The Marcos Dynasty: Its Rise, Fall, and Revival

Temario C. Rivera

In the country’s political history, the Marcos clan is the most politically resilient,
dominant, and contentious among many political families. Through Pres. Ferdinand Marcos and
wife, Imelda Romualdez, the family ruled during the country’s most tumultuous political
periods. This included the almost 15-year dictatorship under martial rule (1972-1986), marked
by massive human rights abuses, systemic corruption and plunder of government resources,
and nationwide armed struggles waged by both the separatist Muslim movements in Mindanao
and the communist-led guerrilla movement. After a forced political exile in Hawaii following the
ouster of Marcos in 1986, the family returned to the Philippines in 1991 and promptly
recovered its political power in local and national politics with electoral victories starting in
1992. In a stunning reversal of fortunes, the Marcos family reclaimed the pinnacle of political
power in the country with Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.'s contested victory in the 2022 presidential
election.
Political Roots and Early Political Life
The first Marcos political patriarch, Mariano Marcos, a teacher and lawyer by profession
was an elected member of the 7th and 8th Philippine Legislatures under American colonial rule
(1925-1928 and 1928-1931). His son, Ferdinand Edralin Marcos first commanded national
attention when he was charged while a law student at the University of the Philippines with the
fatal shooting in 1935 of Julio Nalundasan, his father’s political rival. The young Marcos was
convicted of murder by the Court of First Instance at Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Appealing his
conviction with the Supreme Court, Marcos gained national celebrity status when he topped
the bar examination in 1939 while reviewing for the examination and preparing briefs for his
trial while imprisoned. Together with his three co-accused (Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, and
Quirino Lizardo), Ferdinand was finally acquitted in a 1940 ruling of the Supreme Court penned
by Justice Jose P. Laurel, Sr.1
After the Japanese occupation (1942-45), Marcos sought to portray himself as a guerrilla
leader and war hero, claiming to have organized a major guerrilla force called, “Ang Mga
Maharlika” (The Noble Men). However, between 1945 and 1948, various United States Army
officers and relevant U.S. Army documents concluded that the supposed “Maharlika” guerrilla
unit was fictitious and that “no such unit ever existed”. Official U.S. army investigations about
Marcos’ claims of organizing and leading such a guerrilla unit were variously described as
“distorted, exaggerated, fraudulent, contradictory, and absurd.” These official documents,
many of which were classified as secret until 1958, were discovered by the historian, Dr. Alfred
W. McCoy while doing research at the National Archives in Washington in 1985.2

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 Marcos’ hyperbolic claims about his World War II exploits as a military officer, guerrilla
leader, and the country’s “most decorated war hero” anchored much of the dramatic image-
building that propelled him to electoral prominence and victory after the war. In his first entry
into politics, Marcos ran for Congress under the Liberal Party then led by Pres. Elpidio Quirino
and was elected as district representative of the 2nd district of Ilocos Norte. He was elected for
three consecutive terms as district representative from 1949- 1961 although he cut short his
last term when he ran for the Senate in 1959. Marcos was a member of the historic 1949 House
of Representatives which included three future presidents of the republic (Ramon Magsaysay,
Diosdado Macapagal, and Ferdinand Marcos). During his term as House representative, Marcos
found himself embroiled in many controversial cases including the fake guerrilla scandal, the
immigration quota, import control, and tobacco subsidy rackets.
Preparing for the Presidency
His marriage in 1954 to Imelda Remedios Romualdez of the politically prominent
Romualdez clan of Leyte provided Marcos with an expanded political base. The most politically
influential of the clan, Daniel Z. Romualdez, a cousin of Imelda, served with Marcos as a
representative in Congress between 1949-1961 and Daniel was speaker of the House in 1957-
1962. Romualdez was one of the Nacionalista Party (NP) officers who facilitated Marcos’s
defection from the Liberal Party (LP) to the NP and eventual capture of the party’s presidential
nomination against Liberal Party head and re-electionist president Diosdado Macapagal in
1965.
In Marcos’ ascent to the presidency, Imelda proved to be a shrewd political partner.
Possessed of natural beauty and guile, she charmed the masses in electoral campaigns, helped
win over new allies, and disarmed potential antagonists. During the martial law years, she built
her power base enabled by her appointment as Governor of Metro Manila and Minister of
Human Settlements, in addition to her direct access to Marcos.
In 1959, Marcos ran for the Senate and topped the elections, outranking veteran
politicians such as Fernando Lopez, Mariano Cuenco, Eulogio Rodriguez, and Lorenzo Tañada.
Using the Senate as the institutional launching pad for his presidential ambition, Marcos
became Senate President in 1963 and in 1965 won his first term as president against incumbent
President Diosdado Macapagal. In his reelection bid in the 1969 presidential elections, Marcos
won an unprecedented second term. He defeated Senator Sergio Osmeña, Jr. in what most
observers agree was one of the dirtiest postwar elections, marked by the unbridled use of
“guns, goons, and gold.”
The period of constitutional presidential rule by Marcos from 1965 to 1972 saw the
resurgence of a militant mass nationalist movement and the birth of a new Communist Party
(CPP) in 1968 and its guerrilla army (New People’s Army) in 1969. In Mindanao, a long history of
separatist Muslim movements found its strongest reincarnation in the founding of the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the early seventies. A confluence of a worsening economic

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crisis, revolutionary mass organizing among the peasantry and workers by politicized
intellectuals and students, and deepening inter-elite class rivalry in this decade convulsed the
foundations of the shaky political order. Emblematic of this unrest was the bombing of the
opposition Liberal Party’s proclamation rally at Plaza Miranda in August 1971. Killing five
civilians and wounding close to a hundred, the bombing severely injured all the eight senatorial
candidates of the Liberal Party including party president Gerardo Roxas and party stalwarts
such as Jovito Salonga, Eddie Ilarde, Eva Estrada Kalaw, Sergio Osmeña, Jr., John Henry Osmeña,
and others.
Dictatorial Rule under Martial Law
In response to the Plaza Miranda bombing, Marcos suspended the writ of habeas
corpus and clamped down on the opposition in preparation for the eventual extension of his
rule through martial rule. Under the old 1935 constitution in place at that time, Marcos would
have been ineligible to run in the 1973 presidential elections after completing his two terms in
office. Several other highly suspicious bombings all over Metro Manila followed in the wake of
the Plaza Miranda bloodbath and ignited a train of events that led to the declaration of martial
rule in September 1972. To justify martial rule, Marcos invoked an alleged conspiracy of left-
wing and right-wing elements out to seize power.
Another casualty of this chaotic turn of events was the Constitutional Convention of
1971 which sought to introduce institutional reforms through the framework of a new
constitution. With the declaration of martial rule, the progressive agenda by reform-minded
convention delegates, many of whom were arrested or forced to flee the country, was set
aside. Marcos succeeded in having his version of a new constitution that suited his
authoritarian agenda approved by the remaining compliant or intimidated delegates and later
ratified by orchestrated “peoples’ assemblies.”
Under the dictatorship which lasted for almost 15 years (1972-1986), Marcos disabled
politically his rivals and critics from the legal opposition and unsupportive oligarchs. His most
consistent critics among the legal opposition were arrested, including Senators Benigno Aquino,
Jr., Jose W. Diokno, members of the progressive bloc of the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
several journalists and media personalities, and workers, students, and youth activists. Some of
his leading antagonists from the legal opposition were abroad and thus evaded arrests such as
media magnate, sugar bloc oligarch, and erstwhile ally Eugenio Lopez, Sr., and Sergio Osmeña,
Jr., the LP presidential candidate in 1969. Other critics managed to evade arrests such as
Senator Raul Manglapus and 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate Heherson Alvarez who
ended up as oppositionist political exiles against Marcos in the United States. However, by
foreclosing open legal opposition to the administration, the declaration of martial law also
drove thousands of activists and critics to the underground resistance and the armed struggle.
Martial rule took a heavy toll on the country’s political and economic development. As
documented by Amnesty International, some 70,000 people were arrested, mostly arbitrarily;

