This timely book analyses ‘soft power’ in the light of neoclassical realist premises

as part of the foreign policy toolkit of great powers to expand their sphere of influ-
ence. Vasif Huseynov argues that if nuclear armed great powers compete against
the same type of powers to expand or sustain their sphere of influence over a
SPPS
214
SPPS Edited by
Andreas Umland
Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society Vol. 214

populated region, they use soft power as a major expansive instrument while mili-

Huseynov Geopolitical Rivalries in the “Common Neighborhood”

tary power remains a tool to defend themselves and back up their foreign policies.
Presenting his model of soft power, the author explores the role of soft power
projection by great powers in the formation of the external alignment of regional
states. He focuses on the rivalries between Russia and the West (i.e. the EU and
the USA) over the states located between the EU and Russia (the region known
as the “common [or shared] neighborhood”) and on two of these regional states
(Ukraine and Belarus) to test his hypotheses.

“Huseynov offers a deep and thoughtful but critical reflection on and application of
IR theories. He subscribes to a modified variant of the neoclassical realist school
and proceeds from there to cover the relationship between external great powers
in rivalry and their influence on or use of domestic social and political forces in
countries they would like to control, or even to bring them into their orbit of influ-
ence.”
Peter W. Schulze, Co-Founder, “Dialogue of Civilizations” Research Institute, Berlin

“Huseynov systematically analyses various soft power strategies of great powers.

He shows how great powers financed, partially founded, and politically supported
specific domestic groups, which then supposedly influenced the foreign policies
of their governments. This is a very informative contribution and provides highly
interesting information.”
Anja Jetschke, Professor of International Relations, University of Göttingen

The author:
Dr. Vasif Huseynov studied International Relations, Political Economy, and Politi- Vasif Huseynov
cal Science in Baku, Kassel, and Göttingen. His research has been supported by
the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). He is a Research Fellow at the
Centre for Analysis of International Relations and Lecturer in Politics at the Khazar
University in Baku. His articles have appeared in, among other outlets, Caucasus
Geopolitical Rivalries in the
International, CES Working Papers, and Eastern Journal of European Studies.
The author of the foreword:
“Common Neighborhood”
Dr. Nicholas Ross Smith is Assistant Professor of International Studies at The
University of Nottingham Ningbo, China. Russia's Conflict with theWest, Soft Power,
and Neoclassical Realism
ISBN: 978-3-8382-1277-7
With a foreword by Nicholas Ross Smith
Distributed by

ibidem ibd
ibidem
Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society (SPPS) Vol. 214
ISSN 1614-3515
General Editor: Andreas Umland, Commissioning Editor: Max Jakob Horstmann,
Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kyiv, [email protected] London, [email protected]

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 Contents

Foreword ............................................................................................... ix
Acknowledgements.......................................................................... xiii
List of Abbreviations ......................................................................... xv
List of Figures ..................................................................................... xix
List of Tables ....................................................................................... xx
1. Introduction ................................................................................. 21
Literature Review and Research Gap ....................................... 23
Theoretical Argument ................................................................. 28
Structure of the Book ................................................................... 30
2. Analytical Framework ............................................................... 33
Realism: Neoclassical Realism ................................................... 34
(Neoclassical) Realism on Great Power Rivalries ................... 37
(Neoclassical) Realism on the Foreign Policy of Regional
States amidst Great Power Rivalries ................................. 40
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy ........................................... 43
State Autonomy across Different Variables ............................. 46
Soft Power ..................................................................................... 48
Historical Review on Soft Power ............................................... 51
Soft Power in Theoretical Writings ........................................... 51
Soft Power in Practice ................................................................. 53
Reconceptualization of Soft Power............................................ 55
State-Managed Projection ........................................................... 58
Soft Power vs. Hard Power ........................................................ 64
Case Selection ............................................................................... 70
The Russia—West Confrontation over the “Common
Neighbourhood” .................................................................. 73
The “Common Neighbourhood” States ................................... 76
 Conclusion .................................................................................... 82
3. Soft Power in Western Foreign Policies (2004—2016) .......... 85
Soft Power vs. Hard Power in Policies of Western Powers ... 86
Soft Power as the Western Foreign Policy Tool ....................... 92
Self-Projection .............................................................................. 95
Narratives ..................................................................................... 96
International Broadcasting ......................................................... 98
Cultural Diplomacy and Exchange Programmes.................. 102
Western NGOs and Support for Civil Society ....................... 104
American Non-Governmental Organizations ....................... 105
European Non-Governmental Organizations ....................... 108
Foreign Aid ................................................................................. 112
American Assistance ................................................................. 112
European Assistance ................................................................. 114
Limitations of the Western Soft Power Policies..................... 116
Conclusion .................................................................................. 120
4. Soft Power in Russia’s Practice (2004—2016) ...................... 123
Soft Power vs. Hard Power in Russia’s Policies .................... 124
Soft Power as Russia’s Foreign Policy Tool ........................... 131
Self-Projection ............................................................................ 136
Narratives ................................................................................... 140
International Broadcasting ....................................................... 145
Academic Exchange Programs ................................................ 148
Russia’s NGOs and Support to Civil Society ......................... 151
Economic Ties and Foreign Aid............................................... 157
Limitations of Russian Soft Power .......................................... 158
Conclusion .................................................................................. 160
5. States with Relatively Strong State Autonomy: The Case
of Belarus ................................................................................... 163
Belarus Between the West and Russia .................................... 165
 State Autonomy Vis-à-vis Non-State Actors .......................... 170
Non-State Actors under the Influence of External Powers .. 171
Non-State Actors under the Influence of Russian Soft
Power ........................................................................... 171
Non-State Actors under the Influence of Western Soft
Power ........................................................................... 176
Non-State Actors and External Alignment..................... 179
Conclusion .................................................................................. 182
6. States with Relatively Weak State Autonomy: The Case
of Ukraine .................................................................................. 185
Ukraine Between the West and Russia ................................... 188
State Autonomy Vis-à-vis Non-State Actors .......................... 196
Non-State Actors under the Influence of External Powers .. 202
Non-State Actors under the Influence of Russian Soft Power
.............................................................................................. 203
Non-State Actors under the Influence of Western Soft Power
Projection ............................................................................ 211
Non-State Actors and External Alignment ............................ 217
Conclusion .................................................................................. 223
7. Conclusions ............................................................................... 227
The Puzzle and Theoretical Arguments ................................. 227
Empirical Findings .................................................................... 230
Implications for Theory ............................................................ 233
Bibliography ...................................................................................... 239
Foreword

It is a great privilege to have the task of writing the foreword for

what is a fantastic book by an extremely promising scholar, Vasif
Huseynov. The lingering challenge of conducting any sort of useful
research is to strike a balance between novelty and importance. The
trouble in a saturated field like International Relations (and its sub-
field of Foreign Policy Analysis) is that what can be described as
novel is often not important and what is important is usually heav-
ily examined (and thus, harder to provide novel insights). There-
fore, Vasif deserves a lot of credit for producing a book that is both
novel and important and, as such, makes a timely contribution to
the fields of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis.
Few would argue that the current cooling of relations between
the West and Russia is not one of the great concerns of contempo-
rary international politics. There is the crisis in Ukraine, but also the
emergence of something close to a proxy war in Syria and the ap-
parent infiltration of Western democracies by Russia. These have
been concerning developments, of course, but they have also driven
a significant amount of hyperbole in the analytical discourse about
where the West-Russia relationship is heading. To Vasif’s credit, he
does not fall into this hyperbolic trap as he lets his rich empirical
findings speak for itself.
Vasif forgoes buying the inherent sensationalism of the New
Cold War narrative that has come to dominate recent analyses of
the West-Russia relations—especially the idea that this current
cooling of West-Russia relations resembles the global struggle that
characterized the Cold War proper. Vasif limits his analysis to the
common neighbourhood between Russia and the West in Eastern
Europe. This is important because in the current international sys-
tem, a uni-multipolar system if you will, it is regional settings
where competition and conflict are increasing. Thus, one of the real
contributions of Vasif’s book is adding insight to the current state
of geopolitics in Eastern Europe, and especially how the interac-
tions of the West and Russia has created a tense and competitive
regional security complex there.

ix
 In addition, Vasif’s narrowing of scope to examine the use of
soft power by the West and Russia in the common neighbourhood
is important for three reasons. First, it is undeniable that the infor-
mation war at the heart of the cooling of the West-Russia relation-
ship is extremely important and, as it currently stands, the most
competitive (what Vasif terms “expansive”) aspect of the relation-
ship. In an age of technological advances with regards communica-
tion, winning the narrative battle has surely become a central aspect
of international political competition. One of the real insights of-
fered by Vasif in this book is his analysis of Russia’s soft power. Too
often, scholars in the West underestimate Russia’s intentional use
of its soft power capabilities—often presenting it as a blunt hard
power from a bygone era—which blinds their analyses. This, thank-
fully, is a trap Vasif does not fall into in this book, providing a use-
ful expose of the Kremlin’s soft power capabilities.
Second, Vasif makes an interesting contribution to the soft
power literature with his observation that the levels of state auton-
omy in a target state is an important variable in how effective a soft
power strategy can be. By taking one of the core arguments of neo-
classical realism (gauging state-society relations of the state under
examination), Vasif adds important nuance to the soft power de-
bate, especially as a fixation remains in the literature on examining
the only state utilizing soft power, not the target state. Indeed, the
relative open contest between the West and Russia in Ukraine, com-
pared to Belarus, is convincingly explained, in part, by this obser-
vation as Ukraine’s less centralization made it far more vulnerable
to soft power infiltration.
Third, Vasif reinvigorates the somewhat forgotten realist ob-
servation—forged by the likes of EH Carr and Hans Morgenthau—
that winning the hearts and minds of people (both internally and
externally) is an important aspect of foreign policymaking. Vasif
does this credibly through synthesizing neoclassical realism with
the literature on soft power. Given how important this ideational
battle is in the current age, the lack of incorporation of soft power
(or similar concepts) by many realists in their analyses is a major
limitation of the paradigm. Thus, Vasif’s examination of soft power

x
as an instrument of foreign policy within a neoclassical realist
framework—adhering to the neoclassical realist mantra of “build-
ing theories”—has the potential to make a lasting contribution to
realism’s continued usefulness as a paradigm of International Rela-
tions and Foreign Policy Analysis.
Thanks to Vasif’s watertight research design, the empirical
findings of this book are of great importance to not only under-
standing an often misunderstood (i.e. the utilization of soft power)
aspect of the West-Russia relationship but also theorizing where the
relationship might head in the future. Vasif’s conclusion that it is
through instruments of soft power that the West and Russia are
competing in their common neighbourhod—rather than through
instruments of hard power—is convincing and significantly alters
the way we should hypothesize about the Eastern Europe security
complex moving forward. Ultimately, this book is a demonstration
of how a theoretically informed, analytically focused study can pro-
duce insights and conclusions that have real-world application.
And for that, Vasif should be applauded.
Nicholas Ross Smith

xi
Acknowledgements

This book evolved from my doctoral dissertation at University of

Göttingen. It would not have been possible without full
scholarships of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)
that has generously supported my both master and doctoral studies
between 2011 and 2018. I am deeply indebted to Prof. Dr. Peter
Schulze and Prof. Dr. Anja Jetschke for insightful and patient su-
pervision. I also thank Dr. Patrick Theiner and Dr. Anil Kocaman
for their friendly support in the course of my doctoral studies. I am
particularly thankful to my Göttingen friends, especially Elshan,
Turab, Rafael, Elgiz, and Farid, whose friendship was for me a real
source of inspiration and energy. I cannot thank enough to Dr.
Nicholas Ross Smith whose support encouraged my decision to
publish the dissertation as a book. I had also the honour to discuss
the book before publication with Dr. Farid Shafiyev, Azerbaijan’s
ex-ambassador to Canada and the Czech Republic, whose insight-
ful comments were extraordinarily helpful to properly revise the
manuscript. Last but not least, I am deeply indebted to my parents,
Maharram and Mehpara, who devoted their lives to their children
in the most difficult times our family faced after the displacement
from our hometown in the wake of Nagorno-Karabakh war. This
book is dedicated to them.

xiii
List of Abbreviations

AA Association Agreement
AMS Alfred Mozer Stichting
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BBG Broadcasting Board of Governors
BOC Belarusian Orthodox Church
CDU Christian Democratic Union
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CNN Cable News Network
CRRF Collective Rapid Reaction Force
CSO Civil society organization
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
CU Customs Union
CUFTA Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement
DAAD German Academic Exchange Service
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
DIGIM Digital Media Department
DoD Department of Defense
DW Deutsche Welle
EaP Eastern Partnership
ECU Eurasian Customs Union
EEAS European External Action Service
EED European Endowment for Democracy
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
EFS Eduardo Frei Stichting
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human
Rights
ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instru-
ment
ERI European Reassurance Initiative
EU European Union
FES Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FLEX Future Leaders Exchange

xv
FSA Freedom Support Act
FSB Federal Security Service
FSU Former Soviet Union
FY Fiscal year
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GCCLA Governmental Commission on Compatriots Liv-
ing Abroad
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIZ German Federal Enterprise for International Co-
operation
GUUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Mol-
dova
HSS Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IISEPS Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Po-
litical Studies
IREX International Research and Exchanges
IRI International Republican Institute
KAS Konrad Adenauer Foundation
KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti
MAP Membership Action Plan
MEDA Mediterranean Economic Development Assis-
tance
MNP Moldovan National Platform
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI National Democratic Institute
NED National Endowment for Democracy
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NIMD Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
OSI Open Society Institution
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PPS Policy Planning Staff
NRF NATO Response Force
RAP Readiness Action Plan
RL Radio Liberty
RFE Radio Free Europe

xvi
RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
ROC Russian Orthodox Church
RT Russia Today
SPD Social Democratic Party
SU Soviet Union
TACIS Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States
UGRAD Global Undergraduate Exchange Program
UNP Ukrainian National Platform
UOC-KP Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kiev Patriarchate
UOC-MP Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patri-
archate
US United States
USA United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International Develop-
ment
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VOA Voice of America
VJTF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
VVD Volkspartiy voor Vrijheid

xvii
List of Figures

Figure 1. Soft power ....................................................................... 57

Figure 2. Hard power vs. soft power ........................................... 67
Figure 3. A public opinion poll in the EaP countries .............. 138
Figure 4. Belarussian public opinion on foreign policy .......... 180
Figure 5. Ukrainian public opinion on foreign policy............. 220
Figure 6. Ukrainian public opinion on accession to NATO ... 220

xix
List of Tables

Table 1. Public diplomacy vs. propaganda ...................................... 64

Table 2. The EU assistance to the EaP countries............................ 115
Table 3. Job approval of Ukrainian presidents .............................. 198
Table 4. The main sources of political information for Ukrainians
in 2013 ................................................................................... 201
Table 5. The number of Ukrainian students studying at the
universities of Russia and West ........................................ 213

xx
1. Introduction

The external alignment strategies of the post-Soviet states in the ter-

ritories between the European Union (EU) and Russia—the region
which is known as the “common (or shared) neighbourhood”—
pose a puzzle to the students of international relations. Belarus,
Ukraine and Moldova, the three states located in Eastern Europe
and the three South Caucasian republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia) have pursued dissimilar foreign policy strategies despite
the similarity between them in a number of crucial aspects, includ-
ing the geostrategic environment and the geo-economic structure
of the region. While Belarus has opted for bandwagoning with Rus-
sia in international relations, its neighbour Ukraine is on a pro-
Western path aiming to join NATO which Russia treats as its major
geopolitical rival in the region. Likewise, while Azerbaijan seeks to
maintain neutrality between the West (i.e. the EU and United
States) and Russia, its neighbours Armenia and Georgia align with
Russia and the West, respectively.
The rivalries between the West and Russia have been an influ-
ential factor in the formation of such diverse foreign policy strate-
gies of the “common neighbourhood” states. For Russia, the he-
gemony over the countries located in this region are of supreme im-
portance for its international standing as a great power. In this re-
spect, the former Soviet countries, especially Eastern European and
South Caucasian countries, are extremely important for Russia,
whose leaders, on many occasions, have not refrained from openly
saying that Russia would do everything possible to prevent geopo-
litical shifts in this region that pose threats to Russia’s national se-
curity. The Kremlin’s intention to reinstate its influence over the
former Soviet states has been perceived as a geopolitical threat in
Western capitals. Western leaders, in particular the Americans,
have clearly stressed their determination to prevent or slow down
Russia’s regional reintegration initiatives. Over the last two dec-
ades this confrontation has dramatically evolved and exerted pres-

21
22 VASIF HUSEYNOV

sure on the foreign policies of regional states, made neutrality im-

probable and forced them to make a choice between the rival great
powers and to align with one of them.
Both Russia and the West have made use of various means to
affect the decision regional countries make in their geopolitical ori-
entation. However, although Russia deployed military force in
Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) as an attempt to avert the pro-
Western drift of these countries, the conflicting great powers could
not militarily enforce the regional countries to join their orbit. The
threat of mutually assured destruction has deterred the military es-
calation of the conflict between the West and Russia. It has down-
graded the utility of military power to being an ultimo-ratio or, as
Mark Galeotti (2016) points out, a “final ‘just in case’ option” and
mostly a defensive instrument in the rivalries between the two
great powers. Instead of military force, the conflicting great powers
have been using non-military instruments in order to expand their
influence over the regions which are also in the interests of rival
great powers. Employing the instruments, which are analysed un-
der the notion “soft power” in this research, Russia and the West
have sought to reach out to the general public in target states and
affect the foreign policy decisions of their respective states through
influencing the masses.
Thus, this book analyses the great power rivalries as the inde-
pendent variable vis-à-vis the foreign policy strategy of small states
which are in between these rivalries. It pays particular attention to
the policies of great powers to reach out to and influence non-state
actors (i.e. the general public, non-governmental organizations, re-
ligious groups, etc.) in target states with the eventual aim of impact-
ing their foreign policies. It also analyses the internal conditions in
the smaller states under which the soft power policies of the great
powers could wield successful outcomes. The book argues that as
the internal autonomy of the state leaders decreases, the domestic
non-state actors gain more scope to influence the policies of the
government and the soft power policies of the external great pow-
ers find a more favourable environment in which to wield soft
power and affect foreign policy decisions. The book pursues its
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 23

analysis from the perspective of neoclassical realism and the con-

cept of soft power and narrows down its empirical focus on the
Russia—West rivalries between 2004 and 2014 over the “common
neighbourhood” states in general, and over Belarus and Ukraine in
particular.
The research employs the qualitative method of analysis to ex-
amine its hypotheses. It has explored a long range of academic
works, publications of various research institutes, news media arti-
cles, official documents, public statements, reports of non-govern-
mental organizations, etc. The materials which have been used in
this process are largely in four languages: English, Russian, Ger-
man, and Ukrainian. The research has used a series of public opin-
ion surveys conducted by authoritative poll-taking institutes as an
empirical basis for measurements of Russian and Western soft
power in the “common neighbourhood”. As conducting nation-
wide surveys in the case study countries is beyond the scope of this
research, the results of the surveys conducted by institutes special-
ized in poll taking have been frequently used during the study. For
instance, the results of public opinion polls carried out between
2004—2016 in Belarus by the Independent Institute of Socio-Eco-
nomic and Political Studies (IISEPS), a public institution based in
Lithuania, were the primary measurements used to examine the at-
titudes of Belarusians towards Russia and West. Likewise, the pub-
lic opinion surveys conducted by the International Republican In-
stitute (IRI) in Ukraine played the similar role in my research con-
cerning Ukraine.

Literature Review and Research Gap

Many scholars have tried to understand the factors behind the di-
versity and multiplicity of approaches to the external orientation in
the “common neighbourhood” states. For example, a group of
scholars, namely Giorgi Gvalia, David Siroky, Bidzina Lebanidze,
and Zurab Iashvili, have explored the reasons behind Georgia’s
shift to a pro-Western geopolitical orientation while most of the
other small post-Soviet states maintain neutrality or bandwagon
with Russia (Gvalia et al. 2013). They argue that the theories built
24 VASIF HUSEYNOV

on the external and international factors (e.g. “balance of power”,

“balance of threat”, economic dependency etc.) fail to provide a
convincing explanation for this situation. Instead, they put an em-
phasis on the state- and individual level of variables, especially the
“elite ideas about the identity and purpose of the states”, in explain-
ing the foreign policy behaviours of these states (ibid. 99). Accord-
ing to them, “The idea that Georgia is a European country (and thus
not a post-Soviet state) drives the elite’s understanding of Georgia’s
place in the world” (ibid. 112). They argue that such a perception of
Georgia’s international standing amongst the political elites, and
not the public opinion, explains the states’ foreign policy strategy:

“Although we do not wholly devalue the role of public opinion, we make

the simplifying assumption that elite opinion largely shapes the foreign pol-
icy agenda, rather than the reverse, and that public opinion set the bounds
of what is deemed acceptable” (ibid. 107).

Although Gvalia et al. rightfully examine the role of the elite

perceptions as an influential variable between the international po-
litical system and foreign policy, their relegation of public opinion
to elite perceptions in terms of its effect on foreign policy is prob-
lematic and cannot be easily verified. The facts that (1) Georgia’s
foreign policy strategy radically changed in the aftermath of the
popular uprising of 2003 (Huseynov 2015), (2) the potential of the
growing pro-Russian sentiments amongst the Georgians to reverse
the current pro-Western political course is often recognized by the
political experts (Rimple 2015; Cecire 2015), (3) Russia’s anti-West-
ern soft power projection to affect public opinion in Georgia has
been officially recognized by the Georgian political elite as a threat
(Rukhadze 2016) indicate that public opinion is a more influential
factor than Gvalia et al. believe it is.
In general, the role of public opinion as a potentially influen-
tial intervening variable in the formation of the external alignment
of the “common neighbourhood” states is an under-explored and
largely miscalculated issue. According to conventional wisdom in
scholarly studies of the region, the impact of the general public on
foreign policy is rather limited in most of the post-Soviet states. For
example, in 2003, Viktor Chudowsky and Taras Kuzio, prominent
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 25

scholars of Ukrainian studies, wrote that “Ukrainian society is pas-

sive, atomized and its power is ‘submerged’ relative to that of the
state” and thus “public opinion [in Ukraine] is of minimal im-
portance in the area of foreign policy” (Chudowsky et al. 2003: 273).
In less than 15 years after this analysis, Taras Kuzio, in a co-study
on Ukrainian foreign policy with Paul D’Anieri, realized that in fact
public opinion “has arguably had a profound effect on the coun-
try’s foreign policy” (D’Anieri et al. 2017: 117). Thus, we can speak
of a disinterest in and/or a misunderstanding of the public opin-
ion—foreign policy nexus of the post-Soviet states in scholarly
studies.
The scholars of international relations have also paid little at-
tention to the fact that the role of domestic non-state actors as a po-
tentially impactful political factor might tempt great powers1 to
reach out to and make use of them in order to affect the foreign
policy of their respective state. This is advantageous when the sides
are nuclear-armed great powers who cannot easily deploy military
force against each other due to the threat of nuclear escalation.
There is extensive literature on the policies of external actors to pro-
voke regime change in a target state through interacting with its
internal non-state players (e.g. civil society, media, political parties)
(See, for instance, Muskhelishvili et al. 2009; Stewart 2009; Bunce et
al. 2011; Vanderhill 2014). However, few academic studies have ex-
amined these policies from the perspective of geopolitical rivalries
and political realism.
In fact, the founders of realism underscored the importance of
winning power over the minds and feelings of foreign publics. The
concepts developed by Edward Carr (1951) (“power over opinion”)
and Hans Morgenthau (1965a) (“cultural imperialism”) reflected on
non-hard power elements. However, the next generations of the
school focused on the systemic variables as the primary determi-
nants of international relations, conceptualized power as the com-
bination of military and economic capabilities and disregarded its

1 This study subscribes to the realist classification of great powers and smaller
states in accordance with their population, territory, resources, economic capa-
bility, military power, political stability, and competence (Waltz 1979: 131).
26 VASIF HUSEYNOV

non-material dimensions. Stephan Walt’s Origins of Alliances (1987)

is one of the studies that widened its analysis beyond military and
economic power. In his work, the policies of great powers to reach
out to the domestic non-state actors of smaller states—what he calls
“penetration”—are analysed as one of the strategies to affect their
external alignment (Walt 1987: 218-262). However, he underesti-
mates the potential of these policies:

“[T]he importance of transnational penetration is often exaggerated and…

its effect on alliance formation is usually misunderstood. The opportunity
to establish informal avenues of influence with another state usually re-
quires cordial or even close relations, which indicates that such ties are
largely one result of alignment, not an independent cause… In short, pene-
tration is not an especially common or powerful cause of alignment.”

On the contrary, the advance of information and communica-

tion technologies strictly upgraded the potential of “penetration”
as a foreign policy instrument. In 2004, Joseph Nye published his
first major book on these policies, titled Soft Power: The Means to
Success in World Politics. He theorized about the instruments which
states can utilize to communicate with the publics of foreign coun-
tries and wield power over popular opinion abroad under the no-
tion of “soft power”. The post-Cold War developments in interna-
tional relations, the pro-Western popular uprisings in post-com-
munist states, the role of general public and non-governmental in-
stitutions in reshaping the regional geopolitical view provided em-
pirical evidence to the growing potential of soft power. Gerald
Sussman’s Branding Democracy: US Regime Change in Post-Soviet
Eastern Europe (2010) presented one of the first comprehensive anal-
yses on the use of various public diplomacy and propaganda tech-
niques to communicate with and influence non-state players in for-
eign countries in this period. However, many scholars rightfully
maintain that the concept of soft power lacks “academic refine-
ment,” is “under-theorized”, “misunderstood”, or “difficult, if not
impossible to test empirically’ (Li 2009a: 58; Vuving 2009: 3). There
have been numerous analyses on soft power, but neither Joseph
Nye nor anybody else has provided clear answers to fundamental
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 27

questions about the concept (e.g. What is soft power? How does it
work? Who can produce it? Why do states need it?).
Nye (2013a) asserts that soft power is inextricably linked with
Western norms and values, and therefore, states that are on differ-
ent paths are bound to fail “miserably”. However, this assertion im-
plies “an obligatory respect for international norms and institu-
tions, as well as an adherence to freedom, democracy, liberalism
and pluralism” (Wilson 2015: 289). In reality, both democratic and
non-democratic, liberal and illiberal states utilize soft power as part
of their foreign policy toolkit and invest extensively in cultivating
power over popular opinion abroad. It is often acknowledged that
non-democratic great powers also reach success in these policies
(Tsygankov 2005; Van Herpen 2015). Thus, Joseph Nye (2011: 82),
on the one hand argues that soft power is a dimension of power and
does not have any contradiction with political realism, on the other
hand, as Giulio Gallarotti (2011: 19) correctly points out, presents
his concept “as a subset of neoliberal logic”.
In the aftermath of Joseph Nye’s introduction of the notion
“soft power”, many academic works have been written addressing
problems around the concept. One of the first major critical pieces
on the soft power concept was Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: The-
oretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives edited by Inderjeet
Parmar and Michael Cox. In their chapter in this book, Geraldo
Zahran and Leonardo Ramos (2010: 24), critically analysing the soft
power concept from a Gramscian perspective and the distinction it
presents between consent and coercion, argue that “disregarding
hegemony, Nye creates the illusion of an aspect of power that could
exist by its own only through consent, ignoring the social reality
populated by intrinsic mechanisms of coercion.” In response to this
critique, Nye (2010: 217), in the same book, points out that “Even if
Zahran and Ramos are correct that under hegemony, coercion and
consent are complementary, that is not the same as saying that soft
power is always rooted in hard power. Sometimes it is and some-
times it is not.” The Chinese scholar Mingjiang Li (2009b: 3) sug-
gests that the term “soft use of power” would be more appropriate
than “soft power”, because “soft power does not exist in the nature
of certain resources of power but rather it has to be nurtured
28 VASIF HUSEYNOV

through a soft use of power.” The relationship between the two

types of power still remains unclear. Neither Nye nor anyone else
has ever written a convincing analysis on the distinction and rela-
tionship between hard power and soft power.
The consideration of domestic non-state actors as a potentially
powerful political player by neoclassical realism lays ground for its
analysis of the use of soft power by great powers to affect the exter-
nal alignment of states in contested regions. Neoclassical realism
does not define power as only elements of material power, but in-
cludes other elements, such as the quality of government and its
reputation in international politics (Ripsman et al. 2009: 297). The
theory treats domestic political processes as an intervening variable
between systemic factors and foreign policy. From this point of
view, the intervening variable has the potential to “channel, medi-
ate, and (re)direct policy outputs in response to external forces (pri-
marily changes in relative power)” (Schweller 2004: 164).
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (2009), edited
by Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro, is the first
comprehensive book on neoclassical realism. The authors have re-
fined the theory and elaborated on the distinctions and commonal-
ities between it and other branches of realism. The book serves as a
useful resource to understand neoclassical realism’s conceptualiza-
tion of the internal political system as an intervening variable. It,
however, has not explained the policies that great powers pursue
to reach out to domestic non-state actors in target states and realize
the desired shifts in their external alignment through the manipu-
lation of their internal political system. Nor have other neoclassical
realist scholars, some of whom have supported the incorporation of
the soft power concept into the analytical toolkit of neoclassical re-
alism (e.g. Rathbun 2008: 303-304; Berenskoetter et al. 2012), exam-
ined soft power as an instrument in the competition of great powers
to expand their sphere of influence.

Theoretical Argument
The theoretical argumentation of the book is formed on the hypoth-
esis that if nuclear armed great powers compete against the same
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 29

type of powers to expand or sustain their sphere of influence over

a populated region, they use soft power as a major expansive in-
strument while military power remains a tool to defend themselves
and back up their foreign policies. However, the book underlines
the point that the success of soft power projection by the great pow-
ers depends on the internal structure of the target states. If the lead-
ers of a weak state, which is in between the rivalries of great powers
who use soft power to expand their influence, are autonomous vis-
à-vis the society and other internal non-state actors, they can control
the inflow of soft power projection from foreign states, offset the
intervening influence of the domestic non-state actors on foreign
policy making, and augment their chances to more prudently and
independently follow the imperatives of the international political
system. Conversely, if such autonomy does not exist, then the ex-
ternal powers find a favourable environment in which to wield soft
power, the domestic non-state actors can influence the external ori-
entation of the state, and the state fails to offset their influence.
The non-military instruments great powers deploy and the
policies they pursue to communicate with the general public and
the non-governmental organizations of the target states with the
aim of impacting their foreign policy strategy are analysed in this
book under the umbrella of the soft power concept. The book seeks
to reconceptualise soft power in the light of neoclassical realism.
This approach treats soft power as a dimension of power that states
make use of to reach their foreign policy goals. The book establishes
a model that would allow for the study of different sources of soft
power and the strategies states develop to produce it. The reason
that necessitated the reformulation of the concept of soft power is
related to problems and contradictions in the existing literature on
the subject.
The model developed in this book follows the logic of realist
scholars in its analysis of soft power. Herein the book refers partic-
ularly to the concepts “power over opinion” of Edward Carr (1951),
“cultural imperialism” of Hans Morgenthau (1965a), and “transna-
tional penetration” of Stephan Walt (1987). It examines both public
diplomacy and propaganda strategies as part of great powers’ pol-
icies to wield soft power. According to this model, no matter
30 VASIF HUSEYNOV

whether it is deception or truth, seduction or manipulation, foreign

aid or propaganda, all types of policies to reach out to foreign pub-
lics and intentionally affect their perceptions and attitudes can be
gathered under the umbrella of soft power making. As militarily
powerful states can use all types of military power (air force, navy,
nuclear weapons, etc.) to force the target to do what is wanted of
them, the states enjoying high levels of soft power can use a wide
array of instruments to wield power over popular opinion of the
target state with eventually similar purposes. The model also at-
tempts to conceptualize the hard power—soft power nexus.

Structure of the Book

The book consists of five chapters besides the introductory section
and conclusions. Chapter 2 presents the analytical framework of the
study. It firstly forms the theoretical framework and discusses the
nexus of neoclassical realism and soft power to explain the use of
soft power in great power rivalries and its impact on the formation
of the external orientation of regional states. The chapter continues
with the presentation of introductory information about the se-
lected case (i.e. the Russia—West confrontation over the “common
neighbourhood”) and methodology used to test the research hy-
potheses.
Chapters 3 and 4 are focused on the analysis of the independ-
ent variable which is defined as the rivalries between the West and
Russia over the “common neighbourhood”. These chapters seek to
defend the argument that nuclear armed great powers deploy
largely soft power to expand their sphere of influence over the ter-
ritories that are in the interests of rival nuclear armed great powers.
Chapter 3 discusses the hard power—soft power nexus in the for-
eign policies of Western powers concerning the regional states. Af-
terwards, the chapter focuses on the use of soft power in this con-
text. The chapter provides an analysis of different dimensions of
Western soft power. Chapter 4 replicates the analytical framework
of the previous chapter and applies it in the analysis of Russia’s pol-
icies with respect to the “common neighbourhood” states.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 31

Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the outcomes of the soft power com-

petition between Russia and West. Chapter 5 discusses the case of
Belarus. In this study, Belarus represents “common neighbour-
hood” countries with stronger state autonomy and mostly pro-Rus-
sian or neutral geopolitical orientation. The chapter tests the hy-
pothesis on the role of strong internal autonomy of the state leaders
in their foreign policy amidst the rivalries between great powers.
Chapter 6, in a similar structure to the previous chapter, explores
the case of Ukraine as an example of “common neighbourhood”
countries with weaker state autonomy and mostly pro-Western ge-
opolitical orientation.
The book ends with a concluding section. This section is di-
vided into three sub-sections. The first sub-section briefly reviews
the problems this book has focused on and the hypotheses it has
put forward. The next sub-section presents the empirical findings
of the study. It shortly overviews the discussions on the Russia—
West confrontation over the “common neighbourhood” states and
the cases of Belarus and Ukraine in this context. The concluding
section ends with the presentation of the theoretical implications of
the research for the studies of international relations.
2. Analytical Framework

This chapter is aimed at presenting the theoretical framework and

case study of the research. The chapter consists of three major sec-
tions. The section following this introductory part focuses on real-
ism and its relatively new branch called “neoclassical realism”. This
section will analyse the theoretical assumptions on the rivalries be-
tween great powers and their policies to communicate with the in-
ternal non-state actors of the states that are in between these rival-
ries. It also explores factors that impact the choice weak states make
in their external alignment. The section focuses on the influence of
the general public and non-governmental organizations as the in-
tervening forces between the pressure that the international politi-
cal system imposes on states (independent variable) and the foreign
policy of these states (dependent variable). It also analyses the cir-
cumstances under which these non-state actors can become influ-
ential in the formulation of foreign policy. The autonomy of state
leaders vis-à-vis domestic society is treated as the major indicator to
measure the scope of the domestic non-state groups to impact state
policies.
Since neoclassical realism develops theories that includes both
systemic and unit level factors in its analysis of foreign policy, it has
been chosen as the guiding theoretical line of the book. However,
neoclassical realism, along with other branches of realism, have
paid little attention to the policies of the conflicting great powers to
reach out to the domestic non-state actors of states that are in be-
tween their conflict. Although neoclassical realists have acknowl-
edged the importance of the intervening power of domestic non-
state actors in the formulation of foreign policy, they have not thor-
oughly analysed the policies of great powers to interact with these
non-state actors in target states and make use of them. The section
serves also as an attempt to fill in this gap.
The second section deals with the concept of soft power which
covers the major strategies and instruments great powers make use
of to communicate with the non-state actors of regional states. The
section provides a reconceptualization of soft power analysing it as

33
34 VASIF HUSEYNOV

an instrument developed by states in the pursuit of foreign policy

objectives. It will be followed with the third section that presents
the cases which will be used to test the research hypotheses. The
section is divided in two parts separately analyzing the context of
the West—Russia confrontation over the “shared neighbourhood”
and the reaction of the states located in between this confrontation.
The chapter ends with a brief conclusion which sums up the key
points of the chapter.

Realism: Neoclassical Realism

The advocates of realism identify international politics as anarchy
wherein there is no governing supranational authority. Under the
circumstances of the absence of an overarching global authority,
states are primarily concerned with their survival and therefore are
in constant search for security. In different branches of the realist
paradigm, the factors that impact and drive the struggle for power
in international relations are differentiated at three levels of analy-
sis: the individual, the state and the international system. Kenneth
Waltz (2001) in Man, State and War, first published in 1959, charac-
terizes these levels as three images: the first image (the individual),
the second image (the state), and the third image (the international
system). Mostly, adherents of realism have not limited their anal-
yses to one image as the only determining factor of international
politics. The complexity of the factors behind the behaviours of
states in interstate relations has compelled realist scholars to in-
clude more than one image into their analysis. Below an overview
of the three images in the realist paradigm will be presented in the
discussion on the three main branches of realism: classical realism,
neo- (or structural) realism, and neoclassical realism.
The first image emphasizes the impact of human nature on the
conduct of international relations. Most advocates of classical real-
ism develop their theoretical analyses on the basis of the first image.
The scholars who adhere to this idea believe that human nature is
inherently problematic and unchanged. Hans Morgenthau, in the
beginning of Politics among Nations (1967: 4), asserts that “human
nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 35

changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and

Greece….” Likewise, in the thought of Edward Carr (1951), the
roots of all politics and political conflicts are embroiled in man’s
nature. He, like Morgenthau (1965b: 192), supports Aristotle’s char-
acterization of man as a political animal, and believes that only on
the basis of this view one can pursue sound reasoning about poli-
tics.
Classical realist scholars charge that the growing role of the
masses in shaping foreign policy prevents states from conducting
foreign policies free from the interference of public opinion and,
thus, pushes the international struggle for power into relatively
conflictual bounds and even into total war. They warn against the
growing influence of masses on foreign policy, empowered by the
nationalist and democratic revolutions of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries. For Morgenthau, the interference of the masses in
shaping foreign policy brought about the disastrous conclusions
(e.g. two world wars) of the first half of the twentieth century, and
therefore, he advises diplomats to lead public opinion rather than
follow it.
As classical realists place the primary source of conflicts and
the struggle for power amongst both individuals and states in hu-
man nature, for them the impact of an anarchic environment of in-
ternational relations is a rather secondary and permissive factor.
Unlike them, neorealist scholars deny the determining roles of the
anthropological and unit-level sources of world politics and put a
primary emphasis on system-level variables. Neorealism evaluates
the structure of the international system in terms of an ordering
principle, such as anarchy, and a particular distribution of power.
In the thought of neorealist scholars (e.g. Waltz (1979), Walt (1987),
Mearsheimer (2001)), the security dilemma which originates out of
the anarchic order of international politics shapes the behaviours of
states in interstate relations. Out of uncertainty of each other’s in-
tentions, actions which are taken for one’s own security tend to be
treated by others as a threat to their security and lead to arms races,
conflicts and wars. However, Waltz (2001: 238) also recognizes the
36 VASIF HUSEYNOV

importance of the other two images by underlying the interdepend-

ence of all three images to analyze world politics and predict policy
outcomes.
Neoclassical realism, on the basis of the prior fundamental as-
sumptions of the realist paradigm, emphasizes the second and third
image factors and conceptualizes the foreign policies of different
types of states (great, medium, and small powers). Unlike those the-
ories which privilege either domestic (innenpolitik theories) or sys-
temic factors (structural theories), neoclassical realism develops
theories that integrate these two-level variables in its analysis of for-
eign policy. Neoclassical realist scholars highlight the significance
of unit-level expertise for an accurate understanding of foreign pol-
icy, and avoid treating states as black boxes, i.e. they do not ignore
their distinctive internal characteristics (Rose 1998: 166). On the ba-
sis of Max Weber’s classic definition of state,2 neoclassical realism
develops its “top-down” conception of the state. In neoclassical re-
alism, the state is treated as the central officialdom of the polity
which lacks complete autonomy vis-à-vis society (Taliaferro et al.
2009: 27).
The advocates of neoclassical realism underscore the con-
straints on great powers that originate in the international system
and the domestic environment. In the case of regional powers, the
same are highlighted at the subsystem level (Lobell 2009: 46). In ne-
oclassical realism, the state’s relative power position in the anarchic
system of international relations is considered an independent var-
iable. Structural variables play a causal role in shaping foreign pol-
icies (Taliaferro 2009: 198). The theory positions the internal dy-
namics of states as an intervening variable between the constraints
of the international system and foreign policy. Unlike neorealists,
who see a direct translation of state leaders’ apprehensions of sys-
temic imperatives into their foreign policy, for neoclassical realists
this translation is not immediate and free of obstacles (Walt 2002:

2 According to Weber (1978: 904-905) “A state is a human community that (suc-

cessfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a
given territory. Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the state.”
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 37

211). Domestic political processes are treated as imperfect transmis-

sion belts between systemic pressure and foreign policy (Schweller
2004: 164). Neoclassical realism suggests that these are actual polit-
ical leaders and elite who make foreign policy choices, and so their
perceptions of relative power and their ability to extract or mobilize
societal resources to implement foreign policy matter (Rose 1998:
147). The interference of the domestic actors (public, business and
industrial sectors, labour unions, and other organized economic in-
terest groups, media, legislature, ethnic and religious groups) into
foreign policy making is another powerful intervening variable.
This interference might constrain a state’s autonomy from the in-
ternal society and its ability to enact policy responses to systemic
imperatives (Wohlforth 1993: 2).

(Neoclassical) Realism on Great Power Rivalries

Realism underscores the struggle for power and survival as the un-
derlying motivation of states’ behaviours in the international
sphere. Notwithstanding the fact that the sources of this struggle
are interpreted in different ways by realist scholars, they agree on
its interpretation as the guiding principle of international relations.
According to realism, states are concerned about the distribution of
relative power capabilities and act with “zero-sum” logic in their
approaches to changes in the balance of power (Powell 1991).
Therefore, states have to take care of their competitive power and
maximize their probability of survival in the hostile environment of
international politics. Waltz (1979: 118) asserts that those who do
not follow this logic “will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open
to danger, will suffer.” Stephan Walt (1987: 17) defines balancing
“as allying with others against the prevailing threat” and band-
wagoning as “alignment with the source of danger”. The expansion
of a great power’s sphere of influence and its growing aggregate
power reinforce its perception as a threat in the eyes of other great
powers. Realist-minded scholars and politicians expect other great
powers to counter this threat, while smaller states are mostly ex-
pected to bandwagon (Walt 1987: 22).
38 VASIF HUSEYNOV

From this structural realist perspective, regional hegemons—

that are powerful states which dominate a certain region or regions
(Mearsheimer 2001: 39)—seek to maximize their power and secu-
rity by expanding their sphere of influence and undermining the
bids of rival powers for regional hegemony. However, the prizes
this struggle promises are limited. No great power has ever been
able or is likely to be able anytime soon to become a global hegemon
due to the “stopping power” of oceans (Mearsheimer 2001). This is
why undermining the emergence of a regional hegemon overseas
and not evolving into a global hegemony is considered as the up-
permost objective for regional hegemons. The “fear that a rival
great power that dominates its own region will be an especially
powerful foe that is essentially free to cause trouble in the fearful
great power’s backyard” (Mearsheimer 2001: 41-42) urges the re-
gional hegemon to seek to prevent others from dominating their
respective regions.
Neoclassical realism does not depart from this realist analysis
of great power politics. The primary contribution of neoclassical re-
alism has been to put forward the intervening influence of domestic
factors. Advocates of neoclassical realism argue that systemic fac-
tors alone cannot explain, for example, the US strategy of contain-
ment during the Cold War or the Iraq invasion of the George W.
Bush administration (Taliaferro et al. 2009: 2-3). From this perspec-
tive, the impact of the internal characteristics of states (i.e. domestic
non-state groups, perceptions of state leaders and their autonomy
from society, the capacity of state institutions to extract and mobi-
lize resources, etc.) need to be likewise analysed in order to provide
a more complete understanding of international relations
(Taliaferro et al. 2009: 4). According to neoclassical realism, these
factors exert intervening influence on the formulation of states’ for-
eign policy, however, the systemic variables provide permissive
condition and remain an independent variable in this process
(Taliaferro et al. 2009: 4). Thus, unlike other branches of realism, ne-
oclassical realism combines systemic and unit level variables in its
explanation of great power politics.
International relations theories, however, have paid little at-
tention to the policies of conflicting great powers to reach out to
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 39

domestic non-state actors of states that are in between their conflict.

Although neoclassical realists have acknowledged the importance
of the intervening power of domestic non-state actors in the formu-
lation of foreign policy, they have not thoroughly analysed the pol-
icies of great powers to interact with these non-state actors and seek
to make use of them. One of the few realist scholars who have ana-
lysed these policies is Stephan Walt. In Origins of Alliances, he con-
ceptualizes such policies under the name “foreign aid and transna-
tional penetration”, and argues that great powers may use lobbyists
and propaganda to alter elite and mass attitudes and to influence
public perception with the ultimate goal of affecting policy deci-
sions regarding the potential ally (Walt 1987: 46). Walt (1987: 242)
defines penetration as “the manipulation of the target state’s do-
mestic political system [through propaganda, educational, cultural,
and military assistance] to promote alignment”. His analysis con-
cludes that these policies play “subordinate roles” in the decision
of the regional states in its external alignment (Walt 1987: 260-261).
I argue that the utility of the instruments which Walt calls
“foreign aid and penetration” has been growing due to the increas-
ingly higher costs of direct military clashes between great powers
since the invention of nuclear weapons and the rapid advance of
technological capabilities. It is a fact that since the invention of nu-
clear weapons, there have been no large-scale wars between great
powers. The enormous costs of military operations and the risks of
nuclear involvement have made great powers avoid using them
against each other. In Waltz’s words, they have faced “absolute im-
potence” upon their seizure of “absolute power” (Waltz 1979: 184).
Thus, the possibly catastrophic consequences of a nuclear escala-
tion make the nuclear armed great powers develop instruments to
pursue their interests and expand their spheres of influence with-
out triggering major military clashes. Soft power is such an instru-
ment. Modern information and communication technologies raise
the utility of this instrument even further.
From this viewpoint, I put forward the hypothesis that if nu-
clear armed great powers compete amongst themselves to expand
or sustain their sphere of influence over a populated region, they
use soft power as a major expansive instrument while military
40 VASIF HUSEYNOV

power remains a tool with which to defend themselves and back up

their foreign policies. It is important to note that this hypothesis re-
fers to the initial phases of the competition. Sometimes, nuclear
powers may enter into proxy wars when the conflict escalates or
one of the sides completely fails in the non-military dimensions of
the competition. In such cases, if the stakes are too high for one or
both of the conflicting sides, the escalation of conflict may even
reach a nuclear level.

(Neoclassical) Realism on the Foreign Policy of

Regional States amidst Great Power Rivalries
There is a consensus amongst international relations scholars that
neutrality (nonalignment) is the most optimal strategy for weak
states that are stuck between great power rivalries (Labs 1992: 385).
This allows regional states to maintain ties with rival great powers
and increases their chances of preserving their independence and
security. However, most of the time, neutrality turns out impossible
to be maintained, and regional states are forced to make a strategic
choice. The advocates of structural realism put an emphasis on the
third image analysis of international relations and assert that as the
margin of manoeuvres is increasingly limited for weak states, they
have to adopt to the imperatives of the international distribution of
power between the great powers (Waltz 1979: 72-73; 194-195). This
logic expects regional states to bandwagon with the stronger or the
more threatening great power when neutrality can no longer be
maintained (Waltz 1979: 127). The bandwagoning state joins re-
gional organizations (including economic, political, and security in-
stitutions) supported by the threatening state, avoids deep engage-
ment with rival great powers, and thus is forced to follow certain
patterns of foreign policy considered acceptable by the predomi-
nant power.
Randall Schweller (1994), making an important contribution
to this debate, points out that states may also bandwagon for op-
portunities. In this logic, aligning with the stronger state may be
chosen also for economic or security benefits: “bandwagoning is
not just a behaviour to avoid capitulation, but a strategy that states
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 41

adopt in order to gain something without having survival at stake”

(Cladi et al. 2016: 18). However, the history of international relations
has, on many occasions, shown that weak states may also align
against a stronger or more threatening power (Walt 1987: 148; Labs
1992; Van Evera 1990/91; Gvalia et al. 2013). In reality, not only do
weaker states sometimes seek to balance against a stronger or more
threatening great power, but they may even choose to fight against
it alone in some cases (Labs 1992; Gvalia et al. 2013).
Scholars of international relations have offered various expla-
nations to this inconsistency in the foreign policy alignment of
weak states but most of them fall short of accuracy. The structural
realist emphasis on the distribution of capabilities amongst great
powers as the major driver in the strategic choices of weak states
does not always apply in practice: the external environment and the
global balance of power as an independent variable do not produce
the same actions in the foreign policies of weak states which are
located in a similar international environment. For example, Wil-
liam Wohlforth (2004: 232) points out that structural realism “is of
little utility in explaining much of the variation in local responses
to Russia. Even when we add conditional variables to the theory to
derive more hypotheses, it fails to add much to the explanation
of…why Belarus has been such a faithful bandwagoner despite rel-
ative power and a geographical position similar to the Baltics.”
Stephan Walt’s inclusion of factors other than distribution of
capabilities that impact the formulation of foreign policy strategies
cannot be applicable in many cases, either. For Walt (1987), besides
aggregate power, external alignment strategies are affected by
other important factors, such as: geographic proximity, offensive
power, and aggressive intentions. For Walt, weak states tend to
bandwagon when the threatening state is much more powerful,
when other allies are unavailable or when the situation is about to
transform into an armed conflict. He (1987: 25) points out that un-
der these circumstances, attempting to balance might even be an
“unwise” option. This approach fails in some cases, for instance, in
the relations between Belarus and Ukraine on the one hand and
Russia on the other. Although the two “common neighbourhood”
states are located within the same geographic proximity of Russia,
42 VASIF HUSEYNOV

they have pursued opposite foreign policy strategies: Belarus band-

wagons with Russia, while Ukraine seeks to align with Western
powers against Russia. Similarly, James MacDougall’s (2009: 57)
study on the South Caucasus states has revealed that the regional
states pursue different alignment strategies although they share a
common strategic environment: “Azerbaijan and Georgia, to vary-
ing degrees, have balanced against the threat from Russia, although
at times they have attempted to bandwagon. Armenia has not bal-
anced against Russia, but rather has bandwagoned with Russia.”
Nor do the assumptions of the dependency theorists on the impact
of economic dependence (Papayoanou 1997) provide a convincing
explanation on the strategic choice of weak states in some cases. For
example, the recent crisis between Ukraine and Russia took place
despite economic interrelatedness between the two countries.
Neoclassical realism appears better armed than other theories
to provide analyses about the foreign policy strategy of weak states.
Unlike structural realism, neoclassical realism is aimed at develop-
ing theories of foreign policy. This school of realism contributes to
the above-mentioned debate by highlighting the intervening influ-
ence of state level variables (Schweller 1997). Analysing domestic
political processes as imperfect transmission belts between sys-
temic pressure and foreign policy, the theory places an emphasis
on the perceptions of the political elite, their ability to extract or
mobilize societal resources to implement foreign policy and the in-
terference of domestic actors (public, business and industrial sec-
tors, labour unions, and other organized economic interest groups,
media, legislature, ethnic and religious groups) in foreign policy
making (Rose 1998: 147; Schweller 2004: 164).
The analysis developed in this study is focused on the inter-
vening influence of domestic non-state actors (in particular, the
general public and non-governmental organizations) on the formu-
lation of foreign policy and external alignment. Here the research
goal is to explore the impact of general public and non-governmen-
tal organizations on the formation of the external orientation of re-
gional states in the context of the soft power projection of great
powers. The book argues that these internal non-state actors can, on
occasion, be impactful enough to force their governments to make
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 43

changes in foreign policy which might include even the re-making

of the state’s external alignment strategy. In line with the expecta-
tions of realist scholars, the study finds such influence of non-state
actors on foreign policy dangerous and potentially detrimental.
The book draws on the hypothesis that if the leaders of a small
state, which is in between the rivalries of great powers who use soft
power to expand their influence, are autonomous vis-à-vis society
and other internal non-state actors, they can control the inflow of
the soft power projection of foreign states and offset the intervening
influence of domestic non-state actors on foreign policy making.
Conversely, if such autonomy does not exist, then the external pow-
ers find a favourable environment in which to wield soft power; the
domestic non-state actors can influence the external orientation of
the state, and; the state may fail to offset their influence, and this
may bring about suboptimal foreign policy decisions. The follow-
ing two sections are to discuss this hypothesis analysing the nexus
of public opinion, foreign policy and state autonomy across differ-
ent variables.

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

In the aftermath of World War II, a broad agreement known as the
“Almond-Lippmann consensus” was formed about the public
opinion—foreign policy nexus. According to the propositions de-
veloped by Walter Lippmann and Gabriel Almond:

(1) … [public opinion] is volatile and thus provides inadequate foundations

for stable and effective foreign policies, (2) …lacks coherence or structure,
but (3) in the final analysis, it has little if any impact on foreign policy (Holsti
1992: 439).

