SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO.

158 Hazards XXIII # 2012 Det Norske Veritas Ltd

CCS CO2 RISK MANAGEMENT – NEW INDUSTRY GUIDANCE

Hamish Holt – DNV KEMA, Aberdeen, UK

Kaare Helle & Jock Brown – DNV KEMA, Oslo, Norway

Carbon Capture, [Transportation, Injection] and Storage (CCS) projects will take many forms but
they will all require the safe and responsible handling of a very large carbon dioxide (CO2) stream
that will likely need to be transported large distances over land, under the sea, and possibly on board
ships before being injected deep underground.
CO2 is a familiar and everyday substance but its behaviour and characteristics, particularly when
being handled in large quantities in its liquid and supercritical phases, are not generally understood
sufficiently to ensure its hazard potential is adequately managed. When concentrated, under
pressure and in very large quantities a CCS CO2 stream Loss Of Containment (LOC) event
could result in a major accident hazard (MAH), the risks from which need to be effectively
managed down to an acceptable level, just like any other potential MAH.
DNV has been active within the CCS field since around 2000 undertaking both internal and
industry sponsored research and development. In August 2011 DNV initiated the CO2 Risk Man-
agement (CO2RISKMAN) Joint Industry Project (JIP) to develop a publicly-available guidance
document on MAH risk management of the CO2 stream within a CCS project. Sixteen organisations
(see Acknowledgements) joined the JIP to provide knowledge and guidance in the development of a
relevant and comprehensive reference source for the emerging CCS industry.
A key aim of the JIP is to provide the CCS industry with guidance to help in the development of
consistent, coherent and robust CO2 MAH risk management. The guidance covers all the main links
in the CCS chain and all lifecycle phases of the CO2 system with particular focus on the concept
development and operation phases.
The CO2RISKMAN guidance is scheduled to be released by the end of October 2012.
This paper introduces the guidance document, provides an overview of the challenges associated
with effective MAH risk management of the CO2 stream and highlights how the guidance will help
projects resolve these challenges to deliver effective CO2 MAH risk management.

1. INTRODUCTION very low levels, can increase the likelihood and/or conse-
There is an urgent drive to implement CCS on a commercial quences of CO2 system leaks.
and global scale. For success this needs to be done in a The processes to manage the risks from hazardous
demonstrably safe and responsible manner that gains wide- operations are well tried and tested across many industries
spread acceptance of stakeholders, most notably regulators and these processes can, when appropriately applied,
and the public. ensure that the CO2 system risks are brought down to and
Many aspects of CCS have been successfully deployed subsequently maintained at an acceptable level.
in various industries, however, scaling up and integrating the A vast wealth of experience from other industries is
component parts of the CCS chain from capture to storage is available and is being integrated into the CCS industry and
new and therefore adds fresh challenges. The handling of this is very valuable. However, such experience integration
tens of thousands of tonnes of CO2 is also new outside the requires care as to ensure the specifics and peculiarities of
CO2 Enhance Oil Recovery (EOR) industry in the United CCS are adequately reflected going forward.
States. There will likely be a number of separate organis-
CO2 is a substance that has many everyday uses from ations delivering links in each CCS chain and it is important
carbonising drinks to decaffeinating coffee to chilling food. that knowledge transfer is delivered in a consistent and
But CO2, if it is inhaled in sufficiently high concentrations, coherent manner for all parties to use.
can cause harm to people through toxicological impact and, For the hazard management of the CO2 systems it is
at higher concentrations, by displacing the oxygen in the air essential that the numerous discipline professionals, who
to cause asphyxiation. together will be responsible for delivering a fully chain-
This hazardous aspect of CO2 combined with the very integrated and low risk operation, gain an adequate under-
large quantities that will be contained within CCS systems standing of the characteristics and behaviour of the CO2
creates the potential that a leak from a CO2 system could stream and the issues and challenges of handling it in very
pose a MAH. large quantities.
In addition, captured CO2 will not be 100% pure, the The CO2RISKMAN guidance (the Guidance) has
CO2 stream from capture plants will contain impurities such been developed within a JIP, led by DNV, to provide CO2
as CO, H2O, H2S, NOx, SOx, O2 and H2 that, although in stream specific information and guidance for the CCS

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industry to help ensure effective management of the CO2

stream safety and environmental MAHs.
The Guidance should be completed by October 2012
(i.e. prior to the IChemE Hazards XXIII conference) and
made available for free download from the [Link].
com/ccs website.
The CO2RISKMAN guidance is complementary to
DNV’s other CCS industry initiatives that has seen the
development of Recommended Practices and guidelines
covering CO2 capture, pipeline transportation, injection
wells and geological storage (RP-J201 2010, RP-J202
2010 & RP-J203 2012).

