Programmazione e

funzionamento robot
industriali
Robot Collaborativi Industriali

Castellanza, 23 novembre 2017

LBR iiwa
 Definition of Service Robots
•A robot is an actuated mechanism programmable in two or
more axes with a degree of autonomy, moving within its
environment, to perform intended tasks. Autonomy in this
context means the ability to perform intended tasks based on
current state and sensing, without human intervention.
•A service robot is a robot that performs useful tasks for
humans or equipment excluding industrial automation
application. Note: The classification of a robot into industrial
robot or service robot is done according to its intended
application.
•A personal service robot or a service robot for personal
use is a service robot used for a non-commercial task,
usually by lay persons. Examples are domestic servant robot,
automated wheelchair, personal mobility assist robot, and pet
exercising robot.
•A professional service robot or a service robot for
professional use is a service robot used for a commercial
task, usually operated by a properly trained operator.
Examples are cleaning robot for public places, delivery robot
in offices or hospitals, fire-fighting robot, rehabilitation robot
and surgery robot in hospitals. In this context an operator is a
person designated to start, monitor and stop the intended
operation of a robot or a robot system.

•Source IFR
LBR Project Approach, Stages of the
Product Genesis
1990 – 1995 DLR develops the first lightweight robot arm motivated by the need
for a small lightweight robot, which was supposed to be used for space
applications and to be based on the human model of an arm aiming at a weight-
to-payload ratio of 1:1 and with similar performance. First mechanical structure
in 1991. First working prototype in 1995.
1996 –1999 DLR develops the second generation lightweight robot arm
improving significantly performance and control characteristics.
2001 – 2003 DLR develops the third generation of the lightweight robot arm.
Begin of the cooperation between KUKA Roboter GmbH and DLR with the
objective to reduce system complexity and enhance programmability and
applicability. Begin of technology transfer and further cooperative
developments through funded research projects in which important milestones
were reached: PAPAS [3], DESIRE [6], SMErobot [16], PHRIENDS [14] and
BRICS [4]. Here, the merge of the DLR controller and the KUKA controller and
initial application developments helped to gain visibility within the
company, but also externally.
2004 – 2006 Phase of bilateral (unfunded) technology transfer. Improvements
and adaptations of the integrated algorithms with respect to control
performance. The motion accuracy and the sensitivity of the compliance control
were considerably improved, collision detection and reaction
algorithms have been added.
2006 KUKA starts production of a small series of 18 lightweight robots (KUKA
LWR3) for thorough testing and validation. Within the technology transfer
activity, DLR supports the hardware design and adapts the control software to
industrial standards. Key customers and research partners start application
development.
2007 – 2008 Further improvements to the system with respect to mechanical
and electrical robustness, motion accuracy, performance of impedance and
torque control, collision detection and reaction, and electromagnetic
compatibility in cooperation between KUKA and DLR.
2008 – 2009 Small series production of 60 lightweight robots (KUKA LWR4), all
of them sold to pre-development and research. Successful tests of the LWR4 in
real production environments at key customers.
 LBR Product Genesis

2010 Due to increasing customer demand,

decision was taken to produce the next batch
of further improved LWR4+ robot systems. Start
of LWR5 developments with improved safety
features.
 The new product family
LBR iiwa

The new product family of the Leichtbauroboter is called “LBR iiwa”

(in German and English).

iiwa is an acronym and stands for:

(i) intelligent
An intelligent assistant
(i) industrial
for future-oriented
(w) work
production concepts
(a) assistant

Phonetically close to “Eve” – first generation of industrial robots with integrated

sensitive capabilities.

The name LBR iiwa is a conscious delimitation from the existing KUKA robots, with the
aim of making a clear statement that this is a new robot generation (no longer a KR).

