Nomads in the Middle East

A history of pastoral nomads in the Islamic Middle East, from the rise of
Islam, through the middle periods when Mongols and Turks ruled most
of the region to the decline of nomadism in the twentieth century.
Offering a vivid insight into the impact of nomads on the politics, culture
and ideology of the region, Beatrice Forbes Manz examines and chal-
lenges existing perceptions of these nomads, including the popular
cyclical model of nomad-settled interaction developed by Ibn
Khaldun. Looking at both the Arab Bedouin and the nomads from the
Eurasian steppe, Manz demonstrates the significance of Bedouin and
Turco-Mongolian contributions to cultural production and political
ideology in the Middle East, and shows the central role played by
pastoral nomads in war, trade and state-building throughout history.
Nomads provided horses and soldiers for war, the livestock and guid-
ance which made long-distance trade possible, and animal products to
provision the region’s growing cities.

Beatrice Forbes Manz is Professor of History at Tufts University where

she teaches the history of the Middle East and Inner Asia, with
a particular interest in pastoral nomads. She is the author of Power,
Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran (Cambridge University Press,
2007), which was awarded the Houshang Pourshariati Book Award in
Iranian Studies, and the best-seller The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane
(Cambridge University Press, 1989). She is also the author of numerous
articles and chapters in collected words on the history of the Timurids,
the Mongol Empire and nomad societies, including in The New
Cambridge History of Islam, The Cambridge History of Inner Asia and The
Cambridge History of War.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

 THEMES IN ISLAMIC HISTORY comprises a range of titles exploring
different aspects of Islamic history, society and culture by leading scholars in the
field. Books are thematic in approach, offering a comprehensive and accessible
overview of the subject. Generally, surveys treat Islamic history from its origins to
the demise of the Ottoman Empire, although some offer a more developed
analysis of a particular period, or project into the present, depending on the
subject-matter. All the books are written to interpret and illuminate the past, as
gateways to a deeper understanding of Islamic civilization and its peoples.

Other books in the series:

1. Islamic Historiography by Chase F. Robinson
2. The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600–
1800 by Jonathan P. Berkey
3. Forbidding Wrong in Islam: An Introduction by Michael Cook
4. Martyrdom in Islam by David Cook
5. Charity in Islam by Amy Singer
6. Prayer in Islamic Thought and Practice by Marion Holmes Katz
7. Paradise and Hell in Islamic Traditions by Christian Lange

Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomads in the Middle East

Beatrice Forbes Manz

Tufts University, Massachusetts

Published online by Cambridge University Press

 University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India
103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521816298
DOI: 10.1017/9781139028813
© Beatrice Forbes Manz 2021
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2021
Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ Books Limited, Padstow Cornwall
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Names: Manz, Beatrice Forbes, author.
Title: Nomads in the Middle East / Beatrice Forbes Manz.
Description: Cambridge ; New York. NY : Cambridge University Press, 2021. |
Series: Themes in Islamic history | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021025028 (print) | LCCN 2021025029 (ebook) | ISBN
9780521816298 (hardback) | ISBN 9780521531634 (paperback) | ISBN
9781139028813 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Nomads – Islamic Empire – History. | Pastoral systems – Islamic
Empire – History. | Nomads – Sedentarization – Islamic Empire – History. | Tribes –
Islamic Empire – History. | Islamic Empire – Ethnic relations. | Islamic Empire –
Civilization. | Islamic Empire – History. | BISAC: HISTORY / Middle East /
General
Classification: LCC DS58 .M28 2021 (print) | LCC DS58 (ebook) | DDC
305.9/06918056–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021025028
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021025029
ISBN 978-0-521-81629-8 Hardback
ISBN 978-0-521-53163-4 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of
URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Dedicated to the memory of
Thomas T. Allsen, 1940–2019
and
David O. Morgan, 1945–2019

Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Figure 0.1 Nomadic Encampment, probably a folio from a manuscript
of Layla va Majnun by Jami, Harvard Art Museums/Arthur M. Sackler
Museum, Gift of John Goelet, formerly in the collection of Louis J.
Cartier, Photo @ President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1958.75.

Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Contents

List of Figures and Maps page viii

Preface ix

Debate between Sheep and Grain 1

1. Introduction 3
2. Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate 28
3. The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties 55
4. Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule 81
5. Mongol Conquest and Rule 109
6. After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans 139
7. The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800 168
8. Nomads in the Modern Middle East 199
9. Conclusion 231

Bibliography 242
Index 268

vii

Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Figures and Maps

Figures
0.1 Nomadic Encampment, probably a folio from a
manuscript of Layla va Majnun by Jami, Harvard Art
Museums/Arthur M. Sackler Museum, Gift of John
Goelet, formerly in the collection of Louis J. Cartier, Photo
@ President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1958.75. page vi
1.1 Bedouin black tent, er-Riha, Jordan, 1898. On the
way to Jericho (Er-Riha), Jordan, etc. Bedouin tent
American Colony, Jerusalem. 1898. (Photo by: Sepia
Times/Universal Images Group via Getty Images) 6
1.2 Nomad encampment with yurts, from the Diwan of
Sultan Ahmad Jalayir, ca. 1400. Ink, color and gold on
paper. Freer Gallery of Art, Smithsonian Institution,
Washington, DC: Purchase – Charles Lang Freer
Endowment, F1932.34, verso. 8
1.3 Setting up a Kazakh yurt, Altai Mountains, China, 1987.
Courtesy of Thomas Barfield, Boston University. 9
5.1 Mongolian Archer on Horseback. Iran. Miniature by
Muhammad ibn Mahmudshah al-Khayyam,
ca.1420–1425. Brush and ink on paper. Staatsbibliotek zu
Berlin, Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Orientalabteilung,
Saray-Albums (Diez-Albums), fol. 72, p. 13. 116

Maps
0.1 The Middle East and Central Asia xii–xiii
0.2 Central Regions of the Middle East xiv
0.3 Land Use in the Middle East xv
0.4 Nomad Pastureland xvi–xvii

viii

Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Preface

A number of organizations facilitated the research for this book.

A membership in the School of Historical Studies, at the Institute for
Advanced Study in Princeton in 2003–4 gave me a year in which to begin
this work in the best possible surroundings, and encouragement to
explore fields I had not previously dealt with. Funds for the year were
provided by a postdoctoral Research Fellowship from the American
Council of Learned Societies and a Faculty Research Semester from
Tufts University. Tufts University also provided a Research Semester
grant in the spring of 2012. To all these institutions I express my heartfelt
gratitude.
This book covers periods well outside my sphere of expertise, and
I could not have written it without the assistance of other scholars.
A number of generous colleagues have provided indispensable help by
reading the chapters of the book as they were written, saving me from
many potential errors. I want to thank Thomas Barfield, Tzvi Abusch,
Marc van De Mieroop, the late Patricia Crone, Fred McGraw Donner,
Louise Marlow, Kurt Franz, David Durand Guédy, Jürgen Paul, the late
Thomas Allsen, Patrick Wing, Charles Melville, Rudi Matthee, Linda
Darling, Rhoads Murphy, Lois Beck and Hugh Roberts for their generous
gift of time and expertise. I am also grateful to Margaret Fearey for
reading through the manuscript as an “educated reader.” I owe
a particular debt to the Research Technology, TTS team at Tufts
University, notably Patrick Florance, Carolyn Talmadge and Yuehui
(Aurora) Li, for their painstaking work mapping often obscure locations,
under the difficult conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic.
I have dedicated this book to the memory of two scholars who died in
2019, both of whom contributed enormously to the history of nomads,
and particularly of the Mongol Empire. The work of Thomas Allsen
transformed the field of Mongol history and serves as an inspiration to
all writing in this field. David O. Morgan spent a long and productive
career promoting the study of both medieval Iran and the Mongol
Empire, and also helping to advance the careers of younger scholars.

ix

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 x Preface

I first came in contact with him when he wrote me a very kind letter as
a reader for my first book, and from that time on I profited continually
from his help and guidance. I am also grateful to him for encouraging me
to widen my field by inviting me to write the chapter on the Mongols for
the New Cambridge History of Islam.

Note on Usage and Maps

This book is designed for an audience that includes both specialists and
non-specialists. I have tried to keep transcription as simple and as con-
sistent as possible. For Arabic and Persian in the pre-modern period,
I have used the classical Arabic transcription. Turkic and Mongolian
names are transcribed according to systems specific to those languages.
For the Ottoman Empire and modern Iran, I have retained the classical
transcription for Arabic and Persian terminology, but for well-known
figures I have used common modern spelling. For larger cities, likewise,
modern spelling is used, while for smaller locations I use the classical
transcription. I have omitted most diacriticals in the text but have
retained them in the index.
In addition to maps showing cities and regions, I have included maps
showing land use and pasture locations, based on a combination of
modern maps representing primarily nineteenth- and twentieth-century
conditions and information about earlier periods taken from historical
texts. Since these maps are on a small scale and represent a period of more
than a millennium, for any given time they must be viewed as
approximations.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press
 Map 0.1 The Middle East and Central Asia

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Map 0.2 Central Regions of the Middle East

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Map 0.3 Land Use in the Middle East

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press
 Map 0.4 Nomad Pastureland

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press
 Debate between Sheep and Grain

1–11 When, upon the hill of heaven and earth, An spawned the Anuna gods, since
he neither spawned nor created Grain with them, and since in the Land he neither
fashioned the yarn of Uttu (the goddess of weaving) nor pegged out the loom for
Uttu – with no Sheep appearing, there were no numerous lambs, and with no
goats, there were no numerous kids, the sheep did not give birth to her twin lambs,
and the goat did not give birth to her triplet kids; the Anuna, the great gods, did
not even know the names Ezina-Kusu (Grain) or Sheep. . . . .
26–36 At that time, at the place of the gods’ formation, in their own home, on the
Holy Mound, they created Sheep and Grain. . . . For their own well-being in the
holy sheepfold, they gave them to mankind as sustenance.
43–53 Sheep being fenced in by her sheepfold, they gave her grass and herbs
generously. For Grain they made her field and gave her the plough, yoke and
team. Sheep standing in her sheepfold was a shepherd of the sheepfolds brimming
with charm. Grain standing in her furrow was a beautiful girl radiating charm;
lifting her raised head up from the field she was suffused with the bounty of
heaven. Sheep and Grain had a radiant appearance.
54–64 They brought wealth to the assembly. They brought sustenance to the
Land. They fulfilled the ordinances of the gods. They filled the store-rooms of the
Land with stock. The barns of the Land were heavy with them. When they entered
the homes of the poor who crouch in the dust they brought wealth. Both of them,
wherever they directed their steps, added to the riches of the household with their
weight. Where they stood, they were satisfying; where they settled, they were
seemly. They gladdened the heart of An and the heart of Enlil.
65–70 They drank sweet wine, they enjoyed sweet beer. When they had drunk
sweet wine and enjoyed sweet beer, they started a quarrel concerning the arable
fields, they began a debate in the dining hall.
71–82 Grain called out to Sheep: “Sister, I am your better; I take precedence over
you. I am the glory of the lights of the Land . . . .
83–91 “I foster neighbourliness and friendliness. I sort out quarrels started
between neighbours. When I come upon a captive youth and give him his destiny,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 2 Debate between Sheep and Grain

he forgets his despondent heart and I release his fetters and shackles. I am Ezina-
Kusu (Grain); I am Enlil’s daughter. In sheep shacks and milking pens scattered
on the high plain, what can you put against me? Answer me what you can reply!”
92–101 Thereupon Sheep answered Grain: “My sister, whatever are you saying?
An, king of the gods, made me descend from the holy place, my most precious
place. All the yarns of Uttu, the splendour of kingship, belong to me . . . .
102–106 “The watch over the elite troops is mine. Sustenance of the workers in
the field is mine: the waterskin of cool water and the sandals are mine. . . .
107–115 “In the gown, my cloth of white wool, the king rejoices on his throne. My
body glistens on the flesh of the great gods. After the purification priests, the
incantation priests and the bathed priests have dressed themselves in me for my
holy lustration, I walk with them to my holy meal. But your harrow, ploughshare,
binding and strap are tools that can be utterly destroyed. What can you put against
me? Answer me what you can reply!”
116–122 Again Grain addressed Sheep: “When the beer dough has been carefully
prepared in the oven, and the mash tended in the oven, Ninkasi (the goddess of beer)
mixes them for me while your big billy-goats and rams are despatched for my
banquets. . . .
123–129 “Your shepherd on the high plain eyes my produce enviously; when I am
standing in the furrow in the field, my farmer chases away your herdsman with his
cudgel. Even when they look out for you, from the open country to the hidden
places, your fears are not removed from you: fanged (?) snakes and bandits, the
creatures of the desert, want your life on the high plain. . . . .
143–155 Again Sheep answered Grain: . . . .
156–168 “When you fill the trough the baker’s assistant mixes you and throws you
on the floor, and the baker’s girl flattens you out broadly. You are put into the
oven and you are taken out of the oven. When you are put on the table I am before
you – you are behind me. Grain, heed yourself! You too, just like me, are meant to
be eaten. At the inspection of your essence, why should it be I who come second?
169–179 Then Grain was hurt in her pride, and hastened for the verdict . . . .
180–191 Then Enki spoke to Enlil: “Father Enlil, Sheep and Grain should be
sisters! They should stand together! . . . But of the two, Grain shall be the greater.
192–193 Dispute spoken between Sheep and Grain: Sheep is left behind and
Grain comes forward – praise be to father Enki!1

1
The Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature, Faculty of Oriental Studies, Oxford
University, Oxford, 1998. http://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk/section5/tr532.htm

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 1 Introduction

For almost all people, a comfortable lifestyle requires both animal and
vegetable products. While livestock and agriculture are easily combined
in subsistence farming, a complex society encourages specialization. In
arid and mountainous regions, concentration on livestock breeding led to
the development of a separate lifestyle – pastoral nomadism – which has
had an enormous impact on the history of the world. The owners of large
herds can utilize lands too dry or too high to yield reliable crops by moving
from one pasture to another, usually in regular migrations between
known seasonal pastures. Thus they live in tents which can be moved,
and their other possessions must also be easily portable. Pastoral nomad-
ism presents a number of paradoxes. Although it is in some ways
a limiting lifestyle, which discourages the development of a high civiliza-
tion and centers its people outside the major cultural centers, it is
a specialized economy which developed out of agriculture and involves
exchange with sedentary populations. For thousands of years nomads1
and settled agriculturalists have defined themselves against each other,
each expressing distrust and disdain for the other lifestyle. Nonetheless
both have continued to coexist, to trade, and to influence each other.
Although theoretically nomads could live largely from their herds, in
practice many have also practiced some agriculture and have further
depended on agricultural populations for many of their needs, from grain
and vegetables to metal and ceramic wares. Settled societies are less fully
dependent on pastoral goods, but over history nomads have offered much
more to the settled than the animal products in which they specialize. Their
lifestyle gave nomads several skills of great importance – and of use to their
settled neighbors. The most famous nomad skill was that of war. The need to
migrate required organization and survival skills which translated easily into
military action, and the protection of livestock and pasture rights required the
ability – and willingness – to use arms. As large sedentary states formed and

1
Throughout this book I use the term nomad to refer to pastoral nomads only.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 4 Introduction

developed armies, they soon sought out nomadic populations as soldiers.

Pastoral nomads also have the ability to live in difficult terrain, to move long
distances and to mobilize manpower. Thus, they made trade possible
through areas of steppe and desert which were difficult for settled populations
to access and impossible for them to control. Nomads provided both pack
animals and guidance, and likewise some level of security along the routes.
For the purpose of this book, I define the Middle East as the region
between the Oxus and Nile rivers, stretching in the north through Anatolia.
I have omitted North Africa due to constraints of space and time but include
the eastern regions of Iran and modern Afghanistan, which have been con-
trolled by nomad dynasties through much of the Islamic period. The Middle
East has had a particularly close relationship with nomadic peoples. First of
all, it interacts with large nomad societies on two sides. To the north, the
region borders the Eurasian steppe, a vast tract of grassland stretching from
Mongolia to Hungary, which was dominated by nomads for three millennia.
In the south lie the Arabian and Syrian deserts, inhabited largely by pastoral-
ists. What has been most important in determining the role of nomads in the
Middle East, however, is the topography of the region itself. This is a land
fertile but arid, characterized by small areas of productive agricultural land
separated by mountain ranges, deserts and plateaus. In the west, great rivers
provide two regions of intensive agriculture which were the seats of the first
great civilizations of the Middle East – the Nile in Egypt and the Tigris-
Euphrates system in Mesopotamia. Between these areas stretches an expanse
of desert and arid steppe extending from southern Arabia to the inland region
of northern Syria. The Arabian and Syrian deserts are interspersed with oases
and in rainy seasons can provide some pastures, but much can be considered
hospitable only by the hardiest of men and animals. The northern Middle
East – from Anatolia through Iran and Afghanistan – is a combination of
mountain and high plateau. There are few sand deserts, but also no river
systems as rich as those in the southwest. Some areas – particularly in
Anatolia and Azerbaijan – can support farming without irrigation; elsewhere
water is conducted from mountains and rivers into the plains through canals
and underground conduits.
The regions supporting intensive agriculture are a small percentage of the
total area and much land is best exploited by pastoralists or mountain
peoples. In the marshy riverbeds, arid steppes and the foothills of the moun-
tain ranges, nomads can find winter and summer pastures, while the smaller
remote mountain valleys remain the seat of mountain peoples living from
subsistence farming and livestock. Neither population is easy to control, and
both have remained a constant and significant presence from the beginnings
of written history to the present.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomadic Lifestyles 5

Nomadic Lifestyles
For this book I have adopted a broad definition of pastoral nomads, to
include all populations living primarily from livestock breeding and prac-
ticing regular migration. Many populations practiced a mixed economy,
sometimes living in houses or huts for part of the year and using tents only
for the summer months; many also planted crops and harvested them when
returning along their migration routes. Sometimes such populations are
characterized as semi-nomadic. It was also not uncommon for populations
to move back and forth between settled and nomad economies, as weather
conditions or political unrest made a change desirable. However, I have not
usually tried to distinguish among different levels of nomadism for a simple
reason: the paucity of historical evidence. The sources available to us for
most periods covered in this book give us almost no information on the
lifestyle or economic strategy of individual groups, and therefore do not
allow us to differentiate among populations according to the length of the
migration, winter habitation, or degree of dependence on agriculture.
While mobility and economic specialization create similarities among all
pastoral nomads, very significant variations do exist.2 Two groups have been
most visible in the history of the Middle East: the Arabian and Syrian
nomads in the southwestern regions, and nomads from the Eurasian steppe
in the northern and eastern provinces. The Arab nomads exploit the desert
and semi-desert areas of Arabia, Mesopotamia and Syria to raise sheep,
goats, horses and most famously camels. In this region the scarce resource is
water, and wells are a central necessity. Summer is the season in which
groups congregate most closely around water sources, while in winter after
the rains they disperse to make full use of seasonal pastures. Most migration
takes place between areas where water is available in summer, and those that
can be used only during cooler periods of greater precipitation, often at the
same level. For this reason, this type of nomadism is often called horizontal
nomadism. The tent used by the nomads of Syria and Arabia is usually made
of woven goat hair, which allows the circulation of air in dry weather, but
swells when wet and becomes a protection against rain (Fig. 1.1).
Because the needs of camels are significantly different from those of
sheep and goats, most nomad groups have specialized in one or the other.
Groups raising smaller livestock must remain fairly close to the edge of the
desert, where sufficient pasture and above all water can be found through-
out the year. Camel nomads (a‘rā b or badū ) – known in European lan-
guages as Bedouin – can retreat more deeply into the desert and travel

2
See A. M. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, 2nd ed. (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1994); Thomas J. Barfield, The Nomadic Alternative (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 6 Introduction

Figure 1.1 Bedouin black tent, er-Riha, Jordan, 1898. On the way to
Jericho (Er-Riha), Jordan, etc. Bedouin tent American Colony,
Jerusalem. 1898. (Photo by: Sepia Times/Universal Images Group via
Getty Images)

greater distances in search of pasture, since the camel requires water at

most once every four days, and in cool weather with sufficient grazing can
go for several weeks without drinking.3 Like sheep and goats, female
camels are used for milk, which forms a major component of the
Bedouin diet. Their greater mobility gave the Bedouin both freedom
from settled control and enhanced military skill. As a result they held
greater prestige than the nomads relying on smaller animals.
The northern regions of the Middle East, from Afghanistan to Anatolia,
have been inhabited since the eleventh century largely by nomads of
Turkic and Mongolian descent, originally from the Eurasian steppe.
These populations differ from Arab nomads in a number of important
ways. The livestock raised is usually a mix of sheep, goats and horses,
sometimes with Bactrian (two-humped) camels. Sheep and goats form
the economic basis of the herd, while horses and camels serve for travel,
war and transport. Although horses have somewhat different grazing
preferences from sheep and goats their grazing habits are complementary,
3
Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, pp. 53–56; Barfield, The Nomadic Alternative.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Question of Tribes 7

and the pasture benefits from the mix. Herds can thus be pastured in the
same areas and be raised by the same group. While for desert nomads the
summer is the time of greatest population concentration, for the steppe
and mountain nomads the winter pasture is the more intensive, usually
requiring a river valley with water and dried forage. Pasture is less
dependent on the vagaries of weather and while migrations may be
short or long, a given tribe will migrate spring, summer, fall and winter
to the same places. Within Iran and Anatolia, tribes usually migrate
vertically, with a winter pasture in a river valley and summer pasture in
the mountain highlands which, unlike the lowlands, remain green
through the summer. In general, nomads remain relatively stationary in
winter and summer and move more frequently and for longer distances in
the fall and spring migrations. This is known as vertical nomadism. In the
past, the steppe nomads used tents made of heavy felt attached to a circle
formed by wooden lattice work, with a hole for smoke in the center. These
were heavier but also far warmer than the goat hair tents of the south-
western nomads (Figs 1.2 and 1.3). Within the Middle East, many Turkic
nomads, especially in the warmer regions, have adopted the black goat
hair tent.
Among both Arab and Turco-Mongolian nomads, daily tasks are
apportioned by gender and women play a major role in production,
enjoying a higher position than most settled women. Women set up and
take down the tents, and the black goat-hair tents used now by most
nomads in the Middle East were until recently woven by them. Herding is
usually done by men, but in times of need women can also do this. Among
camel nomads milking is done by the men; sheep and goats are usually
milked by women, who also process milk products for consumption and
sale. Among the Bedouin it is common for extended families to share one
tent, which can be separated into public spaces for men and private ones
for women, and women are sometimes veiled. Nonetheless they are not
segregated and have considerable freedom of movement. Among the
nomads of Iranian and Turco-Mongolian descent, the nuclear family is
more common, while women are rarely veiled and enjoy both authority
and freedom.

The Question of Tribes

The most common social and political unit of organization among pas-
toral nomads is the tribe, a political and territorial unit often expressed in
kinship idiom and requiring little formal administrative structure.
Livestock is owned by individual households, and these have usually
organized themselves along kinship lines in camping groups which share

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 8 Introduction

Figure 1.2 Nomad encampment with yurts, from the Diwan of Sultan
Ahmad Jalayir, ca. 1400. Ink, color and gold on paper. Freer Gallery of
Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC: Purchase – Charles
Lang Freer Endowment, F1932.34, verso.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Question of Tribes 9

Figure 1.3 Setting up a Kazakh yurt, Altai Mountains, China, 1987.

Courtesy of Thomas Barfield, Boston University.

resources and migrate together. The higher level of organization, dealing

with the defense and distribution of pasture, is provided by the tribe.
Tribes will usually include several thousand people, and may unite into
confederacies, or break up into smaller entities. Although the tribal
system is in many ways antithetical to a centralized bureaucratic state,
the two systems have coexisted over millennia, and their relationship will
be one of the concerns of this book.
There is considerable controversy over the use and meaning of the
terms, “tribe” and “tribal,” which have been tarnished in part by an
implied connection with societies considered primitive and with an earlier
stage in the development of political organization. Thus it is necessary to
explain why and how I use the word tribe. In early scholarship, up into the
twentieth century, tribes were usually seen as large kinship groups,
defined by common descent from an ancestor in the fairly distant past.
More recently, scholars have recognized the changing composition of
tribes over time; unrelated groups may join a successful leader and
members may desert for another tribe in times of stress or weak leader-
ship. Individuals may also join as the client of a tribal member, accepting
subordinate status. Actual kinship therefore has been seen as important
primarily in the smallest divisions within the tribe – camping collectives

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 10 Introduction

and limited descent groups accepting collective responsibility for aven-

ging their fellow members. At a higher level, kinship is often claimed but
may well be fictive; as new groups join an existing tribe, a real or presumed
ancestor can be grafted onto the tribal genealogy. Thus, the tribe is seen as
a political grouping, providing a corporate identity, the possibility of
collective action and access to pasture for its members. The chief of the
tribe provides leadership in the mediation of disputes, the management of
seasonal migrations, mobilization for the protection or acquisition of
pastures, and for warfare. Tribal society also provides a basis for law
and a means of keeping order through mediation among tribal leaders,
and through the practice of collective responsibility to avenge harm done
to a member. Despite the importance of tribal structure, we need to
recognize that nomadism and tribalism are not synonymous; it is quite
possible for nomad societies to exist without tribal structure, or to change
back and forth between tribal and non-tribal structures. Such a change
can occur at times of conquest when nomad rulers create decimally
organized armies and move into conquered territories, a phenomenon
which will be discussed in this book.4
Recently the anthropologist David Sneath, working on Mongolian
nomads, has proposed that the concept of tribe should be abandoned
for nomad societies – at least for steppe societies – and instead we should
recognize named groups formerly seen as tribes as being aristocratic
lineages. This reinterpretation is accompanied by a return to the earlier
definition of tribes as actual kinship groups, and of tribal societies as
egalitarian. In this model, the state is also redefined, as an entity not
requiring or even necessarily aspiring to any form of centralization.
Sneath suggests that steppe societies were usually stratified, and state-
like processes were distributed through a number of authorities.5 I have
not adopted Sneath’s model in this book for several reasons. First of all, in
my own work on steppe societies in the pre-modern period I see evidence
of named corporate groups with hereditary membership and leadership in
which it is clear that not all members are aristocrats. Another problem

4
The literature on tribes is too vast to survey here. For a review of the controversies
concerning the definition and discussion of tribes, see for instance, Richard Tapper,
Frontier Nomads of Iran: A Political and Social History of the Shahsevan (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 5–24; Jeffrey Szuchman, “Integrating
Approaches to Nomads, Tribes, and the State in the Ancient Near East,” in Nomads,
Tribes, and the State in the Ancient Near East: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, ed., Jeffrey
Szuchman, Oriental Institute Seminars # 5 (Chicago, IL: Oriental Institute of Chicago,
2009), pp. 4–5.
5
David Sneath, The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society, and
Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia (New York: Columbia University Press,
2007).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Question of Tribes 11

with the replacement of the concept of tribe by that of aristocratic lineage

is that it does not address the central question of what sort of power base
aristocrats possessed, or what bound their followers to them. These are
crucial issues for the analysis attempted in this book.
I have therefore chosen to use the term tribe and have defined it very
broadly, as a group of people with a common named corporate identity
and a recognized leadership which is able to mobilize at least a portion of
the tribe. Membership in a tribe is hereditary but at the same time it is
elective; smaller groups may join or leave. A tribe may or may not use
a kinship idiom, and its leading lineage may come from within the tribe or
may be genealogically unrelated to the majority of its members. One thing
which in my view distinguishes a tribe from other political groupings of
similar size is that its territory does not define its membership. While
tribes often contain members of different lifestyles – nomads, agricultur-
alists and some townsmen – membership is not necessarily coterminous
with the population of the areas a tribe controls. Taxes can be levied, and
protection extended to people not seen as members of the tribe, while
some tribal members may live in towns not fully controlled by the tribe in
question. Furthermore, while at any one time a tribe will have the use of
a given territory or territories, nomad tribes can migrate to new regions
without dissolving, something extremely difficult for a state or a village.
Because the pre-modern sources do not allow us to discern the details
of tribal structures or to test extensive genealogical claims, I have identi-
fied only three levels of tribal structure. One is the leading lineages, in
which it is usually possible to recognize actual descent. Another is the
body of the tribe, usually several thousand people. At a higher level, one
can identify tribal confederations with a common name, often claiming
preeminence over a significant region. Turkic and Mongolian tribal con-
federations had a recognized tribe and lineage at the top, controlling
several other tribes, each with its own leader subordinate to the chief of
the confederation. This was sometimes, but more rarely, the case among
the Arabian and Syrian nomads.
We see different tribal systems in the two major nomadic populations
I have discussed – the nomads of the Arabian and Syrian desert on the one
hand, and the Turkic and Mongolian nomads from the steppe on the
other. Among the desert nomads the tribe has been a central institution,
defining social and political life; social order, law, and identity all depended
on tribal affiliation. Tribal laws have maintained relative peace in the area
through mediation among tribes and by means of laws of vengeance,
similar to the system of the blood feud. These laws assigned collective
responsibility for harm done against a member of the tribe or a subgroup;
thus if one member of a tribe or lineage killed someone of another group,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 12 Introduction

any one of his male relatives could be killed in retaliation. Since a violent
crime put the entire group in danger, there was strong social pressure
against it and though raiding was frequent, most raids did not result in
casualties. The tribal values and the achievements of individual tribes were
celebrated in poetry and tales about tribal exploits. The importance of tribe
was not limited to the pastoralists but seems to have applied to almost all
segments of the Arabian population, at least those within the peninsula,
where town life was also organized along tribal lines.
Despite the importance of the tribe in the life of its members, among Syrian
and Arabian tribes authoritative leadership has not been the ideal. Tribal
chiefs have been traditionally chosen by reputation, and even when leader-
ship has remained within one or two families, they have been considered the
first among equals, ruling by consensus. Even in the past, when tribes
controlled significant territory, the exercise of power depended heavily on
the personality of the tribal leader – the shaykh – and his ability to command
respect through hospitality, skill in war and talent in mediating disputes. It
also depended on success. A larger tribe, or confederation, consisted of many
smaller sections, which could develop and change according to circum-
stances. Leadership at this level was in part theoretical, and it was rare that
one man or one tribe would control all the sections identified with a major
confederation.
The tribes of steppe origin, who became the primary nomad population
of Anatolia, Iran and Afghanistan, have had different structures from
those of the Arabs. Leadership was usually stronger and was held for
generations within one family. In practice, the mobility of pastoralist life
gives the ordinary nomads the possibility of defection to other tribes, so
that leadership must always depend to some extent on persuasion and
consensus. Nonetheless, the power of the chiefs has given them sufficient
authority to create larger confederations which have at times controlled
significant territory and formed regional states. Unlike many confeder-
ations of Arab tribes, these groups had clear leaders within a recognized
lineage. While the political role of the tribe was greater among the steppe
nomads than among the Arabs, its social and legal influence was less
pronounced. Though the practice of vengeance is attested, it held a less
central role. The etiquette and cult of honor that has been associated with
Arab tribalism was less characteristic of Turco-Mongolian nomads.
One reason for the difference in tribal culture was the connection of the
Turco-Mongolian tribes to the imperial tradition of the European steppe.
The mounted nomads of the steppe began early on to create states
exercising at least loose control over large territories, and able to exert
influence on the settled civilizations on their borders, from China, to the
Middle East, to the northern Black Sea. From about 200 BC, the

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomad-Sedentary Relations 13

Mongolian steppe became the birthplace of successive nomad empires, most

famously those of the Turks and the Mongols. The experience – and later
the memory – of these empires gave the steppe nomads a broader identity
beyond the tribal one, and a political culture which encouraged military
ambitions and state building. It is notable that from the eleventh century on,
when the steppe nomads began to enter the Middle East in large numbers,
almost all major states were founded and ruled by people from the steppe.

Nomad-Sedentary Relations
The habitat and the lifestyle of pastoralists distance them from urban and
agricultural populations but the three groups remain interdependent.
Although nomads spend part of the year in terrain useable only for
pasture, at certain seasons many graze their flocks on harvested fields
and in return they provide useful fertilizer and sometimes also payment.
During migration, pastoralists must frequently pass through agricultural
regions and, particularly in times of scarcity, their passage often causes
conflict. Villagers suffer from flocks that find their way into growing fields;
both villagers and nomads suffer from the theft of livestock. Most nomads
depend on trade for income and consumer goods. While they have several
products to offer – livestock, meat, clarified butter, wool and skins – their
need to move and their lack of familiarity with city life often put them at
a disadvantage with city merchants. The result can be a resort to credit,
sometimes at exorbitant rates. In past times, the balance of power was
different. The nomads’ skill in warfare allowed them to achieve equality
and often dominance over agricultural regions and brought them grudg-
ing respect. Their ability to mount raids on villages and to retreat rapidly
into the desert or steppe gave them a powerful tool. Nomadic tribes often
held responsibility for caravan routes, collecting dues from traders and
taxes from villagers in return for protection. This also made them useful
to the rulers of sedentary states; nomads frequently controlled border
regions, serving as a buffer between different states, and soldiers were
perhaps the most sought-after product of nomad society.
However involved they were with the settled population, nomads
remained by definition separate and, in the view of settled societies, to
some extent barbarian. The dynamic of interaction between the tribally
organized nomads and the settled village or state set up a tension felt by
both sides and mirrored in their mythologies. We find on each side a sense
of competition and threat from the other. One of the best-known stories
dealing with the relationship between peasants and pastoralists is that of
Adam and Eve’s sons Cain and Abel.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 14 Introduction

1 And Adam knew Eve his wife; and she conceived, and bare Cain, and said, I have gotten
a man from the LORD.
2 And she again bare his brother Abel. And Abel was a keeper of sheep, but Cain was a tiller
of the ground.
3 And in process of time it came to pass, that Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an
offering unto the LORD.
4 And Abel, he also brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof. And the
LORD had respect unto Abel and to his offering
5 but unto Cain and to his offering he had not respect. And Cain was very wroth, and his
countenance fell.
6 And the LORD said unto Cain, Why art thou wroth? and why is thy countenance fallen?
7 If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the
door: and unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him.
8 And Cain talked with Abel his brother: and it came to pass, when they were in the field,
that Cain rose up against Abel his brother, and slew him.6

God favored the offering of livestock over that of grain, and when
murder was done, it was the farmer who killed the shepherd; there is
thus a suggestion of the vulnerability of pastoralists, and of God’s favor
towards them.7
In Mesopotamian mythology the relationship between pastoralist and
farmer is also addressed, though with a different judgment. The Sumerian
“Debate between Sheep and Grain,” quoted at the beginning of this book,
expresses an ideal of coexistence, together with openly expressed rivalry. At
the beginning of the world, people were naked and ate grass. Then the gods
created sheep and grain, and sent them down to earth, where they created
wealth and sustenance for the population. However, when success – and
sweet beer – went to their heads, they began to quarrel about precedence,
each touting her own excellence and hinting at the vulnerability of the
other. Finally, Grain appealed to the gods for a judgment:
169–179 Then Grain was hurt in her pride, and hastened for the verdict . . . .
180–191 Then Enki spoke to Enlil: “Father Enlil, Sheep and Grain should be
sisters! They should stand together! . . . But of the two, Grain shall be the greater.
192–193 Dispute spoken between Sheep and Grain: Sheep is left behind and
Grain comes forward – praise be to father Enki!8

6
King James Bible, Gen. 4:1–8.
7
It is interesting to note that Dumuzi, the shepherd god of Mesopotamia, was also killed; in
some accounts the sheepfold was also destroyed. Gwendolyn Leick, A Dictionary of Ancient
Near Eastern Mythology (London; New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 31–34;
Thorkild Jacobsen, The Treasures of Darkness: A History of Mesopotamian Religion (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 47–55.)
8
J. A. Black, G. Cunningham, G. Fluckiger-Hawker, E. Robson and G. Zólyomi, The
Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature, Oxford 1998–https://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk/

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Challenges to Understanding 15

Challenges to Understanding
Before we can discuss the history of nomads, we must face the issue of our
distance from their lifestyle and the limitations of our source material. All
historians of the pre-modern Middle East face problems, but the difficul-
ties attached to the history of nomads are particularly great. We are more
distant in lifestyle and experience from the society we are studying, and
we have even fewer sources. Most historians studying the ancient and
medieval periods have turned to ethnographic studies of nomad societies
to fill in gaps left in the record. We can use such studies to bring us closer
to the level of understanding we would start from in studying a settled
society, but they must be used with caution. Modern nomad societies
have traits in common and they may have changed less over the last
several millennia than settled societies, but they do differ from each
other, and they have changed. I have discussed above some of the most
salient differences among nomad populations, and within the major
groups I have mentioned, there are significant variations from one
group to another. The problem of change is a more difficult one since
we have detailed descriptions of nomads largely from the last 150 years,
and scholarly ethnographic studies only from the last eighty.
One important difference between the recorded ethnography and the
more distant past lies in the loss of military and regional power.9 Through
most of history nomads were a crucial element in many armies and often
controlled the areas surrounding their pastures. These activities must
have influenced their economy, their migration patterns, their social
organization, and their leadership. Pastoralism has always been associ-
ated with marginally productive lands, and thus often with peripheral
status, and it has been technologically limiting as well. However, when
nomads held significant military power their position in relation to the
settled was of course a much stronger one; they could choose their
pastures, threaten neighboring towns and offer protection in return for
payment both from towns and from caravans. When they incurred losses
of livestock, they were quite certain of finding ways to replenish their
herds at the expense of others, and their role in trade and regional
government offered them sources of income beyond the sale of livestock
products.

9
Jean-Pierre Digard, “À propos des aspects économiques de la symbiose nomades-
sédentaires dans la Mésopotamie ancienne,” in Nomads and Sedentary Peoples. XXX
International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, ed. Jorge Silva Castillo
(Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1981), pp. 14, 20–22; Michael B. Rowton, “Economic
and Political Factors in Ancient Nomadism,” in Nomads and Sedentary Peoples XXX
International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, ed. Jorge Silva Castillo
(Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1981), pp. 26–27.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 16 Introduction

There are also more subtle differences from the past attached to
changes in society at large. In earlier times the technological gap between
nomad and settled was a much smaller one. Neither world was mechan-
ized, and while settled societies predominated in most technological
development, in the crucial field of military technology advances often
sprang from interactions between settled and nomad peoples. In another
sphere, that of health, the situation has largely reversed itself. In the pre-
modern world, no population had access to effective medical care and the
populations of cities and villages, living closely together, were more often
prey to periodic epidemics, in addition to the constant pressure brought
by problems of diet and sanitation. Nomads lived in smaller groups and
their diet, if not varied, at least contained sufficient protein. In the
contemporary world, people living in more central locations have a clear
advantage over those in the marginal lands, for whom hospitals and clinics
are hard to reach.
When we apply modern studies to earlier conditions, therefore, we
must assume very basic differences in the balance of power and of privil-
ege. The nomad lifestyle is still attractive to many of its adherents and in
some places still retains prestige, at least within the populations who
practice it. Nonetheless, nomadism in the contemporary world plays
a far narrower role in economy and politics and presents few avenues to
advancement. The nomadic societies studied by modern ethnographers
have a more limited economic base and a lower place in the larger society
than those of the past.
When we try to trace the history of nomads our problems start before
the beginning of written history; the archaeological record for nomads is
less rich than that of settled peoples, and harder to interpret. It is almost
impossible to tell whether a site showing temporary residence belonged to
nomads or to settled people leaving their village for a summer pasture.10
In the historical period, information on nomads comes almost exclusively
from the writings of their sedentary neighbors and usually represents an
unfriendly viewpoint. The historical texts available to us which describe
nomads and their relation to settled societies thus present significant
problems of interpretation. Above all, coming from a different society,
they present a simplified view of nomad populations, focusing on the
strangeness of nomad societies and their distance from high culture, as

10
Karim Sadr, The Development of Nomadism in Ancient Northeast Africa (Philadelphia, PA:
University of Philadelphia Press, 1991), pp. 13–22; Richard H. Meadow, “Inconclusive
Remarks on Pastoralism, Nomadism, and Other Animal-Related Matters,” in Pastoralism
in the Levant, ed. Ofer Bar-Yosef and A. M. Khazanov (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1992), p. 262; C. C. Lamberg-Karlovsky, Archaeological Thought in
America (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 285.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Challenges to Understanding 17

people outside the circle of civilization.11 In order to understand how

nomads and settled have interacted in the past, it is important to use
ideologically shaped texts as sources for ideology and to search elsewhere
for evidence about what actually existed.
For most of the period covered in this book we have almost no original
documents and thus very little knowledge of everyday life, especially
outside the major cities.12 The medieval and early modern histories
which have shaped our understanding of the pre-modern Middle East
focus largely on rulers, courts and armies, while biographical literature
gives us some information on learning and urban life. Nomads appear
almost exclusively as soldiers – either attacking under their own leaders or
serving in the armies of others. For many years scholars, both medieval
and modern, described pastoralists as foreign, raw and aggressive
peoples, who came in waves to attack the cities and agriculturalists of
the central lands. Among ancient and medieval historians, we find the
model of an outer world of nomads who periodically invaded and con-
quered the settled world, then assimilated to urban culture, lost their
barbarian strength, and eventually became settled, to be conquered by
new and purer nomads from the reservoir on the borders of settled lands.
This theory was most persuasively argued by the medieval North African
historian Ibn Khaldun and has been enormously influential over the last
several centuries.
Ibn Khaldun saw the nomad and mountain people as populations
closer to nature than the sedentary oasis dwellers. The camel-herding
Bedouin were the prime example; others were Berbers, Kurds, Turkmen
and Turks. These were the most savage human beings in existence, on
a level with wild, untamable animals. At the same time, they were the
most virtuous, had the greatest fortitude, bravery and strength. Unlike the
settled populations living in luxury, they had maintained a simple lifestyle
and a purity of lineage which translated into a group feeling allowing both
effective leadership and mobilization. Thus, nomads gave rise to leaders
who could harness this group feeling into military success; since it was
natural to covet wealth, they aimed at conquest of settled states. Once

11
Pierre Briant, État et pasteurs au Moyen-Orient ancien, Collection Production pastorale et
société (Cambridge; New York; Paris: Cambridge University Press; Maison des sciences
de l’homme, 1982), pp. 13–40; François Hartog, Le miroir d’Hérodote: essai sur la
représentation de l’autre, Bibliothèque des histoires (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), pp. 23–30;
Brent D. Shaw, “‘Eaters of Flesh, Drinkers of Milk’: The Ancient Mediterranean
Ideology of the Pastoral Nomad,” in Rulers, Nomads and Christians in Roman North
Africa, ed. Brent D. Shaw (Aldershot, Hampshire, Great Britain; Brookfield, VT:
Variorum, 1995), pp. 25–31.
12
The exception is the Ottoman Empire, for which archives exist from the seventeenth
century onwards.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 18 Introduction

they were in power, however, younger generations became increasingly

weakened by luxury, lost their group feeling, and by the fourth generation
had become corrupt and incompetent, easy prey for the next conquest
from outside.13 One can certainly find examples in Middle Eastern his-
tory to illustrate Ibn Khaldun’s model. However, not all nomadic dynas-
ties were short-lived; nor were all settled ones lasting. The popularity of
this paradigm can tempt the historian to notice particularly the foreign
nomad traits of the founder, while discerning primarily assimilation in
subsequent generations. Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical formulation need not be
abandoned, but it does need to be applied with caution. I have chosen to
use a more evolutionary, less cyclical model here.

Early Nomads in the Middle East

This book deals with the Islamic period, but we must recognize that many
of the practices and ideologies which defined nomad-sedentary relations
were developed over several millennia before the rise of Islam. Indeed, the
interactions between pastoralist and sedentary agriculturalists were inte-
gral to the development of Near Eastern civilization. Arab conquest and
rule were a continuation and a result of earlier interactions. For this
reason, it is useful to give a brief sketch of earlier history here. Although
settled societies might portray pastoral nomads as intruders enviously
looking in, people of pastoralist background were the founders and the
rulers of many Middle Eastern states, from the beginning of the second
millennium BC. The region of Mesopotamia, which gave birth to the
most important imperial tradition of the Middle East, was one in which
city states based on intensive irrigation dealt continually with pastoralists
both on their borders and within their own territories. The state devel-
oped in lower Mesopotamia and gradually expanded outward.
Pastoralists in the borderlands were recruited into the armies, and thus
moved into the realm. As the territory of the state grew its center moved
north, and the proportion of land and population represented by cities
and irrigated agriculture became smaller. Control over the realm required
frequent campaigning, and troops from peripheral populations were con-
scripted for the army, sometimes still tribally organized.
The history of Mesopotamian dynasties illustrates this dynamic. The
dynasty of Agade founded by Sargon in 2334 BC marked the first move
away from city states towards empire; conquests increased the area of the

13
‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz
Rosenthal, abridged ed., Bollingen series (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1967), pp. 93–114.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Early Nomads in the Middle East 19

state to include mountain and steppe areas on the borders. A number of

troops were recruited from the partly pastoralist Amorites.14 The
Amorites appear with increasing frequency in Mesopotamian sources
from this time on, active particularly on the upper Euphrates. By
2000 BC they were an integral part of the state’s population, and it is
not surprising to find them emerging as rulers over the next several
hundred years. The Mesopotamian political world extended north to
what is now southern Kurdistan and west to the kingdom of Aleppo;
thus, much of what had been the periphery now formed the central
territories. The importance of the Amorite period for state development
is illustrated by the reign of the famous Hammurabi of Babylon (1792–
1750 BC). Like other Amorite rulers, Hammurabi used earlier imperial
legitimation based on religious beliefs, but he also viewed his Amorite
descent as central to the right to rule. Elaborate genealogies connected the
ruler to Amorite tribes with fictive kinship lines, organizing the popula-
tion into a recognized hierarchy of tribes.15
In the middle of the second millennium, Mesopotamia was taken over
by dynasties of Kassite and Hurrian descent. These were again people
originally from peripheral regions of steppe and mountain who had been
present in the region for several centuries. The Kassites at least had
probably been partially nomadic. Kassite and Hurrian rule coincided
with the introduction of the horse-drawn chariot into warfare. Whereas
up to this period the armies of the Near East had consisted of infantry, in
the second half of the second millennium chariots made up an important
part of essentially all armies in the region.16 Over time, horse breeding
developed into a systematic enterprise, and improvements, particularly
stronger and lighter wheels, made chariots increasingly effective.
Babylonian expertise with horses and chariots became a source of
strength and provided products for export.17 By the end of the second

14
Amélie Kuhrt, The Ancient Near East: c. 3000–330 BC, 2 vols., Routledge History of the
Ancient World (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 55.
15
J. J. Finkelstein, “The Genealogy of the Hammurapi Dynasty,” Journal of Cuneiform
Studies 20 (1966): pp. 98–102, 116–118; Piotr Michalowski, “History as Charter: Some
Observations on the Sumerian King List,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 103
(1983): pp. 240–243.
16
Marc Van De Mieroop, A History of the Ancient Near East (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp.
16–17; Glenn M. Schwarz, “Pastoral Nomadism in Ancient Western Asia,” in
Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, ed. Jack M. Sasson (New York: Simon Schuster
Macmillan, 1995), p. 255.
17
I. M. Diakonoff, “Media,” in Cambridge History of Iran, ed. Ilya Gerschevitch
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 40; Walter Sommerfeld, “The
Kassites of Ancient Mesopotamia: Origins, Politics and Culture,” in Civilizations of the
Ancient Near East, ed. Jack M. Sasson (New York: Simon Schuster Macmillan, 1995),
pp. 925–926.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 20 Introduction

millennium therefore, horses had become an important element in war-

fare. They did best in uplands which could provide pasture through the
summer, particularly plentiful in the Zagros and the plateaus of Iran,
Armenia and Anatolia.18 From now on any state with pretensions to
power needed to have access to lands which were likely to be populated
by pastoralists and mountain peoples.
The last and most expansive of the early Mesopotamian empires was
that of the Assyrians, who began their rise to power about 1200 BC, using
the improved war chariot. Given the importance of horses to their power,
it is not surprising to find them centered in territories also inhabited by
pastoralists. Like the dynasties before them, they recruited nomads for
their armies, often in special regiments.19 In their imperial legitimation
the Assyrians grafted themselves onto the dynastic genealogy of the
Amorite rulers, including the fictive tribal genealogy which began with
a list of “seventeen kings who lived in tents.”20 Thus, like the earlier
Amorite rulers, they chose to emphasize pastoralist origins. By the end
of the ninth century BC the state system of the Middle East encompassed
many of the areas inhabited by mountain and pastoral populations,
stretching from the kingdoms of Lydia, Phrygia and Urartu in Anatolia
through western Syria to Egypt, and in the east through Assyria and
Mesopotamia to Elam in southwestern Iran. Pastoral nomads were pre-
sent in most of these states, and for many they represented an important
sector of the economy and the military.21

The Development of Mounted Nomadism

Early nomads moved on foot, using donkeys and horses primarily as
beasts of burden, and most lived quite close to the settled populations.
At the beginning of the first millennium BC, a breakthrough occurred

18
Stephanie Dalley, “Ancient Mesopotamian Military Organization,” in Civilizations of the
Ancient Near East, ed. Jack M. Sasson (New York: Simon and Schuster Macmillan,
1995), pp. 416–417; Diakonoff, “Media,” p. 47; Niels Peter Lemche, “The History of
Ancient Syria and Palestine: An Overview,” in The Civilizations of the Ancient Near East,
ed. J. M. Sasson (New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1995), p. 1201.
19
Florence Malbran-Labat, “Le nomadisme à l’époque néoassyrienne,” in Nomads and
Sedentary Peoples. XXX International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa,
ed. Jorge Silva Castillo (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1981), 68–71;
Dominique Charpin, “The History of Ancient Mesopotamia: An Overview,” in
Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, ed. Jack M. Sasson (New York: Simon Schuster
Macmillan, 1995), pp. 820–825.
20
Finkelstein, “The Genealogy of the Hammurapi Dynasty,” pp. 112–113.
21
Paul E. Zimansky, “The Kingdom of Urartu in Eastern Anatolia,” in Civilizations of the
Ancient Near East, ed. Jack M. Sasson (New York: Simon and Schuster Macmillan,
1995), p. 1137; Malbran-Labat, “Le nomadisme à l’époque néoassyrienne,” pp. 62–75.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Development of Mounted Nomadism 21

with the development of mounted nomadism, based on horse riding

in the north and on camel riding in the south. In the Eurasian steppe
the combination of horse riding and animal husbandry developed
into the powerful economic and military system known as mounted
steppe nomadism.22 Riding saddled horses – though at first without
stirrups – nomads gained speed and mobility, allowing them to move
over greater distances and to become formidable warriors. The appeal of
this way of life is shown by its rapid spread; by about 700 BC much of the
Eurasian steppe was dominated by nomads who shared important elem-
ents of culture in addition to their nomadic lifestyle. They had a stratified
society with a warrior ethos, using new technology and equipment, and
they produced strikingly similar art based on stylized animals. The level of
communication nomadism fostered is shown by the rapid spread of this
art, known as the animal style, which is found from China to the steppes
above the Black Sea.23 One of the new technologies which enhanced the
power of the steppe nomads was a compound bow of wood, horn and
sinew, which could be drawn effectively on horseback.24 The Eurasian
steppe thus became a vast reserve of mounted archers. The mounted
nomadism of the steppe soon influenced settled states, which were quick
to adopt new military techniques. As riding techniques continued to
improve over the next two centuries, cavalry replaced chariots as the elite
branch of the military, allowing armies much greater mobility and
flexibility.25
At about the same time that mounted horse nomadism became pre-
dominant in the steppe, camel nomadism arose in the Syrian deserts. As
with horses, the efficient use of the dromedary depended on technological
innovations, and in this case the invention of a new type of saddle allowed
the camel to be used effectively both for riding and for transport. Earlier
the Mesopotamian states had been blocked from expansion in the
22
Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian
History (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 23–26; Peter
B. Golden, Nomads and Sedentary Societies in Medieval Eurasia, Essays on Global and
Comparative History (Washington, DC: American Historical Association, 1998), p. 5;
Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, p. 92.
23
Di Cosmo, Ancient China, pp. 31–42; David Christian, A History of Russia, Central Asia,
and Mongolia, Blackwell History of the World (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers,
1998), pp. 124–134; T. Sulimirsky, “The Scyths,” in Cambridge History of Iran, ed.
Ilya Gershevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 167–170.
24
Edward McEwen, Robert L. Miller, Christopher A. Bergman, “Early Bow Design and
Construction,” Scientific American (June 1991): p. 81; A. I. Melyukova, “The Scythians
and Sarmatians,” in The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, ed. Denis Sinor
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 98; Diakonoff, “Media,” pp. 92–
94; Christian, A History, pp. 123–128.
25
M. A. Littauer and J. H. Crouwel, Wheeled Vehicles and Ridden Animals in the Ancient Near
East (Leiden: Brill, 1979), pp. 96–98, 134–143.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 22 Introduction

southwest by the Syrian desert, passable only through the river valleys.
With the full use of the camel, travel and trade became possible here as
well.26 Camel nomadism gave a new level of power to the pastoral peoples
who pursued it.27
From this time on, the Syrian and Arabian deserts became important
centers for camel breeding. The widespread domestication of the camel
fostered the development of an overland trade route connecting the
Arabian Peninsula directly with the Euphrates through the oasis of
Tadmor, near the later city of Palmyra.28 Another route linked southern
Arabia with northern Syria and Palestine, supplementing the sea route
which connected eastern Africa with Egypt and Mesopotamia. Camel
nomads provided both the camels and the guidance needed for trade.
Throughout the eighth century BC nomads appear as part of the power
structure in the Syrian desert; we find them mentioned among local
powers sending tribute and sometimes as part of a coalition formed
against Assyrian domination. Several confederations appear to have
been ruled by women; the story of the famous Queen of Sheba in the
Old Testament reflects this.
By the beginning of the seventh century BC, land routes carried two
types of resin – frankincense and myrrh – from Southern Arabia to the
centers of civilization. This trade was lucrative, since both products were
important for ritual purposes and had become a valued commodity
throughout Mesopotamia and the eastern Mediterranean.29 At about
the same time, a large confederation of camel nomads known as the
Qedar developed and for about 300 years controlled the Syrian desert
between the oasis towns of Tadmor (Palmyra) and Dumat, on the south-
ern end of the Wadi Sirhan.30 The economy of the desert confederations
was dependent on camel raising, but also included oasis agriculture and
above all the caravan trade. It is at about this time that we first hear of
several major towns on the Arabian Peninsula, now connected to
Mesopotamia and Egypt.31

26
Van De Mieroop, A History of the Ancient Near East, p. 10.
27
Richard W. Bulliet, The Camel and the Wheel (New York: Columbia University Press,
1990), pp. 45–58, 67–77; Jan Retsö, “The Domestication of the Camel and the
Establishment of the Frankincense Road from South Arabia,” Orientalia Suecana 40
(1991): pp. 199–206; Jan Retsö, The Arabs in Antiquity: Their History from the Assyrians
to the Umayyads (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 122–123.
28
Retsö, The Arabs in Antiquity, p. 122.
29
Retsö “Domestication of the Camel,” pp. 187–199.
30
M. C. A. MacDonald, “North Arabia in the First Millennium BCE,” in Civilizations of the
Ancient Near East, ed. Jack M. Sasson (New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1995),
1359, 1366–1367; Retsö, The Arabs in Antiquity, pp. 131, 166–168, 179–184.
31
MacDonald, “North Arabia in the First Millennium BCE,” pp. 1362, 1366; Bulliet, The
Camel and the Wheel, p. 78.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Development of Mounted Nomadism 23

Although the settled states had incorporated most areas used by pas-
toralists specializing in sheep and goats, camel breeders such as the Qedar
could move deeper into the desert using areas too distant from large
agricultural territories to allow domination by the major settled states.
Nonetheless these nomads required wells for the summer months; this
and their interest in controlling trade made the more powerful confeder-
ations center themselves in desert oases, while many others used summer
pastures on the borders of settled regions.32 Camel nomads therefore
remained vulnerable to the armies of the central empires, who could
often defeat them in battle and plunder their summer camps. What the
empires could not do was to control the desert themselves.
While the Assyrian Empire could dominate the Syrian desert, it faced
a threat from the mounted horse nomads of the Eurasian steppe, who
were a more effective military force than the camel nomads, both because
the horse is better suited to battle and because of their new archery
technology. The first of many nomad groups to enter the Middle East
from the steppe were the Cimmerians, belonging to the Iranian language
family; they established a center of power in what is now Georgia in the
early eighth century BC. When they attempted to invade Assyria they
were defeated, but the Assyrians recognized the military opportunity they
offered and almost immediately incorporated a regiment of Cimmerians
into their army.33 From this time on, the mounted steppe nomads
remained a force in the political balance of the Middle East.
During the seventh century a new group of Iranian nomads, the
Scythians, defeated the Cimmerians and became masters of northern
Iran. From about the sixth to the third century BC they formed a state
ruled by nomads who exerted political and economic power over northern
Iran and a large part of the western steppe, along with several Greek city
states on the Black Sea coast. Unlike most nomads the Scythians left a rich
archaeological record, particularly in spectacular royal graves where horses
were buried along with the ruler, accompanied by gold artifacts, some of
which picture Scythian life in naturalistic detail. They show a nomad
warrior culture of expert mobile archers living off their livestock and
drinking the milk of their mares. The finds of Scythian-style arrowheads
through much of the western Middle East and beyond suggest that the
Scythian military technology was copied well beyond the Scythian realm.34

32
Stefan Leder, “Towards a Historical Semantic of the Bedouin, Seventh to Fifteenth
Centuries: A Survey,” Der Islam 92, no. 1 (2015): pp. 92–96.
33
Diakonoff, “Media,” pp. 94–95.
34
“Media,” pp. 115–119; Melyukova, “The Scythians and Sarmatians”; Willem Vogelsang,
“Medes, Scythians and Persians: The Rise of Darius in a North-South Perspective,” Iranica
Antiqua 33 (1998): pp. 212–214.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 24 Introduction

The Greek historian Herodotus described their lifestyle and military prac-
tice, including the classic nomad tactic of defeating enemies by retreating
before them and luring them forward into terrain where they could be
attacked.35
While the most powerful tribes appear to have remained fully nomadic,
agriculture and trade played an important part in the Scythian economy.
Grain was grown within the Scythian domains from the beginning, and by
the fourth century it was a major export. A fortified settlement north of
the Black Sea known as Kamenskoe was begun in the late fifth century,
and it became a kind of capital city and a center for trade and production,
including metallurgy.36

The Imperial Tradition of the Steppe

From the time of the Scythians onwards, the kingdoms of the Middle East
faced nomad confederations on their northern borders, and these were
more powerful and more strongly organized than the powers of the Syrian
and Arabian deserts. The Iranian Achaemenid Empire (558–331 BC)
which took over from the Assyrians dealt with the Royal Scythians in the
Black Sea area, and with the eastern Scythians in the Oxus region. This
was not an entirely defensive relationship; Achaemenid rulers cam-
paigned beyond the Oxus, bringing new nomad regions into their empire.
They were also eager to enlist nomads into their armies, particularly the
mounted archers of the steppe.
The Cimmerians and Scythians were both Iranian populations, active
primarily in the western and central Eurasian steppe. Later the major
locus of nomad power shifted to Mongolia, and to the Turkic and
Mongolian nomads of the eastern steppe, both belonging to the Altaic
language family. A series of powerful states arose in this region, which
controlled enormous territories and produced an independent imperial
tradition that was passed down and adapted through many centuries. The
history of the Eurasian nomad empires is deeply intertwined with that of
the Middle East, both through direct relations in times of strength and
through population migrations on the Middle Eastern borders at times of
disorder. It is worthwhile therefore to provide a brief sketch here.
The imperial tradition of the eastern steppe began with the nomad
Hsiung-nu empire of Mongolia, which dominated the steppe and parts
of eastern Turkistan from about 200 BC to 90 AD. We do not actually
know what ethnic group the Hsiung-nu belonged to, since they left no

35
Briant, État et pasteurs, pp. 201–202; Sulimirsky, “The Scyths,” pp. 161–199.
36
Melyukova, “The Scythians and Sarmatians,” pp. 101–109.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Imperial Tradition of the Steppe 25

written sources, and we learn about them exclusively from outside histor-
ies. The Hsiung-nu ruler claimed to rule through heavenly mandate; the
dynasty collected taxes from its subjects and organized its army in decimal
units, with the largest troop unit at 10,000. Below the ruler, the realm was
administered through an appanage system with major posts divided
between right and left. Although the ruler was theoretically absolute, he
ruled through an aristocratic council. Rulers were also elected by the
aristocracy at a great gathering, during which the assembly transferred
its authority to the ruler.37
The decline of the Hsiung-nu was followed by several centuries of
decentralized rule in the eastern steppe. The next long-lasting empire in
Mongolia was the T’ü-ch’üeh or Türk Khaghanate, which arose in
Mongolia in 552 AD and for most of two centuries dominated the Silk
Road and much of the Eurasian steppe. This was the state which gave the
Turks their original identity; they were the ruling class of the state and
provided its official language. The T’ü-chüeh negotiated and fought with
the states of China, Byzantium and the Middle East; the empire’s
supreme ruler, known as khaghan, was recognized by both the Iranian
Sasanians (240–651 AD) and the early caliphate as one of the world’s
major powers. The khaghan and the Ashina clan to which he belonged
were considered to be distinguished by special, God-given good fortune,
which allowed the ruler to serve as intermediary between his subjects and
supernatural powers.38 Succession to the throne was usually lateral, with
rule passing first to brothers and then to sons. According to outside
sources, there was also a formal election ritual, as with the Hsiung-nu.39
The main belief system of the Turks was shamanism, and in addition they
worshiped a sky god known as Tengri.
Although the Hsiung-nu and the Türk Khaghanate fostered agricul-
ture, the Turkic elites were self-consciously nomadic and saw their dis-
tance from settled norms as part of their strength.40 This sentiment was
expressed in some of the inscriptions they have left behind written on
stones, first in the Iranian Soghdian language and later in Turkic. The
37
Peter B. Golden, An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples: Ethnogenesis and
State-Formation in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia and the Middle East,
Turcologica, Bd. 9 (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1992), pp. 57–59, 65; Di
Cosmo, Ancient China, pp. 175–185.
38
Golden, Introduction, pp. 146–147.
39
Denis Sinor, “The Establishment and Dissolution of the Türk Empire,” in Cambridge
History of Early Inner Asia, ed. Denis Sinor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), p. 315.
40
Nicola Di Cosmo, “Ancient Inner Asian Nomads: Their Economic Basis and Its
Significance in Chinese History,” The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 4 (1994);
Sören Stark, Die Alttürkenzeit in Mittel- und Zentralasien: archäologische und historische
Studien (Wiesbaden: L. Reichert, 2008), pp. 289–291.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 26 Introduction

neighboring Chinese Empire, tempting their subjects with luxuries and

comforts, was to be avoided:
Deceiving by means of (their) sweet words and soft materials, the Chinese are said
to cause the remote peoples to come close in this manner. After such a people have
settled close to them (the Chinese) are said to plan their ill-will there. (The
Chinese) do not let the real wise men and real brave men make progress . . . .
Having heard these words, you unwise people went close to (the Chinese) and
were (consequently) killed in great numbers. If you go towards those places, oh
Turkish people, you will die! If you stay in the land of Ötükän, and send caravans
from there, you will have no trouble! If you stay at the Ötükän mountains, you will
live forever dominating the tribes!41
In the seventh century, an offshoot of the Türk Khaghanate, the
Khazars, took over the western steppe, controlling the trade of the great
river system from the confluence of the Volga and Kama rivers, connect-
ing them to Scandinavia in the north and more closely to Byzantium in the
south. The Caucasus became a battleground between them and the
caliphate.42 The Türk Khaghanate remained under the charismatic
Ashina clan up to 744, when another related people, the Uighurs,
restored the failing eastern khaghanate and took over as its rulers until
the empire’s final collapse in 840. The tribes and confederations that had
made up the khaghanate remained important over a large area, and
subsequent Eurasian states preserved both the alphabet developed by
the Turks and many of their political traditions.

Conclusion
While pastoralism has long been recognized as a specialized economy
which functioned best in collaboration with agricultural societies, there
has been relatively little discussion of the other side of the equation: the
usefulness of pastoralists to agricultural states. As I have shown, the early
rulers of Mesopotamia expanded into mountainous regions and steppes
inhabited by herders despite the difficulties they met in controlling nomad
populations. We need not assume that states simply expanded out of
a natural urge; the peripheral populations also had something useful to
offer.
Pastoral populations were central to two major processes, the creation
of increasingly large regional states – eventually empires – and the

41
Talât Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1968), p. 262.
42
Peter Golden, “The Peoples of the South Russian Steppe,” in The Cambridge History of
Early Inner Asia, ed. Denis Sinor (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press,
1990), pp. 264–265.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Conclusion 27

development of military strategy involving animals. Once these develop-

ments had begun, the process of expansion fueled itself. Nomads were
from the beginning considered useful as soldiers, but their importance
increased markedly with the development of chariot warfare. Like many
later advances in military technology, the development of light chariots
seems to have occurred on the frontier between nomad and settled. Once
the chariot became an asset in warfare, horses became a necessity and the
regions where they were raised took on strategic importance. New
advances in military technology connected with mounted nomadism
made the horse essential for military might, while the camel became
central to trade and useful in war. The nomads who raised these animals
were recruited into the army as mercenaries or auxiliaries.
By the middle of the first millennium BC the imperial states based on
agriculture had advanced almost as far as they could – in the west and
south up to the Syrian and Arabian deserts, and in the north up to the
borders of the Eurasian steppe. Beyond these limits, the land did not offer
sufficient agricultural potential to maintain a settled empire and could not
be effectively controlled. By this time, both the camel herders and horse
nomads had developed sufficient technology and mobility to create
states – or confederations – based primarily on pastoralism, with agricul-
ture and trade as secondary economies. We now find the familiar worlds
of settled and nomad populations facing each other on borders that
remained relatively stable over two millennia. Neither side, however,
had an economy based exclusively on one strategy. Within the great states
of the Middle East, pastoralist populations exploited areas which were
more suitable for herding than for agriculture, and in both desert and
steppe, agricultural communities continued, sometimes indeed
expanded, under nomadic overlordship.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.003 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 2 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

Early in the seventh century, the Prophet Muhammad began preaching in

the small merchant city of Mecca; by his death in 632 his community
included – nominally at least – the whole population of the Arabian
Peninsula. Within two decades his followers had conquered much of the
heartland of the Middle East, overturning the Iranian Sassanian Empire and
taking over the eastern section of the Roman one. Despite the novelty of its
result, the Arab conquest arose from regional dynamics similar to those of
earlier Middle Eastern dynasties. Imperial expansion and rivalry brought
outlying peoples into the political sphere of settled states, and a population
which had been peripheral became the ruling class. What was new and
perhaps unique was the extent of the conquests and the originality of the
resulting civilization. The Arabians, as the carriers of their own religion and
heir to two separate empires, created a new cultural tradition. After the
conquest, as the Muslim ruling elite sought to create an identity distinct
from that of their more sophisticated subjects, they made use of their desert
past and its pastoralist heritage. Here again, they resembled the Amorites
and Assyrians, whose tribal and nomad background appears to have been an
asset.
To understand the early Islamic state – and the role of nomads within it –
we need to examine the milieu within which Islam arose and to determine
how early Islamic society changed under radically new circumstances. The
Arabians of the Peninsula evolved from a tribal population of varied religions
and lifestyles into an army of conquest and quickly became the rulers and
soldiers of a new empire. The Arabian Peninsula, a region poor in resources
but strategic for trade routes, first became the seat of a new empire, and then
returned to the status of a periphery, important primarily for religious
reasons. The role that nomads played in this drama was complicated and
is not always easy to decipher. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between
ideal and practice; both are important, but they were often quite different.
The geography of the Arabian Peninsula and Syrian hinterland were
central to the structure of society, and I shall begin with a description of

28

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Arab Territories 29

the terrain and the lifestyles used to exploit it, then proceed to history,
from the last century before the rise of Islam to the fall of the Umayyad
dynasty in 750. Throughout the discussion I attempt to distinguish the
role that nomads played, the policies developed towards them, and the
impact of new political structures on the lives of pastoralists.

The Arab Territories

Muhammad and his community were Semitic people belonging to
a language family and a genealogical tradition – known primarily from the
Old Testament – that placed them within the wider world. The Arabians of
the pre-Islamic period were a mixture of sedentary farmers and merchants,
mountain peoples, camel nomads, and nomads specializing in sheep and
goats. The Syrian and Arabian deserts contain land suitable for sheep
herding but many of the central areas will support only camels. Camel
nomads,1 the Bedouin, were not the majority of the population but they
enjoyed a prestige and cultural importance disproportionate to their num-
bers and economic power. Medieval texts and modern travelers have shown
more interest in the desert life and military exploits of the Bedouin than in
their economic activities. The vast and forbidding desert was their domain,
and they could emerge from it to raid their sedentary neighbors, then retreat
into areas inaccessible to others. Nonetheless, it is important to remember
that camel pastoralism was connected to the rise of the trade routes through
the desert and the usefulness of the dromedary as a means of transportation.
The nomads lived off the products of their herds and the needs of desert
caravans. Thus, they required contact with settled merchants as well as with
peasants, and the largest confederations came into being along major trade
routes. Relations between nomad and settled populations were central to the
life of Syria and Arabia. Almost all Arab tribes, including those dominated
by camel nomads, had sedentary sections living in the towns and the
surrounding countryside.2 The tribal confederations which often dominated
larger regions contained a mix of lifestyles.3
1
The camels of the Arabian and Syrian deserts are dromedaries, with one hump rather than
two. The nomads of the northern Middle East and the steppe used the Bactrian camel,
with two humps, less suitable for deep desert but more tolerant of cold.
2
See, for example, Fred M. Donner, “The Bakr b. Wā ’il Tribes and Politics in
Northeastern Arabia on the Eve of Islam,” Studia Islamica 51 (1980): pp. 16–25; David
Frank Graf, “Rome and the Saracens: Reassessing the Nomadic Menace,” in Rome and the
Arabian Frontier: from the Nabataeans to the Saracens, ed. David Frank Graf (Aldershot:
Variorum, 1997); L. Gardet and J.-C. Vadet, “Kalb,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam (hereafter
EI) 2nd, ed. P. Bearman et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005).
3
Donner, “The Bakr b. Wā ’il,” pp. 18–23; M. J. Kister, “Mecca and the Tribes of Arabia,”
in Studies in Islamic History and Civilization in Honour of David Ayalon, ed. M. Sharon
(Leiden: Brill, 1986), pp. 34–8, 42; Michael Lecker, The Banū Sulaym: A Contribution to

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 30 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

The close interaction between settled and nomad was due in part to the
seasonal organization of pastoralism. The towns of the Hijaz, the settled
lands on the west bank of the Euphrates, and the eastern flanks of the
coastal range in Syria were all a regular part of Bedouin life in the summer
months.4 The settled populations controlled resources in water and agri-
cultural produce that they could withhold from their nomadic neighbors,
and a strong power in the agricultural sphere could often dominate nearby
nomads. For their part, the Bedouin could use military force, particularly
in the form of raids on border villages. When the settled power was strong,
however, raids elicited punitive expeditions.5 It is important to recognize
that military skill was not limited to the Bedouin, and many sedentary
Arabs were also excellent fighters, notably the tribes of the mountainous
regions. In the Yemen and the Asir mountains, sedentary power
prevailed.6
The relative importance of nomad and settled populations varied but
almost all regions had a mix of the three lifestyles. The southeastern
section of the Arabian Peninsula – the Hadramawt and the Yemen – has
sufficient rainfall to maintain agricultural states, and nomads here were
a minority. The rest of the peninsula ranges from semi-desert to sand
deserts, usable only by camels, interspersed by oases which offer rich
farmland and significant water supplies over a small area. Three major
regions should be distinguished. The Hijaz, the birthplace of the Prophet,
contains numerous oases where settled populations predominated,
though camel and sheep nomads occupied deserts and hills. To the
northeast lies the Najd, stretching from the borders of the Hijaz to the
Persian Gulf and the lower Euphrates, where camel nomads were more
prominent. Finally, there is the Empty Quarter, the famous sand desert
which separates the fertile coastal region from the interior. Here the lack
of water limited the population to a few small tribes.

the Study of Early Islam, The Max Schloessinger memorial series. Monographs; 4
(Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1989), pp. 5–11, 63, 99–101, 202–203.
4
Eva Orthmann, Stamm und Macht: die arabischen Stämme im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert der Hiğ ra
(Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2002), pp. 153–155; Gustav Rothstein, Die Dynastie der Laḫ miden
in al- Hı̄ ra; ein Versuch zur arabisch-persischen Geschichte zur Zeit der Sasaniden (Hildesheim:
˙
G. Olms, 1968), p. 121. See also Suzanne Pinckney Stetkevych, The Poetics of Islamic
Legitimacy: Myth, Gender, and Ceremony in the Classical Arabic Ode (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2002), p. 90.
5
For an example of the relationship of border towns and Bedouin, see Jibrail
Sulayman Jabbur, Suhayl Jibrail Jabbur, and Lawrence I. Conrad, The Bedouins and the
Desert: Aspects of Nomadic Life in the Arab East, SUNY series in Near Eastern studies
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 1–8.
6
Ella Landau-Tesseron, “Review of F. McGraw Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests,
Princeton 1981,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 6 (1985): pp. 499–500.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Arab Territories 31

In the Syrian desert, settled populations along with sheep and goat
nomads predominated on the desert edges, and camel nomads in the
center. The eastern and western edges of the desert formed the frontier of
the great imperial states, which could usually control border regions and
punish nomads who attempted to impose their will. To achieve independ-
ence and above all to dominate the lucrative trade to Syria and Iraq,
a nomad confederation had to control the central oases which offered
summer grazing and water. It is worth listing the larger oases here, since
they were the key to power over trade routes and the center of successive
desert kingdoms. Al-Yamama is the largest oasis area in the Najd desert,
and the well-watered Bahrayn coast also provided agricultural goods and
summer pasture. Both regions were closely connected to southern Iraq.
Further west, a series of oases have defined the trade routes between the
Arabian Peninsula and the Syrian lands. Dedan, Tayma and Dumat al-
Jandal lead from the Hijaz and Najd to southern Syria, and from Dumat
a string of small oases, the Wadi Sirhan, leads to the Fertile Crescent.
Near the western edge of the desert a series of oases provided an alternate
route leading through Petra and Bostra to Damascus. In the north
Tadmur, site of the famous Arab city of Palmyra, was a key point in the
route between the upper Euphrates and the coast.
While the desert oases allowed nomads to achieve considerable power,
they could not be maintained or defended without year-round popula-
tion. Therefore, we find in them a mix of tribal populations – some
sedentary tribes, some who specialized in sheep and goats, and sections
of primarily Bedouin tribes. The most famous of the Arab desert powers,
the Nabataean kingdom centered at Petra, combined sedentary and
nomadic manpower to dominate trade along the western edge of the
desert from about 300 BC to 100 AD. The original founders of the
kingdom were nomads, who are thought to have become increasingly
sedentary over time as their oases became large and flourishing agricul-
tural centers. Nonetheless, the nomadic population remained an import-
ant element in the kingdom’s structure up to the end of its existence.7
Throughout these regions, the tribe was a central institution, defining
social and political life. Religion, law and identity all depended on tribal
affiliation. The importance of tribe was not limited to the pastoralists, but
also seems to have applied to almost all segments of the population within
the peninsula, where town life was also organized along tribal lines. Both
the tribal system and the pastoral economy were constantly changing;
they were self-replicating but not static. Both before and after the rise of

7
G. W. Bowersock, Roman Arabia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983),
pp. 13–24.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 32 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

Islam, tribes and tribal sections moved towards the north from the
Yemen, through the Najd, into Syria, reacting to economic or political
pressures. These were often slow population movements, with people
moving group by group over long periods of time. Thus, over time in each
region power, pasture and water rights had to be renegotiated or won
through military might.

The Arabs and Surrounding Powers before Islam

What brought the Arabians into a wider political field was the develop-
ment of three major powers to their south, north and west. In Chapter 1,
I discussed the Middle Eastern imperial tradition up to the Achaemenid
Empire (558–331 BC), which centered in southern Iran but inherited the
Mesopotamian tradition and stretched to include the western lands. After
this, Iranian dynasties took over the eastern territories while the western
section gradually came under the control of a new power – the Roman
Empire. By 106–107 AD the Romans controlled much of Syria, creating
the new province of Roman Arabia, and reached into the Peninsula.8
Beginning in 240 AD a new Iranian dynasty, the Sasanians, created an
empire which stretched from Central Asia to the Caucasus and from the
border of India to the Arabian Peninsula. Laying claim to the imperial
tradition of the Middle East, the Sasanians constructed their capital in
Mesopotamia, north of Babylon. The two empires faced each other across
the Syrian hinterland and competed for the control of the desert and its
trade routes. Towards the end of the third century, a southern Arabian
dynasty, the Himyar, united most of the southern end of the Arabian
Peninsula, and began to extend its influence north, thus becoming
involved in the conflict between the Sasanians and the Romans.9
The nomads of the Syrian desert and steppe were now in a strategic
position; they could threaten imperial borderlands and could also offer
their military services to the neighboring states. The Romans instituted
a defense system along the western Syrian desert, using nomadic Arab
tribes as frontier armies. Some tribesmen became citizens living within
Roman boundaries; others were allies offered salaries through individual
treaties. The Sasanians established their presence on the southern shore
of the Persian Gulf and eastern Arabia; another area important for the

8
Bowersock, Roman Arabia, pp. 81–97.
9
C. E. Bosworth, “Iran and the Arabs before Islam,” in Cambridge History of Iran, ed.
Ehsan Yarshater (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 603–606; Robert
G. Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs. From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam (London;
New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 44–57.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Arabs and Surrounding Powers before Islam 33

Sasanians was the Najd, whose camel nomads controlled the approaches
to southern Mesopotamia.10
The three powers surrounding the Arab lands – the Himyarites,
Byzantines and Sasanians – used client Arab confederations to support
their goals rather than attempting to rule the desert directly. The Syrian
and Arabian deserts thus became involved in the rivalry of the surround-
ing states, and their inhabitants entered the Byzantine and Sassanian
armies. Client rulers received land and subsidies in return for controlling
neighboring tribes and providing troops against rival powers. The leaders
of the Kinda tribe in central Arabia served as governors for the Himyarite
kingdom. The Lakhmid dynasty, established on the Euphrates at the
beginning of the fourth century, served the Sasanians. Their capital at al-
Hira developed from an encampment into a permanent city and a center
for the developing literature in Arabic. From 502–503 on, the Byzantines
promoted another dynasty, the Ghassanids, bestowing official ranks as
well as subsidies. The major Ghassanid court was in Jabiya, on the edge of
the desert south of Damascus.
The client kings exerted power in the desert more through promise of
reward than threat of retaliation. There appears to have been a gradation
of power, first subjects, then allies, then tribes considered independent
and not expected to pay taxes. The settled tribesmen closest to the
Ghassanid and Lakhmid courts could be considered subjects, and the
nomads raising sheep and goats likewise. Distant tribes, particularly
camel nomads, were more difficult to incorporate. The Lakhmid and
Ghassanid kings, about whom we have the best information, attracted
the Bedouin elite in several ways. They offered court and military posi-
tions to tribesmen and handed out fiefs to some. A particularly advanta-
geous appointment was that of tax-collector to one’s own tribe –
a position which offered both income and position. Service also provided
opportunity for military activity on a larger scale than was available in
intertribal conflicts, and thus a path to wealth and prestige.11
The client kings had only modest standing armies and when they came
into conflict with inimical tribes, they were not certain of victory.
Nonetheless their influence was felt throughout the peninsula. Even in the
Hijaz, which was only loosely connected to this system, some lineages sought
advantage at the northern courts.12 The Lakhmids and Ghassanids reached

10
Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs, pp. 27–28; Bosworth, “Iran and the Arabs before Islam,”
p. 603.
11
Fred McGraw Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1981), pp. 45–48.
12
Donner, “The Bakr b. Wā ’il,” p. 27; Kister, “Mecca and the Tribes of Arabia,” pp. 42,
46; M. J. Kister, “Al- Hı̄ ra: Some Notes on Its Relations with Arabia,” Arabica 15 (1968).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 34 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

their apogee in the sixth century, then collapsed quite suddenly at the turn of
the seventh. The Kinda rulers, clients of the Himyarites, succeeded twice in
taking over the Lakhmid court for several years.13 It is not entirely clear why
the system was abandoned, though the difficulty of controlling the client
kings may have been one reason. The Lakhmids and Ghassanids, fighting
each other on behalf of their patrons, became personal enemies and did not
always feel bound by treaties between the two empires.
The Lakhmids and Ghassanids undoubtedly contributed to the devel-
opment of stronger political traditions among the tribes and their impact in
the cultural sphere was even more important. Their courts are linked with
two types of early literature in Arabic, the odes (qası̄ da) and accounts of the
˙
tribal battles remembered as ayyā m al-‘arab, both of which remained
popular through the rise of Islam and formed the base for later historiog-
raphy and poetry. The ayā m and qası̄ da were connected to the tribe, whose
˙
glory they commemorated and extolled. Later commentators described the
tribal gatherings at which poetry was recited, often in the Arabian market
towns, and the yearly poetic contest which brought prestige to the tribe
whose poet performed the best.14 Many of the most famous poets are
known also to have sought fame at the courts of the client kings, and
some lived there permanently. Since much of the biographical material
recorded about pre-Islamic poets apparently originated later as commen-
tary on their verse, we do not know the details of their relations to the
Ghassanids and Lakhmids, but the number of poems addressed to these
monarchs attests to the importance of courtly patronage.15
Pre-Islamic literature expresses a tribal tradition closely connected to
the Bedouin, whose habits and ideology came to symbolize an ideal for
Arabians of all lifestyles.16 Theirs was an egalitarian ethos which empha-
sized military bravery, generosity, the pursuit of vengeance, and the
protection of guests and dependents. The honor of individual and tribe
required that no suppliant be turned away and that any guest, however
inconvenient, be fed and given protection. If one someone was killed, the
close relatives had to exact recompense or, preferably, vengeance, no

13
Irfan Shahid, “Lakhmids,” EI 2nd ed.; Irfan Shahid, “Tanū kh,” “Ghassā n,” EI 2nd ed.
14
Abdulla el-Tayib, “Pre-Islamic Poetry,” in Arabic Literature to the End of the Umayyad
Period, ed. A. F. L. Beeston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 28–33.
15
“Pre-Islamic Poetry,” pp. 29–33, 45–49, 65–73.
16
This literature was preserved orally and was edited and glossed only in the Islamic period;
thus, our current texts must be considered only an approximation of the pre-Islamic
poetry. Fred McGraw Donner, Narratives of Islamic Origins: The Beginnings of Islamic
Historical Writing, Studies in Late Antiquity and Early Islam; 14 (Princeton, NJ: Darwin
Press, 1998), pp. 5–20; James E. Montgomery, The Vagaries of the Qası̄ dah: The Tradition
˙
and Practice of Early Arabic Poetry, Gibb literary studies; no. 1 (Cambridge: E. J. W. Gibb
Memorial Trust, 1997), pp. 38–39.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Arabs and Surrounding Powers before Islam 35

matter how much danger this brought them. The claims of honor often
went against the interest of the individual and the family and even more
against those of the state, but that only enhanced the ideal. These were the
virtues which, as the Bedouin saw it – or at any rate as it was expressed in
literature – distinguished the Bedouin from other peoples and gave them
superiority. What is striking about the image enshrined in early works and
continued in later writing is the emphasis on the difference and distance
between Bedouin and settled peoples; much greater in literary traditions
than it probably was in real life.17 Connected with this separation is an
attachment to the desert as the locus of nomadic life and personal free-
dom. The classic pre-Islamic ode began with a lament over a deserted
campsite, followed by an amatory adventure and a journey on either
a horse or a camel. All of these were normally set in the desert, adorned
with place names and a description of the landscape, weather and wildlife:
Oh abode of Mayyah on height and peak!
It lies abandoned
And so long a time has passed it by.

I stopped there in the evening

to question it;
It could not answer, for in the vernal camp
there was no one.

Nothing but tethering pegs

that I made out only slowly,
And the tent trench, like a water trough,
hollowed from the smooth hard ground.18
It is odd to find a tone of nostalgic melancholy associated with what
must have been everyday objects and experience. Scholars have pointed
out that in some cases neither poet nor patron was in fact nomadic; thus,
the poetry was not Bedouin but Bedouinizing.19 There may also be
a more fundamental reason for the tone of the qası̄ da. Arab camel nomad-
˙
ism contained a certain paradox. The nomads’ military prowess and their
considerable prestige stemmed from their wide-ranging migrations in the
desert, when groups were dispersed and self-sufficient. It was this life
which nourished the tough egalitarian code of the Bedouin. The true
desert was a region of danger that required specific highly developed
skills, possessed only by the Bedouin. One had to be able to find remote
wells in a shifting landscape and to read traces in the sand which betrayed
17
Sara Binay, Die Figur des Beduinen in der arabischen Literatur 9.-12. Jahrhundert
(Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2006), p. 30.
18
Al-Nā bigha, “Oh abode of Mayyah,” in Stetkevych, Poetics, p. 20.
19
Montgomery, The Vagaries of the Qası̄ dah, pp. 7–9.
˙

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 36 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

the identity of those who had passed by, sometimes by recognizing the
print of an individual camel.20 Many, perhaps most, Bedouin, however,
spent only the cold months in the desert and the summer under tighter
authority at desert wells or among settled peoples. This was the time at
which taxes were collected, either by tribal leaders or outside powers. It was
sometimes the most prestigious tribal lineages who maintained the closest
ties to settled society.21 The tension between the ideal of desert life as lived
for part of the year and the need to accept greater control during summer
months may be one reason that the desert is emphasized, along with the
ideal of the pure Bedouin, disdaining the constraints of settled life.
There was also a question of authority within the tribe itself. In the ideal,
the tribal shaykhs was first among equals but the organization of large-scale
trade or warfare undoubtedly required the imposition of additional discip-
line. The pre-Islamic Arabic poetry we know originated in the sixth century
when the system of client states was at its height, and this situation
probably threatened the autonomy of individual tribesmen. The client
kings offered wealth and authority to tribal shaykhs and in return expected
them to control their followers. The appointment of tribal clients as tax
collectors to their tribes underlined the subordination of the tribesmen
both to their own chief and to his outside patron. This demand appears to
have been resented, and taxes were sometimes refused.22
The emphasis in many poems on personal freedom – sometimes indeed
transgression – may be in part a response to the diminution of these very
things. Poets who came to the courts to gain recognition sometimes
stressed their claim to equality, and their audience – then and later –
appears to have appreciated their sentiments. The famous ode of ‘Amr
b. Kulthum addressed to the Lakhmid king ‘Amr b. Hind (554–569),
asserting tribal and personal honor in response to tyranny, has been
enshrined among the most famous odes:
With what purpose in view, Amr bin Hind,
do you give heed to our traducers, and despise us?
With what purpose in view, Amr bin Hind,
should we be underlings to your chosen princelet?
Threaten us then, and menace us; but gently!
When, pray, were we your mother’s domestics?23

20
These skills are vividly described for the twentieth century in Wilfred Thesiger, Arabian
Sands (New York: Dutton, 1959).
21
Donner, “The Bakr b. Wā ’il,” pp. 22, 27, 29; Jabbur, Jabbur, and Conrad, The Bedouins
and the Desert, pp. 31–32.
22
Kister, “Al-Hira,” pp. 159–163.
23
A. J. Arberry, The Seven Odes; The First Chapter in Arabic Literature (London, New York:
G. Allen & Unwin; Macmillan, 1957), p. 206.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The First Years of Islam 37

The early poetry that has come down to us illustrates the ideals
and tensions of a period in which the rivalries of the great powers and
of their client kingdoms offered opportunities for power and wealth
that were hard to resist. The nomad and mountain lifestyles fostered
military skills that made tribesmen valuable to the great powers, and
alliance opened new fields of military action to the tribes. On the
other hand, involvement with outside powers threatened the egalitar-
ian nature of tribal life. While Arab tribesmen accepted the oppor-
tunities offered, they also needed to reassert the power of their ideals
and the locus of their independence.

