2024 INSC 394 NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 4034 of 2023)
VIJAY LAXMAN BHAWE SINCE DECEASED
THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
P & S NIRMAN PVT. LTD.
AND OTHERS ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal challenges the judgment dated 14th
December 2022, passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay (for short, “High Court”) in Civil Revision Application
No. 269 of 2022, whereby the High Court dismissed the
revision application filed by the appellants herein, challenging
the order dated 4th May 2022, passed by the Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Thane, (for short, “trial court”) in Civil Misc.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Application No. 1473 of 2021, which was filed by respondent
Narendra Prasad
Date: 2024.05.08
15:07:16 IST
Reason:
No. 1 herein, for condonation of delay in filing of the
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application for restoration, and seeking thereby to restore the
Special Civil Suit No. 269 of 2002, which came to be dismissed
for want of prosecution by the trial court on 3 rd November
2011.
3. Vide an order dated 24th April 2023, this Court issued
notice to the respondents and stayed the proceedings before
the trial court.
4. Shorn of details, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are as under:
4.1 The present appeal is concerned with certain lands
situated at Sonkhar Village, in Taluka and District Thane,
Maharashtra (hereinafter referred to as “suit land”). There are
competing claims with respect to the ownership of the suit
land.
4.2 The Government of Maharashtra, through the Special
Land Acquisition Officer, Metro Centre, Thane, vide Award
Nos. 1 and 2 in the year 1986 and 1988, respectively, acquired
the subject land for public purpose, and handed over the said
lands for development/execution to City Industrial
Development Corporation, Maharashtra (CIDCO).
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4.3 In the year 2002, Special Civil Suit No. 269 of 2002
(hereinafter referred to as “subject suit”) was filed by the
original plaintiff – Pravin Jamndas Thakkar (Kanani) (since
deceased and now represented by his legal heirs respondent
Nos. 2 and 3), in the trial court against the Government of
Maharashtra (defendant No. 1/respondent No. 4 herein),
Special Land Acquisition Officer, Thane (defendant No.
2/respondent No. 5 herein), Vijay Laxman Bhawe (Defendant
No.3) (since deceased and now represented through his legal
heirs – viz. appellant Nos. 1 and 2 herein), Union of India
(defendant No. 4/ respondent No. 6 herein) and City Industrial
Development Corporation, Maharashtra (CIDCO) (defendant
No. 5/ respondent No. 7 herein) for relief of declaration that
the acquisition of suit land is illegal, null and void, and in the
alternative, if the court holds that acquisition is good then
declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to 12½ % Gaonthan
Extension Scheme, in lieu of acquired lands as per the
Gaonthan Extension Scheme of CIDCO.
4.4 In the year 2005, the original plaintiff – Pravin Jamndas
Thakkar (Kanani) passed away.
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4.5 The legal heirs of the original plaintiff, through their
Power of Attorney holder, one Mr. Arunkumar Jayantilal
Mucchalla, filed an application for condonation of delay in
applying for bringing legal heirs of the plaintiff on record, and
filed another application for bringing the legal heirs of the
plaintiff on record in the subject suit.
4.6 Vide order dated 28th November 2006, the trial court
allowed the application for condonation of delay as well as the
application for bringing the legal heirs of the plaintiff on record
in the subject suit. However, vide order dated 3rd November
2011, the trial court dismissed the subject suit for want of
prosecution.
4.7 On 7th November 2019, respondents No. 2 and 3, i.e., the
legal heirs of the plaintiff, filed an application, viz., Misc. Civil
Application (MCA) No. 1082 of 2019 in the subject suit,
seeking condonation of delay of 8 years and 4 days in filing an
application for restoration of subject suit. This application is
still pending adjudication.
4.8 On 12th October 2021, i.e., during the pendency of the
aforesaid application filed by the legal heirs of the plaintiff,
respondent No. 1, a private limited company, claiming to be
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the “assignee” from the legal heirs of the plaintiff, filed an
application viz., Misc. Civil Application (MCA) No. 1473 of 2021
in the subject suit, seeking condonation of delay of 9 years and
11 months in filing the application for restoration of the
subject suit. It was the case of respondent No. 1, that it had
entered into an Agreement for Sale dated 8th December 2009,
with the legal heirs of the plaintiff, i.e., respondents No. 2 and
3 and agreed to procure benefit arising out of the subject land
and in lieu thereof had paid part consideration of Rs. 1.51
crore to the legal heirs of the plaintiff, i.e., respondents No. 2
and 3 alongwith an irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 8th
December 2009, thereby appointing respondent No. 1 as their
constituted Attorney for doing all such acts, deeds and things
to implement the Agreement for Sale.
4.9 Vide order dated 4th May 2022, the trial court allowed the
restoration application being MCA No. 1473 of 2021 filed by
respondent No.1, subject to the payment of costs of Rs.