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34,000 people were tortured; 3,240 were killed by the military (not including many unreported
cases of killings and desaparecidos in the countryside). In official recognition of the victims of
martial rule, the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board (HRVCB), a body created by a law passed
by Congress in 2013 compensated 11,103 persons who were documented victims of human
rights violations under martial rule including cases of enforced disappearances and killings,
torture, and arbitrary detention.3 What can never be compensated for were the lost
opportunities for service to the country by the best and brightest of the sixties and seventies
generations who perished or disappeared (desaparecidos) in the struggle against the
dictatorship. To name a few, these martyrs included: lawyers Voltaire Garcia and Hermon
Lagman; doctors Bobby de la Paz and Juan Escandor, student leaders Edgar Jopson and Antonio
Tagamolila, poet Emmanuel Lacaba, feminist Ma. Lorena Barros, priests Zacarias Agatep and
Rosaleo Romano, and many others.4
Under martial rule, the economy suffered a continuous downturn from the global oil
crisis and recession in 1978 till the regime’s fall in 1986. Marcos and his cronies and technocrats
embarked on a “debt-driven” strategy of growth which increasingly proved unsustainable since
the 1978 global crisis.5 The powerful cronies closest to Marcos such as Eduardo Cojuangco and
Roberto Benedicto who controlled the coconut and sugar industries, respectively, maximized
the use of public resources for their private profit and undermined the modernization of these
key agricultural sectors.6 The Marcos technocrats proved no match for the political clout and
greed of the powerful cronies, including Imelda herself who engaged in the profligate use of
public resources for grandiose showcase projects. With the deepening economic crisis in the
early eighties, the brutal assassination of Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr., in August 1983 accentuated
a process of mass radicalization that led to the ouster of the dictatorship in February 1986 by a
peoples’ uprising combined with a military mutiny.
Reflecting the depth and reach of corruption during the martial rule of the Marcoses,
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) mandated by the government to
recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos family and its cronies had estimated this loot to be
as high as US$10 billion.7 In its more than 30 years of operation, the PCGG has recovered only
about US3.6 billion dollars (about P170 billion pesos). Moreover, in separate final rulings (2003,
2012, and 2017), the Supreme Court forfeited in favor of the government three identified bases
of the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth which include at least US$ 658 million in Swiss deposits,
more than US$3 million in assets and funds of the dummy company Arelma SA, and a jewelry
collection worth more than US$100,000.8
In a related case of possible money laundering, the eldest Marcos child, now Senator
Maria Imelda Josefa “Imee” Marcos was found to have assets in secret offshore trusts and
corporations in tax havens abroad which were not listed in her asset disclosure statements
required of government officials. A former representative and governor of Ilocos Norte, Imee
Marcos was listed as a beneficiary of Sintra Trust created in June 2002 in the British Virgin
Islands whose secretive operations could be used for illegal purposes including “fraud, tax

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evasion, and evading international sanctions”. Unearthed in documents taken from a
Panamanian law firm and corporate service provider, the papers linking Imee Marcos and other
personalities to these secretive offshore trusts and corporations were made public starting in
2016 by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). 9
In 2018, Imelda was sentenced by the Sandiganbayan to 11 years in prison for illegal
bank transfers worth US$200 million to Swiss foundations while governor of Metro Manila. But
she has managed to evade imprisonment due to judicial appeals. Further dramatizing the
impunity of the Marcoses and their cronies, the Sandiganbayan in 2018 dismissed three
separate cases of ill-gotten wealth totaling some P103. 3 billion pesos against Imelda and
Marcos’s cronies including the late Roberto Benedicto. In dismissing these cases, the
Sandiganbayan faulted the PCGG for “critical defects” in the presentation of material evidence
which could be ultimately traced to the loss of interest and glaring prosecutorial lapses by
subsequent pro-Marcos administrations amidst the restored political power of the family
starting in 1992.10
The Return to Power of the Marcoses
Exiled in Hawaii after the end of the dictatorship, the Marcoses were never out of the
political limelight. Politicians of various stripes visited and parleyed with them and Marcos’s
loyalists were linked to various destabilization and coup attempts against the beleaguered
Aquino administration. Marcos died in Hawaii on 28 September 1989 at age 72 but it was not
till 7 September 1993 that his remains were allowed to be flown back to the Philippines by Pres.
Fidel V. Ramos. The successor to Pres. Corazon Aquino, Ramos was a Marcos relative and head
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) when he defected to the anti-Marcos military camp in
the February 1986 uprising. Led by Imelda Marcos, the other members of the exiled family
returned to the Philippines in 1991 during the incumbency of Pres. Corazon Aquino.
Barely six months after her return to the country, Imelda dramatically announced her
political presence and ambition by running for the presidency in the May 1992 elections. In a
field of seven of the biggest political names during that time, Fidel V. Ramos, the outgoing
defense secretary of the Corazon Aquino administration, won the presidency with a small
plurality of 23. 58% of the votes cast. He won over the former Agrarian Reform Secretary
Miriam Defensor-Santiago who received 19.72% of the votes and claimed to have been cheated
of victory. Reflecting the still significant political support for the Marcoses, Imelda got 10.32%
of the votes, ahead of two leading Marcos oppositionists, Jovito Salonga (10.16%) and Salvador
Laurel, (3.40%). Notably, a super Marcos crony and oligarch, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., also ran
and placed third with 18.17% of the votes. Had Imelda Marcos and Cojuangco joined forces in
this election, their combined votes could have won them the presidency.
Imelda Marcos decided to go back to her provincial roots and the Romualdez bailiwick in
Leyte to mark her first electoral victory as a district representative in this province in the 1995
elections. After serving one term as a district representative in Leyte (1995-1998), Imelda

