New School

Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Terrorism

Author(s): MICHAEL IGNATIEFF
Source: Social Research, Vol. 69, No. 4, International Justice, War Crimes, and Terrorism: The
U.S. Record (winter 2002), pp. 1137-1158
Published by: New School
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HumanRights,the! /
Laws ofWar,and
Terrorism / BY MICHAEL IGNATIEFF

A HE twoterms - humanrightsand terror - look like a simple

antithesis: humanrightsgood, terrorbad. Mythesisis thatthe
antithesis is not so simple.Of course,humanrightsand terror
standopposedtoeach other.Terrorist actsviolatetherighttolife,
alongwithmanyotherrights. Butequally,humanrights - notably
therightto self-determination - haveconstituted a majorjustifi-
cationfortheresortto politicalviolence,includingactsofterror,
in thetwentieth century.In thisarticleI willconsidertherelation
betweentheseconceptsfromtwosides:fromthelimitations that
humanrightsimposeon counterterrorism, and fromthejustifi-
cationsthathumanrightsaccord terror.Mypurposeis to put
pressureon humanrightsas a moralsystem, and to showits
strengths and itsweaknesses.
Let us beginwithhumanrightsas the chiefset of principles
thatlimitthetypesofethically permissible actionin a waron ter-
ror.Humanrights bothdefinewhatwe are supposedto standfor
and tie our handswhenwe seek to defendourselves.Tyingour
handsbehindourownbacksis neitherpopularnoreasy;butfun-
damentalto theidea ofall rights doctrinesis theidea ofprecom-
mitment. To believein rightsis tosaywewillnotdo certainthings
tofellowcitizensor fellowhumanbeings,no matter what.
Human rightsare the rightswe have as humanbeings,and
therefore are theoneswe cannotlose.Theyare notconnectedto
politicalor civilstatus,moralworthor conduct.Evenifyouare a

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Winter2002)

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1138 SOCIAL RESEARCH

verybad humanbeingyoustillhavehumanrights. Ifthisis so, it

has to be truethatterrorists havehumanrights. Whynot?Once
are from
rights distinguished deserving and moral worth,theyare
theentitlement ofeventhosewhodespisetheveryidea ofrights.
Like Ulyssestyinghimselfto the mastso thathe willnot be
temptedbytheSirens'song,democratic statespre-commit them-
selvesto respectrightseven when theyare sorelytemptedto
abridge,evenabolishthem.1Terrorism is one ofthebiggesttests
of a society'swillingness to abide bytheseprecommitments. To
thedegreethatterrorists exploitthefreedoms ofa freesocietyto
circulate,to evade detection and to planattacks, theytemptsoci-
eties to jettisonthese freedoms.This temptationis not new.
Indeed,itis as old as lawitself.The Romanshad an adage,salus
populiprimuslex- the safetyof the people is the ultimatelaw-
thatjustifiedemergency measuresforemergency circumstances.
In thesecircumstances, lawitselfshouldbe no barrierto theulti-
matesafety ofthepeople.In thenameofthatprinciple, modern
societiesfacedwithterrorist -
threats Italy,Spain,GreatBritain,
for example - have curtailedrightsto politicalparticipation.
Groupsthatdo not dissociatethemselves fromterrorist activity
are notallowedto competeforvotesor hold office.People sus-
pectedofassociation withterrorist organizations maybe interned
or held withouttrial.These abridgements of rightsmayappear
justifiedbysaluspopuliprimus but
lex, they conflictwiththeidea
thatrights are eitherunconditional or theyareworthless.
Terrorist statesof emergency illuminate a neglectedaspectof
the supposeduniversality of humanrights.Mostdiscussionsof
universality focuson the issue of whetherrightsare universal
across But thereis an equallyimportant
cultures. sensein which
human rightsshould be universalas betweenpersonsand as
betweennormaltimes and timesof emergency. Terroristemer-
genciesputtheseuniversalist commitments understrain.The rea-
sonis notjustthatterror causesfearand fearful haveit
majorities
in theirpowerto oppressminorities; itis also thattheycan do so
withlittledirectcostto theirownliberties and rights.As Ronald

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 HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM 1 139

Dworkinhas pointedout,thereis no generaltradeoff between

our libertyand our securityin timesof terrorist threat,but
betweenoursupposedsecurity and the libertyof smallsuspect
groups,likeadultmaleArabsand particularly thesubsetofthese
groupsthatareinviolationofimmigration regulations (Dworkin,
2002). These abridgements of the rights of a few are easytojus-
tify
politicallywhenthethreatof terrorism appearsto endanger
themajority. Rightsexist,however, precisely to setlimitsto what
fearful can do.
majorities
The idea of rightsas precommitments presupposesthe idea
thatwhenwe facethechoicebetweenour security and theirlib-
erty,we startfroma predisposition againstthe amendmentof
principle.Wedo so principally becauseofthevalueto themajor-
ityof rightsremainingas invariantand universalas possible.
Rightswillnothavemuchvalueto us iftheyare easilytakenaway
fromothers.So we all havean interest in makingas fewexcep-
tionsas possible.
Some civillibertariansbelievethattheruleoflawimpliesthat
thereshouldbe no exceptionsat all, no emergenciesand no
derogations. In fact,mostconstitutions and mostinternational
humanrightscovenantsaccept thattemporary suspensionsof
rights can become necessary to the preservation theconstitu-
of
tionalfabricitself.So exceptions, emergencies, and derogations
are necessaryto constitutional survival.What the rule of law
requires,as JohnFinn and otherscholarshave argued,is not
invariance,butpublicjustification (Finn,1991:32). International
humanrights lawis notcommitted to absolutenonderogation of
rights, butratherto limitation of derogationthroughan obliga-
tionto providejustification accountablepublicbodies,espe-
to
ciallythejudiciaryand electedlegislatures.
The International Covenanton Civiland PoliticalRightsallows
statesto derogateor suspendrightsof politicalparticipation,
habeascorpus,freeassembly, immunity fromarbitrary searchand
seizure, and freedom from detention before trial,but not
absolutenonderogablerightssuch as immunity fromtorture,

