ALVIN PLANTINGA  The Free Will Defense 181

require examination, but this study strongly sug- omnipotence must in any case be restricted in
gests that there is no valid solution of the problem one way or another, that unqualified omnipo-
which does not modify at least one of the constit- tence cannot be ascribed to any being that con-
uent propositions in a way which would seriously tinues through time. And if God and his actions
affect the essential core of the theistic position. are not in time, can omnipotence, or power of
Quite apart from the problem of evil, the par- any sort, be meaningfully ascribed to him?
adox of omnipotence has shown that God’s

III.7 The Free Will Defense

ALVIN PLANTINGA
Alvin Plantinga is professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame and is one of the most
important figures in the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. His
works include God and Other Minds (1957), The Nature of Necessity (1974), and God, Freedom,
and Evil (1974) from which this selection is taken. Plantinga argues that Mackie and other athe-
ologians (those who argue against the existence of God) are mistaken in thinking that the exis-
tence of evil is inconsistent with the existence of a perfectly good and powerful God.

2. DOES THE THEIST CONTRADICT Paul is a good tennis player, and it’s false that
HIMSELF? Paul is a good tennis player.
In a widely discussed piece entitled ‘‘Evil and (People seldom assert explicit contradictions.)
Omnipotence’’ John Mackie makes this claim: Is Mackie charging the theist with accepting
such a contradiction? Presumably not; what he
I think, however, that a more telling criticism can
be made by way of the traditional problem of evil.
says is
Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs In its simplest form the problem is this: God is
lack rational support, but that they are positively omnipotent; God is wholly good; yet evil
irrational, that the several parts of the essential exists. There seems to be some contradiction
theological doctrine are inconsistent with one between these three propositions, so that if any
another. . . . 1 two of them were true the third would be false.
Is Mackie right? Does the theist contradict him- But at the same time all three are essential parts
of most theological positions; the theologian, it
self? But we must ask a prior question: just what
seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently
is being claimed here? That theistic belief con- adhere to all three.
tains an inconsistency or contradiction, of
course. But what, exactly, is an inconsistency According to Mackie, then, the theist accepts a
or contradiction? There are several kinds. An group or set of three propositions; this set is
explicit contradiction is a proposition of a certain inconsistent. Its members, of course, are
sort—a conjunctive proposition, one conjunct
of which is the denial or negation of the other (1) God is omnipotent
conjunct. For example: (2) God is wholly good

From God, Freedom, and Evil by Alvin Plantinga (Harper & Row, 1974). Reprinted by permission of the
author. Footnotes edited.
182 PART 3  The Problem of Evil

and this characteristic with set B is formally contradic-

tory. So a formally contradictory set is one from
(3) Evil exists.
whose members an explicit contradiction can be
Call this set A; the claim is that A is an incon- deduced by the laws of logic. Is Mackie claiming
sistent set. But what is it for a set to be inconsis- that set A is formally contradictory?
tent or contradictory? Following our definition of If he is, he’s wrong. No laws of logic permit
an explicit contradiction, we might say that a set us to deduce the denial of one of the propositions
of propositions is explicitly contradictory if one of in A from the other members. Set A isn’t for-
the members is the denial or negation of another mally contradictory either.
member. But then, of course, it is evident that But there is still another way in which a set of
the set we are discussing is not explicitly contra- propositions can be contradictory or inconsistent.
dictory; the denials of (1), (2), and (3), respec- Consider set C, whose members are
tively, are
(8) George is older than Paul
(10 ) God is not omnipotent (or it’s false that (9) Paul is older than Nick
God is omnipotent)
and
(20 ) God is not wholly good
(10) George is not older than Nick.
and
0
This set is neither explicitly nor formally contra-
(3 ) There is no evil dictory; we can’t, just by using the laws of
none of which is in set A. logic, deduce the denial of any of these proposi-
Of course many sets are pretty clearly contra- tions from the others. And yet there is a good
dictory, in an important way, but not explicitly sense in which it is inconsistent or contradictory.
contradictory. For example, set B: For clearly it is not possible that its three members
all be true. It is necessarily true that
(4) If all men are mortal, then Socrates is mortal
(5) All men are mortal (11) If George is older than Paul, and Paul is
(6) Socrates is not mortal. older than Nick, then George is older
than Nick.
This set is not explicitly contradictory; yet surely
some significant sense of that term applies to it. And if we add (11) to set C, we get a set that is
What is important here is that by using only the formally contradictory; (8), (9), and (11) yield,
rules of ordinary logic—the laws of propositional by the laws of ordinary logic, the denial of (10).
logic and quantification theory found in any I said that (11) is necessarily true; but what
introductory text on the subject—we can deduce does that mean? Of course we might say that a
an explicit contradiction from the set. Or to put it proposition is necessarily true if it is impossible
differently, we can use the laws of logic to deduce that it be false, or if its negation is not possibly
a proposition from the set, which proposition, true. This would be to explain necessity in
when added to the set, yields a new set that is terms of possibility. Chances are, however, that
explicitly contradictory. For by using the law anyone who does not know what necessity is,
modus ponens (if p, then q; p; therefore q) we will be equally at a loss about possibility; the
can deduce explanation is not likely to be very successful. Per-
haps all we can do by way of explanation is to give
(7) Socrates is mortal some examples and hope for the best. In the first
place many propositions can be established by the
from (4) and (5). The result of adding (7) to B is laws of logic alone—for example,
the set {(4), (5), (6), (7)}. This set, of course, is
explicitly contradictory in that (6) is the denial (12) If all men are mortal and Socrates is a
of (7). We might say that any set which shares man, then Socrates is mortal.
 ALVIN PLANTINGA  The Free Will Defense 183

Such propositions are truths of logic; and all of entire existence? Is it possible for a (human) per-
them are necessary in the sense of question. But son to exist disembodied? If that’s possible, is it
truths of arithmetic and mathematics generally possible that there be a person who at no time
are also necessarily true. Still further, there is a at all during his entire existence has a body? Is
host of propositions that are neither truths of it possible to see without eyes? These are propo-
logic nor truths of mathematics but are nonethe- sitions about whose possibility in that broadly
less necessarily true; (11) would be an example, as logical sense there is disagreement and dispute.
well as Now return to set C. . . . What is characteristic
of it is the fact that the conjunction of its mem-
(13) Nobody is taller than himself
bers—the proposition expressed by the result of
(14) Red is a color
putting ‘‘and’s’’ between (8), (9), and (10)—is
(15) No numbers are persons
necessarily false. Or we might put it like this:
(16) No prime number is a prime minister
what characterizes set C is the fact that we can
and get a formally contradictory set by adding a nec-
essarily true proposition—namely (11). Suppose
(17) Bachelors are unmarried.
we say that a set is implicitly contradictory if it
So here we have an important kind of resembles C in this respect. That is, a set S of
necessity—let’s call it ‘‘broadly logical neces- propositions is implicitly contradictory if there is
sity.’’ Of course there is a correlative kind of a necessary proposition p such that the result of
possibility: a proposition p is possibly true (in adding p to S is a formally contradictory set.
the broadly logical sense) just in case its nega- Another way to put it: S is implicitly contradic-
tion or denial is not necessarily true (in that tory if there is some necessarily true proposition
same broadly logical sense). This sense of p such that by using just the laws of ordinary
necessity and possibility must be distinguished logic, we can deduce an explicit contradiction
from another that we may call causal or natural from p together with the members of S. And
necessity and possibility. Consider when Mackie says that set A is contradictory,
we may properly take him, I think, as holding
(18) Henry Kissinger has swum the Atlantic.
that it is implicitly contradictory in the explained
Although this proposition has an implausible ring, sense. As he puts it:
it is not necessarily false in the broadly logical sense
(and its denial is not necessarily true in that sense). However, the contradiction does not arise immedi-
But there is a good sense in which it is impossible: ately; to show it we need some additional premises,
it is causally or naturally impossible. Human or perhaps some quasi-logical rules connecting the
beings, unlike dolphins, just don’t have the physi- terms ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘evil’’ and ‘‘omnipotent.’’
cal equipment demanded for this feat. Unlike These additional principles are that good is
opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing
Superman, furthermore, the rest of us are incapa-
always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that
ble of leaping tall buildings at a single bound or there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing
(without auxiliary power of some kind) traveling can do. From these it follows that a good omnipo-
faster than a speeding bullet. These things are tent thing eliminates evil completely, and then the
impossible for us—but not logically impossible, propositions that a good omnipotent thing exists,
2
even in the broad sense. and that evil exists, are incompatible.
So there are several senses of necessity and
possibility here. There are a number of proposi- Here Mackie refers to ‘‘additional premises’’; he
tions, furthermore, of which it’s difficult to say also calls them ‘‘additional principles’’ and ‘‘qua-
whether they are or aren’t possible in the broadly silogical rules’’; he says we need them to show the
logical sense; some of these are subjects of philo- contradiction. What he means, I think, is that to
sophical controversy. Is it possible, for example, get a formally contradictory set we must add
for a person never to be conscious during his some more propositions to set A; and if we aim
184 PART 3  The Problem of Evil

