ASHANTI AND HER N5IG-HB0URS c.

1700-1807

John Kerson Pynn, B*A.

A Thesis submitted for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in the
University of London

Department of History, School of

Oriental and African Studies,
London, \7.C*1

October, 1964

C7 10 NOV 1964
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 (i)

Contents

Abstract ii - iii

Introduction iv - xii

Chapter 1 The Gold Coast in the seventeenth and the early 1 - 5 0

years of the eighteenth century.

Chapter 2 The rise of Ashanti 51 - 115

Chapter 3 Ashanti under Opoku Ware 1720-1750 116 - 173

Chapter k Ashanti, 1750-176^5 years of Inaction? 17^ - 195

Chapter 5 The Reign of Osei Kwadwo, 176^-1777 196 - 228

Chapter 6 Ashanti, 1777-1807 229 - 252

Abbreviations ... ... ... • ••• 253

Appendix 25 ^ - 259
a. Instructions to David van Neyendaal on his
journey into the interior of the Gold Coast,1701.

b. Map of the Gold Coast c* 1629

c. » " " " c. 1729

d. « » .« .1 .» c- 17 5Q

e. n 11 11 11 11 c# 2007

Bibliography pp. 260 - 272.

 Ab stract

By the middle of the second half of the seventeenth

Century, the Portuguese trading monopoly on the Gold Coast had come

to an end. The Dutch, who were largely responsible for bringing

this about, could not follow their predecessors example of

monopolising the Gold Coast trade however. The development of

plantation agriculture in the American and the Caribbean islands

provided other European nations with strong economic motives to share

in the Guinea trade. Thus English, Danish and Brandenburgers appeared

on the coast to compete with the Dutch for the trade in gold, slaves

and ivory. This ushered in an era of competition which was greatly

to the advantage of the Africans. Apart from the increase in the

volume of trade, the trans-Atlantic trade brought unprecedented wealth

into the country. It was soon discovered however that the existing

small states based on kinship and lineage were incapable of meeting the

new economic demands, therefore larger political states such as

Denkyera, Akwamu and Akyem were created by the Akan peoples to meet

this demand. The creation of these states was made possible by the

introduction of fireaims in appreciable quantities into the country

by the European traders. Because all these states aimed at political

and economic expansion their association was characterized by mutual

rivalry. Denkyera and Akyem usually acted together against Akwamu

therefore Akwamu assisted in the creation of the Ashanti Kingdom to

balance the might of its enemies and to preserve its western

frontier. By the middle of the eighteenth century however Ashanti

had defeated Akyem and Denkyera and was undoubtedly the dominant

political and economic power in the hinterland of the Gold Coast

since Akwamu itself was defeated by Akyem in 1730. In 1807,

Ashanti conquered the coastal Fantis who, like the Ashantis, had also

embarked upon political and economic expansion throughout the

eighteenth century. It was clear, therefore, that in the early

nineteenth century the probability was that the Gold Coast might

become a monarchy ruled by the kings of Ashanti. That this did not

happen was due to the policy adopted by Britain during that period.
 INTRODUCTION

In 1807, Ashanti, which had been pursuing a policy of political

and economic expansion throughout the eighteenth century, made the first of

her nineteenth century invasions of the seaboard by attacking the Fantis.

This even immediately led to European repercussions. The British, who, at

that time, had become the predominating European commercial nation on the

coast, decided that the Fantis should be given protection against the

attacking Ashanti army.'1' Undoubtedly, the British action was motivated by

a desire to help the Fantis with whom the British had had a long trading

connection and in whose country the main British settlements of Cape Coast

Castle and Anomabo fort were located. It is clear, however, that the

fundamental reason underlying the British move was the prevailing view in

the British establishments on the coast that an Ashanti conquest of the

seaboard was not in the British trading interests. In spite of British

assistance, however, the Fantis were completely defeated, and the British

fort at Anomabo was besieged by the Ashanti army. At this point, Colonel

George Torrane, Governor of Cape Coast Castle, and President of the British

Council of Merchants on the Gold Coast, decided to intervene. Torrane met

the Asantehene, Osei Bonsu, (1801 - 182*+) who commanded the Ashanti army,

and after some discussions during which he discovered that the Ashantis
2
were not unaccustomed to civilised habits,

1. H. Meredith, An Account of the Gold Coast of Africa. (London, 1812),

pp. 132-63. W. W. Claridge, A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti.
Vol. 1, pp.237-53. W.E. Ward, A History of the Gold Coast. (Second
impression 1952), pp.l*+0-5 0 .
2. T.70 /3 5 Copy of a letter from Governor Colonel George Torrane, Cape Coast
Castle, to Committe of Merchants, 20th July, 1807* Meredith, who was
second-in-command of Anomabo fort during the invasion also observed
that "the Ashantees...seem not to be unacquainted with the customs of a
civilized people". Meredith, 1812, op.cit., p.l*+8.
 (v)

Torrane reversed the traditional policy of hostility towards

Ashanti, and 11adopted an attitude of “benevolent neutrality toward

-j
Zey (Osei) the King of Ashanti". Torrane believed that the British

could work with the Ashantis, and so he abandoned the policy of

co-operating with the Fantis, and prepared to send an envoy to

2
Kumasi, but died before this could be done.

It was dear, however, that the British could not establish

peaceful relations with the Ashantis in the early nineteenth century,

as Torrane and his advisers fondly believed. Abolition of the Slave

Trade Act of 1807 "gave notice of the British nation1s resolve to

stop the flow of V(

Test Africans from the Guinea Coast across the

A t l a n t i c " A p a r t from the Act itself, which forbade British subjects

to partake in that inhuman traffic, the British Government signed

treaties with other foreign nations by means of which their nationals

were similarly restricted. Moreover, an African Squadron of the

British Navy was instituted to police the African coast, so as to

seize contraband cargo that British or foreign vessels might attempt

to ship across the Atlantic to the Americas. Lastly, the colony of

Sierra Leone was to provide a depot for the cargoes thus seized.

Britain therefore could not be expected to find favour with Ashanti,

which, by 1807, had become the main source of slaves on the Gold Coast.

1. P.G. James, "British Policy in relation to the Gold Coast,

1815-1850", 1I.A. Thesis, presented to the University of London.
2. C.O. 267-44 Letter from Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo, to the
Admiralty, dated 7th November, 1816 .
3* Edmund Collins, "The Panic Element in Nineteenth-Century
British Relations with Ashanti", in Transactions of the Kistoriaal
Society of Ghafea, Vol.V, pt.2, p.32
Thus the old British opposition to Ashanti1s political aims was reinforced

“by their desire to stop the Ashantis from dealing in slaves, and to

undertake "legitimate trade". After Torrane*s death, therefore, his

successors were inclined to favour the coastal peoples, and did nothing

to meet Osei Bonsu's request for direct negotiations between himself and

the British authorities on the coast. In the nineteenth century,

therefore, the history of the Gold Coast was essentially the history of

Ashanti1s relationship with the British and their coastal allies

especially the Fantis.^"

Historians have recognised this relationship as one of the

dominating issues in the nineteenth century. But, as Margaret Priestley

rightly points out, they have laid far too much emphasis on the importance
2
of 1807* For instance, it was not correct that the Fanti and the

Ashanti armies faced each other for the first time in 1807* Nor was it

true that the event of that year caused a crisis in the affairs of the

British, and so forced them to make a choice between the conflicting

parties, their information about the pov/er and resources of the inland
3
peoples being inadequate. There is plenty of evidence from Danish,

Dutch and English sources to show that the events of the early nineteenth

century had their precedent in the eighteenth century. For instance,

in the late 17 ^0 *s, the activities of the

1* For the relations between British, Ashanti and the coastal peoples
in the nineteenth century, see, among other works, Claridge, op.cit,
Yols. 1 and 2. A.B. Ellis, A History of the Gold Coast. (London,
1893); Ward, A History of the Gold Coast, 2nd ed., 1958*
2. M. Priestley, "The Ashanti Question and the British: Eighteenth
Century Origins", in Journal of African History 11, 1 (1961 ), p.36.
3. Claridge, op.cit,, 1, pp. 2^2-3; Ward, 1952, pp. 1^2-5 and- 155*
 (vii>

Asantehene, Opoku 7/are, (1720-1750), caused such unsettlement and

apprehension on the coast, that all the European traders had to

-j
take cognisance of them. Moreover, Brodie Cruickshank, writing

in 1853 , refers to thedisturbances which occurred in the reign of

”Sai Cud joe” (Osei Kwadwo), andpoints out that in 17^5> 17&7, and

again in 1772, the Council of the Company of Merchants at Cape Coast

Castle took into account the unsettled state of the country, and

considered the policy to be adopted in view of the threatened

invasion of Eanti. According to the same author, it was in 17&5

that the first mention was made of the Ashantis in the records at

Cape Coast Castle, and in 1792, on the occasion of another invasion

scare, that there occurred the first ”direct intercourse” of which

he v/as aware between the King of Ashanti and the Governor of the
2
British fort.

The truth of the matter is that Gold Coast historians have

paid far less attention to Ashanti history in the eighteenth century,

for instance, both Claridge and Ellis, who deal much more fully with

the nineteenth century, devoted a few chapters only to the previous

century. Claridge had three chapters only, of Volume 1 on ”The Rise

of Ashanti, 1700-1803”, and Ellis, also, had three chapters on the

1. See Chapter 3* Opoku Ware has been described by a modern Danish

writer as the king who made Ashanti ”the Prussia of Africa” .
See G-eorg Norregaard, "De Danske establishmenter paa
Guineakysten”, in Vore Gamle Tropekolonier. ed.Johannes
Bronsted, Kiobenhavn 1953* P*515*
2. B. Cruickshank, Eighteen Years on the G-old Coast of Africa.
London, 1853> PP*53“54 and 57 • See also Chapter 6 .
 (viii)

eighteenth century*^ Reindorf*s hook has much to commend it# As

much as he could, he set down the -traditional history of the Gold

Coast states of his day, and seems to have drawn a great deal from

Danish as well as English written sources* But, as he himself points

out, his object was mainly to record the traditions of the Ga

people* His accounts of the other states, therefore, have serious

limitations* Ward, too, has drawn from both European written sources,

and oral tradition* But though more favourably placed than most of

his predecessors, his work is rather superficial, and full of

inaccuracies. For instance, he follows his predecessors in recording

Cruickshank* s very brief references to the threatened Ashanti invasion

of the coast after 1750.^ But had he cared to consult the records of

the English African Companies in the Public Record* Office, he would

have discovered that the episode of 1792 , for example^s very well-

documented.^* As far as Ashanti history in the eighteenth century is

concerned, the fundamental factor underlying the errors of the Gold

Coast historians is that they all relied on the works of Thomas Edward

Bowdich, and Joseph Dupuis, who were in Kumasi, the Ashanti capital, in

the early nineteenth century.'* Admittedly, the observations of both

men on the traditions and customs of the Ashantis are of great interest

1. Claridge, 1915> op.cit., Vol.I, pp. 181-234* Ellis, 1893*PP*74-106.

2. C.C. Reindorf, A History of the Gold Coast and Asante* 2nd ed.,
Basle n.d. Reindorf relied on the v^orks of Roemer, and probably
used some of the documents in Christiansborg Castle.
3* Ward, History, 1998, p*147* Ellis, op.cit., pp.100-1 and 104.
Claridge, op.cit., 4, p.213*
Sir P. Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty: Ashanti,(London, 1921) pp.35“6*
4 . See Chapter 6 .
5* T.E* Bowdich, Mission from Caoe Coast Castle to Ashantee (London,1819),
pt.2, pp.228-50. J.Dupuis, Journal of a Residence in Ashantee,
(London,1824), pt.I, pp.224-64*
 (ix)

and value* But as works of history, their accounts have serious

limitations* **or Instance, although their chronologies of the

Ashanti kings contain major differences, in neither case can it he

1
regarded as reliable* Moreover, Dupuis in particular, appears to

have obtained most of his historical information from the Kumasi

Moslems* But these Moslems were not impartial observers, and most

of what they told Dupuis cannot be reconciled y/ith information

2
obtained fran contemporary written sources* The result is that

there are many similarities between all these historical works

which give a generalized and sometimes inaccurate picture of Ashanti

history in thejeighteenth century, based mainly on oral tradition,

rather than on written records.

It is clear, then, that the eighteenth century development

of Ashanti badly needs investigation, and this is the purpose of this

thesis. In it an attempt has been made tot ell the story of the

Ashanti kingdom from the time of Osei Tutu, the first true Asantehene,

in thte late seventeenth century, to t he early nineteenth century, when

Ashanti had become the dominant political and economic power on the

Gold Coast. Without an understanding of the emergence of the Ashanti

kingdom, and its impact on the surrounding African states in the

eighteenth century, it is almost impossible to place in correct

perspective the events of the nineteenth century. Since the printed

works on Ashanti and, indeed, on the G-old Coast as a whole, are of

1. See "The Ashanti lings in the Eighteenth Century: A Revised

Chronology1, in Journal of African History. 1,1,(1960),
pp.83-96, M*./Priestley_and I.Wilks. Also Chapter I.
2 . See Chapter 6 .
 (O

little help in dealing with the Ashanti history during this period, I have

drawn heavily on the archives of the Danish, Dutch and English West Indian

and African Companies. The Danish records consulted are the papers of the

Danish West Indian and Guinea Company in the Royal Archives (Rigsakivet)

and the Royal Library (Kongelige bibliotek). The Dutch records fall into

two main series: the Archives of the Second Dutch West Indies Company, and

the Archives of the Dutch Possessions on the Coast of Guinea. Both series

are in the General State Archives, (Algemeen Rijksarchief), The Hague. The

English records consulted are the T/70 series in the Public Record Office,

London. Besides these, I have also used the C.O. (Colonial Office) and

A.D.M. (Admiralty). The C.O. and A.D.M. series deal with Sierra Leone and

other West African British possessions. They are in some respects

duplications of the T/?0 series. They arealsovery improperlyindexed,and

therefore their usefulness is limited.

This is not the first time that theserecords have beenused. Davies^
2 3
and Martin have used the T/70 series, and Norregaard has used the archives

of the Danish West India Company. But the object of these authors was not

to write a history of the Gold Coast. Davies used it in writing a history

of the Royal African Company, and Martin for the Company of Merchants

trading to Africa. Norregaard also used the Danish records to throw light

on the Danish Company* s activities in

1. K.G. Davies, The Royal African Company, (London, 1957)*

2. E.C. Martin, The British West African Settlements 1750-1821, (London, 1927)»
and an article by the same author, "The English Establishments on the
Gold Coast in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century", in
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series, V (1922).
3. Georg Norregaard, 1953, op.cit.
 U i ) -■:

in Guinea. But their works are useful guides to "the documents relevant
1
to African history. Apart from these three authors, Miss Priestley ,
2
and Ivor Wilks have also used the records of all the European Companies.

They did not, however, use the original manuscripts, hut the Furley
3
papers, deposited in the Balme Library, University of Ghana. Y/hile

the Fur ley collections may be helpful in many respects, they have to

be supplemented, and their accuracy checked in Copenhagen and The Hague.

Apart from these archival materials, some relevant Butch

and Danish printed works have been used.^ There are two of these books

which are of special importance. Firstly, Ratelband’s Bive Day

5
Registers of Elmina Castle, between 1645 and 1647 are very helpful

for a study of West African history^ in the seventeenth century. The

author’s aim was to preserve for future historians the records of the

Dutch Company, which had been neglected hitherto. Secondly, far a

study of Ashanti history in the eighteenth century, the Dane, Ludovic

£
Frederick Roemer’s books are indispensable. Of course, Roemer tends

to exaggerate, and he often makes some careless slips. For instance,

he records the death of Opoku Y/are in one place as 1749> in another

1. M. Priestley in Journal of African History, 1961, op.cit.

II. Priestley and I. Wilks in Journal of African History, 1960,
op.cit*
2. For other works of Ivor Wilks, see Chapter I, p. n. Jills
is also trying to reconstruct the history of Ashanti by using
Arabic documents.
3» The late Mr. J*T. F^iey, formerly of the Gold Coast Civil Service,
made photostatcccpies,notes and transcripts of the Danish and
Dutch Company Records.
4* The printed works in Danish are v e r y well kept in the Royal
Library, (Kongelige Bibliotek), Copenhagen.
5* E. Ratelband, Vijf Dag registers van het Kasteel Sao Jorge de
Mina. (Elmina) aan de Goudkust, 1645-1647, Linsehoten-Vereeniging,1953*
6. L.F. Roemer, Tilforladelig Efterretning om Kysten Guinea.
(Copenhagen, 1760 ).
as 1751 • But his work is reliable bedause he was an eye-witness

to many of the happenings on the coast, and he also used many of

the manuscripts of the Danish Company*

Finally, I have also relied a good deal on the legal and

anthropological works of Rattray and Busia.

This research was made possible by a Post-graduate

shholarship granted to me by the University of Ghana for which I am

very grateful* Hy thanks are also due to the staff of the Public

Record Office, London, the Algemedn Rijksarchief, The Hague, and of

Rigsakivet and the Kongelige Bibliotek, Copenhagen. I am also very

grateful to Hiss A. P. Hollema in The Hague, and to Professor Kristof

Glamann, Dr* Georg Norregaard and Dr* Benedicte Hjejle in Copenhagen

for their kindness and assistance during my stay in those cities*

Finally, I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Professor Roland

Oliver, for his advice and encouragement*

1* Ibid., pp. 110 and 226*

 CHAPTER I
THE GOLD COAST IN THE SE7EETEEHTH AND EARLY
EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

The history of the Gold Coast in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries is largely the history of the consolidation and rise of the

Ashanti kingdom and her relations with the neighbouring African and

European peoples. During the second half of the seventeenth century,

various Akan-speaking peoples were organised intb a military union, aiming

at political, economic and commercial expansion. This major development

in the country resulted in unsettlement and apprehension among the neigh­

bouring African states and even the European traders who had established

themselves on the coast had to take cognisance of it. B y ’the early nine­

teenth century, the Ashanti kingdom had overcome all the neighbouring

African states and was "indisputably the greatest and the rising power

of Western Africa.” For a clear appreciation of the political and

economic basis of the rise and expansion of Ashanti, it is necessary to

give a brief account of the political, economic and commercial situation

in the country during the seventeenth and the early years of the

eighteenth century.

The seventeenth and the early eighteenth century has been des­

ro
cribed as the period of the great ”volkerwanderung” of the Gold Coast peoples

It was an era of migrations into, and within, the country itself, of wafts,

1. T.E.Bowdich, A Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee, (London,

1819), P*341* By this t ime, Ashanti had asserted her control to a
greater or lesser extent, over coastal peoples from Cape Mount in
the West, in what is now Liberia, to Popo in the east, a seaboard of
little under 1000 miles. See I.'iVilks, The Northern factor in Ashanti
History. (Gloucester, 1961), p.12, f.n.3.
2. >V.E.F. 7/ard, A History of Ghana, 2nd Ed. (London, 1958), p.10A.
 -2-

and consolidation of states. It was also a period which saw intensive

commercial activity on the coast by various European consnunities with

their different notions of trade and politics. In dealing with this

period therefore, it is almost hopeless to concentrate on one main theme.

During this period, the Gold Coast may be defined as that stretch

of the Guinea coast from Cape Appolonia in the west to the mouth of the

river Volta in the east, a distance of about 300 miles. It was likely .

that at a remote period in history, the majority of the peoples who

inhabit the country today/ were living in the open grassland areas inside
1
the country itself or just outside it. The traditions of origin of

the majority of the Akan-speaking peoples who constitute the bulk of the

population of the country indicate that their ancestors entered the

forested areas from the north or north-west. Akwamu, an Akan state in

the south-east, preserves traditions of the founder a y having migrated to

their present home from Kong, the Mande Dyula town on the medieval trade

route between Begho and Bobo-Dioulasso. The Fantis say they reached the

coast from Tekyiman in the north-west of Ashanti, under the leadership of

three chiefs: Oburumankoma, Odapagyan and Oson; the Akyem Bosomes say

they came from Ejura, an open grassland area north of Ashanti Mampong.

The Dagombas and the Mamprusis in the northern Region of modern Ghana say

they entered the country from the north-east. In the south-east, the Gas,

the Adangmes, and the Ewes claim to have come from Southern Nigeria. In

the south-west, a section of the Nzima peoples say they entered the country

from the Ivory Coast.

1. For traditions of Origin, see e.g. C.C. Reindorf, The History of the Gold
Coast and Asante. 2nd Edition (Basel n.d.), Ch.I. E.R.Meyerowitz, Akan
Traditions of Origin (London, 1952) and The Akan of Ghana. Ward, 1958, f
op.cit., pp.51-{>3. Traditions linking the Akan with the Western Budan were
first recorded in print by J.M.Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws (London, 1897)
 The interesting point to notice is that all these traditions of

origin indicate movements en masse. The Akans, the Ga-Adangmes and the

Dagombas, all claim that their ancestors occupied a previously uninhabited

country. Some recent commentators on the subject, basing their arguments

mainly onllinguistic and sociological considerations, have tended to think

that this was in fact the case. But, as Fage rightly points out, the Akan

traditions of migrations, for example, might not necessarily have been the

traditions of the bulk of the people, but more essentially those of successive

waves of immigrants who organised earlier kinship groups into political

2
states of the type being developed farther north in the Sudan. We know

that the ancestors of the Dagombas and the Mamprusis met a people akin to

the Konkombas already living in the northern Region of Ghana.^ We also know

that the Gas and the Adangmes entered an area which was already the home of

the Obutus, and earlier Akan-speaking i m m i g r a n t s I t appears that even the

Fantis did not reach their present home directly from Tekyiman, as they say,

but that they originally formed part of an old Akan kingdom in the forest

called Akanny. As late as 1752, Esilfi, described as "the public orator

of Abrah", told the English at Cape Coast, in the presence of representatives

of ”the Braffoe, Curranteers, the priests of Burabura Wegya and all inland

towns of Fantees", that the Fantis left "Arcania" for the coast "under their

1. See e.g. W.T.Balmer, A History of the Akan peoples of the Gold Coast
(London, and Cape Coast, 1926), pp.2^-31. J.B. Danquah, "The Akan Claim
to origin from Ghana", in West African Review. Vol.XXVI, Nov. and Dec.1955*
pp.968-70 and 1107-11.
2. J.D.Fage, Ghana: A Historical Interpretation .Madison. 1961, p. 26.
See also, R. Mauny, "The question of Ghana" in Africa XXIV July 1954 and
Jack Goody, "Ethno-history and the Akan of Ghana" in Africa XXIX No.1,
1059, pp.67-81.
3* D.Tait, "The political system of Kokamba", Africa XXIII No.3, July 1953,
pp.213-23.
4. Ward, 1958, p. 105. M.J.Field, Religion and Medicine of the Ga people 1-3,
10-11, 77 etc.
 A
Braffo Imorah". Indeed, some versions of Fanti tradition point out that

the Fantis found the Etsi and the Asebu peoples already established on the

coast and that the Fantis had to defeat these peoples in a number of battles
2
before they could dislodge them from their lands. A recent archaelogical

survey carried out in the Accra area has also confirmed that large scale
7'%
invasions from the east must be discounted. : On the whole, traditional

accounts of mass movements into unpopulated areas must be rejected on the

grounds that they probably originated, as it is their present-day purpose,

as a means of substantiating or denying political and economic claims* Some

A s h a n t i s ^for instance, say, that they originated from Asantemanso, a place

within their country itself. But it should be remembered that Osei Tutu and

Okomfo Anokye who founded the Ashanti Union laid down a law making it a

capital offence for anyone to allude to his ancestry.^

It is reasonable to suppose that there were people living in the

5
country who may be regarded as autochthones. The fact that the medieval

trade with the Sudan included important commodities like kola nuts, a forest

crop, and salt, a coastal product, presupposes that the Gold Coast forests
£
and coastlands were not empty. The ancestors of the Gas, for instance,
1. T70/30 T.Melvil, Governor of Cape Coast Castle to Committee of Merchants
trading to Africa, dated 23rd September 1732; "Aeriphy” (Esilfi?) "Braffo”
was probably a general term for "Captain” of the Asafo companies."Curanteers”
were the elders of State. "The priests of Burabura Wegya" were the fetish
priests of the great Fanti fetish grove at Mankessim. The English believed
that the "Braffo was like a Dutch "stadtholder" and the "Curanteers",
Senators. See ibid. Letter from Geo. Cockburne to Committee, Cape Coast
Castle, 14th March, 1753*
2. W.W.Claridge, A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti. 2 Vols. (London,
1915), Vol.1 , p 7 £
3. Paul Ozanne, "The Early Historic Archaelogy of Accra" in Trans.Hist.Soc.
Ghana. Vol.VI, Legon, 1963* P P * 5 W 0 .
4. Ward, 1958, p.62.
Perhaps the widespread belief in "Mimoatia", dwarfs, may support this
hypothesis.
6. See, pp.8-13*
 -3-

might "be regarded as the families who obtained control of an existing

population and an economic system at the crucial moment when the economy

was rapidly expanding. It has been suggested that Nyanoase, the Akwamu

capital, had a predecessor in a "Final Prehistoric site", near Nsawam and

that,- initially, it might have consisted largely of indigenous peoples

1
drawn in from the neighbouring villages. Whatever might have been the

case, it was certain, however, that the G-old Coast forests and coastlands

were originally thinly peopled and that, from about the thirteenth century

onwards, these areas received a large number of immigrants from other parts

of West Africa.

The reasons for these migrations are probably complex. It would

seem, however, that they had something to do with the chaotic political and

economic situation in the Sudan as a result of the break-up of the medieval

Western Sudanese Empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhay. This was indeed the

case in the late sixteenth century and the early years of the seventeenth,
e>
when the Moroccans, after destroying the Songhay Empire, failed to create

any stable political machinery capable of sustaining the Western Sudanese

civilizations, based on the trans-Saharan trade with North Africa and Europe.

The decline in political power of the pashalik of Timbuktu and the general
2
collapse of central authority was clearly not conducive to trade. In

contrast, it was during this period that the tenuous Portugese trade

monopoly on the Gold Coast was finally overthrown when the Dutch captured

their last post at Axim in 162*2. The subsequent appearance of the Dutch,

English, Danish, Swedish and Brandenburgers on the coast, created

1. P. Ozanne, 19^3> op.cit.

2. E.W. Bovill, The Golden Trade of the Moors. (London, 1938), pp,172|.-8.
I. Wilks, 19^1, p.11.
 —6—

competitive conditions greatly to the advantage of the Africans.

By the early seventeenth century, most of the African states

had Been consolidated. A Dutch MMap of the Lands of the Gold Coast of

Guinea" dated in 1629, shows that there were six large and two small

kingdoms on the coast. From west to east, these were Little Inkassa, Ante,

(Ahanta), Great Kommenda, Fetu, Asebu, Fanti, Agona and Accra. Behind these

coastal states, there were a host of comparatively small kingdoms. The

most important of these, from the point of view of size and trade, were

Akanny, Akyem, Wassa, Wanquie, (Wenchi), Igwira, Adam, Great Inkassa, Insocco,

Kwawu and Akwamu.

It is interesting to notice that apart from one or two states on

the coast which possessed some gold, all the gold and slaves produced in

the country came from the inland states. Igwira was noted for gold which

the people sent to Axim and the neighbouring trading settlements in exchange

for salt and other European merchandise. Wassa was reputed to have Been

extraordinarily rich in gold and that the inhabitants were continually at

work in the "gold mines". Wen chi had gold but the people also knew the art

of weaving fine cloths which they sold to the Akannists. The Akyems had no

gold but were the main source for slaves. Great Inkassa bad gold, which

the people sent to the Quauqua coast, but when there were no ships lying off

that coast, the traders went to Little Kommenda. Insocco had no gold nor

trade in general, but the people manufactured beautiful cloths and carpets

which were highly esteemed by the Akannists.

1. WIC. 7b-3 Verspreyde Stukken, Caerte des Lantschap van de Goud Kust in
Guinea* van Atsyn (Axim) tot Ningo. Mouree, 25th December 1629*
See Enclosure. According to the Dutch cartographer, the kingdoms of
I Asebu and Fetu were originally integral parts of the kingdom, of
Aguaffo or Great Kommenda.
 That the important trading activities were concentrated in the

interior points to the fact that, before the arrival of the Europeans, the

Gold Coast peoples looked to the north and not the south for their contacts

with the outside world. In the medieval period, these peoples were in

close commercial relations with the peoples of the Sudan. Davies has

pointed out that the Europeans did not have to create any new demands in

West Africa because trade had been carried on for a long time with the
1
medieval cities of Western Sudan. It has also been said that the Portuguese

noticed that some of the kinds of cloth that sold best on the G-old Coast
2
were of Moroccan manufacture.

There were two major trade routes linking the country with the

Sudan. One of these trade routes ran north-north-west from present-day

Ashanti through t<*ms like Bondouku or Bona to the Mande districts of the

upper Niger valley upstream of Timbuktu. According to Dubois, the Sudanese

medieval city of DJenne must have developed as a market primarily for a

3
southern traffic. Wilks strengthens this argument and points out that

the Mande town of Begho, lying to the north-west of modern Ghana, was the

southern end of the DJenne trade route to the south from where merchants
4
reached the Guinea coast* It is believed that, though the bulk of the

Sudanese gold was obtained from the Bambuk and Bure fields to the west, in

the region of the upper reaches of the Niger and the Senegal rivers, some

1. K.G. Davies, The Royal African Company. (London, 1957) , p.4.

2. J.W* Blake, European Beginnings in West Africa, (London, 1937), Vol.I,
pp.97-98; Page, 19^1, p.42.
3. P. Dubois, Timbuktu the Mysterious, translated by D. White (London, 1897),
pp. 171-2; Also, J.D; Page, "Ancient Ghana: A Review of the Evidence” in
Trans. Hist. Boc. Ghana, III, 2, Achimota, 1957, PP*96 and 98, n.45*
4 . I. Wilks, ”The Northern Factor in Ashanti History: Begho and the Mande",
in Journal of African Histoiy, II, 1 (1961). pp.25-34*
Gold Coast gold must have travelled northwards along this route to the
1
Sudan. Along this north-westerly route went also some ivory and slaves

to the cities of Mandeland notably, Ghana, Mali, Dia, Segu and Djenne.

The other trade route was that running to the north-east through eastern

Gonja and Dagomba and across the river Niger to Hausaland. This route

made contact with the trans-Saharan caravan trade in the commercial emporia

of the H&usa states* Traders from such Eausa cities as Kano and Katsina

travelled along this route to Salaga in eastern Gonja and there exchanged

their cotton cloths, leather goods and some slaves for gold, ccwrie shells
2
and other products* Besides gold, ivoiy and slaves, there were two other

important articles of trade which travelled along these trade routes to the

Sudan. These were Kola nuts and salt.

The Kola nut is the ftuit of the Kola tree - Cola acuminata -

which is scattered throughout the forests of the Gold Coast. John Beecham

spoke of a sheriff of Tripoli in North Africa, who said the kola nuts were

"so important a corrective to the unpalatable or unwholesome waters of the

Fezzan, and of other kingdoms that border on the vast Sahara, as to be

deemed of importance to the happiness of life"^ It is said that the twin

interlocking kernels of the kola nuts were regarded as a symbol of friend­

ship and that no gift was complete without kolas in the Sudan.^

Kola nuts were reaching the Sudanese cities from all parts of the

West African forests. Clapper ton saw at Kiama that every caravan he met

1. I. Wilks, (Gloucester, 1961) op.cit., p.6.

2. M.J. Herskovits, MThe significance of West Africa for Negro Research",
Journal of Negro History. Vol.XXI, pp. 15*30, and The Myth of the Negro
Past, (New York, 1940). Also. A.A.Boahene, "The Caravan Trade in the
Nineteenth Century", Journal of African History.III. 2. (1962 )pp. 349-359*
3* John Beecham, Ashantee and the Gold Coast (London. 1841) PP*155-56.
4. Bovill, 1938, p.240; See also, ibid.pp.237, 241-2.
 -9-

1
with was transporting kola nuts from the south. Lander points out that

on leaving Kulfa, after the death of his master, he came across companies
2
of merchants going to ”Ghunja” for ”gora nuts”. "Ghunja”, of course, is

the present-day Gonja district of Northern Region of Ghana and Gora is the

Hausa name for kola nuts. In Gonja today, there are still to be found many

of the principal centres where kola nuts from the south, especially Ashanti,

are collected for export to the north. In Barth*s time, Timbuktu was

importing kola nuts from Tanguela far away in the hinterland of the

Ivory Coast.^

The salt trade with the Sudan may be of some antiquity. The Sudan

though well-endowed by Nature in many respects, had always lacked salt. The

only natural deposits in the whole of the Western Sudan were not only meagre,

but concentrated in a small area in the centre of the country. These were

the salt pans of Dalhul Fog ha in Dendi and the neighbouring ”Fadama" or

marsh of Birnin Kebbi, the soil of which was sufficiently impregnated with

salt to make possible its recovery by evaporation. Salt was such a luxury

commodity in the Sudan that only the rich could buy it, and it is said that

the poorer classes of people had to extract very small quantities from the

ashes of grasses, millet stalks, and certain shrubs, as well as cattle dung.

According to Bovill, gold was valued in the Sudan almost entirely for its

purchasing power in salt.^* The Sudan, therefore, had to rely a good deal

on imported salt.

The rock-salt deposits of the Taghaza in the Sahara

1. K.B. Dickson, ”Cocoa in Ghana”, an unpublished Ph.D. Thesis for the

University of* London, 1960.
2. Ibid., p.4-7.
3. Bovill, 1958, p.237.
4 . See Bovill, 1958, inter alia, pp.67-68, 1if0-if1, 236-37*
 -10-

been, and to some extent still is, the main source of Sudanese imported

salt. But, Bovill*s assertion that Taghaza "came very near to being the
1
only one because sea-salt, the sole alternative, was not readily obtainable,"

was clearly an overstatement, We have noted that the Akannists were in

close commercial contact with Begho, the southern end of the Djenne trade

route. These Akannists were also on record as having obtained large

quantities of white sea-salt from the coastal Fantis in exchange for gold,
2
and that they carried the salt for sale far inland. It would have beei

surprising if seme of this scarce commodity did not find its way to the

cities of the Sudan along the Djenne route. Furthermore, one of the chief

articles of trade of the Quaqua coast, lying to the immediate west of the

G-old Coast, was salt, Barbot says that the people of this area traded a

great deal in salt with their neighbours to the north-east, and adds, "if

these Quaqua salt merchants are to be depended upon, they carry it beyond

the Niger to a people that are not black, and who, according to their
3
description, must be Moors", Indeed, all early European observers on the

G-old Coast noted that most of the coastal villages and towns were engaged

in boiling salt for sale to the inland merchants. The Dane Tilleman, for

example, commented that salt obtained at Labadi, Teshie and Osu - all parts

of Accra - were bought by the people and carried "great distances inland".*4-

Salt was in such great demand by the inland traders that they were prepared

to give one, and sometimes twc*. slaves for a handful of salt.^

1. Ibid, 1958, 140-41.

2* Isaak Tirion, Hedendaagsche Historie of tegenwoordige Staat van Afrika,
(Amsterdam, 176>3), p.499-
3. Barbot Thomas Astley*s A New G-eneral Collection of Voyages and Travels,
Vol.II (London, 1745), p.564.
4* Eric Tilleman, En liden enfoldig beretning om det landskap G-uinea,
(Kiobenhavn, 1697 ), pp.97 -102 .
5. Tirion, 1763, op.cit., pp.464 -4 6 5 .
 -11-

On the airrival of the Europeans, though the emphasis was on the

gold and slave trades, the salt trade remained an important local industry

which yielded great profits to hoth European and African trader alike. The

peoples of the coastal towns and villages obtained the salt either by boiling

sea water in kettles or earthen pots, or they collected the salt from natural

salt pans which had been dried up by the heat of the sun. Atkins, describing

the salt trade at Cape Coast, wrote, "the sale appears like a fair in the

(Cape Coast) Castle and many of those Negroes whose ivory or gold would not
1
buy a bushel of salt had travelled seme hundred miles inland". The salt

from Accra in particular seemed to have been in great demand by the inland

traders. In 1709, Sir Dalby Thomas, the Agent-General at Cape Coast,

2
remarked that "Accra salt is a commanding commodity with the Ashantees".

In the same year, the Royal African Company wrote to Parliament that their

James Port "stands in the kingdom of Accra and opens trade to Quombue,

(Akwamu), Akim and Aquawoa (Kwawu) for gold, slaves, teeth (ivory) and salt*"

In the early years of the.eighteenth century, the carrying trade

was virtually monopolised by Ashanti and Akyem merchants. There arose in

these two states merchants who came to the coast to buy nothing else but

salt for sale farther north. They usually arrived in small parties and

stayed for long periods until they had received their salt supply. In 1715,

William Baillie, the English factor at Kommenda, reported the arrival of

"sundry salt merchants from Ashantee" who informed him that other traders

1. J. Atkins in Astley's Collections. Vol.II, p.603

2. T 70/5 Abstract of Letters received by the Royal African Company, 21st
May and 21st June 1709. Ibid. Letter from William Hicks, Accra, 4th
Jan. 1708/9.
3. T 70/175. The Royal African Company to Parliament, London, 13th Feb.
1709.
 -12-

were on their way thither. In that same year, the Dutch factor at Shama

reported the arrival of about ten Ashanti traders who bought nothing because
2
11they came to buy salt.” In 1722, the Danes regretfully recorded that the

Akwamus had closed the trading paths leading frcrn the coast to the interior

so that Akyem salt merchants had to go to Cape Coast and Elmina for their

salt. The Danes got the Osu people who lived near their Castle of

Christiansborg to promise not to send their salt in canoes to these two

towns so that the Akyems would be farced to come back to Accra. At the same

time, David Herrn, the Governor, remonstrated with Akwonno, the Akwamuhene,

who happened to be at Accra at that time* to open the trading paths. The

Akwanuhene promised to make his peace with the Akyems on his return from
3
a campaign in the east.

The salt trade was so profitable that the European traders actively

participated in it. In 1708, Director-General Earing explained that the

Dutch decided to share fully in the salt trade because of the high profits

involved, which was greatly to the advantage of the Dutch West Indian Company.

The salt was bought at Accra for one and a half engels a piece and sold at

Elmina for four engels a piece. The profit accruing from this source was

employed in defraying some of the expenses involved in the maintenance of

the forts.^ In June 1729* the English declared that the Accra people had

made part payment of a debt they owed them, and they expressed the hope that

the remainder would be paid in the next salt season, adding, "those people

1. T 70/1464 William Baillie*s Kammenda Diary, entries for 6th April, 10th
and 19th May, 1715*
2. N.B.K.G. 82, M. Heyman, Shama, to Director-General H. Haring, 12ih Jan.
1715.
3. V.G.K. Letter from Governor-General David Herrn, Christiansborg Castle,
Accra, 1st July, 1722.
4. WIC Letter from Director-General H. Haring, Elmina, dd.23rd March, 1708.
having no other way to pay it hut in that commodity, and which is indeed

more for your Honours advantage than if it was paid in gold, as there is
1
a profit of hundred per cent, and upwards on the sale of salt,” Both

the Dutch and the English used small coastal vessels in transporting Accra

salt to Elmina and Cape Coast and thereby undercut the African traders who

could, at best, transport their1s in large canoes. In 1708/9, the English

2
sent the small ship'”Dorothy” to Accra for salt. The Dutch also sent the

small ship ”Piershill” in July 1722*. for salt which ”is the most important
3
article of trade on the coast,” A year later, the Dutch commissioned a

Portuguese ship ”Juffrouw Margaretha” on the same errand

The inland merchants such as the Akhnnists travelled not along roads

but mere foot paths to the coast. In the early nineteenth century, Thomas

Edward Bowdich, who visited Ashanti on behalf of the Governor and Council

of Cape Coast Castle, found that Kumasi, the Ashanti capital, was linked

with all parts of the country by a host of these trading pathways. The

most important of these trade routes linking Kumasi with the coast were
5
four: the Aowin path; the Wassa path; the Assin path; and the Akyem path.

The Aowin path linked Kumasi with the coastal centres at Cape La Hou, Cape

Appolonia, and Assine; the Wassa path ran fran Kumasi through Denkyera to

Wassa where it bifurcated, one branch going eastward across the river Pra

through Aguafo to Shama, Kommenda, Elmina and Cape Coast. The Assin path

1. T 70/A. Letter from John Brathwaite and Robert Cruickshank, Cape Coast
Castle, 30th June 1729*
2. T 70/5. W, Hicks, Accra, to Governor and Council of Cape Coast Castle,
dd. 4th Jan. 1708/9*
3. WIC. Vol. 106, Director-General Pieter Valekenier, Elmina, dd. 20th July.
4* Ibid., Letters dd. 11th July 1725, and 16th Jan. 1726.
5* Por these pathways, see e.g.Bowdich, 1819, pt.2, pp. 162 ff.
Joseph Dupuis, Journal of a Residence in Ashantec, (London, 1824),
p.XXVII. K.B. Dickson, ”The development of Road Transport in Southern *
Ghana and Ashanti”, in Trans. Hist. Soc. Ghana, (Legon, 1961), Vol.Y^, y
pt.1, pp.33-35. ^
 -14-

passed through the Adansi and the Assin countries to Abora Dunkwa,

where it bifurcated, one branch passing near Abora, the old

Fanti capital, to Kormantsi and Anomabo, and the other, to

Mouree and Cape Coast, The Akyem path first ran nortji-east of

Kumasi through Dwabin and Akwapim to Accra and the neighbouring

beaches. On the coast itself, there were no good pathways linking

the important trading centres, and those wishing to travel from

Anomabo to Elmina, for example, had to walk for the most part on

the sandy beach. The means of communication between the coastal

towns was coast-wise traffic by surf-boats and schooners.

This picture was not very different from that

obtaining during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. The

Assin path was frequently used by the Akannists and the control of

the Akyem path was one of the main sources of friction between the

Akyems and the Akwamus during this period. It would seem, however,

that there were two other important trade routes in the seventeenth

and early eighteenth century; Firstly, there was Ha second

Akyem path” running through Agona to the coastal trading centres

of Winneba, Senya Bereku and Apam, In 17159 the Dutch reported

that the Agona people had reached an understanding with the two

Akyem chiefs, Ofori and Apenten, that they would not close the

"passes" in future, and that, as a result, the Akyems were going to

I
I
 -15-

the coast with their gold to buy goods. Secondly, there

was another Aowin path running from Axim across the river Tano

through Aowin country to Bondouku and the farther north. In

1715, same Aowin traders who travelled along this route had

their rafts capsized while crossing the river Tano, and five
2
of them were drowned*

Outside the forest belt, the two northern trade

routes were dominated by Mande and Hausa merchants who acted

as middlemen between the traders of the Gold Coast forest

and the caravans of the Sahara desert.

1. N.B. K.G. 82 J. Boerhaven, Bereku, to Director-General

H. Haring, 20th May, 1715*
Ibid. J. V. Alzen to Haring, 6 th September 1715.
"Afforry" or "Offory" is recognisable in Akyem as the
Ofori Panyin (the elder) who founded the modern state
*of Akyem Abualiwa. The first mention of Ofori known
to the writer is a Dutch report of 1704- In that report,
the Dutch, who were anxious to acquire a greater part
of the gold coming from Akyem, sent presents,to secure
Otbriin their interest, including muskets and red cloths,
Ofori died in 1727.
See WIC Vol.99> Letter from Director-General William
de la Palma, Elmina, to the Assembly of Ten dated 9th
April, 1704> and VGK Letter from Governor Pa hi,
Christiansborg Castle, Accra, to the Directors dated
14th April, 1727.
"Apintin" was surely the Akyem Kotoku Chief, Ofosu Apenten,
who initiated the Akyemr-Ashanti war of 1717 and whose
skull is still retained at Kumasi.
See N.B.K.G. 82 J. Doutreleau,Accra, to D/G. H. Haring dated
10th Oct. 1715.
Also M. Priestley and I. Wilks, "Ashanti Kings of the
Eighteenth Century: a revised chronology", in Journal of
African History, 1, 1 (i960 )
R. S. Rattrary, Religion and Art in Ashanti, (Oxford, 1927) p.132
2. N.B.K.G.82 Willem Butler, Axim, to Director-General Haring,
2 nd. 5uly 1715.
There is reason to believe, however, that seme of these Mande and H^iusa

traders penetrated the forest and reached the Guinea coast* Wilks has

indicated that, ”other long range traders, in their own manner equally
1
intrepid, had preceded the Portugese” on the Gold Coast. Pacheco mentions

the Mandinguas (Kande) as among the merchants who brought the gold ”from

distant lands”. In the late seventeenth century, the Dutch, still

adhering to the old view that the main gold-producing areas of West Africa

were far inland, reported that ”beyond this district (insocco) live white-

men who may be supposed to be Moors. It is they who do the greater part

of the traffic in gold”.^ Perhaps the ”Moors” who were found on the coast

by De Marees, the Dutch traveller, in 1602, were some of these itinerant

traders. ^

Apart from the trade with the Sudan, there existed an extensive

maritime trade between the Gold Coast and the Ivory Coast, Whydah, Ardra,

and Benin. Blake has pointed out that the first European traders on the

Guinea coast played the role of middlemen who carried commodities from

such places as Cape Verde and Benin to the Gold Coast where they were

exchanged for gold. Page argues this further, and points out that there

is reason to believe that trade existed between the Gold Coast and Benin

before the arrival of the Portugese and that what the Portugese did was to

increase the volume of trade by the efficient means of transportation at

1. I. Wilks, ”A Medieval Trade-route from the Niger to the Gulf of

Guinea” in Journal of African History, III, 2, (1962 ), P«337*
2. G.R. Crone, Voyages of Cadamasto, Hakhuyt Soc. Series Vol.LXXX.
3 . WIC. Verspjceyde Stukken, 84&.
^ , Report by Director-General Abrannz, Elmina, . . . These diverse papers
are being given new indices and therefore may not be found under this
No. in future.
4 . Pieter De Marees, Reizen naar Guinea. Linschoten - Vereeniging Vol.V.,
ed. E. Naber.
 -17-
i
their disposal. The main articles of trade involved were cloths from the

Ivory Coast and beads and cloths from the Dahomean coast and Benin.

The origins of this trade will probably never be known but it may

be that preferences for the produce of these areas may give a further proof

of the migrations of peoples from these regions into the Gold Coast.

Traditions recounted by the Dane Roemer, who was on the coast in the 1740fs,
2
connect the Accra plain with Benin, and it is conceivable that the ancestors

of the Ga-Adangme and Ewe peoples were already aware of the existence of

the bead and cloth industries there. Whatever might have been the case,

early European observers on the coast found that the Gold Coast peoples had

great preferences for the commodities of these areas. Pacheco asserts that

blue beads called Cor is and slaves from Benin were used to exchange gold

on the Gold Coast.^ De llarees points out that the beads came from Benin

and adds that they were made from blue, green and black stones which were

obtained from the Forcados river. These beads were desired by the Negroes

”especially of the Golden Coast of Guinea.”*4- From Villault, we learn that

the Ivory Coast cloth, known as the Quaqua cloth, was ,fa pretty sort of

cotton stuff” which was sold on the Gold Coast where it was used ”fcr clothing
5
the common people”.

1. Blake, 1937* op.cit., p.93* J.D. Fage, ”Some remarks on Beads and trade
in Bowe* Guinea in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” in Journal
of African History. Ill, 2, (1962 ), pp.343-44*
2. L.F. Roemer, Tilforladelig Efterretning om Kysten Guinea. (Kiobenhavn,
1760), pp.114-18.
3. P.R. Pacheco, Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis. Hakluyt Soc. Series II, Vol.LXXIX,
pp.128-9, ed. G.H.T. Kimble.
4. De idarees, 1602, op.cit., p.231.
5* Astley1s Collections . 1745, p.231* ”Qua qua” was supposed to have been
an imitation of how the people of this part of the Ivory Coast said
”good morning” or ”welcome”. See Tirion, 1763, op.cit., p.486.
Also, K. Ratelband, Vi.jf dag registers van het Kasteel Sao Jorge da Mina
(Elmina) aan de Goudkust, 1645-1647* Linsehotcn-Vereeniging, 1953. P*59>
f.n.3* Ratelband says the Quaqua coast was the area to the immediate
west of the Gold Coast.
 -18-

It is clear from the early writers that the bead found on the Gold
1
Coast came from Benin or even the Cameroons. The bead industry, however,

soon spread westwards until places on the Gold Coast itself came to be

associated with it. As early as 1629, the Dutch found the people of Elmina
2
actively engaged in "polishing beads which the Portugese bring them". All

late seventeenth and early eighteenth century European writers point out

that they found evidence of local knowledge of working at beads.

The beads were used mainly for personal adornment, especially among

the chiefly classes. Loyer saw that the King of Assine had "his grey beard

twisted into twenty small locks which were threaded with sixty Bits of

Aygris stone, bored round and long."^ Bosman found that the "Natives of the

Gold Coast plait their hair with a sort of coral here called Conte de Terra...

•• a sort of blue coral which we call Agrie and the Negroes Accori".^" In

1715, seme Aggrey beads intended for King Osei Tutu of Ashanti were claimed
5
by the Dutch to have been stolen by John Cabes. The Aggrey beads, however,

1. For more information about Aggrey or Akori beads, see e.g.

R. Mauny, "Akori Beads" in Trans.Hist.Soc.Nigeria.(1958).1.3*
J.D. Fage, "Remarks on Beads and trade in Lower Guinea in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" in Journal of African
History. (1962 ), op.cit.
I am grateful to Mr. Kima of the Cameroon Foreign Office, for
his information that the bead industry was, and to some extent
still is, an important local industry in the Cameroons, and
that the beads were made fran animal bones, such as elephant
teeth. The colours of the beads are derived from dyes of some
local shrubs.
2. Chart 743 (1629) op.cit. Some Aggrey beads were known to have
originated from "Aquimena", a place identified by Wilks as a
small state north of Aburi in modern Akwapim state. See, I.
Wilks, MThe Rise of the Akwamu Empire" in Tran s.His t.Soc. Ghana,
111,2, (Achimota, 1957), p.101.
3. Godfrey Loyer, "Abstract of a voyage to Issini on the Gold
Coast in 1701", in Astley!s Collections. Vol.II, p.422.
4. William Bosman, A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of
Guinea divided into the Gold, the Slave and the Ivory Coasts.
(London, 1705), p.119*
5. N.B.K.G. 82, Jan Landman, Kommenda to D.-G. Haring dd. 22 nd June,
1715* On John Cabes, see : *
 -19-

were sometimes used as a medium of exchange, especially in the region of

Cape Appolonia and the Quaqua coast, Loyer noted that "the Aigris-stone

serves for money here (Assine), and is highly valued, though it has neither

lustre nor beauty”. Barbot also found that the African traders exchanged
2
their cloths for arm rings and "sometimes but seldom, for beads”. In

1715y the Dutch sub-factor Heyman, who was trading off the coast of Cape

La Hou in thte small yacht ”Chama”, asked to be sent to him ”800 lb armrings,

and 30 Mas Blew Agri Corael because the Negroes of Cape La Hou are waiting

for these goods.

