INDIA’S POLICY TOWARDS

WEST ASIA
The Modi Era
INDIA’S POLICY TOWARDS
WEST ASIA
The Modi Era

Editors

Sujan Chinoy
Prasanta Kumar Pradhan

PENTAGON PRESS LLP

Copyright © Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
New Delhi, 2024

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 Contents

Preface vii

About the Contributors xiii

1. India’s West Asia Policy Under Modi 1

Sujan Chinoy

2. India and the GCC States: A Growing Engagement 23

Prasanta Kumar Pradhan

3. India-Iran Connectivity Partnership: Opportunities and

Challenges 44
Deepika Saraswat

4. India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 67

Jatin Kumar

5. India’s Approach to Conflicts in West Asia and

North Africa 98
Md. Muddassir Quamar

6. Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and

Converging Interests 117
Rajeev Agarwal

7. India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and

North Africa 145
Saman Ayesha Kidwai

Index 174
 Preface

India’s policy towards West Asia has undergone a massive

transformation under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra
Modi. There has been more proactive engagement with the countries
of the region, with new fronts of engagement having been opened
and existing interactions being substantially strengthened. India
considers the West Asian region as its ‘extended neighbourhood’.
India’s ‘Think West’ policy is commensurately focused on deepening
engagements with the region. Prime Minister Modi’s ‘neighbourhood
first’ policy also emphasises the West Asian neighbourhood.
West Asia remains a highly sensitive region as recent events have
shown in the context of the Israel-Gaza war and the Houthi attacks
on merchant shipping traversing the Red Sea through the narrow
choke-point of the Bab-el-Mandab, and even beyond, in the Arabian
Sea.
During the last ten years, several issues such as the Arab Spring,
the emergence and spread of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),
the COVID-19 pandemic, oil price fluctuations, and the parlous
situation in Yemen, Syria and the Strait of Hormuz, as well as the
Israel-Palestine conflict, have severely challenged the politics, economy
and security of the region. India’s West Asia policy has been shaped
by a nuanced understanding of these complex political and security
dynamics of the region. India has endeavoured to protect its national
interests against the rising tide of regional geopolitical challenges while
adhering to fundamental principles such as condemnation of
terrorism, resolution of disputes through peaceful dialogue,
humanitarian assistance to affected people, and, the importance of a
rules-based international order that provides for freedom of
viii India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

navigation and overflight, unimpeded commerce along critical sea

lines of communication and security of the global commons.
Modi’s pragmatic approach has focused on maintaining a delicate
balance between various competing centres of power without getting
involved in regional conflicts. India’s neutrality and strategic
autonomy have given credibility to its image as an influential regional
power that stands ready to provide assistance during pandemics,
natural disasters and economic downturns.
Bilateral trade and energy are key elements that shape India’s
cooperation with countries of West Asia. Modi has actively interacted
with the nine-million strong Indian diaspora during his frequent visits
to the region. Alongside his hosts, Modi has lauded their contributions
to the economic development of the region. Modi’s government has
taken a keen interest in their safety, security and well-being. Under
Modi, the needs of the Indian diaspora have received greater
consideration on the part of the host governments, including the
fulfillment of their social and cultural aspirations. For example, it
would have been inconceivable a decade ago that the UAE would
grant permission for the construction of a Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi.
These developments have their roots in the close personal relationship
between Prime Minister Modi and his counterparts. It is also a
manifestation of the changing outlook towards India as it courses its
way to the top ranks of the global economy, offering myriad
opportunities to West Asian investors.
In recent years, India has strengthened its economic partnership
with the West Asian region. Countries such as the UAE and Saudi
Arabia have consolidated their positions as top trading partners of
India. Modi has invited entrepreneurs and business houses in West
Asia to invest in India to boost mutual economic growth and
prosperity. With a view to moving beyond the buyer-seller relationship
in the energy sector, India has encouraged the establishment of joint
ventures. Indian companies are now increasingly acquiring stakes in
the Gulf energy sector. Besides, India is also engaged with a number
of countries in its efforts to achieve net zero carbon emission and to
transition towards cleaner fuels such as green hydrogen.
India’s defence and security cooperation with West Asian countries
Preface ix

has undergone a major transformation in recent years. There is a

noticeable increase in the visits of high-level military officials and
joint military exercises. Some West Asian countries have expressed
interest in procuring arms and equipment from India in keeping with
the latter’s thrust on “Make in India” in the defence sector and the
new emphasis on defence exports. Partnerships in this field are being
explored. Enhanced cooperation on terrorism and maritime security
are visible expressions of closer security ties under the Modi
government.
The India, Israel, the UAE and the USA (I2U2) format has emerged
as a key forum for collaboration in the fields of food, energy,
agriculture and technology. During the G20 Summit in New Delhi in
September 2023, India together with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the
European Union, France, Germany, Italy and the USA signed a MoU
to establish the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
The proposed mega-connectivity project intends to connect India, West
Asia and Europe through rail and sea routes to enhance trade and
economic interconnectedness.
The Gulf region is a key fulcrum in India’s ties with West Asia,
given its geographical proximity and the history of close engagement
over centuries. The six Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries and Iran are key partners in the economic and security issues.
People-to-people contacts have left a deep and indelible imprint on
both sides.
In recent years, India’s engagements with Israel have also
deepened significantly. Under Prime Minister Modi, both countries
have strengthened defence, security and strategic cooperation. India’s
commitment towards the establishment of an independent Palestinian
State remains undiluted. India continues to support the Palestinian
people bilaterally and through the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) as well.
Elsewhere in the region, the prolonged regional conflicts in Iraq, Syria
and Yemen have hampered closer links despite the historical connect.
This book, titled India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era,
presents a comprehensive analysis of Indian foreign policy towards
West Asia since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in 2014. It
covers key dimensions of India’s West Asia policy.
x India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Sujan Chinoy, in his chapter “India’s West Asia Policy Under

Modi”, provides a detailed analysis of the progress and achievements
made in India’s relationship with West Asia. He avers that Modi came
to the helm in 2014 at a time when the West Asian region was
experiencing tumult, with the ISIS on the rampage and a rash of civil
wars erupting in Syria, Yemen and Libya. While Modi’s government
joined hands together with the countries of the region to fight
terrorism, it refrained from getting bogged down in the internal affairs
of countries in the region. Chinoy argues that Modi’s outreach and
endeavours at deepening economic engagement and strengthening
the defence and security dimensions of India’s strategic partnerships
in the region have been reciprocated by many in West Asia.
Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, in his chapter “India and the GCC
States: A Growing Engagement”, argues that since Prime Minister
Modi came to power, India’s engagement with the GCC countries
has increased exponentially. Modi has adopted a proactive approach
towards the countries of the region and has engaged with them in
multiple fields. Moving beyond the traditional areas of cooperation,
Modi has visualised and implemented stronger and multifaceted
strategic partnerships with the GCC countries. Modi’s engagement
has resulted in creating new nodes of engagement with the GCC States.
Deepika Saraswat, in her chapter “India-Iran Connectivity
Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges”, analyses the geo-
economic dimension of the India-Iran relationship focusing primarily
on the connectivity partnership. She highlights the fact that despite
facing challenges such as the re-imposition of US sanctions on Iran in
2018 and the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in 2021, India and Iran
have made progress in establishing stable North-South connectivity
in the wake of the historic Chabahar Agreement. Geopolitical events,
including the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Iran’s accession to
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Ukraine War
have highlighted the need for continued commitment to the
connectivity partnership.
Jatin Kumar, in his chapter “India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister
Narendra Modi”, analyses different aspects of the strengthening
relationship between India and Israel. He postulates that since 2014,
India-Israel ties have entered a new phase of significantly expanded
Preface xi

relations. The bilateral engagement has expanded significantly,

encompassing defence, innovation, trade, agriculture and
cybersecurity. Under Modi, both nations have strengthened their
defence collaboration through joint military exercises, procurement
of security equipment and technology sharing. Notably, the
transformation in India-Israel relations since 2014 was underscored
by a shift in the perception of Israel among Arab countries, evident in
the signing of the Abraham Accords, the recent conflict in Gaza,
notwithstanding.
Md. Muddassir Quamar, in his chapter “India’s Approach to
Conflicts in West Asia and North Africa”, analyses how India under
Modi has adopted a balanced approach towards the regional conflicts.
He has examined India’s responses to conflicts such as the Israel-
Palestine issue, civil wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen, as well as the
friction between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the irreconcilable
differences between Iran and Israel. Emphasising India’s vital interests
in the region – such as energy security, expatriates, business, trade,
investments, maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean, and
counterterrorism efforts – the government of Prime Minister Modi
has intensified its diplomatic outreach and expended considerable
political capital to secure better relations with regional countries.
Rajeev Agarwal, in his chapter “Security in West Asia and India:
Shared Concerns and Converging Interests”, delves into the
convergence of security interests of India and West Asian countries
and advocates stronger defence and security cooperation. He states
that India’s security collaboration with the region is rapidly expanding,
with a growing number of countries acknowledging India as a
dependable security ally. Under Prime Minister Modi, West Asia has
become a critical part of India’s extended neighbourhood. This is
evident in the significant number of defence and security
arrangements concluded with regional countries over the past decade.
Saman Ayesha Kidwai, in her chapter “India’s Counter-Terror
Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa”, states that the issue
of terrorism has emerged as a dominant and recurring theme in India’s
engagements with the countries of the region. India’s thrust on the
imperative need for global efforts to combat terrorist networks has
found resonance among the West Asian and North African countries.
xii India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Counter-terror collaboration between India and this region

encompasses crucial aspects such as disrupting the financial networks
of terrorist organisations, de-radicalisation, education, military
training, and intelligence sharing. Given the rising spectre of terrorism
in different parts of WANA, there is a significant potential for
collaboration in future on counter terrorism.
Finally, we, the editors, convey our gratitude to all the contributors
to this volume. We acknowledge the effort put in by Abhishek Yadav,
Research Analyst at the West Asia Centre, in poring over all the
chapters in a timely manner and providing feedback to help refine
the contents. We also extend our appreciation to Vivek Kaushik,
Associate Editor of Strategic Analysis, for his unstinted support, and
to Rajan Aryaa and Virender Negi of Pentagon Press LLP for bringing
out this volume.
We are confident that this compendium of writings on a region at
the centre of a world in flux will prove to be invaluable for scholars,
students, academicians and policymakers alike, offering them a
comprehensive insight into India’s policy towards West Asia during
the Modi era.

February 2024 Sujan Chinoy

Prasanta Kumar Pradhan
 About the Contributors

Amb. Sujan Chinoy is the Director General of the Manohar Parrikar

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi
since 2019. A career diplomat from 1981-2018, he was Ambassador to
Japan and Mexico and the Consul General of India in Shanghai and
Sydney, besides serving at India’s Missions at the UN and Saudi
Arabia. A specialist on China, East Asia and politico-security issues,
he anchored confidence-building measures (CBMs) with China on
the boundary dispute from 1996-2000. At the National Security
Council Secretariat (NSCS) from 2008-2012, he handled external and
internal security policy, including in the extended neighbourhood of
the Indo-Pacific. He was the Chair of the Think20 engagement group
for India’s G20 Presidency. He is the author of World Upside Down:
India Recalibrates Its Geopolitics published in July 2023 by Harper
Collins. He writes regularly for newspapers and journals and has a
well-known presence on the international think-tank circuit.

Dr. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan is a Research Fellow and Coordinator

of the West Asia Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. He holds a doctorate
degree from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Since joining
MP-IDSA in 2008, he has been researching on foreign policy, security
and strategic issues in West Asia, and India’s relationship with West
Asia and the wider Arab world. Dr. Pradhan is the author of India and
the Arab Unrest: Challenges, Dilemmas and Engagements (Routledge,
London 2022), Arab Spring and Sectarian Faultlines in West Asia: Bahrain,
Yemen and Syria (Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2017) and the monograph
India’s Relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council: Need to Look beyond
Business (MP-IDSA, New Delhi, 2014). He is also the editor of the
book Geopolitical Shifts in West Asia: Trends and Implications (Pentagon
xiv India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Press, New Delhi, 2016) and co-edited (with Sujan Chinoy) India’s
Approach to West Asia: Trends, Challenges and Possibilities, (Pentagon
Press, New Delhi, 2024).

Dr. Deepika Saraswat is an Associate Fellow at the West Asia Centre,

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-
IDSA), New Delhi. Her research focuses on Iran’s foreign policy and
geopolitical developments in West Asia and Eurasia, and Indian
Foreign Policy. Her research project at MP-IDSA is on ‘Iran’s Asian
Orientation: Quest for Status and Regional Cooperation.’ Saraswat
has a PhD in Political Geography from the Centre for International
Politics, Organisation and Disarmament, School of International
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Earlier, she was a
Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA). She
has authored a book Between Survival and Status: The Counter-hegemonic
Geopolitics of Iran (ICWA & Macmillan: 2022). Her commentaries on
Iran’s foreign policy and domestic policy have featured in national
dailies and periodicals such as The Indian Express, The Hindustan Times
and the Open Magazine among others.

Dr. Jatin Kumar is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political

Science, Ram Lal Anand College, University of Delhi. Before joining
the University of Delhi, he was working as a Research Analyst in the
West Asia Centre at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses (MP-IDSA). He holds a PhD degree from the Centre for
West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, for his doctoral
thesis on “Israel’s National Security Policy Making after Oslo.” His
areas of interest are the contemporary Middle East, especially Israel.
He is a frequent contributor on various strategic issues to online
publications and newspapers. He has published articles with
Contemporary Review of Middle East and Strategic Analysis and
contributed chapters in various edited books. In July 2017, he was
awarded the Council for Higher Education’s Scholarship (CHE), Israel,
to participate in an International Summer Programme on Identity-
Based Conflict Resolution at Bar Ilan University, Israel.

Dr. Md. Muddassir Quamar is an Associate Professor at the Centre

for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies in Jawaharlal
About the Contributors xv

Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. Dr. Quamar was earlier an

Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies
& Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. He specialises on Middle East
strategic affairs, political Islam, and India’s relations with the region.
Among other issues, he is interested in society, politics and foreign
policy of Saudi Arabia and Turkiye. Dr. Quamar has authored and
edited several books, published research articles in reputed academic
journals and contributed chapters in edited volumes on contemporary
developments in the Middle East. He serves as Associate Editor of
the Contemporary Review of the Middle East (Sage, India) and served as
Book Review Editor of Strategic Analysis between July 2018 and March
2023. In 2014-15, he was a Visiting Fellow at the King Faisal Centre
for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh.

Col. Rajeev Agarwal was commissioned into the Artillery in June

1990. He has been Director Military Intelligence at the Army HQ and
a Military Observer with the UN. He holds a Master’s degree in
Defence and Strategic Studies from Madras University. He was also
Director in the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi and is currently
Assistant Director, MP-IDSA. His major published works include the
Monograph Turkey and its Quest for Leadership Role in the West Asian
Region, IDSA, 2014; IDSA Occasional Papers “Threat of Israel’s
Regional Isolation and Imperatives for the Future”, June 2014 and
“Egypt’s Uneasy Transition: Internal and External Dynamics and
Challenges for India”, August 2014; and “India’s Strategic Partnership
with the UAE: A Key Pillar of India’s Outreach in West Asia”, Indian
Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 17, No.1-2, June 2022.

Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai is a Research Analyst (Counter Terrorism

Centre) at MP-IDSA. She joined the Institute in August 2021. She holds
a Master’s degree in Conflict Analysis and Peacebuilding from the
Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia
Islamia, New Delhi. Her areas of interest include political violence,
counter-terrorism, and geopolitics, primarily within South Asia, West
Asia and the Horn of Africa. Among her publications across different
forums, her notable works include, “The Rise of Iran as a Regional
Power” and “Rivalry Between the Taliban and ISKP: The Collision of
Terror” in the India Quarterly journal.
 1
India’s West Asia Policy Under Modi
Sujan Chinoy

Introduction
India’s policy towards West Asia has received renewed attention since
Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed power in 2014. Moving
beyond the traditional spheres of interaction such as trade, energy
and diaspora, India has now established strategic partnerships with
many of the countries of the region. Defence and security cooperation
has emerged as a key component of India’s West Asia policy under
Modi. In the energy sector, India is moving beyond the buyer-seller
relationship and engaging in strategic partnerships with the key
energy producers in the Gulf. India’s bilateral trade with the regional
countries has been amplified further and India has revived
engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to sign a Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) with the organisation. Cooperation during
the COVID-19 pandemic was significant as India sent medicines,
equipment and healthcare professionals to a number of countries to
help them fight the pandemic in 2020. Later in 2021, when India went
through the worst phase of the pandemic, it also received some
assistance from a number of these countries. Further, Prime Minister
Modi appealed to the Gulf rulers to look after the safety, security and
well-being of the nine-million strong Indian expatriate workers in
the region as many of them were stranded due to the lockdown, some
had lost their jobs and had exhausted their savings during the
2 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

prolonged pandemic. The number of high-level visits and interactions

between India and West Asia has significantly increased in recent years
which was found lacking in the previous decades. Besides, Prime
Minister Modi is regarded as a close and trusted friend by many
regional leaders which is reflected in the several civilian awards of
the highest order that he has been conferred with.
When Modi came to power in 2014, the West Asian region was
undergoing a period of deep turbulence with the aftereffects of the
Arab Spring. The region was dealing with the removal of leaders like
Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi in
Libya and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen. A civil war-like situation
was unfolding in Syria, Libya and Yemen. The humanitarian situation
in these three countries was deteriorating by the day. After a great
deal of internal turmoil, Egypt was slowly limping back towards
normalcy following Sisi’s advent to power in June 2014. The tension
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, often called as a proxy war, was at its
peak with the involvement of both countries in different regional
conflicts. After establishing the so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria,
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was spreading its terrorist
activities throughout the region and beyond. The ISIS targeted Indian
nationals in Iraq and Libya, thus posing a direct threat to India. Thus,
the situation in West Asia and the wider Arab world was one of the
most challenging foreign policy issues for Prime Minister Modi. The
ISIS became the most pressing challenge for the Modi government. It
kidnapped Indians in Iraq and the Indian government had to negotiate
hard with it for their rescue and release.
India maintained neutrality in the domestic affairs of the countries.
It also chose to refrain from interfering in the conflicts and civil wars
in the region. India has adopted a neutral stance in the internal and
regional political affairs in West Asia. India firmly believes that there
are no military solutions to the crises in the region and has emphasised
the need for dialogue and negotiation within the respective countries.
India has demonstrated its commitment to this approach by providing
humanitarian assistance, including food and medicines, to nations
such as Syria, Libya and Yemen at various stages.
India’s West Asia Policy Under Modi 3

From “Look West” to “Think West” Policy

India’s foreign policy towards West Asia has undergone significant
transformations in recent years. In 2005, then Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh announced the “Look West” Policy of India to
prioritise India’s engagements with the West Asia region. But over
the course of the next few years, the pace of engagement and
cooperation in India’s relationship with West Asian countries was slow.
Prime Minister Modi adopted the “Think West” policy to emphasise
India’s engagement with the West Asian countries and to deepen
engagement in economic, defence, security and strategic cooperation.
While recognising the historical and civilisational connection between
India and West Asia, Modi’s Think West policy envisions forging
strategic partnerships which would be mutually beneficial. It also aims
to promote trade, investment, energy cooperation and people-to-
people contacts. The “Think West” policy has since been an important
pillar of India’s West Asia policy.1
The West Asian region is a part of India’s extended neighbourhood
where India has significant economic, political, security and strategic
interests. The rise of religious extremism, terrorism, maritime security
and the continuing civil wars in the region significantly challenge
India’s interests in West Asia. India’s Think West policy, therefore, is
not only aimed at safeguarding and promoting its national interests
but also designed to play a proactive role in maintaining peace and
stability in the region.

India and the Gulf Region

The Gulf region is important for India for a number of reasons. Prime
Minister Modi’s outreach to the Gulf region has been a core element
in his overall policy towards the wider Arab and Islamic world. He
has made several visits to a number of countries in the Gulf region.
During the last ten years, Prime Minister Modi has made four official
visits to the UAE. Besides, Saudi Arabia is another important strategic
partner for India in the Gulf. For his rich contributions to the
strengthening of ties, Modi has been conferred with the highest civilian
awards by Saudi Arabia “the King Abdulaziz Sash”, the UAE “Order
of Zayed” and Bahrain’s “King Hamad Order of the Renaissance”
among the Gulf countries.
4 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Modi has fundamentally transformed India’s relationship with

the Gulf region. India’s bilateral trade with the GCC countries alone
stands at around US$ 184.5 billion.2 He has engaged with the countries
of the region beyond the traditionally dominant spheres of energy
and trade. Today, the India-Gulf relationship encompasses a wide
range of issues including cooperation in defence, security, food
security, climate change, health, renewable energy, to name a few.
Recognising their significance in the fields of energy, geopolitics and
economy, Prime Minister Modi has focused on building strategic
partnerships with the GCC countries. He has attached priority to
bilateral dialogues, high-level visits and joint initiatives with the GCC
countries in order to deepen political, defence and security
cooperation.

Energy
The Gulf countries are the most important source of energy given the
fact that India imports around 60 per cent of its oil from the region.
Iraq is the largest supplier of crude oil to India followed by Saudi
Arabia and the UAE. Presently, there exists a significant alignment of
interests between India and the Gulf nations regarding collaboration
in the energy sector. India sees the Gulf countries as a dependable
supplier of energy, while the Gulf nations perceive India as a secure
and enduring market for their oil and gas resources. Around half of
India’s LNG imports come from Qatar alone. India has established a
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to meet the requirements of energy
in case of exigencies. In its initial stages, India has successfully
established an SPR of five MMT (Million Metric Tons) at
Visakhapatnam, Mangalore and Padur. The government is moving
forward with the second phase, planning to extend the SPR to two
additional locations in Odisha and Padur. Collaborating with the Gulf
nations holds critical importance for India in reaching the targeted
storage capacity within these reserves. In recent times, India has
moved the traditional buyer-seller dynamics with Gulf nations, forging
strategic alliances and making substantial investments in the energy
domain. Indian public sector entities have ventured into the oil and
gas sectors of the UAE, Oman and Iraq, actively participating in
exploration, production activities and pivotal pipeline projects.
India’s West Asia Policy Under Modi 5

India is deepening its engagement with the Gulf countries in the

green and renewable energy sectors as well. There is a convergence
of interests and initiatives between India and the Gulf countries to
reduce carbon emissions. India is looking to investing more in solar
energy, hydropower and green hydrogen. This was highlighted at
the recently concluded G20 Leadership Summit in New Delhi. Earlier
in 2021 India invited the GCC countries to invest in the sustainable
energy sectors.3 The UAE and Saudi Arabia are two key players which
have taken a keen interest and significantly deepened collaboration
with India. In June 2023, during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Abu
Dhabi, India and the UAE issued a joint statement on climate change.
In October 2023, both countries agreed to collaborate on energy storage
technologies, Smart Grids, renewable energy and energy efficiency.4
Earlier in January 2023, India and the UAE signed a MoU on
collaboration in Green Hydrogen. Similarly, India and Saudi Arabia
signed a MoU on Electrical Interconnections, Green Hydrogen and
supply chains in October 2023. Both countries have also agreed to
promote investment in the new and renewable energy sector.5

Indian Expatriates in the Gulf

There are more than nine million Indians living in the Gulf region
contributing to the economic development and progress of these
countries. For many decades, the Indian expatriate workers in the
Gulf have served as a bridge connecting India and the Gulf region.
The contribution of India’s expatriate workers to the development
and progress of their economies has been acknowledged by the leaders
in the Gulf. Their safety, security and well-being are matters of serious
concern for the Government of India. India also benefits from
substantial remittance inflows, a result of expatriates sending a
significant portion of their earnings back to their families in the
country. These remittances form a significant portion of India’s foreign
exchange receipts, contributing to financial stability. In 2022, India
received foreign remittances of US$ 111 billion.6 Around half of the
total remittances received by India flow from the Gulf region.

Defence and Security Cooperation

Under Prime Minister Modi, defence and security cooperation with
6 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

the Gulf region has significantly been strengthened. Defence and

security cooperation between India and the Gulf countries has been a
constant point of discussion between Modi and the Gulf rulers in
bilateral meetings and discussions. The number of military-to-military
interactions such as joint training and exercises which help in sharing
their experiences and skills has increased substantially. Traditionally,
the Indian Navy was at the forefront of engagement with the navies
of the Gulf region. But in recent years, the Indian Air Force and the
Indian Army as well as the Coast Guard have been engaging with
their counterparts in the Gulf.
Modi has invited the Gulf countries to invest in the ‘Make in India’
defence initiatives. In order to strengthen defence ties, India seeks
joint manufacturing and co-production of arms and weapons with
the GCC states. This would require investment, technology and the
highest level of trust between the countries. Besides, some of the Gulf
countries have expressed their interest in buying arms and equipment
from India. The UAE has expressed interest in buying Brahmos
missiles from India. In 2019, the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) signed
a contract with the UAE worth US$ 45.75 million for the supply of
50,000 Bofors 155 mm shells. Prior to that in 2017, OFB had signed a
deal with the UAE for the Bofors Shells.7
Terrorism is a common issue of concern between India and the
GCC countries. Prime Minister Modi has emphasised the importance
of joint efforts and cooperation with the GCC countries to fight the
menace together. India believes that as terrorist organisations have
established transnational networks, it is necessary for the concerned
states to build consensus and join hands together to fight the menace.
Both India and the GCC countries have joined hands together and
taken initiatives to address the shared challenges of extremism and
terrorism. Counter-terror cooperation between India and the Gulf
region has been an important aspect of cooperation between the two.

Iran
Due to Pakistan’s obstruction of India’s overland connectivity to
Afghanistan and Central Asia, New Delhi has turned its attention to
Iran. Recognising Iran’s strategic geographical position between the
Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, India views it as a crucial hub for
India’s West Asia Policy Under Modi 7

inter-regional connectivity between South and Central Asia. Iran is

seen as a valuable land bridge, linking India’s West coast to Central
Asia and the wider Eurasian region. The 2003 New Delhi Declaration,
which was signed during President Mohammed Khatami’s visit to
India, committed to developing the Chabahar port with an eye to
facilitating regional trade and transit, especially with Afghanistan.
The New Delhi Declaration also underscored the mutual interest of
India and Iran in fully utilising the North-South transit routes and
enhancing infrastructure connectivity.8
However, significant progress on the Chabahar Port and the
development of the International North-South Transport Corridor
could only be achieved after the signing of the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. This led to the lifting of UN-mandated
economic sanctions in January 2016. In May 2016, Prime Minister
Modi’s visit to Tehran presented an opportunity to forge strategic ties
with Iran. The highlight of the visit was the signing of the India, Iran
and Afghanistan Trilateral Agreement, also known as the Chabahar
Agreement, on the establishment of an International Transit and
Transport Corridor, also called the Chabahar Agreement. Under this
agreement, India committed itself to building and taking operational
responsibility for the Chabahar Port. The agreement also highlighted
the significant interests shared by Tehran and New Delhi in the
development and stability of Afghanistan.
As part of the Chabahar Agreement, India pledged a US$ 500
million credit line to build, equip and operate two berths at Chabahar
Port in the Gulf of Oman. To operationalise the hinterland potential
of the port, Indian Railway Construction Limited (IRCON) signed a
MoU with Iran’s Construction, Development of Transport
Infrastructure Company (CDTIC) that will enable IRCON to provide
requisite services for the construction of the Chabahar-Zahedan
railway line which forms part of the transit and transportation corridor
in the Chabahar Agreement. In January 2018, India’s Exim Bank
operationalised a US$ 150 million line of credit to Iran’s Maritime
and Ports Organisation for making jetties and berths at Chabahar.
India Ports Global Pvt Limited, a joint venture between the Jawaharlal
Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) and Deen Dayal Port Authority made a
capital investment of US$ 85.21 million under a deal with an Iranian
8 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

company to equip and operate the container and multi-purpose

terminals at Shahid Beheshti Chabahar Port Phase-I. In December
2018, just before the US sanctions on Iran were to take effect, India
took over operations at the Shahid Beheshti Port.
Notably, India’s development of Chabahar Port has a regional
dimension, rectifying India’s sub-optimal level of trade and economic
ties with Central Asian republics, while helping these landlocked
countries diversify their connectivity to international markets
including South Asia. India’s ascension into the multilateral initiative
Ashgabat Agreement, which was signed in 2011 by Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, Iran, Oman and Qatar, was a key milestone in the
development of North-South connectivity in Eurasia. In order to
mutually reinforce the development of the INSTC and Chabahar,
especially given the latter’s significance for Central Asia, both Tehran
and New Delhi have been keen to interlink the two infrastructure
projects. In March 2021, marking ‘Chabahar Day’ at the Maritime India
Summit 2021, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar proposed its
inclusion in the INSTC trade corridor. While welcoming the interest
of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan in joining the 12-member multimodal
corridor project, the minister noted that an ‘eastern corridor through
Afghanistan’ would maximise the potential of the project.9 In a
nutshell, Chabahar Port, despite the challenges posed to its
development by the US sanctions and the Taliban takeover in
Afghanistan, has emerged as a flagbearer of India’s connectivity with
Central Asia and a key symbol of Indo-Iranian cooperation.10
As the US began negotiating peace with the Taliban securing its
military withdrawal from Afghanistan, both India and Iran maintained
that any initiative on the country should be centred on the Afghan
government. Furthermore, both favoured a regional approach to
stabilise Afghanistan and tackle counter-terrorism in the region. In
December 2019, Tehran convened a six-nation “Regional Security
Dialogue” attended by national security officials of Russia, China,
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and India.11 In November 2021, New
Delhi hosted the Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan with
senior security officials from Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.12 At the meeting, Prime
Minister Modi emphasised four aspects that countries in the region
India’s West Asia Policy Under Modi 9

need to focus on, namely, the need for an inclusive government, a

zero-tolerance stance about Afghan territory being used by terrorist
groups, a strategy to counter trafficking of drugs and arms from
Afghanistan and addressing the increasingly critical humanitarian
crisis in Afghanistan.13 Both countries also support the use of regional
organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to tackle
challenges emerging from Afghanistan.

India and the Israel-Palestine Issue

India has historically upheld a nuanced approach towards the Israel-
Palestine conflict. While strengthening ties with Israel, India has called
for a two-state solution, respecting the aspirations of the Palestinian
people. The diplomatic relations between India and Israel witnessed
significant improvement following the normalisation of ties in 1992.
Initially, the focus of cooperation was primarily on the defence and
agriculture sectors. However, over a period of time, the engagement
expanded to encompass a broader range of areas, including defence,
agriculture, cybersecurity, trade, tourism and scientific development.
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi, the bilateral ties between
India and Israel have reached new heights, highlighting the mutual
recognition of the importance of strengthening and broadening their
mutually beneficial partnership. Modi’s emphasis has been on
expanding cooperation beyond the defence sector, particularly in areas
such as science and technology, drinking water and sanitation,
agricultural cooperation, space research, innovation and cyber
security.
This shift in focus was clearly evident during Prime Minister
Modi’s visit to Israel in July 2017, which marked the first-ever visit by
an Indian Prime Minister to the country. The visit represented a
significant departure from India’s previous foreign policy approach
towards Israel, as Modi chose not to visit Palestine during the tour,
breaking with convention and symbolising a “de-hyphenation” of
India’s relations with them. In reciprocation, Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu visited India in January 2018. During this visit,
Modi and Netanyahu reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening
the bilateral relationship, expressing a shared vision for the future.
10 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

On 15 January 2018, both leaders shared a joint statement and said

that both countries share a common vision for the relationship.
Israeli Defence Minister Benjamin Gantz visited India in June 2022.
During his visit, both countries reiterated their commitment to further
deepening and expanding defence cooperation. In recent years, high-
level visits from the military have taken place which have provided a
fillip to the defence ties between India and Israel. The Chief of the Air
Staff Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria visited Israel
in August 2022 and the then Chief of Army Staff General Manoj
Mukund Naravane visited Israel in November 2022.
The expansion of ties in the areas of Health and Medicine is another
milestone in India-Israel ties. Since the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic, India and Israel have been closely cooperating with each
other in this sector. On 21 December 2020, both countries signed an
Agreement on Cooperation in the fields of Health and Medicine.
Since the beginning of the Israel-Palestine conflict, India has overall
maintained a supportive stance towards the Palestinian issue. In 1974,
India became the first non-Arab state to recognise the Palestine
Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the sole and legitimate representa-
tive of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, India was among the early
nations to acknowledge the state of Palestine in 1988. In 1996, India
inaugurated its Representative Office in Gaza, which later shifted to
Ramallah in 2003. These actions indicate India’s traditional support
for the Palestinian cause.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visited India in May 2017
on his third State Visit and overall, his fifth visit to India during his
Presidency. The visit was reciprocated by the historic first-ever visit
by Prime Minister Modi to Palestine on 10 February 2018. India signed
six MoUs focusing on the construction of a hospital, school, the India-
Palestine Centre for Empowering Women and the procurement of
equipment and machinery for the New National Printing Press. India
also promised to provide “one-time project assistance worth US$ 42.1
million for Palestinian nation-building in education, health, women
empowerment and capacity building.”14 During the visit, Prime
Minister Modi was conferred with the “Grand Collar of the State of
Palestine” – the highest civilian honour of Palestine – in recognition
of India’s constant support for the Palestinian cause.
India’s West Asia Policy Under Modi 11

India has deepened its engagement with both Israel and Palestine
while at the same time ‘de-hyphenating’ the two. While continuing
its traditional support for the Palestinian cause, India has steadily
expanded its cooperation with Israel on a wide range of issues. India’s
moral principle of supporting Palestinian statehood has continued
alongside the strengthening of the relationship with Israel in the areas
of defence, security, technology, health, innovation and other fields.
India has maintained a balanced position towards the Israel-
Hamas war that broke out after the 7 October terrorist attack on Israel.
India expressed solidarity with Israel and condemned the Hamas
attack on Israel. While India hasn’t formally designated Hamas as a
terrorist organization, it labelled the 7 October 2023 attack as an act
of terrorism. Prime Minister Modi spoke with Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas following the tragic blast at the Al Ahli hospital in
Gaza, expressing concern for the loss of lives. India was one of the
first countries to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza after the Rafah
border crossing was opened. Modi reiterated India’s position on the
longstanding Israel-Palestine issue, advocating for direct negotiations
between the two parties to resolve the conflict.

Revitalising Ties with Jordan

For the most part of history, the India-Jordan relationship has
remained low-key. The visit by King Abdullah II and Queen Rania to
India in December 2006 created an opportunity for both countries to
share views on all aspects of their bilateral relations.15 The first-ever
visit by an Indian Head of State took place after 65 years of
establishment of diplomatic ties, when then President of India, Pranab
Mukherjee, visited Amman in October 2015.16 During the visit, both
countries inaugurated the US$ 860 million Jordan India Fertiliser
Company (JIFCO) joint venture and signed six agreements focusing
on various areas of cooperation.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Jordan in February 2018
which was described as the beginning of a new chapter in the bilateral
ties by King Abdullah II. Later in the same month, King Abdullah II
visited India. During the visit, both countries signed 12 MoUs, focusing
on areas such as defence, trade, investment, industry, education,
agriculture, mineral exploration and IT. The agreement on defence
12 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

cooperation will be vital for India to “have a strategic imprint in the

region of the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean through the
Levant.”17 Later, India’s National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval, visited
Jordan in 2020. Jordan is a stable country in the turbulent West Asian
region and holds significant geostrategic value for fostering
collaboration with India in the areas of counter-terrorism and security
cooperation.
Both countries have also engaged in fighting against the COVID-
19 pandemic. During the difficult COVID-19 situation in Jordan, India
helped the Kingdom by providing supplies of essential medicine and
equipment.18 Furthermore, a two-week long training for 15 medical
experts of the Jordanian Armed Forces on COVID-19 intensive care
units was organised by the Indian government in February and March
2021.19 The bilateral trade between the two countries stands at US$
2.8 billion in 2021-2022.20 Both countries aim to reach bilateral trade
of US$ 5 billion by 2025 and agreed to diversify the trade basket.21 To
further enhance the commercial ties, India and Jordan launched a
trade and business forum in 2021.

Exploring New Space with Egypt

India and Egypt shared strong political and military ties during the
1950s and 1960s during the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Gamal
Abdel Nasser. Both countries were the champions of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) during the turbulent times of the Cold War.
However, in the subsequent decades, the bilateral relationship between
India and Egypt remained on a low ebb as the earlier momentum
could not be sustained due to a number of factors. Both Prime Minister
Modi and President Sisi came to power in 2014. Since then, both leaders
have expressed their desire to strengthen the bilateral relationship in
different spheres. Sisi has made three visits to India as President. He
first came to India in 2015 to participate in the India–Africa Forum
Summit held in Delhi, undertook a State visit to India in 2016 and in
January 2023 he participated in India’s Republic Day celebrations as
the Chief Guest. From India’s side, there have been frequent ministerial
and official visits to Cairo, including a visit by Defence Minister
Rajnath Singh in September 2022 and one by the External Affairs
Minister S. Jaishankar in October 2022. Prime Minister Modi visited
India’s West Asia Policy Under Modi 13

Egypt on June 24-25, 2023. During the visit, both countries signed a
strategic partnership agreement agreeing to elevate their relationship
to a strategic level.
Some important areas of convergence such as trade and
investment, counter-terrorism, defence and security issues have
emerged between India and Egypt since 2014. Egypt, like India,
confronts significant terrorism challenges, with various extremist
groups operating in the Sinai Peninsula. These include ISIS, Al Qaeda,
and local militant organisations, forming networks across Western
Asia and North Africa. The Egyptian government faces a major
security concern, as these groups frequently target security forces and
minority communities. Therefore, both countries have announced
‘zero tolerance’ for terrorism and have committed themselves to
forging comprehensive counter-terrorism cooperation.22
Under the leadership of Modi, defence and security cooperation
with Egypt has received significant attention. India is eager to enhance
its partnership in these areas with Egypt. In recent years, there has
been intensified military cooperation, including regular visits and port
calls by India and Egypt. The Indian and Egyptian navies have
conducted joint exercises, training programs, and port calls. India
and Egypt conducted their first-ever air exercise ‘Desert Warrior’ in
Egypt, while the Indian Air Force participated in the Tactical
Leadership Programme of the Egyptian Air Force Weapons School.23
Additionally, the Indian and Egyptian armies conducted their
inaugural joint exercise, ‘Exercise Cyclone-I,’ in Rajasthan.24 Given
their extensive experience in combating terrorism, collaborative efforts
in strategy and skills sharing will prove mutually beneficial.
As prominent countries in the Global South, India and Egypt share
common interests and concerns regarding global challenges. As part
of India’s G20 presidency, Egypt has been invited as a guest country,
showcasing the alignment between the two nations. Egypt has
expressed its backing for collaborative efforts with India on G20 issues,
emphasising the importance of addressing Global South issues
adequately within the G20 framework.

Challenges Remain in India-Turkiye Relationship

The relationship between India and Turkiye has historically been
14 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

limited by global and regional geopolitical factors. Although

diplomatic ties were established in 1948, soon after Indian
independence, the Cold War geopolitical dynamics prevented any
political warmth from taking root despite the two being secular
republics. India’s leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
and later, its proximity with the Soviet Union and Turkiye’s close
security ties with the US and membership of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) in 1952 put them in different camps during the
Cold War. Furthermore, Turkiye developed close fraternal and
ideological proximity with Pakistan and sided with Islamabad on
critical issues between India and Pakistan making it difficult for
bilateral relations to gain any traction. The post-Cold War recalibration
in Indian and Turkish foreign policies generated some opportunities
for moving beyond geopolitics to develop bilateral relations. However,
the Pakistan factor as well as Turkiye’s position on Jammu and Kashmir
has prevented any meaningful progress.
Prime Minister Modi has endeavoured to overcome the
geopolitical hurdles that prevented the full realisation of the potential
in bilateral ties, particularly by giving greater thrust to practical
cooperation as well as political and diplomatic engagement. As a
result, a number of important bilateral visits have taken place in recent
years, including by then External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj on
15-16 January 2015 and a return visit by Turkish Foreign Minister
Mevlut Cavusoglu on 19 March 2015. These were followed by the
participation in April 2015 of an Indian delegation led by the then
Minister of State for External Affairs, Gen. (Retd.) V.K. Singh in the
100th anniversary ceremonies of the Canakkale Land and Sea battles
of 1915. In November 2015, Modi attended the G20 Summit held in
Antalya and also held bilateral talks with President Erdogan on the
sidelines. Cavusoglu paid a visit to India on 18-19 August 2016. Modi
and Erdogan also met on the side-lines of other multilateral summits
leading to hopes for improvement in ties. This was followed by the
visit of President Erdogan to India in April-May 2017. These efforts
led to improved trading and business ties leading to bilateral trade
reaching US$ 7.22 billion in 2017-18.25
However, the Pakistan factor has repeatedly come in the way and
impacted adversely on the further deepening of ties. Turkiye’s support
India’s West Asia Policy Under Modi 15

for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, especially since India’s decision in

August 2019 to abolish the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, has
created serious political friction in bilateral relations. President
Erdogan has been one of the most vocal supporters of Pakistan over
the Kashmir issue in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
The Turkish position is anchored in both its historically friendly
relations with Pakistan as well as a broad convergence on
contemporary geopolitical issues as fellow members of the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The ideological and
Islamist leanings of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and
Erdogan himself clearly lead Turkiye to place fraternal religious ties
with Pakistan above trade and business transactions with India. This
has diminished any hopes for improvement in bilateral relations even
though, as large middle powers with growing regional influence, India
and Turkiye should find more common space to work together at the
multi-lateral level.
New Delhi, in response, has begun to be more assertive in dealing
with Ankara and has started taking more vocal positions on conflicts
between Turkiye and its neighbours including Greece, Cyprus and
Syria. It is in Turkiye’s interest to improve bilateral economic ties with
India as the country faces a deepening economic crisis. On the other
hand, Turkiye’s defence manufacturing industry is quite advanced
and holds some opportunities for the two sides to cooperate in
manufacturing of equipment. However, political challenges remain
especially given the intransigent position adopted by Turkiye on the
Kashmir issue. This issue clearly casts a long shadow. Hence, going
forward, it would require more than just improved economic relations
for the relationship to progress. For the foreseeable future, bilateral
ties are likely to remain frosty and continue to pose a challenge for
the Modi government.

Mini-lateral and Plurilateral Engagements in West Asia

Given the polarised nature of geopolitics in the West Asian region,
India has traditionally preferred to engage with each of the countries
of West Asia at the bilateral level. Even regional organisations like the
OIC and the Arab League have remained divided over different issues.
With the changing times, India has opted to engage with the region
16 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

by forming mini-lateral groupings taking like-minded countries on

board. The India, Israel, the UAE and the US (I2U2) has emerged as
an important mini-lateral in the region. It has announced six major
areas of cooperation. The I2U2 group is intended to “encourage joint
investments in six mutually identified areas such as water, energy,
transportation, space, health, and food security.”26 The issues agreed
upon are non-controversial, devoid of suspicion about ulterior motives
and unilateral advantages to member states. Furthermore, they
actively promote private sector involvement, encourage technological
collaboration, enhance investments and facilitate infrastructure
improvements.
In July 2022, the inaugural summit of the I2U2 was conducted
virtually, with the participation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi,
Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, Emirati President Mohammed bin
Zayed Al Nahyan and American President Joe Biden. The leaders
engaged in discussions concerning two critical issues, namely food
security and the energy crisis. A significant outcome of the meeting
was the agreement for the UAE to invest US$ 2 billion in India,
specifically towards the establishment of food parks and the
implementation of smart technology for water conservation and the
utilisation of renewable energy sources. Notably, this initiative will
leverage American and Israeli technology while involving their
respective private sectors. The primary objective is to foster a
collaborative approach to address the challenges posed by food
insecurity. Additionally, the leaders at the summit concurred with
one another on the establishment of hybrid renewable energy projects
in Gujarat, India, with active participation from the UAE, Israel and
the US in terms of investment and technology. The private sector will
also play a crucial role in the field of clean energy projects to advance
renewable energy targets.
In another development, in May 2023, the National Security
Advisers of India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the US met in Riyadh.
Without elaborating further details, US National Security Advisor Jake
Sullivan stated that the officials met “to advance their shared vision
of a more secure and prosperous Middle East region interconnected
with India and the world.”27 It is widely reported that they discussed,
among other issues, the development of a joint railway connectivity
India’s West Asia Policy Under Modi 17

infrastructure project that would connect the Gulf with other Arab
countries in the Levant. This will be connected to India via the shipping
lanes.28 Although this project has yet to take off, it has the potential to
provide economic and connectivity benefits to the whole region and
India. It will provide India with further opportunities in trade, energy
and connectivity access to West Asia. Beyond the stated objective of
establishing connectivity, the cooperation between these four countries
could deepen their convergence on the geopolitical situation.
During the G20 Leaders’ Summit held in New Delhi in September
2023, India along with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the USA, France,
Germany, Italy and the EU announced the formation of the India-
Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). This is an economic
and transport corridor which will connect India to Europe through
West Asia. It is believed that this corridor will significantly bolster
trade and connectivity between these regions using both sea and rail
routes.

Managing Complex Regional Rivalries

The complex regional security dynamics, involvement of external
powers and protracted conflicts in the region bring fresh challenges
to India’s engagement in the region. Keeping in mind its long-term
interests, India has engaged all the regional powers while avoiding
any involvement in any regional disputes. For instance, India
maintains strong relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia who have
had an adversarial relationship with one another in the past. Similarly,
India has simultaneously been engaging with Iran and Israel despite
acrimony between the two. In the aftermath of the Qatar crisis which
led to its boycotting in 2017 by the quartet of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
the UAE and Egypt, India also treaded a fine line without taking sides.
India appealed to the GCC States to resolve the crisis amicably.
Similarly, India has adopted a nuanced policy towards the long-
standing Israel-Palestine conflict.

Cooperation during the COVID-19 Pandemic and Vande

Bharat Mission
In 2020, India demonstrated its support to countries in the region by
offering assistance in various ways. It supplied hydroxychloroquine
18 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

tablets to Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the UAE.
Additionally, India responded to Kuwait’s request by dispatching a
15-member medical team,29 while also deploying a team of 88 medical
and healthcare professionals to the UAE to aid in their fight against
the pandemic.30 These proactive measures have consolidated India’s
reputation as a reliable and steadfast friend, providing timely
assistance during crises. In 2021, when the dangerous Delta variant
of the COVID-19 virus spread across India, there was an acute shortage
of liquid oxygen in India. At the time, the Gulf countries such as the
UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait quickly stepped in to supply liquid
oxygen to help India in its struggle against the pandemic.31 Israel too
emerged as a key partner in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic as it
supplied liquid oxygen, medical equipment and Artificial Intelligence
(AI) based technologies to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences
(AIIMS), New Delhi.
During the pandemic, India reached out to a number of countries
in the world supplying medicines, professionals and equipment. This
was widely known as India’s “COVID diplomacy.” Later, as the
vaccines gradually became available, India supplied vaccines to several
countries despite its heavy domestic requirements. India sent millions
of doses of Covishield and Covaxin vaccines to countries all over the
world, including the West Asian countries.
In April 2020, India initiated a registration process for its nationals
abroad who wished to return home, as many expatriates expressed a
desire to come back as the pandemic continued to spread. Responding
to this, a significant number of Indian citizens in various Gulf countries
registered themselves for repatriation. To address this situation, India
launched the Vande Bharat Mission in May 2020, with the aim of
bringing back stranded Indian nationals from different parts of the
world. India engaged in discussions with GCC countries to facilitate
repatriation and established air bubbles to enable phased repatriation.
The Gulf countries responded positively to India’s efforts, resulting
in the successful repatriation of expatriates. The Vande Bharat Mission
emerged as one of the largest peacetime repatriation initiatives ever
undertaken globally. In December 2021, the Indian Government
announced that over 700,000 Indians had been repatriated from the
Gulf region during the pandemic through the Vande Bharat Mission.32
India’s West Asia Policy Under Modi 19

Conclusion
India’s approach towards West Asia has undergone significant change
under Prime Minister Modi. His multiple visits to the region filled
the void of high-level visits which was necessary keeping in mind
India’s enormous stakes and interests in West Asia. Engagement at a
personal level among the top leadership on both sides has increased
significantly. This has, to a large extent, bridged the earlier trust deficit
between India and the countries of the region.
Modi came to power at a time when the West Asian region was
going through a period of turmoil with ISIS on the rampage and civil
wars in Syria, Yemen and Libya. Intelligence sharing and cooperation
in countering terrorism has been accelerated under Modi. The rise of
ISIS and other terrorist organisations in the region amid the Arab
unrest has propelled India-West Asia cooperation in dealing with the
common challenge of global terrorism. While Modi’s government
joined hands together with the countries of the region to fight
terrorism, it refrained from getting dragged into the internal affairs
of countries in the region. Instead, India chose to use its resources to
provide humanitarian support to the countries experiencing the
ravages of civil wars.
Moving beyond the traditionally dominant areas of cooperation
such as trade, energy and diaspora, Prime Minister Modi has engaged
the countries of the West Asian region on defence, security and
strategic issues. He has adopted a long-term approach towards West
Asia and focused on building strategic partnerships with the regional
powers. In the energy sector, India is now redefining the traditional
buyer-seller relationship and seeking investments and partnerships
in both upstream and downstream activities. India has invested in
the energy sector in the Gulf in terms of human resources and
technology in the exploration and production of oil and gas.
The ‘neighbourhood first’ policy of Modi has proved to be very
successful in West Asia. His priority on deepening economic
engagement and on strengthening the defence and security
dimensions of its strategic partnerships in the region has been
reciprocated by many in West Asia. India’s image as a Good Samaritan
during the COVID-19 pandemic has left a deep and indelible
impression on the people of the region. India’s efforts to promote the
20 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

interests of the Global South have burnished India’s, and Prime

Minister Modi’s, credentials at the government and popular levels.
The change and dynamism introduced by Modi to India’s West Asia
policy will have a lasting impact on the India-West Asia relationship.