Realism recognizes that public opinion can sometimes inter-

vene in foreign policy. However, neoclassical realism, like previous
generations of the realist school, supports the reasoning of the Al-
mond-Lippmann consensus about the consequences of this inter-
vention: public pressure on foreign policy is likely to bring about
negative consequences for the whole country (Christensen 1996: 17;
44 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Lobell 2009: 61). From this point of view, public perceptions of in-
ternational threats and the subtleties of balance-of-power politics
are mostly inaccurate because of a lack of proper expertise and com-
plete knowledge. This view of public opinion is widely shared by
other branches of realism. As stated above, Morgenthau (1965a:
567) warns diplomats that “the rational requirements of good for-
eign policy cannot from the outset count on the support of a public
opinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational.” The
neorealist school of realism maintains similar approach to the pub-
lic opinion—foreign policy nexus. Mearsheimer (1990: 41) observes
that “Public opinion on national security issues is notoriously fickle
and responsive to elite manipulation and world events.” Realist
scholars posit that the vulnerability of state leaders to public opin-
ion prevents them from responding to systemic incentives in a ra-
tional manner in the self-help environment of international anar-
chy.
Realist scholars are skeptical of the public’s contribution to
foreign policy. Although in some cases the demands of the general
public concerning foreign policy might be more in line with na-
tional interests than the policies of state leaders, in general this in-
terference prevents state leaders from pursuing prudent and coher-
ent foreign policies. The world of foreign affairs a remote issue for
the public and seeking detailed information on the topic is usually
a secondary priority when compared to more pressing daily issues.
Hence, the interference of the public threatens the quality and suc-
cess of diplomacy which otherwise needs to uphold principles such
as secrecy and flexibility.3

3 The theoretical approaches that locate the major sources of foreign policy in
domestic politics assume the internal factors (e.g. political and economic ideol-
ogy, national character, socioeconomic structure) as the chief determinants of
states’ behaviours in the international system. These theories (e.g. liberal or
democratic peace theories) treat foreign policy as the product of the domestic
socio-political and economic environment (Doyle 1983; Russett 1993; 2009;
Elman 1997; Gelpi et al. 2001; Mansfield et al. 2005). They differentiate democ-
racies and non-democracies and argue that states avoid wars as a political tool
as they become more democratic. Liberals argue that public opinion on foreign
affairs is stable, rationally structured, consistent, and influences foreign policy
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 45

On the other hand, the public is not a singular body, and

mostly does not speak with one voice. The public is the amalgama-
tion of different ethnic, religious, cultural, business and other
groups. Among these groups, civil society, which can be defined as
non-political social groups that take an active part in public debate
on issues of wider concern with no ultimate objective of political
power, may exert more pressure on foreign policy making. Civil
society include unions, religious groups, independent and cultural
institutions, charitable organizations, professional and trade asso-
ciations, women’s groups, neighbourhood associations, NGOs, etc.
As these groups usually pursue parochial interests, their influence
on the realm of foreign policy may be contradictory to the national
interests that state leaders are supposed to uphold.
Over the years since World War II, public opinion has gained
a number of channels to exert influence on the management of for-
eign affairs. Ripsman (2009: 171) argues that “public opinion usu-
ally influences policy, when it does, indirectly through its repre-
sentatives in the legislature, rather than directly through the foreign
security policy executive.” However, in some cases, as it happened
during the “colour revolutions” in the post-Soviet countries, the
public may also pose direct pressure on the government without
the mediation of third actors. The domestic non-state actors find
ample opportunity to directly influence the government when state
leaders do not have strong autonomy with respect to society. The
following section will analyse state autonomy vis-à-vis its surround-
ing society across different variables and defines the conditions
which impact its level.

making in a way that is eventually favourable to the country. They suggest that
public opinion should exert substantive influence on foreign policy. Public
pressure on foreign policy formulation limits extreme elite tendencies and elite
adventurism. As policy makers depend on the public to maintain their offices,
they refrain from policies which are dangerously risky (Foyle 1999: 5-6). Disre-
garding the systemic factors in their analyses of interstate relations, these theo-
ries maintain several problematic assumptions, and often face “difficulty ac-
counting for why states with similar domestic systems often act differently in
the foreign policy sphere and why dissimilar states in similar situations often
act alike” (Rose 1998: 148).
46 VASIF HUSEYNOV

State Autonomy across Different Variables

State autonomy is the ability of public officials to translate their
preferences and interests into policy and authoritative actions
(Nordlinger 1981: 74; Smith 1993a: 49). This can vary radically
across different states and over time within states. There are a range
of variables which affect the degree of influence of a society on for-
eign policy making, such as regime type, the economic and political
situation in the internal and external environment, socio-political
composition, etc. Below, some of these factors are briefly discussed.
Regime type: In states where there is no unity amongst the
governing elite, or between society and political circles, and the
probability of a sudden coup d’état is high, domestic pressure on
state leaders becomes more impactful. Neoclassical realists argue
that as the likelihood of the domestic actors to remove state leaders
from office through legal (elections or votes of no-confidence) or
illegal ways (coups d’état) increases, the state’s autonomy from its
surrounding society and its political authority for the implementa-
tions of certain foreign policy decision decreases (Ripsman 2009).
In some states, the possibly grave costs of a controversy with
important domestic political groups compel the state leader to seek
consensus with those political actors whose pressure threatens the
state leader’s continued presence in office (Hagan 1987: 348-349).
Compared to non-democratic regimes, in democracies state lead-
ers’ autonomy from society is usually more constrained. As the
public has the legal means to remove the state leader from office
through ballot boxes in the latter group of states, a state’s autonomy
is considerably more constrained in those states. In semi-democra-
cies, although ballot boxes might not work out in the way they do
in full democracies, non-state actors are, in general, still more capa-
ble of bringing about fundamental change than those in non-de-
mocracies.
Non-democratic leaders who have more autonomy from the
society hold more political authority to conduct an autonomous for-
eign policy free of domestic influence. But sometimes the level of
autonomy that state leaders may possess may be lower in non-de-
mocracies than in democratic states. Ripsman (2009: 189) compares
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 47

the level of autonomy of state leaders of democratic and non-dem-

ocratic states, and notes that a structurally constrained non-demo-
cratic leader (for example, Soviet Leader Khrushchev) might pos-
sess even less autonomy to conduct policy than a highly autono-
mous democratic leader (for example, the US Presidents during the
early Cold War).
Domestic socio-economic and political conditions: In states,
where there are relatively prosperous socio-economic standards
and political stability, the influence of public opinion on foreign
policy tends to be less significant. In such states, a successful do-
mestic policy gives leeway to the political elite to pursue a relatively
autonomous foreign policy. Unstable and difficult domestic condi-
tions generate constraints on the foreign policy making. Domestic
constraints become more influential in states which are not classic
nation-states, and/or are a battlefield of different subnational
groups competing (and sometimes fighting) on ethnic, religious,
political and other grounds (Lobell 2009: 50).
The pressure that accumulates from internal variables might
undermine foreign policy making and result in suboptimal out-
comes to the detriment of the nation in the short or long run (Lobell
2009: 63). Neoclassical realism maintains that the state holds the
highest potential to achieve optimal outcomes when “the con-
straints and inducements that emanate from the systemic, sub-sys-
temic, and domestic levels” converge (Lobell 2009: 64). The policy
responses of state leaders to systemic pressure emerge in a coordi-
nated paradigm of state-society relations. The internal composition
of states, the government’s autonomy from its surrounding society,
and the consensus amongst the elite about the nature of interna-
tional threats vary across different states, and over time within
states, and can significantly influence governments’ manoeuvres in
interstate relations (Ripsman 2009: 189).
External conditions: The situation in the external environment
also affects the level of autonomy of state leaders from domestic
non-state groups. During stable periods when the international en-
vironment does not pose any high-level threats to the state’s na-
tional security, public opinion is expected to have greater pressure
on the state’s national security policy. In this period the pressure of
48 VASIF HUSEYNOV

powerful interest groups, which could potentially either assist the

state leader in maintaining its hold on power or contribute to the
opposition against the state leader, become more influential
(Ripsman 2009: 186). However, when the international environ-
ment threatens the state’s national security and its survival, or
when the probability of violent confrontation with foreign powers
increases, state leaders tend to ignore domestic political interests,
and focus on strategies of securing national interests and the state’s
survival. In these periods, the possibly high costs of the interference
of domestic actors into national security policy compel state leaders
to ignore internal pressure on foreign policy making (Ripsman
2009: 186). A turbulent external environment gives rise to the ne-
cessity for the state leader to mobilize the public, to make it accept
the decisions of the government, and in times of military confron-
tation—to persuade it to fight and sacrifice devotedly.

Soft Power
Power over the minds and feelings of people has long been a con-
cept discussed by scholars of international relations and practiced
by politicians. Yet it was Joseph Nye who made the first major at-
tempts at systematizing the resources and techniques which allow
states to wield attractiveness in the eyes of foreign publics, and to
influence their opinions and feelings. With this intent, he coined the
term “soft power” in his Bound to Lead, a book published in 1990.
According to Nye (2004: x), soft power is “the ability to get what
you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”.
Nye (2004: 11) highlights three sources of soft power: culture (in
places where it is attractive to others), political values (when the
state lives up to them at home and abroad) and foreign policies
(when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).
Soft power, which, according to Nye (2010: 219), is an “analyt-
ical concept” (not a theory), describes the requirements of attractive
image building and successful foreign policy making. The concept
explores the nature of the relationship with foreign publics and em-
phasizes the necessity of the inclusion of soft power elements into
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 49

a foreign policy arsenal. These elements are mostly intangible re-

sources—culture, political values, institutions and legitimate for-
eign policy. However, it is often stated that tangible resources (mil-
itary and economic might) can generate soft power, as well (Nye
2011: 86). For example, the deployment of military resources for
earthquake relief in foreign countries can produce an attractive im-
age. It is the reason why the Chinese scholar Mingjiang Li (2009b)
prefers the term “soft use of power” to “soft power”.
Nye (2004: 5) considers soft power as “the ability to shape the
preferences of others”. According to him (2004: 31; 2011: 90), attrac-
tion, persuasion and agenda-setting are the three most important
ways to build soft power. The concept treats attraction as “the cur-
rency of soft power” and defines it in terms of the behaviours and
resources of a state (Nye 2004: 63). Nye (2004: 6) uses poll outcomes
to measure attractiveness. According to Craig Hayden (2012: 44),
attraction can play multiple roles in a soft power relationship: it is
presented as a behaviour in the active approach to soft power and
a resource to be leveraged to achieve an outcome.
Agenda-setting is presented as another source of soft power.
It describes a situation in which certain grievances are not spoken
of because “mobilization of bias” (Bachrach et al. 1962: 949) pre-
vents these issues from becoming an issue by keeping them off the
agenda. To put it bluntly, the people, aware of their powerlessness
in the face of a hegemonic agenda, simply refuse to speak up and
raise their concerns. According to Bachrach and Baratz (1963: 641),
an agenda can be restricted with “the instruments of force, singly
or in combination”. However, Gallarotti (2011: 15) observes that
“soft power generally eschews a strict conflict of interests…”. Nye
(2011: 13) argues that agenda-setting can be characterized as an el-
ement of soft power only if the agenda of action is changed through
acquiescence without the deployment of threats of coercion or
promises of payment.
Moreover, Nye also often mentions “persuasion” as an im-
portant constitutive of soft power. He (2004: 6) defines “persua-
sion” as “the ability to move people by argument” and argues that
“soft power is more than just persuasion.” However, Nye does not
dwell on the thorough clarification of “persuasion” and its role in
50 VASIF HUSEYNOV

soft power making. In his major book on soft power titled Soft
Power: Means to Success in World Politics (2004), the word “persua-
sion” is used only on three occasions, and on one of them, which is
a quote from an interwar period British official, persuasion is pre-
sented as a product of propaganda (Nye 2004: 101), which Nye oth-
erwise does not incorporate into his concept. Nye (2011: 93) states
that persuasion involves some degree of manipulation and fraud.
However, he does not treat manipulation and deception as part of
strategies to wield soft power. In fact, Nye’s attempt to include
these two strategies into persuasion is at odds with many other
scholars, who exclude manipulation from the set of strategies that
persuasion contains (Mattern 2007; Walsh 2005: 3).
The concept of soft power treats public diplomacy, broadcast-
ing, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief,
even military-to-military contacts as essential instruments for soft
power cultivation (Nye 2008a). Nye argues that in the modern
world, in which, unlike earlier times, information is not scant,
broadcasting information to the world does not suffice to wield in-
fluence on popular opinion. States, in the competitive nature of the
international environment, often disseminate (dis)information
damaging one another’s image. Under these circumstances, credi-
bility is more important than mere information broadcasting. Pub-
lic diplomacy is presented as a tool to win credibility in the eyes of
others (2008b).
According to Joseph Nye, hard power is the combination of
military and economic power. He (2004: 7-8) holds a relational ap-
proach to power and maintains that hard power generally rests on
coercion and inducement. For him, while coercion is based mostly
on force or sanctions, bribes and payments are the most likely re-
sources of inducement. States build their hard power on the basis
of their “population, territory, natural resources, the size of the
economy, armed forces [and] technological development” (Zahran
et al. 2010: 17).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 51

Historical Review on Soft Power

Nye (2004: 150; 2007: 162) often claims that he introduced the con-
cept of soft power. However, as Baldwin (2013: 289) states, “there
is a difference between coining a phrase and inventing a concept.”
Nye’s contribution to the studies of international relations in terms
of soft power was not “introducing the concept” but systematizing
and synthesizing the tools and resources which are used to influ-
ence opinions, attitudes and values of the publics of foreign coun-
tries, and to shape their preferences. Elsewhere Nye (2011: 81) him-
self acknowledges that “though the concept of soft power is recent,
the behaviour it denotes is as old as human history.” In fact, not
only “the behaviour it denotes”, but also the ideas the concept of
soft power contains have a long historical background. The histori-
cal roots of the concept of soft power date back to the political phi-
losophy of ancient Greece. Throughout history both scholars and
politicians paid significant attention to power over popular opinion
along with more tangible power (i.e. military and economic might).

Soft Power in Theoretical Writings

Thucydides, who is considered a founder of classical realism makes
clear in his History of the Peloponnesian War that hegemony solely
based on coercion is doomed to fail and therefore is a dangerous
strategy. This forces the hegemon to further strengthen its military
and economic power, as it fears that it would face dangerous re-
sistance if it were to be perceived as weak or irresolute. It leads the
hegemon to pursue an expansionist foreign policy to demonstrate
its power, a strategy which is quite risky and threatens serious mil-
itary loses, and ultimately brings about the collapse of the entire
empire. Thucydides states that initially, Athens’ allies admired the
city’s courage and quality of leadership, which substantially re-
duced the costs of governance and leadership, as well as the
maintenance of the hegemonia. The allies acquiesced with Athens’
hegemony as long as they perceived it as benevolent and beneficial
for their own states as well. When the hegemon abandoned this pol-
icy, and sought benefits solely for its own, then it became a tyrant,
52 VASIF HUSEYNOV

giving rise to its own ultimate end. Lebow and Kelly (2001: 605-
606), comparing Thucydides’ narrative with Nye’s soft power ap-
proach, point out that unlike the latter, the former advises states to
deliver tangible rewards for others in order to gain their acquies-
cence.
Roman political theorists also discussed the promotion of a fa-
vourable image in the eyes of foreign publics as a crucial policy tool.
Marcus Tullius Cicero (107 BC—47 BC), a Roman politician and po-
litical scientist pointed out that no power is strong enough to last if
it relies solely upon inspiring fear (Korab-Karpowicz 2010: 107-
108). According to Cicero, a hegemonic leadership cannot last long
unless it strives to earn others’ affection, confidence, admiration,
and esteem through moral values and justice (ibid.).
A similar approach can be observed in Thomas Hobbes’ polit-
ical writings as well. Gallarotti (2010: 96), after carefully analysing
Hobbes’ The Leviathan, comes to the conclusion that according to
Hobbes’ vision of anarchy, “hard power resources are necessary,
but soft power is just as crucial to optimize influence and achieve
security in an environment without any common power to keep all
actors in awe.” Following these ideas, Italian communist Antonio
Gramsci (1971) highlights the importance of consent along with co-
ercion as the two pillars of hegemony. In the Gramscian sense, he-
gemony is established on the basis of not only economic or political
spheres, but also in the ideational (cultural and moral) sphere.
Gramsci argues that consent and coercion are complementary, and
the latter is mobilized when consent fails to sustain the order con-
trolled by hegemonic power.
Prominent realist scholars have also underscored the im-
portance of image cultivation and public opinion in foreign policy
management. For example, Edward Carr (1951) introduced a three-
fold classification of power: military power, economic power and
power over opinion. He asserts that “power over opinion” is “not
less essential for political purposes than military and economic
power and has always been closely associated with them” (Carr
1951: 132). Noting the Catholic Church as the first totalitarian state,
Carr (1951: 133) stated that the Church pioneered an understanding
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 53

of the potentialities of power over the masses’ opinions and estab-

lished the first propaganda organization.
The significance of power over opinion was acknowledged by
Morgenthau as well. He distinguishes three methods of imperial-
ism: military, economic and cultural imperialism. For him (1965a:
61-61) while the first two aim at the conquest of territory or at the
control of economic life, the latter strives for the conquest and con-
trol of the minds of men as an instrument for changing power rela-
tions. Morgenthau (1965a: 62) states that “the use of cultural sym-
pathy and political affinities as weapons of imperialism is almost as
old as imperialism itself.” He emphasizes the significance of reli-
gion as a way of influencing the minds and feelings of foreign pub-
lics. Morgenthau (1965a: 61) asserts that public sympathy and an
attractive image play a subsidiary role in foreign policy supporting
military and economic methods. This coaxes the enemy and pre-
pares the ground for military conquest or economic penetration.
Like Thucydides, Cicero and Hobbes, Morgenthau (1965a: 63) rec-
ognizes the potential of military methods to conquer foreign terri-
tories without the support of non-military means, but he singles out
its possibility to endure: “no dominion can last which is founded
upon nothing but military force.”

Soft Power in Practice

Throughout history the achievements of states in international pol-
itics was significantly associated with their military and economic
power, as Friedrich Engels once stated, “without force and iron
ruthlessness nothing is achieved in history” (quoted in Carr 1951:
102). Since the beginning of the history of civilizations, military
power has been the decisive element of states’ strength and exist-
ence. Likewise, as “the most obvious, the most ancient, and also the
crudest form of imperialism”, military assets have long been the
major component of states’ power (Morgenthau 1965a: 58). How-
ever, during the late Middle Ages, significant developments took
place in technological, scientific and cultural spheres, including in
social life and political governance. The industrial revolution, major
54 VASIF HUSEYNOV

technological advances, the increase of publishing houses, newspa-

pers, broadcasting agencies, etc. impacted all spheres of human life.
Under these circumstances, the nature of international relations did
not go unchanged, and stepped into overwhelming transfor-
mations. The revolutionary changes in the character of interna-
tional relations in the middle ages intensified with the French Rev-
olution (1789). The revolution empowered the general public and
granted them crucial influence on political issues. The rational-crit-
ical process of debating and weighing political issues in newspa-
pers, speeches, meetings and other institutions of public sphere be-
came part of the political discourse.
The importance of public opinion did not end with conferring
legitimacy and influencing domestic political discourse, but also
gradually gained significant leverage to impact foreign policy. This
was a revolutionary change in the political nature of states and re-
sulted in the struggle for favourable public opinion in international
politics. States started to deploy instruments to influence popular
opinion in other countries. For example, Simon Burrows (1997: 29),
writing about the British-French confrontation in the Napoleonic
era, states that the war between Britain and France “was waged at
both a military and economic level, but also at the level of interna-
tional propaganda.” British foreign policy makers at the time paid
serious attention to the production and dissemination of propa-
ganda written in the French language by writers in Britain and
aimed at “turn[ing] the French general public against the Napole-
onic regime” (Burrows 1997: 29).
David Welch (2003: xvi) points out that propaganda, as a for-
eign policy tool historically associated with periods of wars and se-
rious confrontation, was rarely used from the end of the Napoleonic
Wars to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The massive use of
propaganda during the first total war in history, opened a path in
the practice of international politics which is still being followed.
The war brought the efforts of influencing public opinion as an in-
dispensable part into the formulation of government policies. This
factor played an enormous role during the war, and even some con-
sider the weakness of Germany as a propaganda power one of the
determining factors of its defeat (Welch 2003: xvii).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 55

Prior to World War II, efforts to wield soft power reached an

historical peak. Propaganda provoked a remarkable interest both
among scholars and politicians. A wide array of studies were car-
ried out to examine the ways of moulding the minds and control-
ling the feelings of both domestic and foreign publics. Meanwhile,
special government institutions were created to project power
abroad aimed at shaping perceptions of foreign publics: for exam-
ple, the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda in Ger-
many, the Propaganda Committee of the Communist Party in the
USSR, the Ministry of Information of the United Kingdom and the
Office of War Information in the USA. Nye (2008c: xiii) also points
out that “Hitler, Stalin, and Mao all possessed a great deal of soft
power in their heydays...”
Although historically propaganda was “regarded by almost
everyone as a weapon specifically appropriate to a period of hostil-
ities” (Carr 1951: 137), during the Cold War it gradually trans-
formed into a foreign policy tool actively utilized in peace time as
well. The changing nature of the system of international relations,
the invention of weapons of mass destruction, and the increasing
cost of war made great powers conduct latent wars through eco-
nomic measures and propaganda tools. The world became a battle-
field of a struggle for power over opinion. While since the end of
World War II, a full-scale clash between the great powers has not
taken place (largely because of the fear of nuclear weapons), the
world has been experiencing rivalries between them in other ways:
economically and ideologically.

Reconceptualization of Soft Power

This section will present a model of soft power which differentiates
two sources of soft power: self-projection (attractiveness) and state-
managed projection (Figure 1). Following Nye’s logic, this model
deals with attractiveness as a currency of soft power. The model
uses the word attractiveness interchangeably with the term “self-
projection”. It defines self-projection as the projection of a state’s
cultural, political, economic, educational, military etc. accomplish-
56 VASIF HUSEYNOV

ments to foreign countries without the involvement of its govern-

ment. Attractiveness is built on two general sources: natural en-
dowments and human-constructed qualities. While the former de-
notes the natural qualities of the country, i.e. its territories, popula-
tion, climate, etc., the latter characterizes policies, political values,
economic standards, foreign aid, military power, technological and
scientific advances, music, movies, TV channels, popular culture,
ideas and customs, etc. Attractiveness empowers the state’s narra-
tives and provides arsenal against the contending narratives.
A well-endowed country acquires favourable material condi-
tions to build strong power (both hard power and soft power). Nat-
ural endowments can allow the state to build a strong military and
economic power, but do not suffice to be attractive. It is likewise
important for states to have attractive human-made qualities. While
natural endowments are a crucial, but neither sufficient nor neces-
sary, condition for states to acquire attractiveness, human-con-
structed qualities are both a necessary and sufficient condition to
be attractive. The difference in the soft power achievements of Tur-
key and Singapore is a telling example. In terms of natural endow-
ments, the latter is far behind the former: Turkey with its area
(783,562 sq. km) and population (78.67 million) is a far bigger coun-
try than Singapore (area: 719.1 sq. km; population: 5.535 million).
Nevertheless, Singapore has been more successful than Turkey in
soft power production all over the world. For example, a ranking
by Monocle Magazine in 2015, considering the performances of
states in business and innovation, culture, government, diplomacy
and education, rated Turkey 25th and Singapore 23rd (See Monocle
2015).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 57

Soft Power

Self- State-
projection Managed
(Attraction) Projection

Human
Natural Public
constructed Propaganda
Endowments diplomacy
assets

Figure 1. Soft power4

A state’s attractive endowments and qualities can project an attrac-

tive image through informal communications, grassroots cultural
exchanges, non-state actors, non-governmental organizations, (in-
ternational) media, internet etc. without any state support in a way
that can be theorized as “self-projection”. Though self-projection
happens independently, sometimes it can reach and deliver mes-
sages to foreign publics more effectively than the state-managed
projection of many countries does. Nye (2011: 17) supports this be-
lief:

“[A] country can try to attract others through actions such as public diplo-
macy, but it may also attract others through the structural effects of its ex-
ample or what can be called the ‘shining city on the hill’ effect.”

4 Unlike Nye’s model of soft power, this model does not take agenda-setting,
which is defined as “raising issues to salience among the relevant community
of actor” (Livingston 1992: 313), on par with attractiveness. It does not treat
agenda-setting as a source of soft power, but as a possible outcome of it. This
model treats soft power as power over the minds and feelings of foreign publics
that can be cultivated through the international appeal of a nation’s culture,
values, social-political system, economic model, foreign policies, and its state-
managed propaganda/public diplomacy policies. A state’s soft power in a for-
eign country could be used for different goals by the representing country.
Agenda-setting could be one of these goals, but not a source of building soft
power.
58 VASIF HUSEYNOV

If the people of state A lives in desperate poverty or chaos

while its neighbour state B experiences economic prosperity and
political stability, then naturally B’s economic model and policies
will produce attractiveness for the people of A. In such cases, coun-
try B’s values, supposedly such as democracy, freedom, better liv-
ing standards, and human rights may attract the people in state A,
because these values “address their individual and collective de-
sires and needs” (Roselle et al. 2014: 76). This attractiveness may
also generate incentives among the people of state A to follow the
model of the country B. Thus, self-projection, as an extension of suc-
cessful human-constructed qualities, provides a favourable basis
for the success of state-managed projection.

State-Managed Projection
The mounting influence of domestic non-state actors on the for-
mation of both domestic and foreign policies encourages states to
devote significant energy and resources to programmes that are de-
signed to work with foreign publics, to inform them about the “pro-
jected” country, its values and traditions. These initiatives are
formed in a way to assist the state in its pursuit of national interests
through non-military means by exerting influence on foreign pub-
lics, moulding their opinions, and influencing the policies of their
respective governments. In 1960s, the Director of US Information
Agency, Edward Murrow (quoted in Waller 2007: 25) backed this
approach by stating that “any program supported by government
funds can only be justified to the extent that it assists in the achieve-
ment of national objectives.”
This is why the soft power projection of external powers some-
times generates a strong backlash in target countries. If a state de-
velops a strong amount of power over popular opinion in a foreign
state with ultimately hostile intentions, it might make that state feel
threatened and seek countermeasures. Pointing to this possibility,
Stephan Walt (1987: 260) writes that “penetration is usually coun-
terproductive when a state tries to alter the target’s preferred align-
ment in an especially significant way.” In some cases, the threat-
ened state may even seek a coalition with states that share similar
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 59

concerns. This approach differs from Nye’s, who argues that “if a
country can also increase its soft power, its neighbors feel less need
to seek balancing alliances” (Nye 2012). The growing soft power of
hostile states, in fact, might urge the threatened state to seek a bal-
ancing coalition. The case of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
is an excellent example.
The GCC, founded in 1981, is a regional, intergovernmental
union of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, and Oman. The Iranian regime that came to power fol-
lowing the Shiite Revolution in 1979 had begun to project its ideol-
ogy into neighboring countries. Iran, by using a range of communi-
cative strategies, sought to provoke the Shiite minorities in the Gulf
countries to revolt against their respective states and demand trans-
formation into a more Islamic state. The Arabian monarchies who
had a considerable number of Shiite minorities felt threatened by
Iran’s growing soft power, its propaganda and other subversive ac-
tions. Scott Cooper (2003) writes that poor economic and social con-
ditions amongst Shiite minorities created a favorable environment
for Iran’s propaganda and facilitated domestic discontent. In re-
sponse to Iran’s soft power projection, Gulf countries converged
their counter strategies and founded the GCC to coordinate their
policies. Cooper underlines that there were not any economic inter-
ests behind the formation of the Council. Nor were there military
institutions within the Council to integrate military forces against a
common external threat.
The GCC members cooperated, in fact, against the interference
of Iranian soft power into their internal circles. Considering the
state “as the intermediary between domestic society and the inter-
national system”, Cooper (2003: 309) suggests that internal threats
to the state can be “as serious as external threats—and may, in some
circumstances, be more serious.” Cooperation over the exchange of
information on political dissidents, bilateral agreements involving
sharing sensitive intelligence, border control, extradition of crimi-
nals served to counter domestic subversion instigated by Iran
(Cooper 2003: 313-314). In this respect, some scholars and experts
consider non-military interference in state’s internal affairs by for-
eign countries through subversion, terrorism, espionage, political
60 VASIF HUSEYNOV

propaganda, or related interventions as a form of offensive power

which might be as dangerous as—or sometimes even more danger-
ous than—conventional military actions (Walt 1987: 165, fn. 38;
Priess 1996; Cooper 2003: 324).
States make use of a diverse set of strategies (persuasion, se-
duction, manipulation, etc.) to get their narratives through con-
tending ones. Narratives constitute the central element of the state-
managed projection, and its role in the formation of soft power is
so crucial that some scholars even argue that international affairs
has become a matter of “whose story wins” (Nye, 2013b) or “strate-
gic narrative is soft power in 21st century” (Roselle et al. 2014: 71).
The concept of “strategic narratives” developed by Roselle et al.
(2014: 74) argues that such narratives “directly address the for-
mation, projection and diffusion, and reception of ideas in the in-
ternational system.”
Roselle et al. define strategic narratives as “a communicative
tool through which political actors… attempt to give determined
meaning to past, present, and future in order to achieve political
objectives” (2014: 3) and differentiate its three inter-related levels—
international system narratives, national narratives, and issue nar-
ratives (2014: 76). While international system narratives are narra-
tives about the structure of the international system, the players
and rules in this system, national narratives set out “what the story
of the state or nation is, what values and goals it has” (ibid.). Finally,
issue narratives are about a state’s policies, values, objectives in re-
sponse to a certain national or international issue.
For example, in Russia’s case these three levels of narratives
can be clearly identified: Russia’s calls for a multipolar world and
its objections to the predominance of the USA in the international
system are an example for international system narratives. Mos-
cow’s national narratives present Russia as a peace-loving country
struggling to restore justice in the world which is allegedly domi-
nated by the USA. These two levels of Moscow’s narratives are
complemented by its issue narratives. As in the case of the former
two narratives, the issue narratives also address both domestic and
foreign publics on the legitimacy of its policies and explain why a
certain state action is good or just.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 61

States employ various strategies and instruments to deliver

their narratives to targeted people in foreign countries and to influ-
ence their minds and feelings: such as non-governmental organiza-
tions, international broadcasting, academic exchange programs,
supporting foreign political parties and politically active groups,
etc. Carr (1951: 134) noticed that, “the same economic and social
conditions which… [had] made mass opinion supremely important
in politics… [had] also created instruments of unparalleled range
and efficiency for moulding and directing it.” Public diplomacy
and propaganda are two catch-all terms under whose umbrellas all
the instruments and strategies utilized to wield power over popular
opinion abroad can be located (Table 1).
Joseph Nye does not separately discuss propaganda as an in-
strument of soft power cultivation. In his concept, the policies some
of which were historically considered propaganda (such as interna-
tional broadcasting) are introduced under the label of “public di-
plomacy” (Nye 2004: 107-108). Although when talking about the
policies of Western governments (including the Woodrow Wilson
administration) during World War I, Nye (2008b: 96-97) names the
initiatives of these governments to influence domestic and foreign
public opinion “propaganda”, he (2004, 2008b, 2011) uses the term
“public diplomacy” when talking about the similar policies of the
United States in the modern period. Nonetheless, a deeper analysis
of these two concepts indicates that although the term propaganda
is disregarded in Nye’s concept of soft power, in fact this is still an
integral part of policies to wield power over opinion.
The term “public diplomacy”, which emerged in the second
half of the twentieth century, does not have a single definition all
scholars subscribe to. Paul Sharp (2005: 106) defines it as “the pro-
cess by which direct relations are pursued with a country’s people
to advance the interests and extend the values of those being repre-
sented.” According to Nye (2008b: 95), it is an instrument that gov-
ernments use to mobilize its soft power arsenal to communicate
with and attract the publics of other countries. Nevertheless, ac-
cording to Edmund Gullion, who allegedly coined the term “public
diplomacy” in the mid-1960s, the new term emerged as a result of
their attempts to avoid the word “propaganda” about the policies
62 VASIF HUSEYNOV

of the United States. He (quoted in Vincent 2007: 237) pointed out

that although the activities in question could be called “propa-
ganda”, because of its pejorative connotation a new term “public
diplomacy” was preferred to “to describe the whole range of com-
munications, information, and propaganda”.
Propaganda is mostly defined as “the dissemination of ideas
intended to convince people to think and act in a particular way
and for a particular persuasive purpose” (Welch 2003: xix). Propa-
ganda is historically associated with the Latin term propagate (prop-
agare) denoting the activities of religious circles spreading the
Christian faith during the Middle Ages (Sussman 2010: 14; Vincent
2007: 234). Historically the term was not at all suggestive of the dis-
semination of disinformation aimed at goals which were to the det-
riment of the original interests of the receivers. However, currently
it is mostly conceived as a tool used to mislead people about vari-
ous domestic and international issues (Miller et al. 2010: 4).
Welch (2003: xix) points out that propaganda functions
through the transmission of ideas and values for a specific purpose
which serve the interests of the propagandist directly or indirectly.
Propaganda denotes the dissemination of not only misleading, but
also true information which does not simply intend to inform the
receivers, but to direct their minds and feelings into a specific di-
rection pre-determined by the propagandist (Sussman 2010: 12).
For example, as opposed to the assumptions of propaganda as mere
lies, and the conviction that the dissemination of true information
cannot be propaganda, French philosopher Jacques Ellul (1973: 53)
asserts that the best propaganda operates with some degree of truth
on the basis of which it gives the greatest results. He rightly states
that propaganda does not only aim to change opinions, but much
more importantly, it seeks to reinforce existing beliefs and attitudes.
A few decades before Ellul, writing in 1936, Aldous Huxley (quoted
in Taylor: 1979: 22) also pointed out that “The propagandist is a
man [who] canalizes an already existing stream; in a land where
there is no water, he digs in vain.”
Preserving the ultimate goals of propaganda, public diplo-
macy included elements into its range of activities which look much
less objectionable, and even altruistic. As opposed to propaganda
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 63

that was historically conducted through broadcasting via radio, tel-

evision or newspapers, public diplomacy developed two-way com-
munication. The public diplomacy tools generate the possibility of
communicating with foreign publics face-to-face which is arguably
“the most effective” communication method (Nye 2004: 111). Un-
like propaganda, it allows for deeper engagement with foreign
publics. As Nye notes, “the best propaganda is not propaganda”
(Nye 2014). Non-governmental and civil society institutions are of
paramount importance for the success of soft power policies.
Hence, as Jan Melissen (2005: 4) names soft power a “postmodern
variant of power over opinion”, we can assuredly call public diplo-
macy a “postmodern variant of propaganda”. In a similar vein, for
the definition of public diplomacy Geoff Berridge and Alan James
write that it “is a late-twentieth-century term for propaganda con-
ducted by diplomats” (Berridge et al. 2001: 197).
64 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Propaganda vs. Public Diplomacy

Commonality

Deception

Persuasion
Strategies
Manipulation

Seduction, etc.

To influence the opinions and feelings of the

people in other countries
Objectives

To reinforce or change their attitudes

Dissimilarities

Propaganda Public Diplomacy

Mostly a wartime weapon Mostly a peacetime strategy

Pejorative connotations Less objectionable

Mostly no direct engage- Deeper engagement

ment

Conducted through mostly Conducted through NGOs, academic

international broadcasting exchange programs, cultural diplo-
macy, civil society actors, etc.
Table 1. Public diplomacy vs. propaganda

Soft Power vs. Hard Power

The distinction and relationship between hard power and soft
power is one of the most debatable questions in the concept of soft
power. While a group of scholars, including Nye, consider soft
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 65

power independent of hard power, there are others who claim the
opposite. According to Nye (2004: 9), “soft power does not depend
on hard power.” In his defence of this statement, Nye mentions the
Vatican as an example claiming that it has soft power even though
it has no hard power. Afterwards, Nye defends this view with the
consequences of the Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czech-
oslovakia (1968) to Soviet soft power, stating that these invasions
led the USSR to lose much of its soft power despite its growing eco-
nomic and military capability. In contrast, Colin Gray (2011: 46)
states that “soft power flows to the owner of hard power.” In a sim-
ilar vein, Christopher Layne (2010: 57) argues that Nye’s concept
wrongly assumes that foreign policy is controlled by public opin-
ion. In general, vagueness regarding the hard power—soft power
nexus is often mentioned as one of the flaws of Nye’s concept of
soft power (Zheng et al. 2012: 22).
Another contradiction regarding soft power and hard power
in Nye’s concept is about the nature of their sources. Nye (2003: 10)
is well-aware of the fact that military and economic power can gen-
erate soft power as well. However, as Zheng and Zhang (2012: 24)
write, he does “not provide a clear, logical and persuasive explana-
tion to this contradiction in his soft power theory.” Zheng and
Zhang (ibid.) argue that Nye prefers a simple partitioning of the
policies and behaviours of two types of power: “For instance, the
policies and actions of military power include coercive diplomacy,
war and alliance; those of economic power include aid, bribes and
sanctions; and those of soft power include public diplomacy and
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.”
As an attempt to settle this contradiction I propose an analysis
of the soft power—hard power nexus based on the following four
assumptions (Figure 2):

1. The possession of hard power (i.e. economic and military

power) is a precondition to develop strong soft power;
2. Diminishing utility of military power in international poli-
tics compels great powers to develop their soft power ca-
pacity in the pursuit of their foreign policy goals;
66 VASIF HUSEYNOV

3. Soft power is not a substitute for hard power, and, there-

fore, states need and must pay adequate attention to the
development of their hard power;
4. The possession of strong, hard power elements (e.g. eco-
nomic power) does not automatically produce soft power;
states need to take appropriate measures to wield soft
power.

Below these arguments are discussed in more detail.

1. The possession of hard power (i.e. economic and military

power) is a precondition to develop soft power:

Nye’s above-mentioned description of the negative consequences

of the Hungary and Czechoslovakia invasions to Soviet soft power
is a good point to start. As a matter of fact, a similar image crisis—
which the USSR underwent in the aftermath of these invasions—
happened also to the USA following the Vietnam invasion (1960s).
However, both the USSR and the USA managed to recover their
soft power by the virtue of their growing economic and military
resources. Otherwise they would have failed to regain attractive-
ness if they had lost their military and economic power. Elsewhere
Nye (2004: 14) himself acknowledges this fact: “When the policy
changed and the memories of the war receded, the United States
recovered much of its lost soft power” during the Vietnam war.
Strong hard power backing creates a favourable basis for in-
ternational soft power projection to be effective and successful. Ed-
ward Carr in Twenty Years Crisis asserts that military and economic
strength makes the success of international propaganda possible.
He (1951: 139) observes that “The Third or Communist Interna-
tional enjoyed little influence until the power of the Russian state
was placed behind it.” On the contrary, Trotskyism, which theoret-
ically was not less influential, remained without influence, as it was
not supported by the power of any state.
The importance of hard power for a soft power campaign is
also acknowledged by many contemporary scholars. For example,
Chinese scholar Hongyi Lai (2012: 12) portrays economic clout “as
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 67

a bedrock for a nation’s soft power”. Lai (2012: 9) observes that Ger-
many, Canada, and Japan, the countries that emerged as the top
three most respected nations in polls which were conducted by
GlobeScan for BBC World Services in 21 countries in different parts
of the world between 30 November 2009 and 16 February 2010, are
also among the most economically developed nations and among
the top benefactors of foreign aid in total and especially in terms of
the ratio of aid to GDP. He (2012: 11) rightfully concludes that the
importance of economic resources, foreign aid, and technological
and scientific capacity for soft power cannot be underestimated.

Soft
Power

Military
Power

Economic
Power

Figure 2. Hard power vs. soft power

2. Diminishing utility of military power compels great pow-

ers to develop their soft power capacity:

The evolution of soft power in the policies of great powers is also a

result of the diminishing utility of military power (Huseynov 2016).
It is a fact that since the invention of nuclear weapons, the interna-
tional political environment has not experienced any large-scale
war between great powers. The enormous costs of military opera-
tions and the risks of nuclear involvement have made great powers
avoid using them against each other. They have faced “absolute im-
potence” upon their catch of “absolute power” (Waltz 1979: 184).
68 VASIF HUSEYNOV

The decline in the utility of military power and, against this

background, the rise of soft power, has also been affected by a series
of other developments in recent decades. On the one hand, the in-
formation revolution which has rendered worldwide communica-
tion cheap and easy, is a crucial factor thanks to which soft power
has gained more importance in foreign policy. For some, even the
rapid developments in technology and communications are the
most central driving force in this process (Mattern, 2007: 101-102;
Nye 2014). On the other hand, even though the world community
has not managed to establish an international Leviathan that can
oversee and control international affairs, the world has gone a long
way in this direction since World War II. The establishment of nu-
merous international organizations, non-governmental organiza-
tions, conventions, international courts, etc. has dramatically af-
fected the modus operandi of international relations.
Thus, information technology, the relatively more effective
role of international organizations and law in the management of
interstate relations, but arguably most importantly, the growing de-
structive capability of military power, have contracted its efficiency
while increasing the costs of its usage. Its diminishing utility makes
great powers import soft power into their primary foreign policy
toolkit. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the utility of military
power has disappeared; on the contrary, military power still plays
the primary role in international politics as ultimo ratio.

3. Soft power is not a substitute for hard power, and, there-

fore, states need and must pay adequate attention to the
development of their hard power:

The shrinking utility of military power between great powers does

not necessarily give grounds to perceive soft power as a substitute
for hard power. First, a state’s soft power cannot guarantee its in-
dependence and sovereignty unless the state secures its economic
and military security. Hence, states cannot and should not rely on
soft power resources for national security. Strong military power
or, in the case of smaller states, participation in a military bloc (i.e.
bandwagoning) is a more serious and prudent security measure
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 69

both in regard to non-state threats and rival great powers. There-

fore, military capability will long remain an essential part of states’
power (Gray 2011).
Second, nobody would admire a country which sinks in eco-
nomic problems or shakes under the weight of threats of others. A
state needs an economic and military basis to a certain extent in or-
der to be able to pursue further foreign policy goals which would
include cultivating an attractive image abroad. Nye (2003: 10) him-
self contends that “a country that suffers economic and military de-
cline is likely to lose its ability to shape the international agenda as
well as its attractiveness.” For instance, Russia enjoyed attractive-
ness in the first decade of this century by the virtue of its growing
economy, military power and rising influence in international af-
fairs. In late 2014, following the Ukraine crisis, Moscow faced an
economic and financial crisis. This badly affected Russia’s attrac-
tiveness. Although, Russia’s aggressive foreign policies and anti-
Russian narratives of Western institutions have also played a role
in it, economic and financial downturn was ultimately not less in-
fluential. In fact, Russia experienced a similar situation after the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union when Moscow had lost a considerable
part of the military and socio-economic capacity it once enjoyed.
The 1990s were a period during which Russia suffered military and
economic backwardness, and under these circumstances the pro-
duction of soft power was improbable (Shubin 2004: 110). On the
contrary, the country enjoyed rising soft power between these two
periods- from the beginning of 2000s until 2014 (Rutland et al. 2016).
Thus, states tend to lose their soft power when they fail to success-
fully handle their economic and political challenges. Conversely,
they develop soft power when they are exemplarily successful in
these spheres.

4. The possession of strong hard power elements (e.g. eco-

nomic power) does not automatically produce soft power;
states need to take appropriate measures to wield soft
power:

It is, nevertheless, incorrect to consider soft power to be completely

dependent on hard power. Soft power is not a given power. States
70 VASIF HUSEYNOV

(including great powers) do not enjoy a favourable image abroad

immediately after they achieve strong military or economic capa-
bility. This dimension of power can be produced on the basis of
given cultural resources (such as popular traditions, literature, mu-
sic, unique architecture and so on.) and political values through
well-prepared and accordingly implemented soft power doctrine.
For instance, until the late 1990s China was devoid of strong soft
power despite its growing economy and military might. In the be-
ginning of the new millennium, after having achieved dazzling eco-
nomic growth, Chinese officials started thinking about broadening
their influence internationally. Beijing became able to invest a huge
amount of money on various projects which have been projecting
Chinese soft power globally. For example, the number of Confucius
institutes, of which the first one was established in 2004, rose up at
an impressive speed to 440 institutes and 646 classrooms serving
850,000 registered students worldwide by the end of 2013. Around
$278m was spent on the institutes which serve to project Chinese
cultural values worldwide along with providing Chinese-language
courses. Additionally, a long range of other projects, such as host-
ing the Olympic Games in 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2009,
were initiated, and millions were spent on expanding China Cen-
tral TV’s broadcasts in English and other languages etc. Arguably,
China would not have been able to achieve its current popularity
around the world without these efforts. Most Chinese scholars and
politicians find soft power and hard power mutually complemen-
tary within the correlation in which soft power can facilitate the
growth of hard power, whereas hard power can demonstrate and
support the increase of soft power (Li 2009b: 27-28). Therefore, the
acquisition of strong hard power does not lead automatically to
strong soft power. It demands efforts to build power over hearts
and minds across the globe.

Case Selection
The hypotheses developed above will be tested in the study of the
Russia—West confrontation over the post-Soviet states (Belarus,
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 71

Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) of the “com-

mon neighbourhood”. This study examines rationale behind the
formation of dissimilar external alignment strategies of these states
despite their location in a similar geo-strategic environment. It
found that the existing theories of political realism do not provide
convincing tools to explain this divergence in the foreign policy
strategies of the regional states and the policies of conflicting great
powers to affect their foreign policy choices. The rest of this book
will explore this case in the light of the theoretical assumptions pre-
sented in the previous sections.
Two of the regional states—Belarus and Ukraine—are going
to be more deeply analysed in order to test the hypothesis about the
foreign policies of weak states which are caught in between the
great power rivalries. The empirical analysis here is particularly fo-
cused on the timeframe spanning from 2004 till 2016. This period
has been chosen because the rivalries between Russia and the West-
ern powers, unlike the expectations of many observers (e.g. Brem-
mer et al. 2004), evolved to a very critical level during this period.
The Georgia war of 2008 and the international crisis over Ukraine
of 2014 have affected international relations in the region and across
the globe. Following Crimea’s annexation, Russia—West relations
reached such a critical state that many observers warned against an
all-out war between the two sides (Shlapak et al. 2016; Brewster
2016). However, the confrontation remained limited to non-mili-
tary means and none of the sides dared to militarily attack the other
side.
A number of other existing and past international rivalries be-
tween great powers in various regions across the world, such as the
Cold War rivalries between Western powers and the Soviet Union
over the Third World countries, the slowly growing Russia—Chi-
nese competition over the Central Asian countries and the Chi-
nese—American confrontation over the Pacific countries can serve
as relevant case studies to test the hypotheses of this research. As
delineated in Hypothesis 1, the rival sides in these examples are nu-
clear-armed great powers seeking to expand or secure their influ-
ence over the mentioned territories. Although they are (or “were”
as in the case of the Cold War) highly keen to expand their sphere
72 VASIF HUSEYNOV

of influence over the contested regions and prevent the advance of

the rival power’s influence, they do (did) not dare to make a direct
military attack.
Although US—Soviet tensions rose to dangerous levels on a
number of occasions because of their rivalries over the countries in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, they had to look for ways to pur-
sue their interests through methods which did not include a head-
on superpower confrontation. Their projection of non-military, ide-
ological power produced different results across different countries
and regions. While in some cases they managed to push desired
changes in the external orientation of the target states, they also
failed in other cases and had to engage in proxy wars at times. The
outcome of their policies was not only affected by the international
distribution of military capabilities, but also by ideological/cultural
components of their power, as well as by the internal processes in
the regional states.
Similarly, the slowly growing Russia—China competition
over the Central Asian countries includes elements that may be an-
alysed from the perspectives of the soft power concept and neoclas-
sical realism. Russia’s longstanding military presence in the region
and its historical cultural dominance do not suffice to avert the in-
creasing Chinese influence, which includes both economic and cul-
tural expansion (Pantucci 2015: 275-276). While, as expected by re-
alist scholars, neutrality between Russia and China could benefit
the regional countries more both in terms of security and economic
dividends, the competition between the rival great powers makes
the neutrality challenging to be maintained. This book intends to
provide tools which can also be employed to look into the nature of
the confrontation between Russia and China in Central Asia, ana-
lyse how the internal structures of the regional states would affect
their alignment strategies between the two surrounding great pow-
ers and predict the outcomes of this confrontation.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 73

The Russia—West Confrontation over the “Common

Neighbourhood”
In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the states
located between the EU and Russia, the region which is often called
the “common neighbourhood”, found themselves in an interna-
tional context that was entirely different from the Cold War years.
The Kremlin lost its control over these territories that had been un-
der Moscow’s rule for a significant part of recent history. Russia
was unwilling to reconcile with the loss of its former vassals and
tried to reinstate its supremacy over these territories through vari-
ous channels including economic and political reintegration. Rus-
sian leaders were adamantly against any economic or political rap-
prochement between regional states and the rival great powers (in
particular, Western powers). They warned against the potentially
grave consequences of any expansion of the Western military and
political structures into the region which the Russians treated as
their “near abroad”.
The region remains a priority for Russia’s foreign policy a
quarter of a century after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The es-
tablishment of unchallenged dominance in these territories is con-
sidered of existential importance for the Russian political elite and
is regarded pivotal to its international standing and foreign policy
perspectives (Jackson 2003: 69-70). For the Kremlin’s geopolitical
vision, the hegemony over the “near abroad” is a prerequisite for
Russia to become a global player. This approach, developed in a
similar manner to the US treatment of the Western Hemisphere, is
often analyzed as “Russia’s Monroe Doctrine” (Smith 1993b; Skak
2010: 139). Russia sees the region as its periphery and claims the
right to control the geopolitical manoeuvres of regional countries
(Igumnova 2014: 48). Russia’s leaders, on many occasions, have not
shied away from openly saying that Russia would do everything
possible to prevent geopolitical shifts in this region that pose
threats to Russia’s national security. During the Georgia war of
2008 and the Ukraine crisis of 2014 the Kremlin demonstrated that
it was ready to take military actions towards this end.
74 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Western powers are also interested in this region, especially in

preventing Russia’s plans to re-integrate the regional countries un-
der its hegemony. Many analysts consider former Soviet Eastern
Europe and the South Caucasus as “the most important neighbor-
ing region of the European Union” (Fischer 2011). The region as a
transport corridor between the EU and China and as a transit route
for European energy supplies bears geostrategic importance.
Above all, for the EU, the central question of its policy toward this
region is the security of its eastern frontiers (Skålnes 2005; Dannreu-
ther 2004). The Union’s foreign policy approach with regard to its
eastern neighbourhood is a prominent example of its policies which
are often characterized as “far more Machiavellian than Kantian”
(Smith 2016: 43). Zimmermann (2007: 815), in similar vein, has writ-
ten that:

“The European Union is often seen as the very antithesis of realism and the
extent of co-operation achieved among its Member States is frequently cited
as one of the strongest real-world cases refuting realism. However, this in-
terpretation refers to the integration process itself. It is not necessarily a
given that this would be also reflected in EU external behaviour.”

The EU seeks to establish Western-controlled stability in its

eastern neighbourhood. It is believed that the maximum possible
economic, political, and normative convergence with the neigh-
bouring countries would contribute to the stability of the region
(Missiroli 2004; Lavenex et al. 2009; Hagemann 2013; Smith 2015: 6).
It is therefore not a coincidence that NATO’s eastward enlargement
was also first proposed by German policymakers in 1993, and later
supported by the United States and other NATO members (Skålnes
2005: 231). For example, German Defence Minister Volker Rühe
was convinced that “if we do not export stability, we will import
instability” (quoted in Brown 1995: 37).
The endurance of “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet East-
ern Europe and South Caucasus is also one of the most serious se-
curity challenges to European security. In recent years, these con-
flicts have erupted into bloody clashes that have killed thousands
of people in Ukraine and the South Caucasus and displaced more
than a million people. Thus, economic and political stability in the
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 75

eastern neighbourhood is a particular concern for the EU, as insta-

bility, chaos, and abandonment of reform in those countries would
ultimately constitute various threats, for instance illegal immigra-
tion, smuggling, organized crime, and terrorism. On the other
hand, Eastern European and Baltic members of the European Union
are pushing for the deeper integration of former Soviet members
into the Euro-Atlantic military and political structures to “consti-
tute a buffer zone (“our backyard”) against the unfriendly Big
Other” (Makarychev 2013: 5). Against this background, in its for-
eign policy the EU is focused on two particular goals with regard
to the countries of former Soviet Eastern Europe and the South Cau-
casus:

1. Extending the EU’s influence over the regional countries

through transferring acquis communautaire to the regional
countries, a process which is often characterized as “exter-
nal governance” (Missiroli 2004; Raik 2006a; Lavenex et al.
2009; Hagemann 2013; Smith 2015: 6).
2. Preventing rival powers (first and foremost, Russia) from
(re)establishing supremacy over the countries situated in
this region (Smith 2015);

Despite the fact that the United States is not geographically

related to the post-Soviet countries located between the European
Union and Russia, it has also been heavily involved in the geopolit-
ical mapping of the region since the very beginning of the post-Cold
War years and sought to establish its influence in the region (Haas
2007). The interests of the United States with respect to former So-
viet Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus overlap partly with the
interests of the European Union: like its European allies, the USA
seeks to avert the re-integration policies of Russia, whom some
American politicians consider the “number one geopolitical foe”
(Willis 2012) of the United States. The emergence of Russia as a re-
gional hegemon in Eurasia could entail dramatic geopolitical con-
sequences which would threaten the interests of the USA. Thus, the
United States tries to prevent the revival of Russia’s influence over
the former Soviet countries and Moscow’s regional re-integration
policies (Sakwa 2015: 30). Washington is interested in distancing
76 VASIF HUSEYNOV

the countries of the post-Soviet region from Russia’s orbit econom-

ically, politically, and culturally. US leaders also openly oppose and
criticize the integration projects of the Kremlin as imperialist moves
akin to the Soviet invasion of the region. For example, in 2012 then-
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called Russia’s push for a Eura-
sian Customs Union “a move to re-Sovietize the region”, and
warned, “we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down
or prevent it” (RFE/RL 2012).
Thus, while the maintenance of its dominant role in the region
is for Russia a matter of survival as a great power, for Western pow-
ers the expansion of their influence over the common neighbour-
hood is a measure to ensure the security of eastern borders and pre-
vent re-emergence of a strong regional hegemon (Lavenex et al.
2009; Hagemann 2013; Smith 2015: 6). Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine’s
second president (1994–2005) later wrote in his memories that for
Russia’s leaders “The loss of former influence, particularly in the
borders of the former Soviet Union is a catastrophe” and a “life-
and-death matter” (quoted in Trenin 2011: 88). By deploying mili-
tary power in the conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has
shown that it would risk even a military escalation with the West
to prevent the expansion of the Western military and political insti-
tutions into its backyard. The reserved reaction of the Western pow-
ers to Russia’s military interventions in the regional countries indi-
cated that the region was of a greater importance for Russia, and its
leaders were ready to take more risks for it. These circumstances
define the nature of the great power rivalries as the independent
variable in this study. From the perspective of the regional states,
Russia is closer, stronger, more determined, and a more threatening
power than the EU and the United States. The confrontation be-
tween these two geopolitical centres exerts pressure on the foreign
policy making of the “common neighbourhood” states and pushes
them to the either/or choice between the two.

