SHASTRI INDO-CANADIAN

INSTITUTE
156 Golf Links.

New Delhi -3, India

•
i
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 THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

The Age of Kundakunda or Elacharya.

Sri, Kundakundacharya the author of our work was a very

famous Jaina Philosopher and theologian. He was also a great organiser

of Religious institutions. His name is held in great veneration
especially by the Digambara Section of the Jainas. Many great

leligious teachers claimed it an honour to trace their lineage

from the great teacher Kundakunda. Several inscriptions that

are found in South India and Mysore relating to Jaina teachers

begin with Kiwdakundanvaya—oi the line of Kundakunda.
Students of Jaina literature are familar with such phrases as

the following :

Sri Kundakunda Gurupattaparamparaydm ;

Sri Kundakunda Santhanam ;

Sri Kundakundakya munindra vamsa.

These are some of the phrases claimed by Jaina writers such as
Sakalabhusana author of Upadesaratnamala, Vasunandi author of
Upasakadhyanam, Brahma nemi datta of Aurathana Kathakosha.
Instances may be multiplied without number, for showing the
important place occupied by our author in the hierarchy of Jaina
teachers.

Some of the epithets employed to characterise him are also

nincant of his great importance. Munindra — the Indra among the
cetics, Munichakravati — the emperor among the munis, Kaundeba
Lord Kunda, are familiar designations of the great teacher.

The personality of this great teacher as is generally the

case with world famous individuals is lost in obscurity and shrouded
with traditions. We have to depend upon so many written
and oral traditions to have a glimpse of this great person. The
early history of India is but a string of speculations and even as
such there are very many gaps. Under these circumstances,
we have to be very cautious about the history of our author.
 —

THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

The one great landmark in the chronology of India is Chandra-

gupta'Maurya. This great emperor of Magadha is not only referred

to in the.various literary works of India but is also mentioned by

foreign historians especially the Greeks. This emperor Chandra Gupta
especially is of peculiar interest to the students of the early history

of the Jainas. Lewis Rice and Dr. F. W. Thomas have done consi-
derable service to Indian History by cautiously interpreting several

available facts, archaeological and epigraphical, relating to that

period. 'The early faith of Asoka' and the migration of Bhadrabahu

with Chandragupta are now accepted facts of History. The
tendency among European scholars to post date the historical

events and persons ralating to India is a just antidote to the

phantastic and legendary notions of indigenous writers who generally

measure time by milleniums. Nevertheless we have to point out

that the orientalist have sometimes overreached their work. They

generally proceed on the assumption that writing is a late acquisition

in Indian civilization. The learned arguments put forward on Panini

by Goldsticker to undermine this assumption have been before the
learned public for some decades. The excavations of Jaina stupas at

Mathura and Mr. K. P. Jayaswal's discovery of Konika's Statue with

the inscriptions try to set back the pendulam of Indian chronology to
an earlier period. Speaking about the Jaina stupas Sir Vincent Smith
writes as follows:

"The assumption has generally been made that all edifices in

this stupa form are Buddhist. When the inscription under

discussion was executed not later than 157 A. D., the Vodva stupa
of the Jainas at Mathura was already so ancient that it was regarded
as the work of the gods. It was probably therefore erected several

centuries before the Christian era.''

Again says he,

"Assuming the ordinarily received date B. C. 527 for the death
of Mahavira to be correct the attainment of perfection by that saint

may be placed about B. C. 550. The restoration of the stupa may

be dated about 1300 years later or A. D. 150. Its original erection

in brick in the time of Parasvanath the predecessar of Mahavira would

fall at a date uot later than B. C. 600 considering the significance

of the phrase in the inscription
" built by the gods" as indicating that
the building at about the beginning of the Christian eta was believed
to date from a period of mythical antiquity the date B. C. 600 for its
 THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

erection is not too early. Probably therefore this stupa of which Dr.
Fuhrer exposed the foundations is the oldest known buildings in India".

- When we take these historic discoveries with the Jaina traditions

that a number of Tirthankaras preceded Lord Mahavira we may
not be altogether wrong in supposing that adherents of Jaina faith
in some form or other must have existed even anterior to Mahavira
and that Mahavira himself was more a reformer than the founder
of the faith. If there were Jains influential enough to build stupas
in honour of their saints even anterior to 600 B. C, will it be too
much to suppose that the followers of this religion might have
existed in South India even before Badrabahu's migration to the
south. In fact it stands to reason .to suppose that a large bodv
of ascetics on account of a terrible famine in t lie north migrated
to a country where they would be welcomed by their devoted co-
religionists. If the south were instead of a friendly territory waiting
to receive the Sangha of ltarned ascetics a land populated with
strangers and of alien faith Bhadrabihu would not have ventured
to take with him into strange hnd a large body of ascetics who
would depend entirely upon the generosity of the people. The
Jaina tradition that the Pandya King of the South was a Jaina from
very early times and that Bhadrabahu expected his hospitality might
have some historical background.

Up to the time of Bhadrabahu's migration there was no split in

the Jaina fold. That the schism of the Swetambaras arose about
the time of Bhadrabahu I on account of the hardships of the famine
is more than probable. This fact is evidenced by the complete absence
of Swetambaras in the Deccan and South India. The Jains in the
South and Mysore always claim to be of Mulasangha the original

congregration.

One other interesting fact is the Migration of the Digambara?

from the south to the north for the purpose of religious propogan-
dism. " One point of agreement comes out clearly and is note-
worthy, i.e. the direction of the Digambara migration." It was from
the south to the north from Bhadalpur to Delhi and Jaipur. This
agrees with the opinion that the Digambara separation originally took

place as a result of the migration southwards under Badrabahu in

consequence of a severe famine in Behar the original home of the

undivided Jaina Community " (Prof. A. F. Rudolf Hoernle. hid.
i v THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

Ant. Vol. XXI. Three further Pattavalis of the Digambaras, pp. 60

and 61.)
Professor Hoernle says that he has not been able to identify

Bhadalpur. It is no other than Patalipura or Pataliputra which is the

old name of Thiruppappuliyur or modern Cnddalore (Reports on

the Archaeological Survey of India, Vol. 1906-07 — Article on the
Pallavas by V. Venkayya) suggests that it is not the above place
and identifies it with Tiruvadi a place near Panruti with many
Jaina antiquities and remains. This is only a matter of detail.

But still the reason given by V. Venkiyya is not quite sound. The
fact that Pathiripuliyur is mentioned in Devaram as sacred to God
Siva will not conflict with its being also the centre of the Jainas.
Now this Bhadalpur or Patalipura is associated with our author
SriKundakunda as we shall show later on.
Before we proceed further let us make sure about the age in
which he lived and worked. For this we have clear evidence
furnished in the several Pattavalis preserved by the Jainas both
Digambaras and Swetambaras. After Mahavira there had been a suc-
cession of teachers as shown below :
—
Years
I. — Kevalins ... Gautama 12
Sudharma 12
Jambu 3$
I.— Srnta- Kevalins, Vishnu Kumar 14
Nanda Mitra 16
Aparajita 22
Govardhan 19
Bhadrabahu I 29
I. — Ten-Purvins... Visaka 10
-
Proshtila 15
Natchatra 17
Nagasena 18
Jayasena 21
Siddharta 17
Dhritisena IS
Vijaja 13
Buddhilinga 20
Deva, I 14
Dbarasena 14
 THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

Years.
IV. — Eleven Angina Nakshatra 18
Jayapalaka 20
Pandava 39
Dhruvasena 14
Kamsa 32

Total 468

Year?.
Subhadra 6
Yasobhadra 18

Bhadrbahu, II.

In the year 2 after theAcharya Snbhadra's (accession to the

partificate), the birth of Vikrama took place and in the year 4 of
;

Vikrama's reign Bhadrabahuji 1 1 took

seat on the pontificial
his
chair. Further successiDn will be evident from the following table :
—
" Indian Antiquary" Vols. XX and XXI. The several Patta-
valis examined by R. Hoernle.
 1i I i * t i < 1

VI THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION,

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 THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. vii

If we take this date 8 B. C. as the reliable date of his accession

to the pontificial chair then the date of his birth would be about
52 B. C. For, only in his forty-fourth year he became pontiff or
an acharya.
What is his birthplace and scene of his activities ? With regard
to his birthplace we have no better evidence. Here alsowe have
todepend upon traditions — oral and written, Let us see whether
we can have any useful information from these traditions. In a work
called Punyasravakatha Sri Kunda Kundacharya's life is cited as an
example for Shastradana or gift of Shastras. The account is as
follows :
— In Bharatha Khanda in Dakshanadesa there was a district

called Pidatha Nadu. In a town called Kurumarai in this district

there lived a wealthy vaishya name Karamunda. His wife was

by
Srimati. They had a cow-herd who tended their cattle. His name
was Mathivaran. One day when he was driving his cattle to an
adjoining forest he saw to his great surprise that the whole forest
was consumed by forest fire except a few trees in the centre, which
retained the luxuriant green foliage. This roused his curiosity and
he went and inspected that place. There he found the dwelling
place of some great Muni and also a box containing the Agamas or
the Jain Scriptures. Illiterate as he was he attributed the safety of
the spot to the presence of the Agamas which he carried home with
great awe and reverence. He put up the Agamas in a sanctified
place of his master's house and continued to worship the same
daily.

Sometime after, a religious monk visited their house. He was

affered Bhiksha with great veneration by that wealthy vaishya. Just
then this cow-herd also offered the Agamas to the great Rishi. On
account of these gifts — food from the Master, and the Scripture from
the servant — the Rishi was very much pleased and blessed them both.
The Master of the house since he had no children was to have an
intelligent son and the old and faithful servant would be born as the
promised son of the house. The happy event oame to pass and the
son born to the family became a .great philosopher and religious
teacher. This was our author. Sir Kunda Kunda.
The story further turns upot: his religious tours. The mention
of his name as the wisest of mortals in the Samavasatana of Srec-
Mantharaswami in Purvavideha, the visit of the two Charanas to
verify the fact, his supposed irreverence to them on account of "his
viii THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

concentration, the return of the Charanas in disgust, the explanation

of the misunderstood event, the reconciliation between the Charanas
and Sri Kunda Kunda and the latter's visit to the Samavasarana with
the Charanas are all incidents mentioned in detail. Further as the
fruit of his previous gift of Shastra he became a great leader of
thought and organiser of institutions. Finally he secured the throne
of Achaiya and thus spent his life in usefulness and glory.
There is another account of his life given in "Kunda Kundacharya
Chantra" a pamphlet published in 'Digambsr Jain' office, Surat.
According to this his birth-place is in the country of Malwa. His
parents are mentioned as Kundasreshti and Kundalata. The
young boy Kunda Kunda was apprenticed to religious teacher for the

purpose of education. Early in life he showed an ascetic dispositfon

and therefore he was ordained as a monk and admitted into the

Sangha. The latter part of the story is almost identical with that

of the previous one.

Both these versions appear to be quite legendary. The latter

judged from the names of the parents is evidently a latter construc-
tion by some imaginative mind based upon the name of the hero
Kunda Kunda. The places mentioned in the former story are not
easily identifiable. The only reliable information there perhaps is

that the author belongs to Dakshana Desa. Waiving these two

stories as of no material use we have to depend more upon circum-
Emphasis must be laid upon the
stantial evidence. fact that Sri

Kunda Kunda belonged to Dravida Sangha.

"La commur.aute digambara portrait le nom de mula sangha. Un
synonyme de ce terme parait. Etre Dravila Sangha, qui ne signifie
sans doubte rien de plus que" communaute "des pays dravidiens."
Le mula sangha comptait plusieurs sectes dont la plus importante
Etait le Kunda Kunda anvaya" ( — p. 42. Introduction, Reportaire
Epigraphie Jaina).
This suggestion of Guerinot's based upon circumstantial evidence
is a useful cue for our purpose.
We have to collect further evidence if possible to corroborate the
theory that' our author belonged to the Dravidian country.
(1) Io an unpublished manuscript treating about "Mantra Lakshna" we have the
following sloka :
—
Dakshana desa malayc hamagrame naunir mahiimasft.
Elachiiryo narnna dravilagana— dhiso dhiman.
 TIT!" HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. IX

This sloka is interesting to us. The work treats about a female

disciple of Elacharya, who was possessed of a Brahma Rakshasa.

This possessed disciple was no doubt well- versed in Shastras but

would get up on the summit of a small hill called Nilagiri by the side
of the Hemagranu in which Elacharya lived, and would
village,

laugh and weep alternately with all hystorical violence. She is said
to have been cured by Elacharya with the help of Jwalamalini
Mantra. Fortunately we are able to identify all the places mentioned
in the above sloka.
Malaya is the name of that part of the Madras Presidency
comprised by portions of North Arcot and South Arcot traversed by
the Eastern ghats. The taluks of Kalla Kurichi, Tiruvannarnali and
Wandewash perhaps form the central tract of this Malaya. Hema-
grama which is the Sanskritised form of Ponnur which is a village
near Wandewash. Close to this village there is a hillock by the
name Nilagiri. On the top of this hillock on a rock there are even
now the foot prints of Elacharya who is said to have performed his
tapas thereon. Even now pilgrims frequent this village once in a
year, to perform puja to the foot prints. Further the sloka mentions
Elacharya to be 'Dravidagana disa'. We know very well that

Elacharya, is another well-known name for Kunda Kunda.

Now this Elacharya is according to Jaina tradition the author
of the great Tamil classic 'Thirukkurra!'. This is written in the
old indigenous "Venba" metre of Tamil language. According to the

Jaina tradition this work was composed by Elacharya and given

away to his disciple "Thiruvalluvar" who introduced it to the

Madura Sangha. This version is not altogether improbable. Because

even the non-jaina tradition about the author of Thirukkumal appears
to be merely another version of this one. The Hindu iradition
makes Thiruvalluvar himself the author of the work. He is claimed
to be a Saivite by faith and valluva by birth. His birth place is

said to be Thirumaylai or Mylapuri or the modern Mylapore the

southern part of the city of Madras. The work was composed under
the patronage of one Elala Singh, who was evidently the literary
patron of Thiruvalluvar.
This Elala Singh of the Hindu Tradition may be merely a

variation of Elacharya. Thiruvalluvar figures in both the traditions,

in the one as the author and in the other the introducer before the

Sangha. That Mylapuri, had a famous Jain temple dedicated to

 THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

Neminath Vide Tamil work " Tirunur ruanthathi," and that it was a
seat of Jaina culture is well evidenced by literary remains and
antiquarian facts preserved in South India. Though the work
is claimed by different religionists— Sivaites Buddhists and Jains,

though there is no authentic record as to the exact faith of

the author, still an unbiassed study of the work itself with the

special view as to the technical terms employed in the couplets

and the doctrines religious and moral embodied work will

in the

constrain one to conclude that it is a treatise evidently based upon

the moral principle of Vitaraga, the corner stone oi Jainism. The

praise of Agriculture as the noblest occupation is consistent with the

traditions of the Vellalas, the landed aristocracy of South India, who

were evidently the earliest adherents to Jaina faith in this part of

the country.

This identification of Elacharya the author of Kural with Elacharya

or Kunda Kunda would place the Tamil work in the 1st century of the
Christian era. This is"not altogether improbable. Dr. G. U. Pope
would bring it down to a period later than the 8th century. There
is no sufficient historic evidence for his belief. He is actuated by his
personal bias that such a sublime work embodying highest moral
ideals could not be due to the indigenous Dravidian culture alone,
hut must have been influenced by Christianity brought here by the
parly Christian Missionaries. The tradition about St. Thomas
lends weight to the supposition. There is nothing to show from the
internal evidence that the author of the work was aware of Chris-
tianity. The doctrines treated therein are found widely scattered in
Tamil literature especially in those works composed by Jains such as
'Naladiyar' 'Aranericharam' 'Pazamozi' 'Elathi', etc. One who is

acquainted with Tamil literature will not grudge the authorship of

Kural to purely dravidian scholars and moralists who are uninfluenced
by foreign culture. Hence we may believe with very great pro-
bability that, Elacharya the author of Kural was identical with
Kunda Kunda the author of Prabhrita traya, and that he lived about
the beginning of the 1st entury A. D.

This identification of Elacharya the author of Kural with Kunda

Kunda brings in another important point of historical interest. It
is an acknowledged fact that Kural is anterior to Silabpadikaram
and Manimekhela. The former was, written by 'IlangovadigoP the
 —

THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. XI

younger brother of '

Singuttuman Seran' the Chera King of Vangi.
The latter work which is merely the continuation of the story of

Sildppddikaram was written by "Kulavanikan Sattanar" a contemporary

and friend of Ilangovadi. During the pratishtci of Devi temple
(Silappadikaram) Gajahbhahu I of Ceylon was present, according to

Mahavansa, he reigned about 113 A. D. Kural therefore must be

anterior to this date ; so this also goes to corroborate the age of
Elacharya or Kunda Kunda.

All these scattered facts of traditions and literary remains produce

cumulative evidence to establish that our author was of Dravidian
origin. That he was the leader of the Dravidian Sangha and that
he was evidently highly cultured in more than one language. This
use of the word 'Dravida' in the 'Draviia Sangha' must have a
specific reference to the Jainas of South India, the Velialas of the
ancient Tamil literature, who strictly followed 'Kollavratam' or
'Ahimsa-dharma, and it is further evidenced by the popular use of
the word in the compound, 'Dravida -brahmins' who are strict

vegetarians as contrasted with 'Gouda-brahmins' It is a well-known

fact that the strict vegetarianism in daily life of South Indian
Brahmins who nevertheless perform 'Yagams' involving animal sacrifice
is a heritage from early Jaina culture in South India.

The early kingdoms of South India were the Cheras. che Cholas
and the Pandyas. It is a well-known historical fact pertaining to
South India that the Pandiyas were Jains and were patrons of
Jainism. They changed their faith only during the Sivaite revival
effected by Appar and Sundarar about the 8th century. That the
Cheras were also Jains can be inferred from 'Silappadikana'
another great Tamil classic written by a Jama scholar the younger
brother of the Chera king (who was a contemporary of Gajabahu of
Ceylon). The Cholas were also off and on the Patrons of Jains though
in later days they were associated with Sivaitism. These three
kingdoms were known about The court language the time of Asoka.
in all the three was probably Tamil. Can we suppose that Sri
Kunda Kunda belonged to any one of these kingdoms. Our above
discussion would lead us to such a supposition and yet there is an
important stumbling block in our way.

The work that is translated here is in Prakrit. Further all the

commentators of '
Prabbanitatrava '
xii THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

Panchastikaya, Pravachanasara and Samayasara— mention the fact

that these works were written by Kunda Kundacharya for the benefit
of his royal disciple Shivakumara Maharaja. Who this Shiva Kumara
Maharaja was and over what kingdom he ruled the commentators
are silent about. We are once again compelled to have recourse to

hypothesis. This Siva Kumara Maharaja must have been a follower of

Jaina faith and must have had prakrit as his court language. Further
he must have been somewhere in the south in order to have Sri Kunda
Kunda as his religious teacher. This name does not occur in the

dynastic geneology of the three Tamil Kingdoms— the Cheras, the

Cholas and the Pandiyas. Further there is no evidence that any
prince of these dynasties had prakrit as his court language.

Before we proceed to state our theory we have to dispose of

the theory proposed by K. B. Pathak as to the identification of

Sivakumara Maharaja.
The Indian Antiquary, Vol. XIV, 1885, page 15. Kunda Kunda

was one of the most celebrated Jaina authors. The works attributed
to him are the Prabhritasara, the Pravachanasara, the Samayasara,
the Rayanasara and the Dvadasanupreksha.

These are all written in Jaina Prakrit Balachandra the commen-

tator who lived before Abhinava Pampa says in his introductory

remarks on the Prabhritasara that Kunda Kundacharya was also called

Padmanandi and was the preceptor of Siva Kumara Maharaja. I would
identify the king with the early Kadamba King Sri Vijaya Siva Mrigesa
Maharaja. For in his time, the Jainas had already been divided
into the Nirgranthas and the Svetapatas, and Kunda Kunda
attacks the Svetapata sect when he says, \q the Pravachanasara that
women are allowed to wear clothes because they are incapable
of attaining Nirvana.

" Chitte Chinta mayatbamba tasim na nivvanam

$& fsfamror eras i ciiftf ^fassrH i

Another interesting fact that we learn from his works is that, in the
time of this author Jainism had not spread far and wide in these parts
and that the body of this people worshipped Vishnu for he tells

us in the Samayasara.
 THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. Xlii

" So no difference appears between the people and the Sramanas

in respect of the Siddhanta (in the opinion) of the people, Vishnu
makes (every thing) (in the opinion) of the Sramanas the Soul
makes (everything). On these circumstances, as well as on the
place assigned to him in Jaina Pattavalis and on the fact that his

writings are considered by Jaina scholars, both in Dharwar and

Maisur, to be the most ancient Jaina works now extant I base my
Kunda Kundacharya was a contemporary
opinion that of the early
Kadamba King Siva Mrigese Maharaja.
The reasons cited by K. P. Pathak are all right. Kunda Kunda
is later than the Svetambara Schism which is believed to have taken
place about the time of Bhadrabahu, I And perhaps at the time of
Kunda Kunda the ordinary masses followed the vedantic form of

Vishnava cult. But still these facts do not form a cogent reason for
identifying Siva Kumara Maharaja with the Kadamba King Siva
Mrigese Varma. Mysore and Coorg by Lewis Rice, page 21. "The
Kadambas were rulers of the west of Mysore from the 3rd to the
6th century." And Siva Mrigesa Varma ruled about the 5th
century A. D. But the pontificate of Sri Kunda Kunda began in

B. C. 8. The early dynasties by J. F. Fleet, page 288 of the

Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. I. "and this is altogether too ancient, a period
for the early Kadambas" further we do not know whether the
Kadambas were acquainted with Prakrit language. Under these
circumstances we have to seek elsewhere as to the whereabouts of
Siva Kumara Maharaja, the disciple of Sri Kunda Kunda.
Conchipuram was the capital of the Pallava kingdom. The
Pallavas ruled over Thonda Mandalam and also over a part of the
Telugu country up to the river Krishna. Thonda Mandalam or
Thondainadu was the name given to the land along the east coast
between the two Peunars, South Peunar in South Arcot and North
Pennar in Nellor and to east of the ghats. This land was divided into
several nadus and each nadu into several kottams. It was the land
of the learned. Several great Dravidian scholars such as the author of
the Kurral, the great tamil poetess Avvai, the Sweet Puhazanthi the
author of Nalavenba, all belong to Thondimandalam. Throughout
the Tamil literature there are references to the literary merits and
the culture of the inhabitants of Thondinadu. Concheepuram
the capital of Thondinadu must have been a great centre of learning
in the south. Students from different parts of the country went to
x iv THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

Conjeepuram for purposes of study. Scholars thronged there for the

purpose of being recognised at the Pallava Court. Mayura-Sarma one

of the early founders of the Kadamba dynasty went to the Pallava

capital for the purpose of completing his education in the Sacred lore.
It was there that he quarrelled with the master of the horses who was

a Kshatriya Mayura Sarma, a brahmin by birth vowed that even a

brahmin could handle the weapons of warfare with skill and could
found a kingdom. Thus arose the Kadamba dynasty. Thus the glory
of Conjeepuram —
the Pallava capital must have wide spread about the

2nd century A. D. The kings of Conjeepuram as patrons of learning

must have encouraged philosophical discussion among the representa-
tives of the different religious sects, —
the Hindus, Buddhists and

Jains. Taking part in such religio-philosophical discussions must

necessarily have a reaction on the personal faith of the kings. In
the early centuries of the Christian era, proselytising was a common
factor among the rival religionists. Great religious leader of

different denominations went about from country to country con-

verting kings and people. Thus we hear from Jaina History that
Samantabhadraswami visited Conjeepuram and converted Siva
Koti Maharaja who became Siva Koti Muni the disciple and succes-
sor of Samantabhadra. Still later towards the 8th century Akalanka

visited the capital defeated the Buddhists in open philosophical

contests and converted Himaseeihala the then Buddhist king.

It is not improbable therefore that the Pallava kings at Conjeepuram
during the 1st century of this era were patrons of Jaina Religon or
were themselves Jainas by faith.

We also know from Several epigraphical records that they had

Prakrit as their court language. What is known as the Mayidavolu
grant is an important document for South Indian History.. It is in

Prakrit with the exception of the last verse, which is the closing
mangala in Sanskrit. The body of the grant is in a prakritic dialect

which comes close to the literary Pali, but shows also a number
of peculiarities and divergent forms Dr. Buhler, Epi. Jndica. Vol.
I, p. 2. Come nearer to the usage of the Jaina and Maharashtri
dialectics than to that of the Pali and older inscriptions . It is

issued by the Pallava King Siva Skandavarma of Conjeepuram.

Further it may be pointed out that the grant resembles in many
particulars the Jaina inscriptions from Mathura, The use of the
word 'Siddham' in the beginning of the grant as well as 10 the
 '

THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. XV

Mathura inscriptions is very suggestive of Jaina origiue. The

most important point for us is the name of the King Sivaskanda
which is merely another form of Siva Kumara. No doubt the same
name occurs in the Andhra line. M. J. G. Dubreinl tries to connect
the two dynasties by matrimonial alliance. He suggests that the
Sivaskandavarma lYuvamaharaja) of the Pallava dynasty is the
grandson of Sivaskanda Sa^a Kami by the daughter and received the
name of the Andhra king who was his grandfather. Whether the
name was so inherited or was independently adopted by the Pallava
kings it is not quite material to decide here. It is enough to notice
the fact that there was a Pallava king by name Sivaskanda
or Siva Kumara Maharaja. He also figures as Yuva-maharaja in

another grant. This name is also curiously identical with Kumara

Maharaja. It is quite possible therefore that this Sivaskanda of
Conjeepuram or one of the predecessor of the same name was the
contemporary and disciple of Sri Kunda Kunda* This would well fit

in with known about Kunda Kunda. Kunda Kunda or

several facts
Elacharya must have been in Thondimandalam. So also was
Pataliputra the seat of Dravida Sangha a town in Thondimandalam

In this connection we have to reject two theories about Pallavas

as unfounded and improbable. The Pallavas are generally supposed
to be foreigners from Persia. They are identified with Pahlavas,
Mysore and Coorg by L. Rice, page 53, which is the prakrit form of the
"
Parthava meaning Parthians, here especially the "Arsacidian Parthians
Rice further builds upon this theory another fantastic one that
Chaulkyans who were sometimes the enemies of the Pallavas were
by origin Salenkaians. V. Venkiyya adopts the same theory
though it is based upon purely etymological grounds. The Hypothesis
that based upon mere similarity of names has no great historical
is

importance unless it is corroborated by independent evidence. This

theory unfortunately lacks such a corroboration. Hence it leaves

unchallenged the other hypothesis which is perhaps more probable

that the Pallavas were a section of the Hindu race in the south.

Another hypothesis deserves notice before dis missal. It is the

identification of the Pallavas with some aboriginal tribes as the

Kurumbas. This again is based upon the use of the word "Kadavar'
to designate the later Pallavas. No doubt the term "Kadavar"
"means the men of the forest". But there is no other ground to

show that this "Kadvars" were of the ''forest tribe". In tamil literature
XV THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

it refers to a highly civilised and cultured race. There must be some

other reason therefore for the application of the name to the Pallavas.

It may be merely a contrac ion of "Palakkadavar" a people of the

Palakkada another seat of Pallava government.
Waiving these two hypothesis as improbable may we not suppose
a much closer alliance between the people of the Thondimandalam
and Andhras or the Andrabhrityas who succeeded the Mauryas.
The term "Thondu" in tanvl means 'Service
5

. 'Thondar' may
simply mean 'those who serve' and may be taken as the Tamil
Translation of Andrabhrityas. The Pallavas or the Thondar?
therefore may merely a section of the Andhras. Settled in the
south who inherited that potion of the Andhra kingdom either by
matrimony or by right. This theory that the Pallavas were an
indigenous race with a very high culture and civilizaiion men related

to Andhrabhrityas is highly probable and is corroborated by other

circumstantial evidence.

This digression into the history of the Pallavas we have had

because such a political environment is required for our author Sri

Kunda Kunda Acharya according to the available data about his life.

We may therefore conclude that Sri Kunda Kunda Acharya wrote his
Prabhrita Triya for one Siva Kumara Maharaja who was most
probably the same as Siva Skanda Varma of the Pallava dynasty.

Several works are attributed to Sri Kunda Kunda Acharya.

1. Prabhrita triya (The three Prabhritas).

2. Shatpahudam.
3. Niyamasara, etc.

Of these the first three, Panchastikaya, Pravachanasara and

Samayasara are the best known and most important. The work that

is offered in translation here is the first of these three Panchastikaya

Prabhrita which treats about the five cosmic constituents.
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION
TO

PANCHASTIKAYASARA.
JAINISM— ADYNAMIC REALISM.
When the European scholars first began to studv Indian
Philosophy and Indian Literature they were peculiarly sympathetic
towards the idealistic systems of India. These scholars were brought
up in the tradition of Kant and Hegel. Kant in constructing his
critical philosophy emphasised the phenomenality of our experience
in general. The external word including "the starry heavens above"
was merely a fictitious creation of the human mind according to its

own forms and categories.

Roused from his dogmatic clumber by Hume, Kant began to

inquire as to the possibility of a true metaphysics. Humes analysis
of experience ended in throwing overboard the fundamental concep-
tions of experience. The reality of the Self, the objective world and
even the certain law of causation were all said to be fictitious concepts

based upon psychological habits but having no rational foundation.

From such a sceptical shipwreck Kant attempted to save metaphysics.

Waiving the earlier methods as dogmatic he introduced his own

critical philosophy. The main characteristic of this system is the
activity of the mind as opposed to the passive tabula rasa of the Lockeian

system. Nature is due to the co-operation of sense materials and the

activity of mind. Forms of space and time and the categories of
the understandig from the a priori constitutive elements of experience.
Knowledge is confined to such an experience which is phenomenal.
This phenomenal world or the world of appearance is but an island
surrounded by the unknown ocean of noumenal reality. This may be
taken to be the foundation of modern idealism.
No doubt Kant strongly repudiated the suggestion that his system
was idealistic. It is true that he posited the existence of the thing- in-
itself. But this realm of noumenal reality remained unknown and
unknowable. It was preserved only because of Kant's personal
prediliction ; hence it was the very first thing to be rejected by his
successors.
XVlil A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

Through the influence of Hegel the German idealism secured an

inordinate potency. Peculiarly gifted with genius for system-building

Hegel wrought out his system of idealism based on Kantian traditions.

The thing-in-itself was got rid of as an empty abstraction. Reality
was identified with concrete experience. Thus the metaphysical
dualism of Kant was converted into an idealistic monism. According
to this Hegelian conception reality is equal to the Absolute conscious-
ness. All finite things and persons are reduced to merely adjectives
or qualities of this Absolute which is of the nature of the spirit. It is

this spirit that is the reality of which all other things of our ordinary
experience are mere appearances.

Besides this idealistic monism of Germany there was another

important nspectof thought that determined the trend of modern ideas.
Herbert Spencer worked out a scheme of cosmic evolution in his

synthetic system. This Spencerian philosophy also in its own

way contributed to metaphysical monism and phenomenality of
experience ; hence the philosophy of the 19th century, especially

towards the last quarter, had a predominent note of monism. This

general pronenes? towards a monistic interpretation in western
thought must have determined the attitude of the West towards
Indian thought. Naturally were European scholars like Max
Midler and Deussen sympathetically attracted by the metaphysical
flights of Sankara and Ramanuj.i. The uncompromising monism
of Vedanta was admired as the fruit of oriental culture.

The philosophical attitude is never constant. It has always

been undulating between idealism and realism. In the West there
is observe! a distinct set-back to idealism. The English philosophers
like Bradley and Bosanquet who inherited the traditions of Hegel
and who practically ruled the philosophical world are now openly
challenged. This revolt against idealistic influence has manifested
through different channels. Pragmatism championed by James
and Dexcey has ' exposed the hollowness of a barren Intellectua-

lism.

The Hegelian doctrine of the identity between Thought and

Reality and the consequent criterion of Truth in the form of self-

coherence and self-consistency are openly condemned as pernicious

metaphysics. '•
The will to believe " is recognised as an important
factor in Knowledge, Experimental verification of thought '
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. Xl'x

which is the method followed in Science is hailed as the true

model for philosophy. Thought is studied in its true concrete
setting. In as much as it is merely an instrument to secure greater
efficiency cf life, its value is entirely determined by its utility.

Even Scientistis like Mack and Poincare acknowledge this instru-

mentality of thought. Concepts are only convenient fictions to

comprehend Nature.
From within Oxford University itself there has "sprung up a
philosophical schism which bolulv qestions the pertensions of the
Absolute. Schiller and Rashdall, Struti and others attack the
Hegelian stronghold. The Absolute is condemned because it neith:r
satisfies the philosophical curiosity nor appeals to religious consci-
ousness.

From France and Italy we hear a similar protest from Bergson

and Croce. The former repudiating the Hegelian Absolute builds
up a theory of the Universe based upon evolutionism. He too
condemns intellect as inadequate to apprehend the inner nature
of reality. His antagonism to Intellectualism U carried to an
uncompromising revolt against even scientific and philosophical
constructions in general. He appeals to intuition as the only
means of getting at Reality. Similarly Croce tries to separate what
is living from what is dead, in Hegel . Thus on all sides this

German Idealism is being assaulted. But the most dangerous

opponent of Idealism is come in the form of New Rea'ism.

From an unexpected source there has come opposition. The Science

of Mathematics whose alleged weakness was the strength of Kantian
Idealism has asserted its own right to challenge metayphysics. The
mathematical discoveries of Cantor, Peano, and Frege have once for

all reclaimed certain fundamental Mathematical notions such as

the concepts of infinity and continuity from the unwarranted
criticisms of metaphysicians. As Mr. B. Russell clearly points
out, modern Idealism must once for all relinquish its Kantian basis.

It can no more depend upon the so called demonstration offered

by Kant as to the impossibility of real space and time.

This wave of realism is further intensified by the fact that it

is intimately associated with modern Science. The traditional

Hegelian idealism of the West has been peculiarly adverse to the
interest of Science, It may be safety asserted that a system of
 XX A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

metaphysics with does not take into consideration the method

and achievement of modern Science is so far self-condemned. No-
body can be blind to the claim of Science to be a safe means for

revealing truth. Its claim is so wonderfully substantiated by its

achievements, that we may say that modern life and modern

thought are mainly the result of modern Science. So much so any
system of Metaphysics which aspires to secure the open-sesame
to unlock the secrets of reality must not openly conflict with modern
Science. The ne^v realism therefore is in noble company.
When we are aware of this changed attitude in modern thought
we are naturally stimulated to examine similar philosophical attitudes
in the past.

What is placed before the students of philosophy herein is

due to such a sympathetic scrutiny of the past, The jaina system

of thought is so peculiarly consistent with moiern realism and
modern science, that one may be tempted to question its antiquity.

Still it is a f.ict, that such a system flourished in India several

centuries before the Christian era.

The author of the work who is translated in the following pages

lived in the 1st century B. C. Hence it is one of the earliest treatises
on Jaina Thought. But the author was not the orginator of this
system. The anenhatavada of the Jains must be certainly elder
than Mahavira who is believed to have revived Janism.

The realistic tendency in oriental philosophy is not peculiar to

Jainism. From the very early days, we find this principle of inter-
preting and the Universe running side by side with the idealis-
life

tic one. During the Vedic period we find nothing but gross form
of Realism. The Vedic Gods were but magnified human beings
sharing all the weaknesses and
foibles peculiar to mankind. When
sacrificeswere offered to Indra or Agni or Vayuov Varuna with chant-
ing of hymns, there could be no trace of any suspicion
as to the
reality of the world around. Not only the world of Nature was taken
to be real but many of its element were imaged after
man. No
doubt we find a unifying tendency as an undercurrent of the
Vedic
thought. No doubt the Vedic Devas were subordinated to the one
creative principle of the Universe— Prajapati.
But this wonderful period of primitive culture is followed
by a barren age of sheer ceremonialism. The
period of the Brah-
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. XX)

manas is marked by sacrificial technique. Elaborate formulae were

invented for the conduct of sacrifices. Ceremonialism took the
place of Poetic effusions. This led to the ascendency of the priestly
class. The sacrificial master or Yajaman has to engage his priests,

paying heavy fees or daltshanas. Religious devotion during this

period degenerated into petty commercialism. But this state of things
did not last long. While the priests were further elaborating the
ceremonial formulas the work of investigating the true nature reality
was taken up by another band of thinkers. By this time the homo-
genious Aryan tribe split up into different castes. Of these sects
the Kshalriyas or the warrior class have learned the secrets of Reality.
They have introduced a new philosophical cult known as Brlimavidya.
The Brlimavidya must have originally referred to certain spiritual intui-
tions obtained through introspection. Man discovered himself for the first

time. The inner spiritual principle, the At man is taken to be the Reality.
It is neither the body nor the senses. It is something behind and
beyond the corporeal frame. It is that which hears but is not heard.
It is that which sees but is not seen. It is that which makes the
operation of the senses possible while itself is beyond sense-apprehen-
sion. This spiritual principle was indifferently called Atman or
Brhaman. Like the Pythogorians of Greece, the Indian thinkers
kept their metaphysical cult as a secret. The Kshatriyas who were
the discoverers and custodians of the New Thought imparted it

only to the deserving few. This itpanishadic cult, for so was it

named, soon replaced the earlier ceremonialism. The Jndna-Mnda

superseded the Karma-kdnda as the path to Self-realisation. Even
the priests, discounting their ceremonial technique, flocked to the
Royal courts to be initiated into the new mysteries. Thus the age
was one of intense discussion, research and self-introspection.
During this period again, we have the seeds of the different philo-
sophical systems constructed in the succeeding period. No doubt
Yagnavalhya is a towering personality of the Upanishadic age.
No doubt he attempted reconciliation between the old and the new.
In his hands the new wisdom appeared as distinctly monistic. But
that current which is evidently the source of the later Vedantic
stream was only one of the many currents of the Upanishadic
wisdom. This is very well substantiated by the different systems

constructed subsequent to the age. The philosophical systems in

India ate mainly of two classes, the orthodox and the heretic. The six
xx ij A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

Darshands Purva mimamsa, Uttara mimamsa or Vedanta, Sankbya,

Yoga, Nyaya, Viseshika — constitute the orthodox systems. The here-

tical systems are Buddhism, Jainism, the philosophy of the Charvakas

and Brhaspatyas. Of course this classification does not mean

anything but that it was made by Brahminical schola'rs 'orthox'
and 'heretical' are terms mainly based upon the attitude to-

wards the Vedas. Kapila's Sankhya is Nirisvara and is allied to

Jainism and Buddhi-m in its opposition to Vedic Sacrifices. Purva

mimamsa or Vedanta rejects the creator and creation as Vyavaharic
and hence the result of Maya. There is a good deal of truth in the

statement that it is merely Buddhism in disguise. Hence the tradi-

tional classification is justified neither by pholosophical nor religious

criterion.

Of these different systems which reperesent the post-upanishadic

thought the Vedanta alone has become prominent. But students who
study impartially the other systems will realise the importance of their
contributions to Indian thought and culture.

The supremacy of Vedanta over the systems, which are to a

very great extent realistic, is not a thing to. congratulate ourselves.

For, Realism is generally allied to science and many of the scientific

theories pertaining to the constitution of the physical world are

associated with these realistic schools, e.g., the atomic theory of the
Nyaya and Viseshika schools. Idealism even in the West either

openly or covertly has been antagonistic to the interests of Science.

Hence any attempt to escape from the hypnotic illusion of a power-
ful Idealism is to be welcomed by impartial students of Science and^
Philosophy.

It is not possible for us to examine in detail the several real-

istic schools of Indian Thought. Hence we shall confine ourselves

to Jaina Philosophy which is generally neglected by many and mis-

understood by the few who attempt to speak on it.

JAINA PHYSICS.
We have referred to the contribution to Indian Wisdom by the
Warriors. By their plain living and high thinking they led to the
emancipation of human intellect from the thraldom of barren ritualism
While the priest-craft was engaged in devising sacrifice after sacrifice

their minds were dominated by a passionate desire for solving the

 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. xxill

riddle of the Universe and for understanding the nature of the Eternal
One behind the world of appearance. This dominant phase of
monism centres round the court of Janaka. But there must have
been other schools of new Kshatriya thought. This group of
thinkers could not compromise with the traditional thought of
the Vedic They show a strong bias towards Dualism
period.
and Pluralism. They represent the liberal tendency in the
new thought itself. Whenever they encountered a conflict between
their ideals and the Vedas they did not hesitate to repudiate the
authority of the latter. To this left wing of the pioneers of thought
we owe the Systems of philosophy sucji as the Sankhycz, the Jaina and
the Buddhistic schools. It is worthy of notice here, by the way, " that
the greatest intellectual performances or rather almost
all the perform-

ances of significance for mankind in India have been achieved by men

of the warrior caste."'*'

The Sankhya system presupposes two kinds of existences, Physi-

cal and Spiritual, Prakriti and Purusha — rather an infinite number of
Purushas. Salvation Sankhya consists in the differ-
according to
entiation between the two, matter and spirit. The individual Pursha
secures emancipation by recognising its own intrinsic qualities as be-
ing distinct from the Prakritic transformations which go to constitute
the cosmic evolution. Not only the genuine physical changes but
also the pshychological facts such as will, desire and intellect are
credited to Prakriti while the Purushas remain passive spectators of
the who'e drama, having nothing to do with moral responsibility.

Evidently following the same dualistic tendencies but differing in

the last point of moral responsibility the Jainas and the Buddhists
worked out their respective systems with a deep religious colour.
The Buddhists seem to have overshot their mark. Equipped with the
logic of Kshanikavdda they reduced the whole world of reality,
physical and spiritual, to mere concatenation of sense-qualities having
—
only a momentary existence a result independently reached after
several centuries by Hume. Neither this sensational nihilism of
Sakya Muni nor the monistic interpretation is favoured by the Jainas.
They steer clear of the two extremes. They accept the Purushas
of the Sankhyas ; but in their hands these Purushas cease to be pas-

sive spectators. They are active architects of their own destiny and

* "Philosophy of Ancient India" by Richard Garbe.

xxiv A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

through their own effort obtain final freedom bearing all the while full

moral responsibility for conduct. The Prakriti is also similarly ela-

borately reconstructed. It is made more definite. It is denied many
of its psychological implications. It is identified with Matter in

modern scientific sense and it is also given an atomic constitution.

It appears under a new name— Pudgala. The term pudgala
means matter. The Physical object which has the several sense
qualities and which occupies space is also called Murta and
Rupa, object. In speaking about Pudgala or matter the Jaina think-
ers clearly analyse the qualities apprehended by sense perception.
The qualities of touch, taste, smell, colour, and sound are generally
associated with Pudgala. \

But the Physical bodies that are fipprehended by sense perception

are constituted by atoms or Paramam'n. It is this atomic structure

of the Universe that is the interesting part of Jaina v Physics.* The

Paramanu or atom is defined quite in terms of modern phys :

c>.

Thmgh modern physics 'revolutionised the concept of Atom still it

has not completely annihilated it. No doubt an atom is a cluster of

electrons as complex perhaps as the solar system itself. But the

discovery of radio-activity has not interfered with the laws of Physics
and Chemistry based upon atomic conception. The only change that

modern Physics has introduced is that Atom is no more simple and

basic but complex and perhaps secondary. In spite of this complex
nature it does maintain its individuality. No modern physicist will
deny that it is the fundamental foundation of the structure of

the Physical Universe. It is such an atom or Paramanu that is the

basis of Physical structure.

The Paramanu is neither created nor can be destroyed. It, is the

permanent basis of the Physical Universe. The several kinds of

Physical objects are all constituted by the same class of primordial
atom. The Paramanu cannot be an object of sense perception. It

is in itself transcending the sense experience and as such it is practic-

ally Amiirta though it is the basic constituent of all Murta, objects.
This primary atom or the material point has an intrinsic
attraction to similar atoms. Thus moleculor aggregates are
formed by the combination of atoms. These molecular aggregates

* This doctrine of atomic structure is also prominent in the Nyaya and Viseshika
Schools.
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. XXV

are called S band has.* These skandhas are again of infinite variety;
you may have a malecule constituted by two atoms or three and so on
up to infinite number of atoms. Thus every perceivable object is a
skandha and even the whole physical universe is sometimes spoken of
as Mahaska ndha or the Great aggregate. The physical objects being

aggregates of atoms or skandhas their changes are entirely due to

atomic disintegration or aggregation.

THE CONCEPTION OF MOTION.

Having accepted the reality of physical object the Jainas naturally
accepted the possibility of real motion.
Motion has always been an unintelligible perplexity to the Idealist.
Both in the East and the West Idealistic thinkers have fought shy
of this by taking refuge in the conception of Maya or appearance.
It is in the western System of thought that the conception figures
prominent. Zeno trying to defend the unchangeable admantine
Absolute of Parmlnides introduced four invincible arguments against
the reality of motion. These arguments were accepted as invinciable
for several centuries. They figure in some from or other in Kantian
antinomies and Hegelian dielectic. Even Bradley draws upon Zeno's
wisdom in his attempt to condemn the realities of concrete world to
the limbo of appearances. As Mr. B. Russell points out the argu-
in the light of modern
ments are no more irrefutable Mathematics.
Hence Realism need not approach the problem with any misgivings.
Reality of motion has thus obtained a standing ground in the field of
modern philosophy.
What is more important than this is the part played by this
concept in Science. For Science the world of reality is a system of
energies. This dynamic conception of science has given a new
dignity to the concept of motion. In spite of the unwarranted
caution exhibited by Physicists like E. Mack and Karl Pearson
modern Physics has once again emphasised the importance and the
reality of motion in understanding the mystery of Nature. Always
looked upon with suspicion by idealistic metaphysics the doctrine
of Reality of motion has been welcomed by Realistic and scientific

systems of thought.
But in order to accept the reality of motion of Physical objects
the reality of space must be postulated. Thus motion in Jaina
doctrine is intimately associated with space and two other Categories
* This term also occurs in Buddhistic philosophy but with a different meaning.
4
XXvi A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

with peculiar nomenclature, of Dharma and Adharma. We shall

examine the Jaina account of these three Categories.

Reality of space is also a crucial doctrine to determine whether

metaphysics is indealistic or realistic. Curiously the non- Jaina
Indian systems of thought do not- pay any prominent attention to

the problem of space. In fact the more influential Indian system

of Philosopdy, the Vedanta uses the term Akdsa indifferently to denote

space and ether. It is the latter meaning that is more prominent.

It is to the credit of the ancient Jaina thinkers that they took a bold
attempt to attack the problem and that with very great success. This
fact is perhaps due to their special interest in Mathematics. An
adequate solution of the problem of space and time is intimately con-
nected with Mathematical Philosophy. It is modern Mathematics that

has successfully reclaimed once again space and time from the destruc-
tive dialectic of the idealistic metaphysics. Space is indispensable to

Science and Realistic metaphysics. The wonders of modern science

are all associated with the reality of Space and what is contained
therein. Hence to " the Indian Realism" space cannot but be real.

Akdsa is infinite extension. It accommodates all other real existences.

On account of this accommodating function it has a portion which is

rilled with the other real objects. This portion is called Lokdkdsa
the world-space because it is co-extensive with the world or Lokd.
Beyond that there is the infinite empty space which is Sitddha
Atlanta Akdsa.

The interesting fact about this conception of space is the doctrine

that space also is constituted by simple elements known as Akdsdmi

or spacial point. This Akdsdnn is to space what Pudgala Paramdnu.
is to matter. And each Akasdnu is related to each Pudgalami, To
borrow a convenient modern expression the class of space points and
the class of material points are " similar having one to one relation."

The Jaina thinkers elaborately describe the nature of space care-

fully distinguishing it from matter. It is devoid of the several
Physical qualities and as such it is mere extension. It should not be
confounded with extended objects.
Matter and space do not exhaust the Physical conception. The Jaina
thinker pertinently asks the question why the atoms should be kept
together constituting the world of Maha Skandha ? Why should they
not get dissipated throughtout Anantdkdsa or infinite space ? Then
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. XXVII

there would be no world. The very fact that the structure of the

world is permanent, that the world is a cosmos and not a chaos implies
the existence of another principle which guarantees the permanency
of the world's structure and the world form. This principle has the
function of binding the flying atoms to the world's centre. Its

function then is distinctly inhibitive to arrest the flying atom. This

Physical principle is called Adharma or rest. But if Adharma alone
were to function in the Universe, there would be absolute rest and
universal cosmic paralysis ; hence the necessity of a counteracting
force called Dharma. The function of this is to guarantee free
movement for the objects that move of their own accord or otherwise.

This principle of Dharma or motion then is merely to relieve the

universal inhibition that would otherwise result.

These two principle, Dharma and Adharma, of motion and rest are

described in terms that are applicable to the modern conception of

ether. Both Dharma and Adharma pervade through space up to the
world limit. They are absolutely non-Physical in nature and non-
atomic and non-discrete in structure. The qualities of Pudgala are not
found therein. Nor have they the structure of space which is consti-

tuted by space points. These two Physical principle are perfectly

simple. Therefore they may be spoken of as one or as many. There
are spacial, and yet are non-spacial. They are Amvrta and Arupa.
They are neither light nor heavy. They are not objects of sense
perception. Their existence is inferred only through their function.
Such are the characteristics of these two principles which are
distinctly peculiar to Jaina Physics.
The movement of Physical objects and of organic beings is due
entirely to other causal agency. Organic beings are capable of
spontaneous movement and Physical objects move because of impact

received from other Physical moving objects. Movement of these

things should not be causally traced to the agency of Dharma.

Similary when the moving objects come to rest, rest should not be
interpreted as the result of the agency of Adharma. Dharma and
Adharma are devoid of any kind of direct causal potency. Their
function is purely external and indirect. Their neutrality is so much
emphasised by the Jaina thinkers that there conld be no mistake about
their meaning. These are in short the necessary Physical postulates

without posting which the structure and form of Physical Universe

will be quite unintelligible.
XXVlii A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

JAINA METAPHYSICS.
There are two important concepts in Jaina Metaphysics which
are preplexing to students of Jainism, the Astikayas and the
Draiiyas, The term Astikdya is a compound name made up of
Asti and Kdya which respectively mean existing and extensive
magnitude. Astikdya therefore means a real that has extensive
magnitude. The other term Dravya means the real that is fluent
or changing. We shall try to explain these two concept in detail.

The Astikdya are five in number, Jiva (soul) pudgala (matter),

dhartna (principle of motion), adharma (principle of rest) and
dkdsa (space). These five build up the Cosmos. Space and
matter are distinctly extended reals. Dharma and Adharma are
indirectly related to space. Their operation is in space and is

limited by Lokdkdsa. Thus they may also be considered as related

to space. Lastly Life is generally associated with body, the
organic body constituted by Pudgala or matter. Jiva is operative
in and conditioned by such a physical medium. In a way there-

fore Jiva also is related to space. These five existences which have
spatiality either directly or indirectly are the five Astikayas These
are the constituent elements of the universe or the world.

kAla.
Kala or time though not an element of the physical universe
may be mentioned here. Since change and motion are admitted
to be real, time also must be considered real. The real are absolute
time as contrasted with the relative time is constituted by simple
elements known as Kaldnus or instants. Instants, points and
atoms are the characteristic conceptions of Jaina thought and in

this respect it has a wonderful corroboration from the field of

modern mathematics.
The Jaina thinkers in distinguishing time from the five Asti-
kayas made use of an important idea. Astikdya is spatiality or
extensive magnitude. This extensive magnitude is denoted by a
technical name — Tiryak Prachaya or horizontal extension.

When the simple elements, say, the points are so arranged in

a series where each term is an item also in another series we must
have the two demensional series which will correspond to surface
or extension. Wherever there is such a Tiryak Prachaya we have
Astikdya. But time or Kdla has only Urdha Prachaya. The
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. XXIX

elements are in a forward direction. The series is mono-dimensional

or linear order. Therefore Kdla has no extension either directly
or indirectly. Hence it is not an Astikdya. Though it is not an
Astikdya it is distinctly a real entity which accounts for changes
in other things.

Such are the characteristics of real time. This should not be

confounded with Vyavdhara KdJa or relative time which is

measured by some conventional units of either long or short dura-

tion. These conventional distinctions would have no meaning if

they are not co-ordinated in a single real time series.

THE SIXDRAVYAS.
The term Dravya denotes any existence which has the im-
portant characteristic of persistence through change. Jaina con-
ception of reality excludes both a permenent and unchanging real

of the Permenidion type and also the mere eternal flux of Hara-
clites. An unchanging permanent and mere change without sub-
stratum are unreal dan impossible abstractions. Jaina system
admits only the dynamic reality or Dravya. Dravya then is that

which has a permanent substantiality which manifests through

change of appearing and disappearing. Utpdta — Origin, Vyaya —
decay and Dhrouvya — permanency form the triple nature of the
Real. To emphasise the underlying identity alone would end
vedantic conception of this Realas To emphasise the
Brahman.
change alone would result in the Kshainka Vdda of the Buddhist.
The reality as a stream of discrete and momentary elements. The
Concept of Dravya. reconciles both these aspects and combines
them into an organic unity. It is an identity expressing through
difference, a permanency continuing through change. It corresponds

to the modern conception of organic development rather in its

Hegelian aspect. It has duration; it is movement; it is the Elan Vital.
The five Astikdyas and KdJa or time are tjie six Dravyas or the real
existences.