NOTES
1 “Committed to Global Order Based on Rules in Post-Covid-19 World”, Hindustan
Times, 21 September 2020, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/
committed-to-global-order-based-on-rules-in-post-covid-19-world-harsh-shringla-
on-foreign-policy-priorities/story-zC7ohdSW5Qy9S5XDRc6RwJ.html (Accessed 13
May 2022).
2 Export-Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, Government of India.
3 “India invites GCC Nations to invest in sustainable energy sectors”, Business
Standard, 10 November 2021, at https://www.business-standard.com/content/press-
releases-ani/india-invites-gcc-nations-to-invest-in-sustainable-energy-sectors-
121111000524_1.html (Accessed 22 January 2022).
4 “UAE-India MoU to drive investment and collaboration in industry and advanced
technologies”, Press Information Bureau, 5 October 2023, at https://pib.gov.in/
PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1964714#:~:text=In%20the%20energy%20space%2
C%20the ,renewable %20energy% 20and%20energy%20efficiency (Accessed 22
November 2023).
5 “India and Saudi Arabia decide to promote investment in New & Renewable
Energy”, Press Information Bureau, 10 October 2023, at https://pib.gov.in/
PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1966200 (Accessed 22 November 2023).
6 Vandana Chandra, “Remittance flows reached an all-time high in 2022 in South
Asia”, World Bank Blog, 10 October 2023, at https://blogs.worldbank.org/
peoplemove/remittance-flows-reached-all-time-high-2022-south-asia (Accessed 27
November 2023).
7 “In its largest ever export order, OFB to supply 50,000 Bofors shells to UAE”,
Economic Times, 3 August 2019, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/
defence/in-its-largest-ever-export-order-ofb-to-supply-50000-bofors-shells-to-uae/
articleshow/70501461.cms?from=mdr (Accessed 12 March 2023).
8 The Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Iran, “The New Delhi
Declaration”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 25 January 2003,
at https://www.mea.gov.in/other.htm?dtl/20182/The+Republic+of+India+and+th#1
(Accessed 2 March 2023).
9 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, ‘India proposes inclusion of Iran’s Chabahar Port in
International North South Transport Corridor’, The Economic Times, 5 March 2021,
at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-proposes-
inclusion-of-irans-chabahar-port-in-international-north-south-transport-corridor/
articleshow/81336893.cms?from=mdr (Accessed 22 February 2023).
10 Philip Reid, “Makaran Gateways: A Strategic Reference for Gwadar and Chabahar”,
IDSA Occasional Paper no. 53, August 2019, at https://idsa.in/system/files/opaper/
makran-gatways-op-53.pdf (Accessed 22 February 2023).
11 Alireza Noori, “Tehran convenes allies against threats that include US”, Al Monitor,
24 December 2019, at https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2019/12/iran-tehran-
allies-threats-security-conference-afghanistan.html (Accessed 12 February 2023).
India’s West Asia Policy Under Modi 21

12 Prime Minister’s Office, “Joint Call on Prime Minister by National Security Advisers
/ Secretaries of Security Councils attending the “Delhi Regional Security Dialogue
on Afghanistan”, Press Information Bureau, 10 November 2021, at https://
pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1770732 (Accessed 22 February
2023).
13 “Joint Call on Prime Minister by National Security Advisers / Secretaries of Security
Councils attending the “Delhi Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan”, Press
Information Bureau, 10 November 2021, at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframe
Page.aspx?PRID=1770732 (Accessed 22 February 2023).
14 “India-Palestine Bilateral Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India, at https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral_Brief-Sept_2019.pdf
(Accessed 4 December 2022).
15 “India-Jordan Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Jordan2020New.pdf (Accessed 4
December 2022).
16 “Visit of President to Jordan”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
at https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/25890/Visit_of_President_to_
Jordan_October_1012_2015 (Accessed 4 December 2022).
17 Ibid.
18 “India ambassador lauds Jordan-India ties, as country celebrates independence”,
Jordan News Agency, at https://petra.gov.jo/Include/InnerPage.jsp?ID=40477&lang=
en& name= en_news (Accessed 4 December 2022).
19 Ibid.
20 Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of
India, at https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/iecnt.asp (Accessed 4 December
2022).
21 Ibid.
22 “India-Egypt Joint Statement during the State Visit of the President of Egypt to
India”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 26 January 2023, at https:/
/mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/36148/indiaegypt+joint+ statement +
during + the+state+visit+of+the+president+of+egypt+to+india+ january+2427+2023
(Accessed 24 April 2023).
23 “IAF Participation in Tactical Leadership Programme in Egypt”, Press Information
Bureau, Government of India, 8 July 2022, at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframe
Page.aspx?PRID=1840177 (Accessed 22 March 2023).
24 “Inaugural Edition of Indo-Egypt Joint Training Exercise Cyclone-I Commences
in Rajasthan”, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 20 January 2023 at
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1892377#:~:text= The%20 first %
20ever%20joint%20exercise, Rajasthan %20since% 2014%20January%202023
(Accessed 22 March 2023).
25 Export-Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, Government of India.
26 “First I2U2 (India-Israel-UAE-USA) Leaders’ Virtual Summit”, Ministry of External
Affairs, Government of India, 12 July 2022, at https://mea.gov.in/press-
releases.htm?dtl/35489/First_I2U2_IndiaIsraelUAEUSA_Leaders_Virtual_Summit
(Accessed 12 May 2023).
27 “Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s Meeting on Regional
Integration”, White House, 7 May 2023, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2023/05/07/readout-of-national-security-advisor-jake-
sullivans-meeting-on-regional-integration/ (Accessed 12 June 2023).
22 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

28 “Doval in Saudi to discuss US rail link plan for West Asia”, Indian Express, 8 May
2023, at https://indianexpress.com/article/india/doval-in-saudi-to-discuss-us-rail-
link-plan-for-west-asia-8596962/ (Accessed 12 June 2023).
29 “India rushes Covid-19 medical team to Kuwait, says ready to help Gulf countries”,
Hindustan Times, 11 April 2020, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/
india-rushes-covid-19-medical-team-to-kuwait-says-ready-to-help-gulf-countries/
story-q2at5ekUpOdC0h62ix57VL.html (Accessed 12 May 2023).
30 “Combating coronavirus: 88 medics from India arrive in UAE to assist in war
against pandemic”, Khaleej Times, 9 May 2020, at https://www.khaleejtimes.com/
uae/combating-coronavirus-88-medics-from-india-arrive-in-uae-to-assist-in-war-
against-pandemic (Accessed 2 March 2023).
31 “UAE, Kuwait send oxygen to India amid second coronavirus wave”, Arabian
Business, 4 May 2021, at https://www.arabianbusiness.com/industries/industries-
culture-society/463008-uae-kuwait-send-oxygen-to-india-amid-second-
coronavirus-wave (Accessed 2 March 2023).
32 Statement made by the External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar, in Lok Sabha
on 10 December 2021.
 2
India and the GCC States:
A Growing Engagement
Prasanta Kumar Pradhan

Introduction
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional organisation
consisting of six Gulf Arab States – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It was established in 1981 in the aftermath
of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war, which
began in 1980. Founded amidst such a turbulent political and security
environment in the Gulf region, the GCC aimed to foster unity and
cohesion among member states on issues such as trade, culture,
education, literature, etc. Though defence and security cooperation
was not mentioned in the Charter of the GCC, the issue has emerged
as a key component of discussion over the years because of the
continuing threat perception for the member States and the need to
stay united in the face of such threats. The similar nature of their
political systems, economic systems – mainly rentier economies –
language, culture, ethnicity and geographical proximity have been
the key factors, which have kept them together in an unstable
neighbourhood. Through the collective efforts of the member States,
the GCC has emerged as a key regional organisation in the Gulf. Over
the last four decades, it has played a significant role in regional politics,
security and economy in the Gulf.
24 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

India has a strong and multi-dimensional relationship with the

member States of the GCC. India has also huge political, economic
and strategic interests with the GCC countries. India considers the
Gulf region as its ‘extended neighbourhood’ and ‘economic
hinterland.’ Traditionally, strong economic ties have existed between
India and the Arab Gulf States. Trade and commerce between the
two sides have grown tremendously and the GCC has emerged as a
major trading partner for India. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are among
the top trading partners of India in the world. A strong economic
relationship has remained the backbone of India’s ties with the Gulf
region for a long period. India relies heavily on the GCC countries
for the supply of oil and gas. They have been a reliable source of
energy for India for decades. There are around nine million Indian
nationals living and working in the GCC States. Their safety and well-
being is also a matter of concern for India. Cooperation with the GCC
States is crucial for India for security reasons as well. Terrorism and
piracy are challenges common to India and the GCC States. India
requires the support of the GCC countries to fight terror and to protect
the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS) from the threats of piracy
in the Arabian Sea.
Since Prime Minister Modi came to power, India’s engagement
with the GCC countries has increased significantly. He has adopted a
proactive and pragmatic approach towards the countries of the region
and has engaged with them in multiple fields. His multiple visits to
the Gulf region and interaction with the leadership have been
impressive and have shown results. Moving beyond the traditional
areas of cooperation between India and the Gulf region, Prime Minister
Modi has visualised and implemented stronger and multifaceted
strategic partnerships with the countries of the region.
The GCC Countries have also reciprocated to India’s initiatives
and have expressed their willingness to engage with India in several
fields. High level visits from the Gulf region is a reflective of their
changing approach towards India. The Gulf leaders have increasingly
realised the benefits of partnership and collaboration with India both
in traditional domains as well as in the new and emerging fields. The
Gulf leaders find India’s approach of non-interference in their regional
and internal affairs, coupled with its emphasis on cooperation and
collaboration for mutual benefit to be highly appealing.
India and the GCC States: A Growing Engagement 25

India’s ‘Think West’ Policy

Prime Minister Modi’s approach towards the Gulf countries is driven
by India’s significant interests and stakes in the region. His approach
aims to expand cooperation across various fields which would yield
mutual benefits for both. Modi has focused on further strengthening
the existing areas of cooperation such as bilateral trade and commerce,
energy cooperation and diaspora ties, while at the same time exploring
the potential in other areas such as defence, security, food security,
renewable energy, climate change, science and technology, etc. To
prioritise India’s engagement with the West Asian region, India has
adopted the ‘Think West’ policy. While deepening cooperation with
the countries of the region, under the Think West policy, India intends
to move beyond the traditionally dominant fields of cooperation with
the Gulf region.1 Besides, Modi’s approach of prioritising engagement
with the neighbouring countries under the ‘Neighbourhood first’
policy has also found resonance in the India-GCC relationship.

Trade, Investment and Connectivity

The Gulf region holds significant importance as a destination for
India’s exports. India’s trade with the GCC countries includes a diverse
range of products such as mineral oils, organic chemicals, cereals,
meats, fruits and vegetables, textile products, iron and steel, electrical
machinery and equipment, and other mechanical appliances.
However, the trade balance heavily favours the GCC countries due
to India’s substantial import of petroleum crude. Despite the trade
imbalance, the economic partnership between India and the GCC
countries remains robust.
The total bilateral trade between India and the GCC countries at
present stands at over US$ 184.5 billion. The UAE and Saudi Arabia
are two important trade partners of India in the region with bilateral
trade of US$ 84. 8 billion and US$ 52.7 billion, respectively (Table
2.1). In fact, the UAE is the third largest trading partner of India in
the world after the US and China.
Keeping in view the growing trade and commerce between the
two, India has always believed that a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
with the GCC will be beneficial for both. In 2004, India and the GCC
negotiated for signing an FTA. In the following years, a couple of
26 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

rounds were held, but the talks could not yield any positive results.
In November 2022, the Government announced that India and the
GCC have agreed to resume FTA talks.2 At the bilateral level, India
and the UAE have signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA) in 2022, which will further enhance bilateral trade
and business between the two countries.

Table 2.1: India-GCC Bilateral Trade (in US$ million)

Sl. No. Country 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23
1. Bahrain 762.40 987.94 1,281.77 980.6 1057.74 1,653.19 1,979.76
2. Kuwait 5,960.27 8,531.34 8,764.74 10,860.36 6,268.34 12,243.68 13,807.82
3. Oman 4,018.79 6,703.76 5,005.30 5,931.14 5,443.22 9,988.98 12,388.43
4. Qatar 8,430.78 9,880.90 12,332.86 10,954.33 9,214.97 15,031.45 18,774.87
5. Saudi 25,082.68 27,480.66 34,040.93 33,094.22 22,043.37 42,859.52 52,762.92
Arabia
6. UAE 52,685.33 49,885.23 59,912.05 59,110.1 43,302.53 72,878.36 84,840.45
7. Total 96,940.25 103,469.83 121,337.65 120,930.8 87,330.17 154,655.18 184,554.25
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

The Gulf countries have a large amount of sovereign wealth funds.

Prime Minister Modi, during his meeting with the Gulf leaders and
the business communities, urged them to invest in India. Modi
described India as a ‘land of opportunities’ and appealed to them to
invest in India in different sectors.3 During his visit to Doha in 2016,
while assuring them of the increasingly favourable business
environment in India under his government, Modi invited the business
community to invest in India.4 Again, in his virtual address during
the Dubai Expo in 2021, Modi invited the investors by reiterating,
“India also offers you maximum growth. Growth in scale, growth in
ambition, growth in results. Come to India and be a part of our growth
story.”5 He also invited the Gulf countries to invest in the ‘Make in
India’ projects, which he believed would bring in substantial
investment to the country, which would serve bilateral interests.
Though the GCC countries have surplus capital, India has not
been able to attract substantial investment from them. The foreign
direct investment (FDI) in India from the GCC countries is much below
the potential. However, there has been a substantial increase in the
FDI inflows from the Gulf region to India since 2014. According to
India and the GCC States: A Growing Engagement 27

the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Ministry

of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, the cumulative FDI
inflow from the Gulf region (GCC countries and Iran) to India from
January 2000 to December 2021 was US$ 16.45 billion, which is
approximately 2.87 per cent of the total FDI inflow to the country.6
The total FDI from the Gulf region in 2014 was US$ 326.48 million,
which reached its peak at US$ 6.99 billion in 2020.7 The FDI from the
Gulf region has gone to sectors such as computer software,
construction, service sector, power and tourism sectors in India.
In September 2023, during the G20 leadership summit in Delhi, a
MoU was signed by India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, France, Germany,
Italy, the US and the EU to establish the India–Middle East–Europe
Economic Corridor (IMEC).8 It is a trade and transport corridor which
would connect India, the Gulf and Europe. The Eastern corridor of
the IMEC will connect India to West Asia through the maritime route
and the Northern route will connect West Asia to Europe through
rail, road and maritime routes. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are the
two most prominent trade partners of India in the Gulf. The IMEC,
apart from strengthening India’s engagements with the US and Israel,
has opened new avenues of cooperation with the Gulf countries.

Energy Cooperation
Energy plays a crucial role in the relationship between India and the
GCC countries. India is heavily dependent on the GCC nations, along
with Iran and Iraq, for its energy supply. India is a growing economy
with an increasing population and industrialisation, which heightens
the demand for energy. The Gulf region has been the preferred source
of energy due to its geographical proximity and comparatively lower
transportation costs. Over the decades, India’s dependency on the
GCC region for energy has continued to expand and it will continue
to, in the near future.
The Gulf region supplies around two-thirds of India’s energy
requirements. Iraq and Saudi Arabia have remained the top two crude
oil suppliers for India. This import of large quantities of petroleum
crude underscores the crucial role played by the GCC countries as
suppliers of energy resources to India. In 2022-23, Russia surpassed
Saudi Arabia to be the second-largest oil supplier as India purchased
28 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

large volumes of Russian crude at a discounted price since the onset

of the Russia-Ukraine War. Table 2.2 below shows India’s country-
wise oil imports from the Gulf during the last six years.

Table 2.2: India’s Crude Oil Imports from the Gulf (in US$ million)
Sl. No. Country 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23
1. Iraq 17,544.24 22,265.04 22,764.55 12,873.45 26,380.58 33,599.57
2. Saudi Arabia 15,262.60 21,381.04 20,355.22 10,753.16 19,706.37 29,077.41
3. Iran 8,978.76 12,110.72 994.81 Nil Nil Nil
4. UAE 6,122.20 9,512.48 10,927.52 7,360.73 10,700.71 16,840.67
5. Kuwait 5,283.96 5,430.90 4,840.35 3,126.93 6,551.90 8,024.61
6. Oman 2,413.73 805.61 1,010.43 1,156.36 3,096.58 2,657.57
7. Qatar 1,264.98 1,215.74 1,365.52 955.73 935.69 1,874.62
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

Besides crude oil, the Gulf region is also important for India for
the supply of natural gas as well. Qatar supplies around half of the
total LNG imports of India. In 2021-22, Qatar supplied 44 per cent of
India’s total LNG imports amounting to US$ 5.9 billion.9 In the same
year, the UAE and Oman also supplied LNG to India worth US$ 1.66
billion and US$ 674 million, respectively.10
The Gulf region remains highly volatile due to ongoing conflicts,
civil unrest and terrorism, which possess the potential to disrupt oil
production and supply. In order to ensure energy availability during
emergencies, India has taken several steps to establish Strategic
Petroleum Reserves (SPR) – to store crude oil in the rock caverns
located in various parts of the country. In the initial phase, India has
successfully established an SPR with a capacity of five million metric
tons (MMT) of crude oil across Visakhapatnam, Mangalore and Padur.
The Government has also decided to implement the second phase of
the SPR, with two additional locations identified in Odisha and Padur.
Cooperation with the Gulf countries plays a critical role in enabling
India to attain the desired storage capacity within these reserves.
Therefore, India has reached out to key oil suppliers such as Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, who have expressed their willingness to support
India’s SPR initiative. Agreements have already been signed between
India and these countries to facilitate collaboration. The leaders of
India and the GCC States: A Growing Engagement 29

the Gulf nations have also reaffirmed their commitment to supporting

India’s energy security objectives.
In recent years, India has moved beyond the buyer-seller
relationship with the Gulf countries and has engaged in building
strategic partnerships and investments in the energy sector. Indian
public sector undertakings (PSUs) have started investing in the oil
and gas sector in the UAE, Oman and Iraq in oil exploration,
production as well as in pipeline projects. Prominent Indian PSUs
including ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd
(IOCL) and Bharat Petro Resources Ltd (BPRL) are actively engaged
in upstream activities in the Lower Zakum oil field located in the
UAE. In 2019, Urja Bharat Pte Ltd, a consortium of Indian Oil
Corporation and BPRL won a bid to explore and produce oil from the
Onshore Block 1 in the UAE.11 In 2018, Indian Oil Corporation Limited
acquired a 17 per cent participating interest in Mukhaizna Oil Field
in Oman.12 Beyond the GCC States, OVL has also stakes in oil fields
in Iran and Iraq as well. The involvement of the Indian PSUs in the
Gulf energy sector contributes to strengthening India’s energy security.
Prime Minister Modi’s policy entails India’s strategic investments in
the energy sector in the Gulf, which will foster sustained energy
security for India, and strategic partnerships in the energy sector
which, ultimately, will contribute to economic growth for both sides.

Renewable Energy
In order to reduce the use of fossil fuels, India is trying to increase the
share of renewable energy in its energy basket. During the last decade,
India has made a slow but steady progress in this regard by increasing
power generation from renewable energy, primarily from solar and
wind energy sources. Modi government is committed to attaining a
goal of achieving Net Zero Emissions by 2070. In the short term, the
country aims to elevate its renewable energy capacity to 500 GW by
2030 while simultaneously reducing cumulative emissions by one
billion tonnes within the same timeframe.13 Prime Minister Modi
during his address at the G20 Summit in Bali in 2022 stated that by
2030, half of India’s electricity will be generated from renewable
sources.14
30 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Like India, the GCC countries are also looking to reduce their
carbon emissions and have started investing in renewable energy and
there is a common interest between India and the GCC countries to
cooperate in this sector. Issues such as investment, technology and
human resources have been discussed over the years to take the joint
efforts forward.
Cooperation on renewable energy is emerging as an important
arena of engagement. The UAE has emerged as India’s strong partner
in the realm of renewable energy cooperation. In January 2023, India
and the UAE signed a MoU to promote cooperation in Green
Hydrogen development and investment in India. India-UAE
cooperation in the energy sector gains further strength as both are
members of the India, Israel, the UAE and the US (I2U2) grouping. In
July 2022, after the first Leaders’ meeting of the I2U2, they agreed to
establish a hybrid renewable energy project in Gujarat, India including
wind, solar and battery storage systems. The UAE would be a key
knowledge and investment partner in this project.15 During Modi’s
visit to the UAE in July 2023, both countries issued a joint statement
on climate change. Modi and the UAE President Sheikh Mohamed
bin Zayed Al Nahyan agreed to invest in renewable energy and Green
Hydrogen. They emphasised on the use of technology to reduce
emissions and underscored the need for an equitable and sustainable
energy transition.16
India along with France started the International Solar Alliance
(ISA) in 2015. The ISA aims to increase the production and use of
solar energy, reduce its production cost and invest in technology,
research and development.17 It also intends to mobilise funds of over
US$ 1000 billion for investment by 2030.18 Prime Minister Modi has
been active in promoting the ISA and garnering support from countries
all over the world. The GCC countries such as Bahrain, Oman, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE have joined the ISA. As the Gulf region receives
abundant sunlight throughout the year, they believe this initiative
will be helpful to them in future. Besides, they have surplus wealth to
invest in the technology and R&D required for producing solar energy.
India has prioritised Green Hydrogen as another important area
of renewable energy. On 15 August 2021, Prime Minister Modi
India and the GCC States: A Growing Engagement 31

announced the launch of India’s National Green Hydrogen Mission,

to achieve its climate goals and make the country a hub for the
production of Green Hydrogen. In January 2023, the Mission secured
the cabinet’s approval. The National Green Hydrogen Mission
document states that the objective of the Mission is to become
Atmanirbhar (self-reliant) by producing clean energy, reducing
dependency on fossil fuel imports, and becoming the world leader in
the technology of Green Hydrogen.19 The Mission targets to produce
five MMT of Green Hydrogen per annum by 2030, which will help
replace the use of fossil fuels.20 A number of GCC countries have also
set their objective of producing Green Hydrogen and have started
working in this regard.21 Countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in
particular, have taken strong futuristic steps to produce Hydrogen.
The Emirati cabinet, in July 2023, approved the National Hydrogen
Strategy, which aims to promote the production and export of
Hydrogen energy.22 Saudi Arabia’s NEOM Green Hydrogen Company
(NGHC) is building a large hydrogen production facility at Oxagon
in NEOM. It is expected to be operational in 2026 and will have the
daily capacity to produce 600 tonnes of Green Hydrogen.23 Similarly,
Oman has also set a target of Net Zero Emissions by 2050 and targets
to produce one million tons of Green Hydrogen annually by 2030.24
There is a convergence of interests between India and the GCC States
to cooperate in technology, human resources and investment in the
production of Green Hydrogen.

Emphasising Political Dialogue and Strategic Partnerships

To establish a structured and consistent channel of communication,
the GCC-India Political Dialogue was established in 2003. This
initiative aimed to institutionalise a process for ongoing interaction
between India and the GCC. The political dialogue takes place every
year on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New
York. This forum has proven to be an effective channel of
communication, facilitating a constructive exchange of views and
contributing to the strengthening of ties and the promotion of shared
interests between the two. Recognising India’s importance, the GCC
has accorded to it the status of a ‘dialogue partner’.
32 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

In September 2022, India and GCC signed a MoU on the

Mechanism of Consultations between them. In the MoU, both sides
agreed to institutionalise an annual dialogue to be held between the
two.25 Following up on the MoU, the first India-GCC Senior Officers
Meeting (SOM) was held in Riyadh which discussed a number of
important bilateral and regional issues. Importantly, at the meeting,
both sides agreed to finalise the India-GCC FTA agreement26 which
would provide a boost to the bilateral trade and commerce.
Besides, as India aspires to assume a leading role on the global
stage, the support of GCC countries has become crucial. Consequently,
India is actively engaging with the GCC countries to advocate for
United Nations (UN) reform and pursue its aspirations of securing
permanent membership in the UN Security Council. The GCC
countries have expressed their support for India.
Building strategic partnerships with the GCC countries has been
an important element of India’s approach towards the region. India
believes that building strategic partnerships with the GCC countries
not only opens multiple fronts of engagement but also deepens
cooperation in existing fields. This also provides a boost to the existing
trust and confidence between the countries. The signing of strategic
partnership agreements has also significantly helped to change the
perception of the GCC countries towards India. The economic benefit
the GCC countries accrued out of their collaboration with India, the
success of cooperation in the field of energy, the emerging defence
and security cooperation, and cooperation in emerging fields such as
health, renewable energy, climate change, food security etc., have been
the important aspects of the strategic partnerships. This is a huge
leap forward in the India-GCC relationship, as in the past the general
perception of the GCC countries towards India had been dominated
by a buyer-seller approach. Building strategic partnerships has taken
the India-GCC relationship to a new level of mutual interest and long-
term sustainable collaborations in multiple fields.
India has also engaged with the GCC countries in minilateral
engagements. The I2U2, has been an active platform to discuss and
collaborate on issues such as food security, energy security, water
security and climate change; there has been tangible progress in the
India and the GCC States: A Growing Engagement 33

functioning of the I2U2. Here, India and the UAE get an opportunity
not just to collaborate bilaterally but also to take it forward with Israel
and the US in the aftermath of the Abraham Accords. Coming on the
heels of the signing of the Abraham Accords that normalised the
relationship between Israel and the UAE, the I2U2 grouping, therefore,
assumes significant political and strategic value. In May 2023, the
National Security Advisers of India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the
US met in Riyadh to discuss, among other issues, the possibility of
establishing railway connectivity in West Asia and connecting it to
India via the maritime route.27 Engaging with two key regional players
such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia on connectivity and infrastructure
would further deepen India’s existing strategic partnership with them.

Defence and Security Cooperation

The growing cooperation in defence and security has emerged as a
key pillar of cooperation between India and the GCC countries. Prime
Minister Modi’s proactive approach towards the GCC countries aims
to bolster India’s defence and security ties by enhancing cooperation
beyond the traditionally dominant realms of trade, energy and
diaspora. Modi has recognised the shared security challenges of
terrorism and piracy faced by India and the GCC countries and is
engaging with them at different levels to deter these threats.
The defence cooperation between India and the GCC countries
has witnessed significant progress in recent years. The turbulences in
the West Asian region since the beginning of the Arab unrest, spread
of terrorism and extremism, civil wars, increasing activities of non-
state actors, need to maintain maritime security are some of the factors
that propelled a stronger India-GCC defence and security
cooperation.28 There is a growing convergence between India and the
GCC countries in further collaborating on defence and security issues.
Joint military exercises and training programmes have facilitated
interoperability and sharing of experiences and skills between the
armed forces. Traditionally, the Indian Navy has been at the forefront
of military-to-military engagement with the GCC countries, but of
late, land forces, air forces and the Coast Guard have also been
involved in joint exercises and training programmes.
34 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

India has signed defence cooperation agreements with Oman,

Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Broadly, the agreements elaborate
on different aspects of defence cooperation such as joint exercises,
training, sharing technology, joint production, etc. While joint training
programmes and military-to-military contacts are taking place
regularly, issues such as joint production of weapons and technology-
sharing seem to be lagging as these require huge investments as well
as technology.
Security cooperation has witnessed substantial progress between
the two. India and the GCC have recognised the importance of
addressing transnational security threats, including terrorism,
extremism and maritime piracy. Security collaboration in the form of
intelligence sharing and exchange of information has deepened which
has strengthened joint efforts to deal with such challenges.
Both India and the GCC countries have been victims of terrorist
attacks in the past and the threat of terror attacks continues to be
present. Terrorist organisations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda who have
exploited the regional instability in West Asia, pose a significant threat
to India as well as the GCC countries. The rise of ISIS in the aftermath
of the Arab unrest emerged as a major security threat for all. Therefore,
for India, cooperation against such transnational challenges is
important for the GCC countries.
In recent years, India and the GCC countries have cooperated to
successfully deport terrorists and criminals who have committed
crimes in the country. Cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE
has been particularly successful. For instance, in 2019, the UAE
deported a Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist Nisar Ahmed Tantray, a key
conspirator in the 2017 attack on the Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF) camp in Pulwama, wanted by the Indian authorities. 29
Similarly, two terror accused were deported from Saudi Arabia and
were arrested upon their arrival in India.30
Additionally, fighting piracy and maintaining the safety of the
Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) is important for India and the
GCC countries. Piracy in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden off
the Somalian coast poses a grave challenge to maritime security. In
the past, India and the GCC States have suffered at the hands of pirates
India and the GCC States: A Growing Engagement 35

operating in this region. High ransom amounts have been paid to

them on a number of occasions. India and the GCC States heavily
rely on the sea route for their bilateral trade; around 95 per cent of
India’s total trade by volume and 68 per cent by value is undertaken
through the maritime route.31 Therefore, maritime safety and that of
the SLOCs is of utmost importance for the economies of GCC
countries, which heavily depend on the export of oil and gas. India
has deployed a naval ship in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 and has
successfully escorted a number of merchant ships thwarting pirate
attacks.32 Thus, India’s anti-piracy cooperation with the GCC countries
ensures maritime security in the western Indian Ocean and protects
its trade routes in the region. This also contributes to securing the
supply of energy and other goods and enhances India’s role and image
as a responsible maritime player in the region. In 2022, India joined
the Bahrain-based Combined Military Forces (CMF) as an Associate
Partner.33 In July 2023, INS Sunayna participated in the ‘Op Southern
Readiness 2023’ in Seychelles conducted by the CMF34 Earlier, INS
Sunayna had also participated in the ‘Operation Southern Readiness’
at Seychelles in September 2022.35 India’s involvement in the CMF
will enhance its footprint in the western Indian Ocean, facilitating
collaboration with diverse navies to combat piracy, help secure the
SLOCs and bolster regional security in its extended neighbourhood.

Engaging with the GCC Countries on G20 Issues

India assumed the presidency of the G20 for 2023 and adopted the
theme Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (One Earth - One Family - One Future).
Under its presidency, India engaged with G20 member countries on
climate change, renewable energy, reform of multilateral institutions
and sustainable development goals, among others. Among other
countries, India invited two GCC member States – Oman and the
UAE – as guest countries for the meetings.
Officials from both these countries participated in the G20
meetings and shared their perspectives. For instance, Sayyid Saeed
bin Sultan Al Busaidi, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Culture,
Sports and Youth for Culture of Oman, participated in the G20 Culture
Working Group (CWG) in August 2023.36 Oman also participated in
the Anti-Corruption Working Group (ACWG) in Kolkata in August
36 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

2023. The Omani Minister of Commerce, Industry and Investment

Promotion, Qais Mohammed Al Yousef, participated in the G20 Trade
and Investment Ministers’ meetings in Jaipur in August 2023 where
he emphasised collective efforts for sustainable growth and reinforcing
global supply chains.37 The Sultanate views its participation in the
G20 meetings as a valuable opportunity to foster collaboration with
other nations across various domains, which aligns suitably with the
objectives of the Oman Vision 2040.38
In the run-up to the G20, the UAE announced that supporting
India’s bid for the G20 presidency had been a priority for the country.39
The UAE has participated in a number of G20 meetings held in India.
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
participated in the G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August 2023. In
June 2023, the UAE’s Minister of State to the Cabinet, Ahmed Al
Sayegh, participated in the G20 Development Ministers’ Meeting in
Varanasi. Sayegh reaffirmed his country’s commitment towards the
G20 agenda and called on all the participants to benefit from the
COP28, hosted by the UAE.40 The UAE also participated in the G20
Digital Economy Ministerial Meeting in India.
Participation of these countries in the G20 meetings has brought
to the fore the similarities in their approach and convergence of
interests. It opens the door for further cooperation in these fields at
the bilateral level. Climate change, tourism, digital economy, global
supply chains, etc. are some of the issues over which India has engaged
with the UAE, Oman and other GCC countries.

Reaching Out to the Indian Community in the Gulf

About nine million Indians are living and working in the GCC
countries. The Indian expatriate community forms a natural link
between India and the Gulf region. Indians in the Gulf are known to
be disciplined, skilful and law-abiding. Their contribution to the
development and progress of the Gulf countries has been
acknowledged by their rulers. For Modi, the Indian diaspora are the
true ambassadors of India around the world.41 The diaspora originates
from different parts of India and carries India’s rich culture and
cherished values. Prime Minister Modi has acknowledged the ‘hard
work and commitment’ of the Indian diaspora and its contribution to
India and the GCC States: A Growing Engagement 37

the strengthening of bilateral relations.42 Indian community in the

Gulf has achieved remarkable success across a wide range of fields.
Their contribution to the economic development and progress of these
countries has fostered a positive perception of India which helps to
strengthen bilateral relations. Therefore, engagement with the
expatriate community in the Gulf has been a key priority in Modi’s
foreign policy towards the region.
This has been reflected in the interactions Prime Minister Modi
has had with the Indian expatriate communities during his visits to
the Gulf region. Modi has often interacted with a wide range of the
expatriate community – from blue-collar workers to business leaders
– and has offered support. During his visit to the UAE in 2015, Modi
addressed the Indian diaspora and announced the establishment of
an Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF) in the UAE, to help the
Indian expatriate community in times of distress. He also announced
an online platform ‘MADAD’, to address the problems of the Indian
community and to connect the Indian diaspora around the world.43
During his visit to Oman in 2018, Modi met members of the Indian
community and described them as a ‘mini-India’ in Oman.44 In
Bahrain, Modi appreciated the honesty and integrity of the Indian
expatriate community and their contribution to the economic and
social life of Bahrain during his visit to the country in August 2019.45
Besides, Modi appealed to the Indian business community in the Gulf
to invest in India and expand their business in India as well.
Often, the Hindu community in the Gulf countries faces challenges
in practising their faith due to the limited number of temples in the
region. India has taken up the issue with some of the rulers and in
2015, during Modi’s visit, the UAE government allocated land for
Abu Dhabi’s first Hindu temple. During his visit to Bahrain in 2019,
Modi launched the US$ 4.2 million redevelopment project of the
Srinathji Temple in Manama – the oldest in the Gulf region, which is
around 200 years old.46
India receives substantial remittances and foreign exchange from
the Indian diaspora and is the largest remittance-receiving country in
the world; in 2021-22, India received remittances amounting to US$
89.12 billion.47 A significant amount of this came from the Gulf region.
Due to the fact that a significant number of Indian expatriates have
38 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

their families residing in India, they regularly send money to support

them. Besides, India has also introduced its indigenous RuPay card
in the Gulf. In his address to the Indian community in Manama in
2019, Modi stated that a MoU in this regard had been signed with the
Bahraini authorities and that Indians in the Gulf would be able to
send money home using the RuPay card.48 In August 2029, the RuPay
card was launched in the UAE.49 In the same year, India signed a
MoU with Saudi Arabia to launch it in the kingdom. Oman is the
latest country in the region to accept the RuPay card in October 2022,
when a MoU was signed between the two countries.50

Cooperation during the COVID-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic brought on unsurmountable challenges and
difficulties for the people and the governments. India and the GCC
States cooperated with each other during the pandemic. India sent
medicines, doctors and healthcare professionals as well as the required
equipment to the GCC countries to help them fight the pandemic.
India bolstered its reputation as a steadfast and dependable friend by
promptly offering medical assistance and expertise to the GCC
countries during times of crisis.51 In 2022, when India was under the
severe grip of the contagious delta variant, all the GCC countries came
forward and supplied liquid oxygen immediately.
The close cooperation between India and the GCC countries
during the pandemic has further enhanced their level of trust.
Beginning with despatching medicines, sending experts and vaccines
to seeking their cooperation to repatriate Indian nationals from the
Gulf countries, the India-GCC cooperation during the pandemic
proved effective and trustworthy. The three years of the pandemic
proved that the fundamentals of cooperation, understanding and trust
between India and the GCC countries remain strong; all the GCC
leaders expressed enormous faith in the policies and approach taken
by Prime Minister Modi to deal with the pandemic.52 The pandemic
also opened the door for further cooperation in the health sector –
which had been hitherto overlooked – between India and the GCC
countries.
India started the largest repatriation exercise, known as the Vande
Bharat Mission, during the pandemic to bring its nationals back who
India and the GCC States: A Growing Engagement 39

were struck abroad. India repatriated its nationals from all the six
GCC States by air bubble agreements and with positive cooperation
from the local rulers. The highest number of stranded Indians were
repatriated from the UAE followed by Saudi Arabia, the USA and
Qatar.53 India’s cooperation with the GCC States to fight the pandemic,
appealing to the host governments to look after the well-being of the
Indian community during the pandemic and the successful
repatriation of Indians who were desperate to come back home are
among the successes of Modi’s engagement with the GCC States
during the difficult times.

Conclusion
India’s engagement with the GCC countries has significantly
intensified since Modi assumed office in 2014. In fact, India’s
deepening engagement with the Gulf and West Asian countries has
been one of the most important successes of India’s foreign policy
under Prime Minister Modi. India’s ‘Neighbourhood first’ approach
and the ‘Think West’ policy to emphasise engagement with the West
Asian countries have given a new direction to India’s relationship
with the GCC States and have resulted in a deeper engagement on a
wide range of issues. Apart from trade, energy and diaspora ties, the
recent emphasis on strengthening defence and security cooperation
with the Gulf including new issues such as food security, renewable
energy, cyber security, climate change, space cooperation, science and
technology etc., have added further meaning and purpose to the
existing relationship. In the last ten years, Modi’s pragmatic
engagement has resulted in building new strategic partnerships and
opening new fronts of engagement with the GCC States. The GCC
countries’ perception of India as an emerging and reliable partner
also demonstrates their confidence in fostering deeper collaboration.
This evolving partnership not only reflects their converging interests
but also underscores their commitment to addressing shared
challenges and harnessing the potential for mutual growth and
cooperation.
40 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

NOTES
1 Statement by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in Lok Sabha on 8 December
2023.
2 “India-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) decide to pursue resumption of Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) Negotiations”, Press Information Bureau, 25 November 2022, at
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1878714 (Accessed 12 July 2023).
3 “India a land of opportunities, open to innovation and investment: PM Modi at
Dubai Expo address”, First Post, 2 October 2021, at https://www.firstpost.com/
india/india-a-land-of-opportunities-open-to-innovation-and-investment-pm-
modi-at-dubai-expo-address-10017751.html (Accessed 22 February 2023).
4 “India is a land of Opportunity, PM Modi tells business leaders in Qatar”, NDTV,
5 June 2016, at https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pm-modi-meets-business-
leaders-in-qatar-1415643 (Accessed 12 January 2023).
5 “India a land of opportunities, open to innovation and investment: PM Modi at
Dubai Expo address”, First Post, 1 October 2021, at https://www.firstpost.com/
india/india-a-land-of-opportunities-open-to-innovation-and-investment-pm-
modi-at-dubai-expo-address-10017751.html (Accessed 12 January 2023).
6 Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce
and Industry, Government of India.
7 Ibid.
8 “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) & India-Middle East-
Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)”, Press Information Bureau, 9 September 2023,
at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1955921#:~: text= In%20
his%20remarks %2C% 20Prime%20Minister, %2C%20Italy%2C %20France%20
and%20Germany (Accessed 12 December 2023).
9 Export-Import data bank, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of
India.
10 Ibid.
11 “Indian Oil, BPCL arm bag entire stake in Abu Dhabi block”, Hindu Business Line,
25 March 2019, at https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/indianoil-
bpcl-arm-bag-entire-stake-in-abu-dhabi-block/article26635965.ece (Accessed 18
December 2022).
12 “Indian Oil acquires 17% participating interest in Mukhaizna oil field in Oman
from Shell”, Indian Oil, 6 April 2018, at https://iocl.com/NewsDetails/49385
(Accessed 18 December 2022).
13 “Renewable Energy in India”, Press Information Bureau, 9 September 2022, at
https://pib.gov.in/FeaturesDeatils.aspx?NoteId=151141&ModuleId%20=%202
(Accessed 18 January 2023).
14 See Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi’s address at the G-20 Summit in Bali,
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 15 November 2022, at https://
mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/35884/english+translation+of+prime+
minister+ shri+ narendra+ modis+address+at+the+g20+summit+in+bali+session+i+
food+and+energy+security (Accessed 18 January 2023).
15 “Joint Statement of the Leaders of India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and the
United States (I2U2)”, The White House, 14 July 2022, at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/07/14/joint-
statement-of-the-leaders-of-india-israel-united-arab-emirates-and-the-united-
states-i2u2/ (Accessed 8 March 2023).
16 “India-UAE: Joint Statement on Climate Change”, Ministry of External Affairs,
India and the GCC States: A Growing Engagement 41

Government of India, 15 July 2023, at https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.

htm?dtl/36812/indiauae+joint+statement+on+climate+change (Accessed 5 August
2023).
17 “International Solar Alliance”, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy,
Government of India at https://mnre.gov.in/isa/ (Accessed 5 August 2023).
18 Ibid.
19 “National Green Hydrogen Mission”, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy,
Government of India, January 2023, at https://mnre.gov.in/img/documents/
uploads/file_f-1673581748609.pdf (Accessed 5 August 2023).
20 Ibid.
21 “The Hydrogen Ambitions of the Gulf States”, SWP, 21 July 2022, at https://
www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2022C44/ (Accessed 2 August 2023).
22 “UAE Cabinet approves national energy and hydrogen strategies, establishes UAE
Ministry of Investment”, Emirates News Agency, 3 July 2023, at https://wam.ae/
en/details/1395303173983 (Accessed 2 August 2023).
23 “NEOM accelerates progress towards green hydrogen future”, NEOM, 24 May
2023, at https://www.neom.com/en-us/newsroom/neom-accelerates-green-
hydrogen-future (Accessed 4 August 2023).
24 “Oman announces investment opportunities in green hydrogen”, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Oman, 23 October 2022, at https://fm.gov.om/oman-announces-
investment-opportunities-in-green-hydrogen/ (Accessed 4 August 2023).
25 “EAM concludes visit to Saudi Arabia September”, Embassy of India, Riyadh, 12
September 2022, https://www.eoiriyadh.gov.in/news_letter_detail/?id=35#:~:text=
EAM%20and% 20GCC %20Secretary%20General,on%20different%20areas%20of%
20cooperation (Accessed 12 January 2024).
26 “First India-GCC Senior Officers Meeting (SOM)”, Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India, 20 March 2023, at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-
releases.htm?dtl/36380/First_IndiaGCC_Senior_Officers_Meeting_SOM (Accessed
12 January 2024).
27 “Doval in Saudi to discuss US rail link plan for West Asia”, Indian Express, 8 May
2023, at https://indianexpress.com/article/india/doval-in-saudi-to-discuss-us-rail-
link-plan-for-west-asia-8596962/ (Accessed 12 July 2023).
28 Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, “India-UAE defence and security cooperation”, Strategic
Analysis, 44 (2), 2020, p. 125.
29 “UAE deports Jaish terrorist Nisar Tantray wanted for 2017 CRPF camp attack in
Kashmir: NIA”, Hindustan Times, 3 April 2019, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/
india-news/nisar-tantray-jem-terrorist-wanted-for-2017-lethpora-attack-arrested-
by-nia/story-Ti4oJbrDuZTmKlTg9aDK9L.html (Accessed 12 January 2024).
30 “Terror case accused deported from Saudi arrested from airport”, Times of India,
22 September 2020, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nisar-tantray-
jem-terrorist-wanted-for-2017-lethpora-attack-arrested-by-nia/story-
Ti4oJbrDuZTmKlTg9a DK9L.html (Accessed 12 January 2024).
31 Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, Annual Report
2022-23, p. 4.
32 “Anti-Piracy Operations, Gulf of Aden Deployment”, Indian Navy at https://
www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/anti-piracy-operations-gulf-aden-deployment/
page/0/1 (Accessed 22 July 2023).
33 “Press Statement by Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh after India-US 2+2
Ministerial Dialogue”, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 12 April
2022, at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1815838 (Accessed
22 July 2023).
42 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

34 “INS Sunayna Participates in CMF Ex ‘Op Southern Readiness - 2023’”, Indian

Navy at https://indiannavy.nic.in/content/ins-sunayna-participates-cmf-ex-op-
southern-readiness-2023#:~:text=Southern%20Readiness%202023'-,INS%20
Sunayna%20 Participates%2 0in%20CMF% 20Ex%20’Op%20Southern%20
Readiness%20%2D%202023, Combined %20 Maritime%20Forces(CMF) (Accessed
25 August 2023).
35 “INS Sunayna Participates in Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) Exercise at
Seychelles” Indian Navy, at https://indiannavy.nic.in/content/ins-sunayna-
participates-combined-maritime-forces-cmf-exercise-seychelles (Accessed 25
August 2023).
36 “Oman participates in meeting of G20 Culture Working Group in India”, Times of
Oman, 27 August 2023, at https://timesofoman.com/article/135307-oman-
participates-in-meeting-of-g20-culture-working-group-in-india#:~:text=Muscat%3
A%20The%20 Sultanate%20of%20Oman,between%20August%2024%20and%2027
(Accessed 28 August 2023).
37 “Oman participates in G20 Trade and Investment Ministers Meeting in India”,
The Arabian Daily, 27 August 2023, at https://arabiandaily.com/oman-participates-
in-g20-trade-and-investment-ministers-meeting-in-india/ (Accessed 28 August
2023).
38 “Media briefing highlights Oman’s participation in G20 meetings in India”, Oman
Observer, 14 June 2023, at https://www.omanobserver.om/article/1138755/oman/
media-briefing-highlights-omans-participation-in-g20-meetings-in-india
(Accessed 28 August 2023).
39 “Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of UAE writes:
Supporting India’s G20 presidency is a priority for the UAE”, Indian Express, 2
December 2022, at https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/minister-of-
foreign-affairs-and-international-cooperation-of-uae-writes-supporting-indias-
g20-presidency-is-a-priority-for-the-uae-8301279/ (Accessed on 22 July 2023).
40 “UAE participates in G20 Development Ministers’ meeting”, Emirates News
Agency, 12 June 2023, at https://www.wam.ae/en/details/1395303168209 #:~:
text=VARANASI %2C%20 India%2C%2012th%20June%2C,India%20on%2012%
20June%202023 (Accessed 22 July 2023).
41 “Indian diaspora are our ‘Rashtradoots’, says PM Modi at Pravasi Bharatiya Divas
event”, The Times of India, 9 January 2023, at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
india/indian-diaspora-are-our-ambassadors-says-pm-modi-at-pravasi-bharatiya-
divas-event/articleshow/96849722.cms (Accessed 12 June 2023).
42 “Hard work, commitment of diaspora helped to strengthen India-Saudi bilateral
ties: PM Modi”, The Times of India, 29 October 2019, at https://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/nri/middle-east-news/hard-work-commitment-of-
diaspora-helped-to-strenghten-india-saudi-bilateral-ties-pm-modi/articleshow/
71803941.cms (Accessed 12 June 2023).
43 “PM Narendra Modi reaches out to Indian diaspora in Dubai; announces ‘MADAD’
platform, e-migrant portal”, Economic Times, 18 August 2015, at https://
economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-narendra-modi-
reaches-out-to-indian-diaspora-in-dubai-announces-madad-platform-e-migrant-
portal/articleshow/48518808.cms?from=mdr (Accessed 12 January 2023).
44 “Seeing a mini-India in Oman, says PM Modi in address to Indian community”,
Hindustan Times, 11 February 2018, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-
news/modi-in-uae-live-pm-pays-tribute-at-war-memorial-wahat-al-karama-in-
abu-dhabi/story-OaI0jglXEzwIxfTZ0FRwAL.html (Accessed 12 January 2023).
India and the GCC States: A Growing Engagement 43

45 “PM addresses Indian Community in Bahrain”, Press Information Bureau,

Government of India, 24 August 2019, at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.
aspx?PRID=1582948 (Accessed 2 March 2023).
46 “PM Modi launches $4.2 million redevelopment project of temple in Bahrain”,
Indian Express, 25 August 2019, at https://indianexpress.com/article/india/pm-modi-
launches-4-2-mn-redevelopment-project-of-temple-in-bahrain-5935151/ (Accessed
21 March 2023).
47 “India received highest ever foreign inward remittances in a single year of $89,127
million in FY 2021-22”, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 7 February
2023, at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1897036#:~:text=I ndia%20
received%20 highest%20ever%20foreign,million%20in%20FY%202021%2D22
(Accessed 11 May 2023).
48 “PM addresses Indian Community in Bahrain”, Press Information Bureau,
Government of India, 24 August 2019, at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.
aspx?PRID=1582948 (Accessed 2 March 2023).
49 “PM Modi launches RuPay card in UAE”, Economic Times, 24 August 2023, at https:/
/economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-modi-launches-
rupay-card-in-uae/articleshow/70816228.cms?from=mdr (Accessed 11 May 2023).
50 “Milestone MOU signed for acceptance of RuPay card and UPI QR Code based
mobile payments in Oman”, Times of Oman, 4 October 2022, at https://
timesofoman.com/article/122011-milestone-mou-signed-for-acceptance-of-rupay-
card-and-upi-qr-code-based-mobile-payments-in-oman (Accessed 11 May 2023).
51 Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, “India and GCC Countries Amid COVID-19 Pandemic”,
MP-IDSA Comment, 13 May 2020, at https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/india-
and-gcc-covid-19-pandemic-ppradhan (Accessed 11 December 2023).
52 See Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, “Indians in the Gulf during the Pandemic: Analysing
Responses from India and the GCC Countries”, in Sujan Chinoy and Prasanta
Kumar Pradhan (eds.), India’s Approach to West Asia: Trends, Challenges and
Possibilities, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2024, pp. 154-165.
53 “Statement by External Affairs Minister in Lok Sabha on Recent Developments
Pertaining to the welfare abroad of Indians, NRIs and PIOs”, Ministry of External
Affairs, Government of India, 15 March 2021, at https://meaindia.nic.in/cdgeneva/
?12517?000 (Accessed 22 October 2023).
 3
India-Iran Connectivity Partnership:
Opportunities and Challenges
Deepika Saraswat

Since the New Delhi Declaration, signed in 2003 by the then Prime
Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Iranian President
Mohammed Khatami, India-Iran relationship has been marked by a
regional and geo-economic dimension. At the turn of the century,
geopolitical developments such as the emergence of independent
countries in Central Asia, and the US invasion of Afghanistan
overthrowing Taliban rule in the country, led New Delhi to broaden
its strategic vision through the concept of the extended
neighbourhood. India and Iran have continued to frame their
partnership within a regional context that can best be described as
Southwest-Central Asia.1 The New Delhi Declaration expressed hope
that the initial trilateral agreement signed between the Governments
of India, Iran and Afghanistan to develop the Chabahar route through
Melak, Zaranj and Delaram in Afghanistan, will advance regional
trade and transit to Afghanistan and Central Asia, contributing
towards enhanced regional economic prosperity.2 By promoting
regional connectivity with and via Afghanistan, Iran and India hoped
to support independent state-building in the country as opposed to
an isolated, ineffective State, which becomes a source of regional
instability or falls under the geopolitical orbit of Pakistan or any other
state. For both Iran and India, therefore, the issue of regional
India-Iran Connectivity Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges 45

connectivity has been inextricably linked to regional peace, security

and stability, especially in the context of the prolonged conflict in
Afghanistan.
India-Iran cooperation in regional connectivity has had to contend
with ‘the US factor’, in a context where Iran-US relations have
remained hostile, while India-US ties strengthened especially after
the two countries signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 2005.
This chapter aims to analyse the India-Iran connectivity partnership,
especially since the signing of the Chabahar Agreement in 2016, during
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Iran. While doing so, the
chapter situates the India-Iran connectivity partnership within the
broader Eurasian outreach of the two countries. At a time, when
various connectivity and regional economic integration projects by a
multitude of great powers have created a contentious connectivity
landscape in Eurasia, Iran is keen to advance its gateway status. While
contextualising Iran’s rising gateway status, the chapter delves into
opportunities and challenges facing India’s Eurasian outreach via Iran.

