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STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies

Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

CONTENTS
AUTHORS

4 ONSSSM Events
For the First Time Ever: PN’s Experts’
Dialogue 2023 talks about cyber resiliency
Kyle Esther E Cardona
Miguel Angelo A De Castro
Jan Emil N Langomez
Vincent Kyle D Parada
Altamira Chantrelle M Reyes
Queenie Mhaye S Valencia

7 Indo-Pacific Regional Dynamics

The Indo-Pacific: The Premiere Maritime
Flashpoint of the Early 21st Century
LAYOUT ARTIST
Thea Alexandra P Borinaga

10 ASEAN Affairs
ASEAN and the Philippines on Australia’s
Strategic Partnership: Issues and
Implications
DISCLAIMER: The articles published in the
StratJournal were written by ONSSSM authors in their
personal capacity. In this regard, the opinions in this

14 Philippine Relations
The Importance of the US-Philippines
Alliance in the Region: The Philippines as a
volume are those of the authors. They do not reflect
the position, policy, or decision of the Philippine Navy,
Lynchpin to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Philippine
ASEAN Government.

20 Policy Trends
Should the Philippines Legislate a National
Marine Code?

23 Philippine Relations
Reaffirming the ‘Golden Age’ of Philippines-
Japan Relations

2
The StratJournal is a publication of the Office of Naval Strategic Studies and Strategy
Management (ONSSSM), devoted to strategic, national, regional, and international issues
and developments that have significant impact on maritime and naval security.

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Office of Naval Strategic Studies and Strategy Management

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Front cover photos provided by the Naval Public Affairs Office

3
 STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

For the First Time Ever: PN’s

Experts’ Dialogue 2023 talks
about cyber resiliency
Queenie Valencia

Figure 1. The Philippine Navy conducts the Experts' Dialogue 2023 via Zoom platform
(Source: Philippine Navy)

On October 25, 2023, the Developing Cyber Resiliency Circumscribing the military’s
Office of Naval Strategic Studies Strategies to Mitigate Future role in the cyber domain
a n d S t rat e g y M a n a g e m e nt Threats” aims to gather local and One of the main
(ONSSSM), Philippine Nav y international cyber/cybersecurity points highlighted during the
conducted its annual Experts’ experts to share their perspectives discussion is the convergences
Dialogue to promote purposive concerning current cyber threats in cyberspace and how the
discussions that centered on and rationalize the military’s role in military should rationalize its
the topic of cyber resiliency. the cyber domain to operationalize role in addressing cyber threats.
The Experts’ Dialogue is an comprehensive cyber resiliency During the discussion, one of
annual convening that serves strategy. This is a special event the panel experts raised that the
as an avenue for experts and as this is the first time the military should not do everything
practitioners from the academe Experts’ Dialogue tackled topics concerning the cyber domain
and the defense sector to bridge concerning the cyber domain. The as the military would not be
d i ffe re n c e s i n p e rc e pt i o n s ; discussion was also aligned with able to cover all the activities
enable the exchange of ideas; and the recently approved National in cyberspace. The military in
reach a unified understanding Security Policy 2023-2028 which the cyber domain must have a
of the much-needed policy
states that the cyber domain is circumscribed mission set as 90%
initiatives. This year’s Experts’
an important security concern of cyber activity takes place in the
Dialogue 2023 with the theme
that affects the country’s national private sector. To rationalize its
“Beyond the Fourth Domain:
interests. role, it is therefore important for
the military to know its mission in

4 For the First Time Ever: PN’s Experts’ Dialogue 2023 talks about cyber resiliency
cyberspace. One of these missions
is the ability of the military to gain
and maintain freedom of maneuver
and prevent the adversary from
launching cyber-attacks and this
requires resilience. There is also a
need to circumscribe or define the
military’s activities in cyberspace
since addressing the demands
of the private sector and the rest
of the Philippine government will
expand all the military’s resources.
This is similar to the analogy that
most aviation and maritime activity
does not concern the military as
most cyber activity does not either.

To narrow it further, it is
noteworthy that there are only
four missions for militaries in
cyberspace: crime; intelligence;
Figure 2. The Cyber Domain
information (e.g., shaping (Source: Crowther (2017). The Cyber Defense Review)
cognition, psychological
operations); and cyber operations. that cyber intelligence is the resilience works and they were
In terms of cybercrime, the panel second-most important mission able to protect their critical
expert emphasized that the for militaries in cyberspace, infrastructure from Russia's cyber
military should only be involved in since the Chinese have the most operations with the support of
crimes concerning the Philippine aggressive intelligence-gathering NATO, the US, the UK, France, and
military and defense-related apparatus in the world. Meanwhile, Germany. Proper cyber hygiene
critical infrastructure. Although cyber information operations prevents 80% to 90% of problems
the military does not own all means that the military should and most cyber operations take
the critical infrastructure in the not be guarding the Filipino public place at the tactical level. One way
Philippines and it still depends from information operations, but to maintain this is to circumscribe
on functioning ports and the should only focus on safeguarding the military’s role in the cyber
delivery of fuel, it is still important the personnel in the Philippine domain and identify its priorities.
for the military to be involved in Navy from information operations. Cybersecurity in the Philippines
monitoring and ensuring that Lastly, special and conventional
there is cybersecurity in these operations are cyber operations According to one of the
infrastructures, but not providing supporting the military’s patrol panel experts, the Philippines’
cybersecurity for them. Moreover, craft and command and control cyber security is still at its nascent
as mentioned in the discussion, (C2) therefore having freedom of stage and still faces many
since the Chinese are operating maneuver. Among these, defense structural issues. For instance,
daily in the Philippines and cyber operations are the most it is only recently that the Armed
stealing every piece of data, important since the adversaries Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
the military’s mission in cyber are targeting the PN’s command is developing its cybersecurity
intelligence is to identify the and control. Therefore, the strategy and putting up the AFP
things it needs to safeguard PN should focus its efforts on Cyber Command. One of the
and guard it successfully. The cyber operations and ensure its experts even added that the
panel expert also raised a caveat resilience. As seen in Ukraine,

For the First Time Ever: PN’s Experts’ Dialogue 2023 talks about cyber resiliency 5
 STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

current practice of the AFP of military officers in the organization.

fusing the signal and intelligence Likewise, Philippine government A whole-of-nation approach
towards cyber resiliency
units together should be agencies should also review
rethought. As argued during the the lack of permanent positions The discussion revealed
discussion, cybersecurity is all- for information technology (IT) that cybersecurity in the
encompassing, and therefore a lot personnel. This also serves as Philippines remained fragmented
of elements are involved in cyber a challenge to provide a cyber whereas cyber defense should
operations. If the AFP intends defense posture as these agencies be everybody’s responsibility
to create a Cyber Command, it tend to outsource or contract IT and requires a whole-of-nation
should not be under the 6s family personnel for only 6 months. approach. One of the panel experts
but another major unit of the AFP. described cyber defense as akin
Echoing this sentiment, one of To further contextualize to a mosaic wherein different
the panel experts suggested that cybersecurity in the Philippines, st a ke h o l d e r s h o l d s p e c i f i c
there is a need for a military-wide there is also a need to look at
expertise to enable appropriate
cyber command that includes the policy instruments and laws
cyber defense posture. As such
different services. Thus, there concerning the country’s cyber
the military should not own
needs to be a defined command in defense posture. For instance, one
cybersecurity as a whole, but must
the entire Philippines since during of the panel experts underscored
discussions, the cyber group is that several bills in Congress are have a significant role as part of the
still not represented properly in the promoted to enact cybersecurity, discussion on critical infrastructure.
wider AFP organization. however, laws are useless in the As aforementioned, the military
long run and executive orders must define what is defense critical
Developing a specific should be enacted instead as these infrastructure and defense-related
structure and military personnel are more powerful instruments infrastructure. At present there
with a specific skill set is equally in cybersecurity. In addition, are still no standards for critical
important to developing a Cyber there are also no known laws on infrastructure and the AFP could
Command. However, one of the cybersecurity or cyber operations serve as an expert and contribute to
panel experts pointed out that as a whole in the Philippines, and building resilience and contributing
there is still a low appreciation of the Data Privacy Act, which is a to the security perspective of the
human components that specialize very powerful law in cybersecurity cyber domain. However, one of
in cybersecurity here in the is not fully enforced. The previous the experts slightly disagreed and
Philippines. Having conventional discussions also underscored argued that it is difficult for the AFP
commanders makes it difficult the need for the military to define to engage in providing standards
for cyber warriors or experts to its critic al infrastructure to which is not necessarily the role of
be more flexible and agile which circumscribe its role in the cyber the defense industry. Alternatively,
also concerns their career path. domain. According to a panel another role for the defense in
Due to this, military officers are expert, the Philippine government
moving to the private sector with domestic cybersecurity is bringing
defined a critical infrastructure national security into cybersecurity
better compensation and career list back in 2005. However, the
progression. In addition, there is debates. Often, discussions on
government did not act on this
also a need to adjust the incentive cybersecurity are focused on
list and is currently updating it to
systems for officers dealing tech-specific or business-specific
translate it into a law. The experts
with cyber operations as there factors yet ignore threat factors,
underscored that alignment is
is a reluctance for officers to join crucial in pushing for a Cyber especially cyber threats from
cybersecurity because it does Command. Therefore, published adversaries. Moreover, the military
not provide promotion. Thus, a documents and critical national could also cascade cybersecurity
force structure with a rational security policies need to have a to grassroots stakeholders and
office line-up is important to retain clear and distinct discussion on partner agencies such as USAID
cybersecurity. and the Department of Information