According to Villault, the Quaqua cloth was "striped white and blue”

and it was three-quarters of an ell broad and three or four ells long.^

Marchais also points out that the cloths consisted of six pieces which were

sewn together and that each cloth was about three yards long and six inches

broad. About the origin of the cloth, Barbot points out that the area

' around Cape La Hou and the Quaqua coast produced much of the cotton which

the inland peoples spun and wove into short cloths. The finished cloths

consisted,of "six stripes which were three French ells long and coarser".

The coastal people were merely factors who bought the cloths from the inland

people and sold them to the European traders for Akory. Barbot adds that

1. Loyer in Astley*s Collections, p.433*

2. Barbot in As tley fs Collections,p.5&A*
3. N.B.K.G. 82 Willem Butler, Axim, to D.-G. Haring dd. 7th August,
1715. Heyman exchanged these goods for i+O slaves and 280 lb
ivory. In the Dutch records the Akory beads appear under the
name of Agri, Comte de Terra or "the Element”. See, also
V.G.K. Day-Journal 1698-1703, entry for 18th July 1702.
A Mas was an East Indian measure equivalent to 3*73 grammes.
For the measurements used during this period, see e.g.
Pieter Van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie,
(1s-Gravenha^e, 193l)Y vol.2, pt.i, especially pp.825 & 834*
A. Villault in Astle.y*s Collections, p.5^3*
5. Marchais in ibid., p.563 .
 -20-

the inland manufacturers sold large quantities of the cloths to ”a white

people who lived far up in the inland, and who usually rode on mules or

asses, carrying Assagayes or spears; which must heeds he Arabs from the

Sahara or about the banks of the (river) Niger”. Some cloth, however,

must have come from Begho, for Loyer saw at Assine MTurkish carpets, fine

cloths, strip red and blue silk” in the hands of the people who claimed to
2
have bought them from Nzoko.

East of the G-old Coast lay Whydah, Ardra and Benin. Barbot found

that apart from agriculture, the people of Whydah spun and wove fine cotton

cloths.^ But it was the English ship^-captain, Philips, who affords good

information about Whydah cloths. Philips points out that the Whydah cloth

was about two yards long and about a quarter of a yard broad and that three

of such were commonly Joined together to make a piece of cloth. The people

of Whydah exchanged their cloths for such commodities as knives and tobacco.

A piece of cloth on the Whydah coast might be had for eight knives.^ The

Ardra clbths were said to be small and narrow whereas the Benin cloths

consisted of either three or four bands. Ratelband points out that each

of the Benin bands measured two and a half to two and three-quarters ells

(2-g- to 2% ells) long and two ells broad and that the four bands were called

"Mouponoqua", and the three bands "Ambassis". The colour of the Benin cloths
5
was blue or blue with white stripes.

The Dutch, English, Danes and all the European merchants followed

the Portugese example of transporting these West African products for sale

1. Barbot, in ibid., p.564 .

2. Loyer, op.cit., p.A29.
3. Astlc.y^s Collection of Voyages. 1745, Vol.Ill, p.11.
A. Astley*s Collection of Voyages. 1745, Vol.Ill, op.cit., p.15*
5. K. Ratelband, Vijf dag registers, 1953, op.cit., p.37, f.n.2.
Here Ratelband was following Olifert Dapper, Naukeurige
Beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche G-eweten. (Amsterdam, 1668),pp.499-500.
One Amsterdam ell was equivalent to 69 cm. Ratelband 1953, op.cit.p.X.C.V
f.n.3.
 -21-

on the Gold Coast. The list of ^gpods deposited at Cape Coast Castle,

Elmina and Christiansborg Castle include large quantities of corals of

all kinds, and cloths from Cape Verde, the Quaqua, the Dahomean and the

Benin coasts. In 1645, the Dutch yacht "Fortuyn” sailed with the ship

"Leuwinne" to Ardra and Benin and brought back to the G-old Coast 588

pieces of Ardra cloths and 1755 pieces of Benin cloths in three bands.

Two hundred pieces of these cloths were deposited at Dutch Crevecouer at

1
Accra and the rest were distributed at Elmina, Mouree and Kommenda. In

October of the following year, the Dutch received information frcm their

factor at Benin that an English yacht, which had been on the Ardra coast,
2
had traded four hundred or five hundred small cloths from that place. In

December 1645, the list of goods which theretiringDirector-General,

Jacob Ruychaver handed over to his successor, J. Van der Wei, included

4466;! ounces of fine coraals, 610 pieces of Ardra cloth, 3258 pieces of
3
Benin cloths in three bands. A list of goods which the Dutch seized frcm

a Portugese ship off the Roads of Elmina included 185 pieces Gape Verde

cloths, and 6028 pieces Benin cloths.*1’ The Dutch ship "Juffrouw Maria

Jacoba” brought to Elmina goods which included 4143 pieces of cloth and 440
5
cotton threads from Benin.

In spite of the large-scale importation of cheap cotton prints into

the country, the demands for these West African products were so great that

when supply failed to meet the demand, the European trader imported cloths

1. K. Ratelband, 1953, PP*36-37*

2. K. Ratelband, 1953, pp.251-2,
3* Ibid., pp.386-7.
4. WIC. Vol. 102, Letter from Director-General William Butler
dd. 31st February, 1718.
5. WIC. Vol. 104. Letter from D.-G. W. Butter, Dec., 1719*
 -22-

with the same descriptions as those from Ardra, Whydah, Benin and the

Quaqua coasts. In August 1668, the English ship ’’the Arcany Merchant”
1
brought among other goods, 1752 pieces of Benin cloths to the Gold Coast#

As late as 1752, instructions were sent from London to Cape Coast to send

’’Patterns of the Ashantee and Whydah cloth as now cotton is tolerable cheap,

they can be made here so as to dispose of them to good account on the

coast.

The European traders, with their efficient means of transportation,

must have derived great benefits frcm these West African imports. For

instance, during this period, the price of an iron bar never exceeded 3

guilders (6/-) in Holland, but if this iron bar was sent to a place in the

Bight of Benin, it might be exchanged for iwo pieces of Benin cloth. If

these two Benin cloths were sent to the Gold Coast, they might be sold for

eight guilders (16/-), thus realising a profit of five guilders (10/-).

Again, a piece of Quaqua cloth exchanged for one pound of coraal, might
>,.v
fetch ten pounds wprtffi of ivory in Benin. If the ivory was sent to the

Netherlands, it might be sold for nine guilders (18/-). Even more

advantageous was the barter trade with the island of Sao Tome. For a

piece of Quaqua cloth sent there, the planters readily gave 32 pounds worth

of sugar in exchange. This sugar could be sold in Holland for ten guilders

(20/-).3
It appears, however, that the large-scale importation of cloths

from Europe and the East Indies into the country tended to work to the

disadvantage of the West African producers. The Gold Coast peoples quickly

1. T 70/635 f.6. 20th August 1668.

2. T 70/1478 Committee to Mr. Husbands, London, 6th October 1752#
For Ashanti cloth see pp. 37"38 below.
3. See e.g. K. Ratelband, 1953, op.cit.,p.XCV.
 -23-

developed a taste for these foreign imports, and tended to take lesser

quantities of the West African cloths. The adverse effects were keenly

felt in Benin where the cotton cloth industry had taken deep roots.

the Dutch were reluctant to buy large quantities of the cloths which could

not be quickly disposed of on the Gold Coast. The King of Benin protested,

and insisted that all the Dutch ship captains should take at least 1700

pieces of Benin cloth on board their ships before they were allowed to

buy other goods on that coast. The Dutch had to comply with the king’s

request because, at that time, they were driving a profitable trade in

gum and ivory on that coast. The Dutch, however, found a way out of their

dilemma by sending some of the Benin cloths to the Netherlands where they
•\
were sold at Amsterdam for 12 stuivers a piece.

It was the trans-Atlantic trade in gold, slaves and ivory, however,

which drew the Gold Coast peoples irresistibly into the world economy. It

would seem, initially, the Gold Coast attracted the Portugese because of

its gold and ivory. Indeed, there is evidence that in the sixteenth century

the Portugese were actually importing slaves into the country from other

parts of West Africa, especially from Benin and the region of the Niger
2
delta. The search for Guinea gold, however, was soon reinforced by the

demand for African slaves. The development of the Portuguese slave trade

began as a result of the development of sugar plantations, firstly, in

Madeira, then in Sao Tome, and finally in Brazil. The Spanish Caribbean

colonies, and, to a lesser extent, Mexico and Peru, also became profitable

1. WIC. Vol. 104, Director-General W. Butler’s letter dated 4th July 1719-
A stuiver was equivalent to 5 cents in Dutch currency of the period.
2. J.W. Blake, Europeans in West Africa . pp.59“60;
Page, (Madison, 1961), pp.45 and 100 f.n.40.
slave markets for Portuguese traders.

The Portuguese monopoly of the Guinea trade, however, was tenuous,

and soon Spanish, French, English and Dutch privateers risked capture and

possible death to partake in that gainful trade. These privateers doubled

their efforts after 1530 “ the heyday of the Portuguese gold trade in

Guinea - when the Portuguese concentrated their attention on the East and

virtually neglected the Guinea Coast,

But it was the conquest of Portugal by Philip II of Spain in 1580

which marked the beginning of the collapse of the Portuguese trade monopoly

in Guinea, As a result of this episode, the Portuguese possessions in

Brazil and Africa were thrown open to Philip's revolted subjects of Holland.

In 15955 the Dutch made their first voyage to the Gold Coast, and we^e

speedily followed by others, in spite of strong opposition by the

2
Portuguese, The Dutch action was clearly intended to exasperate the

Spanish king, but it was also possible that it was part of the Dutch efforts

to dominate the carrying trade to the Americas. The potentialities of the

demand for slaves in the Spanish American colonies, and in the English and

French plantation colonies in the Caribbean, provided the Dutch with a

strong economic motive to share in Guinea trade. In the event, the Dutch

decided to have their own bases in the country to challenge more effectively

the Portuguese monopoly. In 1598, they established themselves at Mouree,

Butri, Kormantsi and Kommenda, so that the Portuguese chief trading

settlement of Elmina Castle, was contained with a pair of Dutch settlements

on each side. In 1625 , they stormed Elmina Castle with the help of seme of
1. C, R. Boxer, Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion. A succinct Survey.
1415-1825 (Johannesburg, 1963)5 P«24.
2. Ward, 1958, p.77.
 -25-

the local peoples, but failed to dislodge the Portuguese. They succeeded,

however, in 1637, and, when this was followed up by the capture of the last

Portuguese stronghold at Axim in 1642, the Portuguese monopoly of the

1
Guinea trade ended.

In a sense, 1637 iaay be regarded as one of the great land marks

in Gold Coast history, Whatever hopes the Dutch might have entertained

after the expulsion of the Portuguese, it soon became clear that they

could not follow their predecessor's exanple of monopolising the Guinea

trade. Page has pointed out that post-revolutionary England and Colbertian

France, with their notions of economic nationalisms, could not afford to

2
see the Dutch in sole ccntrol of the carrying trade to the Americas. When

settlers from England and France occupied some of the West Indian islands

and began to engage in large-scale sugar plantations, an additional impulse

was given to traders from these two countries to engage in the Guinea slave

trade. Thus began the foundation of English and French West Indian and

African Companies, with greater or lesser degree of governmental assistance,

aiming at competing with the Dutch in supplying slaves from Africa to the

rapidly expanding communities of the West Indies and tropical America. In

this scramble for the West African Abrade, even comparatively smaller and

weaker nations like Denmark, Sweden and Brandenburgh, urged on by official

or mercantile interests who sought to emulate the Dutch example, came in

for a share,

A permanent feature of this great competitive era was the erection

of forts and castles on the Gold Coast. During the later part of the

1. Ibid., pp.77-79.
2. Fage, 1961, p.46. For the forts see e.g. "A new Check list of the
forts and castles of Ghana", ed. J.D. Fage, in Trans.Hist.Soc.Ghana,
Vol.17, pt.I, pp.57-66.
A.W. Lawrence, Trade Castles and Forts of West Africa, (London, 1963)•
seventeenth and the early years of the eighteenth, Danish, English and

Brandenburger forts appeared on the coast alongside those which the Dutch

had captured from the Portuguese, or had built for themselves. From Axim

in the west to Accra in the east, Dutch and English forts were interspersed

almost evenly at all the major trading centres on the coast. The Danes,

after a brief settlement at Amanful, near Cape Coast, finally confined their

activities to Accra and, later on, built some unpretentious forts east of it,

to a point just beyond the river Volta. It is estimated that, excluding

subsidiary trading stations or lodges, 1here was something like thirty major

stone- or brick-built farts, garrisoned by Dutch, English or Danish Companies,

each of which had a legal monopoly of their country's trade on the Guinea

coast. The headquarters of these traders - Cape Coast Castle, Elmina Castle

and Christiansborg Castle, Accra - all served as warehouses where goods from

Europe and other places were stored .either for sale to the African traders

or for onward transmission to Europe and the Americas.

This large concentration of European establishments, coupled with

an equally large number of merchant ships, on the coast, greatly increased

the volume of trade in slaves, gold, ivory, pepper (Nalaguetta) and gum.

Sir Reginald Coupland has stated, with scarcely any exaggeration, that the

treatment of Africa by Christian Europe in the period of the slave trade

2
constituted "the greatest crime in history1'. This judgment has been echoed
3
overtly or by implication by other students of the trade. The surprising

fact was the apparent callousness with which both the European traders and
1. F age, 1961, p .4£>. ~
2. Sir Reginald Coupland, The British Anti-slavery Movement,(London,1933) p.35*
3. See eg. E.Donnan, Documents illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade
to America.(Washington D.C.1950-5).C.Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade,
^Londo n 1944) Ch.II. W. E.B.Dubois, The Suppression of the African Slave
Trade to the U.S.A. 1638-1870. (New York. 1904). H.A.Wyndham. The
Atlantic and Slavery. (London. 1933).
 -27-

the mercantile communities of West Africa joined together in an unholy

partnership to provide huge profit for themselves out of the terrible

business of denuding Africa of its human resources to provide a labour

force for the plantations of the New World. It has been pointed out

that the trans-Atlantic slave trade which, intthe sixteenth century, had

run at a mean level of perhaps 9000 slaves a year, rapidly grew in volume,

so that even conservative estimates put the total number of African slaves

supplied to America in the eighteenth century at something like 7>000,000,

giving an annual mean of approximately eight times the sixteenth century

figure. During a period of fifty-six years (1676-1731), Dutch, who

were undeniably the most important of the European traders on the Guinea

coast during this period, officially estimated that they exported over

£2 million sterling worth of gold, 8 8 ,40 6 slaves, 2 ,956,649 lb. of ivory

2
and 309,458 lb. wax fran West Africa to Europe and America.

It is difficult to discover how much of these West African

commodities were taken frcm the Gold Coast. It would seem, however, that

from the very beginning, Europeans, were attrabted into the country mainly

because of its ancient reputation as the chief source of West African

gold. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Dutch complained

that during a period of eight years (1668 -1676 ) they were only able to
4
export 3150 marks of gold worth £43,200 sterling from the coast. The

1. Page, 1961, p.4 6 .

2. The estimates were derived from figures obtained from WIC Verspreyde
Stukken 928. A mark of gold equals 8 ozs. of gold and an ounce of
gold was worth about £ 4 *
3* Prcm all early European accounts the gold trade of Guinea paid
handsomely. MThere are indications, in the correspondence of King
John II of Portugal that the Crown came to depend upon a regular
supply of gold frcm Mina”. The quotation is frcm Almeida, Historia
de Portugal. Ill, 554, as cited by J. W. Blake, 1937, op.cit., pp.82-4*
Also, K. 0 . Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger BsliA, 1830-1885.
(London, 1956) ; p.1, f.n.2 .
4. WIC Vol. 97. Director-Gen. J. Van Sevenhuysen, Elmina, 15th April, 1700.
 -28-

Royal African Company noted that Accra "is a place of very great trade

especially for gold valued at £20,000 per annum." Bosman pointed out

that in a good year some 7000 marks of gold worth £200,000 sterling could he

obtained on the Gold Coast, and it should be remembered that gold was a
2
much scarcer commodity then than now.

Nevertheless, it was clear by the 1720*s that the gold trade of

the country had already passed its peak and that the country was increasingly

becoming identified with the slave trade. Director-General Butler reported

in 1720 that the gold trade had decreased in volume by sanething like fifty

per cent, during the past ten or twenty years, a phenomenon which he

attributed to the "heavy payments which the Negroes receive for their

slaves".^ Six years later, the report was that the gold trade had almost

dwindled to nothing and that the Gold Coast was fast becoming the "Slave"
4
coast. The increased demand for slaves on the sugar plantations in the

New World which made the European traders and, especially, the interlopers,

willing to pay high prices for slaves, clearly decided the Africans to

abandon the tedious job of working in the gold pits for the comparatively

easy task of raiding for slaves. At the beginning of the century, the price

for a male slave was about five ounces worth of gold (£10 sterling) and for

female and a healthy child, four ounces (£8 sterling).'* The Dutch, English

and Danish Governors on the coast accused one another for paying more with

a view to engrossing the lion*s share of the trade. It appears, however,

1. T 70/175 The Royal African Company to Parliament, London,

13th February, 1709.
2. Bosman, 1705, 89- Davies, 1957, p.225.
3. WIC 104, D-G. Willem Butler, 14th July 1720. WIC 105 Ibid, letter
dated 8th May, 1722.
4. WIC: 106, D-G. Pieter Valckenier, Elmina, 16th January, 1726.
5. There are numerous references to this in all the European records.
But see e.g. T 70/1515 Prices of Slaves 1737-1807.
 -29-

that during this period, the peoples of West Africa were themselves reluctant

to part with their gold. To them gold had always meant something more than

a medium of exchange. The Portuguese found the coastal peoples using gold

as a personal ornament. But gold was also employed in a number of ritual

1
ceremonies, particularly for burials. Thus the large-scale exportationcf

the metal made the West Africans not only refuse to produce the metal in

any great quantity, but even to demand gold instead of trade goods for their

slaves. Alcwamu merchants, far example, were demanding payment in gold for
2
the slaves they were bringing to Accra. This attitude provoked a sharp

comment frcm the Royal African Company. In 1729, the Company instructed

their servants at Cape Coast Castle that "it was never intended that gold

purchased there (Whydah) should be brought to Cape Coast and sunk there •

if the native traders would not accept English manufactures they should
3
keep their slaves."

The reference to the gold from Whydah was actually to the gold

sent there by the Portuguese. After their expulsion from Axim, the

Portuguese continued to visit the Guinea coast. But their contacts with

Lower Guinea - Costa da Mina - were few, fleeting and tenuous. The

Portuguese concentrated their slave trading activities in Angola, Benguela,

and, to a much smaller extent, the area in Upper Guinea around Cacheau and

Bissau. But with the discovery of gold in Minas Gerais, in the last decade

of the seventeenth century, it became urgently necessary to find labourers

1. Bowdich, 1819, p.334. Joseph Dupi&s, 1824, p.IVI. Page, 1961, pp.41-42.
2. V.G..K, Letter from Governor Franz Boye, Christiansborg Castle, Accra,
to the Directors dd. 13th November, 1714. Also, Johan Rask, Kort og
sandferdig Reisbeskrirelse til og fra Guinea. (Trondhjem, 1754), p.81•
3. Royal African Company to John Braithwaite, Robert Cruickshank and
Charles Peacke, London, 14th August, 1729. X t® /
 -30-

who were stronger and more fitted for work in the mines than the slaves

from Angola and the Congp. This led to the reopening of the slave trade

between the Brazilian ports - Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Pernambuco (Recife),

and Lower Guinea. They brought gold, hides, sugar and tcfcacco to West

Africa, and took away slaves. In 1724# the Dutch reported that the

Portuguese were^in such jgreat demand for slaves that they needed ships to

collect slaves from other parts of West Africa for sale to the Portuguese
2
at Elmina. A year later, the Portuguese slave trade was described as
3
Mthe artery and nerves” of the Gold Coast trade. The Portuguese, however,

concentrated their efforts at the Dahomean and the Benin coasts. They

settled at Whydah in 1721 and, after the Dahomean conquest of that state in

1727“28, it is estimated that an average of 6000 slaves were exported to

4
Brazil annually.

The Portuguese trade was so lucrative that it became one of the

basic causes of Anglo-Dutch conflicts on the coast in the first half of the

eighteenth century. The Dutch claimed the right to force all Luso-Brazilian

ships trading on the Gold Coast to call first at Elmina and pay a tax of

ten per cent. The English ostensibly resented the Dutch interference in

Portuguese freedom of trade and, partly to frustrate the Dutch efforts, but

mainly to further their own trade interests, they required the Portuguese
5
to trade in the Cape Coast roads on payment of five per cent, duty only.

Moreover, in order to help the Portuguese ships elude capture by Dutch

cruising vessels, the English gave the captains of Portuguese ships not only

1. C.R. Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, (Oxford,

1963), --------------------------
2* WIC 106 D.-G. P. Valckenier, Elmina, dated 8th Jan. and 8th May# 1724.
3. WIC 106 Ibid., 10th July, 1725.
4. Boxer, (Oxford, 1963 )# P*17.
Form more information about the Dahomean conquest of Whydah see e.g. WIC
Vol.107# Robert Narre's letter dd. 16th May, 1727.
WIC Vol.922, D.-G. p # Valckenier*s letter dd. 15th June, 1725*
 -31-
1
English passports, but also allowed them to fly the English flag.

Nevertheless, the scarcity of gold on the G-old Coast continued to

worry the European traders because the Brazilian gold was only a small

fillip in comparison with the gold trade in the country itself. The

situation must have become even worse when, in the early 1730*s, the King

of Portugal decreed that his subjects should send no more Brazilian gold to

West Africa. The Dutch thought that the decree was unlikely to be ignored
2
as the Portuguese Crown was determined to enforce it. Indeed, this

seemed to have been the case for, shortly afterwards, the Portuguese and

other European traders were taking gold frcm the Dahomean coast, a move

which forced the King of Dahomey to place an embargo on the export of gold
3
from his kingdom.

The G-old Coast, during this period, was clearly an area of great

commercial significance. The trade with the Sudan coupled with the maritime

trade in slaves, gold, ivory and cloths brought a general prosperity to the

Gold Coast peoples. This prosperity manifested itself almost immediately

in the growth of large coastal trading centres in areas where, formerly,

there had only been tiny fishing and salt-making villages. Towns like

Sekondi, Shama, Kommenda, Elmina, Cape Coast, Anomabo, Winneba, Bereku and

Accra grew and waxed on the unprecendented prosperity brought in by the

intensive commercial activities. Some of these towns which had previously

been mere outlets of their respective coastal kingdoms, either replaced

the capitals of these states or rivalled them in importance andwealth.

1. See e.g. WIC;- Vols.108, 109.Letters fromD.-Gs. Robert Norre and Jan
Pranger, dated 14th April, 1728 and 14th February, 1733 > respectively.
2. WIC 109, -D.-G-. Jan Pranger* s letter dated ^ r d . April, 1732#
3. I 70/1470 fol. 21. William's Port Whydah, 1737.
 -32-

There was a constant flow of peoples from the interior into these coastal

towns, not as invading hordes, but merchant-adventurers of various degree;

or they may have come to provide agricultural and market labour which the

traders would depend on. For example, Anomabo, which started off as a

small Etsi village, and later became one of the ports of the Fanti state,

became such an important coastal trading centre that Bosman could write,

ftThe Town Anomabo may very well pass for the strongest on the whole coast

affording as many armed men as the whole kingdoms of Saboe and Commany;

and yet is proportion but a fifth part of Fantynrt• The large-scale

importation of cowrie shells, the established currency of the Western Sudan,

must have given the coastal communities an unprecedented purchasing power

in their dealings with the northern peoples frcm whom they obtained their

gold, slaves and ivory.

The coastal states themselves put their commerce on a new basis.

They exercised strict control on the trading paths and refused to give

permission to inland traders to come down to the coast to deal directly

with the European traders until they had paid heavy tolls. In due course,

they set up inland markets to deal with the inland traders instead of

allowing them to the coast. The Accra people set up a market at Abonce,

two hours journey from their capital of Great Accra, where the inland traders

from Akyem, Akwamu, Aquimena and Kwawu came to exchange their gold and

slaves for salt and other European merchandise. The king appointed his

trade representative who saw to it that only the Accras carried the goods

frcm the European forts to Abonce and also supervised the trade relations

1. Bosman, 1705» op.cit., p.56

 -33-

there. He had full powers to regulate customs duties and to settle trade

disputes. He could close the trading paths to traders who refused to pay

the king's duties* When there were troubles between the coastal states

and the inland states, the former not only closed the trading paths through

their country to the coast, but they refused to allow the inland traders

permission to enter their inland markets as well. On the coast itself,, the

Fantis levied a toll of 340 guilders (£34 sterling) on any ship which
2
arrived at any of their ports. One of the results of this commercial

reorganisation was the appearance of coastal ”middlemen” whose wealth in

slaves and money surpassed that of most of the petty coastal chiefs, and

therefore came to wield great influence in coast trade and politics.^

The most interesting and perhaps the most important development

was the reorganisation of the states behind the coastal kingdoms. It is

reasonable to suppose that the medieval trade with the Sudan was bound to

have repercussions in the political sphere. The effect, however, was not

as politically revolutionary as might be supposed, for the Sudanese trade

did not involve the introduction of firearms, an important instrument for

would-be creators of empires, into the country. Indeed, it was only with

the advent of the Moroccans, in the late sixteenth century, that firearms

were introduced into the Sudan itself. At the beginning of the seventeenth

century, Insocco, the southern terminus of the Djenne trade route, had no

1. Tilleman, 1697 > op.cit., pp.100-102.

Also, John Ogilby, Africa, being an accurate description of the
Regions of Aegypt, Barbary, Lybia and Billedutgerid, the land of
Negroes, Guinea, Aethopia and the Abyssines... (London, 1670),
pp.434-35.
2. WIC Vol.484> D.-G. Willem de la Palma's letter dated 10th Oct, 1703.
3. See next Chapter.
 -34-

firearms.^ Nor did the Portuguese, during their long monopoly of the G-old

Coast trade, appear to have introduced firearms on any large scale.

Admittedly, the peoples of Axim and Elmina, who were the allies of the

Portuguese, had some firearms with which they engaged in minor skirmishes

with their enemies, such as the Ahanta peoples. It seems, however, that

firearms were not found in many of the coastal states. In a battle between

the Asebus and the Etsii people during this period, the Asebus were able to

defeat the Etsiis, who opposed them with superior numbers, largely because
2
of about 60 or 70 muskets, and two small cannons which the Dutch gave them.

At that time, the Gold Coast armies relied mainly on bows and arrows, shields

and javelins and spears. The Aowins were said to have been experts in
3
shooting poisoned arrows. Even the Akwamus, who were known to have been

capable of sending over 2 5 ,0 0 0 armed men to the field, were described as

being "so nicely dexterous in shooting arrows".^ At the beginning of this

century, the Bekwais told Rattray that, in the past, they fought with

swords, shields and stones, and that during the Ashanti and Denkyera wars

(1698-1701), they had only thirty guns.^ Indeed, it appears that during

the period when firearms were unknown, wars in the country were nothing of

importance. Even at the end of the seventeenth century, Bosman could write,

"a national offensive war may well be managed here with 4,000 men M.o

1* Chart 743 (1629) op.cit. Mr. Ivor Wilks has indicated that Insocco had
four guns. This is not correct. In the context, "geen vier geweeren"
could only mean "no firearms". In old Dutch "vier" meant "fire" or
"four". I am indebted to Miss A.P.Mollema for drawing attention to
this important fact.
See I. Wilks, "The Northern Factor in Ashanti History" in Journal of
African History, II, 1 (1961) op.cit. and"Begho and the Mande" in
The Northern Factor in Ashanti History (Gloucester, 1961), op.cit., pp.4"5
2. Chart 743, (1629 ) op.cit.
3. Bosman, 1705, op.cit., p.79.
4. Ibid., 1705, op.cit. pp.184-86.
5. R. S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution. (London, 1929 ), p.148 .
 -35-

in the field*... sometimes the number of what they call an Army does not

amount to more than 2,000 (men)”.

The introduction of firearms into the Gold Coast on a large scale was

the direct outcome of the overthrow of the Portuguese trading monopoly, and the

subsequent appearance on that coast of the English, the Dutch, Danes and

Brandenburgers. Bosman, realising the dangers inherent in that kind of traffic,

shrewdly remarked that by tha.t action the Europeans were providing the

Africans with "a knife to cut our own throats”. He added, however, that the

Dutch had to indulge in the importation of arms for, if they refused to do

that, the other Europeans would import them and thereby engross the greater

part of the coast trade since the Africans were in great demand of that
2
commodity* The result was that, soon afterwards, the traditional bow and

arrow were ”not much in vogue amongst the coastal Negroes”.3

In the first half of the seventeenth century, when the Gold Coast

market had not yet been flooded with firearms, the best known inland state was

Akanny.*1'During this period, this state was bounded on the west and the south­

west by Twifo and Abramboe respectively; on the east by Akyem, on the north

and north-west by Inta and Bono respectively and on the south by Atty (Etsi).^

The Akanny country has been identified with the present-day Assin
g
state of Ghana. The available evidence, hcwever, tends to suggest that
1. Bosman, A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea, 2nd Edition
(London,1721), p.153*
2. Bosman, 1705* op.cit*, p.184.
3. Bosman, 1705, op.cit., p.186.
4. For information about Akanny see e.g. Bosman, op.cit., p.77; John Ogilby,
Africa, (London 1670); John BarbotJA Descriptionof South Guinea* in
Churchill*s Collection of Voyages, (London, 1732),p.175* and 188 ff;
Ratelband, 1953, op.cit., ch.IV, pp.XCII-XCIII.
5. Chart 743 (1629 ), op.cit.
6. See e.g.I.Wilks, The Northern Factor in Ashanti History (Gloucester, 196 1)
op.cit., p. 5; G.Macdcnald, The Gold CoastiPast and Present,(Londoru^1898)p*
104. Macdonald argues that there was no state called Akanny at all, and
that the ”Akanny Sika” which Bosman referred to, was none other than
gold coming from Akyem. ”Sika”, of course, is the Akan word ?ot gold. It
is now used to refer to money in general.
 -36-

this was not the case. Undoubtedly, sane inhabitants of Assin were living

in the Akanny country during this period. Early in the nineteenth century,

Bowdich found that the capitals of the two rebellious Assin chiefs, Tsibu

and Aputei, were located in the southern part of the modern Adansi division
1
of Ashanti. It appears, however, that the Akanny of the seventeenth

century was the old Akan state of "Arcania", whose territorial boundary

then embraced the whole of modern Adansi, parts of Akyem and Benkyera and

Southern Ashanti. At that time, it was probable that the southern boundary

of the Akanny state was the River Pra. On this point, Bowdich* s observations

on the Assin country are significant. He noted that Assin Manso, the

modern capital of the Apimenim division of the Assin state, was not only

the former great Fanti market, but also it was "the last town of the Fantee
2
territory*'* Again, Bowdich wrote, "Every account I received afterwards,

confirmed the boundary of the Fantee and Assin territories to be between

Mansue and Fousou."^ Also, some versions of Fanti tradition point out

that, in the olden days, the Fanti country stretched from the coast to the

River Pra, and it is significant to notice that a number of towns in the

Assin country today pay a sort of feudal due to some Fanti chiefs.**" The

movement of the Assins from the Adanse area into their present comtry was

the result of political upheavals in that area dating from the rise of

1. Ansa, the capital of the third Assin chief, Amo, was also located
in this region. Bowdich, 1819, op.cit., p.26.
2. Bowdich, 1819, op.cit., pp. 19 and 24.
3# Ibid., 1819, p.25, f.n. "Fousou", of course, is the modern Assin Fosu.
Bowdich in fact believed that the Assin country was the area between the
right bank of the River Pra, and the Twisa mountains. On entering Praso,
the first Assin town, he observed: "...the Assins may be considered,
collectively, a (more) mannerly and orderly people than the Ashantees..."
Ibid.,pp.25-27.
4. Towns like Bosomadwe and Okuruwa in tha state of Assin Atandasu,
still pay feudal dues to the Qmanhene of Abora state because "the
Fantis formerly owned all the land", they say.
 -37-

Denkyera. The Assin country was originally the home of the Etsii peoples,
1
over whom the Fantis exercised some form of overlordship. Perhaps the
2
Akanny state was the Adanse state reputed to have been the first Akan state.

All early accounts indicate that the Akanny people were the most

important inland traders in the country. The Akannists, like the contemp­

orary Hausa and Mande traders, were itinerant merchants who frequented the

coastal trading centres for European goods and sent them far inland for

resale to the peoples living there. The Akannists were known to have traded

as far West as the Qua Qua coast, though they did not venture as far east

as the Ardra and the Benin coasts. Their chief trading path was the "Assin

path" which they seemed to have used without much hindrance frcan the peoples

through whose countries they passed. Some of these Akanny merchants were

known to have settled temporarily at many of the coastal trading centres

where they acted as brokers for traders frcm their own country as well as

other inland tribes. Such Akanny merchants usually spoke the Portuguese

language.-^

It has been pointed out that the Akannists were in close commercial

contact with the peoples of Insocco and Wenchi, whose locally manufactured

cloths they valued highly. It would appear that, in course of time, the

cloth industry spread into the forest bntil the Akannists themselves became

weavers of fine cloths. Early in the eighteenth century, a Dutch factor

\m A number of towns in the Fanti and Assin countries claim to

have had an Etsi origin.
2. See e.g. C.C. Reindorf, History, Gold Coast and Asante.
op.cit., pp.48-49.
E. Meyercwitz, Akan traditions of Origin, (London, 1952), op.cit.
and The Sacred State of the Akan.
3m What was, perhaps, more important, and certainly more lasting, was
the spread of the use of the Portuguese language as a commercial
lingua franca all along the coast. In 1715, the Dutch factor at
Apam believed the story of troop movements by the Akyems told him
by an Agona chief because the latter spoke to him directly in
Portuguese. NBKG 82 G.Hendrik, Apam, to D.-G. Haring, 6/ 6/1715
 -38-

1
was instructed to present one fine "Akanny cloth” to the king of Whydah.

Also, the Ashanti king, Opoku Ware, presented one such cloth to the Dutch

at Elmina which was said to have been worth about 50 bend^s (£400 sterling),

in 1725.2

The Akanny traders were apparently received well on the coast, and

the European traders vied with one another to court their friendship, since

the Akannists supplied about two-thirds of the gold received on the coast; ■

In 1645* the Dutch ordered a monthly salary to be paid to the Akanny chief

"Correnkjn”, as it was being done for the chiefs of Mouree and Elmina*-
^

In 1680, the Danes at Fredericksburg Castle at Amanful, near Cape Coast,

made monthly payments to the king of Fetu, the Dey of Fetu, the cabuceer

of Cape Coast as well as the king of Akanny*s trade representative at Cape

4
Coast*

In the second half of the century, however, the most important

inland states were Akyem, Denkyera and Akwamu. The emergence of these states

may be accounted for by the determination of some enterprising families to

organise a formidable state, capable of controlling the gold and slave

resources in the Gold Coast interior* The peoples of these well-organised

states, whose loyalty to the paramount chief transcended family and tribal

loyalties, could be made to work in the innumerable gold pits, rarely

exceeding about thirty feet in depth, scattered all over the interior*

1* N.B. K.G. 82 Van Naersen, Whydah to D.-G. Haring, dd 2 5 th March, 17i'5»

2, WIC Vol.106, Letter from D.-G. Pieter Valckenier, Elmina, 11th July, 1725•
Perhaps this was a "Kente cloth” still woven in Ashanti* The Dutch
sent it to Holland to be placed in a Museum as an "Antiquity”.
3. Ratelband, 1953? op.cit., p.37* "Correnkijn” is clearly Kurankyi,
which is a well-known name in both Assin and Adansi. See WIC 97*
D.-G. William de la Palma* s letter dd 1st May, 1703*
4* V. G. K. Incoming and outgoing letters and documents from Guinea, 1624*
1659-80, April, 1680. The Danish fort was bought by the English in
1685 for strategic reasons, and renamed Fort Royal.
Moreover, they could be armed and engaged in slave raiding expeditions to

provide slaves who could be forced to work in the gold pits or sold to

the coastal communities. The general prosperity in the country and the

introduction of firearms in appreciable quantities made the creation of such

states possible.

Akyem was undoubtedly an integral part of the old Akanny kingdom

of the Akans. . In fact, during, this period, Akyem was known as "Great Akan1'..

It was then bounded on the north by a state called Ahoy, on the north-west

by Inta, on the east by Akwamu, on the south and south-east by Sonquay and

Aqua respectively, and on the north-east by Kwawu. In the 1620's, Akyem

was mainly noted for slaves but, during the second half of the century,

Akyem was one of the main sources of gold in the country. Tilleman points

out that the bulk of the gold which was received at Accra and the neigh­

bouring beaches came from "Acania which lies West-North-West of Aquamboe"

and that the Akyems were continually at work in the gold pits under the
2
direct supervision of their chief Bomba. Bosman also remarked that
3
Akyem "furnishes as large quantities of gold as any land I know..." In

the early years of the eighteenth century Akyemwas known as one of the main

sources of gold in the country.

It was probable that, initially, Akyemwas under one monarch, but

by the beginning of the eighteenth century she was governed by a number of

chiefs. Bosman noted that Akyem "for as far as it is known to us, was

formerly under a Monarchal Government", but that because the then ruler was

a minor who showed "but too palpable signs of a Cruel Nature, hath not been
1. During this period, the Akyem boundary must have included what is now
South-East Ashanti; it is significant that parts of Eastern Ashanti are
still known as Asante-Akyem. But see Reindorf, History, op.cit., p.61.
2. Eric Tilleman. (1697), op.cit., pp.115-11 6.
3. Bosman, (1705), op.cit., p78.
4. Akyem and Eguira were the two main sources of gold during this
period, see N.B.K.& 82, Baring's letter dd. 11th November, 1715*
 -40-

able to make himself Master of the whole land ... For the G-overning Men of

the kingdom, fearing he will prove a great Tyrant, to restrain him, have

taken a part of the Administration into their own hands,..” By 1715,

Akyem had been constituted into the modern states of Akyem Abuakwa and
2
Akyem Kotoku under Ofori and Apenten, respectively. Between them, they

controlled the gold pits in the upper reaches of the Birim and the Pra

rivers, and raided the neighbouring Inta and Kwawu peoples for slaves.

It is not clear what political association bound these two Akyem

states, but it would appear that, in matters of foreign relations, they

acted together for their mutual interests. For instance, in 1715, they

acted together in sending ambassadors to the Fanti chiefs who were assembled

at Abora, to protest against Fanti interference in their quarrels with the

3
Akannists. During the Akyem and Ashanti war of 1717* which ended in the

death of the King of Ashanti, the Akyem Abuakwas co-operated with the Kotokus

who had initiated the war,^ In fact, no distinction whatsoever was made in

contemporary documents between the two Akyem states and, together, they
5
were described as ”the most potent power in the interior to the leeward”.
....... g ..............
Akwamu in the 1620,s , was a small state lying in the immediate

1. Bosman, 1705, p.78. For more information about internal dissensions in

Akyem, see also Barbot, 1732, op.cit., p.189.
2. N.B.K.G, 82, Boerhaven, Bereku, to D.-G, Haring, 20th May, 1715.
3. N.B.K.G. 82, J. Visbeek, Kormantsi to D.-G. Haring, 26th Sept., 1715*
4. N.B.K.G. 82, J. Douti&sau,. Accra, to D.-G. Haring dd. 10th Oct., 1715-
M. Priestley and Ivor Wilks, "Ashanti Kings in the Eighteenth Century..”
in Journal of African History. (19^0), op.cit., p.123, f.n.62
5. See e.g. T 70/1464, William Baillie's Kommenda Diary, entry for 19th
May 1715, postscript. N.B.K.G. 82, E.Roberts to D.-G. Haring, Elmina,31/2/171
6. Mr. Ivor Wilks has dealt with the history of Akwamu in some detail.
His main works on Akwamu are: 1. "The Rise of the Akwamu Empire, 1650-
1710, in Trans.Hist.Soc.Ghana* Vol.Ill, pt.2. Achimota, 1957, PP*99-136»
2. "The Rise and Fall of a West-African Empire: Akwamu 1650-1750" - an
unpublished M.A. thesis in the Univ. of Wales; 3* MAkwamu and Otublohum”
An Eighteenth-Century Akan MarriageArrangement” in Africa. Vol.XXIX,
No.4, October 1959j 4. MA Note on Twifo and Akwamu” in Trans.Hist.Soc.
Ghana. Ill, 3 , 1958, pp.215-17.
 -41-

hinterland of Agona across the trade routes inland from the coast to Akyem,

Kwawu and the farther north. At that time Akwamu was neither reputed as a

source of gold or slaves and the Dutch cartographer, apparently thinking of

the forms of control which the Akwamus exercised over the trade routes,
1
uncharitably described them as "diefachtich volck1', a predatory people.

It might be, as Wilks suggests, that the Akwamu state, during this period,

must have extended as far as the upper Birim river,' and even further west-
2
wards over the area between the Pra and the Birim. In that case, the

traditional hostility between the Akyems and the Akwamus may have originated

in their determination to monopolise the gold pits in this area. In the

late seventeenth and the early years of the eighteenth century, Akwamu

extended her domination over the Kwawus, the Krepis, ^he Akwapims, and the

G-a-Adangme peoples. The main impulse behind the Akwamu policy was clearly

economic. Pirst, Akwamu secured effective control over the trade routes in

the hinterland of the Accra kingdom, and thereby made the Accras economically

dependent on them, by the incorporation of the G-uan and Kyerepong peoples of

modern Akwapim into the Akwamu state. By defeating the Accra kingdom itself,

in 1680-1, the Akwamus reaped fixed revenues, such as the rents from the

European settlements at Accra, and variable revenues, such as the tolls

which they exacted from the Akyems and other inland traders in their inland

market at Nyanoase, The sources of income enabled Akwamu to finance those

major campaigns that extended her power eastwards to the coast of Dahomey

and north-eastwards into the Afram plains. The extension of Akwamu overlord­

ship over the Kwawu and the Krepi peoples of the Afram plains was certainly

1. Chart 743* 1629* op.cit.

2. I. Wilks, 1957* op.cit., pp.99-100.
intended to monopolise the gold and slave resources in that area. Bosman

discovered that the gold which reached the Dutch fort at Ponni, east of

Accra, came from "Quahoe which abounds in that metal” , and that the Kwawus

passed through "Aquamboe to Accra where they drive the greatest part of

their trade.” In 1709? the Danes commented that the Akwamu campaigns

against the peoples of the Afram plains were detrimental to the slave trade,
2
because "Quahoe is the place from where the slaves come.”

The rise of Denkyera as a powerful inland state may be dated from

the second half of the seventeenth century, since that state was unheard of
3
on the coast in the 1620*s. This conjecture seems to receive support in

Bosman* s assertion that Denkyera, which was "formerly restrained to a

small compass of land, containing but an inconsiderable number of inhabitants,

is, by their valour, so improved in Power, that they are respected and

honoured by all their neighbouring nations; all which they have thought to

fear them, except Asiante and Akim who are yet stronger than they”.^

The consolidation of the Denkyera state must be attributed to some

families from the princely houses of the old Akanny kingdom; It is interesting

to notice that the old Denkyera capital, Bankesieso, was located in present-
5
day Adansi state, on a site near the moderngold-mining town of Obuasi. The

aim was clearly to create a powerful stateout of thetottering Akanny

kingdom, capable of sustaining and meeting the rapidly expanding economy in

the Gold Coast hinterland. Such a state, with increased supply of firearms,

could control the gold resources in the upper reaches of the Tano, Ankobra,

1. Bosman, 1705, op.cit., p.326.

2. V.G.K. Letter from Erich Ligaard, dated 3rd May, 1709*
3* See Chart 7^3? (1629), op. cit.
k. Bosman, 1705? op.cit., pp.72-73*
5. Ward, 1938, op.cit., p.53*
 -43-

the Ofin an! the middle part of the Pra rivers. Furthermore, such a

centralised state could conduct effectively slave raiding expeditions among

the less sophisticated Bono and Inta peoples to the north, as well as

control the trade routes from the interior to the coast from Axim in the

west to Cape Coast in the east. By the early 1690!s , Denkyera had realised

her aims and was in control of the gold-producing countries of Wassa, Inkassa

Igyina, Great Inkassa, Aowin and Twifo. In about 1697, the Denkyera

incorporated Akanny itself into their state and thereby virtually monopolised

the economic resources in the hinterland of the western Gold Coast.

The Denkyeras were certainly bad administrators. The Denkyera

state was centralised in the sense that ultimate political power rested

with the king and his advisers, though the internal administration of the

tributary states were left in the hands of their own chiefs. But the

Denkyeras seemed to have been preoccupied with ruthless exploitation of the

tributary states, so that what we know of her history is a record of internal

discord and disunity. Bosman comments, "Dinkira, elevated by its great

Riches and Power became so arrogant, it looked on all other Negroes with a

contemptible eye, esteeming them no more than its slaves; which rendered
1
it the object of their common hatred ...” The arbitrary demands of the

Denkyerahene on the nascent Ashanti Union was one of the immediate causes
2
of the Ashanti and Denkyera wars. In fact, during theirconflicts with the

Ashantis, Denkyerab relations with her tributarystates were so bad that it

was largely due to their lukewarm support and even their open rebellion,

which finally made the Ashantis the victors. In June 1700, there were

persistent rumours at Elmina that Denkyera had started troop movements, and

1. Bosman, 1705, pp.74-75*

2. Ibid., p;75; Ward, 1958? op.cit., p.120.
that it was unknown whether they intended to attack the Ashantis, the

Fantis, the Twifos, the Adorns, the Wassas or the peoples living in the

Ankobra area. The Dutch, whose trade was being badly affected by the

uncertainties and apprehensions arising out of these rumours, invited the

Denkyeras, the Twifos, the Akannists, the Cabes Terras and other states

involved in the disputes, to Dlmina for a settlement. In the following

month, it was reported that representatives from these states had been to

Elmina and that, in the presence of the chief factors, Pieter Nuyts and

William Bosman, they had solemnly promised to end all wars and to try to

prevent all disturbances in future. They also indicated their willingness

to keep open the trading paths and to make them safe for the inland traders
p
to use. The Dutch apparently failed in their mediatory efforts for, in May

of the following year, the report was that trade was bad because the

Denkyeras, "proud of their former victories", were always engaged in

hostilities with their neighbours. It was said that the Denkyeras had

ruined the states of Akhnny, Twifo, Adorn, Wassa and Aowin so that these

states had decided to close all the "passes", end to prevent the transportation

of firearms to Denkyera. The Dutch commented that since none of these

states dared to attack Denkyera, it was hoped that the Ashantis, who were

being supplied with arms, would initiate the attack,^ In fact, the Akannists

1. WIC Vol.97# D.-G. Jan van Sevenhuysen* s letter dated 21stJune 1700.
2. Ibid., letter dated 1st July, 1700.
3. There is no evidence to support Bosmanfs acid comment that the Denkyeras
foolishly allowed the Ashantis to pass through their territory with the
firearms they had bought on the coast. Reindorf points out that the
Ashantis received their firearms through the Akwamus in the east. It
would seem, however, that the Ashantis also travelled along the Assin
path to Cape Coast and Anomabo, where they bought large quantities of
ammunition. In that case, they might have received active support
from the rebellious Akanny and Cabes Terra States, who controlled these
trading pathways. See Bosman, 1705, P*76; C.C, Reindorf, The History
of the Gold Coast and Asante, 2nd Edition, (Basel n.d.), p.53*
 rif5"

1
not only supported the Ashantis, but welcomed them as their liberators.

The character of the relationship between Akyem, Akwamu and

Denkyera was one of intense rivalry and hostility. Undoubtedly, personal

rivalry of their chiefs and dynastic disputes were also contributory factors.

But it would seem that the decisive factor was economic. The fact that all

these states were near neighbours aiming at political and economic expansion,

was bound to raise problems which could lead to wars. The struggle f a r gold

and slave resources may have led to extravagant land claims which gave an

additional impulse to the power politics in the interior. Akyem, Akwamu,

and Denkyera all obtained their slaves from the northern states of Inta,

Bono, Kwawu and Krepi, and it was certainly the case that commercial

rivalries accounted for many of the wars among these states.

It might be that Akwamu directed her expansionist aims to the east

and north-east largely because of Akyem opposition in the west. Bosman

ccmments that the Akwamu power "is also very terrible to all their neigh-
2
bouring countries, except Akim", and the might of Akyem was sufficient to

frustrate any ambitions Akwamu might have had in that direction. It appears

probable, however, that during the "Dark Age of Akwamu history", when she

was a small state lying behind the coastal Agona kingdom, Akwamu was in some

feudal relationship with Akyem, and that her reluctance to honour her

obligations as a vassal of Akyem, because of her increased power and prestige,

led to the disputes between them. It may be that when the royal house of
3
Akwamu left Twifo and settled at Asamankese in the modern Akyem Abuakwa state,

1* WIG Vol.97, J. van Sevenhuysen* s letter dated 16 th Hovember, 1701.