2. CO2RISKMAN GUIDANCE
The CO2RISKMAN guidance is intended to assist CCS
developers and operators build and implement an effective
and coherent safety and environmental MAH risk manage-
ment process for the CO2 handling system across the
various parts of the complete CO2 system (i.e. links in the
Figure 1. Guidance Pyramid Structure
CCS chain).
The Guidance does this by providing background
knowledge on MAH management, CCS and the character- It is intended that a user of the Guidance, depending
istics and behaviour of CO2. It also describes CO2 stream- on the need for information and time available, would
specific design and operation challenges and goes on to progress through Levels 1 to 3 and possibly into project-
list generic potential LOC causes, escalation routes and con- relevant sections of Level 4. For example, a hazard manage-
sequences. As CCS projects will likely be developed and ment specialist concerned with the risks associated with
operated as separate links in an overall chain, the Guidance operating an offshore CO2 injection facility may skip
reflects this by then providing, in addition to the generic gui- through Levels 1 and 2, and the hazard management
dance, CCS link-specific hazard management guidance, section of Level 3, and focus on the CO2 specific sections
information and examples of possible hazard management of Level 3 and the sections of Level 4 that cover the Off-
measures. shore Facility, Wells and Offshore Pipeline. Figure 2
The Guidance should not be considered as prescriptive illustrates the intended navigation through the Guidance.
or all-encompassing but rather a comprehensive source of Each CCS chain link covered in Level 4 is structured to
information that can be used to raise awareness of the provide information and guidance following the hazard man-
issues, form a basis of discussion, and provide stimuli agement steps: Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and
within the normal hazard management processes. It is Risk Treatment (using ISO 31000 terminology). The hazard
intended for use by the various discipline professionals
within a CCS project or operation to supplement their existing
experience and knowledge with the CO2 stream aspects.
The Guidance should also assist regulators in having
effective and consistent regulatory interaction with CCS
developers and operators. The Guidance can be used as a
common reference.
In general, the Guidance should help promote imp-
roved engagement within and between CCS developers,
between CCS developers and their regulators, and
between the various stakeholders who have influence
within the safe and sustainable implementation of CCS.
Figure 1 illustrates the pyramid structure of the
Guidance. [Note: the Guidance is, at the time of writing
this paper, still under final development and its structure
may be refined before publication.]
The Guidance has a total number of pages of around
400 with the majority of these pages contained within the
Levels 3 and 4 documents. Each Level of the Guidance
will be contained within a separate document although
Levels 1 and 2 may be combined into one physical document. Figure 2. Guidance User Navigation