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shifted to the Marcos stronghold in Ilocos Norte and represented the second district for three
consecutive terms from 2010-2019. After serving a total of 12 years as district representative,
Imelda decided to phase out of active electoral politics after her last term in 2016-2019.
Already 90 years old, she opted not to run in the 2019 elections to give way to the younger
members of the extended Marcos clan.
As early as 1992, the Marcos children started to consolidate their ancestral provincial
political base in Ilocos Norte. The only son and most politically ambitious of the children,
Marcos Jr., (Bongbong) served as vice-governor and governor of Ilocos Norte during the
dictatorship. After his return from exile in Hawaii, Bongbong first won as representative of
Ilocos Norte’s second district in 1992. He was elected as governor of the province for three
consecutive terms (1998-2007) and served one more term as district representative (2007-
2010). Signaling his goal for a national position, he ran successfully for the Senate in 2010 under
the Nacionalista Party and served the full term (2010-2016). In 2016, he made a bid for the vice
presidency but narrowly lost by 263,473 votes to the Liberal Party’s Maria Leonor G. Robredo.
Marcos Jr. contested the results of the 2016 vice-presidential election but the Supreme Court
sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) unanimously junked Marcos’s election
protest. The recount of the ballots in three contested provinces identified by Marcos showed
Robredo increasing her lead by 15,093 votes over the original final count.11 By the time he ran
for the vice presidency, Marcos Jr. had completed a total of 21 years as an elected official (six
years as a district representative, nine years as governor, and six years as a senator.)
The eldest child of the Marcoses, Maria Imelda Josefa R. Marcos (Imee), is a major
political player in her own right. During the dictatorship, Imee served as chairperson of
Kabataang Barangay (KB) and an assembly member of the Batasan Pambansa. As KB chair, she
was accused of being behind the killing of Archimedes Trajano, a student who questioned in a
public assembly the propriety of Imee’s appointment to the position. Helping consolidate her
family’s dynastic rule in Ilocos Norte, Imee served as district representative for three
consecutive terms (1998-2007) and as governor for three consecutive terms (2010-2019). In the
2019 elections, she won a senate seat, running as a Nacionalista party member with the
coalition of Hugpong ng Pagbabago organized by Mayor Sara Duterte and with the blessings of
Pres. Rodrigo Duterte. Excluding her current term as senator, Imee has completed 18 years of
elective positions (nine years as district representative and nine years as governor).
The 2019 elections not only enabled another Marcos to occupy a strategic position of
national prominence (Senator-elect Imee Marcos) but also further cemented the clan’s
domination of Ilocos Norte politics. Already in control of the second congressional district of the
province since 1992 (total of 27 years) and the governorship since 1998 (total of 21 years), the
Marcoses added Laoag city, the provincial capital, to their political bailiwick with the election of
Michael Marcos Keon as city mayor in 2019.12 A nephew of the late Pres. Marcos, Keon ended
the long reign of the Fariñas political family as mayors of Laoag city for a total of 21 years since
1998. Moreover, the Marcoses have also started positioning the younger members of their

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successor generation, notably with the unopposed election of governor in 2019 of Matthew
Marcos Manotoc, son of Imee Marcos. The 2019 elections also saw the election of Eugenio
Angelo Marcos Barba, another nephew of the late president and former vice-governor of the
province, as representative of the second district. In turn, Gov. Matthew Marcos Manotoc rules
the province with Cecilia Araneta-Marcos as her vice governor, widow of former Sanggunian
Panlalawigan member Mariano Marcos II, also a nephew of the late president.
Dramatizing their complete domination of electoral contests in their home province of
Ilocos Norte, the extended Marcos clan won all the major local positions in the 2022 elections.
Matthew Marcos Manotoc, eldest son of Imee Marcos won a second term as governor together
with her vice governor, Cecilia Araneta Marcos. The two congressional districts are represented
by Ferdinand Alexander Araneta (Sandro) Marcos III for the first district and Eugenio Angelo
Marcos Barba for the 2nd district. Sandro Marcos, the eldest son of Pres. Marcos, Jr. was
appointed as a Senior Deputy Majority Leader of the House of Representatives in his first term
of office. The Laoag city mayorship is occupied by Michael Marcos Keon, a nephew of the late
president. In the 2022 elections, the other long-established political family in the province, the
Fariñases, suffered a major debacle losing all key elective positions to the Marcoses.
The Marcoses’ Wealth
The legendary wealth of the Marcoses continues to be surrounded by controversy
involving hidden and ill-gotten resources, murky offshore transactions and deposits,
ostentatious spending by family members, and unending litigations about ownership of
resources here and abroad between the government, the family, and its cronies. Suggestive of
the magnitude of these resources in question has been the P170 billion pesos already
recovered by the PCGG despite the acknowledged lack of support by various administrations of
such efforts.
In her 2018 Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN), Rep. Imelda Marcos
reported a net worth of P933.80 million pesos which made her the third richest member of the
House of Representatives after billionaires Michael Romero of 1 PACMAN party list (net worth
of P8,108 billion pesos and Rep. Alfredo Benitez of Negros Occidental (net worth of P1,016.
billion pesos). In his 2015 SALN (latest publicly available), Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. reported a net
worth of P211 million pesos while Imee Marcos stated a net worth of P24.5 million pesos in her
2017 SALN. What is remarkable about these officially reported huge incomes is that none
seems traceable to a stable source of livelihood beyond the compensations they have received
as elected officials or reported shares from the late Pres. Marcos’ estate. For instance,
Bongbong Marcos reported a net worth of only P600,000. pesos in 1992 when he was first
elected as district representative but this ballooned to P211 million by 2015. He listed three
companies, two jointly owned with his wife but one of these folded up by 2010 and the other
two reported millions of net losses. Imee Marcos states that much of her wealth is accounted
for by personal assets in the form of jewelry, paintings, and artifacts, and shares in various
corporations that are all “under litigation.” Together with her family members, she has also
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been implicated in questionable transactions as a beneficiary in offshore trust companies such
as Sintra Trust in the British Virgin Islands.
Educational Accomplishments and Electoral Bases of Support
For the Marcoses, the educational track record of the family members especially with
the third generation, has not played a major role in the ability to win and hold on to power. The
rise to power of the original patriarchs, Mariano Marcos and son Ferdinand, was linked to the
exercise of their professions that helped push them to political prominence. Mariano Marcos
was both a teacher and a lawyer while his wife, Josefa, was also a teacher, and Ferdinand
excelled as a student at the University of the Philippines, topping the bar examination in 1939.
In contrast, both Bongbong and Imee’s claims of educational achievement have been mired in
controversy. During the martial law period, both Bongbong and Imee spent years abroad as
students but neither one completed any formal academic degree from any of the academic
institutions they attended. Bongbong reports that he spent some years at Oxford University and
the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania while Imee was at Princeton University.
Moreover, Imee claims to have graduated from the University of the Philippines’ College of Law
but this has been denied by officials of the university. In an ironic twist of fate, two generations
of Marcos political leaders faced serious charges of falsifying important records---war records
by the father and academic records by the children---but these did not disadvantage them from
ascending the political ladder.
It is not surprising for the Marcoses to have easily returned to power in their traditional
provincial bailiwick of Ilocos Norte where their deep and wide networks of patronage nurtured
for several decades have always been a distinct political advantage. Moreover, there is also a
strong sense of outrage among their fellow Ilocanos that their local hero, Ferdinand Marcos,
was betrayed and unjustly treated by his erstwhile national allies and cronies in the events
leading to the ouster of the dictatorship. In addition, the Marcoses and their supporters have
crafted a counter-narrative about the dictatorship years as a golden period of development and
stability contrary to the overwhelming material evidence of economic mismanagement,
corruption, plunder, gross human rights violations, and political instability. Finally, the
Marcoses have shown shrewd political pragmatism in choosing alliances with other powerful
political families such as the Villars, Macapagal-Arroyos, Estradas, and Dutertes who have
supported their political agenda at given times. No less than Pres. Duterte has openly
acknowledged the fact that then Gov. Imee Marcos was one of her strongest supporters in the
2016 presidential elections. In this light, it was not unusual for Pres. Duterte, also a known
admirer of Pres. Marcos, to have facilitated the highly divisive burial of Marcos’ remains at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (Heroes Memorial) in November 2016, a decision legitimized by a
Supreme Court ruling. Together with Mayor Sara Duterte and former president Macapagal-
Arroyo, Imee also played a key role in ousting Rep. Pantaleon Alvarez as House Speaker. This
House coup also marginalized a local rival in Ilocos Norte politics, then Rep. and deputy speaker
Rodolfo Fariñas, an ally of the deposed speaker.

