Dao

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-019-09655-6

The Ethical Stance of the “Qiwulun (Discourse

on Corresponding Things)”

Massimiliano Lacertosa 1

# Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Abstract
This essay analyses the second chapter of the Zhuangzi 莊子, the “Qiwulun 齊物
論.” After a brief examination of its main ideas, it will be argued that the
“Qiwulun” needs to be considered not as an equalization that makes everything
indistinguishable but as a discourse on corresponding things. A more attentive
analysis of this correspondence among the myriad things will lead to the
consideration of their mutual transformation. The conclusion is that, contrary
to the ontotheological nature of Western metaphysics that imposes a single
logic for its hierarchical structure Being-beings, the correspondence of myriad
things allows the differentiation and assimilation of values in a comprehensive
and harmonious fashion. Thus, the essay offers an ethical reading of the
“Qiwulun” and considers its significance in the contemporary world.

Keywords Zhuangzi 莊子 . Daoism . Shifei 是非 . Youwu 有無 . Myriad things .

Anthropocentrism

1 Introduction

According to Chad Hansen, the “Qiwulun 齊物論” “is the most profound
expression of philosophical Taoism” (Hansen 1983: 31).1 The profundity of
this expression, however, does not clarify its content in a more intelligible

1
Angus Graham also believes there is a wide consensus that the “Qiwulun” is the most important chapter of
the Zhuangzi 莊子, “which amounts to saying that it is the most important document of early Taoism outside
the Tao te ching [Daodejing 道德經] itself” (Graham 1969–1970: 137).

* Massimiliano Lacertosa
[email protected]

1
SOAS University of London, 10 Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London, UK
 Massimiliano Lacertosa

manner. Quite the reverse. If philosophical Daoism is already a matter of

difficult interpretation,2 the “Qiwulun” puts the interpreter in an even more
difficult position. To begin with, there is the problem of the title.3 “Qiwulun,”
in fact, can be read as both qi wulun and qiwu lun. Considering that qi 齊
means “even” or “equal” then the former can be translated as “The Equality of
Things and Opinions” as Fung Yu-Lan does (Fung 1933/1964); the latter can be
rendered as “Discussion on Making All Things Equal” as in the translation of
Burton Watson (Watson 1968/2013).4 In his remarkable study, CHEN Shaoming
陳少明 explains that, on the one hand, qi wulun is a philosophical critique
against any kind of theory which, in the final analysis, means a critique of
what is affirmed and negated (qi shifei 齊是非); on the other hand, qiwu lun
needs to be considered as qi wanwu 齊萬物, a discourse on the equality of all
the myriad things. Given that humanity is part of the myriad things, it is
necessary, according to Chen, to consider also the equality of things and self
(qi wu wo 齊物我) (S. Chen 2004: 5). Looking at these three interpretations, it
becomes evident that the relations that humans have with themselves, others,
and the world are central, and also that the value of these relations needs to be
considered carefully. In a key and especially dense passage, it is possible to
find synthesized all the pivotal aspects of the “Qiwulun”:

What is It [shi 是] is also Other [bi 彼], what is Other is also It. There they say
“That’s it, that’s not” [shifei 是非] from one point of view, here we say “That’s it,
that’s not” from another point of view. Are there really It and Other [you bi shi 有
彼是]? Or really no It and Other [wu bi shi 無彼是]? (Zhuangzi 4/2/29–30; Graham
1981/1989: 53) 5

The passage clearly explains that the world is evaluated differently depending on the
point of view from which it is seized. As a consequence, reference systems change in
relation to their positions. This implies that what is considered a good criterion to
distinguish between things may not be satisfactory from another point of view and vice
versa. The values of these positions are, therefore, interchangeable insofar as each of
them considers its own perspective to be the standard. Yet, the text also suggests
something more. In asking if there is an it and an other (you bi shi) or if there is not