The “Common Neighbourhood” States

In the early years of the post-Soviet period, the states located in the
“common neighbourhood” sought to minimize Russia’s influence
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 77

and strengthen their newly gained independence. Towards this

end, they either prioritized neutrality as their foreign policy strat-
egy or tried to align with the Western bloc against Russia (Wolczuk
2002; Makili-Aliyev 2013; Szeptycki 2014: 37, Fesenko 2015: 134-135;
Huseynov 2015). However, the international context presented in
the preceding section, in particular Russia’s persistence to preserve
its influence over these states at all costs, made balancing impossi-
ble for the regional states. Consequently, the regional states tried to
either maintain neutrality or align with the stronger and more
threatening power (i.e. Russia).
Two of the regional states, Armenia and Belarus, as expected
by structural realism, bandwagoned with Russia, which compli-
cated their relations with Western powers and gradually pushed
the two to deeper economic and military dependence on Moscow
(Van der Togt 2017: 10; Bosse 2009). Although according to the state
constitution (adopted in 1994), Belarus is supposed to be a neutral
state (Nice 2012), this was not possible to be upheld in practice. The
isolationist policies of the Western leaders with respect to the Bela-
rusian leader Aleksander Lukashenko have further complicated
Belarus’s international position (Bosse 2009). The country regularly
participated in Russia’s regional integration projects, including the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Customs
Union (CU) as a founding member, while its cooperation with
Western military and political organizations remained very limited
or non-existent.
Up until the outbreak of the “colour revolutions” in the region,
the other four regional states (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukraine) tried to keep neutrality between the two surrounding
great powers and maintain economic and political relations with
each of them. Moldova’s constitution (adopted in 1994), in a similar
vein with Belarus’s constitution, declared the country “neutral”.
Although these states, together with Uzbekistan, founded an or-
ganization (GUUAM) that was widely seen as “pro-NATO” and
“anti-Russian” (Kuzio 2000; Splidsboel‐Hansen 2000), they avoided
making real steps towards NATO membership. In this period (i.e.
up until the occurrence of the “colour revolutions”), GUUAM dealt
mainly with economic cooperation, and geopolitical issues were
78 VASIF HUSEYNOV

largely downplayed in the agenda (Landry 2011: 22). Similarly, alt-

hough the leaders of Georgia and Ukraine publicly declared mem-
bership in the EU and NATO as their priority in foreign policy, nei-
ther President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine nor President Eduard
Shevardnadze of Georgia made tangible steps towards this end
(Rondeli 2001: 197-203; Wolczuk 2002; Szeptycki 2014: 37, Fesenko
2015: 134-135; Huseynov 2015: 120-121). At the same time, all of
these four “common neighbourhood” states cooperated with Rus-
sia within regional integration projects (e.g. the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS)) initiated by the Kremlin.
This international status-quo in the region began to partially
change after the popular uprisings known as “colour revolutions”
in the beginning of the XXI century. However, this change was not
in line with the expectations of structural realist scholars: Georgia
and Ukraine, departing from neutrality, sought to align themselves
with Western powers against an increasingly stronger and more
threatening Russia, while Moldova, although did not depart from
its constitutional neutrality, began to deepen its economic and po-
litical cooperation with the EU notwithstanding the threats from
the Kremlin (Kuzio 2011; Samokhvalov 2015; Huseynov 2015: 126-
230). The pro-Western shifts in external orientation in the early
2000s turned out costly for these states, particularly for Georgia. In
the aftermath of the Rose Revolution, relations between Tbilisi and
Moscow gradually deteriorated and eventually resulted in a war
over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia of the
small South Caucasian republic. The five-day Russian-Georgian
war in August 2008 ended disastrously for Georgia. On the contrary
to Tbilisi’s expectations, the West did not declare a war against Rus-
sia to protect Georgia (Huseynov 2015). Russia established its une-
quivocal control over Georgia’s breakaway regions, recognized the
independence of the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and
underlined the irreversibility of this decision.
The rivalries between Russia and the West challenged the ex-
ternal orientation of the “common neighbourhood” states again af-
ter the announcement of regional integration projects by the EU and
Russia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership Programme (EaP) and Rus-
sia’s Customs Union project complicated geopolitical affairs in the
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 79

region. The integration calls by these great powers came to the table
of regional state leaders as an either/or issue. In the face of such a
geopolitical dilemma, they behaved differently. One group of states
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus) did not risk a confrontation
with Russia. The second group of states (Moldova, Ukraine, and
Georgia) that had already experienced “successful” “colour revolu-
tions” eventually signed or initialized the AA with the EU. One of
these states, Ukraine, in which the state leader brought to power by
the “colour revolution” left office in 2010 and the new administra-
tion chose non-alignment as the guiding strategy in foreign policy,
initially found the deal with the EU not “in the national interest”
(Traynor et al. 2013) and refused to sign it. However, another “col-
our revolution” took place and again changed the course of the
state. The 2014 protests brought to power the political elite who
opted to balance with the West against Russia and thus signed the
AA and DCFTA.
Building its analysis on the hypotheses presented in the pre-
vious sections, this book will look into the role of domestic non-
state actors in the formation of the external orientation of these
states. The foreign policy choices of these states and the role of the
internal non-state actors in this process against the backdrop of the
Russian and Western soft power projection will be analysed exclu-
sively in Chapters 5 and 6. The fact that the region hosts countries
that have different levels of state autonomy increases its relevance
as the case study in this research. The level of state autonomy in the
regional countries is identified by considering the political pro-
cesses that took place in these countries over the period under
study (2004-2016). The existence of a different type of political sys-
tems allows the study to identify variations in the autonomy of state
leaders in these countries vis-à-vis their respective societies. With
this purpose, the book has categorized them into two groups: (1)
countries with relatively strong state autonomy (Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, and Belarus) and (2) countries with relatively weak state auton-
omy (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine).
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus are the “common neigh-
bourhood” states where the state leaders have relatively more au-
tonomy vis-à-vis their respective society. This has been possible by
80 VASIF HUSEYNOV

minimizing the influence of internal non-state groups on the man-

agement of foreign policy in a consistent and decisive manner. Un-
like the leaders of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, the political
leadership in these three states have been able to manage the rele-
vant stability of the political systems established in early 1990s. For
example, in the wake of massive anti-government protests the
Georgian President Shevardnadze stepped down in 2003 and the
Ukrainian President Yanukovych stepped down in 2014 without
demonstrating resistance to maintain power. Anti-government pro-
tests in Moldova have usually followed a similar line. On the con-
trary, the political elites in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus
proved themselves more unwavering in the face of similar acts in
the examined period (2004-2016).
The above discussed similarities between these states allow
the study to categorize them in the same group and focus on only
one state to test the hypothesis concerning the foreign policy of the
states whose leaders obtain stronger autonomy vis-à-vis internal
non-state players. In this book, only the case of Belarus is going to
be discussed in detail which is meant to provide helpful insights to
make inferences about the cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan as well.
The particular reason for my choice of Belarus as the case study is
that the location of Belarus is strategically more important for both
the West and Russia than the relatively faraway South Caucasian
countries. Together with Ukraine, Belarus forms the critical buffer
zone between Russia and Western powers. The fact that the country
borders the EU members Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania, who feel
more threatened by Russia, makes Belarus supremely important for
the West. Any instability in Belarus could pose threats to the Euro-
pean Union. This is why both Russia and the West seek to possess
control over this landlocked former Soviet state.
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, known as the most revolu-
tionary nations in the “common neighbourhood”, have made suc-
cessful revolutions and numerous popular uprisings over the last
two decades. They differ from the other three states that have been
discussed above in terms of both their internal political structure
and foreign policy priorities. The frequent change of governments
in these three countries has entailed unavoidable implications for
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 81

their foreign policies, too. Their leaders have been structurally more
restricted than their counterparts in Belarus, Armenia, and Azer-
baijan. This internal pressure has limited their ability to inde-
pendently deal with the imperatives of the international political
system. When they have attempted to disregard public opinion in
making fateful decisions in the past, they have faced, on many oc-
casions, overwhelming domestic discontent and popular upheaval.
The similarities discussed above make it possible to focus on
Ukraine alone to test the hypothesis concerning the foreign policy
of the states whose leaders are weakly autonomous vis-à-vis inter-
nal non-state players. The particular reason for my choice of
Ukraine as the case study is similar to the one that I declared about
Belarus. Like Belarus, Ukraine’s geopolitical importance for Russia
is immeasurable: “it is an existential imperative” (Bogomolov et al.
2012). Ukraine has been invariably the primary target of Russia’s
integration projects. It is a country without which Russia’s plans to
re-integrate the post-Soviet states under the Eurasian Union would
lose most of its value. This is why it is also of a great geostrategic
importance for Western powers.
Ukraine and Belarus, along with other “common neighbour-
hood” states, receive similar pressure from the Russian side to re-
frain from Euro-Atlantic integration. Simultaneously, Western
powers seek to tear these countries away from Russia’s sphere of
influence. These conditions make their geostrategic environment
largely similar. The recent historical background of the two states
is also amongst the conditions which make them comparable: both
of the countries were part of the Soviet Union being amongst its
official founders and disintegrators. They declared themselves in-
dependent after the collapse of the Union in 1991. Existence under
Soviet control for long years has had a series of implications for
these countries. For example, it has made their economies inher-
ently tied with the Russian economy. In 2016, the exports to Russia
accounted for 46,5% of Belarus’s total exports, while imports from
Russia were more than 55% of its total imports (See National Statis-
tical Committee of the Republic of Belarus 2017). Russia was also
the major trade partner of Ukraine until relations deteriorated in
the aftermath of the Euromaidan revolution (2014). In 2013,
82 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Ukraine’s exports of goods to Russia amounted to 50,6% of its over-

all exports of goods, while its imports from Russia were below 40%
(See State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2013). In spite of these simi-
larities, they opted for different strategies in their external align-
ment over the period under study (2004-2016). The research aims to
explain this variation in their foreign policy choices by putting an
emphasis on the (non)intervention of domestic non-state groups in
foreign policy.

Conclusion
This chapter has presented the hypotheses that will be tested in the
case of the Russia—West rivalries over the post-Soviet states lo-
cated between the EU and Russia. This study has found that inter-
national relations scholars have not thoroughly examined the poli-
cies of the rival nuclear-armed great powers to reach out to the do-
mestic non-state actors of the targeted regional states in order to
affect their external alignment. The realist scholars (e.g. Walt 1987:
218-261) who have paid attention to these policies have underesti-
mated their potential to be effective and focused more on the distri-
bution of material capabilities. In contrast to them, this chapter put
forward the hypothesis that if nuclear armed great powers compete
to expand or sustain their sphere of influence, they attempt to affect
the external orientation of the regional states by affecting their do-
mestic political system through influencing the attitude of the
masses and the perceptions of the elite. In this process, great powers
make use of various instruments which I have analysed under the
umbrella of soft power. In this context, they use soft power as a ma-
jor expansive instrument while military power remains a tool of de-
fence and a method of backing up their foreign policies.
The chapter has also explored factors which impact the deci-
sion of the regional states in their external orientation when neu-
trality (non-alignment) turns out impossible to be maintained and
the international system forces them to make a choice between
bandwagoning and balancing. The chapter concluded that ap-
proaches emphasizing the role of the distribution of material capa-
bilities in international relations, geographic proximity, aggressive
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 83

intensions, offensive power, and economic dependence fail in many

cases. It was argued that the analytical toolkit of neoclassical real-
ism, recognizing the causal influence of systemic pressure and in-
cluding the intervening influence of state-level variables, provides
more convincing assumptions to explain the foreign policy strategy
of weak states.
The chapter narrowed down its focus on public opinion and
state autonomy as the intervening variable in its analysis. It ex-
plored the theoretical foundations of the great powers policies to
affect the external alignment of weak states through influencing
their publics. It formed the hypothesis that if the leaders of a weak
state, which is in between the rivalries of great powers who use soft
power to expand their influence, are autonomous vis-à-vis the soci-
ety and other internal non-state actors, they can control the inflow
of the soft power projection of foreign states, offset the intervening
influence of the domestic non-state actors on foreign policy making,
and augment their chances to more prudently and independently
follow the imperatives of the international political system. Con-
versely, if such autonomy does not exist, then the external powers
find a favourable environment in which to wield soft power, the
domestic non-state actors can influence the external orientation of
the state, the state fails to offset their influence, which may result in
suboptimal foreign policy decisions.
In the next section, the chapter aimed at exploring the concept
of soft power, its fundamental assumptions and shortcomings. Af-
ter having reviewed the works of a series of scholars, the chapter
presented its reconceptualization of soft power. The model it pre-
sented differentiated two sources of soft power: self-projection (at-
tractiveness) and state-managed projection. It argued that a state’s
attractive self-projection is built on the superiority of its natural en-
dowments and human-constructed assets. However, this is not a
sufficient condition on which to build strong soft power in the tar-
get states. For that, great powers need to develop a complex set of
strategies which the chapter called “state-managed projection”.
Public diplomacy and propaganda have been analysed as the two
terms that include the instruments (e.g. international broadcasting,
scholarly exchanges, etc.) used in this process. Hard power was also
84 VASIF HUSEYNOV

analysed in the chapter and presented as an important type of

power which cannot be easily substituted with soft power.
The chapter has finally introduced the cases which will be
used to test the hypotheses. It opted for the Russia—West competi-
tion between 2004—2016 over the states which are located between
the EU and Russia—the region which is known as the “common (or
shared) neighbourhood”. It categorized the regional states in two
groups in accordance with some of the political events happened in
these states in the target period: states with relatively strong state
autonomy (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus) and states with rela-
tively weak state autonomy (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). One
state from each group will be subject to more thorough analysis of
the book: Belarus and Ukraine.
3. Soft Power in Western Foreign Policies
(2004—2016)

As outlined in Chapter 2, the hypothesis on rivalries between nu-

clear armed great powers predicts that if these great powers com-
pete to expand or sustain their sphere of influence, they use soft
power as a major expansive instrument while military power re-
mains a tool with which to defend themselves and back up their
foreign policies. This chapter tests this hypothesis along with some
of the assumptions developed by the soft power model of this book
in the case of the policies of Western powers (i.e. the EU and the
United States). It analyzes their rationale of using soft power and
hard power in the policies concerning the post-Soviet region. The
chapter particularly explores how Western powers make use of the
instruments which I have analysed under the notion “soft power”
to communicate with and influence domestic non-state players in
the “common neighbourhood” states.
The chapter’s discussion on Western soft power policies is
based on the analytical framework of the soft power model pre-
sented in Chapter 2. This model differentiated two sources of soft
power as self-projection (attractiveness) and state-managed projec-
tion. Self-projection is built on the basis of natural endowments and
human-constructed assets, while state-managed projection is con-
ducted through propaganda and public diplomacy. The model pre-
sented propaganda as a one-way communication strategy (e.g. in-
ternational broadcasting). On the contrary, public diplomacy is
considered as a two-way communication strategy that includes
face-to-face interactions with the people of the target states. The
model also presented a reconceptualization of the distinction and
relationship between hard power and soft power highlighting inter
alia the importance of hard power to produce strong soft power.
The chapter consists of two major sections. The first section
that follows this introduction briefly examines the policies of West-
ern powers to draw the “common neighbourhood” states into their

85
86 VASIF HUSEYNOV

orbit. It will be followed by a larger section on the soft power poli-

cies of the West with respect to this region. The section explores
elements of both self-projection and state-managed soft power pro-
jection of Western powers in the regional states. A short conclusion
in the end briefly reviews the findings of the chapter.

Soft Power vs. Hard Power in Policies of Western

Powers
The previous chapter’s analysis of the interests of Western powers
with regard to the “common neighbourhood” states concluded that
the region is of lesser importance for the West than it is for Russia.
However, the fact that the subordination of the regional states to
Russia’s control could have entailed a range of geopolitical impli-
cations forced Western powers to think about drawing them into
their own orbit and preventing Russia’s plans to pursue regional
re-integration. Below, three main directions of Western policies
which are aimed at this end are discussed: (1) European integration;
(2) Transatlantic integration; (3) the reinforcement of the defensive
capabilities of the Alliance along its eastern borders.
European Integration: A few years after the dissolution of the
USSR, the EU started to make inroads into Eastern Europe and the
South Caucasus, which had until then been under Soviet control. In
a relatively short period of time three members of the former Soviet
Union (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and most of the other for-
merly communist Eastern European states (Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria) were ad-
mitted to the EU and NATO. This process went rapidly, largely
thanks to the impressive attractiveness of these organizations for
the regional states. Prior to the EU’s 2004 enlargement, this fact was
specifically stressed by Romano Prodi, the then chairman of the Eu-
ropean Commission: “The EU looks certain to remain a pole of at-
traction for its neighbours. For many of the countries in our future
‘backyard’ the EU is the only prospect” (European Commission
2002a). Prodi also underlined the importance of “attractiveness” as
the fundamental pillar of the new proximity policy of the EU with
its new neighbours in the Eastern neighbourhood.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 87

In 2002, Prodi announced that a “ring of friends” would be

formed around the borders of the EU in the aftermath of the en-
largement of 2004-2007. He pointed out that this policy “must un-
lock new prospects and create an open and dynamic framework,”
and “it must motivate… [the EU’s] partners to cooperate more
closely with the EU” (European Commission 2002b). Outlining the
future perspectives of the proximity policy, Prodi fleshed out that
the EU should neither promise nor exclude eventual membership
to the countries involved in this policy. These ideas were encapsu-
lated in the “European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP), which was
announced in 2004 and viewed all periphery countries in the Mid-
dle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Southern Caucasus
as external partners. As an attempt towards differentiation between
Southern and Eastern neighbours within the ENP, in 2009, at the
initiative of foreign ministers Radoslaw Sikorski of Poland and Carl
Bildt of Sweden, the EU and six post-Soviet states (Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine) launched the East-
ern Partnership Programme (EaP), based on a commitment to fun-
damental values (including democracy, the rule of law and respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms), a market economy,
sustainable development, and good governance. The programme
sought to reproduce the internal model of the EU in the target coun-
tries without granting membership, bring them under the norma-
tive influence of the EU, and ensure stability of the eastern bound-
aries of the EU.
The EaP envisioned two primary integration targets with the
partner countries: (1) the signing of an Association Agreement
(AA), an integral part of which would be accords on a Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), and (2) full visa
liberalization, meaning a visa-free travel regime with the EU. Ini-
tially, some of the former Soviet states opposed this project. For ex-
ample, the Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin characterized the
initiative as “a ring around Russia”, and questioned the need for a
new, anti-Russian CIS under the leadership of the EU (Sputniknews
2009). However, eventually they all joined it.
The EaP reached some successful results in the ensuing years:
Above all, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, and Georgia signed AAs,
88 VASIF HUSEYNOV

including DCFTAs. The agreements comprise four general chap-

ters: Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Home Af-
fairs, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), and
a fourth chapter covering a range of issues including the environ-
ment, science, transportation, and education. They create mecha-
nisms for reform in a variety of fields in the respective countries,
cut import tariffs, open EU markets to them and vice versa, and
thus strengthen cooperation between the sides.
Likewise, the DCFTAs deal with principles on environment,
transportation, science and education that are not typical to classic
trade agreements. They also seek to harmonize the trade-related
legislation of these countries with EU standards and the acquis com-
munautaire. The countries that sign these agreements commit them-
selves to adopting some 350 EU laws within a ten-year timeframe.
The three countries have also gained visa-free access to the
Schengen zone. They also joined the Energy Community that was
created by the EU in 2006 for the Western Balkans countries to in-
corporate them into the EU’s electricity and gas markets.
Transatlantic Integration: The end of the Cold War generated
a cooperative international environment between NATO and Rus-
sia. Particularly, the 1997 Russia–NATO Founding Act and the 2002
NATO—Russia Council formalised relations between former Cold
War foes and created a basis for cooperation. The Alliance under-
scored that it had “no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy
nuclear weapons to the territory of new members” and the integra-
tion of new members into NATO would not follow with “addi-
tional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces” on their
territory (See NATO 1997). In the following years, the Alliance ex-
panded its borders eastward and integrated the Baltic States and
most Central and Eastern European states. It also declared the door
of the Alliance open to all European democracies, including the
post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus, that meet
the standards of membership. Thus, the US demonstrated that it
was unwilling to stop the enlargement of NATO’s sphere of influ-
ence at the border of the former Soviet Union, despite the fact that
it was clear that these policies might be confronted with Russia’s
military counteractions. The US leaders made clear that they would
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 89

not recognize the right of any external power to impose limitations

on the external alignment choices of regional states.
Encouraged by such declarative support, two of the regional
states, Georgia and Ukraine, decided to knock at the door of the
Alliance. Their leaders, Mikheil Saakashvili and Viktor Yushchenko
respectively, who had been brought to power by “colour revolu-
tions”, asked the Alliance for the Membership Action Plan (MAP),
a program designed to help aspiring countries prepare for eventual
membership. The Alliance debated the MAP issue for the first time
at the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania (2–4 April 2008). Due
to French and German opposition, the Alliance refused to launch
the MAP process. The final declaration of the summit indicated in
an obscure manner that Georgia and Ukraine would, one day, be-
come members of NATO.
The discussion of the membership of the neighbouring post-
Soviet states at this high level outraged the Russian leadership.
However, it failed to deter the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the re-
gional states, in particular of the Georgian leadership. President
Saakashvili erroneously believed that the EU and the US would
stand by Georgia in a military clash with Russia over the tiny break-
away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Ronald Asmus in his
A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of
the West aptly characterizes Saakashvili’s pre-war foreign policy as
what Richard Nixon once called the ‘madman theory’ of foreign
policy—threatening to act irrationally in order to get someone’s at-
tention (Asmus 2010: 10).
The reluctance of the Alliance members to militarily support
the regional states against Russia’s military operations, despite
their regular declarative support, happened again in the aftermath
of Crimea’s annexation. Although Western powers imposed eco-
nomic sanctions on Russia and provided support to Ukraine, they
did not militarily stand against Russia. The threat of the escalation
of the conflict and its transformation into a nuclear war again de-
termined the fate of the region. Under the existing circumstances,
the West cannot benefit from its military superiority and does not
seem willing to militarily intervene to avert Russia’s efforts to al-
legedly “re-Sovietise the region”. Although both the EU and United
90 VASIF HUSEYNOV

States support some of the regional groups who try to make pro-
Western changes in their respective countries, none of them has
shown a serious determination to put all their resources at stake to
materialize those changes in the region. Thus, this observation al-
lows us to argue that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the pri-
mary goal for the West has not been to draw post-Soviet countries
into their orbit and to get them to join the EU and NATO which
would lead to an all-out military clash with Russia; rather the goal
has been to minimize Russian influence in the region and to impede
upon the Kremlin’s re-integration efforts at relatively little cost.
Reinforcement of Defence: Although Western powers did not de-
ploy military force against Russia’s military intervention in the
“common neighbourhood”, they strictly reinforced their defensive
capabilities along the eastern borders. In the aftermath of the Geor-
gia—Russia war of 2008 and the Ukraine crisis of 2014, NATO
members reinforced the Alliance’s military presence along the East-
ern borders. This was principally remarkable because up until those
events, the role of NATO in European security was gradually de-
clining as Europe was becoming increasingly more capable of
providing regional security on its own (Dannreuther 2004: 2). Some
analysts also claimed that “NATO [was] destined for a greatly re-
duced role in Europe’s security architecture” (Hyde-Price 2007: 4).
As opposed to those expectations, as Richard Sakwa (2015: 4) aptly
points out, “NATO’s existence became justified by the need to man-
age the security threats provoked by its enlargement.” The wars be-
tween Russia and its former allies were used by the Alliance as a
reason for further reinforcement in the region, as the regional
NATO members appealed for a stronger NATO presence in their
lands as a security guarantee against potential Russian aggression.
Thus, although Western powers deployed non-military power to
expand their influence inwards in the post-Soviet region, they rein-
forced their military force in order to counter any backlash of this
expansion.
The Ukraine crisis entailed “the most significant reinforce-
ment of NATO’s collective defence since the end of the Cold War”
(NATO 2017). At the 2014 Wales Summit, the member countries
came to terms with the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to strengthen
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 91

the capacity of the Alliance to respond swiftly and firmly to new

security challenges in an increasingly hostile environment. The
RAP considers “continuous air, land, and maritime presence and
military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance (...) on a rota-
tional basis”, deployment of increased weaponry, including fighter
jets and multinational maritime forces, and the reinforcement of the
NATO Response Force (NRF) (NATO 2014). The personnel of the
NRF were increased to 40,000 in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis
from 13,000; moreover, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
(VJTF) of around 20,000 troops, of which about 5,000 are ground
troops, has been founded. Even though Russia’s military budget
(nearly $69 billion in 2014) is far lower than those of NATO mem-
bers ($852 billion in 2014), the Alliance leaders also called for in-
creasing the defence budget to counter Russia’s growing military
budget. All in all, Moscow’s reaction to NATO’s enlargement initi-
atives has led to more efforts on the part of the Alliance to
strengthen its defencive capabilities along its borders with Russia.
In June 2014, the White House proposed a European Reassur-
ance Initiative (ERI) with the declared goal of “reassuring North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partners of the US
commitment to their security and territorial integrity” (See Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense 2016). The ERI funds the exer-
cises, trainings, and rotational presence in Europe, particularly
Central and Eastern Europe. It seeks to increase the capability and
readiness of US allies within NATO and its partners (Georgia, Mol-
dova, and Ukraine), to show “a quick joint response against any
threats made by aggressive actors in the region” (ibid.). The Tele-
graph reported that the initiative was aimed at “deter[ring] Russia
from carrying out additional land grabs after its 2014 annexation of
the Crimean Peninsula” (Telegraph 2016). The spending through
ERI amounted to $985 million in 2015 and $789,3 million in 2016.
For the fiscal year (FY) 2017, this amount quadrupled to $3,4 billion.
The FY 2017 ERI funding is expected to support projects of the De-
partment of Defense (DoD) seeking “to reinforce the defences of
NATO members and non-NATO partners in the region that feel
most threatened by Russian aggression” (Office of the Under Sec-
retary of Defense 2016).
92 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Additionally, the Pentagon confirmed that it plans to deploy

fully manned combat brigades to Europe in response to “an aggres-
sive Russia”, in addition to the presence of more than 60 thousand
US troops in Europe (Telegraph 2016). In June 2015, the US an-
nounced to pre-position 250 armoured vehicles (M1 Abrams tanks,
Bradley fighting vehicles and M109 howitzers) and their associated
equipment in Central and Eastern Europe. The Polish Institute of
International Affairs reports that “For the first time in NATO’s his-
tory, such equipment will be stored on territories of “new” mem-
bers: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria”
(Kacprzyk 2015: 7). In 2016, the alliance organized its biggest ever
joint military exercises in Poland where some 31,000 Polish, Amer-
ican and other troops participated in land, sea and air exercises. De-
spite Russia’s consistent warnings, NATO is set to strengthen its
eastern flank with new multinational battalions in Poland and the
Baltics and open communication centres in Bulgaria and Romania.

Soft Power as the Western Foreign Policy Tool

The importance of reaching out to foreign publics as a way of ulti-
mately influencing the foreign policy actions of their respective
governments was recognized by the US foreign policy makers at
the very beginning of the Cold War. In the late 1950s, a report pre-
pared by the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff (PPS) men-
tioned the changing character of foreign policy making. The report
noted that unlike previous times, now diplomacy did not only tar-
get foreign policy elites and professional diplomats but sought to
reach out to the general public as well. The report explained that
“Convincing a foreign official is often less important than carrying
an issue over his head to his people, to public opinion in the country
he represents… The people will influence the official’s action more
than he will influence theirs” (Osgood 2002: 89). With these inten-
tions in mind, the USA set up a number of institutions to connect
with the people of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries.
Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), Voice of
America (VOA), United States Agency for International Develop-
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 93

ment (USAID), numerous cultural and academic exchange pro-

grams, scholarships, etc. played a crucial role as an alternative
source of information for millions of people behind the Iron Cur-
tain. RFE and RL, which were founded in 1949 and 1951 respec-
tively and were financed by the CIA for a long time, served as a
primary instrument of US foreign policy to inform and influence
the public of the rival bloc. Michael Nelson (1997: 163) reports that
VOA reached 14–18 percent of the Soviet adult population during
an average week prior to 1985, followed by Radio Liberty with 8–
12 percent, the BBC with 7–10 percent, and the German broadcaster
Deutsche Welle with 3–6 percent. The remarkable aspect of these
broadcasters was that they were mostly broadcasting in the local
languages of the countries they targeted. For example, in 1980s
RFE/RL broadcasted in 21 languages to the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe (Mickelson 1983: 3). They were trying to inform people
living under communist regimes about the high living standards in
the West and make them rebellious against the material deficiencies
and political repression of the communist governments.
Cultural diplomacy and educational exchanges have also long
been an essential tool for Western governments to project favoura-
ble images into foreign countries. Exchange programs played an es-
sential role in combating communism at the height of the Cold War.
Unlike the Soviet Union, Western countries were not reluctant to
send their own nationals and to bring the nationals of communist
countries through these exchanges. The West was eager to project a
tempting and attractive image of abundance of material wealth,
consumer culture, technological know-how, individual freedom,
and political democracy to both communist and non-communist
countries. For example, in response to the offers of the US govern-
ment to accept a hundred students each year from the Soviet Union
in the late 1950s, for a long-time the Soviets agreed to send only 20
students and mostly over the age of 30 who had already advanced
94 VASIF HUSEYNOV

in their career (Richmond 2003: 22).5 In later years, the number of

Soviet students who studied in Western universities gradually in-
creased.
The exchanges in culture, education, information, science, and
technology between the Soviet Union and the West over the thirty-
five years that followed the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, are often
analysed as one of the important factors that brought down com-
munism (Richmond 2003). The role of educational exchanges in the
fall of the Soviet Union has been confirmed by many Soviet partic-
ipants of exchange programs in the United States. For example,
Oleg Kalugin, one of the very first Soviet exchanges who studied in
the USA and later became a KGB General likened the exchanges to
“a Trojan Horse in the Soviet Union… that played a tremendous
role in the erosion of the Soviet system” (Richmond 2003: 32).
The information war between the West and Russia did not
come to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The gradual
deterioration of relations between the sides in geopolitical affairs
also found its way into the information space. In the wake of the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the focus of US broadcasters shifted
gradually towards countries that were still under Russia-supported
governments. RFE/RL completed its mission in and terminated its
broadcasting to Hungary in 1993, Poland in 1997, and Estonia, Lat-
via, Slovakia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Romania in 2004.
However, it continued and enlarged its broadcasting to the post-
Soviet world. Unlike the Cold War years, in the new era the Euro-
pean countries also actively participated and assumed a major role
in the soft power competition with Russia over the “common neigh-
bourhood” countries. A long range of non-governmental institu-
tions, exchange programs, international broadcasters, think-tanks,
etc. were deployed in the fight to win approval amongst the peoples
of the post-Soviet regional states.

5 As a matter of fact, initially President Eisenhower suggested that that ten thou-
sand Soviet students would be invited to the United States, all expenses cov-
ered. However, Eisenhower’s proposal was not made public, as the State De-
partment warned that this would alarm the Soviet officials and problematize
the negotiations. Therefore, eventually only a hundred students were offered
to the Soviet Union to be sent to the United States (Richmond 2003: 22).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 95

Self-Projection
Western powers (i.e. the European Union and the United States),
being some of the most developed states in the world, have ac-
quired wide-ranging capabilities to develop effective self-projec-
tion. The USA and the EU are the world’s first and second largest
economies, respectively. They together ($34,176 trillion) produce
more than 45% of the global gross domestic product (World Bank
2017a). The countries look like paradise for millions of people
across the world with a GDP per-capita $38,442 and $54,629, respec-
tively (World Bank 2017b). Besides, this economic basis also allows
the West to be militarily second to none: NATO’s total budget is
over $904 billion (SIPRI 2016). Around 32% of this budget is cov-
ered by the European members of the alliance (ibid.). A 2015 rank-
ing by Monocle Magazine, considering the performances of states
in business and innovation, culture, government, diplomacy and
education, ranked 13 EU Member States in the top 25 globally in
terms of soft power, with Germany ranking number one and the
United States ranking number two (Monocle 2015).
The enormous economic advance has been possible thanks to
their natural endowments (e.g. geographic location and climate)
but more importantly thanks to the brilliant policies these countries
have historically developed. This is why the socio-political and eco-
nomic model of the West has been admired by millions of people
across the world and in the countries of the Former Soviet Union
(Portnov 2014: 13; Ostrovs‘kyj 2014: 21; Onuch 2014: 48). Although
the image of the liberal democracy model of the Western commu-
nity was tarnished by the rise of right-wing populism towards the
end of 2016, until then (in the period under study—2004-2016) this
model had been a major soft power asset of the EU and the USA in
their policies with regard to the “shared neighbourhood”. The ide-
als that are attached to the West—freedom of speech, human rights,
the rule of law, accountability—have been a major motivation for
the post-communist countries in aspiring to join the European Un-
ion.
It is due to these ideals that many observers consider the EU’s
soft power as “unrivaled”, although, according to others, US soft
96 VASIF HUSEYNOV

power surpasses that of Europe. The latter refers particularly to the

worldwide fame of American cultural products. A leading French
specialist, Frederic Martel (2010), on the basis of his research in 30
countries, concluded that American cultural exports (movies, mu-
sic, books, broadcasting, etc.) has captured a leading position in the
formation of global entertainment, shaping tastes and views over
the world. Criticizing the European cultural industry, which he ar-
gued fails in producing equally attractive cultural goods, Martel
fleshed out that this strength gives America “a capacity to influence
other cultures and societies” (in an interview to Basil Maudave
(2010)). But, in this research, no differentiation is made between the
EU and the USA, and their soft power projection is treated as a uni-
fied unit in competition against Russia in the “shared neighbour-
hood”.

Narratives
In their policies to wield power over the minds and feelings of the
people of the “common neighbourhood”, Western powers do not
build their narratives on the basis of religious affinity, historical
past or ethnic bonds. The narratives which they arm their soft
power policies with have been overwhelmingly future-oriented
proposing “an attractive vision of the future” (Chatham House
2011: 10). They address the existing socio-economic and political
problems the people in “common neighbourhood” countries strug-
gle with. European integration has been presented by pro-Western
forces and seen by many local people as “a promise of wealth and
development as well as better governance and public sector re-
form” (Lang 2015: 37; Fesenko 2015: 132-133). For example, the for-
mer communist member states of the EU formulated their narra-
tives within the framework of their post-communist journeys. Re-
ferring to their own experience following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, they argued that European integration was the proven way
of success to overcome dictatorships and to embark on political and
economic development based on liberal and free market principles
(Sadowski 2015: 66).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 97

For the most part of the period under study (2004-2016), de-
mocracy promotion, which was defined by the European Council
of Ministers as “the full range of external relation and development
cooperation activities which contribute to the development and
consolidation of democracy in third countries” (quoted in Burnell
2007: 1) was a buzzword for Western policies with regard to post-
Soviet countries. The EU and United States called upon regional
states to foster democracy and promote the right of citizens to
choose their own leaders in a free and fair process. Western powers
also criticized leaders who built up dictatorial rule through corrup-
tion and clampdown on independent voices. However, this criti-
cism was applied selectively depending on its relevance from the
perspective of the regional geopolitical and economic interests of
the Western powers. Some political figures like President
Lukashenko and his entourage were personae non-grata in the US
and EU, while others never experienced similar reactions (Ioffe
2004: 96). While anti-Lukashenko critics were provided by the West
with financial and logistics support on significant scales, Western
powers demonstrated disinterest towards those oppositional forces
that fought against the leaders of friendly countries to the West
(Landry 2011: 21).
On the other hand, the EU and the USA criticised Russia’s re-
gional integration projects and accused it of harbouring new impe-
rial ambitions. From this point of view, Russia’s Eurasian Union
was a mere reconstruction of the Soviet Union in a new form which
Hillary Clinton famously described as “a move to re-Sovietize the
region” (RFE/RL 2012). They condemned Russia’s policies of ob-
structing access to the Euro-Atlantic path of regional countries by
deploying military force in a strictly asymmetric manner. Western
leaders repeatedly stressed that no external power could veto the
foreign policy choices of the regional countries or undermine their
right to chart their own future path. Declaring that “We may not
give in to external pressure, not the least from Russia” or “the times
for limited sovereignty are over in Europe,” they opposed Russia’s
attempts to maintain control over the external alignment options of
the regional states (Marszal 2013).
98 VASIF HUSEYNOV

International Broadcasting
The renewed confrontation between the West and Russia brought
back rivalries between the former foes in the information space as
well. Many Western politicians, academicians, and experts
sounded the alarm about Russia’s information war. In response to
these developments, the EU reinforced its support for the develop-
ment of “free” and “independent” media in “common neighbour-
hood” states. The EU Commission states that between 2011 and
2015 it invested €15.5 million for (i) journalist training and network-
ing, (ii) information and communication campaigns, (iii) opinion
polling and media monitoring in the regional countries of the Re-
gional Communication Programme (See European Parliament
2014). In 2011, then US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton warned
that “We are in an information war and we are losing that war”
(Warrick 2011). Similarly, in 2013, in her testimony before Congress,
she criticized the performance of the Broadcasting Board of Gover-
nors—which oversees several international broadcasting institu-
tions, including the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Ra-
dio Liberty—as “practically defunct” (Schadler 2013).
These concerns even grew in the wake of the breakout of the
Ukraine crisis. Enders Wimbush, a former Broadcasting Board of
Governors (BBG) governor and director of Radio Liberty, asserted
that the Ukraine crisis was “the most serious challenge US interna-
tional broadcasting has faced since the fall of the Soviet Union”
(Strobel 2015). Western leaders feared that their counterarguments
did not have a sufficient degree of persuasion. These developments
urged the EU and NATO to take a series of measures to combat
Russian propaganda in the Eastern Neighbourhood. In March 2015,
the European Council stressed the necessity to challenge Russian
propaganda in neighbouring post-Soviet region, to persuade the
people of the region that deeper engagement with and implemen-
tation of reforms backed by the EU could improve their lives over
time. The Council also initiated the establishment of the East Strat-
Com Task Force that is functional within the EU’s diplomatic corps,
the European External Action Service (EEAS). The institution was
tasked with developing communication products and campaigns
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 99

focused on explaining EU policies and promoting European values

in the Eastern Neighbourhood. The EU also began debating the
possibility of broadcasting in local languages in these countries.
A similar institution, named the “Strategic Communications
Centre of Excellence”, was founded by NATO in Latvia’s capital,
which Russian media described as a “propaganda centre”. In 2015,
the EU, with the support of NATO, launched a Russian language
TV channel named ETV+ in Estonia. The channel focuses mostly on
Estonia’s Russian-speaking minorities and is the first Russian-lan-
guage TV channel in the country where more than a quarter of the
population speaks Russian as their native language. The channel’s
Deputy Director noted the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s impressive
capabilities of spreading disinformation across the region among
the factors that necessitated the establishment of the Russian-lan-
guage broadcasting service (Tagesschau.de 2015). It is financed by
the Estonian government, but its regional office in Narva, a city
close to the Russian border where Russian speakers constitute 97%
of the population, is technically supported by the NATO. But the
channel reports that the Alliance does not have any influence on the
content of the programmes. Similar channels have been planned to
be opened in the other two Baltic States, as well.
One of the primary goals of the establishment of the channel
was mentioned as “counterbalancing Russian propaganda”. Ger-
man Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated that the chan-
nel was not meant to be a counter-propaganda tool arguing that
“You cannot combat propaganda with counter-propaganda in a
democratic society” (ibid.). Thus, in a similar vein with other inter-
national broadcasters, Western communication channels broad-
casting to the post-Soviet region strictly reject the word “propa-
ganda” to describe their own activities. For example, Peter Lim-
bourg, the Director General of German broadcaster Deutsche Welle
(DW), responding to questions about DW’s involvement in EU’s
policies to counter Russia’s narratives in the post-Soviet region, ar-
gued that “We do not see ourselves in the role of creating counter-
propaganda. We do journalism on the foundation of democratic
values” (Luther et al. 2015).
100 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Deutsche Welle (DW), Germany’s government-financed inter-

national broadcaster, is also actively involved in the establishment
of media outlets to counter Russian narratives in the Eastern Part-
nership countries. In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, DW built
up its Russian and Ukrainian editorial office providing 24-hour ser-
vice. DW also cooperates with Estonia’s Russian language TV chan-
nel ETV+, supporting them in technical issues, building the content
of the programs, and offering trainings for its workers. The other
EU member states are also contributing to international broadcast-
ing in the “shared neighbourhood”. For example, Poland provides
financial (€4 million annually) and technical support (with equip-
ment and trainings) to the Poland-based Belarusian language TV
satellite station “TV Belsat” (Sadowski 2015: 72). There are also two
Poland-based radio stations (“Radio Ratsya” and “Euroradio”) and
a series of information websites that reach out to Belarusians (ibid.).
The Polish government also provides ample support to TV stations,
information agencies and journalists in other common neighbour-
hood countries, particularly in Ukraine and Moldova.
The US’s BBG reported in early 2016 that the agency had cre-
ated or expanded 35 programs, mostly in the Russian and Ukrain-
ian languages, since Russia moved into Crimea in February 2014.
Additionally, the agency asked Congress for additional funding, ar-
guing that while Russia spends $400 million to $500 million a year
on foreign information efforts, the United States only spends about
$20 million annually on the broadcasting services in the Russian
language (Strobel 2015). $15.4 million from the 2016 budget of the
BBG was allocated “to Russian-language TV programming” alone
(BBG 2015). In October 2014, the BBG started a daily, 30-minute
Russian language television news program called Current Time that
has since then been broadcasting in the post-Soviet countries bor-
dering Russia. In Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Lithuania the
program is broadcasted on domestic television stations, while in
Russia it is available on a video-based news site. The BBG fights
against Russia on social media as well: in 2015, Radio Liberty
opened a Digital Media Department (DIGIM). It was reported that
the department would serve the main purpose of “using social and
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 101

digital tools to enhance RFE/RL overall digital presence with a fo-

cus on the Russian language sphere” (RFE/RL 2016).
In June 2016, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs Victoria Nuland, reported before the US Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee about the work the USA had done to combat
what she described as “Russian propaganda” since the outbreak of
the Ukraine crisis. She said that:

“Since 2014, the total appropriation now, the State Department, USAID [US
Agency for International Development], BBG (Broadcast Board of Gover-
nors) on the US side is about $100 million to counter Russian propaganda.
The money goes… from clean honest Russian language programming that
BBG is now putting out every day, the expansion of Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, VOA [Voice of America] to about $88 million that we use in
State Department and AID to support civil society, independent media, jour-
nalists training, including outside Russia for those Russian journalists who
have fled” (Sputniknews 2016a).

In her speech, Nuland compared the budget of Russia’s RT

channel and the US spending on information warfare with Russia.
Despite the fact that the budget of BBG for international broadcast-
ing operations in 2016 was over $749 million (See BBG 2017), she
complained that:

“[Our spending of $100 million to counter Russian propaganda] … pales in

comparison to the $400 million at least that Russia spends and frankly to the
levels that we spent during the Cold War on such activities, which was over
$1 billion a year” (Sputniknews 2016a).6

In addition to already existing media channels, new legisla-

tion has been adopted since the start of the Ukraine crisis in both
the EU and the USA, which called for more measures to combat
Russian propaganda. For example, an act adopted by the US House
of Representatives in September 2016 called on the Secretary of
State to “develop and implement a strategy to respond to Russian
Federation-supported disinformation and propaganda efforts di-

6 On the other hand, Nuland’s comparison disregards the fact that the USA is not
the only Western country that fights against Russia’s international broadcast-
ing.
102 VASIF HUSEYNOV

rected toward persons in countries bordering the Russian Federa-

tion” (Official Website of the US Congress 2016). The strategy
which is going to be developed in the upcoming months is required
also to establish a partnership with governmental and private-sec-
tor entities “to provide Russian-language entertainment and news
content to broadcasters in Russian-speaking communities border-
ing the Russian Federation” (ibid.).

Cultural Diplomacy and Exchange Programmes

With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union the
Western community accomplished a fateful victory. The disappear-
ance of the Soviet Union also marked the decline in Western soft
power projects addressing the former Soviet region. In the 1990s the
United States began to cut expenses on cultural and educational ex-
changes with the regional countries. Nevertheless, Western powers
still have a multitude of exchange programs that bring students
from these countries to study at Western universities. Particularly,
the USA remains the pole of attraction in academic and research
spheres, and many students worldwide, including from the former
Soviet countries, see the United States as an attractive destination
for academia.
The United States Department of State offers a number of ex-
change programs for nationals of the former Soviet states. This in-
cludes most prominently the Fulbright Program, Humphrey Fel-
lowships, the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) Program, Global
Undergraduate Exchange Program (known also known as the
Global UGRAD Program), the Benjamin Franklin Program, Title
VIII Grant, etc. These programs are quite popular in the “common
neighbourhood” states. For example, the FLEX Program that
reaches secondary school students from former communist coun-
tries has supported one-year undergraduate exchange studies of
over 24,000 high school students (including nearly 8,000 from Rus-
sia) at United States universities since its inception in 1993. During
the 2012-2013 academic year, the selection rate of the program in
Russia was 1.4 percent: Only 239 out of over 17,000 applicants were
admitted (Koshkin 2014). In comparison, Harvard’s selection rate
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 103

was 5.9 percent in 2012 (ibid.). Another popular American ex-

change program that is exclusively focused on the post-Soviet re-
gion is the Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship Program. Es-
tablished by Congress in 1992, the program supports one to two
years of graduate studies of emerging leaders from the former So-
viet countries at the universities of the United States. Nearly 5,000
Muskie fellows have participated in the program since its inception
in 1992. The program’s publication celebrating its 20 years of ser-
vice in Eurasia claims that 75% of its alumni are in a professional
leadership position.
In the framework of the Eastern Partnership, the EU also pur-
sues cultural diplomacy to facilitate durable cultural exchanges,
people-to-people activities, and cross-cultural communications.
These goals are encapsulated in the EU’s Eastern Partnership Cul-
ture Programme. The first phase of the programme ran between
2011 and 2015. In this period, the programme invested €12 million
in grants and technical assistance to help build the capacities of
public administration and non-governmental cultural operators.
The second phase of the program, which run until 2018, imple-
mented similar projects with a budget of €5 million. In early 2016,
the EU also launched a Cultural Diplomacy Platform to enhance its
engagement with third countries and their citizens. Several promi-
nent public diplomacy institutes of the member countries, includ-
ing the Goethe-Institute, British Council, the Centre for Fine Arts
Brussels (Bozar), the European Cultural Foundation, EUNIC
Global, and Institut Français, have been involved in the project. A
scholarship programme of the EU called Erasmus Mundus, starting
in 2004, has selected hundreds of students from Eastern Partnership
countries to study in exchange programs (master’s and doctoral de-
grees). The programme opens up opportunities for young people
to study, train, volunteer and do youth work abroad. It also sup-
ports staff exchanges and cooperation with universities in third
countries to create lasting academic and cultural ties.
Educational exchanges constitute an important part of the pol-
icies of the German government to maintain and reinforce its image
abroad. Germany invests in exchanges more than any other country
and is seen as a place for plentiful opportunities for students, both
104 VASIF HUSEYNOV

during the study period and after graduation. The exchange pro-
grams offered by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)
are particularly popular in the post-Soviet countries. Each year
thousands of students apply for different degree programs offered
by the DAAD. Its budget of over €400 million is derived mainly
from federal funding for various ministries, primarily the German
Federal Foreign Office, but also from the European Union and a
number of enterprises, organisations and foreign governments (See
DAAD 2017). The Institution regards the “Central- and Eastern-Eu-
rope, Community of Independent States” as a priority in its activi-
ties: For example, in 2013 it supported the education of 16,000 peo-
ple from this region (Lang 2015: 51).

Western NGOs and Support for Civil Society

Civil society has long been recognized in Europe as a crucial instru-
ment for change and has been at the front lines of the anti-govern-
ment protests in the post-Soviet countries. Prior to the “colour rev-
olutions” in early 2000s, the US and the EU began to pour a signifi-
cant amount of financial resources into the civil society activists in
the regional countries. Western NGOs became a channel to deliver
the earmarked money in forms of grants and various projects to lo-
cal NGOs and social movements (Beissinger 2007: 261). Western or-
ganizations also supported coordination between local non-gov-
ernmental organizations. The representatives of local NGOs came
together in the framework of different international meetings and
training projects which are mostly supported by Western founda-
tions. These trips have been especially productive and significant at
the time of “colour revolutions”. For example, the Centre for Non-
Violent Resistance, founded by Serbia’s OTPOR, an NGO that
played a key role in overthrowing Serbian Leader Slobodan Milose-
vic, organized trainings for activists from post-Soviet states and
shared their experiences with them on how to charter a movement,
recruit people, and develop mass actions (Beissinger 2006: 20;
Beissinger 2007: 262). Thanks to this cooperation the NGOs in post-
Soviet space were able to emulate the successful practices of their
foreign colleagues. Analyzing the diffusion character of “colour
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 105

revolutions”, Mark Beissinger (2007: 261) writes that it was NGOs

and local social movements that emulated and spread anti-govern-
ment revolutions in the region. Beissinger lists external support
amongst the top six common elements of the “colour revolutions”
(ibid.).
Thus, Western-supported NGOs have already proved them-
selves as effective instruments in the promotion of Western agenda
in the former Soviet Union. Their role in the formation and spread
of “colour revolutions” in the territories of the former Soviet Union
has been well documented (Beissinger 2007; Brucker 2007; Lane
2009; Welt 2010; Wapinski 2014: 49). Over the years since the first
wave of the “colour revolutions”, the European Union and United
States have established various institutions and programmes to
reach out to non-state actors in the region and strengthen and pro-
mote their role in their respective societies. The USA and the EU are
present in post-Soviet countries with so many non-governmental
organizations and foundations that it is beyond the scope of this
book to provide detailed information about all of them or their ac-
tivities. The following section will talk about some of the largest of
these organizations. However, the list of non-governmental organ-
izations to be presented below is by no means exhaustive.

American Non-Governmental Organizations

The “behind-the-scenes roles” of American non-governmental or-
ganizations (such as NDI, IRI, Freedom House, and Soros Founda-
tion) in pro-Western political developments in the former Soviet re-
gion has been documented by many Western observers and schol-
ars (Carothers 2006a: 56; Beissinger 2006; Sussman 2010). These
non-governmental organizations usually portray themselves as
“independent” and deny the influence of any government on their
activities.
The Eurasia Foundation: The organization was founded and in-
corporated as a non-profit organization in Washington, DC in early
1990s. Its declared mission is to empower people to take responsi-
bility and affect change for social justice and economic prosperity
106 VASIF HUSEYNOV

through hands-on programs, helping them to improve their com-

munities. The organization addresses every former Soviet state, in-
cluding Russia. Over the last decade, the foundation has estab-
lished separate branches for the sub-regions within the FSU: (1) The
New Eurasia Foundation was launched in Russia as a joint Russian-
American-European partnership in 2004; (2) The Eurasia Founda-
tion of Central Asia was founded in Bishkek and Osh (Kyrgyz Re-
public), Almaty (Kazakhstan) and Dushanbe (Tajikistan) in 2006;
(3) The Eurasia Partnership Foundation, serving Armenia, Azerbai-
jan and Georgia, and the East Europe Foundation, serving Ukraine,
Belarus and Moldova, were launched in 2007. Between 1992 and
2005, the Eurasia Foundation invested nearly $275 million through
more than 7,700 grants and technical assistance projects in the coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union, including Central Asia (See Eura-
sia Partnership Foundation 2017). Its activities are supported by a
range of donors, particularly the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID), and the Foreign & Commonwealth
Office.
In a similar vein to other Western organizations, the Eurasian
Foundation also operates as a soft power agent of the West in the
region and seeks to help Western narratives defeat contending nar-
ratives. For example, during the Ukraine crisis, the Eurasia Partner-
ship Foundation held a roundtable discussion on the topic of “Cri-
sis in Ukraine and Its Influence on the Nagorno-Karabakh Process:
Perspective from the West” in Baku, Azerbaijan, on March 17, 2014.
The event was attended by representatives from diplomatic mis-
sions, Azerbaijani government officials, members of parliament
and local experts in the field. The report of the event, which is up-
loaded to the organization’s website, is full of statements condemn-
ing Russia’s aggression against Georgia and Ukraine, its annexation
of Crimea, its massive use of propaganda both for internal and ex-
ternal purposes and calls for serious Western presence in the region
and a stronger response to Russia’s actions (See Eurasia Partnership
Foundation 2014). Some of them are worth reading:

“The West needs to be serious about taking care of the Crimea case, other-
wise the former Soviet States may lose confidence in them.”
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 107

“Azerbaijan must make a choice in favour of the US and its European part-
ners, as it is not the neighbours to the North or South who will support Azer-
baijan.”

The National Endowment for Democracy: The NED is active in

the post-Soviet region with its four “core institutes”—the National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the International Re-
publican Institute, the American Centre for International Labour
Solidarity and the Centre for International Private Enterprise—
which represent the two major American political parties, the la-
bour movement and the business community, respectively. Alt-
hough it is mostly financed by governmental institutions, the NED
claims to be “independent from the US Government” and points
out that this status “allows it to work with many groups abroad
who would hesitate to take funds from the US Government” (NED
2016). The spectrum of activities of these four institutes are so large
that it is beyond the scope of this book to cover all of them. These
activities include cooperation with civil society organizations, local
election monitoring organizations, business associations, grass-
roots business communities, providing support to reforms of gov-
ernmental institutions, programs for involving women and youth
in political activities and conducting opinion surveys.
Since the early 1990s, the National Endowment for Democracy
has also been engaged in providing assistance to political “demo-
cratic” parties in some post-Soviet countries through the Interna-
tional Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Insti-
tute for International Affairs (NDI). The political party assistance of
these institutes includes a wide range of activities, such as training
seminars and conferences, targeting party leaders, elected repre-
sentatives, and candidates who represent different political parties.
The political party assistance provided by these institutes is funded
mostly by the USAID and to a much lesser scale by the NED, the
State Department, international organizations such as the World
Bank and private institutions (Bader 2010: 37; Sussman 2010: 87).
However, it has not been possible to access statistics about the ex-
penses of these organizations on party assistance in the post-Soviet
108 VASIF HUSEYNOV

region. Nor was it possible to find this information for comparable

European organizations.
The Open Society Institution: The Open Society Institution (OSI)
of George Soros has passed a noteworthy evolution process since it
was founded in 1984 and become an important force with an annual
budget of hundreds of millions of dollars, more than 30 separate
foundations and sub-organizations (Sussman 2010: 102-103). Like
many other non-governmental organizations, the OSI also portrays
itself as an independent agency. Regional authoritarian leaders
have very often blamed the foundation (along with many other
Western non-governmental organizations) of supporting anti-gov-
ernment forces and interfering in the internal affairs in the region.
For example, Georgia’s former President George Shevardnadze
acknowledged the shortcomings of the elections that led to the Rose
Revolution but protested the Soros Foundation’s involvement7 in
the process asking “why are international forces getting involved?
What does Soros want?” (Ó Beacháin 2010: 209). The contribution
of the foundation to the collapse of communism through support-
ing dissident activities and civil society groups across the Eastern
Europe and the “colour revolutions” of recent years in the Former
Soviet Union is also acknowledged by George Soros himself (CNN
2014).

