Introduction to Basic Pipeline

Engineering Principles

Phil Hopkins
Penspen Group
Contents

1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................2

2. PIPELINE TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS .................................................................5

3. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND CALCULATIONS............................................6

3.1 SELECTION OF DESIGN FACTOR (SEE ALSO 3.1.2) ...............................................7
3.2 CALCULATING HOOP (CIRCUMFERENTIAL) STRESSES IN PIPELINES.......................8

4. HYDROSTATIC TESTING .....................................................................................9

4.1 THE GENERAL HISTORY .....................................................................................9
4.2 HYDROTESTING TRANSMISSION PIPELINES..........................................................9

5. WHY MAINTAIN AND INSPECT A PIPELINE? ...................................................10

5.1 W HY DO PIPELINES FAIL? ................................................................................11
5.2 W HAT METHODS ARE AVAILABLE, AND W HAT DO THEY PREVENT/DETECT? ........12

6. OPERATION AND LEAK DETECTION................................................................15

7. SECURITY POST SEPTEMBER 11TH ................................................................16

8. FINAL WORDS ....................................................................................................17

9. REFERENCES.....................................................................................................19

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 1 of 19

1. INTRODUCTION

This part of the course covers basic pipeline engineering principles.

Pipelines have been with us for a long time. In 2000 BC, natural gas was delivered to users in
China using bamboo pipes. In the western world, cast iron musket barrels left over from wars,
were used in the UK to transport gas, but it was during the 1920s that pipelines as we know them
became popular, due to steel pipe and welding being introduced in the USA. Long distance
pipelines were pioneered in the USA in the 1940s due to war demands, and therefore we can
consider our contemporary pipeline industry over 50 years old.
There are many types of oil and gas pipelines:

i. FLOWLINES & GATHERING LINES – These short distance lines gather a variety
products in an area and move them to processing facilities. They are usually small
diameter (50mm (2in) to 305mm (6in)).
ii. FEEDER LINES - These pipelines move the oil and gas fluids from processing
facilities, storage, etc., to the main transmission lines. They can be up to 508mm (20in)
in diameter.
iii. TRANSMISSION LINES – These are the main conduits of oil and gas
transportation. They can be very large diameter (Russia has 1422mm (56”) diameter
lines) and very long (the USA’s liquid pipeline system is over 250,000 km in length).
Natural gas transmission lines will usually deliver to industry or a ‘distribution’
system, whereas crude oil transmission lines carry different types of product, to
refineries or storage facilities.
iv. PRODUCT LINES - Pipelines carrying refined petroleum products from refineries to
distribution centres are called product pipelines.
v. DISTRIBUTION LINES - These allow local, low pressure, distribution from a
transmission system. Distribution lines can be large diameter, but most are under
152mm (6in) diameter.

This paper focuses on steel (‘linepipe’ – see later) product, transmission, feeder, flowlines and
gathering lines; it does not cover distribution lines as they can be made out of differing materials to
steel (e.g. cast iron, plastic).
Pipelines are recognised as the safest method of delivering energy[1], Figure 1, and this is why they
are used, and will continue to be used in the next century. However, they do fail, often with
dramatic and tragic consequences. For example, in Venezuela in 1993, 51 people were burnt to
death when a gas pipeline failed, and the gas ignited[2]. Also, in 1994 a pipeline failed in New
Jersey, USA, causing the death of one person, injuring 58, and causing damage estimated at
$23,000,000[3].

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 2 of 19

 Figure 1. Safety Record and Failure Causes in Onshore Pipelines, Compared to other
Transportation Modes

OTHER MODES
1000
900
OTHER MODES 800
2408
OTHER HIGHWAY
642 700
PEDESTRIANS 600
6475
500
CARS 400
24170
TRUCKS & VANS 300
8590
200
MOTOR CYCLES
LARGE TRUCKS
100
3143
PEDAL CYCLES
570 0

MARINE
GRADE CROSSI

RAIL
AVIATION

PIPELINE
860

1990, USA FIGURES

Corrosion
23%
Other
30%
LIQUID

Op./Equip. Outside Force

Error 25%
10%
Failed
pipe/weld Other
12% 27%
Corrosion
39%

Const/Mat
Defect GAS
9%

Outside Force 25%

25%

Over the past decade there have been a number of major pipeline ruptures in the USA [1], Canada
(where a company faces possible $2 billion replacement costs[4] and Russia[5], and the failure of a
British Gas transmission pipeline in December 1993 received wide press coverage[6]. Pipeline
failures can cause the casualties described in the previous paragraph, but they can also cause
severe disruption, as was the case when the failure of a gas line in Pakistan disrupted the nation's
energy supply[7].