Reindorf (p. 57) says the Ashanti army was assisted by Pra Agyensam, the
Chief of Assin Kushyia. Kushyia is on the left bank of the Pra near
the modern town of Praso.
2, Bosman, 1705, p.65; I. Wilks, 1957, op.cit., p.102.
3* Ward, 1958, op.cit., p.55; I* Wilks, in Trans.Hist.Soc.Ghana. Ill, 3,
1958, op.cit., pp.215 -17 ; Barbot, 1732, p.182.
 -46-

they entered into an Akyem dominated territory. If this supposition is

correct, then it would help to explain Bosman*s contention that the hostility

between Akyem and Akwamu originated from the latter*s refusal to pay a

feudal due to the former. In that case, 11the feudal due” must have been a

land-tax which Ansa Sasraku, the reputed founder of the Akwamu state,

neglected to pay, and thereby became a bone of contention between the Akysms
1
and his successors, Basua and Ado.

The forms of control which Akwamu exercised over the trading paths

leading from the coast into the interior clearly angered the Akyems. This

was particularly the case with regard to the trading path leading from

Winneba and Senya Bereku through Agona to Akyem and the farther north. One

of the cardinal principles guiding Akwamu foreign policy was to exert some

kind of influence in Agona. This would enable her not only to secure her

western frontier, but also to prevent the Akyems and other interior traders

from reaching the coastal trading centres of Winneba and Bereku. This was

because, if that happened, trade would be diverted from Accra to these areas,

and thereby make it impossible for Akwamu to exact tolls on the Akyem path

to Accra. Thus as early as 1659, Akwamu is found in alliance with Agona,

2
and in conflict with Accra and Akyem. Twenty years later, Agona and G-omua
3
forces assisted Akwamu in the final overthrow of the Accra kingdom. The

Agonas, however, resented Akwamu interference in their affairs, and in 1688

there were rumours of impending alliance between Agona and Akyem. ^ Akwamu

1. Bosman, 1705, P*&9; ^or other possible interpretations, however, see

I* Wilks, 1957, op.cit., p.123. Wilks* supposition that the
Akwamuhene borrowed money from the Akyems seems rather far-fetched.
2. I. Wilks, 1957, p.117.
3. L. P. Roemer, 17&9, op.cit., p. 100.
4. V.G-.K. Nicholai Fensman’s Books entry for 6th July, 1688;
L. P. Roemer, 17&9, p.102.
 -47-

reacted by attacking Agona# In a series of battles which followed, the

Agonas were defeated, and Akwamu annexed the coastal strip of Agona to
-j
Accra, in order to control that area more effectively# Indeed, Akwamu

was so concerned with what happened at Winneba and Bereku that they strenuously

refused to allow the Dutch and the English to strengthen their position

there by building more forts in addition to what they already had in those

places. English efforts to build a lodge at Shidoe, a mile east of Bereku,

in addition to their fort at Winheba was keenly contested by the Akwamus#

The report in October 1713 was that Shidoe had been destroyed by the
2
"Quomboes who took away the Company's effects there, to the value £500".

In the following year, it was reported that "the settlement at Shidoe by

reason of difference between Anguinas (Agonas) and Quomboes, has been more

chargeable than expected."^ The Dutch settlement at Senya Bereku was

established in face of great opposition from Akwamu# It was alleged that

the Akwamuhene swore to prevent the Dutch from settling there if it even

cost him his life. The king argued that the establishment of a fort at

Bereku would jeopardise the trade at Accra, and his relations with the

European traders since the Akyems would no longer trade there# Moreover, he

would lose his "gold purses".^*

Akyem and Akwamu hostility was such that the former was known as

having made a number of incursions in the latter's territoiy during this

period; in 1699, for example, in face of Akyem threat, Ado, the Akwamuhene,

fearing that the Akyems might sack his capital, took the precaution of

1# I. Wilks, 19579 pp.117-118; Eric Tilleman, 1697* op.cit., pp.86-101.

2. T 70/5• Copies of letters by Seth Crosvenor, James Phipps and Robert
Bleau, Cape Coast Castle, 6th October, 1713*
3* Ibid., letter dated 24th May, 1714*
4* WIC Vol.99, Letter from Director-General Pieter Nuyts, Elmina,
24th April, 1706. By the "gold purses" the Akwamuhene meant the
tolls which he collected on the Akyem path to Accra.
 -48-

sending his gold to the king of Ladoku, east of Accra, for safe-keeping,

presumably on the grounds that the Akyem armies could not penetrate thus
1
far. Later in the same year, Akyem sacked two Akwamu towns, taking one

hundred people prisoner, and early in 1700 followed this up by the capture
2
of another town. Akyem harassment of Akwamu provoked Tilleman to remark

that "when the Akwamus, on their oath and fetish, say they are going to
3
make war in the east, it is then that they will generally turn to the west.”

The intense rivalry and hostility among these states paved the

way for the formation of alliances among them. Unfortunately, since the

European traders were mainly confined to their trading settlements, their

reports are not of much help in giving detailed accounts of such alliances.

Moreover, unlike the coastal states, whose developments were under the

constant attention of the European traders, the inland states were compara­

tively unknown. However, the few references to them indicate that their

alliances were essentially military in character. The Akyems usually acted

in the Denkyera interest. The repeated attacks on Akwamu by Akyem in the

late seventeenth century were probably calculated to prevent the Akv/amus

from giving any effective help to the Ashantis, who were known to have been

in close relations with them. Bosman, who was on the coast during that time,

says the Akyems entered the war on the side of Denkyera, and that the Akyems

lost about 30*000 men "besides that a great cabuceer of Akim with all his

men were cut off.”*1" In 1702, King Ado had to cut short his campaign at

Whydah, on the grounds that, in May of that year, the Queen-mother of

1* V.G-.K. Day-Journal 1698-1703 entry for 10th October, 1699*
2. Ibid., entries for 10th October, 1699* and 10th January, 1700.
3# Eric Tilleman, 1697* p. 114*
4# Bosman, 1705, op.cit., p.76.

i
i
 -49-

Akwamu sent messengers to Labadi, Accra, to try to convey to the

Akwamuhene the news that Denkyera, in alliance with Akyem, had

defeated the Ashantis, and that the fear in the Akwamu capital

was that the allies might turn their victorious arms on Akwamu.

fortunately, an English long-boat was lying at anchor off Labadi

at that time, and the message was quickly conveyed to Ado. He

hurried back to his capital, only to discover that the Ashanti

set-back was temporary, and that Akwamu was not likely to be

1
attacked.

It is clear, then that the seventeenth and the early

years of the eighteenth century was an era which saw great political,

economic and social changes on the Gold Coast. The medieval trade

with the cities of Vfestern Sudan was quickly superceded by the trans-

Atlantic trade in slaves, gold and ivory to Europe and the Americas.

The increased volume of trade largely as a result of the efficient

means of transportation at the hands of the Europeans, attracted

merchant adventurers and other peoples to move from the grassland

areas into the forests and coastlands of the country, areas which

had been recorded hitherto as economically backward. In the course

of time, coastal fishing and salt-making villages grew into large

urban trading centres. Since the peoples of these towns came from

all parts of the country, they took little or no account of the

traditional authorities. Instead, they relied on the guns of the

forts and castles for their defence against external anemies. Thus

1. V.G.K. Day-Journal 1698-1703, entries from 4th May to 9th August,

1702 .
Also, ibid., entries from 11th August to 22nd August, 1702.
Also, I. Wilks, 1957* pp. 125-6.
 -50-

in a very real snnse one begins to find references to Elmina as

a Dutch town, and Cape Coast as an English town. At Accra, where

there were Danish, Dutch and English farts, Danish, Dutch and English

Accra came into existence. It was this phase of development which

Fage has neatly summed up as the ”about face” in Gold Coast, and,

indeed, in '.Vest African history. On the G-old Coast, the political

effects of the ”about face” were far-reaching. Before the whiteman

came, Akan political practice had been based on government by

kindred groups. An Akan state was essentially an association of

loosely united family groups who traced descent to a common ancestry.

But the introduction of firearms into the country in appreciable

quantities by the Europeans made possible the reorganisation of

states on a basis which transcended tribal or family loyalties.

This development manifested itself most in the forest states behind

the coastal kingdoms. Kingdoms such as Denkyera, Akwamu and Akyem

supplanted the old tribal kingdoms such as Akanny (Adanse). All these

forest kingdoms aimed at political and economic expansion, therefore

their political association was characterised by mutual rivalries

and jealousies. On the whole, however, Denkyera and Akyem usually

acted together in opposing Akwamu and ib was to preserve her own

political and economic independence that Akwamu assisted the creation

of the nascent Ashanti state to balance the might of her enemies.

1. Fage,(Hadison 1961) , P»51

 CHAPTER II
TK3 RISE OF ASHANTI

The beginnings of the Ashanti kingdom are rather obscure.

It is clear, however, that the majority of the peoples who later on

themselves constituted the nucleus of the Ashanti Union, were

originally living in the Adanse and Amanse districts of modem Ashanti,

The traditions of origin of almost all the important Ashanti divisional

1
states indicate that their founding ancestors migrated from these areas.

The Llampongs say that their ancestors came from Ahensan in Adanse, The

Kumasis, Dwabens, Kumawus, Kokofus, Bekwais and the Nsutas, on the

other hand, say they "came out of a hole” at Asantemanso. The ancestors

of the Ashantis, therefore, were formerly subjects of the Akanny state

which, we have indicated, may confidently be identified with the old

Adanse kingdom, ” the first seat of the Akan nation where God first
2
began the creation of the world” *

The origins of these migrations northwards are probably

complex# The Ashantis themselves attribute the thrust northwards to

two basic causes: dynastic disputes and over-population# For example,

the Mampongs say that Haniampong, the reputed founder of their state,

left Ahensan because of a disputed succession following the death of the

■2
Ahensan chief, Kwakye Panyin (the elder). On the other hand, the
1# On the traditional histories of the Ashanti divisional states, see
e.g, Rattaay, Law and Constitution,1929# op.cit.,Chs.XVT-XXIII#
J# Agyeman-Duah, 11Ashanti Mampong: a traditional history to the
reign of Nana Safo Katanka", in Trans.Hist.Soc.Ghana.Vol.IV.pt#11,
pp.21-5. Perhaps Asantemanso was the most important of the early
settlements of the Ashantis# The migrations which preceded the
foundation of Kumasi, Dwaben, Nsuta, and other towns, left
Asantemanso itself deserted. Today, it is a tiny hamlet of no
importance save as a religious centre. See, R.S. Rattray, Ashanti,
(London, 1923) pp# 121-2; K.A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in
the Modern Political System of Ashanti, (Oxford, 1951) PP«45“7*
2. Reindorf, History, op.cit., p.48.
3* Rattray, Law and Constitution, 1929, P*235*
Kumawus say that they left Asantemanso because of a population explosion

which r esulted in an acute shortage of farming and hunting land. There

seems no good reason to doubt that these factors provided strong motives

for migrations. The general prosperity arising out of the intensive

economic and commercial activities in the country, during the second half

of the seventeenth century, clearly made possible the growth of

population on an unprecedented scale. Since the Akannists had been the

main traders throughout the greater part of the seventeenth century, it

was not surprising that over-population manifested itself in their

country. Moreover, it was quite normal for sections of the royal

families in the country to move sway after succession disputes, and to

2
settle in other places where they could establish new dynasties.

It appears, however, that the fundamental factors underlying

these migrations were external. 7/ilks, apparently intrigued by this

phenomenon, has examined the forces and influences that permeated

Ashanti from the north, and their significance, for an understanding of

Ashanti history from the seventeenth tb the nineteenth century. He has

this to say on Ashanti beginnings: "The upheaval out of which the new

Ashanti state emerged would appear to have been in part consequent upon

the extension of the trade route from Begho - an outpost of the

civilisation of the Middle Niger, a colony of Mande-speaking peoples

thrust out to the very fringe of the rich gold-bearing and kola-producing

1. Ibid., p.217.
2. For example, it is related that a chief of Kokobienteh in Adanse
quarrelled v/ith the King of Denkyera, his overlord, and fled with
a handful of his followers (bo Akwamu. This Kokobienteh stool
was located at Kyebi and, later, became the paramount stoo}. of the
modern state of Akyem Abuakwa. See 11.J. Field, Akim Kotoku: An
Oman, (London, 1948), Ch.I.
 -52-

forest country - through Nta and Adansi to the coast". Wilks argues

this point further and asserts that what made possible the thrust to

the north "is only to be understood with reference to southern factors,

to the influence of Akwamu, and the importance of the European traders,

as the purveyors of guns". This thesis is wholly unsatisfactory,

because there is a serious attempt here to underestimate the political

and economic revolution which had taken place in the forests and coast-

lands of the Gold Coast in the seventeenth and the early years of the

eighteenth century. Admittedly, some gold must have reached the coast

from the Begho area, but it was clearly the case that the bulk of the

gold resources in the country was located in the southern states of

Igwira, Denkyera and Akyem. Indeed, if the Adanse immigrants had been

commercially minded, they would have turned southwards and not north­

wards, for the realisation of their objectives. Furthermore, it must

be stressed that the thrust to the north pre-dated the creation of the

Ashanti kingdom, and it was undertaken by people who regarded than selves .

as Dwabens, Mampongs, Kokofus, and Kumawus. Admittedly, these peoples

were bound together by such ties as common origins, customs, and

language, but they only recognised a loose relationship with one another.

The formulation of common political and economic objectives was to

emerge after the advant of Osei Tutu and Okomfo Anokye and the subsequent

creation of the Ashanti state. Surely, Ashanti carried her victorious

arms into the Begho area and beyond "until it was arrested onthe

1. I. Vfilks, "The Northern Factor in Ashanti History: Begho

and the Mande", in Journal of African History, II, I (19&1).
Also, see A. A. Boahen^ts article "The Two Faces of Ashanti"
in Trans. Hist.Sop.Ghana, Vol.Vl (1963 ), P*127.
 -53-

1
frontiers of the Dyula kingdom of Kongf1, hut this was a much later

development, and it must be seen as a result of the defeat of Denkyera

in 1701 .

The migrations of Adanse and Amanse peoples northwards, during

the second half of the seventeenth century, was a direct consequence

upon the emergence of Akyem, Akwamu and Denkyera as powerful states in

the hinterland of the G-old Coast# The upheaval which followed the rise

and consolidation of these states hastened the canpLete disintegration

of the old Adanse state, and thereby created an atmosphere of

apprehension and unsettlement which resulted in the movement of peoples

from that state to all parts of the country. Since theEe weresouthern

states, the Adanses had to move northwards where there were comparatively

less powerful states, to resist their advance. Indeed, it appears that

2
the "numerous enterprising or'discontented families" of Bowdich moved

northwards because of political and economic pressures emanating from

these southern states. A strong element of self-preservation entered into

the calculations of the Ashanti ancestors, for they either had to stay in

Adanse and be made slaves by the military states being created in the

south, or move northwards into comparative freedom. Having left their

own country, however, the Adanses entered into a territory already

peopled by other Twi- or G-uan-speaking peoples such as the Kwabiris, the

Atwimas, the Amakoms, the Domaas and the Tafos. Thus the Adanses had to

fight with them to get some land on which to settle. Land-hunger,more

than ’ any desire to control the extension of the Begho trade route, was the

1. s See pp. below.

2. Bowdich, Mission....to Ashantee, 1819> op.cit., p.229*
 -54-

fundamental factor which united the Dwabens, the Mampongs and other

Adanse immigrants against the neighbouring G-uan peoples, and thereby

1
prepared the ground for the emergence of the Ashanti state.

Ashanti tradition attributes the creation of the Ashanti

m 2
kingdom to Gsei Tutu and Okanfo Anokye. Some of the earlier versions

of the tradition tell how Obiri Yeboa, Kwamanhene, sometime after the

second half of the seventeenth eentury, had no brothers, and only one

sister, t^anu Eotosii, who was childless. Since this endangered the future

of the dynasty, as succession should pass to younger brothers or,

failing that, to the son of a sister, Obiri Yeboa sent his sister to

Otutu, a renov/ned shrine in Akwapim, at that time in Akwamu territory.

There, offerings were made for a son, and llanu subsequently bore Osei,

who v/as named Tutu for the greater glory of the shrine. Another version

takes the story up from the time when Obiri Yeboa sent his nephew and

heir, Osei Tutu, for training at the Denkyera court. While there, Osei

had an affair with one Akobena Bensua, a sister of the Denkyerahene,

and when it was discovered that she was pregnant, Osei had to flee for

his life. He took refuge in Akwamu, v/here the Akwamuhene, Ansa Sasraku,

became his friend, because of Osei*s personal beauty. It was in

Akwamu, too, that Osei Tutu first met Okomfo Anokye, Y/ho, according to

sane versions of the story, was a native of Awukugua, and thus a subject

of Akwamu. Osei, the future man of action, and Anokye, the wise

companion, became great friends, and when Osei was called to the vacant

1. Sir Francis Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty; Ashanti, (London, 1921),

p p .10-11, and Rattray, 1929, op.cit., pp.169, 199, 235*
2. See e.g. Rattray, 1929, opjcit., Ch.XXIVS
Y.rard, History. 1958, op.cit., pp. 114-6.
 -55-

stool of Kwaman, following the death of his uncle, Anokye agreed to

accompany him. Ansa Sasraku provided Csei with a body of troops, thirty

according to some versions of the tale, three hundred according to others.

There is no reason to doubt the veracity of these traditional

accounts, because the Ashanti traditions were essentially tales connected

y/ith the consolidation and rise of the kingdom. Osei Tutu is certainly

known to history. Bosman attributes the defeat of Denkyera to ”Zay,

the king of Asiante” , and he was clearly wthe great Asiante Caboceer

Zaaytt, whom the Dutch sub-factor, David van Neyendaal, was sent to contact
2
in 1701, with gifts which included a looking-glass and a feathered hat.

Okomfo Anokye, on the other hand, is a typical folk-hero, but may be

an historical figure nonetheless. The magical element is so strong in

the legend connected with these two men, that it is almost impossible to

distinguish truth from fiction. Even todays their names are so

great in Ashanti that all laws and customs are attributed to them. But,

as Ward points out, miracle stories do not grow up around nonentities^

and the very predominance of the magic in the legend shows that the

contemporaries of these two great men believed that their actions were
3
superhuman. Furthermore,, it is interesting that tradition records the

sojourn of Osei Tutu in both Akwamu and Denkyera. Reindorf has pointed

out the significance of this by asserting that Osei ’’had the opportunity

of mastering the politics of the two principal powers then existing,

Denkyera and Akwamu.”^ One may add that Osei must have realised at both

1. Bosman, An Accurate Description...,17051 op.cit., p.77*

2. See pp. --- below. \
3. Ward, 1958, p.116. /
if. Reindorf, op.cit., p.53*
 -56-

these courts, that the two states Y/ere essentially the products of the

Atlantic trade. For example, he must have been aware that the

consolidation and rise of Denkyera and Akwamu were not only made possible

by the large-scale introduction of firearms into those countries, but also

by the fact that the two states aimed at meeting the new economic demands

resulting from the European contact. Besides, he must have been aware

of the internal difficulties which made these states anything but cohesive

political entities. Whatever may have been the case, Osei’s own

personal feud with the Denkyerahene, and the Tact that his people were

smouldering under Denkyera overlordship, must have thrown him into the

hands of the Akwamus, the traditional enemies of the Denkyeras. It

might well be that Csei saw in Ansa Sasraku a potential ally in his

peoples* struggle against Denkyera domination. Ansa Sasraku, in turn,

must have been prepared to support any move which might lead to a

weakening of the Denkyera and AkjmO^ coalition. In particular, Akwamu

would welcome the creation of a powerful state to the north-west of

Akyem to balance the might of that enemy state, and thereby secure her

western frontier. In that case, it seems reasonable to suppose that

when Osei was working out the broad outlines of his future policy, he

must have received the co-operation of the Akwamu court. Thus, it may

be possible, as tradition relates, that when Osei left Akwamu for

Ashanti, Ansa Sasraku provided him with troops. Indeed, there may be

an interesting survival of this in the present military organisation of

Ashanti, because in most Ashanti divisions, the second-in-command of the

1
army is known to this day as the Akwamuhene. Be this as it may, Akwamu

1. I. Wilks,’’The Rise of the Akwamu Empire, 1650-I710”in Trans.Hist.Soc.

Ghana,Vol.Ill.pt.2; Achimata, 1957,p# 127* Rattray, 1929,pp.88-9
 -57-

and Ashanti alliance was an important element in Ashanti history during

the eighteenth century. Perhaps a clear statement on this alliance was

the assertion by Opoku Ware, Osei’s successor, that he made war against

the Akyems, in 1742, because they had ravaged Akwamu, that he would

assist the Danes because they had helped the Akwamus, and that he would
1
attack the Dutch because they had assisted Akyem.

On his return home, Osei Tutu’s major preoccupation was to talk

the chiefs of Uampong Kokofu, Kumawu, Dwaben, Bekwai, Nsuta and the
/
others of the original divisional states, into a political union under

his own leadership. He must have pointed out to the chiefs that his

purpose was to create and maintain stable conditions for the growth of

a civil society capable of meeting the new economic demands arising out

of the development of the trans-Atlantic trade. Again, he must have

told the chiefs of his own experiences at the courts of both Denkyera

and Akwamu. He also probably emphasized that the consolidation and rise

of these t'rtro states had been possible largely because the.basis of those

states rested on loyalty to one political head which transcended all

tribal loyalties. Furthermore, he^must have impressed upon the chiefs

that since the new state would be assisted by the powerful Akwamus,

they would be capable not only of subjugating the neighbouring Guan

peoples, but aiso could free themselves from Denkyera overlordship. If

Denkyera power was broken, the Ashantis and the Akwamus could eliminate

Akyem, which was already riddled with internal dissensions, and thereby

be in a position to exploit to the full the gold and slave resources in

1. T 70/1515 Better from Richard EFraves, Cape Coast Castle, to

Royal African Company, dated 3 rd April, 1742.
 -58-

the Gold Coast hinterland. Osei’s job was probably easier than is

generally supposed, for the elements of union were already there. For

example, all the chiefs of the original divisions, except the chief

of Mampong, belonged to the Oyoko clan, as Osei himself, and, therefore,

the notion of brotherhood implicit in the Akan family system, was

exploited in the interest of union. This, indeed, seems to have been

the case because the Mamponghene, who belonged to the Bretua clan was

conciliated by being made the first of his Abrempon (Divisional Chiefs)

by Osei Tutu. He commanded the right wing of the Ashanti national

army and he deputised for the Asantehene as the commander-in-chief

2
when thekking himself did not accompany the army. Furthermore, his

stool, the symbol of chiefly office, was the Silver Stool, whereas the

king himself occupied the Golden Stool

After the chiefs of the divisions had accepted the policy of

union, Osei Tutu and Okomfo Anokye determined that the Ashanti state

should last. To that end, a number of state-building instruments -

some inherited and others devised - were put to use. For instance^ Osei

Tutu removed his court from Kwaman, the capital of his predecessor,' and

established himself at Kumasi, which to this day remains the capital of

1. Rattray, 1929, PP* 7.6-7 and 272-3*

2. Ibid., p. 120. The Mamponghene was probably created commander
of the Ashanti national army for the reasons suggested by
Prince Owusu Ansa one of the hostages given to the Bpitisji in 1831*
He was quoted as saying, ”In Ashanti, the King never joins the
army except on occasions when the full strength of the Ashanti
power is to be put forth, and in pursuance of some solemn vow%
quoted in H. Brackenbury, Narrative of the Ashanti War.
2 Vols., (London, 1874), Vol.2 , p.224*
3. Rattray, 1923, op.cit.,Ch.XXIV. Osei Tuturegarded the Ashanti
state as s. human body of which he held the head, whilst the
Mamponghene held the feet. See Rattray, 1929, p.2 3 6 .
 -59-
1
the Ashanti kingdom. Moreover, the songs and recitals connected with

traditional history were couched in terms calculated to disseminate the

notion of a common origin# The most potent of these instruments,

however, were the Ashanti army, the Golden Stool, the Odwira festival,

and the Ashanti "Constitution11.

Ashanti was fundamentally a military union* The basis of the

kingdom rested on military power, and it was by direct military action,

rather than by any process of negotiation or treaty-making, that she

achieved her political and economic objectives. This is not to suggest

that the Ashantis were ignorant of diplomacy as a valid instrument of

political action. Dupuis points out that it was "a maxim associated with

the religion" of the Ashanti king, "never to appeal to the sword while
2
a path lay open for negociation" • Indeed, the importance which Akan

society attached to diplomacy, as opposed to forde, finds expression in

the institution of Okyeame. The Akyeame were, and still are, in direct

contact with the king in ceremony and in substance, and therefore wielded

great political influence in society. They were man appointed without

regard to accidents of birth, but for "outstanding ability in the civil

arts of wisdom, eloquence and wit". In times of war, some of them

accompanied the arny, and it was they who conducted the politics connected
3
with the campaign. Nevertheless, it may be said that diplomacy, and

1* Puller, 1921, op.cit.,pp*2 and 9* Kumasi was probably founded !

,
in the 1680*s, because a Dutch report of 1679 mentions Tafo, five J
miles north of Kumasi on the north-west trade route^ as an inland I
trading centre of considerable importance, but did not mention
Kumasi itself. Verspreyede Stukken 848, report by Directbr-r
G-eneral Abramsz, dated 23rd November, 1679#
2. Dupuis, Journal...in Ashantee. (London, 1824),PP*225-6.
3. Bowdich found that Agyei, who rose to become the second Okyeame, and
"foreigp minister" in Ashanti, was originally a salt-carrier frcm
Akwamu. Bowdich, 1819,op.cit.,pp.248-9. On this institution see e.g.
Rattray, 1929,p. 105n,pp.380-4 and 392-7* Okyeame means •spokesman*.
 -60-

not war, was regarded by the Ashantis as the extreme limit of political (

action, because the army was the chief instrument of foreign policy.

The Ashanti forces which achieved such spectacular successes

in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were not regular troops.

Like the armies on the Gold Coast during this period, all the able-bodied
1
Ashanti men were mobilised as and when required. Every Ashanti

divisional state supplied its quota of men according to the overall

requirements of the projected campaign. As may be expected, Astanti,

2
as a forest state, had no cavalry. The main strength of the army lay

in the infantry - musketeers, bowmen and spearsmen. The musketeers/

commanded the greatest prestige, and it was most probable that great

importance was placed upon maintaining a superiority in the possession

of muskets. It appears, however, that the bow and arrow played an

important role in the military efficiency of the Ashanti army. As late

as 1807, when the bow and arrow had been abandoned by most of the coastal

peoples, the English at Cape Coast noted that the Ashantis fought with
3
"musquets, bows and arrows”. The retention of these weapons was

probably due to the fact that the muzzle-loading guns of that period

could not be depended upon to sustain a heavy volume of concentrated.

1. Bosman wrote thus of the Gold Coast armies in his day, ”If I have
before talkfd of Negroes who followed the wars, you must not from
thence infer that they make that their whole Employment. No, it
is but one part, I assure you; and all the Negroes in the country
are S oldiers as long as the war continues, if at least they are but
able to buy Arms or their Masters bestow any on them; and the War
ended each Man applies himself to the Exercise of his particular
Calling”. Bosman, 1705, op.cit.,p.70.
2. Horses were known in Ashanti in the reign of Osei Tutu, for in 1709
Sir Dalby Thomas was informed that the horses in Ashanti were ”small
and thin-bodied and not above 14 hands high”. But they were probably
used for ceremonial occasions only. T 70/26 Letter from Sir Dalby
Thomas, Cppe Coast Castle, dated 8th May, 1709*
3. T 70/35 Copy of Governor Colonel Torrane's letter to Committee of
Merchants, dated 20th July, 1807.
 -61-

fire. The superior power of the muskets, however, may be supplemented

by the rapidity of fire attainable with the bows and arrows.

The successful employment of the Ashanti army as the instrument

of rapid territorial expansion, presupposes a highly developed system

of military organisation. Rattray has described in some considerable

detail, the military organisation of the divisional states of Asumegya,

Bekwai, Dwaben, Kokofu, Kumawu, Mampong and Nsuta. The Ashanti national

army was comprised of a body of scouts (akwansrafo), an advance-guard

(twafo), a main body (adonten), a personal body-guard (gyase), a rear-

guard (kyidom) and two wings - left (benkum), and right (nifa). It

may be that during the time of Csei Tutu the military organisation

had not yet attained this pitch of perfection, but it was clearly these

powers of combination and co-ordination which underlay the apparent

invincibility of the Ashanti army.

2
The Golden Stooi, with its mythological origins, appeared to

Bowdich as n the palladium of the kingdom”.^ Ashanti tradition says that

on one Friday, a great gathering of the union chiefs was held at Kumasi,

and there, Okomfo Anokye brought down from the sky, with darkness and

thunder, and in a thick cloud of white dust, a wooden stool adorned with

gold, which floated to the earth and alighted gently on Osei Tutu*s knees.

Anokye then announced that the Golden Stool contained the spirit of the

whole Ashanti nation, and that its strength and bravery depended upon the
— ■— ■— — — — — — — — ■— ■— - — — ■— - -— ----- — — ------ - — -— - — — -

1. Rattray, 1929* Chs.XI-XXIII. Fuller, op.cit.,pp.12-15*

Busia points out that the national army differed from
the state armies in that each wing of the former had two
formations! right and right-half (nifa nnaase), left and
left-half (benkum nnaane). Busia, 1951, P*90.
2. On the Golden Stool see e.g. Rattray, 1929, Ch.XXIV.
E.\7. Smith, The Golden Stool, (London, 1926), Ch. 1.
3. Bowdich, 1819, op.cit., p.281.
 - 62-

1
safety of the stool. Stripped of its legendary origins, this tale

gives an insight into the astute statesmanship of Osei Tutu and Okomfo

Anokye. By making the G-olden Stool the repository of a national spirit

transcending all local ties, Anokye played upon the superstitious

Beliefs of the Ashantis, and thereby succeeded in impressing on the

national consciousness that henceforth Ashanti was a nation, linked by

a common mystical bond, of which the new stool was the visible symbol.

This dbool, exhibited on great public occasions with a pomp and ceremony

distinct from that of the king, constituted an emblem of unity even

more potent than the king of Ashanti himself. The G-olden Stool supplied

the religious basis of the Ashanti union, and it is significant that

despite many vicissitudes, it still survives today, with its unifying

power unimpaired.

The Odwira’festival ”at which all dependants and tributaries”

were expected to attend, was ”instituted like the Panathenaea of Theseus,

to unite such various nations by a common festival”. Busia reiterated

this view, by noting that the rites associated with the Asantehene*s

odwira rekindled the ”sentiments of solidarity and nation-hood” in the

2
Ashanti chiefs T/ho participated in them. Perhaps the political

significance of the Odwira lay in the fact that it enabled the king to

detect and punish those who would plan subversion in the kingdom.

Failure to attend the festival was a sign of disloyalty to the king,

and the Asantehene could count on the support of some of the chiefs to

punish the recalcitrant chief. On the other hand, a chief who had

1. Ward, 1958, op.cit., p.119. Rattray, 1923, Ch.XXIII.

2. Bowdich, 1819, p.256.
Busia, 1951, p.101.
 -63-

offended the king, and was present at the Odwira festival, might he

arraigned before the assembled chiefs to answer charges of misbehaviour.

Thus the Asantehene’s Odwira was one of the most potent means of

keeping the kingdom together.

Adapted to the same purpose of unification was the

”constitution" • Ashanti government has been described as despotic, and

the Ashantis have been portrayed as a people who lived under a kind of

”Spartan military discipline, ruthlessly enforced by one lord and master,

the King”. This view, of course, has no basis in Ashanti constitutional

history. In the early nineteenth century, Bowdich found at Kumasi that

there were an !fAssembly of Captains” as well as an ,fAristocracy or

2
privy council11, to check the king. Bowdich also drew attention to ”the

mixed nature” of Ashanti government, and indicated that it was ”founded

on equality and obligation.”^ It must be said that, from the very

beginning, the king of Ashanti was a primus inter pares as far as the

Divisional Chiefs were concerned. The Amanhene^ had their obligations

to the king, but they also had compensating rights. They had to take

an oath of allegiance to the king promising to attend his call by day or

night; they were obliged to supply him with fighting men when so

required, and they did recognise a right of appeal from their own courts

to the Asantehene's court in Kumasi.^ They were expected to attend the

Odwira festival, a ceremony which, according to Busia, was held to honour

1. The quotation is from Sir Garnet Y/olseley, Life as a Soldier, cited

in Claridge, History, 1915, op.cit. ,p. 182. Sir Garnet Wolseley led
the British expedition against the Ashantis in 1874*
2. Bowdich, 1819, pp.105, 252-253.
3. Ibid., p.231.
4*. Busia, 1951, op.cit.,pp.52-6; Hattray, 1929, Ch.XIII.
 -64-

and propitiate past Ashanti kings, and to cleanse the nation from
A
defilement* They also contributed to a war tax or a national levy
2
imposed by the king for some specific purpose* It seems they also

observed certain trade regulations made by the king, because the Dwabens

told Rattray that 11The Asante Kene had the power to dose the road until
3
his kolas should have reached the early market”• It is a matter of some

dispute as to whether or not the Asantehene could destool the

Divisional Chiefs. Rattray was informed by the Kokofus that "the Asante

Hene might destool the Kokofuhene even against the wishes of the Kokofu

'Mpanyinfo1".^ Busia, on the other hand, says that they c ould not; and

he describes the provision that those, end only those,/elected a

chief, could also depose him, as "the cardinal principle of the Ashanti

Constitution." These two apparently conflicting views are not irrecon­

cilable, for it was certainly the case that as the kings of Ashanti

gained in prestige and power, they must have been instrumental in

removing certain divisional chiefs of whom they disapproved.

Tte rights enjoyed by the Divisional Chiefs were many. For

example, because most of the Ashanti lands were acquired independently

by the divisions before the Ashanti Union, they held their land

absolutely; their title being based on conquest, and not upon gift from

the king. Thus there was a distinction between their lands and those of

the Kumasi chiefs. Busia points out that, "The rights of the Asantehene

1. Busia, 1931, pp.29-39* Rattray, Religion and Art in Ashanti. 1927,

Ch.II* Bowdich, who gave an early vivid account of the king*s
Odwira, or Yam Custom, noted that "All the caboceers and captains,
and the majority of the tributaries, are enjoined to attend...",
Bowdich, 1819, p. 274*
2. See e.g. Rattray, Law and Constitution. 1929, Ch.XIV.
3. Ibid., p.187*
4# Ibid., p.212. 'ISpanyinfo* means aiders.*
5. Busia, 1931, PP-34 and 99*
over lands in the Kumasi Division were the same as the rights exercised

by the Divisional Chiefs in their own Division. But over the lands
1
of the Divisional Chiefs, the Asantehene exercised no rights." Again,

because the armies of the Divisions were largely responsible for the

conquests of the neighbouring peoples, the Amanhene^/ (Divisional Chiefs)

had a great s.ay in the formulation of foreign policy. Bowdich discovered

that they could interfere in all foreign politics, and even possessed the

right to veto the king's decision. However, they watched rather than

shared in the domestic administration, "generally influencing it by their

opinion, but never appearing to control it from authority; and their

opinions on civil questions, are submitted with a deference directly in

contrast to their bold declarations on subjects of war and tribute,

2
which amounts to injunction". The Divisional Chiefs, therefore,

constituted a formidable body, if only they could unite against the king.

In view of this fact, Qsei Tutu and his successors did not

think it politic to augment further the powers of the Amanhenes. Instead,

they deliberately chose to magnify the position of the Kumasi chiefs,

thereby balancing the power of one class of chiefs against that of

another, and so setting in motion that rivalry between the Kumasi chiefs

and the Amanhenes which has been one of the recurrent themes in Ashanti

history. For example, the Kumasi chiefs became governors of the distant

conquered states where they enjoyed "a princely rank". Since the Kumasi

chiefs were directly responsible to the king, the policy of recruiting

them as provincial governors ensured that theAsantehene should be able

1. Ibid., 1951, p.53.'

2. Bowdich, 1819, p.252.
 -66-

to put a larger army into the field than any of the outlying chiefs.

Moreover, because they were members of the Kumasi State Council, the

king must have relied on them a good deal for the formulation of his

day to day policies, rather than on the Divisional Chiefs, whose visits

to Kumasi were infrequent. Thus the Kumasi chiefs soon came to exercise
1
"a political preponderance in the councils of the nation11• Perhaps,

viewed against this background, the institution of adamfo had its

® 2
origins earlier than in the reign of Osei B^nsu (1801-1824).

This institution was an administrative arrangement whereby an

Qmanhene could only approach the king through his adamfo in Kumasi.

The adamfo was usually one of the Kumasi chiefs, who acted as a sort

of liaison officer between the outside chief and the king. If the

presence of, say, the Mamponghene was required in Kumasi, messengers

were sent through the Kontihene of Kumasi. Busia comments thus on the

institution of adamfo , "It was a development which recognised the

need of some contact between Kumasi and the outlying states in the period
3
between the intermittent meetings of the Union Council". Y/ilks, however,

argues this point further, and regards as significant the titles that

were used: Mamponghene, for example, would address the Kontihene as

adamfo. (my patron), and the Kontihene would address Mamponghene as

M'abarimba. (my man). Wilks writes, "It seems likely that here.we have

a survival of the attempted reduction of the Amanhenes to vassals, with

the institution of the adamfo. or patron, being, as it were, a half-way

stage to governor. Ashanti attempted, but did not quite succeed, in

1. Dupuis, 1824, p.235.

2. W. Tordoff, "Political History of Ashanti 1888-1935”, dissertation
submitted for degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Univ. of London,
1961, p.132.
3. Busia, 1951, p.100.
 -67-

extending its administrative system to the original Amanto, and so

evolving an homogeneous structure of government throughout the empire,

with the administration in the hands of the Kumasi Nsafohene, themselves

directly responsible to the king". Yfilks* s contention is misleading and

must be discounted. Firstly, M 1adamfo means *my friend*, and not *my

patron* • Secondly, though the kings of Ashanti were jealous of the

powers of the Amanhene, they never contemplated making them subservient

to the Kumasi chiefs. That would have been tantamount to a subversion of

the constitution, and this could have united the Amanhenes against

Kumasi, an event which would have led to the break-up of the Ashanti Union,

thirdly, there was Man homogenous structure1* in the Ashanti gpvernment,

because the national government was modelled on the governments of the

divisions. For instance, the Asantehene was as much head of the admin­

istration of the Kumasi division, as the Dwabenhene was of the Dwaben

state. Moreover, the Amanhenes had under them a number of sizeable

villages, whose heads owed them obligations similar to those which they

themselves owed to the king. Indeed, even at the height of its military

successes, in the early nineteenth century, the Ashanti monarchy was so

insecure that Dupuis could write, *'Powerful as the monarchy of Ashantee

certainly is, collectively estimated, it may be considered as a fabric

whose foundation is subject to periodical decay, and therefore requires

2
unremitting attention....**• As Rattray pointed out, some thirty years

1. Quoted from I. Wilks, Akan administrative practices, as cited by

Tordoff, Ph.D. Dissertation, cp.cit. Also W. Tordoff, "The
Ashanti Confederacy'1, in Journal of African History. Ill, 3,
(1962), pp.399-417.
2. Dupuis, 1824, pp.236.-7•
 -68-

ago, the term adamfo was "largely a courtesy title; its application

to an individual inferred no legal rights on one side or disabilities

1
on the other”• It is clear, therefore, that though the key-note of

the Ashanti constitution was decentralisation, it was also a potent

means of keeping the country together.

The first task of the new state was to continue the subjugation
2 '
of the peoples living within a few miles1 radius of Kumasi. Osetf Tutu’s

unde, Obiri Yeboa, had died fighting the Domaas, and so they were the

first to be attacked. In a series of battles, Domaa resistance was

overcome; Odomara Kwesi, the Domaa chief, was killed, and a number of

Domaa refugees fled westwards. The Ashantis then turned their attention

to the Amakoms, and subjugated them. i*he Amakom chief, Akosa, was

beheaded, and his brother Bafo fled with a handful of followers into
o
the Tekyiman area, where he founded the modern state of Nk^ranza in the

Borong-Ahafo Region of Ghana. These Ashanti military successes probably

3
alarmed the Tafos* Apart from the fear of political domination, the

Tafos must have realised that Kumasi might supercede their town as an

important trading centre. Perhaps it was in view of some such consid­

erations that Osafo, the Tafo chief, asked Osei Tutu and his people to

leave the Kumasi area. The Ashai tis replied by declaring war on the

1. Rattray, 1929, PP*95~6* Rattray found that a divisional chief might

find it politic at times ”to curry favour with his ’friend at court*”,
partly for the reasons suggested by Busia, and partly because, in
view of inter-state rivalry, that was the only means of protecting
his interests at the king’s court.
2. On the Ashanti struggles with the Domaas, Amakoms and the Tafos, see
e.g. Puller, 1921, pp. 10-11; iVard, 1958, pp.117“118.
3* The Tafos are on record as living in fear of the Adanse peoples \\
^ ^ " 7 n rt nrTr% o in t t _______________ n _ ** i. **___ • v
 -69-

Tafos. The Tafo country was rapidly overrun, and Osafo was killed*

The stool regalia of the Tafo stool was added to that of the Kumasi

stool.

The significant point to notice about these early Ashanti

conquests was that these peoples, who lived within a few miles' radius

of Kumasi, were effectively incorporated into the kingdom. They were

given rights of citizenship and, within a few years, these erstwhile

enemies became ardent supporters of the new kingdom. An interesting

case in point was the policy adopted towards the Amakoms. Osei Tutu

appointed his favourite, one Edu Penin, to succeed Akosa, as the chief

of Amakom. He then gave his niece, Nyarko, to Edu in marriage. The

offspring of this union was Cpoku Ware, whom Osei Tutu named as his

successor. Yfhat Osei Tutu hoped to achieve by this marriage arrangement

was clearly to conciliate the defeated Amakoms, 7/ho owned the greater

part of the Kumasi lands, and to get them to have a vested interest in
1
his dynasty. In this way, "the natural forces of parental and filial

love were regulated for the creation of new patterns of loyalty and

affiliation."^

The new state, however, was soon called upon to face a more

serious crisis. It has been pointed out that the Denkyera state was no

exception to the general rule that a conquering state bleeds its

conquered provinces and drives them to despair. It was clear that the

Denkyeras could not remain unperturbed by the national feeling that was

1. Puller, 1921, p.11.

2. Edmund Collins, "The Panic Element in Nineteenth-Century
British Relations with Ashanti", in Trans.Hist.Soc.G-hana.
Vol.Y., pt.2, p.81.
 - 70-

growing up in Ashanti. Moreover, the Denkyerahene could certainly not

approve of one of his tributary states being in close alliance with the

traditional enemy - Akwamu. Furthermore, the creation of a strong

state to the north would clearly make it difficult for the Denkyeras to
)
raid the B^rong and other peoples in that area for slaves. Thus,

Denkyera decided to attack the nascent Ashanti Union before the danger

from that quarter became more serious.

Accounts differ els to the actual occasion for war. The

Ashantis say that they threw off Denkyera overlordship because Ntim

G-yakari, the Denkyerahene, made some preposterous demands on them. The

Denkyera king sent a great brass pan and demanded that it be returned

to him full of gold dust, and accompanied by the favourite wife of each

of the Ashanti chiefs. This was rejected by the Ashantis, and they

prepared for war against the Denkyeras. Bosman, however, was informed

that the cause of the war waa the mistreatment of one of Osei* s wives

by Bosianti, the Denkyerahene, On the accession of Osei Tutu, Bosianti

sent scrne of his wives to congratulate his vassal. These Denkyera

messengers were kindly received by Osei and the Ashantis, and then sent

back to their husband. Shortly afterwards, Osei returned the compliment

by sending same of his wives to the Denkyera court with a friendly

message. These Ashanti women were also well-received in Denkyera, and

they were treated as persons of importance. "But the King cast a

wanton Eye upon one of them, and hurried on by exorbitant lust, gratified

his brutal Desire; After satiating of which, he suffer'd her together

with the rest to return to their injured Husband who was informed of

1. See traditional histories in Rattray, Law and Constitution.

1929* op.cit.
 -71-

this Affront**. Osei was angry at this insulting "behaviour by the

Denkyera king and, though the latter offered some monetary compensation,

Osei rejected the offer and prepared for war. One salient fact which

emerges from both these accounts, is that the Denkyeras obviously

intended to provoke the Ashantis into instant war. Indeed, it would

seem that this was a follow-up of the Denkyera occupation of the J

/

Akanry state in 1697* because Akanny was a buffer-state between Denkyera |

and Ashanti, and the Denkyeras must have regarded the conquest of that

state as a first step towards an invasion of Ashanti. HThatever may have

been the case, it was clear, in the late seventeenth century, that

Ashanti was prepared to take up the Denkyera challenge because, apart

from the fact that her own political and economic survival depended

upon the break-up of Denkyera power, Ashanti was also increasingly

2
becoming the leader of Denkyera*s revolted subjects.
3
Ashanti tradition records two major battles with the Denkyeras.

The first battle was fought near Adunku where the advance-guard of the

Ashantis were defeated. They fell back on the main army at Peyiase, some

eight miles south-east of Kumasi. Here, the sedond and final battle

was fought. The Denkyeras were defeated, and Ntim G-yakari, who was

playing an oware game with one of his wives, was surprised by a

Dwaben man, Adakwa Yiadom, who killed him. Adakwa took the Denkyerahene* s

gold bangle, and this became a source of dispute between the king of

1. Bosman, 1705 , pp.76-77*

2. See pp. - ^jfabove.
3* On traditional accounts of the Ashanti and Denkyera war, see e.g.
Reindorf, History, op.cit., pp.54-59*
Ward, 1958, pp.120-22.
Puller, (p.17) says Adunku was situated between Asumegya and
Ejumum.
See Rattray, Religion and Art. 1927, op.cit., pp.382-90.
 'V

-72- / N

Ashanti and the Dwaben chief. That there v/ere two major battles finds

support in contemporary Dutch sources, although there was a time lag

of about one year between the two battles. A Dutch report of 1699

indicates that the Denkyeras, assisted by the Akyems, had been fighting
■j
the Ashantis and the Akwamus since June, 1698 . By the end of 1699,

hostilities had stopped and the Denkyeras spent most of 1700 trying to
2
reach a peaceful settlement with their other disgruntled subjects.

Early in 1701, the report was that the Ashantis and the Denkyeras had

resumed their conflicts and in November of the same year, it was known

at Elmina that the Denkyeras had been defeated, and that the Ashantis
3
were plundering and taking large numbers of Denkyeras prisoner.

Bosman, who was on the coast at that time, recorded that the Ashantis

left ,fthe towring Pride of Dinkira in Ashes".^

It must be pointed out, however, that Ashanti v ictory was not

solely due to her own military strength during this period. Apart from

the treacherous acts of most of Denkyera* s tributary states, the decisive

factor underlying Denkyera defeat was the effective military assistance

which the Akwamus gave to the Ashantis. One may even conjecture that

the Ashantis failed to pursue the war, in the late months of 1699 and

throughout. 1700, when Denkyera was passing through grave internal crisis,

largely because they realised that they could not expect any effective

1. WIG 97 Letter from Director-General Jan van Sevenhuysen,

dated 1st March, 1699*
2. WIG 97 Letter from Director-General Jan van Sevenhuysen, Elmina, dated
31st July 1700. Also, ibid.,letter from chief factor Pieter Nuyts,
Kormantsi, to Sevenhuysen. Nuyts reported, inter alia, the arrival
of a party of Denkyera traders who brought no gold, but only slaves
to sell.
3. W1C 97 Letter from Director-General Jan van Sevenhuysen, Elmina,
dated 30th May, 17®1, and 16th November, 1701.
4* Bosman, 1705, op.cit., p.77.
 \/
-73- /

help from the Akwamus, whose king, Basua, died in that year. The Dutch,

who were anxious to revive trade on the east coast, immediately sent

presents to the new king of Akwamu entreating him to make his peace
1
with his enemies. The .new Akwamu king was Ado, who apparently had no

intention of abandoning the Ashantis. Soon after his accession he

ordered his subjects not to go to Danish Christiansborg Gastle because he

had been informed that a Danish ship had sold guns and powder to the
2
enemies of Akwamu at Winneba. Roemer also points out that it was made a

capital offence for an Akwamu trader to sell firearms to the Akyems.^

Thus, whereas the Akwamus and the Ashantis were receiving appreciable

quantities of guns and powder, the Akyems and the Denkyeras were almost

completely cut off from that vital commodity during this critical period.

As a result of the defeat of Denkyera, Ashanti emerged not only

as the dominant political power in the hinterland of the western coast,

but also the main source of gold, ivory and slaves, in that area. This

fact immediatly led to European repercussions. The Dutch and the English

who were the main European traders on that coast had to talee notice of

Ashanti* s presence, and to adopt a policy v/hich would secure the Ashantis

in the interest of their respective Companies. In particular, it become

a matter of considerable importance for the Governor and Council of

Cape Coast and Elmina Castles to court the friendship and goodwill

of the Ashanti king. But before we examine the reactions of the Dutch

1. WIC 97 Letter from Director-General Jan van Sevenhuysen,

Elmina, dated 10th June , and 12th November, 1699*
For further references to the death of Basua and the accession
of Ado, see V.G.K. Day Journal 1699-1703, entry dated 26th March, 1699*
2. V.G.K. Day Journal, 1699-1703, entry for 21st May, 1700.
3* I. Wilks, M.A. Thesis, op.cit., p.5A*
 -74-

and the English to Ashanti, it is necessary to sketch briefly the nature

of European relations with the coastal communities*

The relationship between the European merchants in their Gold

Coast forts, and the African coastal communities has been described as a

partnership.
1 m
The Africans wanted trade as much as the Europeans, and

ao a kind of co-operation between black and white came into existence.