LBR iiwa replaces the previous development name LBR5.
Why we develop the LBR iiwa?
• Why:
– To create the possibility to automate
sensitive tasks
– To enable totally new assembly concepts
– To make the collaboration between humans
and robots possible
– To relieve the workers at ergonomic bad
Why workplaces
– The give the possibility to produce in high-
wage countries
How • How:
– High-Tech robot with integrated torque
What sensors
– Steamlined lightweight construction
– Powerfull operating system
• What:
– LBR iiwa - An intelligent assistant for future
oriented production concepts
 Analysis of customer requirements
LBR iiwa
Customer
Visualized interaction Performance needs
Design satisfaction
Touch 3D Automatical mastering
Additional axes
Teaching by demonstration Highest sensitivity Multikinematic
Delighters Hand guiding
Tiles Safe Operation
Diagnosis (no message window) Bus communication
Load data determination
Graphical programming Realized quality
HRC
Media Flange properties
Low High

Accuracy easy commissioning

Service Lin/Circ/PTP KUKA quality
Sensitivity Jogging
Basic needs
Safety interface
Mastering Programming High lifetime
Connection to PLC
Simple and intuitive operation
High availability
The new product family
New robot arm in two payload
variants: 7 and 14 kg

New controller
operating system Sunrise.Workbench
Sunrise.OS for configuration
and programming

smartPAD with
new user interface

Control hardware
based on KR C4 compact
 Outlook for LBR iiwa

Kinematic
redundancy Size

Sensitive
Lightweight Mass
construction
Axis position
Payload
Safe sensors

Axis torque

Rounded
structure
Flexible joints
LBR iiwa functions

LBR iiwa …

1. … is light.

2. … has 7 axes.

3. … is sensitive.
 LBR iiwa functions

Position controller

The LBR moves to the programmed
position “stubbornly” with high accuracy.

Stiffness controller

The LBR behaves like a spring with stiffness
and damping parameters in Cartesian or
axis-specific mode

Activation of a defined force

Gravity compensation

The LBR behaves as if weightless;
movement results from application of the
slightest external force

Manual guidance and teaching by demonstration
LBR iiwa – Technical data

LBR iiwa 7 LBR iiwa 14

R800 R820
Number of axes 7 7
Payload [kg] 7 14
Weight [kg] 22.3 29.5
Payload/weight ratio 0.31 0.47
Horizontal reach [mm] 800 820
Repeatability [mm] ± 0.1 ± 0.1
Protection rating IP54 IP54
LBR iiwa – Structure

Joint electronics Joint torque sensor

Motor Gear unit

 LBR iiwa – Media-Flange
• All cables are passed through the LBR
from the base to the flange
• There are two different energy supply
systems to choose:
electric and pnematic
• There is a interface at the base and flange
available
• The interface at the flange is called
„Media-Flange“
• Firstly users have to select features they
need to be provided at the Media-Flange.
That implies the needed energy supply
system

Media-Flange
 LBR iiwa – Media-Flange Connections
Media-Flange
Standard IO Touch

Media-Flange pneumatic Media-Flange IO pneumatic Media-Flange Touch pneumatic

Energy supply pneumatic

-2x Air
-2x Air (2x 4 mm air connection not switched)
-2x Air
(2x 4 mm air connection not switched)
(2x 4 mm air connection not switched) -1x Power supply
-1x Power supply (3 A 24 V, M12 connector)
-1x Power supply
(3 A 24 V, M8 connector)
(5 A max. 30 V, M8 connector) -Interface for fieldbus and low level signals
- Interface for fieldbus and low level (EtherCAT junction, 5 Inputs, 4 Outputs each
- Interface for fieldbus and low
signals 0,5 A, M8 and M12 connectors)
level signals
(EtherCAT junction, 8 Inputs, 4 Outputs
(4x AWG 26 shielded, M8 connector) -Enabling switch, App-button (programmable),
each 0,5 A, M8 connector)
three-colored LED status indicator

Media-Flange electric Media-Flange IO electric Media-Flange Touch electric

Energy supply electric

-2x Power supply

-2x Power supply -2x Power supply
(1x 3A 24V, 1x 4A max. 60V, M8 connector)
(each 5 A max. 60 V, M8 connector) (1x 3A 24V, 1x 4A max. 60V, M8
connector) -Interface for fieldbus and low level signals
- Interface for fieldbus and low
(EtherCAT junction, 5 Inputs, 4 Outputs each
level signals - Interface for fieldbus and low level
0,5 A, 3x2 AWG 28 shielded in pairs, M8 and
(4x AWG 26 shielded, 3x2 AWG 28 signals
M12 connectors)
shielded in pairs, M8 connector) (Ethercat junction, 8 Inputs, 4 Outputs
each 0,5 A, 4x AWG 26 shielded, 3x2 -Enabling switch, App-button (programmable),
AWG 28 shielded in pairs, M8 three-colored LED status indicator
connector)
LBR iiwa – Media-Flange Connections
Media-Flange
Standard IO

