Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe

Volume 44 Issue 1 Article 2

1-2024

The Estonian and Latvian Orthodox Churches of the Moscow

Patriarchate before and after the Russian war in Ukraine
Priit Rohtmets
Tartu University

Valdis Teraudkalns
University of Latvia

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Recommended Citation
Rohtmets, Priit and Teraudkalns, Valdis (2024) "The Estonian and Latvian Orthodox Churches of the
Moscow Patriarchate before and after the Russian war in Ukraine," Occasional Papers on Religion in
Eastern Europe: Vol. 44 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.55221/2693-2229.2486
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol44/iss1/2

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 THE ESTONIAN AND LATVIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES OF THE
MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE BEFORE AND AFTER THE RUSSIAN
WAR IN UKRAINE

By Priit Rohtmets and Valdis Tēraudkalns

Priit Rohtmets is Associate Professor of Church History, School of Religious Studies and
Theology at University of Tartu, Estonia and Professor of Church History, Institute of
Theology of the EELC, Estonia/
Email: [email protected] ORCHID: 0009-0000-6496-590X

Valdis Tēraudkalns is Professor of Church History and History of Religions, Faculty of

Theology at University of Latvia. He is a member of the Board of Advisory Editors of OPREE.
Email: [email protected] ORCHID: 0000-0003-2367-2398

Abstract
From the beginning of the Russian war in Ukraine the Baltic Orthodox churches
subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) have gone through considerable changes
in their canonical status but have also stood out with controversial public statements about the
war. In this article we analyze how the Orthodox churches of the Moscow Patriarchate have
reacted to the Russian war in Ukraine and what have been the major canonical changes in
Latvia and Lithuania. Additionally, we describe the most important narratives, which the
churches have used when speaking about the ongoing war and pay attention to the reaction,
which these narratives have received by the public and state authorities of the Baltic States. We
focus on Estonia and Latvia in more detail and analyze the events in Lithuania in more general
lines. To understand the events and statements of the recent years, we first pay attention to the
history of Baltic Orthodox communities, because the structures of the churches in question and
the identity of the Orthodox communities have been established in course of the political and
social changes of over the 19th and 20th centuries.

Context: The History of Orthodoxy in the Baltics

In the public mind Orthodox Churches in all three Baltic States have traditionally been
referred to as “Russian churches” and Orthodoxy as “Russian faith.” This concept, however, is
one-sided, because there was a mass conversion movement to Orthodoxy in 1840s and 1880s
and although the Orthodox communities are currently predominantly Russian, there are also
Latvian Orthodox congregations in Latvia and a local Estonian Orthodox Church (officially:
Orthodox Church of Estonia), which belongs to the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate
(EP) and has members, who in majority are of Estonian decent. 1

1
The first conversion movement, which was initiated by peasants in 1840s, and was based on a rumor that with
conversion to Orthodoxy, the peasants would get land, was more popular in former Livland, i.e. in Latvia and
Southern-Estonia. From 1845 to 1848 more than 60,000 Estonians and almost 63,000 Latvians converted to
Orthodoxy. In 1880s another wave of converesion took place and this time it was promoted by local state
authorities and Orthodox clergy. The second conversion was more popular in Northern and Western Estonia and

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 1

 The label of “Russian faith” comes from the last decades of the 19th century when the
authorities of the Russian empire implemented a centralization policy. In Baltic societies it has
traditionally been called the policy of Russification. The Russification policy was aimed to
limit the influence of the ruling Baltic German nobility, but at the same time to tie the local
population more closely to Russian culture, language, state apparatus, and the Orthodox faith.
School education had to be in Russian and Orthodox children were given Russian first names.2
The colonization initiated by the Russian central government was in fact not very different
from the colonization carried out by the Baltic Germans, because they both depressed the
vernacular culture, language and national identity of the Baltic nations. The image of
Orthodoxy as a “Russian faith” has persisted until the present day.
Having said that, one has to recognize the fact that the conversion movement in 1840s
and 1880s was popular among Estonians and Latvians and resulted in the formation of local
Orthodox communities. After the establishment of independent states of Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia in 1918, the number of Orthodox people continued to rise slowly. For example in
Latvia, in 1920s the total number of Orthodox increased from 138,803 in 1920 to 197,538 in
1925. The rise also included an increase among Latvians from 42,584 in 1920 to 53,396 in
1925. 3
When in Latvia the Latvians remained a minority in the Orthodox community, in
Estonia they formed the majority. Out of 209,094 people, who confirmed their affiliation to
Orthodoxy in the 1922 census, 123,099 were Estonians and 85,995 Russians. According to the
census in 1934 the number of those affiliated with Orthodoxy had slightly increased to 212,
764, with 125,384 of them being Estonians and,87 380 Russians. 4
The first period of independence brought about a change in the canonical status of the
Orthodox churches in Latvia and Estonia. Like the Orthodox communities in the Balkans
together with state independence they wished to receive ecclesiastical independence, i.e.
autocephaly. The Estonian Orthodox together with the Finns, already in 1923 turned to the EP
to ask for autocephaly. They had first turned to the ROC but received only a limited autonomy
with one deanery and archbishop. Because the churches were small, Patriarch Meletios IV

resulted in the conversion of more than 15,000 peasants. See Nadežda Pazuhina, “Pareizticīgā baznīca,” Nacionālā
enciklopēdija. Latvija (Rīga: Latvijas Nacionālā bibliotēka, 2018), p. 694; Toomas Schvak, “Õigeusu kirik ja
vanausulised,” Eesti kiriku- ja religioonilugu. Õpik kõrgkoolile. Ed by Riho Altnurme (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli
Kirjastus, 2018, p. 198.
2
Priit Rohtmets, Eesti usuelu 100 aastat (Tallinn: Post Factum, 2019), p. 18.
33
Antonijs Pommers, Pareizticība Latvijā. Vēsturisks apcerējums (Rīga: Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas sinode,
2015), pp. 134–135. (the second edition, the first was in 1931).
4
Toomas Schvak, “Eesti õigeusu kiriku lugu 19. sajandist tänaseni,” Mitut usku Eesti IV. Valik usundiloolisi
uurimusi: õigeusu eri. Ed by Liina Eek (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2015), pp. 55–56.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 2

(Metaxakis) did not grant them autocephaly either, but gave them an autonomous status under
the jurisdiction of the EP. The Estonian Orthodox Church (EOC) was led by Metropolitan of
Tallinn and All Estonia Aleksander (Paulus) and the church according to the tomos had three
eparchies (The eparchy of Saaremaa was never established, because Herman Aav, who was
meant to become the bishop of Saaremaa, became the leader of the Finnish Orthodox Church).
Although the church was autonomous under the jurisdiction of the EP, the autonomy was in
fact interpreted as an independence by the local church leaders. 5 The change was not welcomed
by the émigré and local Russian community, who instead wished to remain either in the ROC
or join the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR). As a compromise, Russian
congregations were united into a separate Russian eparchy. 6
In Latvia, after the First World War the newly established Latvian Orthodox Church
(LOC) had difficulties in its legal recognition in independent Latvia. It lost some of its
properties; there were discussions even about the fate of the Orthodox Cathedral in Riga, either
to demolish it or to turn it into the Lutheran church. Discussions over demolishing the Orthodox
Cathedral as a symbol of the Russification policy were also held in Estonia. 7
Latvian state authorities did not recognize the local Orthodox Council that emerged in
February of 1920, arguing that not all congregations took part in it. There was another Council
in August of the same year attended also by representatives of the Ministry of Interior. This
time the Synod elected by the Council was recognized by the state and the LOC like other
larger churches was able to get from the state annual financial subsidy. 8
Legal problems (especially with church property) were solved largely thanks to the
public role of Jānis Pommers, the first archbishop of the LOC, who in 1925 became a member
of Latvian parliament. Even though the LOC in 1920s was part of the ROC, regulations on the
State of the Orthodox Church in October 1926 declared that the head of the LOC was
“completely independent of any church authorities outside Latvia.” According to the same
paragraph (§5) the head of the church “owns rights and the fullness of spiritual power signified
in the holy canons and church rules regarding ruling hierarch of self-governing (patstāvīga in

5
Toomas Schvak, „Õigeusk,“ Eesti kiriku- ja religioonilugu. Õpik kõrgkoolidele (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus,
2018), pp. 248–249.
6
Priit Rohtmets, Riik ja usulised ühendused (Tallinn: Siseministeerium, 2018), pp. 86–89.
7
Andrei Sõtšov, „Õigeusu kiriku oikumeenilised suhted,“ Eesti oikumeenia lugu (Tartu, Tallinn: Tartu Ülikool,
Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu, 2009), pp. 68–69.
8
Сергей Цоя, “Правовое положение Латвийской Православной Церкви в 20-х – начале 30- 30-х годов
XX века,” Латвийский православный хронограф, Выпуск II (Рига: Синод Латвийской Православной
Церкви, 2016), pp. 149–152.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 3

Latvian) Orthodox Church.” 9 To answer to criticism that the LOC was the outpost of the ROC
and therefore political ally of the USSR, the Orthodox community in 1920s and 1930s often
stressed the fact that because of loose ties with the ROC the LOC was actually de facto
independent. Antonijs Pommers in his book on the history of Orthodox Church in Latvia wrote
that Jānis Pommers “made all necessary steps to gain independence.” 10 However, it should be
noted that Archbishop Pommers continued to have contacts with the ROC and functioned as a
secret link between churches in the West and in Russia because persecutions and strict control
over any foreign contacts made international communication of the ROC very difficult. 11
The LOC’s declaration of self-rule and independence in 1920s has the same character
as the recent independence declared by the church after the Russian war in Ukraine. At the
same time Pommers was cautious and skeptical about attempts of neighboring churches (for
example, Estonia) to approach directly the EP and canonically remained in the ROC. He
referred to the document issued by Patriarch Tikhon, “only the Patriarch of Moscow was
entitled to issue the document of independence issued to us.” 12
The canonical status of the LOC changed after the assassination of Jānis Pommers in
October 1934. A few years after the death of Pommers, the LOC was given the autonomy by
the EP and like in Estonia, the church was risen from the rank of archdiocese to a
Metropolitanate. It means that in the end of 1930s only the Lithuanian Orthodox remained in
the ROC. The canonical change, which took place in 1920s and 1930s shaped the ecclesiastical
life and customs of the churches in Latvia, Estonia and Finland and has had implications to the
identity and religious situation until the present day. 13 For this reason we have to focus on the
history of the canonical change and the perception of the inter-war years in more detail.
With the Soviet occupation Latvian and Estonian Orthodox churches were forced back
to the ROC. Only the Orthodox church of Finland in the independent Republic of Finland
managed to maintain its status, although the ROC pressured the Finns to return to the ROC.14

9
“Noteikumi par pareizticīgās baznīcas stāvokli,” Ministru kabineta noteikumu krājums, 17 (30.10.1926.), p. 413.
The canons of the Orthodox Church actually do not allow autocephaly to be declared by a church itself or by the
state power.
10
Antonijs Pommers, Pareizticība Latvijā. Vēsturisks apcerējums (Rīga: Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas sinode,
2015 (reprint of edition published in 1931), p. 22.
11
Jānis Kalniņš. Svētais Rīgas Jānis (Rīga: Jumava, 2001), pp. 135–139.
12
Jānis Pommers, “Latvijas Pareizticīgās Baznīcas attiecības ar citām Pareizticīgām Baznīcām,” Rīgas un visas
Latvijas Arhibīskaps Jānis (Pommers), II. Svētrunas, raksti un uzstāšanās. Jānis Kalniņš, sast. (Rīga: Labvēsts,
1993), p. 98.
13
See for example: Sebastian Rimestad, The challenges of modernity to the Orthodox Church in Estonia and
Latvia (1917–1940) (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 181–228.
14
Juha Riikonen, Kirkko politiikan syleilyssä. Suomen ortodoksisen arkkipiispakunnan ja Moskovan patriarkaatin
välinen kanoninen erimielisyys 1945–1957 (Joensuu: Joensuun yliopisto, 2007), pp. 345–351.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 4