The First Years of Islam

Before beginning the discussion of the rise of Islam, I must state that
I am here using the traditional narrative based on Arabic sources.
Unfortunately, no narrative based on outside sources can provide
sufficient material for an analysis of nomad activities. Thus, my
conclusions must be taken as tentative. According to tradition, the
Prophet Muhammad was born about 570 into a merchant family of
Mecca in the Hijaz. Mecca was a city whose population depended
largely on trade but was closely connected to neighboring farming
and nomadic communities. During the sixth century it appears to
have emerged as a regional trading center, in cooperation with the
rich oasis of Ta’if, which provided the city with much-needed food.
The city and its dominant tribe, the Quraysh, also profited from
control over several pilgrimage sites. The possession of holy sites
was a common base for supratribal leadership within the fluid politics
of the region, since it provided both divine authority and a nucleus
for local trade. There is some dispute among scholars over the nature
and extent of Meccan trade and over the level of control that the city
exerted over the major routes.24 The primary exports were probably
leather and leather goods, clothing, perfume, and perhaps precious
metals mined in the region. The imports were often finished goods,
along with grain from the Yamama oasis.25 The major trading partners
appear to have been Syria and the Yemen.26

24
Patricia Crone, Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1987), pp. 87–108; F. E. Peters, The Arabs and Arabia on the Eve of Islam
(Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998), Introduction, xxxvi, note.
25
Róbert Simon, Meccan Trade and Islam: Problems of Origin and Structure, Bibliotheca
orientalis Hungarica, v. 32 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989), pp. 63–70, 91–95;
Crone, Meccan Trade, pp. 87–108.
26
Crone, Meccan Trade, 117–131.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 38 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

The rise in Mecca’s trade may have been due in part to the fall of the
client states; in 581–582, the Byzantines deposed the last of the Ghassanids
kings and in 602 the Sasanian emperor executed the Lakhmid king and
established a Persian governor in Hira. The Sasanians and Romans now
dealt directly with the Arab tribes, but they did not become fully involved in
the Arabian Peninsula, because for almost three decades, from 603 to 628,
they were locked in a bitter war with each other. It is possible that the
Roman-Sassanian war benefitted Meccan trade, since leather was a crucial
material for military use and the Roman army consumed it in large quan-
tities. Leather was one of the more important pastoral products, so growing
demand would also have increased the prosperity and importance to the
nomad population.27
The Quraysh were sedentary, but the nomads of the region provided
many of their trade partners and helped maintain the security of their
caravans. Some members of nomadic tribes lived in Mecca, and inter-
marriage with city tribes was not uncommon.28 Like many other
Meccans, Muhammad appears to have been suckled by a woman from
a nomad tribe, but his early career, both as merchant and as prophet, was
among the settled population.29 When he and his followers left Mecca,
the community that offered him a new home was the agricultural oasis of
Medina, where he and his followers arrived in 622.
Muhammad’s religious message reflected his settled background. The
emphasis on loyalty to the religious community – the umma – over the
tribe, and social responsibility over individual glory was not designed to
appeal to Bedouin. During Muhammad’s first years in Medina, he made
some attempts to ally with surrounding tribes, but most of the nomads of
the Hijaz supported the Meccans against him. This was not surprising,
considering the Meccans’ long-standing alliances.30 The lack of sym-
pathy between Bedouins and early Muslims is shown in the Qur’an,
where references to Bedouin are few and largely negative. The word
most often used for camel nomads is a‘rā b or a‘rā bı̄ and it is usually
applied in a pejorative sense. The few Qur’anic passages on the Bedouin
27
Patricia Crone, “Quraysh and the Roman Army: Making Sense of the Meccan Leather
Trade,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 70, no. 1 (2007).
28
Lecker, The Banū Sulaym, pp. 107–134; Kister, “Mecca and the Tribes of Arabia,”
pp. 33–34, 38; W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1953), p. 89.
29
Watt, Muhammad at Mecca, pp. 34–36.
30
W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Medina (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), pp.
17–36; Fred M. Donner, “Muhammad’s Political Consolidation in Arabia up to the
˙
Conquest of Mecca: A Reassessment,” The Muslim World 69, no. 3 (1979): pp. 236–239.
The existence of numerous small oases throughout the Hijaz encouraged a mixed econ-
omy among local tribes; except for those in the major oases, most apparently depended
primarily on pastoralism.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The First Years of Islam 39

portray them as inferior in religion, self-serving and deceptive. They are

mentioned as those who make excuses instead of turning up for battle;
they claim to be believers but have no real faith (Qur’an 9:90, 97 and
49:14). To some extent these traits represent the view of the settled
population towards nomads, but the context in which they are placed
suggest frustration with a group of people who resisted Muslim efforts to
attract them.31
The situation changed somewhat with the conclusion of the treaty at al-
Hudaybiya in 628, when the Muslims and Meccans agreed to a ten-year
truce. The Muslims were now apparently free to seek allies among the
regional tribes; this is certainly what they did.32 Muhammad used
a mixture of attraction and force to gather a sizeable following among
the Hijazi tribes and when he took over Mecca in 630 he was accompan-
ied by contingents from former Meccan allies including several primarily
nomad tribes. The key to control lay in the oases, and Muhammad
immediately set about taking over the major ones, thus depriving the
Meccans of key allies and giving himself an advantage over the nomads
of the Hijaz, since he controlled local markets and sources of water.33
According to Islamic tradition, the two last years of the Prophet’s life
saw a rapid expansion of the Muslim confederation and numerous con-
versions to Islam, as tribes from all over the peninsula sent deputations to
Medina to declare allegiance. It is likely that the deputations represented
only sections of tribes and that most treaties did not require a firm
commitment. Towards the end of his life the Prophet decided to place
greater demands on the tribes of his confederation and sent out followers
to oversee the implementation of treaties and the collection of tax. It is not
clear however that his agents had collected any dues before Muhammad
died on June 8, 632.34
Muhammad’s death was sudden and unexpected. In choosing a new
leader for the community, his companions agreed on his aged father-in-
law Abu Bakr, known for his skill as tribal negotiator. Abu Bakr’s two-year
reign was a continuation of Muhammad’s policies in both internal and
external affairs. He appears to have favored the Quraysh aristocracy, who
provided most of the leadership for his military campaigns. With the
death of Muhammad many tribes saw little reason to send on the taxes

31
Binay, Die Figur des Beduinen, pp. 78–89.
32
Donner, “Muhammad’s Political Consolidation,” pp. 240–245; Watt, Muhammad at
˙
Medina, pp. 48–55.
33
Watt, Muhammad at Medina, pp. 66–73; Donner, “Muhammad’s Political
Consolidation,” pp. 245–246. ˙
34
Elias Shoufani, Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 10–46; Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 102–111.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 40 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

so recently demanded of them, while powers who had never accepted an

alliance now became enemies and had to be subjugated. The campaigns
against recalcitrant tribes in Arabia are subsumed in Islamic tradition
under the rubric of the Ridda.35
During his lifetime Muhammad had sent several expeditions to the
north, and the subjugation of the southern Syrian region began during the
Ridda wars. During the lifetime of Abu Bakr, campaigns concentrated on
securing the oases and tribal territories on the desert fringes, avoiding
major engagements.36 In Syria, many of the Muslims’ opponents in early
battles were the Arab clients and allies of the Byzantines and they often
remained faithful to the Romans.37 In the Iraqi campaigns, aimed against
the towns along the Euphrates which had long connections to the desert
tribes, regional tribesmen took different sides.38 By the time of Abu
Bakr’s death in 634, the new Islamic community had been consolidated
and expanded to include almost the whole of the Arabian peninsula and
the southern Syrian desert. The new elite of the community was also
formed, and was securely Hijazi, with the settled tribes of Mecca, Medina
and Ta’if in ascendancy. The Hijazi nomads, along with a few faithful
allies from nearby tribes, also participated in the campaigns of the Ridda
and shared in its rewards but they did not achieve the level of prestige
granted to new converts from Mecca and Ta’if.39
The next caliph, ‘Umar (634–644), at first continued to rely primarily
on the tribesmen of the Hijaz and the Yemen. After 636, when the
Muslim armies began to conquer cities and clash with major Byzantine
and Persian armies, ‘Umar expanded the army, using soldiers and com-
manders even from tribes which had opposed the Muslims during the
Ridda.40 The Muslim armies, which were the major path to wealth, power
and prestige, now included large, primarily nomadic tribes.

Tribes and Nomads in the Founding of the State

As we examine the policies that Muhammad and his successors adopted
to maintain control over their followers, we should recognize two particu-
larities of the Arabian population which presented potential challenges.
One was the centrality of the tribal system, which encouraged numerous
35
Shoufani, Al-Riddah, pp. 58–96.
36
Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 112–119.
37
Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 103–148; Walter Emil Kaegi, Byzantium and
the Early Islamic Conquests (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press,
1991), pp. 68, 79, 114.
38
Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 173–188.
39
Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, p. 88.
40
Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 204–211.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Tribes and Nomads in the Founding of the State 41

power centers. The other was the presence of nomad populations with
a mobile lifestyle and control of inaccessible terrain. It is important to
remember that while tribalism and nomadism were often connected,
many – probably most – Arabian tribesmen were not nomads. Thus, the
policies towards tribes and those towards nomads should be distinguished
from each other. Neither is easy to discern, since the sources at our
disposal were not written down until the eighth and ninth centuries. We
can learn more about cultural attitudes towards tribes and nomads than
about reality. When examining tribes, we can discover something about
the policies of the central government, and the histories pay loving atten-
tion to inter-tribal politics and rivalries; what is less clear is how tribes
were organized. On the question of nomadism there is very little material.
Even when historians were interested in determining the actions of the
Bedouin, they were dependent on traditions which distinguished among
various tribes, but not between their nomadic and settled sections.
The control of tribes was clearly a major concern from the beginning of
Muhammad’s career. The Muslim army required tighter discipline than
tribal structure would allow, and much of it was made up of individuals or
sections of tribes who campaigned under commanders close to the ruler.
Members of the same tribe often belonged to different regiments.41 There
was also a systematic effort to detach potential soldiers from their tribes.
Muhammad and his successors called on new converts to perform the
hijra: to leave their homeland to devote themselves to the expansion of the
Muslim community. During Muhammad’s lifetime the invitation was to
settle in Medina. Clearly such a move could be difficult for farmers, who
would have to give up their land, but it was even harder for nomads,
whose livelihood depended on livestock, territory and social cooperation.
Muslim traditions (hadı̄ th) record exceptions granted by Muhammad
˙
which permitted sincere converts to remain in their original tribal regions,
but this appears to have involved a lower status.42
Once the conquests were underway the caliph ‘Umar and his succes-
sors invoked the concept of hijra to encourage immigration into the
conquered lands and to control new arrivals. Muslims were deliberately
kept apart from the local populations and settled in garrison cities.
Muslims who were active in government or army were allotted regular
stipends inscribed in the official register (dı̄ wā n), calculated according to
the date of conversion and service to the Muslim cause; this created a new
hierarchy based on religious primacy, which favored the largely sedentary
early converts. Those who performed the hijra to settle in the garrison

41
Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 119, 221–226; Kaegi, Byzantium, pp. 72, 123.
42
Patricia Crone, “The First-century Concept of Hiğ ra,” Arabica 41 (1994), p. 356.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 42 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

cities – known as muhā jirū n or muqā tila – received regular salaries. People
who remained in their own territories might fight in the army but received
only the booty of the campaigns in which they participated.43 Taxation
fell most heavily on non-Muslims, while Muslims originally paid only an
alms tax on wealth: for the settled the zakā t, and for nomads a tax in
animals, known as the sadaqa.44 There is controversy over whether the
˙
hijra was part of a deliberate policy to weaken nomads, who might
threaten an orderly state. Whether or not the policy was aimed against
nomads, it must certainly have been designed to increase government
control.
The promotion of the hijra suggests a policy aimed against tribalism, but
nonetheless within garrison cities immigrants were organized along tribal
lines. Members of a tribe were settled in the same quarter, and often shared
a mosque and a guest house. It was the tribal shaykhs who were responsible
for paying salaries and who recruited soldiers for campaigns.45 The con-
tinued use of tribal organization in the army and cities may have been
a concession to Arab traditions, but it also offered significant advantages to
the state. The system brought the tribes into the sphere of government and,
what may have been equally important, stabilized their leadership. The
connection of tribal structures to stipends and recruitment permitted the
state to interfere in the choice of tribal shaykhs, traditionally chosen within
the tribe. The chiefs, appointed as pay masters and as commanders, now
depended partly on the state for their authority and were responsible to the
central government for the actions of the men under them.46
The retention of tribal organization had another major advantage, as
a tool for the exclusion of the conquered population from membership in
the ruling elite. The Caliphs naturally relied heavily on the men who had
served the Romans and Persians to administer their new lands. It was
desirable to consider these people inferior and foreign to the Arab
Muslims, and the tribal system provided a useful marker. The organiza-
tion of military power along tribal lines helped to underline Arab exclu-
sivity even as the Muslim armies accepted increasing numbers of non-

43
F. Løkkegaard, “Fay,” EI 2nd ed.; Wilferd Madelung, “Has the Hijra Come to an End?”
in Mélanges offerts au professeur Dominique Sourdel, Revue des Études Islamiques, vol. LIV
(Paris: Paul Geunther, 1986), pp. 232–234.
44
As usual with administrative terminology, the usage of these terms is not entirely consist-
ent. Orthmann, Stamm und Macht, pp. 173–174.
45
Stamm und Macht, pp. 81–97; Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, pp. 228–240.
46
Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests, p. 259; Martin Hinds, “Kûfan Political Alignments
and Their Background in the Mid-Seventh Century A.D.,” International Journal of Middle
East Studies 2 (1971), p. 347; Hugh Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and
Society in the Early Islamic State, Warfare and History (London; New York: Routledge,
2001), p. 22.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Umayyad Caliphate 43

Arab and particularly Persians troops, highly respected for their mastery
of military arts.47 In the matter of religion, tribal structures were used
even more effectively. The Arabian Muslims defined themselves both by
religion and by origin, and as the ruling stratum they had every reason to
keep themselves distinct. Most land was left in the hands of its previous
owners, and only land owned by non-Muslims was subject to tax. For the
conquered peoples therefore, conversion to Islam could bring financial
advantage, and for the government a loss of revenue. One barrier used to
prevent large-scale conversion was based on the centrality of tribalism to
Arab identity. To become Muslim, the convert had to affiliate himself
with an existing Arab tribe, accepting low status as mawla, or client, the
status given to freed prisoners of war.48

The Umayyad Caliphate

‘Umar’s continued promotion of early converts over other tribesmen,
including those with more prestigious lineages, alienated many Arabs in
the garrison cities who felt insufficiently rewarded for their contributions.
The resulting tensions helped to bring about the murder of the third caliph,
‘Uthman, in 656 and the civil war in which Muhammad’s cousin ‘Ali b. Abu
Talib was murdered. The victor was the governor of Syria, Mu‘awiya,
member of the Umayyad branch of the Quraysh. He moved the capital
to Damascus, not far from the former capital of the Ghassanid kings,
putting the Syrian army at the center of his power structure. Mu’awiya is
credited with a policy which favored the older tribal aristocracy – the ashrā f.
While he established a royal court, he ruled primarily through balance and
persuasion and became famous for the quality of hilm – patience and
˙
subtlety – associated with tribal leadership. His family cultivated close
political and matrimonial ties with the powerful Quda’a confederation,
particularly the largely nomadic Kalb tribe which dominated the northern
Syrian desert. Thus, a number of Bedouin rose to prominence during his
reign. On the other hand, most of the governors he appointed were from
the sedentary Quraysh and Thaqif. The troops who conquered Syria and
thus made up the core of its early army were almost exclusively from settled
tribes. Some scholars believe that Mu‘awiya curtailed Bedouin influence.49
47
Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, pp. 4–5.
48
Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, trans. C. R. Barber and S. M. Stern, 2 vols. (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1967–1971), vol. 1, pp. 101–104; A. J. Wensinck and P. Crone,
“Mawla,” EI 2.
49
Nancy A. Khalik, “From Byzantium to Early Islam: Studies on Damascus in the Umayyad
Era,” unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University (2006), p. 51; Gerald Hawting,
The First Dynasty of Islam: the Umayyad Caliphate AD 661–750 (Carbondale; Edwardsville:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), pp. 32–35, 42–43; H. A. R. Gibb, “An

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 44 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

During his reign and those of his descendants, known as the Sufyanids, the
soldiers of the garrison cities were the regular armies, and whatever their
origins, they themselves were separated from a nomadic lifestyle. The
policy of hijra continued and the garrisons circled the desert, thus poten-
tially exerting control over its nomad populations.
Mu‘awiya’s death in 680 unleashed a new civil war, as candidates from
other branches of the Quraysh attempted to win the caliphate. The two
most important challengers were ‘Abd Allah Ibn al-Zubayr, the son of one
of Muhammad’s companions, and Husayn, the son of ‘Ali b. Abu Talib.
The dynasty was rescued by Marwan, a member of a different Umayyad
lineage, whose descendants held the caliphate to the end of the dynasty.
Marwan had first to rise within the Umayyad camp, and then to win over
the Syrian army, a significant part of which favored Ibn al-Zubayr, par-
ticularly the tribes centered in the Jazira and northern Syria. Marwan
achieved success with the help of the Kalb and several tribes of more local
power in Syria.
Even the Kalb, who had intermarried with the Umayyad house, had to
be won over, and they were powerful enough to impose conditions for
their support. The terms proposed by the tribe’s leader, Ibn Bahdal,
provide a telling illustration of the position of Bedouins and their shaykhs
in the early Umayyad period. Ibn Bahdal demanded that he continue to
hold same high position he had under Mu‘awiya and his son Yazid: 2,000
Kalb would get yearly pay of 2,000 dirhams, which was the highest
stipend for non-Quraysh aristocracy, and Ibn Bahdal would have unre-
stricted control, presumably over the people and territory of his tribe. He
also wanted assurance that he would have leadership of the tribal council
and that after his death either his son or his cousin would lead the Kalb.50
These are large demands and show the centrality of the Kalb position, but
they also suggest the dependence of the tribe on the state. There is an
assumption here that the caliph had the power to appoint the tribal leader,
and that the caliph, not the tribes themselves, determined the member-
ship of the tribal council. The Kalb held significant power within the
state, but their tribe was not a totally self-governing entity.
The decisive victory for Marwan and the Umayyad dynasty was
achieved in a long and destructive battle at Marj Rahit, north of
Damascus, during the summer of 684, during which the coalition oppos-
ing Marwan was defeated and a large number were killed. When the
Marwanid lineage replaced Mu‘awiya’s line, the organization of the

Interpretation of Islamic History,” in Studies on the Civilization of Islam, ed. Stanford Shaw
and William R. Polk (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 7.
50
Gernot Rotter, Die Umayyaden und der zweite Bürgerkrieg (680–692), Abhandlungen für
die Kunde des Morgenlandes; Bd. 45, Nr. 3 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1982), p. 147.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Role of Nomadism in the Early Islamic State 45

army and the role of the Arab tribes in dynastic politics underwent
a change. Marwan’s successor ‘Abd al-Malik (685–705) centralized the
realm and created a more professional army. While Mu‘awiya had chosen
his major commanders from the tribal aristocracy, from the time of ‘Abd
al-Malik commanders of more modest descent were preferred and the
army contained significant numbers of non-Arabian troops. Over time,
moreover, the garrison armies of Basra and Kufa were marginalized, and
the Syrian army was used to maintain control even outside its own
province.51
Although army units no longer mirrored the tribal structure of the
conquest, tribes remained important in politics and in the military. The
battle of Marj Rahit, which was devastating to the defeated tribes, marked
the beginning of factional rivalry between two parties envisioned in tribal
terms: the Qays, consisting of tribes identified as being of northern origin,
most of whom supported Ibn al-Zubayr; and the Yamani, to which the
Kalb belonged, identified with southern origins.52 The continuing fac-
tional struggle between Qays and Yaman incorporated local struggles
over land use and regional preeminence. Starting with Marj Rahit, the
desire for vengeance – justified as a tribal obligation – ensured a constant
succession of raids and battles, both small and large. The resulting
disorder and factionalism lasted to – indeed through – the end of the
Umayyad dynasty and was a major cause of its weakness.53 The schism
spread to other regions, taking on a variety of names. There has been
a great deal of debate about what these factions meant and how they
functioned.54 Whatever their actual nature, they kept alive the concept of
tribalism and its relevance to politics. Only after the ‘Abbasid revolution
and the remodeling of the caliphate on a more Persian model did the
factions gradually die out.

The Role of Nomadism in the Early Islamic State

So far, I have written largely about tribalism; in this section I will explore
the results of Muslim policies on the practice of nomadism, posing three
major questions: whether nomadism increased in conquered territories
under Muslim rule; what level of power and prestige nomads held; and
51
Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, pp. 18–19, 22–23, 34–42; Patricia Crone, Slaves on Horses
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 37–39.
52
Rotter, Die Umayyaden, pp. 133–151; Julius Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall,
trans. Margaret Graham Weir (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1927), pp. 201 ff.
53
See, for example, Abd al-Ameer Abd Dixon, The Umayyad Caliphate, 65–86/684–705: (A
Political Study) (London: Luzac, 1971), pp. 89–119.
54
For some discussion, see Patricia Crone, “Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad
Period Political Parties?” Der Islam 71 (1994); Orthmann, Stamm und Macht, pp. 9–20.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 46 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

finally whether divisions between nomad and settled populations were an

important factor in politics. The central lands of the new Islamic empire lay
on either side of the Syrian desert; thus, communication within the empire
depended on the state’s relations with the Bedouins inhabiting it. Whatever
policy the leadership espoused, nomads could neither be eliminated nor
entirely marginalized. The Muslims had also conquered territories which
lent themselves to a combination of pastoralism and agriculture – mountain
areas such as the Jazira, the desert border along the Euphrates, and the hilly
steppes of Trans-Jordan. The first question to examine is whether the influx
of Arab tribes from the peninsula resulted in an increase in pastoral lifestyle
in these mixed regions.
The scholarship on the period suggests that despite the influx of new
partly nomadic tribes, the ratio between nomad and settled population
did not change significantly. In western and southern Iraq, local pastoral-
ists were encouraged to settle in garrison cities. Agriculture and urban
settlement were significantly expanded, but the pastoral economy appar-
ently continued to be important. In the southern Iraqi border regions, the
desert and steppe appear to have remained largely in the hands of the
tribes already controlling the area, but in central Mesopotamia several
largely pastoral tribes were pushed north by new arrivals.55 In northern
Syria and the Jazira, there was a larger influx of new tribes from the south.
The Kalb extended their territories northward to the Tadmur oasis and
several tribes such as the B. Sulaym moved sections into the Jazira, where
they competed for land with tribes previously there and with new arrivals
from central Iraq.56 Despite the evidence of competition over pasture,
however, there is no clear indication of a long-term increase in the
number of nomads or a growth in the proportion of pastoral to settled
populations.57
Likewise, for the region between Damascus and Palestine studies sug-
gest a continuance of settled and nomadic populations without major
change in their proportions. The northern cities of Syria – Aleppo, Hims
and Damascus – were home to numerous immigrants in the city and

55
Michael G. Morony, Iraq after the Muslim Conquest (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1984), pp. 229–232.
56
Morony, Iraq after the Muslim Conquest, p. 231; Rotter, Die Umayyaden, pp. 126–133;
Claus-Peter Haase, “Untersuchungen zur Landschaftsgeschichte Nordsyriens in der
Umayyadenzeit,” unpublished PhD dissertation, Universität Hamburg (1975),
pp. 140–144.
57
Haase, “Untersuchungen zur Landschaftsgeschichte,” pp. 121–126, 147–169; Chase
F. Robinson, “Tribes and Nomads in Early Islamic Northern Mesopotamia,” in
Continuity and Change in Northern Mesopotamia from the Hellenistic to the Early Islamic
Period, ed. Karin Bartl and Stefan R. Hauser, Berliner Beiträge zum Vorderen Orient,
Band 17 (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1996).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Role of Nomadism in the Early Islamic State 47

countryside, but these were both nomads and agriculturalists. Sections of

formerly nomadic tribes, finding themselves in territories favoring agricul-
ture, became at least partially settled.58 In Palestine likewise, immigration
did not cause a major change in the relationship between nomad and settled;
in the Negev region north of the Gulf of Aqaba there appears to have been
a gradual move towards sedentarization.59 The regions along the western
edge of the desert from Balqa to Hawran show continuity across the Arab
conquest without significant increase in nomad population.60 It is important
to remember that nomads sometimes used cultivated fields as summer
pastures; thus the expansion of agriculture did not necessarily entail
a decline in pastoralism.61 The increased irrigation in the desert fringes of
Hawran and Balqa’, along the Mesopotamian rivers, and in the northern
oases all occurred in regions still used as summer pastures by nomads.62
The importance of the Bedouin population for the Umayyads is illus-
trated by the residences the dynasty constructed at the edges of the desert,
most particularly in Transjordan, at the head of the Wadi Sirhan.
Settlements were also scattered southwest from Damascus, with a few
along the northern edge of the desert. Many of these had highly developed
systems of irrigated agriculture. Early scholars attributed the location of
Umayyad palaces primarily to a nostalgia for the desert, but over the last
decades researchers have suggested additional reasons for their location,
both economic and political. Many are built along important routes.
Most are on the edge of agricultural districts and could be meant to
expand the agricultural base. Finally, these were locations which allowed
the dynasty to maintain relations with nomad tribes, most notably the
Judham in Trans-Jordan and the Kalb to the north. The Qasr al-Khayr al-
Sharqi in Tadmur may have been built specifically with the Kalb in mind,
since they centered in that region.63 There is nothing contradictory in

58
Haase, “Untersuchungen zur Landschaftsgeschichte,” pp. 149, 153–155; Orthmann,
Stamm und Macht, pp. 81–98.
59
Gideon Avni, Nomads, Farmers, and Town-Dwellers: Pastoralist-Sedentist Interaction in the
Negev Highlands, Sixth-Eighth Centuries C.E (Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities Authority,
1996), pp. 55–57, 90–91.
60
G. R. D. King, “The Umayyad Qusur and Related Settlements in Jordan,” in The IVth
International Congress of the History of Bilad al-Sham, ed. Muhammad ‘Adnan al-Bakhit
and Ihsan ‘Abbas (Amman: al-Jami‘a al-Urduniya, 1987), pp. 74–79. For a good discus-
sion of the literature to 1995, see Michael Wood, “A History of the Balqā ’ Region of
Central Transjordan during the Umayyad Period,” unpublished PhD dissertation,
McGill University (1995), pp. 71–96: for nomads particularly 94–96.
61
Sonderforschungsbereich 19 “Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients,” Tübinger Atlas des
Vorderen Orients (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1977), compare AX 1 (Kopp, 1989) and AX 11
(Scholtz, 1989).
62
Tübinger Atlas, map AX 11.
63
King, “The Umayyad Qusur,” pp. 76–77, 79; “The Distribution of Sites and Routes in
the Jordanian and Syrian Deserts in the early Islamic Period,” in Proceedings of the

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 48 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

these various purposes, since the use of the desert routes, the provisioning
of the army, and the security of the settled region all depended on rela-
tions with Bedouin tribes. In the Jazira as well, the Umayyads showed
concern for the control of partly nomad tribes.64
The place of nomads in the Umayyad army is difficult to ascertain. The
Umayyad army was largely Syrian, and thus presumably included recruits
from the tribes of the desert. We should remember also that the regular
army enrolled in the dı̄ wā n did not provide all the troops used by the
Umayyads. Important commanders, often members of the dynasty,
increasingly recruited their own troops, whose pay may still have come
from the central government.65 There were also auxiliary troops raised for
particular campaigns; primarily nomadic tribes certainly contributed to
some of these units.66 However, the sources rarely specify what section of
the tribe troops came from, or whether regular soldiers were recruited
from regions beyond the garrison cities and their attached lands.67 We
can conclude that Umayyad armies included soldiers from nomad groups
and some auxiliary troops were in tribal formation at least at the lower
levels. We cannot judge, without more detailed research, what proportion
of the army was nomad and whether significant numbers of Bedouin were
among the elite troops.68
Finally, we must attempt to determine the importance of nomadism in
political life. Did nomads represent a distinct group in conflicts within the
state? Were they a threat to stability or the economy on their own account?
In general, the answer to these questions should be a qualified “no.”
While nomad concerns added fuel to some rivalries and nomads contrib-
uted manpower to several revolts, the political fault lines were religious
and regional. The factional rivalry between the Qays and Yamani blocks
began with the battle at Marj Rahit in 684, which was fought over the
issue of the caliphate. Over the next years, continued contests over land

Twentieth Seminar for Arabian Studies held at London on 1st–4th July 1986 (London:
Seminar for Arabian Studies, Institute of Archaeology, 1987); Wood, “A History of the
Balqa-Region,” pp. 61–70.
64
Robinson, “Tribes and Nomads,” p. 443.
65
Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, pp. 47–49.
66
Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, p. 49; Dixon, Umayyad Caliphate, p. 56; Morony, Iraq
after the Muslim Conquest, pp. 249–250.
67
Orthmann, Stamm und Macht, pp. 40–41.
68
Scholars have come to different conclusions about the proportion of Bedouin troops
active at this time. See, for instance, Patricia Crone, “The Early Islamic World,” in War
and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds. Asia, the Mediterranean, Europe and
Mesoamerica, ed. Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein (Washington, DC: Center for
Hellenic Studies, Harvard University, 1999), pp. 316–317; Kurt Franz, Vom Beutezug
zur Territorialherrschaft. Beduinische Gruppen in mittelislamischer Zeit, vol. 5, Nomaden und
Sesshafte (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2007), pp. 120, 199.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Bedouin Image 49

combined with the desire for vengeance to keep the tribes of Syria in
a state of feud, contributed to the ill-feeling between the two factions.69
Some land in dispute was pasture, but some may well have been agricul-
tural. In the Qays-Yamani split, as in the division between the supporters
of Ibn Zubayr and the Umayyads, regional issues were more central than
the division between settled and nomadic. Thus, in general the northern-
most region, the Jazira, contained primarily Qaysi tribes, often at odds
with the more southern Syrian regions. The division between Iraqi and
Syrian interests is also well known; here the discontents appear to have
centered around the distribution of wealth and privilege and, in Kufa,
questions of religion. Although there were some raids and occasional
problems with routes, the relations between the Bedouin and towns-
people seem not to have been a source of serious trouble.
When we examine the position of nomads – as nomads – in the early
Islamic state, we find a situation which had elements in common with pre-
Islamic Syria and Arabia. There does not appear to have been a major
shift in the ratio of nomad and settled populations, and the Umayyads
seem to have been successful in their attempt to co-opt the chiefs of the
Syrian Bedouin. Aside from the interior deserts, there was no one region
totally dominated by nomads, and almost none were free of them. Thus,
the system earlier visible in the Arabian Peninsula, in which almost all
regions, tribes, and states included farmers, Bedouin and nomads with
mixed flocks, seems to have spread to the new heartland of the Islamic
state. What is probably most different is the level of integration of the
nomadic population into state structures. Nomads were now less
excluded, but probably more controlled.

The Bedouin Image

The Umayyad period was one of intensifying assimilation to the con-
quered populations. By the eighth century the Arab elite were intermarry-
ing with their new subjects and adapting to the life of the great cities and
imperial traditions. As rulers over the population of two highly developed
empires, they required both a more sophisticated legitimation and
a political and cultural identity as an Arab ruling class.70 The effort to
create these involved the nomads, particularly the Bedouin, though less as

69
Dixon, Umayyad Caliphate, pp. 84–119; Rotter, Die Umayyaden, pp. 133–146.
70
Fred M. Donner, “Umayyad Efforts at Legitimation: The Umayyads’ Silent Heritage,”
in Umayyad Legacies: Medieval Memories from Syria to Spain, ed. Antoine Burrut and
Paul M. Cobb (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Fred M. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers at
the Origins of Islam (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 2010),
pp. 217–220.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 50 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

actors than as an iconic image. The Bedouin came to stand for the pre-
Islamic past of the Arabs and for their separate identity within the larger
world. For many city Arabs, Bedouin provided the definition of the
inferior society they had left behind with the jā hilı̄ ya – the age of ignorance
before the rise of Islam.71 At the same time, the desert and the Bedouin
formed the base for much of the best-loved literature of that period, which
remained highly popular. The desert nomad became an ambivalent fig-
ure; he was uncouth, irreligious and lawless, but also brave and generous.
As we have seen, references to nomads in the Qur’an were largely
negative. The number of hadı̄ th describing Bedouin as inferior Muslims
suggests disapproval among ˙ some of the population also in the first
centuries of Islam. Muhammad was reported to have made disparaging
remarks about them. He was said to have forbidden Bedouin from leading
muhā jirū n in prayer; Bedouin were lax in prayer, tending to put off the
evening prayer until they had milked their camels; women of the
muhā jirū n should not marry them lest they slide back into Bedouin
ways.72 However, one finds some traditions which suggest a more positive
view. One hadı̄ th, for instance, concerns a Bedouin who entered a mosque
˙
during Muhammad’s lifetime, and casually urinated inside it. Incensed,
the Muslims yelled at him, but Muhammad ordered that he be let go and
simply poured water over the urine.73
It was in the literary sphere that the Bedouin became useful. The art of
tribal Arabic poetry was actively promoted by the Umayyad caliphs, who
sponsored a return to pre-Islamic poetic traditions. Mu‘awiya set up his
court at Damascus, near the former capital of the Ghassanids, and like
them, he patronized poets. Thus, the pre-Islamic poem of eulogy and
denigration – the qası̄ da – continued to flourish. Since Mu‘awiya and his
˙
successors chose to rule through the tribal system, it is not surprising to
find that the qası̄ da continued to be used also in the service of tribal rivalry.
˙
The form and imagery of the qası̄ da were highly stylized, and its nomad
˙
references firmly set. For poets remaining within the genre, the locus
remained the desert, and the mores those of the nomad.74 The famous
poem composed by the poet al-Akhtal for the caliph Marwan after the
victory at Marj Rahit in 684 both praises the caliph and claims for his own

71
Binay, Die Figur des Beduinen, pp. 3–7, 26.
72
Robinson, “Tribes and Nomads,” pp. 441; Crone, “The First-Century Concept of
Hiğ ra,” pp. 360–371; Sulayman Bashı̄ r, Arabs and Others in Early Islam, Studies in Late
Antiquity and Early Islam; 8 (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1997), pp. 10–14; Binay, Die
Figur des Beduinen, pp. 106–125.
73
Bukharı̄ , vol. I, bk 4, numbers 218, 221; Sahih Muslim, vol. II, numbers 558, 559. www
.hadithcollection.com
74
Jaroslav Stetkevych, The Zephyrs of Najd: The Poetics of Nostalgia in the Classical Arabic
Nası̄ b (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 111–122.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Bedouin Image 51

tribe, the Taghlib, a greater prestige than they probably held. The Taghlib
was a tribe on the central Euphrates which raised primarily sheep, goats
and horses, and thus did not enjoy the cachet of the camel Bedouin. At
this time, moreover, they were still largely Christian, and therefore pre-
sumably ranked low in both the religious and the tribal hierarchies.75 In
the ode, nonetheless, the pure-bred camels appear with the Taghlib, while
their enemies, many of them originally Bedouin, are associated with the
inferior animals – sheep, goats and asses.76 The many battles associated
with the Qays/Yamani rivalry were commemorated both in poetry and in
prose, and rivals also recalled their pre-Islamic exploits, thus keeping alive
the pre-Islamic historical tradition of the ayyā m al-‘arab.77
Interest in poetry and the use of Bedouin imagery was not confined to court
and army. The reconstitution of tribal structure under the early caliphs and
later the Qays-Yamani factionalism ensured that rivalries would take on
a tribal nomenclature; thus, the historical and legendary traits ascribed to
particular tribes became the object of scholarly research. The creation of
a subordinate class of recent converts, the mawā lı̄ , and their attempt to gain
greater status encouraged the political use of pre-Islamic Arab traditions,
which could be mined to find weapons against rivals and upstarts. The
science of genealogy soon became important, and its practitioners sought
after.78 The new learned classes of the cities in Iraq pursued knowledge of the
Bedouin for other reasons – ironically as a tool for understanding the Qur’an,
a text hardly friendly to the Bedouin ideal. The Bedouin were seen as great
masters of speech and moreover, as desert dwellers who had remained away
from the cities, they were the key to the understanding of earlier language and
habits necessary to the urban commentators, most living outside the Arabian
Peninsula.79 The greatest centers for the elaboration of Bedouin studies were
the cities in Iraq – Kufa and most especially Basra – which although they
started as garrisons soon had a mixed population and an active economy
supporting a learned leisure class. Basra, closer to the desert, stood out,
perhaps because of its famous market, the Mirbad, which attracted desert
Bedouin conveniently to the doorstep of city scholars.80 Iranian converts
75
Stetkevych, Poetics, Chapters 2–3 (pp. 51–108).
76
Stetkevych, Poetics, pp. 90, 96–97.
77
Dixon, Umayyad Caliphate, p. 89; Donner, Narratives of Islamic Origins, pp. 196–197.
78
Morony, Iraq after the Muslim Conquest, pp. 237–238, 254–258; Claude Cahen, “History
and Historians,” in Religion, Learning and Science in the ‘Abbasid Period, ed. J. D. Latham ;
R. B. Sergeant ; M. J. L Young, Cambridge History of Arabic Literature (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 189; Goldziher, Muslim Studies, pp. 126–131,
167–175; el-Tayib, “Pre-Islamic Poetry,” pp. 389, 393, 409.
79
Binay, Die Figur des Bedouinen, pp. 50–52.
80
Charles Pellat, Le milieu basrien et la formation de Ğ ā ḫ iz (Paris: Librairie d’Amérique et
d’Orient Adrien-Maisonneuve,˙ 1953), pp. 5–12, 34–35, ˙ 37–47; Morony, Iraq after the
Muslim Conquest, pp. 195, 198, 208–209, 271.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 52 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

began to write in Arabic, and the literary language started to include Persian
words, while the first translations of Persian literature into Arabic were
undertaken. In response, many poets and philologists sought out Bedouin
lexicography to enshrine in their works.81
When the Arab elites defined themselves against their non-Arab sub-
jects, the Bedouin ceased to be the uncouth “other” and became the
unpolluted “self.” Fear that the prestige and the fighting strength of
Arabs could be damaged by too close an association with their subject
peoples was openly expressed. The problem was particularly acute in
Iraq, where Persian influence was strong, and became sharper as the
governors ‘Ubayd Allah b. Ziyad (675–684) and al-Hajjaj (694–714)
worked to develop a more centralized administration.82 In 683, ‘Ubayd
Allah reportedly declared in the Friday sermon (khutba) in Basra, “We
˙
have worn silk, the striped cloth of Yaman, and soft clothing until our
skins have become disgusted with it. We must replace it with iron.”83
Likewise among the religious classes, settled and Persian ways were
frowned upon, and we find hadı̄ th warning against such Persian habits
˙
as using a knife at meals or rising as a mark of respect.84 By the end of the
Umayyad period there was a significant bilingual elite within which
people of different origins and traditions worked closely together, but
nonetheless the Arabs as rulers and the military class had managed to
retain – or to create – a consciously separate character, based in part on
a carefully preserved corpus of Bedouin lore and literature.

Conclusion
In some ways the dynamics of Arabian conquest and rule resemble those
of earlier dynasties in the Middle East. The Arabian population began as
a peripheral society using a variety of methods to wrest a living from
marginal lands. It was brought into the orbit of the neighboring states
first because the territory lay across important trade routes, and second
because Arabians were useful as troops. After several centuries of service,
strife, and mutual political interference, the Arabs organized and con-
quered not one empire, but all of one and part of another. Once in power

81
H. A. R. Gibb, “The Social Significance of the Shuubiya,” in Studies on the Civilization of
Islam, ed. Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 63;
C. E. Bosworth, “The Persian Impact on Arabic Literature,” in Arabic Literature to the
End of the Umayyad Period, ed. T. M. Johnstone A. F. L. Beeston, R. B. Sergeant and
G. R. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 492.
82
Morony, Iraq after the Muslim Conquest, pp. 51–53, 59–61, 66–68, 74–75, 79.
83
Morony, Iraq after the Muslim Conquest, pp. 262–263.
84
Bosworth, “The Persian Impact,” p. 484.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Conclusion 53

they adopted many of the traditions of their subject peoples while retain-
ing an elite identity as outsiders.
The people of the Arabian Peninsula did not have a common economic
strategy or belong to one political tradition, but they did share a poetic
language and a tribal tradition in which leadership by consent combined
with an egalitarian ethic and a code of conduct covering most aspects of
life. While the tribal code was powerful in towns and agricultural districts,
it reflected Bedouin society in its emphasis on warfare, hospitality and
equality. Effective leadership, however, came most often from settled
tribes or sections, particularly from those who had access to additional
religious legitimation which could transcend tribal separatism.
If we examine the history of nomad and settled through the formation
of the caliphate, what we see could be understood as the expansion of
settled power. In the first centuries of camel nomadism, largely nomad
confederations had controlled several of the major trade routes by center-
ing themselves in the larger oases, and while the oases developed a strong
agricultural base, the Bedouin remained crucial to the control of trade.
After the Roman takeover of the Syrian coast, nomads remained import-
ant as troops and were courted by the client kings of the Romans and
Sasanians. From the time of Muhammad, the balance appears to have
changed. It is notable that Muhammad’s community, centered in towns
living from trade and agriculture, succeeded in building up a coalition
able to expand through the whole of the peninsula and beyond. The early
outside conquests were the work of primarily sedentary soldiers, with the
Hijazis at the center. The need for new manpower in the conquest army
after 634 led to the inclusion of tribes who converted later, some of whom
were largely Bedouin, but at the same time the creation of garrison cities
and the emphasis on the hijra discouraged a fully nomadic lifestyle within
the central army.
The Umayyads controlled three sides of the desert, leaving only south-
ern and eastern Arabia relatively independent, and these were no longer
critical areas. Thus, the nomad tribes of the central deserts could no
longer play one power against another. On the other hand, the
Umayyads had to deal more closely with the desert. While the
Byzantines and Sasanians had used client kings to protect themselves
from raids by desert nomads or attacks from the rival empire, the
Umayyads had to incorporate nomads and their habitat in order to keep
their state together. Many Arabs did remain nomadic, and Bedouin
continued to make up part of the army. We cannot characterize the
Umayyads as a tribal confederation, but the dynasty did bring both
tribalism and nomad populations into state structures. The chiefs of
largely Bedouin tribes such as the Kalb were now part of the central

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 54 Nomads in the Establishment of the Caliphate

elite, intermarrying with the dynasty and holding important positions,

and tribal support was crucial to the second civil war and the triumph of
the Marwanids.85 The nomads had lost some independence of action, but
they were more fully included in the power structure.
The nomads also played a central role in the development of Arab
identity. Unlike earlier nomad rulers in the Middle East, the Muslims
brought with them a new religion and with it their own language and
literary tradition. Here the Bedouins played a crucial role, and one that
has influenced the understanding of Arab culture and history. Two forms
of oral pre-Islamic literature helped to form the basis of later literature:
the qası̄ da and the tales of the ayyā m al-‘arab; both furthered a tribal image
˙
tied to a Bedouin ideal. The emphasis on the desert, on freedom and on
a particular set of personal characteristics may have arisen in opposition to
a reality which limited the autonomy of the camel nomads. The highly
colored image of a separate people who represented both the Arab home-
land and the pre-Islamic past was more ideal than reality. Nonetheless it
proved useful and durable, both in expressing tensions among the early
Muslim Arabs and in demonstrating their cohesion and difference from
other peoples.

85
Crone, Slaves on Horses, pp. 93–94.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.004 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 3 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

On their victory in 750 the ‘Abbasids moved the capital of the caliphate
from Syria to the old imperial center in Mesopotamia and brought a shift
in the composition of court personnel and the standing army. For the
nomads of the Islamic lands the first 250 years of Abbasid rule repre-
sented a period of relative exclusion, followed by a rise to power and
importance. As nomads regained power, the Bedouin were joined by new
groups who enlarged the sphere of nomad control. Abbasid commanders
and the Persian bureaucrats who dominated the Abbasid administration
brought a more eastern geographical consciousness. For the Bedouin and
the Arab tribesmen of Syria, early Abbasid rule meant a drop in status and
probably in prosperity. In other partly nomadic areas, on the other hand,
the Abbasids brought new energy for expansion and consolidation. As the
Jazira, Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and the Caspian provinces gained import-
ance, the nomads and mountain peoples of these regions developed into
political powers.
In the ninth century a new military class emerged as the troops that the
‘Abbasids had brought with them were first supplemented and then
gradually replaced by Turkic soldiers. This was the first appearance of
an ethnic group which has played a central role in the history of the
Middle East. The Turks were imported from the Eurasian steppe in
small groups or as individuals, some originally slaves, and they were
used as highly trained cavalry. By the middle of the ninth century, the
three leading ethnic groups of the central Islamic lands – Arabs, Persians
and Turks – were all recognized as an integral part of the governing elite.
It seems ironic that it should have been under the Abbasids that the
Bedouin developed into independent political powers, since the Abbasid
revolution appeared to shift power away from their lands. During the
Umayyad period the Syrian desert had held a central position. Bedouins
therefore could not be excluded, but when they were active, they were
usually led by settled powers; tribal leaders were active forces in govern-
ment politics but did not establish independent dynasties.

55

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 56 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

Bedouin political development in the Abbasid period was gradual and

the result of a number of separate factors. In their first years, the Abbasids
were a strong expanding power, but within a century they began to face
serious problems. The first and most intractable of these was the decline
in the agricultural base of Iraq; this brought with it financial difficulties
that made the maintenance of a large standing army difficult. Thus, the
dynasty became increasingly dependent on neighboring areas for both
grain and manpower. As a result, dynasties of mountain and nomad
provenance gained increasing power in the center. Both they and the
‘Abbasids, seeking additional soldiers, turned to Bedouins and Kurds
for auxiliary troops. Tribal chiefs, gaining authority and wealth from
outside, strengthened their position over their tribesmen. In the tenth
century, Bedouin tribal groups began to take part in local politics under
their own leadership, and over the century leading lineages strengthened
their power sufficiently to found regional dynasties. During the same
period the Iranian Kurds likewise became organized and emerged as
a significant historical force. From this time on, the Middle East was
never without dynasties of nomad provenance.
When the Abbasids established themselves in Iraq, they were implicitly
claiming all of Iran and the eastern caliphate, since these had been
conquered by the Iraqi army. The early ‘Abbasid period was a crucial
one for the nomads of both the western and the eastern parts of the
caliphate. However, developments in the two regions proceeded along
different lines and would be difficult to trace in one chapter. I have
therefore limited myself here to the history of the western provinces,
from Egypt to central Iran, and will discuss eastern Iran and Central
Asia in Chapter 4, on the Seljukid period.

The Changing Caliphal Army

The Abbasids defeated the Umayyads with the help of a large army they
brought with them from Khorasan, and their rule ended the Syrian
domination of the standing army. When they sought additional soldiers
from outside, they turned to new sources of manpower in the northern
and eastern regions. Arabs – including Bedouins – did not cease to serve
in caliphal armies, but they became one among many different peoples.
The ‘Abbasids settled the core of their Khorasanian army in Iraq as elite
troops; these included Arab soldiers from Khorasan, some of whom had
probably remained nomadic, and Iranian troops.1 These armies and their

1
The region of Marw, which was the garrison center for Khorasan, was on the edge of the
desert and noted for camel raising; many Arabs also inhabited Qumis, also a region known

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Changing Caliphal Army 57

descendants became a separate, privileged group, known as the abnā

(sons). However, the new military order was not a complete or sudden
reversal for either the Syrian military or the nomads. The Bedouin had
ceased to play a central military role before the fall of the Umayyads.2
During the first years of Abbasid rule, moreover, Syria remained
a strategic region. The Abbasid family had been centered in the town of
Humayma in the southern desert, now southern Jordan, and in their
contest with the Umayyads, they had successfully courted many of the
northern Syrian tribesmen.3 During the first decades of Abbasid power,
Syrian troops, both nomad and settled, were still active, and Abbasid
representatives forged close links with nomad tribes, particularly within
the Qays faction.4
The position of western troops was eroded in the succession struggle
which followed the death of caliph Harun al-Rashid in 809, which pitted
the armies of the eastern and western regions against each other. Harun
had divided his realm – the west under his first heir apparent, Amin, and
the east under another son, Ma’mun. Amin was stationed in Baghdad and
had the allegiance of most of the standing army; he also recruited Kalb
from Homs and Damascus, and from the north, including the Jazira. Al-
Ma’mun was stationed in Khorasan, and when he took over Baghdad in
819 he brought with him a largely eastern army. Among the soldiers al-
Ma’mun recruited in the east were a number of Turks. This was a fateful
move, since Turkic soldiers came to play a central role in military and
political history, and in the history of nomads.
The Turks had long been familiar as formidable enemies and occa-
sional allies along the northern frontier in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
They owed much of their military prowess and their reputation as soldiers
to their background as steppe nomads. In particular, they were renowned
for their skill in mounted archery; here they were superior to the Bedouin.
It was not only fighting skill which distinguished the Turks; they also had
the prestige of belonging to a major imperial system, since they were
connected with the Türk Khaghanate. Furthermore, they were available.

for livestock. Heinz Gaube and Thomas Leisten, Die Kernländer des ‘Abbā sidenreiches im
10./11. Jh.: Materialien zur TAVO-Karte B VII 6, Beihefte zum Tübinger Atlas des
Vorderen Orients. Reihe B, Geisteswissenschaften; Nr. 75 (Wiesbaden: L. Reichert,
1994), 37, 110; Vladimir Minorsky, V. V. Bartol’d, and Clifford Edmund Bosworth,
Hudū d al-‘Ā lam; “The Regions of the World”: A Persian Geography, 372 A.H.–982 A.D.,
2nd ed., E. J. W. Gibb memorial series; new ser., 11 (London: Luzac, 1970), p. 104.)
2
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 120, 199.
3
Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the
Sixth to the Eleventh Century (London; New York: Longman, 1986), pp. 126–131.
4
Hugh Kennedy, The Early Abbasid Caliphate: A Political History (London; Totowa, NJ:
Croom Helm; Barnes & Noble, 1981), pp. 59–60, 67–68, 74.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 58 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

Over the two centuries of its existence, the khaghanate had broken down
and fragmented several times. Some Turkic tribes moved west and
became the dominant groups on the Transoxanian frontier; many also
moved into Transoxiana and Khorasan. With the break-up of the western
section of the khaghanate in 737–738, these groups became independent
and available for recruitment. The Turkic borderlands provided oppor-
tunity for volunteer fighters for the faith who could at once spread the
banner of Islam and acquire prisoners of war to sell as slaves.
The Turks were brought in largely as individuals or small groups,
separated from their own society, many of them originally purchased as
slaves. There is some controversy over the extent of actual slavery within
the Turkic forces. Some clearly came in as free men, often prestigious,
while others were purchased but later freed, and fought as free men.5 The
purchased slaves, ideally young men or adolescents, were given intensive
training in military arts, and usually converted to Islam. They were kept
together and separate from the population, to encourage loyalty to the
dynasty. Fully trained as professional soldiers, many achieved high rank
in the army. Known as mamlū k or ghulā m, or often simply as Turks, they
became a standard part of standing armies, and often a considerable
political force.
Ma’mun had recruited Turkic military from the eastern borderlands
and when he took Baghdad from al-Amin he used them, along with
Khorasanians, to augment the standing army. During al-Ma’mun’s
reign his brother, the future caliph al-Mu‘tasim, also began gathering
a personal guard of Turkic slave soldiers from Transoxiana and the
Caucasus. A number of these were slave soldiers but there were also
several powerful Turkic military families in Baghdad, some of them
apparently of aristocratic background.6 From this time on, mamluks
were part of most major Middle Eastern armies.7 When al-Mu‘tasim
became caliph in 833, the Turkish soldiers still formed only a personal
guard, but their numbers grew over time. Estimates of the size of the
Turkic guard vary widely, from a few thousand to over 100,000.8
A foreign standing army quartered in the capital city is likely to show
signs of arrogance. This had happened with the Khorasanian army and
became an even greater problem with the Turkic troops, who were

5
See, for example, Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, pp. 120–123; Matthew Gordon, The
Breaking of a Thousand Swords: A History of the Turkish Military of Samarra, A.H. 200–
275/815–889 C.E (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), pp. 6–8.
6
Gordon, The Breaking, pp. 2, 157–160.
7
For a more skeptical view of Mamluk importance, see Deborah G. Tor, “The Mamluks in
the Military of the Pre-Seljuq Persianate Dynasties,” Iran 46 (2008).
8
Gordon, The Breaking, pp. 71–73.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Ethnic Characterization: The Bedouins and the Turks 59

resented by the Khorasanians as well as the city population. After

a number of unpleasant incidents, al-Mu‘tasim built a new capital for
the court and army at Samarra, about 70 kilometers north of Baghdad.9
However the guard in Samarra became involved in politics, and by 847
when the caliph al-Mutawakkil (847–861) came to the throne, Turks
were among those deciding the succession.10 Al-Mutawakkil’s moves
against the Turks, along with his difficulty in paying their salaries, led to
his murder and to a period of anarchy, in which members of the Turkic
guard supporting a rival caliph attacked Baghdad, causing great destruc-
tion to the city and surrounding districts.11 Finally, under the caliph al-
Mu’tamid (872–892) the dynasty regained control, and the caliphate
moved back to Baghdad.12
While the Samarra caliphate lasted only a short time, the Turkic elite
remained a central part of the power structure, connected to the bureau-
cracy and surrounding powers. As trusted commanders, Turkic mamluks
were appointed to governorships, and when power weakened at the
center, several achieved first autonomy and then independence. Two
dynasties of Turkic soldiers controlled Egypt for about a century, and
will figure in this chapter: the Tulunids (868–905) and the Ikshidids
(935–969). Such dynasties became a common phenomenon in the cen-
tral Islamic lands.

Ethnic Rivalries and Characterization: The Bedouins

and the Turks
By the mid-ninth century Khorasanians and Turks had largely sup-
planted the Syrians – Bedouin and settled – who had dominated the
Umayyad army. The bureaucracy underwent a similar change. Persian
bureaucrats now held the highest offices, introducing elements of Persian
culture and legitimation. Thus the ‘Abbasids were an Arab dynasty with
a ruling elite made up largely of non-Arab peoples, particularly in the
center of the caliphate. One might expect that these changes would
destroy the iconic place of the Bedouin in cultural identity; however,
this was not the case. The adoption of foreign culture and increasing
equalization among the ethnic groups making up the empire provoked
a deliberate promotion of a separate Arab consciousness. The need for
Persian and Turkic elites was accepted – tacitly at least – but not their
equal cultural worth. ‘Abbasid rule, therefore, brought new elaboration to
9
Gordon, The Breaking, pp. 27–30, 48–50. 10 Gordon, The Breaking, pp. 80–87.
11
David Waines, “The Third Century Internal Crisis of the Abbasids,” Journal of the
Economic and Social History of the Orient 20, no. 3 (1977), p. 299.
12
Gordon, The Breaking, pp. 141–143.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 60 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

the theme of ethnic particularism, which became enshrined in literature

for future generations.
In seeking to define a unique and superior character for the Arabs,
writers turned again to the Bedouin as the archetypical inhabitant of the
desert lands. Increasing enthusiasm for the study of their language, his-
tory and lifestyle created a lively market for Bedouin lore, with the
accompanying problems of exploitation and fabrication. The Muslim
scholars of the ninth century already faced the question of how to preserve
the purity of primitive objects of study and how to judge the reliability of
informants.13 The famous essayist al-Jahiz (d. 869) praised the speech of
the cultured, eloquent Bedouin, but railed against those “who pitch their
tents in the neighborhoods of main roads and busy markets.”14 The
bookseller Ibn al-Nadim, who wrote a valuable treatise on Arabic litera-
ture in 987, lists the Bedouin teachers of earlier scholarly generations,
noting several who artificially heightened their desert cachet.15
The trumpeting of Arab superiority irritated the non-Arabs and led to
an intellectual movement in the early Abbasid period known as the
Shu‘ubiyya, in which some scholars of non-Arab origin asserted the
worth of their own people and mocked the Arab glorification of
Bedouin lifestyle.16 The Arabs answered in kind. This was a literary
contest not to be confused with nationalism in the modern sense. Many
people defending their own heritage against that of the Arabs were them-
selves experts in Arab ethnography and history; indeed, it was their
knowledge of Arab lore which allowed them effectively to lampoon
ancient Arab ways.17 The Shu‘ubiyya and its refutation produced
a wealth of ethnic characterizations of Arabs and their subjects – particu-
larly the Persians, who were chosen as the effete counterpart to the Arab.
Disagreement seems to have centered less around the character of each
group than around the question of whether the traits observed were
13
Zoltan Szombathy, “Fieldwork and Preconceptions: The Role of the Bedouin as
Informants in Mediaeval Muslim Scholarly Culture (Second–Third/Eighth–Ninth
Centuries),” Der Islam 92, no. 1 (2015), pp. 128–137.
14
Charles Pellat, The Life and Works of Jā hiz (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1969), p. 105. ˙ ˙
15
Muhammad ibn Ishā q Ibn al-Nadı̄ m, The Fihrist of al-Nadı̄ m; A Tenth-Century Survey
˙
of Muslim Culture,˙ trans. Bayard Dodge (New York: Columbia University Press,
1970), pp. 100, 106, and for further examples 115; Pellat, Le milieu basrien,
pp. 127–128. ˙
16
The epithet shu‘ū bı̄ comes from Qur’an 49:13, where it is stated that God created man in
shu‘ū b and tribes, which was taken to advocate judging nobility according to righteous-
ness rather than tribal descent. Roy Mottahedeh, “The Shu‘ûbîyah Controversy and the
Social History of Early Islamic Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 6 (1976),
pp. 164–165.
17
Ibn al-Nadı̄ m, Fihrist, pp. 230, 244–245; Goldziher, Muslim Studies. pp. 148–149, 177–
180, 189.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Ethnic Characterization: The Bedouins and the Turks 61

admirable ones. Much of the writing was satirical, making full use of irony
and caricature.18
In the literature of the Shu‘biyya and its opponents, the character
sketched out for Arabs is that of the Bedouin and the warrior. In al-
Jahiz’s characterization, the Arabs were not merchants, artisans,
scholars, or farmers (all of which they were in fact by this time);
rather, they lived in the plains and grew up in contemplation of the
desert.19 Arab strength was seen as having derived in part from their
minimal needs and their ability to bear want and hardship.20 The
group of people thus imagined was the ruling class, whose supposed
traits of simplicity and honesty were connected to the legitimacy of
their rule.21 The subject elite, particularly the Persians, are portrayed
in opposite terms, – overdressed, pretentious, at once proud, servile,
and fearful.22 The deprived life and faintly repulsive habits of the
Bedouins, lampooned by the Persian, are thus turned around to
become sources of virtue for the Arabs:
Our life, by God, is a life which can in no way be called deprived. Our food is the
tastiest and most wholesome: colocynth, lizards, jerboas, hedgehogs and snakes.
Sometimes by God, we eat lambskin, roasting the hide.23
The poet al-Akhlab, writing in 684 after the battle of Marj Rahit, had
characterized such foods as “vile provender” and attributed them to his
enemies as a source of ridicule.24
The fashion for ethnic characterization extended to other groups, includ-
ing those serving in the army. The Turks were a frequent subject. As
a military class from an inhospitable region, they shared the traits of simplicity
and martial character for which the Arabs claimed superiority. At the same
time, they were clearly resented and feared. Much of the ambivalence shown
towards the Bedouin, which I described in Chapter 2, can also be found in
writings about the Turks. Both Bedouins and Turks are distinguished by
their bravery and independence, their ability to bear discomfort and to
survive on a limited diet, and their straightforward behavior. On the negative
side, both are uncouth, often ugly, uneducated, violent and given to

18
Göran Larsson, “Ignaz Goldziher on the Shu‘ū biyya,” Zeitschrift der deutche
morgenländische Geselschaft 155, no. 2 (2005).
19
Pellat, Life and Works, pp. 96–97.
20
al-Jā hiz, Nine essays of al-Jahiz, trans. William M. Hutchins (New York: P. Lang, 1989),
˙ ˙
pp. 126–133 (“Homesickness”), 205–206 (“Turks”); Gérard Lecomte, Ibn Qutayba
(mort en 276/889). L’homme, son oeuvre, ses idées (Damascus: Institut français de
Damas, 1965), pp. 350–351.
21
Lecomte, Ibn Qutayba, pp. 250–253. 22 Pellat, Life and Works, pp. 272–274.
23
Jā hiz, Nine Essays, 128. 24 Stetkevych, Poetics, pp. 96, 108.
˙ ˙

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 62 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

plunder.25 The most positive portrayal of the Turks is that of al-Jahiz, who
praised the martial abilities of the Turks, resulting from their hardiness as
a steppe people and their particular expertise in mounted archery. They are
the “Bedouin of the non-Arabs,” sharing one virtue, that of homesickness for
a native land of purity and discomfort.26
The writings of al-Jahiz and other early Abbasid authors, which have
enjoyed enduring popularity, suggest a recognition of peoples of varied ethnic
backgrounds within the caliphate, with a distinct sphere and character
assigned to each. In the military, the groups more recently added,
Khorasanians and particularly Turks, take place alongside the Arab, typified
as the Bedouin. The Persians, with others of urban and non-military origin,
are given a contrasting and equally exaggerated set of traits. Underlying the
opposite characterizations lies the expectation of a military and ruling class
that was foreign to the subject population in origin and character. The
dichotomy set up at this period lasted throughout the Abbasid period and
even beyond when new Turkic and Mongolian rulers from the Eurasian
steppe took the place of Arabs.

Changing Regional Dynamics

The rise of Persians and Turks at the Abbasid court was part of a more
general shift in regional power. Changing routes and growing wealth were
bringing new regions to preeminence and their populations into a broader
political sphere. From the beginning Khorasan was a major source for
military manpower, and from the time of the caliph al-Ma’mun,
Transoxiana became one as well. Thus, northern Iran gained strategic
importance. The northern Khorasan road ran from Iraq through
Hamadan to Rayy, and along the southern edge of the Caspian. Soon after
coming to power, the Abbasids conquered much of Mazandaran and began
to settle at Rayy. Arab penetration into Azerbaijan also increased, and at the
end of the eighth century Abbasid forces began to move into Armenia.27 As
the eastern regions became more important, Syria lost some of its stature
and prosperity. Since the protection and taxation of trade caravans was part
of the Bedouin economy, it is likely that the decline of these routes affected
the nomads of the Syrian deserts.28
25
Susanne Enderwitz, Gesellschaftlicher Rang und ethnische Legitimation: der arabische
Schriftsteller Abū ‘Uṯ mā n al-Ğ ā hiz (gest. 868) über die Afrikaner, Perser und Araber in der
islamischen Gesellschaft (Freiburg ˙ ˙ im Breisgau: Schwarz, 1979), pp. 118–124; Ulrich
W. Haarmann, “Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity: The Arab Image of the
Turk from the ‘Abbasids to Modern Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies
20, no. 2 (1988), pp. 178–180; Binay, Die Figur des Beduinen, pp. 48–49, 154–155.
26
Jā hiz, Nine Essays, pp. 193–208. 27 Kennedy, Early Abbasid, p. 123.
28 ˙ ˙
Kennedy, Early Abbasid, pp. 23–25; Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 56, 162–168, 187, 231–232.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bedouin Powers in the Syrian and Arabian Desert 63

Not all western regions declined under the Abbasids. Under the
Umayyads, Egypt had held little power; now it achieved a position commen-
surate with its wealth in grain and its favorable location for trade. The rulers of
Egypt – Tulunids and Ikshidids – began to extend their power over the cities
of Syria. The Jazira also gained importance. In 772, ten years after founding
the city of Baghdad, the caliph al-Mansur built the city al-Rafiqa near al-
Raqqa on the upper Euphrates as a garrison for frontier troops and a center
for the collection of grain to ship to Iraq.29 Since the Mesopotamian crown
lands – the Sawad – were not sufficient for the demands of an enlarged court
and army, the Jazira, rich in livestock and cereals, became a key supplier.30
Mosul developed into a major regional center, profiting from rain-fed agri-
culture and a location between the steppe inhabited by camel nomads, and
mountain ranges used by nomads raising sheep and horses.
Over the course of the ninth century the decline of the imperial center
further changed the regional balance of power. The most basic problem was
the ongoing deterioration of the rich Sawad region south of Baghdad, which
had provided grain for the cities of Iraq and a good proportion of the state’s
revenue. Over the course of the ninth and tenth century, the dynasty lost
much of the benefit from this region, partly through a vicious cycle of
overuse, need and quick fixes. Internal divisions and disorder added to the
problem.31 From the second half of the ninth century, the caliphs had turned
to grants of land in addition to cash salaries to pay their armies, and as it
became more difficult to gather taxes, the administration resorted to tax
farming. By the tenth century, a significant proportion of the Sawad land of
Mesopotamia was thus no longer directly under government control.32 The
weakness at the center led to growing strength in neighboring regions. Some
reacted with military adventures and moves towards independence. Others
became involved in the politics of the central government.

Bedouin Powers in the Syrian and Arabian Desert

During the late ninth and early tenth centuries rebellious groups began to
gather support among both settled and nomadic tribes in the Syrian
desert and the Arabian Peninsula. The Bedouins had continued to play

29
Kennedy, Early Abbasid, pp. 89–90.
30
Muhammad ibn ‘Alı̄ Ibn Hawqal, Configuration de la terre (Kitab surat al-ard), trans.
˙
Johannes Hendrik Kramer and˙ Gaston Wiet (Beyrouth: Commission internationale pour
la traduction des chefs d’oeuvre, 1965), pp. 207–212.; TAVO Atlases AX 1, AX 11.
31
Waines, “The Third Century,” pp. 282–303.
32
Kennedy, The Prophet, pp. 189–192, 199; Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, pp. 79–87,
128–129; Michael Bonner, “The Waning of Empire, 861–945,” in New Cambridge
History of Islam, ed. Chase Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
pp. 352–354.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 64 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

an essential function in provisioning and guiding caravans, particularly

the pilgrimage caravans that were essential for the prestige of the dynasty.
The Abbasids and other neighboring powers usually paid a stipend to
local tribes to ensure the safety of the caravan. When the agreements
broke down, Bedouins raided the caravans; these raids had occurred
sporadically throughout the eighth and early ninth century, sometimes
provoking retaliation from the Abbasid government.33
At the end of the ninth century, Bedouin activities became more organ-
ized and more threatening, though the Bedouin acted not on their own but
under outside leadership. In about 867 a Medinan family, the Hasanid
Ukhaydirs, gained control of the Yamama oasis and used Bedouin troops
to attack Mecca, Medina and Jidda.34 A larger and longer-lasting challenge
came from the Isma‘ili Shi‘ites, based in the town of Salamiyya on the
western edge of the Syrian desert between Damascus and Aleppo. They
had begun preaching among the tribes of Syria and Mesopotamia at the
end of the eighth century, achieving considerable success among the
Bedouin in northern Syria and the Sawad. The movement soon frag-
mented; one branch, accepting the claim of ‘Ubayd Allah of Salamiya as
the imam, followed him to North Africa and later founded the Fatimid
caliphate. Other factions stayed; they called themselves the Ahl al-Haqq
but were known by the derogatory term Qarmatians (Qaramita). In the
north, a series of leaders attracted a significant following from Bedouin
tribes, primarily sections of the Kalb confederation which dominated the
northern desert and the trade route through Palmyra. We should note,
however, that the tribal section which had responsibility of guarding the
caravans – and presumably enjoyed the resulting rewards – did not choose
to join up.35 Military activity apparently appealed most to tribal sections in
need of additional income. From 903 to 907 the Qaramita and their army
briefly controlled region from Ba’albek to Aleppo, but they were not able to
retain the loyalty of the major Bedouin tribes, and when their armies
suffered a defeat by the ‘Abbasids in 907, the coalition fell apart.36
In the southern regions, the Isma’ili movement had more lasting suc-
cess. A missionary (dā ’ı̄ ) from Iraq, Abu Sa‘id al-Jannabi, established
himself in Bahrayn and Hajar in 899, and eventually formed a state,
making heavy use of the Bedouin. Al-Jannabi and his successors con-
trolled agricultural lands used by the nomads as summer pastures. Some
nomads joined of their own accord, and others were brought into the
military through a combination of compulsion and persuasion. The

33
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 162–171, 197–199. 34 Vom Beutezug, pp. 174–175.
35
Kennedy, The Prophet, pp. 287–288; Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 54–57.
36
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 57–83.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Development of Regional Power 65

Jannabi dynasty organized pasture and migration, and when Bedouin

resisted they could be severely punished.37 The dynasty owed much of
its power to the control of the pilgrimage route from Iraq and when, after
923, the Abbasids attempted to withhold payment, the Jannabis organ-
ized attacks threatening the pilgrims and thus the prestige of the govern-
ment. In some years there was no government sponsored pilgrimage
along this route. In 929–930 the Bahrayni ruler attacked Mecca and
removed the black stone from the Ka‘ba, which remained in the posses-
sion of the dynasty until 951.38
Despite the military importance of the nomads, there was little political
development in the ninth to tenth century among the Bedouin of the
Arabian Peninsula and the Syrian desert. The most organized move-
ments, under the Ukhaydir and the Ismai’li Jannabis, were led by rulers
who centered themselves in oases from which they could control the
Bedouins’ access to summer pasture, water and markets. The Bedouin
were usually powerful enough to claim a share in the income from the
pilgrimage, but not to control the state.39

Development of Regional Power

The events described above involved the development of local powers
able temporarily to challenge government power in regions at a distance
from the center. Bedouin involvement did not lead to claims of independ-
ent power. As the tenth century progressed, however, in northern Syria
and the Jazira the participation of nomad groups in military activity led to
closer involvement with the central government, the development of
stronger tribal leadership and eventually to the creation of nomad states
under tribal leadership. There were two processes going on here. First, as
the Abbasids proved incapable of retaining direct control over the regions
they had incorporated, local powers gained increasing strength and dealt
independently with surrounding nomads. Second, as the politics at the
center became increasingly factional, contestants pulled in tribes and
nomads as allies and troops.
As the Abbasids claimed more extensive territory in Iran, they found it
necessary to delegate authority, and Abbasid commanders in Azerbaijan
and central Iran were allowed significant autonomy.40 Over time, the
Abbasids also resorted to treaties with local rulers, recognizing them as
“governors” of regions like Fars and Rayy, which the Abbasids claimed
37
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 171–172. 38 Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 172–182.
39
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 152–156.
40
Kennedy, The Prophet, pp. 178, 184–185, 192; C. E. Bosworth, “Sā djids,” EI 2nd ed.;
Fred M. Donner, “Dolafids,” Encyclopaedia Iranica (Hereafter EIr).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 66 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

but could no longer control.41 Two mountain populations of northern

Iran begin to appear in the histories over this period: the Kurds and the
Daylamites. Although Kurds are mentioned from the beginning of the
Arab conquest in northwest Iran, we know very little about them before
the ninth century. In medieval Arabic sources, the term kurd (plural
akrā d) denotes Iranian nomads, or nomads who were neither Arab nor
Turkic, and is applied to people well outside the current region of
Kurdistan. The Kurds as we now know them are made up almost cer-
tainly of a variety of different peoples, among whom Iranian tribesmen
have been predominant.42 In this work I shall use the name Kurd only for
the tribal population of primarily nomad or semi-nomad lifestyle raising
sheep, horses and goats who inhabited Kurdistan – the mountainous
region centered in Kermanshah, reaching in the east almost to
Hamadan and in the west to Hulwan. This was a region containing
much fertile agricultural land along with rich pastures and inaccessible
mountain peaks, and it straddled the road linking Baghdad with
Khorasan. Kurdish lands adjoined Bedouin regions to the north and
west, and in some cases the two types of nomad appear to have used the
same pastures at different seasons; this was the case with the meadows
between the two Zab rivers, used in winter by the Kurds and in summer
by Bedouin, and may also have been true of the Mosul region, where the
geographer Ibn Hawqal mentions both Kurds and Arab nomads, and
both summer and winter pastures.43
The mountains of Gilan in the western Caspian region were the home
of the Daylamites, a mountain people known as redoubtable warriors.
Unlike the Kurds, who raised and rode horses, the Daylamites fought as
infantry. By the end of the ninth century, the Caspian region had become
part of wider politics, and Daylami soldiers began to seek employment
outside. Within a short time, contingents of Daylamites were found
within the armies of numerous regional powers and within the Abbasid
army itself.
Over the course of the tenth century, Kurds and Daylamites, along with
many tribes of the Jazira, became intimately involved in the politics not
only of their own regions, but also of Iraq and even Baghdad. What
brought them in was the factional strife which plagued both army and
administration. After about 908, power in Baghdad lay less with the

41
Kennedy, The Prophet, pp. 177–179, 185, 192.
42
Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of
Kurdistan (London; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1992), pp. 15–18, 50–53, 111;
V. V. Minorsky, “Kurd, Kurdistan, iii. B History: The Islamic period up to 1920” EI
2nd ed.
43
Ibn Hawqal, Configuration, pp. 209–210.
˙

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Development of Tribal Power 67

caliphs than with their officials; viziers and commanders vied for control
amid ever-shifting factions and frequent executions. In 936 the caliphs
achieved a partial solution by creating a new position known as amı̄ r al-
umarā ’, which combined military and fiscal responsibility, giving the
commander of the army control over the whole administration. This
move eliminated some areas of conflict but provided a new office to
fight over. Few men remained in the position for more than a year or
two.44
Problems at the center provided opportunity for surrounding peoples.
Some took advantage of Abbasid weakness to raid, plunder, and extort
concessions. Many others were brought in by the Abbasid government.
Attempting to diversify their army and provide a counterweight to the
powerful Turkic slave soldiers, the caliphs recruited numerous other
ethnic groups into the standing army including Daylamites and
Qaramita – former Bedouin soldiers of the Isma‘ilis. The monetary and
political cost of the standing army also encouraged the use of auxiliary
troops, some of whom were recruited among the Bedouin of the Syrian
desert, others from the tribes of the Jazira.45 Finally, outside powers and
their troops were sought out and brought in as allies by people and parties
in need of help against their rivals – from caliphs to tax farmers. Some of
the power gained by nomad and mountain populations was taken, but
more was given.

The Development of Tribal Power

Over time involvement with the Abbasid military led to greater internal
organization among tribal peoples and to the formation of new dynasties.
As these dynasties in their turn sought manpower and alliance with
neighboring peoples, political organization increased among other popu-
lations, leading eventually to the creation of regional states governed by
Bedouins and Kurds. Such states represent a major change, as both
societies are known for their egalitarian social structure and up to this
time had usually been dependent on outside organization for any large-
scale undertaking.46
Two dynasties – the Hamdanids of the Jazira (ca. 905–1004) and the
Buyids of Iran (ca. 932–1062) – played a particularly important role in the
evolution of nomad states. Both arose out of mountain or pastoral soci-
eties and gained power in the center; coming from a tribal society, they

44
Kennedy, The Prophet, pp. 187–199.
45
Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, pp. 157–164; Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 119–133.
46
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 1–9.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 68 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

dealt closely with nomad tribes as mercenaries, allies and competitors. As

a result, Bedouin and Kurdish tribes, becoming an integral part of
regional politics, developed stronger leadership and greater ambitions.
The Hamdanids and Buyids each had one ruler of particular power and
skill who managed to reduce the nomads to obedience for the period of his
reign. These men interfered in tribal affairs, attacked and defeated the
most powerful tribes of the area, and gave regional responsibilities to the
leaders of newly favored tribes. By the time they died, leaving weaker
successors, the tribes they promoted had developed the political institu-
tions needed to found states in their own right. I will give a brief introduc-
tion to the history of each dynasty.

The Hamdanids
The Hamdanids began as chiefs of a section of the Banu Taghlib tribe,
between Mosul and Mardin. Part of the tribe was nomadic, though not
Bedouin; as I have stated earlier, they raised primarily sheep and horses.
Other sections were agriculturalists, and grain was an important
product.47 The first well-known member of the Hamdanid lineage,
Hamdan b. Hamdun, became active during the 860s, providing valuable
service to the Abbasids against dissidents in the Jazira.48 His sons held
command within the Abbasid army and secured recognition as governors
over Mosul along with a considerable portion of the Jazira. At the same
time, they became players in the politics of Baghdad at the highest level,
involved in the appointment and dismissal of chief viziers and even the
choice of caliphs.49
Several factors contributed to the rise of the Hamdanids. First, they
enjoyed great wealth from their control of pastures and agricultural lands
in the district of Mosul. Second, they rose to power at a time of confusion
in northern Syria and the Jazira, with new migrations into the region.
Tribes were competing for pasture, raiding and aiding rebellions.50 It is
likely that the shortage of pastures left many in need of additional income,
and a number served in the Abbasid or regional armies. The unsettled
condition of the Jazira made it impossible for the Abbasids to hold Mosul
on their own despite several attempts to retake the region.51
The establishment of the Hamdanid realm as an independent emirate
was the work of one of Hamdan’s grandsons, Hasan (ruled ca. 929–967),

47
Marius Canard, Histoire de la dynastie des H’amdanides de Jazîra et de Syrie (Paris: Presses
universitaires de France, 1953), p. 303; Franz, Vom Beutezug, p. 107.
48
Canard, Histoire, pp. 291–302. 49 Canard, Histoire, pp. 308–351.
50
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 109–112, 180.
51
Canard, Histoire, pp. 343–344, 350–351, 398–401.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Development of Tribal Power 69

usually known by his honorific title Nasir al-Dawla. His career provides
a good illustration of the dynamics of Hamdanid politics. In 936–937
Hasan and his brother received from the Caliph the accoutrements of
regional status – robes of honor, horses and banners – and from this time
they were relatively independent rulers of Mosul. In 938 Hasan refused to
pay taxes and succeeded in holding his own against an Abbasid attack,
largely because Iraq depended on his grain supply.52 In 942, he achieved
the position of amı̄ r al-‘umarā , given on condition that he restore order in
southern Iraq. Both he and his brother received formal titles, Nasir al-
Dawla for him, and Sayf al-Dawla for his brother.53
The office granted to Nasir al-Dawla was less a grant of power than an
invitation to attempt the impossible; the Sawad could not be brought to
order. After less than a year the brothers gave up and returned to Mosul.
One important result of service as amı̄ r al-umarā was the acquisition of
armies of professional soldiers – Turks, Daylamites and Qaramita, a great
advantage in a situation of tribal upheaval. From this time on, Nasir al-
Dawla was the recognized ruler of Mosul and able to expand to the north
and west into Azerbaijan, Armenia and Kurdistan.54 Sayf al-Dawla took
Aleppo in 944, acknowledging the caliph and Nasir al-Dawla in the
Friday prayers, but controlling northern Syria as a largely independent
emirate.55 The Hamdanid family thus rose to power through
a combination of regional strength and office within the central govern-
ment; they were at once outsiders and insiders. While they usually could
not stand against the caliphal army, they had a strong position from which
to bargain, both because Iraq depended heavily on their region for provi-
sions, and because the Mosul region was almost impossible for an out-
sider to hold.
While Nasir al-Dawla worked to retain his hold on Mosul, his brother
Sayf al-Dawla achieved equal or greater power in Aleppo and
Mayyafariqin. He is remembered particularly for his campaigns against
the Bedouin and his success in bringing them under control. He was
dealing with a situation of particular difficulty, since the immigration of
new tribes strained the resources of the region. The Numayr had migrated
north in 921, and new sections of the B. Kilab came into Syria in 936 to
compete for the fertile region between Aleppo and Hama.56
Sayf al-Dawla should not be seen as an enemy of nomads; he made
liberal use of Bedouin in taking and keeping northern Syria. In taking
Aleppo he had the encouragement of the chiefs of the B. Kilab, eager to

52
Canard, Histoire, pp. 378–407. 53 Canard, Histoire, pp. 416–35.
54
Canard, Histoire, pp. 416–451, 492, 514. 55 Canard, Histoire, pp. 491–504.
56
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 109–112.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 70 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

unseat the Ikhshidid governors of Aleppo who belonged to other tribal

sections. Later we find the B. Kilab in his army along with sections from the
‘Uqayl, Kalb and Numayr.57 Through much of his reign, Sayf al-Dawla’s
policy seems to have been focused on limiting the aggression of the new
arrivals and adjudicating tribal disputes over land. Thus in 948 he settled
a conflict over grazing rights in the region between Aleppo and Palmyra
between sections of the B. Kilab, predominant around Aleppo, and the
B. Kalb of the Palmyra region. Two sections of the Kilab raided the Kalb;
Sayf al-Dawla attacked their camp and punished them but stopped the
killing fairly soon.58 Over the next years Sayf al-Dawla continued to deal
firmly with Bedouin tribes; he meted out harsh punishment to offenders,
followed by a display of mercy towards women and children. At the same
time, he continued to give out generous subsidies to his Bedouin allies.59
The greatest challenge from nomads occurred in 955, when many
people from several tribes including the ‘Uqayl, ‘Ajlan sections of the
Ka‘b, and much of the B. Kilab, attacked Za‘raya and Qinnasrin. The
Numayr, further away, were sympathetic, but apparently sent no troops.
As Sayf al-Dawla headed against the tribes, the B. Kilab section submit-
ted; the others were pursued by Sayf al-Dawla, who killed some and
pushed others into the desert. It was summer, and many died of thirst.
This event changed the balance of power among the Bedouin, leaving the
tribes central to the conspiracy considerably weakened, while those who
had submitted gained in strength. The B. Kilab were rewarded for their
decision with an extension of their lands and became the preeminent tribe
of northern Syria and western Jazira. The Numayr, who had also sent in
their submission, were left in possession of their territories.60 This was the
last major tribal disturbance before the Byzantine incursion in 962 and
Sayf al-Dawla’s death in 967. In the confusion and destruction that
followed the Byzantine attack, the Hamdanids lost their independence
and the B. Kilab stepped into the power vacuum they had left behind.61
Thus, Sayf al-Dawla’s creation of a new order after the suppression of the
revolt led to the creation of a new tribal force.

57
Samir Shamma, “Mirdā s,” in EI 2nd ed.; Canard, Histoire, pp. 501, 587.
58
Canard, Histoire, pp. 598–600.
59
Canard, Histoire, pp. 606–609, 636; Ramzi Jibran Bikhazi, “The Hamdā nid Dynasty of
Mesopotamia and North Syria 254–404/868–1014,” unpublished ˙ PhD dissertation,
University of Michigan (1981), pp. 664–674.
60
Bikhazi, “The Hamdā nid,” pp. 765–773; Canard, Histoire, pp. 611–617; Franz, Vom
˙
Beutezug, pp. 113–114, 117.
61
Canard, Histoire, pp. 644–650; Kennedy, The Prophet, pp. 281–284.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Development of Tribal Power 71

The Buyids
The other dynasty instrumental in the rise of nomad power was the Buyid
lineage from Daylam. The dynasty began its rise to power shortly after the
Hamdanids, and soon became a rival for power over the regions north of
Baghdad. It was founded in 935 by three brothers, ‘Ali, Abu ‘Ali Hasan, and
Ahmad. Starting as soldiers of fortune, and taking over the lands of their
former commander, they gained control over almost all of Iran except for
Khorasan.62 They evolved a system of shared rule with each remaining
essentially independent within his territory, but with one member of the
family recognized as senior to the others.63 Within a year of the Buyids’
rise, one of the factions in the contest for power over Iraq sought them out
as allies. Ahmad, sent to help, soon became an important actor in Iraqi
struggles, and in 945 the caliph granted him the office of amı̄ r al-‘umarā
with the title Mu‘izz al-Dawla. Unlike their predecessors, the Buyids were
strong enough to pass on the office of amı̄ r al-umarā within their family. From
this point on the caliph held no actual power but received a stipend and
retained some officials for his personal service.64
The Buyids of Iraq, however, had to contend with their relatives in other
regions, while in the north they competed with the Hamdanids. Thus, they
were frequently at war. Their standing army of Daylamite soldiers was not
sufficient for their military needs and they soon turned to the nearby
Bedouins. The second Buyid in Baghdad, ‘Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiyar (967–
978), brought in Shaybani and ‘Uqayli troops to fight the Hamdanids, and
enlisted some of the Asad tribe between Basra and Ahwaz, along with the
Kurdish ruler Hasanwayh Barzikani from Dinawar, northeast of
Kermanshah.65 Other nomads, sometimes from the same tribes, posed
a threat, with the Shayban and Kurds raiding from the north and various
sections of the B. Asad from the west and south. Buyid rule over Iraq was
loose and partial; they controlled only a few major cities. Villages and
nomad tribes collected protection money from the population, and within
the cities paramilitary organizations undertook similar activities.66
Stronger rule was introduced for a short time by ‘Adud al-Dawla (949–
983), the most powerful of the Buyid rulers, who took over Iraq in 977.
‘Adud al-Dawla was not content with the loose rule characteristic of most
of his family, and he had access to the resources of several provinces. He

62
W. Madelung, “Deylamites, ii, In the Islamic Period,” EIr, pp. 343–345.
63
T. Nagel, “Buyids,” EIr, pp. 578–579.
64
John J. Donohue, The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq 334 H./945 to 403 H./1012: Shaping
Institutions for the Future (Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 9–14, 17–27.
65
Donohue, The Buwayhid Dynasty, p. 220; Franz, Vom Beutezug, p. 149; Ch. Bürgel and
R. Mottahedeh, “‘Ażod al-Dawla,” EIr.
66
Donohue, The Buwayhid Dynasty, p. 80.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 72 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

overthrew the Hamdanid emir of Mosul, then undertook expeditions

against the Shayban and Kurds at Shahrazur near the lower Zab, and
against the leader of the Asad tribe. In dealing with Kurdish regions,
Adud al-Dawla’s strategy was to impose order by strengthening one
tribe at the expense of others. At the end of 369/980 he campaigned in
Kermanshah and installed as local ruler Hasanwayh Barzikani’s son Badr,
continuing ‘Izz al-Dawla’s alliance with the family.
‘Adud al-Dawla had no hesitation in using harsh measures and deceit.
Soon after his campaign in Kermanshah he sent an expedition against the
Hakkari Kurds and when they surrendered on condition that their lives be
spared, they were crucified along the side of the road for five farsakhs.67
He lured the Shayban tribe back from their retreat in the Zab region only
to attack at night, killing or capturing many of them. Within Iraq he
disarmed the population; he also introduced a tax on the market sale of
horses, asses and camels, a move which may have been aimed at the
nomads.68
‘Adud al-Dawla’s use of violence brought the nomad tribes to order,
but after his death in 983 their power rapidly increased. His successors
depended heavily on Bedouin and other nomad manpower and were
willing to grant local authority in return. Buyid control extended only
over Baghdad, Wasit and Basra.69 A new bureau called the dı̄ wā n al-
himā ya was created to organize the protection moneys paid to regional
tribes.70 The government attempted to use the system to pay some tribes
for protection against others. Tribal disunity made the Bedouin less
immediately dangerous to the government, but it probably increased
the suffering of the population, both nomad and settled.71
Throughout the period of the Hamdanids and the Buyids, there-
fore, nomad tribes gained in importance regardless of the policies
aimed at them. Many tribes of the Jazira and Iraq had served for
decades in the Buyid and Hamdanid armies, and they had been
pulled into government politics and given responsibility for the regions in
which they predominated. Tribal leaders serving as commanders gained
increased authority within their tribes. Both Sayf al-Dawla and ‘Adud
al-Dawla acted aggressively and effectively towards nomads, but their
system of reward and punishment left favored tribes in a position of
unprecedented strength.

