FIRST DIVISION

RENE C. FIGUEROA, G .R. NOS. 235965-66

Petitioner,
Present:

-versus- GESMUNDO, CJ, Cha;rperson,

CAGUIOA,
LAZARO-IA VIER,
SANDIGANJBAYAN,. SPECIAL LOPEZ, M., and
THIRD DIVISION, OFF'ICE OF LOPEZ, J ., JJ.
THE OMBUDSMAN represented
by THE OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR and
PHILIPPINE AMUSEIVIENT
AND GAMING CORPORATION,
Respondents.

x------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------x

DECISION

LOPEZ, M., Jr.:

An accused has no duty to bring himself to trial. 1 The accused must be

spared from the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that
inordinate and vexatious delays crept the conduct of preliminary investigation
which are violative of the constitutional guarantee to speedy disposition of cases. 2
We apply these precepts in this Petition for Certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Sandiganbayan' s Resolution dated October
11, 2017 in SB l 6-CRM-0326 and SB l 6-CRtv[--0327.

ANTECEDENTS

On June 21, 2011, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

(PAGCOR) filed a Complaint again~.t Rene Figueroa (Rene} and its other officers

1
Baker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). See also Coscolh!ela v. 5,'andiganbcryan, 714 Phil. 55, 64 (2013).
2
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 242 Phil. 563, 572 ( 1988).

f
Decision G.R. Nos, 235965-66

for corruption. 3 On July 19, 201 l, the co1Pplaint was endorsed for preliminary
investigation. 4 On July 29, 2011 '. the Oflke of the. Ombudsman directed Rene and
the other officers to file their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days from notice.
On August 16,2011, Rene received a copy of the order and requested an additional
ten (10) days within which to file his counter-affidavit. 5 On September 5, 2011,
Rene filed his .counter-affidavit. 6 On September 22, 2014, the ·Ombudsman
recommended the filing of infon11ations for two {2) counts of violation of Sections
3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 against Rene and the other officers. 7

Rene. and the other officers sought reconsideration but was denied. 8 On
June 3, 2016, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding charges before the
Sandiganbayan docketed as SB l 6-CRJvI-0326 and SB l 6:-CRM-0327 .9 Thereafter,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the amendment of the
informations to indicate the respective middle names of the accused and to
indicate the correct designation of Rene as Executive Vice-President and Head of
.the Research and Development Department. On March 6, 2017, the Overall
Deputy Ornbudsman approved the recommendatjons. 10 On even date, the
Ombudsman moved for the admission of the amended informations. 11 On July 4,
2017, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended infonnations. 12 The
Sandiganbayan found the proposed amendments as merely formal which did not
change the nature of the offense charged. The theory of the prosecution remained
the same and the accused's defenses are still applicable. In any case, Rene and his
co-accused had not yet been aiTaigned thus both formal and substantial
amendments may be made.

On July 20, 2017, Rene· moved to, q~ash thi: informations due to an
inordinate delay in the handlirig of his case. Rene argued that more than six (6)
years have lapsed from the filing of the comp laint on June 21, 2011, up to the filing
of the motion to quash. Yet, the Ombudsman has not decided what cases to file
13
against Rene as shown by the motion to amend informations. On October 11,
2017, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. The Sandiganbayan
explained that the delay is reasonable and part of the ordinary process of justice.
Moreover, Rene failed to raise the speedy disposition of his cases before the
Ombudsman, 14 thus:
Accused rigueroa asserts that [the] Court has been ousted of its
jurisdiction over his person predicated on the alleged violation of his right

3 Rollo, pp. 46-70.

4 Id. at 400.
5 Id.; id. at 6.
6 Id. at 221-244.
· Id. at 251 ~274.
Id. at 275-292
9 Id. at 311-320.
10 Id. at 332-338.
11 ld.at32] 0 331;id.at339-343.
12 Id. at 344-36 l.
13 Id. at 7.
14 Id. at 26-35. Penned by Presidiug Justice Ampuro M. Cabutaje-Tang, vvith the concurrence of Associate
Justices Sarah Jane T. Fernandez and Bernelito R. F1:;:rnandez.
 Decision .)
G.R. Nos. 235965-66

to speedy disposition of ca;,e<.; due pt\)cess by the Office of the

Ombudsman.