In that state of inter-dependence, the Africans may be said to have been

the superior partners. Since the Europeans were confined to their

coastal settlements, they had to court the friendship and goodwill of

the Africans who brought them trade from the interior. Moreover, in

view of the intense rivalry which characterised the activities of the

European traders on the coast, it became necessary for the various

Companies to secure permanent African allies who could not only provide

them with uninterrupted trade:,. but also help to defend the forts

against their enemies. Indeed, co-operation between the Africans and

the Europeans was considered such a vital pre-condition for gainful

trade, that in July 1699, Tor example, the Royal African Company ordered

Cape Coast Castle to "endeavour by all fair means possible to gain

friendship with the natives, especially the Kings and most especially

with those where the best trade is exported...and frequently to study

2
the best ways to procure the Company large returns".

In pursuance of the policy of good relations, a number of

methods were adopted by the European traders. Because they were not the

1. J.D. Fage, Ghana. (Madison, 1961), op.cit., pp.4 8 -5 0 .

2. T 70/51 Royal African Company, London, to Nicholas
Buckeridge and John Browne dated 6 th July, 1699.
 -75-

owners of the land on which their forts and castles stood, they paid

ground rents to the African chiefs and potentates on the coast. In

June 1714, for example, the English paid twenty-four months1 ground

rent due to the "Braffoe and Curranteers of Fantee for Anomaboe

i
Fort and Agya factozy". Besides these monthly payments, a number of

irregular payments were made to the Aftibans with a view to s ecuring

some particular advantage. In 1703, an Akanny messenger who was sent

to Cape Coast Castle by the chiefs of that country, returned home with

three cases of spirits and some other goods as presents for the chiefs

"to confirm them to the interest of the Royal African Company of

England and to encourage them to sway the trade between their country
2
and this Castle". In 1723, the Dutch reported that the Danes gave the

Akwamu king over 100 bendas so that the king would attack Dutch

Crevecoeur. The Akwamu king swore an oath to be "master of the Dutch

fort", and, with a force estimated at between ten and twelve thousand

men, beleaguered it for over three weeks, until the threat of an

Akyem invasion of Akwamu obliged him to retire into the interior."^

The Europeans, however, relied a great deal on the "Company

slaves". These people fell into two main categories. Firstly, there

were the ordinary messengers, such as Abo, Aban, Cudjoe, Jan, and Coffee, w

who were sent regularly to the chiefs to induce them either to send

trade to the forts, or t o collect debts owed to the Company. Such

messengers were very trusted people, who had often been in the Company’s

1. T 70/381 Accounts and Journals, 1714-1715, Sntry dated 17th June 1714*
2. T 70/1463 Memoranda Book kept at Cape Coast Castle, entry
dated 24th February, 1703.
3* 2 WIC 105 Letter from Van de Meer and de Lange to Director-
General Abraham Houtman, dated 29th June, 1723•
service far a long time. For instance, in 1702, the Dutch sent Abo

and Jan "who have faithfully served us for more than twenty years"

to contact David van Neyendaal, "who is at the moment with the great

chief Zaay in the land of Asiente" • The others were the chief brokers.

These included such names as John Cabes, Edward Barter, John Conny,

Noi, Pieter Pasop, Amo and Thomas Ewusi. Some of these people were

either chiefs or relatives of chiefs, and so the Europeans relied upon

their authority and influence to promote their trade interests. Their

chief job was to provide the forts with trade, and to see to it that the

trading paths were kept open. To that end, they were often c redited

with large quantities of goods which they sent into the interior. As

chief brokers, they were also expected to act as "commercial spies".

^or instance, a Dutch chief trader at Kommenda should not only know

when inland traders would arrive on the coast, but also he should

intercept and conduct them to the Dutch fort so that they did not go

to the neighbouring English fort. This aspect of the chief broker*s

work contributed a good deal to Anglo-Dutch disputes on the coast, For

example, in an agreement signed in 1700 between the two trading nations,

it was stipulated that "no traders of any other Natives or others of

this country be any wayes hindered or intercepted directly or indirectly,

by any person or persons belonging to either Company from coming to

2
any forts and factorys belonging to any of the said two Companys..

1. 2 WIC 98 Letter from Director-General Willem de la Palma, Elmina,

dated 25th September, 1702.
2. 2 WIC 97 Oopy of Articles of agreement made and concluded upon
between Meers Edwards Newte, Gerard Gore, and E. Freeman, Chief
Merchants and Directors for the Royal African Company of England of
Cabo Corso Castle, and Jan van Sevenhuysen, Director-General for the
Netherlandish West India Company, dated at Elmina 10th February, 1700.
 -77-

The chief brokers also undertook important missions to the chiefs*

John Cabes, for example, was sent to the king of Aguafo to discover

the truth of a report that the Dutch had obtained his permission to

build a fort "upon a hill on the west side and very near to Commenda
1
Castle." Furthermore, because the chief brokers were expected to help

defend the forts against attacks by both European and African enemies,

it became necessary for them to control large bands of armed retainers,

drawn largely from their own slaves* In 1701, for example, the Dutch,

who were expecting an attack by the French, consoled themselves that

"in case of fighting, Pieter Pasop and his men were as good as any

white men*" Two years later, the Dutch warmly commended "our Chief

Broker Pieter Pasop who has made such an impression on the Blacks by

his well-known courage and knowledge of war, and by being related to

3
the mighty King of Akwamu."

It must be pointed out, however, that the activities of these

favoured individuals were not always calculated to further the interests

of the Europeans. Undoubtedly, they were men of their times and,.......

because they were aware of the sharp practices indulged in by both

European and African traders on the coast, they also used their privileged

position to promote their own interests. Edward Barter allegedly rebbed

1. T 70/1463 Memoranda Book kept at Cape Coast Castle, entry

dated 26th February, 1703 •
2. 2 WIC 97 better from Factor Jean de Pre to Sevenhuysen, dated
16 th April, 1701. Franco-Dutch disputes on the coast arose out
of the former's intention to build a fort east of Dutdh Crgvecoeur
at Accra. See 2 WIC 98 Letters from Director-General Willem de la
Palma, dated 15th March and 10th October, 1703*
3* Ivor Wilks, "Akwamu and Otublohum: An Eighteenth Century Akan
marriage arrangement", in Africa, October 1939, op.cit., p.394*
According to Y/ilks, Pieter Pasop was a brother-in-law of the
King of Akwamu. See I. Wilks, "Akwamu 1650-1750: A Study of
the Rise and Fall of a West African Empire", M.A* Thesis, op.
cit., p.5 3 .
 -78-

the English at Cape Coast, and sought refuge with the Dutch at Elmina,

v/here he died in 1703* In 1704, the king of Aguafo informed the Dutch

that trade had not been coming to Elmina because their chief broker,

Pieter Pasop, conspired with the late chief of Little Kommenda to prevent
2
Denkyera and Twifo traders from reaching the coast* John Cabes served
3
both the English and the Dutch, and quarrelled with them all* In 1715,

John Cabes was the chief English broker at Kommenda, but William Baillie,

the factor there, thought little of him. Baillie wrote, ”when he hears

of trade coming, he never tells me but borrows goods to be paid in two

months out of the warehouse, and send them up the countyy, intercepts

the traders and buys their slaves at a small rate and when be brings them

down, if he finds the possibility of getting interlopers, he is sure to

let me know of none of them. But if he finds it difficult to do this,

as a result of the strict v/atch kept on the coast, he sends the slaves

to the castle with some of his people whom I have never seen and

represent them as traders with full instructions to get the full of my

allowance for slaves and the best of goods” .^

is clear, therefore, that the Europeans were subject to the

laYJs of the African states. V/e have indicated that the European settle­

ments on the coast were designed to ward off attacks by European and

African foes. This immunity, however, v/as never complete. There were

1. K.C. Davies, Royal African Company, 1^57, pp.280-1.

2. 2 Y/IC 99 Letter from Willem de la Palma, Elmina, dated
7th November, 1704.
3* On John Cabes1 activities, see e.g. N.B.K.G-,82 Reports
from Jan Landman, Shhma , dated 7th July, 6 th June, 26th
and 27th August, 1715* Also, T 70/1464 William Baillie1s
Kommenda Diary, 1714-1716.
4. T 70/1464 Jilliam Baillie1s Kommenda Diary, with accounts
entry dated 29 th Hay, 1715 *
 -79-

occasions when African forces captured forts and held them for periods

of several years. A well-known example was the seizure of

Christianshorg Castle by Asemeni, an Akwamu chief in the late seventeeth

1
century. In the early years of the eighteenth century, John Conny,

a chief in the Ahanta area, seized and occupied the Brandenburger fort,

G-root Friederichsborg, in spite of repeated Dutch efforts to dislodge

2
him. Furthermore, there were several instances of Europeans, including

governors, receiving severe physical ill-treatment at the hands of the

Africans within sight of their forts. For example, as late as 1765,

the Fant is seized and mishandled Jan Voortnian, the Dutch factor at

Kormantsi, who was returning from a visit to Anomabo; Y/hen the

Director-General protested to the Omanhene of Abora, he was told that

his factor had Y/ronged the Fantis.

3

Nevertheless, although the Africans used economic sanctions

to emphasize their supremacy, there was one sense in which it may be said

that the political and economic survival of the coastal peoples depended

on the Europeans. It has been indicated that the increased economic

activity in the country resulted in the growth of large urban communities

on the coast* Because the peoples of these tovms came from all parts of

the country, they tended to take little or no account of the traditional

1. On the Asemeni governorship of Christiansborg Caatle, the fullest

printed accounts are in Captain T. Phillips, Journal of a Voyage
.in 1693,-4. in Churchill* s **Collection of Voyages and Travels.
Vol.VT, pp.211-3; Bloome*s Hemoirs in Barbot 1732, pp.448-9*
See also V.G.K. Day Journal 1699-1703, entries for 30th and 31st
December, 1699, and 26th January, and 3rd February, 1700.
Also I. Wilks, in Trans.Hist.Soc.Ghana, Vol.Ill, pt.2, 1957,
op.cit., pp*120-122 .
2. See pp.
3* 2 WIC 116 Letter from Jan Y/oortman, Kormantsi, to Director-
General J.P. T. Huydecooper, EMina, dated 11th June, 1765*
 - 80-

authorities. Instead, they relied heavily on the guns of the European

forts and shipping for protection against their enemies. This trend

was clearly encouraged by the Europeans. For example, at the beginning

of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese induced the Elmina people

to stop paying tributes to their overlords, the Kings of Aguafo and

Fetu; created Elmina an autonomous municipality, and governed it with

1
the help of three local chiefs. Perhaps an interesting case yras the

extension of Dutch authority over the Mouree peoples in the early years

of the eighteenth century. In 1707, the Fantis defeated the Asebu peoples

in a series of battles and the King of Asebu passed under the influence

of the Fantis. The Fantis were assisted by the EngLish at Cape Coast

Castle, and, because the Dutch had a fort at Mouree, the coastal outlet

of the Asebu kingdom, the Dutch decided to protect their trading interest

there. Director-General Pieter Nuyts, and chief factor Jan Landman went

to Mouree to treat with the Fantis, on behalf of the numerous refugees

from all parts of Asebu who had sought refuge in the Dutch fort. The

Fantis, apparently under pressure from the English, refused to negotiate

with the Dutch. The Dutch thereupon signed an agreement with the elders

of Mouree, whereby the Mouree people transferred their allegiance from

their captive king to the Dutch. The elders of Mouree argued that they

considered all their obligations to their king terminated because he was

no longer an independent monarch, but a puppet of the Fantis and the

1. Chart 743, 1£>29, op^cit.

The Dutch who succeeded the Portuguese at Elmina followed their
predecessors1 example in exercising strict supervision over the
Elmina peoples. They raised taxes and administered justice,
See K. Davies, 1957, op.cit.
 -81-

English. Furthermore, "because most of the coastal states were

engaged in numerous wars with their neighbours, they "became heavily

indebted to the Europeans, who provided them with guns and pov/der on

credit. In this way, their chiefs were not able to act against these

creditors, for fear of reprisals. In May 1703, for example, -some

Akanny messengers, who were returning from a visit to Cape Coast

Castle, were seized in Abramboe country by some Aguafo people. The

English immediately sent John Cabes to the king of Aguafo, to remind

him that he was Mindebted of great sums to the Royal African Company

of a long tame and if this was his way of using them notwithstanding
2
their not pressing for payment he would now make him pay that debt" •

Indeed, some of the coastal states were so weak that they could not

resist undue interference in their affairs by the Europeans. Sir Dalby

Thomas was not only able to get a certain Aqua Brafo to be made King

of Fetu, but also, he was responsible for the choice of a certain

Fetu woman as the Queen Mother of that state. When some Fetu people

protested against his action, and attempted to destool the woman by

force of arms, Sir Dalby Thomas warned, 111 made her a queen ao I

will protect her and assist her as my queen against all that will be

her enemies without a Just cause Even powerful peoples like the

Fantis were induced by means of bribes to embark upon wars which could

only benefit the Europeans. In 1703, the Agent -General at Cape Caast

1* 2 Y/TC 122 Agreement signed between Director-General Pieter

Nuyts and the elders of Mouree, dated 10th November, 1707.
Also, 2 WIC 100 Letter from Pieter Nuyts, dated 22nd April, 1708.
2. T 70 /1 4 6 3 Memoranda Book kept at Cape Coast Castle, entries
dated 26 th and 28th February, 1703.
3« T 70 /1 4 6 3 Memoranda Book kept at Cape Coast Castle, entries
for 12th and 17th April, 1703, 26th June and 6th July, 1703.
 - 82-

Castle, sent a messenger T*ith gifts to the Brafo of Fanti to find out

”how he was disposed to the raising of a warr against the queen and

kingdom of Anguina (Agona) for their treachery to the Royal African

Company in bringing the Dutch to settle at Sanja Bereku which belongs

to the Company11• The Brafo accepted the presents and sent messengers

to Akwamu, Winneba and other places ”to the chief men of his acquaintances

to bring them in the interest of the Royal African Company and to

ingage them against the Kingdom of Anguina if they persist in their

1
treachery against the Company.” Thus, in the early years of the

eighteenth century, European trading interests were closely bound up

with those of the coastal peoples, aid it was against that background

that European and Ashanti relations must be viewed.

The Dutch were the first European traders to contact the

Ashantis after the Denkyera defeat. They did that for two main reasons.

The Ashantis spent a long time plundering the Denkyeras of their gold,

and taking a number of them prisoner, either for sale or to be sacrificed

to their gods. Trade, therefore, was extremely bad on the west coast,

and so the Dutch were anxious to get the Ashantis to open the trading

paths and to bring down trade to the forts. The other reason was that it

was widely believed on the coast that the numerous wars undertaken by the

Denkyeras were instigated by the Dutch, and that it was the latter who

supplied them with guns and powder. The Dutch therefore feared that

the Ashantis would not send them trade, since they had been the friends

1. T 7 0 /1 4 6 3 Memoranda Book kept at Cape Coast Castle. Anglo-Fanti

efforts to prevent the Dutch building their fort at Senya Bereku,
are fully dealt with in this document. The English did not want
the Dutch to establish themselves so near their fortat Y/inneba.
The Dutch finally did build their fort there.
 -83-

of their enemies. In November, 1701, Director-General Sevenhuysen,

and his Council, decided to send under-factor David van Neyendaal to

1
contact ”the very much feared Asiente Caboceer Zaay” . The instructions

drawn up for the guidance of Neyendaal shows that he had to go through

the countries of Aguafo, and Twifo to Akanny where the Akanny chief

^Akjesin" and his captain "Crantie", would conduct him to the presence

of the king. Y/hen he had been received by Osei, Neyendaal was to

congratulate him warmly on his great victory, and to let him know that

the Dutch sympathised with the Ashanti cause. Neyendaal should then

discuss business with the king. Firstly he should ask the king to permit

his people, or any other people who wanted to resort to the coast, to

trade, to do so. He must assure the king that, if the Ashantis were

induced to go,to the Dutch forts for their trade, they would receive

as good bargains as they could expect from any other European trading

nation on the coast. Moreover, the Dutch would undertake to punish

those who ill-treated the Ashantis on the coast. Secondly, Osei should

be asked to undertake to make the trading paths safe. Otherwise the

Twifos and other peoples •through whose countries the Ashanti traders *

must pass, would hinder them. Thirdly, Neyendaal must make available

to the Akannists and the Ashantis the prices of trade goods in the Dutch

forts, so they should know beforehand what to expect when they arrived

on the coast. Having completed these commercial transactions, Neyendaal

1. 2 WTC 97 Letter from Jan van Sevenhuysen, Elmina, dated

16th November, 1701. In this letter Sevenhuysen gives the
background to the Neyendaal Mission to Ashanti. Ee disclosed
that the Dutch had no more than 200 Marks of gold in the chest
at Elmina, because *£the Ashantis are so rich from the spoils they
had taken from the country of Denkyera that they do not care about
trade.H Neyendaal volunteered to lead the mission to Ashanti.
 -84-

should also make it clear to the chiefs and people of Ashanti and

Akanny countries that there was no truth in the rumours circulating

in the country that the Dutch were behind the numerous wars undertaken

by the Denkyeras against the neighbouring peoples• In particular, they

had not bribed the Denkyeras to fight the Akannists. Admittedly, the

Dutch had given 100 bendas of gold to the Denkyeras, but this was meant

to enable the Denkyeras to buy guns and powder with which to wage war

against King Abbe Tekki and his Aguafo peoples. Indeed, it was

unreasonable to suppose that the Dutch would instigate the Denkyeras

to destroy Akanny, whose people had for a long time been the main traders

on the coast. Moreover, Neyendaal should stress that the money was paid

to the Denkyeras in the presence of some Akannists as well as other

peoples, and therefore the Akannists would have known if the intention

was to enable the Denkyeras to fight them. Finally, Neyendaal tras

instructed to distribute sane gifts to the king of Ashanti and his chiefs,

as well as to the chiefs of Akanny. The gifts to Osei Tutu included one

big velvet cloth with gold trimmings, a golden looking-glass and a

1 ..................................
plumed hat.

It is significant that the Dutch admitted that they had

supported the Denkyeras in fighting the king of Aguafo and his people.

A Dutch report of 1699 notes that the Aguafos were completely defeated
2
by the Denkyeras, and it may be that it was after the Denkyera victory

that the ground-rent for Elmina Castle was paid to them. Neyendaal1s

instructions did not touch on this point, but documents relating to his

1. Informatie en Instructie voor den tinder Coopman D.V.Neyendaal

waar na hij zig kan, en ook salmoeten reguleren gedurende de
peyze han^erlT. See Appendix
2. See 2 VIC 97 Letters from Director-General Jan van Sevenhuysen,
dated 1st Larch, 10th June, 1699* and 26th June, 1700.
 -85-

own transactions in Ashanti had been lost, and so it is impossible to

know how the Ashanti king came to be the ground-landlord of Elmina

Castle. In the late nineteenth century, however, the Dutch told the

English at Cape Coast that ’'many years ago the Dutch Company of traders

under special protection of the Government granted a stipend of £80 a

yes.r payable in trade goods to the king of Denkerah for the purpose of

promoting trade with his tribe and gave him a document to this effect

on which the dates of annual payments were noted. On Denkerah being

conquered by the Ashantees this document (pay note) came in possession

of the King of Ashantee and after some negotiations with the Company,

the latter granted him the same amount; they considering it desirable

to keep up the same friendly relations with him as they formerly used
2
to have with the Chief of Denkerah11.

Neyendaal stayed in Ashanti for more than a year and, in June,

1702, Willem de la Palma, the new Dutch Director-General, sent messengers

to contact him. The Dutch messengers were to go first to Akanny to

contact.the three chiefs of that country, namely, Tiboy (Tsibu), Awanee

(Awuni ) and Intim Coffee (intim Eofi) • These messengers were to give

the chiefs some brandy and three velvet cloths, and then to induce them

1* Bosman says NeyendaalUs papers were taken-by some French pirates;

see Bosman, 1705> op. cit., p.77*
2. Agenda van openbare Besluiten No l/8. Letter from Consul at Elmina
to Captain C.C. Lees, Lieutenant-Governor, Gold Coast Colony, Cape
Coast, dated 21st June, 1876. It is clear that they regarded the
payment for Elmina Castle to the Ashantis as a means of facilitating
trade and not because the Ashantis v/ere the ground-landlords of
.Elmina as a result of their conquest of Denkyera. Eut, as Coombs
points out, the truth probably lay between the two extreme views.
Undoubtedly, the Africans and the Europeans viewed, the payments
quite differently, and it was this fact which accounted for the
misunderstandings between the British and the Ashantis in the
nineteenth century. See Douglas Coombs, The Gold Coast. Britain
and the Netherlands. 1850-1874. (London, 1963 ), op.8-12, 81, 84,
86, and 107 -8 .
 - 86-

to open trade with the Dutch forts. After that, the messengers should

travel to Ashanti. In Ashanti, the messengers, accompanied by ITeyendaal,

should present Osei with a beautiful red velvet cloth, and a black felt

hat with a red feather. They should inform the king that the Dutch

expected him to use his great power to increase the trade vdth the Dutch.

The king was also to be told that if he could send a son to Elmina,

he would be treated as ”a prince of the country” . Also, the king must

be informed that to protect trade, and to make it possible for Ashanti

traders to travel in safety to the coast, the Director-General had

assembled the kings of Aguafo, Fetu and Asebu, as well as the Braffos

of Twifo and Cabes Terra, to discuss the means of keeping the trading

paths from the coast to Denkyera open. Finally, the messengers were

asked to present ”a costly gold and silver cloth to the Prince, son of
1
Zay or if he does not have one, to his wife”. Indeed, friendship with

the Ashantis was so valued by the Dutch that they were determined to do

nothing to incur the displeasure of Osei Tutu. For instance, in 1708,

messengers arrived at Elmina from Osei to inform the Director-General

that some 80 pieces of ivory which the king had sent to the Dutch fort

had not been sufficiently paid for. The Dutch thought this unlikely, for

a similar complaint had been made during the directorship of Willem de

la Palma, but since they valued their good relations with Osei, they
2
decided that the king!s demands should be met.

The Dutch, however, found a keen competitor for the Ashanti

trade in Sir Dalby Thomas. Sir Dalby repeatedly warned the Royal African

1. 2 WIC 58 Letters from Director-General Willem-de la Palma,

Elmina, dated 18th July and 25th September, 1702.
2. 2 7/IC 125 Resolutions of the Director-General and Council,
Elmina, 20th Harch, 1708.
 -87-

Company that presents to the chiefs and other important peoples in

the G-old Coast were essential if the Dutch v/ere to he prevented from

engrossing the greater part of the trade. He stressed that ”your

Honours trade to Ashantee is so important and the King’s friendship

1
so valuable that you can’t be too generous to the King”. In 1707*

he hoped to make Sekondi ”a great place of trade to the inland country

2
of Ashantee”. He asked London for ”a field bed prettily made up or

an English quilted bed with cotton for a covering” to be sent to him,

because the King of Ashanti had asked him for a bed.^ In 1709* he

reminded the Company of the bed, and pleaded that if it was impossible to

send one ”a more chargeable present” would be acceptable. In that same

letter, he requested that ”a fine horse furniture, Holsters and Pistols

(with a bullet mold for them fit for a colonel to wear having to throw

over the saddle when he is off), a feathered hat, a Colonel’s scarfe

and General1s truncheon”, should be sent as a present to the King of

Ashanti because he had heard that that king ”sometimes rides on horseback”^

After Sir Dalby* s death, the English continued to send presents to the

Ashantis. For example, in 1714, the Royal African Company sent to ”Say

King of Ashantee” presents which included ”a silk flagg with the Company’s

1. T 70/5 Abstract of letters received by the Royal African Company of

England from the coast of Africa. No.1 March 20th 1705 - August
15th, 1715* entry for 8th May, 1709*
Sir Dalby Thomas was English Agent at Cape Coast Castle from 1703
until his death in 1711*
2. T 70/5 Abstract of l e t t e r s ; e n t r y for 17th June, 1707*
3* T 70/26 Letter from Sir Dalby Thomas, Cape Coast Castle, dated
22nd August, 1707.
4. T 7 0 /2 6 Letter from Sir Dalby Thomas, Cape Coast Castle, dated
8th May, 1709•
Osei Tutu must have reciprocated the kind gesture from Cape Coast
Castle, because Sir Dalby noted that he returns ”dashee for dashee”.
’’Dashee” means ”gifts”. See T 70/5 On Sir Dalby*s relations
with Ashanti see also Davies, op.cit., pp.288-9
 -88-

Armes, a laced Hat, a skarf and a General*s truncheon" •

Nevertheless, anxious as they were from a commercial point

of view to solicit the friendship and goodwill of the Ashantis, - the

Dutch and the British reacted differently to the prospect of Ashanti

as the political master on the west coast. The Dutch were apparently

not worried about Ashanti being the dominant power there. Neyendaal’s

mission was intended to enable the Dutch "to work together with Zey (Osei)
2
in all things in future." The Dutch probably believed that they could

contain the king of Ashanti by signing treaties of friendship with him.

Such treaties, whilst benefiting the Ashantis, could also promote the

trade interests^of the Dutch. In fact, in 1703, the Dutch sigped a treaty

with the powerful Akwamu king, who dominated the east coast, with this

object in view. By this treaty, concluded on the 3rd April, of that year,

the Dutch bound themselves not only to pay the monthly ground rent for

Grevecoeur, but also an additional one ounce of gold for every twenty

pounds of gold traded at the fort. Furthermore, the Dutch recognised

the dominion of the Akwamuhene over Accra, and promised that, in the

event of the King of Akwamu being forced to wage "a Just war against

wanton people who v/ish to disturb trade", to supply the King with one

hundred fully armed young men, with three thousand pounds of gun-powder

and with three hundred pounds of bullets. The Akwamuhene, in turn,

agreed to keep open the trade routes from the interior; not to allow

his chiefs to indulge in disputes that might affect grade, unless he

had given authority, and to prevent his subjects from trading with

1*. T 70/381 Accounts and Journals. Entry for 30th September, 1714.
This document contains numerous references to presents sent to
the king of Ashanti ard other coast chiefs.
2. Instructions to D. Van Neyendaal, op.cit.
 -89-
1
interlopers, and to punish those who did. Besides this, when the Dutch

heard, in 1715* that an Ashanti army under Akankwatia had arrived in the ?

\7assa country, they were greatly pleased, "because they believed that
2
"the Ashantis were coming to settle nearer the coast." Indeed, Dutch

and Ashanti friendship was so close that in 1708, when there were

persistent rumours at Elmina that Sir Dalby Thomas had sent messengers

to king Osei and the Twifo chiefs asking for a body of troops to enable

the English to take possession of the Dutch forts, the Director-G-eneral

3
and his Council simply ignored them. The British, on the other hand,

considered that it was undesirable that the coastal tribes should fall

under tbs domination of the Ashantis. It must be said that this

attitude was clearly dictated by motives of self-interest, and was not

the result of any regard for the coastal peoples themselves. In fact,

although the coastal peoples had had a long trading connection with the

Europeans, they were intensely detested because of their "middleman”

activities. The coastal communities were constantly referred to as

being avaricious, unruly, and lacking in effective government. In the

opinion of the British at Cape Coast Castle, this latter characteristic

was a decided advantage, because it enabled them to extract good trade

bargains from the people by playing off one state against the other.

Ashanti, however, v/as regarded as an absolutism presided over by a

despotic king; the imposition, therefore, of the Ashanti system on the

1. 2 7/IC 98 Letter from Willem de la Palma, Elmina, 10th October, 1703*

Enclosure Y Annexure 5» Copy of Agreement between High and Eighty
Lords States G-eneral of the United Netherlands and the West India
Company and Akwonno, King of Akwamu and his Councillors and Head
Chiefs, dated 3rd April, 1703* Also, Wilks, in Trans.Hist.Soc.Ghana,
1957 > op.cit., p.128.
2. N.B.K.G. 82 Letter from Willem Butler to Director-General H.
Haring, dated 6th February, 1713*
3* 2 WIC 100 Letter from Director-General Pieter Nuyts, Elmina,
dated 23rd April, 1708.
 -90-

on the coast was regarded as being harmful to European trading interests.

In such an event, the despotic Ashanti king could not only cut off the

forts from supplies, but also he would be in a position to dictate his

own trade terms.

Furthermore, the British, unlike the Dutch, did not believe

that the Akwamus could be made to serve the European economic interests.

On this point, European experience on the east coast must have helped to

solidify the views of the British. In 1705> for example, the Danes sent

two anchers of spirits, pipes and seme tobacco as a present to the

Akwamuhene, but this was regarded by Akwamu as being inadequate. The

King threatened to stop trade at the Danish fort unless some more

generous gifts were sent to him. Governor Ligaard immediately ordered

1
more goods, valued at 5 ounces of gold, to be sent to Akwamu. In 1707*

the English reported that the Akwamuhene "has made war with the Akims

and will not let them trade which hinders the trade of Accra and ‘Winneba" •

A year later, Sir Dalby Thomas wrote, "James Phipps can’t make the trade

at Accra as formerly because of the tyrannical temper of the king of

2
Quomboe". Thus, although the British would have liked to secure Ashanti

military assistance against their Dutch rivals, they did not want the

Ashantis to impose their nule on the coastal peoples. In view of this

fact, when Osei Tutu was worried about the closing of the trading paths,

and he "sent to know if Sir Dalby was willing he should open the wayes

of trade by destroying those that opposed it", the English Agant-General

1. V.G.K. Letter from Erich Ligaard to Directors, Christiansborg

Castle, Accra, dated 1st September, 1705.
2. T 70/5 Abstract of letters sent by Sir Dalby Thomas to Royal
African Company, entries dated 21st February, 1707, and 30th
September, 1708.
 -91-

replied In general terms so far as it might tend to the advantage of

1
trade” . This fact is important because the prospect of Ashanti as the

dominant power on the coast was to come to the fore from the 1740*s

onwards, when she had overcome all the interior states, and was threatening

an invasion of the coast. At this point, it must he said that the

officers of the European Companies on the coast were not independent

authorities. At Cape Coast, Elmina and Christianshorg Castles, detailed

reports of events were drawn up and sent to Europe, whence the Companies

referred important issues^ to their respective governments. Thus the

officers on the coast were constantly in touch with the authorities in

London, Amsterdam and Copenhagen, from whom they received their

instructions. But, because communications between Europe and Africa

took a long time, it was inevitable that immediate decisions had to be

taken by the officers on the spot. Moreover, the authorities were

aware that their servants had first-hand knowledge of local matters, and

were more likely to be the best judges of what should be done in certain

situations. The opinions and actions of the Governor and his Council,

therefore, v/ere of crucial importance in the formulation of the ”official”

policies towards the African peoples. During the reign of Osei Tutu,

however, Ashanti was not strong enough to dominate the coast. Her main

preoccupation was her relations with the defeated Denkyeras, and her

tributary states, especially the Wassas, Twifos and the Aowins.

It has been said that the Ashantis knew how to conquer, but

did not know how to govern; that after the reduction of a new state, and

1. T 70/5 Sir Dalby Thomas, Cape Coast Castle, to the Royal

African Company, dated 30th September, 1708.
 - 92-

its inclusion as a province of the kingdom, no army of occupation was

left, but the district v/as handed over to one of the Ashanti chiefs,

as Governor or Resident, -and beyond the payment of an annual tribute,

and the rendering of military service when called upon, nothing was

required. Admittedly, Ashanti’s policy towards the distant states

of the kingdom, such as Wassa, Twifo and Aowin, was very different from

their policy towards the contiguous states, such as Domaa, Tafo and

the Amakoms, which were effectively incorporated into the kingdom.

The adoption of this policy, however, did not mean that the Ashantis

did not know how to govern; in fact., in pursuing this policy, the

Ashantis were following one of the traditional modes of government

common to all the Akan states. On this point, a contemporary observation,

made the Dutch Director-General, Jan Pranger, soon after the

Akyem conquest of Akwamu in 1730, is relevant. In a letter sent to

Pranger by de la Flanque, the Dutch factor at Accra, the hope was

expressed that the Akyems would occupy the Akwamu country. Pranger,

who knew the customs of the country, wrote b&dk saying, ”as regards

the Akwamu country, you say that you want to see the Akims themselves

assume the possession and government of it, but that will never happen

because it is an old custom of the natives that they always leave a

part of their defeated enemiesin their own country, one of whan they

put in authority over it, who they then regard as their tribute-paying

vassal. The victorious party can settle there if they wish to, but
p
nevertheless, they obtain no share in the government.” Apart from the

1. Claridge, op.cit., pp.l*?-3WT Ward, 1958* opcit., p.

2. 2 WIG 109 Letter from de la Planque, Accra, dated 10th
November, 1730* and Director-General Jan Pranger* s reply,
dated 17th November, 1730*
 -93-

fact that this policy had the definite advantage of enabling- the

conquering power to make use of the undamaged military resources of the

vanquished peoples, it was also a positive means of reconciliation.

Roemer, commenting a few years later on the same event, wrote, flAll

other African nationsiold their prisoners and, (in the language of the

natives) eat than, but these Akims Y/ere wiser; they kept the slaves in j

their country and married their indigenous slaves to these foreigners: j

treated them with kindness with the result that the Akwamus quickly j
S
forgot their fatherland, and King and became in the course of five

years as good as the native Akims”.

In the early eighteenth century, the Ashantis pursued this

traditional policy for two main reasons. Firstly, Ashanti territory

proper was too small, therefore there v/as not sufficient manpower

to make possible the military occupation of the defeated states. Moreover,

Ashanti appears to have embarked upon the war with the Denkyeras without

having completed the subjugation of the neighbouring Guan peoples. Early

in 1706 , tlife Dutch factor at Axim reported . that Ashanti traders were

buying guns and powder ”for distribution further inland, behind their

country, for the inhabitants of a district lying far behind Auwien

(Aov/in), where war is Y/aged on horseback”.

Again, in May 1715* the English factor at Kommenda was

informed by some Ashanti traders who came to buy guns and powder, that

the Ashantis were contemplating an invasion of ”a country behind their

own”. The factor suspected that this v/as mere subterfuge, and that

1. Roemer, 17^0, op.cit., p.160. Also, V.G.K. Letter from Governor

A. P. Waroe, Christiansborg Castle, Accra, to Directors, dated
28th December, 1730*
2. Jan Landman to Director-General Pieter Nuyts, entered in Nuyts
Diary, Acquisitions, 1902, XXVI.
the Ashantis were going to attack "Akim, their bordering neighbour

to leeward and also a very Potent country”, because the Akyems were

also buying large quantities of firearms on the east coast. The

Ashanti traders were right, because a few months later the same factor

reported the arrival of a party of Ashanti traders who brought no

slaves, becauuse "what they have caught in their last battel with

Gyenebra, a country beyond Ashantee, being so very meagre and lean,”

1
they could not undertake the long journey to the coast. The other

reason is that although the Ashantis plundered and annexed parts of

2 f
Denkyera territory, they must have realised that they had to adopt

a more cautious policy towards the states of Akanny, Twifo, Wassa

and Acwin. These peoples, like the Ashantis, had suffered under the

military rule of Denkyera, and that was the reason why some of them

actively supported the Ashantis. Hence, they regarded the Ashanti

victory as the beginning of their own liberation. Moreover, they

had a long tradition of independence before Denkyera domination, and

therefore they must have viewed the upstart Ashanti kingdom with misgivings,

if not with contempt, furthermore, Denkyera defeat did not automatically

mean that the Ashantis would have a free passage to the European

forts on the west coast. They had to pass through the states of Akanny,

Twifo, 7/assa and Aroin, and so they needed the co-operation and

goodwill of these peoples.

1. T 70/1464 William Baillie's Commenda Diary, with Accounts.

Entries for 27th May and 4th August, 1715*
2. The people of Asumegya, for example, told Rattray that after
the Denkyera war ”the King of Ashanti gave us land in Denkyera,
where our people founded the villages of Dominase and
Agyemasu”♦ Rattray, Law and Constitution. 1929* op.cit.,
p.132.
 -95-

Nevertheless, Ashanti found it extremely difficult to deal

peacefully with these peoples, and she had to resort to arms on a

number of occasions to bring them back to obedience. The fundamental

factor making for friction between the Ashantis and the former Denkyera

tributary states, was the forms of control which the latter exercised

over the trading paths to the coast# Soon after the Denkyera defeat,

the Akannists undertook to maintain the trading path from Denkyera

through Gabes Terra to the coast, apparently without the knowledge of

the Ashantis. In Hay 1703, the Akannists, led by their chief,

v

Kurankyi, attacked the overran Twifo, killing King Amba of that atate#

Kurankyi then proceeded to Elmina Castle with a number of traders from

Denkyera, and his own country# There, he told the Director-General that

if the Dutch could provide him with trade goods to the value of 30 bendas,

or 7 marks AO ozs# of gold, he would reopen the routes so that ”traders

from Denkyera and other places who are on the frontiers of Twifo could
1
continue their Journey to Elmina”. The Wassas, too, were seizing and

selling into slavery people who used the trading paths through their

country# In 1715, Tor example, they stopped a party of Aowin traders,

who were travelling to Axim, and asked them to pay tolls before they

would be allowed to continue their Journey# The Aowins refused to comply

with this preposterous request, and the Yfassas thereupon seized about

80 of the Aowin traders, put them in irons, and robbed ;them of their gold
2
and ivory. The worst offenders, hcwever, appear to have been the

Twifos. The Dutch say that a ’few weeks after the defeat of Denkyera,

1. 2 WIC 59 Extract of Resolutions by Director-General Willem

de la Palma, and Council, Elmina, dated 1st May, 1703#
2# N#B.K.G#82 Willem Butler, Axim, to Dir ect or-General H.
Haring, dated 6th February, 1715*
 -96-

they sent seme two messengers to go and contact the Ashanti king, but
1
they were refused a passage through Twifo. Indeed, during the early

years of the eighteenth century, the activities of the Twifos. were

so inimical to good trade, that in 1712, Ashanti, in alliance with the

Akannists, the Fetus, Asebus and some Fantis, attacked that country and

drove away their chief, Commomore, who sought refuge in Cabes Terra.

The Dutch Director-General commented that ” this is a delightful feat

and something which our predecessors have wished for and attempted to

bring about without success because this small power (Twifo) which lives
2
by plunder has not given free passage to trade”. In the following year,

Accafou, the new Twifo chief, apparently finding himself surrounded by

powerful enemies, applied to the Dutch for financial assistance, so as

to enable him to buy muskets and powder. For a loan of 53 bendas, 8 ozs.

of gold, granted him, Accafou signed an agreement with the Dutch whereby

he provided securities in the form of some valuable beads and gold

3
chains, as well as giving up one of his nephews as a hostage. The Twifo

country, however, remained in such a disturbed state that, in 1715 ?

the English factor at Kommenda described Twifo as Ha scattered nation

harassing their neighbours whenever they have opportunity and only

living by plunder and r o g u e r y . I t was Aowin, however, which

threatened the political and economic ambitions of Ashanti during

this period.

1. Instructions to Neyendaal, op.cit.

2. 2 WIC 101 Letter from Director-General H. Haring, Elmina,
dated 15th August, 1712.
3* 2 WIC 122, f.72 Articles of agreement with Accafou,
the head of the Twif os, dated 30th July, 1713?
4» T 7 0 /1 4 6 4 William Baillie,s Commenda Diary, with Accounts,
entry for 6th April, 1715•
 -97-

Fram the point of view of commerce, territorial extent and

military potentialities, Aowin appears to have been the most powerful

of the tributary states. Bosman points out that it was with great

difficulty that Denkyera asserted her domination over that state in

1
the late seventeenth century. The break-up of Denkyera power, and

the comparative freedom under the Ashantis, enabled the Aowins to

recover some of their pristine glory, and to embark upon military

expansion. In 1713? the Dutch reported that, for some years past, the

Aowins had overrun the whole of Great Hkassa and that they had carried

their victorious arms to "Sacco”, where the bulk of the Aowin army
2
had encamped. The Aowin thrust northwards was clearly aimed at

exploiting the gold resources in the Begho area, and, since the Ashantis

were expanding in that direction, there was bound to be a clash of

economic interest between Ashanti and her tributary state. Moreover,

the new conquests enabled Aowin to increase her military resources,

which could not fail to be taken into consideration by the Ashantis.

What decided the Ashantis to move quickly against the Aowins, however,

was that the Aowin country at that time served as a place of refuge

for rebels and criminals from Ashanti and other tributarystates.

Willem Butler, the Dutdh factor at Axim, was informed that Ashanti

intended to attack Aowin because about 3000 men sent by "Zaay against

a certain country which is inland between Ashanti and Aowin called

Affin the Coco"^ had refused to return to Ashanti after the successful ^j

1. Bosman, 1705? op.cit., p. 79*

2. N.B.K.G. 82 Willem Butler, Axim, to Earing, dated
8th October, 1715-
"Sacco", of course, i& Nsoko (Begho).
3. "Affin the Coco", of the Dutch must be an area in
the present-day Sefu&i country.
cor.pletion of their task. Instead, they had sought, and "been given

permission hy the Aowins to settle permanently in their country with

their acquired booty. furthermore, the Aowins were giving protection

2
to large colonies of refugees from Ashanti, Denkyera, Akanny and Twifo.

It is clear, therefore, that apart from economic and military

considerations, Ashanti had to frustrate the ambitions of the Aowins

if she was not to be denuded of her human resources.

In the late months of 1714* the two Y.rassa chiefs, Intwan and

Ajepa, were called to Ashanti, presumably to discuss plans for an

invasion of the Aowin country. In December of the same year, Amankwatia,

the Kontihene of Kumasi and Gammander-in-Ghief of the Kumasi armies,

was reported to be in the Y/assa country with a body of Ashanti troops.

The British at Cape Coast Castle, apparently believing that Amankwatia1s

mission was to settle the Y/assa country, and to reopen the trading

paths which had been closed for some time, hurriedly sent presents to

"Amonquateha, an Ashantee Captain in the Y/assa country” . By August

of the following year, all arrangements had been completed for an

invasion of the Aowin country with troops drawn from Ashanti and Y/assa.^

If the Ashantis had intended a small punitive invasion, they were

quickly disabused of that idea, for the Aowins put up a spirited defence

of their country. On hearing of Ashanti intentions, they arrested

. i.
i:.E.iC.G-.82 Y'illern .butler, Axiir., to Earing, 8th October, 17U*
2. :;.E.K.G.82 Vfillea Butler, Axim, to Karing, 8th October, 1715*
5* T 70/381 Accounts end Journals, entry for 31st December, 1714«
L.-o.Av.d.82 Letters from H. Blake, Sekondi, and i/illem Butler,
Axim, to haring, dated 24th January, and 2nd Pebunary, 1715*
respectively.
4* h.o.K.b-.o2 Director-General II. Ilaring, Elmina, to Blenke,
Sekcndi, dated 17th August, 1715. Y/. Butler, Axim, to Haring,
uabeu 30th August, 1715*
 -99-

all the refugees resident in their country who were reluctant to join

them against their enemies, and put them in irons. They then instructed

the guards to kill them on the approach of the Ashanti army, so that

they did not fall into the hands of the enemy, and thereby show them

the lie of the country, or give away any of the secrets of the Aowins.

Furthermore, they decided to fly to "Encasser and Socco" in case there

was the possibility of an Ashanti victory. The result of all these

elaborate preparations was that Ashanti and Y/assa forces found themselves

involved in a general war for which they were clearly ill-prepared, and

they were defeated in the early stages of the campaign. In September

1715, the English reported that "the Awawees (Aowins) have beat the '

Ashantees who are returned to recreate new force and have sent to the

Cufferos (Tv/ifos) to come to their assistance as the Abrimboos and....

2
the Adorns and Axims are to join the Awawees11. The reorganisation of

the Ashanti forces, and the arrival of some more troops from Twifo, must

have tipped the balance in their favour because, after a few months, ■ ■ ■

Aowin and her allies were defeated. In December, 1715* 0- Dutch report

was that the people in the Cape Apollonia area had been defeated, snd

that Amankwatia and Intwan were moving troops into the Igwira and
3
Abocraase country, where a part of the Aowin forces 7/as holding out.

In a series of battles Aowin resistance was overcome, and the army

pursued to the Inkassa and Begho area, where the Aowins surrendered.

In January 1716* the English factor at Kommenda asked for Increased

supplies of muskets and powder because "the Ashantees have destroyed

1. IT.B.K.Gr. 82 Will em Butler to Director-Haring, dated 10th October, 1715-

2 . T 70/1464 '.Villiam Bailliefs Commenda Diary with Accounts, entry
for 27th September, 1715•
3. H.B.K.G.82 Letters from II. Heyman, Axim, 3rd November, 1715
YSLlem Butler, 10th December, 1715*
 -100-

the Cape Apolonians and Awawees and are now coming to trade with their

plunder” .^* A few days later, the Dutch factor at Axim reported that

Anankwatia and Intwan had reached an agreement with the vanquished

Aowins, and that the latter had agreed to pay 300 bendas as a token
1
of their submission to the Ashanti Icing# It is clear, then, that

during the reign of Osei Tutu, the Ashanti armies crossed the river

Tano, and carried their victorious arms into the Begho area. In the

early nineteenth century, Dupuis reported that in the reign of the

first king, the Tano river was crossed and "a great extent of country

conquered”, that Benda became an ”auxiliary kingdom”, and that G-yaman

was invaded “with a paverful army, with which he vanquished those

2
tribes, and reduced their monarch to the condition of tributary” •

Dupuis further notes that some llande peoples "submitted to the yoke

of vassalage, under the government of Ashantee, and were permitted to

enjoy their inheritance peaceably in G-hombaty, Sokoo, and the confines

3
of Ghofan” . It seems, however, that the thrust into the Begho area

was the result of Ashanti* s determination to check the political and

economic aims of the vassal state of Aowin, and that the line of' inarch

of the Ashanti forces was the "second Aowin path”, and not along the

extension of the Begho trade route to the Gold Coast#

Amankwatia, who had been conducting the Aowin campaign, was

1# H.B.K.G.82 Willem Butler, Axim, to Earing, dated 24th January, 1716*

2# Dupuis, 1824, op.cit., p.230.
3. Ibid., p.xxrvi#
Ghombaty appears to refer to northern Gyaman. Sokoo (i.e. Nsoko)
is the area of the old Begho. Ghofan was the region around
Gbuipe in Western Gonja. See Ivor Wilks, The Northern Factor in
Ashanti History. (Gloucester, 19^1)p *17,f.n.1.
hurriedly recalled because of an Akyem threat to invade Ashanti. A

decade after the disastrous defeat sustained during the Ashanti and

Denkyera wars, the Akyems had sufficiently recovered to threaten

the security of the Ashantis. In 1712, they undertook certain

instant war. Hirst, they received under their protection the king

of Denkyera, who had thrown off his allegiance to the king of

Ashanti and had sought refuge in Akyem with many of his subjects.

Secondly, the Akyems entered into an offensive and defensive alliance

with the people of Cabes Terra, who had offered asylum to the Twifo

chief, who was deposed by Ashanti and her allies. Director-General

Haring, who believed that war was imminent between the two countries,

thought that it would be dangerous for the Europeans to take sides,

because whichever side suffered defeat, in the event of war, it would

be detrimental to European trading interests. Haring pointed out

that if the Ashantis were defeated, 11the best and most powerful

traders on the west coast” would be ruined, and the peoples of the

small states, such as Twifo, would not only plunder traders who might

pass through their countries, but also, they would demand expensive

presents from the Europeans. On the other hand, an Akyem defeat could

mean an end of the gold trade in the country, because Akyem was the

most important source of that commodity. If that happened, the effect

would be greatly felt in Accra, because the Akwamus who had been hoarding

gold would buy European goods with cowrie shells, as they had done

1. N.B.K.G. 82 Letters from Willem Butler, Axim, and H. Elenke,

Sekondi, to Director-General H. Haring, dated 20th and 22nd
January, 1716, respectively.
 -102-

1
during the past four and a half years. In spite of the apprehension

in the European forts, however, the expected Ashanti and Akyem conflicts

did not take place, because Ashanti was preoccupied with the MAowin

Question”.

Because there v/as no immediate threat from Ashanti, the

Akyems decided to attack the Akannists, who were known to act in the
2
Ashanti interest. In April 1715* the Dutch reported that a large

number of Akannists were fleeing with their wives and children to

Fanti and Cabes Terra countries, because they had heard rumours that
3
the Akyems were contemplating an invasion of their country. A month
i

later, the report was that the intentions of the Akyems were unknown,

but that the Fantis and the Akanny refugees believed that the Akyems

would invade Akanny after the rainy seasons. Ileanwhile, the king of

Abora state called a meeting of all the Fanti chiefs at Abora, the

Fanti capital, to decide on what steps to take if the Akyems made

good their intentions to invade Akanny. The Fanti chiefs decided to

support the Akannists should the Akyems attack them, because they

regarded Akanny as a buffer state between their own and Akyem country.

1. There were rumours on the coast that the Ashantis acted in

concert with the Akyems against Akanny. This is hard to
believe, but probably because the Ashantis had already
decided on war with the Aowins, they did rfihat in order to
gain time, and to make sure that the Akyems did not attack
them. See N.B.K.G.82 Letters from Jan Visbeek, Konnantsi,
and J. van Alzem, Bereku, to Director-General H. Haring,
dated 12th July and 6 th September, respectively.
2. N.B.K.G.82 Letter from J. Visbeek, Kormantsi, to Director-
General H. Haring, dated 19th April, 1715*
2 WIC 102, Letter from Director-General H. Haring, Elmina,
dated 28th April, 1715*
The Akannists who fled to Cabes Terra actually went there to
fight the Cabes Terra, who were the allies of the Akyems.
See N.B.K.G.8 2 Letter from Jan Landman, Kommenda, to H.
Haring dated 15th June, 1715*
 - 103-

They argued that since the intentions of the Akyems were unknown, it

was most probable that an invasion of Akanny v/as a first step towards

an invasion of the Fanti country. The Fantis then appealed to the

English at Gape Coast Castle for muskets and powder, and the English

sent a Cape Coast chief, and one of their own messengers, to Abora to

tell the chiefs that their request would be granted, provided some
1
gold was lodged in the castle against payment.