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1140 SOCIAL RESEARCH

crueland unusualpunishment, the infliction of death,or free

belief.Nationsthatsign the covenantare requiredto publicly
announceandjustify theirderogations to UN treaty bodies.Sim-
ilarobligations to publiclyjustifyderogationare written intothe
EuropeanConvention on HumanRights.Thisseeksto savewhat
can be savedfromtheidea ofabsoluteprecommitment byfocus-
ingthoseprecommitments on preserving terroristsuspectsfrom
absoluteviolations ofpersonalintegrity liketorture and byinsist-
on and
ing accountability publicjustification.2
Evenifwe hold thelineon torture, on crueland unusualpun-
ishment,the veryfactthatotherrights - to free assemblyor
habeascorpus - are frequently derogatedcallsintoquestionthe
idea thathumanrights Wecan believe,as a causal
are indivisible.
that are
matter, rights indivisible, in the sense thathavingone
rightis a precondition forhavinganother.(To use Amartya Sen's
famousexample,havinga rightto freespeechand freeassembly
are indirectcausalcontributors to havinga rightto subsistence,
sincewithoutthe rightto makeyourvoice heard,you willbe
unableto protestwhenfoodrunsshort.)Butthissenseofcausal
interdependence is distinctfromthe idea thatall rightsare
equallyimportant in a timeofemergency. We can stillarguethe
are
rights analytically in
indivisible, Sen's sense,whileadmitting
thatin dangeroustimes,somerights justturnouttobe morefun-
damentalthanothers.
How shouldwe thinkaboutemergency suspensionsof rights?
Do exceptionsleaverulesin ruins,or do theyenablerulesto sur-
vive?Arederogations ofrightsa lesserevilor a fatalcompromise
thatjeopardizestheirstatusin normaltimes?I willarguein favor
of a lesserevil position,one thatcountenancesdemocratically
authorizedabridgements oftheliberties ofsometo preservethe
libertiesofall. In thewakeofSeptember11,whenno one knew
howmanycellsAI Qaeda had in operationin theUnitedStates,it
was legitimateto arrestand hold in administrative detention
1,200people who had violated the terms of theirimmigration
visas.Butitwasalsoincumbent on theauthorities toprocessthese

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 HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM 1141

people throughpublicadministrative hearingsas quicklyas pos-

sibleand toafford themlegalcounseland contactwiththeirfam-
ilies.The hearingshavenotbeen open and theyhavenotbeen
expeditious,buttheyhavebeensubjecttojudicialreview, and the
SupremeCourtwillprobably examinetheirfinalconstitutionality.
In thesecircumstances, the abridgement of the rightsof these
1,200peoplecouldbejustified. Butthejustification becomesless
compelling with each passingday that the executive fails
to prove
thatthedetaineesconstitute an actualor possibledanger.
AbrahamLincoln'sabridgement of habeas corpusduringthe
CivilWarwouldbe a further exampleof a necessary derogation
in timeofemergency. Theseexceptionsneed notfatally compro-
misetheruleof law.To maintainthattheydo is to assumethat
rightssuspendedin emergency are neverrestoredin peacetime.
Allconstitutionsassumea distinction betweentherulesthatapply
in emergencies in
and thosethatapply timesofsafety, and seeka
to
way manageemergencies so that they do not become perma-
nentor permanently damaging.The positionI takeis essentially
thatofAbrahamLincolnin hisjustification ofthesuspensionof
habeascorpusduringtheCivilWar.Lincoln'sposition,setoutin
hisletterto ErastusCorning,wasthatsuspensionof habeascor-
pus in wartime did notjeopardizeitsstatusin peacetime.Excep-
tions,he argued,did not erode the statusof rules.Without
exceptions,he insisted,therulecouldnotbe preserved(Letterto
ErastusCorning,1989:457-460;Neely,1991).
The problemwithemergencies, as Lincolnsaw,was not that
they constitute
a threatto constitutional principlesin general.
The problemwithemergencies iswhether theyarejustified in the
specificcircumstances. The problemis to identify whatlevelof
actualor apprehendedthreatconstitutes a genuineemergency
and to provethatthesuspensions or abridgements ofliberty are
necessary to meet the threat,rather than simply offera sop to
publicopinion.A recentscholarly evaluationofCanada'sBillC-
36, enacted afterSeptember 1 1 to tightenCanada'santi-terrorist
legislation,
questioned whether the legislationdid actuallyadd