Media-Flange inside pneumatic Media-Flange IO valve pneumatic

Energy supply pneumatic

-3x Air
-2x Air (2x 4 mm air connection switched –
(2x 4 mm air connection not switched) 1x4mm air connection not switched )
-1x Power supply -1x Power supply
(3 A 24 V, M8 connector) (3 A 24 V, M8 connector)
- Interface for fieldbus - Interface for fieldbus and low level
(EtherCAT junction) signals
(EtherCAT junction, 8 Inputs, 4 Outputs
each 0,5 A, M8 connector)

Media-Flange inside electric

Energy supply electric

-2x Power supply

(8A and 5 A max. 60 V, M8 connector)
- Interface for fielbus
(2xCAT5 interface and analog signals)
 LBR iiwa – Facts

The lightweight construction of the LBR is the key to its sensitivity.

The weight reduction compared with a KR 6 is 90%.

The world’s only robot with joint torque sensors in safe technology

Safety-oriented position sensors requiring minimal space

The LBR has world-leading heat management.

Motors with extremely high power density

Electronics with maximum packing density

Automatic mastering runs for all axes

 KUKA Sunrise

KUKA Sunrise LBR iiwa

KUKA Sunrise Cabinet

KUKA Sunrise.OS LBR iiwa 7 R800

KUKA Sunrise.Workbench LBR iiwa 14 R820

 KUKA Sunrise Cabinet

New control concept

High-speed servo control

Integrated, programmable software safety controller

Compact design (19")

smartPAD with new, innovative user interface

Support for all commonly used field bus systems
 KUKA Sunrise.OS

The KUKA Sunrise.OS (Operating System) is the new operating system for
the LBR iiwa

KUKA Sunrise.OS – the technological basis for innovative robotics:

Multiple kinematic systems

Human-robot collaboration

Integration of sensors

Object-oriented programming
 Sunrise.OS
Sunrise – The control system of the future.
Things are moving in the world of control
technology. And that is quite literally true with KUKA
Sunrise. Our control system combines motion and
sensor systems and is thus a response to current
programming requirements for service robotics, such
as the dynamic interaction of kinematic systems with
multiple arms or safe human-robot collaboration.
Mechatronics and information processing in a single
controller kernel enable object-oriented
programming of the robot controller and its relevant
safety functions.
Controlling robots with open interfaces.
The pioneering KUKA Sunrise control system has
modular and open interfaces. In conjunction with
the scalability, performance and simplicity of the
robot controller, and the use of JAVA as the
programming language, this means that there is
virtually no limit to the range of new automation
possibilities. On the contrary. With the new KUKA
Sunrise control technology it is possible for
researchers to implement their ideas more easily
and for companies to supply markets with
comprehensive applications and technologies more
quickly, for example, and it is now only a matter of
time before it will be possible to control multiple
small robots with a single controller.
KUKA Sunrise.OS – User Inferface
• The user interface has been completely re-done and
designed
• Intuitive operation with self-explanatory symbols
• Visualization via tiles
• Simple diagnosis by color status LEDs
• Visualization through graphical elements
 KUKA Sunrise.OS – Overview

1. Navigation Bar: Main menu

and status display
2. Display area
3. Button Options Hand-Override
4. Traversing display
5. Button Hand-Override
6. Display watchdog
7. Button language
8. Button clock
9. Button traversing
10.Back-Button
 KUKA Sunrise.OS – Visualization

• Visualization of the axis position and axle torques

 KUKA Sunrise.Workbench

New engineering suite

Ergonomic user interface

Program editor with many powerful
user-friendly functions

Object-oriented programming

Fast start-up

User-friendly diagnostics

Integrated user manual

Professional debugging
Advantages LBR iiwa in full automation

The system costs for the entire application

over all phases of use must be taken into
consideration.