'.Vhile the Fantis were still debating, ambassadors arrived

from Akyem to tell them that they had no intention of invading the

Fanti country, therefore the Fantis should stop meddling in their

quarrels with the Akannists. The Akyem messengers further told the

Fanti chiefs that their kings would be happy if the Akanny refugees

were driven away from the Fanti country, or sold into slavery. The

Fantis replied that they would do nothing of that kind, because they

and the Akannists had always been, and still were, the same people,

and so that they considered an attack on the Akannists as an attack

2
on themselves. The Akyems, thereupon, declared that it would be

better if the Fantis 11armed all the fishes in the sea to fight for

them!*# and the Fanti chiefs retorted in similar scathing terms. At

the end of June 17*15, the Akyem armies entered Akanny country. Since

almost all the able-bodied Akannists had fled, the Akyems sacked a few

1. N.B.K.G.82 Letters from J. Visbeek, Kormantsi, to H. Haring,

dated 28th Nay, and 4th June, 1715* Also, Letter fran G.
Hendrix, Apan, to Haring, dated 6 th June, 17*15*
2. N.B.K.G.82 Letter from J. Visbeek, Kormafttsi, to Director-
General E. Haring, dated 26th September, 1715*
3. N.B.K.G.82 Letters from J. Visbeek, Kormantsi, and G. Hendrix,
Apan, to Haring, dated 4th and 6 th June, 1715, respectively.
 - 104-

towns, and then hurriedly retired into their country, without

1
pursuing the enemy into Fanti country as they had intended to do.

The Akyem decision to cut short the campaign in Akanny was

the result of a move by the Agonas to cut them off from their supply

of guns and powder. Because of their incessant hostilities with the

Akwamus, the Akyems received the bulk of their supply of firearms

from the European settlements at Senya Bereku, Shidoe, Y/inneba and

Apan through the Agona country. Thus, to ensure the flow of arms

into their country whilst fighting the Akannists, both the Abuakwas

and the Kotokus signed a treaty with Nyanko Eku, the paramount chief

of the Agona state, whereby Akyem traders were granted free passage
p
through Agona country. The Agonas, however, apparently, acting under

political pressure from the Akwamus, unilaterally abrogated the treaty

with the Akyems. In June 1715, a Gomua chief called G-yani informed

the Dutch factor at Apam that Ofori, the Akyem Abuakwa chief, had sent

ambassadors to Nyanko Eku to solicit the military assistance of the

Agonas against the Akannists, the-Fantis and the Acrons. Gyani revealed

that the Akyem messengers told Nyanko Eku that if he would help the

Akyems, the empty pan which they had brought would be filled with pure

Akyem gold, which then would be presented to the Agona chief. Nyanko

Eku refused to comply with the request of the Akyems. Ee said that

he preferred the nbad gold” of the Fantis to the Akyem gold, because

he believed that the Akyems would attack his country soon after they

1. N.B.K.G.82 Letter from J. Visbeek, Kormantsi, to H. Haring,

dated 29th June, 1715*
2 . N.B.K.G.82 Letter Jan Boerhaven, Bereku, to H. Haring,
dated the 20th Nay, 1715.
 -105-

had defeated the Fantis and their allies. Moreover, he had sworn an

oath with the late Brafo of Fanti premising to assist the Fantis in any

future war, and, to shew his honesty of purpose, had had sent his son to

stay at the Fanti court at Abora. Furthermore, the Agona capital

v/as so near the Fanti border that he could not expose it to attacks

from the Fantis. Gyani also said that Nyanko Eku had decreed that no

Agona man should sell guns and powder to the Akyems. He added, however,

that although the king had declared for the Fantis, 11the big Agona

Or can Soedru11 continued to supply the Akyems with firearms and that

Nyanko Eku had sworn to punish his rebellious subjects as soon as

1
the Akyems had been defeated by the allied forces.

In the light of this unexpected development, the Akyems

decided to attack the Agonas. In July 1715, rumours were current in

the Dutch forts that the Akyems had abandoned their intentions of

invading the Fanti country, but that they were going to fight the
2 .....................................................
Agonas. In September of the same year, the factor at Bereku reported

that all the important Agona chiefs, namely, Nyanko Eku, Apreba, Affery

and others, had arrived at the coastal town of Shidoe to discuss 11the

1. Agona was under Akwamu overlordship at that time. The

Akwamus were allies of the Fantis. According to the
Dutch, the Fanti chiefs at Abora sent messengers to
contact the Akwamuhene, who was on a visit to Accra,
and to inform him about their intentions regarding Akyem.
The Akwamuhene sent the messengers back with 2 bendas
to buy drinks for the assembled Fanti chiefs, and to tell
them that as soon as they were attacked by the Akyems, he
would also attack the Akyems and the Agonas. See N,B,K,G,
82 Letter from G. Hendrix, Apam, to Haring, dated 6 th
June, 1715*
2. N.B.K.G.82 Letter from G. Hendrix,Apam, to Director-
General H. Haring, Elmina, dated 24th July, 1715*
 -106-

present state of affairs with the Akyems’1. The Akyems, however,

postponed the invasion of Agona for several months, because of differences

in opinion between the Akyem Abuakwas and the Akyem Kotokus.-

It appears that the Abuakwas had always regarded the

Akwamus as the traditional enemy of Akyem. Because of this, the

Abuakwas were known to have made a number of incursions into Akwamu

territory. Por example, in March 1715* the Akwamuhene who was on a

visit to Accra told the Dutch factor there that he v/as “experiencing

grave difficulties with 0 fori“, but failed to give further details when
2
pressed to do so. A few days later, Akwonno' v/as reported to be still

at Accra in spite of the fact that he had been informed that the

Akyems had sacked an Akwamu village, and that his great chiefs had
3
warned him of an imminent Akyem invasion of his country. The Akyem

Kotokus, however, thought that the Ashantis were the most dangerous

enemy of the Akyems. Indeed, it appears that they had agreed to join

the Abuakwas to attack Agona, because the defeat of the Agonas would

enable them to get an uninterrupted supply of firearms with which to

attack the Ashantis. This conjecture seems to be supported by the

fact that whilst preparations were in progress for an invasion of the

Agona territory, some two hundred Akyem traders arrived at Dutch

Crevecoeur, and told the factor there that “the Akim Caboceer Apintin

1. N.B.K.G.82 Letter from J. Van Alzem, Bereku, to Director-General

E. Karing, Elmina, dated 6 th September, 1715* &nd Haring*s reply,
dated 8 th September, 1715*
2. N.B.K.G.8 2 Letter from Sub-Pactor, J. Van Dyck, Accra, to H.
Haring, Elmina, dated 23rd March, 1715*
3. N.B.K.G.8 2 Letter from factor Zelst, Accra, to Karing, Elmina,
dated 31st March, 1715*
 -107-

thinks himself strong enough to fight the Zaay (Osei) of Asjantijn".

The Abuakwas, however, must have argued against an invasion of Ashanti

at that time. They preferred to attack the Akwamus and the Agonas

before an invasion of Ashanti could be considered. If these two

countries were defeated, the Akyems would receive an unlimited

supply of guns and powder from all the European forts on the east

coast, and this would enable them to defeat the Ashantis. Meanwhile,

since the Ashantis v/ere deeply involved in the war with the Aowins,

they could be bribed to refrain from entering the war. The Abuakwa

argument was convincing and on the 30th October, 1715* the Dutch

factor at Accra reported that the Akyems had sworn an oath to “march

on next Sunday against the Agonas and the Akwamus; that the Gaboceers

Apintin and Offery have agreed with each other to act together; that

Caboceer Offery has received the blessing of the Zaay of Asjantijn to

whom he had sent considerable presents; and that the Caboceer Apintin
2
has sent back to the house of her father the daughter of Aquando..•

In early 1716, reports frcm Accra indicate that the Akyems had been

fighting the Agonas, the Akwamus, the Fantis and the Akrons for quite

some time. But, as in the case of the campaign in Akanny, the Akyems

suddenly ceased hostilities, and retired hurriedly into their own

1. N.B.K.G.82 Letter from J. Doutreleau, Accra, to H. Karing,

Elmina, dated 10th October, 1715•
2. Ibid., same to same, dated JOth October, 1715* and Karing*s
reply, 4th November, 1715* It would seem that Apenten was
married to a daughter of Akwonno, the Akwamuhene, and this,
coupled with the fact that Kotoku v/as far away from the
Akwamu border, probably accounted for the good relations
between the Kotokus and the Akwamus. On the other ha&d,
the Abuakwas were nearer the Akwamu border, hence the constant
hostilities between the Akwamus and the Abuakwas.
 - 108-

country.

The reason for this inexplicable behaviour of the Akyems was

that the Ashantis were threatening to enter the war. The Ashantis,

apparently aware of Kotoku intentions, and, flushed with their recent

victory over the Aowins, responded to an appeal for help from the
2
Agonas. Early in 1717? the report from Cape Coast Castle was that

”the Ashantees and the Aekims are resolved on a war with each other.”

In September the report was that ”a decisive battle was likely between

the Ashantees and the Aekims by which the Trade will be opened”; and,

in October, that trade was bad and the trading paths ©topped because
3
of hostilities. The Dutch and Danish records also provide plenty of

evidence to support the English accounts of conflicts between the two

countries, during this period. In February 1717* the Dutch reported

that the two major trading states, Ashanti and Akyem, v/ere preparing
L
to fight each other. In October of the same year, van Alzen, the

factor at Accra, reported the death of the Zaay (Osei), which had been

1. N.B.K.G.82 Entry by Director-General E. Karing, dated 12th April, 1716.

. V.G.K. Letter from Governor Frans Boye, Christiansborg Castle, to
Directors, dated 10th May, 1716.
The Akyems may have decided against fighting the Akwamus and the
Agonas at this time, if they could be sure of a free passage to the
coast. A Dutch report of December, 1715? indicates that they made
overtures for peace, but negotiations broke down because the Agonas
demanded 200 bendas from the Akyems before they could grant Akyem
traders free passage to the Coast. See N.B.K.G.82 Letter from J.
van Dyck, Accra, to Karing, dated 31st December, 1715•
2. N.B.K.G.8 2 Letter from van Alzen, Accra, lo Haring, dated 30th Got. 1717
N.B.K.G.82 Letter fromD.-G. Robbertz, Elmina, dated ifth March, 1718*
3. T 70/6 Letters from Cape Coast Castle to the Royal African
Company, dated 6 th February, 23th September, and 23th October, 1717*
2 WIC 103 Dispathh from Director-General Engelgraaf Robbertz and
Council, Elmina, 31st February, 1717* It is clear from this report
that whereas Ashanti was the main source of trade on the west coast,
Akyem was the main source of trade, especially gold, on the whole
of the east coast.
 -109-

follov^ed by the withdrawal of the Ashanti army and its subsequent

1
defeat by the pursuing Akyems. The Danes at Christiansborg Castle

also reported, in November 1717, that the two kingdoms had embarked

upon a decisive war, and that that accounted for the lack of trade

at Accra, since the two kingdoms were the main sources of gold, slaves
' 2
! and ivory in the country. Prom 1718 onwards, the reports from all

the European establishments were that peace had been made between the
3
two countries.

These contemporary European accounts are clearly references

!
i
to the same circumstances as those which Ashanti tradition associates

with the death of Osei Tutu on the river^Pra, during a campaign

against the Akyems.^ In 1817, Bowdich was informed at Kumasi that

5
Osei had been shot whilst in his hammock. Three years later, in 1820

Dupuis was also told that the king, with some -two or three hundred

retainers to the rear of the main army, was suddenly attacked by the

Akyems as he. was crossing the river Pra* Ee further records that the

king’s retinue was annihilated, and adds that after the king’s death,
|

the main Ashanti army wreturned home, bringing in their train a

considerable number of prisoners, who were doomed to be immolated to

1# N.B.K.G.84 Letters from van Alzen, Accra, Blenke, Axim,to

Director-General E. Robbertz, dated 30th October, and 10th
November, 1717, respectively.
2. V. G-.K. Letters from G-overnor Knud Rost, Christiansborg Castle,
dated 29th November, 1717, and 11th February and 30th June 1718.
3. T 70/6 Entry dated26 th iay, 1718.
2 WIC 104 Dispatch from Director-G-eneral Willem Butler, and
Council, dated 8 th August, 1718.
V.G.K. Letters from Governor Knud Rost to Directors, dated
31st October, 1718, and 22nd February, 1719$
4* See for example, Dupuis, 1824, op.cit., p.231; Reindorf, op.cit.,
p.6 6 ; Fuller, 1921, op.cit., p.23*
3. Bowdich, 1819, op.cit., p.233*
 -110-
1
to his shade; for as to the body of the king, it was never recovered.11

Priestley and Wilks, however, believe that the king who died
2
in 1717 on the Pra v/as not Osei Tutu, but another king called Osei.

They regard Dupuis’s testimony of the non-recovery of the king’s body

as being of ’’crucial importance”, and assert that this had led to

discrepancies in traditional accounts of the circumstances which led

to the institution of Ashanti’s Great Oath. They argue that since the

king^s body was not recovered, his name became a ’’kunorokosem”, something

known, but not to be mentioned, its utterance strongly tabooed

(akyiwadie); and that this was the reason why the King’s name was not

mentioned when the Great Oath v/as being sworn.

I
This view is untenable. Admittedly, after a period of more

than a hundred years, there were bound to be discrepancies in

I traditional accounts, if only because memory is short. It must be said,

i
[
| however, that the king's name was never mentioned when swearing the

Great Oath, not because his body was not recovered, but because, to the
3
Akans in general, death and a great man’s name should never be coupled.

The death of an Akan chief, whether in battle or through natural causes,

was considered an event of such national calamity that it was usually,

referred to in such obscure phrases as ”a mighty tree has fallen”,

”Nana (Grandfather or chief) has gone to the village,” or ’’the fire in

4
the house has gone out”. In the olden days, to say that a chief had

1. Dupuis, 1824, pp.231-3*

2. Priestley and Wilks, ’’The Ashanti Kings in the Eighteenth Century:
a revised chronology”, in Journal of African History, 1,1 (i960 ),
pp.83-96. Apart from the date on which Osei Tutu died, the sources
used by the authors have been checked and found very accurate.
3. Reindorf (p.67 ) says if an Ashanti king died in battle, it was
considered such a great disaster, that when any warrior was asked
about the rumours of the king’s death, his reply was likely to be
"I Joined the campaign, but never heard of it”.
4. These sayings are still current among the Akans of Ghana today.
 -111-

died would have been an offence punishable by death. Moreover, it

was not every chief whose death was commemorated in an oath. Any

Akan chief, or person whose death forms the basis of an oath for his

people, must have been regarded by his people as a great man indeed.

The Ashantis believed, and still believe, that Osei Tutu was the

greatest of their eighteenth century kings, and it was due to this

fact, coupled with the fact that they were unable to give him a

fitting burial, that his name was enshrined in an oath which Bowdich

described as *■ the most solemn oath of the Ashantees”. It appears,

however, that the strength of their case rests on contemporary written

sources. In 1712, the English at Cape Coast Castle reported the death

of an Ashanti king, and noted that this explained the absence of

Ashanti traders on the coast. This report must be ignored, because,

apart from the fact that the Dutch, who gave detailed reports of events

in Ashanti in that year, failed to mention it, there were numerous

occasions when such reports had been based on mere rumours. For example,

in 1715* Willem Butler, the Dutch factor at Axim, was informed that

the Ashantis v/ere marching on the Aowins, because "the Zaay had already

died”, and that the Ashanti chiefs planned to place the successor of

Osei on the Aowin stool, whilst they divided the Ashanti kingdom
2
amongst themselves. Butler believed this story, but a few days later,

he reported that Amankwatia and Intwan, the Wassa chief, were marching

1. Bowdich, 1819, p.233*

2. N.B.K.G. 82 Willem Butler, Axim, to Director-General H. Earing,
dated the 8th October, 1715*
 -112-

on the Aowins "without the knowledge of the Zaay". Also, in 1739>

2
the Danes heard rumours that the king of Ashanti had died* We know,

however, from Danish and other sources, that the king of Ashanti then

was Opoku Ware, whose death was reported in the early months of 1750;

again, in 1706, Jan Landman, the Dutch factor at Axim, reported that

he had been informed by same Ashanti traders that Zaay (Osei), on

account of his great age, had recently handed over "his sword and all

his riches, greatness and authority to the Assantynse Caboceer

Amanquatja", so as to avoid disputes about the succession qaon his

death*^ Priestley and Wilks infer from this report that if Osei Tutu

was old in 1706, then he could not have accompanied the Ashanti army

in 17113 and that this report supports the English account of his death

in 1712* It must be pointed out that there are cases on record where

aged Akan chiefs had accompanied their armies to war. If the campaign

was considered of great importance in the national interest, the aged

chief would normally be conveyed to the battle-field to give moral

support to his people*- It seems, however, that Landmants report may

have been a reference to the creation of Amankwatia, whose mother

reputedly suckled Osei, as the first Kontihene of Kumasi, senior

divisional chief and, inter alia, commander of the Kumasi armies, by

1* N*B*K*G*82 Letter from Willem Butler, to H. Earing,

dated 20th October, 1715*
2. V.G.K. Letter from Governor E. N. Boris, Christiansborg
Castle, to the Directors, dated 10th Larch, 1739*
3* Letter from Landman in Nuytfs Diary, Acquisitions, 1902, XXVT, 113*
 -113-

-I
that king. In that case, the episode had nothing to do with Osei

being an old man. All that happened was that Osei Tutu elevated thajfc

famous chief to act for him in the Kumasi division, as the Hamponghene

deputised for him on the national level. Indeed, President Nuyts

thought that Landman's report was so incredible that he believed that

Osei Tutu had abdicated in favour of Amankwatia. Ke noted in his

diary that "Zaay had transferred his kingdom and his dependencies to
2
his slave the Caboceer Amanquad ja". It is clear, therefore, that

arguments in favour of Osei's death in 1712 are inconclusive. On the

other hand, traditional accounts and contemporary written sources

agree that Osei died in 1717*

By the end of Osei Tutu's reign, the Ashanti kingdom had

emerged from obscurity and was clearly poised to play a major

part in the political and economic developments on the Gold Coast.

Ashanti had superceded Denkyera as the dominant political power

in the hinterland of the west coast, and she was also in control

of the gold, slave and ifrory resources in that area. The

political and economic ambitions of the vassal statesof Aowin had

led to its subjugation. But in doing that, the Ashanti farces had

overrun the area of Great Inkassa, and carried their victorious arms into

the Begho area. These remarkable developmentswere taken notice of by the

1. Rattray, 1929* p.68; Busia, 1951* P*91»

In 1820, Dupuis discovered that the Kontihene of Kumasi was also
called Amankwatia; it is still customary in the absence of the
Asantehene, for the Bantamhehe (Kontihene) to assume the
presidency of the Kumasi state Council.
2. Acquisitions, 1902, XXVI, 115, President Pieter Nuyts, Elmina,
to Jan Landman, Axim, dated 4th November, 1706.

i
i
 - 114-

European traders on the coast, who vied with one another to secure

the Ashanti king in their interest. But, although for purely commercial

reasons, they desired to be on good terms with the Ashantis, the Dutch

and the English reacted differently to the prospect of Ashanti as the

political overlord of the western coast. In the process, the Dutch and

the EngLish developed different policies towards Ashanti, which were

clearly stated during the second half of the eighteenth century, when

Ashanti was in complete control of the whole of the Gold Coast hinterr

land, and was threatening an invasion of the coast.

The emergence of Ashanti was made possible by Osei Tutu. Osei

1
was greatly revered in Ashanti, not because he spoke "through guns",

but because he was a great political genius and statesman. Ee

accurately gauged the political and economic situation in the country

during the second half of the seventeenth century, and organised his

people into a political union capable of playing a decisive role in that

development. It is significant that Osei spent part of his early life

in the powerful states of Denkyera and Akwamu. In these two kingdoms,

Osei not only learnt his politics, but also discovered that the rise of

those states had been made possible by the introduction of firearms

into the country. Thus, the rise of Ashanti, as Metcalfe points out,

appears to have been a compound of the state-building genius of Osei

2
Tutu, and the introduction of guns and powder. Osei gave the Ashanti

policy a cohesion and a capacity to absorb new elements; whereas

by controlling the southward movement of guns, the Ashantis secured

1. Puller, 1921, p.23.

2. G.E. Metcalfe, Maclean of the Gold Coast. (London, 19&Z)
 -115-

a decisive advantage over their neighbours to the north. Furthermore,

it was significant that it was in Akwamu that Osei found, and formed a

friendship with, Okomfo Anokye, an event which was to become so

decisive in his career. If Osei Tutu was the future king and man of

action, Okomfo Anokye was the wise companion, and adviser. Fage has

said that Okomfo Anokye1s greatest achievement was the creation of

2
the Golden Stool of Ashanti. By that act, Anokye provided the

religious basis of the Ashanti Union, because "it was presented to

the Ashantis as enshrining the soul of the nation."^

Nevertheless, it must be said that Osei Tutu left behind

him a kingdom which was politically and militarily vulnerable. The

policy adopted towards the conquered states of Denkyera, Wassa, Akanny,

Twifo and Aowin, was unprogressive, and this fact, coupled with the

fact that most of these peoples had a long tradition of independence,

largely accounted for the frequent revolts. Ashanti traders were kept

waiting for long periods in Wassa and Twifo countries, and Ashanti had

to play off one state against anfcther before her traders could gain

free passage to the coast. Moreover, it seems that the superb Ashanti

military organisation had not attained perfection in Osei’s time. It

was neither invincible nor feared then. The army found it difficult

to overcome the Aowins, and the Akyem victory on the banks of the Pra

claarly threw the Ashanti forces into disarray. Indeed, the disaster
J
at the Pra so shook the foundations of the kingdom that lit did not dissolve
r
into its component parts largely because of the martial genius of

Opoku Ware.

1. Fuller, (p.9) describes Anokye as the "Cardinal Wolsey of Ashanti".

2 . Fage, (Madison,1961), op.cit., p.54.
3. A.A.Y. Kyeramatten, A Panoply of Ghana. (London, 1964 ), p.25
 CHAPTER III
ASHAHTI UNDER OPOKU WARE, 1720-1750

In the 1720*3, Opoku Ware was described by the European

1
traders on the coast as the most powerful monarch in the country.

In 1766, John Hippisley, the Governor of Cape Coast Castle also

described him as having been the wisest and most valiant monarch

of his time, in that part of the world, drawing attention not only

to his long and active reign, but also to his use of wise counsellors,
2
and his successful wars. Again, both the English and the Dutch

believed that Osei Kwadwo, the Asantehene who reigned from 1764 to

1777* wished to model himself on his great p r e d e c e s s o r T h e nine­

teenth century Ghanaian writer, Carl Reindorf, reiterated this view,

and noted that Opoku Ware "extended the Asante dominion more than any

of his predecessors or successors

It is difficult to ascertain the actual year of Opoku* s

accession to the Golden Stool of the Ashantis. The preliminary to

his relgi was confhsion and civil strife, largely as a result of the

unusual circumstances surrounding the death of Osei Tutu. The Ashantis

1. WIG Vol. 106. Letters from Director-General Pieter Valckenier,

dated 11th July, 1725* and 16th January, 1726.
VGK Letter from Governor Pahl, Christiansborg Castle, to
directors, Accra, dated 10th September, 1727*
2. T 70/31 ff.201-2. Letter from Governor John Hippisley, Cape Coast
Castle, to the Committee of the Company of Merchants trading
to Africa, 13th July, 1766.
3* T 70/31« Hippisley*s letter op.cit.;
WIC Vol.115* Letter from Director-General J.P. T. Huydecooper, Elmina,
to the Assembly of the Ten, Amsterdam, dated 15th October, 1764*
4« C.C. Reindorf, History, op.cit., p.85* Reindorf*s comment is given
added weight by the fact that Opoku Ware reigned for some 12 years
more than he (Reindorf) calculated.
 -117-

say that Okukuadani, a nephew of Osei Tutu, claimed the stool, but

he was rejected by the chiefs because his supporters were few and,

also, because Opoku had been nominated by Osei Tutu himself as his

successor* The disputes which followed resulted in civil war, and

1
Okukuadani and his followers were exterminated. That there was

civil strife in Ashanti soon after the Ashanti-Akyem war of 1717> is

confirmed by evidence from contemporary European sources. In 1718*

van Naerssen, the Dutch factor at Axim, reported that Ashanti "was

much at variance between itself, and had already fought twice between

itself", and that according to the reports of the Africans, "the heir

of the Zaay was getting the upper hand hcwever." Four y e a rs later,

in 1722, Director-<xeneral Willem Butler reported the arrival at

3
Elmina of messengers from "the young Zaay of Ashanti". Early in the

nineteenth century, Bowdich was informed in Kumasi that Opoku Ware

was enstooled in 1720.^ It is clear, then, that Opoku*s enstoolment

«.y

took place between 1718 and 172^. Bowdich's date of his accession,

therefore, is acceptable.

Soon after his accession, Opoku Ware set about the reunifi­

cation of Ashanti. He was determined to rest ere confidence, and so

to rekindle the fighting spirit of his people. To that end, he

instituted the Great Oath of the Ashantis. The "oath" as an institution

is common in Akan society. Every chief, lineage head, and, indeed,

1. Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty..... 1921, op.cit., p.25.

2. N.B.K.G. 85. Letters from van Naerssen, Axim, to Director-
General Willem Butler, Elmina, dated 9th and 30th October, 1718.
3* Ibid. Entry by Direfitor-General Willem Butler, dated 3rd
February, 1722.
4. Bowdich, 1819, op.cit., p.234*
 -118-

every man of Importance, had his oath*^ It referred, usually

obscurely, to some tragic incident of the past* An allusion to

this misfortune was strongly forbidden for two main reasons* Firstly,

it was widely believed that it offended the ancestors of the

community, and thus estranged them from the living. Secondly, the

Aksns feared that an allusion to the incident might lead to a repetition

of the farmer disaster* Thus, if an oath was sworn, it behoved the

authorities to investigate the reasons for which the taboo had been

broken* This meant that private issues, like debt, theft, abuse,

slander, assault andadultery, could be made public issues* Hence,

Busia1s assertion that the Oath was Mthe only means of having a
2
private injury inquired into, by the central authority”* The Oath,

too, might be put to other uses than to bring a private issue to

public notice. Far example, a chief might swear an oath enjoining

his people to observe a certain custom or trade regulation; to perform

a certain service, or to support a particular causa* Also, before he

set out on a campaign, a war-lord would swear that he wouLd never turn
3
his back to the enemy* But, in all cases, the "oath” was intended to

achieve the same purpose: to ranind the people of the inseparable

link between them and their ancestors who protect them.

The Great Oath (Ntam Kese) recalled the death of Osei Tutu,

who, according to Busia, is the most venerated person in Ashanti

1* On the oath in general, see, far exagie , Rattray, Religion and

Art, 1927, op.cit., Ch.XXII, and Law and Constitution* 1929,
Ch.XXXVT; Busia, 1951, pp.75-77.
2. Busia, 1951, P«77*
3* Busia, 1951, pp.77-8*
4* Ibid., p.76^
 -119-

It is concerned with the day on which, and place at which, the king

was killed. But, because it was considered the greatest oath in

Ashanti, the actual names of the day, Memeneda, (Saturday), and place,

Kormantsi, must not be uttered when swearing the oath. A person

swearing the Great Oath would simply say: "Keka Ntam Kese" (MI say

the Great Oath"); a less obscure, and therefore much mare serious

version, was "Meka Kcrmante ne 1'emeneda", ("I say Kormante and

Saturday"). The Great Oath is surrounded by such strong taboos that

Bowdich could write, "when the oath by Cormantee and Saturday was
1
sworn a gloomy silence" followed. Dupuis gives a much better account

of th£ strength of the taboos. Dupuis wrote, "Miminda Acromantee

(implying Saturday and Acromantee) by which the national affliction

is recorded, has been considered ever since an oath of the most solemn

and unequivocal import; and the day itself has been cast into the

calendar among the list of the ominous days stigmatized by the

Ashantees as days which forbode evil.... The words, as recorded, are

deemed too profan^e to utter, unless in a whisper between friends; and

this redoubtable oath is most commonly taken by inference only, as the

dreadful day, the day of Gcd'A chastisement, etc. The effect of these

expressions only, as I have witnessed at the court, clouds every brow

with woe, from the king to the slave who stands behind his chair, many fly

from the presence.... Others cover their faces with both hands, uttering

at the time a charm or invocation to the patron Gods to shield them from

the ominous import of those words, and the effect of the king* s wrath or

1. Bowdich, 1819, op.cit., p.297

sorrow-.... The Oath itself entails the penalty of death, frequently

by torture".

In this striking passage, Dupuis dearly demonstrates how

deeply the Ashantis felt the loss of the founder of their nation.

The Oath was intended not cnly to assure the Ashantis that Osei's spirit

continued to guide the nation, but also to unite &nd rekindle their

fighting spirits, to achieve the purposes for which the Ashanti kingdom

was called into being. It was not only the Asantehene*s greatest

oath, but also a national one - Asantefo Ntam. For this reason,

althou^i the king alone retained the right to impose the death sentence,

and to hear cases involving the Divisional Chiefs, the latter were

entitled to hear cases in which the oath was invoked by their cwn
2
subjects. No chief who used the Great Oath in swearing his allegiance

to the Golden Stool could go back on his word, because, if that

happened, the Asantehene could always count upon the support of the

other chiefs to punish the recalcitrant one. Moreover, the oath was

invoked by the chiefs to dear themselves of suspicion that they were

3
plotting against the State. Even the Asantehene was not above the

law in cases where the Great Oath was invoked. Both Rattray and Busia

state that the king could be arraigned before a national tribunal on

1. The quotation is from Dupuis, 1824* op.cit., pp.232-3* as cited

in Priestley and Wilks, Ashanti Kings in the eighteaith century...
in Journal of African History", ~1* 1 ("i960"), op.cit. , P*90
2. Rattray, Daw and Constitution. 1929* p.161, Note 1. There was
a slight variation of procedure between the different states.
Ibid., Chs.XVII-XXIII.
3. For example, in 1945* when Bakwai announced its secession from
the Ashanti Confederacy Council, all the chiefs reaffirmed their
loyalty to the Golden Stool by swearing the Great Oath. Busia,
The Position of the Chief..., 1951* PP*55~6* an& 171 •
 -121-

1
on which sat all the Divisional Chiefs.

Opoku Ware must have encountered little difficulty in

reuniting his people, because of the treacherous activities of the

tributary states of Twifo, Wassa and Aowin. While the Ashai tis were

campaigning in the Akyem country, these three states seized the

opportunity to enter Ashanti, sack a number of villages, and take

large numbers of Ashantis prisoner, whom they sold into slavery at

the coast. In March 1719* the Dutch at Elmina reported that although

the protracted war between the Akyems and the Ashantis had ended, there

was no hope of a lasting peace in the country, because the Ashantis

wouLd certainly revenge themselves on the Twifos, the Wassas and the

Aowins, who had "sacked two or three Ashanti villages, and had stolen
2
a number of the Ashantis" • Two years later, in 1721, the report was

that the Ashantis were marching against the Wassas and the Aowins,

and in the following year, that the Ashantis had emerged as victors

in their wars against their enanies, and that "the gold rich Aowin

country has suffered most" during the war. The Aowins were driven

away from their country, and they were scattered all over the country­

side. The report also revealed that the Ashantis were selling large

numbers of the prisoners-of-war at Elmina, Cape Coast, and Anomhbo.^

It is interesting that these contemporary accounts noted the

destruction of Aowin, for this episode is clearly remembered by the

1. Rattray, Law and Constitution. 1929* p.161, note 1; p. 105.

Busia, 1951* p.101.
2. WIC Vol. 104* Letter from Director-General Willem Butler and
Council, Elmina, dated 27th March, 1719*
3* WIC Vol. 105* Letters from Director-General Willem Butler,
dated 1st November, 1721, and 8th May, 1722.
 -122-

Ashantis. It is related that while the Ashanti army was still fighting

the Akyems, the Sefwis, led by their chief, Ebirim Moro, seized the

opportunity to pounce on Kumasi and sack it, killing the Queen Mother,

Nyarko, and all but two members of the royal family, who were captured

and sent to Sefwi as prisoners. When the news reached Opoku Ware,

he returned to Kumasi by forced marches. There, a meeting was held

and Amankwatia, the Kontihene and Commander of the Kunasi forces, who

had conducted the earlier campaign against the Aowins, was detailed

to pursue the enemy. Amankwatia and his fbrces caught up the Sefwis

before they could recross the river Tano, gave them battle, and

completely routed them. Ebirim Maro was killed, but Amankwatia

pursued the fleeing SefWis into their own country, and defeated them.

By this signal defeat of the Sefwis, the whole territory up to the

river Bia was annexed, and this tract of land, known as Ahafo, in the
1
north-west Ashanti, became the game-preserve of the Ashanti kings.

The complete subjugation of the powerful Aowins, and the

consequent thrust into the Ahafo area by the Ashantis, was bound to

result in conflicts with the pOTerfhl state of Tekyiman in the neighbour­

hood. Ths story goes that Amo Yao, the Tekyimanhene, was so frightened

that he made friendly overtures to the Ashantis. Amo Yao selected as

his messenger to the Ashanti king, the fugitive Bafo, from Amakom, who

had established himself in the nearly village of Nkoranaa. Bafo was

1. See, for example, Fuller, 1921, op.cit., pp.26-27;

Reindorf, History, op.cit., pp.81-2.
According to Reindorf, one thousand prisoners "were sacrificed
in honour of the royal personages'* the Sefwis had massacred.
During this period, the Aowin country included parts of
modem Sefwi.
 -123-

instructed to send three hags of gold-dust to Opoku Ware, in order

that the Ashantis and the Tekyimans might he friends. Bafo decided

to keep the valuable presents, and instead he substituted flints,

lead and powder, and sent them in three parcels to Opoku Ware. When

the Asantehene asked Bafo what the gesture ^meant, Bafo said that the

Tekyimanhene was determined to fight the Ashantis, hence such curious

gifts. Opoku Ware was unable to get an explanation from Amo Yao him­

self, because Bafo waw to it that all messages to the Tekyjman Court

passed through himself. Bafo had the Tekyimans informed that the

Ashantis were preparing to attack them, end the frightened Amo Yao

asked Bafo to tell him wherein lay the apparent invincibility of the

Ashanti army. Bafo told the Tekyimanhene that the strength of the

Ashanti army lay in the fact that, before they set out on a campaign

they buried all their guns for forty days so as to render them more

deadly. Amo Yao believed this story, and he immediately ordered ell

the Tekyimans to burjr their guns. Bafo had the Ashantis informed then

of ’What the Tekyimans had done, and Opoku immediately marched his

troops to the Tekyiman border. There, a chief and his people who had

defied the orders of Amo Yao, offered the Ashantis stout resistance.

But as the mass of the Tekyiman guns were rusted and useless, the country

was quickly overrun by the Ashantis after three engagements. Amo Yao

and the Tekyiman Queen Mother, Gyamarawa, were captured, and sent to

Kumasi, where the Queen Mother,was ill-treated because of her boast

that she did not know what was meant by poverty. It is further related

that Amo Yao was well-treated, and that it was the Tekyimans who
 -124-

introduced solid "gold weights" into Ashanti.

That Tekyiman was wen by a trick is collaborated by two

pieces of evidence from Dutch sources. In January 1724, it was

reported that the Ashantis had won a big victory over a country

"lying behind Ashanti and which is at least three times as large

as Ashanti"; and that the Ashanti victory was won by "treaflhery".

The report further stated that the defeated country was ruined, and

that the Ashantis took large numbers of people prisoner. It was

also said that, in order to let the Dutch knew about the event, the

Ashanti king sent an ambassador with "a great number of slaves" to

Elmina Castle, and that the Dutch received him civilly, and sent him
2
back with gifts to the Ashanti king. This report did not mention

the name of the conquered state, but two years later, in 1726, Opoku

Ware was threatening an invasion of Abremboe country with Tekyiman

troops, to secure the fugitive Wassa chief, Intsiful.^

The reasons far an Ashanti invasion of Tekyiman will probably

never be known. It is clear from Ashanti sourdes that the Tekyimans

were afraid of them, and that that was the reason why Amo Yao made

friendly overtures to Opoku Ware. The available evidence, however,

suggests that this was not the cause. It was certainly the case that

Ashanti, after the disastrous defeat by the Akyems, and the subsequent

1. On traditional accounts of this episode, see e.g. Reindorf,

History, op.cit., pp.71-73• Fuller, 1921, op.cit., pp.27-29.
2. WIC Vol. 105. Letter from L. Beuns, Elmina, to the Council
of Ten, dated 8th January, 1724.
3. N.B.K.G. 93* Letter from Director-General Pieter Valckenier,
ELmina, to factor Jacob Elet, Komnantsi, dated 5th May, 1726.
 -125-

wars with the Aowins, was not militarily capable of threatening the

ancient, more populous ani powerful state of Tekyiman. Indeed, the

whole Bafo episode, it seans, suggests that the threat came from

Tekyiman, and not vice versa. Since Tekyiman controlled most of the

gold resources in the present-day north-west Ashanti, it was unlikely

that the Tekyimans would tolerate Ashanti1s presence in the Ahafo

area. If that were the case, then Opoku Ware used Bafo, his paternal
1
uncle, to achieve a purpose for which the Ashanti military resources

at that time were incapable of bringing about.

The defeat of the powerful state of Tekyiman made it possible

for the Ashantis to control the gold and slave resources in the

* greater part of the present-day Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana. Moreover,

it provided the Ashantis with more troops, and Opoku Ware felt able

to turn his attention to the sourthern states of Akwamu, Wassa, Twifo

and Akyon.

We have noted that the creation of the Ashanti kingdom was

made possible by assistance from Akwamu. Osei Tutu must have worked

with the Akwamuhenes, Ansa Sasraku, Basua and Ado, as equal partners.

His successor, however, initiated a policy towards Akwamu which was

clearly aimed at reducing the Akwamus to the position of junior

partners in the alliance. This policy was vigorously pursued by

Opoku* s successors, so that, in the early nineteenth century, a

commentator on Gold Coast politics could remark, "the political state

1. Bafo was the brother of Akosa of Amakom, and therefore a

relative of Edu Penin, Opoku Ware*s father. See, Fuller,
1921, pp.25-26.
 - 126-

of the Gold Coast has been chiefly marked by a decline of the power

of Aguamboe, which, instead of ruling over all the neighbouring states,

now scarcely maintains its own independence. The predominance is at

present indisputably possessed by Ashantee... •" There were valid

reasons for this shift in Ashanti's policy towards Akwamu during this

period. Ashanti, as the dominant political power in the hinterland of

the western Gold Coast, was clearly in a position tbo end her military

and economic dependence on Akwamu. The main reason, however, appears

to have been the decline of Akwamu during the reign of Akwonno, who

ruled from 1702 to 1725*

Wilks rightly points out that Akwonno must be ranked with

Ansa Sasraku among the most able and greatest of the Akwamuhenes of *

the past. Akwonno built upon, and consolidated, the gains of his

predecessors, so that by the time of his death in 1725* Akwamu found

itself in control of an empire "extending well over a hundred miles

on each side of the river Volta, and an indeterminate way inland over
2
the Afram plains and the hill country beyond the Volta to the east."
I
But Akwonno1s twenty-three years' rule was also a period of interndiL

decay in Akwamu. It has been pointed out that in the early years of

the eighteenth century, the Akwamus were hoarding gold instead of selling

it. This meant that Akwamu prosperity increasingly came to depend

upon the slave trade, and Akwamu policy was geared to meet the increased ■

1. High Murray, Historical Account of Discoveries and Travels in

Africa. London, 1818, Vol.II, p.316
2. I. Wilks, "The Rise of the Akwamu Empire, 1650-1710", in Trans.
Hist. Soc. Ghana. Vol.III, pt.2, Achimota, 1957* pp.128 and 130.
 -127-

demands far slaves by the European traders at the ooast during this

period. It may be supposed, therefore, that it was under these

circumstances that Akwamu* s policy both?towards her own subjects, and

towards other peoples, began to charge. Roemer records that "the

rule of the first Akwamu kings was, in the opinion of the Accras and

all the conquered peoples, very mild", but that the Akwamus "behaved

mare and more harshly towards the Accras and others under their

domination as time passed". In 1709* for example, Samson Walter,

the English factor at Accra, declared that trade at Accra was bad

because of "the king of Quonboe hindering the inland traders; but

in hopes he'l(l) soon be humbled, the inland people being about

2
make war upon him".

Under Akwonno, the rule of law in Akwamu gave way to tyranny.

Everywhere power was abused, and violence, it seems, became a valid

instrument of Akwamu policy. This change showed itself most clearly

in the growth of organizations concerned chiefly with the illegal

enslavement of peaceful citizens, and with their secret sale to the

Europeans on the coast. Members of these organizations, collectively

known on the coast as "Siccadingers", terrorized the countryside.

They seized innocent people, and carried than off to the coast, where

the Accras and other coast middlemen arranged for their sale to the

forts, or to the numerous interlopers. The activities of these Akwamu

1. Roemer, Tilforladelig Efterretning.... 1760, op.cit., p. 106.

2. T 70/5 Sampson Walter, James Fort, Accra, to Governor of
Cape Coast Castle, dated 31st January, 1709
 -128-

robber bands can be better appreciated from Roemer, "The Akwamu

Siccadings or the thievish young man who were sent into neighbouring

territories toibb people often returned with empty hands; often

with blood-stained heads; but in order to have some reward for their

pains, they took their own countrymen and fellow citizens and sold

them to the Accras, who would have been glad if all the inhabitants

of Akwamu had been sold as slaves#1* Akwonno did nothing about this

growing abuse of power# Indeed, he employed his own barris of

2
Siccadings to raid into neighbouring territories#

Perhaps the greatest disservice which Akwcnno rendered to

his people was his betrayal of the Akwamu and Ashanti alliance# There

is no evidence to suggest that Akwonno fbrmally repudiated the special

relations with the Ashantis# Indeed, it would seem that he cherished

them, because Akwamu stood to gain by co-operating with the Ashantis#

For example, in 1708, Akwonno marched his troops into Kwawu country,

and defeated the Kwawus in a series of battles. The Akwamus pursued

the Kwawu forces to the borders of Ashanti, where the latter iinexpectedly

reformed, turned, and inflicted a serious defeat on the battle-worn

Akwamu forces# Akwonno thereupon dedided to retire into Akwamu to re­

equip and reinforce his troops. In mid-February 1708, th$ Akwamu army
3
arrived back in the capital# The Dane Ligaard, who gave detailed

1# Roemer, 1760, op.cit., pp.125-6.

2# Ibid., pp. 143-4* Akwonno is said to have retained about 1000
Siccadings, who raided the G-cmuas for slaves,
3# V.G-.K. Letter from G-ovemcr Erich Ligaard, Christiansborg Castle,
Accra, to Directors, dated 23rd February, 1708. On the Akwamu
struggles with the Kwawu peoples, see ibid# Letters dated 14th
July and 8th October, 1708; Rask, Kort og sandferdig Reisebeskrivelse
til og fra Guinea . 1754, op.cit., pp.155-6, 162 and 93* Alsp,
I# Wilks, in Trans.Hist.Soc.Ghana. 1957, Vol.Ill, pt.2, Achimota,
1957, P*129
 -129-

accounts of this campaign, did not give reasons far the unusual

behaviour of the Kwawu troops when they reached the Ashanti border.

One may conjecture, however, that the Kwawu resolution was one born

out of desperation. Since the Ashantis were known to act in the

Akwamu interest, the Kwawus clearly feared that their fate would be

worse if they entered into Ashanti territory.

Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that Akwonno,

presumably jealous of the growth of Ashanti power, was determined to

betray the ideals of the Akwamu and Ashanti alliance. According to

the Dutch, the great disaster which befell the Ashantis on the river

Pra in 1717* was largely the responsibility of the Akwamuhene. Akwonno

suggested to the Ashantis that one of their armies should pass through

Akwamu to attack the Akyems where they would least expect it. The

Akwamuhene then had the Akyems informed of the line the Ashantis must

take. As a result, part of the Ashanti army was surprised and surrounded,

the troops were unable to procure food, and soon small-pox broke out

in the camp. The Akyems. then attacked vigorously and inflicted heavy
/■*

losses.^

That there was an understanding between the two erstwhile

enemies is further shown by a Dutch report of 1725* In that year,

1. N.B.K.G-.82 Letter from van Alzen, Accra, to Director-General

H. Haring, dated 30th October, 1717*
N.B.K.G.84 Letter from Director-General Engelgraaf Robertz and
Council, dated 4th March, 1718. Also Priestley and Wilks in
Journ. African Hist.. 1, 1 (i960 ), p.88.
Akwonno and his troops retired into Akwamu when the Akyems hastily
moved into the interior, when rumours of the impending Ashanti
invasion of their country reached them. It was probable that it
was during the intervening period that Akwamu and Akyem rapprochement
came into existence. See V.G.K. Letter from Governor Frans Boye,
Christiansborg Castle, Accra, dated 16th May, 1716.
 -130-

the Danes reported that there were hostilities between the Akwamus

anl the Akyems, because ;the Akwamus had refused to surrender the wives

and children which the Akyems had sent to Akvamu for safe-keeping

during their recent war with the Ashantis; that Akyem messengers, sent

there to bring back the Akyems, discovered that Akwonno had given

acme of the women in marriage to his sub-chiefs, and sold Several

others to the European traders; and that the Akwamuhene himself kept
1
the Akyem king's sister as his slave. Besides, presumably because

the Ashantis entered into the war upon Agona invitation, the Akwamus

allied with the Fantis to fight the Agonas soon after the Ashantis
2
had been defeated. Indeed, the twenty-three years' of Akwonno*s reign

brought Akwamu fortunes to such depths that, on his death, the Danes

pointed out that unless his successor found new friends, the empire

would collapse, since Akwamu was surrounded by enemies, and also

3
because the Akwamu monarchy rested on such slender support.

Akwonno's successor was, of course, Ansa Kwao, who had neither

the ability nor the inclination to check the abuses which were sapping

the strength of his kingdom. Ansa Kwao even went further than Akwonno,

and sent his own bands of Siccadings "to steal hill negroes and

Adampis from his own nation, though not the Accras, because they were
» A
useful to him in getting goods for the slaves". Indeed, during the

1. V.G.K. Letter from Governor A. Suhm, Christiansborg Castle, Accra,

dated 20th September, 1725•
2. V.G.K. Letter from Governor A. Suhm, Chris tiansborg Castle, Accra,
to Directas, dated 15th July, 17214.*
WIC Vol. 106 Letter Director-General Pieter Valckenier, Elmina,
dated 20th August, 1724*
3* V. G.K. Letter from Governor A. Suhm, Chris tiansborg Castle, Accra,
dated 20th September, 1725*
4* Roemer, 1760, op.cit., pp.121-122.
 -131-

short reign of Ansa Kwao, the break-down of the rule of law in the

Akwamu dominions was so complete that internal revolts became rampant.

For example, Amega, a son of a powerful Akwamu Divisional Chief,

Asaromaso, and an Akwamu administrator in the Adangme area, so terrorised

the countryside that the people rebelled and drove him out of office.

Amega fled to the Akwamu c apital and appealed to Ansa Kwao to assist

him with troops to quell the revolt. At that time, however, Ofori,

the Akyem Abuakwa chie£ had died, and since it was unknown what his

successor's policy would be towards Akwamu, Ansa Kwao felt constrained

to maintain his forces in the west at full strength, and so Amega* s

request was turned down. Amega then appealed to his father, who

enlisted the support of other chiefs, quelled the revolt, and

i
reinstated Amega as governor of the Adangme area.

In the light of all this, Opoku Ware felt bound to find other f

allies to check the Akwamus. To that end, be immediately made

friendly overtures to the Akyems, and apparently the two countries

reached an understanding to act together in future. As early as 1724,

the Dutch reported that since the war with the Tekyimans was over, the

Ashantis might attack thb Akwamus because the latter had "very badly

treated the Akyems who are now the great friends of the Ashantis.'*

In 1727, the report was that the Fantis, the Akyems, 4hs Kwawus and

the Ashantis had resolved to invade Akwamu, and that there were comotions

1. V.G.K. Letters from Governor Pahl, Chris tiansborg Castle, Accra,

dated 14th April and 10th September, 1727*
2* WIC Vol. 105 Letter from L. Beuns, Elmina, dated 8th January, 1724*
 -132-

in Akwamu which had resulted in many of the Akwamus fleeing to the

1
coastal towns to seek refuge.

This formidable combination of states against Akwamu

fizzled out, however, The Akwamus did not find it difficult to

persuade the Fantis to leave their allies in the lurch. Ansa Kwao,

the Akwamuhene, hurriedly sent Kwesi Edu, an Akwamu war-lord, to

negotiate with the Fanti chiefs, isho were assembled at Kormantsi, for

a peaceful settlement of their disputes. Kwesi Edu*s mission was

successful, and the Fantis not only withdrew from the alliance, but

also they warned the Akyems that if they persisted in their intentions
2
to attack Akwamu, they would enter the war on behalf of the Akwamus.

The Ashantis, too, could not play any effective role in the coalition

against Akwamu, because they were in conflicts with the Wassas during

this period.

The origins of the disputes between the Ashantis and the

Wassas did not merely stem from the forms of control which the

Wassas exercised over the trade routes, which led from Ashanti

through their country to the coast. The sacking of a number

of Ashanti villages, when the Ashantis were campaigning in Akyem in 1717,

largely accounts for the bad relations between the two states. It would

seem, however, that what precipitated matters was the dispute between

the Wassas and John Conny, the wealthy Ahanta chief, and former chief

1. V. G.K. Letter frcrn Governor Pahl to Directors Chris tiansborg

Castle, Accra, dated 10th September, 1727*
2. V. G.K. Letter from Kamp to Directors n.d., but included in
the packet marked "VGK 1722-1731” ♦
 -133-

broker af the Brandenburg Company*

It has been pointed out that John Conny occupied Groot

*
Friederisckborg and other possessions of the Brandenburg Company

on the Ahanta coast after they had been abandoned. The vast trading

experience which he bad acquired as the chief broker of the Branden-

burgers enabled Conny to play an active role in coast trade and

politics* The security of the forts enabled him to wield great

influence on the neighbouring peqples, and he soon emerged as a

shrewd businessman, whose immense wealth was based on the large

amount of gold, and an equally large number of slaves he possessed.