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 3 of 19

However, it is important to maintain a perspective with the risk associated with pipelines. Table 1
compares the risks associated with transmission pipelines, with other risks associated with
everyday living (in USA - 1993).
Table 1. Relative Risks Associated with Pipelines

RISK FATALITIES/annum
Liquid Pipelines 0
Gas Distribution 13
Gas Transmission 1
Highways (1992) 42,500
Home Accidents (1992) 19,500
Accidental Firearms 700
Accidental Poisoning 4,100

In the UK, there has been no recorded fatality to a member of the public, caused by a transmission
pipeline failure. Western European gas transmission pipelines have the same enviable safety
record. The public may have a perception of pipelines being dangerous, but this is probably due to
casualties caused by the lower pressure distribution pipelines that service homes and offices,
Figure 2.
Figure 2. Fatalities Caused by the Low Pressure Distribution & Service Pipelines in the UK

Natural Gas (not including carbon monoxide poisoning)

15

Others
No OF FATALITIES

10 Service
Pipes
Mains

0
'86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93
YEAR
('Others' are mainly appliances and installation pipes) (Source - dti/HSC)

How can we ensure that our pipeline is designed in such a way as to prevent failures, and
guarantee a reliable long life? In simple terms:
Day 1. We must ensure our pipeline is designed, constructed and installed to a recognised pipeline
standard.
Day 2 and beyond. We must ensure our pipeline is operated, maintained and inspected to
recognised standards that apply to our pipeline, and managed safely and effectively.

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 4 of 19

Pipeline ‘design’ is usually taken to mean the initial specifications and quality standards used in
setting operating parameters, and the condition it enters its first day of service. This is incorrect; a
pipeline design must cover the full design life of a pipeline, and consequently maintenance and
inspection methods and procedures should be considered and included in the design process.

2. PIPELINE TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS

The UK has many years of pipeline design and operating experience. This can be illustrated by
listing the pipelines operating in the UK:
Table 2. Transmission pipelines in the UK[8]

PIPELINES DETAILS LENGTH, km OPERATORS

Industrial, Commercial, Ethylene, Crude, Gasolene, etc. 50- 10 500 100
& Government 1219mm diameter (Various)
Natural Gas High Pressure Transmission 18 000 Transco (a
(up to 75bar) (Medium Pressure Distribution) (40 000) part of BG
(Low Pressure Distribution) (200 000) plc)
Offshore Natural Gas, Crude, etc. 50-912mm 9 700 20 (various)

Therefore, there is extensive pipeline design experience in the UK.

Around the world there are many million kms of oil and gas pipelines. Figure 3 gives a summary
of the length of pipelines in the Western World. Pipeline systems in Russia are longer than in the
USA, and it is worth remembering that new pipelines are being built at a much higher rate than the
abandonment of old pipelines.
Figure 3. Transmission Pipelines Around the World

1200
TOTAL
1000 OFFSHORE
ONSHORE
800
Length (km)
Thousands

600

400

200

0
UK W Europe USA World

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 5 of 19

3. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND CALCULATIONS

Pipeline design includes:

• select route,
• determine throughput & velocity,
• calculate pressure gradient,
• select of pumps/compressors/other equipment,
• determine pipe thickness and grade
• conduct engineering economic analysisand a market analysis to determine the optimum
system based on alternate designs.
In each design, careful consideration must be given to:
• safety,
• leak and damage prevention,
• government regulations, and
• environmental concerns.
The prime role of pipeline design is safety. Most transmission pipelines are designed to the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) standards (ASME B31.8 for gas lines and
ASME B31.4 for oil lines) or standards based on these. The design and operation of pipelines is
usually regulated or subject to local laws. In the UK, pipelines are covered by the Pipelines Safety
Regulations 1996, which detail design, construction, operation and maintenance requirements for
pipelines.
The pipelines are made by welding together lengths of steel pipe (called ‘linepipe’), typically
bought to the American Petroleum Institute standard API 5L.
The linepipe is known by its diameter, wall thickness, weld type (either longitudinally welded,
spiral welded, or seamless), and ‘grade’; grade X60 has a minimum specified yield strength of
60,000 lbf/in2 (414N/mm2).
Complying with a design standard will ensure that a pipeline will operate safely in the conditions
stated in, or expected by, the standard. However, standards are not engineering handbooks, and all
users are expected to have relevant experience and be competent in pipeline engineering design.
Additionally, there will be areas of the pipeline design and operation that may well be outside the
recommendations in the standard. Sound engineering judgement will be needed in these areas.
This section covers key elements of pipeline engineering design. Quality assurance and records
and document control are not covered. These are essential parts of design, and are as important as
any of the items that follow.
Most pipeline design standards require a systematic evaluation of the pipeline route, population
densities, etc., before stipulating limits on pipeline pressures and stresses.
Before summarising key elements of design, it is important to understand the term ‘pressure’ we
will be using. Pressure is the force per unit area exerted by the medium in the pipe. There is often
confusion over pressure terminology – around the world you may often see pressures written as
‘gauge’ pressure or ‘absolute’ pressure, or ‘psia’ or ‘psig’. Atmospheric pressure (Patmos) is the
pressure due to the weight of the atmosphere (air and water vapour) on the earth's surface. The
average atmospheric pressure at sea level has been defined at 1 bar (=105Pa or 14.5 lb/in2)

