Modern Economy, 2021, 12, 247-273

https://www.scirp.org/journal/me
ISSN Online: 2152-7261
ISSN Print: 2152-7245

Managing Shipping Companies, the Way Their

Pioneers Did: The Case-Studies of Aristotelis S.
Onassis II and Angeliki Frangou

Alexandros M. Goulielmos1,2
1
Former Professor of Marine Economics, Faculty of Maritime and Industrial Studies, Department of Maritime Studies,
University of Piraeus, Piraeus, Greece
2
Shipping, Transport and Logistics Department, Business College of Athens, Athens, Greece

How to cite this paper: Goulielmos, A. M. Abstract

(2021). Managing Shipping Companies, the
Way Their Pioneers Did: The Case-Studies This work finalized the presentation of the business life of the late (golden)
of Aristotelis S. Onassis II and Angeliki Greek shipowner Aristotelis S. Onassis, which we started in a previous paper
Frangou. Modern Economy, 12, 247-273.
(in this journal1). Our purpose was to provide a real example, in which pros-
https://doi.org/10.4236/me.2021.121013
pective managers may find-out certain strong points. Onassis believed in his
Received: December 10, 2020 arithmetic as far as shipping economies of scale are concerned and in the fu-
Accepted: January 26, 2021 ture of oil consumption, since 1938. The largest tanker in the water was al-
Published: January 29, 2021
ways his, a fixed target. He was also after a rapid growth of his fleet, using
Copyright © 2021 by author(s) and other people’s money. He was building almost 3 ships each year on average
Scientific Research Publishing Inc. for about 4 continuous decades! The top Chian shipowner Mrs. Angeliki N.
This work is licensed under the Creative Frangou, reached a fleet of over 18 m dwt-3 times larger than that of Onassis!
Commons Attribution International
License (CC BY 4.0).
She is strong knowing capital markets, as she used to work in Wall Street, and
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ she has the ability to derive the funds she needs at low interest rates. She (a
Open Access mechanical Engineer by education) understands also the “cost minimization”
principle. She was round during the end-2008 global financial crisis, when she
learned that a hundred of opportunities crop-up during such a time, provided
one has funds. Unlike Onassis, she was on board her father ships since a little
girl, and surely tradition, (and her conservative father), taught her the old
shipping wisdom…while the modern one, she learned by herself. The method
used was to read a great number of books, articles, announcements and inter-
views, many more than those mentioned in the reference list. To note-down
the business style of each shipowner, dropping-out all irrelevant facts and
private life. For Onassis, we read more than 10 books. Our scientific curiosity
and our experience as a professor of shipping management enabled

“Managing shipping companies, the way their pioneers did: the case-studies of vafias N family and
1

Aristotelis S. Onassis”.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 Jan. 29, 2021 247 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

us to single out the management ways and the principles applied by these two
managers. The end purpose was to teach readers of how shipping business
can be carried-out with success given the changes occurred.

Keywords
A Case-Study Related to Aristotelis S. Onassis, also to Angeliki Frangou,
Liberty Ships, Onassis’ Animal Spirits

1. Introduction
It has been written2 that Greek shipowners are of 2 at least types (Graph 1).
The traditionalists are those with long-established names, who were enduring
for several generations, and at least five. They usually originate from 1 family
and 1 island with a seafaring tradition, such as Andros and Chios, prior to 1800s.
These companies are usually characterized by a slow and steady growth. An ex-
ample is the late Stavros Livanos3. The Parachutists are those, a first-generation
owner, with no particular background in shipping, who suddenly landed on ma-
ritime…sea, during the years following the 2nd World War.
The traditionalists were endowed by the 107 surplus ships for Liberty (pre-
sented below), available (lend-lease) at low prices in 1946 by USA Government
to Greek shipowners. The Parachutists had a sudden and fast growth. One
strong example is Onassis. In Greece, ship owning is a way of life, and not only a
profession, and prior knowhow is not a necessary condition to become a shi-
powner. Best example is the “Martinos family” (1969), belonging rather to Pa-
rachutists. It created 3 top shipping companies4 one for each brother- and a

Graph 1. The 2 types of greek Shipowners accord-

ing to Bothwell (1982). Source: author.
2
Bothwell, J. H. (1982) Com.
3
He came from Chios (Kardamyla), born in 1887. He was a Chief Engineer. In 1917 settled-down in
London establishing a shipping office. After 2nd World War he owned over 30 vessels of which 9
new-buildings. In 1948 obtained a tanker of 26,000 tons. He passed away in 1956. He was a lover of
money.
4
Thenamaris; Minerva and Eastern owning about a total of 25 m dwt in 2018! There is a large num-
ber of companies created by non-traditional shipowners emerging after 1960s. As we mentioned
elsewhere 1/3 of companies come from ex-sea officers (Captains and Engineers). One third is
created by shore industrialists and 1/3 are traditionalists out of 1000 at least shipping companies.
We may stress here the importance of the maritime cluster existing in Greece, where one learns the
business of shipping, finds crews and many former senior staff of shipping companies create their
own shipping company, best example being Costas Priftis, of Thenamaris.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 248 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

two-generation company for Thenamaris. This family started with an old, using
steam, used5 dry cargo ship, and hired experienced departmental/divisional
managers till owners learned the business. Tradition is truly a strong motive
among Greeks not only in Shipping but also in national issues.

2. Aim and Organization of Paper

We will present one of the past and one of the present Greek shipowners as
Managers, so that to reveal their management style, behind their fleet, so that to
teach present or future managers by their example. The selection has been made
so that to have an old and a modern shipowner. This work emanated from the
fact that certain shipping managers have built great fortunes and to the students
of shipping business there is always the inclination to find-out how and why?
This work is structured and organized in three parts, as follows: Next is a lite-
rature review followed by part I dealing with the case-study of the 107 ships built
for liberty in 1941-1945. Then is Part II dealing with Onassis business life: a
case-study II, followed by part III: the case-study of Mrs. Angeliki N. Frangou.
Finally, we conclude.

