Game Theory, Legal History, and the Origins of Judicial Review: A Revisionist Analysis of

Marbury v. Madison
Author(s): Robert Lowry Clinton
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May, 1994), pp. 285-302
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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Game Theory,Legal History,and the Originsof
JudicialReview: A RevisionistAnalysis of
Marburyv. Madison*

RobertLowry Clinton,Departmentof Political Science, Southern

Illinois University

Marburyv. Madison,theSupremeCourt'sleadingprecedent forjudicialreviewof

nationallaws,has longbeenviewedby scholarsas a kindof"game"-a politicalstruggle
betweentwotitansofUnitedStatesconstitutional history:PresidentThomasJefferson and
ChiefJusticeJohnMarshall.Furthermore, Marbury has generally
beenseenas a conflict
inwhichMarshalloutfoxed Jeffersonbyestablishing a precedentforcourtreviewoflegisla-
tiveactsina situationto whichJefferson couldnotrespond.The analysiscontained inthis
articlesuggeststhattheconventional viewof Marburyis mistaken. The authoremploys
bothtraditionallegal-historical
analysisandgametheoryto demonstrate thatthebehavior
ofbothMarshalland Jefferson was consistent withtheassumption thattheyweremerely
rationalactorsmaximizing theirpayoffs at each stageofthecontroversy.

Introduction
The decisionof the UnitedStates SupremeCourtin Marburyv.
Madison(1803) has been universally hailedas a politicalmasterpiece.
Federalistson the highcourt,led by ChiefJusticeJohnMarshall,had
foundthemselvesin an awkwardposition.A fellowFederalist,William
Marbury, had asked forvindication of a judicialappointment madeby
lame-duckFederalistPresidentJohnAdams,and failureto do so would
notpleaseMarshall'spartisans.On theotherhand,attempting to enforce
Marbury's claimwouldsurelyprovokethewrathofthenewlydominant
Republicans,led by PresidentThomasJefferson and Secretaryof State
JamesMadison,withwhomtheCourtwouldhaveto liveforsometime.
Marshall'sresolutionof thisdilemma,involving theCourt'srefusal
on constitutionalgroundsto issue a writof mandamusrequestedby
Marbury,is widelythoughtto have accomplishedseveralobjectives
presumably desiredby the Court:(1) publiclyrebukingJefferson and
Madisonand branding theirconductas improper and illegal;(2) advanc-
ingthenotionthata writof mandamuswas a properremedyat law in
thiskindofcase, withthecorresponding implicationthathighexecutive

*Theauthorwishesto thankProfessors
JamesEnelow,UdayDesai, JohnHamman,
WallaceMendelson,and twoanonymous reviewers
forhelpfulcommentson thisarticle.

AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience, Vol. 38, No. 2, May 1994, Pp. 285-302

? 1994bytheUniversity ofTexas Press,P.O. Box 7819,Austin,TX 78713-7819

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286 RobertLowry Clinton

weresubjectto theprocessoffederalcourts;(3) establishing

officials the
authority of the Courtto overturnacts of Congress;yet (4) avoiding
outrightconflictwiththeexecutivebranch,giventhatissuanceofa writ
ofmandamusin thiscase probablywouldhave metwithexecutivenon-
compliance,ultimately jeopardizingtheauthority of thefederalcourts.
The factthattheCourt'spowerto overturn laws was established in
circumstances to whichtheadministration couldnotrespondhas led to
theconventional understanding of Marburyas a case in whichjudicial
reviewwas established by virtueofJefferson havingbeen "outdone"by
Marshall.This understanding is reflectedin virtuallyall textbookac-
countsofthecase. RobertG. McCloskey(1960,40) referred toMarshall's
opinionas "a masterwork ofindirection, a brilliant
exampleofMarshall's
abilityto sidestepdangerwhileseemingto courtit, to advancein one
directionwhilehisopponentsare lookinginanother."FormerChiefJus-
ticeWarrenE. Burgersaid that,in Marbury,Marshallwon "the great
waroverthesupremacy oftheSupremeCourtinconstitutional adjudica-
tion"and thatJefferson had been "outmaneuvered bytheholdingofthe
court"(Cannonand O'Brien 1985,14). C. HermanPritchett (1977,126)
said that,in MarburytheCourt,"dominatedby Marshall,had success-
fullyassertedits authority to invalidateacts of Congressin one of the
cleverestcoups of Americanhistory."Andin perhapsthemostfamous
ofall rhetorical on Marbury,
flourishes Marshall'smostinfluential biogra-
pherconcludedthat"by a coup as boldindesignandas daringinexecu-
tionas thatby whichtheConstitution had been framed,JohnMarshall
set up a landmark in Americanhistoryso highthatall thefuturecould
takebearingsfromit,so enduring thatall theshockstheNationwas to
endurecouldnotoverturn it" (Beveridge1916,3:142).
Notwithstanding thegrainof truthcontainedin thesecolorfulcom-
ments,theanalysisthatfollowsmilitates againsttheiruncritical accep-
tance.Aftera briefsurveyof thehistorical background, I shallpresent
a simplegame-theoretic reconstruction of the Marburysituationthat
strongly suggeststhatboth Marshalland Jefferson behavedrationally
underthecircumstances and thateach obtainedthebestresultavailable
fromhis own pointof view. The formalanalysiswill thenbe supple-
mentedand strengthened by consideration of substantive legal history.
Background
ThomasJefferson defeatedincumbent President
JohnAdamsin the
electionof 1800and was to take officeon 4 March 1801.In February
theFederalistCongresspassedtheCircuitCourtAct,whichdoubledthe
numberof federaljudges, and the OrganicAct, whichauthorizedthe