European Non-Governmental Organizations

In the aftermath of the launch of the European Neighbourhood Pro-
gramme, in 2006, the EU founded the European Instrument for De-
mocracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) to work with non-state actors
in non-EU countries. The EIDHR is focused particularly on civil so-
ciety actors who make up 90% of the partners of the programs (the
rest are international organizations) (Dobreva 2015). It is reported
by a publication of the European Parliament that the EIDHR “does
not require the consent of national authorities” to provide funding

7 Beissinger (2006: 20) reports that the local Georgian branch of the Soros Foun-
dation supported Kmara (the NGO that spearheaded the Rose Revolution) out
of its $350,000 election support program.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 109

for civil society organizations (CSOs). The budget of the pro-

gramme for the period 2007-2013 was €1,1 billion; although there
was some rise for the next 6 years (2014-2020) but it did not make
more than €1,3 billion. Support for civil society in the “common
neighbourhood” countries has also been considered within broader
assistance programmes. For example, 5% of the €15.433 billion
budget of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) is to sup-
port civil society in the ENP partner countries.
EU support for civil society actors in the countries of the “com-
mon neighbourhood” gradually increased following the inception
of the EaP in 2009. A Civil Society Forum was established for “pro-
mot[ing] contacts among civil society organisations and facili-
tat[ing] their dialogue with public authorities” (See European Com-
mission 2011). Afterwards the forum built National Platforms in
each EaP country. The platforms bring together almost all the pro-
European civil society organizations in their respective countries.
The tools they utilize for this purpose are wide-ranging. For exam-
ple, the Moldovan National Platform (MNP), which brings together
at least 35 non-governmental organizations, reports that:

“[Between October 2013—October 2014] [a] considerable number of pro-Eu-

ropean promotional materials were published and distributed, including
more than 6,000 leaflets about the DCFTA and AA, 1,000 brochures about
the EaP CSF, 800,000 postal cards about the benefits of the EU Association
Agreement, 12 posters and 40,000 EU binders. Additionally, 8 editions of the
‘European Objective’ newspaper in Romanian and Russian with approxi-
mately 100,000 copies were published and distributed as supplements to
many national and local newspapers and 10 informative filters were inten-
sively broadcasted on TV stations with national coverage” (eap-csf.eu 2014).

They also fight against Russia’s soft power projection. The

promotion of national culture and values, local languages, narra-
tives against the domination of Russia, etc. has been on the top of
the agenda of these National Platforms. Coordinating civil society
actors, the national platforms also take a leading role in protesting
the misdeeds of the public authorities, even when the EU leaders
avoid publicly confronting regional governments.
The European Endowment for Democracy (EED): The EED, a
brainchild of the Polish government that aims at supporting pro-
110 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Western activities in the Eastern Neighbourhood, was established

in October 2012. Originally the geographic focus of the EED was
exclusively Eastern Partnership countries. Although in December
2014 the foundation began to support projects from Russia, the
Arab world, and Central Asia, it is still mainly focused on the EaP
region. With the motto “supporting the unsupported”, and with
flexibility and minimal bureaucracy, the foundation provides sup-
port to civil society groups, pro-Western media, political parties,
non-registered NGOs, trade unions and other social groups. The or-
ganization, according to its executive director, is specifically aimed
to provide alternative to Russia’s state media that meddle in do-
mestic affairs of the regional countries (Dempsey 2015). It is re-
ported that the fund provided by the European Commission to the
EED has been doubled to €12 million for the period 2016-18 follow-
ing the positive evaluation of the work the institution had done in
previous years (European Parliament (2015).
German Foundations: Germany, as the largest economy of the
European Union, plays a principal role in the soft power projection
of the EU. Key actors in Germany’s strategic communication in the
post-Soviet world are party-affiliated political foundations
(Stiftungen). The internationally active party-affiliated actors from
other countries are usually smaller and represented abroad with
non-permanent agencies. But the German party foundations are
represented with permanent offices in many countries around the
world, including in the former Soviet Union. Many scholars have
pointed out that the work of these party institutes was part of the
official foreign policy of their respective countries, despite the fact
that they were autonomous in formal terms (Bader 2010; Carothers
2006b; Pogorelskaja 2002; Sussman 2010).
The largest Stiftungen operating in the region are the Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), and
the Hanns-Seidel Stiftung that are affiliated with the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU), Social Democratic Party (SPD), Christian
Social Union, respectively. The “non-governmental” status of the
Stiftungen gives them more space to operate than diplomats are
usually given. “Their informal face as an NGO-like organization”
also allows them to establish contacts with groups and individuals
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 111

who do not have contacts with diplomats (Lang 2015: 46; Brucker
2007: 304). The foundations, declaring democratization as their goal
(Brucker 2007: 308), are particularly specialized in the promotion of
European values, culture, policies and institutions. The foundations
also award scholarships for Ph.D., bachelor’s and master’s degree
students from regional countries.
Some other Non-Governmental Organizations: In addition to the
above mentioned non-governmental organizations, some of the
other EU member states are also actively involved in soft power
projection into the EaP region through similar institutions. For ex-
ample, Dutch party institutes—Eduardo Frei Stichting (EFS), Al-
fred Mozer Stichting (AMS), and the International Bureau of VVD
(Volkspartiy voor Vrijheid en Democratie or People’s Party for
Freedom and Democracy) provide support to civil society organi-
zations and liberal-minded political parties in the regional coun-
tries. These institutes are also engaged in political party assistance
in the EaP countries, albeit in a considerably more limited scale than
the above-mentioned six actors. The three institutes together or in
cooperation with other institutions organize trainings for political
parties, “leadership academies” for youth from the most relevant
parties. These activities are aimed at familiarizing local parties with
the political platforms of Western countries, developing their me-
dia skills, providing platforms for reflecting on the problems and
shortcomings of their respective parties, and involving young peo-
ple and women in politics. These party institutes are supported by
the Matre programme of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
program was established in 1993 and aims “to support democrati-
sation in Central and Eastern Europe” and “to contribute to EU en-
largement policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)”.
Through the Matre programme Nederland spent €44.3 million on
various projects in the Eastern Partnership countries between 2008-
2014. The programme also supports Netherlands Institute for Mul-
tiparty Democracy (NIMD), another Dutch non-governmental or-
ganization that works also in the FSU (particularly in South Cauca-
sus). Established in 2000, NIMD has a regional office for the Eastern
European Neighbourhood which covers Georgia, Armenia, Azer-
baijan, and Ukraine and is one of the six organizations (the others
112 VASIF HUSEYNOV

are NDI, IRI, KAS, FES) that offer the largest assistance to political
parties in the EaP countries.8

Foreign Aid
The civilian aid of the USA and the EU countries to the “common
neighbourhood” states has played a pivotal role in the formation of
pro-Western sentiments amongst many people across the region.
Although the aid provided by the Western community might not
always pursue geopolitical objectives, this has truly affected the im-
age of the West in the regional countries and consequently boosted
its soft power. Many Western governmental (such as USAID, the
embassies of the USA and some EU members) and international
non-governmental organizations (such as the Open Society Foun-
dation, World Vision, and Oxfam) have been involved in this pro-
cess at different times since the very beginning of the post-Cold
War period. Below a quick review is given about the activities of
these organizations and the consequences of their work.

American Assistance
In 1992, the US Congress passed the Freedom for Russia and
Emerging Eurasian Democracies and the Open Market Support Act
(FSA). A US Congress report states that between 1992 and 2007 the
United States provided more than $28 billion in assistance to the
former Soviet states (excluding the Baltic States, including Russia
and Central Asia) (Tarnoff 2007). The American assistance to re-
gional countries is largely assumed to have planted seeds of change
for anti-government upheavals in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyz-
stan (ibid.). These three countries, prior to the “colour revolutions”
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, had received a substantial
amount of US assistance, a part of which was earmarked to civil
society and political party trainings. The above-mentioned report
points out that before the “colour revolutions” the United States

8 Max Bader (2010: 36) estimates that “these six organizations probably account
for over ninety per cent of expenditures on party assistance worldwide.”
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 113

had sent $807 million in aid to Georgia, $2.1 billion to Ukraine, and
$408 million to Kyrgyzstan (including $138 million, $453 million,
and $94 million respectively in democracy aid) (Tarnoff 2007).
USAID is the leading American government agency that is re-
sponsible for administering civilian foreign aid. The organization
began operating in the post-Soviet region after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Since the early 1990s it has been involved in a very
wide range of activities throughout regional countries with strong
financial backing. It is involved in supporting various initiatives to
stimulate economic growth, develop democratic institutions, en-
hance energy security, and improve health and education. It helps
improve social services, ensures the integration of disadvantaged,
vulnerable groups and women in social and political activities,
amongst other activities. Initially this aid made an important con-
tribution to the success of pro-Western anti-government forces in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet region. It is reported that the
US government spent $41 million on Serbian civil society groups
that were in the forefront of the Bulldozer Revolution in 2000 (Bes-
singer 2006: 20).
In 1990s, amidst economic decline, political instability, war
and chaos, the aid provided by these donors was gratefully em-
braced by local people. Particularly the aid for people in war-torn
zones and internally displaced persons (IDPs) was of immeasurable
value for thousands of people in the region. As an IDP family in
Azerbaijan, my family was one of the recipients of the aid after hav-
ing fled our home in Kalbajar leaving behind everything we had in
the wake of the Armenian occupation of the town in 1993. Living in
desperate conditions in a yard of a hospital many of us looked for-
ward to monthly aid (particularly food) brought to us by USAID.
As a child in those years I first came to know about USAID when I
read its name on the packages we were given.
The agency also supports educational initiatives. For example,
with a USAID grant, a master’s degree programme in property
management with European-based course offerings was launched
at Belarusian State Technological University, in partnership with
Lithuania’s Vilnius Gediminas Technical University. Although the
program is open to Belarusian, Lithuanian and foreign students, in
114 VASIF HUSEYNOV

the 2014-2015 academic year only Belarusian students were en-

rolled in the program. The agency pays special attention to people-
to-people contacts between regional countries and the USA. Such a
program called “Community Connections” is in operation in Bela-
rus. The website of USAID reports that since 2006 the program has
provided over 340 Belarusian professionals in business, education,
law, civil society and government the opportunity to gain practical
experience in the United States from their American counterparts
within their respective fields (USAID 2016).
The aid provided by the organization is particularly important
for empowering the civil society institutions in the regional coun-
tries. It helps civil society organizations increase civic engagement,
supports the oversight of local governance and decentralization re-
form at central and local levels, supports independent media, helps
targeted media outlets to improve their professional capacity to
produce fact-based, quality content as well as act as effective media
watchdogs, etc. The agency carries out more projects in Georgia,
Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and at lesser extent in Belarus and
Azerbaijan.

European Assistance
Over the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU,
the largest aid donor in the world, has initiated three broad projects
to coordinate its assistance to the former Soviet States in their tran-
sition to market economies and democratic political reforms: (1)
The Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States
(TACIS) in 1991-2006; (2) The European Neighbourhood and Part-
nership Instrument (ENPI) in 2007-2013; (3) The European Neigh-
bourhood Instrument (ENI) in 2014-2020 (Table 2).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 115

The Assistance of the European Union to the “Common Neighbour-

hood” Countries

The Pro- Focus Countries Time Pe- Budget

gramme riod
Name

TACIS Former Soviet Countries (ex- 1991-2007 € 7,3 bil-

cluding the Baltic States, in- lion
cluding Russia and Mongo-
lia)

ENPI ENP partner countries and 2007-2013 €11.2 bil-

Russia lion

ENI ENP partner countries and 2014-2020 €15.43

Russia billion
Table 2. The EU assistance to the EaP countries

TACIS was the first initiative of the EU to engage with the post-
Soviet countries and deliver technical support to their political and
economic transformation policies. A publication of the European
External Action Service (EEAS) distinguishes two phases of the pro-
gramme: demand-driven (1991-1999) and dialogue-driven (2000-
2006). While in the former period the EU organized its assistance in
accordance with the requests of the ministries of the partner coun-
tries, in the last seven years it began to uphold conditionality in its
cooperation with those countries. During the second phase the EU
expected the partner countries to demonstrate commitment to pol-
icy reforms in order to further the cooperation and allocate re-
sources.
In the next long-term assistance programme following TACIS,
post-Soviet countries were merged with the Mediterranean coun-
tries which previously were addressed within the Mediterranean
Economic Development Assistance (MEDA) programme—a twin
initiative to TACIS. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument (ENPI) coordinated EU assistance with those countries
between 2007-2013. In 2014, the third phase of EU assistance to the
116 VASIF HUSEYNOV

neighbourhood countries started with the announcement of the Eu-

ropean Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). The assistance to the
partner countries is formed separately within comprehensive
multi-annual single support framework agreements. The priority
areas of the instrument are boosting small businesses, civil-society
engagement, climate change action, easier mobility of people, en-
ergy cooperation, gender equality promotion, gradual economic in-
tegration, people-to-people contacts, transport connections, youth
and employment.
Apart from these assistance programmes, the EU has allocated
loans and aid to the “common neighbourhood” countries on a bi-
lateral basis. For example, in the immediate aftermath of Yanu-
kovych’s fall, the EU Commission announced a large support pack-
age for Ukraine. The package included overall support of €11 bil-
lion over the next seven years from the EU budget and international
financial institutions, including up to €1.4 billion in grants from the
member states (European Commission 2014). EU member states
themselves are also involved in development aid to many countries
around the world. For example, Germany’s development aid in to-
tal amounted to €10.7 billion in 2013 and was delivered to many
countries around the world primarily by the German Federal En-
terprise for International Cooperation (GIZ). The GIZ is, with an
annual turnover of €1.9 billion (2013) and more than 16,000 employ-
ees in 130 countries, the main public institution in implementing
Germany’s development aid (Lang 2015: 47). It has been operating
in the “common neighbourhood” since the early 1990s. Besides
Germany, other EU member states also provide development aid
to countries in this region (Sadowski 2015).

Limitations of the Western Soft Power Policies

Western powers had to pursue these soft power policies in a re-
gional and social context which had had historically few cultural
and political links with the West. On the one hand, the historical
ties, cultural and linguistic proximity between Russia and regional
countries, the existence of Russian minorities in those countries,
and on the other hand the restricted space for free and independent
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 117

media, have made it hard for Western soft power channels to effec-
tively operate in the region and triumph over contending narra-
tives. Although the appeal of European narratives and the desire
for closer relations with the West are quite strong amongst the re-
gional people, Russia is also considered by many as an indispensa-
ble and/or strategic partner (Lang 2015: 37). Due to this vagueness,
the pro-European sentiments in the region, though widespread, are
“shallow and confused” (Popescu et al. 2009a: 324; Lang 2015: 37).
Moreover, not everybody is enthusiastic about Western values. Alt-
hough pro-Western liberal groups glorify the political and civil lib-
erties the West promotes, traditional segments of societies oppose
some of these liberties, for example LGBT rights. The observation
of Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson (2009b: 4) concludes that:

“The EU is comprehensively outplayed by Russia in the neighbourhood me-

dia. Few people in the neighbourhood read or watch EU media, and other
than Ukraine, none of the six states has a free media market. Russian media
both takes an active role in domestic politics in the neighbourhood and
shapes the way citizens see international events.”

Towards the end of 2016, the challenges the EU faced in its

internal politics, particularly the disintegration crisis, financial cri-
sis, growing right-wing populism among others shook the founda-
tions of the liberal democratic model of the West and affected the
perception of the EU and United States in the “shared neighbour-
hood” (Qasimov 2016a). A publication by European Parliament la-
mented that:

“It is difficult to deny that the Union’s ‘soft power’ has suffered considerably
in recent times: internal divisions, inadequate policy delivery, and mounting
populism have all contributed to creating an environment (even inside the
EU itself) significantly more receptive to their messaging—which, in turn,
further undermines that ‘soft power’ and, more generally, EU influence”
(See European Parliament 2016).

This observation is confirmed by a political analyst from the

South Caucasus, who writes that:

“… the increase of centrifugal tendencies within the EU have dealt a crush-

ing blow to the reputation of the Union in the post-Soviet region and given
ammunition to Kremlin propaganda; the internal challenges of the EU are
118 VASIF HUSEYNOV

used by Russian propagandists to portray Western integration projects as a

perilous alternative to a Russia-led Eurasian Union... Russian-sponsored
news outlets convincingly argue that an EU that is stuck in several crises and
at the verge of collapse cannot be a worthy economic and political bloc to
trust in” (Qasimov 2016a).

Western self-projection has also been damaged by its failure

to successfully handle the challenges the EU and the USA encoun-
tered in their policies concerning the post-Soviet region. This has
been reflected in its policies with respect to the ethno-territorial
conflicts in the region and in a number of shortcomings in the EU’s
and the USA’s engagement with regional conflicts. The West ap-
pears to have limited leverage to seriously affect the ethno-territo-
rial conflicts in the “shared neighbourhood”—a region which is em-
broiled in many such conflicts (only one country—Belarus—has not
been inflicted with such a conflict). It is rather important for the
West to be influential in its conflict resolution policies in order to
overhaul its image. However, this has not happened yet. Particu-
larly in the South Caucasus, neither the EU nor the USA can exert
effective influence on frozen conflicts. It is due to this fact that
voices have recently started to be heard from the region questioning
if “the West [in fact] recognizes the South Caucasus as a de-facto
Russian sphere of influence” (Qasimov 2016b). This threatens to
erode the credibility of European projects among the publics of the
Eastern Neighbourhood.
On the other hand, the fact that the West cannot back its soft
power projection in the “common neighbourhood” states with
equally strong hard power, damages its image in the region. In
Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014), the transatlantic alliance, in gen-
eral, demonstrated its reluctance to confront Russia militarily. This
makes the regional people reconsider their geopolitical strategies
and refrain from provoking Russia into military action.
The EU’s reluctance to promise membership perspective to the
countries in the EaP has also been regularly criticized by pro-West-
ern groups in the region (Nielsen et al. 2013). Many commentators
rightfully argue that “the membership perspective is the EU’s big-
gest soft power asset and removing it reduces its leverage” (Nielsen
et al. 2013: 16). Although for the countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia,
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 119

and Belarus) that are not enthusiastic or hopeful about this perspec-
tive this situation is not a serious concern, for the ones who have
been traditionally seeking to join the Union it causes a depressive
effect and disillusionment. It might be difficult to say how much
positive difference the existence of this perspective would make in
the policies of the governments (Nielsen et al. 2013: 16), but it would
definitely be a great incentive for the people of those countries. The
lack of this incentive discourages regional countries to undertake
“overly costly” political and economic reforms on their Euro-Atlan-
tic integration path (ibid.). For example, while the EU allocated
€120.4 million to Georgia between 2007-2010 within the ENPI, it
was reported that the costs of the Georgian criminal law reform
alone, which was one of the priorities of the EU-Georgia Action
Plan, was estimated to be almost €130 million (Rinnert 2011: 8).
The underfunding of Western soft power projects with regard
to the “common neighbourhood” countries has been another short-
coming that is often criticized by political experts from the region
(Nielsen et al. 2013). As the previous section concluded, neither the
EU nor the USA has ever demonstrated a serious and consistent in-
terest to pull the “common neighbourhood” states into their mili-
tary and political structures and as such has not invested significant
resources in policies with regard to this region. Rather they have
tried to block Russia’s policies to build EU or NATO-like organiza-
tions with those countries. This has been reflected in the EU’s and
the US’s regional soft power policies, as well. The projects that ad-
dress the “shared neighbourhood” countries have been often un-
derfunded. For example, the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme,
which has been the major framework of relations between the EU
and regional states since 2009, has been regularly criticized for its
limited budget (Makarychev et al. 2012) and for being “stingier…
compared to the pre-accession aid” provided to the Central and
Eastern European candidates following the end of the Cold War
(Nielsen et al. 2013: 17).
Despite this type of problems, public opinion polls conducted
in the “common neighbourhood” have demonstrated that these
problems have not strictly deteriorated the image of the West in this
region. For example, 90% of the Georgian people supported the
120 VASIF HUSEYNOV

country’s joining the European Union in a March 2017 poll con-

ducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI 2017). Alt-
hough the other regional countries were not as enthusiastic about
the EU, they still had a sizable number of EU supporters. For exam-
ple, despite extensive anti-Western propaganda by pro-Russian
groups (See next chapter), in a late 2016 poll, more than half of the
respondents (51%) in Ukraine supported admission to the EU
which was significantly higher than the supporters for the Customs
Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (19%) (IRI 2016).

Conclusion
This chapter explored the soft power—hard power nexus in the
case of Western policies concerning the “common neighbourhood”
in accordance with the principles of the soft power model presented
in Chapter 2. It indicated that, as expected by the hypothesis about
the use of soft power as an expansive instrument and the use of
hard power as a defensive tool, the EU and the United States have
sought to draw the regional countries to their orbit through the use
of soft power. Although they have demonstrated strong declarative
support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the regional countries,
they have not become militarily involved in the region when these
aspirations encountered Russia’s military response. However, in
spite of the reliance on soft power in regional intervention and the
choice not to confront Russia militarily, the West has strengthened
its military force along the Eastern borders, as predicted by the as-
sumption of the model about hard power: Soft power is not a sub-
stitute for hard power, and, therefore, states need and must pay ad-
equate attention to the development of their hard power.
The chapter also explored the soft power potential of Western
powers (i.e. the EU and the United States) and their policies to wield
power over popular opinion in the “common neighbourhood”
countries. The chapter firstly focused on Western self-projection. It
found that the attractive human-constructed assets of Western
powers (i.e. economic prosperity, higher living standards, high
ranking universities, culture, political values, etc.) effectively
armed their state-managed soft power projection to the post-Soviet
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 121

space during the period under study (2004-2016). As expected by

the soft power—hard power nexus of the model, the possession of
strong hard power resources allowed the EU and United States to
establish a long range of propaganda and public diplomacy instru-
ments to communicate with the “common neighbourhood” coun-
tries. The chapter also concluded that the policies to reach out to the
domestic non-state actors of the target countries with the intention
of affecting the policies of their respective governments have been
used by Western powers ever since the early years of the Cold War.
Analysing Western propaganda and public diplomacy projects, it
concluded that although the EU and United States sought to wield
soft power in the “common neighbourhood”, their projects were
usually underfunded. The chapter claimed that this could be be-
cause of their reluctance to accept these countries into the Western
political and military structures as fully-fledged members. The EU
and United States appeared more interested in preventing Russia’s
regional integration projects rather than opening the door of the EU
and NATO to the regional states which inter alia could have led to
disastrous consequences in relations with Russia.
4. Soft Power in Russia’s Practice
(2004—2016)

This chapter replicates the structure and goals of the preceding

chapter and applies them in the analysis of Russian soft power pol-
icies with respect to six post-Soviet states (Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus). Its analysis aims to test
the hypothesis that amidst the rivalries between nuclear armed
great powers, soft power serves as an expansive instrument, while
military power is used by the conflicting sides to defend themselves
and back up their foreign policies. In its analysis of Russian soft
power, the chapter follows the principles of the soft power model
presented above. This model differentiates two primary sources of
soft power as self-projection (attractiveness) and state-managed
projection. It describes self-projection as based on the natural en-
dowments and human-constructed assets a state possesses.
The model points out that a state which is well-endowed with
rich natural resources obtains favourable conditions in which to a
build successful economy and attractive culture. These human-con-
structed qualities have been designated as a necessary condition to
build an attractive image to project to the foreign publics. Thus, the
model argues that states need appropriate policies in order to de-
liver their narratives to foreign countries and wield power over the
minds and feelings of their people. These policies have been cate-
gorized as propaganda and public diplomacy. While propaganda
is presented as a one-way communication strategy conducted
through mostly international broadcasting (television, journals,
newspapers, online media channels, etc.), public diplomacy has
been conceptualized as a two-way communication strategy using
instruments such as non-governmental organizations, scholarly ex-
change programs, cultural diplomacy, etc. The chapter also tests the
soft power—hard power nexus of the model which inter alia argues
that soft power is not a substitute for hard power, and, therefore,
states need and must pay adequate attention to the development of
their hard power.

123
124 VASIF HUSEYNOV

The chapter proceeds as follow. The next section explores the

soft power—hard power nexus in Russia’s policies concerning the
“common neighbourhood”. This is to be followed by a broader sec-
tion on Russia’s soft power policies with respect to this region. The
section analyses Russia’s self-projection, strategic narratives, inter-
national broadcasting, academic exchange programs, non-govern-
mental organizations, economic ties and foreign aid. The chapter
ends with a short conclusion. The chapter by no means provides an
all-inclusive coverage of all dimensions of Russian soft power. Due
to time and space limitations, it will only briefly review key ele-
ments of Russia’s soft power vis-à-vis the regional countries.

Soft Power vs. Hard Power in Russia’s Policies

Russia has developed a complicated strategy to keep the regional
post-Soviet countries in its orbit and prevent “the perceived erosion
of its ‘sphere of influence”’ due to EU and NATO expansion (March
et al. 2006: 351–52). The Kremlin launched several integration pro-
jects to retain the regional countries under its control and prevent
their drifting away from Russia’s orbit towards competing projects,
particularly Western-led integration projects. In the 1990s, projects
such as the Collective Security Treaty, the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS), the Economic Union Treaty (1993), the Free
Trade Agreement (1994) failed to achieve most of their declared
goals. Ukraine never signed the charter of the CIS, Turkmenistan
declared itself neutral at the outset, and Georgia left the organiza-
tion in the aftermath of the 2008 war. In the early 2000s, Russian
policymakers decided to establish a Common Economic Space that
would integrate Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan in a
common economic union. It was supposed to be an EU-like institu-
tion and was predicted by the Kremlin to be formed by 2008-2010.
However, the eruption of the “colour revolutions” in the region
complicated these plans.
Following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004-2005), the
Kremlin sought to build a fundamentally new integration regime—
the economic union of Eurasian independent states, or the Eurasian
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 125

Economic Union. In January 2010, Russia, with Belarus and Ka-

zakhstan, launched its Customs Union (CU), which was framed in
a way that excluded the participation of its members in any other
free-trade agreement which the EaP had declared as one of its ob-
jectives. In the following years, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and Armenia
announced that they would cooperate with the CU. In October
2011, two weeks before the second Eastern Partnership Summit was
to be held in Warsaw, then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin pre-
sented the plan to upgrade the CU into a Eurasian Union. In May
2014, in a move forward towards the Eurasian Union, Russia, Bela-
rus, and Kazakhstan signed the treaty establishing the Eurasian
Economic Union (EEU), which extended the provisions of the exist-
ing Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) and came into existence in
2015. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan became members of the ECU in
2015. The Union was envisioned by Moscow as a project which
would enable the Kremlin to challenge the attractiveness of the EU
in its neighbourhood and “to create an alternative power centre for
integration to the EU’s normative power” (Vilpišauskas et al. 2012:
11).
However, the underlying problem regarding Putin’s new ini-
tiative is that like previous generations of Russia’s regional integra-
tion projects, the ECU is first and foremost a political project with
vague economic benefits for participating states. Although the de-
clared goals of these projects were economic, they were in fact pur-
suing predominantly political objectives. The countries that these
projects target do not hold weighty shares in Russia’s overall trade.
Thus, regional economic trade, which has steadily declined over the
past twenty years, is of less significance for Russia. The share of CIS
states in total Russian exports dropped from 22 per cent in 1994 to
14 percent in 2013. Their share in Russian imports dropped from 27
to 12 percent in the same period (See Federal Statistics Service of
Russia 2017). The declining role of the neighbourhood countries in
Russia’s foreign economic activities can also be seen in the share of
the CIS countries in Russia’s external investments: these countries’
share in Russia’s total investment abroad was around 22 percent in
2003, but this figure went down to a mere 2.5 percent in 2013 (See
Central Bank of the Russian Federation 2017).
126 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Alongside economic and political integration, Russia has also

pushed NATO-style military integration in its neighbourhood. The
Collective Security Treaty, which was signed back in early 1990s by
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan, transformed into fully-fledged organiza-
tion (the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)) in 2002.9
The treaty aimed at providing a common defence system if one
member were to fall under attack, and promoted cooperation
among member states against terrorism, extremism, separatism, or-
ganized crime, drug trafficking and so forth. Although the princi-
ples remained the same, transformation into an organization
strengthened its structure and enlarged the responsibilities and
competence of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the
Council of Ministers of Defence, and the Committee of Secretaries
of the Security Councils. The CSTO created its Collective Rapid Re-
action Force (CRRF) in February 2009, which, according to then
Russian President Medvedev, would be on par with NATO
(Oldberg 2011: 38). The CRRF was largely a response to NATO’s
plans to consolidate its forces in Eastern Europe through enlarge-
ment and the deployment of a missile defence system. It was
formed based on Russia’s 98th Airborne Division and the 31st Air-
borne Assault Brigade.
Although Putin noted the European Union as a model to em-
ulate in its regional integration projects, his methodology of inte-
grating the neighbouring countries has been different from that of
the EU. As opposed to the “soft power” approach of the EU, the
Kremlin policies to discipline those countries contained more hard
power elements including economic power, military, and energy
(Hagemann 2013; Bugajski et al. 2016). The display of military force
takes a central place in Russia’s policies against the EU and NATO
enlargement. At the 43rd Munich Security Conference in 2007, Pres-
ident Putin made clear that Russia would no longer tolerate any
further expansion of NATO towards Russia’s borders. He stated
that in the territories of the former Soviet Union Russia’s opposition

9 In 1999 Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan left the treaty. In 2006 Uzbekistan
re-joined and in 2012 left again.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 127

to NATO’s enlargement would not be limited only to verbal pro-

tests as it was in Eastern Europe and Baltic states but would poten-
tially cause a geopolitical crisis.
Soon after the Munich Security Conference, in August 2008
Russia deployed military power against Georgia. Prior to the war,
Georgia, under the leadership of President Mikheil Saakashvili,
was advancing on the road to NATO membership and “Russia
[was] gradually being forced to retreat from this region” (Haas
2007). Therefore, Moscow started to militarize the breakaway re-
gions of Georgia in the hopes that Georgian leader Saakashvili
would respond with a military attack that would provide a reason
for Russia to intervene (Van Herpen 2014). Svante Cornell (2009:
134) observed that “Russia ‘set a trap’ for Saakashvili, and… [he]
stepped into it.”
It is reported that Western leaders regularly warned the Geor-
gian leadership against a military venture and called them to
“avoid a direct military confrontation with Russia at all costs…”
saying that “You cannot prevail. It simply is not possible” (See Reu-
ters 2008). Nevertheless, Saakashvili decided to counter Moscow’s
heavy militarization of the breakaway regions with a sudden at-
tack. The five-day Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 resulted
in a devastating defeat for Georgia. Despite Saakashvili’s expecta-
tions, NATO did not launch a war against Russia to protect Geor-
gia. Consequently, Russia established its control over Georgia’s
breakaway regions, recognizing the independence of the so-called
republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and underlining the irre-
versibility of this decision. As Washington’s envoy to the Caucasus,
Matthew Bryza, reportedly warned Tbilisi before the war that a mil-
itary clash with Russia would destroy any chance Georgia had of
entering NATO (Spiegel 2010).
In Georgia, Russia demonstrated that it would not refrain
from using military force if its control over the geopolitical posture
of the countries in its sphere of influence is at stake. However, alt-
hough the consequences of the war became a serious obstacle for
Georgia’s pro-Western path and alarmed NATO states, it failed to
completely banish Western influence from the post-Soviet space. In
128 VASIF HUSEYNOV

2009, the EU launched its Eastern Partnership programme and of-

fered regional states deeper European integration. The constituents
of the programme, particularly the agreements (i.e. Association
Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Deal) it of-
fered, outraged Russian officialdom. The establishment of the
DCFTA process between the regional states and the EU would sin-
gle out their participation in Russia’s Customs Union which was to
form the basis of its Eurasian Union.
Prior to the EaP summit in Lithuania’s capital Vilnius in late
2013, Russia threatened the countries (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia,
and Armenia) that were preparing to sign or initialize the agree-
ments with the EU. Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry
Rogozin explicitly warned Moldova that the country’s pro-Euro-
pean choice might cause them “to freeze in winter” and to lose its
control over the breakaway region of Transnistria (See Moscow
Times 2013). In a later move the Kremlin imposed some trade re-
strictions on Moldova and generated problems for the inflow of la-
bour migrants. Similarly, the Kremlin threatened Ukraine that sign-
ing the agreement would turn out to be catastrophic for the Ukrain-
ian economy and generate political and social unrest mentioning
specifically the possibility of separatist movements springing up in
the Russian-speaking east and south of Ukraine (Walker 2013). Like
Armenian President Serzh Sarkysan, who abruptly opted for the
Customs Union in return for lower prices in natural gas imports
and a security guarantee against Azerbaijan and Turkey, in a sur-
prising volte face the Ukrainian President Yanukovych made an ab-
rupt about-turn in favour of the Customs Union under Russian
pressure in return for $15 billion counteroffer and discount in gas
prices (from $400 to $268 per 1000 cubic meters) (Rutland 2015: 137).
Although the Armenian president managed to fulfil the agreement,
Yanukovych failed due to the sudden outbreak of massive popular
upheaval, which became known as the “Euromaidan revolution”
supported by the European and American leaders (Müllerson
2014).
In the aftermath of the Euromaidan revolution, Russia’s lead-
ers declared their readiness to intervene in post-Soviet countries
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 129

when Western-backed anti-regime protestors threatened the exist-

ing governments. For example, the head of the Russian Federal Se-
curity Service (FSB), Aleksandr Bortnikov, in a meeting with the
representatives of CIS intelligence services, unequivocally stated
that the FSB “considers that there can be in [the CIS] countries
forces with definite intentions concerning the overthrow of the au-
thorities” (Newsru.com 2014). Pointing to the Euromaidan revolu-
tion, he said that the attempts of the oppositional groups and for-
eign forces to “overthrow the authorities with the goal of changing
the constitutional system” is unacceptable and “we will act harshly
in the framework of the law not to give an opportunity to destruc-
tive forces to influence the situation in our countries” (ibid.). Ap-
parently, following the ousting of President Yanukovych, Russia
became more assertive in declaring the possibility of using military
intervention to prevent anti-government protests of a similar scale
in territories of allies (McDermott 2015). Such protests or “colour
revolutions” were mentioned along with other security threats that
Russia encountered in the recent Military Doctrine of December
2014 and National Security Strategy of December 2015.
Likewise, in the other former Soviet countries in its shared
neighbourhood with the EU, Russia sees the existing interstate or
intrastate territorial disputes or ethnic conflicts (e.g. the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Trans-
nistria issue in Moldova) as a tool of influence. These conflicts have
problematized the Euro-Atlantic path of the parent states, as nei-
ther the EU nor NATO would recruit a new member that cannot
exercise full control over its territory, is involved in internal con-
flicts with breakaway regions, or has Russian troops on its soil
(Siddi et al. 2012: 7). When the geopolitical situation of the regional
states develops to the dislike of Russia, Moscow escalates those con-
flicts, and through this leverage has so far been able to reach its ob-
jectives. For example, many observers have concluded that “The
‘de-freezing’ and rapid escalation of the conflicts in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia was mainly the consequence of US-Russian disputes
in the international arena and the direct and indirect intervention
of foreign powers in the conflicts” (Siddi et al. 2012: 7). Russia tries
to transform the countries that host these conflicts into a federation
130 VASIF HUSEYNOV

or confederation, a political structure that would give the autono-

mous entities crucial influence over the foreign policies of the cen-
tral governments. This would allow Russia to slow down, if not
completely avert, the transatlantic ties of those countries with the
help of the pro-Russian autonomous regions (Bugajski et al. 2016:
166).
To this end, the Russian policymakers invest a significant part
of the country’s GDP on military reinforcements. Russia is also pur-
suing a comprehensive military reforms program that is aimed at
rearming Russian military. According to the initial plan which was
unveiled during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, i.e. when oil
prices were on the rise, Russia was planning to spend 13 trillion
roubles, or approximately $425 billion at the exchange rates of those
years, on modernizing 70 percent of military equipment by 2020
(Gorenburg 2010: 1). In early 2016, the Russian Defence Ministry
stated that the country was successfully implementing military re-
forms at twice the expected speed, despite the economic decline
that Russia found itself in (TASS 2016a).
Since 2014 Russia has been continuously carrying out military
build-up in the territories along its European borders, particularly
in Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave sandwiched between Poland and
Lithuania. NATO has warned that Moscow is deploying “thou-
sands of troops, including mechanized and naval infantry brigades,
military aircraft, modern long-range air defence units and hun-
dreds of armoured vehicles in the territory” (Wesolowsky 2015).
Particularly Russia’s stationing of nuclear-capable Iskander-M mis-
siles into the area is read as an “alarming threat” in the West. Mos-
cow has also made a radical change in its commitments to the use
of nuclear weapons. While the Soviet Union undertook not to use
nuclear arms first, Putin’s Russia does not single out this possibil-
ity. On the other hand, with military intervention in Georgia and
Ukraine, Moscow, as NATO’s secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg
observes, “has shown it can deploy forces at very short no-
tice…above all, it has shown a willingness to use force” (See NATO
2015).
However, along with developing its military power, Russia
has also started to rethink the role of soft power in the aftermath of
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 131

the first wave of the “colour revolutions”. The geopolitical devel-

opments in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union demon-
strated that economic pressure, military force, energy, and other
hard power elements failed to avert the growing influence of West-
ern powers in the region which was based on non-hard power. Alt-
hough Russia’s military power succeeded in preventing the path of
Georgia and Ukraine into the EU and NATO, it did not suffice to
pull these countries fully back into Russia’s orbit.
Notwithstanding Russia’s military capabilities and its nuclear
arsenal, three of the regional countries opted for alignment with
Western powers signing the Association Agreements and free trade
deals. The crucial role of the general public and non-governmental
organizations in this process and the success of popular protests
urged Russia to reconsider its foreign policy techniques in accord-
ance with soft power principles. In 2008, a Russian political scien-
tist, Gleb Pavlovsky, the then adviser to the Russian Presidential
Administration, described the Orange Revolution as “a very useful
catastrophe for Russia” and stated, “We learnt a lot” (quoted in
Popescu et al. 2009b: 27). For Russian officials, it has become “im-
possible” to effectively defend national interests “without proper
use of solid soft power resources” (See Official Website of Russia’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). The remaining sections of this
chapter will examine Russia’s potential and its policies to develop
power over popular opinion in the “common neighbourhood”
countries.

Soft Power as Russia’s Foreign Policy Tool

Russia’s soft power has been one of the most debated political phe-
nomena amongst scholars of international relations. In Western ac-
ademic circles, a number of terms and expressions have been at-
tributed to such policies of the Kremlin. Most Western experts ar-
gue that Russia’s perception of soft power is rather different from
that of Western countries (Saari 2014; Drent et al. 2015; Walker
2016). For example, the experts of the Netherlands Institute of In-
ternational Relations point out that unlike the Western understand-
ing of soft power “as a means to attract other countries to its own
132 VASIF HUSEYNOV

community”, Russia perceives soft power as a tool “to influence or

destabilise countries through non-military actions” (Drent et al.
2015: 10). For them, the Russian term myagkaya sila can be better
translated as “soft force”, rather than “soft power”. Similarly, An-
drew Monaghan (2013: 7) of the Chatham House claims that as Rus-
sia sees soft power “as a means of promoting Russian culture and
language and countering ‘soft’ attacks on the country”, a more ap-
propriate term for Russia’s understanding of this concept would be
“soft strength”. Another expert from the Chatham House proposed
a new term to Russia’s perception of soft power: “soft coercion”
(Sherr 2013). Thus, there is a tendency amongst Western scholars to
focus on the coercive elements of Russia’s soft power while under-
estimating its potential to be loved and respected by people in the
region.
Historically, co-optation, along with coercion, has been an in-
tegral part of Russia’s strategy to expand its influence over foreign
countries. Since the outset of imperial expansion, Russian leaders
have paid significant attention to generate consent amongst the
peoples of the lands where Russia was set to intervene. While dur-
ing the Tsarist years these policies were guided largely by Christian
ideals, which had a more local character, in the aftermath of the Bol-
shevik revolution Moscow adopted communist ideology with uni-
versal objectives and significant appeal amongst many peoples
over the world. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia lost most of
this soft power along with its military and economic power. Not-
withstanding the fact that Moscow declared itself a liberal-market
economy and remained largely committed to international cooper-
ation in a number of international crises, for instance in the first
Gulf war, its attractiveness dramatically plummeted in those years.
Throughout the 1990s, the Russian political elite mostly ne-
glected policies of cultivating power over the public opinion abroad
which once were one of the priorities of the Soviet government. Do-
mestically, in those years Russia was experiencing political disor-
der, economic crises, internal wars, and the defeat of communist
ideology which had been the cornerstone of Soviet soft power. The
international conditions were not in favour of the former super-
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 133

power, either. Moscow was withdrawing from international poli-

tics and recalling most of its personnel deployed to faraway coun-
tries. Under those circumstances, the soft power projects gradually
faded in the foreign policies of the Kremlin. For example, Vladimir
Shubin (2004: 110) writes that “in the 1990s approximately half of
the Russian cultural centres in Africa were closed due to lack of
funding”. Thus, the primary reason for the apparent disinterest
amongst Russian politicians in soft power was not due to lack of
understanding of its importance, as some have argued (e.g. Van
Herpen 2015: Kindle location 715 of 8957), but rather Russia’s with-
drawal from international politics and its enormous domestic soci-
oeconomic and political problems.
After the political turmoil, economic crises and an unsuccess-
ful war in Chechnya in the 1990s, Russia began an upward climb in
the beginning of the new millennium. In the late 1990s, in response
to the “unfriendly” geopolitical developments in its immediate
neighbourhood Russia stepped into a more assertive foreign policy
with overarching objectives. In 2003, the country managed to raise
its GDP to the level it was in 1993 thanks to rising commodity
prices. This propped up more assertive domestic and foreign poli-
cies of the new Russian President, Vladimir Putin. The growing mil-
itary and economic capacity of the country allowed Russia to
launch comprehensive policies to wield power over opinion be-
yond its borders. Moscow started to invest both in its military and
non-military power to back up its international policies and counter
the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic military and political struc-
tures in the territories which it considered its “zone of privileged
interests”.
The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept stressed the importance of
the promotion of “a positive perception of the Russian Federation
in the world” and underlined the need “to popularize the Russian
language and culture of the peoples of Russia in foreign states” and
“to form a good-neighbour belt along the perimeter of Russia’s bor-
ders” (Lankina et al. 2015: 103). This strategy gained momentum in
the wake of the “colour revolutions” in Russia’s backyard and the
growth of the increasingly threatening Western soft power in the
region. Russia claimed that since the end of the Cold War the USA
134 VASIF HUSEYNOV

had spent around 20 billion dollars in the former Soviet countries

on non-governmental organizations, scholarly exchanges, civil so-
ciety etc. for provoking pro-Western sentiments (Shilov 2014: 185).
This urged both Russia’s political elite to initiate more projects to
wield influence on popular opinion in the “near abroad” and to
steer the intervening influence of non-state actors in the region.
In 2007, the Russian Foreign Policy Review for the first time
mentioned “soft power” as a new approach in Russia’s foreign pol-
icy making (Kudors 2010: 2). The document stated that “A big role
in modern diplomacy is played by factors, which are often de-
scribed in terms of ‘soft power’” (See Official Website of Russia’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). The document made clear that
the objective of Russia in using soft power was to build “the ability
to influence the behaviour of other states”. Both Russian official-
dom and the expert community started speaking out about the im-
portance of soft power as a tool to influence the domestic actors of
other countries with the ultimate goal of affecting the policies of
their respective governments. For example, a Russian expert, Greg-
ory Filimonov (2010) argued that public diplomacy was “not just
intervention in the minds, hearts and souls of people, but also an
effective way of influencing the domestic affairs of a sovereign
state”.
Thus, amidst the geopolitical challenges in its neighbourhood
Russia imported the Western concepts of soft power and public di-
plomacy and began to emulate the successful practices of Western
powers. The import of these terms allowed the Russian authorities
to avoid using old and pejorative terms, such as propaganda or psy-
chological warfare about their own policies. The term “soft power”
in Russia’s latest Foreign Policy Concept (2013) was defined as “a
comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives build-
ing on civil society potential, information, cultural and other meth-
ods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy” (See Of-
ficial Website of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). The con-
cept mentions wielding soft power as a foreign policy goal of the
state and underscores the importance of “improving the applica-
tion of ‘soft power’ (ibid.).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 135

Russia imported not only the concept of soft power but also
emulated the instruments that the West had established to wield
this power. The primary soft power tools of the Russian govern-
ments were a copy of the ones in the West. For example, RT emu-
lated international news channels like BBC and CNN, the ‘Russian
World’ foundation, and Rossotrudnichestvo was built on the basis
of the model of USAID, Germany’s Goethe Institute and the UK’s
British Council (Makarychev et al. 2015: 241).
The breakout of the Ukraine crisis in early 2014 brought about
new elements into Russia’s perception of soft power. The Kremlin
reconsidered its soft power policies in general, its counter-revolu-
tionary agenda in particular (Huseynov 2016). On the one hand,
Russia’s soft power policies with respect to the former Soviet Un-
ion, predominantly Ukraine, started to be more concentrated on
one-way communication (i.e. propaganda) through media chan-
nels. Russian leaders began to put more emphasis on media and the
dissemination of Russia-biased information. They described the
media as “weapons” and the information war as “the main type of
warfare” (Interfax 2015a; Yaffa 2014). Hence, the Kremlin also
boosted the budget of its international media channels, for instance,
there was a 41% hike in the 2015 budget of television channel RT
compared to the previous year (Raybman 2014). Russia’s state-di-
rected projection also began to put more emphasis on programmes
to discredit pro-Western governments in the “common neighbour-
hood” states and undermine their policies (Sherr 2015: 28; Drent et
al. 2015: 10).
On the other hand, the Ukraine crisis made Russia become
louder in declaring the possible use of military force to counter “col-
our revolutions” in the region (McDermott 2015). Russia’s new Mil-
itary Doctrine that was accepted in December 2014 and National
Security Strategy that President Vladimir Putin approved at the end
of 2015 characterize “colour revolutions” amongst the security
threats that Russia is facing. These developments were widely in-
terpreted as Russia’s “[move] from securitizing the issue of anti-re-
gime protests to militarizing it” (Bouchet 2016: 1). The presentation
136 VASIF HUSEYNOV

of those protests as a security threat would allow Moscow to inter-

vene to protect pro-Russian political elite in the former Soviet coun-
tries.
However, although Russian leaders considered the possibility
of responding to “colour revolutions” and hybrid warfare with con-
ventional troops, they themselves were aware of the fact that this
had little potential to be successful. That is why the Russian military
was planning to develop its soft power concepts to fight against un-
conventional attacks (McDermott 2016). These concepts, which are
not yet made public at the time of writing, are likely to include all
the instruments that can be useful to influence popular opinion in
and outside Russia. The statements of the Russian leaders demon-
strate that the Kremlin is resolved to spare no effort to achieve this
objective. For example, Russian Chief of General Staff Valery
Gerasimov (2013), who believes that “responding to [hybrid war-
fare and “colour revolutions”] using conventional troops is impos-
sible” (Sputniknews 2016b), had already written about these instru-
ments in 2013:

“The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals

has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of
weapons in their effectiveness. The focus of applied methods of conflict has
altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational,
humanitarian, and other non-military measures.”

Thus, on the one hand Russia invests in soft power to influ-

ence the policies of the former Soviet states in the “common neigh-
bourhood”, to re-establish its control over them, and to get its for-
eign policies accepted as legitimate by local people, on the other
hand it threatens with and prepares the legal ground for the use of
military force if it fails in “softer” ways. The Ukraine crisis has
evolved these two elements in Russia’s foreign policy to an unprec-
edented level in the post-Soviet period.

Self-Projection
Russia is the largest country in the world with an area of ap-
proximately 17 mln. square kilometres. It is well endowed with nat-
ural resources. Russia is the second largest producer of fossil fuels,
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 137

the third largest oil producer, the second largest natural gas pro-
ducer and holds a significant share of all the world’s available nat-
ural resources. The country also boasts the world’s largest forest
areas which account for approximately half of its territories. These
natural resources have been historically a major enabling factor be-
hind Russia’s economic expansion and international standing. This
has given the Russian people enormous potential to perform well
in development of elements which this book regards as “human-
constructed assets”.
As a country that has a very old imperial past, Russia has been
able to develop significantly attractive cultural properties over the
centuries. The literature, music, theatre and other cultural elements
produced in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union have made enor-
mous contributions to global cultural heritage. Millions of people
over the world, particularly in the countries that were previously a
part of the USSR, still watch, listen, and read the works of Russia’s
cultural icons. Although its modern popular culture, arguably, fails
to prevail over the attractiveness of that of America and Western
Europe even in the former Soviet Union, Russia still has a strong
cultural link with former Soviet countries. A public opinion poll
conducted by the European Neighbourhood Barometer in 2014
found out that while just 11% and 40% of respondents feel a simi-
larity with American and European cultures respectively, the num-
ber of people that feel closer to Russian culture was significantly
higher—60% (See Figure 3; Enpi-info.eu 2014).
138 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Personally, to what extent do you feel close to...

Russian Culture

European Culture

American Culture

0% 23% 45% 68% 90%

Don't Know Total Far Total Close
Figure 3. A public opinion poll in the EaP countries (conducted by the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Barometer in 2014)

There are millions of people in the region who live with the nostal-
gia of Soviet times. A public survey in 2016 revealed that the ma-
jority of people between the age 35 and 64 think that their lives were
better during the Soviet period than the present: Azerbaijan—69%,
Armenia—71%, Belarus—53%, Georgia—51%, Moldova—60%,
Ukraine—60% (Sputniknews 2016c). Similar results were reached
by earlier polls (e.g. Esipova et al. 2013). Russia, being the successor
of the Soviet Union, benefits from these sentiments and is able to
wield power over the minds and feelings of the regional publics. It
is partly due to the influence of shared history that a Gallup survey
showed that 61 percent of those questioned said they approved of
Russia’s leadership (Ray 2011). This is a staggering number consid-
ering that the median percentage of approval for Russia across 104
countries over the world was only 27% in the same poll (ibid.).
The Russian language is one of the most important attributes
of Russian soft power in the entire former Soviet Union. Although
the number of Russian speakers over the globe has plummeted
from 350 million (in the early 1990s) to 270-300 million (Panova
2015: 91-92), it is still widely spoken across the former Soviet Union.
It is true that the English language is being taught more frequently
than other languages at the schools of most of the regional countries
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 139

(Blauvelt 2013), but Russian is still more widespread than English.

For example, in Georgia, one of the most Western-oriented coun-
tries of the region, while Russian is spoken by more than 70% of the
overall population, the proficiency of English among Georgians is
lower than 20% (Blauvelt 2013: 191). Not only in Georgia, but in the
entire post-Soviet space, the Russian language is not considered by
many as a “foreign” language in its real sense, “but rather a sort of
second native language (regardless of how well they actually spoke
it)” (Blauvelt 2013: 190). There is even growing interest in studying
at Russian-language schools in some countries, particularly in
Azerbaijan (See Azertag 2016).
Moscow supports this interest by establishing centres for
learning the Russian language. For instance, in Armenia, since 2012,
more than 100 such centres have been founded, where Russian-lan-
guage courses are provided free of charge (Vardanyan 2015). This
has been initiated by the Armenian Institute for Strategic Develop-
ment, whose head Andranik Nikoghosyan in 2010 was awarded by
the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev with the Friendship Order
“for [his] great contribution to the development of cultural ties with
Russia, for preserving and spreading the Russian language and cul-
ture abroad” (See Armenpress 2010).
However, although the Russian language is still popular in
post-Soviet countries, the number of its speakers has faced a con-
sistent decline in the region in recent years. Filimonov (2010) re-
ports that “instead of the original 20,000 Russian-language schools
in the former Soviet Union, now there are about 7,000.” Besides, in
this territory the number of children educated in the Russian lan-
guage has fallen from 5 million to 3.1 million (ibid.). Although Rus-
sian is still spoken widely in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, it has
ceased to be a language of everyday communication in the South
Caucasus. On the other hand, a recent study by the Institute for
Strategic Studies “Eurasia” has found that Russian speakers com-
prise a major part of emigrants from the former Soviet countries:
Armenia—64%, Moldova—50%, Azerbaijan—35%-36%, Georgia—
40%, Ukraine—32% (See Interfax 2015b). Tatiana Borzova, an ex-
pert of the Institute, called on the Russian leadership for more pro-
jects to support Russian speakers in those countries, stressing the
140 VASIF HUSEYNOV

fact that “Young people from Russian-speaking families are leaving

the former Soviet Union, [if this remains so] in 10 years Russian in-
fluence in these countries will not exist (ibid.).