to show that set A is implicitly contradictory, contradiction set A is alleged to contain. This
these propositions must be necessary truths— view is not very popular, however, and for good
‘‘quasi-logical rules’’ as Mackie calls them. The reason; it is quite incoherent. What the theist typ-
two additional principles he suggests are ically means when he says that God is omnipotent
is not that there are no limits to God’s power, but
(19) A good thing always eliminates evil as
at most that there are no nonlogical limits to
far as it can
what He can do; and given this qualification, it
and is perhaps initially plausible to suppose that (20)
is necessarily true.
(20) There are no limits to what an omnipotent
But what about (19), the proposition that
being can do.
every good thing eliminates every evil state of
And, of course, if Mackie means to show that set affairs that it can eliminate? Is that necessarily
A is implicitly contradictory, then he must hold true? Is it true at all? Suppose, first of all, that
that (19) and (20) are not merely true but neces- your friend Paul unwisely goes for a drive on a
sarily true. wintry day and runs out of gas on a deserted
But, are they? What about (20) first? What road. The temperature dips to –108, and a miser-
does it mean to say that a being is omnipotent? ably cold wind comes up. You are sitting com-
That he is all-powerful, or almighty, presumably. fortably at home (twenty-five miles from Paul)
But are there no limits at all to the power of roasting chestnuts in a roaring blaze. Your car is
such a being? Could he create square circles, for in the garage; in the trunk there is the full five-
example, or married bachelors? Most theologians gallon can of gasoline you always keep for emer-
and theistic philosophers who hold that God is gencies. Paul’s discomfort and danger are cer-
omnipotent, do not hold that He can create tainly an evil, and one which you could
round squares or bring it about that He both eliminate. You don’t do so. But presumably you
exists and does not exist. These theologians and don’t thereby forfeit your claim to being a
philosophers may hold that there are no nonlogi- ‘‘good thing’’—you simply didn’t know of
cal limits to what an omnipotent being can do, Paul’s plight. And so (19) does not appear to be
but they concede that not even an omnipotent necessary. It says that every good thing has a cer-
being can bring about logically impossible states tain property—the property of eliminating every
of affairs or cause necessarily false propositions evil that it can. And if the case I described is pos-
to be true. Some theists, on the other hand— sible—a good person’s failing through ignorance
Martin Luther and Descartes, perhaps—have to eliminate a certain evil he can eliminate—
apparently thought that God’s power is unlimited then (19) is by no means necessarily true.
even by the laws of logic. For these theists the But perhaps Mackie could sensibly claim that if
question whether set A is contradictory will not you didn’t know about Paul’s plight, then in fact
be of much interest. As theists they believe (1) you were not, at the time in question, able to elim-
and (2), and they also, presumably, believe (3). inate the evil in question; and perhaps he’d be right.
But they remain undisturbed by the claim that In any event he could revise (19) to take into
(1), (2), and (3) are jointly inconsistent— account the kind of case I mentioned:
because, as they say, God can do what is logically
(19a) Every good thing always eliminates every
impossible. Hence He can bring it about that the
evil that it knows about and can eliminate.
members of set A are all true, even if that set is
contradictory (concentrating very intensely {(1), (2), (3), (20), (19a)}, you’ll notice is not a
upon this suggestion is likely to make you formally contradictory set—to get a formal con-
dizzy). So the theist who thinks that the power tradiction we must add a proposition specifying
of God isn’t limited at all, not even by the laws that God knows about every evil state of affairs.
of logic, will be unimpressed by Mackie’s argu- But most theists do believe that God is omni-
ment and won’t find any difficulty in the scient or all-knowing; so if this new set—the set
 ALVIN PLANTINGA  The Free Will Defense 185

that results when we add to set A the proposition affairs G will outweigh a trivial E—that is, the
that God is omniscient—is implicitly contradic- conjunctive state of affairs G and E is itself a
tory then Mackie should be satisfied and the the- good state of affairs. And surely a good person
ist confounded. (And, henceforth, set A will be would not be obligated to eliminate a given evil
the old set A together with the proposition that if he could do so only by eliminating a good
God is omniscient.) that outweighed it. Therefore (19a) is not neces-
But is (19a) necessary? Hardly. Suppose you sarily true; it can’t be used to show that set A is
know that Paul is marooned as in the previous implicitly contradictory.
example, and you also know another friend is sim- These difficulties might suggest another revi-
ilarly marooned fifty miles in the opposite direc- sion of (19); we might try
tion. Suppose, furthermore, that while you can
(19b) A good being eliminates every evil E
rescue one or the other, you simply can’t rescue
that it knows about and that it can
both. Then each of the two evils is such that it is
eliminate without either bringing about
within your power to eliminate it; and you know
a greater evil or eliminating a good state
about them both. But you can’t eliminate both;
of affairs that outweighs E.
and you don’t forfeit your claim to being a good
person by eliminating only one—it wasn’t within Is this necessarily true? It takes care of the
your power to do more. So the fact that you second of the two difficulties afflicting (19a)
don’t doesn’t mean that you are not a good per- but leaves the first untouched. We can see this
son. Therefore (19a) is false; it is not a necessary as follows. First, suppose we say that a being prop-
truth or even a truth that every good thing elimi- erly eliminates an evil state of affairs if it eliminates
nates every evil it knows about and can eliminate. that evil without either eliminating an outweigh-
We can see the same thing another way. ing good or bringing about a greater evil. It is
You’ve been rock climbing. Still something of a then obviously possible that a person find
novice, you’ve acquired a few cuts and bruises himself in a situation where he could properly
by inelegantly using your knees rather than your eliminate an evil E and could also properly elimi-
feet. One of these bruises is fairly painful. You nate another evil E 0 , but couldn’t properly elim-
mention it to a physician friend, who predicts inate them both. You’re rock climbing again, this
the pain will leave of its own accord in a day or time on the dreaded north face of the Grand
two. Meanwhile, he says, there’s nothing he can Teton. You and your party come upon Curt
do, short of amputating your leg above the and Bob, two mountaineers stranded 125 feet
knee, to remove the pain. Now the pain in your apart on the face. They untied to reach their cig-
knee is an evil state of affairs. All else being arettes and then carelessly dropped the rope while
equal, it would be better if you had no such lighting up. A violent, dangerous thunderstorm is
pain. And it is within the power of your friend approaching. You have time to rescue one of the
to eliminate this evil state of affairs. Does his fail- stranded climbers and retreat before the storm
ure to do so mean that he is not a good person? hits; if you rescue both, however, you and your
Of course not; for he could eliminate this evil party and the two climbers will be caught on
state of affairs only by bringing about another, the face during the thunderstorm, which will
much worse evil. And so it is once again evident very likely destroy your entire party. In this case
that (19a) is false. It is entirely possible that a you can eliminate one evil (Curt’s being stranded
good person fail to eliminate an evil state of affairs on the face) without causing more evil or elimi-
that he knows about and can eliminate. This nating a greater good; and you are also able to
would take place, if, as in the present example, properly eliminate the other evil (Bob’s being
he couldn’t eliminate the evil without bringing thus stranded). But you can’t properly eliminate
about a greater evil. them both. And so the fact that you don’t rescue
A slightly different kind of case shows the Curt, say, even though you could have, doesn’t
same thing. A really impressive good state of show that you aren’t a good person. Here,
186 PART 3  The Problem of Evil