2
According to Graham, “even among the philosophies commonly called ‘mystical,’ there can hardly be one
more resistant to an analytic approach than Taoism” (Graham 1983: 3). Although it is true that the analytic
approach does not offer enough instruments to interpret texts such as the Daodejing or the Zhuangzi, it is also
necessary not to consider them as inscrutable and mystical. LIN Yutang affirms that when “Laotse and
Chuangtse spoke in mystic phraseology of the ‘elusiveness’ of Tao, it must be remembered that they were
not being mystic, but merely good observers of life” (Y. Lin 1948/1958: 31).
3
It is well-known that the Zhuangzi is not the work of a single author (on this see Liu 1987, 1994), and that it
was edited by GUO Xiang 郭象 (died 312 CE). Regarding the heading of the chapters, Graham holds that, most
probably, an editor of the 2nd century BCE devised them (Graham 1981/1989: 29).
4
Wu 物 is generally translated as “thing” but it is not limited to inanimate objects. In this essay, the word is
meant as an integral part of the wanwu 萬物 “myriad things” and must not be considered as an objectifying
concept. Regarding lun 論, it means “discourse” or “to discuss.” For further analysis on the title see Huang
2005. For an account of the title’s interpretations in Chinese history see Wang 1988: 39–40.
5
The references for the Zhuangzi are from Hung et al. 1947, followed by the page of Graham’s translation,
who offers an unsurpassed balance between a meaningful interpretation and a poetical rendering. For a critique
of Graham’s translation see S. Lin 2003.
The Ethical Stance of the “Qiwulun (Discourse on Corresponding Things)”

an it and an other (wu bi shi), the author introduces a supplementary differentiation,

namely you 有 and wu 無. This does not simply question the possibility of differenti-
ation between “it” and “other,” but asks if it is actually possible to have a unique
reference system. In other words, the text calls into question the legitimacy itself of any
standard that wants to define the world in a univocal manner. Another important
passage points directly in this direction:

Saying is not blowing breath, saying says something; the only trouble is that what
it says is never fixed. Do we really say something? Or have we never said
anything? If you think it different from the twitter of fledgelings, is there proof
of the distinction? Or isn’t there any proof? By what is the Way hidden, that there
should be a genuine or a false? (Zhuangzi 4/2/23–25; Graham 1981/1989: 53)

What one says is never fixed, that is, saying cannot be determined in a
categorical manner. There is no possibility to know if one says something or
not, no proof that this saying is more meaningful than any other sound of
nature, no assurance that there is a genuine and a false. Therefore, how can
there be any legitimacy for definitions, any standard to assess controversies?
CHEN Shaoming is right in considering this the implicit meaning of the qi
wulun as qi shifei (S. Chen 2004: 216). However, Chen also considers this
discourse as dissolving differentiations (min shifei 泯是非) (S. Chen 2004: 220).
This can be misleading and needs to be evaluated attentively. It is, in fact, of
great importance to clarify whether the qi of the “Qiwulun” is a normative
equalization that homogenizes everything and if this has ethical consequences.
Let us first consider this aspect from a wider perspective.

2 Corresponding Pluralities

From a Western epistemological point of view, the discourse about the impossibility of
discrimination between alternatives is certainly a cryptic piece of reasoning. As Hall
and Ames have argued, the problem lies in a different approach toward the world that
led early Chinese thought to develop a network of complementary oppositions instead
of a dialectic of mutual exclusive dichotomies. According to them, this is a reflection of
a non-transcendent cosmology:

The epistemological equivalent of the notion of an immanental cosmos is that of

conceptual polarity. Such polarity requires that concepts which are significantly
related are in fact symmetrically related, each requiring the other for adequate
articulation. This is a truistic assertion about Chinese thinking, of course, and is
usually illustrated with regard to the concepts of yin 陰 and yang 陽. Yin does not
transcend yang, nor vice versa. Yin is always “becoming yang” and yang is
always “becoming yin,” night is always “becoming day” and day is always
“becoming night.” (Hall and Ames 1987: 17)

As a result, in early Chinese thought “there is no element or aspect that in the strictest
sense transcends the rest. Every element in the world is relative to every other; all
 Massimiliano Lacertosa

elements are correlative” (Hall and Ames 1987: 18). In considering this correlative
polarity, Ames and Hall indicate a two-way influence between complementary events,

each of which requires the other as a necessary condition for being what
it is. Each existent is “so of itself” [ziran 自然] and does not derive its
meaning and order from any transcendent source. The notion of “self” in
the locution “so of itself” has a polar relationship with “other.” Each
particular is a consequence of every other. And there is no contradiction
in saying that each particular is both self-determinate and determined by
every other particular, since each of the existing particulars is constitutive
of every other as well. (Hall and Ames 1987: 18)

Consequently, contrary to the Western dualistic view that tries to define the exact
essence of objects and their place in the world, in early Chinese thought there is no
transcendent separation between the natura naturans and natura naturata (generating
nature and generated nature). The “Qiwulun” seems to go one step further in
questioning the very possibility of differentiation. However, this is not a simple
negation of the reasoning process which leaves everything undistinguished. In one
place, the text is perfectly clear on this:

Where neither It nor Other finds its opposite is called the axis of the Way [dao
道]. When once the axis is found at the centre of the circle there is no limit to
responding with either, on the one hand no limit to what is it, on the other no limit
to what is not. Therefore I say: “The best means is Illumination.” (Zhuangzi 4/2/
30–31; Graham 1981/1989: 53)

