TRAIN v.

CITY OF NEW YORK

Syllabus

TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY v. CITY OF NEW
YORK ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 73-1377. Argued November 12, 1974-

Decided February 18, 1975

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972

provide a comprehensive program. for controlling and abating
water pollution. Title II of these Amendments makes available
federal financial assistance for municipal sewers and sewage treat-
ment works. Section 207 of Title II authorizes the appropriation
of "not to exceed" specified amounts for each of three fiscal years,
and § 205 (a) provides that the "[slums authorized to be appro-
priated pursuant to [§ 207] ...shall be allotted by the Administra-
tor" of the Environmental Protection Agency. The President
directed the Administrator not to allot among the States § 207's
maximum amounts but instead to allot no more than $2 billion
of the $5 billion authorized for fiscal year 1973 and no more than
83 billion of the S6 billion authorized for fiscal year 1974; and
the Administrator complied with this directive. Thereupon re-
spondent city of New York brought this class action seeking a
declaratory judgment that the Administrator was obligated to
allot to the States the full amounts authorized by § 207 for fiscal
years 1973 and 1974, and an order directing him to make those
allotments. The District Court granted the respondents' motion
for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, hold-
ing that "the Act requires the Administrator to allot the full sums
authorized to be appropriated in § 207." Held: The 1972 Amend-
ments do not permit the Administrator to allot to the States
under § 205 (a) less than the entire amounts authorized to be
appropriated by § 207. Pp. 42-49.
(a) That § 205 (a) directs the allotment of only "sums"--not
"all sums" as originally provided when the legislation went to
Conference-and that the Conference Committee added the "not
to exceed" qualifying language to § 207, which authorized the ap-
propriation of specific amounts for the three fiscal years, show no
congressional intention of giving the Executive discretionary con-
 OCTOBER TERM, 1974

Syllabus 420 U. S.

trol over the rate of allotments under the Title II programs. The
"not to exceed" qualifying language in § 207 has meaning of its
own, apart from § 205 (a), and reflects the realistic possibility that
approved applications for grants from funds already allotted would
not total the maximum amount authorized to be appropriated.
And the word "sums" has no different meaning and can be
ascribed no different function in the context of § 205 (a) than
would the words "all sums." Pp. 42-46.
(b) The modified position taken by petitioner in this Court that
§§ 205 (a) and 207 merely give the Administrator discretion as to
the timing of expenditures, not as to the ultimate amounts to be
allotted and obligated, as was urged in the lower courts, does not
alter this Court's conclusion. The Administrator's power to allot
under § 205 (a) extends only to "sums" authorized to be appropri-
ated under § 207, since, even assuming some sort of power in
the Executive to control outlays under the Act, the legislative
history indicates that the power to control was to be exercised at
the obligation phase, rather than the allotment stage, of the process.
Pp. 46-49.
161 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 494 F. 2d 1033, affirmed.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGER,

C. J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, MARsnAL, BwcKnruN, POWELL,
and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DoUGLAs, J., concurred in the result.

Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for petitioner.

With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General
Hills, Deputy Solicitor General Friedman, Edmund W.
Kitch, William L. Patton, Robert E. Kopp, Eloise E.
Davies, and David M. Cohen.
John R. Thompson argued the cause for respondent
city of New York. With him on the briefs were Adrian
P. Burke, Gary Mailman, and Alexander Gigante, Jr.*
*Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney
General, pro se, Robert H. O'Brien, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, and Nicholas C. Yost, Deputy Attorney General, for the At-
torney General of California; by Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General,
Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Stewart H. Freeman
and Charles Alpert, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of
IMXichigan; by Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, Byron B. Starns,
 TRAIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK

35 Opinion of the Court

MR. JUSTIcE WRITE delivered the opinion of the

Court.
This case poses certain questions concerning the proper
construction of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U. S. C. § 1251
et seq. (1970 ed., Supp III) (1972 Act), which provide a
comprehensive program for controlling and abating
water pollution. Section 2 of the 1972 Act, 86 Stat. 833,
in adding Title II, §§ 201-212, to the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1281-
1292 (1970 ed., Supp. III),' makes available federal finan-