Moreover, his far-flung connections enabled him to exploit to the full

the gold and slave resources in the middle reaches of the Ankobra

river* Conny* s agents were found all over the Aowin and Igwira

countries, where European merchandise was exchanged far gold, slaves

and ivoiy. Thus the Dutch who were established at Axim, found their

trading interests greatly threatened by John Conny and his agents,

and they schemed to didbdge Conny, and to occupy the Brandenburg

forts themselves. John Conny, however, was determined to keep the

forts, and he also enlisted the support of the Wassas and the Cape

Appolonians to oust the Dutch from Axim. From 1715 onwards, a series

of battles were fought on the western coast between John Conny and his

allies on the one hand, and the Dutch ani their African allies on the
1
other. Nothing came out of this, because none of the battles was

1. On the Dutch disputes with John Conny see e.g., N.B.K.G.82,

Letters from YYillem Butler, Axim, to Director-General H*
flaring, dated 6th February, and 30th August, 1715;
W.W. Claridge, His tory « 1915> op.cit., Vol.2, pp.203-205
 -134-

was decisive, although the confusions arising out of these skirmishes

tended to ruin the trade in that area. John Conny attributed his

failure to dislodge the Dutch from Axim to the ineffective military

assistance given by Intwan, the Wassa chief, to whom he had advanced

large sums of maiey. In the circumstances, Conny asked Intwan to

refund the monies he bad given him, but because the Wassa chief

was then assisting Amankwatia to subjugate the Aowins, he could do

nothing but prevaricate. These events led to serious quarrels between

Conny and Intwan, and the former arrested a number of Wassas, including

Bo Kofi, a relative of the Wassa chief, and imprisoned them pending

1
payment of Intwan*s debts. The Wassas retaliated by entering into

an alliance with the Akannists and a section of the Abantas, in order

to fight Conny and his people. In May 1724, the Dutch reported that

the Wassas and their allies were marching on Conny, and that they had

sent messengers to inform the Director-General that they wanted the

Dutch to help them. The allies also threatened that if Dutch assistance
i
was not forthcoming, they would seek English support, and if Conny

was defeated, the Brandenburg forts whuld be handed over to the English.

On the following day, it was definitely known at Elmina that John

Conny and his people were besieged by Intsiful, described as Mthe great

Caboceer of the Wassas*1, and Dodoo Tsibu, the chief of Abramboe, and
2
their troops. The Dutch were, of course, not prepared to see the

1. N.B.K.G.82 Letter from Willem Butler, Axim, to Director«General

H. Haring, Elmina, dated 8th October, 1715* Butler rightly guessed
that the Wassas would attack Conny after the Aowin campaign
was completed.
2. WIC Vol. 106 Letters from Director-General Pieter Valckenier,
Elmina, dated 8th and 9th May, 1724*
Intsiful succeeded Intwan, who might have died soon after the
war against the Aowins.
 -135-

English in control of the Brandenburg farts, therefore they agreed

to help the Wassas and their allies. On the 25th October, the

Director-General wrote that "we have been obliged with regret, to

start a war against the rebel Jan Conny and for that purpose we have

secured the support of the negroes from Elmina, Aguafo, Fetu,

Abramboe, Accany, Yfassa and Ahanta with which power we hope (if God

permits,) to be able to defeat and humble Jan Corny"•

John Conny was, however, neither defeated nor humbled by the

Dutch and their African allies, because of the timely intervention of

Opoku Ware. It appears that Ashanti’s intervention at this t ime was

largely due to an appeal for help by John Conny, who was said to be

on friendly terms with Ashanti. As ;early as 1715, when Conny was

having troubles with other Ahanta chiefs, the Dutch factor at Sekondi

reported that Osei Tutu sent messengers to Ahanta to settle the disputes
2
in his name. In 1719, Director-Oeneral Butler declared that the

Dutch had been unsuccessful in their several attempts to solicit the

help of the Ashantis to punish Conny, because t he Dutch West India

Company did not permit their officers on the coast to use their money

to bribe people. On the other hand, John Conny, with his great riches,

could easily get the help of the most powerful people in Guinea to
3
fight his war for him.

Since the Wassas and their allies were heavily dependent upon

the Dutch for the supply of guns and powder, Opoku* s first objective

1. WIC Vol.106 Lettter from Director-General Pieter Valckenier, Elmina,

dated 25 th October, 1724*
2. N.B.K.G. 82 Letter from H. Blenke, Sekondi, to Director-General
E. Earing, dated 24th Januaiy, 1715*
3. WIC 104 Letters from Director-General Willem Butler, dated 27th
March, and 6th July, 1719*
 -136-

was to secure the withdrawal of the Dutch frcsn the coalition* He

sent messengers to Elmina to negotiate with the Dutch on this head and,

since the Dutch were aware of theadvantages to he gained from friendly

relations with the Ashantis, they agreed on the terms proposed by the

Ashanti king. In July 1725> Director-General Pieter Valckenier

reported to his superiors at Amsterdam that, "we are pleased/to inform

you that, urged on by the powerful negro of Ashanti, we have been

•
ocmpelled to end the war against Jan Conny and to put an end to ou3/

quarrells with him. Poku has paid us 20 marks of gold to make good

our expenses incurred during the campaign, and he has also presented

us with a cloth said to be worth 50 bendos gold, although we believe

1
it is worth less*..." In addition, John Conny himself, presumably

acting under pressure from Ashanti, paid the Dutch 20 marks of gold,

16 Male slaves at 5 ozs. each, making 10 marks in all, and presented

2
the Dutch with a cloth valued at 12 marks, A ozs. of gold.

After the negotiations with thb Dutch had been completed,

Opoku Ware marched his troops on the Wassas. Early in 1726, the

Dutch reported that the "King of Ashanti is marching against the

Wassas", and that it was probable that he would also invade Akanny.

By May of the same year, the Wassa country had been rapidly overrun

and Intsiful, who had succeeded Intwan as the .chief of Wassa, fled

1. WIG Vol. 106 Letter from Director-General P. Valckenier, Elmina,

dated 11th July, 1725* In order to show his sincerity of purpose,
Opoku Ware also instructed the Ashanti traders to resort to Elmina
Castle for their goods and, in one day, the Dutch were able to
purchase one hundred slaves and J000 lb. worth of ivory.
2. WIC Vol. 106 Letter from Director-General P. Valckenier, Elmina,
dated 16th January, 1726.
 -137-

wit h a few of his people, and sought refuge in Abramboe, on the

north-western frontier of Fanti. The Ashantis pursued the fleeing

Wassas into the Twifo country, where they encamped pending the arrival

of reinforcements fran Ashanti. On the 20th of the same month, two

Ashanti war-lords, Anane and Apreko, were reported to have arrived in

Twifo at the head of 50*000 troops, and that they had assembled large

numbers of canoes with which to cross the river Pra for an invasion

of Abramboe, in order to capture the rebel Wassa chief.

The expected invasion of Abramboe did not come off, because

of the intervention of the Fantis, the Dutch and the English at Cape

Coast Castle. The Pant is were clearly opposed to an Ashanti occupation

of Abramboe, which was under their influence. Moreover, they must have

realised that if the Ashantis established thenselves in Abramboe, there

were bound to be conflicts between them and the Ashantis. But because

the Fantis were on good terms with the Ashantis, the former decided

to mediatee between the warring parties. On the 13th May, 1726, the

Brafo of Panti informed the Dutch factor at Kormantsi, Jacob Elet,

of their intentions, and added that they were arranging for a meeting

between Intsiful and representatives of the Ashanti king to take place

in Fetu. Elet comimnfcated this information to the Director-General

at Elmina, but because the Dutch were determined that reconciliation

1. WIC Vol. 106 Letter from Director-General Pieter Valckenier,

Elmina, dated 16th January, 1726.
M.B.K.G. 93 Letter from Jacob Elet, Kormantsi, to Director-General
Pieter Valckenier, dated 13th May, 1726, and Valckenier1s reply,
dated 15th May, 1726. Also ibid., Letter from J. Maes, Shama, to
Director-General Pieter Valckenier, dated 14th and 20th May, 1726.
The Ashanti troops were assisted by Twifo troops, led by Kodwo
Abbe Tekki.
 -138-

between Intsiful and Opoku should be achieved through their means,

they objected to the Fanti offer. Instead, Pieter Valckenier warned

the Fantis that if they did not want to have trouble with the

Ashantis, they should refrain from meddling in the Intsiful affair,

because, apart from the troops under Ananne and Apreko, Opoku also

intended to invade Abramboe with a large body of troops drawn from

1
Tekyiman and Aowin. The Fantis then informed the Dutch Director-

General that they were prepared to leave everything in his hands,

provided his efforts would bring about reconciliation between Intsiful

2
and his overlord.

The English at Cape Coast Castle, however, were opposed to

the Dutch being the sole mediators, because they feared that if the

Dutch succeeded, the Wassas would be in the interest of the Dutch,

it

and since the latter were on friendly terms with Ashanti, it meant

that the bulk of the trade on the west coast would go t o the Dutch.

The English therefore sent their chief broker, Thomas Ewusi, to

Abramboe, to warn Intsiful that if he went to Elmina, the Dutch would

hand him over to the Ashantis. Moreover, the English urged on the

Faiitis to mediate between the Wassas and the Ashantis, instead of

abandoning that responsibility to the Dutch. They then wrote to the

authorities in London to the same effect. In their reply, the Eoyal

African Company expressed concern about the continued existence of

1. N.B.K.G. 93 Letters from Jacob Elet, Kormantsi, to Director-General

Pieter Valckenier, Elmina, dated 13th, 14th and 20th May, 1726,
and Valckenier1s reply, dated 15th May, 1726.
2. N.B.^.G. 93 Letter fran Jacob Elet, Kormantsi, to Director General
Pieter Valckenier, dated 15th May,?1726.
The Aitch wanted the matter to be settled at Elmina, so they
made several attempts to get the Y/assa chief to go to Elmina
Castle for that purpose.
 -135-

tbe Ashanti and Wassa disputes, and regretted that the Dutch at

Elmina were reluctant to join the English in bringing about a

peaceful settlement of the affair. The Governor and his Council,

however, were congratulated on their unilateral efforts to bring about

peace, but, realising the Fanti involvement in the disputes, they

cmmmented thus on the Council^ intention to use the Fantis as mediators

*....and as for making the Fantis the mediators between the Ashantis

and the waterside natives, though it were better that the peace of

the country should be re-established by their means than not at all;

yet we cannot but think that if peace cmuld be obtained by any other

means, the Fantis are the last that either of the Companies should
i
employ as mediators in such an affair".

In the light of all this, the Ashanti and Wassa disputes

persisted for more than four years until Intsiful, probably realising

that he must be his own saviour, made his peace with the Ashantis
■. 2
and returned to Waasa in October, 1730. It soon became clear, however,

that Opoku Ware was hot prepared to forgive a man who was not only

responsible for bringing trade on the west coast to a standstill, for

a number of years, but also had nearly brought about Ashanti and Fanti

conflict. In March, 1731* the Dutch reported that "at last the Ashantis

with whcm we have the biggest trade^ have defeated the notorious king

of Wassa, Intuffer; his whole country is ruined and he himself has

1. WIC Vol. 107 Letters from Director General Robert Norre, Elmina,
dated 11th April, 1727* and 14th April, 1728.
T 70/54 Royal African Company to the Governor and Council of
Cape Coast Castle, dated 33st December, 1730.
2. WIC Vol. 109 Letter from DirectorGeneral Jan Pranger, EMna,
dated 30th October, 1730.
 -140-

fled to some other country; so that this great obstacle which has

given us so much trouble and who was the cause of the decline of
1
our trade, has been removed". The Dutch should have been more

tenperate in their jubilation over the misfortune of Intsiful, because

his second flight from Wassa was not followed by a revival of trade

on the west coast. Intsiful depopulated his country, moved closer

to the Fanti border, and occupied certain "impregnable passes", so

that all inland traders, including the Ashantis, were completely barred

from reaching the western forts. Moreover, he entered into an

offensive and defensive alliance with the Fantis and other small

states, apparently with the connivance of the English at Cape Coast

2
Castle. Indeed, the activities of Intsiful and his following so

affected the Dutch trade that Jan Pranger, the Director-General,

believed that his death would be the only solution to the problem,

and he schemed to bring that about. He sent for the kings of Aguafo

and Fetu to come to Elmina to discuss the possibility of attacking the

Abramboes and killing Intsiful. His messengers, hew ever, returned to

say that the kings could not cane because they had sworn an oath to

1. WIC Vol. 109 Letter from Director General Jan Pranger, Elmina,
dated 1st March, 1731*
2. WIC Vol. 109 Letter from Director General Jan Pranger, Elmina,
dated 11th August, 1731 •
John Hippisley, "On the necessity of erecting a fort at Cape
Appolonia", in Essays. (London, 1764)* PP*52-54»
A manuscript copy of Hippisley* s essays is in WIC Vol. 116,
ff. 1181-1236.
The Dutch tried to get Intsiful to go to Elmina Castle again,
so as to assist him to resolye his differences with the Ashantis.
But, again, their efforts were frustrated by the English chief
broker, Thomas Ewusi.
 -141-

-j
assist Intsiful "against anybody who will attack him". The English

were also unable to find a solution to the Ashanti and Wassa problem,

and they again referred the matter to London. The Royal African

Company pointed out that it was regrettable that "the Dutch still

continue so obstinate, as not to join with you heartily therein. One

would think they had long enough pursued that old, destructive and

chymerical scheme, of thinking by their bribery and underhand cunning

with the natives to engross the whole trade of the coast to themselves

to be tired of the same". The G-overnor and his Council were enjoined

to observe "an exact neutrality" with all parties, and not to "embarque

in any of their quarrels upon any account, but to be ready to

interpose by your good offices for restoring peace and friendship

amongst them because the natives are very sensible people and know
2
their own interest as well as the Dutch do theirs".

It is clear, then, that since the Ashantis were engaged in

a protracted war with the Wassas, they could not actively participate

in the coalition against the Akwamus. The availabe': evidence suggests,

however, that they co-operated with the Akyems, who had the motive and

were free to fight the Akwamus. In 1727> there were strong rumours in

the Dutch forts that the Akyems intended to purchase Ashanti neutrality

1. WIC Vol. 109 Letters from Director-General Jan Pranger., Elmina,

dated 11th August, 1731 > 3rd April, 1732, and 21st March, 1733*
2. T 70/54 Royal African Company, African House, London, to
Governor John Braithwaite, 17th June, 1731 •
T 70/1470 A Description of the Castles Ports and Settlements
belonging to the Royal African Company of England on the
Gold Coast of Africa and at Whydah, dated ? September, 1737«
Ashanti-Wassa disputes remained unresolved long after the
death of Opoku Y/are.
 -142-

before launching a new offensive against Akwamu. Roemer gives a

much fuller account. He states that when the Akyems decided to

attack the Akwamus, they sent messengers to Opoku Ware promising

him 500 slaves if he would assure them that the Ashantis would not

invade their country in their absence. Opoku agreed to the Akyem

proposition, but allowed them only five months within which to

finish the campaign. Roemer, who was apparently aware of the

Ashanti and Akwamu alliance, explained foffj this unusual: behaviour

of Opoku by saying that the Ashanti king did not believe that the

Akyems could 11ruin so considerable a nation like Akwamu", and that

Opoku1s read motive was to find a casus belli;for declaring war

2
on Akyem. This was certainly a plausible explanation, but, in spite

of his knowledge of internal decay in Akwamu, Roemer.did not know

that the relationship between Ashanti and Akwamu had deteriorated in

such a way that the former secretly desired thehumiliation of the

latter. Whatever credence maybe given toRoemer*sinterpretation

of Opoku* s action, the significant point was that when war broke out,

in 1730, between Akyem and Akwamu, Ashanti did nothing tohelp her ally.

A minor incident occurred at Accra which sparked off Akyem

and Akwamu conflicts. In 1728, Otting, a cousin' of the Akwamuhene*

who was staying in the Dutch fort, was murdered by one ofthe Dutch

Acer as. The Dutch say that Otting died accidentally fromthe wounds

1. I. Wilks, M.A. Thesis, op.cit., p.80.

2. Roemer, 1760, op.cit., p.153*.
According to the same source, the Akyems sent the 500
slaves to the Ashanti king after the defeat of the Akwamus.
 -143-

inflie ted by one of his own slaves in the fort. The Akwamus, however,

believed that the Dutch factor at Accra, de la Plangue, was privy to

the murder, therefore they demanded that La Planque should pay a

compensation of 2000 bendas gold. Ansa Kwao threatened that if the

Dutch refused to pay the compensation asked for, he would march his
1
troops on the Dutch Accras, defeat them, and demolish Dutch Crevecoeur.

According to the Danish Governor-General at Christiansborg Castle, de

la Planque not only refused to comply with the Akwamuhene*s request,

but also he said that he would rather spend the money in buying guns
2
and powder with which to fight the Akwamus. Ansa Kwao thereupon

marched his troops into Dutch Accra on February 1728, and beleaguered

the Dutch fort for more than five weeks, but failed to take the fort
3
because of the stout defence put bp by de la Planque and his men.

These developments at Accra seriously hampered trade, and

both' the Dutch Director-General, Jan Pranger, and John Braithwaite,

the English Governor of Cape Coast Castle, decided to mediate between

the hostile parties. The Akwamus agreed to the terms of peace and,

on the 28th Kary, 1730, Braithvaite wrote to London that "my good offices

were so acceptable to the Accras and the Aquamboes between whom I made

the inclosed articles of peace.••.that I received a very gratefull

acknowledgement from both partys and presents in all to the value of

1. WIC VOL. 108 Letter from Director-General Robert Norre, Elmina,

dated 14th April, 1728.
Ibid., Letter from Director-General Jan Pranger, Elmina, dated
16th April, 1730.
2. WIC V61.108 Letter from Governor A.P. Y/aeroe, Christiansborg Castje,
Accra, to Director-General Jan Pranger, Elmina, dated 25th Karch,
1730.
The available evidence suggests that de la Planque, in fact,
/ instigated his chief broker, Amu, and his people, to revolt
against Akwamu rule.
3. WIC Vols.108 and 109 Letter from Director-General Jan Pranger,
Elmina, dated 16th April, and 9th'July, 1730
 -144-

1
£100...." In their reply, the Royal African Company expressed their

hope that the peace he had initiated would be preserved, and that

"the friendship established between you and the Dutch West India

Company will be maintained, according to Mr. Pranger, the General's,

declaration of his intentions to you, and that by your joint interest,

the ways may be opened into the inland countrys that a gcod trade may
2
be established in the forts and factories under your direction."

But the intervention of Braithwaite and Pranger brought only

a temporary peace, because of the activities of Amu and the Dutch

Accras. Amu and the Dutch Accras, as well as the Akwapims, retired

into Akyem and appealed to that traditional enemy of Akwamu for help.

The Akyems agreed, and, together with troops drawn from the Assin

country, they joined Amu's forces and invaded Akwamu. In July 1730,

the Dutch reported that there was heavy fighting between the Akwamus

and the allied forces, and they expressed the hope that the Akwamus

would--be defeated, and "their, wings clipped because they hinder the

passing of Akyem traders to the c o a s t T h e Danes say that the

Akyems and their allies were defeated in the first engagement, but

that the Akyems, taking advantage of the rainy season, started a new

offensive, and completely routed the Akwamus.^ Robert Cruickshank, a

member of the English Council of merchants, who was sent to Accra "to

1. T 70/4 Letter from John Braithwaite, Governor of Cape Coast Castle,

to the Royal African Company, dated 28th May, 1730.
2. T 70/54 Letter fran Royal African Company to Braithwaite, and
others, African House, London, dated 1st October, 1730.
3. WIC Vol. 109 Letter from Diredtor-General Jan Pranger, Elmina,
dated 9th July, 1730.
V.G.K. Letter from Governor A.P. Waroe, Christiansborg Castle,
24th December, 1730.
4. V.G.K. Letter from Governor A.P. Waroe, Christiansborg, Accra,
24th December, 1730.
 -145-

wait the event and secure the Company’s interest", also reported that

the Akyems were "becoming intire conquerors"* The Governor of Cape

Coast Castle,immediately ordered Cruickshank to treat with the victors,

and on the 30th November, 1730, the report was that messengers sent

by Thomas Ewusi, the English chief broker, had been introduced to

the "King of Arcania and Carboshiers and by them to the King of Achim".

The Danes, who had hitherto supported the Akwamus, were surprised at

the unexpected defeat of their allies, but because they wanted to

share in the Akyem trade, they hurriedly sent presents to the Akyem

chiefs.^

The Akyem conquest of Akwamu in 1730, was one of the major

developments in the country during the eighteenth century. The event

was described by contemporaries as the greatest revolution that had

taken place in that part of the world since the Akwamus themselves

destroyed the old Accra kingdom in the late seventeenth century.^ The

Akwamus were pushed across the river Volta, and the whole western half

of the Akwamu enpire was reconstituted into the modem state of Akyem

Abuakwa. The Akyems also created the state of Akwapim out of the

Aburis, Berekusos and the Lartehs, the majority of whom were Guan- and

Kyerepong-speaking peoples. Ofori Dua, an Akyem war-lord, and a

member of the Akyem Abuakwa foyal family, was appointed the Qmanhene

1. T 70/7 Letters from Governor of Cape Coast Castle to the Royal

African Company, entry dated 22nd October, 1730.
The messengers were instructed to inform the Akyem "King of
the impositions of the Dutch" and the Akyems, after expressing
their resentment, sent trade to the English fort. See ibid.,
entry dated 3 0 th November, 1730.
2. V.G.K. Letter from Governor A.P. Waroe, to Directors, dated
28th December, 1730.
3. Ibid.
of the new state. He located his capital at Amanprobi and his

followers founded the important Akwapim towns of Akropong and

1
Amanokurom. Also, Owusu Akyem, a sister* s son of Ba Kwante, the

Oman hene of Abuakwa, and Commander of the Abuakwa forces, replaced

Amega as the administrator of the Adangme area, including the hill

peoples of Krobo. Further more, although the Accra peoples decisively

contributed to the general effort to defeat the Akwamus, they did not

recover their independence. Instead, the two Akyem chiefs, Frimpong

Manso, of Kotoku, and Ba Kwante, proceeded to divide authority over

Accra. Frimpong Manso became the overlord of the Osu district, in

which stood Danish Christiansborg Castle. Ba Kwante had charge of the

2
Accra townships in which stood Dutch Crevecoeur and English James Fort.

Thus the Akyems, like the Akwamus before them, received ground rents

from the three European settlements, and thereby secured a permanent,

regular means of purchasing muskets, and powder, which were essential

for their political and economic expansion.

This rapid and somewhat unexpected build-up of Akyem power

greatly alarmed the Ashantis. It has been indicated that the Ashantis

had apparently condoned and connived at the disaster which befell the

Akwamus. But it was certainly the case that they did not envisage the

1. Ivor Wilks, M.A. Thesis, op.cit.; B.F. Akuffo, Ahemfi Adesua.

(1950), p.VIII.
Reifldorf, His tory, pp.87-88. Reindorf calls him ”Prince Safori"3
By this act, the Akyems forged a strong link between themselves
and the Guan-Kyerepong speaking peeples of Akwapim, which was
to last until the present day.
2. V.G.K. Letters from Governor A.P. Waroe, Christiansborg Castle,
Accra, dated 24th and 28th December, 1730; and 27th September, 1731*
Roemer, 1760, op.cit., pp.158-9.
Also, Biorns Beretning om de Danske For ter og Negerier, 1788,
(ed. Prof. Eriderik Thaarup), "p.203.
 -In­

complete break-up of Akwamu power. Since the Ashantis were still

engaged in a protracted war with the Wassas and their allies, it was

clear that the political balance in the Gold Coast hinterland was

tilted in favour of the Akyems, The consternation in Ashanti must

have been very great, since it was known that the rebel Wassa chief,

Intsiful, had been to Akyem, presumably to talk the Akyems into

1
joining the coalition against Ashanti.

In the circumstances, Ashanti could not react immediately

to the successes of the Akyems* Nevertheless, their hostile

intentions became clear even before the Akwamu conquest had been

completed. As early as December, 1730, the Danes expressed their hope

that trade at Accra would flourish since the Akwamus had been ruined.

The report added, however, that this would only be possible if the

Akyems were spared an attack by the Ashantis, "who are stronger than
2
the Akims*1. The Dutch also believed that the Akyems refused to sell

the Akwamu prisoners because they feared An attack by Ashanti, and

3
that they hoped to use the captured Akwamus against the Ashantis.

The Ashantis need not have been unduly worried about Akyem

military strength, because, soon after the common purpose had been

achieved, the Kotoku and Abuakwa coalition began to disintegrate. It

1. WIC Vol. 109 Letter from Director general Jan Pranger, Elmina,
dated 1st March, 1731 • An Akyem-Wassa coalition meant that
the two states could effectively control the trade routes through
their countries, and thereby completely cut off the Ashantis
from their access to the coast.
2. V.G.K. Letter from Governor A.P. Waroe, Christiansborg Castle,
Accra, dated 24th December, 1730.
3. WIC Vol. 109 Letter from Director-General Jan Pranger, Elmina,
dated 1st March, 1731• Also,
V.G.K. Letter from A. P. Waroe, dated 28th December, 1730, and
Roemer, 1760, op.cit., p.160
 -1 48-

may be that a clash of personalities was one of the factors under­

lying their disputes* Frimpong Manso was a great warrior who

tempered his martial propensities with efficient internal administration*

Ba Kwante, on the other hand, was said to have been addicted to drink

and inefficient as a ruler. He was arbitrary in his rule, and he

extorted great sums from his people* Roemer regretted that Owusu

was not the Qmanhene of the Abuakwa state during that critical, period
1
in Akyem history. The real point of Conflict, however, appears to

have been connected with matters arising out of the Akwamu defeat.

It is clear that the Akyem Ahuakwas, and not the Kotokus,

gained greatly from the Akwamu defeat. The explanation for this would

seem to be that, contrary to what is generally supposed, it was the

2
Abuakwas who bore the brunt of the fighting. By fleeing across the

Volta, the Akwamus had sought refuge in the eastern half of their

empire, and there was the possibility of a revival of their power on

the coast, between Accra and the mouth of the Volta. It may be

supposed therefore that the Akyan chiefs must have disagreed as to

whether or not the war should be carried into that area. Akyem

Kotoku was nearer to Ashanti, and therefore open to attack from that

quarter, and Frimpong Manso was clearly not prepared to expose his

country, because of a campaign against the remnant Akwamus. The

Abuakwas, however, had occupied much of Akwamu country, and they must

have feared that a revival of Akwamu power could mean a reversal in

1. Roemer, 17&0, op.cit., p.181.

Reindorf, History* op.cit., pp.80.
2. See e.g. I. Wilks, M.A. Thesis, op.cit.
 -149-

their fortunes. The Abuakwas therefore were determined to dontinue

the war into the new Akwamu homeland. The Abuakwa fears were probably

increased by reports from Accra. In 1732, the Danes bought land at

G-reat Ningo to build a lodge on. Dutch attempts to get Owusu to

1
repudiate the transactions with the Danes were unsuccessful, so they

decided to work through their chief broker, Darko, and his people.

Having in mind the former do-ope rat ion between the Danes and the

Akwamus, the Accras allowed themselves to be persuaded by the Dutch

that the Danish fort was being built in order ttto assemble and cherish
2
the scattered Akwamus” . Darko and his people declared that ”the

Danish factor, Sparre, had not scrupled....to settle at Great Ningo

so that, in that way, he could give the Akwamus more help, who at that

time were still our enemies, the Accra peoples mortal enemies.

Since Darko and the Accras were in touch with the Akyems, it was not

surprising that, in November, of the same year, Owusu*s messengers were

in Accra to ask for recruits to help in the campaign against the

Akwamus.**' Early in 1735? Owusu*s troops crossed the Volta near the

coast, and encamped in the neighbourhood of Keta. By March, Owusu* s

1. On the building of Fort Fredensbag at Great Ningo by theDanes',

see e.g. V.G.K. Letter from Governor E.N.Boris, Christiansborg
Castle, Accra, dated 15th April, 1736. According to Boris, the
Dutch offered Owusu double the amount paid by the Danes in order
to stop the Danish fort being built, but Owusu refused.
2. WIC.Vol. 109 Letter from Director-General Jan Pranger, Elmina,
dated 3rd April, 1732.
3. WIC Vol. 110 Declaration of Darko and other Accra dhiefs made before
chief factor From, dated 25th April 1734; on the attack on Sparre
see also V.G.K. Letter from Sparre to Jan Pranger,dated 14th
February, 1732. In order to £et Sparre released, Ayi Kuma, the
leader of the Accras, demanded 300 bendas gold, but the Danes
promised to pay 100 bendas.
4. I. Wilks, K.A. Thesis, op.cit., p. 126 .
 - 150-

forces engaged the Akwamus on an island in the river Volta, and

i

| From, the Dutch factor at Keta, reported that no ivory could be

had on the coast because the Krepis, who brought it, were fleeing

before the advancing Akyems, Indeed, it may even be said that it

was because the Kotolcus refused to join the Abuakwas to fight the

war in the east, that Ba Kwante decided to acquire the ground rent

for Christiansborg Castje, which had hitherto been paid to Frimpong

Manso. The Abuakwa chief instructed the Danish Governor to make

the monthly payments to him instead of Frimpong Manso. In February,

i ^733, the Danes noted that they had advanced twenty-two months
I
[ ground rent to Ba Kwante because wFrempung has surrendered his
2
monthly custom to Banq Quantijn”. These events led to disturb­

ances in Akyem, and in Jujy 1737, it was reported that there had

I been little trade at Accra for the past four months, because of
I
[ a civil war between the Akyems - ”that is between Frempung’s and Bang’s

people” ?

Tha Abuakwa-Kotoku conflicts only lasted for a few months,

I
because, in the late months of 1737, rumours were current at Accra

that the Ashantis were preparing to invade Akyem* According.; to the

Dutch, Okaidza, a resident of Dutch A£cra, fled to Osu and, in alliance

with the Danish Governor, he sent one Patram to Akyem to tell Frimpung

1. WIC V©1.110 Letter from Bartram From, Keta, to Direct or-G-eneral

Jan Pranger, dated 17th February, and 18th March, 1735, and 27th
June, 1736.
2. V*G.K. Letters from G-overnor A.P. Waroe, Christiansborg Castle,
Accra, dated 19th February, 24th April, 1733, and 30th April, 1734#
3* V.G.K. Letters from Governor E.N. Boris, Christiansborg Castle,
Accra, dated 12th July, and 30th September, 1737*
 -151-

Manso, Ba Kwante and Owusu, that the Dutch Director-General, acting

through his chief broker, Darko, had bribed the Ashantis to

exterminate the Akyems by force of arms. The Dutch denied any

knowledge of this affair, and they sent messengers to Akyem to inform

the Akyem chiefs that the story had been put up by Okaidza and the

Danes to discredit the Dutch. The Dutch envoys returned with

representatives fi’om Akyem, and a great meeting was held at the Dutch

fort to discover the truth in the matter. Okaidza and Patram were

found guilty of starting false rumours, and because Okaidza was

the originator of it all, he was fined 70 "bendas, or 70 marks 4ozs.

gold. Okaidza, however, could not pay this vast amount, therefore

he surrendered several members of his family as hostages to the Dutch

pending payment. The Danes confirm this story in its essentials,

although they deny any knowledge of having been in alliance with

Okaidza. They say that Okaidza was ill-treated in the Dutch fort, and

that that was why he fled to Osu, and subsequently had the Akyems '
2
informed of what the Dutch and the Ashantis were planning to do. The

truth of this matter, however, appears to have been that, after the

overthrow of Akwamu, the effective control of Accra affairs passed into

the hands of the Accra residents, and not the Akyema. In particular,

the descendants of the Accra king, Okai Koi, who had been killed by the

Akwamus in 1677, contested the supremacy in the Accra area with Darko,

1. Dutch accounts of this episode are contained in WIG Vol.Ill Letters

from Director-General De Bordes, dated 14th April, 1738.
2. V.G.K. Letter from Governor E.N. Boris, Christiansborg Castle,
Accra, dated 30th September, 1737» The Danes say that the man
sent to Akyem was walled Tettiara.
 -152-

the son of Amu, who was regarded as an Akwamu. The most prominent

of Okai Koi1s descendants were Ayi Kuma and his son and successor

Okaidza. In 1738, ancl 1739, there were several minor battles between

Okaidza*s people, with Danish support, and Darko*s people, assisted

by the Dutch. In December, 1737, for example, Darko and his people

attacked the followers of Okaidza, and their expressed purpose was

**to get Okaidza* s head**. Okaidza managed to escape to Osu, and sought

refuge in the Danish fort there. Darko*s people pursued the enemy

and attacked the people of Osu. The Danish fort opened fire on the

invaders, wounding and killing several of them. On the following

day, the Danish Governor told the Osu people that they shoud not

entertain Okaidza and his people in their town, otherwise they would

have trouble with the Dutch. The Osu people said that they, as well

as the Labadis, and the Teshi peoples, regarded Okaidza as **the

rightful Accra chief”, and that Darko was a slave*s son, and a puppet
1 ••

of the wbiteman.

In spite of Dutch efforts to clear themselves of Okaidza* s

charge against them, the Akyems remained convinced that they were

intriguing with the Ashantis to destroy them. Apart from the

persistence of the rumours reaching the coast, the Akyems were also

aware that they themselves had been able to defeat Akwamu largely

because of the assistance in money and firearms provided by de la Planque,

the Dutch factor at Accra at that time. Purthenmore, an event occurred

in the region east of Accra which must have increased the Akyem fear of

1. V.G.K. Letter from Governor E.N. Boris, dated 3rd May, 1738.
Also, I. Y/ilks, ”Akwamu and Otublohum.. , in Africa. October,
1959 , op.cit.
 -153-

an imminent Ashanti invasion of their country. In July 1737, a

Dahomey army marched through Little Popo to Keta, seized the Dutch

lodge there after a siege of several days, and captured, and later
1
on executed, Prom, the Dutch factor. The report of this event

which reached Accra indicated that the Dahomeans were assembling

canoes preparatory to conssing the Volta to campaign In the west.

Director-General De Bordes, who was at Accra &t that time, commented

thus, ”it now seems dear that these Dahomeans intend only to kill

and rob, and are to be regarded a® nothing but barbarians. Therefore,

we shall do all we can to overthrow them. Our belief, which is not

without foundation, is that since the Akwamus are living in close

co-operation with this marauder, the object is to defeat the Accras

and then to make war upon the Akims so that the Akwamus may settle

again in free possession of their country”. De Bordes also indicated

that the Ashantis were involved in the Dahcmean-Akwamu plot to

attack Akyem and the Accras, and it should be remembered! thq.t, in

later years, Opoku Ware dedared that one of his reasons for attacking
2
the Akyems was to restore the Akwamus to their homeland.

1. V.G.K, Letters from Governor E.N. Boris, Christiansborg Castle,

Accra, dated 12th July, and 30th September, 1737*
WIC Vol. 111 Dedaration by J.J. Steimark, dated 4th December, 1737*
Bartram Prom was executed apparently for his previous attempts to
induce the Ashantis to attack the Dahomeans, Director-General Jan
Pranger, to whom Prom made the suggestion, thought ”his proposal to
bribe the Ashantis to fight the Dahomeans extraordinary, firstly,
because of the great distance separating the two states and, secondly,
because it will not be possible to bring it about for a cost less
than 500 marks of gold, expenses which the Company cannot afford”.
See WIC Vo.109- Copy of Jan Pranger* s letter, dated 9th August, 1732.
2. WIC Vol.111 Letter from Director-General De Bordes, Accra, dated
21st July, 1737•
T 70/l515 Letter from Richard Graves, Cape Coast Castle, dated
3rd April, 1742.
 -154-

In view of these developments, the Akyems took a number of

defensive measures. Firstly, Owusu moved his troops into the Dutch

Accra area, and beleaguered the Dutch fort for several months. All

traders from the interior were forbidden to trade with the Dutch, and

a strict watch was kept on theiirade routes. This precipitated a sharp

decline in Dutch trade at Accra, and messengers were sent to Ba Kwante

and Frimpong Manso to effect a peaceful settlement. The two Akyem

chiefs were won over, and Owusu was instructed to mare his troops into

the Lower Volta area, presumably to check the revival of Akwamu power

in that area. In March 1740, the Danes reported that Owusu1s army

had encamped in Akwapim, and that he was preparing to leave for the

east with a big army; in May, that the Accras, as well as the peoples

of Labadi, Teshi and Ningo, had joined Owusu* s forces; and in August,

that heavy fighting was going on between the Akyems and the peoples
1
living in the Lower Volta Area. Secondly, the Akyems entered into

an alliance with the Wassas and the Fantis in order to control the

trade routes effectively* and thereby prevent the Ashantis from

receiving firearms from the coast. The eastern Fantis and the Agonas,

who apparently resisted Akyem pressure to be drawn into the alliance,

were attacked by thb Akyems. The Akyems invaded Agona, and defeated

the combined forces of the eastern Fantis and the Agonas. Menuan,

described by the Danes as **the great Fanti market town”, was razed

to the ground. The Fantis and the Agonas retaliated by robbing and

1. V.G.K. Letters from E. N. Boris, and P.M. Jorgensen, Christiansborg

Castle, Accra, datfcd 3rd March, 23rd May, 3rd August, 1740.
T 70/1515 Letter ffcan Richard Graves, Cape Coast Castle, dated
3rd April, 1742
 -155-

seizing small parties of Akyem traders who travelled to Y/inneba

and Senya Bereku and Ba Kwante declared that in future, the Akyem

traders would be escorted down by a body of troops# The Akyems,

however, were not affected by the destruction of the market at

Agona, because the bulk of their trade at that time, went to Accra.

In November 1738, for example, the Danes purchased from the Kotokus
2
about 1,400 rix dollars worth of gold. On the west coast, the

western Fantis and the Wassas proved loyal to the Akyems. The

Yfassas marched to Sekondi, where the people were known to have traded

with the Ashantis. They attacked the town and demolished the Dutch

and English lodges there.^ The Fantis also assembled between

30,000 and 40,000 troops, and laid siege to Elmina, whose people were

known to act in the Ashanti interest. The Elminas were completely

cut off from their supply of victuals, and anybody who ventured out
4.
of town was seized and sold into slaveiy.

1.. V.G.K. Letters from Governor E.N. Boris,Christiansborg Castle, Accra,

dated 6th October, 1738, and 27th April, 1739*
T 70/1470 A Description of the Castles Forts etc., op.cit.
N.B.K.G. 103 Letter from Kuyl, Bereku, to Director-General De Bordes,
dated 17th September, 1738.
2. V.G.K. Letter from Governor E.N. Boris, Christiansborg Castle, Accra,
dated 28th November, 1738.
3* V.G.K. Letter from Governor E.N. Boris, Christiansborg Castle, Accra,
dated 13 th February, 1740.
WIC Vol. 111 Letter signed by F. Bavonius, CommercialSecretary,
Elmina, dated 30th April, 1740.
4-. V.G.K. Letter from Governor E.N. Boris, Christiansborg Castle, Accra,
dated 15th February, 1740.
Y/IC Vol. 111 Letter from P.B. Verschaeven, Elmina, dd 24th Nov. 1739*
The Elminas must have been in great distress, because, according to
the Danes, the Fantis were assisted by the Director-General, De.
Bordes. He provided the Fantis not only with brandy and powder,
but also a sum of 26,000 rix dollars, and promised to contribute
further to the expenses which the Fantis might incur during the
campaign. The Dutch say that De Bordes was angry with the Elminas
because they disobeyed his instructions to attack the Aguafo peoples.
 -156-

Xt is clear, then, that in the late 1730*s the situation on

the Gold Coast was one of unsettlement and apprehension, arising out

of an expected Ashanti invasion of allied territories. Apart from

the desire to have free and uninterrupted access to the coastal

trading settlements, Opoku Ware's chief concern was clearly to redress

the political and economic balance in the Gold Coast interior. Early

in 1740, conflicting reports of the situation in the interior kept

reaching Accra. Some said that the Akyems had withdrawn into their

own country in order to plant their corn. Others said that there was

consternation in Akyem because the Akyems had been informed that the

Ashantis were preparing to march, and it was unknown whether they

intended to attack them, or whether they would go to the western district

to relieve the Elminas, who were besieged by the Fantis. Moreover,

in 174-1, the Akwamus were boasting that Opoku Ware of Afehanti would
2
give them Accra as a present after defeating the Akyems, In the

light of all this, the Akyems made haste to purchase large quantities

of firearms. The Danes, far example, sold about 6000 pounds of powder,
z
2000 pieces of flint, and 6,800 ankers of Danish brandy.

The Ashanti invasion of Akyem, however, was timed to take

place when the Akyems were in a serious predicament. In the summer of

1741, Frimpong Manso, the great Kotoku warrior king, died, and the

Ashantis apparently without waiiting;for his funeral customs to be

1. V.G.K. Letter from E.N. Boris, Christiansborg Castle, Accra,

dated 15 th February, 1740.
2. I. Wilks, M.A. Thesis, op.cit., p. 127. In anticipation of
the Ashanti invasion, the Akwamus were said to be lying in
the bush around Accra, and seizing everyone they could, so
that "the Accra people were obliged to go armed whenever
they fetched water".
5. V.G.K. Letter frcm E.N. Boris, Christiansborg Castle, Accra,
dated 23 rd Kay, 1740.
 -157-

performed, invaded the enemy territory. The Akyems summoned the

Accras to join them, hut only a small section, led by Darko,

responded. With considerable optimism, the Akyems threatened

2
retribution as aoon as the Ashantis had been defeated. In January

and February, 1742, it was known at Accra that fighting had been

going on between the Ashantis and the Akyems.^ In March 1742, the

Akyems and their allies were completely defeated. Apau, the

Kotokuhene, Ba Kwante, and Owusu, were all slain.^ Darko fled into

the bush, but was betrayed by one of his guides, an Akwamu man,

described by the English as Darko* s "fetish boy*f. He fell into the

hands of an Akwamu chief, Popiwaa, who, despite Darko* s offer of one

hundred bendas of gold for his life, had him beheaded. Popiwaa

justified his action by saying that Darko "should pay for what his

father had done, who was the chief instrument of killing the Quomboe

1* Roemer, 17^0, op. cit., p. 181. Also V.G.K. Letter from Governor P.N.
Jorgensen, Christiansborg Castle, Accra, dated 2nd April, 1742.
Frimpong Manso was succeeded by Apau, who was killed during the
Ashanti invasion.
2. N.B.K.G. 105 Letter from Kuijl, Accra, dated 5th December, 1741*
3. V.G.K. Letter from Governor P.N. Jorgensen, Accra, dated 2nd
April, 1742.
T 70/1515 Letter from R. Graves, Cape Coast Castle, dated 3rd
April, 1742.
The Akyems must have gained some earlier successes. See V.G.K.
P.N. Jorgensen*s letter dated 5th December, 1741•
4« On the Ashanti defeat of Akyem, see, for example,
WIC Vol. 113, better from van Kuyll, Accra, to Director-General
Jacob de Petersen, dated the 18th March, 1742, and ibid., copy
of the minute of the Dutch Council at JJlmina, dated 22nd
March, 1742.
T 70/1515 Letter from R. Graves, Cape fioast Castle, Accra,
dated 3rd April, 1742.
V.G.K. P.N. Jorgensen*s letter dated,2nd April, 1742.
Roemer, 17&0, p.159«
count ry** •

The Ashanti army encamped in the Abuakwa country for same

time but , in April 1742, they moved in the direction of Accra. In

May, they were on the outskirts of the town, but they did not enter

it. Instead, they moved into the area between Accra and the mouth

of the Volta, and attacked Great Ningo, Teshi and Labadi. Then they

entered Accra and demanded monetary compensation from the Europeans

for their harbouring refugees in their forts. The Danes paid 110

bendas. The Dutch, however, had to pay 200bendas because they had

, allowed their chief broker, Darko, "to go with his people to Akim to
2
join the Akims to fight against the Ashantis"•

The defeat of Akyem left the Ashantis the dominant political

and economic power in the Gold Coast interior. The Ashantis annexed

parts of Akyem and Kwa^iu, and they declared their overlorship over

Akwapim, Adangme and Accra. The European traders hurried to

congratulate Opoku on his great conquest, and confirmed him in his

dominion over Accra by granting him the payment of the ground rent for

their forts there.^ The Ashanti^ however, did not appoint

1. T 70/1515 Letter from R. Graves, Cape Caast Castle, dated

3rd April, 1742.
I. Wilks, "Akwamu and Otublohum.. , in Africa. October, 1959*
op.cit. Wilks* account of Darko*s death is misleading.
Darko did not flee to Akwamu, as he suggest, but he was
captured during the war in Akyem.
2. V.G.K. Letter from G. Dorph, Accra, dated 11th July, 1743»
T 70/1515 Richard Graves* letter dated 3rd April, 1742.
3• The Danes and the English paid 32 rix dollars and £8 per
month respectively. The Day Books of all the Companies are
full of such payments. In 1757, for example, the English
paid "Cuishee King of Ashantee his Ground Rent at £8 per
month far January 15 th, 175^ to 15th January 1757”, in trade goods.
T 70/975 Letter from James Whyte, James Fort, Accra;
Accra Day Book; Accomts for January and February, 1757*
 -159-

administrators to govern the Accras and the Adangnes as the Akyems

and the Akwamus had done. Instead, Opoku Ware continued Osei Tutu's

policy of ruling the distant conquered states through their own

chiefs. For instance, two years after their defeat, the Danes

reported that Pobi succeeded Ba Kwante, Akradua succeeded Owusu,

and Boronni succeeded Apau as the Kotokuhene. The Ashantis were

satisfied to make the Akyems, the Akwapims, the Adangmes and the

Accras tribute-paying vassals, and to rely on the undamaged economic

and military resources of these peoples* But this unenlightened

policy, as we have noted, had one fundamental defect: it enabled

the conquered states to regain power quickly, and to revolt whenever

the opportunity offered itself. For instance, socn after their defeat,

the Akyems could threaten that they would never dllow trade to go to

Danish Christiansborg, because apart from failing to help them, the

Danes did not even send messengers fcf condolence to them after they
2
had been defeated.

Perhaps an interesting development, resulting from the Akyem

defeat, was the new relationship bwtween Ashanti and Akwamu* Admittedly

Akwamu, unlike Akyem, was not a conquered state. Indeed, it was

largely because of Ashanti threats to invade Akyem in the 1730*s that

Akwamu power revived on the coast between Accra and the river Volta.

After the Akyem defeat, however, Opoku Ware made clear his intentions

of making Akwamu a dependent ally. Akwonno, who ruled Akwamu until

1. V.G.K. Diary Book kept in Guinea from 3rd February, 1744, to

31st December, 1745; entry by J. Billsen, dated 4th April, 1744*
2. V.G.K. Ibid., entry by J. Billsen, dated 21st July, 1744*
 -160-

1744, was treated by the Ashanti king as one of his divisional

chiefs. He accompanied Opoku1s messengers on a number of occasions

1
to collect ground rents for the forts at Accra. In 1744, however,

Opoku definitely asserted his overlordship over Akwamu. Roemer

t

gives a detailed account of the events leading to the enstoolment

of the Akwamuhene, Opoku Kuma, which clearly demonstrates the new

Ashanti policy towards.Akwamu. He notes that one of the prisoners

captured during the Akyem war was a member of the Akwamu royal family.

Yfhen the identity of this Akwamu nobleman was made known, Opoku Y/are

agreed to restore him to the Akwamus, so as to be made king, on

condition that he took the name of Opoku Akoa, Opoku* s subject.

Opoku complied with the king's request, and returned to Akwamu. As

soon as be became the Akwamuhene, he changed his name to Opoku Kuma,

Opoku the younger. Opoku Ware felt cheated, and he decided to

punish the Akwamuhene for disobeying him. Opoku Akoa explained his

action by saying that he would lose the respect of his pecple if he

retained the name given to him in Ashanti. After prolonged negotiations,

it was finally settled that the Akwamuhene might purchase the name for
2
one hundred slaves, which he did. Surely the substance behind

Roemer*s story was the formal assertion of Ashantils overlordship over

Akwamu, though the latter did not become a tribute-paying vassal at that

time. Indeed, in the same year, Opoku emphasized his claim by

3
demanding Akwamu troops to assist him in a campaign against his enemies.

1. V.G.K. Ibid., entry by J. Billsen, dated 22nd July, 1744*

2. Roemer, 17&0, op.cit., pp.214-5*
Reindorf, History, op.cit., pp.82-83•
"Akoa" could also mean a slave.
3. See pj. \C>% below.
 Furthermore, Darko, OpolairKuma1s successor, did not repudiate

the claims of the As bant is • Indeed, it might he, as Wilks suggests,

that Darko realised that in its weakened state, Akwamu could benefit

from Ashanti protection; economic, and not military, recovery had to

1
be the prime consideration• In that case, the new relationship proved

advantageous to both sides. For example, in the late 1740’s it was

largely through Akwamu assistance that Ashanti traders were able to

2
reach the coast to trade with the Europeans. On the other hand,

Darko, under Ashanti protection, was able to govern Akwamu well. It is

said that he gave his people "many and good laws", and it was through

the constructive policies that he pursued, that Akwamu was able to

establish her domination over parts of Kwawu and Osudoku, countries

3
that had slipped from Akwamu control after the collapse in 1730.