6 For the First Time Ever: PN’s Experts’ Dialogue 2023 talks about cyber resiliency
and Communications Technology
(DICT) to raise awareness and
provide connectivity in far-flung
areas.
M e a nw h i l e, s i n c e t h e
distinction between what is a
cyber crime and what is a state-
sponsored crime is porous in
cybersecurity compounded with
the blurring of the military’s role in
the cyber domain, questions were
raised during the discussion on
how the Philippines could attribute
cross-border issues. According
to one of the panel experts,
there needs to be discussion Figure 3. FOIC PN delivering his closing remarks via Zoom platform
on cross-border issues and (Source: Philippine Navy)
collaboration outside the country.
At present, however, there are still of the panel experts also clarified closing remarks wherein he
questions in the Philippines on that there is a unique distinction mentioned that cyber warfare is not
how the country would address in terms of attribution – who did new and plays an important role in
if a hacker is from a different it? and who is responsible for it? the military. As often highlighted in
country. Therefore, cooperating Not all attributions should be done the discussion, incorporating cyber
with other countries can lead a in public as the larger part of it is resiliency is needed but the military
response towards attribution and mostly done in private confidence. cannot do it alone and necessitates
this is indeed often collaborative It is important to collect and a whole-of-nation approach.
a m o n g d i ffe re nt c o u nt r i e s . analyze information first to look Cybersecurity also goes beyond the
at different decisions before national level and, therefore requires
For instance, the Philippine pointing at a foreign state. Indeed, further collaboration from experts.
military can engage in intelligence- it is impossible to limit cyber Indeed, the ED 2023 contributes to
sharing with other stakeholders defense merely in the context the discussion on cyber resiliency
and the Philippines must look for of the Philippines’ cyberspace and aids in developing new ideas to
supporters and partners including since no single nation can handle inform the PN’s role in crafting and
in the ASEAN. An example of this everything in space as the cyber operationalizing cyber resiliency
collaborative effort is the Microsoft domain knows no boundaries. strategies and enable it to respond
hacking where several countries to the rapidly evolving cyberspace.

“ ...it is impossible to limit cyber defense

merely in the context of the Philippines’
cyberspace as no single nation can handle
everything in space since the cyber domain
knows no boundaries.
hold the Chinese Ministry of State At the end of the discussion,
Security accountable, therefore, VADM TORIBIO D ADACI JR,
the attributed actor is not Flag Officer in Command of the
retaliating to a single entity. One Philippine Navy delivered his
For the First Time Ever: PN’s Experts’ Dialogue 2023 talks about cyber resiliency 7
 STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

The Indo-Pacific: The Premiere flashpoints are either maritime by

nature, or have critical implications
Maritime Flashpoint of the Early to the seaborne flow of trade
should conflict erupt. This makes it
21st Century rational to concur with Indian Vice
Admiral Girish Luthra regarding his
Miguel De Castro
view that among various maritime
theatres, the Indo-Pacific region
has emerged as the key area of
interest, attention, cooperation,
and contestation for the 21 st
Century.
A Historic Theater for
Competition and Coalition
Building

The Indo-Pacific is
h i st o r i c a l l y a n d i n h e re nt l y
a geopolitical tool; the term
was first propounded in 1920
by German geographer Karl
Haushofer as Indopazifischen
Raum in his academic work,
"Studies on the Relationship
between Geography and History."
Ironically, Haushofer’s Indo-Pacific
strategy stemmed from his view of
a political resurrection of Asian
Figure 1. Geography of the Indo-Pacific people against Euro-American
(Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
domination 3 as seen in his inter-
At t h e 2 0 2 3 M u n i c h Indeed, recent years have seen war vision of an Indo-Pacific
Security Conference, Germany’s the idea of an Indo-Pacific region coalition, headed by Japan, India,
Fo re i g n M i n i s t e r A n n a l e n a evolve from a niche geopolitical and China, against the maritime
Baerbock described the Indo- concept linked to Japan and the colonial powers of Western
Pacific as a region that will decide US, into an apt description of a Europe, the British Empire, and
what international order in the country’s strategic approach to the United States.4 Currently, the
21 st century would look like. She maritime Asia. Indo-Pacific is mostly tied to the
then added that the Philippines Quad regional grouping of the
is in an area where tensions Depending on how one US, Japan, Australia, and India;
might explode at any given views the Indo-Pacific, the an arrangement championed by
moment. While discussions about region does house several high- former Japanese Prime Minister
Ukraine dominated the "Davos tension and critical flashpoints 1: Shinzo Abe in 2007, echoing the
of Defense," Asian delegations the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, natural alignment of the Pacific
pointed out how the security of Territorial Disputes in the East and the Indian Ocean as well
the Indo-Pacific and Europe are China Sea and South China Sea, as advocating for a “broader
inseparable, further noting that Tension with Iran, and Instability Asia” similarly espoused by
the concerns of Ukraine today in Afghanistan, among many Haushofer. 5 While the primary
may be (East) Asia’s tomorrow. others. It is also important to note difference between Haushofer and
that a significant number of these contemporary views on the Indo-

8 The Indo-Pacific: The Premiere Maritime Flashpoint of the Early 21st Century
Pacific lies in which states align geopolitical term outlining ways the need for unity and strength, the
with which version, both versions to contain it and led by a coalition bonding power of shared values,
outline a coalition against another it sees as an Asiatic attempt at and the imperative to be active in
due to conflicting ideologies of NATO. It must be noted though that defending a liberal international
what the Indo-Pacific should China has started to use the term order.
represent. Indo-Pacific 7 as a contemporary
concept to describe the region
On one hand, the US and its Going Beyond Great Power
in international engagements. As Competition: Of Extra-regional
alliance structure with Australia, the international system evolves Interests and ASEAN Relevancy
Japan, and the UK rally around the to accommodate the competing
concept of a Free and Open Indo- However, framing the Indo-
interests of nation-states, the
Pacific to highlight shared values Pacific conflict within the lens
prevailing question of China’s
and ideals of the strategic space. of the great power competition
integration into or revision of the
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific d y n a m i c ove r s i m p l i f i e s t h e
existing international structure
concept highlights the need to complexities of the interests
safeguard freedom of navigation is of utmost importance. This
revolving around this particular
in the open seas of the Pacific and question looms behind every
geopolitical concept. Much to
Indian Ocean, as well as promote, i nt e r n at i o n a l i n i t i at i ve t h at
China’s chagrin, the concept of the
s afe g u a rd , a n d s u st a i n t h e China puts forward, especially
Indo-Pacific has also invigorated
relevancy of current international because its neighbors are wary
extra-regional players, such as
maritime laws through promoting of its every move as China tries
France, the European Union (EU)
the defense of the concurrent to shift the international balance
collectively, and India to jumpstart
rules-based order. Updating its of policies and institutions in
their economic and political
hubs-and-spokes architecture, its favor. As opposed to China
influence within the region. Despite
Washington’s approach to the creating coalitions of its own, it has
being constantly linked to the US,
Indo-Pacific centers upon 2 key instead become a revanchist and
the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy calls
principles: Collective capacity an irredentist power, constantly
for a Europe that is not reliant on
and Integrated deterrence. reminding itself of its responsibility
the US for its security concerns
to reclaim “lost” territories and
T h e a c t i o n p l a n fo r nor is economically dependent on
secure greater maritime space, as
collective capacity is anchored on the Chinese market.8
well as a revisionist power looking
5 arrangements: Empower ASEAN, to undo established international
Support India’s Rise, Strengthen Such a notion is also
norms. being promoted individually by
the Quad as a premier regional
grouping, Improve the Japan- European powers like France, who
The challenge of has been proactive in becoming a
Republic of Korea dynamic, and
revisionism is especially more visible force in the region to
Re-establish its partnerships with
highlighted in the Indo-Pacific highlight its relevancy as a maritime
the Pacific Islands. Meanwhile,
through China’s approach in Pacific power. While India’s Indo-
integrated deterrence is described
by the US as the “concept which the South China Sea and the Pacific engagements have been
will inform almost everything that East China Sea, where it applies seen through Quad, New Delhi’s
we do,”6 this particular concept will select interpretation of the approach is still primarily centered
be particularly dependent on the UNCLOS alongside inconsistent on maintaining an image of strategic
integrity of Washington’s alliance applicability and extra-territorial autonomy. To note, France and India
structure, or its ability to execute enforcement of its jurisdiction. are historically strong proponents
its collective capacity approach. While the US has never taken of being fundamentally non-aligned
sides in the territorial disputes, it and maintaining a strong degree
On the other side of the has led a coalition to challenge of independence to act on foreign
spectrum lies China , which China’s revisionist approach both and defense issues. Interestingly,
initially saw the Indo-Pacific as a through patrols, with emphasis on

