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Henry A. Kissinger White House Years

Edwin H. Fedder

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 Occasional Paper 803
February, 1980

Henry A. Kissinger
White House Years

by

Edwin H. Fedder
Henry A. Kissinger - White House Years

Edwin H. Fedder
Professor, Political Science
Director,
Center for International Studies
 ~------------------------------------,.

Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years. Bos.ton, Mass.:

Little, Brown & Co., 1979) pp. XXIV, 1521. $22.50.

The lessons of history cannot be learned until the past is truly

behind us. Memoirs and contemporary accounts by participants and

observers can assist historians in their tasks or contribute to

obscurity by blazing false trails which must be sorted out before

the 11
truth 11 may be discovered. The test for the' h i st or i an is d is-

tinguishing the false from the true trails. Pub] ic officials can

assist future historians or make their work more difficult by the

qua 1 i ty of record they 1 eave behind.

Henry Kissinger 1 s White House Years wil 1 confound future his-

torians more than provide illumination because it blazes numerous

false trails, lacks analytical int~grity, frequently lacks credi-

bility and obscures critical issues as often if not more often

than it provides enlightenment. No living person comes off badly

in the book; yet none quite measures up to Kissinger's own qualities

of intelligence, comprehension or vision.

To be sure, Kissinger is frequently self-deprecating but

always to the end that we are assured that his mastery knows no

peers, that while.he is not infallible, others are more fallible.

In the few instances when Nixon differed sharply on pol icy,

Kissinger brought him around so things turned out well after all.

Nixon had, Kissinger avers, a better feel for public relations~

one must give credi-t where due. But Nixon was deprived of great-

ness because he was mean, petty; vindictive, isolated and suspicious.

Yet he was courageous; witness: the opening to China, the Allende
ouster in Chile, the perseverance in Vietnam, extending the war to
 2

Cambodia. Nixon's "courage" stands in bold contrast to those less

resourceful and courageous around hi~ such as Secretaries Laird

and Rogers, Ambassadors Bunker and Lodge, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

and General Haig -- stalwart men all but not of Nixon's (or Kissinger's)

mettle.

When North Korean MIG fighters shot down an unarmed US re-

connaissance intelligence plane over the Sea of Japan in April 1969,

Nixon was restrained from bombing North Korea 11

primari ly because of

the strong opposition of Rogers and Laird. But as always when suppress-

ing his instinct for a jugular response, Nixon looked for some other

place to demonstrate his mettle." (p. 247) Kissinger tells us that

Cambodian targets were selected as surrogates for Nixon 1 s "jugular

response".

The period covered.by this book, January, 1969 to January, 1973,

covers Nixon's first administration and the author's tenure as

National Security Advisor. With the second term came appointment

as Secretary of State which post he held coterminously with his

Advisor's post until the inauguration of President Carter in

January, 1977, Kissinger's "record" of the second term will be

presented in a companion volume to be published subsequently. One

can but hope that that volume wi 11 be more revealing and less pre-

tentiously literary than White House Years. The Forbidden City's

"yellow roofs seeming to tumble 1 ike waterfalls into the pools of

sand • II
(P. 749) exemplifies a 1 iterary reach beyond the

author 1 s grasp.
The book is replete with vignettes describing world leaders

with whom Kissinger was associated. While praised by some reviewers,

 3
these biographical diversions are often shallow, condescending,

and unilluminating. While many of us might be intimidated by

former l~rael i Foreign Minister Abba Eban 1 s (born, reared and educated

in England as Aibrey Epstein) mastery of the English language,

K i s s i n g er I s react 'i on was that 11

Eng 1 i sh was for me, after a 1 1 , an

acquired language. 11
(p. 359)

Kissinger 1 s record was not one of unmixed success of stellar

accomplishments piled one upon another. In part he limited his

opportunities by his penchant for secrecy and monopoly of decision,

·attributes he shared with President Nixon. Kissinger disdained the

career practitioners in State, Defense, Treasury, and the CIA as

bureaucrats who provided obstacles to pol icy formulation and

implementation. Not one instance is mentioned throughout the

fjfteen hundred pages wherein the career service - a rather well-

trained, experienced set of professionals on the whole - performed

any substantative, creative or important roles in making and carry-

ing out pol icy. Of course they did, else the government 1 s conduct
of foreign policy would have ground to a halt. Curiously the only

predecessor singled out for high praise, Dean Acheson, earne:d.

Kissinger 1 i praise for his management of the bureaucracy,- for his

skillful use of all of the tools of statecraft.