In fear of communist repressions Metropolitan Alexander of the Orthodox Church of Estonia
together with 23 priests fled Estonia in 1944 and continued his duties in exile and reorganized
the Orthodox Church in exile, this way maintaining legal continuity, which was in 1990s
recognized by the Republic of Estonia, when the Orthodox Church of Estonia was registered
again in Estonia in 1993. Metropolitan Augustine of the Orthodox of Latvia fled to the West
too, but his church did not survive in exile. 15
At the beginning of the Soviet era the attitude of authorities towards the Orthodox
Church was more relaxed than towards other denominations. In Latvia it was partly a result of
the activity of after-war Metropolitan Venjamin (Fedchenkov), in office from 1947 to 1951,
who was very active in trying to use all possible means to continue church life. The Soviet
authorities considered the Orthodox Church to be a tool in promoting their foreign policy goals
and for this reason the repressions were not comparable with those in Soviet Union in 1920s
and 1930s. In Latvia the local eparchy for a short time even had its own periodical.
However, the situation started to change already from 1951, when over the next two
years 12 Latvian congregations were closed by the authorities. The situation worsened even
more with anti-religious campaigns organized during the rule of Nikita Khrushchev. In 1959
the Council of Ministers of Soviet Latvia decided to close the remaining monasteries in Latvia
(including Orthodox). In the end the convent in Riga was not closed and was one of few in
USSR that remained open (all together 16 in 1964). 16 But there were other cases, when
authorities persisted in their plans; in 1962 a wooden church in Dzintari was demolished,
Orthodox cathedral in Riga was turned into a planetarium, a cathedral in Daugavpils was blown
up. During Soviet era the number of Latvian Orthodox congregations decreased (many of them
were small and where in rural areas). In 1935 there were about 50 Latvian Orthodox
congregations, by the beginning of 50s it had decreased to 32, and by the beginning of 60s to
only 14. After Latvia regained independence, their number started to increase again, so that in
2015 there were more than 20 Latvian congregations, some of them recently re-established. 17
Similar policy was carried out in Estonia, where from 1962 to 1964 19 congregations
were closed. However, both monasteries (Pühtitsa and Petseri) remained open. The closed
congregations in Estonia were in most cases also located in rural areas and had local Estonians

15
Priit Rohtmets, Valdis Tēraudkalns, “Taking legitimacy to exile: Baltic Orthodox churches and the interpretation
of the concept of legal continuity during and after the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states,” Journal of Church
and State, 58 (4), pp. 649−655.
16
“Rīgas Svētās Trijādības – Sergija sieviešu klosterim – 130,” Pareizticīgās baznīcas kalendārs 2022 (Rīga:
Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas sinode), p. 39.
17
Latvijas Pareizticīgās Baznīcas latviešu draudžu dievnami (Rīga: Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas sinode, 2015),
p. 3.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 5

as members. The policy of closing congregations led to the retreat of Orthodoxy from rural
areas. There were just a few exceptional regions (Saaremaa, Setumaa and partly Pärnumaa),
where Orthodoxy managed to maintain its importance. At the same time, in the cities, the
nationality of the Orthodox community had started to change from the 1950s. Mass
immigration of Russians from the Soviet Union exacerbated this tendency, so that by 1970s
the Orthodox community in Estonia was dominated by Russian speakers. 18 It has remained so
until the present day.
In 1992 Patriarch Alexei II of the ROC reaffirmed Tikhon’s decision from 1921 to grant
limited self-governance to the Latvian Orthodox and in 1993 he issued similar right of self-
organization to Estonian orthodox. 19 Whereas in Latvia the church remained in the ROC, in
Estonia on the basis of legal succession, the EOC was registered in the Ministry of the Interior
in 1993. Thereafter the diocese of the ROC also wanted to be recognized as the legal successor
of the church that operated in Estonia before World War II, but neither the court nor the state
authorities could do this, because before the war the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church
did not exist in Estonia. After 1993 the Orthodox community in Estonia split. Consequently,
the 1990s passed in a relatively anxious atmosphere, which was characterized by the ecclesial
processions and appeals of the clergy of the ROC in Estonia. 20
Alongside with negative perceptions of the Orthodox faith and the Orthodox Church as
being a Russian church and a Russian soft power tool there has also been a more positive
evaluation of the role of Orthodoxy in history of Latvia and Estonia. The famous Latvian poet,
Imants Ziedonis, has connected efforts of Dāvids Balodis, one of key persons in the conversion
movement, as one of first ‘public Latvians’ and using diplomacy, rather than reacting violently
simply to German rule. 21 In Estonia, the first president of the Republic of Estonia, Konstantin
Päts, along with the foreign minister Jaan Poska, were both Orthodox. Their brothers Nikolai
Päts and Nikolai Poska were priests in the EOC, with Nikolai Päts being one of the leaders of
the Synod of the EOC. 22 In addition, there were a number of politicians, public servants, actors,
musicians, etc. of Estonian decent, who were Orthodox.

18
Andrei Sõtšov, Eesti Õigeusu Piiskopkond Nõukogude religioonipoliitika mõjuväljas 1954–1964.
Dissertationes Theologiae Universitatis Tartuensis 14 (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2008), pp. 157–160.
19
Ringolds Balodis, Valsts un baznīca (Rīga: Nordik, 2000), pp. 318–319.
20
Rohtmets, Riik ja usulised ühendused, pp. 226–227.
21
Imants Ziedonis, “Trauksmainais Rīgas bīskapa Filareta laiks,” in Guntis Dišlers, Uz citu zemi (Jūrmala:
Latvijas Kristīgā akadēmija, 2019), p. 286.; He is an example of how multi-layered the conversion movement was
-- economic and political factors were interwoven with religious motives. Balodis was a preacher of the Moravian
Brethren Church, after a conflict with the Lutheran clergy, who banned the worship services he led in Riga, he
gradually turned to Orthodoxy. In 1846, Bishop Filaret ordained him a priest in the Orthodox parish of Ļaudona.
22
Rohtmets, Eesti usuelu 100 aastat, p. 31.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 6

 In present day too there are some public persons who converted to Orthodox faith. In
Latvia, the former Lutheran pastor, Guntis Dišlers, is one of them (converted together with his
wife Skaidrīte Gūtmane, rector of the Latvian Christian Academy (currently called the
European Christian Academy). Dišlers has written a book on the conversion movement of
Latvian peasants in 19th century Vidzeme. 23 In Estonia several Lutheran pastors (Jaan Leppik,
Roland Tõnisson) have converted to Orthodoxy and there are a number of actors, writers,
architects, film directors, etc. who belong to the Orthodox church. Probably the most famous
Estonian belonging to the Orthodox church is composer Arvo Pärt.

Orthodox Churches in Estonian and Latvian Political Arena

Since the 1990s, the LOC has tried to show its loyalty to the political elite (in general
continuing the tradition of the Soviet period). This can be noticed simply by reviewing the
church calendar published annually in Russian and Latvian by the LOC. For example, the
Calendar of 2018 has photos of Orthodox hierarchs with State President Raimonds Vējonis
visiting the Orthodox convent in Riga, as well Metropolitan Alexander together with others
posing with the Mayor of Riga, Nils Ušakovs. 24 In 2015 Ušakovs received an International
Public Orthodox Peoples Unity Award from Patriarch Kirill. The award was founded in 2001
and has been given annually to politicians, religious and public figures who have made "a major
contribution to the Orthodox peoples' spiritual and cultural unity." 25 Ušakovs' Harmony Party,
which draws most of its support from Russians in Latvia had a long-standing co-operation
agreement with Putin's United Russia party (in 2017 Ušakovs said that “the cooperation
agreement has lost its relevance”). 26
In 1990s and early 2000s, when the relationship between Russia and Latvia was better,
the attitude of the political elite towards the Patriarchate of Moscow was also more positive.
Patriarch Alexy II during his visit to Latvia in 2006 was received by the President of the
Republic, Mrs. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga and was awarded the Order of Three Stars. He also met
with the Chair of Parliament and Prime Minister. 27 Political experts as well as the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Artis Pabriks, expressed their opinion that the visit of Alexy would have

23
Guntis Dišlers, Uz citu zemi (Jūrmala: Latvijas Kristīgā akadēmija, 2019).
24
Pareizticīgās baznīcas kalendārs 2018 (Rīga: Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas sinode).
25
“Riga mayor honored by Russian Patriarch,” https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/riga-mayor-honored-by-
russian-patriarch.a118629/
26
“Ušakovs: «Saskaņas» līgums ar «Vienoto Krieviju» vairs nav aktuāls,”
https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/usakovs-saskanas-ligums-ar-vienoto-krieviju-vairs-nav-aktuals.a252978/
27
“Maskavas patriarha Aleksija II vizīte Rīgā,” http://www.katedrale.lv/index.php/index.php?id=6512

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 7

a positive effect on the relationship between two countries. 28 In 2010 State President Valdis
Zatlers met with Patriarch Kirill during his visit to Moscow. 29
Because of the restoration of the EOC, in Estonia the situation has been more complex.
After the EOC was registered by the Estonian Ministry of Interior the congregations
subordinated to the ROC remained unregistered, because they did not recognize the fact that
they were the successors of the eparchy of the Soviet period and not the successors of the EOC
of the pre-Soviet period. As the independence of Estonia was restored based on legal continuity
with the republic, which had been established in 1918 and occupied in 1940, it meant that the
property was given to the EOC and not to the congregations of the ROC. 30
In 1996 the conflict between the two Orthodox communities reached a turning point,
when the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew decided to restore the Tomos granted to the
Estonian Orthodox Church in 1923. This threw the two patriarchates into a global crisis, as the
ROC decided to break communion between the two churches. Bartholomew and Alexy met in
Zurich in 1996 and reached an agreement that two Orthodox jurisdictions can exist side by side
in Estonia. 31
Metropolitan Kornelius, the head of the ROC congregations in Estonia from 1992 to
2018, accused the representatives of the Republic of Estonia of interfering in the internal affairs
of his church. In the 1990s and early 2000s, demonstrations were held in Tallinn, with the
representatives of the ROC claiming that their rights were being violated.
By 2002, Kornelius agreed to give up the claim of legal succession, so on April 12, the
Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (EOC-MP) was finally registered in the
Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior declared that the EOC-MP was born as a
legal entity for the first time, ending an unregistered activity of a religious community in the
Republic of Estonia. The autonomous EOC was willing to leave the property, which the EOC-
MP used, to the state, under the condition that it will not be transferred to third parties. Thus,
the EOC-MP got 18 objects for its use for 50 years. Despite the agreement, already after the
registration of the church, the representatives of the EOC-MP claimed that they were not

28
“Eksperti: Patriarha Aleksija II vizīte uzlabo gaisotni,” https://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/eksperti-
patriarha-aleksija-ii-vizite-uzlabo-gaisotni.d?id=1458616
29
“His Holiness Patriarch Kirill meets with President of the Latvian Republic Valdis Zatlers,”
https://mospat.ru/en/news/90132/
30
Priit Rohtmets, “Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu liikmeskonna kujunemine,” Eesti oikumeenia lugu (Tartu, Tallinn:
Tartu Ülikool, Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu, 2009), pp. 257–259.
31
Sebastian Rimestad, „Orthodox churches in Estonia,“ Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First
Century. Ed by Lucian N Leustean (London, New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 299.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 8

willing to give up the demand for legal succession and that the goal was to become the owners
of the church property. 32
In 2003 Patriarch Alexy visited Estonia and he was received by President Arnold Rüütel,
as well as by the prime minister and foreign minister. The president honored him with the Order
of the Cross of Terra Mariana, which is the highest honor a foreign representative can receive.
Although the state representatives welcomed the elderly patriarch, who was born in Estonia,
had served in Estonia for decades and came to Estonia to visit the graves of his parents, the
visit was actually a political act during which the Patriarch presented the demands of the ROC
and the Russian Federation. At first, most of the stories published in Estonian media were rather
positive, but after the Patriarch had left, critical remarks were also heard over the decision to
give him the decorations, but also about his statements, which he delivered to the Estonian
public. 33
Alexy’s past, including his recruitment by the KGB (agent Drozdov), was very well
known in Estonia, because in 1996, a book by an Estonian historian, Indrek Jürjo, which
included the description about his career as a KGB agent (based on KGB files in Estonia) had
been published. 34 In his statements, Patriarch Alexy demanded that the equality of people living
in Estonia should be respected. This had to be interpreted in the context of ecclesiastical matters,
with the EOC-MP wanting to own 13 buildings in Estonia. Alexy also demanded that the
Russian speaking former citizens of the Soviet Union be respected as citizens with no need to
know even basic Estonian and the Russian language should be treated equal to the Estonian
language. 35
Alexy was accompanied by Metropolitan Kirill (Gundyayev) of Smolensk and
Kaliningrad, who visited Estonia as Alexy’s successor ten years later. Although it was a
pastoral visit in June 2013 and he wasn’t invited by the representatives of the Republic of
Estonia, he was nevertheless met by Prime minister Andrus Ansip, Foreign minister Urmas
Paet, and Speaker of the Parliament Ene Ergma. President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, however, did