The Indo-Pacific: The Premiere Maritime Flashpoint of the Early 21st Century 9
 STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

both France and India have a adherence to non-interference,

comparatively consistent naval particularly as this has curbed END NOTES
presence in the Indian Ocean, its capacity to effectively resolve
alongside a similar scope of
1
Council on Foreign Relations. “Global
its regional security issues. For Conflict Tracker”. Council on Foreign
operational interest. ASEAN to effectively carve out Relations, accessed 22 February, 2023.
a role and maintain its regional https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker
Lost in the shuffle of great relevancy, it has to be able to
2
Luthra, Girish. “The Indo-Pacific Region,
Maritime Focus, and Ocean Governance”.
power competition and minilateral uphold its strategic autonomy and Raisina Debates. Observer Research
coalition building is carving out develop policy agility amidst the Foundation, January 08, 2022. https://
a larger role for established glare of geopolitical competition, as www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-indo-
regional blocs, notably ASEAN. well as calibrate its responses in a pacific-region-maritime-focus-and-ocean-
governance/
Through its Indo-Pacific Outlook, way that it asserts its authority and 3
Li, Hansong. “The ‘Indo-Pacific’: Intellectual
there is tacit recognition of its shape behavior through norms- Origins and International Visions in Global
geographical importance as the building.10 Otherwise, it risks being Contexts.” Modern Intellectual History
conduit and portal to the dynamic 19, no. 3 (2022): 807–33. doi:10.1017/
simply another stage for political S1479244321000214.
maritime regions of the Asia- competition, and an involved-yet- 4
Ibid
5
Prakash, Testa. “Abe Shinzo: the Quad

“
Stands as his Indo-Pacific Legacy”. The
However, framing the Indo-Pacific conflict within Interpreter. The Lowly Institute, July 26,
2022. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-
the lens of the great power competition dynamic interpreter/abe-shinzo-quad-stands-his-
oversimplifies the complexities of the interests indo-pacific-legacy
6
Ibid
revolving around this particular geopolitical concept. 7
Saran, Shyam. “How China Views Indo-
Pacific”. The Tribune India, Dec 18, 2019.
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/
Pacific and the Indian Ocean, neutered bystander in its own comment/how-china-views-indo-
and how ASEAN must uphold its pacific-13470
maritime theater. 8
Duggal, Mahima. “The China Factor in
centrality as a key proponent to France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.” Journal of
promote cooperation. This is also While it can be argued that Indo-Pacific Affairs. Air Press University, July
bolstered by how Indo-Pacific 13, 2022. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/
the Indo-Pacific’s evolution into an JIPA/Display/Article/3091134/the-china-
strategies highlight the importance actual theater is ultimately fueled factor-in-frances-indo-pacific-strategy/
of ASEAN and its existing regional by the US-China competition,11 it 9
Prakash, Anita. “What Kind of Indo-Pacific?
structures and ASEAN Centrality. cannot be denied that the growing It is for ASEAN to Ensure.” Economic
To note, ASEAN’s centrality in Research Institute for ASEAN and East
involvement of many players and Asia Affairs, September 04, 2023. ttps://
the Indo-Pacific requires greater their respective interests create a www.eria.org/news-and-views/what-kind-
examination, given that the whole new dynamic in the region.12 of-indo-pacific-it-is-for-asean-to-ensure/
Indo-Pacific architecture is a 10
Laksmana, Evan. “Autonomy, Access, and
From collective deterrence, Agility: Southeast Asia and the (Re)search
balancing act of economic and strategic autonomy, ASEAN for Regional Order”. PowerPoint presented
strategic interests in the region, Centrality, and China’s own vision; at the Maritime Security Symposium at the
with an emphasis on consensus, the abundance of these Indo- Luxent Hotel, Quezon City, May 11, 2022
inclusiveness, governance,
11
“Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific • Stimson
Pacific concepts forms another Center,” Stimson Center (blog), accessed
transparency, and sustainable layer of tense competition in a February 13, 2023, https://www.stimson.
growth.9 region already rife with multiple org/project/geopolitics-of-the-indo-
flashpoints. As Singapore’s pacific/.
There are concerns
12
Rory Medcalf, “Many Players, Many
Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen said Layers: The Indo-Pacific Long Game,” in
about ASEAN’s actual capacity at the Munich Security Conference: Asian Geopolitics and the US–China Rivalry
to strongly influence the Indo- "We are not in a comfortable place. (Routledge, 2021).
Pa c i f i c’s c o m p l ex s e c u r i t y The temperature is not boiling, but
environment given its strong certainly rising. We must do all we
can to cool it."

10 The Indo-Pacific: The Premiere Maritime Flashpoint of the Early 21st Century
ASEAN and the Philippines on
Australia’s Strategic Partnership:
Issues and Implications
Jan Emil Langomez

Figure 1. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long during an ASEAN
Summit in 2018 (Source: Reuters)

A u s t r a l i a ’s s t r a t e g i c to its foreign policy interests.1 only to maintain key relations with

engagement with the Association To achieve its strategic aims, ASEAN countries but also to work
of Southeast Asian Nations the 2016 Defence White Paper with the US in promoting regional
(ASEAN) has significantly underscored the importance of stability and a rules-based order.4
evolved over the years, reflecting securing Southeast Asia and the
Implications for ASEAN
its commitment to the Indo- South Pacific. Much of Australia’s
Pacific Region. This is due to maritime trade network passes In October 2021, ASEAN and
Australia’s recent shift from an through Southeast Asia, Australia signed its Comprehensive
insular security outlook towards with an estimated value of USD Strategic Partnership (CSP). The
an external framework. In 2016, 248.7 billion in 2021. This two-way CSP has several implications
t h e Au st ra l i a n G ove r n m e nt exchange between Australia and for ASEAN. First, the CSP seeks
published its Defence White ASEAN is significantly larger than to promote enhanced regional
Paper underscoring its strategic its trade value with Japan and resilience. Australia’s participation
outlook in the Indo-Pacific. the United States. 2 Moreover, in ASEAN regional mechanisms
This white paper recognized ASEAN is seen as a lynchpin for seeks to strengthen Southeast
the Indo-Pacific Region as an promoting a stable and rules-based Asia’s collective resilience in
essential political, economic, and order in the Indo-Pacific Region.3
security environment in relation Australia’s strategic thrust is not
ASEAN and the Philippines on Australia’s Strategic Partnership: Issues and Implications 11
 STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

Figure 2. ASEAN Leaders with Prime Minister Anthony Albenese MP, the current Prime Minister of Australia
since 2022, pose for a shot during the 3rd ASEAN-Australia Summit held on 07 September 2023 in Jakarta,
Indonesia.(Source: ASEAN.org)

dealing with security challenges, Support Programme, and the that while Australia seeks a
particularly on counterterrorism Regional Comprehensive closer diplomatic relationship
and trafficking. The CSP also further Economic Partnership. Third, with ASEAN , it continuously
reiterates the Treaty of Amity and the CSP strengthens Australia’s emphasizes its policy stance on
Cooperation between Australia multilateral diplomacy with active sensitive issues, particularly on
and ASEAN, which underscores role in ASEAN-centric forums human rights and engagement
the Australian Government’s “strong such as the ASEAN Regional w i t h C h i n a . Fo r i n st a n c e ,
commitment to promoting ASEAN Forum and the East Asia Summit Au stra l i a h a s c o nti n u o u s l y
member states. Australia’s regional e l e v a t e s S o u t h e a s t A s i a’s aired its growing concern about
peace and security”.5 Second, the diplomatic influence both in the human rights cases in Myanmar’s
CSP reinforces Australia’s trade Indo-Pacific and in the wider world. Rohingya population. 6 It has also
agreements and investments with continuously supported the 2016
ASEAN to contribute to the region’s A u s t r a l i a ’s fo c u s o n Arbitration Award won by the
economic growth and development. ASEAN is further rooted in its Philippines, which many ASEAN
This includes commitments to shared interests and values countries have remained lukewarm
maintaining essential trade and with Southeast Asian countries. in its recognition. Meanwhile, the
economic agreements such as the These shared values are rooted ASEAN consensus, which allows a
in promoting regional security, single Southeast Asian country to
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand
economic development, and veto key decisions, has not always
Free Trade Area (AANZFTA), the
further political collaboration. been in sync with Australia’s
AANZFTA Economic Cooperation
However, it is important to note interests in the region. Hence,