3. Literature Review
Lowry N. (2003)6 wrote for Onassis a book. For this paper I had the same idea as
Mpatis (1999) had. The idea came to Mpatis during a presentation of a number
of bachelor degree essays in the Dept. of Maritime Studies (University of Pi-
raeus) (in 1998). The presentations were overwhelmed by statistics, but there
was no reference to the men behind them…Mpatis decided7 to write a book to
5
The obstacle to become a shipowner is to find, or have, the own capital in USA$, most probably a
40% of the value of a ship. This is a necessary condition. Overaged ships are cheaper and Greeks
most frequently than never bought such ships. In old times Greeks gathered the savings of say about
100 persons to buy a ship, till Greeks became rich as nowadays.
6
I thank the Foundation for sending me one copy.
7
“Vision magazine”, Greek shipping Vision; date unknown, pp. 110-112.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 249 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

show-up the human element! We decided to write a number of papers for the
same reason.
Randoy et al. (2003) studied the good corporate governance in maritime
firms, empirically testing-among Norwegian and Swedish firms only if the
founding family leader—CEO, increases performance, (ROA-return on assets),
in shipping, and if board’s independence is related to higher performance8. We
may ask for further research: does shipping companies’ fast decision-making
provide higher profits, together with perfect timing, when only one single man-
ager does it? Does in decision-making family hierarchy prevail? What conclu-
sion is drawn if we compare the performance of personal companies with family
ones?
Stopford M. (2009) mentioned Onassis repeatedly and said that shipping vola-
tility created him (p. 3). Onassis in 1956 earned $80 m due to 1st Suez Canal clo-
sure, but he was wrong believing that this will last for years (p. 702). His aide
Costas Gratsos told him to use the “time charters” and…he, secretly, chartered
12 tankers to Esso for 3 years and 3 months!
Koufopoulos et al. (2010) used a maritime directory, in 2006-7, to study-out
the governance structure of the Greek owned companies having more than 5
vessels. This coupled with 179 questionnaires addressed to their managing di-
rectors. Twenty-seven responses were received-back only (~15%). They found-out
(Table 1):
Further research may answer: is the family hierarchy respected during control
(?) and what happens if managers are e.g., two or 3 (of equal standing) brothers?
Interesting is also what happens if there are disagreements between father and
son, and between brother and brother9?
Pedagogical is the case of the ex-Greek company “Stelmar Shipping Co Ltd”

Table 1. Greek owners with more than 5 vessels & their governance structure (2006-2007).

The international activity

Family is: owner The founding (family) provides incentives for Small board size
and manager member is the leader decision-makers to (5-7)
optimize returns

CEO is also A hesitation is

Company’s directors A starting trend to
Board’s noted to evaluate
are also board-members adopt more structured
Chairman (by CEO & his/her
(by majority) (*) governance systems
majority) performance

No external
board members Frequent board Boards contribute
(by majority) meetings most to strategic process
(**)

Source: author, based on authors’ paper. (*) Stelmar shipping company adopted this. (**) The Vafias group,
presented in Goulielmos (2020), had external board members.
8
Notable is that out of 56 quotations only 4 are maritime of which one in Norwegian…
9
The paper showed indirectly the poverty of research on matters of companies, which are thought
to be confidential. From 84 quotations only 15% were shipping and from them some hardly rele-
vant to paper’s topic.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 250 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

founded in 1992 by Stelios Hadjiioannou of a Cypriot family of shipowners, and

listed in NYSE in 2001. This was a case of confrontation between owner Stelios
and 2 members of company’s Board of Directors (CEO and CFO). So, first les-
son is one to be careful about what members one invites in company’s board10,
and what % of shares has the founder, being that not below 51%. Shipping busi-
ness reality has taught us that the personal interest is above company’s interest,
despite what Fayol11 asked for in 1916. Fayol advanced 14 principles of manage-
ment (Robbins & Coulter, 2018: p. 70), of which one said: “subordination of in-
dividual interests to the general interest”! Stelmar finally sold12 to OSG- Over-
seas Shipholding Group in 2004 against $843 m.
Lorange & Fjeldstad (2010) posed one question and gave a positive answer
with 3 reasons. The question was: Does the organization of international ship-
ping companies deserve special attention? They recognized that shipping has a
more important and effective role to play after the opening-up of the new trades
with over-populated areas, like China and India, and other S E Asia countries.
Given market’s volatility companies had to be organized and managed properly
to make high stakes and rapid asset-playing decisions (Graph 2).
A Greek shipowner (Danaos) said that globalization made possible by contai-
nerization. In what particular way shipping helps humanity? Table 2 illuminates
this.

Graph 2. Special features of shipping industry of managing & organizing.

Source: author, from the paper mentioned.

Table 2. Ships and their particular % role in the transport (shipments) of certain cargoes.
% of total cargo in
Type of ship Phosphate rock Coal Grain Bauxite-Alumina
Iron-Ore
Capesize - 70% 45 7 -
Panamax 20 22 40 43 45%
Handy 80% 8 15 50% 55%

Source: Data from fearnleys’ & LSE, undated.

10
Worth noting is that Stelios had a 13% of company’s shares, his brother Polys had 7% and her sis-
ter Clelia had 7%, a total of 27%.
11
Translated into English in 1949 by Sir Isaak Pitman & Sons, Lon.
12
If a buyer agrees to retain certain members of the boards of directors after sale of the company,
these agree strongly for this take-over!

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 251 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

As shown Capes carry the majority of iron-ore required for buildings, public
works etc., along with Handy carrying bauxite and alumina, and feeding people
with Grain. This last type helps also agriculture (80%). Capes and Panamax help
with coal, as a source of energy, almost equally. This is a pre-China etc. picture
as China is not mentioned and India is mentioned for providing iron-ore to Ja-
pan and Korea. China dominated the iron-ore transport gradually since 1986
with 190 mt, in 2004, out of 590 m (~32%).
Moreover, Lorange & Fjeldstad (2010) pointed-out further the changes that
occurred in shipping industry since 1990 (Graph 3).
Managers have to realize the main characteristics of Shipping Industry
(Graph 4).
Summarizing, we believe that managing shipping companies is better to be
one-man show, and decision-making to be again one-man show, but this has to
come out with a contribution from all relevant departments. Family structures in
Greek shipping maintain family hierarchy in decision-making and this is more

Graph 3. Major changes in Shipping Industry, 1990-2000. Source: author, based on paper
mentioned.

Graph 4. Major characteristics of Shipping Industry, 2010. Source: author, based on pa-
per mentioned.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 252 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

effective. When there is a disagreement, father’s opinion prevails, but when fa-
ther dies sons or daughters set-off in their new individual companies. This also
has happened with brothers (Polemis; Procopiou; Martinos and others).
Perfect timing, however, is the King and the successful shipping managers
have done it. Greeks by using a number of economic principles succeeded to
excel and to approach, but not to reach perfect timing. This we believe is the top
criterion of managing and organizing a shipping company successfully. By pur-
suing a perfect timing, this presupposes certain times waiting with utmost pa-
tience. Let us take an example in answering the question: when was a perfect
timing to order and build tankers between 1980 and 1992 (January)? This is
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 indicates that the lowest price, over the 1980-1992 period, to build a
VLCC is in Jan. 1986. This consists a perfect-timing (with probable delivery in
1988 Jan.). The competitive advantage of such a decision is obvious: one has to
pay $38m for a VLCC, against what he/she should pay in 1991 of $95m. The lat-
er owner will have a higher capital cost of $57m and for a 15- yearly lifetime of
the ship $10,411 per day additional cost. However, to build a ship cheaply is one
important factor, but to earn maximum earnings is another (Figure 2). Figure 2
indicates that the highest earnings are obtained in March 1991, and in May 1991,
and not in 1986 Jan. What one has to do (Table 3)?

Figure 1. Prices for newly-built tankers, 1980-1992 (Jan.). Source: Clarkson

Research Studies Ltd.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 253 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

Figure 2. Tanker earnings, 1990-1992 (April). Source: Clarkson research stu-

dies ltd.

