G.R. No.

L-19550 1/28/24, 15:22

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EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as
Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal
Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a
total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed
to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules
of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered
to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and
prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or
any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be
rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of
the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search

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warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the
alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by
resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and
things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs
exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers
in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to
nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional
rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other
defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor
could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with
reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that
the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not
extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned
resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in
effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid
or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things
may be used in evidence against petitioners herein. 1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13
provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

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Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence
of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is
sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought
to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the
minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this
Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that
"no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded
by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure
of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as
well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches
and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the
opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American
common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered,"
16
upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by
means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those
assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful
seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the

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action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused
of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches
and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from
the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20
After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from
unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom
door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved
to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it
used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance
against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving
of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had
steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence
seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the
sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd,
Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily
that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of
the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise
is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself
recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional
restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied
in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude
invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision,
founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him
to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that
judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has

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competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to
find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly,
those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction,
is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners
allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in
said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the
corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts
of federal courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in
their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of
June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit
the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits
or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain
either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and
the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently
established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of
the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our
opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962,
are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents,
papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion
for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and
the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the
deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants
and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution;

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2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were
consequently illegal;

3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared,
abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared null and void
the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal
standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than
the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly
declaring as null and void the such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and
seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph
(numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants
served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under
the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the
environmental political and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down
the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without
exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and
indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers,
things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or
otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures
made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void,
and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the
Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of
the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the
petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and
effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional
provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by
federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and
effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of
documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession — actual or
constructive — of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search
warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against
the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the
President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three
corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also
the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all
the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be
made, and were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the
petitioners.

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Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives
them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of
seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the
defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of
corporation of which the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in
an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books
seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683
(10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under the
constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth
Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when he
places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel
room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts
some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure
from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not
tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in
Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to
this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the
Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By
nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may
be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72
S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have
standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the
premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for
reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or
indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club;
Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices
(IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the
papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned
the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the
premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the
books, papers and affects seized therefrom.

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the
searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly
technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it
is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in
evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped
by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration
has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability
Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions
such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be
determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman
vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized
in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a

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Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved
for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the
corporation's president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate
documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:

The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the corporation's was
entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar,
the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the
suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).

Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles seize had the
necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S.
461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may
expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of
the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in
1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere
guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected
him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone
legitimately on premise where the search occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution
against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650,
652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First —
he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises
searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had
seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:

Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal
Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not
show ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade
premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police
officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim
ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that
the employee had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano
considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his
files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically
in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court
rejected the contention, holding that

Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers
as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural
device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United
States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person gives "standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C.
S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn,
was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at
his home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and
management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books

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and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records
were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even
though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of
all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co.,
53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that

It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and exclusively
against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first
search warrant described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was
captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such was
the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)

If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters not
whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C.
58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal from this
decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many
personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the
searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of
documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection
with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were
directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the
petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their
personal control.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all personal and
private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate
offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various
pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and
other places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful
searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were
they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or
possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in
securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things are
personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued the
void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.

And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to
move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations
involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions,
the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of
their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

Footnotes

1Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as Acting Director,
National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal,
Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes, City of Manila.

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2Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino, Judge of the
Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and
Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.
3
Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.

5U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East Publishing
Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management Corporation, General
Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday
Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business Management Corporation, United Housing
Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real Estate
Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
6Inter alia.

7
"Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the decision to be rendered in the case, the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by us in this case against the use of the papers, documents and things from
the following premises: (1) The office of the U.S. Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg., Arzobispo St., Manila;
(2) 932 Gonzales, Ermita, Manila; (3) office at Atlanta St. bounded by Chicago, 15th & 14th Sts., Port Area,
Manila; (4) 527 Rosario St., Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or Atlas Development Corp., Magsaysay Bldg.,
San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St., Port Area, Mla.; (7) No. 224 San Vicente St., Mla.; (8) Warehouse
No. 2 at Chicago & 23rd Sts., Mla.; (9) Warehouse at 23rd St., between Muelle de San Francisco & Boston,
Port Area, Mla.; (10) Investment Inc., 24th St. & Boston; (11) IBMC, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Mla.; (12)
General Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (13) American Asiatic Oil Corp., Magsaysay
Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (14) Room 91, Carmen Apts.; Dewey Blvd., Manila; (15) Warehouse Railroad St.
between 17 & 12 Sts., Port Area, Manila; (16) Rm. 304, Army & Navy Club, Manila, South Blvd.; (17)
Warehouse Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port Area, Manila; (18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts.; Dewey Blvd., Manila; (19)
Holiday Hills, Inc., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (20) No. 2008 Dewey Blvd.; (21) Premises of 24th St. &
Boston, Port Area, Manila; (22) Republic Glass Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (23) IBMC, 2nd Floor,
Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (24) IBMC, 2nd Flr., Gochangco Blg., 610 San Luis, Manila; (25) United
Housing Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (26) Republic Real Estate Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis,
Manila; (27) 1437 Colorado St., Malate, Manila; (28) Phil. Tobacco Flue-Curing, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis,
Manila and (29) 14 Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the hearing of Deportation Cases Nos. R-953 and 955
against petitioners, before the Deportation Board, is hereby lifted. The preliminary injunction shall continue as
to the papers, documents and things found in the other premises namely: in those of the residences of
petitioners, as follows: (1) 13 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; (2) 15 Narra Road, Forbes Park,
Makati, Rizal; and (3) 8 Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta Village, Makati, Rizal."
8
Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.
9
Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.
10In re Dooley (1931) 48 F 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 60 2d 916; Lusco vs. U.S. 287 F. 69; Ganci vs.
U.S., 287 F. Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.

11U.S. vs. Gass 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 394.

12On March 22, 1962.

13Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.

14
Reading: . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge or
justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

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15
. . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.

No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126.)
16
People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.
17Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.

18Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.

19
Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341; emphasis supplied.
20Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed, 647, 41 S. Ct. 261; Olmstead vs. United States
(1928) 277 US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564, Wolf vs. Colorado, 338 US 25, 93 L. ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct.
1359; Elkins vs. United States, 364 US 206, 4 L. ed. 2d. 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960); Mapp vs. Ohio (1961),
367 US 643, 6 L. ed. 2d. 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684.
21
Even if remote.
22Particularly, Jones vs. U.S. 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. U.S., 216 Fed. Supp. 49: U.S. vs. Jeffries, 72 S. Ct. 93:
Villano vs, U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and Henzel vs. U.S., 296 Fed. 2d 650.

CASTRO, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING:

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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