then, each of the evils is such that you can prop- That is, any five would formally entail the denial
erly eliminate it; but you can’t properly eliminate of the sixth. So if A0 were formally inconsistent,
them both, and hence can’t be blamed for failing the denial of (3) would be formally entailed by
to eliminate one of them. the remaining five. That is, (1), (2), (20 ), (19c),
So neither (19a) nor (19b) is necessarily true. and (20) would formally entail
You may be tempted to reply that the sort of
(30 ) There is no evil.
counterexamples offered—examples where some-
one is able to eliminate an evil A and also able to But they don’t; what they formally entail is not
eliminate a different evil B, but unable to elimi- that there is no evil at all but only that
nate them both—are irrelevant to the case of a
(3@) There is no evil that God can properly
being who, like God, is both omnipotent and
eliminate.
omniscient. That is, you may think that if an
omnipotent and omniscient being is able to elim- So (19c) doesn’t really help either—not because
inate each of two evils, it follows that he can elim- it is not necessarily true but because its addition
inate them both. Perhaps this is so; but it is not [with (20)] to set A does not yield a formally
strictly to the point. The fact is the counterexam- contradictory set.
ples show that (19a) and (19b) are not necessarily Obviously, what the atheologian must add to
true and hence can’t be used to show that set A is get a formally contradictory set is
implicitly inconsistent. What the reply does sug-
(21) If God is omniscient and omnipotent,
gest is that perhaps the atheologian will have
then he can properly eliminate every
more success if he works the properties of omni-
evil state of affairs.
science and omnipotence into (19). Perhaps he
could say something like Suppose we agree that the set consisting in A plus
(19c), (20), and (21) is formally contradictory.
(19c) An omnipotent and omniscient good
So if (19c), (20), and (21) are all necessarily
being eliminates every evil that it can
true, then set A is implicitly contradictory.
properly eliminate.
We’ve already conceded that (19c) and (20) are
And suppose, for purposes of argument, we con- indeed necessary. So we must take a look at
cede the necessary truth of (19c). Will it serve (21). Is this proposition necessarily true?
Mackie’s purposes? Not obviously. For we don’t No. To see this let us ask the following ques-
get a set that is formally contradictory by adding tion. Under what conditions would an omnipo-
(20) and (19c) to set A. This set (call it A0 ) con- tent being be unable to eliminate a certain evil
tains the following six members: E without eliminating an outweighing good?
Well, suppose that E is included in some good
(1) God is omnipotent
state of affairs that outweighs it. That is, suppose
(2) God is wholly good
there is some good state of affairs G so related to
(20 ) God is omniscient
E that it is impossible that G obtain or be actual
(3) Evil exists
and E fail to obtain. (Another way to put this: a
(19c) An omnipotent and omniscient good
state of affairs S includes S 0 if the conjunctive
being eliminates every evil that it can
state of affairs S but not S 0 is impossible, or if it
properly eliminate
is necessary that S 0 obtains if S does.) Now sup-
and pose that some good state of affairs G includes
an evil state of affairs E that it outweighs. Then
(20) There are no nonlogical limits to what
not even an omnipotent being could eliminate
an omnipotent being can do.
E without eliminating G. But are there any
Now if A0 were formally contradictory, then from cases where a good state of affairs includes, in
3
any five of its members we could deduce the this sense, an evil that it outweighs? Indeed
denial of the sixth by the laws of ordinary logic. there are such states of affairs. To take an artificial
 ALVIN PLANTINGA  The Free Will Defense 187

example, let’s suppose that E is Paul’s suffering 3. CAN WE SHOW THAT THERE IS
from a minor abrasion and G is your being delir- NO INCONSISTENCY HERE?
iously happy. The conjunctive state of affairs, G
and E—the state of affairs that obtains if and To summarize our conclusions so far: although
only if both G and E obtain—is then a good many atheologians claim that the theist is
state of affairs: it is better, all else being equal, involved in contradiction when he asserts the
that you be intensely happy and Paul suffer a members of set A, this set, obviously, is neither
mildly annoying abrasion than that this state of explicitly nor formally contradictory; the claim,
affairs not obtain. So G and E is a good state of presumably, must be that it is implicitly contra-
affairs. And clearly G and E includes E: obviously dictory. To make good this claim the atheologian
it is necessarily true that if you are deliriously must find some necessarily true proposition p (it
happy and Paul is suffering from an abrasion, could be a conjunction of several propositions)
then Paul is suffering from an abrasion. such that the addition of p to set A yields a set
But perhaps you think this example trivial, that is formally contradictory. No atheologian
tricky, slippery, and irrelevant. If so, take heart; has produced even a plausible candidate for this
other examples abound. Certain kinds of values, role, and it certainly is not easy to see what
certain familiar kinds of good states of affairs, such a proposition might be. Now we might
can’t exist apart from evil of some sort. For think we should simply declare set A implicitly
example, there are people who display a sort of consistent on the principle that a proposition
creative moral heroism in the face of suffering (or set) is to be presumed consistent or possible
and adversity—a heroism that inspires others until proven otherwise. This course, however,
and creates a good situation out of a bad one. leads to trouble. The same principle would
In a situation like this the evil, of course, remains impel us to declare the atheologian’s claim—
evil; but the total state of affairs—someone’s that set A is inconsistent—possible or consistent.
bearing pain magnificently, for example—may But the claim that a given set of propositions is
be good. If it is, then the good present must out- implicitly contradictory, is itself either necessarily
weigh the evil; otherwise the total situation true or necessarily false; so if such a claim is possi-
would not be good. But, of course, it is not pos- ble, it is not necessarily false and is, therefore, true
sible that such a good state of affairs obtain (in fact, necessarily true). If we followed the sug-
unless some evil also obtain. It is a necessary gested principle, therefore, we should be obliged
truth that if someone bears pain magnificently, to declare set A implicitly consistent (since it
then someone is in pain. hasn’t been shown to be otherwise), but we
The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is should have to say the same thing about the athe-
that (21) is not necessarily true. And our discus- ologian’s claim, since we haven’t shown that
sion thus far shows at the very least that it is no claim to be inconsistent or impossible. The athe-
easy matter to find necessarily true propositions ologian’s claim, furthermore, is necessarily true if
that yield a formally contradictory set when it is possible. Accordingly, if we accept the above
4
added to set A. One wonders, therefore, why principle, we shall have to declare set A both
the many atheologians who confidently assert implicitly consistent and implicitly inconsistent.
that this set is contradictory make no attempt So all we can say at this point is that set A has
whatever to show that it is. For the most part not been shown to be implicitly inconsistent.
they are content just to assert that there is a con- Can we go any further? One way to go on
tradiction here. Even Mackie, who sees that some would be to try to show that set A is implicitly
‘‘additional premises’’ or ‘‘quasi-logical rules’’ are consistent or possible in the broadly logical
needed, makes scarcely a beginning towards find- sense. But what is involved in showing such a
ing some additional premises that are necessarily thing? Although there are various ways to
true and that together with the members of set approach this matter, they all resemble one
A formally entail an explicit contradiction. another in an important respect. They all amount
188 PART 3  The Problem of Evil