An Overview of Iran’s ‘gateway’ Status

Over the last two decades Chabahar, Iran’s only deep oceanic port,
and Pakistan’s Gwadar – located only 72 km apart on the Makran
coast along the Gulf of Oman – have made competing claims as
potential ‘gateways’ connecting Eurasian hinterland to the Indian
Ocean. For fin-de-siècle geopolitical thinkers, who were formulating
their theses in the context of the inter-imperial rivalry of the late
nineteenth century, the Eurasian littoral was considered to be of
geostrategic importance in the struggle for primacy between
continental and maritime powers. First, the invention of the steam
engine fuelled the Industrial Revolution in Europe, then the rise of
the steam-driven locomotive enabled the railway revolution of the
nineteenth century, leading continental powers such as Germany and
Russia to advance terrestrial alternatives to the global maritime
economy.3 Unlike naval powers, who sought to maximise their
economic efficiency through maritime trade, land powers, wary of
their dependence on the security of freedom of navigation, feared
risking their economic survival on the good graces of the naval
hegemon.4 British Geographer Halford Mackinder was alarmed by
46 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

rapid-pace development of the network of trans-continental railways

by Russia in the aftermath of its defeat in the Crimean War of 1856.
During the War, Russia had struggled with weak transport links
compared to Britain and France, who were able to transport supplies
and reinforcements faster through a maritime corridor from Gibraltar
to Crimea.5 Mackinder’s ‘Heartland thesis’ warned about a Eurasian
interior unified by a single power and becoming ‘inaccessible to
oceanic commerce’. He argued that efficient overland connectivity
would extend continental hegemony over the Eurasian littoral,
potentially challenging the dominance of the oceanic empires.6
On the historical geo-economic character of Makran, Philip Reid
writes that despite its location in the open sea, its rugged and barren
topography, absence of navigable river connecting with the interior,
and sparse population, stifled the growth of ocean-facing emporia.
On the other hand, the nearby port of Karachi (called Barbaricum)
located on the mouth of the Indus River, from as far back as antiquity
when it was under the control of Indo-Scythian tribes or the Saka
kingdoms, channelled trade from Bactria, the neighbouring parts of
Central Asia, China to the Roman Empire.7 From antiquity to the early
modern period, India’s terrestrial connection to the overland trans-
Eurasian trade routes in Central Asia and Iran was by way of the
North-west Frontier.8 This overland route, connecting the Indian
subcontinent with the wider Silk Road network in Eurasia, lost its
salience first as a result of the emergence of long-distance maritime
commerce from the late 17th century, and then in the wake of the Great
Game in the 19th century between the Tsarist Russian Empire and the
British Empire in India. The Anglo-Russian Great Game turned
Afghanistan and Iran into contested buffer zones between the two
imperial powers. During the course of the 19th century, Iran suffered
territorial losses in its peripheries, to Russia in the South Caucasus
and Britain in Afghanistan and Baluchistan. It was barely able to
maintain its nominal sovereignty. The British feared Russian advances
into Central Asia and towards Iran in the Persian Gulf as ultimately
aimed at the British Empire in the Indian subcontinent. As a result,
the question of railways in Iran, much like elsewhere in Asia, became
a matter of strategic rivalry between the two imperialist powers.9
India-Iran Connectivity Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges 47

Under an agreement with Iran’s Qajar ruler Nasir al-din Shah in

1889, Russia had secured a five-year exclusive option of building
railways in Persia. Moscow was able to exercise a veto on railways in
Iran until 1909 when Russian protégé Muhammad Ali Shah was exiled
in the aftermath of the constitutional revolution in Iran.10 For Russia,
its commercial interests in northern Iran benefited from the
geographical isolation of the region from the Persian Gulf.11 Russia,
therefore, saw any railway connecting the Eurasian hinterland and
the Gulf coast as strategic exposure to Britain, which had naval
supremacy in the Persian Gulf. Britain, for its part, was concerned
that a railway extending from Russia to the Indian Ocean littoral or
for that matter Germany’s Berlin-Baghdad Railway would facilitate
continental hegemony over the Eurasian littoral.12 The Russian and
British strategic concerns delayed any serious construction of railroads
in Iran except for some short sections such as between Jolfa and Tabriz
in north Iran, completed in 1916 and connected with the Russian
railway system. The Baluchistan Railway, constructed by the British,
connected Quetta with the Iranian city of Duzdab (today Zahedan).13
Naturally, these lines were constructed with British and Russian
commercial and strategic interests in mind. The 1907 Anglo-Russian
entente that delineated Russian and British zones of influence in
northern and southern Iran respectively and a neutral middle region,
enabled Anglo-Russian cooperation on Trans-Persian railway from
the Russian to the Indian frontiers.14 The two powers had shared
interests in outflanking Germany’s Berlin-Baghdad railway by
developing the trans-Persian railway as a link between Europe and
India. 15 As they engaged in protracted negotiations over the
prospective route and financing, with the onset of the First World
War, the construction never took off.
It was only after Reza Khan’s coup d’état in 1921 and the
foundation of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925, that the Trans-Iranian
Railway, linking the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf coasts was seen as
an important instrument for modernising the country. Given the
fraught history of the development of the railway network in the
country, the two terminals of the Trans-Iranian route – the Caspian
harbour city of Bandar-e Shah (today Bandar-e Torkaman) and
Bandar-e Shahpur (today Bandar-e Emam Khomeini) on the Persian
48 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Gulf – were selected for their location being as far away as possible
from Russian and British territories respectively.16 During the course
of the Second World War, the Allied forces invaded Iran in August
1941 to ensure the use of Iranian transportation facilities for the supply
line of Allied war material to Russia. The so-called ‘Persian Corridor’
stretched from the Iranian port of Khorramshahr and the nearby Iraqi
port of Basra to the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea ports in the Soviet
zone.17 It underscored Iran’s unique geographical advantage in north-
south transit and connectivity.
Following the end of the War, when the Soviet Union delayed the
withdrawal of its troops from northern Iran and supported the
autonomy movement led by pro-Soviet forces in Iran’s Azerbaijan
province, Iran sought American support for its territorial integrity.18
Diplomatic support and pressure from the US in the United Nations
Security Council and outside was instrumental in pushing back against
Soviet demands for oil concession in Iran’s Northern provinces, and
eventually forcing Soviet withdrawal in January 1946.19 The ‘Iran
Crisis’ of 1945-46 therefore set the stage for Iran’s role in the northern
tier of the United States’ Soviet containment strategy and as the pillar
of the US position in the Persian Gulf. Around the time when Iran
became the pillar of containment of the Soviet Union, the partition of
India and Pakistan’s occupation of parts of Kashmir, severed overland
connectivity between the Indo-Gangetic plains and Central Asia, two
geopolitical developments effectively ‘spelling a death knell for India’s
northern outreach.’20
Though neither India nor Pakistan are immediate neighbours of
the Central Asian Region, Pakistan has pursued a zero-sum approach
to regional connectivity by excluding India. Islamabad not only denies
India its natural overland access to Eurasia, but also its initiatives at
inter-regional connectivity between Central and South Asia are pitted
against similar efforts by India via Iran. P. Stobdan notes that from a
geo-economic point of view, the issue is not limited to India’s physical
access to Eurasia per se, “it is about orienting and benefiting from
[the] economic integration of India’s immediate borderland with that
of [the] Eurasian growth line.”21 It was only in the post-Cold War
geopolitical context, when Iran no longer shared a direct border with
Russia – which had shaped its historical threat perception from the
India-Iran Connectivity Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges 49

north – and the emergence of land-locked states in Central Asia, that

India found a strategic opportunity to seek a land-sea alternative
connectivity to Eurasia via Iran. So long as Pakistan continues to deny
India its centuries-old overland access which played a role in forging
the historical ‘civilizational connect routinely recounted in our bilateral
ties with Uzbekistan and Iran, the latter will remain the veritable
‘gateway’ for India and Central Asia.22

India and Iran’s Foray into a Contested Eurasian

Connectivity Landscape
It was only towards the late 1990s that India, Iran and Russia found
convergence in developing trans-continental connectivity along a
north-south axis via Iran. Following the emergence of independent
States in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the United States and the
European Union pursued a zero-sum approach to connectivity in Asia.
The European Union’s flagship east-west connectivity project of the
Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), linking the
newly independent Republics in Central Asia with Europe along the
Caspian-Caucasus-Black Sea route, bypassed both Russia and Iran. It
was aimed at consolidating the independence of these fledgling
Republics in Russia’s immediate backyard. Though Iran was admitted
as a TRACECA member in 2009, it never received any technical
assistance or investment because of international and EU sanctions
on the country that remained in place until the implementation of the
nuclear agreement between Iran and six major world powers in
January 2016. Given that the underlying logic of trans-regional
connectivity between Europe and post-Soviet States in Asia was to
promote Western orientation in their economy and thus foreign policy,
the US was cautious about giving Tehran any influence over its
strategy in Eurasia.

Russia-Iran-India Convergence on North-south Connectivity

At the turn of the century, Moscow increasingly realised that the
Yeltsin-era attempts at liberalising Russia’s economy and seeking
integration into the West had not borne fruit. Subsequently, Moscow
made renewed efforts to strengthen ties with its traditional partners
in the East including India. India-Central Asia ties in the decade since
50 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

the collapse of the Soviet Union had suffered considerably. It therefore

signed on to the idea of north-south connectivity with Russia and
Central Asia via Iran.23 Further, multilateral efforts led by two leading
non-Western powers – Russia and India – to implement a trans-
continental land-sea corridor linking them with each other, also fitted
well within their overarching vision of a multipolar world in the
twenty-first century. For its part, Tehran looked towards cooperation
with neighbours, nearby Muslim States, and with possible major
alternative centres of power (Russia, and India) to counter
Washington’s efforts to isolate Iran. Furthermore, it actively sought
to use its advantageous location to participate in international trade
and attract international investment to support its development
efforts. Given Iran’s strategic location straddling the Persian Gulf in
the south and the Caspian Sea in the north, it was envisaged as an
optimal gateway between Russia and India. In the New Delhi
Declaration, India and Iran recognised that their growing strategic
convergence in Afghanistan and the wider region needs to be
underpinned with a strong economic relationship including greater
trade and investment flows.24 The two countries agreed to broad base
their cooperation in the oil and gas sector, boost non-oil trade, and
jointly develop the Chabahar port complex and free trade zone.
Chabahar was also expected to boost economic activity in Iran’s
underdeveloped Sistan and Balochistan province.
For developing countries in Asia, such as Iran and India, the push
for a coordinated approach to regional connectivity, instead of being
driven by the intensity of interdependent relations came from these
States trying to address the artificially low level of such
interdependence, giving regional connectivity initiatives the character
of ‘development integration’.25 Also, given the limited demand, and
paucity of investment, enhancing the connectivity of national transport
systems, including railways, has been seen as the most viable solution
for the development of regional as well as trans-regional transport.26
However, a variety of factors, including the imposition of international
sanctions on Iran since 2006, American presence and instability in
Afghanistan, the inability of the member states to mobilise sufficient
financing for constructing the ‘missing links’, and their disparate
connectivity priorities, have resulted in the International North–South
India-Iran Connectivity Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges 51

Transport Corridor (INSTC) and Chabahar progressing at a snail’s

pace over the last two decades.
In 2011, the United States launched its New Silk Road Strategy,
with the declared aim of supporting continental corridors through
Afghanistan and Central Asia, a region it dubbed as ‘Greater Central
Asia’. It envisaged Afghanistan as the pivot and the missing link in
the Eurasia-wide continental corridors for the transport of goods and
energy between Europe, the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia.27
Washington, in taking the leadership role in creating transportation
corridors connecting Greater Central Asia with the Indian
subcontinent through Afghanistan, hoped that transit revenues would
help efforts to sustain the US-backed government in Kabul.28 Given
Pakistan’s reluctance to provide overland transit to India, and the US
approach of bypassing Iran in Eurasian connectivity, Washington’s
Silk Road strategy did not take off, thus ceding the initiative to China’s
Belt and Road Initiative, and to some extent to Russia.
In 2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and the subsequent
Western sanctions induced Moscow to strengthen its pivot to Asia,
and at the same time alerted the Central Asian States to the imperative
of diversifying their partnerships, including with India. Amid a rapid
deterioration in ties with the West, Russia began considering the
expansion of the functions and membership of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to make the grouping a more
effective and non-Western counterweight to Western structures. Until
2015, Russia had taken an ambivalent approach to economic
cooperation within the SCO, preferring to deepen multilateral
economic cooperation within the Russian-led Eurasian Economic
Union (EAEU).29 However, after concluding that deterioration in
relations with the West over the Ukrainian crisis was irreversible,
Moscow substituted the concept of ‘Greater Europe’ made up of the
European Union and the Russian-led EAEU with ‘Greater Eurasia’,
centred on linking the EAEU with China’s Silk Road Economic Belt.30
Notably, China and Russia’s cooperative approach towards developing
Eurasia-wide transport networks, such as the ‘Northern corridor’
connecting East Asia with Europe via an upgraded Trans-Siberian
Railway and the Baikal-Amur Railway, is part of broader Chinese
efforts at developing “reliable connectivity in a multipolar format.”31
52 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

At a time of growing rivalry with the United States, China is asserting

greater control over transport corridors to ensure reliable access to
resources and markets, which is necessary for sustaining China’s
economic growth. Though both Russia and the Central Asian States
saw China’s economic activities as playing a stabilising role and
advancing Eurasian integration, they have continued to see
engagement with India and its SCO membership, which was approved
at the 2015 Ufa Summit, as important to diversify their external
economic relations.32 As India’s economy continued registering high
growth (7.6 per cent for the 2015-16 fiscal year and an average of 7.5
per cent in the 2014-19 period), it came to be seen as an attractive
large-size economic partner.
Notwithstanding, the view in Moscow and certain Central Asian
capitals that India could play a balancing role in the region, India’s
accession to the SCO came in the context of a very competitive geo-
economic and geopolitical landscape in Central and South Asia. Philip
Reid, using the language of inter-imperialist geopolitical rivalry of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, observes that the
“scramble for connectivity leadership in Central and South Asia” that
began in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union
intensified with the launch of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt in
2013.33 While Russia had been consolidating the Eurasian Economic
Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), China’s
BRI was advancing new continental transport corridors to Europe
across Central Asia and Russia. India is the only SCO country that
has not signed up to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At the
SCO Summit of Heads of State in Qingdao, Prime Minister Modi noted
that “connectivity with our neighbourhood and in the SCO region is
our priority.”34 He maintained that mega connectivity projects must
respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries, as he
assured India’s full support to initiatives which are “inclusive,
sustainable and transparent, and which [respect] member states’
sovereignty and territorial integrity. India’s articulation of ‘inclusive
connectivity’, has to be seen together with other narratives such as
‘debt-trap diplomacy’, which seeks to delegitimise China’s
infrastructure investment activities based on State capitalism as
economic statecraft aimed at cultivating powerful followers for a
India-Iran Connectivity Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges 53

Chinese order-remaking project, while foregrounding public-debt

implications of the BRI projects in the recipient countries.35 Even as
Russia, Central Asian States and Iran are keen to avoid a zero-sum
competition among various connectivity projects, they have continued
to look at India as a useful balancer in Eurasia.
Amid a variety of connectivity initiatives in Eurasia, the Makran
Coast, the southern coastal region of Baluchistan divided between
Iran and Pakistan, has gained a strategic profile as the littoral interface
or ‘gateway’ between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean, the two
regions that have historically played the role of east-west
thoroughfares.36 China’s plans to build overland transport corridors
connecting its landlocked provinces to the Indian Ocean, such as the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CEPC) and the China-Myanmar
Economic Corridor (CMEC), notwithstanding their framing in the
language of economic diplomacy, have serious implications for the
centuries-old geo-strategic character of the Indian Ocean. David
Brewster argues that historically, two geographical constraints of the
Indian Ocean, namely the absence of connection between the Indian
Ocean littoral and interior of the Eurasian continent through navigable
rivers, and that the access to the Ocean is through a few maritime
entrance points, have contributed to the domination of this Ocean by
a succession of extra-regional maritime powers.37 By corollary, these
geographic factors have had the effect of virtually excluding Eurasian
land powers such as China and Russia from projecting their naval
power in the Indian Ocean.38 Therefore, just as the Chinese efforts to
establish maritime infrastructure across the Indian Ocean littoral,
which have been dubbed by analysts as the ‘string of pearls’ strategy,
Beijing’s investment in overland transport corridors reaching up to
‘gateway’ ports such as Gwadar, have implications beyond their
declared aims of addressing China’s internal development priorities
and mitigate strategic vulnerabilities on ‘choke points’. In geo-
economic terms, overland pathways are advancing China-led
economic and strategic integration of much of the Eurasian littoral,
and in doing so fundamentally transform the traditional character of
the Indian Ocean as a semi-closed strategic space capable of
domination by a single naval power.39 Notwithstanding the discourse
surrounding Gwadar and Chabahar as ‘gateways’ to the Chinese
54 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

interior, and to Afghanistan and Central Asia respectively, such

investments seem to be driven less by commercial logic and more by
geostrategic priorities of China and India as they engage in a strategic
rivalry in the Indian Ocean and Eurasia.

India-Iran-Afghanistan: Chabahar
Maysam Bizaer notes that Iran was one of the largest donors at the
2002 Tokyo International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance
to Afghanistan. It dedicated a bulk of this assistance to building
schools, power plants, new border crossings and roads in western
Afghanistan, which shares strong historical and cultural ties with
Iran.40 Iran’s interest in western Afghanistan has to do with the security
of their more than 900 km long shared border, creating job
opportunities that can help in stemming the flow of refugees into
Iran and also seeking economic benefits for Iran at a time when it has
been reeling under US sanctions. In 2005, Iran opened the 122 km
Dogharun-Herat Highway, which over the years has become one of
the major import-export gateways to Afghanistan. The Dogharoon
Special Economic Zone located at the zero point of the border with
Afghanistan emerged as a key hub for trade with Afghanistan and to
Central Asian countries. 41 In 2017, Iran replaced Pakistan as
Afghanistan’s largest trading partner followed by China and Pakistan,
a position that Iran has continued to hold even after the return of
Taliban to power.42 India’s construction of the 215 km long highway
from the Zaranj-Delaram highway stretching from the Iran-
Afghanistan border to Delaram in Nimruz province of Afghanistan,
also facilitated the growth of this trade. The strategic highway,
completed in 2009 at the cost of Rs 600 crores, feeds into the 2,200 km
two-lane metalled road called ‘garland road’ connecting major cities
of Afghanistan.
In 2007, Tehran had committed US$ 75 million for constructing a
railway line from Khaf in north-eastern Iran to Herat in western
Afghanistan. The Khaf-Herat railway project was part of the trilateral
agreement between Iran, Afghanistan and India to develop the
Chabahar route, and the larger East-West Railway Corridor extending
to China and Europe.43 In December 2020, Tehran inaugurated a 140
km section from Khaf to Ghoryan in western Afghanistan, while the
India-Iran Connectivity Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges 55

last section from Ghoryan to Herat, financed by Italy, was 80 per cent
complete. Though New Delhi struggled to make good on its plan to
develop the Chabahar port due to sanctions, it upgraded the road
from Chabahar to Zaranj on Iran’s border with Afghanistan. India
invested in infrastructure in Iran and Afghanistan aiming to establish
transit and connectivity with Central Asian countries.44
The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
and lifting of international sanctions on Iran in January 2016 created
new momentum for India’s hitherto delayed northern outreach. Prime
Minister Modi visited Tehran in May 2016, where the India-Iran-
Afghanistan Trilateral Agreement on the establishment of an
International Transit and Transport Corridor, called the Chabahar
Agreement, was signed. Under Phase-I of the Agreement, New Delhi
committed to equip and operate two berths in Chabahar Port with a
capital investment of US$ 85.21 million, and an annual revenue
expenditure of US$ 22.95 million on a 10-year lease.45 India and Iran
agreed to jointly construct the Chabahar-Zahedan railway line, as part
of a transit and transportation corridor under the Chabahar
Agreement. Indian Railway Construction Limited (IRCON) signed a
MoU with Iran’s Construction and Development of Transportation
Infrastructures Company (CDTIC) to provide requisite services for
the construction of the railway line.
In December 2018, just before the snapback of the US sanctions
following the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the nuclear
agreement, India took over the operations of a part of the Shahid
Beheshti port.46 Subsequently, New Delhi was able to negotiate with
Washington a limited sanctions exemption for the construction of
Chabahar Port and the associated railway line. As President Trump’s
South Asia strategy, announced in August 2017, exhorted India to
play a bigger role in Afghanistan, especially in the field of economic
assistance and development, the US Treasury’s exemption of Indian
investment in Chabahar was a necessary compromise even from
Washington’s point of view.47 However, Washington maintained that
it would extend the exemption so long as Iran’s Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC), which had been put on the US State Department’s list
of foreign terrorist organisations in April 2019, does not participate
in the port project.48 With Tehran’s insistence that Khatam-al Anbiya
56 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Construction Headquarters, the engineering arm of the IRGC, be

entrusted with the civil work for the Chabahar-Zahedan railway line,
New Delhi became circumspect about its role in the construction of
the strategic railway line.49 Subsequently, citing delays from the Indian
side, Iran decided to go alone on the railway line. Soon after, Iran’s
Port and Maritime Organisation (PMO) requested India to help it
procure the equipment to run the railway line and activate the US$
150 million credit line to pay for equipment procurement.50 India had
promised the credit line during President Rouhani’s visit to India in
2018. India has stakes in developing port-hinterland connectivity from
Chabahar, especially given that New Delhi is keen to integrate
Chabahar with the eastern branch of the INSTC towards Central Asia.
In March 2021, at an event marking ‘Chabahar Day’, External Affairs
Minister S. Jaishankar proposed the inclusion of the port in the INSTC.
While welcoming Uzbekistan’s interest and Afghanistan joining the
12-member multimodal corridor project, the Minister noted that an
‘eastern corridor through Afghanistan’ would maximise the potential
of the project.51
While Iran has followed a policy of pragmatic engagement with
the Taliban after it overthrew the West-backed government in August
2021, India took a wait-and-watch approach before it reopened its
Embassy, with a skeletal technical staff, in June 2022. New Delhi
maintained that the purpose of the ‘technical team’ in Kabul was to
“closely monitor and coordinate” the delivery of humanitarian
assistance to the country.52 Subsequently, in partnership with the
United Nations World Food Programme, India delivered 40,000 MT
of wheat through the overland route via Pakistan, and another 20,000
MT of wheat through the Chabahar port.53 Given Pakistan’s role in
nurturing, and supporting the Taliban, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan is
being integrated into the CPEC. At a China-Pakistan-Afghanistan
ministerial dialogue in Islamabad in June 2023, Beijing and Islamabad
announced the extension of the CPEC into Afghanistan.54 India for its
part, has redoubled its efforts to develop Chabahar as a gateway for
Indian trade with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) countries.55 After the approval of Iran’s full membership
of the SCO, and the imperative for Central Asian States to diversify
their transit and transport routes to Europe in the wake of the Russia-
India-Iran Connectivity Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges 57

Ukraine war and European sanctions on Russia, Iran is keen to project

Chabahar as a trans-shipment hub for SCO member countries.56

Opportunities: The New Momentum on the INSTC

The INSTC has been long hailed by its three key proponents, namely
India, Iran and Russia, as a faster, cheaper alternative to the Suez
Canal route. However, the corridor has not received the same level of
attention and commitment even from these three countries.
The new momentum on the INSTC is owed to Russia’s ‘turn to
the East’, which was aimed at correcting its commercial over-reliance
on Europe and provide economic dynamism to its Far Eastern
provinces. However, it became more of a survival strategy following
its February 2022 ‘special operation’ in Ukraine, which resulted in the
European countries imposing comprehensive sanctions on Russia, and
closing their border with Russia. In recent years Iran and Russia have
developed increasing geopolitical and geo-economic convergence
based on their shared security objectives in limiting Western influence
in the region, preference for regional dialogue and cooperation on
issues ranging from the Caspian Sea to Afghanistan and terrorism,
and on north-south connectivity via Iran. Iran has undertaken an
ambitious programme of expanding its Caspian Sea shipping, mainly
to facilitate its own growing trade with the Eurasian Economic Union,
with which it signed an interim free trade agreement in March 2018.
The augmented shipping facilities at the Caspian ports of Russia and
Iran have helped operationalise the INSTC, especially as the 164-
kilometre Rasht-Astara railway line crucial to interlink the railway
networks of Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran, remains the missing link of
the multimodal INSTC. In June 2022, the State-run Islamic Republic
of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) ran a pilot test on the INSTC.57 It
coordinated transport of containers of wood laminate sheets, weighing
41 tons by road from St Petersburg to the jointly owned Iranian-
Russian terminal in the Caspian seaport city of Astrakhan to Iran’s
Caspian port of Anzali, and from there by road to Iran’s Bandar Abbas
port in the Persian Gulf and then on to the Nhava Sheva port on India’s
western coast.
58 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Iran’s Vision of the INSTC

Source: CSIS: Reconnecting Asia.

It is noteworthy, that during Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s

visit to Moscow in January 2022, Russia finalised the previously agreed
US$ 5 billion credit line for the completion of several projects in Iran,
including the financing of the Rasht-Astara railway line and
electrification of railway line between Garmsar in the south-west of
Tehran to Incheh-Borun on Iran–Turkmenistan border, which is part
of the eastern branch of the INSTC.58 This recent mobilisation of
financial resources and political will by Russia, Iran and India for
expediting the INSTC, indicates an optimistic future for this long-
awaited corridor. In addition, it is hoped that Iran’s membership in
the SCO will contribute to the attractiveness of the INSTC, especially
to the Central Asian States.
Iran’s interpretation of the INSTC entails a connection between
Chabahar to Sarakhs on the Turkmen border. Following the war in
Ukraine, there has been momentum on this eastern branch of the
corridor. In August 2022, while hosting an international conference
of transport ministers from landlocked countries, Turkmen Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov noted that
Turkmenistan had begun the process of joining the INSTC
agreement. 59 Under the agreement, the Caspian Sea port of
India-Iran Connectivity Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges 59

Turkmenbashi will become an INSTC node.60 In June 2022, the North–

South railway corridor also became operational when the first freight
train from Kazakhstan, carrying sulphur destined for Europe, arrived
at Incheh Borun at the Iran–Turkmenistan border. In Tehran, President
Ebrahim Raisi, along with the Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart
Tokayev launched the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran (KTI) transit
corridor, to Europe via Turkey.61 These developments indicate that
Iran’s outreach to the Central Asian States to use Iranian soil for both
East-West and North-South transit has supplemented India’s efforts
in operationalising the INSTC and Chabahar.

Challenges: Connectivity and Competition

In the geo-economic competition between Iran and Turkey in the
Caucasus and the Central Asian region, socio-cultural considerations
– that is, Iran being a predominantly Persian country among the
majority of Turkic States – act as strategic constraints for Iran’s
overtures to the region. Turkey has tried to leverage ethnic-linguistic
commonalities for fostering regional economic cooperation within the
framework of the Organisation of Turkic States. It continues to receive
support from Europe, and is courting China to develop East-West
connectivity from Central Asia to Europe through the Trans-Caspian
International Transport Route (TITR), called the Middle Corridor. It
charts a middle passage bypassing Russia in the north and Iran in the
south.62
In a similar vein, Uzbekistan, which has the distinction of sharing
borders with all other Central Asian States, and also Afghanistan, has
supported infrastructure and connectivity projects leading south via
Afghanistan rather than Iran. Over the last decade, Afghanistan and
Uzbekistan – both landlocked States – have depended on each other
for trade, transport and connectivity to Central Asia and South Asia
respectively. In the last couple of years, Uzbekistan sought to engage
the European Union and the United States, by interlinking regional
connectivity projects with the political survival of the US-backed
government in Kabul.63 Tashkent’s view that economic integration of
Afghanistan with the region is not only essential for stability in the
war-torn country but also the best bet for regional stability, explains
its early outreach and willingness to work with the Taliban in taking
60 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

forward regional connectivity projects. At the ‘Central and South Asia

Connectivity: Challenges and Opportunity’, organised by Tashkent
in July 2021, Uzbekistan joined the United States, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan in a quadrilateral diplomatic platform, focused on enhancing
regional connectivity. Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan merely a
month later raised a question mark on Western involvement, but
Uzbekistan hosted the 2022 version of the connectivity conference
focussing on economic recovery and mitigating the humanitarian crisis
in Afghanistan.64 At the end of the conference, Tashkent facilitated
direct talks between the visiting Taliban and US delegations on
unfreezing some of the Afghan assets for humanitarian aid. Uzbekistan
has also led efforts to secure European investment in the Trans-Afghan
railway.65
For transit countries to maximise their potential benefits, they
actively seek integration of international transport corridors with
regional and national logistics infrastructure. It is in this context that
Iran has been keen to foster complementarity between the INSTC and
other East–West latitudinal corridors. However, such integration
efforts will require Iran to navigate the competitive East-West
connectivity dynamics. After the Northern Corridor connecting
Northeast Asia with Europe via Russia came to an abrupt halt,
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have sought to work with the European
Union to increase the capacity of the Middle Corridor. In a move that
will give Uzbekistan more heft in Europe-Central Asia connectivity,
during the SCO summit in Samarkand in September 2022, an
agreement was reached on the long-delayed China-Kyrgyzstan-
Uzbekistan (CKU) Railway Corridor.66 The CKU route as the southern
part of China-Europe freight train, will link to Central and Eastern
Europe via Iran and Turkey. Among the existing routes, the route
linking China’s rail freight transport networks and the EU through
Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea ports of Aktau and Kuryk to Baku port in
Azerbaijan and then via Baku–Tbilisi–Kars Railway is considered the
second-best option after the Northern Corridor. However, with
increasing volume, Caspian shipping will need expansion. Uzbekistan
recently used the Turkmenistan route of the Middle Corridor when a
cargo train carrying 91 containers of copper concentrate crossed a
distance of 4000 km across Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
India-Iran Connectivity Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges 61

Bulgaria.67 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

(EBRD), which has been mandated by the European Commission to
conduct a study on sustainable transport connections between Central
Asia and Europe, has estimated that the Middle Corridor
infrastructure upgrade will require an estimated 3.5 billion.68
The EU’s interest in developing the Middle Corridor as the
alternative to the Russian Corridor underscores how Iran, despite its
geographical advantage, is often left out. Given the fact that the key
participants in the Middle Corridor initiative Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan, Turkey and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Organisation
of Turkic States, while Turkmenistan is an observer, the grouping has
adopted a transportation cooperation agenda.69 The activities of the
Turkic grouping, especially support for controversial projects such
as the Zangezur Corridor will inevitably run into problems with Iran,
which opposes the Corridor on the ground that it will undermine its
own narrow border with Armenia. These contestations in the Caucasus
create rival visions of north-south connectivity as countries see
infrastructure projects through a geopolitical prism of leverage and
avoiding dependencies. Armenia has been determined to construct
its north-south road corridor with the aim of connecting the southern
and northern borders of the country through the 556 km-long Meghri-
Yerevan-Bavra highway. Armenia had signed contracts with the Asian
Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and the Almaty-based Eurasian Development Bank to
secure funding for the strategic road project connecting Armenia to
the Georgian border in the north and up to Iran in the south. This can
be a key link in the Black Sea-Persian Gulf corridor if Georgia, a
Western ally, is willing to cooperate.70 Yerevan hopes that this highway
can be a key link in realising the Black Sea-Persian Gulf Transport
corridor, and the INSTC. Crucially, India and Iran have found
converging interests in supporting Armenia at a time when Baku,
with backing from Turkiye, is making a claim over its southern
province of Syunik and its traditional security partner Russia has taken
a more balanced approach between Baku and Yerevan. Apart from
cooperation in the military-technical sector, trade and transit sector
cooperation was the focus of the first India-Iran-Armenia trilateral
consultation in Yerevan in April 2023.71
62 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Conclusion
In the last seven years since the signing of the historic Chabahar
Agreement, India and Iran have made slow but steady progress
towards creating stable north-south connectivity. While the return of
the US sanctions on Iran in 2018 and the Taliban takeover of
Afghanistan in 2021 posed serious challenges in implementation of
the Chabahar port and related railway projects, other geopolitical
factors such as the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Iran’s accession
to the SCO and the war in Ukraine have convinced Iran and India to
continue their connectivity partnership. For India to play its balancing
role in Eurasia, which is desired by Russia, Iran and most Central
Asian States, the importance of reliable transport corridors cannot be
overestimated. Similarly, in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from
the JCPOA and the dismal status of the talks for restoring US and
Iran’s compliance to the same, Iran has strengthened its ‘Asia
orientation’ in both foreign policy and geo-economics. Tehran’s ‘Look
to the East’ policy seeks to diversify economic connectivity with
neighbouring Asian countries and strengthen its geo-economic
position within the global economy and thus goes beyond a tactical
shift to overcome Western economic sanctions. In this context, Iran’s
cooperation with India, together with deepening partnerships with
China and Russia, will continue in the near future. New Delhi for its
part, in keeping with the trend over the last two decades, will have to
balance its continental interests, with Iran being a crucial partner in
continental Asia, and its priorities in the Indo-Pacific, where it has a
burgeoning partnership with Washington.72

NOTES
1 Deepika Saraswat, “The US challenge to India’s ties with Iran”, The Round Table:
The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 111 (6), December 2022, pp. 735-
736.
2 “The New Delhi Declaration”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
25 January 2003, at https://mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?20182/The+
Republic+ of+ India+and+the+Islamic+Republic+of+Iran+quotThe+New+Delhi+
Declarationquot (Accessed 22 December 2022).
3 Philip Reid, Makran Gateways: A Strategic Reference for Gwadar and Chabahar, MP-
IDSA Occasional Paper No. 53, 2019, at https://idsa.in/occasionalpapers/makran-
gatways-op-53 (Accessed 19 December 2022).
4 Glenn Diesen, “New Trajectories of Transportation Corridors in Eurasia”, Valdai
Club, 11 October 2022, at https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/new-trajectories-of-
India-Iran Connectivity Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges 63

transportation-corridors/ (Accessed 19 December 2022).

5 Ibid.
6 Philip Reid, Mahan and Mackinder: Addressing the False Dichotomy in the Eurasian
Pivot Theory, MP-IDSA Occasional Paper No. 59, December 2022, at https://
www.idsa.in/system/files/opaper/op-59-mahan-and-mackinder_0.pdf (18.
7 P. Stobdan, Central Asia: India’s Northern Exposure, MP-IDSA Monograph Series
No. 44, 2015, at https://www.idsa.in/monograph/CentralAsiaIndiasNorthern
Exposure_ pstobdan_ 44 (22 December 2022); Ravi K. Mishra, “The ‘Silk Road’:
Historical Perspectives and Modern Constructions”, Indian Historical Review, 47
(1), 2020, pp. 21–39.
8 Philip Reid, no. 3, p. 5.
9 John Hayhurst, “Technologies of Power: Railway Records and what they can tell
us”, Qatar Digital Library, 3 May 2022, at https://www.qdl.qa/en/technologies-
power-railway-records-and-what-they-can-tell-us (Accessed 15 December 2022).
10 D.W. Spring, “The Trans-Persian Railway Project and Anglo-Russian Relations,
1909-14”, Middle Eastern Studies, 49 (2), 2013, p. 61.
11 Ibid., p. 60
12 Philip Reid, No. 3.
13 Szczepan Lemañczyk, “The Trans-Iranian Railway – History, Context and
Consequences”, Middle Eastern Studies, 49 (2), March 2013, p. 238.
14 Abbas Amanat, Iran: A Modern History, Yale University Press, New Haven and
London, 2017, p. 338.
15 D.W. Spring, “The Trans-Persian Railway Project and Anglo-Russian Relations,
1909-14”, The Slavonic and East European Review, 54 (1), January 1976.
16 Szczepan Lemañczyk, no.13, p. 239.
17 Philip Reid, no. 3.
18 Gary R. Hess, “The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War”, Political Science
Quarterly, 89 (1), 1974, pp. 117-146.
19 Ahed George Samaan, “The policy of containment and the Middle East, 1946-
1958”, 1972, at https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.967 (Accessed 28 November 2022).
20 P. Stobdan, no. 7, p. 5.
21 Ibid., p.16.
22 Philip Reid, no. 3, p. 6.
23 Mher D. Sahakyan. “Rebuilding Interconnections: Russia, India and the
International North-South Transport Corridor”, Asia Global Online, 2020, at https:/
/hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02980041/document (Accessed 23 December 2022).
24 “The New Delhi Declaration”, no. 2.
25 Edmund Herzig, “Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia”, International Affairs, 80
(3), 2004, pp. 503-17.
26 Alexander Karavayev and Mandana Tishehyar, “International North–South
Transport Corridor and Transregional Integration Scenarios”, Valdai Club, 26 June
2019, at https://valdaiclub.com/a/reports/north-south-transport-corridor (Accessed
11 December 2022).
27 Conference Report, “Central Asia, Afghanistan and the New Silk Road: Political,
Economic and Security Challenges”, The Jamestown Foundation, 14 November 2011,
https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Afghan_Silk_Road_conf_
report _-_ FULL.pdf?x87069 (Accessed 11 December 2022).
28 Ibid.
29 Alexander Lukin, “Russian–Chinese Cooperation in Central Asia and the Idea of
Greater Eurasia”, India Quarterly, 75 (1), 2019, pp. 1-14.
64 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

30 Richard Sakwa, “Eurasian Integration: A Project for the 21st Century?”, in D. Lane
and V. Samokhvalov, (eds.), The Eurasian Project and Europe, Palgrave Macmillan,
London, 2015, at https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472960_4
31 Glenn Diesen, no. 4.
32 Alexander Lukin, no. 29.
33 Philip Reid, no. 3.
34 Elizabeth Roche, “Narendra Modi pushes for stronger economic ties at SCO
summit”, Mint, 10 June 2018, at https://www.livemint.com/Politics/lBDkvSPdjPBy4
TGka4gKNJ/Narendra-Modi-says-connectivity-with-neighbourhood-and-in-
SC.html (Accessed 11 December 2022).
35 Lai-Ha Chan, “Can China remake regional order? Contestation with India over
the Belt and Road Initiative”, Global Change, Peace & Security, 32 (2), 2020, pp. 199-
217.
36 Philip Reid, no. 3, p.14.
37 David Brewster, “Silk Roads and Strings of Pearls: The Strategic Geography of
China’s New Pathways in the Indian Ocean”, Geopolitics, 22 (2), 2017, pp. 269-291.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Maysam Bizaer, “Iran’s railway ambitions go beyond Afghanistan”, Atlantic
Council, 4 January 2021 at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/irans-
railway-ambitions-go-beyond-afghanistan/ (Accessed 18 December, 2022).
41 “Dogharoon Special Economic Zone”, at https://dogharoon.ir/home-2/ (Accessed
13 July 2023).
42 “Is Afghanistan’s Main Trade Partner, Official Says”, Tasnim News, 18 March 2023,
at https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2023/03/18/2869466/iran-is-afghanistan-
s-main-trade-partner-official-says (Accessed 10 July 2023).
43 Maysam Bizaer, no. 40.
44 P. Stobdan, no. 7.
45 “India to fully operationalise Chabahar port soon; Iranian bank branch to open in
Mumbai: Nitin Gadkari”, The Economic Times, 8 January 2019, at https://
economictimes.indiatimes. com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-to-fully-
operationalise-chabahar-port-soon-iranian-bank-branch-to-open-in-mumbai-nitin-
gadkari/articleshow/67435229.cms? from=mdr (Accessed 19 December 2022).
46 “India takes over operations of part of Chabahar Port in Iran”, Press Information
Bureau, 7 January 2019, at https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1558896
(Accessed 18 December 2022).
47 Deepika Saraswat, “How India Got US Waiver on Iran Oil, Chabahar – And Its
Importance”, The Quint, 17 November 2018, at https://www.thequint.com/opinion/
us-waiver-iran-oil-chabahar-port-india-advantage#read-more (Accessed 25 July
2023).
48 Lalit K. Jha, “US grants India ‘narrow exemption’ from sanctions to continue
Chabahar port development in Iran”, The Print, 19 December 2019, at https://
theprint.in/diplomacy/us-grants-india-narrow-exemption-from-sanctions-to-
continue-chabahar-port-development-in-iran/337733/ (Accessed 15 December,
2022).
49 Geeta Mohan, “Real reason why India sits out of Iran’s Chabahar-Zahedan rail
link project”, India Today, 21 July 2021, at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/
iran-chabahar-zahedan-rail-link-project-india-1702928-2020-07-21 (Accessed 11
December 2022).
50 Suhasini Haidar, “Months after starting Chabahar rail project without India, Iran
India-Iran Connectivity Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges 65

seeks equipment”, The Hindu, 7 November 2021, at https://www.thehindu.com/

news/national/months-after-starting-chabahar-rail-project-without-india-iran-
requests-help-with-equipment/article33048813.ece (Accessed 11 December 2022).
51 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India proposes inclusion of Iran’s Chabahar Port in
International North South Transport Corridor”, The Economic Times, at https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-proposes-
inclusion-of-irans-chabahar-port-in-international-north-south-transport-corridor/
articleshow/81336893.cms?from=mdr (Accessed 15 December 2022).
52 Naynima Basu, “India reopens embassy in Kabul, sends ‘technical team’ with relief
material for Afghanistan”, The Print, 23 June 2022, at https://theprint.in/diplomacy/
india-reopens-embassy-in-kabul-sends-technical-team-with-relief-material-for-
afghanistan/10094 (Accessed 11 July, 2023).
53 Madhu Kapparath, “India sends food aid to Afghanistan on humanitarian grounds,
upon Taliban’s request”, Forbes India, 12 June 2023, at https://www.forbesindia.com/
article/news/india-sends-food-aid-to-afghanistan-on-humanitarian-grounds-
upon-talibans-request/85659/1/ (Accessed 17 December, 2022).
54 “At Islamabad meeting, China & Pakistan agree to extend Belt and Road initiative
to Afghanistan”, The Indian Express, 8 May 2023, at https://indianexpress.com/
article/world/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-to-enter-afghanistan-8596584/
(Accessed 18 December 2022).
55 Suhasini Haidar, “Explained: Reinvigorating the Chabahar port”, The Hindu, 23
August 2022, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/explained-
reinvigorating-the-chabahar-port/article65802514.ece (Accessed 22 December
2022).
56 Deepika Saraswat, “Iran’s Central Asia Policy Gains Momentum amid Russia–
Ukraine War”, MP-IDSA Issue Brief, 19 July 2022, at https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/
iran-central-asia-policy-gains-momentum-dsaraswat-190722 (Accessed 19
December 2022).
57 “Iran kicks off pilot transit via North-South Corridor”, IRNA, 11 June 2022, at
https://en.irna.ir/news/84784416/Iran-kicks-off-pilot-transit-via-North-South-
Corridor (Accessed 19 December, 2022).
58 Vali Kaleji, “Will Russia Complete Iran’s Rasht–Astara Railway?”, The Jamestown
Foundation, 16 May 2022, at https://jamestown.org/program/will-russia-complete-
irans-rasht-astara-railway/ (Accessed 20 December 2022).
59 “Turkmenistan will join the transport corridor ‘North–South’”, Turkmenportal,
8 August 2022, at https://turkmenportal.com/en/blog/50762/turkmenistan-will-join-
the-transport-corridor-north—south (Accessed 18 December 2022).
60 “Turkmenistan to Officially Join the International North-South Transport
Corridor”, Silk Road Briefing, 29 August 2022, at https://www.silkroadbriefing.
com/news/2022/08/23/turkmenistan-to-officially-join-the-international-north-
south-transport-corridor/ (Accessed 12 December 2022).
61 “1st Kazakhstan-Turkey Transit Train Arrives in Iran”, Tehran Times, 19 June 2022
at https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/473795/1st-Kazakhstan-Turkey-transit-
train-arrives-in-Iran (Accessed 13 December 2022).
62 James Jay Carafano, “Central Asia’s Middle Corridor gains traction at Russia’s
expense”, GIS Report Online, 29 August 2022, at https://www.gisreportsonline.com/
r/middle-corridor/ (Accessed 11 December, 2022).
63 Timor Sharan, “Andrew Watkins, Stabilization and Connectivity Uzbekistan’s dual-
track strategy towards Afghanistan”, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2021, at https://
library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kabul/17313.pdf (Accessed 15 December 2022).
66 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

64 Ayaz Gul, “Uzbekistan to Host US-Taliban Talks on Economic Challenges Facing

Afghans”, Voice of America, 25 July 2022, at https://www.voanews.com/a/uzbekistan-
to-host-us-taliban-talks-on-economic-challenges-facing-afghans/6673250.html
(Accessed 12 December 2022).
65 “Trans-Afghan rail corridor needs EU as much as Taliban”, Rail Freight, 3
November 2022, at https://www.railfreight.com/corridors/2022/11/03/trans-afghan-
corridor-needs-eu-as-much-as-taliban/?gdpr=deny (Accessed 18 December, 2022).
66 Li Xuanmin, “China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway to open ‘southern Eurasia
corridor, facilitates BRI cooperation with Central Asia: analysts”, Global Times, 15
September 2022, at https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202209/1275365.shtml
(Accessed 12 December 2022).
67 “Turkmenbashi port transported copper concentrate from Uzbekistan to Europe”,
Orient, 28 December 2022 at https://orient.tm/en/old/post/44075/turkmenbashi-
port-transported-copper-concentrate-uzbekistan-europe (Accession date 30
December, 2022).
68 Antov Usov, “EBRD researches sustainable transport connections between Central
Asia and Europe”, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 7
November 2022, at https://www.ebrd.com/news/2022/ebrd-researches-sustainable-
transport-connections-between-central-asia-and-europe-.html (Accessed 18
December 2022).
69 Muhammad Rafiq, “China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Corridor to Boost
Regional Cooperation”, The Astana Times, 9 September 2022, at https://
astanatimes.com/2022/09/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-corridor-to-boost-
regional-cooperation/ (Accessed 11 July 2023).
70 “North-South Road Corridor Investment Program”, at https://armroad.am/en/
projects/north-south-road-corridor-investment-program (Accessed 11 July 2023).
71 “Armenia hosts first trilateral meeting with Iranian and Indian officials”, Tehran
Times, 23 April 2023, at https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/483916/Armenia-hosts-
first-trilateral-meeting-with-Iranian-and-Indian (Accessed 11 July, 2023).
72 Deepika Saraswat, no. 1.
 4
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister
Narendra Modi
Jatin Kumar

Israel holds an important place in India’s West Asia Policy. While India
recognised Israel in 1950, it established formal diplomatic ties with
the latter under the leadership of P.V. Narasimha Rao, on 29 January
1992. This was facilitated by a change in the international order at the
end of the Cold War, wherein the US emerged as a major power.1
Though India took 42 years to establish bilateral relations with Israel,
it successfully maintained the image of a time-tested friend for India
in difficult times since 1950.
In the early decades of India’s independence, its policy towards
Israel was dominated by the presence of a significant Muslim
population in India and its energy concerns which were largely
dependent on Arab countries. While these factors prevented the
successful maturing of relations between the two countries, Israel
helped India in its wars with countries such as China in 1962 and
Pakistan in 1965, 1971 and 1999.2
Despite the advancements in India and Israel’s relations after 1992,
India’s traditional support for the two-state solution prevented its
successive Prime Ministers from visiting Israel. However, the exchange
of visits by ministers and armed forces officers took place at regular
intervals. In the post-1992 period, India separated bilateral relations
68 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

from the intricacies of the peace process without changing its voting
patterns in international forums.
Post-1993, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres’s visit to India
helped in creating a strong foundation of economic and defence ties.
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed to deepen
economic ties, and discussions were held on issues related to
terrorism.3 Subsequent visits including that of Israeli President, Ezer
Weizman, to India (first visit by an Israeli President), L.K. Advani’s
visit to Israel in 2000 and Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon’s visit to
India in 2003, helped to cement the ties further. Sharon’s visit was
extremely significant since it witnessed the signing of six agreements
focusing “on combating illicit trafficking of drugs, environment,
health, education and culture,” and deepened the defence ties further
between the counties.4
In 2004, under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government,
the “contacts with Israel became minimal and were largely confined
to defence and security issues.”5 This was majorly attributed to the
domestic and international opposition to Israel which emerged after
the Al Aqsa intifada (September 2000). However, the UPA government
tried to return to Nehru’s pragmatic approach towards the West Asian
region and adopted a more balanced policy with Israel in its decade-
long tenure.6
Since 2014, India-Israel ties have reached a new era of more
pronounced relations. Under the leadership of Narendra Modi, the
bilateral relations have expanded across various sectors such as
defence, innovation, trade, agriculture, and cyber security, to name a
few. Both countries have intensified their defence relations through
regular joint military exercises, procuring security equipment and
weapons and technology sharing.
Similarly, agricultural ties have also witnessed significant
advancements. In this regard, India has sought Israel’s technological
know-how in areas such as irrigation technologies, water management
and agricultural productivity. Furthermore, both countries have
initiated various collaborative projects and training programmes to
improve agricultural practices and water-related issues in India. At
the diplomatic level, regular high-level visits have been taking place
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 69

between the two countries, the most recent being the visit by Israeli
Foreign Minister, Eli Cohen to India on 9 May 2023. Cohen’s visit
opened avenues to expand the ongoing collaboration in agriculture
and water between the two nations.
An important factor that has been a major catalyst in nurturing
robust Indo-Israel ties is Prime Minister Modi’s close personal
relationship with Israeli leaders, including Benjamin Netanyahu. This
can be inferred from the instance wherein both the leaders addressed
each other by their first names, indicative of their informality and
warmth. In light of the positive relations shared between the two, the
countries have engaged with each other on several fronts. Currently,
both countries are exploring joint collaboration in new areas such as
cybersecurity, renewable energy and the establishment of a robust
start-up ecosystem in India.