32
Ringo Ringvee, Riik ja religioon nõukogudejärgses Eestis 1991–2008. Dissertationes Theologiae Universitatis
Tartuensis 23 (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2011), pp. 155–161.
33
“Argipäev. Aleksius II visiit,” https://arhiiv.err.ee/audio/vaata/argipaev-argipaev-aleksius-ii-visiit
34
Indrek Jürjo, Pagulus ja Nõukogude Eesti. Vaateid KGB, EKP ja VEKSA arhiividokumentide põhjal (Tallinn:
Umara, 1996).; Likewise Alexander, current head of the LOC, also is mentioned as an agent under the cover name
“Reader” in the now publicly available files of the Committee for State Security (KGB), the fact he or other
representatives of the LOC refused to comment. Jānis Domburs, Inese Liepiņa, Danute Tomsone, “'Maisi vaļā':
Aģenta 'Čitaķeļ' ziņojums atklāj VDK interesi par reliģiskajām konfesijām,” https://www.delfi.lv/delfi-tv-ar-jani-
domburu/raksti/maisi-vala-agenta-citakel-zinojums-atklaj-vdk-interesi-par-religiskajam-
konfesijam.d?id=50945521
35
“Maailm täna. Aleksius Eestis,” https://arhiiv.err.ee/audio/vaata/maailm-tana-maailm-tana-aleksius-eestis, Last
visited 20.12.2023.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 9

not meet the patriarch. It was not a co-incidence that the visit of Patriarch Kirill took place just
shortly before the visit of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, who came to Estonia in
September 2013 as an official guest of President Ilves. Bartholomew came to Estonia to
celebrate the 90th anniversary of the Estonian Orthodox Church.
When Patriarch Kirill visited Nevsky cathedral in central Tallinn he said something,
which he has repeated over the decades: “We do not engage in political analysis of history,
because sooner or later truth and goodness will triumph over evil." 36 As he was in Estonia
during the time, when the Republic of Estonia commemorated a mass deportation carried out
by the Soviet Union in 1941, Kirill also paid his respect to the victims of the deportation, who
died in Siberia. He added that “one should not forget the past and learn from it, but at the same
time one should not anchor oneself to the past.” Even though it was meant to be a pastoral visit
the political tension was very well felt. When already upon his arrival he was asked for the
purpose of his visit, he replied that he wished to overcome the difficulties which had emerged
in the 1990s. Kirill added that “the church was not a representation of a foreign country and
not an agent of influence, working in the interest of a foreign country.” 37
The term ‘agent of influence’ had a specific meaning in the context of events, which
had taken place a few years earlier. In 2010 the EOC-MP reached the news in connection with
Estonian national security. The construction of a new church to Lasnamäe in Tallinn received
public attention because it turned out that in February 2010 the leader of the Estonian Center
Party, Edgar Savisaar, who was the Mayor of Tallinn at that time, met with Vladimir Yakunin,
the head of the Russian Railways to ask for his financial support for the construction of the
Lasnamäe church. Like Ušakovs' Harmony Party in Latvia, the Center Party in Estonia had a
co-operation agreement with Putin's United Russia Party, and it was very often critically
referred to by Estonian media and politicians, causing a fight even among the Center party
members themselves. 38
Vladimir Yakunin, who was a close ally of Vladimir Putin from the 1990s and like
Putin served in the ranks of the KGB during the Soviet era, was also one of the board members
of the Russkii Mir Foundation, when the scandal broke out. Yakunin grew up in Estonia, where
his father had served as a Soviet army officer. The meeting took place in Tallinn, and it turned
out that Savisaar was actually asking support for his party to finance the coming elections and

36
“Patriarh Kirill esikarjaselik visiit algas Toompea päikeses,” https://www.ohtuleht.ee/530410/patriarh-kirilli-
esikarjaselik-visiit-algas-toompea-paikeses
37
“Aktuaalne Kaamera, 14.6.2013,” https://arhiiv.err.ee/video/vaata/aktuaalne-kaamera-614-141492
38
“Suur ülevaade: Keskerakonna 12 aastat Ühtse Venemaaga,” https://arvamus.postimees.ee/3881147/suur-
ulevaade-keskerakonna-12-aastat-uhtse-venemaaga

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 10

funding the construction of Lasnamäe Church was just a cover-up. During the same visit,
Yakunin also met Metropolitan Kornelius of the EOC-MP. Regardless of the scandal, another
foundation headed by Yakunin (Фонд Андрея Первозванного) helped to finance the
construction of Lasnamäe church, but the Estonian Internal Security Service managed to
prevent the transfer of money to the Centre Party. Raivo Aeg, the Director of the Internal
Security Service was not willing to accept the fact that Russian money did not influence the
elections. He mentioned that even the support to construct the church was and indirect support
of the elections. 39 Although the EOC-MP had already before that had a reputation of a Russian
church, the scandal for the first time showed, how directly the Russian state authorities used
the church to do politics.
In addition to the church in Lasnamäe, the EOC-MP has over the decades established
several new Orthodox churches in Northern Estonia, where the population of Russian speaking
people is higher. 40 When the EOC trains its clergy in a seminary in Estonia and increasing
number of students study at the University of Tartu, the EOC-MP has trained its priests in
Russia. Therefore, it is not a surprise that its focus has been on uniting the Russian speaking
community in Estonia and based on a research carried out in 2011–2012, the church could
hardly be used as an integrating tool for the youth. 41
Recently, the Orthodox landscape in Latvia has also become more tense and complex.
In 2019 after long legal battles another Orthodox church, Latvian Autonomous Orthodox
Church (LAOC), was registered. It is a very small organization. According to the statistics
provided by the Ministry of Justice in 2021 it had 238 members, 1 clergyman, 2 places of
worship and 12 congregations. 42 The LAOC demanded that the LOC should hand over 10 of
its’ churches. 43 This, however, has not happened. Some sources state that only two of its
congregations really exist (in cities of Daugavpils and in Tukums). 44 The LAOC is
commemorating the Ecumenical Patriarch in its liturgies. At one point it even called itself the

39
“Savisaare idarahaskandaal on kapo aastaraamatust välja jäetud,” https://www.ohtuleht.ee/422372/savisaare-
idarahaskandaal-on-kapo-aastaraamatust-valja-jaetud
40
For example the EOC-MP has built an Orthodox church in Narva, smaller buildings in Loksa, Viljandi, and
Valga have been converted into churches and new buildings have been erected in Maardu, Türi, and Paldiski.
41
Mari Hiie, Õigeusu roll Vene gümnaasiuminoorte integreerumisel Eesti ühiskonda siseturvalisuse perspektiivist
Tallinna koolide näitel (Tallinn: Sisekaitseakadeemia magistritöö, 2012), pp. 66–67.
42
“Reliģisko savienību (baznīcu), diecēžu pārskatu par darbību 2021. gadā apkopojums,”
https://www.tm.gov.lv/lv/media/12657/download?attachment
43
“Бывший священник из Даугавпилса В. Контузоров хочет по-братски поделить церкви и приходы,”
https://gorod.lv/novosti/307314-byvshii-svyaschennik-iz-daugavpilsa-v-kontuzorov-hochet-po-bratski-podelit-
tserkvi-s-prihodami.amp
44
“Латвийская Православная Автономная Церковь юрисдикции Константинопольского патриархата,”
http://hierarchy.religare.ru/h-orthod-lpac.html

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 11

Church in Canonical Jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople. 45 The EP, however, has
been silent on the matter and no formal recognition has followed.
In the past the church was a part of the Russian Free Orthodox Church (now called The
Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church, headquartered in Suzdal, Russia) but in 2011 left that
ecclesial structure. The LAOC has been headed by Archbishop Victor (Kontuzorov) who was
in 1997 excommunicated by the LOC Council (earlier he was deprived of his clerical position;
financial violations, disobedience to the hierarch and immorality were mentioned among the
accusations). 46 In 2022 Archbishop Victor died and at the moment the church does not have a
leader, who could replace him. His friend and co-worker Archimandrite Filaret (Romanov)
currently regularly attends Catholic worship services. 47 He wrote in his blog that after Victor’s
death was offered to lead the church but he refused. 48 There was an attempt by Archimandrite
Augustin (Zaschirinsky) to register a third structure, which was also claimed to be in the
jurisdiction of the EP. The state authorities rejected that application. The LOC published a
statement saying that Augustin was in fact not an archimandrite and had no right to perform
clerical duties. He himself said in an interview that he had started his ministry in Kyiv-Pechersk
Lavra (Ukraine) and was theologically educated in Germany. He added that there were about
260 people in the church, which he wanted to register. His activities were at least temporarily
put to an end by his arrest on suspicion of fraud. 49

Who Controls the Past, Controls the Future; Historical Narratives of the Russian
Orthodox Churches in Estonia and Latvia
Like the EOC-MP, the LOC in its publications has always underlined its historical and
canonical ties with ROC. For example, the Calendar for 2022 has an article that states,
“preservation of church-state relations, which was established already in the pre-war Republic
of Latvia, has allowed to ensure stability and prosperity of the Orthodox Church in the state of
Latvia, preserved the canonical jurisdiction of the mother-church, the old style calendar,

45
“Рукоположение во иереи в Даугавпилсе,”
https://www.facebook.com/320607078309926/posts/1018929611810999/
46
Oļegs Peļevins, “Baznīca no 1993. līdz 1998. gadam,” Latvijas Pareizticīgā Baznīca. 1988.-2008. gads, galv.
red. Aleksandrs (Rīga: Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas sinode, 2009), pp. 66–67.
47
“Как быть взрослым ребёнком и главное для чего?,” https://filaretuos.livejournal.com/678151.html
48
“Как Латвийская православная церковь получила автокефалию и что же всë же произошло…,”
https://filaretuos.livejournal.com/603434.html; Formally Filaret never was member of the LAOC clergy despite
leading services and being considered very close to Victor.
49
“Августин Защиринский: Скоро в Латвии будет ещё одна Православная церковь,”
ttps://baltija.eu/2022/08/26/skoro-v-latvii-bydet-eshe-odna-pravoslavnaia-cerkov-avgystin-zashirinskii/;
“В ЛПЦ подозревают спровоцированные Москвой попытки раскола,”
https://bb.lv/statja/nasha-latvija/2023/03/26/v-lpc-podozrevayut-sprovocirovannye-moskvoy-popytki-raskola

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 12

worship services in Church Slavonic, sermons in Russian and Latvian languages,
education..." 50
The 2021 Calendar has an article signed by the LOC Synod that praises Patriarch Kirill
in connection with his seventy-fifth jubilee. 51 It especially mentions his positive response to
the LOC request to reaffirm its autonomy (it was in fact already done in 1992 when Patriarch
Alexey II reaffirmed decision made by patriarch Tikhon in 1921). This action was explained
by the LOC as a preventive step in dealing with a potential threat created by the registration of
The Latvian Orthodox Autonomous Church (as mentioned earlier, LOAC leadership demanded
that it should get properties that belonged to the LOC). 52
In the same calendar there is also an article about Jānis (Pommers). It characterizes the
first Archbishop of the LOC as one whose public role in 1920s “was consistently based on the
fact that the Latvian Orthodox Church, as a part of the Orthodox Church of Motherland Russia,
performs its redemptive ministry within the borders of the sovereign state of Latvia and to this
country it was without doubt loyal and completely independent (autonomous) in its
activities.” 53 Metropolitan Alexander, the author of that article wrote that Pommers “saw future
only in the Republic of Latvia and in unity with the Orthodox Church in Russia.” 54
In the same article Alexander opposed the view, which had been expressed in 1930s by
Metropolitan of Lithuania Eleutherius (Bogoyavlensky) criticizing Pommers for what he
thought was an implementation of autocephaly of the Latvian church. 55 Eleutherius was a
strong supporter of remaining in the jurisdiction of the ROC and as mentioned earlier, the
church in Lithuania in 1930s was the only one among the Orthodox churches in the Baltic
States, who maintained canonical ties with the ROC. In another article Metropolitan Alexander
has pointed out that Jānis (Pommers) never cut canonical ties with Moscow and did not support
the Russian émigré groups, which were part of ROCOR. 56

50
Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas autonomijas atjaunošanai– 30,” Pareizticīgās baznīcas kalendārs 2022 (Rīga:
Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas sinode), p. 27.
51
Viņa Svētībai Svētīgākajam Maskavas un visas Krievzemes Patriarham Kirilam – 75,” Pareizticīgās baznīcas
kalendārs 2021 (Rīga: Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas sinode), pp. 7–8.
52
Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas koncils,” Pareizticīgās baznīcas kalendārs 2021 (Rīga: Latvijas Pareizticīgās
baznīcas sinode), p. 9.
53
Aleksandrs, “Svētais svētmocekli Jāni, lūdz Dievu par mums!,” Pareizticīgās baznīcas kalendārs 2021 (Rīga:
Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas sinode), p. 4.
54
Ibid., p. 6.
55
Ibid.
56
Aleksandrs, “10 gadu jubileja kopš Krievzemes Pareizticīgās Baznīcas un Maskavas Patriarhāta Krievu
Aizrobežu Pareizticīgās Baznīcas kanoniskās vienotības Akta parakstīšanas,” Pareizticīgās baznīcas kalendārs
2017 (Rīga: Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas sinode), p. 126.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 13

 Currently the LOC in its publications is usually either avoiding analyzing the change
of jurisdictions in 1930s or is explaining it as a politically motivated step. 57 The same rhetoric
is used by the representatives of the EOC-MP, when they analyze the restoration of the EOC
in 1990s. Accusations of nationalism and ethnophyletism are usually mentioned too. 58 This
forms the backbone in the set of arguments, which the ROC usually presents, when speaking
about the Orthodox communities, who wish to become independent. This way the ROC ignores
its own history of achieving autocephaly, but even more importantly the more recent history of
the Orthodox church, namely the 19th century. In the Balkans one can observe, how political
support and state independence were the preconditions in achieving autocephaly. 59
There are examples of states being directly or indirectly responsible for initiating a
canonical change of a church which, of course, has caused tension with other Orthodox
churches, who have doubted the canonicality of such decisions. For example, the Greek
government declared the church autocephalous in 1833. 60 The new status of the church in
Greece was recognized by the EP in 1850. In Bulgaria according to the statutes drafted in 1950
by communist functionaries and accepted by the Orthodox synod at the beginning of 1951, the
Orthodox Church was proclaimed a Patriarchate, a move that was recognized by
Constantinople only in 1961. 61 The EP has played a crucial role in all these processes.