It is not by chance that the author uses the metaphors of the circle and light. At the
centre of the circle everything can be seen and can be reached in every direction. And
yet, this does not mean that all directions are the same or that the “other” is totally
obliterated in the “it.” The problem here is that one cannot use the teleological and
idealistic dialectics to solve the polarity of shifei, which would result in a synthetic and
implicit affirmation of shi.6 On the contrary, the text suggests that there is no synthesis
between dichotomies but they are simultaneously present in the axis of dao as
nonopposing or as accommodating each other. When one finds this pivot, there is no
limit to shi as well as no limit to fei. The problem, therefore, is to consider the
questioning of shifei not as a dissolution of polarities but as a boundless possibility

6
In his acute interpretation of the “Qiwulun,” LIU Xiaogan 劉笑敢 proceeds in a completely opposite direction
using the Hegelian dialectics as the main tool of his reading. According to him, dialectics can lead people to
properly understand the antitheses of the objective world and to see the truth that sophistry twists (Liu 1986:
122). Considering these premises, it is evident that, from Liu’s perspective, although the “Qiwulun” uses a
dialectical approach toward the world, it constantly falls into sophistry. Still, even if dialectics were a proper
and scientific method of disclosing an objective world, this method would affirm precisely the subject-object
opposition, activating the shifei process that the “Qiwulun” tries to neutralize, as we shall see soon. As a
consequence, although the “Qiwulun” uses oppositions, these are meant to show the corresponding value of
conflicting argumentations. Thus, supposing that one could use this terminology in this context, from the point
of view of the “Qiwulun,” the primary sophistry is dialectics itself if this is believed to solve the oppositions in
a synthesis. For a detailed analysis of the discursive strategy in the Zhuangzi and its relation to the other
traditional Chinese schools of thought, see Hansen 1992: 269–292.
The Ethical Stance of the “Qiwulun (Discourse on Corresponding Things)”

of relations.7 In other words, more than a simple equalisation, the qi of the “Qiwulun”
is a correspondence—cum-respondere literally “to answer together” which implies a
mutual response, the rejoining of things to each other—in both its relational and
analogical meaning.8 The discourse on corresponding things indicates an ethical stance
where opinions are not just equal but are equally corresponding. Therefore, the
correspondence of shifei does not have the purpose of eliminating them, but precisely
the reverse: it aims to eliminate the presupposition that the controversies of shifei can be
settled once and for all.9 Looking from the axis of dao it is clear that everywhere shifei
are at play. The difference is that, from this point of view, they are all equally valuable
and inseparable because one produces and transforms the other.10 And yet, even this
axis is only metaphoric and cannot be located anywhere because dao has no bound-
aries. The challenge therefore is not to dissolve shifei imposing discriminative values.
The real challenge is to accept them without deeming and setting permanent bound-
aries. In order to appreciate this, it is necessary to step out of the theocentric,
anthropocentric, humanistic subject-object dichotomies and see the world from the
pluralistic wanwu, that is, from the myriad things perspective.11

The Way has never had borders, saying has never had norms. It is by a “That’s it”
which deems that a boundary is marked. Let me say something about the marking
of boundaries. You can locate as there and enclose by a line, sort out and assess,
divide up and discriminate between alternatives, compete over and fight over:
these I call our Eight Powers. What is outside the cosmos the sage locates as there
but does not sort out. What is within the cosmos the sage sorts out but does not
assess. The records of the former kings in the successive reigns in the Annals the
sage assesses, but he does not argue over alternatives. (Zhuangzi 5/2/55–57;
Graham 1981/1989: 57)

All these discriminations and assessments, all the “Eight Powers,” are the powers
employed by humans in order to make sense of the world. The author seems to admit
a degree of necessity for these powers. Still, it is meaningful how these necessities are
organized in an order of rank. Even if the sage considers the possibilities of something
outside the cosmos, he or she does not discuss or theorize about it, thus avoiding what
in the Greek tradition was the first step toward metaphysical disputations. Regarding
what is within the cosmos, the sage discusses but does not evaluate or criticize, thus
avoiding any epistemological standard, so to speak. In the final analysis, even if the
sage uses assessments for human affairs, these do not become a means to disputes.