67
V. Minorsky, “Kurds, Kurdistā n, iii B: History: Islamic Period up to 1920,” EI 2nd ed.
68
Donohue, The Buwayhid Dynasty, pp. 80–85; Franz, Vom Beutezug, p. 149–151.
69
Donohue, The Buwayhid Dynasty, p. 217.
70
Donohue, The Buwayhid Dynasty, pp. 94–95, 104–105.
71
Donohue, The Buwayhid Dynasty, pp. 106, 223–227.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Rise of Nomad Dynasties 73

The Rise of Nomad Dynasties

The late tenth through the early eleventh centuries represents a new
phase, with the rise of several independent nomad states among the
Bedouin and Kurds. These were not conquest states; most tribal leaders
gained power through service to settled powers and eventually assumed
power over their own and neighboring territories.72 What distinguished
these states from earlier polities involving tribes was that their leadership
was not settled but nomadic in origin and usually lifestyle. We should not
ascribe the nomad rise to power to simple military superiority. As the
narrative in this chapter shows, in battles with the central government the
nomads very often lost. Like the settled population, Bedouins were vul-
nerable to attack, particularly in their summer pastures, and in summer
they could also be pushed out into the desert where they might die of
thirst. The poisoning or destruction of wells was an effective tactic fre-
quently used against nomads.73
A more important factor in the creation of nomad states was the lack of
a single central power able to control the larger region. The Byzantine
campaign against Sayf al-Dawla in 962 left a trail of destruction and
fatally weakened the Syrian Hamdanids, while ‘Adud al-Dawla’s defeat
of the Hamdanids of the Jazira similarly reduced the power of the western
branch of the dynasty. The Hamdanid regions were now contested
among local tribes and three neighboring states: the Byzantines, the
Buyids, and a new power, the Isma‘ili Fatimid dynasty of Egypt and
North Africa, which took over Egypt in 969 and extended its power into
Syria.74 Damascus and Aleppo became disputed cities, with Damascus
generally under Fatimid control, while Aleppo was usually dominated by
tribal powers. The Syrian desert and the Jazira returned to the position
they had held before the Arab conquest, with competing powers on either
side. The nomads inhabiting them could play neighboring powers off
against each other and thus gained in importance and in independence.75
The first new dynasties to develop were Kurdish powers in the Jazira
and its border regions, where the Buyid ‘Adud al-Dawla had defeated the
Hamdanids and transformed the landscape of power. Badr of the
Hasanuyid Barzikani, whom ‘Adud al-Dawla had put in charge of much
of Jibal, became independent on ‘Adud al-Dawla’s death in 883. He and
his successors dominated the region from Kermanshah to Hamadan.76

72
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 251–252.
73
Vom Beutezug, pp. 76, 171, 193; Canard, Histoire, pp. 614–615.
74
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 210; Kennedy, The Prophet, pp. 315–327.
75
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 86–87.
76
Donohue, The Buwayhid Dynasty, pp. 221, 225; Kennedy, The Prophet, pp. 250–253.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 74 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

Meanwhile the city of Nasibin reacted to news of ‘Adud al-Dawla’s death

by giving allegiance to a Kurdish leader, Badh b. Dustak, the founder of
the Marwanid dynasty. Badh’s forces rapidly gained control over Diyar
Bakr and half of the region of Tur ‘Abdin, southeast of Mardin, from
which they encroached on Mosul.77 The Marwanids were the most
powerful and prestigious of the new Kurdish dynasties, contending and
allying with their neighbors – the Byzantines, Georgians and Armenians,
and the northwestern Bedouin powers, the Numayr and ‘Uqayl. They
initiated strong building programs in their two major cities, Mayyafariqin
and Amid (the modern Diyarbakr) and, especially under the long-lived
ruler Abu Nasr Ahmad (1011–1061), presided over a brilliant court
culture.78
The first of the Bedouin dynasties in the Jazira was the ‘Uqaylids (ca.
990–1096). The ‘Uqayl tribe, summering near Mosul and wintering west
of Baghdad, had likewise begun to develop a stronger leadership during
the reign of ‘Adud al-Dawla. ‘Adud al-Dawla’s successors, unable to hold
the Jazira on their own, reinstalled Hamdanids in Mosul; the Hamdanids
then turned to the ‘Uqaylids to defend them against Marwanid aggres-
sion. The ‘Uqaylids provided help and in return demanded Jazira and
Mosul. Within a few years their leader Muhammad b. al-Musayyib con-
trolled Mosul and received Buyid recognition as a vassal; for about
a century the ‘Uqaylids remained in control of the region.79 During
much of this time they appear to have remained largely nomadic and
often preferred to live in camps outside their cities.80
After ‘Adud al-Dawla’s death Iraq likewise came under tribal control,
and was soon dominated by the Mazyadid dynasty, originating in the
Asad tribe, which had been deeply involved in the dynastic and tribal
rivalries of the later Buyid period and eventually was given responsibility
for much of Iraq. By 996–997 the Mazyadids in the south and the
‘Uqaylids in the north were between them responsible for almost the
whole length of the Euphrates and much of the Sawad.81 Mazyadid
power was centered at al-Jami‘ayn, where their camp, or hilla, quickly

77
Donohue, The Buwayhid Dynasty, pp. 89, 22; Kennedy, The Prophet, pp. 262–266.
78
Paul A. Blaum, “A History of the Kurdish Marwanid Dynasty A.D. 983–1085, Part I,”
International Journal of Kurdish Studies 5, no. 1–2 (1992); “A History of the Kurdish
Marwanid Dynasty, A.D. 983–1085, Part II,” International Journal of Kurdish Studies 6,
no. 1–2 (1993).
79
C. E. Bosworth, “‘Ukaylids,” EI 2nd ed.; Kennedy, The Prophet, p. 297.
80
Hugh Kennedy, “The ˙ Uqaylids of Mosul: The Origins and Structure of a Nomad
Dynasty,” in Actas del XII congreso de la Union européenne d’arabisants et d’islamisants
(Málaga, 1984) (Madrid: Union Européenne d’Arabisants et d’Islamisants),
pp. 397–398.
81
Donohue, The Buwayhid Dynasty, pp. 221–222.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Rise of Nomad Dynasties 75

developed into a prosperous city, retaining the name Hilla. This was not
an easy region in which to retain power, but through astute and shifting
alliances the dynasty remained in place well into the Seljuqid period.82
In northern Syria, where the Hamdanid Sayf al-Dawla had held power,
nomad dynasties developed only a few years later. After Sayf al-Dawla’s
death in 967 the region became the frontier between Fatimids and
Byzantines, and the last of the Hamdanids held on to their territory as
vassals of one or the other. Not surprisingly, the gainers were the B. Kilab
tribe, who had benefitted from Sayf al-Dawla’s favor and now increased
their power through astute acts of diplomacy and treachery as the
Fatimids and Byzantines competed for control over pliant members of
the Hamdanid dynasty in Aleppo. Salih b. Mirdas of the B. Kilab, the
founder of the Mirdasid dynasty, is first mentioned as governor of Rahba
in 399/1009, when Aleppo was controlled by former slaves of the
Hamdanids. His tribe twice saved the Aleppan governors, first from
Marwanid and then from Fatimid armies, and naturally demanded rec-
ompense, in grants of pasture. The governor agreed, then invited the
tribesmen to a feast, where he captured and killed many of them. In
1014 Salih escaped, and some time later managed to take the city.
Aleppo proved a slippery prize, and neither Fatimids nor Mirdasids
were able to control it consistently, but the dynasty did hold several cities
in the region, up to Raqqa on the Euphrates, against both Byzantine and
local rivals.83
The Mirdasids shared power with another Bedouin dynasty, the
Numayrids. After the conspiracy against Sayf al-Dawla in 955 the
Numayr had been pushed east where they were allowed to consolidate
their power, useful as a shield against the Kurdish dynasties to the north.
When the Hamdanids of Aleppo collapsed, the B. Numayr began to issue
their own coinage and developed a court in Harran, east of Aleppo. At
first, they seem to have remained self-consciously nomadic, camping
outside the city; later they became at least partially settled and involved
in city life.84
The history of these dynasties is a tale of internal and external rivalries;
battles, raids and retaliation; the taking, losing and retaking of cities and
regions; treaties made, unmade and remade. It was undoubtedly a stirring
82
C. E. Bosworth, “Mazyad, Banū , or Mazyadids,” EI 2nd ed.
83
Th. Bianquis, S. Shamma, “Mirdā s,– Mirdā s b. Udayya,” EI 2nd ed.
84
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 136–146; Stefan Heidemann, “Numayrid ar-Raqqa:
Archaeological and Historical Evidence for a ‘Dimorphic State’ in the Bedouin
Dominated Fringes of the Fā timid Empire,” in Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid
and Mamluk Eras. The 9th and˙ 10th International Colloquium at the Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven in May 2000 and May 2001, ed. U. Vermeulen and J. van Steenbergen (Leuven,
Belgium: Peeters, 2005), pp. 93–105.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 76 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

life to live – at least for those who liked battle – but the telling becomes
complicated and confusing. The regions held by Bedouin dynasties
remained in flux partly because of pressure from outside powers: the
Fatimids who wanted to control northern Syria, the Byzantines who
were gaining ground in Armenia and along the Syrian coast, and the
Kurdish dynasties to the north and west. Most nomad dynasties recog-
nized the suzerainty of one or another of these powers, and sometimes
recognized two at once. Thus, local nomad dynasties were threatened by
outside powers, but not destroyed.
Most of the dynasties discussed here continued into the Seljuqid
period; each was fortunate to have at least one ruler with an exceptionally
long reign, and several of these overlapped in the early eleventh century.85
Although politics was never still, the reigns of these emirs encompassed
a period of renewed prosperity and development in the middle of
a difficult age. Their contributions went beyond the political sphere. As
Baghdad declined in power, scholars, writers and musicians sought
patronage at provincial courts, moving from one to another as their
favor or the fortunes of various rulers changed. Confusion, economic
decline and political fragmentation in fact added to the opportunities
open to men of literature and learning. The Buyid courts in Shiraz,
Rayy, Isfahan and Hamadan attracted major scholars.86 The court of
the Hamdanid Sayf al-Dawla at Aleppo was also known for its brilliance
in both scholarship and literature, with two of the greatest Arab poets of
the century – al-Mutanabbi and Abu’l Firas al-Hamdani – as members of
his entourage.87 Another great poet of the ‘Abbasid age, al-Ma‘arri, wrote
for and about the rulers of Aleppo, as the city was transferred from the
control of the Hamdanids to that of the Mirdasids, who continued the
court culture of Aleppo and the patronage of poetry.88 The Marwanid
dynasty is remembered for flourishing courts at Mayyafariqin and Amid,
where medicine, religious scholarship and literature were patronized.

85
The Marwanids rose to the peak of their power under Ibn Marwan, who ruled from
1011–1161. From 1001 to 1051 the ‘Uqaylids were ruled by Qirwash, whose reign
overlapped significantly with that of Nur al-Dawla Dubays of the Mazyadids (1018–
1081), and somewhat less with Thimal Mirdasi, who ruled (with interruptions) from
1041 to 1062.
86
Joel L. Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: The Cultural Revival during the
Buyid Age (Leiden: Brill, 1986), pp. 28, 50–51, 53.
87
Kraemer, Humanism, pp. 90–91; A. Hamori, “al-Mutanabbı̄ ,” in ‘Abbasid belles-lettres,
ed. Julia Ashtiany, T. M. Johnstone, J. D. Latham, R. B. Sergent, and C. Rex Smith,
Cambridge History of Arabic Literature (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), pp. 300–01; Abdullah el-Tayib, “Abū Firā s al-Hamdā nı̄ ,” in ‘Abbasid
Belles-lettres, pp. 317–319. ˙
88
P. Smoor, “al-Ma‘arrı̄ ,” EI 2nd ed.; Suhayl Zakkā r, The Emirate of Aleppo, 1004–1094
(Beirut: Dar al-Amanah, 1971), pp. 263ff.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Nature and Impact of Nomad Rule 77

Even the minor Bedouin dynasty of the Jarrahids at Ramla attracted

some poets to its court.89 Thus the tenth and eleventh centuries saw
increasing fragmentation and the movement of political strength and
cultural production from the center, through the Buyid and
Hamdanid dynasties to the tribal nomadic states which they had
helped bring into existence.

The Nature and Impact of Nomad Rule

The impact of nomad power on urban life and agriculture has usually
been judged as negative. In the western caliphate the tenth and eleventh
centuries have been characterized as a period of “bedouinization,” in
which pastoralism increased at the expense of settled life, with some
former nomads returning to nomadism, and agricultural land being con-
verted to pastures. This formulation helped to explain the decline in
settlement and in city building, which has been an object of study. Kurt
Franz has recently reopened the issue of nomadization and has deter-
mined that the sources yield insufficient evidence to prove it.90 The
concept of Bedouinization appears to rest at least in part on the assump-
tion that nomadism and agriculture must be inversely related, a belief that
I called into question in Chapter 2. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, as
in the Umayyad period, the two economies often flourished in close
proximity, under one ruler. The geographers describe several cities as
owing their wealth to both grain and livestock: at this period, these
include Nasibin, Mosul, Hims, Antioch, Hamadan and Isfahan.91 It is
clear that the Hamdanids and Marwanids, two particularly successful
dynasties, owed their strength to the combination of the two economies.
The decline of cities is more clearly illustrated than the agricultural
situation. However, it is important not to draw broad conclusions from
studies limited to a few regions. We should recognize that cities, whether
under nomad or settled rule, had quite varied experiences, stemming
from a number of causes. The major cities of northern Syria – Aleppo,
Antioch and Edessa – began to decline in the early ‘Abbasid period when
the capital was moved east, and they suffered during the disorders of the
later period. With the rise of Fatimid power in the eleventh century, the
change in trade routes from a system centered in Baghdad to one which
brought trade through Egypt was undoubtedly a factor in this decline.
The Balikh river valley has been intensively studied and shows a reduction
89
Thomas Ripper, Die Marwā niden von Diyā r Bakr: eine kurdische Dynastie im islamischen
Mittelalter (Würzburg: Ergon, 2000), pp. 411–424.
90
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 36–38, 250.
91
Ibn Hawqal, Configuration, pp. 173, 177, 181–182, 205–210, 350, 354.
˙

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 78 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

in settlement and building.92 Its two main cities, al-Raqqa and Harran,
were impoverished first due to their abandonment by the ‘Abbasid caliphs
who had occupied them, and then through over-taxation by the
Hamdanid rulers.93 Towards the end of the Numayrid dynasty, however,
al-Raqqa became a regular capital with dynastic buildings, and the
Numayrids showed an interest in developing it further.94 Several other
cities flourished and grew during this period. In Amid, both the
Hamdanids and the Marwanids undertook major building projects. The
Mazyadids embellished their capital Hilla with magnificent dwellings and
rich markets, which lasted through their reign and beyond.95 It appears
that both nomad dynasties and those that combined nomadic and seden-
tary lifestyles promoted cities when there was sufficient security and when
the region was one in which they were invested.
The tenth and eleventh centuries were a difficult period. There can be
no doubt that the population and the land suffered from the constant
warfare of the time. Scholars have concentrated on the trials of settled
populations, particularly the harm they suffered at the hands of Bedouin
raiders. The geographer Ibn Hawqal, who came from the Jazira and
described its situation during his lifetime, has been a useful source for
this school of thought, since he was inimical to the Hamdanid dynasty and
eloquent on the suffering of the region.96 However, though Ibn Hawqal’s
references to Bedouin are usually negative, the wrongs he lists were not
visited exclusively on the settled. In his lament for the fate of his own
hometown, Nasibin, he mentions the departure of the Taghlibid Banu
Habib and their neighbors, along with their families and their herds.
When the Hamdanid ruler Hasan took over, he cut down trees and
changed watercourses; he did this not to create pasture, but to plant
grain.97 New tribes came into the region and pushed out nomad and
semi-nomadic populations; when they demanded protection money from
the inhabitants, it is quite possible that they were replacing earlier nomads
who had done the same.98 One of Ibn Hawqal’s accusations against the
Hamdanids was their oppressive taxation, and here again it appears that
nomads suffered along with the settled population, since taxes on the sale
of livestock are among those frequently mentioned, and in some places,
the disappearance of nomads – at least their livestock – is given as an
92
Heidemann, “Numayrid ar-Raqqa.”
93
Stefan Heidemann, Die Renaissance der Städte in Nordsyrien und Nordmesopotamien:
städtische Entwicklung und wirtschaftliche Bedingungen in ar-Raqqa und Harrā n von der
˙
Zeit der beduinischen Vorherrschaft bis zu den Seldschuken (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 29–31.
94
Franz, Vom Beutezug, pp. 143–144. 95 J. Lassner, “Hilla,” EI 2nd ed.
96 ˙
See, for instance, Ibn Hawqal, Configuration, pp. 173, 204, 215–216.
97 ˙
Ibn Hawqal, Configuration, pp. 205–208.
98 ˙
Ibn Hawqal, Configuration, pp. 204, 222–223.
˙

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Conclusion 79

example of decline and destruction.99 There is no reason to doubt that

Bedouin raids contributed to the troubles of the Jazira, but we should
recognize that the nomads were victims of violence as well, and their raids
were often in reaction to conditions of hardship imposed by others.

Conclusion
The Abbasids began as a centralizing power, but by the eleventh century
political power lay in the hands of regional dynasties. A significant num-
ber of these were founded by nomads or mountain peoples and from this
time on, the Middle East was never without nomad rulers. The rise of the
Fatimid dynasty in Egypt made the Syrian desert once again a borderland
between two competing powers, allowing its nomad inhabitants to enjoy
an independence which had been curtailed by the early caliphate. The
greater importance of northern regions, particularly Azerbaijan and the
Khorasan Road, added another set of actors. The Bedouin and other
Arab pastoralists who had been prominent in the Umayyad period were
now joined by Iranian peoples, notably Daylamites and Kurds.
The early caliphate, from the Rashidun to the early Abbasids, was
closer to the Bedouin but did not provide favorable conditions for polit-
ical development. The Bedouin were not excluded, but where they were
politically active, they were almost always under outside leadership. The
long decline of Abbasid power had a very different result, leading to the
political involvement of tribal peoples, first the Hamdanids and Buyids –
partly nomadic and mountain populations – and then the more fully
nomadic Bedouin and Kurds. Tribal leaders gained fuller authority over
their tribesmen and over the regions they inhabited as they were increas-
ingly called in to provide military service to one or another faction in local
contests. By the eleventh century they were able to take over the rule of
their areas. Much of the central territory of the caliphate was now under
the rule of Bedouins or Kurds, from Iraq to Azerbaijan, and across to
northern Syria.
Changes within the standing army were also striking; here what was
most important for the future was the introduction of Turkic soldiers as
skilled cavalry. Though they came in mostly as individuals, the Turks
were recognized for their nomadic background and skills, and they were
associated with the prestige of an imperial and warlike power. As they
began to serve as governors, and eventually as independent rulers, their
sphere expanded, both geographically and politically.

99
Ibn Hawqal, Configuration, pp. 208, 213, 220–221.
˙

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 80 The Rise of New Peoples and Dynasties

Cultural developments of the Abbasid period were also important for the
future. The rise of Persian influence resulted not in an abandonment of the
Bedouin image, but in further elaboration of both tribal prestige and
Bedouin traits as an important marker of an Arab ruling class. The
emphasis on martial accomplishments associated with nomadism,
Spartan lifestyle, and peripheral origin brought idealized Arab traits close
to those associated with the Turks, “the Bedouin of the non-Arab.” All
these developments – the rise of nomad dynasties, the introduction of
Turks as a military class, and the idealized image of foreign rulers of
nomad origin – helped to prepare the way for a new stage in which nomads
from the eastern steppe invaded and took over the central Islamic lands.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.005 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 4 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

In 1035 a few thousand ragged nomads crossed the Oxus into Khorasan
and wrote a letter to the governor requesting pasture in return for military
service. Within six years the Seljuqs had conquered eastern Iran and were
heading west to take over the central Middle East, from Transoxiana to
Anatolia. Historians recognize the Seljuq conquest as the beginning of
a new era in Islamic history. From the eleventh to fifteenth centuries most
of the Middle East was ruled by nomads from the Eurasian steppe. The
first to arrive were the Seljuqs, whose reign established a set of institutions
adapted by later nomad conquerors. The Seljuqs were Oghuz from
a western branch of the Turks, different in language and traditions from
the eastern Turks and Mongols who succeeded them. Their descendants
thus maintained a separate Turkic identity in the Middle East, coming to
be known as “Turkmen.”1
In this chapter we move our focus east, to Iran and its northeastern
frontier, an area suited to the animals of the steppe nomads – horses,
sheep, goats and Bactrian camels – which became the center of successive
nomad states. It has a landscape of mountains and high plateaus, com-
bining oasis agriculture dependent on irrigation with vertical pastoralism
in mountain and steppe. There were a number of nomad populations in
Iran before the arrival of the Seljuqs; in addition to the Kurds of north-
western Iran, mentioned in Chapter 3, there were Iranian and Arab
nomad groups in Fars, Kerman and Khorasan, combining sheep, goats
and horses with some camels and a few cattle. The nomads do not appear
to have utilized all the pastoral resources of the region, and the arrival of
the Seljuqs began a long period of growth in the nomad population of the
eastern Islamic world.

1
The term Turkmen was not used entirely consistently and seems to have changed its
meaning over time. At first it probably denoted the nomad Turks in the steppe who had
converted to Islam. Later, it was used for the Oghuz in the Middle East, particularly the
nomad followers of the Seljuqs. See A. C. S. Peacock, Early Seljū q History: A New
Interpretation (London: New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 49–53.

81

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 82 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

The Seljuqs who entered Iran had a different tribal structure and
political tradition from those of the Kurds and Arab nomads we have
been discussing. Steppe nomads had a hierarchical society that allowed
significant authority to the tribal leadership, and many had been at least
peripherally involved with the steppe empires centered in Mongolia, most
recently the Türk Khaghanate. The khaghanate had also included terri-
tories and cities inhabited by Iranians, who had provided the khaghans
with many of their scribes. Thus, the Seljuqs arrived in the Middle East
with a tradition of state building and some knowledge of Iranian culture.
Entering through Transoxiana and eastern Iran, where Perso-Islamic
administrative practice was strongly developed, they picked up accom-
plished bureaucrats who accompanied them into central Iran. Their rule
created a powerful synthesis of Islamic, Turkic and Iranian political
cultures which remained in force until the modern era.

The Eastern Steppe Frontier

The main locus of interaction between the Islamic world and the steppe
nomads was Transoxiana, the region between the Oxus and Jaxartes rivers.
When the Türk Khaghanate fragmented in the mid-eighth century, increas-
ing numbers of nomads migrated into the steppes north of the Jaxartes. Two
groups created confederations that became important for the history of the
Islamic world. Along the lower Jaxartes and the Aral Sea region were the
Oghuz, western Turks who by the tenth century had developed a separate
dialect; and to the East, from Ferghana to the Semirechie, were the Qarluqs,
who appear to have had a more eastern origin. Both confederations had
leaders with the title Yabghu, the second-rank title in the Türk Khaghanate;
thus, whether or not they connected themselves explicitly to the khaghanate,
they had inherited some of its political traditions.2
The border was complex and porous. We can best chart it as
a gradation from the area north of the Jaxartes, where Turkic peoples of
nomadic lifestyle were in the majority, to the regions of Transoxiana and
Khorasan where settled Iranians were predominant. Turks and Iranians,
nomads and settled people traded, allied and fought with each other. The
area south of the Oxus, corresponding to what is now southern
Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, was also mixed. The region of Balkh
just south of the Oxus, and Khuttal to its north, were both known for
livestock.3 The most important part of Khorasan for the caliphate was the
region stretching from Nishapur to Marw. Here again agricultural land

2
Golden, Introduction, pp. 194–199.
3
Ibn Hawqal, Configuration, pp. 428–430, 434–436.
˙

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Eastern Steppe Frontier 83

combined with pasture; Jurjan, Marw and Sarakhs were known for
camel raising and provided winter pasture for other livestock, while
the mountains near Nishapur and Khabushan had excellent summer
pastures.4 The eastern frontier was not quiet on either side, and the
populations of Transoxiana and Khorasan were known for their skill
in war. The Arabs began their conquest of Central Asia in the 660s,
and by the early eighth century had taken Transoxiana along with
several cities beyond the Jaxartes.5 By the eighth century Transoxiana
was part of the central Islamic lands. The Turks to the north were
soon acquainted with Islamic and Iranian culture. Trading towns on
the steppe border served as a conduit for Islam, and by the tenth
century Islam was spreading among both the Oghuz and the Qarluq.
Since most merchants came from the Iranian population, there was
a bilingual population of Iranians speaking Turkic along with Turks
familiar with Iranian languages.6
The relationship between the Iranians and Turks had begun earlier,
under the Türk Khaghanate. In the western regions of the khaghanate
a good proportion of the city and agricultural population was Iranian.
While the Ashina clan and the tribes attached to it were nomadic, scribes
and administrators were usually from the settled population, most often
Soghdians – an Iranian people centered in Samarqand with a strong
merchant class active along the Silk Road. Both Chinese sources and
funerary art indicate close interaction between Turkic and Iranian elites;
murals show the two peoples making treaties, hunting together and eating
at common banquets, with music, song and dance.7
The connection between Iranians and Turks is given expression in the
place that the Turks found for themselves within the Iranian epic trad-
ition, popularized in the medieval Middle East through the enormously
popular epic poem, the Shā hnā ma of the Persian poet Firdawsi (932–
1025). In both Turkic and Iranian traditions, the Turks became identified
as the descendants of the legendary nomad king Afrasiyab, the powerful
enemy of successive Iranian heroes. Among the Turks, Afrasiyab came to
be conflated with a legendary Turkic figure, Alp Er Tonga, whose heroic

4
Configuration, pp. 437–438; Gaube and Leisten, Die Kernländer des ‘Abbā sidenreiches im
10./11. Jh.: Materialien zur TAVO-Karte B VII 6, p. 158; Rashı̄ d al-Dı̄ n Ṭabı̄ b, The
History of the Seljuq Turks from the Jā mi‘ al-tawā rı̄ kh: an Ilkhanid adaptation of the
Saljū q-nā ma of Zahı̄ r al- Dı̄ n Nı̄ shā pū rı̄ , trans. Kenneth A. Luther (Richmond, Surrey:
Curzon, 2001),˙ pp. 518, 594, 598–599, 605, 609.
5
H. A. R. Gibb, The Arab Conquests in Central Asia (New York: AMS Press, 1970),
pp. 29–52.
6
Golden, Introduction, pp. 197–198, 212–213.
7
Golden, Introduction, pp. 190, 198; Stark, Die Altürkenzeit, pp. 289–314.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 84 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

and untimely death had entered into folk poetry.8 It seems surprising that
the Turks should have embraced a connection to the great villain of
Iranian tradition; however, Afrasiyab was of kingly blood – related to
the Iranian kings – and Iranian epics contain a few favorable stories
about him, some of which may reflect originally Turkic traditions.9
Furthermore, according to legend, the family of Afrasiyab had intermar-
ried with the Iranian dynasty and the exemplary king Kay Khusraw was
descended from him on his mother’s side.10 By the time the Turks
entered the central Islamic lands, therefore, they and the Iranian popula-
tions of Central Asia had a long shared history and tradition.
In the ninth century, Muslim regional dynasties began to arise in
eastern Iran and Transoxiana. One of most influential of these was the
Samanid dynasty (819–1005), who were appointed as governors over
several cities by the caliph al-Ma’mun (813–833), and who became
wealthy through eastern and northern trade, particularly the sale of the
Turkic military slaves then coming into fashion. In 875 the Samanid
family gained caliphal recognition as governors of the whole of
Transoxiana and became essentially independent rulers over
Transoxiana, Khorezm, and Khorasan, a realm which they held until
999. They enjoyed a subsidiary source of manpower in religious volun-
teers eager to gain blessing by fighting the infidels, following the tradition
established on the Byzantine frontier.11 Like the Arabs, the Samanids
were active campaigners; they soon extended their rule beyond the
Jaxartes, to Otrar, Isfijab and Taraz along with most of the Ferghana
Valley – thus well into Turkic and nomad territory.12 These campaigns
are often portrayed as a response to Turkish raids, but given the
Samanids’ expansionist policies and the value of captured Turks, we
should not characterize all of their border warfare as defense.13

8
Louis Bazin, “Que était Alp Er Tonga, identifié à Afrâsyâb,” in Pand-o Sokhan. Mélanges
offerts à Charles-Henri de Fouchécour, ed. Claire Kappler, Christophe Balaÿ, Ziva Vesel
(Tehran: Institut français de Recherche en Iran, 1995).
9
Mahmū d al-Kā shgharı̄ , Compendium of the Turkic Dialects, trans. Robert Dankoff and
James˙ Kelly, vol. 1, Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University, 1982), pp. 92, 189; E. Yarshater, “Afrā sı̄ ā b,” in EIr.
10
Dick Davis, “Iran and Aniran: The Shaping of a Legend,” in Iran Facing Others: Identity
Boundaries in a Historical Perspective, ed. Abbas Amanat and Farzin Vejdani (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 39–40.
11
Jürgen Paul, The State and the Military: The Samanid Case (Bloomington: Indiana
University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1994), pp. 11–23; Golden,
Introduction, p. 190; D. G. Tor, Violent Order: Religious Warfare, Chivalry, and the ‘ayyā r
Phenomenon in the Medieval Islamic World (Würzburg: Ergon, 2007), pp. 66–67, 211–215.
12
Minorsky, Bartol’d, and Bosworth, Hudū d, pp. 118–119; S. G. Kliashtorny, “Les
Samanids et les Karakhanides: une étape ˙ initiale de la géopolitique impériale,” Cahiers
d’Asie Centrale 9, Études Karakhanides (2001), pp. 38–40.
13
Golden, Introduction, pp. 193.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Eastern Steppe Frontier 85

The Samanids are important in the history of the Middle East as

creators of a tradition of Iranian culture and administration, which was
adopted and spread by the Turkic dynasties that succeeded them. The
Samanids were of Iranian origin, and they attached themselves to the
memory of earlier Iranian glory while remaining supporters of caliph.
Iranian language, social structure and tradition had remained strong in
eastern Iran, distant from the center of the caliphate. The dynasty and its
landed elite patronized literature in a new Persian language written in
Arabic script, which replaced Arabic as the chancellery language and over
time became a major literary language. They and their servitors patron-
ized poetry and belles lettres in New Persian, and likewise the collection
and recording of Iranian myths. In other ways the Samanids copied
Abbasid governance, maintaining an administration staffed by highly
trained bureaucrats.14 The Turkic dynasties that followed them adopted
many of their policies and hired their bureaucrats. Thus, the condomin-
ium of Turkic rule and Iranian culture, begun under the Türk
Khaghanate, continued within the Islamic lands.
Two immediate successors to the Samanids are particularly important to
our story. The first of these was the nomad Qarakhanid polity, which
controlled Transoxiana and the regions to its north and east from
999 to 1211. This was the first state to combine loyalty to Turkic
political traditions with adherence to Islam. The Qarakhanids came
to power within the Qarluq confederation which controlled both
steppe regions and significant cities.15 In its political structure the
Qarakhanid state adhered to Turkic norms, and the official titles attested
are those found in the Türk Khaghanate; however, its legitimation reflects
Iranian traditions as well. The name Qarakhanid is an outside designation;
the dynasty itself used various names, including “al-Khā qā niyya” and
“Ā l-i Afrā siyā b.”16 The first title clearly emphasizes the link to the Türk
Khaghanate, laying claim to equal status by claiming the highest title in
the steppe. The second one refers likewise to royal origin, but through
Iranian myth.
Sometime in the tenth century the Qarakhanids converted to Islam,
and in the 990s they began to compete with the Samanids for control over
Transoxiana, achieving victory in 999. Their conquest does not appear to
14
Richard N. Frye, “The Sā mā nids,” in Cambridge History of Iran, ed. Richard N. Frye
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 136–145.
15
Karl M. Baypakov, “La culture urbaine du Kazakhstan du sud et du Semiretchie à
l’époque des Karakhanides,” Cahiers d’Asie Centrale 9 (2001), pp. 142–145.
16
Jürgen Paul, “Karakhanids,” in The Turks, ed. C. Cem Oguz, Hasan Celâl Güzel, Osman
Karatay (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2002), p. 71; E. A. Davidovich, “The
Karakhanids,” in History of Civilizations of Central Asia, ed. M. S. Asimov and
C. E. Bosworth (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1998), p. 121.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 86 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

have caused severe disruption. A number of Samanid military command-

ers served under them, and the ghā zı̄ activities against pagan Turks
continued.17 Like the Samanids, the Karakhanids developed a new lit-
erature in their own language written in the Arabic script. The first known
monument of the new literary language, the Kutadğ u Bilig: Wisdom of
Royal Glory, was a mirror for princes – an Iranian genre – written in Turkic
with an Islamic tone and a liberal admixture of Persian and Arabic
vocabulary.18 Another work, the Dı̄ wā n Lughā t al-Turk, was written by
a member of the Qarakhanid dynasty in Baghdad about 1070, and it
represents an effort to preserve Turkic language and culture and to give
Turkic an honorable place among Muslim literary languages.19
The Qarakhanid rulers retained a largely nomadic lifestyle for the first
century and a half of their rule while actively promoting city life and
agricultural prosperity. The rulers relied on nomad armies and preferred
to camp outside cities rather than taking up residence within them. This
practice changed in the mid-twelfth century, when the dynasty began to
inhabit palaces in the city and citadel, but it is not clear whether or not this
move represented a decline of nomadism beyond the dynasty itself.20
Throughout their reign, the Qarakhanids were patrons of urban develop-
ment, repairing fortifications and constructing hospitals, religious build-
ings and caravansarays.21 They presided over a period of urban growth in
which new cities developed and older ones grew larger. We should note
that local trade in livestock products was an important factor in the
prosperity of Transoxiana and its borderlands.22 In this time and place
then, nomad rule and the existence of a large and favored pastoral
population was not a disadvantage for the settled economy.

17
“The Karakhanids,” pp. 123–125; Boris D. Kochnev, “Les frontières du royaume des
Karakhanides,” Cahiers d’Asie Centrale 9 (2001), p. 42.
18
Jürgen Paul, “Nouvelles pistes pour la recherche sur l’histoire de l’Asie centrale à l’
époque karakhanide (Xe–début XIIIe siècle),” Cahiers d’Asie Centrale 9 (2001), pp.
23–24; Yū suf Khā ss Hā jib, Wisdom of Royal Glory: A Turko-Islamic Mirror for Princes,
˙ ˙ ˙ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), “Introduction,”
trans. Robert Dankoff
pp. 1–4; Ahmet B. Ercilasun, “Language and Literature in the Early Muslim Turkish
States,” in The Turks, ed. C. Cem Oğ uz, Hasan Celâl Güzel, Osman Karatay (Ankara:
Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2002), pp. 349–353.
19
Ercilasun, “Language,” pp. 352, 362–364.
20
Davidovich, “The Karakhanids,” pp. 123, 132; Paul, “Karakhanids,” pp. 73, 75;
Valentina D. Goriacheva, “À propos des deux capitales du khaghanat karakhanide,”
Cahiers d’Asie Centrale 9 (2001), p. 91; Yuri Karev, “From Tents to City. The Royal
Court of the Western Qarakhanids between Bukhara and Samarqand,” in Turko-Mongol
Rulers, Cities and City Life, ed. David Durand-Guédy (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
21
Davidovich, “The Karakhanids,” pp. 130, 133.
22
Baypakov, “La culture urbaine,” pp. 144–148, 151–157, 161–162; Michal Biran,
“Qarakhanid Studies: A View from the Qara Khitai Edge,” Cahiers d’Asie Centrale 9
(2001), pp. 78–83.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Early History of the Seljuqs 87

The other important dynasty was the Ghaznavids, founded by a lineage

of Turkic mamluks from the Samanid army who had been garrisoned in
the region of Ghazna. The third ruler of the dynasty, Sultan Mahmud
(r. 998–1030) undertook a career of conquest both into India and into
the Samanid realm, then in 999 joined with the Qarakhanids to destroy
the Samanids and divide their territory.23 Sultan Mahmud acquired
a realm stretching from the Oxus to Lahore, and west to Rayy.
Bureaucrats, scholars and literati from the Samanid court transferred
their services to the Ghaznavids who were famous for the cultural
brilliance of their court, where Persian literature continued to flourish.
An example is the poet Firdawsi, mentioned above, a native of Tus in
Khorasan, who began writing his great Shā hnā ma under the Samanids,
but finished it after their fall and presented it to Sultan Mahmud. In
this instance Mahmud was not enchanted and offered only a paltry
reward, but other writers were better treated. The dynasty also followed
the Samanids in inventing a royal Iranian genealogy, but at the same
time both rulers and army appear to have retained some Turkic ethnic
loyalty; Mahmud’s defeat of the Samanids was portrayed as a victory of
the descendant of the Khaqan over descendants of the Iranian kings.24

The Early History of the Seljuqs

The Ghaznavids and Qarakhanids had been in control of the eastern
regions for about thirty years when they were challenged by new arrivals
from the steppe. The Seljuqs originated within the Oghuz confederation
in the Aral Sea region. Since the word Oghuz designates a confederation,
we cannot be certain that these are the people who are mentioned in the
inscriptions of the Türk Khaghanate, and in any case they had apparently
mixed with local populations in their new regions.25 However their use of
the title Yabghu does suggest that they were within the Turkic political
system. While the Oghuz are portrayed in contemporary sources as
primitive, it is important to remember that their winter pastures on the
lower Jaxartes had several significant towns and they traded actively with
the people of Khorasan and Transoxiana in forest and livestock products,
particularly sheep.26 The eponymous founder of the dynasty was Seljuq,
son of Duqaq; both he and his father seem to have made a career of

23
Clifford Edmund Bosworth, The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern
Iran 994:1040, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1973), pp. 37–40.
24
Bosworth, Ghaznavids, pp. 40, 56.
25
Peacock, Early Seljū q, pp. 17–20; Golden, Introduction, p. 207.
26
Baypakov, “La culture urbaine,” p. 143; Ibn Hawqal, Configuration, p. 437; Minorsky,
Bartol’d, and Bosworth, Hudū d, p. 119. ˙
˙

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 88 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

military service, leading armies of their own followers. Seljuqid sources

mention them first serving the Khazars centered in the Volga region, who
as members of the Ashina clan held the title Khaghan. At some point the
two men broke with the Khazars and Seljuq moved to Jand, in what is now
western Kazakhstan. There he apparently converted to Islam, perhaps
from Judaism, the religion of the Khazars; several of his sons had the
names of Jewish prophets: Mikha’il, Musa and Isra’il. Seljuq and his
followers occupied themselves in jihā d against the pagan Turks and also
served as auxiliaries for the Samanids and later for the rulers of Khorezm.
Coming into conflict with one of the Oghuz powers, they moved into
Transoxiana, with summer pastures near Samarqand and winter ones
near Bukhara.27
After Seljuq’s death some of his descendants, including his son Arslan
Isra’il and two of Arslan’s nephews, Toghril and Da’ud Chaghri, served
the Qarakhanid ruler of Bukhara, ‘Ali Tegin. In return they were allotted
grazing lands near Bukhara. In 1025 the Ghaznavid sultan Mahmud
joined with the Qarakhanid khan to attack ‘Ali Tegin and his Oghuz
allies, imprisoning Arslan and disbanding his armies. After this he allowed
a group of about 4,000 of Arslan’s followers to cross the Oxus into the
pastures of Sarakhs, Abiward and Farawa, near the border of the desert.28
At the time of their migration, the Oghuz probably specialized in Bactrian
and hybrid camels with some sheep; these were the animals connected
with the regions they inhabited and mentioned in their battle tactics.29
The Oghuz who came into Khorasan were poor, disorganized and
angry. Their new hosts had little patience with them and no desire to
provide them with a livelihood. The result was painful for both sides.
Khorasan was a fertile region with excellent pasture, but it had been badly
overtaxed under the Ghaznavids, and agriculture had suffered.30 The
Oghuz arrived in Khorasan almost destitute and, to make matters
worse, they soon broke into segments under separate commanders. By
1027 the people of Nasa and Abiward were complaining. The governor of
Tus undertook punitive measures, which were followed the next year by
a campaign under Sultan Mahmud Ghaznawi, who defeated and scat-
tered the Oghuz.31 Some found employment with Mahmud’s son Mas‘ud

27
Andrew C. S. Peacock, The Great Seljuk Empire (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2015), pp. 24–27; Jürgen Paul, “The Role of Ḫ wā razm in Seluq Central Asian Politics,
Victories and Defeats: Two Case Studies,” Eurasian Studies VII (2007–2008), pp. 6–8.
28
Peacock, Early Seljū q, pp. 64–66; Peacock, Great Seljuk, pp. 28–32.
29
Ann K. S. Lambton, Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia: Aspects of Administrative,
Economic, and Social History, 11th–14th century (Albany, NY: Bibliotheca Persica, 1988),
p. 6; Claude Cahen, “Le Malik-nameh et l’histoire des origines seljukides,” Oriens 2
(1949), p. 63.
30
Bosworth, Ghaznavids, pp. 86–88. 31 Bosworth, Ghaznavids, p. 224.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Early History of the Seljuqs 89

and a few moved west to serve regional rulers in Iran. In 1033 to 1034 the
Ghaznavids vented their anger on the nomads. They summoned leaders
to Nishapur and executed about fifty of them, including the commander
who had earlier served Mas‘ud. When the survivors moved towards Rayy
and continued their depredations, Mas‘ud – who had succeeded his
father on the throne in 1030– captured their camps and moved their
followers to India, where he killed many by cutting off their hands and
feet and then gibbeting them. Oghuz men captured raiding on the
Karakhanid border were thrown under the feet of elephants and
trampled.32
The Oghuz who had remained in Transoxiana under Seljuq’s grand-
sons Toghril and Chaghri had a somewhat better time of it. For a while
they continued to serve ‘Ali Tegin, but towards the end of his life they
apparently quarreled with him. In 1035 they crossed the Oxus into
Ghaznavid territories with 7,000 to 10,000 followers, moving into the
region of Nasa in northwestern Khorasan. From there they wrote to the
Ghaznavid governor offering their services as border troops in return for
pasture.33 These men were to some extent professional soldiers, and
when they came into Khorasan they were probably looking for
a situation similar to the one they had left.
The Ghaznavids had been fighting the earlier Oghuz for two years and
they greeted the new arrivals with frank hostility. The request for pasture
was summarily refused and Mas‘ud moved against them. The armies met
near Nasa in June or July and the Ghaznavid army suffered a severe
defeat. The Seljuqs now achieved recognition as governors of the border
region from Marw and Sarakhs to the Caspian. Troubles continued,
however. According to a tradition originating from the Seljuqids, Sultan
Mas‘ud acted insultingly against the Seljuqid leaders and did not honor
his promise to give freedom to their uncle Arslan. The Seljuqs continued
to raid and were joined by new contingents of Oghuz from the steppe.34
Events now moved with remarkable speed. The Seljuqs needed live-
stock and acquired it by raiding. The lands allotted them were not suffi-
cient, and the Ghaznavids had no desire to give them more or to employ

32
‘Izz al- Dı̄ n Ibn al-Athı̄ r, The Annals of the Saljuq Turks: Selections from al-Kā mil fı̄ ’l-Ta’rı̄ kh
of ‘Izz al-Dı̄ n Ibn al-Athı̄ r, trans. D. S. Richards (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002),
pp. 14–15; Bosworth, Ghaznavids, p. 224–225; Abū ’l Fadl Muhammad Bayhaqı̄ , The
History of Beyhaqi (The History of Sultan Mas‘ud of Ghazna, ˙ ˙ 1030–1041), trans.
C. Edmund Bosworth, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA and Washington, DC: Ilex
Foundation and Center for Hellenic Studies, 2011), vol. 2, pp. 94–96.
33
Cahen, “Malik-nameh,” pp. 53–54; Peacock, Great Seljuk, pp. 33–35.
34
Abū ’l Fadl Muhammad Bayhaqı̄ , Tā rı̄ kh-i Bayhaqı̄ , ed. Manū chihr Dā nishpazhū h
(Tehran: ˙Intisha˙̄ rā t-i Hı̄ rmand, 1997–1998), pp. 708, 730, 750; Cahen, “Malik-
nameh,” pp. 59–60; Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 35–36.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 90 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

them as soldiers. The Ghaznavid policy was to punish the Seljuqs, contain
them, or push them back, but these tactics could not work against a group
which had insufficient sources of livelihood and no place to return to. In
battles between the Ghaznavids and the Seljuqs, victory went sometimes
to one side and sometimes to another, and as they realized that the
Ghaznavids could not decisively defeat them, Toghril and Chaghri set
their sights on the larger cities.35
In 1036–1037 they took Marw and Balkh, and in 1037 or 1038,
Nishapur opened its gates without resistance.36 We have a vivid descrip-
tion of this event, which illustrates Toghril’s tactics and the state of his
troops. Toghril’s relative Ibrahim Inal first approached the city with about
200 men and sent in a messenger. The notables decided to submit, but
when they came out to escort Ibrahim into the city they were appalled at
the ragged appearance of his troops. This was a major city, used to having
rulers of power and magnificence. The crowd watching the Seljuq entry
was likewise taken aback, comparing the ragged Seljuq troops with the
imposing Ghaznavid armies. Two days later Ibrahim read the congrega-
tional prayer in the name of Toghril, and despite his wearing better
clothes, riots broke out. The situation improved when Toghril arrived
about ten days later attired in fine silk and linen and accompanied by
3,000 horsemen in armor. He seated himself on the sultan’s throne and
the few members of the mob still present remained orderly.37
After the fall of Nishapur, Sultan Mas‘ud brought a Ghaznavid army
north and the Seljuqs abandoned the cities to take refuge in the steppes
and mountains. However, the region could not support the Ghaznavid
army, and while the Oghuz could often be defeated, they could not be
eliminated. In May 1040 the full Seljuq force met the Ghaznavid army at
Dandanaqan near Marw, and the Seljuqs won a decisive victory. The
Seljuq brothers sent an emissary to the Abbasid caliph with news of their
victory and from this time increasingly presented themselves as rightful
rulers.38
The Ghaznavid historian Bayhaqi, who has left us the fullest account of
the Seljuqid conquest, blamed the loss of Khorasan on Sultan Mas‘ud’s
failure to act decisively. However, it is hard to see how more military

35
Bosworth, Ghaznavids, pp. 242–244, 249; Cahen, “Malik-nameh,” pp. 60–61;
Erdoğ an Merçil, “History of the Great Seljuk Empire,” in The Turks, ed. C. Cem
Oguz, Hasan Celâl Güzel, Osman Karatay (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2002),
p. 149.
36
For the question of the date, see Peacock, Great Seljuk, p. 39.
37
Bosworth, Ghaznavids, pp. 254–257.
38
C. E. Bosworth, “The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian World (A.D. 1000–
1217),” in Cambridge History of Iran, ed. J. A. Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1968), p. 23.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Formation of the Seljuqid State 91

activity could have helped. As the Ghaznavid armies campaigned against

Toghril and Chaghri they depleted both local and central reserves, and by
the end the Ghaznavid army was living off plunder and causing as much
destruction as the Seljuqs.39 Despite their poverty, the Seljuqs had several
advantages: since they controlled the desert border, they could interrupt
the caravan trade and cut off the supply of livestock products, for which
Khorasan relied heavily on the Oghuz.40 In a situation of scarcity, the
mobile troops of the Seljuqs, which appear to have depended more on
camels than horses, were clearly at an advantage.41 The central problem
for the Ghaznavids, however, may not have been the power or military
prowess of the Seljuqs but their desperation: they had too little to live
from, no place to return to, and thus no choice but to stand and fight.

The Formation of the Seljuqid State

It is not clear how the Seljuqs were organized when they arrived in the
Middle East. Our sources give no indication that either army or adminis-
tration were set up along tribal lines. The Seljuqs entered the Middle East
in three distinct groups. The first Oghuz, who crossed the Oxus in 1025,
were the followers of Arslan Isra’il and came to be known as the “Iraqis,”
because they soon moved west and became active in Iraq. Those who
came in with Toghril and Chaghri were made up of two allied groups – the
“Saljuqiyan,” followers of the brothers, and the “Inaliyan” attached to
Ibrahim Inal.42 It seems likely that the Seljuqid leaders were warriors
working outside the tribal system, leading personal followings made up of
people from various groups and owing loyalty directly to their new lead-
ers. Ambitious men leading a group of personal non-tribal followers were
a common phenomenon in the steppes; two great dynastic founders,
Chinggis Khan and the later conqueror Tamerlane, began as leaders of
personal warbands, separate from their own tribes. Like the Seljuqs, these
men spent years leading their armies in the service of several different
powers. It is not clear whether the dynasty had a hierarchical chain of
command; over time Toghril emerged as the most powerful figure, but
there are signs of early rivalry among the relatives.43 From the earliest
mention of the Seljuqs in Transoxiana and Khorasan we find them under
39
Bosworth, Ghaznavids, pp. 260–266; Peacock, Great Seljuk, pp. 37–39.
40
Bosworth, Ghaznavids, pp. 248, 260; Ibn Hawqal, Configuration, pp. 437–438.
41 ˙
Cahen, “Malik-nameh,” p. 63; Bosworth, Ghaznavids, pp. 247, 251–252; Peacock, Early
Seljū q, pp. 73–81.
42
Peacock, Early Seljū q, p. 68.
43
Claude Cahen, “The Turkish Invasion: The Selchükids,” in A History of the Crusades, ed.
Kenneth Setton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955), pp. 142–143;
Peacock, Early Seljū q, pp. 63–68.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 92 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

several rulers, and this structure did not change as their power increased.
After the victory in Dandanaqan Chaghri went to Balkh and the neigh-
boring region of Tukharistan, Toghril to Nishapur, and Musa Yabghu
with Ibrahim Inal to Marw.44
Toghril held the westernmost territories, and he had a major asset in
the services of Ibrahim Inal, an exceptionally competent commander and
administrator. Toghril stands out as an organizer who was capable as
a commander but perhaps even more gifted in utilizing the efforts of
others. When he began to campaign to the west he was following in the
footsteps of the “Iraqi” Oghuz, who had taken Rayy. Toghril’s first
expedition was probably an attempt to bring them under control and to
take Rayy, which provided both pasture and access to western Iran. He
sent Ibrahim Inal ahead and many of the Oghuz fled into the regions of
Diyar Bakr and Mosul.45 Further expansion in the west continued in the
same way, with Toghril sometimes undertaking campaigns on his own
and more frequently entrusting them to other commanders, among
whom Ibrahim Inal continued prominent.46 As he moved into central
Iran, Toghril expanded his power by joining local power struggles, lend-
ing out Seljuq contingents to allies. Kurdish and Turkmen contingents
were often found within the same armies, sometimes under Seljuq com-
mand, and sometimes under Kurdish leaders.47 The Iraqi Oghuz con-
tinued to campaign in western regions, joined by new Oghuz groups
coming in from the steppe. Toghril made use of the confusion they
caused, taking advantage of their conquests without accepting full
responsibility for their actions.48
There were, however, disadvantages to the division of authority with
which the Seljuqs furthered their conquests. Military commanders, Iraqi
Oghuz, and junior members of the dynasty made separate alliances with
local powers and felt ownership in areas they had conquered. Indeed, it
was not always clear for whom regions were being taken. In Hulwan on
the Iraq-Kurdistan border for instance, the khutba was read in the name of
˙
Ibrahim Inal, and the one surviving coin struck by Ibrahim contains
symbols denoting sovereignty. It is hardly surprising to find Toghril
49

soon at odds with some of his most important commanders. In 1049–

1050, he asked Ibrahim Inal to hand over Hamadan and several forts in

44
Bosworth, “Political and Dynastic,” pp. 21–22. For a chart of the relationships, see
Peacock, Great Seljuk, p. 53.
45
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 15–20. 46 Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 49–52, 58.
47
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 58–60, 63–65, 87, 90.
48
Bosworth, “Political and Dynastic,” p. 42; Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 19–20, 21–23, 50;
Ripper, Die Marwā niden, p. 188.
49
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, p. 61; Peacock, Early Seljū q, p. 68.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Formation of the Seljuqid State 93

Jibal; Ibrahim refused, and Toghril had to subdue him with force.50
Ibrahim’s actions were not thought to merit serious punishment and he
continued to be prominent.
For about fifteen years Toghril suffered only minor setbacks. However,
the situation changed when he seized what appeared to be his greatest
opportunity and took Baghdad from the Buyids. The Seljuq advance had
brought disorder to Iraq and the Jazira. Bands of Kurdish and Arab
brigands were pillaging the countryside, while the Bedouin ‘Uqaylid,
Khafaja and Mazyadid dynasties, discussed in Chapter 3, fought in
support of one or another local faction. Within Baghdad, tensions
between Sunni and Shi‘i added to the disorder and the Turkish slave
soldiery began to riot. At the end of 1055 the caliph invited Toghril to
enter Baghdad, agreeing to include his name in the khutba.51 This event
˙
raised Toghril’s personal status but his involvement in the area precipi-
tated a crisis that nearly cost him his rule. Toghril’s troops were attacked
by the population of Baghdad, and they repaid the insult with interest.
The atmosphere of the city, already poisonous, worsened. After a few
days Toghril tried to prevent his troops from looting, but they continued
their destruction and eventually he forced some of his Oghuz followers to
leave. The thirteen months that he and his army spent in Iraq were
disastrous not only for the population but for the Turkmen army as well
and caused serious disaffection within it.52
The Buyid commander of Baghdad, al-Basasiri, had taken refuge in the
Jazira and taken Mosul. Toghril could not afford to lose the Jazira and he
set out to retake it. By the end of the year the province was again under
Seljuqid suzerainty, Ibrahim Inal was appointed to Mosul, and in
January 1058, Toghril met the caliph and was crowned “king of east
and west.” However, Toghril was losing support among his followers.
In order to hold Iraq and neighboring regions he had given high positions
to a number of local rulers: the Mazyadid Dubays, Quraysh of the
‘Uqaylids, and the Khuzistani emir Hazarasp b. Bankir. Ibrahim Inal
and other relatives were openly angry over the favor shown to Arab
rulers.53 Within a few months Ibrahim was in open revolt and had won
over a number of Toghril’s soldiers. Toghril called on Chaghri’s sons for
help and together they defeated Ibrahim in July 1059; this time he was put

50
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, p. 73.
51
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 91–92, 98; Peacock, Great Seljuk, pp. 49–50; M. Canard, “al-
Basā sı̄ rı̄ ,” EI 2nd. ed.
52
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, 100–107; Lambton, Continuity and Change, p. 165; Peacock, Early
Seljū q, pp. 96–97.
53
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 108–112, 114; M. Canard, “al-Basā sı̄ rı̄ ,” EI 2nd ed.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 94 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

to death along with his closest allies.54 Once Ibrahim Inal had been
defeated, Toghril was able to pursue his goal of a marriage alliance with
the caliph, which he achieved just before his death on 4 September 1063.

The Assessment of Toghril’s Reign

In both medieval sources and modern histories of the Seljuqs, Toghril has
often been portrayed as the creator of the mature Seljuqid state in which
Perso-Islamic principles of rule became paramount. After the first years of
conquest, Toghril’s interests and those of his nomadic Oghuz followers
were thought to have diverged, with the Turkmen eager to continue
plundering, while the ruler attempted to promote discipline in the army
and a stable administration. This interpretation of Toghril’s reign reflects
a general paradigm of nomad conquest dynasties and their relations to the
sedentary population. The destruction accompanying a nomad conquest
was interpreted as hostility to agriculture and city life and a failure to
recognize their economic importance. According to this view leaders
were educated in the needs of settled society by the Persian viziers in
their employ, but their nomad followers remained attached to steppe
traditions. Toghril was seen as quick to adapt, while his relatives Chaghri
and Ibrahim Inal remained closer to the habits of their Oghuz followers.
Toghril was thought to have lost popularity after the takeover of Baghdad
because he prevented the Oghuz from looting which, as nomads, they
considered a traditional right. Ibrahim Inal’s rebellion after Toghril’s
sojourn in Baghdad has been attributed partly to this tension; he has
been portrayed as exploiting the dissatisfaction of the Oghuz troops with
Toghril’s imposition of personal power and discipline.55
Recent scholarship has challenged this interpretation. When the
Seljuqs arrived in Khorasan, they were familiar with agricultural regions;
from the beginning they sought out cities and tried to get access to tax
revenue. The evidence moreover does not suggest that Toghril differed
from other Seljuq leaders in his attitude towards plunder, or indeed that
looting declined as the Seljuqs adjusted to rule over a settled society. All
three early leaders – Toghril, Chaghri and Ibrahim Inal – sometimes
allowed plunder and sometimes forbade it; this was true of Toghril both
on his first arrival and near the end of his life.

54
Annals, pp. 118, 124; Ibrahim Kafesoğ lu, A History of the Seljuks: Ibrahim Kafesoğ lu’s
Interpretation and the Resulting Controversy, trans. Gary Leiser (Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1988), p. 44; Peacock, Great Seljuk, p. 51.
55
C. E. Bosworth, “Political and Dynastic,” pp. 43–45; Cahen, “The Turkish Invasion,”
pp. 143–145.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Assessment of Toghril’s Reign 95

What does emerge from the narrative suggests two competing needs
common to both settled and nomad leaders: the army had to be supplied,
while the central area of power had to be preserved from harm. On the first
conquest of Nishapur, Toghril reportedly ordered Chaghri and Ibrahim Inal
to prevent looting, while Chaghri argued in favor of it. Nishapur was the
central city of Toghril’s allotted territory, and when Chaghri returned to his
own center, Marw, he forbade pillage and began to restore agriculture.56
During the difficult campaign in Kurdistan, Ibrahim Inal allowed his troops
to pillage, but in 1057, when he was appointed governor of Mosul, he
immediately forbade the practice. This was shortly before the revolt he led
against Toghril, supposedly in support of the Oghuz tradition of plunder.57
Toghril, campaigning in the Jazira a few months earlier, had an army which
had suffered months of privation in Iraq. On his way north against al-
Basasiri, Toghril allowed plunder both along the way and in the region of
Mosul. He had no choice, he said, because his troops were hungry.58
We should not view Oghuz troops as nomads whose depredations came
from nomad tradition. These men had spent years serving as auxiliaries,
and such troops – nomad or not – were rewarded largely with booty. This
usage had begun early in Islamic history and was not limited to the Middle
East.59 It was standard to allow at least a day of looting in a newly taken
city. The question was how much to allow, and how to keep troops
faithful and under control without destroying the lands being conquered.
We should note that while plundering by Seljuq troops decreased under
the reigns of Alp Arslan and Malik Shah when the army was more
efficiently paid, it increased again later when order broke down and
contestants could no longer afford to pay and feed their armies.60 We
should likewise recognize that Seljuq campaigns in nomad territories such
as Kurdistan were sometimes more destructive than those in urban and
agricultural regions, perhaps because they were competing for the same
resources – pasture and livestock.61
Toghril has also been credited with beginning to replace the Turkmen
in his army with mamluks, which were seen as more disciplined and

56
Bosworth, “Political and Dynastic,” pp. 20–21; Bosworth, Ghaznavids, p. 244.
57
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 58–65, 112.
58
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 102, 107–109; Gregory Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography of
Gregory Abû’l Faraj, the Son of Aaron, the Hebrew Physician, Commonly Known as Bar
Hebraeus: Being the First Part of His Political History of the World, trans. E. A. Wallis Budge,
2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press 1932), vol. I, pp. 209–210, 213.
59
For an example from the same period, see Julie Scott Meisami, Persian Historiography to
the End of the Twelfth Century (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), pp. 96–98.
60
David Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites and Turkish Rulers: A History of Isfahā n in the Saljū q
Period (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 213–216. ˙
61
Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites, p. 68.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 96 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

reliable. Current scholars, however, suggest that Toghril and his succes-
sor Alp Arslan continued to value Turkmen troops and did not attempt to
deny their close relationship to the dynasty. Although both added some
mamluks to the army, the Turkmen remained in the majority throughout
their reigns, and their support was thus crucial for the dynasty.62

The Reigns of Alp Arslan and Malikshah

By the time of Toghril’s death the Seljuqid realm stretched from the border
of Anatolia through eastern Khorasan and Khorezm. Because Toghril had
remained childless and his brother Chaghri had died before him, the
sultanate went to Chaghri’s descendants, bringing together the eastern
and western sections. Under two sultans, Alp Arslan b. Chaghri (1063–
1072) and his son Malikshah (1072–1092), the Seljuqs continued to
expand their realm. From the beginning, the administration was set up on
Perso-Islamic lines and run largely by bureaucrats of Khorasanian origin.
The most prominent of these was the vizier Nizam al-Mulk, a man of
enormous ability and ambition who served under both Alp Arslan and
Malikshah. These two reigns have been seen as a classical age, comparing
favorably to the earlier Buyids and the later Mongols. However, we should
not overestimate the power – or the orderly nature – of this state. The Seljuq
sultans were never free of internal challenges and they could not overcome
all of them. Succession to the throne always brought struggles with relatives,
some of whom continued to wield regional power. Many local dynasties
remained intact, usually pursuing their own ends.
When Alp Arslan came to the throne in 1063 he faced a serious chal-
lenge from a senior cousin, Arslan Isra’il’s son Qutalmish, who had played
a major role in the conquest of Azerbaijan and Armenia where he
remained powerful.63 These regions were rich in pasture and agricultural
land, and many Oghuz had collected there, forming a valuable reserve of
manpower. Qutalmish gathered a Turkmen army and headed against
Rayy but was defeated by Alp Arslan.64
In central Iran and Baghdad Alp Arslan had few challenges to his author-
ity, but elsewhere he had to work to maintain control. In Fars he was able to
maintain at best a tenuous hold, and only in the western regions. Alp
62
David Durand-Guédy, “Goodbye to the Türkmens? The Military Role of Nomads in
Iran after the Saljū q Conquest,” in Nomad Military Power in Iran and Adjacent Areas in the
Islamic Period, ed. Kurt Franz and Wolfgang Holzwarth (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2015),
pp. 111–113; Peacock, Early Seljū q, pp. 68–71.
63
Peacock, Early Seljū q, pp. 66, 70.
64
Bosworth, “Political and Dynastic,” pp. 54, 58; David Ayalon, Eunuchs, Caliphs and
Sultans: A Study in Power Relationships (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The Hebrew
University, 1999), p. 145.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Reigns of Alp Arslan and Malikshah 97

Arslan’s powerful brother Qavurt governed Kerman and aimed at extending

his power into Fars.65 Azerbaijan, Armenia and Anatolia presented both
opportunity and challenge: they were closely connected to Syria and the
Jazira, which were important to the Seljuqs as rulers of Baghdad. In these
areas the Seljuq sultans faced a complicated and unstable situation with two
major enemies – the Fatimids and the Byzantines – along with Bedouin and
Kurdish dynasties. Within this mix Seljuq princes and Turkmen emirs often
pursued their own ends, leading Turkmen troops sometimes in the service of
others and sometimes on their own account.66 After his victory over
Qutalmish in 1063, Alp Arslan headed to Azerbaijan, where Qutalmish’s
sons remained active.67 In 1069–1070 he set off against the Fatimids, but
learning that the Byzantines were approaching with a large army, he headed
instead against them and defeated them soundly at the famous battle of
Manzikert in August 1071. This battle cost the Byzantine emperor his
throne and opened Anatolia to further Turkmen migration.68 Earlier
scholars interpreted Seljuq expansion in the west as a ploy by the dynasty
to keep the Oghuz troops happily occupied outside the center of the realm
where they were not wanted. However, Andrew Peacock has argued persua-
sively that the westward advance was a deliberate policy of the sultans, aimed
at acquiring pastures needed for their nomad followers.69
Alp Arslan was murdered in November–December 1072. His son
Malikshah, then about eighteen, was challenged by his uncle Qavurt
b. Chaghri but prevailed with the help of the ‘Uqaylid and Mazyadid
rulers leading armies of Arabs and Kurds.70 The twenty-year reign of
Malikshah is considered the apogee of Seljuqid rule. Several former vassal
states became fully incorporated and the realm expanded to reach its
greatest extent. Malik Shah’s governance was more fully Perso-Islamic
and less dependent on Turkmen troops than those of his predecessors.
Unlike Toghril and Alp-Arslan, who had divided their time among several
different cities, he spent more than half of his reign at Isfahan (though still
camped outside); the city now became a true capital.71 By the end of his
reign the mamluk corps had reportedly grown to 50,000, dominating the
standing army.72

65
K. A. Luther, “Alp Arslā n,” EIr.
66
Heidemann, Die Renaissance, pp. 103–125; Ripper, Die Marwā niden, pp. 192–195.
67
Paul A. Blaum, “Children of the Arrow: The Strange Saga of the Iraqi Turkmens,” The
International Journal of Kurdish Studies 15, no. 1–2 (2001), pp. 155–158; Luther, “Alp
Arslā n,” EIr.
68
Ripper, Die Marwā niden, 195–202; Luther, “Alp Arslā n,” EIr.
69
Peacock, Early Seljū q, pp. 143–150. 70 Bosworth, “Political and Dynastic,” p. 88–89.
71
Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites, pp. 78–79.
72
Bosworth, “Political and Dynastic,” pp. 88, 99.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 98 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

While Malik Shah’s reign saw the growth of the standing army and the
incorporation of new territories, it also witnessed the rise of powerful inde-
pendent emirs, many of them Turkmen. Although the Oghuz had ceased to
make up the bulk of the central army, they had not lost their military import-
ance. New Turkmen groups had continued to migrate into the central
Islamic region, and by this time they constituted a significant proportion of
the nomad population of Seljuqid lands, particularly in the pastures stretch-
ing across the northern regions. Turkmen occupied pasturelands stretching
across the northern Middle East. There were populations in the regions of
Balkh, through northern Khorasan to Marw, the desert and steppe regions
from Marw and Sarakhs to the eastern Caspian shore, in Jurjan, and what is
now Kurdistan, from Hamadan through northern Jazira.73 Many moved
west to Azerbaijan and Armenia, which offered both excellent pasture and
the opportunity to attack Christian territories. In this region the Turkmen
soon began to displace the Kurdish nomads who had earlier dominated, and
by the end of the Seljuqid period, Azerbaijan had begun a process of
Turkification.74 Nomads continued to migrate into Anatolia, where they
soon became an important presence as the Byzantines lost territory.
During Malik Shah’s reign emirs increased their power as Azerbaijan,
Syria and the Jazira became increasingly independent. Some military
commanders – both mamluk and Turkmen – achieved significant auton-
omy and greater power within the state, especially in border regions.
Malik Shah’s method of expansion worked to the advantage of ambitious
emirs. In 1086 he undertook a major campaign in Georgia and
Azerbaijan, then in the Jazira and into northern Syria.75 From this period
also he began to appoint Seljuqid officials over the major cities of the
Jazira. The ‘Uqaylids lost much of their land, and some dynasties, like the
Marwanids, were eliminated. A significant portion of the actual fighting
in Malik Shah’s expansion was undertaken by local commanders with the
help of Seljuqid troops, many of them Turkmen.76 Central Syria and
Anatolia were likewise taken over by princes and commanders who were
at best marginally under central authority.77

73
Ann K. S. Lambton, “The Internal Structure of the Saljuq Empire,” in The Cambridge
History of Iran, ed. J. A. Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 246;
David Durand-Guédy, “The Türkmen-Saljū q Relationship in Twelfth-Century Iran:
New Elements Based on a Contrastive Analysis of Three inšā ’documents,” Eurasian
Studies IX, no. 1–2 (2011).
74
Ripper, Die Marwā niden, pp. 268; C. E. Bosworth, “Azerbaijan IV: Islamic History to
1941,” EIr.
75
C. E. Bosworth, “Malik-Shā h,”EI 2nd ed; Bosworth, “Political and Dynastic,” p. 98.
76
Heidemann, Die Renaissance, pp. 132–138; Ripper, Die Marwā niden, pp. 222–238.
77
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 172, 190, 192–193, 197; Merçil, “History,” p. 159.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Fragmentation of Seljuqid rule 99

In Anatolia the main actors were two sons of Qutalmish, Sulayman and
Mansur, who profited from disarray within the Byzantine state to gather
territory in western Anatolia and aimed for independence. Malikshah sent
an army which killed Mansur but did not subdue Sulayman, who adopted
the title of sultan. After Sulayman’s death in 1086 Anatolia remained
under the control of his sons and local Turkmen.78 By the end of Malik
Shah’s reign, emirs had become a major force, many with troops and
territory.

The Fragmentation of Seljuqid Rule

The unity of the Seljuqid sultanate ended with the deaths of two men in
1092: the vizier Nizam al-Mulk was murdered in October, and Malikshah
died, probably of poison, in November. Upon Malikshah’s death his
powerful widow, the Qarakhanid Terken Khatun, obtained a patent
from the caliph for her four-year-old son Mahmud. However, the mam-
luks attached to Nizam al-Mulk quickly enthroned Berk-Yaruq, a son
from another wife. Another contender was Malikshah’s brother Tutush,
governor of Syria, who had the support of a Turkmen army and alliances
with numerous Turkmen emirs and local rulers.79
Although Berk-Yaruq defeated his rivals, he was never able to consoli-
date power over the whole of Malikshah’s realm. Individual emirs, lead-
ing their own armies, were an important element in internal struggles and
began to control more of the administration.80 Several established inde-
pendent power over large districts, which they passed down to their
descendants. One example is the Turkmen commander Artuq, who had
campaigned on the Arabian Peninsula for Malikshah and then served his
brother Tutush in Syria.81 Within ten years of Malikshah’s death, Artuq’s
children had established their power in Diyar Bakr.
A Turkic institution, the atabeg (“father-lord”) facilitated the rise of
independent territorial power among emirs. Immature members of the
dynasty appointed to governorships were provided with senior emirs as
atabegs. The atabeg was often married to a prince’s mother when she
became a widow, thus cementing his attachment to the dynasty. The
princes themselves became increasingly marginal in the process. It is
78
Claude Cahen, The Formation of Turkey: The Seljukid Sultanate of Rū m: Eleventh to
Fourteenth Century, trans. P. M. Holt (Harlow, England; New York: Longman, 2001),
pp. 8–10; Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 216–220, 223–226.
79
Bosworth, “Political and Dynastic,” pp. 102–108; Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 258–277;
Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites, pp. 153–157.
80
Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites, pp. 207, 213–216; Lambton, Continuity and Change,
pp. 43–48.
81
Kafesoğ lu, History of the Seljuks, pp. 51–52; Ripper, Die Marwā niden, pp. 221–228.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 100 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

not surprising to find that several Seljuqid successor states were founded
by atabegs.82 In the 1140s both Fars and Azerbaijan became essentially
independent under atabegs: Fars under the Turkmen Salghurids, and
Azerbaijan under the Eldigüzids, were founded by a mamluk emir.

Seljuqid Rule in Khorasan and Anatolia

In 1097 Berk-Yaruq appointed his younger brother Sanjar, then twelve
years old, as governor of Khorasan. The province remained under
Sanjar’s control for almost sixty years, and after 1118 he became the
recognized head of the Seljuqid state, with the Seljuq ruler in central
Iran seen as his subordinate. Around this time a nomadic dynasty, the
Qara Khitay, arrived in Turkestan from the borders of China, causing
a new wave of Turkmen immigration. Sanjar led an army against them in
1141 and suffered a devastating defeat. As his campaigns in Transoxiana
exhausted his treasury, he turned to taxation. The Oghuz nomads on the
borders were among the groups pressed for taxes. Those in the region of
Balkh were additionally burdened with a harsh governor, and they
rebelled. Nonetheless, Sanjar undertook two punitive expeditions against
them, and he was defeated in both. He was captured in 1153 by the
Oghuz who carried him with them for several years while they rampaged
through Khorasan. Sanjar succeeded in escaping after three years but
died thereafter.83 This was the end of effective Seljuq rule in Khorasan.
For the next twenty years the province remained a battleground for
competing powers. This was a period of great hardship to which the
Oghuz contributed liberally. They were still without a paramount ruler
and probably still migrating into Khorasan.84 The destruction visited on
Khorasan and the general confusion at the end of Seljuq rule changed the
relationship between the Turkmens and the Seljuq family, as well as the
attitude of the general population. There had been criticism before, but
now we find some poets exhorting rulers to fight the Oghuz and explicitly
linking them with the devil.85
In Anatolia on the other hand, Seljuqid rule expanded and continued
into the Mongol period. This region remained a boiling cauldron, with
Crusader states, new crusading armies, Byzantine rivalries, Turkmen
82
Lambton, Continuity and Change, pp. 229–233; C. Cahen, “Atabak,” EI 2nd ed.
83
Bosworth, “Sandjar,” EI 2nd ed.
84
Bosworth, “Political and Dynastic,” pp. 185–187; A. K. S. Lambton, “Aspects of
Saljū q-Ghuzz Settlement in Persia,” in Islamic Civilization, 950–1150, ed.
D. S. Richards (Oxford: Cassirer, 1973), pp. 111–113.
85
Durand-Guédy, “Türkmen-Saljū q Relationship,” p. 43; Peacock, Great Seljuk, pp. 121–
123. Andrew Peacock takes a less negative view, suggesting that Oghuz destructiveness
has been exaggerated.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Government and Political Culture 101

powers, and autonomous tribes constantly embroiled in war. In addition

to its extensive pastures, Anatolia had good agricultural land and import-
ant trade routes, and thus offered opportunities for local state building.
Over the course of the century new Turkmen principalities developed.
One of the earliest and most powerful of these was the state created by the
descendants of Qutalmish, active in the area since its first conquest.
During the twelfth century their state, known as the Rum Seljuqs, became
the greatest power in eastern and central Anatolia, presiding over a period
of prosperity and growth of urban life. The Turkmen remained an
important element in the population, in close relationship with the dyn-
asty and with the cities to which they provided livestock products.86
Persian remained the language of administration, but in architecture
Anatolia developed new regional styles including Turkic animal themes
and traces of Central Asian influence. The prosperity and longevity of the
Rum Seljuqs revived Seljuq prestige and made the dynasty a continued
source of legitimacy, particularly in Anatolia.

Government and Political Culture

As Turks the Seljuqs inherited a strong political culture, but one in which
they did not hold first place; they never adopted the titles khan and
khaghan, as the Qarakhanids had done. When the Seljuqs took over the
Middle East, they accepted a tradition which also denied them sover-
eignty, and in their formal legitimation they adhered solidly to Islamic
norms. Like other dynasties, they justified their rule through a patent
from the caliph, adopting the title of sultan. The Seljuqid dı̄ wā n was
modeled on that of the Samanids and Ghaznavids, and at the beginning
the highest offices went to bureaucrats of Khorasanian descent. These
men brought their heritage with them and the language of administration
under the great Seljuqs was thus Persian rather than the Arabic used by
earlier Muslim dynasties in central Iran. Bureaucrats were instrumental in
cultural patronage, and it is not surprising to find that the Persian lan-
guage continued to gain strength in poetry, belles lettres and history. It
was at this time that New Persian became established in the central
Iranian lands.
The Seljuqid administration was divided: on one side the court
(dargā h) and the military with personnel made up of Turks – Oghuz
and Mamluk; and on the other, the bureaucracy (dı̄ wā n) whose personnel
was composed of Persians and Arabs. There was thus an ethnic division of

86
A. C. S. Peacock, “Court and Nomadic Life in Saljuq Anatolia,” in Turko-Mongol Rulers,
Cities and City Life, ed. David Durand-Guédy (Leiden: Brill, 2013).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 102 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

offices underlining the separate identity of the dynasty and its military
servitors. This system remained in place for centuries and became
a marker of successive nomad conquest dynasties. In the Islamic world
the separation of ethnic spheres was seen as natural and indeed necessary
for two reasons: First, Turks were seen as superior fighters and military
might was necessary for the maintenance of order; second, a ruler coming
from outside could remain impartial towards the factions of the society he
ruled, while a ruler from the local population would favor one side.87
In Seljuqid government as it actually functioned, the distinction
between Turk and Persian, civil and military, was less stark.
Theoretically, the sultan was head of the army, the vizier headed the
bureaucracy, and a high official maintained communication between
the two spheres. However, since the vizier handled financial affairs, the
offices responsible for the recruitment, payment and equipment of the
standing army came under his jurisdiction. Furthermore, most viziers had
their own military followings and participated in campaigns. The viziers
of the early sultans, al-Kunduri and Nizam al-Mulk, had slave armies
large enough to provide significant military force.88 The more powerful
emirs within the army sometimes had their own dı̄ wā ns and could thus
wield power in the civil administration. As with most pre-modern gov-
ernments, the prerogatives of a given office depended largely on the
person holding it.
Despite their Islamic legitimation, the Seljuqs did not totally abandon
their steppe identity. Alp Arslan showed the importance of the Central
Asian heritage of the dynasty in his early campaign into Transoxiana,
where he elicited expressions of submission from neighboring Turkmens
and Qipchaqs and visited the grave of his ancestor Seljuq b. Duqaq in
Jand. He also married his heir apparent, Malik Shah, to a Qarakhanid
princess.89 The dynasty retained some institutions and customs from its
steppe past and from its period of service with the Qarakhanids. The
Oghuz appear to have preserved the oral tradition connecting the royal
house with the figure of a wolf, the mythical progenitor of the Türk
Khaghans. Some of the iconography used in documents and coins went
back to steppe imperial traditions. At the head of official documents, the

87
Carole Hillenbrand, “Islamic Orthodoxy or Realpolitik? Al-Ghazā lı̄ ’s Views on
Government,” Iran 26 (1988), pp. 83–84; Roy P. Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership in
an Early Islamic Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 177–179.
88
Lambton, “Internal Structure,” pp. 257–264; Carla L. Klausner, The Seljuk Vezirate:
A Study of Civil Administration, 1055–1194 (Cambridge, MA: Distributed for the Center
for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University by Harvard University Press, 1973),
pp. 39–41, 58.
89
Luther, “Alp Arslā n,” EIr.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Government and Political Culture 103

Seljuqs placed the emblem of the sultan or toghra, which in the early
period was the image of a bow and arrow and mace. From the Seljuqs this
practice spread to other dynasties, developing gradually into a calligraphic
exercise best known from the Ottoman Empire. The bow and arrow also
appeared on Seljuqid coins, as it did in Qarakhanid coinage.90 Like the
early Qarakhanids, Seljuq rulers usually camped in tents among the army
outside the city while at the same time sponsoring construction within it.
This began with Toghril, who underwrote major building projects in
Rayy, Baghdad and Isfahan, but lived in camp outside.91
In social habits, the dynasty retained its Turkish traditions for some
time. At the time of Toghril’s marriage to the daughter of the caliph he
and his emirs sang to Turkish music and danced in the Turkish fashion,
going down on their knees and rising again, and the spoken language of
the court remained Turkish.92 Despite their enthusiasm for correct
Islamic observance, the early sultans continued the levirate: the practice
of marrying widows of one’s brother or father (excepting one’s own
mother), a habit contrary to Islamic law.93 The Seljuq sultans spent
much of their time feasting, drinking and hunting, all of which accorded
with Turkic custom, but these pastimes also conformed to the royal
practice of other courts in the central Islamic lands (and indeed
elsewhere).94
One of the steppe traits shown by the Seljuq dynasty was the prestige
and power accorded to dynastic women, and the Turks continued to give
high status to women after their arrival in the Middle East. Marriage
alliances were an important part of politics; the Seljuqs intermarried
with many of the surrounding and vassal powers.95 Although women
moved to their husband’s family when they married, royal women
retained the prestige attached to their birth and passed it on to their
children. Many had their own landed estates, grants of tax revenue

90
Peacock, Great Seljuk, pp. 126–129.
91
David Durand-Guédy, “Ruling from the Outside: A New Perspective on Early Turkish
Kingship in Iran,” in Every Inch a King: Comparative Studies on Kings and Kingship in the
Ancient and Medieval Worlds, ed. Lynette Mitchell and Charles Melville (Leiden: Brill,
2013); Iranian Elites, p. 90; Kafesoğ lu, History of the Seljuks, p. 39; Merçil, “History,”
p. 153.
92
Faruk Sümer, Oğ uzlar (Türkmenler): tarihleri, boy teşkilatı, destanları, 4. baskı. ed.
(Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1999), pp. 121, 126; Bar Hebraeus,
Chronography, vol. I, p. 215.
93
Bosworth, “Political and Dynastic,” p. 79; Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, p. 129.
94
Peacock, Great Seljuk, pp. 172–177.
95
Cahen, “Malik-nameh,” p. 54; Heidemann, Die Renaissance, p. 293; Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals,
p. 155; Carole Hillenbrand, “Women in the Seljuq Period,” in Women in Iran from the
Rise of Islam to 1800, ed. Guity Nashat and Lois Beck (Urbana and Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 2003), p. 108.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 104 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

(iqtā ‘) from the government, a personal administration and a military

following.96
Women could wield significant power, particularly during succession
struggles. A prime example is that of Malik Shah’s Qarakhanid wife
Terken Khatun, in her efforts to enthrone her son Berk-Yaruq. Safiya
Khatun, the sister of Alp Arslan who was married successively to two
‘Uqaylid rulers, provides another illustration. During the struggle after
Malik Shah’s death, she marched on Mosul with her son and took the city
for her husband Ibrahim; when Malik Shah’s brother Tutush killed
Ibrahim, he appointed her and her son as his deputies in the city.97 In
order to enhance their power ambitious women sometimes married men
who could increase their standing, and they might even initiate the match.
While trying to keep her son on the throne, Terken Khatun proposed
marriage to two members of the dynasty who controlled large armies of
Turkmen.98 The Arabs and Persians involved with the Seljuqs did not
always approve the freedom of women; the caliph refused to allow Terken
Khatun to act as sole regent for her infant son, and Nizam al-Mulk’s
famous mirror for princes, the Siyā sat-nā ma, contains a chapter on the
importance of denying power to women and avoiding their influence.99

Turks and Turkmen

By the eleventh century, Turks had become familiar as neighbors in the
steppe and as military slaves; by the end of Seljuq rule, they were also
internal nomads and independent dynastic founders. The Turkmen who
migrated into the Middle East have remained an important population up
to the present. Their military role has been well chronicled, but the
histories provide less information on social and economic conditions.
The political organization of the Turkmen in the Seljuqid period remains
a puzzle. We know something about Oghuz social structure from the work
of the Qarakhanid Mahmud al-Kashghari. He lists the major Oghuz
tribes, identifying the Seljuq dynasty as belonging to the Qınıq tribe.100
However the Seljuqs’ tribal name is not mentioned in most other sources,
and we do not know that the leaders entered as chiefs of the tribe.
Moreover, almost none of the tribal names mentioned by al-Kashghari
appear in historical sources chronicling the first century of Seljuqid rule.

96
Lambton, Continuity and Change, pp. 35, 110, 259.
97 98
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, pp. 266–267. Peacock, Great Seljuk, p. 179.
99
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, p. 262; Nizā m al-Mulk, The Book of Government: or, Rules for Kings:
˙
the Siyar al-muluk or Siyasat-nama of Nizam al-Mulk, trans. Hubert Darke, 2nd ed.
(London; Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1978), pp. 179–186.
100
al-Kā shgharı̄ , Compendium of the Turkic Dialects 1, pp. 101–102.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Turks and Turkmen 105

After the migration into the Middle East, first the Iraqi Oghuz and later
a variety of emirs acted largely independently, but no tribal names are
attached to such groups until the twelfth century.101 Two decrees issued by
Sultan Sanjar in the twelfth century mention Turkmen leaders but give
them the same titles accorded to regular regional officials, and make no use
of the standard words for tribes or clans in describing their subdivisions.102
Andrew Peacock has suggested that tribes may not have been important
within the Oghuz and that al-Kashghari, who wrote in Baghdad about
1077, might have exaggerated the importance of tribes in an attempt to
make the Seljuqs appear more like Arabs, and thus more legitimate.103
It is also possible, as suggested above, that the Seljuqs who entered the
Middle East were leaders of armies based not on tribes but on personal
followings, thus outside the tribal system. Later, in the twelfth century,
a number of Turkmen tribes listed in al-Kashghari did become active: the
Salghur in Fars, the Iva’i in Armenia and the Jazira, and the Afshar in
Khuzistan are all clearly attested. It is possible that tribes or sections of
tribes came into the region during the migrations of the twelfth century;
another possible explanation is that as central control broke down, tribal
organization developed more strongly.104 The question has not been
thoroughly investigated, and the paucity of detailed sources may make it
impossible to find a full explanation.
Throughout their rule, Seljuqid sultans considered the Turkmen as
their kin, placing high value on their services and on their economic
contribution. The Seljuqid rulers did not distance themselves from the
Turkmen or attempt usually to keep them away from cities.105 Both
before and during the Seljuqid period, livestock products are mentioned
for several regions with nomad populations; these were among the trade
goods contributing to the wealth of towns.106 Trade expanded under the
Seljuqs and was an important part of the economy promoted by the
dynasty, and the camels provided by the Turkmen were important to
this effort.107Most scholars suggest that the Seljuqid period was one of
general prosperity, and the regions in which Turkmens were concentrated
flourished at least until the disturbances at the end of the dynasty.108

101
Claude Cahen, “Les tribus turques d’Asie Occidentale pendant la période seljukide,”
Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 51, no. 1–2 (1948).
102
Durand-Guédy, “Türkmen-Saljū q Relationship,” p. 29.
103
Peacock, Great Seljuk, p. 28. 104 Cahen, “Les tribus.”
105
Peacock, “Court”; Durand-Guédy, “Türkmen-Saljū q Relationship.”
106
Lambton, “Aspects of Saljū q-Ghuzz Settlement in Persia,” pp. 116–117, 122–123.
107
Peacock, Great Seljuk, pp. 297–302; Durand-Guédy, “Türkmen-Saljū q
Relationship,” p. 37.
108
Heidemann, Die Renaissance, pp. 145–146, 150–153; Lambton, Continuity and Change,
pp. 158–160, 169.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 106 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

Nomads were considered part of the general population and were taxed
accordingly; the pasture tax was considered one of the basic, canonical
taxes. Oghuz and others also paid dues to support local officials, some of
which went to the central government. When the state was in need, they
suffered from higher taxes along with the rest of the population.109 Our
most detailed information on the position of the Turkmen comes from
two decrees appointing officials to Turkmen groups in the period of
Sanjar, mentioned above. Although the military role is referred to in
these documents, the terms used for the Turkmen are those commonly
applied to peasants as well: ra‘aya and khalq. Their economic contribu-
tion to the realm is mentioned, and while they are seen as a potential
threat to the government they are also portrayed as vulnerable to abuse.
An official appointed by the government was responsible for allotting
pasture and water sources, and it appears that such officials might have
been Turkmen.110
Although Turkic slave soldiers are often discussed in contrast to the
Oghuz, both Turkmen and mamluks were often referred to simply as
Turks, and it is sometimes impossible to tell the two apart in the historical
sources.111 Thus some commonality of origin was recognized. Opinions
about the Turks among the population were often strong but not univer-
sally favorable, and it is not surprising to find hadı̄ th brought in to
˙
strengthen one or another position. Mahmud al-Kashghari, who aimed
to encourage the spread of the Turkish language, quoted a Prophetic
hadı̄ th: “Learn the tongue of the Turks, for their reign will be long,”
˙
connecting this tradition to the emergence of the Oghuz themselves.112
Less friendly observers preferred the apocryphal hadı̄ th referring to the
˙
Turks: “If they love you they eat you, if they are angry with you they kill
you.”113 The theologian al-Ghazali, who enjoyed the patronage of the
Seljuqs but had reservations about their followers, struck a middle note in
his defense of the new system of governance: the Turks, despite their
overbearing pride and many other faults, had the crucial quality of mili-
tary power, which gave them the ability to guard the caliphate and hence
Islam. The ghā zı̄ activities of the Turkmen on the Byzantine frontier were
thus an important factor in their favor.114

109
Lambton, “Internal Structure,” pp. 245–249; Nizā m al-Mulk, The Book of
Government, p. 24. ˙
110
Durand-Guédy, “Türkmen-Saljū q Relationship,” pp. 28–29, 31–35, 44, 46.
111
Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites, pp. 213–216.
112
al-Kā shgharı̄ , Compendium of the Turkic Dialects 1, p. 70.
113
Haarmann, “Ideology and History,” p. 180.
114
Hillenbrand, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” pp. 83–86.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Turks and Turkmen 107

While they might accept the Turks as rulers, the settled elites
considered themselves culturally superior. The ragged Oghuz who
entered Khorasan and had the effrontery to take it over were met
with ridicule as well as fear. These were people from a lower order of
civilization who could not understand the niceties of city life. One
story described Toghril and his followers in Nishapur after their
victory and final takeover: Toghril ate an almond cake and said,
“This is excellent tutmach (probably a noodle dish) but there is no
garlic in it.” His followers, even more ignorant, mistook camphor for
salt and complained of its bitterness, without recognizing that it was
another substance altogether.115
In the Iranian world, Turks had long been neighbors both inside
and outside the border, and they were seen as part of the natural
order of society. By the time of the Seljuqid invasion, the Turks and
the Persians – “Turk wa Tā jı̄ k” – were regarded as two complemen-
tary parts of government and society. As New Persian literature
developed in Khorasan and Transoxiana, the images and even the
words of the Turks were brought into it. Turks were seen as having
two basic qualities: military skill and personal beauty. Young Turkic
slaves of both sexes were often portrayed in poetry as love objects,
personifying beauty. We can cite one couplet to illustrate the com-
bination of characteristics associated with the Turks:
My idol is an archer bearing arrows of two kinds
With which in two ways he pierces hearts, in peace and war.
In time of peace my heart he pierces with the arrow of his eyelashes,
In time of war the heart of the enemy with arrows of khadang [actual
arrows].116

The ambivalent attitude towards the Turks, at once necessary soldiers

and uncouth nomads, recalls the feelings expressed towards the Bedouin
which I described in earlier chapters. The Turks were different in two
ways: First, they were strangers speaking a separate language and without
either the kinship acknowledged to the Bedouin or their literary contribu-
tion. Second, the Turks, unlike the Bedouin, had a social structure and
political tradition which encouraged state formation. They were not only
soldiers but also rulers over much of the Middle East, and they remained
so up to the modern period.