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identification is based around the generic hazards introduced across a CCS operation at the earliest opportunity. A holistic
in Level 3 and examples of risk treatment measures are given lifecycle approach to risk management should be a goal
for each hazard cause, consequence and escalation route where resources can be focused on the most significant
broken down into Prevention, Detection, Alarm, Control, risk contributors throughout the CCS chain.
Mitigation and Emergency Response, reflecting the risk An added complication within CCS projects is that
management hierarchy described in Level 3. It is expected the management of some hazards will incorporate measures
that to get full value from the Guidance a hazard management or actions taken in other parts of the CCS system, which will
specialist would use both Levels 3 and 4. require effective communication and collaboration between
organisations in order to holistically reduce risks across the
whole CO2 system or operation.
2.1 HAZARD MANAGEMENT It is therefore essential for a CCS project or operation
The number of organisations that could be involved in deli- that the organisations responsible for delivering parts of the
vering an integrated CCS operation along with their unfami- complete chain work closely together in a consistent and
liarity of the hazards associated with handling very large coherent way. The major accident risk management within
quantities of CO2, adds to the challenge of ensuring major and across a CCS project or operation needs to:
accident risks are effectively controlled.
The hazard management section of the Guidance’s . Be based on principles, policies, objectives, risk accep-
Level 3 provides an overview of generic risk management tance criteria and key performance indicators that are
and its application within the context of effectively mana- aligned within the project to deliver effective holistic
ging major accident risks within CCS. It does not attempt lifecycle major accident risk management
to provide a detailed and comprehensive guidance on . Be based on consistent, best available knowledge,
MAH risk management as there is already a number of experience, base data and assumptions
existing publications that adequately cover this. It should, . Use aligned hazard screening approaches
however, provide a good introduction to the subject for . Use aligned approaches and criteria within any cost
those not familiar with MAH risk management. benefit analysis of risk reduction measures
Four of the key challenges associated with CCS . Be carried out by suitably competent resources
hazard management are: . Have aligned reporting metrics, risk communication
language and formats
1. Complexity and scale of CCS projects and operations . Follow a consistent and comprehensive stakeholder
2. Multi and cross-industry and regulator involvement communication and consultation strategy that aims to
3. Lack of track record within industry and their regulators foster an open, honest and constructive relationship with
4. Need to gain and maintain stakeholder acceptance external parties (e.g. regulators, financial, underwriters,
local government agencies and services, NGOs, adj-
These challenges are compounded by: acent businesses, public, etc.).
. Lack of experience handling very large quantities of
liquid and supercritical phase CO2
. Absence of CCS-specific or CCS-validated reference 2.2 CCS CHAIN
material and tools The CCS chain is comprised of a number of integrated
. Need to integrate hazard management across the whole systems, which when linked together cover all processes
CCS chain from CO2 capture, through to transport, injection and
. Lack of maturity in CCS personnel competency develop- storage. Carbon capture may be included at the concept
ment stage in new developments, or be retrofitted to existing facili-
. Rapid technology development and innovation ties. A CCS system may comprise a single ‘point-to-point’
. Trans geographic, legislative and national nature of CCS scheme, where a single capture source is linked directly to a
. Political pressures (e.g. for rapid implementation, scale- single storage site. Alternatively, a CCS system may com-
up, cost reduction) prise of integrated ‘networks’, where shared or intercon-
. High impact of an actual or perceived major event (e.g. a nected infrastructure is used to transport CO2 from multiple
large leak from a CO2 pipeline) sources to an individual or multiple injection sites.
. Lack of stakeholder awareness and understanding A CCS chain will, in general, be comprised of some,
potentially all, of the following components:
As noted above, different organisations are likely to
be responsible for delivering and operating different parts † CO2 Capture Facilities † CO2 Conditioning and
of a CCS chain. These organisations will have their own Compression
corporate approaches to risk management, albeit all will † Onshore & Offshore † Intermediate Storage
be striving to ensure that the risks that are associated with Pipelines Facilities
their responsibility are managed down to an acceptable † Onshore & Offshore † CO2 Carrier Ships &
level. They will also have different tolerance and acceptance Injection (Un)Loading Facilities
to risk, as well as different drivers (e.g. regulations). This † Storage Sites † Injection & Other Wells
needs to be recognised and harmonised as far as possible