57
For example, article about Metropolitan Augustīns (Pētersons) in the church calendar for 2012 nothing is said
about the fact that under his leadership the LOC was under Constantinople (Justīne Vivanta Volkova, “Metropolīts
Augustīns – dzimtenē un svešumā,” Pareizticīgās baznīcas kalendārs 2012. gadam (Rīga: Latvijas Pareizticīgās
baznīcas sinode), pp. 195-201.; This information is not included in sermon by Metropolitan Alexander during
Augustīns’ reburial in 2011 (“Visaugstisvētītā Rīgas un visas Latvijas Metropolīta Aleksandra sprediķis Rīgas
Kristus Piedzimšanas katedrālē 2011.gada 10. augustā sakarā ar mūžam pieminamā metropolīta Augustīna
(Pētersona) mirstīgo atlieku pārapbedīšanu no Vācijas Latvijā,”
http://pravoslavie.lv/index.php?newid=3957&id=32&lang=LV ). The church's position is made clearer in its
published history book, which states that the decision to join Constantinople was the result of external pressure
and was canonically wrong. Events of 1940 are briefly described by stating that leadership of the Latvian Church
confessed that it a wrong decision and returned in the ranks of Moscow Patriarchate (Oļegs Peļevins, “Ieskats
Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas vēsturē,” Latvijas Pareizticīgā Baznīca. 1988.-2008. gads, galv. red. Aleksandrs
(Rīga: Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas sinode, 2009), pp. 9–10).
58
Patriarh Aleksius II, Õigeusk Eestimaal (Tallinn: Revelex 2009), pp. 450, 454. The book by Alexy II about the
Orthodoxy in Estonia was originally publish in Russian in 1999, but was translated to Estonian and published in
2009. Publishing the translation was financed by the “Russkii Mir”Foundation. On the last page the publisher
among others (e.g. Aleksei Gromõko) thanks the Mayor of Tallinn, Edgar Savisaar. In addition to the original text
there is a paragraph added by an anonymos author, where the events of 1990s are analyzed from the viewpoint of
the EOC-MP.
59
Paschalis M. Kitromilides, „The Ecumenical Patriarchate,“ Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in
Nineteenth-Century Southeastern Europe. Ed by Lucian N. Leustean (New York: Fordham University Press,
2014), pp. 17–20.
60
Charles A. Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece 1821-1852 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969), pp. 105-106.
61
Daniela Kalkandjieva, “The Bulgarian Orthodox Church,” Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, 1945-91,
Lucian N. Leustean, ed. (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 87–88.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 14

 In Latvia one can observe, how over the years the attitude of the LOC towards the EP
has changed. In the 1994 Calendar the change of jurisdiction from Moscow to Constantinople
in 1930s was described in rather neutral terms (except the phrase “returning to the bosom of
the mother church” which was used to describe return to the ROC later on) as a move caused
by historical circumstances and done “with the help of government.” 62 However, increased
tensions between Moscow and Constantinople and a threat that alternative church structures
could be established in Latvia have stimulated a more negative attitude. In the 2002 Calendar
the same author provided a critical overview of EP, stating that its canonical territory (a term
used most often by the ROC) was getting smaller and time may come when it existed only in
the diaspora. Constantinople was criticized as being too politicized and as uncanonically
presenting itself as responsible for churches in the diaspora. A scenario that the Orthodox in
Latvia could be under Constantinople was described negatively, “alienation from the homeland
may arise in the consciousness of Orthodox Latvians due to the fact that they will consider
themselves part of the jurisdiction of an amorphous diaspora.” 63 This was a political statement.
The set of arguments, which were used in the Calendar, raise a question, to whom was the
statement addressed. It sounded as if the recipients were not the believers (main readers of the
calendar), but the state authorities instead. In the past the LOC has often argued that
establishing another Orthodox Church would endanger stability in the society.
The EOC-MP has from the 1990s been very active in promoting its own historical
narrative of the Orthodox past in Estonia. The approach rests on several pillars. Firstly, it is
important to show that Orthodoxy had already reached the territory of Estonia before Western
Christianity and the Christianization of Estonia in the 13th century (the same strategy is used
in Latvia). The fact that there might have been a church for the merchants, can be true, but to
clarify Orthodoxy did not actually reach Estonians in the 11th century and remained unknown
to the local population until the 19th century, when two waves of conversion took place.
Concerning the Christianization of Estonians in the 13th century by the Catholic church
the fact of violent Christianization is repeated. 64 It was used by the ROC already in the 19th
century to emphasize that the spread of Orthodoxy challenged the Baltic German nobility, who
were considered as successors of the people, who violently Christianized Estonians in the 13th

62
Николай Тихомиров, “Исторический путь Православия в Латвии,” Православный церковный календарь
1994 (Рига: Латвийская Православная церковь, без года издания), p. 117.
63
Николай Тихомиров, „Константинопольский патриархат: история, современность, перспективы,“
Православный церковный календарь 2002 (Рига: Латвийская Православная церковь, без года издания), p.
94.
64
Õigeusu hingekarjased Eestimaal. Elulood. Kirjad, Jutlused. Päevikud. Ed by Toomas Hirvoja and Merike Pau
(Tallinn: Püha Issidori Õigeusu Kirjastusselts, 2002), p. 11.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 15

century. Therefore, Orthodoxy was seen as a liberating force for Estonian peasants, while the
Catholics and Protestants were considered to be responsible for the slavery of Estonians.
Additionally, there is traditionally a great amount of hostility towards the West. Estonia at the
same time is considered to be a territory, where a lot of Russian blood has been shed already
centuries ago.
Secondly, martyrs and religious heroes play an important role in the ROC’s approach
to history. For example, the priest-martyr Issidor from the 15th century, who is said to have
been drowned after multiple trials in Tartu together with 72 Orthodox believers in 1472. All of
Issidor's reception is based on a long version of the Issidorian legend compiled by Varlaam, a
monk of Pskov in the 1550s and 1560s, based on an otherwise relatively unknown short legend
supplemented with anti-Catholic rhetoric. As Professor Anti Selart has stated, Varlaam's works
are characterized by indifference to historical facts, they are compilations of sources with
different backgrounds. There is no evidence of Issidor's existence in non-Russian historical
sources.
Issidor became known only through Russian propaganda literature in the 19th century
and was clearly a political saint. According to Anton Budilovich, rector of the University of
Tartu during the time of Russification in the 19th century, priest-martyr Issidor redeemed the
guilt of Metropolitan Issidor of Kiev and all of Russia, who had accepted the Union of Florence,
and the legend of priest-martyr Issidor was like a ray of light for the Old Russian city of Yuryev
(Tartu). Russian church and social figures in the 19th century in any way did not hide that the
establishment of the Issidor cult was in fact one step in the process of Russification of the Baltic
provinces. 65
Thirdly, the events of the 1990s and the history of the 1920s and 1930s are analyzed in
several history books, as well as some biographies, such as the memoirs of Metropolitan
Kornelius. Some of them have been published with the financial help of the Russkii Mir
(Russian World) Foundation in Russia. 66
From early 2000s the EOC has also published several books about the history of the
Estonian Orthodox. 67 For this reason the EOC-MP in 2013 published a book, where they

65
Anti Selart, „Tartu märter Isidor ja tema kannatuslugu,“ Akadeemia 3/1998, pp. 501–503.
66
Metropoliit Kornelius, Minu eluteest (Tallinn: Moskva Patriarhaadi Eesti Õigeusu Kiriku Sinodi
Kirjastusosakond, 2014). The memoirs of Kornelius were also published with the financial help of the Russkii
Mir Foundation; Eesti Õigeusu Kirik: 100 aastat autonoomiat. Ed. by Igor Prekup (Tallinn: 2021).
67
Tallinna ja kogu Eesti metropoliit Stefanus, Pilguheit õigeusku. Ajalugu ja Teoloogia, nr 3 (Tallinn: Tallinna
Püha Platoni Õigeusu Teoloogia Seminar, 2011); Arhim. Grigorios D. Papathomas, Õnnetus olla väike kirik
väikesel maal. Teoloogiline tõde Eesti Õigeusu Kiriku kohta. Ajalugu ja Teoloogia, nr 3 (Tallinn: Tallinna Püha
Platoni Õigeusu Teoloogia Seminar, 2007).

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 16

attacked Archimandrite Grigorios Papathomas (now the Metropolitan of Peristeri and the
Professor of Canonical Law at the University of Athens), who had the courage to challenge
with canonical arguments the ROC’s right to claim back the territory of Estonia. 68

Reaction of Baltic Religious Leaders to the Russian War in Ukraine

After Russia started a full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022 most of the religious
leaders all over the world have condemned the war. “When justifying Russia's war in Ukraine,
people think like terrorists” stated Jānis Vanags, Archbishop of the Latvian Evangelical
Lutheran Church. 69 Zbigņevs Stankevičs, the Catholic Archbishop in Latvia in his statement
referred to Pope Francis, saying that “the war in Ukraine is a shame for Russia, but as the Pope
says, also for all humanity, because it has allowed Russia's aggression to grow and escalate.
(...) the war did not break out in one moment; it is the result of a long process. The world has
not done all it could to nip these germs of war in the bud.” 70
The Consistory of the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church passed a declaration on
March 1, 2022, saying that every war of conquest against an independent state and nation
represents evil, condemning the Russian military attack on Ukraine. 71 A week later, the EOC
adopted a statement calling for peace in Ukraine as soon as possible. The EOC also condemned
Russia's unjust war of conquest, calling people not to be misled by sleazy news and propaganda,
which tries to downplay or justify this terrible war. 72
The EOC, in cooperation with local Ukrainian community, began to organize services
for refugees, who started to arrive in Estonia shortly after the war had begun. 73 Lutherans,
Catholics and Free Evangelical Churches also helped to accommodate the refugees and assisted
them in any way they could. In Latvia too, the Baptists got involved in helping refugees from
the first days of the war, establishing a special coordination group dealing with refugees. It has
been in close contact with churches in Poland and Romania. 74

68
Nikolai Balašov, Igor Prekup, Õigeusu probleemid Eestis. Arhimandriit Grigorios D. Papathomase raamatust
„Õnnetus olla väike kirik väikesel maal“ (Tallinn: 2013).
69
“Arhibīskaps Vanags: Attaisnojot Krievijas karadarbību Ukrainā, cilvēki domā kā teroristi,”
https://www.tvnet.lv/7468922/arhibiskaps-vanags-attaisnojot-krievijas-karadarbibu-ukraina-cilveki-doma-ka-
teroristi
70
Līga Abakuka, “Zbigņevs Stankevičs: Karš Ukrainā ir apkaunojums ne tikai Krievijai, bet visai cilvēcei,”
https://www.la.lv/arhibiskaps-kars-ukraina-ir-apkaunojums-ne-tikai-krievijai-bet-visai-cilvecei
71
EELK Kirikuvalitsus: “Iga Vallutus- Ja Allutussõda Iseseisva Riigi Ja Rahva Vastu Esindab Kurjust,” https://e-
kirik.eelk.ee/2022/eelk-kirikuvalitsus-iga-vallutus-ja-allutussoda-iseseisva-riigi-ja-rahva-vastu-esindab-kurjust/
72
https://www.eoc.ee/uudised-teated/eaok-puha-sinodi-avaldus-seoses-sojaga-ukrainas-2/?v=a57b8491d1d8
73
https://www.err.ee/1608526780/priit-rohtmets-ukraina-soda-kui-ususoda
74
Līva Fokrote, “Atbalsts Ukrainai,” Baptistu Vēstnesis, April/May (2022), pp. 8–9.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 17