115
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, Annals, p. 40.
116
Tourkhan Gandjeï, “Turkish in Pre-Mongol Persian Poetry,” Bulletin of the School of
Oriental and African Studies 49, no. 1 (1986), pp. 67–71.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 108 Turkic Tradition and Seljuqid Rule

Conclusion
It is not clear how many Oghuz entered the Middle East over the course of
the Seljuqid period. After the initial migrations there appear to have been
two additional movements into the region in the twelfth century, so that
by the end of the century Turkmen constituted a significant population of
pastoral nomads throughout the northern regions, particularly in
Anatolia and Azerbaijan. Within the central Islamic lands, the Seljuq
rulers did not claim sovereign titles and followed the practice of other
secondary dynasties in subordinating themselves formally to the caliphs
while using the title of sultan for themselves. Nonetheless, they created
a new dynastic tradition and a new source of legitimation which lasted
beyond the Great Seljuq sultans. The Rum Sultanate, stemming from the
branch of Arslan Isra’il, lasted into the Mongol period. Other dynasties,
led by Atabegs, ruled in several regions, benefitting from Seljuqid dynas-
tic prestige well after the end of a unified state. An example is the
Salghurid dynasty of Fars, which retained control over the province as
a tributary of successive powers up to 1270. Former servitors of the
Seljuqs established states in the Jazira, Azerbaijan and northern Syria.
Although there was little overt reference to the steppe imperial tradition in
Seljuqid administration, the steppe nomads were now established in the
Middle East both as a ruling class and as an important source of military
manpower.
The Seljuqs did not attempt to establish Turkic as a language of
literature or administration, and in the religious sphere they sponsored
standardization and orthodox revival through their promotion of the
madrasa. However, they did effect a significant cultural change in bring-
ing the use of New Persian west as the language of the court and adminis-
tration, and as a literary language suitable for poetry, belles lettres and
history. This went along with the use of a dual administration, dividing
offices, theoretically at least, into a Persian civil sphere and a Turkic
military one. While the Turco-Iranian synthesis had begun under the
Samanids and Ghaznavids, it now became the court culture of most of
the Iranian regions.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.006 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 5 Mongol Conquest and Rule

The Seljuqs had arrived in the Middle East as fugitives; the Mongols
came as a conquering army, building a vast empire based on the steppe
imperial tradition. They began with a ferocious conquest, then created
a new imperial ideal encompassing the Eurasian steppe, the Silk Road and
China. For a while, much of the Middle East became a mere province in
a world empire that was governed through political institutions developed
and tested outside the Islamic world, most particularly in Inner Asia and
China. At the same time, the Mongols were quick to recognize local
expertise and to ally with regional powers. Within a few months of their
arrival in the eastern Islamic lands, they were incorporating Iranians into
their armies. The bureaucrats of eastern Iran were soon brought into
service and, as in the case of the Seljuqs, Iranian traditions found fertile
ground in Mongol court culture. Acculturation went both ways; as the
Mongols adapted to the Islamic world, their Muslim subjects in turn
adopted some elements of the steppe tradition. The Mongol Empire
lost its unity just as the conquest of Iran was completed, but its compo-
nent parts remained under the rule of Chinggis Khan’s descendants, and
in some cases continued to expand. Thus, what we might call the Mongol
enterprise remained an important world force for centuries.
Mongol rule had a profound cultural impact on the central Islamic
lands. The most developed steppe institutions were political and military,
and these left a lasting imprint. Like the earlier steppe rulers, the Mongols
fostered trade and with it the exchange of goods and ideas over a wide
area, from the rivers and forests of the Russian territory to China and the
Middle East. They further intensified cultural borrowing by their distri-
bution of personnel and goods throughout their empire. Iran and China
became closely connected, as khans in the central Islamic world brought
in a stream of Chinese and Central Asians and experimented with new
systems of governance and likewise with new foods and plants. Over time
the Islamic and steppe imperial traditions became intertwined and
together spread to encompass the western section of the Mongol

109

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 110 Mongol Conquest and Rule

Empire. The influx of foreign ideas and styles created a period of remark-
able efflorescence in Perso-Islamic culture in numerous fields, opening
and widening the horizons of the Middle East.

The Formation of the Mongol Empire

The Mongol Empire was the greatest moment in the imperial tradition of
the steppe. It arose in the old center of the Türk Khaghanate and incorp-
orated many Turkic institutions. The central steppe territories had
remained politically active and connected to neighboring powers from
China to western Turkestan. Between the Tarim River Basin and the
northern Tien Shan mountains the major power was the Uighur state
which had preserved the traditions of the Turkic empire within an
increasingly sedentary society. During the Uighurs’ rule, Turkic became
a literary language, sophisticated enough to use in religious texts and in
administration. In the Mongolian steppe, probably the strongest power
was the Kereyid khanate in the upper Orkhon region, whose ruling house
had likewise remained attached to Turkic traditions and had developed
a rudimentary administration. In eastern Mongolia, tribal confederations
were smaller and less organized. Among them were the Mongols and the
Tatars, whose rulers claimed the title khan.1
According to tradition, Temüjin – who became Chinggis Khan – was
born into the Mongol tribe, probably about 1167. The account of his
youth is a tale of hardship: a widow with her children abandoned by
erstwhile followers. The young man gathered a band of personal followers
from outside his own tribe who owed their loyalty exclusively to him;
these men later formed the center of his army and administration. In the
early 1180s he collected his affianced bride, Börte, and attached himself
to the leader of the Kereyids, Toghril, known as Ong Khan, who had
authority over much of the plateau, including the Mongol tribe. Over the
next twenty years Ong Khan and Temüjin collaborated to defeat their
rivals, applying unusual violence and sometimes massacring members of
defeated tribes. Both seem to have been attempting to introduce a new
level of central power, and Temüchin, in particular, worked to undermine
the power of tribes, breaking with established custom to impose a new
level of discipline in military campaigns.2 As Temüchin gained strength

1
Isenbike Togan, Flexibility and Limitation in Steppe Formations: The Kerait Khanate and
Chinggis Khan (Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp. 75–77, 117–118; Thomas T. Allsen, “The Rise of
the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Rule in North China,” in Cambridge History of
China, vol. 6, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), pp. 323–326, 331–332.
2
Togan, Flexibility, pp. 86, 90–91, 99, 102–103.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Formation of the Mongol Empire 111

and ambition the two men began to disagree, and in 1203 Temüjin fought
and defeated Ong Khan. He treated his victory as legitimate succession to
the rule of an expanded confederation and appropriated Kereit prestige
for his emerging state, in part by marrying into the dynasty.3 In
a campaign lasting from May 1204 into 1205 he broke the power of the
remaining tribes and became master of the Mongolian plateau.4
In 1206 Temüjin convoked a khuriltai – a gathering of representatives
from his own and subject tribes – at the source of the Onon River and
adopted a new title: Chinggis Khan. He set up his emerging empire as the
continuation of the imperial tradition of the Türk Khaghanate. Both
the Orkhon River valley, which had been the central imperial territory
of the khaghanate, and the Turkic concept of God-given fortune attached
to the person of the ruler were now taken over by the Mongols.5 Chinggis
Khan had a Uighur scribe from the Naiman adapt the Uighur alphabet for
the Mongolian language and teach it to his sons. He had already rewarded
his personal followers with formal offices. Much of his administration was
modeled on the Kereit adaptation of earlier traditions: he ordered his army
on a decimal system from units of ten men up to regiments of 10,000,
known as tümens, a system which went back to the Hsiung-nu. He also
formed a central guard corps, the keshig, which he put under his most loyal
followers.6 Most tribes were broken up and divided among contingents
commanded by outside commanders, many from his following.7 These
institutions became part of Mongol administration and survived among
subject states well beyond the end of Chinggisid rule. After his enthrone-
ment, Chinggis quickly expanded his realm in several directions. He sent
his eldest son Jochi to campaign on the northern and western frontiers,
while from 1211 to 1215 he mounted campaigns in north China and
Manchuria.8
Islamic Central Asia was known to the Mongols, since they traded with
the cities of Khorezm, and Chinggis Khan had had several Muslim
merchants among his early followers. Two new and aggressive powers
had arisen in the region. In Khorezm, a new dynasty of Khwarazmshahs
3
Igor de Rachewiltz, The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the
Thirteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 108–109.
4
Paul Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan, His Life and Legacy, trans. Thomas Nivison Haining
(Oxford; Cambridge, MA: B. Blackwell, 1992), pp. 52–88; Allsen, “Rise,” pp. 338–342;
Togan, Flexibility, p. 135.
5
Thomas T. Allsen, “Spiritual Geography and Political Legitimacy in the Eastern Steppe,”
in Ideology and the Formation of Early States, ed. Henri J. M. Claessen and Jarich G. Oosten
(Leiden: Brill, 1996), pp. 124–125.
6
Rachewiltz, Secret History, commentary, pp. 410, 464–465, 689; Togan, Flexibility, p. 75.
7
Togan, Flexibility, pp. 86, 90–91, 102–103; Allsen, “Rise,” pp. 346–347.
8
Paul D. Buell, “Early Mongol Expansion in Western Siberia and Turkestan (1207–1219):
A Reconstruction,” Central Asiatic Journal 36, no. 1–2 (1992), pp. 4–16.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 112 Mongol Conquest and Rule

had gathered an army of Turkmen from the steppe and taken over much
of Transoxiana and northern Khorasan. For about a century the Qara
Khitay, mentioned in Chapter 4, ruled a realm extending from the west-
ern Tarim River Basin to Transoxiana, and the Uighurs had become their
vassals. As Chinggis Khan began to expand his empire, the Uighur ruler
submitted to him voluntarily in 1211 and the Qarluq chiefs of the Ili valley
soon followed suit.9
In 1216 Mongol armies began to campaign in the west and by the end
of 1218 the Qara Khitay realm was under Mongol control. The
Khwarazmshah Sultan Muhammad now faced the Mongols directly,
and relations soon deteriorated. When a Mongol caravan reached Otrar
on the Jaxartes River it was detained by the governor, who executed its
merchants and seized their goods, probably with Sultan Muhammad’s
encouragement. Chinggis Khan sent an envoy to protest; Sultan
Muhammad had him killed. This incident provided the justification for
a western campaign, begun in the summer of 1219.10

The Mongol Campaign in the Middle East

The Mongol conquest is remembered equally for its destructiveness and for
its extraordinary success. Sultan Muhammad Khwarazmshah retreated and
left the defense of Transoxiana, Khorezm and Khorasan to the garrison
troops of its cities.11 Chinggis Khan divided his forces and attacked
Transoxiana simultaneously with four separate armies.12 The main army
under Chinggis and his youngest son Tolui headed against Bukhara, where
they arrived in February 1220. After three days of fighting the population
opened the city gates, but since there was continued resistance by the
garrison troops in the citadel, the Mongols continued to attack and much
of the city was destroyed by fire. They then marched against Samarqand,
which also submitted after a few days. A section of the army under Chinggis
Khan’s followers Jebe and Sübedei pursued Sultan Muhammad who fled
west and took refuge on an island in the Caspian, where he died in the winter
of 1220–1221. Jebe and Sübedei continued through the Caucasus.
Chinggis Khan’s conquests were carried out with a display of force and
selective violence that made the Mongols appear to many as a manifestation
9
Thomas T. Allsen, “The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the 13th century,”
in China among Equals, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1983), pp. 246–247.
10
V. V. Bartol’d, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, trans. Mrs. T. Minorsky (London:
Luzac, 1968), pp. 393–399.
11
‘Alā ’ al-Dı̄ n ‘Atā -Malik Juwaynı̄ , The History of the World-Conqueror, trans. John Andrew
Boyle (Manchester: ˙ Manchester University Press, 1958), pp. 373–378.
12
Buell, “Early Mongol,” p. 27.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Mongol Campaign in the Middle East 113

of God’s will and gave Chinggis extraordinary charisma. The destructiveness

of his campaign was not a result of ignorance or antipathy to agriculture and
city life, on the contrary, by the time they arrived in Transoxiana, Chinggis
Khan and his followers were well acquainted with settled populations. The
Mongols had campaigned extensively in China and had begun to occupy its
cities. The western army, moreover, contained some sedentary troops; there
was a large corps of Chinese siege engineers and a significant number of
Central Asian troops under their own rulers including a tümen (10,000) of
Uighur troops and contingents from the Qarluq, some of whom were
Muslim.13
The conquests also stood out for their systematic exploitation of con-
quered populations. When city populations submitted, they were spared,
subjected to a tax and assigned a Mongol official. Usually, the garrison
troops in the citadel resisted and were often backed by the population for
a few days. In these cities the population was taken out of the town, which
the army then looted. The walls and fortresses were destroyed, the gar-
rison was massacred, and the Mongols conscripted military levies and
craftsmen before allowing people to return. The cities whose inhabitants
showed determined resistance or rebelled after conquest suffered even
more theatrical punishment. The population was divided up among the
soldiers and killed, and only the religious classes and people considered
useful to the Mongols were spared. The Mongol interest in trade and
production was apparent in this: craftsmen were spared and immediately
put to use, some in the army and others as skilled labor in specialized
Mongol workshops.14
Local manpower gathered from conquered cities became part of the
conquering armies. In the first months, levies were used to gather and
carry stones, dig trenches or set up siege machines; they were also pushed
before the army in the assault on city walls.15 Quite soon, however, the
levies became more integrated into the Mongol army, and within a year or
so, levies and Iranian volunteers could be used as regular soldiers, some-
times making up a significant proportion of expeditionary forces.16
13
John A. Boyle, “Dynastic and Political History of the Ī l-Khā ns” in Cambridge History of
Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 307; Michal Biran, Chinggis
Khan (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007), p. 56.
14
Thomas T. Allsen, Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire: A Cultural History of
Islamic Textiles (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 31–36.
15
Juwaynı̄ , World Conqueror, pp. 106, 117, 126; Muhammad ibn Ahmad Nasawı̄ , Histoire
du sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankobirti, prince du Kharezm, ˙ ˙
par Mohammed en-Nesawi: texte
Arabe publié d’après le manuscrit de la Bibliotèque Nationale trans. O. Houdas, 2 vols., vol. 2
(Paris: E. Leroux, 1891–1895), pp. 89, 91.
16
Juwaynı̄ , World Conqueror, p. 118; Minhā j Sirā j Jū zjā nı̄ , Tabakā t al-Nā sirı̄ : A General
History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia, including Hindustan; ˙ ˙ from A. ˙H. 194 (810 A.
D.) to A. H. 658 (1260 A.D.) and the Irruption of the Infidel Mughals into Islam, trans.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 114 Mongol Conquest and Rule

The conquest of Transoxiana was swift, and the Mongols encountered

relatively little resistance. In Khorasan, however, the population was
more active. A number joined the Mongol army but many others fought
back, and as a result the Mongol campaigns there were longer and more
devastating. The high level of resistance was probably due partly to local
politics and partly to an understandable miscalculation of Mongol
strength. Khorasan had been a battleground for decades – indeed for
much of the time since Sultan Sanjar’s capture by the Oghuz in 1153 –
and it was deeply divided. For the beleaguered population, the Mongols
were one army among many within a struggle that was both local and
inter-regional. The flight of the Khorezmshah and the approach of the
Mongols brought out latent rivalries and allowed new opportunities for
those currently out of power. When Sultan Muhammad’s sons returned
to Khorezm from the Caspian provinces, some people welcomed their
return, but others decided to side with the Mongols. Accounts of cam-
paigns in Khorasan often mention “renegades” among the Mongol
armies; some of these were soldiers from the Khorezmshah’s army, and
others were Khorasanian soldiers under local rulers.17
Both uncertainty about the future and local disagreements led many
cities to resist the Mongols and others to rebel against them after they
had submitted, or to attack each other. The results were disastrous, and
some cities such as Nishapur, Marw and Herat were devastated several
times, both by Mongols and by other Iranians. The Khwarazmshah’s son
Jalal al-Din Mangubirni, who had escaped from Khorezm and regrouped
near Ghazna, twice succeeded in defeating Mongol forces. The news of his
victories ignited insurrections throughout Khorasan. In 1221 Chinggis
defeated Jalal al-Din, who retreated and spent the next three years south
of the Indus, but some cities continued to trust in his future. Anti-Mongol
agitation started in Marw and was put down with great ferocity. The
resistance movement nonetheless spread to other cities. The Mongols
probably did not restore complete control until late summer 1222.18
When we examine events in Khorasan then, we see that the course of the
Mongol conquest was influenced by the actions of the population. Political
factions and city notables formed different assessments of Mongol strength,
and these combined with local enmities sharpened by years of conflict to
create a festival of violence that was part conquest and part civil war.

H. G. Raverty (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp.; exclusively distributed by

Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970), p. 1068–1069; Nasawı̄ , Histoire du sultan, vol. 2, p. 87.
17
See, for example, Histoire du sultan, vol. 2, pp. 75, 90, 120; Jū zjā nı̄ , Tabakā t, pp. 1007,
1039, 1068. ˙ ˙
18
Juwaynı̄ , World Conqueror, pp. 163–168; Bartol’d, Turkestan, p. 448.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Mongol Campaign in the Middle East 115

At the end of 1222, Chinggis Khan moved to Transoxiana and in early

1223 the main army departed for the east. Transoxiana was incorporated
into the empire, under an Inner Asian official appointed as darugha
(military governor) of Samarqand and Bukhara. He began to restore the
region, importing Chinese, Khitan and Tangut to help with agriculture
because of severe depopulation; a Chinese Taoist who visited Samarqand
in 1221 stated that its population was reduced to one-fourth of its previ-
ous population.19 The conquest of the city was not the only cause of its
depopulation; this was due in part to successive levies of soldiers, and
probably also to an earlier rebellion against the Khwarazmshah in 1212
that resulted in a retaliatory massacre.20
The Mongols have often been characterized as a “nation at arms,” but
the army was not the whole of society; nor were nomads the whole of the
army. Members of the army were recruited from the larger population –
distinguished by a different hairstyle. They were trained in tactics and
forbidden to change from one regiment to another. Members of tribes
had been deliberately distributed among different decimally ordered regi-
ments, the most important of which were led by members of Chinggis’s
personal following who were loyal exclusively to him. The army itself was
divided into three parts: left wing, right wing and center, and each was
under the stable command of a high commander. The keshig – the imperial
guard – served both as bodyguard and as an institution to control and train
future commanders and officials.21 What was most extraordinary about the
Mongol army was its strict discipline, remarked upon by many observers.
Punishments for desertion or disobedience were draconian, and soldiers
thus could be depended on not only to obey, but to remain loyal through
defeats, a crucial strength particularly in the Khorasan campaigns.22
Another strength of the army was its mixed composition of nomad and
settled soldiers. Starting with troops from the settled populations of
Central Asia, the Mongols added levies from the conquered cities,
which were brought in not just at the conquest but also through later
conscription. There were likewise local soldiers who joined voluntarily,
probably both nomad and settled. Together, these troops sometimes
formed a significant proportion of the army, particularly in the later

19
Paul D. Buell, “Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara,” Journal of Asian
History 13, no. 2 (1979): pp. 122–125, 134–141; Igor de Rachewiltz, “Yeh-lü A-hai
(ca. 1151– ca. 1223), Yeh-lü T’u-hua (d. 1231),” in In the Service of the Khan: Eminent
Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period, ed. Igor de Rachewiltz, Hok-lam Chan,
Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing and Peter W. Geier (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), pp. 118–119.
20
Juwaynı̄ , World Conqueror, p. 122; Bosworth, “Political and Dynastic,” p. 194.
21
Timothy May, The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System
(Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword Military, 2007), pp. 27–34.
22
May, Mongol Art of War, pp. 47–49.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 116 Mongol Conquest and Rule

Figure 5.1 Mongolian Archer on Horseback. Iran. Miniature by

Muhammad ibn Mahmudshah al-Khayyam, ca.1420–1425. Brush and
ink on paper. Staatsbibliotek zu Berlin, Preussischer Kulturbesitz,
Orientalabteilung, Saray-Albums (Diez-Albums), fol. 72, p. 13.

campaigns. Although nomads are famous for their skill in mounted

archery, other skills were also useful, particularly in siege warfare, and it
may well have been advantageous to have some troops who did not
require the amount of pasturage needed for nomad troops. While the
core of the army was Mongolian light cavalry, Chinggis Khan’s army
should not be considered purely a “nomad army.” This was a mixed
force and an exceptional one, an army of a size and quality rarely found
in the history of nomads.

The Middle East in the Early Mongol Empire

The conquered regions of the Middle East now formed one edge of an
empire centered in Mongolia, and administration was designed to benefit

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Middle East in the Early Mongol Empire 117

the empire as a whole. Chinggis Khan died in August 1227. His sons by
his principal wife Börte became the progenitors of the four branches of the
dynasty, and most of the empire came to belong to their descendants.
Their individual territories are designated by the term ulus, signifying
both land and population. The Russian steppes formed the ulus of the
eldest son Jochi, while the Semirechie and Turkestan went to the second
son Chaghadai, and the Altai was the ulus of the third son Ögedei. As the
youngest son, Tolui kept the heartland of Mongolia and served as regent
on his father’s death. Ögedei was enthroned as supreme khan – khaghan –
by the Mongol princes at a khuriltay in the fall of 1229.
Transoxiana was joined with the other sedentary regions of the Silk
Road. The regional governor repaired irrigation systems, restored agri-
culture, and introduced a tax reform abolishing most extraordinary taxes,
at least in theory. Contemporary observers and numismatic evidence
suggest that by 1260 Central Asia had nearly regained its earlier
prosperity.23 The situation was very different in Iran, where Chinggis
Khan had installed officials only in a few eastern cities.24 Local rulers in
Iran, eastern Anatolia, and Syria found it wise to offer submission and
many traveled to the central court in person.25 One who did not submit
was the Khwarazmshah’s son Jalal al-Din Mangubirni, who left India to
campaign throughout the Middle East. The level of pillage he allowed his
army soon turned both rulers and populations against him. In 1230 a new
Mongol expedition arrived in Iran to deal with Jalal al-Din and impose
control. Jalal al-Din retreated and was subsequently killed by Kurds in the
summer of 1231. The Georgians and Armenians were subdued and most
of the major cities of Central Iran surrendered with minimal resistance.
Azerbaijan, with its excellent pasture, became the center of Mongol
administration over western Iran.
Under Ögedei and his successors, Güyüg (1246–1248) and Möngke
(1251–1259) the administration was systematized, and mechanisms were
developed to maximize the exploitation of conquered lands and peoples.
The Mongol Empire was a mix of brilliantly conceived organization and
administrative chaos. The largest settled regions were not included in the
individual uluses of Chinggis Khan’s sons. Chinggis Khan had appointed
darughas – military governors – in many cities and had created adminis-
trations in northern China and Transoxiana. Ögedei Khan transformed

23
Buell, “Sino-Khitan Administration,” pp. 139–147; Thomas T. Allsen, “Mahmū d
˙ in
Yalavač (?–1254); Mas‘ū d Beg (?–1289); ‘Alı̄ Beg (?–1280); Buir (fl. 1206–1260),”
In the Service of the Khan, pp. 122–127.
24
Paul D. Buell, “Tribe, ‘Qan’ and ‘ulus’ in Early Mongol China: Some Prolegomena to
Yüan History,” unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Washington (1977), p. 154.
25
Juwaynı̄ , World Conqueror, p. 250.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 118 Mongol Conquest and Rule

these into jointly managed secretariats under civilian governors, a system

that was later extended into Iran. The khaghan’s officials in the secretar-
iats were accompanied by representatives of the Jochid, Chaghadayid and
Toluid houses. In this way the khaghan maintained his claim on the
settled territories while acknowledging the interests of other branches of
the family. In the armies sent on major campaigns, the lines of all four
brothers were likewise represented, and since some soldiers remained as
regional guard troops, each area of the empire had armies representing
the four dynastic branches. Troop contingents known as tamma, usually
conscripted from a variety of armies, were stationed in border regions,
both to protect the boundaries and to aid in further expansion. These
armies remained in place over decades and often became important
regional power centers.26 The dispersal of personnel from each branch
of the family throughout the empire helped to create a common interest
and culture, but it also made the internal administration of each ulus
difficult.
Ögedei Khan carried out a census of the conquered regions and
reorganized the official post – a system of stopping places and horses
kept for official business throughout the empire – and in 1235 he began
the construction of the capital city Kharakhorum in the Orkhon Valley
near the old capital of the Türk Khaghanate. The government collected
two standard taxes from the settled population – a tax on agricultural
produce (qalan) and a poll tax (qupchur) – along with a tax on trade
(tamgha). Throughout the empire, nomads – including Mongols – were
assessed at a rate of one animal per hundred.27 In many places, however,
taxes were less systematized. Both local commanders and Chinggisid
princes were eager to increase their personal income, and the population
suffered from dues levied by innumerable people connected to the gov-
ernment or to the Mongol elite.
The great khan Möngke (1251–1259) brought the Mongol Empire to
the height of its unified power. He undertook a series of reforms designed
to rationalize taxes while maximizing resources for the central govern-
ment. In Iran the poll tax became a progressive one, from one dinar for the
poor to seven dinars for wealthy men. In 1252 Möngke organized a new
census, covering many areas that had not been counted before. One major
purpose was the mobilization of troops; the subject population was

26
Timothy May, “The Mongol Conquest Strategy in the Middle East,” in The Mongols’
Middle East, ed. C. P Melville and Bruno De Nicola (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 15–22.
27
Thomas T. Allsen, Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China,
Russia, and the Islamic Lands, 1251–1259 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987),
pp. 159–162, 169; Igor de Rachewiltz, “Yeh-lü Ch’u Ts’ai (1189–1243); Yeh-lü Chu?
(1221–1285),” in In the Service of the Khan, pp. 150–151.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Early Mongol Governance in the Middle East 119

divided into decimal units from ten to 10,000, of which a portion served
as soldiers and others provided for the army’s needs. Thus, settled sol-
diers became a permanent part of the Mongol army.
Despite efforts by the khaghans, it proved impossible to prevent wide-
spread confusion and abuse, partly due to problems at the center.
Accession to the office of khaghan was based on consensus among the
major Chinggisid princes, and this was not easy to reach; thus, there were
long periods of interregnum during which the widow of the former khan
served as regent. During these times, princes and emirs expanded their
power within the satellite administrations at the expense of the govern-
ment and the population. In the twenty-four years between the death of
Chinggis Khan and the enthronement of Möngke Khan in 1251, the
Mongol Empire was without a khan for ten years, enough time to undo
much of the systematization achieved by the khaghans.

Early Mongol Governance in the Middle East

Mongol armies in the Middle East centered in two areas which provided
winter and summer pastures within a convenient distance. In the west, the
summer pastures lay in the mountainous regions of Ala Taq, north of
Lake Van, and the area southwest of Sultaniyya. As winter pastures the
Mongols used the low-lying regions of Arran, Mughan, the Jaghatu River,
south of Lake Urmiya, and later the environs of Baghdad.28 In the east,
the largest winter pastures were in Jurjan, the regions around Sarakhs,
and Marw. The administrative center was in the summer pasture at
Radkan, near Tus.29
From the time of the expedition of 1230, Mongolian troops and com-
manders were active throughout Iran, not as a cohesive bloc, but as one
contentious group among many. Mongol officials soon began to compete
against each other and allied with regional Iranian rulers. Mongol gover-
nors hired Persian bureaucrats, thus involving another group famous for
its infighting. One can take as an example the politics of Khorasan, about
which we are well informed. Here rival camps arose in the northern region
and the split within the Mongol administration combined with existing
power struggles among the local rulers of Khorasan and Mazandaran to
divide both Mongols and Persians into rival camps. Ögedei summoned
the combatants to appear before the court in Kharakhorum, where pro-
vincial enmities became part of contentious court politics lasting
28
Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Rashiduddin Fazlullah’s Jami‘u’t-tawarikh: Compendium of Chronicles,
trans. W. M. Thackston (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Dept. of Near Eastern
Languages and Civilizations, 1998), pp. 518–520, 551, 629.
29
Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Compendium, pp. 518, 594–595, 598, 605, 609.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 120 Mongol Conquest and Rule

throughout Ögedei’s reign.30 Mongol and Iranian politics thus became

closely intertwined, and the two peoples soon began to influence each
other. We have usually credited the Persian bureaucrats, who wrote the
histories, with introducing the Mongols to settled culture. However, local
Iranian rulers, working in alliance with Mongols at all levels, probably
also exerted cultural influence. On their side, Iranians became familiar
with Mongol traditions and some took pride in their knowledge.31
During the reign of Ögedei the Mongols began to restore agriculture in
Iran, though not as successfully as they did in Transoxiana. Mongol
commanders played a significant part in this process, often in cooperation
with Iranian officials. Ögedei ordered that Herat be repaired after the
devastating punishments it had suffered, and the task was overseen by the
Mongol governor. In 1239–1240, the Mongol governor of Khorasan
restored buildings, markets and irrigation in the center of his administra-
tion – the region of Tus and Radkan. The Mongol commanders beneath
him also built mansions and parks. The next governor, Arghun Agha,
continued the development of Tus, and improved his winter pasture area,
rebuilding the village of Arzanqā bā d near Marw, where he had a palace,
and adding further parks and mansions for his followers.32 There can be
no doubt that the Mongols were still largely nomadic and that they
regarded themselves as a steppe power. The building of these centers
therefore suggests that the construction of imperial centers with devel-
oped agriculture and fixed palaces for the Mongol elite was not seen as
a denial of nomadic identity.

The Founding of the Ilkhanid Dynasty

Möngke Khan began his reign in a weak position as the son of Chinggis
Khan’s youngest son Tolui, and because he had come to power through
a coup against the line of Ögedei Khan. He therefore cemented the power
of his line by sending out two major military expeditions in which the chief
commanders were his own younger brothers: Khubilay, who was sent to
China; and Hülegü, who was sent to consolidate Mongol rule over the
Middle East. Hülegü set out in 651/1253 and arrived at Samarqand in
653/1255. He brought with him a large army that became part of the
Mongol population of Iran and is therefore worth discussing. From the
army belonging to the Toluids, Hülegü was granted two out of each ten

30
Juwaynı̄ , World Conqueror, pp. 488–489, 492–505.
31
Jean Aubin, Émirs mongols et vizirs persans dans les remous de l’acculturation, Studia Iranica.
Cahier 15 (Paris; Leuven, Belgique: Association pour l’avancement des études ira-
niennes; Diffusion Peeters Press, 1995), pp. 26–27.
32
Juwaynı̄ , World Conqueror, pp. 501, 510.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Founding of the Ilkhanid Dynasty 121

soldiers. He then marched through Ögedeyid territories and added sol-

diers and commanders from that branch. In addition, he was accompan-
ied by large contingents of Oirats and Qunqirat, two tribes whose leading
lineages married into the dynasty and had thus managed to retain their
cohesion.33
By the time of Hülegü’s arrival, new taxes were in force and local rulers
were ordered to provide supplies and to accompany the army. It is not
surprising, therefore, that some people who had previously shown obedi-
ence should balk at the new conditions. The caliph likewise refused the
Mongol demands, so in January 1258 three Mongol armies converged on
Baghdad along with local armies, including Armenians, Georgians, and
the Atabegs of Shiraz and Mosul. The assault began on January 29 and
the caliph surrendered on February 10. The inhabitants of Baghdad were
systematically slaughtered and the city sacked for seven days, apparently
at Möngke’s orders; the scene echoed the massacres of the first Mongol
conquest. On February 20, the caliph was killed, probably by being rolled
in a carpet and kicked, since the shedding of blood on the ground was
forbidden by Mongol custom. This moment was a momentous one for
the Islamic world, and Hülegü had reportedly been warned that disaster
might befall him if the caliph were killed; however, no calamity occurred.
In the autumn of 1258, Hülegü invaded Syria with the experienced
commander Ked-Bugha as advance guard. The subjugation of Syria and
Egypt appeared to pose little challenge, since the Ayyubid dynasty was in
disarray and the Mamluk regime in Egypt was in its infancy. By the
beginning of the summer the Mongol army had taken the northern cities
and reached Gaza, where Hülegü learned of the developing struggle over
the succession to Möngke and turned back, leaving behind a small part of
the army under Ked-bugha.34 In the meantime, the situation in Egypt had
changed with the accession of the mamluk Qutuz to the throne in 1259.
Qutuz gathered a significant force and when the armies joined battle at
‘Ayn Jalut in Galilee on September 3, 1260, Ked-Bugha was killed, and
his troops fled.35 The Mamluks’ victory provided instant prestige to their
nascent state. In 1261 the new sultan Baybars welcomed a fugitive
‘Abbasid, thus acquiring a shadow caliph, and from this time on the
Mamluks presented their rule as a bulwark of Islam against the infidels.

33
Michael Hope, Power, Politics, and Tradition in the Mongol Empire and the Ī lkhā nate of Iran
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 92–100.
34
Reuven Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ī lkhā nid War, 1260–1281
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 16–28; R. Stephen Humphreys,
From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193–1260 (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1977), pp. 330–363.
35
Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, pp. 39–45.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 122 Mongol Conquest and Rule

The Middle East was now divided into two sections: a primarily Iranian
region governed by pagan Mongols, and an Arab one ruled by Muslim
slave soldiers of Turkic descent, in the name of a shadow caliph.
Möngke’s death on August 12, 1259 marked the end of the unified
Mongol Empire; the Chinggisid princes were unable to reach consensus
on a new khaghan. When Khubilai had himself enthroned as khan,
Hülegü was the only important ruler to recognize him, and he was
rewarded in 1262 when Khubilai’s envoys formally invested him with
the title Ilkhan and with official power over the Mongol Middle East. The
two khanates maintained close relations, with frequent exchanges of
personnel.36
Hülegü soon came into conflict with Berke, the Jochid ruler of the Golden
Horde, and hostilities broke out in 1261–1262 over the rule of northwestern
Iran. Berke had converted to Islam and was now allied with the Mamluks.
The Mongols had for some time been in contact with the pope and
European rulers, and Hülegü sent a mission in 660/1262 to King Louis,
proposing cooperation.37 These two opposing alliances lasted through much
of the Ilkhanid period. The Golden Horde periodically raided through the
Caucasus; since the Mongol capital was in Azerbaijan, and the vulnerable
winter pastures lay to the north, this was a significant threat. The Mamluks
and Ilkhans likewise remained enemies. The Ilkhans undertook several
expeditions to Syria, none of which resulted in long-term rule, while the
Mamluks raided and sometimes occupied Mongol vassal powers in Anatolia
and Armenia. In the east, the Ilkhans were soon in conflict with the
Chaghadayid Khanate, which gradually took over the eastern part of
Afghanistan and threatened the Ilkhans’ Khorasanian territories.
The Ilkhans ruled directly over most of northern Iran and Iraq but left
eastern Anatolia and parts of Iran under the control of vassal dynasties. The
most powerful of these were the Sultanate of Rum (1077–1307), described
in Chapter 4; the originally Ghurid Kartids in Herat (1245–1381); the Qara-
Khitay Qutluq-Khanid dynasty of Kerman (1222 to 1305/1306); and the
Turkmen Salghurids of Fars (1148–1280). The dynasties of Fars and
Kerman both married princesses into the Ilkhanid dynasty and became
active in central politics, bringing the dynasty also into local rivalries.38

36
Thomas T. Allsen, “Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran,” in Rulers from the
Steppe: State Formation and the Eurasian Periphery, ed. Gary Seaman and Daniel Marks
(Los Angeles: Ethnographics Press, 1991), pp. 226–232; “Notes on Chinese Titles in
Mongol Iran,” Mongolian Studies 14 (1991), pp. 27–39.
37
Jean Richard, “D’Älğ igidäi à Ğ azan: la continuité d’une politique franque chez les
Mongols d’Iran,” in L’Iran face à la domination mongole, ed. Denise Aigle (1997),
pp. 62–63.
38
George Lane, Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian Renaissance
(London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 96–175.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Rule of the Ilkhans 123

The Rule of the Ilkhans

Much of the Middle East was now an independent khanate ruled by
pagan Mongols. The Islamic caliphate and the unified Mongol Empire
had ended within a year and a half of each other: the caliphate on
February 20, 1258, and the unified empire with Möngke’s death on
August 11, 1259. However, Chinggisids continued to rule much of
Eurasia, and the traditions of both empires continued to command loy-
alty. Islamic and Mongol traditions became increasingly intertwined as
Mongols, both within and outside the Middle East, converted to Islam,
and Mongol political institutions became part of the governance of
Ilkhanid lands. Like the Seljuqs, Mongol rulers in the Middle East had
adopted much of the administrative apparatus of earlier Middle Eastern
dynasties. Their administration was also to some extent a dual one, with
a Mongol military and an Iranian civil administration. The two branches
were not well differentiated, however; Mongol officials sometimes over-
saw the dı̄ wā n and some Persian viziers held authority over both members
of the dynasty and Mongol emirs. Towards the end of the dynasty, a few
powerful Persian viziers even became members of the Mongol keshig.39
The transition from province to khanate was not without strain. The
satellite administration in Iran was now disbanded, and the region came
directly under the Ilkhan. However, at the time of the conquest rights over
the income of some districts and populations in Iran had been granted to
members of other Chinggisid branches, and these could not be easily
revoked. Moreover, Mongol tamma troops and governors had been estab-
lished in Iran since the reign of Ögedei and had acquired regional power
and local alliances. The major Mongol officials and commanders, known
as noyans, often held inherited rights to high position. Royal women had
their own entourage (ordo), including armed retainers, and they had
independent sources of income in taxes, trade and workshops.40 The
inclusion of women and noyans in state deliberations was formalized in
the ceremonies surrounding the accession of a new ruler.41
Within the new khanate, both noyans and members of the dynasty were
determined to retain their inherited rights. As soon as central control
weakened, they seized what they considered theirs, making it difficult for
the central government to collect the money it needed. Members of the
dynasty and the Mongol elite were involved in administration alongside

39
Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the Islamic World from Conquest to Conversion (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2017), pp. 282–285.
40
Bruno De Nicola, Women in Mongol Iran: The Khā tū ns, 1206–1335 (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2017), pp. 132, 151–152, 159.
41
Women, pp. 95, 98; Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Compendium, pp. 548, 562, 580.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 124 Mongol Conquest and Rule

Iranian bureaucrats and the combination of two groups involved in

factional fighting made politics particularly murderous: a remarkable
percentage of Persian viziers and Mongol commanders died violent
deaths.42 This was not an easy realm to rule.
Despite the difficulties that the Ilkhans faced both within their realm
and with their neighbors, the reigns of the first two Ilkhans, Hülegü
(1260–1265) and Abaqa (1265–1282), are considered times of relative
order and prosperity. Abaqa died of delirium tremens on April 1, 1282,
and the three reigns which followed mark a period of increasing internal
strife. His brother and successor, Tegüder Ahmad, reigned for only two
years. From the beginning his position was ˙undercut by the power of
Abaqa’s son Arghun, who inherited a portion of his father’s troops and
property, and who succeeded in taking the throne in 1284. Over the
course of Arghun’s reign (1284–1291) the rivalries and ambition of his
noyans, in alliance with princes, royal women, viziers and members of
local dynasties, came to dominate political life. Arghun was succeeded by
his brother Geikhatu (1291–1295), who has been remembered as
a profligate khan. To do him justice, there was already a financial crisis
in the state and some of his generosity may have been an attempt to retain
the loyalty of his followers.43 Soon Geikhatu’s noyans began to conspire
against him and he was seized and killed on 6 Jumada I 694/March 24,
1295. The thirteen years of confusion following Abaqa’s death had
brought the Ilkhanid economy to a crisis.
It was under these conditions that Geikhatu’s son Ghazan achieved
power. He had been governor of the crucial province of Khorasan and had
the help of the powerful emir Nawruz, the son of Arghun Agha, who had
governed Iran under Möngke Khan. Nawruz had inherited great wealth
in land and flocks centered in Radkan and had dominated the region for
much of Ghazan’s governorship.44 Ghazan’s reign is remembered for
three major actions: he converted the Ilkhanate to Islam, he instituted
major administrative reforms, and he weakened the power of the Mongol
noyans and members of the dynasty. On Ghazan’s death in 1304 his
brother Öljeitü succeeded to the throne and enjoyed an unusually com-
fortable position, since Ghazan had destroyed the power of noyans and
princes and had left no male offspring. After Öljeitü’s death in 1316, his
twelve-year-old son, Abu Sa‘id, was enthroned without opposition,

42
David Morgan, “Mongol or Persian: The Government of Ī lkhā nid Iran,” Harvard Middle
Eastern and Islamic Review 3, no. 1–2 (1996), pp. 62–76; Judith Pfeiffer, “Conversion to
Islam among the Ilkhans in Muslim Narrative Traditions: The Case of Ahmad Tegüder,”
unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Chicago (2003), pp. 226–227;˙ Aubin, Émirs
mongols, p. 82; Jackson, The Mongols, pp. 294–296.
43
Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Compendium, p. 741. 44 Aubin, Émirs mongols, p. 53.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Rule of the Ilkhans 125

though actual power in the beginning lay with his chief noyan, Amir
Choban. The Ilkhanate continued to defend itself successfully, but
when Abu Sa‘id died in 1335, he left no child or other suitable successor,
and the Ilkhanate soon came to an end.
For many years the accepted view of the Ilkhanate was that of
nomad rulers gradually educated by their Persian viziers to value
and support Perso-Islamic civilization and its agricultural base.
According to this formulation, it was the khan who was most likely
to promote assimilation and respect for the settled economy, while
a significant proportion of his Mongol followers opposed both. The
turning point of the dynasty was seen as 1295, when Ghazan Khan
restored Islam as the official religion and instituted reforms con-
sidered the first recognition of the needs of the settled population.
This formulation flows naturally from the contemporary histories,
most of which were written by bureaucrats in the service of the
Ilkhans. The most influential was that of Ghazan’s and Öljeitü’s
vizier, Rashid al-Din, who carried out Ghazan’s reforms. However,
in recent years scholars have increasingly questioned this analysis of
assimilation, as they have done for the Seljuqs. There are two ques-
tions to ask: first, whether acculturation began with the ruler and was
resisted by the noyans; and second, whether Ghazan’s reforms repre-
sented a turn towards the agricultural sector and away from a policy
favoring nomads.
Ghazan’s adoption of Islam was long considered a sign of the Ilkhanid
dynasty’s adjustment to the Perso-Islamic culture of its subjects, and
a prelude to his reforms. Ghazan converted at the urging of Amir
Nawruz shortly before he came to power, and he soon proclaimed Islam
the religion of the realm.45 Charles Melville has shown, however, that
conversion among the Mongol army elite was widespread by the time of
Ghazan’s accession; it is therefore possible that most of the army was
already Muslim. Thus, Ghazan probably converted as much to gain
support within the army as to appeal to the settled population.46 We
should remember that when Hülegü arrived, much of Iran had already
been under Mongol administration for several decades. As previously
mentioned, the Mongol army and administrators had been closely in
touch with Iranians, and within a few years of Chinggis Khan’s first
attack, the soldiers levied from Iranian cities were fighting alongside
Mongol soldiers. Both before and during Ilkhanid rule, Mongol emirs

45
Boyle, “Dynastic,” pp. 378–380.
46
Charles Melville, “Pā dshā h-i Islā m: The Conversion of Sultan Mahmū d Ghā zā n Khā n,”
Pembroke Papers 1 (1990), pp. 159–177; Pfeiffer, “Conversion,” pp. ˙ 85–99.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 126 Mongol Conquest and Rule

allied with local Iranian rulers and bureaucrats.47 Thus acculturation

occurred at many levels and had begun before the establishment of the
Ilkhanate.
The second question is whether agriculture in Iran had been suffering
due to the Mongols’ failure to understand its importance, and whether
Ghazan’s reforms represent a repudiation of earlier attitudes favoring
nomad exploitation of settled populations. Scholars have usually concen-
trated on the need to protect agriculture, but it is possible that the
problem was not only the disruption of the settled economy, but also
the impoverishment of the lower segments of society, both settled and
nomad. The plight of Mongol soldiers contributed to a crisis during the
reign of Geikhatu, which Ghazan had to address before he could bring the
realm to order.
Rashid al-Din, who tends to paint a bleak picture of earlier Ilkhanid
rulers to highlight Ghazan’s achievements, nonetheless describes the
impoverishment of the army as beginning only when the old order
broke down. He states that under Hülegü and Abaqa, when Mongol
customs were still in effect, although Mongol soldiers did not receive
wages or provisions, an annual tax of livestock and nomad products was
reserved for poorer soldiers.48 Later, however, the Mongol troops had
become increasingly impoverished. He cites a number of abuses to
explain the plight of the ordinary peasant and nomad. In addition to
noting general corruption and the resulting over-taxation – a problem
for settled and nomad alike – he rails against the hordes of messengers
(elchis) engaged in both government and private business, who covered
the land like a plague of locusts. Assuming the right to help themselves to
supplies, messengers seized goods by force, depleting both livestock and
harvests. This plague increased with the growing weakness of the central
government.49 The falconers and leopard keepers who provided animals
and birds for court hunts behaved in much the same way.50 While the
higher Mongol commanders were able to extort larger subsidies from the
ruler, soldiers at a lower level achieved no such favor.51 Some apparently
47
Beatrice F. Manz, “Nomads and Regional Armies in the Middle East,” in Nomad Military
Power in Iran and Adjacent Areas in the Islamic Period, ed. Kurt Franz and Wolfgang
Holzwarth (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2015), pp. 11–22.
48
Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Compendium, pp. 730, 736.
49
Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Compendium, pp. 704–705, 714–718, 759–761. Similar abuses are
reported earlier. See Jackson, The Mongols, p. 301.
50
Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Compendium, pp. 751–755.
51
A. P. Martinez, “Some Notes on the Ī l-Xā nid Army,” Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aeivi VI
(1986), pp. 206–213; Ahmad ibn Yahyā ibn Fadl Allā h al-‘Umarı̄ , Das mongolische
˙
Weltreich. Al-’Umarı̄ ’s Darstellung ˙
der mongolischen˙ Reiche in seinem Werk Masā lik al-
absā r fı̄ mamā lik al-amsā r, trans. Klaus Lech, Asiatische Forschungen, Bd. 22
˙
(Wiesbaden: ˙ 1968), p. 154.
Harrassowitz,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Rule of the Ilkhans 127

had become so impoverished that they sold their children into bondage.52
It is possible that the impoverishment of Mongol soldiers was also due to
wider social changes in the transition from tribe to army, since the 1290s
saw a similar problem in China, where some soldiers were likewise driven
by poverty to sell their children into slavery.53
When troops had to prepare for a campaign without sufficient supplies,
they stole each other’s horses to eat and pillaged agricultural populations.
This was a problem that Ghazan experienced in Khorasan in 1291–
1293.54 Ghazan thus faced an immediate crisis which threatened both
the Mongol army and the agricultural population. This problem was one
impetus for reforms aimed at providing a secure fiscal base for the army
and protection for settled populations. To support the army, grants of
land were to be distributed to Mongol soldiers according to rank down to
commanders of ten; these were to be farmed, probably by slaves or
subjects, as was the case under Khubilai in China.55 Land and other
taxes were to be collected according to fixed rates written on plaques
attached to the walls of buildings; nomads could write them on steles
erected wherever they thought best.56 Numerous extraordinary taxes
were repealed, and envoys and military were not allowed to demand
lodging at will. Other measures promoted restoration of abandoned
land and systematized currency, weights and measures. Ghazan’s meas-
ures share similarities with many of Khubilai Khan’s programs in China,
and we should note that Bolad Ch’eng Hsiang, a high official who had
served under Khubilai, was at court.57 Thus these reforms represent not
only an adjustment to local conditions, but a broader movement towards
change.
In the last decades several scholars have questioned whether Ghazan’s
reforms were fully carried out, since there is little evidence beyond Rashid
al-Din’s account and some abuses apparently continued.58 Nonetheless,
52
Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Compendium, pp. 735–736.
53
Ch’i-ch’ing Hsiao, The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty (Cambridge, MA:
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University: distributed by Harvard University
Press, 1978), pp. 29–30.
54
Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Compendium, pp. 604–613.
55
al-‘Umarı̄ , Das Mongolische Weltreich, p. 155; Hsiao, Military Establishment, pp. 20–
22, 46.
56
Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Compendium, p. 711.
57
Thomas T. Allsen, “Biography of a Cultural Broker, Bolad Ch’eng-Hsiang in China and
Iran,” in The Court of the Il-khans 1290–1340, ed. Julian Raby and Teresa Fitzherbert
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 7–22.
58
David O. Morgan, “Rašı̄ d al-Dı̄ n and Ġ azan Khan,” in L’Iran face à la domination
mongole, ed. Denise Aigle, Bibliotèque Iranienne (Tehran: Institut Français de
Recherche en Iran, 1997), pp. 185–186; Reuven Amitai, “Continuity and Change in
the Mongol Army of the Ilkhanate,” in The Mongols’ Middle East, ed. C. P. Melville and
Bruno De Nicola (Leiden: Brill, 2016), p. 44.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 128 Mongol Conquest and Rule

there does appear to have been some change for the better, particularly in
Öljeitü’s reign. This happy outcome may be due also to Ghazan’s success
in curbing the power of the Mongol elite, in particular the great noyans.
He had likewise taken steps to diminish the influence of dynastic women,
in part by interfering in the inheritance of their ordos, some of which now
passed to male members of the dynasty instead. Indeed, it is notable that
women become less conspicuous from the time of his reign.59 The depre-
dations of the high elite – both Mongol and Iranian – are a major theme in
Rashid al-Din’s discussion of the reforms.

Nomadism and Tribalism in the Mongol Period

The Mongol period brought a significant nomad population into the
Middle East. There were three separate conquests – in 1219–1220,
1230 and 1255 – each bringing new troops, many accompanied by their
families. It appears that most Mongols remained nomadic. The Ilkhanid
rulers regularly traveled between winter and summer pastures, accom-
panied by their ordos in which soldiers, chancellery and bazar were housed
in a moving tent city. Within the army likewise, seasonal pastures were
allotted to each tümen (10,000).60 Observers and Mongol historians attest
to the continuance of pastoral nomadism in the Mongol army.61 Most of
these nomads were in the northern regions, from Anatolia to Khorasan,
with the greatest concentration around the two centers of power,
Khorasan and Azerbaijan. In addition to the main army there were
tamma troops garrisoning several regions, particularly eastern Khorasan
and the regions to the south of it, partly under Ilkhanid and partly under
Chaghadayid control. Some tamma troops had become largely independ-
ent under their own leaders and were feared for their plundering exped-
itions; the most notable were the Negüderi active in Sistan, Kerman and
Fars.62 Fars and central Iran also had a sizeable nomad population,
largely Iranian and Turkmen.63

59
De Nicola, Women, pp. 159–164.
60
Charles Melville, “The Itineraries of Sultan Öljeitü,” Iran 28 (1990), pp. 55, 58, 60; John
Masson Smith, “Mongol Nomadism and Middle Eastern Geography: Qı̄ shlā qs and
Tümens,” in The Mongol Empire and Its Legacy, ed. Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David
O. Morgan (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 41–42, 51–52.
61
Reuven Amitai, “Did the Mongols in the Middle East Remain Pastoral Nomads?” in
Seminar at Max Planck Institute, Halle, Germany (Internet: Academia.edu), pp. 10–13.
62
Beatrice F. Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, Cambridge studies in Islamic civiliza-
tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 159–161.
63
Denise Aigle, Le Fā rs sous la domination mongole: politique et fiscalité, XIIIe-XIVe s, Studia
Iranica, Cahier 31 (Paris: Association pour l’avancement des études iraniennes, 2005),
pp. 77–80.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomadism and Tribalism in the Mongol Period 129

In the regions outside Mongol control, nomads also remained important.

Syria contained a significant nomad population, within which Turkmen
were increasingly predominant. The Mamluk sultan Baybars (1260–1272)
installed Bedouin, Kurds and Turkmen as military settlers in many areas of
Syria, with the task of guarding the country against enemies, serving in the
official postal service (barı̄ d) and supplying horses to the government. From
the beginning of the Mamluk state, nomads, including Mongols, Kurds, and
Turkmen had found a place in the army, though they could not hold high
rank.64 Other nomads served as auxiliaries and received land in return.
The Mamuk borders with Anatolia and the Jazira became the domain
of Turkmen nomad confederations encouraged to raid neighbors, and
when possible, to acquire new land. In 1298 the sultan granted the region
of Mar‘ash on the Armenian border to the Turkmen who later formed the
Dhu’l Qadr confederation; they were subject to the governor of Aleppo
and participated in campaigns against the Armenians and the Mongols.65
The frontier with the Jazira was the territory of Bedouin tribes and the
Turkmen Döger.66 While the Mamluks made use of the nomads, their
attitude towards them was highly ambivalent. Turkmen were sometimes
courted and favored, due in part to a perceived kinship between them and
the early Mamluk sultans, who prided themselves on their Turkic
Qipchaq origin. On the other hand, they were characterized as rebels,
thieves and irreligious people.67
Over this period Anatolia became a major repository of nomad popula-
tion. Immigration had begun during the Seljuq period, and the Mongol
occupation of Azerbaijan pushed more Turkmen west. The Mongol
victory over the Rum Seljuqs at Köse Dagh in 1243 brought most of
eastern Anatolia under Mongol suzerainty, although at first, rule
remained largely indirect. There were three major spurts of immigration,
in the 1230s, 1260s and late 1270s.68 The Oghuz Turkmen were the
64
David Ayalon, “The Auxiliary Forces of the Mamluk Sultanate,” Der Islam 65 (1988),
pp. 15–20; Robert Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate,
1250–1382 (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 50–53.
65
Margaret L. Venzke, “The Case of a Dulgadir-Mamluk Iqtā ’: A Re-Assessment of the
˙
Dulgadir Principality and Its Position within the Ottoman-Mamluk Rivalry,” Journal of
the Economic and Social History of the Orient 43, no. 3 (2000): pp. 407–408.
66
Gerhard Väth, Die Geschichte der artuqidischen Fürstentümer in Syrien und der Ğ azı̄ ra’l
Furā tı̄ ya (496–812/1002–1409) (Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1987), pp. 167–168; F. Sümer,
“Döger,” EI 2nd ed.
67
Barbara Kellner Heinkele, “The Turcomans and Bilā d aš-Šā m in the Mamluk Period,”
in Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East, ed. Tarif Khalidi (Beirut:
American University of Beirut, 1984), p. 169; Ayalon, “The Auxiliary Forces of the
Mamluk Sultanate,” p. 16.
68
Rudi Paul Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia (Bloomington: Research
Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 1983); Sara Nur Yıldız, “Mongol
Rule in Thirteenth-century Seljuk Anatolia: The Politics of Conquest and History

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 130 Mongol Conquest and Rule

largest group among the nomad population, but there were also
Qipchaqs, related to the ruling class of the early Mamluk state;
Mongols; and Khorezmian nomads, some previously under the
Khorezmshahs.69 Their political culture was formed by the nature of
their arrival: most came not as a conquest army, but as semi-
independent groups of frontier fighters. The Muslim-Christian border
region, known in Turkic as uj, had characteristics associated with other
frontiers – adaptability to local conditions and impatience with higher
authority. After the Seljukids of Rum lost power in 1306, Mongol gover-
nors ruled eastern Anatolia from two regions: Diyar Bakr to the south, an
important center for winter pastures; and the summer pastures in the
region of Mush and Akhlat.70 Control was partial, however. Local inde-
pendence and the fluidity of politics led to the rise and fall of innumerable
small principalities – or beyliks – mostly founded by powerful command-
ers who were able to gain independence and recruit soldiers from the
nomadic tribes.71
The active trade routes, extensive pastures and good agricultural land
of Anatolia provided a strong power base for the Mongol commanders
appointed to govern it. Several Mongolian lineages became established
there and were active over generations. In 1314, Abu Saìd’s emir Choban
was appointed to the governorship, and his family remained powerful in
the region for the next ten years. Several other great emirs succeeded to
this post, most notably Shaykh Hasan Jalayir, founder of the Jalayirid
dynasty.72 These families founded the western successor states to the
Ilkhans, and in the centuries thereafter, the nomads of Anatolia provided
leadership, troops, or both for many of the dynasties who ruled the
Middle East after the Mongols.
For the Mongols as for the Seljuqids, the question of tribalism is
complex. Among the Turkmen, tribes appear to have gained importance
in the Mongol period. As I wrote in Chapter 4, there is little evidence of

Writing, 1243–1282,” unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Chicago (2006),

pp. 161–162, 256, 264–265.
69
Speros Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of
Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1971), pp. 245–246; Ilhan Şahin, “The Oguz Turks in Anatolia,” in
The Turks, ed. C. Cem Oguz et al. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2002), p. 419;
Tuncer Baykara, “Society and Economy among the Anatolian Seljuks and Beyliks,” in
The Turks, ed. C. Cem Oguz et al., pp. 611–613.
70
F. Sümer, “Ḳarā -Ḳoyunlu,” EI 2nd ed.
71
Ilham Erdem, “Eastern Anatolian Turkish States,” in The Turks, ed. C. Cem Oguz et al.,
pp. 477–506; Salim Koca, “Anatolian Turkish Beyliks,” in The Turks, ed. C. Cem Oguz
et al., pp. 507–553.
72
Charles Melville, “Anatolia under the Mongols,” in Cambridge History of Turkey, ed.
Kate Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 89–92.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomadism and Tribalism in the Mongol Period 131

tribal organization among the Turkmen of the early Seljuqid period. The
traditional tribal names of the Oghuz do appear in the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries, held by several regional dynasties including the
Salghurids and Döger, and a branch of the Döger tribe was powerful
near Edessa.73 In the fourteenth century more tribes with traditional
Oghuz names are mentioned on the Syrian-Egyptian border, and with
the collapse of the Ilkhanids they appear in eastern Anatolia as part of
rising confederations.74
Among the Turco-Mongolian population tribal power was uneven.
Chinggis Khan had created a decimal army and divided most tribes
among several different regiments, thus largely removing tribes as centers
of power. Within the central Ilkhanid territories, tribalism seems not to
have played a significant role in politics. Many of the great noyans of the
Ilkhanid period bear tribal names, but these appear to denote a descent
line rather than a larger corporate group, and their power depended in
large part on dynastic favor, which was often cemented by intermarriage.75
The only tribe which was clearly an active political entity was the Oirat,
whose leader had married Chinggis Khan’s daughter. Subsequent marriages
cemented its power, and a significant segment of the tribe came west in the
army of Hülegü and was still under its own leadership. It remained as a large
cohesive tribe in the region of Diyar Bakr beyond the period of the
Ilkhanate.76
Over time, however, the new troop contingents formed by the Mongols
became power centers in themselves. Mongol soldiers were closely con-
nected to their regiments, which they were not permitted to leave.77
Rashid al-Din mentions several tümens whose command was either
inherited by descendants of the original commander or reassigned by
a khan.78 Both regiments and royal camps (ordos) could remain intact
over generations, sometimes passed on within one family and sometimes
re-assigned. This is attested for the ordos of Ilkhanid dynastic women; the
ordo of Hülegü’s wife Dokuz Khatun, who died in 1265, can be traced
through numerous other women into the fourteenth century.79 Ordos
consisted of servants, livestock, and soldiers, and the regiments also
presumably owned considerable livestock, since we know that pasturages

73
F. Sümer, “Döger,” EI 2nd ed.
74
Cahen, “Les tribus”; John E. Woods, The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire, rev.
and expanded ed. (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1999), pp. 25–28.
75
See, for example, Patrick Wing, The Jalayirids: Dynastic State Formation in the Mongol
Middle East (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), pp. 42–58.
76
Anne F. Broadbridge, “Marriage, Family and Politics: The Ilkhanid-Oirat Connection,”
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 26, no. 1–2 (2016).
77
May, Mongol Art of War, p. 31. 78 Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Compendium, pp. 42, 91.
79
De Nicola, Women, pp. 156–157.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 132 Mongol Conquest and Rule

were assigned to them. It seems probable that membership in the ordos

and in troop contingents was hereditary, independently of ownership or
leadership. The army of Arghun Agha passed to his son Nawruz; this was
known as the Jawun-i Qurban and remained intact into the fifteenth
century. In the fourteenth century we find two armies, the tümen of
Kebek Khan and the Boroldai tümen, which are specifically identified as
the descendants of the followers of Kebeg and the troops of Boroldai,
both dating from the early fourteenth century, and without clear
leadership.80 Thus an ordo or a regiment could over time develop into
a new corporate entity, not originally based on kinship, but maintained
through heredity. Some maintained leadership from within, and thus they
should be seen as tribes.
Outside of the most central Ilkhanid territories, new tribes quite soon
began developing out of the regiments formed by the Mongol state. In
a situation of constantly shifting power relationships and frequent disrup-
tion, nomads required leaders who could protect or seize pasture rights
and deal with neighboring powers. In Kerman and Fars, two Mongol
tribes named after earlier commanders, the Jurma’i and the Ughani, were
active in the early fourteenth century.81 In Anatolia, the families of earlier
commanders had remained powerful, and at the end of the Ilkhanate we
find important political groups named after earlier Mongol commanders.
One was the Samaghar, named after the commander intermittently
posted to the region in the 1260s and led by his descendant. Another
was the Barambay, named after the son of the Mongol noyan Sütay, who
had earlier governed Diyar Bakr. Yet another was named Jawunghar, the
Mongolian term for the advance guard.82 The same process took place in
the eastern borders of the Ilkhanate and in the Chaghadayid khanate, as
will be discussed in Chapter 6.

The Economic Impact of the Mongols

It is difficult to form an accurate picture of the economic impact of the
Mongols. In 1960 the Soviet scholar I. P. Petrushevsky produced a study
of agriculture under the Ilkhans, shaped by Soviet policies dictating
a negative assessment of Mongol rule.83 His argument was based on
80
Manz, Rise and Rule, pp. 34, 158. 81 Jackson, The Mongols, pp. 205–206.
82
Jürgen Paul, “Mongol Aristocrats and Beyliks in Anatolia. A Study of Astarabā dı̄ ’s Bazm
va Razm,” Eurasian Studies IX, no. 1–2 (2011), pp. 115–117, 127–128; Melville,
“Anatolia,” pp. 61, 67, 77, 82–84. I should note here that Jürgen Paul does not denote
these groups as tribes, which he defines as groups organized according to either real or
fictive kinship. Since my definition is broader, they fit within it.
83
I. P. Petrushevskiı̆, Zemledelie i agrarnye otnosheniia v Irane XIII–XIV vekov (Leningrad:
Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, Leningradskoe otd., 1960). Parts are summarized in

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Economic Impact of the Mongols 133

flawed computations and is no longer fully accepted, but no comprehen-

sive study has since taken its place. In general, assessments of Mongol
impact have become less negative. Contemporary descriptions show that
agriculture suffered badly from the conquests, but some allowance must
be made for rhetorical hyperbole and the desire to blame Mongol destruc-
tiveness for a decline that had begun earlier.84 Although both Hülegü and
Abaqa inflicted destruction on cities, both were aware of the need to
restore the realm.85 Hülegü began reconstruction almost immediately
after taking Baghdad, and Abaqa ordered its agriculture restored.86
We must also consider the causes of agricultural problems and ask
whether the presence of nomads was naturally destructive. If this were
the case, agriculture would have suffered most in the regions surrounding
the major pastures and routes, in Azerbaijan and Khorasan. However,
these regions appear to have recovered, and some areas close to Mongol
camps even flourished, with new towns appearing. In these areas the
market for agricultural produce provided by the Mongols may have
outweighed the impact of nomad depredations. In other places, however,
nomadism was harmful.87 Fars and Kerman, for instance, suffered con-
siderably from the depredations of semi-independent nomad tribes.88
Corruption and over-taxation were also serious problems. I have already
discussed the extortion inflicted by emirs and princes. Local governors
often bribed Mongol collectors, thus enriching themselves at the expense
of the population.89 The situation could be worse in areas ruled through
local powers, where the regional dynasty provided an additional level of
corruption. Fars provides a vivid illustration of the difficulties facing the
Ilkhanid tax administration. Under several different khans, officials arrived
with a reform agenda only to suffer attack and demotion.90 During the

I. P. Petrushevskiı̆, “The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran under the Ī l-Khā ns,” in The
Cambridge History of Iran, vol. V (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968),
pp. 483–537.
84
Lambton, Continuity and Change, p. 219; Jean Aubin, “Réseau pastoral et réseau car-
avanier. Les grand’ routes du Khurassan à l’époque mongole,” Le Monde iranien et l’Islam
1 (1971), pp. 107–108; Jean Aubin, “La propriété foncière en Azerbaydjan sous les
Mongols,” Le monde iranien et l’Islam 4 (1976–1977), p. 130.
85
See, for example, Juwaynı̄ , World Conqueror, pp. 616–617; Ahmad b. Jalā l al-Dı̄ n Fası̄ h
˙ Bā stā n, 1960–1961) ˙II,˙
Khwā fı̄ , Mujmal-i Fası̄ hı̄ , ed., Muhammad Farrukh (Mashhad:
pp. 334, 337, 340. ˙ ˙ ˙
86
Aigle, Le Fā rs, p. 124.
87
Jean Aubin, “Réseau pastoral”; Qazvı̄ nı̄ , Hamd Allā h Mustawfı̄ , The Geographical Part of
the Nuzhat-al-qulub (Leiden: Brill; London: ˙ Luzac, 1915–1919), pp. 61–66, 68–73,
78–94; Aubin, “La propriété foncière,” pp. 112–113.
88
Jackson, The Mongols, p. 206. 89 Aigle, Le Fā rs, pp. 152–153.
90
Ann K. S. Lambton, “Mongol Fiscal Administration in Persia, pt. II,” Studia Islamica 65
(1987), pp. 100–121; Lane, Early Mongol Rule, pp. 133–141; Aigle, Le Fā rs, pp. 92, 104,
120, 127.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 134 Mongol Conquest and Rule

struggle preceding Ghazan’s accession, taxes were increased and a levy of

20 percent was raised from livestock in the province, thus bringing the
nomadic tribes into disorder.91
On the other hand, trade and production were actively promoted by the
Mongols and flourished in this period. Tabriz and Sultaniyya became
international trading centers where the land routes through Central Asia
connected with those of the Golden Horde and the sea trade of the
Persian Gulf. The Ilkhans were conscientious in protecting trade routes
in both the Black Sea and the Gulf.92 The leadership engaged directly in
international trade through partnerships known as ortoq, in which booty
and other income was entrusted to merchants in return for a share of
profits. Dynastic women were also conspicuously active; many had
received shares of land, booty and artisanal manpower from the con-
quests, which they invested in trade.93 There was thus a close relationship
between the Mongol government and international merchants, who ben-
efitted from significant privileges; a number served the administration,
particularly as holders of tax farms.94 While ortoqs stimulated trade, they
also led to an atmosphere of speculation and consequently often to
indebtedness among members of the dynasty.
The increase in trade promoted the growth of the middle classes.
Skilled craftsmen seem to have risen in status, while practical and linguis-
tic skills provided a path to advancement within government. The success
of upstarts of lower status is a frequent lament of Ilkhanid bureaucrat
historians.95 However, this was a period of great disparity between rich
and poor. I have written above about the plight of ordinary nomads; many
peasants likewise suffered severe financial stress, some even abandoning
their land in desperation. At the same time, merchants, viziers and some
members of the Mongol elite were amassing enormous wealth. We can
take as examples the two great historians of the period, Rashid al-Din and
Juwayni; Rashid al-Din amassed a huge fortune, and the Juwayni family
acquired vast landholdings.96 The economic hardship seen under the
Ilkhans may be no more due to nomad exploitation of settled resources

91
Lambton, “Mongol Fiscal Administration,” pp. 109–110.
92
Jacques Paviot, “Les marchands italiens dans l’Iran mongol,” in L’Iran face à la domin-
ation mongole, ed. Denise Aigle, p. 84; Jean Aubin, “Les princes d’ Ormuz du XIIIe au
Xve siècle,” Journal Asiatique 24 (1953), pp. 85, 92–93.
93
De Nicola, Women, pp. 152–154.
94
Lambton, “Mongol Fiscal Administration,” pp. 105–106, 114.
95
Oliver Watson, “Pottery under the Mongols,” in Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan, ed.
Linda Komaroff (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 330–333; Bernard O’Kane, “Persian Poetry
on Ilkhanid Art and Architecture,” in Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan, ed.
Linda Komaroff (Leiden: Brill, 2006), p. 353; Aubin, “Propriété foncière,” p. 129.
96
Aubin, “Propriété foncière,” pp. 93–94.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Cultural Impact 135

than to extortion by Iranian and Mongol elites from the general popula-
tion, settled and nomad alike.

Cultural Impact
The Mongols came into the Middle East as imperial rulers, imposing their
own institutions, and the Mongol Empire brought most of Eurasia into
one interconnected system with unprecedented levels of travel and
exchange. The steppe imperial tradition became intertwined with the
Islamic heritage, both through Mongol rule and through the expansion
of the Islamic religion. The Mongols also brought with them an expansive
world view, encompassing the Eurasian steppe and its neighbors – China,
Russia and western Europe. The first Mongol rulers in the Middle East
were pagan and treated all religions as equal; their promotion of
Buddhism was particularly resented, since it was seen as polytheism.
The source of legitimacy was no longer the caliphate, but the family of
Chinggis Khan and the authority of the supreme khaghan. For some time
after the demise of the unified Mongol Empire, legitimate sovereignty
remained limited to the descendants of Chinggis Khan. With the end of
the caliphate, there was no impediment either to Muslim acceptance of
Chinggisid rule, or to Mongol conversion to Islam. There were moreover
some commonalities between Islamic and Mongol ideologies, most not-
ably a belief that successful conquest indicated God’s favor and thus
justified rule. By the mid-fourteenth century the Ilkhanate, the Golden
Horde, and the Chaghadayid Khanate were all officially Muslim.
While the Mongol rulers adopted Perso-Islamic chancellery practice,
they brought with them new government structures, some of which
remained in place well beyond the Ilkhanate. Institutions such as the
military governor assigned to a city – darugha – and the imperial guard,
the keshig, lasted into the Safavid dynasty.97 A more contentious element
of Mongol tradition was the yasa (Mongolian: jasakh), a term usually
translated as “law” or “code.” There is controversy over whether the yasa
was a specific set of laws existing as a written document. The precepts
preserved deal primarily with military and administrative matters, but in
the Middle East by the fourteenth century the term yasa had come to
signify both law and custom (yosun). The yasa and yosun were considered
central to Mongol power, but some tenets contravened requirements of
the shari‘a. The most problematic were a prohibition against washing in

97
Charles Melville, “The Keshig in Iran: The Survival of the Royal Mongol Household,” in
Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan, ed. Linda Komaroff (Leiden: Brill, 2006),
pp. 135–164.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 136 Mongol Conquest and Rule

running water, which interfered with the Muslim ablution, and the rules on
how animals should be killed – by cutting the breast and squeezing the vital
organs – which went against Muslim dietary law demanding the slitting of
the throat. Mongols also practiced the levirate – marrying the wives of their
deceased fathers – likewise contrary to Islamic law. Islamic histories
recount stories of Muslims punished for infringing on these customs by
tyrannical pagan khans, most notably Chinggis Khan’s son Chaghadai, but
it seems unlikely that Mongol rules were fully enforced on the Muslim
population. After the Ilkhanid conversion to Islam, most customs specifically
contrary to Islam appear to have been abandoned; in any case, we hear little
about them. The yasa seems to have been an elastic and changing code,
adapting over time to a new society; its edicts are described quite differently
by various historians. Whatever the reality of the yasa, as an idea and a marker
of identity, it continued to be central to Turco-Mongolian government and
remained for some Muslims a potent symbol of the alien nature of Mongol
governance.98
In the realm of cultural production – scientific, literary, and artistic – the
Mongol impact was clearly a positive one. The Mongol taste for Chinese
and Central Asian culture brought in new influences which initiated
a period of extraordinary cultural efflorescence in Iran. The Mongols
also showed a predilection for practical scientific knowledge such as astron-
omy, medicine, pharmacology, agronomy, and geography. When Chinggis
Khan conquered the Middle East he brought along Chinese astronomers,
one of whom was in charge of an observatory in Samarqand by 1222.99
Hülegü in turn brought doctors and astronomers from China, and on his
conquest of the fortress of Alamut from the Isma‘ilis he acquired its famous
library and instruments, along with the brilliant scholar Nasir al-Din Tusi
(1201–1274) for whom he founded an observatory whose calculations lay
behind most later astronomy in the Middle East and Europe.
The later Mongol khans were also patrons of art and architecture.
Abandoning the Mongol custom of secret burial, Ghazan built
a mausoleum for himself in a waqf complex in Tabriz, with religious institu-
tions, an observatory, library, hospital, and a kitchen to feed the poor.100 In
713/1313–1314 his successor Öljeitü completed a mausoleum in the town of

98
Denise Aigle, “Mongol Law versus Islamic Law. Myth and Reality,” in The Mongol
Empire between Myth and Reality: Studies in Anthropological History, ed. Denise Aigle
(Leiden: Brill, 2015). For another recent discussion, see David Morgan, “The ‘Great
yasa of Chinggis Khan’ revisited,” in Mongols, Turks and Others, ed. Reuven Amitai and
Michal Biran (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 291–308.
99
Thomas T. Allsen, Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia, Cambridge studies in Islamic
civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 165.
100
Birgitt Hoffmann, Waqf im mongolischen Iran: Rašı̄ duddı̄ ns Sorge um Nachruhm und
Seelenheil (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2000), p. 112.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Mongol Legacy 137

Sultaniyya. The complex became a new ceremonial capital, and the mauso-
leum is considered a masterpiece of Islamic architecture.
The vizier Rashid al-Din was a towering figure in Ilkhanid cultural life.
This great polymath was born in 647 or 648/1249–1251 and probably began
his career at court quite young.101 He was the author, or compiler, of several
encyclopedic works. His treatise on agronomy is distinguished by its inclu-
sion of numerous plants from outside, particularly from China. His greatest
work was his world history, the Jā mi‘ al-tawā rı̄ kh, begun for Ghazan and
completed about 710/1310. It put earlier histories of the Islamic world into
a new frame that encompassed the Mongols, Europeans, Chinese and
others. Rashid al-Din made use of many experts, using Indian and
Buddhist scholars and experts in Chinese and Mongolian traditions. For
centuries afterwards, universal histories included both the regional kings of
Iran and the four branches of the Chinggisid house.102 The history was
illustrated – a practice new with the Ilkhans – and the paintings show strong
Chinese and Central Asian elements. By the 1330s a new Persian style of
painting had begun, one which developed into the Persian miniature.
In crafting their legitimation, the Ilkhans turned to Iranian traditions,
particularly to the Shā hnā ma, which their artists produced in magnificent,
illustrated manuscripts. Like earlier nomad dynasties, they identified with
the Turanian king, Afrasiyab.103 The promotion of Persian traditions in
the Mongol court combined with active cultural borrowing to create new
Persian styles in art, architecture and historiography that were increas-
ingly distinct from Arab culture. The cultural achievements of the
Ilkhans, and the magnificent monuments they erected, contributed to
their lasting prestige within the Perso-Islamic world.

The Mongol Legacy

Mongol rule was a watershed in the history of the Middle East. This is
when the modern ethnic division took shape. The Ilkhanid realm
stretched across most of the northern Middle East and included Iraq
but did not extend into Syria or Egypt. It thus created a separation between
the Arab cultural region of the Mamluk Sultanate, still showing token loyalty

101
Hoffmann, Waqf, pp. 59–72.
102
Charles Melville, “From Adam to Abaqa: Qā dı̄ Baidā wı̄ ’s rearrangement of history,”
Studia Iranica 30, no. 1 (2001), pp. 71–79. ˙ ˙
103
Tomoko Masuya, “Ilkhanid Courtly Life,” in The Legacy of Genghis Khan: Courtly Art
and Culture in Western Asia, 1256–1353, ed. Stefano Carboni and Linda Komaroff
(New York; London: Metropolitan Museum of Art; New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2002), pp. 84–85; A. S. Melikian-Chirvani, “Conscience du passé et résistance
culturelle dans l’ Iran mongol,” in L’Iran face à la domination mongole, ed. Denise Aigle
(Tehran: Institut français de recherche en Iran 1997), pp. 145–159.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 138 Mongol Conquest and Rule

to the ‘Abbasids, and Iran, which was in the Mongol sphere. The Middle
East became divided into three major cultural zones, one Arab, one Iranian,
and one – in Anatolia – primarily Turkic. In Iran the concept of a separate
Iranian realm – Irā n zamı̄ n – returned to use after centuries in abeyance. This
term reflected a new regional and cultural consciousness but did not imply
either that a political realm would coincide with the boundaries of Irā n
zamı̄ n, or that it would be ruled by Iranians. Despite strong separate iden-
tities and feelings of superiority on each side, Mongols and Iranians inter-
married and became closely connected both culturally and politically.104
Ambitious Iranians had early realized that an understanding of Mongolian
culture was an asset, and numerous Turkic and Mongolian words entered
the language. While Iranians resented some Mongol practices, they none-
theless accepted many aspects of Mongolian political culture, which
remained important for centuries after the fall of the Ilkhans.
The vast extent of Chinggis Khan’s conquests and the spectacular
punishments he visited on rebellious cities gave him an almost unmatched
charisma, and the success of his descendants in expanding and ruling
a world empire cemented the prestige of his dynasty. The Mongols were
cursed by many historians, but they commanded respect. The Mongol
heritage was treasured and elaborated despite the breakup of the empire
and the changing identity in the western Mongol realms as the elite
converted to Islam and adopted Turkic as their spoken language. The
population of Mongolia and the army of Chinggis Khan had been made
up of both Turkic and Mongolian speakers sharing a political culture.
Over time, Turkic won out as the language of speech, while loyalty to
Mongol tradition remained, and by the end of the dynasty, the ruling class
of the western Mongol world is best characterized as Turco-Mongolian.
While they mixed with the eastern Turks, they remained separate from
the Oghuz/Turkmen in language and political culture. From this period
into the nineteenth century, the Turks provided much of the military
manpower of the Middle East, as well as most of its ruling dynasties.
By destroying the central caliphate, the Mongols inaugurated a new era
in which it was possible to assert full sovereign rule over separate regions
of the Islamic world. This act made possible the empires of the early
modern period – the Ottomans, Safavids, Mughals and Uzbeks – each of
which fostered a unique cultural complex, while sharing many elements
of the mixed culture that developed under the Mongols.

104
al-‘Umarı̄ , Das Mongolische Weltreich, p. 159; Yali Xue Tatiana Zerjal et al., “The
Genetic Legacy of the Mongols,” American Journal of Human Genetics 72 (2003),
pp. 717–721.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.007 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 6 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen
and Ottomans

The collapse of the Ilkhanate in 1336 did not mark the end of Mongol
influence in the Middle East. Through the northern regions of Iran and
eastern Anatolia, Turco-Mongolian personnel and their armies remained
active and powerful. Nor did the end of the Ilkhanate signal the decline of
the Mongol enterprise as a whole. The Chinggisid dynasty continued to
reign through much of Eurasia – in China until 1368 and for centuries
more both in the Chaghadayid territories, and in the Golden Horde as
well as other Jochid khanates to the north. By this time the Islamic and
Mongol traditions had ceased to be separate. Through much of the
steppe, the nomads were Muslim and acquainted with Persian culture.
The Middle East was part of a wide world in which the figure of Chinggis
Khan and the memory of the unified Mongol Empire retained over-
whelming prestige. By destroying the caliphate, the Mongols had made
it possible for sovereign Mongol states to adopt Islam and for the religion
to spread to vast new territories. In this world, however, legitimate sover-
eignty was limited to the descendants of Chinggis Khan, and in the
fourteenth century this tradition in its turn became a problem for rulers,
calling for new forms of steppe legitimation.
Within the Islamic Mongol world, with which we are concerned here,
separate identities had begun to form reflecting regional and historical
variations, different levels of involvement with the Mongol enterprise,
and different paths within it. The Mongols had ruled from two regions:
the pastures of northwestern Khorasan and the highlands of Azerbaijan.
After the fall of the Ilkhans several centers of power emerged, with
increasing separation between the eastern and the western regions. In
the east, Ilkhanid successor states bordered the Chaghadayid realm,
which was strongly attached to the Chinggisid tradition. Azerbaijan, in
contrast, was drawn into the politics of Arab Iraq, Syria and especially
Anatolia. Over time, therefore, these two regions developed separate
political cultures. The western regions, with a large Turkmen population,
moved to a more tribal structure and a legitimation built on an earlier
steppe tradition. In the east, both organization and legitimation remained
Chinggisid.

139

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 140 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

The later fourteenth century saw the creation of new domains. The
towering figure of the period was the Turco-Mongolian conqueror
Temür, known in the West as Tamerlane. Temür rose to power near
Samarqand in 1370 and set out first to take over the western half of the
Chaghadayid khanate, then to recreate the Mongol Empire symbolically,
and finally to dominate both the Islamic and the Mongol worlds. To the
north he was challenged by the equally ambitious Jochid ruler,
Tokhtamish, who reunited much of the Jochid ulus and harried the
borders of Temür’s realm.
In the west, the political picture was more complicated. In Anatolia the
Oghuz population outnumbered the Turco-Mongolian nomads, and
separate principalities sprang up through the region. The Ottoman dyn-
asty had begun to develop by 1300, and through the fourteenth century it
gradually expanded, moving into eastern Anatolia towards the end of the
century under the leadership of Yildirim (Thunderbolt) Bayazid. The
Mamluk sultanate attempted to control the areas bordering northern
Syria, often through client confederations of Turkmen tribes. Several
major tribal confederations arose in eastern Anatolia and later expanded
into Iran, most notably the Qaraquyunlu and the Aqquyunlu – the Black
and White Sheep.
Rulers of the fourteenth century were not only conquerors; they were
also major cultural patrons. The brilliant achievements of the Ilkhans had
made them a model for their Turkic successors, who created a highly
sophisticated artistic culture in architecture, literature and the arts of the
book. In historiography and political ideology, they produced a synthesis
of Turkic, Mongolian and Perso-Islamic traditions that remained influ-
ential for centuries thereafter.

Western Iran after the Ilkhans

When the Ilkhan Abu Sa‘id died without an heir in 1335, Iran became the
scene of a struggle among local rulers, viziers, and Mongol emirs promot-
ing a bewildering variety of puppet khans connected to the Ilkhans. It is
probably no coincidence that the two powers who emerged as the major
rivals for rule in the western Ilkhanid territories, the Jalayirid and the
Chobanid families, had both served as governors of Anatolia, which had
become an important locus of power and sometimes independence.1
Several Turco-Mongolian groups in eastern Anatolia – the Oirat tribe
or confederation, led by ‘Ali Padshah, the followers of the former gov-
ernor Shaykh Hasan Jalayir, and the descendants of the powerful emir

1
Charles Melville, “Čobā n,” EIr; Wing, Jalayirids, pp. 63, 69–70.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Western Iran after the Ilkhans 141

Choban Suldus – headed east to assert their power.2 Shaykh Hasan

Jalayir, grandson of Arghun Khan, soon promoted a Chinggisid khan.
In 1338 the descendants of Choban made a bid for power, using Abu
Sa‘id’s sister Sati Beg – Choban’s widow – as candidate for Khan.3
For twenty years after the death of Abu Sa‘id the Chobanids had the
upper hand, ruling Persian Iraq and Azerbaijan, while the Jalayirids held
Diyar Bakr, Arab Iraq and Khuzistan, with their center at Baghdad. Over
time, however, the Jalayirids gained a major advantage by winning control
over the Oirat troops, who were now apparently without internal
leadership.4 In 1357 the khan of the Golden Horde invaded Azerbaijan,
leaving the Chobanids badly weakened. The next year, Shaykh Hasan
Jalayir’s son and successor, Shaykh Uways, was able to take the region. By
the time of his death in 1374, Shaykh Uways had expanded his realm
through northern Iran to Rayy and was recognized as suzereign by the
Iranian dynasties of the Caucasus, Fars and central Iran. Thus, for about
thirty years the Jalayirids were the dominant power over much of the
former Ilkhanate.5
By now the exclusivity of the Chinggisid claim to sovereignty was
weakening in much of Iran. The Chobanids had begun to claim Iranian
descent for some of their puppet khans and, twenty years after Abu Sa‘id’s
death, it was possible for Shaykh Uways Jalayir to abandon the use of
a khan and mint coins in his own name.6 Nonetheless, the Mongol
heritage was still central to dynastic legitimation. Shaykh Uways claimed
legitimacy as the reviver of Chinggisid custom and as the true successor to
Abu Sa‘id, emphasizing continuities in genealogy, ideology and adminis-
tration. The style of his coinage echoed that of the Ilkhans and some coins
even used the Uighur script, which the Ilkhans had retained for some
formal documents.7 The Jalayirids likewise kept the political structure of
the Ilkhanate, in which tribal powers remained largely submerged. Emirs
might hold great power, but the sources do not identify them by tribe; nor
did the dynasty itself claim legitimacy from its Jalayir identity.8
The regions further from the Ilkhanid center and under looser rule
seem to have returned to a more decentralized system, permitting the
resurgence of tribal groups, some of which were formed from the rem-
nants of Mongol armies. The regions of Quhistan, Mazandaran and
northwestern Khorasan were controlled by a variety of minor local dyn-
asties and Mongol emirs, some leading inherited regiments. These
included the descendants of the former governor Arghun Agha, whose
2
Woods, Aqquyunlu, p. 29. 3 Melville, “Čobā n” EIr; Wing, Jalayirids, pp. 64–68.
4
Wing, Jalayirids, pp. 83–94. 5 Wing, Jalayirids, pp. 103–115.
6
Wing, Jalayirids, p. 129; Boyle, “Dynastic,” p. 416. 7 Wing, Jalayirids, pp. 130–134.
8
Wing, Jalayirids, pp. 195–197.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 142 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

following, known as the Jawun-i Qurban, was centered in the pastures of

Tus and Radkan. In eastern Iran, loyalty to the Chinggid legacy was still
strong. Thus in 1336 the regional ruling elite – Turco-Mongolian emirs
and tribal leaders; local rulers, both Iranian and Turkic; bureaucrats; and
Sufi shaykhs – gathered to enthrone Taghay Temür, a descendant of
Chinggis Khan’s brother Jochi Qasar.9 Despite several campaigns to the
west, however, Taghay Temür never expanded his power beyond
Khorasan.
Further to the east and west, in eastern Khorasan and Transoxiana on
the one side, and in Anatolia to the other, tribal and local powers were yet
more important. It was here that the largest successor states arose and
soon came to dispute the rule of the entire region. We will begin with the
history of Anatolia, which had become perhaps the greatest reserve of
pastoral nomadism in the region.