7
According to Hansen, the point is precisely “to appreciate that many languages, many ways of shi-feiing are
possible. The useful advice is that we should be flexible, tolerant, aware of the infinite range of possible ways
to respond to life” (Hansen 1992: 284).
8
Although controversial and metaphysically indebted, Wu’s idea of qi as a “spontaneous system of ontolog-
ical reciprocity” (Wu 1990: 171) is an interesting interpretation.
9
Hall and Ames underline that there are no “hierarchies built upon implicit ontological claims. No ‘Great
Chain of Being’ or ‘Ladder of Perfection’ exists in the Daoist thinking; only ‘the parity of all things’ (qiwu 齊
物), where each thing is at once insistently itself, and necessary for everything else to be what it is” (Hall and
Ames 1995: 237). We shall come back to the problem of ontology.
10
We shall come back to see this process of transformations in more detail.
11
For the antianthropocentric view, see G. Chen 1985: 20 and Parkes 2013.
 Massimiliano Lacertosa

Therefore, there is no contention that can divide things because there is no division
between them:

To “divide,” then, is to leave something undivided: to “discriminate between

alternatives” is to leave something which is neither alternative. “What?” you ask.
The sage keeps it in his breast, common men argue over alternatives to show it to
each other. Hence I say: “To ‘discriminate between alternatives’ is to fail to see
something.” (Zhuangzi 5/2/57–58; Graham 1981/1989: 57)

It is clear that the “Qiwulun” does not refuse distinctions but, more properly,
refuses to turn these into alternatives.12 In other words, it is necessary to avoid
turning distinctions into either-or choices, which means to see distinctions not as
excluding each other but as mutually related. To see the relations between
differences is to recognize the polyphony of nature and the polyphonic nature of
humanity. To “discriminate between alternatives” is to fail to see this relation and
to hear this polyphony. If common people argue over alternatives, the sage keeps
everything in his breast. Therefore, “to fail to see something” means to fail to see
that everything is continuous.13 In this sense the “Qiwulun,” using its peculiar
double question, asks if there is an it and an other (you bi shi) or if there is not an
it and an other (wu bi shi) at all. Someone can argue that there is another kind of
discrimination in play here, the discrimination between you 有 and wu 無. A reply
could ask if there is actually a youwu or no youwu at all. This reply, however,
would step in a regressus in infinitum. And yet, this is probably the only way out
or, even better, the only way in. The “Qiwulun” points precisely in this direction:

There is “beginning,” there is “not yet having begun having a beginning.”

—There is “there not yet having begun to be that ‘not yet having begun having a
beginning’.”
There is “something,” there is “nothing.”
—There is “not yet having begun being without something.”
—There is “there not yet having begun to be that ‘not yet having begun being
without something’.”
All of a sudden “there is nothing,” and we do not yet know of something and
nothing really which there is and which there is not. Now for my part I have
already referred to something, but do not yet know whether my reference really

12
Graham properly explains that “It is all right to make fluid distinctions varying with circumstances, it is
when we make rigid distinctions misleading us into judging that something is permanently what it is
temporarily convenient to name it that thinking goes wrong” (Graham 1989: 190). In fact, to say something
means to distinguish something from something else. However, this saying is never fixed, which implies that
distinctions are also never fixed. Hence, it is not possible to agree with Bryan Van Norden, who proposes that
the sage “does not make evaluative judgments at all” (Van Norden 1996: 259).
13
We shall see how this continuity is crucial to understand the myriad things transformation. For now it is
worth emphasizing how Ames states that “A recognition of the mutuality one shares with one’s environments
leads to a reconciliation of opposites: a transcending of self/other distinction and freedom from the desires,
attachments, and dichotomous values that are generated from the notion of a discrete self (that is, a
reconciliation of ‘this/that,’ ‘good/bad,’ ‘right/wrong,’ ‘life/death,’ and so on)” (Ames 1998: 3). By the same
token Graham affirms that “The Taoist sage is unselfish, neither by acting out his nature nor by obeying moral
principle, but by seeing through all dichotomies including self and other” (Graham 1989: 193).
The Ethical Stance of the “Qiwulun (Discourse on Corresponding Things)”

referred to something or really did not refer to anything. (Zhuangzi 5/2/49–50;

Graham 1981/1989: 55)

Here the regression is not only toward an origin that cannot be defined but also toward
any kind of linguistic determinacy. It is clear that the text is referring to something, but
in questioning this reference the author is thematizing the polarity of you and wu itself.
However, this thematization too is put into question by the possibility of not referring to
anything. This is a typical strategy of the “Qiwulun,” where a polarity is supposed just
to be negated. And yet, this polarity needs to be in place in order to be negated. The
constant affirmation and its corresponding negation destabilize any possible ground for
univocal standards. Thus, the regression goes in both directions: there is neither a
reachable beginning nor a reachable conclusion, neither original meaning nor final
determinacy. These infinite regressions are not faults in reasoning, but rather ethical
assumptions, provided that one is able to step out of the subject-object dichotomy and
step in to the myriad things perspective, which means to see the world from the axis of
dao and appreciate the infinite relations of youwu and shifei.14

