Journal of Applied Mathematics and Physics, 2024, 12, 2172-2189

https://www.scirp.org/journal/jamp
ISSN Online: 2327-4379
ISSN Print: 2327-4352

A Blind Spot in the Reframing of a Universe of

Possibles: Towards a Suitable Model for
Decision-Making Theory and A.I.

Gilbert Giacomoni

AgroParisTech (Paris Saclay University) & Paris Saclay Applied Economics (UMR 210) INRAE, 22 place de l’Agronomie,
Palaiseau, France

How to cite this paper: Giacomoni, G. Abstract

(2024) A Blind Spot in the Reframing of a
Universe of Possibles: Towards a Suitable Bayesian inference model is an optimal processing of incomplete information
Model for Decision-Making Theory and that, more than other models, better captures the way in which any deci-
A.I. Journal of Applied Mathematics and
sion-maker learns and updates his degree of rational beliefs about possible
Physics, 12, 2172-2189.
https://doi.org/10.4236/jamp.2024.126132 states of nature, in order to make a better judgment while taking new evi-
dence into account. Such a scientific model proposed for the general theory of
Received: March 28, 2024 decision-making, like all others in general, whether in statistics, economics,
Accepted: June 22, 2024
Published: June 25, 2024
operations research, A.I., data science or applied mathematics, regardless of
whether they are time-dependent, have in common a theoretical basis that is
Copyright © 2024 by author(s) and axiomatized by relying on related concepts of a universe of possibles, espe-
Scientific Research Publishing Inc.
cially the so-called universe (or the world), the state of nature (or the state of
This work is licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial the world), when formulated explicitly. The issue of where to stand as an ob-
International License (CC BY-NC 4.0). server or a decision-maker to reframe such a universe of possibles together
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
with a partition structure of knowledge (i.e. semantic formalisms), including
Open Access
a copy of itself as it was initially while generalizing it, is not addressed. Mem-
ory being the substratum, whether human or artificial, wherein everything
stands, to date, even the theoretical possibility of such an operation of self-
inclusion is prohibited by pure mathematics. We make this blind spot come
to light through a counter-example (namely Archimedes’ Eureka experiment)
and explore novel theoretical foundations, fitting better with a quantum form
than with fuzzy modeling, to deal with more than a reference universe of pos-
sibles. This could open up a new path of investigation for the general theory
of decision-making, as well as for Artificial Intelligence, often considered as
the science of the imitation of human abilities, while being also the science of
knowledge representation and the science of concept formation and reason-
ing.

DOI: 10.4236/jamp.2024.126132 Jun. 22, 2024 2172 Journal of Applied Mathematics and Physics
 G. Giacomoni

Keywords
Decision-Making, Innovation, Universe of Possibles, A.I., Quantum Form,
Fuzzy Modeling

1. Introduction
Bayesian inference model is identified because—as an optimal processing of in-
complete information [1]—more than other models, it better captures the way in
which any decision-maker learns and updates his degree of rational beliefs about
a possible state of nature θ among all enumerated ones whether in human or ar-
tificial memory (a theory, a hypothesis, an event, an observation, or an occur-
rence), in order to make a better judgment while taking into account new evi-
dence E (new knowledge, new measurement, new sampling data, or other stand-
points) [2]. Such framework operates within a universe of possibles [all possible
states of nature] given beforehand. And in general, it is common practice to rely
on scientific models working so, exploring and exploiting, in whole or in part, a
specific pre-defined research space that is a universe of possibles.
This is true for dealing with a decision-making theory: “(…) there exists a
considerable area of design practice where standards of rigor in inference are as
high as one could wish. I refer to the domain of so-called “optimization me-
thods” (…) The optimization problem is to find an admissible set of values of
the command variables, compatible with the constraints, that maximize the (ex-
pected value of the) utility function for the given values of the environmental
parameters” ([3], p. 116). This is true especially when complex situations are
being analyzed and decision makers are called upon to make optimized choices
(e.g. minimal loss, maximum gain, etc.), notably those emanating from opera-
tions research, data science, knowledge discovery in databases, Artificial Intelli-
gence and adaptive learning (such as metaheuristics, hybrid-metaheuristics and
hyper-heuristics, etc), with underlying deterministic models or stochastic ones,
taking an empirical approach, with or without prior knowledge. On a cyclical
basis, they collect information, and often stochastically, with a view to enhancing
understanding of the problem (based on different phases that can be classified in
exploration phases or diversification phases), storing it in a myriad of possible
forms, whether collectively (considering the problem as a whole) or inter indi-
vidually (considering one solution in relation to another), then sorting through
it so as to reduce dispersion (in the phase called exploitation or intensification).
This is true also for pure or applied mathematics, economics, statistics, or de-
sign science. What these scientific models have in common, regardless of
whether they are time-dependent, is a theoretical basis that is axiomatized by re-
lying on related concepts of “the universe” (or “the world”), “the state of nature”
(or “state of the world”), or the “development of a state of nature” (or a true
“state of the world”) where knowledge is partitioned as if it were always there,