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1 142 SOCIAL RESEARCH

muchto thecriminallawalreadyon thebooksto deal withthe

terrorist threat(Daniels,Macklem,and Roach, 2001). Similar
arguments havebeen madeabouttheSpanishban on theBasque
separatistparty:does it actuallycontributeto the campaign
againstBasqueterror or is ita politicalresponsetopublicoutrage
at terroristattacks(Woodworth, 2001)? The real dangeris the
manipulation ofopinion,themanufacture ofdangerbyexecutive
authorities who are seekingmorepower.The rule of law is not
compromised byemergencies perse,butbypoliticizedconstrual
ofrisktojustify emergency measuresthatare notactuallyneces-
saryto meet the threat at hand.
The testofwhether statepowercan be heldto accountwhenit
makesthesedecisionsis notso muchwhattheemergency or anti-
terroristlawssaysbutratherwhether ofa freesoci-
theinstitutions
etydo theirjobs. It is, of course,thefunctionof a legislature, a
freepress,a well-organized civilsocietyand an independent judi-
to
ciary keep the executive under There
scrutiny. have been few
nationalemergencieswhere executivesdid not overstepthe
bounds,theinternment of theJapanesebyRooseveltbeingthe
mostegregiousmodernexample.Whatthisexampleseemsto
showis thatinstitutions failedto do theirproperjob: the press
keptsilent,dissenting voices within theexecutive werestilled,and
mostimportant, thejudiciaryexplicitly supportedthe executive
(Robinson,2001).
The exampleoftheJapaneseinternment suggests thatcivillib-
ertiesaremostat riskwhena popularpresident, facinga genuine
threat, uses his formidable power manipulateboth popular
to
and congressional opinion.In the case of theJapaneseintern-
it
ment, appears thatrace playeda malignpartin undermining
theabilityofboththepresidentand thejudiciaryto understand
thata fundamental violationof the rightsof Americanshad
occurred.The exampleilluminatesthe extentto whichrights
enforcement depends on institutionally diffusedideas of civic
equality, which mean rights derogations anygroupare under-
for
stoodas potentialthreatsto all. It remainsto be seen whether

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 HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM 1143

Arab-American citizens,and Arabswiththe entitlementto live,

work,orstudyin theUnitedStates,benefitfromthispresumption
ofcivicequalityand henceofdue process.Thattheyhaveso far
escaped thefateof theJapaneseAmericansis difficult to inter-
pret:eitherwe havelearnedfromourhistory, or else,theworstis
yetto come.

//

If we are at war withterror - and thisseems more than a

metaphor, forthe reasonthatthey are at warwithus- thenan
additionalquestionis notsimply whetherexceptionaldeviations
fromprecommitments destroy theveryidea ofprecommitments,
butwhichprecommitments - humanrightsor thelawsofwar-
shouldapplyin thecircumstances. These twoethicalsystems are
closelyrelated,but theyare also contradictory, and one wayto
understandthe ethicalcomplexity of a waragainstterroris to
understand thedifferences betweenthem.
Sometimesthelawsofwarand humanrightsoverlap.In nei-
therethicalsystem - whether thedetaineeis heldas a prisonerof
warundertheGenevaConventions or as a criminal
suspectawait-
-
ing trial is tortureallowed.For a statepartylike the United
Statesto handa detaineeoverto another forinterro-
jurisdiction
gationwheresuch prohibitions do not applywould make the
UnitedStatesresponsible, as principalagent,fortheconductof
itsproxy.
Sometimes - as in the case of torture - humanrightsand the
lawsofwarimposethesame ethicallimitation on counterterror
Butat otherpointstheydiverge.In combatoperations,
strategies.
usingthearmedforcesofa state,youcan shootto kill;ifyouare
conducting policeoperationsonly,youcannotor at leastshould
not.In thecase ofAI Qaeda, whichwas a full-scale for-
military
mationwithextensive training camps,munitions, and
stocks, sup-
a
plies, military response to its threatwas In other
unavoidable.

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1144 SOCIAL RESEARCH

formsof terrorism, police operationsmaybe sufficient and the

appropriateethicaland operationallimitations on deadlyforce
shouldapply.
The largerpointhere is thathumanrightscannotserveas a
completeguideforactionwhenterrorists wagewaragainsta state.
Because of its fundamental commitment to the rightto life,
humanrightsis inherently a pacifist
doctrine,and weresocieties
to pre-commit to pacifistlimitations,theywould disarmthem-
selvesagainstmortalthreat.
Movingbeyondthelimitations imposedbyhumanrightsdoes
notmeanpassingfromethicallimitation to barbarism. It simply
means passingfromone strategy -
of precommitmenthuman
-
rights to another:thelawsofwar.The lawsofwarseekto save,
forconditions wherecombatis necessary, thoseethicalrestraints
thatare builtintohumanrights.
Morecomplicatedis therelationbetweenthelawsofwarand
standardcriminallaw.The lawsofwarhold thatitis unlawful to
kill a disarmedcombatanttakenprisoner.Further,prisoners
mustbe releasedupon conclusionofhostilities. Americancrimi-
nal lawsees thesamesituationverydifferently. A terrorist trans-
ferredto an Americancriminalcourtand triedas a civilian
defendantmayface the deathpenaltyor substantial periodsof
imprisonment. The Bush administration's handlingof terrorist
prisonerssuggeststhatit picksits ethical accordingto
restraints
convenience. It abidesbysomeofthelawsofwarfordetaineesat
Guantánamo,respecting forexample.But
theirreligiousrights,
it willnot grantthemformalprisonerof warstatus,since that
would require posthostilitiesrelease. So the Guantánamo
detaineesare in a legal limbo,underthecontrolofa detaining
powerwho allowsRed Crossvisitsand otheraspectsof Geneva
Conventionprotectionwhilerefusingothers,such as tribunal
determination ofstatus.Stillotherterrorist detaineestheUnited
Statesseeks to indictand punishhave been takento federal
court,whereprosecutors can seekthedeathpenalty. A thirdcat-
egoryofnon-United Statescitizendetaineesmayhavetheircases