3 Revolving Transformations

Let us consider how these relations are formed:

No thing is not “other,” no thing is not “it.” If you treat yourself too as “other”
they do not appear, if you know of yourself [zi zhi 自知] you know of them.
Hence it is said:
“‘Other’ comes out from ‘it,’ ‘it’ likewise goes by ‘other,’”
the opinion that “it” and “other” are born simultaneously. (Zhuangzi 4/2/27–28;
Graham 1981/1989: 52)15

If “No thing is not ‘other’” and if “no thing is not ‘it’,” one cannot exclude from this
relation any single aspect of the world.16 Whatever emerges in the world does not do so
in an autonomous fashion but always in relation to its “other.” More precisely, no one is
without an other, because one gives rise to the other and vice versa. They are mutually
engendering. Consequently, it is not possible to single things out in a hierarchical
manner, and every single new aspect needs to be seen in its reciprocal relation with the
rest.
This becomes even clearer in the second part of the passage. Here Graham reaches
one of the highest points in his interpretative translation. Since the earliest

14
To this boundless and nonopposing relation of shifei, CHEN Guying adds their “endless transformation” (G.
Chen 2007: 72).
15
In the second chapter of the Daodejing it is possible to find a similar concept when it is said that you and wu
are mutually generating (youwu xiangsheng 有無相生).
16
In his commentary, GUO Xiang interprets this passage, underlining more its negative aspect and leaving the
centrality of reciprocity between polarities untouched: “Since each and every thing considers itself ‘it,’ no one
cannot be considered ‘it.’ All things consider one another ‘other,’ hence no one cannot be considered ‘other.’
For no thing is not ‘other,’ there is no ‘it’ in the world. No thing is not ‘it,’ thus there is no ‘other’ in the world.
Since there is no ‘other’ and no ‘it,’ then they profoundly correspond” (Guo 1895/1961: 66; my translation).
 Massimiliano Lacertosa

commentators, the passage has been interpreted as a consideration of subjectivism and

the impossibility of knowing from the point of view of the other.17 Graham, however,
overturns the perspective and interprets the sentences in a positive direction, giving the
reader the result of the critique rather than the critique itself. Therefore, if you conceive
yourself as other—that is to say, if you single yourself out—no relation can be seen. If
you know yourself—to wit, if you know the other in yourself—then you know the
perspective of “it” and “other.”18 This is directly the result of the preceding discourse. If
no thing cannot be conceived as only “it” or only “other,” one cannot be “other” from
the rest. One is always both “it” and “other.”19 If one is detached from the rest, it is not
possible to see the relation between things, that is: to lift oneself above the net of
relations is to miss seeing something. The point is precisely to see that the myriad
things are mutually engendering, and this clearly includes the self/other relation.20 In
fact

Without an Other there is no Self, without Self no choosing one thing rather than
another. (Zhuangzi 4/2/14–15; Graham 1981/1989: 51)

Going one step further in this direction, it becomes evident how, in the end, all the
polarities of the “Qiwulun” can be considered as wo bi 我彼 or “self/other” polarities.
However, even the self/other polarities need to be conceived in their infinite possibility
of relations, without origin or determinacy. In fact, “since the world and I are born
together, the myriad things and I are continuous” [Tiandi yu wo bing sheng, er wanwu
yu wo wei yi 天地與我並生 , 而萬物與我為一 (Zhuangzi 5/2/52–53)].21 Hence, from the
axis of dao, the self corresponds with the world and vice versa. From the myriad things’