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G. Giacomoni

somewhere, in one part or another of the “universe of possibles” [3] [4] [5] [6].
“The world (is) the object about which the person is concerned. A state (of the
world) (is) a description of the world, leaving no relevant aspect undescribed.
The true state (of the world) (is) the state that does in fact obtain, i.e., the true
description of the world” ([4], p. 9). This means that irrelevant aspects of a de-
scription of the world may be undescribed, provided irrelevance/relevance is not
time-dependent, in accordance with scientific knowledge.
A change in representation thus results in a convenient redistribution of
probabilities attached to existing possible states of nature θ (hypothesis or theo-
ries, etc.) after the addition of previously unknown or uncertain observations E.
Such a redistribution is obtained by Bayesian conditioning of probabilities at-
tached to θ and E, while ensuring that the total always stands at 1 according to
the theory of probabilities [4]. In other words, the decision-maker’s1 scientific
knowledge space is expanding whenever an event obtains at a state of the world
(i.e. of the universe of possibles) including such an information set: “For [a
player] to know [an event] is itself an event” ([5], p. 264). This is to say: “Seman-
tic formalism consists of a partition structure [of a space of states of the world]”
(Ibid)2. But it turns out that a counter-example shows a change in representation
which involves a reframing of the universe of possibles [all possible states of na-
ture θj], relying on the extension [7] to a novel partition structure of a novel
space of states of nature θ j∗ (novel hypothesis or theories, etc.) based on an an-
cient partition structure of a prior space of states of nature θj (hypothesis or
theories, etc.). The counter-example in question is namely Archimedes’ thought
experiment, which led to his famous “Eureka” moment3 (that word being at the
root of “heuristics”), by using a reproducible method described in the Palimp-
sest4. Hence, as a consequence, scientific model foundations must shift and
evolve. There is a blind spot in such a reframing of a universe of possibles [all
possible states of nature] as it raises the issue of how but also wherein—in which
fuzzy multiverse of possibles or quantum universe of possibles—it is supposed to
take place.
The article is structured as follows: In the first section we shall present the
Bayesian inference modeling proposed for general decision-making theory or
Artificial Intelligence. In the second section, we shall consider the emblematic
counter-example of Archimedes’ Eureka, which involves a reframing of the un-
iverse of possibles [all possible states of nature] unlike the Bayesian inference
modelling, while revealing a blind spot with a moment of undecidability. In the
third section, we shall discuss new theoretical foundations of reframing the un-
1
Also called the player.
2
“a space Ω of states of the world, together with a partition of Ω for each player, whose atoms
represent information sets of that player; Ω is called the universe. Like in probability theory, events
are subsets of Ω; intuitively, an event is identified with the set of all those states of the world at which
the event obtains. Thus, an event E obtains at a state ω if and only if ω ∈ Ω, and a player i ‘knows’ E
at Ω if and only if E includes his information set at ω. For i to know E is itself an event denoted KiE:
it obtains at some states ω and at others does not” (Ibid).
3
An interjection taken from the Greek (ερηκα) translated as “I found it”.
4
An interjection taken from the Greek (ερηκα) translated as “I found it”.

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 G. Giacomoni

iverse of possibles [all possible states of nature], that it would be tempting to

formalize with fuzzy modeling, but nonetheless fits better with a quantic form.

2. Bayesian Inference Modeling for General

Decision-Making Theory or A.I.
Bayesian inference modeling is based on interpreting p-value as a degree of ra-
tional belief (in hypothesis θ, or theory, etc.) and on conditioning that probabil-
ity on knowledge of new data E (i.e., evidence, observation, etc.) denoted as
p(θ|E) or expressed as “the probability p of hypothesis θ given E (after getting
relevant evidence)…”. For the purposes of this theorem, p(θ) and p(θ|E) are, re-
spectively, a priori and a posteriori probabilities of θ. They are brought together
under the Bayes Theorem: p (θ | E ) ⋅ p ( E = ) p ( E | θ ) ⋅ p (θ ) . In other words,
when considering hypothesis or theory θ, comparing the probability that is as-
signed to it, before and after evidence E is obtained—p(θ) and p(θ|E) respective-
ly –, would be equivalent to comparing in the same relationship, the probability
assigned to evidence p(E) and the probability assigned to the likelihood p(E|θ).
By reference to probabilities, the decision-maker weighs his trust in his own
choice and his perceived credibility in information received from others, before
he/she begins updating his judgment.
Jaynes [1] proposed a general decision-making theory which posits an objec-
tively derived model of Bayesian inference, including in situations where infor-
mation is incomplete, requiring reliance on probabilistic inductive reasoning.
“By ‘inference’ we mean simply: deductive reasoning whenever enough informa-
tion is at hand to permit it; inductive or plausible reasoning when—as is almost
invariably the case in real problems—the necessary information is not available.
But if a problem can be solved by deductive reasoning, probability theory is not
needed for it; thus, our topic is the optimal processing of incomplete informa-
tion” [1]. The latter is intended to reflect “the phenomenon of a person who tells
the truth and is not believed, even though the disbelievers are reasoning consis-
tently. The theory explains why and under what circumstances this will happen
(…) New data that we insist on analyzing in terms of old ideas (that is, old mod-
els which are not questioned) cannot lead us out of the old ideas (…) Old data,
when seen in the light of new ideas, can give us an entirely new insight into a
phenomenon” [1]5.
The rules to solve the problem of inference are as follows [1]: 1) enumerate
the possible states of nature θj, discrete or continuous, as the case might be; 2)
assign prior probabilities p(θj|I) which represent whatever prior information I
you have about them, before any measurement; 3) assign sampling probabilities
p(Ei|θj), which represent the likelihood of the measurements, that is, prior
knowledge about the mechanism of measurement process yielding the possible,
observable data sets Ei; 4) Digest any additional evidence E = E1 E2… (Sampling
data) and, by application of Bayes’ Theorem, obtain the posterior probabilities
For instance, the visual perception, the discovery of Neptune, etc.
5