DRAVYA GUNA AND PARYAYA

or

Substance, Qualities and Modes.

Having introduced tho Jaina conception of the real let us
examine the distinctions in the realem of the reals. The dynamic
XXX A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

substance or Dravya is always associated with certain intrinsic and

inalienable qualities called Gunas. Thus the yellow colour, malle-

ability, etc., will be the qualities or Gun.a of the Dravya gold. The
Dravyas with its inalienable qualities must exist in some state or

form. This is its mode of existence or Paryaya. This mode or

Paryaya is subject to change. It may be destroyed and a new
mode may appear. But this creation and destruction are relevent
only to Paryavds or modes and not to Dravyas the constitutive

substance. That can neither be destroyed nor created. That is

eternal.

The approximate parallel conceptions in the western thought

will be Spinoza's substance, qualities and modes. Of course for

Spinoza there was only one substance whereas here we have six
distinct substances or Dravys. The term 'attribute' is used in a
technical sense by Spinoza whereas it means merely the qualities

in Jaina Metaphysics. Each Dravya or the real has its own ap-

propriate attributes. Matter has the sense qualities of touch, taste,

etc., soul has Chetana consciousness, and so with the other Dravyas.
What is the relation between Dravya and Guna ? The reals and
their qualities ? This is an important problem even in modern
metaphysics. There have been two distinct answers proposed by
philosophers. One answer always emphasises the permanent basis
as the real and the other the changing qualities. The former con-
demns change as mere appearance or Maya, whereas the latter
condemns the permanent substance as a mere figment of imagination.
The former school generally ends in agnoticism and maintains that
the real is unknown and unknowable. The latter generally ends in
scepticism and sweeps away in a flood of doubt the fundamental
concepts of life and world, of morality and religion. In India we have
Adivaita Vendarta as an example of the former and Bhuddism of the
latter. In the West the philosophers, like Locke and K<int may be
mentioned as representatives of the former school and Hume may be
taken as a type of the latter.

The problem is once again taken by Bradley who after an acute

analysis codemns it to be insolube. Hence according to his own
dialectic the thing with its qualities is self-contradictory and there-
fore an appearance. This is a conclusion which goes clean against
science and common sense. Thing-hood is not after all a self-
 .

A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. XXXI

contradictory notion. For the Jains it is a fundamental concept.

The thing or Dravya as it is a dynamic entity is always flowing. It

has no existence apart from its qualities which in their turn are not
really distinct from the Dravya. The thing-in-itself apart from all

the qualities is merely an empty abstraction. The qualities themselves

are not merely momentary fleeting sensations. The thing exists in
and through its qualities and the qualities related and organised
constitute the thing. The difference between the two is only a
difference of reference and not difference of existence; in the technical
language of Jaina metaphysics, the anyatva between dravya and
guna is only vyapadesamdtra. They donot have pradesapradnhtva
Hence they are one in reality though having distinct nomenclature
and reference.

Parydya is another technical term demanding careful under-

standing. Paryuya means mode of existence. This again is viewed
from two different aspects, arthaparydya and vyanjana-Praydya.
We have already mentioned that dravya is but an entity that is

continually changing. This triple nature of reality that is perma-

nency through births and deaths, through creation and destruction
gives to dravya a characteristic mode of existence every moment.
This continuous flow of the real is parallel to the continuous flow of
the duration of time. This intrinsic change of dravya is known as
arthaparydya. All the six dravyas have this arthaparyaya. What
is vyanjanaparydya ? It is not merely the cross- section in the
continuous flow of draoya. Vyanjanaparydya has a pretty fixed
duration of existence. Besides the molecular aggregation and
disintegration that take place every moment in a physical object, the
object may have a particular mode of existence as a pot, for example
for a certain duration of time. This parydya of pot is vyanjana-
parydya of pudgala. Similarly for jiva. The continuous change
that takes place in consciousness is Jiva's arthaparydya. Its exis-

tence as a particular organism as a man or a deva with determinate

age is the vyanjanaparydya of Jiva's. Thus Jiva and pudgala
have both the kinds of paryayds whereas the other four dravyas,
have got only arthaparydya alone. The reals are thus exhausted
by the six dravyas with their respective gunas and parydyas.

Since these Dravyas are reals they have satta or astitva or

existence as there common characteristic. From this point of view
XXxii A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

of satta all the Dravyas may be brought under one class. Though
from the class point of view all the dravyas are one, still the satta,
their common characteristic should not be abstracted and postu-
lated as the unitary substance of which the other Dravyas may be
taken as paryayas. This ekanta view is condemned as unwarranted
and erroneous. The six Dravyas, in spite of their common charac-
teristic of satta are fundamental and irreducible one to another.

One more point and we may leave this topic. A thing in

concrete world is therefore a parydya of anyoneof the Dravyas. It isalso

otherwise called artha. An artha or a thing is a corporate unity of an
infinite number of qualities, just as the Cosmos is a system of infinite

number of arthds. The one is extensive and the other is intensive ;

but both are infinite wholes. According to Jaina Philosophy

therefore, we require an infinite thought to apprehend them completely,
He who cannot know a thing completely cannot know the world
completely and conversely he who cannot know the world completely
cannot know even a single thing rea'ly and completely. This
particular attitude of the Jaina thinkers reminds us of Tennyson's lines
in, "A flower in the crannied ica//" "If I could know thee root and all

I could know what God and man is."

Having spoken of the Dravyas in general, let us try to explain

Jiva-dravya a little more in detail.

JAINA BIOLOGY.
Perhaps it is inaccurate to speak of biology in the system before
us. The science of biology as such is peculiar to modern age ; hence
we are not quite justified in expecting such a scientific conception in

a work of pre-christian era and which is perhaps of the same age

as of Plato and Aristotle. Naturally therefore, the ideas about the
organic world are curiously intermixed with various mythic and
fantastic conception relating to being of Hell and Svarga. Eliminat-
ing all these as irrelevent we still have considerable material to enable
us to have an insight into the ancient ideas about life and living beings.

One important conception that would strike the reader in the very
beginning is the organic unity of the plant and the animal world.
Vegetable kingdom is distinctly organic- Its nature was accurately
observed and carefully described. The whole plant world is included
in the class of organisms having one sense, i. e. the senses of contact.
Then the world of animals and insects is classified according to the
 A PTTJLOSOPHTCAT, INTRODUCTION. XXXMl

same principle of sense organs. The animal world beginning with

such insects as earthworm and ending with man is brought under
four main groups, organisms, with two, three, four, and five senses.
PRANAS.
Associated with organisms there is the Conception of Prdnas or
the essential characteristic? of living beings. These are mainly four.

Balaprdna, Indriyaprdna, Ayuli Pi ana, and Uchhvdsa — nischhvasa

Prana. Every organism implies certain capacity of spontaneous activity.

This capacity for action is Balaprdna or life potency. Every

organisms must possess some kind of sense awareness. This implies
the possession of a sense organ and the capacity to apprehend the
environment through that sense. The number of sense organs is

different according to stages of organic development. Next is AyuJi

Prana or duration of life. Every living organism has a limited dura-
tion of life. This organic capacity to persist through a certain duration
is Aytth Prana And lastly respiration. There is no organism without
this Prdnt of Uchhvasa — nichhvasa. These four main Prdnas are the
essential attributes of organic beings.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF BIRTHS.

One other interesting point is the enumeration of the different
means of birth of organisms. Young ones may be produced from Garbha.
These are Garbhajas young ones produced from the womb. Then the
Andajds, the young one produced from eggs. Thirdly Saminurchana
or spontaneous generation. This refers to minute organisms. And
lastly they speak of Upapadikas in the case of Devas and Narakas

The last one of course we may treat as beyond scientific pale The recog-
nition of spontaneous generation is a point deserving special emphasis.

MICROSCOPIC BEINGS.
Another fact deserving notice is the early recognition of the exis-
tence of microscopic organisms. These are called Sukshma
Ekendriya Jivas or microscopic organisms having only one sense.
These are said to fill the earth, air, water and fire. The possibility
of microscopic organisms in fire seems a little too fantastic* But in

the case of the other three we need have no hesitation as they are
fully established by modern Science.
In this connection it is necessary to point out that H. Jacobi's con-
jecture that Jainisms is very ancient though historically true rests on an

*For tho verification of this, one must look to the result of further scientific investigation.

5
XXXIV A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

unwarranted assumption as to this J ivanikdyas. He interprets (vide

his .translation of Tattvarthadhigama) this Jivas in earth, air, water

and fire in such a way as to suggest that Jainsisms is or was once at

least, a mind of Indian fetishism which believed in the souls of earth,

air, etc. Then what is the purpose of calling these Lukshma

Ekendriya Jivas ? What is the meaning of this distinction between
Jiva and ajiva, chetna and achetna ?
The different organism? mentioned above are jivas or souls in

association with matter or pudgala. If you look at the system of

metaphysics as a whole, you have the picture of an infinite number
of jivas caugh in the vortex of matter. Souls surrounded by a soulless
environment. This picture is extremely analogous to the cosmic
picture of the Sankhyas. An infinite number of purushds submerged
in an ocean of prahiiti and drifting alone the current of

prakritic evolution. But here instead of one homogeneous

prakriti constituting the environment of the purushds we have the
five ajiva-dravyas forming the appropriate stage for the enactment
of the spiritual drama of the souls. The primary characters are

Jiva and Pudgala. The others make the things go. The whole
cosmic evolution is due to the interaction between soul and matter.

According to Jaina thought this entanglement of Jiva in the vortex

of matter is Samsdra. How could achetna pudgala bring about
such a calamitous result. Pudgala or matter in a very subtle and
fine form fills the cosmic space. This form of pudgala is spoken of
as Karma prayogya pudgala — matter fit to manifest as Karma. In
this cosmic space are also the Jivas. Jivas by their impurity of
heart led to formation of subtle material cocoon or Karmic bodies
which retard and obstruct the intrinsic spiritual radiance of the soul.

When once this subtle deposit of matter is begun, the grosser

encrustation of matter and the formation of organic bodies is inevi-

table according to psycho-physical laws. Here we have to notice one

important point. Even such a great oriental scholar like Hermann
G. Jacobi makes the ambiguous and misleading statement that
Karma according to Jains is purely material and he further suggests
that since they speak of a combination between Jiva and Karma,
Jains assme that soul is of some subtle matter thus making the
combination between the two possible. This is extremely misleading
and far from the truth. Thsre is neither combination nor direct
causal relation between soul and matter. Jains speak of bhdva-karmas
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. XXXV

as distinct from dravya-karmas. The former psychological karma

is immediate to jiva. The latter material is mainly concerned with
the building up of the bodies. No doubt the two are associated
together ; yet the two are distinct and separate. Jiva is chetana and
sarira is A diet n a.

This conjoint existence or samsara is Anadi, without begin-

ning. Through its congenital impurity of the heart soul is thrown
into impure environments from time immemorial, though there
can be an end to the state of existence. This end consists in secur-
ing spiritual freedom and perfection through obtaining the purity
of the heart which in its turn leads to the destruction of the material
encasement. Thus the life of the soul in samsara is an infinite

series without beginning but with an end which is Mokshct.

JAINA PSYCHOLOGY.
Jiva is the central conception of Jaina system. Its nature is

Chetana or consciousness. Jiva and Chetana, life and consciousness

are co-extensive. Wherever there is life there is consciousness. Even
in the lowest class of organisms we have to posit existence of consci-
ousness. But this does not imply that in every living organism there
is explicit consciousness. In very many cases consciousness may
be latent and implicit. In the lower organisms it is mainly implicit
and latent, in man generally explicit and in certain exceptional cases

of men having higher spiritual development consciousness may be

supernormal.

Jiva with its characteristic of Chetana is entirely distinct from

Pudgala or matter. It cannot be apprehended by sense perception;
hence it is Ami'irta. The qualities which are generally associated
with matter such as colour, taste, etc., have no relevancy in the case
of Chetana.

Jaina Psychology is thus based upon the metaphysical assumption

of Jiva which is of the nature of Chetana. It is not a " Psychology
without a soul." This general nature of Chetana or consciousness
manifests in two ways, Darsana and Jndna, Perception and Under-
standing. These two modes of consciousness are mainly cognitive
or thought elements, Consciousness includes also emotion and will.

The effective and conative elements are also recognised by Jaina

system. Affective states or emotions are the general characteristics
XXXvi A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

of Samsari Jiva or living beings in our ordinary sense. Conduct or

behaviour is also assumed to be the natural manifestation of life.
Chdritra or conduct is also associated with all Samsari Jlvas. Thus
from the point of view of modern Psychology consciousness has a
threefold function and this is also assummed in Jaina system.

This tripartite division of consciousness is expressed in another

way also. In describing the characteristics of Jiva its Chetana
character is said to mainfest not only in Jnana, Dtf rscz/ftf-understand-

ing and perception but also in Karma Chetana and Karmaphala

Chetana awareness of action awareness of pleasure pain. The recog-

nition of the threefold aspect of consciousness may be illustrated

even from the conception of a perfect being. The characteristics of

a perfect being are Anantajndna, Anantadarsana, Anantavirya,

and Anata sukha — infinite Knowledge, Infinite perception. Infinite

power and Infinite Bliss. The other characteristics are irrelevent to our
purpose. The first two of the enumerated qualities Infinite knowledge
and infinite perception are distinctly cognitive. Infinite power im-
plies activity or conation and infinite bliss the hedonic experience.
Thus throughout the Jaina account of life the three aspects of con-
sciousness are assumed.

SOUL AND BODY.

Every organism or Samsari Jiva is an organic unity of two
a
distinct entities, Jiva and Pudgala, soul and body. Naturally there-
fore there crops up the problem of the relation between the two.
Soul is Chetana (consciousness) Amiirta (non- corporeal) Ardpa (non-
sentient) whereas body has the opposite qualities in each case. One
may be said to be the contradiction of other. The Dualism is so
emphatically expressed here as in Cartesianism.

The term body implies two different things. The gross body
that wc actually perceive through our senses. This is constituted
and nourished by matter taken in the form of food, etc. This body
is every moment changing and will be given up by the sou! after a
certain period. Besides this gross body there is for every Jiva a
subtle body known as Karmdna Sarira. This body is constituted by
subtle material molecules known as Karma Pudgala. This subtle body
may also be changing. But still it is a necessary and inalienable append-
age of Samsari Jiva. This is transcended only in the perfect state.
In discussing the relation between the states of this Karma Sarira
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. XXXV11

states of Jiva, Jainism makes an important distinction between

and the
Upddana Karta and Nimitta Karta, substantial cause and external
cause. Mental states mind and Physi-
are the modifications of the
Mind is the Upddana
cal states are the modifications of matter.

Karta of psychical states and matter is the Upddana Karta of physi-

cal changes and yet physical states and psychical states may be mutu-
ally external conditions. The causal activity contemplated here is a
bit obscure. One Psych-cal State is due to the immediately antecedent
psychical state and similarly one physical state is the result of its own
antecedent. Thus mental series in a way is independent of physi-

cal series. But still a mental change may be externally determined

by a physical change and the physical conversely by the mental

change. The between the physical and the mental is purely

relation

external. In the technical language of the system one is the Nimita

Karta of the other. So far as we are able to make out, the meaning
seems to be this a mental change is due to two condition one an
;

Upddana Karta a mental antecedent and another Nimita Karta a

physical antecedent. The mental change is the result of both these

antecedent conditions physical and mental. Similarly a change in the

body is to be traced to two conditions an Upddana condition a physi-

:

cal antecedent in this case and a Nimitta condition a

mental antece-

dent. The system emphasises the causal interrelation between mind

and matter even though the interrelation is one of external condition

The reason given for accepting this interrelation is the reality ofmoral

responsibility. If there is no causal interrelation between mind and

matter should a person be taken responsible for his conduct.
why If

moral responsibility is real, if moral evaluation of conduct is genuine

then conduct must be the intimate expression of the personality.

Though the discussion is between Jiva and its Karmana Sarira

the discussion and its conclusion may very well be taken as relevant to

our problem of the relation between soul and body. The whole
discussion may be taken as expressing the views in regard to the
wider

problem. Soul and body are capable of causal interrelation and a

change in one always involves two antecedents, one physical and the
other psychical. If causal interrelation is not admitted certainly

ethical value will remain unexplained and unintelligible.

SENSATIONS AND SENSE ORGANS.
The sense organs recognised in the system are the usual five.
But sometimes Manas or mind is also spoken of as an Indnya.
Xxxviii A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

Indriyas in general are of two kinds. Dravya Indriya or the physical

sense organ and Bhdva Indriya the psychical counterpart. Sensary

awareness is the result of the contact between Draxfyd Indriya and the

physical object sensed. It is assumed of course that only physical

objects or Pudgala that can be apprehended by sensation. This
contact may be direct or indirect. In the case of sight the contact
is indirect. The object perceived by vision is not brought in contact
with the eyes. The objects in space are revealed to us by light or
Jyoti. It is through being illuminated they are apprehended by vision.
The exact operation of light on the eyes is not farther explained. In
the case of the other senses we have direct contact. But the direct

contact may be Sthula or Sukshma gross or subtle. In the case of

contact and taste we have the direct contact with the gross objtct.
But in the case of smell we have contact with minute particles of the
object smelt. In the case of sound also we have Sukshma contact.
But in this case what the ears come in contact with is merely a kind
of motion. Unlike the other Indian system of thought which associate
sound with Akasa Jaina system explains the sound as due to the
violent contact of one physical object with the other. It is said to be
generated by one Skandha knocking against another Skandha. Sound
is the agitation set up by this knock. It is on account of this theory

of sound the system speaks of an atom or Paramanu as unsounding

by itself. Thus in all these cases the environmental stimulus is either

directly or indirectly a prrysical object. Sense perception is the result

of the contact between two physical things Dravyendriya on the one
hand and the stimulus from the objeet on the other hand.

ANALYSIS OF SENSATIONS.
The next interesting point is the analysis of the different sensa-
tions obtained through different sense organs. Through the eyes
we have the apprehension of five colours. Visual sensations consist
of the five elements or Pancha Varna. But we have to note here
that sensation of white is also included as one of the colours. In
this respect the term Varna or colour is used in its popular sense
and not in the scientific sense. Similarly taste is of five kinds, pun-
gent, bitter, sweet, sour and saline. These five tastes are obtained

through the tongue which is Rasanendriya. Skin is Sparsanendriya

and through it the following eight kinds of cutaneous sensations are
obtained : light and heavy, soft and hard, rough and smooth, and
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. XXX'Ix

cold and hot sensations, four pairs of opposite senses. These cut-
aneous sensations include sensations of temperature, contact, pres-
sure and muscular or kinesthetic sensations. Sensation of smell
is only of two kinds, Sugandha and Durgandha. Sound sensations
are of infinite variety. The different kinds of sounds natural and
artificial, purposive and non-purposive, articulate and inarticulate,
musical and non-musical are spoken of.

SENSE PERCEPTION.
What we directly apprehend through a sense organ is not merely
particular sensation but the object. Sense perception is known as
Darsana. Darsana is the perception of a physical object. Darsana
may Darsana and Achakshu Dasana. Chahshu D.irsana
be Chakshu
means perception of an object through visual sensation. Achahshu
Darsana means perception through the other senses. Darsana or
sense perception not only implies the pa-sive receptivity of the mind
but also the active interpretation of the received stimulus, i. e.

Darsana means the complication between the datum and mental

construction. This is implied in the description given of "knowledge
by acquaintance" or Hha, Avaya are different
matt Avagraha,
stages of sense Avagraha refers to roughly the datum.
perception.
But the datum does not mean anything. It is merely the ununder-
stood patch of colour, e. g. in the case of visual sensation. At the
presentation of this visual patch there is the questioning attitude of
mind which is represented by the term Eha. As a result of this
examination we may interpret the object. This interpretation is

Avaya. In the case of visual perception these three different stages

may not be clearly distinguishable. But in the case of auditory
perception we may clearly recognise the different stages. Darsana
then includes all these three stages, then only is the thing known
to us.

[These three stages together with Darsana or recollection consti-

tute the different forms of Matt Jnana But recollection is connect-
ed with memory and need not be brought under sense perception.]

In this connection we have to notice one important point. The

term j^arsana is not eonftned to sense perception. It is a general
term including the sense perception as well as the supernormal
perception of other kinds. Two kinds of supernormal perception
are generally mentioned by Jaina thinkers, (1) Avadhi Darsana (2)
xl A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

Kevala Darsana. Avadhi Darsana refers to the peculiar kind of

clairvoyant capacity which is able to perceive things and events in
distant places and also in distant times either past or future. Objects
and events not evident to the normal sense perception are obvious to
Avadhi Darsana. But the objects of Avadhi perception appear as
if they are perceived normally close at hand.
It is said that Avadhi
Darsana is concerned with only Rupa Dravyas or perceptual objects.
The other Darsana known a=; Kevala Darsana is perception par
excellence. It is associated with perfect consciousness. This faculty
is acquired only after complete emancipation from kdrmic bondage.
To this perfect perception the whole reality is obvious. In short it

refers to the all-perceiving faculty of Paramdtma. What we are

justified in speaking of in connection with Jaini psychology are the
normal sense perception {Chakshu Darsana and Achakshn Darsana
and the supernormal clairvoyant perception (or Avadhi Darsana).

jNAna or knowledge.
Jaina account of cognition is also interesting. Jna.ni or under-
standing is said to be of different kinds according to means employed
in cognition. (1) Mali Jndna. is knowledge obtained through the
normal means of sense perception and memory based upon the same.
This is the common inheritance of all persons. (2) Sruta Jndna is

knowledge obtained through testimony of books. This corresponds

to knowledge by description. It is acquired by study. Therefore
it is possessed by only the leirned men. Besides these two
means of knowledge there are three other supernormal means
of understanding. These are Avala Jndna, Mana Paryaya
Jndna, and Kevala Jndna. Avadhi Jndna is the understanding
of the nature of the objects obvious to Avadhi Darsana. Mana
Paryaya Jndna refers to a peculiar kind of telepathic knowledge
acquired by persons of certain stage of spiritual development. It

is a means by which knowledge of alien minds is obtained. The last

one of course refers to the perfect understanding or the omniscience

of the Perfect Being or Purushottama. Treating this as the metaphy-
sical ideal we have to recognise the other four kinds of cognition as
relevant to our psychological interest.

AFFECTION.
Affective consciousaness plays a very important part in Jaina
metaphysics. The whole religious discipline is directly secured by
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. xli

a stoic freedom from the affective influence of environmental objects.

Experience of pleasure, pain, is assumed to be the specific characteris-
tic of organised beings or Samsdri Jivas. In one of the descriptions
given of Jiva it is mentioned that Jiva has the tendency to continue
beneficial activity from which pleasure results and to discontinue the
harmful activity from which pain results. This is so very analogous
to biological description of the instinct of self-preservation. Jiva
equipped with this quality naturally desires pleasant things and
avoids unpleasant things.

Since the psychological analysis is subordinate to the metaphysical

system several facts of psychological interest are thrown into the back-
ground of the philosophical scheme. Nevertheless there is no mistake
about the striking psychological analysis exhibited by Jaina thinkers.
Experience of pleasure and pain, is generally referred to as Karma-
phala Chethana or consciousness of the fruits of action. Pleasure
and pain are always viewed in relation to action.

Bhdva or affective consciousness is of three kinds, Sabha Bhdva,

Asubha Bhdva, and Suddha Bhdva Feeling of pleasant nature, feeling

of an unpleasant nature, and feeling of pure nature. The last one

refers to the enjoyment of Self by Self. As such it may be taken to
mem the spiritual experience of the pure Self. The other two kinds
of the feeling are relevant to the point. These are corresponding to
the normal feelings generally recognised by students of psychology.
These feelings are generally related to certain objects in the environ-
ment to which there may be attraction or aversion in the Jiva. Thus
on the one hand feelings manifest as the result of Karma or action
and on the other hands they are determined by objects in the
environment.
A very interesting classification of emotions is given in connection
with the conditions of Kdrmic bondage. These emotions are generally
divided into two main classes Sakashdym, and Akashdya those that
have the tendency to colour or stain the purity of the soul and these
that have not that tendency. The Sakashdya ones are Krodha, or anger,
Mdna or pride,Maya or deceitfulness or dissembling and Lobha or
greed. The Akashaya emotions are
Hdsya — laughter.
Rati— feeling of attraction.
Arati — feeling of repulsion.
6
Xlli A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

Soka— sorrow.
Bhaya — fear.
Jugupsd — feeling of disgust which may manifest in hiding ones
own weaknesses.
Striveda — peculiar sex feeling of women.
Pumsaveda— peculiar sex feeling of men.

Napumsaka Veda — The corrupt sex feeling of eunuchs.

Again certain instinctive tendencies are also referred to as Sam-

inds. These are Ahdra, Bhaya, Maithuna, and Patigraha hunger, —
fear, sexual appetite and acquisitive instincts. There are corres-

ponding feelings to these instinctive appetites which may colour the

consciousness of a Jiva.

The feeling aspect of sensations is implied in the very classifica-

tion of the sense elements. The feeling aspect is predominent in the

case of smell and test whereas it is indirectly associated with audi-

tory and visual sensations. The rest of the references to feeling of

pleasure pain are purely metaphysical and therefore they are more of

religious interest than of scientific interest.

CONATION OR THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ACTION.

#
Atma is not only Jndni and Bhoktd, the knower and the enjoyer
but is also a Kartd or the agent. This may be considered as
the centeral idea of Jaina system. Soul by its own activity is

able to make or mar its own destiny. The Theory of Karma is

intimately associated with the causal agency of Atma As the result
.

of this metapysical assumption we have several facts of psychological

importance mentioned in the System. Even in the lowest organism
there is the tendency to continue pleasurable activity and to discontinue
painful activity. This primitive tendency of life or Jiva is just the
conative activity which develops into conscious choice of an end
or purpose which is the characteristic of volitional activity. In
human beings this conative tendency is naturally associated with
rdga and dvesha, desire and aversion.
Conative activity in general is denoted by the term Karmachetana.
This Karma chatana or consciousness of activity is to be associated
with the Zoological Kingdom— Trasa Jivds. The plant world or the
world of Ekandriya Sthavara Jivds is devoid of this Karma Chetana.
They have Karma Phala Chetana alone whereas the other Jivds have
 —

A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. xliii

both and also Jndna Chetana to boot. The importance of volitional

activity is clearly testified by the part it plays in the Jaina System of

ethics. The psychology of xvill is also connected with another

doctrine of Mohaniya Karma which is
psychological importance.
considered to be the root of all evil has two aspects cognitive and
conative. What is known as Drasana Mohaniya interferes with the
faculty of perception and belief. Charitra Mohaniya is a sort of
corruption of the will ; it misleads the will and thus leads the Jiva
towards evil : We shall consider the relation betsveen Karma and
Atma when we go to consider the ethical aspect of Jaina system. In

the meanwhile let us see what Jaina logic is.

JAINA LOGIC.
UNDER this head we have to consider the following three

points:

1. Pramdna
2. Naya
3. Saptabangi
Pramdna and Naya refer to understanding. {Pramdna nayai-
radhigamaha) Knowledge is through Pramdna and Naya Pramdna
refers to the apprehension of reality or valid knowledge, Naya refers
to the different aspects of considering things. These are the two
means of enriching knowledge. Saptabangi refers to the theory of

predication which is peculiar to Jaina System.

Pramdna is of two kinds, Pratyaksha Pramdna and Parokslia-

Pramdna,— Immediate Apprehension of reality and Mediate Appre-
hension of reality. Ordinarily the term Pratyaksha refers to sense
perception. This ordinary meaning of the word is considered secon-
dary and subordinate by Jaina thinkers. They call it Vyavahdrika
Pratyaksha. The real Pratyaksha is known as paramdrthika
pratyaksha or that which is apprehended by Atma immediately and
directly. According to this view sense perception is indirect and
mediate, for the sensory object is apprehended by Atma only through
the medium of sense organs.

Pramdnds in general are five, — Mati, Sruii, Avadhi, Manahparyayu,

and Kevald. These five are already explained in connection with

cognition. Of these Miti and Sruti are considered Paroksha

Pramdnds. The other three are cosidered to be Pratyaksha Pramdnds,
•cliv A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

There is one interesting fact about these Pramdnds. The standard

of reality is distinctly experienced in its normal and super-normal
aspects. The normal experience would be Mati J nana ; the super'
normal experience would include Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala.
These four would constitute direct knowledge by the Self, but our

experience is also enriched by the testimony of others. Therefore

the testimony of others transmitted through

ed as one of the Pramdnds.
'
literature

This is Smta J nana. This

is
...
also
is
cosider-
not given
the supereminent place which it has in the other Hindu systems of
thought. The Vedas form the ultimate Pramdna for the Brahmanical
systems. Every other principle of knowledge is subordinated to the
Vedic revelation which itself must be implicitly accepted. But
the Jainas recognise Srutajndna as only one of the Pramdnds and
even then it is only subordinate. Direct and Immediate Apprehen-
sion is the ultimate standard of truth. The Pramdnds are all

distinctly human and they are not considered to be eternal. It is this

humanistic element in the system that is specially interesting. Three

of these i^ve Pramdnds have the possibility of being corrupted by
adverse psychological conditions. Thus they will become misleadignor
corrupt Pramdnds or Pramanabhasas. Thus Mati Judna may become
Kitmati. This evidently refers to illusory and hallucinatory percep-
tions aud erroneous inferences. Sruti may become Kits' rut if'This would
be feeding ones intellect with fictitious philosophy and unreliable
literature. False and misleading clairvoyance is the corrupt form of

Avadhi which is technically called Vibhanga Janna ; hence right

pramdnds would exclude these three corrupt forms of Kitmati KiUruti,

and Vibhanga. But in the case of the other two Pramdnas there is

no such psssibility of falsification, Manahparyaya is the supernormal

faculty acquired after great spiritual development and Kevala

is the Ideal reached after complete emancipation. Hence in these
two cases there is no chance of extraneous interference. The right

forms of the former together with the latter two constitute the
Pramdnas.

From the short enumeration of the Pramdnas given above it

is clear that the Jaina doctrine of Pramdnas is slightly different

from that Hindu Systems in general. The Pramdnas such as

of the

Fratyaksha, Anumdna, Upamana, Sabha, etc. which are variously

stated by the various systems of Hindu Philosophy are all
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. xlv

comprehended by Matt J nana and Sruta J nana. Even in these two

cases objective corroboration seems to be the most important criterion
of the true Pramanas. In addition to these two normal sources
ofKnowledge they recognise the other three supernormal sources.
Thus they recognised not merely the intellect but also the higher
intuition which Bergson emphasises. Bergson is no doubt right
in placing intuition over intellect. Intellect is the analytic process
of understanding things. Hence it shares the artificial nature of the
process of analysis. It is no doubt incapable of accounting for the
vision of artist or the poet. The Daemon of Socrates and the Christ
of St. Paul are quite beyond the pale of intellectual analysis. The
Reality like the Proteus of ancient myth slips out from the grip of
intellect but is quite evident to the supernormal intuition. The
existence of such a supernormal faculty in man we have an
inkling of, through the lifting of the veil by recent psychic
research. The normal personality is but a fraction of the total
personality which is more of the subconscious nature. It is the
sub-conscious self that seems to be the storehouse of spiritual power
and wisdom. One who has learnt to tap the resources of this
hidden self, becomes a genious in the field of art or morality. To him
is given the open seasame to unlock the secrets of the universe. A
philosophy of knowledge, therefore, must neeessarily take cognisance
of such a supernormal intuition.

But to recognise this is not to deprecate the intellect altogether.

According to Bergson what is revealed by the intellect is quite
untrustworthy. Such a summary condemnation of the intellect

would be an unwarranted impeachment of modern Science, Intuiton

apotheosised at such a cost would be no more than a philosophical
fetish. A more reasonable attitude would be to recognise both the
intellect and intuition as adequate means
apprehending the nature of
of reality so long as they have corroboration by objective evidence.
Rationalism which could not accomodate any suppernormal faculty
and mysticism which could not stand the glare of Reason, both are
inadequate representation of the full nature of human personality
whose powers are inexhaustible and whose depths are unfathomable.
The Jaina doctrine of Pramanas is able to accommodate both from the
olwcst to the highest in the order of gradation.
xlvi A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

J nana and Jneya

KNOWLEDGE AND THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE.
The recognition of the distinction between the Pramdnas and
Pramdndbhasds implies an important philosophical principle— The

existence of an objective reality which is beyond and beside know-

ledge. Knowledge is not the only form of reality. If that be the

case philosophy would not be different from Advaita. Its.,

Jaina
whole philosophical claim as an independent system of thought
rests on the admission of the independent existence of the objective

universe besides consciousness. The world of objective reality is

apprehended by perception or dariana and understood by intellect

or Jndna which two are but the manifestations of chetana the
intrinsic nature of the soul. Nowhere in the Jaina system is it
even casually implied, that the object of Knowledge is in any
way modified or interfered with by the process of Knowing. In
order that Darsdna may reveal the form and Jndna may discover the
nature there must be an object postulated, an object which is
logically prior to the intellectual process. This postulating of an
independent object of Knowledge should not be interpreted to imply
the passivity of the intellect. The continuous activity of the Jiva
or soul is the central doctrine of Jaina thought. Hen<;e the intellect
is an active manifestation of consciousness but this activity has
the power of revealing its own nature as well as non- chetana
objects beyond. Thus the term Jneya or the object of Knowledge
includes both the self and the non-self, mental facts as well as

physical facts. The example of a light is very often brought in to

illustrate the nature of Knowledge. Just as light reveals itself

as well as other objects Jndna

which are illuminated so also
reveals the tattvas both Jiva Hence it would be quite
and Ajiva.
inconsistent to interpret the relation between J nana and Jneya Know-
ledge and its object in any other way that would make both insepar-
able elements of any higher unity. No doubt as far as Jiva or soul
is concened the relation between Jndna and Jneya is very intimate.
The soul is JHani the possesser of Jndna or knowledge. There can
be no Jiva without Jndna for without it he would be achetana and
indistinguishable from other ajiva dravyas ; and there could be no
knowledge without Jiva for being foundationless and off its moorings
from life it will cease to have connection even with consciousness.
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. xlvii

Thus Jndna and Jndni, knowledge and self are absolutely inseparable

though distinguishable by name. But this very name Jndni may

also become Jneya-paddrtha the object of knowledge to his own J nana
The, Jnani, Jnana and Jneya, the self, knowledge, and the self as
object of knowledge all become different aspects of a single concrete
unity.

But Knowledge or Jfidna is also related to ajiva paddrthas that

is, physical objects can also be Jneya paddrthas, — When physical
objects are the objects of Knowledge the relation of Knowledge to its

object is not the same as in the previous case that between Know-
ledge and self as object of Knowledge. Jnana is distinctly alien to
ajiva paddrthas though these become as Jneya related to Jndna ov
Knowledge. The function of Jfidna or knowledge here is to reveal
the ajiva paddrthas in their true nature as achetna or physical. How
could chetana reveal the nature of achetana things ? This questiou
is rejected as unreasonable for the simple reason that it is unanswer-
able for the question means why Jfidna should have its Jfidna nature.
That Jndna though alien to the nature of physical object — these
latter being achetana can still be related to them and reveal their
nature to Jndni or the knowing self — is taken as the fundamental
postulate of Jaina Epistemology.

Thus the close study of the philosophical foundation of Jaina

Epistemology reveals the following two facts.

(1) The relation between knowledge and its objects, Jndna and
Jneya as far as ajiva paddrthas ate concerned is purely one of external
relation.

(2) As a corollary of the first we have the independent existence

of Jneya paddrthas or objects of knowledge, of course with the ex-
ception of self, which has an internal relation to Jndna or Know-
ledge.
The distinction between internal relation and external relation
requires explanation. The Russell -Bradley controversy as to the
nature of relations is an interesting though an intricate topic of
modern philosophy. But here we cannot deal with it in detail. It

is enough to indicate what the terms mean. Bradley-Bosanquet

school of modern idealism following the traditions of He gal assume
that all relations are grounded in the nature of the terms related.

That is, the terms apart from the relations and the relation apart from
Xlviil A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

the terms will not be the same. A and B having a relation R cannot
be the same A and B if they cease to have that relation R. Change
or cessation of a particular relation will lead to change or the nulli-

fication of the terms so related. A blind faith in this metaphysical

doctrine has constrained the Hegelian Idealist to subscribe to many
an absurd doctrine. The terms related to one another since

their nature is tyrannically controlled by this relation are to be in-

terpreted as members or elements of a higher organic unity. The
members of a family therefore are the elements of the unity of family.

Society itself is nn organic unity like plant or an animal body having

as its elements the different human personalities who constitute the

society. Nay, even the whole universe is conceived as an organic

unity or system having as its memhers both things and persons. The
logical result of this doctrine is the complete subordination of human
personality, to this fetish of a higher unity beside which there is

nothing real. Every thing is degraded to the level of appearance and

unreality. The political and moral consequences of such a metaphy-
sical doctrine need not be portrayed in detail. It is enough to say
that the catastrophe which destroyed the European civilisation is the
necessary consequence of the culture and social organisation inspired

by the philosophy of the Absolute.

But we have a healthy change introduced into modern thought
by the invaluable contributions from B. Russell. He the upholder
of the opposite doctrine of external relations sufficiently exposed the
inadequacy and the falsity of the rival doctrine. According to him
two terms A and R may have a relation R and yet the nature of
the terms may not be affected by the change of the relations.

To exhibit the truth of the controversy we may cite the following

illustration which is very useful to the reader though crude.
You may have for example a chair by the side of a table.

The two are in a certain spatial relation : say the chair is to the
south of the table. If the relation is changed, (i.e.) if the chair is

placed to the north of the table then according to the doctrine of

internal relations both the terms the chair and the table must undergo
change in their nature because of a change in the relations. This ^eems
absurd to the unsophisticated observer. In this case he knows fully

well that there is no change in the things themselves except the

change of position, To persist in the belief that the things do change

in consequence of the change of position is merely to surrender one's

 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION. xlix

own reason to the false gods of philosophy. Russell holding the

doctrine of external relations maintains that the things do not change

their nature inspite of the change of postion. This has an important
and refreshing consequence. You may have a society of human
beings without degrading the personalities to fractions of a unity or

to appearance of a reality. And the one consequence that is relevent

to us in this connection is that the relation of Knowledge to its object

need not amount to the postulating of a higher unity of which these

two are aspects. If that were the case this alleged higher unity must
have as its members both persons and things chetana and achetana
dravyds. The fundamental doctrine of Jainism like that of the
Sankhya is the distinction and the alienability between Jiva and

ajiva.

This short digression into modern European thought we had for

the following reason. The authors of an Epitome of Jainism " in
,;

trying to expound the doctrine of Syadvdda attempt to make out that

Jainism is a bold Idealistic interpretation of the universe as a set-off

against the Realistic method. We are not going to quarrel about a

name. Jainism may be characterised idealistic or realistic according
to one's own tastes so long as the terms are clearly defined. But
what we are concerned with is just the exposition of the doctrine of

Syadvdda. Speaking of the ordinary way of thinking of ajivas, the

authors say,

" They are continually betraying the phenomenal changes when

brought into relation with other existences around them. How, then,

can we think of them as individual things in spite of the changes ?

The answer often unhesitatingly forwarded by philosophers is that
we can combine diversity with unity in our conception of things by
thinking them as individual entities each endowed with manifold
qualites. They are substances according to philosophers, which
possess various properties such as extension, solidity, weight, colour
etc. Or they are substances or subjects to whom belong the capaci-
ties of sensation, feeling and perception etc., But a careful observation
will show that such a device obviously fails to give ns any real

apprehension of existence— even though it may be the simplest indivi-

dual existence ; because in trying to give unity to a member of uncon-

nected determinations by ascribing them to a common substance what

we really do is to add to these determinations another determination,

7
I A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.

equally and unconnected with the rest. Take away the

isolated
other determinations, what will be left of your substance ? It is

impossible to explain the known by the unknown. So to apprehend

the real unity of different qualities or to put in other words, to
think them as one, what mind demands is, that we should think or
have a rational notion of the relation of each to each and that we
should discern how the existence of any one involves the existence
of all the rest and how all are so connected with this particular
quality would not exist except in and through the whole to which it

belongs. To catch hold of such substance and not substratum as

Locke had meant we must discern the principle from which this
manifoldness of parts and properties necessarily arises and which has
its very existence and being in them and linking together in thought
differences which spring out of it. Such unity of substance is really

a unity in difference which manifests itself and realises in these

differences.
" In the realm of mind or in the spiritual life of conscious beings
also, there are undoubtedly infinite multiplicity and diversity, but
we must not overlook the fact that it is a multiplicity or diversity

which is no longer of parts divided from each other but each of

which exists and can be conceived of by itself in isolation or segregation

from the rest or in purely exterenal relations to them. Here on the

contrary, the multiplicity or diversity is that of parts or elements

each of which exists in and through the rest and has its individual

being and significance only in its relation to the rest or each of which
can be known only when it is seen in a sense to be the rest. We
cannot, for example, take the combination of two external independent
things in space and employ it as a representation of the relation of mind
and its objects, for though thought be distinguishable from the object,
it is not divisible from it. The thinker and the object thought of are
nothing apart from each other. They are twain and yet one. The
object is only object for the subject, the subject for the object. They
have no meaning or existence taken individually and in their union
they are not two separate things stuck together but two that have
lost or dissolved their duality in a higher unity." ("An Epitome
of Jainism" pages 106-109.)
The subject and the object merging into a higher unity sound's
more like idealstic rhetoric than philosophical logic. Here we have
an echo of Bradley and Bosanquet. The authors have drunk deep
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION,

of Hegel but they have not discerned what is living and which is

dead in Hegel. No doubt the Jaina Conception of Dravya is closely

allied to the Hegelian dialectic but the Jaina metaphysics does not
contemplate the Hegelian absolute. The Authors who do not spare
the Indian Absolutist, Sankara, for his misunderstanding of Syad-
vdda do not hesitate to make obeisance to his western counterpart.
This inconsistency is quite glaring and the misrepresentation of Jaina
doctrine is all the more surprising as it apparently proceeds from Jaina
writer, amore careful study of their own system and a little less of that
hypnotic illusion by and the blind adoration to the German Idealism
would have enabled our authors to see that the System they
expound is a bold and masterly refutation of the philosophical Absolut-
ism of ancient India.
 JAINA LOGIC.
NAYAS.
The next topic relating to Jaina Logic is about "Nayas" This is

the second means of understanding things, the first being "Pramdnas".

All concrete things are extremely complex ; they have innumerable
qualities and relations. The Reals being such complex entities,

they may be examined from different aspects. This apprehension x)f a

thing from a particular point of view is known as naya — an opinion
or an assertion from some one aspect. Every aspect of a thing in

its own way reveals the nature of that thing. Hence Naya is a

means of insight into the nature of Reality. Theoretically the pos-

sible Nayas are infinite in number since the Reals have infinite
qualities and relations. But writers on Jaina Logic generally speak of

seven (7i dffferent Nayas. These are Naigama, Samgraha, Vyavahdra

Rijitsutra, Sabda, Samabhirndha and Evambhuta. Let us try to
explain these in order.
NAIGAMA NAYA.
This Naya seems to be somewhat obscure and is therefore
differently interpreted by the Scholars. Pujyapdda in his commentary
on Sutra 33 of Bk 1 Tattvdrtha Sutra, explains the Naya thus:
Naigama is that which relates to the purpose or end of a course of

activity. The illustrations given are: —

(1) You see a person carrying water, firewood and other

necessaries for cooking meals and ask him "what are you doing?"
"I am cooking meals" he replies. This answer refers to the purpose
or end of a series of activity. The person is not actually in the act

of cooking at the time of the answer.

(2) The Second illustration refers to a person who goes with

an axe. When he is asked what he is about, he replies "I am to bring

a wooden measure (Prastha)" He is to cut a piece of bamboo

perhaps and make a prastha out of it. Here again this measure is

only the purpose or end to be realised.

(3) In each of the two examples "Odana" and "Prastha" "food"
"measure" there is a central purpose which gives meaning to a
course of conduct some duration. The course of
of conduct is

represented by different modes of activity at different stages. In

 —

JAINA LOGIC. liii

9pite of this difference, the whole series and also every individual
item tend towards the ideal aimed at. So far therefore the general
purpose or aim may be said to be present in all the different stages
of the course of conduct. It is the general purpose that gives
meaning to the different items nf the series and connects them into
a whole. This emphasis on the teleological element which is

immanent in a course of purposive activity sterns to be Naigama

naya point of view.
The same interpretation, with the same two illustrations of
'cooking' and making a 'measure' isthe adopted by SrutaScigara,
authors of a Vritti on " Tattvdrtha " called after him Srutasagareyam.
The same illustrations are again found in Prameya Kamala Mdrtanda
a treatise on Logic.

This Naigama Naya is further sub-divided into three according

to the true relations of the teleological and interpreting idea. The
two illustrations refer to some present course ; hence they come
under

(1) Vartamana Naigama.

But there may be looking back to
a past event. On the morning of Deepavali day, you may say
" To-day is the Parinirvdna Kdla of Lord Mahavira." But Lord
Mahavira does not attain Nirvana on that day which you are
actually
speaking about. The event took place several centuries ago. Yet it
was on a corresponding day of that year. Because of this corre-
spondence an event true of the day centuries ago is also
associated
with all such corresponding days of the subsequent years.
Thus we
speak, of the King's birth-day, the Darbar day every year. The
assertion has meamng only because of a past event. This charac-
teristic attribute of the present— the genuinely belonging to the past
yet transferred to the present, because of an identical relation
between the two is pertaining to

(2) Bhuta Naigama. Naigama.) Instead of looking back to

(Past
the past you may look forward to a remote future. Instead of detecting
in the concrete present some element which was once associated
with it, you may discover in it something which is yet to he. At the
sight of a prince you may hail Here comes His Royal Highness,"
''

The Prince is but Lion of the Royal family. He is not yet King,
but is going to be one. Similarly you may speak of every Bhavyd
Jiva a good soul as Siddha Jfva, a perfect soul. For somehow in
lj v JAI*A. LOGIC.

off future Perfection will be the goal of all for every one is
the far ;

Qod in the germ.

Such an assertion is true according to Bhdva Naigama— lututt

Naigama.
The other way of interpreting this Naigama Naya is associated

who quoted by Hermann Jacobi under his trans-

with Siddhasena is

lation of the Sutra 33 (referred Umasvdti's Tattvdrtha.

to above) of

Sri Deva Suri who is quoted by Mallishena in his' Syadvada Manjari

second view. But curiously, this is not so very
also adopts this

prominent Umasvdtis own Bhdshya, any how this

in
method of inter-

relation between
preting the Hay* -tarts with the examination of the
and Vishesha. For this Nya-
the universal and the particular, Sdtndnya
to as adopting this Naigama
ya and Vaiseshika systems are referred
an ekdnta manner These two system adopt this Naya
Naya in (i e.).

push to an unwarranted length. Sankhya

so far as they go, but it

Vsddnta deny altogether Viseshas— particulars. Buddhism

and
outright. Against these two extremes
denies— Sdmanya universal

the above systems recognise the

importance of both. The universal
not be able to account for a
by itself or the particular by self will
concrete thing. These will be empty abstractions. Again one cannot
the other. The thing is an
be derivative from and secondary to
organic unity of both Sdmanya and Visesha, universal and
There can be no (Sdmanya) universal apart from
particular.
apart from the universal
the particular and no particular (Visesha)
This seems
and there can be no real thing apart from
either.

to be the fundamental Jaina view of the Real.

The very same view is said to be adopted by the Nayyayikds

and the Veseshikds. Therefore both the Jainas and the others adopt
the Naigama point of view. But wherein the Jainas differ from the
It is here. No doubt Nayyayikds and Veseshikas adopt the
others ?

Naigama view by maintaining that the concrete thing is the complex

made up of the unversal and the particular {Sdmdnyas and Vishe-
shds). No doubt they maintain that these two are different and
therefore distinguishable. No doubt they believe each is in itself

primary and not derivative. So far they agree with the Jainas. But
while the Jainas believe that the distinction between Sdmanya—
universal and Visesha— particular, is true only in a relative way the
Naiyaythds and the Vistshikds maintain tbat it is absolutely true.
 JAINA LOGIC. J v

Sdmdnya is quite different and distinct from Visesha. It is because

of this absolute difference between the two that in their hands this
Naya becomes Naigamabhdsa. They are kathanchit bhinnah and
not atyanta bhinnah.

After explaining thus the Naigama Naya, Sri Deva Suri enu-
merates three species of this Naigama distinction.
1.— Differentiating two qualities one from the other, e. g. exis-
tence and thought are in soul Sat chaitanyam atmani" Here
Thought is differentiated from existence.

2.— Differentiating two substances, e. g. Dravya that

is which
manifests through things and their modes,

Vasttt paryayayah Dravyam"

3.— Differentiating a thing from its attribute., a

e. g. sensual
person has only a momentary pleasure. " Kshavarnekam Sukhi
Vishayasaktajiva"

Thus (1) existence is spoken to be separate from Thought, (2) a

thing from its mode and (3) a person as different from his pleasure.
Contrast in all these cases is true only in a relative way. As we saw
above the very same illustrations are reproduced
by H. Jacobi in his
translation.

But when we attend to Mallishena, we find evidently both the

interpretations given in his Syadvada Manjari. He begins by
explaining Naigama Naya in the same way as Deva Suri or Siddha-
sena does. He refers the readers to an earlier portion of his book.
When there is a discussion of the relation between Sdmdnya and
Visesha. Hence he does not want to add anything further under
this Naya and ends the passage by mentioning two well-known
examples given in Pravachana Divine
the word. What are
the two examples He just mentions
? two names ; and they
appear to be But this need not be altogether helpless.
cryptic.
His words are Pravachana Prasiddha Nilayana
Prastha dristanta-
dvya, etc., Nilayana and Prastha— are the words
here. In Pujyapada
we have Odana and Prastha. Instead of food and
a measure we
have a house and a measure. The rest is quite clear. The
illustrations leave us in
no doubt as to the meaning of the Naya.
House-building or making a measure refers to the
purpose or the
ideal. It relates to "Samkalpa rndtra" as Pujyapada says.
l v j
JAIN A LOGIC.

The next question we have to face is '"How does Mallishena

manage one explanation and to bring in the illustrations
to give

pertaining to the other interpretation ? Here we must confess we

are driven to conjecture. We do not know wherefrom he is
quoting the examples. It may refer to an another from whom
both Pujyapdda and Mallishena draw their inspiration. What justi-
fication is there for Mallishena' s attempt to bring the
two views
together ? The teleological element or purpose may be taken to

common basis both the views. In the case of house-

be the for

building or measure-constructing the thing which is to be the Goal

is indicated by the purpose of the individual. This purpose

embodies the ideal nature of the thing which is the concrete realisa-

tion of the same. Similary the distinction between the universal

and particular is purely teleological. What is particular from one
point of view may be universal from another. In fact the particular

is drawn out of the universal. It is through the medium of the

particular that the universal expresses its nature. If you remember

this point then it is clear to us that the distinction entirely

depends upon the purpose in view. It is this purposive nature that

brings the two views together. What are apparently divergent

have this common foundation. Perhaps Mallishena had this in

his mind when he interpreted the Naigama one way and illustrated

it in the other way. This compromise is offered as a provisional

suggestion.
Samgraha Saya
(ii.) The next Naya is the : class point of

view. The nature of things as understood by the Jaina System

is such that there is a similarity and identity among a number of

individuals.

These individuals naturally fall into appropriate classes. When we

consider them as individuals belonging to a class, our attention is

indivi-
directed to the underlying similarity to the exclusion of their
From this underlying principle of
dual and proper characteristics.
classification we may consider the individuals as a whole and

a Unity. Here again the unity is only relatively true. The

unity here rests on the underlying similarity among the number
of individuals brought under the same class. But there is a great

in forgetting the elementary fact of this class point of view

danger
The individuals forming the class though spoken of as a whole and
unitary class are really distinct from one another and
may be really
 JAINA LOGIC. Ivii

differentiated by not only their intrinsic natures but also by intervals

of Space and Time. To emphasise the unity at the cost of the
plurality and difference would be a distinct metaphysical error. It is

this erroneous application of Samgraha Naya that accounts for

the system of Advaita Veddnta Too much emphasis on the
unity and the complete ignoring of the diversity is the charac-
ristic of this system. A similar mistake is found in its western
counterpart of Hegelian Idealism. Both agree in condemning the
differences as appearances and Naya and in accepting the ultimate
absolute as the one reality.

But Jaina thinkers noticed very early both the utility as well
as the danger of this Samgraha Naya. This class point of view is

quite useful and rational in its own way. It contributes to

economy of thought by enabling us to deal with a number of things
as one.

This is not merely justified by practical convenience but also

by the philosophical principle of the common nature. The common
nature by itself is but an abstraction. Hence to set it up as the
reality and the only reality is doubly erroneous, So long as its
relative nature remembered the Naya has its
is own uses. But in
the hands of the Samkhyas and m/mansikds it becomes absolute
and thus a Nayabhdsa.