15,000/-, thereby condoning the delay of 9 years and 11
months.
4.10 Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the trial court dated
4th May 2022, the appellants filed Civil Revision Application
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No. 269 of 2022 before the High Court.
4.11 The High Court, vide impugned judgment, dismissed the
civil revision application filed by the appellants, upheld the
order of the trial court and only enhanced the costs awarded
from Rs. 15,000/- to Rs. 1,50,000/-.
4.12 Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.
5. We have heard Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Shri C.A.
Sundaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents.
6. Shri Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellants submitted that the learned trial court has totally
erred in entertaining the application filed at the behest of a
private party. It is submitted that respondent No.1 is totally a
stranger to the proceedings. He submitted that, when an
application filed by the legal heirs of the original plaintiff, i.e.
respondents No. 2 and 3 herein being MCA No. 1082 of 2019
for condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration
of the subject suit was pending since 7th November 2019, there
was no occasion for the learned trial court to have considered
the application filed by a stranger subsequently on 12th
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October 2021.
7. Shri Rohatgi further submitted that, as a matter of fact,
the subject suit itself is a frivolous one. The suit land belonged
to the predecessors of the appellants and it was acquired by
the State and the compensation duly received by the
appellants. The proceedings for enhancement are also pending
before the High Court. It is submitted that entertaining the
application at the instance of a stranger for condonation of
delay in filing an application for restoration of a frivolous suit
is nothing else but a travesty of justice. It is submitted that,
for the same reasons, the judgment of the High Court is also
not sustainable.
8. Shri Sundaram, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents, on the contrary, submitted that
respondent No.1 has accrued a right in the lis on account of
an Agreement for Sale dated 8th December 2009 entered into
between it and the legal heirs of the original plaintiff. It is
submitted that, since respondents No.2 and 3 were not
prosecuting the application for condonation of delay in filing
the application for restoration of the subject suit, respondent
No.1 was justified in filing such an application. It is submitted
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that, in any case, no interference is warranted in the
concurrent orders of the trial court and the High Court.
9. We find that the approach of the trial court in
entertaining the application filed at the behest of respondent
No.1 is totally unsustainable in law. The claim of respondent
No.1 is on an unregistered Agreement for Sale dated 8 th
December 2009. We do not wish to comment anything upon
the said Agreement for Sale inasmuch as the same may
prejudice the rights of the parties. However, entertaining an
application filed at the behest of a stranger for condonation of
delay in filing an application for restoration of the subject suit
is totally unsustainable in law. Admittedly, respondent No.1
has not even been impleaded in the subject suit. As such, the
application filed at the behest of the stranger, who is not a
party to the proceedings, is totally illegal. If the approach as
adopted by the trial court is approved, any Tom, Dick and
Harry would be permitted to move an application for
condonation of delay in filing an application for restoration of
the suit even if he is not a party to the subject suit.
10. Apart from that, an application for condonation of delay
in filing an application for restoration of the subject suit at the
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behest of the legal heirs of the original plaintiff is very much
pending since 7th November 2019. It is difficult to understand
as to what was the compelling necessity for the trial court to
have entertained the application filed at the behest of
respondent No.1 after a period of two years from the date of
filing of the application by respondents No.2 and 3. The trial
court could have very well decided the application filed by
respondents No.2 and 3 on its own merits in accordance with
law. We do not appreciate the propriety in keeping the
application filed by the legal heirs of the original plaintiff in
2019 pending and deciding the subsequent application filed
by respondent No.1 in October 2021 within a period of six
months. We do not wish to say anything more on it.
11. Though, it was urged by the appellants before the High
Court that respondent No.1 was totally a stranger and the
reasons given for condonation of delay did not constitute the
“sufficient cause”, and though the judgments of this Court
were relied upon to contend as to why the application ought
not to have been allowed by the trial court, the High Court has
totally ignored the same.
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12. In light of the view taken by us, though it is not necessary
for us to consider in detail as to whether the reasoning given
by the trial court and the High Court as to whether respondent
No.1 had made out a “sufficient cause” for condonation of
delay is correct or not, we are of the prima facie view that the
reasoning given by the trial court as well as the High Court for
condoning such an inordinate delay will not come under the
ambit of “sufficient cause” as has been delineated by this
Court in a catena of judgments.
13. We find that the order of the trial court as well as the
High Court are not sustainable in law. The appeal is therefore
allowed. The judgment dated 14th December 2022, passed by
the High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 269 of 2022,
and the order dated 4th May 2022, passed by the trial court in
Civil Misc. Application No. 1473 of 2021 are quashed and set
aside.
14. However, we clarify that the application filed by
respondents No.2 and 3 being MCA No. 1082 of 2019 would
be considered by the trial court on its own merits in
accordance with law.
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15. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No
costs.
…….........................J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
…….........................J.
[SANDEEP MEHTA]
NEW DELHI;
MAY 08, 2024.
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