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G. Giacomoni

p(θj|E I), which means taking into account new data feedback as it comes in.
That is the end of the inference problem and probabilities p(θj|E I) yield all in-
formation regarding the possible states of nature θj that can be known a posteri-
ori. In other words, the set of available information can be factored into the cal-
culation of probabilities p(θj|E I) pertaining to the states of nature. All of these
probabilities are interrelated through Bayes’ theorem:
p (θ j / E I ) ⋅ p ( E I )= p (θ j / I ) ⋅ p ( E / θ j I )

As for the final steps of the decision-making process, they are: 5) enumerate
the possible decisions Di; 6) express what was sought to be accomplished, as a
function of preferences (minimize the expected loss/maximize the expected
gains) by associating possible decisions with states of nature L(Di|θj); and 7)
make the decision Di that leads to the most preferred expected outcome (mini-
mized expected loss/maximum expected gain) for θj.
It should be noted, however, that this general theory of decision-making based
on a Bayesian inference modeling does not expressly refer to the universe of
possibles [all possible states of nature] (or the “world” as Savage puts it) in its
equations. Insofar as the universe has been posited once and for all, there is no
need to do so. Moreover, once the states of nature θj are formulated, information
I on these states of nature, which is assumed to be held as a priori and as intro-
duced into the decision process at step (2) through the equations, does not (but
should) serve the same function. If that had been the case, information I should
have been included either in every step of the process or at least at steps (3) and
(6). But anyway, as will be developed later, once the universe of possibles [all
possible states of nature] is reframed—relying on the extension to a novel parti-
tion structure of a novel space of states of nature θ j∗ (novel hypothesis or
theory, etc.) based on an ancient partition structure of a prior space of states of
nature θj (hypothesis or theories, etc.) –, the step (7) becomes undecidable, al-
though a decision leading to the most preferred expected outcome for θj is ex-
pected to be made. Indeed, a function of preferences L associating possible deci-
sions Di with states of nature θj or rather θ j∗ (depending on the reference un-
iverse of possibles), as any function, is a binary relation which is one-one
[L(Di|θj)] or many-one [L(Di; Dk|θj)], not one-many [L(Di|θj; θk; θ j∗ )] just as it is
in the blind spot of reframing—by extension—the universe of possibles [all
possible states of nature] [8]. Besides, as we can note, that is why no novel state
of nature θ* (novel hypothesis or theories, etc.) is introduced in the general
theory of decision-making based on a Bayesian inference modeling.
In light of the foregoing, we shall consider the emblematic counter-example of
Archimedes’ Eureka moment, that precisely involves a reframing—by extension
– of the universe of possibles [all possible states of nature]. Forgetting then the
meaning of a universe of possibles [all possible states of nature] (or the “world”)
previously set forth—as everything that exists and the assumption that it is
possible to possess perfect knowledge about it [5]—we must turn to a considera-
tion of what is held to be universal in accordance with a current state of scientif-

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 G. Giacomoni

ic knowledge, in the sense of a “universality of reference”. This means that, while

irrelevant aspects of a description of the world may be wrongly undescribed be-
cause irrelevance/relevance is time-dependent, the description of the world is
prone to be reframed by extension. Such a change in representation allows us to
bear out the truth of Cédric Villani’s remark, which we might paraphrase by
saying that, like mathematics, an innovative idea “can change the world”6.

3. Counter-Example: Archimedes’ Eureka Moment

Before discussing Archimedes’ thought experiment and explaining its
non-conformity with the general decision-making theory based on Bayesian in-
ference modeling, let us first consider how it acquired its status as a counterex-
ample.

3.1. Status as a Counter-Example

According to Larousse (French dictionary), a theory is an organized set of prin-
ciples, rules, and scientific laws used to describe and explain observed pheno-
mena. In more formal language, a theory is a consistent set of statements con-
taining all of its consequences. In science, a theory cannot demonstrate its own
consistency. To be universally valid, it must be provable. Its experimental verifi-
cation [9] would assume an infinite set of favorable outcomes (i.e., outcomes of
interest), which is unsustainable. As a next best alternative, a theory is therefore
viewed as being constructed from incomplete information and accepted as true
until it is contradicted, notably by a counter-example [10] [11]. A counter-example
is an indefinitely reproducible experiment that contradicts a theory and may suf-
fice to refute it or refine it, wholly or at least in part, making it more efficient
[12]. The thought experiment that brought Archimedes to the Eureka moment,
occupies the status of counter-example for the general theory of decision-making
based on Bayesian inference modeling. Archimedes constructed a new represen-
tation for understanding a class of phenomena (floating bodies) and solved a de-
cision-making situation once thought insoluble. This accomplishment was by no
means fortuitous but was, rather, derived from a reproducible method that he
described in a 100-page letter written to Eratosthenes7 (276 BC to 194 BC) [13].
The letter, which was lost for nearly 2000 years, reappeared in 1906, only to be
lost again until 1998 (the Archimedes Palimpsest Project). The “method” con-
sists in having a strategically situated observer who compares an unknown ob-
ject to a known one (based on a specially designed artificial model whose beha-
vior is known). To sum up, he had created a method for modeling and simula-
tion of an unknown object. The thought experiment was ingenious in that he
had to find a way to monitor the characteristic properties of an unknown object
potentially belonging to a new overarching reference universe, while reasoning
within a long-standing reference universe where a known object was taken as the
6
From statements made by 2010 Fields Medal winner at TedxParis conference held in 2012.
7
Eratosthenes is famous for having calculated the circumference of the Earth with great accuracy
(39,375 km), within 10% of the actual figure.