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 6 of 19

absolute. Pressure absolute (Pa) (denoted ‘psia’ in imperial units) is pressure in excess of a
perfect vacuum. Absolute pressure is obtained by adding gauge pressure to atmosphere pressure:
Pa = Pg + Patmos. Pressures reported in ‘Atmospheres’ are usually taken to be absolute. Pressure
gauge (Pg) (denoted by ‘psig’ in imperial units) is the pressure above atmospheric pressure. Gauge
pressures below atmospheric pressure are called vacuum. In the pipeline industry, gauge
pressure is in common use.

3.1 Selection of Design Factor (see also 3.1.2)

The categorisation of the substance, the limits on population densities, and the specified minimum
distance of buildings from the pipeline, as specified in pipeline design codes, all contribute to the
safety of the pipeline. Pipeline safety, and the consequences (both to environment and population)
can also be increased by limiting the design factor (i.e. the maximum pressure) of the pipeline.
The design factor, and the resulting maximum pressure the pipeline will operate at, will always be
below the pre-service hydrotest (see Section 4), and well below the failure pressure of the pipeline
when it is in pristine condition.
Figure 4. Ensuring a Design Stress (‘Factor’) is Below Critical Material Properties

STRESS, (N/mm^2)
800
700 Ultimate tensile strength
600
Yield strength
500
400 Design Stresses are kept below
yield strength and yield strain
300 in most engineering structures

200 Failure
Yield strain
100
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
STRAIN, %

a. Why have a ‘design factor’?

It is important to understand the origins and meaning of these design factors. First, the design
factor is a simple engineering way of ensuring that your working stresses in your pipeline are well
below the yield or ultimate tensile strength of the pipeline material, Figure 4. The failure stress of
a new, perfect pipeline will be close to its ultimate tensile strength, which will be a design factor
equivalent to greater than 1.3 (i.e. 1.3 x pipe yield strength).
b. The 0.72 Design Factor
Most pipelines around the world have a maximum design factor of 0.72, although there are some
pipelines operating at higher factors. This 0.72 design factor originates in North America, from the
American Pipeline Standard ASME B31[9],[10].
The 72% SMYS (specified minimum yield stress) limit originates from the 1930s in the USA, and
was based on the mill testing of pipelines. The mill test was typically 90% SMYS. Operators

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 7 of 19

agreed that a 1.25 safety factor on this was reasonable, therefore the 72% SMYS limit was created,
and appeared in the American Code ASME B31.8 in the 1960s. It has no structural significance,
and is an historical limit.
c. Inherent Safety Factors
The use of a design factor of 0.72 will ensure a reasonable safety factor, Figure 5. For example, a
pre-service hydrotest to 100% SMYS means that a 72% SMYS pipeline has a safety factor of
100/72 (equals 1.39) on pressure. This safety factor is needed to account for uncertainties in pipe
supplies (e.g. wall thickness), uncertainties in pressure (e.g. overpressures) and - most important -
the inevitable deterioration of the pipeline with time.
Figure 5. Safety Factors in Pipeline Pressure Design

1.3

Safety Factor 1
1 based on failure
Design Factor

0.72

Safety Factor
based on hydrotest
0.5

Design Hydrotest Failure

3.2 Calculating Hoop (circumferential) Stresses in Pipelines

a. Basic Formulae and Limiting Stress
Hoop stress in a pipeline is usually calculated using the ‘Barlow’ equation:
t

Pipe Dimensions

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 8 of 19

 2tσ
P =
D
where: hoop
P = internal pipeline pressure (MPa)
t = pipewall thickness (mm) axial
D = diameter of pipe (mm)
σ = hoop stress (MPa)
A pipeline will fail (or burst) when pressurised, when the internal pressure causes the pipe material
to yield, and plastically deform.
The simplest and, in general, the most conservative formula for calculating failure pressures, for
the range of transmission pipeline D/t ratios, is given by using the ultimate tensile strength, σu, in
the Barlow equation:
2 tσ u
Pf =
D
The maximum stress a defect-free pipeline can withstand is between 1.25xSMYS and its ultimate
tensile strength, depending on the linepipe.