Table 3. Perfect timing for building and for earnings.

Earnings13 for a hire

Perfect
Delivery Per day of 38 months, from
timing to Remarks
(probably) earnings 1988 Jan.-to 1991,
build
March

$15,000 A low freight rates

1986 Jan. 1988 Jan. $16.62m
hypothetical period

Perfect Earnings for hire in

Price difference
timing for March 1991 $45,000 real 1991-1994 for: 38
$ 42m (80-38)
earnings months = $49.93m

Earning difference
Bad timing to $33.31
1991 March Price $80 $49.9m
build: 1989 ($49.93 − $16.62 =
$33.31m)

Source: author.

As shown, the perfect-timing for building is in 1986, at $38m and this pro-
vides a benefit of $42m, against $80m, which is the price prevailing in 1989 (the
year of perfect timing for earnings). Thus, a theoretical loss comes from the

Earnings are always calculated for 350 days per annum, while cost over 365 days.
13

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 254 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

lower earnings of $30,000 per day and for 350 days or $33.31m for a hypothetical
hire of 38 months (1988-1991). There is a final surplus (42 m from building
prices) and a 33.31 m loss from earnings, which gives a final $8.69m benefit,
between the two perfect-timing decisions to build and to charter. Thus, this
whole example is in favor of building cheap and the suggestion is to order at a
rock-bottom newbuilding price no matter what the freight rate is.
Part I: The case-study of the 107 ships built for Liberty in 1941-1945.
The end of 2nd World War found USA with 2751 laid-up commercial ships,
which built in 17 USA shipyards (from 27/09/1941 to 30/10/1945), of about
27.5m dwt, for the war. They were built for the 1sttime using the “electro-welding”
method in fixing (the iron) plates together, instead of using iron rivets, as hi-
therto, something which made ships heavier14. USA’s aim was to build these
ships fast, so that to replace the vessels foundered by German submarines…They
were named “Liberty” ships (Scan 1) indicating their purpose to contribute to-
wards world’s liberty. Their cost was about $2m each.
USA, after the war, wanted to dispose (lend-lease) abroad above Liberties at
favorable terms with a credit facility15. Greek shipping had losses during 2nd
World War amounting to 72% - 75% of its 1938 fleet (GRT). Onassis calculated
that Greeks lost ships valued $153m during the war (an amount received-back
partly from insurance compensations and partly from companies’ profits). Greek
shipowners in order to invest these funds, which were held by Greek State, in a
more secure way, wanted to buy 100 Liberty ships.
Greek State intervened to USA so that Greeks to obtain 98 Liberty ships
($550,000 each; 25% cash; 75% in 17 annual installments; at 3.5% interest rate
and Greek state’s guarantee). Latter this modified and shipowners paid 50% cash

Scan 1. One liberty out of 98 sold to Greeks by USA, 1947. Source:

Argo shipping periodical, 1986; modified.
14
Indirectly we see here the remarkable technological advance by going from iron to steel! Ships be-
came lighter, and thus larger, plus other benefits. Japanese have invented also an even lighter steel.
Some have wondered if these ships built with “improved” steel plates, produced less resistance in
bad weather, and thus more marine accidents?
15
The history is repeated, however, as something similar happened at the end of Great War in 1918,
where more than 4000 sailing ships were laid-up in Danube, and other rivers, most bought by
Greeks.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 255 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

and a 10% of ships’ value only guaranteed16. A 1st mortgage on their 50% value
was written in favor of Greek State. These ships had, however, to flow Greek flag
and employ Greek crews.
The ships for Liberty underwent repairs of about $100,000, or over, each; in
addition, Greeks obtained and 7 T2 tankers at a price round $2m each. The 107
Liberty ships of about 730,000 GRT were the only solution, at that time, for
Greek shipowners as Greek shipyards did not exist and funds in US $ were also
not available…In 1948, Greeks owned ships amounted to 2.52 m GRT; and over
364 m dwt by 2020!
The buyers had to have US$—Greek shipowners had only English pounds17
also bound (locked by Greek State) in UK banks- and the transfer into $ was
complicated. Global shipping demand was in hands of USA, as it has not been
involved in the war from the beginning. The Liberties covered up to 58% of
Greek flagged shipping in 1948-1949 and remained 40 years in the fleet
(-1986)…Thus they produced a great advantage and benefit to Greek flagged
shipping. In addition, Greece received, in kind, a gesture of gratitude for fighting
for liberty in allies’ and USA’s side and paying a toll.
Moreover, the Greek state organized the entire project together with “NY
Greek shipowners”. The 2 first criteria set for one to buy the Liberties were fair,
we believe: 1) Greek owners should have lost ships during the War, and perhaps
to receive ships in analogy of losses suffered, and 2) to have flown Greek flag.
And 3) to be members of the “NY Greek shipowners’ union”—something we
consider to be unfair. Onassis had none of the above criteria…A number of 47
Greek shipowning-families, or 66 shipowners-traditionals, obtained 98 Liberty18.
A list of Greek shipowners, who bought the 98 Liberties can be found in Gou-
lielmos (2020).
Part II: Onassis19 Business Life20: A Case-Study ii
We were impressed by Onassis, O thereafter, written will establishing the
16
State’s guarantee was for $40m-ended in 1954 and in 1955; shipowners’ counter-guarantee was
$5.5m, which ended in 1954 and 1955 too (Laws 747 and 150/1946).
17
The ships lost due to war-cause were insured in UK insurance market for war-risks and thus
Greek shipowners had £ funds to buy Liberties.
18
Sixty-six (66) ships obtained by 18 traditional families; these families that have obtained more
than 1 Liberty were: Fafalios 2, Andreadis(*) 2, Vergotis 3, Goulandris(**) 3, Gratsos(***) 4, Elliniki
4, Epiphaniadis 3, Kassos SA 3, Kulukuntis 7, Livanos 11, Lemos(****) 5, Los 2, Michalinos 2, Nico-
laou 2, Nomikos(5*) 2, Kumantaros 4 (1 with Niarchos(6*), Pateras 5 & Stathatos 2. (*) He was
born in Chios (Vrontados) in 1905. A University Professor. He passed away in 1989. (**) V.J. was
an M.P. born in Andros in 1886 and Captain. In 1925 established -with his brothers-the company
“Goulandris Bros Ltd”. (***) Born in Kassos in 1898. He passed away in 1998. (****) Lemos, C M
born in Oinousses in 1911 and passed away in 1995. One of the 5 major global shipowners. In 1937,
together with his cousins Costas and Markos Lyras, established -in London- the shipping office:
“Lyras & Lemos”. After 2nd World War went to NY. (5*) Lukas Nomikos born in Oia next to Santo-
rini in 1886 and was a seaman. He passed away in 1937. (6*) Born in Athens in 1909 and passed
away in 1996. He was among the top shipowners by 1957 and a Golden Greek.
19
Onassis born in Smyrni in 1900. His birth date is… movable as the situation required (!). To
avoid being transferred to Turkish concentration camps, he was under 17; to get a work permit in
Argentina was 18.
20
For the first part see Goulielmos, A.M. (2020).