Deputy Attorney General, Peter W. Sipkins, Solicitor General, and

Eldon G. Kaul, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of
Minnesota; by William F. Hyland, Attorney General, pro se, Stephen
Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, and John M. Van Dalen,
Deputy Attorney General, for the Attorney General of New Jersey;
by William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Richard P. Fahey and
David B. Northrop, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of
Ohio; by John L. Hill, Attorney General, Larry F. York, First As-
sistant Attorney General, and Philip K. Maxwell, Assistant Attorney
General of Texas, Robert W. Warren, Attorney General, and Theo-
dore L. Priebe, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, John C.
Danforth, Attorney General, and Robert M. Lindholm, Assistant At-
torney General of Missouri, Larry Derryberry,Attorney General, and
Paul C. Duncan, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Vern
Miller, Attorney General, and Curt T. Schneider, Assistant Attorney
General of Kansas, for the States of Texas, Wisconsin, Missouri,
Oklahoma, and Kansas; by Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General,
Gerald L. Baliles, Deputy Attorney General, and James E. Ryan, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia; by
Slade Gorton,Attorney General, Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant
Attorney General, and Martin J. Durkan and James B. McCabe,
Special Assistant Attorneys General of Washington, and IsraelPackel,
Attorney General, and James R. Adams, Deputy Attorney General
of Pennsylvania, for the State of Washington and the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania; and by Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., for the
Center for Governmental Responsibility.
1
The provisions of Title II, as added by the 1972 Amendments
chiefly involved in this case are, in pertinent part, as follows:
 OCTOBER TERM, 1974

Opinion of the Court 420 U. S.

cial assistance in the amount of 75% of the cost of munic-

ipal sewers and sewage treatment works. Under §207,
there is "authorized to be appropriated" for these purposes
Section 205 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 1285 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. III):
"Sums authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 1287
of this title for each fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1972, shall
be allotted by the Administrator not later than the January 1st
immediately preceding the beginning of the fiscal year for which
authorized, except that the allotment for fiscal year 1973 shall be
made not later than 30 days after October 18, 1972. . .
Section 207, 33 U. S. C. § 1287 (1970 ed., Supp. III):
"There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this sub-
chapter . . . for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, not to exceed
$5,000,000,000, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, not to
exceed $6,000,000,000, and for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975,
not to exceed $7,000,000,000."
Section 203, 33 U. S. C. § 1283 (1970 ed., Supp. III):
"(a) Each applicant for a grant shall submit to the Administrator
for his approval, plans, specifications, and estimates for each pro-
posed project for the construction of treatment works for which a
grant is applied for [sic] under section 1281 (g) (1) of this title from
funds allotted to the State under section 1285 of this title and which
otherwise meets the requirements of this chapter. The Administrator
shall act upon such plans, specifications, and estimates as soon as
practicable after the same have been submitted, and his approval
of any such plans, specifications, and estimates shall be deemed a
contractual obligation of the United States for the payment of its
proportional contribution to such project.
"(b) The Administrator shall, from time to time as the work
progresses, make payments to the recipient of a grant for costs of
construction incurred on a project. These payments shall at no
time exceed the Federal share of the cost of construction incurred
to the date of the voucher covering such payment plus the Federal
share of the value of the materials which have been stockpiled in the
vicinity of such construction in conformity to plans and specifications
for the project.
"(c) After completion of a project and approval of the final
voucher by the Administrator, he shall pay out of the appropriate
sums the unpaid balance of the Federal share payable on account of
such project."
 TRAIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK

35 Opinion of the Court

"not to exceed" $5 billion for fiscal year 1973, "not to
exceed" $6 billion for fiscal year 1974, and "not to exceed"
$7 billion for fiscal year 1975. Section 205 (a) directs
that "[slums authorized to be appropriated pursuant to
[§ 207]" for fiscal year 1973 be allotted "not later than 30
days after October 18, 1972." The "[s]ums authorized"
for the later fiscal years 1974 and 1975 "shall be allotted
by the Administrator not later than the January 1st im-
mediately preceding the beginning of the fiscal year for
which authorized.. . ." From these allotted sums, § 201
(g) (1) authorizes the Administrator "to make grants to
any... municipality... for the construction of publicly
owned treatment works... ," pursuant to plans and spec-
ifications as required by § 203 and meeting the other re-
quirements of the Act, including those of § 204. Section
203 (a) specifies that the Administrator's approval of
plans for a project "shall be deemed a contractual obliga-
tion of the United States for the payment of its propor-
tional contribution to such project." 2

The Act thus established a funding method differing in important

2

respects from the normal system of program approval and author-

ization of appropriation followed by separate annual appropriation
acts. Under that approach, it is not until the actual appro-
priation that the Government funds can be deemed firmly com-
mitted. Under the contract-authority scheme incorporated in
the legislation before us now, there are authorizations for future
appropriations but also initial and continuing authority in the
Executive Branch contractually to commit funds of the United States
up to the amount of the authorization. The expectation is that
appropriations will be automatically forthcoming to meet these con-
tractual commitments. This mechanism considerably reduces what-
ever discretion Congress might have exercised in the course of
making annual appropriations. The issue in this case is the
extent of the authority of the Executive to control expenditures
for a program that Congress has funded in the manner and under
the circumstances present here.
 OCTOBER TERM, 1974

Opinion of the Court 420 U. S.