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Contained within Level 3 of the Guidance is an intro- in ship carriers. Typical transportation conditions for CO2
duction to CCS and overview of each of the various links of are illustrated in Figure 3.
a CCS chain. A phase diagram, as shown in Figure 3, is a common
To give an idea of capacity requirements for a CCS way of representing the phases of a substance and the con-
CO2 handling system, for a relatively small 300 MWe ditions under which each phase exists. However, it tells us
power station with a single capture train and 90% capture little regarding the change in the thermodynamic state of a
efficiency, the CO2 mass flow rate would be in the substance during a transient event, for example, a leak to
order of 95 tonnes/hour for a gas station and around atmosphere or a system depressurisation. To understand
205 tonnes/hour for a coal station (ZEP, 2011). With larg- the behaviour of CO2 in a process or release to atmosphere,
er power stations and if a number of CO2 sources feed into a the Pressure-Enthalpy (P-h) diagram (sometimes called
network transport system the mass flow within the network Mollier diagram) or the Temperature-Entropy (T-s)
could rise to many thousands of tonnes per hour. diagram can be used. Contained within Level 3 of the Gui-
dance is a description of how the P-h or T-s diagrams can be
used to predict the final conditions of a CO2 system depres-
2.3 CO2 CHARACTERISTICS surisation or leak.
Carbon dioxide is a colourless, odourless gas, and at stan- In humans, CO2 is a normal component of blood
dard temperature and pressure (STP), it is about 1.5 times gases at low concentrations, however if inhaled at high
heavier than air. levels it can be lethal. Humans are very sensitive to
CO2 can exist as a gas, liquid, solid or a supercritical changes in CO2 concentrations. In addition to the hazard
fluid (SCF). Under normal atmospheric pressures CO2 of asphyxiation due to CO2 displacing oxygen in the air,
can only exist as a gas or solid. CO2 cannot exist as a the inhalation of elevated concentrations of CO2 can
liquid under atmospheric conditions. CO2 sublimates increase the acidity of the blood triggering adverse effects
directly between solid and gas across the sublimation line on the respiratory, cardiovascular and central nervous
shown in CO2 phase diagram in Figure 3. At a pressure systems. Depending on the CO2 concentration inhaled and
and temperature above the critical point CO2 exists as a exposure duration, toxicological symptoms in humans
supercritical fluid. In this region CO2 possesses the viscosity range from headaches, increased respiratory and heart
similar to that of a gas and the density closer to that of a rate, dizziness, muscle twitching, confusion, unconscious-
liquid. ness, coma and death (EPA, 2000).
CO2 can be transported as a compressed gas but for Breathing air with a CO2 concentration of around 5%
economic and technical reasons, CO2 captured for CCS will within a few minutes cause headache, dizziness,
application will predominantly be transported either in increased blood pressure and uncomfortable and difficult
liquid/SCF conditions in pipelines or as a saturated liquid breathing (dyspnea). At CO2 concentrations greater than

Figure 3. CO2 Phase Diagram With Typical Transportation Conditions

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17%, loss of controlled and purposeful activity, unconscious- Inadequate Appreciation of CO2 Hazards: Those
ness, convulsions, coma, and death occur within one minute responsible for, or have influence over, safety risk manage-
of initial inhalation. ment need to have an adequate understanding of the potential
It should be noted that to pose an immediate threat to hazard that CO2 and the associated CO2 stream impurities
life from the toxicological impact requires a significantly can pose within the CCS context and scale of operations.
lower CO2 concentration than that to pose a similar threat Without this there is potential for the CO2 stream hazards
due to oxygen reduction (i.e. due to asphyxiation). For to be inappropriately assessed and managed which could
example, a 20% rise in CO2 concentration in air would lead to increased risk levels and/or an overly high aggregate
reduce the O2 concentration to around 17.5% which by risk management cost burden on a project.
itself would increase a person’s pulse and breathing rate Mixture Phase Diagrams: The phase diagram of
whereas as mentioned above, the toxicological impact pure CO2 is well known but the presence of impurities
would be immediately life threatening. Further details on within the CO2 stream such as H2 or N2 can result in signifi-
the impact of CO2 on humans can be found in the HSE’s cant changes to the phase envelopes. Models used for