4. HYDROSTATIC TESTING

4.1 The General History

Most engineering structures are ‘proved’ before they go into service, or go to the customer. For
example, the early days of bridge building required a troop of soldiers to pass over the new bridge
to demonstrate its strength. Figure 6 gives a brief history of strength testing.
Figure 6. A Brief History of Strength Testing

Year Structure Location Method

BC Ice covering World wide Send fat boy
ponds across first
Middle Ages Bridges UK Troop of soldiers
1817 Steam Boilers UK Pressure (steam)
testing
before 1930s Pipelines USA Gas testing
1950s Pipelines USA Hydrostatic
testing
1967 Pipelines USA High level
testing
1967 Pipelines UK High level
testing

4.2 Hydrotesting Transmission Pipelines

Transmission pipelines are tested before going into service, by pressurising them with water.
Natural gas, or air is not used at high pressures because the energy content of a pneumatic test is

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 9 of 19

many times greater than that of a hydraulic test, and can support very long running fractures in the
pipeline - should it fail.
Hydrostatic testing of transmission pipelines started in the early 1950s in the USA (Figure 6), and
is now widely accepted as a means of:
a) checking for leaks,
b) proving the strength of the pipeline,
c) removing defects of a certain size (the higher the stress level in the test, the more defects are
likely to fail),
d) ‘blunting’ defects that survive (this increases the subsequent fatigue life),
e) reducing residual stresses, and
f) ‘warm prestresses’ defects that survive (this improves their low temperature properties).
Historically, pipelines, pressure vessels and piping have been tested to 1.1 to 1.5 times the design
pressure. The concept of a ‘high level’ test, or a ‘test to yield’ (100% SMYS) was introduced into
the UK and USA in 1967, when it was recognised that testing to 80 or 90%SMYS would not
reveal (fail) defects that may cause failure during operation. These high level tests are popular in
gas pipeline codes; for example, IGE/TD/1[11] requires seam welded pipe to be tested to a design
factor of 1.05 (i.e. 105% SMYS).
Most codes also specify limits to the pressure-volume plot (i.e. the pressure in the line is monitored
against the volume of water added). The pressure-volume plot is a means of measuring the
pressure in the line, and also any yielding in the line. Yielding in the pipeline during the test is
usually taken as the pressure at which twice the volume of water is required to raise the pressure 1
bar, compared to the volume at the commencement of the linear portion of the pressure-volume
plot (this is also called ‘double-stroking’, or ‘half slope’).
The pressure is held for 24 hours in both BS 8010[12] and IGE TD/1. Obviously, a hold period is
needed for the pressure to become stable, time is needed to detect leaks, and residual air takes time
to go into solution. The selection of this 24 hour period is based on USA practices, and their
experiences that most failures on hydrotest occurred on initial pressurisation, but less than a third
occurred after 2 hours. This suggests that the hold period could be reduced, but this would be of
little cost or logistical benefit for most pipelines.

5. WHY MAINTAIN AND INSPECT A PIPELINE?

Pipeline regulations and codes require an operator to maintain and inspect their pipeline to
appropriate standards. As well as satisfying these requirements, there are real benefits to be
obtained from good maintenance practices (see Section 4.1.1).
Engineering plant follow a 'bath tub' type failure probability curve1, Figure 7[13]. This curve shows
that during a structure's design life the highest failure probability is when the structure is new, or
when it is old.
This curve applies to automobiles, aircraft, etc., and pipeline operators will identify with it;
pipelines have high failure rates early in life (e.g. hydrotest) and later in life (due to corrosion).

1
Experts in reliability engineering will know that this is a simplistic view; engineering components follow
varying probabilities of failure during life. However, this curve is a valid example of a pipeline structure, but
not its individual components.

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 10 of 19

Maintenance and inspection of a pipeline will help to extend the low probability portion of Figure
7 - the goal for the pipeline operator being to extend the design life of his pipeline to 80 or even a
100 years.