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 256 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

“Alexander S. Onassis Public Benefit Foundation”. O’s company, “Springfield”

owned, in 2018, 6.08m dwt and 30 ships. The company more than doubled its
fleet dwt since 2010. Onassis is shown in 1932 with one of his 6 second hand
ships bought from a Canadian company (Scan 2).

3.1. The Investment Policy of Onassis

As shown, Onassis changed the investment strategy of traditional Greek shi-
powners: Greek shipowners used to buy 1 ship at a time, using past profits. They
used also to buy first, and then sell, till this day. This policy apparently could not
help a shipowner to grow fast. Moreover, few of them dreamed to build a new-
building, considered to be an adventure.
We have to admit, however, from the start, that Onassis was lucky-or had he a
lucky star? This is so because he lived during a period, where the abundant
cheap oil he transported, since 1938, and especially after 1945, was the King in
sea transport. This peaked in1967, where Suez Canal closed and created 7 (pros-
perous) years (till 1974) (Stopford, 2009: p. 123)!
Onassis died in March 1975, 4 years before the disastrous crisis in tankers
started (1979). Moreover, O exploited the possibility to obtain finance, for ex-
pansion, away from own profits, which anyway were limited to accomplish a
champion’s vision, as mentioned… In fact, Norwegians, at that time, used to
acquire tankers on “time charter-backed” credit21 during interwar period. O im-
proved the above method by ordering a series of same vessels (“sisters”) at one
shipyard. He obtained lower prices due to “learning by doing22” (economies
from building ships in series and in mass). O used for this a single charter to
back-up his loan (Harlaftis, 1993) (Graph 5).

Scan 2. Onassis with his vessel M/V “Onassis Socratis”. Source: Panama’s
register.
21
“Oil companies” and “steel mills” offered ship-owners time-charters as an incentive to order new
ships, where the owners could raise a loan to buy the ship against the security of a time-charter
(Stopford, 2009: p. 272). This started in 1920s and peaked during 1927 in particular.
22
Applied for the first time in the construction of Liberty ships by Kaiser (USA).

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 257 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

Graph 5. Onassis’ investment policy. Source: author.

Perhaps the above idea, (series and mass production), followed also by Ford in
the construction of cars. Japanese applied this philosophy after the war intro-
ducing also robots, steel, computerized designs and steel cutting, heavier cranes,
longer launching quays, so that to minimize time and cost of building a series of
standard vessels, with no influence from weather…
Another event that benefitted Onassis or induced him to enter the tanker
market was Norway’s foreign exchange policy (Harlaftis, 1993). Norway, in
1948, was in foreign exchange shortage, and so it imposed a ban on the imports
of ships (1948-1951). Norwegians who were heavily involved in tankers in the
interwar period failed to benefit from the increasing demand created by Korean
War (1950-1951)!
O opened the American financial markets to Greek shipowners (Harlaftis,
1993). O in order to bend the opposition of the USA financial institutions23 to
accept the “standard charter clauses”—persuaded “Socony Oil” to take into ac-
count in charter coverage the “count-assurance from owner”. O obtained also
from Grand “Metropolitan Life Insurance” (NY) Co a loan of $40m…

3.2. Onassis “Reconstructs” the German Shipbuilding Industry

(1951)!
O saw in Germany’s destruction from 2nd World War, the great opportunity to
build there his future vessels! The “Potsdam 1945 agreement”, however, pre-
vented him for building large tankers till 1951. The “Hamburg shipyard” told O
that an order of 16 tankers is needed for this yard to be completely recon-
structed. O immediately organized a $100m loan and placed orders for 16 + 2
tankers in 3 German shipbuilders: at Kiel, Bremen and Hamburg! Kiel yard de-
livered, in 1953, 2 vessels, one of which named “Tina Onassis” (45,230 dwt)24,
called “supertanker25”—for the first time. This was the largest tanker in water. O
accumulated large profits during 2nd World War by using flags of neutral coun-
tries, like Panama and Sweden.

3.3. The “Ill-Fated” Saudi Arabia Deal (1954)

This was O’s greatest mistake, though it was a clever idea; also, this mistake was
23
Between UK and USA there were two bases of financing: on mortgage and on charter parties re-
spectively.
24
“Howaldtswerke” shipyard (Hamburg).
25
“Sumitomo” later delivered a tanker of 300,000; really a newer super-tanker (1973).

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 258 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

admitted by O26. In Jan. 1954, O, all suddenly, signed a deal with Saudi Arabia,
which shocked the oil and shipping world, with its global repercussions (Graph
6).
The whole package of O was a clever “win-win” case. Feroudi (2011) argued
that O was a clever businessman, and in any business deal, he knew how to get
what he wanted (p. 203). O, however, was not able to beat the 4 powerful oil ma-
jors27…This deal called -by “oil alliance” a “red line” one…These four through
Aramco-dominated, long before, over Country’s oil transport, and also on the
exploration and production of oil for almost 70 years. In 1954, O took delivery of
his 47,000-dwt tanker built in Hamburg, named with a special meaning:
“Al-Malik Saud Al-Awal”…The 4 oil majors boycotted O’s tankers, and forced
the whole deal into a long term—with no visible end-arbitration…
In July 1956, Egypt “flirted” with Russia. This led USA to withdraw from
Nile’s dam project; Egypt expected to try to nationalize and close Suez Canal in
retaliation. In such a case, ships had to travel via the Good Hope cape, an almost
double distance. Hires from $4 a barrel went up to over $60; the “tanker
Worldscale index” went up at 460 (from W220). O faced rough times, when 1/2
of his tankers were laid-up; he then tried to have a charter with BP. Finally, “So-
cony Oil” chartered M/T “Al-Malik”…due to his lucky “star”? Britain, France
and Israel warred with Egypt in October 1956 and the Suez Canal closed (1956
Oct.), but reopened in April 1957; Onassis was the only major shipowner with
most of his fleet in ballast, due to the prior boycott.
The net profit for O was $75m - $80m for less than 7 months for the
short-time of Suez Canal’s closure…and $2m for one crossing from Persian Gulf
to Europe. This, however, worked-out as a trap, because Onassis stuck
(“locked-in” in “Chaos Theory terminology”) in the spot market. The freight
rate soon fell below W100. O overlooked the option he had for time charters at a

Graph 6. Onassis 1954 deal with Saudi Arabia. Source: author.