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 A REVISIONIST ANALYSIS OF MARBURY V. MADISON 287

appointment of42justicesofthepeace intheDistrictofColumbia.Presi-

dentAdams'sappointments to fillthesepositionswerecalledthe"mid-
nightappointees"and werevirtually all Federalists.Theircommissions
wereapparently signedbyAdamsand sealedbythen-Secretary ofState
JohnMarshall,butdue to timelimitations, severalof thecommissions,
including thatof WilliamMarbury,could notbe deliveredby midnight
of3 March,Adams'sfinaldayinoffice.WhenJefferson, who,alongwith
mostotherRepublicans,had been infuriated by whathe thoughtwas
illegitimatetamperingwiththejudiciaryby the lame-duckFederalists,
assumedofficeon 4 March,he apparently orderedactingSecretaryof
StateLevi Lincoln(whowas attorney general,supervising theStateDe-
partment duringMadison's absence) to withholddeliveryof the re-
mainingcommissions (Ellis 1974,53-68; Dewey 1970,75-134; Clinton
1989,81-101).
Laterin 1801,Marburyand otherssoughta writof mandamus(an
orderissuedby a courtto a publicofficial instructingthelatterto fulfill
an obligationimposedby law) in the UnitedStatesSupremeCourtto
compeldeliveryof thecommissions (Ellis 1974,43).1The Court,led by
ChiefJusticeJohnMarshall(whohad himself beenappointedto thepost
by Adamsin January1801),orderedthe new administration to "show
cause whya mandamusshouldnot issue" (1 Cranch153-54),and the
case was placedon theCourt'sdocketforthe1802term.Whilethecase
was pending, thenow-Republican Congressdecidedto eliminate the1802
SupremeCourtterm,thuspostponing decisionin the Marburymatter
until24 February1803(Haskinsand Johnson1981,184).
On thatday,MarshalldeliveredtheopinionoftheCourtinMarbury
v. Madison(1 Cranch153-80),holding:(1) thatMarbury hada legalright
to thecommission, thuscallingintoquestionwhether Jeffersonhad not
failedto carryouthisresponsibility to "take carethatthelawsbe faith-
fullyexecuted";(2) thatMarburyhad a rightto resortto thelaws ofhis
country fora remedy;but(3) thattheproperremedywas nota writof
mandamusissuingfromtheSupremeCourt.Marshallarguedin support
ofthethirdpointthatthehighcourthad no powerto issuea mandamus
to the secretaryof statebecause thiswouldhave been an exerciseof
original notwarranted
jurisdiction bytheConstitution, whichspecifies in

ofthesuit,theplaintiffs
'Priorto initiation ofstateand
had appliedto thesecretary
thesecretaryoftheSenateforinformation regardingthecommissions. On 31January1803,
aftera lengthydebate,theSenatevoted(15-13)to refusecopiesfromtheJournal reflecting
its"adviceandconsenttotheappointments" (DebatesandProceedings ofCongress,1803,
34-50).The plaintiffs a similarfateat theStateDepartment.
suffered

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288 RobertLowry Clinton

ArticleIII, Section2, thattheSupremeCourthas original jurisdictionin

"all Cases affecting Ambassadors,otherpublic Ministers and Consuls,
and thosein whicha Stateshallbe Party,"and appellatejurisdiction in
all othercases.
Marburyhad sued undertheJudiciary Act of 1789,whichstatedin
Section13 thatthe SupremeCourt"shall have powerto issue writsof
prohibition to thedistrictcourts,whenproceeding as courtsofadmiralty
andmaritime jurisdiction; of
and writs mandamus, in cases warranted by
theprinciplesand usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons
holdingoffice,underthe authority of the UnitedStates." Marshallre-
gardedthisclause in the Judiciary as an enlargement
Act oftheoriginal
jurisdiction of the Court, and since the Constitution had spelled out its
original jurisdiction in thefirstplace, any enlargement by Congress was
unconstitutional. According to Marshall: "The particular phraseology of
theConstitution of the United States confirmsand strengthens the prin-
ciple... thata law repugnant to theconstitution is void,andthatcourts,
as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument" (1 Cranch
176-80).Theprimary importance ofthiscase, then,derivesfromitsbeing
thefirstoccasionon whichthe SupremeCourtunequivocally declared
an act ofCongressunconstitutional.
Form
Marburyin Extensive
As the textbookcommentary notedearliersuggests,Marburyv.
Madisonhas longbeenviewedby scholarsas a kindof"game." Indeed,
thatprevailsinjudicial systems
in the adversarialcontextof litigation
strongly influencedby Englishcommonlaw, it mightbe reasonableto
somewhatsurprising
viewmostlaw suitsin thisway. It is therefore that
politicalscientistsworkingin the fieldof publiclaw have made only
sporadicuse of formalmodelingtechniquesin theanalysisof case law.
Schubert(1959, 1962)pioneeredthe applicationof gametheoryto the
studyofbloc votingon theSupremeCourt.Rohde(1972a,1972b)com-
binedgame-theoretic approachesin his studyof coalition
and statistical
formation on the Court,whileprovidinga test of Riker's(1962) size

2Therehadbeenintimations ofthispoweras earlyas 1792,where,inHayburn'sCase

(2 Dallas 409),fiveSupremeCourtjustices,sitting refusedto enforcean act of
on circuit,
Congressthatauthorized thejudgesto performadministrativedutiessubjectto reviewby
the secretary of war and by Congress(Currie1981,822-25; Haines 1932,173-75).The
following year,in theCorrespondence of theJustices(8 August1793),theCourtrefused
to renderan advisoryopinionrequestedby thepresident and secretaryof state,holding
thatsuchan opinionwouldbe "extrajudicial" andthusviolativeofthe"linesofseparation
drawnbytheConstitution betweenthethreedepartments ofthegovernment" (Currie1981,
829).See generally Dionisopoulosand Peterson(1984).