MAH human vulnerability guidance (HSE). process and release modelling need to be able to predict
The dangers of breathing in elevated concentrations the phase envelopes for the range of mixtures likely to be
of CO2 are well known to people such as divers, submari- delivered from the various capture technologies using suit-
ners, anaesthetists and astronauts (i.e. people who need to able Equations Of State (EOS). The short comings of the
maintain inhaled gas mixtures within acceptable limits to existing equations of state need to be understood, so that
sustain life). Outside these specialist communities knowl- they can be incorporated into design. Experimental work
edge about the impact of breathing elevated concentrations is currently on-going to collect data for EOS refinement
of CO2 is generally low. Concentrated CO2 inventories may and validation but the range of impurity mixtures is large
be present, for example as part of a fire suppression system, and as capture technology develops the impurity levels
but the potential for persons to be exposed to CO2 inhalation will likely evolve.
are usually localised and the associated safety risks can be Material Compatibility: Liquid phase CO2 and par-
effectively managed through localised hazard management ticularly supercritical CO2, is commonly used as an industrial
measures. solvent. CO2 can break down some lubricants either remov-
With the advent of CCS, where pipeline systems are ing it or causing changes to its properties. This can lead to
likely to have inventories of liquid phase CO2 in the order seizing or jamming of equipment (e.g. valves, pigs, non-
of 10s if not 100s of thousands of tonnes, the potential for return valves, etc.), damage to rotating equipment potentially
widespread exposure to air with hazardous concentrations leading to a significant loss of containment event, and con-
of CO2 will exist. tamination of the CO2. In addition to its solvent properties,
To effectively manage the risks associated with hand- CO2 is also highly invasive and capable of dissolving into
ling large quantities of CO2, a full understanding of the materials and causing damage to the material particularly
impact CO2 has on the human body is required. Level 3 upon depressurisation. Seal elastomers are known to be vul-
of the Guidance provides details of this. nerable to explosive decompression damage, particularly
The venting of liquid CO2 to atmosphere whether when exposed to supercritical CO2. This property means
through a vent or leak will result in a phase change as the that careful selection of materials is very important for
CO2 depressurises through the release aperture with seals, flexible hoses, instruments, wire and cable insulators,
vapour and solid CO2 being formed. Anyone caught in the controls and other safety-critical components
cold jet of gas with potentially entrained solid CO2 particles Internal Corrosion: CO2 in combination with free
will suffer cryogenic burns. Inhalation of such a cold atmos- water is well known (e.g. in the oil and gas industry) to
phere would also cause severe internal injuries. form carbonic acid which is highly corrosive to carbon
Liquid and particularly supercritical phase CO2 steels. The presence of impurities within the CO2 stream
is a very efficient solvent. When there is substantial may significantly heighten the corrosion rate by forming
reduction in pressure of CO2 in either of these phases, for other acids (e.g. sulphuric, nitric, etc.) and changing water
example during a leak, it will change state to vapour solubility properties. Developing a suitable CO2 stream spe-
phase essentially losing its solvency capacity, thus liberat- cification that will avoid impurity levels that could lead to
ing any impurities within the stream which were previously unacceptable internal corrosion and then ensuring that
held in suspension. This can lead to a build-up of impurities there are no excursions outside this specification is extre-
at the release point. mely important.
Low Temperatures and Solid CO2 Formation:
Liquid or supercritical phase CO2 when depressurised
2.4 CO2 HAZARD MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES may, depending on the initial pressure and temperature con-
The following provides an overview of significant chal- ditions and final conditions, change phase to be a pure
lenges that need to be considered within the MAH risk man- vapour, a two phase liquid and vapour mixture, a two
agement process applied to the CO2 handling system within phase solid and vapour mixture, or if the final conditions
a CCS project. Details on each can be found in Level 3 of are at the triple point, be three phases solid, liquid and
the Guidance. vapour. CO2 cannot exist at atmospheric pressure in its

