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DeThiSo1 K53KHMT LoiGiai

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48 views3 pages

DeThiSo1 K53KHMT LoiGiai

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Vietnam National University, Hanoi Faculty of Information Technology

University of Engineering and Technology Friday, January 06, 2012


Duration : 120 minutes Open books and notes, no notebooks, no mobile phones
Class : INT3093 No discussion or exchange of documents between students during the exam

Final Exam
Network Security
(4 problems, 3 pages, point values given in parentheses, 10 maximum)

1. Key distribution and user authentication (2 points)


Assume an open distributed environment in which users at client workstations wish to
access services on servers distributed throughout the network. We would like for servers
to be able to restrict access to authorized users and to be able to authenticate requests for
service. Rather than building in elaborate authentication protocols at each server, an
authentication server (AS) and a ticket-granting server (TGS) are used. The AS knows
the passwords of all users and stores these in a centralized database. Its function is to
authenticate users to servers. The TGS knows if a user can access a particular service.
Consider the following hypothetical dialogue.
(i) Once per user logon session
(1) C → AS : IDC ║ IDtgs
(2) AS → C : EKC[Tickettgs]

(ii) Once per type of service


(3) C → TGS : IDC ║ IDV ║ Tickettgs
(4) TGS → C : TicketV
(iii) Once per service session
(5) C → V : IDC ║ TicketV
Tickettgs = EKtgs[IDC ║ ADC ║ IDtgs ║ TS1 ║ Lifetime1]

TicketV = EKV[IDC ║ ADC ║ IDV ║ TS2 ║ Lifetime2]

where, C is a client workstation, IDC is the identifier of user on C, IDtgs is the identifier
of TGS, V is a service server, IDV is the identifier of V, Tickettgs is the ticket to be used
by client to access TGS, TicketV is the ticket to be used by client to access server V, ADC
is the network address of C, KC is a key derived from the user’s password, Ktgs is a secret
key known only to AS and TGS, KV is a secret key known only to TGS and V, TS1
indicates the time at which Tickettgs is issued, TS2 indicates the time at which TicketV is
issued, Lifetime1 và Lifetime2 indicate the length of time for which the corresponding
ticket is valid.
a. (1 point)

Final Exam NETWORK SECURITY 1/3


Vietnam National University, Hanoi Faculty of Information Technology
University of Engineering and Technology Friday, January 06, 2012
Describe two scenarios in which an opponent, without knowing the user IDC‘s
password nor KC, is able to impersonate this user to obtain TicketV from TGS.
Tình huống 1: Người dùng ID_C rời khỏi máy tính C nhưng không tắt máy tính C, địch
thủ sẽ tìm cách ngồi vào máy tính C và gửi lại thông báo (3) nó nghe lén được trước đó
cho TGS khi Ticket_tgs chưa hết hạn.
Tình huống 2: Người dùng ID_C tắt máy tính C, địch thủ sẽ cấu hình máy tính của mình
cho địa chỉ IP trùng với AD_C (địa chỉ IP của máy tính C) rồi gửi lại thông báo (3) nó
nghe lén được trước đó cho TGS khi Ticket_tgs chưa hết hạn
b. (0.5 point)
In each of the above scenarios, after obtaining obtain TicketV from TGS, how the
opponent can do to have access to the corresponding service?
Sau khi nhận được Ticket_V từ TGS, địch thủ gửi ID_C || Ticket_V cho V từ máy tính C
(trong tình huống thứ nhất) hay từ máy tính đã được cấu hình có địa chỉ IP là AD_C
(trong tình huống thứ hai), V kiểm tra thấy truy vấn là hợp lệ nên sẽ cho phép địch thủ
truy cập V.
a. (0.5 point)
Explain how our system is vulnerable to a password attack.

2. Transport-level security (3 points)


Consider the SSL Handshake Protocol. Suppose that the hybrid ephemeral/fixed Diffie-
Hellman key exchange method is used; the server has a fixed Diffie-Hellman
public/private key pair (the Diffie-Hellman public parameters are contained in the
server’s certificate); the client generates a one-time Diffie-Hellman public/private key
pair but has a fixed RSA public/private key pair (the RSA public key is contained in the
client’s certificate).
a. (1.5 point)
Draw the most secure exchange of messages expected for this scenario.
b. (1.5 point)
Describe the parameters associated with each situation dependent message and
with the client_key_exchange message.

3. Electronic mail security (2.5 points)


A user A maintains a PGP public key ring with the fields Public Key, User ID, Owner
Trust, and Signatures as follows:

Public PUA PUB PUC PUD PUE PUF PUG PUH


Key
User ID A B C D E F G H
Owner Ultimate Always Usually Always Usually Usually Not Always
Trust trusted trusted trusted trusted trusted trusted trusted

Final Exam NETWORK SECURITY 2/3


Vietnam National University, Hanoi Faculty of Information Technology
University of Engineering and Technology Friday, January 06, 2012

Signatures - A A C C, D B C, F G, I
The Key Legitimacy fields are computed on the basis of the attached signatures as
follows:
• If the owner is A then the public key is legitimate.
• If at least one signature has a signature trust value of ultimate, then the public key is
legitimate.
• Otherwise, PGP computes a weighted sum of the trust values. A weight of 1 is given
to signatures that are always trusted and ½ to signatures that are usually trusted.
When the total of weights of the introducers of a Public Key/User ID combination
reaches 1, the public key is considered legitimate.
• In all remaining cases, the public key is considered illegitimate.
Draw the corresponding PGP trust model.

4. IP Security (2.5 points)


Draw the format of the IPv4 IPSec packets as transmitted on the Internet by the security
gateway GW1 of a local network LAN1 to the security gateway GW2 of another local
network LAN2. Those packets have the host H1 in LAN1 as the original source and the
host H2 in LAN2 as the original destination. IPSec is implemented on the devices H1,
GW1, GW2, and H2. Two security association are combined together: an inner transport
security association and an outer tunnel security association. In the tunnel mode, both
ends of the security association are a security gateway. The inner transport security
association provides data origin authentication. The outer tunnel security association
provides only data confidentialy but no additional authentication
Are the given packets protected against data modification, replay and limited traffic
analysis attacks? Explain why with each attack.

Final Exam NETWORK SECURITY 3/3

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