The Court finds accused r 1~!ltCl'(la' s contention untenable.

It is settled that the concept of disposition is relative or
flexible. A mere mathem:iticru reckoning of the time involved is not
s:tfficient. It is consistem vvith delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution · prohibits are unreasonable,
aTbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.

In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has

been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against
each other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of
the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay.

xxxx

Considering the above cited reasons and the ·chronology of

incidents, the Court finds that there was no unreasonable or
oppressive delay to speak of in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation. The delay was reasonable being part of the ordinary
process of justice. To repeat, the concept of speedy disposition is
consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the
Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays
which render rights nugatory. Further, there was no showing that the
prosecution deliberately delayed the proceedings to gain an
advantage or for other impermissible reasons. Thus, the fact tha.t it
took the Office of the Ombudsman five (5) years to resolve the cases
against the accused and file the corresponding Informations does
not, by itself, amount to a violation of the accused Figueroa's right to
speedy disposition of cases.

Notably, accused Figueroa failed to raise the issue on speedy

disposition of his case before the Office of the Ombudsman. It is only
now that he is minded to put the issue to fore. This belated assertion of
a violation of his right to speedy disposition of his cases before the Office
of the Ombudsman should militate against accused Figueroa's claim. 15
(Emphases supplied.)

Rene sought reconsideration but was denied. 16 Hence, this Petition for
Certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. i 7 Rene contends
that the Sandiganbayan acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to quash the infonnations. Rene
maintains that it took more than six (6) years for the Ombudsman and the Office of
the Special Prosecutor to decide the appropriate informations to file against him - .
five (5) years from the filing of the complaint from June 21, 2011 until the filing of
informations on June 3, 2016, and another year until the admission of the amended
informations on July 4, 2017. The Ombudsman did not offor special reasons or
circumstances for the delay. Despite this, Sandiganbayan ruled that there was
15
Id. at 29-32.
16
Id. at 36-45.
17
!d. at 3-25.
Decision G.R. Nos. 235965-66

"no unreasonable delay" and tha.t "rhe rlclcn' was reasonable being part of the
ordina,yprocess a/justice." Rene add::: that the delay amounted to a violation of
the Ombudsman's duty to promptly act on thi.: complaints filed before it. Finally,
Rene claims that his failure to raise the issue of speedy disposition of cases before
the Ombudsman did not result in the \Naiver of such right.

In its Comment, 18 the People of the Philippines argues that the

Sandiganbayan acted well within the bounds of law and jurisprudence when it
denied Rene's motion to quash. There tvas no inordinate delay amounting to a
violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases. Further, the Sandiganbayan
maintained a delicate balance bet\veen Rene~s right to speedy disposition of cases
and the right of the State to prosecute crlrnes.

RlJLING

The petition is meritorious.

Article III, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of

persons to a speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. In Cagang v.
Sandiganbayan, 19 the Court clarified the
mode of analysis in situations where the right to speedy disposition of cases or the
right to speedy trial is invoked, thus:

First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the

right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the san1e, the
right to speedy trial may-mily be invoked in criminal prosecutions against
courts of law. Tbc right to speedy dispositio,n of cases, however, may
be inYoked before any tribunal, whetber judicial or quasi-judicial.
What is important is that the :accused may already _be prejudiced by .
the proceed'ing f Qr the right to ·speedy disposition of cases to be
~ob~. . -

Second, a case i9 deemed initiated upon the filfog of a formal

complaint prior to a conduct of a prefoninary. investigation. [The] Court
acknowledges, however,_ that the Ombudsman should set reasonable
periods for preliminary imiestigation, with due regard to the complexities
and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against
the prosecution. The period takt.n for fact,.finding investigations prior
to the filing of the fo;rm:d complaint· shaH not be included in the
determination of whcthei· then: bas been inon.linate delay.