 The LOC, however, at the beginning was very general in its public announcements, it
called to pray to God for the cessation of war. Texts of prayers in Latvian and Russian differed;
In Russian it called to stop "hostility, anger and intolerance" in Ukraine and to introduce "peace
and understanding" ("о прекращении вражды, злобы и ненависти, об утверждении мира и
взаимопонимания"), In Latvian to stop hostilities in Ukraine. Later it was more direct in
talking about the war. On March 3, 2022, a prayer for "ceasing the war" and not for
"establishing peace" was held in the Cathedral of the Daugavpils-Rēzekne eparchy. 75
Metropolitan Alexander said that war “was the most senseless and terrible sin.” 76 However he
has been diplomatic enough in avoiding a direct criticism of Kirill or the state of Russia. 77
In Estonia the EOC-MP had the courage to publish the speech made by Patriarch Kirill
on February 24, where he emphasized the unity of Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian peoples,
at the same time denying Ukrainian statehood and the right for self-determination. The speech
was published a day later on the website of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow
Patriarchate. 78
After the death of Metropolitan Kornelius the EOC-MP starting from 2018 has been
led by Metropolitan Yevgeny (Reshetnikov). He was nominated to this position by the
Patriarchate of Moscow, and he did not have any contacts with Estonia before his election.
Soon after his election he was mentioned in the yearbook of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence
Service, because under his leadership the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow
Patriarchate joined the propaganda campaign against the autocephalous Orthodox Church of
Ukraine. The Foreign Intelligence Service mentioned that Yevgeny had visited Crimea already
in the spring of 2014, i.e. immediately after its annexation by the Russian Federation. 79
What is even more important, is the information campaign, which started just a short time
before the Russian war against Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The EOC-MP published a
special edition in Estonian and Russian, which was critical about the independence of the
Ukrainian Church and defended the historical right of the Russian Orthodox Church to the soil

75
Elmārs Barkāns, “Latvijas pareizticīgo baznīcas balss šobrīd klusa. Kāda tad ir viņu nostāja šajā liktenīgajā
brīdī?,” https://jauns.lv/raksts/zinas/490727-latvijas-pareizticigo-baznicas-balss-sobrid-klusa-kada-tad-ir-vinu-
nostaja-saja-liktenigaja-bridi
76
Vita Anstrate, “Latvijas Pareizticīgā baznīca nosoda karu Ukrainā,”
https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/latvijas-pareizticiga-baznica-nosoda-karu-ukraina.a446784/
77
For full text of Alexander’s announcement see” Обращение Митрополита Рижского и всея Латвии
Александра,” https://eparhija.lv/20220306-mitr-obrash-prosh/ - more-44831
78
„Moskva ja kogu Venemaa pühima patriarhi Kirilli pöördumine,“ https://orthodox.ee/et/uudised/moskva-ja-
kogu-venemaa-puhima-patriarhi-kirilli-poordumine-24-02-2022/
79
„Välisluureameti aastaraamat,“ https://www.valisluureamet.ee/doc/raport/2019-en.pdf

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 18

of Estonia. 80 On February 5, 2022, the largest Estonian daily Postimees published an article
about the aggression of the ROC in Africa, which serves political goals of the Russian
authorities. 81 As a response Metropolitan Yevgeny published an article, claiming that the ROC
rejected accusations that the church was engaged in politics. 82
On March 2, Metropolitan Yevgeny published an official statement, in which he
continued to defend the view that the church had nothing to do with politics. At the same time,
he warned that a lot of misinformation was spreading, which could incite hatred, urging
"everyone to be sensible about spreading rumors, and not to succumb to incitement to hatred,
which could complicate an already difficult situation." He called for prayer for peace soon, but
there was no mention of his condemnation of Russian aggression in his statement. At the same
time he said that political divisions and war must not divide Christians. 83
The Council of Estonian Churches (ECC), which has ten Estonian Christian religious
associations as members, at first expressed a modest position and did not rush to speak on
Ukraine. The EOC-MP is also a member of the ECC. The president of the ECC Andres Põder,
even managed to defend the vague position of the Council in Estonian media and claimed that
the ECC had prophesied already a few days before the war with a statement for peace, also
defending Yevgeny’s statement and not doubting his sincerity. 84 This way he was probably
hoping to keep the council together and avoid conflicts. Realizing the absurdity of the latter
statement, the Council on March 17, finally adopted a proper statement. It referred to a
document adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly condemning Russia’s
aggression and expressed solidarity with the position of the UN. It was also signed by
Metropolitan Yevgeny of the EOC-MP. 85
It soon turned out, it did not mean that Yevgeny was willing to accept the council’s
position. On March 30 he gave an interview in which he refused to recognize Russia as an

80
"Православный Собесьдникъ. Специальный выпуск,"https://orthodox.ee/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ps-
01-2022-.pdf
The special edition was mentioned in the yearbook of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service. „Välisluureameti
aastaraamat,“ https://raport.valisluureamet.ee/2023/en/terrorism-and-migration/5-1-the-candle-of-the-russian-
world-is-burning-out/
81
„Vene agressioon õigeusu kirikus,“ https://leht.postimees.ee/7446010/vene-agressioon-oigeusu-kirikus
The
82
„Metropoliit Eugeni: Vene Õigeusu Kirikut süüdistatakse alusetult,“
https://arvamus.postimees.ee/7456548/metropoliit-eugeni-vene-oigeusu-kirikut-suudistatakse-alusetult
83
„Tallinna ja kogu Eesti metropoliit Eugeni pöördumine,“ https://orthodox.ee/et/uudised/tallinna-ja-kogu-eesti-
metropoliit-eugeni-poordumine-02-03-2022/
84
„Andres Põder: Armastusega kurjuse vastu,“ https://www.err.ee/1608530386/andres-poder-armastusega-
kurjuse-vastu
85
„Eesti Kirikute Nõukogu ja liikmeskirikute juhtide avaldus seoses sõjategevusega Ukrainas ja sõjapõgenike
vastuvõtmisega Eestis,“ http://ekn.ee/inc.seisukoht.php?id=585

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 19

aggressor. He also told the media that at the request of their church, a reference to Vladimir
Putin was left out from the statement of the ECC. He said he had agreed with the statement of
the ECC but left it for everyone to decide who was to blame for the war and who was the
aggressor. Yevgeny told the Estonian public that he was not familiar with politics, and he could
not say who was to blame for the war, adding that he had instead heard the Russian side
claiming that the Russian attack was preventive in nature in order to prevent an attack on
Ukraine a few days later. According to him, the responsibility for resolving the conflict also
lay on the West.
This absurd position is fundamentally in line with that of Patriarch Kirill. Yevgeny also
testified that on March 20, i.e. nearly a month after the outbreak of the all-out war, he attended
the liturgy with Kirill at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, saying that his
participation had been agreed upon already a long time ago. Finally, Yevgeny confirmed that
although some European congregations in Western-Europe had left the ROC, the war would
not crack the unity of Estonian congregations of the Moscow Patriarchate. 86
The statements of ROC representatives in Estonia and Latvia differed from some of the
ROC hierarchs, who serve outside Russia. To give one example, Bishop Petru Pruteanu,
responsible for the Russian Orthodox community in Portugal and Spain, told journalists that
the conflict pitting two Orthodox nations against each other was “scandalous.” The bishop,
who from November 2022 served in the ROC’s Patriarchal Exarchate in Western Europe also
suggested that Orthodox support for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intervention was a
result of an “enslaved” and idolatrous mindset. 87
The head of the ROC congregations in Lithuania, Archbishop Innokentiy of Vilnius
and Lithuania shortly after the breakout of the war also made a straightforward statement,
declaring his condemnation of the war initiated by Russia and stating that concerning the war
he does not agree with the views of Patriarch Kirill. 88
The vague statements made by Yevgeny after the Russian aggression caused a debate
in the Estonian press and social media in early March as to whether the activities of the EOC-
MP should be restricted or banned in Estonia. His views were in contrast with the statement
made by several Orthodox members of the EOC-MP, led by composer Arvo Pärt. They

86
„Metropoliit Eugeni: tsiviilobjektide pommitamine on kuritegu,“ https://www.err.ee/1608548929/metropoliit-
eugeni-tsiviilobjektide-pommitamine-on-kuritegu
87
Filipe D’Avillez, “Young bishop of Russian Orthodox Church: Ukraine war is ‘scandalous’,”
https://www.pillarcatholic.com/p/young-russian-orthodox-bishop-ukraine-war-is-scandalous
88
“Lithuanian Orthodox Church condemns Russia’s war on Ukraine,” https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-
english/19/1647975/lithuanian-orthodox-church-condemns-russia-s-war-on-ukraine

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 20

appealed to Patriarch Kirill with a request to speak up for an immediate end of the war. Among
the signatories were some Orthodox from Russia, Belarus, European countries, and the United
States. 89
The clergy of the EOC-MP, however, remained silent, except for archpriest Igor Prekup,
who tried to distance the local EOC-MP from the ROC, saying that he was ashamed of the war
in Ukraine. 90 In Latvia too, except for official pronouncements, there was not much said by
other Orthodox clergymen on the topic of war. For example, the website of the Alexander
Nevsky congregation in Riga just duplicated an official information provided by the LOC Press
Service about helping Ukrainian refugees. 91 Sometimes spiritualized explanations are given
like one by Valentīna Šimaņeca, Council member of the Orthodox congregation in Valmiera,
who stated:
We are all human, we all sin. The Soviet state has done a lot of evil, made people
godless with atheism. People (…) have forgotten the ability to pray. This is not just
about Russia and Ukraine, but the whole world. When people turned away from God,
all kinds of misfortunes began, genocide, war, natural disasters, diseases... There are
few people who pray from the heart, with love and tears in their eyes. You have to pray
for these people, they don't understand what they are doing!” 92

Kaspars Dimiters, a Latvian singer and well-known convert to the Orthodox faith, has
stirred up a controversy because of songs with texts like “This is not Europe, but an island of
Nazism, and they hypocritically lie about human rights here.” Another cause for irritation has
been the fact that some of his songs are dedicated to the liquidated Russian mercenary, Andrey
Ivanchuk, nicknamed Kuban, as well as to Darya, daughter of the Russian world ideologist
Alexander Dugin (she was killed by unknown persons in 2022). 93 However, Dimiters does not
represent the church in any formal way.