Anatolia after the Ilkhanids

With the loss of Ilkhanid control, power devolved on the beyliks which had
sprung up after the dissolution of the Rum Sultanate. Most of these
combined nomad Turkmen and Turco-Mongolians with settled popula-
tion and many were ruled by Turkmen. One of the driving motives for
political activity was the desire to control access to the great summer and
winter pastures of the region, often quite far apart from each other. These
pastures were contested among confederations and by individual tribes
acting under their own leaders. The situation was complicated by the
Turkmen tribes of northern Syria, who also depended on Anatolia for
summer pastures. Under such pressure, tribes whose pastures were
endangered looked to the leaders of beyliks and confederations for help,
sometimes paying dues for the use of pasture. Another important goal was
the control of the trade routes which crisscrossed Anatolia, providing
income to rulers through tolls and protection money, while also offering
their nomad followers a market for their livestock and perhaps for their
services as guides.10 The local historian ‘Aziz ibn Ardashir Astarabadi,
writing in 1397–1398, paints a vivid picture of tribes, local rulers and
confederations struggling for survival and preeminence.11
9
Jean Aubin, “Le qurlitai de Sultân-Maydân (1336),” Journal Asiatique CCLXXIX
(1991), pp. 180–192.
10
Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 29–30, 56, 62, 80; Sara Nur Yıldız, “Post-Mongol Pastoral
Polities in Eastern Anatolia during the Late Middle Ages,” in At the Crossroads of
Empires: 14th–15th Century Eastern Anatolia. Proceedings of the International Symposium
held in Istanbul, 4th–6th May, 2007, ed. Deniz Beyazit (Paris: De Boccard, 2012), pp. 30,
33, 38.
11
See, for example, Paul, “Mongol Aristocrats.”

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Anatolia after the Ilkhanids 143

It is impossible here to list all the beyliks and nomad coalitions of

Anatolia, so I will limit my discussion to a handful of the most important
ones. One of the longest lasting was that of the Turkmen Karamanids,
who held the Konya Nigde region in central Anatolia.12 From the middle
of the thirteenth century, the Karamanids had maintained some level of
independence and for their armies they could call upon a variety of
pastoralist tribes. One Mongol governor remained after the fall of the
Ilkhans: Eretna, whose lands lay to the west of the major Mongol strong-
holds. He turned for patronage to the Mamluk sultan and formed
a principality stretching at its height from Samsun on the Black Sea to
Nigde and Konya, which he contested with the Karamanids.13 After Amir
Eretna died in 1352, his capital region of Sivas came under the control of
a judge of Turkmen descent, Qadi Burhan al-Din.14 Jürgen Paul has
provided an analysis of Burhan al-Din’s governance, showing the import-
ance of the Mongol emirs and tribes who provided a significant portion of
his military and exerted considerable influence over policy. Several for-
mer Mongol contingents led by the descendants of their earlier com-
manders were now becoming tribes, along with other tribes of uncertain
provenance.15 During their spring migration, the Mongol leaders regu-
larly visited Burhan al-Din in Sivas, exchanged presents with him, and
consulted about possible military action. Their wishes and needs were
clearly a factor in Burhan al-Din’s actions. One of their constant concerns
was access to the pastures of Kayseri in central Anatolia, which were part
of their normal migration.16 Burhan al-Din himself claimed Turkmen
descent and, especially in his later years, Turkmen tribes were also an
important part of his power structure. There are several mentions of
formal meetings with Turkmen in summer pasturelands. These lands
were an appropriate setting in which to form a network of nomad tribal
alliances, without which Burhan al-Din could not retain his regional
position.17
Another Anatolian power which gained strength with the fall of the
Ilkhans was the Turkmen Dhu’l Qadr confederation. In 1298, the
Mamluk sultan granted the region of Mar‘ash on the Armenian border
to the Turkmen who later formed the Dhu’l Qadr, who were subject to
the governor of Aleppo.18 While they remained formally subservient to
12
F. Sümer, “Ḳaramā n-oghullarï,” EI 2nd ed. 13 Claude Cahen, “Eretna,” EI 2nd ed.
14
Claude Cahen, “Eretna,” EI, 2nd ed.
15
As I stated in Chapter 6, Paul has defined a tribe as a group based on a real or constructed
genealogy tracing members to one ancestor, and thus he does not use the term to describe
most of these groups. Paul, “Mongol Aristocrats,” pp. 116–131.
16
Paul, “Mongol Aristocrats,” pp. 133–137.
17
Paul, “Mongol Aristocrats,” pp. 148–149.
18
Venzke, “Dulgadir-Mamluk,” pp. 407–408.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 144 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

the Mamluks, the Dhu’l Qadr soon emerged as a significant power,

and one which could not be fully controlled.19 The Karamanids,
Eretnids and Dhu’l Qadr were part of an interlocking political field
bounded to the south by the Mamluk sultanate and to the east by the
Jalayirids. To the west, they eventually met the rising power of the
Ottoman state.
The Ottomans became involved in the politics of eastern Anatolia only
in the late fourteenth century, but had their origins much earlier, as
a group of nomads whose winter pasture was east of the Sea of
Marmara. This area lies on the edge of the steppe region and at the
confluence of several routes. The Ottoman career of expansion began
during the last three decades of the Ilkhanate. They first appear in the
histories in July 1302, when their leader Osman defeated a Byzantine
force near Nicomedia/Izmit. At this time their armies were largely
nomadic, but also included other populations, both Christian and
Muslim.20 The nomads lived in close proximity and in symbiosis with
settled populations; as they departed for their summer migration, they left
their goods in the fortress of a local lord, and on their return the women
paid its owner in cheese, rugs and sheep.21
Over time nomadism declined as a source of wealth for the
Ottomans, whose territory was best suited for agriculture, as were
the rich areas to the north and west into which they soon began to
expand. Over the next thirty years the Ottomans added increasing
numbers of foot soldiers to their army and many of their originally
nomad subjects appear to have switched to transhumance. By the
time that the Ilkhanate ended in 1335, the Ottomans had expanded
their territory from the Sea of Marmara to the Black Sea and had
begun to create a regular bureaucracy.22 Under two energetic sultans,
Orhan (1324–1362) and Murad I (1362–1389) they absorbed essen-
tially all the Byzantine territories in Anatolia and much of southeast-
ern Anatolia. This movement brought them into contact with the
Karamanids who were also expanding – for a while as far as
Kayseri – and attracting numerous new tribes to the confederation.23

19
Venzke, “Dulgadir-Mamluk,” pp. 409–413.
20
Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995), pp. 10–17, 37–57.
21
Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, p. 25; Kafadar, Between two Worlds, pp. 125–129.
22
Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, pp. 26–37; Lindner, Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), pp. 35–53.
23
F. Sümer, “Ḳaramā n-Oghullarï,” EI 2nd ed.; Rudi Lindner, “Anatolia, 1300–1451,” in
Cambridge History of Turkey, ed. Kate Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), pp. 114–115.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Rise of New Anatolian Powers 145

The Rise of New Anatolian Powers

The fluidity of politics in eastern Anatolia and the Jazira encouraged the
emergence of tribal confederations; the situation was similar to that of
the Bedouin and Kurdish regions in the tenth and eleventh century,
when the rivalry between the Fatimids and ‘Abbasids provided new
political opportunities for nomad groups. Several major powers
attempted to expand their influence in the region, none with complete
success, or with great comfort. The Mamluks played a significant part in
Anatolian tribal politics over several centuries, attempting to extend
their influence and to control nomads migrating across their borders.
The Jalayirids, having started their career in eastern Anatolia, still
profited from the manpower of the Oirat, who migrated between
winter pastures near Mosul and summer grazing grounds in Eastern
Anatolia.24 The Jalayir competed with Ottomans, and later the
Timurids. Each outside state sought alliances with tribal leaders,
who were thus able to play one against another, and when attacked
to find refuge with the enemy of their enemy. Attempts by these
neighboring states to attract and incorporate nomads were generally
unsuccessful, perhaps because they attempted to suppress tribes as
centers of independent power.
The two rising powers we will discuss here, the Qaraqoyunlu and the
Aqqoyunlu, were confederations of Turkmen tribes able to move and
expand or contract in order to adapt to changing situations. Both eventu-
ally developed into bureaucratic states, but unlike the Ottomans they
retained a strong tribal structure and nomadic lifestyle. The central tribes
of the Qaraqoyunlu are mentioned under the Ilkhans holding winter
pastures in the Mosul region and summering in the area of Van. The
rise of the confederation began during the rule of Bayram Khwaja, who by
his death in 1380 controlled a confederation covering the region from
Mosul to Erzerum. Formally, the Qaraqoyunlu were vassals of the
Jalayirids, but they were often rivals as well. When the Jalayirids split
after the death of Sultan Husayn in 1382, the Qaraqoyunlu achieved
independence.25 The ruling tribe of the Aqqoyunlu, known as
Bayandur, claimed descent from the legendary Oghuz Khan, and was
mentioned by Rashid al-Din as one of the leading Oghuz tribes.26 In the
later fourteenth century the leader of the tribe gathered a confederation
under his leadership along the northern Mamluk frontier and allied with
the ruler of a section of the former Eretnid territories.27 At this point the
Aqqoyunlu were only a minor power in the Anatolian cauldron.
24
Wing, Jalayirids, p. 78. 25 F. Sümer, “Ḳarā -Koyunlu,” EI 2nd ed.
26
Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Compendium, pp. 25, 34. 27 Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 25–29, 34–37.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 146 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

Near the end of the fourteenth century the Ottomans attacked the
Karamanids, and hostilities intensified during the reign of the ambitious
Sultan Yildirim Bayezid (1389–1402). The entry of the Ottomans into
the politics of eastern Anatolia did not, however, impede the growth of the
tribal confederations. A centralizing government did not appeal to
autonomous nomad populations; thus, tribes dislodged from the
Karamanids often moved east to join the Aqqoyunlu or Qaraqoyunlu.
The independent attitude of the Turkmen tribal commanders is illus-
trated in the terms on which the Qaraqoyunlu had agreed to join the
Jalayirids in 1382; they demanded that the Turkmen be allowed to fight in
their own way, and that they keep the spoils of battle.28 The nomads of
eastern Anatolia had retained their independence from the centralized
states on their borders. They were soon to encounter yet another threat,
with the rise of the great conqueror Tamerlane.

The Eastern Regions and the Rise of Tamerlane

Like Chinggis Khan, Temür remains a figure larger than life. Although he
was not himself a Chinggisid, Temür stood clearly within the Mongol
tradition, at once deferring to the figure of Chinggis and attempting to
equal him. Over the course of his reign, he defeated every ruler of note
within his horizon. For the powers of Iran and Anatolia Temür and his
dynasty presented a daunting challenge, first and most acutely in the
military realm but later also in terms of dynastic prestige.
Temür rose to power in Transoxiana, within the remains of the
Chaghadayid khanate. A few decades before his rise the khanate had
divided in two. The western regions – Transoxiana and much of what is
now Afghanistan – became largely independent and were known as the
Ulus Chaghatay. In 1347 the emir of a powerful nomad group known as
the Qara’unas seized power over the Ulus while the eastern region
remained under Chinggisid khans.29 The Qara’unas had originated as
tamma troops garrisoning eastern Khorasan; since they were not des-
cended from Chinggis, they governed in the name of a Chinggisid puppet
khan.30
The Ulus Chaghatay was a confederation of tribes, most of which were
probably formed from Mongol armies. Chinggis Khan had granted four

28
Wing, Jalayirids, pp. 155–156.
29
Michal Biran, “The Mongols in Central Asia from Chinggis Khan’s Invasion to the Rise
of Temür: The Ögödeid and Chaghadaid Realms,” in The Cambridge History of Inner
Asia: the Chinggisid Age, ed. Allen J. Frank, Nicola Di Cosmo, Peter B. Golden
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 58–59.
30
“Mongols in Central Asia,” p. 59; Manz, Rise and Rule, pp. 43–45, 51, 57, 155, 158.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Eastern Regions and the Rise of Tamerlane 147

regiments of a thousand to his son Chaghadai, headed by commanders

from the Barlas, Jalayir and Suldus; at the time of Temür’s rise, these were
among the most powerful tribes of the Ulus. As I wrote in Chapter 5, most
regiments in the Mongol army were made up of soldiers from different
tribes, and there is no evidence that those assigned to Chaghadai were an
exception. It seems most likely therefore that the tribes originated as
regiments, probably remaining under the command of the family of the
earlier commander and taking the name of his tribe; indeed, this is well
attested for the Barlas.31 Of the other major tribes the Arlat probably
descended from troops of Arlat emirs who came to the region somewhat
later, while the Yasa’uri originated in the army of the dissident emir
Yasa’ur who was active in the early fourteenth century.32 The sources
refer to these groups as large bodies of people (il, qawm), able to field
troops of their own. Many had been in the region from about the time of
Chinggis Khan’s death, and in the relatively decentralized Chaghadayid
realm they had developed into separate powers.
The Ulus came into being around the time that the new tribal confed-
erations were forming in Anatolia and shared many things in common
with them. Its members were nomadic tribes that were politically active
and willing to follow a leader as long as he brought them advantage.
Attempts at coercion were met with resistance or desertion. However,
there were also significant differences between the two areas. In Anatolia,
Seljuqid and Mongol traditions held almost equal weight, and by the later
fourteenth century tribal rulers could rule in their own names. The Ulus
Chaghatay remained strongly attached to the Chinggisid tradition. Its
tribes were nomadic, and each held territory suitable for both winter and
summer pasture. However, Timurid histories put much less emphasis on
migration and on control of pasture than do the Anatolian ones. Summer
and winter pastures in the east did not usually require crossing territory
belonging to other powers, as tribes in Anatolia were often forced to do.
Moreover, there is little evidence of the competition over pasture which
was so central to Anatolian politics.33
The story of Temür’s rise to power has much in common with tales of
Chinggis Khan’s youth. Both came from the aristocracy, but not from
a ruling lineage; both lost their fathers relatively early, gathered personal
followings and attached themselves to more powerful leaders. Temür
belonged to the Barlas tribe, one of the major tribes of the Ulus

31
The Suldus are not mentioned in Rashid al-Din’s list of Chaghadai’s troops, but they do
appear in the Mongol and Timurid genealogies. Manz, Rise and Rule, pp. 156–158, 163–
164; Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n, Compendium, pp. 279–280.
32
Manz, Rise and Rule, pp. 155–156, 164–165.
33
Manz, Rise and Rule, pp. 27–28, 36–38.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 148 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

Chaghatay, and began his rise to power in the classic fashion of nomad
conquerors, by going outside his own tribe to gather support. He first
appears in the histories in 1360, when he allied with the invading eastern
Chaghadayid khan to become chief of the Barlas. The next ten years were
ones of constant political struggle. Over this period Temür gradually
increased his power, supporting various candidates for leadership and
gathering a personal following outside his tribe.34
In 1370, Temür defeated the Qara’unas leader Amir Husayn and took
power over the Ulus Chaghatay. He incorporated the Qara’unas troops
into his army and married several of Amir Husayn’s wives, including two
Chinggisid women. For his capital he chose the prestigious city of
Samarqand, where he called a convocation to recognize the rule of his
own puppet khan.35 Titles connoting sovereignty – sultan, padshah and
khan – were reserved for the puppet khan, while Temür himself used the
title amir, or Amir-i Kabir (Great Commander) adding the epithet
güregen – royal son-in-law. Like Chinggis Khan, Temür centralized
power within his confederation before embarking on his conquests. The
tribal leaders of the Ulus soon began turning against his rule, but as tribes
rebelled, Temür was able to defeat them and put them under the leader-
ship of personal followers. Unlike Chinggis, who decimated many
defeated tribes, Temür treated tribal leaders with care. Nonetheless,
over the course of eleven years he transformed his army from a tribal
confederation into a decimally organized army of conquest commanded
by men from his personal following.36 Tribal leadership no longer pro-
vided a separate power base. Here Temür’s confederation differed mark-
edly from those of the western regions.
Temür developed his ambitions within the framework of the Mongol
Empire. The first campaigns he undertook were against the Eastern
Chaghadayid Khans and Khorezm, both part of the Mongol Empire,
and he justified these expeditions through Chinggisid ideology.37 When
in 1375–1377 Tokhtamish, a Chinggisid pretender to the Jochid Blue
Horde on Temür’s northern border, applied for help, Temür gave him
a warm reception and helped him to regain his throne. In 1380 Temür
began to look to the south and west. Within Iran he pursued goals both
strategic and symbolic, aiming at control over the northern trade routes
while laying claim to the inheritance of the Mongol Ilkhanate. In
Mazandaran, he defeated the upstart who had supplanted the

34
Manz, Rise and Rule, pp. 45–57. 35 Manz, Rise and Rule, pp. 57–58.
36
Manz, Rise and Rule, pp. 58–62.
37
John E. Woods, “Timur’s Genealogy,” in Intellectual Studies on Islam: Essays Written in
Honor of Martin B. Dickson, ed. Michael Mazzaoui and Vera B. Moreen (Salt Lake City:
University of Utah Press, 1990), pp. 101–104.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Eastern Regions and the Rise of Tamerlane 149

Chinggisid dynasty of Taghay Temür and installed Taghay Temür’s son

Lughman, allowing him the imperial title padshah, carried by the Ilkhans.
In northwestern Iran he took the city Sultaniyya, symbolically important
as the Ilkhanid necropolis.
With three Chinggisid khans as protégés, Temür aimed at a symbolic
restoration of the Mongol Empire, with himself at its center. He increased
his personal charisma by imitating Chinggis Khan’s actions. In fact, his
conquest of cities and his punishment of those that rebelled were eerily
reminiscent of Chinggis Khan’s campaigns. In cities conquered after
a rebellion the population was taken out and divided into categories,
with craftsmen and ulama spared, and systematic massacres in which
soldiers were given a quota of heads to present to their commanders. In
an additional and very effective touch, Temür’s army often built minarets
with the severed heads of rebellious populations; as they decomposed,
they glowed in the night.38 For his court etiquette, Temür imitated that of
the Mongol khaghans.
However, Temür was not the only person who remembered Mongol
history, and while he campaigned in Iran, his former protégé Tokhtamish
was seizing control of the fragmented Golden Horde. Tokhtamish
renewed the earlier Jochid alliance with the Mamluks and invaded
Azerbaijan in 1385–1386.39 Over the next ten years Temür expanded
and consolidated his power in Iran, but his greatest effort was concen-
trated on his duel with Tokhtamish, who as a descendant of Chinggis
could legally claim the title of khan. After several inconclusive campaigns
into the steppe, in 1395 Temür was able to inflict a decisive defeat on
Tokhtamish; he then ravaged the winter pastures and trading cities of the
western steppe and installed his own pretender over the Golden Horde.40
With this campaign, Temür achieved primacy within the western Mongol
world.
Temür’s steppe campaign of 1395 marks a turning point in his career.
Despite his hard-won success he made no effort to incorporate the steppe
into his realm. He did not install a permanent administration over the
Golden Horde, although in Iran and Central Asia he had already begun to
appoint his sons as governors in the major provinces. The regions Temür
chose to put under his administration included the territory of the Ilkhans
and that of the western Chaghadayids; although it contained much

38
Jean Aubin, “Comment Tamerlan prenait les villes,” Studia Islamica 19 (1963).
39
Beatrice F. Manz, “Mongol History Rewritten and Relived,” in Figures Mythiques des
mondes musulmans, special issue of Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, ed.
Denise Aigle (Aix en Provence: Édisud, 2001), pp. 138–140.
40
M. G. Safargaliev, Raspad Zolotoı̆ Ordy, Uchenye zapiski (Saransk: Mordovskoe knizhoe
izd-vo, 1960), p. 172.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 150 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

territory suitable for nomadism, the larger part of the economy was
agricultural and urban. The definition of his realm did not mark the end
of Temür’s campaigns. By the 1390s, Temür had acquired an additional
ambition – primacy within the Islamic world – and in 1398 he set out
against the Delhi sultanate of India. The new ambition did not push out
the old; Temür was still determined recreate the Mongol Empire symbol-
ically. At the time of his Indian campaign, he was already planning to
attack China where the Ming dynasty had overthrown the Mongol
Yüan.41

The Clash over Anatolia

Within the central Islamic world, Temür faced two great rivals for pres-
tige: the Ottoman Empire under Yildirim Bayezid (1389–1402) and the
Mamluk sultanate. Both states were closely involved with the powers of
eastern Anatolia, to which Temür now turned his attention. All the actors
in this struggle were connected in one way or another to the heritage of the
steppe, and their clash tells us a great deal about competing identities and
ideologies within the Middle Eastern nomad traditions. In the welter of
claims and counterclaims, insults and counter-insults the sources record,
we see how alive the history of earlier nomad dynasties remained, and how
important the distinctions among Turks and Mongols of different back-
grounds still were.
After taking Baghdad from Sultan Ahmad Jalayir in 1393, Temür sent
an embassy to the Mamluk sultan Barquq (r. 1382–1399) laying claim to
the Ilkhanid territories. The response was unequivocally negative. The
sultan murdered Temür’s envoys and when Sultan Ahmad arrived in
Cairo seeking refuge, Barquq received him with conspicuous honor,
parading him around as a new protégé and vassal.42 Temür’s response
was to send a yet haughtier letter, a direct copy of the demand for
submission that Hülegü Khan had sent to the Ayyubids and the
Mamluk sultan Qutuz in 1259–1260:
Know that we are the soldiers of God, created from his wrath, given dominion
over those on whom His anger has descended . . . We do not feel tenderness for the
one who complains, nor do we have mercy on the tear[s] of the one who weeps, for
verily God has torn mercy from our hearts . . . .

41
Beatrice F. Manz, “Temür and the Problem of a Conqueror’s Legacy,” Journal of the
Royal Asiatic Society series 3 vol. 8, no. 1 (1998), p. 25.
42
Patrick Wing, “Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Sultā n Ahmad Jalā yir’s Time as
a Refugee in the Mamluk Sultanate,” in Mamluk Cairo, ˙ A Crossroads
˙ for Embassies:
Studies on Diplomacy and Diplomatics, ed. Frédéric Bauden and Malika Dekkiche
(Leiden: Brill, 2019), pp. 164–166.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Clash over Anatolia 151

Our hearts are like mountains and our numbers like sand . . . He who makes
peace with us is saved, and he who fights us regrets it . . .43
In response, Sultan Barquq also returned to past models, sending a letter
claiming guardianship of Islam and suggesting that Temür was an
infidel.44 From this time on the Mamluks were open enemies.
In 1394–1395 Temür sought an alliance with the Ottoman sultan
Bayezid, who was then occupied in the western Ottoman regions.45
Temür’s letter to Bayezid initiated a correspondence which lasted until
his invasion of Anatolia in 1402. The language of their letters, both in
praise and in blame, gives insight into the fault lines within the nomad
heritage. Temür’s first letter was written in the hopes of detaching
Bayazid from the Mamluks. The title used for Bayazid, “Ghazi Bayazid
Khan,” acknowledged both Bayazid’s Islamic merit and his status within
the Turco-Mongolian world. Sultan Barquq on the other hand, was
a nobody – a Circassian slave page, who had overthrown and killed his
master and imprisoned the ‘Abbasid shadow caliph.46 This passage refers
to the fact that Barquq came from a new line of Mamluk sultans,
Circassians from the Caucasus who had taken over the sultanate from
the Qipchaq Turks who had held it earlier. Temür was pointing out that
Barquq was not only a slave and an outsider, but one who had killed
a ruler who although a slave was at least a Turk.
Temür’s alliance with Bayezid did not last long. As Bayazid turned his
attention east, he wrote to Barquq requesting a diploma from the Abbasid
shadow caliph recognizing him as the heir to the Seljukids of Rum.47
Meanwhile Temür again headed west to attack Sultan Ahmad Jalayir
(now back in Baghdad) and the Qaraqoyunlu chief, Qara Yusuf. Both
took refuge with Bayazid. The correspondence between Temür and
Bayazid gained in frequency and declined in civility. Temür boasted of
his conquests and the overwhelming size of his army, identifying himself
with the Ilkhans; Bayazid answered by stating that his ancestor Ertoghrul
had defeated a large army of Mongols and Tatars.48 Thus the earlier
struggles between the Turkmen of Rum and the Chinggisid Mongols
were resurrected. As Bayazid continued intransigent, Temür clearly
expressed the superiority that the eastern Turco-Mongolians claimed

43
Anne F. Broadbridge, Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 182.
44
Broadbridge, Kingship, pp. 174–185.
45
Zeki Velidi Togan, “Timurs Osteuropapolitik,” Zeitschrift der deutchen morgenländischen
Geselschaft 108 (1958), pp. 279–280; Lindner, “Anatolia, 1300–1451,” pp. 129–130.
46
Togan, “Timurs Osteuropapolitik,” pp. 279–281. 47 Broadbridge, Kingship, p. 175.
48
‘Abd al-Husayn Nawā ’ı̄ , ed. Asnā d wa makā tibā t-i tā rı̄ khı̄ -i Ī rā n (Tehran:
˙
Bungā h-i Tarjama va Nashr-i Kitā b, 2536/1977), pp. 97–103.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 152 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

over the Turkmen. He accused Bayazid of giving himself airs beyond his
station; he was after all merely the descendant of a Turkmen boatman,
and Turkmen were known to be without judgment.49 Now Bayezid was
sailing the boat of vain ambition into the whirlpool of conceit, and if he
did not lower his sail and drop the anchor of repentance, he would find
himself buffeted by waves of revenge and would drown in the sea of
calamity.50
After defeating the Mamluk army in Syria, Temür prepared to attack
the Ottomans in the spring of 1402. The two adversaries both led formid-
able armies. In addition to his own troops, Temür had some Anatolian
forces, notably the Aqqoyunlu, who sided with him. Bayazid commanded
a highly trained standing army with additional Anatolian Turkmen and
Mongol soldiers.51 Temür also wooed local forces, sending an emissary to
the Mongols of Sivas, Kayseri and Malatya with promises of independ-
ence under their own khans.52 When the two armies met near Ankara in
July 1402, Temür’s strategy bore fruit. Some Mongol and Turkmen
troops deserted the Ottomans to join Temür. Bayazid’s army suffered
decisive defeat, with Bayazid himself taken captive.53 Although Temür
spent a few more months campaigning in Anatolia, he made no attempt to
create his own administration there.54 As he left, he divided the Ottoman
realm, now a vassal state, among three of Bayazid’s sons, and reestab-
lished many of the beyliks that Bayazid had destroyed.55
Temür defeated both the Mamluks and Bayazid, and deported a large
body of nomads, but the tribal confederations of Anatolia and Azerbaijan
remained largely outside his control. He never succeeded in gaining a firm
hold over Azerbaijan; nor did he succeed in weakening the Qaraqoyunlu
for long. The Aqqoynlu received the region of Amid (Diyar Bakr) in
reward for their service, a grant which helped the branch of Temür’s
ally Qara ‘Uthman to gain preeminence and increase internal control.56
Eastern Anatolia remained a repository of nomad and tribal power threat-
ening the Timurid hold on Azerbaijan and Baghdad.

49
Michele Bernardini, Mémoire et propagande à l’époque timouride, Studia Iranica. Cahier 37
(Paris: Association pour l’avancement des études iraniennes, 2008), p. 151.
50
Sharaf al-Dı̄ n ‘Alı̄ Yazdı̄ , Zafarnā ma (Tehran: Amı̄ r Kabı̄ r, 1957), vol II, pp. 186–189.
51 ˙
Marie-Mathilde Alexandrescu-Dersca, La campagne de Timur en Anatolie (1402)
(Bucharest: Imprimeria Nationala, 1942), pp. 57–59, 114–115.
52
Alexandrescu-Dersca, La campagne, p. 55.
53
Alexandrescu-Dersca, La campagne, pp. 68–79.
54
Alexandrescu-Dersca, La campagne, p. 91.
55
Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power, 2nd ed.
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 16.
56
Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 41–43.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 From Temür to Shahrukh 153

Temür returned to Samarqand and began to prepare for his most

ambitious campaign, ostensibly to retake China from the Ming dynasty.
Before setting out he called a convocation or khuriltay held in
a magnificent tent city. The Spanish ambassador Ruy Gonzales de
Clavíjo noted the Chaghatay grazing their flocks as he approached
Samarqand, and the supplies gathered for the army included several
horses and ten sheep for every soldier. Thus, it appears that the core of
Temür’s army remained nomadic. By this time Temür was probably in
his eighties, and far from well.57 Several times he had to postpone his
departure due to illness, but finally the army set off through the winter
steppe. They reached Otrar, a bit beyond the Jaxartes, and there, in
February 1405, Temür died.58

From Temür to Shahrukh

The army with which Temur achieved his conquests combined settled
and nomadic soldiers, like that of Chinggis Khan. The regional dynasties
Temür conquered were left in place and required to accompany him on
campaigns with their armies. Troops were also raised from the provinces
of Iran and joined the Chaghatay army on campaign. Though less presti-
gious than the central army, the settled troops contributed significantly to
the army’s power.59 While nomad horsemen had greater mobility than
settled troops and required less grain, they needed more extensive pas-
tures. The combination of nomad and settled troops provided a mix of
different skills and allowed campaigns in a variety of terrain. Through
much of the Timurid period, the main army appears to have remained
Chaghatay, with the power of the tribes suppressed due to the division of
their members among different regiments. Tribes, however, were not
destroyed, and while they appear rarely in the histories, some did remain
in existence. After Temür’s death we hear of the Suldus tribe in its old
territories and of the Jalayir in new ones, while in the later succession
struggle after Shahrukh’s death the Arlat appear, providing some support
to one of the contestants in their old territories; some Jalayir are likewise
mentioned.60

57
For Temür’s date of birth, see Beatrice F. Manz, “Tamerlane and the Symbolism of
Sovereignty,” Iranian Studies 21, no. 1–2 (1988), pp. 113–114, n33.
58
Beatrice Forbes Manz, Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 16.
59
Manz, Rise and Rule, pp. 91–100; Manz, Power, Politics, pp. 123–126.
60
Manz, Rise and Rule, pp. 132–136; Manz, Power, Politics, p. 269n.; Abū Bakr
Tihrā nı̄ Isfahā nı̄ , Kitā b-i Diyā rbakriyya, eds. N. Lugal and F. Sümer (Ankara: Türk
˙
tarih Kurumu˙ Basımevi, 1962–1964), p. 350.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 154 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

Temür created a sovereign realm which combined Turco-Mongolian

with Perso-Islamic norms and could be ruled effectively with the
resources he commanded. He set up systematic administration only in
areas which had primarily settled population and had been under the
control of the Ilkhans or the Chaghadayids. Most regional powers
remained in place under him, serving in his armies. Cities were looted
and heavily taxed at the time of conquest and those which resisted
sometimes suffered exemplary punishments, but on departing Temür
often left behind a part of the army to restore buildings and
agriculture.61 We should note that nomad populations were not given
preferential treatment. Like the Seljukids and Mongols, Temür was often
brutal towards the nomads he encountered whose livestock and pasture
he wanted for his army. Although local nomads were often recruited for
regional campaigns, they remained auxiliaries.62
Temür’s death led to a protracted struggle in which the eventual winner
was his youngest surviving son Shahrukh (r. 1409–1447), who was gov-
ernor of Khorasan and made Herat the new capital. The Timurids are
sometimes seen as an example of Ibn Khaldun’s pattern of nomad dynas-
ties, with Temür portrayed as adhering to steppe traditions, gradually
abandoned by his successors as they adopted Perso-Islamic norms. This
characterization can be disputed. Temür himself was a strong patron of
Perso-Islamic culture; it was at his court and under his supervision that
many of his sons and grandsons received the education that made them
knowledgeable patrons of art and scholarship. Chaghatay emirs likewise
patronized both religion and Persianate culture from the very beginning
of the dynasty.63
The theoretical divide between the Turco-Mongolian and Perso-
Islamic traditions was expressed in the two competing codes: the
Islamic shari‘a and the Mongol yasa, discussed in Chapter 5. Shahrukh,
renowned for his piety, is reported to have repealed the yasa and discon-
tinued the yarghu court associated with it. However, such accounts are
contained in works by members of the religious classes and are not echoed
in the dynastic histories, where Shahrukh’s devotion to Islam is presented
as a continuation of his father’s policies.64 Throughout Shahrukh’s reign
and those of his successors, Temür’s original followers – the Chaghatay
nomads – remained the backbone of the army and an important element
in civil administration.

61
Manz, Rise and Rule, p. 116. 62 Manz, Rise and Rule, pp. 100–106.
63
Manz, Rise and Rule, pp. 109–110.
64
Maria Subtelny, Timurids in Transition: Turko-Persian Politics and Acculturation in
Medieval Iran, vol. 19, Brill’s Inner Asian library (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007), pp.
25–27; Manz, “Mongol History,” p. 144.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 From Temür to Shahrukh 155

Timurid administration was based theoretically on the dual system, but

as under earlier dynasties, the distinction between the Turkic military and
Arab or Persian civil spheres was often blurred. Turco-Mongolian emirs
were active in many aspects of administration, including the Persian
dı̄ wā n. Many built garden palaces for themselves in the suburbs and
sponsored building programs within the cities along with Persian
notables.65 On the other side, some Persian viziers led troops in battle,
as did some Iranian city notables.66
Shahrukh had a very different mission from that of Temür; he aimed to
retain, not enlarge, the realm that Temür had left. Two regions remained
outside Shahrukh’s grasp: the western border from Baghdad to
Azerbaijan and the northeastern regions stretching to Issyk Kul. Both
were inhabited primarily by nomadic tribes and had not been solidly
under Timurid rule. The Eastern Chaghadayids remained a problem,
requiring several campaigns, but the greater threat emerged in the middle
of Shahrukh’s reign with the rise of a nomad confederation under the
Jochid Abu’l Khayr Khan, who took over much of the Qipchaq steppe and
for a while also Khorezm. In the west, Shahrukh struggled throughout his
reign to maintain a hold over Azerbaijan. The region was of great sym-
bolic importance since he continued to claim the legacy of the Ilkhanate.
Although he repeatedly defeated the western tribal confederations, he
could not dislodge them, and effective Timurid power usually stopped at
Sultaniyya.
Through most of the fifteenth century, first the Qaraqoyunlu and then
the Aqqoyunlu expanded their power at the expense of their neighbors.
We cannot attribute their success entirely to military prowess, since when
they engaged in full-scale battles with the Ottomans, Mamluks or
Timurids, they usually lost. What distinguished them was their ability
to absorb military defeat and repeated succession struggles without suf-
fering permanent collapse. Unlike other rulers whom Temür had
defeated, Qara Yusuf Qaraqoyunlu quickly recovered and was well pre-
pared to take advantage of the struggle on Temür’s death. He seized
Azerbaijan in 1408, then in 1411 took Baghdad from the Jalayirids.
Shahrukh undertook three major expeditions to Azerbaijan and each
time defeated the Qarqoyunlu armies, but the best he could attain was
a largely fictional suzerainty over Qaraqoyunlu leaders appointed as
“governor.” The periodic defeats of the Qaraqoyunlu worked to the
advantage of the Aqqoyunlu, as the two confederations contested the

65
Manz, Power, Politics, pp. 80–110, 164–177.
66
Manz, Power, Politics, pp. 147–150, 157–165.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 156 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

pastures and trade routes of eastern Anatolia from Erzerum to Diyar Bakr
throughout Shahrukh’s reign.
Despite the control of important cities and the development of sophis-
ticated administrations, both the Aqqoyunlu and the Qaraqoyunlu
retained their tribal structure. For the Aqqoyunlu, who sponsored several
dynastic histories, we have a picture of the conduct of government. The
sultan enhanced his power through the use of a personal military follow-
ing, recruited from both tribal nomads and non-tribal populations. This
was regularly paid, and not organized on tribal lines. The chiefs within the
confederation had similar retinues on a smaller scale. Women held
a relatively high position and could be important political players. The
ruler consulted regularly with a council of family, chief officers and tribal
leaders, and seems to have been bound by its decisions. Regionally, the
Aqqoyunlu governed through princely appanages with a fixed share of
local revenue; princes were accompanied by an army made up of mem-
bers of different tribes.67 This system of government limited the power of
the ruler and made centralization difficult, but it allowed the nomad
confederations of eastern Anatolia to survive under often chaotic circum-
stances, and to make use of new opportunities when they arose.

New Ideologies and New Genealogies

Struggles over territory were accompanied by rivalry within the ideo-
logical sphere; the various dynasties of steppe provenance competed for
prestige both as Muslims and as inheritors of the steppe imperial trad-
ition. The Timurids claimed superiority over those outside the Mongol
heritage and likewise over steppe peoples less adept in high culture. To
them, the Turkmen and Mamluks lacked pedigree and imperial back-
ground, an attitude we have seen displayed in Temür’s correspondence
with Bayazid and the Mamluk sultan. On the other hand, some groups
within the Mongol world were thought to lack culture and discipline. The
Timurids, claiming the term Chaghatay for their own followers, called the
eastern Chaghadayids either Moghuls or “Chete,” robbers. The term
“Uzbek,” which at this time referred to the nomads of the eastern
Qipchaq steppe, was sometimes used as a term for those considered
uncultured.68

67
Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 14–19.
68
Beatrice F. Manz, “The Development and Meaning of Čagatay Identity,” in Muslims in
Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change, ed. Jo-Ann Gross (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1992), pp. 37–39; “Multi-ethnic Empires and the Formulation of
Identity,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 26, no. 1 (2003), pp. 85–87.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 New Ideologies and New Genealogies 157

The early fifteenth century produced a new spate of historical writing

and a variety of founding narratives. Once again, a divide emerges
between the eastern and western regions. Temür had used two strategies
to make up for his modest official position. He had fostered a heroic image
of himself as a second Chinggis Khan, favored by destiny and endowed
with exceptional powers. Towards the end of his career, he had also
begun to refer to the status of his Barlas ancestor Qarachar Noyan, who
had served both Chinggis Khan and Chaghadai.69 Shahrukh retained and
elaborated both aspects of Temür’s legitimation, which he reworked to
fashion Temür as a dynastic founder in his own right. The Chinggisid
puppet khans were no longer considered useful, and Temür was posthu-
mously awarded their sovereign titles. At the same time, the Timurids
embellished the genealogy of the Barlas, connecting the Timurids to
Chinggis Khan through a common ancestor. They thus retained their
Mongol legitimacy while glorifying a more immediate Muslim dynastic
founder.
The powers of Anatolia used another set of myths to counter Timurid
prestige. To compete with the charisma of Chinggis Khan, Turkmen
dynasties turned to the legendary Turk Oghuz Khan, who became the
subject of an elaborate myth incorporating the ancestors of these dynas-
ties and furthermore providing them with Islamic roots, since according
to legend Oghuz refused his mother’s milk until she agreed to convert to
monotheism.70 This legend had been incorporated into steppe history in
the Mongol period and was included by Rashid al-Din in the Jā mi‘al-
tawā rı̄ kh, where Oghuz Khan appears also as a great conqueror who had
taken over much of the Middle East. It was now adopted by three major
Turkmen rulers of the fifteenth century: Qara ‘Uthman Aqqoyunlu
(1379–1435), the Ottoman sultan Murad II (1421–1444 and 1446–
1451) and Jahanshah Qaraqoyunlu (1438–1467).71 Thus the Turkic-
speaking nomad dynasties of the Middle East were divided into two
distinct groups each claiming steppe heritage through a different ancestral
myth.
Another difference between legitimation in Anatolia and Iran was the
amount of emphasis put on nomadism, which was part of the ideology of
the western powers but does not appear in Timurid sources. The
Anatolian approach is neatly illustrated by the strategy of Qara Yusuf

69
Manz, “Mongol History,” pp. 139–141; Woods, “Timur’s Genealogy,” pp. 99–100.
70
Devin A. DeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and
Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition (University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1994), pp. 85–86.
71
Stefan Kamola, “History and legend in the Jā mi‘ al-tawā rı̄ kh: Abraham, Alexander and
Oghuz Khan,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 25, no. 4 (2015), pp. 557–569.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 158 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

Qaraqoyunlu when he wrested Azerbaijan from Temür’s son Amiranshah

in 1408. Instead of taking power over the region in his own name, he
persuaded the Jalayirid ruler to recognize his son Pir Budaq b. Qara Yusuf
as an adopted son, and established Pir Budaq in Tabriz as heir to the
Jalayir dynasty, which posed as successor to the Ilkhanids. Qara Yusuf
himself returned to the pastures of his followers. According to a later
historian, he explained his actions through his Turkmen descent: “I am
from the Turkmen people. My summer residence is Alataq and my winter
residence is Diyarbakr and the banks of the Euphrates. The throne of the
sultanate does not belong to us.”72 We may understand this as the means
by which Qara Yusuf was able to retain hold of two areas and populations
attached to incompatible political traditions. His adoption of Jalayirid/
Ilkhanid tradition served to challenge Shahrukh’s claim to the Ilkhanid
realm, including Azerbaijan; at the same time, he maintained his appeal to
nomads who wished to retain their freedom.
For both the Aqqoyunlu and the Qaraqoyunlu, the need to control
pastures and the routes between them was central to political life. As the
confederations expanded, they took major cities, established courts, and
patronized high culture on the pattern of earlier dynasties, both settled
and nomadic. Nonetheless they had to accept the autonomy of the tribal
leadership. The emphasis on freedom and the primacy of nomadism
distinguished them from the centralized states surrounding them and
helped to attract tribes away from the Mamluks and the advancing
Ottomans, both of whom could also claim Turkic ancestry. Qara
‘Uthman Aqqoyunlu (1403–1435) was reported to have said that the
Turkmen should not become sedentary, since their sovereignty lay in
their nomadic way of life. In his book of advice (Pandnā ma) the nomad
confederation and warband were included with the peasantry as part of
the classic circle of justice.73
It seems odd to find a similar emphasis on nomadism in Ottoman
histories of the fifteenth century, since by 1400 the Ottoman state had
adopted an administration and military based primarily on sedentary
populations. Nonetheless the myth developed about Orhan’s ancestor
Ertoghrul connected him firmly to a nomad lifestyle. Tales about him
bring up both summer and winter pastures and the importance of live-
stock in his entourage.74 These stories may have originated during the
interregnum after Bayazid’s death, when his son Muhammad Çelebi

72
Wing, Jalayirids, pp. 170–174. 73 Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 17, 56.
74
Lindner, Explorations, pp. 18–23; Kafadar, Between two Worlds, pp. 94–103; Dimitris
J. Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum (1402–1413): Politics and Narratives of
Dynastic Succession” unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2005,
pp. 35–47, 261–262.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Turkmen, Ottomans, Timurids in the Fifteenth Century 159

made use of Turkmen and Tatar forces from northeastern Anatolia in his
campaigns against his brothers.75
The Timurids on the other hand, although many of their followers were
nomad, distinguished themselves from the Tajiks primarily as Turks –
people with an imperial steppe background and military prowess, which
the Tajiks were thought to lack. While the Anatolian confederations
sought to differentiate themselves from their more settled neighbors, the
Timurids faced the opposite challenge. To the north and east they bor-
dered on territory that was both more solidly nomadic and more tribal:
the decentralized Chaghadayid khanate and the rising Uzbek confeder-
ation. Thus, in distinguishing themselves from their neighbors, it made
sense to stress their superiority in culture and organization.
During the fifteenth century, religious movements arose challenging
existing rulers. In response, Turkic leaders sought to claim personal
religious charisma and to connect their heritage to the Islamic world.
The Oghuz legend, with its incorporation of Islam, neatly provided dual
legitimation to the Turkmen. The Timurids developed a new version of
the Mongol genealogical myth, which was carved on Temür’s tombstone.
Temür’s ancestry was taken back to Chinggis Khan’s mythical ancestress
Alan Go’a, said to have been impregnated by a shaft of light; this light was
now identified as the spirit of ‘Ali b. Abu Talib. Another inventive
genealogy connected the Timurids to the genealogical tree of the
Yasawi Sufi order, taking them back to ‘Ali again, now via Muhammad al-
Hanafiyya.76

Turkmen, Ottomans and Timurids through the Fifteenth

Century
Shahrukh’s death unleashed a bitter struggle, and his successor Abu Sa‘id
(1451–1469) was never able to extend his power securely over the whole
of the Timurid realm. In 1452 Jahanshah Qaraqoyunlu took advantage of
Timurid strife to annex almost all of western Iran. He now adopted the
titles sultan and khaghan, commensurate with his new status as ruler over
much of the former Ilkhanate.77 The Qaraqoyunlu did not retain their
new position for long; in 1467 The Aqqoyunlu, under a new ruler, Uzun
Hasan (r. 1452–1478), defeated and killed Jahanshah and the

75
H. Inalçik, “Mehemmed I,” EI 2nd ed.
76
Kazuo Morimoto,˙ “An Enigmatic Genealogical Chart of the Timurids: A Testimony to
the Dynasty’s Claim to Yasavi-‘Alid Legitimacy?” Oriens 44 (2016), pp. 159–172.
77
Woods, Aqquyunlu, p. 78; Hans Robert Roemer, Persien auf dem Weg in die Neuzeit:
iranische Geschichte von 1350–1750 (Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen
Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1989), pp. 194–195.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 160 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

Qaraqoyunlu fragmented. Uzun Hasan annexed most of their tribes and

took over both Baghdad and Azerbaijan. By the end of 1469 he had
incorporated all the Qaraqoyunlu territories in Iran.78 Moving into Iran,
Uzun Hasan brought many of the tribesmen of Anatolia east, where they
formed a new nomad population under their own leaders. It was at this
time that several tribes active through the nineteenth century arrived in
Iran, the Qajars, Bayat and Afshar among them.79
In twelve years Uzun Hasan had risen from contestant for power over
a confederation to ruler of an empire. The transition did not occur
without strain. Establishing a capital in Tabriz, he became heir to the
administrative tradition of the Ilkhanids, Jalayirids, and Timurids. He
aimed at centralization; he appears to have attempted to standardize
procedures over the disparate parts of his realm and is reported to have
produced a compilation of laws later used by the Ottomans. This may
have been a collection and systematization of earlier customs.80 Uzun
Hasan’s attempt to promote central control alienated many of the nomad
elite, and perhaps for that reason Hasan did not change his military
organization, which remained largely tribal.81 After his death in 1477,
his son Ya‘qub (1478–1490) gained the throne. Again attempting to
centralize, Ya‘qub instituted a further tax reform in the name of Islamic
orthodoxy and tried to recall the tax-exempt land grants (soyurghals) given
out to Turkmen emirs and some members of the ‘ulama. Both classes
objected, and the attempt was given up. To curtail the power of Bayandur
princes, Ya‘qub abandoned the practice of handing out princely appan-
ages, granting provincial governorships instead to tribal emirs.82 Thus
Turkmen rule brought a new level of nomad population and tribal power
to Iran, making both provincial governance and the maintenance of
a fighting force dependent on relations with the tribes.
During the first part of his reign, Uzun Hasan had managed to hold his
own against the expanding Ottomans. The Ottoman realm was reunified
under Murad II (1421–1444 and 1446–1451), and both Murad and his
successor Mehmed Fatih (1444–1446, 1451–1481) pursued campaigns

78
Hans Robert Roemer, “The Safavid Period,” in The Cambridge History of Iran: The
Timurid and Safavid Periods, ed. Laurence Lockhart and Peter Jackson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 116; Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 84, 96–100.
79
Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 108–110; Vladimir Minorsky, “A Civil and Military Review in
Fā rs in 881/1476,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies X (1940–1942),
pp. 172–176.
80
Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 102–106, 109; Vladimir Minorsky, “The Aq-Qounlu and Land
Reforms,”Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies XVII (1955), pp. 449–450.
81
Woods, Aqquyunlu, p. 110.
82
Minorsky, “The Aq-Qoyunlu,” pp. 451–458; Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 132–135,
144–145.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Turkmen, Ottomans, Timurids in the Fifteenth Century 161

of expansion and centralization which culminated in an imperial state.

The Ottoman armies soon took over much of southern Anatolia. The
Karamanid Beylik, however, remained independent. The combination of
nomadic lifestyle, tribal organization and daunting terrain made this
a particularly difficult region for outside powers to conquer, and for
some time the Ottomans and Aqqoyunlu competed for influence over
Karamanid politics.83 In 1472 Uzun Hasan marched west against the
Ottomans, initiating a war which ended in a major Ottoman victory in
1473, due in part to the Ottomans’ use of firearms, which the Aqqoyunlu
did not yet possess. This defeat struck a serious blow to Uzun Hasan’s
prestige and when he died in 1477 the Aqqoyunlu confederation again
fractured. His son Ya‘qub succeeded in gaining power, but expansion
ended and unity proved impossible to maintain. Nonetheless, despite
Ottoman might and the disarray among the Aqqoyunlu, at the time of
Mehmed’s death in 1481, the Ottomans had not established power
beyond Karaman, the Eretna sultanate and Trabzon.84 The Ottoman
Empire was now a centralized bureaucratic state, and the tribal society of
the eastern Anatolian frontier was not an easy fit.
The Aqqoyunlu’s neighbors to the east were in no better position to
profit from Aqqoyunlu civil wars. The Timurid realm was divided, with
Abu Sa‘id’s successors ruling in Transoxiana while Khorasan came under
the control of his cousin, Sultan Husayn-i Bayqara (r. 1470–1506).
Sultan Husayn never enjoyed much military might and made little
attempt to increase his territory, but within the small region he held he
presided over a period of agricultural prosperity and cultural splendor.
From this time on the Timurids posed no threat to their neighbors and
retained their prestige through cultural rather than military
accomplishment.
Despite its decline in power, the Timurid dynasty retained many of the
characteristics it had held under Temür. Although increasingly depend-
ent on intensive agriculture, the Timurids under Sultan Husayn con-
tinued to act within the framework of the Mongol Empire, while
increasing their prestige as a center for Islamic scholarship and piety.
Both the shari’a and the yasa were still invoked. We get a glimpse into
the meaning of Turco-Mongolian and Islamic tradition in the vivid
memoirs composed by one of the last of the Timurid princes, the founder
of the Mughal dynasty, Zahir al-Din Babur. Babur was a grandson of Abu
Sa‘id and descended from Chinggis Khan on his mother’s side. Family

83
Inalçik, “Mehemmed II,” EI 2nd ed.; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650,
pp. 28–33. ˙
84
Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 114–129; Venzke, “Dulgadir-Mamluk,” pp. 428–429.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 162 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

and marriage relationships linked him to both of the Timurids’ steppe

neighbors – the Jochid Uzbeks and the eastern Chaghadayid Khans.85
Throughout his memoir he comments on the character of princes and
emirs, their morals, religious observance, and military prowess, associ-
ated with Turco-Mongolian background and habits. In Herat, visiting the
sons of Sultan Husayn, he is at once admiring and suspicious of their
sophistication and the luxury of their court, which, in its use of gold and
silver utensils, supposedly went against the yasa. As warriors he found
them sadly wanting.86 On the other hand, when Babur visited his mater-
nal relations, the Eastern Chaghadayid khans, he noted their praise-
worthy loyalty to the Chinggisid tradition but also their lack of polish.
When he attempted to regain his position in Ferghana with the help of
Eastern Chaghadayid troops, he blamed his failure in part on their lack of
discipline and of loyalty, although it appears that Mongol military tactics
and Moghul troops were important factors in the success of his Indian
campaign.87
The Timurid dynasty fell at the beginning of the sixteenth century, with
the Uzbek conquest of Transoxiana in 1501 and of Khorasan in 1507.
Babur, pushed out of Transoxiana by the Uzbeks, took his armies even-
tually to India and founded the Mughal dynasty, also known as the later
Timurids. Here the legacies of Chinggis Khan and Temür continued to
be valued. Despite its relatively short duration, the Timurid dynasty
played a crucial part in creating a synthesis of Turco-Mongolian and
Perso-Islamic tradition. The figure of Temür was fully developed as
a dynastic founder – at once a second Chinggis Khan and an Islamic
sovereign – and was combined with the cultural brilliance of Herat under
Shahrukh and especially Sultan Husayn-i Bayqara. Together these
achievements made the Timurid dynasty a cultural icon and a source of
legitimacy for the dynasties that followed.

Cultural Patronage and the Steppe Legacy

Dynasties of nomad provenance played a central role in the cultural life of
the Middle East in the post-Mongol period. Rulers were eager to inherit
Mongol prestige and they therefore continued court patronage in the

85
Maria E. Subtelny, “Bā bur’s Rival Relations: A Story of Kinship and Conflict in 15th–
16th Century Central Asia,” Der Islam 66, no. 1 (1989).
86
Zahı̄ r al-Dı̄ n Muhammad Babur, Baburnama: Chaghatay Turkish Text with Abdul-Rahim
˙
Khankhanan’s ˙
Persian Translation, trans. W. M. Thackston, Sources of Oriental
Languages and Literatures (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University: Department of Near
Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1993), vol. 2, pp. 389–392.
87
Babur, Baburnama, vol. 1, pp. 131, 201–202, 220–221, 568–570, 685–690.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Cultural Patronage and the Steppe Legacy 163

traditions set by the Ilkhans, who had brought in practices and goods from
the east along with new art forms. The successor dynasties created an art
of synthesis in which Chinese and Central Asian themes combined with
Islamic traditions. The Mongol heritage became something which could
be considered indigenous and became immensely popular. One major
strength of Ilkhanid patronage was the writing of history, notably the great
world chronicle of Rashid al-Din, the Jā mi‘ al-tawā rı̄ kh, which I discussed
in Chapter 5. The successors to the Ilkhanids continued the new trad-
ition, and made the late fourteenth and fifteenth century a high point for
historiography. In 1360, soon after taking Azerbaijan, Shaykh Uways
Jalayir had a universal history written for him, the Tā rı̄ kh-i Shaykh
Uways, modeled on the Jā mi‘al-tawā rı̄ kh, but bringing the story up to
the present. Here the Ilkhans and the Jalayirids follow earlier states in the
Islamic world; at the same time, their history is seen within the frame of
a continuing Mongol Empire, whose history continues outside the central
Islamic lands.88 The Timurid rulers were even more active in the patron-
age of historical works. At the court of Shahrukh, the historian Hafiz-i
Abru collected the histories of earlier times, including Rashid al-Din,
adding the history of Temür’s and Shahrukh’s period. Later Timurid
historians, notably Mirkhwand and the hugely popular Khwandamir,
who began his career under Husayn-i Bayqara, carried the project of
universal history into their own time.89 The Turkmen dynasties also
commissioned histories; most of these were more limited in scope and
presented their patrons as heirs to the Oghuz tradition, thus also recog-
nizing the steppe as relevant to their history but not embracing the
Mongol worldview.90
Another innovation of the Mongols was the development of the Persian
miniature, illustrating historical and literary works. After the fall of the
Ilkhans, a few courts in Iran – the Inju’ids and Muzaffarids in Shiraz, and
the Jalayirids in Tabriz and Baghdad continued to produce miniatures.91
As new conquerors took over these cities, they employed many of the
same people; the Timurid prince Iskandar Sultan presided over a brilliant
court in Shiraz, while the Qaraqoyunlu continued the artistic traditions of

88
C. A. Storey and Yuri Bregel, Persidskaia literatura, bio-bibliograficheskiı̆ obzor, 3 vols.
(Moscow: Nauka, 1972), p. 337.
89
John E. Woods, “The Rise of Tı̄ mū rı̄ d Historiography,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies
46, no. 2 (1987).
90
C. P. Melville, “Between Tabriz and Herat: Persian Historical Writing in the 15th
Century,” in Iran und iranisch geprägte Kulturen, ed. Ralph Kauz, Birgitt Hoffmann,
and Markus Ritter (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2008), pp. 30–33.
91
Linda Komaroff and Stefano Carboni, The Legacy of Genghis Khan: Courtly Art and
Culture in Western Asia, 1256–1353 (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art; New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 47, 60, 108, 223–225.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 164 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

Tabriz. When Shahrukh took Tabriz in the winter of 1420–1421, one of

his prizes was the famous calligrapher Ja‘far Tabrizi, who finished his
illustrious career in Herat.92 During the reigns of Shahrukh and Husayn
Bayqara, Herat became a brilliant center for cultural production. Its styles
of miniature painting and calligraphy became the model for contempor-
aries and for later dynasties. Two sons of Uzun Hasan Aqqoyunlu are also
famous for their patronage of painting: Khalil, who presided over a court
in Shiraz during his father’s reign, and Ya‘qub b. Hasan who ruled during
the last years of the united Qaraqoyunlu.93
The works of the Aqqoyunlu and the Timurids exerted enormous
influence on later dynasties – the Uzbeks, Mughals, Safavids and
Ottomans. Both fell at the height of their cultural brilliance, with the
death of Sultan Ya‘qub Aqoyunlu in 1490 and that of the Timurid Sultan
Husayn Bayqara in 1506. The painters, calligraphers, poets, and histor-
ians who had flourished at their courts had to find new employment, and
the courts of erstwhile rivals were delighted to receive them. These
prestigious figures thus became arbiters of taste for a new generation of
rulers, preserving and disseminating a synthesis of Chinese, Inner Asian
and Perso-Islamic culture.

The Rise of Turkic as a Language of High Culture

Although written Turkic literature in the Islamic world began well before
the Mongol period, it was the post-Mongol age, and particularly the
fifteenth century, which established Turkic, written in the Arabic alpha-
bet, as a language of high culture. The earliest and fastest development
was in Anatolia, where Turkic had begun to supplant Persian by the late
fifteenth century. We have a few fragments of Anatolian Turkic poetry
from the thirteenth century, and by the early fourteenth century Turkic
mystical and folk poetry was quite well established; the famous Anatolian
poet Yunus Emre, whose lyrics are still widely read, died in 1320.94 The
numerous local courts of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were
connected to the wider cultural world and offered opportunities for
ambitious scholars and writers. In the early fifteenth century, the rulers

92
Nazan Ölçer, “The Anatolian Seljuks,” in Turks: A Journey of a Thousand Years, ed.
David Roxburgh (London: Royal Academy of Arts, 2005), pp. 118–119;
W. M. Thackston, Album Prefaces and Other Documents on the History of Calligraphers
and Painters (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 8, 13.
93
B. W. Robinson, Fifteenth-Century Persian Painting: Problems and Issues (New York:
New York University Press, 1991), pp. 3–44.
94
Alessio Bombaci, Histoire de la litérature turque (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1968), pp. 177,
225–242.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Rise of Turkic as a Language of High Culture 165

of Aydin, situated on the Aegean, patronized writings in Arabic, Persian

and Turkic.95
The self-consciously Turkic/Seljuqid identity of many rulers and elites
led to an upsurge of literature in their language. Verse romances were very
popular, as were epics recounting the exploits of Turkic fighters for the
faith, such as the Dede Korkut, which was probably written in its current
form under the Aqqoyunlu.96 While battles for the faith might provide the
moral justification for such works, their heroes spent easily as much time
in romantic adventures and lengthy feasts, in which they consumed
mountains of meat washed down with seas of wine and fermented
mare’s milk. These tales could also incorporate variations of the Oghuz
legend.97 During the centralizing reign of Murad II (1421–1444 and
1446–1451) the first Ottoman chronicles appeared, one or two already
in Turkish.98 From this time on Ottoman Turkish remained established
as a language of high culture. In the Aqqoyunlu and Qaraqoyunlu courts
Persian remained the main literary language, but Turkic poetry found an
audience, especially with the Aqqoyunlu.99
The other western region important for the development of Turkic
literature was the Mamluk sultanate. Despite their determined stand
against the Mongols, the Mamluks took pride in their Turkic identity.
Throughout the Qipchaq period they patronized works in and about
Turkic, including translations of religious and military works, dictionaries
and grammars of Qipchaq Turkic, and verse romances. Indeed, several of
the earliest monuments of Islamic Turkic literature have come down to us
through their hands, including the unique copy of al-Kashghari’s treatise
on the Turks and their language, the Dı̄ wā n lughā t al-Turk, and one of the
few early copies of the Qarakhanid mirror for princes, the Qutagtu Bilig.
Early versions of the legends comprising Dede Korkut are also to be found
in Mamluk literature.100
95
Sara Nur Yıldız, “Aydınid Court Literature in the Formation of an Islamic Identity in
Fourteenth-Century Western Anatolia,” in Islamic Literature and Intellectual Life in
Fourteenth- and Fifteenth-Century Anatolia, ed. A. C. S. Peacock and Sara Nur Yıldız
(Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2016), pp. 197–213.
96
Jo-Ann Conrad, “Dede Korkut: Reintegrating the Historic, the Heroic, and the
Marvelous,” Turcica 33 (2001), pp. 244–250.
97
Bombaci, Histoire de la litérature turque, pp. 185–199, 249–251; Woods, Aqquyunlu,
pp. 179–182.
98
Bombaci, Histoire de la litérature turque, pp. 252, 264–265; Barbara Flemming, “Old
Anatolian Turkish Poetry and Its Relationship to the Persian Tradition,” in Turkic-
Iranian Contact Areas: Historical and Linguistic Aspects, ed. Lars Johanson and
Christine Bulut (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), pp. 49–52.
99
Bombaci, Histoire de la litérature turque, pp. 183–185.
100
al-Kā shgharı̄ , Compendium of the Turkic Dialects 1, pp. 10–24; Fikret Turan, “The
Mamluks and Their Acceptance of Oghuz Turkic as a Literary Language: Political
Maneuver or Cultural Aspiration?” in Einheit und Vielfalt in der türkischen Welt:

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 166 After the Mongols: Timurids, Turkmen and Ottomans

When the Cherkes replaced the Qipchaq mamluks as sultans, they

found themselves in an anomalous situation: as non-Turks amid a host
of Turkic rulers. Mamluks were associated with Turkic identity; indeed,
the Mamluk ruling class was known to the population as the dawlat al-
turkiyya. Determined to keep the Qipchaqs out of power, the Cherkes
sultans did not continue patronage of the Qipchaq language but instead
attached themselves to the Turkmen heritage, changed their names for
Oghuz ones, and encouraged literary works in Oghuz.101
In the east it was the Timurids who developed Turkic into a language of
court literature. Poetry in Turkic gained popularity starting in Temür’s
reign and reached its apogee during the reign of Husayn-i Bayqara, in the
poetry of the brilliant bureaucrat and poet Mir ‘Ali Shir Nava’i, whose
lyrics are still celebrated in the Uzbek republic. Nava’i (who also wrote in
Persian) celebrated the superiority of Turks and the Turkic language in
a composition entitled Muhā kamat al-lughatayn – The Contest of Two
˙
Languages. Persian, he wrote, was full of Turkic vocabulary:
The Persian language would be lost without Turkish expressions, for the Turks
have created many words to express nuances and gradations of meanings which
cannot be understood until explained by a knowledgeable person.102
By the late fifteenth century, some Turkic rulers were also writing in
Turkic; this was the language in which the Timurid prince Babur wrote
his memoirs. Poetry in Turkic was more widespread. Sultan Husayn
Bayqara was the most famous of the prince poets of that period, but the
Qaraqoyunlu ruler Jahanshah (d. 1467) also wrote sophisticated religious
poetry, and the last Aqqoyunlu, Ya‘qub, left behind some Turkic
verses.103 Several of the last Mamluk sultans did likewise.104 Turkic was
now an established written language, just as Turks were an integral part of
the population.

Conclusion
When the Ilkhans fell, Mongol Khans still ruled over much of the former
empire, and throughout its territory only descendants of Chinggis Khan

Materialien der 5. Deutschen Turkologenkonferenz Universität Mainz, 4.–7. Oktober 2002,

ed. Hendrik Boeschoten and Heidi Stein (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2007), p. 41; Jo-
Ann Conrad, “Dede Korkut,” p. 247.
101
Turan, “The Mamluks,” pp. 40–44.
102
Mı̄ r ‘Alı̄ Shı̄ r Nawā ’ı̄ , Muhā kamā t al-lughatayn, trans. Robert Devereux (Leiden: Brill,
1966), pp. 5–6. ˙
103
Bombaci, Histoire de la litérature turque, pp. 183–185.
104
János Eckmann, “Die kiptschakische Literatur,” in Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta, vol.
II, ed. Jean Deny (Aquis Mattiacis: Steiner, 1964), pp. 299–300.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Conclusion 167

had the right to claim sovereign power. Over the fourteenth century,
however, tribal leaders gained strength. Chinggisid rule was not finished,
but it was deeply fragmented and in many places had given way to either
settled or tribal powers. Within the central Islamic lands actual
Chinggisid rule ended with the Ilkhans, though power remained largely
in the hands of nomads or rulers of nomad provenance. Nomads
remained a significant proportion of the population and, for most states,
a majority within the military.
In earlier centuries, nomads had arrived in the Middle East from
Central Asia, and as migration succeeded migration, many moved into
Anatolia. After the fall of the Ilkhans, the movement of nomad popula-
tions went the other way, from Anatolia into Iraq and Iran. The conquest
of Iran by the Qaraqoyunlu and the Aqqoyunlu transformed its ethnic and
political geography. Under the Seljukids and Mongols, most Turkic and
Mongol nomads had congregated in the northern pastures; now
Turkmen became numerous also in southern Iran. There was a change
likewise in the social and political organization of many nomads. The
Seljukids, Ilkhans and Timurids had all used non-tribal armies and for
much of their rule had suppressed tribes as power centers. In Anatolia,
a decentralized system developed during the fourteenth century, in which
tribes again became central to military and political activity. The
Turkmen dynasties brought this system into Iran, making tribalism an
important element in both military and provincial administration.
The Mongol destruction of the caliphate had opened the way both to
the conversion of Mongol rulers and to the creation of independent
sovereign states in the Middle East. It was no longer necessary to retain
the capital in Baghdad, with its depleted agricultural resources, or to pay
lip service to an undivided Islamic empire. The new regional states were
all in some way connected to the steppe heritage and continued to use it.
Most also sought to connect themselves with the memory of the
Ilkhanate, which held prestige as a part of the Mongol Empire and for
its brilliant cultural achievements, imitated by its successors.
The court culture of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was highly
sophisticated, but it did not return to the classical pre-Mongol models.
New forms and motifs remained along with a broader world view. Turkic
written in the Arabic alphabet joined Arabic and Persian as a language of
high culture. By the end of the fifteenth century, Turks had become
indigenous to the Middle East, and the imperial traditions of the steppe
had become intertwined with those of the Arabs and the Persians.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.008 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 7 The Rise of Nomad Tribes,1500–1800

The early sixteenth century brought with it a political revolution in the

creation of the “Gunpowder Empires.” In 1501, Shah Isma’il I declared
himself Shah and founded the Safavid state, ruling most of Iran. From
1500 to 1507 the Uzbeks took over the Timurid territories, founding the
Chinggisid Uzbek Khanate; in 1516–1517, the Ottomans under Selim
I conquered Anatolia up to Kurdistan, and the whole of the Mamluk
state. Finally, in 1526 the Timurid prince Babur took Delhi and founded
the Mughal Empire. These were the states – Safavid, Ottoman, Uzbek,
and Mughal – which brought the central Islamic lands into the mod-
ern era.
In the history of nomads, the turn of the sixteenth century also marks
a turning point. The last three chapters have covered the Middle Periods
of Islamic history, in which nomads from the Eurasian steppe entered the
Middle East and gained control over almost the whole of it. This was
a great period for the power of nomads, but not for that of tribes; in the
Seljuqid, Ilkhanid and Timurid states, tribalism was largely suppressed in
military and political organization. The exceptions to this were the tribal
confederations of Anatolia, which were forming at the end of the period.
In the new order that arose in the sixteenth century, nomads held sway
over somewhat less territory, but tribalism was more widespread, and
tribes became a major political force.
The Ottoman and Safavid states, with which we will concern ourselves
here, had widely different policies towards both nomadism and tribalism.
The Safavids arose out of the Aqqoyunlu confederation and embraced
both tribes and nomads. Turkmen and Mongol nomads formed the core
of the Safavid army, gaining tribal pastures and regional holdings
throughout Iran and much of what is now Afghanistan. The Ottomans
continued their efforts to create a centralized army and state, a system in
which tribes and nomads had a less central role. However, with Ottoman
expansion into new nomad territories, actual government in the border
regions was a matter of negotiation with local powers, including nomads.

168

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Rise of the Safavids 169

The Turkmen nomads of eastern Anatolia and northern Syria remained

autonomous and receptive to outside alliances. In Arabia and Syria, the
Bedouin were likewise active, with new tribes migrating north from the
Arabian Peninsula to dominate the Syrian desert, much of Iraq, and parts
of the Jazira.
In the sixteenth century the Ottoman and Safavid Empires were able –
with some lapses – to maintain control over tribal leaders. Over the course
of the seventeenth century the balance changed, and the eighteenth
century saw an age of decentralization with local powers, including
nomads, largely autonomous through much of the Middle East. The fall
of the Safavid dynasty in 1722 was followed by the spectacular conquests
of the tribal leader Nadir Shah Afshar, who briefly conquered all of Iran
and much of Afghanistan. After his death, the chiefs under him returned
to their own regions to found new states. In the Ottoman Empire, the
Wahhabi movement mobilized nomads to take over much of the Arabian
Peninsula and sparked new tribal migrations to the north and west. This
was the situation in the Middle East at the dawn of the nineteenth
century.

The Rise of the Safavids

The Safavid dynasty was of Iranian – probably Kurdish – extraction and
had its beginnings as a Sufi order located at Ardabil near the eastern
border of Azerbaijan, in a region favorable for both agriculture and
pastoralism. Its rise was intimately connected to the Turkmen nomads
of Anatolia and Azerbaijan. To understand Safavid history, we must
return to the fifteenth century and to Aqqoyunlu rule. At about the time
that the Timurid ruler Shahrukh died in 1447, the Safavid order became
involved in the rivalry between the Qaraqoyunlu and the Aqqoyunlu, each
of which supported a different candidate for the leadership of the order.
The younger claimant, Shaykh Junayd, sought help – and soldiers – from
powers in Anatolia and eventually found a useful ally in the Aqqoyunlu
ruler Uzun Hasan, whose sister he married. Over the next years he led his
followers in a series of campaigns in eastern Anatolia and the Caspian
region of Shirwan under the banner of holy war.1 On Junayd’s death in
battle in 1460, Haydar, his infant son by his Aqoyunlu wife, was recog-
nized as heir. Haydar continued to develop the Safavid religious-military
organization, introducing the distinctive scarlet headdress (tā j) which

1
Adel Allouche, The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906–
962/1500–1555) (Berlin: Schwarz, 1983), pp. 41–47. ˙

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 170 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

became the identifying mark of Safavid devotees, and won them the
epithet Qizilbash – red head – by which they later became known.2
A number of early Iranian religious beliefs had survived in the Middle
East and combined with Sufi and Shi‘ite ideas to create a set of doctrines
usually characterized as ghuluww (extremism). These included the doc-
trine of a living mahdi – a messiah. Such beliefs found a following in
Anatolia and parts of Syria, and among the populations they attracted
were many members of the Turkmen tribes.3 Scholarship on the early
Safavid movement is in flux. Most writers have portrayed the following of
Junayd and Haydar as a radical Shi‘ite order whose leader was at once
a religious leader and commander over a sizeable Turkmen army of
believers.4 According to the Aqqoyunlu historian Khunji Isfahani,
Junayd’s followers openly called Junayd God and continued to consider
him living after his physical death.5 However, both the extreme Shi‘ite
views of Junayd and Haydar and the centrality of the Turkmen in their
armies have recently been called into question, and some see the early
Safavid following as an army of ghā zı̄ s from a variety of backgrounds.6
Over the course of Haydar’s career, Uzun Hasan Aqqoyunlu took over
western and central Iran. Despite Haydar’s marriage alliance with the
dynasty, Safavid and Aqqoyunlu interests soon began to diverge, and in
1488 Haydar was killed fighting the Aqqoyunlu.7 As the Aqqoyunlu
descended into civil war, Haydar’s youngest son Isma‘il took refuge in
Lahijan in the Caspian mountains where he was protected and given
a religious education by the elders of the Safavid order.8 In 1499, at the
age of twelve, Isma‘il left Lahijan for Ardabil with seven powerful mem-
bers of his entourage and a few hundred followers. Numerous Qizilbash
devotees had remained loyal to the order throughout Azerbaijan, eastern

2
Shahzad Bashir, “The Origins and Rhetorical Evolution of the Term Qizilbā sh in
Persianate Literature,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 57, no. 3
(2014).
3
Kathryn Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs: Cultural Landscapes of Early Modern
Iran (Cambridge, MA: Distributed for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard
University by Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. XV–XXIV.
4
Allouche, Origins, pp. 30–39.
5
Ali Anooshahr, Turkestan and the Rise of Eurasian Empires: A Study of Politics and Invented
Traditions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 78.
6
Anooshahr, Turkestan and the Rise of Eurasian Empires, pp. 56–83; Ayfer Karakaya-Stump,
“Subjects of the Sultan, Disciples of the Shah: Formation and Transformation of the
Kiszilbash/Alevi Communities in Ottoman Anatolia” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University, 2008), pp. 172–181.
7
Allouche, Origins, pp. 50–53; Michel M. Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids: Šı̄ ‘ism,
Sū fism and the Ġ ulā t (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1972), pp. 75–77. ˙
8 ˙
Jean Aubin, “Révolution chiite et conservatisme. Les soufis de Lâhejân, 1500–1514
(Études Safavides II),” Moyen Orient et Océan Indien. Middle East and Indian Ocean
XVIe–XIXe siècles 1 (1984), pp. 2–8.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Rise of the Safavids 171

Anatolia and Syria; now Isma‘il set out to gather them around himself. In
the spring of 1500, he moved through the pasturelands of northern
Azerbaijan. Having started out with only a few hundred soldiers, by the
end of the summer he had an army of about 7,000.9 After several success-
ful battles, he entered Tabriz in the summer of 1501 and was crowned as
Shah. By 1510 he had conquered Baghdad and most of Iran.
Isma‘il now stood both at the head of a Sufi order which was at the same
time a largely nomadic army, and at the head of an evolving state. The
Qizilbash were organized into large political and religious communities
called oymaq. Although many oymaqs included numerous named sub-
groups, the term is usually translated as tribe, and I shall follow that
practice here. Some oymaqs, like the Qajar, the Afshar and the Dhu’l
Qadr, came from existing tribes or confederations which had converted
to the Safavid cause. Others, like the Tekkelu, Rumlu and Shamlu, seem
to have been new, based probably on regional populations. While most
Qizilbash seem to have been Turkmen, some sedentary villagers or
townsmen were included within the oymaqs. After Shah Isma‘il’s acces-
sion, membership in the Safavid order was limited to members of the
oymaqs; the newly conquered populations were excluded.10
The Qizilbash had a strong communal culture centered on absolute
loyalty to their leader. Isma‘il enjoyed great personal charisma as a poet,
warrior, and king. In his poetry, written in Turkish, he presented himself
as the reincarnation of earlier prophets and kings, while many of his
followers considered him one with God.11 At this time it is clear that
ghuluww mysticism and apocalyptic thought were central to the
movement.12 Despite his claim to divinity, the shah did not keep aloof
from his followers; he passed on booty and wealth and took part in large
communal feasts with heavy public drinking.13 Isma‘il created a new
religious office, that of khalı̄ fa al-khulafā – chief deputy. Below him were
numerous other khalı̄ fas, one to each of the tribal sections, and to villages
and districts even beyond his actual realm, since the Safavids retained
numerous adherents in Anatolia.14
9
Jean Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides reconsidéré,” Moyen Orient et Océan Indien.
Middle East and Indian Ocean XVIe–XIXe siècles 5 (1988), pp. 9–15; Masashi Haneda, Le
châh et les Qizilbā š: le système militaire safavide (Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1987), pp. 63–64.
10
Martin Dickson, “Sháh Tahmásb and the Úzbeks (The Duel for Khurásán with ‘Ubayd
Khán: 930–46/1524–1540),” ˙ unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University
(1958), pp. 6–8, 266–267; Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 13, 164.
11
Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, pp. xxviii–xxxii.
12
Colin P. Mitchell, The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran: Power, Religion and Rhetoric
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), pp. 19–38.
13
Aubin, “L’avènement,” pp. 43–53, 62–63.
14
Willem Floor, “The Khalifeh al-Kholafa of the Safavid Sufi Order,” Zeitschrift der deutchen
morgenländischen Gesellschaft 153, no. 1 (2003): pp. 52–53.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 172 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

It is tempting to regard Isma‘il’s early campaigns as a triumphal pro-

gress towards the creation of the Safavid state. However, his military
activity was part of a civil war within the Aqqoyunlu confederation, and
he can be seen as one of several ambitious leaders who aimed for
preeminence.15 After the death of the last Aqqoyunlu ruler in 1514, the
Safavids took over some of the Aqqoyunlu confederate tribes along with
many of their habits and institutions. In Isma‘il’s early years, the Qizilbash
of Anatolia and Syria were a significant source of support; Turkmen
nomads continued to join his following, partly through attraction, and
partly due to local famine accompanied by Ottoman persecution.16 It was
the rise of the Ottoman sultan Selim I and the defeat at Chaldiran which
prevented expansion or consolidation in the western regions, and cen-
tered the Safavid state within Iran.

Nomads and Tribes in Safavid Administration

Like the Aqqoyunlu rulers, Isma‘il incorporated tribal structure into his
administration. This was a realistic policy given the strength of tribal
leadership and Isma‘il’s reliance on Turkmen manpower. As I showed
in Chapter 6, both Uzun Hasan Aqqoyunlu and his son Ya‘qub had met
resistance to their centralizing policies. In 1496, four years before Isma‘il
declared himself shah, the briefly enthroned Aqqoyunlu sultan Ahmad
attempted to create an Ottoman-style administration, with a ban on wine,
the recall of benefices, and the abandonment of tribal law; after only six
months of rule, he was overthrown. These experiences served as
a warning to other leaders.17 Isma‘il’s decision to incorporate tribal
structure and to include new populations within it through the oymaqs
presents a striking contrast to the policies of Chinggis Khan and Temür,
who used their personal following as the top command in a decimally
organized army, preventing tribes from developing as centers of power.
Both the Safavid army and provincial administration were organized
along tribal lines. The oymaqs had recognized leaders and contributed
contingents to the army. In the early Safavid period almost all military
commanders were identified by tribal names and led troops from their
own oymaqs; in an account of an army review in 1530 we find 15–18,000
soldiers from each of the two largest oymaqs, 6–9,000 each from several
others. Tribes had a recognized place in either the left or the right wing of
the army, which they appear to have retained through most of the Safavid
period.18 The system of provincial government was closely connected to

15
Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 163–166. 16
Roemer, “The Safavid Period,” pp. 218–219.
17 18
Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 158–159. Haneda, Le châh, pp. 46–50, 104–110.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomads and Tribes in Safavid Administration 173

the military structure and also organized tribally. Qizilbash emirs were
appointed to governorships, providing troops for local defense, while land
grants and provincial holdings provided upkeep for their soldiers. In the
early Safavid period the Qizilbash appointed as governors over provinces
were often chiefs of their oymaq; if they were not, the governorship usually
brought with it the appointment to lead the tribe as well.19 Oymaqs were
allotted specific territories known as ulka, which provided income and
pasture.20 Until the reign of Shah ‘Abbas almost all regions of the realm
were governed by tribal leaders.21
At this time governors of provinces usually appointed subordinate
officials, held judicial power, and retained much of the income of the
province.22 When the shah or his delegates set out on a major campaign
they called on the governors to join the army with their contingents.23
Some governorships came to be considered the property of a specific
tribe; the Dhu’l Qadr retained Fars for several generations, the Qajars
were governors of Ganja and parts of Azerbaijan, while the Afshar held on
to the governorships of Kerman and Kuh-Giluya with neighboring
regions.24 However, despite the close connection between oymaqs and
provincial rule, tribal territories and provincial governorships were not
identical. Qizilbash and other officials were given land grants as a source
of income, and these were not necessarily in the province governed by the
chief of the tribe. Thus, the regional power of individual tribes was
diluted.25
Up to the middle of the Safavid period, tribal chiefs were convened at
important junctures to decide the affairs of state, and they considered this
part of their function.26 The shahs attached the Qizilbash elite to the

19
Klaus Röhrborn, Provinzen und Zentralgewalt Persiens im 16. und 17. Jahrhunder (Berlin:
de Gruyter, 1966), p. 25.
20
Vladimir Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-mulū k: a manual of Safavid administration (circa 1137/
˙ Gibb memorial series (London:
1725), Persian text in facsimile (B.M. Or. 9496), E. J. W.
Luzac, 1980), pp. 14–15, 27, 86; Aubin, “L’avènement,” p. 29; Dickson, “Sháh
Tahmásb,” pp. 6–8, 13.
21 ˙
Röhrborn, Provinzen, pp. 18–19, 24, 29.
22
Röhrborn, Provinzen, pp. 24–27, 54–55, 61.
23
Röhrborn, Provinzen, pp. 44–48; Dickson, “Sháh Tahmásb,” pp. 13, 65–66, 93, 134.
24
Röhrborn, Provinzen, pp. 4, 10, 31. ˙
25
Röhrborn, Provinzen, p. 54; Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-mulū k, pp. 27–28, 85–87;
Maria Szuppe, Entre Timourides, Uzbeks et Safavides: questions d’histoire politique et
sociale de Hérat dans la première moitié du XVIe siècle (Paris: Association pour
l’avancement des études iraniennes, 1992), p. 37; Maria Szuppe, “Kinship Ties
between the Safavids and the Qizilbash Amirs in Late Sixteenth-Century Iran:
A Case Study of the Political Career of Members of the Sharaf al-Din Oghli
Tekelu Family,” in Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of an Islamic Society, ed.
Charles Melville (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), p. 87.
26
Haneda, Le châh, pp. 94–97, 207; Röhrborn, Provinzen, p. 31.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 174 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

dynasty through marriage alliances often stretching over several gener-

ations. Thus, many of the major oymaq amirs were close relatives of the
shah.27 While the ruler had the power to appoint both provincial gover-
nors and the chiefs of oymaqs, candidates unacceptable to the tribe would
be rejected. The chiefs themselves were likewise forced to consider the
wishes of their subordinates, who held both territories and troops of their
own.28 The more powerful tribes could thus promote their own interests,
and in the absence of a strong ruler the central offices of the state became
a prize to be fought over among them.
The Persian narrative sources give little information on the level of
nomadism among the Qizilbash, but there is mention of pastures assigned
to them. European observers noted the presence of nomads throughout
the Safavid dominions, including many Turkmen. We have an account of
Shah Tahmasp’s army in 1538 which characterizes his troops as nomads,
while also mentioning the distinctive red hat. A source from the reign of
Shah Sultan Husayn (1694–1722), the Tuhfat-i Shā hı̄ , contains a list of
˙
nomad tribes (ı̄ lā t), some with summer and winter pastures, and this
29
includes several of the Qizilbash oymaqs. The Qizilbash were not the
only nomads within Safavid territories. As Isma‘il took over new territor-
ies, he incorporated independent dynasties and tribal powers into the
Safavid system as vassals; their rulers were given the title walı̄ . Four
large areas remained under the rule of walı̄ s almost to the end of the
dynasty: Georgia, Kurdistan, Luristan with the Bakhtiyari territories,
and Khuzistan, then often called ‘Arabistan.30 These last three were
regions with a strong nomadic presence whose location along the
Ottoman border gave them a position of strength. In Khuzistan the
Musha‘sha‘ dynasty stood at the head of a coalition of Arab tribes, usually
loyal to the Safavids in a turbulent region. The Lurs to their north had
maintained relative autonomy and were ruled by a local dynasty from the
Mongol period. Within the Lur the Bakhtiyari tribe began its rise to
power.31 The Kurds occupied the most open and contested border
between the Ottomans and the Safavids, and they increased their strength
considerably.