Third, courts must first detennhu~ '""'·bich party carries the

burden of proof. If the dght ;~; invoked ,,vi thin the given time periods
contained i.n current Supre1he Ci)urt rcsoiuti(')t1s and circulars, and the
time ·periods that v,ill be prdmulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, ·
the defense has th.e bllrden of prciving, thnt .th..::: rigb1 ,was justifiably · ·
invoked. ff the delay occurs beyond the giwn time perioliand the right is
invoked, the prosecuticm ha~ the burden ofjw,tifying the delay.

r
18 Id. at 399-42 L
19 837 Phil. 815, 880-882 (2018).
Decision s G.R. Nos. 235965-66

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first,

whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically
motivated and is attended by utter la(:k of evidence, and second, that
the defense did not contribute to the delay.

Once the burden of proof shitls TO the prosecution, the prosecution

must prove first, that it fi.)llowed the prc:,cribed procedure in the conduct
of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second,
that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the
delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused
as a result of the delay.

Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical.

Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of
evidence to be \veighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues
raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the

prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when
the case is politically motivated or when there is continued
prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be
gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings.
If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the
case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis
of the delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right

to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be
proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional
right can no longer be invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the

delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy

trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file
the appropriate motion upon the lapse ofthe statutory or procedural
periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to
speedy disposition of cases.

We now apply these precepts vis-a-vis the materiaJ dates in Rene's case,to
wit:

June 21, 2011 Complaint initiated by P AGCOR

July 19, 2011 Complaint endorsed for preliminarJ

investigation

July 29, 2011 Ombudsman Order directing respondents to file ·

counter-atlidavits

August 16, 2011 R(~ceipt by Rene of the order

August 22, 2011 Request by Rene for additional period of 10 days

 •.
Decision 6 G.R. Nos. 235965-66

IP fi1 1:'. his counter-affidavit

September 5, 2011 Counter-affidavit of Rene filed

September 22, 2014 Omlmdsrnan Joint resolution finding probable
cause against Rene and his other co-respondents
January 12, 2015 iv~,)h.on for reconsideration of the joint
resolulion of Rene filed

January 28, 2015 OmbudsmaP Joint order denying the motions for
reconsideration of Rene and his other
co-respondents

June 3, 2016 Tv,,o informations against Rene and his other

co-respondents filed

March 6, 2017 Motion to amend informations filed by the

Office of the Ombudsman

July 20,2017 Motion to quash filed by Rene

The first issue which must be resolved is whether there was a delav in the ,I

conduct of the preliminary investigation. Administrative Order No. 07 or the Rules

of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman does not provide for a specific time
period to conclude the preliminary investigation. Thus, the time periods in the
Rules of Court are applied suppletorily to determine whether the Ombudsman
committed delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. 20 Indeed, the
Court has applied Section 3(f), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which states that the investigating officer shaJl detennine whether or
not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial within ten (10) days
after the investigation. 21 In Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, 22 however, the Court
observed that the Ombudsman introduced new provisions to its rules of procedure
and has prescribed time periods for conducting a preliminary investigation, 23 viz.:

Section 8. Period for the ,conduct of Preliminary Investigation. -

Unless otherwise provided for in a separale issuance, such as an Office
Ord.er creating a special . panel of investigators/prosecutors and
prescribing the period for completion of
the preliminary investigation,
the proceedings therein shaH not exceed hvelve (12) months for
simple cases or t\venty-four months (24) months for complex cases,
subject to the following consideration:s: · · ··

(a) The complexity of the cast shall be determined on the basis of

factors such as, b11t not limited to, the number ofrespondents, the number
of offenses charged, the volume oi' documents, the geographical
coverage, and the arnount of public funds involved.