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liquid phase. The depressurisation of CO2 by design or by pipe that increases its toughness. Due to the phase change
accident can result in temperatures within systems and/or that occurs at the release point of a CO2 pipeline, the depres-
within any release at or below, – 788C, the sublimation surisation front may travel at a relatively slow speed.
temperature of solid CO2. In addition, significant quantities The approaches and methods to prevent crack propa-
of solid CO2 can be formed within systems and/or within gation in CO2 stream pipelines are known but the current
any release which in addition to its low temperature could uncertainty may result in overly conservative designs
cause blockages, and subsequent hazard. Understanding which could add a significant cost burden to a project.
the thermodynamics of the CO2 stream, including the CO2 BLEVE: Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour
effects of the impurities, is of vital importance within the Explosion (BLEVE) is a very unusual but extremely cata-
design and operation of CO2 stream handling systems. strophic event. The principle behind a CO2 BLEVE is that
Thermal Expansion: CO2 density is sensitive to a very sudden depressurisation of a pressurised liquid such
temperature changes especially close to critical point con- as CO2 creates a superheated liquid phase that suddenly
ditions. This can result in system over pressurisation vaporises in an explosive manner. This may give a transient
should an isolated (i.e. contained) inventory of liquid overpressure peak inside the vessel, which again may lead to
phase CO2 increase in temperature due to, for example, a powerful burst of the whole vessel, with total loss of
heat radiation from the sun or flame impingement from an content, a resulting blast wave and risk of flying fragments.
adjacent fire event. There have been some reported BLEVEs with CO2, mostly
Toxic Substance Deposits: As previously men- involving fire extinguishers. In an accident involving a
tioned, liquid phase CO2 and particularly supercritical rupture of a 30 tonne capacity CO2 tank that occurred in
CO2, is a highly efficient solvent. During a release (e.g. 1988 at a plant in Worms, Germany (Clayton, 1994), based
venting or leak), the significant pressure reduction that on the damage, number and location of fragments, fatalities
occurs at the leak point changes the CO2 from a super and injuries it was speculated that the failure caused a cold
solvent to a vapour with virtually no solvent capability. CO2 BLEVE. For a CO2 BLEVE to occur in a vessel it is
Any impurity within the CO2 stream that is dissolved by believed that the CO2 inventory must be within a defined
the CO2 and held in solution will therefore be released BLEVE envelope, details of which are given in Level 3 of
should the CO2 change phase to a vapour (e.g. at a release the Guidance. The effect of impurities on the BLEVE poten-
point). Any solid impurities that are released in this way tial adds uncertainty to this potential hazard.
could lead to a concentrated deposit of the substance at Toxic Effects of Pure CO2: As previously mentioned
the release point, potentially causing harm to people or CO2 is a colourless and odourless substance that is a gas at
the environment over an extended period of time. atmospheric conditions and is naturally present in the air at a
Propagating Pipeline Cracks: Fracture propagation concentration of around 0.04% by volume. A release from a
and arrest in high pressure pipelines has been the subject of CCS CO2 handling system will be of highly concentrated
study for many years, there is, however, only limited experi- CO2 (i.e. .95% CO2 by volume) and until the release
ence with CO2 pipelines. Should a pipeline propagating dilutes to a concentration of less than around 7% it will
fracture occur, the contents of a pipeline can be released pose a significant and immediate threat to people who
within a very short period. There are two fracture failure may inhale it. CO2 is a heavier than air gas and as such a
mechanisms, namely, brittle and ductile, and both can release will tend to slump and accumulate or be influenced
result in pipelines unzipping very rapidly along a consider- by natural or manmade topographical features such as
able distance (e.g. hundreds or thousands of meters). drains, valleys, basements, low lying ground. To create a
In brittle failures, following the crack initiation, the hazardous CO2 cloud of sufficient size and duration to
crack propagation is close to the speed of sound in the pose a major accident threat would likely require a large
metal (400+ m/s). Aspects of a liquid phase CO2 release and prolonged CO2 release. Liquid phase CO2 pipelines
that may lead to low temperature embrittlement are due to will contain tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of
the Joule-Thomson effect and the formation of solid CO2 tonnes of CO2 which, if containment is lost, could foresee-
at –788C at a leak point, and within the pipeline due to ably create a CO2-rich cloud that could potentially threaten
the temperature reduction of the liquid CO2 caused by the large geographical areas. The size of the visible cloud
boil-off to sustain a pressure drop (e.g. due to a leak or should not be used as an indication of the CO2 concentration
venting) and from solid CO2 deposits at pipeline low within the cloud. A large low momentum slumping CO2
points should the pipeline pressure fall below 5.18 bara release that could accumulate in low lying ground may
(i.e. triple point pressure) before all the liquid has vaporised. quickly become invisible as the water vapour cloud disap-
In ductile failures, following the crack initiation, the pears as the cloud is warmed by its surroundings.
crack will start propagating along the pipe. A race will Toxic Effects of CO2 Mixtures: The presence of
occur between the crack propagation velocity and the impurities in a CO2 stream may affect the potential inhala-
speed at which the pipeline depressurises through the tion impacts of a CO2 stream release. Some incidental sub-
growing rupture. The crack will continue to propagate stances are toxic, such as CO, NO2, SO2 and H2S, and it is
with a speed that is much slower than for a brittle fracture important to understand the impact of possible impurities,
until either the depressurisation front overtakes the crack both in isolation and combined with CO2 and other impuri-
tip or the crack is stopped or slowed by a feature of the ties. In the event of a well blow-out that releases flow from