17
Regarding this passage and the issue of considering zi shi 自是 instead of zi zhi see G. Chen 2007: 68.
Ziporyn explains that this line “constitutes an essential turning point in the discussion, but it is very hard to
construe.” He interprets the line as critical toward the possibility of seeing from the other point of view. This,
however, is only one aspect of the passage—Ziporyn, in fact, needs to “assume an intersubjective concept of
‘thing’” (Ziporyn 2003: 46) in order to justify the inconsistency of this reading. Only by acknowledging that
the other point of view also has awareness of both perspectives is it possible to have a correspondence between
one’s own standpoint and the other. CHEN Guying affirms precisely this, explaining how the yi ming 以明—
which precedes and concludes this passage—suggests a mutual illumination: “‘that’ is enlighten by ‘this’ and
‘this’ is enlighten by ‘that’” (G. Chen 1985: 22).
18
Graham holds that “ceasing to choose and simply ‘being about to’ the sage thinks of other people as ‘I’”
(Graham 1989: 193).
19
In his commentary on this passage, CHENG Xuanying 成玄英 (608–669 CE) concludes that “if one can really
perceive the other and the self, then there is no shi and no fei” (Guo 1895/1961: 65). However, as we have
seen, in the “Qiwulun” the scope seems not to dissolve opposition but to assimilate them. More on this below.
20
For a history of the self’s conceptions in China, see Elvin 1985. For a detailed analysis of the concept of the
self in the Daoist thought, cf. Hall and Ames 1998: 45–67. For a discussion of the self in the “Qiwulun,” cf. G.
Chen 2008: 212–213.
21
In commenting on this passage, Ames specifies that in “this processive worldview, the embedded particular
and its context are at once continuous and distinct” (Ames 2015a: 266). Coutinho explains that yi 一 cannot be
regarded as “the One” because in early Chinese philosophy yi as “one” has a “different set of connotations
from those of Western philosophy: it often has a temporalized sense, referring to the continuity between past
and present” (Coutinho 2014: 64). According to him concepts such as integration and continuity are more
consistent with the early Daoist understanding of yi. The same “Qiwulun” passage (Zhuangzi 5/2/53) reminds
us of the impossibility of naming the “one” as “unity,” because the saying itself constitutes an addition to it.
Therefore, as perfectly clarified by Hansen, it is of paramount importance not to think at the “Qiwulun” as a
monistic assertion (Hansen 1992: 291).
The Ethical Stance of the “Qiwulun (Discourse on Corresponding Things)”

perspective, self and other are constantly in shifting positions. This clearly has impor-
tant ethical consequences.
According to CHEN Shaoming, the “Qiwulun” shows how, in facing the world, one
not only needs to get rid of self-centered humanism, but also to learn how to respect
every single element of the world, “no matter if it is a person, a fish or a bird” (S. Chen
2004: [Introduction] 8). He affirms that this is the intimate meaning of wu sang wo 吾喪
我, “I have lost my-self.” In fact, according to him, “the body as dried wood and the
heart as dead ashes are precisely the correspondence of things and self” (S. Chen 2004:
11).22 Similarly, CHEN Guying considers the “Qiwulun” not only as a discourse on the
equality of things but also as “parting from the self-centered structure” (G. Chen 2008:
210). Therefore, in the last analysis, the “Qiwulun” can be considered as qi wu wo 齊物
我 and, more precisely, as qi bi wo 齊彼我, which is only another way of saying wanwu
yu wo wei yi 萬物與我為一.
CHEN Guying considers yi 一 not only as a “comprehensive harmony” that dissolves
boundaries, but also as a wholeness in which everything is a constant process of
transformation (G. Chen 2008: 218). This entails that yi is not a static “One,” but a
comprehensive and harmonious flux in which differentiation always returns on itself.
The “Qiwulun” clearly presupposes this perpetual mutation of things:

Their dividing is formation, their formation is dissolution; all things whether

forming or dissolving in reverting interchange and are deemed to be one [fu tong
wei yi 復通為一]. (Zhuangzi 4/2/35–36; Graham 1981/1989: 53)

If a oneness needs to be thought, this is not any kind of substance but at most a
continuity of transformations. CHEN Guying explains that, in its fragmented dissolution,
a thing contributes to the formation of a new one and the constitution of this new thing
includes the element of the former dissolved one (G. Chen 2008: 218). Thus fragmen-
tation, formation, and dissolution are all part of a continuous process, namely, yi.
It is essential to understand that fu tong wei yi is not a return to a higher status in a
teleological way but a return to continuity. In the process of transformation, things are
constantly arising from each other and dissolving into each other. At the same time, the
myriad things are constitutive of a wholeness and this wholeness is formed by the
transformation of the myriad things. Therefore, the returning of all things into yi means
that they return into a continuous wholeness, that is to say, the same continuity returns
on itself as transformation. In fact, wanwu and yi also form a polarity, and like all the
elements of the other polarities it is necessary to consider them in their reciprocal
correspondence: the myriad things form a continuous flux, simultaneously, a continu-
ous flux produces myriad things.
This, however, must not be regarded as a mere ontological stance but as an ethical
one. One needs to think the world as yi in its double aspect of process and wholeness in
order to keep all the myriad things in balance. It is precisely this whole process of
becoming that allows the myriad things to transform in each other without any of them
assuming a higher status. As we have seen, the infinite regression proposed by the
“Qiwulun” destabilizes any possible ground for univocal standards of judgments. This
implies that neither wu nor you can assume the role of original or final ground. Thus, yi