Changes in Canonical Status of the Latvian Orthodox Church

On September 8, 2022 the Latvian Parliament adopted in its final reading the
amendments to the Law of the Latvian Orthodox Church submitted by State President Egils

89
„Priit Rohtmets: The Two Estonian Orthodox Churches and the war in Ukraine,” https://www.vartija-
lehti.fi/the-two-estonian-orthodox-churches-and-the-war-in-ukraine/
90
„Õigeusu preester ütleb, et Ukraina sõda pole sünnis,“ https://kuuuurija.postimees.ee/7518888/oigeusu-
preester-utleb-et-ukraina-soda-pole-sunnis
91
„Латвийская Православная Церковь оказывает помощь украинским беженцам,”
https://www.xram.lv/post/pomosch-bezencam
92
Sandra Gredzena, Kad beigsies ieilgušais “krievu” baznīcas remonts?,” https://www.valmieraszinas.lv/kad-
beigsies-ieilgusais-krievu-baznicas-remonts/#1
93
Elmārs Barkāns, “Kaspars Dimiters kapos atklāj savu karam veltīto dziesmu albumu,”
https://jauns.lv/raksts/zinas/562607-kaspars-dimiters-kapos-atklaj-savu-karam-veltito-dziesmu-albumu-foto

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 21

Levits, stating that the church will operate completely independently. 73 MPs voted in favor
of the law, three against, and one abstained. Levits argued that the law needed to be changed,
because there was a certain risk the ROC leadership could unilaterally eliminate the existing
status of the LOC and this was something, which the Latvian state could not allow. According
to this understanding the separation of church and state in no way implied that there was no
connection or interaction between church and state and that freedom of religion absolutely
prevails over considerations of public safety and public order. 94
The decision, which at least formally was initiated by the state, took many people by
surprise. Just a couple years earlier Artūrs Bikovs and Andris Sprūds, scholars from Rīga
Stradiņš University, in a study where they compared the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine and
Latvia concluded that there were no preconditions that would lead to the establishment of the
autocephalous church in Latvia. 95
Defenders of the proposal to separate the LOC from the ROC argued that there was a
danger that the LOC could experience what the EOC-MP had gone through in 2018, when
Yevgeny was nominated as the leader of the EOC-MP, Yevgeny represented the ideas of “the
Russian world.” Soon after taking office Metropolitan Yevgeny together with representatives
of the Russian Embassy in Estonia and activists of “the Russian world” in Tallinn unveiled a
memorial plaque dedicated to the chapel named after St. George of the 95th Krasnoyarsk
Infantry Regiment of the Russian Empire. 96 However, the question of replacing a church leader
with a one more favorable to Moscow, was legally solved already in 2019. According to the
new regulation the head of the LOC, as well as metropolitans, bishops, and candidates for these
positions had to be members of clergy and citizens of the Republic of Latvia with a permanent
place of residence in Latvia for at least 10 years. 97
Interestingly, even Jānis Urbanovičs, the leader of the Russian speaking party
Harmony, supported the changes. In an interview he talked about his meeting with Orthodox
leaders. His comments reported by media shed more light on perspective of the LOC,

94
Edīte Brikmane, “Par Latvijas Pareizticīgās Baznīcas statusu,” https://lvportals.lv/skaidrojumi/344895-par-
latvijas-pareizticigas-baznicas-statusu-2022
95
Artūrs Bikovs, Andris Sprūds, “Towards Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine: Trend or Unique
Situation? Comparison with Latvia,” Daugavpils Universitātes 62. starptautiskās zinātniskās konferences rakstu
krājums. C. daļa. Humanitārās zinātnes (Daugavpils: Daugavpils Universitātes Akadēmiskais apgāds
"Saule", 2020), pp. 16-24.
96
Mārtiņš Drēģeris, “"Būt karā" jeb pusceļā uz jaunu Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas statusu,”
https://m.juristavards.lv/doc/281908-but-kara-jeb-puscela-uz-jaunu-latvijas-pareizticigas-baznicas-statusu/
97
“Pareizticīgās baznīcas galvai, metropolītiem, bīskapiem būs jābūt Latvijas pilsoņiem,”
https://saeima.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas-zinas/28036-pareizticigas-baznicas-galvai-metropolitiem-biskapiem-
bus-jabut-latvijas-pilsoniem

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 22

 they (i.e. church leadership) expressed their concern about the religious war between
brothers, about possible internal conflicts in the congregations, about the future
existence of a unified Latvian Orthodox Church. The bishops told the politician that
even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there were attempts to unite the Orthodox
Church of Latvia with the Orthodox Church of Constantinople. The change in the
church's status was justified by the need to break any ties with Russia, including the
hierarchical subordination of the Latvian Orthodox Church.” 98

Previously, Urbanovičs had been negative about any involvement of the state in
Orthodox affairs. He said that “the security of the state is most threatened by those who want
to provoke conflict even in the church, even in faith.” 99 It seems that after meeting the church
leaders he had changed his mind; probably some assurance was given that the new system was
not against the will of the current church leadership. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic
of Latvia authorized the Minister of Justice Jānis Bordāns to address Patriarch Kirill on behalf
of Latvia in order to inform him about the amendments to the Law of the Latvian Orthodox
Church and to ask autocephaly for the LOC. Thus, the representatives of the Republic of Latvia
followed the constitution of the ROC. A month later the LOC itself appealed to Kirill about a
canonical solution to the status of the LOC. 100
The Synod of the LOC was brief in its comments just stating that it "lovingly calls on
the clergy and laity to maintain a peaceful disposition of the spirit and the unity of the Church,
strictly observing the laws of Latvia." 101 Church leaders confirmed that the changes were about
legal status and did not change the liturgical life of the church. The public does not know all
the details, because they have not been made public. As expected, the reaction of the ROC was
negative, archpriest Nikolai Balashov, an advisor to Patriarch Kirill, said that the Latvian
authorities "outdid the Middle Ages" by their decision. 102 At the same time it is interesting to
note that leadership of the ROC was not harsh in its relation to the LOC. Its Holy Synod heard
a report from Kirill concerning the appeal of the LOC Council “to resolve the insurmountable
difficulties” caused by the amendments to the Law on the Latvian Orthodox Church adopted by the
Parliament of Latvia. The Holy Synod decided that the appeal should be considered at a meeting of

98
“Urbanovičs: Likuma grozījumi nekādā veidā neskars Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas iekšējo dzīvi,”
https://www.diena.lv/raksts/viedokli/latvija/urbanovics-likuma-grozijumi-nekada-veida-neskars-latvijas-
pareizticigas-baznicas-ieksejo-dzivi-14285975
99
“Urbanovičam bažas par "dažu kūdītāju" attieksmi pret pareizticīgo nostāju Ukrainas kara jautājumā,”
https://www.apollo.lv/7515614/urbanovicam-bazas-par-dazu-kuditaju-attieksmi-pret-pareizticigo-nostaju-ukrainas-kara-jautajuma
100
“Latvijas Pareizticīgā baznīca prasa neatkarību no Krievijas baznīcas,”
https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/latvijas-pareizticiga-baznica-prasa-neatkaribu-no-krievijas-
baznicas.a479602/
101
“Par grozījumiem Latvijas Pareizticīgās Baznīcas likumā,”
http://www.pareizticiba.lv/index.php?newid=9660
102
“Latvian Orthodox Church chooses not to argue with govt about its status,” https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-
stories/83021/

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 23

the Bishops’ Council. At the same time it decided to keep giving the Holy Chrism to the Church in
Latvia.103
President Levits’ announcement on September 5, 2022, about the proposal to change
the Law of the LOC has been criticized for mistakes in the text (The ROC is mistakenly called
the Orthodox Church of Russia) 104 and for continuing to legitimize the status of the LOC as
part of the Moscow Patriarchate. The autonomy Tomos of 1936, which was given by EP was
not mentioned in the text and when asking for autocephaly the state followed the constitution
of the ROC and did not turn to the EP to recognize its autocephaly. It is also questionable how
the changes, which were made in 2019 (only a Latvian citizen who has lived in Latvia for at
least 10 years can be elected as bishop or metropolitan) relate to the freedom of religion and
the constitutional principle of state and church separation (parliament’s legal office made
objections to these changes already in 2019). 105 Inese Runce, a scholar from the Institute of
Philosophy and Sociology of University of Latvia has pointed out that “even if the Orthodox
Church of Latvia will not have spiritual ties with Moscow, people will not change, because the
Moscow Patriarchate has already established a certain agency of the ‘Russian world’ in Latvia
(…) that influence has stayed since the days of Tsarist Russia, the USSR and the State Security
Committee.” 106
As expected, the changes in the law of the LOC were criticized by the LAOC. Its Synod
published an open letter to Latvian state authorities criticizing the decision to ignore the status
of the LOC from 1936 to 1940: “It is with great regret that the Latvian state after the collapse
of the USSR and the restoration of Latvia's independence did nothing to regain both legal and
factual strength and significance of Tomos issued by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of
Constantinople in 1936.”107 Authors of that document mentioned the situation in Estonia as a
comparison, acknowledging different circumstances among Estonians and Latvians, namely
the fact that the Estonian Orthodox in exile managed to maintain their Synod and therefore in

103
“Holy Synod: Appeal from the Council of the Latvian Orthodox Church will be considered by the Bishops’
Council of the Russian Orthodox Church,” https://mospat.ru/en/news/90132/
104
“Par likumprojektu "Grozījumi Latvijas Pareizticīgās Baznīcas likumā"”, https://likumi.lv/ta/id/335219-par-
likumprojektu-grozijumi-latvijas-pareizticigas-baznicas-likuma
105
Aldis Alliks, “Pazemīgā cerībā cerot aiztaupīt Latvijas valstij to pazemojošu rīcību…,”
https://m.juristavards.lv/eseja/282080-pazemiga-ceriba-cerot-aiztaupit-latvijas-valstij-to-pazemojosu-ricibu/
106
“Eksperte brīdina par sekām,” https://jauns.lv/raksts/zinas/521052-eksperte-bridina-par-sekam-ja-latvijas-
pareizticiga-baznica-neatbalstis-atdalisanos-no-maskavas-patriarhata
107
“Latvijas Pareizticīgās Autonomās Baznīcas Konstantinopoles Patriarhāta jurisdikcijā vēstule,”
https://m.juristavards.lv/eseja/282082-latvijas-pareizticigas-autonomas-baznicas-konstantinopoles-patriarhata-
jurisdikcija-vestule/

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 24

1990s they were able to provide an alternative to the eparchy of the ROC, which had existed
in Estonia during the Soviet era.
Latvian government chose a path different from neighboring Lithuania. Although
Metropolitan Innokenty, head of the Lithuanian Orthodox Church, at first criticized the position
of Patriarch Kirill and it was publicly announced that the church was seeking more
independence from Moscow, 108 he was nevertheless not willing to stop praying for Kirill. This
caused a schism among the Lithuanian Orthodox community, with priests being kicked out
from the structure of the ROC. 109
Unlike the Latvian government, the Lithuanian government decided to openly support
the establishing of a new church structure that would be under the jurisdiction of the EP. In
February 2023 Patriarch Bartholmew reinstated five defrocked Lithuanian Orthodox priests110
and in March 2023 he visited Lithuania. During his visit he told that they are going to establish
a branch (an exarchate) of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Lithuania. 111 Thus, as an outcome of
the Russian war in Ukraine the situation with Lithuanian Orthodox is becoming similar to
Estonia and Ukraine. An Estonian Justinus (Kiviloo) from the EOC was appointed as the exarch
of the exarchate and on January 6, 2024, he served at the first liturgy in Vilnius. 112

The Question of Loyalty of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate
In Estonia, a completely different kind of scenario unfolded in Autumn 2022. From
Spring 2022 Estonian media published articles, where the historical and political position of
the ROC and the EOC-MP was thoroughly explained, often leading to demands for the
termination of the EOC-MP. 113

108
“Orthodox Church of Lithuania to seek independence from Moscow,” https://orthodoxtimes.com/orthodox-
church-of-lithuania-to-seek-independence-from-moscow/
109
“Lithuanian Orthodox Church says it’s moving toward autonomy,” https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-
english/19/1940281/lithuanian-orthodox-church-says-it-s-moving-toward-autonomy
110
“Constantinople Patriarch reinstates 5 defrocked Lithuanian Orthodox priests,” https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-
english/19/1917248/constantinople-patriarch-reinstates-5-defrocked-lithuanian-orthodox-priests
111
“Ecumenical Orthodox Patriarch plans Lithuanian branch, in blow to Moscow,”
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ecumenical-orthodox-patriarch-plans-lithuanian-branch-blow-moscow-
2023-03-21/
112
“Istorinis įvykis: Vilniuje pirmąsias mišias laikė Konstantinopolio egzarchas,” https://m-delfi-
lt.cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/m.delfi.lt/delfi/article.php?amp=1&amp_gsa=1&amp_js_v=a9&id=95548853&usqp=mq331AQI
UAKwASCAAgM%3D&fbclid=IwAR2qu1SO0qXpxrMb-
s2j3KkK_gYiq8IRvTSFPHZlUaXIEoIdeV7kaxw4lpc#amp_tf=Pateikė%20„%251%24s“&aoh=17045412597386&referre
r=https%3A%2F%2F2.zoppoz.workers.dev%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.google.com&ampshare=https%3A%2F%2F2.zoppoz.workers.dev%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fm.delfi.lt%2Flietuvoje%2Farticle.php%3Fid%3D9
5548853
113
„Juku-Kalle Raid: Miks tulb Moskvale alluva õigeusu kiriku tegevus Toompeal lõpetada,“
https://elu24.postimees.ee/7614510/elu25-juku-kalle-raid-miks-tuleb-moskvale-alluva-oigeusu-kiriku-tegevus-
toompeal-lopetada