This Samgraha Naya is of two kinds. Para Samgraha or the

ultimate class- view and Apara Samgraha or the inferior class-view.
Every existing thing partakes of the nature of Reality. Hence we
may spea kof all things as one in the Ultimate Reality or Existence.
But the different classes of things living and non-living included
in this ultimate Realitymay themselves be spoken of as different
classes. This is Apara Samgraha or the inferior clnss view.
(iii) VYAVAHARA : Vyavahdra Naya means the popular and
conventional point of view, which rests on sense-perception of
the concrete present. This is the basis of the ancient materialistic
systems of the Chdrvdkds and Brahaspatyds. The whole Criterion
of Reality is the Concrete present. The forgotten past and the
far off future are unwarranted myths not justified by the only
pramdna of sense-perception. Looking back into the past through
memory and keeping into the future through ideal forecast are
8
lviii JAINA LOGIC

philosophical uucertainties. The same applies to the categories

obtained by Intellectual analysis such as Samdnya and Visesha

Universal and particular.

Sense-perception reveals to us a tree or a stone or a pot or a cloth.

These are the real things supported by the Pramdnds and sanctioned
by Vyavahdra or convention. Whoever has perceived at any
time either Samdnya or Visesha ? Why should philosophers trouble
themselves about these metaphysical abstractions. The concrete
reality of things is sufficient for our practical life and what is justi-

fied by this pragmatic criterion is so far theoritically true.

Here again the Jaina thinker recognises the partial truth of the
principle. The tree in the compound, the stone on the path way,
the pot with water and the cloth you wear are all real things. They
are not appearance, or illusions of Naya. Their reality is corroborated

by our concrete experience. To say this much is certainly acceptable

and true. But to go beyond to condemn everything that is not
included in the concrete present to deny the past and the future and
to reject the philosophical categories in toto is to surrender reason
to sense-perception is the apotheosis of convention. Hence Jaina
thought rightly rejects the unwarranted exaggeration of this Vyava-
hdra Naya though it recognises in it the soul of goodness, and an
element of partial truth.

(iv) Riju SUTRA. This Riju Sutra is the extreme opposite

of the Samgraha Naya, The latter denies all difference whereas
Riju Sutra denies all continuity and identity. Reality is concentra-
ted to mathematical present. It is purely momentary. In this respect
it is still narrower than the vyavahdric present. At least for vyava-
hdra view there is. a tolerable duration ; for, the present and the
conventional things are real so far. But according to this Riju Sutra

Naya a thing is what it is in the present mathematical moment. To

speak of duration of a thing is rejected by this view as an unwarranted
assumption. What we are absolutely sure of is just the
present moment. The past moment is no more and the next mo-
ment is not yet. Hence a thing as being in the no more or in the
not yet is sheer contradiction. If it is real at all it must be in the

present moment. We at once recognise the identity between this

Riju Sutra view and Buddhistic metaphysics. Its aim is as

that of Buddhism to expose the pretensions of an unchanging

 J AT MA LOGIC. IIX

mataphysical substratum of things. As a corrective to such a

conception of changeless substratum Buidhist metaphysics

adopts Riju Sutra view and brings the centre of gravity to the present
moment. Thus it enables to secure the balance between change and
permanence. Change partakes of the nature of time duration. It
shares with it the ephemerality. There is some truth in maintaining
the reality of change and in concentrating it to one moment. To
over emphasise the neglected element of change as a set off against

Veddnta and to ?ecure a habitation for. it in the camp of Rea'ity is

certainly a commendable metaphysical venture. But to identify

reality with mathematical moment, to emphasise change as the only
real and to make it live in a metaphysical void is to overshoot one's
mark It is this erron eons and uncalled for accent on change to the
detriment of the relating and the unifying principle of Reality without
which, change will have no meaning. It is this Riju Sutrabhaslm that
the Jaina system asks m to beware of. If this principle is the s >le

criterion of Reality, then reality would end itself by committing

suicide to employ a suggestive phrase of Bradley's.

(v.) Sabda-Naya or the implication of Terms or names. The name

has the function of calling to our mind, the particular object which
is referred to or implied by the name. Of course the implication need
not neces-arily be an individu il object. An attribute, relation and ;i

action may be referred to by appropriat: words in the language.

Thus the grammatical distinction of terms into parts of speech h ,s

an underlying logical foundation. The particular kind of

meaning is associated with a particu'ar part of speech. Thus
the difference in meaning corresponds to the difference among
the terms. Thus a sort of intimate relation exists between a term
and its meaning. Variation in the term may introduce a corre-
sponding variation in the meaning. Thus not only the differ-

ence of the parts of speech implies a broad difference among the

meanings but also the inflexional variations in the same part of
speech may be said to have corresponding variations, however, slight
they be. This principle of correspondence between the terms and their
meanings is the foundation of the science of grammar. We have
already mentioned that there is a relation to logic implicitly present
in this grammatical principle. Indian grammarians in their discus-
sion of verbal implications very often pass beyond their legitimate
sphere and enter into logical and quasi-metaphysical discussions. Such
 .

Ix JAIN A LOGIC.

an exaggerated notion about the verbal implication would be not only

illogical but also conflicting with common sense and convention. Jaina
logicians therefore raise a note of warning against such an unwarranted
application of this principle and point out the logical danger in that
one-sided emphasis of the relation between Sabda and Artha.
is this. No doubt generally speaking the gramma-
Their contention
Sabda Naya adopted by the Vayakaranls is sanction-
tical principle or

ed by usage. But to assume it to be an universal principle without an

exception would be neglecting the difference between the relative and
the absolute and identifying the partial truth with the whole and the
complete one. Ordinarily each name has its own meaning. The
term 'cow' is different from 'king' not merely in word but also in
meaning. But this is also true. Words which are different in nature

and origin may nevertheless refer to the same identical object.

Exaggerated and universal application of the Sabda Naya of the
grammarians cannot conveniently accommodate synonyms in the
vocabulary. That there are synonyms and that they are distinct
from one another literally no grammarian can afford to deny. Yet
unswerving loyalty to his principle of sabda naya would constrain
him to accept such an absurdity, The only way out of the difficulty

is to accept the Jaina interpretation of sabda naya, according to which

the relation between terms and meanings is a relative principle. The
illustrations generally offered are the synonyms, India, Saftra, and

purandhara, names referring to the one and the same individual, the

Lord of the Devds. Similarly terms differing not merely in origin as

theabove but also in number, gender, person, case, etc., may still refer

to the same individual fact. Thus pushyaha (masculne) Tara (femi-

nine) Nakshatram (Neuter), in spite of difference of gender do refer

to the same object,— Star. Again in a sentence, terms referring to

the same individual object may appear in different cases and if a verb, ;

in different sense and person may refer to the same activity. This
subordination of grammatical differences of inflexion to the logical

implication of terms seems to be the essential principle of sabda naya

as understood by the Jainas. It is not necessary to repeat that the
naya in the hands of the grammarians because of ekdnta application
degenerates into a false naya — {Sabdabhd sa)
vi. Samabbirudah naya — The derivative difference of names.
This samabhirudah nayas is the differentiation of terms according to

their roots. Thus it is only a special application of Sabda naya. In.

 JAINA LOGIC, ! X i

becoming specialised it becomes narrower and more exaggerated than

the above naya. As a general rule the terms in a language have their
own special radical signification. This radical signification is the
reason for the particular nomenclature. The first appearance of the
word was evidently suggested by such an implication of the root. Of
course this does not mean the connotation of the name. Connotation
is the ground of the application of thename whereas the significance
of the root accounts for the origin of the name. The former is logical

and universal whereas the latter may be purely subjective and

even accidental. The science of history of language may discover
various principles subserving the origin of names in a vocabulary. To
the historian of language this is certainly animportant principle. To
detect radical difference in the vocabulary and to trace the history of
different terms from this original seed-difVerence is certainly a com-
mendable pursuit. But this nuclear difference interesting to the
historian of language is not so very important as to swallow up all the
other grammatical and logical principles of implication. Here again
the naya is discovered to be a relative one by Jaina Logic which
enjoins a necessary circumscription to the above claims put forward by
the historian of language. For example, it is true that the terms 'gait'
1
(cow) is different from '
India. This difference can be traced to their
respective roots. Hence the difference in the roots must mean a
corresponding difference in the terms and therefore in their meanings.
Accurately speaking says this naya, the terms '
Indra,' '
Sakra '
and
'Purandhara' respectively imply the 'all prosperous,' 'the all powerful'
and 'the destroyer of enemies.' These are the direct and legitimate
signification sanctioned by their origin. To emphasise the original and
the radical implication of a term is one thing and to suggest that the
term in its ordinary application must necessarily and always mean the
same original radical sense is quite a different thing. The passage
from the radical and immediate difference to the current application
and the general accepted sense is an unwarranted jump taken by this
naya.

(vii) Evambhuta naya. — The last of the nayas is a further specia-

lisation of the previous one. This is merely the historical principle

run mad. According to this principle the radical sense in general is

not the appropriate implication of a term. Even the root signification

must have different gradations and aspects. Of these various aspects
and gradations in the manifestation of the thing, only one particular
l x ii JAINA LOGIC.

aspect contemplated by the root of a term and it is this contemplated

is

aspect that is the legitimate meaning of the

term in its current usage.

The verything in a different attitude must be designated by a

same
an
differentterm altogether. Thus for example, the t-rm 'gati' implies
The same
animal in motion. That which moves is a
'gatf or 'cow.'
animal is at rest or
term therefore should not be applied when the
lying d>wn. Movement is fundamentally different from lying down
the same term 'cow" should not be applied to
an animal
and°therefore
two such fundamentally different attitudes. Fundamental
difference
at
literal differ-
the logical implication must necessarily be indicated
by.
in
naya. The
ence on the term-. This is the contention of evambhuia
term must just designate the particular asnert or attitude in the object

referre \ to. If the term goes beyond that it will be a source of con-

fusionand ambiguity. Language instead of revealing things as they are

would only c mceal them.
This grammatico-logical contention may be conceeded partially.
the language
In a perfect vocabulary this ought to be the principle but
that we use is not so evolved under the guidance of such a rigorous

logical principle. Hence it would be an egregious blunder to identify,

what ought
\shat actually exists, with to be, logically. Therefore this

evambhnta naya interpreted without reference to concrete usage and.

conventional meaning would only end in meaningless veibiage.

These are the Seven nay as referred to in Jaina logic. The first

they deal with objects of

four are called attha nayas inasmuch as

knowledge, whereas the other three are called Sabda nayas inasmuch
as they pertain to terms and their meanings. The same seven are
sometimes otherwise grouped. The first three come under Diavya
naya whereas the other four come under paryaya naya. The former
means the substantive aspect whereas the latter means the aspect of

change or manifestation.
These nayas have an important place m the Anekinta Vdda of the
Jaina system. All human descriptions and predications are relative
and
and circumscribed inasmuch as they issue forth from the limited
partial nature of the intellect. Not only in our every day speech but
also in the language of the metaphysical statements have their own
context and relation universalising their meaning apart from their

setting in the background would result in practical inconvenience and

philosophical confusion. Jaina thinkers recognising the extreme
 JAINA LOGIC. lxiii

complexity of reality are never wearied of emphasising the anekdnta as-

pect. Multifaced reality may lead to "multitude of descriptions," Every
one of them may be partially true but not one of them is really true.

Philosophy is but the fable of the seven blind men and the elephant.
Each one perceives a certain aspect of the real and congratulates
himself that that is the only reality. When reality would not fit in

with his own petty framework then there is the ruthless pruning and
chopping to make it convenient. Then there is the denial of certain
inconvenient things as appearance and illusion. System building in

philosophy has always been the process of providing reality with a

procrustean bed. But one who knows, smiles at the simplicity of

human philosophising. The critical caution that there are more things
in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy was sounded
several centuries before the Chrtstian era by the Anekdntacddins

Our account of the nayas will be incomplete without a mention of

the six nayas which are generally employed in the examination of the
nature of souls. According to Jaina Metaphysics Jlva or soul has the
nature of consciousness or chetand. When it is viewed in its pure state
unlimited by extraneous conditions, it has its thought characteristics
fully and perfectly developed. This state of its existence represents the
Ideal of Perfection or Siddhahood. But even in this ideal state, the
nature of the self does not lose its complexity. Even in its infinite

radiance, the self does not lose its Dravya nature or dynamic constitu-
tion. It is not distinct and separable from its own infinite qualities.
It is the richness of content that marks the Jaina conception of
Perfection as against the nihilistic attitude of Veddnta which speaks
of quality. less existence as the ultimate Reality. Existence apart
from qualities would be an empty abstraction and is therefore ail the
more unfit to stand for the ultimate reality. It is this unalienable
unity that exists between the Real and its qualities that may be
said to be the central doctrine of the Jaina metaphysics.

This pure and perfect state of the self is a thing to be achieved.

Ordinarily the existence of the self is somewhat different. Its infini-
tude is limited, its glory abated and radiance dimmed by alien condi-
tions and limitations. By its own general weakness and disposition it
weaves round itself material sheaths some subtle and some gross.
These material sheaths form the encumbrances and limitations
which make the cycle of births and deaths possible for the Jivds.
Ixiv JAINA LOGIC.

In this state jiva is generally an embodied consciousness or an orga-

nism. In its normal state it may be evident to the senses through
its gross organic body. In its subtle state of interval for death to
ano-her birth ev.-n though it casts off its grosser sheath it is still

endowed with a subtle kdrmic body which serves as the nucleus for
b aiding up its appropriate body of the next generation. Jiva in these
states is said to be the conditional one Sofrddhi Jiva as differentiated
from the unconditioned perfect self Nirupddhi Jiva.

Jiva in its samsdric state is not only associated with a body of

its own but with several other things living and non-living. The
environment in which it lives, moves and has its being is generally

wider than its own corporeal frame. Even in the case of animals and

birds there is such a wider interest than the mere instinct of self-

preservation. Tne parental instinct of helping and preserving the

young ones and filial instinct of falling back upon the support of the
parents from the prehuman biological foundation of the institution

of family among human beings. When we come to human society this

widening of the environmental horizon of the self becomes all the

more marked. Several economical and soci-il institutions such as

owning property or belonging to a particular social order or a nation

all these contribute to extending the personality so as to coincide

with its environments. There is a personal pride and pleasure in

extending one's own property. There is a sympathetic feeling of joy

or sorrow with the prosperity or adversity of the family or the nation
to which the individual belongs. The nature of the personality there-

fore is determined by the extent and diversity of interest. We feel

offended when any injury is done to our possessions. We feel it a

personal insult if any one who is near and dear to us is unfairly

treated. The self which is by its own intrinsic nature a complex

entity becomes all the more complex by identyfying itself through
its interest with its environment of things and persons. Under such
circumstances it is an extremely difficult problem to define the exact
nature of the soul and to point out its own appropriate boundary.
Hence the necessity of the application of Nayas or points of view.
These Naya» as already mentioned are specially designed for the pur-
pose of explaining the nature and defining the limits of the self.

To start with there are two main aspects or Nayas-Nischaya and

Vyavahdra. The former represents the true and complete point of
 JAINA LOGIC. Ixv

view. There is no distinction between Dravya and its gunas. The self
is looked at as a whole with al! the wealth of its attributes. The latter
The complex nature of the self
represents the partial point of view.
is analysed into its may be .direct-
divers? qualities and our attention
ed to any particular attribute with which the self may be identified
at the moment. Further the former Nischaya Naya is divided into
Suddha Nischaya and Asiiddha Nischya Naya, Siiddha Nischaya
Naya holds the self in its pure and unconditioned Nirupddhi state.

Disentangled from all its material evironment and limitation the

self radiates in its pristine glory through all its wealth of infinite qualities.
This aspect where the self is in its qualities and its qualities are pure
and unalloyed expression of the nature of this self is the topic of
Suddha Nischaya Naya. The second Asiiddha Nischaya Naya
contemplatas the self as caught in the meshes of the material
evironment the Sopddhi state. The presence of Upadhi makes it

impure or Asiiddha. Its intrinsic glory is dimmed but still it is viewed

as a whole with' its complete nature as expressed in its attributes
though somewhat warped by alien influences. This is the self

according to Asiidha. Nischaya Naya.

Similarly the vyavahdra point of view is divided into two main

heads- Satbhuta Vyavahdra and Asatbhuta Vyavahdra. The term Sat-
bhiUa implies the intrinsic nature of the thing. Here the question
is not about the purity or the impurity of the thing. The term
Vyavahdra as already explained implies the analysis and differentia-
tion of attributes from the underlying Dravya. Jndna or thought is

certainly an attribute of the self. To speak of Jndna as identical with

self is to adopt Satbhuta Vyavahdra Naya, The term Asatbhuta
implies the importation of alien qualities into the self. Some of the
organic instincts and emotions are distinctly due to the physical
constitution. Nevertheless such instincts and emotions are associated
with the self from the point of view of Asatbhuta Vyavahdra Naya.
Similarly the kdrmic constituents which are intrinsically physical may
be said to belong to the self and modify its manifestations.

Each of these two again is divided into two other minor kinds
Upachdrita and Anupachdrita. Upachdrita is usage sanctified by
convention but having no other intrinsic justification. It is a sort
of metaphorical application ; whereas Anupachdrita is just the
opposite of the above. It stands on its own intrinsic merit and
9
J xv i JAINA LOGIC,

has no metaphorical and transferred import. Thus finally we have 4

kinds of Vyavahdra Naya 1. Anupachdrita Satbhuta Vyavahdra

Naya 2. Upachdrita Satbhuta Vyavahdra Naya 3. Anupachdrita
Asatbhtita Vyavahdra Naya 4. Upachdrita Asatbhftta Vyavahdra
m
Naya.

Now the first is mainly Vyavahdra inasmuch as it analyses

the attributes from the thing is Satbhuta inasmuch as it emphasises
the genuine and intrinsic attributes and i? Anupachdrita inas-

much as it is free from figurative and transferred implication.

The illustration of this is the self is of the nature of Jndna or
knowledge. The second Naya is Vyavahdra for the reason stated
above and Satbhuta for the same and Upachdrita because the
epithet is figurative and transferred. When we speak of Jndna
or knowledge as Pramdna or the criterion of we are thinking
truth
of the objects of knowledge or Artha. Artha itself may bespoken
of as a manifestation of knowledge or Jndna Vikalpa. To speak of
artha or the object as a modification of knowledge is only figuratively
true in the case of external objects. These being physical in

nature are achetand and yet as object of knowledge may be spoken of as

modification of Jndna. What intrinsically belongs to the self is trans-
ferred to its object because cf the relation brought about by the
process of knowledge. The third Naya is Anupachdrita Asatbhuta
Vyavahdra. The only term that demands explanation is Asatbhuta
here. It refers to the identification of the Self with some alien

properties. For example to consider one's own body as oneself

which is generally done in ordinary life is Asatbhuta Vyavahdra.
This is not merely figurative as the statement is sanctioned
by the intimate interrelation that exists between the soul and
the body. Hence 'this body is mine,' or 'I am this,' pointing
to the body is a statement which is justified according to

Anupachdrita Asatbhuta Vyavahdra Naya. The last Naya is the

Upachdrita form of the same. Here the alien quality or the thing
with which the self is identified lack that intimate relation that
exists between the soul and its own body. To cell the ornaments

as one's own, to claim certain individuals as one'* relating to possess

certain things as one's own property in shor': to identify one's
personality with alien things and persons is possible only in a
figurative sense. Each personality is distinct from and alien to
 JAINA LOGIC. lxvii

the others .hough all by co-existing together may partake of common

environment and enter into definite relations. Still from the meta-
physical point of view one's destiny is in one's own hands. Therefore
the popular identification of the self with the other things said to be
owned by it is and transferred predication or Upcvhdrita
a figurative
Asatbhuta Vyavahdra Naya. These four kinds of Vyavahdra Naya
together with the two Nischaya Nayas constitute the six Nayas
which are specially employed to fathom the depth of human
personality.

The object of these Nayas generally of the former seven and

specially of the latter six is to reveal the intrinsic nature of per-
sonality in its comic environment. It is not merely a matter of
theoretical interest that underlies these Nayas. Apprehension and
understanding of the nature of reality must be
useful means in a
the hands of the self to reach the safe haven of Beatitude from which
there is ne return. But besides this practical aspect there is another
aspect to the question. The truth that is apprehended by the
Pramdnas and the Nayas must be available for the general public.
Ever growing under the weight of sorrow and yearning to have that
Bliss which they know only by faith and hope. Hence is the
necessity for expressing the truth through Scripture. This Reveal-
ation of the truth through language is the WORD or Syadvdda.
This pertains to the principle of conditional predication which is

sevenfold. This seven-fold predication is known as Saptabhangi.

 SAPTABMANGI.
SAPTASHANGI or the SEVEN MODES OF PREDICATIONS.
The Dialectic of Syadvdda is no less puzzling to Indian students
of philosophy both old and new, than the Hegelian dialectic is to the
European philosophers. Syadvdda and its counterpart appear at first

sight self-conflicting and unwarratned. But they have an important

principle, — nay the fundamental principJ3_of reality asjiieir substratum
andL.justification. Closer exam ination re v eals in them a cle ar grasp of
truth. Every other theory of knowledge is fading into insignificance
before the principle of conditional predication.

Everything existing from the bespangled heavens above to the

inmost core of human personality is in a process of change and modi-
fication. If we trust ourselves to the imagination of the astronomer

which enables him to look b?.ck through eons of the past cosmic history
or to have a glimpse of the far off future we see the universe as a

motion picture on the screen of existence. What is a twinkling star

at present was »nce upon a time gigantic nebulous mass of several
million miles diameter. Then by process of aggregation and
condensing there is the formation of a denser nucleus which becomes

larger and larger by the same process which in its turn leads to the
evolution of an enormous quantity of heat. This leads to the forma-
tion of the fiery orb which by the same laws of motion gives birth to a
number of incandescent masses. These held to the parent by the

laws of gravitation form the planetary system. Thus our Sun itself is

but a star among the starry systems.

Side by side with t

vts evolution of a sun with its planetary system

we have the conven e drama enacted. Ether due to a mysterious

explosion or due to a clash of star with star there bursts into
existence a new mass of nebula. The telescope reveals to human
view not cnly the nursery of distant solar systems, but also the

decay and dissolution of the decrepit and defunct starry systems. The
starry heavens are^.bjit^the__£osj2iic alphabel==^iiJi_^ell_the three

sublime words bu^, grqwth_anrLdecay.

Turn now to our own earth which is but a tiny speck in space
wheD compared 10 the Sun and the|Stars. Here also the same process.
 SAPTABHANGI. Ixix

The formation of the crust of the earth is after terrible volcanic con-
vultions which had taken place in the early history of the earth. The
geological changes are followed by the appearance of life on the
surface; then the wonderful evolution of the plant and animal kingdoms
are all indelibly written on the different strata of the earth. This also
repeats the same story. Then life itself is ajnyste rious though subtle
process of combined building up and breaking up. Turn where you
will you see the same thing. Reality is a compl ex p rocess of change
and everything in it is partaking of the sfeeme prcfcess .

Nothing is merely permanent ; nothing is merely changing. The

acorn grows to the oak; t he seed is in the plant and the _._tree_ and_y_et
itjsjiot there as the _seecL_ Everything lives by the process ^oL death.
The v^ry__kissJeajds.tQgain^ This message of the organic reality is an
important contribution to philosophy.

Hegel founded his metaphysics on Logic— nay identified both. But

his Logic is not the mere scholastic logic on which his predecessor Kant
built his system. Hegel's logic came as a disturber of peace to the then
philosophic thought ; but it ultimately led to the emancipation of
thought from scholastic thraldom. He proclaimed boldly to the
world that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a
higher unity 'is' and '
is not' are really identical and same, for they are
but the aspects of the same reality. To one who is familiar with this

dialectical process of thesis and antithesis reconciling in a higher

synthesis, the following presentation of saptabhangi will lose its para-
doxical nature and discover the underlying truth.

Long ago the Jainas recognised this complexity of existence. Any

particular object which as the topic of assertion can very well take in

two assertions — affirmative and negative. How can there be two

apparently contradictory statements both true of a single fact ? The
nature ofjhe f act is suc h is_t he answer. Every concrete assertion
presupposes a question as to the exact nature of the object. This
interrogation again rests on the desire to determine the thing from a
particular point of view. Since the__thing has-severaLaspects and
relations there may be several determinations. Henc e is th e_possibijity

of apparently conflicting attribtues inhering ih_ the same^and

exhibited by the process of predication. Is that statue of marble or of

plaster of Paris ? If it is one, it is not the other. Is that the same

gold bangle which you had last year ? No, it is newly made though the
\XX SAPTABHANGI.

same gold is used. Was Socretes a Greek or Roman ? He was Greek

and not Roman. What is the Kaiser now ? He is and yet is not the
Kaiser. These are familiar questions and answers. All these exhibit the
possibility of predicating affirmation and negation of the same thing.

Is and is not, can significantly refer to the same subject. The only
thing we have to remember is that the point of view is different in each

case. There is nothing mysterious, nothing incredible. When the same

subject can "have two such_piedicate3 nq_one predicate can_monop_olise
the subject to itself. There will always be some aspect of the subject
left out by this predicate ; and this left-out aspect can very well be
expressed by the rival predicate. This implies that under no circum -
stances can vfe have a predication which is the only_true predica-
tion about the subject. There can be no judgment absolutely true_and
excluding every other judgment about the same^topic. Hence we have
recourse to qualified assertions as the only available ones under the
circumstances. These qualified or conditional assertions are primarily

two affirmation and negation.

(1) Perhaps X is.
(2) Perhaps X is not.
These two aspects are inherent in the same thing ; hence we
can say.

(3) Perhaps X is and is not here we are contemplating the

;

whole thing in its two aspects which are kept apart and attended to
severally. But these two aspects are inherent in and expressive of

one single identity. Hen^di e^jrmy be considered tog ether jointl y as

expressing the single identit y. In that case there is no chance of
asserting two conjointly by a single predicate, for the simple reason that
there can be no such predicate. Therefore we have to confess our
inability to and proclaim the bankruptcy of vocabulary for having
such an assertion. This fact becomes the fourth mode of pre-

dication.

(4) Perhaps X is indescribable.

Remembering this helpless nature of our tongue, we may still

qualify this by each of the first three predicates. Thus we have the last

three modes of predications.

Which are (5) Perhaps X is though indescribable.

(6) Perhaps X and is not though indescribable.

(7) Perhaps X is and is not though indescribable.

 —

SAPTABHANGI. Ixxi

In their traditional form these are :

(1) Syddasti

(2) Sydnndsti

(3) Syddastindsticha

(4) Syddavaktavyah
(5) Syddasti avaktavyah

(6) Syddndsti avaktavyah.

(7) Syddasti ndsti avaktavyah.

These seven modes of predication are usually illustrated wit
reference to some object such as a Jar or Ghata. Whether it is to have
an affirmative predicate or negative one depends respectively on four
aspects its own form, matter, place and time leading to affirmation and
:

alien form, matter, place and time bringing in negation to the jar. A
jar is real, or is affirmed \sith reference to Svarupa, Svadravya
Svakshetra, Svakdla and is unreal or is denied from the point of view
of pararupa, Paradravya, parakshetra and parakdla. When we have
affirmation and negation for their reasons, the subsidiary modes are
derived from these two.

1, Then what is the Svardpa or intrinsic form of a Jar ? And

what is its pararupa ? When we hear the word jar uttered, the term
invariably implies a certain definite group of attributes through which
a particular object is designated by the term. These essential attri-
butes connoted by the term Jar will be its Svan'tpa. The attributes
of any other object implied by any other term will be its pararupa—
will be alien to the Jar. Existence rests on Svarupa and non-existence
on pararupa. If existence is predicated of ihe Jar both from its own
form as well as that of an alien thing iike cloth (pata) then the jar will
lose its distinctive character and become one with cloth. If on the
other hand non-existence is predicated from its own form as from alien
nature then there will be no jar at all. Neither of these results stand
to reason.

Again confining ourselves to the class of vessels we still find that

ajar is different from a kettle. Is that vessel a jar or kettle ? The
jar-form is its svarupa and the kettle form is its pararupa. From the
former the jar is, from the latter, it is not.

Again we may be concerned with jars alone. One individual jar

has its individuality as Svarupa, and every other jar will be pararupa
 —

i XX n SAPTABHANGL

Jar A exists on account of svarupa and does not on account of para-

riipa. If non-existence is associated with svarupa then there will be
no jar at all; if existence follows from pararapa then all jars will

become one without distinction and there will be no separate individual

ones.

Then Ghata-jar is made by the potter. The mass of clay on the

potter's wheel is not yet Sijar. It is only the finished product that is a

jar. This finished form is its svarupa ; any other stage in its form-
ation is its parariipa. The former leads to affirmation the latter leads
to negation.

2. What is its own matter ? Clay is Svadravya, and gold is

paradravya. The Jura is of clay and is not of gold. Svadravyena
asti, paradravyena ndsti.

3. What is its own place or Svakshetra ? The ground where the

Jar is, is its Svakshetra and every other place is its Parakshetra. The

Taj is in Agra (Svakshetra) and is not in Delhi (Parakshetra). If

the Jar exists in Parakshetra also then there will be no place with-
out a Jar. In the case of the Taj every place will have a Taj
Mahal. If the thing own place then there will
is not even in its
be no Jar anywhere in the world. Either result will be unsatisfactory.

4. What is its own time or Svakdla ? The Jar's Svakdla is the

duration of the present in which it is intact. Its past when it was
a mass of clay on the potter's wheel and its future when it will be
a heap of broken shells will be its Parakdla. Its existence in its
own time and non-existence in other times will be quite evident.
So also with every other object. Socrates existed at a particular
age of Athenean History and is not existing now. If a thing exists.
in Parakdla also as in Svakdla then it will be eternal ; if it does not
exist in Svakdla, as in parakdla then it will be nothing ; for existence
implies a relation to its time or duration.
Thus a thing is affirmed in its fourfold self-relation, form, matter,
place and time ; and is denied in its four-fold alien relation.

Nowthe Svarilpa, etc., are determined with reference to the four-

fold other-relation of Parariipa, etc. The self-relation apart from the

other relation has no meaning. But how are we to determine the four
kinds of relation : Parariipa, Paradravya, etc. These must depend
on their environmental relations and these latter again on others. Thus
we pass on from our environment to others still wider without having
 SAPTABHANGI. Jxxiii

any clear grasp of the self-relation. The distinction between a thing

and its other rests on the sandy foundation of a vicious indefinite
regress. Hence the affirmation and negation also fall to the
ground.

This objection rests on misapprehension. The distinction

between the fourfold self-relation and other-relation
does not rest
on an indefinite regress. The essential nature
of a thing not only
implies its Svarupa but differentiates itself from Pararupa. In
experience we not only perceive a thing, but perceive it as distinct
from other things. A Jar is seen not merely a s a Jar but as a thin g
distinct from cloth by its side. Without this disti nction* the re, can
be no perception of the Jar at all. The very process of self-assertion
i
m plje^iffer^r^tiojijr^^ f. "Tience the change of indefinite
regress is quite unwarranted.

Now, according to this theory asti and ndsti (is and is not) may
be predicated of PrameyaUhe objective aspect of knowledge or the
process apprehending an object.
of This dual predication must
rest on Svarupa and Pararupa of Prameya. What is its Svariipa
and what is its Pararupa: Pararupa of Prameya means non-Prameya
anything other than Prameya we have no means of knowing.
Hence the theory must fail in this case.

No, says the Logician. The state of being apprehended by

knowledge-Prameyatva is the Svarupa of Prameya. This implies
in general the relation of object to the knower
anything besides
^\s relation; even the object will be distinct from
Prameyatva and
hence will be the Pararupa in this
context. Now this theory
must be applicable to the ultimate existence
or Mahdsatta. If
ts and is not are to be
predicated of this Summum Genus what are
its Svarupa and Pararupa
? For the latter cannot be, as there can
be no other form or matter or
place or time not included in this.
The pararupa of Mahdsatta need not
imply the existence of other
things besides itself ; thatwould be self-contradictory. But still
we can speak of its Pararu P a when we contemplate something
which falls short of the all-comprehensive universal. Any of
its parts will be so far the negation of whole -its Para, : 7.
Now asti, affirmation depends on self ndsti, negation,
;
on other
things. Asti which is conditioned by can very well belong to
self
a thin- But if ndsti which is conditioned by other than the Jar
10
l xx v |
SAPTABHANGI.

Then it would imply that the

e. g. is also predicated of the Jar.
other— say cloth. This will lead
Jar participates in the nature of its

to mere confusion.

based on a misapprehension. Affirmation

This objection also' is

no doubt rests on the nature of the self the Jar. The negation resting

on another thing— Pata (cloth, does not mean that the Jar also has

the nature of a doth . That would be absurd. The clear cut

vanish and with it all knowledge.
boundary Ibet ween things will

Asti— implies self assertion, ndsti implies alien-efcfluston. A thing

own individuality, but also repulses anything

not only asserts its

alien to it.
*
It is this element of repulsion that everything must

have in order to be real that entitles it lo have the negative

predicate. Instead of leading to a confusion this element of

diffe^ejntia^pnjs_the^n^ Asti
in t he
and /za-s/i-assertion and exclusion a re inalie nably p resent
same thirjg. \Vhergver there_is_gs/3, t here is ndsti and wherever^ there

is ndsti, there is asti also.

Now this association of this two asti and ndsti — in the same thing
appears quite unwarranted. For on the one hand when we perceive
a Jar we see mere asti without ndsti and on the other hand in
the case of certain impossible and unreal concepts such as asse's

horns, sky-flower there is mere ndsti without asti.

This is not quite correct. In the case of any perceived object

ndsti does not mean that the thing should not exist as such and

yet be perceived. That would be meaningless. Ndsti means nothing

more than that element of repulsion and differentiation which
isolates a thing from its background and give- it a determinate

and positive nature. In this sense ndsti is inseparable from asti

and it is the sense in which it is used. As to the other case of

impossible and unreal concepts where is the positive foundation.

If sky-flower is quite real ; nay if it has a slight positive basis

it will cease to mean an -unreal and an impossible thing. Its

nature seems to be pure negation and nothing less than that.

This cannot be, answers our Logician. How can there be any
negation without any significance. A significant negation must have
some positive mere nonsense. The
basis ; otherwise it will be

elements constituting the concept are by themselves real and

are

justified by the canons of expe.i-nce. We have seen horns in a cow ;

 —

5APTABHANGI. lxxv

we have seen an ass or a horse. These are existing and real. But the
fanciful combination of an ass with horns or a flower with sky is

unreal. But for the experience of horns on the head of a cow or

flower in a tree there can be no talk of an ass with horns or a flower

in the sky. Without this positive basis of experience there will no

elements to make up even a fanciful complex. Thus even the fanciful
ideas of unicorn and centaur must have some foundation in our
experience. Again in the proposition
" Syddasti Jiva" the terms asti.

and Jiva must mean identically the same

(life) thing or different things.

If the meanings are of the same nature then one cannot be predicated
of the other as a pot cannot be the predicate of a Jar both being
co-ordinate. Further asti or existence is predicabl^ of everything real.

If asti is identical with Jiva then Jiva also must be predicated of

everything. But if Jiva is different from asti then there is no chance

of predicating asti of Jiva for they are entirely different from each
other. Further Jiva being different from asti and asti being the

predicate of everything, Jiva cannot be ralated to anything real ;

(i e.) Jiva would become unreal. You cannot mintain that Jiva though

different from asti can he said to have the predicate by a process of

combination with it ; for combination is impossible in the case of

repelling elements.

The horns of this dilemma are blunted by syadvdda. These results

need not frighten the Logician to whom asti and Jiva are identi-

cal from the dravyartha view and different from paryartha

view. They are different and yet identical. But for this dual nature

there can be no predication at all*

The primary modes of predication are three Sycidasti, syannasti

syadavaktavyah The other four are obtained by combining these three.

Now. according to sankhya philosophy everything is real and there-

fore exists.According to Buddhism everything is momentary and

unreal. Both these views are rejected by the Jainas as extremes.
The former is true according to the principle of Dravyarthika point
of view ; the latter is true according to paryayarthika. point of view.

Hence each is true in its own way and is not true absolutely. Again

reality is indescribable according to the Veddntins who emphasise

the nirvachaniya aspect of rea'ity. Even this is only partially true,

* [This discussion from 3< ptabhanr/Aarangini reminds u^ of Bradley's discussion of

the theory of Predication -in

appearance and Reality.]
l X Xvi SAPTABHANGI.

for otherwise even this predication "that Reality is indescribable" will

be impossible.
The same seven modes of predication may be obtained in the case
of following pairs of attributes ; eternal and changing, one and many,
universal and particular, etc. These pairs of opposites can very well be
predicated of reality and these may yield the other derivative modes
of predication. Thus practically every attribute by being affirmed
and denied according to different aspects may bring about seven funda-
mental propositions true of real subject.
It may be said that after all this principle of Saptabh a ngi is a
wanton indulgence in meaningless self-contradiction. This objection
has been susfficiently answered above. This is not a case of wanton
paradox or purposeless pun. If the words are wantonly misinterpreted

or understood in an unwarranted sense then it may be charged with

wanton quibbling ; for example in the statement that this person has
a new woollen shawl {nava kambala) the term nava may be taken to
mean also nine. Though the word is capable of such an interpretation
still in this statement it does not mean that. In spite of the context

if a person retorts that assertion by saying' "this person 'cannot have

nine shawls as he is very poor," it would be wanton quibbling. There
is no such wanton quibbling underlying Saptabhangi.
If it is not wanton quibbling it must merely be an expression of
doubt. To say a thing may be as well as may not be is to exhibit
one's own doubt and ignorance. At the best therefore the doctrine
is a mode of scepticism. This charge of scepticism is certainly
unfounded. Doubt expresses absence of determinate knowledge.
If the prima facie appearance of a thing leads you to two different
interpretations of which alternatives we cannot choose the right one
then there is doubt as to its nature. Since its exact nature is

unknown scepticism may be the result. But in the case of the

contradictory propositions forming the basis of Saptabhangi we have
two different aspects each serving as the basis of one of the proposi-
tions. Hence there is neither doubt nor confusion in this case.
Each assertion is definite and clear.

SANKARA AND SYADVADA.

Thibaut's translation of the Bhdshya.
" This doctrine we meet as follows : — Your reasoning, we say, is in-

admissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to

 SAPTABHANGI. Ixxvil

say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and

non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing;
just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold
the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must
either be so many and such or not be so many and such; the third
alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such are not such'
results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a
source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that
the cognition that a thing is more than one nature is definite
of

and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the

unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is

itself something, falls as such under the alternative predications

'somehow it is' 'somehow it is not' and so ceases to be a definite
assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion
and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are
not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the
knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite,

how can the Tirthankara {Jina) teach with any claim to authority
and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is

altogether indeterminate ? Observation shows that only when a

course of action known to have a definite result people set about
is

it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of

altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any
more than a drunken man or a madman. Again, we apply the
if

Jaina reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to

say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view
they are not five ; from which latter point of view it follows that
they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare
the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot
be described ; but, as a matter of fact they are described
so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And
if you go on to say that the categories on being described are
ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not
ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being
ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that
imporfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not
the opposite ;
you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man
than like a sober, trustworthy person. If you further maintain that
the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are
lxxviii SAPTABHANGI.

eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge

which is employed in such statement will result in nobody's
acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and
final release. And moreover it follows from your doctrine that soul,
non-soul and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained,
and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse
all at once into the condition of absolute indetermination. As there-
fore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot
belong to any of the categories — being excluding non-being and vice
versa non-being excluding being — the doctrine of the Arhat must
be rejected"

"RAMANUJA AND SAPTABHANGI/'

Thibaufs Translation. — With the help of this they prove that
all things — which they declare to consist of substance (dravya),
and paryaya-to be existing one and permanent in so far as they
are substances, and the opposite is so far as they are paryayds.
By paryaya they understand the particular states of substances, and
as those are of the nature of Being as well as Non-being, they
manage to prove existence, non-existence and so on. With
regard to this the sutra remarks that no such proof is possible. 'Not

so,on account of the impossibility in one ; i. e. bscause contradictory

attributes such as existence and non existence cannot at the same
time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As
a substance and particular states qualifying it — and (by the Jainas)

called paryaya —are different things (paddrtha) one substance cannot

be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a

substance qualified by the particular state, such as existence, should

at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i. e. non-existence.

The non-permanency, further of a substance consists in its being the

abode of those particular states which are called origination and
destruction ; how then should permanency, which is of an opposite
nature, reside in the substance at the same time ? Difference (bhin-

natva,) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attri-

butes ;
non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence
possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference ;

not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a
buffalo can belong to one animal. But (the Jaitia may here be
supposed to ask the vedclntin) how can you maintain that Brahman,
 SAPTABHANGI. lxxix

although one only, yet at the same time is the self of

all ? Because
we reply, the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings
constitute* the body of the supreme person, omniscient, omnipotent
and so on. And that the body and the Person embodied and their
respective attributes are of totally different nature (so that Brahmana
is not touched by the defects of this body), we have explained like,

wise. Moreover, as your six substances, soul and so on are not one
substance and one paryaya, their being one .substance and so on, can-
not be used to prove their being one and also not one and so on. And
if it should be said that those six substances are such (viz. one and
several, and so on) each owing to its own paryaya and its own nature,
we remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own theory
of everything being an ambiguous nature. Things which stand to
each other in the relation of mutual non-existence cannot after all be
identical. Hence the heory of the Jainas is not reasonable."

These two passages are quoted from the two great Hindu
Commentators of Vedanta Sutras, Sankara and Ratnanuja. The
Sutra that is commented on is "tapttJitercfa^ffiC' (CH I. pada 2 SU. 33.)

The author of the Vedanta Sutras as well as the commentators

reject the Saptabhangi naya on the ground of the impossibility of
contradictory attributes inhering in the same thing.

All that is said above by way of exposition and discussion would

vindicate the claim of Saptabhangi against the charges brought against
it by these scholars. Our account svould be incomplete if these
charges are not examined in this connection.

Now the author of the Sutras does not give any detailed reasons
besides the one contained in the Sutra itself — that a thing cannot have
self-contradictory attributes. Asti and nasti being and non-being, or
affirmation and negation being contradictory epithets cannot be
referred to the same thing. Hence the doctrine of such a predication
is futile. This reasoning though short is interesting and suggestive.

We have already pointed out the philosophical attitude adopted by the

Jainas. A thing being of complex nature, having dravya and
paryaya must be an identity in difference. Instead of rejecting the
doctrine of reality for the reason given they seem to claim that the
real is real only because of such a capacity to comprehend and recon-
cile the differences in itself. Here we are reminded of Bradley's
1XXX SAPTABHANGI.

polemic against "the nature of things". Though he admits the Hege-

lian doctrine of identity in difference he cannot forget the scholastic
traditions about identity and difference. Every concrete thing or

person is according to Bradley a Unity in diversity, and identity in

difference a constant which is varying also. Now Bradley argues

that such a nature implies self-contradiction and internal conflict.

This is so because it is not possible for us to know how the

difference could be derived from and related to an identity. Hence
he condemns such things to the limbo of appearances.

We have been suggesting the similarity between the Hegelian

doctrine of identity and the Jaina doctrine of Asti-nasti . But we
must raise a note of warning that the Jaina doctrine does not accept
wholesale Hegelian metaphysics. Unlike Bradley the greatest living
representative of Hegelian absolutism the Jainas emphasizes this
important aspect of reality. The reason which is employed by
Bradley to condemn a thing to be appearance is the very reason
which serves the Jain thinkers to proclaim the reality of the
same.

The commentators deserve special attention. Hence we shall

examine their criticism in detail. Sankaras criticism is of three
main stages. First he tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility
of this doctrine. Second its practical futility. Third its conflict
with many other Jaina doctrines. Being and non-being cannot be
predicated of the same thing just as it is impossible to predicate
hot and cold of the same. Mutually contradictory and conflicting
attributes cannot exist together of the same thing at the same time,
This objection appears to be unanswerable but if we remember the
two and other relation we can very
different aspect of self-relation

easily see that the objection does not hold good. Very often even
in ordinary experience we have examples of co-existing attributes
which are in the abstract self-contradictory. The branches of a tree
may be in motion, but the tree as a whole may not budge an
inch. Here the tree is moving and yet is not moving. The same
individual person may be father in relation to X and son in relation to
Y. In this case we cannot reasonably ask how can the same individual
be both father and son. The two conflicting attribes of fatheu-
hood and sonhood are quite intelligible in the same individual,
Similarly a class which is a genus with reference to its owu species
 SAPTABHA.NGI. Jxxxl*

may itself be a species in relation to its own higher genus. We

need not multiply instances. It would be quite idle to maintain
the impossiblity of incompatible attributes in one and the same-
thing. It is a matter of surprise to us modern readers how such an
acute thinker like Sankara should go without observing the parti-
cular aspect from which the rival presents his case.
After appealing to experience to substantiate his point Sankara
brings in the charge of indefiniteness against the doctrine of Safcta-
bhangi. On a previous occasion we replied to this charge of in-
defiaiteness. It is enough here to show that if by definiteness.
Sankara means unconditional and absolute assertion indefinit-
ness instead of bsing a defect would be certainly a meritorious point
to the credit of sayadvdda. In the course of the discussion the
critic indulges in certain epithets which we should now call
"unparliamentary." We may pass it without notice partly because
of its main argument and partly because of the
irrelevency to the
fact that in his days such an
intermixture of Logic and Rhetoric
was perhaps accepted as a justifiable weapon of debate.
As to his second point the practical futility of the doctrine we
have to say a word. His argument comes to this. Every theoretical
doctrine has a practical bearing. This is all the more so in the case
of Indian thinkers. All Indian philosophers in spite of their doc-

trinal differences accept this as the fundamental truth of philosophy

that metaphysical research handmaid of ethico-religious
is the ideal

of securing the suminum bonum of life. Hence any doctrine that

is indefinite and ambiguous in its message is condemned by this

pragmatic test. Since we have not accepted the theorical charge

of ambiguity we need not tarry long at this practical consequence.

Next let us go to the application of Saptabhangi to the other

Jaina doctrines. Such as the five categories and the final release

with the consequent heavenly Sankara points out that

bliss.

according to this logic the five astikdyas may be five and may not be

five. This result will not certainly non-pluss the Jaina logician.
If they are severally referred to they are five. If they are referred
to as an aggregate and a class they are one. If they are classified
according to a different principle they may be two, living and non-
living. Hence there is no fixed numerical characterisation of these
categories. Variation in the number that may be used to designate
11
Ixxxii SAPTABHANGI.

these categories Instead of implying self-contradiction indicates

only a variation in the point of view from which they are examined.
As the climax of his criticism Sankara asks his rival to say what
would become of the heavenly world if it both exists and does not,
both eternal and non eternal. His rival will only answer as the
author of Saptabhangi Tarangini does — in the following manner. If

as you say it must be one of those and not both you have the fol-

lowing difficulty. If the final release and heavenly bliss is eternal

and existing where is the chance for Samsdra and the attempt to
obtain moksh a. It the other alternative is the only truth! what is

the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is altogether impos-

sible. " Man partly is and wholly hopes to be " is not mere poetry.
It is genuine philosphy. Inasmuch as the final release is the goal
towards which the whole creation moves it is true and real and in-
asmuch as it is the goal and is not yet an actualised fact it is not
real and true. Why should this doctrine be so vehemetly
attacked passes our understanding.

When we go to Ramanuja we have got a different method of

argument altogether. He seems to accept the rival doctrine all the
while protesting. He clearly dravya
sees the distinction between
and paryaya. Substance and mode. He also perceives that par-
yaya means change and dravya permanency. He also correctly
points out that the doctrine of syadvdda is based upon these two
different aspects Dravya and Parayaya. The proper course for the
critic having gone so far would be
to accept the doctrine. Or if
he wants to reject he must show that things
do not have both these
aspects dravya. and puryaya. Instead of, doing either Ramanuja
attempts to defend the Sutra on a principle which is quite indefen-
sible and unwarranted. What he proves
and nasti can- is that asti
not be predicated of a thing from dravya point alone. Accord-
the
ing to him the same substance eannot have both
predicates. Certainly,
it cannot have. Jaina Logic too proclaims the same thing.
But
if you take the thing in both its aspects— and it'?must be so taken
to avoid empty abstractions— then it can and ;
must have both the
predicates.

Attempting to reject this doctrine of identity in difference Rama-

nuja has the insight to perceive how his own doctrine of Veddnta 3

is affected. In one sense the veddntic metaphysics is theldoctrine

 SAPTABHANGT. lxxxiii

of the^oneand the many. If reality could be one and the many at

the same time Veddntism would b^ sufficient argument in favour
of Sayadvdda. Rut unlikelSankara who dismisses the Many as. Maya

Ramanuja as ^constrained by his metaphysical attitude accepts the

reality of the many also. Then what becomes of the one in the

many. He proposes the purva paksha for tlje Jaina, Rut how '

can you maintain that Brahmaa although one only yet at the same
time is]the self of all," He answers the purva paksha thus — " The
whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the
body of the Supreme Person and that the body and the person are
of totally different nature." This is extremely dubious victory.

the body constituted by finite things and persons is really the

If

manifestation or parinama of the

Brahmana and this what Ramanuja
refuge is [quite unsafe. For, his rival would
believes, then his
the parinama or the body is real or
be justified in asking whether
illusory. If 'the latter, commentary
his becomes an unnecessary

reduplication of Sankara'slnnd if the former he is bound

to admit the

Sayadvdda point of view that the real is one from the point of view of
many from the point of view of parinama or his
the Person and
body.

For a fuller discussion of the same we

refer the reader to the

excellent work
Saptabhangitarangitii from which we have freely

drawn in this essay.

One other point and we may take leave of this topic. Bert rand

Russell in his American lectures " On Logical atomism" develops

very suggestive way. Accord-
Menrong's Theory of objective fact in a
ing to Menrong every
proposition either true or false has an objective

fact as the basis. For in

order that there may be an intelligent asser-
their must be some objective basis. This
tion apart from its truth value
objective facts one for true propositions
doctrine implies two sets of
and other Both being objective, what is the destine
for false ones.

mark of each so that one stands for truth and

the other for error ?
withont being answered
Thus the question of truth is pushed further
which are false and erroneous.
and we have to admit objective facts
proposes a modification in the
In order to avoid this result [\ Russell
doctrine.

distinguishes between the meaning of a name and the fact

He
Any individual object may be designated
implied by a proposition.
 ;

1XXXIV SAPTABHANGI.

by a name. The name is a symbol refering to some particular object.

This is a are fact. There is no meaning in calling this true or false.

It simply i Truth or falsity refers to a proposition, a proposition
becomes true or false because of an objective fact. The term objective
fact is used in the sense of that which is other than the proposition
that makes for its truth or falsity. Every objective fact may have two
propositions of which one is true because it corresponds to the fact
and the other is false because it has no corresponding fact. This theory
of correspondence works well in the case of a true affirmative proposi-
tion (i.e.) of the pair of propositions based on each fact if the true one
is affirmative, it is so because there is a corresponding fact, The
negative proposition which is not corresponding to that fact is so far
falsified by the fact. But take the following pair. Socrates is living

and Socrates is not living. Here it is the negative proposition that is

true and affirmatiue one is false. According to Russel's theory the

negative proposition which is true must have a corresponding fact

otherwise it cannot be true. But what is the objective fact that is

corresponding to this proposition < ' socrates is not living.' There

seems to be none and yet there must be one. Therefore Russell brings
in the theory of "negative fact." This suggestion raised a lot of dis-

cussion among the audience. But Russel himself leaves it undeveloped.

He emphasses the fact that negative facts must be accepted as
a fundamental postulate if the correspondence theory is to work.

Now what have we in the above doctrine of Saptabhangi

? Each

thing is capable of having seven modes of predication and primarily two

affirmative and negative. The affirmative proposition is determined
by self form, matter, place and time. The negative proposition rests

on non-self relation of the same four form, matter, place and time. In
this case both the propositions are true. A negative proposition in the

case of self-relation and affirmative proposition in the case of

non-self-relation would both be false. The proposition relating

Socrates to his own time is true ; the one relating him to any other
time is false- To say that he is living now is such a false proposition.
We are entitled to say only this that he is not living now.

Thus we have something like thus. A thing in its Svarufra

'self- form), svadravya, (matter), svakshetra (place) sva'kaia (time) is

the positive fact enabling the truth of an affirmative proposition. The

thing in its pararilpa (ndn-self-form), par-dravya, parakshetra t
 SAPTABHANGI. lxxxv

parakdla will constitute the negative fact. This will justify the
negative proposition. This is offered only by way of suggestion for a
possible explanation of what Russell calls " negative fact." Neither
do we propose to develope Russell's theory nor do we want to imply
that he was anticipated by Indian logicians of old. Any how the com-
parison is interesting and suggestive.

This Saptabhangi is a powerful organon in the hands of Syadvd-

dins who avoided the Nihilism of the Buddhists a> well as the abso-
lute Monism of the Vedantists, who steered clear of the shallow
realism of the Charvakas and the ludicrous idealism of the Navavddins.
 WORKS BY SRI KUXDAKUXDA ACHARYA, lxxxv

Z/je following works are due to Sri TCundakunda jfchary a.

Prabhrita-traya or Nataka-traya, i e , the trilogy of

Panchastikayasara,

Pravachanasara, and

Sammayasara or Sammayasara Prtibhrita.

Also Niyamasara ;

Sata Pnlbhrita ; or of Dar^ana

Satapahfida ; consisting

Pahuda, Sutta, Charitta, Bodha, Bhava, and Moksha Pahudas.