to this: to show that a set S is consistent you think really a case of producing a possible state of affairs
of a possible state of affairs (it needn’t actually such that, if it were actual, all the members of the
obtain) which is such that if it were actual, then set in question (in this case the pair set of P and
all of the members of S would be true. This pro- Q) would be true.
cedure is sometimes called giving a model of S. How does this apply to the case before us? As
For example, you might construct an axiom set follows, let us conjoin propositions (1), (2), and
and then show that it is consistent by giving a (20 ) and henceforth call the result (1):
model of it; this is how it was shown that the
(1) God is omniscient, omnipotent, and
denial of Euclid’s parallel postulate is formally
wholly good.
consistent with the rest of his postulates.
There are various special cases of this proce- The problem, then, is to show that (1) and (3)
dure to fit special circumstances. Suppose, for (evil exists) are consistent. This could be done,
example, you have a pair of propositions p and as we’ve seen, by finding a proposition r that is
q and wish to show them consistent. And suppose consistent with (1) and such that (1) and (r)
we say that a proposition p1 entails a proposition together entail (3). One proposition that might
p2 if it is impossible that p1 be true and p2 false— do the trick is
if the conjunctive proposition p1 and not p2 is
(22) God creates a world containing evil and
necessarily false. Then one way to show that p is
has a good reason for doing so.
consistent with q is to find some proposition r
whose conjunction with p is both possible, in If (22) is consistent with (1), then it follows that
the broadly logical sense, and entails q. A rude (1) and (3) (and hence set A) are consistent.
and unlettered behaviorist, for example, might Accordingly, one thing some theists have tried
hold that thinking is really nothing but move- is to show that (22) and (1) are consistent.
ments of the larynx; he might go on to hold that One can attempt this in at least two ways. On
the one hand, we could try to apply the same
P Jones did not move his larynx after April 30
method again. Conceive of a possible state of
is inconsistent (in the broadly logical sense) with affairs such that, if it obtained, an omnipotent,
omniscient, and wholly good God would have a
Q Jones did some thinking during May.
good reason for permitting evil. On the other,
By way of rebuttal, we might point out that P someone might try to specify what God’s reason
appears to be consistent with is for permitting evil and try to show, if it is not
obvious, that it is a good reason. St. Augustine,
R While convalescing from an April 30 laryng-
for example, one of the greatest and most influ-
otomy, Jones whiled away the idle hours by
ential philosopher-theologians of the Christian
writing (in May) a splendid paper on
Church, writes as follows:
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
So the conjunction of P and R appears to be con- . . . some people see with perfect truth that a crea-
sistent; but obviously it also entails Q (you can’t ture is better if, while possessing free will, it
write even a passable paper on Kant’s Critique remains always fixed upon God and never sins;
of Pure Reason without doing some thinking); then, reflecting on men’s sins, they are grieved,
so P and Q are consistent. not because they continue to sin, but because
they were created. They say: He should have
We can see that this is a special case of the
made us such that we never willed to sin, but
procedure I mentioned above as follows. This always to enjoy the unchangeable truth.
proposition R is consistent with P; so the propo- They should not lament or be angry. God has
sition P and R is possible, describes a possible not compelled men to sin just because He created
state of affairs. But P and R entails Q; hence if them and gave them the power to choose between
P and R were true, Q would also be true, and sinning and not sinning. There are angels who
hence both P and Q would be true. So this is have never sinned and never will sin.
 ALVIN PLANTINGA  The Free Will Defense 189

Such is the generosity of God’s goodness that are both trying to show that (1) is consistent with
He has not refrained from creating even that crea- (22), and of course if so, then set A is consistent.
ture which He foreknew would not only sin, but The Free Will Theodicist tries to do this by find-
remain in the will to sin. As a runaway horse is bet- ing some proposition r which in conjunction with
ter than a stone which does not run away because
(1) entails (22); he claims, furthermore, that this
it lacks self-movement and sense perception, so
proposition is true, not just consistent with (1).
the creature is more excellent which sins by free
will than that which does not sin only because it He tries to tell us what God’s reason for permit-
has no free will.5 ting evil really is. The Free Will Defender, on the
other hand, though he also tries to find a propo-
In broadest terms Augustine claims that God sition r that is consistent with (1) and in conjunc-
could create a better, more perfect universe by per- tion with it entails (22), does not claim to know
mitting evil than He could by refusing to do so: or even believe that r is true. And here, of course,
he is perfectly within his rights. His aim is to
Neither the sins nor the misery are necessary to the show that (1) is consistent with (22); all he
perfection of the universe, but souls as such are need do then is find an r that is consistent with
necessary, which have the power to sin if they so (1) and such that (1) and (r) entail (22); whether
will, and become miserable if they sin. If misery r is true is quite beside the point.
persisted after their sins had been abolished, or if
So there is a significant difference between a
there were misery before there were sins, then it
Free Will Theodicy and a Free Will Defense. The
might be right to say that the order and govern-
ment of the universe were at fault. Again, if latter is sufficient (if successful) to show that set
there were sins but no consequent misery, that A is consistent; in a way a Free Will Theodicy
order is equally dishonored by lack of equity.6 goes beyond what is required. On the other
hand, a theodicy would be much more satisfying,
Augustine tries to tell us what God’s reason is if possible to achieve. No doubt the theist would
for permitting evil. At bottom, he says, it’s that rather know what God’s reason is for permitting
God can create a more perfect universe by per- evil than simply that it’s possible that He has a
mitting evil. A really top-notch universe requires good one. But in the present context (that of
the existence of free, rational, and moral agents; investigating the consistency of set A), the latter
and some of the free creatures He created went is all that’s needed. Neither a defense or a theo-
wrong. But the universe with the free creatures dicy, of course, gives any hint to what God’s rea-
it contains and the evil they commit is better son for some specific evil—the death or suffering
than it would have been had it contained neither of someone close to you, for example—might
7
the free creatures nor this evil. Such an attempt to be. And there is still another function —a sort of
specify God’s reason for permitting evil is what I pastoral function—in the neighborhood that nei-
earlier called a theodicy; in the words of John Mil- ther serves. Confronted with evil in his own life
ton it is an attempt to ‘‘justify the ways of God to or suddenly coming to realize more clearly than
man,’’ to show that God is just in permitting evil. before the extent and magnitude of evil, a believer
Augustine’s kind of theodicy might be called a in God may undergo a crisis of faith. He may be
Free Will Theodicy, since the idea of rational tempted to follow the advice of Job’s ‘‘friends’’;
creatures with free will plays such a prominent he may be tempted to ‘‘curse God and die.’’ Nei-
role in it. ther a Free Will Defense nor a Free Will Theodicy
A theodicist, then, attempts to tell us why is designed to be of much help or comfort to one
God permits evil. Quite distinct from a Free suffering from such a storm in the soul (although
Will Theodicy is what I shall call a Free Will in a specific case, of course, one or the other could
Defense. Here the aim is not to say what God’s prove useful). Neither is to be thought of first of
reason is, but at most what God’s reason might all as a means of pastoral counseling. Probably nei-
possibly be. We could put the difference like this. ther will enable someone to find peace with him-
The Free Will Theodicist and Free Will Defender self and with God in the face of the evil the
190 PART 3  The Problem of Evil

world contains. But then, of course, neither is as would refusing induction into the army. On
intended for that purpose. the other hand, having Cheerios for breakfast
(instead of Wheaties) would not normally be
morally significant. Further, suppose we say
that a person is significantly free, on a given
4. THE FREE WILL DEFENSE occasion, if he is then free with respect to a mor-
In what follows I shall focus attention upon the ally significant action. And finally we must dis-
Free Will Defense. I shall examine it more tinguish between moral evil and natural evil.
closely, state it more exactly, and consider objec- The former is evil that results from free human
8
tions to it; and I shall argue that in the end it is activity; natural evil is any other kind of evil.
successful. Earlier we saw that among good states Given these definitions and distinctions, we
of affairs there are some that not even God can can make a preliminary statement of the Free
bring about without bringing about evil: those Will Defense as follows. A world containing
goods, namely, that entail or include evil states creatures who are significantly free (and freely
of affairs. The Free Will Defense can be looked perform more good than evil actions) is more
upon as an effort to show that there may be a valuable, all else being equal, than a world con-
very different kind of good that God can’t taining no free creatures at all. Now God can
bring about without permitting evil. These are create free creatures, but He can’t cause or deter-
good states of affairs that don’t include evil; mine them to do only what is right. For if He
they do not entail the existence of any evil what- does so, then they aren’t significantly free after
ever; nonetheless God Himself can’t bring them all; they do not do what is right freely. To create
about without permitting evil. creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He
So how does the Free Will Defense work? must create creatures capable of moral evil; and
And what does the Free Will Defender mean He can’t give these creatures the freedom to per-
when he says that people are or may be free? form evil and at the same time prevent them
What is relevant to the Free Will Defense is the from doing so. As it turned out, sadly enough,
idea of being free with respect to an action. If a some of the free creatures God created went
person is free with respect to a given action, wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this is
then he is free to perform that action and free the source of moral evil. The fact that free crea-
to refrain from performing it; no antecedent tures sometimes go wrong, however, counts nei-
conditions and/or causal laws determine that ther against God’s omnipotence nor against His
he will perform the action, or that he won’t. It goodness; for He could have forestalled the
is within his power, at the time in question, to occurrence of moral evil only by removing the
take or perform the action and within his possibility of moral good.
power to refrain from it. Freedom so conceived I said earlier that the Free Will Defender tries
is not to be confused with unpredictability. to find a proposition that is consistent with
You might be able to predict what you will do
in a given situation even if you are free, in that (1) God is omniscient, omnipotent,
situation, to do something else. If I know you and wholly good
well, I may be able to predict what action you
will take in response to a certain set of condi- and together with (1) entails that there is evil.
tions; it does not follow that you are not free According to the Free Will Defense, we must
with respect to that action. Secondly, I shall find this proposition somewhere in the above
say that an action is morally significant, for a story. The heart of the Free Will Defense is the
given person, if it would be wrong for him to claim that it is possible that God could not have
perform the action but right to refrain or vice created a universe containing moral good (or as
versa. Keeping a promise, for example, would much moral good as this world contains) without
ordinarily be morally significant for a person, creating one that also contained moral evil. And if
 ALVIN PLANTINGA  The Free Will Defense 191