27
Szuppe, “Kinship Ties”; Andrew J. Newman, Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 15, 29, 40, 45, 54.
28
Röhrborn, Provinzen, p. 25; Szuppe, “Kinship Ties,” pp. 81–85, 89.
29
Daniel T. Potts, Nomadism in Iran, From Antiquity to the Modern Era (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), pp. 228–247; Marina Kunke, Nomadenstämme in Persien im 18.
und 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1991), pp. 132–144.
30
Röhrborn, Provinzen, pp. 73–88.
31
Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-mulū k, pp. 44, 112; Rudi Matthee, Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline
and the Fall of Isfahan (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012), pp. 143, 227.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Safavid Shahs and the Qizilbash 175

Safavid Shahs and the Qizilbash

Although Isma‘il chose to institutionalize the tribal system, the dangers of
Qizilbash power were clear from an early date. When he became shah in
1501, Isma‘il proclaimed Twelver Shi‘ism as the official religion of the
realm, thus implicitly setting up a separate religious hierarchy outside
Qizilbash control. In 1508 he pushed out the Sufi elders who had coun-
seled him in Lahijan and continued to occupy high positions and began to
delegate significant power to his highest Iranian bureaucrats, who over
time became more powerful and grew more distant from the early reli-
gious and martial enthusiasm.32 The central post of wakı̄ l – deputy to the
shah – went to an Iranian, as did for a while the position of amı̄ r al-umarā .
While the office of wakı̄ l was a central one, in the hands of an Iranian who
had no independent military force, it remained vulnerable to the
Turkmen emirs. The two Iranians who gained significant power in this
position under Isma‘il both came to bad ends due to the machinations of
the Qizilbash.33 Isma‘il also acted to curtail the power of some of the most
powerful oymaqs and their leaders by stripping them of their positions and
replacing them with members of less powerful tribes.34 However, he
depended too heavily on the Qizilbash organization to risk destroying it.
If the Turkmen tribal elite had objected only to the concentration of
power in the hands of an Iranian, Safavid politics might have remained
relatively simple. However, most were equally unwilling to allow preemi-
nence to one of their own. In the absence of a strong shah, tribal rivalries
quickly became murderous. Shah Isma‘il’s death in 1524, leaving the
throne to his ten-year-old son Tahmasp, precipitated the first major tribal
contest, within which Tahmasp was little more than a pawn. Safavid
succession struggles were numerous, complicated and bloody, and they
left the realm vulnerable to outside threats from the Ottomans and the
Uzbeks on their borders. Instead of detailing each succession struggle
individually, I will present here a simplified account of the contest at Shah
Isma‘il’s death to serve as an example of oymaq politics.
During most of Isma‘il’s reign, the Ustajlu had been the most powerful
of the oymaqs, holding the important office of qurchibashi, commander of
the Shah’s guard regiment. Two other oymaqs also had very significant
power: the Shamlu and the Tekkelu. At Tahmasp’s accession his tutor,
Div Sultan of the Rumlu tribe, claimed the position of regent and gath-
ered support from most emirs of the Rumlu, Tekkelu and Dhu’l Qadr,
who were all eager to weaken the hold of the Ustajlu. Undistracted by

32
Mitchell, Practice of Politics, pp. 19–52. 33 Aubin, “L’avènement,” pp. 115–118.
34
Roger Savory, Iran under the Safavids (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980),
pp. 50–51.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 176 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

threats on the border and Uzbek depredations in Khorasan, the great

oymaq emirs devoted themselves wholeheartedly to the internal struggle
for power.35 The first round went to Div Sultan and his allies, notably the
Tekkelu. They successfully pushed most of the Ustajlu out of Tabriz,
killed two leading Ustajlu emirs and expropriated some of the Ustajlu
lands (tiyuls).36
The tide turned in 1531, however, when the Shamlu and most of the
other oymaqs united against the Tekkelu, joined by Shah Tahmasp, who
was eager to assert some personal power. The Tekkelu lost many of their
positions and large numbers were killed; the Shamlu and returning
Ustajlu now shared power, with their emirs as regents.37 Neither external
nor internal peace resulted. While the Tekkelu were being attacked, one
of their emirs took refuge with the Ottomans, whom he encouraged
against the Safavids. In 1533–1534 the Ottoman army took Bitlis,
Tabriz, and all of Arab Iraq. In 1535 the Uzbeks mounted a major
invasion of Khorasan, bringing Herat into chaos. Shah Tahmasp was
now approaching twenty, and he began to assert his power. In 1533 he
put Sultan Husayn Shamlu to death; this is considered his emergence as
a true ruler. In 1536 he assembled his armies, marched to Khorasan, and
pushed out the Uzbeks.38
After this it is not surprising to find Shah Tahmasp eager to curb the
military power of the Qizilbash. He set out to create new centers of power
to balance the might of the oymaqs. The Shah’s personal corps, the qurchi,
was expanded to approximately 5,000 troops. These soldiers owed alle-
giance to their commander rather than the chiefs of their tribes, and in
1533 leadership was taken away from tribal chiefs. Tahmasp also cam-
paigned in the Caucasus and brought back captives to serve as soldiers.
These were known as ghulā m – translated as page or slave – but they could
hold significant power and retained ties to their families and native
regions.39 With these measures, Tahmasp succeeded in concentrating
power in his own hands, but he did not destroy the tribal system or
disengage it from military and provincial administration. Instead, he
added new power centers which joined the struggle for control at his
death in 1576. There were even more contestants this time, with
Georgian ghulā ms and dynastic women along with the major oymaqs.
The contest lasted almost uninterrupted through the reigns of

35
Dickson, “Sháh Tahmásb,” pp. 18, 52–66; Haneda, Le châh, pp. 170, 178–179.
36
Savory, Iran under˙ the Safavids, pp. 52–54; Dickson, “Sháh Tahmásb,” pp. 67–68.
37
Dickson, “Sháh Tahmásb,” pp. 197–201. ˙
38
Savory, Iran under˙ the Safavids, pp. 55–56, 61; Dickson, “Sháh Tahmásb,” pp. 200–202,
265–295, 340–357. ˙
39
Haneda, Le châh, pp. 168–180; Savory, Iran under the Safavids, pp. 64–66.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Safavid Shahs and the Qizilbash 177

Tahmasp’s two successors, Isma‘il II (1576) and Muhammad

Khudabanda (1578–1588). In 1587–1588 Murshid Quli Khan Ustajlu
took advantage of an Uzbek invasion to engineer the abdication of Shah
Muhammad and the enthronement of Muhammad’s son ‘Abbas, making
himself wakil.40
The reign of Shah ‘Abbas is considered the defining moment of the
Safavid dynasty and early modern Iran. He is remembered for his patron-
age of art and trade and likewise for his centralizing policies, which he
pursued with ruthless cruelty. By the time he was enthroned, ‘Abbas was
sixteen years old; in his world that meant he had reached the age of self-
assertion, and he moved quickly first against his wakı̄ l, and then against
other tribal powers.
Shah ‘Abbas is credited with the decisive shift of the Safavid power
structure away from tribal power towards central control on three fronts:
political, religious and economic. He used several stratagems – the move-
ment of populations, the introduction of new military personnel, and the
transformation of state land into crown land. The artillery corps and the
qurchi regiment became a larger proportion of the total army.41 In times of
need, ‘Abbas continued to call upon loyal elements to come to his aid
under the rubrick of Shahsevan (those who love the shah) and he gave this
title also to some of the nomads fleeing to his kingdom from Ottoman
repression.42 ‘Abbas’s best-known initiative was the promotion of
ghulā ms, mostly of Caucasian Christian provenance. By the end of his
reign, many of the great provinces were governed by ghulā ms, while others
had qurchi governors – governorships no longer belonged to the same tribe
over generations.43 However the ghulā ms and their families could also
become powerful; an example is the Georgian Allahverdi Khan, who
commanded a large army and became master of much of southern Iran
where he passed power on to his own children.44
Tahmasp had attempted to weaken tribal structures and ‘Abbas carried
this policy further. In a number of cases, he put ghulā ms in charge of tribal
sections when “there was no suitable tribal leader available.”45 Tribes
were also broken up by the practice of forced migration. Nomads were
sometimes moved in order to install them as a military population in
a threatened region; as smaller groups, away from their place of origin,

40
Savory, Iran under the Safavids, pp. 70–75.
41
Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-mulū k, pp. 32–33; Haneda, Le châh, pp. 184–197.
42
Tapper, Frontier Nomads, pp. 36–37, 49–51, 83–87.
43
Röhrborn, Provinzen, pp. 29–33; Haneda, Le châh, pp. 206–207.
44
Rudi Matthee, “Relations between the Center and the Periphery in Safavid Iran: The
Western Borderlands v. the Eastern Frontier Zone,” The Historian (2015), pp. 435–436.
45
Röhrborn, Provinzen, p. 31; Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-mulū k, pp. 16–18.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 178 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

they were expected to remain loyal to the Safavids. Some populations

were transferred as punishment for misdeeds.46 In 1596–1597 Shah
‘Abbas ordered a massacre of the Tekkelu oymaq, which he blamed for
offenses that included participation in a recent uprising in Mazandaran.
He ordered that every Tekkelu found anywhere should be killed by the
governor of the province concerned.47
One of the most important changes introduced by Shah ‘Abbas was the
conversion of large quantities of state land into crown land. It was state
lands which provided tiyuls, grants of land with income granted to com-
manders and governors. Crown lands on the other hand belonged to the
dynasty; thus the income they produced financed the sovereign directly.
They were garrisoned by court regiments rather than by the Qizilbash
oymaq troops and were put under a vizier rather than a governor.48 On the
religious front, likewise, ‘Abbas continued earlier policies to reduce
Qizilbash influence. Shah Tahmasp had twice performed public repent-
ance in which he ceremoniously dropped practices against the shari‘a,
including the consumption of wine, an important part of Qizilbash feast-
ing. Abbas distanced the government further from the Qizilbash, enscon-
cing the Twelver Shi‘ite ‘ulama in positions of power.49
The dynasty’s moves against Qizilbash power continued after the death
of Shah ‘Abbas in 1666. Crown lands grew at the expense of state lands as
the tiyuls of commanders were expropriated. However the Safavid shahs
continued to depend on the Qizilbash organization, which still provided
new military recruits from Anatolia where the Safavids retained a loyal
following.50 Although they turned many provinces into crown lands, the
Safavid shahs retained the older system on the borders where the state was
most threatened, and indeed settled nomad tribes in these areas.51 We
can see the dilemma facing the Safavids in another move which served to
weaken the Turkmen tribes: the signing of a treaty with the Ottomans at
46
Hirotake Maeda, “The Forced Migrations and Reorganization of the Regional Order in
the Caucasus by Safavid Iran: Preconditions and Developments Described by Fazli
Khuzani,” in Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds,
in Slavic Eurasian Studies, ed. Ieda Osamu and Uyama Tomohiko (Hokkaido: Research
Center, Hokkaido University, 2006), pp. 247–252; John R. Perry, “Forced Migration in
Iran during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” Iranian Studies 8 (1975),
pp. 205–208.
47
Perry, “Forced Migration,” pp. 206–208; Szuppe, “Kinship Ties,” pp. 94–95.
48
Roemer, “The Safavid Period,” p. 269; Bert Fragner, “Social and Internal Economic
Affairs,” in Cambridge History of Iran. The Timurid and Safavid Periods, ed. Peter Jackson
and Laurence Lockhart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 522–523.
49
Mitchell, Practice of Politics, pp. 69, 110; Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, pp. 351–352,
362–364.
50
Floor, “Khalifeh al-Kholafa,” pp. 70–73; Karakaya-Stump, “Subjects of the Sultan,”
pp. 182–183.
51
Matthee, Persia in Crisis, pp. 27–47, 142.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Safavid Shahs and the Qizilbash 179

Zuhab in 1639. With this agreement the Safavids gave up several western
regions and implicitly acknowledged Ottoman military superiority. The
consequent reduction in military forces did indeed diminish the role that
the Qizilbash played in politics, but it did so at the expense of Safavid
power in general.52
Shah ‘Abbas achieved great success during his reign, but he set the
dynasty on a course which bought centralization at the price of weakness,
and by moving nomad groups to the borders he actually contributed to
the resurgence of local tribal power. The new crown lands were ruthlessly
exploited through governors and tax farmers whose tenure was kept short
to prevent the formation of new power centers. Unlike the oymaq chiefs
who had held hereditary tiyuls and therefore had a long-term interest in
the land, the new officials often bought their office and had to recoup their
expenses quickly.53 Many scholars have presented the Safavid move
against tribal power and towards centralization as a success, citing the
reduced power of the Qizilbash. However, we need to distinguish the
position of the major Qizilbash oymaqs as a force within the state from
the strength of nomads and tribes in general.54 The history of the
eighteenth century clearly shows the fragility of Safavid centralization
and the continued power of pastoralists in Iran.
After the reign of Shah ‘Abbas, the largest Safavid oymaqs did play
a smaller part; the Ustajlu, Rumlu, and Turkman largely disappear from
the histories, as do the Dhu’l Qadr and the Mawsillu, who had previously
held significant regional power, while the Tekkelu and Shamlu appear to
have survived in a reduced position.55 Two of the original Qizilbash
oymaqs, the Qajars and the Afshars, gained strength in the later Safavid
period. The Afshars became strongly ensconced around Mashhad in
Khorasan and in Kerman, while the Qajars retained some territory in
Azerbaijan, as well as Mazandaran and Marw. Both tribes undoubtedly
benefited from their position on the borders of the realm. Other nomadic
powers which had never been part of the Qizilbash increased their stand-
ing. The Lurs retained their autonomy, and we see the rise of the
Bakhtiyari section, whose leaders had become governors under Shah
Tahmasp.56 In return for an annual payment in mules, Bakhtiyari gover-
nors had the right to collect taxes in Dizful and Shushtar. In the later
52
Matthee, Persia in Crisis, pp. 117–118.
53
Matthee, Persia in Crisis, p. 149; John Foran, “The Long Fall of the Safavid Dynasty:
Moving beyond the Standard View,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 24
(1992), pp. 286–287.
54
See Matthee, “Relations.”
55
John R. Perry, Karı̄ m Khā n Zand: A History of Iran, 1747–1779 (Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 19.
56
Matthee, Persia in Crisis, p. 149.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 180 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

Safavid period they were the major suppliers of nomad products to the
capital city of Isfahan, and they were a valuable source of soldiers in the
final struggles of the dynasty.57
Nomadic groups on the borders also began both to raid and to enter
into the politics of the Safavid state. Two groups of tribal and partially
nomadic people on disputed borders – the Kurds on the Ottoman border,
and the Afghans on the borders of the Mughal Empire – expanded and
organized under the Safavids. By the seventeenth century they had devel-
oped an indigenous literature and identity, along with stronger internal
political structures. During the last three decades of Safavid rule raids by
these peoples were constant and destructive, reaching well inside the
borders.

Ottomans and Nomads

While the Safavids incorporated both tribalism and nomadism into their
government structure, the Ottomans pursued the opposite course, at least
to the extent that they were able to do so. In Chapter 6 we ended the
Ottoman narrative in 1481, at the death of Mehmet II – the conqueror of
Constantinople and creator of a more imperial, centralized state. Nomads
continued to make up a significant proportion of the empire’s population
in the European province of Rumelia and in Anatolia, but they were
increasingly incorporated into provincial governance, and were subject
to taxation and conscription. At the same time the Ottomans continued to
move eastward to take over territories in which nomads were more
numerous, more independent and more powerful.
In 1485, Mehmed’s successor Beyezid II (1481–1512) began a struggle
with the Mamluks for the control of eastern Anatolia. The greatest
problem was the Qizilbash, who owed their primary allegiance to the
Safavids; obedience to the Ottomans was thus provisional at best. It was
Selim I (1512–1520) who really expanded the nomad presence within the
Ottoman Empire, though he was no friend to pastoralists. After defeating
Isma‘il at Chaldiran in 1514, Selim pushed the Safavids out of most of
eastern Anatolia, then in 1516–1517 he took over the Mamluk sultanate
and won the allegiance of most of the Kurdish principalities on the Iranian
border. His successor, Suleiman Kanuni (1520–1566), added Baghdad
and Iraq and pushed the border into Azerbaijan, though these territories
remained contested. The government set out to incorporate its new
nomad subjects into the state but did not find the task an easy one. In

57
Gene R. Garthwaite, Khans and Shahs: A Documentary Analysis of the Bakhtiyari in Iran
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 49–51.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Ottomans and Nomads 181

1522 the Dhu’l Qadr confederation was disbanded, leading to six years of
rebellion in their territory. Selim deliberately repressed the Qizilbash; all
known members were registered, a number were massacred, and some
others imprisoned. Large numbers crossed into Azerbaijan to serve the
Safavids, while many of those who remained in Anatolia and Diyar Bakr
still considered themselves under the authority of the Safavid khalı̄ fa.58
The Ottomans brought most of their new nomad populations into their
administrative system. Syria, eastern Anatolia and much of the Kurdish
region were surveyed shortly after the conquest and organized under the
existing timar/sanjak system. Egypt, Baghdad, Basra and most of the Arabian
Peninsula remained outside. The timar was an institution similar to the iqta‘:
grants of land revenue in return for service. Timar holders had to appear on
campaign with armed cavalries calculated according to the size of their
holding. Timars were organized into sub-provinces, known as sanjaks, and
put under military officials. In conquered territories, the Ottomans distrib-
uted land to their own servitors but also granted military status – including
the right to hold a timar – to the local elites, including pastoralists; this was
done in Karaman, the territories of the Dhu’l Qadr, and the smaller Kurdish
principalities, as well as parts of Syria.59 In population registers nomads were
distinguished from settled populations, each subject to a different set of
taxes. While settled communities remained within one sanjak, nomads
who migrated between summer and winter pastures often crossed borders.
Although the Ottoman administration was theoretically consistent, in
practice it conformed to local conditions. Syria was within the timar system,
but government control faded out as one progressed into the desert. Some
nomad tribes appear not to have been assigned to a timar, owing their taxes
directly to the governor or the central government – if they paid at all. Others
were simply not included in the registers. The Bedouin regions of ‘Ajlun in
Transjordan, parts of Hawran, and Tadmur in northern Syria appear not to
have been directly under Ottoman fiscal control.60
For most nomad regions the sixteenth century was a period of increas-
ing incorporation and control, much of which was reversed in the follow-
ing centuries.61 The seventeenth century was a time of stress for the

58
Roemer, “The Safavid Period,” pp. 221–223; Floor, “Khalifeh al-Kholafa,” pp. 64, 71–72.
59
Halil Inalcik, “Tı̄ mā r,” EI 2nd ed.; Bruce Masters, “Egypt and Syria under the
Ottomans,” in The New Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 2. The Western Islamic World
Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Maribel Fierro (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), pp. 415–416.
60
Wolf D. Hütteroth, “Ottoman Administration of the Desert Frontier in the Sixteenth
Century,” Asian and African Studies 19 (1985).
61
Masters, “Egypt and Syria under the Ottomans,” pp. 411–421; Bernard Haykel, “Western
Arabia and Yemen during the Ottoman Period,” in New Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 2. The
Western Islamic World Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Maribel Fierro (Cambridge:

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 182 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

Ottomans. Control over the desert and the Jazira was threatened by the
migration of Bedouin confederations from the Arabian Peninsula. The most
important was the ‘Anaza, which had become preeminent in the Najd region
of the Arabian Peninsula in the sixteenth century, but in the seventeenth
century was challenged by new arrivals. From the middle of the century,
groups of the ‘Anaza began to move into the Syrian desert where they
replaced the Mawali tribe, which had accepted Ottoman payment and
kept peace in the Syrian desert.62 As the ‘Anaza moved into their new
territories, they competed for pasture and the control of trade routes, causing
increased disorder among the tribes and the movement of nomads into both
eastern and central Anatolia.
The Ottomans attempted to increase their control over nomads, some-
times openly and violently, and sometimes more subtly. Ottoman policies
encouraged the expansion of settled agriculture, and farmers began to take
over marginal lands including nomad pasture. However, the 1590s saw the
onset of the Little Ice Age with exceptional cold and drought, affecting both
agriculture and pastoralism. The change in climate may have contributed to
the outbreak of the destructive Jelali Rebellion in Anatolia, which lasted from
1596–1610. These factors, along with the increase in population due to
competition over pasture in northern Syria, brought a wave of nomad move-
ment from eastern Anatolia westwards into central Anatolia, and a dramatic
increase in nomad pillaging of farmland, particularly in the marginal lands at
the edge of the steppe, some of which had been their pastures. This situation
is reported through much of Anatolia, the Jazira and northern Syria.63
In reaction, the Ottomans attempted policies of forcible settlement,
military conscription and heavy taxation, causing more westward move-
ment. Anatolian population and agriculture were slow to recover, with
much land remaining in nomad hands, and at the end of the seventeenth
century the government began a concerted program of nomad settlement,
moving nomads to new lands and demanding that they cultivate them. At
about the same time, a new policy of conscripting populations seen as
unsettled – including both nomads and brigands – to man garrison
fortresses served to suppress pastoral migration.64 Another Ottoman
policy, less coercive, but more constant and pervasive, was the move to

Cambridge University Press 2010), pp. 441–445; Tom Sinclair, “The Ottoman
Arrangements for the Tribal Principalities of the Lake Van Region of the Sixteenth
Century,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 9, no. 1–2 (2003), pp. 140–143.
62
Uwaidah M. al Juhany, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement (Reading, UK: Ithaca
Press, 2002), pp. 65, 69.
63
Sam White, The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 42–43, 70–72, 130–132, 229–242.
64
Reşat Kasaba, A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2009), pp. 53–54, 65–68; Halil Inalcik, “The Yürüks,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Tribes and Nomads along the Ottoman-Iranian Border 183

register and control summer and winter pastures. Although it was recog-
nized that nomad groups might have to cross sanjak lines in their migra-
tions, the government preferred to keep them within one administrative
area and above all tried to avoid variation in the use of pasture. These
limitations sometimes caused hardship for pastoralists and for the leaders
attempting to maintain control within nomad regions.65 Over time, the
policy undoubtedly favored sedentarization, and at the end of the seven-
teenth century the Ottomans made several direct attempts to settle
nomads on the land.66

Tribes and Nomads along the Ottoman-Iranian Border

While the Ottomans pushed for sedentarization in internal regions,
nomadism continued strong along the eastern frontier. In the centuries
that followed the rise of the Safavids and the Ottoman conquest of Syria,
the border between the two states shifted back and forth over the same
region, creating a space for autonomous tribal powers of pastoral or
mixed economy. In their contests over the valuable Gulf port of Basra,
the region of Baghdad, and the northern Euphrates region, the two
powers depended heavily on local tribes. The border region stretched
from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf, through largely mountainous
territory to marsh and desert towards the south. Kurds and Turkmen
were the primary border population in the north; in the middle the Iranian
Lurs populated the central Zagros region, while Arab tribes controlled
significant sections of the southern Jazira and Mesopotamia. In the south,
Khuzistan, also known as ‘Arabistan, had a mixed population, with some
Lurs and Turkmen Afshar, and a larger population of Arab tribes. State
control over the frontier region was partial at best. On the Safavid side, the
territory was organized in semi-autonomous wilā yats, ruled by largely
hereditary local leaders. The five wilā yats which remained to the late
Safavid period were all along this frontier: ‘Arabistan, Lur, the
Bakhtiyari territory, Kurdistan and Georgia.67 On the Ottoman side
likewise, the state had little actual control and depended heavily on tribal
leaders who switched allegiance at will.68

Their Origins, Expansion and Economic Role,” in Oriental Carpet and Textile Studies, ed.
R. Pinner and H. Inalcik (London: HALI, 1986), pp. 46–48.
65
Inalcik, “The Yürüks,” pp. 49–50; Rhoads Murphy, “Some Features of Nomadism in
the Ottoman Empire: A Survey Based on Tribal Census and Judicial Appeal
Documentation from Archives in Istanbul and Damascus,” Journal of Turkish Studies 8
(1984), pp. 195–196.
66
Kasaba, Moveable Empire, pp. 72–76. 67 Matthee, Persia in Crisis, pp. 143–144.
68
Rudi Matthee, “The Safavid-Ottoman Frontier: Iraq-i Arab as Seen by the Safavids,” in
Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Changes, ed. Kemal Karpat and

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 184 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

Several groups expanded their power in this period. It was particularly

decisive for the Kurds, who had formed several states before, but now
developed a consciousness of themselves as a people. By this time the
name seems to have come to denote the Kurds more or less as we
understand them today – as the tribal people of what is now Kurdistan.
The first source written by a Kurd and dealing specifically with Kurdish
history is the Sharafnā ma, written in the late sixteenth century by Sharaf
al-Din Khan Bitlisi (d. 1603–1604). The Sharafnā ma first gives a history
of Kurdish dynasties, and then proceeds to a broader history of Muslim
dynasties, in which the author includes his own lifetime from personal
experience. In this work the term Kurd appears for the ethnic group, and
there is a clear sense of a common culture and history.69
The Kurdish region was important to the Ottomans as a buffer separ-
ating the Safavids from their Qizilbash followers in Anatolia. The
Ottomans incorporated a number of principalities, some of which
enjoyed the trappings of independence: minting their own coins and
pronouncing the khutba in the name of the local ruler. Despite a sense
˙
of common identity, the Kurds seem to have had little desire for a central
Kurdish power. Most of the region was organized as hükümet – vassal
states – but it was also incorporated into the sanjak system, with leading
families as sanjak beys, holding the right of appointment of some subor-
dinate officials. Tribes remained intact, but the migration patterns were
restricted to the sanjak. The rearrangement of migration patterns caused
some predictable hardship.70
The Ottomans were prevented from using coercive techniques against
the Kurds by the presence of the Safavids on the western border. In
general, the Ottomans were the greater power, but some Kurdish princi-
palities chose a Safavid alliance, especially during the rule of strong shahs
such as Shah ‘Abbas. When campaigning in Safavid territory, the
Ottoman army depended on Kurdish support for local information,
transport, diplomacy and auxiliary troops. Both the Safavids and the
Ottomans used Kurdish spies to provide information about the other
side; some Kurds worked as double agents, informing on both sides.71

Robert W. Zens (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003); Rudi Matthee,

“Between Arabs, Turks and Iranians: The Town of Basra, 1600–1700,” Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies 69, no. 1 (2006).
69
Stephan Connermann, “Volk, Ethnie oder Stamm? Die Kurden aus mamlükischer
Sicht,” Asien und Africa. Beiträge des Zentrums für asiatische und afrikanische Studien der
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel 8 (2004), pp. 27–28.
70
Sinclair, “Ottoman Arrangements”; Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State, pp. 168, 171.
71
Mustafa Dehqan and Genç Vural, “Kurds as Spies: Information-Gathering on the
16th-Century Ottoman-Safavid Frontier,” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum
Hungaricae 71, no. 2 (2018), pp. 197–216.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Decentralization in the Eighteenth Century 185

Their choice of affiliation and the usefulness of their services gave

Kurdish princes and tribal leaders new leverage, which they used to
increase their autonomy at the level of tribe and principality. It is likely
also that nomadism increased in the area, due to the scorched-earth
tactics the Safavids used against the Ottoman advance.72 Throughout
the period of this chapter, the Kurds remained a border population, self-
consciously separate from the powers on their borders, proud of their
martial prowess, but divided in allegiance.

Decentralization in the Eighteenth Century

As we have seen, border powers gained strength in the seventeenth
century. Both the Safavid and the Ottoman governments undertook
attempts at centralization, but the end of the century found their central
governments in a weakened position. There was a rise in autonomous
regional powers, including nomad tribes, some taking power in their own
name and many others serving in the armies of new warlords. The most
spectacular of these last was the Turkmen leader Nadir Shah Afshar, who
seized power in Iran after the end of the Safavid dynasty.
By the end of the seventeenth century the weakness of the Safavids had
become clear. The army was incapable of defending the government from
either internal or external threats. Neither the military nor the tribes
settled on the border were receiving the money owed to them and they
could not be relied on to fight when asked. There were raids from the
mountain Lezghis of the Caucasus, from the Turkmen on the northeast-
ern frontier, the Uzbeks, and the nomadic Baluch on the southeastern
frontier. Subject peoples rebelled, particularly those in border regions: the
people of Kerman, the Afghans of Qandahar, the nomads of Khuzistan,
and the Lur of southern central Iran. When the Ghilzay Afghans took
Isfahan in 1722, their victory was due less to their strength than to the
weakness of the Safavids.73
The Afghans were a partially nomadic group that had long inhabited
the border between Iran and the Subcontinent. Over several centuries
they had increased their territory, while the rivalry between the Safavid
and Mughal states had given them a strategic position and involved their
leaders in the politics of both states. In 1722 the Ghilzay Afghans invaded

72
Rhoads Murphy, “The Resumption of Ottoman-Safavid Border Conflict, 1603–1638:
Effects of Border Destabilization on the Evolution of Tribe-State Relations,” in Shifts and
Drifts in Nomad-Sedentary Relations, ed. Stefan Leder and Bernard Streck (Wiesbaden:
Reichert, 2005), pp. 307–323.
73
Matthee, Persia in Crisis, pp. 206–41. For a divergent view, see Newman, Safavid Iran,
pp. 104–106, 116.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 186 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

and took Isfahan. They followed their victory with a campaign through
much of Iran, but their armies met continued resistance. Unfortunately
for Iran, the fall of the Safavids left behind several evenly matched powers,
whose leaders fought for control through the rest of the century.
A number of Baluch and Afghan groups were active in Iran, and several
internal tribes also aimed for preeminence, most notably the Qajars,
centered primarily in Mazandaran and Astarabad, the Afshars of
Khorasan, and the Lur tribes between Isfahan, Khuzistan and Shiraz.
After the fall of Isfahan to the Afghans, most opponents gathered
around the Safavid prince Tahmasp, son of the last reigning Safavid
monarch, who found support among several nomad groups –
Bakhtiyari, Shahsevan and Qajar.74 After 1726, Nadir Afshar, whose
tribe was centered in western Khorasan, emerged as Shah Tahmasp’s
most important ally. For the next six years he campaigned alongside
Tahmasp, while the balance of power between them gradually changed.
In 1729 they retook Isfahan from the Ghilzay Afghans. In 1732 Nadir
Shah deposed Tahmasp, and in 1736 he felt secure enough to claim the
title of shah for himself.75
Nadir Shah was a man in a hurry. After deposing Tahmasp he campaigned
against the Ottomans and took Baghdad, then headed to Azerbaijan and the
Caucasus. In 1736 he moved southeast, conquering Qandahar, then Delhi in
March 1738. From there he proceeded to take Kabul, then Sind. By the fall of
1740 he was attacking Bukhara and Khiva. Like the earlier conqueror
Tamerlane, Nadir did not attempt to retain his most distant conquests;
neither India nor Central Asia became part of his realm.76 Unlike Temür,
however, he failed to consolidate his gains to form a working state.
Nadir’s army was both modern and traditional. He expanded the guard
regiment and created an effective artillery corps with modern firearms. He
mustered an extraordinarily large army, considering the condition of his
realm. In addition to peasants and the tribal groups within Iran, he
enlisted Afghans, Baluch, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and also Lezghis from the
Caucasus. Nonetheless, the basic structure of his army resembled that of
the Safavids. The cavalry still made up most of the army and remained
tribally organized. Indeed, Nadir used group rivalries within the army to
promote greater zeal in battle.77

74
Newman, Safavid Iran, pp. 124–125.
75
Peter Avery, “Nā dir Shā h and the Afsharid Legacy,” in Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 7.
From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, ed. Gavin Hambly, Peter Avery, Charles Melville
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 29–31.
76
“Nā dir Shā h and the Afsharid Legacy,” pp. 31–42.
77
Michael Axworthy, “The Army of Nader Shah,” Iranian Studies 40, no. 5 (2007),
pp. 639–643.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Decentralization in the Eighteenth Century 187

Nadir’s conquests were ruthless and ruinously expensive. He himself

came from a nomad background and gave prominence to nomadic tribes
in his army, but his reign brought hardship to nomads, just as it did to the
settled population. His campaigns were interrupted by frequent resist-
ance movements, especially among pastoralists. In October 1732 the
Bakhtiyari rebelled; at the end of 1733 Nadir had to raise the siege of
Baghdad to put down an uprising in Khuzistan led by Muhammad Khan
Baluch.78 Rebellions were put down with violence, the leaders were
usually killed along with large numbers of tribesmen, and tribes were
often further punished with the deportation of several thousand house-
holds to Khorasan. Here they were resettled, and many conscripted into
the army.79 This practice served to break up recalcitrant tribes while
gaining manpower for the army and population for Khorasan.
By 1744 the population was showing acute disaffection and Nadir Shah
was displaying signs of insanity, becoming a danger to his associates as
well as his subjects.80 In 1747 he was murdered by several of his closest
followers. Whereas many of the populations that Shah ‘Abbas relocated
had remained in their new territories, at Nadir’s death there was a general
exodus as his commanders left to start fighting on their own account.
Though for a few years he had united much of the nomad population
within his armies, Nadir left Iran poorer and more fragmented that he had
found it.
In many ways Nadir Shah was a transitional figure, combining
Safavid rule through tribal powers with the expansive conquests
associated with the nomads of the steppe. In the realm of ideology
he likewise marks a combination of traditions. The four great regional
empires which had taken over the central Islamic lands were all
connected to the Turkic and Mongolian steppe heritage, which con-
tinued to influence their worldview.81 Shah Isma‘il had risen to
power and led his early conquests as a messianic figure, and his
successors inherited some of his religious charisma. With the distan-
cing of the Qizilbash, however, the Safavids sought out elements of
legitimation from the steppe tradition, and they had turned not to
Chinggis Khan but to the Muslim Tamerlane. Under Shah ‘Abbas,
historians claimed that Temür had paid his respects to the early

78
Michael Axworthy, The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from Tribal Warrior to Conquering
Tyrant (London: I. B. Tauris 2006), pp. 107–111, 127–130, 142–143.
79
Perry, “Forced Migration,” pp. 208–210.
80
Axworthy, Sword of Persia, pp. 258–263.
81
Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa
Âli (1541–1600) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 275–279, 283–286.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 188 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

Safavid shaykhs, and indeed had granted them waqf land in almost all
areas of his dominion – thus legitimating Safavid rule over the former
Timurid realm.82 Throughout the seventeenth century, legends of
Temür’s connection to the Safavids proliferated: we have an account
of a prophetic dream narrated by the Imam ‘Ali to the head of the
Safavid order, and of the rediscovery of Temür’s sword, supposedly
given to Shah ‘Abbas’s successor, Shah Safi.83
Nadir Shah used both religious and Turco-Mongolian sources of legit-
imation, emphasizing ties with the Safavid house, and likewise with
Tamerlane.84 Just as Temür had imitated the actions of Chinggis Khan,
Nadir recalled Temür’s career in his choice of regions to conquer and the
brutality of his methods. He claimed Iraq as a territory that had belonged
to Temür; he also named his grandsons after members of the Timurid
house. A dynastic chronicle recounts a story offering supernatural evi-
dence that Nadir should be seen as Temür’s successor. While camped
near the fortress of Kalat, where Temür had achieved a significant victory,
Nadir awoke at night and noticed a glow on the mountainside. Seeking
this out he discovered a hidden treasure and an inscription identifying it as
having belonged to Temür and stating that he who arrived there would be
the Sā hib Qirā n (Lord of the Fortunate Conjunction), a title that had been
˙ ˙
held earlier by Temür.85
Nadir Shah introduced a major innovation in his attempt to reformu-
late Turkic identity, erasing the distinction between the western Turks
and those who shared the legacy of the Mongol Empire. The term
“Turkmen” had previously denoted the Oghuz; now Nadir used the
term to denote all Turks as inheritors of sovereignty. To justify his stance
and claim a common heritage with the Ottomans, he invoked the history
of Chinggis Khan:
In the time of Chingiz Khan, the leaders of the Turkman tribes, who had left the
land of Turan and migrated to Iran and Anatolia, were said to be all of one stock
and one lineage. At that time, the exalted ancestor of the dynasty of the ever-
increasing state [the Ottoman Empire] headed to Anatolia and our ancestor
settled in the provinces of Iran. Since these lineages are interwoven and

82
Maria Szuppe, “L’évolution de l’image de Timour et des Timourides dans l’historiogra-
phie safavide, XVIe–XVIIIe siècles,” in L’héritage timouride Iran – Asie centrale – Inde
XVe–XVIIIe siècles, ed. Maria Szuppe, Cahiers d’Asie centrale ¾ (Tashkent; Aix-en-
Provence, 1997), pp. 315–322; Sholeh Alysia Quinn, Historical Writing during the Reign
of Shah ‘Abbas: Ideology, Imitation, and Legitimacy in Safavid Chronicles (Salt Lake City:
University of Utah Press, 2000), pp. 45, 85.
83
Quinn, Historical Writing, pp. 87–89; Szuppe, “L’évolution,” pp. 322–324.
84
Ernest Tucker, Nadir Shah’s Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2006), p. 13; Axworthy, Sword of Persia, p. 281.
85
Tucker, Nadir Shah’s Quest, pp. 9–10, 13, 37–38, 68–75.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Middle East in the Later Eighteenth Century 189

interconnected, it is hoped that when his royal highness learns of them, he will give
royal consent to the establishment of peace between [us].86
In a letter presented to the Ottomans after his assumption of the title of shah
in 1736 Nadir claimed legitimacy simply as a Turk, stating that “kingship is
the ancestral right of the exalted Turkmen tribe.”87 Thus the rulers of the
regional states – the Chinggisid khans of Khiva, the Timurid/Chinggisid
Mughals, the Ottomans, and Nadir himself, all had equal legitimacy.

The Middle East in the Later Eighteenth Century

The second half of the eighteenth century saw the rise of new nomad powers
in both Iran and the Ottoman Empire, as decentralization increased
throughout the Middle East. Iran remained a battleground for fifteen years
after Nadir Shah’s death. Nadir Shah had moved populations within Iran
and brought in troops from outside. Many of these, together with mountain
and pastoral populations, remained politically active after his death. Several
autonomous political regions emerged: Khorasan, where the Afshar dynasty
survived as a minor power; northern Iran from Astarabad to Qazwin,
dominated by the Qajars; and central and southern Iran, inhabited by the
Lurs and eastern Kurds with the Bakhtiyari confederation as the major force.
Struggles for power were closely intertwined as leaders tried both to assert
control over their own regions and tribes, and to extend rule outward.
The first winner was Karim Khan of the small Zand tribe on the Luri-
Kurdish border. In 1751 he became the preeminent leader among the Lurs,
and by 1762 had taken most of southern and central Iran. Karim Khan had
begun as the weakest of the contenders for power, and his success may have
been due in part to the fact that the two most powerful groups, the Bakhtiyari
and the Qajars, were split into warring factions more willing to ally with
outside powers than with their internal rivals. Karim Khan made Shiraz his
capital, and from 1762 until his death in 1779 he controlled a large part of
Iran, from Khuzistan to Azerbaijan. He did not aspire to formal sovereignty,
however, and for much of his reign ruled in the name of a Safavid puppet
khan, presenting himself as “wakı̄ l ” – deputy.88 The eastern territories –
Sistan, Kerman and Khorasan – remained outside his domain, and the
Caspian regions under the Qajars, though formally within the realm, never
fully submitted to his rule.89 Though he used considerable violence, Karim
Khan allowed autonomy to the tribal powers under him, exerting control by

86
Tucker, Nadir Shah’s Quest, p. 37. 87 Tucker, Nadir Shah’s Quest, p. 39.
88
Tucker, Nadir Shah’s Quest, p. 110.
89
John Perry, “The Zand Dynasty,” in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 7, ed. Gavin
Hambly et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 85, 95–96.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 190 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

keeping members of the leadership as hostages at court and through occa-

sional force. He did not develop a large, organized bureaucracy, but did
promote trade, agriculture and city life, building up his capital at Shiraz. His
reign provided a short respite for the population of Iran in the middle of
a difficult century, but it did not transform political structures.90At Karim
Khan’s death, hostilities broke out again, as various members of the dynasty
fought each other and other tribes gained power, most notably the Qajars,
who eventually founded the dynasty which ruled Iran through the nine-
teenth century.
The second half of the eighteenth century was also a difficult period for
the Ottoman Empire, which lost effective control of several regions, while
nomad groups gained autonomy and importance. In Palestine, the
Bedouin Zaydani family rose to power, particularly under the shaykh
Zahir al-‘Umar (1690–1775) who from about 1750 to his death expanded
his power through northern Palestine, dominating the trade route to
Damascus and the regions which had traditionally financed the pilgrim-
age caravans. He thus put the Hajj in jeopardy. He also conquered the
port city of Acre, gaining control within the cotton trade.91
The most consequential event for the nomads of the Ottoman lands was
the founding of the Wahhabi state on the Arabian Peninsula. In 1744–1745
the religious reformer Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab allied with
Muhammad al-Sa‘ud, the amı̄ r of the town of Diriyya in the Najd. Al-
Sa‘ud supported a jihā d to spread the new doctrine, and in return became
the secular leader of the community. Those who joined the community
agreed to obey both the religious and the political leadership and to fight
for the cause. Those who did not agree were subject to raiding.92 The
leadership of the Sa‘udi state was settled, and the movement spread first to
villages and towns; the nomads were slower to join and never became part of
the ruling elite. However, by the 1780s nomad tribes had begun to enlist in
campaigns of expansion which provided income for the Sa‘udi state and
enriched those who participated. Religious enthusiasm was likewise
a factor, and some tribes converted to the Wahhabi doctrine. Unlike earlier
confederations on the Peninsula, the Sa’udis imposed a regular tax – the
zakā t – on the tribes under them and replaced many of the tribal leaders;
nonetheless the social and political structure remained tribal and was not
fundamentally changed.93

90
Perry, “The Zand Dynasty,” pp. 95–102.
91
Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History (New York: Basic Books, 2009), pp. 45–49.
92
Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), pp. 14–18.
93
al-Rasheed, A History, p. 19; Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi
Books, 1998), pp. 89–93, 112–126.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Social and Economic Conditions 191

By the end of the eighteenth century the Wahhabis had taken the
Holy Cities and destroyed much of the Ottoman hold on the Arabian
Peninsula, and their impact was felt well beyond. Although some
nomads accepted their leadership, others did not. Various sections
of the great Shammar confederation chose different sides, and those
who did not want to join the Wahhabis began to migrate first into
Iraq and then into the Jazira. By the end of the century, they were
strongly established in their new regions and largely autonomous.94
Tribes from the Arab Peninsula also entered southern Iraq and the
province of Baghdad, strengthening nomad power at the expense of
the Mamluk emirs who ruled the province largely independent of
Ottoman control. Despite numerous attacks on the tribes, the gov-
ernment was unable to dislodge them or to provide security on the
routes by themselves.95 Much of Iraq’s hinterland was effectively
under tribal and largely nomad control.

Social and Economic Conditions

In the early modern period, covered in this chapter, European travelers’
accounts and trade documents begin to provide a fuller view of the life of
nomads, revealing some of the everyday realities which are omitted in
historical chronicles. In addition, for the Ottoman Empire rich government
archives have survived that have not yet been fully exploited. Thus we can
draw some general conclusions, though with the reservation that condi-
tions differed from region to region. It is clear that in both the Safavid and
the Ottoman domains, nomads made up a significant part of the popula-
tion. For Safavid Iran we have no firm figures; scholars estimate the nomad
population of Iran at the end of the Safavid period at 30 percent of the total,
though some estimates are higher.96 In the Ottoman Empire, tax records
begin in the 1520s and note the percentage of population that was con-
sidered nomadic. In western and central Anatolia nomads were estimated
at 16 to 17 percent; in southeastern Anatolia about 70 percent were
registered as nomadic. For the Syrian and Iraqi provinces, we have figures
from the latter part of the sixteenth century, showing about 36 percent for

94
Bruce Masters, “Semi-autonomous Forces in the Arab Provinces,” in The Cambridge
History of Turkey, vol. 3. The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 190; M. al-Rasheed, “Shammar,”
EI 2nd ed.
95
Hala Mundhir Fattah, The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf, 1745–
1900 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), pp. 28–41.
96
Willem M. Floor, The Economy of Safavid Persia, Iran-Turan Bd. 1 (Wiesbaden: Reichert,
2000), p. 8; Matthee, Persia in Crisis, p. 6; Kunke, Nomadenstämme p. 18.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 192 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

Baghdad and Aleppo provinces, and about 32 percent for Basra.97 Thus
some Ottoman regions may have equaled or even surpassed the Safavid
ratio of nomad to settled population.
Not surprisingly, nomads played a particularly crucial role in transport
and trade – both regional and long distance. Camels were the most import-
ant animal for transport; they were used not only in caravans, but also often
in delivering taxes paid in kind. Given that the annual pilgrimage caravans
passing through the Syrian and Arabian deserts required up to 40,000
camels, we should recognize the huge numbers needed for trade and
pilgrimage together. Nomads also played an important part in guiding
caravans and in maintaining security on the roads.98 The official pilgrim-
age caravans, crucial to the prestige of the Ottoman state, were heavily
dependent on nomad services and cooperation. First of all, pilgrims
required water when passing through the deserts of Syria and Arabia,
and the Bedouins had to be persuaded to share this scarce resource with
them. Second, supplies needed by pilgrims as they passed through barren
terrain were usually transported by Bedouin and deposited in storehouses
along the road. And finally, pilgrims always required an escort. In return
for these services, tribes received remuneration, usually regular subsidies,
and to ensure loyalty their shaykhs were often given insignia and titles.99
The provisioning of the capital with sheep for meat and dairy products also
depended in part on nomads. Most sheep came from the northern and
western regions, but Anatolia was also an important source and was
sometimes called upon for as many as 60,000 sheep at a time.100
In border and desert regions not fully incorporated into Ottoman
government, administration was often in the hands of the tribal shaykhs
who were responsible for maintaining order and imposing the law over
their tribesmen. Tribes controlled recognized areas, known as their dı̄ ra,
within which they collected taxes and provided security. The tax they
collected was called khuwwa; this is often translated as “protection
money” but literally means brotherliness and implied some commonality
of interest and identity. Tribes also collected tolls from travelers passing
through their regions; these were also called khuwwa. Khuwwa should not
be understood simply as a tax of the nomad on the settled. It was also paid

97
Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, “Research on the Ottoman Fiscal Surveys,” in Studies in the
Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day, ed. Michael
A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 169–171.
98
Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman
Empire, 1300–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 39;
Suraiya Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans, 1517–1683
(London: I. B. Tauris 1996), p. 46.
99
Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans, pp. 6, 34, 43, 48, 54–56.
100
White, The Climate of Rebellion, pp. 27–41, 48.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Social and Economic Conditions 193

by weaker tribes to stronger ones, both of which might be nomads. Over

time, smaller tribes within the dı̄ ra of powerful confederations such as the
‘Anaza might become a part of the larger entity, with a genealogical link
provided by a putative ancestor.101 When governments expanded into
such regions and attempted to monopolize the collection of taxes,
nomads often retaliated by raiding.102
Nomads developed a reciprocal relationship with cities and towns in
their regions. They required a market, while many cities depended directly
on neighboring pastoral populations for meat and dairy products and
sometimes for materials needed in the production of trade goods, notably
wool and leather. Isfahan, Mosul, and Baghdad for instance had close
market relations with nearby nomadic populations. Since cities could
impose a tax on the sale of livestock, trade with nomads provided consid-
erable income.103 The presence of pastoralists thus could stimulate the
development of regional trade centers. It is notable that when Nadir Shah
moved nomads into Khorasan to develop the region, he created trading
towns for them.104 Several kinds of goods important to international trade
depended on livestock products; for instance, Kerman traded in goat hair
products, and in Anatolia wool carpets were a growing industry. We see
tribal shaykhs active therefore in numerous aspects of trade, which was
central to their livelihood. When no suitable market towns were available to
them, shaykhs sometimes founded new settlements.105 Some invested in
trade themselves, acting as merchants while leaving the everyday care of
herds to shepherds.106 At a lower level, ordinary nomads sometimes par-
ticipated independently in the economy as day laborers, both in manufac-
ture and for public works. They had the advantage of being more mobile
than peasants and could thus move seasonally.107 In the Safavid realm, the
Bakhtiyari were conscripted by Shah ‘Abbas as laborers to link together
two rivers near Isfahan; this work went on for years.108

101
Juhany, Najd, pp. 69–70.
102
Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540–1834
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 23, 39; Fattah, Politics, pp. 31–32;
F. H. Stewart, “Khuwwa,” EI 2nd ed.
103
Khoury, State and Provincial Society, p. 31; Fattah, Politics, p. 35; Minorsky, Tadhkirat
al-mulū k, p. 179.
104
Khoury, State and Provincial Society, pp. 27–34; Avery, “Nā dir Shā h and the Afsharid
Legacy,” p. 52.
105
Fattah, Politics, pp. 25–26, 186–187.
106
Matthee, Persia in Crisis, p. 159; Inalcik and Quataert, Economic and Social History,
pp. 38–39.
107
Kasaba, Moveable Empire, pp. 32–34; Inalcik, “The Yürüks,” pp. 52–54; Inalcik and
Quataert, Economic and Social History, p. 40.
108
Arash Khazeni, Tribes & Empire on the Margins of Nineteenth-Century Iran (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2009), p. 24.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 194 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

While nomads were an integral part of the economy in several regions,

this does not mean that there was no friction with settled populations.
The Ottoman local records contain complaints from each group against
the other. Villages wrote to protest animals straying into fields during
migrations or pastured in their fields without permission. Settled popula-
tions who herded animals complained of the theft of their livestock. There
were numerous instances of nomads collecting extra taxes for protection
and of attacks on villages or caravans. The nomads likewise lodged
complaints: they had animals seized while on migration even though
they had paid the full tax; they were sometimes charged exorbitant
pasture dues, even on government land to which they had rights; and
when they reclaimed abandoned lands, the original owners sometimes
returned to seize them. In adjudicating between the two groups the
Ottoman government tried to remain evenhanded.109
The maintenance of security on trade and pilgrimage routes was
a constant source of tension. When pilgrimage authorities failed to fulfill
their obligations to the Bedouin, or when contracts went to the enemies of
nearby tribes, Bedouin responded by raiding. Small-scale raids could be
tolerated, but the authorities sometimes met larger attacks with bloody
reprisals. In the seventeenth century relations worsened, and twice, in
1632, and again from 1683 to 1699, there was serious violence in the
desert from both sides.110 At times trade and travel were largely blocked
by inimical tribal forces attacking caravans, particularly in Syria and Iraq.
We see various causes for breakdowns in order. Periods of hardship
among nomads due to weather conditions or the immigration of new
populations such as the ‘Anaza often caused fighting over scarce
resources and attacks on travelers. Grievances over high taxation, military
conscription, or other ill-treatment also resulted in raiding. The
Ottoman-Safavid border in Khuzistan was almost always a region of
conflict, in which travel was difficult and dangerous.111
In administrative structures nomads held an anomalous place. Many
nomad populations were required to serve in the military, and thus were
taxed at a somewhat lower rate than peasants. There were two standard
nomad taxes which had existed at least since the Mongol period: a herd
tax calculated on the number of animals, and pasture dues. Dues for
pasture might also be collected privately, by the owners of land useful for

109
Murphy, “Some Features,” pp. 194–195; Kasaba, Moveable Empire, p. 30; Khoury,
State and Provincial Society, p. 61; Moshe Sharon, “The Political Role of the Bedouins in
Palestine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in Studies on Palestine during the
Ottoman Period, ed. Moshe Ma‘oz (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975), pp. 15, 20.
110
Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans, pp. 65–69.
111
Sharon, “Political Role,” pp. 15–22; Matthee, “Between Arabs, Turks,” pp. 58, 72–74.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Military Developments 195

nomads.112 Some nomad populations were required to provide particular

products. In the Ottoman Empire we find groups delivering arrows or
butter to the state, and in Iran the Bakhtiyari Lurs paid an annual tribute
in mules.113 There is some scholarly controversy over Ottoman policies
towards nomads in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, particularly
on the issue of tax. A few taxes were added on nomads in general, while
tax incentives were organized to encourage settling. Some scholars con-
sider the taxes levied on nomads as a serious burden that was designed to
encourage settlement; others believe taxes were reasonable.114
In most of the Ottoman Empire, the proportion of nomad to settled
population seems to have declined over the period under discussion.
Figures for the sixteenth century have been analyzed and show that while
both the nomad and the settled population was growing, the overall
percentage of nomads within the population of the whole of Anatolia
declined somewhat.115 For much of Anatolia this trend appears to have
been reversed with the Jelali rebellion and climate extremes at the end of
the century.116 In the Arabian Peninsula, the Syrian desert and the Safavid-
Ottoman border, nomads continued numerous, autonomous and active in
military affairs. In Iran, as I have stated above, nomadism seems to have
increased, especially at the beginning and the end of this period. Thus,
from the Ottoman borders through Iran, nomadic tribes formed a central
part of the political and social fabric at the end of the eighteenth century.

Military Developments
In the three centuries from 1500 to 1800, the global military balance
shifted in favor of European powers while the military power of Iran
declined in relation to that of the Ottomans. We need to consider what
role nomadism played in this development. Since Europe vastly improved
its military technology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, fire-
arms have been cited as a major factor and nomad disdain for new
technology has been seen as one cause for Safavid inferiority to the
Ottomans. However, recent scholarship has brought this analysis into
question. In a region like Europe, with a high population density and

112
Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, pp. 56–59; Kasaba, Moveable Empire, p. 27; Inalcik and
Quataert, Economic and Social History, p. 36; Murphy, “Some Features,” p. 193;
Fragner, “Social and Internal Economic Affairs,” pp. 538–539.
113
Inalcik, “The Yürüks,” p. 54; Garthwaite, Khans and Shahs, p. 49.
114
Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, pp. 56–62, 82–84; Murphy, “Some Features,” p. 193;
Khoury, State and Provincial Society, p. 31.
115
Barkan, “Ottoman Fiscal Surveys,” p. 169. Note these figures include Karaman,
Zulkadiriye and other regions of central and eastern Anatolia.
116
White, The Climate of Rebellion, pp. 238–243.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 196 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

increasing use of infantry, firearms quickly led to a military revolution. In

the Middle East, where the terrain was more difficult and distances often
very large, cannon had fewer advantages. Armies did profit from heavy
artillery in sieges but sacrificed mobility and lost time in reaching their
destination.117
Handguns were also used in the Middle East, but the early ones had
serious drawbacks. Early muskets were loaded through the barrel, the soldier
first measuring out the powder, and then loading wadding, powder and
pellet and ramming them down. It was difficult to do all this on horseback,
and most horsemen dismounted to use their guns. In Europe, massed
firepower worked well against armies of infantry and heavy cavalry. In the
Middle East gunmen usually faced mounted archers, some of whom could
discharge up to six arrows a minute while charging, circling or retreating.
This made reloading a dangerous affair. Middle Eastern light cavalry more-
over used the compound bow of the Mongols which had a longer range and
far greater accuracy than muskets. Even with the improved muskets of the
eighteenth century, soldiers shooting at a target 33 yards wide at 67 yards
scored only 46 percent of the time. The experienced archers of the mamluk
army on the other hand were expected to be able to hit a target of 38 inches
at 75 yards.118 Once the charge was over and the armies engaged in hand-to-
hand combat, the musket was less useful than the saber.
Nonetheless, Middle Eastern powers were eager to acquire and use
firearms. One advantage they offered was that they required much less
training than did mounted archery.119 The ruler could conscript towns-
men and peasants with no previous military experience, train them, and
have an army responsible directly to him. The Ottomans, whose military
efforts were focused primarily against Europe, were the first to develop
firearms and over time increased infantry at the expense of cavalry. Two
decisive Ottoman victories are attributed to their superior firepower: the
Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, when the Ottomans defeated Shah Isma‘ il;
and their victory over the mamluks at Marj Dabiq in 1516, which sealed
the conquest of Egypt and Syria.120
Nomad armies of mounted archers did sometimes look down on artil-
lery and firearms as dirty and demeaning. Nonetheless, the Safavid armies
were using artillery within a year of coming to power, although they never

117
Kenneth Warren Chase, Firearms: A Global History to 1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), p. 23; Rhoads Murphy, Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700 (New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999), p. 66.
118
Chase, Firearms, pp. 24, 73–74.
119
Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West,
1500–1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 17.
120
Chase, Firearms, pp. 104–105; Savory, Iran under the Safavids, pp. 41–43.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Military Developments 197

integrated it as fully into their army as the Ottomans.121 We find

firearms prominent in the army of Nadir Shah, where they were also
used by cavalry units, and the largely nomadic powers that contested
Iran after Nadir Shah’s fall also had firepower.122 By the late sixteenth
century many Bedouin owned firearms, and by the mid-seventeenth
century the Kurds on the Safavid-Ottoman border seem to have had
them as well.123
However, while firearms were decisive in some battles, they did not win
the wars. What was most decisive in war was organization, logistics and
discipline; it was excellence in these that gave the Ottomans a permanent
advantage over the Safavids. Ottoman soldiers were well nourished and
well equipped, and they were motivated through substantial and predict-
able rewards.124 The Iranian armies – based first on tribal contingents,
later on a variety of competing forces, and not regularly paid – were much
less reliable. Thus, we cannot ascribe the decline of Middle Eastern armies
primarily to inferior firepower. If the presence of nomad populations in
regional armies had a negative effect, it was not because they refused to use
firearms but because tribal autonomy made some difficult to control.
Despite the problem of discipline, nomads remained an important part
of the military. In Iran and Afghanistan, they constituted a significant
proportion of the army through the eighteenth century. In the Ottoman
Empire nomads lost importance in the central army, but they remained
useful in the waging of war on both fronts. They provided livestock
products to feed the army, supplied animals for transport, and often
organized the transport itself. They were used for intelligence, and had
a role also in the deployment of artillery because they could scout out the
routes ahead of the army and could also cover the army in retreat; it was
local Kurds, for instance, who made it possible for the Ottomans to
retreat and regroup safely after their failure to take Baghdad in 1620.125
For Ottoman campaigns, the use of nomad troops often tipped the scales
in their favor.126 Thus while the management of nomadic tribes was
a headache for many states, interstate competition – in other words,
war – was still difficult without them.

121
Chase, Firearms, p. 117; Matthee, Persia in Crisis, p. 112; “Unwalled Cities and Restless
Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid Iran,” in Safavid Persia, ed. Charles Melville
(London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 391.
122
Axworthy, “Army,” pp. 635–641; Perry, Karı̄ m Khā n Zand, pp. 68, 87.
123
Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans, p. 69; Matthee, “Unwalled Cities,” pp. 405–407;
Matthee, Persia in Crisis, pp. 144, 217–218.
124
Murphy, Ottoman Warfare, pp. 85–98, 166.
125
Murphy, Ottoman Warfare, pp. 74, 82, 109; Murphy, “Resumption,” pp. 316–317.
126
Murphy, Ottoman Warfare, pp. 67–71, 191.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 198 The Rise of Nomad Tribes, 1500–1800

Conclusion
The Middle Periods have been seen as the age of the steppe traditions, which
were still relevant in most of the Middle East through much of the fifteenth
century. Nomads were a significant portion of the population in many
regions and were particularly powerful in Anatolia where Turkmen tribal
confederations became expansive powers. With the conquest of Iran first by
the Qaraqoyunlu and then the Aqqoyunlu, both new nomads and a stronger
tribal structure were imported into Iran, initiating a new era of tribal organ-
ization in both provincial government and the military. At the turn of the
sixteenth century this process was completed by Isma‘il’s creation of the
Safavid state, which brought a continued influx of Anatolian nomads. The
conquests of the Ottoman sultan Selim I blocked Safavid expansion west
and created a long borderland stretching from the Gulf to the Caucasus.
Over the next centuries the Ottomans faced successive Iranian states across
a buffer zone made up of primarily nomadic and tribal populations largely
outside the control of either state. Here both nomad and tribal power was
strengthened by the need for local allies on the part of the rival powers. One
should note that while this was a border region for both states, for the Middle
East it was a central area straddling major trade routes.
The Mongols and Timurids had suppressed tribalism while retaining
their steppe nomad origin both as a source of legitimacy and as a bond with
the armies that served them. The Ottomans and Safavids referred some-
times to Turkic traditions – the Oghuz in the Ottoman case, and
Tamerlane in the Safavid – but their primary legitimation was within the
religious tradition of the Middle East. Both used nomads in their military,
but were likewise threatened by them, in large part probably because of the
strength of tribal powers. Even the Safavids, who created the Qizilbash
oymaqs, soon attempted to dilute their power and their ideological import-
ance. Despite continued reliance on nomad troops, the sense of a common
origin with the dynasty declined. In the ideological sphere, we see here the
end of the Turco-Mongolian age. Nadir Shah’s attempt to revive the
steppe heritage in a unified Turkic identity did not last beyond his lifetime.
In the political and economic sphere, nomads remained more import-
ant. The Ottomans succeeded in suppressing nomad powers through
their central territories, including much of Anatolia, but tribes and
nomads remained integral to society and politics in Kurdistan, Syria,
Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula. In Iran, despite the efforts of the
Safavid shahs, nomads remained integrated into both the military and
provincial system and dominated the region.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.009 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 8 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries were a decisive period for

nomads in the Middle East. At the end of the eighteenth century,
nomad pastoralists had lost numbers and influence in the central
Ottoman lands, but their tribes still wielded considerable power in the
eastern borderlands, much of Syria, and the Arabian Peninsula. In Iran
they remained a significant proportion of the population and furnished
the majority of military personnel. By the late twentieth century, there
were fewer nomads; those who remained contributed to the regional
economy but could wield no force and had little influence. Over the
centuries discussed in this book we have seen periodical fluctuations in
nomad numbers and strength, but the changes described in this chapter
are likely to be permanent.
The most fundamental causes of this change were the modernization of
the Middle East and the encroachment of European powers. In the
eastern Ottoman lands, the nineteenth century begins with decentraliza-
tion and apparently an increase in nomad population. However, while the
Ottomans were losing power in relation to Europe, internally this was
a period of consolidation and systematization, with the imposition of
increasing control over nomadic tribes. The Ottoman government, rec-
ognizing its military and economic inferiority to Europe, began a series of
modernizing reforms in the late eighteenth century. These culminated in
the Tanzimat reforms introduced in 1839 by Sultan Abdul-Mejid (1839–
1861). The new order militated against the regional accommodations of
city, town, and nomad which had developed throughout the eighteenth
century.
The Middle East was also undergoing a revolution in transport, with
the introduction first of steam navigation and then of the railroad.
Increasing integration into the world economy encouraged tribal shaykhs
to invest in agriculture at the expense of pastoralism. By the end of the
nineteenth century, it is clear that many nomads had begun to settle and
to practice agriculture. In Iran, westernizing reform movements started

199

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 200 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

later and went less deep. Throughout the nineteenth century most nomad
tribes remained intact and in control of significant territory, while tribal
contingents remained the greater part of the army. However, the new
economic order affected Iranian nomads just as it did those of the
Ottoman Empire. As tribal shaykhs became more fully involved in the
global economy, their interests sometimes became increasingly distant
from those of their followers.
Earlier travelers to the Middle East had provided some general descrip-
tion of pastoral nomads and tribal populations. By 1800 the European
powers had become actively involved in the Middle East and there was an
interest in the science of ethnography among academics and administra-
tive personnel. The Arabian tribes attracted particular attention; they
inhabited strategic regions and the Bedouin offered a rich and romantic
culture for study. For this reason, we have both documents and detailed
reports by travelers and scholars who attempted to document the
nomadic lifestyle, providing us a fuller understanding of tribal structure
and the relationship between nomads and settled communities.
European involvement in the Middle East often worked against the
interests of nomads in encouraging government controls and mechanized
transportation. At the same time the British, deeply involved in the Gulf,
offered alternative partnerships to neighboring pastoralists. The disrup-
tions of the early twentieth century, with the Constitutional Revolution in
Iran and World War I throughout the region, brought a resurgence of
nomad activity and strength. In both Iran and the Ottoman Empire
nomad tribes were often pulled into the struggle and offered a choice of
allies. This period was the last great moment of nomad power, but it
created a new order in which nomads have played a lesser part.

The Ottoman Lands in the Early Nineteenth Century

The beginning of the nineteenth century was a time of strength for the
nomads and tribes in the eastern Ottoman territories. In the Kurdish
regions new emirates achieved considerable autonomy and took part in
the politics of Iran and the eastern Ottoman lands. The northern Syrian
desert, formally under the governors of Damascus and Aleppo, was
largely controlled by Arab tribes among whom the ‘Anaza was para-
mount. In most of the Hawran, which cultivated rain-watered grain,
Bedouin shaykhs shared power with local rulers while farther south and
east, in the Balqa region, Bedouin tribes were dominant.1 The province of

1
Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850–1921
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Ottoman Lands in the Early Nineteenth Century 201

Baghdad, still under the control of Mamluk governors, was largely

autonomous. Its eastern and southern regions were governed in uneasy
cooperation with local tribes, while the south was closely involved with
the politics of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. At the outset of
the nineteenth century most of the Arabian Peninsula was under the
control of the first Sa’udi state, which was still expanding.
Even with the fuller information we have on this period, it is not always
clear which tribes we should count among the nomads. Almost all of the
important Arab tribes included several economic strategies – camel
nomadism, sheep and goat herding, and agriculture. In most of the
Arabian Peninsula, villagers and town dwellers also held strong tribal
affiliations, particularly among the elite, and those who did not have
a tribal genealogy were considered inferior.2 Some tribes are noted as
having a primarily Bedouin lifestyle; these include the Shammar, ‘Anaza
and Tayy in the Jazira and Syrian desert, with the Bedouin Shammar also
important in the Najd.3
The economies of nomad, town, and village were closely related, and
one might talk of a spectrum of economic strategies. Villagers usually
raised some livestock in nearby pastures, and the urban elite sometimes
owned large flocks, for which they hired herders.4 Many nomads, even
Bedouin, planted crops in seasonal pastures, and some ordinary nomads
also worked in the fields as day labor during harvest.5 Bedouin shaykhs
often owned date palm plantations; sometimes they collected a share of
the harvest from farmers and sometimes they cultivated plantations dir-
ectly through tribal labor and slaves. Some owned additional agricultural
land which they managed like other large landowners, giving the land out
to be cultivated by sharecroppers to whom they provided seed and
implements.6
We can see the functioning of the khuwwa system in more detail during
this period. The extent to which it provided actual protection within the
tribal dı̄ ras varied widely. In some places there does seem to have been
a sense of common community and interest across different populations.
In Transjordan for instance, the Bani Sakhr tribe stationed a member of
the tribe in each village as a “brother” to take responsibility for protection

2
Juhany, Najd, pp. 95–97; Rogan, Frontiers of the State, pp. 7–8.
3
Tom Nieuwenhuis, Politics and Society in Early Modern Iraq: Mamlū k Pashas, Tribal
Shaykhs and Local Rule between 1802 and 1831 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982),
pp. 122–132.
4
Khoury, State and Provincial Society, pp. 60–61; Madawi al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian
Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 15–17.
5
Norman N. Lewis, Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan, 1800–1980 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 5; Juhany, Najd, p. 75.
6
Rasheed, Politics, pp. 16, 76, 95–96; Lewis, Nomads and Settlers, pp. 31, 158.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 202 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

and to adjudicate disputes according to Bedouin law.7 It seems likely that

relations between nomad and settled were closer in regions distant from
the larger urban centers, where populations went back and forth between
pastoralism and agriculture. In Syria, the relatively close relations
between Bedouin and town in Transjordan, mentioned above, contrasts
with the more conflictual relationship found for instance in the Aleppo
region.
While the system of khuwwa worked under favorable conditions, both
villages and caravans often found that the payments were extorted by
force and did not ensure protection. This practice was undoubtedly
caused in part by the overbearing behavior of powerful Bedouin tribes,
with a custom of raiding both nomad and settled. To some extent,
however, it was the normal functioning of states which did not possess
a monopoly of force. Similar complaints were voiced about the Ottoman
authorities, who arrived to collect taxes with an armed force and likewise
sometimes failed to protect the population.8
For provincial governors the control of the tribal populations was
a constant challenge. Although governors could certainly inflict punish-
ment, they did not have the military force to maintain control over the
desert routes or to collect taxes in the more remote desert and steppe
regions. They could ally with the strongest tribes and bolster the power of
their shaykhs with subsidies and titles. Ottoman officials also often
involved themselves in tribal succession struggles, attempting to install
rulers who would be reliable allies. Another option was the time-honored
practice of fomenting strife among the tribes in order to weaken them all.
As we have seen in earlier periods, this strategy usually worked only in the
short term and at the expense of the population, which suffered the
hardships of constant strife. Despite this, it remained a common practice
in the nineteenth century.
The actions of the governor of Aleppo dealing with the ‘Anaza provide
a good example of the limitations of government control and the variety of
motivations that animated governors’ decisions. The Fid‘an section of the
‘Anaza was the major tribe in the summer pastures near Aleppo. During
the 1811 migration, they ruined forty villages and destroyed the harvest.
However, instead of inflicting punishment, the next year the governor of
Aleppo attempted to use the ‘Anaza troops against other problem groups,
both the janissaries and rebel governors. By 1816 the ‘Anaza were raiding
west of Aleppo, where they seized a caravan and had to be bought off. In
7
Rogan, Frontiers of the State, pp. 26, 33–35.
8
Frontiers of the State, pp. 21, 41–42; Frederick F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The
Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (New York: Columbia University Press,
1997), pp. 58–59, 62.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Implementation of the Tanzimat 203

1818 there were skirmishes with the governor’s troops, which ended in
a negotiated peace.9 The relationship with the ‘Anaza was both too equal
and too useful to compromise by excessive use of force.
The first decades of the nineteenth century were a tumultuous time.
The Sa’udi-Wahhabi state achieved a series of spectacular victories,
gaining control over most of the Arabian Peninsula. When the
Wahhabis reached the limits of expansion, they lost the loyalty of their
allies and they were overthrown in 1818 through the power of the
Ottoman governor Muhammad ‘Ali, by then essentially independent in
Egypt. Muhammad ‘Ali also controlled the Holy Cities as governor of the
Hijaz, and for a decade, from 1831 to 1841, he extended his power over
most of Syria. During this time, however, the Ottomans did manage to
reassert control over several other border regions. In 1831, with the help
of Kurds and other local tribes, they overthrew the Mamluk governor of
Baghdad and put the province under direct Ottoman rule. In a series of
expeditions from the 1830s to the 1850s, Ottoman troops managed to
destroy the independent Kurdish emirates of eastern Anatolia and insti-
tute more direct rule. In 1841 the Hijaz and the Holy Cities returned to
Ottoman rule under the restored Hashemite Sharif dynasty which had
held it earlier.
Two developments of the 1830s had less immediate effect but brought
greater long-term change. One of these was the introduction of steamship
transport in the Gulf and along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Steam
power had relatively little impact at the beginning, since the tribes along
the rivers could collect khuwwa from boats as well as caravans, but over
time the efficiency of new transport and the British power behind it led to
a shift in trade routes from land to water, cutting into the Bedouin
economy.10 The other crucial event was the beginning of the modernizing
Tanzimat reforms in 1839 with the Khatt-i sherif of Gülkhane, the first of
a series of decrees aiming to institute a more European form of govern-
ance. These reforms introduced a major shift in the understanding of
government and society. All classes were to be treated alike, and fixed
taxes would be collected by government agents.

The Implementation of the Tanzimat

The Tanzimat laws were promulgated over a period of several decades
and implemented gradually, especially in the more remote border prov-
inces. One aim was to decrease the independence of tribes and to increase
agriculture at the expense of pastoralism. New land laws culminating in

9 10
Lewis, Nomads and Settlers, pp. 9–10. Fattah, Politics, pp. 124–127, 137–138.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 204 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

the Land Law of 1858 required registration of land based on written proof
of ownership, which rarely existed. This provision made it difficult to
preserve the collective ownership and the practice of seasonal land use
rights on which pastoralism depended.
The implementation of the Tanzimat was neither smooth nor steady.
Among the early measures was the introduction of a census and military
conscription. Governors in Syria and Iraq began to implement the census
over the 1840s and 1850s, while extending government administration
into the frontier through military campaigns. In 1845 the governor of
Aleppo fortified the steppe frontier, attacked the Bedouin and ordered the
restoration of villages and uncultivated fields. In 1852 there was a major
settlement program in the summer pastures of the Fid‘an tribe of the
‘Anaza near Aleppo. Tribesmen were given land with tax exemptions, and
their shaykhs were paid as irregular cavalry. This worked for a while, but
some groups returned to nomadism when the tax exemptions ended.11
During the same period, the Ottoman government in Damascus began
military campaigns into northern Transjordan, but actual control proved
difficult.12 Local tribes continued to collect khuwwa, and the district soon
returned to the control of tribes and village headmen. In Baghdad,
attempts to impose a census and conscription began with the creation of
the regional army in the 1840s, but the negative reaction limited the
implementation to the central regions; in the late 1850s an attempt to
impose conscription on the southern tribes led to insurrection.13
Expeditions in the 1860s had more permanent results and at this time
the Ottomans began to install garrisons in tribal and nomadic regions.14
In 1867 the Damascus government successfully asserted control over the
tribes in the hinterlands of Hims and Hama, and incorporated the north-
ern regions of ‘Ajlun in Transjordan.15 In 1868 the governor of Aleppo
created the Governorate of the Desert, establishing military posts stretch-
ing northeast from Damascus, at Dayr al-Zawr, Palmyra, Sukhna and
Qaryatayn. Actual control was still difficult to attain, however. The river
tribes of mixed livelihoods were forced to pay taxes, but the more fully
nomadic Shammar and ‘Anaza rebelled and did not accept the govern-
ment camel tax until the end of the century.16 In the 1870s, the energetic
governor of Baghdad, Midhat Pasha, began to extend control over the

11
Lewis, Nomads and Settlers, pp. 42–45. 12 Rogan, Frontiers of the State, pp. 45–48.
13
Ebubekir Ceylan, The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and
Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011),
pp. 58–64, 76.
14
Fattah, Politics, p. 187.
15
Rogan, Frontiers of the State, p. 48; Lewis, Nomads and Settlers, pp. 124–125.
16
Lewis, Nomads and Settlers, pp. 30–33.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Implementation of the Tanzimat 205

outlying districts, established a line of military posts along the Euphrates,

and implemented conscription among the tribes with only partial success.
The advance of Ottoman control continued to meet with resistance from
settled and nomad alike. Military conscription was particularly unpopu-
lar; even in the early twentieth century, it could not be safely imposed on
all regions. In the desert regions of southern Transjordan, conscription
and disarmament were still out of the question for the tribes.17
While resistance led the Ottoman government to desist in its efforts to
impose conscription, in the matter of taxation it was more successful.
However, even after the imposition of government taxation, the nomad
tribes were reluctant to give up their collection of khuwwa, which they
considered their right. The tribes often continued to collect in places
where they retained sufficient strength, or when troops withdrew they
might resume collection. The result was that peasants sometimes found
themselves paying both the government tax and the khuwwa.18
Despite some successes, the Ottomans did not have the manpower to
enforce their rule continuously. One expedient they used was to adapt the
old system of recognizing paramount tribal shaykhs within a more cen-
tralized system. This system could be used to undercut the authority of
tribal shaykhs. Shaykhs sometimes received tax farms for their own dis-
tricts or were appointed as subgovernors (kaymakam). They thus became
part of the administration; they were responsible for delivering the taxes
set by the regional government and could be dismissed. The government
sometimes demanded extortionate taxes, making the shaykh unpopular
with the tribe. Dı̄ ras might be divided into several tax farms, diluting the
central tribal authority.19 With greater incorporation of tribal areas into
the government tribesmen increasingly turned to government authorities
to solve disputes and some shaykhs began to lose their role as judges and
arbitrators.20 With government patrols, their military role was reduced
and the possibility of collecting khuwwa destroyed; they then lost the
ability to redistribute wealth, which had been a cornerstone of tribal
authority. Taken together these changes gradually undermined the
internal position of the tribal shaykhs whose lands were more fully
incorporated.
The restructuring of land ownership brought even greater changes.
The Provincial Land Law promulgated in 1858 was designed in part to
promote the extension of agricultural land and the sedentarization of
nomads. It had a profound impact on the tribes, most particularly the
17
Rogan, Frontiers of the State, pp. 186, 214.
18
Lewis, Nomads and Settlers, pp. 29, 32, 37–38, 125.
19
Ceylan, Ottoman Origins, pp. 128, 142–144, 162–163.
20
Ceylan, Ottoman Origins, p. 106; Rogan, Frontiers of the State, pp. 181–183.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 206 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

sections that practiced nomadism. Land was now to be surveyed, classi-

fied and registered in the name of individuals. To prove a claim to land,
customary usage rights were no longer sufficient – only three forms of
acquisition were recognized: inheritance, purchase or grant by
a government authority. Very few tribal people, nomad or peasant,
could prove ownership of the land they used, almost all of which was
collective and regulated by the tribal shaykhs.21 Some dı̄ ra lands were
forcibly taken by the state and given to new settlers, and some tribal
claims were refused. In other cases, however, the government used incen-
tives to get tribes to accept the division of the dı̄ ra into individual
landholdings.
The smaller and more sedentary tribes were more likely to divide the
land broadly, while in the richer tribes, and especially those for whom
pastoralism was the major economy, the leading shaykhs were able to
register large amounts of land in their own names.22 The creation of new
categories of saleable land produced a lively market. Some lands went into
the hands of city elites, but much remained with the shaykhs.
Landowning was not new to tribal shaykhs, but as their personal holdings
increased, the pastoral economy became less important to them. The
Middle East was now part of the world economy and had begun to export
grain and other agricultural produce; indeed, even before the land law
some tribal shaykhs had been major dealers in grain. Now many found
greater advantage in agriculture, which produced higher profits than
pastoralism, and they began to encourage tribesmen to settle.23 As
a smaller portion of their power and prestige came from the tribe itself,
the interests of the shaykhs were less closely allied with those of ordinary
members of the tribe.
Over the course of the nineteenth century the tribes of Syria and Iraq lost
autonomy, and sedentarization significantly increased. Change, however,
came slowly. Ottoman centralization provoked resistance, with frequent
rebellions and Bedouin raids, and southern Transjordan and the northern
Syrian desert retained considerable independence. Even in the early twenti-
eth century, some tribes continued to collect khuwwa. With the market for
camels still quite strong, the Bedouin economy remained profitable.24

21
Ceylan, Ottoman Origins, pp. 160–161; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of
the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977),
p. 114.
22
Rogan, Frontiers of the State, pp. 88–89.
23
Lewis, Nomads and Settlers, pp. 127–130; Fattah, Politics, pp. 156–157; Ceylan, Ottoman
Origins, p. 164.
24
Lewis, Nomads and Settlers, 34–35, 37, 156.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Iran under the Qajars 207

The Arabian Peninsula followed a separate trajectory and experienced

much less direct pressure from the Ottoman government. It remained
only marginally within the Ottoman Empire, with its tribes essentially
intact. The Ottomans could neither manage to exert full control nor leave
the region entirely to its own devices. The Hijaz remained under dual rule
until World War I, with Ottoman officials responsible for commercial,
political and foreign relations. The Hashemite Sharifs managed the two
Holy Cities and the tribal confederations which surrounded them. It was
thus their responsibility to safeguard the route of the pilgrimage.25
After its defeat in 1818 the Wahhabi state had managed to find a refuge
in Riyadh and hold power until 1890 as a vassal of a new tribal power, the
Rashidi dynasty (1836–1921) of the Shammar confederation. The
Shammar were one of the largest and most powerful of the Bedouin
confederations, but like others, also included sheep and goat nomads
and sedentary populations. The Rashidi dynasty was a sedentary lineage
which had established itself in the oasis of Hail in 1836 and had gained
recognition from the Shammar tribe; this was the first time that all the
Shammar of the Peninsula had formally recognized a single leader.26 Up
to the end of the century, the dynasty remained in control of central
Arabia, from the Najd to Jabal Shammar, benefitting from the control
of the caravan trade that passed through, from the collection of khuwwa
and from subsidies provided first by the Egyptians and later by the
Ottomans. For control over the tribes, they maintained a small private
army of slaves and settled soldiers while using Shammar tribal troops for
occasional campaigns. This was a classic tribal state in which rulers used
their authority to allot pasture and redistribute resources, along with
superior access to information, to maintain their power. The Ottoman
government generally favored the Rashidi state but gave some subsidies
also to outside tribal leaders.27 The Arabian Peninsula therefore did not
undergo the social, economic and political transformation that the later
nineteenth century brought to the other Ottoman lands.

Iran under the Qajars

In Iran the position of nomads remained much stronger. The Qajar state
founded by Agha Muhammad Qajar in the 1790s began as a tribal con-
federation in a region divided among numerous competing powers. In the
early nineteenth century the Qajar shahs succeeded in building up a court
and bureaucracy in Tehran and in establishing provincial governorships

25
Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 30–31.
26
Rasheed, Politics, pp. 39, 45–46, 75. 27 Rasheed, Politics, pp. 69–82, 93.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 208 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

under Qajar princes, but they had inherited a region with little effective
bureaucracy and their armies were made up largely of tribal contingents.
In attempting to increase their power and to bring the population more
fully under control they were hampered by new geopolitical realities, with
England dominating the Gulf and the Russians advancing in the
Caucasus. There was no possibility of territorial expansion; instead, the
Qajars were soon embroiled in expensive defensive wars which brought
them neither prestige nor income. The possibilities for economic growth
were limited by European domination of the market in textiles, which the
Iranians exported, and in arms, which they needed. Though the shahs
were able to improve both security and the economy, they did not have
the power to extend their control directly into Iranian society.
A major source of weakness for the dynasty was its inability to create an
effective army independent of nomadic tribal manpower. From the begin-
ning of the century the shahs attempted to bring nomads more fully under
control, using many of the same techniques as the Ottomans. However,
they did not apparently try to settle nomads. Indeed, their policy seems to
have been both to retain nomads within Iran and to preserve
pastoralism.28 Nomadic tribesmen remained necessary to the state as
a military resource, as a source of crucial livestock products and for the
taxes they paid, and they were powerful in most regions of Iran. The
territories of the Qajar tribe in Azerbaijan and Mazandaran remained
central to the Qajar army and administration. The Shahsevan confeder-
ation occupied the region stretching from Western Azerbaijan towards
Qazwin. It had become an organized force under Nadir Shah but in the
nineteenth century its leadership became less centralized, and it did not
constitute a major power for much of this period.29 Farther to the west,
the Kurdish border states were generally under Ottoman more than Qajar
influence. Turkmen Afshar tribes were present in both Khorasan and
Azerbaijan along with a number of other tribal groups, some of which had
been resettled during the turbulent political period of the eighteenth
century.30
South and central Iran also supported large populations of nomads –
Iranian, Arab and Turkmen. The region from Isfahan to Khuzistan was
the territory of the Bakhtiyari, mentioned in Chapter 7. The Shiraz
countryside was dominated by the Qashqa’i confederation, whose tribes
migrated between winter pastures south and west of Shiraz and summer

28
See, for example, Lois Beck, The Qashqa’i of Iran (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1986), pp. 72–76; Tapper, Frontier Nomads, pp. 151–167.
29
Tapper, Frontier Nomads, pp. 21–26, 35–37.
30
Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1982), p. 15.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Shahs and Nomads in the Nineteenth Century 209

pastures north and northeast of the city.31 East of the Qashqa’i territories
were several originally independent tribes of mixed ethnicity, later formed
into the Khamsa confederation.32 The Gulf littoral was populated pri-
marily by Arab tribes, among whom the most prominent confederation
was the Banu Ka‘b of Muhammara (now Khorramshahr) east of Basra,
who combined pastoralism with agriculture.33 In the east, Iran suffered
from raiding by two largely nomadic tribal confederations straddling its
borders: the Baluch to the southeast, and in the northeast, the Yomut and
Göklen Turkmen. The Turkmen were particularly feared and disliked
because of their sale of Persian captives in the slave markets of Bukhara.34
As the century progressed, the tribes of Iran became increasingly
involved with outside powers. Some of the Shahsevan migrated between
Russian and Iranian territory and were thus under Russian control for
part of the year. The British had set up client states along the shores of the
Gulf and increasingly negotiated independently with tribes in Iranian
territories, including the Bakhtiyari, the Banu Ka‘b and the tribes of the
Khamsa confederation.

Shahs and Nomads in the Nineteenth Century

Agha Muhammad’s successors, starting with Fath ‘Ali Shah (r. 1797–
1834) are credited with moving against tribal power and increasing
internal security.35 Like the Ottomans, the shahs attempted to bring
tribes under control by formalizing rule over confederations, making
tribal leaders agents of the government to be appointed by the shah. In
1818–1819, Fath ‘Ali Shah bestowed the title of ilkhani on the Qashqai’i
chief Jani Khan, making him responsible for the tribal populations of
Fars.36 In 1839 Muhammad Shah (1834–1848) created the somewhat
lower position of ilbeg for the Shahsevan, appointing an ilbeg to each of the
major divisions of the confederation.37 The position of ilkhani was intro-
duced to the Bakhtiyari in the 1860s.38 For both the Qashqa’i and the
Bakhtiyari the office ilbegi was also used, not infrequently held by the

31
Pierre Oberling, The Qashqā ı̄ nomads of Fā rs (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), p. 15.
32
Beck, Qashqa’i, pp. 4, 79.
33
See Willem Floor, “The Rise and Fall of the Banū Ka‘b. A Borderer State in Southern
Khuzestan,” Iran 44 (2006).
34
Afsaneh Najmabadi, The Story of the Daughters of Quchan: Gender and National Memory in
Iranian History (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998), pp. 53–57.
35
Oberling, Qashqā ı̄ , pp. 48–49; Abbas Amanat, Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah
Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831–1896 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1997), p. 3.
36
Beck, Qashqa’i, pp. 52, 83. 37 Tapper, Frontier Nomads, p. 180.
38
Garthwaite, Khans and Shahs, p. 9.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 210 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

brother or son of the ilkhani. These two offices remained within the same
lineages into the twentieth century, thus creating a stable aristocratic
stratum. In 1861–1862 Nasir al-Din Shah (1848–1896) decided to bal-
ance tribal politics in Fars by creating a new confederation of five formerly
independent tribes, given the name Khamsa (five). They were put under
the leadership of a man from a Persian merchant family of Shiraz, ‘Ali
Muhammad Khan, who held the hereditary title of Qawam al-Mulk. ‘Ali
Muhammad Khan’s family was familiar with these tribes, from whom it
had recruited military forces to protect its commercial empire. The cre-
ation of the Khamsa confederation was encouraged by the British, who
were concerned with the safety of the southern routes.39
The ilkhanis and ilbegis were invested by the government as leaders of
their confederations and could therefore be dismissed, though official
dismissal did not always prevent tribesmen from continuing to obey
a leader they trusted. Ilkhanis were held responsible for collecting tribal
taxes due to the government, for maintaining order within their districts,
and particularly for maintaining security on the routes.40 Their position
gave them independent sources of revenue since they collected taxes also
for their own use and levied tolls both on tribesmen and on commercial
traffic along the roads they controlled. Two important routes went
through tribal territories in the south: the Shiraz-Bushehr route through
Qashqa’i lands and the Shiraz-Abadan route through the Khamsa
territory.41 Tribal management of the routes was a continuous source of
friction with the Iranian government and later in the century also with the
British, since raiding along them was a standard way for tribal populations
to express discontent or to weaken their rivals.42
While strong ilkhani leadership worked to increase security, it also
threatened to encroach on the power of provincial governors and of the
shah himself. Furthermore, the ilkhanis, as powerful members of the elite,
became involved in the politics of the dynasty. Like the Ottomans, the
Qajars tried to limit the strength of tribal confederations by undermining
or eliminating the leaders they had appointed when they became too
powerful, and by fomenting strife within the tribal leadership. I will give
one example here: In 1832 the Qashqa’i Ilkhani Muhammad ‘Ali was so
powerful that it was said he could make all of Fars rotate around his index
finger, and he felt free to make demands on the governor of Fars. When

39
Beck, Qashqa’i, pp. 79–83; Vanessa Martin, The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest and the
State in Nineteenth-Century Persia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 48–53.
40
Garthwaite, Khans and Shahs, pp. 82–83; Beck, Qashqa’i, pp. 80–83; Oberling, Qashqā ı̄ ,
p. 23; Tapper, Frontier Nomads, p. 183.
41
Garthwaite, Khans and Shahs, pp. 105, 107; Oberling, Qashqā ı̄ , pp. 83–84.
42
Oberling, Qashqā ı̄ , p. 92; Garthwaite, Khans and Shahs, p. 130.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Shahs and Nomads in the Nineteenth Century 211

the governor failed to fulfill his requests he moved many of his tribesmen
to the province of Kerman, where they were welcomed for the tax income
they would bring. Under pressure from the shah the governor was forced
to give in and the tribe returned.43 However, when a powerful ally of the
ilkhani in Azerbaijan died, the governor of Fars took his revenge; the
ilkhani was arrested, his estates in Shiraz plundered, and Qashqa’i graves
dug up. The ilkhani was later released and reinstated, only to be arrested
again a year or two later and moved to Tehran where he was kept hostage
for thirteen years.44
The tribal leaders did not depend entirely on the collective strength of
their followers for their position; they were also major landowners. The
Bakhtiyari ilkhani family held estates providing significant income, while
the Qashqa’i had a magnificent building in Shiraz and also large land-
holdings. The leading families of tribal confederations led their tribes not
as first among equals, but as a wealthy elite that was able to deal with the
provincial powers, the Qajar dynasty, and foreign states using the man-
power and economy of their followers as only one of their sources of
strength.45 In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Bakhtiyari
acquired a new source of wealth when the British D’Arcy concession
struck oil in their territories. Although the Bakhtiyari leaders were per-
suaded to settle for a small percentage of profits, their royalties and
further sale of land to the concession provided significant new
income.46 A description of Hajji Quli Sardar As‘ad and other Bakhtiyari
leaders by the British official Sir Mortimer Durand shows his surprise at
finding a leader of nomads who could deal with him in his own cultural
sphere:
[He had] a fine new house with many curious prints and pictures on the walls; and
his little son, a bright pleasant boy of twelve, came and read to us a little story out
of an English book . . . the chiefs were very well read. It was curious to hear them
talking of Stanley’s travels in Africa, and the war in the Transvaal, and bacteri-
ology, and all sorts of unexpected things. The Sipahdar told us he had a son who
was being educated in Paris.47

The ordinary nomads did not share all the advantages of their leaders.
Although in general the tax burden on nomads was lighter than that of
peasants, it was nonetheless oppressive and observers noted the poverty of
some nomads.48

43
Oberling, Qashqā ı̄ , p. 49. 44 Beck, Qashqa’i, pp. 72–76.
45
Beck, Qashqa’i, pp. 86–87. 46 Khazeni, Tribes and Empire, pp. 112–157.
47
Potts, Nomadism, pp. 328–329.
48
Oberling, Qashqā ı̄ , p. 60; Tapper, Frontier Nomads, pp. 188, 243.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 212 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

The Qajar Military

Nomads were an essential part of the Qajar military. Despite considerable
effort and the use of outside advisors and officers, the Qajars were never
able to create a standing army that was strong enough to enforce the will
of the state, let alone to defend its territory. Most of the cavalry, which
formed the core of the army, was recruited from nomadic populations.
Like earlier rulers in Azerbaijan, the shah called together tribal leaders at
the Persian new year in March and gave orders for the recruitment of
troops.49 Facing the expansionist Russian Empire on his border, Fath ‘Ali
Shah’s son ‘Abbas Mirza, governor of Azerbaijan, followed the lead of the
Ottomans and created a new standing army, the nizā m-jadı̄ d, which was
equipped with modern uniforms and trained by European officers. This
move aimed to make the state less dependent on tribal levies. Used
against the Russians in 1812, the unit suffered a humiliating defeat.
There were several further attempts at army reform over the century,
but the quality of the standing army remained low; it was poorly equipped
and even more poorly paid. Many soldiers had to turn to outside work to
survive, and mutinies were not infrequent.50 Training for most of the
troops concentrated on parade drill, the goal being to produce
a respectable army for reviews. Weapons practice was limited to the tribal
infantry who had already been trained in the use of firearms.51
The tribal cavalry regiments were considered a more effective force.
These were salaried forces provided in return for tax exemptions and were
led by tribal commanders.52 Most troops came from the north, but both
the Bakhtiyari and the Qashqa’i contributed regiments led by members of
the ilkhani families. Command of these contingents gave the younger
members of the family valuable experience and connections with the
dynasty and elites outside their territory.53 The armies serving the
Shahs were only a part of the military forces present in Iran. Princes
assigned to governorships were expected to raise armies from their
regions, and they often recruited tribesmen.54 The ilkhani families had
their own tribal contingents, and in some cases at least, the chiefs of

49
Tapper, Frontier Nomads, p. 185; Stephanie Cronin, Armies and State-Building in the
Modern Middle East: Politics, Nationalism and Military Reform (London: I. B. Tauris,
2014), p. 46; Potts, Nomadism, p. 297.
50
Cronin, Armies, pp. 55–62; Martin, Qajar Pact, pp. 134–143.
51
Reza Ra’iss Tousi, “The Persian Army, 1880–1907,” Middle Eastern Studies 24, no. 2
(1988), pp. 210–212.
52
Tousi, “The Persian Army, 1880–1907,” p. 217; Cronin, Armies, p. 63; Garthwaite,
Khans and Shahs, pp. 64–65.
53
Garthwaite, Khans and Shahs, pp. 64–65, 79–81; Oberling, Qashqā ı̄ , pp. 48, 70.
54
Beck, Qashqa’i, p. 75.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomads in the Constitutional Revolution and WWI 213

subordinate tribes likewise had private forces at their disposal.55 What

made nomad troops useful – and at the same time potentially dangerous –
was their access to modern firearms. Despite attempts by the shahs to
limit arms sales, the tribes were able to buy guns from the British in the
south or from the Russians in the north, and observers considered the
tribal confederations significantly better armed than the standing army.56
By the later nineteenth century, breech-loading firearms suitable for
mounted cavalry were available, and their use was a significant advantage.