In 1744, therefore, Opoku Ware pursued a policy which ensured that

Akwamu, which had been largely responsible for the consolidation and

rise of Ashanti, should be drawn into that very empire which Osei

Tutu had created. By the early nineteenth century, the process had

been so complete that Dupuis could write that Ashanti had extended

her frontiers to incorporate as provinces with the empire Accra,

Akwapim, and the Adangmes "whilst Aquambo, the only existing kingdom

in that quarter worthy the title, wourted the conqueror’s alliance,

and was received into protection as a confederate of the empire".^

1. I. Wilks, li.A. Thesis, opjcit., p. 140.

2. See pp. r/C'~ f7 ( below.
3* Binrns Beretning om Danske For ter og Negerier paa G-uinea Kysten.
1788 , op.cit., pp.211 -2 .
.
I. Y/ilks, 11 A. Thesis, op.cit., p.141*
4» Dupuis, Journal.....in Ashantee, 1824, op.cit., p.234*
 — 162-

After the defeat of Akyem, it was widely believed that the

Ashantis would invade the Fanti and the Wassa countries. The

confusion and apprehensions caused by the persistence of the rumours

of an Ashanti invasion must have been greatly increased when it was

learnt that the Ashantis had assembled about 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 men ready to

1
march to the coast. The allied states made elaborate preparations

to resist the Ashantis. A decree was proclaimed making it a capital

offence for anybody to trade with the Ashantis in muskets and powder;

the trading paths were closed and a strict watch kept to detect would-

be breakers of the law. Besides, the Fantisand the Wassas and their
2
allies embarked upon massive military preparations. In fact, the

situation on the coast was so serious that the English believed that

if the Ashanti invasion.materialised, and they became the conquerors,

2
it would change the "Plan of Politicks" in that part of the world.

The expected Ashanti irruptions into the west coast did not

take place, however, because, in the late months of 1744 and early

1745, the Ashanti army moved north and invaded G-onja and Kong. Some

Danish messengers were in Ashanti during this period, and they were

1. V.G-.K. Diary Book kept at Christiansborg Castle, Accra, op.cit.,

entry by J. Billsen, dated 4th April, 1744*
The gigure of 400,000 was certainly an exaggeration. Nevertheless,
in 1817, Bowdich was told in Kumasi that Ashanti proper could
raise 204,000 fighting men. On this particular occasion, Roemer
says each of the three Akyem chiefs supplied 10,000 men each, and
Akwamu provided 3 0 0 .
Bowdich, 1819, op.cit., p.
Roemer, 1760, p.218.
2. C.O. 388/44 Extractcf a letter from Cape Coast Castle to Captain
Pocock, Commander of H.M.S. Sutherland, dated 27th November, 1745*
M. Priestley, "The Ashanti Question and the British", in Journal
African History. II, 1, (1961), p.49*
 -163-

made to accompany the Ashanti army, apparently to y/atch how the

Ashantis conducted their campaign* Their report was summarised by

Roemer, and since this was the first contemporary account of Ashanti*s

thrust to the north from written sources, it is worthwhile quoting

in full: fl*.,.for twenty-one days they inarched through the bush and

across rivers, which sometimes hindered them, until they came to a

wilderness where neither grass nor a single straw was to be seen;

then for fourteen days they had to wade through sands and sometimes

the army went for two days without water. For as long as they had

been in the bush they had eaten fruits, roots and game, and had

lacked nothing; in the wilderness, however, maiywent hungry. At

last, they came to a flat land, where they found people living in

towns and villages (Opoku had among his people many who had travelled

to this land and traded there). The Ashantis surprised them and took

them prisoner. They advanced further still, and came to a large

town in which Opoku and his 300,000 men encamped; the inhabitants

all having left the town. Opoku’s army, however, only occupied a

small part of the town, from which they concluded that more people

lived there than in the whole of Ashanti. The Ashanti traders

informed their king that he would pass through many such towns before

he came to the capital city of the king. They found an abundance of

victuals, cows, sheep, goats, fowl and horses. Of the latter there

were so many that Opoku provided a thousand of his men with them, and

thereby obtained a force of cavalry.

He sent these riders out to obtain information about the

whereabouts of the ensny* They did not return, however, and, according
 -164-

to the statements of a few prisoners of that nation whom they took,

all were slain. It was also reported that the Ashantis were opposed

by a large number of horsemen. This nation had the Turkish religion,

and we have received many Arabic books in Accra which the Ashantis

had taken from the town mentioned. They also took some Hoar’s prisoner,

who had come to trade in this country without doubt from Barbary,

whereof two Moors yet live in Ashanti.

The Ashantis remained for a whole month in this town, and

Opoku feared to advance farther; at last Opoku’s enemies appeared,

and surrounded the 7/hole town with a very large army. The Ashantis

were thereupon forced to throw themselves against the enemy, which

they did with considerable losses; the horses became frightened by

the shooting (of muskets), since these horsemen have no guns but lances

or spears and sabres. And so the Ashanti army retired, surrounded by

cavalry, straight across the wilderness into the Ashanti bush. Thus

ended this war for Opoku, who considers himself the greatest king

in the world; he had indeed got some hundreds of prisoners and

horses, etc., but he And his allies had lost over 40,000 in the

v/ilderness, including one of our messengers who died of starvation#

This campaign took eijht months and each of the allies returned his

own country again, and on Opoku* s orders must hasten to a new war
1
which should be against the Fantis." Roemer did not mention the

name of the country, but merely asserts that it was "the mighty nation

1# Roemer, 1760, pp.218-22.

On the figure of 300,000 see p^. above, note
 -165-

which lies north-east of Ashanti". A Gonja chronicle, apparently of

late eighteenth century origin, puts the matter succintly: "At

the end of this year, AH 1157 (1744^5 AD) the infidels entered the

country of Gonja, and the Gonja knew them as, Imho (Ashanti). They

also invaded Gwong (Kong?) and the people of Gwong took to flight,

in the month of Dhul-hijja, the month of prayer..."

By 1745, then, Ashanti was not only the dominant political

power, hut also the chief source of gold, slaves and ivory in the

Gold Coast hinterland. This latter point is worthy of note, because

some historians have tended to think that Ashanti "was not notably

a nation of traders". Bowdich, for example, wrote, "they are as

little commercial as the Komans were in their infancy, and their

government 7/ould repress rather than countenance the inclination

(believing no state can he aggrandized hut by conquest) lest their

genius for war might.be enervated by it, and lest, either from the

merchants increasing to a body too formidable for their wishes to

be resisted, too artful from their experience to be detected, they

mi^it sacrifice the national honour and ambition to their avarice, and

furnishing Inta, Dagwumba or any of their more powerful neighbours

(who have yielded to circumstances rather than force) with guns and

powder (which are never allowed to be exported from Ashantee), break

1. Roemer, 1760, p.218.

2. Jack Goody, The Ethnography of the Northern Territories of the Gold
Coast, West of the White Volta^ (Colonial Office, .1954).Appendix IV.
Bowdich, (p.330j, states that the Ashanti invaded Da^omba during
the reign of Opoku Ware. Undoubtedly, Ashanti must have had some
influence in the Dagomba even before Opoku* s reign. The invasion
of 174J|/5> however, appear to have been against Gonja and Kong.
 -166-

the spell of their conquests and undermine their power” • The

available evidence suggests that this assertion in untenable. It

is interesting that the thrust to the north followed hard upon the

defeat of Akyem. Both Tilleman and Roemer assert that the gold
2
mines in Akyem were worked by slave labour. Since the Akyem
3
country was almost depopulated in the war of 1742, one may conjecture

that the Ashantis invaded Gonja and Kong partly to get slaves to

sell to the Europeans on the coast, and partly to secure sufficient

manpower to work the Akyem gold pits. Moreover, the Ashanti

authorities never discouraged the people from engaging in commerce.

Rattray has clearly shown that Oommerce was one of the major

preoccupations of the Ashantis, and that all the chiefs, including

the Asantehene, had people who did their trading for them.^ In

April 1715> the English factor at Kommenda reported the arrival of

"sundry Ashantee traders and caboceers who are designed for Cape

Coast. They have sent most of their slaves and teeth (ivory)

along with the General's boy by way of Abrimboe. But they have great

quantity of gold, some slaves and teeth with them here which they

1. I. Wilks, The Northern Factor in Ashanti History. (Gloucester)

1961, p.18.
Bowdich, 1819, op.cit., p*335»
2. Eric Tilleman, En liden enfoldip; beretning om det landskabs
Guinea 1697, op.cit., p.116.-
Roemer, 1760, p.166.
3* According to Roemer, the devastation in the Akyem country was such
that two years after the war, the oldest man in Akyem was not more
40 years old. This was pbbably an exaggeration, but it was
not unlikely.
4. T 7 0 /1 4 6 4 £ailliefs Kommenda Diary, with Accounts entry dated
22nd April, 1713 • Among the Ashanti traders were ”one of the
King*s wives, and his son”.
Rattray, 1929, op.cit. ^
 -167-

1
would have me buy in expectation of great price than at Cape Coast.”

Besides, there were Ashanti chiefs v/ho established their trading

head-quarters in some of the coastal states. For example, Antibene,

described as an ”Ashantee Caboceer”, had his permanent residence in

the Aguafo country, where he conducted his trade with the Europeans

at Elmina, Shama, and Kommenda. Also, in February 1729* the Dutch

reported that Bafo, an “Ashanti chief who provided them y/ith plenty

of trade goods in slaves, gold and ivory, had been killed by poison,

and that this had led to disturbances in Ashanti, and thereby badly
2
affected trade.

- The incursion into Gonja and Kong territories was the last

military campaign which Opoku Ware undertook against his external

enemies. During the last few years of his reigp, he was chiefly

occupied with the internal administration of his kingdom. The first

notable act he did was to send twelve young men and two girls to the

Dutch at Elmina, and to request the Director-Genera], Jacob de

Petersen, to send them to Holland to be taught reading, writing and

music. De Petersen thought that the expense involved was too great,

since Opoku only provided ten elephant tusks to pay far the children’s

education. He therefore decided not to send them to Europe, but to

put them to the school at Elmina. De Petersen then had the Asantehene

informed of his decision. Opoku was willing that the Ashanti children

attended the local school, but he asked de Petersen to use the elephant

tusks in ordering a coffin with a glass head-end for him. The king

1. Ibid.
2. WIC Vol. 108 Letter from Director-General Robert Norre, Elmina,
dated 27th February, 1729*
 -168-

also asked the Dutch to allow another young Ashanti man called

Gyakye to travel to Holland to bring back the coffin. The Director-

General agreed to this latter request, and wrote to his superiorsin

Holland to the same effect. The Directors approved of de Petersen’s

actions, and they undertook to send the king's coffin without freight

charges. However, they stressed that the children should be taught

1
the rudiments of Christianity. Opoku* s second, and perhaps most

important act, was his attempt to strengthen the Ashanti monarchy at

the expense of the Kumasi chiefs.

It has been pointed out that the Ashanti kings deliberately

augmented the powers of the Kumasi chiefs to balance the might of the

outlying chiefs, with their dangerous, separatist tendencies. Bowdich

noted that "every subject state was placed under the immediate care

of an Ashantee chief, generally resident in the capital, who seldom

visited it, but to receive the tribute from the native ruler, for whose
2
conduct he was in a reasonable degree responsible." The addition

of so many new provinces to the kingdom must have greatly increased

the powers of the chiefs, and Opoku, it seems, attempted to curtail

their power in the provinces. This brought about disturbances in

Ashanti. In August 1746, the Danes reported that there were "great

1. \WIG Vol.925 Letters from Director-General Jacob de Petersen,

| Elmina, dated 1st May and 31st October, 1744; 1st July and j'
/ 30th November, 1745•
2y P.L. Bartels, "Jacobus Eliza Capitein, 1717-1747% in Trans.
Hist>3oc.Ghana. Vol.IV, pt.1, p.8. Jacje {(jyakye?) • Gyakye
was not one of the children sent to ^Imina to be educated as
Bartels says, but was sent oto Europe specifically to collect
the king* s coffin.
2. Bowdich, 1819, op.cit., p.235.
 -169-

disputes in the Ashanti country”, and they expressed the fear that
1
the quarrels might lead to civil war. In the early nineteenth

century, Dupuis was informed in Kumasi that the Kumasi chiefs revolted,

and Opoku fled his palace and sought refuge with his kinsman, the

Dwabenhene. At Dwaben, he received the support of some of the

Divisional Chiefs to bring back the rebel chiefs to obedience. After

a series of battles the rebels were defeated, and Opoku reoccupied

his capital. He pardoned the rebel leaders, and allowed them to

return to Kumasi, but only on condition that they accepted /the

i
\
2
limitations on their power.

These disturbances in Ashanti had immediate repercussions in

the distant provinces. In September 1746, the report from

Christiansborg Castle was that the Akyems had left their country and

that some had retired into the Fanti Country, and others to Kwabo

and Popo. In January 1747, it was known at Accra that the Akyems

had entered into an alliance with the Fantis, the Wassas and other
3
coastal peoples to fi&ht the Ashantis. By 1749, the Denkyeras and

the Twifos had joined the Fantis and their allies.^

Nevertheless, in spite of the determination of the Fantis,

the Y/assas, the Denkyrras, the Twifos and the Akyems to cut off the

Ashantis from the coast, and thereby prevent them frco having access

to firearms, Ashanti traders managed to reach the coast east of Accra.

1* V.G-.K. Letters from Joast Platfues, L.F. Roemer and Hachenberg,

Christiansborg Castle, Accra, dated 20th August, 1746.
2. Dupuis, 1824, op.cit., p.
3. V.G-.K. Letters from J. Platfues, Roemer and Hachenberg, dated 9th
September, 17^6 and 18th January 1747* Ihe Akyems who moved eastwards
of Accra attacked the Akwamus on an island in the river Volta.
4* V.Gr.K. Letter from J. Platfues, Roemer and Carl Engnan, Christiansborg
Castle, Accra, dated 26 th November, 1749*
 -170-

The Ashantis shunned the more direct and shorter trade routes, through

Wassa and Akyem, and used the longer, hut safer, route along the

Kwawu scarp, across the Afram plains and so into the Krepi and Akwamu

countries. There, they were escorted to the European forts at

Prampram, Great Ningo, Pani and Accra by Akwamu middlemen. In 1748,

for example, the Danes reported that, accompanied by Akwamu middlemen,

2000 Ashanti traders arrived at Great Ningo with slaves, gold and

ivory. At Cape Coast, the English also wrote, 11there is not an ackie

of gold or any teeth (ivory) to be bought on any part of this coast,

or slaves to windward of Winneba, but there is considerable trade at

Accra by the Ashantees opening a path to that place” .^

At the Coast, however, the tribulations of the Ashantis did

not come to an end. Hippisley noted that the journey through Krepi

and Akwamu ”takes them at least three weeks to perform and is

otherwise very inconvenient from the mountainous and marshy ways.

They also receive such ill treatment from the Aquamboes, v/ho will not

suffer them to trade with the Europeans, but on condition of being

their brokers, at commissions little short of forty per cent; and lose

such numbers of slaves in so long a journey, that of late years they

have less and less been inclined to pursue so tedious, troublemcme

2
and dangerous trade.” Roemer gives a much fuller account: ”It is

ridiculous”, he wrote, ”to see how the Ashanti Kotoko, (great Ashantis,

as they call themselves) are cheated by the few Akwamus, and not only

1. T 70/1315 Extract of a letter from John Roberts and others to

Henry Sascilles, Cape Coast Castle, dated 4th February, 1749*
2. John Hippisley, Essays, in WIC Vol.116, op.cit.
 -171-

in trade; for instance, an Akwamu chief who might come to us with

fifty Ashanti will usually sell half a score of them before they return.

He makes the Ashantis believe that the place where^ they are going to on

the coast is peculiarly dangerous because of sea-devils, which some­

times come on to the land, and take back people with thep. to the sea”.

In this way, a number of Ashanti traders were subsequently lured away

from their friends, seized and, later, sold as slaves. The Akwamus

then "return to the other Ashanti traders, deploring the fact that

they had not been able to overpower the sea-devils, who were too

strong for them; and although they had fought with them and pursued

them to the beach, the sea-devils had carried off some Akwamus and
1
Ashantis'*. Since the Kumasi chiefs were disgruntled as a resultof

Opoku* s abridgement of their powers, the Ashanti king could not adopt

a forward policy towards the allied states. Nor cbuld the European

traders get the Fantis and the Wassas as well as the Akyans to open

the trade routes and to reconcile with the Ashantis* According to

Roemer, the Dutch at Elmina whose trade was badly affected by the

closure of the western trade routes, spent large sums of money to

induce the Wassas and Fantis to come to terms with the Ashantis,
2
but all to no purpose.

This was the situation at the end of the first half of the

eighteenth century on the Gold Coast, when Opoku Ware died. Danish

1. Roemer, 1760, op.cit., pp.224”5*

I. V/ilks, M.A. Thesis, op.cit.
2. Roemer, 1760, p.223*
 -172-

and Dutch reports of May 1750, suggest that the event occurred earlier

in that year. This seems to he confirmed by an entry in an Arabic

chronicle, apparently of late eighteenth century origin, which records

the death of "Muliki Asanti", the king of Ashanti, in A.E.1163, early

in the Christian year 1750* The report continues tt.... may God durse

him, may He take his soul and cast it into the fire. He it was who

troubled the people of Gonja; continually and at all times did h©

trouble them. He seized their possessions. Yfhatever he wished, bo he

2
did, for he was all powerful in his rule”.

Opoku Ware was clearly one of the greatest, if not the

greatest, of the eighteenth century Ashanti kings. Surely the Ashanti

kingdom was not his creation, but it was he who prevented the Ashanti

union from dissolving into its component parts after the great disaster

in 1717. Indeed, the thirty years of Opoku* s rule were chiefly con­

cerned with the consolidation of the power of the kingdom, and with

a vigorous expansion into neighbouring territories, culminating in the

invasion of Gonja and Kong in 1744“5* Under him, Denkyera, Twifo,

Aowin, Akyem, Wassa, Akwapim, the Ac eras and the Adangmes became

tribute-paying vassals of Ashanti. Moreover, the Ashantis became

the ground landlords of Accra, and thereby received the regular stipends

from the European forte which enabled them to acquire firearms in

1. V.G-.K. Letters from Governor Joost Platfues, and others, Christiansbcrg

Castle,'"Accra, dated 4th May, 10th August, and 17th December, 1750.
N.B.K.G. 111 Letters frcm Brumner, Acera, to Director-General Van
Voorst, Elmina, dated 3rd and 29th May, 1750.
Priestley and Wilks, in Journ.Afr.Hist. .1.1 (19^0), p.92.
2. Jack Goody, The Ethnography of the Northern Territories of the Gold
Coast, Tfest of the White Volta,''('Colonial'Office, 1954) Appendix IV.
 -173-

appreciable quantities, a necessary prerequisite for their political,

economic and military expansion* Koreover, Akwamu, though not a

conquered state, became a junior partner in the Ashanti-Akwamu

coalition, and the Akwamus, like the conquered state of Akyem, was

expected to provide the Asantehene with troops when required* In

fact, Opoku Y/are achieved one of the main objectives for which the

Ashanti state was created; Ashanti became the dominant political

and economic power in the G-old Coast hinterland, and therefore become

the chief source of the country*s gold, slave and ivory. Moreover,

he established, friedship with the European traders, especially the

Dutch, which was to have great significance during the second half

of the eighteenth century.

Nevertheless, Opoku*s achievements were a mixed blessing far

the Ashantis. Although the Ashantis had secured complete control of

the gold and slave resources in the interior, the revolt of the

Denkyerastthe Wassas, the Akyems and the Twifos almost made it

impossible for them to reap the full benefits arising therefrom. When

the Wassas and the Aiyems entered into an alliance with the powerful

coast Nantis, to prevent the Ashantis from reaching the coast, Opoku

T/are must have realised the futility of his career, since internal

difficulties made it impossible for him to destroy the powerful

combination against him.

Thus, after Opoku Ware*s death in 1750, Ashanti was saddled

with serious internal and external problems which needed all the

patience and tact of a statesman to resolve^, and it was against this

background that the achievements of his successor, Kusi Obodum, must

be seen.
 CHAPTER 17
ASHANTI, 1750-1764s The Years of Inaction?

Opoku Ware was succeeded by Kusi Obodum. Danish and

Dutch reports suggest that his enstoolment took place in the early

months of 1750* The accession of "Kayishi" (i.e. Kusi), is also

recorded for the same year in the Arabic chronicle already mentioned*

As we have pointed out, Kusi became the Asantehene at a most critical

period in Ashanti history, since the policies pursued by his

predecessor brought into existence a counter-balancing alliance

which controlled two of the major trade routes from Kumasi to the

coast. This led to stagnation of trade on the coast from Axim to

Winneba, because the Ashanti traders could only visit the European

settlements east of Accra, where they exchanged their gold, slaves

and ivory for guns, powder, brandy, knives, buttons, iron1bars, brass
2
basins and cowrie shells. Kusi's accession led to speculation on

the coast that the Ashantis would defeat the allies and reopen the

trade routes. This hope was not fulfilled, and the European traders

blamed the king for his people's inaction. The Dutch, for example,

4 . V.G-.K,Extract of letters from Guinea, Christiansborg Castle,

Accra, dated 4th May, 10th August, and 7th September, 1730*
WIC 490 Letters from Brumher, Accra, to Director-General
Van Voorst, Elmina, dated 8 th January, and 10th February, 1751*
j. Goody, The Ethnography of the Northern Territories of the
Gold Coast West of the White Volta, (Colonial Office.1954) Ano.
IV., op.cit.
M. Priestley and Wilks, "Ashanti Kings in the eighteenth century..",
in Journal African History. 1,1,(1960), pp*93“4*
2. V.G.K. Letter from Joost Platfues, and L.F. Roemer, Christiansborg
Castle, Accra, to Directors, dated 7th November, 1748.
70/30 Letter from Governor T. Melvil, Anomaboe, to the
Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa,
dated 30th October, 1754*
 -175-

not only described Kusi as an effeminate, lazy monarch, who was

addicted to drink, but also they accused him of being responsible

1
for the fact that the trade routes had been closed for so long#

These opinions have been repeated in almost all the printed works

on Ashanti. For instance, Brodie Cruickshank says that he had

difficulty in keeping the conquered states under subjection without

attempting any further expansion. Fuller also describes Kusi as

"an elderly mediocrity who left the business of governance to his

chiefs and advisers." Furthermore, Priestley and Wilks, in recent

articles on Ashanti, have endorsed these statements, adding that

2
Kusi was not a particularly forceful character.

This view of Obodum is misleading because it shows complete

lack of appreciation of the difficult political problems which he

had to deal with throughout the whole fourteen years of his reign.

It must be stressed that the main objective of the allied states was

to maintain their political and economic independence of Ashanti by

preserving a lucrative middleman interest in the inland trade and to

check any further expansion by cutting off the Ashantis from direct

access to supplies of firearms from the coast. Thus, unless the

1. Y/IG 114 Letter from Fiscal D.P. Erasmi, Elmina, to the

Assembly of the Ten, dated 1st May, 17&0.
WIC 113 Letter from Direct or-General J.P. T, Huydecooper,
Elmina, to the Assembly of the Ten.
2. Brodie Cruickshank, Eifthteen Years on the Gold Coast of Africa.
(London,1853)>P •52•
Sir Francis Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty.... 1921, op.cit.,p.31
11. Priestley and I. Wilks, "Ashanti Kings...", in Journ.Afr.
Hist.. 1,1, (1960),op.cit.
M. Priestley, "The Ashanti Question and the British: Eighteenth
Century Origins", Journ.Afr.Hist., 11, 1, (19&1), pp.41-42.
powerful alliance disintegrated, the Ashantis were clearly not in a

position to force their way down to the coast. Indeed, Director-

General Huydecooper summed up the matter neatly when he wrote, in

1764 , that as long as this alliance lasted, there was no hope of a

passage through from the interior, as the self-interest of the member-

1
states demanded the closing of the trade routes. Moreover, the

support which the powerful Fantis were known to have given the allies

must have deterred the Ashantis from making an irruption onto the coast.

Since Fanti involvement in the quarrels of the interior states event­

ually led to open conflicts with the Ashantis, during the reign of

Kusi* s successor, it is necessary to know who were the Fantis, and

how the events in the hinterland affected them.

The Fantis fall into two main groups; the B^rb^r Fantis

(i.e. The Aboras, Mankesims, Nkusukums and the Anomaboes) occupied

the western district of Fanti country, whereas the Ekumfies, Adjumakos

2
and the Gomuas occupied the eastern sector. It may be that, initially,

the effective political head of all the Fanti peoples was the King of

Abora. In 1715> for instance, the Brafo of Fanti called a meeting

of all the Fanti chiefs in his town, to consider an Akyem threat to

1

invade Fanti territory. The King of Abora refused to attend the meeting
rr
because, as a leading Fanti king, the meeting ought to be held in his

state. All the chiefs of Fanti agreed with the king, and the meeting

was held at Abora, in spite of the protests of the Brafo of

1. WIC 115 A letter from Diredtor-General J.P.T. Huydecooper,

Elmina, to the Assembly of the Ten, dated 15th October, 17&4*
2. According to some versions of Fanti traditional history, the
B^rbar Fantis were the "real" Fantis.
 -177-
1
Fanti* Moreover, Abora, the residence of the King of Abora, was widely

known as the political centre of the Fanti state. In 1752, for example,

the Britisji described Abora as the first town in Fanti for greatness,
2
and at least twice as big aa Anomabo. Nevertheless, it was clear that,

by the middle of the eighteenth century the King of Abora* s claim to

pre-eminence was more apparent that real, becausejthe Fanti state was

increasingly becoming an association of independent states. The

Governor of Cape Coast Castle, writing of the eastern Fantis in 1753>

noted that "The Accomfee Fantees and the Burabura Fan tees. •• .were

originally the same people, but now they have two Braffoes (or Stadt-

holders), and two sets of Curranteers (or Senators); they are neither

under the same circumstances in point of Union as the Switzers or

Grisons, nor as the United Provinces of Holland. I call their connexion

& federal union for want of a better expression; tis an union formed

on manners, customs and religion for they are under the same subjection

to the Father (of God) of Fantee as the Western Fantees are"

1* N.B.K.G.82 Letters from J. Visbeck, Kormantsi, to Director-General

H. Haring, dated 28th May, and 5th August, 1715*
Although the Brafo was the commander-in-chief of all the Fanti
armies, his powers seemed to have been very limited. Visbeck noted
that ’’the Brafo is dependent on the Caboceers of Abrah because
their power is bigger than that of the Braffo and all his elders ^
together”. The Brafo was elected from all the Fanti divisional
chiefs by turns for a limited period. In April, 17&8, Idun Kwegyir,
described as the Captain of Abora, was elected ”Captain General of
Fantee”. In the following month, Adoo "Principal Pynin of
Annamaboe” was elected ’’Braffoe of Fantee" •
2. C. 0. 388/45 Governor Thomas Melvil, Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee
of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 20th August,1752.
The Dutch records also provide plenty of evidence in the eighteenth
century to support the view that Abora was the political centre
of the Fantis.
3. T 70/30 Geo.Cockburne, Cape Coast Castle, to Committee of Merchants,
dd 14th March, 1753* During this period the English were enlisting
the support of all the Fantis to prevent the French from building a
fort on the coast. See e.g. J.N. Matson, "The French at Amoku" in
Transactions of the Gold Coast and Togoland Historical Society. 1,
Part 11, (Achimota, 1953)
 At th e b e g in n in g o f th e c e n tu r y , Bosman rem arked t h a t ” i f

the Fantyneans were not in perpetual civil divisions, the circumjacent

countries would soon find their power by the irruptions into their
1
territories” . By 1750* however, the Fantis, by means of threats,

intimidation, diplomacy, colonization, the use of their language, as

well as by force of arms, had brought the petty coastal states of

Aguafo, Fetu, Asebu and Agona into the Fanti federation. Thus the

Fantis came to exercise an influence over a coastal strip stretching

eastwards from the mouth of the river Fra near Shama to Senya Bereku,
2
a distance of more than 70 miles. Undoubtedly, there were political

reasons for Fanti expansion because they were bound to be involved in

the political developments of the time. The consolidation and rise

of the Ashanti kingdom, and the subsequent disintegration of the old

states of Denkyera, Wassa, Twifo, Akyem and Akwamu, must have decided

the Fantis to take measures to protect the territorial integrity of

s* . . .
their state. Since most of these states abandoned their territories

and established themselves closer to the Fanti border, the Fantis must

have realised that a conflict between them and the Ashantis was

inevitable, especially as they would be the last serious obstacle

blocking Ashanti1s line of access to the coast.It may besupposed

therefore, that the Fantis sought to dominate Aguafo, Abremboe, Fetu

1# Bosman, 1705, op.cit., p*56.

2. On the Fanti expansion in general, see e.g. T 70/31 W. Mutter, Gape
Gaast Castle, to the Committee of the Company of Merchants trading
to Africa, 10th January, 17&4* W. Bosman, 1705, pp.
H. Meredith, An Account of the Gold Coast of Africa, (London, 1812),
pp.55-6, 111-2 and 115; A.B. Ellis, A History of the Cold Coast,
(London,1893), PP.108-9; Claridge, 1915, op.cit., Vol.I, p.229;
Balmer, op.cit., pp. 7-S'- X.
 -179-

and Agona, so as to control more effectively the northwards movement

of firearms,**

Nevertheless, the fundamental factor underlying Fanti

expansion was economic* The Fantis, like the Ashantis in the interior,

responded to the new economic demands arising out of the development

of the trans-Atlantic trade. The Fantis were extremely active in

the coast trade in the eighteenth century. In 1727, for example,

the Banes reported that the Fantis were itinerant traders, who

travelled great distances to Ashanti, Akyem and Akwamu, with the

goods they had bought cheaply from the Europeans on the coast, and
2
sold them at exorbitant prices to the inland peoples. The Fanti

chief port of Anomabo was open to traders from all nations, including

interlopers. The Fantis levied customs duties on the ships which

entered into Anomabo roads, and they frequently ignored the protests

of the Governors of the trading Companies on the coast not to trade

with interlopers. In 1764, John Hippisley/ noted that the chiefs cf

/
the European forts would have wielded great influence on the coast had

not the Gold Coast trade beencarried on "almost entirely by the

Fantees, a people exceedingly intelligent and tenacious of their Rights;

in so much go that they would laugh in a person's face who should tell

them that by an Act of the English Parliament they have not the

1. All these coastal states had markets established on their northern

borders, w here they traded with the inland peoples. See e.g.
T 70/31 Letter ffcan Governor William Mutter, Cape Coast Castle,
to Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa,
dated 19th January, 17&4*
2. V.G.K. Letter from Governor A, Suhm, and Council, to Birectors
Christiansborg Castle, Accra, dated 5th March, 1727*
 180-

liberty to trade with whom they think proper" * The control of* the

markets at the northern borders of the Fanti country also enabled

the Fantis to become the most important of the middlemen, in the

coastal trade. In those places they exacted tolls from the inland

traders, and regulated trade patterns on the coast. The British

declared, in 1764* that trade was bad on the Gold Coast, because

"goods are more plenty; the Blacks are more knowing than they v/ere

in former times; Besides this, regular markets have been settled on

the borders of the Fantee country where the Warsaws, Akims and ri

several others keep up a constant intercourse between Ashantee and

2
Fantee country." Furthermore, the strip of coast from Shama to

Senya Bereku contained Dutch and English settlements, and since these

two nations were commercial rivals, the Fantis obviously sought this

area in order to profit from t heir dissensions.^ For political and

economic reasons, therefore, the Fantis were clearly opposed to

Ashanti1s expansion. Thus the Fantis were prepared to,support the

intervening states of Dehkyera, Akyem, Wassa and Twifo to resist

Ashanti*s advance. Thus, in 1753* when Intsiful, who had been a thorn

in the flesh of the Ashantis for so long, died, the Fantis met at Abora

and decided to send messengers to Wassa to &ell the Wassas "not to be

discouraged by the loss of their king, but to remain in the place where

1. John Hippisley, "On the Trade at the Forts on the Gold Coast", in
Essays. iS copy in 2 WIC 116 ff.1181-1236, op.cit.
Between 1737 and 17M* Governor Melvil noted that because Anomabo
was a free port, a male slave sold there at 10 ozs., i.e. £40 sterling.
T 70/30 Letter frco Governor Thomas Melvil, to the Committee of the
Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 17th March, 1755 •
2. T 70/31 Letter from Governor William Mutter, Cape Coast Castle,
to Committee of Merchants, dated 27th May, , 17^4*
3. W.E.F.Ward, 1958,op.cit.,p.143*
 -181-

they were, without making any overtures for an accommodation with

1
the Ashantees11.

Apart from the formidable character of the combination

against the Ashantis, the political situation in Ashanti itself

dtcring this peiiod was not conducive to the adoption of a forward

policy. Danish reports indicate that the preliminary to Kusi

Obodum* s reign was unsettlement and civil strife in the kingdom. f

^his

also had its origin in Opoku Ware*s attempts to strengthen the powers

of the monarchy at the expense of the Kumasi chiefs. We have

pointed out that Opoku, after defeating the rebels, allowed the leaders

to return to Kumasi on condition that they accepted the limitations

on their powers. In order to ensure the continuity of his policies,

*s

Opoku also appointed one Darko to succeed him. On his death, however,

the chiefs ignored Opoku* s request, and elected Kusi Obodum as the

Asantehene. In May 1750* the Danes reported that Ashanti had been

plunged into civil war because of succession disputes following the

death of Opoku Ware. In the following year, the report was that Kusi

was firmly established on the throne, and that Darko, who disputed
2
Kusi*s claim, had committed suicide. Kusi Obodum was obviously

elected king so as to repudiate Opoku*s internal reforms, and to rule

according to the tenets of the old constitution. Indeed, before long,

1. T 70/30 Diary or Narrative of transactions with the Fantees from

the Death of Intuffero, King of Warsaw, dated 23rd September, 1753*
IntsifuL is referred to in the English and Dutch records as
Intuffero, Intuffer, etc.
2. Roemer, 17&0, op.cit., p.
V.G.K. Letters from Guinea, Christiansborg Castle, Accra, dated
4th May, 10th August, 7th September, 1750; signed by Joost
Platfues, L. Engmann, and M. Svane.
Ibid., Letter from Joost Platfues and S. Engmann, Christiansborg
Castle, Accra, to Directors, dated 7th May, 1751*
 -182-

the Kumasi chiefs recovered most of their powers, so that, seme 70

years later, Dupuis could write, HKad it been practicable to have

given stability to the wise regulations of Sai Apoko (i.e. those

diminishing the power of the Kumasi Nsafohene), it is generally

believed by the Moslems that the empire of Ashantee, at this day,

would have "held a rank proportionate to several of the most powerful

monarchies inland. The accession of Kusi, however, did not end

the civil disobedience in Ashanti because Kusi was essentially the

nominee of a faction. In March, 1755* the English declared that

11the almost total destruction of Akim and Assin and the Civil Wars

in Ashantee have made those slaves which pass under the denomination of
2
Cormantcy very scarce and consequently very dear.” Moreover, Kusi

dared not leave Ashanti to campaign in foreign lands, for fear that the

disgruntled elements in his kingdom might destool him in his absence.

Indeed, in 1760, the Dutch reported that there was disunity in Ashanti

because most of the principal chiefs hated the king, and that they

were waiting for an opportunity to put "the young Zaay, son of the
3
famous Poku in his place11.

Therefore, it is clear that the political situation in the

country did not permit a policy of military expansion. In the circum­

stances, Kusi Obodum reversed the policy of his predecessors and made

1. J. Dupuis, Journal of a Residence in Ashantee, (London, 1824)>

opscit., p.
2. T 70/30 Letter from Governor Thomas Melvil, Cape Coast Castle, to
the Committee of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 17th March, 1755«
The Akanny country was definitely called wAssin county* after 1750.
3. WIC 114 Letter from J.P. T. Huydecopper, to Elmina, to the
Assembly of the Ten, dated 1st May, 1760.
 -183-

war, instead of diplomacy, the extreme limit of political action.

In fact, in pursuing this policy Kusi was responding to peace moves

emanating from the coast. Fanti trade, like that of Ashanti, was
1
greatly hampered by the stoppage of the trade routes. The Fantis

therefore decided to mediate between the Ashantis and the allied states.

In November, 1753* some Fanti ambassadors went to the allied camp

and succeeded in getting them to make peace with Ashanti. They then

sent messengers to Capt-Coast Castle to inform the Governor that they

had 11at last fixed the terms of peace between Ashantees and Warsaw"

and that the English should send a messenger to join them to go to

Ashanti so as "to gain credit to what they shall say and to show that

the English and the Fantees stand by one another". Governor Melvil

was not hopeful of the successful outcome of the missionto Ashanti,

but he acceeded to the request of the Fantis, because "the Fantees

are very eager after the Trade and promise to submit to any terms or

regulations I shall make for the security of the Ashantee traders".

A few days later, messengers from Wassa, Fanti, Akyem and "some lesser

Nations" arrived at Cape Coast Castle to join the Governor* s messenger

to go to Ashanti "whither they are going to swear to the peace and open

the paths"

Apart from the English and Fanti efforts at mediation, the

Dutch at Elmina also made strenuous efforts to settle the disputes between

1. Since the Ashai tis were not allowed to come to the West Coast,
Fanti traders had to go to Akwamu and Accra to trade withlhem.
See e.g. V.G.K. Letter from Carl Engmann, Christiansborg Castle,
Accra, to Directors, dated 3rd May, 1753*
2. T 70/30 Letters from Governor Thomas Melvil, Cape Coast Castle,
to the Committee of the Cfompany of Merchants trading to Africa,
dated 5th and 11th November, 1753*
 -184-

0
Ashanti and her tributary states. Between September 1754 and r' :

November 17^^ Director-General de Gietene and President Ulsen, sent

their chief brokers, Dwammo and Kofi Andafor, to the warring parties,
1
to try to settle the disputes. According to Dwummo and Andafor, the

allied chiefs who had encamped in the Ak&nny country, agreed to

reconcile with the Ashantis, and they sent their own messengers to join

them to go to Ashanti. When they arrived at the Ashanti court, Kusi

Obodum and his chiefs recounted the wrongs they had received from the

Wassas, the Akyems, the Denkyeras and the Twifos. In particular, the

king stressed that the main purpose of the allies was to destroy the

Ashanti kingdom; that important Ashanti ambassadors sent to them to

discuss peace had been imprisoned and finally executed, and that

against M the custom of all Negroes, the allies had taken prisoner
2
the Titje and finally executed him.” The King and his chiefs, however,

agreed to accept Dutch mediation, but the king declared that the

allies should pay him 1000 bendas of gold in order ” to put back his

sword with which he had sworn his people to fight, into its sheath.”

1. WIC 114 Helaas gedaandoer Djemoe dienaar van wylen de

Directeur-Generaal de G-ietene en Coffee Andafor dienaar
van den oud Praesident Ulsen behelvend hun wedervaaren,
en verrigtingen eerst uyt ordne van voornoemde Generaal
van September 1754 tot desselve er lyden op 24 October
1755* En laast uyt ordne van den laastgemelde KerEe oud
Praesident van January 175& tot heeden dat Zy retourneeren#
Also, T 70/30 Thomas Melvil, Cape Coast Castle, to Committee
of Merchants, dated 30th October, 1754. According to this
report the allies v/ere asked to pay 1600 ozs. of gold. The
Wassas were to pay 800 ozs., whereas the Denkyeras and the
Akyems had to pay 400 ozs. each. The Y/assas paid 400 ozs.
to Ikusi Obodum*s messengers, and promised to pay ”the other
Koitey when Say (the heir to the Stool) of Ashantee takes fetish
to observe what has been concluded.”
2. Titje, of course, i£ a court crier.
 -185-

After prolonged negotiations, the allied representatives agreed to

pay the sum, and the Asantehene then put forward his conditions

for peace# First, he demanded that the allied states should not

molest the Akannists, the Kwawus and the Sefwis, who were still

loyal to the Ashanti government# Second, that he had taken under his

protection parts of the countries of Akyem and Aowin, whose chiefs h

and people had asked for Ashanti* s protection, and that the allies

should leave these peoples to li/e in peace. Third, that Ashanti

traders should he allowed a free passage to the coast; that they

should he allowed to procure provisions on the Y^ay, and that if any

of the traders fell into debt, the matter should he referred to him

for restitution, instead of imprisoning the trader. Further, the king

asked that all r ehels, criminals and deserters, from bo th sides, should

he handed to their respective authorities without difficulty. Fifth,

that Agyerakwa, the cousin of late King Poku, who was given as a
h'
hostage to King P o M of Akyem, and v/as still retained by that king,

should he sent hack with all his dependents, and effects* Also,

the personal effects of Djan Frimpong, an Ashanti man who v/as killed

by the Wassas during the reign of King Opoku, and the golden headgear

of Kwakye, the herald v/ho died in a Y/assa prison, should all he

surrendered t© the Ashantis. Sixth, that Odupon, King of Twifo, should

refund to him the 20 Bandas gold which the late king Poku gave him to

buy gun-powder, hut which Odupon had misused. Seventh, that the allies

should decamp and leave the Akanny country within ten months, so that

the Akannists, v/ho had been driven away by them, should reoccupy their

territory in peace* Finally, the king swore before his chiefs that if

the allies failed to leave the Akanny oountry, he would declare war
 -186-

on them.

The Dutch messengers and the deputies from the allied states

as well as an Ashanti chief, Hensah, returned to the allied camp to

inform them of the king*s conditions for peace. As soon as they had

been told of them, the Y/assas, the Akyems, the Denkyeras and tlx Twifos

rejected the peace terms, and swore that since they did not want to

lose the money they had paid the king, they would not rest until they

had destroyed the Ashanti kingdom by force of arms# The allied

objection stemmed from two main reasons. Firstly, they said that they

had been wronged by the Akannists and, though they had expected the

Ashantis to champion the cause of the Akannists, they had also hoped

that the Ashanti king would have induced the Akannists to give them

satisfaction# Secondly, they considered that the ten months within

which they were expected to leave the Akanny country were not enough

since they had to retire into their own country in good order. The

Dutch messengers persuaded the allied chiefs to send representatives

to Elmina to discuss the matter with the Director-General, so that the

latter could induce the Ashanti king to modify his peace terms, but
1
the allied chiefs rejected the offer, and the negotiations broke down#

It Y/as not surprising that the Europeans and the Fantis failed

to reconcile tha Ashantis and their enemies, and to reopen the trade

routes# The messages were heard, presents received, and premises

1# The Dutch messengers returned to Elmina with gifts from

Kusi, ,fAkjaanba”, the Queen Mother, Safo Katanka, the
Mamponghene, and Odanquah, the Dwabenhene, to President
Ulsen. Except Akjaanba, who sent a beautiful piece of
Kente cloth, all the chiefs sent slaves to Ulsen#
sometimes given, but all to no purpose. Governor William Mutter

of Cape Coast Castle attributed this to "the greedy, avaricious

and villainous disposition of the natives which puts out of every

white man’s power to keep up a free and uninterrupted intercourse

with the inland countries". But, as Hippisley rightly points out,

the animosity between the Ashantis and the Wassas, for example,

"is so strong and has subsisted ao many years," that it seemed

impossible a reconciliation would ever take place. The Ashantis

would certainly revenge the indignities they had suffered at the

hands of their tributaries. The allied states, on the other hand,

were determined to end their political and economic dependence on

Ashanti.^

By 1758, then, the political pattern on the Gold Coast

was no different from the situation in 1750* when Kusi Obodum

became the Asantehene. Indeed, the situation was ever more serious,

because the allies were convinced that their disputes with Ashanti

could only terminate in war. They therefore embarked upon massive

military preparations. The Wassas, the Denkyeras and the Twifos

bought large quantities of guns and powder on the west coast, and

prevented any Ashanti trader from reaching the European settlements

2 1
in that area. In the east, the Akyems induced the Kr&bos to join

them in harassing the Ashantis. The Akyems and the Krabos not only

1* T 70/31 Letter from W. Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, to the

Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa,
dated 27 th May, 17&4*
John Hippisley, "On the Necessity of,Erecting a Fort at
Cape Appolonia", in Essays, op.cit., pp.53-54*
2. WIC 114 Letter frcsn Director-General J.P.T. Euydecooper,
Elmina, to the Assembly of the Ten, dated 6th August, 17^0.
 -188-

effectively controlled the trade routes through their cwn

countries, but also they seized Ashanti traders who used the

paths through Alcwamu, and either killed or sold them to the

slavers on the coast. In 1764, the report from Cape Coast Castle

was that "the trade which is brought to Accra comes mostly from

Aquamboe on the River Volta. But as the path from that place to

Accra lies near the Crabo Hills which are inhabited by 700 or

800 lawless Banditti, they seize on the traders with impunity

whenever they please, and that puts a stop to all trade till matters

are compromised".^

Because the Ashantis were almost cut off from the coast,

the European traders believed that they would definitely declare war

on the allied states, and push their way to the coast. This did

not happen, and the Dutch Director-General, Huydecooper, declared

that an invasion of the allied territory would never take place so

long as Kusi Obodum lived, because he hated war. The Dutch believed

that what would make the Ashantis invade the coast was the death or
2
destoolment of King Kusi. Thus it was with considerable optimism

that they reported, on 3rd August 1760, that Adu Gyamera, described

as "the General of all Ashanti and a pretender to the throne", had

3
instigated the overthrow of the king.

1. WIC 114 Letter from J.P.T.Huydecooper, Elmina, to the

Assembly of the Ten, dated 27th February, 1760.
T 70/31 William Mutter to the Committee, dated 10th January, 1764^
2. WIC 114 Letter from J.B. T. Huydecooper, Elmina, to the
Assembly of the Ten, dated 1st May, 1760.
3f WIC 115 Letter from D.P. Erasmi to the
dated 3rd August, 1760*
 -189-

It was clear, however, that Kusi Obodum was biding his

time, because there were definite signs, soon after peace negotiations

had broken down in 1758, that the coalition against Ashanti was

disintegrating. Firstly, the Fantis were clearly disappointed when

their efforts at mediation failed, because the stoppage of the trade

routes affected their trade as much as it did Ashanti trade. Fanti

traders who travelled through Accra to Akwamu to trade with the

Ashantis and other inland traders, were seriously hampered by the

Akyems. In 1760, for example, James Whyte, the English factor at

Accra, entertained wthe Curranteers and messengers of all Fantee,

i
i

| Cape Coast, etc., who came to give the Accras fetish that they should

protect their trading men who were passing to and fro betwixt Fantee
1
and Aquamboe from the Akims”• On the west coast, too, the Wassas

j and the Twifos were making it difficult for Fanti traders to trade
j

with the Ashantis in their market towns in Aguafo and Abramboe.

Because the Wassas were aware that the Fantis were secretly sending

firearms through Abramboe country to Ashanti, Asare Abr mpa, described

as wcaptain-general of Wassa”, suddenly marched about 3000 troops

into Abramboe, sacked a number of villages and took 300 people

prisoner, whan they sold as slaves on the coast. The Dutch also
i

quoted Asare as saying that he intended to invade the Aguafo, and the

3 .T 70/976 Accra Day Books, September to October, 1760,

entry for 26£h October, 1760.
James Whyte, the factor at Accra, spent £2. 10. 0 on
drinks for the Fanti messengers.
 -190-

1
Fetu countries# As soon as the Fantis learnt of the Wassa attack

on Abramboe, they held a great meeting at Abora, and sifter prolonged

discussions, they decided to send messengers to Governor William

Mutter at Cape Coast Castle, to ask him to supply them with guns and

gun-pcwder "for the defence of their country, and for them to go and
2
fight the Warsaws in Abremboen. Thus, frustration in the commercial

field, coupled with the fact that Fanti was only indirectly involved

in Ashanti*s disputes with her tributary states, decided the Fantis

to make friendly overtures to the Ashantis. The eventual outcome

of this was that between 1759 and 1760, Ashanti and Fanti had reached

an agreement to attack the Wassas and their allies at an opportune

3
moment#

Apart from the withdrawal of Fanti support, there were

dissensions in the allied camp itself. It appears that the invasion

1. WIC 115 Letter from Director-General D.P# Erasmi, Elmina,

to the Assembly of the Ten, dated 22nd March, 1761#
T 70/31 Letters from Governor W# Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, to
the Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa,
dated 15th October, 1760, and 10th January, 1764*
T 70/69 Letter from the Committee of Merchants, London, to
Governor W. Mutter and Council, dated 15th October, 1764#
2. ADM 1/3810 Extract of a letter from Governor William Mutter
to the Committee, dated 15th October, 1760.
WIC 114 Letter from Director-General J.P.T. Huydecooper,
Elmina, to the Assembly of the Ten, dated 27th February, 1760.
WIC 115 Letter fran D.P. Erasmi, Elmina, to the Assembly
of the Ten, dated 22nd March, 1761.
3# T 70/30 Governor Nassau Senior, Cape Coast Castle, to the
Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
25th September, 1759, and 3rd Febnuajy, 1760#
Ibid#, William Mutter, Cppe Coast Castle, to the same, dated
15th October, 1760#
WIC 115 Director-General D#P# Erasmi, Elmina, to the Assembly
of the Ten, dated 22nd March, 1761#
 -191-

of Abramboe was planned and executed on the orders of Asare

Abr mpa, without the consent of Enimir, the Wassa king. Since

Enimir had apparently no intention of antagonising the powerful

Fantis, he must have quarrelled with his canmander-in-chief. The

result of the feud between the two chiefs led to serious disturbances

in Y/assa, and Asare enlisted the support of other chiefs to destool

Enimir. The king was arrested, put in irons, and would have been

executed had not the Twifos and other V/assa chiefs, who were still

loyal to the king, freed him, Asare and his supporters were defeated,

and the rebel leader fled to Akyem Abuakwa, and sought refuge with

Pobi, the Abuakwahene. Enimir thereupon applied to Pobi for the

return of Asare in order to be tried for treason. Pobi, who

apparently believed that the Wassa General had acted in the best

interest of the allies, refused to send Asare back to YYassa• This

led to disputes between Enimir and Pobi, and it was widely believed
’■ 1 ''

that the Wassas and the Akyems would fight each other. Secondly,

there were disputes between the Denkyeras and the other members of

the alliance. It is related that Owusu Bori, the king of Denkyera,

suggested at a meeting of the allied states, that the allies should

reopen negotiations with the Ashantis, because the continued existence

of the disputes was detrimental to the economic interests of both

sides. The Wassas, Akyems and Twifos immediately suspected Owusu Bori

1. T 70/31 Governor W. Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee

of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 27th May,
1764 . Copy of Mutter* s letter is also in ADM 1/3810.
WIC 115 Director-General J.P.T. Huydecooper, Elmina, to
the Assembly of the Ten.
”of carrying on a correspondence privately with Ashantee and of

abandoning his own country in order to assist the Ashantees in

destroying the other nations in alliance with them....” The allies

therefore determined to attack Denkyera, destool Owusu Bori, and to

replace him with a pliant member of the Denkyera royal family. When

Owusu got wind of this, he marched his troops into the allied camp

under cover of darkness, killed many of the allied troops, and took

large numbers prisoner. Owusu then fled with his supporters to

Ashanti, where he signed a separate peace treaty with Ashanti, and

promised to help the Ashantis in defeating the Wassas, the Akyems

1
and the Twifos.