so, then it is possible that God has a good reason pleased. So I shall say no more about this objec-
for creating a world containing evil. tion here.10
Now this defense has met with several kinds A second objection is more formidable. In
of objections. For example, some philosophers essence it goes like this. Surely it is possible to
say that causal determinism and freedom, contrary do only what is right, even if one is free to do
to what we might have thought, are not really wrong. It is possible, in that broadly logical
9
incompatible. But if so, then God could have sense, that there would be a world containing
created free creatures who were free, and free to free creatures who always do what is right.
do what is wrong, but nevertheless were causally There is certainly no contradiction or inconsis-
determined to do only what is right. Thus He tency in this idea. But God is omnipotent; his
could have created creatures who were free to power has no nonlogical limitations. So if it’s
do what was wrong, while nevertheless prevent- possible that there be a world containing crea-
ing them from ever performing any wrong tures who are free to do what is wrong but
actions—simply by seeing to it that they were never in fact do so, then it follows that an
causally determined to do only what is right. Of omnipotent God could create such a world. If
course this contradicts the Free Will Defense, so, however, the Free Will Defense must be mis-
according to which there is inconsistency in sup- taken in its insistence upon the possibility that
posing that God determines free creatures to do God is omnipotent but unable to create a
only what is right. But is it really possible that world containing moral good without permit-
all of a person’s actions are causally determined ting moral evil.). J. L. Mackie . . . states this
while some of them are free? How could that objection:
be so? According to one version of the doctrine
in question, to say that George acts freely on a If God has made men such that in their free
given occasion is to say only this: if George had choices they sometimes prefer what is good and
sometimes what is evil, why could he not have
chosen to do otherwise, he would have done other-
made men such that they always freely choose
wise. Now George’s action A is causally deter- the good? If there is no logical impossibility in a
mined if some event E—some event beyond his man’s freely choosing the good on one, or on
control—has already occurred, where the state several occasions, there cannot be a logical
of affairs consisting in E ’s occurrence conjoined impossibility in his freely choosing the good on
with George’s refraining from performing A, is every occasion. God was not, then, faced with a
a causally impossible state of affairs. Then one choice between making innocent automata and
can consistently hold both that all of a man’s making beings who, in acting freely, would some-
actions are causally determined and that some times go wrong; there was open to him the obvi-
of them are free in the above sense. For suppose ously better possibility of making beings who
that all of a man’s actions are causally determined would act freely but always go right. Clearly, his
failure to avail himself of this possibility is incon-
and that he couldn’t, on any occasion, have made
sistent with his being both omnipotent and
any choice or performed any action different from wholly good.11
the ones he did make and perform. It could still
be true that if he had chosen to do otherwise, Now what, exactly, is Mackie’s point here?
he would have done otherwise. Granted, he This. According to the Free Will Defense, it is
couldn’t have chosen to do otherwise; but this possible both that God is omnipotent and that
is consistent with saying that if he had, things He was unable to create a world containing
would have gone differently. moral good without creating one containing
This objection to the Free Will Defense moral evil. But, replies Mackie, this limitation
seems utterly implausible. One might as well on His power to create is inconsistent with
claim that being in jail doesn’t really limit God’s omnipotence. For surely it’s possible that
one’s freedom on the grounds that if one were there be a world containing perfectly virtuous
not in jail, he’d be free to come and go as he persons—persons who are significantly free but
192 PART 3  The Problem of Evil

always do what is right. Surely there are possible 5. WAS IT WITHIN GOD’S POWER
worlds that contain moral good but no moral TO CREATE ANY POSSIBLE WORLD
evil. But God, if He is omnipotent, can create
any possible world He chooses. So it is not possi- HE PLEASED?
ble, contrary to the Free Will Defense, both that This is indeed the crucial question for the Free
God is omnipotent and that He could create a Will Defense. If we wish to discuss it with insight
world containing moral good only by creating and authority, we shall have to look into the idea
one containing moral evil. If He is omnipotent, of possible worlds. And a sensible first question is
the only limitations of His power are logical lim- this: what sort of thing is a possible world? The
itations; in which case there are no possible basic idea is that a possible world is a way things
worlds He could not have created. could have been; it is a state of affairs of some
This is a subtle and important point. Accord- kind. Earlier we spoke of states of affairs, in par-
ing to the great German philosopher G. W. Leib- ticular of good and evil states of affairs. Suppose
niz, this world, the actual world, must be the best we look at this idea in more detail. What sort of
of all possible worlds. His reasoning goes as fol- thing is a state of affairs? The following would
lows. Before God created anything at all, He be examples:
was confronted with an enormous range of
choices; He could create or bring into actuality Nixon’s having won the 1972 election
any of the myriads of different possible worlds. 7 + 5’s being equal to 12
Being perfectly good, He must have chosen to All men’s being mortal
create the best world He could; being omnipo-
and
tent, He was able to create any possible world
He pleased. He must, therefore, have chosen Gary, Indiana’s, having a really nasty pollu-
the best of all possible worlds; and hence this tion problem.
world, the one He did create, must be the best
possible. Now Mackie, of course, agrees with These are actual states of affairs: states of affairs
Leibniz that God, if omnipotent, could have cre- that do in fact obtain. And corresponding to
ated any world He pleased and would have cre- each such actual state of affairs there is a true
ated the best world he could. But while Leibniz proposition—in the above cases, the correspond-
draws the conclusion that this world, despite ing propositions would be Nixon won the 1972
appearances, must be the best possible, Mackie presidential election, 7 + 5 is equal to 12, all men
concludes instead that there is no omnipotent, are mortal, and Gary, Indiana, has a really
wholly good God. For, he says, it is obvious nasty pollution problem. A proposition p corre-
enough that this present world is not the best sponds to a state of affairs s, in this sense, if it is
of all possible worlds. impossible that p be true and s fail to obtain
The Free Will Defender disagrees with both and impossible that s obtain and p fail to be true.
Leibniz and Mackie. In the first place, he might But just as there are false propositions, so
say, what is the reason for supposing that there there are states of affairs that do not obtain or
is such a thing as the best of all possible worlds? are not actual. Kissinger’s having swum the Atlan-
No matter how marvelous a world is—containing tic and Hubert Horatio Humphrey’s having run a
no matter how many persons enjoying unalloyed mile in four minutes would be examples. Some
bliss—isn’t it possible that there be an even better states of affairs that do not obtain are impossible:
world containing even more persons enjoying e.g., Hubert’s having drawn a square circle, 7 + 5’s
even more unalloyed bliss? But what is really char- being equal to 75, and Agnew’s having a brother
acteristic and central to the Free Will Defense is who was an only child. The propositions corre-
the claim that God, though omnipotent, could sponding to these states of affairs, of course, are
not have actualized just any possible world He necessarily false. So there are states of affairs
pleased. that obtain or are actual and also states of affairs
 ALVIN PLANTINGA  The Free Will Defense 193