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 A REVISIONIST ANALYSIS OF MARBURY V. MADISON 289

principlein the contextofjudicialbehavior.Modelingtechniqueshave

also been employed,withvaryingdegreesof rigor,in thestudyof legal
institutions and rules:adversarialand inquisitoriallitigation
procedures
(Tullock1975);peremptory challengesinjuryselection(BramsandDavis
1976);theeffectsof precedentin arbitration cases (Schotter1978);and
evidentiary standardsin due processcases (Bell 1987).Interestingly,of
thestudiesmentioned above, onlythoseof Schubert,Rohde,and Bell
involveSupremeCourtdecisionmaking.Moreover,withtheexception
of theBramsand Muzzio (1977)analysisof theWatergate Tapes Case,
whichthepresentstudymostcloselyresembles,therehas been no at-
temptto applytraditional game-theoretic approachesin the studyof a
singlecase.
It is reasonableto begintheanalysisby reconstructing theMarbury
situation as a two-person,nonzero-sum gamewithMarshallandJefferson
as players.3I shallfirstconstruct a decisiontreethatencapsulatesthe
alternatives availableto the playersat each stage of the conflict(see
Figure1), withthecorresponding possibleoutcomes(see Table 1).
Theinitialmoveis clearlyJefferson's, sincehe caneitherorderdeliv-
eryofthecommissions-inwhichcase therewillbe no lawsuitbrought
byMarbury or theothers,henceno conflict, and thegameis over;or he
can ordernondelivery-which givesrise to the suit,and consequently
thesecondmove(byMarshall)is necessitated. Theoriginal choicesavail-
able to Jefferson, then,are as follows:
of stateto deliverthecommissions.
a. Orderthesecretary
b. Orderthesecretary
of statenotto deliverthecommissions.
The choiceofa byJefferson leads to outcomeA, sinceno countermoves
are availableto Marshallin thisinstance.On theotherhand,thechoice
ofb byJefferson makesavailablethefollowing threeoptionsto Marshall
on theconstitutionality
of Section13 and therelatedmandamusissue.4

31tmightbe thought thatlaw suits,especially,

wouldbestbe modeledas "zero-sum,"
butthatimpression is misleading.
Like mostotherreal-world contests,law suitscan only
rarelybe characterized as "all-or-nothing"affairs,due mostlyto the ubiquityof such
institutions
as plea bargaining,negotiatedsettlements,
andthelike.Thenonzero-sum char-
acterof the situationbecomeseven moreapparentin a case like Marbury, wherethe
"real" contestmightbestbe describedas a shadowplayinvolving participantswhoare
not(technically)
partiesto thesuit.
4BecauseMarshallhas twoalternatives on each oftheissues(Section13andmanda-
mus),thereare actuallyfourlogicallypossibleoptions.He mayinvalidate Section13and
declinethewrit(as he infactdid),or he mayinvalidate Section13andissuethewrit.The
onlywayto do thelatter,however,wouldbe to applytheholdingof unconstitutionality
"prospectively,"whileholdingthelaw validforMarbury. Whilethisapproachhas been

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290 RobertLowry Clinton

Table 1

Sequence Jefferson'sMarshall's
Outcome of Choices Description Value Value
A a Marburyreceivescommis- 1 2
sion;Courthas no op-
portunityto issuewritof
mandamus or invalidate
act ofCongress.
B b-c-g Marburyreceivescommis- 0 4
sion;writofmandamus
issued;no act of Con-
gressinvalidated
C b-c-h Marburydoes notreceive 2 0
commission; writofman-
damusissued;no act of
Congressinvalidated.
D b-d Marbury does notreceive 4 1
commission; no writof
mandamus issued;no
act ofCongressinvali-
dated.
E b-e Marbury does notreceive 3 3
commission; no writof
mandamus issued;act of
Congressinvalidated.

used by the Court recently(see NorthernPipeline ConstructionCompany v. Marathon

PipelineCompany, 458U.S. 50 (1982)),thereis no evidencethatMarshallconsidered using
it in Marburyor in any othercase. Givenprevailing attitudesaboutlegal reasoningin
Marshall'sday,it is implausible merelyto assumethathe wouldhave consideredit. So
thisalternative has been excludedfromthe analysis.On theotherhand,Marshallmay
upholdSection13 and eitherissue or denythewrit.The former alternativeis obvious,
sinceSection13, by Marshall'sreading,authorizesthewritdirectly, whereasthelatter
maybe accomplished by a restrictive
interpretationof thestatute(see n. 6 below).I as-
sume,arguendo,thecorrectness of the "right/remedy" portionoftheMarbury opinion.
Marbury's alleged"right"was statutory (see n. 14below),andtheappropriateness ofthe
remedy wasgrounded incommonlaw(see n. 15below).Theanalysisalso doesnotconsider
otherarguably importantaspectsofthecase, suchas Marshall'sfailure todisqualifyhimself
due to his previousinvolvement in theappointment process.The latterissue,alongwith
severalothers,consideredonlyfromMarshall'sperspective, has beenincorporated into
Nagel's(1988)analysisoftheMarbury case, whichutilizesa "PolicyGoal Percentaging"
approach.