Narratives
Russian officials are most likely aware of the fact that “Soft power
is effective only if its application generates and spreads positive so-
cial impulses and meanings” (Makarychev 2011: 2). During Soviet
times, Russia used to have this potential. However, the disintegra-
tion of the USSR destroyed the ideological appeal of the communist
utopia. This also debilitated the institutional basis which was nec-
essary to continue the quite successful soft power policies of the So-
viet Union (Maliukevičius 2013). Starting in the beginning of the
new millennium, the soft power policies of the Kremlin started to
be re-built and reinvigorated under the administration of President
Putin. Particularly following the “colour revolutions”, a wide range
of fundamental measures were taken in this regard and the strate-
gic narratives of the Kremlin began to be re-constructed. Russia be-
gan to develop its own normative agenda and put forward partic-
ular concepts for using its non-military arsenal (culture, language,
media, etc.).
One of the most popular initiatives of the early 2000s was the
concept of “sovereign democracy” that was prepared as a part of
Moscow’s efforts to counter Western soft power. In 2006, Vladislav
Surkov, then deputy head of the presidential administration,
pointed out that it was developed in response to the “colour revo-
lutions” in the region (Surkov 2006). Although the concept was
never coherently outlined, its two core ideas were clear from the
beginning. Firstly, underlying the idea of sovereignty, the concept
rejected any attempts of the Western states and institutions to med-
dle in the domestic affairs of Russia. Secondly, it stressed the fact
that Russia has its own set of values, which are democratic but
based on Russia’s unique historical experience and its traditions
(Popescu 2006). The concept, defending Russia’s democracy, re-
jected the allegedly universal character of the Western standards of
democracy. For the Russian leaders, “if there is western democracy,
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 141

there should be an eastern democracy as well” (quoted in Popescu

2006: 1). However, Peter Shearman (2010: 23) correctly notes that
Russia has not sought to export its model of democracy to other
countries, or at least there is no evidence to argue otherwise.
In 2012, the Kremlin began publishing its own “Report on the
Human Rights Situation in the European Union” to counter the
negative assessments of the European powers on the conditions of
human rights in Russia. The report, published in 2013, accused the
EU of propagating of homosexuality and same-sex marriage. The
Kremlin benefits from and inflames homophobic sentiments in the
post-Soviet space to push the regional people against the EU. For
example, it is reported that an NGO in Ukraine, financed by an oli-
garch close to Putin, distributed pamphlets saying that “association
with the EU means same-sex marriage” (Tafuro 2014).
The national narratives that constitute important components
of Russia’s soft power policies are built on the combination of a set
of diverse policies, primarily a state-promoted ideology of conserv-
atism and the Russian World concept, manipulation of symbols and
nostalgia for the glorious days of the Soviet past, the leveraging of
socio-political, economic and cultural links with the post-Soviet
states. These policies achieve greater success in Russia’s “near
abroad”, compared to “far abroad”.
The Russian World10 (Russkiy Mir) concept is an element in
Russia’s soft power toolkit that puts emphasis on social, cultural,

10 Some of the ideas embedded in the Russian World concept associate also with
those of Eurasianism, an ideology that has had various versions developed over
its long history dating back to the late Middle Ages and in modern times is
promoted largely by Alexandr Dugin. Its adherents, similarly, stress the differ-
ences between the West and Russia, presenting the latter as part of a distinct
Eurasian civilization. In the aftermath of the announcement of Eurasian inte-
gration projects, the ideology gained momentum in academic and research cir-
cles. Although, Eurasianism as an ideological doctrine has some overlap with
Putin’s project of the Eurasian Union, this overlap is confined mostly to its ge-
ographical focus and is not taken as an ideological guide by Russian policymak-
ers. Marlene Laruelle (2015) rightly argues that: “As we delve into the contents
of the Eurasian project, in terms of political values and economic politics, criti-
cal dissonances soon emerge. The Eurasian Union takes nothing from (neo)Eur-
asianism in defining a political and economic strategy for the region. No official
142 VASIF HUSEYNOV

and historical issues and projects a collective identity based on Rus-

sian roots. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, amidst an
identity crisis, Russia began to recall the concepts of the Tsarist
years. In those years, the Russian World appeared as a comeback of
the Tsarist doctrine of pravoslavie, samoderzhavstvo, narodnost (“or-
thodoxy, autocracy and nationality”) which the Russia of the Mid-
dle Ages had developed as a counterbalance of France’s Liberté,
égalité, fraternité (“liberty, equality, fraternity”). In the late 1990s,
some architects of the concept, such as Efim Shchedrovitsky and
Petr Ostrovsky (quoted in Laruelle 2015: 5), argued that the collapse
of the Soviet Union divided the Russian World, and, hence, the ex-
isting borders of the Russian Federation did not constitute a com-
plete area which historically had belonged to the Russian World.
The concept allows Russia to claim responsibility for 300 million
Russian-speakers, 30 million ethnic Russians outside Russia across
the world and also embraces people who feel culturally close to
Russia. 20 million of those ethnic Russians reside in the countries of
the former Soviet Union (Sputniknews 2012).
In the early years of the post-Soviet period, the Kremlin tried
to sign agreements on dual citizenship with the former Soviet coun-
tries. This plan failed largely due to the disinterest of the regional
states, as these agreements would give Russia substantive leverage
over those countries (Zevelev 2008). Following this failure, Moscow
re-evaluated its relations with Russians outside of Russia by de-
scribing them as “compatriots living abroad” within the framework
of the Russian World concept. Although the concept was initially
widely discussed amongst academics and experts, it came into offi-
cial usage only following Vladimir Putin’s rise to power. Using this
term for the first time at an official level during his speech at the
October 2001 Congress of Compatriots, supported the view that the

text produced in Russia about the Eurasian Union mentions Eurasianism as an

ideology. Dugin has not been given any official status since the coming into
force of the Eurasian Economic Union; he is not a member of the Public Cham-
ber and he even lost his position at Moscow State University since the onset of
the Ukraine conflict.” Therefore, in the analysis of Russia’s soft power narra-
tives, this book will remain focused on the Russian World concept.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 143

Russian World comprises the territories where Russia’s compatri-

ots live: “The term ‘compatriot’ is definitely not a legal category.
[...] For, since the very beginning, the concept ‘Russian World’ has
gone far beyond the geographical boundaries of Russia and even
beyond Russian ethnic boundaries” (See Putin 2001). During his
presidency, the concept gradually “expanded from an internal
search for Russian identity in the 2000s to a foreign policy impera-
tive” (Lough et al. 2014: 2).
While all citizens of the former Soviet Union were considered
“compatriots” in the early years of the post-Soviet period, after-
wards the term was redefined and started to be based on “self-iden-
tification” of those people. The Foreign Policy Concept of 2013, like
the previous two, particularly highlighted that “ensuring the com-
prehensive protection of rights and the legitimate interests of Rus-
sian citizens and compatriots residing abroad” was one of the goals
of Russia’s foreign policy (See Official Website of Russia’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs 2013). These conceptual initiatives do not remain
only in theory and are being pursued with practical consequences.
As the existence of compatriots gives Russia a leverage to meddle
in the domestic affairs of neighbouring countries, Moscow spares
no effort in reinforcing its ties with these people. Most importantly,
the distribution of Russian passports to these populations—a pro-
cess known as “passportization”—has de facto generated a Russian
contingent in the neighbourhood. The russification of these popu-
lations and promoting their linguistic and cultural attachment to
Russia is of great strategic importance. This proved itself to be
highly significant when the defence of their rights and physical se-
curity served as an excuse for a military intervention in Georgia
(2008) and Ukraine (2014) and for exerting political pressure on the
Baltic states and Kazakhstan.
The concept Russkiy Mir delineates Russia as a unique civili-
zation and superior to the West that is allegedly in a moral crisis
due to its deviation from traditional and Christian values (Speedie
2015). This civilizational approach is also reflected in the official
narratives of the Kremlin. For example, the Russian Foreign Policy
Concept of 2013 specifically noted that “for the first time in modern
history, global competition takes on a civilization level,” and that
144 VASIF HUSEYNOV

“the major states of the world…should be representative in geo-

graphical and civilizational terms” (See Official Website of Russia’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). By presenting civilizations as a
new type of factor in international relations, the Kremlin aims to
defend the uniqueness of Russian civilization. The presentation of
the West as the victim and promoter of “degeneration” and “moral
degradation” takes a central line in this context (Igumnova 2014:
51).
This civilizational approach reinforces Russia’s narratives to
compete against rival narratives and to win over the hearts and
minds of foreign publics, especially in its near abroad. The Kremlin
calls upon others to respect the sovereignty of each civilization and
thus the Russian civilization, as well. The Foreign Policy Concept
(2013) presents it as “a priority for world politics to prevent civili-
zational fault line clashes and to intensify efforts to forge partner-
ship of cultures, religions and civilizations” and highlights the
threats (such as “a rise in xenophobia, intolerance and tensions in
international relations”) of “imposing one’s own hierarchy of val-
ues”. The Kremlin also employs this ideological stance to expand
its ideals and values over other countries and to challenge the foun-
dations of Western liberal democracy. In conservatism, the Kremlin
sees the potential for filling the ideological vacuum created by the
collapse of the Soviet communism (Whitmore 2013; Lewis 2016).
Russia’s enthusiastic promotion of conservativism and the estab-
lishment of strong ties with right-wing political parties and other
groups in Europe are an example of this.
The elements of the Westphalian system and warnings against
the erosion of this system constitute a central role in Russia’s inter-
national narratives. “State sovereignty”, “respect for international
law”, “non-interference”, and similar Westphalian norms are
largely employed by the Russian officials for the purposes for both
soft power cultivation and self-defence. With this intent, Russia
presents itself as a “norm enforcer” rather than challenging the ex-
isting international systemic norms (Sakwa 2011a: 970). The Krem-
lin strictly opposes the alleged attempt of the United States to pre-
serve the unipolarity that the collapse of the USSR brought about
and vows not to permit it.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 145

Simultaneously, Moscow behaves like a revisionist power that

seeks to challenge Western predominance in international relations.
Complaints against the misdeeds of the West, its catastrophic con-
sequences for many people across the world, and the need to avert
this trend are likewise central in the international-level narratives
of the Kremlin. However, as Richard Sakwa (2011b: 211) argues,
“Russia is certainly not a fully-fledged revisionist power”. Russia
strives to enforce the normative basis of the existing world order
and to get all other great powers, particularly the USA, to uphold
these norms. As Moscow is largely unable to “pose a systemic al-
ternative to the dominance of Western ideological and structural
hegemony” (Wilson 2015: 297), the maintenance of the Westphalian
system of international politics is considered as the most optimal
choice for the Russian political elite. State-supported propaganda
demonizes liberal and pro-Western political groups and instigates
violence and aggression against them. The Kremlin has generated
and supports a climate of hate against those groups which fre-
quently leads to physical confrontations and bloodshed. The Rus-
sian propaganda vehicles broadcasting to the post-Soviet space
maintains similar political tones. Russia’s public diplomacy and
propaganda institutions in those countries and pro-Russian politi-
cal groups propagate anti-Western sentiments. Russian propa-
ganda seeks to promote the harmony of interests between these
people and Russians and creates an image of a devious external en-
emy which tries to destabilize these countries and ultimately to in-
vade them.

International Broadcasting
Arguably, in recent years the Kremlin’s most important broadcast-
ing project was RT television channel (previously known as Russia
Today) which was launched in 2005 with a $30 million initial
budget and broadcasts to more than 100 countries (Evans 2005). The
network already offers 24/7 programming in 6 languages (English,
Arabic, Spanish, German, and French) and claims to be the most-
watched YouTube channel (with more than 2 billion views) (See RT
2015). Russia’s international broadcasting was further strengthened
146 VASIF HUSEYNOV

by the establishment of Sputnik News (an international multimedia

news service launched on 10 November 2014), and Russia Beyond
the Headlines (an international multimedia project which was
launched by Rossiyskaya Gazeta in 2007). Russia’s influential politi-
cal scientist Igor Panarin (2010; 2014) distinguishes two waves of
information warfare against Russia. He argues that the first one was
launched in the late 1980s and ended with the collapse of the Soviet
Union. According to him, Russia is presently under a second infor-
mation aggression which the West initiated at the start of this mil-
lennium. Russian media channels disseminate this perception ex-
tensively in its neighbouring countries. Both Sputnik News and RT
claim to fight against the informational hegemony of the West and
deconstruct the “lies” propagated by Western politicians and me-
dia channels. The two news agencies with intriguing taglines like
“Telling the untold” and “Question more” have been able to attract
significant attention across the world. The rhetoric of these chan-
nels is obsessively centred on anti-Americanism.
The Kremlin also founds and/or supports pro-Russian local
media channels in the neighbourhood countries. For example, in
Georgia, Russia has connections with a number of local media out-
lets, such as information portals Sakinformi, Iverioni, Geworld.ge, and
Internet television channel Patriot TV. These media outlets have
been either founded by or are connected to Russia-oriented non-
governmental institutions in Georgia (Eurasian Institute, Historical
Legacy, etc.) (Bugajski et al. 2016: 343). In some of the regional coun-
tries, the audience of the Russian or Russia-supported local media
channels even outnumbers that of the others. For instance, the local
outlets of the Russian newspapers Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii
and Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii are the most widely read news-
papers in Belarus (Szostek 2015: 2).
Since Crimea’s annexation, Russian media channels and other
soft power outlets are particularly focused on denouncing the east-
ward expansion of the EU and NATO, “colour revolutions” and
Ukraine’s pro-Western geopolitical shift. They echo Putin’s accusa-
tions that “the US instigated ‘colour revolutions’ in the former So-
viet region, using grievances of people against their governments,
in order to impose their values that contradict local traditions and
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 147

culture. These efforts were directed against Ukraine, Russia and

Eurasian integration.”11 These channels, when necessary, do not
shy away from broadcasting disinformation and conspiracy theo-
ries to reach foreign policy goals. From this perspective, the policies
of modern Russia are considered by many observers, including
some Russians, more malevolent than those of the Soviet Union. In
a similar vein, Gleb Pavlovsky points out that:

“The main difference between propaganda in the USSR and the new Rus-
sia… is that in Soviet times the concept of truth was important. Even if they
were lying, they took care to prove what they were doing was ‘the truth.’
Now no one even tries proving the ‘truth.’ You can just say anything. Create
realities” (quoted in Pomerantsev et al. 2014: 9).

Russia also skillfully benefits from opportunities created by

technological development in its information campaigns. It has
given Moscow new instruments to project its narratives to millions
of people in the “near abroad” at relatively low costs. The Kremlin’s
media outlets extensively use social media (Facebook, Twitter,
VKontakte, etc.). Some studies on social media have disclosed that
the Kremlin also makes use of social media bots, fake accounts
(known as “trolls”) for various purposes (See Stratcomcoe 2016).
With this purpose, Russia is reported to have built a “troll” army
whose task is commenting on articles on social media and other
websites. In 2013, it was revealed by a Russian investigative jour-
nalist that a group of people in St. Petersburg have been hired on a
permanent basis to comment on social media and to distribute the
messages of the Kremlin on other online platforms (Garmazhapova
2013). Those people managing fake accounts are supposed to both
defend Russian positions on various issues and create confusion
through disseminating conspiracy theories (Kottasova 2015). The
seriousness of this issue made Russia’s opponents deploy similar
tactics to fight (pro)Russian trolls. For example, in 2015 it was re-
ported that Ukraine also started to build its internet army employ-
ing the same tactics as Russia used.

11 Translated by Lutsevych (2016: 6-7) from Vladimir Putin’s Speech about Cri-
mea: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApP5sWCpjDY
148 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Russia’s propaganda outlets appear to be reaching some of

their objectives in the former Soviet region. Peter Pomerantsev, an
expert on the Russian propaganda, writes that, “Take Estonia,
where viewers who followed rival Russian and Western stories
about the downing of flight MH17 over Ukraine last year ended up
disbelieving both sides” (Pomerantsev 2015). For the regional peo-
ple, for most of whom Russian is a second language and for some
of them a first language, there are not many alternative sources of
information. In 2014, a public opinion poll conducted by Gallup in
12 countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union (excluding
the three Baltic States) concluded that many people in these coun-
tries considered Russian media a more reliable source than Western
media (Bernstein 2016). The poll indicated that “majorities in most
of the former Soviet states”, particularly “who lived in urban areas
and were better educated tended to be more supportive of Russia’s
policy in regard to Crimea” (ibid.). However, the “common neigh-
bourhood” countries are not equally receptive to this rhetoric. Rus-
sian propaganda is less successful in countries that have territorial
conflicts with Russia. The studies show that Russia’s use of force in
and occupation of some territories of Georgia and Ukraine has
damaged its image in these countries. This year a Gallup poll found
out that Russia is seen as the biggest threat by the residents of Geor-
gia (48%) and Ukraine (52%) (Esipova et al. 2016).

Academic Exchange Programs

During the Soviet era, Russia was one of the most popular destina-
tions for international students. In 1980, the Soviet Union (62,942)
evolved to being the third most popular destination for interna-
tional students after the United States (311,882) and France
(110,763) (King et al. 2010: 10). Russian experts admit that “the USSR
for a long time used higher education as a geopolitical tool and as
an ‘ideological weapon’ at the time of confrontation and the Cold
War (Torkunov 2013). However, the collapse of the Soviet Union
relegated Russia’s attractive power as an educational centre and de-
creased the country’s share of the world’s educational services mar-
ket. In 2004, losing the position of the former USSR in the top list of
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 149

most popular destinations for international students, Russia down-

graded to the eighth place (75,786 foreign students) (King et al. 2010:
10). Presently Russia hosts a mere 2-3 percent of the global number
of international students, most of whom come from developing
countries and the former Soviet republics (Torkunov 2013).
Russia considers the growing influence of Western academic
and cultural institutions in its neighbourhood as a threat to its in-
fluence over the regional countries. The official website of the Rus-
sian World Foundation makes clear that the exchange programmes
and educational institutions of the United States, Europe, China,
and Turkey pose “a serious threat to Russia’s interests in this re-
gion” (Starchak 2009). In the wake of the first wave of “colour rev-
olutions”, the Russian political elite began to assess this threat seri-
ously. The official documents started to feature public diplomacy
and academic cooperation as a vital instrument of foreign policy.
Public diplomacy was for the first time stressed in 2008’s Foreign
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation as a tool to promote “an ob-
jective image of the Russian Federation” and the “Russian language
and the Russian peoples’ culture” abroad (Fominykh 2016: 20). The
Concept also underlined the importance of reintegrating the na-
tional education systems in the post-Soviet region to promote the
common cultural and civilizational heritage.
These official statements were also reflected in the practice of
the Russian government. In order to emerge as an attractive desti-
nation for the international students from its “near abroad” Russia
invested more resources on its scholarship programmes for inter-
national students. If there were only 3,000 such students receiving
financial help for their studies at Russian universities in 1995, in
2008 this number was raised to 10,000 (Fominykh 2016: 20). Follow-
ing the breakout of the Ukraine crisis, this number increased further
from 10,000 to 15,000—a 50% increase in a year. Until 2014 those
students were given the same amount of living allowances as Rus-
sian students, but travel expenses and health insurance were not
covered. In 2014 Russia began to pay for travel allowances for some
students: in that specific year 1,000 foreign students obtained this
opportunity (Koshkin et al. 2014). Presently, most of the full-time
international students studying in Russia are citizens of post-Soviet
150 VASIF HUSEYNOV

states—more than 50%. This share nears 70% in the number of stu-
dents arriving in Russia for short time studies (one or two weeks)
(Fominykh 2016: 28).
In its educational projects, the Kremlin also seeks to reverse
the decline of the Russian language over the world and also in the
post-soviet countries. In order to make progress in the expansion of
the Russian language, the CIS Network University was created in
2008 on the initiative of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Rus-
sia. This aimed to support education in Russian in the CIS countries
(Filimonov 2010: 3). In 2011, the Federal Target Program “Russian
Language” for 2011-2015 was adopted. The program operated un-
der the control of Rossotrudnichestvo and the Ministry of Educa-
tion of Russia.
The Kremlin also adopted a concept named “Russian schools
abroad” in November 2015, which aimed at promoting the Russian
language abroad. According to the concept, Russia would help with
informational, methodological, logistical and professional support
to Russian schools in foreign countries. The concept underlined the
significance of the Russian language for the realization of Russia’s
foreign policy agenda and the formation of positive attitudes
amongst these people toward Russia. Thus, not only does Moscow
invest in projects to attract the students from the “common neigh-
bourhood” states to its educational institutions in Russia, but also
builds such opportunities in these countries themselves, by open-
ing Russian-language courses, establishing branches of Russian
universities, and financing or supporting education programmes in
the Russian language or Russian studies. One of the most notewor-
thy elements of Russia’s educational policies with regard to those
countries is the establishment of the branches of Russian universi-
ties in the “shared neighbourhood”. According to the Ministry of
Education and Science of the Russian Federation, there are 30 such
institutions in this region.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 151

Russia’s NGOs and Support to Civil Society

In the wake of the “colour revolutions”, Russian politicians and po-
litical experts began to raise their voices for comprehensive coun-
terrevolutionary policies both in Russia and in other CIS countries.
In the immediate aftermath of these revolutions the Kremlin cre-
ated the Presidential Directorate for Interregional and Cultural Re-
lations with Foreign Countries which was entrusted with the task
of conceptualizing Russia’s new policy toward the “near abroad”.
Modest Kolerov, a political technologist and for whom “culture is
a weapon that Russia is using to gain respect in the FSU” (cited in
Jackson 2010: 110) was brought to the head of the Directorate. In an
interview, shortly after his appointment, Kolerov admitted that his
mission was to counter revolutions in the CIS countries, and, for
this purpose, he underlined the importance of mobilization of “cul-
ture, “spirituality”, and the Russian language (See Kommersant.ru
2005).
In a short period of time, a number of public diplomacy insti-
tutions were created, such as the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foun-
dation (2007), Rossotrudnichestvo—the Federal Agency for the
Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living
Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (2008), the
Gorchakov Foundation (2010), etc.). In late 2013, new plans to create
a network of Russian-language-learning centres abroad named
Pushkin Institutes (analogous to Germany’s Goethe Institute and
Spain’s Instituto Cervantes) were made. Russia also began to sup-
port pro-Russian civil society, cultural and folklore clubs, youth
movements, think thanks, and analytical centres in its “near
abroad”. These cultural organizations promote the Russian culture
and language, youth movements recruit young people who stand
for Russian values, and Russia-supported think tanks and research
centres provide largely Russia-biased information. They are sup-
posed to counter Western influence in their respective countries,
defend ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people, and promote
conservative values and the Russian interpretation of the history.
The Chatham House reports that in Moldova alone more than 100
152 VASIF HUSEYNOV

pro-Russian organizations have been identified by Moldovan intel-

ligence agencies (Lough et al. 2014: 4).
In 2012, in Russia, there were around 5,000 registered non-
profit organizations—856 of which had the status of “interna-
tional”—which were supposed to serve Russia’s public diplomacy
objectives (Kosachev 2012). These organizations were tasked with
countering Western soft power and the promotion of the Russian
language and culture with the ultimate goal of spurring positive
sentiments towards Moscow’s integration projects. Not only are
they focused on countries that are on a pro-Western path but are
also notably active in countries that are in the umbrella of the Eur-
asian Union (Bugajski et al. 2016: 308).
Having minimized the foreign funding of domestic non-gov-
ernmental organizations to prevent any threat of colour revolution,
the Kremlin launched its own funding programme for NGOs in
2005. Over the years, the major beneficiaries among the NGOs that
are supported by this programme have been the Russian Orthodox
Church (ROC) and organizations that promote Eurasian integra-
tion—both of which constitute primary elements of Russia’s soft
power projection into the neighbouring countries (See CEPR 2015).
The study also found that since 2012, these non-commercial organ-
izations have been receiving constantly growing government fund-
ing (from 1 billion roubles in 2012 to 4.2 billion roubles in 2015).
The existence of pro-Russian civil society in the neighboring
countries is of great importance for the Kremlin. Russia supports
pro-Russian cultural and folklore clubs, youth movements, think
thanks, and analytical centres. These cultural organizations pro-
mote the Russian culture and language, youth movements recruit
young people who stand for Russian values and Russia-led integra-
tion projects, and research centres provide largely Russia-biased in-
formation. As it was clearly mentioned above in the statements of
Russian leaders, these groups are supposed to counter the interfer-
ence of Western-backed non-governmental organizations and pro-
mote Eurasian integration. They, in line with the general foreign
policy narrative of the Kremlin, defend the human rights of ethnic
Russians and Russian-speaking peoples and promote conservative
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 153

values as the core of Eurasian civilization and the Russian interpre-

tation of history. These organizations provide access to works of
authors who criticize US hegemony and NATO’s expansion and
praise the virtues of a multi-polar world. Likewise, the books of for-
eign writers who share these views are translated into Russian and
used in the propaganda of these groups.
The rest of this section presents brief information about the
key public diplomacy vehicles of Russian foreign policy which
were operational in the “common neighbourhood” during the pe-
riod under study (2004-2016).
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC): The Russian Orthodox
Church has been traditionally the largest and most influential Rus-
sian soft power tool. The adoption of the title “Third Rome” in 1517,
a declaration of messianic ideals and supposedly unique merits of
the church of Moscow, and the establishment of the Moscow patri-
archate in 1589 were historically used “to justify the claim of the
Muscovite ruler to lead a universal Christian Empire” (Duncan
2000: 11). The ROC was drawn under total state control during the
reign of Peter the Great and “came to be seen as a pillar of the state”
(Anderson 2007: 185). During Soviet times, it was the only Christian
church allowed to act but remained under the total control of the
government and most of the time worked for the KGB.
After the collapse of the predominant communist ideology,
the emerging ideological vacuum made Moscow return to the ide-
ological traditions of Tsarism. The percentage of Russians who
identified as Russian Orthodox made a dramatic rise from 31% in
1991 to 70% in 2012 (See Levada Centre 2011). In post-Soviet Russia,
the ROC became of principal importance both for governing the
country and promoting its foreign policy goals. In 2007, President
Vladimir Putin, likening the importance of the traditional relations
to the nuclear shield of the country, estimated them “equally im-
portant for its security” (See Interfax-religion 2007).
Preserving the relations with the Russian and Russian-speak-
ing communities abroad is a primary foreign policy task of the
church. The ROC, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, strives to preserve and reinforce the spiritual bonds in
154 VASIF HUSEYNOV

“Holy Russia”, which denotes the canonical territory of the Patriar-

chate, i.e. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Kazakhstan (Laruelle
2015: 15). With this purpose, the church also established an interna-
tional organization named Day of Baptism of Rus (Den Khreshchenia
Rusi) in 2007. It was aimed at promoting the integration of Russia,
Belarus, and Ukraine as one Holy Rus. The organization was partic-
ularly active in 2013 prior to the Vilnius summit later that year.
With slogans like “We Are One” and “Holy Rus is Indivisible” it
tried to foment pro-Russian sentiments in Ukrainian society
(Lutsevych 2016: 24).
The Russian Orthodox Church has branches in Belarus, Esto-
nia, Latvia, Moldova, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and claims exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the Orthodox Christians in other post-soviet
countries, except Armenia and Georgia. It is often considered one
of the most respected institutions in the region. The church seeks to
maintain an apolitical status and thus refrains from nationalistic
and political statements that might damage its image. For example,
after the break of diplomatic relations Georgia and Russia in the
wake of the 2008 war, the ROC was the only national institution still
maintaining formal ties with Georgians.
The Russian church firmly advocates traditional social values,
demonizes “the cultural corruption of the West” and supports the
Russian officials’ view that western standards of human happiness
are not applicable to all countries. The ROC and its conservative
ideals attack at the very foundations of contemporary Western val-
ues and strive to consolidate a strong social basis against them. One
of the flagmen of the new conservative Russian ideology, Metro-
politan Kirill states that “The liberal idea does not call for a libera-
tion from sin because the very concept of sin is absent in liberalism”
(See Official Website of Russian Orthodox Church’s Department for
External Church Relations 2000). Henceforth, they call for a re-
striction of civil liberties, free competition, freedom of speech,
which, for them, promote western style social and cultural degra-
dation.
The Russian Orthodox Church, in the same vein with the
Kremlin, criticizes Western perceptions of democracy and human
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 155

rights. According to the church leaders, Western democracy, pro-

moting individualism and competition, damages the foundations
of a unified and consolidated society. Presenting competition and
the clash of opinions as a threat to society, the church supports the
Russian concept of “managed” or “sovereign” democracy and calls
for a model of democracy in accord with national traditions (An-
derson 2007: 191). According to the view of the church’s main ide-
ologue Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, Russia should respond to the
criticism of western-backed international institutions by develop-
ing its own model and promote it internationally.
The Russkiy Mir Foundation: The Russkiy Mir (Russian World)
Foundation institutionalizes the Russkiy Mir concept. The founda-
tion, according to its director, is “a nongovernmental centre to sup-
port and popularize the Russian language and culture” (See Official
Website of Russkiy Mir Foundation 2012). But, like many other Rus-
sian non-governmental organizations, it was established by the
government (in June 2007). This is a joint project created by the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science.
The prime task of the foundation is to provide informational re-
sources, educational programs, cultural events and the promotion
of Russia’s intercultural communication. The Russkiy Mir founda-
tion maintains special relations with ethnic Russians and Russian-
speaking publics living abroad. As of 1 November 2015, the foun-
dation has opened more than 90 Russian centres in 45 countries
across the world, of which 28 (around 30%) are in the territories of
the former soviet countries: Azerbaijan (1), Armenia (1), Belarus (1)
Kazakhstan (3), Kyrgyzstan (3), Moldova (4), Tajikistan (4) and
Ukraine (11). The centres are aimed at popularizing Russian culture
and language in the countries in which they are operational. Alt-
hough the former Soviet countries and ethnic Russians living there
are the main focus of the institution, its activities address also
“those who speak Russian in their everyday life, also think Russian,
and as a result- act Russian” over the world (Kudors 2010: 2-6).
Rossotrudnichestvo: The Federal Agency for the Common-
wealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and In-
ternational Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) was es-
156 VASIF HUSEYNOV

tablished in 2008 and is focused on the countries of the former So-

viet Union. The institution was built on the basis of Roszarubezht-
sentr (Russian Foreign Centre), the roots of which date back to the
early years of the Soviet Union. Unlike the Russkiy Mir Foundation,
Rossotrudnichestvo is a government agency and more focused on the
CIS region than the former.
Rossotrudnischestvo deals with the promotion of the Russian
language, cultural, scientific and education exchanges, cooperation
with compatriots abroad, and international development aid. To-
gether with a number of institutions, such as the Governmental
Commission on Compatriots Living Abroad (GCCLA), Interna-
tional Council of Russia’s Compatriots, the Association “Home-
land”, the International Associations of Youth Compatriots, and the
Moscow House of Compatriots, the organization aims at reinforc-
ing ties with compatriots. Rossotrudnichestvo organizes regular
events (such as forums, seminars, conferences) and scholarly ex-
change programs with neighbouring CIS states. The CIS countries
are a priority for most of the programs of the agency.
The Gorchakov Foundation: The Gorchakov Foundation is a
public diplomacy foundation named after Alexander Gorchakov,
Russia’s Foreign Minister from 1856 to 1882. The foundation was
established with the decree of President Medvedev in February
2010. It serves the goals of supporting Russia’s foreign policy strat-
egy and to promote the participation of Russian non-governmental
organizations in foreign countries. Leonid Drachevsky, Executive
Director of the Foundation, proudly declares that the Gorchakov
Foundation “is the first and unique mechanism of a state-society
partnership in the field of foreign policy in modern Russia” (See
Official Website of the Gorchakov Foundation 2015). Almost all the
research, educational and cultural programs of the Foundation
(such as “Dialogue in the name of the Future”, “CSTO Academy”,
“School of Young Experts on Central Asia”, “Caspian Youth
School”, and “Caucasus Dialogue”) are directed at the CIS region.
These programs, which focus on young experts and scientists from
regional countries, have heavy political content and objectives. The
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 157

projects mostly cover issues of security, internal and external fac-

tors affecting the situation in the region and includes meetings and
discussions with renowned Russian experts and politicians.

Economic Ties and Foreign Aid

An important link between Russia and the “common neighbour-
hood” states is the fact that the economies of the regional countries
have been deeply integrated with Russia’s economy through the
long centuries of co-existence under common rule. For millions of
people in the “near abroad”, Russia has been the only source of in-
come for years. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia be-
came the most popular destination for millions of labour migrants
from the newly independent states. The existence of a visa-free re-
gime between Russia and most other former Soviet countries has
also facilitated the flow of people to Russian cities. Remittances are
a very important source of income for the post-Soviet countries. For
example, in 2013, 25% and 21% of the Moldovan and Armenian
GDP, respectively, depended on remittances (See World Bank
2014). Around 70% and 80% of those remittances received by Mol-
dova and Armenia, respectively, originated in Russia (See Telera-
dio Moldova 2014; Arka News Agency 2015). The inflow of remit-
tances, which can be considered a form of foreign aid, help a lot of
its recipients to survive in the difficult economic conditions of their
own countries (Jackson 2010: 109). In 2006, Fiona Hill (2006: 341)
noted that migration to Russia and remittances sent back to neigh-
bouring countries had played an extremely crucial role in the life of
millions of people during the turbulent years following the collapse
of the Soviet Union: “Migration to Russia [had] become the region’s
safety valve.”
Russia seeks also to benefit from its economic superiority over
neighbouring former Soviet countries in its pursuit to develop soft
power. An Oxfam analysis in 2013 reported that the post-Soviet re-
gion is the primary recipient of Russia’s humanitarian aid, of which
the annual budget was around 51 million dollars in 2012 (Brezh-
neva et al. 2013: 7). The analysts underline that Russia’s allocation
of aid in greater volumes and more frequently to the former Soviet
158 VASIF HUSEYNOV

countries is “often interpreted as a way of maintaining a degree of

influence over these countries” (ibid.). The report concludes that
the geographical distribution of Russia’s aid must be viewed in the
context of its long-term strategic ambitions which shows that “Rus-
sia regards former Soviet republics as its sphere of influence, and
its willingness to maintain close ties with them explains why they
receive such a large proportion of its aid” (Brezhneva et al. 2013: 13).
It is estimated that Russia’s gas subsidies across the CIS region
between 1992 and 2008 amounted to $75 billion (Bochkarev 2009).
In this period, Russia sold natural gas to those countries at a lower
price than that of the world market. This is a form of external aid
which is not added to Russia’s official data on foreign aid to the CIS
countries (Sasse 2012: 557). Konstantin Kosachev, head of Ros-
sotrudnichestvo, lamented this fact in 2014, stating that Russia
helped Ukraine for many years by imposing lower gas tariffs and
opened its market to Ukrainian products, but Ukrainian people did
not see them. On the contrary, sums that were hundreds of times
smaller from the USA and the EU “to support democracy” was seen
as “bailout” to Ukraine. He emphasized that Ukraine was not the
only such case (Khimshiashvili 2014).

Limitations of Russian Soft Power

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned potential and accomplish-
ments, self-projection is the main soft power element that is mostly
disregarded by Russia’s political elite and is a largely underdevel-
oped aspect of its soft power. Many observers argue that “Russia
lacks the attractiveness the EU has… [and] still needs to become
sufficiently attractive in order to become the preferred partner for
its neighbours” (Rostoks et al. 2015: 247). Russia’s internal economic
and socio-political structure, its authoritarian governance, eco-
nomic backwardness, etc. destroy the image of the country and pre-
vents it from developing itself as a worthy model to be followed or
emulated. Despite having vast natural resources (e.g. 6% of global
proven oil reserves and 17.3% of global proven gas reserves), Rus-
sia’s gross domestic product (GDP) is far lower than that of the EU:
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 159

the EU’s single market produced a GDP of $16.312 trillion in 2015,

compared to Russia’s total of $1.33 trillion (World Bank 2017a).
Russian leaders are mistakenly focused mostly on the ele-
ments of soft power that are controlled and managed by the state.
For example, in his 2012 article “Russia in a Changing World”,
Putin defined soft power as “a complex of tools and methods for
achieving foreign policy goals without deploying weapons, using
information tools and other forms of intervention” (See Putin 2012).
This incomplete understanding of soft power lays the foundation
of future failures in Russia’s soft power policies. The Kremlin con-
tinues its tight grip on the media and saturates the information
landscape with nationalist propaganda while suppressing the most
popular alternative voices (See Freedom House 2016). Despite the
fact that some Russian leaders have acknowledged these problems
and stress the importance of reforms, they have consistently failed
to materialize them. For example, the former President Dmirty
Medvedev, on many occasions, criticized the country’s “humiliat-
ing dependence on raw materials”, as well as its “inefficient econ-
omy, a semi-Soviet social sphere, a fragile democracy, negative de-
mographic trends, unstable Caucasus” (See Medvedev 2009).
Nonetheless, neither he nor his successor took effective measures
to eradicate these problems.
Russia is widely seen as a force that supports authoritarian
governments in its neighbourhood and as such promotes autocracy
(Tolstrup 2009; Melnykovska et al. 2012; Furman et al. 2015). Alt-
hough it might be inaccurate to argue that Russia exports autocracy
to its neighbourhood (Tansey 2015), Russian leaders develop poli-
cies and practices aimed at blocking Western advance in its neigh-
bourhood (Walker 2016). Despite disagreeing on some issues, Rus-
sia and some post-Soviet policy-makers in the region broadly share
the objective of preventing “colour revolutions”—a mutual under-
standing which some depict as “Moscow Consensus” (Lewis 2016).
This strategy of the Russian leadership to counter rival ideologies,
particularly Western liberal democracy, through cooperation with
post-Soviet leaders on narrow anti-Western rhetoric is strictly
160 VASIF HUSEYNOV

short-term unless the local leaders are able to advance socio-eco-

nomic reforms which will address problems with corruption and
the lack of good governance.
Russia’s image suffers also from its controversial efforts to
preserve its traditional influence over the neighbourhood countries
and from its aggressive reactions to the pro-Western geopolitical
drift of regional countries. All the countries in the “common neigh-
bourhood”, apart from Belarus, have been stuck in frozen conflicts
in which Russia is a key player, directly or indirectly. Occupied by
Armenia Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, Abkhazia and
South Ossetia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova, Crimea, Donbas
and Lugansk regions in Ukraine are the conflicts which Russia has
been manipulating to have a word over the foreign policy manoeu-
vres of these countries. Unlike Western powers, who have never
deployed military power vis-à-vis the “common neighbourhood” in
the post-Soviet period, Russia does not shy away from using it
when regional countries make decisive moves to join Euro-Atlantic
political and military institutes. Thus, Russia’s policies to fight
against Western soft power have not been confined to soft power
but also included hard power. This has been one of the most crucial
problems in Russia’s policies that have damaged its overall policies
to wield power over popular opinion in the “common neighbour-
hood” and made it be seen as a threat by numerous people (Esipova
et al. 2016).

Conclusion
This chapter analysed Russia’s policies to retain the neighbouring
post-Soviet states under its dominance. As opposed to the analyses
which argue that Moscow sees military force as a means to re-es-
tablish its hegemony over regional states, this analysis concludes
that the Russian leadership is aware that they could not establish
an EU-like Union with military force. However, they tend to use
military power as a last resort to prevent the loss of territories of
existential importance. The Georgia war of 2008 and Russia’s mili-
tary intervention in Ukraine in 2014 are such cases that in which
Russia became militarily involved and opposed the pro-Western
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 161

drift of the two countries that it considers as part of Russia’s sphere

of influence. It was Russia’s military force that succeeded in stop-
ping the enlargement of NATO into the territories of the former So-
viet Union. On this account, Karaganov rightfully writes that:

“NATO’s expansion was stopped, alas, not by persuasion or calls for com-
mon sense. The show of Russia’s military muscle in Georgia did it” (Kara-
ganov 2012).

This supported the hypothesis about the use of soft power as

an expansive instrument in the rivalries between great powers and
the use of hard power as a defensive tool to preserve the existing
sphere of influence and to back up foreign policies.
The chapter built its analysis of Russia’s soft power policies on
the basis of the soft power model presented in Chapter 2. In accord-
ance with the principles of this model, firstly, this chapter explored
Russia’s self-projection from the perspective of the “common
neighbourhood” countries. It has found that Russia’s natural en-
dowments and human-constructed assets give it significant poten-
tial in its soft power policies vis-à-vis the regional people. The fact
that these countries used to live together under Moscow’s rule also
affects their attitude to and perceptions of Russia. The public opin-
ion polls cited in the chapter showed that most people in the region
feel closer to Russian culture than to European or American cul-
tures. The chapter has also analysed the role of the Russian lan-
guage as a soft power asset. It concluded that although Russian is
still of great importance for the regional people, many of whom
speak this language, the number of its speakers is declining. This
was mentioned as one of the problems of Russian soft power in gen-
eral. However, Russia’s self-projection has other, more serious
problems as well. Its domestic socio-economic problems, relatively
weak economic performance, authoritarian governance and eco-
nomic backwardness damage the image of the country and prevent
it from looking as the “shining city upon the hill” for the “common
neighbourhood” countries. The image of the state is being damaged
also by its foreign policies with respect to the regional countries.
Russia’s military interventions in the regional countries make it ap-
pear as a loser in the competition with the West whose policies vis-
162 VASIF HUSEYNOV

à-vis this region have been always based on non-military power

since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The chapter focused also on Russia’s state-managed soft
power projection and explored Russia’s strategic narratives, its in-
ternational broadcasting, academic exchange programs, non-gov-
ernmental organizations and foreign aid as dimensions of its state-
managed projection with regard to the “common neighbourhood”.
This analysis showed that the existence of sufficient hard power re-
sources (in particular, financial wealth) has allowed the Kremlin to
establish a long series of propaganda and public diplomacy institu-
tions to wield soft power in the region. The chapter concluded that
the Russian political elite began to invest resources on this field in
the aftermath of the “colour revolutions” in the beginning of this
century. As expected by the soft power model of this book, Russia
did not rely on only its hard power, but was forced to found nu-
merous soft power instruments to fight the non-military power of
the West.
The chapter concluded that Russia has been successful in these
policies to some extent, despite its non-democratic structure and
profound socio-economic and political problems. However, Rus-
sia’s soft power cannot successfully compete against Western soft
power unless the Kremlin resolves the above-mentioned problems
that undermine the self-projection of the country. Probably this is
why there is widespread pessimism about Russia’s soft power po-
tential in the Russian political expert community. Ruslan Pukhov,
director of Moscow-based military think tank CAST, argues that
“‘Soft power’ doesn’t work for us. We need people to be afraid of
us and we seem to be unable to find a proper substitute for military
power” (Grove 2011).
5. States with Relatively Strong State
Autonomy: The Case of Belarus

This chapter, along with the following chapter, complements the

discussion provided in the previous two chapters which described
the geopolitical nature of the Russia—West rivalries over the “com-
mon neighbourhood” countries and the use of soft power by the
conflicting sides in the pursuit of their regional goals. Focusing on
the case of Belarus, the chapter analyses the response of the regional
countries to these rivalries. The chapter aims to test the hypothesis
that if the leaders of a weak state, which is in between the rivalries
of great powers who use soft power to expand their influence, are
autonomous vis-à-vis the society and other internal non-state actors,
they can control the inflow of the soft power projection of the for-
eign states, offset the intervening influence of the domestic non-
state actors on foreign policy making, and augment their chances to
more prudently and independently follow the imperatives of the
international political system.
Belarus, a Slavic country situated in the geographically strate-
gic location between Russia and the EU, gained its independence
from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since 1994, the country has been led
by Aleksander Lukashenko. He has amassed extensive control over
the internal and external policies of the country. Since the early
years of its independence, Belarus has remained Russia’s closest
ally in the region. However, according to its constitution, the state
declares itself neutral in international relations and has invariably
strived to preserve its sovereignty. The willingness and attempts of
the surrounding great powers (i.e. Russia and the West) to pull Bel-
arus into their orbit and the country’s economic dependence on its
northern neighbour (i.e. Russia) have complicated its international
relations and restricted the possibilities it has to manoeuvre.
Belarus is of immeasurable geopolitical importance for Russia,
inter alia due to its geographic proximity to Russia’s important re-
gions and its location between Russia and NATO countries. Over
the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin has

163
164 VASIF HUSEYNOV

spared no efforts to maintain warm relations with Belarus and pre-

serve its control over Minsk’s foreign policies. To this purpose,
Moscow has invested a large sum of resources, including a huge
amount of subsidies which, according to former Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev, accounted for $50 billion between 1990-2009
(RT 2009).12 Russia has also launched a number of projects to ad-
dress the Belarusian people and wield soft power in the country.
However, Russia has mostly worked with the Belarusian governing
elite because of, on the one hand, the impediments the Lukashenko
government builds before the external soft power projection and,
on the other hand, the already widespread attachment of the Bela-
rusians to Russia.
For many years, the European Union, in line with its broader
neighbourhood policies, tried to extend its external governance to
Belarus through democratic reforms in the country. The rapproche-
ment of Belarus with the EU would boost the geopolitical leverage
of the Union with respect to Russia. The detachment of the country
from Russia’s orbit would deal a crushing blow to Russia’s geopo-
litical stance and preclude its integration plans. Likewise, the
United States tried to build a relationship with Belarusian civil so-
ciety and help the pro-Western political forces to come to power in
the country. The fact that military power could not be deployed to-
wards these goals, both the EU and the USA tried for many years
to reach them via soft power policies. However, the strict domestic
control of Lukashenko government left Western powers no room to
affect its policies through influencing internal non-state actors.
This chapter will discuss the role of domestic non-state actors
in shaping Belarus’s foreign policy orientation and Minsk’s interac-
tions with the surrounding great powers. The geopolitical context
Belarus has existed in since the early years of its independence is

12 Some experts suggest higher figures about the amount of subsidies from Russia
to Belarus. Alachnovič (2015), referring to the findings of the Economic Institute
of the Belarusian National Academy of Sciences, pointed out that Russian sub-
sidies had accounted for around 15% of Belarusian GDP annually. If Russia had
imposed the prices gas exports to Belarus at the same level as the prices on gas
exported to Poland, it would have costed $4.2 billion to Belarusian economy per
a year (ibid.).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 165

presented in the first section coming after this introductory part.

The following section will analyse the autonomy Belarusian leaders
have wielded with respect to the general public and other non-state
actors since the country gained independence but particularly dur-
ing the period between 2004 and 2016. This section will be followed
by a wider discussion on the power of the West and Russia wielded
over public opinion in Belarus. The section is divided into two parts
providing a separate take on Western and Russian soft power. In
its final section before the conclusion, the chapter will explore the
attitude of the Belarusians towards the two geopolitical poles (i.e.
Russia and West) and their role in the formation of the country’s
foreign policy orientation. The concluding part will summarize the
major findings of the chapter in the light of the hypotheses pre-
sented in the beginning of the book.

Belarus Between the West and Russia

Belarus is the only Eastern Partnership (EaP) country whose Part-
nership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the European Un-
ion (signed in 1995) never came into force. The decision to isolate
Minsk in protest to President Aleksandr Lukashenko adopted by
the EU and the USA in the early years of Lukashenko’s tenure de-
fined the framework of bilateral relations between the West and
Belarus for the years to come. In 2004, the EU adopted sanctions on
high-ranking representatives of the government (including Presi-
dent Lukashenko) and other persons who were blamed for under-
mining rule of law in Belarus. The sanctions consisted of travel bans
and orders to freeze their assets at European banks. Similar sanc-
tions were imposed by the United States, as well. In 2004, following
the controversial referendum that lifted limits on presidential
terms, the United States adopted the Belarus Democracy Act that
prohibited, with limited exceptions, any form of assistance to Bela-
rus. European and American leaders underscored the significance
of cooperation with and support to the pro-democracy forces in Bel-
arus (Shepherd 2006). The meeting between the US Secretary Con-
doleezza Rice and the Belarusian democracy activists in Vilnius in
166 VASIF HUSEYNOV

2005—amidst the popular uprisings in the wider region—was

therefore remarkably symbolic.
President Lukashenko’s unbending rejection of the criticism of
the Western community strictly restricted the foreign policy op-
tions of the Belarusian leadership and pushed Minsk towards Rus-
sia economically and politically (Rontoyanni 2005: 47). Initially,
Lukashenko attempted to establish a Union State with Russia and
to take leadership of the new state. During the years of President
Yeltsin, the sides made significant steps towards the Union, and the
two states ratified the foundational treaty in early 2000, guarantee-
ing labour rights in both countries, removing border controls, and
laying the foundation for the unification of legislation and the cre-
ation of a single economic space and single currency. Belarus has
been a founding member in most integration projects initiated by
Moscow, including the Customs Union, the Collective Security
Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasian Union.
Meanwhile, relations between Belarus and the West remained
at a diplomatic impasse. The EU and the USA demonstrated an ab-
solute aversion to Minsk’s Russia-leaning policies. Although
Lukashenko offered cooperation on many occasions, he never re-
ceived a positive response. Western leaders drew explicit parallels
between Lukashenko and Middle Eastern leaders who had been
overthrown in the course of the “Arab spring”. Some of them pub-
licly spoke about the necessity of a government change in Minsk
(Marples 2005: 895). Imposing financial sanctions and travel re-
strictions on Belarus, spending millions of dollars in aid to support
the NGOs and independent media in the country, and thus basi-
cally seeking a regime change in and external governance over Bel-
arus (Lynch 2005: 8; Myers 2006), the Western community has al-
ienated Lukashenko in a way no other government in the “common
neighbourhood” has ever experienced. Grigory Ioffe (2004; 2013)
counts the frustration of the Western leaders in their expectations
over the geopolitical reorientation of Belarus as a major reason for
the rather critical attitude towards Lukashenko which remains un-
paralleled in the post-Soviet world.
In the aftermath of the failure of the Belarusian opposition in
the 2006 elections, in which Western powers expended massive
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 167

amount of resources on civil society and anti-Lukashenko forces,

the approach of the West to President Lukashenko began to gradu-
ally change (Ioffe 2011; Vieira 2014a). This was also affected by
growing disputes between Belarus and Russia over energy prices
(Ioffe 2013) and Belarus’s implicit support for Georgia following the
2008 war (Padhol et al. 2011: 3-4). Against this backdrop, relations
between Belarus and Western powers improved: Belarus was in-
vited to the EU’s Eastern Partnership (2009) and visited by senior
NATO officials after a long standstill (2008). This rapprochement
persisted, in varying degrees, in the following years, as well. How-
ever, the Belarusian leadership never strictly changed its pro-Rus-
sian alignment in its external sphere.
Belarus, in return for its Russia-leaning geopolitical choice, in-
sisted on discounts on the import of fuel and energy resources, de-
manding the prices found on the internal Russian market. On the
one hand, it looked for alternative energy sources (from Venezuela
and Azerbaijan) to decrease its energy dependence on Russia
(Čajčyc 2010), on the other hand pressed Russia to keep the energy
prices low and remove restrictions on trade. Lukashenko himself,
on several occasions, reiterated that if Russia didn’t meet these ex-
pectations, Minsk “[would] not be able to stay in the Customs Un-
ion, since we would not see any economic benefits from it” (Bohdan
2013). Siarhei Bohdan (2013) reported that:

“Since 2011, Belarus has been importing duty-free Russian oil to reproduce
at its own refineries. These petroleum products partly are sold to third coun-
tries. For these exports, Minsk pays duties directly to the Russian state
budget: in 2012—$3.8bn, in 2011—$3.07bn. Meanwhile, Minsk believes that
Moscow should not demand this money from them as Russia owes Belarus
something for being its close ally.”

Although Lukashenko fought to extract as many benefits as

possible from Russia in return for being its geopolitical ally, he also
dealt responsibly with the task of preserving the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of his country. He never allowed Russia to
transform Belarus into another autonomous republic of the Russian
Federation. Belarus’s approach to Russia and its integration pro-
168 VASIF HUSEYNOV

jects was primarily driven by economic interests. Unlike the Ka-

zakhstan leader Nazarbayev, Lukashenko did not demonstrate any
affinity with the Eurasian ideology or the Russian World concept,
either. The form of Belarus’s approach to its relations with Russia
is characterized by some observers as “sovereignty entrepreneur-
ship”, that means “the extraction of rents in the form of energy sub-
sidies and credits in return for loyalty, or through the threat of a
reorientation away from Russia” (Nice 2012: 7). Thus, it responds
to Russia’s attempts to reduce subsidies by threatening to make
changes in its choice of partners in foreign sphere. Against this
background, Nice (2012: 1) detects a continuity in Lukashenko’s
foreign policy: “the consolidation of Belarusian statehood and iden-
tity as an independent state”.
The Lukashenko government sees the Russian and Western
approach to Belarus in the same context in which each of them seeks
to influence the internal structure of the country and establish ex-
ternal governance over it through coercion and incentives (Nice
2012). Ioffe (2015) has identified three reasons that have allowed
Lukashenko to adroitly manoeuvre in this hostile international con-
text: the absence of a strong cultural divide in the Belarusian popu-
lation, the existence of a consolidated political elite, and the absence
of oligarchic power centres. These factors played important roles
for Lukashenko to strengthen his domestic autonomy. Unlike
Ukraine, where these three elements were the opposite, Belarus at-
tained the ability to play the external great powers against each
other, follow the imperatives of the international political system
and sustain a favourable foreign policy course. Belarus has on var-
ious occasions demonstrated that it does not trust the Kremlin in
most security issues. For example, it is due to this fact that despite
Moscow’s offers and pressure, Belarus never recognized the inde-
pendence of Georgia’s breakaway territories. Minsk has gradually
sought more diversification in foreign policy and more intense ties
with the West in order to balance Russia’s influence over the coun-
try, particularly in the wake of Crimea’s annexation (Vieira 2014b).
Belarus did not recognize the Russia-organized referendum’s re-
sults in Crimea. Lukashenko criticized the annexation as a “danger-
ous precedent” in the post-Soviet space (Bogutsky 2015: 91). He,
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 169

along with Nazarbayev, resisted Russia’s attempts to adopt anti-

Ukrainian restrictive measures within the Eurasian Economic Com-
munity.
Against this background, bilateral relations between Moscow
and Minsk deteriorated and anti-Lukashenko statements swelled in
Russia. The Russian media questioned the independence of Bela-
rus, portrayed it as a natural part of Russia, began to discuss the
possibility of a Western-orchestrated Euromaidan-style upheaval
in Belarus and highlighted the importance of Russia’s ability to in-
tervene and prevent such a “colour revolution”. Simultaneously,
contacts between Minsk and Western capitals intensified and the
sides embarked on negotiations to build cooperation in the field of
technology, economy and security (Fedirka 2016). The visits of Pen-
tagon officials and the EU Commissioner for the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (2015) to Belarus
for the first time after a long period signified a rapprochement be-
tween the sides. The EU, citing the release of some political prison-
ers as a sign of improvement and underscoring the need to encour-
age the Belarusian government for further democratic advance-
ment, even permanently lifted the sanctions imposed on 170 indi-
viduals, including Lukashenko in early 2016 (Rankin 2016). Minsk’s
policies and Lukashenko’s statements since the Ukraine crisis broke
out indicate that Belarus was interested in the increasing involve-
ment of Western powers in the post-Soviet region as a move to
counterbalance Russia’s influence and to ensure that Belarus would
not become the next battleground between Russia and West. This
intention was particularly clear in Lukashenko’s interview with
Bloomberg where he stated that:

“The most worrying thing [about the Ukraine crisis] is that the United States
hasn’t been openly involved in this process. I believe that there would be no
stability in Ukraine without the Americans” (See Bloomberg 2015).