12 ASEAN and the Philippines on Australia’s Strategic Partnership: Issues and Implications
Australia’s strong focus on human
rights and the need to recognize
the 2016 Arbitration Award
has impacted the Philippines, a
founding ASEAN member, in many
ways.
Implications for the Philippines

In 2016, two key issues

were a key interest for Australia
in its relationship with the
Philippines. These are the 2016
Arbitration Award and the human
rights situation of the former
President Rodrigo R. Duterte’s
administration. It is interesting
to note that while the Philippines Figure 3. Australian ODA to Southeast Asia and East Asia Regional by Sector Group,
2023-2024 budget estimate (Source: Australian Government Department of Foreign
remained lukewarm on its victory Affairs and Trade)
from the 2016 Arbitration Award,7
Au s t ra l i a h a s c o n t i n u o u s l y Comprehensive Partnership.10 has been an active participant in
pressed for the award’s legitimacy Moreover, Australia was a key several military exercises in the
condemning China’s push for its partner in pushing for for the Philippines in 2023 alone. This
“9-dash-line” in the South China Philippines to adopt the Regional includes Balikatan 2023 held in
Sea. 8 Furthermore, the previous Comprehensive Economic April, Exercise Alon 2023 held
P h i l i p p i n e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’s Partnership along with other in August, and most recently,
ongoing drug war campaign ASEAN member states. Australia’s Exercise Samasama 2023 held this
has often been recognized by relationship with the Philippines October.12 Australia’s enhanced
the Australian Government as a reached significant heights during relations with the Philippines and
concern in its engagement with the assumption of President cooperation in the maritime field
the Philippine Government. These “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. The have been integral in supporting
two key issues resulted in differing Philippines’ bilateral relationship the nation’s push to build up its
perspectives among the two with Australia was upgraded defense capabilities and promote
governments from 2016 to 2022. as a strategic partnership last the rule of law in the region.
August 2023.11 This comes at an Way Forward
Despite these differences, auspicious moment when the
Australia’s relationship with South China Sea dispute has A u s t r a l i a ’s s t r a t e g i c
the Philippines grew clos er experienced heightened tension engagement with the ASEAN
during this period. Australia and in recent years from China’s grey- has evolved significantly over the
the Philippines continuously zone operations. The Philippines’ years, marking a substantial shift
cooperated in maritime security, renewed push towards enforcing from an insular security outlook
environmental protection, m a r i t i m e l a w i n t h e We s t to a more externally focused
counterterrorism, and Philippine Sea, and Australia’s framework. The pivotal moment
cybersecurity. Both Australia growing presence in the Indo- began in the recent decade
and the Philippines have also Pacific Region, have made this w h e n Au st ra l i a re c o g n i ze d
negotiated a plan of action to bilateral relationship all the more Southeast Asia as a key player
implement the Joint Declaration important. As a reflection of this in the Indo-Pacific for critical
of the Philippine-Austalia growing partnership, Australia

ASEAN and the Philippines on Australia’s Strategic Partnership: Issues and Implications 13
 STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

2
“ASEAN and Australia,” Australian Government
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,

“
accessed October 6, 2023, https://www.dfat.
Australia’s enhanced relations with the gov.au/geo/southeast-asia/asean-and-australia.
3
The Australian Government’s Department
Philippines and cooperation in the maritime of Foreign Affairs and Trade recognizes that
“Southeast Asia is the nexus of major power
field have been integral in supporting competition in the Indo-Pacific”; “ASEAN and
the nation’s push to build up its defense Australia”. 4 See Australia’s Defence Strategy;
“2016 Defence White Paper”, p. 17.
capabilities and promote the rule of law in “Overview of ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive
5

Strategic Partnership”, Information Paper

the region. (ASEAN Secretariat, 2023).
6
Grant Wyeth, “Australia and the Case of the
Rohingya,” accessed October 6, 2023, https://
thediplomat.com/2019/09/australia-and-the-
case-of-the-rohingya/.
7
Renato Cruz de Castro, “After Four Years, the
Philippines Acknowledges the 2016 Arbitral
Tribunal Award!,” Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative, last modified July 27, 2020, https://
amti.csis.org/after-four-years-the-philippines-
acknowledges-the-2016-arbitral-tribunal-
award/.
8
“PH Thanks Australia for Supporting 2016
Arbitral Ruling,” Philippine News Agency, last
modified November 15, 2015, https://www.pna.
gov.ph/articles/1121858.
9
Charmaine Deogracias and Orrie Johan,
“Australia-Philippines Relationship: It’s
Figure 4. Current Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese during the ASEAN Summit 2023 held Complicated,” The Diplomat, last modified
in Indonesia (Source: Rappler) December 24, 2016, https://thediplomat.
com/2016/12/australia-philippines-relationship-
its-complicated/.
engagement in the region's also extends to its relationship with 10
“Australia, Philippines Agree to Upgrade
political, economic, and security the Philippines, where cooperation Bilateral Relationship,” accessed October
environment. The CSP signed on various fronts , including 13, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/
australia-philippines-agree-to-upgrade-
between ASEAN and Australia maritime security and economic bilateral-relationship/.
in 2021 has amplified Australia’s integration, has seen substantial 11
“Australia, Philippines Agree to Upgrade Bilateral
centrality within Southeast Asia progress. As the Philippines and Relationship,” accessed October 13, 2023,
https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/australia-
and has profound implications for Australia continue to enhance their philippines-agree-to-upgrade-bilateral-
the region. It reinforces regional strategic partnership, particularly relationship/.
resilience in dealing with security in the context of the South 12
“Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific • Stimson
Center,” Stimson Center (blog), accessed
challenges, bolsters economic China Sea dispute, their growing February 13, 2023, https://www.stimson.org/
growth and trade agreements, collaboration in maritime security project/geopolitics-of-the-indo-pacific/.
and elevates diplomatic influence. becomes increasingly integral to Department of Defence, “Australia supports
cornerstone Exercise in the Philippines,” Australia
upholding regional stability and the Government Department of Defence, accessed
While there are areas of rule of law in the Indo-Pacific. October 6, 2023, https://www.defence.gov.au/
disagreement, such as human news-events/releases/2023-04-28/australia-
supports-cornerstone-exercise-philippines;
rights and engagement with China, “PH-Aus Exercise Alon 2023 Officially Kicks
Australia’s proactive engagement Off,” Armed Forces of the Philippines, accessed
with ASEAN member states October 6, 2023, https://www.afp.mil.ph/news/
ph-aus-exercise-alon-2023-officially-kicks-off;
signifies a commitment to building END NOTES Mila Villanueva, “Philippines and United States
a more resilient and cooperative Navies Conduct Joint Maritime Exercises for
Indo-Pacific. This engagement
1
“2016 Defence White Paper,” White Paper SAMASAMA 2023.,” The Thaiger, last modified
(Australian Government, 2016). October 9, 2023, https://thethaiger.com/ph/
news/554736/.