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The 2022 National Elections and the Marcos Presidential Victory 13

In the country’s post-EDSA political history since 1986, the May 2022 presidential election
marked the first time the two most powerful political families running as a team won the
presidency and vice presidency with majority votes. Stunningly, the Marcos family is once again
on top of the country’s political establishment with the proclamation by Congress of Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Jr. as the 17th president of the republic. With Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte as the
vice-president, the administration led by Marcos, Jr., is now set to define the country’s line of
march in what may prove to be the most challenging circumstances in the country’s recent
history.

Ousted from power and forced to go into exile after a combined military mutiny and
peoples’ uprising in February 1986, the Marcos family systematically plotted its political
restoration after being allowed back into the country in 1991, ironically to face corruption
charges. As early as 1992, the family jump-started a political comeback with the former first
lady, Imelda R. Marcos, running for the presidency, and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. for the
governorship of Ilocos Norte, the family’s political fiefdom. Mrs. Marcos lost her presidential
bid, receiving a little over 10% of the votes but Marcos, Jr. easily won as governor.

It is instructive to note that in the early 1990s, the broad pro-Marcos national electoral
base remained at almost 30%. In retrospect, it appears that the national electoral base of the
Marcoses at about 30% proved to be a reliable resource for their succeeding bids for national
positions. In his successful run for the Senate in 2010, Marcos, Jr. received almost 35% of the
votes while in his failed bid for the vice presidency in 2016, he got more than 34%. Following
this voting trend, Marcos, Jr.’s sister, Maria Imelda “Imee” Marcos also received about 34% of
the votes in her winning bid for the Senate in 2019.

The Presidential and Vice-Presidential Contest: A victory foretold?

There was an uncanny alignment between the pre-election survey results and the final
canvassed counts as reported by the Commission on Elections (Comelec). While some election
watchdogs and opposition groups continue to cast doubt on the integrity of the automated
election system, the unprecedented election results favoring the Marcos-Duterte team require
some explanation backed up by some empirical validity and analytic plausibility.

A confluence of different factors helps untangle the events that shaped the final outcome.
First, there exists the continuing reality of election bailiwicks rooted in regional-linguistic
identities and loyalties as a critical resource base for national candidates. Second, the impact of
President Duterte’s position on the campaign especially considering his continued high survey
ratings till the end of his term needs to be evaluated. Third, the extent to which the systematic
campaign of disinformation and historical revisionism, especially in social media, impacted
voter behavior also needs explanation. Closely related to this factor was the puzzle of why the
political narrative and messaging of the Marcoses seemed to have resonated far better with

9
many of the voters, especially with the poorer and disadvantaged social classes. Fourth, what
was the impact of the divided opposition on the campaign and voter choices? Fifth, what was
the overall effect of the huge financial and organizational resources of the Marcos-Duterte
team especially with the support of other powerful families and oligarchs, and various local
government officials? A final factor requires an examination of the continuing problems and
impact of an automated electoral system (AES), especially under the management of a
Commission on Elections (Comelec) and a foreign service provider (Smartmatic) whose past and
current records have not inspired trust and confidence in the system.

The regional distribution of votes and election bailiwicks

Many questions were raised on the credibility and verifiability of the election returns
generated by the vote counting machines as reported by the Comelec. What can be inferred
from the official election results? (See Table 1)

On 26 May 2022, Congress acting as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed former
senator Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., and Mayor Sara Duterte as the new president and vice-
president. With 98.84% or 171 out of 173 of the certificates of the canvas (CoCs) counted,
Marcos, Jr. received 31,629,783 votes or 58.77% of the votes counted while Duterte received
32,208,417 or 61.33%. Presidential candidate Vice-President Robredo trailed far behind with
15,035,773 votes (27.94% of votes counted) and her running mate, Senator Francisco
Pangilinan had 9,329,207 votes (17.82%).

In comparison with the 2016 vice-presidential contest which also featured Robredo and
Marcos, Jr. as the top two candidates, the 2022 presidential contest between them as the
leading bets showed a sharp reversal of results. In 2016, Robredo won over Marcos, Jr., by a
narrow margin of 278,566 votes after a recount in some contested precincts by the Supreme
Court in response to an election protest filed by losing candidate Marcos, Jr. In the vice-
presidential race in 2016, Robredo won in nine of the regions while Marcos, Jr. prevailed in the
other nine, including the CAR, NCR, and the Overseas Absentee Voters.

In the 2022 presidential contest, Robredo won in only two regions, her home region, (Bicol-
Region 5), and Region 6 (Iloilo, Capiz, Aklan, Antique, Negros Occidental, and Guimaras), a
traditional Liberal Party and an opposition stronghold. On full display in the May 2022 election
was the continuing potency of regional bailiwick votes but lopsidedly in favor of the Marcos-
Duterte team. In the Ilocano heartland of Regions 1 and 2, Marcos, Jr. enjoyed a huge lead of
3.66 million votes over Robredo, equivalent to an 82% share of the total votes in both regions
while the latter received only about 9.5% of the total votes. Showing the same loyalty to a
homegrown candidate, the Bicol region also gave Robredo a 1.88 million vote edge over
Marcos, Jr. and received a 73% share of the region’s total votes. However, Marcos Jr. still
managed to get a 17% share of the Bicolano votes, bigger than the 10% vote share of Robredo
in the two Ilocano bailiwicks of Regions 1 and 2.