that don’t obtain. Among the latter some are what it is for a state of affairs to be complete: A
impossible and others are possible. And a possible is a complete state of affairs if and only if for
world is a possible state of affairs. Of course not every state of affairs B, either A includes B or A
every possible state of affairs is a possible world; precludes B. (We could express the same thing
Hubert’s having run a mile in four minutes is a by saying that if A is a complete state of affairs,
possible state of affairs but not a possible world. then for every state of affairs B, either A includes
No doubt it is an element of many possible –
B or A includes B the complement of B.) And
worlds, but it isn’t itself inclusive enough to be now we are able to say what a possible world is:
one. To be a possible world, a state of affairs a possible world is any possible state of affairs
must be very large—so large as to be complete that is complete. If A is a possible world, then
or maximal. it says something about everything; every state
To get at this idea of completeness we need a of affairs S is either included in or precluded by it.
couple of definitions. As we have already Corresponding to each possible world W,
seen . . . a state of affairs A includes a state of furthermore, there is a set of propositions that
affairs B if it is not possible that A obtain and B I’ll call the book on W. A proposition is in the
not obtain or if the conjunctive state of affairs book on W just in case the state of affairs to
A but not B —the state of affairs that obtains if which it corresponds is included in W. Or we
and only if A obtains and B does not—is not pos- might express it like this. Suppose we say that a
sible. For example, Jim Whittaker’s being the first proposition P is true in a world W if and only if
American to climb Mt. Everest includes Jim Whit- P would have been true if W had been actual—if
taker’s being an American. It also includes Mt. and only if, that is, it is not possible that W be
Everest’s being climbed, something’s being climbed, actual and P be false. Then the book on W is
no American’s having climbed Everest before Whit- the set of propositions true in W. Like possible
taker did, and the like. Inclusion among states of worlds, books are complete; if B is a book, then
affairs is like entailment among propositions; and for any proposition P, either P or the denial of
where a state of affairs A includes a state of affairs P will be a member of B. A book is a maximal
B, the proposition corresponding to A entails the consistent set of propositions; it is so large that
one corresponding to B. Accordingly, Jim Whit- the addition of another proposition to it always
taker is the first American to climb Everest entails yields an explicitly inconsistent set.
Mt. Everest has been climbed, something has been Of course, for each possible world there is
climbed, and no American climbed Everest before exactly one book corresponding to it (that is,
Whittaker did. Now suppose we say further that for a given world W there is just one book B
a state of affairs A precludes a state of affairs B if such that each member of B is true in M; and
it is not possible that both obtain, or if the con- for each book there is just one world to which
junctive state of affairs A and B is impossible. it corresponds). So every world has its book.
Thus Whittaker’s being the first American to It should be obvious that exactly one possible
climb Mt. Everest precludes Luther Jerstad’s world is actual. At least one must be, since the set
being the first American to climb Everest, as well of true propositions is a maximal consistent set
as Whittaker’s never having climbed any moun- and hence a book. But then it corresponds to a
tains. If A precludes B, than A’s corresponding possible world, and the possible world corre-
proposition entails the denial of the one corre- sponding to this set of propositions (since it’s
sponding to B. Still further, let’s say that the com- the set of true propositions) will be actual. On
plement of a state of affairs is the state of affairs the other hand there is at most one actual
that obtains just in case A does not obtain. [Or world. For suppose there were two: W and W 0 .
–
we might say that the complement (call it A) of These worlds cannot include all the very same
A is the state of affairs corresponding to the states of affairs; if they did, they would be the
denial or negation of the proposition correspond- very same world. So there must be at least one
ing to A.] Given these definitions, we can say state of affairs S such that W includes S and W 0
194 PART 3  The Problem of Evil

does not. But a possible world is maximal; W 0 , John Paul Jones, and many other famous Pauls.
–
therefore, includes the complement S of S. So if So who goes with ‘‘Paul exists’’? Which Paul?
both W and W 0 were actual, as we have supposed, The answer has to do with the fact that books
–
then both S and S would be actual—which is contain propositions—not sentences. They contain
impossible. So there can’t be more than one pos- the sort of thing sentences are used to express and
sible world that is actual. assert. And the same sentence—‘‘Aristotle is
Leibniz pointed out that a proposition p is wise,’’ for example—can be used to express
necessary if it is true in every possible world. many different propositions. When Plato used it,
We may add that p is possible if it is true in one he asserted a proposition predicating wisdom of
world and impossible if true in none. Further- his famous pupil; when Jackie Onassis uses it,
more, p entails q if there is no possible world in she asserts a proposition predicating wisdom of
which p is true and q is false, and p is consistent her wealthy husband. These are distinct proposi-
with q if there is at least one world in which tions (we might even think they differ in truth
both p and q are true. value); but they are expressed by the same sen-
A further feature of possible worlds is that tence. Normally (but not always) we don’t have
people (and other things) exist in them. Each of much trouble determining which of the several
us exists in the actual world, obviously; but a per- propositions expressed by a given sentence is rele-
son also exists in many worlds distinct from the vant in the context at hand. So in this case a given
actual world. It would be a mistake, of course, person, Paul, exists in a world W if and only if W 0
to think of all of these worlds as somehow book contains the proposition that says that he—
‘‘going on’’ at the same time, with the same per- that particular person—exists. The fact that the
son reduplicated through these worlds and actu- sentence we use to express this proposition can
ally existing in a lot of different ways. This is not also be used to express other propositions is not
what is meant by saying that the same person relevant.
exists in different possible worlds. What is After this excursion into the nature of books
meant, instead, is this: a person Paul exists in and worlds we can return to our question.
each of those possible worlds W which is such Could God have created just any world He
that, if W had been actual, Paul would have chose? Before addressing the question, however,
existed—actually existed. Suppose Paul had we must note that God does not, strictly speaking,
been an inch taller than he is, or a better tennis create any possible worlds or states of affairs at all.
player. Then the world that does in fact obtain What He creates are the heavens and the earth
would not have been actual; some other and all that they contain. But He has not created
world—W 0 , let’s say—would have obtained states of affairs. There are, for example, the state
instead. If W 0 had been actual, Paul would have of affairs consisting in God’s existence and the
existed; so Paul exists in W 0 . (Of course there state of affairs consisting in His nonexistence.
are still other possible worlds in which Paul That is, there is such a thing as the state of affairs
does not exist—worlds, for example, in which consisting in the existence of God, and there is
there are no people at all.) Accordingly, when also such a thing as the state of affairs consisting
we say that Paul exists in a world W, what we in the nonexistence of God, just as there are the
mean is that Paul would have existed had W two propositions God exists and God does not
been actual. Or we could put it like this: Paul exist. The theist believes that the first state of
exists in each world W that includes the state of affairs is actual and the first proposition true, the
affairs consisting in Paul’s existence. We can put atheist believes that the second state of affairs is
this still more simply by saying that Paul exists actual and the second proposition true. But, of
in those worlds whose books contain the propo- course, both propositions exist, even though just
sition Paul exists. one is true. Similarly, there are two states of affairs
But isn’t there a problem here? Many people here, just one of which is actual. So both states of
are named ‘‘Paul’’: Paul the apostle, Paul J. Zwier, affairs exist, but only one obtains. And God has
 ALVIN PLANTINGA  The Free Will Defense 195

not created either one of them since there never Let’s begin with a trivial example. You and
was a time at which either did not exist. Nor has Paul have just returned from an Australian hunt-
he created the state of affairs consisting in the ing expedition: your quarry was the elusive dou-
earth’s existence; there was a time when the ble-waffled cassowary. Paul captured an aardvark,
earth did not exist, but none when the state of mistaking it for a cassowary. The creature’s dis-
affairs consisting in the earth’s existence didn’t arming ways have won it a place in Paul’s heart;
exist. Indeed, God did not bring into existence he is deeply attached to it. Upon your return to
any states of affairs at all. What He did was to per- the States you offer Paul $500 for his aardvark,
form actions of a certain sort—creating the heav- only to be rudely turned down. Later you ask
ens and the earth, for example—which resulted in yourself, ‘‘What would he have done if I’d offered
the actuality of certain states of affairs. God actu- him $700?’’ Now what is it, exactly, that you are
alizes states of affairs. He actualizes the possible asking? What you’re really asking in a way is
world that does in fact obtain; He does not create whether, under a specific set of conditions, Paul
it. And while He has created Socrates, He did not would have sold it. These conditions include
create the state of affairs consisting in Socrates’ your having offered him $700 rather than $500
existence.12 for the aardvark, everything else being as much
Bearing this in mind, let’s finally return to our as possible like the conditions that did in fact
question. Is the atheologian right in holding that obtain. Let S 0 be this set of conditions or state
if God is omnipotent, then he could have actual- of affairs. S 0 includes the state of affairs consisting
ized or created any possible world He pleased? in your offering Paul $700 (instead of the $500
Not obviously. First, we must ask ourselves you did offer him); of course it does not include
whether God is a necessary or a contingent being. his accepting your offer, and it does not include
A necessary being is one that exists in every possi- his rejecting it; for the rest, the conditions it
ble world—one that would have existed no matter includes are just like the ones that did obtain in
which possible world had been actual; a contin- the actual world. So, for example, S 0 includes
gent being exists only in some possible worlds. Paul’s being free to accept the offer and free to
Now if God is not a necessary being (and many, refrain; and if in fact the going rate for an aardvark
perhaps most, theists think that He is not), then was $650, then S 0 includes the state of affairs con-
clearly enough there will be many possible worlds sisting in the going rate’s being $650. So we
He could not have actualized—all those, for might put your question by asking which of the
example, in which He does not exist. Clearly, following conditionals is true:
God could not have created a world in which
He doesn’t even exist. (23) If the state of affairs S 0 had obtained,
So, if God is a contingent being then there Paul would have accepted the offer
are many possible worlds beyond His power to (24) If the state of affairs S 0 had obtained,
create. But this is really irrelevant to our present Paul would not have accepted the offer.
concerns. For perhaps the atheologian can main- It seems clear that at least one of these condition-
tain his case if he revises his claim to avoid this als is true, but naturally they can’t both be; so
difficulty; perhaps he will say something like exactly one is.
this: if God is omnipotent, then He could have Now since S 0 includes neither Paul’s accept-
actualized any of these possible worlds in which ing the offer not his rejecting it, the antecedent
He exists. So if He exists and is omnipotent, He of (23) and (24) does not entail the consequent
could have actualized (contrary to the Free Will of either. That is,
Defense) any of those possible worlds in which
He exists and in which there exist free creatures (25) S 0 obtains
who do no wrong. He could have actualized does not entail either
worlds containing moral good but no moral
evil. Is this correct? (26) Paul accepts the offer
196 PART 3  The Problem of Evil