14 ASEAN and the Philippines on Australia’s Strategic Partnership: Issues and Implications
The Importance of the US-Philippines th e N ew B ilate ral D efe nse
Guidelines which emphasizes
Alliance in the Region: The Philippines the US’ willingness to respond to
grey zone activities, re-opening 9
as a Lynchpin to the US Indo-Pacific more bases under the Enhanced
Strategy in ASEAN Defense Cooperation Agreement
Kyle Cardona (EDCA), and taking away the
decades-old ambiguity of the MDT
It is important to remember (GWOT) after the 9/11 attacks. It was by reaffirming the US’ ironclad
that the US is the Philippines’ only after the 2012 Scarborough commitment to the Philippines
oldest ally in the Indo-Pacific. Shoal takeover that the Philippine in the event of an armed attack.
T h e ex i s t e n c e o f t h e U S - government genuinely considered Current US President Joe Biden’s
Philippines’ Mutual Defens e recalibrating and identifying what reaffirmation, in particular, came
Treaty itself has spanned more should be prioritized as a threat to right after a Chinese Coast Guard
than seven decades, and the national security. 2 vessel collided with a Filipino
relations between the countries supply boat en route to Ayungin
span longer given the Philippines’ While former President Shoal this year. 4
previous status as an American B e n i g n o S . Aq u i n o I I I ’s The US Indo-Pacific Strategy and
colony. However, the alliance had administration was able to make Current Defense Infrastructure
to transform over time. When the strides on that front with the filing It is important to note that
Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War of the Arbitration Case against the Indo-Pacific only started to
ended, the strategic raison d’etre China in The Hague, reactive it may occupy a central role in the US
be, this was severely undermined national strategy when China
of the US-Philippine security
began to rise as an emerging
pact fell as well; with both sides and pushed to the backburner power in the Asia-Pacific, and
concluding that while the alliance after former President Rodrigo the growing strategic importance
was good to have, it was no longer R. Duterte was elected. From of the two connecting theaters
of vital importance.1 2016 to 2022, the US-Philippines of the continent, the Indian and
security pact almost disintegrated the Pacific Oceans , became
In 1991, the Philippine with President Duterte’s repeated increasingly apparent. As
Senate rejected the renewal of the attacks on the alliance. He stopped China started to unilaterally
1947 Military Bases Agreement most major joint exercises , change the status quo in the
resulting in the withdrawal of the threatened to end the Visiting region , militarizing the SC S
and conducting activities in
American forces. This too swift of Forces Agreement (VFA), and
contested territories that violate
a downgrade proved to be a folly warmed up to China, despite the international conventions, laws,
on both ends as only three years latter having conducted harmful and norms, the US started to lean
later, China illegally occupied advances in the West Philippine away from its previous GWOT
Mischief Reef, an underwater Sea (WPS). 3 alignment and re-prioritize its
feature located in the Philippines’ core interests, thus making the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ); The change of strategic and political decision to
and is now one of the most a d m i n i st r at i o n , n ow u n d e r ‘pivot to Asia.’ The alarming need
militarized islands in the South President Ferdinand Marcos to keep the region open and free
has been the basis of the U.S. and
China Sea (SCS). Despite this Jr., came with the expected re-
most of the West’s Indo-Pacific
incident, the alliance between the invigoration of the US-Philippines strategies. To balance China’s
US and the Philippines became alliance. Within a year, the US expanding force projection in
fixated on counterterrorism and and the Philippines were able to the Asia- Pacific, and actively
counterinsurgency missions in rebuild confidence with each other promote an open and free Indo-
Mindanao, which was aligned and make strides in the alliance. Pacific via freedom of navigation
with the US global war on terrorism This was done by by releasing
The Importance of the US-Philippines Alliance in the Region: The Philippines as a Lynchpin to the
15
 STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

operations (FONOPS), the US

has taken it upon itself to revitalize U.S. Territories/ Allied
Military Installations
its defense infrastructure in what Partner Countries
is now known as the Indo-Pacific Hosts Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Installations used to base
region. Army and Marine Corps ground units (including Army Terminal
Guam High Altitude Area Defense Battery and future Marine ground units),
The US maintains at least Navy vessels (including one submarine squadron), and rotational
66 significant defense sites spread deployments of Air Force bomber aircraft;
across the Indo-Pacific. Some of Hosts a number of sites that are used to support training and exercise
these installations are found in the Northern Mariana activities, including the Marianas Island Range Complex and Tinian
Islands International Airport; a new construction is underway to allow
US territories such as Guam, and increased usage of the islands in support of Air Force’s Agile Combat
the Northern Mariana Islands, and Employment and related requirements;
allied partner countries like South Hosts Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Installations, including
Camp Humphreys, Fleet Activities Chinhae, Marine Corps Installation
Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Camp Mujuk, and Osan Air Base; sites are used to base and support
and Australia. This network of South Korea Army units (including 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-US Combined
Division) and Air Force fighter, reconnaissance, and attack aircraft;
infrastructures performs and unlike other installations, basing posture in South Korea is primarily for
supports numerous militar y the deterrence and resistance of potential North Korea aggression;
functions, which include basing for Mainland
military personnel and weapons Hosts Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force installations, including
Camp Zama, Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Marine Corps Air Station
systems; domain awareness and Iwakuni, and Yokota Air Base; sites are used to base and support
area defense; maintenance and Army ground and aviation units, Navy vessels (including an aircraft
carrier, destroyers, cruisers, and amphibious assault ships), and Navy,
repair; training and exercises; Marine Corps, and Air Force fighter, electronic attack, command
storage and prepositioning of and control, tanker, and airlift aircraft; uses defense infrastructure in
mainland Japan to detect and intercept missile threats, maintain and
materiel; and research, among repair surface warships and submarines, and conduct training and
other activities. The US has started exercises;
Japan
to fortify these bases, particularly Okinawa
in the countries mentioned above. 5 Hosts Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force installations, including Army
Garrison Okinawa, Marine Corps Base Camp Butler, and Kadena
The US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Air Base; sites are used to base and support Marine Corps units
Current Defense Infrastructure (including the III Marine Expeditionary Force) and Marine Corps
and Air Force fighter, tilt-rotor, rotary wing, airlift, and aerial refueling
aircraft; uses sites to conduct training and exercises specific to jungle
AS E A N a s a re g i o n a l environments and support fuel storage and distribution functions;
organization is stuck in limbo, installations also represent the closest U.S.-operated bases to Taiwan
particularly with the negotiations and the SCS, both possible operational areas in a potential conflict
with the PRC;
on the Code of Conduct (CoC)
with China concerning the SCS The Philippines allows the US to deploy military forces at 9 Philippine
defense sites spread across the country. This access is governed by
issue. Experts have predicted EDCA. Per the EDCA text, U.S. access is authorized “on a rotational
that whatever the conclusion Philippines basis, as mutually determined;” authorized activities U.S. forces may
of this CoC will most likely be at conduct include “security cooperation exercises; joint and combined
training activities; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
the advantage of China and the activities; and such other activities as may be agreed upon;”
expense of ASEAN; specifically
Australia allows the US to rotationally deploy a number of ground
w ith C h i n a p o s s i b l y h av i n g and air forces to baseswithin the country, including a rotational U.S.
greater influence over joint Marine Air Ground Task Force known as Marine Rotational Force-
Darwin (at Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin and Robertson
exploration initiatives and naval Barracks) and rotational deployments of U.S. Air Force bombers and
drills that would be conducted in fighters under the Enhanced Air Cooperation (EAC) initiative. As part
Australia of the Australia-United Kingdom-U.S. (AUKUS) pact, U.S. and U.K.
the region. 6 nuclear-powered submarines will begin rotational deployments to
Australia’s HMAS Stirling naval base in 2027 (U.S. submarines will
also reportedly increase the frequency of visits to this base beginning
It is worth mentioning that in 2023). DOD’s increasing presence in Australia is widely seen as a
the Philippines originally raised response to worsening relations between U.S.-aligned countries and
the PRC.
the need for a CoC to address
the 1988 incident that happened Table 1. A few of U.S. military installations in the Indo-Pacific
(Source: Congressional Research Service)

The Importance of the US-Philippines Alliance in the Region: The Philippines as a Lynchpin to the
16 US Indo-Pacific Strategy in ASEAN
between Chinese and Vietnamese This is where the US-Philippines It is then safe to presume
forces at the Spratly Islands, which alliance comes in, as well as that any actions or activities
resulted in fatalities. Ending up the US’ overarching defense that could harm the WPS and
with a Code that does not address infrastructure. Without any security by extension the SCS (e.g.,
China’s aggression in the past up arrangement from ASEAN’s end, incursions of Chinese vessels,
to the present, and has no teeth at the US network of alliances and harassment of Filipino fishers and
all7 when it comes to dealing with the Philippines being its lynchpin government vessels, swarming of
the illegal and damaging activities in Southeast Asia could work well island features in the WPS, illegal
China has done in the SCS, leaves at the moment and even in the unreported, and unregulated
ASEAN with the short end of the long run for ASEAN. Unlike most fishing of Chinese maritime militia,
stick. ASEAN member countries, the indiscriminate harvesting of corals
Other factors that make Philippines has a lot at stake in the and other raw materials, and
ASEAN ineffective when it comes SCS. illegal island reclamations) would