Factors Shaping India’s Approach to Israel

The expansion of India’s relations with Israel, especially under the
leadership of Modi, has been influenced by several domestic and
international factors. With respect to the deepening of defence ties
between the two countries, the following factors have played a major
and overpowering role: Firstly, the growing national security challenge
faced by India from China and Pakistan has necessitated the
modernisation of its armed forces in terms of acquisition of more
advanced weaponry and technology. The intelligence failures during
the Pathankot and Uri attacks and terror strikes in Mumbai in 2008
have highlighted gaps in India’s intelligence system and coastal
surveillance capabilities respectively. In addition, India’s recent
confrontation with China has underlined the urgent requirement of
multiple security systems to safeguard Indian borders.7
Secondly, India’s progress in the development of indigenous
defence equipment and systems has been relatively slow.8 For instance,
the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in 2018
highlighted the unwarranted interruption in the home-grown
advancement in the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
led by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).9
The Report further underscored that the UAVs so developed, failed
to meet the user’s requirements despite incurring a cost of INR 79.75
70 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

crore in their procurement.10 Additionally, the setback in the progress

of the Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV system development
had an adverse effect on the Indian Army’s aerial surveillance
capability.11 Thus, India has sought more dependable partners such
as Israel which has expertise in UAVs and surveillance systems.12 India
has also procured radars from Israel due to the unavailability of
indigenous technologies to enhance surveillance on its borders.13
The economic factors have also contributed significantly in
shaping India-Israel relations. Israeli technology and its advanced
expertise in various sectors have benefited the Indian economy in
areas such as water management, agriculture, cybersecurity and
healthcare. The recognition of these benefits by the Indian policy
makers has incentivised them to further explore avenues for
deepening ties with Israel to provide solutions to problems associated
with India’s economic development.
In addition, certain changes in the geopolitical dynamics have
dictated India’s enhanced engagement with Israel. The gradual shift
in the perception of the Arab countries regarding Israel has provided
an opportunity for India to engage more freely with Israel. The
reduced hostility towards Israel among the major Arab countries, such
as Egypt, Jordan, Turkiye, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain has
changed the regional realities. A further impetus to the relations was
provided by the signing of the Abraham Accords on 15 September
2020 between Israel and the UAE, followed by Bahrain. This removed
the strategic obstacles for India to actively expand its ties with Israel
and opened the doors for multilateral cooperation with the West Asian
countries along with Israel as one of the partners. The inaugural virtual
gathering in October 2021 featuring the foreign ministers of India,
Israel, the UAE and the US (I2U2) followed the principles of the
Abraham Accords.
In addition to aiding India’s increased engagement with Israel,
the growing convergence between Israel and the Arab countries has
also made it easy for India to de-hyphenate its relations vis-a-vis Israel
and Palestine. This has enabled India to have a relationship with Israel
independent of its ties with the Palestinians, thereby being able to
follow a more pragmatic policy focussing on its best interests.14
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 71

High-Level Visits Between India-Israel Since 2014

The initial encounter between the Prime Ministers of both nations,
Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu, during the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2014 signalled an era of
deepened relations between both countries. During the meeting,
Netanyahu highlighted the opportunities for collaboration between
the two countries by saying that “sky’s the limit” when it comes to
cooperation between the two countries.15 A year later, in March 2015,
Modi met with the President of Israel, Reuven Rivlin, in Singapore.16
At the meeting, the Israeli President reiterated an invitation to Modi
to visit Israel. Henceforth, several other important visits by leaders
from the two countries took place, including a visit by the Israeli
Minister of Agriculture Yair Shamir (January 2015), Defence Minister
Moshe Ya’alon (February 2015), Indian Union Home Minister Rajnath
Singh (November 2015) and then Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj
(January 2016). All these early meetings were indicative of India’s
foreign policy shift towards Israel.
President Pranab Mukherjee’s first visit to Israel in October 2015,
signified another breakthrough in bilateral relations. This set the stage
for the future visit by the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi.
During the visit, President Mukherjee addressed the Israeli Members
of Parliament in a special Knesset session, expressing that his trip to
Israel coincided with a period of increasingly positive developments
in relations between the two governments.17 Shortly after the visit of
the President, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj paid a visit to
Israel in January 2016.18 She met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and
discussed various issues related to bilateral relations, particularly,
security, science and technology, cyber security, education, research
and innovation, water and agriculture. Both leaders also discussed
possibilities to expand cooperation in business and education sectors.19
The conducive environment being provided by the shift in perception
among the Arab countries regarding Israel played an enabling role
for India to productively engage with Israel.
Thus, within the first few months of Modi’s premiership, Israel
became an important part of India’s “constructive engagement” with
West Asia, and Israel was integrated within India’s wider regional
policy rather than being treated as a special case. Significant
72 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

importance began to be given to expanding cooperation in the non-

defence areas, such as science and technology, drinking water and
sanitation, agricultural cooperation, space research, innovation and
cyber security. This was clearly evident in the agreements and MoUs
that both the countries signed in July 2017 during Modi’s visit to Israel.
Since this was the first time an Indian Prime Minister visited Israel, it
marked a big shift in India’s foreign policy towards Israel. Prime
Minister Modi’s decision of not to visit Palestine during the trip, broke
all previous conventions and came to be described as the “de-
hyphenation” of India’s relations with Israel and Palestine.20
From 14 to 19 January 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu visited India to celebrate the silver jubilee of the India-
Israel relationship and the growing partnership between the two.
Accompanied by a 130-member business delegation, Netanyahu
aimed at solidifying trade relations. On 15 January 2018, the leaders
shared a joint statement and said that both countries “share a common
vision for the relationship.” In addition, both countries agreed that
“in the next twenty-five years the two respective countries should
strive to raise bilateral cooperation in diverse sectors to a qualitatively
new level in consonance with our Strategic Partnership.”21 During
the visit, Netanyahu held comprehensive talks with Modi and also
visited his home state Gujarat, where the two leaders participated in
a joint road show. Both the leaders signed “four government-to-
government agreements on cyber security, oil and gas cooperation,
film co-production and air transport, along with five other semi-
government agreements.”22
Netanyahu also delivered the keynote address at the Raisina
Dialogue in 2018, organised by the Observer Research Foundation.
In his speech, he emphasised on deepening collaboration in all the
areas of cooperation. He also highlighted the common security
challenges for both nations and emphasised on strengthening the
“India-Israel alliance.” The use of the term alliance was significant to
understand the deepening ties between the two countries. The visit
was the final step in the process of full normalisation of bilateral
relations.
The developments before the visit, such as India’s General
Assembly vote on Jerusalem23 and the signing of a US$ 2 billion rail
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 73

deal with Iran,24 highlighted that India was vigilantly balancing its
policy with the other actors in the region as well. However, during
Netanyahu’s visit, both countries agreed to strengthen relations in
areas that improve the well-being of people, such as agriculture,
security and science and technology. Discussions were held on
developing more Centres of Excellence, key pillars of agricultural
cooperation, with the aid of sophisticated Israeli practices and
technology. In addition, India also welcomed “Israeli companies to
take advantage of the liberalised Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)
regime to make more in India with Indian companies.”25 The visit
emphasised on traditional domains of collaboration between India
and Israel, including agriculture and defence, while also expanding
cooperation into less explored sectors like energy resources (oil and
gas), cybersecurity, start-ups, and the film industry.
As part of the visit, nine MoUs and agreements, including those
on cyber-security, gas and oil sector, Amendments to the Air Transport
Agreement, Agreement on Film co-production, cooperation in the field
of Research in Homoeopathic Medicine, MoU on cooperation in the
field of space, memorandum on investment, were signed.26 A Letter
of Intent (LoI) for “cooperation in the domain of metal-air batteries
and concentrated solar thermal technologies” was also signed. As an
encouragement to Indian innovation, Netanyahu and Modi dedicated
iCREATE27 to the nation in order to create an ecosystem in India to
produce quality entrepreneurs.28
Indo-Israel relations which were previously limited mostly to
defence collaborations, now expanded to non-defence areas with a
major thrust given by India on leveraging the innovation capabilities
of Israel in various fields and domains.

India-Israel Defence Cooperation

Since the recognition of Israel in 1950, defence ties have been the
cornerstone of India-Israel relations, although marginally documented
in the pre-normalisation period (1950-1992).29 After the India-China
War in 1962, India expressed its willingness to seek consultation from
Israeli specialists regarding security matters. In the following years,
the two nations shared frequent off-the-record visits of dignitaries
including a secret visit by Moshe Dayan in 1977.30 Both the countries
74 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

also shared covert intelligence ties under the leadership of Prime

Minister Indira Gandhi (1966-1977 and 1980-1984) and Rajiv Gandhi
(1984-1989).31 Since the normalisation of relations in 1992, defence
ties have deepened consistently. In the mid-1990s, India bought Ramta
two Super Dvora Mark II attack boats from the Israeli Aerospace
Industries (IAI) and secured the “licence to build the remaining at
Goa Shipyard in collaboration with Ramta in 1997.”32 Furthermore,
India procured Electronic Support Measure Sensors, 32 IAI Searcher
UAVs and Instrumentation simulator systems from Israel.33 Israel has
also played an instrumental role in upgrading Russian-made ground
attack aircraft, MiG-21, for the Indian Air Force.34 In 1999, Israel’s
vital support to India in the Kargil War made it a dependable partner
for India’s defence requirements.
In the post-normalisation period, India procured various
equipment from Israel, including but not limited to, assault rifles
(Tavor), Sniper rifles (Galil), Harpy and Harop loitering anti-radiation
drones, Spike anti-tank missiles, Barak-1 air-defence missile, the Green
Pine missile-defence radar, night/adverse weather precision-targeting
pod, Spyder air-defence system, radars, Python-4 air-to-air missile,
fire-control missiles, Phalcon airborne warning and control systems
(AWACS).35 From 1997 to 2000, India accounted for 15 per cent of
total Israeli arms exports, which further increased to 27 per cent by
mid-2000.36
The defence ties further deepened under Prime Minister Modi’s
leadership. Data on defence trade since 2014, compiled by the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicates that
approximately 42.1 per cent of Israel’s arms exports have been directed
to India, with Azerbaijan (13.9 per cent), Vietnam (8.5 per cent), and
the US (6.2 per cent) constituting the other significant
customers.37 SIPRI also underlined that the weapon deliveries to India
from Israel witnessed a 175 per cent increase in 2015-201938 rendering
Israel the second largest supplier of major arms to India. In addition,
exports from Israel increased by 19 per cent between 2012-16 and
2017-2021.39
From 2014, Israel has turned out to be an important player in
India’s defence market along with Russia and France. In October 2014,
a contract for procurement of Barak-1 missiles was signed with Rafael
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 75

Advanced Defence Systems Ltd. 40 The defence ties have further

strengthened because of the joint development projects. For instance,
in January 2006, the Defence Research and Development Organisation
(DRDO) and the IAI, signed a contract to co-develop a long-range
surface-to-air missile (LRSAM) for India’s naval forces.41 The first batch
of five LRSAMs was handed over by DRDO in 2017.42,43 In the same
year, India also signed a MoU worth US$ 1.6 billion with Israel for
the development of MRSAMs for the Indian ground forces, the first
test of which was conducted in December 2020.44
In 2017, a joint venture between Indian and Israeli companies,
namely, Kalyani Rafael Advanced Systems Ltd (KRAS) commenced
manufacturing of Spike anti-tank guided missiles for Indian forces.45
Reportedly, India procured over 200 Spike missiles and their launchers
from Israel for the Indian Army through the emergency procurement
route in February 2020.46 In addition, India reportedly inked a US$
200 million deal with Israel for the procurement of software-enabled
radios, bomb guidance kits and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).
Apart from radars, UAVs and missiles, India and Israel also
deepened their relations in the fields of small arms and ammunition.
Indian forces are using Israeli small arms such as Tavor, Uzi, Negev
and Galil rifles. In 2020, India ordered 16,000 Negev NG-7 light
machine guns (LMGs) to deal with increasing ceasefire breaches from
Pakistan. Similarly, under Make in India initiative, Punj Lloyd is
collaborating with Israel Weapon Industries (IWI) to produce small
weapons (Tavor) in India under “a complete technology transfer
arrangement.” 47 Indian and Israeli armed forces collaboratively
engaged in joint training exercises which helped in strengthening
relations. In 2017, for the first time, an Indian Air Force (IAF)
contingent comprising 45 members participated in the Blue Flag
Exercise (A multilateral Exercise organised in Israel) along with France,
Greece, Germany, Italy, the US and Poland.48 In 2021, India again
participated in the same Exercise and its contingent included Mirage
2000 and Rafale aircraft. Indeed, the joint military exercises have
played a vital role in deepening the synergy between the two forces.49
In 2022, to boost defence ties and discuss avenues for further
enhancing security relations, various high-level visits were made from
India to Israel. This includes a visit by India’s Chief of Air Staff Air
76 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria (3 August 2021)50 and

Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane’s visit (15-19
November 2022).51 Air Chief Marshal Bhadauria’s visit to Israel was a
significant milestone for the ties of the Air Forces of the two countries.
During the visit, both countries discussed issues of mutual interest
and bilateral defence cooperation. In addition, both also shared their
vision for further strengthening of bilateral engagements and
multidisciplinary professional exchanges. In November 2022, General
Naravane’s visit focused more on the aspects of border management
and counter-terrorism practices.
In addition, a five-day visit to Israel was made by Indian External
Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, in October 2021, marking a milestone
in the relations between India and Israel with the announcement of
the formation of the I2U2. During this visit, a decision was made to
create a joint task force to identify new domains for defence
collaboration through the formulation of a comprehensive ten-year
roadmap.52 On 2 June 2022, the visit of Israeli Defence Minister
Benjamin Gantz played a significant role in deepening the defence
ties. During the visit, both countries agreed to advance joint military
training, weapons research and development. 53 To strengthen
collaboration in the realm of Futuristic Defence Technologies, a Letter
of Intent was also exchanged between the two Ministers.54

Table 4.1: Major Israel Weapons Used by Indian Armed Forces

Weapon Description
Ariel Vehicles Searcher UAV
Heron UAV
Air Defence Systems SPYDER SAM System
BARAK-LR SAM System
Missiles BARAK-8 SAM
Derby BVRAAM
Python-5 BVRAAM
SPICE-2000 Guided Bomb
Griffin Guided Bomb
Harop Loitering Ammunition
Crystal Maze ASM
Barak-1 SAM
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 77

Weapon Description
Sensors EL/M 2075 Phalcon AWACS
EL/M 2032 Combat Aircraft Radar
EL/M 2248 MF-STAR Multi-function RADAR
EL/M 2221 STGR Fire Control RADAR
Small Arms Carmel Assault Rifle
UZI Submachine Guns
ARAD Multi-Caliber Assault Rifle
Tavor Assault Rifle
Galil Sniper Rifle
UZI Pro Sub Machine Gun
Israeli Tavor X95 Assault Rifle
Negev Light Machine Gun
Source: SIPRI55 and Middle East Eye.56

Cooperation in Security and Border Management

Internal security and border management are the two other areas of
India-Israel cooperation. Common security challenges of terrorism
and radicalisation impacting the people of both countries have
provided a solid ground for robust cooperation in these areas. To
deal with the threats posed by terror groups, the two countries formed
a Joint Working Group for Counter Terrorism in 2002 and this group
has served as a platform to share the field experiences on border
security, suicide terrorism, terror financing and cyber warfare.57 In
October 2021, the 15th gathering of the Joint Working Group on
Counter-Terrorism took place, during which India and Israel
concurred to establish “a task force to formulate a comprehensive
Ten-Year Roadmap to identify new areas of cooperation.”58
The cooperation in areas of internal security has significantly
improved since the Mumbai attacks of 2008. The attacks highlighted
the challenges which India was facing in managing its borders and in
dealing with the terrorist attacks. As a result, Israel came forward to
help India by providing “satellite photo imagery, unarmed aerial
vehicles, hand-held thermal imagers, night vision devices, long-range
reconnaissance and observation systems (LORROS), and detection
equipment for counterterrorism purposes.”59 In November 2016,
during the Israeli President Reuven Rivlin’s meeting with Modi on
78 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

his visit to India, counter-terrorism was a focal point of the

deliberations.60 To expand the cooperation in Homeland and Public
Security, an Agreement was signed in February 201461 in pursuance
of which regular institutional interactions have taken place. The
Agreement facilitated the formation of “four working groups in areas
of border management, internal security and public safety, capacity
building and police modernisation with the objective of preventing
and combating crime and cybercrime.”62 The groups frequently hold
meetings in both countries.
Border management is another area where Israel has shared its
technological know-how with India. In November 2014, Home
Minister Rajnath Singh reviewed the Israeli border management
technology while visiting Israeli bordering territories along with the
Israeli National Security Adviser, Yossi Cohen. Since then, there were
media reports suggesting that India acquired “high-technology
border-fencing solutions” from Israel which was later confirmed by
the Director General Border Security Force (BSF), K.K. Sharma in July
2018. He confirmed that India was using Israeli technology and
methods in the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management
System (CIBMS), which was a pilot project started by the Government
of India in 2016.63
India and Israel have close ties in the intelligence domain as well.
The roots of intelligence cooperation can be traced to 1968 when India
established the Research and Analysis Wing. According to the reports,
its first director “R.N. Kao was tasked by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
to establish ties with Israel’s Mossad.”64 However, details regarding
the same are largely classified. Media reports suggest that India
imported critical intelligence-gathering technologies from Israel and
regularly exchanged officials from the intelligence community. Both
nations also exchange real-time intelligence to combat the issue of
terrorism.65

India-Israel Economic Ties

On the economic front, India-Israel bilateral trade has continued to
grow. In 2022-23, the total trade between the two countries was worth
US$ 10.8 billion, with the balance of trade in India’s favour. The total
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 79

trade has jumped from US$ 7.8 billion in 2021-22 to 10.8 billion in
2022-23.66 While imports fluctuated, the Indian exports to Israel rose
from US$2.8 billion in 2015 to US$ 3.7 billion in 2019. The period of
COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a fall in total trade between the two
countries (2019 to 2021). However, as the countries recovered, the
value of total trade saw a major jump from US$ 4.6 billion in 2020-21
to US$ 10.8 billion in 2022-23. In addition to the increase in the value
of total trade, there has been diversification in the products being
traded between the two countries over the years, encompassing new
goods and services such as pharmaceuticals, agriculture, homeland
security and IT and telecom.67
In terms of cross-country investments, the inflow of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) from Israel in India amounted to US$ 284.96 million
from April 2000 to March 2022.68 Indian investments in Israel as of
June 2022 were to the tune of US$ 131.85 million.69 In July 2022, Israel’s
Gadot Group and India’s Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone
Ltd (APSEZ) successfully secured the bid for privatising the Port of
Haifa. By securing the tender of US$ 1.18 billion, “the Adani-Gadot
consortium holds the right to buy 100 per cent shares of Haifa Port
Company Ltd.”70
Previously, some major Indian companies such as Infosys, Tech
Mahindra and Wipro Infrastructure Engineering have also made
significant acquisitions and investments in Israel during 2015-2016.
In 2017, Saisanket Enterprises Private Limited, an Indian company,
took over the Israeli firm Shtula, while in January 2019, India’s Lohia
Group assumed control of the Israeli defence company Light and
Strong.71 As far as investments from Israel into India are concerned,
Government of India data shows that “more than 300 investments
have been made especially in the high-tech and agricultural domain.”72
Additionally, the countries are also negotiating a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) which will expand the volume of trade between
the two. Thus, the economic engagements are not only making great
strides in magnitude but also in terms of composition.
80 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Table 4.2: India-Israel Bilateral Trade (in US$ Millions)

Sl. No. Year Export Import Total Trade
1 2014-2015 3,289.85 2,328.04 5,617.89
2 2015-2016 2,821.18 2,095.33 4,916.50
3 2016-2017 3,087.16 1,961.12 5,048.28
4 2017-2018 3,364.05 2,066.51 5,430.56
5 2018-2019 3,717.98 1,931.58 5,649.56
6 2019-2020 3,363.10 1,592.70 4,955.80
7 2020-2021 2,701.49 1,960.19 4,661.68
8 2021-2022 4,796.13 3,073.79 7,869.92
9 2022-2023 8,451.47 2,323.19 10,774.66
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Government of India.

Agriculture and Water Cooperation

The saga of India-Israel agricultural relations began after the signing
of a comprehensive work plan for agricultural cooperation, on 10 May
2006. Thereafter, the relations in the agricultural domain have
improved significantly. Since 2014, there has been growing cooperation
between India and Israel in agriculture, as Israel is recognised for its
unique expertise in the field. Both parties are collaboratively operating
within the framework of a Five-Year Joint Work Plan for strategic
cooperation in agriculture and water.73
As part of the three-year joint programme (2018-21), the Indo-
Israel Agricultural Project (IIAP) set up 30 Centres of Excellence (CoE)
across 21 Indian states, majorly focussing on vertical farming, soil
solarisation and increasing productivity.74 Additionally, two more such
Centres are being opened in Jammu & Kashmir.75 Through these CoEs,
Israel shares its best practices and know-how and provides a suitable
platform for technology transfer to Indian farmers. The Government
of India and Israel’s Agency for International Development
Cooperation (MASHAV), are also in the process of expanding
collaboration towards Indo-Israel Villages of Excellence (IIVOE)
wherein CoEs, tailored to local conditions, shall disseminate Israel’s
novel technologies and methodologies. The goal is to reshape 74
villages in India. The IIVOE shall include modern agriculture
infrastructure such as precision agriculture solutions, agro-machinery,
cold chain facilities, etc.; capacity building through training of farmers
and agribusiness training; and digital marketing platforms.76
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 81

In September 2022, a two-week training programme on

horticulture management, “Horticulture Management: The Israeli
Value Chain” organised by MASHAV, was concluded by a third major
delegation of 19 agricultural officers from seven states in India. As a
part of this, the delegation visited orchards, vegetable farms and
nurseries, to explore the potential of importing Israeli planting
varieties suitable for India.

Table 4.3: List of India-Israel Centre of Excellence in Indian States

Sl. No. State Centre of Excellence
1. Haryana (4) Vegetables, Karnal
Fruits, Mangiana
Mango, Ladwa
Beekeeping, Ram Nagar
2. Gujarat (3) Mango, Junagarh, Talala
Vegetables, Vadrad
Date palm, Bhuj
3. Karnataka (3) Veg, Dharwad
Pomegranate, Bagalkot
Mango, Kolar
4. Maharashtra (4) Mango, Dapoli
Citrus, Nagpur
Pomegranate, Rahuri
Mango, Aurangabad
5. Punjab (3) Fruits, Hoshiarpur
Vegetables, Kartarpur
Brackish Water, Bhatinda
6. Rajasthan (3) Citrus, Kota
Pomegranate, Bassi
Date Palm
7. Tamil Nadu (2) Floriculture, Thally
Vegetables, Dindigul
8. Mizoram (1) Citrus, Lunglei
9. Uttar Pradesh (2) Vegetables, Kannauj
Mango, Basti
10. Andhra Pradesh (1) Vegetables & Flowers, Kuppam
11. Telangana (1) Vegetables & Flowers, Jeedimetla
12. Bihar (2) Vegetables, Chandi-Nalanda
Mango, Desri-Vaishali
13. West Bengal (1) Vegetables, Chinsurah, Hooghly
Source: Government of Israel. 77
82 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

In water resource management, India is the only country where a

Water Attache has been stationed by Israel at its Embassy. Israel is a
world leader in water management and recycling. While India adopted
Israeli drip irrigation in 1993, two major pacts were inked during the
visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Israel in 2017, including
one on the National Campaign for Water Conservation in India and
the other on the reform of state water utility in India, between the
Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam and the Ministry of National Infrastructure,
Energy & Water Resources.78 The countries also officially endorsed
the Strategic Partnership on Water in 2018. Furthermore, technological
know-how is being provided by 32 Israeli water projects in 13 Indian
states. More than seven desalination plants in India are using Israeli
technology.79 In 2018, the Gal-Mobile, a desalination and purification
jeep, was gifted by Israel to India, which was transferred to the BSF to
help them avail high-quality drinking water during operations in
difficult arid terrains. This can also be used during natural disasters
and for providing drinking water to rural areas.80
Israel is also considering investing in the Bundelkhand region to
solve the problem of water scarcity.81 At the 17th Everything About
Water Expo on 4 August 2022 to strengthen Indo-Israel cooperation
in the water sector, the Israeli companies shared solutions related to
water distribution and management, desalination, wastewater
treatment and filtration.82

Cooperation in Health and Medicine during COVID-19

The expansion of ties in the areas of health and medicine is another
milestone in India-Israel ties. The two countries inked an Agreement
on Cooperation in the fields of Health and Medicine on 21 December
2020. The Agreement envisions deepening the partnership in “the
health sector, including research and development, between the two
countries.” 83 According to the Agreement, the countries would
exchange and train medical practitioners and other health
professionals, share regulatory information regarding pharma-
ceuticals, medical devices, cooperate in developing climate-resilient
hospitals along with promoting research and development in several
relevant domains.84
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 83

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, India and Israel

have been closely cooperating with each other. During the initial and
difficult period of COVID-19, Prime Minister Modi conversed with
Netanyahu multiple times on telephone wherein both discussed
possible areas of collaboration to fight the pandemic. Some of these
areas include “improving the availability of pharmaceutical supplies,
innovative use of high technology, cooperation in research and
development efforts in the fields of vaccines, therapeutics and
diagnostics.” 85 Due to COVID-19 restrictions, interactions were “held
virtual[ly] including the First India-Israel Policy Planning Dialogue
on 21 October 2020 and the 16th Foreign Office Consultations on
7 December 2020.”86
Amidst the COVID-19 crisis, both countries expressed solidarity
with each other in their fight against the global pandemic. A shipment
of medicines weighing five tonnes, which included the anti-malarial
drug hydroxychloroquine, considered a potential treatment for
COVID-19, was sent by India to Israel. 87 In July 2020, Israel
reciprocated by sending a special flight with researchers, defence
experts and advanced medical equipment (ventilators) on board, for
India’s aid.88 The delivery was made following an exceptional approval
from the Israeli Government. Additionally, scientists from both nations
collaborated to create a rapid COVID-19 testing kit.89 On 12 August
2020, as part of its pandemic aid to India, the Israeli Government
provided state-of-the-art Artificial Intelligence technologies as well
as high-end equipment to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences
(AIIMS).90 In addition, the Prime Ministers of both countries discussed
ways to combat the pandemic at a meeting on the sidelines of the
COP-26 climate summit in Glasgow on 2 November 2021.91 Moreover,
during Jaishankar’s visit to Israel on 17-21 October 2021, both countries
agreed to recognise each other’s COVID-19 vaccine certificates.92 By
expressing solidarity towards each other during the testing times of
COVID-19, India and Israel have displayed a stronger humane bond.

Science and Technology Cooperation

Under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership, considerable emphasis has
been placed on broadening collaboration with Israel in the fields of
science and technology. In this regard, a MoU to establish the India-
84 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Israel Industrial R&D and Innovation Fund (i4F) by the Department

of Science and Technology (India) and the National Authority for
Technological Innovation (Israel) was signed in July 2017 during
Modi’s visit to Israel. This Fund has sponsored more than ten projects
so far including “the Apollo-Zebra Medical Artificial Intelligence-
based project for the early detection of tuberculosis.”93
Similarly, in September 2020, Israel’s Start-Up Nation Central
(SNC) and India’s International Centre for Entrepreneurship and
Technology (iCREATE) signed a bilateral programme to boost
innovation and cooperation in the area of technology.94 To achieve
the objective of iCREATE, 93 problem statements from 25 Indian
companies were gathered during the programme and after a tough
shortlisting procedure, five innovators were selected for the first India-
Israel Innovation Accelerator (i3A) that began on 22 February 2021.95
By February 2021, iCREATE supported over 262 innovations and 20
patents,96 to deliver commercially profitable innovative technological
solutions.97
To promote innovation in start-ups, the DRDO and the Directorate
of Defence Research & Development (Israel) entered into the Bilateral
Innovation Agreement (BIA), which will help both countries to
develop dual-use technologies. 98 The agreement fosters the
development of cutting-edge technologies and products in domains
like Drones, Artificial Intelligence, Brain-Machine Interface, Robotics,
Biosensing and Natural Language Processing, to name a few.
To expand cooperation in the cyber domain, in July 2020, the
Ambassador of India to Israel, Sanjeev Singla and Yigal Unna, Director
General of Israel’s National Cyber Directorate signed an agreement
on cyber security. During Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Israel in 2017,
both nations acknowledged the significance of cooperation in the cyber
domain, and in pursuance of the same, an agreement was signed
during Netanyahu’s India visit in 2018.99 Currently, various cyber
security start-ups are flourishing in India where people from both
countries are working together, such as Coralogix and ThinkCyber.

Space Cooperation
Apart from innovation and cyber security, both countries have also
widened the areas of cooperation to the realm of Space by signing a
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 85

MoU for cooperation in space exploration in January 2018. In March

2018, the Israel Space Agency (ISA) and the Indian Space Research
Organisation (ISRO) completed a study on the joint work on electric
propulsion for small satellites, and a Plan of Cooperation was entered
into in April 2020. In addition, the Chairman of ISRO, K. Sivan and
the Director of the ISA, Avi Blasberger, examined the progress made
on these projects in July 2021.100 In 2019, ISRO’s launch of the Israeli
satellite RISAT-2BR1101 (November 2019) and Duchifat-3 (December
2019) from Sriharikota launch site, had been another notable
collaboration between both nations.102
To enhance collaboration and find more avenues in this sphere,
Israel’s Ambassador Naor Gilon met ISRO Chairman, S. Somanath at
the ISRO headquarters in Bengaluru on 22 February 2022.103 Both
agreed to collaborate and commemorate the 30th anniversary of
diplomatic ties, through an event held jointly in 2022. India-Israel
collaboration in the field of Space underlines the strong desire of the
two countries to expand bilateral ties in new domains. Under the
changed regional realities in West Asia after the signing of the
Abraham Accords, India-Israel cooperation in the Space domain can
be expanded to include countries such as the UAE. Although India
and Israel have engaged in a few collaborative efforts in the Space
domain, their partnership remains relatively limited compared to their
respective collaborations with other countries. There is substantial
scope in this domain to cooperate, considering the technological
advancement in the Space domain between the two countries.

I2U2
While India has bilaterally engaged with the West Asian countries
over these years, the Abraham Accords brought about a major change
in the regional realities, thereby providing a boost to multilateral
engagements of India with Israel and other Gulf countries. The
formation of I2U2 in October 2021, was a milestone in this regard.
India is aiming to utilise this forum to deepen its engagements with
Israel without putting at risk its relations with the Arab nations. In
addition, the grouping has also brought the member countries together
to cooperate in key areas such as water, transportation, energy, food
security, space and health.
86 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

The I2U2 grouping underlined a shift in India’s approach towards

West Asia and created a flourishing ground to advance cooperation
in the human security domain.104 The regional grouping provides
India with a great opportunity to avail of “scientific and technological
solutions along with foreign direct investments (FDI)” from the other
member countries in areas such as water, transportation, food security
and clean energy.105 India can also benefit through strengthened trade
relations with the Arab nations and simultaneously aid in the
advancement of the economy, peace and prosperity of the region.
On 14 July 2022, the group held its first-ever Virtual Summit which
witnessed the participation of Prime Minister Modi along with the
Heads of State of Israel, the UAE, and the US. During the meeting,
the leaders discussed issues of clean energy and food security. In
addition, all four countries agreed on finding “innovative ways to
ensure longer-term, more diversified food production and food
delivery systems that can better manage global food shocks.”106 At
the meeting, it was agreed to extend invitations to the private sectors
of the US and Israel to share their knowledge and innovative
approaches, thus contributing to the project’s long-term viability.
Regarding clean energy, it was decided to progress a hybrid renewable
energy project in Gujarat, featuring a combined wind and solar
capacity of 300 megawatts (MW) and an energy storage system
powered by batteries. The feasibility study for the project, funded by
the US Trade and Development Agency, received $330 million in
funding. The UAE pledged to assist in identifying opportunities for
investment partners, while Israel and the US committed to supporting
India in exploring opportunities in the private sector.
On 22 February 2023, the four partnering nations discussed
sustainable cooperation opportunities at the Abu Dhabi Business
Forum, which saw the participation of public and private sector
representatives from I2U2 countries.107 In the same Forum, India also
joined the Agriculture Innovation Mission for Climate initiative. On
19 April 2023, I2U2 member countries signed a MoU to form a joint
business coalition to encourage the group’s key initiatives namely,
economic development and food security. The MoU aimed at
gathering private sector support for a new economic partnership
between the four countries. I2U2 will serve as a valuable platform for
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 87

India to attract West Asian businesses and investors to tap its large
consumer market. In addition, the group will help India fortify its
position in West Asia, both strategically and economically.

Israel-Palestinian Conflict and India

Since the evolution of the Palestinian issue, India has consistently
maintained a favourable position towards Palestine. In 1947, when
the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, calling for the
establishment of two states for Jewish and Arab people respectively,
India voted against the resolution. However, over time, India’s stance
shifted, and it became empathetic towards the Palestinian cause. The
Palestinian people have since become an integral part of India’s foreign
policy. India holds the distinction of being the first non-Arab state to
recognize the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the sole and
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1974.
Additionally, India was among the earliest countries to recognize the
state of Palestine in 1988. In 1996, India opened its Representative
Office in Gaza, which was later relocated to Ramallah in 2003.
India has consistently maintained an independent and steadfast
stance on the Palestinian issue, as reflected in its global positioning.
This commitment is evident through its active support for the
Palestinian cause at the international level. Notably, India co-
sponsored the draft resolution affirming “the right of Palestinians to
self-determination” and voted in favour of this resolution during the
53rd session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1998.108
Similarly, India endorsed the UNGA resolution on 29 November 2012,
which granted Palestine the status of a “non-member Observer state”
at the UN, albeit without voting rights.109
Under the premiership of Modi, India has maintained its
conventional position vis a vis Palestine, abreast strengthening
relations with Israel. On 21 December 2017, India voted in favour of
the resolution presented by Turkiye and Yemen in the UN, opposing
the US decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.110
Additionally, India supported the UNGA resolution titled “Protection
of the Palestinian Civilian Population” on 13 June 2018.111 On 16 May
2021, India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
88 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

T.S. Tirumurti, reiterated India’s support for the “Palestinian cause”

and its unwavering commitment to the two-state solution at the
Security Council. 112 This position was reiterated by the Modi
government at the COP28 meeting in Dubai on 1 December 2023,
during his meeting with the Israeli President Isaac Herzog.113 Under
the leadership of Modi, India has consistently urged Israel and
Palestinian groups, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to exercise
restraint and refrain from attempting to unilaterally change the
existing status quo. The country has also called for timely de-escalation
of clashes that periodically erupt between Israel and Palestinian
groups.
However, a shift was seen in India’s position after the surprise
attack on Israel by Hamas on 7 October 2023 wherein India described
the attacks as “terrorist attacks”, and expressed solidarity with
Israel.114 The promptness of Prime Minister Modi’s remarks highlights
the importance India accords to its relations with Israel and its zero-
tolerance policy towards terrorism. In addition, its position during
the ongoing conflict seems like a balancing act between both the parties
wherein India supports Israel in its war against terrorism at the same
time holding steadfast to its stand on a two-state solution between
Israel and Palestine. This was reflected in India’s positions in the UN
over the issues related to the Israel-Hamas War. On 13 December 2023,
India endorsed a UNGA resolution calling for an immediate
humanitarian ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas conflict and the
unconditional release of all hostages.115 This marked the first instance
of India supporting such a resolution since the war broke out more
than two months ago. The same position was reiterated by the External
Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, during the High-Level Segment of
the 55th Session of the Human Rights Council on 26 February 2024,
wherein he highlighted the need for a sustainable resolution to the
Gaza crisis and emphasised on the unacceptability of terrorism and
hostage taking.116 Throughout the ongoing conflict, India maintained
a cautious and traditional stance, aiming to avoid causing harm to
both Israel and the Palestinians.

Conclusion
India’s foreign policy acknowledges Israel’s geo-political significance.
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 89

Since 1992, a gradual improvement was seen in the relations of the

two countries especially in the areas spanning defence, health,
education, Space, agriculture and water management, to name a few.
A major shift has been seen in the relations since 2014, under Modi’s
leadership. The factors aiding this include a shift in perception about
Israel among the Arab countries, as can be seen through the signing
of the Abraham Accords. Furthermore, India’s closeness has increased
due to consistent support from Israel to deal with its security
challenges and owing to Israel’s technological know-how which has
proved a boon for India’s defence indigenisation campaign. Israel’s
backing of India on the Kashmir matter and India’s need for modern
defence equipment to tackle hostile neighbours and upgrade its
military has further enhanced the relations between the two.
Recognising Israel’s technological prowess, ranking in innovation
and expertise in non-defence areas, India has entered into collabora-
tion in the domains of water resource management, agriculture, health
and medicine, science and technology and Space cooperation.
Additionally, both countries extended help during the pandemic
thereby indicating their increasing commitment to uphold the
humanitarian principles while engaging with each other.
While bilateral relations have strengthened with time, the countries
are also engaging with each other through multilateral groupings.
The I2U2 platform has provided India and Israel a forum to enter
into quadrilateral economic partnerships with the US and the UAE.
Apart from focussing on defence security, the group aims to incentivise
joint investments in the areas of water, transportation, energy, health,
food security and Space and thus help India leverage the research
and development know-how and promote knowledge and exchange
of personnel between the member countries. In terms of geopolitics
and geo-economics, being part of this forum shall strengthen India’s
position at the global level, especially among the West Asian countries,
thereby allowing it to tap the economic opportunities in this region.
Since the two countries individually have invested significantly
in transforming into knowledge-based economies, their efforts at
working jointly on innovation and Research and Development in
various fields shall be highly beneficial. In the defence sector, India
can positively add to its military might with Israel’s assistance, military
90 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

hardware and weapons procurement. Additionally, India and Israel

– with their extremely similar civilizational values of Vasudhaiva
Kutumbakam (the world is one family) and Tikun Olam (heal the world)
respectively – can strive to make the world a better place, with their
cooperation being ample testimony.