Nomads in the Constitutional Revolution and World War I

After the death of Nasir al-Din Shah in 1896, the Qajars’ hold on power
outside the capital weakened, and tribal confederations became ascend-
ant in the provinces. Britain and Russia were deeply involved in Iranian
affairs, and their power was formalized in the Anglo-Russian agreement of
1907. This treaty divided Iran into three zones: the north under the
influence of Russia, the southeast under British influence, and the rest
a neutral zone. The British negotiated independently with the confeder-
ations of the south; they were closely allied with the powerful Shaykh
Khaz‘al who headed the Arab Banu Ka‘b confederation centered on the
border between Iran and Iraq. The Bakhtiyari also dealt directly with
British officials in their negotiations over the oil concession and the
Bakhtiyari road, which was built across the Zagros through Bakhtiyari
lands. Fars was officially part of the neutral zone, but it lay along the trade
routes to the Gulf and thus also attracted British interference.
The outbreak of the Constitutional Revolution in 1906 brought the
confederations into national politics. The country was divided between
those advocating a constitution and a parliament, and supporters of the
Shahs. As usual in periods of strife, tribal rivalries became aligned with
issues of national and international politics. These dynamics can be seen
clearly in the history of Fars. The strongest leader of the Qashqa’i during
this period was Isma‘il Khan Sawlat al-Dawla, who was able to muster 2
or 3,000 soldiers, at least for part of the year. Nevertheless, although he
held the position of ilkhani for most of the period from 1904 to 1933,
Sawlat al-Dawla was never able to control all members of the confeder-
ation. The tribes of Fars were split both on the constitutional issue and on
their relations with the British. Sawlat al-Dawla was an enemy of the
British, and he quickly sided with the constitutionalists against the shah,

55
Garthwaite, Khans and Shahs, pp. 80–81; Oberling, Qashqā ı̄ , p. 23; Tapper, Frontier
Nomads, pp. 239–243.
56
Potts, Nomadism, p. 323; Tousi, “The Persian Army, 1880–1907,” pp. 215, 218.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 214 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

allying with revolutionary clubs in Shiraz and the ulama of Fars and Najaf.
The rival Khamsa were close allies of the British and now sided with the
shah. With the victory of the constitutionalists and the creation of
a parliament (majlis), the major tribal confederations were ensured rep-
resentation, with seats for the Bakhtiyari, Qashqa’i, Khamsa, Shahsevan
and Turkmen.57
The Bakhtiyari became involved later but played a decisive role and for
a while gained national power. The main mover was the same Hajji ‘Ali
Quli Sardar As‘ad who so surprised Durand with his sophistication. He
had served as commander of the Bakhtiyari contingent within the prime
minister’s guard, then moved back and forth between the Bakhtiari
territories, service in Tehran, and residence in Europe. In 1909 when
Muhammad ‘Ali Shah dissolved the majlis, ‘Ali Quli was in Paris but
returned to Iran and allied with Shaykh Khaz‘al who provided funds for
a campaign. After gathering troops among the Bakhtiyari he and his
brother moved towards Tehran. As constitutionalist troops from the
north joined the Bakhtiyari, support for the shah crumbled and the
revolutionaries took the capital without violence, replaced Muhammad
‘Ali Shah with his young son Ahmad, and restored the majlis.58 In the
governments that followed, the Bakhtiyari elite played a leading part. ‘Ali
Quli Sardar As‘ad, for instance, served first as minister of the interior,
then as minister of war and as Majlis deputy, while his brother Najaf Quli
Khan Samsam al-Saltana was appointed as governor of Isfahan and later
served as prime minister. There were also Bakhtiyari governors in several
major cities, and Bakhtiyari troops remained garrisoned in the city until
the autumn of 1913.
Not surprisingly, the ascent of the Bakhtiyari brought a reaction among
the other tribes. Aiming to curb Bakhtiyari power, the Qashqa’i even
allied with their rivals, the Khamsa, and Ismaìl Khan Sawlat al-Dawla
created a brief alliance with Shaykh Khaz‘al of Muhammara and the
leader of the Lurs.59 As the government in Tehran suffered one crisis
after another, the countryside outside Tehran increasingly came under
the control of the tribal confederations. This situation brought disorder
and problems for both nomad and settled. Rivalry among confederations
was one problem; another was increasingly assertive leadership at the sub-
tribal level, which made it impossible for the ilkhanis to assert control over
their subordinates or to prevent raids along the routes. Both tribal power
and general disorder in Iran lasted through World War I. Iran began the
57
Beck, Qashqa’i, pp. 100–106.
58
‘A. A. Sa‘ı̄ dı̄ Sı̄ rjā nı̄ , “Baktı̄ ā rı̄ ; Hā jı̄ ‘Alı̄ qolı̄ Khan Sardā r As‘ad,” EIr; Khazeni, Tribes and
Empire, pp. 176–182. ˙
59
Oberling, Qashqā ı̄ , p. 91; Beck, Qashqa’i, p. 107.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Early Twentieth Century in the Arab Lands 215

twentieth century much as it had found itself before the Qajar dynasty,
with a central government unable to assert power over its nominal realm
and the countryside largely under the control of local powers, many of
them largely nomadic.

The Early Twentieth Century in the Arab Lands

During World War I the Ottoman Empire sided with the Axis powers and
became a significant theater in the war, which brought disruption and
suffering to nomad and settled populations but also offered opportunities
for self-assertion. Over the course of the nineteenth century the British
had gained influence over parts of the empire, concentrating their atten-
tion on Egypt and the Persian Gulf. When World War I broke out local
leaders had to decide which power to support. The two best-known
movements involving nomads were the creation of the new Sa‘udi state
and the Arab Revolt of 1916. Both began in the Arabian Peninsula, which
had preserved significant autonomy and a large Bedouin population.
Both initiatives, however, were led by people from the settled population
and owed part of their success to financial backing from European
powers.
The twentieth century transformed the Arabian Peninsula. At the turn
of the century the Ottomans began to build a modern infrastructure; the
telegraph was extended to the Hijaz in 1900 and the Hijaz railway reached
Medina in 1908, posing a threat to Bedouin income from the pilgrimage.
As a result, there were attempts to destroy the railroad tracks, which the
Ottomans countered with force but also with subsidies and gifts.60 The
beginning of the century also saw the rise of the second Sa’udi state,
created by ‘Abd al‘Aziz Al-Sa‘ud (Ibn Sa‘ud). The Sa’udis had lost
Riyadh in 1890 and had taken refuge in Kuwait; from here Ibn Sa‘ud
launched a successful surprise attack on Riyadh in 1902 with a force of
only forty to sixty men. Over the next several years he took several
commercial towns from the Rashidis. All this he achieved with an army
made up largely of townsmen. In 1913 he took the coastal region of Hasa,
a strategic region for the trade of the Peninsula, particularly for the
Shammar tribe. At this point the Ottomans, generally favoring the
Rashidi, came to an agreement also with Ibn Sa‘ud, recognizing him as
a vassal.61 Meanwhile the British India Office was searching for allies
against the Ottomans, and in 1915 they signed an agreement with Ibn
Sa‘ud as ruler of Najd, Hasa, and other territories, giving him a lump sum
of 20,000 pounds and promising a regular subsidy along with shipments

60 61
Rasheed, Politics, p. 209. Rasheed, A History, pp. 38–39.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 216 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

of machine guns and rifles. In return he was not to correspond with other
foreign powers or attack local leaders under British protection.62
While this was happening the British Commissioner in Cairo was
pursuing a different course, wooing the Hashimite ruler of the Hijaz,
Sharif Husayn, and encouraging him to rebel against the Ottomans. As
recompense he was promised an independent Arab kingdom after the
war, which would include Mesopotamia and most of Syria. The British
offered money, guns and grain in return. This was the famous Husayn-
McMahon correspondence. Although Sharif Husayn’s religious prestige
made him well-positioned to lead a revolt, he was less well off from
a military standpoint. The Ottoman government had about 12,000 troops
garrisoned in the cities of the Hijaz. The Sharif, responsible for the
countryside and the tribal confederations, had an insignificant regular
army and depended on volunteers from the tribal confederations.63 The
history of the Arab Revolt illustrates both the strengths and – even more
clearly – the limitations of Arab tribal armies.
Sharif Husayn remained the acknowledged leader, but the active fight-
ing was carried out by his four sons; the most central was Faysal about
whom we are well informed because the famous T. E. Lawrence –
Lawrence of Arabia – was attached to his camp. Sharif Husayn had
spent time in exile in Istanbul, and his sons were educated there. At the
same time, they were well schooled in the tribal politics necessary to
assemble a fighting force in the Hijaz.64 On June 2, 1916, Faysal and his
brother ‘Ali set out to gather tribal forces and on June 9 they cut the
railroad track and the telegraph lines, then defeated the Ottoman garrison
of Mecca. Over the months that followed they took Jeddah, Ta’if and
several Red Sea ports with the help of British forces. However, their
position soon deteriorated, and their forces began to disperse.65 While
Sharif Husayn and his sons were motivated by wider ambitions, their
tribal followers had primarily local concerns: rivalries with other tribes,
fear of Ottoman encroachment and the threat the railway posed to their
livelihood. They also required payment. Faysal had nothing to give and
had to disguise the fact by having a locked chest filled with stones con-
spicuously guarded by his slaves and carried into his tent every night.66

62
Rasheed, A History, pp. 39–40.
63
William Ochsenwald, Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman
Control, 1840–1908 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), pp. 154–158;
Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East (New York:
Basic Books, 2015), p. 302; Ali A. Allawi, Faisal I of Iraq (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2014), p. 73.
64
Allawi, Faisal, pp. 10–17.
65
Allawi, Faisal, pp. 69–70, 74–75; Rogan, The Fall, pp. 299–301.
66
Allawi, Faisal, p. 72.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomads in the Middle East after World War I 217

Over the next months the Hashemites managed to improve their

central army and to recoup their losses. For the army they recruited
both officers and soldiers from Arabs who had been Ottoman prisoners
of war, creating a small but dependable regular army. The British
furnished the funds needed to reward tribes, and crucial support in
holding the Hashemite positions.67 The progress of the Arab Revolt
often seemed to the British maddeningly slow and fitful: the princes
spent much of their time in meals and audiences, drinking coffee,
exchanging news and mediating disputes, but this activity was the
necessary prelude to gathering and keeping their armies. Since most
tribal volunteers only fought near to their own terrain, a campaign in
a new area required a new army; one coalition was used for the central
Hijaz, another had to be formed for the northern Hijaz, and yet another
for the campaign into Syria. While the forces of the Arab Revolt are often
referred to as Bedouin, in the Hijaz the majority came from largely
sedentary tribes, and at the beginning the camel riders made up at
most 10 percent. As the campaign moved north through more fully
nomadic territory, the Bedouin became an increasingly important part
of the army.68 Over time the Arab Revolt turned largely to guerrilla
tactics; one of their major assignments was to attack the Hijaz
Railroad, providing diversion for the Egyptian Expeditionary force
under Allenby. This task was well suited to the nomad and semi-
nomad tribes of the region, who were long accustomed to raiding travel
routes. The Arab Revolt thus fulfilled British needs and raised Faysal to
prominence as a successful leader. As it turned out, however, the revolt
did not win the expected rewards for either the Hashemites or the tribes
they led. The Hashemites were not given the territories they had been
promised, and the war brought changes, both technological and polit-
ical, which gradually undermined nomad power.

Nomads in the Middle East after World War I

After the first two decades of the twentieth century nomad tribes gradually
lost much of their influence. Neither the new states which arose at this
period, nor the European colonial powers wished to incorporate nomads
as earlier states had done. Part of this change was due to advances in military

67
Allawi, Faisal, p. 82; Rogan, The Fall, pp. 303–307.
68
Allawi, Faisal, pp. 77–80; Joseph Kostiner, “The Hashimite Tribal Confederacy of the
Arab Revolt, 1916–1917,” in National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays
in Honour of Elie Kedourie, ed. Edward Ingram (London: F. Cass, 1986), p. 13. See also
Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, Die Beduinen, vol. 2, 3 (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz,
1939–1952), vol. 2, pp. 232, 277, 293, vol. 3, p. 88.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 218 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

technology that allowed states to assert control over difficult regions.

Perhaps the most important weapon was the airplane, which was highly
effective against nomad troops and camps. Neither desert nor mountain
could now offer secure protection. Equally significant was the growing reach
of state infrastructure, which made it possible for the central government to
control the countryside and to collect taxes, while new roads and railways
replaced old trade routes and deprived nomads of much of their earlier
income. Thus, nomadic populations were weakened in part by force, and
in part by the changes inherent in modernization.
In the Arabian Peninsula the 1920s brought the rise of the Sa’udi
state. While the Hashemites were leading the Arab Revolt, Ibn Sa‘ud
had been expanding his power. In 1921 he inflicted a decisive defeat on
the Rashidis, and in 1925 completed his conquest of the Hashemite
kingdom, becoming the sultan of Najd and king of the Hijaz. Like many
other states of the period, the Sa‘udis used the nomads but eventually
helped to weaken them. Ibn Sa‘ud belonged to a sedentary lineage and
the core of his army came from village and agricultural populations;
throughout his career, these were the people he could count on.69
Wahhabi doctrine promoted a generally negative view of nomadism,
portraying nomads as ignorant and unobservant – they had to be
brought into the fold before they could be considered true Muslims.70
Nonetheless, Ibn Sa‘ud needed Bedouin troops and, like the Rashidis
and the Hashemites, he spent considerable time on tribal politics.
Under Ibn Sa‘ud a new movement developed which tapped the
manpower of the nomadic tribes: the Ikhwan (“brothers”), who
became active about 1912. It was customary to send preachers from
the Wahhabi villages to proselytize among the neighboring tribes.
These preachers had considerable success, even among the
Bedouin. Tribal converts were encouraged to abandon nomadism
and perform the hijra – that is, to move into a truly Islamic, and
settled, community. This policy was a direct reference to the Prophet
Muhammad’s hijra from Mecca to Medina and was also a recreation
of the hijra policy of the early Muslim rulers discussed in Chapter 2,
which encouraged men to leave their tribes and settle as soldiers in
the new garrison cities. Converts who answered this call at the time
of Ibn Sa‘ud were known as Ikhwan, and they settled in new towns

69
Abdulaziz H. al-Fahad, “The ‘Imama vs. the ‘Iqal: Hadari-Bedouin Conflict and the
Formation of the Saudi State,” in Counter-Narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and
Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, ed. Madawi al-Rasheed and Robert Vitalis (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 43, 49–50.
70
David Commins, The Mission and the Kingdom: Wahhabi Power behind the Saudi Throne
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2016), pp. 80–81; al-Fahad, “‘Imama,” pp. 42–45.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomads in the Middle East after World War I 219

called hijra (plural hujar) where they were expected to take up seden-
tary occupations but also be ready at all times to be called up for war.
The Ikhwan soon attempted to enforce the Wahhabi doctrine on
populations who were not fully compliant. The first hijra was set up
in 1913 and other settlements quickly developed thereafter, so that
by 1930 most tribes had settlements associated with them.71
Ibn Sa‘ud quickly began to make use of the Ikhwan, providing them
stipends and incorporating them into his armies. Scholars are not entirely
in agreement about their military importance, but they were certainly
a major force during Ibn Sa‘ud’s rise to power, pushing for expansion and
sometimes for forcible conversion.72 However the Ikhwan were a two-
edged sword, and the inner edge was almost as sharp as the outer. The
atrocities they committed against nomads and Shi‘ites created ill-will,
threatening Ibn Sa‘ud’s reputation, and they brought disorder both into
the state administration and into the management of tribal grazing
grounds. Their refusal to accept the borders agreed upon between Ibn
Sa‘ud and the British in 1925 and their continued raiding into Syria and
Iraq also threatened relations with the European powers. There were
crises in 1916, 1919, and 1925–1926, and from 1927 to 1930 on the
Ikhwan were fully in revolt, finally defeated only with the help of British
air power.73
It is difficult to assess how the Ikhwan related to nomadism or to
the issue of tribal power. On one hand, they gave up their animals to
take up a settled life, and the importance of this step was emphasized
both by the Ikhwan themselves, who often attacked nomads as infi-
dels, and by Ibn Sa‘ud.74 On the other hand, the boundaries between
the Ikhwan in the hujar and their Wahhabi fellow-tribesmen outside
were not always clear. It is notable that among the complaints from
the Ikhwan were the taxation of nomadic tribes and limitations on
grazing land.75 The relation of the Ikhwan movement to tribal power
is also ambiguous. The Ikhwan were to move away from the tribe
into the hujar. Meanwhile, tribal leaders were strongly invited to
move to Riyadh for proper indoctrination, where they were brought
into the central tribal council, and had to depend on the government

71
Rasheed, A History, pp. 57–58; John S. Habib, Ibn Sa’ud’s Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan
of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa’udi Kingdom, 1910–1930 (Leiden: Brill,
1978), pp. 47–59.
72
Joseph Kostiner, “On Instruments and Their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the
Emergence of the Saudi State,” Middle Eastern Studies 21, no. 3 (1985), pp. 306–307.
73
Kostiner, “On Instruments,” pp. 305, 309, 311–315; Rasheed, A History, pp. 62–68;
Habib, Ibn Sa‘ud’s Warriors, pp. 79–86.
74
Commins, Mission, pp. 85–87; Kostiner, “On Instruments,” pp. 308–309.
75
Commins, Mission, pp. 88–89.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 220 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

for gifts to distribute.76 On the other hand, most hujar were settled
by a particular tribe and remained associated with it; Ikhwan settled
in the hujar therefore retained loyalty to their tribal leaders. Chief
among these was Faysal al-Duwish, head of the Mutayr tribe, who
fought against the creation of frontiers which cut off migration
routes, restricted raiding, and denied tribes access to grazing and
wells.77
In general, scholars have interpreted the Ikhwan rebellion as
a movement to preserve tribal power; thus, Ibn Sa‘ud’s victory over the
Ikhwan should be seen as a victory for a centralized, non-tribal state.78 By
1925 he had abolished the tribal dı̄ ras and outlawed the practice of
intertribal raids. From the 1920s and increasingly after the defeat of the
Ikhwan, the nomad tribes were made dependent on subsidies from the
central government and lost much of their independence.79
In Iraq and Syria nomads and tribes also lost influence, while the
government gradually gained decisive power. After the war it became
clear that the British did not plan to honor their promises of Arab
independence, and that the French did not intend to give up Syria. The
French and British Mandates imposed foreign and more intrusive rule
which brought resistance from their new subjects. Nomads were involved,
but they were not the leaders in the larger movements. The Iraqi Revolt of
1920, remembered as a decisive moment in Iraqi national consciousness,
was begun by nationalists and depended on the military manpower of the
tribes of the middle and southern Euphrates who practiced agriculture
along with sheep and goat pastoralism.80 Some Bedouin of the northern
regions, notably the Shammar Jarba who occupied much of the Jazira,
were active at the beginning of the revolt, but they were quickly put down
by the British.81 The revolt in central and southern Iraq lasted several
more months, but the use of the British air force, with the destruction of
villages and other settlements, extinguished the uprising before the end of
the year.82 While many tribes resisted, some shaykhs played a different

76
Habib, Ibn Sa‘ud’s Warriors, pp. 30, 48–52. 77 Commins, Mission, pp. 88–89.
78
Rasheed, A History, p. 6; al-Fahad, “‘Imama,” p. 36; Kostiner, “On Instruments,”
p. 307.
79
Ugo Fabietti, “State Policies and Bedouin Adaptation in Saudi Arabia, 1900–1980,” in
The Transformation of Nomadic Society in the Arab East, ed. Martha Mundy and Basim
Musallam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 84–85.
80
Amal Vinogradov, “The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in
National Politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 3, no. 2 (1972).
81
Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
pp. 39–40; John Frederick Williamson, “A Political History of the Shammar Jarba
Tribe of al-Jazirah: 1800–1958,” unpublished PhD dissertation, Indiana University
(1974), pp. 154–155.
82
Vinogradov, “1920 Revolt,” pp. 136–138.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomads in the Middle East after World War I 221

game, allying themselves with successive powers, choosing them accord-

ing to their chances of success and their willingness to pay for service. The
prime example of this was Shaykh Nuri al-Sha‘lan of the Ruwalla
Bedouin: he first served the Ottomans, then joined Faysal in the Arab
revolt, and after that he went back and forth between the British and the
French, finally receiving a stipend from the French for safeguarding
caravans in the desert.83
Although nomads who resisted could be defeated, nomads did pose
a challenge to both the British and the French mandates, just as the new
order posed a challenge for them. The new boundaries drawn in the north
between the Turkish Republic, French Syria, and British Iraq and in the
south with the rising Sa’udi state, often divided tribes and compromised
migration routes. For the nomads these boundaries meant that they might
be blocked from moving to seasonal pastures and face the loss of their
livestock. If they did migrate, they faced the possibility of paying taxes to
two separate states.84 For government authorities, the presence of state
borders meant that tribal shaykhs could escape across them after con-
ducting raids.
The Mandate powers adopted many of the earlier Ottoman policies.
Like the Ottomans, the French and British encouraged nomads to engage
in agriculture. They also attempted to register arable land in the name of
individuals, leading to further concentration of land in the hands of tribal
shaykhs. We find ever more tribal shaykhs engaging in agriculture on
a large scale, often in tandem with merchants from the city.85 The
Mandate powers identified a leader for each tribe, paid him a regular
subsidy, and held him responsible for maintaining order and delivering
taxes; in some cases, they allowed the collection of khuwwa.86 In their
response towards raiding, however, the British and French pursued a new
and different policy. The Ottomans had not attempted to prevent
83
Dawn Chatty, From Camel to Truck: the Bedouin in the Modern World (New York: Vantage
Press, 1986), pp. 18–19; Allawi, Faisal, p. 449.
84
Williamson, “A Political History,” pp. 171–173; Tariq Tall, “The Politics of Rural Policy
in East Jordan, 1920–1989,” in The Transformation of Nomadic Society in the Middle East,
ed. Martha Mundi and Basim Musallam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), p. 93.
85
Chatty, From Camel, pp. 40–41, 69–70; Tripp, A History, pp. 43, 51, 180; Christian
Velud, “French Mandate Policy in the Syrian Steppe,” in The Transformation of Nomadic
Society in the Arab East, ed. Martha Mundi and Basim Musallam (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), p. 75; Philip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate:
The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1987), p. 187.
86
Velud, “French Mandate Policy,” pp. 64–67; Philip S. Khoury, “The Tribal Shaykh,
French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement in Syria between Two World
Wars,” Middle Eastern Studies 18, no. 2 (1982), pp. 185–186; Tripp, A History, p. 38;
Williamson, “A Political History,” pp. 153–154, 167, 180.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 222 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

intertribal conflict and were willing to put up with disorder for the sake of
preventing tribal alliances. In contrast, the French and the British were
eager to end raiding and inserted themselves in the process of tribal
negotiation, bringing tribes together with Mandate officials. They collab-
orated on two major conferences in 1925 and 1927. In 1926 raiding
became illegal in British Iraq, sometimes punished by air raids, and in
1927 the French and British established a tribal court to settle claims.87
Over the long run the reduction in raiding did much to weaken tribal
leaders as a political force, since military leadership had been an import-
ant part of their authority over their tribes.
Although increasing sedentarization of nomads during the interwar
period was due in part to Mandate policy, much was also the result of
economic and technological development. World War I had ushered in
the age of oil and of motor transport. Over the course of a few decades the
truck and car made the caravan a thing of the past and largely destroyed
the market for camels. Thus, the Bedouin, who had been the most
prestigious and powerful of the nomads, lost much of their economic
base – the sale of camels and horses and the guidance of caravans. Some
became settled or turned to other occupations, often in transport or the
military. Others replaced camels with herds of sheep and goats, still
earning a living, but no longer able to retreat into the distant desert and
retain their independence.88 The war and the development of the
machine gun likewise marked the end of cavalry as a fighting force,
weakening the market for horses and the usefulness of mounted soldiers.
Many tribal shaykhs now became fully part of the urban elite, with their
main residence in town and only occasional visits in the tribe. Some
became members of the Syrian Chamber of Delegates, thus becoming
representatives more than leaders of tribes.89 The nomads of Iraq and
Syria did not cease all military activity, and we find them still engaging in
occasional raids throughout the first half of the century. However, they
were no longer central to the politics of the region as a whole.

Nomads in Pahlavi Iran

In Iran, a similar development took place in the twentieth century, one
that was likewise due to both government policy and economic change. At
the end of World War I, the central government held almost no power
outside of Tehran. The south of the country was dominated by the great
tribal confederations, which were under the sway of the British.

87
Chatty, From Camel, pp. 34–36, 57–58; Williamson, “A Political History,” pp. 164–171.
88
Chatty, From Camel, pp. 40–42. 89 Khoury, “The Tribal Shaykh,” pp. 186–189.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomads in Pahlavi Iran 223

Kurdistan, Azerbaijan and Gilan were largely under the control of separ-
atist movements, and there were revolts among the Kurds and in
Khorasan. In 1921 the British encouraged the Cossack Brigade led by
the officer Reza Khan to take over Tehran. Reza Khan became minister of
war, but from the beginning he was the active power, and in 1925 he was
proclaimed shah. His goal was to form a centralized nation state in Iran,
with a population as homogeneous and as Persian as he could make it. In
this endeavor he had the approval of government officials and modern
intellectuals; few people in Iran wanted a continuation of the confusion
and lawlessness then prevailing. In his early campaigns against tribal
powers Reza Khan had the support of some tribal leadership, and nomads
made up part of the army he sent against recalcitrant tribes.90
In the mid-1920s, Reza Shah sharpened his campaign against the
largely nomadic tribal confederations, particularly against the most
powerful – the Qashqa’i and the Bakhtiyari. He put the Qashqa’i under
a military governorship and ordered them disarmed. What made central
control painful was not simply incorporation, but the oppression and
corruption that accompanied it. The treatment of the Qashqa’i was
symbolized by one particular outrage: an army captain’s demand that
Qashqa’i women feed his litter of puppies with their breast milk.91
Reza Shah assailed tribal power from a variety of directions. At the
beginning he sought to attract the tribal leadership, working to separate
them from the lower echelons of the tribe. As in other states, land-
registration laws often resulted in the conversion of communal pasture
into personal property owned by the khans. This situation was resented
by ordinary nomads and peasants within the tribe, creating a division
between the top leadership and tribesmen.92 Reza Shah both exploited
and exacerbated these tensions. The tribal leadership spent considerable
time in Tehran or provincial cities; Reza now used representation in the
central majlis to keep them away from tribal territories. In 1923 he engin-
eered the election of Sawlat al-Dawla Qashqa’i to the majlis and then
restricted him to the capital.93 Over time, increasing numbers of tribal
ilkhanis were detained in Tehran or provincial cities. In their absence the
middle leadership, chiefs of individual tribes, became more
autonomous.94 Nomadic populations participated increasingly in the
national and international economy as day laborers, some, especially
the Bakhtiyari, working in the oil industry. Their interests thus began to

90
Stephanie Cronin, Tribal Politics in Iran: Rural Conflict and the New State, 1921–1941
(London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 2–5; Beck, Qashqa’i, pp. 129–130.
91
Beck, Qashqa’i, p. 132. 92 Cronin, Tribal Politics, pp. 85–86, 94–97.
93
Beck, Qashqa’i, p. 131; Cronin, Tribal Politics, p. 25, 43–44.
94
Cronin, Tribal Politics, pp. 70–73, 120, 124.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 224 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

diverge from those of the khans, and they became more aware of the
public sphere. Reza Shah was able to use press campaigns to discredit
tribal leaders not only with the general public, but also among some
tribespeople as well.95
The Bakhtiyari, the most powerful confederation at the end of World
War I, was the most vulnerable, due in part to its involvement in central
politics. Ironically, the other weakness of the Bakhtiyari leaders was their
income as shareholders in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The shares
they received represented the tribal interest but were held in the name of
the leading lineage. Over time, as expenses mounted and the Great
Depression set in, members of the family borrowed against their shares,
encouraged by the company, which provided loans it knew could not be
repaid. Money which was supposed to be passed to the tribal membership
as a whole could no longer be given, causing increasing resentment from
the subordinate khans.96 The result was that when the government
attacked, the Bakhtiyari leaders could not count on support from the
lower echelon of the tribe.
In 1927–1928 Reza Shah began to implement his modernization plan,
introducing a census, land registration, and a western dress code. Again,
the program was carried out without consideration for the population and
it aroused opposition throughout the countryside. The government also
began to relocate tribes and to implement forcible settlement of
nomads.97 These moves, together with Reza Shah’s dismissal of the
head of the Khamsa confederation, brought the southern tribes into
rebellion; the Khamsa, Qashqa’i and neighboring tribes raised armies
strong enough to attack the aerodrome, cut the routes, and threaten
Shiraz. At this time the ilkhani Sawlat al-Dawla was under arrest, and
the uprising was organized by other members of the lineage along with
mid-level tribal leaders. The struggle ended in a stalemate; the Pahlavi
army was still not truly effective, while the tribes could not remain
stationary around Shiraz when the change of season required migration.
The next year several sections of the Bakhtiyari rebelled and scored
a number of victories. The government had to give in to some of the tribal
demands, releasing imprisoned leaders and removing direct government
oversight.98
Reza Shah, however, was still determined to bring the nomadic tribes
fully under control. The forcible settlement of nomads was implemented
from 1932 onwards; nomads were forbidden to migrate in their usual
large groups and were to practice agriculture, moving into newly

95
Cronin, Tribal Politics, pp. 103–104. 96 Cronin, Tribal Politics, pp. 133–159.
97
Cronin, Tribal Politics, pp. 31–32, 113. 98 Cronin, Tribal Politics, pp. 104, 120–127.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomads in the Modern World 225

constructed houses. It was impossible to build enough houses in the time

allotted and some locations were not habitable for the whole year.
Migrations were blocked by the army and sometimes attacked through
aerial bombing. These measures resulted in a huge loss of livestock for the
nomads, and for the settled population, an acute shortage of meat and
dairy products. Both ordinary nomads and peasants suffered
destitution.99 The resulting crisis brought a suspension of the prohibition
of migrations in 1933, but due to corruption, migration often required
bribery and the fees became a drain on the pastoral economy.100
Reza Shah next went against the tribal leadership. An undefined con-
spiracy known as the “Bakhtiyari plot” served as a pretext for the arrest of
many of the Bakhtiyari elite – much of their land was expropriated and
a number were executed. Sawlat al-Dawla Qashqa’i was again arrested,
along with his son, for supposedly fomenting revolt. He and several other
tribal leaders died in prison, presumably after a dose of what was known
as “Pahlavi coffee.”101 Tribal representation in the majlis was ended.
Tribes came under direct military rule and most tribal leaders were
forbidden to enter their tribal territories. By the end of the 1930s the
nomads were impoverished, without effective leadership, and becoming
sedentarized.102
It was World War II that rescued the nomads of Iran. Reza Shah was
sympathetic to the Germans, and in 1941 the British and Russians forced
him to abdicate. On his departure many pastoralists abandoned their
houses, bought livestock and re-armed. The tribal leaders, released
from prison, returned to the tribal territories and to their former positions.
They regained importance also in national politics, though not at the level
they had earlier known.

Nomads in the Modern World

While nomads remained active after World War II, their political weight
was much reduced. Uprisings could cause inconvenience, but they did
not seriously threaten the central government. With the creation of newly
independent states – or in the case of Iran, a return to independence –
rulers in the Middle East were eager to present themselves as modern and
developed. Thus, most governments promoted sedentarization. Usually,
foreign advisors and agricultural specialists encouraged more intensive
land use and likewise saw nomads as a holdover from the past who were
99
Cronin, Tribal Politics, pp. 88, 167–170, 191–192; Beck, Qashqa’i, pp. 137–139.
100
Cronin, Tribal Politics, pp. 35–38, 110.
101
Cronin, Tribal Politics, pp. 165–166, 172–186; Beck, Qashqa’i, p. 137.
102
Cronin, Tribal Politics, pp. 34, 156, 166; Beck, Qashqa’I, pp. 131, 140–142.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 226 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

sure to disappear over time.103 Increasing government control over the

allocation of land and maintenance of order led to the loss of important
functions for the leadership of tribes, no longer able to lead military raids
or to allocate pastures. Many tribal chiefs were now spending more of
their time in cities, though some retained the functions of representative
and mediator.104 The result of these changes has been an increase in
sedentarization. Many of those who remained nomadic supplemented
their income through a range of occupations, including contract herding
and various forms of transport and day labor.105 As I have shown, subsid-
iary occupations are attested also at an earlier period, so this is not an
entirely new phenomenon.
As was the case in the interwar period, the suppression of nomadism
was pursued with greater intensity in Iran than in the Arab countries.
After the abdication of Reza Shah and the resumption of nomadism in
1941, there was a resurgence of tribal activity which alarmed Reza Shah’s
son and successor, Muhammad Reza Shah (1941–1979), and he moved
strongly against the nomads in the 1960s. Leadership was destroyed at the
level of individual tribes, with migration, land allocation, settlement of
disputes and military activity again taken over by the government. The
national Land Reform Law of 1962 targeted tribal lands in particular.
Another and very effective policy against nomadism was the importation
of meat and milk products from abroad, which lowered their price and
made the pastoral economy less profitable.106 Muhammad Reza Shah’s
reign ended with the 1979 revolution and the establishment of the Islamic
Republic, which at first showed favor to pastoralists. Meat and dairy
imports ended, and nomadism once again increased. Some of the tribal
leaders, including those of the Qashqa’i, returned to Iran hoping to
resume their former positions, but the Islamic Republic soon turned
against them and has kept the nomadic population securely under gov-
ernment control ever since.107
Towards the end of the twentieth century the remaining nomads of the
Middle East adopted motor transport on their annual migrations. Instead
of moving slowly through spring and fall pastures to reach their summer
and winter grazing grounds, most nomads now load their animals in

103
Chatty, From Camel, pp. xviii–xix; Donald P. Cole, “Where Have the Bedouin Gone?”
Anthropological Quarterly 76, no. 2 (2003), p. 259.
104
Chatty, From Camel, pp. 58–60.
105
Lois Beck, “Economic Transformations Among Qashqa’i Nomads, 1962–1978,” in
Continuity and Change in Modern Iran, ed. Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1981), pp. 94–96; Chatty, From
Camel, pp. 108–110; Potts, Nomadism, p. 417.
106
Beck, “Economic Transformation,” p. 101.
107
Tapper, Frontier Nomads, pp. 311–314; Potts, Nomadism, pp. 414–417.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomads and Modern Nationalism 227

trucks and accomplish the migration in a few days. With fewer pastures
and a longer stay in those that remain, it has become necessary to pur-
chase feed. Nomads therefore remain near the settled community for
much of the year.108 Pastoralism by truck is more profitable and probably
easier, but some aspects of earlier migrations are missed. Among the
Bedouin, it appears that it is the women, not the men, who have regretted
the end of the long migrations, which were times in which much of their
labor was cooperative rather than individual. With the loss of the camel,
moreover, other satisfying tasks such as weaving have been reduced or
eliminated.109 For the Qashqa’i in Iran, the shortening of the migration
season has also affected women and girls, who used to forage along the
route for additional foods which added significantly to their diet, and for
natural dyes to use in their weaving of rugs.110 Pastoral nomadism has
thus survived in modern form and with a market orientation. The days of
long migrations, regional power and military exploits are remembered
and retold, but they are no longer lived.

Nomads and Modern Nationalism

The advent of the modern period brought a major change in ideologies of
state legitimation. The Middle East entered this period ruled mostly by
dynasties of nomad or steppe origin, but emphasis soon shifted from
dynastic legitimation to the promotion of unitary state power. Nomad
forebears became less important and the challenges of controlling nomad
societies less acceptable. The Tanzimat promoted direct government of
the whole society and homogenization of the population. Thus, any
structures and lifestyles which hindered the penetration of government
into society were viewed negatively. Nomads came to be seen as savage
and backward people who had to be settled if the region was to become
part of the enlightened modern world. The belief that nomadism was
a holdover from pre-modern society, something to be phased out as
society modernized, was shared with many European thinkers and lasted
well into the twentieth century.111
In the nineteenth century some nostalgia for nomad origins did survive.
The Ottoman sultan Abdul-Hamid (1876–1909) revived the Oghuz
108
Tapper, Frontier Nomads, pp. 310, 313; Beck, “Economic Transformation,” p. 105;
Chatty, From Camel, p. 104.
109
Chatty, From Camel, pp. 104–110. 110 Beck, Qashqa’i, pp. 105–106.
111
Selim Deringil, “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery:’ The Late Ottoman
Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 45,
no. 2 (2003), pp. 312, 317, 327; The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the
Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998),
pp. 31–32.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 228 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

genealogy of the Ottomans, which had been celebrated in the fifteenth

century but was later ignored. A commemorative ceremony was staged
yearly at the shrine of the dynasty’s legendary founder, Ertuğ rul Gazi,
with the “original tribe” of the Ottomans dressed as medieval Central
Asian warriors. After the rise of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Mustafa
Kemal (Ataturk) discarded the Ottoman heritage and promoted a new
Turkish identity. Now Turks were identified not by their nomad and
imperial steppe heritage, but linguistically, and also physically through
their supposed brachycephalic build – their short, wide skulls. Studies of
physical anthropology were commissioned, along with a government pro-
ject to produce terms of Turkic origin to replace Arabic and Persian
words. With the dictates of modern nationalism demanding a local origin,
neither the Oghuz Khan legend nor the Türk Khaghanate of Mongolia
would serve, and the formation of the Turks was pushed back in time to
accommodate the Hittites, who had ruled a powerful empire in central
Anatolia from about 1600 to 1180 BC and could thus be identified with
modern-day Turkey from well before the time of Islam.112
In Iran the westernizing elite of the late nineteenth century came to see
nomads as the cause of Iranian decline and eventual subjugation to the
west.113 During the Constitutional Revolution, the rescue of the constitu-
tional government by the Bakhtiyari made them briefly into heroes, but as
a new concept of the nation developed, nomads were seen once again as
a problem. They spoke a variety of languages and often allied with the British
or the Russians.114 The chaos that followed the Constitutional Revolution
and World War I, when the tribal confederations controlled much of the
country, reinforced this negative view of nomadism.115 Under Reza Shah’s
successor, Muhammad Reza Shah, these ideas continued in force even
among the dissident intellectuals. The well-known writer Jalal Al-i Ahmad,
in his famous treatise Gharbzadegi (Plagued by the West), attacked many of
the shah’s westernizing programs, but likewise vilified the nomads:
In short, no century in our legendary or historical past has gone by without being
marred once or twice by the hoofprints of nomadic invaders from the
northeast . . . . Each time we tried to build a house, as soon as we got to the
ramparts, some hungry invading tribe would come from the northeast and pull the
ladder out from under our feet, destroying everything from the foundation up.116

112
M. Şükrü Hanioğ lu, Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2011), pp. 160–175.
113
Cronin, Tribal Politics, p. 17.
114
Khazeni, Tribes and Empire, pp. 170–173; Najmabadi, Daughters of Quchan, pp. 35–50.
115
Cronin, Tribal Politics, p. 27.
116
Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Plagued by the West (Gharbzadegi) trans. Paul Sprachman (Delmar,
NY: Caravan Books, 1982), pp. 12–13.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Conclusion 229

The folkloric aspect of nomadism has been seen as less objectionable

than the political. The most useful nomads in this regard are the Bedouin,
who have been used to promote tourism in the Arab lands and even in
Israel. Thus tourism, along with transport, smuggling and day labor, has
become one of the occupations taking the place of herding and control of
routes. The accoutrements of Bedouin nomadism – the goat-hair tent,
camels, hospitality, and the ubiquitous coffee – are now reproduced for
the market.117 In several new states the Bedouin image has been useful as
an icon of national culture and identity. Radio programs in Kuwait, newly
invented traditions of horse and camel racing in Sa‘udi Arabia, and liberal
use of the Bedouin tent hospitality in Jordan all serve to present a link to
a Bedouin past which no longer presents a threat.118 There is a parallel
here with the use of the Bedouin ideal in the Umayyad and early ‘Abbasid
periods. If we bemoan the questionable authenticity of the modern
Bedouin theme park, we must remember that the same issues confronted
scholars of the ninth century who sought out Bedouin for their linguistic
and cultural studies.

Conclusion
The decline of nomad power in the modern period is undoubtedly con-
nected with the growing strength of government and the development of
new military technology. What is probably even more important is the
decrease in the usefulness of nomad pastoralists to settled society and to
the state. The development of steamships in the nineteenth century
provided transport that was more efficient than the camel caravan,
where water travel was possible. The telegraph and railway allowed faster
communication and travel even overland, and it is surely not by chance
that both were targets of attacks by nomads. The most fateful develop-
ment was the discovery and use of oil for motorized transport starting in
World War I, which soon made the camel caravan obsolete. The market
for camels largely disappeared, and so did the nomad responsibility for
the security of routes through steppe, mountain and desert. Pastoralists
had also served as guides and protectors for caravans on those routes and
had controlled and taxed the regions in which they pastured. This system
had not been perfect; order among tribes and between tribes and govern-
ment had often broken down. However, pre-modern governments usu-
ally did not have the ability to maintain control over difficult terrain
117
Cole, “Where Have the Bedouin Gone?” pp. 254–256.
118
Cole, “Where Have the Bedouin Gone?” pp. 256–258; Andrew Shryock, Nationalism
and the Genealogical Imagination (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997),
pp. 7, 312.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 230 Nomads in the Modern Middle East

themselves, since they lacked the manpower needed to garrison roads and
provide supplies. Thus, even as the governments expanded their reach,
they often returned the task of controlling and taxing marginal regions to
tribal leaders. In the twentieth century, with the advent of the truck and
the building of roads, it became possible for states to assert stable control
over territories which had earlier been under nomad protection.
World War I also introduced the machine gun and the airplane, and
these ended the use of cavalry that had been at the core of Middle Eastern
armies for millennia. As the markets for horses declined and nomads were
no longer needed as mounted auxiliaries, the nomads of the Middle East
lost several of their major functions within wider society. They were no
longer indispensable in war, trade could be carried on largely without
them, and the peripheral lands could be kept more or less quiet through
direct government control. What remained necessary was the provision of
livestock products. Despite state attempts to create a fully sedentary
society, it has become clear that in some regions the practice of pastoral
nomadism is still the best way to use marginal lands and to supply the
population with meat, milk, wool and leather.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.010 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 9 Conclusion

The central Islamic lands are set in a region of dry climate and difficult
terrain; it is doubtful that they could have developed a rich cosmopolitan
society without the presence of pastoral nomads. It was the improved
camel saddle and the development of camel nomadism that made it
possible for caravans to cross the Syrian desert and to connect
Mesopotamia to the Syrian coast and the Arabian Peninsula. The
mounted nomadism of the steppe likewise created new opportunities:
horses, sheep and goats were combined with Bactrian camels, used in
trade routes running north-south, from the forests and rivers of northern
Russia to the Black Sea and Transoxiana, and east-west, linking China
and the Middle East along the Silk Road from the second century BC
onwards. Nomads provided most of the animals needed for caravans and
were well placed to guide them through territory which they could navi-
gate more easily than the settled population. Their military prowess and
mobility also allowed them to protect the routes, a task that pre-modern
states could not manage with only settled manpower. This protection was
admittedly imperfect – nomad raids often disrupted trade – but even in
settled districts the maintenance of security was rarely fully reliable.
Finally, the nomads provided invaluable military manpower as mounted
archers, and likewise the horses necessary for any state to maintain an
army.
The medieval Middle East stands out for its urban development, active
trade and artisanal production. We should recognize that these achieve-
ments were due in part to nomads, who not only provided the means of
transport, but also helped to provision the cities with animal products –
milk and meat for consumption, wool and hides for the manufacture of
textiles and leather goods – central to the economy. Thus, the Islamic
Middle East was built on two complementary economies. While pastor-
alists and agriculturalists were seen as separate, in marginal territories
people moved back and forth between the two lifestyles, depending on
both climate and political circumstances. In times of disorder agricultural

231

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 232 Conclusion

land might turn into pasture, and the same could happen due to pro-
longed drought. This change can be seen as a negative outcome, since
agriculture is a more intensive form of land use, but the availability of
pastoral nomadism also provided a means of survival when agriculture
failed.

The Political Dynamics of Nomad-Sedentary Relations

Just as they contributed to a complex economy, pastoral nomads played
a central role in state building within the Middle East, starting before the
rise of Islam. Part of their contribution was military. Nomads were
involved in the development first of chariot warfare and then of mounted
archery. They also made an important political contribution. We see two
different processes in state building involving nomads; the internal
nomads, such as Bedouin, usually developed small, local polities, while
those of the steppe, coming from an imperial tradition, brought their
ideology into the Middle East and created large territorial states often
with imperial pretensions.
The two best-known types of nomads internal to the Middle East were
the Arab Bedouin and the Iranian Kurds. While the Bedouin were often
important in the formation of states, they usually provided military man-
power while accepting leadership from the settled population. This was
the case with the Arab conquest and early caliphate, and later with the
Isma‘ili Qaramita at the turn of the tenth century and the Jannabi dynasty
which controlled the pilgrimage routes from Bahrayn and Hajar in the
first part of the tenth century, both of which have been discussed in
Chapter 3. We see a similar pattern in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries with the rise of the Rashidi, Hashemite and Wahhabi/Sa’udi
states in the Arabian Peninsula.
Under certain conditions, however, the Bedouins and Kurds did
develop their own states; this was most likely to happen when their
territories lay between competing powers who pulled nomad groups
into their political contests, strengthening their internal leadership while
also providing tribes the opportunity to play one state against the other.
The contest between the Roman and Sassanian empires in the century
before the advent of Islam led to the rise of two well-known states or
confederations: the Lakhmids and the Ghassanids on either side of the
Syrian desert. In the tenth century a similar situation arose when the
Fatimid caliphate in Egypt competed over Syria with the Abbasids of
Baghdad. The nomad states of this period were largely local; their leaders
rose through service to nearby settled powers. In the north we see two
Bedouin powers, the Numayr (ca. 999–1077) in Mayyafariqin and the

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomad-Sedentary Relations 233

‘Uqaylids (990–1096) in Mosul, Nisibis and Anbar. A bit later the

Mazyadids (961–1150) controlled significant territory in Iraq; they and
the ‘Uqaylid dynasty controlled the whole length of the Euphrates and
much of the Sawad. Most of these dynasties continued into the Seljuqid
period.
A similar situation arose in Anatolia in the late fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, when the Mamluk sultanate, the Timurid state and the
Ottomans competed over the region both through direct military action
and through local nomad allies, in this case primarily Turkmen. The
result was the rise of the beyliks of Anatolia, and of the two great tribal
confederations which took over Iran – the Aqqoyunlu and the
Qaraqoyunlu. The final example of this phenomenon is the rise of
nomad and mountain powers along the Ottoman-Safavid border in the
sixteenth century, forming a buffer territory of tribes and small states
running from the Kurdish principalities in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan,
through the Lur and Bakhtiyari territory and the tribal territories of
Iraq, to the Arab tribes of Khuzistan. It was not until the late nineteenth
century that much of this region came fully under the control of the states
that bordered it.
The state building of the steppe nomads was considerably more ambi-
tious and was closely connected to political processes in the Eurasian
steppe. The break-up of the Türk Khaghanate after 850, causing the
western migration of many Turkic peoples, and later the formation of
the Mongol Empire, brought new and politically sophisticated nomad
populations into the central Islamic lands. It is not entirely by chance that
their descendants provided most of the leadership for Middle Eastern
states from the eleventh to the nineteenth centuries. The Seljuqids were
not from the ruling clan of the Turks and came in as fugitives, but they
soon gained in ambition and turned to conquest; twenty years after
coming across the Oxus, Toghril was in control of Baghdad. The
Mongols and the Timurids, both arriving as conquering armies, aimed
at the creation of empires combining the whole of Iran and Iraq – in the
Mongol case, also Anatolia.
It is notable that all three of these powers came in with armies that were
not tribally organized. Our sources do not make it clear why tribalism is
not visible in the early Seljuqid period. The history of Chinggis Khan and
Tamerlane is better documented. Both rose to power in tribally organized
societies and later deliberately suppressed tribal organization in their
armies. All these armies also included numerous settled soldiers. Thus,
all three conquering powers created mixed armies with a chain of com-
mand largely independent of tribes and, in the Mongol and Timurid
cases, famous for their discipline.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 234 Conclusion

The three steppe dynasties of the Middle Period laid claim to broad
territory and adopted the bureaucratic culture created by the ‘Abbasids,
administered largely by Persian bureaucrats. While adopting much of
Islamic tradition they also brought in new ideas, each creating a new
charismatic lineage which survived well beyond the dynasty itself. The
Mongols in particular introduced traditions and structures developed in
the steppe which were added to the institutions developed by the caliph-
ate. Just as military activity was not limited to steppe nomads, adminis-
tration was not entirely in the hands of Persian bureaucrats. In the
Mongol and the Timurid realm, Turco-Mongolian emirs were active in
the dı̄ wā n, presumably not in the more technical posts, but nonetheless
involved in running the state.

Legitimation and State Ideology

Both the Bedouin and the steppe nomads made important contribu-
tions to state ideology. Though the Bedouin had little tradition of state
building, they did provide a useful image for the nascent Muslim ruling
class. While encouraging their followers to settle in garrison cities and
give up the life of the desert, the Muslim ruling class also sought to
differentiate itself from its more sophisticated subjects. The Bedouin
image, already well developed in Arabic poetry and lore, proved popular
and useful, better suited to an emerging aristocracy than the more
modest ethos of town and merchant that became enshrined in the
hadı̄ th. Thus the image of the Arab as a martial nomad, simple in habits
˙
but brave and generous, became part of court culture in the Umayyad
period and retained its charm long thereafter. At the same time, the
tribal tradition proved useful first as an organizational convenience in
the new cities, and then more broadly as a way to distinguish the
Muslims from the subjects of the Roman and Persian empires. The
requirement that converts become clients (mawā lı̄ ) of tribes both
helped to discourage conversion and retained a formal superiority for
the new conquerors, while the development of tribal genealogies gave
the Arabs pedigrees to match those of the established elites of their new
territories.
The arrival of the steppe nomads brought in a new imperial tradition
which first rivalled and then combined with the Islamic one. This ideol-
ogy also enshrined the idea of nomad military prowess, with an origin and
lifestyle distant from and superior to that of the settled and urban popu-
lations. Though the Seljuqs did not claim imperial status and legitimated
their rule primarily through Islamic institutions, they did introduce a new
dynastic legitimation, and the lineage of their rulers achieved a stature

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Successor States and Conquest from Inside 235

that lasted for centuries, particularly in Anatolia where the memory of the
Rum Seljuqs continued to be invoked well into the Ottoman period.
The Mongols of course came in as a fully imperial power with their own
tradition, and for a while reduced much of the Middle East to provincial
status, introducing new offices and institutions which were frankly foreign
to the region. Most importantly perhaps they created a uniquely charis-
matic dynasty which first rivalled and then overthrew the caliphate. For
almost a century the descendants of Chinggis Khan were the only people
who could claim legitimate sovereign power within the Mongol lands,
which included much of the central Islamic territory, and the Mongol
yasa was held up beside the shari‘a. With the end of the unified Mongol
Empire and the gradual conversion of the western Mongolian Empire to
Islam, the two traditions became closely intertwined despite their appar-
ent contradictions, and Mongol heritage became part of dynastic legitim-
ation. The synthesis was completed by the rise of the Timurid dynasty
which produced a dynastic founder claiming both Muslim identity and
Chinggisid connections, and also a brilliant court culture in which innov-
ations brought by the Mongols combined with the rise of a sophisticated
literature in the Turkic language and a continued flowering of Persianate
art and culture. The Turks and Turco-Mongolians were now fully part of
the Islamic world and its political culture. The figure of Tamerlane
remained useful as a source of dynastic legitimation through the eight-
eenth century.

Successor States and Conquest from Inside

The period of steppe dominance was followed by a new set of nomad
conquests and the creation of the great regional empires – the Ottoman,
Safavid, Uzbek and Mughal – made possible through the destruction of
the caliphate. These states were based on Turkic power, the Uzbek and
Timurid from the Turco-Mongolian tradition and the Ottoman and
Safavid from Turkmen – Turks who shared the steppe tradition but did
not belong to the Chinggisid enterprise. We see two major differences
from the earlier period. First, the conquest came from within, now from
the largely Turkic and nomadic population of Anatolia, which was ener-
gized by the rivalry of the states on its borders. The other difference was
that tribalism became a significant element in state development. The
Aqqoyunlu and Qaraqoyunlu were tribally organized and the Safavids
followed them in using tribal structure as an organizing principle, in stark
contrast to the earlier Seljuqs, Mongols and Timurids. It is unlikely that
tribes had ceased to exist in the middle periods. Although tribal powers
did not play a part in the early campaigns of the Seljuqs, they do appear

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 236 Conclusion

later, perhaps through the continued influx of Oghuz nomads from the
steppes. Under the Mongols and Timurids, tribes ceased to be an active
organizing principle in the army or regional politics and for that reason
they are largely absent from contemporary histories. It is probable none-
theless that they continued to play a role in social and economic life and in
local politics, just as regional settled elites did. We know that some tribes,
like the Oyirad, remained intact in the Mongol period, and in the later
period a number developed out of Mongol contingents, particularly in the
regions less fully under central control – Anatolia in the west, and to the
east, in Khorasan and Transoxiana. In the Timurid histories we find a few
continuing mentions of the tribes that had been active before and during
Temür’s rise, and in the struggles of the later Timurid period tribalism
became a more important factor.
With the conquest of Iran first by the Turkmen confederations and
then by the Safavids, the nomad population again increased, particularly
in southern Iran, and tribalism became a major force in both provincial
and military organization. Although the Ottomans pursued a very differ-
ent strategy in their central regions, in Anatolia and the Arab provinces,
Turkmen, Kurdish and Arab nomadic tribes remained prominent. Thus,
the Middle East entered the modern period with a large population of
tribally organized nomads.

Nomad Military Prowess

Nomads are seen as exceptionally good soldiers and as such were both
useful and threatening to the settled powers they interacted with. The
steppe nomads were excellent mounted archers; the Bedouin were
likewise hardy and mobile, often better fighters than their settled neigh-
bors. However, we should recognize that nomad military superiority
was far from absolute; when tribal nomad armies met the army of
a strong settled state, they generally lost. One problem was that of
discipline and control. Soldiers who were paid in booty might simply
cease fighting and start plundering; likewise if they encountered
a setback, they could not necessarily be counted on to remain loyal.
Tribal troops could succeed very well in local campaigns and could
likewise be effective in raids either for booty or to extract concessions,
but the most powerful armies were those not tribally organized and not
exclusively nomadic. This was true of those serving settled states, which
often included nomads, and equally of the armies of nomadic powers.
As we have seen, the three conquests from the steppe – Seljuq, Mongol
and Timurid – were all accomplished with armies in which tribes did
not fight as units under their own leaders.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Nomad Military Prowess 237

All of the major armies of conquest likewise included a large number of

soldiers of settled origins. The Seljuq Toghril soon acquired local allies
who fought for him, and added mamluk cavalry to his army; mamluks
became an important and central part of the Seljuq army, particularly
during the reign of Malik Shah. Chinggis Khan began to use soldiers from
settled regions in his army early on. The troops he brought with him on his
initial conquest included contingents from Eastern Turkestan, as well as
Chinese siege engineers. To these he added levies of soldiers from the
cities he conquered, which began as cannon fodder but soon fought
alongside the Mongols. A significant number of local soldiers also joined
the Mongol army, taking part in most of their campaigns in the central
Islamic lands. Tamerlane appears to have started with a primarily nomad
army, but he quickly added settled contingents as allies or as vassals. Both
the Mongols and the Timurids likewise introduced systematic conscrip-
tion from the settled population, and regional armies became a significant
part of their military manpower.
It makes sense that a mixed army would be an advantage. In some
cases, it may have been a matter of discipline and an attempt to limit the
power of nomads or tribes; this has been adduced (but also questioned) in
the case of the Seljuqs, and it is clear that the Safavids added both artillery
and ghulā ms in order to curtail the power of the tribally organized
Qizilbash. In the case of the Mongols and Timurids, discipline was not
a significant problem, and settled soldiers were brought in for different
reasons. Soldiers of different background could bring complementary
skills and could cope with a variety of terrain. Furthermore, while
a purely nomad army enjoyed greater mobility and could survive without
the amount of grain required for a settled army of infantry or heavy
cavalry, it did require extensive pasture, something that was not always
available.
Nomad societies have sometimes been described as nations at arms, in
which all adult males could act as soldiers. Certainly, both the Bedouin
and the steppe nomads were trained from early on in skills useful for war.
However, not all men were equally trained or equally active. It appears
that in most nomadic societies, chiefs have had small standing armies of
trained soldiers separate from the tribe as a whole. For individual cam-
paigns a much larger body of troops could be assembled but might not
always be retained for a long period. One should keep in mind also that
there were central nomad occupations which competed with sustained
military activity: pastoralism, the guidance of caravans, the guarding of
routes and collection of taxes, for instance. Military service was one
source of income and of prestige, but not the only one, and war could
be destructive to the nomadic economy as well as the settled one.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 238 Conclusion

In some ways nomads were less vulnerable than settled agriculturalists

because they could retreat before an army, and pasture suffers less from
the passage of troops than do the crops of the farmer. However, they also
had vulnerabilities. For the Bedouin the more vulnerable period was the
summer when they required significant sources of water, often in or near
settled districts. If water was denied them, if their wells were poisoned –
a common practice in war – or if they were pushed out into the desert,
then they and their animals would die of thirst. For the nomads raising
sheep, goats, and horses the vulnerable season was the winter, and par-
ticularly the lambing season in early spring. At this time of the year, they
were more closely gathered, often in an area around a river offering winter
grass and water, and were vulnerable to attack. Another weakness of
nomads was their need to migrate. This appears particularly clear in the
modern period. From the seventeenth century on the Ottomans often
used the limitation of migration to control and weaken nomad groups,
and in the twentieth century this became an important tool in combatting
nomad power both in Iran and in the former Ottoman territories.

Social and Economic Life

Medieval and early modern sources elucidate only a small percentage of
nomad activities, placing strong emphasis on the military actions which
are the central interest of most early historical works. The everyday
economic and political relationships among the population receive very
little attention. We should recognize nonetheless that the economic rela-
tionship between settled populations and pastoral nomads went well
beyond the exchange of livestock products. Nomads also gained money
from the services they provided: the guidance of caravans; the transport of
goods, including taxes in kind; and the protection of trade and pilgrimage
routes. In regions controlled by nomads, tribes were often able to collect
taxes from villages in return for protection. It is likely that in premodern as
well as modern times, nomads also provided day labor for farming and
even state projects. Another important source of income for nomads was
military service, whether in the core army or as auxiliaries. Thus, the
production and sale of livestock products was only one of many sources of
income and influence for the premodern pastoral nomad.1
While we can learn much about nomad society and economy from the
excellent ethnographic studies of twentieth-century nomads, we must be
careful about projecting all aspects of the current lifestyle onto the past. It is

1
See, for instance, Kurt Franz, “The Bedouin in History or Bedouin History?” Nomadic
Peoples 15, no. 1 (2011): pp. 27, 31–32, 35–36.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Decline of Nomad Power 239

important to remember that by the mid-twentieth century, when most

ethnographic studies were carried out, pastoral nomads had ceased to be
a military force and had lost several other sources of income. With the
decline of the caravan trade, they no longer guided caravans, collected
regional dues or held responsibility for the safety of trade and pilgrimage
routes. For this reason, I have, for instance, not attempted to estimate the
flock sizes of earlier times on the basis of modern calculations of the number
of animals needed per family. Although in the twentieth century the income
from the sale of livestock products would probably have constituted the
main household income – sometimes with the addition of wage labor – in
the premodern period other sources of income were more important and
may have affected both the kind and the number of animals raised.
In the early nineteenth century, the economy of pastoral nomadism
probably resembled the premodern system more closely. We have few
ethnographic studies from the period, but archives and travelers’ accounts
do provide some information. This period therefore is probably a better
one from which to reconstruct earlier habits and structures. Although the
nineteenth century was a period of rapid change, and scholarship often
emphasizes the impact of new market forces and growing government
interference, there are some indications that many of the structures and
institutions seen in that period may also have existed earlier. The posses-
sion of tribal territories or dı̄ ras and the collection of tax or protection
money (khuwwa) mentioned for this time are certainly well attested for the
early modern period, and allusions in the sources suggest strongly that the
same system existed in the medieval period, if not earlier.
It is clear for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the tribal
aristocracy did not live exclusively within tribal territories but formed part
of the wider elite, holding agricultural land and properties in cities or their
suburbs. There are references in the Mongol and Timurid period to
nomad elites building garden palaces and contributing to city edifices,
and also to their involvement in the life of the court. Thus, we should not
see the distance between the ordinary nomad and the tribal elite as a new
phenomenon created by modern market conditions. The striking dispar-
ity between the wealthy nomad elite and the sometimes impoverished
nomad subjects, noted in some places in the nineteenth century, echoes
Rashid al-Din’s and al-‘Umari’s descriptions of impoverished Mongol
nomads at a time when Mongol noyans collected taxes at will.

The Decline of Nomad Power

There are many reasons for the decline of nomad power in the late
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, most of them connected with

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 240 Conclusion

modernization, the growth of state power, and changing concepts of the

relationship between the state and its subjects. In the nineteenth century,
although nomads still played a part in Ottoman armies and dominated
those of the Qajars, we see less feeling of connection. The nomads are no
longer seen as part of the ruling group, except for a small elite.
Legitimation was now based more on ideas of nation and citizenship
and less on military prowess and dynastic origin, in both of which nomads
had played a part. As modernization became an increasingly important
goal, nomads were seen as holdovers from a past that was being discarded.
Earlier they had maintained independence from the center and thus
hindered the direct imposition of state control but in return had kept
some sort of order in remote and inaccessible areas.
The goal of direct rule over the population and the move to register land
made communal pasture rights obsolete, helping to concentrate land in
the hand of tribal shaykhs and city merchants who found more profit in
agriculture than in pastoralism. Inclusion in the world market likewise
encouraged large-scale agriculture. With the development of modern
weapons and military organization, the role of nomads in warfare
declined, while the state armies gained powerful weapons against them.
From the middle of the nineteenth century guns, which could now be
reloaded on horseback, were clearly superior to the bow and arrow. This
development did not destroy nomad independence in itself, since the
tribes soon gained access to firearms and had new possibilities for
outside alliances with the British presence in the Gulf. However, with
World War I ushering in the development of the machine gun and the
airplane, cavalry lost its role in war after nearly three millennia of domin-
ance. The machine gun could destroy a mounted charge in a matter of
minutes and the airplane could pursue nomads into otherwise inaccess-
ible regions.
Above all, it was the development of motorized transport which con-
stricted the sphere of nomad activity, severely reducing traditional
sources of income and influence. The introduction of steamships in the
1830s marked the beginning of this shift but still left many trade routes
dependent on the camel, and river routes could still be protected and
taxed by local nomads. The railroad was a greater threat and was recog-
nized as such by many nomads. The most important change, however,
was the discovery of oil and the development of motorized wheeled
transport. The jeep and truck opened new terrain to the settled powers,
who no longer had to depend on the horse and camel for transport and the
nomad powers for guidance and protection. The market for both camels
and horses collapsed, while additional income from guidance and local
taxes dried up. What was left were the livestock products – meat, milk,

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 The Decline of Nomad Power 241

leather and wool – which have continued to support a smaller and weaker
nomad population.
The nomads not only lost income, they also lost their usefulness to the
states of the Middle East. Previously both nomad manpower and the
animals they raised had been indispensable for the practice of trade and
war, central to all states. The steppes, mountains and deserts so common
in the central Islamic lands could not be fully controlled or safely tra-
versed without them. Despite frequent conflicts with nomad tribes, states
could not do without them, and had to come to an accommodation
allowing them a separate sphere of power. In the contemporary Middle
East nomads occupy only a small niche, but the history of the region
cannot be well understood without including them. We should recognize
that their role was not peripheral but central, and that it was not only
a negative but also a positive one.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography

Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1982.
Aigle, Denise. Le Fā rs sous la domination mongole: politique et fiscalité, XIIIe–XIVe s.
Studia Iranica, Cahier 31. Paris: Association pour l’avancement des études
iraniennes, 2005.
“Mongol Law versus Islamic Law. Myth and Reality.” In The Mongol Empire
between Myth and Reality: Studies in Anthropological History, edited by
Denise Aigle, 134–156. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
Al-e Ahmad, Jalal. Plagued by the West (Gharbzadegi). Translated by Paul
Sprachman. Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1982.
Alexandrescu-Dersca, Marie-Mathilde. La campagne de Timur en Anatolie (1402).
Bucharest: Imprimeria Nationala, 1942.
Allawi, Ali A. Faisal I of Iraq. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014.
Allouche, Adel. The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906–
962/1500–1555). Berlin: K. Schwarz Verlag, 1983. ˙
Allsen, Thomas T. “Biography of a Cultural Broker, Bolad Ch’eng-Hsiang in
China and Iran.” In The Court of the Il-khans 1290–1340, edited by
Julian Raby and Teresa Fitzherbert, 7–22. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996.
“Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran.” In Rulers from the Steppe:
State Formation and the Eurasian Periphery, edited by Gary Seaman and
Daniel Marks, 223–241. Los Angeles: Ethnographics Press, 1991.
Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire: A Cultural History of Islamic
Textiles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001.
“Mahmū d Yalavač (?–1254); Mas‘ū d Beg (?–1289); ‘Alı̄ Beg (?–1280); Buir
(fl. ˙1206–1260).” In In the Service of the Khan, edited by Igor de Rachewiltz.
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993.
Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia, and
the Islamic Lands, 1251–1259. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
“Notes on Chinese Titles in Mongol Iran.” Mongolian Studies 14 (1991):
27–39.
“The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Rule in North China.” In
Cambridge History of China, vol. 6, edited by Herbert Franke and
Denis Twitchett, 321–413. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

242

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 243

“Spiritual Geography and Political Legitimacy in the Eastern Steppe.” In

Ideology and the Formation of Early States, edited by Henri J. M. Claessen
and Jarich G. Oosten, 116–135. Leiden: Brill, 1996.
“The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the 13th century.” In China
among Equals, edited by Morris Rossabi. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1983.
Amanat, Abbas. Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the
Iranian Monarchy, 1831–1896. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1997.
Amitai-Preiss, Reuven. Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ī lkhā nid War, 1260–
1281. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Amitai, Reuven. “Continuity and Change in the Mongol Army of the Ilkhanate.”
In The Mongols’ Middle East, edited by C. P. Melville and Bruno De Nicola,
38–52. Leiden: Brill, 2016.
“Did the Mongols in the Middle East Remain Pastoral Nomads?” In Seminar at
Max Planck Institute, Halle, Germany. Internet: Academia.edu.
Anooshahr, Ali. Turkestan and the Rise of Eurasian Empires: A Study of Politics and
Invented Traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Anscombe, Frederick F. The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
and Qatar. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
Arberry, A. J. The Seven Odes: The First Chapter in Arabic Literature. London;
New York: G. Allen & Unwin; Macmillan, 1957.
Aubin, Jean. “Comment Tamerlan prenait les villes.” Studia Islamica 19 (1963):
83–122.
Émirs mongols et vizirs persans dans les remous de l’acculturation. Studia Iranica.
Cahier 15. Paris; Leuven, Belgique: Association pour l’avancement des
études iraniennes; Diffusion Peeters Press, 1995.
“L’avènement des Safavides reconsidéré.” Moyen Orient et Océan Indien.
Middle East and Indian Ocean XVIe–XIXe siècles 5 (1988): 1–130.
“La propriété foncière en Azerbaydjan sous les Mongols.” Le monde iranien et
l’Islam 4 (1976–1977): 79–132.
“Le qurlitai de Sultân-Maydân (1336).” Journal Asiatique CCLXXIX (1991):
175–197.
“Les princes d’Ormuz du XIIIe au Xve siècle.” Journal Asiatique 24 (1953):
77–137.
“Réseau pastoral et réseau caravanier. Les grand’ routes du Khurassan à
l’époque mongole.” Le Monde iranien et l’Islam 1 (1971): 105–130.
“Révolution chiite et conservatisme. Les soufis de Lâhejân, 1500–1514
(Études Safavides II).” Moyen Orient et Océan Indien. Middle East and
Indian Ocean XVIe–XIXe siècles 1 (1984): 1–40.
Avery, Peter. “Nā dir Shā h and the Afsharid Legacy.” In Cambridge History of Iran,
vol. 7. From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, edited by Gavin Hambly,
Peter Avery, Charles Melville, 3–62. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991.
Avni, Gideon. Nomads, Farmers, and Town-Dwellers: Pastoralist-Sedentist
Interaction in the Negev Highlands, Sixth-Eighth Centuries C.E. Jerusalem:
Israel Antiquities Authority, 1996.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 244 Bibliography

Axworthy, Michael. “The Army of Nader Shah.” Iranian Studies 40, no. 5 (2007):
635–646.
The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from Tribal Warrior to Conquering Tyrant.
London; New York: I. B. Tauris 2006.
Ayalon, David. “The Auxiliary Forces of the Mamluk Sultanate.” Der Islam 65
(1988): 13–37.
Eunuchs, Caliphs and Sultans: A Study in Power Relationships. Jerusalem:
Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1999.
Babayan, Kathryn. Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs: Cultural Landscapes of Early
Modern Iran. Cambridge, MA: Distributed for the Center for Middle Eastern
Studies of Harvard University by Harvard University Press, 2002.
Babur, Zahı̄ r al-Dı̄ n Muhammad. Baburnama: Chaghatay Turkish Text with Abdul-
Rahim ˙ Khankhanan’s ˙ Persian Translation. Translated by W. M. Thackston.
Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1993.
Bar Hebraeus, Gregory. The Chronography of Gregory Abû‘l Faraj, the Son of Aaron,
the Hebrew Physician, Commonly Known as Bar Hebraeus: Being the First Part of
His Political History of the World. Translated by E. A. Wallis Budge. 2 vols.
London: Oxford University Press, 1932.
Barfield, Thomas J. The Nomadic Alternative. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1993.
Barkan, Ömer Lûtfi. “Research on the Ottoman Fiscal Surveys.” In Studies in the
Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day,
edited by Michael A. Cook, 162–171. London: Oxford University Press,
1970.
Bartol’d, V. V. Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion. Translated by
Mrs. T. Minorsky. London: Luzac, 1968.
Bashir, Shahzad. “The Origins and Rhetorical Evolution of the Term Qizilbā sh in
Persianate Literature.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient
57, no. 3 (2014): 364–391.
Bashı̄ r, Sulaymā n. Arabs and Others in Early Islam. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press,
1997.
Bayhaqı̄ , Abū ‘l Fadl Muhammad. The History of Beyhaqi (The History of Sultan
Mas‘ud of Ghazna, ˙ ˙
1030–1041). Translated by C. Edmund Bosworth. 3 vols.
Cambridge, MA; Washington, DC: Ilex Foundation and Center for Hellenic
Studies, 2011.
Tā rı̄ kh-i Bayhaqı̄ . Edited by Manū chihr Dā nishpazhū h. Tehran:
Intishā rā t-i Hı̄ rmand, 1997–1998.
Baykara, Tuncer. “Society and Economy among the Anatolian Seljuks and
Beyliks.” In The Turks, edited by Hasan Celâl Güzel, C. Cem Oguz,
Osman Karatay, 610–629. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2002.
Baypakov, Karl M. “La culture urbaine du Kazakhstan du sud et du Semiretchie à
l’époque des Karakhanides.” Cahiers d’Asie Centrale 9 (2001): 141–175.
Bazin, Louis. “Que était Alp Er Tonga, identifié à Afrâsyâb.” In Pand-o Sokhan.
Mélanges offerts à Charles-Henri de Fouchécour, edited by Claire Kappler,
Christophe Balaÿ, Ziva Vesel, 37–42. Tehran: Institut français de recherche
en Iran, 1995.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 245

Beck, Lois. “Economic Transformations among Qashqa’i Nomads, 1962–

1978.” In Continuity and Change in Modern Iran, edited by Michael
E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie, 85–107. Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1981.
The Qashqa’i of Iran. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986.
Bernardini, Michele. Mémoire et propagande à l’époque timouride. Studia Iranica.
Cahier 37. Paris: Association pour l’avancement des études iraniennes,
2008.
Bianquis, Th., S. Shamma. “Mirdā s,– Mirdā s b. Udayya.” In Encyclopaedia of
Islam, Second Edition. Edited by P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–
2005.
Bikhazi, Ramzi Jibran. “The Hamdā nid Dynasty of Mesopotamia and North
Syria 254–404/868–1014.”˙ Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of
Michigan, 1981.
Binay, Sara. Die Figur des Beduinen in der arabischen Literatur 9.-12. Jahrhundert.
Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2006.
Biran, Michal. Chinggis Khan. Oxford: Oneworld, 2007.
“The Mongols in Central Asia from Chinggis Khan’s Invasion to the Rise of
Temür: The Ögödeid and Chaghadaid Realms.” In The Cambridge History of
Inner Asia: the Chinggisid Age, edited by Allen J. Frank, Nicola Di Cosmo,
Peter B. Golden, 46–66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
“Qarakhanid Studies: A View from the Qara Khitai Edge.” Cahiers d’Asie
Centrale 9 (2001): 77–89.
Black, J. A., G. Cunningham, G. Fluckiger-Hawker, E. Robson, G. Zólyoni. The
Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature. Oxford 1998–. https://etcsl
.orinst.ox.ac.uk/
Blaum, Paul A. “Children of the Arrow: The Strange Saga of the Iraqi
Turkmens.” The International Journal of Kurdish Studies 15, no. 1–2 (2001):
137–163.
“A History of the Kurdish Marwanid Dynasty A.D. 983–1085, Part I.”
International Journal of Kurdish Studies 5, no. 1–2 (1992): 54–68.
“A History of the Kurdish Marwanid Dynasty, A.D. 983–1085, Part II.”
International Journal of Kurdish Studies 6, no. 1–2 (1993): 40–65.
Bombaci, Alessio. Histoire de la litérature turque. Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1968.
Bonner, Michael. “The Waning of Empire, 861–945.” In New Cambridge History
of Islam, vol. 1, The Formation of the Islamic World, Sixth to Eleventh Centuries,
edited by Chase Robinson, 305–359. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010.
Bosworth, C. E. “Azerbaijan IV: Islamic History to 1941.” In Encyclopædia
Iranica. Vol. I–. London, 1982–.
The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran 994:1040. 2nd ed.
Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1973.
“Iran and the Arabs before Islam.” In Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 3 pt. 1. The
Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian Periods, edited by Ehsan Yarshater, 593–612.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
“Malik-Shā h.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by P. Bearman
et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 246 Bibliography

“Mazyad, Banū , or Mazyadids.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.