“
also negatively affect not just the
Without any security arrangement from the Philippines’ fishing industry and
emerging blue economy but the
ASEAN’s end, the US network of alliances and overall livelihood of its coastal
the Philippines being its lynchpin in Southeast communities.
Asia the heart of the Indo-Pacific could work
Beyond that, these activities
well at the moment and even in the long run for would cause massive destruction
ASEAN. Unlike most ASEAN member countries, to the marine environment of these
the Philippines has a lot at stake in the SCS. waters, thereby contributing to
habitat destruction and the rapid
decline of fish stocks on a global
to dealing with the SCS territorial scale. It is not surprising then that
and maritime disputes are (1) Eight y percent of the the Philippines is more willing to
ASEAN’s foundational principle of country’s 117 million population live collaborate with the US to balance
non-interference in the domestic in coastal communities comprising China in the SCS and keep them
affairs of neighboring countries, 8 about 85 percent of Filipino in check in terms of their harmful
which in realit y extends to fisherfolks who are dependent on activities in the shared waters of
international affairs; (2) ASEAN these waters for food and income the region. Fortunately, the US
member states tendency to security. Moreover, 50 percent is more than willing to support
remain neutral over geopolitical of the Philippines’ fish stocks are the Philippines in this endeavor,
issues, prioritizing the economic caught by small-scale fishers. This by aiding the country in its
trade-offs that China provides amounts to an annual estimate modernization and through the
the region; and (3) China’s locked of 981 million US dollars. The implementation of EDCA.
grip on Cambodia , Myanmar, country also sits at the heart of the
How Can the Philippines and the
and Laos, all heavily dependent coral triangle, which is the global Philippine Navy Exploit this?
on China for economic trade center of marine biodiversity and
and water security with their accounts for 60 percent of the There are many ways for the
share of the Mekong River; thus, world’s known fish and more than Philippines, and by extension, the
i nfl u e n c i n g th e c o n s e n s u s - 300 hundred species of corals. Philippine Navy could exploit this
based decision -making of It is noteworthy as well that 9 rare advantage. But first, there is a
ASEAN and undermining the percent of the world’s coral reefs need for the Philippine government
organization’s course of action on are found in the Philippines 10 . to identify its interests and needs
high-stakes geopolitical issues. 9
The Importance of the US-Philippines Alliance in the Region: The Philippines as a Lynchpin to the
US Indo-Pacific Strategy in ASEAN 17
 STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

in this current strategic landscape. by requesting high-impact joint

One way to effectively determine exercises and training that would
such is to have an overarching and cater to the Philippine Navy’s needs END NOTES
cohesive maritime doctrine. With (e.g., war games, littoral exercises,
this comes a need for leveling replenishment at sea exercises,
1
Gregory B. Poling, “The Transformation
of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance,” CSIS,
not just among the policy and basic submarine training, etc.).
February 2, 2023, https://www.csis.org/
lawmakers of the government, Exploring asymmetric warfare analysis/transformation-us-philippines-
or the maritime agencies of the capabilities (e.g., drones, mine alliance.
country, but also among other warfare, etc.) that the US could 2
“The Transformation of the U.S.-
sectors of society, as a cohesive provide the organization is also Philippines Alliance”
and effective maritime doctrine one way of utilizing this alliance. 3
The Transformation of the U.S.-
would require a whole-of-nation Finally, the attention that the US is Philippines Alliance”
4
Joel Guinto, “South China Sea: Biden
Says US Will Defend the Philippines If
China Attacks,” BBC News, October
26, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-67224782.
5
Luke A. Nicastro, U.S. Defense
Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific:
Background and Issues for Congress,
Congressional Research Service, June
6, 2023, pdf.
6
Richard Heydarian, “ASEAN’s Silence
amid South China Sea Confrontation
Is Deafening,” Nikkei Asia, accessed
October 29, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.
com/Opinion/ASEAN-s-silence-amid-
South-China-Sea-confrontation-is-
deafening.
7
“ASEAN’s Silence amid South China
Sea Confrontation Is Deafening”
Figure 2. U.S. and PH Marines’ Landing Drill in San Antonio, Zambales
8
Minoru Nogimori, “ASEAN Is Reluctant
(Source: Francis Malasin/ EPA-EFE) to Join the U.S.-Led Decoupling/de-
approach. However, realization providing the country could also be Risking Strategy for China,” April 11,
of this necessity as well as 2023
a conduit for the Philippine Navy 9
“ASEAN’s Silence amid South China
overall appreciation of the US- to finally have a voice in the policy- Sea Confrontation Is Deafening”
Philippines alliance are observed making level of the government 10
“Fish Forever in the Philippines,” Rare
to be unequally distributed and to push territorial defense (blog), accessed October 29, 2023,
among the government and the and preservation of the country’s https://rare.org/program/philippines/.
Philippine population, which could sovereignty and sovereign rights at
be a result of misinformation, its forefront.
miseducation, and lack of threat
perception. Those areas need
to be dealt with accordingly.

As for the Philip p ine

Navy, this is high time to take
advantage of the US interests

The Importance of the US-Philippines Alliance in the Region: The Philippines as a Lynchpin to the
18 US Indo-Pacific Strategy in ASEAN
 u n d e rst a n d i n g th e ex i sti n g
Should the Philippines Legislate challenges that the Philippines
continues to face in terms of policy
a National Marine Code? development and enforcement in
Jan Emil Langomez the maritime domain.
Legal Context of a Philippine
Maritime Policy
Since 1983, the World
Bank has recognized that the
convergence of multiple agencies
pursuing a similar mission and
operational mandate within
the Philippines. This signifies
organizational challenges resulting
in the inefficient allocation of
resources . 2 This issue has
persisted since 1976, leading
to the proliferation of agencies
involved in the management of the
country's maritime affairs, thereby
giving rise to intricate institutional
Figure 1. The Philippine Navy along with naval ships from the United States, Japan, and India arrangements characterized
conducted a patrol in the South China Sea in 2019
(Source: Philippine Daily Inquirer)
by a lack of clearly defined
horizontal relationships within
Maritime policy stands as Concurrently, the specter their respective legal mandates.
an enduring pillar underpinning of overlapping jurisdictions and
the Philippines' security and conflicting maritime legislation At present, there persists
develop mental pursuits . As continues to cast shadows over a significant challenge to fully
one of the world 's largest the Philippines' maritime policy in harmonize the existence of
archipelagos, the establishment addressing maritime security and overlapping functions among
of a robust framework of maritime- development challenges. Such these agencies, which often

“
related policies and laws is
indispensable in realizing the Concurrently, the specter of overlapping
nation's development objectives
and safeguarding its territorial jurisdictions and conflicting maritime legislation
integrity. Nonetheless, recent continues to cast shadows over the Philippines'
events have starkly underscored maritime policy in addressing maritime security
the imperative for a more holistic
a p p roac h to ma naging the and development challenges.
Philippines' expansive maritime
domain. The West Philippine Sea, challenges include the persistent
in particular, has become a focal results in unwarranted allegations
ove rl a p p i n g of o p e rati o n a l o f m a n d a te i n f r i n g e m e n t .
point for a spectrum of challenges, mandates and challenges for inter-
encompassing grey zone Fu r t h e r m o r e , i n te r- a g e n c y
agency collaboration.1 To address fragmentation has led to structural
operations and environmental these issues, there is an urgent and operational challenges to
degradation wrought by foreign need to discuss the Philippines' conduct operations which hinders
vessels, including overfishing, maritime legal framework which the promotion of cooperative
coral reef destruction, and marine underpins operational mandates
pollution. and strategies. This is key to
Should the Philippines Legislate a National Marine Code? 19
 STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

maritime law enforcement efforts. 3

It can be argued that many of
these structural challenges stem
from the reactive nature of legal
development. For instance, the
Administrative Code of 1987
mandates activities against
illegal fishing under the purview
of the Philippine Navy. 4 However,
the Fisheries Code of 1998
gives this mandate under the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources as a primary function
of law enforcement. 5 In terms of
enforcing maritime regulation, Figure 2. The Port of Manila
(Source: Panay News)
the Administrative Code gives
this primary mandate under the was enacted on June 18, 1949, 2 . Formalizing Inter-Agency
Philippine Navy. 6 However, this and covers private law in the Collaboration. The Philippines'
same mandate is also given as a Philippines. The Comprehensive current maritime governance
primary function of the Philippine Agrarian Reform Code was structure relies heavily on informal
Coast Guard under the PCG Law enacted on June 10, 1988 , working-level organizations that
of 2009.7 and covers land reform in the lack enforceable legal backing.
Philippines. The National Building The absence of a legislated statute
Suffice it to say, maritime Code was enacted on February has often led to ambiguities in
law in the Philippines continues to 19, 1977, and covers building jurisdiction and authority, causing
experience structural challenges standards in the Philippines. challenges for law enforcement
which leads to both inter-agency There is a possibility of legislating agents, maritime services, and
fragmentation and differing a “National Marine Code” which policy developers. The National
priorities among services. This could serve as a legal code for Marine Code would rectify this by
leads to the question of whether maritime affairs. A National Marine establishing clear lines of authority,
the Philippines should look for Code is seen to provide several and ensuring that all maritime
methods to harmonize its maritime advantages to the Philippines’ stakeholders work within a unified
law enforcement function, and maritime framework. Some of framework.
significantly reform its existing these include the following:
legal framework concerning the 1. Unifying Maritime Policies. 3. International Alignment and Best
maritime domain. The archipelagic nature of the Practices. In a globalized world,
A Legal Code for Maritime Affairs Philippines has led to a complex nations must align their policies with
web of laws, regulations, and international standards. The National
A legal code is a systematic agencies that oversee various
collection of laws or statutes that Marine Code would enable the
aspects of marine governance, Philippines to integrate best practices
purports to cover a complete including maritime securit y,
system of laws or a particular and lessons learned from other
coastal management, and marine
area of law as it existed at the maritime nations, ensuring that its
activities. This fragmentation has
time the code was enacted. In the created confusion, inefficiencies, maritime policies meet international
Philippines, there are several legal and conflicts in enforcement. A benchmarks. This alignment would
codes adopted from 1901 to the well-structured National Marine not only enhance the nation's
present, including the Civil Code, Code would serve as a single, reputation on the international
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform consolidated source of maritime stage but also foster cooperation
Code, and the National Building laws and regulations, streamlining with neighboring countries and
Code, among others. The Civil Code the legal framework governing the international organizations.
nation's waters and seas.