26
Forestie, F. (2009).
27
Standard oil; Mobil; Exxon and Texaco.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 259 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

lower, but more stable, hire. Onassis failed also to foresee the quick re-opening
of the Suez Canal within six months unlike Gratsos C, who foresaw it…

3.4. Onassis’ Shipbuilding Program, 1948-1975

O was a shipowner of a continuous shipbuilding! He reached 41 units of new-
ly-built tankers of a higher quality. Finally, 97 orders-almost 3 ships p.a.-were
recorded for him over 28 yards… The 80% of them were tankers, dominated by
VLCCs-very large crude carriers. From the 18 bulkers 11 of them were of small
size round 27,000 dwt.
As shown, O ordered about 7 m tons since 1948.
As shown, 1965 and thereafter were the years at which the shipbuilding pro-
gram of O rose by leaps and bounds, till 1973 (Figure 3).
To the picture helped VLCCs due to their size. The year 1958 was a crisis one
for shipping; O cancelled a number of shipbuilding contracts, including the 3
tankers that planned to be built in “Bethlehem Steel” (USA), under the “scrap
and build” program of US Maritime Commission. Crew wages cut by 20%. O
continued to use foreign flags, because, as he said, they allow: “free competition;
ability in taking initiatives, and imposing no restrictions”…
The 2nd Suez crisis, during the 6-day war in June 1967, triggered a rush by
leading owners to invest in larger tankers—able to travel round the Cape of
Good Hope. Israel did a pre-emptive strike against Arab targets. O, few days af-
ter this, offered BP all his off-charter fleet at 200% of existing freight rates. BP
accepted…; the rates in few days, however, doubled. This was a hasty action of
O, depriving him from a much larger profit. This mistake is committed and by
other Greek shipowners.

3.5. Onassis’ Fleet Growth 1958-1981

The growth of “O’s fleet” from 1958 to 1981 in GRT is shown (Figure 4).
As shown, O climbed-up in shipowners with over 2.5 m tons GRT in 1975.

Figure 3. Onassis’s shipbuilding program 1950-1973 (in dwt). Source: author.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 260 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

Figure 4. Onassis’ fleet growth in 1958, 1975 and 1981 in GRT. Source: Data from Kapsi
N. (2005). Source: Data from Kapsi N. (2005).

3.6. Onassis as Investor (1960s)

As investor28, O, bought thousands of BP shares in 1960s, as a good gesture to
BP, which played a key role in restoring his fortune. He bought the “Banque de
Depots” in Geneve—a bad investment which later sold to Latsis J. In 1970, O
bought 100 tons of gold valued $100m. Three years later, when gold sold, valued
$357m. This was also a hasty sale as prices went-up further. In the real estate, he
built the ‘Olympic Tower’, a 50:50 joint venture, and a 51-storey skyscraper in
Manhattan’s Park Av. of 225 apartments and 420,000 square feet of office and
retail space. In end 1968, the “Northern Ireland project” was an effort of O to
buy-out the “Harland & Wolff” shipyards (Scotland). O had already 26% of
company’s shares. In 1968, he placed there an order for 2 × 265,000 dwt tankers
at $12.6m each. This deal failed (1971).
O used to conduct talks personally with either union leaders, or even terror-
ists, as happened in 1968 and in 1970. In 1963, 4 × 46,000 dwt tankers delivered
to an O’s company in USA (“Victory”), serving US domestic trades; these ships
were small. In 1966, 2 of O’s tankers-including the Al-Malik…had a fire in en-
gine room and declared constructive total losses—i.e., beyond any economical
repair. Bad luck.
Table 4 summarizes the wealth29 of O by 1973-1974.

3.7. Onassis and the End-1973 Shipping Crisis

In 1973 (summer), a success story for VLCCs and ULCCs (Ultra large crude car-
riers) has been written, when the spot market was improving. O owned then 100
ships and had a profit of $144m p.a. The global oil consumption increased by at
28
We will not deal with the “whale-fishing” businesses, confronted with Peru’s Government (1949).
29
Published in “Economic Postman” (in Greek: “Oikonomikos Tachidromos”), 3rd July 1975.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 261 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

Table 4. Onassis value of investments, 1973-1974.

Country of Onassis
Area of investment Amount in US$m Area of investment Amount in $m
Company

Europe, L.
Buildings & Tourism 126.0 General enterprises 116.0
America & USA

Finance & Banking 6.5 Transport 196.5

Industry 518.0 37% Shares 317.0 23%

Shipping 78.5 Brokerage 22.0

Mortgages 17.0 Total ~$1.4b

Source: “The Financial Postman” journal. Kapsi (2005). Note: some data is from Harlaftis (1993: p. 192).
The above list of O’s wealth is an underestimation: it excludes wealth in Asia; also, deposits in 217 banks;
the value of O’s bank in Switzerland; the value of shares in Harland & Wolf; the value of Skorpios’ island;
the value of NY skyscraper and the value of O’s fleet of 56 ships of 2.5 m dwt, plus 1m ounces of gold, va-
lued $170m (1974). Given that O left to his heirs $500m, this means that part of his wealth lost in unfortu-
nate projects like “Olympic Airways”, we believe.

least 8% per year and almost 9% in USA (covering the 40% of total transport). O
ordered 4 tankers of >200,000 dwt each in Japan and 2 ULCCs in France (Table
5).
In October 1973, Arabs reduced the production of oil to prevent the West
from helping Israel in the 4th “Arab-Israel” war. O’s 1/3 of his fleet was laid-up.
He cancelled 2 VLCCs ordered in France by paying a $12.5m penalty. The situa-
tion led people to changes-like their efforts to save energy, to discover new
sources of oil and adopt new non-oil technologies, etc. This was the worst tanker
crisis that O faced. Moreover, OPEC raised the price of oil per barrel from $2.9
to $13 (4.5 times).
By 1975, the overall demand for tankers fell 20%. O was partial lucky for
most of his VLCCs were in rather long-time charters with major oil compa-
nies, but 1/2 of them were about to expire. All other O’s vessels were idle. The
few new-buildings had an uncertain future, as there were no charters available.
“Sumitomo” delivered the first quality supertanker of 300,000 dwt—as O has
asked for -the “Olympic Loyalty” priced $115m. This was the highest ever in-
vestment in ships, and the 3rd double-hull delivered worldwide. Onassis star fell
on earth, however, (Figure 5) when the laid-up tonnage of tankers in 1975 was
24m GRT!
During O’s life, 2 international conventions were adopted (1974): the MARPOL,
with a purpose to limit routine pollution. The new SOLAS (1974), purposed to
speed-up measures for passenger ships, but it included special new requirements
for tankers, like the IGS (inert gas system) to avoid accidental explosions.

3.8. Onassis’ “Animal Spirits”

Keynes wrote in 1936-in another context (slightly rephrased): “It is safe to say
that the enterprise depends on hope… But the individual initiatives will only
be adequate, when reasonable calculations (are) supplemented and supported

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 262 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

Table 5. Onassis’ shipbuilding program, 1948-1975

Vessel’s Number/Dwt/tanker/
Shipyard Remarks
name delivery or order date

Olympic The 1st built tanker

1-/1950 Bethlehem, Baltimore
Games (out of 6) in USA

Bethlehem, Baltimore,
2 of 19,000 t/1950
USA

To catch-up in size
with the 4 tankers
Bethlehem, Baltimore,
4 of 28,000 dwt/1950 built for Texaco.
USA
Amortizable in 5
years!

