
apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and
which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.

It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the
niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero who is the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller.

Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died without any ascendant or descendant, and

was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners.

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died, hence they seek to inherit from
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.

The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her
surviving spouse, Martin, executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement
adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin
Guerrero thereafter sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora
Domingo.

Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for

reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of representation

from the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

YES. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by
which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:

Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive
with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in
equal portions.

Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and

illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should
there be any, under Article 1001.

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or theirs children to the other half.

Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject

property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin
Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the
aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally
divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled
to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only
validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the
entire property to herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners
and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property in the
proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share
thereof, respectively.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent

Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein
petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject
property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share
therein, respectively.

SO ORDERED.

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
DOCTRINE: We adopt a construction of Article 992 that makes children,
regardless of the circumstances of their births, qualified to inherit from their
direct ascendants-such as their grandparent-by their right of
representation. Both marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a
marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other
ascendants. Nonmarital children are removed from their parents and
ascendants in the same degree as marital children. Nonmarital children of
marital children are also removed from their parents and ascendants in the
same degree as nonmarital children of nonmarital children.

When the nonmarital child has a right of representation to their parent’s

share in her grandparent’s legitime. It is silent on collateral relatives where
the nonmarital child may inherit by themself. We are not now ruling on the
extent of the right of a nonmarital child to inherit in their own right.

[ G.R. No. 208912. December 07, 2021 ]

AMADEA ANGELA K. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. RODOLFO C.

AQUINO AND ABBULAH C. AQUINO, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 209018]

RODOLFO C. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. AMADEA ANGELA K.

AQUINO RESPONDENT.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

A child whose parents did not marry each other can inherit from their
grandparent by their right of representation, regardless of the grandparent's
marital status at the birth of the child's parent.

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2023-24-2ND SEM.
For this Court's resolution are two consolidated Petitions for Review
on Certiorari concerning a nonmarital child's2 right to inherit from her
grandfather's estate.

The Petition in G.R No. 2089123 questions the Court of Appeals

Decision4 disqualifying Amadea Angela K. Aquino (Angela) from inheriting
from her alleged grandfather's estate.

Meanwhile, the Petition in G.R. No. 2090186 assails the Court of Appeals
Decision7 and Resolution8 denying Rodolfo C. Aquino's (Rodolfo) Petition
for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy and for violating the rules against
forum shopping and the principle of res judicata.

On May 7, 2003, Rodolfo filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for
the letters of administration of his father's estate.

Rodolfo alleged that his father, Miguel T. Aquino (Miguel), died intestate on
July 5, 1999, leaving personal and real properties. The estate of his first
wife, Amadea C. Aquino (Amadea), who had died earlier on September 27,
1977, was already settled in 1978. Miguel was survived by: (1) Enerie B.
Aquino, his second wife; (2) Abdulah C. Aquino (Abdulah) and Rodolfo C.
(Rodolfo) Aquino, his sons with Amadea; and (3) the heirs of Wilfredo C.
Aquino, his son with Amadea who also died earlier. Miguel was also
predeceased by another son with Amadea, Arturo C. Aquino (Arturo).

On July 2, 2003, Angela moved that she be included in the distribution and
partition of Miguel's estate.12 She alleged that she was Arturo's only
child.13 She presented a July 5, 2003 Certification from the hospital,
stating that she was Arturo and Susan Kuan's daughter.

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According to Angela, Arturo died on January 10, 1978, before she was born
on October 9, 1978. While her parents were not married, they did not suffer
from any impediment to marry. Her parents were planning to marry before
Arturo died.

Angela claimed that her grandfather, Miguel, took care of her mother's
expenses during her pregnancy with her. Her mother was also attended by
the Aquinos' family doctor. Moreover, Angela lived with her mother and the
Aquino family at their ancestral home.

Since her birth, her father's relatives had continuously recognized her as
Arturo's natural child. Her father's brother, Abdulah, was even her
godfather. In support of this, Angela presented her baptismal
certificate stating that she was Arturo's daughter.

Angela narrated that Miguel, who fondly called her "Maggie," provided for
her needs and supported her education. Before Miguel died, he provided
instructions on how his properties were to be distributed. Based on a
certain July 2, 1999 "INSTRUCTION OF MIGUEL T. AQUINO," Angela was
among the heirs who would receive portions of Miguel's estate. Miguel
gave her a commercial lot, which rentals were now paid to her.