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G. Giacomoni

model. Hence, the need for the observer to be appropriately “situated”. “Indeed,
I assume that someone among the investigators of to-day or in the future will
discover by the Method here set forth still other propositions which have not yet
occurred to us” [14]. Archimedes was so proud of having used this method to
determine that the ratio of the volume of a sphere to the volume of the circum-
scribed cylinder worked out to be two-thirds that he asked for the figure of a
sphere and cylinder to be modeled in stone on top of his grave. He is also gener-
ally considered to be one of the greatest scientists of all time. “It is just possible
that Archimedes, could he come to life long enough to take a post-graduate
course in mathematics and physics, would understand Einstein, Bohr, Heisen-
berg and Dirac better than they would understand themselves” [15].
The reproducibility of Archimedes’ Method stems from its scientific formula-
tion. Like the Law of Floating Bodies, it can be discussed separately from Archi-
medes. Only a science can build itself on a body of knowledge that can be dis-
cussed separately from its formulators and the class of objects and phenomena
to which it is applied.

3.2. A Decision-Making Situation Once Thought Insoluble

Hieron II, king of Syracuse, had chosen Archimedes to supervise an engineering
project of unprecedented scale: a sailing vessel 50 times bigger than a standard
ancient warship, named the Syracusia after his city. He wanted to construct the
largest ship ever, which was destined to be given as a present to Egypt’s ruler,
Ptolemy. In Archimedes’s day, no one had attempted anything like this. The Sy-
racusia was successfully completed and arrived in Alexandria on its first and on-
ly voyage. At the core of the Syracusia story is a keel8 (korone in Greek, corona
in Latin, crown in English). This sounds like another story: Hieron II would
have asked a goldsmith to craft a solid-gold crown, in tribute to the immortal
gods. He had reason to suspect that some of the gold had been replaced by silver,
and asked Archimedes to find out if he had been cheated. No known solution
was available to solve the problem as presented. That is, the solution set was
empty. At that stage, even operations research or Artificial Intelligence would
have been unsuccessful. To the great benefit of science, Archimedes, upon en-
tering his bath, noticed the increase in the water level, due to the volume of wa-
ter his body had displaced, and cried “I found it! [Eurêka]” [16]. He had two
lumps of pure gold and pure silver brought to him, each weighing the exact same
as the crown. He immersed the bar of silver into a large vessel, with water filled
to the brim, and measured the volume of displaced water. Then he repeated the
experiment under exactly the same conditions, using a bar of gold, and observed
that a smaller volume of water had been displaced. Next, he conducted the expe-
riment with the solid-gold crown and noted that the volume of displaced water
was greater than was the case with the gold bar. He had found out the fraud and
his cry of Eureka, upon realizing that he had solved the vexing problem, has
8
A long piece of wood or metal along the bottom of a boat that forms part of its structure and helps
to keep the boat balanced in the water.

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 G. Giacomoni

since become the emblematic cry of discovery or comprehension. It is of little

real importance that the experiment probably did not transpire exactly as re-
ported by Roman architect Marcus Vitruvius Pollio (1st century BC). What is
important is the inference modeling employed by Archimedes – a line of rea-
soning that does not conform to the Bayesian inference modeling proposed for
general decision-making theory or Artificial Intelligence, even during the expe-
rimentation stage.

3.3. Reframing the Reference Universe of Possibles

It was not simply a matter of comparing the behavior of objects in the context of
a given reference universe of possibles [all possible states of nature in the air],
but also of noting differences in the apparent behavior of a single object while
considering the reference universes of possibles [all possible states of nature in
the air and underwater] which, until then, had been deemed to be independent.
Hence, the need to reason independently of the reference universe as it was
originally perceived [all possible states of nature in the air] and consider a refer-
ence universe broadened to encompass all fluids [all possible states of nature in
all fluids], in order to conceive a more general relationship linking the apparent
weight of objects to the displaced volumes of fluid and, in this way, identify a
new property, that is, volumetric weight or density: “anybody completely or par-
tially submerged in a fluid (gas or liquid) at rest is acted upon by an upward, or
buoyant, force the magnitude of which is equal to the weight of the fluid dis-
placed by the body.” The property thought to account for the expected behavior
of an object is thus conditioned9 by the reference universe of possibles in which
its use is imagined. It would thus appear more logical to talk about embedding
or situational properties [17] rather than intrinsic properties (independent of
embedding in a referent) to account for the interpretation of observable pheno-
mena or behaviors: the weight of an object in a fluid, its color in a luminous at-
mosphere, its price on a market, etc. And if certain properties are deemed to be
intrinsic, it is because they are dependent on a reference universe10 of possibles
[2]. Over time, a commonsense knowledge base has been built up and ultimately
come to prevail, through the force of collective representations. Imagining that
things might be otherwise has proved to be a challenging reflective exercise [18].
The processual pattern can be applied to any immaterial objects (software,
etc.) whose properties (weight, volume, value, etc.) and behaviors change in
keeping with the reference universe of possibles in which they are embedded
(situations of use, markets, etc.). Weighing choices, evaluating possibilities,
gains, losses or risks, are all part of the underlying process that fuels reasoning
during decision-making. The decision maker (whether an individual or an or-
ganization) need merely change the name of the reference universes of possibles,
9
That depends on the interaction with the other substances comprising the reference universe (mo-
lecules of air, water, etc.).
10
Set theory in mathematics (where a provable property, respectively a refutable one, depends on the
system of axioms, whereas a property that is neither provable nor refutable-in other words, which is
undecidable-is independent of the system of axioms).