However, despite this rapprochement with the West,

Lukashenko’s Belarus remains loyal to Russia. Although Belarusian
leaders verbally criticize Russia’s foreign policy, the transfer of this
criticism into tangible deeds has been limited. For example, alt-
hough they have, on several occasions, expressed their support for
170 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Ukraine and its territorial integrity, Belarus never joined the coun-
tries recognizing Crimea’s entry into the Russian Federation as “an-
nexation” (Pankovski 2016).

State Autonomy Vis-à-vis Non-State Actors

The influence of non-state players on the domestic and foreign pol-
icies of the Belarusian government had been already strictly limited
when the first wave of the “colour revolutions” set foot on the post-
Soviet space. In 2004, the Lukashenko government, having nation-
alized around 80% of economy (Lawson 2003: 127), had also devel-
oped counter-revolutionary political instruments. Belarus had al-
ready built a “state ideology” devoting the country to the Eastern
European Civilisation and rejecting Western liberal values. The
Lukashenko government received assistance also from the Kremlin
in developing resistance against those revolutions (Wilson 2011:
209). However, the unanticipated success of the popular uprisings
across the region urged the Lukashenko government to take even
more measures to further diminish the power of non-state domestic
actors and prevent the import of a colour revolution into his coun-
try.
In the wake of the “colour revolutions” in neighbouring coun-
tries, in 2003-2004, Belarus shut down more than 50 NGOs and
adopted new regulations to make it harder for NGOs with undesir-
able agendas to be registered (Silitski 2005: 31). In two years (2003-
2004), 34 newspapers were forced to stop working (ibid.).
The fact that the Lukashenko government was remarkably
successful in economic issues compared to other former Soviet
states was often mentioned as one of the primary factors that cre-
ated conditions for the silent acceptance of the tight control by the
general public (Ioffe 2004; 2007). Unlike many other post-Soviet
countries, under Lukashenko’s leadership Belarus was able to sus-
tain most of the achievements the country made during Soviet
times. The Belarusian GDP in 1999 was 83.6% of its 1991 level with
the second smallest decline among the CIS countries (Ioffe 2004: 91).
The country recorded consistent economic growth for 15 years
(1996-2010) at an average annual rate of around 7% (Yarashevich
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 171

2014: 1703-1704), which was also affected by the low cost of energy
from Russia (Vanderhill 2014: 275-276; Alachnovič 2015). Belarus
also stands out in the post-Soviet space for its low levels of poverty,
unemployment, and inequality. Amidst the spread of the “colour
revolutions” in the neighbourhood, the number of Belarusians who
said in a poll that the economic provision of their families was very
good, good, or middle amounted to 56%, while this figure was less
than 30% in Ukraine at that time (Petuxov 2004: 5).
Very much like its external policies, the internal policies of the
Lukashenko government also demonstrated a remarkable continu-
ity in the period under study (2004—2016). In 2009, when the Bela-
rusian economy was in decline in the wake of the global financial
crisis, a survey concluded that the majority of respondents would
vote for Lukashenko (39.2%) and not for opposition leaders
(Alaksandar Milinkevich (former presidential candidate)—4.4%,
Alyaksandr Kazulin (former presidential candidate and political
prisoner)—2.3%, Sergei Sidorski (the Prime Minister)—1.6%)
(Marples 2009: 761).

Non-State Actors under the Influence of External

Powers

Non-State Actors under the Influence of Russian Soft Power

Russia and Belarus share a history that dates back to the middle
ages. The formation of the cultural and societal characteristics of the
latter have been continuously affected by the former. The transfor-
mation of Belarus from a weak agricultural region into the indus-
trial hub of the entire Soviet Union under Moscow’s rule further
connected the Belarusian population to Russia. These bonds did not
fade in the post-Soviet era, and, quite the contrary, were reinforced
under the russification policies of the Lukashenko government. The
deep, inter-societal links between Belarus on the one hand, Russia
and other post-Soviet countries on the other hand is a major reason
often mentioned for the perseverance of pro-Russian sentiments in
Belarusian society (White et al. 2014). The two societies are so inter-
172 VASIF HUSEYNOV

connected that a public polling concluded that for 80% of Belarus-

ians Russia is not even viewed as a foreign country (Ioffe 2013:
1267). The visa-free travel between the two countries helps main-
tain the bonds between the two nations alive. More than 70% of the
34,801 Belarusian students abroad in 2014 studied in Russia
(UNESCO 2017). Not surprisingly, during the period under study,
the number of Belarusian migrant workers in Russia was approxi-
mately ten times higher than that of those who emigrated to the EU
(Popescu et al. 2009b: 34). A public polling carried out in 2011 like-
wise proves the remarkable strength of this bond between Belarus
and Russia:

“More than half (54%) of our Belarusian respondents, in 2011, had at least
one close relative living in Russia, and 42% had at least one close relative
living in one of the other post-Soviet republics. Twenty years after inde-
pendence, this was also where most of our respondents had travelled. More
than three-quarters (76%) had visited Russia, and nearly as many (72%) had
visited Ukraine; substantial numbers had also visited Poland (37%) or one
of the Baltic republics, such as Lithuania (36%). But fewer than 5% had vis-
ited Hungary, and only 3% had ever visited the USA” (White et al. 2014: 3).

The Belarusian language was severely marginalized under the

Soviet regime. The number of Belarusians speaking and studying
in their native language continuously decreased during those years.
In early 1989, the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic had the high-
est number of people who spoke only Russian (29,9%) or spoke flu-
ently in Russian (over 50%) within the Soviet Union (Ryder 2002:
137). In that year, no major Belarusian cities had Belarusian-lan-
guage schools (Ryder 2002: 137)—a stark decline in less than 40
years: 95% of Belarussian schools operated in the native language
in 1955 (Astapenia 2016). At the time of Soviet collapse, only 20% of
Belarusian pupils were studying in Belarusian. The proportion of
these pupils declined to 13,7% towards the end of 2016, when only
0,1% of university students studied in Belarusian (Astapenia 2016).
More than 80% of the published books are in the Russian language
in Belarus (Astapenia 2014). The Belarusian constitution recognizes
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 173

the Russian language as an official language along with the Bela-

rusian language. But Belarusian is rarely used at the official level.13
Over the years of co-existence and thanks to ethnic, religious,
and linguistic proximity Russia has acquired various channels to
build soft power in Belarus and to transfer this power into tangible
state policies. Its soft power outlets are distinguishably stronger in
Belarus than those of Western powers. The approach of the state
towards Russian soft power projection was also significantly
friendlier than it was towards that of the West. For Lukashenko,
who opted for Soviet ideology as the ideological foundation of his
government from the very beginning of his power, the Russian cul-
tural influence was more acceptable than the Western or even na-
tional ones. This was why while allowing the Russian soft power
instruments to more freely operate in Belarus, he strictly restricted
the activities of the groups and organizations who promoted na-
tional or Western culture. For example, Belarusian (Civil Society
Platform) National Platform complained that:

“The Russian propaganda mass media are being broadcast without re-
strictions, while the values connected with the Belarusian people’s identity,
i.e. the Belarusian language, culture, and historical memory, still have no
state institutional support and remain marginalized” (See Centre for Euro-
pean Transformation 2015).

Nevertheless, the Kremlin have not built or was unwilling to

build a strong pro-Russian political movement in Belarus. Accord-
ing to some, it has been so due to the lesser incentives of the Russian
leaders to develop pro-Russian civil society organizations in Bela-
rus (Vanderhill 2014: 270; Astapenia 2014). As the Kremlin enjoys
closer links to the Belarusian government, they are more successful
in imposing more direct influence on the Lukashenko government

13 Despite the lamentable situation of the Belarusian language, in recent years

there are signs that its usage is expanding amongst both the population and at
official meetings, religious ceremonies, schools, art galleries, etc. (Vasilevich
2016: 177). The government has also started to show more support for the re-
vival of the nation’s language (Ioffe 2014). However, observers note that in-
creasing government support might be simply aimed at preventing the extinc-
tion of the Belarusian language, rather than reviving it and overtaking the Rus-
sian language (Astapenia 2016).
174 VASIF HUSEYNOV

than in reaching out to and developing pro-Russian civil society in-

stitutions (Vanderhill 2014: 270). The fact that there is only one cul-
tural centre (in the city of Brest) of the Ruskiy Mir Foundation in
Belarus, which was established in 2014 — much later than many
other such centres in other former Soviet countries — also indicates
the unwillingness of the Russian officials to invest substantial re-
sources in soft power policies concerning Belarus. This has been
equally, if not more, affected by the limited political environment
for the activities of the non-state actors in Belarus. Russia probably
would have liked to develop strong pro-Russian movements in Bel-
arus considering the long-term perspectives and possible internal
shake-up in the post-Lukashenko period.
One of the assets the Russian government used to wield power
over popular opinion in Belarus is religion. The Belarusian Ortho-
dox Church (BOC) is a branch of the Russian Orthodox Church
(ROC). The two churches are administratively connected. The for-
mer is under the jurisdiction of the latter and thus depends on its
cultural and ecclesiological settings (Vasilevich 2014). Although
other churches face continuous legal and bureaucratic impedi-
ments, the Orthodox Church, under the tutelage of the government,
operates on a larger scale and disseminates pro-Russian sentiments
(Vasilevich 2016). However, in line with other non-governmental
institutions, the activities of the BOC are also required to be regis-
tered by governmental agencies. The unauthorized activities of the
BOC are usually persecuted (Vasilevich 2014: 9). The BOC is a sub-
stantial influencing tool in Belarus, considering that 63.5% of the
Belarusian population define themselves as believers, 83% as sup-
porters of the Orthodox religion (Vasilevich 2016: 172).
Despite tight control over the media, the Belarus government
has not banned the Russian media from domestic media space—
quite the contrary, it was “allowed and facilitated” to realize the
cross-border flow of news from Russia to the Belarusian audience
(Szostek 2015: 2). Belarus and Russia came to terms on the estab-
lishment of a “single information space” (yedinoye or obshcheye infor-
matsionnoye prostranstvo) and thus provided unrestricted access to
the same news providers. Szostek (2015: 2) has found that the two
most widely read newspapers by Belarusians are Komsomolskaya
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 175

Pravda v Belorussii and Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii which are sub-

sidiaries of the Moscow-based tabloids Komsomolskaya Pravda and
Argumenty i Fakty. He reports that a similar situation exists in the
television sector as well: “In the period under study [i.e. during the
second half of 2010], three of Belarus’s major state-owned TV chan-
nels [ONT (Obshchenatsionalnoye televideniye), RTR-Belarus,
NTV-Belarus] had line-ups based wholly or substantially on Rus-
sian made content” (ibid.). Besides, as Russian TV channels pro-
duce programmes with higher standards than Belarusian local TV
channels, they are widely watched across the country. The online
media is also dominated by Russian internet outlets so that Russian
internet pages are more popular in Belarus than local ones. Alas,
Russian dominates Belarus’s information space.
Usually the narratives of the Russian broadcasters have been
in line with the official narratives of the Lukashenko government.
That is the reason why the Russian media has not been driven out
of the country. However, from time to time, especially when there
were disputes between the governments of the two countries, Rus-
sian media broadcasted programmes critical of Lukashenko’s poli-
cies. Thus, media was not always used by Russia as a tool to garner
attraction amongst Belarusians for Russia, but it also aimed to
“elicit aggravation” occasionally (Szostek 2015). In order to mini-
mize the hostile influence of the Russian media, Lukashenko re-
duced the number of Russian newspapers available in Belarus. Lo-
cal transmitters of Russian TV channels (ONT, NTVBelarus and
RTR-Belarus) dropped unwanted content from their broadcasting
and introduced increasingly more domestically produced content
along with programmes produced in Russia (ibid.). The transmis-
sion of Russian channels via cable network has been also compli-
cated by local producers. As a result, Szostek (2015: 3) reports that
for most of the population the three local re-broadcasting channels
“are now the only platforms where Russian TV news can be
watched.”
176 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Non-State Actors under the Influence of Western Soft Power

The internal policies of the Lukashenko government have been, to
some extent, successful in countering the self-projection of Western
countries. The massive use of official narrative has managed to blur
the perception of the Belarusian population about the neighbouring
Western countries (Raik 2006b: 173). The surveys indicate that over
the years under the current government, the number of Belarusian
people who considered the life standards of the neighbouring EU
countries as lower than in Belarus gradually rose. For example, be-
tween 2004 and 2006 the percentage of people who considered the
living standards of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland as higher than in
Belarus plummeted from 24% to 12% (Manaev 2006: 41).
The state-managed soft power projection of Western powers
also encountered interruptions posed by the Belarusian authorities
(Kowalski 2008: 189). In 2009, Giselle Bosse (2009: 215) observed
that, although the neighbourhood policies of the EU impacted the
local perceptions in Ukraine and Moldova, they did not produce
similar results in Belarus. Referring to the United States as a “dark
force” that seeks to destabilize Belarus, Lukashenko resisted Amer-
ican pressure which he called “stupid”, “immoral”, and “unfair”
(Kudrytski et al. 2004). Belarusian authorities prevented the finan-
cial assistance of Western powers from going to anti-government
forces in Belarus. This paralyzed the agenda of Western non-gov-
ernmental organizations. For example, Balazs Jarabik (2006: 86)
notes that the European Initiative for Democracy and Human
Rights (EIDHR) was not allowed to provide effective support to lo-
cal groups and was forced by governmental structures to deal with
non-political issues (e.g. children’s rights). This was one of the most
important factors that distinguished Belarus from Ukraine and
Moldova, where reforms were being conducted by the government
and thus supported by the EU (Raik 2006b: 170).
US government assistance to Belarus is formed in the frame of
“selective engagement”, which confines assistance almost excep-
tionally to humanitarian assistance, educational exchange pro-
grammes, independent civil society and media institutions. From
1997, the International Republican Institute (IRI) was involved in
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 177

programmes addressing political parties in Belarus. The Institute,

with the financial backing of USAID, offered training for political
parties in 2001-2002 (Vanderhill 2014: 273). Afterwards it began to
provide trainings to pro-democracy forces in developing campaign
messages and strategies. Similarly, the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED) provided support to political groups in mobiliz-
ing voters and building pro-democracy political party coalitions
(ibid.). In the wake of the regional “colour revolutions”, prior to the
2006 presidential elections, which proved to be the last chance for
regime change in Belarus for a long time, this assistance gained mo-
mentum. Many Western agencies (e.g. the National Endowment for
Democracy, its British counterpart called the Westminster Founda-
tion for Democracy, the Foreign Ministry of Germany, and the US
Department of State) and a large amount of financial resources
were involved in this process. The US Secretary Condoleezza Rice
met with some Belarusian NGO leaders in 2005. In the same year, a
supplementary assistance bill gave a democracy assistance allot-
ment worth $5 million earmarked for Belarusian political parties,
civil society, independent media, radio and TV channels (Jarabik
2006: 89). For 2006 and 2007, the amount of this assistance sharply
rose to $24 million (ibid.). The amount of EU assistance to Belarus
was raised from $10 million annually to an annual $12 million for
2005 and 2006 (Jarabik 2006: 90). The EU member states supported
the Belarusian democratic forces separately as well. For example,
Swedish assistance to Belarus amounted to $3 million in 2005 and
$4 million in 2006, of which around half was earmarked to civil so-
ciety (Raik 2006b: 176).
The information space, since the early years of the
Lukashenko tenure, has been also an important part of the Western
soft power projection to Belarus. The New York Times reported that
a German organization, Media Consulta, signed a $2.4 million con-
tract with the EU “to break an information blockade that has left
most Belarussians isolated from, and ignorant about, even neigh-
boring countries” (Myers 2006). Besides, Belarusian civil society
leaders visited their Ukrainian and Serbian counterparts in their re-
spective countries to learn about their experiences. They were also
178 VASIF HUSEYNOV

visited by members of Ukrainian and Georgian civil society organ-

izations.
In those years, there were several movements in Belarus that
were heavily supported by the West. For example, Zubr, one of the
three Belarusian youth movements in the early 2000s, whose man-
ners and rationale were analogous to the other youth movements
in Serbia (Otpor), Ukraine (Pora), and Georgia (Kmara), was re-
ported by various sources as having received financial backing
from the West. Andrew Wilson (2011: 2015) cites an interview with
a former NGO leader who argues that: “Zubr was always more ‘ex-
ternally inspired. Its activities were mainly based on money from
US foundations.’ But ‘US money was destructive in the long term.
When the flow of money ended, they [Zubr] disappeared.’” The
other two youth movements—Khopits! (‘Enough!’) and the Youth
Front—were less organized but still supported by the Western
agencies (Myers 2006; Wilson 2011: 215-216).
However, following the failure of the opposition in the 2006
presidential elections, according to the observation of some West-
ern experts, “There… [was] no longer the slightest possibility of
some form of ‘colour’ revolution in Belarus: the cases of Georgia
and Ukraine, in different ways, hardly foster enthusiasm for such a
cause, and the Europeans… [had] evidently abandoned such an
idea… as failed plans” (Marples 2009: 774). The failure of pro-West-
ern forces in spite of massive external support made Western pow-
ers understand that regime change in Belarus through popular up-
heaval was improbable for the time being. They began to make
changes in their approach to Lukashenko and reduced their assis-
tance to anti-governmental non-state actors in Belarus (Ioffe 2011).
Prior to the 2010 elections, some Western Foreign Ministers visited
Minsk. Lukashenko himself paid a visit to Lithuania whose presi-
dent Dalia Grybauskaite “endorsed him as the most suitable candi-
date for the presidency of Belarus” (Padhol et al. 2011: 3). The di-
minishing Western intervention allowed Lukashenko to hold the
2010 and 2015 presidential elections without problems. In early
2016, the EU lifted sanctions that had been imposed in 2004 and
began to normalize relations with Minsk.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 179

Non-State Actors and External Alignment

The previous sections indicated that the Lukashenko government
has effectively minimized the influence of civil society organiza-
tions on the formation of not only internal but also external policies.
However, public opinion polls show that the external orientation of
the state is in line with the preferences of the general public. Cer-
tainly, the elements of Russia’s self-projection, the domestic policies
of the Belarusian government and Russia’s state-managed projec-
tion have played an enormous role in the formation of these prefer-
ences. The entrenched cultural attachment of the Belarusians to
Russia, shared history, linguistic and economic bonds in combina-
tion with the pro-Russian cultural and political stance of the
Lukashenko government have minimized the chances of pro-West-
ern groups to realize their agenda in the country.
The results of the public opinion polls carried out between
2004 and 2016 by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and
Political Studies (IISEPS), a public institution based in Lithuania
(indicated in Figure 4) demonstrate that when Russia is in an in-
tense confrontation with the West, supporters for closer relations
with Russia (i.e. unification) tend to outnumber those who support
European integration. Between 2004 and 2008, when pro-Western
groups were marching “colour revolutions” across the post-Soviet
world and later Russia was engaged in a war with Georgia, Bela-
rusians appeared more Russia-leaning. In this period, the majority
reported they would choose integration with Russia rather than
joining the EU in a hypothetical referendum on the either/or ques-
tion between Russia and the European Union (See Figure 4). The
difference was notable in a 2008 survey as well: 46% of respondents
preferred integration with Russia to the EU integration (30%) in re-
sponse to the question “If you had to choose between Belarusian
reunification with Russia and integration with the EU, which
would you go for?” (Ioffe 2013: 1269). Over the period between 2000
and 2010, the number of Belarusians who self-identified as “Euro-
pean” declined as well (White et al. 2010).
A similar tendency was noticed in the wake of the Ukraine cri-
sis. While in the 2013 polling, the ratio between accession to the EU
180 VASIF HUSEYNOV

and integration with Russia in a hypothetical referendum on the

either/or question was 45% vs. 37%, this ratio changed to the op-
posite in the following year (34% vs. 45%). The trend continued in
the next two years as well: 2015—25% vs. 53%; 2016—34% vs. 42%
(See Figure 4). The upward changes in public support for an align-
ment with Russia during the confrontational periods can be inter-
preted as evidence for the strength of anti-Western propaganda in
Russian media which, as the previous sections showed, gets inten-
sified when Russia is in a face-off with the West. However, the out-
comes of the public opinion polls show that when Russia—West
relations were at ease (2009-2013), Belarusians tended to be more
supportive of European integration (See Figure 4). For example, in
the 2011 poll, half of the respondents said that they would vote for
accession to the EU in a hypothetical referendum posing the ei-
ther/or question between Russia and the European Union, while
only 31% chose unification with Russia.

Accession to the EU Integration with Russia

60,00%

50,00%

40,00%

30,00%

20,00%

10,00%

0,00%
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

Figure 4. Belarussian Public opinion on foreign policy (The question in the

surveys: “If you had to choose between integration with Russia and
joining the European Union, what choice would you make (For de-
tails, see the internet page of Independent Institute of Socio-Eco-
nomic and Political Studies: http://www.iiseps.org/?lang=en ? )
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 181

However, the public support to Belarus’s admission into the Trans-

atlantic bloc has been always low amongst Belarusians. A survey in
early the 2000s identified that NATO was considered “a significant
threat” by most of the Belarusian population. 47% of the respond-
ents defined NATO as either “a platform for Western expansion”
or “a relic of the Cold War”, while for 22% its objective was the
“strengthening of international security” and for 30% it was “hard”
to portray NATO’s aims (White et al. 2006: 179). The same survey
found that for just a minority in Belarus, the country’s admission
into NATO would be “very good” (6% in 2000; 5% in 2004) or “quite
good” (23% in 2000; 17% in 2004). A similar antipathy towards the
transatlantic bloc was also seen in a survey by Gallup which indi-
cated that 44% of respondents considered closer relations with Rus-
sia as important even if this entails harming relations with the
United States (Esipova et al. 2008).
This attitude towards NATO is still prevalent amongst Bela-
rusians. 54% of Belarusians considered NATO a threat in a Gallup
poll in 2016 (a mere 3% associated the alliance with protection)
(Smith 2017). This was the second highest such result in the former
Soviet countries after Russia, where 67% thought NATO was a
threat (ibid.). In June 2016, a public opinion poll in Belarus found
that 26,1% of respondents supported Russia’s actions in its confron-
tation with the West over Ukraine and believed that Russia would
protect Belarus “from possible NATO aggression” (IISEPS 2016).
The proportion of those who supported the West and trusted it as
a potential ally in the case of possible Russian aggression was sig-
nificantly lower: 10,6%. However, another major finding of this poll
was that for most Belarusians (58%), it is more important to main-
tain neutrality between the two geopolitical centres.
The growing preference for neutrality and for policies aimed
at maintaining national sovereignty rather than making a clear-cut
choice about the geopolitical poles amongst Belarusians has been
noticed also in IISEPS surveys. The 2015 survey concluded that
more people would vote “against” joining an external power in a
hypothetical referendum (IISEPS 2015). 19.8% of respondents
would vote “for” and 56.1% would vote “against” in a referendum
182 VASIF HUSEYNOV

on joining the European Union. The survey identified that a nega-

tive outcome would be produced also in a referendum on the uni-
fication of Belarus and Russia: 29.7% of respondents would vote
“for” and 51.5% of respondents would vote “against”. This signi-
fied a steady decline from back in 2002, when the ratio was 53,8%
to 26,3% in favour of unification with Russia (Ioffe 2013: 1268).
Thus, for most of the time during the period under study, par-
ticularly when Russia found itself in a face-off with the West, the
public support for pro-Russian alignment in the international
sphere prevailed in Belarus. This has forced even Western-sup-
ported oppositional candidates to refrain from publicly favouring
integration into Western blocs (Manaev 2006: 43). However, it does
not give sufficient evidence to designate pro-Russian sentiments as
the decisive factor in the foreign policy orientation of the country
(Clem 2011). Apparently, President Lukashenko can disregard pub-
lic opinion when he thinks it necessary. For example, during the
Georgia war and the Ukraine crisis, when public support for unifi-
cation with Russia outweighed public support for European inte-
gration (See Figure 4), Belarusian leaders in fact tried to counterbal-
ance Russia’s pressure and looked into opportunities to approach
the West. However, Belarusians’ pro-Russian sentiments and the
disinterest of the public towards pro-Western foreign policy
changes contributed to the failure of Western-supported political
groups’ attempts to topple the incumbent government. It is one of
the major factors that secures the persistence of a pro-Russian geo-
political alignment. A Belarusian political analyst argues that “Bel-
arusians’ addiction to Russian culture and media is in large part
responsible for the nation’s political dependence on Russia and the
geopolitical situation in Belarus” (Astapenia 2014).

Conclusion
This chapter tested the hypothesis that if states that are subject to a
geopolitical confrontation between external great powers, enjoy au-
tonomy from domestic non-state actors, they can control foreign at-
tempts to influence these non-state actors and augment their
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 183

chances to follow the imperatives of the international political sys-

tem more independently and potentially more prudently. The anal-
ysis of the chapter supported this hypothesis. During the period
under study (2004-2016), Belarus’s foreign policy was formed un-
der a vigilant consideration of the distribution of capabilities be-
tween the two geopolitical poles (i.e. the West and Russia). In this
period, the imperatives derived from the distribution of capabilities
between the two poles could easily transfer into certain state ac-
tions. The internal dynamics of the state did not pose a serious chal-
lenge for the government in foreign policy. The fact that the Russia-
leaning external orientation of the state corresponded to stronger,
pro-Russian sentiments amongst the Belarusian people minimized
the countervailing influence of the public as an intervening variable
between the international political system and foreign policy. The
relatively homogenous internal cultural environment, the absence
of antagonist ethnic divides within society, and weak non-govern-
mental groups are the major factors that removed internal non-state
actors as the intervening variable between the international politi-
cal system and foreign policy.
6. States with Relatively Weak State
Autonomy: The Case of Ukraine

This chapter, along with the preceding chapter, complements the

discussion provided in Chapters 3 and 4 which described the geo-
political nature of the Russia—West rivalries over the “common
neighbourhood” countries and the use of soft power by the conflict-
ing sides in the pursuit of their regional goals. The chapter, focusing
on the case of Ukraine, aims to portray the response of regional
countries to these rivalries and analyse the impact of the lack of
strong state autonomy on foreign policy. The chapter’s purpose is
to defend the argument that when leaders of states are not autono-
mous vis-à-vis domestic non-state actors, the latter become politi-
cally more influential with the potential of affecting foreign poli-
cies, mostly in a negative way. The non-existence of strong state au-
tonomy in such states allows the external powers to more effec-
tively pursue policies to wield soft power there. This gives external
powers the chance to impact the foreign policies of these states
through influencing their domestic non-state actors and push a fa-
vourable reconfiguration in their geopolitical orientation which
might be at odds with the national interests of the regional states.
In the wake of the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine
emerged as a geopolitical actor that had never existed before. For
the first time in history, Ukrainian leaders gained control over both
the Western and Eastern parts of the country, including the Cri-
mean Peninsula that had been part of Russia until recently (1954).
However, the leaders of the newly independent Ukraine soon
found themselves in the middle of an intense geopolitical competi-
tion between Russia and West. A large number of internal prob-
lems—inter alia the country’s political instability, the incapability of
the Ukrainian governments to properly deal with economic chal-
lenges, the uncontrollable influence of oligarchic groups on the po-
litical establishment and their influence in internal and external pol-
icies, the entrenched economic ties with and dependence on Russia,
and against this background an enormous cultural divide within

185
186 VASIF HUSEYNOV

society—dramatically complicated the political landscape of the

country.
From the Russian perspective, the geopolitical importance of
Ukraine is immeasurable. The “encroachment” of rival powers into
Ukraine has been always considered by the Kremlin as an existen-
tial threat. This is why, from the very beginning of the post-Soviet
era, Russia tried everything possible to keep Kiev in its orbit and
prevent its pro-Western aspirations. For this purpose, Moscow ap-
plied various strategies including sticks, carrots and soft power.
Along with pressuring Ukrainian leaders into staying away from
Euro-Atlantic organizations, the Kremlin maintained a compromis-
ing stance in bilateral deals. For example, Moscow put low prices
on energy exports to Ukraine: it has been estimated that between
1992 and 2008 Russia’s gas subsidies to Ukraine alone amounted to
$47 billion—out of the total $75 billion across the CIS countries
(Bochkarev 2009). Currently half of Ukrainians working abroad are
in Russia and the remittances sent by them back home is close to $4
billion—around half of the total remittances that Ukraine receives
annually (See IFAD 2015: 20; 31). For a country of which around 4%
of GDP is formed on the basis of money transfers by its citizens
working abroad, this is an important factor (Sakwa 2015: 77). The
economic interconnectedness between Ukraine and Russia and the
former’s energy dependence on the latter used to be a potential
source of practical leverage for the Kremlin to influence Ukrainian
leaders.
Ukraine is an important, if not the most important, country in
the coverage of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood policies. It is the
largest country whose territories are entirely located in Europe and
is one of the top European countries in terms of population size.
Hence, any serious turmoil in this country or its submission to Rus-
sian control has been considered as a potential threat to the EU’s
security. To counter this threat and promote the European integra-
tion of Ukraine has been a priority in Europe’s eastern neighbour-
hood policies for decades. Likewise, Ukraine is of a great geopolit-
ical importance for the United States. For American geopolitical
thinkers, Ukraine’s subordination to Russian control would lead to
Russia’s re-emergence as a Eurasian empire (Brzezinski 1994).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 187

Therefore, Ukraine has also been in the focus of American efforts to

prevent Russia’s alleged policies to “re-Sovietize” the region.
Under these circumstances, the multivectorial stance between
the West and Russia appeared as the most prudent option for
Ukrainian foreign policy. As presented in the theoretical frame-
work, neutrality (nonalignment) is seen in the realist school as the
most optimal strategy for weak states that are in between great
power rivalries (Labs 1992: 385). For example, Kissinger (2014), in
the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, rightfully argued that “Far too
often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether
Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and
thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it
should function as a bridge between them.” However, the growing
tensions between the West and Russia did not allow Ukrainian
leaders to maintain neutrality.
The relatively more democratic environment in Ukraine and
the restricted autonomy of Ukrainian leaders allowed Western
powers to reach out to sizeable, non-state groups in the country and
to affect the country’s foreign policies through influencing these
groups. Russia also invested largely in its counter-revolutionary
policies vis-à-vis Ukraine and sought to create politically active,
strong pro-Russian, non-state groups. The competition between the
two geopolitical centres (i.e. the West and Russia) over Ukraine
over the period under study (2004-2016) was largely of a soft power
nature and never evolved to a direct military confrontation though
it entailed economic warfare to some extent. This chapter is going
to pursue an in-depth analysis of the soft power confrontation be-
tween the West and Russia, the role of Ukrainian non-state groups
in this confrontation and their impact on the formulation of the
country’s geopolitical orientation.
This chapter replicates the structure of the previous chapter
on Belarus. It will discuss the role of domestic non-state actors in
shaping Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation and its interactions
with surrounding great powers. The geopolitical context in which
Ukraine has existed since the early years of its independence is to
be presented in the first section coming after this introductory part.
The following section will analyse the autonomy Ukrainian leaders
188 VASIF HUSEYNOV

have had with respect to the general public and other non-state ac-
tors since the country gained independence but particularly over
the years between 2004—2016. This section will be followed by a
wider discussion on the power the West and Russia have wielded
over popular opinion in Ukraine. The section is divided into two
parts, providing a separate take on Western and Russian soft
power. In the final section before the conclusion, the chapter will
explore the attitude of the Ukrainian people towards the two geo-
political poles (i.e. Russia and West) and the role they have played
in the formation of the country’s foreign policy orientation. The
concluding part will summarize the major findings of the chapter
in the light of the hypotheses presented in the beginning of the
book.

Ukraine Between the West and Russia

Ukraine, under the presidencies of Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994)
and Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004), balanced between the West and
Russia (Szeptycki 2014: 37, Fesenko 2015: 134-135; Wolczuk 2002).
For Ukrainian politicians in the 1990s, cooperation was more fa-
vourable than integration in relations with NATO, since integration
into the Alliance would have risked economic relations with Russia
and other CIS countries (White et al. 2006: 170). During the tenure
of President Kuchma, Ukraine—NATO relations gradually evolved
through Ukraine’s active participation in Partnership of Peace, the
establishment of the NATO—Ukraine Commission, the formation
of a Polish—Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion and its dispatch to
Kosovo, Ukraine’s support to the USA in the wake of 11 September
terror attacks, etc. In 2002, Kuchma even expressed Ukraine’s desire
to enter NATO. However, his administration did little to actually
join the alliance. Integration was considered a more permissible op-
tion in the case of non-military organizations, such as the European
Union and the World Trade Organization (ibid.). Membership into
the European community had remained a priority in foreign policy
ever since 1993, when the document “On the Key Directions of the
Foreign Policy of Ukraine” declared it as a priority (Domaradzki
2014: 278).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 189

After the presidential elections of 2004, the Western-sup-

ported popular uprising—known as the Orange Revolution—de-
feated political groups led by Viktor Yanukovych who was sup-
ported by Leonid Kuchma and Russia. The uprising led by young
movements and non-governmental organizations brought pro-
Western political elite led by Viktor Yushchenko to power. It was a
turning point in the history of the country. For the new govern-
ment, EU and NATO membership was a primary objective in for-
eign policy. Yushchenko launched formal governmental prepara-
tion for Ukraine’s entry into NATO and accelerated reforms with
the hope of receiving the Membership Action Plan (MAP) from the
alliance. Despite the fact that societal support to NATO member-
ship was rather low (less than 20%), in January 2008, the Orange
elite asked NATO to give the MAP to Ukraine at the Bucharest sum-
mit later that year (Samokhvalov 2015: 1383).
However, Yushchenko’s pro-Western course failed to realize
the expectations of the Orange Revolution in domestic politics
(Kuzio 2011). The new government did not end the influence of the
oligarchic groups on Ukrainian politics and against this back-
ground the popularity of President Yushchenko plummeted to 4%
towards the end of his term (Wapinski 2014: 59). The disillusion-
ment of the Ukrainian people with the Orange government resulted
in an electoral loss for Yushchenko in the 2010 presidential elections
which was won by Viktor Yanukovych (Åslund 2015: 80). During
the presidency of Yanukovych, the country returned to a multi-vec-
tor foreign policy. In 2010, Ukraine’s new Law on Foreign and Do-
mestic Policy adopted a non-aligned status in the international
sphere, prohibited the country’s participation in military blocs, and
thus ruled out accession into the transatlantic alliance. This was a
fundamental change to the 2003 Law on Fundamentals of National
Security which had declared NATO membership as the country’s
foreign policy goal. The new law named both Russia and the Euro-
pean Union as Ukraine’s strategic partners and underscored coop-
eration with each of them as the country’s foreign policy priority.
In his article for the Wall Street Journal, Yanukovych (2010), just
after his victory in the 2010 presidential elections, highlighted the
importance of the “non-bloc” status:
190 VASIF HUSEYNOV

“Ukraine should make use of its geopolitical advantages and become a

bridge between Russia and the West. Developing a good relationship with
the West and bridging the gap to Russia will help Ukraine. We should not
be forced to make [a] false choice between the benefits of the East and those
of the West” (See Yanukovych 2010).

However, EU membership remained a main foreign policy

goal in the new law as well. The law also recognized the necessity
for reforms in the Ukrainian legislation to bring it into accord with
the EU’s acquis communautaire.
During Yanukovych’s presidency, relations with Russia re-
turned to a friendlier path. One of the most contentious issues in
the bilateral relations—the extension of the deployment of the Black
Sea Fleet—was resolved. In exchange for a $100 discount on the im-
port of Russian gas, Kiev extended the lease on the naval facilities
in Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet beyond 2017
until 2042 (Shapovalova 2014: 252). This extension was another
move that was to complicate Ukraine’s NATO admission, as this de-
facto limited Ukraine’s sovereignty over some parts of its interna-
tionally recognized territories (Shapovalova 2014: 252).
Although many critics used to portray Yanukovych as a Rus-
sian puppet, there is little evidence to defend this speculation (Götz
2015: 4). Yanukovych’s foreign policy strategy was in fact similar to
Lukashenko’s: like his Belarusian counterpart, in pursuing a prag-
matic foreign policy, Yanukovych tried to play the West and Russia
against each other and to extract economic benefits from the geopo-
litical importance of Ukraine’s location (Samokhvalov 2015: 1379-
1380). The attitude of the Russian leaders to him was not different
from their attitude to Lukashenko. For the Kremlin, Yanukovych
was the lesser of two evils. US embassy cables released by Wik-
ileaks revealed that Putin, as a matter of fact, “hated” him (Götz
2015: 5). However, compared with Lukashenko, Yanukovych and
his cabinet members were more suspicious of Russia’s Customs
Union project. Yanukovych sought alternative sources of energy to
reduce Ukraine’s gas dependence on Russia, thus hoping to offset
Russian pressure and to bypass its integration projects (Fesenko
2015: 137; Samokhvalov 2015: 1379-1380; Åslund 2015: 92-95).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 191

On the other hand, he continued cooperation with the EU, el-

evated the status of the Ukrainian Ambassador to the EU to the
level of a State Representative, and seriously approached the adop-
tion of EU technical norms (Samokhvalov 2015: 1380). Under his
presidency, Ukraine finalized the negotiations on the Association
Agreement and DCFTA with the European Union and initialled
them. For several months before the Vilnius summit, his govern-
ment “carried out an information and propaganda campaign for a
closer association with the EU in Ukraine” (Savin 2014: 7). Although
no immediate considerable economic benefits were expected from
these agreements, it was widely believed that the agreements
would allow Ukraine to gradually evolve in political, legal and so-
cio-economic standards to the European level (Åslund 2013; 2015:
46-47). Ukraine’s entry into the Customs Union with Russia, Bela-
rus and Kazakhstan, on the contrary, promised no comparable de-
velopment in the situation of the rule of law and human rights.
In terms of the economic benefits of the two integration op-
tions, pro-Western groups had estimated that the AA and DCFTA
would help the Ukraine economy grow more than 10% in the long
run, while joining the Customs Union would reduce Ukraine’s wel-
fare by almost 4% in the long run (Movchan et al. 2011: 11). The pro-
Russian groups, on the contrary, argued that the DCFTA with the
European Union would cause a 1.5% reduction in Ukraine’s base-
line GDP” (Ivanter et al. 2012: 40). According to them, “Over the
period of 2011-2030, the total cumulative effect of the creation of the
SES [Single Economic Space] and Ukraine joining it on the four
countries can reach $1.1 trillion in 2010 prices....” (Ivanter et al. 2012:
41). However, the methodology of the analysis of the pro-Russian
groups is highly disputed (Åslund 2015: 48).
Yanukovych’s Ukraine made a number of offers to Russia (e.g.
exclusive rights to Russian Gazprom and an alternative 3+1 for-
mula in cooperation with the Customs Union, which meant main-
taining special status, but not membership, within the organization
of Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus) to assuage Moscow’s concerns
192 VASIF HUSEYNOV

about the Association Agreement and DFCTA with the EU. This at-
tempt did not suffice to assuage Moscow’s geopolitical fears. Russia
was pressing hard to prevent Yanukovych from signing the Asso-
ciation Agreement with the EU. Moscow both threatened Kiev with
damaging consequences for Ukraine’s economic and political fu-
ture (e.g. abolition of preferential trade agreements and imposing
stringent customs and sanitary controls on imports from Ukraine)
and offered huge amounts of loans, subsidies, and discounts on en-
ergy imports in return for its retreat from the deal. This pressure,
along with deteriorating internal economic and financial situation,
forced the Ukrainian president to withdraw from the EU agree-
ments before the EaP Vilnius summit (Fesenko 2015: 137-138). In-
stead, he signed the so-called Moscow agreements with Russia, ac-
cording to which the Kremlin agreed to provide Ukraine with $15
billion in financial aid and a 30% discount in natural gas supplies
(Fesenko 2015: 138). However, although the agreement was likely
to increase Russia’s influence on Ukrainian politics, it was not an
accession agreement to the Customs Union and the Yanukovych
government did not take on such an obligation for the future.
The internal non-state actors, however, did not allow Yanu-
kovych to implement his decision. Protesting the volte-face of the
Yanukovych administration, pro-Western political groups and or-
dinary citizens marched to the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence
Square) in central Kiev—or Euromaidan, as it later came to be
known because of the pro-EU protests. US and European leaders
rejected Yanukovych’s offer to hold trilateral negotiations between
the EU, Russia and Ukraine on integration issues (RFE/RL 2017a).
Seizing the opportunity created by anti-governmental upheaval,
they decided to finally pull Ukraine into West’s orbit. US Senator
John McCain, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eur-
asian Affairs at the United States Department of State Victoria Nu-
land and many other European and American officials met the de-
monstrators and encouraged them to stand firmly for their ideals.
McCain’s address to the protesters declaring “We are here to sup-
port your just cause” (Guardian 2013) and Nuland’s meeting with
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 193

them at Maidan are a few examples that demonstrated the ex-

tremely concentrated engagement of the United States in the pro-
cess. These Western politicians could never have had this chance to
support anti-governmental demonstrations so overtly in
Lukashenko’s Belarus. From the very beginning of Euromaidan,
these politicians openly stood with protestors and encouraged
them to fight for their cause despite the Ukrainian authorities. For
example, the address of one of the first EU politicians who travelled
to Ukraine to speak to protestors at the beginning of Euromaidan
in late November 2013, Polish MEP Pawel Kowal, the head of Par-
liamentary Delegation on Co-operation with Ukraine, deserves to
be quoted here:

“I could not just sit there, in Brussels, and watch you freeze on this square. I
came so that the whole of Europe could see and pay attention to what is
happening here. They will ask me why you are here. I think it is because you
want to be able, just like every Polish, German or French person, to decide
about your future. I would like them in Brussels to know that you, young
people, are here for the sake of your country […]. Standing here, you are
opening the European gates for Ukraine!” (cited in Przelomiec 2014: 300).

These actions of the Western politicians have been character-

ized by some experts as a crude violation of international law and
a form of interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. For example,
Rein Müllerson (2014: 135), President of Tallinn Law School, at Es-
tonia’s Tallinn University, in his article titled Ukraine: Victim of Ge-
opolitics, fleshed out that:

“…[I]t was the representatives of Western states who completely ignored

one of the cornerstone principles of international law—the non-interference
in the internal affairs of other states. Such unconditional support of the op-
position not only constituted a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of
Ukraine but it also raised expectations and made uncompromising revolu-
tionaries even more intransigent.”

Truly, the Euromaidan protestors were seriously emboldened

by and became more determined thanks to the clear support of the
European Union and United States. In February 2014, they finally
194 VASIF HUSEYNOV

toppled President Yanukovych through an unconstitutional14 over-

throw; and Western-supported15 politicians came to power in
Ukraine. Following Yanukovych’s fall, the Kremlin realized that it
would lose Ukraine to NATO unless it intervened immediately and
unwaveringly. Therefore, regardless of all the risks, Moscow
adopted the decision to occupy Crimea and instigate separatism in
Eastern Ukraine. Only an intervention on this scale would suffice
to deal a crushing blow to Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic prospects.
Thus, Ukraine became a victim of geopolitical rivalries (Mül-
lerson 2014). Its democratically elected leader Yanukovych fell prey
to these rivalries that pushed him to the either/or choice between
Russia and the West. On one side, the Western fear of and distrust
in the resurgence of Russia as a strong regional power had gener-
ated in the Western capitals a desire to tear away Ukraine from Rus-
sia’s sphere of influence and thus to undermine its projects to re-
integrate the post-Soviet countries. Russia’s determination to push
back against such expansion of Western military and political struc-
tures and reinstate control over its immediate neighbourhood
brought it into a stand-off with the West over Ukraine. On the other
side, as expected by neoclassical realism, the internal factors (i.e. the
general public and non-governmental organizations) played a cru-
cial role in the formation of the state’s external alignment along
with international pressure. The intervening influence of domestic

14 As a matter of fact, Euromaidan supporters argue that the removal of President

Yanukovych from his office was consistent with the norms of the Ukrainian
constitution, particularly because, in their opinion, “the change took place in an
extraordinary situation” (Musiyaka 2014). However, the four circumstances in
which, according to the constitution, the president may cease to exercise his
power were not present before Yanukovych’s removal from the presidency: (1)
resignation, (2) inability to exercise his or her powers for reasons of health, (3)
removal from office by the procedure of impeachment, (4) death (Morrison
2014).
15 The role of the United States in the formation of the post-Yanukovych govern-
ment “became embarrassingly clear” in a leaked telephone conversation be-
tween Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland and US ambassador to Ukraine,
Geoffrey Pyatt (Sparrow 2014: 328). On the phone, the two American politicians
assessed the skills of the Ukrainian opposition leaders to lead the government
(See BBC 2014),
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 195

non-state players empowered by Western forces made Yanu-

kovych’s decision to retain neutrality a political suicide for him.
Thus, the pressure derived from confrontation between the great
powers and intensified by the intervening influence of domestic
non-state groups did not allow Kiev to maintain its geopolitical
neutrality which leading geopolitical minds considered the best op-
tion for Ukraine (Kissinger 2014; Mearsheimer 2014).
The Euromaidan revolution and its aftermath costed Ukraini-
ans a dramatic economic breakdown, political turmoil and territo-
rial losses. Ukrainian sources evaluated the economic damages in-
curred due to the occupation of Crimea to be $40 billion in the losses
of oil and gas reserves in the Black Sea and $90 billion in other losses
(Shapovalova 2014: 264). Donetsk and Lugansk—the two Ukrainian
regions that have been under the control of Russia-supported sep-
aratists since 2014—had contributed to well-nigh 16% of the
Ukrainian GDP until the secessionist war broke out (Poluneev
2014). These losses are still growing. For example, government es-
timates show that Russia’s move to deviate the route of its gas ex-
ports from the pipelines going through the territories of Ukraine
will cost Ukraine a 10% loss in its annual budget (Rapoza 2017). On
the other hand, contrary to the optimistic prognoses of observers
back in early 2014, Yanukovych’s departure did not change Ukraine
substantially and did not trigger tangible economic progress and
democratic political reforms.
However, in the wake of Yanukovych’s overthrow, Ukraine
massively intensified its relations with Western powers. An Asso-
ciation Agreement and DCFTA were signed shortly after Yanu-
kovych’s departure. The country has already launched the imple-
mentation of these agreements. The volume of trade with the EU
currently accounts for 40% of Ukraine’s foreign trade, while the
share of Russia has dropped from 27.3% to 11.5% over the last three
years since early 2014 (See lb.ua 2017). Ukraine obtained a visa-free
regime with the EU which would certainly increase the integration
of Ukrainian society into the European community. The range of
integration with the West expands beyond the borders of the Eu-
rope: in 2016, Kiev signed a free trade agreement with Canada
196 VASIF HUSEYNOV

(CUFTA). In the same year of Yanukovych’s fall, the Ukrainian par-

liament revoked the law on neutrality and declared the country’s
goal to be NATO membership. A state programme for the adoption
of NATO standards by the Armed Forces of Ukraine by 2020 has
been accepted and is being implemented (See Interfax-Ukraine
2017). On the other hand, the gap between Russia and Ukraine is
increasingly widening. The post-Euromaidan government took a
series of actions in order to accelerate this process and minimize
Russian cultural influence on Ukraine. Towards this end, the gov-
ernment-imposed restrictions on Russian language textbooks, Rus-
sian media, Russian language, Russian symbols and the promotion
of Soviet heritage.

State Autonomy Vis-à-vis Non-State Actors

The autonomy of the state vis-à-vis society in Ukraine has never
been as strong as it has been in Belarus. The economic challenges
that independence brought about, the existence of influential and
politically active oligarchic groups and the ethnic composition and
social characteristics of the state have played a decisive role in the
failure of Ukrainian state leaders to consolidate power entirely in
their own hands. The revolutionary or anarchist attitude of many
Ukrainians towards state authorities has also been an influential
factor in curbing the power of their leaders and preventing them
from using force to protect their regimes (Chernega 2015). The an-
nual approval ratings of Ukrainian leaders since the Orange Revo-
lution indicate that, although the leaders are usually elected with
some expectations and hope, they fail to live up to those expecta-
tions and the people withdraw their support en masse and rapidly
(Table 3). Despite the fact that there have been consistent attempts
by the state to limit the influence of non-state actors, neither have
these attempts evolved to massive repression campaigns against in-
dependent voices nor were they sufficient to totally counterbalance
them. This section will briefly discuss the form of interaction be-
tween the Ukrainian state and non-state actors and the scope of the
latter to influence the policies of the former.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 197

The collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed the ambitions of

Ukrainian businessmen to accumulate their wealth and expand
their influence. The post-Soviet political history of the country is
inherently related to the internal conflicts between these business-
men who are known as oligarchs, due to their involvement in poli-
tics. Most of the influential non-state actors, particularly non-gov-
ernmental organizations and media channels, have been founded
or are supported by oligarchic groups as part of their strategy to
exert pressure on the internal and external policies of the state. Alt-
hough President Kuchma was rather repressive towards non-state
actors, he failed to entirely eradicate their influence on government.
The crackdown on media during his presidency included attacks
on or the murder of journalists, imposing censorship and specifying
what could be covered, reducing access to Radio Liberty’s Ukrain-
ian service and other Western radio broadcasts, etc. (Bunce et al.
2011: 120). However, Kuchma was not able to silence opposing
voices across the country. His power was structurally constrained
by the relatively influential authority of the parliament and the op-
positional forces that had, though limited, still some access to the
media (ibid.).
There were around 40,000 registered non-governmental insti-
tutions in the country in early 2003 (Puglisi 2015: 4). Almost one
tenth of them were active and functional (ibid.). Despite these high
figures, prior to the Orange Revolution Ukrainian civil society had
a long range of problems, particularly a lack of sufficient funding
and a low level of public participation (Stepanenko 2006). In those
years, state funding of civil society organizations was insufficient,
complicated and non-transparent. Consequently, only a few organ-
izations could receive it. For example, around half of the direct
budget funding of CSOs was allotted only to eight organizations
(Ghosh 2014: 7). Therefore, most of the CSOs were dependent on
external funding (ibid.: 7-10). However, thanks to the existence of a
relatively more liberal environment many civic organizations were
still in operation. They cooperated within small coalitions, such as
the Freedom of Choice Coalition, “Ukraine without Kuchma”,
“Rise, Ukraine”, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, etc.
198 VASIF HUSEYNOV

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

President V. 17 7
Yushchenko

President V. 46 29 28 28
Yanukovych

President P. 47 17 6.4
Poroshenko

Table 3. Job Approval of Ukrainian presidents (percentage) 16

Thus, the relatively larger scope of the media and a stronger civil
society were one of the most important factors that facilitated the
emergence of a social upheaval protesting election fraud in 2004
which went down in history as “Orange Revolution”. Assessing the
political opportunities for a social movement prior to these events,
Abel Polese (2009: 257) points out that:

“[There] were many [political opportunities] ranged from a united and

growing opposition to the pressure of international attention towards the
country, through the organization of a protest network that was close to per-
fection, to the existence of an increasingly divided regime.”

The Orange Revolution took place in such a political environ-

ment. The revolution, led by non-governmental organizations, par-
ticularly a civic campaign called PORA (in Ukrainian: It’s Time)
that included hundreds of NGOs, empowered the potential of civil
society in Ukraine and generated a favourable environment for
non-state actors to directly influence the policies of their leaders.
There were also consistent legislative improvements on the Law on
Civic Associations in this period: each year throughout 2005-2009,
progressive amendments were adopted on the Law (Ghosh 2014:

16 The figures for the period between 2008-2015 have been retrieved from Gallup’s
official website (See Ray 2015). 2016’s figures are from the official website of
Rating Group Ukraine—Ratinggroup.ua.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 199

3). Some ministries founded public councils dealing with civil soci-
ety organizations and holding policy dialogues (ibid.). A 2014 study
supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung notes that:

“The number and variety, levels of registration and scope of activities in civil
society and the free media in Ukraine made them among the most vibrant
and diverse in the former Soviet Union countries (Ghosh 2014: 3).

In the wake of these developments, the democratic environ-

ment of the country experienced some progress which was re-
flected in the assessment of Freedom House that upgraded the sta-
tus of Ukraine to “free” in 2006, for the first time (See Freedom
House 2006). However, the advent of Yanukovych’s presidency
negatively affected this process. President Yanukovych did in fact
consolidate power largely in the hands of his family and close asso-
ciates to an extent previously unaccomplished by any other Ukrain-
ian president (Åslund 2015: 82). He initiated a constitutional
amendment, expanded the presidential powers, and consequently
got the de-facto chance to rule over all the executive, legislative and
judicial institutions of the country (ibid.). Due to his undemocratic
policies, crackdown on opposition, non-governmental institutions
and media, Freedom House downgraded the score of Ukraine to
“partly free” in 2011 (See Freedom House 2011). The country’s
press freedom was also downgraded by various international or-
ganizations, such as Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, Re-
porters without Borders, etc. (Bachmann et al. 2014: 352-353; Åslund
2015: 82).
The circumscription of political liberties and the growing au-
thoritarian tendencies of the political leadership generated popular
discontent with the Yanukovych administration (Solonenko 2014:
224-228). Deteriorating economic conditions in the country, on the
other hand, further decreased the popularity of his government.
Similar to the situation before the Orange Revolution—when, alt-
hough the state had managed some economic growth (5.2% in 2002
and by 9.6% in 2003), it failed to generate noteworthy improvement
in the living standards of the majority (Bunce et al. 2011: 118)—
Ukrainians under the rule of Yanukovych struggled with substan-
tial economic challenges. The economic situation was one of the
200 VASIF HUSEYNOV

most important factors that increased the vulnerability of the gov-

ernments prior to both revolutions. Klaus Bachmann (2014: 424) has
rightfully counted the economic challenges as a cause of the anti-
governmental upheaval in the wake of Yanukovych’s decision not
to sign the Association Agreement with the EU:

“[Yanukovych’s volte-face prior to the Vilnius summit of the EaP] was a trig-
ger, but not the only cause of the protests. During the last years of Yanu-
kovych’s rule, Ukrainians had observed a steady decline of their economy,
with rising unemployment, shrinking foreign currency reserves, high infla-
tion and decreasing foreign direct investment...”