NOTES
1 P.R. Kumaraswamy, “India and Israel: Evolving Strategic Partnership”, Begin Sadat
Centre for Strategic Studies, 1 September 1998, at https://besacenter.org/india-and-
israel-evolving-strategic-partnership-2-2/ (Accessed 4 December 2022).
2 Ibid.
3 Nicolas Blarel, The Evolution of India’s Israel Policy: Continuity Change and Compromise
Since 1992, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2015.
4 “India, Israel sign six agreements”, The Times of India, 9 September 2003, at https:/
/timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-and-israel-sign-six-agreements/
articleshow/174162.cms (Accessed 4 December 2022).
5 P.R. Kumaraswamy, no. 1.
6 Nicolas Blarel, no. 3.
7 S. Samuel C. Rajiv, The India-Israel Strategic Partnership: Contours, Opportunities and
Challenges, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2023, p. 19.
8 Ibid.
9 “CAG’s Audit Report No. 13 of 2018 on Defence Services (Army)”, Comptroller
and Auditor General, Government of India, 7 August 2018, at https://cag.gov.in/
uploads/PressRelease/PR-Press-13-of-2018-1-05f5f6fb85a2021-47277784.pdf
(Accessed 25 December 2022).
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 S. Samuel C. Rajiv, no. 7, p. 22.
13 Ibid.
14 Herb Keinon, “What is India’s de-hyphenation policy toward Israel and why does
it matter?”, Jerusalem Post, 18 January 2018, at https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/india-
israel/what-is-indias-de-hyphenation-policy-toward-israel-and-why-does-it-matter-538170
(Accessed 1 December 2022).
15 “Home Minister Rajnath Singh to visit Israel,” Gateway House, 6 November 2014,
at https://www.gatewayhouse.in/events/home-minister-rajnath-singh-to-visit-
israel/ (Accessed 4 December 2022).
16 P.R. Kumaraswamy, “Modi’s stand-alone visit to Israel?”, MP-IDSA Comment, 2
January 2017, at https://idsa.in/idsacomments/modi-stand-alone-visit-to-
israel_prkumaraswamy_ 020117 (Accessed 4 December2022).
17 Ibid.
18 “Indian EAM Sushma Swaraj to visit Israel”, Embassy of Israel New Delhi, 12
January 2016, at https://embassies.gov.il/delhi/NewsAndEvents/Pages/
Minister%20of% 20External %20 Affairs%20Sushma%20Swaraj%20to%20visit%
20Israel.aspx (Accessed 5 December 2022).
19 Ibid.
20 Kabir Taneja, “The nuances of India’s de-hyphenated policy”, Livemint, 5 Feb 2018,
at https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/HcQJgc8h4klmaczOw4BWQM/The-
nuances-of-Indias-dehyphenated-policy.html (Accessed 5 December 2022).
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 91

21 “India-Israel Joint Statement during the visit of Prime Minister of Israel to India”,
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 15 January 2018, at https://
www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29357/IndiaIsrael_Joint_Statement_
during_ visit_ of_ Prime_Minister_of_Israel_to_India_January_15_2018 (Accessed
12 November 2022).
22 “India-Israel Bilateral Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
1 June 2019, at https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Israel_
relations.pdf (Accessed 1 November 2022).
23 Prabhash K. Dutta, “Why India voted against US, Israel on Jerusalem at United
Nations,” India Today, 22 December 2017, at https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/
why-india-voted-against-us-israel-on-jerusalem-at-united-nations-1114436-2017-
12-22 (Accessed 1 December 2022).
24 “Iran Signs $2b Rail Deal with India”, Financial Tribune, 13 January 2018, at https:/
/financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/79897/iran-signs-2b-rail-deal-
with-india (Accessed 1 December 2022).
25 “Press Statement by Prime Minister during Visit of Prime Minister of Israel to
India”, Press Information Bureau, 15 January 2018, at http://pib.nic.in/
PressReleseDetail.aspx? PRID=1516713 (Accessed 1 December 2022).
26 “List of MoUs/Agreements signed during the visit of Prime Minister of Israel to
India”, Official Website of Prime Minister of India, 15 January 2018, at https://
www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/list-of-mousagreements-signed-during-
the-visit-of-prime-minister-of-israel-to-india/ (Accessed 12 June 2023).
27 A centre established to foster entrepreneurship in the areas of food security, water,
connectivity, cybersecurity etc., by leveraging creativity, innovation, engineering,
product design and leveraging emerging technologies to deal with major issues
such as food security, water, connectivity, cybersecurity, etc.
28 “PM Modi, Israeli PM Netanyahu inaugurate iCreate”, Official Website of Prime
Minister of India, 17 January 2018, at https://www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-
israeli-pm-netanyahu-inaugurate-icreate—538547 (Accessed 1 December 2022).
29 Manjari Singh, “India-Israel Defence Relations: From Longstanding to Robust”,
Centre for Land Warfare Studies Journal, 15(1), 2022, pp 129-139.
30 Jayita Sarkar, “India and Israel’s Secret Love Affair”, The National Interest, 10
December 2014, at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/india-israels-secret-
love-affair-11831 (Accessed 12 June 2023).
31 P.R. Kumaraswamy, India’s Israel Policy, Columbia University Press, New York,
2010, pp. 4-5.
32 “Indian Naval Fast Attack Craft (In Fac) T80 decommissioned after 23 years of
service”, Press Information Bureau, 8 October 2021, at https://pib.gov.in/
PressReleaseIframePage. aspx?PRID=1762095 (Accessed 1 December 2022).
33 “India-Israel: Blowing hot and cold”, Business Standard, 2 June 2015, at https://
www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-israel-blowing-hot-and-
cold-115060200510_1.html (Accessed 11 December 2022).
34 Ibid.
35 S. Samuel C. Rajiv, The India-Israel Defence and Security Partnership At 30, MP-IDSA
Monograph Series No. 75, at https://www.idsa.in/system/files/monograph/
monograph75. pdf (Accessed 6 December 2022).
36 Azad Essa, “India and Israel: The arms trade in charts and numbers”, 1 June 2022,
at https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/india-israel-arms-trade-(Accessed 6
December 2022). numbers#:~:text=A%20brief%20history,wars%20against%20China
%20 and%20Pakistan (Accessed 6 December 2022).
92 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

37 Ibid.
38 “Trends In International Arms Transfers”, SIPRI Fact Sheet, 1 March 2020, at https:/
/www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/fs_2003_at_2019_0.pdf (Accessed 5
November 2022).
39 Ibid.
40 S. Samuel C. Rajiv, no. 35.
41 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2009-2010, Government of India, at https://
mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AR910.pdf (Accessed on 13 June 2023).
42 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2017-18, Government of India, at https://
www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AR1718.pdf (Accessed on 12 June 2023).
43 S. Samuel C. Rajiv, no. 35.
44 Seth Frantzman, “Israel and India test MRSAM air defence system”, Defence News,
5 January 2021 at https://www.defensenews.com/training-sim/2021/01/05/israel-
and-india-test-ofmrsam-air-defence-system (Accessed 17 December 2022).
45 Azad Essa, “India and Israel: The arms trade in charts and numbers”, Middle East
Eyes, 31 May 2022, at https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/india-israel-arms-trade-
numbers#:~:text=A%20brief%20history,wars%20against%20China%20and%20Pakistan
(Accessed 6 December 2022).
46 “Tel Aviv completes Spike missiles supply to New Delhi: Rafael India head”, The
Business Standard, 5 February 2020, at https://www.business-standard.com/article/
news-ani/tel-aviv-completes-spike-missiles-supply-to-new-delhi-rafael-india-
head-120020501352_1.html (Accessed 6 December 2022).
47 Tunia Cherian, “Punj Lloyd ties up with Israeli co to manufacture assault rifles in
India”, The Hindu Business Line, 11 January 2018, at https://www.thehindubusiness
line.com/companies/punj-lloyd-ties-up-with-israeli-co-to-manufacture-assault-
rifles-in-india/article64269107.ece (Accessed 3 November 2022).
48 S. Samuel C. Rajiv, “Blue Flag 2017 and Beyond”, MP-IDSA Comment, 1 December
2017, at https://idsa.in/idsacomments/blue-flag-2017-and-beyond_sscrajiv_011217
#:~: text=A%2045%20member%20Indian%20Air,Israeli%20Air%20Force%20(IsAF).
(Accessed 5 November 2022).
49 “Jaishankar visits Israel’s Ovda Airbase to meet IAF contingent taking part in Blue
Flag exercise”, The Hindu, 19 October 2021, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/
national/jaishankar-visits-israels-ovda-airbase-to-meet-iaf-contingent-taking-part-
in-blue-flag-exercise/article37072122.ece (Accessed 5 November 2022).
50 “IAF Chief in Israel”, The Hindu, 4 August 2021, at https://www.thehindu.com/
news/national/iaf-chief-in-israel/article35732691.ece (Accessed 5 November 2022).
51 “Army Chief Gen. Naravane leaves for Israel on 5-day visit”, The Hindu, 14
November 2021, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/army-chief-gen-
naravane-leaves-for-israel-on-5-day-visit/article37484356.ece (Accessed 5
November 2022).
52 “Jaishankar visits Israel’s Ovda Airbase to meet IAF contingent taking part in Blue
Flag exercise”, The Hindu, 19 October 2021, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/
national/jaishankar-visits-israels-ovda-airbase-to-meet-iaf-contingent-taking-part-
in-blue-flag-exercise/article37072122.ece (Accessed 5 November 2022).
53 Yaniv Kubovich, “China Tensions Top Israeli Defence Minister Gantz’ India Visit”,
Haaretz, 23 January 2024, at https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-06-02/ty-
article/.premium/israeli-defense-minister-gantz-visits-india-to-mark-30-years-of-
security-ties/00000181-23b4-d366-a1f3-afbfa6150000 (Accessed 5 November 2022).
54 “Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh & his Israeli counterpart Mr Benjamin Gantz
hold bilateral talks in New Delhi”, Press Information Bureau, 2 June 2022, at https:/
/pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1830445 (Accessed 5 November 2022).
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 93

55 “SIPRI Arms Transfer Database”, 25 December 2022, at https://armstrade.sipri.org/

armstrade/page/values.php (Accessed 25 December 2022).
56 Azad Essa, “India and Israel: The arms trade in charts and numbers”, Middle East
Eye, 31 May 2022, at https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/india-israel-arms-trade-
(Accessed 1 November 2022)
57 Ely Karmon, “India’s Counterterrorism Cooperation with Israel”, Perspectives on
Terrorism, 16(2), April 2022, pp. 1-12.
58 “5th India-Israel Joint Working Group meeting in Tel Aviv”, Press Information
Bureau, 29 October 2021, at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID
=1767593 (Accessed 27 December 2022).
59 Vinay Kaura, “Indo-Israeli Security Cooperation: Onward and Upward”, Begin-
Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies, 8 July 2017, at https://besacenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/07/522-Indo-Israel-Security-Cooperation-Kaura-final.pdf (Accessed
27 December 2022).
60 Ibid.
61 “India-Israel Relations 2014”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1
August 2014, at https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Israel_December_
2014.pdf (Accessed 28 December 2022).
62 “India-Israel Relations 2014”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1
December 2014, at https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Israel_Decem
ber_2014.pdf (Accessed 28 December 2022).
63 “Israel fence systems, quick response team at Pakistan borders: BSF DG”, The
Economic Times, 13 July 2018, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/
defence/israel-fence-systems-quick-response-team-at-pakistan-borders-bsf-dg/
articleshow/60044263. cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&
utm_campaign=cppst (Accessed 1 November 2022).
64 Somdeep Sen, “India’s deepening love affair with Israel”, Aljazeera, 9 September
2021, at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/9/9/indias-deepening-love-
affair-with-israel (Accessed 27 December 2022).
65 “India, Israel share similar challenges from radicalism, terrorism: Jaishankar”,
The Economic Times, 9 September 2021, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
news/defence/india-israel-share-similar-challenges-from-radicalism-terrorism-
jaishankar/articleshow/87101672.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_
medium=text& utm_campaign=cppst (Accessed 27 December 2022).
66 “Ministry of Commerce Trade data”, Government of India at https://
tradestat.commerce. gov.in/eidb/iecnt.asp (Accessed 1 November 2022).
67 “India-Israel Bilateral Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
1 January 2022, at https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/ISRAEL_BILATERAL_
brief_ final_2022.pdf (Accessed 1 November 2022).
68 “India-Israel Economic and Commercial Relations”, Indian Embassy in Israel, at
https://www.indembassyisrael.gov.in/pages?id=nel5a&subid=7 ax9b#:~:text=
(c)%20 Israeli%20 investments%20in%20India,tech%20domain%2C%20agriculture
%20and%20water (Accessed 1 November 2022).
69 “India-Israel Economic and Commercial Relations”, Indian Embassy in Israel at
https://www.indembassyisrael.gov.in/pages?id=nel5a&subid=7ax9b (Accessed
1 November 2022).
70 Ibid.
71 “India-Israel Bilateral Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
June 2019, at https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Israel_relations.
pdf (Accessed 14 December 2022).
72 Ibid.
94 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

73 “India, Israel working on 5-year cooperation plan for agriculture, water”, Business
Today, 16 January 2018, at https://www.businesstoday.in/industry/agriculture/story/
india-israel-5-year-cooperation-plan-for-agriculture-water-99287-2018-01-16
(Accessed 1 November 2022).
74 Navdeep Suri and Hargun Sethi, “30 years of bilateral ties: What Indo-Israeli
relations look like”, Observer Research Foundation, 12 September 2022, at https:/
/www.orfonline. org/expert-speak/30-years-of-bilateral-ties-what-indo-israeli-
relations-look-like/ (Accessed 1 November 2022).
75 Sunil Bhat, “Israel to open 2 centres of excellence in Jammu and Kashmir as part
of agriculture project”, India Today, 8 November 2022, at https://www.indiatoday.in/
india/story/israel-india-agriculture-project-centres-of-excellence-in-jammu-
kashmir-2294928-2022-11-08 (Accessed 11 November 2022).
76 “Indo-Israel Villages of Excellence (Iivoe)”, Israeli Embassy in India, at https://
embassies.gov.il/delhi/Relations/Indo-Israel-AP/Pages/Villages%20of%20
Excellence.aspx (Accessed 1 December 2022).
77 “Indo-Israel Agricultural Project (IIAP) A Growing Partnership”, Israeli Embassy
in India at https://embassies.gov.il/delhi/Relations/Indo-Israel-AP/Pages/
Centers%20of%20 Excellence.aspx (Accessed 21 December 2022).
78 “Water to space: India, Israel ink 7 key strategic pacts during Modi visit”, Business
Standard, 6 July 2017, at https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-
policy/water-to-space-india-israel-ink-7-key-strategic-pacts-during-modi-visit-
117070501128_1.html (Accessed 1 December 2022).
79 Ron Malka, “Based on Israel’s success story, we want to help India in its quest for
water”, The Hindustan Times, 24 November 2019, at https://www.hindustantimes.
com/analysis/based-on-israel-s-success-story-we-want-to-help-india-in-its-quest-
for-water-opinion/story-dG8BrpIBsYkH8hurynpyoK.html (Accessed 1 December
2022).
80 Kamaljit Kaur Sandhu, “From Israel to India: A desalination vehicle”, India Today,
15 January 2018, at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/from-israel-to-india-a-
desalination-vehicle-1146142-2018-01-15 (Accessed 1 December 2022).
81 “Israel’s deal with UP to resolve Bundelkhand water crisis has a 3-pronged
solution”, The Hindustan Times, 20 August 2020, at https://www.hindustantimes.
com/india-news/israel-signs-deal-to-resolve-bundelkhand-water-crisis-has-a-3-
pronged-solution/story-606PQi6jfeZFoxRFcpq4ZM.html (Accessed 12 December
2022).
82 “India can learn from Israel about water management: Jal Shakti Ministry”, The
Print, 05 August 2022, at https://theprint.in/world/india-can-learn-from-israel-
about-water-management-jal-shakti-ministry/1069764/ (Accessed 11 December
2022).
83 “India-Israel Bilateral Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
at https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/ISRAEL_BILATERAL_brief_
final_2022.pdf (Accessed 1 November 2022).
84 “Agreement between India and Israel on Cooperation in the fields of Health &
Medicine”, Government of India, at https://www.indembassyisrael.gov.in/
press?id=bqx2a (Accessed 1 January 2022).
85 “India-Israel Cooperation”, 24 February 2022, at http://www.mei.org.in/india-
speaks-150 (Accessed 1 March 2022).
86 Ibid.
87 “Netanyahu thanks PM Modi for delivering hydroxychloroquine to Israel”, India
Toda, 10 April 2020, at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/israel-pm-netanyahu-
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 95

thanks-india-pm-modi-delivering-hydroxychloroquine-to-israel-1665302-2020-04-
09 (Accessed 11 December 2022).
88 “Supply of medical equipment to India reciprocation of earlier help: Israel”, Business
Standard, 28 July 2020, at https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-
affairs/supply-of-medical-equipment-to-india-reciprocation-of-earlier-help-israel-
120072800085_1.html (Accessed 10 December 2022).
89 “India, Israel collaborate to develop rapid testing for Covid-19 in under 30 seconds”,
The Print, 23 July 2020, at https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-israel-collaborate-
to-develop-rapid-testing-for-covid-19-in-under-30-seconds/467043/ (Accessed 8
December 2022).
90 Shailaja Tripathi, “Israel shares AI-based Technology, equipment with AIIMS for
COVID-19 treatment”, Jagran Josh, 12 August 2020, at https://www.jagranjosh.com/
current-affairs/israel-shares-ai-based-technology-equipment-with-aiims-for-covid-
19-treatment-1597233104-1 (Accessed 10 December 2022).
91 “Prime Minister’s Meeting with Prime Minister of Israel on the sidelines of COP-
26 in Glasgow, UK”, Press Information Bureau, 2 November 2021, at https://
pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1768998 (Accessed 15 December 2022).
92 “India and Israel agree to recognise corona vaccine certification of each other”, All
India Radio, 19 October 2021, at https://newsonair.gov.in/News?title=India-and-
Israel-agree-to-recognise-corona-vaccine-certification-of-each-other&id=428237
(Accessed 10 December 2022).
93 “India-Israel Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/ISRAEL_BILATERAL_brief_final_
2022.pdf (Accessed 11 December 2022).
94 “Israel, India sign MoU to collaborate in tech innovation and start up”, Asian News
Agency, 23 September 2020, at https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/israel-
india-sign-mou-to-collaborate-in-tech-innovation-and-start-ups20200923005935/
#:~:text=The%20 Memorandum %20of%20Understanding%20 (MoU)%20 was%20
signed%20between %20 Israel’, projects %2C %20 according %20to%20a%20
statement. (Accessed 11 December 2022).
95 “iCreate helps Indian corporates find innovative solutions from Israel via a Joint
Accelerator Programme with SNC of Israel”, Business Standard, 12 April 2021, at
https://www.business-standard.com/content/press-releases-ani/icreate-helps-
indian-corporates-find-innovative-solutions-from-israel-via-a-joint-accelerator-
programme-with-snc-of-israel-121041201278_1.html (Accessed 11 December 2022).
96 “iCreate and Start-Up Nation Central (SNC) kick off Accelerator Programme with
6 Israeli Start-up”, 22 February 2021, at https://www.icreate.org.in/press/bwdisrupt-
businessworld/ (Accessed 3 January 2023).
97 Pradipta Roy, “Benjamin Netanyahu’s state visit to India,” Israel Affairs, 25(5), 2019,
pp. 788–802.
98 “DRDO & Directorate of Defence R&D, Israel signs Bilateral Innovation Agreement
for development of dual use technologies,” Press Information Bureau, 9 November
2021, at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1770299 (Accessed
11 December 2022).
99 “India and Israel sign agreement to expand collaboration in dealing with cyber
threats”, India Today, 16 July 2020, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/
defence/india-and-israel-sign-agreement-to-expand-collaboration-in-dealing-with-
cyber-threats/articleshow/76998307.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm
_medium=text&utm_ campaign=cppst (Accessed 11 December 2022).
100 S. Samuel C. Rajiv, no. 7.
96 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

101 U. Tejonmayam, “ISRO PSLV-C48/RISAT-2BR1 mission: PSLV milestone flight

successful, 10 satellites placed in orbits”, The Times of India, 11 December 2019, at
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/isro-pslv-c48/risat-2br1-mission-pslvs-
milestone-flight-successful-10-satellites-placed-in-orbits/articleshow/72472857.cms
(Accessed 11 December 2022).
102 Pon Vasanth B. A., “Satellite built by Israeli students successfully put into orbit by
ISRO”, The Hindu, 13 December 2019, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/
chennai/satellite-built-by-israeli-students-successfully-put-into-orbit-by-isro/
article30290548.ece (Accessed 11 December 2022).
103 “Ambassador of Israel to India met Chairman, ISRO/ Secretary, DOS”, Indian Space
Research Organisation, 22 February 2022, at https://www.isro.gov.in/
Ambassador.htm l#:~:text=Naor%20Gilon%2C%20Ambassador%20of%20Israel,
South%20India%20 accompanied% 20the%20Ambassador. (Accessed 6 December
2022).
104 Muddassir Quamar, “I2U2: A New Template for Cross-Regional Cooperation”,
Issue Brief, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 5
September 2022, at https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/I2U2-A-New-Template-mm
quamar-050922 (Accessed 6 December 2022).
105 Ibid.
106 “Joint Statement of the Leaders of India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and the
United States (I2U2)”, Government of United States, 14 July 2022, at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/07/14/joint-
statement-of-the-leaders-of-india-israel-united-arab-emirates-and-the-united-
states-i2u2/ (Accessed 10 September 2022).
107 “I2U2 business forum holds inaugural meeting in Abu Dhabi”, The Hindustan Times,
23 February 2023, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/i2u2-business-
forum-holds-inaugural-meeting-in-abu-dhabi-101677123402503.html (Accessed 10
March 2023).
108 Seema Guha, “India’s Shifting Stand on Israel-Palestine Reflects the Changing
Contours of its Foreign Policy”, Outlook, 12 August 2022, at https://www.outlook
india.com/national/india-s-shifting-stand-on-israel-palestine-reflects-the-
changing-contours-of-its-foreign-policy-news-215882 (Accessed on 1 January 2024).
109 “India-Israel Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral_Brief-Sept_2019.pdf (Accessed
on 2 January 2024).
110 “Why India voted against US, Israel on Jerusalem at United Nations”, India Today,
22 December 2017, at https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/why-india-voted-
against-us-israel-on-jerusalem-at-united-nations-1114436-2017-12-22 (Accessed on
2 January 2024).
111 “India-Israel Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at
https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral_Brief-Sept_2019.pdf
(Accessed on 2 January 2024).
112 “UNSC Open VTC on The situation in the Middle East” Permanent Representative
of India to the United Nations, 16 May 2021, at https://pminewyork.gov.in/
IndiaatUNSC?id=NDI0OA (Accessed on 2 January 2024).
113 “PM Modi Meets Israeli President Isaac Herzog on Sidelines of COP28”, NDTV
World, 1 December 2023, at https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pm-narendra-modi-
meets-israeli-president-isaac-herzog-on-sidelines-of-cop28-4624964 (Accessed on
2 January 2024).
114 “Deeply shocked, says PM Modi on terrorist attack in Israel, says India stands in
India-Israel Ties Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi 97

solidarity with Tel Aviv”, Business Today, 7 October 2023, at https://

www.businesstoday.in/latest/story/deeply-shocked-says-pm-modi-on-terrorist-
attack-in-israel-says-india-stands-in-solidarity-with-tel-aviv-401098-2023-10-07
(Accessed on 12 January 2024).
115 “India votes in favour of UN resolution demanding Gaza ceasefire: Everything
you need to know”, Indian Express, 14 December 2023, at https://indianexpress.com/
article/explained/explained-global/india-vote-favour-un-resolution-gaza-
ceasefire9066979/#:~:text=India%20on%20Tuesday%20(December%2013, uncondi
tional%20release%20of%20all%20hostages (Accessed 3 January 2024).
116 “Statement by EAM Dr. S. Jaishankar at the High-Level Segment of the 55th Session
of the Human Rights Council, Geneva”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government
of India, 26 February 2024, at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?
dtl/37663/Statement+by+EAM+Dr+S+Jaishankar+at+the+HighLevel+Segment+of+
the+55th+Session+of+the+Human+Rights+Council+ Geneva+February+26+2 024#
:~:text=The%20humanitarian%20crises%20arising%20from,law%20must%20
always %20be%20respected. (Accessed 27 February 2024).
 5
India’s Approach to Conflicts in
West Asia and North Africa
Md. Muddassir Quamar

Introduction
West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region has been beset with
conflicts. Some of these are protracted historical conflicts such as the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Turkiye-Cyprus conflict, the conflict
in Western Sahara and the Kurdish struggle for self-determination.
On the other hand, numerous limited conflicts have caused tensions
in the region and beyond from time to time. Such conflicts include
the four wars between Israel and the Arabs between 1948 and 1973,
followed by wars between Israel and Lebanon (1982), Israel and
Hezbollah (2006), and Israel and Hamas (2008 onwards) as well as
the wars between Iraq and Iran (1980-88) and the Gulf War (1990-91).
Besides these wars, almost all regional countries have at one time or
another witnessed internal conflicts or/and civil wars with few
exceptions. But since the Arab Spring uprisings that erupted in
December 2010, regional conflicts, geopolitical rivalries, terrorist
attacks and military interventions have threatened the security and
stability of the region, and their ripple effects have been felt globally.
The 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the Israeli military
incursion on Gaza in response have again underlined the proneness
of the region to armed conflicts.
India’s Approach to Conflicts in West Asia and North Africa 99

India too has been affected by the turmoil in the region. Although
India does not have problems with any of the regional countries and
maintains friendly ties with all of them, regional events acquire
significance for India given its multifaceted stakes in the region.
Among the key issues that concern India in WANA is the safety and
security of its citizens living and working as expatriates in regional
countries with a large concentration, estimated at 8.9 million as of
2022,1 in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Besides,
India overwhelmingly depends on the regional countries to fulfil its
energy security needs and imports large quantities of oil and gas from
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, the UAE, Qatar and other regional countries.2
Further, WANA is one of the largest trading blocks for India with
trade worth US$ 240.94 billion, which comprised nearly 20 per cent
of India’s total foreign trade in 2022-23.3 The region is also crucial for
the safety and security of maritime trade routes in the Western Indian
Ocean vital not only for India’s foreign trade but also for global energy
supplies and the sea lines of communication (SLoCs) connecting
North and South America, Europe and Africa.4 Finally, WANA is
critical for India and the world for containing and defeating global
jihadi terror emanating from regional conflicts and turmoil.5
For India, therefore, it is vital to manage and minimize the impacts
of conflicts in WANA that directly or indirectly affect its interests.
Historically, India adopted a policy of maintaining neutrality in
regional conflicts, avoiding any military commitments except in the
case of United Nations (UN) peace forces6 and advocating diplomacy
and negotiations to resolve disputes and conflicts. These served India
well and can be construed as the principle behind India’s approach
towards regional conflicts. Nevertheless, over the years, India has
undertaken rescue and repatriation missions for its nationals stuck in
the region in case of conflicts; the largest of which was carried out
after Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait in August 1990.7 Furthermore,
India has developed close maritime security partnerships with
regional and global powers for the safety and security of the SLoCs in
the Western Indian Ocean as well as for India’s coastal security in the
Arabian Sea.8 Besides, there is the institutionalised mechanism for
intelligence sharing and exchange of views with the WANA region,
directed towards countering terrorism and combating radicalism.9
100 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

The increased intensity of India’s engagements with important

regional countries since 2014 has helped improve political, economic
and security ties between India and WANA, and in the process has
enhanced India’s ability to safeguard its interests in the region. Under
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Indian approach towards conflicts
in the region has continued to follow the abiding principles of
neutrality and promoting peace through diplomacy. India’s growing
global stature and improved strategic ties with the region have added
weight to the Indian position. This chapter focuses on India’s response
to select ongoing conflicts in WANA within the context of the
significance of the region for India’s external relations. The conflicts
have been chosen based on the degree of their impact on India’s stakes
and interests in the region. The chapter first gives a brief sketch of the
relevance of the region in Indian foreign policy followed by a
discussion on the response of the Government of India. It concludes
that India has followed the abiding principles of its foreign policy
when responding to conflicts in the region, and the growing strategic
ties between India and WANA countries under Prime Minister Modi
have helped it safeguard its interests from the adverse impacts of the
conflicts.

WANA in Indian Foreign Policy

The WANA region finds a prominent place in Indian foreign policy.
Post-independence, as India charted the course of evolving into a
major global actor and a leader among newly independent countries,
the Government of India gave due importance to developing closer
political and diplomatic ties with WANA. Hence, in the early decades
after independence, countries like Egypt and Iraq emerged as India’s
major partners.10 Nonetheless, the Indian policy towards WANA
countries was constrained by domestic, regional and international
factors, limiting relations with countries such as Israel, Iran, Saudi
Arabia and Türkiye.11 After the Cold War ended, India gradually
began recalibrating its foreign policy with the focus shifting to
accelerating economic growth and leaving the trap of a low-income
country behind. This required developing close global economic, trade
and business ties including with the WANA region. With issues like
energy security, migration and remittances, and bilateral trade at the
India’s Approach to Conflicts in West Asia and North Africa 101

forefront, the Gulf countries including the members of GCC – Bahrain,

Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – and Iran and Iraq,
emerged as India’s most important partners in the region. 12
Meanwhile, India also developed closer ties with Israel, with an
increased volume of defence trade and cooperation in areas like
agriculture and science and technology.13
With better political and diplomatic contacts, trade and
commercial ties began to develop. One of the key areas where India’s
trading ties with the region witnessed an increase was in imports of
oil and gas. Most of the Gulf countries are rich in hydrocarbon reserves
and their economies have revolved around the production and export
of petroleum while India’s fast-paced economic growth meant an
increasing requirement for energy supplies. Domestic production was
unable to meet this requirement. The Indian requirement and the
Gulf’s keenness to find markets formed a strong mutuality of interest.
Hence, the Gulf region emerged as one of the most reliable suppliers
of hydrocarbons to India and gradually energy security emerged as a
pillar in Indo-Gulf relations.14 As of 2022-23, the Gulf countries’ share
in India’s oil and gas imports was close to 50 per cent. Besides energy
security, the number of Indians migrating to the GCC countries
increased rapidly in the 1990s to find work in the booming labour-
incentive regional economies. Thus, the Indian expatriate population
increased from 1.5 million in 1991 to 3.2 million in 2000 and reached
nearly 6.5 million in 2010 and as of 2022, an estimated 8.9 million
Indians resided in the Gulf.15 Concurrently, the remittances sent by
the expatriate community in the Gulf increased contributing as much
as 50 per cent as of 2016-17, although according to media reports, this
has declined to 30 per cent as of 2020-21.16
An important area where relations began to improve was trade
and commerce. While the bulk of the trade was energy imports from
the Gulf, Indian exports of food and agricultural products, jewellery,
textile, machinery and petroleum products started to increase,
resulting in significant growth in trade. Thus, India’s bilateral trade
with the WANA countries increased from a meagre US$ 9.59 billion
in 1996-97 to US$ 240.94 billion in 2022-23.17 Further, the share of the
regional countries in India’s foreign trade increased from 13 per cent
to 21 per cent during the period. Besides trade, the two-way flow of
102 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

investments has also been a major source of improved economic

relations, particularly with the GCC countries. While the share of
foreign direct investments (FDIs) from the region to India witnessed
a sharp increase, especially since 2014-15,18 the number of Indian
businesses and investments in the WANA market too has increased
significantly in recent years. This has led to a situation wherein trade,
investments, energy, expatriates and remittances emerged as the
driving force behind India’s policy towards the WANA region.
In addition to economic relations, greater political contacts led to
improved security and defence cooperation. Maritime security
emerged as an important area of priority, given the increased
significance of the Western Indian Ocean for India’s trade with West
Asia, Africa, Europe and North and South America.19 Piracy in the
Horn of Africa, off the coast of Somalia, further boosted maritime
security cooperation with the regional countries.20 Moreover, the need
for India’s enhanced coastal security in the Arabian Sea guided greater
naval and maritime cooperation. Besides, threats from terrorism,
radicalism and organised crimes led to improvement in security
cooperation through intelligence sharing, institutionalised cooperation
and extradition treaties.21 Gradually, defence and military cooperation
were also included, given the shared security interests and friendly
relations.
Since 2014, under Prime Minister Modi, India accelerated its efforts
towards improving relations with WANA countries. High-level
political contacts played a key role with the Gulf countries, especially
the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and Israel emerged as the key partner for
India in WANA. Other regional countries, Iran, Qatar, Oman, Egypt,
Bahrain, Syria, Morocco, and Jordan too featured prominently in
India’s engagement with the region under Modi. Greater political
contacts boosted bilateral investments and closer security cooperation
and created an opportunity for rapid growth in trade, besides opening
up the defence and security sector for cooperation. The strategic
component in India’s engagement with WANA got a significant boost
under Prime Minister Modi. Thus, India’s ‘Look West’ policy acquired
more robust ‘Think West’ and ‘Act West’ contours since 2014, with
Modi making the Gulf and WANA region a foreign policy priority.22
India’s Approach to Conflicts in West Asia and North Africa 103

Indian Response to Conflicts in WANA

To explain the Indian response to conflicts in WANA, it might be useful
to classify the regional conflicts into three categories: (1) protracted
historical conflicts; (2) civil wars or internal conflicts; and (3) conflicts
or rivalries among regional countries. As noted earlier, it is not possible
to take into account all the conflicts, hence only select conflicts have
been chosen for analysis here, based on how significant they are in
terms of India’s stakes and interests in WANA. Among these are the
protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the internal crises in Iraq, Syria,
Libya and Yemen and the intra-region rivalries and tensions between
Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel and the Qatar crisis. Overall,
the Indian response has followed the broad principle of Indian foreign
policy wherein neutrality, non-intervention and achieving peace
through diplomacy form the core. Nonetheless, given the variation
in the characteristics of these conflicts and the specific interests at
stake, one can also find certain variations, adaptability and evolution
in the Indian approach.

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Among the most contentious and protracted conflicts in WANA is
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The complexity of the conflict can be
gauged from the fact that it has historical, cultural, ethnic, racial,
religious, political, geopolitical and socio-economic manifestations that
have remained unresolved for close to a century. While the roots of
the problem go much deeper, it was the disintegration of the Ottoman
Empire after the First World War and the end of the European colonial
enterprise after the Second World War that accentuated the conflict.
It led to the first Arab-Israel War in 1948, when Egypt, Syria, Iraq and
Jordan marched their militaries into the newly declared State of Israel
to prevent the formation of a Jewish State and restore the Arab-
Palestinian character of the territory that as of 2024 constitutes Israel,
the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. While Israel withstood
the assault and emerged stronger from the War, the conflict did not
end leading to many more wars, attacks and killings that continued
into the third decade of the twenty-first century even when the regional
political scene has changed significantly, with the gradual change in
Arab approach towards Israel.23 Hence from being an Arab-Israeli
104 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

conflict at the start, the character of the conflict has changed to Israeli-
Palestinian.
The 7 October 2023 attack from Gaza on southern Israel by Hamas
and Islamic Jihad followed by the massive military operation by Israel
Defence Forces (IDF) in response have once again underlined the
potency of the conflict in destabilising the region and keeping the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict alive. The fact that the Palestinian Authority
(PA) led by President Mahmoud Abbas has not joined the conflict
indicates the faction-ridden intra-Palestine politics but also underlines
the possibility of a change in the character of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict into an Israel-Hamas conflict. Notwithstanding, it is clear that
going forward, it is the non-state actors and proxies of Iran which are
keeping the violent nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict alive. That
none of the regional states–including Iran, the staunchest supporter
of Hamas–joined the conflict while regional non-state actors (NSAs),
such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthis in Yemen, have come out
in support of Hamas underlines the threats posed by armed NSAs in
the region.24
The Indian response to the broader Israeli-Arab and Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has been marked by a degree of continuity with a
level of adaptability and evolution based on both its foreign policy
changes as well as the changing nature of the conflict. One of the key
issues that India has maintained since the beginning is its support for
the Palestinian right to self-determination and the establishment of a
Palestinian State.25 In that context, since proposing a federal plan in
1947, India has consistently supported a two-state solution in
accordance with the Resolutions adopted by the United Nations. Until
1992, when it established diplomatic relations with Israel, India
remained closer to the Palestinian side. As relations between India
and Israel began to improve, and as the Palestinian issue started to
lose its primacy in the region, India’s approach also evolved. The
growing defence trade with Israel played an important role in
changing the dynamics. India has, however, not given up support for
Palestine providing aid for nation-building. Politically, it continues to
support a two-state solution, even though under Modi, India de-
hyphenated its relations with Israel and Palestine.26 That is, the
relations with the State of Israel and the support for Palestinian
India’s Approach to Conflicts in West Asia and North Africa 105

Statehood were no longer considered mutually interlinked and now

stand on their merit.
On the recurrent conflicts between IDF and Hamas since 2008,
and the latest conflagration since October 2023, India maintains that
fighting cannot resolve the conflict and leads only to loss of life and
that the two sides should cease violence and engage in diplomacy to
resolve the problems. India also advocates the revival of the peace
process between Israel and Palestine to avoid escalation in violence
between IDF and Hamas.27 During each of the violent conflicts between
IDF and Hamas, India has condemned the targeting of civilians and
civil infrastructure by both parties. Nonetheless, one can also see a
nuanced shift; whereas India was earlier more critical of Israeli actions
and ignored Palestinian violence, under Modi, it has also underlined
and condemned rocket attacks by Hamas on Israeli civilian targets
such as in May 2021.28 Hence, New Delhi was vocal in condemning
the 7 October attack by Hamas as a terrorist act, but simultaneously it
refused to condone the continued Israeli occupation and settlements
in the Occupied Territories.29

Conflict in Iraq and the Rise of the Islamic State

Iraq has faced serious internal turmoil, violence and conflict since the
toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime after the US invasion in 2003.
The US military action in Iraq was a reaction to the 11 September
2001 attacks in the United States wherein the George W. Bush
administration devised the global war on terror policy and attacked
Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Undoubtedly, the two wars proved
disastrous from both American foreign policy and economic
perspectives as well as global and regional geostrategic and
geopolitical points of view.30 But its impact on Iraq was even more
devastating as it destroyed the country to the extent that it is yet to
come out of the cycle of violence and turmoil. After the US forces
removed Saddam Hussain, the country went through a brutal phase
of insurgency and sectarian violence devolving into a civil war in
2006 that continued until 2008-09. While it was yet to recover from
the violence, Iraq felt the ripple effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ protests
leading to the ‘Islamic State in Iraq’ led by Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi
starting a military pursuit to form a Sunni Islamic Caliphate in the
106 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Levant.31 The rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) terror group sent shock
waves across WANA and the world, inspiring jihadi terrorist
organisations and lone-wolf attacks in many places.
India also faced serious challenges. Among the pressing issues
that emerged was the safety of Indians who were advised against
travelling to Iraq.32 After the abduction of 40 Indians working for an
oil company in Mosul in 2014, India started diplomatic efforts to rescue
them but could not succeed as they were killed by ISIS. In the
meantime, India evacuated thousands of Indians stranded in Iraq.
Eventually, in 2018, the Government of India facilitated the return of
the remains of those abducted and executed by ISIS to their families
after they were discovered in mass graves once ISIS was defeated by
American, Iraqi, Kurdish and Iranian forces.33 While this was one of
the problems, India also faced the challenge of ISIS spreading its
ideology inside the country through online propaganda and social
media attracting scores of Indian Muslim youth towards its ideology.
As reports of many Indians trying to migrate to Syria and Iraq to join
ISIS began to emerge, Indian security forces took proactive measures
to prevent them from going to ISIS territory and to counter the spread
of the terrorist ideology among Indian citizens.34 In addition to taking
security-oriented measures, India also took diplomatic steps to engage
with the regional countries towards countering terror and combating
radicalisation.35 These measures aided in minimizing the threats from
ISIS to India, although the challenge from jihadi terror remains a potent
one.

The Syrian Civil War

The crisis in Syria began with the eruption of protests against the
Bashar Al Assad regime in March 2011, and within months Syria
devolved into a civil war. The inability of the Syrian government to
accommodate the protestors’ demands and proclivity to use force to
suppress dissent and the tendency of the opposition movement to
take up arms and call for the fall of the regime worsened the crisis.
Political and military interventions from regional powers and external
players including Russia, Iran, Türkiye, the Gulf Arab countries and
the United States accentuated the crisis. Syria eventually fell into one
of the worst humanitarian crises of contemporary times and continues
India’s Approach to Conflicts in West Asia and North Africa 107

to struggle to come out of it.36 However, as the civil war progressed,

several factors, namely the inability of the opposition groups to put
up a united front, the involvement of jihadist forces against the regime,
the Iranian, Russian and Hezbollah military support for the Assad
forces and the inability of the anti-Assad external forces to build a
consensus, tilted the civil war in favour of the Assad regime.
From the Indian point of view, the Syrian crisis was a case of armed
uprising and external intervention. India viewed the crisis from the
lens of the violation of Syrian unity and sovereignty by both internal
and external actors. The Government of India supported the regime
from the beginning, underlining the need for an immediate ceasefire
and argued against any external intervention even under UN
sanction.37 Through the crisis, India kept its mission in Damascus open
and functional and continued to have political exchanges with the
Syrian government with several high-level visits from the Syrian side
since 2011.38 In 2016, India sent its Minister of State for External Affairs
M.J. Akbar to convey its support for the Syrian government. India’s
support for the Syrian government was based on friendly relations
and the principle of resolution of any dispute in a peaceful and
negotiated manner. India argued for a ‘Syrian-led’ political process
for the resolution of the crisis.39 Besides, India delivered aid worth
US$ 6 million to Syria in the form of medicine and essential food
items in 2018 to help the government ward off the humanitarian
crisis.40 India has also committed to helping the Syrian government
in its effort towards education and capacity building of its youth to
come out of the crisis as well as extended support in the fight against
COVID-19.

Turmoil in Libya
The problem in Libya started with protests against Muammar
Gaddafi’s rule in February 2011 that soon devolved into an armed
rebellion and a civil war. A North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) military intervention after the imposition of a United
Nations-sanctioned no-fly zone over Libya in March 2011 led to the
quick fall of the regime. Within months the rebels with NATO’s
military help forced Gaddafi to flee into hiding in his hometown in
Sirte where he was eventually found and brutally killed in October.41
108 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

While the NATO intervention ended with the toppling of the Gaddafi
regime, the trouble for Libya had just started. Tribal infighting began
soon after, and local strongmen, militias and terrorist groups
proliferated as the National Transition Council (NTC) was formed
to take Libya to an elected and stable government, unable to wield
power. A second civil war erupted in Libya in May 2014 and
continued until October 2020 when an UN-led ceasefire transpired.
However, the situation in Libya is far from stable, with different
factions engaged in infighting and no consensus on the way forward.
The threats of terrorist groups including ISIS persist while there is
no central authority to govern. Involvement of external powers
including Egypt, UAE, Russia, France, Italy, United States and
Türkiye, has further worsened the quagmire.
India which has historically had friendly relations with Libya was
from the start sceptical of the international response to the Libyan
crisis. It counselled respecting Libyan sovereignty and avoiding
external intervention. It also advocated for peaceful dialogue and a
negotiated resolution of the problems. In March 2011, India abstained
from the UNSC vote for the imposition of the no-fly zone.42 It also
underlined the need for NATO to stop airstrikes and wait for the
government and rebels to come to a political solution.43 After the end
of the first Libyan civil war, India encouraged the Libyan factions to
work towards a political solution and supported the NTC towards
leading Libya to a stable government. It also provided humanitarian
aid to the tune of US$ 2 million in medical and essential supplies
through the UN Office of Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid
(OCHA).44 During 2011-12, India advised its citizens against travel to
Libya, carried out rescue and repatriation of several thousand of its
nationals stranded in the country, and temporarily closed its mission
in Tripoli. The mission resumed work in 2012. When the second civil
war erupted in 2014, India again had to carry out the rescue and
repatriation of its nationals and eventually closed down its mission
in April 2019. In August 2021, the Indian embassy in Tunis was
concurrently accredited to Libya.45
The response to the crisis in Libya reinforced the Indian position
of respecting state sovereignty and avoiding external intervention. It
advocated the need for political dialogue and non-military solutions
India’s Approach to Conflicts in West Asia and North Africa 109

to differences and disputes. India was also mindful of the human and
commercial costs to the country as well as to India.

Yemen Conflict
Yemen also felt the tremors of the Arab Spring protests in 2011. After
months of protests and uncertainty, in February 2012 Ali Abdullah
Saleh agreed to step down and hand over power to his deputy
Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in a GCC-mediated transition. The hope
for an elected and more representative government started to fade as
no consensus emerged in the National Dialogue. Eventually, in 2014,
an agreement was made for the way forward but within weeks the
Houthi faction from northern Yemen backtracked and began marching
towards Capital Sana’a in September. By January 2015, the Houthis
had taken over government buildings in Sana’a and declared the
formation of a parallel government forcing Hadi to flee to the southern
city of Aden. The Houthi actions were bolstered by political and
military support from Iran, while the Hadi government was hoping
for Saudi-GCC support to help it maintain its control over Yemen.
Hadi eventually fled to Riyadh in March 2015 leading a coalition force
of regional allies led by Saudi Arabia to attack Yemen hoping for a
quick turnaround forcing Houthis to retreat and enforcing a status
quo ante. Nonetheless, nine years after the military intervention, the
conflict in Yemen has only festered causing a humanitarian disaster
of historical proportions.46 The conflict has threatened to spread to
the whole region with Iran using the situation in Yemen to settle scores
with its smaller neighbours as well as with the United States. The
internal conflict in Yemen also has manifestations of a proxy war
between Iran and Saudi Arabia which has prevented any meaningful
political resolution. As of 2024, the situation in Yemen remains
uncertain but the change of guard in April 2022 pushing Hadi out of
the office and the process of rapprochement between Iran and Saudi
Arabia have generated some hopes.
The Indian response to the conflict has been guided by maintaining
neutrality and underlining the need to avoid external military
interventions. Like the case of Libya, India was forced to undertake a
rescue and repatriation mission and brought back nearly 5,000 of its
nationals and scores of foreign citizens from Yemen under Operation
110 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Raahat.47 An important Indian concern vis-à-vis the conflict in Yemen

is the SLoCs passing through the Gulf of Aden and the choke point of
Bab al-Mandab, underlining the need for greater multilateral
cooperation for maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean.
Despite its neutrality in the fighting, India has been clear that any
terrorist actions or targeting of civilian and business infrastructure as
has been done by the Houthis in Saudi Arabia and UAE is not
acceptable. The Government of India has therefore condemned these
attacks48 and underlined the need for avoiding further escalation and
resolving the conflict through the United Nations-led political process,
which has achieved limited success in implementing a ceasefire
between May and October 2022.

Qatar Crisis
The Qatar crisis started in June 2017 when three GCC members –
Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain – along with Egypt decided to impose
a political, economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar – a fellow Arab
country and member of the GCC. This was one of the worst crises in
the GCC, the only successful regional multilateral organisation in
WANA. The main grievances of the Arab quartet were Doha’s softer
approach towards Iran, its support of regional Islamist organisations,
especially the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, Al-Jazeera’s and
other Qatari-funded media’s coverage of internal issues in fellow Arab
countries and contrarian foreign policy followed by Doha.49 Qatar
not only dismissed these allegations but termed the boycott as an
assault on its sovereignty. It received regional and international
support with Iran and Türkiye extending critical political and
economic support. The two other members of the GCC, Oman and
Kuwait, remained neutral with Oman emerging as an alternative to
UAE for Qatar’s external trade, while Kuwait led political and
diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. With Qatar able to withstand
the initial setbacks and refusing to give in to Saudi-Emirati demands,
and the change in international and regional posture, eventually
Riyadh took the lead to resolve the crisis in January 2021. The crisis
came to a formal end with the signing of the Al-Ula Declaration,50
though the tensions among the regional capitals might take longer to
fade.
India’s Approach to Conflicts in West Asia and North Africa 111

The Indian response to the crisis was prudent and mindful of its
stakes and interests in the region. India took a neutral stand. A
statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India noted the crisis and underlined that India is “of the view that
all parties should resolve their differences through a process of
constructive dialogue and peaceful negotiations based on well-
established international principles of mutual respect, sovereignty and
non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries (sic).”51 It
further noted the significance of peace and prosperity in the GCC
countries for regional security and stability and also for the
international community. Throughout the crisis, India managed to
maintain its relations with individual countries and refused any
temptation to attempt mediation or offer a diplomatic office for
negotiations. Eventually, when the crisis came to an end, India
welcomed it and underscored the importance of reconciliation for
both the region and India’s relations with the region.52

Saudi-Iran Tensions
Iran and Saudi Arabia are two important regional powers in the Gulf
and WANA and have been geopolitical rivals for decades. Their
relations became sour after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and
the two countries seldom see eye-to-eye on any important regional
matter.53 But the geopolitical tension and competition reached new
heights during and in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, with both
trying to outdo the other to undermine their interest and advance
partisan influence. They also see each other as security threats. Both
have allied with neighbouring countries and external powers and
worked with non-state actors to strengthen their position against the
other.54 Any regional effort or international counsel has failed to bring
the two to engage in a meaningful dialogue. For India, navigating
this rivalry has required a degree of diplomatic dexterity and political
maturity. Both are important bilateral partners and India has important
stakes and interests with both of them. Hence, India has kept away
from any intermixing of issues between the two Gulf neighbours
maintaining a stoic silence on the rivalry and advancing relations with
each on its merit. This has helped India to be in good stead and avoid
any costly entanglement.
112 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Iran-Israel Proxy War

The other important regional problem wherein Indian interests and
stakes can be harmed is the ongoing proxy war between Israel and
Iran. Again, both are important regional actors and partners of India.
They see each other as serious security threats, and while Iran
considers Israel as an illegitimate country formed by the colonial
powers and supported by the United States to maintain its regional
hegemony, Israel views Iran as an existential security threat because
of its ideological rhetoric and arming of proxies such as Hamas and
Hezbollah.55 Israel has become more active in countering the Iranian
military threat because of its presence in Syria and Iraq which have of
late become the theatre for the fight between the two regional foes.
The latest round of fighting between IDF and Hamas in Gaza in
response to Hamas’s attack on Israel in October 2023 is in some ways
an extension of the Iran-Israel proxy conflict. India has to depend on
its diplomatic and political capital with the two countries to avoid
any entanglements and maintain relations with them mutually
exclusive. There are certain challenges, especially as Indo-Israeli
relations have thrived in recent years while relations with Iran have
remained stagnant because of a variety of factors.56 Nonetheless, India
maintains political and diplomatic neutrality and has been careful
not to make any statements on the attacks on Iranian targets in Iraq
and Syria by Israeli forces.

Conclusion
The WANA region has been beset with conflicts, violence, civil wars,
regional rivalries and geopolitical tensions and competitions. While
this has been a problem historically, the situation has worsened during
and after the Arab Spring protests. India has vital stakes in the region
with energy security, expatriates and remittances, business, trade and
investments, maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean,
preventing terrorism, radicalism and organised crime making India’s
immediate priorities in the region. In light of this, the Government of
India has invested significant diplomatic and political capital to
develop and strengthen relations with the regional countries, and this
process has intensified under Prime Minister Modi. Undoubtedly, the
conflicts in the region are a threat to India in the sense that they can
India’s Approach to Conflicts in West Asia and North Africa 113

both, directly and indirectly, harm Indian interests as has been noted
in this chapter. India has relied upon a time-tested policy of
maintaining neutrality in external conflicts, avoiding and counselling
against external interventions and calling for respecting the
sovereignty of individual countries, and encouraging peaceful
dialogue and political processes, with United Nations mediation, if
needed, in responding to these conflicts. These in a way form one of
the core principles of Indian foreign policy. At the same time, India
has been reacting to specific conflicts and issues in a contingent manner
to avoid any costly entanglements in regional conflicts. Hence, there
are variations, adaptations and evolution on a case-to-case basis in
Indian response to the conflict. The bottom line remains to safeguard
Indian interests and maintain neutrality that has served India well in
keeping its engagement with the WANA countries in good stead
despite the multiple regional conflicts.