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G. Giacomoni

observables and comparison tools, reconsider the possible states of nature, to

identify with Archimedes’ thought experiment.

3.4. A Novel Partition Structure of an Extended Space of States of

Nature: Reference Universes of Possibles and Decidability
Let us consider the following statement—the two scales of a balance have to be
in equilibrium to account for two objects of the same weight. According to the
partition structure of the space of states of nature θj in the air, a decision maker
would be led to accept this proposition as necessarily true. But according the
partition structure of the space of states of nature θj underwater, a decision
maker wouldn’t be led to accept this proposition as necessarily true. Hence, con-
sidering both partition structures, the statement becomes undecidable (neither
provable nor refutable). It is impossible to assign it a truth value (as true or false)
as long as a novel partition structure of a novel space of states of nature θ j∗ in
all fluids is not designed—this is to say, as long as the fluid in which the weigh-
ing was carried out is not specified. Accordingly, two scales of a balance have to
be in equilibrium to account for two objects of the same volume weight or den-
sity. A way to define a variation of volume is thus to consider the weight of the
object and the same weight of the fluid in which the object is immersed. Con-
versely, the weight of the volume of the object may differ from the weight of the
same volume of the fluid in which the object is immersed. Density is not ex-
pressed in units, but as a ratio and that of water is equal to 1 as a reference. This
is why the decision-maker’s semantic formalism (i.e. the partition structure)
must change together with the novel space of states of nature θ j∗ —comparison
of density in all fluids). The outcome of the methodology is significant (see Ta-
ble 1): decidability is linked to a partition structure of the space of states of na-
ture θj or rather to that of the space of states of nature θ j∗ as well as to the
meaning ascribed to universal properties that are respectively weight or rather
volume weight (i.e. density). In physics, such a revision of constants related to
physical properties to bring experimental data into line with theory is a so-called
renormalization.
For the same observation, such as that obtained from the weighing of objects
where the two scales of a balance are in equilibrium, explanatory hypothesis θ in
the initial reference universe of possibles [all possible states of nature in the air]
is necessarily the equality of weight; whereas explanatory hypothesis θ in the
other reference universe of possibles [all possible states of nature underwater]
may be not necessarily equality of weight. Rather, explanatory hypothesis θ* in
the final reference universe of possibles [all possible states of nature in all fluids],
is the equality of density—a property unknown in the initial reference universe
of possibles (in the air). As a corollary to this, the observation of a balanced
weighing in the initial reference universe of possibles [all possible states of na-
ture in the air] is consistent with hypothesis θ of the equality of weight as well as
the observation of an unbalanced (immersed) weighing in the other reference
universe of possibles [all possible states of nature underwater]. An observation

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 G. Giacomoni

Table 1. Constructing a more generalizing representation, reference universe of possibles

and decidability.

Reference Universe of
Explanatory Hypotheses:
possibles U → Uk ⊃ U*
Observations Partition structure P(Θ0/Θ1) →
[all possible states of
Partition structure P∗ ( Θ∗0 / Θ1∗ )
nature Θj → Θ∗j ]

Initial U1 (air) Θ0: equality of weights

Θ1: not necessarily equality of

New and independent U2 (water)
weights
Balanced
undecidable (knowing that the ex-
weighting E1 Unknown
istence of U2 is possible)

U* broadened to encompass Θ∗0 : equality of densities

all fluids (volumetric weights)

Initial U1 (air) Θ0: inequality of weights

Θ1: not necessarily an

New and independent U2 (water)
inequality of weights
Unbalanced
undecidable (knowing that the ex-
weighing E2 Unknown
istence of U2 is possible)

U* broadened to encompass all Θ1∗ : inequality of densities (volu-

fluids metric weights)

such as an unbalanced weighing, considered as a priori unfavorable to explana-

tory hypothesis θ such as the equality of weight in the initial reference universe
of possibles [all possible states of nature in the air] may be favorable to it in the
other reference universe of possibles [all possible states of nature underwater].
Only hypothesis θ* of equality of density in the final reference universe of pos-
sibles [all possible states of nature in all fluids] can dispel the obvious contradic-
tion.
It is not only a matter of reasoning rationally and consistently, by reference to
an interpretable universe of possibles, while striving to estimate the plausibility
of various explanatory hypotheses θj, based on observations, but also a question
of bringing to bear ever more generalizing representations and coherences. In
this way, our theoretical constructions are continually put to the test, under ex-
perimental conditions that are reproducible, every time that the referential un-
iverse of possibles changes, which involves a (temporary) absence of decidability
(i.e., undecidability). “Embracing contradictory forces can inspire learning, dis-
covery, and creativity” [19].
According to the Bayesian inference model, the decision-maker’s semantic
formalism would consist of a prior partition structure Pi of an initial space of the
states of nature (i.e. a universe of possibles in the air) and of another partition
structure Pf of another space of the states of nature (i.e. a universe of possibles
underwater), in such a way that Pi and Pf cannot coexist without being contra-