20 Should the Philippines Legislate a National Marine Code?

 2
Undisclosed Expert. Session Opening
A p ro p o s e d N at i o n a l aforementioned challenges. This and Agenda Setting. In Expert’s
Dialogue: Prospects for Cooperation and
Marine Code would provide legal code, akin to established Collaboration for a Collective Philippine
clarity on overlapping mandates codes in other areas of law, offers Maritime Response. Office of Naval
and jurisdictions, harmonizing several advantages, including Strategic Studies and Management. (Eds.)
Valeene Salanga & Queenie Valencia. (2021).
the fragmented maritime policies the unification of fragmented 3
Guidote (2016 interview) cited examples of
towards a unified framework. maritime policies, formalization of conflicts in jurisdiction and responsibilities.
In ports, for instance, continuous export and
This legal code could serve inter-agency collaboration, and smuggling of endangered species occur as
as a crucial point of reference strengthening of the Philippines' the port is under different jurisdiction. The
for all stakeholders involved in m a r iti m e l aw e nfo rc e m e nt PNP is placed outside the port, the PPA
within the port, and the Bureau of Customs
maritime affairs, facilitating a functions. By providing clarity inside the port. Bias occurs as goods enter
shared comprehension of their on overlapping mandates and different jurisdictions. Culprits of oil waste
respective roles, responsibilities, jurisdictions, a proposed National into the sea also go unpunished as detection
fails in moving water and as it moves to
and regulatory obligations. The Marine Code paves the way for a different jurisdiction”; “National Marine
consolidation of these laws more streamlined and accessible Policy Review”, p. 33.
4
Section 53(4) of the Administrative Code
signifies a significant stride toward source of maritime laws and of 1987 states the following: “The Philippine
establishing a singular and easily regulations. Furthermore, it offers Navy shall: (4) Enforce laws and regulations
accessible source of information, a well-structured framework that pertaining to navigation safety of life at
sea, immigration, customs revenues,
benefiting not only law enforcement will enhance the clarity of roles and narcotics, quarantine, fishing and neutrality
officials but also the general public. responsibilities among maritime of the territorial contiguous waters of the
stakeholders. The formalization Philippines”; “Executive Order No. 292
Pushing for A Unified Legal [BOOK IV/Title VIII/Subtitle II/Chapter
Framework of inter-agency collaboration will 8-Major Services] | GOVPH,” Official
rectify the existing ambiguities Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines,
Maritime policy in the in jurisdiction and authority, July 25, 1987, https://www.officialgazette.
gov.ph/1987/07/25/executive-order-no-
Philippines serves as a lynchpin for thus ensuring a more cohesive 292-book-ivtitle-viiisubtitle-iichapter-8-
both the nation's security and its maritime governance structure. major-services/.
developmental aspirations, given
5
See Section 65(n) of the Fisheries Code
This represents a significant step of 1998 which states the following: “As a line
its vast archipelagic expanse. toward achieving more effective bureau, the BFAR shall have the following
Recent challenges, particularly a n d a c c o u nt a b l e m a r i t i m e functions: (n) enforce all laws, formulate and
in the West Philippine Sea, have enforce all rules and regulations governing
governance for the Philippines. the conservation and management of fishery
illuminated the pressing need for resources, except in municipal waters,
a more comprehensive approach and to settle conflicts of resource use and
allocation in consultation with the NFARMC,
to managing the country 's END NOTES LGUs, and local FARMCs”; “Republic Act
maritime domain. The specter No. 8550 | GOVPH,” Official Gazette of
of overlapping mandates and 1
“The largest gaps emerge from the Republic of the Philippines, February
fragmented implementation and lack of 25, 1998, https://www.officialgazette.gov.
divergent maritime legislation interdepartmental discussions on how ph/1998/02/25/republic-act-no-8550/.
continues to cast a shadow over to fully implement marine policies and 6
This also falls under Section 53(4) of the
Philippine maritime policy. To programs. The lack of information transfers, Administrative Code of 1987; “Executive
sharing, and collaboration perpetuates the Order No. 292”.
address these issues effectively, gaps within the progress of the policy and 7
Section 3(a) of the Philippine Coast
a thorough examination of the its programs. Open sharing and trading of Guard Law of 2009 states the following:
information and ideas have substantially “The PCG shall have the following powers
nation's maritime legal framework delayed proper implementation of many and functions: (a) To enforce regulations
is imperative, as it forms the existing laws and policies, as well as created in accordance with all relevant maritime
b e d ro c k fo r g o v e r n m e n t a l overlap between agencies, which is a strain international conventions, treaties or
on money, time, and resources”; Edna Co, instruments and national laws for the
o p e ra t i o n a l m a n d a t e s a n d et al, “National Marine Policy Review and promotion of safety of life property at
strategies in this critical domain. Strategic Direction: Review and Update sea within the maritime jurisdiction of the
of the 1994 National Marine Policy and the Philippines and conduct port state control
A p ro p o s e d N at i o n a l Formulation of the National Marine Strategy,” implementation”; “R.A. No. 9993,” July 27,
Marine Code emerges as a University of the Philippines Public Policy 2009, https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/
Volume XV No. I, no. Special Issue (2016), p. 32. ra2010/ra_9993_2010.html.
potential improvement to the

Should the Philippines Legislate a National Marine Code? 21

 STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

Reaffirming the ‘Golden Age’ of

Philippines-Japan Relations
Altamira Reyes

Figure 1. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos [R] shakes hands with Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida [L] (Source:
Presidential Communications Office)

In June 2023, Japan sent concern both nations. Both

Kishida conducted an official visit
one of its largest Coast Guard patrol the Philippines and Japan have
to the Philippines reaffirming their
vessels, Akitsushima, to partake strategic partnership and their been witnesses to an assertive,
in the first-ever trilateral maritime commitment to a free and open irredentist, and revanchist China
exercise1 with the Philippine Coast international order based on thethat has been staking claims to
Guard and the United States Coast roughly 90 percent of the South
rule of law. 3 These among others
Guard. In August 2023, JS Izumo, are recent developments that China Sea (SCS) as well as
one of the Japan Maritime Self- disputes concerning sovereignty
point toward the growing relations
Defense Force’s (JMSDF) largest issues in the East China Sea (ECS).
between Japan and the Philippines
vessels, and JS Kaga were docked On one hand, Japan’s National
and the reaffirming of golden ties
in Manila for a goodwill visit2 after given current and future plans Security Strategy released in 2022,
participating in a Quadrilateral between both nations, including mentioned China’s intensified
exercise with the Philippine Navy, attempts to unilaterally change the
defense and security initiatives.
the Royal Australian Navy, the status quo by force in the maritime
Royal Australian Air Force, and the Intersecting Challenges and and air domains of the ECS and the
Interests
United States Navy in Philippine SCS.4 For Japan, this is exemplified
waters. From November 3 to 4, The growing ties between by China’s establishment of an air
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio the Philippines and Japan is defense identification zone (ADIZ)
natural because of intersecting over much of the ECS 5 and the
challenges and interests that carrying out of intensified military