On November 12, 2003, Rodolfo opposed Angela's Motion, claiming that

Arturo never legally recognized Angela as his natural child in his lifetime.
Angela also never presented sufficient evidence to prove her filiation.
Moreover, Rodolfo alleged that Angela was born more than nine months
from Arturo's death. Therefore, there was no way of knowing if Angela was
Arturo's child.

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On November 17, 2003, Abdulah filed his Comment on Rodolfo's Petition
and moved for the issuance of letters of administration of Miguel's estate in
his favor.

On December 18, 2003, Angela filed a Manifestation and Reply to

Rodolfo's opposition. She alleged that she was born less than nine months,
or particularly 272 days, from Arturo's death.

Recognizing that Rodolfo had expressed his intention to yield the

administration in favor of Abdulah, the trial court issued the letters of
administration on September 3, 2004, and appointed Abdulah as
administrator of Miguel's estate.

On March 7, 2005, Angela filed a Motion for Distribution of Residue of

Estate or for Allowance to the Heirs. She alleged that as Arturo's natural
child, she has a legal right to a monthly allowance like those given to
Miguel's other heirs. Rodolfo opposed, while Abdulah commented on this
motion.

On April 22, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order that granted
Angela's July 2, 2003 and March 7, 2005 Motions. It ruled that the Aquino
clan was already estopped from denying Angela's filiation. As heir, Angela
was deemed entitled to a share in Miguel's estate.

Rodolfo and Abdulah separately moved for reconsideration,50 though

Rodolfo's was later deemed withdrawn. Later, the trial court denied
Abdulah's Motion in its March 6, 2008 Order.

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Rodolfo filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing
the trial court's April 22, 2005 and March 6, 2008 Orders.

On August 23, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, denying

Rodolfo's Petition on the grounds of wrong remedy and violation of the
principles of forum shopping and res judicata. Rodolfo moved for
reconsideration, but his motion was also denied in an August 1, 2013
Resolution.

On September 30, 2013, Rodolfo filed a Petition for Review before this
Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' August 23, 2012 Decision and
August 1, 2013 Resolution.59 This Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
209018.60

Rodolfo argued that Angela was already barred from claiming her
nonmarital filiation to Arturo, since she was born after his death. Even if she
were Arturo's nonmarital child, Rodolfo noted that she cannot represent him
in Miguel's estate under Article 992 of the Civil Code. Moreover, assuming
that she was Miguel's granddaughter, she was still not entitled to the grant
of P64,000.00 monthly allowance since, says Rodolfo, the Civil Code limits
the provision of an allowance to the decedent's widow and children.

Rodolfo also contended that he availed of the right remedy in elevating his
case via a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, since the trial
court's Orders, one of which was an interlocutory order, were issued with
grave abuse of discretion. If he did avail of the wrong remedy, he says that
the Court of Appeals should have consolidated his Petition with Abdulah's
appeal, since it already treated his Petition as an appeal.

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Finally, Rodolfo claimed that he did not commit forum shopping because he
filed his Petition for Certiorari before Abdulah filed his appeal. Furthermore,
he was not a party in Abdulah's appeal.

Rodolfo prayed for the reversal of the Court of Appeals' August 23, 2012
Decision and August 1, 2013 Resolution.

Meanwhile, Abdulah appealed the trial court's April 22, 2005 and March 6,
2008 Orders before the Court of Appeals68 claiming that Angela failed to
prove her filiation and, in any case, Angela could not inherit from Miguel ab
intestato.

DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:

On January 21, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of

Abdulah. It held that Angela failed to prove her filiation in accordance with
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code. Moreover, she failed to present
birth records showing Arturo's paternity or any document signed by Arturo
admitting her filiation. Since Arturo died before she was born, Angela
cannot also establish open and continuous possession of her status as
Arturo's child, under Article 172(3) of the Family Code. Thus, Miguel's or
the Aquino clan's overt acts cannot translate to legal recognition of her
status as Arturo's child.

In any case, even if Angela were able to establish her filiation, the Court of
Appeals ruled that she could not inherit ab intestato from Miguel. It cited

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Article 922 of the New Civil Code, which provides that nonmarital children
cannot inherit ab intestato from their parents' marital relatives.