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 Table 1: Election Returns as Reported by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC
Transparency Server as of 13 May 2022 and provided by the National Movement for Free
Elections (NAMFREL). Processed by Dr. Felix P. Muga, CenPEG Senior Research Fellow.

Predictably, Marcos, Jr. also won handily in the Duterte bailiwick of the Davao provinces
(Region 11), with a winning margin of 1.93 million votes over Robredo or a 79% share of the
total regional votes. Pacquiao had more votes than Robredo in Region 11, getting an 8% share
of the total (202,581) to the latter’s 5% (134,658). Pacquiao also placed second to Marcos, Jr. in
Regions 10 and 12, getting more votes than Robredo in these Mindanao areas.

Unlike in the 2016 elections when Robredo won over Marcos in four regions in Mindanao
(ARMM, Regions 9, 10, and 13), she ended up losing in all the Mindanao regions in 2022.
Robredo’s big loss in what is now the Bangsa Moro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(BARMM) was also surprising since she beat Marcos, Jr. by a wide margin here in 2016 (44% vs.

11
27%). This region suffered the worst atrocities during the Marcos dictatorship and the common
view lingered that this would work against Marcos, Jr. While some of the powerful local clans
supported Marcos, Jr., notably the Tans of Sulu and a faction of the divided Mangudadatu
families, Robredo also managed to get the endorsement of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), one faction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Hatamans of Basilan.
However, the Duterte factor, especially considering the Marcos-Sara Duterte team-up was the
new element that was not prominent in the Robredo-Marcos, Jr., faceoff in the 2016 election.
In 2022, Marcos, Jr. turned the tables against Robredo by winning 55% of the BARMM votes
against Robredo’s 24%.

The voting results in the National Capital Region (NCR) were also instructive in terms of the
seeming contradictions and unexpected outcomes. The NCR has the largest concentration of
the country’s most affluent families and educated middle classes. Compared with the other
regions, the NCR has also the easiest access and most exposure to all kinds of media including
the various social media platforms. It is the country’s business and financial center and hosts
the most heterogeneous demographic mix of individuals coming from all parts of the country.
Traditionally an opposition political center, the NCR, surprised many with the victory of Marcos,
Jr. in the 2016 election where he received 46% of the votes against Robredo’s 28%. With the
entry of Manila Mayor Francisco Domagoso “Isko Moreno” in the presidential race in 2022,
many expected the election in the NCR to be more competitive. But once again, Marcos, Jr.
prevailed in both the NCR and the city of Manila where Isko Moreno managed to win only in his
Manila congressional district. For the whole of the NCR, Marcos, Jr. received 55% of the votes
against Robredo’s 30% while Moreno struggled with only 9% of the votes. Moreover, Marcos,
Jr. also won in all 16 cities of the NCR and the municipality of Pateros. In the two cities in the
NCR with the biggest number of votes, Quezon City and Manila, Marcos, Jr. also led by huge
margins over Robredo. In Quezon City, Marcos Jr. received 57% of the votes against Robredo’s
34% while in the city of Manila, the former got 40% of the votes compared with Robredo’s,
22%. Mayor Isko Moreno placed second to Marcos, Jr. in Manila with 34% of the votes.

For the election contest at the provincial level, Robredo won in only 15 out of the country’s
81 provinces. Of these 15 provinces, six belong to her home region (Region 5- Albay, Camarines
Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon), and five provinces in an
opposition regional stronghold (Region 6- Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, and Negros Occidental).
The remaining three provinces that provided Robredo with winning margins included Rizal,
Quirino, and Biliran. Robredo won in three of the top 10 vote-rich provinces, (Negros
Occidental, Iloilo, and Rizal) but only by an average winning margin over Marcos, Jr. of 140,000
votes. In contrast, Marcos, Jr. posted an average winning margin of 608,000 votes over Robredo
in the seven other top-10 vote-rich provinces (Cebu, Cavite, Pangasinan Laguna, Bulacan
Batangas, and Pampanga). For instance, in these seven provinces, Marcos, Jr. led Robredo by
the following huge margins of victory: Pangasinan, 1.12 million votes; Cebu, 897,313; Bulacan,
643,894; Cavite, 479,154; Laguna, 418,862; Batangas, 381,431; and Pampanga, 310,863.

12
 What seemed incredulous about the final Comelec results was that Robredo had added
only 601,863 thousand votes to her 2016 total or a measly 4% increase. In contrast, Marcos, Jr.
added 17,489,532 million to his 2016 votes or an increase of 124%!

Explaining the Marcos, Jr.-Sara Duterte electoral victory

Long supported by historical data on electoral behavior in the country, the regional-
linguistic ties of candidates with voters as seen in voting bailiwicks continue to be a critical
factor in voter preferences. In the 2022 presidential elections, these regional bailiwicks proved
to be formidable factors once again as shown in the initial advantage enjoyed by Marcos, Jr.
and Sara Duterte with the melding of their voting strongholds, the so-called “solid North and
solid South” votes. Comparing the voting strength of their tested regional bailiwicks (Regions 1
and 2 for Marcos plus Region 11 of the Dutertes vs. Regions 5 and 6 for Robredo), Marcos, Jr.
immediately gained a 1.8 million advantage over vice-president Robredo. But the key question
was the domination by the Marcos-Duterte team in all the regions outside of the two regional
bailiwicks won by Robredo since bailiwick votes alone cannot explain the outcome except in
closely contested elections.

High trust ratings for President Duterte and election impact

A confluence of several factors contributed to defining the final election verdict. The
continuing high trust and performance ratings of President Duterte up to the end of his term
impacted voter preferences. As shown by the country’s electoral record since 1986, a
presidential candidate endorsed by or closely associated with the outgoing president with low
trust and performance ratings usually ended up losing the election. The only exception to this
trend appeared to be the victory of the Aquino administration-backed Fidel V. Ramos in the
1992 election in a closely contested match marred by allegations of massive fraud and vote-
buying. Unlike his predecessors who all ended their terms with low trust ratings below 50% (as
low as 10% for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo), President Duterte set a precedent with an average
high trust rating of not less than 70% for his six years in office. As shown by all credible public
opinion survey groups, Duterte maintained these high ratings even during the height of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Even the allegations of coddling close allies charged with massive
corruption (Pharmally scandal),14 and the red-tagging of opposition groups and personalities
did not dent his high trust ratings. In terms of voter preferences, the high trust ratings enjoyed
by the outgoing president apparently translated to electoral support for the team (Marcos, Jr.-
Sara Duterte) perceived to be most closely aligned with the persona and policies of the
outgoing president and administration.