22 Reaffirming the 'Golden Age' of Philippines-Japan Relations

activities and maritime intrusions
around the disputed Senkaku
Islands (Diaoyu in China) as well
as the harassment of Japanese
“ The growing ties between the
Philippines and Japan is natural
vess els that affect Japan’s
national security. On the other because of intersecting challenges
hand, the Philippines’ recently
re l e a s e d N at i o n a l S e c u r i t y
and interests that concern both
Policy 2023-2028 emphasized nations.
that the “West Philippine Sea
(WPS) remains a primary national
interest of the Philippines with the Philippine Coast Guard and the movement (e.g., of armed forces),7
nation exercising its sovereignty, Philippine Navy, as well as its and maritime nations such as the
sovereign rights, and jurisdiction seizing of the Bajo de Masinloc Philippines and Japan have stakes
under the 1982 United Nations (Scarborough Shoal) in 2012. in this. Meanwhile, both nations
Convention on the Law of the also espouse the importance of
Ensuring that the SCS adherence to international rules
Sea” and by the Arbitration Award not only remains free and open and norms (including international
accorded to the Philippines on 12 for access to all but also should law). Meanwhile, as long-standing
July 2016.6 Despite such a ruling, be stable and peaceful is vital allies of the United States
China continues its unwarranted to many economies because (US), both countries have been
ex p a n s i o n i s m i n P h i l i p p i n e it is considered one of the exposed to the military practices 8
wat e r s t h ro u g h i n c u r s i o n s , most important sea lines of and military culture of the US
continued harassment of Filipino communication (SLOCs), one that given a variety of cooperative
fishermen, intimidation of the facilitates international trade and engagements that have been

Figure 2. JS Izumo docked in Manila for a Goodwill visit last August 2023
(Source: Philippine News Agency)

Reaffirming the 'Golden Age' of Philippines-Japan Relations 23

 STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

Figure 3. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida delivering a policy speech at the Joint Session of the Philippine Senate and
the House of Representatives during his official visit to the Philippines on November 2023.
(Source: Prime Minister's Office of Japan)

harnessed bilaterally between growing relations between the awareness (MDA) capabilities.
the US and the Philippines as Philippines and Japan given the
Both leaders have also
well as the US and Japan over the outcome of his trip to Manila.
agreed to start negotiations for
past years. Lastly, both countries A p a r t f ro m b e i n g t h e f i r st
a reciprocal access agreement
share fundamental principles Japanese leader to address the
(RAA) between Japan and the
and values including freedom, Philippine Congress; substantive
Philippines. Accordingly, RAAs
democracy, respect for human discussions and agreements
serve as a legal framework for
were signed during his visit. In
rights, the rule of law, and dignity.9 foreign armed forces with a
These factors make cooperation terms of defense and security,
specific set of procedures and
easier to facilitate between the the Japanese government
guidelines for training and joint
Philippines and Japan. will be granting aid to the exercises.11 An RAA between
Philippines worth JPY600 million both countries will boost
Transformative and Forward- (approximately Php235,500,000)
Looking: Reaffirming ‘Golden interoperability between the
Ties’ for a coastal radar system 10 Philippines and Japan’s military
through its Official Security forces and may serve as a “legal
The official visit of Prime Assistance (OSA) program that
Minister Kishida to the Philippines will contribute to strengthening b a s i s fo r J a p a n’s p ote nt i a l
is an added testament to the the Philippine Navy’s coastal participation in Philippine-US
military exercises.” 12 If pushed
surveillance and maritime domain through, this will be Japan’s first

24 Reaffirming the 'Golden Age' of Philippines-Japan Relations

RAA with a Southeast Asian 3
Department of Foreign Affairs, “Joint 12
Aries Arugay and Mico Galang,
country and its third RAA apart Press Statement on the Outcome of “The Philippines-Japan Security
the Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Relationship: A New Golden Age?,”
from its agreement with the United Kishida Fumio To The Philippines,” FULCRUM, November 16, 2023, https://
Kingdom and Australia. accessed November 17, 2023, https:// fulcrum.sg/the-philippines-japan-
dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/statements- security-relationship-a-new-golden-
But apart from the field of and-advisoriesupdate/33615-joint- age/.
defense and security, other key press-statement-on-the-outcome-of-
the-visit-of-japanese-prime-minister-
13
Department of Foreign Affairs, “Joint
agreements were also signed Press Statement on the Outcome of the
kishida-fumio-to-the-philippines.
relating to the economy and 4
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “National Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Kishida
trade, environment and natural Security Strategy,” access ed Fumio To The Philippines,”
resources, mining, and tourism Novemeber 17, 2023, https://www.mofa. 14
Renato Cruz De Castro, “Exploring a
among others furthering bilateral go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html 21st-Century Japan-Philippine Security
5
“Where Will It End?: China’s East China Relationship: Linking Two Spokes
relations and reaffirming a ‘golden Sea Air Defense Identification Zone -
age’ of partnership that sets FPRI,” November 24, 2013, https://www. Together?,” Asian Survey 49, no. 4 (July 1,
sights not only on the current but fpri.org/2013/11/where-will-it-end- 2009): 691–715, https://doi.org/10.1525/
chinas-east-china-sea-air-defense- as.2009.49.4.691.
also future cooperation between
identification-zone/.
both nations. 6
National Security Council, “National
Security Policy 2023-2027,” accessed
In light of intersecting November 17, 2023, https://nsc.gov.
interests and shared challenges ph/index.php/national-security-
recognized by both the policy-2011-2016
Philippines and Japan as well as
7
“Territorial Disputes in the South
China Sea,” Global Conflict Tracker,
the plethora of initiatives that are accessed November 17, 2023, https://
set to be undertaken by both, one cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/
can see that their relationship will territorial-disputes-south-china-sea.
likely remain transformative and
8
Felix Chang, “Japan’s Security
Engagement with the Philippines -
future-looking under the ambit of Foreign Policy Research Institute,”
its Strategic Partnership.13 This is accessed November 17, 2023, https://
coursed through the deepening of www.fpri.org/article/2023/08/japans-
linkages with one another for the s ecurity-engagement-with-the-
philippines/.
development of both nations, the 9
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "JJapan-
constructive engagement with Philippines Joint Statement on the
an emergent China,14 continued Comprehensive Promotion of the
cooperation with the US and ‘Strategic Partnership’ between
Australia, and most of all, the safety Neighboring Countries Connected by
and security not only of the region Special Bonds of Friendship,” accessed
November 17, 2023, https://www.
but also its peoples. mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/noda/joint_
statement110927.html.
10
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Official
END NOTES Security Assistance (OSA) Programme
in Implementation,” Ministry of Foreign
1
John Eric Mendoza, “PH Coast Guard Affairs of Japan, accessed November 17,
Kicks off First-Ever Drills with US, Japan 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/ipc/
| Global News,” accessed November page22e_001067.html.
17, 2023, https://globalnation.inquirer. 11
Priam Nepomuceno and Wilnard
net/215472/pcg-kicks-off-first-ever- Bacelonia, “Proposed PH-Japan
drills-with-us-japan. Reciprocal Access Pact to Boost
2
Joyce Ann Rocamora, “2 Japanese Regional Security,” accessed November
Destroyers in Manila after Quadrilateral 17, 2023, https://www.pna.gov.ph/
Drills,” accessed November 17, articles/1213063.
2023, https://w w w.pna .gov.ph/
articles/1208634.

Reaffirming the 'Golden Age' of Philippines-Japan Relations 25

 STRATJOURNAL Office of Naval Strategic Studies
Volume 4 CY 2023 and Strategy Management

STRATJOURNAL
EDITORIAL BOARD
CAPT WILLESTER S ROBLES PN(GSC) CALL FOR PAPERS FOR SJ CY 2024
Director, Office of Naval Strategic Studies and
Strategy Management The StratJourn is a quarterly publication by the Office
of Naval Strategic Studies and Strategy Management
CDR ERROL N DELA CRUZ PN (ONSSSM), Philippine Navy that is devoted to
Deputy Director, Office of Naval Strategic Studies strategic, national, regional, and international issues
and Strategy Management and developments that significantly impact maritime
security and naval defense.
MAJ VLADIMIR D CABRERA PN(M)
Chief, Strategy and Policy Branch Currently, the editorial board welcomes the authors’
submission of papers StratJourn CY 2024. Interested
LT MIKE ANTHONY P MOGOL PN parties, may reach out to the editorial board for further
Chief, International Defense and Security Engagement details (e.g., appropriate format and topics covered)
Branch and Revolution in Military Affairs Branch through the email address:
[email protected]
LT VANESSA KATRINA J TULANG PN
Chief, Strategy Management Branch

LTJG ABIGAIL JEAN B LATURNAS PN

Chief, Administrative Branch

Editorial Assistants

Thea Alexandra P Borinaga

Kyle Esther E Cardona
Miguel Angelo A De Castro
Jan Emil N Langomez
Vincent Kyle D Parada
Altamira Chantrelle M Reyes
Queenie Mhaye S Valencia

26