Angela moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of

Appeals in its July 24, 2013 Resolution.

On October 2, 2013, Angela filed a Petition for Review before this Court,
assailing the Court of Appeals January 21, 2013 Decision. This Petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 208912.

Angela argued that since she enjoyed the same love and support from her
grandfather and his family, as they would to marital children, the principle of
estoppel should apply. She claimed that the Aquino clan's acknowledgment
of her status as her father's natural child should stop them from questioning
her filiation.

Moreover, Angela contended that Article 992 of the Civil Code's presumed
antagonism between the marital and nonmarital family should only apply to
immediate families. Her grandfather "cannot be presumed to hate his own
grandchild." Article 992 cannot be interpreted to apply to the relatives in the
ascending line. It should only apply to collateral relatives.

Angela prayed that the Court of Appeals January 21, 2013 Decision be
reversed, and that the trial court's April 22, 2005 and March 6, 2008 Orders
be reinstated. Angela also prayed for a declaration that she was her
grandfather Miguel's legal heir.

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On October 21, 2013, this Court's Third Division issued a Resolution
consolidating G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018. This Court denied both
Petitions in its November 11, 2013 Resolution, which reads:

In G.R. 208912, the CA did not commit any reversible error in holding that
petitioner Amadea Angela Aquino is disqualified to inherit from the intestate
estate of decedent Miguel T. Aquino. Jurisprudence has consistently held
that Article 992 of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from
inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother.

In G.R. 209018, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition. A petition
for certiorari may only be availed of when there is no adequate, plain, or
speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner Rodolfo C. Aquino
is also guilty of forum shopping and litis pendentia for pursuing different
remedies for a single objective. Moreover, the petition lacked proof that its
copy was served on the lower court concerned in violation of Section 3,
Rule 45 in relation to Section 5 of the same rule as well as Section 5(d) of
Rule 59 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Angela moved for reconsideration on January 10, 2014, citing the following
grounds:

ART. 992 SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN A VACUUM. IN THE CASE

OF IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA
AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, petitioner, vs. ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, respondent, IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT ART.

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992 SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER
PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE.

THERE IS NO REMEDY IN LAW FOR A PERSON LIKE PETITIONER

WHO WAS BORN AFTER THE DEATH OF HER FATHER TO BE
LEGALLY RECOGNIZED AS HIS CHILD. IN FACT, THERE IS ALSO NO
REMEDY FOR A PERSON SAME AS PETITIONER WHO WAS BORN
OUT OF WEDLOCK TO A FATHER WHO HAS NEVER BEEN MARRIED
TO ANOTHER. THUS, SINCE THE COURT IS A COURT OF EQUITY,
JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS DICTATES[sic] THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF
ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE APPLIED TO GRANT RECOGNITION TO
PETITIONER AS A DAUGHTER OF ARTURO AQUINO WHO IS A
LEGITIMATE CHILD OF THE DECEDENT, FOR WHICH REASON, SHE
CAN INHERIT AB INTESTATO FROM HER GRANDFATHER.90 (Citation
omitted)

On April 25, 2014, Angela moved to have the case referred to this Court En
Banc, She asserted that this Court should revisit its ruling in Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court. In Diaz, this Court held that the word
"relatives" in Article 992 was a broad term that, when used in a statute,
"embrace[d] not only collateral relatives" but also all of the person's kin,
unless the context indicated otherwise. Thus, Angela argued that it
included the grandparents of nonmarital children. According to Angela,
referral of the case to the En Banc was proper, as only it could reverse a
doctrine or principle laid down by this Court.

On April 29, 2014, this Court's Third Division issued a

Resolution96 granting Angela's Motion.

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On May 30, 2014, Angela filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration97 arguing that the interpretation that grandparents are
included in the prohibition under Article 992 of the Civil Code is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.98 The law allows
nomnarital descendants to inherit from a nonmarital child, putting
nonmarital descendants of marital children, like Angela, at a more
disadvantageous position.

On September 2, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution granting Angela's

Motion for Reconsideration, reinstating the Petitions, and requiring Abdulah
and Rodolfo to submit their comment.