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G. Giacomoni

dictory, until a novel partition structure P* of an extended space of the states of

nature (i.e. a universe of possibles including all fluids) is designed. Hence, the
issue of how and wherein—in which fuzzy multiverse or quantum universe of
possibles—P* can be designed.

4. Implications under the Bayesian Inference Modeling

Proposed for General Decision-Making Theory or A.I.:
Fuzzy Model or Quantic Form?
First, we will discuss the implications for the Bayesian inference modeling pro-
posed for general decision-making theory or Artificial Intelligence. Then we
shall examine the foundations of a theory that is intended to be more generaliz-
ing.

4.1. Reformulating the System of Rules

Given that all comparisons between hypotheses or observations must be relati-
vized in relation to the reference universes Uk of possibles [all possible states of
nature], rules (3) and (4) of the general theory of decision-making should be re-
formulated, as follows: (3) assign sampling probabilities p(Ei|θj Uk) which
represent the likelihood of the measurements, reflecting prior knowledge about
the mechanism of measurement process yielding observable data sets Ei in a ref-
erence universe Uk of possibles [all possible states of nature]; (4) digest any addi-
tional evidence E = E1 E2… (Sampling data) and, by application of Bayes’ Theo-
rem, obtain the posterior probabilities p(θj|E I Uk). The probabilities p(θj|E I Uk)
yield all information about possible states of nature θj that can be known a post-
eriori in reference universe Uk of possibles [all possible states of nature in all
fluids]. The reformulation of steps (3) and (4) has a notable impact on those that
ensue. Assuming that the possible decisions Di set out in step (5) are not affected
(if only two decisions Yes/No or 0/1 were ever proposed), it is obvious that steps
(6) and (7) are bound to be affected. Indeed, the expression of what is sought to
be accomplished, as a function of preferences (minimize the expected losses/
maximize the expected gains) linking possible decisions with states of nature
L(Di|θj) will be transformed into L(Di|θj Uk). A concomitant transformation will
take place, in step (7), regarding decision Di which leads to the most preferred
expected outcome for θj (minimized expected loss/maximum expected gain) in
reference universe Uk of possibles [all possible states of nature], given that the
novel hypotheses θ j∗ must be formulated pursuant to the reframing of reference
universe U* of possibles (encompassing Uk). Otherwise, the problem becomes
undecidable (see Table 1). Technically, that would proceed by imposing a forced
coupling [20] on probabilities p(θj|E I Uk) within U* (see Figure 1).
The theory of probabilities [4] was not intended to apply to several reference
universes Uk (in-sofar as the probability of any reference universe of possibles
cannot exceed 1). It is important to note that, as already explained, it is not a
matter of adding any previously unknown or un-certain observations Ei [21]
[22] to a reference universe Uk of all possible states of nature θj (hypotheses or

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 G. Giacomoni

Figure 1. Decision, inference and reframing of the reference universe of possibles.

theories, etc.) by conveniently redistributing the probabilities so as to ensure that

the total always stands at 1.
Now inspired by the sciences of nature, some scientists [20] [23] have begun
to formalize the coupling of two or more previously separated universes of pos-
sibles (such as two separated probability spaces, etc.) in each of which an opera-
tor (a function, differentiation, transformation, map, etc.) is defined, knowing
that it is difficult to describe a deformation of one operator on the other. How-
ever, it is possible to extend both of them to the overall universe of possibles (i.e.
overall space of the states of nature) assigning value 0 outside its universe of
possibles. This can be made by multiplying each of them by a function that has
value 1 in one universe of possibles and 0 outside. If we also normalize the two
functions in such a way that their sum is identically 1, the couple may then be
called partition of unit. Thanks to this extension, the two operators act on the
same set of functions, allowing a coupling (or heterogeneous assemblage), which
is a deformation of an operator on the other. This process of coupling can be
formally expressed as a linear combination of the two extended operators. Since
the first function takes value 1 in the first sub-universe of possibles (that was
originally the first universe of possibles) and 0 outside, the coupling coincides
with the first operator in the first sub-universe of possibles. Analogously, since
the second function takes value 1 in the second sub-universe (that was originally
the second universe of possibles), the coupling coincides with second operator in
the second sub-universe of possibles. The resulting operator is then a smooth
transformation of the first operator into the second one. Note that this is just
one of the many coupling possibilities, especially the quantum translation.

4.2. Discussion of the Theoretical Foundations of Reframing the

Reference Universe of Possibles: Quantic Form Rather Than
Fuzzy Modeling?
While raising the issue of a Quantic Form rather than Fuzzy Modeling, the re-
presentation that we have constructed and the assessment that we make regard-
ing any space of all possible states of nature and the impact of our decisions
(emanating from both our behavior and our actions) thus depend on: 1) the ref-
erence universe of possibles together with the partition structure of such a space
of the states of nature that makes decidability, 2) the potential for identifying
other universes of possibles (in line with the problem to be solved) and parti-
tioning structures with such spaces of the states of nature which makes undeci-
dability, 3) the potential for reframing by extension the reference universe of
possibles so as to encompass all others, together with a novel partition structure

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G. Giacomoni

of such a mega-space of all spaces of the states of nature.