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 HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM 1 145

determined bythemilitary tribunalscreatedbyexecutiveorder

of the president.Those troubledby thisethicalinconsistency
mightaskwhetherthehandlingof terrorism can alwaysbe con-
sistent,given that terrorists themselvesconfoundcategories,
seekingcivilianguisesto escape detectionand thenusingmili-
tarytraining and tacticsto mountattacks.Moreover, a consistent
application of lawsof war doctrine mightrequire releaseof
the
individualswhoconstitute a threat.Whatmaymattermorethan
strictconsistency,or at leastbe moreattainablethanstrictcon-
is publicaccountability.
sistency,
But thenthe issuearises:accountableto whom?The Ameri-
can positionis thattheexecutiveshouldbe accountableonlyto
Americancourtsand theAmericanCongress.Yet it is holding
prisonerswhilereserving the rightto decide whichof itsinter-
nationalobligationsunder the Geneva Conventionsdo or do
notapply.ThismakestheUnitedStatesjudge andjuryin a mat-
teraffecting thehumanrightsofdetaineesand thisis precisely
whatthe Geneva Conventionregimeis designedto prevent.
This positionmore or less guaranteesthatthe reciprocity on
whichtheregimedependswillbreakdownwhenAmericansare
takenprisoner.
SinceAI Qaeda has thecharacteristics ofa criminalcell and a
militaryformation, itis inevitablethatthemoralprinciplesgov-
erningthe combatagainstit shouldconflict. Wherethe action
againstAI Qaeda is primarily a civilianpolice operation,the
rulesregardingsearchand seizure,arrest,use of deadlyforce,
and thecivillibertiesprotections regardingdetentionand trial
shouldbe in forceas muchas possible.Wherederogationsor
exceptionsare required,theymustbe publiclyjustifiedand
approvedbycourtorder.Wherethe actionsare primarily mili-
-
tary,thelawsofwarshouldapply and sincetheseare interna-
tional instruments,the United States should accept
international accountability foritsactions,especiallywithnonci-
tizendetainees.

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 1146 SOCIAL RESEARCH

///

Thusfar,I havelookedat humanrightsand thelawsofwaras

precommitment strategiesdesignedto restrain our conductin a
waron terrorand keep it withinthe confinesofjustice.Now I
wanttolookat humanrights and terror froma lessfamiliar stand-
point:thepointofviewofterrorists. It is notsufficiently appreci-
ated that human rights - in particular the right to
self-determination - also serveas an important justification for
terror. Whereversubjector oppressedpeoples seekingself-rule
turnto terror, theydo so in thename of thishumanright.The
entireanticolonialresistance to imperialrule- in India,Algeria,
Vietnam,to name onlythe epochal examples - wasjustifiedby
the humanrightto self-determination. In some cases,notably
Algeria,the anticolonialstruggleturnedto terrorand justified
themeansas a necessity in thebattleforfreedom.The Palestin-
ian struggle is a struggleforhumanrights, and actsofterror find
justification in theclaimto self-determination.
Humanrights do notmotivate terror- itis hardtosee howthey
could motivatesince theyexpresslyenjoin us againsttaking
humanlife- but thisdoes not preventthemfromservingas an
important justificationforacts of terror.For ordinaryterrorists,
terroris a wayoflife,a business,a meansof exercising, consoli-
and
dating, increasing power in theirown communities. Terror-
ism,byand large,is a careerratherthana moralcommitment,
and it is generally motivated, as a dailymatter, bythesamemat-
tersthatmotivate criminality:hope profit, ofviolencefor
of love
itsownsake,and theglamouroftheunderworld life.Yetterror-
ismis notjust criminality, sinceitseeksto attract civiliansupport
and it does so bymakingpoliticalclaimsthatare groundedin
moralprinciples.So if humanrightsdo not oftenfeatureas a
directmotivation, theydo figureas a justification, in theformof
theclaim,amongtheIrishterrorists, forexample,thatthepeople
of Irelandshouldrulethemselves freeof Britishoccupation.Of
course,thishumanrightsclaimis speciousat anynumberoflev-

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 HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM 1147