20 Javierv. Sandig~nb'ayan, G.R. No, 237997· Jun,: 10. ::020.

21
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, October 3, 2000.
22
G.R~ Nos. 236 i 77-210, February 3, 2021,

r
23
Administrative Order No. L Series of 2020. ·
Decision 7 G.R. Nos. 235965-66

(b) Any delay incurred in the; r;rn~:cedings, whenever attributable to

the respondent, shall susperid the nmn1 of the period for purposes of
completing the preliminary ·

(c) The period herein prcscribtd may be extended by written

. authority of the Ombudsman, m- th? Ovetall Deputy Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor/Deputy Ombudsman concerned for justifiable reasons, which
extension shall not exceed om, (l) year. (Emphases supplied.)

Obviously, whether the 10-day, 12-month or 24-month period is applied, it

is clear that the Ombudsman exceeded the specified time for preliminary
investigation. To be sure, the complaint against Rene and his co-accused was filed
on June 21, 201 L On the other hand, the joint resolution finding probable cause
against Rene and his co-accused was issued on September 22, 2014, or three (3)
years and three (3) months after the filing of the complaint. As such, the
Ombudsman must now justify the delay. To discharge this burden, the
Ombudsman averred the following in its comment and opposition to the motion to
quash, to wit:

7. Second, the reason for the delay, if any was indeed incurred, is
reasonable. In the cases of Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan and
Mendoza-Ong vs. Sandiganbayan, the highest Court of the land ruled that
a mere mathematical reckoning of time involved would not be sufficient.
The review of the findings of the investigating lawyers ensure that
the resolution carefully weighed and considered the arguments of
both parties, the complainant and the respondents.

8. In order to come up with a fair resolution, it is impl:rative to

carefully examine and weigh all the evidences gathered in these
cases, as well as the allegations and defenses raised by the parties in
the documents submitted in this case such as the Complaint,
Counter-Affidavits, and their corresponding annexes.

9. In resolving complaints against public officials, the Ombudsman

is duty-bound to protect the right of the people to public justice. In
Dansal vs. ~Fernandez, the Supreme Court emphasized that the heavy
duty of the Ombudsman "should not be mistaken with a hasty resolution
of cases at the expense of thoroughness and correctness. Judicial notice
should be taken of the fact that the nature of the Office of
Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for etlicient
government service to freely lodge their complaints against ening
government personnel, thus resulting in a steady stream of cases reaching
the Office of the Ombudsman.'' 24

Notably, the Ombudsman did not discuss the context of the case of Rene
and his co-respondents, the amount of evidence to be 'Neighed, or the complexity
of the issues raised therein to explain the delay in the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation, The Ombudsman merely argued that the delay, if any, was
reasonable. The Ombudsman highlighted..._, -· the irnportance
-
of evaluating the
al legations of the complainant, the defenses of the respondents, and the evidence
24
Rollo, pp. 30-3 l.

(
Decision 8 G.R. Nos. 235965-66

gathered in a case before arriving ar. a re::nlution. The Ombudsman even relied on
the steady stream of cases befiwe , t. I)dfei. ently stated, the prosecution failed to
prove that the delay was reasonable und justified.

The second question that rnusr be determined is whether Rene waived his
right to speedy disposition of cas.;::s \vhi::m hr: falled to raise the matter before the
Ombudsman. Verily, the renuncic,iion of a cr:,,nstitutional right must be positively
demonstrated. The implled waiver of such right cannot be presumed. To be sure, a
valid waiver of a right requires the conflucnct~ of the following elements, to wit:
(1) that the right exists; (2) that the persrv; involved had knowledge of the
existence of such right, either actua 1 or constructive; and, (3) that said person had
an actual intention to relinquish the right. 25 M.oreover, the waiver should not only
be voluntary but must also be knowingly and intelligently made. The waiver must
be performed with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences. There must be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to
relinquish the right. 1\1.ere silence of the bolder of the right should not be easily
construed as surrender thereof. The courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against the existence and validity of such waiver. 26