In crisis situations such as that attending the Cuban missiles

in 1962, decisions are made with 1 ittle or no search for information.

Neither time nor opportunity for searching is available. Kissinger 1 s

account depicts routine decisions being made in the same way as those

made during crises. While this may be a more efficient process for

doing something fast, it created marvelous opportunities for

 4

ignorance of conditions and events to have significant impact upon

decisions. Kissinger was unprepared for and reacted with hostility

toward West Germany's Ostopol itik, opening relations with the Easr

Europeans and the Russians independently. The signs had al 1 been

there; Kissinger simply had neither time nor opportunity to become

sufficiently aware of the impending change in German foreign policy.

Kissinger tel ls of receiving Chancellor Brandt's emissary,

Egon Bahr at the White- House with Assistant Secretary of State

Hillenbrand sitting in to represent the State Department. At the

end of their formal meeting, Bahr left the White House by the

front door. "He reentered it through the basement for a private

talk with me As with my channels with Dobrynin to Moscow,

with Pakistan to China and on occasion with Israel and even Egypt,

my contact with Egon Bahr became a White House backchannel by

11
which Nixon could manage diplomacy bypassing the State Department.

(page411) Thus were normal diplomatic channels undercut and

rendered largely useless.

Nixon app6inted William Rogers Secretary of State, says

Kissinger, because he was f~lt to be incompetent in foreign

affairs and ineffectual; but, nevertheless a friend whose loyalty

_J

would remain true - he would pose no threat to Nixon.

Curiously, the only area of foreign pol icy that was left to

the Secretary of State for his 11

independent 11 administration of

policy was the Middle East. Kissinger attributes that to Nixon's

uncertainty as to what Middle East pol icy should be and to

!
Kissinger's "Jewish backg_r.ound 11 • Until mid 1971, the Middle East

was not central to or even very important for American pol icy.
 5

Yet these were years that witnessed Nasser's death and Sadat's

succession in Egypt, Qaddafi 1 s seizure of power in Libya, and

the radicalization of politics _in Syria and Iraq.

Additionally the United States engaged in rather significantly

increased arms shipments to Israel; shipments that were to be

matched in kind by the USSR to the Arabs. The end result was

reached in the October (1973) Arab-Israeli war which witnessed

larger tank battles than any engaged in during World War I I. Indeed

the initial Egyptian invasion of the Sinai included more tanks than

the Germans used to invade Russia in June 1941. Almost inadvertently,

the arms race in the Middle East had gotten out of hand, had

escalated to alarming proportions that consequently greatly en-

hanced the cost in terms of money and of human lives.

There are curious omissfons in White House Years that are

perhaps explainable by Kissinger's inattention or by his careful

exclusi0n of it~ms that might not be quite so flattering to his

self-image. Cyprus, for example, never appears in the discussion

although it could hardly be'omitted from his second volume.
Kissinger wa~ impla~a.bly hostile to Cypriot President Archbishop

Makarios. Kissinger frequently referred to Makarios as the

Mediterranean Castro yet he bore little resemblance to Castro -

Makarios was a conservative religious figure. Makarios was

independent and steered clear of both Russian and American spheres

of influence. All of the consequences for our pol icy today need
no elaboration at this point.
 6

this is omitted as is any reference to the Greek junta whose

machinations provided the US with difficult problems.

Iran was to become for Kissinger the most important Middle

Eastern power destined to provide military protection for the

Perslan Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz (through which 40% of all Western

oil is transported) the Arabain Sea and the Arabian Peninsula. In

order to accomplish these ends, the Shah was encouraged to purchase

• • I
enormous quant1t1es of weapons in order to build up a military force

second to none in the region and indeed ultimately surpassing those

of Britain, France or Germany. Many observers have concluded that

this set of actions, this interest indicated by Kissinger contributed

to the Shah 1 s growing m~galom~nia leading ultimately to his downfall.

Yet to Kissinger, 11
he was rather shy and withdrawn. I could never

escape the impression that he was a gentle, even sentimental man

who had schooled himself in the maxim that the ruler must~b~ aloof

and hard, but had never succeeded in making it come naturally. His

majestic side was ike a role rehearsed over the years. In this,

he was a prisoner suspect, of the needs of his fate, just as

he was ultimately the victim of his own successes." (page 1259)

To Kissinger, the Shah was 11

a dedicated reformer" and a true

p r o g r e s s i v e i n t h a t h e s o u g h t t o mo d e r n i z e a nd i n d u s t r i a l i z e h i s

society. There is no indication that Kissinger was aware of or

sensitive to the fact that there was a large and powerful opposition

to the Shah that might supplant him. The old addage of politics

that one should not put all of one's eggs in one basket was ignored

to the end that in the latter part of the Shah's regime we rel led

on him to inform us of such things as his durability and stability.