While Mr. Duterte openly expressed his misgivings about the candidacy of Marcos, Jr.,
calling him a “weak leader” with no significant achievements, he did not also endorse an
alternative candidate for the presidency which could have potentially weakened the Duterte
support base for Marcos. In short, a voter who trusted President Duterte was also more likely
to vote for a team that included the president’s daughter, Mayor Sara, a natural successor, and
surrogate for a preferred Duterte legacy. A clear indicator of this trust and voter preference

13
affinity was seen in the significant increase in survey ratings for Marcos, Jr. when Mayor Sara
decided to be her vice-president, shifting much of her earlier electoral support base for the
presidency to Marcos, Jr., especially in Mindanao. A CenPEG (Center for People Empowerment
in Governance) correlational and regression test of the actual votes received by Marcos, Jr., and
Mayor Sara showed a very high significant positive relationship which meant that a vote for
Marcos, Jr. almost always translated to a vote for Duterte and vice-versa.15

Disinformation campaigns and political narratives

As early as 2014, the Marcos family reportedly had an arrangement with the now defunct
British political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica to rebrand the family image and revise the
narratives of the Marcos dictatorship era in preparation for the national candidacy of Marcos,
Jr. Social media platforms, especially Facebook and later TikTok, became the main conduits for
this rebranding campaign to put the Marcoses in a good light and push their major political
rivals, especially Robredo, on the defensive through systematic disinformation campaigns. In
consonance with this rebranding and disinformation campaign, the Marcos camp crafted a
political message built around restoring an alleged golden era during the martial law years and
moving forward through a “Unity Team” led by Marcos, Jr., and Mayor Sara Duterte. Consistent
with this campaign strategy, Marcos, Jr. deliberately avoided public debates and fora to shield
himself from the inconvenient questions about his unimpressive personal and government
track record and sought to project, instead, an inclusive personality relatable to many.

It appeared from the election results that most voters embraced much of the Marcos
rebranding and disinformation messages or remained unmoved by critics who sought to fact-
check these false claims. Part of the explanation was in the generational gap between the older
voters who directly experienced the hardships under the dictatorship and the younger
generation (40 years and below) who did not have those life-defining engagements with martial
rule and were thus more vulnerable to historical revisionist accounts.

But another explanation was in the perception of many that the challenging times required
a continuity agenda rather than a new change in leadership as shown in the unusually high trust
ratings enjoyed by President Duterte. Thus, in the context of an extraordinary crisis such as the
illegal drugs problem and the COVID-19 pandemic, it appeared that many voters were willing to
provide more slack to the harsh and fatal excesses of authoritarianism displayed by Duterte.
Radiating a sharply different inclusive persona and leadership style, Robredo’s campaign largely
resonated with the educated middle classes, students, and professionals but failed to change
the views of the considerable number of Duterte supporters, mostly from the disadvantaged
social classes and families. Ever in search of a strong and decisive “savior leader” who will
address their social and economic woes and political marginalization, these voters opted, once
again, to test the promises and limits of the presidential team most closely linked to the
country’s authoritarian political tradition.

14
Organizational and financial resources

Another extraordinary feature of the May 2022 election was the support given by the
country’s most powerful and influential political families and oligarchs to the Marcos, Jr. -
Duterte team. Among the most prominent of these families were those of former president
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo who was a key orchestrator of the Marcos, Jr.– Duterte team, the
Villars, Estradas, Floirendo-Lagdameos, Singsons, and the Romualdezes. As shown in the
celebratory gatherings after the victory of Marcos, Jr., the following powerful grouping of
business tycoons also supported his candidacy: Ramon S. Ang of San Miguel Corporation, Lance
Gokongwei of Cebu Pacific, Andrew and Kevin Tan of Megaworld, Sabin Aboitiz of the Aboitiz
group of companies, Michael Tan of the Lucio Tan group of companies, Hans Sy and Tessie Sy-
Coson of the SM Group, and former Senate President Manny Villar and Senator Cynthia Villar
and children Mark and Camille (newly elected senator and reelected representative,
respectively) of the Villar business conglomerate.

The breakdown of the opposition Liberal Party since the 2016 election magnified this
Marcos-Duterte advantage and Robredo lost an important organizational resource base that
helped her win the vice presidency in 2016. Lacking this asset on the ground, the Robredo
campaign depended largely on a movement of passionate volunteer campaigners working with
limited resources and with little or no previous experience in political campaigning. Robredo
also received several endorsements from former government officials and some local
politicians but the former had limited political reach and influence after retirement and the
latter was more focused on attending to their own election concerns.

As partially indicated in their reported expenditures, candidates running for a national

office required billions of pesos to run a serious campaign. Compiling data from Nielsen Ad Intel
which tracks expenditures on media ads, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism
(PCIJ) reported that at least P20 billion pesos were already spent by candidates for political ads
on mainstream media (TV, radio, print, and billboards but excluding social media expenses) for
the period from January 2021 to the end of March 2022. Among the senatorial candidates, the
biggest spenders for this period were Mark Villar - 2.20 billion, Joel Villanueva – 2.05 billion,
Sherwin Gatchalian and Alan Peter Cayetano - 1.55 billion, and Loren Legarda – 1.11 billion. The
five other winning senatorial candidates in the May election (Miguel Zubiri, Jinggoy Estrada, JV
Ejercito, Risa Hontiveros, and Chiz Escudero) also spent an average of P538 million on political
ads on mainstream media alone for this period, not counting the two months before the May 9
election day.

For this same period, the following presidential candidates had the following expenses:
Marcos, Jr. – 1.4 billion pesos, Robredo – 1.4 billion, Lacson – 1.20 billion, and Isko Moreno –
1.19 billion. If the expenditures reported in Marcos, Jr.’s SOCE (Statement of Campaign
Expenditures) were added to his earlier expenses, he would have spent at least P2.02 billion, a
conservative estimate since there were other expenses difficult to track including social media
costs, influencer-celebrity fees, and financial largesse for political allies and local government
officials including resources for massive vote-buying. Indeed, while not necessarily decisive for

15
presidential elections as shown by the defeat of far more moneyed politicians such as Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. in 1992, Manny Villar in 2010, and Mar Roxas in 2016, the possession of huge
financial resources is always a distinct asset, especially for candidates running for a national
office.