The LBR iiwa enables costs to be saved in
many areas.
 Arguments for the LBR iiwa in full
automation
Planning/engineering Start-up Operation Conversion

Low costs for development and

manufacture of tools
Product out of the box
Low energy
Security of investment
(compliance in the LBR)
No calibration of FTS consumption for future applications as

Simplified feed of materials relative to the robot, no
Short cycle times due the LBR is the robot with
(LBR can compensate for interface problems to fast motion into the highest performance
inaccuracies)
Optimized software for contact position and (what isn’t possible with
sensitive processes high-performance the LBR can’t be done

Planning security with any other robot
movements
(due to highest performance)
Object-oriented either)
programming with
Process monitoring via

No selection of an FTS
Most advanced controller
powerful Workbench position and forces
necessary on the market
(quality assurance)

No clarification of interfaces
Fast programming of
even complex
Low space
with external sensors
processes, requirements
optimization via
Protection of the
software, no objects moved and the
modification of tools periphery by means of

No time-consuming highly responsive
process optimization collision detection and
(8 weeks = €40k) jerk-free motion
 Simulation system for LBR iiwa
• KUKA.Sim supports the redundant kinematic LBR iiwa
(Redundant – More axis than degrees of freedom 7>6)
• Reachability checks possible
• OLP*-Support currently not available

Video – LBR iiwa with KUKA.Sim Video – LBR iiwa swivel elbow

* OLP – Offline Programming / Code generation

 Outlook for LBR iiwa
• With the LBR iiwa, KUKA will provide its customers with the means of
implementing measures to minimize the risk of a HRC application in
accordance with the standard (ISO 10218-1:2011) by means of a freely
configurable safety controller.

• This applies in particular to:

– Safe velocity monitoring
– Safe workspaces and safeguarded zones
– Safe collision detection (free collision)
– Safe force monitoring (crushing)
– Safe tool detection
– Safe switching of states

in PL d and Cat. 3
 Relevant Robot Developments

Kawada Industries “NextAge”

Kinova Robotics “JACO”

Assistive robot for
Rethink Robotics “Baxter” upper body
disabled
 Relevant Robot Developments

Universal Robots “UR5” x 2

SRI International “Taurus”

ABB YuMi®
Meka Robotics “M1”
Hannover messe 2015
 Benefits of human-robot collaboration
• Robots have their strength in the repetition of simple handling tasks.
• Humans, on the other hand, have unique cognitive skills, such as
understanding the task.
• The combination of human and robot can greatly rationalize tasks, as long
as the work is optimally divided between them.
• Human-robot collaboration then enables variable automation. Tasks for
which complete automation is too expensive or too complex can thus be
partially rationalized.
• Non-ergonomic workstations are replaced by robots.
 Why do we want HRC?
Humans and robots:
An ideal team due to the utilization of synergies

+ +
+ Strength Problem-
+ Creativity
Precision solving
approach
+
+
+ Endurance
+ Sensory
capabilities
Flexibility
Speed
 Forms of human-robot collaboration
No fixed guard,
virtual safety fence
 contact not desired,
unlikely
(e.g. photo-electric
barrier)

Shared workspace
 contact desired,
simultaneous motion
(e.g. manual
guidance)
Fixed safety fence Shared
 contact not possible workspa
ce
Shared workspace
 contact not
desired, but
Robot possible
workspa
ce Shared workspace, but
exclusive motion  contact
Operator possible, but only with
workspa stationary robot
ce e.g. in the case of industrial
robot as handling assistant
 Directives and laws
Manufacturer Machinery Directive
2006/42/EC
obligations

9. Ordinance relating to the Product Safety Law (Machinery

Ordinance)

Risk assessment

Analysis of hazards

Reduction of the risk by means of
1. Engineering/design
2. Safety equipment
3. User information

Operator
obligations Laws on the use of equipment, workplaces, ...
 Standards/Directives
• The Machinery Directive (2006/42/EC) of the European Parliament and of
the Council on machinery defines a harmonized level of safety with regard
to accident prevention for machines placed on the market within the
European Economic Area (EEA).
• Every EU Member State must implement the Machinery Directive in
national legislation. This is carried out in Germany by means of the
Product Safety Law.
• With the CE mark, the manufacturer or EU importer (in our case the
system integrator) indicates “that the product is in conformity with
the applicable requirements set out in Community harmonization
legislation providing for its affixing.”
• A robot does not receive a CE mark, but only a declaration of
incorporation, as it is classified as partly completed machinery.
 Standards
Standards harmonized with Describes hazards arising from industrial robots:
the Machinery Directive: safety
Electrical hazards
standards
Mechanical hazards

…
Prescribes measures for design engineering,

Stability, strength, energy sources, …
Presumption of
conformity with the Safety equipment,
Machinery Directive
Safe control functions (E-STOP, enabling, etc.) in PL d Cat. 3, covers …
and user documentation.