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 25

 On September 25, Patriarch Kirill said in a sermon that all (Russian) soldiers who die
in the line of duty in Ukraine have all of their sins forgiven. Kirill compared their sacrificial
death to that of Jesus. His sermon received a strong reaction by Estonian religious leaders and
politicians. It wasn’t only the words of Kirill that caused such a heated reaction, but the
ambivalent position of the EOC-MP. After more than 6 months since the beginning of the war
the church had still not managed to clearly state its position towards the war.
As an answer to these accusations, the EOC-MP claimed that they were attacked and
forcefully drawn into politics by Estonian media. In August the church published an open
prayer to all Orthodox in Estonia, to pray in churches and in homes that their flock would not
decrease because of evil people, who want to harm the EOC-MP.
According to the Ministry of the Interior, Patriarch Kirill's speech was an act of hostile
influence activity, which was not allowed in Estonia. 114 Therefore, on September 27, Lauri
Läänemets, the Minister of Interior, said that he expected a clear message from Metropolitan
Yevgeny that he disagreed with Patriarch Kirill. 115 Urmas Viilma, the Archbishop of the
Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church, also condemned the words of Patriarch Kirill, and
mentioned that the voices of the members or leaders of the EOC-MP, which would give an idea
of what these Orthodox Christians living in Estonia think of the position of Patriarch Kirill,
were very rare. The tension was growing, and the society expected a clearly and unequivocally
condemning assessment, he added. Viilma also mentioned that the joint ministry of Estonian
Christians would become more and more difficult, if the condemnation of Russia's war and
spiritual and physical aggression in Ukraine was not equally shared. 116
As Metropolitan Yevgeny did not take a stand on his Patriarch’s words, he was invited
to the Ministry of Interior to explain his position in connection with the views of Patriarch
Kirill. The ministry said that the head of the EOC-MP had to publicly denounce the views of
its Patriarch concerning the forgiveness of sins to Russian soldiers. This was a question of
maintaining public trust of the EOC-MP and keeping the Estonian society united in a situation

„Kadri Paas: Lõpetame Kremli allorganisatsiooni tegevuse Eestis,“ https://arvamus.postimees.ee/7624257/kadri-

paas-lopetame-kremli-allorganisatsiooni-tegevuse-eestis
„Moskva Patriarhaadi Õigeusu Kirik – terroristliku riigi rakuke Eesti Vabariigis,“
https://ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/120087766/moskva-patriarhaadi-oigeusu-kirik-terroristliku-riigi-rakuke-eesti-
vabariigis
114
Ministeerium: Patriarh Kirilli sõnavõtt on selge mõjutustegevus,“
https://www.err.ee/1608731419/ministeerium-patriarh-kirilli-sonavott-on-selge-mojutustegevus
115
„Whom does the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate serve?“ https://www.vartija-
lehti.fi/whom-does-the-estonian-orthodox-church-of-the-moscow-patriarchate-
serve/?fbclid=IwAR36_SbqrMii_DZSfo3oOZfFAmTkOn5E7l3KMSg_uWuzUUuUTLGpSGf6zKY
116
„Urmas Viilma: Patriarh Kirill on andnud loa tappa,“ https://www.err.ee/1608729499/urmas-viilma-patriarh-
kirill-on-andnud-loa-tappa

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 26

of war in Ukraine. As Metropolitan Yevgeny is a Russian citizen, who has a fixed-term
residence permit in Estonia, the Minister of Interior said on October 5 that the actions of the
Metropolitan could lead to withdrawal of the residence permit. 117 When these events happened,
Yevgeny was not in Estonia, officially due to health reasons. On October 9 he celebrated his
65th birthday in Moscow, and Patriarch Kirill congratulated him and praised him for preserving
the unity of the church. 118
The state’s position to ask for answers was met with criticism by Christian conservative
circles, who considered it as an attack against the EOC-MP, which they interpreted as an attack
against all Christians living in Estonia. 119 Archbishop Viilma, who himself had earlier asked
the EOC-MP to take a clear position about the war, now asked the public to calm down. In
October Estonian media was full of articles demanding the closure of the entire EOC-MP.
Viilma argued that there were members in the EOC-MP, who had openly opposed the war, so
the closure of the entire EOC-MP seemed to be unfair. 120 He also questioned the state’s right
to ask answers in such manner from churches. 121 His statement caused a strong reaction from
Estonian public. It was asked in the media, why he suddenly became an advocate for the EOC-
MP, 122 and there were even claims made that Viilma had begun to radicalize. 123
The Undersecretary for Population and Civil Society of the Ministry of Interior Raivo
Küüt explained that the Estonian state had not demanded a political statement from
Metropolitan Yevgeny, but explanations and a clear message that the church operating in
Estonia did not support the enemy and thus did not divide the society. 124

117
„Siseministeerium: Eugeni elamisloa tühistamist ei saa välistada,“
https://www.err.ee/1608738268/siseministeerium-eugeni-elamisloa-tuhistamist-ei-saa-valistada
118
„Патриарх Кирилл поблагодарил главу Эстонской церкви за сохранение единства,“
https://rg.ru/2022/10/09/patriarh-kirill-poblagodaril-glavu-estonskoj-cerkvi-za-sohranenie-edinstva.html
119
„Juhtkiri: Rünnak MPEÕK vastu on rünnak kogu Eesti kristlaskonna vastu,“
https://meiekirik.net/index.php/art/2132-juhtkiri-ruennak-mpeok-vastu-on-ruennak-kogu-eesti-kristlaskonna-
vastu
120
„Urmas Viilma: Rahu – pidage hoogu!“ https://www.err.ee/1608741982/urmas-viilma-rahu-pidage-hoogu
121
„Viilma tõstatas küsimuse riigi õigusest kirikule ultimaatumeid esitada,“
https://www.err.ee/1608746614/viilma-tostatas-kusimuse-riigi-oigusest-kirikule-ultimaatumeid-esitada
122
„Seisukoht: Miks Urmas Viilma hakkas ootamatult Moskva suuvoodriks?,“
https://www.ohtuleht.ee/1071877/seisukoht-miks-urmas-viilma-hakkas-ootamatult-moskva-
suuvoodriks?fbclid=IwAR2AlCP0K02dREbWF8K6n7aDHVoYbZ17RgFzkYZy5LT-iD9e0zFHD3i4DhU
123
„Võim ja julgeolek. Meelis Oidsalu: EELK Peapiiskop on hakanud radikaliseeruma,“
https://arvamus.postimees.ee/7627019/voim-ja-julgeolek-meelis-oidsalu-eelk-peapiiskop-on-hakanud-
radikaliseeruma?fbclid=IwAR05hYzaDEUwY9QqKdos6xQ6Ea-
j6TZa0AQzKX1KXaHsWTlZGBq1UuIFCX4#_ga=2.80891987.519952137.1664883759-
720479677.1639630362
124
„Raivo Küüt: Riik peab tagama nii usuvabaduse kui ka inimeste julgeoleku,“
https://www.err.ee/1608751471/raivo-kuut-riik-peab-tagama-nii-usuvabaduse-kui-ka-inimeste-julgeoleku

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 27

 On October 12, Metropolitan Yevgeny officially stated that he did not share the views
of Patriarch Kirill concerning his sermon about the forgiveness of sins to Russian soldiers and
confirmed that no war propaganda was made in the church. A week later he visited the Ministry
of Interior to repeat his statement and after the meeting Raivo Küüt explained to the public that
at the moment, there was no reason to consider the EOC-MP as a security threat. 125
Although the situation calmed down, the explanation, which Yevgeny gave to the
public, managed to cause more confusion. He overruled the claim that he had abandoned his
Patriarch and that there was a schism between the two. He confirmed that he had expressed his
disagreement with one statement made by Kirill about the forgiveness of sins to soldiers,
because it was expressed in a confusing manner. He then offered a surprising explanation,
saying that in fact, the Patriarch had not incited war, but tried to take care of people, so that
they would not lose their humanity in this difficult situation. 126
After the scandal, the church has kept a very low profile. Once, shortly before
parliamentary elections in March 2023, Metropolitan Yevgeni was again in the news, when he
together with Aivo Peterson and Oleg Ivanov, two representatives of the NGO “Together”
(Koos) released a video on social media, inviting people to a prayer for peace. According to
the Ministry of the Interior, the same NGO had repeatedly made pro-Kremlin statements. After
a heated reaction by Estonian politicians, who said that the residence permit of Yevgeni should
be revoked, in case he should cooperate with “Together,” 127 he decided to withdraw and cancel
the prayer, claiming that they fell victims of a provocation. 128
On January 31, 2023, the ministry of Interior published a press release that Yevgeni
was invited to the Ministry to explain his involvement in organizing a political
demonstration. 129 It was already a second time he was asked to explain his position. Peterson
and Ivanov registered the NGO Together as a political party, but on March 11, 2023 Peterson
was arrested by the Estonian Internal Security Service on suspicion of treason and thereafter

125
„Metropoliit Eugeni: Ma ei jaga patriarh Kirilli sõnu,“ https://www.err.ee/1608747715/metropoliit-eugeni-ma-
ei-jaga-patriarh-kirilli-sonu
126
„Professor: Metropoliit Eugeni vastas ministeeriumile nii nagu temalt küsiti,“
https://www.err.ee/1608753352/professor-metropoliit-eugeni-vastas-ministeeriumile-nii-nagu-temalt-kusiti
127
„Ossinovski: Metropoliit peab poliitilisest koostööst loobuma või tuleks tühistada tema elamisluba,“
https://www.postimees.ee/7702021/ossinovski-metropoliit-peab-poliitilisest-koostoost-loobuma-voi-tuleks-
tuhistada-tema-elamisluba
128
„Vene kirik tühistas MTÜ Koos/Vmeste algatatud ühispalvuse,“ https://www.err.ee/1608869081/vene-kirik-
tuhistas-mtu-koos-vmeste-algatatud-uhispalvuse
129
„Siseministeerium kutsub metropoliit Eugeni selgitusi andma,“
https://siseministeerium.ee/uudised/siseministeerium-kutsub-metropoliit-eugeni-selgitusi-andma

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 28

Oleg Ivanov left for Russia, claiming that he will continue running the party from there. 130 In
June 2023 Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna added Patriarch Kirill to the list of persona non-
grata and thus banned Kirill from entering Estonia. 131
On January 18, 2024, the Minister of Interior, Lauri Läänemets announced that the
Estonian Police and Border Guard Board had decided not to extend the residence permit of
Metropolitan Yevgeni. The representative of the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board
explained that the Estonian Internal Security Service “finds that Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all
of Rus, as head of the Russian Orthodox Church, has consistently vindicated and supported the
Kremlin regime's bloody aggression against Ukraine. The actions of both the Moscow patriarch and
Metropolitan Eugene have aided Russia's security policy in Estonia/” Representatives of the
Ministry of the Interior have several times met with the Metropolitan and explained to him that he
needs to stop promoting the Kremlin regime and Russia's military actions in his statements. But
despite past warnings, he has not altered his conduct.132

Conclusion
The Russian war in Ukraine has considerably changed the position and perception of
Orthodoxy and the Orthodox churches of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Baltic States.
The churches in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have for decades constructed their identity, and
this is why it was important in this article to focus first on the history of Orthodoxy in the
Baltics. The identity, which has been constructed, aims to emphasize the loyalty towards local
authorities and the local nature of the churches, but at the same time relies on Russian historical
figures and imperial narratives.
The narratives defend and promote the imperial understanding of Russia and Orthodoxy,
which according to their best understanding have for centuries been important players and
influencers in Baltic history and therefore are naturally part of the society and its historical
consciousness nowadays too. Therefore, any interruption, like the change of canonical order in
the 1920s and 1930s, is considered to be a negative development, usually referred to as a sign

130
„Kohus vahistas Aivo Peterson ja kaks meest, keda kahtlustatakse Eesti Vabariigi vastase suhte loomises,“
https://www.delfi.ee/artikkel/120156128/kohus-vahistas-aivo-petersoni-ja-kaks-meest-keda-kahtlustatakse-eesti-
vabariigi-vastase-suhte-loomises;
„Erakonna Koos juht Ivanov lahkus Venemaale ja juhib erakonda sealt,“
https://www.err.ee/1608983237/erakonna-koos-juht-ivanov-lahkus-venemaale-ja-juhib-erakonda-sealt
131
„Välisminister Tsahkna keelas patriarh Kirillile Eestisse sisenemise,“
https://www.vm.ee/uudised/valisminister-tsahkna-keelas-patriarh-kirillile-eestisse-sisenemise
132
„Estonia forcing Russian head of church to leave the country by February 6,“
htps://news.err.ee/1609225554/estonia-forcing-russian-head-of-church-to-leave-the-country-by-february-6