els,especially in theIrishRepublicanclaimthattheirshas some

automaticrightto trumptheequal and competingclaimof the
Loyalistcommunity to enjoytheirownself-determination, in the
formofcontinuedassociation withtheBritish crown.
The complexrelationship betweenhumanrightsand terroris
evenbetterilluminated by eventsofSeptember11.The apoc-
the
alypticnihilistswho attackedon September11 did not leave
behinddemandsorjustifications. Buttheiractshavebeen inter-
pretedbytheirsupporters to havebeen in thenameoftherights
of thePalestinians and therightsofbelieversto worshipin holy
places free of foreign - thatis, American - occupation.To be
sure,itwouldbe politicalidiocyto regardAI Qaeda as a human
rightsorganization. The so-calledmartyrs defendedtheiractions
in the languageof Islamiceschatology, not in the languageof
rights.Moreover, theirintentions wereapocalyptic, notpolitical:
tohumiliate the archenemy of Islam and secure martyrdom in the
process.Yetthe enduringimpactof September11 dependsnot
juston itsshattering violence,butalso on thedegreetowhichthe
eventwasjustifiedbymillionsof Palestinians and othersin the
Muslimworldas an actin defenseofa pairoflinkedrights claims.
Whatarewe to makeoftheusesofhumanrights as a justifica-
tionforterror? Obviously, the contradiction between the twois
flagrant,and itwouldbe easytoconcludethewholematter bysay-
ing that human rightsmustneverbe pairedwithviolenceofany
kindas a vocabulary ofjustification.Ifbelievingin humanrights
meansanything, itmeansbelievingthatkillingcivilians forpolit-
ical purposescan neverbe justified.In short,thereare no- and
therecannotbe- deserving victimsof politicalviolence.Terror
justifiesitselfthrough a belief in the idea thatvictimsdeserve
theirfate,or at leastiftheydo not deservetheirfate,thenthat
theirfateis a secondarymatter. Thus fora committed terrorist,
thereare no innocentcivilians. Civilianswhobenefitfromor col-
laboratewithoccupationor oppressionarejust as guiltyas the
agentsof thestatedirectly responsible fortheoppression.For a
humanrights believer,thisviolatesthebedrockofhumanrights,

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1 148 SOCIAL RESEARCH

theKantianidea thathumanbeingsareendsin themselves, never

to be sacrificed, coerced,or destroyed forthe sake of even the
noblestend.
If thisis so, howcan we reconcilethisprohibition againstthe
instrumental use ofhumanbeingsforpoliticalpurposeswiththe
equal commitment withinhumanrightsto a collectiverightto
self-determination? The obviousanswer - and it leads to prob-
lemswe willdeal withlater- is thathumanrightsendorsecol-
lectiveself-determination as a goal withoutat the same time
endorsinganyand all means of struggle.Indeed, a consistent
beliefin humanrightswouldonlyendorsenonviolent meansof
civildisobedienceas an appropriate tacticforsecuringself-deter-
mination.
Butthat,ofcourse,is nothowthehumanrightto self-determi-
nationis commonly understood(thatis,as a rightto self-govern-
ment that can only be met, consistentwith human rights
principles,throughpeaceful negotiationand, if that fails,
throughnonviolentprotest).Instead,when humanrightslan-
guage is used, it figuresas a moraltrump,as a table-clearing,
game-winning claimto moralentitlement. In thismoreindirect
sense,as a languageof closed self-righteousness, humanrights
can passfrom justificationto actualmotivation forterror.
Palestiniansfrequently argue as if theirself-determination
claimwasa trumpwhen,bothas a matter ofpracticalpoliticsand
as a matterof ethics,thereal issueis to reconciletheirjustified
claimswithotherequallyjustifiedclaimsheld by Israelis.The
sametypeoftrumping argument is used byIrishRepublicansin
thefaceofLoyalistclaims.All too frequently twoor moreclaims
to self-determination are competing forthe same politicalspace.
Human rightsprinciples - since theyenjoin respectand obser-
vance of the rightto life- would implythatthe twoor more
claimsmustbe reconciledthroughpeacefulnegotiation,not
through waror terror.
Human rightsprinciplesthusjustifyself-determination strug-
gles butalso two
specify practical ethicallimits on a
waging strug-

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 HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM 1 149

gle forself-determination. The firstis an injunctionagainstvio-

lence,and thesecondis an injunctionto respecttheself-deter-
minationclaimsofothers,throughnegotiation and deliberation.
Finecounsels,I hearyousay.Butthereis an obviousobjection.
Moralperfectionism is oftena waytokeeptheweakin submission
and humanrightsis certainly a formof moralperfectionism.
Tellingthe Palestinians to returnto nonviolenceand to accept
thecompeting rights of the Israelismightbe tocondemnthemto
politicalfailureinside a Bantustan.Certainlythatis how my
morally perfectionistarguments wouldbe rebutted wereI togo to
theJeninrefugeecampand attemptto makemyself heard.The
humanrights principles -
I haveadduced nonviolence and delib-
-
eration seemonlytodisarmtheweakand entrench theinjustice
ofthestrong.
So whatarewe to do?Wemightconcludeat thispointwiththe
hypothetical speculationthat had these two principlesbeen
observedin the Palestinianstruggle, theymightnowbe in the
possessionofa viablestateoftheirown,ratherthancaughtin the
nightmare of a war of terrorwithoutend, insidea Bantustan
underpermanent military occupation.I happento believethisis
true,but it is, to saythe least,a hypothetical truth.We do not
knowwhatwouldhavehappenedhad thePalestinians beenled by
nonviolent leaderswitha commitment todeliberation.Wedo not
know what would have happened had Zionism's historical
foundersrecognizedthe competingPalestinianclaim to self-
determination and iftheirIsraelisuccessorshad understoodthe
folly and injusticeof permanentoccupationin timeto reverse
course.Historicalanalogiesfromotherstrugglessuggestthat
thosewhofollowthedual counselof nonviolenceand delibera-
tion are not alwayscondemnedto morallyhonorabledefeat.
Sometimestheyevenwin.Strictadherenceto nonviolenceand
deliberation havewonhistoric victories- considerthesuccessof
Gandhiagainstthe Britishor MartinLutherKing againstthe
southernsegregationists. Thesevictories, itmightbe added,were
all themoreheroicsincetheywereachievedin thefaceofalmost