The water pollution bill that became the 1972 Act was
passed by Congress on October 4, 1972, but was vetoed
by the President on October 17. Congress promptly
overrode the veto. Thereupon the President, by letter
dated November 22, 1972,1 directed the Administrator
"not [to] allot among the States the maximum amounts
provided by section 207" and, instead, to allot "[n]o
more than $2 billion of the amount authorized for the
fiscal year 1973, and no more than $3 billion of the
amount authorized for the fiscal year 1974 ... ." ' On
December 8, the Administrator announced by regulation I
that in accordance with the President's letter he was al-
lotting for fiscal years 1973 and 1974 "sums not to ex-
ceed $2 billion and $3 billion, respectively."
This litigation, brought by the city of New York and
similarly situated municipalities in the State of New York,
followed immediately.' The complaint sought judgment
against the Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency declaring that he was obligated to allot to
the States the full amounts authorized by § 207 for fiscal
years 1973 and 1974, as well as an order directing him to
make those allotments. In May 1973, the District Court
denied the Administrator's motion to dismiss and granted
the cities' motion for summary judgment. The Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that "the Act requires the
Administrator to allot the full sums authorized to be ap-
3 Letter from President Nixon to William D. Ruckelshaus, Admin-
istrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Nov. 22, 1972, App. 15-16.
4Although the allotment for fiscal year 1975 is not directly at
issue in this case, on January 15, 1974, the Administrator allotted
$4 billion out of the $7 billion authorized for allotment for that
fiscal year. Brief for Petitioner 6.
537 Fed. Reg. 26282 (1972).
6 The District Court ordered the action to proceed as a class
action under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (1) and (2) and also
allowed the city of Detroit to intervene as a plaintiff.
 TRAIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK

35 Opinion of the Court

propriated in § 207." 161 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 131,

494 F. 2d 1033, 1050 (1974).
Because of the differing views with respect to the
proper construction of the Act between the federal courts
in the District of Columbia in this case and those of
the Fourth Circuit in Train v. Campaign Clean Water,
post, p. 136, we granted certiorari in both cases, 416 U. S.
969 (1974), and heard them together. The sole issue 7 be-
fore us is whether the 1972 Act permits the Administrator
to allot to the States under § 205 (a) less than the entire
amounts authorized to be appropriated by § 207. We
hold that the Act does not permit such action and affirm
the Court of Appeals.'
7 The petition for a writ of certiorari also presented the question

whether a suit to compel the allotment of the sums in issue here is

barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but that issue was not
briefed and apparently has been abandoned. The Administrator
concedes that, if § 205 (a) requires allotment of the full amounts
authorized by § 207, then "allotment is a ministerial act and the
district courts have jurisdiction to order that it be done." Brief
for Petitioner 14.
8
On July 12, 1974, while this case was pending in this Court
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
Pub. L. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 31 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq. (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV), became effective. Title X of that Act imposes cer-
tain requirements on the President in postponing or withhold-
ing the use of authorized funds. If he determines that certain
budget authority will not be required to carry out a particular pro-
gram and is of the view that such authority should be rescinded, he
must submit a special message to Congress explaining the basis
therefor. For the rescission to be effective, Congress must approve
it within 45 days. Should the President desire to withhold or delay
the obligation or expenditure of budget authority, he must submit
a similar special message to Congress. His recommendation may be
rejected by either House adopting a resolution disapproving the
proposed deferral.
These provisions do not render this case moot or make its decision
unnecessary, for § 1001, note following 31 U. S. C. § 1401 (1970
ed., Supp. IV), provides that:
 OCTOBER TERM, 1974

Opinion of the Court 420 U. S.