4.3. A Partition Structure of a Space of the States of the World to

Make Decidability
As stated earlier, the belief in an absolute and eternal universality can be posited
as an axiom. The implications of this can be seen in the Bayesian inference mod-
eling proposed for general decision-making theory or Artificial Intelligence.
Theoreticians (in economics, epistemic modal logic, etc.) have formulated such a
conception, as so-called semantic knowledge, in a unifying axiomatic principle11
[7], modeled in terms of partitions on a comprehensive space of “possible states
of the world” (i.e. universe of possibles). A partition structure of the space of the
world is thus of use to give symbols of the language a meaning and a truth value
(semantic) to validate a formal (logical/mathematical) theory [10]. The basic
principle is to consider a theory as consistent (i.e. mathematically correct), if it is
possible to define a world where this theory is true. Semantics (truth) and syntax
(proof) are independent and equivalent [24]. To illustrate, according to New-
ton’s theory of gravitation and its principle of equivalence, gravity acts equally
on all bodies—this is the proof. Now the demonstration was carried out by D.
Scott during the Apollo 15 mission in 1971, when a hammer (1.32 kg) and a
feather (0.03 kg) released at the same moment hit the ground at the same time –
this is for truth.

4.4. Partitioning Structures with Many Spaces of the States of the

World Makes Undecidability
Another conception is to posit as an axiom that universality depends on the
(time-dependent) state of knowledge. Under this somewhat constructivist con-
cept—an idea seized upon by a mathematical theory dubbed intuitionism [25] –
every decision maker must know which reference universe of possibles serves as
the lens through which he/she can look in order to reframe, decide and act in an
informed manner. The acquisition of a novel understanding of the world de-
pends on his ability to foresee the broadening of his knowledge beyond the
bounds of his rationality [3] and ultimately place into perspective the reasons
behind his previous viewpoints and stances. This may happen in the space of all
possible parts wherein partition structures are designed. Such space is always
wider than the space of the world itself (i.e. all possible states of nature), as it in-
cludes all possible sub-spaces, the entire space of the world as a whole and even
the empty space. Indeed, let us remember and note that mathematical structures
and their relations are designed according to set theory [26]. The latter is re-
garded as a fundamental theory of all arithmetic and analysis, axiomatized by
Zermelo E. & Fraenkel A. (Ibid) and known as ZFC system, according to which
it is possible to “assign to an arbitrary logically definable notion a set (as one), or
class (as many), as its extension” [27]. So, the validation of formal human con-
struction and the notion of mathematical truth are based on set theory and its
The axioms of Conscience, Omniscience, Knowledge, Transparency, and Prudence.
11

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 G. Giacomoni

metatheoric language. Being conveniently “situated” in such a space of all possi-

ble parts, it is interesting to note that the observer (i.e. the decision-maker) nec-
essarily works somewhere outside the space of the world (i.e. the universe of
possibles), as Archimedes put it in the Palimpsest. Thus, the observer also nec-
essarily made and stored, somewhere in a human or artificial memory, a copy of
the space of the world. “(…) since it includes a version of the entire mathemati-
cal world, and one might expect it to be difficult to construct explicitly. In fact,
Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem forbids even the theoretical possibility
of such a construction, since it would entail the non-contradiction of the ZFC
system, which the theorem asserts, is impossible to show from ZFC, i.e. within
the framework of set theory” [7]. From outside the space of the world, the ob-
server can reframe it while exploring the existence of others. In addition, as-
suming he/she finds some in the space of all possible parts of all possible spaces
of the world, he/she has to cross the barrier of undecidability as to what encom-
passing all these possible worlds implies. To achieve this, he/she cannot rely on
the Bayesian inference modeling, but rather on intuition, elaborating and
nuancing the forms of rationality and corresponding codified languages [28], to
design novel partition structures. ‘The intuition–rationality paradoxical tension
will be present in any strategic decision-manipulate making process (…) Under-
standing better how rationality and intuition interact during decision-making
has, however, remained a major challenge (…) Some researchers suggest that
intuition is the main mechanism through which choices are made, and the role
of rational thinking is to evaluate the product of intuitive processing [29] [30].
Note also that, from the space of all possible parts of all possible spaces of the
world, to devise a novel partition structure together with a mega-space of the
world encompassing all possible spaces of the world, generates new dimension:
“the term dimension can be defined as the unique mega-space that is built by in-
finite general-spaces, subspaces and micro-spaces that are systematically inter-
connected (…) any dimension needs to be studied using the ideas of spaces/sets
or sub-spaces/sub-sets or partitions/cuts” ([31], p. 340).