NOTES
1 “Population of Overseas Indians”, Minister of External Affairs, Government of
India, at https://www.mea.gov.in/population-of-overseas-indians.htm (Accessed
11 November 2022).
2 Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of
India, Export Import Data Bank at https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/
Default.asp (Accessed 9 January 2024).
3 Ibid.
4 Amit A. Pandya, Rupert Herbert-Burns and Junko Kobayashi, Maritime Commerce
and Security: The Indian Ocean, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.,
2011.
5 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge University
Press, New York, 2009.
6 P.K. Chakravorty, “India’s Contribution to Peacekeeping”, Journal of Defence Studies,
16 (3), 2022, pp. 275-82.
7 J. Mohan Malik, “India’s Response to the Gulf Crisis: Implications for Indian Foreign
Policy”, Asian Survey, 31 (9), 1991, pp. 847-61.
8 Gopal Suri, “India’s Maritime Security Concerns and the Indian Ocean Region”,
Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 11 (3), 2016, pp. 238-52.
9 Mohammed Sinan Siyech, “India-Gulf Counterterrorism Cooperation”, Middle
East Institute, Washington, D.C., 21 December 2017, at https://www.mei.edu/
publications/india-gulf-counterterrorism-cooperation (Accessed 11 November
2022).
10 Najma Heptullah, India-West Asia Relations: The Nehru Era, Allied Publishers, New
Delhi, 1991.
11 Prithvi Ram Mudiam, India and the Middle East, British Academy Press,
London,1994.
114 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

12 Bansidhar Pradhan, “Changing Dynamics of India’s West Asia Policy”, International

Studies, 41 (1), 2004, pp. 1-88.
13 P.R. Kumaraswamy, India’s Israel Policy, Columbia University Press, New York,
2010.
14 Akhilesh C. Prabhakar, “India’s Energy Security of Supply and the Gulf”, India
Quarterly, 60 (3), 2004, pp. 120-71.
15 Annual Reports, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at https://
mea.gov.in/Annual_Reports.htm?57/Annual_Reports; and “Population of Overseas
Indians”, Minister of External Affairs, Government of India, at https://
www.mea.gov.in/population-of-overseas-indians.htm, (Accessed 11 November
2022).
16 “Remittances from Advanced Nations Beat Flows from Gulf Region in FY21”, The
Hindu Business Line, 17 July 2022, at https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/
money-and-banking/share-of-inward-remittances-from-gcc-region-declined-to-30-
in-2020-21/article65650279.ece (Accessed 11 November 2022).
17 Export Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, Government of India, at https://tradestat.commerce.gov.in/eidb/
Default.asp (Accessed 11 November 2022).
18 “FDI Statistics”, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Ministry
of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, at https://dpiit.gov.in/
publications/fdi-statistics (Accessed 11 November 2022).
19 Abhijit Singh, “India’s ‘Look West’ Maritime Diplomacy”, The Diplomat, 4 October
2015, at https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/indias-look-west-maritime-diplomacy/
(Accessed 11 November 2022).
20 Shrikant Paranjpe “Maritime Security Issues in the Indian Ocean Region”, Journal
of African Union Studies, 2 (3/4), 2013, pp. 79–91.
21 Siyech, no. 9.
22 Anil Trigunayat, “India’s Foreign Policy in West Asia”, Lecture delivered at Indian
Institute of Technology (IIT), Guwahati, 29 March 2019, at https://mea.gov.in/
distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?809 (Accessed 11 November 2022).
23 Three accords beginning with the Camp David Accords in 1978, the Oslo Accords
in 1993 and the Abraham Accords in 2020, underline the changing Arab approach
towards Israel.
24 Md. Muddassir Quamar, “Armed Non-State Actors and Regional Stability in
WANA,” in Sujan Chinoy and Prasanta Kumar Pradhan (eds.), India’s Approach to
West Asia: Trends, Challenges and Possibilities, New Delhi: Manohar Parrikar Institute
for Defence Studies and Analyses and Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2024, pp. 56–
79.
25 “India-Palestine Bilateral Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India, September 2019, at https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral
_Brief-Sept_2019.pdf (Accessed 11 November 2022).
26 P. R. Kumaraswamy, “Modi Redefines India’s Palestine Policy”, IDSA Issue Brief,
18 May 2017 at https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/modi-redefines-india-palestine-
policy_prkumara swamy_180517 (Accessed 11 November 2022).
27 “India Calls for Direct Peace Talks between Israel, Palestine based on Global
Consensus”, The Hindu, 26 March 2021, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/inter
national/india-calls-for-direct-peace-talks-between-israel-palestine-based-on-
global-consensus/article34168200.ece (Accessed 11 November 2022).
28 “India Condemns All Violence in Israel, Gaza; Supports ‘Just Palestinian Cause’”,
Hindustan Times, 16 May 2021, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/
India’s Approach to Conflicts in West Asia and North Africa 115

india-condemns-all-violence-in-israel-gaza-supports-just-palestinian-cause-
101621186766056.html (Accessed 11 November 2022).
29 “Question No–587 Israel – Palestine Conflict,” Rajya Sabha, Unstarred Question,
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 7 December 2023, https://
www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/37365/QUESTION+NO587+ISRAEL++
PALESTINE+CONFLICT (Accessed 9 January 2024).
30 Paul Rogers, Why We’re Losing the War on Terror, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK,
2008.
31 The Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL), also known as Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) and by its Arabic acronym Da’esh.
32 “India-Iraq Bilateral Brief”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
February 2022, at https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Iraq_2022.pdf
(Accessed 11 November 2022).
33 “Bodies of Indians Killed by ISIS in Iraq Return, Handed over to Family:
Highlights”, NDTV, 2 April 2018, at https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/live-
updates-mortal-remains-of-indians-killed-by-isis-in-iraq-to-return-today-handed-
over-to-family-1831518 (Accessed 11 November 2022).
34 Kalicharan V. Singam, “The Islamic State’s Reinvigorated and Evolved Propaganda
Campaign in India”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 12 (5), 2020, pp. 16-20.
35 Siyech, no. 9; Ely Karmon, “India’s Counterterrorism Cooperation with Israel”,
Perspectives on Terrorism, 16 (2), 2022, pp. 2-11.
36 Dania K. Khatib (ed.), The Syrian Crisis: Effects on the Regional and International
Relations, Springer, Singapore, 2021.
37 Embassy of India, Damascus, “India-Syria Bilateral Relations”, at https://eoi.gov.in/
damascus/?3078?000, (Accessed 11 November 2022).
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Horace Campbell, Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya, Monthly Review
Press, New York, 2013.
42 “India Abstains from U.N. Vote on Libya”, The Hindu, 19 March 2011, at https://
www. thehindu.com/news/national/India-abstains-from-U.N.-vote-on-Libya/
article14952398. ece (Accessed 11 November 2022).
43 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhary, “India, African union Call for End to Libya Air Strikes”,
India Today, 15 May 2011, at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/india-and-
african-union-call-for-end-to-libya-airstrikes-134433-2011-05-25 (Accessed 11
November 2022).
44 “India-Libya Bilateral Relations”, Embassy of India, Tunis, 31 May 2022, at https:/
/www.embassyofindiatunis.gov.in/india-libya-bilateral-relations.php (Accessed 11
November 2022).
45 Ibid.
46 “Yemen: One of the World’s Largest Humanitarian Crises”, United Nations
Population Fund, 11 October 2022, at https://www.unfpa.org/yemen (Accessed 11
November 2022).
47 “Evacuation Operation Yemen – Operation Rahat”, Indian Navy, 6 April 2015, at
https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/operation-evacuation-operation-rahat;
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Suo-Moto Statement by
Minister of External Affairs and Overseas Indian Affairs in Rajya Sabha on ‘Recent
Developments in the Republic of Yemen and Efforts Made for Safe Evacuation of
Indian Nationals from There’”, 27 April 2015, at https://mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?
116 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

dtl/25129/SuoMoto+Statement+by+Mi nister+of+External+Affairs+and+Overseas+
Indian+Affairs+in+Rajya+Sabha+on+Recent+Developments+in+the+ Republic+ of
+Yemen+and +Efforts+Made+for+ Safe+ Evacuation+ of + Indian+Nationals+ from+
There (Accessed 11 November 2022).
48 “India Condemns Missile Attack on Saudi Arabia Oil Facility”, Deccan Herald, 1
December 2020, at https://www.deccanherald.com/national/india-condemns-
missile-attack-on-saudi-oil-facility-922208.html (Accessed 11 November 2022).
49 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, Oxford University Press, New
York, 2020.
50 Tuqa Khalid, “Full Transcript of AlUla GCC Summit Declaration: Bolstering Gulf
Unity”, Al Arabiya News, 6 January 2021, at https://english.alarabiya.net/News/
gulf/2021/01/06/Full-transcript-of-AlUla-GCC-Summit-Declaration-Bolstering-
Gulf-unity (Accessed 11 November 2022).
51 “India’s Official Statement following the Recent Developments Related to Qatar”,
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 10 June 2017, at https://
www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/28523/indias+official+ statement+
following+the+recent+developments+ related+to+qatar (Accessed 11 November
2022).
52 “Official Spokesperson’s Response to Media Queries on the Reported
Announcement of Restoration of Full Ties between Saudi Arabia/UAE/Bahrain/
Egypt with Qatar at the GCC Summit in Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia”, Ministry of External
Affairs, Government of India, 5 January 2021, at https://www.mea.gov.in/response-
to-queries.htm?dtl/33369/official+spokespersons+ response+ to+ media+ queries+
on+the+reported+announcement+of+ restoration+ of+ full+ties+ between+saudi+
arabiauaebahrainegypt+with+qatar+at +the+gcc+summit+ in+ alula+ saudi+ arabia
+ on+5+january+2021 (Accessed 11 November 2022).
53 Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East, I.B. Tauris,
London, 2013.
54 Ibid.
55 Daniel Avis, “Understanding the Shadow War between Israel and Iran”, Bloomberg,
4 August 2021, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-04/
understanding-the-shadow-war-between-israel-and-iran (Accessed 11 November
2022).
56 See Jayant Prasad and S. Samuel C. Rajiv (eds.), India and Israel: The Making of a
Strategic Partnership, Routledge, New Delhi, 2020; and P.R. Kumaraswamy and
Meena Singh Roy (eds.), Persian Gulf 2016-17: India’s Relations with the Region,
Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2018.
 6
Security in West Asia and India: Shared
Concerns and Converging Interests
Rajeev Agarwal

India and the West Asian region share a special bond and strong
civilizational links nurtured over centuries. The idea of India has
figured in the imagination of people in the region for centuries, and
their civilisation has therefore effortlessly intersected with Indian
civilization all these years. It is not merely a geographical fact or a
coincidence that the Arabian Sea links the shores of our two regions.
It is, in fact, a bridge across which people have found a common
heritage and which has led to a rich exchange of ideas, beliefs, customs
and language.
The British too saw common links between India and the region.
British interest in the Persian Gulf region was also influenced by their
strategic need to protect critical sea lanes back to Britain. They
established a protectorate in Abu Dhabi in 1820, and captured Aden
in 1839, incorporating them as provinces of British India. Later, they
established protectorates over Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and
the States that today comprise the UAE.1
In the 21st century, as India looks beyond its immediate
neighbourhood, West Asia forms a vital part of its strategic outlook
and is crucial for its national interests. The region supplies about 50
per cent of India’s crude requirements, over 70 per cent of natural gas
requirements, hosts about 9 million Indians and accounts for a large
118 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

percentage of remittances received in India annually. Instability in

the region has a direct bearing not only on India’s energy security but
also on the safety and security of millions of Indians working and
living in the region. From a strategic point of view, therefore, India
has vital stakes in the stability, security and economic well-being of
the region.
As India evolves into a major economic and military power and
is exerting its influence beyond its shores, the West Asian region too
is going through a phase of security transition and transformation
and is seeking trustworthy and reliable security partners. The ‘Arab
Spring’ in the previous decade, the 2019 crisis in the Persian Gulf, the
Qatar crisis from 2017-21, the conflict and humanitarian crisis in
Yemen, instability in Syria and Libya, episodic conflicts between Israel
and Palestine or the uncertainty due to the Iran nuclear issue – have
severely impacted the security dynamics of the region and are of deep
concern to India. The reluctance of the US to be actively involved in
security issues in the region coupled with the rise of terrorism
emanating from countries in the region, adds to overall security
concerns.
India’s traditional foreign policy approach has been to remain non-
intrusive, non-judgmental and non-prescriptive and strictly avoid
taking sides in intra-regional disputes or exhibit partiality among
regional countries. The fact that India is a power with no extra-
territorial ambitions is widely appreciated in the region. While offering
full support, India has always maintained that it is for respective
countries to decide their destiny, without any external interference or
diktats. This philosophy and India’s unflinching commitment to
sustaining and expanding relations with the region has helped build
stronger ties in recent times, especially on security issues.
The constantly evolving security situation in the region and the
fact that the guarantee of security through the US as in the past is no
longer assured, has also resulted in an increased scope and space for
India to play a constructive role in the region’s security. India’s growing
security cooperation with the region covers a vast spectrum of issues
like counter-terrorism, maritime security and anti-piracy as well as
transnational crimes such as money laundering, fake currency, drugs,
human trafficking etc. Safety of the Sea Lines of Communications
Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and Converging Interests 119

(SLOCs) too is of prime importance for India, as any disruptions here

impact India’s economy adversely, especially energy security. It is also
important to keep the region free of influence of sea pirates and other
disruptive non-State actors. Towards this, India has continuously
deployed one naval ship since October 2008 in the Gulf of Aden for
anti-piracy duties.2 Security cooperation with the region is thus
growing by the day as more and more countries recognise and
embrace India as a reliable security partner. To evolve a better
understanding of how India can enhance its security cooperation in
the region, it is important to examine the fast-evolving security
dynamics in the region.

Evolving Security Dynamics in the Region

The West Asian region has always been an area of conflict and
competition, both internally between the regional powers and
externally by the bigger players trying to establish influence and
control. In modern times, we could go back to 1948, when the State of
Israel was established which led to the first of many Arab-Israel
conflicts in 1948. The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 19793 may have
ensured that there have been no more Arab-Israel wars, but conflicts
with various Palestinian factions have continued. Among the recent
conflicts was the one when Israel launched an offensive code-named
“Operation Breaking Dawn”4 on 5 August 2022 in the Gaza Strip
targeting the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Again, in May 2023, Israel
launched ‘Operation Shield and Arrow’ into the Gaza Strip, as Israel’s
response to an escalation of rocket and mortar fire by PIJ, which itself
was a response to the death of a senior member of the group’s West
Bank branch while on hunger strike in an Israeli prison. The continued
skirmishes and hostility, both in the West Bank as well as the Gaza
Strip, along with shrinking land available for a viable Palestinian State
due to ever-increasing Israeli settlements, offer very little hope for
this conflict to end soon. The surprise terror attack by Hamas from
the Gaza Strip into Israel on 07 October 2023 and the resultant Israeli
offensive has put to rest any hopes of an early settlement of the issue,
at least, in the short-term.
The other important security issue is the regional rivalry between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, manifested in good measure after the Islamic
120 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Revolution of Iran of 1979. Although both nations have not been

involved in any direct military conflict yet, a number of proxies from
both sides do keep creating disorder in the region from time to time.
The most recent and prominent is Iran’s support to the Houthis in
Yemen who are fighting against the Saudi-led coalition since March
2015.5 This, coupled with an intense debate and uncertainty over Iran’s
nuclear programme, has often drawn the US and other Western
powers into the conflict. It manifested into the Persian Gulf Crisis of
2019,6 which was triggered when four ships, including three oil
tankers, were damaged in an attack on 12 May off the coast of the
UAE.7 On 13 June, a Norwegian and a Japanese tanker came under
attack in the Gulf of Oman.8 Fingers were immediately pointed at
Iran, which denied it. However, when the Iranian military downed a
US drone flying over its airspace on 20 June 2019, it brought the region
close to an active military conflict. There were reports that the US
President ordered retaliatory military strikes against Iran, to be
executed at dawn on 21 June, before changing his mind at the last
moment.9 The killing of General Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian head
of Al Quds Force at the Baghdad Airport on 03 January 2020 by a US
Drone,10 was again a strong provocation but the fragile cold peace
has prevailed so far in the Persian Gulf. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine
conflict and the fact that Iran has once again come under scrutiny
and sanctions on supply of armed drones to Russia,11 is keeping the
security situation simmering in the region. The Saudi–Iran peace deal,
brokered by China in March 2023, took the world by surprise. The
agreement includes a deal to re-open their embassies and missions
within two months. The agreement includes an affirmation of respect
for the sovereignty of states and the non-interference in the internal
affairs of states.12 If successful, it has the potential to alter the security
dynamics of the region, including an end to the war in Yemen.
Another major factor adding to the ever-fluctuating security
dynamics in the region was the ‘Arab Spring’, a collective revolt by
people in the West Asian region against ‘dictators and oppressive
regimes.’ An incident on 17 December 2010 sparked unprecedented
protests in the region when Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street
vendor, set himself on fire in a show of public protest. Bouazizi’s self-
immolation triggered widespread unrest in Tunisia dubbed as the
Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and Converging Interests 121

‘Jasmine Revolution’. Subsequently, when protests broke out in a

number of other Arab countries, the phenomenon came to be termed
as the ‘Arab Spring.’13
It has been more than a decade since the ‘Arab Spring’, but the
situation across the region is far from being normal. The only two
countries who have ‘stabilised’ somewhat are Tunisia and Egypt. In
Tunisia, President Ben Ali was forced to flee the country on 14 January
2011,14 a month after the protests. However, in October 2011, in
Tunisia’s first free election, the Islamist group Ennahdha won 89 of
217 seats in a new Assembly.15 Later, in January 2014, the new
Constitution was adopted, leading to parliamentary and presidential
elections later in the year. The cycle of election was repeated in 2019
and although not perfect, Tunisia is finding its own formula of
governance.
In Egypt, after the initial turmoil and fall of President Hosni
Mubarak’s government, the Islamists came to power, electing
Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood as the President in
June 2012. He was ousted in June 2013 by a military coup led by
General Fateh El Sisi.16 However, thereafter, Sisi has stabilised the
country and also won presidential polls twice in 2014, 2018 and again
in December 2023.
Some of other countries in the region have not been so fortunate
in coming to terms with the scars of the ‘Arab Spring.’ In Yemen,
President Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted when, under UN mediation,
he signed a transfer of power agreement and relinquished the post of
President, to hand over power to Vice-President Abdu Rabbo Mansour
Hadi on 23 November 2011.17 The transition process however got
disrupted due to conflicts. In September 2014, the Houthis, an ethnic
Shia group in Yemen seeking control and rule over Northern Yemen,
took over the capital Sana’a.
Saudi Arabia, in consultation with regional Arab allies and the
US, launched airstrikes in Yemen on 26 March 2015 in an air assault
codenamed Operation Decisive Storm.18 There have been a number of
attempts towards negotiating peace in Yemen, a number of ceasefires
as well as UN Resolutions, but a long-term solution still evades Yemen.
A new dimension was added to the Yemen conflict when the
122 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Houthis attacked the Saudi airport at Abha and oil pipelines in May-
June 2019, followed by drone strikes on Saudi Aramco facilities in
September 2019. During the attacks on the Saudi cities of Riyadh,
Nazran and Jizan on 23 June 2020, the Houthis claimed to have used
Quds cruise missiles, Zulfiqar ballistic missiles and Sammad-3 drones,
all of Iranian origin. There have been repeated attempts by the UN to
negotiate a ceasefire, including two during Ramadan in 2021 and 2022,
without much success.
Syria is another country impacted by the ‘Arab Spring’ and is yet
to stabilise. More than 12 years have passed since protests against
President Bashar Al Assad’s government erupted in March 2011 later
turning into a full-fledged war pitching the US-led coalition on one
side and the Russia-Iran coalition supporting Assad on the other.
President Assad has survived and retained power. But the security
situation is far from stable. The scars of the use of chemical weapons
in August 201319 continue to haunt the Syrians while the Islamic State
(IS) and the Kurdish rebels continue to attack government assets and
machinery. The Kurdish forces have established an autonomous region
in the north, creating serious security concerns in Turkiye, which is
trying to create a buffer zone in Syria along its southern borders.
Libya too erupted in protests in early 2011 leading to mass reprisals
by its dictator, Muammar Gaddafi. He was ousted after a bloody battle
and finally killed in October 2011. However, Libya has not been able
to stabilise. One of the other primary reasons for Libya’s instability
has been its failure to find a suitable political governance model and
a common ground between the rival interests between competing
tribal groups. After a protracted battle between the warring factions,
the country is split down the middle, into eastern and western halves.
The Government of National Accord (GNA) is based in Tripoli,
whereas the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National
Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar, is in Tobruk, in the East. The
lingering political tensions and frequent clashes are a challenge to the
internal security and political stability of the country.
Iraq, though not directly impacted by the ‘Arab Spring’, was
attacked by the then newly established Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) or Daesh, a Sunni jihadist group led by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.
ISIS launched an attack on Mosul and Tikrit in June 2014. In response,
Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and Converging Interests 123

a US-led coalition launched operations and airstrikes against ISIS in

Iraq on 7 August 2014. Over the next year, the coalition launched
more than 8,000 airstrikes, leading to huge losses to the ISIS. By the
end of 2015, Iraqi forces had recaptured Ramadi and by December
2017, the ISIS had lost 95 per cent of its territory, including Mosul.20
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi declared victory over the ISIS
on 9 December 2017. Later, US Special Forces in northwestern Syria
killed Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi in a raid on 26-27 October 2019. 21
Although ISIS has largely lost its cohesion, it remains active in small
splinter groups across the region, especially Syria.
The security dynamics in the region, therefore, remain fluid and
very fragile. Number of competing and conflicting interests prevent
the establishment of lasting peace. Intra-regional rivalries, territorial
disputes and terror have all contributed towards the prevailing
situation. Dialogue and compromises are the only way to work out
peace and is the need of the hour. India, with its goodwill and trust
across the region, may have an important role to play in this regard
in the future.

Existing Security Architecture in the Region and the Need

for a Viable Alternative
Security threats in the modern era can quickly morph into multiple
forms. Conventional military threats between nations are being
constantly overshadowed by threats like cyber security, terror and
human trafficking which transcend national boundaries and impact
peace and security. The existing security dynamics in the West Asian
region and the constantly evolving security threats in the region
require a robust, reliable and an all-encompassing security framework.
However, the West Asian region has not yet been successful in
either identifying common security threats or in coming up with a
common security framework for the region. Across the region, only
the GCC has a security component whereas the other two major
regional frameworks, OIC and Arab League, are consultative
frameworks on regional and political issues. Even the GCC is limited
to six countries and does not include many important countries in
the region like Egypt, Turkiye, Jordan, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, etc.
The GCC was formed in 1981, shortly after the Iranian revolution
124 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

in 1979. The idea of the GCC was to bring together countries of the
Gulf region against the threat from two perceived adversaries; Iran,
an ideological rival, and Iraq, a belligerent military power. The birth
of the GCC was thus based on fear (of Iran and Iraq), and exclusion
(Iran and Iraq, along with embattled and weak Yemen). In its
formation, the GCC however ignored the geographical and
geopolitical realities of the region. Iran and Iraq together cover almost
the entire northern coast of the Persian Gulf, and are critical links
towards the Levant, Central Asia and South Asia. They also possess
large reservoirs of natural resources. Geo-politically too, Iraq and Iran,
being significant economic and military powers, cannot be ignored.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is the only big country in the GCC.
A very critical component of this framework was the US, which
pledged to provide security guarantees to the GCC. In his 1980 State
of the Union Address, in reaction to the 1979 Iranian revolution,
President Jimmy Carter articulated this, stating:
“An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of
the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled
by any means necessary, including military force.”22

The US, accordingly deployed the ‘Rapid Deployment Force’, and set
up regional military bases, such as the ones in Masira and Bahrain.23
In the following decades, several other security initiatives were
experimented with in the region. After the Iraq war in 1991, the US
also created a multilateral security framework known as the Madrid
process,24 within which it pursued a containment and deterrence
strategy vis-a-vis Iraq and Iran.25 In 1999, the US introduced a new
strategy to minimise threats posed by Iran and Iraq. The Cooperative
Defense Initiative (CDI) was a plan for the integration of the defence
forces of the GCC, Egypt and Jordan; and coordinate intelligence
sharing between them.26 All GCC members signed a joint defence
pact in December 2000. However, the 9/11 incident and the resultant
war on terror in Afghanistan along with the war on Iraq in 2003 and
the discovery of a ‘covert’ nuclear programme in Iran in 2002, once
again changed the entire dynamics of security and US engagement in
the region. The US found itself deeply involved in the security issues
of the region. In May 2006, the US launched the Gulf Security Dialogue
Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and Converging Interests 125

(GSD). The core objectives of the Dialogue were the promotion of

intra-GCC and GCC-US cooperation to meet common perceived
threats.27
Later, the concept of a ‘Gulf Union’ was discussed at the GCC
Summit in Bahrain in December 2012.28 During the Manama Dialogue
in December 2013 too, Saudi Arabia brought up this issue but failed
to find traction among other partners. Oman was even quick to rubbish
the idea with its Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi stating, “We are
against a union,” further adding, “We will not prevent a union, but if
it happens, we will not be part of it.”29
At the US-GCC Summit in Riyadh in May 2017, a proposed
regional alliance in the form of an ‘Arab NATO’ or ‘Middle East
Strategic Alliance’ (MESA) was mooted. The alliance was projected to
include nations of the GCC plus Egypt and Jordan.30 However, soon
thereafter, in June 2017, the diplomatic blockade against Qatar buried
the concept before it could take any shape.
The Abraham Accords,31 mediated by the US and signed between
Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan in September 2020,
was another significant development. These were the first accords in
the region since 1994, when Israel had signed a peace pact with
Jordan32 And could lead to the mainstreaming of Israel into West Asian
framework in the future. The issue of Palestine and the sacred pledge
of Arab countries to safeguard Palestinian interests is the most
important factor in the way, although there has been a marked dilution
in the stand by regional countries on Palestine issue in recent years.
The Abraham Accords do not have any security component, at least
as of now. However, if its coverage expands across the region, security
cooperation too could get incorporated.
Another attempt towards making the existing GCC framework
more inclusive across the region was witnessed during the GCC
Summit at Jeddah on 16 July 2022 when, apart from GCC countries,
the US and Egypt, Iraq and Jordan were invited. The final statement,
“The leaders reiterated their condemnation of terrorism, and
reaffirmed their keenness to strengthen efforts to combat terrorism
and extremism, prevent the armament and financing of terror groups
and confront all activities that threaten the region’s security and
stability”,33 had a clear security element embedded in it.
126 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

All regional security initiatives, right from the formation of GCC

in 1981, have had two clear and critical consequences: first, Iran has
been specifically targeted, second, the US, over the years, got more
and more engaged in the security of the region. Regarding a viable
regional security architecture, the most crucial is the question of
regional participation. When examining it in the context of the West
Asian region and specifically the GCC, the question is, can it afford to
ignore the two largest countries north of the Persian Gulf, namely,
Iran and Iraq in any viable security framework? The answer is clearly
‘no’. Alluding to this important aspect in a speech at the Manama
Dialogue in 2006, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister, Sheikh Khalid Bin
Ahmed Al Khalifa had stated: “In the Gulf, no sustainable long-term
regional security arrangement can be envisioned without Iraq and
Iran acting as two of its pillars.”34
The GCC is, therefore, grossly insufficient and under-represented
to address collective security concerns of the region. It also lacks a
strong, viable and regionally representative armed force. The only
military arm, the Peninsula Shield Force, consists primarily of troops
from Saudi Arabia and therefore cannot be classified as credible or
representative. The region therefore requires a security framework,
which is larger in scope than the current GCC. It also needs to carve
out a capability that is independent of the US, which is clearly
unwilling to commit active resources for security in the region any
more.
India, which has enhanced its engagement manifold with the
region in the past decade, especially after the current government
under Prime Minister Narendra Modi made West Asia a clear priority,
could offer solutions to the region. A clear indication of India’s
increasing engagement with the region on security issues is illustrated
by the growing defence and security cooperation, which could lay
the foundation for a strong and viable regional security architecture
in the future.

India’s Defence and Security Cooperation with the Region

When compared with trade and people-to-people ties, India was slow
off the blocks with its security and defence engagements with the
West Asian region. This was attributed to a number of factors including
Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and Converging Interests 127

India’s inward-looking policies and Pakistan-centric security outlook

till the late 1990s. In addition, the traditional support and solidarity
of the Arab countries to Pakistan came in the way. It was only after
9/11 that the world was forced to change its outlook on terror. The
slow decoupling of India’s security outlook away from Pakistan and
also recognition of India as an emerging power by the countries of
the region, helped India enhance its engagement in defence and
security with the region. The start was modest and not much progress
was made until 2014 when Narendra Modi was elected as the Prime
Minister and the government thereafter prioritized its engagement
with the region.

Oman
Within the region, Oman was amongst the first countries that signed
the Agreement to Combat Terrorism and Organized Crime in Muscat
with India in May 1999.35 It was followed by the visit of Major General
Ali bin Rashid Alkalbani, Commander of the Royal Army of Oman,
to India in June 1999. MoU on defence cooperation was signed in
December 200536 during the visit of the Omani minister responsible
for defence affairs Sayyid Badr bin Saud bin Hareb al Busaidi. The
MoU has since been operational and is extended every five years.37
Oman is also the only country in the region with which India conducts
regular biennial bilateral military exercises with all three services –
with the Army (since 2015), the Navy (since 1993) and the Air Force
(since 2009). In May 2016, Manohar Parrikar, the then Defence Minister,
paid a three-day visit to Oman. During the visit, four MoUs/
agreements were signed, namely the MoU on Defence Cooperation
between the Ministry of Defence of Sultanate of Oman and Ministry
of Defence of Republic of India; the MoU between the Royal Oman
Police (Coast Guard) and the Indian Coast Guard in the field of Marine
Crime Prevention at Sea; the MoU between India and Oman on
Maritime Issues, and the Protocol between the Omani Royal Air Force
and the Indian Air Force on Flight Safety Information Exchange.38
In addition, there has been extensive cooperation between the two
navies with the Indian Naval Ships often visiting ports of Muscat and
Salah for Operational Turn Around and goodwill visits. On its part,
India has been imparting regular training to Oman’s naval personnel
128 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

at its naval training institutes every year. During the visit of Prime
Minister Modi to Oman in February 2018, India and Oman signed an
Annexure to the MoU on military cooperation.39 Under the Annexure,
Oman is to provide logistical facilities to the Indian Navy in the Special
Economic Zone and port of Duqm. Indian naval ships will also be
able to use the port and dry dock for maintenance of ships. Duqm is
strategically important due to its location right across the Indian
coastline and overlooking the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea and
in close proximity to the Chabahar Port in Iran. It also allows India to
keep a discreet watch on the growing naval activity of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the region.
Oman was also the first Gulf country to purchase the Indian Small
Arms System (INSAS) assault rifle in 2010.40 In September 2021, India
and Oman signed an agreement on the exchange of white shipping
information and to boost maritime security cooperation.41 In February
2022, Oman’s Secretary General of Defence, Mohammad bin Nasser
bin Ali Al-Zabbi visited India where the two sides agreed to examine
areas of mutual interest in forging joint ventures to enhance defence
industry cooperation.42 Admiral R. Hari Kumar, Chief of India’s Naval
Staff, undertook a three-day official visit to Oman from 31 July – 2
August 2023, which apart from high-level discussions, included a visit
to the strategically important port of Duqm.43 The State visit of Sultan
of Oman, Sultan Haitham bin Tarik, on 16 December 2023 and the
signing of joint vision document is an important landmark in India-
Oman security partnership.

UAE
With the UAE, although a MoU on defence cooperation was signed
in 2003, not much progress was made for almost a decade. During
Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the UAE in August 2015, a decision
was taken to elevate the bilateral relationship to a ‘comprehensive
strategic partnership’, in which security cooperation was an important
element. Shortly thereafter, during the state visit of the UAE’s Crown
Prince Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in February 2016, both
sides agreed to conduct a regular security dialogue between their
National Security Councils, to work closely on security issues, like
counter-terrorism, maritime security, and cyber-security. Both sides
Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and Converging Interests 129

also agreed to enhance cooperation in training, joint exercises, as well

as identify options on the production of defence equipment in India.44
The focus on security cooperation continued with the visit of Manohar
Parrikar, India’s Defence Minister, to the UAE in May 2016.45 It was
the first visit by any Indian Defence Minister to the UAE.
Cooperation in bilateral exercises forms an important component
under which India and the UAE held the first Joint Navy Exercises
‘Gulf Star 1’ in Abu Dhabi in March 2018.46 In March 2021, an Indian
Air Force (IAF) contingent participated for the first time in Exercise
Desert Flag–VI, an annual multilateral large force employment exercise,
hosted by the UAE. The Exercise was conducted at the Al Dhafra Air
Force Base, UAE. The IAF participated in this exercise for the first
time, fielding Su-30MKI fighter aircraft.47 The IAF again participated
in Exercise Desert Flag–VII in UAE in March 2023, this time with five
LCA Tejas and two C-17 Globemaster III aircraft. The first edition of
joint military exercise ‘Desert Cyclone’ was held in January 2024 in
the deserts of Rajasthan.
As part of cooperation in defence production, the Ordnance
Factory Board (OFB) of India signed a contract with the UAE on 23
March 2017 for the supply of 40,000 rounds of 155 mm shells, followed
by another 50,000 rounds in 2018.48 There have been some reports in
the media on the UAE expressing interest in the purchase of Helina,
Nag and Brahmos missiles from India. India and the UAE have already
agreed to cooperate in the field of Space as a part of their
comprehensive strategic partnership.

Saudi Arabia
With Saudi Arabia too, there is an increased focus on defence and
security cooperation. The ‘Delhi Declaration’49 signed during the visit
of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud in 2006 and the ‘Riyadh
Declaration’50 signed during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit
in March 2010, set the tone for revitalising the relationship. Later, a
MoU on defence cooperation was signed during the visit of the then
Crown Prince and Defence Minister Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz Al
Saud to India on 27 February 2014.51 However, it was the visit of Prime
Minister Modi to Riyadh in April 201652 that holistically captured the
spirit of enhancing cooperation in security and defence. During the
130 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

visit, King Salman conferred on Prime Minister Modi the Kingdom’s

highest civilian honour, indicating the importance Saudi Arabia
attached to its relations with India. The visit of Crown Prince
Mohammad bin Salman to India later in February 2019 further
cemented the engagement.
Saudi Arabia recognises India as one of its Strategic Partner
countries under its “Vision 2030”. Similarly, India is also seeking Saudi
Arabia as a partner under its “Make in India” initiative in the field of
defence production. Recently there were media reports which
indicated that Kalyani Strategic Systems, a wholly owned subsidiary
of Bharat Forge, has bagged an offer to sell its Bharat 52, a 155mm/
52-calibre artillery gun to a friendly country in the ‘non conflict zone.’53
No names were revealed but the firm had been in talks with Saudi
Arabia and it could have finally fructified. There have also been some
inputs that Saudi Arabia has shown interest in the Brahmos missile
system. In February 2022, Saudi Arabia was one of the 46 countries,
which were invited to the Indian Navy’s “Milan Exercise.”54 Earlier,
in August 2021 the first-ever bilateral naval exercise between India
and Saudi Arabia “Al Mohed Al Hindi 2021” was conducted off the
King Abdulaziz Naval base in Al Jubail, Saudi Arabia.55 The first
edition of India-Saudi Arabia joint military exercise ‘Sada Tanseeq’
was held in the deserts of Rajasthan in January-February 2024.
A further testimony to strengthening defence relations has been a
flurry of visits at the highest level of armed forces between the two
countries in the recent past. On 14 February 2022, Lieutenant General
Fahd Bin Abdullah Mohammed Al Mutair, Commander of the Royal
Saudi Land Forces reached New Delhi on an official visit,56 the first-
ever visit by a serving Royal Saudi Land Forces Commander to India.
Earlier, in December 2020, Chief of the Army Staff General M.M.
Naravane visited Saudi Arabia on an official visit; once again, it was
the first time that an Indian Army Chief had visited Saudi Arabia.

Egypt
Egypt is another country with which India has enjoyed close defence
relations. Indo-Egypt defence ties go back to the 1960s-70s when Indian
Air Force pilots trained Egyptian pilots and were a part of a joint
venture to manufacture the Helwan-300 (Kahira) jet fighter.57 Later,
Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and Converging Interests 131

in 1998, during the visit of India’s Chief of Air Staff, various proposals
to enhance defence cooperation were proposed by both sides. The
formation of a Joint Defence Committee was one such proposal. A
Joint Defence Committee was proposed which was finally set up in
August 2006 and its inaugural meeting was held in Cairo.
Ties with Egypt have received a fillip since 2014 when Prime
Minister Modi and President Sisi both came to power in their
respective countries. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj paid a
visit to Cairo in August 2015. Prime Minister Modi met President Sisi
on the sidelines of the UNGA in New York in September 2015. Later,
President Sisi paid a state visit to India in September 2016. The Joint
Statement issued outlining the three pillars of cooperation, highlighted
political-security cooperation as an important pillar. Egyptian Minister
of Defence Sedki Sobhi later visited India in November 2017 and
Minister of State for Military Production, General Mohamed El Assar
was in India in April 2018, to participate in the DEF-EXPO at Chennai.58
During India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s official visit to
Egypt in September 2022, the two countries signed a MoU on defence
cooperation,59 aimed to formalize and enhance bilateral defence
cooperation, including expansion of their partnership in defence
industries. As a part of the ‘Make in India’ initiative, Egypt could
emerge as a lucrative market for Indian defence products, joint defence
manufacturing and co-production units. Egypt is also one of the six
countries interested in India’s Tejas aircraft.60 In addition, Egypt has
reportedly shown interest in buying Brahmos missiles too. Most
recently, the state visit of President Sisi in January 2023, as the Chief
Guest at the Republic Day Parade and quick reciprocal visit by Prime
Minister Modi to Egypt in June 2023, has further added impetus to
the strengthening ties between the two nations.

Qatar
The India-Qatar Defence Cooperation Agreement was signed during
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Qatar in November 2008.61
The Agreement is being implemented through a Joint Defence
Cooperation Committee (JDCC), which held its fifth meeting in Doha
on 27-28 November 2019.62 The pace of engagement has however
picked up in recent years. National Security Adviser Shri Ajit Doval
132 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

visited Doha from 11-12 February 2015, the first such high-level visit
from India after the Modi Government assumed office. The Emir of
Qatar Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani paid a state visit to India in
March 2015, his first visit to India. This was also the first visit of the
Head of State of an Arab country after Modi became Prime Minister.63
During Prime Minister Modi’s reciprocal visit to Doha in June 2016,
both countries agreed to provide impetus to defence cooperation,
including through joint exercises and enhanced training of naval, air
and land forces, as well as in the area of coastal defence. Qatar evinced
interest in the opportunities under the ‘Make in India’ initiative for
joint production of defence equipment in India.64 Both sides agreed
to enhance cooperation in maritime security in the Gulf and the Indian
Ocean regions. A MoU on cooperation in exchange of intelligence
related to money laundering, related crimes and terrorism financing
was also signed.65
A number of high-profile visits have followed thereafter. The Chief
of Staff of Qatar Armed Forces, Lt. Gen. (Pilot) Ghanim bin Shaheen
Al Ghanim, visited India during19-22 June 2018. Khalid bin
Mohammed Al Attiyah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State
for Defence Affairs visited India in February 2020. Staff Maj Gen
(Navy) Abdulla Hassan M A Al Sulaiti, Commander of the Qatar Amiri
Naval Forces (QENF) visited India from 02 to 05 April 2019.66
From the Indian side, there have been regular visits to Qatar from
the armed forces. Indian Navy’s warships, INS Mumbai and INS
Trikand docked at Hamad port in 2018 and 2019. The Indian Coast
Guard Ship Samudra Paheredar also docked at Doha Port in 2020 as
part of its goodwill visit to the Gulf region. Indian Air Force C-17
Aircraft landed in Doha in May-June 2021 to transport cryogenic
containers as part of COVID-19 relief operations. INS Kolkata, INS
Tarkash, INS Trikand and INS Shardul docked at Hamad Port Doha in
May and June 2021 to undertake shipping of medical supplies for
COVID-19 relief from Qatar as part of Operation Samudra Setu-II.
India has offered training modules and facilities to Qatar for its
armed forces personnel and Coast Guard. A number of Qatari officers
have attended the Defence Services Staff College Course at Wellington.
A customised course was conducted at Kochi in July 2019 for Qatari
Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and Converging Interests 133

Naval officers. With Qatar importing most of its defence equipment

and India emerging as a significant producer, there is a lot of potential
for enhanced engagement in defence and security with Qatar. The
visit of Prime Minister Modi to Qatar on 14 February 2024 and the
release of the Indian ex-navy personnel, who were on death sentence
in Qatar, is an important confidence building measure in the bilateral
partnership in general, and security cooperation in particular.

Iran
With Iran, India signed a MoU on defence cooperation in 2001,67 but
could not progress it further. Iran is very important to India due to its
location, its relevance to peace in the Gulf and its centrality to peace
in Afghanistan. Both countries are looking at the appropriate time to
revitalize this relationship. In light of the security and geo-political
dynamics, which have evolved over the past two decades in Iran, it is
perhaps the right time to pursue closer defence and security ties with
Iran. In this context, the visit of India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh
to Tehran in September 202068 and that of the Iranian Defence Minister
to India in March 202169 are indicative of this. Most recently, the Iranian
Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri visited India on 24 November
2022.70 The Saudi-Iran peace deal of March 2023 too promises towards
larger inclusion of Iran in the region and may facilitate closer ties
with India too, in defence and security sphere. The visit of
Dr. S. Jaishankar to Tehran in December 2023 and the focus on regional
security is an important indicator towards increasing cooperation.

Israel
Defence cooperation with Israel is unique in nature when compared
with other countries in the region. While India drives the contours of
defence cooperation with most countries in the region, with Israel,
due to its technological superiority, Israel is in a position to assist
India and augment its defence preparedness. Both countries,
surrounded by hostile neighbours and victims of frequent terror
attacks, have often sought convergence on a number of security and
defence issues. While the two sides established diplomatic relations
in 1992, it was the Kargil War of 1999, which cemented the ties when
Israel emerged as one of the very few countries to rush to India’s aid
134 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

and provide direct military assistance. It also brought to the fore Israel
as a reliable, trustworthy and a technologically superior partner on
defence and security, critical for India’s defence preparedness.
During these last 30 years, Israel has provided India with a number
of cutting-edge technologies, weapons and surveillance platforms like
UAVs, missiles, Special Forces equipment and radar systems. An
important part of this collaboration has also been joint production,
within which the Barak-8 air and missile defence system, co-developed
by the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and India’s Defence Research
Development Organisation (DRDO), is one such success story. During
the visit of Israel’s Defence Minister Benjamin Gantz to New Delhi in
June 2022, both sides decided to work together to enhance cooperation
in all forums of defence and security. The ‘India-Israel Vision on
Defence Cooperation’ was adopted during the visit and a Letter of
Intent on enhancing cooperation in the field of Futuristic Defence
Technologies was also exchanged.71 Israel’s Ambassador to India, Naor
Gilon, speaking to the media in September 2022, underlined the
importance of this partnership when he reiterated that defence
cooperation between the two sides is a long and successful one and
that Israel is happy to be a strong partner in areas like UAVs, rockets,
missiles and whatever defence system India needs.72

Others
With Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq and Kuwait, there are no formal defence
and security agreements in place. There are ongoing discussions with
Kuwait and Bahrain towards formalizing defence cooperation in the
future. Turkiye-India ties are often overshadowed by Turkey’s close
ties with Pakistan, especially the military and Turkey’s oft-repeated
statements and comments on India’s internal affairs, especially
Kashmir.
India’s defence and security cooperation with the region is
therefore a work-in-progress but has gained significant momentum
in the past decade. In addition to core defence issues, there is strong
support for India in countering terror and unanimous acceptance of
India’s position on terror. Whether it was Uri or Pathankot, all the
Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar
condemned the attacks strongly. In fact, the UAE and Bahrain even
Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and Converging Interests 135

supported active military action by India to confront, eradicate and

fight terrorism. On the attack on a convoy of security forces in
Pulwama on 14 February 2019, all the Gulf countries were prompt in
their condemnation of the terror attack. There has also been strong
support to the adoption of India’s proposed Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism in the United Nations.
Operation Raahat, conducted to evacuate Indians and foreign nationals
stranded in conflict-ridden Yemen during March-April 2015 is yet
another example of strong security coordination with countries in
the region. This operation conducted over land, air and sea through
multiple countries was a resounding success. Not only were 4,700
Indians safely evacuated but more than 1,950 foreign nationals from
48 countries were also brought to safety under most difficult
circumstances.73

Areas of Convergence and Recommendations for the Future

India considers West Asia as its extended neighbourhood and “home
away from home’74 and accords priority to peace and security in the
region. Under Prime Minister Modi’s vision of India’s overseas
engagement, India’s ties with the countries in the region has grown
manifold in the past few years. Minister of State for External Affairs,
M.J. Akbar, during the annual Manama Dialogue in December 2017,
stated, “India recognises and stands by the Gulf region in its efforts
to counter emerging security threats. However, while engaging with
the Gulf countries, India’s approach has remained and will remain
non-intrusive, non-judgmental and non-prescriptive. We do not take
sides in intra-regional disputes.”75 It is this specific philosophy of
India’s regional outlook that the countries in the region appreciate
and therefore place their trust in exploiting the potential for greater
and a more intensive security engagement with India in the region.
In doing so, India’s engagement options on defence and security
need to be evaluated against her core interests in the region, the
capacity to engage actively, external pressures and more importantly,
depth and scope of the ‘strategic reach and vision.’ Most countries in
the region are looking for reliable partners and security assurances
and therefore look at India as a safe and reliable partner, particularly
136 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

after the US made it clear that it no longer has the appetite for any
active military engagement in the region, especially involving boots
on the ground. In such a scenario, India needs to explore options of
engagement on a bilateral as well as multilateral/regional basis. While
bilateral engagements provide the initial foothold and establish mutual
confidence, multilateral engagements could give India an increased
visibility as a security collaborator in the region.

Defence Wings
For any effective defence cooperation, India has to extend its Defence
Wings to each of the countries in the region. In countries where the
engagements are intense, personnel of more than one service could
form part of the defence wings. With India enhancing its capabilities
in defence production and seeking export destinations, a suitably
equipped and a proactive defence wing at our embassies abroad is a
must.

Maritime Agreements
India has signed specific agreements on maritime security with Qatar
and Oman. These agreements provide India an opportunity to
cooperate in combating a variety of maritime threats of terrorism,
piracy as also security of offshore oil installations. India should sign
similar maritime security agreements with other countries in the
region too. In addition, the Indian Navy should increase its frequency
of port calls, naval basing, joint exercises and missions to ensure an
enlarged Indian foothold in the region. Logistics and basing facilities
akin to Duqm in Oman need to be extended to other select countries
in the region too.

Counter Piracy Cooperation

A large percentage of India’s trade, including crude oil, natural gas
and fertilizers, passes through the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden. As
a part of the counter-piracy mission in the region, India has been
operating independently in the region since 2008 in close coordination
with the Bahrain-based and US-led multilateral Combined Maritime
Force (CMF).76 Recently, based on an agreement during the India-US
2+2 Dialogue in April 2023, India has formally commenced
Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and Converging Interests 137

cooperation with the CMF as part of its widening military diplomacy

and strengthening regional security cooperation.77

Counter Terrorism Engagement

Terrorism is a common concern that India shares with the region.
Counter-terror cooperation already forms part of existing security
protocols with some countries of the region. India needs to deepen
this engagement by signing similar protocols with others in the region.
Intelligence sharing and extradition of terror accused should form
important elements of such cooperation. India could offer to train
troops from these countries in counter-terror operations or even set
up a regional Counter Terrorism School in the UAE or Oman. India
could pitch for setting up a ‘Regional Counter Terrorism Command
Centre’ in the region, which could be manned by intelligence personnel
of these countries and India, for real-time intelligence sharing and
coordination.

Regional Military Engagement

India should expand interaction with regional militaries through visits
and courses/training, port visits, military exercises, intelligence
sharing, joint production of weapon platforms and munitions. Regular
bilateral or multilateral training exercises, training of their personnel
– especially officers – in India should form an essential part of such
an engagement. Maintaining regular contact with officers who have
trained in India should be encouraged through our defence wings.
Such officers should be specially invited to Embassy events and even
regular reunions in India. This would help in building long-term
relationships and comraderies for future engagements between the
two armed forces. With these forms of engagements, India has the
potential to emerge as an acceptable and successful ‘security
collaborator’ in the region (especially the Gulf region).

Role in Regional Security

In addition to its role as a ‘security collaborator’ with individual
nations, India could play an important role in the regional security
structures too. An observer role in the GCC, or establishment of a
‘regional military communication and liaison command post’,
138 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

comprising of officers from regional countries along with India, could

not only facilitate training and sharing of experience between armed
forces of regional countries and India, but could also help avert
potential military situations by timely reporting and sharing of inputs,
helping in diffusing the situation before it goes out of control. As
such structures mature in time, it could help avert any potential crisis
as also overcome the present atmosphere of hostility and mistrust
between various camps, something extremely vital to regional security.
India, with its vast experience of military conflicts and peacekeeping
missions, could play a significant role.