Rayana Sara Baraha Anubekkha
; ;

(All these books have been printed.)

He is have written 84 Pahudas. Some names are

said to

given below :-— They are not as yet found in any library

Jonisara, Kriyasara, Arahanasara, Ksapanasara, Vamdha-

sara Amgasara, Dabbasara, Karma Pahuda,

TattvasaraJ;
Paya Pahuda; Vidya Pahuda, Ughata Pahuda, Dristi Pahuda,
Siddhanta Pahuda, Samavaya Pahuda, Naya Pahuda, Prakriti
Pahuda,*; Churni Pahuda, Pamchabagga Pahuda, Karma
Vipaka Pahvida, vVastvl Pahuda, Payadhara Pahdua, Utpada
Pahuda, Dibba Pahuda, Sikkha Pahuda, Jiba Pahuda, Achara
Pahuda, Sthava Pahuda, Alapa Pahuda, Chuti Pahuda, Sata
Darsana Pahuda, Nakamma Pahuda, Samthana Pahuda,
Nitaya Pahada, Eyamta Pahuda, Vihaya Pahuda, Salami
Pahuda.

All the works of Sri Kundakunda are in Prakrit verse.

But it is easy and beautiful. His nataka traya or Trilogy

has been commented upon in Sanskrit by Sri Atnrita Chandra

Ach&rya and also by Sri Jayasena Ach&rya. There is also a
commentary on Siyamsara by Sri Padma\Prabha Maha Dhan
Deva. There is an excellent printed Hindi edition of this

work by Jaina Dharma Bhusana Brahmchan Snal Prasadji.

 Pahchastskaya Samayasara.

^*
!. Obeisance to Jinas, possessed of attributes infinite, the
conquerors who
beyond the influences of transmigration,
are
worshipped by the hundred Indras ievealers of the clear, ;

sweet, and three-world-beneficial Word.

Commentary.
A
The three Lokas are Urdhva (upper), Madhyama (middle), and
Adhali (lower). The Word is called beneficial, because it enables the
people of the three worlds to realise their pure and perfect self. It is

sweet because it draws towards itself the hearts of the faithful and the
wise. It is called clear because it is free from defects such as, doubt,
or self-contradiction etc.

The hundred Indras are: —

40 of the Bhavana Devas.
32 of the Vyantara Devas.

24 of the Kalpa Vasis.

2 of the Jyotiska Devas, Sun and Mcon.

1 of the Human beings.

1 of the Animals.

One who is worshipped by such Indras in Samosarana is certainly

deserving of worship by the ordinary mortals. The reference shows
the glory of Jina.

2.

Next, salutation to the Jinngama.

'Sanskrit rendering :
 —

THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

2. I bow to the Sastra that is revealed by Jinas, is the

means of liberation from the four " Gatis" and leads to Nir-
vana : Listen ! I describe that same truth in this work.

Commentary.

Samaya means system. It is of three kinds :

—
(1) Sabdi Samaya, the system of philosophy or scripture.

(2> Arthasamaya, the system of reality.

(3) Jnanasamaya. the system of knowledge.

Saluting the Sabdasamaya or the scripture the author goes to

describe Arthasamaya the facts of reality in order to attain true

knowledge of the Jnanasamaya.

The four Gatis are :

1. Naraka: the Heil.

2. Tiryak : the plant and the animal world.

3. Manusya: Man.
4. Deva : the Gods.

These four Gatis constitute Samsara.

The Agama is saluted because of two great reasons : Its

origin and its fruit. It is the word of God. It is revealed by

Sarvanja. Its fruit is that it saves the soul from the four Gatis of

Samsara and leads it to Nirvana, the unconditioned state of perfection

where the self is completely realised.

3.

Then he mentions the three Samayas. Sabda, Artha,

Jiiana in the first half of the Gatha ; and the distinction between the
Loka (the world) and the Aloka (the beyond) in the second half of
the Gatha :

* Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAyasama yasAra.

3. It is said by Jina that the group of five categories

constitutes the system of reality ; the same is the world. And
beyond that, is the immeasurable and infinite space (called
Aloka.)
Arthasamaya or the system of reality is two-fold. Loka
and Aloka. Loka is constituted by the five Astikayas, or
existences. Beyond that is the great and the infinite Aloka
which is co-extensive with pure Space or AnantakaSa.

4.

Here the author enumerates the five existences He

describes the number of each and the general and special
characteristics of the different Astikayas.

4. Jivas Pudgalas or non-souls, Dharma and

or souls,
Adharma, the principles of rest and motion, and finally Space
— these are the Astikayas. They are eternal, uncreated and
of huge magnitude.
Commentary.
Since the atom or the material point is the unit of space the
spatial point is also called Ann or Atom. Since the five entities, such
as Jivas, etc., mentioned above are capable of occupying space, they

are called Kayas (corporeals) ; the term Kaya implies relation to many
spatial points. Existences that can be so related to space are called

by the Jainas, Astikayas. It is evident that material objects consti-

*
Sanskrit rendering :

Htfsri^T H3JT*? sr*re ?% fsmt^: asm i

4
Sanskrit rendering :
 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

tuted by physical molecules have such space quality. Jiva or soul is

also considered to be an Astikaya because of its organic nature.

Jiva exists as an organism and as such it is related to body and

hence the spatial quality. Dharma and Adharma are the peculiar
principles recognised by Jainas as corporeal. These are also

Astikayas. One is the principle of motion ; the other is the principle

of rest. They are pervading space and as such are Astikayas. It is

not necessary to point out that space is a multidimensional existence.

Jains have recognised the reality of space. They do not think that

it is possible to reduce space to a "form of the mind" as the

Idealists of Europe and India have done.
Since Time has neither potentially nor really the possibility of

such space relations it is denied the name Astikaya. It is purely an

entity of monodimensional series. Though it is not an Astikaya it does
not cease to be a real entity. Here also the Jains differ from the
Idealistic thinkers of the world in their attitude towards Time. Time
is a reality and not a form of experience. Their views are more or
less akin to the ideas of the Realism which is associated in England
with thinkers like B. Russell.
5.

Then the Astikayas are described.

3ft srf^n-npsft **tff ** vzmyf$ faftff* i

5. Whatever things have the essential nature of manifest-

ing themselves severally through their numerous qualities and
modes are the Astikayas. These fill the three worlds— they
being the constituent parts of the world
Commentary.
Since these are real, they are called Asti. Since they constitute
the world or Loka they have the space quality, hence they are Kayas.

Astikaya then implies existential nature as well as space quality.

6.

Next the description of the six Dravyas. The above five

Astikayas together with the Time (Kala) form the six Dravyas.

^Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra

* — " '
^i

6. These five Astikiiyas which though manifesting them-

selves diversely, maintain their permanency, constitute together
with Kala or time which has the quality of permanence in

change, the Dravyas.

Commentary.
These five entities are being and becoming. They undergo
change and yet maintain their identity.
Thus they have the three characteristics of coming into existence,
ceasing to exist, and also remaining permanent in spite of both.
Creation, destruction, and yet continuity, — these are the main
qualities of Dravya. Kala or time also has these three qualities,

hence the Dravyas are six in number.

Dravya is fundamentally an organic unity. This view takes
reality not merely in its aspect of change nor of permanency. It is

permanency in change. Hegel is responsible for introducing such a

conception of reality modern thought. Jainas in their conception
in

of Dravya have anticipated such a modern idea, several centuries in

advance. Of course the concept was not fully worked out because of
other limitations peculiar to their age.
7

These six Dravyas can move in the same place. They can
also occupy the same space because of their mutual accommodating
nature. Though they get thus interpenetrated still each preserves its

own proper nature.

7. These six Dravyas though mutually interpenetrating,

and accommodating one another, and though getting mixed up
* Sanskrit rendering :

t Sanskrit rendering :
 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

in view of occupying the same space, yet they always main-

tain their identical nature without losing their respective
qualities, general as well as special.

Commentary.
The six Dravyas are classified into three kinds:— (li Sakriya (2)

Sakriyaniskriya, (3) Niskriya. Sakriya Dravyas are those that

can be efficient causes. They can move about from place to place.

They have the capacity of Agamana or motion. Such are Pudgala,

or matter and jiva or soul. Sakriyaniskriya Dravyas are those
that condition movements, without themselves undergoing change or
motion. These have merely Avagahana. The physical principles of

Dharma and Adharma correspond to this description. Lastly

Niskriya Dravya is one which is capable of being neither the direct
nor the indirect condition of change. Such is Space which has pure
Avasthana.
8.

After describing the general nature of Astikayas in Gatha.

No. 5, " Jesiin Atthisahao etc," the author proceeds to describe

their distinctive characteristics and examines them from different

points or Nayas.

^tTC ^^^r^rr ^sf^r^rr spfaq^rreT i

8. Substance is one (as a class). It is the inherent essence

of all things. It manifests itself through diverse forms. It

undergoes infinite modifications. It has the triple character-

istics of creation, destruction and permanence. It also has

the antithetical qualities, that is, it may be described by the
opposites.
Commentary.
The antithesis referred to is due to the fact that the substance
may be described in each case by the opposite attribute. It is des-

cribed as one from the class point. It may be described as many

from the individual point. So with every adjective ; Sarvapadastha

"Sanskrit rendering :

ST?TT ^^M^T ^f^Rj^T SPTFTTOfv I

 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra.

may have the antithesis Ekapadastha, Viswarupa against Ekarupa,

Anantaparyaya, against Ekaparyaya, etc. Such a description of the

same thing by opposite attributes may be incompatible with the false

position taken up by Ekanta philosophy, that is, the philosophical
attitude which insists on a single point of view with reference to the
extremely complex facts of reality. But such complex facts can be

described by opposites without involving violent self-contradiction

according to the Anekanta philosophy — philosophy of manifold

aspects. Complex reality naturally of ths
claims complex attitude
understanding. Any attempt to provide life and its problems with a
simple ready-made framework must certainly end in failure for ;

conceptual analysis always implies selection and abstraction. The

reality which is described by a concept will certainly be richer in

content than the content of the idea. Hence is the possibility of

describing the same fact of Life by distinct and sometimes diverse

conceptual symbols. This means that life is always greater than
Logic. It is this aspect that is expressed in the Jaina attitude of

Anekanta. The prima facie contradiction suggested by the term

Anekanta is in no way different from the Hegelian dialectic which
could embrace contradictions. When the Jaina philosopher speaks
of describing the same thing by opposite attributes his view need not
be assumed more violently shocking to the common sense
to be
attitude than Hegel's assertion that affirmation and negation arc
identical. Both the views in short are apparently inconsistent, but
both emphasize an important aspect of reality.
9.

While describing the nature of Dravya the author goes to

mention the qualified identity between Satta and Dravya. These are
the same from one aspect.
'

9. What Hows, or maintains its identity through its

several qualities and modifications, and what not is different

from Satta or Substance, that is called Dravya by the All

knowing.

Sanskrit rendering'.
 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

Commentary. •

Here Satta or substance is distinguished from Dravya. Dravya

means that which flows or changes. While changing through its
different qualities and modifications its essential nature persists. This
kind of progressive development is associated with Dravya. But such
development is also the characteristic of substance. Hence according
to Jaina attitude Dravya is not entirely different from Satta. or subs-
tance. Therefore the opposite qualities mentioned above with
reference to Satta or substance are also applicable to Dravya which is

not different in meaning.

According to this view there is no unchanging substance or Satta

in Jaina system. Such adamantine existence cannot be identified

with Dravya which is extremely volatile. Here also the similarity

between Hegelian concept of " thing" and the Jaina concept of Dravya
is worth noticing. Satta is not " a thing in itself" behind Dravya.
Satta. and Dravya are one and the same as Hegel mentioned. Thing in

itself and experience are not absolutely distinct. Dravya refers to

facts of experience. Satta. refers to existence or reality. One may be

abstracted from the other but it is not different from the other as a
fact.

10.

Then he speaks of the other characteristices of Dravya.

^T^^RTO^ 3TT <3f rf vproffa W>W*% II \° II*

10. Whatever has substantiality, has the dialectical triad

of birth, death, and permanence, and is the substratum of
qualities and modes, is Dravya. So say the All-knowing.
Commentary.
Here the three characteristics of Dravya are described First :

Dravya has the quality of Sat or existence.

'
Secondly
'
it has the
quality of permanence through birth and death. Thirdly it is the

*Sanskrit rendering :

S^qfcusro «n 3TT^gfcf prefer: n \° n

 —

paNchAstikAya-sama yasara.
'

substratum of attributes and conditions. The quality of '

Sat
emphasises the substantial reality of Dravya. It is not merely the
form of the intellect. It hasRerum Natura. The
an existence in

triple quality of dialectical change is the second attribute. Utpada

is appearence, i.e., assuming new modification. This does not mean

creation out of nothing. Creation by the fiat of a Will is not recognised
by the Jainas. Utpada therefore means that phase of the process of the
development when a new form is assumed. Vyaya is losing the
previous form. Here also it is different from absolute disappearance.
It only means that phase in the process of development where the
earlier form is replaced by the succeeding one. Dhruva refers to the

persistence of the essential nature of Dravya which undergoes develop-

ment and which makes both Utpada and Vyaya simultaneously
possible. In fact the process of development includes all the three
phases. This fact is not only recognised by the scientists like

Darwin and Spencer, but by the great French philosopher, Bergson,

who raised it to an important philosophical principle. Lastly Dravya
is the substratum of qualities and modes. Attributes and modifica-

tions will have no basis if they do not rest on something real. This
does not mean that Dravya is merely a prop, supporting an alien fact,
the attribute. The attribute is the thing and the thing has the
attribute ; but still the Jainas do not admit that the attributes alone
are sufficient to constitute a reality. For them esse is not percipii.
Attributes in order to be objective and not merely psychical do
require an objective basis. Such a basis Dravya is. Finally it is to be

noted that these three characteristics are inseparable from one

another. Satti pre-supposes Utpada, Vyaya, Dhruvattva, and also is

the substratum. Similarly process of development implies Satta,

which again cannot be existing apart from qualities and modes.
Neither of the three can exist apart from the other two. In short the

three characteristics express the same essential nature of Dravya in

three different ways.

11.

Then Dravya is examined from two points of view :

(1) Dravyarthika. Naya, the aspect of substance, and (2) Paryayar-

thika Naya, the aspect of change or development.
 10 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JA1NAS.

3^^ fspnurt ^osr^ ^ Tirf^r ^f|^ ^r^vrrat i

11. Dravya in its reality can neither be created nor

destroyed ; it has only permanent substantiality. But througl
its modes, it secures the triple qualities of permanence, ap-

pearance and disappearance.

Commentary.
According to Dravyarthika Naya, Dravya, e.g., gold can neither

be created nor destroyed. It exists and that is all. But the orna-
vfc
ments and other things made of gold are the Paryayas or modes.
These may change one ornament may be melted and a new one be
;

made. The disappearance of the previous ornament is Vyaya and the

appearance of the new ornament is Utpada, and yet all the while

there is the same gold Dhruva. Dravya then has both the qualities,
permanence and change, it is permanent as Dravya and changing as
Paryaya.
- 12.
Then it is pointed out that there is no fundamental
difference between Dravya and Paryaya, substance and its mode.

12. There is neither substance without mode nor

mode without substance. The one cannot be without the

other, so say the Sramanas.

Commentary.
Though there is a difference between substance and its mode
from the points of significance, quality and utility, yet the one cannot
>/*
exist apart from the other as the difference is not fundamental. For

"There is another reading of it in the printed edition of this work in

Raichandra Jain Granthamala as WT^Tl^

\ Sanskrit rendering :

^qfrR? fe^T S^q 5T f»T*rqfel WgW I

gq ^IT^r? $4foT 8^* <Tqfar; \\\\\\

I Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAyasamayasAra. 11

example, an ornament which'is the Par} aya of gold is different from

gold in Samjna or significance, in Laksana or attribute, and in Prayo-
jana or utility. But still there can be no ornament apart from gold
and gold apart from some form or mode of it. The relation between
Dravya and Paryaya is the same as the relation between matter and
form. No matter without form and no form without matter.

13.

Next he establishes the identity of substance and qualities.

13. There is neither quality without substance nor

substance without quality ; hence these two are not incom-
patible in their nature.
COMMENTARY.
Though the quality and the qualified are different in appella-
tion, thev are not really different in nature, as both refer to the same
real fact.
14.

Then he describes the Pramana Sapta — Bharigi. The seven

forms of Predication about Reality.

™p or*

14. According as Dravya is viewed from different

aspects of reasoning it may be described by the following
propositions :
— (1), Perhaps it is. (2), Perhaps it is not. (3),

Perhaps it isand is not) (4), Perhaps it is indefin-

both (is

able (5), Perhaps it is and is indefinable (6), Perhaps it is not

and is indefinable and (7) Perhaps it is and is not and is
indefinable.
^^.jy
* Sanskrit rendering :
_
5ts^ct fsrci tt ij?3jt 3#sM few i srcvrqfa i

\Sanskrit rendering :
72 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

Commentary.
Sapta— Bharigi or the seven-aspected logical predication is an
important doctrine of Jaina logic. The same object may be des-
cribed by seven distinct propositions, These are the seven possible
ways of a priori description. We cannot have another proposition
about an object which cannot be brought under any one of the seven
propositions. The complex nature of a real object or Dravya is

amenable to description by the above seven and only seven proposi-

tions. To have a complete description then, the thing must be taken
in all the seven ways. In each case it is the same fact that is the
subject of the propositions which are certainly diverse in nature.
That only means that different and apparently conflicting ideas may
be predicated of the same subject. This is possible only in Anekanta
philosophy.
The different propositions are all beginning with the term
" Sydt " which means perhaps. The proposition aims, at the most
only at probable truth. Jaina logicians were evidently extremely
cautious. With the consciousness of seven possible predications they
would never assert anything categorically about anything. Absolute
categorical assertion may be justified in Ekanta philosophy. But
the Jaina thinker in his dread of such absolutist attitude never
hesitated to emphasize his relativistic philosophy even at the cost
of verbal redundency.
The prefix Syat therefore saves the proposition from becoming
an absolute assertion. The quality predicated is probably or perhaps
true. The predication is accepted provisionally with the full recogni-
tion that the same may be denied and th it other ideas may be
affirmed of the subject.
1. The proposition Syadasti Dravya means that existence is

affirmed of a thing from the point of view of its own Dravya or

essence. Essential characteristic may be safely affirmed of a thing.

The affirmation has meaning with reference to its own kseira or

place, i.e., you can say that " a thing is " when you refer to its place of

existence. Similarly the proposition is significant with reference to

its own Kdla. You can affirm the existence of a being during its life-

time. Again affirmation is significant if reference is to its Bhdva

or quality. The quality of a thing can be safely predicated of the
thing. Hence the proposition Syadasti Dravya is an affirmation
about the Dravya with reference to its own Dravya, (substance),
Ksetra (place), Kala (time) and Bhava (quality).
 paRchAstikAya-samayasAra. 13

2. Sydnndsti Dravya, (perhaps the thing is not.) This proposi-

tion is ;i negation about a thing from the point of view of Para-
Dravya (alien substance', Para-Ksetra ialien place), Pura-Kala
(alien time) and Para-Bhava (alien quality), i.e., you can have a nega-
tive proposition of a thing in the following manner :
—
1. X is not Y (Para Dravya).

2. X is not in Y (Para Ksetra).

3. X is not now (Para Kala), i.e., it ceased to exist or it is

not yet born.

4. X has not the quality Y, i.e., (Para Bhava.)

3. Syadastitiasti Dravya (perhaps the thing is and is not.) Both
the conflicting predicates may be applied to the same subject, provided
the following condition is satisfied. The affirmed predicate must refer
to Sya_Dravya (its own substance), Sva- Ksetra (its own place), Sva
Kala (its own time) and Sva-Bhava (its own quality.) And the
predicate denied must refer to Para Dravya (other substance), Para
Ksetra) (other place), Para Kala (other time) and Para Bhava (other
quality.)

4. Syadavahtavyam Dravya (perhaps the thing is beyond descrip-

tion.) Thereis no word which would bring out the implication of
both the affirmation and negation of a thing at the same time. Avak-
tavya should not b^ interpreted to be absolutely indescribable for then
1
A vahtavya '
itself would become meaningless. It only refers to

the impossibility of finding an idea which would include both the

thesis and the antithesis at the same time.
5. SyatastiavjJitavya (perhaps the thing is and is beyond descrip-
tion). When reference is made to Sva Dravya, Sva Ksetra etc., the

thing exists and hence the affirmation ; and when reference is made at

the srtme time to Sva Para Dravya, Sva Para Ksetra etc , the thing
becomes beyond description and when attention is directed to both

the abovementioned aspects, affirmation and indefinability will be the

fifth Bhahga, namely: — perhaps a thing is and is beyond description.

Syknn&stiavaktavya (perhaps a thing is not and is indefinable.)

6.

Here the first reference is negation from the point of Para Dravya,
Para Ksetra, etc. Secondly the refetence is to the indescribability

and when both these characteristics, denial and indefinability are

associated with the thing at the same time then the proposition
"perhaps that not and is beyond description " becomes significant.
it is
14 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

7. Syad-asti-nasti-avaktavya Dravya, (perhaps the thing is, is

not and is indefinable.) Affirmation is with reference to Sva Dravya

etc. Negation is with reference to Para Dravya. Indefinability

when these two are taken at the same time. When all the three

above characteristics are attended to together then the thing may be

said to exist, and yet not to exist, and to be beyond description.
The seven principles are divided in the following manner.
1. Piatyeha Bhai/gas, single principles.
(a) Syadasti.
(b) Syannasti.
(c) Syadavaktavya.
2. Dvisamyoga Bltaugas, dual principle.

(a) Sya.dastina.sti.

(b) Syadastiavaktavya.
(c ) Syannastiavaktavya.
3. Trisamyoga Bha/tga (triple principle).

(a) Syadastinastiavaktavya.
It is already mentioned that the Jainas accept only seven prin
ciples.Hence the following statement of Kumarila Bhatta i;

condemned to be absurd.

" When seven principles are admitted then there may also be

hundred." Jainas believe that the true nature of reality will be

understood when it i> viewed according to Sapta — Bharigi.

15.
There can be neither destruction of existing Dravyas nor

creation of non-existing ones. Concepts of creation and destructiot

are applicable to substance only because of its qualities and modes.

In this Gatha. Dravya is shown to be permanent from Dravyarthika
Naya and changing from Paryayarthika Naya.

wsrc^ ^sr *n€t wreor sw^res %r ^m^t i

15. There can be no destruction of things that do exist,

nor can there be creation of things out of nothing. Coming

into existence and ceasing to exist, things do have because
of their attributes and modes.
* Sanskrit rendering :

*u*to *tfei jtt^t mfm swisrem %sr ztmv i

 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 15

Commentary.
For example the atoms of gold that constitute the substance gold

are subject to neither creation nor destruction. But there may be

appearance and disappearance in the different forms and modifications
of gold ; the original form may be lost ; and a new form may be assumed.
One ornament may be destroyed and another created. What is true

of inorganic things is also true of other Dravyas such as Jiva. Jiva as

such is neither created nor can be destroyed. Its essence is eternal,

but it may lose its original state of existence and come into a new state

of life. Life then is continuity of existence through births and deaths.

Thus Dravya as such is permanent and unchanging. But its forms
and modes are perpetually changing. Hence Dravya may be described
by both the attributes permanent and changing according to the

respective aspects or Naya.

16.

Then Dravyas are further distinguished from their qualities

and modes.

16. Jiva and other Dravyas are reals. The qualities

of Jiva are consciousness and upayoga, (perception and
knowledge), which are manifold. The soul manifests in the
following forms as Deva, as man, as a member of the Hell or
as a plant or an animal.
Commentary.
The term Upayoga is used to denote DarSana and J nana.

DarSana is perception and J nana is knowledge. Besides Upayoga

there is the quality of consciousness or thought or Chetana. Chetana

and Upayoga constitute the main qualities of Jiva. But according to

Jaina thought, Jiva may be pure and perfect or impure and imper-
fect— Suddha Jiva and Karma Jiva. Karma Jiva is not a distinct

kind. It is the same Suddha Jiva soiled by the Karma.

Chetana or thought when associated with Suddha Jiva would

mean perfect thought to which there can be nothing opaque.

* Sanskrit rendering :
 :

15 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAISAS.

Upayoga Suddha Darsana and Suddha Jnana perfect

also will be —
perception and perfect knowledge. The whole of reality forms an
object of perception to Suddha Dar£ana and at the same time the
whole reality is known to Suddha Jnana. Suddha Chetana and
Suddha Upayoga, consciousness, perfection, and understanding all
perfect and pure, constitute Svabhava Guna the intrinsic
the —
qualities of Jiva. These Sabhava Gunas are potentially present in

all Jivas and explicitly manifest in Siddha Jiva or the Realised Self.]
The same Svabhava-Gunas get corrupt because of the
very
interference of Karma. 'Then they become Vibhava Gunas of Jiva
or the extrinsic qualities of Jiva. Chetana and Upayoga become
Asuddha. The imperfect and the impure consciousness of man and
other Samsara states of Jiva is ASuddha Chetana. It is the Vibhava

Guna which must be got rid off before the self attains purity and
regains its intrinsic Suddha Chetana. Similarly Suddha Dar6ana
aud Suddha Jnana become A6uddha in Samsari Jivas. Sense,
perception or Indriya DarSana and knowing or ASuddha Jnana are
the forms of Upayoga which is corrupt. This again in the Vibhava
Jnana of Jiva. The Vibhava Gunas accordingly are present in all

Samsara jivas, whereas the Svabhava Gunas are in the germ.

In a similar way Jiva has two main Paryayas, Sabhava or

Suddha Paryaya, Vibhava or ASuddha Paryaya. The Siddha

state, the state of purity and perfection is the Svabhava Paryaya,
whereas all Samsara states are Vibhava Paryayas.
The distinction between qualities and modifications or states

of existence may also be illustrated with reference toother Dravyas.

17.

Next it is pointed out again that though things have origin and
decay from the point of forms or modes they have no change in

essence.

STTOTT%r Wgt $ffr ^sft f$f^ ^t 3TT 1

17. If a soul departs from the human state it be-

comes either a Deva or some other living being. In either
case (during death or birth), it does not lose its intrinsic nature.

* Sanskrit rendering

*T3^r%?( *£\ ^ %$t tfcrrffan 3TT I

 paNchAstikAya-sama yasAra. 17

Commentary.
Wiiei! the original form is io>r, ;he soul dees not lose its

own nature with the passing form and when it puts on a new form it

does not get a new nature with its coming form. In spite of origin
and decay of forms the soul maintains its nature and identity.

This view of soul rejects the two false views, Ksanika Ekanta
and Nitya Ekanta. The former maintains that there is a different
self at every moment as the Buddhist believes. The Jaina view
rejects this as untenable because it recognises the change with Paryaya
or Guna and not with Dravya. Nitya Ekanta view maintains that
the self is absolutely permanent and unchanging, and that all changes
are illusory. This view also is rejected by the Jainas. For them
Jiva maintains its identity through the changes of Guna and Paryaya,
18.

The same fact is again explained from the point of Nayas or

principles of understanding.

# ^ snfg; *TC*jf snf^ W <Tgt *T %* sennit \

18. Though the soul experiences both birth and death, yet
it is neither really destroyed nor created. Origin and decay
refer respectively to the disappearing Deva state or the
appearing human state and these are only its Paryayas or
modes.
Commentary.
From the Dravyarthika principle there is neither birth nor death
for the Jiva has an indestructible essence which cannot be annihilated
even by the hand of Time Origin and decay are applied to Jiva
only from the point of Paryayarthika Naya.

19.

Then the different states of existence and their time limits are
described.

*Sanskrit rendering :

*T «*<* mfa JJTjfj ^fo * STCt ?T %??tr<T«5r: I

 18 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

19. Thus neither an existing thing is liable to death or

destruction, nor a non-existing one can come into being. The
Jiva has the Deva state or human state as the effect of the
Gatinfima Karma and the duration of each state is conditioned
by its own Nama-karma.
COxMMENTARY.
The Atma in itself has neither beginning nor end. and yet it will

take infinite forms. Each form of existence will be of a particular

Gati. Gati is a general class of beings. Four such classes are

recognised by the Jainas, Manusya, Deva, Naraka, and Tiryak Gatis.

The birth of Atma into any one of these forms is entirely conditioned
by a particular kind of Karma. This K arma which eads the _soul
l to

take forms acc ording. .to Jthe different Gatis Gatinama Karma.
is call ed

The form and the d urati on of life are dependent upon the quality
and the strength of this Nama-karma.
When the particular Nama-karma exhausts its efficiency, the parti-

cular form of life brought about by that Karma ceases to exist, and the
soul puts on another form, that is, enters into another Gati, as deter-
mined by the new Nama-karma acquired during the previous life. Thus
Atma is like an actor who takes several parts on the stage. Forms
are put off and put on while the actor is one and the same. Through
all the changing forms the soul maintains its identity and nature for
which there is neither birth nor death. And finally when the Atma.
gets liberated from the Karmas it still maintains its everlasting
nature, of course, pure and perfect.
20.

It is pointed out that the soul which by from

liberation
Karma attains Moksa is not absolutely distinct from the soul which
was in Samsara.
For a gem purified is not fundamentally different from its own
state before purification. The g em is the same though free from dirt.
* Sanskrit rendering :
 P4^CHisr//clyA-SAMAyASiR4. /p

20. Jiva on Bhava Karma or an impure

account of his

emotional state may get utterly bound by the Karmas such as

Jfian&varniya (the knowledge-clouding Karma).
(Then he
becomes a Samsfiri Jiva). But he may (through the realisation

of his own nature) completely liberate himself from that

bondage and then attains a state unknown to him before the

state of perfection.

Commentary

Though gold, may be different from brass, yet it is mixed with it.
gets bound by Karmas. The
In the same way Jiva pure in itself

initial condition is its own impure

heart called " Bhava Karma." On
this psychological state, the Dravya Karmas, or the
account of
Karmic matter are attracted and get deposited on
different kinds of

the Jiva, thereby shrouding its light and glory.

When the Jiva is so hound by Karmas it undergoes a series of

manifestations. But finally by realising its true nature it may liberate

itself from Karmic shackles and get Nirvana. When once this stage
Samsara. Jainas do
is reached there is no fear of coming back to
to begin
not assume the doctrine of the fall of man. Every Jiva
state to be acquired
with is a Karma-Jiva and Nirvana is a unique
time. The state of nature is not a state of
anew and for the first

a state of bondage. Jiva rinds itself in chains

and by
freedom. It is ;

its own exertion secures freedom.

21.

manifestation of
Then it is stated that the Atma with the
existing
Guna and Paryaya (attributes and modes) will lose its
to the Paryayar-
nature and assume a new state of existence according
thika Naya.

^Sanskrit rendering :

ffimsnsjjraT *isn sftt* §«p srgvgn i

20 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

TTcf ^ enroll ^TT^fT^T^ s3?^T^nof ^ I

21. Thus the Jiva with its attributes and modes, roaming
in Samsara, may lose its particular form and assume a new
one. Again this form may be lost and the original regained.
Commentary.
Dravya or substance has the quality of identity and difference.
It is permment while changing. Jiva Dravya is capable of taking
different forms or Paryayas. This process of Paryayic change is

Samsara. In the series of Samsara with reference to a particular

Jiva there is the passing away of old forms and the coming in of new
ones. These changes forms do not pre-suppose the loss of identity
of
of the Jiva. The very same Jiva as an individual survives after each
change thus maintaining its self identity. Snmsara for the Jaina is

not the manifestation of a shgle ?elf as the Vedantin would have ic.

Infinite number own Paryayas constitute the

of Jivas each having its

total of Samsara. At any particular moment the simultaneous and

co-existing forms of different Jivas will make up the Samsara of
that moment which means the organic world the mankind and the
Devas and the Narakas and animals and plants of that moment
22.
After describing the Dravyas in general by way of introduc-
tion the author is going to speak about Kala or time which is

indispensably related to the five Astikayas.

Before going to the
description of time, the author re-capitulates the five existences or
Astikayas in relation to which only time has relevencv and meaning.

22. The souls, the material bodies, space, together with

the remaining two, Dharma and Adharma, are the uncreated
existences that constitute the world. These are the Astikayas.
^Sanskrit rendering :

jj^rjtpk; srfer: sfarq; 5f>dfcT *fta: II R\ n

^Sanskrit rendering :

surer srfarsro^n ^rr^j^r ft star** ii ^ n

 1

pa NchAstikA ya -sa m a ya sAra . 2

Commentary.
The infinite number of souls, the infinite number of physical
bodies, space and the two physical principles of (Dharma and Adharma)
of motion and rest —
these are the constitutive elements of the
:

world. These are uncreated and eternal. Jainas recognise the

reality of space. To complete the world they also pre-suppose the
two principles of motion and rest called by them Dharma and
Adharma.
23.
Then Time is described. It is the instrument of change in the
above five Astikayas. This is real Time or absolute Time. From
these changes we have the perception of duration uxmj intervals which
corresponds to relative or Vyavaharika Time. Real Time is also a
matter of inference from the changes in the above Astikayas.

^^TCfaft ^mt RR% ^w€t II t$ II #

23. That on account which these existences the Jivas,
of
material bodies, the Dharma and Adharma undergo changes
is called real time or Kala-Dravya.
Commentary.
Time is of two kinds, and relative.
real Birth, growth and decay
of things are possible only because of the former absolute time. The
relative Time is made up of conventional periods measured by unit
based upon those changes. This is merely an aspect of reai time
which is constituted by Instants. Thi?unconditional and absolute.
is

First of all the distinction between absolute and relative time

reminds one of Newton's distinction. The idealist for whom the
world of concrete experience is illusory may speak of time as a form of
experience. But one who accepts the reality of the concrete world
and its changes, must also admit the reality of Time. Jainas being
realists do recognise the reality of time. If change is real, again,
Time must also be real. It is the instrument of creative evolution
as Bergson would say. And lastly the absolute or real time is con-
st it utedJ>yMnstants which correspond to the points of space and
*Sanskrit rendering :
22 THE SACRED BOOKS OP THE J4/.VAS

particles of matter. In fact, these three classes of elements, points,

instants, and particles have important function in the Jaim

system of Philosophy. It is also worth noticing that modern realist

led by the Mathematical Philosophers admits the doctrine that

space is real and is made np of points, Time is real and is made ii|

of Instants or moments, and the physical world is real and is made

of particles. And these doctrines form the fundamental concept?

of the Jaina view of the world.
24.
Next the account of real time of which the conventional time is

form or mode.

n3 \3 ^ ^* '

(24) What is without the and the five

five colours, tastes,

without the two smells, and eight contacts; what is neithei

heavy nor light and has the character of introducing changes

in other things is Time.
Commentary.
Time has meaning foi and existence in the world. It is made up
of Instants or Kalanus. The Instants have neither colour, taste, nor

touch. The qualities associated with physical objects cannot be

applied to it. These constitute a " continuous compact series." The
time series formed by Instants is one dimensional in the language of
the Mathematicians ; that is why Time is denied Kayatva by the Jaina
Philosopher. Time which is so constituted by Instants is called

Mukhyakala or absolute time. It is also described by the following

terms : — Paramarthnkaln, the great unconditioned time. Nischa-

yakala, true time. Dravyakala, real time. It is one of the six

Dravyas or the Reals.

25.

Then the account of relative Time which is measured by

changes in the physical object or in the Jivas. This conventional

Time is merely a Paryaya of real time and is conditioned by the above
changes.

*Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAya-sama yasAra. 23

25. Samaya, Nimisa, Kastha, Kala, Nali,then (Muhurta),

A
day, month, season, Ayana, and, Samvatsara and other periods
of Time are all Vyavahara or conventional time These are
determined by other objects.
Samaya or moment (which is the manifestation of infinite number
of ultimate distants).

Nimisa which is made up of innumerable such moments.

Kastha which is equal to fifteen Nimisa s.
Kala which is equal to thirty Kdsthds.
Nail which is a little over twenty Kdlas.
Muhurta which is equal to two Ndlis.
Day and Night, equal to thirty Muhurtas.
Month which is equal to thirty days.
Season which is equal to two months.
Ayana Half year equal to three seasons,
Samvatsara year which is equal to two Ayanas.
Commentary.
The different periods enumerated in this Gatha are the conventional
periods measured by different units. These are artificial distinc-
tions introduced into the continuous time series of real time. The
units which determine the conventional distinctions are generally the
changes in the objects of the physical world or of the organic world.
Winking of the eyelid, the diurnal motion of the sun across the
heavens (which is only apparent according to modern Astronomy) and
the motion of the moon round the earth are some of the important
changes of physical objects which have been traditionally associated
with conventional period of measurements. Because of these conven-
tional distinctions, relative Time is said to be Pardyatta " dependent on
other things," but still since it is merely a form of real time which is

an unconditioned Dravya. Vyavahara Kala is said to be conditioned

in a way. It is called Kathahchit Pardyatta, somewhat conditioned.
26
Then is explained what is meant by somewhat conditioned in the
case of relative Time.
* Sanskrit rendering :
24 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

Duration of time either long or short is impossible

26.
apart from a standard of measurement. The standard oi
measurement no meaning apart from material objects.
also has

Hence conventional or relative time is brought about by extra-

neous conditions.
Commentary.
Vyavahara Kala or conventional time consists of periods of dim
tion which may be either short or long. This distinction of length

periods is not intrinsic. It is entirely due to external conditions sue!

as the moments of the physical bodies. Therefore though time as

such is unconditioned Vyavaharakala is certainly conditioned by

alien objects. Thus Time as such is the instrument of change or

Parinama in the five existences of the world, while itself has the
Vyavaharika Paryayas measured by the changes of the other objects.
Here ends the Introductory Chapter of the Panchastikaya
Prabhrita.
CHAPTER I.

27.

After describing the Dravyas in general the author examines

them in detail. He takes up Jiva Dravya first, for that is the

most important.

27. The soul has the following attributes. It has Life

Consciousness, Upayoga, (knowledge and perception) and is
Potent, performs actions, and is affected by their results, i<
conditioned by his own body, is incorporeal and is ordinarib
found with Karma.
*Sanskrit rendering :

I Sanskrit rendering :

AtRT ^ $^Ttsff * ft *J^n «*>4« ^ Th: II %l ||

 — —

paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 25

Commentary.
The author enumerates nine attributes. These attributes are true
not only of Sopadhi Jivas, but also of Nirupadhi Jivas. The enumer-
ated attributes refer to Sopadhi Jiva— the Jiva that has Upadhi or

limitations. Of course the author implies also the correlative nine

attributes of the Nirupadhi Jiva or the liberated soul.

The attributes relating to Sopadhi Jiva are :

(li Life, i.e., living with DaSa-pranas or ten life principles.

(2) Chetand or consciousness, i.e., the ordinary finite consciousness

which as associated with will and emotion, viz., acting and enjoying.
(3) Upayoga. Upayoga is the manifestation of Chetana. in the

act of understanding. Jfiana and Dar6ana are the two Upayogas ;

Knowledge and perception. These two modes of the understanding

are intimately related to Karmic changes. The relation may be
said to be in inverse ratio. They decrease in intensity and quality as
the Karmic veil becomes thicker and stronger. If the Karmas decay
or disappear then the Upayogas have the chance of fuller manifestation.

(4) Lordship or the capacity to assume different states of existence

in Samsara. He is the architect of his own life.

(5) Kartd. He is the doer of his own Karmas — both Dravya and
Bhava (Physical and mental Knrmas).
(6) Bhoktd. He is the enjoyer of the fruits of his own Karmas.
(7) Dehamdtra. Being embodied he may be said to be of the

same dimensions as the body.

<8) Amdrta : is incorporeal, being spritual by nature.

(9) Karma —Samyuktah is born with Karmas, being a Samsari

Jiva.

Similarly we have the nine corresponding attributes of the Niru-

padhi Jiva or the liberated soul :

(1) Living the life of pure and perfect existence.

(2) Having the consciousness which is infinite in contentment.

(3) Suddha Upayoga : He has the pure modes of Kevala Jfiana and
Kevala DarSana, perfect knowledge and perfect perception.
(4) Lord: He is the true Lord because of the freedom acquired by
annihilation of Karmas.

(5) He is the true Kartd or Doer, being independent of and

undetermined by extraneous conditions ;
Self-determined.
26 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

(6) Is the enjoyer of the eternal and infinite bliss begotten of the
complete realisation of self.

(7) Is the approximate size of the body possessed by him last.

(8) And yet is without form, being spiritual and being free from
all Karmas or physical qualities.

l9) And is Karma — nirmukta is absolutely free from the bondage

of Karma.
Thus the author in a single gdthd describes the two kinds of Jivas,
each with the nine qualities.
28.

28. Atma. which is free from the defect of Karma gets to

the highest point of the universe, knows all and perceives all,

and obtains the transcendental bliss everlasting.

Commentary.
Of the nine attributes the attri bute of lordsh ip is taken first

for explanation. It is known by experience and by the study

of scriptures that Soul is the lord of his own attributes and states of

existence. Impurity of the heart or false faith may lead him into

Samsara. The Lordship should not therefore be interpreted only

with the reference to the fall from a high estate. Even when he is

in the right path, the path that takes him to the never-before-expe-
rienced bliss, everlasting, liej s the Lord of his own destin y. He is not
to be imagine d merely as a drifLovood carried up and d ow_n_j?y_the
wa^&sJn the Ocean of Sam sara. That would make him helpless in
the hands of extrinsic Karmic forces. No. He is the Creator, the
Karm as themselves owe their existence to his wi Hence he is his ll.

own Lord whether he walks the path of righteousness or choses the

other one. Atma. is his own maker and Lord.
Jaina philosophy is peculiarly associated with its own cosmogony.
Heavens and hells are arranged in an order. The soul that gets
liberation quits the place, rises up to the summit of Loka where he
retains his abode. This Dogma is referred to in the Gatha. As the

^Sanskrit rendering:
 —

paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 27

natural and inevitable result of self-realisation the true Lordship of

the soul consists in inheriting the abode of bliss at the summit of the
world.

Then it is mentioned that this everlasting heavenly bliss is

secured by Atma by his own efforts without any extraneous help.

T^rti% ^f^r^rf
l

s^tstp* ^nrnwrf m ^ u*
29. Thus Atma becoming omniscient and all perceiving
through own effort obtains the infinite bliss which transcends
its

sense experience which is free from any imperfection, which is

spiritual and self-determined.

'^Commentary.
This Gatha goes with the previous one and states that infinite
bliss is an acquisition of the self through its own exertions. This
brings out the quality of Prabhutva or lordship, over one's own
destiny.
30.

After the description of the attribute Prabhutva we have an

account of Jivatva or Life characteristic. Here the author adopts
the Vyavaharika point of view and describes the characteristics of
organic beings in Samsara

qT^tff ^ff| sftaf^ *ftcrc^ ^t 1 iftfk$( Tpf 1

30. Whatever thing manifesting through four Pranas (or

principles of organism) is living at present, will continue to
live in the future, and was living in the past, that same is Jiva.
Again the Pranas are Bala, or strength, Indriya or the senses,
Ayuh, or the age and Vchchhvasa or respiration.
-'' **- '

= '
» —~v
'

;
-~-

*Sanskrit rendering :

I Sanskrit rendering :
 —

28 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

A living organism must hive these four Pranis or life principles.

You cannot think of a living b^ing devoid of these characteristics

Hence the author trying to describe xho nature of life as we know

it, enumerates the four fundamental characteristic of organic life.

These are :

1. Balaprana or strength which consists of

(a) Manobala or strength of mind.

(b) Vakbala or strength of speech.

(c) Kayabala or strength of body.

2. Indriya pranas are the senses

(a) Sparta or contact sense through skin.
(b) Rasa or taste through tongue.
(c) Ghrana or smell through nose.
(d) Sabda or sound through ears.
(e) Chaksu or vision through eyes.
Thus the Indriyas are five.

(3) Ayuh Prana which is the duration or age of life and it is one.

(4)Uchhvasa or respiration is one.

Thus the four Pranas become tea Pranas when details are taken

into consideration. These Pranas need not all of them with all the
details be present together in an organism, i.e., there may be an
organism which has not all the five Indriyas. But there must be
the four main characteristics These Pranas are generated by the
respective Karmas. The number and quality of the Pranas will be

determined by the Karmic differences. These are considered to be

the characteristics of soul, only from Vyavaharika point. The parti-
cular Vya.vaha.ra point adopted here is called by the Jaina Philosopher,

WJT^far ^TCTrTVpT s^srfT^q i e., non-conventional and relative aspect of

attending to the unessential nature of a thing, i.e., these characteristics

do not belong to Atma according to the principle of absolute reality

or Suddha NiSchayanaya.
31 and 32.
Next he enumerates the general and special characteristics
of Jiva, the characteristics both manifested and unmanifested.

^Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAyasamayasAra. 29

3132. The spiritual qualities of Jiva are infinite. Jivas

assume forms through the manifestation of these
different

infinite attributes. Taking the point of world-space some souls

through their complete manifestation may fill the whole world.

Others are not so fully manifested. These are filled with false
faith-blinding emotions, erroneous knowledge and perception
The former class of souls are free from these defects and are
called the perfect ones. And the latter are the Samsari,
Jivas or the imperfect ones. Each class contains infinite
number of individuals.

Commentary.
That spiritual principle on account of which the Jiva Uravvas
continue to manifest through ail their different forms is called Agurula-
ghutva guna. On account of the explicit manifestations of these
attributes Jivas have the chance of becoming complete and perfect.
The number of Jivas are infinite. They have their abode only in the
: Lokakasa. A soul developed to perfection is calied Siddha. That
stage represents absolute freedom from Karrnas. The other class
consists of Samsari Jivas. According to [ainas each class contains
infinite number of individuals.

If we employ the terminology of modern philosophy we have to

characterise the system as pluralistic. The souls are not only different
and distinct in their Samsaric state but also in the perfect state. A
soul may become perfect, may acquire by self-manifestation infinite
number of qualities and still it preserves own individuality.
its

(Individuality and perfection are not incompatible. Hence according

to the Jaina system realisation of Paramatma does not mean absolute
nullification of self-identity. That means several Paramattnas or
perfect souls may co-exist.
This attitude of uncompromising plurai m is evidently due to the
extraordinary emohasis laid on individual conduct bv the Taina
1. . :

Sanskrit rendering :
30 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS-

system. Bhakti and Jfiana are inadequate either severally or jointly

to lead the soul to Moksa. Charitra or conduct is the indispensable
third to constitute Moksamarga. If individuality is merely pheno-
menal appearance, moral value will also become purely relative.

Ultimate reality may withoutbe complete conserving moral value

which becomes merely an unessential characteristic confined to the
world of appearance. Anv system that attaches great importance to
moral value, that believes that reality would be incomplete without

the conservation of values, cannot afford to play with individuality

and must necessarily be pluralistic explicitly or implicitly.

33.

Next he explains the characteristic that soul is of the same

dimensions as its own body which is acquired through Karmas. He
explains it by analogy.

rff ^ft ^fwt ^f*rrf ^*rn=rcfg: u 33 II:* j

33. Just as the lotus-hued ruby when placed in a cup of

milk imparts its lustre to the milk, so Atm& residing in its own
body imparts its lustre or intelligence to the whole body.
Commentary.
Atma is in itself non-special hence it is not accurate to ask "Where
does it reside in its body ?" It pervades through the whole body,
it is located in any particular part of the body, the parts away from ii

residence will have to be somehow related to consciousness. The Jaina

system avoids the whole difficulty by considering the soul to be com-

pletely pervading in its own body. This pervading is not to be

interpreted as a sort of physical expansion. It is merely spiritual

manifestation still since the relation of consciousness is intimate with
its own body which is physical and special. Atma is considered to be
a Kaya. But this Kayatva would not make it physical. It is dis-

tinctly defined to be spiritual.

34.
This characteristic of co-extensiveness with the bodv is true
in its present as well as its past and future states or forms. Then
^Sanskrit rendering :
 —

paNchAstikAyasamayasAra. 31

the author mentions the substantiality of the soul, its distinctness

from the body and the reason of its different states of existence.

34. Jiva pervades the whole body. Still he is not one

with the body though when functioning, he is identical with it.

Impelled by gross emotions, stained by Karmas he puts on

different forms in the cycle of Samsara.
Commentary.
The term Sarvatra is again interpreted to mean all the different

bodies taken up by a soul during different births. Then the Gatha

will be interpreted slightly differently. The very same soul exists in

all its different bodies. It is one with its body and yet distinct from
them and so on. Again Sarvatra may mean in all parts of the world.

Then the interpretation will have to be as follows :

STSSTr*! In all parts of the world.

Sff?*J Jiva exists.

There are Jivas everywhere, i.e., in all parts of the world.

The Jivas m*X%t\ are not identical as they are distinct entities.

TOt and yet they are one and identical, 3^§t as they are substantially
similar to one another, etc., i.e., they are one, from the generic point
of view, but different from the specific point of view. Though the
Atma has continued to exist, and has an embodied existence from
time immemorial, it is in its spiritual nature entirely distinct from its

corporeal habitation. It puts on a body because of Karmas and thus

it roams in the world of Samsara.
35.
Next, the characteristic of Amurta or incorporeality. This
quality is real absolutely in the case of a Siddha Jiva who is free

from all taint of matter, karmic and non-karmic, whereas the other
Jivas though in themselves Amiirtas, are ordinarily associated with
Murta Dravyas or physical characteristics.

* Sanskrit rendering :
32 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.
_ .
-
i

35. Those Jivas which have not the life principles (Dravya
Pranas or the sense organs) and yet are not altogether devoid
of them (as the Bhava Pranas are intact) are the ones that
are free from corporeal limitation and they are the perfect
ones beyond description.
Commentary.
The body is the limiting condition of Atma Pradesa or the dimen-
sion of Atma. The size of the perfected soul is said to be a little
less than that of its last body for it is free from the Yoga the '
'

principle which brings about contraction and expansion or shrinking

and diffusing. It may be said to be merely an assemblage of pure
knowledge and other qualities of perfection.
36.

That Siddha state is shown to be neither the cause nor the

effect of the Samsara series. It being absolutely unconditioned can-
not be an item of the conditioned series of causation.

The Siddha is
36. not to be born again at any time in

Samsara. Hence he is not to be an effect (he is not to be

causally determined by anything else)'. Nor is he to bring
about a change in anything else, therefore he is not a cause
either.
Commentary.
Siddha has secured the absolute Amuurta State, the state of perfect

spirituality and is incapable of maintaining causal relation with the

Samsara series. The latter is determined by Karmic conditions. The:

*Sanskrit rendering :

\ Sanskrit rendering:
 paNchAstikAya-sama yasAra. 33

former is not so conditioned. The casual category which is true of

thee conditioned series is not to be applied to the unconditioned reality.
The argument is the same as that employed by Kant with the reference
to theThing in itself. What is true of the experience need not
necessarily be true of the metaempirical. The Siddha state then is
transcendental Self.

37.

Then he states that the soul maintains its intrinsic nature

and is real even in its Siddha or perfect state. Thus the Bud-
dhistic view of Nirvana as the annihilation of self is condemned
and rejected.

37. That he is infinite in perfection and yet finite with

reference to temporal life, that he is born into perfection
and yet dead from Samsara ; that he is the negation of all
and still the affirmation of his own intrinsic
extrinsic qualities
nature; that he has knowledge perfect and yet devoid of know-
ledge imperfect ; these eight attributes will not be associated
with him if 'Nirvana' is interpreted nihilistically.

Commentary.
As we said above, this Gatba. defends the Jaina view of Self against
the nihilistic interpretation of the Buddhists. Even in Siddha state
the self does not lose its "Satbhava" substantial reality.
It is only perfection of the already existing true nature which is in
the germ in the finite self. Complete evolution is no annihilation.
There must be more of its real nature and not less.

With this ends the Amurta characteristic of Jlva.

38.

Next the characteristic of "Chetana". The author notices

the three forms of Chetana or consciousness.

"Sanskrit rendering :

fasrrcJTfasrw ^ufa sp*^ ^rerfa sr-in^ ii

\s
34 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

38. One kind of Jiva experiences merely the fruits of

Karma, pleasure-pain. Another experiences conative activity

as well another has pure and perfect knowledge.

; still
Thus
consciousness is manifested in three-fold awareness.
Commentary.
The first two states of experience are related to Samsari Jiva, for

they have reference to Karma; whereas the third has reference to

pure Chetana Svabhava and hence is associated with the perfect one.

implicit recognition by the author of the three different aspects

The
of consciousness feeling, activity, and knowledge, is worth noticing

from the point of modern Psychology.

39.

Jivas according to the three aspects of

Then he specifies the
consciousness noticed above.

39. Indeed all fixed organisms like plants experience

merely feeling but the moving ones, the animals have besides
;

feeling, conative experience. Whereas those that transcend

the organic conditions or Pranas experience pure knowledge.
Commentary.
Plants are fixed and incapable of movement, and can therefore
only suffer the environmental changes. They can only feel the
mechanical and climatic stimuli around. The moving organisms
because of their movement are capable of experiencing their own
activity. In their experience then there is besides feeling, the

i\ Sanskrit rendering :

^rafa sft wftre^revn^fT fsrfara* II 3s II

* Sanskrit rendering :

mf^HprfowFiT: str fa^fcr & after: 11 3^ H

 paNchAstikAya-sama yasAra. 35

consciousness of activity, whereas to experience pure thought, there

must be complete absence of physical and organic conditions. Such a

being is certainly the Mukta Jiva.