2 of 46,000 dwt/ordered Bethlehem, Baltimore,

1958 USA

1 of 46,000 dwt/ordered
Chester
1958

4 of 46,000 - 47,000
Quincy yard, USA
dwt/1963

3 tankers France

2 refrigerated ships Belgium

2 of 65,000 dwt/late
Howaldtswerke
1957/1963-64

O turned to the
revived Japanese
3 of 65,000/dwt Mitsubishi, Japan shipbuilding, offering
generous credit &
lower cost!

Ishikawajima Harima,
3 of 82,000 dwt
Japan

2 of 100,000 t/1965 France

Bulkers followed
tankers in the same
course in achieving
4 of 27,000 dwt bulk/1965 Nippon
economies of scale,
but to a much lesser
range

1 VLCC/1966 Japan

7 of >200,000 end 1968 Japan

4 of 220,000 end 1968 France

9 VLCC 30
Japan, France, UK 1st VLCC tanker
1970s/260-273,000 dwt

2 VLCC of 400,000 dwt France Numbers 83 & 84

Excluding
Total ~7m
refrigerated ships

Source: various, and especially data from Lowry (2003).

“Olympic Armour”.
30

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 263 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

Figure 5. Laid-up tonnage in m GRT between 1975 and 1985. Source: Lloyd; modified.

by animal spirits31, so that the thought of ultimate loss, which often over-
takes pioneers—as the experience undoubtedly tells us and them-is put
aside, as a healthy man puts aside the expectation of death (Keynes, 1936: p.
162). O already succeeded when he applied his animal spirits and made his first
$100,000 and more so when he made his 1st 1m$, knowing empirically how one
can get a profit from business.
One may wonder why Onassis was dedicated to oil transport, almost exclu-
sively? The answer can be given by the help of Table 6; of course, we took a dif-
ferent period, that of 1997 to 2007, because for this period we have data.
As shown, those shipowners dealing with tankers earned $143b more than
those having only dry cargo ships, over a period of 11 years.

3.9. O’s Win-Win Strategy

O proved to be a capable negotiator by taking from the other most of what he
wanted, offering more or less what the other wanted (a “win-win” strategy).
Taking e.g., the case of the German yards: they wanted to reconstruct their in-
dustry by building 16 vessels. O wanted to build cheap ships there, and he or-
dered 16 + 2, and mobilized $100 m finance. Who won more does not matter…
Taking also the S Arabia deal: Arabs wanted to transport their oil in a cheaper
and independent way; to create their tanker business-knowhow and their own
crews something, which they did many years later. O sought after Arabian car-
goes, by creating a 1/2m dwt fleet -which was easy for him; and he was prepared
to pay-out for an “Arab Maritime Academy” from profits…
O did not stop in front of problems, advised by his good friend Costas Grat-
sos, who knew shipping well. O was self-taught, and an ever-learning person
This explains investors, who put aside the mathematical models on the basis of “animal spirits”.
31

A term used by Keynes (1883-1946) to convey the idea that major investments are undertaken, not
on the basis of a careful calculation of expected profit, but on the strength of hunches for an op-
portunity to be grasped out there by whoever had the courage to try…

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 264 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

Table 6. The profitability between Tankers and Dry Cargoes, 1997-2007.

Date, end- Tanker sector profits $ billion Profits dry cargo sector $ billion

1997 23 8
1998 20 5 low
1999 10 low 5 low
2000 35 10.5
2001 40 1st peak ~10
2002 11 7
2003 44 22
2004 71 2 peak
nd
48 1st peak
2005 56 32
2006 58 40
2007 50 74 2 peak
nd

Total $381b $238b (63% of tankers)

Source: Loyd’s.

with an arithmetical mind (a merchant mind): “Γηράσκω αεί διδασκόμενος” said

philosopher Socrates, meaning that “I become wiser as time goes-by, learning
from facts”. He learned the business of shipping, and especially of tankers, by
himself or from Norwegians as it was written32.

3.10. The End of Onassis’ Life (March, 15th, 1975)

His final fortune divided equally between Christina, his daughter, who passed
away in 1988, and a “public benefit foundation” in memory of his son (who
passed away in 1973, at 24). The foundation (1980) had to draw funds from the
parallel business activity of 51 ships and 3 on order (1975). This caused O’s
companies to continue their activities for a longer future than his… This was the
cleverest decision taken, we believe, which gave to his aides and their sons a job
to continue and a task to benefit public.

3.11. The Fleet after Onassis Death

O’s death caused his fleet to have a 20-year decadence till 1995 (Figure 6). This
was something to be expected, when a strong manager used to take all decisions
and risks by himself.
Despite this decadence the fleet re-assumed strength and surpassed its 1975
capacity by 2018.
Let us see now a modern female shipowner.
Part III: The case-study of Mrs. Angeliki N. Frangou

4. The Case-Study of an Amazing Female-Shipowner

This case-study has a multiple interest as the shipowner is a married woman and

Mpatis, E. (1999).
32

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 265 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

Figure 6. Onassis fleet, 1976-2018, selected years. Source: author, based on O’s fleet sta-
tistics.

mother, and at the same time a modern top manager. Angeliki comes from a
Greek traditional ship-owning family: the Frangos N. (Scan 3). She is born in
Chios (Kardamyla). She overpassed, in fleet capacity, her father by leaps and
bounds i.e., by more than 17 times (in…dwt) by 2018. Her father used to be a
Captain, and a shipowner since 1966 in partnership33 with Moundreas N34. She
argued (in June 2018) that maritime industry today is for Greece what
wine-making is for France, Wall Street for New York and what is technology in
Silicon Valley for USA; Shipping is part of Greek DNA.
As shown, Frangos N., father of Angeliki, is among the 43 traditional Greek
shipowners, born in Chios, out of a total of 184 (23.4%). Chian shipowners add-
ing also those from Oinousai, arrive at 50 shipowners or 27% of total.

33
The father of Frangou established with N Moundreas the company “Good Faith” (1966). The
company owned 1.07 m in 1991, held the 23rd position in March 1994 (1.14 m dwt) and the 49th in
end 2009 with 1.09 m dwt.
34
In 2016, Moundreas N G alone owned 3.28 m dwt.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 266 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

Scan 3. Chios: an island producing shipowners all along. Source: Surveyor magazine; un-
dated; modified.

4.1. The Navios Group

Frangou, or Navios Group, (Graph 7), appeared in 1990 by founding the
“Franser Shipping” company, and aimed at managing dry cargo ships, based in
Piraeus.
The “Navios Maritime Partners” merged with ISE. “Navios” was a shipping
company bought by Frangou in mid-2005. In 2010 it was estimated having a
value of $3b. She also controls a company listed in London SE AIM named:
“European Finance Investments”. She is also in charge of the “Greek Informa-
tion Technology” participating in Singular Logic. Moreover, she controls the
Navios S America logistics Inc.