The Comelec, Smartmatic, and the Automated Election System (AES)

First implemented on a nationwide scale in the 2010 national elections, the automated
election system (AES) introduced by the Comelec with a foreign-owned provider, Smartmatic
continue to ignite questions about the lack of verifiability of the election results as reported by
the vote counting machines (VCMs). Many of these election-related problems are rooted in the
lack of confidence in the Comelec’s performance as a constitutional body mandated to run
elections and aggravated by the lack of accountability of the AES provider, Smartmatic. The
Comelec’s technical dependence on Smartmatic in running the AES and the failure or
inadequacy of the safety mechanisms and auditing protocols provided by law to oversee the
AES had resulted in a system whose contested results cannot be validated or confirmed
conclusively, short of the actual count of the paper ballots.

In the May 2022 national elections, many of the problems that have hounded the AES
surfaced once again, casting doubts on the veracity and accuracy of the results. The first set of
problems focused on the institutional structure and organizational competence of the Comelec
about its expected independence and professionalism as a constitutional body. For instance,
the appointment by the president of the Comelec commissioners including its chairperson is
not mediated by an initial process of public scrutiny of the appointees, at least something akin
to the Judicial and Bar Council of the judiciary. Moreover, the Comelec must attend to a quasi-
judicial function of resolving electoral disputes and protests that detracts from its primary
function of running a credible and accountable electoral process. Finally, Comelec has failed to
systematically develop its institutional competence to run the AES without depending on a
foreign provider (Smartmatic) by ensuring that a critical mass of its personnel including some of
the commissioners is knowledgeable about the AES.

As highlighted once again in the May 2022 elections, the safety and auditing mechanisms
provided by the AES Law were inadequate or not fully implemented. To start with, the source
code (the human-readable version of a computer program) review process, as in past elections,
had not been conclusively finished by local reviewers. The digital signatures required by law for
members of the electoral boards and board of canvassers to authenticate transmitted
electronic data were implemented partially in only three areas, Cebu City, Davao City, and some
NCR cities. Moreover, there were alarming reports that the secure digital cards (SDs) used in
each vote counting machine (VCM) had been compromised because of the non-usage of the
WORM format (write-once-read-many) in many precincts. Earlier, a close business crony of
President Duterte, Dennis Uy of Davao City won the contract to deliver the VCMs and SD cards
to each precinct all over the country, raising issues of propriety and conflict of interest.

16
 The other safeguards in the existing Automated Election Law, notably the Random Manual
Audit (RMA), the Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), and the count review done by the
Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) all fell short of ensuring the verifiability
of election results. For instance, the RMA that mandates counting the ballots of one randomly
selected precinct per congressional district is a case of a “too little, too late” auditing protocol,
usually finished when the national candidates have already been proclaimed. The Comelec
reported that the RMA of votes finished after 34 days showed a 99.959% match between the
audited ballots and the count as reported by the vote-counting machines. Strictly speaking, this
accuracy match equivalent to five errors in 10,000 did not comply with the required 99.999%
accuracy or one error out of 20,000 as mandated by law.

Made available for the visual inspection of each voter, the VVPAT only confirms the
veracity of a voter’s final choice of candidates but does not figure in the process of verifying the
machine-generated precinct count. The PPCRV counting review process compares the machine-
generated precinct election returns with the printed and transmitted election returns it
receives but does not verify the accuracy and authenticity of the precinct machine counts
themselves. In short, questions about the accuracy and authenticity of machine-generated vote
counts, if challenged, can only be conclusively resolved by the manual count of the paper
ballots in each clustered precinct to be observed by representatives from the political parties
and concerned citizens’ groups. However, recent studies indicate that the VVPAT with both its
machine-readable data (QR code) and human-readable data as verified by each voter may serve
as an alternative countercheck to the accuracy of the machine counts.

Considering the many questions about the automated process and announced results in
the 2022 elections, especially for the presidential contest, concerned civil society groups, and
personalities filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the Comelec to preserve all
transmission logs on the election returns (ERs) as a basis for authenticating the source and time
when the VCMs did such processes. This legal action was initiated by a former undersecretary
of the Department of Communications and Technology, retired general and engineer Eliseo Rio,
Jr., former Comelec Commissioner and NAMFREL (National Citizens Movement for Free
Elections) chair, Augusto “Gus” Lagman, and Mr. Franklin Ysaac, a former bank manager and
financial consultant with extensive experience in banking software. Later, this group also
exposed another alleged anomaly when they discovered the use of a single IP address (Internet
Protocol) in transmitting results for more than 20,000 precincts to a telco exchange network
before these results were transmitted to the laddered system of transmission mandated by law
(precincts to municipalities and cities, to provinces, and the Comelec central server). Rio and his
colleagues asserted that the use of a single IP address for the questioned returns and the
existence of the unauthorized telco exchange server was a clear violation of the AES law.

In response to the legal and technical challenges posed by Rio’s group and related petitions
on the contested results of the 2022 elections, the Comelec decided to disqualify Smartmatic in
November 2023 from all its procurement activities.16 In disqualifying Smartmatic, Comelec
explained that the company was allegedly involved in providing bribe money to former Comelec
chair, Andres Bautista, for which the latter is now charged with money laundering, conspiracy,

17
and bribery by the U.S. Homeland Security. Both Smartmatic and Bautista denied these
accusations, pointing out that there has been no indictment yet in the U.S.17 However,
Comelec’s controversial administrative reasoning in disqualifying Smartmatic, in effect, clears
the company as well as Comelec from many of the alleged defects and flaws of the automated
election system since 2010.

Such continuing problems with the AES have pushed many concerned civil society groups,
election watchdogs, and some legislators to consider shifting to a system that ensures secret
manual voting and public counting assisted by computers and projectors in each precinct.
Under this proposed alternative, the transmission and canvassing of the votes could still be
done electronically since a publicly authenticated election return in each precinct is now
available as a basis for any possible complaints and electoral challenges. The proposal is now
called the Hybrid Election System (HES). Some bills were filed in the 18th Congress adopting the
provisions of the HES with variations including a proposal to livestream the vote count which
can be used as evidence in an electoral protest.

The adoption of an alternative verifiable and accountable election system (such as the HES)
can be part of a body of political and electoral reforms, including measures to minimize if not
eliminate voters’ vulnerability to various kinds of intimidation including vote-buying and
disinformation; regulating and weakening the control of political dynasties over our political-
electoral process; developing strong, programmatic political parties; and ensuring the
independence and non-partisanship of the Comelec.

The state of the opposition and political alignments

In the May 2022 election, the broad political opposition against the Marcos, Jr.–Duterte
alliance was divided into at least four major factions led by presidential bets Robredo, Isko
Moreno, Lacson, and Pacquiao. The Left parties were represented by two major formations
with the bigger party, the Makabayan bloc officially supporting Robredo, and the smaller one,
Partido Lakas ng Masa, putting up its presidential candidate, the trade union leader, Leody de
Guzman. Partly because of these internal divisions and differences, the broad opposition failed
to mount a unified challenge against the administration team and suffered a major electoral
defeat in 2022. Within the opposition bloc, the new forces that were inspired by Robredo who
also tried to distance herself from the old Liberal Party, show some promise of reconstituting
themselves into two possible formations. The first option is to operate as a broad NGO-type
movement to help address the concrete socio-economic needs of disadvantaged families and
communities. The second possibility is to operate as a political movement that eventually
transforms into a new political party to contest elections. These are not mutually exclusive
options but the lines of engagement will depend initially on the actions of Robredo as the
recognized leader of the movement. While Robredo’s role is essential in the early stages, it
must be complemented and supplanted later by an inclusive programmatic base of unity and
action that could be led or complemented by new leaders with significant mass bases of
support.