22
For a different reading on this and on the Zhuangzi ethics see Huang 2010.
 Massimiliano Lacertosa

as wholeness of transformations is a radical alternative to the ontotheological structure

Being-beings.
Similarly, dao cannot be conceived as a Parmenidean Being that grounds the myriad
things. If this were the case, it would not be clear how one can damage it. The text
openly states that dao is damaged by the emergence of disputations (Zhuangzi 5/2/42).
This means that dao is not a metaphysical essence but the process of the dynamic
balance between the myriad things that forms yi. For this reason, as we have seen, from
the perspective of dao, shi and fei are in balance and have no limits. As soon as this
balance is compromised by the imposition of a univocal standard for judgments that
does not consider its correspondence with other values, dao starts to be harmed. Thus,
dao cannot be determined univocally as the essence of the myriad things because, as
dynamic process, it is constantly in the making, that is to say: dao is formed by walking
it (dao xing zhi er cheng 道行之而成) (Zhuangzi 4/2/33).
To summarize, in its revolving transformation, everything returns on itself both as
part of the things and as a continuity. Hence, in the last analysis, the wholeness is the
returning of the myriad things into the continuity of fragmentation, formation, and
dissolution. It is fundamental to understand this double movement of things from
differentiation to assimilation and from assimilation to differentiation. Only in this
way is it possible to preserve the plurality of values and, at the same time, to keep the
correspondence of these same values. This is one of the most important ethical stances
of the “Qiwulun.” If everything transforms and returns into one continuity, then this
same continuity transforms and returns into the myriad things. It is not possible to
reduce one to the other: they go both ways. “It is this that is called ‘Letting both
alternatives proceed’” (Zhuangzi 5/2/40; Graham 1981/1989: 54). From the pivot of
dao these two sides of the polarity are not in contrast but corresponding. Therefore,
wanwu yu wo wei yi does not reduce everything to one univocal expression. On the
contrary, it opens subjectivity to the plurality of the world and, simultaneously, it
considers all their corresponding values. Being continuous with the myriad things
means precisely to participate in their constant transforming diversification and, con-
currently, in their corresponding assimilation.
Therefore, from the perspective of dao, inner and outer, subject and object, wanwu
and yi, shi and fei, and so on and so forth, are constantly revolving, continuously
shifting their positions. The intention of the “Qiwulun” is not to obliterate them but to
keep them present in a mutual entailing correspondence. As stated by CHEN Guying:
“Abolishing the conflicting relation between the world’s myriad things and the self—
that is, between the object and the subject—then it is possible to attain a state in which
subject-object are organically assimilated. […] This state is the state of ‘being without
boundaries’” (G. Chen 2008: 222). Things do not vanish in an indistinguishable
homogeneity but they are not in opposition either. This means that, from the perspec-
tive of dao, the world is not an amorphous and undifferentiated flat plane but an
unbounded plurality of relations.23 However, it is necessary to recall that this
23
Ziporyn proposes the interesting concept of “omnicentric holism” (Ziporyn 2003: 35). This seems to
resemble the concept of focus/field developed by Hall and Ames, which in turn, refers back to the Fazang’s 法
藏 Hall of Mirrors (Hall and Ames 1987: 239). On a different note but with similar conclusions, Graham
states: “Chuang-tzu’s position is that we should cease to distinguish between one thing and another, but this
does not entitle us to affirm that ‘everything is one,’ a proposition which immediately distinguishes itself from
the world which is other than it” (Graham 1969–1970: 145).
The Ethical Stance of the “Qiwulun (Discourse on Corresponding Things)”

perspective is not provided by a metaphysical essence. On the contrary, the unbounded

plurality seen from the perspective of dao is always an understanding and, consequen-
tially, an interpretative value, even though this one is not confined to the subject-object
dichotomy and entails the ethical possibility of accepting all the other values.
Thus, when Changwuzi 長梧子 says to Ququezi 瞿鵲子 “You and Confucius are both
dreams, and I who call you a dream am also a dream” (Zhuangzi 6/2/83; Graham 1981/
1989: 60), his rationale overturns the possibility of defining an objective reality: what
can be less objective than a dream? Still, not only is the object deprived of its
objectivity but also the subject is deprived of its subjectivist capacity to objectify the
other. If subject and object are both dreams, there is no possibility for the subject to
ground in itself the objective truth of reality. This entails that the self and the other as
dreams can be corresponding and, simultaneously, can preserve their own diversity.
Whilst the “Qiwulun,” faithful to its nonassertive nature, does not propose a positive
moral that indicates a specific code of conduct, it offers a possibility that welcomes
other possibilities and in so doing suggests a wider ethical attitude toward oneself, the
other, and the world.