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1150 SOCIAL RESEARCH

constant provocationsto repayviolencewithviolence.Butwe can

hardlyaddressthe claimsof the oppressedwiththe comforting
thought thatin theend rightwillprevail.Alltoooftenitdoes not.
And we mustconsiderseriously the claimthatforthe weakto
observehumanrightsis to deliverthemup, defenseless, to the
ruthlessness ofthestrong.Thisargument fromweaknessis a fun-
damentalpartoftheethicaljustification ofactsof terrorin pur-
suitof a self-determination claim.Wherea stateor occupying
powerpossessesoverwhelming military force,peoplefighting for
freedomoftenarguethattheywillgo downto defeatiftheycon-
finetheirstruggle to nonviolent protestor iftheyseekto directly
challengethemilitary mightoftheotherside.The onlytacticthat
converts weaknessintostrength - hittingtheenemy
is terrorism
whereit is mostvulnerable, itscivilianpopulation.This is more
thana tacticalargumentin favorof "asymmetrical" methods.It
has a moralelement.The weakmusthavetherighttofightdirty;
otherwise thestrongwillalways win.Ifyouobligetheweaktofight
clean,injusticewillalwaystriumph. Here theethicaljustification
is in theformofa lesserevilargument. To overcomethegreater
evil of injusticeand oppression,the weak mustbe entitledto
resortto the lesserevil.If theydo not,ethicalscruplewillcon-
demnthemto an eternity ofsubjugation. Greaterand lesserevil
arguments are oftenused by the otherside- thatis, by states
fighting terrorism.Theyarguein favorof the lesserevilof sus-
pending civil in orderthatthegreaterevilof terrorism
liberties
can be defeated.So ifone sidecan makeuse ofa lesserevilargu-
ment,whycan'ttheother?
Wecannotresolvethisproblemwiththepietythattheweakare
bestservedbynot surrendering thehighmoralground.This is
sometimes butitisa councilofperfection,
truehistorically, which
theweakhave reasonto rejectwhenit is arguedbythe strong.
Moreover, humanrights principlesthemselves arenotan ethicsof
resignation, but a call to struggle.To claimthathumanrights
neverjustifytheviolationof the rightsof othersis to associate
humanrightswithpoliticalquietism, withsubmission to oppres-

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 HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM 1151

sion.Buthumanrightsare notan ethicsofquietism.The Euro-

pean liberalpoliticaltraditionincubatedthe idea of human
rights,yetLocke andJefferson explicitly reservea rightforthe
- -
oppressed the weak to rise up in revoltagainstintolerable
conditions: againstthestrong.WhatisJefferson's Declarationof
Independencebuta reasoneddefenseofthenecessity ofpolitical
violenceto overthrow imperialoppression? The rightof revolu-
tion, enshrined in Enlightenment liberal politicaltheory, implies
thatpoliticalfreedomis so valuable,so muchthe precondition
forthesafeenjoyment ofanyrights at all,thatitsdefensecanjus-
tifyacts of armed resistance that,of necessity, willviolatethe
rights ofothers.Thisconnectionbetweenrights and armedresis-
tance is deep and historically enduring.Rightswould not be
rights(thatis,ultimate claims)unlesstheywereworthdefending,
ifnecessary, at thepriceofone's life.To fight fora rightdoes not
necessarily the
requireviolating rights of others. Butitmay.Ifthe
Americanrevolutionaries had not takenup arms,and drawn
bloodin doingso,theywouldnothavewontheirfreedom. There
is thusa historical but also conceptualconnectionbetweenthe
veryidea ofa codifiedsetofultimatecommitments and ultimate
immunities, and the necessity, in situations of extremity, to resort
to violenceto preserve, restore,or establishthemin thefaceof
tyranny or usurpation(Honore,1988;Miller,1984).
Butletus be clear.The rightofrevolution is nota humanright.
It is containedwithinthe liberaltraditionthatgave birthto
humanrights, butrevolution - itsjustification,
itself morality and
a modeofaction- is notarticulated withinthehumanrightstra-
dition.The 1948Universal DeclarationofHumanRightsconfines
therightofrevolution to itspreamble:"Whereasitis essential, if
manis nottobe compelledtohaverecourse, as a lastresource,to
rebellionagainsttyranny and oppression,that human rights
shouldbe protectedbytheruleoflaw."Butthemeaningof this
referenceis clearlya messageof warningto states:theymust
entrench humanrights or riskrebellion.Itis notan endorsement
ofa righttorebellionas such,butratherthestatement thatrebel-