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the well bore, the release may also contain down-hole for- potential initiating causes that could lead to loss of contain-
mation solids, fluids and gases, such as hydrocarbons, H2S ment events, potential immediate and delayed escalation,
and trace components of heavy metals. The possible con- and potential consequences. It focuses on the CO2 stream
stituents in a formation release will need to be considered. aspects and therefore does not seek to address non-CO2
Release Modelling: There is extensive experience aspects which should already be understood by competent
modelling vapour phase CO2 releases and current modelling individuals coming into CCS from other industries or fields.
tools and approaches should be adequate to assess the The lists of potential causes, escalation routes and
hazard potential from a CCS-scale vapour phase CO2 inven- consequences are not credited as being comprehensive and
tory. The modelling of liquid and SCF phase CO2 releases all-encompassing, rather they are included in the Guidance
is, however, in its infancy and this raises the level of uncer- to stimulate thinking and discussion within normal CCS
tainty within hazard assessment. The main challenge associ- project hazard identification and assessment processes.
ated with modelling these phases of CO2 is the potential for Included within Level 3 CO2 Generic Hazards section
the formation of two phase, solid and vapour, flow. Release are details on the following:
and dispersion models usually have the capability to model
two phase liquid and vapour flow but CO2 introduces the Potential LOC causes:
potential for solid and vapour flow which needs to be
taken into account. . Inappropriate human input or action during the design,
It is not only the selection of suitable modelling tools operation, maintenance, intervention, etc., due to a
that is important but also the selection of the modellers who lack of relevant CO2 competency and/or experience
need to have sufficient competency in liquid and SCF phase . Low temperature embrittlement of containment envel-
CO2 modelling. There are several gaps and uncertainties ope due to rapid depressurisation of a liquid phase
with respect to CO2 modelling that need to be recognised CO2 inventory
and considered when scoping and undertaking CO2 release . Low temperature embrittlement of containment envel-
modelling and when making use of the modelling output. ope due to CO2 stream flow expansion through valve,
These include (with details contained with the Guidance’s flow restrictor, etc.
Level 3) modelling of: . Internal corrosion due to out of specification impurities
levels (e.g. water) entering system
. Pipeline depressurisation . Internal corrosion due to maintenance or operation
. Vessel depressurisation activities (e.g. pigging) allowing water to enter the
. Buried pipeline release system
. Subsea pipeline release . Internal corrosion due to melting of hydrate formation in
. CO2 mixtures stagnant line (i.e. no flow)
. Confined release . Component failure due to inappropriate specification,
. Release geometry selection or replacement of materials or operating
. Temperature envelopes outside material specification
. Visibility . Overpressure from thermal expansion of a trapped liquid
. Vertical/angled releases phase inventory
. Low wind conditions . Overpressurise due to vent or relief line blockage
System Vents: The preceding discussion highlights . Overpressure due to rapid sublimation of solid CO2
the issues within a liquid phase CO2 system when it is . Failure of supports due to change of pipeline/pipework
depressurised, however there also exists challenges associ- use
ated with designing the depressurisation system itself (i.e. . Mechanical failure or seizing due to inappropriate speci-
the vent system). In addition to the system having to be able fication, selection or replacement of lubricants
to handle the cold temperatures and solid CO2 formation . Loss of containment associated with use of a temporary
that it may be exposed to, the release point must also be equipment (e.g. 3rd party equipment)
designed and located such that people are not exposed to . Loss of containment due to fluid hammer created by
harmful concentrations of CO2 during all reasonably fore- rapid closure of a valve.
seeable conditions. Particular consideration must be taken Potential escalation:
when releasing a CO2 –rich stream in still weather conditions,
especially if there is a temperature inversion, since the cold . Propagating crack
CO2 stream being released may slump towards the ground . Leak enlargement (possible rupture) from low tempera-
or water surface with relatively low dispersion rates. ture embrittlement due to leak impingement (e.g. within
a crater or congested area)
. Loss of containment of adjacent inventories and/or
2.5 CO2 STREAM GENERIC HAZARDS structures due to low temperature embrittlement from
Level 3 of the Guidance also provides information that can be cold jet impingement, energy release, projectiles, etc.
used to assist in the hazard identification of CCS CO2 hand- . External corrosion due to small (pin-hole) leak acidify-
ling system MAHs. It lists, along with relevant comments, ing water trapped close to the pipe