4.2. The Group’s Revenues and Profits

Navios Maritime Holdings in 2008 had a revenue of $1.3b against $599 in 2009,
as a result of the Global financial crisis. Profits were $118.5m or ~9% on revenue
in 2008 and ~$68m in 2009 or ~11%. The crisis reduced by 43% the average dai-
ly time charter ($25,821 agains $45,660) and the days in hire from 22,817 to
15,588 (or −32%). In 2010 the chartered-in vessels in 2010 earned $10,079/day
and the average time charter for core fleet varied from $28,313 to $35,006 per
day.

4.3. Frangou in Stock Exchange

Angeliki knows-well the NY Stock Exchange as she used to work in Wall Street.
She eventually led all her companies to NASDAQ. Greeks long absent from
Stock Exchanges-SE- have derived $1.5b in 2009. It is our intention to present, in
a new work, the Greek shipowners listed in Stock Exchanges.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 267 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

Graph 7. The “Navios” group. Source: author.

In 2005, she created, or rather re-vitalized the “blank checque” technique by

creating the company “International Shipping Enterprises-ISE”, listed subse-
quently in Wall Street. This was a sign of the confidence that Wall Street showed
to Angeliki to list shares for an undisclosed in details shipping project! Investors
knew amount and sector only. The Navios group listed in May 2008 3.5 m shares
at $10.32 ($36.12m) in Nasdaq. In Sept. 2008 listed 2.8 m shares at $4.36
($12.21m). In Nov. 2009 listed 4m shares at $14.9 ($59.6). In July 2018, Greeks
had a 23% market share in Wall Street, by their capitalization of $6.3b (March
31st), though the size of Greek companies was smaller than their competitors.
There were 50 firms with a capitalization of $27.2b. Navios Maritime Partners
held the last 10th position with near $300m capitalization in mid-2018.

4.4. Frangou Faces the End-2008 Crisis

Navios Maritime Holdings faced the maritime crisis as everybody else at the end
of 2008 which halved its profits and revenue in 2009. In end-Jan. 2009 Frangou
declared a “measured optimism” based on data about urbanization, construction
contracts in China and in US in particular, and BDI (Figure 7).

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 268 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

Figure 7. BDI-Baltic Drycargo Index, 2007-2016. Source: Thomson Reuters.

Navios Maritime Partners filed a shelf registration for up to $500m for a credit
facility. This action of Frangou meant to reduce a loan by $40m (out of $235m)
and saved $1.5m of interest! Frangou apart from paying attention on interest
cost, she paid attention also in the Yen/$ parity and ordered 4 ships in Japan
priced at $108m.

4.5. The Investment Activity of Navios Group

Her investments are shown in Table 7.

4.6. Navios Final Growth

“Navios” group final growth is as shown (Figure 8).
As shown, the growth of the “Navios” fleet is extraordinary. From 2008 to
2018 the fleet increased almost by 11 times, and this under a crisis!

5. Concluding Remarks
Onassis showed the way of how a fleet can become extra-large, and also, how
this can be done fast. He made fleet’s growth independent of its past profits, and
based it on finance from other people’s money. O understood that to become a
shipowner was rather easy, but to find cargoes out there, was really a tough
business. This try led him to the ill-fated S Arabian deal. O said “that shipping
was his wife”. Onassis in fact had 4 wives: The super-Tankers: since 1938; Tina:
since 1946; Maria: since 1959 and Jacky: since 1968.
Onassis and company’s chief executives shared a desk in the same room.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 269 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

Table 7. Group’s investments, 2009-2010.

Number of ships,
Company/Year Type, size (delivery in 2013) Finance source Remarks
type, year built

“Navios Maritime -Capesize

2 new-buildings 50% banking
partners” -Ultra-handymax, 61,000 dwt

2 2nd hand -Kamsarmax 82,790 dwt

50% banking
(b. 2005 & 6) -Panamax 76,619

5 tankers 30 - 80,000 dwt

Cash; banking
10 (b. after 2006) 5 containerships,
Cash
2000 - 3400 TEU

2 2nd hand (b 2007)

“Navios Maritime Tankers MR2s
3 new-buildings Cash Low prices
Acquisition”, 50,000 dwt
1 eco tanker

Fleet of 23 crude carriers

2 eco MR2s; 2014
& product; 11 on order

1 58,000 tons low prices; no one else

7
ultra-handymax (Japan) could buy

4 2008 $324 3 from a bank

To enter tanker industry;

7 product carriers MR 50,000 dwt 2012; 2 25,000 the group cultivated
new-buildings dwt 2010; ordered by another $457.7m good relations with
2 chemical 2010 Greek shipowner Commerzbank and S
Korea Shipbuilding

$42.5m to be paid from ships

sold $40m 2011; 440.5;
LR1
2 tankers 2012 pay $123m cash in installments Korea yard
LR1
$334m from debt and
$60m from shares

Secured cash flows for

Navios Maritime 10 years varied from
7 new-buildings 2009 Capes; 2010
Holdings $247m-303m for
2010-13; lowest op. cost

-Cash $141.5
Price reduced to
2 Capes 180,000 dwt; -Mandatorily preferred stock at
$115.6m; charter of
2009 2010; from S Korea shipyard $10 conversion price;
10 years
Bank $75m(*)

$1.3b raised in cash; of which

Only $60m in debt ma-
1b is from debt; $130m cash
turing in 2010 and <130
from sales of ships to Navios
m in 2011
Mar. Partners

Source: company’s announcements. (*) A 10-yearly loan at 1.75% over LIBOR, is rather an expensive one; ship’s amortization estimated at 14 years at
$29,356/day hire.

Little, if anything, was kept secret from his closest aides. He had an esteem in
management: “I do not need capital, he said, if I have good people around me,
and good management; they will make money for me”. “But even if you are the
wealthiest man on earth, with bad management, you are going to lose even your
own shirt” (italics added). The above, for the capital, is surely an exaggeration.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 270 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

Figure 8. Navios’ fleet evolution, 2008-2018. Source: author, with data from MIS-marine
information services.

Capital is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one.