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1152 SOCIAL RESEARCH

lion becomes inevitablewhen essentialrightsare repeatedly

denied.
The ambiguousplace ofrevolution in theantechamber ofthe
foundingrightsdocumentexposes the limitations of human
rightsas a systemof ultimatecommitments. For theseultimate
commitments - to respect,preserve, and defendhumanlifeand
theexerciseofhumanfreedom - do nottellus whatwe are enti-
tledto do whenthesevaluesare denied,whenoppressionand
tyranny crushthe essentialhuman aspirationsdefinedin the
humanrights lexicon.
Indeed, ifwe seekanswersto thequestion - whatis permitted
whenrisingup againstoppressionand tyranny? - weneed topass
out of the rubricof humanrightsaltogetherand considerthe
bodyofreflection and codification knownas thelawsofwar.The
twosystems ofmoralreflection are linked.The lawsofwarseek
to protecttheessentialcommitments ofhumanrights;thatis,to
maintainthe dignityand inviolability of combatantsand non-
combatants.But theyare writtenfor the situationthatarises
whentheprimary humanright - to life- has been abrogatedby
a stateofwar,whenstatesor partiesto a conflicthavedeclared
theirrightto takeup armsand to kill.This is the situationin
whichthe questionof revolutionis posed- when a statehas
declaredwaron itsowncitizensand theytakeup armsto resist.
The lawsofwaressentially seekto savewhatcan be savedofthe
humanitarian impulse ofhuman rightsonce violencehasbegun.
The lawsofwardo notdefinewhentheresortto violenceisjus-
tified,buttheyseekto regulateconductonce violenceis chosen
as a methodof struggle.The firstAdditionalProtocolof the
GenevaConventions, signedbymanystatesin 1977,seeksto reg-
ulatetheviolenceused in struggles forself-determination.The
typesof strugglethatcome withinthe termsof the convention
are those concernedto overthrow "colonial dominationand
alien occupation"as wellas "racistregimes"thatdenytheexer-
cise of self-determination. This protocolinsiststhatthe same
rulesof proportionality and civilianimmunity thatgovernthe

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 HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM 1153

conductof regularsoldiersshouldapplyto insurgents, militia-

men,and otherforcestakingup an armedstruggle(Greenwood,
1996).
The veryidea of civilianimmunity illustratesthe difference
betweenthe universalistic framework of humanrightsand the
particularisticframework of the laws of war.Lawsof wardistin-
guish minutelybetweenthe moral statusof varioushuman
- combatants,
actors noncombatants, civilians,military,prisoners,
medical staff - while human rightsprinciplesexplicitlyreject
moraldiscriminations basedon status.Froma humanrightsper-
spective,civilian immunity is an incoherentmoral principle,
inconsistentwiththeequal respectdue all humanbeings.Froma
lawofwarperspective, itis theprinciplethatpreserves somemea-
sureofethicaldiscrimination in themidstofcombat.
Thus, if we view national liberationstrugglesexclusively
through a humanrights lens,we areforcedto concludethatthey
mustdisciplinethemselves to followthetworulesofnonviolence
and deliberation. Thismaycondemnthemto politicalfailure.If
we believethattheiroppressionis suchthatitjustifiesturning to
thentheethicsoftheirstruggle
violenceas a lastresort, passesout
ofhumanrights and intotherulesofthelawsofwar.Theserules
theseexpressly forbidthetargeting ofcivilians.
Ifwe sumup at thispoint,I am sayingthatthereis an ethical
wayto defendthe use of violencein supportof a self-determi-
nation claim: as a last resort,when nonviolent,deliberative
meanshave been exhausted,and providedthatviolenceobeys
the rulesof warrelatingto civilianimmunity. To be sure,this
limitsthestruggle forfreedom.You cannotfightdirty, youmust
takeon military not
targets, civilianones, butat leastyouare not
requiredto turntheothercheekwhenyouarefacedwithassault
and oppression.Those who observesuch rules deserve the
nameoffreedomfighters. Those whodo not,deservethename
ofterrorist.
Whywouldanyone fighting forfreedomsubjecttheirstruggle
to ethicalrestraintwhenterrorism is so oftensuccessful? Thereis

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1154 SOCIAL RESEARCH

no easy answerto the question.The motivesfor observing

restraint mightincludewanting tomaintaina certainmoraliden-
tityto oneselfand one's followers, together witha consequential-
ist calculationthat targetingcivilianswould alienatevaluable
support.Whatcountsas valuablesupportdependscritically on
whetherthe struggleneeds international approvalto succeed.
Struggles that need such supportmay be more willingto subject
themselves toethicalrestraintthanthosethatbelievetheycanwin
on theirownterms.Eitherway,itmustbe confessedthatwilling-
nesstokeepon therightsideoftheterrorist/freedom-fighter dis-
tinctiondependsratherless on the intrinsic appeal of human
rightsprinciples and more on the international politicalincen-
tivesthatexistto rewardrestraint.
In 1981,theAfrican NationalCongress(ANC) becamethefirst
nationalliberation movement tocommititself toobeytheGeneva
Conventions in itsarmedstruggle againsttheapartheidregimein
SouthAfrica.It did so to gainfurther international supportand
to assertthatitsownmoralidentity was different fromthe gov-
ernment itwasfighting. In theend,ofcourse,itdid secureinter-
nationalsupport,but itsconductdid notalwaysconformto the
highmoralidentity ithad definedforitself. AstheTruthand Rec-
onciliationCommission discovered, torture and nonjudicialexe-
cutionofprisoners, attackson civiliantargets,
as wellas terrorist
occurredduringtheliberationstruggle. It is to thecreditof the
ANC government thatitacceptedpublicaccountability forthese
acts,by testifying to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
hearings.Butifevena movement keenlyconsciousofitsinterna-
tionalreputationcould have committed crimesin the prosecu-
tionofa juststruggle, itisunclearhowmovements lessconcerned
withtheirmoralreputation willacceptethicalrestraint. But this
at least suggeststhatone wayto reduce terrorism is to create
incentives forliberation movements to comply with the Geneva
Conventions duringarmedstruggle and to penalizethem,with
international ostracism, whentheydo not.