 7

On the eve of his election in 1968, Candidate Richard Nixon

said that he,had a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam. No such

plan existed of course; indeed, shortly after coming into office the

Nixon administration escalated the war in Vietnam considerably beyond

the 1 imits imposed by his predecessor. The war was played to dis-

asterous conclusion four years later well after the new election on

the eve of which Kissinger declared to an anxious public that 11

peace

is at hand 11 • Careful reading of Kissinger 1 s volume leads to one

principal conclusion: that the extension of the war for four and

one-half more years was occasioned by the need to guarantee the

reelection of Richard Nixon for a second term. Once the. election

had taken place, the war was settled on terms quite favorable to

North Vietnam; terms according to Kissinger, that had been available

several years earlier. To be sure, Kissinger states that the North

Vietnamese could have had those terms four years earlier but had

rejected them; however, his case isn't convincing by his own

account. The extended war resulted in the ultimate destruction of

Laos as a viable independent state and in Cambodia 1 s descent into

a malestrom of bestiality, disease, famine and destruction. The

end result of Kissinger 1 s management of the war and the settlement

of the peace with North Vietnam has been the uniting of North and

South Vietnam and the establishment of Vietnamese hegemony over

Laos and Cambodia. Thailand today stands exposed and endangered

by Vietnamese troops on her borders.

 8

The disarray facing the world today is largely the result of

the Nixon-Kissinger management of American power during their term

of office. Kissinger was convinced, in large measure correctly,

that the principal overriding fact of the 'international relations

today is the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Ln order to manipulate this relationship properly, the Soviet Union

had to have parity with the United States as a major power.

Kissinger was convinced that intelligent statecraft would then

permit the two to have a functional condominium in global affairs.

Everything was sacrificed to this end and permitted enormous dif-

ficulties to be raised.

The Nixon shock, that almost benign term that covers a near-

declaration of economic warfare against Germany and Japan; fit in

we] 1 with American pol icy because it permitted the US and Soviet

Union to play a major role. That it destroyed in essence the

al 1 iance relationship that we had with Japan and Germany was not

adequately comprehended by Kissinger. Our al 1 ies were put on

notice that we would act unilaterally even if it hurt them. Hence

when first we embargoed Iranian 6i1, Japan's initial response was

to continue importing. it despite American pres~ure. Similarly,

France and Germa~y resisted American leadership in dealing

with the Soviet Onion and Europe to the end that the do] Jar is

under attack and the economic position of the United States is

not threatened by the Soviet Union so much as it is threatened

by our allies.

This conflict with our al 1 ies was not foreordained but was a
 9
direct result of American mismanagemeNt of international economic

relationships under the bluster and fundamental ignorance of

Treasury Secretary Connally 1 s blunderbus approach which led to the·

scuttling of the Bretton Woods agreement which established the

postwar international moietary system and which has not yet beeM

replaced. International financial markets are in near chaos and

that chaos is largely attributable to the management of American

economic relations.

Kissinger indicates that this occurred largely because he was

preoccupied and did not take enough in~erest in economic issues.

Indeed, he states that he n~eded some tutoring by Undersecretary

Peterson, who was subsequently removed from his position in the

Treasury and promoted to Secretary of Commerce and denied access

to highlevel discussions of economic issues because he did not

agree with the basic thrust. Indeed, even Federal Reserve Board

Chairman Arthur Burns is said to have urged kissinger to stan~

firm because the United States needed an economic pol icy that

would replace the scuttled international system with a new

monetary system. Such replacement has yet to be achieved and

the dollar ~nd gold marke~s are rather unstable and in a state

of disarray.

Henry Kissinger is a brilliantjcontemplative person who will

at some future day, hopefully, write down a record that will permit

proper evaluation of his conduct of our foreign pol icy during the

Nixon-Ford years. This book was written to take advantage of the

market and serves as a useful vehiele to propel him into a senior

post- in the next Republ lean· administrati"on or perhaps even the

 I0

Democratic administration. As such it is a useful volume for a

campaign document for Henry Kissinger seeker of portfolio. It is

not a terribly u~eful historical document nor an adequate repres-

entation of his very notable accomplishments.

Edwin H. Fedder is Director of the

Center for International Studies and
Professor of Political Science of the
University of Missouri-St, Louis