or That was a past tense example. Perhaps it

would be useful to consider a future tense case,
(27) Paul does not accept the offer.
since this might seem to correspond more closely
So there are possible worlds in which both (25) to God’s situation in choosing a possible world to
and (26) are true, and other possible worlds in actualize. At some time t in the near future Mau-
which both (25) and (27) are true. rice will be free with respect to some insignificant
We are now in a position to grasp an impor- action—having freeze-dried oatmeal for break-
tant fact. Either (23) or (24) is in fact true; and fast, let’s say. That is, at time t Maurice will be
either way there are possible worlds God could free to have oatmeal but also free to take some-
not have actualized. Suppose, first of all, that thing else—shredded wheat, perhaps. Next, sup-
(23) is true. Then it was beyond the power of pose we consider S 0 , a state of affairs that is
God to create a world in which (1) Paul is free included in the actual world and includes Mau-
to sell his aardvark and free to refrain, and in rice’s being free with respect to taking oatmeal
which the other states of affairs included in S 0 at time t. That is, S 0 includes Maurice’s being
obtain, and (2) Paul does not sell. That is, it was free at time t to take oatmeal and free to reject
beyond His power to create a world in which it. S 0 does not include Maurice’s taking oatmeal,
(25) and (27) are both true. There is at least one however; nor does it include his rejecting it. For
possible world like this, but God, despite His the rest S 0 is as much as possible like the actual
omnipotence, could not have brought about its world. In particular there are many conditions
actuality. For let W be such a world. To actualize that do in fact hold at time t and are relevant to
W, God must bring it about that Paul is free his choice—such conditions, for example, as the
with respect to this action, and that the other states fact that he hasn’t had oatmeal lately, that his
of affairs included in S 0 obtain. But (23), as we are wife will be annoyed if he rejects it, and the
supposing, is true; so if God had actualized S 0 and like; and S 0 includes each of these conditions.
left Paul free with respect to this action, he would Now God no doubt knows what Maurice will
have sold: in which case W would not have been do at time t, if S obtains; He knows which action
actual. If, on the other hand, God had brought it Maurice would freely perform if S were to be
about that Paul didn’t sell or had caused him to actual. That is, God knows that one of the follow-
refrain from selling, then Paul would not have ing conditionals is true:
been free with respect to this action; then S 0 would
(28) If S 0 were to obtain, Maurice will freely take
not have been actual (since S 0 includes Paul’s being
the oatmeal
free with respect to it), and W would not have been
actual since W includes S 0 . or
Of course if it is (24) rather than (23) that is
(29) If S 0 were to obtain, Maurice will freely
true, then another class of worlds was beyond
reject it.
God’s power to actualize—those, namely, in
which S 0 obtains and Paul sells his aardvark. We may not know which of these is true, and
These are the worlds in which both (25) and Maurice himself may not know; but presumably
(26) are true. But either (23) or (24) is true. God does.
Therefore, there are possible worlds God could So either God knows that (28) is true, or else
not have actualized. If we consider whether or He knows that (29) is. Let’s suppose it is (28).
not God could have created a world in which, Then there is a possible world that God, though
let’s say, both (25) and (26) are true, we see that omnipotent, cannot create. For consider a possi-
the answer depends upon a peculiar kind of fact; ble world W 0 that shares S 0 with the actual world
it depends upon what Paul would have freely cho- (which for ease of reference I’ll name ‘‘Kronos’’)
sen to do in a certain situation. So there are any and in which Maurice does not take oatmeal. (We
number of possible worlds such that it is partly know there is such a world, since S 0 does not
up to Paul whether God can create them.13 include Maurice’s taking the oatmeal.) S 0 obtains
 ALVIN PLANTINGA  The Free Will Defense 197

in W 0 just as it does in Kronos. Indeed, every- within God’s power to create a world containing
thing in W 0 is just as it is in Kronos up to time moral good without creating one containing
t. But whereas in Kronos Maurice takes oatmeal moral evil. His atheological opponent—Mackie,
at time t, in W 0 he does not. Now W 0 is a per- for example—agrees with Leibniz in insisting
fectly possible world; but it is not within God’s that if (as the theist holds) God is omnipotent,
power to create it or bring about its actuality. then it follows that He could have created any
For to do so He must actualize S 0 . But (28) is possible world He pleased. We now see that this
in fact true. So if God actualizes S 0 (as He must contention—call it ‘‘Leibniz’ Lapse’’—is a mis-
to create W 0 ) and leaves Maurice free with respect take. The atheologian is right in holding that
to the action in question, then he will take the there are many possible worlds containing moral
oatmeal; and then, of course, W 0 will not be good but no moral evil; his mistake lies in endors-
actual. If, on the other hand, God causes Maurice ing Leibniz’ Lapse. So one of his premises—that
to refrain from taking the oatmeal, then he is not God, if omnipotent, could have actualized just
free to take it. That means, once again, that W 0 is any world He pleased—is false.
not actual; for in W 0 Maurice is free to take the
oatmeal (even if he doesn’t do so). So if (28) is
true, then this world W 0 is one that God can’t 6. COULD GOD HAVE CREATED A
actualize, it is not within His power to actualize WORLD CONTAINING MORAL
it even though He is omnipotent and it is a pos-
sible world.
GOOD BUT NO MORAL EVIL?
Of course, if it is (29) that is true, we get a Now suppose we recapitulate the logic of the sit-
similar result; then too there are possible worlds uation. The Free Will Defender claims that the
that God can’t actualize. These would be worlds following is possible:
which share S 0 with Kronos and in which Maurice
(30) God is omnipotent, and it was not within
does take oatmeal. But either (28) or (29) is true;
His power to create a world containing
so either way there is a possible world that God
moral good but no moral evil.
can’t create. If we consider a world in which S 0
obtains and in which Maurice freely chooses oat- By way of retort the atheologian insists that
meal at time t, we see that whether or not it is there are possible worlds containing moral good
within God’s power to actualize it depends upon but no moral evil. He adds that an omnipotent
what Maurice would do if he were free in a certain being could have actualized any possible world
situation. Accordingly, there are any number of he chose. So if God is omnipotent, it follows
possible worlds such that it is partly up to Maurice that He could have actualized a world containing
whether or not God can actualize them. It is, of moral good but no moral evil, hence (30), con-
course, up to God whether or not to create Mau- trary to the Free Will Defender’s claim, is not
rice and also up to God whether or not to make possible. What we have seen so far is that his sec-
him free with respect to the action of taking oat- ond premise—Leibniz’ Lapse—is false.
meal at time t. (God could, if He chose, cause Of course, this does not settle the issue in the
him to succumb to the dreaded equine obsession, Free Will Defender’s favor. Leibniz’ Lapse
a condition shared by some people and most (appropriately enough for a lapse) is false; but
horses, whose victims find it psychologically impossi- this doesn’t show that (30) is possible. To show
ble to refuse oats or oat products.) But if He cre- this latter we must demonstrate the possibility
ates Maurice and creates him free with respect to that among the worlds God could not have
this action, then whether or not he actually per- actualized are all the worlds containing moral
14
forms the action is up to Maurice—not God. good but no moral evil. How can we approach
Now we can return to the Free Will Defense this question?
and the problem of evil. The Free Will Defender, Instead of choosing oatmeal for breakfast or
you recall, insists on the possibility that it is not selling an aardvark, suppose we think about a
198 PART 3  The Problem of Evil