Conclusion
As India’s security ties with the nations in the region evolve, India
will have to remain vigilant to some important issues. Balancing and
managing conflicting and often contradictory, stands on regional
security issues (Saudi Arabia versus Iran or Israel versus Iran etc.),
would be a challenge. Also, given the nature of regimes in the region,
defence cooperation could mean dealing with an ex-military ruler
(Egypt) or with monarchies (GCC countries), which come with their
own dynamics. However, India with its goodwill and trust across
ideologies in the region, should be able to navigate such issues deftly.
India under Prime Minister Modi has made the West Asian region
a critical part of its outreach into its extended neighbourhood and
security cooperation has formed an important part of it which is clearly
reflected in the growing defence and security cooperation with
countries of the region in the past decade. Cooperation with the UAE
has been the frontrunner with a number of bilateral initiatives. A MoU
on cyberspace, signed in January 2017, upgrading security dialogue
at the level of the National Security Adviser as well as agreement for
joint defence production in India and purchase of important military
equipment from India (Brahmos missile and 155 mm Artillery shells)
are some of the important agreements with the UAE. Saudi Arabia,
which is one of the largest purchasers of defence equipment globally
(over US$ 80 billion annually), has been invited to join the ‘Make in
India’ initiative. Saudi Arabia has also agreed to commence joint naval
exercises. During the Prime Minister’s visit to Qatar in June 2016,
both sides agreed to give impetus to defence ties, including through
Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and Converging Interests 139

joint exercises and enhanced training of naval, air and land forces,
and also in the area of coastal defence. Kuwait has offered to sign a
Defence Cooperation Agreement. The MoU on Duqm Port during
the Prime Minister’s visit to Oman in February 2018 is a historical
landmark in India’s security cooperation. Continued cooperation with
Israel, the recent upswing in ties with Egypt and talk on revival of
security cooperation with Iran during the recently held visits are a
positive indicator of India’s security outreach. Continuing Indian naval
deployment in the anti-piracy operations across the Gulf of Aden and
off the coasts of Oman and Yemen is another reflection of strong
security cooperation with the region.
As India looks beyond its immediate neighbourhood, the West
Asian region provides the perfect platform to expand its reach beyond
its shores as a regional player and as a viable ‘security collaborator.’
Defence and security cooperation would play a pivotal role in this
engagement.

NOTES
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9 Rajeev Agarwal, no. 6.
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2022).
41 “India, Oman sign pact to boost maritime security cooperation”, Business Today,
28 September 2021, atchttps://www.businesstoday.in/latest/economy/story/india-
oman-sign-pact-to-boost-maritime-security-cooperation-307802-2021-09-28
(Accessed 17 December 2022).
42 “Secretary general of Oman’s defence ministry calls on Rajnath Singh”, The Times
of India, 1 February 2022, at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/secretary-
general-of-omans-defence-ministry-calls-on-rajnath-singh/articleshow/
89281949.cms (Accessed 17 December 2022).
142 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

43 Ministry of Defence Press Release, PIB, 31 July 2023, at https://pib.gov.in/

PressRelease Page.aspx?PRID=1944358 (Accessed 4 August 2023).
44 “India-UAE Joint Statement during the State Visit of Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi”,
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at https://www.mea.gov.in/
bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26349/India_UAE_Joint_Statement_during_the_ State
_ Visit_of_ Crown _ Prince_of_Abu_Dhabi (Accessed 19 December 2022).
45 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Press Release, at https://
mea.gov.in/Portal/CountryNews/6277_Press_Release_23.5.2016.pdf (Accessed 19
December 2022).
46 “Naval Ships exercise to boost UAE-India ties”, Khaleej Times, 18 March 2018, at
https://www.khaleejtimes.com/uae/naval-ships-exercise-to-boost-uae-india-ties
(Accessed 19 December 2022).
47 “Exercise Desert Flag-VI”, Indian Air Force, at https://indianairforce.nic.in/exercise-
desert-flag-vi/ (Accessed 19 December 2022).
48 “In its largest ever export order, OFB to supply 50,000 Bofors shells to UAE”, The
Economic Times, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/in-its-
largest-ever-export-order-ofb-to-supply-50000-bofors-shells-to-uae/articleshow/
70501461.cms?from=mdr (Accessed 19 December 2022).
49 “Delhi Declaration, Signed by King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh of India,
Embassy of India Riyadh”, 27 January 2006, at https://www.eoiriyadh.gov.in/page/
delhi-declaration/ (Accessed 19 December 2022).
50 “Riyadh Declaration: A New Era of Strategic Partnership”, Embassy of India,
Riyadh, 28 February 2010, at https://www.eoiriyadh.gov.in/page/riyadh-
declaration/ (Accessed 19 December 2022).
51 “India, Saudi Arabia sign defense agreement”, Al Arabiya News, 28 February 2014,
at https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2014/02/28/India-Saudi-Arabia-sign-
defense-agreement (Accessed 19 December 2022).
52 “India-Saudi Arabia Bilateral Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government
of India, February 2022, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Saudi_
Arabia__1_. pdf (Accessed 19 December 2022).
53 “Indian company bags $155.5 million export order for artillery guns”, The Hindustan
Times, 10 November 2022, at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indian-
company-bags-155-5-million-export-order-for-artillery-guns-101668019885550.
html (Accessed 19 December 2022).
54 Ravi Sharma, “Saudi Army Chief on a historic visit to India”, The Frontline, at
https://frontline.thehindu.com/dispatches/saudi-army-chief-on-a-historic-visit-to-
india/article65220306.ece (Accessed 19 December 2022).
55 Ravi Sharma, “Indian and Saudi navies hold the first-ever bilateral naval exercise
in Port Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia”, The Frontline, 12 August 2021, at https://
frontline.thehindu.com/dispatches/indian-and-saudi-navies-hold-the-first-ever-
bilateral-naval-exercise-in-port-al-jubail-saudi-arabia/article35878352.ece
(Accessed 19 December 2022).
56 “Saudi Army Chief on a historic visit to India”, The Frontline, 16 February 2022, at
https://frontline.thehindu.com/dispatches/saudi-army-chief-on-a-historic-visit-to-
india/article65220306.ece (Accessed 19 December 2022).
57 “India-Egypt Defence Relations”, Indian Embassy Cairo, at https://www.eoicairo.
gov.in/eoi.php?id=Defence#:~:text=It%20was%20decided%20that%20a, in%20
Cairo%20in% 20Aug%202006 (Accessed 23 December 2022).
58 “India-Egypt Bilateral Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India, July 2019, at https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral_brief_ for_
Security in West Asia and India: Shared Concerns and Converging Interests 143

website.pdf (Accessed 23 December 2022).

59 “India, Egypt sign MoU to further defence cooperation”, The Hindu, 20 September
2022, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-egypt-sign-mou-to-
further-defence-cooperation/article65913296.ece (Accessed 23 December 2022).
60 “US, Australia among 6 countries interested in Tejas: Govt”, The Economic Times, 5
August 2022, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-australia-
among-6-countries-interested-in-tejas-govt/articleshow/93371035.cms?from=mdr
(Accessed 23 December 2022).
61 “India, Qatar ink key defence pact, Financial Express”, 10 November 2008, at https:/
/www.financialexpress.com/archive/india-qatar-ink-key-defence-pact/383907/
(Accessed 23 December 2022).
62 “India Qatar Bilateral Relation”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
12 July 2021, at https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Qatar_2021_new.
pdf (Accessed 23 December 2022).
63 Ibid.
64 “India-Qatar Joint Statement during the visit of Prime Minister to Qatar”, PIB
Note, 6 June 2016, at https://pib.gov.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=145991
(Accessed 23 December 2022).
65 Ibid.
66 “Staff Maj Gen (Navy) Abdulla Hassan M A Al-Sulaiti, Commander, Qatar Emiri
Naval Forces visits India” PIB Press Release, 6 April 2019, at https://pib.gov.in/
PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1570089 (Accessed 23 December 2022).
67 Monika Chansoria, “India Iran Defence Cooperation”, Indian Defence Review, 17
February 2012, at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/interviews/india-iran-
defence-cooperation/ (Accessed 27 December 2022).
68 Abhijnan Rej, “Indian Defense Minister Visits Tehran Amid Predictable
Complications in Ties”, The Diplomat, 7 September 2020, at https://thediplomat.com/
2020/09/indian-defense-minister-visits-tehran-amid-predictable-complications-in-
ties/ (Accessed 27 December 2022).
69 “India-Iran Military Cooperation: Analysing Iranian Defence Minister’s Visit to
India”, The Diplomatist, 12 March 2021, at https://diplomatist.com/2021/03/12/india-
iran-military-cooperation-analysing-iranian-defence-ministers-visit-to-india/
(Accessed 27 December 2022).
70 Iran, India complete each other: Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, ANI News, 24
November 2022, https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/iran-india-complete-
each-other-iranian-deputy-foreign-minister20221124144548/ (Accessed 27
December 2022).
71 “Discuss ways to enhance cooperation in all domains with focus on R&D in future
technologies & defence co-production, India-Israel Vision on Defence Cooperation
adopted to further strengthen existing framework”, PIB Press Release, 2 June 2022,
at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1830445 (Accessed 3 January
2023).
72 “Israel can be very strong player in Make-in-India plan, says envoy”, ANI News,
26 September 2022, at https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/israel-can-be-very-
strong-player-in-make-in-india-plan-says-envoy20220926101528/ (Accessed 3
January 2023).
73 “Yemen evacuation operation was ‘resounding success’: Sushma Swaraj”, Economic
Times, 27 April 2015, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-
nation/yemen-evacuation-operation-was-resounding-success-sushma-swaraj/
articleshow/47071300.cms?from=mdr (Accessed 3 January 2023).
144 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

74 “India, UAE to work together to fulfil Indian diaspora dreams: Modi”, Business
Standard, 11 February 2018, at https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-
ians/india-uae-to-work-together-to-fulfil-indian-diaspora-dreams-modi-
118021100256_1.html (Accessed 3 January 2023).
75 Minister of State M. J. Akbar’s speech on India’s International Partnerships at
Manama Dialogue 2017 Bahrain, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29285/Minister_of_State_
Shri_M_J_ Akbars_ speech_on_Indias_International_Partnerships_at_Manama_
Dialogue_2017 BahrainDecember_09_2017 (Accessed 3 January 2023).
76 “CTF 150: Maritime Security”, at https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-150-
maritime-security/ (Accessed 3 January 2023).
77 Peri Dinakar, “India begins cooperation with Bahrain-based Combined Maritime
Forces”, The Hindu, 8 August 2022, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/
india-begins-cooperation-with-bahrain-based-combined-maritime-forces/
article65741512.ece (Accessed 3 January 2023).
 7
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with
West Asia and North Africa
Saman Ayesha Kidwai

Introduction
India’s counter-terrorism partnership with West Asian and North
African (WANA) countries has strengthened significantly in recent
years. In the decades following India’s independence, its relationship
with the WANA countries was dominated by bilateral trade, energy
cooperation, and the presence of Indian manpower in the region.
Cooperation on defence, security and strategic affairs has been a
comparatively recent phenomenon in the India-WANA relationship.
Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed office, India has given
renewed attention to strengthening defence and security cooperation
with the region, which India believes is its ‘extended neighbourhood.’
Prime Minister Modi has visited a number of countries in the region
and interacted with their leaders. The issue of terrorism has been a
dominant issue in India’s engagements with the countries of the region.
India’s belief that joint international efforts are required to fight the
global networks of terror has found resonance in the WANA countries.
As a result, there is a growing convergence between India and the
WANA countries on the issue. Thus, among other issues of
cooperation, countering terrorism has emerged as one of the key
elements of engagement between India and the region in recent years.
Several aspects of counter-terror cooperation such as stopping the
146 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

flow of money to the hands of terrorist organisations, de-radicalisation,

education, military training, exchange of information, and intelligence
sharing, are key features of India’s counter-terror cooperation.

Driving Factors of India-WANA Counter-Terror Partnership

Terror Attacks and Radicalisation
On the one hand, the 9/11 attacks profoundly impacted the Western
countries’ perception of the scale and reach of transnational terrorism.
It also created a backlash within their societies towards the WANA
countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, where most of the perpetrators
were initially based. This backlash manifested in the form of visible
racial violence but, most importantly, a drastic shift in the US-Gulf
foreign policy framework.
Islamist terrorism’s nature and the lethality of al-Qaeda signalled
to the American leadership that the above-mentioned attacks were
the resultant impact of undemocratic systems in the WANA region.
The Saudi Kingdom’s support and reliance on Islamist groups in the
past to advance its broader interests further created a rift with its
Western ally. Additionally, the regional countries gradually began to
look at the US as a disruptor instead of a stable guarantor of security
any longer with its dwindling commitment towards regional issues.
As a result, questions arose about the American foreign policy’s ability
to ensure a balance of power among the regional stakeholders.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that WANA States began cultivating closer
ties, including counter-terrorism, with alternative actors, such as
India.1
On the other hand, India’s tilt towards WANA countries
presumably was driven by the fact that radicalisation in the WANA
region always has a bearing on South Asian events. It is even believed
that a deep relationship exists between the “interpenetration of religion
and politics between Middle East and South Asia ... given the history
of cross-border terrorism and radicalization supported by Pakistan
and other jihadist groups.”2 Therefore, Indian officials might have
found it prudent to forge closer ties with countries in West Asia and
North Africa.
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 147

Moreover, during the 26/11 attacks, several casualties were

reported among individuals who had travelled to Mumbai from
several WANA countries. Given this situation, India’s cooperation with
West Asian countries became necessary to extradite perpetrators of
the attack, such as Abu Jindal. Also, suspects who have been ISIS
sympathisers or involved in terror financing have also been extradited
from Gulf States, including UAE and Saudi Arabia, to India.3 Finally,
as discussed below, Israel is a key partner for India in the security
sector. Tel Aviv has even provided New Delhi with key counter-
terrorism measures and weaponry.

Arab Spring and Geopolitical Developments

The beginning of the Arab unrest brought unprecedented changes
and turbulence in the Arab world. One of the most disturbing
phenomena amid the Arab Spring was the emergence of a number of
terrorist organisations and radicalised groups in different parts of
West Asia. These groups severely threatened the national security of
some of these countries and the region as well. Furthermore, the
widening regional sectarian conflicts, socio-political and economic
instability further introduced instability with global ramifications.
In the throes of uprisings across the region, organisations like
Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, ISIS, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
Al Nusra Front began to fill the vacuum by seizing territories and
through recruitment and radicalisation of the erstwhile demonstrators
who participated in the Arab Spring protests. This happened as efforts
to institute democratic regimes in the region gave way to uncertainty,
power struggles, and protracted civil wars. Furthermore, each conflict
zone gradually became a theatre of proxy conflicts, and sectarian
rivalries between Shia and Sunni Muslim communities pitted domestic
and regional stakeholders against each other.4 Iraq, with ISIS’ rise and
the Saudi-Iran proxy conflict in the Yemeni war, are critical examples
here.
Countries worldwide, particularly in the WANA region, began to
be rapidly exposed to violence, instability, and devastation caused by
ISIS’ campaign to establish its “caliphate.”5 Transnational threats in a
globalised world order, such as terrorism, never remain confined to a
specific geographical location. It makes it necessary for States to
148 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

counter this challenge through increased cooperation. Therefore, it

makes sense that India and WANA countries have worked closely
together to address critical security threats. Their cooperation has been
underlined below.
The Arab Spring was followed by a spurt in proliferation of
terrorism carried out by violent non-State actors. 6 This was
exacerbated due to the combination of the influence of social media
forums, an influx of foreign fighters from all corners of the globe to
fight in active combat zones, and violent extremist ideologies. These
factors possibly began to be perceived by India and its WANA partners
as detrimental to their national security interests. The chaos that
followed spurred India to evacuate its citizens from countries like
Yemen and Libya and coordinate with regional countries bordering
the conflict zones.7
Finally, the presence of the Indian diaspora throughout the region,
valuable remittances worth millions of US dollars sent to India, and
the energy trade anchoring India-WANA ties have been a subject of
great debate in the face of these challenges.8 They have made it all the
more critical for partner countries to ensure stability becomes the norm
rather than the exception for all the stakeholders. Furthermore, these
factors appear to have cultivated robust security engagements between
them.
Despite the instability and rise in oil prices caused in some
countries following the Arab Spring protests, India and WANA
officials participated in high-level ministerial visits, investments, and
trade and signed bilateral agreements.9 This undoubtedly must have
provided continuity for the regional actors amid all the uncertainty
and instilled profound trust and cooperation towards India.

ISIS and Mutual Threat Perceptions

The emergence of the ISIS Caliphate by carving out territories in Iraq
and Syria brought direct challenges to the regional countries as well
as India. ISIS targeted Indian nationals in Iraq and Libya. A few Indians
also travelled to Iraq and Syria to join the Caliphate. A number of ISIS
sleeper cells were busted by the security forces in different parts of
India as well. The presence of ISIS in India’s neighbourhood is also a
matter of grave concern for India’s national security.10 Therefore, it
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 149

signed several agreements with Gulf States to share vital intelligence

regarding notorious terrorists. In addition, it positioned itself as one
of the key advocates of a joint global response to neutralise the threat
posed by ISIS.11
There has been a convergence of interests between India and the
West Asian countries to fight and defeat ISIS. For example, by
exercising influence over actors fighting ISIS, Qatar has proven itself
a capable partner in the fight against it. In addition, India looked to
the Gulf State to locate Indian construction workers whom ISIS had
taken hostage. The convergence was further amplified as India and
WANA countries realised the impact of ISIS’ online recruitment tactics
on their populations should they let the matters go unchecked any
further.12 On the one hand, India has been a favoured partner in this
regard due to its vast experience in countering online radicalisation.
On the other hand, a number of Indians who joined ISIS travelled
through Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and UAE as transit points.13 Thus,
the WANA stakeholders became crucial partners for India in its fight
against terrorism. These factors have brought these actors closer to
confronting and defeating a violent enemy.

Growing Trade and Investment

In the economic sphere, trade and investment between India and the
WANA countries are increasing significantly each year. India relies
on the Gulf countries for the supply of oil and gas. For the Gulf
countries, India remains a long-term and reliable market for their oil.
Thus, there is a convergence of economic interests between the two.
It is in the interest of both to protect and further promote such huge
economic interests and not allow the terrorist groups in India or in
West Asia to disrupt that flow. The total trade between India and
WANA countries has increased by 80.17 per cent in the last two years
alone.14 However, India’s energy security and their (WANA and India)
commercial interests can only be sustained by providing maritime
security in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz.15 This maritime domain
is one through which India has imported at least half of its natural
gas and oil from the resource-rich Arab States.16
Simultaneously, India and UAE are part of the I2U2 format which
is designed to “...tackle some of the greatest challenges of confronting
150 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

our world, with a particular focus on joint investments and new

initiatives in water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food
security.”17 How this grouping aims to establish a linkage between
their start-ups and I2U2 investments and how it assesses collective
financing opportunities is equally critical.18 Additionally, UAE and
India agreed on a Free Trade Agreement in February 2022.19 This
grouping will open its doors to Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the
foreseeable future. Furthermore, Petronet, an Indian company, will
import 7.5 million tonnes of Liquefied Natural Gas from Qatar until
2028.20
These aspects have ensured that counter-terrorism ties between
India and WANA stakeholders have a solid foundation (given their
long-standing and diversified relationship) to anchor them and deepen
their partnership further. These actors must continue strengthening
their counter-terror relationship by investing further in their bilateral
energy trade and through commercial investments.

India-WANA Counter-Terror Cooperation

Israel
Even before the formalising of diplomatic ties, the India-Israel
relationship was bolstered in the defence sector, including during the
Kargil War. Today, India is the largest purchaser of Israeli weapons.
However, their counter-terrorism ties gained prominence mainly after
the 26/11 attacks. In 2008, Nariman House, a Jewish outreach centre
in Mumbai, came under attack by Pakistani terrorists. During that
incident, six people died, including the couple who ran the centre,
Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg and his wife, Rivka. This brought to light
the urgency with which India and Israel had to come together to fight
the menace of terrorism, regardless of their geographical positioning.
Israeli technological advancements in combating terrorist threats play
a critical role in this regard.
However, the origins of their counter-terrorism ties lie in the
immediate aftermath of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s
assassination in 1984 and the attack on Israeli tourists in Kashmir by
a group proclaiming itself to be the ‘Defenders of the Islamic
Revolution,’ amidst which Indian soldiers reportedly underwent
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 151

counter-terrorism training in Israel.21 In 2001, they set up a Joint

Working Group to counter threats concerning cyber security, terror
financing, border security, and suicide bombing. While India brings
to the table its share of dealing with cross-border terrorism, Israel has
the experience of facing threats posed by Hezbollah and Palestinian
Islamist militants. Israel had offered its support and expertise to India
to help strengthen its border security along the Line of Control after
the Uri attacks in September 2016.22 Having frequently experienced
attacks on its border from Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel has sufficient
experience in this matter. A renewed emphasis is placed on their
bilateral ties with Israel, particularly after former Israeli President
Reuven Rivlin’s visit to New Delhi in November 2016 and Prime
Minister Modi’s visit to Tel Aviv as the first Indian Prime Minister to
do so, in July 2017.
Terrorism and counter-terrorism initiatives have frequently
featured as two primary aspects of bilateral discussions between
leaders on various levels. The joint statement issued during PM Modi’s
visit focused on combating global terrorism in various domains,
including cyberspace. The leadership at both ends even emphasised
the need for their Working Group on Homeland and Public Security
to implement key agreements regarding terrorism-based issues.23 On
his numerous visits as India’s Minister of External Affairs, Dr. S.
Jaishankar, has reiterated how India and Israel confront the twin
challenges of terrorism and radicalisation. Over the years, both
countries have forged a deeper partnership, having faced security
threats from their hostile neighbourhood.24
Israel has committed to providing India with equipment to
enhance the latter’s counter-terrorism measures, such as thermal
sensors, long-range reconnaissance and observation systems, and
thermal imagers. This has allowed India to adopt pre-emptive
measures to prevent any other significant terrorist attacks on its soil.25
In addition, while both countries have shared relevant real-time
intelligence with each other, India has also procured precision-guided
Spice-2000 bombs and missile supplies. The bombs have been used
to successfully retaliate against the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorist
camps in Pakistan after the 2019 Pulwama attacks.26 The Phalcon
AWACS system also played a crucial role during the strikes in
152 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Balakot.27 To foil infiltration bids from cross-border terrorists, Indian

armed forces posted in Jammu and Kashmir, rely on Israeli foliage-
penetrating radar and surveillance technology.28

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has been no stranger to terrorist attacks aimed at
undermining its national security. In the past, it has faced attacks from
Al Qaeda, which has repeatedly targeted the Kingdom. Al Qaeda in
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which operates out of neighbouring
Yemen, remains a key security threat to the Kingdom. In recent years,
ISIS has been trying to find a foothold for itself in Yemen, which is yet
another challenge for Saudi Arabia. Besides, since the beginning of
the coalition military strikes on Yemen, the attack on the Saudi
Kingdom launched by the Houthis from Yemen has increased
significantly. The Houthis have been able to target critical
infrastructure in the Kingdom including airports, oil installations as
well as the security forces. Repeated drone strikes on its oil, military,
and civilian infrastructure by Houthi rebels have amplified its
vigilance to guard its territorial integrity and populace.
In the Riyadh Declaration signed in 2010, the two countries decided
to band together, condemn terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations, and rejected attempts to link it to any religion or race.
They mutually agreed to enhance cooperation in the sphere of
intelligence sharing about narcotics and human trafficking and signed
the Extradition Treaty and the Agreement for Transfer of Sentenced
Persons.29 The Treaty was ratified in 2011, with one of the earliest
instances of extradition taking place in 2012. That year, Saudi
authorities handed over to India, Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Hamza
– responsible for instructing the ten terrorists who waged the
coordinated assaults during 26/11, to converse in Hindi, including
Ajmal Kasab.30
The Riyadh Declaration elevated the India-Saudi relationship to
a strategic level and laid a strong foundation for counter-terror
cooperation between the two countries.
Prime Minister Modi has further engaged with the Kingdom on
the issue and there has been continuous engagement between the
two at the political and official levels. Over the years, India’s National
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 153

Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Prime Minister’s Special Envoy on

Counter-Terrorism, Syed Asif Ibrahim, have frequently travelled to
West Asia to bolster regional counter-terror ties with India and discuss
key security threats.31 India has made great efforts to take the Kingdom
into confidence regarding its implemented counter-terrorism
measures.32
In 2016, the two countries, through a MoU, committed themselves
to share relevant intelligence about terrorist threats.33 This pact
cemented Saudi Arabia’s commitment to supply India with terror
financing data and vice-versa, trace the paper trail of terrorists’ money
laundering methods and those covertly or passively supporting violent
extremist propaganda within their countries. One of the other key
developments, due to the 2016 MoU, was the formation of a Joint
Working Group, similar to what India has instituted with Israel and
Bahrain.34
A comprehensive dialogue at the level of National Security
Advisors, to deal with terrorism and evolving challenges took place
in February 2019. During this visit, the joint statement declaring that
conducive conditions must be cultivated for Indo-Pak dialogues to
resume presumably reflected the Kingdom’s tacit acknowledgement
that unless Pakistan’s support for anti-India terrorist groups ends,
there can be no resumption of talks. 35 In September 2019,
approximately two weeks after the drone attacks on Saudi Arabia’s
Aramco oil facilities, India-Saudi bilateral ties in the counter-terrorism
arena were further upgraded. The relationship now includes joint
efforts to eliminate terror financing channels, intelligence sharing, and
information exchanges. There have also been bilateral discussions
about strengthening bilateral ties in spheres such as maritime and
cyber security.
Due to growing bilateral engagements, Saudi Arabia has moved
away from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) virulent
rhetoric about Jammu and Kashmir, becoming more aware of the
security threats India faces in the Union Territory.36 It has also become
more empathetic of India’s actions in the Valley and strongly
condemned events like the Pulwama attack, which proved to be one
of the worst terrorist attacks faced by armed forces in recent history.
It even disallowed Pakistan’s attempts to organise discussions on
154 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Kashmir at the OIC’s Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 2020. This denoted

another shift in Saudi Arabia’s approach towards India vis-à-vis
Pakistan.
In August 2021, bilateral naval exercises, ‘Al Mohed Al Hindi 2021,’
which were shore and sea-based, were conducted amid deepening
ties and in the light of the drone attack on Mercer Street Vessel. Vice
Admiral Majed Al Qahtani, Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Fleet Commander,
termed these exercises the ‘first of their kind.’37 These were within
the realm of their counter-terrorism initiatives.

UAE
Like Saudi Arabia, Yemeni Houthis have attacked the UAE. It is deeply
concerned about the threat of terrorism and finds India to be a reliable
partner in counter-terrorism. India and the UAE signed a Defence
Cooperation Agreement in 2003 and a Security Cooperation
Agreement in 2011. In recent years, there have been serious efforts on
the part of the UAE to cooperate with India in several fields including
counter-terrorism.
The radical transformation of ties has mainly taken place since
2015 after Modi chose the Emirati State to be his first foreign visit
among the Gulf countries after he was sworn in after the 2014 general
elections, as part of his foreign policy strategy. His visit was critical
because it was the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister after more
than three decades. It was also during the above-mentioned meeting
that the two sides issued a joint statement, committing their countries
to cooperation in arenas such as de-radicalisation and cyber security.38
Additionally, during Modi’s visit to the UAE in April 2016, the
two countries signed a MoU concerning terror financing and money
laundering. Both sides have been affected by State-sponsored
terrorism and have therefore shown great initiative in expanding their
ties in the security domain.39
This was followed by the 2016 Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership Agreement, which focused on India and the UAE’s
collective efforts to engage in counter-terrorism and maritime security,
among other significant matters. It was also the first official visit by
an Indian Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar, to the Emirati State.
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 155

Furthermore, Pakistan’s refusal to participate, announced after a

unanimous decision in its parliament in 2015, in the Saudi-led coalition
in Yemen also fractured its ties with the Emirati leadership.40
In January 2017, the two sides agreed to enhance their issue-based
counter-terrorism ties focused on promoting collaboration in
cyberspace, money laundering (with an impact on terrorist groups’
radicalisation activities), arms, narcotics, and human trafficking, and
maritime security, during President al Nahyan’s visit to India.41
During the February 2018 virtual summit, Prime Minister Modi
and President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, committed
their countries to collectively work towards countering terrorism. This
development came on the heels of the July 2018 visit of the President
to India, during which they upgraded their relationship to a
comprehensive strategic partnership. However, the other significant
highlight of this visit was the joint statement that the leaders issued.
Both leaders condemned the efforts of any country to polarise political
issues along sectarian or religious lines and underlined the culpability
of State leaders to curb activities of the non-State actors under their
control. They also called for ending any means through which
terrorists could carry out their destabilising objectives against other
States.42
The UAE has tacitly condemned Pakistan’s policy of State-
sponsored terrorism directed at undermining India’s national security
without laying it out publicly in explicit terms. It has, on numerous
occasions, expressed ‘unconditional’ support for India’s efforts to
counter terrorism.
Both countries have supported each other’s call for formulating a
comprehensive strategy of disruption of the use of cyberspace and
social media forums to radicalise and indoctrinate vulnerable youth
by terrorist groups to advance their nefarious objectives. Additionally,
the Indian efforts at lobbying the UAE have resulted in the latter
maintaining a relatively neutral position on the Kashmir issue and
agreeing to include several Pakistani terrorist groups within its gambit
of terrorism, like the LeT, Haqqani network, and Indian Mujahideen
(IM).
The deepening counter-terrorism cooperation has also yielded
156 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

results in the extradition of known terrorists like Asadullah Akhtar,

Abdul Sattar, and Yasin Bhatkal, associated with the proscribed
organisation, IM.43 The Extradition Treaty between the UAE and India
was operationalised in 1999, and instruments of ratification were
exchanged the following year. The first instance of extradition dates
to 2002.44 The IM has been culpable for the 2008 Ahmedabad bombings
and the 2006 train attacks in Mumbai. Furthermore, terrorists affiliated
with other banned organisations like LeT have also been detained
and extradited to India. On the other hand, their fruitful partnership
resulted in Yasin Mansoor Mohamed Farooq alias Farooq Takla’s –
accused of the 1993 blasts in Mumbai and Dawood Ibrahim’s aid –
extradition to India in May 2018.
In the past, both countries have called on all States to ‘fully respect
and sincerely implement their commitments to resolve disputes
bilaterally and peacefully, without resorting to violence and terrorism,’
covertly laying the blame for regional security challenges on Pakistan’s
policy of perpetuating terrorism through proxy groups.45

Kuwait
Kuwait’s sympathetic stance and proactive participation in
international matters concerning terrorism stem from its historical
trauma. Beginning in the 1970s, it began experiencing a spate of
terrorist attacks by Islamist militant groups allied with groups such
Hezbollah, Peninsula Lions, Mujahideen of Kuwait, and the Muslim
Brotherhood.
However, the worst attack on its soil occurred in June 2015, when
an ISIS suicide bomber killed at least 27 and wounded no less than
227 individuals after an attack on the Imam Sadiq Mosque.46 Following
this attack, the former Indian President, Pranab Mukherjee, while
expressing his concern and condolences over the incident, condemned
‘all acts of terror and mindless violence’ while underscoring that
humanity can only move forward through an amalgamation of
brotherhood, unity, non-violence, and peace, affirming support for
Kuwait’s efforts to counter terrorism.47
The above-mentioned attack (June 2015) proved even more of a
jolt for India, as it lost two of its citizens – Ibne Abbas and Rizwan
Hussain – who were offering mid-day prayers when the blast
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 157

occurred. This is one of the several instances which have demonstrated

why India and Kuwait, united by shared grief, have found ways to
come together in the fight against terrorism.
One of the earliest instances of significance attached to India-
Kuwait counter-terrorism cooperation includes the February 2010
meeting conducted between former External Affairs Minister S.M.
Krishna and the Kuwaiti delegation, wherein the latter expressed a
desire to see India play a more extensive role in international relations.
In March 2018, a Kuwaiti Defence Ministry delegation led by Brigadier
General Khaled Bilal Al Obaidi, was one of the key participants in the
International Counter-Terrorism Conference held in Gurugram, India,
revolving around themes such as terrorist trends and ideological
challenges.48
Kuwait, after the Pulwama attack, condemned the attack, and in
May 2019, during its tenure as a non-permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council, designated Masood Azhar, JeM’s Chief, as
a global terrorist. The latter had long been a demand raised by India
in the United Nations’ corridors.

Qatar
India firmly believes that terrorism is a menace that can only be
eradicated through the international community’s collective efforts;
therefore, Qatar is also one of its preferred partners in this fight. The
latter has experienced relatively few terrorist attacks in the past, with
only a small number of its citizens joining ISIS’ ranks. Nonetheless, it
remains well versed in the devastating impact of terrorist acts. For
example, its Al Udeid base, housing the American military and Qatari
air force, has repeatedly come under attack. Additionally, in March
2005, a suicide attack at the Doha Players Theatre injured 12 people
and killed one.49
While their counter-terrorism partnership has intensified after
Modi was sworn in, it has a long-standing precedent. For example, in
November 2008, both countries inked a strategically important defence
pact, under which naval officers were trained to combat international
piracy, and a mechanism for sharing a database on threats detailing
information posed by violent extremists to their security, was laid
down.
158 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

On the other hand, in a joint statement issued at the end of Prime

Minister Modi’s visit to Qatar in June 2016, the two sides delineated
that:
‘Both sides noted that addressing the menace of global terrorism
should be based on a comprehensive approach which should
include the following measures:
(a) countering violent extremism,
(b) combating radicalisation and recruitment,
(c) disrupting terrorist movements,
(d) stopping all sources for financing of terrorism,
(e) stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters,
(f) dismantling terrorist infrastructure, and
(g) countering terrorist propaganda through the internet.’50

During the above-mentioned visit, out of the seven pacts signed by

the two sides, one of them has its basis in counter-terrorism initiatives.
The agreement was signed between the Qatar Financial Information
Unit and India’s Finance Intelligence Unit. It aims at clamping down
on terror financing affecting their countries’ stability. As per its clauses,
both sides will swap relevant intelligence to counter monetary offences
and illegal transfers of money by terrorists. During this visit, the joint
agreement highlighted the determination to pool resources and fight
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.
Furthermore, in December 2016, India and Qatar signed a MoU
to enhance security and defence ties and combat terror financing.
Exchange of information also occurred regarding these issues between
Qatari and Indian teams at the latter’s Ministry of Home Affairs.51
On the other hand, in November 2019, the Qatari and Indian naval
officers were involved in a three-day joint maritime exercise to enhance
interoperability and defence cooperation to counter maritime piracy
and terrorism.52
Qatar has also acted as an important facilitator of dialogue with
insurgent groups-turned government leaders like the Taliban whose
political office in Doha acted as a conduit for all international
stakeholders who invested in the Afghan peace process, including
India.
Understanding that combating terrorism requires a holistic
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 159

approach, the two sides have, under Modi’s leadership, called for
conducting dialogue between their intellectual eminent religious
scholars to promote inclusivity and peace instead of violence and
terror. Similar to India’s relationship with Kuwait, its ties with Qatar
in counter-terrorism domain are driven by prevention of use of
cyberspace to contain online radicalisation.

Bahrain
Like Kuwait and Qatar, Bahrain has also maintained a steadfast
partnership with India in countering terrorism and violent extremism.
In 2016, India and Bahrain inaugurated their first Bahraini-Indian Joint
Steering Committee, which focused on reinforcing bilateral
cooperation in the domain of counter-terrorism.53 Rejecting the notion
of ‘your terrorist versus my terrorist,’ they also pledged to campaign
for conducting seminars and training modules to aid their collective
fight in combating unconventional security challenges.
Incidentally, in December 2015, they assured their commitment
to partake in global efforts to counter narcotics, human and arms
trafficking, organised crime, counter-terrorism, and promote
intelligence sharing. During Modi’s visit to Manama in August 2019,
where he met Bahraini Prime Minister Prince Khalifa bin Salman Al
Khalifa, the two leaders issued a joint statement that implicitly targeted
Pakistan for its support for subversive acts like cross-border terrorism
within Indian territory while agreeing to strengthen cooperation in
areas such as intelligence sharing and security. Some of the key features
of their joint statement addressed the following:
(a) Condemning the policy of using terrorism against a fellow
nation-state.
(b) Eradicating terrorist networks and infrastructures.
(c) Ceasing support to terrorist groups working against the
interests of other States.
(d) Bringing terrorists to justice.54
They have also actively campaigned to adopt the United Nations
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and sanction
terrorists and their affiliated organisations without delay. Incidentally,
like in the above case studies, cyber security features predominantly
in the India-Bahrain counter-terrorism partnership, with both actors
160 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

emphasising preventing misuse of cyberspace, which can otherwise

be used for online radicalisation and undermining social harmony.
Equally significant is the two sides’ cooperation on maritime piracy
and security, recognising in April 2021, how their bilateral dialogues
have been instrumental in strengthening bilateral defence and security
cooperation as a result of frequent interactions across counter-
terrorism, maritime security, and piracy domains, and ‘institutionalis-
ing cooperation in the area of intelligence sharing.55

Iran
While India and Iran’s bilateral relationship has mainly revolved
around the Chabahar Port’s construction and oil imports, they have
also displayed a united front regarding their mutual fight against
Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Within a span of a day, in February
2019, Indian armed forces and members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard
Corps were attacked by JeM and Jaish Al Adl terrorists, respectively,
in Pulwama and Khash-Zahedan (Sistan-Balochistan).56 While 40
Indian officers were martyred in the fatal attack, Iranians lost 27
soldiers.
Stopping short of carrying out a surgical strike as India did in
Balakot, Iranians lambasted the Pakistani nexus – civilian, military,
and intelligence – for the attack on its armed officers, claiming that
the security apparatus remained aware of Jaish Al Adl’s safe house.
Incidentally, Iran went so far as to threaten those involved with
definitive measures to crack down on terrorists who act on behalf of
trans-regional and regional countries’ spy agencies, as mercenary
officers.57
In May 2016 and February 2018, India and Iran, after Modi’s
bilateral meeting with former President Rouhani, released the same
concise and rhetorically harsh joint statement. They called for:
(a) Eliminating the process of providing havens and any support
to terrorists and their affiliated organisations
(b) Being critical of states who, in any manifestation or through
various means, choose to support terrorism.58
By September 2016, as conflicts in Syria and Yemen arrived at their
climax, India, and Iran, with strategic and civilisational ties with those
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 161

countries, arrived at a mutually acceptable agreement to share

intelligence and prevent the spillover of terrorism. ISIS’ violent and
destabilising activities featured prominently in Modi’s discussions
with his then counterpart in Tehran during that period. Additionally,
the former Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif, during his visit to New
Delhi in August 2016, emphasised the security concern facing India
and Iran due to the emergence of the Islamic State Khorasan Province
(ISKP) in Afghanistan.59 These two bilateral visits highlighted how a
terrorist organisation or its affiliates could threaten the national
security of multiple countries simultaneously.
On the other hand, in September 2018, India, Iran, and Afghanistan
held their initial tripartite meeting, focused on enhancing counter-
terrorism cooperation, economic growth, curbing narcotics trafficking,
and infrastructural initiatives.60 Moreover, since Iran remained one
of the few countries not to shut down its embassy doors in Kabul,
along with China, Russia, and Pakistan, it has been able to preserve
open communication channels with the Taliban regime.
As India has begun to diplomatically engage the interim
administration, almost a year after it withdrew its diplomatic corps,
Iran’s continued, and much deeper ties with Afghanistan’s new rulers
could serve India’s long-term goals well in the country. This is mainly
because under President Rouhani and Raisi’s tenures, Iranian regimes
have welcomed India’s participation in stabilising Afghanistan
through non-military means. Since their bilateral cooperation
regarding Afghanistan-centric issues has precedent, they (Indian
leaders) can leverage those ties to ensure that the Taliban do not allow
groups like JeM to conduct training camps in Afghanistan in
preparation of any attacks. Iran has even backed India’s stand at
various international forums like the United Nations about how there
must be no distinction between terrorists, for they are one and the
same, with each activity carried out by them as unjustified.

Iraq
Iraq and India have forged their ties through diaspora, energy trade
and the common threat posed by domestic terrorist groups. Concerned
about its citizens joining ISIS, India stood steadfast alongside Iraq in
its efforts to rally the international community at the United Nations
162 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

to counter the terrorist outfit’s rapid military offensive. Its defence

delegations made three visits to Iraq from July 2017 to January 2018,
after Mosul was recaptured from the Islamist militants, to express
their solidarity in the fight against terrorism and towards stabilising
the post-ISIS era.61
At one point, the Indian and Iraqi intelligence agencies were also
deeply involved in tracing and freeing 39 Indians who were taken
hostage by ISIS and used as slave labour. Falih Al Fayyadh, the former
Iraqi National Security Advisor, had earlier called on his country and
India to have robust counter-terrorism ties based on their shared
experiences of being impacted by the scourge of terrorism.
During his visit to the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses in December 2013, the Institute signed a MoU
with Al Nahrain Center for Strategic Studies for enhanced academic
cooperation between the two organisations.62 Al Fayyadh’s views
expressed during the above-mentioned visit to India concerning
capacity building and intelligence sharing being two crucial aspects
of their bilateral counter-terrorism relationship have continued to hold
and resonate on both sides of the spectrum.

Jordan
There is deep-seated synergy between Jordanian and Indian
perspectives on countering terrorism, both arguing that the fight
against terrorism and radicalisation is not synonymous with the fight
against any specific religion. Instead, it is aimed at countering those
who mislead impressionable individuals to commit atrocities against
humankind, particularly through the Aqaba Process (of which India
is a participating member). This process involves an exchange of
knowledge and expertise to prevent the expansion of terrorism.63
In October 2015, former Indian President Pranab Mukherjee
rejuvenated long-standing historical ties between the two countries
during his visit to Amman, making this the second visit by an Indian
leader to Jordan since former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit in
1988. Emphasising their shared perspectives on the fight against
terrorism, President Mukherjee and King Abdullah II agreed to bolster
their counter-terrorism partnership and defence cooperation
mechanisms.
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 163

In Jordan, there is a great deal of appreciation for India’s

involvement in global counter-terrorism initiatives; since the
Hashemite Kingdom has been at the forefront of the international
coalition against ISIS, it is cognisant of terrorism’s devastating impact.
During the Jordanian monarch’s visit to India, the 12 agreements
signed by PM Modi and King Abdullah II in March 2018 focused
primarily on bolstering bilateral defence cooperation. As per the MoU
on Defence Cooperation, they focused on ‘defining the scope of such
cooperation and making provisions for the implementation of the
cooperation in some of the recognised areas like training; defence
industry; counter-terrorism; military studies; cyber security; military
medical services, peace-keeping, etc.’64 The leaders also highlighted
the need to disseminate ideas about Islam’s moderate version, religious
plurality, interfaith dialogues between their communities, and a
coordinated approach to ward off violent extremism.65

Morocco
Positioned at the crossroads of the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic
Ocean, the Moroccan Kingdom has become a key strategic and
counter-terrorism partner for India, particularly due to the proactive
efforts of the Modi government. Approximately 22 high-level visits
have taken place, and 35 MoUs regarding security and economic issues
have been signed since October 2015.66 Both India and Morocco have
been affected by terrorism-related issues at different intervals.
Therefore, due to the Kingdom’s moderate interpretation of Islam and
relatively successful de-radicalisation programmes, it is arguably a
key ally in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism.67
During the former Indian Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s
visit to Morocco in 2018, the two sides identified counter-insurgency
and counter-terrorism as two key areas of further cooperation.68 In
February 2019, India and Morocco signed a MoU to establish a Joint
Working Group to combat terrorism by acquiring and exchanging
relevant information.69 This working group was created to address
challenges emanating from cross-border terrorism, weaponisation of
social media by terrorists, and terror financing. Additionally, it is
meant to intensify their security cooperation on such matters in
organisations such as the United Nations.70
164 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

The two countries have also collaborated to prevent a second

round of terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka after the Easter bombings by
providing credible leads that resulted in the arrest of potential
attackers.71 Furthermore, efforts are underway to develop a joint legal
framework to deal with issues related to crime and violent
extremism.72

Syria
The historical, civilisational ties between India and Syria received a
boost in August 2016 when, in light of increasing ISIS-related threats,
they agreed to strengthen their security ties through information
sharing.73 Their collective experience of being threatened or attacked
by Islamist jihadist groups like LeT, Al Qaeda, and ISIS binds them,
driving their strategy of upgrading their bilateral ties. For example,
the IED blast near Damascus on 13 October 2022 killed 18 Syrian
soldiers while wounding 27 others.
Furthermore, similar to arguments raised by Kuwait, Bahrain, and
Qatar, Syria has also backed India’s claims that there can be no
differentiation, such as ‘my terrorist versus your terrorist’ made, to
defeat this international menace since it has faced the brunt of groups
like ISIS. Syria has also consistently supported India’s position and
initiatives regarding Kashmir. In return, while advocating for a
peaceful resolution to the Syrian conflict, India has supported
President Assad’s stance against domestic terrorists. This position was
in line with Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s remarks
made during a meeting with his Syrian counterpart, Faysal Mikdad,
where he affirmed India’s support for Syria in its counter-terrorism
practices and territorial integrity.74 Riad Abbas, the former Syrian
Ambassador to India, believes that India and Syria’s bilateral counter-
terrorism ties can be strengthened further by tapping its experience
in countering terrorism.75

Oman
Oman has remained clear of significant terrorist attacks while
frequently serving as a mediator or peacemaker for disputing
countries. Overlooking the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, Oman
has served as a critical partner for Indian anti-piracy operations and
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 165

remains the sole country with which all three wings of the Indian
armed forces conduct bilateral training and exercises.
Since the Muslim Brotherhood’s plan to overthrow former Sultan
Qaboos bin Said was uncovered by authorities in 1994, Oman has
decisively stood against radicalism and terrorism in all its
manifestations. It has even extended the same support to India, a
country that has, on numerous occasions, faced the devastating impact
caused by terrorist activities.
Principally taking a stand against terror financing during Modi’s
visit to Oman in February 2018, their joint statement comprised three
crucial points, underscoring how Pakistan has implicitly been cornered
in their decisive fight against global terrorism:
“They reiterated their strong condemnation of terrorism in all its
forms and manifestations, wherever committed and by whomever,
and declared that there could be no justification for any act of
terrorism anywhere.... The two sides also emphasised upon the
need to isolate the sponsors and supporters of terrorism and ...
agreed to coordinate efforts to counter extremism and
radicalization and misuse of religion by groups and countries for
inciting hatred and perpetrating acts of terrorism.”76

Under the Modi government, both the countries have been concerned
with bolstering their counter-terrorism efforts by sharing intelligence
and via capacity building. Incidentally, the Omani ports, including
the one based in Salalah, allowed Indian naval ships easy access to
the Gulf of Aden and carried out effective counter-piracy operations,
because of which pirates have been captured and piracy has declined.
Like Bahrain, Oman has also actively supported India’s call for
the swift adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism in the United Nations and working towards ending the
misuse of cyberspace for subversive acts. These countries have deep
regard for, and are cognisant of, the collective efforts of key global
powers in the fight against eliminating terrorism.
In September 2017, Oman played a pivotal role in freeing Father
Tom Uzhunnalil from ISIS’ captivity. He was taken hostage in March
2016 after terrorists raided a home for the elderly in Aden, where he
was residing. Both Indian and Omani leadership have frequently
166 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

emphasised the need to isolate sponsors of terrorism and build

inclusive societies as part of effective de-radicalisation and counter-
terror measures.77
On 13 August 2022, India and Oman concluded the fourth phase
of their joint counter-terrorism military exercise, referred to as ‘Al
Najah.’ The most recent phase of the Al Najah exercise focused on
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations within semi-
urban settings, as per the United Nations mandate. The core features
of this exercise included counter-terrorism operations, organisation
of collective drills and procedures, peacekeeping and regional security
operations, etc.78

Egypt
Egypt is no stranger to terrorism, and the similar experiences of India
make the two countries natural allies. In 2018, Indian and Egyptian
National Security Advisors signed a MoU, following which both
countries formally initiated the process of sharing pertinent
information to eliminate terrorist threats and established a Joint
Working Group to combat terrorism, similar to what India shares
with Israel.79
Terror financing, money laundering, violent extremism,
radicalisation and cross-border terrorism are some of the key drivers
of the India-Egypt partnership and have deepened their bilateral ties
over the years.80 Since both countries continue to be affected by these
challenges, they will presumably remain the cornerstone of their
counter-terror ties.
During President Fattah El Sisi’s visit to India in September 2016,
he and Prime Minister Modi agreed to upgrade their counter-terrorism
partnership with three key pillars – counter-radicalisation of youth,
sharing of intelligence, and operational cooperation. Appreciating
Egyptians as the moderate voice of Islam, the Prime Minister has
underlined that he and his counterpart arrived at the conclusion that
threats emanating in cyberspace would feature predominantly in their
counter-terrorism partnership.81
Furthermore, in September 2020, during former Defence Minister
Nirmala Sitharaman’s visit to Cairo, Egypt and India agreed to
upgrade their defence and security ties by committing their countries
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 167

to joint military exercises and domain awareness in the maritime

sphere.82
Their bilateral partnership has also served both countries well in
the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, in their efforts to
rally member states around joint international efforts to counter
terrorism, as per Indian officials’ statements in the past. In September
2022, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh visited Egypt where his
interaction with President al-Sisi focused on enhancing defence
cooperation and the need to intensify cooperation regarding the
exchange of successful practice and expertise to counter terrorism.83

Conclusion
Among WANA countries, Israel remains at the top in terms of counter-
terrorism cooperation and is followed by Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. There is huge
potential for cooperation on counter-terrorism with other regional
countries, namely Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Morocco who
share the same concern with India. Dialogues, security agreements,
counter-terrorism exercises, and extradition of criminals and terrorists
have served as cornerstones of their evolving ties.
Undoubtedly, India’s cooperation with the regional countries has,
to a considerable extent, been successful in countering terror. The
extradition of some terrorists to India from Saudi Arabia and the UAE
reflects the success of counter-terror cooperation between these
countries. Behind the scenes, there are a number of initiatives and
continuous efforts among the security agencies such as sharing
information and intelligence about the organisations, their leadership,
ideology, the flow of money and the movement of terrorists, which
have deterred terrorist attacks and busted their sleeper cells.
Three crucial factors would arise if one were to analyse the ebbs
and flows of India-WANA counter-terrorism cooperation. Firstly,
significant convergence is running across each partnership India
shares with the regional States, from counter-terrorism to energy and
defence security. Secondly, the implementation of the credible
initiatives undertaken has accelerated under Modi’s leadership.
Thirdly, despite the constraints and challenges at both ends, greater
168 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

cooperation in counter-terrorism is a step in the right direction.