Abdulah filed his Comment on October 17, 2014, while Rodolfo filed his
Comment on October 30, 2014. Angela filed her Consolidated Reply103 on
January 14, 2015.

On January 27, 2015, this Court issued a Resolution104 giving due course
to the Petitions and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.

On April 17, 2015, Rodolfo filed his Memorandum. He reiterates that

Angela can no longer prove that she was Arturo's nonmarital child since
Arturo died before she was born. Assuming that she was Arturo's
nonmarital child, Rodolfo says that she still could not inherit from Miguel's
estate since a nonmarital child was "barred to inherit from the legitimate
family of her [or his] putative father under the iron bar rule in Article 992 of
the New Civil Code."

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On April 28, 2015, Abdulah filed his Memorandum. He averred that the
Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that Angela "failed to present
competent proof of her filiation with Arturo[.]" Angela's birth record states
that her mother was Maria Angela Kuan Ho and her father was Enrique Ho.
Angela also allegedly failed to present any public document or any private
handwritten document made and signed by Arturo, admitting that he was
Angela's father. There was likewise no evidence showing that Angela
openly and continuously possessed the status of a nonmarital child. He
adds that she never even instituted any action "for recognition or
acknowledgement by her putative father within the periods allowed by law."

Abdulah contended that the Court of Appeals did not err when it held that
the principle of estoppel in Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, could not be
applied. In Tongoy, there was overwhelming evidence that the nonmarital
child was in continuous possession of the status of natural children.
Meanwhile, Angela failed to present evidence to prove her allegations.

Abdulah further maintained that the Court of Appeals correctly held that,
under Article 992 of the Civil Code, Angela was barred from participating in
the settlement of Miguel's estate. Article 992 "categorically bars an
illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of [their] father or mother." Lastly, Abdulah argued that Angela
cannot question the constitutionality of Article 992 in a settlement
proceeding. It should be done in a case for declaratory relief before the trial
court, with notice to the Solicitor General.

On May 13, 2015, Angela filed her Memorandum insisting that Arturo
recognized and acknowledged her filiation. She asserted that even Rodolfo

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and Abdulah admitted this in their judicial admissions, thus estopping them
from claiming otherwise.

Angela added that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied the iron
curtain rule to her. According to Angela, interpreting Article 992 of the Civil
Code in conjunction with Articles 902, 982, 989, 990, 995, and 998 will
show that "Article 992 only prohibits reciprocal succession between
collaterals, not between descendants and ascendants."

Finally, Angela asserted that when the Court of Appeals considered

grandparents and other direct ascendants as "relatives" under Article 992,
it violated the Constitution's equal protection clause. She argued that a less
restrictive measure should be considered:

Article 992 [must] be construed to prohibit only the reciprocal

intestate succession between collateral relatives separated by
the lines of illegitimacy, not between the illegitimate child and his
relatives in the direct line. If the illegitimates of an illegitimate
child can inherit from his or her grandparent by right of
representation, so too should the illegitimates of a legitimate
child.

On July 3, 2018, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the
Solicitor General to submit its Comment on the Petitions.

In its Comment filed on July 16, 2018, the Office of the Solicitor General
concurred with the Court of Appeals ruling that Rodolfo's Petition should be
denied "for being an erroneous remedy and for violating the rules on forum
shopping." It likewise agreed with the Court of Appeals that Angela's failure

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to prove her filiation with Arturo prevented her from inheriting from Miguel's
estate.

Further to a July 9, 2019 Resolution, this Court conducted oral arguments

on the consolidated petitions on September 3 and September 17, 2019.
Dean Cynthia Del Castillo (Dean Del Castillo) and Professor Elizabeth
Aguiling-Pangalangan (Professor Aguiling-Pangalangan) were appointed
as amici curiae. After the oral arguments concluded, the parties were given
20 days to file their respective memoranda.

On October 7, 2019, Angela, the Office of the Solicitor General,

Abdulah, and Professor Aguiling-Pangalangan filed their respective
Memoranda. On the same day, Dean Del Castillo submitted a
Supplemental Opinion to her earlier-submitted Opinion of Amicus Curiae.
Rodolfo filed his Memorandum on October 17, 2019. The Memoranda filed
by Angela, Rodolfo, and Abdulah substantially reiterate their previous
arguments before this Court.