After the wonderful discoveries of Dr. Bose with reference to

plant life it is not necessary to defend the proposition that plants are
capable of feeling. Western science, though it recognised the organic
nature of plants was very much reluctant to admit the correlative
organic characteristic of feeling in plants. This is only another phase
of the Cartesian prejudice with reference to plants and animals.
Descartes was responsible for the view that animals were skilfully

created automata or machines. Darwin gave a death blow to this

philosophical superstition and Bose did the same service to the plant
world and thereby distinctly established the fundamental unity of the
organic world and this is the thesis presupposed in the above Gatha.
Thus ends the discussion of Chetana characteristic of Jiva.

40.
Then the quality of Upayoga or the instrument of knowledge
jnana and DarSana — understanding and perception.

-.••'

40. Upayoga the instrument or means of knowledge is

twofold —Jnana or understanding and Darsana or perception.

It is inseparable from and always present in Jiva. So do thou

learn its nature.

Commentary.
One of the commentators says that this Gatha is addressed to a
disciple who is a Naiyayika. Perception and understanding are
essentially related to Jiva There can be no Jiva which lias not
pcic^ption and understanding, similarly the faculties cannot exist
apart from the self. This is the view of the author. He rejects the

view that the faculties are adventitious and acquired.

41.
Then the author describes the different species of Jnana
which is one of the Upayogas referred to in the previous Gatha.

* Sanskrit rendering.
 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAiNAS.

Abhinibodha (knowledge obtained by congenital mental

capacity), Sruta (knowledge obtained by study), Avadhi(a kind
of clairvoyant knowledge of events in different places and
in different times), Manah Paryaya (telepathic knowledge of
another's mind), and Kevala Jnana (the perfect knowledge).
These are the five kinds of right knowledge. But, when the
first three are associated with the error, or Ajiiana they form
three kinds of erroneous knowledge, Kumati, Kusruti,
Vibhahga Avadhi, and are included in the forms of
knowledge.
Commentary.
Mati J nana refers to sense perception and the inferential know-
ledge based upon it. Sruta Jnana is knowledge based upon testimony
obtained mainly through books. Avadhi Jnana is an abnormal
faculty of perception, but the perception is not conditioned by sense
organs. It is supposed to comprehend things and events of different

places and of different times. The faculty is able to project itself

either to the past or to the future. This form of awareness is quite

analogous to sense perception. This in a way corresponds to the

clairvoyant capacity possessed by certain "mediums." Manah

Paryaya is the capacity of knowing the ideas iu another's mind.
This corresponds in a way to telepathy of modern psychology. This
gives an insight into mental facts of persons at a limited distance — the
distance limit being conditioned by the strength and the quality of
the faculty. This should not be confounded with inferential know
ledge obtained from facial expression. And lastly Kevala Jnana is

the perfect knowledge which is associated with the Siddha State. The
first two are distinctly conditioned by sense perception, whereas the
other three transcend sense limitations. The last is absolutely free

from any kind of physical conditions, whereas the other four are still

associated with corporeal existence. Avadhi and Manah Paryaya

are the super-normal faculties acquired under peculiar psycho-physical

Sanskrit tendering :
 paNchAstikAyasamayasAra. 37

conditions. The normal and super-normal cognitive faculties which

correspond to the revelations of modern psychic research are not
facts to be passed over without notice.
42.
Then the live Jnanas are described in detail. Pirst Mati
J nana is taken.

srf^TTsf w*i f%f%f asRjgt srratn ^ 3^#5tt i

42. Matijnana is of three kinds, — Upalabdhi or perception,

Bhavana or memory, Upayoga or understanding. It is also
said to be of four kinds. This Jnana is always preceded by
sense presentation or Dar^ana
Commentary.
This Matijnana is certainly consequent upon sense perception.
It includes as the Sutra says apprehension of the object, memory,
and understanding, i.e., all that is given to us through sense percep-
tion and all that we elaborate out of these sense-elements in memory
and imagination. Though it is mainly of three kinds it is also
considered to be of four different form?. For example the author of
Tattvarthasutra speaks of :
m%Z%mm *m<UT; This four-fold division
is not fundamentally different from the previous division. ?R!T£
implies the sense datum, eg Perceiving a thing to be white through
,

the eyes is Avagraha. To attempt to determine what that white

object is, is f^T. This {%\ refers to the indecisive mental attitude
jwhere several alternative determinations are possible. Finallywhen
the thing is determined, i.e., out of several alternatives when one is
chosen because of certain special characteristics perceived in the
white object then we have Avaya. This implies the inferential
element in all perception. This should not be confounded with
mediate inference about other things through sense perception. The
very same act of perception involves all these three stages. And
lastly whenever we remember these things after sometime it is called

W^r This Matijnana consists of 336 forms when viewed accord-

ing to different principles of Division.

* Sanskrit rendering :
38 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

43.

Then Srutajuana, knowledge by testimony and not by

acquaintance. The objects of this knowledge may be Murta and
Amurta, Physical and non-physical.

43 The wise four kinds— Labdhi,

say that Sruta Jnana is"of

or association, Bhavana or attention, Upayoga or understand-

ing of things and Naya or the aspects of their meaning.

Commentary.
Of these four forms of Srutajuana or knowledge by testimony,
the first is Labdhi. This corresponds to association of idea?. Lab-
dhi is defined to be the process of getting the meaning of one idea
through its associated idea. Bhavana is the direction of attention

to one idea with a view to get at Upayoga is

the associated idea.

the process of understanding the meaning of ideas consequent upon

Bhavana. Naya is viewing the meaning from different relations.

The first three are concerned with the psychic process of acquiring

knowledge through the ideas contained in books. The last is the

way of understanding things from different aspects. This Naya

plays a very important part in Jaina system of thought. This and
the Sapta Bhangi mentioned above are the two pillars of Jaina Logic.
The Nayas also are of seven different kinds. In order to distinguish
the seven Nayas these are called Naya Sapta Bhangi as contrasted
with Pramana Sapta Bhangi. Naya is defined in "Naya Vivarana "
thus, sftq^ *T*M$<I«I WcTT^fta: tf'ft'nis that by which the various aspects
of the meaning of the scripture are understood is for us the Naya or

principle. This Naya or principle of interpretation is mainly of two

kinds, 1. Dravyarthikanaya, that pertaining to Dravya or substance,

2. Paryayarthika Naya that pertaining to modifications. Again

Dravyarthikanaya is further sub-divided into three kinds, 1. Naiga-

ma, 2. Samgraha, 3. Vyavahara. The Paryayarthika Naya is

sub-divided into four kinds, 1. Rijusutra, 2. Sabda, 3. Samabhi-

rudha, 4. Evambhuta. These seven may be explained in detail,
 —

paNch Astir Ay asama yasAra. 39

I. Naigamanaya. Nigamah or Sankalpah or purposp. That which

pertains to f^TT*T: or purpose is ^JW^q: It may be said to be the
Teleological aspect of a continuous activity. When the purpose of
the activity is taken to represent the whole series then it is ^WT^.
It is defined in the Sutra 3FTf*?frf?TW *fa5<T*Tnc 5*T?T *PW-, Thus when
a person who is drawing water or who is busy carrying firewood is

questioned " What are you doing?" He answers " I am cooking."

Here he is not actually cooking but it is the purpose which accounts
for his action of carrying firewood or drawing water vide Poojya
! Padya's Commentary Sarvarthasiddhi Sutra 33 of Ch I. This Naya
is misunderstood by M. D. Desai (Nayakarnika)* and by S. C. Vidva-
bhusana !,Nyayavatara).1
These passages give an entirely different interpretation of this

'Bay a. It is very clearly explained and illustrated by Poojyapadya in

his Sarvarthasiddhi first chapter.—The same explana-

Sutra 33 of the
tion and same illustrations are adopted by another
also the
commentator of the same sutra Srutasagara the author of —
—
Srutasagareyam an unpublished commentary on Tatvarthadhigama.
My own explanation is based upon these authorities and also on the
great work on Logic Prameya Kamala Martanda. I consulted
Syadvadamanjari also of the Renares Edition, page 1G6 and Bombay
Edition of Raiehandrajaina granthmala page 198. Here also the same
interpretation is found. If in a series of qualities or action any
part is taken as the representative of the whole, this representative
aspect is Naigama. The derivation given by Mr. Desai may also
mean the same Naiham, gahatiti Nigama nigamo bana — Naigama.
"The particular that is not restricted to itself, but goes beyond itself

to unify and represent the whole."

This representative character is of course not to be identified with
either the mere universal or particular. It is different from both.
When a person is making preparations to start on journey, we say
" He starts." At the moment of the statement he is not starting,
but is going to start. Similary " He dwells here," need not mean
that the person must be actually be in the residence at the moment

* Naigama Naya (vide) Nayakarnika pages 7, S of introduction and 43.

Also Nyayavataraf pages 27 and 47,
40 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

Samgraha is the class view. When several things which

are similar in essence and which are not incompatibb with one
another are brought together under one class concept we have
Samgraha Naya. Thus the name pot refers to the whole class of

individual objects which go by that name. Similarly the idea of

Dravya. From the point of Dravya characteristic (Permanency

through change) the term Dravya refers to several entities, living and

non-living which are all taken as one class.

3. Vyavahara d*tCTT%ffFfl*ret5n ftfiUjIvMWf ^ZK- II

(Tatvarlha)

en5fal#U fefa^jNrs^rSf fim^J Wr 9^W sq^r?;: ll (Prameya.)

Vyavahara is the process of examining the objects which are

brought together under one class according to the different rules of
Logic. This would specially enquire into the several species which
constitute the whole genus. Examination of the specific Dravyas
Jiva Dravya and Ajiva Dravya which both belong to Dravya Genus
would be an illustration for Vyavahara Naya,
4. Riju Sutra ^JF\m g^Rffo cjs^ttsfa ^^ : II (Tatvartha )

55jg5j75!5f sq^') zmw* ^11* q*RJ<ft (*ftaraPl) fm qr^ ^:ll (Prameya)

That which clearly expresses a momentary state is Riju Sutra

Naya. This would take into consideration only the present state of
a thing. " It is very pleasant now." This proposition predicates
something which is true of the subject only at the moment of the

predication. Such an aspect of a thing is Riju Sutra Naya.

5. Sabda Naya.
fHJT WRIT STWlf^ sqfa^TC fr^rrT^ : *KHq : (Tatvartha.)
^i^rc^r fsfa mm jetwtw vttt^tV^ ?t4 srirfrfcr jasfm: ^? jtvih^t^
(Prameya.)

Words though differing in tense, voice, gender, number and instru-

ments may point to the same thing i.e. refer to the same meaning.
This aspect of the identity of meaning in spite of differences noted
above is Sabda Naya.
6. Samabhirudha.
sti*t4 sn?f*fapn^, *wfa^
 —

paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 41

This refers to synonymous which though interpreted

merely
account to their derivation may refer same identical thing.

7. K\$ ^?R^: That which describes a particular action or capacity

of a thing. Though the thing has not that particular aspect at the
time of judging, the name obtained because of that action is still

applicable to the thing, according to this principle.

Again the Nayas are divided into six kinds. Thus we have
Shadanayas. Dravyarthika Naya is also called Nischaya Naya or the
real aspect. Parydydrthiha Naya is called Vyavahara Naya or the
relativeaspect. The former Suddha and
is further sub-divided into
Asuddha. Thus we have Suddha Nischaya Naya and Asuddha
Nischaya Naya. Vyavahara Naya is divided into Sadbhuta and
Asadbhuta. Each again determined as Upacharita and Anupacharita
Thus we have four kinds of Vyavahara Naya.
(1) Upacharita Sadbhuta, (2) Anupacharita Sadbhuta, (3) Upa-
charita Asadbhuta, (4) Anupacharita AsadhJiuta. The term Vyava-
hara is added to each at the end. These six Nayas are specially

employed in the examination of the characteristics of Atma.

(1) Suddhanischaya Naya. That he soul I is identically the same
whether in Samsara or in Moksha because of its intrinsic characteris-

tics of Jnana and Darsana is a statement according to this Naya.

(2) Asuddha Nischaya Naya : to believe that the soul is

characterised by gross emotions in its Samsaric state is true according

to Asuddha Nischaya Naya.

(3) Upacharita Sadbhuta Vyavahara Naya. The opinion that
the soul has the chetana modification of Matijnana etc., is true
because of the Upacharita Sadbhuta Vyavahara. That the soul has
Matijnana, is relative aud figurative though pertaining to a quality

which is in a way real.

(4) Anupacharita Sadbhuta Vyavahara. That the soul has the

modification of Kevala Jnana.

(5) Anupacharita Asadbhuta Vyavahara Naya. This corresponds

to the inseparable accident of the scholastic logic, for example, this is

my body. Body is identified with self according to this particular

Naya.
(6) Upacharita Asadbhuta Vyavahara Naya. This corresponds
to the separable accident of scholastic logic, for example. This is my
house. House is identified with the self according to Upacharita
Asadbhuta Vyavahara Naya.
42 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS

the different relations that the several

These Nayas refer to
The sou! owns these several attributes
attributes have to the self.
according to these several Nayas. That special aspect of possessing is

different in different cases and the different Nayas define the

several relations which may be real or relative; which may be pure

or impure ; which may be separable or inseparable and so on.

Then Avadhi is described in detail.

(44)

#f| af^ %q| ^f *rc*t ^ <atf|^ ^ i

Thus Avadhi aiso is of three kinds. Desavadhi, Paramava-

dhi and Sarvavadhi. All the three are conditioned by Psychic
qualities. But Desavadhi is also
conditioned by birth in the

case of Deva and Naraka.

Commentary.
Desavadhi is the very limited faculty of perceiving things beyond

able to apprehend only a limited number of

sense perception. It is

things within a limited space and within a limited time.

Paramavadhi
nana which free from such limitations. But
is the higher Avadhi J
is

the last. Sarvavadhi is the perfect faculty which perceives all reality.

This is associated with the perfect self. These three faculties are
long as certain
respectively acquired by psychic development,
e. as i

metemperical faculties spontaneously

Psychic qualiies are present these
manifest themselves. But in the case of the last when once it is

acquired it becomes permanent and everlasting. Whereas the first

is also present as a matter of birth tight in Devas and Narakas. i.e.

they need not acquire it by special Psychical effort and development.

But in the case of man and some higher animals it is to be acquired

by developing the psychical nature.

Thus Desavadhi, is said to be of two kinds. Gunapratyaya

and Bhavapratyaya, conditioned by Gunas or Psychic qualities and

bv Bhava or Birth. Gunapratyaya Desavahi is associated with
man and animals and Bhavapratyaya with Deva and Naraka.
Gunapratyaya is again divided into six kinds.
1. Anugami (the following)
2. Ananugami (not following)
3. Vardhamana (the growing)
4. Hiyamana (decaying or decreasing)
 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 43

5. Avasthita (limited or- bounded).

6. Anavasthita (unlimited or indefinite)

The first is that which enlightens the things while marching as

the sun does.

The second is that which sticks to one and the same thing as the
fixed idea of an insane person. In the first attention is continually
flowing from things to things whereas in the second it is rivetttd to
the very same thing.
The third is that which begins lik; a spark of light aud grows into
a huge flame gradually lighting up a number of objects.
The fourth implies the opposite tendency in the faculty. Here
the faculty gradually decreases like fire going out.
The fifth is the faculty that neither increases nor decreases but is

limited and definite because of the Samyak qualities of the soul.

The sixth is the opposite of the fifth. It is unlimited and inde-

finite. It is wavering hither and thither like a column of fire or
water that is subject to heavy gust of wind.

(45) Then the description of Manah Paryaya.

Manah Paryaya and Vipulamati;

is of two Kinds: Rijumati
telepathy which manifests straight and direct and telepathy
that manifests crooked or in undulations. These appear only
in a person of appramatta Gunasth&na who acquired Samyama
labdhi. (i, e.) a person who acquired complete harmony or
steadiness of the spirit by thorough renunciation.

Commentary.
Rijvi means straight that which manifests straight or direct is

Rijumati. This apprehends straight and direct the ideas in another's

mind. Vipula means crooked or zigzag. When the process of know-
|
ing the ideas in other's mind manifests in a way it is Vipula
zigzag
Mati. These are the two kinds of Manah Paryaya Jfiana. This
capacity is distinctly an acquired one. It is associated only with
a person who has risen pretty high in the ladder of spiritual evolu-
tion. That particular stage at which this faculty appears is known
as Apramatta gunasthana.
44 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

The stages in spiritual evolution are fourteen. They are called

Gunasthanas. These are —

1. faeqide: ii

2. sisn^r ^r^refe: ii

3. ^^jRSSldg: II

4. mwz *T*q*€%: II

5. s'qm&RT: II

6. SWrWqri: II

7. ^WTTe*^: II

8. srijNiqi^i^ 3^arq^: ^T^r: n

9. ^frlFPn^TT^H^ HT^Iinr: ^T^: II

10. ^JT^TU^IH STS*?^: ^TW: II

11. aqsn^^MtrTCTn^^: II

12. ^tenfreiqfmm^s*: n

13. *T3T»T^n?ft ii

14. S&T1%5T$ft %frTH

1. The first is the stage which represents spiritual blindness. A
person in this stage is incapable of either perception of or belief in

true reality. This is the lowest stage of spiritual existence where

without the value of truth and conduct without the value

thought is

of goodness.

2. The seccnd stage is the stage of retrogression. A person may

advance in the path of evolution and become a Samyagdrishti

Gunasthana). This stage is the opposite of the first. It

(the fourth
capable
only from this stage (the fourth) onwards that a person
is
is

or goodness. But sometimes a soul after

of having either truth

reaching the fourth stage which is really the next step from the first

may have the misfortune of spiritual degeneration. He may slip

down to the bottom of the ladder. This process of slipping down is

the stage of Sasadana.

It is only a transition period. The person will very soon settle

down in the first stage. Hence the second stage does not really mean

from the first. So also the third stage is the spiritual

the next slip

oscillation between first and fourth. It is also a transition stage.

3. The third stage represents the mixed quality. The character-

istic of the first and of the fourth stage get inextricably mixed toge-
ther. The spiritual character is indeterminate. A person cannot be
brought under either the first class or the fourth class. Hence it i

called Misragunasthdna.
 — . .

PA NchAsTIKA YA -SA MAYA sARA 45

4. The fourth stage represents the beginning of the spiritual

well being. Here is the possibility of truth and goodness. But still

there is not active effort to elicit true thought and good conduct.
The absence of this effort is associated with the right spiritual dis-
position. The latter is called Samyaktva. A person who is in
this stage and who is without the effort to exhibit the innate powers
is Asamyata Samyakdrhhti.
5. The fifth stage represents partial effort to draw out the spiritual
powers. In this stage a person has not only the desirable spiritual
disposition but also makes some effort towards further development.
He is called a Desavrati
6. The sixth stage represents whole-hearted effort. Complete
and possible control over self is associated with the true bent of
the spirit. But still the whole-hearted good will is not yet free
from tempting desires and impulses. There is the chance of

these impulses getting the mastery for there is not yet complete
renunciation. Hence this stage is Pramatta Samyata.
7. The seventh stage is called Apramatta Samyata. In this stage
the tendency to be attached by the outer things is thoroughly over-
come. Spiritual strength is firmly established. Spirit has conquered
the body. This stage is the critcial stage in the spiritual evolution.
From here begins the double path of higher spiritual evolution.
One path leads to absolute perfection. And the other relative per-
fection. The former is associated with the annihilation of Karmas.
The latter with the suppression of them. The former is called
Kshapaka Sreni the ladder of annihilation, the lather is called

UpaSama Sreni — the ladder of pacification of Karmas.

Manah Paryaya Jnana appears only in a person who has reached

this critical stage of higher spiritual evoloution.
Hence it must be considered as an extraordinary psychic quality
acquired only after reaching a high stage of spiritual evolution.
Before proceding to describe the characteristics of the other stages
of evolution let us note the further qualities of Manah Paryaya. This
Psychic capacity is peculiarly limited by time and space. Though
it is higher than ordinary mental faculty, though it is supernormal
still it should not be considered even as approaching Kevala Jnana.
Of the two kinds of mind-knowing Vipula Mati is considered to be
greatly superior to the other. The limitations given are as
follow :
46 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

Rijumati Manah Paryaya from the point of time has a lower

limit as well as a higher limit. In its lower limit it may appre-
hend the .thoughts of another individnal during his lifetime
or may extend to two
it or three Bhavas or births before and
after. The upper limit is upto seven or eight Bhavas or births

before and after. From the point of view of space its lower limit is to

the red ins of a Gavyuti Gavvuti or about two leagues and the upper
limit is the radius of one Yojana. The second, Vipulatnati has the
lower time limit of seven or eight births whereas the higher is

innumerable. Its lower distance limit is round a radius of one

yojana and its higher distance limit is upto Manushottara moun-
tain and not beyond that. This Manushothara Saila is according
to Jaina Geography the limit of human habitation.

When we examine the limitations described above it is clear

to us that the latter Vipula M it i is decidedly the higher supernor-

mal faculty- Therefore the commentator's interpretation of vipula

as kutila or crooked really means Rythmic or undulatory manifesta-

tion. Whereas the former is straight and direct. The rythmic
manifeststion is naturally capable of greater efficiency. This is

illustrated, by several rythmic movements in Nature, as in the heart-

beat. Thi! Psychic faculty evidently through this rythmic or
undulatory manifestation is able to achieve bet ter and higher results

than those of Rijumati.

8. Tiie eighth stage represents the acquisition of a spiritual

weapon called the first Sukla Dhyana. This is an instrument by

help of which karmas are to be destroyed. This is a unique Psychic
force never before experienced by the Self. Hence it is Apurva
Karana. This stage is represented in both the ladders of develop-
ment : Upasamakaha and Kshapakaha, i.e , self in this stage^may
be in the path of annihilation or in that of pacification of Karmas.
9. The ninth stage represents spiritual warfare. Equipped
with the weapon of Sukla Dhyana, Self — the warrior, destroys the
grosser desires. This spiritual warfare is also associated with
both the paths of development.

Badara Samparaya: Sampara means warfare : Badara mennq

gross: warfare or conflict, with gross desir. .*.•; and impulses of
this soul.

10. The tenth stage is the stage of the same spiritual warfare
when the subtle impulses of the soul get destroyed. This stage also
 —

pa NchAstikA yasa ma ya sAra .

47

has representatives in either ladder, i.e. as the result of the spiritual

struggle the grossand subtle desires may either be rooted out or
supressed. One who roots them out is kshapaka and one who
supresses them is upasamakaha.
Sukshma Samparaya. Conflict with subtler impules.
11. The eleventh stage is the stage where spiritual peace is secur-
ed, but here peace is the result of suppression. Hence it may not be
quite secure. The spiritual harmony may yet be disturbed If it

gets disturbed then there may be the misfortune of slipping down

again. But the fall will be to the Aoramatta Gunasthana from which
the two Srenis branched off.

12. The twelfth stage represents the corresponding step in

the ladder of annihilation, i.e. after the destruction of subtle and

gross desires with the help of Sukla Dhyana the self may pass on
to kshina kashayasthana which is the twelfth. This is just below
the stage of perfection.

13. This st^ge is certainly the stage of Perfect Emancipation.

Kevala Jnana is reached but there is still yoga (Manavachanakaya
or mind, speech and body). Hence this stage is called Sayogakevali
the kevali who has still yoga.

14. The last is the stage where even this yoga disappears. The
stage immediately after the disappearance of yoga is called Ayoga-
kevali. The Siddha state is considered to be a transcendental stage.
Therefore it is considered to beyond this classification of Gunas-
be.

thanas. It is purely metemperica! aud therefore description by

difference of degree will have no meaning with reference to this
transcendental Ego.

46. Then the kevala jnana the ideal knowledge. This is the
result of the destruction of the four Ghatiya Karmas ; co-existence
with infinite qualities such as infinite bliss the desire of all the
faithful and the pure and that which makes even a Devcndra
discontented in his own glory.

Turn *rfafaf*?TT %ci^<jn<jf *r fri% 5^*iT<jf \

Kevala Jnana is knowledge par excellence. It is not con-

ditioned by objects of knowledge. It is not even Srutajfiana
which is consequent upon study. To the person who has
48 THE SACRED BOOKS QF THE JAINAS.

acquired perfect knowledge there is no diversity of knowledge.

So let it be known.
Commentary.
Kevala Jnana completely comprehends all Dravyas and all their

modifications. The author of Tatwartha Sutra says *pfe s wfal

^5T^T . The infinite number of Jiva Dravyas, the infinite number
of Physical bodies, the two physical principles of rest and motion
and infinite space and time all become transparent to Kevala Jnana.
There can be nothing which is not comprehended by this knowledge.

The contents of this knowledge constitute the whole of reality.

This is not conditioned by objects. It is absolutely self-determined.

Therefore all the Dravyas and the Paryayas are at the same time
evident to Kevala Jnana. This unconditioned simultaneous compre-
hension of reality makes it fundamentally distinct from Mati Jnana
or Sruta Jnana and also from the other two. The other four jiianas

are limited in efficiency and extent. And Kevala Jnana knows no

such limitations. Again Mati, Sruti, and Avadhi, are subject to
degeneration and corruption. But Manali Paryaya and Kevala do
not have any such tendency. But the capacity of Kevala Jnana is

infinitely higher than even Manali Paryaya. In short it is the

absolute and unconditioned wisdom.

47. After describing the five kinds of right knowledge (Samyak-
jnanal, the author mentions the three Ajnanas or the kinds of
wrong knowledge.

If Mithyatva which veils the faculty of perception of and

faith in reality appears, then knowledge gets vitiated

and becomes Ajiiana and the regulative principle of conduct

also becomes corrupt. Again during the process of investiga-
ting reality the standard of truth and the methods of reaching
it all become misleading and untrustworthy.

Commentary."
Mithyatva is the condition of Ajiiana. Its presence in a soul is

responsible for several undesirable consequences. This Mithyatva

may be innate or acquired. In the case of persons who have conge-
nital Mithyatva their faculty of understanding is also corrupt from
 pa $ohA s tikA ya-sa ma ya sAra . 49

birth. They have innate Ajfiana: Kurmti rind Kusruti. But in the
case of persons who acquired tjiis Mithyatva after losing Samyaktva
their right knowledge turns into erroneous one. The effect of
Mithyatva is not confined to corrupting the faculty of understanding.
It indirectly affects conduct also; such a person because of his Ajfiana
is incapable of chosing the right path. Evil becomes his good. And
lastly even if there is any effort after truth it ends in mere illusion
?'> long as there is the primary source of evil, Mithyatva, intact.
48. After describing Jfianopayoga he goes on to speak about
Darsanopaya : — The faculty of perception.

Perception or Darsana is of four kinds. Perception through

visual sensations, perception through non-visual senses,
again that through the faculty of Avadhi, or clairvoyance,
and lastly through kevala or infinite perception, which is
unlimited and apprehends all reality.— Thus is it described.
Commentary.
Darsana or perception implies merely the awarerless that a thing
exists. It corresponds to knowledge by acquaintance. Understand-
ing the reality thus appr. bended in a rough way Darsana
is Jfiana.
and Jfiana may be said to correspond to the sensibility and under-
standing of Kant's
Thus understanding and perception
system.
apprehend things gradually one after the other. But in the case of
Kevalis the two faculties are co-extensive with the complete reality.
The whole existence is perceived and understood at the same time,
and as there is no reality beyond such faculty, it is not necessary for
such a person to attend to things one after the other.
49. After describing Jfiana and Darsana the author in order to
clear the doubt of a Naiyayika student for whom substance and
quality are absolutely distinct, explains that the distinction is only
relative ; and he also mentions the diversity of Jfiana.

The soul is not distinct from its attribute of Jn-ina or

knowledge and because the ways of Knowledge are diverse
7
50 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

the world of reality or the universe is also said to be multi-

verse by the wise.

Commentary.
There can be no knowledge apart from the knower. Self and its
knowledge are inseparable. Again knowledge is also intimately
related to the objects known. There are diverse forms of knowledge.

This implies that the objects of knowledge are also diverse. Hence
from the point of view of objects. They are both one and many.
— One because of the common Dravyatva and many because of the
diff erent ways_ of apprehending objects. The proposition that the

reality is one and also many is not self contradictory according to

the Jaina system ;

hence the statement th-it reality is universe is

not incompatible with ''the reality is a multiverse." The point em-

phasized in the gathu is mainly the inalie nability of the attrib ute

f rom the thin g.

50. Then he points out the absurdity of the view that substance

and the attribute are entirely distinct.

If the substance is entirely separate and distinct from

its qualities, then it may change into infinite other

substances or again if the qualities can exist separate from

their substance, there will be no necessity for a substance at

all. (In either way the result would be absurd.)

Commentary.
substance and qualities is an extremely
The relation of its

difficult problem for a metaphysician.

Some would emphasize the qualities to the detriment of substance
In
and some would emphasize the substance at the cost of qualities.
false emphasis.
either case the result would be absurd because of the

We may have the world of unchanging reality of Parmenides 01

of Heraclites, but both these worlds arc

a world of eternal flux

* Sanskrit rendering :

3rsqtsT??*WT*reT s^mnf surfer n «u 11

><*.
 —

paNchAstikAyasamayasAra. 51

so far removed from the world of our concerete experience. In our

world of concrete experience things and qualities are of equal
importance. In fact the distinction is not absolute.
There can be no qualities apart from substance nor substance
without qualities. If substance is deprived of all its qualities and
if it is still the possible substratum of qualities then different groups

of qualities may get associated with that substratum, i.e., the same
substace has the of qualities may chance of becoming infinite other
substances.
This is a manifest absurdity. Or again if the attributes can float
themselves without any fixing substratum then they would by their

own combination constitute a thing and the category of substance is

no more necessary. To think of reality as identical with qualities apart

from the qualified thing is also equally absurd. On account of

internal contradiction the view that qualities may be different from

substance is condemned. The argument adopted by the author
reminds us of Burkley and Hume.
Burkley's argument against Locke's doctrine of substance
similarly emphasizes the absurdity of an unknown V which is
substance for Locke. This unknown V may get several determin-
ations and thus may become several distinct things. But Burkley's
main argument is slightly different from the author's. His attack on
substance is based upon the absurdity of abstract ideas. Again
Hume after reducing the world to a group of sense-presented ideas
points out the absurdity referred to in the latter half of the Gatha by
his doctrine that anything may be the cause of anything else.
Similar tendencies are not altogether absent in Indian thought.
You have the one sided emphasis both in Vedantism and Buddhism.
The idea of Nirguna reality and the principle of Kshanika Vada are
the two rival doctrines and both are condemned by the author
;
;

qualityless reality and the qualities bringing about a new reality

every moment are both untenable according to the author.

(51) Next the author rejects the following views :

1. That substance and qualities are absolutely identical.

2. That they are absolutely different

3. That they are absolutely identical and different at the

sametime.
Then he establishes their conditional or relative identity and
relative difference.
52 THE SACRED HOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

**" 1
far^fa f^Rfl rff^ft^ f| w %rcr mhv 1

Those that know the truth do not recognise any of

following the views as to the relation of substance and quality:
that they are absolutely identical and inseparable that ;

they are distinct and separate in every way and lastly that ;

they are both distinct and identical at the same time.

Commentary.
The doctrine maintained by the author is that substance and
quality are not distinct and separable in raruwnatura ; but only in

thought, and there too, the distinction is only relative, i.e., the quality
cannot be thought of as absolutely independant of substance. Still it

can be attended to as distinct from the thing. Hence it is that the

three views mentioned in the gatha are rejected.

(52) From the point of view of Vyapadesa ete , substance and

quality are in an aspect distinct.

srsr^rr itevm wt fsreranf ^ fff% % snpn i

The difference between Dravya and guna, substance

and attribute, may be determined by appellation, form,
number, or locality. These determinants are various. They
hold good among things and their attributes whether these
are considered different or identical.
Commentary.
These differences hold good not only among different things but
also in the case of a single complex thing which is capable of internal
distinction. The difference due to Vyapadesa or name is of
two kinds.

'Sanskrit rendering :

k^fe fa^TOTSlfeiTtfcf % ST *Nf II IK II

Sanskrit rendering :

& ^Wra?*K* STOrl" g-ffqfTOi^ II ^ II

 —

paRchAstikAya-samayasAra. 53

1. SHASHTI VYAPADESA. This is the relation of the sixth case

or the possessive relation.

2. KARAKA Vyapadesa due to causal relation. Each of these

may be true of different things or of the same thing. The Possessive
relation among different things is illustrated thus. " Devadatta's

cow." The same relation is illustrated by a single complex thing.

•'The branch of a tree." or "Jinas' attributes." Here the possessive
relation is distinctly internal in the very same thing.

(2) Karaka or causal relation. This is alse Vyapadesa difference,

i.e. difference due to Nomenclature or appellation. Karaka sanjna
also holds good between two different things or in the same identical
complex thing. Karaka or causal relation is recognised to be of six

forms, i e. in a complete causal relation six elements are implied —

1. Karta or agent or subject.
2. Karma, the object or effect.

3. Karana, the instrument.

4. Nimitta, the purpose.
5. Sakasa, the place from which the effect issues.

6. Adhikarana, the place in which the cause operates.

The illustration given below implies all these six elements.

'a) Causal relation among different things. See the following

sentence :

3^fT:= Devadatta (Karta or subject or agent).

^ = a fruit (Karma or object).

sff^rT= with the hook (Karana or instrument'.
SR^fTm=for Dhanadatta (Nimitta or purpose)

3^1^= from the tree (Sakasa or the place of issue).

^if^^iqt = f rom the orchard (Adhikarana or the place of operation)

^«jf%%lffT= plucks down.

This sentence illustrates the different aspects of causal relation
that may exist among different things. The proposition " Devadatta
"
plucks a fruit for Dhanadatta from a tree in his orchard with a hook
relates several independent things. Whereas the next illustration
shows how the same causal relation with the six elements may exist
in an identical thing,

wwr: mroHt snwfr sjfa^sF ^ «*nqfrr i

54 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

"Atma about himself with his self-reflection for his own purpose
himself and yet reposing in himself contemplates."
drawing out of

causal relation is with reference to the same complex

Here the
thing.
Samsthana— the difference of figure or form. This determi-
(2) ]

nant also is illustrated with the different things and with the same

thing.
(a) Tall Devadatta's tall cow: The Samsthana determinant is
J

applied to two different things.

(b) The tall branch Here the determinant is
of a tall tree.

are not two separate things.

applied to the branch and the tree which
"Murta Dravyasya Murtaguna." Here also the determinant
form refers to Dravyn and guna
which are not
Murta or [visual

separate and distinct.

3. Sankhya or number.
cows. The quantitative difference here is
(«) Devadatta's 10
and Cows.
between two distinct things— Devadatta
may e xist internally in the
(6) But the quantitative difference
in finlte attributes
same thing as the 10 branches of the tree or the

of Dravya.

4. Vishaya or locative difference.

" In the cowshed is the cow." Here the Vishaya or the locality
(a)

is external or Bheda Vishaya.

;<

locative relation. In the

ib) Abheda Vishaya or the internal

substance are the qualities."

Vyapadesa, Samsthana, etc., is seen
Thus the difference due to
same thing which is internally
things or in the
among different
relation implied it need
differentiated. Hence when one kind of is

If substance and other. attributes are

not be confounded with the
need not be interpreted to make
said to be different this difference
the relation between substance
the two distinct and separate.fHence
a relation of difference
and attribute can certainly be from one aspect
relation
and still the two need not be absolutely distinct. In short the
may be one of identity and
between substance and attribute
relation of identity in difference is not self
difference. That this

supported by analogy. The illustrations of the same

contradictory is

justify the attitude of the

thing internally differentiated given above
~1
author.
 paRchAstikAya-samayasAra. 55

(53) Again he speaks of the relation of ownership or possession.

This relation may exist between two different things or in the same
thing internally differentiated. Hence by analogy he brings ont
the Ekatva — Nanatva aspect of the relation.

*l<J*ff% Sf ^tT Y^ ^nf% rF^g || ^ n* mp

Just as Dhana and and wisdom) make the
Jfiana (wealth
owners Dhani and and the wise) thus express-
jfiani (the rich
ing two ways of relationship (unity and diversity) so also the
relation between substance and qualities implies both the
aspects of identity and difference. Thus say those that know
the truth.
Commentary.
One who owns Dhana or wealth becomes on account of that
ownership a Dhani— the rich. Here too, different things because of the
relation of possession are brought together, i.e., because of possession
there is union and again because of possession the things uniting
must be different. Things may exist as separate and distinct when
the relation may unite them or there may be single thing which
because of the relation may get differentiated. The illustration of
Dhana, Dhani is of the former kind. The illustration for the latter

is jfiana, jnani. The person to start with is one, but on account of

this relation of possession the single entity gets differentiated. In
order to be called jnani one who possesses jfiana or wisdom the
possessed thing must be differentiated from the owner. Otherwise
the relation of ownership will have no meaning.
Hence we have to
admit that the relation of ownership implies both unity and diversity
whether the things related are different or identical in themselves.
Thus the author concludes between substance and
that the relation

its qualities exhibits both these characteristics. It js not incoherent

to associate both the characteristics with the relation.

(54) Then he points out the absurdity that would result if

jnana and jnani (the knower and knowledge) are taken to be

entirely distinct and separate.
* Sanskrit rendering :
 I

56 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE J A IN AS.

If self and its knowledge are always substantial!)' distinct

one from the other, then each will become non-conscious or
non-spiritual entity. That view being self-contradictory would
undoubtedly conflict with the truth revealed by Jina.
Commentary.
Son! and knowledge are called spirit ual or conscious entities only
because of their identity. If the two are entirely absolute and distinct
they would cease to be spiritual. Soul would be deprived of thought
and hence will ce.^se to he a conscious being and knowledge or

thought perse would have no association with ihe thinker and hence
will become again non-spiritual. Thinker without thought would be
blind and thought without thinker would be chimerical. The person
who maintains such a view would contradict himself because of his
own thought; the jaina view is free from such a contradiction.
Here we have to notice one important thing. "Jinava ma'am" is

not to be taken as the reason for rejecting the oppisite view.

The n*a! standard of truth or Pramana is not the principle of

revelation. Though no doubt the Jaina system of thought is very

often referred to as revealed by Jina, the system is acknowledged

to be true not because it isrevealed by a great spiritual being
but because the revelation is borne out by the nature of Reality.

Jaina thinkers therefore attach more importance to absence of]

self-contradiction than to revelation.

A doctrine must not contradict any previously accepted truth.

"Purvapara Virodha"' is the main thing that is dreaded by the
Jaina thinker. Hence the anther's rejection of the opposite view
because it is inconsistent with Jaina thought is really based upon
the internal self-contradiction involved in the rejected view. If it is||

interpreted otherwise then the Jaina position become self-

would
contradictory. When the Ja'na rejects the Vedas of Brahmanic

thought, though they are claimed to be revelation from the divine

^Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 57

being, on the ground that they

involve internal inconsistency, he
cannot have reoourse to the very
same method of depending upon
revelation. For according to his principle even
revelation must
I

stand on logical evidence.

If Self and thought be

really distinct then the two would never
be
:able to constitute a single spiritual
being even by the process of com-
bination.

nr f|^f ^STcfTqTft Sr^fcft f^TTOTft WTnft I

35. Tf the Self

is entirely distinct in nature from
thought
then he cannot
become, even by combination with thought,
jMni or the thinker. ''Unthinking thing" will still be the
name denoting the identity brought about by the combination
of substance and quality which
are in themselves unthinking
things.

Commentary.
If Self and thought are in themselves unthinking things then
b combination they would still be unthinking. Consciousness is
lot to be derived from non-conscious
elements existing severally or
n combination. thought is an adventitious characteristic of the
If

then before the acquisition of thought

elf
he must have been cither
nani or Ajnani (thinking or unthinking).
If he is thinking then the
lombination with jnana is unnecessary and useless.
But if he be
fothinking then, is that attribute " unthinking "
again innate or
jdventitious If it is adventitious then the
? self cannot acquire
aought for this attribute is incompatible with his former acquisition,
the unthinkig quality innate then the
f is thinking quality may as
ell be taken to be innate. Thought then is not an adventitious
itribute of the self. Self is jnani not as a result of combination
self and thought. Even the perfect knowledge Kevala jnana
j
is
nate in the soul, th ough veiled for the time being by the
j
it is Karmas.
* Sanskrit rendering :

8
58 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

56
no other relation than identity between subs-
Then sinee there is

the principle of comination

tance and quality the explanation by j
shown to be unwarranted and absurd.

56. The between substance and quality is one of

relation
of essential simpli-
co-eval identity, unity, inseparability, and
is saic
That is why the unity of substance and qualities
1

city.

to be not the result of union or

combination.
Commentary.
implies mainly unity and also union.
Unioi
The term, Samavaya
th<
implies the existence of independent elements which constitute
The elements must be prior to the unity. Then unity Wfl
unity.
The relation between Guna and Gur
be the result of combination.
is not one of combination.

relation by the ten

Hence though the author designates the
implication of the terr
Samavaya he strictly excludes the other
unity. Dravya ant
The term means nothing more than oneness or
the different aspects of
Guna, substance and quality are merely
they must exist together without
the' same reality and as such

beginning and without end.

implied by the term Samavaya.
This eternal co-existence is

Dravya and Guna is termed Samavaya

or
This co-existence of
unity by the author. The very
same relation implies mseparabi-
they are different in name.
Hence is the
litv of the two though
Again since the umty ,s no
relation called Aprtthag-bhutotva*.
two independent elements it has
brou.ht about by combination of
Therefore the relation is one of unity and not
Apl-Udkilfm.
0fU " i0n
57 and 58.
'

and quality though

J
Then he establishes by analogy that substance

distinguishable in thougJU^J^t^ti^njiaUir^
* Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAya-sauayasAra, so

Colour, taste, smell and touch are the qualities of

57-58.
the primary atom. They are not said to be really distinct from
their material substratum
though they are undoubtedly
distinguishable from it as regards name, form, etc. In the
same way perception and understanding are really insepar-
able from the self and are not dUtinct from it; though from
the point of name, form, etc., they may be spoken of as
distinct from the substratum Ego. In short though dis-
tinguishable in thought the faculties are not really dis-
tinct.

Commentary.
The author establishes the proposition that distinction in thought
does not necessarily imply distinctness in nature. What may be
distinguish id by comparison may in reality exist in essential unity.

\
This result is obtained by the principle of analogy. In the case
ofmatter the qualities are not distinct and separate, from the subs-
.
tratum though they may be referred to by different names, by
different forms, and so on. Exactly in the same way are the
conscious qualities and understanding related to
of perception

\ Jiva. As attributes from the ego and may be

they are distinct

distinguished by name, form, number, etc. But still they are not
really distinct from it.

Distinctness necessarily presupposes an underlying identity

between the things compared. Apart from this identity there can
be no comparison and distinction. What are distinct must really

Sanskrit rendering:

^s^g- STC«CT: «r?qr^iT^I^^T H^T II ¥$ II

SUBSET! 'J^Rr^ §^ f| ?ft ^mraT?I II HP II

60 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

be identical. Hence distinction in thought instead of presupposing

distinctness in nature, implies identity. This view of the author

is borne out by modern thought. Thus ends the section dealing

with the attribute of upayoga.

59.

The next section deals with the three remaining qualities

of Jiva. Kartritva, Bhohtritva, and Karnuisamyuktatva acting,

feelingand being associated with Karmas. In the beginning the
author describes the nature and number of Jiva Dravya which is
the substratum of all the nine attributes.

59. Jivas according to have neither

their characteristics

beginning nor end, have beginning and end, have beginning

but no end. Thus having these five fundamental qualities they
are as existences infinite in number. M ,t^
COMMENATRY.
different modes
Jivas really are the agents, since they bring about
with the different names. They are described as (1) without
beginning or end, (2) with beginning and end (3) and with beginning
and no end. If we attend to the essential nature of Jivas (parina-

mika bhava,) i. e., thoir thought or consciousness then they may

be said to have neither beginning nor end ; as spiritual existences

they are eternal. Neither are they created nor can they be des-
troyed.

2. The very same Jivas from thePsychic qualities of Audayika

Aupashamikn, and Kshayopashamika have both beginning and
end.

3. But from the Kshayika Bhava they have beginning but

not end. It cannot be said in the last case that because there is

beginning there must also be an end. When they are free from

Upadhis then they realise their true nature, then they become

* Sanskrit rendering :
 PANChAsTIkAyA-SAMAYASArA. 61

Siddhas. Jivas that are found with such characteristics are infinite
in number. Again it cannot be said that in the case of these Jivas
which really have neither beginning nor end the other characteristics
would be inconsistent. The other characteristics are, having both
beginning and end and having beginning but no end. These
characteristics are true of Jivas because of Karmic entanglements.
The presence of Karma with Jiva is the condition of Sam?aric
transformations and Jivas Samsaric cycles have both birth and
in

death. But in the last stage towards emancipation from Karmas,

Jivas may be said to have only birth but no death. For there is

spiritual immortality as the result of complete emancipation.

The five fundamental characteristics implied in this gatha are

the five Jiva Bhavas mentioned in the 62nd gatha.

These are (1) ^for (2) sfrrofa^, (3) snmTOfa?: (4) 5nfq«fr (5)

The last one is the attribute of consciousness. This conscious

nature is eternal. Hence Jiva is Spnf^W without beginning or end.
The first three bring about Samsaric changes of birth and death.
Therefore from their aspect Jiva has both beginning and end. The
fourth is the characteristic of emancipation. The emancipated Self
has beginning but no end.

60.

Though Jivas are truly eternal yet they are born and thev
die because of accidental conditions of Karmic associations. To be
eternal and to have births and deaths are not really conflicting.

60. Thus Jivas that are, may die and those that are not
may be born ; thus sayeth the Jina. Though the statements
(this Sutra and the 19th) are apparently conflicting they are
not really contradictory.

Sanskrit rendering :
 :

62 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

Commentary.
From Dravyarthika Naya, i. e., from the aspect of essential nature
Jivas can have neither birth nor death. But from Paryayarthite
Nava from the point of modifications they have births and deaths.
The two propositions are quite compatible with one another as
they state two different aspects of Jiva. The other proposition with
which this gatha appears to conflict is the gatha 19.

There is no death for the existing Jivas ; nor birth of the non-
existing ones.

This certainly appears to contradict the present Sutra and the

commentator establishes that the conflict is only apparent and nor
real.
61.

Then it is pointed out that the death of Beings that are

and the birth of those that are not are the result of Gatinamakarma
the Karma that brings about for the soul different modes of
existence.

tfroeffa ^ft *m^r sroft srre^r ^mi \\%\\\*

61. Life in hell, life as plant or animal, as man or as

Deva, these states of being are caused by their respective

Nama Karma Prakritis. These bring about death to the Jivas

that are and birth to those that are not.

Commentary.
The different states of existence are the different modifications

of Jiva brought out by upadhi or Karmic conditions. Those Karmas

that determine the next individual state of Jiva are Nama Karma?.
These Nama Karmas are the real causal conditions that lead the

soul to manifest in a particular form. These forms appear and dis-

appear. Birth and death are characteristics associated with these

forms or modes. Just as waves may appear and disappear in the

Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 63

surface of ocean as the result of wind, while the sheet of water

is really unaffected, so Jiva remaining eternal and changeless in its

real essence is the basis of the different waves of existence appearing

and disappearing. And these waves in the ocean of life are brought

about by upadhis or Karmic conditions. The characteristics of

birth and death which are really true of the form of existence are
also predicated of Jiva

62.

After mentioning the Karmas as the condition of Samsaric

cycle the author goes to describe their nature. Here he explains
the origin of the five Bhavas emotional states of consciousness.

3!tIT ^ sftcTTFTT SJ^r Sf SJr^TO firf^nm WWII #

62. On account of the rise, suppression, annihilation, mixed
suppression and annihilation of karmas, by the intrinsic nature
of self unconditioned by Karmas, Jiva has five Bhavas or
thought characteristics. These are fully described in the
Agamas.
Commentary.
Karmas are considered to be physical in nature. These physical
conditions determine the Psychic characteristics. Five different
classes of Karmic conditions are mentioned. Each of these is the
causal condition determining its corresponding Bbava or thought
state in Jiva.

These conditions are —

1. Udaya, or rise of Karmas ;

2. Upasama, or suppression of Karmas ;

3. Kshaya or eradication;

4. Kshayopa&ama, the mixed process of eradication and

suppression ;

5. Parinama. or the unconditioned thought.

"Sanskrit rendering :
 —

64 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

These five conditions (four physical and one spiritual) determine

respectively the Bhavas.

And these are

1. Audayika Bhava ;

2. Aupashamika Bhava ;

3. Kshayika Bhava ;

4. Kshayopashamika Bhava ;

5. Parinamika Bhava.

The last one is unconditioned by Karmas. It is Nirupadhi

character, whereas the other four are generated by the changes in

physical conditions or upadhis. The last Parinamika Bhava is not

causally connected with Samsara or Moksha. It is Nishkriya
Bhava.

63.

Next it is pointed out how these Bhavas or thought states are

brought about.

€t %t sre* ^ttt f^f^f% * im*i <tf%3 (i

\\ ii

63. Being affected by the change inKarmic material Jiva

experiences certain emotional states. Whatever emotional state
thus appears in consciousness is due to the direct causal
agency of Jiva. Thus say the Scriptures of Jainas.
Commentary.
Jiva is said to be the direct and immediate cause of the several
emotional states brought about by Karmic materials. The extrinsic

cause is physical matter and the proximate cause is jiva itself.

Karmas are always spoken of as of two kinds : Dravya Karma

and Bhava Karma. Dravya Karma is distinctly physical. A peculiar
combination of Paramanus constitutes Karma Pudgala or Karmic-

Sanskrit rendering :

^ tfcr ass ^tt? ^<ftfcr sr m&* <rfe?f ii %%

 PANCHAsTIkAyA-SAMAYASAra. 65

matter. Matter under such modification has

a special attraction
towards Jivas ordinarily. Jiva in its world
state is generally found in
association with such Karmic matter.
Karmic matter and conscious
states are mutually determining
each other. A change in Karmic
matter may bring about a corsesponding
change in consciousness.
This conscious change has a predominent
affective tone. It is
generally some form of emotion. This
corresponding emotional
state is Bhava Karma.Since it is a Psychic event it is immediately
determined by mind itself. It is this fact that is emphasized by
the author in this gatha.

The author recognises two distinct causal agencies as will be

evident later on. Nimitia Karta and Upaddna Kartd. Distant or
remote cause and substantial cause,
Jiva is the substantial cause of
all its modifications, and matter
may still be an extrinsic cause. Then
Jiva is the Upadana Karta of the Bhavas while Karmic matter is
Nimitta Karta.
64.
It is this fact that
is mentioned in the next gatha. That Self
is the immediate cause of the emotional
state while Karmic matter is
the indirect cause.

^ 64.
^Sfcmf^
The different
r?*fT STTSi
forms of Bhava Karmas
^ W*m&*
such as, the
II
^ ||*

rising,the sinking, the annihilating and partial

annihilation and
sinking cannot happen in the consciousness
of a jiva without
corresponding changes in Dravya Karmas
or Karmic matter
Therefore the Bhavas such as Audayika
which are brought
about by the Bhava Karmas may be
said to be the effects of
Dravya Karmas as well.

Commentary.
A change Dravya Karma or physical karma immediately brings
in

about a change in Bhava Karma i. e„ a corresponding

change
pure or impure in consciousness, Th is Bhava Karma
in its turn brings

*Sanskrit rendering :

9
 66 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JA1NAS.

about its corresponding emotional state or Bhava. It may be

pleasant or unpleasant. The chain of causation is as follows :— Dravyj
Karma, Bhava Karma and Bhava. Karmic matter, Karmic thought
and an affective state. The last affective state or Bhava which is the
immediate result of Karmic thought or Bhava Karma may also be said
to be the effect of Dravya Karma. For there can be no Karmic

thought or Bhava Karma in a jiva which is not determined bj

Dravya Karma.
65.

The next gatha is in the form of Purvapaksha from the dis-

ciple. An objection is raised against the doctrine that Atma is 1

sole and immediate cause of Bhava Karma.

*n^t 3rf| ^sre^r sjtH w*wm ftf^ fara 35tH \

65. If these states of emotion or Bhava are really broughl

about by Karmic matter how can Atma be said to be the cause

of these Bhavas ? But the soul's agency is such that whih
givingup its own state it can effect entirely alien or non-
mental changes (i. e., it is the cause of its own mental states
which are also indirectly conditioned by Karmic matter).
Commentary.
mentioned already Dravya Karma or Karmic mattei
As has been
and the nature of Jiva, both determine the occurrence of a Bhava oi
an emotional state. Still Jiva is taken to be the causal agent oi

Karta to these emotional state. If the Bhavas are really due t<
I Dravya karma or Karmic matter then how can it be consistently helc
'that Jiva is Karta. But the answer is given thus. Bhava is Psychic

change and as psychic change it can only be brought about by Jiva.