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 Figure 1

A(1, 2)
B(O, 4)

a g
3
1 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~h
C(2, 0)

E(3, 3)

Q = move.
Jefferson's

Q2
= Marshall'smove.

Q3
= Jefferson's
move.

* = denotes an endpointof tree.

Note: Lowercaseletters
indicatechoices(describedintext);uppercaselettersdenoteout-
comes(describedin Table 1).

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292 RobertLowry Clinton

c. Decide thecase infavorofMarbury (issuethewritofmandamus),

at thesame timeupholding theconstitutionality
of theJudiciary
Actof 1789.5
d. Decide thecase in favorofMadison(refuseto issuethewrit),at
the same time upholdingthe constitutionality of the Judi-
ciaryAct.6
e. Decide thecase in favorof Madison(refuseto issuethewrit),at
thesametimedeclaringtheJudiciary Actunconstitutional.7
Now, if Marshallchooses d or e at the second stage,thenno options
remainforJefferson, and thegameends withoutcomeD or E, respec-
tively.On theotherhand,ifMarshallchoosesc, thenJefferson againhas
theoptionto deliveror notdeliver.However,it shouldbe notedthatthe
choiceat thisjunctureis quitedifferent
fromthatat thefirststage,since
thedecisionnow is whetherto defyan orderof theSupremeCourt.In
responseto Marshall'schoiceof c, Jefferson
may:
g. ComplywiththeCourt'sorder-leadingto outcomeB.
h. Refuseto complywiththeCourt'sorder-leadingto outcomeC.
Because of thedifficultyof arrivingat estimatesof cardinalutilitywith
respectto theoutcomesforthe two players,I have onlyattempted to
judge therelativemeritsof theoutcomesforeach. Since thereare five
suchoutcomes,I assignthe value fourto themostpreferred, threeto
thenextmostpreferred, and so on downto zerofortheleastpreferred.
Theanalysisassumesthroughout thatinstitutionalfactors(judicialpower
executiveand legislative)
vis-a'-vis are paramount forbothplayers.
The valuationsof outcomesforJefferson are assignedaccordingto
the followingassumptions.First,Jefferson does not want Marbury's
commission delivered(thusC is rankedhigherthanA); butifit is to be
delivered,he wouldpreferto deliveron his own initiative, ratherthan
pursuantto a courtorder(thusA is rankedhigherthanB-his worst
outcome).Second,Jefferson wantsneither judicialreviewof Congress

5Since I assumethecorrectness ofthe"right/remedy" portionoftheMarbury opinion

ofSection13necessitates
(see n. 4 above),itfollowsthatapplication a decisionforMarbury,
unlesstheCourtrelieson a restrictive of thestatute,thereby
interpretation yieldingop-
tiond.
6TheCourtmaydo thisby construing Section13 narrowly, saying,perhaps,that
Congressdid notintendto enlargetheoriginal of theCourtbeyondtheterms
jurisdiction
of ArticleIII, but merelymeantto ensurethatthe originaljurisdiction wouldbe fully
exercisedby theCourtwhenappropriate. Or theCourtmayholdthatMarbury's case is
inappropriate because Section13 requiresthatwritsbe issuedaccording to customsand
usagesoflaw, and Marbury'srequestis notin accordwiththese(Van Alstyne1969,15).
7This, of course,is whattheCourtdid,by invalidating Section13 and renouncing
jurisdiction to issuethewrit.

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 A REVISIONIST ANALYSIS OF MARBURY V. MADISON 293

norjudicialreviewof the executive(via mandamuswitha supporting

judicialopinion)established(thusD-his bestoutcome-is rankedhigher
thanE); butifone oftheseis to be established, he prefersjudicialreview
ofCongressratherthanjudicialreviewoftheexecutive(thusE is ranked
higherthanC).
The valuationof outcomesforMarshallare assignedaccordingto
theseassumptions. First,Marshallwouldliketo establish judicialreview
over bothCongressand the executivebut is in no positionto do so
becausetheonlyquestionablecongressional act involvedis also thesole
basisfortheCourt'sauthority to disciplinetheexecutivevia mandamus.
Forcedto choose, Marshallwouldpreferto establishjudicialauthority
overtheexecutiveratherthanCongress(thusB-his bestoutcome-is
rankedhigherthanE); butifhe cannotobtainthisoutcome,he would
valuetheopportunity to establishsomekindofjudicialreview(i.e., over
Congress)morehighlythanany outcomethatdoes not allow forthis
opportunity (thusE is rankedhigherthanA, D, or C).8 Second,Marshall
wantsMarbury'scommission delivered(thusA is rankedhigherthanD
or C); butifthiscannotbe done, thenhe wouldpreferthattheCourt
notissuea writofmandamusthatthepresident can defybecauseexecu-
tivedefiance,if unanswered,may impairthe Court'sabilityto speak
withauthority in subsequentcases (thusD is rankedhigherthanC-
Marshall'sworstoutcome).