Before discussing the methods available to us, for effective inspection and maintenance of our
pipelines, it is essential that we understand the main threats to our pipelines, i.e. what causes them
to be damaged, and fail?
Figure 7. The Change in Failure Probability with Time

High failure probabilty

late in life, as pipeline
'wears' out.
Probability of Failure

Failure probabilty can

be kept low, and life extended,
High failure probabilty
with extra inspection
early in life and maintenance

40 80
Pipeline Age, years

5.1 Why do Pipelines Fail?

Pipelines can fail due to a variety of reasons, ranging from bad design and operator error, to
corrosion.
Our inspection and maintenance methods are mainly aimed at detecting and preventing time
dependent deterioration, or damage, such as corrosion or external interference (also called
mechanical damage or third party interference). We assume that the pipeline will be designed
correctly, and operated and managed effectively. This is often not the case, but in this part of the
course we will concentrate on the time dependent deterioration of pipelines, and how we can
minimise the effects.
a. What Fails a Pipeline?
The main cause of a failure in a pipeline is dependent on many things including the product it
carries, its age, construction quality, design, operation and the environment. In the Western World,
published failure data shows mechanical damage and corrosion to be the major causes of failure:
• third party damage (sometimes called, outside force, mechanical damage or external
interference), such as caused by a farmer ploughing a drainage ditch, or a supply boat
dragging its anchor around an offshore platform,
• corrosion of the pipe wall, either internally by the product or externally by the surrounding
environment.

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 11 of 19

External interference and corrosion are the two major causes of failure in the oil and gas pipelines
in Figure 1, and can be reduced by good inspection and maintenance. The ‘operation errors’ can be
eliminated by good practices and management.
Figure 8 shows how pipelines carrying different products can have differing major causes of
failure.
Figure 8. A Comparison of Incident Data for Onshore Pipelines - Various Products

N. Gas Crude
Corrosion
Other 28.0%
32.0% Corrosion
Other 38.0%
43.0%

Third Party Third Party

40.0% 19.0%

Multiphase Water
Overpressure Const Damage
Weld 8.0% Weld 6.0%
4.0% 5.0%

Other Other
16.0% 17.0%

Corrosion
Third Party 62.0%
10.0% Corrosion
72.0%

Mainly Internal
Corrosion

Alberta, Canada, 1991 - 208,000km

Clearly, we would need differing types of inspection and maintenance procedures on these
differing product pipelines, but if we look more closely at similar pipeline systems (USA and
European (‘EUR’) gas and oil pipelines) we can see some similarities, Figure 9.
Failures are infrequent: reference 5 gave some typical failure frequencies in pipelines:
Table 3. A Comparison of Incident Frequency in Western World Pipelines
INCIDENT Frequency (incidents/1000km year)
Incident Requiring Repair 4
Failure (loss of product) 0.6
Failure (casualties and/or high costs) 0.16

Table 4 gives a comparison of failure data in both European and USA pipelines.

5.2 What Methods are Available, and What do they Prevent/Detect?

Pipelines are designed to be protected from the environment as follows:
i. EXTERNAL CORROSION - The pipe steel must be separated from the soil or water
environment otherwise it will corrode. Usually, there is no ‘corrosion allowance’
(increase thickness of linepipe specifically to allow for predictable corrosion wastage)

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 12 of 19

 for external corrosion in pipelines. Hence the outside surface of the linepipe is
protected by using a pipe coating (e.g. coal tar) as the primary protection, and a
corrosion protection system is the secondary protection.
ii. INTERNAL CORROSION – A corrosion allowance to accommodate in-service,
predictable, corrosion can be introduced at the design stage; however, it is preferable
to prevent internal corrosion by: treating the product prior to entry into the line, and
checking quality, cleaning the line, mixing chemicals to inhibit any corrosion.
iii. EXTERNAL DAMAGE – Pipelines can be protected from third parties by: thicker
pipe wall, deeper cover (but beware of overburden), locating in remote regions, regular
patrols or surveys of the line, clear markings, good communications with third parties
including the general public, protective measures such as concrete casings2, and
damage detection equipment.
Maintenance of a pipeline is an essential part of maintaining the overall integrity of the entire
pipeline system. Pipelines are routinely inspected and monitored using many direct and indirect
techniques. The methods are well-documented[14-16] and aim to ensure that:
a) pipelines do not become defective or damaged ('proactive' methods),
b) damage or defects are detected before they cause serious problems ('reactive' methods).