4 Conclusion

As has been suggested, it is necessary to step out of the subject-object dichotomy in

order to appreciate the perspective that the “Qiwulun” suggests. If this is possible, it
becomes evident how the position proposed in the text is neither subjectivist nor
objectivist. In fact, the critique of shifei is precisely intended to undermine any sort
of perspectivism: this does not mean to say that the “Qiwulun” negates the presence of
perspectives; on the contrary, acknowledging the constant opposition of shifei in human
activities, it underlines their intrinsic correspondence. On the other hand, neither does
this critique of perspectivism result in any affirmation of objective reality. In fact, if
shifei are at play everywhere, and if they are all corresponding, there is no final ground
that allows the formulation of a standard for judgments. Thus, the philosophy proposed
by the “Qiwulun” can neither be defined as absolutist nor as relativist or sceptical.24
The problem is that its philosophy cannot be regarded as merely epistemological. In
order to grasp its content, it is necessary to consider the ethical stance that is naturally
implied by its epistemology.
The crucial point is that the critique offered by the “Qiwulun” through the analysis
of shifei does not aim to simply affirm any epistemology or ontology. The scope of the
discourse on corresponding things is not to define the substance of the myriad things
but to consider their values. The myriad things, in fact, are not simply equal—as if they
shared the same substance—but are equally valuable depending on the perspective
taken by the observers. This implies a correspondence of values which undermines any
affirmation of ontological and metaphysical absolutisation. This is not to say that one
cannot express absolute stances, it is to say that their values are corresponding to any
other value.

24
On the problematic characterisation of the Zhuangzi’s philosophy as relativist or sceptical, see Kjellberg and
Ivanhoe 1996. For a critique of the position that interprets the Zhuangzi as neither absolutist nor relativist, see
Allinson 1989: 117–120.
 Massimiliano Lacertosa

For similar reasons some scholars use terms such as “non-metaphysics” (Cheng
1989) or “ametaphysics” (Ames 2015b) in order to describe early Chinese philosophy.
These are authoritative positions and are useful in order to differentiate the Chinese
perspective from the onto-theo-logical nature of Western metaphysics. Cheng, howev-
er, negates Chinese metaphysics in the sense of a “separation of the sensible from the
nonsensible, the practical from the transcendental” (Cheng 1989: 167–168). According
to him, metaphysical thinking in the Chinese context “is a matter of seeking the way,
the comprehensive and integrative understanding of reality, with all its changes and
transformations. Metaphysics is not to go beyond this reality, but to embrace it” (Cheng
1989: 206). It is difficult to disagree with this position. And yet, why should one retain
a term such as metaphysics which is so distant to the concept it is supposed to express?
Even more important in the context of the “Qiwulun,” what is this reality that Cheng
takes for granted? If there are no standards, it is not clear how one can define reality,
let alone embrace it. The butterfly dream at the end of the chapter is a clear example of
this uncertainty, which precisely undermines any possibility of ontological assurance by
dissolving the separation between sensible and nonsensible. Still, it is precisely a matter
of being able to embrace this uncertainty: to welcome both reality and dream, affirma-
tion and negation, life and death. It is thanks to this that one can accept the world, not
just as it is but also as it might be, which entails that one is open to the transformation of
things (wu hua 物化) and ready to be part of it.25
If it is possible to embrace the unknown and to change through it, then one is open to
the other in the widest sense. The possibility to cross boundaries and appreciate values
from different perspectives opens an ethical sphere in which a dialogue between the self
and the other is not only possible but also facilitated. The self and the other correspond
to and welcome each other in a reciprocal hospitality that dissolves limits and,
simultaneously, preserves differences. Contrary to the ontotheological nature of West-
ern metaphysics that imposes a single logic for its hierarchical structure Being-beings,
the correspondence of myriad things allows the differentiation and assimilation of
values in a comprehensive and harmonious fashion. Thus, the “Qiwulun” offers an
ethical reading of the world in which no single perspective is affirmed, let alone the
anthropocentric one. What it thematizes is rather the encounter and correspondence
between perspectives along with the constant transformation of the myriad things and
their values. In a historical moment in which the world needs to find a new balance not
only among populations but also between humankind and nature, the “Qiwulun”
proposes an ethical stance that should be taken very seriously.

Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Graham Parkes, Robin Wang, and Antonello Palumbo
for their precious comments and suggestions. Professor Parkes kindly proofread the text as well. Many thanks
also to the two anonymous reviewers for their attention and help.

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