4.5. Reframing by Extension the Space of the World Together with

a Novel Partition Structure: Quantic Form Rather Than Fuzzy
Modeling
The main theories applied in fuzzy modeling are fuzzy logic and the fuzzy set
theory. Such fuzzy modeling theories, including fuzzy inference reasoning, ena-
ble us to work with imprecise information [often available in the form of sen-
tences of natural language only [32] [33]. They have yielded impressive out-
comes in decision-making when dealing with classes of objects or things with a
continuum of grades of membership ranging between 0 and 1 [34]. Fuzzy mod-
els require partitioning the universe into parts, with the specificity that they need
not be precisely formed and can overlap. Thus, such fuzzy modeling theories
clearly assume to work and explore within a given reference universe U of pos-
sibles. They do not assume to work within a so-called Class [27] [35], neither

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G. Giacomoni

between many universes of possibles Uk (i.e. spaces of the world) nor between a
reference universe of possibles U (i.e. a space of the world) and a reference ex-
tended universe of possibles U* (i.e. mega-space of the world) including U.
Moreover, fuzzy sets are especially characterized by membership (characteristic)
functions, which are relations of the type one-one or many-one and not of the
type one-many (i.e. Uk ⊃ U*), as previously explained.
The process of reframing a reference universe of possibles U (i.e. a space of
the world) requires the observer or the designer to deal with a quantum transla-
tion: 1) quantum coherence/decoherence, 2) superposition of states (quantum
notation in a Hilbert space: |U〉 + |Uk〉, 3) non-commutability of observations or
observers (i.e. irreversibility) [36]. Indeed, reference universes of possibles U and
Uk (i.e. spaces of the world) have independent states until the existence of a ref-
erence universe of possibles U* encompassing them (i.e. a mega-space of the
world) gets its own translation through a superposition of these states. É. Galois
[37] opened the way by studying the extension of structures. It is necessary to
understand by extension of structures, the generation of a more general struc-
ture such as U* generalizing U while including it (i.e. a mega-space of the world
including any pre-existing space of the world). Yet, a fundamental issue, still
opened, is where to travel searching for reference universes of possibles Uk with
the aim of extending them, if no universe of possibles U* is preexisting. Accord-
ing to formal logic, working within a reference universe U means that it has to
remain unique. This is a basic rule (called contraction): “U and U” must be re-
duced to “U”. Therefore, U and U* cannot be active simultaneously. This is also
true for U and Uk. Thus, we must switch to another more suited logic form,
namely a quantum one, to consider U, Uk, U* in quantum states respectively.
Also, since the process of reframing a reference universe of possible U is
time-dependent, a quantum form seems to be well suited to formalize it. To put
it another way, memory being the substratum, whether human or artificial,
wherein everything stands [3] [38], especially wherein the universe of possibles
U is stored, then, where to stand as an observer or work as a designer and where
to store a novel universe of possibles U* including a copy of itself (as it was in-
itially) while generalizing it, if not in a quantum universe? To date, even the
theoretical possibility of such an operation of self-inclusion is prohibited by pure
mathematics [7]. Such approach remains to be explored and could open up a
new path of investigation.

4.6. Application of the Quantic Form to Loyds’ Problem

The continuous tracing problem [39] consists in connecting points (9) with lines
(4) without lifting the pencil. Thinking Outside the Box is another name for an
original, creative and clever way of thinking. We chose this problem because it is
deemed practically impossible to solve (you have to think about getting out of
the mental framework) and makes us manipulate elementary objects which are
the points, the links between these points, the links between these links. Neither

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 G. Giacomoni

Figure 2. Quantic Form applied to the Loyds’ problem.

Operations Research nor A.I. nor even adaptive learning will enable us to over-
come Loyds’ problem. Instead, applying the Quantic Form provides a solution
(Cf Figure 2).

5. Conclusion
Bayesian inference model [1] is an optimal processing of incomplete informa-
tion that, more than other models, better captures the way in which any deci-
sion-maker learns and updates his degree of rational beliefs about possible states
of nature, in order to make a better judgment while taking new evidence into
account. Such a scientific model proposed for the general theory of deci-
sion-making, like all others in general, whether in statistics, economics, opera-
tions research, A.I., data science or applied mathematics, regardless of whether
they are time-dependent, have in common a theoretical basis that is axiomatized
by relying on related concepts of a universe of possibles, especially the so-called
universe (or the world), the state of nature (or the state of the world), when
formulated explicitly. The issue of where to stand as an observer or a deci-
sion-maker to reframe such a universe of possibles together with partition
structures of knowledge (i.e. semantic formalisms), including a copy of itself (as
it was initially) while generalizing it, is not addressed. Memory being the sub-
stratum, whether human or artificial, wherein everything stands, to date, even
the theoretical possibility of such an operation of self-inclusion is prohibited by
pure mathematics. We have made this blind spot come to light through a coun-
ter-example (namely Archimedes’ thought experiment, which led to his famous
“Eureka” moment) and have explored novel theoretical foundations, fitting bet-
ter with a quantum form than with fuzzy modeling, to deal with more than a
reference universe of possibles (i.e. space of the world). Indeed, the last ones
have independent states (i.e. decoherence) until the existence of a mega-space of
the world encompassing them, together with a novel meta-partition structure of
knowledge, gets its own translation through the superposition of these states (i.e.
coherence). This could open up a new path of investigation for the general
theory of decision-making, as well as for Artificial Intelligence, often considered
as the science of the imitation of human abilities [40], while being also the
science of knowledge representation and the science of concept formation and
reasoning [2] [41].

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G. Giacomoni

Conflicts of Interest
The author declares no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this pa-
per.

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