Marburyin NormalForm
Nowthatwe haveexaminedtheextensive formofthegame,itmakes
senseto convertthetreeintoa matrixandtakea lookat itsnormalform,
assumingthateach of theplayerswas awareof theoptionsavailableto

81tmight be thought thatestablishing overCongressrather

judicialauthority thanover
theexecutive wouldhavebeenmoreimportant toMarshall,butI thinksucha viewamounts
to readingmodernperspectives backintoMarshall'stime.A fairreadingofcongressional
debatesand seriatim judicialopinionsof the 1790sdemonstrates thatjudicialpowerto
disregardconcededly unconstitutionallawswas notreallyindisputebythetimeMarbury's
case reachedtheCourt.Forat leasta decade,Republicans hadurgedtheCourttooverturn
actsofCongress, andthejusticeshadrepeatedly to do so whenever
declaredtheirintention
confronted withan appropriate case (whichturnedouttobe Marbury). Perhapsthisis why
therewas so littlecontemporary criticismofthatportion oftheMarbury opinionthatlater
cametobe regarded as itscentralfeature(Clinton1989,chap.6). By contrast,thequestion
concerning judicialauthority overillegalor unconstitutionalexecutiveacts was farfrom
settledat the timeof Marbury,and thisconstitutes a strongreasonforbelievingthat
Marshall'sidealoutcomewouldhavebeentocompeltheexecutive bymandamus todeliver
Marbury's commission, ifit was withinhis power.Finally,it is worthremarking, in case
one is notpersuadedbythisargument, thatswitchingMarshall'svalueson thispointdoes
notaltertheresultoftheanalysis.

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294 RobertLowry Clinton

theother.To getthefullpictureofthesituation,
theconditionalstrategies
of Jefferson
willbe examinedin combination withMarshall'sthreeop-
tionsin thecase thatJefferson chooses notto deliverfromtheoutset.
The procedurefollowedis thatsuggestedby Hamburger (1979,26-30),
and theresultantmatrixis as follows:

Matrix 1. Outcomesand PayoffsShown

Marshall

c d e

a A(1, 2) A(1, 2) A(1, 2)

0
W
b-g B (, 4) D (4, 1) E(3, 3)

b-h | C2, 0) D(4, 1) E(3, 3)

In Matrix1,A is thesole outcomeinthefirst rowbecauseifJefferson

choosesto deliverfromthebeginning a), thenthe
(i.e., choosesstrategy
gameis over.Similarly, at thesecondstage(Marshall'sturn),ifMarshall
choosesd, thenthegameendsin outcomeD; and ifhe choosesstrategy
e, the game culminatesin outcomeE. The conditionalstrategiesof
Jeffersonare b-g and b-h. These two strategiesare contingent upon
Jefferson'sinitialchoicenotto deliver,hencethepresenceof b in each
of them.They are also contingent upon Marshall'schoice of c at the
second stage and constitutealternative responsesto thatchoice. For
Jefferson,strategy b-g says: firstchoose b, thenchoose g if Marshall
choosesc. Strategy b-h says: firstchoose b, thenchoose h ifMarshall
choosesc. Thereare twoconditional strategiesforJeffersonbecausehe
has twoconceivableresponsesto Marshall'schoiceofc.
First,it shouldbe notedthatb-h, e is in equilibrium, withpayoffs
ofthreeforbothJefferson and Marshall.Once arrivedat, neither player
can makehimselfbetteroffby changinghis strategy. Second,b-h is a
dominant strategy forJefferson, sinceno matterwhatstrategy Marshall
uses, Jeffersonis alwaysat least as well offusingb-h as he wouldbe
usingb-g or a, and is sometimes betteroff.Finally,whenb-g and a are
eliminated forJefferson, thenc and d becomedominated forMarshall,
leavingus withequilibrium outcomeE, the resultin fact reachedin
thecase.

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 A REVISIONIST ANALYSIS OF MARBURY V. MADISON 295

Constitutional
History
Whereas formalreconstructions of such a situationas that in
Marburycannottellus withcertainty whatactuallyhappened,theycan
illuminate structuralfeaturesof thesituation thatmaylead to betterun-
derstanding. If,as thepreviousanalysissuggests,it is plausibleto view
theoutcomeof theMarburyaffairas a productof rationalchoicesby
bothMarshalland Jefferson, thenanyviewofthecase thatrelieson the
assumption thatone playerwas essentially "tricked"bytheotheris put
in doubt.The prevailing beliefthatJefferson was outfoxedby Marshall
restson thepresident'sallegedignoranceof theCourt'savailablelegal
optionson thejurisdiction and mandamusissues. The former of these
issues led ultimately to theCourt'sexerciseofjudicialreview,and the
latterled to its rebukeof the executiveby way of dicta. In turn,
Jefferson's alleged"naivete"turns,at leastinpart,on Marshall'salleged
willingness to "bendthelaw" inorderto establish judicialsupremacyover
Congress(and perhapstheexecutiveas well) in constitutional matters.
Marshall'sallegedwillfulness in thecase seemsto have beenbased
largelyon the assumptionthattheMarburydecisionhad no firmlegal
basis and was therefore an exerciseof "will" ratherthan"judgment,"
recallingHamilton'sfamousdistinction. Relyingagainon Marshall'sin-
fluentialbiographer forthe textbookdescription:"[Marbury],forper-
fectlycalculatedaudacity,has fewparallelsinjudicialhistory.In order
to assertthatin theJudiciary restedtheexclusivepowerto declareany
statuteunconstitutional, andto announcethattheSupremeCourtwas the
ultimate arbiteras to whatis andwhatis notlaw undertheConstitution,
Marshalldetermined to annulSection13 of theEllsworth JudiciaryAct
of 1789.Marshallresolvedto go stillfurther. He wouldannouncefrom
the SupremeBench rulesof procedurewhichtheExecutivebranchof
theGovernment mustobserve"(Beveridge1916,3:32).
ButMarshalldidnot,inMarbury or on anyotheroccasion,proclaim
an exclusivepowerin thejudiciaryto invalidate laws,northattheCourt
was ultimatearbiterof constitutional questions;nor did he announce
"rules of procedure"for the executivebranch.9Though some of