18
 No stranger to direct electoral engagements, particularly since the resumption of elections
in 1987, the Left parties continue to face severe structural constraints provoked by radical
changes in the political economy of globalized capitalism such as flexible work contracts (ENDO)
that have weakened working class organizing and solidarity. Moreover, these parties continue
to face systematic harassment of their political and organizing efforts seen as threats to long-
established elite dominance. In particular, the Makabayan bloc has faced existential dangers to
their individual and group political participation in the public sphere with their systematic
targeting by police and military authorities through the weaponization of laws such as the Anti-
Terror Law and deadly red-tagging through the National Task Force to Eliminate Local
Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC). Considering the setbacks suffered in the May 2022
elections, the Left parties need to address at least two key concerns: working for a unified Left
formation to contest elections and related political activities, and strengthening their distinct
political identity while forging effective alliances with political allies.

The Marcos Dynasty’s Line of March

The Marcoses remain poised to play a significant albeit highly controversial role in the
national political life of the country. They have a proven local and national constituency of
support as shown by their domination of local electoral contests in their bailiwicks and their
successful runs for the Senate and the victory of Bongbong Marcos in the 2022 presidential
election. They have the financial resources to back up a national campaign and a loyal linguistic
bloc of Ilocano voters spread out all over the country as well as a natural link to Visayan voters
through their Romualdez relatives in Leyte. Projecting into the longer term, the Marcoses also
have in place a “successor generation” of younger family members who have already cut their
teeth in local and national politics unlike other political families lacking politically savvy heirs or
with scions uninterested in the rough and tumble of politics. Among the major political clans,
the Dutertes, arguably pose the strongest challenge to any Marcos project of dynastic
entrenchment.
However, the extended political clan of the Marcoses including the other political
families also continue to face challenges from opposition forces rooted in people’s movements,
programmatic political parties, and more inclusive broad, progressive alliances. In an unstable
society such as the Philippines rent by weak institutions and deep social and economic
inequalities, the igniting of political ruptures in continuing crises is a reality beyond the control
of even the most powerful political families.

* * *

19
About the Author:
Temario C. Rivera is a professor of political science (ret.) and former chair of the Department of
Political Science of the University of the Philippines. He also served as a tenured professor of
international relations at the International Christian University of Tokyo. His major book
publications include: Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family, and State in Philippine
Manufacturing (1994); Philippines: State of the Nation (1996); co-author of Probing Duterte’s
Foreign Policy in the New Regional Order: ASEAN, China, and the U.S. (2018); and co-editor of
Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy, 2nd. ed. (2016); and The Marcos Restoration:
The CenPEG Papers on Election 2022. He was editor-in-chief of the internationally peer-
reviewed Scopus journal, the Philippine Political Science Journal (PPSJ) for 20 years and was a
recipient of the National Academy of Science and Technology (NAST) Outstanding Social Science
Book award. He also received an Outstanding Alumnus Award from the University of the
Philippines Alumni Association in 2019.

ENDNOTES

1
For a copy of the final decision of Justice Jose P. Laurel acquitting Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr. and his co-
accused in the Nalundasan case, see https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1940/oct1940/gr_l-
47388_1940.html
2
For a full discussion of the contradictory claims about the World War II record of Ferdinand E. Marcos,
see Jeff Gerth and Joel Brinkley, “Marcos’s Wartime Role Discredited in U.S. Files,” New York Times, 23
January 1986. See https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/23/world/marcos-s-wartime-role-discredited-in-
us-files.html
3
See, https://www.rappler.com/nation/202033-human-rights-victims-claims-board-final-list-eligible-claimants-
released/

4
The Bantayog ng mga Bayani (Monument of Heroes) established in 1993 has memorialized the names
of heroes and martyrs who fought against the dictatorship and serves as a museum and historical
research center on the dictatorship and authoritarian rule.

5
For the “debt-driven growth strategy” of Marcos during the martial law period, see Emmanuel S. de Dios, “The
Erosion of the Dictatorship” in Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power, edited by Aurora Javate-De
Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol. Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation, Inc., 1988, pp. 70-131.

20
6
The emergence and role of the technocrats during the martial law period are analyzed in Philippine Politics and
the Marcos Technocrats: The Emergence and Evolution of a Power Elite by Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Quezon
City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2019.

7
See https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2022/3/24/Marcos-ill-gotten-wealth-unretrieved-6-billion-
dollars.html
8
See https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/specialreports/626576/the-supreme-court-s-
rulings-on-the-marcoses-ill-gotten-wealth/story/
9
See https://www.icij.org/investigations/offshore/ferdinand-marcos-daughter-tied-offshore-trust-
caribbean/
10
For court cases on ill-gotten wealth decided in favor of the Marcoses, see
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2023/2/22/Sandiganbayan-junks-ill-gotten-wealth-Marcos-
cronies-.html and https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1635196/sandiganbayan-affirms-dismissal-of-ill-gotten-
wealth-case-vs-marcoses
11
See https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/2/16/Supreme-Court-Bongbong-Marcos-Leni-
Robredo-vice-president-poll-protest.html
12
In the 2019 elections, there was a falling out between Michael Marcos Keon and his other Marcos relatives but
this rift appeared to have been addressed after the 2022 elections.

13
This section is an updated version of the chapter in The Marcos Restoration: The CenPEG Papers on Election
2022, edited by Temario C. Rivera and Bobby M. Tuazon, Quezon City: CenPEG (Center for People Empowerment in
Governance), 2022, pp. 127-142.

14
Between 2020-2021, the Pharmally Pharmaceutical Corporation was awarded at least P10 billion pesos worth of
contracts for materials related to addressing the COVID-19 pandemic. A Senate investigation found out that the
company was a small, newly created firm that lacked the funds, track record, and credibility to handle the awarded
procurement contracts. Moreover, some businessmen and public officials close to Pres. Duterte allegedly financed,
guaranteed, and facilitated the questionable procurement deals. See, https://rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/list-
everything-need-to-know-pharmally-covi-19-pandemic-deals-scandal/

15
This unpublished study was done in 2022 by CenPEG Senior Fellows, Professors Felix Muga and Maragtas S.V.
Amante.

16
See, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1868607/comelec-on-disqualifying-smartmatic

17
See, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1868574/fwd-comelec-on-defending-disqualification-of-smartmatic

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