Soul cannot have direct causal relation with material and non-mental
things. Again if the Bhavas have no causal relation to Jiva then there
is no reason why it should be bound by Karma. Karmic bondage
necessarily presupposes the intimate relation between Jiva and its
emotional states. Since there will be no logical ground for bondage

I
Sanskrit rendering :

* ^kirmmj fajf^fa g*w* *z* *n* u Vi h

 paRchAstikA\a-samayasAra. 67

in the absence of causal relation then there is no chance for Samsara

which is the result of Karmic bondage. This result contradicts our
real experience for there is Samsara. Therefore our original supposi-
tion that the soul is not causal agent for his emotional states is an
impossible hypothesis. With this indirect demonstration, the author
establishes that soul is the causal agent producing the emotional
states which are also indirectly conditioned by Karmic matter.
The disciple who raises the Purvapahsha is evidently a believer
in the Sankhya system.

In answering Purvapahsha the author is really condemning the

Sankhya view represented by the above sloka.

66.

The answer is again strengthened by further detailed argu-

ment.

*i § %re
Bhava
^ 35rnr ^ t%<tt ^t %*^\i n %% 11*
66. or emotional states are conditioned by Dravya
Karma or matter. And Karma turn indeed condi-
^^
in its is

tioned by Karmic thought or Bhava. Soul is not the essential

cause in that case and still without essential cause those
changes cannot happen.

Commentary.
The author here makes use of the distinction between Upadana
Karta and Nimitta Karta. Intrinsic or substantial condtions, ex-
trinsic or alien condition. Soul is the essential cause of Karmic
thought, the emotional states of desire etc., Karmic matter is the
essential cause of the changes in Karmic matter, i. e., the changes in
each case form an independent series and yet the two series are corres-

* Sanskrit rendering ;

1 3 ^f ^1 *TOJ 1 f^ *l?"*| *^ft II W 'I

68 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JA1NAS.

ponding and interrelated. Bhava or the emotional states is distinctly

a Psychic change. As a mental fact it is immediately determined by
the nature of consciousness. So is the change in Karmic matter. It is

entirely determined by physical conditions. Matter cannot take the

form of mental state nor the mind underago a physical change. The
author seems to suggest a kind of Psycho-physical parallelism. But
this parallelism is not merely the temporal correspondence of the two
series. The parallelism is transcended and reconciled by the doctrine
of Nimitta kartd The author has in his mind such a sharp distinc-
tion between the thinking thing and unthinking thing as is associated
with cartisianism and yet the two are related by a peculiar conception
of causal relation. The unthinking thing may be the Nimitta Kartd
of the thinking thing and conversely the thinking thing may be the
NimittJ Kartd of the other, though certainly one cannot be the
Updddna Kartd of the other.

67.

The same view is further elaborated.

f55f ^Ff ^ftcf ^t!T ^tTT ^T^r VfTSTW \

\

67. Soul which brings about changes in himself is the

Upadana cause of such mental states. But not of changes
in Karmic matter which are distinctly physical in nature. Let

the word of Jina be understood thus.

Commentary.
The author strengthens his argument by referring to Agama or

Sruta. He draws the attention of the reader that this doctrine of

causation is the right view upheld by the Scriptures.

68.

Then it is explained that Jiva and Karmic matter are related

to their respective changes according to the six aspects of causal
relation.

*Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikA ya-sama yasAra . 69

68. Karmic matter itself through its own essential nature

indeed brings about own changes. Jiva too in
its the same
manner through own impure states of thowght
its that are
conditioned by Karma brings about its own thought cl.arr.es.

Commentary.
The author here emphasizes the fact that the mental states and
the states of Karma form two independent series. A change in
Karmic matter is determined by antecedent physical change.
Similarly the mental change in the Jiva is entirely determined by
the antecedent mental change. In short Jiva is the primary condi-
tion of mental changes and Karmic matter of its own changes. The
Physical changes of Karmic matter cannot be attributed to Jiva nor
the mental changes of Jiva to matter.

The Shatrakd referred to by the commentator has reference to

the six aspects of causil relation already explained. These axe (1)
Karta (2) Karma (3) Karan.i (4) Nimitta (5) Sakasa and (6) Adhi-
karana. Each series of causal changes has by itself these six aspects
i. e., the physical and the mental series are self-sufficient and
complete.
69.

Having heard that the two causal series are independent the
student ignorant of the principles of reasoning or the Nayas raises
an objection.

%<* rTC* T,^ *J5lf| 3p:qT W*ti*t ^^ H^ICf*

*Sanshrit rendering :

^Sanskrit rendering :

^ ?ffq <raf 3^w smm to ^ ^fa toj h ^$ n

70 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

69. IfKarmic matter effects its own changes and similarly

if Jiva brings about his own changes in himself why should he
enjoy the results or fruits of Karma for which he is not res-

ponsible and how can Karma offer its fruits to* him ?

Commentary.
If Karmic changes form an independent physical series and if

then
mental changes similarly form an independent Psychic series
what
why should Jiva be affected at all by physical changes and in
manner could the physical changes affect Jiva at all. The student asks

why the two really independent series should

for the justification

affect each other at all.

70.

The Purvapaksha is answered by the seven following gathas.

This one states that the Loka is filled with matter.

70. With material bodies of form perceptible and imper-

ceptible, infinite of infinites in number, and of multifarious
every respect filled without
kinds by constitution, the world is in

interspaces.
Commentary.
trying to answer objection by showing first
The author is

beteewn Jiva and Karmic matter. The

the possibility of connction
world space is throughout filled with material bodies. Some of these

some of these are Of

perceptible to the senses.
are minute and
the peculiarly necessary constitution
these minute forms some have
Tnese are called Karma-
which would make them fit to be Karmas.
Varganas. Karma- Varganas are physical molecules of a particular
to be attracted by Jivas.
constitution which gives them the tendency
known as karma-Prayogya Pudgala. The world
They are otherwise
with such materials also contains Jivas.
The Jivas and
that is filled
and
Karma Varganas co-exist and by the mere fact of contigu ity Jiva

* Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 71

Karmic matter are brought together. The settling of Karmic

molecules in Jiva is evidently explained by the author as a necessary
result of contiguous co-existence. He does not want to assume that
Jiva has positive attraction towards Karmic matter. If any such
active influence on the part of Jiva is presupposed the author will be
forced to acknowledge the inevitable causal interaction between
matter and Jiva. The author does not want to encourage that view.
Hence he explains the contact between Jiva and matter as due
to local conditions. The commentator explains the principle of
contiguity as.

The principle that the casket rilled with collyrium powder

becomes black by mere contact. Thus by analogy the author
hopes to explain how two distinct things Jiva and matter become
related together.

71.

How is it relevent to say that the world is filled with Karmic

matter? How is it an answer to the above objection
? The author in

this gatha shows the relation between the answer and the objection.

Tf^3T% ^JTOToT ^*JjtWRTTipT3RTT£T II ^ II

71. Jiva as determined by own nature creates its own

its

changes. But existing in the same place there is Karmic

matter. This
Karmic matter gets inseparably bound with
Jiva and manifests as modes of Karma such as Jnanavaraniya.
Commentary.
Here the author emphasizes the fact that Karmicmatter is entirely
self determined in its modifications. So also is Jiva. Jiva according
to Jaina belief has Samsaric changes from time immemorial i. e., the
series of Samsaric changes is without beginning. In this state it is

destined to lose its pure thought and has the gross emotional qualities
such as desire anger, etc. While this Jiva is undergoing such

* Sanskrit rendering :

3ITrm «bft ^WT* a^T «TcTT:

2^ *tstt: ^mit: I

*T^f?rT ^*f«re*rfij|rqi5fJTT^t;EnTl^n II &\ II

 72 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

emotional states determined by its own intrinsic Psychic nature

there is in the same place Karmic matter which as conditioned by
those mental states undergoes modifications. These modifications
are really determined by matter itself though externally conditioned
by the mental states. The mental states of an impure character
create a sort of adhesive quality in Jiva. The Karmic particles
merely by proximity cling to Jiva which has the adhesive quality.
Jiva gets adulterated with Karmic matters as milk and water. But
this adulteration is not due to direct causal action upon Jiva.

72.

As a concomitent of the Psychic state Karmic matter undergoes

modification in its own way.

<3fl£ W^osntJT ^grqiTTCTf ^^Tnro^TT I

72. arrangements in matter are

Just as several molecular
seen in diverse forms though uncaused by alien agency so
also the manifestations in Karmic matter occur undetermined
by alien cause. So do thou understand.
Commentary.
The author makes himself clear by the illustration. The mere
presence of light from the sun or the moon is enough to create the

fiery sunset or sunrise or the rainbow or the halo. These changes

are all due to molecular arrangement in matter. The sunlight is not
directly interfering with matter in producing changes. The changes
are the necessary concomitants of the presence of light. Similarly
the presence of emotional states of desire or aversion in Jiva has as
its concomitant, the changes in Karmic matter. The rainbow of

several iridescent colours is merely the concomitant of light and

the different manifestations of Karmic matterare also the concomitants

of mental states as desire and aversion. From all these examples

it is clear that the author wants to reject direct causal relation

between the two series and yet he wants to make out that one series
is the concomitant of other.

^Sanskrit rendering.
 pa NchAstikA yasa A] a ya sAra . 75

73.
The author explains why Jiva
should enjoy the fruit, of
Karma of which he is not the cause
essential. In answering this
point the author employs the
principles of Naya.

-'
rN
73. Jivas and Karmic materials are bound
together
stron-ly. But when the time for their separation
comes they
fall apart. Karmas offer their results of pleasure
and pain and
the Jivas enjoy them.
Commentary.
jiva and matter in reality have only one causal function of
generattng the lr own respective modes and yet because
of the con
comitants they may be said to be interdetermining
from tlJ
fyavahdra v.ew. Jiva because of its emotional states of desire
and
hatred develops an inclination towards
matter. This inclination is
only the Nimitta or an external condition.
Karmic matter so deter
mined gets bound to Jivn. It is to be imagined that the
material
particlessomhow cling to Jiva and cloud its
intrinsic radiance
Changes may occur in molecules as determined
by temporal condi'
tions. There may be aggregation or disintegration
in them. When
such changes take place in I>ravya
Karma Jiva experiences pleasure
* plain These are said to be offered by
Karma from a relative
pent of view though as a matter of fact
they are the modifications
of
Jiva. One o the commentators says that
just as we experience
the
act.v.ty and the change in our body
so also we experience the changes
in our Karmic body for both of them
are physical. When we don't
question, ordinarily our experiencing
bodily changes, we
need not
question the possibility of experiencing
the changes of Karmic
body.
Thus ends the quality of Bhoto-ih.
enjpyer. Jtva is shown to
tneenjoyer. be
c

74.
Then the
author has a resume of the
nature of the relation
between causality and affective
experience.

* Sanskrit
rendering :
74 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

^FfT 3*=tf ^tTT *nt*T f| ^^ **** I

According to Nischya Sara or real aspect Karmic

74.
matter is the cause of its own changes. But from FrW^a
in association with Psychic states
Na vtf or relative aspect it is,

of Audayika, etc., also the cause of mental

changes in Jiva. Lo !

he is by
from this point Jiva becomes the enjoyer because
nature consciousness.
Commentary.
point and rela-
The author makes a distinction between absolute
cause of its own
tive point of view. Really Karmic matter is the
molecular changes. From the relative point it may also be said lo

Similarly with Jiva. It is its own

be the cause of mental changes.
also the cause of material
cause and from the other point it is

changes. It is by nature conscious.

Experience presupposes mental
directly its own mental
changes. Jiva may be said to experience
states and yet Vyavaharically it
experiences or is affected by things
If the aspects of view are
remembered then
desirable and undesirable.
You may say Jiva enjoys its
both the propositions are consistent.
of sense presen-
own state and also that Jiva enjoys physical objects
Therefore it may very well be conceded that the proposition
tation.
that Jiva is the essential cause of its own mental state is compatible
the enjoyer of Katmic effects. He
with the proposition that Jiva is

is the Karta as well as tbe Bhokta the doer and the enjoyer.

75.

The author again refers to the Lordship of the soul.

tt$ sfttt ^trn fr^s sr^rr *ptff ^^f| i

"Sanskrit rendering :

i Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAyasamayasAra. 75

75. The soul which is thus the agent of its own Karma,
and the enjoyer of the fruits thereof, as conditioned by its own
Karma gets blinded by the veil of ignorance and roams about
in the world of Samsdra which is limited for the faithful and
unlimited for the unfaithful.
COMMENTRY.
Jiva is the Lord of his own career, because he effects his own
Karma, he enjoys the fruits thereof. He may roam about in the
world of Samsdra as conditioned by his own actions, he may finally
liberate himself from the bondage by walking the path of three
jewels. Then he becomes free from his upddhi This is the career
of the Bhabhya Jiva, Throughout the career of the Bhtbhya Jiva, Jiva
has the characteristic of Lordship. Again the Abhavya devoid of
the benefits of the Jewels is denied the above career. He is destined
to roam about for ever in Samsara. The Abhavya Jiva also in his
own way is the Lord of his own career. Thus the career of Jiva is
entirely self determined.
76.
Then it is shown how the soul which obtains the benefit of the
three jewels is able to realise its true nature through its Lordship
over its own career.

WTSITOWWM^
v^ —
fascTra^
^d
^ff% *
^folt II **N ll#

76. Suppressing or annihilating the veil of ignorance

which clouds the faculties of perception and will, well equipped
with the three jewels which constitute the path revealed by
Jina, the soul, the undaunted pilgrim that conquered the
suffering and pain due to the environment, beckoned by the
ideal of self-knowledge wades through the path and reaches
the divine city of perfection.
Commentary.
Jiva is co-eval with Samsdra. Ordinarily Jiva is associated with
Upadhis. The most important of these is Mohaniya Karma. This is

Sanskrit rendering :
76 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

a sort of veil of ignorance whose effect is twofold. It may interfere

with the faculty of perception or with the faculty of Will. On account

of this interference there may be false knowledge or wrong conduct.
In the former case it is called Darsana Mohaniya, in the latter
Charitra Mohaniya. All the other Karmic Upadhis may be ultimately

traced to the operation of this fundamental Karma. This Mohaniya

or the veil of ignorance may sometimes get thin and transparent or
may altogether be annihilated. On account of this happy occurrence
Jiva may start on a very desirable career. On account of sup-

pression or annihilation of DarSana Mohaniya Jiva is able to apprehend

tihe nature of true reality. And thus has faith in the ultimate tattvas

The faith in and comprehension of tattvas may lead to clear know

By this
Jledge of reality. suppression and annihilation of Charitra

Mohaniya, Will may be ri&ht in its decision, for right volitional choice

consequence of true knowledge. Right perception and

faith,
is the
true path. These are
Right knowledge and Right conduct form the
these three jewels must further
the three jewels. Soul equipped with
pain due to environ-
conquer the environment. The suffering and
any way. After conquei-
mental conditions should not touch Jiva in
ing the environment Jiva has to
pursue the path of ..righteousness
This pilgrim in the path
having as the goal complete self knowledge.
finally reaches the city of Nirvana
which is the Summum
of life

Bonum of life according to Jainism.

77 and 78.
characteristics of Jivastikaya.
Then the author summarises the

*Sanskrit rendering :

I Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAyasamayasAra. 77

77-78. The great soul characterised by upayflga may

be
said to be essentially identical and
one; is again of two
kinds
has three fundamental qualities, roams
about in four gatis; is
marked by five primary emotional states moves
about in the ;

world along the six directions is capable of admitting

seven
;

fold predication, has eight qualities

generates the nine ;

Padarthas manifests in ten states of existence;

;
thus is he is
said to be.

C©MMENTARY.
The author in the form of a Chulika or summary ingeneously
describes JIva. He employs numerical description from one to ten.
When Jivas are looked at from their essential characteristics
all
they
are substantially one. From the point of Upadhis they may be said
to be of two classes the perfect and the imperfect,
has three primary
qualities. The three characteristics may be the three aspects of cons-
ciousness, knowledge, will and emotion ; cr may be the three Jewels
Dar£ana Jnana and Charitra or may be the three characteristics
; ;
c{
Dravya in general, permanence through birth and death
; or may
refer to three forms of existences, substance, qualities, and modes.
Jiva is again said to be subject to four gatis. The gatis are already
mentioned. He is marked again by the
primary emotional states five
which are brought about by the five different changes of
Karmic
matter. These also have been dealt with above. "Six" denotes
the
six directions of the world along which there may be possible move
mentsfor Jiva, "Seven" denotes these seven fold predication appli-
cable to Jiva.These are the seven propositions forming the Sapt*-
Bhatigi. "Eight" denotes the eight characteristics of
Jiva. Samsari
Jiva has the eight Karmic characteristics, such as Jfian&varana-
DarSanavarana, Mohaniya, etc. The perfect Jiva has the eight infinite
gunas such as Ananta Jnana, Ananta DarSana, Ananta Virya, Ananta
Sukha, etc. "Nine" denotes the nine padarthas generated by
Jiva in
conjunction with matter. These are Jiva, Ajiva, Papa, Punya
Asrava, Samvara, Nirjara, Bandha, and Moksha.

"Ten" denotes the 10 states of existence. The ten states are

the (1) and the unliberated nine, which are five Ekendriya
liberated
Jivas (Prithvik&yika Apakayika, Tejakayika, Vayukiyika, and
Vanaspatikayika\ and Jivas with two, three, four and five sense
organs respectively.
78 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

79.

The perfect and the liberated soul has nothing to gain by

going from one place to another. Therefore he may stay in

the very
But according to Jaina view
same place where he attains Nirvana.
he goes to the summit of the world. The author explains
why he
should do so.

79. When Jiva gets liberated from the bonds of Karma

which are of different aspects of substance, duration, fertility,
and extensity, he reaches the summit of the upper world.
Others who are in Samsara move about in all the directions
except the four diagonal corners.
Commentary.
This gatha refers to a religious dogma. The liberated Jiva or

Siddha Jiva has the intrinsic movement upwards. It tends to

movo
vertically upwards till it comes to a stay
at the summit of the Loka-.

absence of the moving

For it cannot move beyond, because of the
principle of Dharmdstikayct.

But Samsari Jivas after death are said to have movements in

six directions. They are denied the four diagonal courses. Along the

cardinal points and up and down they can move. These are the
anusren'ts the ladder paths of disembodied Jivas.

body consti-
The disembodied Jiva has still the Kdrthana Sarira—
is sukshma— subtle body. Is
tuted by Karmic matter. This body
electro-magnetic condition which constrains the
Karmic
there any
move only in the six diiections ? We dont want to
specu-
body to
late.

Sanskrit rendering :
 :

CHAPTER II.

PUDGALASTIKAYA.
The author mentions the four different kinds of material
objects.

^ si \3 \3
These are the four basic modifications out of which the
multifarious modes of matter are formed.

80. Be understood that matter exists in four main

it

modes : Skandhas, Skandhadesas, Skandhabradcsas and primary

atoms.

Commentary.
Skandhas are the aggregates of atoms. This classe refers to
complete molecular constitution. Sliandhades* is said to be
incomplete. But still it is an aggregate. Similarly Skandhapradesa.
These three are the differences in molecular constitution The
last class refers to the primary atom which is the unit constituting
the other threa classes. This is explained in the next Gatha.

81
The respective characteristics of these four classes are given
below.

©s.

^Sanskrit rendering

*Sanskrit rendering :
80 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE J A IN AS.

81. The complete molecule of matter is Skandha a half ;

of it is ^kandhadesa ; a half of that half is Skandhapradesa ;

and what cannot be divided is the primary atom :

— thus say
(the learned).
Commentary.
The complete Skandha refers to the molecule which has all the
physical qualities without any exception. Any physical body
perceived by us may be taken as an example of complete Skandha.
If the process of bisection is continued to infinity the limit of the
series is the Paramdnu — that which cannot be divided further.
Conversely starting from the atom an aggregate of two, three, etc.,

more atoms will generate Skandhan. An aggregate of infinite number

of atems is the complete Skandha,

(Note the atomic basis of Physics.)

82

Pudgala ultimately refers to the class of primary atoms. But

the name is also applied to the derivative classes of Skandhas.

82. Skandhas are Those that can be

of two kinds.
perceived by the senses and the minute ones beyond sense
perception. These also are called matter conventionally.
These manifest themselves in six different modes by which
the three worlds are completely filled.

Commentary.
The term Pudgala is specially applicable to the primary atoms.
These are the indestructible material basis of the world. The
Skandhas or molecules though derivative and secondary are also
called by the same name Pudgala. These molecules or Skandhas
have theclaracteristics of touch, taste, smell, sound and colour.
They can increase or decrease being aggregates. They can grow or

"Sanskrit rendering :
 pa NchAstikA ya -sa ma ya sAra . 81

decay. They are minute or large. These Skandhas or molecular

aggregates are of six different kinds which are mentioned in the next
gatha. These aggregates or Skandhas in their six different forms
completely fill the three Lokas.
83
The six different kinds of Skandhas are enumerated.

^rlf% 5Tc3 ^ sZTCT ^3^ f^f^R^TRlsStWH I

83. The Skandhas or molecular aggregates exist in 9ix

different forms :
— Earth, water,shadow, the objects of the four
senses except sight, and karmic matter, and molecules which
are unfit to become karmic matter.
Commentary.
The six kinds of Skandhas are otherwise called thus :—
1. Badara badara — Solid.
2. —
Badara Liquid.
3. —
SukshmabaoVara Apparently solid like a shadow.
4. Badarasukshma — Minute particles evident to the senses.

5. Sukshma — Minute, not perceptible.

6. Sukshma Sukshma— Very minute.
1. Is that which cannot become combined or one, when broken;
like wood or stone.

2. Is the one whose parts become one again when broken ; as

water, etc.
3. The larger cannot be broken, or divided or caught as shadow,
lightning darkness.

4. Though minute yet evident to the senses as taste, smell,

colour, etc.

5. Minute and imperceptible as Kaxmic matter.

6. Those below Karmic matters upto Skandhas made up of
two atoms.
&4

Thus after describing the various Skandhas the author explains

the nature of Paramanus or primary atoms which are the consti-
tuent elements of Skandhas.
11
82 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

84. Do thou understand that whatever is the limit of all

Skandhas is the primary That same is eternal un-
atom.
sounding (silent) occupying one space point and of corporeal
form.
Commentary.
The limiting unit of the process of division of mo'ecules is the

Paramanu or the primary atom. Since it cannot be further sub-divid-

ed it is called atom. Since it occupies a single point of space it is

one. Since it is the eternal and inalienable substratum of carporeal

things it is eternal. Since it is the constitutive basis of physical
objects it is the generator of physical things. Since it cannot by it-

self bring about sound vibrations, it is non-sounding or silent. These

are the characteristics of the primary atom.

It may be noted here that according to Jaina thought matter is

indestructible ; so also is Jiva. It is not due to the creative fiat

of a Will. It cannot be destroyed. Atoms are the constitutive

elements of physical bodies. Thus according to Jaina view
matter and space are objectively real. In this respect the view is

quite similar to that of modern science. Again it is worth noting

that the atom is described as non-sounding. Several Indian systems
of thought associate sound with Akasa, a term which is quite
ambiguous. It means either space or ether. But the Jaina thinkers
distinctly explain sound as due to molecular impingenent. Unless
one molecule of matter strikes against another there is no possibility
of sound. An atom by itself is incapable of producing sound. Hence
it is silent. Jaina physics of sound is also quite scientific.

85

This primary atom is not of four kinds as some people would have
such as earth, air, fire and water. But it is only one in nature
though it is the constitutive basis of the four Dhattis or modes of

'Sanskrit rendering :

^spri ^?srT?rf ^r^r^w' fesnsftfe <?*m^* ii

 paNchAstikAyasamayasAra. 83

physical existence. The atom has its own essentia! nature which
is distinct from that of the four elements."

85. Whatever thing by its very name implies, perceptual

form; is the essential cause of these four elements;
is charac-
terised by unthinking murta nature and is unsounding ; that
is the atom ; so be it understood,
Commentary,
The author denies the qualitative difference paramanus.
of Py
the very name an atom implies the division of physical objects
having the sense qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour. From
the point of spaciality it is beginning middle and end in one. From
the general principle that substance and quality are inseparable, it
follows that the spacial unit of atom is also the spacial unit of con-
tact, or of smell, or of colour, i.e., the unit of
space occupied by the
atom is also frhe unit of space accommodating- the sense colours.
If
the primary atom through its manifestation were to part
with either
smell or with thesmell and taste or with smell taste and colour
then the very atom would be annihilated. Therefore the separability
of the quality cannot be associated with the atom. Again fire, air,
earth, and water, have as their constitutive cause the atom. Wonder-
ful are the qualities o: primary atoms when their potential characteris-
tics are taken into consideration. The non-manifested sense qualities
become actual in the aggregates or Skandhas. But in the case of
sound it can't be said that it is present in the atom even in Saldi or
potentiality for sound implies several molecules of several spacial
units. Therefore such a characteristic cannot consistently belong to
an atom which has only one spacial unit. Paramanu is called Murta
for another reason also ; because it can be a perceptual object for
Paramavadhi. It is called so not because it is perceived by our senses
It is distinctly transcending the capacity of our senses though it can
be perceived by the Kevali.

^Sanskrit rendering :
 —

84 THE SACRED BOOKS OP THE J A IN AS.

86

Then he describes how sound is actually produced by atoms

whicb are really without sound quality.

86. Sound is generated by skandhas. Skandhas

themselves are the aggregates of atoms. When these aggre-

gates strike one another sound is produced which

may be
natural or artificial (hence sound may be indirectly
associated

with atoms also).

Commentary.
If the skandhas constituted by Primary atoms strike one an-
other there is sound. If they strike of their own accord then there

is natural or svabhdvika sound. If the striking is due to other

agencies then it is Prayogika or purposeful sound. The illustrations

of Svabhdvika or natural sound are thunder of the clouds and the

roar of the sea. Prayogika or purposeful sound is again of two kinds

BhasMtmaka or Language and Abhashatmaka, non-language.

The language sound again may be Akshardtmaka or Anakshardtmaka,

articulate and inarticulate. The articulate sound is made up of
alphabetical sounds; the inarticulate is the language of animals.

Non-language sounds are of four k4nds :

1. Tata sound produced by stringed instruments.

2. Vitata the sound produced by drum.

3. Gana sound produced by cymbals, etc.

3. Sushira sound produced by pipes and other wind instru-

ment.
87

Further description of the primary Atom. That it is

Ekapradesa or occupies one spacial point is specially referred to.

*Sunskrit rendering :

315^: *^>*sm^ W*: <rem^JHf STf Tel: I

 paNchAstikAya-sama yasAra. 85

jcrerxjf fq q <%^j qfif^T 35T^f^FT II o» II

87. The primary atom is eternal, is and yet

spacial,
non-spacial ; is the differentiating factor of skandhas and is also
the cause of their changes. It is also the determinant of time
and number.
Commentary.
Paramanu is associated with one space point. Since it is not
capable of disintegration it is indestructible and eternal. Though
it occupies only one space point since it is the substratum of colour
and other sense qualites, it hasspaciality accommodating qualities. But
as it has ouly one space point and as it is without beginning, middle,
or end, and as it cannot accommodate another space point it may also
be called non-spacial. Being the constituent element of skandhas it
may be said to be the determinent of the difference of skandhas. For
the same reason it is the substantial cause of skandhas. By its own
change of position it becomes the measure of time. A single instant

of time corresponds to a singJe shift of an atom from one position

to the immediately next. It is also the measure of number or quan-
tity. Being the constitutive element of skandhas it brings about
quantitative difference of things (Dravya Sankhya), Since its associat-
ed space point is the constitutive element of space
it is indirectly

the cause of quantitative difference of space (Kshetra Sankhya.)

Since its motion from point to point corresponds to duration

of time it is also the basis of quantitative difference of time.

{Kdla Sankhya.)
Again because it is the basis of modification of things through
aggregation or disintegration it is also the condition of the quantita-

tive difference of modes or {Bhava Saukya).

Thus according to Jaina view the primary atom is the direct

unit of things and the indirect unit of space, time, and change. The

*S;mskrit rendering :
$6 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

qimtitative difference in these things and also the qualitative differ-

ence in physical objects may ultimately be traced to the constitutive
of Paramanu.
88

Furtherdescription of the qualities of Paramanu and its modes.

^sr^p**^ ft wj^i ^sjtojff^ i

That substance which has a single taste, colour,

88.
and smell and two contacts; which is the cause of sound, itself
unsounding, which is different from skandhas though consti-
tuting them is the Paramanu. So do thou learn.
Commentary.
The Primary atom is examined with reference to different
sense qualities
t
of physical objects. Five colours are recognised
generally in external things of which only one colour can be associ-
ated with the Paramanu. According to Jaina view a
Paramanu is
an object of perfect Avadhi perception. Though an atom is metem-
perical to a finite individual it is distinctly a Rupa or Vismal object
for the super-normal faculty of Avadhi. If the description in
the Gdtha is based upon such super-normal perception, unfortu-
nately it cannot be verified by our experience. But still there is a
way of imagining the truth. An atom may be associated with a
single light wave. If it is not able to obstruct more than a single
light wave of a particular wave length then it must manifest itself
as having only one colour to a super-normal faculty, Whether it is
actually so constituted as to behave in that fashion it is for the phy-
sicist to determine. We have here only to notice the uncompromising
realistic attitude of Jaina thought.

Of the five different states ordinarily recognised, an atom can have

only cne. Of the two different smells it may have either. Of the
eight contact qualities smooth and rough ; heavy and light are the
;

* Sanskrit rendering :
 paRchAstikAya-sasiayasAra. 87

qualities of skandhas. These cannot be in the atom. The remaining

four qualities may be present in an atom in pairs. The elements
constituting the pair must be mutually compatible. Snigdha and
Sita, Ruksha and Ushna, may constitute the consistent
pairs, i.e ,
viscosity or adhesiveness may co-exist with cold and hardness' and
repulsiveness may co-exist with heat.

This description would naturally introduce

qualitative difference
among atoms and yet according to the author there can
be no quali-
tative difference among atoms as they are identical
material units.
It is extremely interesting to notice the elaborate analysis of
sense qualities which even as minute as that of modern
is
Psychology.
But the ancient Psychological analysis of smell is as halting
as the"
modern one. Smell could be analysed only into disagreeable and
agreeable. Several attempts made in recent years to go
beyond this
crude difference merely ended in failure where
the modern scientists
succeeded there the ancient thinkers also
achieved succes, i.e., in the
analysis of the other senses. Another point worth noticing' is the
analysis of cutaneous sensations into
eight elements. This is almost
modern in its achievement. This indirect Psychological value is
more important than the description based upon
super-normal percep-
tion which unfortunately cannot be verified by Science in its
present state.
89
By way summary, the author enumerates the different
of
forms of
corporeal existence. The description may also be faken
as a sort of
extensive definition of matter.

3^^fst%f| ^ gf^| ^mi ttfft ^^rf^ I

89. Whatever
is perceived by the senses,
the sense organs
|he various kinds of Sdrirds, or bodies of
Jivas, the physical
hands or brain, the karmas, &c. a re Mtirta objects
. Understand
that all these are Pudgala or matter.

*Sanskrit rendering :
88 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JA1NAS.

Commentary.
The author enumerates the different states of matter. All objects

of sense perception are corporeal. An object may be appre-

hended through any one of the senses. Therefore, anything that
has the sense quality of colour, contact smell, taste, or sound comes
under this definition. Not only the objects of sense perception but
also the sense organs are physical. Thirdly the different Sariras
or the bodies of Jivas are also physical. These are five in

number. Auddrika, Vaikriyaka, Ahdraka, Taijasa, and Kdrmana

Sariras. The author includes Dravya Mana or mind under the
same class. Evidently it means brain which is no doubt physical.
Dravya Karmas are also material since they are constituted by
physical atoms. And again he implies no-karma/judgalas, organised
matter forming part of organism. This no-karma matter refers to
matter assimilated by the organism through the process of Metabo-
lism. And by the word " others" he refers to the several atoms and
Skandhas not already enumerated. All these are material.

The five sariras referred to in the Gdtha require iljcidation.

1. Audarika Sarira. Uddtwna meaus Sthula or gross. The Sarira

is called Audarika because it is constituted by Sthula or gross matter.

ItU also derived from udara womb that which is born from the
womb is Audarika. Any way Audarika Sarira refers to organic bodies
animal and human.
2. Vaikriyaka Sarira. Term vikriya implies the wonderful bodily
transformations that areassociated with a Deva or divine being A
Deva can take any kind of body he pleases from minute to 'huge
forms. That kind of sarira is calied Vaikriyaka Sarira.
3. Ahdraka Sarira when a yogi during Tapas has certain diffi-
culties about intricate facts of reality, there shoots forth a kind of
subtle body from him. This stretches out so far as to be in commu-
nion with another well-informed person, from whom the infomation

sought for is secured by a sort of telepathic response. This shootting

body from the yogi is Ahdraka Sarira.

4. Taijas Sarira. This refers to the shining body or the light-

body.
5. Kdrmdna Sarira. This refers to the karmic body of each Jiva.
Every Jiva carries this karmic body with itself when it roams through
the cycle of Samsdra.
 PANCHAsTIKAy A-SAMAYAsArA. 89

The first alone is the object of sense perception, and the others
are subtle bodies. The succeeding one is subtler than the peceed-
ing one in order, cf. the Sutra. <H3T*' q^f for further descrip-
tion of these sariras, we may refer the reader to Tattvdrtha Sutra
where the author describes the characteristics by several Sutras.
(Sutra 56 to the end of 2nd chapter).

Thus ends the chapter on matter or Pudgalastikdya.

90 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JA1NAS,

CHAPTER ON DHARMA AND ADHARMA.

90
describes Dharma or the principle of motion.
The author first

90. Dharmastikdya is devoid of qualities of taste, colour,

smell sound and contact. pervades the whole world, it is
It

continuous because of inseparability has extension because ;

space. Though in reality of

of its co-existensiveness with
Ekapradesa yet in Vyavakdra is of many pradesas.

Commentary
principles without which the
The author introduces important
world would be incomplete. Dharmastikdya and Adharmdstikdya

are distinctly peculiar to Jaina system of thought. The former is

These terms are used

the principle of motion and the.
latter of rest.

writers. Non Jaina writers both

.in a technical sense by Jaina.
European and Indian have many of them misunderstood these
We shall reserve our discussion to the end of
technical names.
this chapter.

In the above Gdtha the author clearly describes the nature of

non-corporeal or
Dharma or the principle of motion. Since
it is

qualities which are generally associated with

Amitrta it has no sense
qualities of contact, colour, taste, smell and sound
matter. The
associated with Dharma. Therefore it is not physical.
are not to be
of simple element as matter is. There-
Again it is not an aggregate
fore Dharma is continuous and non-composite. Its influence is
co-extensive with the whole
world. Therefore it may be said to be

any gaps or intervals. It cannot

co-extensive with Lokdkdsa without
any particular time of the World's His-
be said to have manifested
at

created. It is coeval with the world and co-

tory much less is it

and because of the latter character it is an

extensive with space,
Astikdya.

Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. gj

91
Next Gdtha describes the remaining qualities of Dharmdstikaya.

91. Because it has the infinite manifestations of the incor-

poreal nature Agurulaghu, and because of its dialectic nature
of persistence through appearance and disappearance it is a
real existence. Itself being unaffected by movement it con-
ditions the motion of those that can move, matter and life.

Commentary.
The author next establishes the substantial reality of Dharmds-
tikaya. It has the characteristic change and modification of all
the primary entities though it is incorporeal. Therefore it is

permanent and real. It is the indispensable condition of movement

in physical objects as well as in living
beings. But itself cannot be
moved by any other thing because it is incapable of movement.

92
The author explains by a well-known analogy how it is the
condition of motion.

cTf sftcRWT^Tnf ^f^ ^3cC f^Rmff II

^ II i
mp
92, Just as water itself being indifferent or neutral, is the
condition of movement of fishes so Dharma itself non-motive,
is the sine quanon of motion of Jivas and Pudgalas.

Commentary.
The author explains the function of Dharmdstihdya by a very
striking example. Water is the indispensable condition for the life

^Sanskrit rendering.

"Sanskrit rendering :
92 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

of the fish. The fish lives and moves only But water neither
in water.

moves with the moving nor does itfish stimulate the fish to move.

It is practically indifferent towards the moving fish. If the fish moves,

it is due to its
own intrinsic and spontaneous activity, and not to
the causal agency of water.
Such is the relation of Dharmastikdya
of the world. If objects move from one place to another,
to objects
due to the intrinsic condition of the object. But
the movement is

the sine qua non of motion of the objects of

still Dharmastikdya is

the world, i.e., in short it is merely the condition, and not the genera-

tive cause, of motion.

93
or the principle of
Next the author describes the Adharmdstikdya
rest.

^ fcff^ ^n^sof af ?f *rmf ^m&&$ i

\

The nature of Adharma is essentially similar to that

93.
Dhanna. But it is like the earth (which is the resting place
of
the sine qua nou of rest for things in motion,
of things)
(both animate and inanimate).
Commentary.
the principle of rest has all the characteristics
Adharma or
Dharma or the principle of motion. This is also
associated with
qualities. This is also non-corpcreal. This is in
devoid of sense
co-extensive with Lokdkdsa. These
itself non-spacial and yet it is

has in common with the principle of motion.

characteristics it

own differentiating quality. In this respect it is

But it has its
place of things. Moving
compared with earth which is the resting
inaninate are not arrested and brought
things whether animate or
to rest by the earth. But if there is no earth to support, there will
for the moving things. Similarly the
be no possibility of rest
motion the condi-
Adharmdstikdya without interfering with
itself is

tion of rest for the moving

things.

*Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAyasamayasAra. 93

94

Then the author gives the reason why Dharma and Adharma are
considered Astkdyas or existences.

The two things which by their existence bring about

the difference between the world and beyond, which are
respectively the condition of motion and rest, which are
different in function, but same in nature and Pradesa, are
Dharma and Adharma. These are uncreated and of the
same magnitude as Lok&k&sa.

Commentary.

The existence of these two principles must be postulated as the

necessary condition of the world for without this there will be
neither motion nor rest among things. There will be neither the
world nor beyond. If the material particles and jivas are not
kept together as a system then they will get scattered through the
whole place resulting in sheer chaos. There will be no definite
world. There will be neither the beyond or Alokd. The difference
between Loka and Aloka is entirely due to the coherent system of
molecules and Jivas, conditioned by these principles. Dharma and
Adharma are said to be distinct because of the difference in function.
The former is the condition of motion, the latter of rest. But they
are quite similar in nature and are indistinguishable because of their
non-exclusive co-existence in space. They are in themselves
Nishkriya Dravyas. Non-active and non functional and yet
condition the things living and non-living in their motion and rest.

For this reason they are limited entirely to the world. Their
function will not be felt beyond the world for the simple reason that
there are no things beyond.

* Sanskrit rendering:
94 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE J A IN AS.

95

Next the author points out that Dharma and Adharma are in
themselves neutral, and indifferent condition respectively of motion
and rest in other things

fsrf^ *T^t * ^^ SrftaTW ^WT^T^f ^ II <H II

95. Dharmdstikdya does not move itself nor effect motion

in other things. But it forms the condition of motion in living

and non-living things.

Commentary.
Then it is determined that Dharma and Adharma being in

themselves entirely neutral from the external condition of motion

and rest respectively. Dharmdstihaya itself is incapable of

movement nor can it be an efficient cause of motion in other things

such as, phyical objects and living beings. In what way can it be

said to condition motion ? certainly not like the horses that, while

themselves running, indirectly cause the motion of prersons on their

back. Dharmdstikdya does not carry things locomotion of things ;

and persons is not brought about by Dharma for it is a Nishkriya

Dravya. But it behaves like water which by its mere presence is
the condition of motion in fishes, i. e., Dharmdstikdya by its mere
existence conditions motion without being the efficient cause of

motion. Jtvas and Padgalas have motion because of their own efficient
causes and yet motion in them will be impossible, but for the
external condition of Dharmdstikdya.

Similarly Adharma being neutral in itself is the external condi-

tion of rest. It is merely a Bahirangahetu. Just as the earth is the

standing place for horses and the shadow of a tree, the place of rest

for the pilgrims so Adharma is the non-efficient external condition

of things at rest.
96
Then the reason why Dharma and Adharma are merely neutral
conditions (UdusUiahettt).

* Sanskrit rendering :
 paSchAstikA yasa ma ya sAra .
§5

foj^ srfrf Tmnf sTTif ^ ^f%^ ^^ {

96. To whatever things there is motion to the very same

there can be rest, or cessation of motion,
such things of their
own spontaneous efficiency effect either motion or rest.

Commentary.
The author explains why these are called uddsmahetu. He
wants to emphasize that Dharma is not the intrinsic condition of
motion nor Adharma of rest, e., he wants to i
deny that they are
Mukhyahetu. What if they .re the Mukhyahetu for
motion and rest,
then the things that are in motion must
continue to be so for ever
and the things that are at rest must remain in the
same state for
ever. But things dont behave in that fashion.
Therefore it is
inferred that these are only Uddsinahetus or neutral or external
conditions. This only means that they are not efficient causes.
Ordinarily we perceive that things moving
come to rest and things at
rest begin to move. That shows that both motion and rest are as
sociated with single things. Since this fact prevails in nature we
have to infer that motion and rest are, not produced by Dharma and
Adharma as Mukhyahetu. Motion and rest must be traced to the in-
trinsic and efficient nature of things themselves. That clearly shows
that Dharma and Adharma are merely Bahirangahetus.

Note.
After taking to task the several writers who misunderstood the
technical terms Dharma and Adharma, Mr. J.L. Jaini writes (in pp.
25 of his Outlines of Janism).

"Matter goes to struggle with the unwary or infatuated soul

;

time times the conflict, space makes possible the arena dharma
keeps ;

the combatants to struggle on and adharma assists them

; when they
are inclined to rest.'' Again in the same page: "dharma and adhar-
ma are the necessary conditions of its continuance in its endless vicis-
situdes, merit and demerit, high and low, happiness and misery, as

Sanskrit rendering :

& *^<if?:*uriNrj tor s*ir xi $4fa li =a II

 —

96 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JA1NAS.

far as disturbance and tranquillity. Of course, dharma and adharma

are in their nature and modus
operandi the same. It is the same

in the hand of a devoted soldier or

fanatic relet:'
sword
thinking of dharma and
I am afraid that Mr. Jaini is still

adharma as gutfst-moral instruments in the hands of a Jiva.

not in the least be associated with any kind of

The terms shoud
and rest in contemplated
moral struggle and tranquillity. Motion
physico-mathematical. They should
this connection on distinctly
metaphorically to mean anything
not therefore be interpreted even
to remember the following
more than that connotation. We have
points:
arnica dravyas. They have no
1. Dharma and Adharma- are

sense qualities of colour, etc.

2. They are ajivas— non-living.

themselves eka-pradesi.
3. They have spatial relation though in

4. They are Nishkriyas— non-active.

Bahiranga hetu or uddsina hetu and not
Mukhya
5. They are
hetu.

6. They are non-discrete and continuous.

important common qualities emphasised by

There are some of the
they are astikdyas need not be
the Jaina Thinkers. Of course that

emphasised.
qualities, then they can never be con-
If we ponder over the=e

nected with moral struggle ©r evolution.

philosopher recognised in the world matter, Life and
The Jaina
There would be no world. The Atoms
Space. But are they enough? No.
the infinite space. Therefore
and Jivas may be scattered throughout
That something
else besides these three.
there must be something
and atoms, must
must be able to maintain a coherent system of Jivas
of preventing the flying atoms
must limit the
have the function
;

world of things and persons. For the author d.s-

boundary of the
be only chaos; there
tinctly says that without Adharma there will
Thinkers pointed the existence
will be no world. Therefore the Jaina
So the
of a fourth entity which binds together things and persons.
hypothesis of adharma.
Newton's gravitation but adharma is
This is something like ;

main function is to arrest things. But then

slightly different. Its
 p a Re h Astir Ay a samayasAra. 37

there is this difficulty. If there were adharma alone how could their
be motion at all in things ? There would ba an eternal paralysis
of Reality. To remove this difficulty Dharma had to be posited.
The function of Dharma is to guarantee motion within the limits
imposed by adharma. This is the reason for the second hypo-
thesis.

But the trouble is not yet over. If the two exist within a
spatial limit one guaranteeing motion and the other rest, then the
things in motion must be in motion for ever and things at re.^.t ;

must be there for ever. But our experience is not of One

that kind.
and the same has motion or rest ; it may- move or it may come to
stay. Therefore Dharma and Adhanna must be deprived of their
causality. They can be only Bahiranga-hetu or Uddsfna-hetu,
(i.e.) they must be indfferent and neutral themselves and
in yet
must be indispensible to the completion of the world:
This seems to be the logical development of the system; The
most approximate modern conception answering to the description
will be Ether of the physicist. But the Jaina systems require
two such entities functionally
different; one acting like Newton's
gravitation (adhanna) and the other guaranteeing motion within
the
limits. It would not be quite-accurate to think of centripetal and
centrifugal forces, because dharma and adhanna are Nishkriyas.
Does it mean the duality of electro-magnetic influence of Ether ?

The constitution of an atom is supposed to be a system of

electrons (positive and negative). Had the Jaina thinkers any
such idea about the whole world ? We can only contemplate. But
of this much we are certain that dharma and adharma are parts of
the physical system. They are two different entities without which
the system of reality would be impossible and incomplete.

Again Dr. Seal suggests that dharma is " answering some-

what to Leibneitz" s Pre-established harmony it is the cause
(or condition) of the system of movements, the fact of an order in
the movements of Jiva and Pudgala," (Note E at the end of Dravya
Samgraha, S. B. J. pp. LVIII)

As the whole letter is not quoted I am not in a position to know

what Dr. Seal has to say about adharma. With due deference to
'
the great Philosopher I beg to state that he misses the point.
Dharma, need not necessarily be associated with simultaneous-
98 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.
logically prior
movements as I pointed out. Adharma seems to be
construction of the system. Hence I am
to Dharma) in the
not able to appreciate this reference to Pre-established Harmony
windowless
"
which has a special function in the system of a
monads" There certainly is the idea of correspendiog movements.
Hence Dharma is not the " system of movements." Its meaning
is

distinctly subsequent to that of adharma.

How could adharma
what is the force of that
be connected with Leibneitz's System ? Then
reference ?
 paKchAstikAya-samayasAra. 99

CHAPTER ON AKASA OR SPACE.

97
In this Chapter the author describes the nature and
characteristics
of space. The term Akasa here means space and not Ether as it is
very often interpreted in other systems of Indian philosophy,

^5i*j ^ftenjf %^rm rff *r ^wr^Tof ^r u

woP

97. What
contains or accommodates completely all
Jivas
and Pudgalas and the remaining Dravyas is the world
space
or Lokakasa.

Commentary.
Space is considered to be objectively real in Jaina system.
Objectively real space is ordinarily considered to be self -contradictory
and impossible. On the so-called impossibility of space idealism bases
its arguments. But in recent years Mathematicians have clearly
shown that space and time are not really self-contradictory. Euclidian
space is quite possible and may be real.

Philosophical description of space as real is not the characteristic

of
the other Indian systems of Philosophy. The term ikasa is
used in an
ambiguous sense referring to either space or Ether. As Doctor
Thibaut points out the consistent translation of the word
Akasa is
Ether. He invariably translates the term into Ether. For according
.
to the Hindu creation theory,
Akasa is the primieval substance from
which the other elements appear. Therefore Akasa must mean some
subtle form of matter and not the Mathematicians' space.
But the
Jaina thinkers reject the theory of creation. Therefore they found it
possible to acknowledge the objective existence of space
; space there-
fore is a fundamental element of the system of reality
according to the
Jaina view.
98.

The same point is further elaborated.

^Sanskrit rendering :
wo THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

98. Life, matter, the principle of motion and that of rest

and also Time, these are not distinct from the world. But that
which is the same as the world, and also distinct from it,
is

Akasa or space which is infinite.

Commentary.
elements of the world are the infinite number of
The constituent
and the infinite physical objects, the principles of motion and
Jivas,
rest,and space and time. Of these space contains the other five.
The space which is co-extensive with these objects is called Lokakasa.
But that is only a part of the real space. Beyond the Loka
there is

Alokakasa or Annntakasa, This Anantakasa is pure space. There

are no objects animate or inanimate in this Infinite Beyond. Not

a tiny molecule of matter nor a stray Jiva,

would step beyond the
limits of Loka. Ttie system of objects is held together by the

principles of Dharma and Adharma. And these .principles are con-

fined to Lokakasa.
Mathematically pure space is
Thus we have to note that

recognised to be possible and real by Jaina thinkers. Arguments against

pure space have already been said to be generally fallacious.

99.

Akasa thus accommodates the other Dravyas. Why should it not

be taken al-o as the condition ef motion and rest. The author shows
why it cannot be such a condition.

* Sanskrit rendering :

3JTSIT: f^^rai! W?*T&? ^ mftisis^ I

^Sanskrit rendering :
 pa Rc hAs tikA yasa ma ya sAra. 1 or

99. If space, in addition to accommodating other things,

conditions their motion and rest, then why do these Siddhas
whose tendency is to go upwards come to stay at the summit
of the world ?

•Commentary.
The author evidently explains why it is necessary to postulate the
existence of Dharma and Adharma. Cannot Akasa be credited with
the functions of motion and rest in addition to its own function of
accommodating things ? According to the author such a Hypothesis
would be impossible. It would be -conflicting with other facts for

if it is also the condition of motion and rest, then wherever there is

Akasa there should be free chance for motion and rest. But neither
a single Jiva or a single atom of matter could step beyond the limit
of Lokakasa though there is Akasa beyond. Therefore the author
concludes that space is not the condition of either motion or rest
These require independent principles as their condition. Akasa
cannot be a substitute for Dharma and Adharma. This argument
should be considered conjointly with the arguments in the previous
Chapter for the necessity of Dharma and Adharma. We have to
notice especially that one which points out the difference between
Cosmos and 'Chaos to be based upon principles of state and motion.
The Jaina system evidently considers the world incomplete and unreal
without the statical and dynomical principles.

100.

The author strengthens the argument by showing that according

to Jaina faith the perfected ones come to a stay in the summit of the
Loka.

Because the Siddhas or the perfected ones stay in

100.
the summit of the world— So it is revealed by the great Jina.

* Sanskrit rendering :
im THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS,

Therefore there cannot be in space either the condition of

motion or of rest.

Commentary.
That the Siddhas reside in the summit of the world is one of the
religious doctrines of Jainas. If space be credited to be the condition
of motion and rest it would contradict the scriptures. To avoid this
internal contradiction space should not be suppo sed to be the condi-
tion of motion and rest. The argument prima facie is based upon
a religious Dogma. But really it is another form of the same philoso-
phical argument which maintained that without the principles of
Dharma and Adhrama there would be no distinction between Loka
and Aloka. The argument in this Gatha is merely the converse of the
above. Since there is a definite Loka or Cosmos, and since there is

space beyond, there must be something besides space which maintains

the integrity of the system of things and persons. For space itself

cannot have that function of maintaining the unity of the world.

101.

The author shows that the supposition about space is impossible

by bringing in a really strong argument.

101. If space be the condition of motion and rest, of life

and matter, then there would happen the disappearance of

Aloka or the beyond and the destruction and dissipation of
Loka or the world.
Commentary.
As a matter of fact the world is an integral system of things,
and non-living, existing in space. That th -re is some force or
living
power which holds the constituent elements of the world together is a
necessary pre-supposition even of modern science. It is really won-
derful that Jaina thinkers several centuries ago felt the same intellec-

*Sanskrit rendering :
 PANCHAsTIKAyA-SAMAYAsARA. 703

tual necessity as to suppose a physical force which maintains the

cosmic unity. The reason given for that Hypothesis is still more in-
teresting. If there isno such power and if things living and non-
living were left in space by themselves without a further principle
to holdthem together there would only be chaos, no systematic world.
This argument must be considered very important for it gives us an
insight into the scientific ideas of the ancients. The positive science
of ancient Indians must have been fairly advanced in order to pro-
mulgate such physical theories as are contemplated by the author.
102.
If then space cannot be the determining condition of motion and of
rest, the latter facts must be due to some other conditions. Therefore
Dharma and Adharma must be admitted to be the necessary consti-
tuents of the system of reality.

102. Dharma and Adharma alone are the condition of

motion and rest respectively, and not Akasa or space. So was
the nature of the Cosmos revealed by the great Jina to his
audience (in Samavasarana).
Commentary.
The author summarises his position as to the nature of Loka.
He distinctly asserts that the coherence of the world is due to
princip'es of Dharma and Adharma and not to space. The author
further states evidently to strengthen his own case in the eyes of the
faithful such was the message delivered by the Jina to his
that
audience, consisting of Ganadharas, and Chakradharas, and several
u
others in Samavasarana. The description of the world is as revealed
by the Omniscient to his disciples.
103.

The author states that Lokakasa or world, Space, Dharma and

Adharma, are all co-extensive and coincident. Hence they may

* Sanskrit rendering :
Wt THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE J A FN AS.

be considered as one conventionally, as they are all incorporeal entities

in the same locality. But they are in reality different from ona
another on account of their fun tional difference.