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. CO2 BLEVE of vessel sidered, but they should provide stimuli to help the required
. Road traffic accident due to lack of visibility caused by discussions and debate within CCS projects that are key in
water vapour cloud the pursuit for an effective and balanced hazard manage-
. Exposure to a build-up of toxic and/or harmful sub- ment strategy at reasonable cost.
stances at location of release
. Engulfment of helicopter during flight stage at offshore
platform causing a crash. 3. CONCLUSIONS
The DNV led CO2RISKMAN JIP will (in October 2012)
Potential Consequences: publish a comprehensive and robust industry guidance
document for the emerging CCS industry to help CCS pro-
. Inhalation of elevated CO2 concentrations in air
jects and operations develop and implement robust strat-
. Inhalation of hazardous levels of CO2 stream impurities
egies for addressing the challenges described in the early
. Inhalation of, or exposure to, very cold air mixture
sections to deliver effective major accident hazard manage-
. Contact with solid CO2 or cooled surfaces
ment for the CO2 stream.
. Rapid expansion
The Guidance is structured into four Levels to allow it
. Projectiles
to be used to inform, educate and provide guidance to
. Lack of visibility
various levels of a CCS project or operation from manage-
. Loss of structural integrity due to low temperature
ment to hazard management specialist. The Guidance is not
embrittlement.
prescriptive, its goal it to help projects develop their own
integrated hazard management strategy that adequately
includes and addresses the ‘new’ aspects brought in by the
2.6 GENERIC BOW-TIE DIAGRAM
need to handle very large quantities of impure CO2.
To graphically illustrate the potential causes, escalation
A CCS project that adopts the Guidance as a common
routes and consequences associated with loss of contain-
reference source across all the links of the chain should find
ment events from the CO2 stream across the CCS chain, a
it easier to implement a consistent, coherent and full-chain
generic bow-tie diagram has been developed and is con-
approach to major accident hazard management. The
tained within Level 3 of the Guidance. This bow-tie
project should also find it easier to communicate hazard
diagram will provide a useful visual reminder of the CO2
management aspects amongst the various organisations
stream hazard management aspects for CCS projects as
within the CCS chain and with external stakeholders such
they undertake their hazard management processes.
as their HSE regulator.
There is no reason why handling the very large quan-
tities of CO2 that will be required to make CCS an effective
2.7 CCS LINK-SPECIFIC GUIDANCE part of global carbon reduction cannot be performed in a
The previous sections of this paper provide an overview of safe and responsible manner. In fact, the CCS industry,
some of the detailed information contained within Level 3 which is starting from a relatively clean piece of paper,
of the Guidance. Level 4 builds on this generic information has a huge opportunity to build on the knowledge, experi-
and provides pertinent information and guidance on hazard ence and lessons of other industries to develop fit-for-
identification, risk assessment and risk treatment with purpose, effective, major accident hazard management
regard to the CO2 stream aspects for each link in the CCS approaches and standards aimed at delivering high levels
chain separately. of safety performance at reasonable cost.
Each section of Level 4 covers a link in the CCS The CO2RISKMAN Guidance is intended to assist
chain. A systematic approach is taken to consider the chal- the CCS industry in this goal.
lenges and generic hazards described in Level 3 and provide The Guidance will be available for free download
pertinent information and examples relevant to the CCS from [Link]/ccs.
chain being considered.
For each potential CO2 stream loss of containment
cause, escalation route and consequence, a comprehensive ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
list is given of measures that could be considered within a DNV would like to thank and acknowledge the following
MAH risk management process, sub-divided into measures sponsors of the CO2RISKMAN Joint Industry Project for
for prevention, detection, alarm, control, mitigation and their support and active contributions to the development
emergency response. of the Guidance: Air Liquide, Amec, Chevron, Environment
Also included for each link of the CCS chain is dis- Agency, [Link], Gassco AS, Gassnova SF, Global CCS Insti-
cussion on the main cross-chain integration aspects. This tute, Health & Safety Executive, IEAGHG, Institute for
is to highlight key areas where hazard management in one Studies and Power Engineering, Maersk Oil, National
link of the chain has a dependency with another part or Grid, Petroleum Safety Authority, Scottish Environment
parts of the chain to deliver effective hazard management. Protection Agency, and Shell.
The risk management measures listed in each Level 4 Acknowledgements are also extended to those who
section are not intended to be prescriptive, complete, or have participated in technical meetings and provided infor-
always relevant to all parts of the CCS link being con- mation for, and feedback on, the Guidance.

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Clayton, W.E., and Griffin, M.L., Catastrophic Failure of a Dioxide as a Fire Suppressant: Examining the Risks,
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RP-J202, 2010, Design and Operation of CO2 Pipelines, offshore major accident hazard assessment, [Link]
[Link]/ccs [Link]/foi/internalops/hid/spc/spctosd30-annex. pdf
RP-J203, 2012, Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide, ZEP (Zero Emissions Platform), 2011, The cost of CO2
[Link]/ccs Capture, Post-demonstration CCS in the EU, p12.

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