morally significant action such as taking a bribe. accepting the bribe or his rejecting it; (3) is other-
Curley Smith, the mayor of Boston, is opposed wise as much as possible like the actual world—in
to the proposed freeway route; it would require particular, it includes Curley’s being free with
destruction of the Old North Church along respect to the bribe; and (4) is such that if it
with some other antiquated and structurally were actual then Curley would have taken the
unsound buildings. L. B. Smedes, the director bribe. That is
of highways, asks him whether he’d drop his
(32) if S 0 were actual, Curley would have
opposition for $1 million. ‘‘Of course,’’ he replies.
accepted the bribe is true.
‘‘Would you do it for $2?’’ asks Smedes. ‘‘What
do you take me for?’’ comes the indignant reply. Now, of course, there is at least one possible
‘‘That’s already established,’’ smirks Smedes; ‘‘all world W 0 in which S 0 is actual and Curley does
that remains is to nail down your price.’’ Smedes not take the bribe. But God could not have cre-
then offers him a bribe of $35,000; unwilling to ated W 0 ; to do so, He would have been obliged
break with the fine old traditions of Bay State pol- to actualize S 0 , leaving Curley free with respect
itics, Curley accepts. Smedes then spends a sleep- to the action of taking the bribe. But under
less night wondering whether he could have these conditions Curley, as (32) assures us,
bought Curley for $20,000. would have accepted the bribe, so that the
Now suppose we assume that Curley was free world thus created would not have been S 0 .
with respect to the action of taking the bribe— Curley, as we see, is not above a bit of Water-
free to take it and free to refuse. And suppose, gating. But there may be worse to come. Of
furthermore, that he would have taken it. That course, there are possible worlds in which he is
is, let us suppose that significantly free (i.e., free with respect to a mor-
ally significant action) and never does what is
(31) If Smedes had offered Curley a bribe of
wrong. But the sad truth about Curley may be
$20,000, he would have accepted it.
this. Consider W 0 , any of these worlds: in W 0
If (31) is true, then there is a state of affairs S 0 that Curley is significantly free, so in W 0 there are
(1) includes Curley’s being offered a bribe of some actions that are morally significant for him
$20,000; (2) does not include either his accepting and with respect to which he is free. But at least
the bribe or his rejecting it; and (3) is otherwise as one of these actions—call it A—has the following
much as possible like the actual world. Just to peculiar property. There is a maximal world seg-
make sure S 0 includes every relevant circumstance, ment S 0 that obtains in W 0 and is such that (1)
let us suppose that it is a maximal world segment. S 0 includes Curley’s being free re A but neither
That is, add to S 0 any state of affairs compatible his performing A nor his refraining from A; (2)
with but not included in it, and the result will S 0 is otherwise as much as possible like W 0 and
be an entire possible world. We could think of it (3) if S 0 had been actual, Curley would have
roughly like this: S 0 is included in at least one 15
gone wrong with respect to A. (Notice that
world W in which Curley takes the bribe and in this third condition holds in fact, in the actual
at least one world W 0 in which he rejects it. If world; it does not hold in that world W 0 .)
S 0 is a maximal world segment, then S 0 is what This means, of course, that God could not
remains of W when Curley’s taking the bribe is have actualized W 0 . For to do so He’d have
deleted; it is also what remains of W 0 when Cur- been obliged to bring it about that S 0 is actual;
ley’s rejecting the bribe is detected. More exactly, if but then Curley would go wrong with respect
S 0 is a maximal world segment, then every possi- to A. Since in W 0 he always does what is right,
ble state of affairs that includes S 0 , but isn’t the world thus actualized would not be W 0 . On
included by S 0 , is a possible world. So if (31) is the other hand, if God causes Curley to go right
true, then there is a maximal world segment S 0 with respect to A or brings it about that he
that (1) includes Curley’s being offered a bribe does so, then Curley isn’t free with respect to
of $20,000; (2) does not include either his A; and so once more it isn’t W 0 that is actual.
 ALVIN PLANTINGA  The Free Will Defense 199

Accordingly God cannot create W 0 . But W 0 was persons who suffer from transworld depravity.
just any of the worlds in which Curley is signifi- More generally, it is possible that everybody suffers
cantly free but always does only what is right. It from it. And if this possibility were actual, then
therefore follows that it was not within God’s God, though omnipotent, could not have created
power to create a world in which Curley produces any of the possible worlds containing just the per-
moral good but no moral evil. Every world God sons who do in fact exist, and containing moral
can actualize is such that if Curley is significantly good but no moral eviI. For to do so He’d
free in it, he takes at least one wrong action. have to create persons who were significantly
Obviously Curley is in serious trouble. I shall free (otherwise there would be no moral good)
call the malady from which he suffers transworld but suffered from transworld depravity. Such per-
depravity. (I leave as homework the problem of sons go wrong with respect to at least one action
comparing transworld depravity with what Cal- in any world God could have actualized and in
vinists call ‘‘total depravity.’’) By way of explicit which they are free with respect to morally signif-
definition: icant actions; so the price for creating a world in
which they produce moral good is creating one in
(33) A person P suffers from transworld depravity
which they also produce moral evil.
if and only if the following holds: for every
world W such that P is significantly free in
W and P does only what is right in W, NOTES
therevis an action A and a maximal world 1. John Mackie, ‘‘Evil and Omnipotence,’’ in The
segment S 0 such that Philosophy of Religion, ed. Basil Mitchell (London
(1) S 0 includes A0 s being morally significant for P Oxford University Press:, 1971), p. 92. [See previ-
(2) S 0 includes P 0 s being free with respect to A ous reading.]
(3) S 0 is included in W and includes neither P 0 s 2. Ibid., p. 93. [Philosophy of Religion: Selected Read-
performing A nor P 0 s refraining from per- ings, Second Edition, p. 224.]
3. More simply, the question is really just whether
forming A
any good state of affairs includes an evil; a little
and reflection reveals that no good state of affairs can
include an evil that it does not outweigh.
(4) If S 0 were actual, P would go wrong with 4. In Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca, N.Y.:
respect to A. Cornell University Press, 1967), chap. 5, I
explore further the project of finding such
(In thinking about this definition, remember that
propositions.
(4) is to be true in fact, in the actual world—not 5. The Problem of Free Choice, Vol. 22 of Ancient
in that world W.) Christian Writers (Westminster, Md.: The New-
What is important about the idea of trans- man Press, 1955), bk. 2, pp. 14–15.
world depravity is that if a person suffers from 6. Ibid., bk. 3, p. 9.
it, then it wasn’t within God’s power to actualize 7. I am indebted to Henry Schuurman (in conversa-
any world in which that person is significantly free tion) for helpful discussion of the difference
but does no wrong—that is, a world in which he between this pastoral function and those served
produces moral good but no moral evil. by a theodicy or a defense.
We have been here considering a crucial con- 8. This distinction is not very precise (how, exactly,
tention of the Free Will Defender: the conten- are we to construe ‘‘results from’’?), but perhaps
it will serve our present purposes.
tion, namely, that
9. See, for example, A. Flew, ‘‘Divine Omnipotence
(30) God is omnipotent, and it was not within and Human Freedom,’’ in New Essays in Philosophi-
His power to create a world containing cal Theology, eds. A. Flew and A. MacIntyre (Lon-
moral good but no moral evil. don SCM:, 1955), pp. 150–53.
10. For further discussion of it see Plantinga, God and
How is transworld depravity relevant to this? Other Minds, pp. 132–35.
As follows. Obviously it is possible that there be 11. Mackie, in The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 100–101.