103.Dharma, Adharma, and space, are mutually intero

penetrating and coincident Hence they are one from the:
point of locality they are of the same size and form, and
;

constitute an inseparable unity. But from, the difference of

function they also exhibit their diversity..
Commentary.
This Gatha is interesting for this reason that Dharma and Adhar-
ma beingp constitutive elements of the world are said to be confined
to Lokakasa. Their influence is not felt bayond the bou idary of the
world for their influence is fundamentally related to things material
and spiritual. These two mysterious physical principles are all

pervading and co-extensive with the world space. Their existence

cannot be inferred from their difference of locality. There is no such
difference. But yet they have fundamentally different functions
and on account of these differences they are really diverse. In
short they are one in. Pradesa but different as Vastus i. e., they have
a unity of Locality with diversity of function and nature.
This functional difference is emphasized by the author only be*-

cause these three Dravyas are Amiirta ones There is no other

way of differentiating them unlike physical objects which can be dis-

tinguished by sense qualities and unlike Jivas which can be differen-

tiated by conscious qualities. Dharma and Adharma have to be

determined only by their function in the economy of the physical
realm.

Thus Ends the Chapter on Space.

^Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 105

CHULIKA.
104.
Then the resume of the
five Astikayas and
Dravyas. They are
described Murta and Amurta (Physical and
as
non-physical) and
Cnetana and Achetana (conscious and
non-conscious).

104. Space, Time, Life, Dharma and Adharma, these are

Amurta Dravyas and are therefore without sense
qualities
Matter alone is Murta and has these qualities. Again of
these life alone is conscious.
Commentary.
Gatha the author classifies the Dravyas
In this
according to two
pnncples Accordmg to the first classification,
they are grouped
mto Murtas and Anitas. Murta Dravya
is one which has the sense
qualities of contact, taste,
smen, sound; and colour.
That which is
devo.d of these qualities is Amurta.
Here, space, time, Jiva in
itself
Dharma and Adharma, are all Amurtas,
Matter alone is Murta
which has the nature of consciousness That
is Cheiana and
that which is
otherw.se ,s Achttana. Space,
time, and matter, Dharma
Adharma and
are all Asanas. Jiva alone is Che,an a Draw*
105,
Again the Dravyas are classified into Sahiyas and NishUriya,
>»'"*nyas,
active and non-active.

105. Jivas and physical objects

become sekrys or causal
agents when determined b^
ertainconditi^The rest are
not
* Sanskrit rendering \

^Sanskrit rendering ;

sf^r: s^a^wr: ^5 srforar *3&r * * fan ,

706 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE J AW AS.

causally active. Jiva is active because of Karmic matter.

time.
Skandhas or physical bodies are active because of
Commentary.
According to this classification Dravyas are either Sakryas or
described to be Sakrya. If there
Nishkriyas. Any causal activity is

The activity contem-

is no such causal activity then it is Nishkriyr.
brought about by external
plated here may be merely any change
Dravyas for they become
conditions. Jivas and matter are Sakrya
time, Dharma and Adharma
Sakriya under certain conditions space, ;

Nishkriyas or non-active entities. The external condition

of
are all
group of Karmas These are material.
activity of Jiva is merely the
condition of the activity of matter is time. Temporal
The external
either of aggregation or disintegra-
succession brings about changes
physical objects.
in
There can be no change in matter without
tion
in Jiva without Karmic matter but
time as there can be no change
;

be free from Karmic matter. In this state

Jiva in perfect states can
practically Nishkriya, i. e., it is not subjected to
the Siddha Jiva is

cannot be so with matter for there is

no
causal category. But it
must always be
chance for matter to exist independent of time. It

Therefore it is always Sakrya.

subject to change due to time.
Siddha
One commentators relying on the religious dogma that
of the
as Sakriya.
the world, speaks of Siddha also
Jiva gets to the sum.niit of
any causal change, it is this initial change
of locality.
If at all there is

in the perfect state it will bemore accurately described as Nish-

But
kriya for already Jiva is described to be beyond causal series in its
that attitude it is better
state of perfection. To be consistent with

to consider Siddha as Nishkriya.

106.
Amurta again described
The difference between Murta and is

in other words.

%* ^ WWrt
* Sanskrit rendering
T^TtT

:
3*R **tf^ « \ \
Q «#

*tf wrtq* farrg^ srm^fa H l<* n

 paKchAstikAya-samayasAra. 101

106. All those objects that are

apprehended or perceived
by the senses are Murta objects. The rest are Armlrtas.
Mind apprehends both Murta and Amurta objects.
Commentary.
The author again tries to explain the
difference between percep-
tualand non-perceptual objects. All these objects that are objects of
the senses are Murta Dravyas. The term Murta therefore implies
the inherence in the object of the sense qualities of colour, taste,
smell, etc. Those objects that have not these characteristics are
Amurta Dravyas. According to this description Physical objects are
distinctly Murta Dravyas. But Physical objects may exist in different
forms. There may be minute molecular constitution and the primary
atoms. These are certainly not perceived by the senses and yet they
also come und£r Murta category for they form the potential basis of
the gross or physical objects which are evident to the senses. In short
all those objects which are Pratyaksha to the senses are Murta objects
and those objects which are known through Paruksha are Amurtas.
Under the Amurta category come such facts as Dharma and Adharma
and all Psychic states. (We have to note here that the term Pratyak-
sha is used in Vyavahara sense.) Mind, which is in itself an Amurta
Dravya is able to know both Murta and Amurta Dravyas. Murta
Dravyas are apprehended Pratyaksha and Amurta Paroksha or medi-
ately.

Thus ends the Chulika or Summary,

107.

In the treatment of Panchastikaya, time has only a secondary

place. Therefore the author gives a subordinate place to time and
mentions about it in the summary. The section dealing about time
therefore is merely a part of the Chulika and it is not considered
as an independent chapter by the author as well as the commentators.

^Sanskrit rendering :
108 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JA1XAS.

107. determined by changes or motions

Relative time is

in things. These changes themselves are the effect of time

absolute. The former time is ephemeral (having beginning
and end;. The latter is eternal, such are the characteristics

ef the two.
Commentary,
The author differentiates between relative time and absolute time,
The different conventional periods from Samaya or moment onwards
are the relative time. The different periods of relative time are
measured by changes in other things. Movement of Physical objects is
mainiy the unit of measuring the different periods of relative time.
The changes which .measure the periods of relative time are them-
selves the effect of real or absolute time. The periods of relative time

have both beginning and end. But Dravyakdla or real-time is eternal,

is without beginning or end.

The author takes up an attitude which is very familiar to common

sense and science. The distinction is quite identical w.th Newtonian
distinction between relative and absolute time. According to the
author time is a real Dravya, it is not merely a form of mental activity.

The idealistic thinkers both in the east as we !

l as in the west have

treated time as merely an appearance. But the Jaina thinkers

evidently form an exception for them, time is not an appearance but a

reality. The main argument against the reality of time is the so-

called self-contradiction in the motions of continuity and infinity.

Time has these characteristics of continuity and infinity and yet it is

also constituted by instants or Dravyakd/dnus as the Jaina writers

call them. How can there be continuity constituted by primary
elements of instants ? This difficulty is not peculiar to time. It is

common to space, as well as matter. In all these cases Philosophers

emphasize the impossibility of obtaining continuity and infinity from

simple elements. On account of this impossibility space, time and
matter were condemned to be appearances.

But the problem has been taken up by the Mathematicians. The

wonderful mathematical discoveries of the con inental mathemati-
cians such as, Cantor, Pc.ino
and Frege have shown clearly the intrin-
the arguments against the reality of time and space.
sic fallacy in all

The problem is developed by mathematicians as a special case of

 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 109

" transitive and continuous series." To go into further details would

be too mathematical. The discussion
may very well be reserved to
the general introduction. It is enough to note here the
wonderful
correspondence between the ideas of the
author, and those of philo-
sophical Mathematicians of our present
day.
Another point worth notice is that time is the cause of changes
or modifications in things. The author not only admits the reality
of time but also recognises its potency. In this respect one is re-
minded of the great French Philosopher Bergson. Bergson has
revealed to the world that time is a potent factor in the evolution
of
Cosmos. Changes and modifications in things are
absolutely impos-
sible without time, and that is just the view of the author.
•
108.
In order to clear the doubt of the disciple
of a different Sangha,
who disbelieves the reality of time, the author
emphasizes the exis-'
tential nature of time.

108. The name time or Kfila denotes an existential fact.

The thing so denoted— Time is real but the other relative
time has from the point of present moment, origin
and end
almost simultaneously. But it may also be of long
duration.
Commentary.
Tha author differentiates the real time from relative time.
Real
or absolute time is eternal existence But relative time is merely of
finite duration.But from the aspect of moment it has no duration
at
all. Origin and end are together in a single moment. It has Kshani-
katva as its nature as against Nitvatva of the other.
But the Kshani-
katva may apparently disappear and relative time may
have long
duration. Even then it has both beginning and end and as
such it is
different from Dravya Kala or absolute time.

* Sanskrit rendering :
110 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

109>
Then the quantitative appreciation of time and the absence of
KayzJva or Corpus for the same.

109.Time, space. Dharma, and Adharma, matter, and

Jiva these things are called Dravyas. Of these to time alone
there is no Kayatva.
Commentary.
In this Gatha, Ae author emphasizes the fact that time has Astitva
or existence but not Kayatva speciality. It is one of the six Dravyas.
The name Dravya is applicable to all those existences which have
continuity through origin and decay. Time has such a nature. There-
fore it shares the name Dravya with the other things herein enumer-
ated.

But the other Dravyas are also called Astikayas because they have
extension or Bahttpradesa. But time has no such Bahupradesa
Therefore it is not an Astikaya.

This nature of time is described in mathematical terms by the

author elsewhere. {Pravachana Sara). Time has Urdhva Prachaya
wherens the other Dravyas have Tiry ik Prachaya. In the language
of Modern Mathematics the former term corresponds to mono-dimen-
sional assymetrical series, the latter multi-dimensional series. Ac-
cording to Mathematical Philosophy extension is multi-dimensional
series. Kayatva therefore is generated by Tiryak Prachaya but
Urdhva Prachaya cannot be associated with extension since it is uni-

lateral. Therefore time is not an Astikaya. More of this in the

general introduction.

110

The fruit of contemplating upon these facts— Panch astikaya.

^'Sanskrit rendering :

^ ^IvITSRT^ wrfopof ^ 3t^t afar: I

 pa^chAstikAya-sama yasAra. 111

110. Thus one who with

the knowledge of, and faith in
this short summary
Panchastikaya— the essence of the
of
Divine word gives up desire and aversion (towards wordly
things) realises freedom from sorrow.

Commentary.
Here the author indicates the path to eternal bliss. The path
consists of the three jewels or Ratna Traya. Right faith, Right know-
ledge and Right conduct, tfsqsp ^fa STR ^ifofTfar«ftwf: I and
Samyak Darsanam is defined to be TattvartaPSraddhdnam. The
Tattvas are the existence described in short in Panchastikaya or
the reality itself may be considered as a system of Panchastikayas.
One who believes in the nature of reality, one who tries to understand
its constituent elements must next try to realise his own true
nature. When faith and knowledge get the co-operation of effort or
charitra then there is the surity of heavenly bliss.

111.

Then the manner of obtaining such a freedom.

111. Whoever knowing this truth (that self is the greatest

reality) endeavours to reach or realise the same gets free
from spiritual Darsna Mohaniya, and as the
stupidity or
result of that, roots out desire and aversion (charitra
Mohaniya), and finally becomes the conqueror of Samsara.

* Sanskrit rendering :

\Sanskrit rendering :
112 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

Commentary.
He describes the order of events that ends in Moksha. The grea-
test thing mentioned in this SCRIPTURE is the SELF. Whoever
understands the glorious nature of self -consciousness cannot but

attempt to realise the same. On account of that effort the wall round
the faculty of faith or Darsana Mohaniya gets removed. By the removal
of this ignorance dawns the knowledge of SELF. Through self-

knowledge the rooting out of desire and aversion the destruction of

Charitra Mohaniya or the palsy of the good will. Hence the shattering
of karmic shackles ; then with freedom radiates the eternal glory of
the Divine Person.

Thus ends the Book I.

 1 arq *

P-4^Cf/iST.//iiF4-S4M4 YAsAra.
n.

BOOK II.

NINE PADARTHAS,
112.
Thesis Dravyas and the five Astikayas are of two kinds,
life and
non-hfe. These two things life and- non-life form the two primary
elements among seven Tatty
,s and nine Padarthas.
Besides these two
the other Tattvas
and Padarthas are derivative. They
are due to the
combination or separation of these two
primary Tattvas Life and
non-hfe. On account of combination occur the
following Padarthas-
Punya (virtue), Papa (vice), Asrava (incoming of Karma)
and Bandha
(bondage). The four which lead to Samsara, originating by their
separation the following Padarthas occur. Samvara (prevention cf
incoming Karma), Nirjara (withering
away of existing Karma) Moksha
(emancipation from all Karma or Freedom^.
Of these Moksha Tattva
is the most important, being the summum Bonum of life The path
to this goal is described by the author who begins by praying to the
last of the Jinas, Lord Mahavira who revealed the path.

112. Bowing my head in reverence to

Mahavira the
saviour of the world, I describe those two primary Padarthas
life and non-life, and the various derivative Padarthas
and
also the path to heaven.

Commentary.
This Namaskiraslokt Midhyahamanoala (Salutation for the
is

middle of the books;. The author worships Vardhamana Mahavir

the last of the T.rthankaras he
; is considered to be the revealer of the
true path. Ail Sastras are traced to
Mahavira as the originator.

In the second book the author is concerned with the career of life.
In the first book, he described in detail the nature of the constitutive
elements of the world. In the second book he is going to follow the
spiritual evolu tion. Evolution or development implies a struggle
and
*Sanskrit rendering :

zi\ qgfuwsf «i*t m^rcn s^ifa iu^'u

114 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JA1MAS.
and Ajiva, life and non-
of struggles are Jiva
the primary conditions
liva is situated in an
environment of Ajiva or non-living things.
)ife
of primary .mportance.
The struggle »
Of 'the Ajiva's matler is doctrine the
According to the Jama
mainly between life and matter. pro-
struggle is without beginning.
The spiritual evolution cons.sts in
gressive emancipation of Jiva
from physical shackles.

The reality therefore -

^edat from a different angle
of vision

the TaUvas
struggle and evolut.cn form
The different aspects of the Ast.ka, as
author is no more concerned wrth
and the Padarthas. The The
group appear in another form.
andDravyas. The very same non-hvmg
elements, are Jiva and its
Mula Tattvas or the primary and A,,va
combination and separation of J ,va
environment. By the
other Tattvas and Padarthas
wh.ch are derivative
are generated, the And the
and secondary. The central actor in the Drama is J.va.
development is Moksha. The second booh there-
ulm'n tion o, the
to Moksha.
the career of life from Samsara
fore is concerned with
113.

or the path to heaven as

First the author takes up Mokshamdrga

he wants to describe it in short. wC ircm

***!**
H3
^ **& *****
Ri»ht conduct uninfluenced by
^|N W «* «
the desire or aversion,
path
together with right faith
and right knowledge, forms the
self knowledge
faithful jivas who realise
to heaven to those
or Labdhis.
through the five attainments
COHSMENTARY.
three jewels.
the path to Moksha or the
Here the author indicates
very first Sutra of
the paraphrase of the
The Gatha is merely
Tattvarthadhigama.
the path. Darsana, or behef Jnana
Three elements constitute
all the three must be of tltt
knowledge and Charitra
or conduct. Jlut

-Sanskrit rendering :
 PANChAsTIkAyA-SAMAYAsAra. 775

the right sort. Belief in the true nature of reality is Dar£ana, which
is right. This Sarnyak Darsana, is considered to be the result of
suppression or eradication of that particular Karma called Darsana
Mohaniya whose function is to blind that faculty of belief or Darsana^

The understanding of the nature of these Tattvas, the constitutive

categories of reality is Sarnyak J nana. The term Samyak implies the

absence of doubt and error. Conduct as conditioned by right belief

and right knowledge is Samyka Charitra or right conduct.

These form the indispensable elements of the Moksha mdraga

Unless all the three are present there would be no path.

In this Gatha the author indicates eight main conditions of the

path.

1. The co-operation of right belief and right knowledge, without

these there would be no path.

2. Conduct is the main constituent element ; not any conduct

but only right conduct.

3. This implies that there should be no Rdga or Dvesha, Desire

or aversion, the presenee of these would nullify the Mdrga,
4. Conduct of that kind forms the path to Moksha or liberation,
feut does not lead to Bandha or bondage.

5. The path so constituted is the right and the reliable one ; and
as such
;
it is distinct from several Mithya-Mdrgds or false paths.

6. The path is available only to Bhavya Jivas or the good matured

ones and not to Abhavyds of intrinsic evil disposition.

7. Even amoKg the Bhavyas only to those who secured five

attainments or the Pancha Labdhis but not to those who had not
those attainments.

8. Only those who have eradicated completely all Kashayas or the

gross emotions which have the tendency to stain the purity of self;

but one in whom such emotions are still present cannot walk the
path of righteousness.

The three elements constituting the path are the three jewels, or
Ratnatraya. This Ratnatraya is spoken to be of two kinds Nischayct
Ratnatraya and Vyavahdra Ratnatraya^ The former is from the
absolute point of view and the latter is of relative point of view.
When the Ratnatraya is distinctly based upon self then it is Nischaya
115 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JALVAS.

Ratnatraya. Darsana, and Charitra,

J nana all have reference to self

and self alone. This Nischaya Ratnatraya first implies the belief in
the ultimate nature and importance of self, i.e., the belief that Para-
mdtmd is nothing but self Again consequent upon this firm belief there

must be knowledge of self. Complete knowledge of self is the next

•element of the Nischaya Ratnatraya. The knowledge of all other
Tattvas centres round the Personality. Knowledge of the Person there-
fore is knowledge par excellence. And lastly realisation of the
Paramatma or the great Person would be Charitra par excellence.

Vyavahdra Ratnatraya is constituted by Darsana Jnana and

Charitra which are based upon Pardtattvds or objective ideals. Belief
in an objective diwnity independent of our Self for example, would
be Vyavahara Darsana. Knowledge of such alien entities would be
Vyavahara knowledge and attempting to realise our ideals and
aspirations through the help of such alien personlities either

through sacrifices or propiciations is Vyavahara Charitra. These three

constitute Vyavahdra Ratnatraya.
The five Labdhis referred to in theGatha are, (1) Kshdyopasama
Labdhi, (2) Desana Labdhi, (3) Prayogya Labdhi, (4) V isudhalabdhi,
and (5) Karanalabdhi.

3W?£Hrc: Jivakanda, gatha 650.

To Samsari Jiva there is continuous fruition of old and existing

Karmas and combination with novel and incoming Karmas. On
account of this Karmic encircling their should be no chance for such a
Jiva to realise its pure and perfect form independent of Karmic effects.
Then how can we talk of Moksha cr Emancipation for Samsari Jivus
or the worldly souls ?

By way of reply to this objection from the desciple the Master

says " You have seen this in your experience— that a hero watches
:

* Sanskrit rendering :
 pa NchAstikAya sa ma ya sAra . 7 17

for an opportunity for vanquishing his enem)'. Whenever the

-enemy is in his minimum strength on account of several reasons, the
hero without losing the chance carefully prepares for the struggle t

making use of his mature deliberation and select instruments. Thus

is the enemy vanquished."

Similary Samsari Jiva embarrassed by ancient as well as fresh

Karmic enemies patiently waits for an opportune moment. As a
natural consequence of Karmic matter duration rrny come to an end ;

or its intensity and fertility may be declining to minimums. At

that moment the Bhavya Jiva which is patiently aspiring for spiritual
grea:ness, strikes with vehemence and vanquishes the enemy. This
suppression of Karmas at their weakest moment is Kshayopasama
Labdhi No. 1.

After this initial assertion of spiritual independence their may

.appear a change of disposition in the nature of Jiva which may there-
after be hankering for good. This hankering for good may manifest in
good and useful conduct (p""ya.) ; and as such it may be the
•condition for Punya Karma Asrava. Nevertheless the declension of
the disposition towards good is Viswdha Labdhi No. 2.

Then with this changed disposition Jiva may have the good
fortune to obtain a master who would instruct him in the path This
instruction m;iy lead to the removal of ignorance and error and to the
acquisition of Jiiana. This may guarantee progress for the Jiva along
the rungs of spiritual ladder. This good fortune of obtaining
instruction is Upadesa Labdhi. (Desana) No 3.

The duration and intensity of some Karmas may go on mutually

.aggravating each other to their maximum. After reaching the
maximum they have to decline of their own accord. This declining
stage of Karmas after reaching maximum is another opportunity
known as Prayogyata Labdhi (co-relative of Karmic glow) No. 4.

Again after reaching a certain stage in the spiritual develop-

ment — Gur.asthdnds, their may appear certain psychic instruments,
e. g. t
Sukladhyana. This attainment of spiritual instruments and
other supernormal powers is known as Karana Labdhi No. 5.

These are the Labdhis or attainments which a Jiva by good

fortune may secure
f18 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JA1XAS.

These Labdhis are net to be confounded with what are known

as Niiva Kevala Labdhis. Nine attainments about the time of
Kevala jilana.

At the Kevali stage of development the following facts happen

to the person.

1. The all penetrating Kevila J nana which is the result of annihil-

ation of the veil of knowledge.

The all illuminating

2. perception or Kevala Darsana or
Kshdyaka Darsana which is ; also the concomitant of the destruction

of the veil of perception.

3. The all-merciful attitude of the great spiritual Harmony

known as Kshdyika Abhaya Da nam,
4. Even after relinquishing all kinds of good and nourishment,
in order to maintain the Sarira for a time there is the incoming
or assimilation of subtle physical principles This is Kshdyika Ldbha
gain or income after Kshdyika state.

5. Then this happy events introduced by Indias such as

showing flowers over head is Kshayika Bhoga. This is the consequence
of complete annihilation of Bhogantaraya Karma,
6. Similary the introduction of Simhasana, (Lion thrones)
Chattra, Chamara, etc., (umbrella, etc,) is Kshdyikaupabhoga which
is the consequence of destruction of Upbhogantaraya Karma,

7. Then the realisations of Omnipotence. Ananta vir'xya which

is the result of complete eradication of Viryantaray Karma,
8. Then by this complete destruction of the seven inula prakritis
(fundimental Karmas) happens Kshdyika S.unyaktvam Absolute
Belief in the true nature of Reality.

9. And finally Kshdyika Chdritra. This 'mplies the absolutely

self-determined thought activity of the pure and perfect person
Siddha or Arhanta. . This thought activity is again the consequence
of absolute emancipation from all Upddhis.

The former class of Labdhis is always referred to as Pancha

Labdhi's and the latter as Navakevala Labdhis in Sastras in order to

avoid confusion. Therefore it is not necessary to emphasise the

difference further.
 —

PANChAsTIKAyA-SAMAYAsArA. 7T9

It is enough to remember that Pancha Labdhis have reference to

[Sam sari Jiva,) and Navakevala Labdhi to Xhikta J'va.

114.

Then Vyavahara Samyak Darsana is described.

114. If a person who thus with great interest believes in

the Padarthas revealed by Jina obtains Mati Jnana. Then in
his case the term Darsanika " he is a believer " has relevency.

Commentary.
To believe in the real nature of yltma and other Padarthas is

Vyavah&ra Samyaktva. Conventional or relative belief. This is the

popular means of attaining salvation. The real immediate condition
of salvation is the suppression or Annihilation of the Sapta Prakritis ox
seven fundamental kinds of Karmic matter.

These are :

1. Anantanubandhi Krodha.
2. Anantanubandhi Mana.
3. Anantanubandhi Maya.
4. Anantanubandhi Lobha.
5. Samyaktva.

6. Mithyatva.

7. Samyak Mithyatva.

These seven constitute the Sapta Prakritis. The Prakritis 1 to 4

are sub-divisions of Charitra Mohaniya and the other three of Darsana
Mohaniya.

If these get abated then there is the chance for Samyak Darsana
or right belief.
115.

Then the description of the nature of the three Jewels or

Ratnatraya.
 —

120 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIXAS.

^tRt! ^?TOT3t fii^g f%^*n*TTW II ^H II*

115. Belief in the real existences or Tattvas is the right

faith. Knowledge of their real nature without doubt or error is

right knowledge. An attitude of neutrality without desire or

aversion towards the objects of the external world is right
conduct. These three are found in those who know the
pach.
Commentary.
The Gatha may be interpreted either as referring to Vyavahdra
Ratnatraya or to Niftchaya Ratnatraya. The description of the three
jewels may be consistent with the relative path or with the absolute
path.

In describing Samyak Darsana and Samyak Jnana right belief and

knowledge, the author indicates the nine Padarthas which are the
objects of the said belief and knowledge. The Second Book mainly
treats of the nine Padarthas; And the description of the
Ratnatraya may be considered as an indirect introduction to- the
Padarthas which are :

1. Jiva = life.
2. Ajiva = non-life.
3. Papa = sin.
4. Punya = virtue.
5. Asrava= flow-in of Karmas.
6. Samvara = the prevention of the incoming Karmas.
7. Nirjara = eradication of Karmas.

8. Bandha = bondage.
9. Moksha=» liberation or emancipation.
The first two are the primary Padarthas and the others are deriva-
tive.

^Sanskrit rendering :
 paXchAstikAya-sauayasAra. 121

116.
Of the nine Padarthas or categories Moksha is the most important
as ,t .s the goal of life. Hence. Ratnatraya which is the means to
reahse the goal was first described. Then the nine categories or
rad&rthas are enumerated in detail.

116. Life and non-life (Jiva and Ajiva) are

the two primary
Padarthas. Out of these appear righteousness (Punya) sin
(Papa), their source or inflow (Asrava) their prevention
(Saravara) their partial annihilation (NirjarA) Bondage
(Bandha) and Salvation (Moksha). '
These are the niL
uRe
Padarthas.

Commentary.
Of these Jiva or life alone has consciousness.
Ajiva is so called
because of the absence of consciousness.
These are the five Dravva,
mentioned previously matter, space,
condition of motion and
that of
rest and hnally tune. These five constitute the
non-life. Life and
non-life are the root Padarthas. Seven other Padarthas
enumerated
above originate from the different relations
of Jiva to p,,<feak or
* OI
matter. '

Purity of thought in self is the subjective righteousness

Punya. As conditioned by
or BMva
this there is the
corresponding objective
righteousness of Karmic matter, or Dravya Punya. Similarly
evil
thought or the impurity of the heart is
known as subjective sin or
Bhava Papa. As the result of this there is
the Karmic matter
or
Dravya Papa, whose nature is vicious. The
appearance of lust
desire,and aversion, is the subjective influx of Karmas, Bhavasrava'
As the concomitent of these affective states Karmic matter flows in
towards the soul, which flowing Dravyasrava or the physical
is
^current of Karmas. Suppressing the states of lust, desire, and
aversion

'Sanskrit rendering :
722 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JA1NAS.
the subjective inhibition or preven-
by the principle of renunciation
is

tion which is Bhdva Samvara. This refers to the closing up of the

spring of evil thought as the

concomitant of this Psychic inhibition

of evil, there appears the

withering a* ay of Karmic matter which is
stupor, desire, and aversion, these
Dravya Nirjard. Moha or spiritual
proneness, towards Karmic matter in the
bring about a characteristic
environment is
nature of Jiva. This proneness towards the Karmic
disposition which spins out a cocoon of evil
of the nature of Psychic
This Bhdva Bandha. On account
is
thoughts enshrouding the self.

results the settling in of Karmic matter on the

of this disposition there
This is objective bondage or Dravya Bandha. Lastly realisation
Jiva.
and perfect self after complete emancipation from evil
of the purest
Moksha. The absolute annihila-
is the subjective salvation or Bhava
Jiva from the physical
liberation of
tion of Karmic matter and the
or Dravya Moksha. In all these
shackles is the objective Moksha
and the Dravya aspects to
c ases the Bhava aspects refer to Jiva
matter.
117

Then the duality of Jiva the first of the Padarthas.

sfan ^to^it fa^^T ^<n«**n ^fafr i

Having the nature of consciousness, characterised

117.
by Upayoga— faculties of perception
and understanding, Jivas
areof 'two kinds. One incarnate of the world and the other ;

discarnate of heaven.
Commentary.
and manifestation through per-
Chetana or conscious nature its

characteristics of all
ception and understanding are the intrinsic
Samsari Jivas and Mukta Jivas.
Jivas which are of two classes.
Jivas are always
The fomer has the limitation of Upadhis, Samsari
some kind of body, gross or subtle. The Muktojwa
associated with

* Sanskrit rendering:

3fcrr. *tarcwt flifNji; ^n?w*t ftfsw- \

 paKchAstikAya-sama yasAra. 123

is free from such bodily limitations, because of complete emancipa-

tion from material conditions Karmic and non-Kiirmic. Asa result
of Upddkis, Chetana and Vpayoga of the former get limited and
encircled and as a result of the destruction of Upadhis the very same
become perfect and pure in the case of Siddhas.

The five kinds of Sariras have already been mentioned.

118.

Samsari souls are again twofold — fixed ones and the moving ones.
The fixed ones or the Sthdvara Jivas are here described.

118. Vitalised by Jivas are the following bodies: — Earth,

water, fire, air, and also plants. These are many in number.
They yield to their respective Jivas only one kind of feeling
contact; and that too associated with highly intensified stupor
of ignorance

Commentary.
This Gatha refers to Ekendriya Jivas. Jivas having only one
sense. These as a result of their Karmic intensity may degenerate to
such an extent as to be associated with the live kinds of physical
objects enumerated above. Earth, water, fire, air and plants.
These kinds of physical objects are used as bodies by these Jivas.
There is no difficulty in understanding the organic nature of the
plant world especially after the discoveries of Dr. Bose, it is not
necessary to elaborately defend that plants are living organisms. But
the organic nature of the other four kinds, earth, water, fire and air,

is somewhat obscure. The commentators themselves do not help

us in the difficulty, so much so, that some of the European Scholars
who have studied Jainism have come to the conclusion that Jainism
is very primitive since it believes in the existence of souls in material

and inorganic things. This argument of the existence of primitive

*\Sanskrit rendering :

1$fa ^r§ mssrpr *<tst scj^t sifa ^ am 11 \ \* 11

124 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

beliefs in Jaina system is brought forward in favour of the antiquity

of Jainism. Certainly it is very pleasing to be assured of a hoary past ;

but it is no compliment to Jainism if its beliefs are identified with the

primitive notions of the Hottentot.

It is almost incredible to believe that Jaina thinkers with their

uncompromising dualistic attitude accepted the doctrine that
Achetana physical objects had souls of their own. The definitions
of Jiva and Pudgala are clearly unmistakable. There is no possibility
of any confusion. Mutually they are as much contradictory to a
Jaina thinker as to a cartecian philosopher.

The clue to the difficulty is supplied by the doctrine that the

four kinds of Ekendriya jivas associated with fire, air, earth and
water are Sukshma Ekendriya Jivas, i e., microscopic organisms
having only one sense. That the Jainas believed in the existence of
microscopic organisms needs no elaborate evidence. The rules of
conduct prescribed for Jaina Grahastas and Yatis are sufficient testi-

mony. Again this interpretation is further strengthened by the

following point. All the five kinds of Sthavani Jivas are considered
to have four kinds of Pranas or life principles.

1. Feelings of Contact.

2. Kayabala Ptdna or strength of body.

3. Uclthvdsa Nischvasa Pr&na or respiration.

4. Ayuh Prdnd or duration of life.

To suppose that these four Pranas are associated with really

inorganic bodies would be inconsistent with the other aspects of the

system. Therefore it is incumbent upon us to emphasize that the

Jivas associated with inorganic bodies are mainly Sukshma Ekendriya
Jivas or microscopic organisms ; for it is only with an organism that

Pranas can be consistently associated.

This does not remove all our difficulties. Whether there can be
organisms associated with fire is still an unintelligible problem. We
don't want to dogmatise on the matter. Evidently for the sake
of symmetry fire is added on to the enumeration of the other kinds
of physical forms. We can only confess that the doctrine for want
of sufficient light from the commentators remains a very obscure
part of Jaina thought leading to strange conjectures, Where there
 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 125

is scope for speculation we beg to offer our own Hypothesis as an

alternative interpretation.
119.

These have monosensic and non Psychic vitalism.

^^^^f^f^TSTtaT TjTTfl^T vrfai^T II ^* # II

119. These Jivas such as the earth-bodied ones are of five

different castes. All of them are devoid of mental states.
They have a single sense. So are they described in the
scripture.
Commentary.
The author points out that these Sthdvara Jivas are utterly
devoid of Psychic states. They have only one kind of feeling of contact.
This description indicates a difference between the botanical and
the zoological realms and the Sukshma Ekendriyus or the microscopic
organisms of the four Uinds also share the nature of the plant world.

120
Though devoid of mental states they are not non-conscious in
essence. Really they are to be considered as unconscious but not
non-conscious. The author explains by illustration their unconscious
nature.
#
a i^r ^r^^fT Ti*w?€n vntivw sr st^ttstt i

snfWTT rnfT^RT ^faT Tpff^T %m II

\^o llf

120. Just as life or Chetaua is associated with unconscious-

ness in the following cases eggs, foetus growing in mother's
womb and the man in a trance so also the monosensic

^Sanskrit rendering :

^Sanskrit rendering :•
—
 ——

126 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

organisms are unconscious, though having life or Chetana.

Thus be it understood.
Commentary.
The author establishes that these monosensic beings have life

and also potential Chetana or consciousness. It is ordinarily

acknowledged that there is life and consciousness in the germ in the

case of eggs, foetuses, and in men in trance. Here unconsciousness

is no objection to the belief of their living nature. Similarly these
monosensic organisms though devoid of consciousness have life and
potensy for consciousness.
121.

Then the author by way of illustration enumerates some of the

organisms having two sense organs.

141.Sea snail, cowrie shell fish, conch shell fish, mother

o'pearl and earth-worm are organisms which have two
senses, touch and taste. Hence are they bisensic.
122.

Then author enumerates some of the organisms having three

senses.

122. The louce, the bug, the red and ordinary scorpion,
the ant and other insects have three senses are triacsthetic.

* Sanskrit rendering :

K\*fel **f *7ST ^^ SCtforgp sfcff: II IRK II

'
Sanskrit rendering :
 ——

paNchAstikAyasamayasAra. m
123.

Then the author enumerates some of the organisms having four

senses.

123. Again, the Gadfly, the mosquito, the fly, the bee, the
beetle and the dragon fly and the butterfly — These organisms
experience, touch, taste, smell and sight hence they are
quadraesthetic — have four senses.
124.

Then the beings with five senses, are enumerated.

124. Devas, human beings, hell beings, and higher animals

all these have five senses; colour, taste, smell, touch and
sound. Some of the animals arc water animals, some land
animals and some birds of the air. There are very strong
ones also among these.
Commentary.
The classification of Jivds according to sense organs is based
more upon the behaviour of insects and animals, than on the structure.
In the case of bisensic insects given in Gatha 121, the classification

seems to be correct. Taking the sea snail for example it has touch all

over the body and very sensitive in the tentacles on the head. It has
no tongue but the base of the respiratory organs determines the kind
of water that should enter the respiratory chamber. The mobile lips

* Sanskrit rendering :

*<f *ST ^ TOT *Tfl J^sfa 3TT*f?rT II l^\ ||

Sanskrit rendering :
128 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE jAINAS.

of the snail also act as gustatory organs. There is no special auditory

organ but there is an organ in the foot, called the otocyst which
enables the creature to keep its balance in the water. This evidently
corresponds to the semicircular canals of the human ear whose func-
tiors is to determine the positions of our body in space. General v I

they have some sensitive parts to light also, but this is not considered
as an eye by the author. Cowrie, conch, and mother of pearl do have
and ordinary earth-worms also have the sense of
similar structures
contact and some kind of gustatory sense. In their case also the
skin is sensitive to light, but it is treated as insignificant.

Next in the case of organisms with three senses the enumeration

contains some dubious specimens. The louce and the bug have the
sense of touch, taste and smell. Ants also have these three senses.
But some of them have sight also. Hut ordinarily their sense of

smell is the most predominent. Lord Avebury Sir John Lubbock after

seve-ral years of patient observation comes to the conclusion that ants

become aware of objects in the environment only through smell. But
in the case of caterpillars and scorpions there are eyes. But anyhow
they are included under this class.

In the next class are include i the mosquitoes, flies, bees, etc.

These insects have clearly four senses. Contact, taste, smell and
sinht. But in the case of some for example, beetle and the bee a
peculiar humming sound is produced. Naturalists suppose that these

insects must respond to sound and they have some organ in the
abdomen which is supposed to be responsive to sound vibrations.
Whether what they experience is sound or some other vague sensation
of contact nobody can be certain. Therefore ive may take the
author's description as almost accurate. Lastly many of the higher

animals and human beings are included under the next class, five

sensed organisms. They have also sense of hearing to boot. But

the distinction between other higher animals and human beings is

that the latter have a well developei consciousness. These are

Samanasfa Panchendriya Jiv.is, where as the other Panchsndriya
Jivas are devoid of mind. Evidently the distinction implies the
presence of self-consciousness in the one class and the absence of the

same in the other.

125.

Then the author enumerates the several subspecies of the four

 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 129

fundamental kinds of Jivas already

differentiated according^TthT
four gat is. 5

125. Devas are of four classes. Human

beings are of two
classes. Inhabitants of Kanna Bhoomiznd
those of Bk$a
Bhoomi. Animals are of numerous kinds. Hell beings of
seven according to their respective
regions.

Commentary.
This
Gatha presupposes the peculiar Jaina
cosmogony. Accord-
ing to the Jainas
Lokd is arranged in three orders, the
lower world
the m.ddle world and the upper
world. In the upper world there
are different regions one above
the other, so lower world also in the
The different regions of the
upper world are inhabited by
Devas •

the different legions of the lower

world one below the other are
inha
bited by beings thrown into hell. The conception is something ana-
logus to that of Dante.

This Gatha classifies jivds according to the principle of

gati, i.e.,
the principle of gatimdrgana. But the previous gathds had the
clasification according to the principle of sense organs or Indriya
Margand.
Devas are said to be of four kinds: —
Vide— Tattvdrthd Sutra Chapter IV, Bhavanavasis, Vyantaras,
Jyotishkas, kalpavasis, or Vaimanikas. Each class is further sub-
divided into several species. Each subclass has its own special
characteristics physical and Psychical, and has the characteristic periods
of life. It is not possible to enter into the details.

The hell beings are seven. According to the hells inhabited by

them. The seven hells are, Ratna Prabha, Sarkara Prabha, Valuka,
Pattka, Dhuma, Tama, and Maha Tama. The hell beings again
have their respective characteristics of suffering, age, and other
*
Sanskrit rendering ;
—
 —

HO THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

characteristics with graduated intensity. These

Psycho-physical
classes of beings are only of doctrinal
importance to us.
two
classifica-
Coming to human beings and animals the principle of
tion is much simpler. The animals are recognised to be of numerous
species, and human beings again are
divided into two classes those

born in Karma Bhoomi and those born in

Bhoga Bhoomi. This
is again only the result of the peculiar geography
classification

of the Jaina system. Geography and cosmogany form an important

branch of Jaina Literature. It is one of the four Anuyogas. Jainas
Pratha-
recognise four main departments of their Scripture. (1)

mdnuyoga dealing with the life of the Tirthankaras and the other
great personalities. (2) Karatta nutty oga dealing with the structure
and constitution of Lokd, the cosmos. (3) Charandnuyoga, dealing
householder as well as
with principles of conduct prescribed for the
Sannydsi. (4) Dravyanuyoga dealing
with the metaphysical aspects
Dravyas,
of reality. Jainas whenever they speak of Jivas and other
their
always assume the special constitution of the world according to
more detailed knowledge of these things is desired
religious dogma. If

reference must be made to treatises on Lokaswarupa or the form of

the world.
126.

the different Gati Marganas, are not

Jivas described according to
state permanently. Jivas undergo
to be supposed to maintain that
different states of existence with the
several modifications assuming
Thus do they roam about in Samsara.
different durations of life.

\»

126. When the existing Karmas determining the gatl

into another
and the age of zjiva, decay, then that Jiva get
gati with a different duration of life as
determined by its last

conative state or aspiration known as Lesyd.

^Sanskrit rendering :
 paRchAstikAya-samayasAra. 131

Commentary.
The Gati
or state of existence of a particular
Ji»a is determined
by a particular Karma known as
Gatinamakarma. So is the dura-
tion of a particular Jiva determined by Ayuh Karma. When these
two Karmas exhaust themselves to the very
last then age of the Jiva
will come to an end and the
Jiva has to change its state of existence
i.e. it have to enter into another Uati with a
will
different duration
of life. This entrance into the next state
is generally determined
by Karmas acquired during the
lifetime. But the fundamental
factor which immediately determines
the passage into the other stage
must be determined by Gatinamakarma
and Ayuh Karma of the
succeeding stage. Jiva before quitting a particuler Gati
acquires
these two fresh Karmas determined by the last conative state or Lesya.
The term Lesya is used not in its usual sense. Jn this place it
implies merely the particular activity of Yoga or Mana, vachana,
kaya, manifesting in the l.st desire or aspiration of life. This'
lesya may be pure or
impure according to the ideal aimed at.
And
according to its value it forms the two Kaunas
in their pure form or
impure form. According to the determining
antecedent Karmas the
Jiva incarnates in a particular place with a
particular body and with
particular Psycho-physical development. Thus he may have a
pleasant life or drag on a miserable existence.

127.
But the Samsdric cycle is not eternal for
Jiva. On account of
Labdhis or lucky spiritual attainments a Jiva may
realise the three
jewels. Then it may free itself from Kdrmic matter as gold is
puri-
fied from drops. Then it is the pure self.

127. These different classes of Jivas are again said to be

of two kinds: incarnate ones and discarnate ones. The latter
are Siddhas whereas (the former) are the samsari souls who
;

are again of two species Bhavyas and Abhaviyas.

^Sanskrit rendering :

^f factor fasrf: vrn: ^fsnftjjjtevrs'nr^ 11 \w \\

132 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

Commentary.
Here the author summarises the nature of Jims. The first princi-

ple of division is the possession of a body. All the incarnate ones

are said to be Samsari Jivas and all the discarnate once are Siddha
Jivas or pure souls. But the former class is ogain sub-divided the ;

principle of division being the capacity to become perfect. Those

Samsari Jivas which have this capacity under special opportunities
are called Bhavyas whereas those Samsari Jivas which have no such
capacity are called Akhavyas.

This distinction of Samsari Jivas into Bhavyas and Abhavyas

corresponds to Drummond's division of souls into organic and inorganic.
The organic souls, given the proper opportunity, have the capacity
to develop and attain spiritual perfection ; whereas inorganic ones have
no such capacity of spiritual growth This is one of the Jaina reli-

gious dogmas whose metaphysical basis is not quite clear. Most

probably the distinction is as arbitrary as that of Drummond's.

128.

The five senses and the six bodies examined above are not essential
elements of Jiva.

nr f| if^nfar stHt wim w*i ^q*m q^Tn \

3? %^ % *ini sfttt far *t rf wlfa n \yz m

128. The five senses andfthe six kinds of bodies mentioned
above these are not of the essence of soul. Whatever in the
midst of these manifests as consciousness that they call
by the name Jiva.
Commentary.

The sense organs and the various bodies are associated with Jiva

only from the conventional point of veiw. The very same characteris-
tics are really its accidental
adjuncts. Senses such as touch taste, etc.

as earth body, etc., are not Jiva, because they have

and bodies such

*Sanskrit rendering :

q^rfci ^i wisf *fte %fa * cfrswiqfcr ii \K$ n

 paSchAstikAyasamayasAra. 133

nothing ,„ common with the thought which is the true nature of

1 f
°' th6Se '"" 0rga ' >3 Md ^^ —Won. there
J iva .

TT"
is

^
Princio,"
°' "hich sheds
ohlet f mamfeStSas kn0
light upoa
of 'he subject and the
itself and other
ThTt'wr
That thinking thing t is said to be Jiva or soul.
object.

129.
Then theauthor mention,
•eristics W h,ch distinguish Ji„ a
the special characteristics
f rom material and
^ ^J
at Jiva, charnc.

\^r :

129. What knows and perceives the various objects

desires pleasure and dreads pain, acts beneficially or
harmfully'
and expenences the fruit thereof-that is Jiva.

Commentary.
G <!' /"\ th
Whit „
What
1' 3

i" mentioned V har!CteriStiC

to be conscionsness in the
behavi0Ur ° f '*«
previous OdlHa
is Scribed.
is here
indicated by several purposeful activities which have meaning only
«.th reference to consciousness. Perception and understanding
of objects are the function of
Jlvd or conscionsness. This function
cannot be associated with matter.
So also is the tendency to desire
pleasure and to avoid pain. It is distinctly the nature of life to con-
tinue beneficial activity and to
discontinue harmful activity.
Such
conduct can
have reierence
reference only
nnlv t^ t;.i t
'
to Jiva. Inorganic
,

mechanical
activity can never exhibit such
purposive nature. These various ins
tances of purposeful activity as againstmechanical activity clearly
mark out Jiva from the other Dravyas. The , hole gathd then
may be taken as the definition of Jiva through its behaviour.
130.
h SUmmariseS the characteristics of
the ?!
* >? Kf T J lv d Padartha in
first ha l
of the Gdtha and introduces the other Padartkas
in the
second half.

Sanskrit rendering \

*TRTfa <r^far snffa^fa 4\m fzfifo g^ t

134 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

130. Thus having seen the nature of Jiva through the

numerous and distinct characteristics, well do thou grasp the
nature of non-life that is absolutely of non-thinking- nature.
Commentary.
The author generalises the characteristics of Jiva. Jiva and its

modifications were studied under different principles of Gunasthana

and Marganasthaiia. In all these multifarious changes there is the
one constant character of Jiva -consciousness or thought. Thought
may exist in its impure form in Samsara and in its pure and perfect
form is Moksha. Whether pure or impure chetana is the fundamen-
tal nature of life. Before introducing the other Padarthas the author
emphasizes the fact that consciousness should not be associated

with Ajiva or non-life. The absence of consciousness is the mark

of Ajivd. Its activity or change is purely mechanical and
non-teleological. We are asked to remember this fundamental na-
ture of Ajiva before the author describes the A jiva Pa dart ha or non-

life. Thus ends the chapter on Jiva Padartha i

131 . Chapter on Ajiva Padaitha.

Then the author enumerates the different Ajiva Padarthas Taking

absence of consciouness as the mark of Ajiva.

^ftf Sr^Trf *fa3 sftcTC* ^<i|^T II \l\ «|

131. Space, time, matter, the principle of motion and
that of r^st, these have no life principle in them. They are
absolutely without consciousness. There is thought or cons-
ciousness only in Jiva.

^Sanskrit rendering :

qsnrfaTJFq 5fte*r?*icfa <™f§sf§$: i

^Sanskrit rendering :

*WW%?Hr<f Hfigtf "*fto«l %<T5WJ II %%\ II

 paRchAstikA\a.samayasAra. 135

Commentary.
Consciousness is not the only reality.
There are several Achelana
or nonconsctous entities which
are grouped under
Aitva Padartha.
In this respect jama thought
is fundamentally distinct from
the
.deal sm w h,ch admits the
reality of only one thing,
consciousness.
One tendency m philosophic thought
tries to reduce
everything to
consciousness. The other tendency tries to
maintain that matter
alone ,s real and everything
is unreal and derivative. Both these
extremes are avoided by Jaina thought.
There are conscious entities
as well as non-conscious entities
constituting the system of
reality.
This Gatha is said to be the condemnation
of the advalic view-
that everything is Brahma.
132
In this Gallia the author evDlains n-h»t
? *' Aa °h °""""™
t ,

°' "on-
consciousness means

132 Wherever such attributes of life

are never found as
the ^^Pleasu r& and pain, desiring only
the

ones caJJ "1

a„ Apva
aV °' d,nS
^
or non-life.
harmfuI ^^ that
beneficial
the wise

Commentary.

fha winch has not got the fundamental characteristics of

"e
T
life
te

,
1
activity
t Z-
and avoiding harmful
fee ' ing P,eaSUre
activity.
'
?ain - -"tinning be Lficiai
Whate'veris devofd
of th s
characteristics ,s Ajiva. This may be taken as negative
definition

133

Sanskrit rendering :

TO * fes£ fori x„ w <f

ftfrtfft ( ir< „
136 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

133. From, structure, colour, taste, touch, smell and

sound, these are associated with matter. They are again of
various kinds. They are either attributes or modes of matter.

Commentary.
The physical attributes are colour, taste, smell,sound and touch.
again of many kinds. Configuration or form is
Each of these is
physical objects.
innumerable according to the different forms of
Combination or structure is of infinite kinds The structure of

referred to. These are modes of

skandhas from two atoms onwards is

may be organic related to life or

matter. These modifications
distinct from life so also
inorganic. Just as the inorganic matter is

this organic matter distinct from it though associated with it.

134
are not to be associated
If form, structure and other characteristics
with Jiva than what is the real nature of Jiva.

taste,
134. Understand that life has no sense qualities of
It has no form either. It has
smell colour, touch and sound.
only thought or consciousness.
Commentary.
with matter are not present
The several sense qualities associated
perception.
in Jiva. Jiva or not to be apprehended through sense
life is
sense qualities for
not to be inferred through any of
its
Its nature is

Sanskrit rendering :

*
Sanskrit rendering :

wsftaftw xvq *^Bh«Nrt II W II

 pa$chAstikAya-sauayasAra. 137

it has no such attributes. Again it has no form corresponding to

that of physical objects. Jiva is formless being spiritual. Such are
the characteristics of life and consciousness.
Thus ends the Ajiva Padarthi.

135, 136 & 137.

After describing the primary

categories of life and non-life the
author goes to seven other
derivative PaJarthas, originating
from
either the synthesis or analysis
of the two primary ones.
Jiva and
Karmtc matter are the primary generating
categories for the rest.
Hence these two are taken up here for
examination.

y>0 f>

I
v~\ f»

13^-7. To a Jiva in Samsfira desire and aversion

will
naturally occur. On account of these states Karmic
matter
clings to the y/,^. The ^r«fc bondage leads the /*W through
he four Gabs or states of existences.
Entering into the Gati
Jiva builds up its own appropriate body; being embodied he'
gets the senses. Through the sense objects of the
environment
are pursued. From perception appears desire or aversion
towards those objects and from desire the cycle begins again.

'Sanskrit rendering :

<lf^rmr**T <*jf%r *s?fa *Tfa$ jt%:

H \\*i ,|

^3 fsmsrstf Z7ft TAzft *u H\ %i ,| 9\\ ||

 138 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

Thus desire brings Kay ma, Karma leads to gati, gati, means
body, body implies senses, senses lead to perception, and
perception again to desire or aversion and so on adinfinitum.
But the cycle ends in the case of Bhavyajiva whereas it is
unending to the Abhavyas. But it has no beginning in either
case. Thus is it taught by the Jina, the conqueror of Samsdra.

Commentary.
The author describes the causal series that constitute the cycle of

Samsara Jioa according to Jaina doctrine is enshrowded by Kdrmic

conditions from eternity. On account of this association with
Kdrmic matter Jiva experiences the emotional states of desire,

etc , These emotional states are conditioned by the Kdrmic

ubddhis. But these states in their turn bring about the

acquisition of fresh Kdrmic matter. The acquisition of Kdrmic matter

means that the Jiva should manifest in any one of the four gatis.
Manifestation means embodied existence. Body implies sense organs.

Sense organs again are the windows for the soul to apprehend the
environment. Awareness of the objects in the environment generates
the affective states in the soul. These affective states once again
begin the series of the above mentioned causal series.
Thus by the mutual interaction between mind and matter there
appears the C)de of Samsara. In the case of the fortunates ones

wild are capable of spiritual emancipation this whirligig comes to an

end. But in the case of the unfortunate ones who are incapable
of spiritual sdvation the cycle goes on for ever.

138
THEN THE CHAPTER ON PUNYA AND PiPA
OR VIRTUE AND VICE.
After describing the veil of samsara which is the condition of the
nine catagories or padarthas the author examines Punya and Papa
and their respective Psychic antecedents.

sftft xuft Tf€t fafrrorft sf 5R5 vnqfN i

Sanskrit rendering :
 PA NGHAsTIkAya.SA MA YASARA . 139

138. Whatever Jiva has in himself Moha corrupting the

faculty of belief, desire and aversion, or the purity of thought
is subject to the hedonic state of happiness or
misery.

Commentary.
The Psychological conditions determining virtue and vice are des-
cribed. Moha is the mental state brought about
by the ripening of
Banana Mohaniya Karma, Tiie Karma that clouds the faculty of
perception and
belief. R aga and Dvcsha, desire and aversion, 'are
»he result of Oharitra Mohaniya The karma that misleads the will
while the former misleads cognition
Thus when cognition and will are
determined by the Karmic conditions they
may manifest in Volitional
states marked by virtue or vice. If the objects
of cognition and
will is desirable and good then the
mental state is Subha Parinan>a
If it is undesirable and bad then
the mental state is Asubha
Pari-
nama. In the former case there results
happiness to the individual
whereas in the latter misery.

139
Next the author describes the subjective
states of good and evil
Bhava Punya Paba and their corresponding karmic conditions
or
Dravya Punya Papa.

5** fimft T" 1

* s»3ffr <"*fa ¥*f* sfcrc* i

139. Good will or

pure thought is righteousness.
wil or evil thought is sin.
Bad
Conditioned by these two
mental
states of the J,va the classes of
karmic molecules which
are
physical in nature undergo
modifications and manifest ..
Dravya karmas such as jiUnavarniya.