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 HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM 1155

rv
Terrorism exposesthelimitations ofhumanrights as an ethical
system.Humanrights maynotbe quietist, buttheymightbe paci-
- enjoiningresistance,
fist butneverup to thepointofviolence.
The pacifism ofhumanrightsstrikes me as a limitation essential
to itsnature,butnonetheless one thatcondemnstheoppressed
to eventualdefeatand submission. A struggle forfreedom, justi-
fiedbyhumanrights, can onlywinifitexitsfromhumanrights as
a moralsystem.
There is a conflict, then,betweenhumanrightsas a deonto-
logical systemof priorcommitments - we will not do certain
thingsto humanbeingsno matterwhat- and an ethicsofstrug-
gle thatmustarguethatcertainends,likefreedomfromintoler-
able oppression,do justifycertainmeans,namelythe takingof
humanlife.I cannotsee anywayaroundthisconflict, butitdoes
notfollowthatifyouabandonpuredeontological principlein the
midstofa struggle forfreedom, youabandonall moralrestraints
on thepursuitofyourobjective.The alternative, as I see it,is not
betweenhumanrights and barbarism, buttounderstand thattwo
ethicalsystems, in
not one, are play,and thatthe resortto vio-
lence is not the end of ethicalrestraint, but simplythe passage
intothedomainofethicsruledbythelawsofwar.
The choicebetweenthelawsofwarframework and thehuman
rightsframework is nota choicebetweenbarbarism and civiliza-
tion,betweenlawand lawlessness, betweenethicsand pureexpe-
diency. It is a choice between two competingmoralframesof
reference, and we haveto understand whatmoralframeofrefer-
encewe are in,and in whatsituation.
The realquestionaboutpoliticalviolenceis whetherit is truly
a lastresortor something else. Theremaybe caseswherethere
are no peacefulpoliticalmeansavailableto theweak,or where
themeansareso stackedagainstthem - I am thinking hereofthe
systematic disenfranchisement of minorities- thatresort,firstto
nonviolent protest,and thentoarmedstruggle, mayultimately be

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1156 SOCIAL RESEARCH

justified.No defenseof politicsas an alternative to violenceis

honestunless such politicsactuallydoes offeran alternative
venuefortheweakto maketheircase heard.
Butthetestas to whether a politicalsystem meetstheneedsof
the weak is not whetherthe case of the weak succeeds,but
whether itcanbe heardand insomewayaccommodated. The test
ofwhetherviolenceisjustifiedis also stringent: the interestsin
questionmustbe seriousand their denial a very basic denial of
essentialhumanrights;thefailureto accommodatetheseinter-
estsmustbe repeatedand mustgenuinely shutthedoor to fur-
therredress.Finally,thetestofwhether violentactionisjustified
dependson whetherall peaceful,deliberative courseshavebeen
genuinely exhaustedand nonviolenceprotesthas comeup short
on a matter,again,thatinvolves a fundamental humanright.
-
Timeand again and theexampleshereare theBasque sepa-
ratists,theTamilTigers,theIrishnationalists, and yes,thePales-
tinianstoo- violenceis not resortedto as a last resort,after
exhaustinggood faithefforts to exploitall peacefuland legiti-
matemeansofpoliticalaction,includingnonviolent protest,but
resort.The weakconclude:Let'sgo thefastway.The fast
as a first
wayis to killas manycivilians as possibleto gettheworldto take
notice.Let'skillas manycivilians as we can to provoketheother
side intoa downward spiralof repressionand violencethatwill
delegitimate themin theeyesoftheirsupporters and theworldat
large.Thisis whattheFrenchso rightly dupire.
call la politique
du piredoes awaywiththe core of politicsthatis
La politique
deliberation, businessof actuallypersuadingotherhuman
the
beingsthatyouare rightand theyare wrong.The horrorofter-
rorismis thatitis a politicsthatseeksthedeathofpolitics, a prac-
tice thatwantsto replacedialogue,discussion,debate,protest,
and theartsbywhichwe maintainsomecontroloverhumanvio-
lence withviolencealone. The reasonthatOsama bin Laden is
the enemyof the humanrace is notjust thathe caresso little
abouthumanlife,butthathe willnotreasonor arguewithany-
one. He is not interested injoininganyargument withanyone.

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 HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM 1157

He wouldratherterrify or intimidate. So in understanding what

we do not like about terror,it is not simply thatit killshuman
beings. It also kills
politics,the one processwe havedevisedthat
masters violencein thenameofjustice.Thisis whattruly entitles
us to saythatOsama bin Laden and his likeare enemiesof the
humanraceand thatourrelations withthemshouldbe relations
ofwar.

Notes
*OnUlysess and theSirensand on precommi tmentin generaland in
relationto constitutionsand rightsregimes,see Elster(2000, esp. p.
104),and Elster(1979:36-40);see also Homer(12:36-60).A morefully
developedversionof thearguments in thispaperwillbe made in my
forthcoming Gifford Lecturesat Edinburgh "TheLesserEvil:
University,
PoliticalEthicsin an AgeofTerror"(2003).
2In 2001,the Britishgovernment informedthe Councilof Europe
thatitwasderogating fromitsEuropeanConvention in rela-
obligations
tionto thedetention ofterroristsuspects.

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