9Sofaras I know,theCourtdidnot(nordidanysitting forthatmatter)

Justice declare
itselftheultimate oftheConstitution
expositor until1958,when,in Cooperv. Aaron,358
U.S. 1, 18,it held,erroneously, thatMarburyhad "declaredthebasic principle thatthe
federaljudiciaryis supremein the expositionof the law of the Constitution,and that
principlehas eversincebeenrespectedby theCourtandthecountry as a permanentand
indispensable featureof our constitutionalsystem."Justhow badlymistaken theCourt
was in itshistoricalreferenceis indicatedby thefactthatMarbury was notcitedby the

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296 RobertLowry Clinton

Marshall'slanguagemightappearto sweepmorebroadly,Marbury's ju-

dicial reviewholdingwas in factquite narrow,justifying at mostthe
Court'spowerto nullify nationallaws in cases bearingdirectlyuponthe
exerciseofjudicialfunctions (Clinton1989,15-20). Furthermore, it is
unlikelythatanything morethanthiswouldhave been even thinkable,
givenearlyU.S. attitudes aboutthenatureand scopeofjudicialauthority
(Wolfe1986,1-11).
This kindofjudicialreview,in whichtheCourtwouldbe thefinal
judgeofitsownpowerin cases involving theperformance ofitsassigned
functions, was one to whichneither JeffersonnorMadisonwas opposed.
ThoughJefferson maynothavebeenenamoredoftheFederalist judiciary
exercising even thismuchauthority over a Republicanlegislature,just
as he hadnotbeenenamoredofjudicialreviewas ithadbeenexercised-
or moreaccurately,not exercised-by the Federalistjudiciaryover a
Federalistlegislatureinthe1790s(Warren1925,119-20),he hadnonethe-
less longbeena supporter ofjudicialreviewoverCongress,inprinciple
(Mendelson1962),and he neverdirectlychallengedthejudicialreview
aspectoftheMarburydecision(Dewey 1970,142).10Thus,ChiefJustice
Burger'ssuggestion thatMarshallhad somehowslippedtheprinciple of
reviewpast Jefferson like a thief"in the night"(Cannonand O'Brien
1985,14) shouldbe regardedas highlyimplausible.
The historical
focusupontheMarbury affair
fromtheperspective of
itslong-term effectonjudicialpowerhas also obscuredunderstanding of
theroleof theexecutivein thecase. Asidefromtheusual speculations
aboutwhatJefferson mighthave donehad thecase beendecideddiffer-
ently(i.e., had thewritof mandamusbeen issued),theinvolvement of

Courtin supportof any kindofjudicialreview,howevernarrowly defined,until1887,

thoughthe Courthad by thattimeinvalidatedsome 20 federallaws on constitutional
grounds.See Muglerv. Kansas, 123U.S. 623,661(1887).Interestingly, in thisfirst
use of
Marbury to supporta doctrineof review,theCourtplainlydidnotknowexactlywhatit
was citing,forit used Marburyin supportof thethen-developingdoctrine of Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due processas a groundforoverturning statelaws. For fuller
discussionofthispoint,see Clinton(1989,chap.7).
'Oltshouldbe notedthatJefferson was awareof theexercisesofjudicialreviewby
lowerfederalcourtsin the 1790s,in one of whichhe was directly involved.It had been
Jefferson,as secretary of statein Washington'sadministration,
who had petitioned the
SupremeCourtfortheadvisoryopinionthatwas rejectedin theCorrespondence of the
Justices(see n. 2 above).Theissue,whichinvolvedthequestionofwhattodo witharmed
foreignvesselsdockedin U.S. ports,had to be resolvedultimately by executiveofficers
(includingJefferson), whoweredisappointed bytheCourt'srefusalto providelegaladvice
andwhoanticipated "therebuffoftheCourt"once thedecisionwas made.It was appar-
entlyJefferson whohad beenthestrongest supporter
oftheCourt'sinvolvement (Malone
1962,119).