In addition to arguments already made in its Comment, the Office of the

Solicitor General posits that Angela's alleged birth certificate attached to
Abdulah's Comment in G.R. No. 208912, which shows the father named as
one Enrique A. Ho, means that Angela's father is not Arturo, as she
claims. The Office of the Solicitor General, Abdulah, and Rodolfo all argue
that Article 992 of the Civil Code does not violate the equal protection
clause, maintaining that marital and nonmarital families should be kept
separate to reduce resentment between them.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not Angela be allowed to inherit from her grandfather Miguel’s
estate.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

Intestate succession is based on the decedent’s presumed will. Article 992

then assumes that the decedent’s disposition of their property would not
have included any nonmarital children, due to a supposed hostility between
the marital family and the nonmarital child because the latter was the
outcome of an extramarital affair.

However, a nonmarital child is not defined that way. Nonmarital children, or

“illegitimate children” as used under Article 165 of the Family Code, are
“[ c ]hildren conceived and born outside a valid marriage[ .]”205 The phrase
“outside a valid marriage” does not necessarily mean an extramarital affair.
Parents may choose not to get married despite having no legal impediment
to marry. Another reason why a child could have been born “outside a valid
marriage” is because their mother was a victim of sexual assault who did
not marry the perpetrator. There are also times when the father of an
unborn child may have died before being able to marry the child’s mother,
as what has been alleged in Angela’s case. Children born from these
circumstances are also considered “illegitimate.” Yet, there may be no
“antagonism or incompatibility,” “hate,” or “disgraceful looks” to speak of. If
Article 992 merely recognizes existing conditions, then it should be
construed to account for other circumstances of birth and family dynamics.
Peace within families cannot be encouraged by callously depriving some of

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its members of their inheritance. Such deprivation may even be the cause
of antagonism and alienation that could have been otherwise avoided.

This Court has recognized that the alleged resentment and hostility
presumed by Article 992 can be proven by evidence to be non-existent.
Particular facts of a case may show that the decedent’s will does not
distinguish between marital and nonmarital relatives, precluding a rigid
application of Article 992.

This Court abandons the presumption in In re Grey, Corpus, Diaz, and In re

Suntay, among others, that nonmarital children are products of illicit
relationships or that they are automatically placed in a hostile environment
perpetrated by the marital family. We are not duty bound to uncritically
parrot archaic prejudices and cruelties, to mirror and amplify oppressive
and regressive ideas about the status of children and family life. The best
interest of the child should prevail.

We adopt a construction of Article 992 that makes children, regardless of

the circumstances of their births, qualified to inherit from their direct
ascendants-such as their grandparent-by their right of representation. Both
marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital
child, are blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants. Nonmarital
children are removed from their parents and ascendants in the same
degree as marital children. Nonmarital children of marital children are also
removed from their parents and ascendants in the same degree as
nonmarital children of nonmarital children.

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Accordingly, when a nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased
parent to succeed in their grandparent’s estate, Article 982 of the Civil
Code shall apply.

To emphasize, this ruling will only apply when the nonmarital child has a
right of representation to their parent’s share in her grandparent’s legitime.
It is silent on collateral relatives where the nonmarital child may inherit by
themself. We are not now ruling on the extent of the right of a nonmarital
child to inherit in their own right. Those will be the subject of a proper case
and, if so minded, may also be the subject of more enlightened and
informed future legislation.

However, the application of Article 982 here does not automatically give
Angela the right to inherit from Miguel’s estate. Angela must still prove her
filiation. Documents may need to be presented and authenticated;
witnesses’ testimonies received and examined; and DNA testing ordered
and conducted, to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations raised by
the parties before this Court. This Court finds it prudent to remand these
cases to their court of origin for reception of evidence, in conformity with
the legal principles articulated here.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, Amadea Angela K. Aquino's Motion for Reconsideration in

G.R. No. 208912 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The January 21, 2013
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01633 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

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The cases are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of origin for
resolution, within 90 days of receipt of this Decision, of the issues of
Amadea Angela K. Aquino's filiation—including the reception of DNA
evidence upon consultation and coordination with experts in the field of
DNA analysis—and entitlement to a share in the estate of Miguel T.
Aquino, in accordance with this Decision and the re-interpretation of Article
992 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

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