Edited by P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
“The Persian Impact on Arabic Literature.” In Arabic Literature to the End of the
Umayyad Period, edited by T. M. Johnstone, A. F. L. Beeston, R. B. Sergeant,
G. R. Smith, 483–496. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
“The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian world (A.D. 1000–1217).”
In Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 5. The Saljuq and Mongol Periods, edited by
J. A. Boyle, 1–202. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
“Sā djids.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by P. Bearman et al.
Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
“Sandjar.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by P. Bearman
et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
“‘Ukaylids.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by P. Bearman
et ˙al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
Bowersock, G. W. Roman Arabia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
Boyle, John A. “Dynastic and Political History of the Ī l-Khā ns.” In Cambridge
History of Iran, vol. 5. The Saljuq and Mongol Periods, edited by J. A. Boyle,
303–421. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
Briant, Pierre. État et pasteurs au Moyen-Orient ancien. Cambridge; Paris:
Cambridge University Press; Maison des sciences de l’homme, 1982.
Broadbridge, Anne F. Kingship and Ideology in the Islamic and Mongol Worlds.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
“Marriage, Family and Politics: The Ilkhanid-Oirat Connection.” Journal of
the Royal Asiatic Society 26, no. 1–2 (2016): 121–135.
Bruinessen, Martin van. Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures
of Kurdistan. London: Zed Books, 1992.
Buell, Paul D. “Early Mongol Expansion in Western Siberia and Turkestan
(1207–1219): A Reconstruction.” Central Asiatic Journal 36, no. 1–2
(1992): 1–32.
“Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara.” Journal of Asian History 13,
no. 2 (1979): 121–147.
“Tribe, ‘Qan’ and ‘ulus’ in Early Mongol China: Some Prolegomena to Yüan
History.” Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Washington, 1977.
“Yeh-lü A-hai (ca. 1151-ca.1223), Yeh-lü T’u-hua (d. 1231).” In In the Service
of the Khan, edited by Igor de Rachewiltz. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993.
Bulliet, Richard W. The Camel and the Wheel. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1990.
Bürgel Ch. and R. Mottahedeh. “‘Ażod al-Dawla.” In Encyclopædia Iranica. Vol.
I–. London, 1982–.
Cahen, Claude. “Atabak.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by
P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
“Eretna.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by P. Bearman et al.
Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
The Formation of Turkey. The Seljukid Sultanate of Rū m: Eleventh to Fourteenth
Century. Translated by P. M. Holt. Harlow: Longman, 2001.
“History and Historians.” In Religion, Learning and Science in the ‘Abbasid
Period, edited by J. D. Latham, R. B. Sergeant, M. J. L Young. Cambridge

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 247

History of Arabic Literature, 188–233. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1990.
“Le Malik-nameh et l’histoire des origines seljukides.” Oriens 2 (1949): 31–65.
“Les tribus turques d’Asie Occidentale pendant la période seljukide.” Wiener
Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 51, no. 1–2 (1948): 178–187.
“The Turkish Invasion: The Selchükids.” In A History of the Crusades, edited by
Kenneth Setton, 135–176. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1955.
Canard, Marius. “al-Basā sı̄ rı̄ .” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by
P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
Histoire de la dynastie des H’amdanides de Jazîra et de Syrie. Paris: Presses
universitaires de France, 1953.
Ceylan, Ebubekir The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform,
Modernization and Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East.
London: I. B. Tauris, 2011.
Charpin, Dominique. “The History of Ancient Mesopotamia: An Overview.” In
Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, edited by Jack M. Sasson, 807–829.
New York: Simon Schuster McMillan, 1995.
Chase, Kenneth Warren. Firearms: A Global History to 1700. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Chatty, Dawn. From Camel to Truck: the Bedouin in the Modern World. New York:
Vantage Press, 1986.
Christian, David. A History of Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia. Blackwell
History of the World. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.
Cole, Donald P. “Where Have the Bedouin Gone?” Anthropological Quarterly 76,
no. 2 (2003): 235–267.
Commins, David. The Mission and the Kingdom: Wahhabi Power behind the Saudi
Throne. London: I. B. Tauris, 2016.
Connermann, Stephan. “Volk, Ethnie oder Stamm? Die Kurden aus mamlükischer
Sicht.” Asien und Afrika. Beiträge des Zentrums für asiatische und afrikanische
Studien der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel 8 (2004): 27–68.
Conrad, Jo-Ann. “Dede Korkut: Reintegrating the Historic, the Heroic, and the
Marvelous.” Turcica 33 (2001): 243–275.
Crone, Patricia. “The Early Islamic World.” In War and Society in the Ancient and
Medieval Worlds. Asia, the Mediterranean, Europe and Mesoamerica, edited by
Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein, 309–332. Washington, DC: Center
for Hellenic Studies, Harvard University, 1999.
“The First-century Concept of Hiğ ra.” Arabica 41 (1994): 352–387.
Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1987.
“Quraysh and the Roman Army: Making Sense of the Meccan Leather Trade.”
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 70, no. 1 (2007): 63–88.
Slaves on Horses. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
“Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad Period Political Parties?” Der
Islam 71 (1994): 1–57.
Cronin, Stephanie. Armies and State-Building in the Modern Middle East: Politics,
Nationalism and Military Reform. London: I. B. Tauris, 2014.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 248 Bibliography

Tribal Politics in Iran: Rural Conflict and the New State, 1921–1941. London:
Routledge, 2007.
Dalley, Stephanie. “Ancient Mesopotamian Military Organization.” In
Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, edited by Jack M. Sasson, 413–422.
New York: Simon and Schuster McMillan, 1995.
Davidovich, E. A. “The Karakhanids.” In History of Civilizations of Central Asia,
edited by M. S. Asimov and C. E. Bosworth, 119–143. Paris: UNESCO
Publishing, 1998.
Davis, Dick. “Iran and Aniran: The Shaping of a Legend.” In Iran Facing Others:
Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective, edited by Abbas Amanat and
Farzin Vejdani, 37–48. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
De Nicola, Bruno. Women in Mongol Iran: The Khā tū ns, 1206–1335. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2017.
Dehqan, Mustafa and Genç, Vural. “Kurds as Spies: Information-Gathering on
the 16th-Century Ottoman-Safavid Frontier.” Acta Orientalia Academiae
Scientiarum Hungaricae 71, no. 2 (2018): 197–230.
Deringil, Selim. “‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery’: The Late
Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate.” Comparative Studies in
Society and History 45, no. 2 (2003): 311–342.
The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman
Empire 1876–1909. London: I. B. Tauris, 1998.
DeWeese, Devin A. Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba
Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition. Hermeneutics,
studies in the history of religions. University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1994.
Di Cosmo, Nicola. Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in
East Asian History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
“Ancient Inner Asian Nomads: Their Economic Basis and Its Significance in
Chinese History.” The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 4 (1994):
1092–1126.
Diakonoff, I. M. “Media.” In Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 2. The Median and
Achaemenid periods, edited by Ilya Gerschevitch, 36–148. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Dickson, Martin. “Sháh Tahmásb and the Úzbeks (The Duel for Khurásán with
˙
‘Ubayd Khán: 930–46/1524–1540).” Unpublished PhD Dissertation,
Princeton University, 1958.
Digard, Jean-Pierre. “À propos des aspects économiques de la symbiose
nomades-sedentaires dans la Mésopotamie ancienne.” In Nomads and
Sedentary Peoples. XXX International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and
North Africa, edited by Jorge Silva Castillo. Mexico City: Colegio de México,
1981.
Dixon, Abd al-Ameer Abd. The Umayyad Caliphate, 65–86/684–705: (A Political
Study). London: Luzac, 1971.
Donner, Fred M. “The Bakr b. Wa’il Tribes and Politics in Northeastern Arabia
on the Eve of Islam.” Studia Islamica 51 (1980): 5–38.
“Dolafids.” In Encyclopædia Iranica. Vol. I–. London, 1982–.
The Early Islamic Conquests. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 249

“Muhammad’s Political Consolidation in Arabia up to the Conquest of Mecca:

˙
a Reassessment.” The Muslim World 69, no. 3 (1979): 229–247.
Muhammad and the Believers at the Origins of Islam. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press, Harvard University Press, 2010.
Narratives of Islamic Origins: The Beginnings of Islamic Historical Writing.
Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1998.
“Umayyad Efforts at Legitimation: The Umayyads’ Silent Heritage.” In
Umayyad Legacies: Medieval Memories from Syria to Spain, edited by
Antoine Burrut and Paul M. Cobb, 187–211. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
Donohue, John J. The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq 334 H./945 to 403 H./1012:
Shaping Institutions for the Future. Leiden: Brill, 2003.
Durand-Guédy, David. “Goodbye to the Türkmens? The Military Role of
Nomads in Iran after the Saljū q Conquest.” In Nomad Military Power in
Iran and Adjacent Areas in the Islamic Period, edited by Kurt Franz and
Wolfgang Holzwarth, 107–136. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2015.
Iranian Elites and Turkish Rulers: A History of Isfahā n in the Saljū q Period.
London: Routledge, 2010. ˙
“Ruling from the Outside: A New Perspective on Early Turkish Kingship in
Iran.” In Every Inch a King: Comparative Studies on Kings and Kingship in the
Ancient and Medieval Worlds, edited by Lynette Mitchell and
Charles Melville, 325–342. Leiden: Brill, 2013.
“The Türkmen-Saljū q Relationship in Twelfth-Century Iran: New Elements
Based on a Contrastive Analysis of Three inšā ’documents.” Eurasian Studies
IX, no. 1–2 (2011): 11–66.
Eckmann, János. “Die kiptschakische Literatur.” In Philologiae Turcicae
Fundamenta, vol. II, edited by Louis Bazin, Alessio Bombaci, Jean Deny,
Tayyib Gökbilgin, Fahir Iz, Helmuth Scheel. Aquis Mattiacis: Steiner, 1964.
Edward McEwen, Robert L. Miller, Christopher A. Bergman. “Early Bow Design
and Construction.” Scientific American, June (1991): 76–82.
el-Tayib, Abdulla. “Pre-Islamic Poetry.” In Arabic Literature to the End of the
Umayyad Period, edited by A. F. L. Beeston, 27–109. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
el-Tayib, Abdullah. “Abū Firā s al-Hamdā nı̄ .” In ‘Abbasid Belles-lettres, edited by
Julia Ashtiany, T. M. Johnstone, ˙ J. D. Latham, R. B. Sergent, C. Rex Smith.
Cambridge History of Arabic Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990.
Enderwitz, Susanne. Gesellschaftlicher Rang und ethnische Legitimation: der arabische
Schriftsteller Abū ‘Uṯ mā n al-Ğ ā hiz (gest. 868) über die Afrikaner, Perser und
Araber in der islamischen Gesellschaft.˙ ˙ Freiburg im Breisgau: Schwarz, 1979.
Ercilasun, Ahmet B. “Language and Literature in the Early Muslim Turkish
States.” In The Turks, edited by C. Cem Oğ uz Hasan Celâl Güzel and
Osman Karatay, 347–372. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2002.
Erdem, Ilham. “Eastern Anatolian Turkish States.” In The Turks, edited by
C. Cem Oğ uz, Hasan Celâl Güzel and Osman Karatay, 477–506. Ankara:
Yeni Türkiye Publications, 2002.
Fabietti, Ugo, “State Policies and Bedouin Adaptation in Saudi Arabia, 1900–
1980.” In The Transformation of Nomadic Society in the Arab East, edited by

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 250 Bibliography

Martha Mundy and Basim Musallam, 82–9. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2000.
al-Fahad, Abdulaziz H. “The ‘Imama vs. the ‘Iqal: Hadari-Bedouin Conflict and
the Formation of the Saudi State.” In Counter-Narratives: History,
Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, edited by
Madawi al-Rasheed and Robert Vitalis, 35–75. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004.
Faroqhi, Suraiya. Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans, 1517–1683.
London; New York: I. B. Tauris 1996.
Fası̄ h Khwā fı̄ , Ahmad b. Jalā l al-Dı̄ n. Mujmal-i Fası̄ hı̄ , edited by Muhammad
˙ ˙Farrukh. Mashhad:
˙ Bā stā n, 1960–61. ˙˙ ˙
Fattah, Hala Mundhir. The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf,
1745–1900. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.
Finkelstein, J. J. “The Genealogy of the Hammurapi Dynasty.” Journal of
Cuneiform Studies 20 (1966): 95–118.
Fleischer, Cornell H. Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The
Historian Mustafa Âli (1541–1600). Princeton studies on the Near East.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Flemming, Barbara. “Old Anatolian Turkish Poetry and Its Relationship to the
Persian Tradition.” In Turkic-Iranian Contact Areas: Historical and Linguistic
Aspects, edited by Lars Johanson and Christine Bulut, 49–68. Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz, 2006.
Floor, Willem. “The Khalifeh al-Kholafa of the Safavid Sufi Order.” Zeitschrift der
deutchen morgenländischen Gesellschaft 153, no. 1 (2003): 51–86.
“The Rise and Fall of the Banū Ka‘b. A Borderer State in Southern
Khuzestan.” Iran 44 (2006): 277–315.
The Economy of Safavid Persia. Iran-Turan Bd. 1. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2000.
Foran, John. “The Long Fall of the Safavid Dynasty: Moving beyond the
Standard View.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (1992):
281–304.
Fragner, Bert. “Social and Internal Economic Affairs.” In Cambridge History of Iran,
vol. 6. The Timurid and Safavid Periods, edited by Peter Jackson and
Laurence Lockhart, 491–565. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Franz, Kurt. “The Bedouin in History or Bedouin History?” Nomadic Peoples 15,
no. 1 (2011): 11–53.
Vom Beutezug zur Territorialherrschaft. Beduinische Gruppen in mittelislamischer
Zeit. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2007.
Frye, Richard N. “The Sā mā nids.” In Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 4, edited by
Richard N. Frye, 136–161. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
Gandjeï, Tourkhan. “Turkish in Pre-Mongol Persian Poetry.” Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies 49, no. 1 (1986): 67–75.
Gardet, L. and J.-C. Vadet. “Kalb.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.
Edited by P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
Garthwaite, Gene R. Khans and Shahs: A Documentary Analysis of the Bakhtiyari in
Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Gaube, Heinz, and Thomas Leisten. Die Kernländer des ‘Abbā sidenreichs im 10./11.
Jh.: Materialien zur TAVO-Karte B VII 6. Beihefte zum Tübinger Atlas des

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 251

Vorderen Orients. Reihe B, Geisteswissenschaften; Nr. 75. Wiesbaden:

L. Reichert, 1994.
Gibb, H. A. R. The Arab Conquests in Central Asia. New York: AMS Press, 1970.
“An Interpretation of Islamic History.” In Studies on the Civilization of Islam,
edited by Stanford Shaw and William R. Polk, 3–33. Boston: Beacon Press,
1962.
“The Social Significance of the Shuubiya.” In Studies on the Civilization of
Islam, edited by Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk, 62–73. Boston:
Beacon Press, 1962.
Golden, Peter B. “The Peoples of the South Russian Steppe.” In The Cambridge
History of Early Inner Asia, edited by Denis Sinor, 256–284. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples: Ethnogenesis and State-
Formation in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia and the Middle East.
Turcologica, Bd. 9. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1992.
Nomads and Sedentary Societies in Medieval Eurasia. Essays on global and com-
parative history. Washington, DC: American Historical Association, 1998.
Goldziher, Ignaz. Muslim Studies. Translated by C. R. Barber and S. M. Stern. 2
vols. London: Allen and Unwin, 1967–1971.
Gordon, Matthew. The Breaking of a Thousand Swords: A History of the Turkish
Military of Samarra, A.H. 200–275/815–889 C.E. Albany: State University of
New York Press, 2001.
Goriacheva, Valentina D. “À propos des deux capitales du khaghanat karakha-
nide.” Cahiers d’Asie Centrale 9 (2001): 91–114.
Graf, David Frank. “Rome and the Saracens: Reassessing the Nomadic Menace.”
In Rome and the Arabian Frontier: From the Nabataeans to the Saracens, edited
by David Frank Graf. Aldershot: Variorum, 1997.
Haarmann, Ulrich W. “Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity: the Arab
Image of the Turk from the ‘Abbasids to Modern Egypt.” International
Journal of Middle East Studies 20, no. 2 (1988): 175–96.
Haase, Claus-Peter. “Untersuchungen zur Landschaftsgeschichte Nordsyriens in der
Umayyadenzeit.” Unpublished PhD dissertation, Universität Hamburg, 1975.
Habib, John S. Ibn Sa‘ud’s Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in
the Creation of the Sa’udi Kingdom, 1910–1930. Leiden: Brill, 1978.
Hamori, A. “al-Mutanabbı̄ .” In ‘Abbasid belles-lettres, edited by Julia
Ashtiany, T. M. Johnstone, J. D. Latham, R. B. Sergent, C. Rex Smith.
Cambridge History of Arabic Literature, 300–314. Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Haneda, Masashi. Le châh et les Qizilbā š: le système militaire safavide.
Islamkundliche Untersuchungen Bd. 119. Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1987.
Hanioğ lu, M. Şükrü. Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2011.
Hartog, François. Le miroir d’Hérodote: essai sur la représentation de l’autre.
Bibliothèque des histoires. Paris: Gallimard, 1980.
Hawting, Gerald. The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate AD
661–750. Carbondale; Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press,
1987.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 252 Bibliography

Haykel, Bernard. “Western Arabia and Yemen during the Ottoman Period.” In
New Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 2. The Western Islamic World Eleventh to
Eighteenth Centuries, edited by Maribel Fierro, 436–449. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Heidemann, Stefan. Die Renaissance der Städte in Nordsyrien und
Nordmesopotamien: städtische Entwicklung und wirtschaftliche Bedingungen in
ar-Raqqa und Harrā n von der Zeit der beduinischen Vorherrschaft bis zu den
Seldschuken. Islamic ˙ history and civilization. Studies and texts, v. 40.
Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002.
“Numayrid ar-Raqqa: Archaeological and Historical Evidence for
a ‘Dimorphic State’ in the Bedouin Dominated Fringes of the Fā timid
Empire.” In Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk ˙Eras.
The 9th and 10th International Colloquium at the Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven in May 2000 and May 2001, edited by U. Vermeulen and J. van
Steenbergen. Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 85–105. Leuven,
Belgium: Peeters, 2005.
Heinkele, Barbara Kellner. “The Turcomans and Bilā d aš-Šā m in the
Mamluk Period.” In Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the
Middle East, edited by Tarif Khalidi, 169–80. Beirut: American
University of Beirut, 1984.
Hillenbrand, Carole. “Islamic Orthodoxy or Realpolitik? Al-Ghazā lı̄ ’s Views on
Government.” Iran 26 (1988): 81–94.
“Women in the Seljuq Period.” In Women in Iran from the Rise of Islam to 1800,
edited by Guity Nashat and Lois Beck, 103–120. Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 2003.
Hinds, Martin. “Kûfan Political Alignments and Their Background in the Mid-
Seventh Century A.D.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 2 (1971):
346–367.
Hoffmann, Birgitt. Waqf im mongolischen Iran: Rašı̄ duddı̄ ns Sorge um Nachruhm
und Seelenheil. Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2000.
Hope, Michael. Power, Politics, and Tradition in the Mongol Empire and the
Ī lkhā nate of Iran. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Hoyland, Robert G. Arabia and the Arabs. From the Bronze Age to the Coming of
Islam. London; New York: Routledge, 2001.
Hsiao, Ch’i-ch’ing. The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty. Cambridge,
MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University: distributed by
Harvard University Press, 1978.
Humphreys, R. Stephen. From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus,
1193–1260. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977.
Hütteroth, Wolf D. “Ottoman Administration of the Desert Frontier in the
Sixteenth Century.” Asian and African Studies 19 (1985): 145–155.
Ibn al-Athı̄ r, ‘Izz al-Dı̄ n. The Annals of the Saljuq Turks: Selections from al-Kā mil
fı̄ ‘l-Ta’rı̄ kh of ‘Izz al-Dı̄ n Ibn al-Athı̄ r. Translated by D. S. Richards. London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.
Ibn al-Nadı̄ m, Muhammad ibn Ishā q. The Fihrist of al-Nadı̄ m: A Tenth-Century
Survey of Muslim ˙ ˙
Culture. Translated by Bayard Dodge. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1970.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 253

Ibn Hawqal, Muhammad ibn ‘Alı̄ . Configuration de la terre (Kitab surat al-ard).
˙
Translated ˙ Johannes Hendrik Kramer and Gaston Wiet. Beirut:
by
Commission internationale pour la traduction des chefs d’oeuvre, 1965.
al-Kā shgharı̄ , Mahmū d. Compendium of the Turkic Dialects. Translated by Robert
Dankoff. Sources˙ of Oriental Languages and Literatures, vol. 7. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Ibn Khaldū n, ‘Abd al-Rahmā n. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History.
Translated by Franz ˙Rosenthal. Abridged ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1967.
Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power. 2nd ed.
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2009.
Inalcik, Halil. “Mehemmed I.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited
by P. Bearman˙et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
“Mehemmed II.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by
˙
P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
“Tı̄ mā r.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by P. Bearman et al.
Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
“The Yürüks, Their Origins, Expansion and Economic Role.” In Oriental
Carpet and Textile Studies, edited by R. Pinner and H. Inalcik, 39–65.
London: HALI, 1986.
Inalcik, Halil, and Donald Quataert. An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman
Empire, 1300–1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Irwin, Robert. The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate,
1250–1382. London: Croom Helm, 1986.
Jabbur, Jibrail Sulayman, Suhayl Jibrail Jabbur, and Lawrence I. Conrad. The
Bedouins and the Desert: Aspects of Nomadic Life in the Arab East. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1995.
Jackson, Peter. The Mongols and the Islamic World from Conquest to Conversion. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017.
Jacobsen, Thorkild. The Treasures of Darkness: A History of Mesopotamian Religion.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976.
Jā hiz, al -. Nine essays of al-Jahiz. Translated by William M. Hutchins. New York:
˙ ˙P. Lang, 1989.
al-Juhany, Uwaidah M. Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement. Reading, UK:
Ithaca, 2002.
Juwaynı̄ , ‘Alā ' al- Dı̄ n ‘Atā -Malik. The History of the World-Conqueror. Translated
by John Andrew Boyle. ˙ Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958.
Jū zjā nı̄ , Minhā j Sirā j. Tabakā t al-Nā sirı̄ : A General History of the Muhammadan
˙
Dynasties of Asia, including ˙ Hindustan;
˙ from A. H. 194 (810 A.D.) to A.H. 658
(1260 A.D.) and the Irruption of the Infidel Mughals into Islam. Translated by
H. G. Raverty. New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp.; exclusively dis-
tributed by Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970.
Kaegi, Walter Emil. Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Kafadar, Cemal. Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 254 Bibliography

Kafesoğ lu, Ibrahim. A History of the Seljuks: Ibrahim Kafesoğ lu‘s Interpretation and
the Resulting Controversy. Translated by Gary Leiser. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1988.
Kamola, Stefan. “History and Legend in the Jā mi‘ al-tawā rı̄ kh: Abraham,
Alexander and Oghuz Khan.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 25, no. 4
(2015): 555–577.
Karev, Yuri. “From Tents to City. The Royal Court of the Western Qarakhanids
between Bukhara and Samarqand.” In Turko-Mongol Rulers, Cities and City
Life, edited by David Durand-Guédy, 99–148. Leiden: Brill, 2013.
Kasaba, Reşat. A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees.
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009.
al-Kā shgharı̄ , Mahmū d. Compendium of the Turkic Dialects. translated by Robert
Dankoff and˙ James Kelly, vol. 1, Sources of Oriental Languages and
Literatures Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1982.
Kastritsis, Dimitris J. “The Ottoman Interregnum (1402–1413): Politics and
Narratives of Dynastic Succession.” Unpublished PhD dissertation,
Harvard University, 2005.
Kennedy, Hugh. The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic
State. London: Routledge, 2001.
The Early Abbasid Caliphate: A Political History. London; Totowa, NJ: Croom
Helm; Barnes & Noble, 1981.
The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to
the Eleventh Century. London; New York: Longman, 1986.
“The Uqaylids of Mosul: The Origins and Structure of a Nomad Dynasty.” In
Actas del XII congreso de la Union européenne d’arabisants et d’islamisants
(Málaga, 1984), 391–402. Madrid: Union Européenne d’Arabisants et
d’Islamisants, 1986.
Khalik, Nancy A. “From Byzantium to Early Islam: Studies on Damascus in the
Umayyad Era.” Unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2006.
Khazanov, A. M. Nomads and the Outside World. 2nd ed. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1994.
Khazeni, Arash. Tribes & Empire on the Margins of Nineteenth-Century Iran.
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009.
Khoury, Dina Rizk. State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul,
1540–1834. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Khoury, Philip S. Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism
1920–1945. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
“The Tribal Shaykh, French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement in
Syria between Two World Wars.” Middle Eastern Studies 18, no. 2 (1982):
180–193.
King, G. R. D. “The Distribution of Sites and Routes in the Jordanian and Syrian
Deserts in the Early Islamic Period.” In Proceedings of the Twentieth Seminar
for Arabian Studies held at London on 1st-4th July 1986, 91–105. London:
Seminar for Arabian Studies, Institute of Archaeology, 1987.
“The Umayyad Qusur and Related Settlements in Jordan.” In The IVth
International Congress of the History of Bilad al-Sham, edited by Muhammad
‘Adnan al-Bakhit and Ihsan ‘Abbas. Amman: al-Jami‘a al-Urduniya, 1987.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 255

Kister, M. J. “Al-Hı̄ ra: Some Notes on Its Relations with Arabia.” Arabica 15
(1968): 143–169.˙
“Mecca and the Tribes of Arabia.” In Studies in Islamic History and Civilization in
Honour of David Ayalon, edited by M. Sharon, 33–57. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986.
Klausner, Carla L. The Seljuk Vezirate: A Study of Civil Administration, 1055–1194.
Harvard Middle Eastern monographs, 22. Cambridge, MA: Distributed for
the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University by Harvard
University Press, 1973.
Kliashtorny, S. G. “Les Samanides et les Karakhanides: une étape initiale de la
géopolitique impériale.” Cahiers d’Asie Centrale 9, Études Karakhanides
(2001): 35–40.
Koca, Salim. “Anatolian Turkish Beyliks.” In The Turks, edited by C. Cem Oguz,
Hasan Celâl Güzel, Osman Karatay, 507–553. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye
Publications, 2002.
Kochnev, Boris D. “Les frontières du royaume des Karakhanides.” Cahiers d’Asie
Centrale 9 (2001): 41–48.
Komaroff, Linda, and Stefano Carboni. The Legacy of Genghis Khan: Courtly Art
and Culture in Western Asia, 1256–1353. New York; New Haven, CT;
London: Metropolitan Museum of Art; Yale University Press, 2002.
Kostiner, Joseph. “The Hashimite Tribal Confederacy of the Arab Revolt, 1916–
1917.” In National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in
Honour of Elie Kedourie, edited by Edward Ingram, 126–143. London:
F. Cass, 1986.
“On Instruments and Their Designers: the Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence
of the Saudi State.” Middle Eastern Studies 21, no. 3 (1985): 298–323.
Kraemer, Joel L. Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: The Cultural Revival during
the Buyid Age. Leiden: Brill, 1986.
Kuhrt, Amélie. The Ancient Near East: c. 3000–330 B.C. London: Routledge, 1995.
Kunke, Marina. Nomadenstämme in Persien im 18. und 19.
Jahrhundert. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen Bd. 151. Berlin:
K. Schwarz, 1991.
Lamberg-Karlovsky, C. C. Archaeological Thought in America. Cambridge;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Lambton, Ann K. S. “Aspects of Saljū q-Ghuzz Settlement in Persia.” In Islamic
Civilization, 950–1150, edited by D. S. Richards, 105–125. Oxford: Cassirer,
1973.
Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia: Aspects of Administrative, Economic,
and Social History, 11th–14th century. Columbia lectures on Iranian studies;
no. 2. Albany, NY: Bibliotheca Persica, 1988.
“The Internal Structure of the Saljuq Empire.” In The Cambridge History of
Iran, vol. 5. The Saljuq and Mongol Periods, edited by J. A. Boyle, 203–282.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
“Mongol Fiscal Administration in Persia, pt. II.” Studia Islamica 65 (1987):
97–123.
Landau-Tesseron, Ella. “Review of F. McGraw Donner, The Early Islamic
Conquests, Princeton 1981.” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 6 (1985):
493–512.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 256 Bibliography

Lane, George. Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian

Renaissance. Studies in the history of Iran and Turkey. London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
Larsson, Göran. “Ignaz Goldziher on the Shu‘ū biyya.” Zeitschrift der deutche
morgenländische Gesellschaft 155, no. 2 (2005): 365–372.
Lassner, J. “Hilla.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by
P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
Lecker, Michael. The Banū Sulaym: A Contribution to the Study of Early Islam.
Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1989.
Lecomte, Gérard. Ibn Qutayba (mort en 276/889). L’homme, son oeuvre, ses idées.
Damascus: Institut français de Damas, 1965.
Leder, Stefan. “Towards a Historical Semantic of the Bedouin, Seventh to
Fifteenth Centuries: a Survey.” Der Islam 92, no. 1 (2015): 85–123.
Leick, Gwendolyn. A Dictionary of Ancient Near Eastern Mythology. London:
Routledge, 1991.
Lemche, Niels Peter. “The History of Ancient Syria and Palestine: an Overview.”
In The Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, edited by J. M. Sasson,
1195–1218. New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1995.
Lewis, Norman N. Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan, 1800–1980.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Lindner, Rudi. “Anatolia, 1300–1451.” In Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 1.
Byzantium to Turkey, 1071–1453, edited by Kate Fleet, 102–137.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Lindner, Rudi Paul. Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2007.
Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia. Bloomington: Research Institute
for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1983.
Littauer, M. A., and J. H. Crouwel. Wheeled Vehicles and Ridden Animals in the
Ancient Near East. Leiden: Brill, 1979.
Løkkegaard, F. “Fay.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by
P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
Luther, Kenneth A. “Alp Arslā n.” In Encyclopædia Iranica. Vol. I–. London,
1982–.
MacDonald, M. C. A. “North Arabia in the First Millennium BCE.” In
Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, edited by Jack M. Sasson, 1355–1369.
New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1995.
Madelung, Wilferd. “Has the Hijra Come to an End?” In Mélanges offerts au
professeur Dominique Sourdel. Revue des Études Islamiques, vol. LIV,
226–237. Paris: Paul Geunther, 1986.
“Deylamites, ii, In the Islamic Period.” In Encyclopædia Iranica. Vol. I–.
London, 1982–.
Maeda, Hirotake. “The Forced Migrations and Reorganization of the Regional
Order in the Caucasus by Safavid Iran: Preconditions and Developments
Described by Fazli Khuzani.” In Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic
Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds, in Slavic Eurasian Studies, edited by
Ieda Osamu and Uyama Tomohiko, 237–271. Hokkaido: Research Center,
Hokkaido University, 2006.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 257

Malbran-Labat, Florence. “Le nomadisme à l’époque néoassyrienne.” In Nomads

and Sedentary Peoples. XXX International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia
and North Africa, edited by Jorge Silva Castillo, 57–76. Mexico City: El
Colegio de México, 1981.
Manz, Beatrice F. “The Development and Meaning of Čagatay Identity.” In
Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change, edited by Jo-
Ann Gross. Durham: Duke University Press, 1992.
“Mongol History Rewritten and Relived.” In Figures Mythiques des mondes
musulmans, special issue of Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée,
edited by Denise Aigle, 129–150. Aix en Provence: Édisud, 2001.
“Multi-ethnic Empires and the Formulation of Identity.” Ethnic and Racial
Studies 26, no. 1 (2003): 70–101.
“Nomads and Regional Armies in the Middle East.” In Nomad Military Power
in Iran and Adjacent Areas in the Islamic Period, edited by Kurt Franz and
Wolfgang Holzwarth, 1–28. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2015.
Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007.
The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
“Tamerlane and the Symbolism of Sovereignty.” Iranian Studies 21, no. 1–2
(1988): 105–122.
“Temür and the Problem of a Conqueror’s Legacy.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic
Society series 3 vol. 8, no. 1 (1998): 21–41.
Martin, Vanessa. The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest and the State in Nineteenth-
Century Persia. London: I. B. Tauris, 2005.
Martinez, A. P. “Some Notes on the Ī l-Xā nid Army.” Archivum Eurasiae Medii
Aeivi VI (1986): 129–242.
Masters, Bruce. “Egypt and Syria under the Ottomans.” In The New Cambridge
History of Islam, vol. 2. The Western Islamic World Eleventh to Eighteenth
Centuries, edited by Maribel Fierro, 411–435. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010.
“Semi-autonomous Forces in the Arab Provinces.” In The Cambridge
History of Turkey, vol. 3. The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839, edited
by Suraiya N. Faroqhi, 186–206. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006.
Masuya, Tomoko. “Ilkhanid Courtly Life.” In The Legacy of Genghis Khan:
Courtly Art and Culture in Western Asia, 1256–1353, edited by
Stefano Carboni and Linda Komaroff, 74–104. New York; New Haven,
CT: Metropolitan Museum of Art and Yale University Press, 2002.
Matthee, Rudi. “Between Arabs, Turks and Iranians: The Town of Basra, 1600–
1700.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 69, no. 1 (2006):
53–78.
Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan. London: I. B. Tauris,
2012.
“Relations between the Center and the Periphery in Safavid Iran: The Western
Borderlands v. the Eastern Frontier Zone.” The Historian (2015): 431–463.
“The Safavid-Ottoman Frontier: Iraq-i Arab as Seen by the Safavids.” In
Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Changes, edited by

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 258 Bibliography

Kemal Karpat and Robert W. Zens, 157–173. Madison: University of

Wisconsin Press, 2003.
“Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid
Iran.” In Safavid Persia, edited by Charles Melville, 389–416. London:
I. B. Tauris, 1996.
May, Timothy. The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military
System. Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword Military, 2007.
“The Mongol Conquest Strategy in the Middle East.” In The Mongols’ Middle
East, edited by C. P. Melville and Bruno De Nicola, 13–37. Leiden: Brill,
2016.
Mazzaoui, Michel M. The Origins of the Safawids: Šı̄ ‘ism, Sū fism and the Ġ ulā t.
Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1972. ˙ ˙
Meadow, Richard H. “Inconclusive Remarks on Pastoralism, Nomadism, and
Other Animal-Related Matters.” In Pastoralism in the Levant, edited by
Ofer Bar-Yosef and A. M. Khazanov, 261–69. Madison, WI: Prehistory
Press, 1992.
Meisami, Julie Scott. Persian Historiography to the end of the Twelfth Century.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999.
Melikian-Chirvani, A. S. “Conscience du passé et résistance culturelle dans l’ Iran
mongol.” In L’Iran face à la domination mongole, edited by Denise Aigle.
Bibliotèque iranienne, 135–177. Tehran: Institut français de recherche en
Iran, 1997.
Melville, C. P. “Between Tabriz and Herat: Persian Historical Writing in the 15th
Century.” In Iran und iranisch geprägte Kulturen, edited by Raliph Kauz,
Birgitt Hoffmann, Markus Ritter, 28–39. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2008.
Melville, Charles. “Anatolia under the Mongols.” In Cambridge History of Turkey,
vol. 1. Byzantium to Turkey, 1071–1453, edited by Kate Fleet, 51–101.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
“From Adam to Abaqa: Qā dı̄ Baidā wı̄ ’s Rearrangement of History.” Studia
Iranica 30, no. 1 (2001): 67–86. ˙ ˙
“Čobā n.” In Encyclopædia Iranica. Vol. I–. London, 1982–.
“The Itineraries of Sultan Öljeitü.” Iran 28 (1990): 55–70.
“The Keshig in Iran: The Survival of the Royal Mongol Household.” In Beyond
the Legacy of Genghis Khan, edited by Linda Komaroff, 135–164. Leiden:
Brill, 2006.
“Pā dshā h-i Islā m: the conversion of Sultan Mahmū d Ghā zā n Khā n.” Pembroke
Papers 1 (1990): 159–177. ˙
Melyukova, A. I. “The Scythians and Sarmatians.” In The Cambridge History of
Early Inner Asia, edited by Denis Sinor, 97–117. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
Merçil, Erdoğ an. “History of the Great Seljuk Empire.” In The Turks, edited by
C. Cem Oguz, Hasan Celâl Güzel, Osman Karatay, 147–170. Ankara: Yeni
Türkiye Publications, 2002.
Michalowski, Piotr. “History as Charter: Some Observations on the Sumerian
King List.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 103 (1983): 237–248.
Mieroop, Marc Van De. A History of the Ancient Near East. Oxford: Blackwell,
2003.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 259

Minorsky, Vladimir. “The Aq-Qoyunlu and Land Reforms.” Bulletin of the School
of Oriental and African Studies XVII (1955): 449–462.
“A Civil and Military Review in Fā rs in 881/1476.” Bulletin of the School of
Oriental and African Studies X (1940–1942): 141–178.
“Kurd, Kurdistan, iii. B History: The Islamic period up to 1920.” In
Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by P. Bearman et al. Leiden:
Brill, 1960–2005.
Tadhkirat al-mulū k: A Manual of Safavid Administration (circa 1137/1725),
Persian text in facsimile (B.M. Or.˙ 9496). E. J. W. Gibb memorial series.
London: Luzac, 1980.
Minorsky, Vladimir, V. V. Bartol’d and Clifford Edmund Bosworth. Hudū d al-
‘Ā lam: “The regions of the world”: A Persian Geography, 372 A.H.-982˙ A.D.
2nd ed. London: Luzac, 1970.
Mitchell, Colin P. The Practice of Politics in Safavid Iran: Power, Religion and
Rhetoric. London: I. B. Tauris, 2009.
Montgomery, James E. The Vagaries of the Qası̄ dah: The Tradition and Practice of
Early Arabic Poetry. Cambridge: E. J. W. ˙Gibb Memorial Trust, 1997.
Morgan, David O. “The ‘Great yasa of Chinggis Khan’ revisited.” In Mongols,
Turks, and Others, edited by Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran, 291–308.
Leiden: Brill, 2005.
“Mongol or Persian: The Government of Ī lkhā nid Iran.” Harvard Middle
Eastern and Islamic Review 3, no. 1–2 (1996).
“Rašı̄ d al-Dı̄ n and Ġ azan Khan.” In L’Iran face à la domination mongole, edited
by Denise Aigle. Bibliotèque Iranienne, 179–188. Tehran: Institut Français de
Recherche en Iran, 1997.
Morimoto, Kazuo. “An Enigmatic Genealogical Chart of the Timurids:
A Testimony to the Dynasty’s Claim to Yasavi-‘Alid Legitimacy?” Oriens
44 (2016): 145–178.
Morony, Michael G. Iraq after the Muslim Conquest. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984.
Mottahedeh, Roy P. “The Shu‘ûbîyah Controversy and the Social History of
Early Islamic Iran.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 6 (1976):
161–182.
Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1980.
Murphy, Rhoads. Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1999.
“The Resumption of Ottoman-Safavid Border Conflict, 1603–1638: Effects of
Border Destabilizaton on the Evolution of Tribe-State Relations.” In Shifts
and Drifts in Nomad-Sedentary Relations, edited by Stefan Leder and
Bernard Streck, 307–323. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2005.
“Some Features of Nomadism in the Ottoman Empire: A Survey Based on
Tribal Census and Judicial Appeal Documentation from Archives in Istanbul
and Damascus.” Journal of Turkish Studies 8 (1984): 189–197.
Mustawfı̄ , Qazwı̄ nı̄ , Hamd Allā h. The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat-al-qulub.
Leiden; London:˙ E.J. Brill; Luzac, 1919.
Nagel, Tilman. “Buyids.” In Encyclopædia Iranica. Vol. I–. London, 1982–.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 260 Bibliography

Najmabadi, Afsaneh. The Story of the Daughters of Quchan: Gender and National
Memory in Iranian History. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998.
Nasawı̄ , Muhammad ibn Ahmad. Histoire du sultan Djelal ed-Din Mankobirti,
prince du˙ Kharezm, par ˙Mohammed en-Nesawi: texte Arabe publié d’apres le
manuscrit de la Bibliotèque Nationale. Translated by O. Houdas. 2 vols. Vol. 2.
Paris: E. Leroux, 1891–95.
Nawā ’ı̄ . ‘Abd al-Husayn, ed. Asnā d wa makā tibā t-i tā rı̄ khı̄ -i Ī rā n. Tehran, 2536/
1977. ˙
Nawā ’ı̄ , Mı̄ r ‘Alı̄ Shı̄ r. Muhā kamā t al-lughatayn. Translated by Robert Devereux.
Leiden: Brill, 1966. ˙
Newman, Andrew J. Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire. London:
I. B. Tauris: Distributed in the U.S.A. by Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Nieuwenhuis, Tom. Politics and Society in Early Modern Iraq: Mamlū k Pashas,
Tribal Shaykhs and Local Rule between 1802 and 1831. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1982.
Nizā m al-Mulk. The book of Government or Rules for Kings: The Siyar al-muluk or
˙ Siyasat-nama of Nizam al-Mulk. Translated by Hubert Darke. 2nd ed.
London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1978.
Oberling, Pierre. The Qashqā ı̄ Nomads of Fā rs. The Hague: Mouton, 1974.
Ochsenwald, William. Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under
Ottoman Control, 1840–1908. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984.
O’Kane, Bernard. “Persian Poetry on Ilkhanid Art and Architecture.” In Beyond
the Legacy of Genghis Khan, edited by Linda Komaroff, 346–354. Leiden:
Brill, 2006.
Ölçer, Nazan. “The Anatolian Seljuks.” In Turks: A Journey of a Thousand Years,
edited by David Roxburgh, 102–145. London: Royal Academy of Arts, 2005.
Oppenheim, Max, Freiherr von. Die Beduinen, vol. 2, 3. Leipzig: Harrassowitz,
1939–1952.
Orthmann, Eva. Stamm und Macht: die arabischen Stämme im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert
der Hiğ ra. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2002.
Parker, Geoffrey. The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the
West, 1500–1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Paul, Jürgen. “Karakhanids.” In The Turks, edited by C. Cem Oguz, Hasan
Celâl Güzel, Osman Karatay, 71–78. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Publications,
2002.
“Mongol Aristocrats and Beyliks in Anatolia. A Study of Astarabā di’s Bazm va
Razm.” Eurasian Studies IX, no. 1–2 (2011): 105–158.
“Nouvelles pistes pour la recherche sur l’histoire de l’Asie centrale à l’
époque karakhanide (Xe-début XIIIe siècle).” Cahiers d’Asie Centrale 9
(2001): 13–34.
“The Role of Ḫ wā razm in Seluq Central Asian Politics, Victories and Defeats:
Two Case Studies.” Eurasian Studies VII (2007–8): 1–17.
The State and the Military: The Samanid Case. Bloomington: Indiana University
Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1994.
Paviot, Jacques. “Les marchands italiens dan l’Iran mongol.” In L’Iran face à la
domination mongole, edited by Denise Aigle. Bibliotèque iranienne, 71–86.
Tehran: Institut français de recherche in Iran, 1997.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 261

Peacock, A. C. S. “Court and Nomadic Life in Saljuq Anatolia.” In Turko-Mongol

Rulers, Cities and City Life, edited by David Durand-Guédy, 191–222.
Leiden: Brill, 2013.
Early Seljū q History: A New Interpretation. London: Routledge, 2010.
The Great Seljuk Empire. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015.
Pellat, Charles. Le milieu basrien et la formation de Ğ ā ḫ iz. Paris: Librairie
˙
d’Amérique et d’Orient Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1953. ˙
The Life and Works of Jā hiz. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
˙ ˙
Perry, John R. “The Zand Dynasty.” In The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 7. From
Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, edited by Gavin Hambly, Peter Avery,
Charles Melville, 63–103. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
“Forced Migration in Iran during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.”
Iranian Studies 8 (1975): 199–215.
Karı̄ m Khā n Zand: A History of Iran, 1747–1779. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1979.
Peters, F. E. The Arabs and Arabia on the Eve of Islam. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate,
1998.
Petrushevskiı̆, I. P. “The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran under the Ī l-Khā ns.”
In The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 5. The Saljuq and Mongol Periods, edited
by J. A. Boyle, 483–537. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
Zemledelie i agrarnye otnosheniia v Irane XIII–XIV vekov. Leningrad: Izd-vo
Akademii nauk SSSR, Leningradskoe otd., 1960.
Pfeiffer, Judith. “Conversion to Islam among the Ilkhans in Muslim Narrative
Traditions: The Case of Ahmad Tegüder.” Unpublished PhD dissertation,
University of Chicago, 2003.
Potts, Daniel T. Nomadism in Iran, From Antiquity to the Modern Era. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014.
Quinn, Sholeh Alysia. Historical Writing during the Reign of Shah ‘Abbas: Ideology,
Imitation, and Legitimacy in Safavid Chronicles. Salt Lake City: University of
Utah Press, 2000.
Rachewiltz, Igor de. The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of
the Thirteenth Century. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
“Yeh-lü Ch’u Ts’ai (1189–1243); Yeh-lü Chu? (1221–1285).” In In the Service
of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period, edited by
Igor de Rachewiltz, Hok-lam Chan, Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing, Peter W. Geier.
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993.
al-Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010.
Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty. London: I. B. Tauris, 1991.
“Shammar.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by P. Bearman
et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
Rashı̄ d-al-Dı̄ n. Rashiduddin Fazlullah’s Jami‘u’t-tawarikh: Compendium of
Chronicles. Translated by W. M. Thackston. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University, Dept. of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1998.
Rashı̄ d al-Dı̄ n Tabı̄ b. The History of the Seljuq Turks from the Jā mi‘ al-tawā rı̄ kh: an
˙
Ilkhanid adaptation of the Saljū q-nā ma of Zahı̄ r al- Dı̄ n Nı̄ shā pū rı̄ . Translated
by Kenneth A. Luther. Richmond, Surrey: ˙ Curzon, 2001.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 262 Bibliography

Ratchnevsky, Paul. Genghis Khan, His Life and Legacy. Translated by Thomas
Nivison Haining. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
Retsö, Jan. The Arabs in Antiquity: Their History from the Assyrians to the Umayyads.
London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
“The Domestication of the Camel and the Establishment of the Frankincense
Road from South Arabia.” Orientalia Suecana 40 (1991): 187–219.
Richard, Jean. “D’Älğ igidäi à Ğ azan: la continuité d’une politique franque chez
les Mongols d’Iran.” In L’Iran face à la domination mongole, edited by
Denise Aigle, 57–69. Louvain: Peeters, 1997.
Ripper, Thomas. Die Marwā niden von Diyā r Bakr: eine kurdische Dynastie im
islamischen Mittelalter. Würzburg: Ergon, 2000.
Robinson, B. W. Fifteenth-Century Persian Painting: Problems and Issues.
New York: New York University Press, 1991.
Robinson, Chase F. “Tribes and Nomads in Early Islamic Northern
Mesopotamia.” In Continuity and Change in Northern Mesopotamia from the
Hellenistic to the Early Islamic Period, edited by Karin Bartl and Stefan
R. Hauser, 429–452. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1996.
Roemer, Hans Robert. Persien auf dem Weg in die Neuzeit: iranische Geschichte von
1350–1750. Beirut: Orient-Institut der deutschen morgenländischen
Gesellschaft, 1989.
“The Safavid Period.” In The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 6. The Timurid and
Safavid Periods, edited by Laurence Lockhart and Peter Jackson, 189–350.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Rogan, Eugene. The Arabs: A History. New York: Basic Books, 2009.
The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East. New York: Basic
Books, 2015.
Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850–1921.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Röhrborn, Klaus. Provinzen und Zentralgewalt Persiens im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert.
Berlin: de Gruyter, 1966.
Rothstein, Gustav. Die Dynastie der Laḫ miden in al-Hı̄ ra: ein Versuch zur arabisch-
persischen Geschichte zur Zeit der Sasaniden. Hildesheim: ˙ G. Olms, 1968.
Rotter, Gernot. Die Umayyaden und der zweite Bürgerkrieg (680–692). Wiesbaden:
Steiner, 1982.
Rowton, Michael B. “Economic and Political Factors in Ancient Nomadism.” In
Nomads and Sedentary Peoples, XXX International Congress of Human Sciences
in Asia and North Africa, edited by Jorge Silva Castillo, 25–36. Mexico City:
Colegio de México, 1981.
Sadr, Karim. The Development of Nomadism in Ancient Northeast Africa.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991.
Safargaliev, M. G. Raspad Zolotoı̆ Ordy. Saransk: Mordovskoe knizhoe izd-vo,
1960.
Şahin, Ilhan. “The Oguz Turks in Anatolia.” In The Turks, edited by Hasan
Celâl Güzel, C. Cem Oguz, Osman Karatay, 418–429. Ankara: Yeni
Türkiye Publications, 2002.
Sa‘ı̄ dı̄ Sı̄ rjā nı̄ , ‘A. A. “Baḵtı̄ ā rı̄ ; Hā jı̄ ‘Alı̄ qolı̄ Khan Sardā r As‘ad.” In Encyclopædia
Iranica. Vol. I–. London, 1982–. ˙

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 263

Savory, Roger. Iran under the Safavids. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1980.
Schwarz, Glenn M. “Pastoral Nomadism in Ancient Western Asia.” In
Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, edited by Jack M. Sasson. New York:
Simon Schuster Macmillan, 1995, pp. 249–58.
Shahid, Irfan. “Ghassā n.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by
P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
“Lakhmids.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by P. Bearman
et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
“Tanū kh.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by P. Bearman
et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
Shamma, Samir. “Mirdā s.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by
P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
Sharon, Moshe. “The Political Role of the Bedouins in Palestine in the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Centuries.” In Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period,
edited by Moshe Ma‘oz, 5–31. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975.
Shaw, Brent D. “‘Eaters of Flesh, Drinkers of Milk’: The Ancient
Mediterranean Ideology of the Pastoral Nomad.” In Rulers, Nomads and
Christians in Roman North Africa, edited by Brent D. Shaw, 5–31.
Aldershot: Variorum, 1995.
Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern
Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
Shoufani, Elias. Al-Riddah and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia. Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1973.
Shryock, Andrew. Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1997.
Simon, Róbert. Meccan Trade and Islam: Problems of Origin and Structure.
Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989.
Sinclair, Tom. “The Ottoman Arrangements for the Tribal Principalities of the
Lake Van Region of the Sixteenth Century.” International Journal of Turkish
Studies 9, no. 1–2 (2003): 119–143.
Sinor, Denis. The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
“The Establishment and Dissolution of the Türk Empire.” In Cambridge
History of Early Inner Asia, edited by Denis Sinor, 285–316. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Smith, John Masson. “Mongol Nomadism and Middle Eastern Geography:
Qı̄ shlā qs and Tümens.” In The Mongol Empire and Its Legacy, edited by
Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David O. Morgan, 39–56. Leiden: Brill, 2000.
Smoor, P. “al-Ma‘arrı̄ .” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by
P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
Sneath, David. The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society, and
Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia. New York: Columbia University
Press, 2007.
Sommerfeld, Walter. “The Kassites of Ancient Mesopotamia: Origins, Politics
and Culture.” In Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, edited by Jack
M. Sasson, 917–930. New York: Simon Schuster Macmillan, 1995.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 264 Bibliography

Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1977, maps AX1 and
AX11.
Stark, Sören. Die Alttürkenzeit in Mittel- und Zentralasien: archäologische und histor-
ische Studien. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2008.
Stetkevych, Jaroslav. The Zephyrs of Najd: The Poetics of Nostalgia in the Classical
Arabic Nası̄ b. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Stetkevych, Suzanne Pinckney. The Poetics of Islamic Legitimacy: Myth, Gender,
and Ceremony in the Classical Arabic Ode. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2002.
Storey, C. A. and Yuri Bregel. Persidskaia literatura, bio-bibliograficheskiı̆ obzor. 3
vols. Moscow: “Nauka,” 1972.
Stewart, F. H. “Khuwwa.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by
P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
Stump, Ayfer Karakaya. “Subjects of the Sultan, Disciples of the Shah:
Formation and Transformation of the Kiszilbash/Alevi Communities in
Ottoman Anatolia.” Unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University,
2008.
Subtelny, Maria. Timurids in Transition: Turko-Persian Politics and Acculturation in
Medieval Iran. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
“Bā bur’s Rival Relations: A Story of Kinship and Conflict in 15th–16th
Century Central Asia.” Der Islam 66, no. 1 (1989): 102–118.
Sulimirsky, T. “The Scyths.” In Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 2, The Median and
Achaemenid Periods, edited by Ilya Gershevitch, 149–199. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Sümer, Faruk. “Döger.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by
P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
“Ḳarā -Ḳoyunlu.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by
P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
“Ḳaramā n-oghullarï.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by
P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
Oğ uzlar (Türkmenler): tarihleri, boy teşkilatı, destanları. 4. baskı. ed. Istanbul:
Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1999.
Szombathy, Zoltan. “Fieldwork and Preconceptions: The Role of the Bedouin as
Informants in Mediaeval Muslim Scholarly Culture (second-Third/Eighth-
Ninth Centuries).” Der Islam 92, no. 1 (2015): 124–147.
Szuchman, Jeffrey, “Integrating Approaches to Nomads, Tribes, and the State in
the Ancient Near East,” in Nomads, Tribes, and the State in the Ancient Near
East: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, edited by Jeffrey Szuchman, 1–14.
Oriental Institute Seminars # 5, Oriental Institute of Chicago, IL, 2009.
Szuppe, Maria. Entre Timourides, Uzbeks et Safavides: questions d’histoire politique et
sociale de Hérat dans la première moitié du XVIe siècle. Studia Iranica. Cahier 2.
Paris: Association pour l’avancement des études iraniennes, 1992.
“Kinship Ties between the Safavids and the Qizilbash Amirs in Late Sixteenth-
Century Iran: A Case Study of the Political Career of Members of the Sharaf
al-Din Oghli Tekelu Family.” In Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of an
Islamic Society, edited by Charles Melville, 79–104. London: I. B. Tauris,
1996.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 265

“L’évolution de l’image de Timour et des Timourides dans l’historiographie

safavide, XVIe–XVIIIe siècles.” In L’Héritage timouride Iran – Asie centrale –
Inde XVe–XVIIIe siècles, edited by Maria Szuppe. Cahiers D’Asie centrale,
313–331. Tashkent, Aix-en-Provence, 1997.
Tall, Tariq. “The Politics of Rural Policy in East Jordan, 1920–1989.” In The
Transformation of Nomadic Society in the Middle East, edited by Martha Mundi
and Basim Musallam, 90–98. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Tapper, Richard. Frontier Nomads of Iran: A Political and Social History of the
Shahsevan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Tatiana Zerjal, Yali Xue, et. al. “The Genetic Legacy of the Mongols.” American
Journal of Human Genetics 72 (2003): 717–721.
Tekin, Talât. A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic. Bloomington: Indiana University
Uralic and Altaic Series, 5,1968.
Thackston, W. M. Album Prefaces and Other Documents on the History of
Calligraphers and Painters [in Original Persian texts and parallel English
translations]. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
Thesiger, Wilfred. Arabian Sands. New York: Dutton, 1959.
Tihrā nı̄ Isfahā nı̄ , Abū Bakr, Kitā b-i Diyā rbakriyya, edited by N. Lugal and
˙ F. Sümer. ˙ Ankara: Türk tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1962–1964.
Togan, Isenbike. Flexibility and Limitation in Steppe Formations: The Kerait
Khanate and Chinggis Khan. Leiden: Brill, 1998.
Togan, Zeki Velidi. “Timurs Osteuropapolitik.” Zeitschrift der deutschen
morgenländischen Gesellschaft 108 (1958): 279–298.
Tor, Deborah G. Violent Order: Religious Warfare, Chivalry, and the ‘Ayyā r
Phenomenon in the Medieval Islamic World. Würzburg: Ergon, 2007.
“The Mamluks in the Military of the Pre-Seljuq Persianate Dynasties.” Iran 46
(2008): 213–225.
Tousi, Reza Ra’iss. “The Persian Army, 1880–1907.” Middle Eastern Studies 24,
no. 2 (1988): 206–229.
Tripp, Charles. A History of Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Tucker, Ernest. Nadir Shah’s Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran.
Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2006.
Turan, Fikret. “The Mamluks and Their Acceptance of Oghuz Turkic as
a Literary Language: Political Maneuver or Cultural Aspiration?” In Einheit
und Vielfalt in der türkischen Welt: Materialien der 5. Deutschen
Turkologenkonferenz Universität Mainz, 4.–7. Oktober 2002, edited by
Hendrik Boeschoten and Heidi Stein. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2007.
al-‘Umarı̄ , Ahmad ibn Yahyā ibn Fadl Allā h. Das mongolische Weltreich. Al-
‘Umarı̄ ‘s ˙Darstellung der˙ mongolischen˙ Reiche in seinem Werk Masā lik al-absā r
fı̄ mamā lik al-amsā r. Translated by Klaus Lech. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, ˙
1968. ˙
Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 1998.
Väth, Gerhard. Die Geschichte der artuqidischen Fürstentümer in Syrien und der
Ğ azı̄ ra’l Furā tı̄ ya (496–812/1002–1409). Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1987.
Velud, Christian. “French Mandate Policy in the Syrian Steppe.” In The
Transformation of Nomadic Society in the Arab East, edited by Martha Mundi
and Basim Musallam, 63–81. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 266 Bibliography

Venzke, Margaret L. “The Case of a Dulgadir-Mamluk Iqtā ’: A Re-assessment of

the Dulgadir Principality and Its Position within ˙the Ottoman-mamluk
Rivalry.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 43, no. 3
(2000): 399–474.
Vinogradov, Amal. “The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in
National Politics.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 3, no. 2 (1972):
123–139.
Vogelsang, Willem. “Medes, Scythians and Persians: The Rise of Darius in a
North-South Perspective.” Iranica Antiqua 33 (1998): 195–224.
Vryonis, Speros. The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of
Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1971.
Waines, David. “The Third Century Internal Crisis of the Abbasids.” Journal of
the Economic and Social History of the Orient 20, no. 3 (1977): 282–306.
Watson, Oliver. “Pottery under the Mongols.” In Beyond the Legacy of Genghis
Khan, edited by Linda Komaroff, 325–345. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
Watt, W. Montgomery. Muhammad at Mecca. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.
Muhammad at Medina. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.
Wellhausen, Julius. The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall. Translated by Margaret
Graham Weir. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1927.
Wensinck, A. J. and Patricia Crone. “Mawla.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second
Edition. Edited by P. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005.
White, Sam. The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Williamson, John Frederick. “A Political History of the Shammar Jarba Tribe of
al-Jazirah: 1800–1958.” Unpublished PhD dissertation, Indiana University,
1974.
Wing, Patrick. “Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Sultā n Ahmad Jalā yir’s Time as
a Refugee in the Mamluk Sultanate.” In Mamluk ˙ ˙
Cairo, A Crossroads for
Embassies: Studies on Diplomacy and Diplomatics, edited by Frédéric Bauden
and Malika Dekkiche, 163–175. Leiden: Brill, 2019.
The Jalayirids: Dynastic State Formation in the Mongol Middle East. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2016.
Wood, Michael. “A History of the Balqā ’ Region of Central Transjordan during the
Umayyad Period.” Unpublished PhD dissertation, McGill University, 1995.
Woods, John E. The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire. Rev. and expanded
ed. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1999.
“The Rise of Tı̄ mū rı̄ d Historiography.” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 46, no. 2
(1987): 81–108.
“Timur’s Genealogy.” In Intellectual Studies on Islam: Essays written in Honor of
Martin B. Dickson, edited by Michael Mazzaoui and Vera B. Moreen,
85–126. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990.
Yarshater, E. “Afrā sı̄ ā b.” In Encyclopædia Iranica. Vol. I–. London, 1982–.
Yazdı̄ , Sharaf al-Dı̄ n ‘Alı̄ , Zafarnā ma, ed. Muhammad ‘Abbā sı̄ . Tehran: Amı̄ r
Kabı̄ r, 1957. ˙ ˙
Yıldız, Sara Nur. “Aydınid Court Literature in the Formation of an Islamic Identity
in Fourteenth-Century Western Anatolia.” In Islamic Literature and Intellectual

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Bibliography 267

Life in Fourteenth- and Fifteenth-Century Anatolia, edited by A. C. S. Peacock and

Sara Nur Yıldız, 197–242. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2016.
“Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-century Seljuk Anatolia: The Politics of Conquest
and History Writing, 1243–1282.” Unpublished PhD dissertation,
University of Chicago, 2006.
“Post-Mongol Pastoral Polities in Eastern Anatolia during the Late Middle
Ages.” In At the Crossroads of Empires: 14th–15th Century Eastern Anatolia.
Proceedings of the International Symposium Held in Istanbul, 4th-6th May 2007,
edited by Deniz Beyazit. Varia Anatolica 27–48. Paris: De Boccard, 2012.
Yū suf Khā ss Hā jib. Wisdom of Royal Glory: A Turko-Islamic Mirror for Princes.
Translated˙ by Robert Dankoff. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1983.
Zakkā r, Suhayl. The Emirate of Aleppo, 1004–1094. Beirut: Dar al-Amanah, 1971.
Zimansky, Paul E. “The Kingdom of Urartu in Eastern Anatolia.” In Civilizations
of the Ancient Near East, edited by Jack M. Sasson, 1135–1146. New York:
Simon and Schuster McMillan, 1995.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Index

Note: Page numbers with the suffix n indicate a footnote and those in italic denote
illustrations.

Abaqa Khan, 124, 133 Mongol Empire, 132–133

‘Abbā s Mı̄ rzā , 212 nomads, 47, 77, 201
‘Abbā s, Shā h, 177–179 and pasture land, 77
Abbasid Caliphate post-war era, 221
amı̄ r al-umarā ’, 67, 69, 71 Scythians, 24
army, 56–59, 67, 79 see also nomad-sedentary relations
Bedouin political power, 56 Ahmad Jalayir, Sultā n, 150, 151
bureaucracy, 59–60 ˙
al-Akhtal, Ghiyā th ˙ibn Ghawth (poet), 61
factionalism, 65, 66–67 Ā l-e Ahmad, Jalā l, 228
nomad dynasties, 73–77 ˙
al-Hamdani see Abū ’l Firā s al-Hamdā niı̄
nomad population, 55, 57 al-Rā fiqa, 63
overthrown by Mongols, 121 al-Raqqa, 78
regional balance of power, 62–63, Aleppo, 73, 75, 76, 202–203
65–67, 79 ‘Alı̄ b. Abū Tā lib, 43
tribal dynasties, 67–72 ˙
‘Alı̄ ibn Husayn, 216–217
tribal rebellions, 63–65 ‘Alı̄ Muh˙ammad Khan, 210
Turkic soldiers, 55 ‘Alı̄ Quli˙ Sardā r As‘ad, 211, 214
‘Abd al-Malik, 45 ‘Alı̄ Tegin, 88, 89
‘Abd al -‘Azı̄ z Ā l-Sa‘ū d, 215–216, 218, 219 Allā hverdi Khan, 177
‘Abd Allā h ibn al-Zubayr, 44 Alp Arslan b. Chagri, Sultā n, 96–97, 102
Abdul-Hamı̄ d, Sultā n, 227–228 Alp er Tonga, 83–84 ˙
Abdul-Mejı̄˙ d, ‘Abd˙ Allā h b. ‘Uthmā n, Amid, 74, 76, 78, 152
Sultā n, 199 see also Diyar Bakr
Abū Bakr, ˙ Caliph, 39–40 al-Amı̄ n, Muhammad b. Hā rū n
Abū Nasr Ahmad, 74 ˙ 57
al-Rashı̄ d,
Abū Sa‘ı̄˙d Khan,
˙ 124–125, 140 Amorites, 19
Abū ’l Firā s al-Hamdā nı̄ (poet), 76 ‘Amr b. Hind, 36
Abū ’l Khayr Khan, ˙ 155 ‘Amr b. Kulthū m, 36
Achaemenid Empire, 24, 32 Anatolia
‘Adū d al-Dawla, 71–72, 73 beyliks, 142–144
˙
Afghans, 185–186 nomad Turkmen, 98
Afrā siyā b (mythical king), 83–84, 137 nomads, 129–130
Afshar tribe, 105, 171, 173, 179, 186, 208 post-Ilkhanid era, 140, 142–144
Agade dynasty, 18–19 Seljuq Empire, 97, 100–101
agriculture tribes, 132
control by settlers, 30 ‘Anaza tribe, 182, 201, 202–203,
grain exports, 206 204
Ilkhanid dynasty, 127 animal-style art, 21

268

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Index 269

Aqqoyunlu (White Sheep) Assyrians, 20, 23

consolidation of power, 159–161 astronomy, 136
expansion, 155–156, 158 atabeg, 99–100
loss to Ottomans, 161 Ataturk, Kemal, 228
origins, 140 ayyā m al-‘arab (battle accounts), 34–37, 54
rising power, 145–146 Azerbaijan
and Temür, 152 Jalayrids, 141
Arab literature Mongol Empire, 117, 139
ayyā m al-‘arab (battle accounts), nomad Turkmen, 98
34–37, 54 Ottoman Empire, 180
qası̄ da (odes), 34–37, 50–51, 54 Qajar dynasty, 208, 212
˙
Arab nomads, 4, 5–6, 11–12 Qaraqoyunlu, 155, 157–158, 160
see also Bedouin Safavid dynasty, 171
Arab Revolt, 216–217 Seljuq Empire, 96–97, 99
Arabian Peninsula Timurid era, 149, 152
early twentieth century, 215–217 ‘Azı̄ z ibn Ardashı̄ r Astarā bā dı̄ , 142
oases, 23, 31
Ottoman Empire, 207 Babur, Zahı̄ r al-Dı̄ n, 161–162
sedentary-nomad relations, 29–32 Bā dh b.˙Dustak, 74
topography, 30–31 Baghdad
archery, 21, 23, 57, 196 Abbasid Caliphate, 57, 58–59, 66–67
Arghun Agha, 124, 132 Arab tribe control, 191
Arlat tribe, 147, 153 Jalayirids, 141
armies Mongol assault, 121
Abbasid Caliphate, 56–59, 67, 79 Ottoman Empire, 180, 201, 203,
amı̄ r al-umarā ’, 67, 69, 71 204–205
Arab Revolt, 217 Ottoman Empire nomadic population,
Chinggis Khan, 111, 131, 237 191–192
conscription, 193, 204, 237 Persian culture, 163–164
logistics and discipline, 197 Qaraqoyunlu, 155
looting and destruction, 93, 94–95 Qizilbash, 171
Mamluk Sultanate, 129 relations with nomads, 193
mamlū ks, 58, 95–96, 97, 237 Safavid dynasty, 171
Temür (Tamerlane), 148, 153 Seljuq Empire, 93, 103
mixture of nomad and settled sol- siege (1733), 187
diers, 237 Toghril control, 93, 94, 103
Mongol Empire, 111, 113, 114, 115–116, Bakhtiyari tribe
118, 120–121, 126–127 conscripted labor, 193
Mongol tamma (troops), 128 elite, 211
Mongol tümens (regiments), 111, internal rivalries, 189
131–132 leadership, 209–210
Nā dir Shā h Afshar, 186 oil exploration, 211, 213
Ottoman Empire, 197 political power, 214
Qajar, 212–213 Qajar military, 212
Safavid dynasty, 172 rebellion, 187
Seljuq Empire, 94–96, 97, 237 Reza Shah treatment, 223–224, 225
slave soldiers, 58 rise to power, 174, 179–180, 208
suppression of tribal organization, 233 support for Tahmā sp, 186
Turkic soldiers, 57–59, 79, 93 Baluch confederation, ˙ 186, 209
Umayyad Caliphate, 43–44, 45, 48 Banū Ka‘b, 70, 209, 213
see also military technology Barambay, 132
Arslan Isrā ’ı̄ l, 88, 91 Barlas tribe, 147, 148, 157
Artuq (Turkman commander), 99 Barquq, Sultā n, 150–151
Asad tribe, 71 ˙
al-Basā sı̄ rı̄ , 93
Ashina clan, 25, 83 Basra, 51

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 270 Index

battle accounts (ayyā m al-‘arab), 34–37, 54 Chinggis Khan (Temüjin)

Battle of Baghdad (1258), 121 army, 111, 131, 237
Battle of Chā ldirā n (1514), 196 Bukhara and Samarqand conquest, 112
Battle of Dandanaqā n (1040), 90 death, 117
Battle of Manzikert (1071), 97 early life, 110–111
Battle of Marj Dā biq (1516), 196 Khorasan conquest, 114
Battle of Marj Rā hit (684), 44, 45, 50–51 method of conquest, 112–113
Bayandur tribe, 145˙ personal followers, 91
Baybars, Sultā n, 121, 129 Transoxiana conquest, 112
˙ 146, 150, 151–152
Bā yezı̄ d I, 140, and Turkman tribes, 188–189
Bā yezı̄ d II, 180 Chinggisid lineage, 116–118, 120, 131,
Bayhaqı̄ (historian), 90–91 135, 139, 141, 146
Bayram Khwā ja, 145 Chinggisid tradition, 131, 139
Bedouin Choban (Mongolian emir), 130
Abbasid period, 63–65 Chobanid dynasty, 141
attachment to desert, 35 Cimmerians, 23
character traits, 34–35, 49–52, 54, conscription, 193, 204, 237
60–62, 80 culture
court positions, 33 Abbasid courts, 76–77
desert skills, 35–36 Mongol Empire, 135–137
and early Muslims, 38–39 post-Ilkhanid era, 140
interwar era, 222 post-Mongol era, 162–164
mobility, 5–6 Seljuq Empire, 102
Ottoman Empire, 181–182, 190 Turco-Islamic/Mongol traditions,
relations with settled neighbors, 29–30 154, 162
Sa‘udi state, 219–220
tents, 5, 6 Damascus, 43–44, 46–47, 50, 73
and tourism, 229 Dandanaqā n, battle of (1040), 90
tribal legitimation, 234 Daylamites, 66, 67
Umayyad period, 43–44, 47–48 Dhū ’l Qadr confederation, 129, 143–144,
Zaydanı̄ family, 190 180–181
Bedouin dynasties, 73–77, 232–233 Dhū ’l Qadr tribe (Iran), 171, 173, 175–176,
Bedouin studies, 51–52 179–180
Bedouinization, 77 Diyar Bakr, 74, 92, 99, 130, 141, 152
Berk-Yaruq, 99, 100 see also Amid
Berke (Jochid ruler), 122 Döger tribe, 129, 131
Bible, 12, 13–14 Dokuz Khatun (Hülegü’s wife), 131
Bolad Ch’eng Hsiang, 127 Durand, Sir Mortimer, 211
Boroldai tümen, 132
Börte (wife of Chinggis Khan), 110, 117 Egypt, Abbasid era, 63
Britain elites
Anglo-Russian agreement (1907), 213 Bakhtiyari, 211
and Arab Revolt, 216–217 Khorasan, 56, 62
Ibn Sa‘ū d agreement (1915), 215–216 Mongol Empire, 120, 134–135, 138,
and Ikhwā n movement, 219 139, 142
Iraq Mandate, 220, 221–222 tribal elites, 239
Burhā n al-Dı̄ n, Qā dı̄ , 143 Turks/Turkmen, 55, 59
Buyid dynasty, 67–68, 71–72, 76, 93 Eretna, Amı̄ r, 143
Byzantines, 33, 38, 97 Eurasian steppe see steppe nomads

camels, 5–6, 21–22, 27, 29n, 81, 192, 222 Faysal al-Duwı̄ sh, 220
caravans, 4, 63–64, 65, 192, 194, 229–230 Fays˙ al ibn Husayn, 216–217
Chaghadai Khan, 116–118, 122, 136, 147 ˙ 81, 96–97,
Fars, ˙ 100, 132, 133, 210–211,
Chaghri Beg, 89–91, 94–95 213–214
Chā ldirā n, battle of (1514), 196 Fath ‘Alı̄ Shā h, 209
˙

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Index 271

Fatimid Caliphate, 64, 73 Ibrā hı̄ m Inal, 90, 92–95

Firdawsı̄ , Shā hnā ma, 83, 87, Ikshidid dynasty, 59, 63
137–138 Ilkhanid dynasty
firearms, 195–197, 213 administrative centers, 123, 139
France, Syrian Mandate, 220, 221–222 agriculture, 127
army impoverishment, 126–127
Geikhatu Khan, 124 border conflicts, 122
Ghassanid dynasty, 33–34, 38 conversion to Islam, 123, 125
al-Ghazā lı̄ , Abū Hamı̄ d, 106 end, 125
Ghazan Khan, 124–128,˙ 136 factional fighting, 123–124
Ghaznavid dynasty, 87, 88–91 foundation, 122
goats, 4, 5, 6–7, 50–51, 81, 222, 238 Ghazan’s reforms, 126, 127–128
Göklen Turkmen, 209 Mongol-Iranian acculturation, 125–126
Golden Horde, 122 noyans, 123–124, 128, 131
Güyüg Khan, 117 ordos (royal camps), 128
summer/winter pastures, 128
hadı̄ th taxation, 127
˙ on the Bedouin, 50 tribes, 131
on Persian habits, 52 vassal dynasties, 122
on Turks/Turkmen, 106 women, 123, 128
Hā fiz-i-Abrū , 163 Iran, 222–225
al-H˙ajjā j (governor), 52 eighteenth-century rise in nomadism,
˙ ̄ n b. Hamdū n, 68
Hamda 189–190
˙
Hamdanid ˙
dynasty, 67–70, 73, 75, 76, Anglo-Russian agreement (1907), 213
78–79 Constitutional Revolution, 213–214, 228
Hammurabi of Babylon, 19 increase of tribal power in Safavid period,
Harran, 75, 78 172–174
Hā rū n al-Rashı̄ d, 57 Irā n zamı̄ n, 138
Hasanwayh Barzı̄ kā nı̄ , 71 Iran-Turkic culture, 83–84, 85
H˙ aydar Safawı̄ , Shaykh, 169–170 Islamic Republic, 226
˙
Herat, ˙ 120, 122, 154, 162, 164
114, Mongol Empire, 117
Herodotus, 24 Mongol-Iranian acculturation, 109–110,
Hijaz railway, 215, 216, 217 120, 125–126, 138
Hijaz region, 30, 33, 203 nomadism in the Safavid period, 174
Hijazi nomads, 40 oil industry, 211, 224
hijra, 41–42, 218–219 post-Ilkhanid era, 140–142
Himyarites, 32–33 rise in nomadism under the Seljuqs,
horizontal nomadism, 5 81–82
horses trade routes, 210
burial, 23 tribal struggles, 214–215
horse raising, 5, 6–7, 27, 68 see also Pahlavi dynasty; Qajar dynasty
mounted cavalry, 19–21, 23, 27, 222 Iraq, British Mandate, 220, 221–222
Hsiung-nu empire, 24–25 Iraqi Revolt (1920), 220–221
Hülegü Khan, 120–121, 122, 124, 133, 136 Isfahan, 76, 97, 103, 180, 185–186, 193
Hurrians, 19–20 Ismā ‘ı̄ l I, Shā h, 170–172, 174, 175, 196
Husayn, Sharı̄ f, 216 Ismā ‘ı̄ l II, Shā h, 177
H˙ usayn-i Bayqara, Sultā n, 161 Isma‘ili Shi‘ites, 64
˙ ˙ Iva’i tribe, 105
Ibn al-Nadı̄ m, 60 ‘Izz al-Dawla Bakhtiyar, 71
Ibn al-Zubayr see ‘Abd Allah Ibn al-Zubayr
Ibn Bahdal, 44 Ja‘far Tabrı̄ zı̄ , 164
˙
Ibn Hawqal, 78–79 Jahā nshā h Qaraqoyunlu, 157, 159
˙
Ibn Khaldu ̄ n, 17–18 al-Jā hiz, 60, 61, 62
Ibn Marwā n, Marwanid, 76n Jalā l ˙al-Dı̄
˙ n Mangubirnı̄ , 114, 117
Ibn Sa‘ū d, 215–216, 218, 219 Jalayir tribe, 147, 153

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 272 Index

Jalayirid dynasty, 130, 140–141, 145 literature

al-Jannā bı̄ , Abū Sa‘ı̄ d, 64–65 Abbasid Caliphate, 76–77
Jarrahid dynasty, 77 Persian literature, 51–52, 85, 87,
Jawan-i-Qurban, 142 101
Jawunghar, 132 Qarakhanid, 86
Jazira, 46, 63, 67–70, 78–79, 93 Shu‘ū biyya movement, 60–61
Jebe (Chinggis Khan follower), 112 Turkic literature, 164–166
Jelā lı̄ Rebellion, 182 see also Arab literature
Jochi (son of Chinggis Khan), 111, Little Ice Age, 182
116–118 Lughmā n, Pā dshā h, 149
Junayd, Shaykh, 169–170 Lur tribe, 174, 179, 183, 186
Jurma‘i tribe, 132
Juwaynı̄ , ‘Atā ’ Malik ‘Alā ’ al-Dı̄ n, 134 al-Ma‘arrı̄ Abū ’l-‘Alā ’ Ahmad, 76
˙ Mahmū d, Sultā n, 87, 88–89 ˙
Kalb tribe, 43, 44, 46, 47, 57, 70 ˙
Malik-Sha ̄ h I,˙Sultā n, 97–99, 102
Kamenskoe, 24 Mamluk Sultanate˙
Karamanid coalition, 143, 144, 146 in Anatolia, 145
Karı̄ m Khā n Zand, 189–190 Ilkhanid conflict, 122
al-Kā shgharı̄ , Mahmū d, 104, 105, 106, 165 nomads, 129
Kassites, 19–20 ˙ Temür’s ambitions, 150–151
Kebek Khan tümen, 132 Turkic literature, 165–166
Ked-Bugha (Mongol commander), 121 victory over Mongol army, 121–122
Kereyids, 110–111 mamlū ks, 58, 95–96, 97, 237
keshig (imperial guard), 111, 115, 135 al-Ma’mū n (Abbasid caliph), 57, 58, 84
Khamsa confederation, 209, 210, 214 al-Mansū r (Abbasid caliph), 63
Khazars, 26 ˙
Manzikert, battle of (1071), 97
Khorasan Marj Dā biq, battle of (1516), 196
border region, 82–83 Marj Rā hit, battle of (684), 44, 45, 50–51
military elite, 56, 62 ˙
marriage, levirate, 103–104, 136
Mongol campaign, 114 Marwā n (Umayyad caliph), 44, 50–51
Mongol Empire, 119–120 Marwanid dynasty, 74, 76, 98
Oghuz nomads, 88 Mas‘ū d, 88–89
Seljuq rule ends, 100 Mawsillu tribe, 179–180
Seljuq victory over Ghaznavids, 90–91 Mazyadid dynasty, 74–75, 78, 93, 97,
Khubilai Khan, 120, 122, 127 232–233
khuwwa payments, 192–193, 201–202, Mecca, 37–38
203, 204, 205, 221 Medina, 38
Khwarazmshah dynasty, 111–112 Mehmed Fā tih, Sultā n, 160–161
Kilā b tribe, 69–70, 75 ˙
Melville, ˙
Charles, 125˙
Kinda tribe, 33, 34 Mesopotamian empires, 18–20
Kurdish dynasties, 233 Mesopotamian mythology, 1–2, 14
Kurdistan, region, 66 migration, summer/winter pastures, 7, 47,
Kurds 119, 128, 142, 143, 144, 147
Buyid dynasty, 71, 72 military power
Kurdish dynasties, 56, 73–74 of nomads, 15, 236–237
nomadic lifestyle, 66 see also armies
Ottoman-Iranian border, 184–185 military technology
see also Buyid dynasty; Marwanid dynasty Arab skills, 30
archery, 21, 23, 57, 196
Lakhmid dynasty, 33–34, 38 firearms, 195–197, 213
land laws mounted cavalry, 16, 20–21, 23, 27,
Ottoman Empire, 203–204, 205–206 222, 230
Pahlavi dynasty, 223, 226 Mirdasid dynasty, 75
Safavid dynasty, 178, 179 Möngke Khan, 118–119, 120–121, 122
law and order, 10 Mongol Empire

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Index 273

administration, 111, 117–118, 135–136 Murā d II, Sultā n, 157, 160–161, 165
agriculture, 132–133 Murshid Quli ˙Khan Ustajlu, 177
army, 111, 113, 114, 115–116, 118, Musha‘sha‘ dynasty, 174
120–121 al-Mu‘tamid (Abbasid caliph), 59
astronomy, 136 al-Mutanabbı̄ , Abū ’l-Tayyib Ahmad, 76
cultural impact, 135–137 ˙
al-Mu‘tasim (Abbasid˙caliph), 58–59
defeat by Mamluks, 121–122 ˙
al-Mutawakkil (Abbasid caliph), 59
dynastic legitimation, 235 Mutayr tribe, 220
economic impact, 132–135 ˙
mythology
economic inequality, 134–135 Biblical, 12, 13–14
formation, 110–112 Mesopotamia, 1–2, 14
four dynastic branches, 116–118 Oghuz Khan, 157, 159, 227–228
imperial centers, 120 Temür, 159, 188
Iranian-Mongol acculturation, 109–110,
120, 125–126, 138 Nabataean kingdom, 31
keshig (imperial guard), 111, 115, 135 Nā dir Shā h Afshar, 186–189, 193, 197,
Khorasan conquest, 114 208
legacy, 137–138 Najd region, 30
method of campaigns, 112–113 Nā sir al-Dawla (Hasan), 68–69
Middle East campaign, 112–116 Nā ˙sir al-Dı̄ n Shā h,
˙ 210
nomadism, 128–130 Nas˙ ı̄ r al-Dı̄ n Tū sı̄ , 136
ordos (royal camps), 128, 131–132 ˙ ̄ z, Emir,
Nawru ˙ 124, 125
overthrow of Abbasid Caliphate, 121 Nizā m al-Mulk (vizier), 96, 99, 102, 104
political infighting, 119–120 ˙
nomad dynasties, 73–77
religious belief, 135 nomad-sedentary relations
tamma troops, 128 army looting, 94–95
taxation, 118, 127, 133–134 decline of cities, 77–78
trade, 134 friction, 194
Transoxiana administration, 115 land laws, 205–206
Transoxiana conquest, 112, 114 and nomad military power, 15
tribalism, 130–132 pre-Islamic era, 29–32
tümens (regiments), 111, 131–132 Rashidun Caliphate, 38–39, 41, 45–49
Turco-Mongolian elite, 138, 139, 142 reciprocal nature, 193
yasa (code/customs), 135–136, 154 state-building, 232–234
see also Ilkhanid dynasty nomads
Mongols, steppe identity, 120 animal products, 13, 37, 38, 192, 193,
Mosul 230, 231, 239
agriculture, 63 animals, 5–7, 50–51, 81, 194
Buyid rule, 72 see also camels; horses; pasture (summer/
Hamdanid dynasty, 68–69 winter); sheep
Qaraqoyunlu, 145 declining power in twentieth century,
relations with nomads, 193 239–241
Seljuqid dynasty, 93, 104 definition, 5
‘Uqaylid rule, 74, 232–233 early nomads, 18–20
motor transport, 226–227, 229 economic strategies, 192, 193, 201
Mu‘ā wiya (Umayyad caliph), 43–44, 50 health, 16
Muhammad ‘Alı̄ , 203 interwar era, 217–222
Muh˙ ammad b. al-Musayyib, 74 khuwwa payments, 192–193, 201–202,
Muh˙ ammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhā b, 190–191 203, 204, 205
Muh˙ ammad Khudā banda, Shā h, 177 lifestyle, 3–4, 5–7
Muh˙ ammad Khwā razmshā h, Sultā n, 112 Middle East migrations, 167
˙
Muhammad ˙
Reza Shah Pahlavi, 226, 228 Mongol Empire, 128–130
Muhammad Shā h, 209 Ottoman Empire, 158, 180–183
˙ al-Dawla, Ahmad, 71
Mu‘izz population numbers (Safavid and
˙
Murā d I, Sultā n, 144 Ottoman domains), 191–192, 195
˙

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 274 Index

nomads (cont.) Pahlavi dynasty

post-World War II, 225–227 arrests of tribal leaders, 225
Safavid dynasty, 174, 180 campaign against tribal confederations,
social and economic conditions, 223–224
191–195, 238–239 forced settlement of nomads, 224–225
summer/winter pastures, 7, 47, 119, 128, land laws, 223, 226
142, 143, 144, 147 modernization plan, 224
transport and trade role, 192, 229–230 negative view of nomadism, 228
vulnerabilities, 238 nomads position post-World War II, 225
Numayr tribe, 69–70 suppression of nomadism, 226
Numayrid dynasty, 75, 78, 232–233 Palestine, 47, 190
Nū r al-Dawla Dubays, Mazyadid, 76n Palmyra, 22, 31, 64, 70
Nū rı̄ al-Sha‘lā n, Shaykh, 221 pasture (summer/winter), 7, 47, 119, 128,
142, 143, 144, 147, 182–183
oases, 23, 31 Khorasan, 82–83
Ögedei Khan, 116–118, 119–120 Paul, Jürgen, 132n, 143
Oghuz Peacock, A. C. S., 97, 105
Mongol Empire, 130, 131 Persian bureaucrats, 59–60, 96, 102,
origins of Seljuq Empire, 81, 87 119–120, 123–124, 125, 234
raids and executions in Khorasan, Persian language, 85, 101, 108
88–89 Persian literature, 51–52, 85, 87, 101
tribes, 104–105 Persian miniatures, 163–164
Western Turks, 81, 82 Persian troops, 40, 42–43
see also Seljuq Empire; Turks/Turkmen Persians, in literature, 60–61
Oghuz Khan, legend, 157, 159, Petrushevsky, I. P., 132–133
227–228 pilgrimage caravans, 63–64, 65, 192, 194
oil industry, 211, 224, 229 Pı̄ r Budaq b. Qara Yū suf, 158
Oirat tribe, 121, 131, 140–141, 145 poetry
Öljeitü Khan, 124, 136–137 Abbasid Caliphate, 76
Ong Khan (Toghril), 110–111 pre-Islamic odes (qası̄ da), 34–37,
Orhan, Sultā n, 144, 158 50–51, 54 ˙
Ottoman Empire ˙ Turkic poetry, 164–165
army, 197 Turkic slaves in poetry, 107
censuses, 204
defeat by Temür, 152 Qajar dynasty, 189–90, 207–211,
expansion, 160–161, 180–181 212–213
Jelā lı̄ Rebellion, 182 Qajar tribe, 171, 173, 179, 186, 189
land laws, 203–204, 205–206 Qara Khitay dynasty, 100, 112
military victories, 196 Qara ‘Uthmā n Aqqoynlu, 152, 157, 158
nomad population, 158, 180–183, 190, Qara Yū suf Qaraqoyunlu, 151, 155,
191–192 157–158
nomad resettlement programs, 204 Qarachar Noyan, 157
origins, 144 Qarakhanid dynasty, 85–86, 88, 102–103
pasture registration, 182–183 Qarā mā nid coalition, 143, 144, 146
Safavid border area, 183–185, 233 Qarā mita, 64, 67
Safavid treaty, 178–179 ˙
Qaraqoyunlu (Black Sheep)
sedentarization of nomads, 182–183, culture, 163–164
205–206 defeat and fragmentation, 160
Tanzimat reforms, 199, 203–206, 227 expansion, 145, 155–156
taxation, 195 origins, 140
taxation reforms, 204, 205 rise to independence, 145–146
timar/sanjak (administration system), and Temür, 152
181 Qara’unas group, 146, 148
and tribal shaykhs, 205 Qarluq confederation, 82, 85, 112

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Index 275

Qashqa‘i confederation, 208, 209–210, crown lands, 178, 179

212, 213–214, 223–224, 227 early movement, 169–172
qası̄ da, 34–37, 50–51, 54 frontier wilā yats, 183
˙
Qavurt b. Chaghri, 97 ghulā ms, 176, 177
Qays tribal faction, 45, 48–49, 51, 57 Iranian influence, 175
Qedar confederation, 22–23 nomad population, 174, 180, 191–192
Qınıc tribe, 104 Ottoman Empire border area,
Qipchaq Turks, 130, 165–166 183–185, 233
Qirwā sh, Muʿtamid al-Dawla ‘Uqaylid, 76n Ottoman Empire treaty, 178–179
Qizilbash, 169–171, 172–174, 175, Ottoman and Uzbek invasions, 176
178–179, 180–181 oymaq, 171, 172–174, 179–180
Qizilbash, 180, 181 provincial government, 172–173
Qunqirat tribe, 121 Qizilbash, 169–171, 172–174, 175,
Qur’an, 38–39, 51 178–179
Quraysh tribe, 37, 38, 39, 44 succession struggles, 175–177
Qutalmish (Arslan Isra’il’s son), 96 tribal rivalries, 175–176
Qutluq-Khanid dynasty, 122 Twelver Shi‘ism, 175
Qutuz, Sultā n, 121 weakness, 185
˙ Sā fiya Khatun, 104
Radkan, 119, 120, 124, 142 S˙ akhr tribe, 201–202
railways, Hijaz railway, 215, 216, 217 ˙
Salghur tribe, 105
Rashı̄ d al-Dı̄ n Hamadā nı̄ , 125, 126, Salghurid dynasty, 108, 131
128, 131, 134, 137, 145, 157, 163 Sā lih b. Mirdā s, Mirdasid, 75
Rashı̄ dı̄ dynasty, 207 ˙ ˙
Samaghar, 132
Rashidun Caliphate Samanid dynasty, 84–85
army, 40, 41, 42–43 Samarqand, 148
consolidation, 40 Samsā m al-Saltana, Najaf Quli Khan, 214
expansion, 28 ˙ ˙ Sultā n,˙100, 105
Sanjar,
immigration, 41–42 Sargon of Agade,˙ 18
nomad population, 38–39, 41, 45–49, 53 Sasanian empire, 32–33, 38
taxation, 39, 42 Sa‘udi state
tribal allies, 39 British agreement (1915), 215–216
tribal factionalism, 45, 48–49, 51 creation, 190–191, 207, 215–216
tribal policy, 40–43 expansion, 203, 218
Rayy, 62, 65, 76, 87, 89, 92, 103, 141 hujar settlements, 218–220
Reza Shah Pahlavi, 222–225 and nomad tribes, 219–220
abdication, 225 Sawā d region, 63
arrests of tribal leaders, 225 Sawlat al-Dawla, Ismā ‘ı̄ l Khan Qashqa’i,
campaign against tribal confederations, ˙ 213–214, 223, 225
223–224 Sayf al-Dawla, Hamdanid, 69–70, 73, 75
forced settlement of nomads, 224–225 Scythians, 23–24
land laws, 223, 226 sedentarization, 182–183, 205–206, 222
Ridda wars, 40 Selı̄ m I, Sultā n, 180–181
Roman Empire, 32 Seljuq b. Duqaq, ˙ 87–88, 102
Rum Seljuqs, 101, 108, 129–130 Seljuq Empire
Rumlu tribe, 171, 175–176, 179–180 administration, 96, 101–102
Russia, Anglo-Russian agreement army, 94–96, 97, 237
(1907), 213 consolidation of territory, 91–94
Ruwalla Bedouin, 221 dı̄ wā n (bureaucracy), 101–102
early history, 87–91
Safavid dynasty expansion, 81, 97
administration, 171 fragmentation, 99–100
Afghan victory over Safavids, 185–186 ”Inaliyan,” 91
army, 172 independent emirs, 98, 99
centralizing policies, 177–178, 179 internal challenges, 96

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 276 Index

Seljuq Empire (cont.) Suleimā n Qā nū nı̄ (Kanuni), Sultā n, 180
”Iraqis,” 91 Sultā n Husayn, Shā h, 174 ˙
local commanders, 98 ˙ ˙ 119, 134, 136–137, 149
Sultaniyya,
nomad Turkmen, 98 Sumerian mythology, 1–2
Oghuz Turks (Turkmen), 81 Sütay Noyan, 132
”Saljuqiyan,” 91 Syria
separate ethnic spheres, 101–102 French Mandate, 220, 221–222
steppe identity, 102–103, 108 Turkmen, 129
Turco-Iranian synthesis, 82, 108
Turkish social practices, 103 Tabriz, 134, 136, 158, 160, 163–164,
victory over Ghaznavids, 89–91 171, 176
viziers, 102 Tadmor, 22, 31
women’s status, 103–104 see also Palmyra
see also Toghril, Sultā n Taghay Temür, 142
Shā hnā ma, 83, 87, 137 ˙ Taghlib tribe, 50–51, 68
Shā hrukh, Sultā n, 154, 155, 164 Tahmā sp, Shā h, 175–176, 178, 186
˙
Shā hsevā n confederation, 186, 208, 209 ˙
Tamerlane see Temür (Tamerlane)
Shamlu tribe, 171, 175–176, 179–180 Tanzimat reforms, 199, 203–206, 227
Shammar confederation, 191, 201, taxation
204, 207 Buyid dynasty, 72
Shammar Jarbā tribe, 220 Hamdanid dynasty, 78–79
Shaybā n tribe, 71, 72 Ilkhanid dynasty, 127
Shaykh Hasan Jalayir, 140–141 Mongol Empire, 118, 127, 133–134
˙
Shaykh Uways Jalayir, 141, 163 nomads, 194–195
sheep, 5, 6–7, 29, 30, 50–51, 68, 81, 88, pre-Islamic era, 33, 36
153, 192, 222, 231, 238 Rashidun Caliphate, 39, 42
Shiraz Turkmen, 106
Buyid court, 76 see also khuwwa payments
Pahlavi dynasty, 224 Tayy tribe, 201
Persian culture, 163–164 ˙
Tegüder Ahmad Khan, 124
Qashqa’i, 211 ˙ 171, 175–176, 178, 179–180
Tekkelu tribe,
trade routes, 210 Temür (Tamerlane)
under Karim Khan, 189–190 achievements, 140, 146
Shu‘ū biyya movement, 60–61 administration, 154, 155
Sneath, David, 10–11 ambitions against China, 150, 153
Soghdians, 83 army, 148, 153
source material, 15, 16–18, 191, 200 defeat of Sultan Bayezid, 151–152
state-building, 12–13, 27, 65–67, 73–77, Delhi campaign, 150
167, 232–234 early campaign successes, 148–149
steamships, 203 early life, 91, 147–148
steppe nomads genealogical legends, 157, 159, 188
animals, 6–7, 81 Islamic world ambitions, 149–150
dynastic legitimation, 234–235 Mamluk Sultanate claims, 150–151
frontier, 82–83 method of campaigns, 149
heritage, 187–188 and nomads, 154
historical empires, 24–26 Perso-Islamic culture, 154
Iranian-Turkish relations, 83–84 Samarkand convocation, 153
Mongol identity, 120 and tribes, 153
Seljuq identity, 102–103, 108 Ulus Chaghatay conquest, 148
state-building, 12–13, 233–234 unfulfilled ambitions, 152
Turks/Turkmen nomads, 57, 98 tents, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
yurts, 7, 8, 9 Terken Khatun, 99, 104
see also Turco-Mongolian nomads Thimā l Mirdā sı̄ , 76
Sübedei (Chinggis Khan follower), 112 Timurid dynasty
Suldus tribe, 147, 153 administration, 155

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 Index 277

decline in power, 161 difference between Arab and Turco-

dynastic legitimation, 235 Mongolian, 5–7, 12–13
genealogical legends, 157, 159 fluctuating state development role,
historical works, 163 235–236
ideological rivalries, 156, 159 leadership, 10, 12, 42, 209–211
Islamic/Mongol codes, 154, 162 limitations of government control,
Perso-Islamic culture, 154 202–203
succession struggles, 154, 159 Safavid (oymaq), 171, 172–174, 179–180
tribes, 153 structure, 11
Turkic literature, 166 terminology, 7–13
Toghril, Sultā n tribal shaykhs in Ottoman Empire, 205
˙
on army looting, 93, 94–95 under Temür (Tamerlane), 153
in Baghdad, 93, 94 Tulunid dynasty, 59, 63
Dandanaqā n victory, 90–91 Turco-Mongolian nomads
Ghaznavid raids and fighting, 89–90 empires, 24–26
Jazira, 93 leadership, 12
and local rulers, 93 lifestyle, 6–7
Nishapur conquest, 90, 95, 107 tribal culture, 12–13
relations with Ibrā hı̄ m Inal, 90, 92–94 uneven tribal power, 131
Seljuq leader, 91–92 yurts, 7, 8, 9
service to ruler of Bukhara, 88 see also steppe nomads
western campaign, 92 Türk Khaghanate (T’ü-ch’üeh empire),
Tokhtamish Khan, 140, 148, 149 25–26, 58, 82, 83
Tolui (son of Chinggis Khan), 112, Turkey, new identity, 228
116–118 Turkic literature, 164–166
topography, 4 Turks/Turkmen
trade Abbasid army, 57–59, 79
frankincense and myrrh, 22 ambivalent opinions about, 90, 106–107
markets, 193 changing identity, 188–189
nomad interaction with settled popula- characteristics, 61–62, 107
tions, 13, 29–30 Dhū ’l Qadr confederation, 129, 143–144
provisioning and guiding role, 4, 63–64, economic contribution, 105–106
192, 231 governing elite, 55, 59
trade routes, 22, 31, 37–38, 142, Iranian Turkmen, 209
210, 231 Mamluk Sultanate, 129
Transoxiana mamlū ks, 58, 95–96
military manpower, 62 Qarā mā nid coalition, 143, 144, 146
Mongol campaign, 112 Seljuq Empire, 81, 93, 95–96, 98, 104–107
Qarakhanid control, 85–86 slave soldiers, 58
Samanid dynasty, 84 steppe nomads, 57, 98
steppe frontier region, 82–83 Syria, 129
transport terminology, 81, 106
airplanes, 218 Tus, 87, 88, 119, 120, 142
Hijaz railway, 215, 216 Tusi see Nası̄ r al-Dı̄ n Tū sı̄
motor transport, 226–227, 229 ˙
Tutush (governor ˙
of Syria), 99
nomads/camels role, 192, 229–230
steamships, 203 ‘Ubayd Allā h b. Ziyā d (governor), 52
tribal dynasties, 67–72 Ughani tribe, 132
tribal studies, 51–52 Uighurs, 26, 110, 112
tribalism, Mongol Empire, 130–132 Ukhaydir dynasty, 64
tribes Ulus Chaghatay, 146–147
administration, 192–193 ‘Umar b. al-Khattā b, Caliph, 40, 41–42, 43
Arab nomadic culture, 11–12 Umayyad Caliphate,˙˙ 43–45
Arabian Peninsula, 31–32 army, 43–44, 45, 48
definition, 7–11 civil wars, 43, 44–45

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press

 278 Index

Umayyad Caliphate (cont.) water, 5, 23, 31, 192, 238

nomad population, 43–44, 47–48, women
53–54 daily tasks and lifestyle, 7
palaces, 47–48 Ilkhanid dynasty, 123, 128
‘Uqayl tribe, 70, 71 rulers, 22
‘Uqaylid dynasty, 74, 93, 97, 98, 232–233 Seljuq Empire, 103–104
Ustajlu tribe, 175–176, 179–180 World War I, 215
‘Uthmā n b. ‘Affā n, Caliph, 43 World War II, 225
Uzun Hasan Aqqoyunlu, 159–160,
˙ 170
169, Yamanı̄ tribal faction, 45, 48–49,
51
vengeance, 11–12, 34–35, 45 Ya‘qū b, 160, 161
vertical nomadism, 7 yasa (code/customs), 135–136, 154,
viziers, 102 161
Yasa’uri tribe, 147
Wahhā bı̄ state, 190–191, 207 Yomut Turkmen, 209
see also Sa‘udi state Yunus Emre, 164
Wahhabism, 218–220
warfare Zā hir al-‘Umar al-Zaydā nı̄ , 190
nomadic skills, 3–4, 13 ˙
Zand tribe, 189
see also armies; military technology Zaydā nı̄ tribe, 190

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139028813.013 Published online by Cambridge University Press