Table 4. Causes of Failures in Onshore Pipelines

CAUSES US GAS EUROPE US OIL EUROPE

GAS OIL
EXTERNAL 40.4 28.2 21.5 47.5
INTERFERENCE
CORROSION 20.4 15.7 21.7 27.7
MATERIAL/ 12.7 9.5 11.5 23.4
CONST.
DEFECT
OPERATION 26.4 46.5 45.4 4.3
ERROR
INCIDENTS/ 0.26 1.85 1.33 0.83
1000 M YR

An operator should assess the greatest damage/defect risk to his/her pipeline, then select a
monitoring/inspection method to reduce that risk. All pipeline operators use a variety of methods
to ensure their pipelines are not damaged, or that damage is detected before it poses a problem.

2
Sub-sea pipelines are often encased in concrete. This concrete coating is primarily a weight coating – it
prevents the pipeline floating; however, it additionally offers protection against impact from, e.g. anchors.

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 13 of 19

Some of these methods are now summarised in Table 5. Detailed summaries can be found in the
literature[14-16].
Table 5. Pipeline Inspection and Monitoring Methods

METHOD

DEFECT/DAMAGE
AERIAL/ INTELLIGENT PRODUCT LEAK GEOTECH CP & HYDRO-
GROUND PIGS QUALITY SURVEYS SURVEYS COATING TEST
PATROLS & S. SURVEYS
GAUGES
3rd Party Damage P R R
Ext. Corrosion R P R
Int. Corrosion R P R
Fatigue/Cracks R R
Coatings P
Materials/Construct R R
Defects
Ground Movement R R
Leakage R P R R
Sabotage/Pilfering P
(Visual examinations are not included. Offshore pipeline inspection by ‘ROV’ (remotely operated vehicle) is
not included).
(P - 'proactive method, i.e. it prevents the defect/damage occurring. R - 'reactive' method, i.e. it detects the
damage/defects after it has occurred.)

An operator should assess the greatest damage/defect risk to his/her pipeline, then select a
monitoring/inspection method to reduce that risk. Hence, pipeline operators use a variety of
methods to ensure their pipelines are not damaged, or that damage is detected before it poses a
problem. Some of these methods are summarised in Table 5:
i. Patrols – Aircraft, road and walking patrols along pipeline routes can check for
unwanted or unplanned excavations around the pipeline, encroachment of
population/buildings. Sub-sea pipelines are regularly surveyed using a survey boat and
associated equipment to check the pipeline route.
ii. Internal Inspection – Pipelines can now be inspected from the inside, without serious
disruption to the product flow by ‘intelligent3 pigs’. The ‘pigs’ are sophisticated
machines that usually travel with the product and via arrays of sensors record data on
the condition of the pipe. These pigs (named ‘pigs’ because early pipeline engineers
thought the noise they made as they passed through the pipeline resembled a pig
squealing) can measure metal loss (e.g. corrosion), and geometry abnormalities (e.g.
dents). More specialised pigs can map the pipeline, and others can detect cracks.
iii. Above Ground Inspection – The condition of the pipeline’s corrosion protection
system, and its coating can be determined remotely using above ground measurements.
Sub-sea pipelines can have similar surveys conducted using ‘remotely operated
vehicles’ (ROVs).

3
‘Intelligent’ pigs are known as ‘smart’ pigs in the USA. Pigs have been used for over 100 years in the
pipeline business, primarily to clean a line, or prove its shape. However, when a pig collects data on-board, it
is classed as ‘intelligent’.

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 14 of 19

 iv. Leak Surveys – Leaks in pipelines can be detected by on-line systems (see above), and
also by patrols that may see discoloured vegetation (in onshore lines), or traces of
product (in sub-sea lines).
v. Specialised Surveys – Pipelines can be subjected to detailed geo-technical surveys to
detect subsidence, etc., and can be fitted with strain gauges to detect excessive
stressing.
vi. On-line Quality Monitoring – Product quality control, and on-line measurement of
product properties can help control internal corrosion and erosion.
vii. Hydrotesting - Some pipelines are periodically hydrotested in-service to prove
integrity (see Section 4).
viii. Public Awareness – Pipeline operators will liaise with farmers, fishing organisations,
etc., to ensure that organisations that may be working around their pipelines, are aware
of the location of the lines, and do not damage them. There is an increased use in ‘one
call systems’ in onshore pipelines where contractors and utilities call a telephone help
line before they carry out excavations. This call allows a central organisation to check
for the presence of sub-surface utilities such as pipelines, and either prevent the
excavation, or supervise it.