Yanukovych, although had attempted on many occasions,

failed to establish complete control over non-state actors and media
(Szostek 2014: 467). The public effect of the independent news out-
lets (e.g. Ukrainskaya pravda, Weekly Mirror), television channels
(e.g. Channel 5, 1+1 and ICTV owned by businessmen Petro Pro-
shenko, Ihor Kolomoisky, and Victor Pinchuk, respectively), online
media services, internet-based TV channels (e.g. Hromadske.TV
and Espreso.TV) and social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc.) can-
not be underestimated (Åslund 2015: 103-104). A public opinion
poll revealed that the “vast majority” of the people who watched
non-partisan television channels were more likely to support the
Euromaidan (Bachmann et al. 2014: 360). The growing access to the
internet amongst the Ukrainian population affected the wider dis-
semination of information: 46% of the whole adult population aged
over 16 had internet access in 2013 while only 15% had it in 2008
(Bachmann et al. 2014: 353). The existence of independent television
channels was, however, much more crucial, as for around 90% of
the population local TV was the main source of political infor-
mation (Szostek 2014: 467; Bachmann et al. 2014: 352) (Table 4).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 201

Whole Population

Ukrainian TV 90,5

Russian TV 22,7

Western (American, European 2,9

TV)

Radio 28,9

National newspapers 20,1

Local newspapers 36,7

Magazines 2,5

Websites (news, political analy- 21,0

sis)

Social networking sites 5,7

Internet TV & Internet radio 3,4

Other 2,0

Hard to say 0,6

Table 4. The main sources of political information for Ukrainians in 2013
(percentage) (The table is retrieved from Bachmann et al. 2014:
352).
This environment was also favourable for the solid growth of civil
society between 2004-2014. Freedom House recorded an improve-
ment in the rating of Ukrainian civil society’s performance from
3.00 in 2005 to 2.50 in 2014 (See Freedom House 2014). Tellingly, the
crackdown on anti-governmental forces in Ukraine under Yanu-
kovych never evolved to the scale it was observed in the fully au-
thoritarian states. Solonenko (2014: 220-221) reports that:
202 VASIF HUSEYNOV

“Since the Orange Revolution, there has been a steady increase in officially
registered civil society organizations (CSOs) in Ukraine. By 2014 there were
already 75,41417 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), known officially
as ‘civic organizations’, as well as 28,851 trade unions, 15,904 associations of
co-owners of multiple-family dwellings, 15,708 ‘charitable foundations or
organizations’, 1,369 self-organized territorial communities, and 276 profes-
sional organizations.”

On 16 January 2014, during the Euromaidan protests, Yanu-

kovych forced the parliament to adopt a list of laws to restrict the
influence of anti-government protestors. These laws required exter-
nally funded non-governmental organizations to be registered as
“foreign agents”, put massive restrictions on the internet and anti-
government protests, etc. (Wilson 2014: 81-82). However, by the
end of January, Yanukovych had to repeal most of these laws. Thus,
his power to fight back against the forces who opposed him was
structurally limited. Although the sniper shootings against the pro-
testors were attributed to him, a wide range of sources and revela-
tions disputed this claim (Sakwa 2015: 81-100). Later Yanukovych
counted his restrained reaction as “the most important” mistake he
made prior to his ouster: “I made a number of mistakes, and the
most important one was that I wasn’t able to force myself to bring
troops and impose martial law in Ukraine, this being the only way
to stop the radicals. I didn’t opt for bloodshed.” Retrospectively,
some analysts consider the “inadequate response” of the Yanu-
kovych administration to the Euromaidan upheaval as a more de-
termining reason for the eventual fall of his government rather than
“support for European integration, continued police brutality, or
the size of the protest movement” (Peisakhin 2014).

Non-State Actors under the Influence of External

Powers
Ukraine, as the “biggest prize” (Gershman 2013) in Russia—West
rivalries over the “common neighbourhood”, has attracted a vast

17 Solonenko (2014: 220-221) later notes that not all of the officially registered non-
governmental organizations were active. She, referring to Ukrainian experts,
points out that only some 3,000-4,000 of them were operating, the rest existed
only nominally.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 203

amount of soft power investment from the two geopolitical foes

since the very beginning of the post-Soviet period. The two great
powers have strived to influence the political processes in Ukraine
through influencing the minds and feelings of the Ukrainians via
media, non-governmental organizations, exchange programs, etc.
The following two sub-sections will briefly explore the soft power
of the West and Russia over Ukrainian society and their policies to
wield this power.

Non-State Actors under the Influence of Russian Soft

Power
Ukraine is inherently connected to Russia through linguistic, reli-
gious, historical, cultural, ethnic and economic bonds. The long
years of common existence within the same country have made
these bonds distinctively strong and enduring. It has provided Rus-
sia with various assets to be used to affect the internal affairs of
Ukraine through influencing the minds and feelings of the Ukrain-
ian people. According to the only census carried out in the inde-
pendence period (2001), 17,3% of the Ukrainian population were
ethnic Russians and 80% had fluency in Russian (Marples 2015: 9)
(See State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2001). Russian is the first
language for more than a quarter of the Ukrainian people (See
Lenta.ru 2007).
Most of the ethnic Russians living in the Eastern part of the
country have demonstrated a strong tendency to support pro-Rus-
sian candidates in nationwide elections (Marples 2015: 9). On the
contrary, the Western territories, which had been under Poland or
Austria-Hungary dominance up until World War II, have an
equally strong tendency to support Euro-Atlantic integration of the
country and politicians who are on a pro-Western track. Beissinger
(2014) has found that “Orange revolutionaries were more than
eight times more likely to be from Western Ukraine… [and] 92 per-
cent of… [them] claimed Ukrainian as their native language.” The
Westerners, of which 80% supported the anti-Yanukovych protests
while only 30% of Easterners did so, constituted also the majority
both in the Orange and Euromaidan revolutions (Andreyev 2014;
204 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Petro 2014). Eastern regions differed from the Western part also in
their judgement of the post-Yanukovych bloodshed in eastern
Ukraine: in a survey asking respondents who they found responsi-
ble for the bloodshed in the east of the country, only 19,1% of East-
erners found Russia responsible, while for 81,6% of Westerners
Russia was the aggressor to be blamed (Petro 2015: 28).
From the disintegration of the Soviet Union up until the Or-
ange Revolution, Russia did not have a substantial pro-Russian
NGO network in Ukraine, and instead built ties with Ukrainian
elites. As its governmental support to Viktor Yanukovych failed to
reach its goals in the 2004 presidential elections and Western-sup-
ported non-governmental institutions played a decisive role in this
process, the Russian leaders realized the importance of these insti-
tutions and interactions with ordinary people. The Russian political
elite and expert community widely related Russia’s failure to its
negligence of civil society as an influential tool. Gleb Pavlovsky, a
Kremlin political consultant, who had been dispatched to Kiev to
assist Yanukovych in electoral processes, regretted the fact that:
“during the electoral campaign in Ukraine there was an underesti-
mation [by Russia] and a low level of cooperation between Russian
society and Ukrainian NGOs. We will try to avoid such an under-
estimation in the future” (Socor 2005).
Soon after the Orange Revolution, the number of such organ-
izations founded and supported by Russia started to rise. In the
years before the Euromaidan, the Kremlin had already formed con-
nections with a large number of NGOs in Ukraine. For example, the
“Russian-speaking Ukraine” organization, under whose umbrella
120 civic organizations and 10,000 members come together, had
been supported by Russian foundations such as Russkiy Mir, the
Gorchakov Foundation and the Moscow House of Compatriots
World Foundation (Lutsevych 2016: 15). “Ukrainian Choice” (in
Ukrainian: “Ukrayinsʹkyy vybir”) was another popular pro-Rus-
sian civil society organization which opposed European integration
and advocated for closer relations between Ukraine and Russia.
The organization was established in 2012 by business tycoon and
former lawmaker Viktor Medvedchuk who has close personal ties
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 205

to the Russian political elite and President Putin. It organised regu-

lar demonstrations and posted billboards protesting the Associa-
tion Agreement. In parallel with the mainstream Kremlin narrative,
they equate closer relations with the EU to the adoption of same-
sex marriage and warn against dramatic economic repercussions of
signing trade deals with Europe.
Russia-supported non-governmental organizations and polit-
ical parties were more active in Crimea. Political parties (e.g.
“Russkiy Blok” (Russian Block), “Russkoe Edinstvo” (Russian
Unity), “Soyuz” (Union), and Rus’ Edinaya” (Russia United)),
NGOs (e.g. Russkaya Obschina Kryma” (Russian Community of
Crimea), “Russkaya Obschina Sevastopolya” (Russ Community of
Sevastopol), Narodny Front “Sevastopol’-Krym-Rossiya” (Popular
Front “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia”)), Cossack organizations (e.g.
Ob’edineniye Kozakov Kryma (Crimea Cossack Union) and Cher-
nomorskaya Kazachya Sotnya (Black Sea Cossack Sotnia)), and Co-
alitions of pro-Russian organizations (e.g. Sevastopol “Front pro-
tiv NATO” (Front against NATO)) helped Russia to sustain and re-
inforce pro-Russian sentiments amongst Crimeans and eventually
to annex the region without shooting a single bullet (Bjorn 2014).
However, arguably the most active and influential non-gov-
ernmental organization in Russia’s soft power arsenal concerning
Ukraine has been the Russian Orthodox Church. The fact that the
majority of the people in both countries believe in Orthodox Chris-
tianity and that Ukrainians trust churches (60-70%) more than any
other institution (Kochan 2016: 105) have helped post-Soviet Russia
to deploy religion as a tool in its foreign policy vis-à-vis Ukraine.
Before the annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainian branch of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church (ROC)—the largest religious confession in
Ukraine—has had more or less equal popular support amongst the
Orthodox believers in Western (19.8%) and Eastern (24,2%) parts of
Ukraine (Suslov 2016: 135). The ROC has invariably considered
Ukraine a major part of the Russkii Mir and generously invested to
wield influence on Ukraine’s religious discourse and to maintain a
“special relationship” with Ukraine (Suslov 2016: 133). Although
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-
206 VASIF HUSEYNOV

MP) has financial and administrative independence from the Mos-

cow Patriarchate, the latter has not granted autocephaly to the for-
mer. The Moscow Patriarchate maintains symbolic superiority over
the UOC-MP: according to the UOC-MP Statute, “the patriarch
blesses every new head of the UOC-MP, the patriarch’s name is
mentioned first in all church services, and the UOC-MP maintains
contacts with other Orthodox Churches through the ROC” (Suslov
2016: 134). The UOC-MP also has stronger institutional capacity
than its main rival, the anti-Russian Ukrainian Orthodox Church
Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP): approximately 40% of the 34,000 reli-
gious institutions in the country belong to UOC-MP, while the
UOC-KP holds only about 15% of them (Suslov 2016: 136).
Even during the times when the relationship between the two
countries was at its worst, the ROC avoided politicizing its role and
tried to maintain “spiritual unity” of the Russian World (See TASS
2014). The ROC often addressed the Ukrainian people, defended
the importance of the brotherly ties on the religious grounds and
prayed for the peaceful resolution of the disputes between the gov-
ernments of the two nations. Likewise, the UOC-MP used to advo-
cate closer relations between Ukraine and Russia and supported
pro-Russian politicians and presidential candidates. For instance,
prior to the 2004 presidential elections, Volodymyr Sabodan, Met-
ropolitan of Kyiv took part in Russia-supported candidate Yanu-
kovych’s electoral campaigns and gave his blessings to him in the
elections (Gretskiy 2007: 8).
However, this religious affinity did not inhibit numerous
members of the UOC-MP from taking part in Euromaidan (Kraw-
chuk 2016: 175). Most of the UOC-MP synod and church members
condemned the “the criminal actions of the government” for com-
mitting bloodshed during the protests, refused to take a pro-Rus-
sian position, and declared their support for European values and
Ukraine’s territorial integrity (Krawchuk 2016: 182). Although there
were many priests in Donbass and some Eastern regions who sup-
ported the separatists, none of the bishops of the Church “dared to
openly support Russian aggression on Ukraine” (Olszański 2014).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 207

As a matter of fact, there are substantial groups within the UOC-

MP, particularly amongst the younger hierarchs, who support gain-
ing full canonical independence from Moscow and European inte-
gration (Olszański 2014).
In general, Crimea’s annexation and Russia’s support to sepa-
ratist groups in Eastern Ukraine weakened the popular support for
the ROC and its Ukrainian branch (Olszański 2014; Suslov 2016).
Olszański (2014) mentions that growing anti-Russian sentiments
amongst the members and parish clergy and the fact that some of
them have left the UOC-MP to join the Kiev Patriarchate and many
others want to do so “will force the UOC to identify itself increas-
ingly strongly with the Ukrainian state and nation.”
Russia is one of the most popular destinations for Ukrainian
students who go abroad to study. In 2015, approximately 16 thou-
sand students from Ukraine were enrolled in Russian universities
(Semonov 2016). The Russian authorities claim that more than 75%
of these students choose to remain in Russia following their gradu-
ation (ibid.). Apart from that, millions of students used to study in
Russian at Ukrainian schools: In Ukraine at the time of the collapse
of the Soviet Union, there were 4633 Russian schools where more
than 3 million pupils were studying (ibid.). Over the years since
then there has been a drastic decline in these numbers. In 2011, only
1149 of these schools remained in operation (ibid.). The number of
pupils also dramatically decreased to below 700,000 (ibid.). In 20
years following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the propor-
tion of pupils studying in Ukrainian increased from less than 50%
to 83% (See Polit.ru 2010). The Russian government could not take
any effective counter measures to prevent or reverse this trend.
As it happened in the case of non-governmental organiza-
tions, Russia came to understand the importance of educational
programmes in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution. In 2007,
Russia started an exchange programme for international students,
including Ukrainian students. The program covered the costs of
study for a certain number of Ukrainians (less than 100 students per
208 VASIF HUSEYNOV

a year)18 at Russian higher education institutions (Semonov 2016).

In the same year, it also opened the first cultural centre of Ros-
sotrudnichestvo in Kiev. However, compared to scholarly ex-
change programmes of Western countries in Ukraine, Russia’s pro-
grammes were rather belated and provided limited opportunities.
For example, the United States had already started an exchange
programme addressing post-Soviet countries in 1993 and thou-
sands of Ukrainians have obtained the support to study in the USA
since then. Likewise, the educational channels of Western countries
had been operating in Ukraine long years before Russia opened the
first Rossotrudnichestvo centre in Kiev: the Ukrainian offices of the
British Council (1992), the Goethe Institute (1993), and the French
Institute (1994) had been in Ukraine since the first years of
Ukraine’s independence (ibid.).
In the post-Soviet period, the Russian media has experienced
a steady decline in its reputation amongst Ukrainians. Several sur-
veys conducted by Razumkov institute between 1999-2013 con-
cluded that the majority of the population in Ukraine found Rus-
sian media untrustworthy and biased (Petro 2015: 38). Neverthe-
less, both Russian TV channels and newspapers are amongst the
most watched and read in Ukraine. For example, in 2011, the three
biggest Russian state-controlled TV channels, Pervyy Kanal, RTR
Planeta and NTV Mir weekly reached out to 32.8%, 24.9% and 19.8%
of the Ukrainian population, respectively (Szostek 2014: 468). Simi-
larly, Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine and Argumenty i Fakty v
Ukraine—Ukrainian editions of Moscow-based publications—are
one of the few publications in Ukraine that have readerships to
compete with the viewership of the TV news bulletins that domi-
nate Ukraine’s media space (Szostek 2014: 467-8). Besides, the Rus-
sian language had a predominant position in the cultural and infor-
mation sphere of the country: Nicolai Petro (2014: 5) cites a 2012

18 In the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia increased the quota for interna-
tional students, including Ukrainians. For the period 2016-2017, 455 places were
allocated for Ukrainian students (Semonov 2016). However, Semonov (2016)
accurately argues that this is a rather small figure for a nation of 40 million. For
example, the places (494) allocated for Moldovans (less than 4 million popula-
tion) was even higher than that for Ukrainians.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 209

study which has found that “over 60 percent of newspapers, 83 per-

cent of journals, 87 percent of books and 72 percent of television
programs in Ukraine are in Russian.” He (ibid.) points out that the
predominance of Russian has been further reinforced in the wake
of the massive use of the Internet by Ukrainians whose most pre-
ferred language on websites is Russian (80%).
Crimea’s annexation and separatist escalation in Eastern
Ukraine strictly worsened the conditions for Russian soft power
projection in Ukraine. On the one hand, the aversion to everything
Russian grew rapidly amongst the Ukrainian people which was re-
flected in various spheres of their daily life. This was wide-ranging
as the Russian people also supported the Kremlin’s policies regard-
ing Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (See UNIAN 2016a). Tellingly,
while just 4% of the respondents rated Russia unfavourably in
Ukraine in 2010 (See ICPS 2010), the percentage of these people
went up to around 60% in 2014 (See Pew Research Centre 2014).
The majority (68% of the Ukrainian people) found Russia’s Crimean
policies as “an attempt to break Ukraine into several parts and
threaten its independence” (See IRI 2014). These sentiments af-
fected also the use of the Russian language by Ukrainians. Ievgen
Vorobiov, a Ukrainian expert, points out that:

“Now many Russian speakers in Ukraine — who live primarily in the coun-
try’s east and in large cities — are demonstratively turning to Ukrainian as
a badge of self-identification… Patriotic Russian-speakers in Kiev and big
eastern cities are pledging on social networks to speak Ukrainian to their
children, hoping to make the next generation more fluent and natural speak-
ers of their native tongue. For the first time in decades, speaking Ukrainian
is seen as fashionable rather than backward” (Vorobiov 2015a).

On the other hand, the government adopted a series of

measures against Russia’s soft power projection. The post-Yanu-
kovych Ukrainian leaders imposed a range of restrictions on Rus-
sian media outlets, non-governmental organizations, and other soft
power instruments that addressed the Ukrainian public. Immedi-
ately after Yanukovych’s fall, in March 2014, Kiev restricted the
broadcasting of a number of Russian TV Channels (e.g. Vesti, Rossia
24, ORT, RTR Planeta and NTV-Mir) in Ukraine (UNIAN 2014a).
210 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Several media agencies had to cease operation in Ukraine. For ex-

ample, Kommersant-Ukraina—the Ukrainian branch of Russian busi-
ness daily Kommersant founded in 2005 and owned by Russian ty-
coon Alisher Usmanov—terminated its activities in 2014 (Szostek
2014: 469). These restrictions covered even films produced by Rus-
sians: in March 2016, the “films of the aggressor state” produced or
released for the first time after January 1, 2014 were banned from
broadcasting (See RT 2016).
In December 2014, in a controversial manner, the Poroshenko
government established the Ministry of Information Policy with the
declared purpose of counteracting Russian propaganda (Interfax-
Ukraine 2014). More importantly, the Poroshenko government
adopted a law on de-communization in 2015 (Ukraynskaya Pravda
2015a). The law prohibited the propagation of Soviet-style com-
munism in Ukraine and ordered the removal of its symbols. In the
course of this process, the remnants of the Soviet past were targeted
by the Ukrainian authorities. In less than two years after Yanu-
kovych’s fall, over 800 of the remaining 1400 Lenin monuments
were dismantled across the country. The names of dozens of cities
and villages which had been associated with the Russian past were
changed (Ukraynskaya Pravda 2015b).
In some regions, even the use of the word “Russia” in signs at
enterprises, offices and advertising spaces was banned (TASS
2016b). The communist parties were outlawed and prohibited from
taking part in the political processes and elections. In line with the
previous policies countering Russian soft power projection, in May
2017, the Poroshenko government ordered the leading Russian so-
cial networks and search engines to be completely blocked or re-
stricted in Ukraine (RFE/RL 2017b). The list of websites that were
affected by this order included VKontakte, Odnolkassniki, Yandex
and the Mail.ru Group that had been widely used by the Ukrainian
people.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 211

Non-State Actors under the Influence of Western Soft

Power Projection
From the early years of the post-Soviet era, the relatively more fa-
vorable political environment in Ukraine made it possible for West-
ern countries to wield soft power in Ukraine through various chan-
nels. The existence of independent media outlets and a large num-
ber of non-governmental organizations helped the West to easily
deliver its narratives to the Ukrainian people and to successfully
compete against Russia’s soft power. Unlike Russia, that tried to
capitalize on the historical past and cultural bonds, Western powers
have been projecting a future-oriented soft power armed with the
attractiveness of European values, democratic ideals and the rela-
tive prosperity of Western countries. The relatively stronger desire
of many Ukrainians for rapprochement with Western powers and
their support for pro-Western political developments in the country
have laid favourable ground for Western soft power projection.
For numerous people in Ukraine, integration into the club of
the European Union and NATO promised a chance to establish the
rule of law in the country which for over 70% of Ukrainians was
“the most important human need of which they felt deprived”
(Ryabchuk 2014; Kochan 2016: 106). Although Ukrainians find the
“cultural” values of Europe different from those of Ukraine and feel
culturally closer to Russia (Stegniy 2011: 64), it is not reflected in their
geopolitical vision. Considering Russia as a backward country with
no progressive development model, many of them—particularly
those who live in the Western part of the country—have seen geo-
political divorce from their northern neighbour as an imperative to
pursue the Europeanization of Ukraine (Ryabchuk 2014; Chernega
2015).
Due to the fact that Western Ukraine was historically under
either the rule of Poland or the Austro-Hungarian Empire and had
never been under Russian control up until World War II, the people
currently living in this region feel a special attachment to the West.
Hence, the Western power over popular opinion in Western
Ukraine is especially stronger than in other parts of the country.
212 VASIF HUSEYNOV

These people are also politically more active than their fellow coun-
trymen both in other regions of Ukraine and abroad. Western
Ukrainians, comprising the major part of the Ukrainian diaspora in
Europe and America, have advocated Ukraine’s integration into the
Western community at the expense of its ties with Russia. Those
Ukrainians, abroad and at home, promote the image of Russia as a
historically aggressive neighbour that has committed a series of
crimes against Ukraine, including the Holodomor. They also distin-
guish their ethnic identity from that of Russia, claiming that the lat-
ter is more of a mixed identity containing Slavic, Finnish and Tatar
heritage (Rywkin 2014: 125). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
this attitude towards Russia has been propagated at Ukrainian
schools as well (Chernega 2015).
The “European dream”, associated with the rule of law, social
justice, and freedom, was a key motive for Ukrainians in pro-West-
ern social upheavals (Portnov 2014: 13; Ostrovs‘kyj 2014: 21; Onuch
2014: 48). There has been an unrealistic expectation amongst many
Ukrainians, particularly amongst younger people, that their coun-
try would progressively reform itself and establish high living
standards in a short period of time if it were to succeed in integrat-
ing itself into the West. Ukrainian leaders, themselves advocating
European integration, have never substantially opposed this dis-
course. Vladimir Chernega (2015), the Russian advisor to the Coun-
cil of Europe, in his analysis on Russia’s failure in the Ukraine crisis,
writes that:

“[In Ukraine] many sincerely believe that the rapprochement with the EU
will not only quickly stop the impoverishment of the majority [of the public],
that has never stopped since the country gained independence, but also will
evolve Ukrainian welfare standards to the European level. It should be
noted that this hope was strengthened by Ukrainian governments, including
during Yanukovych’s period. In 2012, I took part in a conference in Kiev
where the Minister of Labour and Social Policy declared that the average
pension in the country would reach 1,000 euros in a few years after the sign-
ing of the Association Agreement. In Ukraine, the average pension did not
exceed 100 euros at that time.” (my translation)

The desire of Ukrainians to integrate into the European com-

munity has been augmented by the wide-ranging public diplomacy
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 213

and propaganda campaigns of the Western countries which cover

all the dimensions of soft power making including scholarly ex-
changes, mass media, non-governmental organizations, etc. On the
contrary to Russia’s strategy aimed at reinforcing ties primarily
with Ukrainian elites or pro-Russian political groups, Western
powers have, since the beginning of the post-Soviet period, sought
to promote their connection with the ordinary people and opposi-
tional forces (Chernega 2015).
European countries and the United States launched educa-
tional exchange programmes for Ukrainians in the immediate after-
math of the Soviet collapse. The programmes provided by the
United States (e.g. the Fulbright Program, Humphrey Fellowships,
the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) Program, Global Undergrad-
uate Exchange Program (UGRAD), Benjamin Franklin Program)
and the European countries (e.g. German Academic Exchange Ser-
vice (DAAD), Erasmus Mundus), and Open Society Institution
(OSI) have brought thousands of Ukrainians to study at Western
universities. According to UNESCO statistics, the number of
Ukrainian students studying in European countries (EU members
plus non-EU Western European countries), in the USA and Canada
(more than 31,000) far outweighed that of those studying in Russia
(12,043) in 2014 (See UNESCO 2016). The ratio of Ukrainian stu-
dents studying at Russian universities to those studying at Western
universities has further increased in favour of the latter over the pe-
riod between 2004 and 2014 (See Table 5).

Host country or region 2004 2014

Russian Federation 6841 12,043

Western countries 12,333 31,000

Table 5. The number of Ukrainian students studying at the universities of
Russia and West (See UNESCO 2017).

Over the years since the 1990s, the West has supported emergence
of an army of non-governmental organizations in Ukraine. These
organizations played a key role in the anti-governmental protests
214 VASIF HUSEYNOV

and the pro-Western drift of their country. The Western NGOs op-
erational in Ukraine have supported the local NGOs on a large scale
and played a crucial role in their empowerment (Beissinger 2007:
261; Wilson 2005: 183–189). Without the financial and technical sup-
port of those Western agencies, it would have been hardly possible
for Ukrainian NGOs to evolve to the current significantly influen-
tial level in the civil and political life of the country (Ghosh 2014: 7-
10). By the virtue of the non-governmental institutions, Western
powers succeeded in influencing political developments in Ukraine
without direct involvement. Cooperation with those non-state ac-
tors also helped Western agencies in their rhetoric to downplay
their own role in the anti-governmental upheavals that changed the
tide of history for Ukraine. Ann Marie Yastishock, the deputy re-
gional USAID director, refused claims that USAID had supported
revolutions and protestors in Ukraine and pointed out that “We
don’t finance revolutions, we support civil society and NGOs. We
financed neither the Orange Revolution nor the Maidan protests in
2014. Those were citizens out there at the Maidan, rising up against
their corrupt government” (Bota et al. 2015).
The United States, as the “top bilateral donor” to Ukraine since
the very beginning of the latter’s independent statehood
(Shapovalova 2010: 2), played a crucial role in the Westernization
of Ukraine. In December 2013, a couple of weeks after the Vilnius
summit, Victoria Nuland, the US assistant Secretary of State for Eu-
ropean and Eurasian affairs, declared that the United States had in-
vested more than $5 billion since 1991 “on supporting the aspira-
tions of the Ukrainian people to have a strong, democratic govern-
ment that represents their interests” (UNIAN 2014b). The carriers
of American aid to Ukrainian non-state actors—USAID, the Na-
tional Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Public Affairs Section
of the US Embassy, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the In-
ternational Republican Institute (IRI), the American Bar Associa-
tion, and others—significantly empowered the Ukrainian pro-
Western forces. Not only were the American non-governmental or-
ganizations actively involved in political life in Ukraine and con-
tributed to its pro-Western developments, European agencies par-
ticipated in this process as well. One of the most prominent EU civil
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 215

society initiatives in Ukraine was the establishment of the Ukrain-

ian National Platform (UNP) of the Eastern Partnership Civil Soci-
ety Forum in January 2011. Uniting Ukrainian NGOs and in close
cooperation with other National Platforms in EaP countries, the
UNP coordinates public support for the implementation of the EaP
programme in the country.
Apart from the soft power projection of the European Union,
member states also considerably contributed to the promotion of
Western values in Ukraine. In 2007, Matthias Brucker (2007: 308)
identified three German political foundations operational in
Ukraine: the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS), the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung (FES) and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS). Involved
in different sectors, they in general cooperated with the govern-
ment in reforming the administrative apparatus, police and secu-
rity forces and supported the emerging civil society, non-govern-
mental organizations and trade unions (ibid.; Shapovalova 2010: 4).
Coordinating the cooperation between German and Ukrainian
NGOs, organizing conferences for Ukrainian non-governmental or-
ganizations, organizing trainings for political parties on efficient
party management, election campaigns and professional public re-
lations, German foundations were an influential supportive force
for Ukrainian democratization. Brucker (2007: 311) makes an im-
portant observation about the function of those foundations:

“…the foundations are more than norm entrepreneurs and agents of social-
ization—they actively interfere in domestic processes. Thus, the HSS edu-
cated police forces, which later refrained from the use of force against civil-
ian protestors; FES fosters an emergent civil society; KAS has good contacts
with all leading members of Nasha Ukraina and trains youth organizations,
a social stratum that later represented the major part of the protesters in
Kyiv’s central square. Hence, the work of the foundations is not simply
about norm dissemination, but also about moulding domestic processes.”

The other European countries, particularly Poland, have also

taken part in this process individually. The promotion of European
values in the European countries bordering Russia is a key part of
Poland’s security strategy (Petrova 2014: 1). Thus, it is unsurprising
that these countries, particularly Belarus and Ukraine, are the top
recipients of Poland’s foreign democracy assistance
216 VASIF HUSEYNOV

(Kaźmierkiewicz 2008: 107). A 2008 assessment of European de-

mocracy aid calculated that Poland’s democratization aid to
Ukraine outweighed the combined assistance of the UK and Swe-
den (Kucharczyk et al. 2008: 21). Poland’s support was more visible
in the Euromaidan protests where Polish politicians and civic activ-
ists physically appeared and supported the cause of the revolution
(ibid.). For most of the other Central European and Baltic members
of the EU, the democratization and Westernization of Ukraine is of
similar geostrategic importance and attracts a significant part of
their foreign aid.
These countries have sought to affect the domestic political
process in Ukraine also through international broadcasting and
supporting “independent” (pro-Western) media outlets in Ukraine.
Most of the above-mentioned Western non-governmental organi-
zations that have been active in Ukraine have also supported the
development of independent media in the country.
USAID/Ukraine’s flagship media support program, Strengthening
Independent Media in Ukraine (U-Media), launched in 2003 and
has been one of the most prominent amongst these projects. In less
than ten years, it supported 12 non-governmental institutions (e.g.
Telekritika and Internews Ukraine) that deal with the problems of
independent media in Ukraine. The NGOs supported by U-Media
have become leaders in media monitoring, journalist training, legal
support and awareness and investigative journalism (ibid.).
Stopfake.org is another media project that is supported by Western
donors (the international Renaissance Foundation, the Foreign
Ministry of the Czech Republic, the British Embassy in Ukraine and
the Sigrid Rausing Trust). According to the website, its primary
goal is “to verify information, raise media literacy in Ukraine and
establish a clear red line between journalism and propaganda” (See
Stopfake.org 2017).
In addition to these projects, the government supported inter-
national broadcasters of Western powers have also addressed the
Ukrainian people in broadcasting programmes in local languages.
The Ukrainian service of Radio Liberty has been in operation since
1954 in three languages (Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 217

RFE/RL expanded its Ukrainian service in the aftermath of the out-

break of Crimea’s annexation. In September 2015, the Ukrainian
Service began broadcasting to Crimea on AM and in July 2016 it
began broadcasting to parts of separatist-controlled Donbass on FM
(RFE/RL 2017c). The agency has also launched a website to broad-
cast news about events in Crimea in Russian, Ukrainian, and Cri-
mean Tatar, which in short time became one of the most quoted
news sources on the peninsula (ibid.). The BBG reports that the au-
dience of the Ukrainian services of American international media
significantly increased following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis.
While before the crisis (in 2012) only 9,8% of adults turned to
Ukrainian or Russian-language American media platforms for
news, the percentage of those people reached 20,8% in 2014 (See
BBG 2014). However, the audience of the US media channels varies
considerably across Ukraine: while more than 40% of Western
Ukrainians choose these channels for news, only around 10% of
Ukrainians in the East and South regions chose these channels as
sources of news in 2014 (ibid.).

Non-State Actors and External Alignment

The discussion on the autonomy of Ukrainian leaders vis-à-vis
non-state actors and the application of Western and Russian soft
power in the country indicated that Ukrainian non-state actors have
had relatively more opportunities to be politically influential and
been subject to stronger soft power projection of the external pow-
ers. On several occasions over the last decade, Ukrainian society
played decisive roles in shaping not only domestic politics but also
foreign policy. To say the least, the Orange and Euromaidan revo-
lutions, which were movements of the ordinary people, civil society
and other non-state actors, had more revolutionary implications for
the foreign policy orientation of the country than its internal struc-
ture. This characterization of the Ukrainian public differs dramati-
cally from observations by experts in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
For example, in 2003, some argued that “Ukrainian society is pas-
sive, atomized and its power is ‘submerged’ relative to that of the
218 VASIF HUSEYNOV

state” and thus “public opinion [in Ukraine] is of minimal im-

portance in the area of foreign policy” (Chudowsky et al. 2003: 273).
A year later, the Ukrainian public proved these estimations wrong
by exerting substantial influence on the foreign policy orientation
of the country. This demonstrated that in Ukraine “public opinion
can force elites to rethink foreign policy and/or bring to power
counter-elites whose preferences are different” (Munro 2007: 44).
The internal socio-economic and political problems were often
noted as the underlying reason behind the anti-governmental up-
heavals of the Ukrainians both during the Orange Revolution (Ste-
panenko 2006) and Euromaidan (Bachmann 2014; Surzhko-Harned
et al. 2017). This was the dissatisfaction of the Ukrainian public with
the performance of the government that fomented massive protests
across the country. However, the geopolitical dimensions of these
upheavals, particularly the Euromaidan revolution, should not be
underestimated. For example, Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec
(2017: 760) argue that “Euromaidan’s unique frame centres on op-
position to the Yanukovych regime” rather than on the “choice be-
tween Europe and Russia”. They underrate the significance of the
fact that Euromaidan protests started in the immediate aftermath
of Yanukovych’s refusal to further move on the path of integration
to Europe which was seen by the protestors as a progressive alter-
native to the country’s traditional geopolitical master (i.e. Russia)
(Ryabchuk 2014). The involvement of Western powers in the Euro-
maidan protests and their support to the anti-governmental forces
further reinforced the external dimension of the protests and its
character as a choice between the West and Russia.
In the period under study (2004—2016), the attitude of the
Ukrainian people towards Russia and the West did not remain sta-
ble. In the beginning of this period, integration with one or the other
of these two powers was not widely supported: public opinion
polls showed that the Ukrainian public was ambivalent towards
rapprochement with either of the two geopolitical poles (White et
al. 2010: 359-362). For example, in 2008, supporters (42%) of integra-
tion into Russia-initiated projects outnumbered those supporting
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 219

European integration (34%) (Popescu et al. 2009b: 28). However, as

seen from Figure 5, this ambivalence remained up until September
2013. The surveys prior to the Euromaidan uprising concluded that
there were more supporters of EU integration and the Association
Agreement was supported by almost two-thirds of the Ukrainian
people (Savin 2014: 7).
Ukrainians used to be more suspicious of the transatlantic al-
liance: more than 40% of the respondents found the alliance a
“threat” in the 2008 and 2009 Gallup polls, while only less than 18%
perceived it as “protection” (Esipova et al. 2010). A 2009 poll con-
cluded that 60% of Ukrainians said they were against NATO mem-
bership, while only 21% supported it (Vorobiov 2015b; See Figure
6). Therefore, it is not surprising that Yanukovych’s push to adopt
the law on non-bloc status in 2010 did not face any substantial op-
position. These foreign policy perceptions were noticed also in re-
action to the Georgia war (2008). During the war, although the Or-
ange government took sides with Georgia, 23.5% of the Ukrainian
people found Russia’s use of force in the conflict justified and for
60.5% use of force by Georgia was illegal (Bogomolov et al. 2012:
10). However, the regional West—East difference was evident in
the polls on Ukraine’s possibility of joining NATO: the 2010 polls
indicated that while the majority in the East (72%) and South (60%)
were more likely to oppose accession, most people in western
Ukraine said they supported it (Sprehe 2010).
220 VASIF HUSEYNOV

EU Integration Eurasian Integration

70,00%

60,00%

50,00%

40,00%

30,00%

20,00%

10,00%

0,00%
2008 NOV AUG SEP FEB MRZ SEP JUL FEB
11 12 13 14 14 14 15 16

Figure 5. Ukrainian Public opinion on foreign policy (Support for the EU in-
tegration vs. the Eurasia integration19 in the Ukrainian society.20)

For the NATO Accession Against the NATO Accession

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2009 2013 2014 2015

Figure 6. Ukrainian Public Opinion on Accession to NATO

 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 221

The Euromaidan revolution and its aftermath caused drastic

changes in the perception of the Ukrainian public about the foreign
policy orientation of the country. The supporters of Eurasian inte-
gration dropped to 12% in two years after the revolution, while the
percentage of EU integration supporters neared 60% of the Ukrain-
ian nation. Before these events, many Ukrainians supported EU in-
tegration, but they were more reserved on NATO accession. After
Euromaidan the Ukrainian public became increasingly more sup-
portive of the membership to the transatlantic club as well.
In 2013, just before the start of the Euromaidan revolution,
Ukrainian public opinion about NATO was the same as it had been
several few years ago: only 20% supported accession into the Alli-
ance, while the majority remained against it (See Radio Svoboda
2013). What happened after the Euromaidan revolution was re-
markable: In 2014, 44% of those polled said they would vote against
joining NATO in a hypothetical referendum, whereas 34% said they
would vote for accession. In 2015, however, in the course of the per-
sistence of the Ukraine—Russia conflict in the East and the contin-
uation of Crimea’s occupation by Russia, all of a sudden 64% said
that their vote in a hypothetical referendum on NATO accession
would be in favour of it (Vorobiov 2015b). The percentage of the
people who were against accession decreased dramatically to 28%
(ibid.; See Figure 6).
The pro-Western dramatic shift in public opinion was re-
flected also in the parliamentary elections of October 2014. Com-
pared to the previous elections (2012), the voters of the pro-Russian
parties decreased from 28.3% to 16,4% and the pro-Western parties
won a stunning 81%, which happened so partly due to the non-par-
ticipation of the citizens lived in the annexed Crimea and parts of
Donbas (Kochan 2016: 108). Late 2016 surveys showed that 73% of

19 Eurasian integration in this chart implies joining the integration projects offered
by Russia, primarily the Customs Union while the EU integration implies ac-
cession into the EU as a member.
20 For the source of data from 2008, see: Popescu & Wilson 2009b: 28; For the
source of the data for the period November 2011—March 2014, see: IRI 2014;
For the September 2014 and July 2015 surveys, see: IRI 2015; For the results of
the March 2016 polls which were conducted by Gorshenin Institute, see:
UNIAN 2016b.
222 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Ukrainians did not support Poroshenko’s presidency, 79%—his

cabinet, and 87%—the parliament (Kyivpost 2016). As the public
support to him and his cabinet dramatically decreased and support
to NATO membership conversely shot up, Poroshenko began to try
to be seen as an increasingly stauncher supporter of the country’s
pro-Western course. In early 2017, Poroshenko announced that he
would hold a referendum on the accession to the Alliance. In an
interview to the German media, he pointed out that:

“Four years ago, only 16 percent favoured Ukraine’s entry into NATO. Now
it’s 54 percent… As president, I am guided by the views of my people, and
I will hold a referendum on the issue of NATO membership” (Reuters 2017).

The widespread anti-Russian mood in the country—which, as

the previous sections demonstrated, was supported and intensified
by the Ukrainian government—affects the foreign policy making of
the state. The geopolitical situation over Ukraine, Russia’s seem-
ingly irreversible decision not to return Crimea and its continuous
support to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, and against this back-
drop, the West’s reluctance to counter Russia with heftier sanctions
or military force might generate an international imperative for the
Ukrainian authorities to sit down at the negotiation table with Rus-
sia and look for a solution. However, neither the public in Ukraine
nor the Poroshenko government seems willing to launch such ne-
gotiations with the Kremlin which eventually could reverse the
country’s pro-Western moves that have been made since the Euro-
maidan revolution. In August 2015, commenting on growing pro-
NATO support amongst the Ukrainian people in the aftermath of
the failure of negotiations on the settlement of the conflict in East-
ern Ukraine, Ievgen Vorobiov, a Ukrainian analyst, pointed out
that:

“Even if the Ukrainian political leadership were ready to make a behind-the-

curtain ‘anti-NATO’ deal with Russia, it would attract little support from
the citizenry and would certainly backfire politically” (Vorobiov 2015b).
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 223

Conclusion
This chapter aimed to explore Ukraine’s foreign policy amidst the
rivalries of the West and Russia and the influence of domestic non-
state groups on its formulation. The chapter was guided by the hy-
pothesis that when state leaders are not autonomous vis-à-vis do-
mestic non-state actors, the latter become politically more influen-
tial with the potential to affect foreign policy and run the risk of
undermining independent and potentially more prudent foreign
policy making. The non-existence of strong state autonomy in such
states allows external powers to pursue more effective soft power
policies there. This gives the external powers the chance to impact
the foreign policies of these states through influencing their domes-
tic non-state actors and push for a favourable reconfiguration in
their geopolitical orientation.
The chapter has found that the location of Ukraine in the geo-
politically sensitive position between Russia and the West has
shaped the country’s external policies since the early years of the
post-Soviet period. The geostrategic and geo-economic environ-
ment of its location between two geopolitical centres necessitated
neutrality as the most prudent option for Ukrainian foreign policy.
Such a position would have allowed Ukraine to maintain its eco-
nomic and political relations with both centres and extract benefits
from each of them. The first leaders of the newly independent
Ukraine of the 1990s were relatively more successful in pursuing a
multivectorial foreign policy maintaining ties with Russia and the
West but keeping both of them at bay. From the beginning of the
new millennium it became increasingly more difficult to maintain
a multivector approach. The intensifying rivalries between the two
geopolitical poles forced Ukraine to make a choice in its external
orientation. In the aftermath of the inception of the integration pro-
jects by the EU and Russia, Ukrainian leaders found themselves in
a serious dilemma between the two great powers. The internal non-
state groups played a crucial intervening role in this process and
reinforced the pressure to make a choice on the country’s external
alignment. The Ukrainian leaders’ unconsolidated control over
224 VASIF HUSEYNOV

these groups opened room for their influential activities. The exter-
nal great powers, making use of different public diplomacy and
propaganda channels, were able to reach out to these non-state
groups seeking to mould their feelings and opinions.
The Orange and Euromaidan revolutions, being decisive
events in the formation of the geopolitical destiny of Ukraine,
demonstrated the superiority of Western soft power vis-à-vis Rus-
sian soft power. The combination of successful self-projection and
state-managed projection allowed Western powers to realize their
goals in Ukraine. Notwithstanding the existence of strong cultural,
linguistic, ethnic, historical bonds between Ukraine and Russia,
Western soft power won over Russia’s soft power. The latter’s cor-
rupted political system, backward economy and stagnating living
standards marred its state-managed soft power projection and re-
duced its potential to succeed in its mission. The West’s association
with higher living standards and a liberal democracy model and its
support for the pro-democracy politicians and civil society put it-
self in stark contrast with Russia’s authoritarian governing struc-
ture and its closer ties with Ukraine’s corrupted political elites. This
situation affected the policy vision of the Ukrainian people and was
ultimately reflected in their anti-governmental protests.
The Euromaidan revolution, which erupted immediately after
President Yanukovych refused to sign the Association Agreement
with the EU, was thus also the triumph of Western soft power. The
public intervention resulted in the overthrow of Yanukovych in
February 2014, Crimea’s annexation by Russia next month and Rus-
sia-supported separatist upheaval in Eastern Ukraine. The post-
Yanukovych Ukrainian leaders signed the Association Agreement
and a free trade deal with the European Union, revoked the law on
non-bloc status which opened the path to NATO membership, dra-
matically restricted Russia’s soft power channels in Ukraine,
boosted trade relations with the West and minimized those with
Russia, etc. Although Russia was able to secure its control over Cri-
mea which was of supreme geostrategic importance and put obsta-
cles on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic path by supporting separatism in
Eastern Ukraine, it failed at large. It lost Ukraine as a potential
member in its integration projects which are of lesser meaning
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 225

without Ukraine. As Vladimir Chernega (2015), the Russian advisor

to the Council of Europe, admits, Russia underwent its “worst geo-
political defeat” in the post-Soviet period in Ukraine.
7. Conclusions

This section will summarize the findings of the research on the Rus-
sia—West confrontation over the “common neighbourhood” states
(i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine)
from the perspective of the nexus of neoclassical realism and soft
power. This concluding section proceeds as follow. The first sub-
section will present the puzzle and theoretical arguments that
formed the basis of this study. The next sub-section will summarize
the empirical findings of the research in the light of the research
hypotheses. The final sub-section will present the implications of
the research for international relations theories.

The Puzzle and Theoretical Arguments

This study began with a puzzle identified in the external alignment
of states that are in between great power rivalries. It questioned the
rationale behind the fact that the post-Soviet states located in East-
ern Europe and South Caucasus—a region which is known as the
“common (or shared) neighbourhood”—have pursued dissimilar
foreign policy strategies (i.e. pro-Western or pro-Russian) notwith-
standing their similar geopolitical situations. The book presented
the rivalries between Russia and the West (i.e. the EU and the
United States) over the post-Soviet region as the independent vari-
able, while the foreign policies of the regional states and the for-
mation of their dissimilar geopolitical strategies served as the de-
pendent variable of the research. Both of the conflicting great pow-
ers have made use of a diverse set of instruments to distance the
regional states from the orbit of the rival geopolitical centre and
draw them towards their own orbit. The book analysed the policies
of the great powers to interact with and influence non-state actors
(i.e. general public, non-governmental organizations, religious
groups, etc.) in target states with the eventual aim of affecting the
external alignment strategies of their respective states. This impact
of the domestic non-state actors on foreign policy has been treated
as the intervening variable in the study.

227
228 VASIF HUSEYNOV

Herein the book subscribed to realist assumptions about the

intervention of the general public in foreign policy making and the
conditions in which their intervention could be impactful. It was
argued that this intervention could push the state to opt for a for-
eign policy strategy which is not expected by realist theories such
as Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) “balance of power”, Stephan Walt’s
(1987) “balance of threat”, or Randall Schweller’s (1994) “balance of
interests” in the given circumstances. The book drew on the realist
conviction that public pressure on foreign policy is likely to bring
about detrimental consequences for the whole country as public
perceptions of international threats and the subtleties of balance of
power politics mostly are inaccurate because of a lack of proper ex-
pertise and complete knowledge (Christensen 1996: 17; Lobell 2009:
61). The book stressed the level of state autonomy as an important
variable that defines the degree of the influence the non-state actors
can exert on foreign policy. It argued that when state leaders have
strong autonomy vis-à-vis the domestic non-state actors, they can
control the soft power projection of external great powers and offset
the intervening influence of domestic non-state actors on foreign
policy.
The preliminary literature review found that neoclassical real-
ists recognize domestic non-state actors as a potentially influential
intervening variable between the pressure of the international po-
litical system and foreign policy. However, the analysis of the
school has not incorporated the policies of the great powers to reach
out to these actors in the target states and mould their perceptions
and attitudes with the ultimate objective of affecting the external
alignment of their respective state. The book argued that these pol-
icies could gain momentum when the conflicting sides are nuclear
armed great powers and the object of their conflict is a region that
hosts smaller states. The policies that great powers pursue and the
instruments that they deploy to deliver their narratives to the pub-
lics of target states have been analysed in this study under the no-
tion of “soft power”.
On this basis, the book built two major guiding hypotheses for
this study: (1) if nuclear armed great powers compete against the
same type of powers to expand or sustain their sphere of influence
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 229

over a populated region, they use soft power as a major expansive

instrument while military power remains a tool to defend them-
selves and back up their foreign policies; (2) If the leaders of a weak
state, which is in between the rivalries of great powers who use soft
power to expand their influence, are autonomous vis-à-vis society
and other internal non-state actors, they can control the inflow of
soft power projection of foreign states, offset the intervening influ-
ence of the domestic non-state actors on foreign policy making and
augment their chances to more prudently and independently fol-
low the imperatives of the international political system. Con-
versely, if such autonomy does not exist, then the external powers
find a favourable environment in which to wield soft power, the
domestic non-state actors can influence the external orientation of
the state, the state fails to offset their influence, and this may bring
about suboptimal foreign policy decisions.
The book also presented its model on the soft power policies
great powers pursue in order to reach out to and influence public
opinion in target states. This model differentiates two sources of
soft power: attractiveness (self-projection) and state-managed pro-
jection (propaganda and public diplomacy). It argues that the at-
tractiveness of a state is built on the basis of its natural endowments
and human-constructed assets (policies, political values, economic
standards, foreign aid, military power, technological and scientific
advances, music, movies, TV channels, popular culture, ideas and
customs, etc.). The book regarded international broadcasting as a
one-way communication channel which was conceptualized in the
model as propaganda. Two-way communication with foreign pub-
lics through non-governmental organizations, scholarly exchange
programs, etc. were considered as instruments of public diplomacy.
It also presented its conceptualization of the hard power—soft
power nexus based on four principles: (1) The possession of hard
power (i.e. economic and military power) is a precondition to de-
velop strong soft power; (2) The diminishing utility of military
power in international politics compels great powers to develop
their soft power capacity in the pursuit of their foreign policy goals;
(3) Soft power is not a substitute for hard power, and, therefore,
states need and must pay adequate attention to the development of
230 VASIF HUSEYNOV

their hard power; (4) The possession of strong, hard power ele-
ments (i.e. economy) does not automatically produce soft power;
states need to take appropriate measures to wield soft power.

Empirical Findings
The book opted for the Russia—West (i.e. the EU and the United
States) rivalries over the states located between the EU and Rus-
sia—a region which is known as “common (or shared) neighbour-
hood” in political and academic circles—as the case study. It partic-
ularly focused on the cases of Belarus and Ukraine representing re-
gional states with relatively strong state autonomy and states with
relatively weak state autonomy, respectively.
Chapters 3 and 4, supporting the hypothesis on the use of hard
power as a defensive instrument and soft power as an expansive
instrument by nuclear-armed great powers in their rivalries, con-
cluded that although both the West and Russia maximize their mil-
itary power to ensure their security, it has been non-military power
that they make use of to expand their influence over states in the
“common neighbourhood”. The recent decades of Russia—West re-
lations have shown that military power primarily serves the pur-
pose of ensuring security, backing up foreign policy and maintain-
ing international standing. Although both sides invest heavily in
their military power, they cannot deploy it to completely kick the
rival powers out of the areas of conflicts, as great powers used to
do in the past. The possibly catastrophic costs of military confron-
tation, the relatively greater role of international organizations,
conventions and laws in the management of international relations,
and probably also Russia’s awareness of the far superior military
capabilities of NATO countries strengthen the status of military
power as ultimo ratio. Although Russia is militarily far superior to
its post-Soviet neighbours and is the second strongest military
power after the United States, this does not suffice for Moscow to
establish its unchallenged hegemony over its entire immediate
neighbourhood.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 231

The analysis of Russian and Western policies concluded that

as expected by the theoretical foundation of this study, the dimin-
ishing utility of military power in international politics compels
great powers to develop their soft power capacity in the pursuit of
their foreign policy goals. The circumstances portrayed in the
West—Russia competition over the “common neighbourhood” re-
quire both sides to develop strong, non-military means to realize
their goals with regards to the post-Soviet region. This increases the
importance of soft power. However, this analysis concluded that
soft power is not seen by Russia and the West as a substitute for
hard power. Therefore, they do not downplay their policies to pro-
duce more hard power resources. This is where some Russians mis-
takenly argue that strong military power may offset Russia’s rela-
tive weakness in non-military spheres—economy, ideology, cul-
ture, technology, etc. (Karaganov 2012). On the contrary to these
views, the weakness in soft power cannot be effectively counterbal-
anced by relative strength in hard power. Russia’s strong military
has demonstrated impotence against the growing influence of the
West in the post-Soviet region. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine,
countries that are of the utmost geostrategic importance for Russia,
have signed agreements with the EU that have prevented their in-
tegration into the Russia-promoted Eurasian Union. The driving
force that led these countries to making pro-Western geopolitical
moves was primarily the superiority of Western soft power.
Analysing the self-projection (attractiveness) of Western pow-
ers (i.e. the EU and the USA) and Russia, the book found that each
side has its own strength and weakness in terms of self-projection.
However, it concluded that the problems concerning Russia’s self-
projection are more serious and damage its potential to successfully
compete against Western soft power. Unlike the EU and the USA
that produce more than 45% of the global gross domestic product
(US$73,502 trillion), Russia’s economy is heavily dependent on nat-
ural resources and remains inferior to Western economies (See
World Bank 2017b). The success of the Western model is one of the
major factors that attracts the attention and admiration of the post-
Soviet people. On the other hand, while the Western model of lib-
eral democracy based on freedom of speech, human rights, the rule
232 VASIF HUSEYNOV

of law, and accountability has been able to build power over public
opinion in post-Soviet countries, Russia has failed to develop an at-
tractive ideology. Moscow’s aggressive reactions to the pro-West-
ern drift of the “common neighbourhood” states have further wors-
ened its image in the region.
Chapters 5 and 6 explored the cases of Belarus and Ukraine to
test the hypothesis on the external alignment choices of smaller
states caught between great power rivalries, the potentially strong
influence of the intervening variables (in this case: domestic non-
state actors (i.e. general public)) on the formation of their foreign
policy decisions, and the role of the (non)existence of strong state
autonomy in this context. This choice was especially important as
one of these cases (i.e. Belarus) represents the “common neighbour-
hood” states (Azerbaijan and Armenia) in which state leaders pos-
sess relatively strong autonomy with respect to internal non-state
players, while the other case (i.e. Ukraine) represents those with rel-
atively weak state autonomy (Georgia and Moldova). The book
concluded that in each case the external great powers (i.e. the West
and Russia) have strived to wield power over public opinion in
these countries.
However, Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko’s consoli-
dation of power in his own hands and thus his build-up of strong
autonomy vis-à-vis the society has allowed him to prevent the in-
flow of external soft power projection which his government deems
hostile. He has also circumscribed the influence of the general pub-
lic, civil society and media on the governance of domestic and ex-
ternal politics. Consequently, Belarus, as expected by the hypothe-
ses of this study, has been able to adroitly manoeuvre amidst the
confrontation of the two surrounding great powers and economi-
cally benefit from its alignment with Russia. Although Belarus offi-
cially aligned with Russia and joined its regional integration pro-
jects, it sought to maintain warm relations with Western powers
and prevented the Kremlin from violating its sovereignty. The anal-
ysis concluded that in the case of Belarus the soft power projection
of the West and Russia was largely ineffective, and the intervening
influence of internal non-state players was mostly minimal.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 233

The analysis on Ukraine produced results opposite to the Bel-

arusian case. The relatively more democratic political structure of
Ukraine and the stronger influence of media, civil society and the
general public on the government considerably impacted the for-
eign policy of the state since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Alt-
hough the first leaders of the country in the 1990s managed to main-
tain neutrality between the West and Russia, which was in fact
more beneficial for the country both in terms of economic and po-
litical benefits, this gradually became impossible due to the intensi-
fying rivalries between the two conflicting great powers and the
growing pressure of internal non-state actors on foreign policy. The
book concluded that internal non-state actors played a crucial role
in the decision the state eventually made between these two powers
in its external alignment.
The superior self-projection and profound state-managed pro-
jection of Western powers succeeded in neutralizing Russian soft
power and wielding influence over popular opinion in Ukraine.
The limited internal autonomy of Ukrainian leaders circumscribed
their chances to offset the pressure of the domestic non-state actors
and follow the imperatives of the international political system. The
systemic factors pushed the state to abandon neutrality which
would have been more advantageous for Ukraine (Kissinger 2014),
and the domestic non-state groups affected its choice in external
alignment through massive anti-government protests (e.g. the Or-
ange and Euromaidan revolutions). Thus, as expected by the hy-
potheses of this research, limited state autonomy created a favour-
able environment for the external powers to wield soft power over
Ukrainians, the domestic non-state actors of the state were able to
influence the external orientation of the state, the state failed to off-
set their influence, and this brought about suboptimal foreign pol-
icy decisions which inter alia led to the loss of state control over
some parts of the country (i.e. Crimea and Eastern Ukraine).