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 29

of nationalism, ethnophyletism or simply a political intrusion into ecclesiastical life.
Sometimes, as shown in Latvia, the history of 1920s and 1930s has been analyzed in relatively
neutral terms, but all in all, the dominant features in writing the Orthodox history of the Baltics
are the (political) martyrs, Russian imperial, and more recent traditions (like the celebration of
the victory day on May 9th), the conflict with the West, and a battle against local Western rulers,
who have treated the peasants poorly. The churches are eager to promote their history in writing
and have received funds from Russia (namely from the “Russki Mir” Foundation) to do so.
The scandals, which have arisen over the last decades, either for reasons of national
security or some other reason, have not done much harm to the churches. Political connections
with “Russki Mir” and the policy of Russian compatriots, as well as infiltration into the local
political life, have over the years gained public attention. Although they have confirmed the
notion, which has been rooted in Baltic societies for a long time that Orthodoxy has been and
still is a Russian religion, until the war there were no major state interferences in ecclesiastical
matters. Having said that, there are a few cases which have been analyzed in the article, when
the state has interfered, i.e. the scandal over the construction of Lasnamäe church in Tallinn.
There are a few examples from Latvia as well. To begin with, in 1992 negotiations with the
ROC about the status of the LOC there were a number of state representatives, who participated,
e.g. Viktors Skudra, Minister of Justice and Antons Seiksts, deputy of the Supreme Council
and others took part of the discussion. 133
In 1992 Patriarch Alexy II sent a letter to the Minister of Justice of Latvia stating that
ROC does not have pretentions to the property owned by LOC (according to the by-laws of
the eparchy of Riga, its predecessor, property of the Orthodox Church in Latvia belonged to
the ROC). Thus, the LOC as a legal successor of pre-war LOC was able to register church
properties under its name. 134
Finding a balance between Russian and local identity and state loyalty became
significantly more difficult when the Russian full-scale war broke out in Ukraine in February
2022. The churches were expected to take a stand and condemn the aggressor. As shown in the
article the reactions of the leaders of local ROC Orthodox Churches differed. There, history of
local communities and tactics chosen by individual church leaders played an important role. In
all three Baltic states it lead to the interference by state authorities. In Estonia the state only

133
“Latvijas Pareizticīgās baznīcas koncils,” Pareizticīgās baznīcas kalendārs 2021 (Rīga: Latvijas Pareizticīgās
baznīcas sinode), p. 10.
134
Николай Тихомиров, «Исторический путь Православия в Латвии,» Православный церковный календарь
1994 (Рига: Латвийская Православная церковь, без года издания), pp. 119–120.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 30

asked explanations; in Latvia and Lithuania the state helped to reorganize a new church (in
Lithuania) or reorganized the existing church (in Latvia).
In Latvia the war launched by Russia and Kirill’s wholehearted support of its’ cause
provided a new impetus for the separation of the LOC from Moscow, which in the past has
been discussed occasionally in the media. The President of the Republic of Latvia, Egils Levits,
of all presidents since 1990s, was the closest to the ideology of the National Alliance (a right-
wing party), and this probably helped him to carry out the separation of the LOC from the
ROC. Actually, President Levits had spoken about the independence of the LOC already earlier,
for example on the occasion of presenting the Certificate of Merit to Metropolitan Alexander
to honor him on his 80th birthday in 2019. Levits thanked him for making sure that the LOC
“has full legal status and can be fully functioning and independent church which is represented
in all parts of independent Latvia.” 135 As explained in the article, the approach is similar to the
one in the 1920s and the beginning of 1930s, when the LOC remained in the jurisdiction of the
ROC but saw itself as an independent church.
Like in Latvia, in Lithuania the state also interfered in church affairs. The schism in the
local Lithuanian Orthodox community led to the establishing of a new church structure under
the jurisdiction of the EP. This way, as a result of the Russian war in Ukraine the situation with
Lithuanian Orthodox is becoming similar to Estonia and Ukraine.
Analysis of the changes in 2022 should be viewed in a larger context of the more
negative attitude towards Russian language and culture in general, identifying it with the
aggressor. For example, Aleksandr Pushkin’s monument was also removed from its place in
one of central parks of Riga. Latvian poet Liāna Langa launched a controversial campaign of
de-russification in Facebook and other media. This call has been praised by right-wing
nationalists but criticized by others for stirring up ethnic tension and for being a “Latvian
version of the Russian World”–different in its goal but similar in rhetoric and a level of hate. 136
Previous quotations in this article from various Orthodox sources show that the LOC in
the recent past carefully stressed both aspects–first, the loyalty to the state of Latvia and second,
autonomy and canonical ties with Moscow. Changes in canonical status were not something
which was debated by the church. There is no political theology in the church, which would

135
“President of Latvia presents Certificate of Merit to Metropolitan of Riga and all Latvia Alexander in honour
of His Eminence’s 80th birthday,” https://www.president.lv/en/article/president-latvia-presents-certificate-merit-
metropolitan-riga-and-all-latvia-alexander-honour-his-eminences-80th-
birthday?utm_source=https%3A%2F%2F2.zoppoz.workers.dev%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.google.com%2F
136
“Lido, McDonald's, KFC - kāpēc Liāna Langa kategoriski neiesaka tur ēst,”
https://tautaruna.nra.lv/divaini/434574-lido-mcdonald-s-kfc-kapec-liana-langa-kategoriski-neiesaka-tur-
est/?utm_source=inboxlv&utm_campaign=inboxlvNews&utm_medium=button

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 31

challenge secular authorities or would encourage critical thinking about social-political
processes and Christian participation in them (except cases when the LOC together with leaders
of other churches have expressed concerns about what they have seen as a threat to Christian
values (e.g. Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and
Domestic Violence, LGBT rights, etc.). 137
Analysis of articles and statements, published by structures belonging to the LOC (e.g.
Pravoslavnaya Zhiznj, published by eparchy of Daugavpils-Rēzekne, Vinogradnaya Loza,
church calendar) shows that there is no discursive change after church independence was
announced. As previously, a lot of articles are devoted to the history of the Orthodox Church
in Latvia. There are also articles and photos related to church life in Russia and Russian culture
in general. For example, in the February-March 2023 issue, in the cover of Vinogradnaya Loza
there is a picture of Mikhail Nesterov’s painting “Holy Russia” and there is an article published
about that piece of art. 138 The same issue also has a story about a saint from Penza in Russia.139
The September issue of Vinogradnaya Loza (2022), which was published during the
canonical changes of the LOC, printed a short announcement by the Press Service of the LOC
stating that the changes do not alter dogma and liturgical life of the church. 140 In the same issue,
as in some previous issues, there is a portrait of a Russian tsar (in this case Nikolay I) as an
illustration to the story from his time. 141 Illustrative materials of Orthodox publications in
Latvia often are from the tsarist period. For example, archbishop Amvrosij’s (Kljucarev)
sermon, which was published in 2018, was illustrated with a painting of a ball in the Hall of
Nobles in St. Peterburg. 142 The state TV stopped regular broadcasts of Orthodox liturgy
because it spotted that Kirill is still mentioned in prayers during worship services conducted
by the LOC. 143 In August 2023 bishops of the LOC consecrated the new bishop, Jānis (Lipšāns)

137
For a different Orthodox theological perspective see, for example, Nikolaos Asproulis,
“Doing Orthodox Political Theology Today, Insights from the Document For the Life of the World: Toward a
Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church (2020).” Ecumenical Review Sibiu / Revista Ecumenica Sibiu 13: 1 (2021),
pp. 16–30.
138
Ксения Дементьева, Художник Михаил Нестеров: “Эта картина – итог моих лучших помыслов,”
Виноградная Лоза № 2-3 (2023), p. 19.
139
Татьяна Суслова, “Крестные пути отца Гавриила,” Виноградная Лоза № 2-3 (2023), pp. 20-24.
140
“О изменениях в Законе о Латвийской Православной Церкви,” Виноградная Лоза № 9 (2022), p. 2.
141
Олег Пелевин, “У него есть Государь,” Виноградная Лоза № 9 (2022), p. 21.
142
Амвросий, “О семейном счастье,” Православная Жизнь 2 (2018), p. 6.
143
“Reaģējot uz aizlūgumu par Kirilu, LTV pārtrauc pārraidīt pareizticīgo dievkalpojumus,”
https://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics /reagejot-uz-aizlugumu-par-kirilu-ltv-partrauc-parraidit-pareizticigo-
dievkalpojumus.d?id=55879014; The state TV is broadcasting worship services of all major Christian
denominations.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 32

who is Latvian by nationality, not well known outside Orthodox circles. 144 No foreign hierarch
was involved in this act. The ROC criticized it as noncanonical because the LOC did not ask
the ROC to confirm the candidacy of the new bishop. 145 However in October 2023 a delegation
from the LOC visited Moscow and we read on the LOC website that the meeting “took place
in a constructive and Christian atmosphere of trust.” 146 Delegates also received a chrism
(anointing oil) although as an autocephalous church (at least in eyes of the state), the LOC
could produce such oil itself.
In Estonia, the controversial statements, which were made by Metropolitan Yevgeni of
the EOC-MP in 2022 resulted in the public demand that the EOC-MP should be terminated.
Although the situation calmed down after the clash in September and October, when there was
a serios chance of Yevgeni losing his residence permit, the EOC-MP was persistently observed
by the public and there is a great distrust towards the church. For example in December 2022,
Martin Repinski, a member of Estonian Parliament Riigikogu wanted to support the EOC-MP
Jõhvi congregation in Eastern Estonia with 25,000 euros. Once a year, MPs hand out regional
grants, and while the scheme has been criticized every year for its lack of transparency (in 2023
the grant system was abolished), in this case the criticism was about security and loyalty of the
EOC-MP. The Chairman of the Parliament’s Finance Committee, Aivar Kokk, explained that
the members of the committee thought that with today's security issues, it was not justified to
give money to this NGO. “The members of the commission unequivocally supported this
proposal," Kokk told. 147
The leader of the EOC-MP has repeated several times that the church does not do
politics and denies any political connections with Russia. Instead, he has mentioned that the
church can only speak on important issues of value. As it turns out, killing innocent Ukrainians
is not a value question, but a question of politics. His position seemingly separates political
issues from value issues, although in fact value issues are an integral part of Russian state
politics. After all, Russian leaders justify the current war by protecting their values and their
way of life.
Even more importantly, it characterizes the understanding of politics in the Russian
society. When people in Western societies have considered politics as being an integral part of

144
„Pēc 80 gadu pārtraukuma Latvijas pareizticīgajiem atkal bīskaps - latvietis,“
https://jauns.lv/raksts/zinas/572639-pec-80-gadu-partraukuma-latvijas-pareizticigajiem-atkal-biskaps-latvietis-
foto
145
“Учреждение автокефалии: канонический аспект,” http://edinstvo.patriarchia.ru/en/db/text/6069558.html
146
“Встреча в Отделе внешних церковных связей,” http://www.pareizticiba.lv/index.php?newid=10043
147
https://www.err.ee/1608810664/repinski-suunas-oma-katuseraha-johvi-koguduselt-johvi-jalgpalliklubile

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 33

democracy, have valued different opinions, considering it as an essential part of democratic
society and thus there is no major gap between the people and politics (if we leave out the
rhetoric of the far-left or far-right), the statement about the fear of being part of politics by the
ROC characterizes something else. It mirrors Russian society, where politics is something,
which is removed from the hands of the people, where one opinion is correct, and others are
wrong. This is why it is possible to draw a strict line between politics and the people and claim
that the church does not do politics.
The EOC-MP seems to understand that most of the Estonian society perceives it as an
organization, which represents a foreign power and culture, but as the church is more or less
Russian in its nature, the options of what to do, are rather limited. In addition to some members
of the EOC-MP, who have decided to join the EOC and the appeals by members of the EOC-
MP to say out loud, who is to blame for the war and call for immediate peace, recently
Archpriest Igor Prekup published a different sort of article in the biggest Estonian daily
newspaper Postimees, stating that the accusations towards the church are just lies and the
church has not been understood. This characterizes well that even though the churches are
serving the people in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, they have in fact not integrated in the
societies and even after the war represent Russian imperial history and consciousness. 148
Andrey Kurajev, a former priest of the ROC and now a critic of Putin’s regime and the ROC
responded to Prekup’s article and stated that the article shows the deep roots of the “Russki
mir” in Estonian society. 149 The same conclusion can be made about the rest of the Baltic States.

148
“Ülempreester Igor Prekup: Moskva Eesti Õigeusu Kiriku kohta valetatakse. Meid ei ole mõistetud,”
https://arvamus.postimees.ee/7905788/ulempreester-igor-prekup-moskva-eesti-oigeusu-kiriku-kohta-
valetatakse-meid-ei-ole-moistetud
149
„Русский мир в Эстонии,“ htps://rus.pos�mees.ee/7906920/russkiy-mir-v-estonii

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2024) XLIV, 1 34