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 A REVISIONIST ANALYSIS OF MARBURY V. MADISON 297

theadministration in theMarburystruggle has largelybeenignored.The

historicimportance of thejudicialreviewprinciple, combinedwiththe
historicunimportance ofthefactthatMarbury failedto receivehiscom-
mission(i.e., that,technically, Madisonwon thecase), has lefttheim-
pressionthatthepresident was somehowa "loser" in thecontest,thor-
oughlyoutwitted by a cleverchiefjustice.
But Jefferson was notas foolishas he has been madeto appearby
historiansof theMarburyaffair.It is verylikelythathe possessedad-
vance knowledgeconcerning theCourt'slegaloptionsforresolvingthe
dispute.It is even probablethathe was aware of the ultimateground
uponwhichtheCourtwouldinvalidateSection13 (thatCongresscould
notby statuteenlargetheCourt'soriginal jurisdiction), sinceMarbury's
counselstressedtheprovision'sconstitutionality, duringoralargument,
in the presenceof severaladministration officials,at least two weeks
beforethefinaldecision.Amiddiscussionaboutministerial dutiesofthe
secretaryof stateand the appropriateness of themandamusremedyin
Marbury's case, CharlesLee remarked, "Congressis notrestrained from
conferringoriginaljurisdiction inothercases thanthosementioned inthe
" II
constitution.
Notwithstanding the Court'sexerciseofjudicialreview,it was the
famous"right/remedy" portionof theMarburyopinion,againstwhich
Jeffersonwouldlaterinveighon severaloccasionsand whichcontained
theso-calledpublicrebukeoftheadministration's conduct,thataroused
the president'shostilitymore than any otheraspect of the decision.
Thoughmostcommentators appearto have sidedwithJefferson on this
point,an attentive readingof therecordsuggeststhatthescoldingmay
nothave been altogether The secretary
unjustified. of state,presumably
actingundera presidential directive,had blatantly violateda statutory
obligationto safeguardall officialfederaldocuments-including judicial
commissions-andto producecopies oftheseuponrequest.Moreover,
111 Cranch137,148(1803).ItappearsthatLee mayhaveblundered here.Hisaccompa-
nyingcitationwas to a 1793decisionof thecircuitcourtforPennsylvania thatinvolved
prosecution ofa Germanconsulforextortion. The consul'slawyershadarguedagainstthe
relying
court'sjurisdiction, on theprovisionof ArticleIII thatgivestheSupremeCourt
original in cases affecting
jurisdiction consuls.The courtrejectedthisargument on the
ground thatCongress,inSection13oftheJudiciary Act,hadspecified theSupremeCourt's
overconsulsto be original,
jurisdiction butnotexclusive.See UnitedStatesv. Ravara,2
Dallas297-98(1793).IfLee thought thatRavarawas supportive oftheCourt'sjurisdiction
inMarbury, he was mistaken,forRavarainvolvedneither mandamus norstatutoryenlarge-
mentoftheCourt'soriginal jurisdiction. Whatis moreinteresting forpresentpurposesis
thatLee stressedthepointat all. It is unlikelythathe wouldhavedoneso had theissue
notbeenindisputepriortotheMarbury litigation. thattheadministra-
Itis thusalsounlikely
tionwouldnothaveknownthattheCourtmight voidSection13in Marbury's case.

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298 RobertLowry Clinton

theprimary purposeofthestatutethatimposedthesedutieswas to pro-

videevidencein courtwheneverlitigation aroseovertheauthenticity of
whateverthedocumentsrepresented.12In lightof thesecircumstances,
Madison'ssubsequentfailureto appearto explainwhyhe had notpro-
duced copies of the commissions forMarburyand the otherplaintiffs
(i.e., to "show cause whya mandamusshouldnotissue") was probably
regarded byMarshalland hisfellowjusticesas a serious,ifnotominous,
interference withtheCourt'sabilityto perform itsfunctions properly."3
If so, thenit is understandable thatthe Courtwould have thoughtit
desirabletodepartfromtheusualmethodofdismissing a case onjurisdic-
tionalgroundswithoutexpressing an opinionon itsmerits.
Thisseemsdoublytrueinlightoftheequitydimension ofthecontro-
versy.Afterall, Marburyhad petitioned theCourtforessentially equi-
tablereliefandhad doneso ingoodfaithrelianceupona law thathe had
a rightto presumevalid.Sittingas a courtoforiginal jurisdiction(i.e., a
trialcourt),withpowerto awardbothlegaland equitableremedies,the
Courtwouldhave viewedits own discretion moreliberallythanin the
normalcase brought on directappeal.Giventheadministration's "stone-
walling,"theCourtmayhave feltthatMarburywas at leastentitledto

12Theact was passed by Congresson 15 September 1789and,amongotherthings,

chargedthesecretary withthedutyto "makeout," "record,"and "affixtheseal ofthe
UnitedStatesto all civilcommissions, aftertheyhave been signedby thePresident."
Respecting thejudicialprocess,theact statedthatall copiesofofficial
documents, towhich
"the law givesa right, on thepayment of tencents,""shallbe as good evidenceas the
originals."See 1 Cranch137,140-41,170(1803).Thisstatuteplainlywas notdesignedto
delegatediscretionary authority
to theexecutivebranchin matters of state,butratherto
safeguard theintegrity ofthecourtsin theperformance ofjudicialduties,by ensuring the
of "good evidence."Duringoralargument,
availability it was rightlypointedoutthatan
entirelydifferent statute(Act of 27 July1789)requiredthe secretary to "perform and
executesuchdutiesas shallfromtimeto timebe enjoinedon, or entrusted to himbythe
President."The scope of thisact was explicitly confined to matters"respecting foreign
affairs."See 1 Cranch137,139-40(1803).
13TheMarbury situation
was notaltogether unlikethatinwhichtheCourtfounditself
morerecently in UnitedStatesv. Nixon,418U.S. 683(1974).In NixontheCourtheldthat
documents inthecustodyofadministrative officials,
including thepresident,are subjectto
judicialprocesswhenevertheyare essentialto adjudication of the rightsand dutiesof
partiestoa case pending infederalcourt,absenta clearshowing ofnecessityforexemption.
Notwithstanding obviousdifferences betweenthetwocases (e.g., in Nixonthepresident
was an unindicted coconspiratorin a criminalprosecution),thefactremainsthat,in both
NixonandMarbury, importantdocuments sorelyneededbythecourtswerewithheld with-
outeventhebarestshowing ofnecessity.Moreover, inMarbury theexecutive intransigence
hadoccurred inthefaceofan actofCongressthatrequired thattheinformation be produced
andthatrequiredproduction forthepurposeof safeguarding
explicitly theintegrity ofthe
judicialprocess(see n. 12above).