ln Javier v. Sandiganbayan. 27 the Ombudsman found probable cause to

indict the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 five (5) years
after the filing of the complaint against them. A month later, infonnation was filed
against the petitioners. The Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment However,
the petitioners manifested that they were not ready for arraignment as they
imended to file a motion to quash on
the ground bf' inordinate delay, The
petitioners then filed· a motion to quash which the Sandiganbayan denied.
Aggrieved; the petitioners elevat~:;d the matter to the Court. In that case: the Court
ruled that there was an inordinate delay in the preliminary fovestigation because it
was· terminated beyond the . 10-day · period provided· i'n the Revised Rules of
Cr.iminal Procedure. The prosecu,tion had tlie burden to prove that the petitioners'
right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated which it fi1iled to do so.
1vloreover, the Court held that the Oi11budsman' s claim that the case had
voluminous records and that it had a '"steady stream of casesi~ should still be
subject to -proof. as to its effects on a pafticular case, bearing in mind the
i~nportance of the right to speedy .disposition of cases as a fondamental righL The
Court further explained that the petitioners did not vvaive their right to the speedy
disposition of their case and that their jnaction did not.ammmt to acquiescence.
While it is true that the records are bereft f,f any _indication that the petitioners
"followed up 11 on the resolution of their case, the same could not be construed to
mean that they acquiesced to the delay. The Court cladfie,~i -that the petitioners do
not have any duty to folfow up on tlie prosecution of their case. Instead, it is the
Ombudsman1s responsibility to expedite the preliminary investigation within the
bounds of reasonable timellness ln view of its mandate to oromptly act on all
of
• . .L. •

complaints lodged before it The Ornbudsrnan 1s O\~>n Ru1es Procedure provide

that motions to di~mis:s. except c:iri the ground of lack ·orjurisdiction, are
- - - - - - - - ·. ·-----·----~--
25 Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin. 65 P!dL 689. 694 l 19.18 ).
26
· People v. Budoso, 446 PhiL 8)8, 850-85 i L:OGJ ).
27
GJZ. No. 237997 June !O. 2020.

I
Decision 9 G.R. Nos. 235965-66

prohibited. Hence, the petitioner::-- no legitimate avenues to assert their

fundamental right to speedy disp,Jsition of cases at the preliminary investigation
level. Lastly, the petitioners' filing a to quash before their arraigmnent
shows that they did not sleep on ·cheir rights.

Similarly, the Court finds that Rene 1 s failure to assert his right before the
Ombudsman is not a ground for the denial of the motion to quash absent any ·
pleading or act on his part that contributed to the deferral of the proceedings.
Rene's request for an additional ten ( 10) days within which to file his
counter-affidavit did not significantly contribute to the delay in the resolution of
his cases. It is also of no moment that Rene did not file a motion to expedite the
proceedings before the Ombudsman or raise i'1is right to speedy disposition irt his•
motion for reconsideration. The burden is not upon Rene to ensure that the wheels
of justice continue to turn. Rather, it is for the State to guarantee that the cases are
disposed of within a reasonable period. It is sufficient that Rene raised the
constitutional violation after the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended
informations and prior to his affaignmenL 28

At this point, the Court reiterates that the objective of the right to speedy
disposition of cases is to spur dispatch in the administration of justice and to
prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended
over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to a speedy trial, its objective is to
assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of
litigation or if otherwise, to have his guilt determined within the shortest possible
time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate
defense he may raise. This unrest and the tactical disadvantages carried by the
passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the
. d'1v1.dual :'"" 9
m

'FOR THESE REASONS, the petit10n is GRANT.ED. The

Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated October 11, 20] 7 in SB16-CRM-0326 and
SB16-CR.i\!I-0327 is SET ASIDE. The criminal cases against Rene C. Figueroa
are DISMISSED for violation of his constitutional right to the speedy disposition
of cases.

SO ORDERED.

28 Magante v. Sandiganbl(Jian, 836 Phil. l l tll.{, 1138 18)

29 Coscolluela v. Sandiganhayan, 7i4 Phil 55. 65 (2013).
 .
*.
Decision 1(1 G.R. Nos. 235965-66

WE CONCUR:

CACUIOA
.Associate Justice

JHOS~OPEZ
Associate Justice

CERTIFICA1.'lON

· Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case \Vas assigned to writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.