Specific C
e.g. ISO 10218
standards Safety requirements for industrial robots

B e.g. ISO 13849

Safety of machinery – Safety-related parts of
standards control systems
ISO 12100
General A standards Safety of machinery – Basic concepts, general
principles of design
 ISO 13849-1: Performance Level
Risk parameters
– S Severity of injury
• S1 - Light (usually reversible)
• S2 - Severe (usually
irreversible/death)
– F Frequency and/or duration of
d exposure to hazard
• F1 - Rare to infrequent and/or
short duration of exposure
• F2 - Frequent to continuous
and/or long duration of
Industrial robots: exposure
S2 – F2 – P1 = Performance Level d – P Possibility of avoiding the
hazard or limiting the damage
• P1 - Possible under certain
PL d
Probability
conditions
of failure: • P2 - Scarcely possible
 Standards – ISO 10218 (2011)
• Performance requirements
– “Safety-related parts of control systems must be designed to
meet the requirements of PL “d” with structure category 3
as described in ISO 13849-1:2006”

Architectures

Category B and Category 2 Category 3 and

Category 1 Category 4

Senso Senso
Logic Actuator Logic Actuator Sensor Logic Actuator
r r

Test Shutdow Sensor Logic Actuator

unit n method

“Dual-channel”
What must be taken into account when
installing an HRC cell?
• The current standard EN ISO 10218-1:2011 states that the robot is only
one component in a robot system and as such is not sufficient for safe
collaborative operation.
• An application involving collaborative operation must be investigated and
defined in the risk assessment.
• Additional information is contained in ISO/TS 15066.
– Currently in force as a recommendation (technical specification)
– Weaker than a standard, but possibly becoming
a standard in the future
• Conclusion:
– No human-robot collaboration is
possible without a risk assessment.
– The overall cell must always be
considered, not just the robot
(application, clamps, gripper
system, robot).
 Risk assessment
Carrying out risk assessments:
• First of all, the application must be precisely specified, including all
constraints and components.
– The intended, expected use is also derived from this.
• This concrete application is then subjected to a risk assessment.
• The result is the assessment of the overall risk of the application.
• If the risk is too great, measures are drafted to minimize the risk of
the application to an acceptable residual risk. An example of such a
measure would be safely reduced velocity in combination with
collision detection. In accordance with EN ISO 10218-1:2011, these
functions must be implemented in PL d.
• The CE mark may only be affixed if the subsequent risk assessment
confirms a sufficiently low residual risk.
 Excerpt from the standard (force
limitation)

• ISO 10218-2:2011 (Part 2: Robot systems and integration)

– 5.11.5 Operation in the collaboration space

– 5.11.5.5 Power and force limiting by design or control

“In robot systems designed to control hazards by means of energy or

force limitation, robots that conform to ISO 10218-1 must be used.

The parameters for power, force and ergonomics must be defined in

the risk assessment.”
 Excerpt from the standard (force
limitation)
• ISO 10218-1:2011 (Part 1: for the robot)
– 5.10 Requirements for collaborative operation

– 5.10.5 Power and force limiting by design or control

“The function for power or force limitation of the robot must meet the requirements
of 5.4. If a limit value is exceeded, a safety stop must be triggered.”