6. OPERATION AND LEAK DETECTION

Modern long-distance pipelines are operated mainly automatically by a computer at the

headquarters of the pipeline company. The computer monitors the pressure, flow rates, and other
parameters at various locations along the pipe, performs many on-line computations, and sends
commands to the field to control the operation of the valves and pumps. Manual intervention is
frequently needed to modify the automatic operation, as when different batches of fuels are
directed to different temporary storage tanks, or when the system must be shut down or restarted.
Through the use of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) equipment, the Control
Room of a pipeline operator can control and monitors volumes, pressures and temperatures as well
as the operating status of pipeline facilities.
Using microwave, telephone or communication satellites, SCADA provides the Product Control
operator with information on the volume of product flowing into the system, the volume of product
delivered to customers, and the ability to quickly identify and react to equipment malfunctions.
The SCADA equipment also gives Product Control the capability to remotely start or stop certain
compressors/pumps, thereby changing flow volumes to meet changes in customer demand for
natural gas/oil.
The pipeline will be fitted with some type of leak detection system, to allow for a rapid response
should the pipeline fail. There are various types of system:
i. Simple Systems (‘Seeing or Smelling’) - The simple systems involve flying,
driving, walking along or surveying a pipeline and looking for evidence of
discoloured vegetation around the pipeline, or hearing or smelling (if the fluid is
odorized) a discharge. ‘Unofficial’ pipeline leak detection is performed by
members of staff working near a pipeline (e.g. on an offshore platform) or
members of the public living near, or passing, pipelines.
ii. Flow Balance (‘What goes in, must come out’) - Simple line flow balances can be
used to detect leakages. This involves measuring inputs and outputs of a pipeline.

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 15 of 19

 A loss of product is determined as the difference between the steady state
inventory of the system and the instantaneous inlet and outlet flows.
iii. Acoustic Methods (‘Leaks are noisy’) - Noise associated with a leak can be
detected. These frequencies, caused by vibration, can have frequencies in excess of
20 kHz. Transducers can be clamped to a pipeline, and by noting signal strength,
the source of the leak can be pinpointed.
iv. Pipeline Modelling (‘Theory versus Operation’) - Real time pipeline modelling,
which simulates the operation of the pipeline and continually compares the
expected with the actual, can offer both detection and location of leaks. There are
commercial packages on the market that may be appropriate to certain pipeline
operations. The model is a mathematical representation of the pipeline and will
include such features as elevation data, valve and pump locations, etc.. The model
can then calculate the expected pressures, flows etc., and compare them with what
the measurements are showing. Any discrepancy may be a leak, and leak alarms
can be triggered if this is the case.
Leaks can be difficult to both detect and locate due to transients in the control systems and the
product flow.

7. SECURITY POST SEPTEMBER 11th 2001

7.1 General
Terrorism is now a real threat to the oil and gas business. We should never be complacent -
remember that terrorists attacked the World Trade Centre in 1993, and Algerian Armed Islamic
Group terrorists attempted to fly a jet into the Eiffel Tower in 1994.
There are 3 types of terrorists ‘mindsets’:
i. RATIONAL terrorists who perform a type of cost benefit on their attacks to determine
maximum impact versus minimum personal risk
ii. PSYCHOLOGICAL terrorists who are motivated by personal dissatisfaction and
cannot differentiate between right and wrong, do not recognise any views other than
their own, and will show no mercy or remorse
iii. CULTURE MOTIVATED terrorists who are dedicated to a religion, race or
nationality and are aggressive to any perceived threat to their culture; their attacks may
include self-annihilation in pursuit of an unquestioning adherence to dogma or
propaganda
If you are travelling abroad, remember that terrorists can be motivated by many things, ranging
from religion to patriotic fervour, to environment and concern for animals. Therefore, understand
the country you are visiting, and obtain the latest security information (e.g. www.travel.state.gov).
And remember – as security is increased at official/government/obvious locations, the terrorist will
strike at ‘softer’ targets. Plus… kidnapping is a $1billion/year business, and increasing – don’t get
caught….
Finally, most security problems are failures of management, therefore ensure security is in place
TO YOUR SATISFACTION before venturing to high risk areas. Your life – your responsibility.