Commentary.
Pure thought
is Bhdva Punya.
This conditions Dravya
Punya
theKarmic matter facilitating the purity of the
heart. Evil thought
s Bhava PS fa sinning in t he heart.
This conditions the Dravya
Sanskrit rendering :
140 THE SACKED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

Papa which aggrevates the evil disposition of the soul. Thus from
the Psychic conditions which are amurta their resuit the different

Cdrtnic modifications which are physical and murta, Thus the Bhdva
karmas and the Dravya karmas are mutually interacting.
140
He establishes that karmic matter is physical in nature and
therefore

^t^r
is

^T ***** ^ fWR ^T%Tf

*pf
Murta.

<§^ rnsn ^HTfar wzrvn \\\m\*

^ ftlH* I

140. Because the fruits of karma the objects of happiness

or misery are experienced by Jiva through tbe sensations of
touch, etc , therefore the kannaa are physical and MUrta.
Commentary.
The fruit of karma is either a desirable or an undesirable object
pleasant or unplea eut to the jiva This object is experienced through
sensa perception. Senses are physical, obje: ts apprehended through
the sense organs are aho physical. Therefore the karmic effects ;-re

physical and Murta. Cau-e and effect are identical. Therefore the
author concludes that the karmas themselves are physical and Murta.
Since their effects are physical Of course this refers to Dravya
karmas.
141
Karmas past or present are physical and Murta. Samsari Jiva,
because of its Karma? is also physical and Murta. Hence there is

the chance for fresh accretion of Karmas. Hence the liability to

continued bondage.

St^f *|f%f%<ff^[ *ITff^ ft frf| 3*»Tff| *W«t

141. Past Karma which is physical in nature comes into
contact with the present Karma which is also physical in
nature.

^Sanskrit rendering :

t Sanskrit rendering :

tj4: sssifcr i^xf ijttt q^fa «r*OT3**rfa i

 paXchAstikAyasama yasAra. 141

Thus existing
K&rmic matter enters into combination
with
incoming Karmic matter. Jiva though
in itself spiritual
and Amurta is certainly corporeal (in
its Samsdric state)
because of its coeval Karmas. Therefore it absorbs the fresh
K&rmice matter and is absorbed by that
(because of mutual
attraction of molecules
)
Commentary.
Gdtha the autlv r explains how there could
In th?s
be a contact
between Jiva and Karma which a e Amurta and Mdrta
respectively.
That there is the possibility of combination among physical
molecules is accepted by all and it is a fundamental presupposition of
Jaina thought that Jiva is in Samsara to start with, i. e. it is from time
immemo ial associated with K&rmic matter. Because of this associated
Karma, Jiva itself has body and i* Murta. Because of this intimate
association with Karmic matter there is the chance for fresh
bondage
and Samara. The Gdtha must be taken as an explanat on
of the
perpetuity of the Samsaric cycle. Given the initial presupposition
that Jiva in its natural state exists in
Karmic bondage then we can
understand the reason for the samdric
cycle from bondage to Gati and
Gatt to bondage and so on. The
series of causality is
certainly
assumed to be infinite i.e. without beginning
though it may come to an
end with the emancipation. An
infinite past is not a
mathematical
impossibility. Therefore though it is admitted
that the series may
come to an end it need not necessarily have
a beginning. Through the
infinite causal interaction
therefore, a Jiva may acquire fresh Karmas
though ,n itself it is spiritual and Amurta. Thus ends the chapter
on Punya Papa Paddrthas.
142
CHAPTER ON Asrava Paddrtha.
Asrava means the fountain source of righteousness
or sin. First
the Punyasrava or the spring of virtue is taken for description.

fMl *ifw ^^ tjmif tfcre* vmmfs uty^u*

*Sanskrit rendering :
142 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JALXAS.

Whatever Jtva has desires high and noble, thoughts

142.
based on love and sympathy and in whose mind there are no
evil impulses towards the same, the pure Ronnie matter flows

in as conditioned by the above mentioned springs of righte-

ousness. ,

Commentary.
Noble desires and thoughts of charity are the springs of right
conduct— Bhava punyasrava, as conditioned by these springs there
flows Puny a Dravya Karma pure Kdrmic matter into the soul: noble

desiresand pure thoughts, those springs of subjective righteousness

may be followed by objectively evil deeds if they have not the co-
operation of Samyak Darsana or right belief. But if those springs are
saturated with right belie! then there is no confict between subjective
states and objective conduct. The subjectively pure springs of con-
duct have the chance of being succeeded by series of right conduct
till the attainment of heavenly bliss. In ?hort subjective purity un-
accompanied by right belief will still keen the soul tied to the wheel
of life whereas the same in association with the sight belief wil

gradually lead the soul to Nirvana.

143

Then the noble desire? are i. lust rated.

Love and devotion towards Arahania, Suidha and

143.
Sadhus, living according to the rules of conduct household and
ascetic, and faithfully following the Masters., these are said to
be the noble ideals.
Commentary.
Noble noMe objects deserving of worship
ideals are associated with

and devotion. These are what areknown as the Paticha Parameshtis.

Arahantds, Siddhds, Sadhus, Acluiryds and Vpadyayds. The term
Arahanta denotes a perfected being who is still in the world, i.e., who

* Sanskrit rendering :
 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. U3
has still his bodily state. It corresponds to the term Sayogakevali,
the person who attained Kevalajfidna or perfect knowledge and who
still has Yoga or Mana vackaua. Kdya. The term Siddha
represents
the perfect soul, without the Yoga or Mana vachana Kdya, Sadhu
represents the great ones who are on the path of perfection. It
represents mainly the Ydtis who havs attained great spiritual
advancement through Tafias. Achatya represents the organiser of the
Sangham, the chief of a group of ascetics as well as the
householders.
The term Upddyhdya represents the great religious teachers whose
function it is to instruct the people, lay and ascetic, about the chief
tenets of religion and also about the rules of conduct, Reverence
and devotion to these great ones and a desire to follow the path marked
out by them constitute the noble aspiration which
leads (o Punya.

144
Then Anukmpa or charity is described.

144. If anyone moved at the sight of the thirsty,

the
hungry, and the miserable, offers relief to them, out of
pity,
then such behaviour of that person is love or charity.

Commentary.
This is the second condition generating Punya Bhava or the
good will. The act of chanty implies two things. The feeling of
sympathy at the sight of the needy and the sufferers, and secondly
active relief to them. Mere feeling of sympathy is ineffective. Active
relief as the result of the feeling of sympathy essential
is to charity.
This kind of charity is common -to the ordinary mortals and it

manifests in only temporary relief. But in the case of the wise ones
Anukampa or charity manifests in a higher form at the sight of the
struggling souls in the
ocean of Satnsara they manifest a generons
sympathy and help them towards emancipation. Thus Anukampa is of
two kinds, lower and higher according as its result is temporary and
superficial or radical and permanent.

Sans/ail rendering :
144 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS

145.

After describing the ideals and aspirations forming the positive

condition of good will, the author describes its negative condition, i.e.,

the impure emotions that are to be avoided in every way to secure the
purity of the heart or Sublia Parindma.

*ret * ^ murt *tot #w ? f*rraT%3* I

145. Whenever anger, pride, deceit, and covetousness,

appear in the mind of a ]\va they create disturbing motion,
interfering with calmness of thought. This emotional agitation
of thought is called impure thought by the wise.

Commentary.
Impurity of thought is explained to be the interference of thought
and will by grosser emotions, enumerated in the Gdtha. Freedom
from such emotional interference is also a necessary condit on
:

of

righteousness. Thus noble desires (Prasasta Kdga charity

(Anukdmpa) and freedom from impurity of the heart (Ghitta Akalush

ya) these three constitute the spring of righteousness or Pimydsrava.

146.

Then the springs of evil or Papasrava.

146. Inordinate taste for wordly things, impure emotions,

hankering for and indulging in sensual pleasures, causing
anguish to fellow beings, and slandering them openly or
covertly ; these constitute the springs of evil.

*Sanskrit rendering :

sifon sri n^t mh\ mm afoft m fe^smwa i

^Sanskrit rendering :

Uf:i?fV?TT<TT<T*T^: WIS* ^f \ ^f¥ "Stffa II \*%. II

 pa NchAstikA ya sa ma ya sAra .
145

Commentary.
The above mentioned ignoble thoughts
five
constitute the subjective
side of the springs of evil
(Bluiva Pdp* Asrava) conditioned
by these
mental states impure Karmic matter
flows into the Jiva. And this
inflow is the objective side of the evil or Dravya Pdp* Asrava, i e
there the acquisition undesirable and
is
dark physical conditons by'
Jiva on account of the above mentioned,
impurities of thought.

147.
Again the subjective springs of evil are described in detail.

147- The different animal instincts, the different soul-

soiling emotions, the tempting, senses, suffering and wrath
undesirable thoughts and corruption of the faculties of
perception and will, these constitute the springs of
evil.
Commentary,
Samjnd are the instincts ; these are—
,
Ahara Sawjnd— Preying instinct
Bhaya Samjnd— The instinct of fear.
Maithuna Samjhd~or the sexual instinct.
Parigraha Sumjhd^Tke acquisitive instinct.
These instincts are liable to generate
evil. Next.
Lesya or the soul-soiling tints.

These are six in number—

Krishna or the black,
Neela or the blue.
'
Kapota or the grey.
Peeta or the yellow.
Padma or the lotus-hued.
Stikla or the white.

Sanskrit rendering :
146 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JA1NAS.

These lesyas or the tints of the soul, perhaps denote a peculiar kind

ofAura of each soul corresponding to its grade of spiritual develop-

ment and ethical purity. Very often these tints are associated with

the different emotional states present in Jiva. Therefore this Psychic

Aura is not a fixed and permanent adjective of a Jiva. They change
and appear as concomitants of Psychic conditions. We have to assume

that these colours are apprehended only by an occult and

supernormal

vision. would be simply absurd to associate these colours as the

It

intrinsic colours of the Jiva itself for that would make the Jiva
a

Miirta and RApa Dravya—a material thing. That would be quite in-

consistent with the Jaina system.

Of the six lesyas or the tints the first three Krishna, Neela and

Kapota the bl ick, blue and grey are associated with the darker emo-
tions which constitute the springs of evil.

The next constituent of the spring of evil is yielding to the tempta-

tions of the senses. Spiritual development depend upon controlling the

senses. The soul is very often compared to the charioteer and the
sense

to restive steed. If the charioteer is led away by the horses that means
danger and destruction because there would be no good in life much
less the possiblity of spiritual emancipation.

Arta or suffering refers to the painful feeling experience when

desirable things and persons are lost and when undesirable and un-
Thi* experience also the fountain of evil.
pleasant ones are got. is

Raudra refers to wrath or mispl iced enthusiasm in cruelty, deceit, theft

and sensuality. Evil thoughts consist in shunning good objects and
apprehending and attending to evil ones. And lastly Mohaniya that

spirit-paralysing stupor in its dual form corrupts the faculties of percep-

tion or wdl. Darsana Mohaniya and Charitra Mohaniya. In either

form it is a source of evil.

These are the subjective conditions of evil. Bhdva Pdpa-Asrava,

the inner springs of sin, whereas thea^bring about the inflow of the
dark Kdrmic matter.

This inflow is the Physical or objective side of evil i.e., the

Dravya-Pdpa-Asrava. Kdrmic material of an undesirable kind flows

towards the soul as the result of the above mentioned Psychic

conditions.

Thus ends the chapter on Asrava,

 pa SjhAstikA ya sa ma ya sAra .
147

184.

CHAPTER ON S \MVARA PADArTHA.

The category that denotes the process of suppressing or blocking
the spnngs of good and evil treated in the previous chapter is
Samvara. The author considers first
Pofia Sahara or the prevention
or evil.

148. To whatever extent the five senses, the four

taints of
emot.ons, the four instinctive
appetites, are suppressed by
a
person, well established in the
oath or righteousness, to
such
extent the door way for the
entra, ce of evil is closed
for that
person.

Commentary.
The volitional suppression of the above mentioned
Psychic ten-
dencies is Bhdva Samvara or the subjective inhibition of the evil
This condition is the antecedent of the physical
arrest of the inflow
of the Kdrmic matter which is Dravya Samvara. This Samvara
or the inhibition of the springs of
evil is possible only to
that person
who has the three jewels or Ratnatraya, right belief, right knowledge
and right conduct. One who
has not adopted the path
cannot suc-
ceed in the attempt to block the spring
of evil,

149.
Evii thoughts and sin are the cause of misery as they lead to
suffering in the world as well
as in hell hence they ought to be avoi-
;

ded. Noble thoghts and the consequent happiness

of Deva state in
svarga or Devaloka is also insignificant
when compared with heavenly
bliss. To one whose ideal is self-realisation therefore,
the happiness
of Devaloka is also worthless.
He should shun that course also
Pleasure consequent upon Prnya, and
pain of Pdfia are both imper-
fect and undesirable by the side of
the ultimate ideal Moksha Both
the doorways of Punya and Pdpa hav, to be blocked. Shunnin-
,
o

*Stmskrit rendering.
148 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

natural. Bat action which le^ds to

action that leads to misery is

pleasure and which stimulates desire is also a hindrance towards self

this sentiment that

attainment and therefore must be avoided. Itis

is expressed in the next Gdtha.

^m ** f^?sf^ Trrit fr^r ^til ^ **^i i

If a Bhikshu and misery as

looks upon happiness
149,
he is free from desire, aversion, and stupor
of
same, if

perception and will, then K&rm&s both beneficial and harmful

do not approach that being.
Commentary.
conscionsnefs. Subha
There are three fundamental states of
Parindma, pleasant and
Parindma, Asubha Parindma, ahd Sttddha
beneficial, unpleasant and harmful,
aud pure and perfect respectively.
alone is the ultimate ideal. The other
two have to be trans-
The last

cended.
150
mental states conducive to Samvara
Next the author describes the
or the prevention of Karmas.

^t w% v^ 5r*t m^' ^ w'a fa^^r

<a^[
; •

^af <nst «$30$P*fHi ^*re* « W «+ " p

150 As long as a person pure in life, is really free from,

either thuoght,
action conducive to pleasure or pain through
karmas, beneficial
speech or body, so long is he protected from
and harmful that is, they are prevented from approaching
;

him.
Commentary.
aversion, and activity of thought,
Effective states of desire and
the conditions that attract Karmas good and
speech or body are

r
Sanskrit rendering.

^m i ft*fr ***** W ot*

***** *i

mt^&*m fa#
5 *! 1

*«a
*rer*fa grog* I H

Sanskrit rendering.
\

q*q **V *3% *gm ^ ^ <* T<*

gwgwwi «**
* *™
1 *******
W°
'

^|^r:«4f <fiq zv A »
 —

paNchAstikAyasama yasAra 749

bad towards the soul. When those conditions are remov d there
will be Karmds approaching the /j va-f that is complete Samvara— a
protective wall round the self shutting out karmas is established.
all
This Samvara again is twofold Bhdva S nnvara and Dravya
Samvara. The subjective exclusion of th ughts and desires that may
lead to bondage, and the objective exclusion of Kdrmic matter fiom
seif. Thus ends the Samvara Padartha,
151

THE CHAPTER ON NIRJARA PADARTHA.

The author describes the nature of Nirjara or the withering away
of Karmds.

151. That mighty personality which after closing the

springs of Karmas, good and evil, and equipped with the
faculty of pure thought, controls its life according to manifold
forms of Tafias, will undoubtedly be able to rid itself of
Karmds manifold.
Commentary.
The faculty of pure thought, protected from all Karmds, associated
with twelve kinds of Tapas, and leading to immortality, to annihila-
tion of all Karmds, is the subjective side of Nirjata or Bhdva Nirjara,
As a concomitant of this there appears the annihilation of Kdrmic
dust, that clouds the divine beam of pure self.

The means for obtaining Nirjara is Tapas which is of two main

forms, outer and inner. Each of these is again of six different kinds.

These are :

(a) Outer Tapas consisting of—

(1) Anasana.
(2) Avamodarya,
(3) Vritti Pari Sankhydtia,

* Sanskrit rendering :

«fw*gf f«ti£3f vf^mi «dft *r ft*Rf ii w i

 —

150 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

(4) Rasa Parityaga.

(5) Vivikta Sayydsana.

(6) Kdyaklesa.

(6) Inner Tapas consisting of

(1) Prdyaschitta.

(2> Vinaya.

(3) Vaiya Vrittya.

(4) Swddhyaya.

(5) Vyutsarga.

(6) Dhydna.

(1) Anasana is abstaining from food To obtain control over the

senses and will, to root out desires and apatites to destory Karmdt,
to facilitate meditation and to study peacefully the scriptures, fasting

is the means and fasting in order to secure such results is Anasana

Vrata.
(2) Avamodarya.
To sustain control of the will and the senses, to regulate disorders

of, Vata, Pitta, and Sleshma, the humours of the body, to secure self

knowledge, and meditation, eating with a limit or a little less than

the normal is Avamodarya.
(3) Vritti Pari Sankhydna. — In order to control the will which
would by nature hanker after all the objects of taste, limiting the
number of items of Dharma, or in the case of Ehik^hus, resolving in
one self to accept food only from a particular house is Vritti Pari
Sankhydna or numbering or limiting the items of food.

(4) Rasa Parityaga. In ord^r to control the flesh to get rid of

drousiness and sleep, to promote clearness of thought, abstaining from

fatty and sweet substances is Rasa Parityaga or relinquishing sweet

essences.

(5) Viviktz Sayyasana. To have ones bed, in separate and vacant

rooms or caves or on rocks free from insect pests is Vivikta Sayyasa-
na or lonely bed The place must be free from insect pests in order

that the p rsen may have peace of mind, preparatory to meditation

and separate beds of course to avoid temptations of the flesh.

Kdyaklesa getting the body ennured, to pain and suffering by

(6)

standing in the sun, living under a tree and sleeping in the open in
 paNchAstikAyasamayasAra 151

the winter cold, etc., is Kdyahle^a or mortification

of the body. This
will harden the body and make the person fit for
the arduous" t.sk of
religious life How is this Kdyak/esa d fferent from what known as
is
Parishaha Jaya or the victory over troubles.
The latter means over-
coming the suffering due to the natural environment;
whereas the
former volunta-y training of the body.
is
If it is voluntary why is it
called outer Tapas> Because it pertains mainly to physical objects.
Next Inner Taf>as. Because the object is mainly to control the mind.
These are called innner Tapas.
(1) Prdmschitta is removing the evil ideas that are born of intoxi-
cation of worldliness.

(2) Vinaya is humility towards gurus and masters.

(3) Vaiyavritya. Personal attendance *nd other kinds of service

to Munis who are weary, sick, or infirm.

(4) Sivddhyaya is quickenmg of thoughts by concentation of

attention.

Vyutsarga renouncing the

(5) belief that this body is mine, is
Vyutsarga or isolation of self.

(6) Dhydna calm meditation on the self after controlling the

vagaries of thought is Dhydna.
152.
Meditation on self is showa to be the main condition of Nirjard.

152. Clinging to the ideal of self realisation, being fortified

against Karm&s through Samvara, the yogi, who truly under-
stands the word of the master, and meditate upon Self—
Pure
thought with controlled senses, will completely wash off
the
Karmic dust.
Commentary
The main condition for annihilating Karmas is stated here. The
person is to be equipped with Samvara or fortification round the

* Sanskrit rendering :
151 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

self against Karmas, desirable and undesirable. The springs of

Parinima, Sttbka and Asubh.r, are to be completely blocked. Instead

ol diverting ones attention to environmental objects, thought is to be

fixed on
Self. This reflection upon the Self is to be made secure

enough by controlling the senses. If a person under such circum-

stances meditates upon the Self, according to the instructions from

the Masters, he is sure to attain purity of self by completely washing

off the Kdrmic dust by the flood of Dhydna.

Then the divine glory of the Self will shine without interruption.

153

The origin, nature, and effect of meditation.

^s *r nrenf^ Tim\ ^t€t ^tft cc ^mqft^Rt \

?|f np^pjt wj<TO37t ^n^nj

<rc^r sRsft i\$\\\*
153. In the person that has neither desire nor aversion,
and that is free from ignorant attachment to sense pleasures
and from the activity of thought speech and body, there
flames forth the fire of meditation that burns out all Karmas
beneficial as well as baneful
Commentary.
Dhydna or meditation is thought directed towards the pure self.

This is the means of self realisation Ignorance that stupifies the

faculties of perception and will must be got rid of. There should be
neither attachment nor hatred towards the objects of the environment.
Then there should be unruffled pence, in thought, speech and body.
Meditation attended by such circumstances manifests as the fire that
destroys the rubbish heap of Karmas. It is this fire of meditation that
reveals the Stirling beauty of pure Self. This is Nirjara.

Thus ends the Chapter on Nijara.

CHAPTER ON BANDHA PADARTHAS.
154

The nature of Bandha or Kdrmic bondage is described.

*Sanskrit rendering :

HW * fk^ ^l iKt »tft 3T ^mqffc^lf I

 PAXChAsTIkAyA-SAMAYAsArA. 153

154. When Atma out of desire aversion, and corruption of

knowledge and will, experiences affective states pleasant and
unpleasant, then because of the very same states the self gets
bound by K&rmic matter of various kinds.

Commentary
Bandha is of two kinds Bhdva Bandha and Dravya Bandha
The former refers to the appropriate psychological conditions that
bring about the actual bondage with Kdrmic molecules. The latter is

Dravya Bandha. On accou it of desire the Atma experiences happiness

or misery. Such emotion :! states create in the Atma a disposition
peculiarly favourable for the Kdrmic molecules to settle in. This
Psychological disposition is the intrinsic condition of bondage.
155

The two aspects of bondage internal and external are again des-
cribed.

155. Karmic ma:ter with Jiv'a is due to

Combination of
Yoga. Yoga is the action of mind, speech and body. The
opportunity for combination is created by Bhdvas or the
affective states an. 1 such affective states are due to desire,
aversion and perverse cognition.
Commentary.
Here is described bondage both internal and external, Psychical

and physical. The Kdrmic matter that flows towards the soul is the

*Satiskrit rendering :

Sanskrit rendering :

wm^ftreft s?m *nm ?:f?!?:t*Tt«Tmf ^5: ii \vi II

154 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

manifold Kdrmic Skandha around the Jiva. This attraction of

Skandhas is due to yoga, i.e. the Karma Skandhas get aggregated
and intermixed with Jiva because of the activity of yoga, or of
tnatia vachana kaya, mind, -peech and body.

Bandha then is the state of being so bound by Kdrmic matter.

This Kdrmic formation around the Jiva is occasioned by the
Psychological dispositions known as Bhdva. Bhdva is the emotional
state of desire or aversion, or perverse cognition and will. All these
states are brought about by Mohaniya, that fundamental Karma
responsible for spiritual delusion. Yoga is the external condition of
bondage since it brings about directly the combination of Kdrmic
matter with Jiva. But the internal condition is the Bhdva or the
disposition of the self.

156.

Again the conditions of bondage fro;n another point of view are

described.

%f* fa ** <Nii<(l §f%*rai$ W 3T3*fif% 0^U#

156. The eight kindj of Kannas are said to be caused by
the four external conditions or Dravya Pratyayas. But these
conditions themselves are the result of desire, etc., or BhUva
Pratyayas. Without these intrinsic conditions there will be
no bondage.
Commentary.
In some Philosophical works of Jainas, the eight Karmas are traced
to the four causal conditions Mithyatva, Ai-irata, Kashdya and
Yoga. Our author here shows that these four conditions themselves are
the result of the Ps}'chological disposition effected by the emotional
states of desire, etc, Hence he insists on recognising these Psycholo-
gical states as the real and Whereas the
intrinsic condition of bondage.

above four are only subsidiary and external conditions. Without the
ultimate condition of rdga there can certainly be no Kdrmic bondage,

^Sanskrit rendering :
 PASChAsTIKAya-SAMA YASlljA.
,.„

are d.rectly ass.cated >

with /«,,„,, maUer and the uW
refe t^H
refer to the H
1C d ti0nS
disposition of
'

"I
i/ W(7
3 " ed

.
8^W *«*"» <~ they
y

The conditions of bondage are

enumerated thus
wM« Sutra. Chapter VIII, Sutra 1.
in 7a//-

It be noted that five conditions

to
» of bondage are enumerated
here whereas the Gutna mentions only
four. For the fifth and
additional condign Pramada is
also included in the
above mentioned

mthyatvah the opposite of right faith

or Samyak Darsana. This
Mathyatva may manifest in the form of belief in false
doctrine, and
disbelief in the true one.

Samyakehantra
Art*, is the opposite of right c JL j
This
conduct and a hesitation
may
for
manifest in
righteousness.
an enthusiasm
Kashaya
for the
refers to
Z
2
grosser emotions such as anger,
Pride, deceit, etc., and
yoga refers to
the uncontroh.d and useless
activity of Mana vackana
are the four Dravya Pratyayas
Zy*. The e K
eight Karmds which are-
or external conditions
gelatin* the
generating Z
(1) Jfidndvaraniya.
(2) Darsanavataniya.
(3) Mohaniya.
(4) Vedaniya.
(5) Antardya.
(6) 4yw/f

(7) Ndtna.

(8) AndGctfrr/.

(1) /nanavara^a is the veil round the pure consciousness.

(2) Darsanavataniya is that which corrupts the faculty
of perception and also of belief.

(3) Mohaniya is a sort of spiritual intoxication interfering

with cognition and will.

(4) Vedaniya is the feeling of pleasure and pain.

 »

156 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

(5) Attt'araya is the frustration of the useful efforts of right-

eously minded persons.

determines the duration of life that a Jiva has in
(6) Ayuh
a particular state of existence.
characteris-
(7) Ndma determines the generic and the specific

tics of a Jiva, i.e. on account of this Ndma Karma a Jiva

particular Gati.
is bora as a particular organism in a
determines the value of life for example in a
(8) Gotra
human b -ing. This Karma determines the birth of a Jiva

in a higher status or in a lower s'atus.

various sub-divisions which we need
These eight Karmas are of

not enumerate in detail. These eight effects, though they are sup-

posed to be due to the above four conditions are ultimately due to

The author wants to
Bhdva Pratyayas or the disposition of the heart.
dispositions are
emphasis the fact that if the Bhdvas or the Psychic
or the external conditions
absent then even if the Dravya Pratyayas
bondage of the eightfold kind
are present still, there will be no ;

Bhava or Psychic.
hence the intrinsic condition of bondage is

Thus ends the chapter on Bandha Padattha

CHAPTER ON MOKSHA PADARTHA
157,

ttoksha or emancipationbegun with the description of Bhava

is

This Bhava Mohska

Moksha or the inner perfection of the soul.
leads to the annihilation of the four
Ghatia Karmas. The very
the great Samvara or the absolute
same Bhdva Moksha again is

obstruction to Karmas.

f§jT*rt3 fcram ^t^ <nTfa^r sm^f*!^**

*nsf^ tf^reff^ sRssnsrif %3*p» W h^ch*

* Sanskrit rendering :

CThawvirifr <sr sew Hsf&T^tff =* i

 paNchAstikAyasama yasArA. 157

157—58. causal condition of Karmds disappears

If the
in the case wiseman through the control of senses and
of
thought, then the springs of Karmds get blocked. When the
springs of Karmas thus get blocked the Dravya Karmds get
repulsed. When the Dravya Karmas completely disappear
then the person becomes all-knowing and all-perceiving and
attains the state of infinite bliss which transcends the sense
feeling and which is untouched by the sorrows of life.

Commentary.
Through the instrumentality of the five Labdhis a Bhavydtina
obtains the three jewels. On account of this acquisition he is able to
get rid of the four-fold condition of Karma, Mithyatva, Avirata, Kas-
ha ya and yoga, both in their subjective and objective aspects. When he
gets rid of Dravya and Bhdva Pratyayas or Kdrtnic adjuncts, then he
attains the great Samvara or repulsiveness tn Karmas. This Sum vara
leads to the annihilation of Karmic shackles. Thus ascends the ladder
of higher life which leads to destruction of ignorance. This brings on
the inner purity. Finally through second Sukla Dhydna or the great
meditation, the Ghdtiya Karmas get burnt away. Then the self rises
to eternal wisdom, eternal perception, infinite bliss, and infinite power.
This is Anantachatushtaya, the four infinite qualities. This is Bhdva
Moksha, the spiritual freedom. When this Bhdva Moksha is attained
the inevitable destruction of Dravya Karmas follows. With the attain-
ment of Bhdva Moksha the person becomes a Kevali worshipped by
men and Devas. He becomes really Paramatma.
159

Then we have the description of Dhydna or meditation which is

the direct cause of repulsing and eradicating all Karma*.

159. The meditation that is completely determined by

right belief, right knowledge and right conduct and that is not

* Sanskrit rendering :
158 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

related to objects alien to the self becomes the cause of

Nirjava or annihilation of Karmas to the Yogi that is in the
path of self realisation.
Commentary.
The great meditation on the self is shown to be the condition of
complete Ni.rjara or the absolute annihilation of the existing
Karmas. Gdtha Bhdva Moksha was described.
In the previous On
account of this Bhdva Moksha the person becomes a Kevali with the
four infinite qualities equipped with the infinite perception and infinite
knowledge. The self no more becomes attached to any other alien
ideal. The only object of attraction and adoration is the perfect

self-consciousness. When meditation thus manifests in self rapture

because of self purity and self perception, then it leads to the

eradication of the remaining Karmas, i.e. it is the causal condition

of complete Nirjara.

160

Dravya Moksha or the absolute emancipation is next described.

160. When a ]\va being rid of the four Ghatiya and being
equipped with absolute repulsiveness to Karmas succeeds in
eradicating the remaining Karmas, then he becomes freed
from Vedaniya and Ayu and finally from N&ma and Gotra.
This eradication of the latter four Karmas means absolute
and complete Moksha or Dravya Moksha.
Commentary,
This Gatha speaks of Di avya Moksha or the iinal and complete
emancipation. After attaining Bhdva Moksha mentioned in the
previous Gdthas Jiva has to obtain absolute emancipation from
Karmic or physical conditions for the attainment of Kevalajildna
is still associated with the bodily condition. The person is merely

* Sanskrit rendering :
 panchAstikAya-sama yasAra. 159

Sayogi Revolt. No doubt he got rid of the four Ghatiya Karmas which
lead to the corruption and degeneration of Attn a. Because they
injure the soul they are called Ghatiya
These are Jadna Karmas.
Varaniya Darsatidvaraniya
; Mohaniya and Antaraya.
; But still
there are the other four Karmas known as A ghatiya. Karmas.
Vedaniya Ayah, Noma and Gotra. These four also must be annihila-
ted. When Bhava Moksha Jiva has the perfect Dhyana, then
a
Vedaniya and Ayuh first wither away and finally Natna and Gotra also.

Then the M tiki a Jiva becomes A yogi Kevali or a Siddha. Attna has
attained its intrinsic spiritual purity and is absolutely free from any
kind of association with the matter. This state is Dravya Moksha.
Thus ends Moksha Paddrtha.

This is the end of the second Book of the great work dealing
with Sapta Tattva and Nava Padarthas.

Next the Resume or the Chulika dealing with Jina the great Victor
and the perfect Brahma who is the ideal of Moksha Paddrtha. This
Chulika supplements the ideas already mentioned about heaven, and
the path. The author indicates here, the importance of conduct
leading to self realisation. Self and self alone is the goal. Anything
other than self as an ideal would lead away the self from the path.
All these facts are emphasized in the Chulika.

161.

The intrinsic nature of Jiva is described, thus indicating the path

to Moksha.

Unlimited perception and unlimited knowledge are

161.
inseparable from the nature of Jiva, Permanently associated
with that nature, spotless conduct is the path to Moksha
because it is the immediate antecedent.

'Sanskrit rendering :
 ;

16 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE J AIM AS.

Commentary.
described here. Right conduct
The characteristic of Sloksha is
nature of sel. > the path
which is always associated with the intrinsic
existence winch is
to Hokska. The intrinsic nature of J*, is
the
Dar.ana. Inalienability implies that
inalienable from Jnana and
through know-
nature of manifests genetically and specifically
Jtva
which is associated with such
ledge and perception. The existence
activity is the
characteristics and which
has the dialectic nature of
irreproachable because ,t is not
self. It is
intrinsic conduct of
aversion That same conduct is the
desire or
influenced by either
path to emancipation.
of two kinds, intrinsic conduct and
Conduct in Samsiri Jiva is

other deterimined. Self-determined

extrinsic self-determined or
The
based upon the intrinsic nature of
self.
conduct is that which is
is that which is
due to the influence of non-
other determined conduct non-self
self and is uninfluenced by
self The path then is related to
the means to the realisation of self.
hence it is

162.

internally distinguished as lower and

That Jewel or Ratnatraya is

lower aspect associated with the ideal only indirectly

is
hteher the
directly associated with
it. One who has the
whereas the higher is
by
known as PUrasanayi or the self that is determined
otr cwel is
absolutely self
higher jewel is
the other. But the self which has the
called Svamwayi.
conditioned and is

the essential qualities

162 Ihejiva that is associated with
or the self-determined
whereas that which
is called Svasamayi
qualities and
accidental and unessential
is associated with
or the other determined.
The
mo des is called Par.samayt
i.e. the essential
nature as its .deal,
Jiva that has the former,
able to get itself freed
from Kartmc bo ndage,
is

*Sunskrit rendering:

nft f^t w* *""» «ra*»ft ^w^arT^ii W

 paKchAstikAya-samayasAra. 161

Commentary.
The Ratnatraya which is self-determined has corresponding
stages of development to the spiritual evolution
of Jiva. Abhedadra-
natraya certainly Svasamayi, but the
is early stages of this
Ratnatraya when compared to the last stage of perfection would
be
considered as Parasamayi. It is not even necessary to mention
the fact that faith in alien deity, etc., is distinctly Parasamayi, i.e.
when Samyaktva itself in its earlier stage requires to be transcended
much more therefore Mithyatva. But a person while still with
Karmic bondage may have the thought 'I am Siddha' 7 am Shuddha'
i.e. I am the realised, I am the pure. This contemplation is also
called Abhedaratrataya, the pure jewel by convention. Such subtle
distinctions in the nature of the path of Self-realisation can only be
understood by the great Ones.
163.

Then the duality of the outer path or Parasamayd and also the
duality of the other-determined or Parasamayi.

^T i^C^SSrfac ^^ 3??pf TJTiW sppff^ 3ff^ vrN I

163. That Jiva which through outer things desire for

experiences pleasurable or painful states loses his hold upon
Self and gets bewildered and led by outer things. He
bee mes the other determined.
Commentary.
The author describes here the characteristics of the self that is

still determined by the other. According to this view even the

traditional worship of Jaina orthodoxy would not escape this sweeping
condemnation by the author. All that would be merely Paracharita
conduct determined by the other. This other determined conduct
must be transcended by one who perceives the ideal of Self.
164.
Next the author points out that the other determined-conduct
is only the means to bondage and not to Nirvana.

* Sanskrit rendering ;

q: m;$ZQ ^OTgtf H^ «Edfa qfa[ VTR I

162 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

164. On account of the pleasurable or the painful states

of the Atma there may flow in Punya Karma or Papa Karma.
Such an Atma on account of such states becomes the
other determined. So say the Jinas.
Commentary.
Conduct that determined by outer things leads to bondage and
is

the
blocks the way to liberation, for, the pleasurable mental states is
spring of Punya Karma and the painful mental state of Papa
Karma,
i.e. both merit and demerit in their subjective and objective aspects
lead the soul to Kdrmic bondage. Therefore if a Jiva experiences those
mental states which form the springs of those Karma then for that
very reason his conduct becomes other determined. He therefore
becomes the other determined one.
165.

Then the author describes the characteristics of the self-

determined Jiva or the Purshottama.

*mx$
165-
^^
That
fara^ %t ^*ren3 ^rcf^ sft^t \\\\yx\
which being free from relations to others,
Jiva
and from alien thoughts through its own intrinsic nature of
perception and understanding perceives and knows its own
eternal nature to be such, is said to have conduct that is
absolutely self-determined.
Commentary.
Here is the description of conduct that is self determined. First

there should be no kind of relation to outward things through

^Sanskrit rendering :

\ Sanskrit rendering :

siRift <i^fa fore* ?=t: ssr^fttf 'arcfa site: II W

 PANCHAsTIkAyA-SAMA YASARA. 163

affective states. On account of this freedom, thought is reflected

upon Self. The fundamental faculties of Jiva are perception and
understanding. If the self is perceived or intuited and understood to
be constituted by perception and knowledge that thought is purely
self-determined. Jiva that has that thought alone is said to have
absolute self realisation.
166.
Next the very same Svasamaya is described in a different way.

^njnnqf^q^ stfin^ ^f^ 3P=qT^T II

\%\ ll#

166. Whatever Yogindra being entirely free from affective

states related to other things and firmly established in its
own intrinsic nature, perceives himself to be identical with
that which perceives and knows is said to have self-

determined activity.
Commentary.
Thus in order to instruct the disciple both according to Dravyar-
thika and Paryayarthika Nayds the two paths are described
Nischaya Ratnatraya or the teal jewel and Vyavahara Ratnatraya
or the relative Jewel. The real and the relative are related to one
another as the ideal or end and the means to realise the same. Thus
the ultimate goal is the real jewel.

167.
Next is the description of Vyavahara Mokshamarga or the relative
path which is the means for the realisation of the ultimate end.

^Nt^a^fof ^n*tri ^t^jtw*^ *

f%gT rf^ff ^fo*T SRSff TO lfcKc|+<Jjftf% ll^llf

* Sanskrit rendering :

srfaf prefer s^ * m 'n^icJromfencWT i

\ Sanskrit rendering :
164 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

V 167. Belief in the Paddrthas such as Dharma and in their

respective value Understanding the Scriptures

is right belief.
which are divided into A kgas and Purvas is Right knowledge.
Conduct according to the twelve kinds of Tapas is right
conduct. These three from the Vyavahara point of view
form the path to Moksha,

Commentary.

On account of the suppression or the partial eradication of the

seven liar mas called MulaPrakritis there may appear to a man,

perception of and belief in the several Padarthas and their values.

Such a belief resulting from the apprehension of the nature of reality

is called Vyavaharically the right belief. It is right belief only

Vyavaharically because it is the means to emancipation and thus to
the absolute and the real belief. But this Vyavahara Samyaktva
should not be confounded with false belief which is neither the means
to Moksha nor is the instrument of the right belief.

Ahgas and Purvas are the parts of Srutas or the Scriptures.

Understanding these is considered to be right knowledge Vyavahari<
cally. It is only the means for obtaining the real knowledge of
reality through direct apprehension. This Vyavahara knowledge
is also distinct from false knowledge possessed by persons of alien

faith.

Again right conduct from the Vyavahara point of view is life

according to the twelve kinds of Tapas. This TaPasic self-control

again cannot be associated with persons who are not enthusiastic

about the ideal of self-realisation. Thus Vyavahara Ratnatraya is

shown to be the means of Nischaya Ratnatraya.

[The seven Prakritis, the twelve kinds of Tapas, have been

explained elsewhere and for Ahgas and Piirvas the reader is referred
to Weber's History of Jaina Sacred Literature and to the Outlines
of Jainism by J. L. Jaini.]

168.

Next tbe description of Nischaya Moksha Marga or the real path

to realise which the previous one the Vyavahara Moksha Mdrga, is
the means.
 PANCHAsTIKAyA-SAMAYAsArA. 165

^168. Whatever Atmd through the three-fold jewel well-

established in itself neither perceives alien things as its own,
nor gives up its own intrinsic nature, that Atma is indeed
called the absolute path to Salvation.

Commentary.
Belief, knowledge, and conduct so long as they are based upon
other things besides self would only constitute tbe relative jewel.
But ifsame three are based upon intrinsic nature of
the self then
they would form the real jewel. The former is the means of obtain-
ing the latter.
169.

According to the principle that the thing and its qualities are not
distinct the Atma is described to ba identical with the constitutive
elements of perception, knowledge and conduct.

^t ^ref^ nnf^ ft^rf^ s^ft 3?^<jit 3?<Jtuumif i

169. Whatever perceives its own self-identical nature,

knows its own subjective and objective nature, and
experiences its own immediate existence, is identical with
the very activity of perception, knowledge and conduct.

Commentary.
Chdritra, Jnana and Darsans (conduct, knowledge, and percep-
tion) constitute the Atma. These are also the path to Nirvana.
Hence the intrinsic nature and function of the Self are the real path,

i.e. the real path is nothing but a real Self.

^Sanskrit rendering :

t Sanskrit rendering :

qs^n:t% 5u;nf?JT q^qfa wtrmfmrrJreiwtfq i

166 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE jAINAS.

170.

The Samsdri Jivas do not as a matter of course all attain

Moksha only some of them are said to have that privilege.

170. Because of the fact that the Self perceives and

understands all things without limit it also enjoys infinite

bliss. This fact that infinite knowledge and infinite bliss are
inseparable is understood only by the Bhavya The Abhavxa %

cannot appreciate that, much less believe in it.

Commentary.
obtain the state of self-realisa-
All Samsdri Jivas are not fit to

the absence of any kind of hindrance to

tion. Here happiness is

Perception and understanding are

the intrinsic activity of the self.

Hindrance to the nature of the

the intrinsic nature of the
self.

therefore would be a kind of obstruction to either perception

self
The perfected self is all knowing and all perceiving
or knowledge.
nature of perception and understanding. The
i.e., has no limit to its

hindrance naturally manifests in its positive aspect as

absence of

infinite bliss. The logical consequence of Kevala Jndna is Atlanta

and accepted only by the faithful.
Sukha. This truth is appreciated
appreciating this truth. There-
The unfaithful ones are incapable of
is available only to the former. Therefore
fore the path to salvation
only some of the Samsart Jivas but not all are fit to walk the path

to Moksha.
171.

conditioned by other things

Darsana, Jndna. and Qhdritra when
Self may in a way lead to
bondage. But if they are determined
than
the direct antecedent of eman-
absolutely by the self then they form
cipation.

*Sanskrit rendering :
 paXchAstikAya-samayasAra. 167

171. Since £W„* y^, and chdntm constitute -

A/o^/w M^g* they are adored by the wise. If they

are
determined be non-self they may
lead directly to bondage or
indirectly to Moksha. But if they are determined by Self
then they may lead to Moksha.

Commentary.
Intuition, knowledge and conduct produce effects according as
they are determined by the
associated things. If they are associated
with external things they may
get associated with desire
and aversion
and thus may bring about kdrmic bondage.
But if thev are associated
with intrinsic and pure nature
of the self, then they may
directly
and immediately bring about liberation. A
king for example be-
cause of h.s defective instruments
political and military may
lead to
the strengthening of the enemy
instead of annihilating him •
or for
example, ghee which is by
nature of soothing effects may
when
associated with fire aggravate the
heat. Similar is the case with
the three jewels.

172.
Next the characteristic of Sukshma
Parasam*ya> or the subtle
non-self or other determinedness.

l^f% g«fei«taf ^^TFR^t W^^foft nv^irj-

127. If an Atm a through ignorance believes that through
awe and reverence to Arahanta and others
he may attain
emancipation from misery then he is only
the lover of
non-self or Parasamayi.

* Sanskrit rendering :

^Sanskrit rendering ;
168 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

Commentary.
kind of perfection and
Arahanta and Siddha are free from every
Love and devotion towards these
may
are full of all good qualities.
certainly be desirable but still by
themselves they can never br.ng
to obtain salvation only
through
about kdrmic liberation. The hope
The person who has that hope
is
devotion is Parasamaya.
The other determined
Parasamayi, the other determined one.
When love and devotion
means to be away from the ideal of self.
nearer the goal, we need not
to the perfect beings cannot take us
alien
of ignorant worship of
even mention the utter uselessness
parapharnalia. Thus the author
deities with all the samsaric
and devotion towards the
emphasizes the fact that even the love
kind of obstacle in the way of
self-
perfect beings form a subtle
realisation.
173

reverence and devotion as they some

The above mentioned
not constitute the path to Moksha.
times lead to bondage, do

173 ^The person who has reverence and devotion towards

4rahanta, Siddha, their images, Sangha, and congregations

can
will invariably get bondage with Punya karma, hence he
of karma.
never achieve absolute annihilation
Commentary.
the importance of popular form of
religious
The author minimises
Traditional Jaina religion always
devotion and worship. The
of faith and devotion towards the objects
emphasizes the value
But our author views the popular faith from
worthy of reverence.
philosophcal point of view such
a higher point.
From the true
Punya karma and its consequent divine
Bhakti will only lead to
thraldom thoughthe shackles
happiness.But Punya karma is still

Deca ha ppiness is still Sansari. Thereto

are made of gold and

"'Sanskrit rendering :
 PANCHASTIkAyA-SAMAYAsArA. J69

karmic annihilation cannot be achieved by the

person who has such
faithand devotion alone.
174
The main obstacle in the path of self-realisation or Svasunaya
is said to be Rciga or affection.

174. If in the heart of a yogi there

is an iota of affection
towards alien objects (even in an Arahanta) then,
though he
be well versed in all the Sastras, he would be
incapable of
appreciating his true Self or ParamMma through immediate
experience.
Commentary.
Devotion to external ideals may be useful up to a certain stage
of development. The ideal of Vitardga is distinctly related to self;
Absolute freedom from attachment is the meaning of Vitardga.
Complete absence of rdga is certainly inconsistent
with attachment
and devotion to Arahanta or Siddha. So far
as self is concerned
these ideal personalities are indeed external.
The right ideal must
be to attain perfect Siddha state oneself.
This realisation of Siddha
state cannot be reached by having attachment
to external objects-
hence the author emphasizes the importance
of effort to transcend
even this subtle kind of attraction
however worthy the object of
the ideal be. self and self alone must be the final and
the ultimate
ideal of spiritual evolution. To have Bhaldi which is a subtle
attraction and then to believe that somehow the final good will
be Moksha is to forget the importance of self-effort towards self
realisation. According to the author then the traditional religious
reverence, is only a stepping stone for the
higher spiritual goal.
He
who shrinks from transcending the traditional orthodoxy
is unfit to
live in the higher plane. He is infected with the delusion
that what
is only a means is an end in itself. That what is merely relative
is the abso lute. That what is of temporary value has eternal
value.

*Sanskrit rendering :
no THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIN AS.

175
The author enumerates the train of several evils that may be
generated by that little iota of affection, above referred to.

d^t rt^s *r fsr^f^ praises SSl^FF&llV^N*

175. To whomsoever there is no ability to bear the
turmoil of the mind apart from and independent of the pure
contemplation of self to him there is no possibility of
preventing the Karmas bom of pleasure and pain.
Commentary.
There can be no devotion to Arahanta and others apart from an
affective state, when there is affection the disturbance of the

mind cannot be avoided. With the agitation of the heart the calm
of the self is lost and if the calm of the self is disturbed, it is not
possible to prevent the appearance of pleasure and pain and there
is no escape from happiness and misery there can be no emancipa-
tion from Samsara. Affection however little is therefore the cause

of this series of undesirable events.

176
One who has the ideal of Moksha must therefore completely
eradicate every kind of desire from his heart.

fall f ^ *tf^ fa^ntf

Therefore he who aims at Nirvana must not say "I
^ 'i^W^ »W*
176.
love this, this is mine," Then he can very well be devoted to
his own true self which is Siddha or the perfect one, Through
that same self-realisation he will attain Nirvana,

*
Sanskrit rendering :

t Sanskrit rendering :

fsrsfn ^rfa *iRr fasitm $* amtfa 11 1*\ 11

 paNchAstikAya-samayasAra. 171

Commentary.
The great soul that understands the truth
of the previous causa!
sequence from desire to turmoil of the mind, and from thence to
karma and finally to Samara, struggles to escape from the attrac
on of the environment and from
the idea of ownership of alien
thmgs. When the relation of
self to alien things
either through
attract.cn or owning is severed,
then ,here is no possibility
of
desue spnngmg up in the heart.
No desire means no spriritual
d.scord; spiritual harmony, repels
tarmas, prevention of karma,
means d.sappearance of Samsara.
Absence of Samsara certainly
mphes ,ts opposite Moksha, hence the person
that longs for spiritual
pertection and karmic emancipation
must neve, say " This
I love
This is mine."

177
The attitude of worship towards
Arahanta and others, though
M interferes with the immed.ate
: realisation of perfection is not
altogether valueless, for may
it ultimately lead to Nirvana.

who h* ^ IM
f tune Paddrthas.
the basts of
is
•
Understand the
true "atn« of
One ntay
Tirthankara,
have interest in
and devotton to the Scripture. One may have self control
and penance.
ing his own
With
true self, to
all these if

him Nirvana
one ts

is
not capable of
beyond reach.
r"
Commentary.
Even though a person is well versed in Agamas and well
acquamted vv.th the nature of reality, i* he is ever much filled wi h
devotton and worship to
objective ,deas, he will only secure the
happmess of Svarga as the immediate fruit
thereof. Nirvana or
MoHha is very remote and he can obtain
that only by a tedious
process of spiritual development. The immediate and di ec
^edent^Mofo^is the realisat.on of the true sell, worship
"
"
* Sanskrit rendering :
172 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE J A IN AS.

of and devotion to any other ideal however worthy it may be is only

a circuitous path to reach the goal.
178

Again the author emphasizes the fact that worship of the

Arahata and others cannot be the immediate antecedent of

Mukti.

178. The person [who has and reverence towards love

Arahanta and Siddha, their representations and the divine
Word or Agama^ however well he is engaged in the best form
of Tapas so long as he is incapable of apprehending the true
greatness of self on account of attachment to external ideals,

will inevitably through his efforts enter only the world of the
Devas.
Commentary.
Whether now or hereafter the direct and immediate condition of
Moksha is the apprehension of trneself and not attachment to
external ideal?. The person who has not grasped the self through
all his efforts associated with worship and reverence will only secure
the happiness of Devas. This is merely a higher state of Samsdra
and not Moksha.
179

Then the author mentions the direct and immediate path to

Moksha, thereby indicating that that is the meaning of the present

Work.

%r %*r ^t^TTTTT *rf%^T ^oKiitrf rrcf^ mv^ii*

^Sanskrit rendering :

^Sanskrit rendering :
 paRchAstikAyasamayasAra. 173

179. Because of this truth that even the subtle attachment

to external ideals hinders Nirvana, let not the person who desires
Moksha have any kind of attachment to things, living or non-
li\ing, desirable or undesirable, then he becomes the Vita-
raga, the non-attached. Thus will he be able to sail across
the ocean of Samsara.

COMMENTARY.
The essential ingredient of the direct and immediate path to

Moksha is the stnte of Vitaraga or non-attachment. Attachment to

alien persons and things deserving worship is something like burning
sandal wood It may smell sweet nevertheless it will burn. The
subtle attachment to external ideals may lead to happiness but the
very happiness will scorch the soul ; hence the great person, who
longs for freedom from Samsara must rid himself of any kind of
attachment, must become a Vitaraga. Then will he be able to con-
quer the misery of Life and inherit the kingdom of Nirvana.
This is the meaning of the above Sutra and the same is the pur-
port of the whole book.

Panchdstikdya, i. e. it is not only the Sutra Tatparya but also

Sastra Tatparya. This aims to apprehend the nature of Jinesvara,
the great victor, the all-knowing of infinite qualities and the Vita-
raga or the non-attached.

It is called Prabhuita " well filled with the meaning" because it

treats about the nine Paddrthas and thus describes the nature of the

systems of reality. Since it deals with the Dravyas or the existences

it is also called Dravyaniyoga. It clearly explains the five Astikdyas

the six Dravyas, seven Tattvas, and the nine Paddrthas. It also

examines the nature of bondage and of the bound, of liberation and

the liberated. Lastly in the Chulika or the appendix there is a clear
distinction between the absolute path and relative path, and also the

indication of the fact that non-attachment is the direct and imme-

diate condition of Nirvana. Non-attachment and perfect peace of
the heart is the central doctrine emphasized by an embodied in this

Parichdstikdya Prabhrita. This Vitaragatva or the state of non-

attachment is available only to that Bhavya or the right believer who
appreciates the comparative merits of the two paths, relative and
absolute Vyavahara, and Nischaya, but not to one who is incapable
of appreciating the various aspects of truth and who clings to only a
114 THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAIXAS.

particular and fractional aspect as the whole truth, i.e. one who
believes in Ekanta aspect of reality is incapable of appreciating the
ideal of Vitardga and the difference between the absolute path and
the relative path. He is far away from the goal. The true believer

will certainly understand the compatibility and the harmony between

the two paths and thus will try to realise the ideal of non-attachment
or Vitargatva as the immediate condition of Moksha.

180

The author ends the Work indicating his object in this com-
position.

44JJiiM vncTOT§ wng*ff%t*n^f^*!J 'TOT I

180. For the purpose of explaining the Moksha Marga^

this work by the name of Panchdstikdya containing the
essentials of divine revelation is composed by me as actuated

by Bhahti or devotion towards the divine Word.

Commentary,
The author explains the purpose of his writing this work. The
Moksha. Marga or the path is revealed by Jina. But Divine revelation

or the Sastra is elaborate and extensive. In order to exhibit the path

to the believers this short summary of the divine WORD is written

with the name of Panchdstikdya Samgraha.

Thus ends Book II of Panchdstikdya.

*Sanskrit rendering :

wtststtsrhS s^rc*rf%3^tf^f TOT I

 BL Kundakunda Acharya
1351 Sripanca s tikaya samaya sarah
K82

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