Onassis had the affection and loyalty of his staff (250 persons). He looked in
his staff mostly for loyalty as he said not for credentials, which as he said he
could easily buy. Every company requested to keep detailed accounts, with
proper directors’ minutes. Junior managers were encouraged to share their ideas
with him; he was after off-chances for a money-spinner in it, in all conversa-
tions. O could see if a person was telling lies or was a thief…
Shipping was quite rightly chosen by O, as this was one industry to provide
him the opportunity for exceptional wealth35. He was constantly after something
new, and he was always active36. O was after tankers of higher quality and size
than hitherto. It is easily recognized that O created a modern and powerful
tanker fleet. O had the vision of big tankers, and his company at one point of
time owned 22 VLCCs; (2m barrels; over 200,000 dwt); he preferred the spot
market and the relatively short-period- time charters.
He committed mistakes, as any human, because he let himself to be involved
in a number of unfortunate projects37. The most important and painful of his
failures, however, was as father. With a superstition to a lucky “star”, O created a
fortune, but he wished to be recognized primarily by his son… Onassis lacked
the appreciation of his closest relatives, apart from his 3 sisters. During his youth
displeased his family for wasting-away family’s savings for freeing his impri-
soned father…
O received love only from his grandmother Gethsemane- a religious woman.
His mother Penelope passed away in 1912, whose married life lasted only 16
years. O was an orphan. His lucky “star”, however, fell-down, when his only son,
35
Though one member of the Laimos dynasty left in the 1980s, when he died, £20b!
36
He was against the idea to put his money in other people’s business… as other shipowners have
done with unpleasant results.
37
Omega, Hampshire, Haiti, Scotland, Saudi Arabia, Monte Carlo & Olympic Airways. We believe
that $900m at least lost in these projects. Preliminary research for a cost benefit analysis was appar-
ently not used.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 271 Modern Economy

A. M. Goulielmos

and successor, died in an air crash. O was a person of no regrets and he never
felt necessary to ask for forgiveness. When he harmed someone, by action or
words, he used to send a proper gift as an excuse…Alexandros wanted his di-
vorced mother back. For stubborn fathers, we believe, to love their son, it is re-
quired first for sons to show an absolute obedience to them. All hopes of Alex-
andros for his parents to re-unite disappeared when Tina married Niarchos (she
passed away in 1974).
O did not obey38 to the traditional Greek shipowners’ dogma. Traditional
Greek shipowners told their children: “You have to live in such a way so that to
pass unnoticed”! Greeks have the envy in their blood! Wealth etc. calls for the
envy of the rest, since the ancient times of Iliad… In Iliad, Agamemnon, king
of Mycenae, and commander-in-chief of the Greek expedition against Troy,
deprived Achilles of his favorite slave-woman: Briseis…
O many times, sitting on the deck of his yacht “Christina”, was staring for
hours at sea watering his island. Onassis, metaphorically, was in fact a sailor by
mentality-we believe- not an Odysseus or a citizen of mountain Olympus- look-
ing every time at the distant horizon, ready to cross the sea for unknown lands
meeting new people. From time to time, the sailor returns always to his Pe-
nelope-his official wife.
O always wanted to have a Penelope to wait for him at Scorpios’ house, pre-
paring…the “shroud” of her father-in-law. He was always returning to his island
and kingdom… even for his last time for him to be buried there, under his isl-
and’s soil and next to his son’s tomb. Had O a coin to give to the ferryman
“Charon”—a small shipowner in Greek mythology and…colleague of Onassis-
to pass his soul across river “Styx”? We believe that he, as a great shipowner, had
a “free permit” to pass over to Hades’ kingdom…This, however, was Onassis’ ul-
timate and unique personal profit from his entire life on earth, which he only
took with him in the Underworld!
Mrs. Frangou’s competitive advantage is that she was aware, by her previous
profession, of the best sources of cheap finance. “Navios Maritime Holdings”
faced the last maritime crisis—as everybody else at the end of 2008, which halved
its profit and revenue in 2009. In end-Jan. 2009 Frangou declared a “measured
optimism” based on data about urbanization, construction contracts in China
and in US in particular, and BDI (Baltic dry cargo index). Frangou’s policy was
to maximize the days of vessels under a time charter: 2010/90%; 2011/66%;
2012/57% and 2013/48%, but the crisis made them falling. Frangou realized that
to exploit a crisis one has to have cash, and be well capitalized and positioned, as
she was.
38
O married the younger daughter Tina of Greek shipowner Stavros Livanos; he married the 1st Op-
era singer in the world; he also married the 1st lady of USA. He became the 1st tanker owner global-
ly. He thus won… 4 Gold medals in shipping Olympic Games… and perhaps this explains why he
chose as the name of his company and ships: “Olympic”. “Olympus” mountain is the highest
mountain in Greece of 2917 meters, alleged to be the home of the 12 mythical Gods, meaning a
dazzling mountain due to Sun. O’s ships had a dazzling white color…

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 272 Modern Economy

 A. M. Goulielmos

NM Partners filed a shelf registration for up to $500m e.g., for a credit facility.
This meant to reduce a loan by $40m (out of $235m) and she saved $1.5m of in-
terest! Frangou paid attention also in the Yen/$ parity and ordered 4 ships in Ja-
pan. Frangou held the idea that in a crisis unique opportunities are created, so
that to buy ships at low prices. Frangou cancelled 12 shipbuildings, from an or-
der of $265m, to stay liquid.
We may stress that the start of the investment rally of Frangou planned for
2009, in a crisis year. She looked for opportunities in the banks for failed loans
and in shipbuilding yards for cancelled or distressed ships like in 2009. She could
find cheap finance for this. In 2010 Frangou decided to enter into tankers.

Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

References
Bothwell, J. H. (1982). Will Greek Shipowners Flee the Flag? May. In Marine Engineering
Log (pp. 145-146). New York: Simmons-Boardman Publishing Company.
Feroudi, K. (2011). The Onassis Women: The Way I Lived along with Them. Athens: Vima.
Forestie, F. (2009). Onassis, the Man Who Wanted All. Athens: Vima.
Goulielmos, A. M. (2020). Managing Shipping Companies, the Way Their Pioneers Did:
The Case-Studies of Vafias N Family and Aristotelis S. Onassis. Modern Economy, 11,
2156-2182. https://doi.org/10.4236/me.2020.1112142
Harlaftis, G. (1993). Greek Shipowners & Greece, 1945-1975: From Separate Develop-
ment to Mutual Interdependence. London: The Athlone Press.
Kapsi, N. (2005). The Shipping Funds Invested in Greek Economy (Kerkyra ed.). Athens:
Kerkyra.
Keynes, J. M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London:
Macmillan.
Koufopoulos, D. N., Lagoudis, I. N., Theotokas, I. N., & Syriopoulos, T. C. (2010). Cor-
porate Governance and Board Practices by Greek Shipping Management Companies.
Corporate Governance, 10, 261-278. https://doi.org/10.1108/14720701011051901
Lorange, P., & Fjeldstad, O. D. (2010). Redesigning Organizations for the 21st Century:
Lessons from the Global Shipping Industry. Organizational Dynamics, 39, 184-193.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orgdyn.2010.01.007
Lowry, N. (2003). Onassis and His Legacy, Published by “Informa/Lloyds List” for “Al-
exander S. Onassis Benefit Foundation” (p. 19). London.
Mpatis, E. (1999). Portraits in Blue Background: Persons that Wrote History in the 20th
Century Shipping. Piraeus: Finatec.
Randoy, T., Down, J., & Jenssen, J. (2003). Corporate Governance and Board Effective-
ness in Maritime Firms. Maritime Economics & Logistics, 5, 40-54.
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.mel.9100059
Robbins, S. P., & Coulter, M. (2018). With Contributions. Management (14th ed.). Lon-
don: Pearson.
Stopford, M. (2009). Maritime Economics (3rd ed.). London: Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203891742

DOI: 10.4236/me.2021.121013 273 Modern Economy