– 5.4 Safety-related performance of the control system

(hardware/software)

– 5.4.2 Performance requirements

“Safety-related parts of control systems must be designed to meet the

requirements of PL “d” with structure category 3 as described in ISO 13849-
1:2006, or to conform to SIL 2 with a hardware fault tolerance of 1 with a Proof-
Test interval of no less than 20 years (see IEC 62061:2005).”
 Principal risks in collaborative
operation
Challenge

Avoidance of injuries
to humans from the robot
Free collision Crushing

• Transient contact (Free collision)

– Dynamic due to high velocities
– Dependent on velocity, mass and shape
– Collision detection must function reliably and in time (before
consequential damage)

• Quasi-static contact (Crushing)

– No high velocities, virtually static
– Max. force must be parameterizable and not exceeded
 Criteria of a collision
Principal risks to be considered

Transient contact

Free, non-crushing
contact

Quasi-static contact

Crushing contact
 Criteria of a collision
Further factors
Principal risks to be considered

Collision objects

Free transient contact
Blunt

Free, non-crushing
Pointed

contact
Area of the body

Head

Quasistatic contact
Abdomen

Crushing contact
Velocity

Mass
Force characteristic for a quick, hard collision with
subsequent crushing

Phase 1 Phase 2
Impact Crushing
Force • High peak force • Quasi-static increase in force during a crushing situation
characteristic • Short duration
 Forms of contact

The process must be implemented so that
only one form of contact can occur:

Transient contact

Quasi-static contact

Quasi-static contact
Transient contact (Crushing)
 Process: only one form of contact
Example:

Lowering motion: risk of quasi-static contact ->
Lower velocity

Motion in open space: risk of transient

contact -> Higher velocity possible

Using this procedure, the overall risk can be

reduced to an acceptable level

If process forces are above the

permissible limit values for a collision
with the human operator, the affected
area must be made inaccessible.
 Transient contact

Peak force depends on:
velocity and mass

Damage can be minimized by reducing
velocity

The appropriate monitoring function is
collision detection

Collision detection = Monitoring the
external torque in all axes

Transient contact
 Quasi-static contact

If there is a risk of quasi-static contact, the
velocity must be particularly low since

The energy must be removed very
quickly (no long braking distance)

Two possible monitoring functions

Collision detection

Force monitoring

Quasi-static contact
(Crushing)
 Estimation of the external force

Estimation of the external force

Torques are measured in each
,
axis. This measured torques
can be used to estimate the
external force that caused
,
them.

 
 Estimation of forces in the vicinity of
singularity

Caution: The quality of the

force estimate depends on the   0
robot’s pose. 0

0

There are axis
configurations in whose
0
vicinity a force estimate is
not meaningfully possible.
0

In the example, the joint
torque sensors cannot
measure anything since no 0
lever arm is active.
0
 Permissible stress limits

The limit values for contact between the human
operator and the robot are determined in a risk
analysis

The recommendation of the employers’ liability
insurance association regarding the design of
workplaces with collaborative robots provides guide
values for

Pinching and crushing forces (KQK)

Impact forces (STK)

Pressure and surface compression (DFP)

The final limit values are currently being prepared in
ISO/TS 15066 (completion scheduled for the end of
2014)

Link to recommendation of employers’ liability insurance association

http://publikationen.dguv.de/dguv/pdf/10002/bg_bgia_empf_u001d.pdf
Basics of sensitive robotics
and Human Robot
Collaboration
Safety concept
Why yellow technology and gray technology?

By removing the physical barrier between human operator and robot,

human-robot collaboration (HRC) places new requirements on the design
of processes and systems
Why yellow technology and gray
technology?
 Yellow technology
• What is yellow technology?
All functions executed in PL d, structure category 3
• What is the function of yellow technology?
To ensure the safety of human operators at all times
• Which possible reactions are available to us when using yellow technology?
Stop 0, Stop 1, safe output

Risk situation:
e.g. Collision

Safe Reaction:
Stop

Safe State
Disadvantages of yellow technology
• Why don’t use only yellow technology?
– The safe stop is the only possible reaction
– The process is interrupted
– Resuming the process costs time
– Potential for frustration

Risk situation:
e.g. Collision

Safe Reaction:
Stop

Safe State
 Gray technology

Solution = Additional use of “gray technology”

Gray technology = All functions not implemented in PL d, structure category 3

Goal: Reaction in gray technology deals with the risk before yellow technology
kicks in

Implemented during programming and thus carried out more flexibly

Risk situation: Risk situation:

e.g. Collision e.g. Collision

Non-Safe Reaction: Safe Reaction:

e.g. soft impedance Stop
mode
Safe State
 Advantages of gray technology

The process does not necessarily have to be stopped

Other reactions other than stopping possible, such as switching to impediance
control

The process becomes more comfortable, more robust and with a “safer feel”

Risk situation: Risk situation:

Failure
situation
of robot
e.g. Collision system
e.g. Collision

Non-Safe Reaction: Safe Reaction:

e.g. soft impedance Stop
mode
Safe State
 Possibilities of implementation in gray technology

General conditions
while the process is Break conditions Reaction possibilities
running

• Programmed velocity • Position • Stop

• Suitable path • Force and Cartesian • Compliance
• Non-hazardous poses torque • Return motion strategy
• … • Axis torque • Wait for user feedback
• Inputs (e.g. gestures,
• … SmartPAD)
• …
 Disadvantages gray technology
Why NOT deal with all risk situations using only gray technology?
• Gray technology cannot take effect in the event of system errors or system failure
• Reason: Gray technology not implemented in PL d, structure category 3
Solution: Yellow technology guarantees safety in the event of system errors

Risk situation: Failure of robot

e.g. Collision system

Non-Safe Reaction: Safe Reaction:

e.g. soft impedance Stop
mode
Safe State
 Solution: Two-tier safety concept

Combination of both safe (yellow) and non-safe (gray) monitoring functions and reactions

Principle:

Risks must be minimized by gray technology

If a system failure prevents this from occurring, the yellow safety function must be activated

Risk situation: Failure of robot

e.g. Collision system

Non-Safe Reaction:
Safe Reaction:
e.g. soft impedance
Stop
mode
Safe State
 Effect of the two-tier safety
concept on HRC - Experience
The two-tier safety concept can be used to
positively influence operator acceptance of
the robot “colleague”:
- Implementation of functions to safely design applications (yellow technology)
- But also to improve the HRC experience
– More robust process sequence
– Usability
– The feeling of control
– The feeling of safety
Defining collaborative operation
Process steps presenting a hazard that is too great are not
suitable for direct HRC!

Division of the process into autonomous and
collaborative operation

„Speed“: High velocity

⇒ Autonomous(1) operation „Sensitivity“: Responsive transmission
⇒ Separation by safety glass ⇒ Collaborative operation
⇒ Light barrier ⇒ Contact is possible
⇒ Collision detection, velocity monitoring,…
(1)
The standard distinguishes between
autonomous and collaborative operation
Defining the collaborative workspace
Clear definition of the collaborative workspace

Where are both the human operator and robot able and permitted
to be present?

ISO 10218:2: Clear designation of the collaborative workspace
– Clear and unambiguous marking of the area in the robot’s workspace into which the operator
may intervene in accordance with the intended use

Blue Signs

Collaborative workspace

Accessible to human operator and robot

Intervention of the operator permissible
 Marking the collaborative robots
Marking of the collaborative robots

ISO 10218:2: Marking of the collaborative robots with a suitable symbol
 Preventing undesired contact
The principal risks for HRC applications arise from transient and quasi-static
contact.
In general, the risk of undesired contact between the human operator and the
robot should be reduced through:

Provision of the operator with a complete overview of the collaborative
workspace.

Provision of the operator with sufficient room to maneuver in order to avoid
contact with the robot.

No long, unexpected, upredictable robot motions.

Selection of a suitable approach strategy
– Avoidance of unfavorable contact situations
– Timely contact detection
 Preventing unacceptable situations
In particular situations, contact is unacceptable and must be prevented!

No sharp, pointed or cutting edges or parts and no rough surfaces at
the points of contact

No shearing situations

Crushing Shearing

Preventing shearing situations (Example from the trade fair exhibit „display assembly“):
 Reducing the risk of injury in the
event of contact
In the event of contact, risk can be reduced through suitable design measures:
– Avoid sharp edges, rough surfaces, etc. in the vicinity of the human operator

Large-surfaced contact area

Enclosures and housings for tools and workpieces with sharp edges

Reduce the risk of falling components

– Transport as near the ground as possible
Crushing between the gripper jaws
If the gripper can be reached by the human operator, there is a risk
of being crushed between the gripper jaws:
– Getting caught between the jaws of a gripper is only permissible if:
• maximum force of the gripper < limit value for a finger
– Otherwise: Prevent the insertion of fingers between the gripper jaws
through suitable design.
 Allowing contact during the
application of process forces
Where the robot is supposed to fullfill its task, each application contains unavoidable clamping points.
If the required process force is higher than the limit value for the body part at risk, the robot has to
approach the working place very sensitve until the clamping of a part of the humand body (e.g. finger)
is no longer possible.
Only if clamping can be excluded, the robot may switch to the required process force.