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 A REVISIONIST ANALYSIS OF MARBURY V. MADISON 299

something likean "advisoryopinion"concerning hisrighttothecommis-

sion,theappropriate remedy,and his abilityto pursuethecause in an-
othercourt.14 It shouldalso be notedthatJefferson was one ofthefore-
mostequitylawyersof his time(Hoffer1990)and wouldnothave been
insensibleto theseconsiderations.
On themandamusremedy,itis wellknownthatJefferson was angry
aboutMarshall's"obiterdissertation" on theissue,especiallytheintima-
tionthatwritscouldbe issuedbyfederaljudgesto subordinate executive
in certaincircumstances.
officials It is also wellknownthatRepublicans
weregenerally apprehensive aboutthispossibility longbeforetheactual
decisionof Marbury'scase. It would therefore appear unlikelythat
Jeffersonwas unawareoftheBlackstonian logicofMarshall'sargument
on thispoint,as thematter had receivedthorough discussioninthepress
and thegovernment duringthemonthsbetweenthefiling of Marbury's
claimand thefinaldecision.ThoughJefferson (andotherreasonableper-
sons)disagreedwithMarshall,thereis littledoubtthatthelatter'sargu-
mentson theissue are legallyplausible;and Blackstone'sviewson the
subject(whichMarshallfollowed)would have been knowngenerally
amonglawyers(including Jefferson) in theearlyrepublic.15

141tshouldbe notedthattheso-calledadvisory opinioninMarbury has nothing what-

everto do withthemodemSupremeCourt'sdoctrine proscribing ex cathedrapronounce-
mentson constitutional questions.First,Marbury'snotorious"right"to a copy of his
commission wasnota constitutional onebutwas purelystatutory, theresultofan obligation
imposedby Congresson thesecretary of state(see n. 12 above). Second,thepurposeof
the Court'sproscription of advisoryopinionsis fullysatisfied whena courtrefusesto
interpretconstitutionalprovisions intheabsenceofa bonafidecase or controversy. There
is no questionconcerning Marbury'sstanding to litigate;theonlyquestionconcernsthe
appropriate forum in whichto do it.
15According to Blackstone, a writofmandamus is "a command issuingintheKing's
namefromthecourtof King'sbench,and directedto anyperson,corporation or inferior
court,requiring themto do some particular thingthereinspecified, whichappertains to
theirofficeandduty,andwhichthecourthas previously determined, or at leastsupposed,
to be consonant to rightandjustice.It is a writofa mostextensively remedial nature,and
issuesin all cases wherethepartyhas a rightto have anythingdone,and has no other
specificmeansofcompelling itsperformance" (Blackstone1979,3:110).In oralargument,
thispassagewas quotedin full,in themidstofan argument stressingtheequitablenature
of theproceeding, theabsenceof anyothercivilremedyavailableto Marbury(criminal
prosecution was possible,sincethestatutemadeoffending subjectto indictment),
officers
and thethreatto an independent judiciaryposed by the seemingly arbitrary acts of the
administration. The argument concludedwithreference to a number of Englishcases de-
signedto showthatmandamus is appropriate wherethereis "no otheradequate,specific,
legalremedy,"thereby rendering its issuanceconsistent with"the principles and usages
oflaw," as requiredby Section13. See 1 Cranch137,139-53(1803).

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300 RobertLowry Clinton

Conclusion
The legal-historical analysisthushelpsto confirm whattheformal
analysisstrongly suggests:thattheCourt'sdeterminations, at each stage
of the-Marburycontroversy, wereat leastplausibleapplications of ex-
istinglaw and thatboththeCourtand theadministration werehemmed
inbylegalconstraints to a largerextentthanusuallyhas beensupposed.
Ifthismuchis granted, thenitalso mustappearless likelythatJefferson
and Madisonwouldhave been incognizant of thealternatives available
to theCourt,and so less likelythatJefferson wouldhaveallowedhimself
to be outpointed bythechiefjusticein thesituation, eitherthrough igno-
ranceofMarshall'soptionsor becausehe was "lookingin anotherdirec-
tion" (McCloskey1960,44). Textbookaccountsof Marburyseem to
haveoverstated boththeextralegal dimensions ofthecase andMarshall's
politicalaggressiveness in "contriving" thedecision.Conversely, these
accountsappearto have understated the important role of Jefferson's
administration in the conflict,as well as information about Marshall's
motivesand legal alternativesthat was likelyavailable to Jefferson
himself.
It has oftenbeen said thatpoliticsmakesstrangebedfellows. To the
extentthatMarburywas a "political"decision,it seemsto have beena
tacitpoliticalcompromise betweentwofigures whohavemostoftenbeen
consideredmortalenemiesin thedramaof UnitedStatesconstitutional
history,not a "game" witha clear winnerand loser. This finding has
implications beyondthemerereversalof textbookwisdom.Marburyis
notjust anycase; rather,as ChiefJusticeRehnquist(1987,99) recently
putit: "One need understand veryfewof thecases thatit has decided
in orderto understand theSupremeCourt'srolein ournation'shistory.
But one mustassuredlyunderstand thecase of Marburyv. Madison."

Manuscriptsubmitted23 November 1992

Final manuscriptreceived28 April 1993

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