Implications for Theory

This study has a number of theoretical implications. Firstly, the
analysis it carried out supported the hypothesis that soft power is
234 VASIF HUSEYNOV

deployed as an expansive instrument amidst the territorial rivalries

between nuclear-armed great powers while military power re-
mains a tool for defence and backing up of foreign policies. The
book exhibited that this is caused by several factors—primarily by
the nuclear dimension of the conflict which significantly discour-
ages the use of military power, but also by the growing role of nu-
merous international organizations, non-governmental organiza-
tions, conventions, international courts, etc. in the management of
international relations. The great powers cannot easily intervene in
smaller states and invade them anymore. Instead they make use of
soft power to win over public opinion in the target state and even-
tually push it to an alignment through influencing its internal non-
state players (i.e. general public and non-governmental organiza-
tions).
Although Russia and the West neared the verge of an all-out
war over the “common neighbourhood” states twice (2008 and
2014) during the period under study (2004-2016), none of them
dared to launch such a war. Russia proved itself much more deter-
mined than Western powers to do “everything possible” to prevent
the admission of regional post-Soviet states into Western military
and political structures. The Kremlin demonstrated this determina-
tion by deploying military force against Georgia and Ukraine in re-
sponse to the possibility of their admission to NATO. Russia occu-
pied some of the territories of these two states and as such rolled
out insurmountable obstacles on their pro-Western path. The case
shows that military power remains relevant as the ultimo ratio in
international relations, and therefore, states (must) invest in devel-
oping their military capabilities. However, the case also indicates
that Russia tried to prevent the pro-Western integration of Georgia
and Ukraine through soft power and invested sizeable resources in
these policies since the first wave of colour revolutions (2003-2005)
in the region. However, its soft power failed in the competition with
that of Western powers who also deployed soft power to prevent
the integration of the regional countries into Russia’s re-integration
projects.
This result is particularly relevant for neoclassical realism, the
mission of which is defined as “building theories of foreign policy,
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 235

rather than theories of the system within which states interact”

(Taliaferro et al. 2009: 19). The incorporation of soft power as a for-
eign policy tool for the great powers to expand their influence en-
riches the theory and allows it to develop its analysis of situations
akin to the Russia—West confrontation over the “common neigh-
bourhood” (e.g. USSR—West rivalries over the Third World coun-
tries). Although some scholars, such as Felix Berenskoetter and
Adam Quinn, have discussed the integration of the soft power con-
cept into the analytical framework of neoclassical realism, their em-
phasis has been different. They have stressed the importance of
ideas to preserve the hegemony achieved through the use of mili-
tary and economic superiority (Berenskoetter et al. 2012). Thus, this
research presented a different perspective and allowed for an ex-
amination of great power policies to encourage smaller states to
bandwagon through the use of non-military power.
Secondly, the research supported the hypothesis that lower
autonomy from internal non-state actors restricts the ability of state
leaders to offset the intervening influence of these groups in foreign
policy. This opens up the possibility for great powers to effectively
pursue soft power policies vis-à-vis that state and affect its external
alignment through influencing its general public and civil society.
This hypothesis was tested in the case of Ukraine. The pro-Western
choice Kiev made in its external alignment in the aftermath of the
Euromaidan uprisings can be explained by neither “balance of
power” nor “balance of threat” theories. In the given geopolitical
context, Russia was the more powerful and more threatening
power. The Kremlin was more resolved to deploy military power
and even nuclear weapons if necessary to defend its interests in the
post-Soviet region. The West, on the contrary, held a reserved posi-
tion and was unable to employ military force in the region against
Russia. These two theories would predict Ukraine’s bandwagoning
with Russia, since it was more powerful, geographically close and
more threatening; on the other hand, no real ally was available to
fight against Russia. Nor can the “balance of interests” theory con-
vincingly explain Ukraine’s pro-Western alignment in the after-
math of the colour revolutions. The consequences of the Ukraine
crisis (2014) indicated that the abandonment of neutrality between
236 VASIF HUSEYNOV

the West and Russia and the disruption of economic relations with
Russia could not be quickly offset by the benefits Ukraine gained in
its pro-Western alignment.
This study provided another analytical tool to predict the
choices made by small states amidst great power rivalries in their
external alignment when the maintenance of neutrality becomes
impossible. It implies that domestic non-state actors could play a
crucial role in this process. Even a small state would opt for an
alignment which is at odds with the imperatives of the international
political system and potentially dangerous when its non-state ac-
tors, under the soft power projection of external powers, intervenes
in foreign policy making. The popular uprisings in Ukraine and the
state’s dramatic changes in its foreign policy direction under the
pressure of the public support this argument. While the geopolitical
location of the country, the distribution of power between the West
and Russia, the threats posed by the Kremlin and the state’s eco-
nomic relations with these powers necessitated non-alignment in
foreign policy or predicted bandwagoning with Russia should non-
alignment have not worked out, the country opted for balancing
against Russia. This turned out catastrophic for Ukraine: Russia oc-
cupied Crimea and territories in Eastern Ukraine. More than 10,000
people died in the clashes with Russia-supported separatist groups,
the country encountered a severe economic crisis and lost im-
portant sources of revenue.
Third, the book reconsidered the principles of the soft power
concept. The analysis of Western and Russian soft power showed
that soft power is not a given power; it must be garnered and
wielded through appropriate policies and strategies. The soft
power model presented in this book distinguished two sources of
soft power as self-projection (attractiveness) and state-managed
projection (propaganda and public diplomacy). The comparison of
Western and Russian soft power in the “common neighbourhood”
demonstrated that self-projection is a necessity for effective soft
power making abroad. When a state fails to build attractive human-
constructed qualities (political values, high living standards, good
quality of education, culture, etc.), its chances to be seen as a role
model by foreign publics considerably decrease.
 GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRIES 237

However, attractiveness does not suffice to vanquish contend-

ing narratives in the target regions. To this purpose, states also need
to develop a comprehensive network of state-managed projection.
The case of Belarus was a relevant example to defend this assump-
tion. The comparative perspectives presented in the study identi-
fied that the self-projection of Western powers (i.e. the liberal de-
mocracy model, higher living standards, political values, etc.) per-
formed more successfully in the “common neighbourhood” than
Russia’s self-projection does. However, the superiority of Western
self-projection failed to defeat Russian soft power in Belarus. The
blockage of the entrance of Western soft power outlets into the
country by the Lukashenko government has succeeded in isolating
people from Western narratives. Compared to the West, Russia had
more channels to interact with the Belarusian public and domi-
nated Belarus’s information space during the period under study
(2004-2016). Nevertheless, in spite of the non-existence of signifi-
cant state-managed projection and weaker societal and cultural
links with Belarus than Russia has, the EU succeeded to become a
challenge for Russia in the fight to win approval amongst Belarus-
ians. The public opinion polls by the IISEPS (See Figure 4) show that
if Belarus opens its doors to soft power outlets of West, in a short
period of time Western soft power has the potential to further grow
and provoke the emergence of powerful pro-Western movements
in the country.
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..

.SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Edited by Dr. Andreas Umland |ISSN 1614-3515
1 Андреас Умланд (ред.) | Воплощение Европейской конвенции по правам человека в
России. Философские, юридические и эмпирические исследования | ISBN 3-89821-387-0
2 Christian Wipperfürth | Russland – ein vertrauenswürdiger Partner? Grundlagen, Hintergründe und
Praxis gegenwärtiger russischer Außenpolitik | Mit einem Vorwort von Heinz Timmermann | ISBN 3-89821-401-X
3 Manja Hussner | Die Übernahme internationalen Rechts in die russische und deutsche Rechts-
ordnung. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit der Verfassungen der Russländischen Föderation und
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland | Mit einem Vorwort von Rainer Arnold | ISBN 3-89821-438-9
4 Matthew Tejada | Bulgaria's Democratic Consolidation and the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant
(KNPP). The Unattainability of Closure | With a foreword by Richard J. Crampton | ISBN 3-89821-439-7
5 Марк Григорьевич Меерович | Квадратные метры, определяющие сознание. Государственная
жилищная политика в СССР. 1921 – 1941 гг | ISBN 3-89821-474-5
6 Andrei P. Tsygankov, Pavel A.Tsygankov (Eds.) | New Directions in Russian International Stud-
ies | ISBN 3-89821-422-2
7 Марк Григорьевич Меерович | Как власть народ к труду приучала. Жилище в СССР –
средство управления людьми. 1917 – 1941 гг. | С предисловием Елены Осокиной | ISBN 3-89821-495-8
8 David J. Galbreath | Nation-Building and Minority Politics in Post-Socialist States. Interests, Influ-
ence and Identities in Estonia and Latvia | With a foreword by David J. Smith | ISBN 3-89821-467-2
9 Алексей Юрьевич Безугольный | Народы Кавказа в Вооруженных силах СССР в годы
Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945 гг. | С предисловием Николая Бугая | ISBN 3-89821-475-3
10 Вячеслав Лихачев и Владимир Прибыловский (ред.) | Русское Национальное Единство,
1990-2000. В 2-х томах | ISBN 3-89821-523-7
11 Николай Бугай (ред.) | Народы стран Балтии в условиях сталинизма (1940-е – 1950-e
годы). Документированная история | ISBN 3-89821-525-3
12 Ingmar Bredies (Hrsg.) | Zur Anatomie der Orange Revolution in der Ukraine. Wechsel des
Elitenregimes oder Triumph des Parlamentarismus?| ISBN 3-89821-524-5
13 Anastasia V. Mitrofanova | The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy. Actors and Ideas | With a
foreword by William C. Gay | ISBN 3-89821-481-8
14 Nathan D. Larson | Alexander Solzhenitsyn and the Russo-Jewish Question | ISBN 3-89821-483-4
15 Guido Houben | Kulturpolitik und Ethnizität. Staatliche Kunstförderung im Russland der neunziger Jahre | Mit
einem Vorwort von Gert Weisskirchen | ISBN 3-89821-542-3
16 Leonid Luks | Der russische „Sonderweg“? Aufsätze zur neuesten Geschichte Russlands im europäischen
Kontext | ISBN 3-89821-496-6
17 Евгений Мороз | История «Мёртвой воды» – от страшной сказки к большой политике.
Политическое неоязычество в постсоветской России | ISBN 3-89821-551-2
18 Александр Верховский и Галина Кожевникова (peд.) | Этническая и религиозная
интолерантность в российских СМИ. Результаты мониторинга 2001-2004 гг. | ISBN 3-89821-569-5
19 Christian Ganzer | Sowjetisches Erbe und ukrainische Nation. Das Museum der Geschichte des
Zaporoger Kosakentums auf der Insel Chortycja | Mit einem Vorwort von Frank Golczewski | ISBN 3-89821-504-0
20 Эльза-Баир Гучинова | Помнить нельзя забыть. Антропология депортационной травмы калмыков | С
предисловием Кэролайн Хамфри | ISBN 3-89821-506-7
21 Юлия Лидерман | Мотивы «проверки» и «испытания» в постсоветской культуре. Советское
прошлое в российском кинематографе 1990-х годов | С предисловием Евгения Марголита | ISBN 3-89821-511-3
22 Tanya Lokshina, Ray Thomas, Mary Mayer (Eds.) | The Imposition of a Fake Political Settle-
ment in the Northern Caucasus. The 2003 Chechen Presidential Election | ISBN 3-89821-436-2
23 Timothy McCajor Hall, Rosie Read (Eds.) | Changes in the Heart of Europe. Recent Ethnographies
of Czechs, Slovaks, Roma, and Sorbs | With an afterword by Zdeněk Salzmann | ISBN 3-89821-606-3
24 Christian Autengruber | Die politischen Parteien in Bulgarien und Rumänien. Eine vergleichende Ana-
lyse seit Beginn der 90er Jahre | Mit einem Vorwort von Dorothée de Nève | ISBN 3-89821-476-1
25 Annette Freyberg-Inan with Radu Cristescu | The Ghosts in Our Classrooms, or: John Dewey
Meets Ceauşescu. The Promise and the Failures of Civic Education in Romania | ISBN 3-89821-416-8
26 John B. Dunlop | The 2002 Dubrovka and 2004 Beslan Hostage Crises. A Critique of Russian Counter-
Terrorism | With a foreword by Donald N. Jensen | ISBN 3-89821-608-X
27 Peter Koller | Das touristische Potenzial von Kam’’janec’–Podil’s’kyj. Eine fremdenverkehrsgeographische
Untersuchung der Zukunftsperspektiven und Maßnahmenplanung zur Destinationsentwicklung des „ukrainischen Rothenburg“ |
Mit einem Vorwort von Kristiane Klemm | ISBN 3-89821-640-3
28 Françoise Daucé, Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski (Eds.) | Dedovshchina in the Post-Soviet Military.
Hazing of Russian Army Conscripts in a Comparative Perspective | With a foreword by Dale Herspring | ISBN 3-89821-616-0
29 Florian Strasser | Zivilgesellschaftliche Einflüsse auf die Orange Revolution. Die gewaltlose Massenbe-
wegung und die ukrainische Wahlkrise 2004 | Mit einem Vorwort von Egbert Jahn | ISBN 3-89821-648-9
30 Rebecca S. Katz | The Georgian Regime Crisis of 2003-2004. A Case Study in Post-Soviet Media Repre-
sentation of Politics, Crime and Corruption | ISBN 3-89821-413-3
31 Vladimir Kantor | Willkür oder Freiheit. Beiträge zur russischen Geschichtsphilosophie | Ediert von Dagmar Herr-
mann sowie mit einem Vorwort versehen von Leonid Luks | ISBN 3-89821-589-X
32 Laura A. Victoir | The Russian Land Estate Today. A Case Study of Cultural Politics in Post-Soviet Russia | With
a foreword by Priscilla Roosevelt | ISBN 3-89821-426-5
33 Ivan Katchanovski | Cleft Countries. Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova|
With a foreword by Francis Fukuyama | ISBN 3-89821-558-X
34 Florian Mühlfried | Postsowjetische Feiern. Das Georgische Bankett im Wandel | Mit einem Vorwort von Kevin
Tuite | ISBN 3-89821-601-2
35 Roger Griffin, Werner Loh, Andreas Umland (Eds.) | Fascism Past and Present, West and East.
An International Debate on Concepts and Cases in the Comparative Study of the Extreme Right | With an afterword by Walter
Laqueur | ISBN 3-89821-674-8
36 Sebastian Schlegel | Der „Weiße Archipel“. Sowjetische Atomstädte 1945-1991 | Mit einem Geleitwort von
Thomas Bohn | ISBN 3-89821-679-9
37 Vyacheslav Likhachev | Political Anti-Semitism in Post-Soviet Russia. Actors and Ideas in 1991-2003 |
Edited and translated from Russian by Eugene Veklerov | ISBN 3-89821-529-6
38 Josette Baer (Ed.) | Preparing Liberty in Central Europe. Political Texts from the Spring of Nations 1848 to the
Spring of Prague 1968 | With a foreword by Zdeněk V. David | ISBN 3-89821-546-6
39 Михаил Лукьянов | Российский консерватизм и реформа, 1907-1914 | С предисловием Марка Д.
Стейнберга | ISBN 3-89821-503-2
40 Nicola Melloni | Market Without Economy. The 1998 Russian Financial Crisis | With a foreword by Eiji Furukawa |
ISBN 3-89821-407-9
41 Dmitrij Chmelnizki | Die Architektur Stalins | Bd. 1: Studien zu Ideologie und Stil | Bd. 2: Bilddokumentation | Mit
einem Vorwort von Bruno Flierl | ISBN 3-89821-515-6
42 Katja Yafimava | Post-Soviet Russian-Belarussian Relationships. The Role of Gas Transit Pipelines | With a
foreword by Jonathan P. Stern | ISBN 3-89821-655-1
43 Boris Chavkin | Verflechtungen der deutschen und russischen Zeitgeschichte. Aufsätze und Archiv-
funde zu den Beziehungen Deutschlands und der Sowjetunion von 1917 bis 1991 | Ediert von Markus Edlinger sowie mit einem
Vorwort versehen von Leonid Luks | ISBN 3-89821-756-6
44 Anastasija Grynenko in Zusammenarbeit mit Claudia Dathe | Die Terminologie des Gerichtswe-
sens der Ukraine und Deutschlands im Vergleich. Eine übersetzungswissenschaftliche Analyse juristischer
Fachbegriffe im Deutschen, Ukrainischen und Russischen | Mit einem Vorwort von Ulrich Hartmann | ISBN 3-89821-691-8
45 Anton Burkov | The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Russian Law. Legis-
lation and Application in 1996-2006 | With a foreword by Françoise Hampson | ISBN 978-3-89821-639-5
46 Stina Torjesen, Indra Overland (Eds.) | International Election Observers in Post-Soviet
Azerbaijan. Geopolitical Pawns or Agents of Change? | ISBN 978-3-89821-743-9
47 Taras Kuzio | Ukraine – Crimea – Russia. Triangle of Conflict | ISBN 978-3-89821-761-3
48 Claudia Šabić | "Ich erinnere mich nicht, aber L'viv!" Zur Funktion kultureller Faktoren für die Institutionali-
sierung und Entwicklung einer ukrainischen Region | Mit einem Vorwort von Melanie Tatur | ISBN 978-3-89821-752-1
49 Marlies Bilz | Tatarstan in der Transformation. Nationaler Diskurs und Politische Praxis 1988-1994 | Mit ei-
nem Vorwort von Frank Golczewski | ISBN 978-3-89821-722-4
50 Марлен Ларюэль (ред.) | Современные интерпретации русского национализма |
ISBN 978-3-89821-795-8
51 Sonja Schüler | Die ethnische Dimension der Armut. Roma im postsozialistischen Rumänien | Mit einem
Vorwort von Anton Sterbling | ISBN 978-3-89821-776-7
52 Галина Кожевникова | Радикальный национализм в России и противодействие ему. Сборник
докладов Центра «Сова» за 2004-2007 гг. | С предисловием Александра Верховского | ISBN 978-3-89821-721-7
53 Галина Кожевникова и Владимир Прибыловский | Российская власть в биографиях I.
Высшие должностные лица РФ в 2004 г. | ISBN 978-3-89821-796-5
54 Галина Кожевникова и Владимир Прибыловский | Российская власть в биографиях II. Члены
Правительства РФ в 2004 г. | ISBN 978-3-89821-797-2
55 Галина Кожевникова и Владимир Прибыловский | Российская власть в биографиях III.
Руководители федеральных служб и агентств РФ в 2004 г.| ISBN 978-3-89821-798-9
56 Ileana Petroniu | Privatisierung in Transformationsökonomien. Determinanten der Restrukturierungs-Bereit-
schaft am Beispiel Polens, Rumäniens und der Ukraine | Mit einem Vorwort von Rainer W. Schäfer | ISBN 978-3-89821-790-3
57 Christian Wipperfürth | Russland und seine GUS-Nachbarn. Hintergründe, aktuelle Entwicklungen und Kon-
flikte in einer ressourcenreichen Region| ISBN 978-3-89821-801-6
58 Togzhan Kassenova | From Antagonism to Partnership. The Uneasy Path of the U.S.-Russian Cooperative
Threat Reduction | With a foreword by Christoph Bluth | ISBN 978-3-89821-707-1
59 Alexander Höllwerth | Das sakrale eurasische Imperium des Aleksandr Dugin. Eine Diskursanalyse
zum postsowjetischen russischen Rechtsextremismus | Mit einem Vorwort von Dirk Uffelmann | ISBN 978-3-89821-813-9
60 Олег Рябов | «Россия-Матушка». Национализм, гендер и война в России XX века | С предисловием Елены
Гощило | ISBN 978-3-89821-487-2
61 Ivan Maistrenko | Borot'bism. A Chapter in the History of the Ukrainian Revolution | With a new Introduction by Chris
Ford | Translated by George S. N. Luckyj with the assistance of Ivan L. Rudnytsky | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition
ISBN 978-3-8382-1107-7
62 Maryna Romanets | Anamorphosic Texts and Reconfigured Visions. Improvised Traditions in Contempo-
rary Ukrainian and Irish Literature | ISBN 978-3-89821-576-3
63 Paul D'Anieri and Taras Kuzio (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution I. Democratization and Elec-
tions in Post-Communist Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-89821-698-2
64 Bohdan Harasymiw in collaboration with Oleh S. Ilnytzkyj (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolu-
tion II. Information and Manipulation Strategies in the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections | ISBN 978-3-89821-699-9
65 Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolu-
tion III. The Context and Dynamics of the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections | ISBN 978-3-89821-803-0
66 Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolu-
tion IV. Foreign Assistance and Civic Action in the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections | ISBN 978-3-89821-808-5
67 Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (Eds.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolu-
tion V. Institutional Observation Reports on the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections | ISBN 978-3-89821-809-2
68 Taras Kuzio (Ed.) | Aspects of the Orange Revolution VI. Post-Communist Democratic Revolutions in Com-
parative Perspective | ISBN 978-3-89821-820-7
69 Tim Bohse | Autoritarismus statt Selbstverwaltung. Die Transformation der kommunalen Politik in der Stadt Kali-
ningrad 1990-2005 | Mit einem Geleitwort von Stefan Troebst | ISBN 978-3-89821-782-8
70 David Rupp | Die Rußländische Föderation und die russischsprachige Minderheit in Lettland. Eine
Fallstudie zur Anwaltspolitik Moskaus gegenüber den russophonen Minderheiten im „Nahen Ausland“ von 1991 bis 2002 |
Mit einem Vorwort von Helmut Wagner | ISBN 978-3-89821-778-1
71 Taras Kuzio | Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Nationalism. New Directions in Cross-Cul-
tural and Post-Communist Studies | With a foreword by Paul Robert Magocsi | ISBN 978-3-89821-815-3
72 Christine Teichmann | Die Hochschultransformation im heutigen Osteuropa. Kontinuität und Wandel bei
der Entwicklung des postkommunistischen Universitätswesens | Mit einem Vorwort von Oskar Anweiler |
ISBN 978-3-89821-842-9
73 Julia Kusznir | Der politische Einfluss von Wirtschaftseliten in russischen Regionen. Eine Analyse am
Beispiel der Erdöl- und Erdgasindustrie, 1992-2005 | Mit einem Vorwort von Wolfgang Eichwede | ISBN 978-3-89821-821-4
74 Alena Vysotskaya | Russland, Belarus und die EU-Osterweiterung. Zur Minderheitenfrage und zum Prob-
lem der Freizügigkeit des Personenverkehrs | Mit einem Vorwort von Katlijn Malfliet | ISBN 978-3-89821-822-1
75 Heiko Pleines (Hrsg.) | Corporate Governance in post-sozialistischen Volkswirtschaften |
ISBN 978-3-89821-766-8
76 Stefan Ihrig | Wer sind die Moldawier? Rumänismus versus Moldowanismus in Historiographie und Schulbüchern
der Republik Moldova, 1991-2006 | Mit einem Vorwort von Holm Sundhaussen | ISBN 978-3-89821-466-7
77 Galina Kozhevnikova in collaboration with Alexander Verkhovsky and Eugene Veklerov | Ultra-
Nationalism and Hate Crimes in Contemporary Russia. The 2004-2006 Annual Reports of Moscow’s SOVA
Center | With a foreword by Stephen D. Shenfield | ISBN 978-3-89821-868-9
78 Florian Küchler | The Role of the European Union in Moldova’s Transnistria Conflict | With a fore-
word by Christopher Hill | ISBN 978-3-89821-850-4
79 Bernd Rechel | The Long Way Back to Europe. Minority Protection in Bulgaria | With a foreword by Richard
Crampton | ISBN 978-3-89821-863-4
80 Peter W. Rodgers | Nation, Region and History in Post-Communist Transitions. Identity Politics in
Ukraine, 1991-2006 | With a foreword by Vera Tolz | ISBN 978-3-89821-903-7
81 Stephanie Solywoda | The Life and Work of Semen L. Frank. A Study of Russian Religious Philosophy |
With a foreword by Philip Walters | ISBN 978-3-89821-457-5
82 Vera Sokolova | Cultural Politics of Ethnicity. Discourses on Roma in Communist Czechoslovakia |
ISBN 978-3-89821-864-1
83 Natalya Shevchik Ketenci | Kazakhstani Enterprises in Transition. The Role of Historical Regional Develop-
ment in Kazakhstan’s Post-Soviet Economic Transformation | ISBN 978-3-89821-831-3
84 Martin Malek, Anna Schor-Tschudnowskaja (Hgg.) | Europa im Tschetschenienkrieg. Zwischen poli-
tischer Ohnmacht und Gleichgültigkeit | Mit einem Vorwort von Lipchan Basajewa | ISBN 978-3-89821-676-0
85 Stefan Meister | Das postsowjetische Universitätswesen zwischen nationalem und internationa-
lem Wandel. Die Entwicklung der regionalen Hochschule in Russland als Gradmesser der Systemtransformation | Mit einem
Vorwort von Joan DeBardeleben | ISBN 978-3-89821-891-7
86 Konstantin Sheiko in collaboration with Stephen Brown | Nationalist Imaginings of the Russian
Past. Anatolii Fomenko and the Rise of Alternative History in Post-Communist Russia | With a foreword by Donald Ostrowski |
ISBN 978-3-89821-915-0
87 Sabine Jenni | Wie stark ist das „Einige Russland“? Zur Parteibindung der Eliten und zum Wahlerfolg der
Machtpartei im Dezember 2007 | Mit einem Vorwort von Klaus Armingeon | ISBN 978-3-89821-961-7
88 Thomas Borén | Meeting-Places of Transformation. Urban Identity, Spatial Representations and Local Politics
in Post-Soviet St Petersburg | ISBN 978-3-89821-739-2
89 Aygul Ashirova | Stalinismus und Stalin-Kult in Zentralasien. Turkmenistan 1924-1953 | Mit ei-
nem Vorwort von Leonid Luks | ISBN 978-3-89821-987-7
90 Leonid Luks | Freiheit oder imperiale Größe? Essays zu einem russischen Dilemma | ISBN 978-3-8382-0011-8
91 Christopher Gilley | The ‘Change of Signposts’ in the Ukrainian Emigration. A Contribution to the History
of Sovietophilism in the 1920s | With a foreword by Frank Golczewski | ISBN 978-3-89821-965-5
92 Philipp Casula, Jeronim Perovic (Eds.) | Identities and Politics During the Putin Presidency. The
Discursive Foundations of Russia's Stability | With a foreword by Heiko Haumann | ISBN 978-3-8382-0015-6
93 Marcel Viëtor | Europa und die Frage nach seinen Grenzen im Osten. Zur Konstruktion ‚europäischer
Identität’ in Geschichte und Gegenwart | Mit einem Vorwort von Albrecht Lehmann | ISBN 978-3-8382-0045-3
94 Ben Hellman, Andrei Rogachevskii | Filming the Unfilmable. Casper Wrede's 'One Day in the Life of Ivan
Denisovich' | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition | ISBN 978-3-8382-0594-6
95 Eva Fuchslocher | Vaterland, Sprache, Glaube. Orthodoxie und Nationenbildung am Beispiel Georgiens | Mit
einem Vorwort von Christina von Braun | ISBN 978-3-89821-884-9
96 Vladimir Kantor | Das Westlertum und der Weg Russlands. Zur Entwicklung der russischen Literatur und
Philosophie | Ediert von Dagmar Herrmann | Mit einem Beitrag von Nikolaus Lobkowicz | ISBN 978-3-8382-0102-3
97 Kamran Musayev | Die postsowjetische Transformation im Baltikum und Südkaukasus. Eine ver-
gleichende Untersuchung der politischen Entwicklung Lettlands und Aserbaidschans 1985-2009 | Mit einem Vorwort von Leonid
Luks | Ediert von Sandro Henschel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0103-0
98 Tatiana Zhurzhenko | Borderlands into Bordered Lands. Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine | With a
foreword by Dieter Segert | ISBN 978-3-8382-0042-2
99 Кирилл Галушко, Лидия Смола (ред.) | Пределы падения – варианты украинского
будущего. Аналитико-прогностические исследования | ISBN 978-3-8382-0148-1
100 Michael Minkenberg (Ed.) | Historical Legacies and the Radical Right in Post-Cold War Central
and Eastern Europe | With an afterword by Sabrina P. Ramet | ISBN 978-3-8382-0124-5
101 David-Emil Wickström | Rocking St. Petersburg. Transcultural Flows and Identity Politics in the St. Petersburg
Popular Music Scene | With a foreword by Yngvar B. Steinholt | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition |
ISBN 978-3-8382-0600-4
102 Eva Zabka | Eine neue „Zeit der Wirren“? Der spät- und postsowjetische Systemwandel 1985-2000 im Spiegel
russischer gesellschaftspolitischer Diskurse | Mit einem Vorwort von Margareta Mommsen | ISBN 978-3-8382-0161-0
103 Ulrike Ziemer | Ethnic Belonging, Gender and Cultural Practices. Youth Identitites in Contemporary Russia |
With a foreword by Anoop Nayak | ISBN 978-3-8382-0152-8
104 Ksenia Chepikova | ‚Einiges Russland’ - eine zweite KPdSU? Aspekte der Identitätskonstruktion einer post-
sowjetischen „Partei der Macht“ | Mit einem Vorwort von Torsten Oppelland | ISBN 978-3-8382-0311-9
105 Леонид Люкс | Западничество или евразийство? Демократия или идеократия? Сборник статей
об исторических дилеммах России | С предисловием Владимира Кантора | ISBN 978-3-8382-0211-2
106 Anna Dost | Das russische Verfassungsrecht auf dem Weg zum Föderalismus und zurück. Zum
Konflikt von Rechtsnormen und -wirklichkeit in der Russländischen Föderation von 1991 bis 2009 | Mit einem Vorwort von Ale-
xander Blankenagel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0292-1
107 Philipp Herzog | Sozialistische Völkerfreundschaft, nationaler Widerstand oder harmloser Zeit-
vertreib? Zur politischen Funktion der Volkskunst im sowjetischen Estland | Mit einem Vorwort von Andreas Kappeler | ISBN
978-3-8382-0216-7
108 Marlène Laruelle (Ed.) | Russian Nationalism, Foreign Policy, and Identity Debates in Putin's
Russia. New Ideological Patterns after the Orange Revolution | ISBN 978-3-8382-0325-6
109 Michail Logvinov | Russlands Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus. Eine kritische Bestands-
aufnahme des Bekämpfungsansatzes | Mit einem Geleitwort von Hans-Henning Schröder und einem Vorwort von Eckhard Jesse
| ISBN 978-3-8382-0329-4
110 John B. Dunlop | The Moscow Bombings of September 1999. Examinations of Russian Terrorist Attacks at
the Onset of Vladimir Putin's Rule | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition | ISBN 978-3-8382-0608-0
111 Андрей А. Ковалёв | Свидетельство из-за кулис российской политики I. Можно ли делать добрo
из зла? (Воспоминания и размышления о последних советских и первых послесоветских годах) | With a foreword by Peter
Reddaway | ISBN 978-3-8382-0302-7
112 Андрей А. Ковалёв | Свидетельство из-за кулис российской политики II. Угроза для себя и
окружающих (Наблюдения и предостережения относительно происходящего после 2000 г.) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0303-4

113 Bernd Kappenberg | Zeichen setzen für Europa. Der Gebrauch europäischer lateinischer Sonderzeichen in der
deutschen Öffentlichkeit | Mit einem Vorwort von Peter Schlobinski | ISBN 978-3-89821-749-1
114 Ivo Mijnssen | The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia I. Back to Our Future! History, Modernity, and
Patriotism according to Nashi, 2005-2013 | With a foreword by Jeronim Perović | Second, Revised and Expanded Edition |
ISBN 978-3-8382-0578-6
115 Jussi Lassila | The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia II. The Search for Distinctive Conformism in
the Political Communication of Nashi, 2005-2009 | With a foreword by Kirill Postoutenko | Second, Revised and Expanded Edi-
tion | ISBN 978-3-8382-0585-4
116 Valerio Trabandt | Neue Nachbarn, gute Nachbarschaft? Die EU als internationaler Akteur am Beispiel ihrer
Demokratieförderung in Belarus und der Ukraine 2004-2009 | Mit einem Vorwort von Jutta Joachim | ISBN 978-3-8382-0437-6
117 Fabian Pfeiffer | Estlands Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik I. Der estnische Atlantizismus nach der wiedererlang-
ten Unabhängigkeit 1991-2004 | Mit einem Vorwort von Helmut Hubel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0127-6
118 Jana Podßuweit | Estlands Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik II. Handlungsoptionen eines Kleinstaates im Rah-
men seiner EU-Mitgliedschaft (2004-2008) | Mit einem Vorwort von Helmut Hubel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0440-6
119 Karin Pointner | Estlands Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik III. Eine gedächtnispolitische Analyse estnischer Ent-
wicklungskooperation 2006-2010 | Mit einem Vorwort von Karin Liebhart | ISBN 978-3-8382-0435-2
120 Ruslana Vovk | Die Offenheit der ukrainischen Verfassung für das Völkerrecht und die europäi-
sche Integration | Mit einem Vorwort von Alexander Blankenagel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0481-9
121 Mykhaylo Banakh | Die Relevanz der Zivilgesellschaft bei den postkommunistischen Transfor-
mationsprozessen in mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern. Das Beispiel der spät- und postsowjetischen Uk-
raine 1986-2009 | Mit einem Vorwort von Gerhard Simon | ISBN 978-3-8382-0499-4
122 Michael Moser | Language Policy and the Discourse on Languages in Ukraine under President
Viktor Yanukovych (25 February 2010–28 October 2012) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0497-0 (Paperback edition) |
ISBN 978-3-8382-0507-6 (Hardcover edition)
123 Nicole Krome | Russischer Netzwerkkapitalismus Restrukturierungsprozesse in der Russischen
Föderation am Beispiel des Luftfahrtunternehmens "Aviastar" | Mit einem Vorwort von Petra Stykow | ISBN
978-3-8382-0534-2
124 David R. Marples | 'Our Glorious Past'. Lukashenka‘s Belarus and the Great Patriotic War |
ISBN 978-3-8382-0674-5 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0675-2 (Hardcover edition)
125 Ulf Walther | Russlands "neuer Adel". Die Macht des Geheimdienstes von Gorbatschow bis Putin | Mit einem Vor-
wort von Hans-Georg Wieck | ISBN 978-3-8382-0584-7
126 Simon Geissbühler (Hrsg.) | Kiew – Revolution 3.0. Der Euromaidan 2013/14 und die Zukunftsperspektiven der
Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-8382-0581-6 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0681-3 (Hardcover edition)
127 Andrey Makarychev | Russia and the EU in a Multipolar World. Discourses, Identities, Norms | With a fore-
word by Klaus Segbers | ISBN 978-3-8382-0529-8
128 Roland Scharff | Kasachstan als postsowjetischer Wohlfahrtsstaat. Die Transformation des sozialen
Schutzsystems | Mit einem Vorwort von Joachim Ahrens | ISBN 978-3-8382-0622-6
129 Katja Grupp | Bild Lücke Deutschland. Kaliningrader Studierende sprechen über Deutschland | Mit einem Vorwort
von Martin Schulz | ISBN 978-3-8382-0552-6
130 Konstantin Sheiko, Stephen Brown | History as Therapy. Alternative History and Nationalist Imaginings in
Russia, 1991-2014 | ISBN 978-3-8382-0565-6
131 Elisa Kriza | Alexander Solzhenitsyn: Cold War Icon, Gulag Author, Russian Nationalist? A Study of
the Western Reception of his Literary Writings, Historical Interpretations, and Political Ideas | With a foreword by Andrei
Rogatchevski | ISBN 978-3-8382-0689-9 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0690-5 (Hardcover edition)
132 Serghei Golunov | The Elephant in the Room. Corruption and Cheating in Russian Universities |
ISBN 978-3-8382-0670-7
133 Manja Hussner, Rainer Arnold (Hgg.) | Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Zentralasien I. Sammlung von
Verfassungstexten | ISBN 978-3-8382-0595-3
134 Nikolay Mitrokhin | Die "Russische Partei". Die Bewegung der russischen Nationalisten in der UdSSR 1953-1985 |
Aus dem Russischen übertragen von einem Übersetzerteam unter der Leitung von Larisa Schippel | ISBN 978-3-8382-0024-8
135 Manja Hussner, Rainer Arnold (Hgg.) | Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Zentralasien II. Sammlung von
Verfassungstexten | ISBN 978-3-8382-0597-7
136 Manfred Zeller | Das sowjetische Fieber. Fußballfans im poststalinistischen Vielvölkerreich | Mit einem Vorwort von
Nikolaus Katzer | ISBN 978-3-8382-0757-5
137 Kristin Schreiter | Stellung und Entwicklungspotential zivilgesellschaftlicher Gruppen in Russ-
land. Menschenrechtsorganisationen im Vergleich | ISBN 978-3-8382-0673-8
138 David R. Marples, Frederick V. Mills (Eds.) | Ukraine’s Euromaidan. Analyses of a Civil Revolution |
ISBN 978-3-8382-0700-1 (Paperback edition) | ISBN 978-3-8382-0740-7 (Hardcover edition)
139 Bernd Kappenberg | Setting Signs for Europe. Why Diacritics Matter for European Integration | With a foreword
by Peter Schlobinski | ISBN 978-3-8382-0703-2
140 René Lenz | Internationalisierung, Kooperation und Transfer. Externe bildungspolitische Akteure in der Rus-
sischen Föderation | Mit einem Vorwort von Frank Ettrich | ISBN 978-3-8382-0751-3
141 Juri Plusnin, Yana Zausaeva, Natalia Zhidkevich, Artemy Pozanenko | Wandering Workers. Mo-
res, Behavior, Way of Life, and Political Status of Domestic Russian Labor Migrants | Translated by Julia Kazantseva |
ISBN 978-3-8382-0713-1
142 David J. Smith (Eds.) | Latvia – A Work in Progress? 100 Years of State- and Nation-Building |
ISBN 978-3-8382-0718-6
143 Инна Чувычкина (ред.) | Экспортные нефте- и газопроводы на постсоветском
пространстве. Aнализ трубопроводной политики в свете теории международных отношений |
ISBN 978-3-8382-0822-0
144 Johann Zajaczkowski | Russland – eine pragmatische Großmacht? Eine rollentheoretische Untersuchung
russischer Außenpolitik am Beispiel der Zusammenarbeit mit den USA nach 9/11 und des Georgienkrieges von 2008 | Mit einem
Vorwort von Siegfried Schieder | ISBN 978-3-8382-0837-4
145 Boris Popivanov | Changing Images of the Left in Bulgaria. The Challenge of Post-Communism in the Early
21st Century | ISBN 978-3-8382-0717-9
146 Lenka Krátká | A History of the Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping Company 1948-1989. How a Small,
Landlocked Country Ran Maritime Business During the Cold War | ISBN 978-3-8382-0716-2
147 Alexander Sergunin | Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behavior. Theory and Practice |
ISBN 978-3-8382-0782-7
148 Darya Malyutina | Migrant Friendships in a Super-Diverse City. Russian-Speakers and their Social Relation-
ships in London in the 21st Century | With a foreword by Claire Dwyer | ISBN 978-3-8382-0702-5
149 Alexander Sergunin, Valery Konyshev | Russia in the Arctic. Hard or Soft Power? | ISBN 978-3-8382-0783-4
150 John J. Maresca | Helsinki Revisited. A Key U.S. Negotiator’s Memoirs on the Development of the CSCE into the
OSCE | With a foreword by Hafiz Pashayev | ISBN 978-3-8382-0872-5
151 Jardar Østbø | The New Third Rome. Readings of a Russian Nationalist Myth | With a foreword by Pål Kolstø |
ISBN 978-3-8382-0900-5
152 Simon Kordonsky | Socio-Economic Foundations of the Russian Post-Soviet Regime. The Re-
source-Based Economy and Estate-Based Social Structure of Contemporary Russia | With a foreword by Svetlana Barsukova |
ISBN 978-3-8382-0875-6
153 Duncan Leitch | Assisting Reform in Post-Communist Ukraine 2000–2012. The Illusions of Donors and
the Disillusion of Beneficiaries | With a foreword by Kataryna Wolczuk | ISBN 978-3-8382-0874-9
154 Abel Polese | Limits of a Post-Soviet State. How Informality Replaces, Renegotiates, and Reshapes Governance
in Contemporary Ukraine | With a foreword by Colin Williams | ISBN 978-3-8382-0885-5
155 Mikhail Suslov (Ed.) | Digital Orthodoxy in the Post-Soviet World. The Russian Orthodox Church and Web
2.0 | With a foreword by Father Cyril Hovorun | ISBN 978-3-8382-0881-7
156 Leonid Luks | Zwei „Sonderwege“? Russisch-deutsche Parallelen und Kontraste (1917-2014).
Vergleichende Essays | ISBN 978-3-8382-0823-7
157 Vladimir V. Karacharovskiy, Ovsey I. Shkaratan, Gordey A. Yastrebov | Towards a New Russian
Work Culture. Can Western Companies and Expatriates Change Russian Society? | With a foreword by Elena N. Danilova |
Translated by Julia Kazantseva | ISBN 978-3-8382-0962-3
158 Edmund Griffiths | Aleksandr Prokhanov and Post-Soviet Esotericism | ISBN 978-3-8382-0963-0
159 Timm Beichelt, Susann Worschech (Eds.) | Transnational Ukraine? Networks and Ties that Influence(d)
Contemporary Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-8382-0964-7
160 Mieste Hotopp-Riecke | Die Tataren der Krim zwischen Assimilation und Selbstbehauptung. Der
Aufbau des krimtatarischen Bildungswesens nach Deportation und Heimkehr (1990-2005) | Mit einem Vorwort von Swetlana
Czerwonnaja | ISBN 978-3-89821-940-2
161 Olga Bertelsen (Ed.) | Revolution and War in Contemporary Ukraine. The Challenge of Change |
ISBN 978-3-8382-1056-8
162 Natalya Ryabinska | Ukraine's Post-Communist Mass Media. Between Capture and Commercialization |
With a foreword by Marta Dyczok | ISBN 978-3-8382-1051-3
163 Alexandra Cotofana, James M. Nyce (Eds.) | Religion and Magic in Socialist and Post-Socialist
Contexts. Historic and Ethnographic Case Studies of Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy, and Alternative Spirituality | With a foreword by
Patrick L. Michelson | ISBN 978-3-8382-1039-1
164 Nozima Akhrarkhodjaeva | The Instrumentalisation of Mass Media in Electoral Authoritarian Re-
gimes. Evidence from Russia’s Presidential Election Campaigns of 2000 and 2008 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1043-8
165 Yulia Krasheninnikova | Informal Healthcare in Contemporary Russia. Sociographic Essays on the Post-
Soviet Infrastructure for Alternative Healing Practices | ISBN 978-3-8382-1030-8
166 Peter Kaiser | Das Schachbrett der Macht. Die Handlungsspielräume eines sowjetischen Funktionärs unter Stalin
am Beispiel des Generalsekretärs des Komsomol Aleksandr Kosarev (1929-1938) | Mit einem Vorwort von Dietmar Neutatz |
ISBN 978-3-8382-1052-0
167 Oksana Kim | The Effects and Implications of Kazakhstan’s Adoption of International Financial
Reporting Standards. A Resource Dependence Perspective | With a foreword by Svetlana Vlady |
ISBN 978-3-8382-1037-7
168 Anna Sanina | Patriotic Education in Contemporary Russia. Sociological Studies in the Making of the Post-
Soviet Citizen | With a foreword by Anna Oldfield | ISBN 978-3-8382-1033-9
169 Rudolf Wolters | Spezialist in Sibirien Faksimile der 1933 erschienenen ersten Ausgabe | Mit einem
Vorwort von Dmitrij Chmelnizki | ISBN 978-3-8382-0515-1
170 Michal Vít, Magdalena M. Baran (Eds.) | Transregional versus National Perspectives on Contem-
porary Central European History. Studies on the Building of Nation-States and Their Cooperation in the 20th and 21st
Century | With a foreword by Petr Vágner | ISBN 978-3-8382-1115-2
171 Philip Gamaghelyan | Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm. Evolving
Designs as a Transformative Practice in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria | With a foreword by Susan Allen |
ISBN 978-3-8382-1117-6
172 Maria Shagina | Joining a Prestigious Club. Cooperation with Europarties and Its Impact on Party Development in
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine 2004–2015 | With a foreword by Kataryna Wolczuk | ISBN 978-3-8382-1104-6
173 Alexandra Cotofana, James M. Nyce (Eds.) | Religion and Magic in Socialist and Post-Socialist
Contexts II. Baltic, Eastern European, and Post-USSR Case Studies | With a foreword by Anita Stasulane |
ISBN 978-3-8382-1090-2
174 Barbara Kunz | Kind Words, Cruise Missiles, and Everything in Between. The Use of Power Resources
in U.S. Policies towards Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus 1989–2008 | With a foreword by William Hill | ISBN 978-3-8382-1085-8
175 Eduard Klein | Bildungskorruption in Russland und der Ukraine. Eine komparative Analyse der Performanz
staatlicher Antikorruptionsmaßnahmen im Hochschulsektor am Beispiel universitärer Aufnahmeprüfungen | Mit einem Vorwort
von Heiko Pleines | ISBN 978-3-8382-0995-1
176 Markus Soldner | Politischer Kapitalismus im postsowjetischen Russland. Die politische, wirtschaftliche
und mediale Transformation in den 1990er Jahren | Mit einem Vorwort von Wolfgang Ismayr | ISBN 978-3-8382-1222-7
177 Anton Oleinik | Building Ukraine from Within. A Sociological, Institutional, and Economic Analysis of a Nation-
State in the Making | ISBN 978-3-8382-1150-3
178 Peter Rollberg, Marlene Laruelle (Eds.) | Mass Media in the Post-Soviet World. Market Forces, State
Actors, and Political Manipulation in the Informational Environment after Communism | ISBN 978-3-8382-1116-9
179 Mikhail Minakov | Development and Dystopia Studies in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Eastern Eu-
rope | With a foreword by Alexander Etkind | ISBN 978-3-8382-1112-1
180 Aijan Sharshenova | The European Union’s Democracy Promotion in Central Asia A Study of Political
Interests, Influence, and Development in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 2007–2013 | With a foreword by Gordon Crawford |
ISBN 978-3-8382-1151-0
181 Andrey Makarychev, Alexandra Yatsyk (Eds.) | Boris Nemtsov and Russian Politics. Power and Re-
sistance | With a foreword by Zhanna Nemtsova | ISBN 978-3-8382-1122-0
182 Sophie Falsini | The Euromaidan’s Effect on Civil Society. Why and How Ukrainian Social Capital Increased
after the Revolution of Dignity | With a foreword by Susann Worschech | ISBN 978-3-8382-1131-2
183 Andreas Umland (Ed.) | Ukraine’s Decentralization. Challenges and Implications of the Local Governance Re-
form after the Euromaidan Revolution | ISBN 978-3-8382-1162-6
184 Leonid Luks | A Fateful Triangle. Essays on Contemporary Russian, German and Polish History |
ISBN 978-3-8382-1143-5
185 John B. Dunlop | The February 2015 Assassination of Boris Nemtsov and the Flawed Trial of his
Alleged Killers. An Exploration of Russia’s “Crime of the 21st Century” | ISBN 978-3-8382-1188-6
186 Vasile Rotaru | Russia, the EU, and the Eastern Partnership. Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? |
ISBN 978-3-8382-1134-3
187 Marina Lebedeva | Russian Studies of International Relations. From the Soviet Past to the Post-Cold-War
Present | With a foreword by Andrei P. Tsygankov | ISBN 978-3-8382-0851-0
188 Tomasz Stępniewski, George Soroka (Eds.) | Ukraine after Maidan. Revisiting Domestic and Regional
Security | ISBN 978-3-8382-1075-9
189 Petar Cholakov | Ethnic Entrepreneurs Unmasked. Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflicts in Contemporary
Bulgaria | ISBN 978-3-8382-1189-3
190 A. Salem, G. Hazeldine, D. Morgan (Eds.) | Higher Education in Post-Communist States.
Comparative and Sociological Perspectives | ISBN 978-3-8382-1183-1
191 Igor Torbakov | After Empire. Nationalist Imagination and Symbolic Politics in Russia and Eurasia in the Twentieth and
Twenty-First Century | With a foreword by Serhii Plokhy | ISBN 978-3-8382-1217-3
192 Aleksandr Burakovskiy | Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Late and Post-Soviet Ukraine. Articles,
Lectures and Essays from 1986 to 2016 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1210-4
193 Natalia Shapovalova, Olga Burlyuk (Eds.) | Civil Society in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine. From
Revolution to Consolidation | With a foreword by Richard Youngs | ISBN 978-3-8382-1216-6
194 Franz Preissler | Positionsverteidigung, Imperialismus oder Irredentismus? Russland und die
„Russischsprachigen“, 1991–2015 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1262-3
195 Marian Madeła | Der Reformprozess in der Ukraine 2014-2017. Eine Fallstudie zur Reform der öffentlichen
Verwaltung | Mit einem Vorwort von Martin Malek | ISBN 978-3-8382-1266-1
196 Anke Giesen | „Wie kann denn der Sieger ein Verbrecher sein?“ Eine diskursanalytische Untersuchung der
russlandweiten Debatte über Konzept und Verstaatlichungsprozess der Lagergedenkstätte „Perm’-36“ im Ural |
ISBN 978-3-8382-1284-5
197 Alla Leukavets | The Integration Policies of Belarus and Ukraine vis-à-vis the EU and Russia. A
Comparative Case Study Through the Prism of a Two-Level Game Approach | ISBN 978-3-8382-1247-0
198 Oksana Kim | The Development and Challenges of Russian Corporate Governance I. The Roles
and Functions of Boards of Directors | With a foreword by Sheila M. Puffer | ISBN 978-3-8382-1287-6
199 Thomas D. Grant | International Law and the Post-Soviet Space I. Essays on Chechnya and the Baltic
States | With a foreword by Stephen M. Schwebel | ISBN 978-3-8382-1279-1
200 Thomas D. Grant | International Law and the Post-Soviet Space II. Essays on Ukraine, Intervention, and
Non-Proliferation | ISBN 978-3-8382-1280-7
201 Slavomír Michálek, Michal Štefansky | The Age of Fear. The Cold War and Its Influence on Czechoslovakia
1945–1968 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1285-2
202 Iulia-Sabina Joja | Romania’s Strategic Culture 1990–2014. Continuity and Change in a Post-Communist
Country’s Evolution of National Interests and Security Policies | With a foreword by Heiko Biehl | ISBN 978-3-8382-1286-9
203 Andrei Rogatchevski, Yngvar B. Steinholt, Arve Hansen, David-Emil Wickström | War of Songs.
Popular Music and Recent Russia-Ukraine Relations | With a foreword by Artemy Troitsky | ISBN 978-3-8382-1173-2
204 Maria Lipman (ed.) | Russian Voices on Post-Crimea Russia. An Almanac of Counterpoint Essays from
2015–2018 | ISBN 978-3-8382-1251-7
205 Ksenia Maksimovtsova | Language Conflicts in Contemporary Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine. A
Comparative Exploration of Discourses in Post-Soviet Russian-Language Digital Media | With a foreword by Ammon Cheskin |
ISBN 978-3-8382-1282-1
206 Michal Vít | The EU’s Impact on Identity Formation in East-Central Europe between 2004 and
2013. Perceptions of the Nation and Europe in Political Parties of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia | With a foreword
by Andrea Petö | ISBN 978-3-8382-1275-3
207 Per A. Rudling | Tarnished Heroes. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the Memory Politics of Post-Soviet
Ukraine | ISBN 978-3-8382-0999-9
208 Peter H. Solomon Jr., Kaja Gadowska (Eds.) | Legal Change in Post-Communist States. Progress,
Reversions, Explanations | ISBN 978-3-8382-1312-5
209 Pawel Kowal, Georges Mink, Iwona Reichardt (Eds.) | Three Revolutions: Mobilization and
Change in Contemporary Ukraine I. Theoretical Aspects and Analyses on Religion, Memory, and Identity | ISBN 978-
3-8382-1321-7
210 Pawel Kowal, Georges Mink, Adam Reichardt, Iwona Reichardt (Eds.) | Three Revolutions:
Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine II. An Oral History of the Revolution on Granite, Orange
Revolution, and Revolution of Dignity | ISBN 978-3-8382-1323-1
211 Li Bennich-Björkman, Sergiy Kurbatov (Eds.) | When the Future Came: The Collapse of the
USSR and the Emergence of National Memory in Post-Soviet History Textbooks | ISBN 978-3-8382-
1335-4
212 Olga R. Gulina | Migration as a (Geo-)Political Challenge in the Post-Soviet Space. Border Regimes,
Policy Choices, Visa Agendas | With a foreword by Nils Muižnieks | ISBN 978-3-8382-1338-5
ibidem.eu