When approaching, contact is allowed:

Prerequisit: limit value for the body part at risk is
not exceeded.

Measures: velocity monitoring, force monitoring

Contact during the application of process forces is not
allowed:

If after switching to process force, intervention
with clamping is still possible

In this case, intervention from the human worker
in the process has to be prevented.

Measures: Suitable programming, technical safety
measures, etc.
Further measures and suggestions
Further constructive and design measures can increase the safety of
the operator:

Use of a gray protective wall

Barriers to prevent access to areas outside of the collaborative
workspace
– Placement of displays, monitors and information materials

Head of the human operator outside of the collaborative

workspace
– Provide access barriers for the head

Personal protective equipment for the operator

– Safety shoes, protective gloves, safety goggles

Robot as an access barrier to separate humans from the process

– Process: Difficult to monitor and control
– Robot: Can be safely monitored and controlled
Module for flexibile automation grade

LBR Knight LBR Produktionsinsel LBR Produktionsstraße

MRK

0% 50 % 100 %

Automation rate
 Application: LBR iiwa as spare worker
• Targets
– Output increase
– Reduction / avoidance
stops of production
– Direct Worker binding decouple
– Lower setup costs

• Requirements/basic conditions
– Given basic condition
– Same or higher production level
– Simple handling

• Advantages/benefits
– Increase of the productivity
– Simple reequipping on new
products • Fast change from Automatic to Manual
– Machine-independent, flexibly • Economical solution for small numbers of
items
 LBR iiwa as spare worker – ready in 10 Minutes
Manual loading 1- robot carriage 2 Tray carriage positioning
locking

Machine
tool
preparation

3. Carriage connection 4. Safeties activation 5. Establish data connection

MRK not ready!

LBR iiwa spare worker – Cost effective analysis
Manuell LBR Springer

Manual Brutto-Taktzeit 82 Sek. 63 Sek.

Additional time with production interruptions Teile/Stunde 44 57

Random samples for quality tests
Teile/Schicht 7,5h 330 430
(every 50 parts, 3 parts to measure)

Personal need time

Logistical interruption Produktionsunterbrechung
Nebentätigkeiten Manuell LBR
Stichproben Qualität X

LBR-Springer Logistik X

Production without time interruptions! persönliche Verteilzeit X
Pausen/Mittag X
Schneidplatten wechseln X X

Results NIO-Teile X X

Return/piece 2,07 €, every shift work 207 €
from increased number of items
LBR Springer

Anzahl produzierter Teile

• Annual demand of 250,000 parts
580 shifts x 207 € = 120.000 € Werker mit Verteilzeiten/Abwesenheit

Spare machine capacity

Spare worker capacity

increased
production
Customer has increased the production capacity Zeit
over 30% to 2017!
LBR iiwa as spare worker– Handling cell
for machining center

Targets

Use of flexible production concepts

Improving productivity

Payback period about 2 years

Operations

Inserting blanks Personal

Removal after processing
Actual: Worker + Logistician

Cleaning
Target: LBR + Logistician

Check for dimensional quality

Storage OK or not OK
Application: LBR iiwa Glueing application
Human Robot Cooperation
• Targets
• Reduction in space
• Flexible Cell installation for different existing
line layout
• Time reduction for production change

• Requirements/basic conditions
– Productive Space reduction of approx. 35%
– Flexibility by mobiles concept

• Advantages/benefits
– Reduction of the plant complexity by integrated
LBR system
– High flexibility
– Increase of the productivity
– High quality and reproducible processes
 LBR at work inside a vehicle frame

Operational experiments to develop

and test a recognised standrad for the
cost effective use of HRC in
the automotive sector
 LBR IN RESEARCH

• New Reference
platform in
robotics

• Open and fast

control interface

Prof. Bruno Siciliano

Professor of Control and
Robotics,
University Napoli Federico II

\
KUKA LBR iiwa

KUKA Roboter Italia S.p.A.

www.kuka.com

Via Pavia, 9A/6

10098 Rivoli (TO)
Tel. +39 011 9595013

Mauro Baima: [email protected]