Section 205 (a) provides that the "[slums authorized

to be appropriated pursuant to [§ 207] . . . shall be
allotted by the Administrator." Section 207 authorizes
the appropriation of "not to exceed" specified amounts
for each of three fiscal years. The dispute in this case
turns principally on the meaning of the foregoing lan-
guage from the indicated sections of the Act.
The Administrator contends that § 205 (a) directs the
allotment of only "sums"-not "all sums"-authorized
by § 207 to be appropriated and that the sums that must
be allotted are merely sums that do not exceed the

"Nothing contained in this Act, or in any amendments made by

this Act, shall be construed as-

"(3) affecting in any way the claims or defenses of any party to

litigation concerning any impoundment."
The Act would thus not appear to affect cases such as this one, pend-
ing on the date of enactment of the statute. The Solicitor General,
on behalf of the Administrator, has submitted a supplemental brief
to this effect. The city of New York agrees that the case has not
been mooted by the Impoundment Act and no contrary views have
been filed.
Although asserting on the foregoing ground and on other grounds
that the Impoundment Act has no application here, the Executive
Branch included among the deferrals of budget authority reported to
Congress pursuant to the new Act:
"Grants for waste treatment plant construction ($9 billion). Release
of all these funds would be highly inflationary, particularly in view
of the rapid rise in non-Federal spending for pollution control. Some
of the funds now deferred will be allotted on or prior to February 1,
1975."
In connection with that submission, the President asserted that the
Act "applies only to determinations to withhold budget authority
which have been made since the law was approved," but nevertheless
thought it appropriate to include in the report actions which were
concluded before the effective date of the Act. 120 Cong. Rec.
S17195 (Sept. 23, 1974). Other than as they bear on the pos-
sible mootness in the litigation before us, no issues as to the reach
or coverage of the Impoundment Act are before us.
 TRAIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK

35 Opinion of the Court

amounts specified in § 207 for each of the three fiscal

years. In other words, it is argued that there is a maxi-
mum, but no minimum, on the amounts that must be
allotted under § 205 (a). This is necessarily the case, he
insists, because the legislation, after initially passing the
House and Senate in somewhat different form, was
amended in Conference and the changes, which were
adopted by both Houses, were intended to provide wide
discretion in the Executive to control the rate of spending
under the Act.
The changes relied on by the Administrator, the
so-called Harsha amendments, were two. First, § 205 of
the House and Senate bills as they passed those Houses
and went to Conference, directed that there be allotted
"all sums" authorized to be appropriated by § 207.1 The
word "all" was struck in Conference. Second, § 207 of
the House bill authorized the appropriation of specific
amounts for the three fiscal years. The Conference Com-
mittee inserted the qualifying words "not to exceed" be-
fore each of the sums so specified.
The Administrator's arguments based on the statutory
language and its legislative history are unpersuasive.
Section 207 authorized appropriation of "not to exceed"
a specified sum for each of the three fiscal years. If the
States failed to submit projects sufficient to require obli-
gation, and hence the appropriation, of the entire amounts
authorized, or if the Administrator, exercising whatever
authority the Act might have given him to deny grants,
refused to obligate these total amounts, § 207 would
obviously permit appropriation of the lesser amounts.
But if, for example, the full amount provided for 1973
was obligated by the Administrator in the course of

9 Section 205 as it appeared in the Senate bill directed the Admin-

istrator to "allocate" rather than to "allot." The difference appears
to be without significance.
 OCTOBER TERM, 1974

Opinion of the Court 420 UI. S.

approving plans and making grants for municipal con-

tracts, §207 plainly "authorized" the appropriation of
the entire $5 billion. If a sum of money is "authorized"
to be appropriated in the future by § 207, then §205 (a)
directs that an amount equal to that sum be allotted.
Section 207 speaks of sums authorized to be appropri-
ated, not of sums that are required to be appropriated;
and as far as §205 (a)'s requirement to allot is concerned,
we see no difference between the $2 billion the President
directed to be allotted for fiscal year 1973 and the $3
billion he ordered withheld. The latter sum is as much
authorized to be appropriated by §207 as is the former.
Both must be allotted.
It is insisted that this reading of the Act fails to give
any effect to the Conference Committee's changes in the
bill. But, as already indicated, the "not to exceed"
qualifying language of §207 has meaning of its own, quite
apart from § 205 (a), and reflects the realistic possi-
bility that approved applications for grants from funds
already allotted would not total the maximum amount
authorized to be appropriated. Surely there is nothing
inconsistent between authorizing "not to exceed" $5 bil-
lion for 1973 and requiring the full allotment of the
$5 billion among the States. Indeed, if the entire
amount authorized is ever to be appropriated, there must
be approved municipal projects in that amount, and
grants for those projects may only be made from allotted
funds.
As for striking the word "all" from § 205, if Congress
intended to confer any discretion on the Executive to
withhold funds from this program at the allotment stage,
it chose quite inadequate means to do so. It appears to
us that the word "sums" has no different meaning and
can be ascribed no different function in the context of
§ 205 than would the words "all sums." It is said that
 TRAIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK

35 Opinion of the Court

the changes were made to give the Executive the discre-

tionary control over the outlay of funds for Title II pro-
grams at either stage of the process. But legislative in-
tention, without more, is not legislation. Without some-
thing in addition to what is now before us, we cannot
accept the addition of the few words to § 207 and the
deletion of the one word from § 205 (a) as altering the
entire complexion and thrust of the Act. As conceived
and passed in both Houses, the legislation was intended to
provide a firm commitment of substantial sums within
a relatively limited period of time in an effort to achieve
an early solution of what was deemed an urgent prob-
lem."0 We cannot believe that Congress at the last
1
0 The Act declares that "it is the national goal that the discharge
of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985,"
§ 101 (a) (1), 33 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. III). Con-
gress intended also to apply to publicly owned sewage treatment works
"the best practicable waste treatment technology over the life of the
works consistent with the purposes of this subchapter." § 201
(g) (2) (A), 33 U. S. C. § 1281 (g) (2) (A) (1970 ed., Supp. III). See
§ 301 (b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b) (1) (B) (1970 ed., Supp. III).
The congressional determination to commit $18 billion during the
fiscal years 1973-1975 is reflected in the following remarks of Senator
Muskie, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee concerned with
the legislation and the manager of the bill on the Senate floor:
"[T]hose who say that raising the amounts of money called for in
this legislation may require higher taxes, or that spending this much
money may contribute to inflation simply do not understand the
language of this crisis.
"The conferees spent hours and days studying the problem of
financing the cleanup effort required by this new legislation. The
members agreed in the end that a total of $18 billion had to be
committed by the Federal Government in 75-percent grants to
municipalities during fiscal years 1973-75. That is a great deal
of money; but that is how much it will cost to begin to achieve the
requirements set forth in the legislation.

[T]here were two strong imperatives which worked together

to convince the members of the conference that this much money was
 OCTOBER TERM, 1974

Opinion of the Court 420 U. S.

minute scuttled the entire effort by providing the Execu-

tive with the seemingly limitless power to withhold funds
from allotment and obligation. Yet such was the Gov-
ernment's position in the lower courts-combined with the
argument that the discretion conferred is unreviewable.
The Administrator has now had second thoughts. He
does not now claim that the Harsha amendments should
be given such far-reaching effect. In this Court, he
views §§ 205 (a) and 207 as merely conferring discretion
on the Administrator as to the timing of expenditures, not
as to the ultimate amounts to be allotted and obligated.
He asserts that although he may limit initial allotments
in the three specified years, "the power to allot contin-
ues" and must be exercised, "until the full $18 billion has

needed: first, the conviction that only a national commitment of this

magnitude would produce the necessary technology; and second,
the knowledge that a Federal commitment of $18 billion in 75-per-
cent grants to the municipalities was the minimum amount needed
to finance the construction of waste treatment facilities which will
meet the standards imposed by this legislation.

"Mr. President, to achieve the deadlines we are talking about in

this bill we are going to need the strongest kind of evidence of the
Federal Government's commitment to pick up its share of the load.
We cannot back down, with any credibility, from the dnd of invest-
ment in waste treatment facilities that is called for by this bill. And
the conferees are convinced that the level of investment that is
authorized is the minimum dose of medicine that will solve the prob-
lems we face." 118 Cong. Rec. 33693-33694 (1972).
Both Houses rejected authorization-appropriation funding in favor
of the contract-authority system, which was deemed to involve a
more binding and reliable commitment of funds. See 117 Cong.
Rec. 38799, 38846-38853 (1971); 118 Cong. Rec. 10751-10761 (1972).
Congressman Harsha, the House floor manager of the bill, explained
the preference for the contract-authority approach and indicated
that it was essential for orderly and continuous planning. Id., at
10757-10758.
 TRAIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK

35 Opinion of the Court

been exhausted." 11 Brief for Petitioner 13; Tr. of Oral

Arg. 16-17. It is true that this represents a major modi-
fication of the Administrator's legal posture," but our
conclusion that §205 (a) requires the allotment of sums
equal to the total amounts authorized to be appropriated
under § 207 is not affected. In the first place, under
§205 (a) the Administrator's power to allot extends only
to "sums" that are authorized to be appropriated under
§ 207. If he later has power to allot, and must allot, the
balance of the $18 billion not initially allotted in the
specified years, it is only because these additional amounts
are "sums" authorized by § 207 to be appropriated. But
if they are "sums" within the meaning of § 205 (a), then
that section requires that they be allotted by Novem-
ber 17, 1972, in the case of 1973 funds, and for 1974 and
1975 "not later than the January 1st immediately pre-
ceding the beginning of the fiscal year for which author-
ized." '13 The November 22 letter of the President and
the Administrator's consequent withholding of authorized
funds cannot be squared with the statute.
Second, even assuming an intention on the part of

"I The Administrator goes on to argue that under his present view
of the Act, there is little if any difference between discretion to
withhold allotments and discretion to refuse to obligate, for under
either approach the full amounts authorized will eventually be
available for obligation. The city of New York contends otherwise.
Our view of the Act makes it unnecessary to reach the question.
12The Administrator now indicates that the Act is presently being
administered in accordance with his view of the Act asserted here.
Brief for Petitioner 13.
13 Under § 205 (b), any funds allotted to a State that remain un-
obligated at the end of a one-year period after the close of the fiscal
year for which funds are authorized become available for reallotment
by the Administrator in accordance with a formula to be determined
by the Administrator. These provisions for reallotment, as well as
the reallotment formula, plainly apply only to funds that have
already been allotted.
 OCTOBER TERM, 1974

Opinion of the Court 420 U. S.

Congress, in the hope of forestalling a veto, to imply a

power of some sort in the Executive to control outlays
under the Act, there is nothing in the legislative history
of the Act indicating that such discretion arguably
granted was to be exercised at the allotment stage rather
than or in addition to the obligation phase of the process.
On the contrary, as we view the legislative history, the
indications are that the power to control, such as it was,
was to be exercised at the point where funds were obli-
gated and not in connection with the threshold function
of allotting funds to the States.14 The Court of Appeals
carefully examined the legislative history in this respect
and arrived at the same conclusion, as have most of the
other courts that have dealt with the issue." We thus
14 Senator Muskie, who was the senior majority conferee from
the Senate, gave his view of the meaning of the Harsha amend-
ments on the floor of the Senate:
"Under the amendments proposed by Congressman William Harsha
and others, the authorizations for obligational authority are 'not to
exceed' $18 billion over the next 3 years. Also, 'all' sums authorized
to be obligated need not be committed, though they must be allo-
cated. These two provisions were suggested to give the Administra-
tion some flexibility concerning the obligation of construction grant
funds." 118 Cong. Rec. 33694 (1972).
He repeated his views in the course of Senate proceedings to over-
ride the President's veto. Id., at 36871. Nothing was said in the
Senate challenging the Senator's view that executive discretion did not
extend to allotments.
In the House, the power to make allotments under § 205 was not
mentioned in terms. The impact of the Harsha amendments was
repeatedly explained by reference to discretion to obligate or to ex-
pend. Typical was -Representative Harsha's remarks that the
amendments were intended to "emphasize the President's flexibility
to control the rate of spending . . . ," and that "the pacing item"
in the expenditure of funds was the Administrator's power to approve
plans, specifications, and estimates. Id., at 33754. See also id., at
33693, 33704, 33715-33716, 33754-33755, 36873-36874, 37056-37060.
'1 161 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 494 F. 2d 1033 (1974), aff'g 358 F.
Supp. 669 (DC 1973). Other District Courts have reached this
 TRAIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Opinion of the Court

reject the suggestion that the conclusion we have arrived

at is inconsistent with the legislative history of §§ 205 (a)
and 207.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
So ordered.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurs in the result.

same result: Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Administrator,EPA, Nos. C. 73-

1061 & C. 74-104 (ND Ohio June 26, 1974); Maine v. Fri, Civ. No.
14-51 (Me. June 21, 1974); Floridav. Train, Civ. No. 73-156 (ND
Fla. Feb. 25, 1974); Texas v. Ruckelshaus, No. A-73-CA-38 (WD
Tex. Oct. 2, 1973); Martin-Trigonav. Ruckelshaus, No. 72-C-3044
(ND Ill. June 29, 1973); Minnesota v. EPA, No. 4-73, Civ. 133
(Minn. June 25. 1974). The only District Court case in which the
issue was actively litigated and which held to the contrary was
Brown v. Ruekelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258 (CD Cal. 1973).