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 16 of 19

 4
7.2 Pipelines
Most pipeline companies in USA participate in several alert systems, and coordinate through
government bodies to learn of any potential terrorist activity. Companies rehearse, review and
refine their security measures on an on-going basis. Safety and reliability always have been at the
heart of everything pipeline companies do.
A pipeline is monitored all day, every day. A pipeline’s flow and pressure are monitored and
regulated around the clock. Companies can deploy extra measures. This may involve calling up
additional manpower or sophisticated technology. The tools used to prepare and respond will vary
from company to company.
Emergency response plans will be in place, as they will be required by local laws/regulations, but
ensure your crisis management plans in not just for a shelf – it must be a realistic living document.
7.3 Specific Actions
The type of actions operators need are::
- Identify process for assessing pipeline system and facility vulnerabilities
- Develop uniform definitions of security conditions
- Develop graduated set of countermeasures for each security condition level
The quick measures that can be put in place are:
- Limited access to pipeline maps/information
- Identify key facilities and secure
- Background checks for selected state and pipeline personnel
- Security exercise program
- Plan rapid restoration of pipeline service following an attack/sabotage.
Some USA pipeline companies are:
- Controlling access,
- Using intrusion detection,
- Reviewing electronic systems against cyber-terrorism,
- Preplanning with FBI/military,
- Hiring armed guards
The Future? This has already started in the USA with a government/industry partnership to address
security needs (See Research & Special Programs Admin Office of Pipeline Safety -
www.naseo.org).

8. FINAL WORDS….

Do not assume that you have a perfect pipeline, if it is designed to ‘code’. You can have an
acceptable pipeline design… you can have the most modern material… but you MUST have smart
managers both designing and running the pipeline:

4
See www.aga.org

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 17 of 19

 - CODES DON’T INCLUDE EVERYTHING - It is a fact that many pipeline codes
do not require leak detection systems, do not require automatic shut off valves, do
not require internal inspections….
- CODES INCLUDE SOME GOOD THINGS, BUT YOU DON’T HAVE TO USE
THEM - in USA, pipelines must be designed to carry smart pigs, but operators are
not required to run smart pigs.
- SMART PIPELINES, SMART PIGS.. SMART ANYTHING, ARE USELESS
WITHOUT SMART MANAGERS!

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 18 of 19

9. REFERENCES

1. R J Eiber, D J Jones, 'An Analysis of Reportable Incidents for Natural gas Transmission and
Gathering Lines June 1984 through 1990', AGA Report NG-18 Report Number 200, Aug.
1992, and www.ops.dot.gov.
2. Anon., 'Venezuelan Natural Gas Pipeline Explosion Kills 51', Financial Times, UK, page 6,
29th Sept. 1993.
3. Anon., 'Reports on Gas Blast', Houston Chronicle, USA, 25-27th March 1994.
4. Anon., 'TCPL Pipe Ruptures Sound Safety Alarms', Financial Post, Canada, 21st Nov. 1992.
5. P Hopkins, 'Ensuring the Safe Operation of Older Pipelines', Keynote Talk, The International
Pipeline and Contractors Association Convention, Mexico, 1994.
6. Anon., 'Gassed Off - Probe into Burst Pipe Mystery', Daily Record, Scotland, page 13, 24th
December 1993.
7. Anon., 'Gas Supply Restored, Foreign Experts Begin Probe', The International News, Karachi,
Pakistan, 9th April 1994.
8. A T Thayne, 'Pipeline regulations - the old and the new', Health and Safety Executive Report,
1995.
9. Anon. ‘Liquid Transportation Systems for Hydrocarbons, Liquid Petroleum Gas, Anhydrous
Ammonia, and Alcohols’, American National Standard ANSI/ASME B31.4 -1992.
10. Anon. ‘Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems, American National Standard’,
ANSI/ASME B31.8 - 1992.
11. Anon., IGE TD/1, Institution of Gas Engineers Recommendations, IGE TD/1, UK, 1993.
12. Anon., ‘Pipelines on land: design, construction and installation’, BS 8010, Section 2.8, British
Standards Institution, 1992.
13. P Hopkins, 'Transmission pipelines: How to improve their integrity and prevent failures', 2nd
International Conference on Pipeline Technology, Ostende, Belgium, September 11-14 1995.
14. G J Posakony, V L Hill, 'Assuring the Integrity of Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines', Gas
Research Institute, Report No GRI 91-0366, Chicago, November 1993.
15. W K Muhlbauer, 'Pipeline Risk Management Manual', Gulf Publishing Co., London, 1992.
16. P Hopkins, 'Pipeline Inspection and Monitoring', International Energy Agency, 'Natural Gas
Technologies' Conference, Kyoto, Japan, November 1993.

© Penspen Group Rev 2003/1 Page 19 of 19