Furthermore, India and its WANA partners can explore economic and
trade diversification, enhance defence and energy cooperation and
cyber-technological exchanges, as measures to bolster and rejuvenate
their ties.

NOTES
1 Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “The balance of power in the recent past”, Delhi Policy
Group, 2015, at https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/uploads_dpg/arch_publication_
file/west-asia-in-transition-1003.pdf (Accessed 11 January 2023).
2 Jon B. Alterman, “India’s Middle East strategy”, CSIS, 13 December 2022, at https:/
/www.csis.org/analysis/indias-middle-east-strategy (Accessed 11 January 2023).
3 Rajesh Ahuja and Jayanth Jacob, “Of 24 terror suspects turned in by Gulf countries
to India since 2012, 18 are from UAE and Saudi”, Hindustan Times, 24 August 2018,
at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/of-24-terror-suspects-turned-in-
by-gulf-countries-to-india-since-2012-18-are-from-uae-and-saudi/story-225ND 6iI
OaWrD9m YZYRFLL.html (Accessed 11 January 2023).
4 Raed Fawzi Ihmoud Ihmoud, “Extremism and terrorism, challenges and impact
on India-West Asia ties”, Observer Research Foundation, 5 February 2016, at https:/
/www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/transformations-in-west-asia-
regional-perspectives.pdf (Accessed 11 January 2023).
5 Talmiz Ahmad, “Sectarianism and security implications for West Asia”, in Prasanta
Kumar Pradhan (ed.), Geopolitical shifts in West Asia, Pentagon Press, New Delhi,
2016, pp. 61-78.
6 Vincent Durac, “The role of non-state actors in Arab countries after the Arab
uprisings”, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2015, at https://www.iemed.
org/publication/the-role-of-non-state-actors-in-arab-countries-after-the-arab-
uprisings/ (Accessed 11 January 2023).
7 “Rescue operations by India”, Press Information Bureau, 23 December 2015, at
https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133841 (Accessed 12 January
2023).
8 Arvind Gupta, et al. “Arab Spring: Implications for India”, MP-IDSA Policy Brief,
2 January 2014, at https://www.idsa.in/policybrief/ArabSpringImplicationsfor India
_westasia_020114 (Accessed 11 January 2023).
9 Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, “India’s relationship with West Asia: Facing the
challenges of Arab Spring”, in Prasanta Kumar Pradhan (ed.), Geopolitical shifts in
West Asia, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2016, pp. 227-240.
10 Adil Rasheed, “India was of little value to ISIS. That’s all set to change now”, The
Print, 22 May 2019, at https://theprint.in/opinion/india-was-of-little-value-to-isis-
thats-all-set-to-change-now/238361/ (Accessed 11 January 2023).
11 Pradhan, no. 9.
12 Kabir Taneja, “India’s Middle East policy gathers momentum”, The Diplomat, 8
March 2015, at https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/indias-middle-east-policy-gathers-
momentum/ (Accessed 12 January 2023).
13 Mohammed Sinan Siyech, “India-Gulf counter terrorism cooperation”, Middle
East Institute, 21 December 2017, at https://www.mei.edu/publications/india-gulf-
counterterrorism-cooperation (Accessed 12 January 2023).
14 “Foreign trade (WANA)”, Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 169

Industry, Government of India, at https://commerce.gov.in/about-us/divisions/

foreign-trade-territorial-division/foreign-trade-wana/ (Accessed 12 January 2023).
15 Ra’ed Fawzi Ihmoud Ihmoud, “Extremism and terrorism, challenges and impact
on India-West Asia ties”, Observer Research Foundation, 5 February 2016, at https:/
/www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/transformations-in-west-asia-
regional-perspectives.pdf (Accessed 11 January 2023).
16 “India faces biggest impact of tensions in Strait of Hormuz”, Economic Times, 20
July 2019, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/
india-faces-biggest-impact-of-tensions-in-strait-of-hormuz-iea/articleshow/
70301376.cms?from=mdr (Accessed 12 January 2023).
17 Seema Guha, “Beyond religion, remittances: India’s relationship with West Asia
has transformed into partnership of mutual interests”, Outlook, 10 January 2023,
at https://www.outlookindia.com/national/beyond-religion-remittances-india-
relationship-with-west-asia-has-transformed-into-partnership-of-mutual-interests-
news-252247 (Accessed 12 January 2023).
18 “I2U2 Summit: UAE to invest $2 billion to develop integrated food parks in India”,
Indian Express, 14 July 2022, at https://indianexpress.com/article/india/i2u2-summit-
uae-to-invest-2-billion-to-develop-integrated-food-parks-across-india-8029382/
(Accessed 12 January 2023).
19 “Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the
Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the United Arab
Emirates (UAE)”, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, 27
March 2022, at https://commerce.gov.in/international-trade/trade-agreements/
comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement-between-the-government-of-
the-republic-of-india-and-the-government-of-the-united-arab-emirates-uae/
(Accessed 12 January 2023).
20 Seema Guha, “Beyond religion, remittances: India’s relationship with West Asia
has transformed into partnership of mutual interests”, Outlook, 10 January 2022,
at https://www.outlookindia.com/national/beyond-religion-remittances-india-
relationship-with-west-asia-has-transformed-into-partnership-of-mutual-interests-
news-252247 (Accessed 12 January 2023).
21 Ely Kamon, “India’s counterterrorism cooperation with Israel,” Perspectives on
Terrorism, 16(2), April 2022, pp. 2-11.
22 Alvite Ningthoujam, “The upward trajectory of India-Israel relations”, South Asian
Voices, 6 April 2017, at https://southasianvoices.org/upward-trajectory-india-israel-
relations/ (Accessed 27 November 2022).
23 Efraim Inbar, “Modi’s Visit to Israel – The view from Jerusalem,” MP-IDSA
Comments, 10 July 2017, at https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/modi-visit-the-
view-from-jerusalem_e-inbar_100717 (Accessed 25 November 2022).
24 “India, Israel share similar challenges from radicalisation, terrorism: Jaishankar”,
Economic Times, 18 October 2021, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/
defence/india-israel-share-similar-challenges-from-radicalism-terrorism-jai
shankar/articleshow/87101672.cms (Accessed 4 September 2022).
25 Ely Kamon, no. 21.
26 Robert Fisk, “Israel is playing a big role in India’s escalating conflict with Pakistan”,
Independent, at https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/israel-india-pakistan-
conflict-balakot-arms-trade-jaish-e-mohammed-a8800076.html (Accessed 4
September 2022).
27 Pradipta Roy, “Debunking the Myths of Conflicting Nationalism Between India
and Israel”, 15 October 2020, at https://www.spmrf.org/debunking-the-myth-of-
conflicting-nationalism-between-india-and-israel/ (Accessed 26 November 2022).
170 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

28 Somdeep Sen, “India’s deepening love affair with Israel”, Al Jazeera, 9 September
2021, at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/9/9/indias-deepening-love-
affair-with-israel (Accessed 5 September 2022).
29 “Riyadh Declaration”, Embassy of India Riyadh, at https://www.eoiriyadh.gov.in/
page/riyadh-declaration/ (Accessed 2 September 2022).
30 Surabhi Malik and Mala Das, “The Abu Hamza trail: How US thwarted Pakistan’s
attempts to get him deported”, NDTV, 27 June 2012, at https://www.ndtv.com/
india-news/the-abu-hamza-trail-how-us-thwarted-pakistans-attempts-to-get-him-
deported-490068 (Accessed 30 August 2022).
31 Md. Muddassir Quamar, “Indo-Saudi Relations under the Modi government”, at
https://www.e-ir.info/2017/03/13/indo-saudi-relations-under-the-modi-
government/ (Accessed 26 November 2022).
32 Omair Anas, “India-West Asia relations under the nationalist Modi government”,
International Studies, 58 (1), January 2021, pp. 59-79.
33 “Saudi Arabia to enhance anti-terror cooperation with India: Envoy”, Economic
Times, 25 September 2019, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/
saudi-arabia-to-enhance-anti-terror-cooperation-with-india-envoy/articleshow/
71291017.cms?from=mdr (Accessed 2 September 2022).
34 Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, “Mohammed bin Salman walks the India-Pakistan
tightrope”, MP-IDSA Comments, 25 February 2019, at https://www.idsa.in/
idsacomments/saudi-india-pakistan-tightrope-pkpradhan-250219 (Accessed 25
November 2022).
35 “India-Saudi Arabia Joint Statement during the State Visit of His Royal Highness
the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia to India”, Press Information Bureau, 20 February
2019, at https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=188826 (Accessed 25
November 2022).
36 Kinda Bakr, “Saudi Arabia-India: Strategic partnership”’ Gulf Research Centre, 4
May 2021, at https://www.grc.net/single-commentry/31 (Accessed 2 September
2022).
37 “India and Saudi Arabia hold first-ever naval exercises in the Arabian Gulf”, Middle
East Eye, 10 August 2021, at https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/india-and-saudi-
arabia-hold-first-ever-naval-exercises-arabian-gulf (Accessed 2 September 2022).
38 “Joint statement between the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of India,”
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 17 August 2015, at https://
www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25733/Joint_Statement_ between _
the_United_ Arab_ Emirates_and_the_Republic_of_India (Accessed 3 September
2022).
39 S. Samuel C. Rajiv, “Modi’s Act West policy in motion”, 15 March 2017, at https://
www.spmrf.org/modis-act-west-policy-motion/ (Accessed 27 November 2022).
40 “UAE officials slams contradictory Pakistan vote”, Al Arabiya, 20 May 2020, at
https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2015/04/11/UAE-FM-Pakistan-
needs-a-clear-a-position-on-Yemen-conflict- (Accessed 26 November 2022).
41 “India, UAE to cooperate on counterterrorism, increase trade by 60 per cent”, Deccan
Chronicle, 26 January 2017, at https://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-
affairs/260117/india-uae-to-cooperate-on-counterterrorism-increase-trade-by-60-
per-cent.html (Accessed 3 September 2022).
42 Md. Muddassir Quamar, “India and the UAE: Progress towards comprehensive
strategic partnership”, MP-IDSA Comments, 5 July 2018, at https://www.idsa.in/
issuebrief/india-and-the-uae-progress-strategic-partnership-mmquamar-050718
(Accessed 25 November 2022).
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 171

43 Jhinuk Chowdhury, “India and UAE: A partnership against terrorism”, Swarajya

Mag, 11 February 2016, at https://swarajyamag.com/world/india-and-uae-a-
partnership-against-terrorism (Accessed 3 September 2022).
44 Amitabh Bhaumik, “UAE extradited 19 in 16 years; 2 since 2014”, Deccan Herald, 5
December 2018, at https://www.deccanherald.com/national/uae-extradited-19-
india-18-yrs-706556.html (Accessed 27 November 2022).
45 “Joint statement between the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of India”,
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 17 August 2015, at https://
mea.gov.in/articles-in-foreign-media.htm?dtl/25733/Joint+Statement+between+the
+United+ Arab+ Emirates+and+the+Republic+of+India (Accessed 28 November
2022).
46 “Kuwait: Extremism and terrorism”, Counter Extremism Project, at https://
www.counter extremism.com/countries/kuwait-extremism-and-terrorism
(Accessed 30 August 2022).
47 “President of India expresses deep concern over terrorist attack at a mosque in
Kuwait”, Press Information Bureau, at https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.
aspx?relid=122845 (Accessed 30 August 2022).
48 “Kuwait participates in international counter-terrorism conference in India”, Arab
Times, 15 March 2018, at https://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/kuwait-
participates-in-international-counter-terror-conference-in-india/ (Accessed 30
August 2022).
49 “Qatar: Extremism and terrorism”, Counter Extremism Project, at https://
www.counterextremism.com/countries/qatar-extremism-and-terrorism (Accessed
31 August 2022).
50 “India, Qatar pledge to fight terrorism, internet propaganda”, Business Standard, 5
June 2016, at https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/india-qatar-
pledge-to-fight-terrorism-internet-propaganda-116060500602_1.html (Accessed 31
August 2022).
51 “India-Qatar agrees on joint action plan to counter terrorism”, United News of
India, 3 December 2016, at http://www.uniindia.com/india-qatar-agrees-on-joint-
action-plan-to-counter-terrorism/india/news/707011.html (Accessed 31 August
2022).
52 “Joint exercise between the Qatari Emiri Navy and the Indian Navy Forces (the
Roar of the Sea)”, Press Information Bureau, 18 November 2019, at https://
pib.gov.in/PressRelease Page.aspx?PRID=1591973 (Accessed 31 August 2022).
53 “India-Bahrain relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
January 2020, at https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-bahrain_Bilateral_
Brief_ JAN_2020.pdf (Accessed 31 August 2022).
54 “India, Bahrain call on global community to reject use of terrorism against other
countries”, The Hindu, 28 November 2021, available at https://www.thehindu.com/
news/national/india-bahrain-call-on-global-community-to-reject-use-of-terrorism-
against-other-countries/article61580225.ece (Accessed 31 August 2022).
55 “Joint statement on third India-Bahrain high joint commission meeting”, FSI, 7
April 2021, at https://fsi.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33777/Joint _
Statement _on _Third_ IndiaBahrain_High_Joint_Commission_Meeting_ 7_ April
_ 2021 (Accessed 31 August 2022).
56 “India, Iran agree on close cooperation to fight terrorism”, Economic Times, 17
February 2019, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-iran-
agree-on-close-cooperation-to-fight-terrorism/articleshow/68038205.cms?from=
mdr (Accessed 31 August 2022).
172 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

57 “After India, Iran threatens Pakistan for harbouring militants, asks how many of
your own people killed in terrorist operations”, 4 March 2019, at https://
www.india.com/news/world/after-india-iran-threatens-pakistan-for-harbouring-
militants-asks-how-many-of-your-own-people-killed-in-terrorist-operations-
3594668/ (Accessed 31 August 2022).
58 Shubhajit Roy, “India, Iran agree to eliminate forces that support terror”, Indian
Express, 17 February 2018, at https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-iran-
agree-to-eliminate-forces-that-support-terror-5068055/ (Accessed 31 August 2022).
59 Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, “A renewed Indo-Iranian security cooperation in the
offing”, Vivekananda International Foundation, 7 September 2016, at https://
www.vifindia.org/print/3257?via=at (Accessed 27 November 2022).
60 “India, Iran, Afghanistan to boost economic, counter-terrorism cooperation”,
Business Standard, 11 September 2018, at https://www.business-standard.com/
article/news-ians/india-iran-afghanistan-to-boost-economic-counter-terrorism-
cooperation-118091100700_1.html (Accessed 1 September 2022).
61 Farzad Ramezani Bonesh, “How India views Iraq and important areas of
cooperation between the two countries”, Bayan Center, at https://www.bayan
center.org/en/2022/03/3181/ (Accessed 1 September 2022).
62 “India and Iraq must cooperate to counter terrorism: National Security Advisor of
Iraq”, MP-IDSA, 20 December 2013, at https://idsa.in/pressrelease/Indiaand
IraqMustCooperate toCounterTerrorism (Accessed 1 September 2022).
63 Ashok Sajjanhar, “India-Jordan Relations: An ascendant partnership”, MP-IDSA
Comments, 26 February 2018, at https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/india-jordan-
relations_asajjanhar_260218 (Accessed 25 November 2022).
64 “India and Jordan strengthen ties with a focus on defence cooperation”, The Wire,
1 March 2018, at https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-jordan-defence-cooperation
(Accessed 1 September 2022).
65 Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui, “The visit of King Abdullah of Jordan to India: Its mean-
ing and implications”, Academia, 26 April 2018, at https://www.academia.edu/
36547855/The_visit_of_King_Abdullah_of_Jordan_to_India_Its_Meanings_and_
Impli cations (Accessed 28 November 2022).
66 “India-Morocco bilateral relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of
India, 31 July 2022, at https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bilateral_brief-
31July_2022.pdf (Accessed 26 November 2022).
67 Meena Singh Roy, “India’s Outreach to North Africa: Advancing the India-Morocco
Partnership”, MP-IDSA, January-February 2019, at https://idsa.in/system/files/
profile/6-waw-2-1-MSR.pdf (Accessed 26 November 2022).
68 “India, Morocco enter into bilateral deals”, 26 September 2018, at https://
indbiz.gov.in/india-morocco-enter-into-bilateral-deals/ (Accessed 26 November
2022).
69 “Cabinet approves MoU between India and Morocco for setting up of a Joint
Working Group on Counter-Terrorism”, Press Information Bureau, 13 February
2019, at https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1564358 (Accessed 26
November 2022).
70 “Morocco, India poised to foster their counterterrorism cooperation”, North Africa
Post, 19 February 2019, at https://northafricapost.com/28179-morocco-india-poised-
to-foster-their-counterterrorism-cooperation.html (Accessed 26 November 2022).
71 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India, Morocco prevent further terror strikes in Sri
Lanka”, Economic Times, 3 May 2019, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
news/defence/india-morocco-prevent-further-terror-strikes-in-sri-lanka/
India’s Counter-Terror Cooperation with West Asia and North Africa 173

articleshow/69163536.cms?from=mdr (Accessed 26 November 2022).

72 Ihssane Guennoun, “India and Morocco’s new cooperation areas: Focusing on
security and preventing violent extremism”, Policy Center for the New South, 2
October 2019, at https://www.policycenter.ma/opinion/india-and-morocco’s-new-
cooperation-areas-focusing-security-and-preventing-violent-extremism (Accessed
26 November 2022).
73 “India-Syria to upgrade security consultations over Isis threat”, AGI, 22 August
2016, at https://international.agi.it/international/india-syria_to_upgrade_ security_
consultations_ over_isis_threat-1021183/news/2016-08-22/ (Accessed 2 September
2022).
74 “Mikdad meets Jaishankar; India supports Syria in war against terrorism”, Syrian
Arab News Agency, 26 September 2021, at https://sana.sy/en/?p=249492 (Accessed
1 September 2022).
75 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Syria eyes to expand counter-terror ties; develop energy
partnerships with India: Envoy”, Economic Times, 30 October 2021, at https://eco
nomictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/syria-eyes-to-expand-counter-terror-ties-
develop-energy-partnership-with-india-envoy/articleshow/87391035.cms? from
=mdr (Accessed 1 September 2022).
76 “India Oman joint statement during visit of Prime Minister to Oman”, Ministry of
External Affairs, Government of India, 12 February 2018, at https://www.mea.gov.
in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29479/India%B1Oman%B1Joint%B1Statement%
B1during %B1 visit%B1of%B1Prime%B1Minister%B1to%B1Oman.html (Accessed
1 September 2022).
77 Samuel Rajiv, “Imparting new dynamism to India’s engagements with West Asia”,
SPMRF, 20 March 2018, at https://www.spmrf.org/imparting-new-dynamism-to-
indias-engagements-with-west-asia/ (Accessed 26 November 2022).
78 “India and Oman to carry out 13-day military exercise in Rajasthan”, The Hindu,
31 July 2022, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-and-oman-to-
carry-out-13-day-military-exercise-in-rajasthan/article65706768.ece (Accessed 2
September 2022).
79 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India, Egypt sign MoU to exchange terrorism
information”, Economic Times, 13 July 2018, at https://economictimes.indiatimes.
com/news/defence/india-egypt-sign-mou-to-exchange-terrorism-information/
articleshow/53988210.cms? from=mdr (Accessed 1 September 2022).
80 Alvite Ningthoujam, “Military cooperation with MENA Region: An Indo-Egyptian
connection”, Observer Research Foundation, 27 September 2022, at https://
www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/military-cooperation-with-mena-region/
(Accessed 26 November 2022).
81 “Press statement by PM during the visit of President of Egypt to India”, PMINDIA,
2 September 2016, at https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/press-
statement-by-pm-during-the-visit-of-president-of-egypt-to-india/ (Accessed 28
November 2022).
82 “India Egypt decides to boost defence cooperation”, The Week, 4 April 2020, at
https://www.theweek.in/wire-updates/national/2018/09/23/del27-def-india-
egypt.html (Accessed 2 September 2022).
83 “India, Egypt sign MoU to enhance defence cooperation”, New Indian Express, 20
September 2022, at https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2022/sep/20/india-
egypt-sign-mou-to-enhance-defence-cooperation-2500158.html (Accessed 14
October 2022).
 Index

26/11 Attacks, 147, 150, 152 Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),

9/11 Attacks, 146 152
Al Quds Force, 120
Abbas, Mahmoud, 10-11, 104 Al Saud, Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz ,
Abbas, Riad, 164 129
Abraham Accords, 70, 89, 125 Al Thani, Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad, 132
Abu Dhabi, 129 Alawi, Yusuf bin , 125
Act West, 102 Ali, Ben, 2, 121
Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Al-Jazeera, 110
Ltd (APSEZ), 79 All India Institute of Medical Sciences
Advani, L.K., 68 (AIIMS), New Delhi, 18, 83
Afghanistan, 6, 8, 9, 44, 45, 46, 50, 51, 54, Al-Ula Declaration, 110
57, 59, 60, 105, 161 Anglo-Russian Great Game, 46
Trilateral Agreement, 7 Anti-Corruption Working Group
Taliban takeover of, 62 (ACWG), 35
Africa, 102 Anti-Piracy Operations, 139
Agreement to Combat Terrorism and Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs), 75
Organized Crime, Muscat, 127 Aqaba Process, 162
Ahmed Al Khalifa, Sheikh Khalid Bin, Arab Gulf States, 24
126 Arab NATO, 125
Ahmed Al Sayegh, 36 Arab Spring, 2, 121, 123, 147-48
Akbar, M.J., 107, 135 Arabian Peninsula, 147
Al Ahli Hospital, 11 Arabian Sea, 24, 34, 99, 164
Al Aqsa Intifada, 68 Arab-Israel War, 103, 119
Al Abadi, Haider, 123 Armenia, 61
Al Baghdadi, Abu Bakr, 105, 122 Artificial Intelligence (AI), 18, 84
Al Busaidi, Sayyid Saeed bin Sultan, 35 Asia, 50
Al Fayyadh, Falih, 162 Asian Development Bank, 61
Al Hindi, Al Mohed, 2021, 130, 154 Assault Rifles (Tavor), 74
Al Khalifa, Prince Khalifa bin Salman, 159 Atlantic Ocean, 163
Al Najah, 166 Azerbaijan, 60-61, 74
Al Nusra Front, 147 Azhar, Masood, 157
Al Nahyan, Sheikh Mohamed bin
Zayed, 16, 30, 36, 128, 155 Baghdad Airport, 120
Al Qaeda, 13, 34, 146-47, 152, 164 Bagheri, Ali, 133
Index 175

Bahrain, 17-18, 23, 30, 37, 70, 101-02, 124- Chabahar-Zahedan Railway Line, 7, 55,
25, 134, 149, 153, 159-60, 164-65 56
‘King Hamad Order of the China, 8, 52, 54, 67, 69, 120
Renaissance’, 3 China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, 51
Baikal-Amur Railway, 51 China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU)
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway, 60 Railway Corridor, 60
Bandar-e Emam Khomeini, 47 China-Myanmar Economic Corridor
Bandar-e Shah, 47 (CMEC), 53
Bandar-e Shahpur, 47 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Bandar-e Torkaman, 47 (CEPC), 53
Barak-1 Air-Defence Missile, 74 Civil Wars, 103
Barak-8 Air and Missile Defence System, Cohen, Eli, 69
134 Cohen, Yossi, 78
Bashar Al Assad, 106 Cold War, 12, 14, 67, 100
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 51-53 Collective Security Treaty Organisation
Bharat Petro Resources Ltd (BPRL), 29 (CSTO), 52
Bhadauria, Rakesh Kumar Singh, 10, 76 Combined Maritime Force (CMF), 35,
Biden, Joe, 16 136-37
Bilateral Innovation Agreement (BIA), 84 Commonwealth of Independent States
Biosensing and Natural Language (CIS), 56
Processing, 84 Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Black Sea-Persian Gulf Corridor, 61 Agreement (CEPA), 26
Blasberger, Avi, 85 Comprehensive Integrated Border
Bofors Shells, 6 Management System (CIBMS), 78
Border Management, 78 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
Bouazizi, Mohammed, 120 Agreement, 154
BPRL, 29 Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG),
Brahmos missile, 129-31, 138 69
Brain-Machine Interface, 84 Connectivity and Competition, 59-61
Bulgaria, 61 Construction and Development of
Bundelkhand, 82 Transportation Infrastructures
Bush, George W., 105 Company (CDTIC), 7, 55
Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI), 124
C-17 Globemaster III Aircraft, 129 COP-26, 83
Caliphate, 147 COP-28, 88
Canakkale Land and Sea battles, 14 Counter Piracy Cooperation, 136
Carter, Jimmy, 124 Counter Terrorism Engagement, 137
Caspian Sea, 6, 47, 50, 57-58 Counter Terrorism School, 137
Caspian-Caucasus-Black Sea Route, 49 Counter-insurgency, 163
Central Asia, 6-8, 44, 46, 49, 51-54, 56, 124 Counter-radicalisation of Youth, 166
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Counter-terrorism, 163
34 Counter-terrorism Initiatives, 151
Centres of Excellence (CoE), 80 Covaxin Vaccine, 18
Chabahar Agreement, 7, 45, 62 COVID-19, 1, 10, 12, 18-19, 38, 79, 83, 132
Chabahar Day, 8, 56 Covishield Vaccine, 18
Chabahar Port, 7, 8, 44-45, 50-51, 53, 55, Crimean War, 46
59, 62, 160 Cross-border Terrorism, 166
176 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Cyber Domain, 84 Industrial Revolution, 45

Cyprus, 15 European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), 61
Daesh, 122 European Sanctions on Russia, 57
Debt-trap Diplomacy, 52 European Union (EU), 17, 27, 49, 59-60
Deen Dayal Port Authority, 7 Europe-Central Asia Connectivity, 60
Defence and Security Cooperation, 5-6 Exercise Blue Flag, 75
Defence Cooperation Agreement, 139 Exercise Cyclone-I, 13
Defence Research and Development Exercise Desert Cyclone, 129
Organisation (DRDO), 69, 75, 84, 134 Exercise Desert Flag-VI/VII, 129
Defence Services Staff College, Exercise Desert Warrior, 13
Wellington, 132 Exercise Milan, 130
Defence Wings, 136 Exercise Sada Tanseeq, 130
DEF-EXPO, Chennai, 131
Delaram, 44, 54 Fire-control Missiles, 74
Delhi Declaration, 129 Five-Year Joint Work Plan, 80
Department of Science and Technology Flight Safety Information Exchange, 127
(India), 84 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 26-27,
Development Integration, 50 73, 79, 102
Dogharoon Special Economic Zone, 54 France, 17, 27, 30, 75, 108
Dogharun-Herat Highway, 54 Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 1, 25-26, 79,
Doha Players Theatre, 157 150
Doha, 132
Doval, Ajit, 12, 131, 153 G20, 5, 27, 35, 36
Drones, 84 Culture Working Group (CWG), 35
Dubai Expo 2021, 26 Development Ministers’ Meeting,
Duchifat-3, 85 Varanasi, 36
Duqm Port, 139 Summit, Bali, 30
Duzdab (today Zahedan), 47 Trade and Investment Ministers’
Meetings, Jaipur, 36
East Jerusalem, 103 Gaddafi, Muammar, 2, 107, 122
Eastern Mediterranean, 12 Gandhi, Indira, 74
East-West Latitudinal Corridors, 60 Gandhi, Rajiv, 74, 162
East-West Railway Corridor, 54 Gantz, Benjamin, 10, 76, 134
Egypt, 13, 70, 100, 102, 108, 121, 123-25, Gaza Strip, 10-11, 87, 103-04, 119
130-31, 138, 166-67 Georgia, 60-61
Exploring New Space with, 12-13 Germany, 17, 27, 75
Egyptian Air Force Weapons School, 13 Gilon, Naor, 85
El Sisi, Fatteh, 121, 131, 166 Glasgow, 83
Electrical Interconnections, 5 Global South, 13, 20
Electronic Support Measure Sensors, 74 Government of India, 5, 110-11
Emirati State, 154 Government of National Accord (GNA),
Energy, 4-5 122
Eurasia, 8, 54 Grand Collar of the State of Palestine, 10
Silk Road Network in, 46 Greater Central Asia, 51
Eurasian Development Bank, 61 Greece, 15, 75
Europe, 54, 59, 102 Green Hydrogen, 5, 30-31
Index 177

Green Pine Missile-defence Radar, 74 16, 30, 32-33, 70, 85-86, 89, 149-50
Gulf Arab, 106 India’s
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 1, 4-6, COVID Diplomacy, 18
17, 23-24, 26-27, 34, 38-39, 99, 101-02, Crude Oil Imports from Gulf, 28
110-11, 123-26, 137-38, 167 Economy, 52
Summit, Jeddah, 125 Exports, 101
Gulf of Aden, 34, 119, 136, 139 Foreign Policy, 113
Gulf of Oman, 45, 120 Foreign Trade, 101
Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), 124 G20 Presidency, 13
Gulf War (1990-91), 98 General Assembly vote on Jerusalem,
Gulf, Indian Expatriates in, 5 72
Gwadar, 45, 53 LNG Imports, 4
Look West Policy, 3, 102
Hadi, Abdu Rabbo Mansour, 109, 121 National Green Hydrogen Mission, 31
Haftar, Khalifa, 122 Think West Policy, 3, 25, 39, 102
Haifa Port Company Ltd, 79 West Asia Policy, 3
Hamas, 88, 104-05, 151 India’s International Centre for
Haqqani Network, 155 Entrepreneurship and Technology
Harpy and Harop Loitering Anti- (iCREATE), 73, 84
Radiation Drones, 74 India-Africa Forum Summit, 12
Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, 147 India-Central Asia Ties, 49
Helina missile, 129 India-China War, 73
Helwan-300 (Kahira) jet fighter, 130 India-Egypt, 12
Hezbollah, 104, 151, 156 Partnership, 166
Holtzberg, Rabbi Gavriel, 150 India-GCC Relations, 25, 32, 38
Horn of Africa, 102 Bilateral Trade, 25-26
Horticulture Management: The Israeli Defence and Security Cooperation,
Value Chain, 81 33-35
House of Representatives (HoR), 122 Energy Cooperation, 27, 30
Houthis, 104, 109-10, 152 FTA Agreement, 32
Human Rights Council, 88 Growing Engagement, 23
Hussein, Saddam, 105 Political Dialogue, 31
Hydroxychloroquine Tablet, 17 Senior Officers Meeting (SOM), 32
India-Gulf Relations, 4, 101
IED, 164 India-Iran Relations, 44-45, 160
Imam Sadiq Mosque, 156 Bilateral Relations, 160
India, 2, 5, 8, 11, 16-18, 24, 26-27, 30, 33, Connectivity Partnership, 44
35, 50, 70, 74-75, 79, 82, 87, 99, 106, 108, India-Iran-Afghanistan: Chabahar, 54-56
111, 118-19, 126, 128, 132, 135, 137-39, India-Iran-Armenia Trilateral
146-49, 154, 158, 161, 163-64 Consultation, Yerevan, 61
and Israel-Palestinian Conflict, 9-11, India-Israel Alliance, 68, 72
87-88 Agriculture and Water Cooperation,
India Defence Cooperation Agreements 80-92
with Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bilateral Trade, 80
the UAE, 34 Centre of Excellence, 81
India Ports Global Pvt Limited, 7 in Health and Medicine during
India, Israel, the UAE and the US (I2U2), COVID-19, 82-83
178 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

in Security and Border Management, India-West Asia Cooperation, 19-20

77-78 Indo-Egypt Defence Ties, 130
Defence Cooperation, 73-76 Indo-Israel Agricultural Project (IIAP), 80
Economic Ties, 78-79 Indo-Israel Villages of Excellence
Factors Shaping Approach, 69-70 (IIVOE), 80
High-Level Visits, 71-73 Indo-Scythian Tribes, 46
Joint Working Group for Counter Infosys, 79
Terrorism, 77-78 INS Kolkata, 132
Science and Technology Cooperation, INS Mumbai, 132
83-84 INS Shardul, 132
Space Cooperation, 84-85 INS Sunayna, 35
Vision on Defence Cooperation, 134 INS Tarkash, 132
India-Israel Industrial R&D and INS Trikand, 132
Innovation Fund (i4F), 84 International Development Cooperation
India-Israel Innovation Accelerator (i3A), (MASHAV), 80-81
84 International North-South Transport
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (INSTC), 8, 51, 56-60
Corridor (IMEC), 17, 27 International Solar Alliance (ISA), 30
Indian Air Force (IAF), 6, 13, 74-75, 129 International Transit and Transport
Indian Armed Forces, Israel Weapons Corridor, 7
Used by, 76-77 Iran, 6-9, 27, 46, 49-50, 55-56, 59, 99-102,
Indian Army, 6 106, 133, 138, 160-61, 167
Aerial Surveillance Capability, 70 Crisis, 48
Indian Coast Guard, 127 Iran’s
Indian Community in Gulf, 36-38 Azerbaijan Province, 48
Indian Community Welfare Fund, 37 Gateway Status, 45-49
Indian Mujahideen (IM), 155-56 Maritime and Ports Organisation, 7
Indian Navy, 136 Iran’s Port and Maritime Organisation
Indian Ocean, 35, 53-54, 164 (PMO), 56
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd (IOCL), 29 Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps
Indian Railway Construction Limited (IRGC), 55-56, 160
(IRCON), 7, 55 Iran-Afghanistan Border, 54
Indian Small Arms System, 128 Iran-Iraq War, 23, 98, 112
Indian Space Research Organisation Iraq, 4, 29, 99, 101, 105, 122-23, 125, 134,
(ISRO), 85 161-62, 167
India-Oman, 166 Conflict in and Rise of the Islamic
on Maritime Issues, 127 State, 105-06
India-Qatar Defence Cooperation Islamic Jihad, 104
Agreement, 131 Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines
India-Turkiye Relations, 13-15 (IRISL), 57
India-UAE Joint Navy Exercises ‘Gulf Islamic Revolution, Defenders, 150
Star 1’, 129 Islamic State Khorasan Province, 161
India-UAE signed MoU, 5 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 2,
India-US 2+2 Dialogue, 136 13, 19, 34, 106, 108, 122-23, 147-49, 152,
India-WANA Relations, 145, 148, 150 156, 161, 164
Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, 150, and Mutual Threat Perceptions, 148-
167 49
Index 179

Israel, 11, 16, 18, 69-70, 82, 100, 102, 118, Khalid bin Mohammed Al Attiyah, 132
125, 133-34, 138, 150-51, 153 Khatami, Mohammed , 44 **visited
Terrorist Attack on, 11 India, 7
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), 74-75, Khan, Reza, 47
134 Khash-Zahedan, 160
Searcher UAVs and Instrumentation, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud,
74 129
Israel Defence Forces (IDF), 104-05 King Abdullah II, 11, 162-63
Israel Space Agency (ISA), 85 Krishna, S.M., 157
Israel Weapon Industries (IWI), 75 Kumar, Hari R., 128
Israel’s Gadot Group, 79 Kurdish Struggle, 98
Israel’s Start-Up Nation Central (SNC), Kuwait, 23, 99, 101, 110, 134, 139, 149, 156-
84 57, 159, 164
Israel-Hamas War, 88, 98 Kuwait, Mujahideen of, 156
Israel-Hezbollah War (2006), 98 Kyrgyzstan, 8, 61
Israeli Arms Exports, 74
Israeli-Arab Conflict, 104 Lapid, Yair, 16
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 10, 98, 103-05 LCA Tejas, 129
Israel-Lebanon War (1982), 98 Lebanon, 104
Italy, 17, 27, 75, 108 LeT, 155, 164
Libya, 2, 19, 107-08, 118, 122, 148
Jaishankar, Dr. S., 8, 12, 56, 76, 88, 151, Libyan National Army (LNA), 122
164 Long-Range Reconnaissance And
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), 151, 161 Observation Systems (LORROS), 77
Jammu and Kashmir, 153 Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missile
Jasmine Revolution, 121 (LRSAM), 75
Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT), 7
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Mackinder, Halford, British Geographer,
(JCPOA), 7, 55, 62 45-46
Joint Defence Cooperation Committee, Heartland thesis, 46
131 Make in India, 6, 26, 130-32, 138
Jordan, 12, 70, 102, 123-25, 162-63, 167 Makran Coast, 45
Revitalising Ties with, 11-12 Managing Complex Regional Rivalries,
Jordan India Fertiliser Company (JIFCO) 17
Joint Venture, 11 Manama, 159
Jordanian Armed Forces, 12 Dialogue, 125
Justice and Development Party (AKP), 15 Srinathji Temple in, 37
Marine Crime Prevention at Sea, 127
Kalyani Rafael Advanced Systems Ltd Maritime Agreements, 136
(KRAS), 75 Maritime India Summit 2021, 8
Kalyani Strategic Systems, 130 Maritime Security, 102
Kargil War, 133 Mediterranean Sea, 163
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, 59 Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV
Kazakhstan, 8, 61 System, 70
Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran (KTI) Meghri-Yerevan-Bavra Highway, 61
Transit Corridor, 59 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU),
Khaf-Herat Railway Project, 54 68
180 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Middle Corridor, 59-61 Night/adverse Weather Precision-

Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), Targeting Pod, 74
125 Non Conflict Zone, 130
Mikdad, Faysal, 164 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 12, 14
Ministry of National Infrastructure, Non-State Actors (NSAs), 104, 111, 119,
Energy & Water Resources, 82 148, 155
Modi, Narendra, India’s Prime Minister, Non-Western Powers, 50
2, 4, 6, 10, 13-16, 19, 24-25, 30, 36, 38- North Africa, 13
39, 52, 68-69, 71-72, 82, 84, 87-88, 100, North and South America, 102
102, 104, 112, 126-29, 131-33, 138, 145, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
151-52, 157-59, 163, 165-66 (NATO), 14, 107-08
visited Abu Dhabi, 5
visited Egypt, 12 Odisha, 4, 28
visited Iran, 7, 45, 55 Oman Vision 2040, 36
visited Jordan, 11 Oman, 4, 8, 18, 23, 29-30, 35, 101, 102, 110,
Money Laundering, 166 127-28, 137, 139, 149, 164-66
Morocco, 102, 125, 163-64, 167 ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL), 29
Morsi, Mohammad, 121 Operation Breaking Dawn, 119
Moscow, 49, 52 Operation Decisive Storm, 121
Mosul, 123 Operation Raahat, 109, 135
MoU, 7, 27, 32, 73, 83, 85, 127-29, 131-33, Operation Samudra Setu-II, 132
138-39, 153, 158, 162 Operation Shield and Arrow, 119
Mubarak, Hosni, Egypt, 2, 121 Operation Southern Readiness 2023, 35
Mukherjee, Pranab, 11, 71, 156, 162 Operation Southern Readiness, 35
Muslim Brotherhood, 121, 156, 165 Operational Cooperation, 166
Operational Turn Around, 127
Nag missile, 129 Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), 6, 129
Naravane, Manoj Mukund, 10, 76, 130 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
Nariman House, 150 (OIC), 15, 123, 153
Nasir al-din Shah, Iran’s Qajar Ruler,
47 Padur, 4, 28
National Authority for Technological Pakistan, 8, 14-15, 48, 54, 60, 67, 69, 75, 127,
Innovation (Israel), 84 151, 165
National Security Advisors, 153 Palestine Liberation Organisation, 10, 87
National Transition Council (NTC), 108 Palestine, 70, 118
Nazran, 122 Palestinian Authority (PA), 104
Negev NG-7 light machine guns (LMGs), Palestinian Cause, 88
75 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), 119
Neighbourhood First Policy, 19, 39 Parrikar, Manohar, 127, 129, 154
NEOM Green Hydrogen Company, 31 Pathankot Attack, 69, 134
Net Zero Emissions, 29 Peninsula Lions, 156
Netanyahu, Benjamin, 72 Peninsula Shield Force, 126
New Delhi, 55-56 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 128
Declaration, 44, 50 Peres, Shimon, visited India, 68
New Silk Road Strategy, 51 Persian Corridor, 48
New York, 31, 131 Persian Gulf, 6, 46-47, 57, 118, 124, 136
Nhava Sheva Port, 57 Crisis, 120
Index 181

Phalcon airborne warning and control Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union

systems (AWACS), 74, 151 (EAEU), 51
Piracy, 102 Russia-Ukraine War, 28, 56
Poland, 75
Post-Cold War, 14, 48 Saka Kingdoms, 46
President Erdogan, 14-15 Saleh, Ali Abdullah, 2, 109
Protracted Historical Conflicts, 103 Sammad-3 drones, 122
Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), 29 Sattar, Abdul, 156
Pulwama Attack, 151, 153, 157, 160 Saudi Arabia, 3-5, 16-18, 23, 27, 30, 38, 70,
Python-4 Air-to-Air Missile, 74 99-102, 110, 121, 125-26, 129-30, 134,
138, 147, 152-54, 167
Qatar, 4, 8, 18, 23, 28, 99, 101-02, 110, 131- ‘the King Abdulaziz Sash’, 3
34, 149, 157-59, 164 Saudi-Iran Peace Deal, 120, 133
Crisis, 110-11, 118 Saudi-Iran Tensions, 111
Qatar Amiri Naval Forces (QENF), 132 Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs),
Quds Cruise Missiles, 122 24, 34-35, 99, 110, 118
Second World War, 103
Radars, 74 Security Collaborator, 137
Radicalisation, 166 Security Cooperation, 119
Rafael Advanced Defence Systems Ltd., Security Threats, 123
74 Shah, Muhammad Ali, 47
Raisi, Ebrahim, 58-59 Shahid Beheshti Chabahar Port, 8
Rajasthan, 13, 129 Shamir, Yair, 71
Rania, Queen, 11 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Rao, P.V. Narasimha, 67 (SCO), 9, 51-52, 57-58, 60
Rapid Deployment Force, 124 Sharon, Ariel, visited India, 68
Rasht-Astara Railway Line, 57-58 Singapore, 71
Red Sea, 12 Singh, Manmohan, 3, 129, 131
Regional Counter Terrorism Command Singh, Rajnath, 12, 71, 131, 133, 167
Centre, 137 Singh, V.K., 14
Regional Military Engagement, 137 Sitharaman, Nirmala, 163, 166
Regional Security Dialogue on Sivan, K., 85
Afghanistan, 8 Sniper Rifles (Galil), 74-75
Regional Security, 137 Soleimani, Qasem, 120
Renewable Energy, 29-31 Somanath, S., 85
Research and Analysis Wing, 78 South Asia, 7, 124
RISAT-2BR1, 85 Southwest-Central Asia, 44
Rivlin, Reuven, 71, 77 Spike anti-tank guided missiles, 74-75
Riyadh Declaration, 129, 152 Spyder Air-defence System, 74
Riyadh, 33, 122, 129 Sri Lanka, 164
Robotics, 84 Sriharikota, 85
Rouhani, Hassan, 160 St Petersburg, 57
Royal Oman Police (Coast Guard), 127 Stockholm International Peace Research
RuPay Card, 38 Institute (SIPRI), 74
Russia, 8, 27, 46-47, 50-52, 106, 108 Strait of Hormuz, 149
Russia-Iran-India Convergence on North- Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), 4,
south Connectivity, 49-53 28
182 India’s Policy Towards West Asia: The Modi Era

Su-30MKI Fighter Aircraft, 129 ‘Order of Zayed’, 3

Sudan, 125 Ufa Summit, 52
Suez Canal Route, 57 UN Office of Commissioner for
Sultan Haitham bin Tarik, 128 Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), 108
Swaraj, Sushma, 71 United Nations (UN), 32, 99, 161, 163, 165-
Syria, 2, 15, 19, 102, 118, 122-23, 160, 164, 66
167 United Nations Counter-Terrorism
Syrian Civil War, 106-07 Committee, 167
United Nations General Assembly
Tajikistan, 8 (UNGA), 15, 31, 71, 87-88, 131
Tantray, Nisar Ahmed, 34 Resolution 181, 87
Tashkent, Central & South Asia Connec- United Nations Security Council (UNSC),
tivity: Challenges & Opportunity, 60 32, 48, 108, 157
Tavor Rifle, 75 United Nations World Food Programme,
Tehran, 8, 133 56
Tehran’s ‘Look to the East’ Policy, 62 United States (US), 8, 14, 16-17, 27, 48, 51-
Tejas Aircraft, 131 52, 54, 60, 74-75, 86, 89, 106, 108-09,
Tel Aviv, 147, 151 120, 124-25, 136
Terror Attacks and Radicalisation, 146-47 Drone, 120
Terror Financing, 166 Sanctions on Iran, 62
Terrorism, 6, 151 Trade and Development Agency, 86
ThinkCyber, 84 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), 69,
Tikun Olam (heal the world), 90 75, 134
Tirumurti, T.S., 88 Uri Attacks, 69, 134, 151
Tokyo International Conference on Urja Bharat Pte Ltd, 29
Reconstruction Assistance to US-GCC Summit, Riyadh, 125
Afghanistan, 54 Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam, 82
Trade, Investment & Connectivity, 25-26 Uzbekistan, 8, 49, 59-61
Trans-Caspian International Transport Uzi Rifle, 75
Route (TITR), 59
Trans-Iranian Route, 47 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 44
Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus- Vande Bharat Mission, 18, 38
Asia (TRACECA), 49 Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (One Earth - One
Trans-Siberian Railway, 51 Family - One Future), 35, 90
Tripoli, 122 Vietnam, 74
Tsarist Russian Empire, 46 Violent Extremism, 166
Tunisia, 121 Vision 2030, 130
Turkiye, 14-15, 59, 61, 70, 87, 100, 106, 108,
123 Washington, 62
Turkiye-Cyprus Conflict, 98 Washington’s Silk Road Strategy, 51
Turkiye-India Ties, 134 Water Resource Management, 82
Turkmenistan, 8, 60 Weizman, Ezer, 68
West Asia and North Africa (WANA), 98-
UAE, 3-6, 16-18, 23, 27-30, 33, 35-37, 70, 100, 102-03, 106, 110-13, 145-48, 167-
85-86, 89, 99, 101-02, 108, 110, 117, 120, 68
125, 128-29, 134, 137-38, 147, 149-50, and India, 149
154-56, 167 in Indian Foreign Policy, 100
Index 183

Indian Response to Conflicts in, 103 Wipro Infrastructure Engineering, 79

West Asia, 17, 19, 34, 71, 85, 87, 102, 126, World War I, 47, 103
135, 153
Evolving Security Dynamics, 119-23 Yaalon, Moshe, 71
India’s Defence and Security Yemen, 2, 19, 87, 104, 109, 123, 134, 139,
Cooperation, 126 148, 160
Mini-lateral and Plurilateral Conflict, 109-10, 118
Engagements in, 15-17 Yigal Unna, 84
Security Architecture, 123-26
West Bank, 103, 119 Zangezur Corridor, 61
Western Asia, 13 Zaranj, 44
Western Indian Ocean, 99, 102, 110 Zaranj-Delaram Highway, 54
Western Sahara, 98 Zulfiqar ballistic missiles, 122