It was in early 17&4, however, that the Ashantis felt able

to invade the allied territory. This was because the Akyems invited

the Yoruba state of Oyo to assist them against Ashanti at that

time. Oyo, like Ashanti, was a great slave-trading state in the

2
interior, which had been expanding at the expense of.her neighbours.

During this period, Oyo had expanded westwards, and had established

her dominion over the powerful Dahomey peoples. It would seem that

Oyo was jealous of the rapid build-up of Ashanti power, and therefore

must have seen in the rebellion of Ashanti's tributary states, an

opportunity to break up Ashanti power. Dupuis was informed in Ashanti

1. WIC 116 Director-General J.P. T. Huydecooper, Slmina,

to the Assembly of the Ten, dated 29th December, 17&4*
T 70/31 Governor W. Mutter to the Committee of the Company
of the Merchants trading to Africa, dated 25 th January, 17&5*
Ousabody (Owusu Bori?)
2. On Oyo see e.g. J.D. Page. An Introduction to, the History of
West Africa, (London, 193^5> pp.88-91* J.D. Page, ’’States
of the Guinea Forest”, in The Dawn of African History, ed.
R. Oliver, (London,196 1),pp.70-74
 -193-

that, during the reign of king Kusi, "the caboceers of Bouromy,

Quahou and Akim were instigated to take up arms by the intrigues

9

of the court of Dahomey whose monarch received them into pay, and

promised to support them with an army for the. restoration of their

1
original government. " hat ever the case may have been, the

Ashanti king obviously considered the intervention of Oyo serious

enough, and Dankwa, the Dwabenhene, was detailed to attack the

Akyems, and their allies. In a series of battles Akyem resistance

was overcome, king Pobi of Abuakwa fled with a handful of his

followers, and the Ashanti troops crossed theriver Volta to meet

the Oyos. The Ashanti and the Oyo forces met, and a bloody battle

ensued. The battle raged for a whole day, but the outcome was

indecisive, and the battle-worn Ashanti troops decided to retire.

Cdanquah and his troops fell into an ambuscade, and they were all
v
killed. In Hay 1764* report from Cape Coast Castle was that

"the Ashantees have met with a very considerable loss lately which

had almost deterred them from venturing to the waterside. The affair

is this: One of their Caboceers called Odanquah having made an

incursion into Yo country, which lies behind Whydah. He and all his

people to the number of 10,000 or 12,000 men fell into an ambuscade

1. J. Dupuis, Journal of a Residence in Ashantee. 1824*

op.cit., p.
The Ashantis referred to Oyo as Apo. It was probable,
that the Ashantis told Dupuis that they fought against
Dahomey instead of Oyo, because they encountered for
the first time the Amazon section of the Dahomey army.
See Rattray, Lav/ and Constitution. 1929* p.221.
 -194-

i
and were either killed or made slaves of"•

This disastrous defeat, culminating in the loss of the

Bwabenhene, must have decided the Ashanti chiefs to replace the

aged Kusi Obodum with the youthful Csei Kwadwo, who could be depended

upon to prosecute the war against the Akyems and the allies with

vigour. A few months afterwards, in October 17^4, Director-General

Huydecooper reported from Elmina that **the drunkard Kusie", who had

long ruled Ashanti, and as a result of whose cowardly attitude the

trading paths had been closed for so long, "has now been kickedout

of government and has been succeeded by a courageous youngman,

Zai (Osei) who would most certainly follow the footsteps of the late

king Poku**.^

It is apparent therefore that Kusi Obodum was not a nonentity,

as some historians would have us believe. Kusifs fourteen years* rule

of Ashartti was certainly not marked by spectacular military successes,

as Opoku*s had been. Indeed, as we have noted, his one great effort

to defeat the allies ended in disaster, and led to his eventual

destoolment. But it must be emphasized that Kusi Obodumbecamethe

Asantehene at a most critical period in Ashanti history. Ashanti

was threatened by an external invasion at a time when the kingdom was

riddled with internal dissension. All this had its origins in the

policies pursued by Opoku Ware, and Kusi must have realised that a

1. T 70/31 Governor W. Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee

of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 27th May,
176 4 . See also copy in ADLI 1/3810.
The Dutch also refer to this episode rather obliquely. See WIC
115, letter from Director-General J.P T. Huydecooper, ELmina,
to the Assembly of the Ten, dated 15&h October, 17^4.
2. WIC 115 Director-General J.P.T. Huydecooper, to the
Assembly of the Ten, dated 13th October, 17&4.
 -193-

reversal of Opoku1s methods was the only means of preserving the

territorial integrity of the Ashanti kingdom. The adoption of

diplomacy, instead of war, as an instrument of foreign policy, was

not a sign of weakness, hut an indication of Kusi*s political

maturity. Indeed, it might well he, as Reindorf suggests, that

Kusi Obodum was the most merciful and peaceful of the eighteenth
1
century Ashanti kings. Kusi was certainly the victim of circum­

stances. The adverse criticism of the Europeans on the coast must

be rejected on the grounds that they were motivated by their own

economic interests, and not by any appreciation of the difficult

political problems facing the Ashanti government during this period.

1. C. C. Reindcrf, History. (2nd ed.) op.cit., pp.130-1.

 CHAPTER V
THE REIGN OF OSEI KWADffO. 1764-1777

By 1765, the new direction of affairs in Ashanti, coupled

with the disagreements among the allied states, made possible ■

{
Ashanti*s advance on the coast. The youthful Ceei Kwadwo was clearly

determined to prosecute with vigour the war against the tributary

states. Soon after his accession, the Europeans on the coast were

referring to him as enterprising, courageous and fiery, though

inexperienced. Both the British and the Dutch drew attention to his

intense admiration for Opoku Ware, and indicated that Osei Kwadwo wished
2
to follow in the footsteps of his gpeat predecessor. Apart from Osei*s

personal qualities, the rapprochement between the Ashantis and the

Fantis, coupled with the withdrawal of Denkyera support for the allies,

must have made an Ashanti invasion of allied territory a feasible

proposition. In January 1765, "the report from Cape Coast Castle was

that "the Ashantees now give out that they will join the Denkyeras and

then attack the Wassas, Akims and Tufferos"; in the following month,

that all was quiet, "from one end of the coast to the other at present",

but that it was only a tenporary calm, because "by all accounts the

1. Osei Kwadwo* s activities have been ably dealt with by Miss

Margaret Priestley, and this chapter is intended as a
supplement to that work. See M. Priestley, "The Ashanti
question and the British: Eighteenth Century Origins", in
Journal of African History, 11,1,(1961),pp.35-59, cp.cit.
2. WIC 115 Letter from Director-General J.P.T. Huydecooper,
Elmina, to the Assembly of the Ten, dated 15th October, 1764*
Ibid. 116, the same to same, letter dated 8th March, 1765*
T 70/31 Letters from Governor John Hippisley, Cape Coast Castle,
to the Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa,
dated 20th March, and 12th July, 1766. Bowdich was informed in
Kumasi that, in the early nineteenth century, Osei Kwadwo had
been "esteemed a very great captain". Bowdich, 1819, op.cit.,
P. 237
 -197-

Ashantees are determined to force their way to the waterside.1*

The Wassas, the Akyems and the Twifos also made elaborate

military preparations in anticipation of the expected Ashanti

onslaught. They abandoned their own countries and encamped at

Bendah "about forty miles to the North-East” of Cape Coast Castle,

Osei Kwadwo, however, could not leave Ashanti immediately, because

“two very considerable Ashantee Caboceers” had died, and the king

“has to bury and make custom for the deceased"• Meanwhile, a party

of Akyems and the Akwamus "who are gone to join the Ashantees",

engaged in some minor skirmishes.^

It was in May 17^5 that the Ashanti forces advanced from the

north to join the Fanti armies from the south. Apparently because

they realised the formidable nature of the combination against them,

the Wassas and the Twifos abandoned camp at Bendah, and fled to

"Ahiman, about fifty or sixty miles to the North-West” of Cape Coast

Castle. Thus the Akyem forces, under the leadership of Pobi, the

Akyem Abuakwa chief, had to fight the Ashantis and the Fantis alone,

and since the Akyems were "half starved for want of provisions and

in a manner surrounded by an army of Ashantees commanded by Sey Coomah,

King of Ashantee, and another of Fantees”, they fell an easy prey to

their enemies. PobTbi and his principal chiefs committed suicide, and

1. T 70/31 Letters fr o m Governor William Mutter, Cape Coast Castle,

to Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
25th January, and 10th February, 1765*
Also, WIC 116 Letters from Director-General J.P. T. Huydecooper,
to the Assembly of the Ten, dated 8th March and 27th June, 1765*
2. T 70/31 Governor William Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, to the
Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
25th April, 1765 .
 -198-

the Akyem forces decamped and fled. The Ashantis decided to follow

up this victory, by dealing next with the Wassas and the Akyems. But

because the rains had then set in, Osei Kwadwo decided to remain on

the coast for at least a year. Ee came to an understanding with his

Fanti allies for t his purpose, and he established his camp in the Abora

state within the Fanti federation. In order to demonstrate that his

intentions were peaceful, and that his aim was to bring back the

rebellious states of Wassa and Twifo to obedience, he gave the Fantis

one of his close relatives as a hostage, as well as many presents. In

addition, both the Ashantis and the Fantis took fetish to live in

harmony with each other. The Fantis nevertheless were suspieious.

Their agreement with the Ashantis was brought into existence by the

_ special circumstances of joint opposition to the allied states for

closing the trade routes. But with the total defeat of the Akyems, and

the Wassas and the Twifos in flight, the alliance was unlikely to be

more than temporary. Since the Fantis were aiming at political and

economic domination of the petty coastal states, they must have disliked

the prospect of having the Ashanti army at such close quarters for a

long period. Osei Kwadwo might emphasize that his purpose was to

punish his rebellious subjects and to reopen the trade routes. The Fantis

1. WIC 116 Director-General J.P.T. Huydecooper to the Assembly of

the Ten, dated 8th May, 17&5*
T 70/31 Governor William Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, to the
Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
20th July, 1765 .
The British say that Pobi was t aken prisoner by the Fantis, but
this was not correct, for if that were the case, he would have
been set free soon after the hostilities between the Fantis and
Ashantis began.
"Ahiman", of course, is the modern Twifo Heman. For a useful
comment on the wide application of the word "fetish", see Dupuis,
1824, op.cit., p . 107 note.
 -199-

however, believed that the Ashantis aimed at the political subjugation

1
of the coastal states.

It is not surprising, therefore, that hostilities broke out

between the Ashantis and the Fantis. Undoubtedly, the behaviour of

the Fantis was provocative in a number of ways. For instance, as a

result of the defeat of the Akyems, the victors had large numbers of

slaves to sell, and the price of slaves, which had stood at 10 ozs. and

6 ozs. for a male and female slave respectively, immediately felj. to

6 ozs. and 4 ozs. The Fantis thereupon not only kept their own slaves

"till the prices raise”, but also ”by their greedy and perfidious conduct,

have been the means of cutting off all communications with the Ashantees
2
who have certainly numbers of slaves to dispose of". Moreover, in

spite of the understanding to live in peace with the Ashantis, the

Fantis seized and sold as slaves Ashantis who went to their villages

for food. The Governor of Cape Coast Castle, for example, noted that

the Fantis sold "not less than 1200 or 1500 of the Ashantees". Osei

Kwadwo, v*ho believed that his people might have committed sane crime,.

sent four of his chiefs and a herald to discover the reasons of the

Fanti action, but they were all detained. The Asantehene*s protests

fell on deaf ears, and, unable to obtain satisfaction by peaceful means,

the Astemtis resorted to arms. On 27th June 17&5, reports reached

both Cape Coast Castle and Elmina Castle that there had been fighting

1. T 70/1022 Cape Coast Castle Day Books, 176$, entry dated 18th June.
Also, E. Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave
jCrade to America. (Washington. 1950-5). Vol.II. PP.527-8.
2* T 70/31 Governor William Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee
of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 20th July, 17^5*
 -200-

s 1
between the Fantis and the Ashantis for the past three days.

The conflicts between these two erstwhile allies immediately-

led to European repercussions. Both the British aral the Dutch had

hoped that, by their joint effort, the allies could defeat the Wassas

the Akyems and the Twifos, and reopen the trade routes, so as to

ensure a constant flow of slaves from the interior to their coastal

settlements. Ashanti and Fanti disputes, however, seemed to jeopardise

that prospect. In their own trade interests, therefore, the British

and the Dutch decided to intervene, so as to reconcile the warring

peoples. At first, however, both Cape Coast and Elmina adopted an

independent line of action. As soon as news of hostilities between

the Ashantis and the Fantis reached Cape Coast, the Governor sent

messengers with presents "to the Fantee Caboceers at their camp to

2
advise them to make peace with the Ashantees". In addition, the

Governor called a meeting of the Council of Merchants to discuss the

political situation and its impact on British trade. The Council passed

a resolution on 10th July which, because of subsequent events, merits

quoting in fulls "Whereas the Fantees and the Ashantees, after

destroying the Akims, have commenced hostilities against each other

the consequence of which is likely to be a war between these two

Nations; it is the opinion of this Council that should the Fantees,

1. WIC 116 Director-General J.P.T. Huydecooper, Elmina, to

Assembly of the Ten, dated 27th June, 1765•
T 70/31 Governor W. Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee
of the Ccanpany of Merchants trading to Affica, dated 20th July, 1765*
T 70/1022 Cape Coast Castle Day Books, 1765, entry for 27th
June, 1765 •
2. T 7o/l022 Cape Coast Castle Day Books, 1765, entry for 27th
June, 1765*
who by the best information have been the agressors in this quarrel,

get the better of the Ashantees a total stagnation of Trade would

ensue, and that, on the contrary, should the Ashantees become Masters

of the Fantee Country, the Forts and Settlements on this coast would

be greatly endangered, as the King of Ashantee being an absolute prince,

might, upon the slightest provocation, or from mere caprice, so

effectively block up any Fort as to oblige the garrison (if 4 or 5

Europeans and as many Mulattoes deserve that Name) to surrender. Such

being the present unsettled state of affairs in this country, it is

hereby resolved (after mature deliberation) to observe a strict

1
Neutrality between the two Nations as possible1*. The Dutch at Elmina

also declared themselves neutral, but they sent some Elmina chiefs

and some of their servants with two white flags to the camps of the
2
Fantis and the Ashantis, urging them to cease hostilities. But the

sigis were ominous, and it became necessary for the British and the

Dutch to concert their efforts at mediation. The initiative came from

Elmina. Director-General Huydecooper desired the defeat of the Fantis,

but he feared that this might not happen, because the Wassas and the

Twifos at their camp in Twifo Heman would join the Fantis and attack

the Ashantis from the rear. If that happened, the Ashanti army,

surrounded on all sides, and in a predominantly hostile country, would

1. T 70/31 Minutes of the Council at Cape Coast Castle, dated 10th

July, 1765* signed by William Mutter, Gilbert Petrie, and John
Grossle.
2. WIC 116 Director-G-eneral J.P. T. Huydecooper, Elmina, to the
Assembly of the Ten, dated 27th June, 17&5*
 -202-

certainly suffer defeat. In order to forestall that, Huydecooper

decided to join William Mutter to reconcile the Ashantis and the

Fantis. On 20th July, Mutter reported that MMr. Huydecooper,

Governor of Elmina, had been here for these eight days past, and

we have jointly taken every step which we think proper and necessary

in order, if possible, to reconcile the Ashantees and Fantees1*#

The period of Anglo-Dutch consultations was one of much

diplomatic activity both at Cape Caast and Elmina Castles. Although

there was seme sporadic fighting, a full-scale war did not develop.

Osei Kwadwo and his troops **more for want of provisions than anything

else”, left their camp and established themselves in Denkyera country.

On 8th July, messengers representing the Companies were sent to the

Ashantis, and the Fantis who had assembled at Fetu to consider the

crisis. The Ashanti embassy returned to Cape Coast Castle on 21st

^july and, on the following day gave a report to the Dutch at Elmina

of its interview with the Asantehene. In it, Osei Kwadwo explained

that neither he nor his predecessors had ever had troubles with the

Fantis and so he was surprised efc the behaviour of the Fantis, who,

although they were the allies of the Ashantis, had ill-treated his

people. He pointed out that the Fantis* behaviour was even more

objectionable because they had eaten fetish and exchanged hostages

to live in peace and friendship, yet the Fantis had captured 4000

1. WIC 116 Director-General Huydecooper, Elmina, to the Assembly

of the Ten, dated 27th June, 17&5*
^ 70/31 Governor W. Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee
of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 20th
July, 1765#
 -203-

Ashantis, whom they had sold as slaves, excluding 10,000 men who

had died of famine because the Fantis prevented them from obtaining

food. Osei Kwadwo then disclosed that, upon the advice of his

principal chiefs, he bad decided to retire, re-equip his army, and

to return to the coast to take his revenge because he "now considers

all the coastal peoples as his enemies” . The Asantehene, however,

agreed to accept European mediation, and to reconcile y/ith those

who had wronged him, provided the Fantis returned the four chiefs

and the herald they were still retaining. Osei Kwadwo also indicated

that the Wassas and the Twifos should be included in the peace

negotiations, so as to end all disputes. The British and the Dutch

thereupon directed their efforts towards the achievement of these

demands. Messengers passed forwards and backwards between Cape Coast

Castle and Elmina Castle, the principal Fanti towns of Abora, Kankesim

and Fetu, and the Ashanti camp in Denkyera. For example, in August

1765, the British paid subsistence allowance to Kofi Abo, described

as 11the Company’s linguist” at Anomabo, and a messenger frcxn Dutdh

Director-General Huydecooper, who went ”on public business to Murram”;

on the 18th of the same month, presents were sent 4jq the principal Fanti

chiefs ”assembled at Fetue on account of the quarrel subsisting between

the Fantees and the Ashantees”; and in December, 1766, a bed, double

satin hammock and pole, rum and brandy were sent to Osei Kwadwo and his

1. WIC 116 Director-G-eneral J.P. T. Huydecooper, Elmina, to

the Assembly of the Ten, dated 27th June, 8th November, 1763*
T 70/31 Governor William Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, to the
Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa,
dated 20th July, 1765#
 -204-
1
principal chiefs. Anglo-Dutch mediation achieved very little, however.

There were many reasons for this failure. Firstly, though the Fantis

boasted that they had put the Ashantis to flight, they genuinely

believed that the Ashantis would make another descent on the coast.

On 20th July 17&5, it was widely known on the coast that the Queen

Mother of Ashanti was urging the Asantehene Hwith all the force of

female vehemence to war”, declaring that she herself would call the

Ashantis to arms, and lead an attack upon Fanti if the king failed so

to do. In March 1766, the report from Cape Coast Castle was that the

Asantehene "mediates an invasion upon the sea coast",and that he was

urged on by "the young Counsellors and the Queen Mother"; in July, the

Governor of Cape CosLst Castle prayed the Committee of Merchants in

London to repair the British forts on the coast so as to put them in a

posture of defence because "the young enterprising Sayie, King of

Shantee seems to threaten the Gold Coast with a fiercer and better

conducted irruption thafc he made last year". Again, in September 1766,

Governor Gilbert Petrie* who visited Accra, reported the arrival of

Ashanti messengers there. Ostensibly, they came to collect the arrears

of pay due to the Asantehene, but "in reality, to receive the subjection

1. T 70/1022 Cape Coast Castle Day Books, 1765, entries for 14th and
18th August, 1765, and Ibid.
T 7Q/1024 entries dated 1st October and December, 1766.
The Cape Coast Castle Day Books, and the Elmina Journals, and
Correspondence with the outposts make it possible to reconstruct
a full picture of the comings and goings of the Companies* s
messengers during this period.
Mankessim, the seat of the "High Priest of Fanti", was called "Murram"
by the British, and "Grand Terne" by the Dutch.
See WIC 299 e.g. Director-General Van der Grijp, Elmina, to the
Assembly of the Ten, dated 15th September, 1788, and E.C. Martin,
The British West African Settlements 1750-1821.(London. 1927),p. 109.
2. T 70/31 Governor W. Mutter," Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee of
the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 20 th July, 1765 .
Ibid., Governor John Hippisley, Cape Coast Castle, to Committee,
dated 20 th March, and 13th July, 1766 .
 -205-

or at leafct to make peace with the residue of the Akim nation and

the several other states inhabitating the country between Accra and

Ashantee and thereby to open a canmunication with the Europeans by a

more direct and a much shorter road than that hitherto used by the

Ashantees on accomt of the late power and opposition of their enemies

the Akims". Petrie argued that the motives of the Ashantis were

doubtful, and admitted of a double interpretation. First, that if

the Fantis persisted in refUsting to make a reasonable satisfaction to

the Asantehene for the, insult and loss he sustained from their attack

on hdin the previous year, and consequently refused to supply him with

European commodities, "he may have a recourse left in the trade of that

channel". Second, that "Zay's endeavour to open that passage from his

country to the seaboard is that if his ambition leads him to disemble

his sentiments on this occasion and to conceal a design to make peace

another irruption into the Fantee country", he might be enabled by

means of such a passage to supply himself with arms and ammunition in

spite of his enemies.^

In view of this, the Fantis not only refused to surrender the

Ashanti hostages, but also they began to build up a new alliance with

the Wassas and the Twifos. They offered these two states protection

against Ashanti. In the months July to November, all Fanti efforts

were directed towards achieving this objective. After prolonged

negotiations, the Wassas and the Twifos agreed to join the Fantis in

1. T 70/31 Governor Gilbert Petrie, Cape Coast Castle, to the

Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
13th September, 1766.
 -206-

opposing Ashanti and, in November 1765, the British sent presents

to ”Enimree, King of Warsaw, ENCHAK00N, principal Caboceer of

Warsaw, Effafuah, principal Caboceer of Tuffero, Guinterry Empanee,

Attinagy and Soben, Caboceers of Warsaw and Tuffero being all assembled
1
at Fetue to drink fetish to be friends and allies of the Fantees” .

Thus a new political alignment based upon Fanti-Wassa-Twifo co-operation

came into existence, its object being to prevent the Ashantis from

making another advance by the western trade routes. John Hippisley,

who realised the importance of these developments, pointed out that

since Akyem was ”an undone nation or male a part of the Ashantees”,

the Fantis entered into ”an alliance offensive and defensive with the

Warsaws and Tufferoes to which Ammoniah, King of Appblonia has

acceeded", in order to guard against the dangers arising from the

Akyem defeat. Hippisley believed that this alliance would last

2
because the very existence of the member states d epend upon it.

Furthermore, the Fantis prohibited ”by a Law” the sale of guns, gun­

powder, irons, lead and pewter to the Ashanti traders who resorted to

the markets on the borders of Fanti country. But although some of

those who broke this law and traded in firearms with the Ashantis were

put to death, ”yet dre the demands of the Ashantees for these articles

so great that they are secretly supplied by these very Fantees” A

second reason why Ahglo-Dutch negotiations broke down, was the activities

1. T 70/1022 Cape Coast Castle Day Books, 17&5* entries from

9th and 23rd November, 17&5*
2. T 70/31 Governor John Hippisley, Cape Coast Castle, to Committee of
the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 20th March, 1766.
3« T 70/31 Sovemor Gilbert Petrie, Cape Coast Castle, to Committee of
the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 13th September, 1766.
 -207-

of Richard Brew, a private British trader at Anomabo, who also chose

to act as mediator, and whose behaviour caused great annoyance to

both Companies during this period. Brew* s business interests were

firmly bound up with those of the Fantis, and he was clearly behind

Fanti resistance to Ashanti*s advance to the coast. In August 17^5>

the herald whose return Osei Kwadwo had demanded in the previous month

as an essential condition at peace with the Fantis, was sold to a

French captain lying in the Mouree roads. The Dutch managed to get

the herald, by exchanging him with another slave, so as to send him

to Ashanti. Brew and Webster protested to Huydecooper, claiming that

the herald was his property. The Dutch refused to comply with Brew*s

demand, whereupon he and Webster seized and put in chains one of

Huydecooper* s messengers on his way back to Elmina from Kankesim, where

he had been sent in connection with the Anglo-Dutch peace negotiations.

The Dutch protested vigorously to the Governor of Cape Coast Castle,

but failed to secure the release of the messenger, because Brew was

also quarrelling with Governor Mutter of Cape Coast Castle. Eventually,

the matter was referred to the Dutch West India Company in Amsterdam,

and to the British Board of Trade by the Committee of the Company of

Merchants in London. The major difficulty, however, attending joint

mediation was the fact of Anglo-Dutch suspicion and rivalry.

1. There are many references in the British and Dutch records, to

the activities of Richard Brew, and his partner, Webster. See
e.g. WIC 966 entries during August by Director-General J.P. T.
Htzydecooper. Also, M.A. Priestley, "Richard Brefs an Eighteenth
Century Trader at Anamabu**, in Trans.Hist.Soc.Ghana. IV, pt.I,
(Legon, 1959) 29-46, and pp. - ^ 6 Below.
 -208-

Although both the British and the Dutch were officially

neutral in the Ashanti and Fanti disputes, it was clear that the

sympathies of the Dutch lay with the Ashantis. Director-General

Huydecooper was heir to a long tradition of Dutch co-operation with

Ashanti, and he was certainly not opposed to Ashanti becoming the

political master on the Gold Coast. In 1764, when the disputes among

the Wassas, the Denkyeras, the Twifos and the Akyems threatened to

disrupt their alliance, Huydecooper expressed the desire to fish in

troubled waters, so as to enable the Ashantis to reopen the trade

routes. In June 1765, he instructed his messengers, who were going

to the Ashanti camp to discuss peace with the Fantis, to tell the

Asantehene privately that the Ashantis could count on the friendship

of the Dutch, and that he had bought a number of the Ashantis whom

the Fantis had sold as slaves, in order to send them back to Ashanti

at an opportune moment. Moreover, he secured the services of the

Ashanti prince, Agyerakwa, who became the Dutch chief link with the
i
Asantehene. Furthermore, during the discussions at Cape Coast Castle

in ^uly 1765, Huydecooper noted that the British seemed very reluctant

to help the Ashantis, and he tried to convince them of the undesirability

2
of strengthening the Fantis. For the same reasons, he tried to

persuade the Wassas, the Twifos, the Abremboes, and the Elminas, not

to join the Fantis against Ashanti. On 25th October 1765, Governor

Mutter reported that the Wassas and the Twifos had not yet committed

1. WIC 115 Director-General J.P. T. Huydecooper, Elmina, to

Assembly of the Ten, dated 15 th October, 1764*
2. M. Priestley, "The Ashanti Question and the British...", in
Journ.Afrc.Hist., 11, 1, (1%1), opcit., p.54*
 -209-

themselves by signing a treaty of alliance with the Fantis, because

of "the infidelity of the Fantees, and owing to the address and

intriguing disposition of Mr. Huydecooper, General of Elmina, who

has hitherto prevented the Warsaw Caboceers from going to Fetue" ♦

These activities of the Dutdh Director-General were known

at Gape Coast Castle, and aroused British suspicion of Dutch intentions.

As we have indicated, the British were as anxious as the Dutch to

establish direct commercial contact with Ashanti. Indeed, during the

short period of Ashanti-Fanti rapprochement, the British paid

subsistence allowance to messengers "going to the Ashantee camp at

Abrah in Fantee v/ith 22 Fathoms tobacco and one cotton Promal for the
2
King and his principal Caboceers11. But the British were anxious that

the seaboard Should be under divided political control, and not under

an absolute monarch, like the king of Ashanti. Thus before the policy

of co-operation was many months old, Hip;isley and Petrie wrote to

Mutter from Accra, advising him to be wary of the Dutch negotiations,

and warning him of the adverse consequences that would follow an

Ashanti conquest of the coast. The Governor agreed with this view, and

noted that the plan of the Dutch had changed. He pointed out that,

initially, Huydecooper had aimed simply at re-establishing friendly

relations between the Ashantis and the Fantis, whereas now his object

1. T 70/31 Governor William Mutter to Committee of the Company of

Merchants trading to Africa, dated 25th October, 1765•
WIC 116 Director-General J.P. T. Huydecooper, to the Assembly of
the Ten, dated 19th July, 1765*
Only Elminas obeyed the Dutch and refused to join the Fantis,
and they were attacked by the latter. See ibid. same to same,
8th November, 1765*
2. T 70/1022 Cape Coast Castle Day Books, 1765, entry for
12th June, 1765*
 -210-

was that the latter should be defeated, and a way forced through to

the waterside. The British case was clearly put by John Hippisley,

who succeeded Mutter as Governor of Cape Coast Castle in 1766.

Hippisley wrote, "The Dutch avowedly espouse the cause of the Shan tees

and this from a principle the most erroneous in African politics. They

urge the insolence of the Fantees, ever since our establishments Y/ere

made and the frequent outrages they are guilty of to whitemen; their

confused government and the consequent difficulty of appeals to them,

whereas, say they, if the whole Gold Coast was under one powerful

Prince, there would be only him to satisfy.... as it easily might by

giving him Presents and we should then be in a condition to bid defiance

to the rest. But ought they not to consider, we owe the supremest

advantage from the mixt government of the Fantees? The independence

of District on District is of such importance that whilst it subsists

(and so it may, if not put an end to by the officious and fatal

interposition of whitemen) we may safely promise ourselves to hold

our forts and power in this country as long as we please...” Hippisley

then ooncluded that if there was a renewal of the Ashanti and Fanti

war, and the latter were in danger of being defeated, they should receive

the support of the British, since their victory was in the British
2
Company’s interest.

This political re-grouping, and the attitude of the British

1. C.0.38£/$3 John Hippisley and Gilbert Petrie, James Fort, Accra,

to Governor William Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, dated 1st
October 1765? and Mutter’s comments on this letter.
2. C.0.267/13 Copy of a letter from John Hippisley, Governor of
Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee of the Conpany of Merchants
trading toAfrica, dated 13th July, 1766.
 -211-

on the coast, were certainly the main reasons why the Ashantis did

not carry out their intentions to invade the coast after 17&5 *

prospect of an Ashanti onslaught, however, continued to haunt the

coastal peoples. The Ashantis had reasserted their overlordship over

the Akyems, and thereby had managed to reopen the eastern trading

paths from the interior to Accra and the neighbouring beaches. But

the rebellion of the Wassas and the Twifos had not been suppressed,

and the opposition of these two states had now been reinforced by the

hostilities of the Fantis and the Cape Appolonians. This meant that

the European settlements on the west coast were deprived of sharing

in the Ashanti trade. Thus, although Anglo-Dutch mediation failed,

the Companies reverted to the policy of independent negotiations with

Ashanti. In July 1766, for example, Governor John Hippisley sent an

embassy to Osei Kwadwo, bearing a public and a private message. In

the private message, to be delivered to the king alone, Hippisley

strongly urged the Asantehene to refuse the Dutch invitation to

invade the coast. He sought to dissuade the king from such a course

by pointing out that ”a compliance with the invitation of the Dutch

to come to the waterside would contradict the first rules of his two

immediate predecessors! conduct; his great-uncle Apochafs particularly

who with all the advantages of successful wars and able counsellors

acquired by long and active reign” had always declared against an

invasion of the coast. Hippisley argued that Opoku Ware must doubtless

have been influenced in his decision not to embark upon a coastal

invasion by the fear that, "by residing at the waterside his subjects

would quickly be debauched both in their constitutions and principles,

 -212-

because they would drink the spirituous liquors being at least six

times as dear in Shantee as they are at the waterside”, and also

because, if the Ashantis came into contact with Fanti "liberty41, it

would have the effect of undermining the king* s arbitrary power, so

that ”his scepter would scrap out of his hand...” In October 1766,

the messengers sent by Hippisley to Ashanti returned to Cape Coast

Castle, accompanied by an embassy from Osei Kwadwo. They brought

"the most fair and reasonable” proposals for peace, because the *

Asantehene merely requested the Fantis to allow all the Ashantis -

hostages and messengers - still retained on the coast, to return to

Ashanti. The Ashanti ambassadors stressed that if the king*s demands

were met, he "offers to drink fetish with the Fantees and drown in

oblivion all his past grievances.” Governor Petrie declared that there

were seme prospects of peace being established between the Fantis and

the Ashantis, because the Fantis were assembling to give audience to

the Ashanti messengers. Petrie warned, however, that this would be the

work of time, of trouble and expense, because the Fantis ”are very slow,

very turbulent in all their meetings, very much divided amongst

themselves and very avaricious”. By December, however, the Fantis

had accepted, in part, the Asantehene*s terms relating to the return of

the hostages. They promised to give a free passage to all the Ashanti:

messengers and hostages, except young Osei, the member of the' Ashanti

1. T 70/31 ^Letter from Governor John Hippisley, Cape Coast Castle, to

the Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
13th July, 1766.
Hippisley, however, endeavoured to maintain an interest with both
the Ashantis and the Fantis. In this letter he pointed out that
he was, at that very momfcnt, treating the Asantehene "in a respectful
manner", and that ”a decent present is preparing for him, and I have
ordered the arrears of his ground rent at Accra to be paid by his
messengers who are now there".
 -213-

royal family retained at Anomabo. He too would be released on condition

that the Asantehene allowed the Fanti hostages to return home frcm

Ashanti. The Dutch also persuaded the Wassas and the Twifos to sign

a treaty of peace with the Ashantis, and to keep open the trade routes*

Since the disputes affected their economic interests, and because they

regarded the Fantis as faithless allies, King Enimir of V/assa and his

chiefs agreed, and both the Wassas and the Twifos reaffirmed their
1
allegiance to the Asantehene.

By the beginning of 1767* therefore, the prospect of an

Ashanti invasion of Fanti territory was remote. The cessation of

hostilities, however, proved short-lived, because the Akyems revolted

again. Obirikorang, who had recently succeeded Pobi as the Cmanhene

of Akyem Abuakwa, refused to swear allegiance to the Asantehene, and,

according to a report from Cape Coast Castle, he decided to abandon

his country, and to "take sanctuary on the other side of the River

Volta with Ashampoe, King of Papae". The Ashantis feared that the

Akyems would induce the Wassas and the Twifos to join them, so Osei
2
Kwadwo sent "two armed bodies to binder the Akims in their designs".

In January 1773* Governor David Mill reported that the Ashanti army

was defeated in the first engagement, but Obirikorang, fearing that the

1. T 70/31 Letter from Governor Gilbert Petrie, Cape Coast Castle, to

the Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
20th October, 1766.
WIC 132 Resolutions of the Council at Elmina, 1764-1767* entries
dated 8th and 22nd December, 1^66. Also WIC 116 Director-General
J.P.T. Huydecooper to the Assembly of the Ten, dated 1st Feb. 1767*
The Dutch sent presents to Osei Kwadwo, which included, a green
velvet cloth, a green velvet cap with gold trimming, a stick with
a silver knob, an East Indian cloth, 24 pipes and a roll of tobacco.
2. T 70/31 Letter fran Governor Gilbert Petrie, Cape Coast Castle, to
the Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
20th August, 1767*
 -214-

Ashantis would bring more reinforcements, sent the Akyem woman and

children to Krobo country, and kept them "in places made by nature

defensible" ♦ The Abuakwa chief and his army then moved into the Accra

area, and at first everybody thought that they would go to Accra and

seek shelter under the three European farts there, a move which could

not fail to have implicated the Accras. Obirikorang, however, did not

go to Accra. Instead, he reached an understanding with the eastern

Fantis, and after giving them "many presents for liberty to retire

into their country" he encamped in an area between Accra and Senya

Bereku. Since the Ashantis were not prepared to engage the Fantis

and the Akyems at the same time, Osei Kwadwo instructed his army to

attack the Krobos, "into whose hands the Akim King had deposited part

of his women, and who had for many years past been his auxiliaries".

After a series of battles, in which the Ashantis were clearly at a

disadvantage, since "the Croboes inhabit a hill of great natural strength" 9

the Ashantis were eventually defeated, and they had to retire into

their o m country. ^

The western Fantis could not fail to be involved in these

developments. They had refused an Akyem request for protection soon

2
after the revolt. But they must have feared that if the Ashantis

succeeded in defeating the Akyems, they might attack them in order to

1. WIC 118 Letter from P Woortman and Laefdael, Elmina, to the Assembly
of the Ten, dated 30th August, 1770.
T 70/31 Copy of letter from Governor David Mill, Cape Coast Castle,
to the Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
30th January, 1773. Also T 70/32 Ibid., dated 4th December, 1773.
According to Wilks, Obirikorang was finally deposed by the
Asantehene and his successor, Ampoforo, reaffirmed his allegiance
to Osei Kwadwo. See I. Wilks, K.A. Thesis, cp.cit.. p. 134.
2. T 70/31 Governor Gilbert Petrie, Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee
of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 20th August, 1767.
 -215-

secure the release of the hostage still retained at Anomabo.

A major difficulty attending the surrender of this hostage was

that he was not in the possession of the Fantis at all, but in

the hands of Richard Brew, who rivalled with the Companies to

be the mediator in the Fanti-Ashanti disputes. In 1768, when the

Governor of Cape Coast Castle went to Anomabo to persuade the

Fantis to return the hostages to Ashanti, he discovered that the

Fantis were prepared to do this, provided the Dutch were excluded

from having a share in the settlement of their disputes with

Ashanti, and also if the Governor would act in concert with Brew.

The Governor agreed to do this, provided Brew acted in a subord­

inate capacity, and that it was t he Company to whom the hostages

were handed over for return to ©sei Kwadwo. Brew rejected the

proposal "with the utmost disdain", declaring that if he could

not participate with the Governor on equal terms, he would

continue to follow an independent line of action* The Governor

then pointed out to the Fantis that they would be very unwise

to place their confidence, at this juncture of their affairs,

in a private trader, instead of in the Company, which, as a public

establishment, was in a much better position to give them support

and assistance than any individual could ever be. Even when the.

Fanti Oracle at Mankesim declared for the Company of Merchants, and

instructed the elders of Anomabo to deliver the hostages to Cape Coast

 -216-
1
Castle, "Mr. Brew* s profusion prevailed uver the power of the Deity*1.

Brew’s persistence to be involved in the Fanti and Ashanti

disputes did not stem merely from his desire to be popular with the

Fantis and to make them believe that he was superior in power, wealth

and importance to the servants of the Company. There was a material

side to it, quite apart from the question of prestige. He intended

to claim expenses from the Ashantis for the upkeep of the hostages

whom Osei Kwadwo had been trying to reoover since 1765* In 1768,

Brew claimed that the Asantehene owed him some 300 ounces of gold for

the cost of their maintenance over the past three yeairs. The

G-overnor of Cape Coast Castle, however, believed that Osei Kwadwo

would never meet such an unreasonable demand; in his opinion,

Brew would have stood a better chance of getting a partial

settlement if he had acted jointly with the Company1s officers,

2
instead of acting independently.

The upshot of these varied cross-currents of activity was that

1. T 70/31 Letter fran Governor Gilbert Petrie, Cape Coast Castle, to

the Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Afrifia, dated
21st October, 1768.
T 70/1026 Cape Coast Castle Day Books, 1768, entries dated 23rd
23th and 28th August, and 2nd 14th and 20th September.
WIC 118 Letter from Director-General Pieter Woortman, Elmina, to
the Zeeland Chamber, dated 21st April, 1770.
Also, M.A. Priestley, "Richard Brew; an Eighteenth Century,trader
at Anomabu", in Trans.Hist.Soc.Ghana. Vol.IV, pt.1, op.cit., pp.29-43*
Brew’s influence with the Fantis partly stemmed from the fadt that
he was married to a daughter of Eno Besi Kurentsir, the Qmanhene
of Anomabo, an important member of the Fanti Council of Chiefs.
He was referred to in the English records as John Currantee.
2. T 70/31 Governor Gilbert Petrie, Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee
of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 21st October, 1768.
WIC 118 Letter from Director-General Pieter Woortman and Council
to the Zeeland Chamber, dated 9th October, 1768.
According to the Dutch, Brew released most of the Ashanti hostages,
and kept young Osei, the most Important of them, being a relative
of the Asantehene.
 -217-

the western Fantis took precautionary measures to defend themselves

in the event of an Ashanti onslaught to secure the hostages. They

declared that no guns, gunpowder, or any kind of ammunition, should

he sold to the Ashanti traders. To enforce this, parties of armed

men from the Abora atate took positions on all the trade routes, to

seize 11the goods and persons of every trader who would be found

attempting to carry up any of the contraband articles". It might well

be, as Governor Petrie points out, that the Fanti resolution must

have been not only taken suddenly, but privately, for young Osei, the

hostage at Anomabo, apparently unaware of this, sent one of his servants

with "a quarter barrel of gun powder" to contact one of the Ashanti

traders at Manso during this period. The messenger, accompanied by an

Anomabo man, was arrested by the Abora soldiers, and carried to Abora

where he was executed. The execution of the messenger was clearly an

act of folly, because it could have led to war between the Ashantis

and the Fantis. Governor Petrie reported that whenever the news of

this atrocious deed was heard "it spread terror and dismay", because

nothing was expected to follow "than an immediate Rupture with the

King of Ashantee to whom wuch an act of violence was the highest

insult that could be offered". Petrie pointed out that it was a long­

standing custom among the peoples of the Gold Coast that "the persons

not only of Titles or heralds, Messengers and Hostages, but of all those

who belong to or accompany them are held sacred, and an injury done

to any of them is considered to affect the Honour of those represented,

or are sent from". The murder of such persons, therefore, was always

regarded as "a challenge and a mark of defiance". In view of such

considerations, it was feared in Cape Coast Castle, that the first act
 -218-

of Osei Kwadwo, on hearing of the ghastly behaviour of the Fantis,

would be to put to death all the messengers in his possession, except

those from the Dutch. Then "it is probable", wrote Be trie, "we shall

have the greatest Revolution ever known on the Gold Coast. Either

the King of Ashantee will become sole and absolute master of the

coast and extirpate the Fantees, or be overcome by them and driven

back to his country; in either case the trade must be ruined for many

years after a little glut which might follow a Battle by the sale of
1
prisoners". In order to avert this danger, the British decided to

intervene. But since it was considered dangerous far the British

themselves to send messengers to Ashanti, since they were knovrti to

act in the Fanti interest, the Governor persuaded the Ashanti hostage

to send messengers to inform Osei Kwadwo that the man who was killed

was a slave of no importance, and that the Fantis had punished the

culprits, therefore his death should not be a basis for invading the
✓
coast. Unfortunately, these other messengers from young Osei were

also prevented from going to Ashanti by the Abora soldiers. According

to a report from Cape Coast Castle, "the soldiers of Abra obstinately

refused either to let the messengers go up to Ashantee or to make the

smallest satisfaction to the person whose property the Man was whom

they had murdered and who had so readily offered his intercession to

secure them against the resentment of the King of Ashantee, his Master

and Relation". The report added that the old men in Fanti, especially

the chiefs at Cape Coast and Anomabo, were deeply disturbed by the

prospect of an Ashanti attack, but that the young pepple affected to be

perfectly indifferent about the matter. "Sey Cocmah and his Ashantee",

1. T 70/31 Letter from Governor Gilbert Petrie, Cape Cat st Castle, to

Committee of Company...., dated 9th October, 1767*
say they, !,may come when they will, we are braver and more powerful

though not so numerous as them, therefore we have no need to fear

1
them as enemies”•

Because the Fantis were unco-operative, the British could

have abandoned them to their fate* There were two vital considerations,

however, which decided the British to continue with their efforts at

mediation* Firstly, they believed that if the Fantis were defeated,

the whole G-old Coast would fal^L under the domination of the king of

Ashanti, for "all the smallest opposition to a People who had conquered

the Fantees"'. If that happened, all the European settlements between

Cape Appolonia and the River Volta, would become "as much dependent

on the King of Ashantee as the Forts at Whydah are on Dahomey11.

Secondly, the British feared that the Dutch would be the greatest

beneficiaries of an Ashanti victory, because the Dutch had all along

made the Asantehene regard the British "as his enemies or at least

the Allies of his enemies, the Fantees". On October 25th 1767*

therefore, the Council at Cape Coast Castle passed a resolution

proclaiming its neutrality as of 1765* This time, however, it was

decided to put all the British forts in a posture of defence, and to

ask for naval assistance from Britain, on the grounds that the Dutch

1. T 70/51 Letters ffam Governor Gilbert Petrie, Cape Coast Castle,

to the Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa,
dated 9th October, and 6th November, 1767*
Petrie, however, was of a different opinion regarding Fanti
bravery and military strength. He said that all he had noticed
was "in bravado, and the tyrannical exercise of their superiority
over the lesser states, their Neigfrb0urs on the Sea Coast and their
insolence to Europeans who have chosen to make themselves dependent
on them".
2. T 70/51 Letter from Governor Gilbert Petrie, Cape Coast Castle, to
the Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
6th November, 1767,
 -220'

had persistently invited the Ashantis to invade the coast. Furthermore,

the Council urged the Governor of Cape Coast Castle to renew his peace-

making efforts with the Fantis. In the following year, Gilbert Petrie

urged the Fantis to rely on the Company, because apart from the close

links which existed between them, it was the Company alone which would

be their effective source of help in time of crisis. He even

suggested that if peace were concluded through the Company^ mediation,

the British would be under an obligation to guarantee it, and to

2
defend the Fantis against any breach on the part of their enemies.

The Fantis finally agreed to return the hostages, and the situation

greatly improved. Then, in 1772, occurred another invasion scare. The

Assins suddenly started to plunder the Fantis. It was believed that

the Asantehene had instigated this as a preliminary to an invasion of

Fanti. There was no truth in this, because the Ashanti army which

moved south was fully occupied with the Akyems and the Krabos^ f

1. ADM 1/3810 Minutes of the Council at Cap6 Coast Castle,

dated 23 th October, 1767.
2. T 70/31 Governor Gilbert Petrie, Cape Coast Castle, to the
Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
31st March, 27th August and 21st October, 1768. Petrie was also
urged on to mediate between the Ashantis and the Fantis by the
Committee of Merchants in Londcn in order to prevent the Dutch
from getting the sole merit as peacemakers. See T 7 0 /6 9 Committee
of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa to Governor Gilbert
Petrie and Council, Cape Coast Castle, dated 6th April, 1768«
3. T 70/31 Letter from Governor David Mill, Cape Coast Castle, to the
Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
22nd June and 12th August, 1772.
The Committee in London was of the opinion that the 1772 troubles
were connected with the fact that the Fantis had not handed over
the Asantehene*s relative to the Ashantis. See T 7 0 /6 9 Committee etc.
to Governor David Mill, and Council, Cape Coast Castle, 10th Dec.1772.
A# T 70/31 Governor David Mill, Cape Coast Castle, to Committee etc.
12th December, 1772, 30th January and 6th March, 1773 > and
pp. above.
 -221-

Nevertheless, the European traders regarded the situation as serious

enough to take cognizance of it. Director-General Y/oortman informed

the Governor of Cape Coast Castle that the Dutch would remain strictly

neutral, and asked the British to co-operate in re-establishing peace.

Governor David Mill expressed his personal agreement, but because he

believed that the Dutch were strongly attached to Ashanti, although

in an ^Indirect Manner*, he did not commit himself to a policy of

co-operation with the Dutch. Instead, he said that he must consult

1
the Council in order to discover its views. Consequently, no Anglo-

Dutch plan for mediation emerged, and on August 1772, the Council

passed a resolution to the effect that the Fantis should be given

every assistance *consistent with reason*, if they were attacked. The

Council explained, however, that this did not mean that the British

would interfere in a general war. But they would protect the Fantis

if they were driven under the forts for shelter; an act of humanity,
2
declared the resolution,, which the Fantis had a right to expect.

It is clear therefore that between 1765-1772, largely as a

result of Anglo-Dutch rivalry, the former were gradually committed to

a policy of having to defend the Fantis, should they be attacked by the

Ashantis. This pro-Fanti policy, and the failure to explore the

possibilities of Anglo-Dutch co-operation, did not find favour in

London. When trouble first began in June 1765* Committee of

1. WIC 119 Letters frcm Director-General Pieter Woortman, to Governor

David Mill, Cape Coast Castle, 28th and 30th July, 1772.
T 70/31 Governor David Mill, Cape Coast Castle, to ths Committee
of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 6th March, 1773*
2. T 70/l52 Minutes of the Council at Cape Coast Castle, dated
11th August, 1772. Also J. J. Crooks, Records Relating to the
Gold Coast. (Dublin,1923), P«37
 -222-

Merchants, upon receiving the news, referred the matter to the Board

of Trade and Plantations, who recognized it as very serious and

important as to the effects which it might have on trade and the

security of the British forts. It therefore approved the policy

laid down in the Council's resolution of July 10th. The Board,

however, expressed disagreement with the current opinion on the

coast that an Ashanti conquest would endanger the British settlements.

It made its views known to the Committee, who consequently wrote to

the Governor of Cape Coast Castle that Hwe differ somewhat in opinion

from Mr. Mutter in regard to the danger of the British forts and

settlements if the Ashantees should force their way to the sea coast,

apprehending in that case it will be as much the interest of these

people to live in harmony with us as it is at present that of the

Fantees and a great increase of trade may be expected by the Ashantees

having a direct communication with the ships; this event will also

be a just punishment on the Fantees for their perfidious conduct".

The Committee added, however, that the Governor and Council were the

best judges of what ought to be done in the present critical situation

strongly recommending that the Council acted in the way most likely to
2
increase trade. Again, during the 1767 invasion scare, the Committee

1. Non-involvement in African politics was the "official" policy of

all the European Companies, although conditions on the coast
often made the pursuit of such a policy impracticable. The major
consideration, of course, was that expense should be kept as
low as possible, See e.g. T 70/69 Committee of the Company of
Merchants trading to Africa to Governor Y/illiam Mutter and Council,
Cape Coast Castle, dated 29th October, 1765*
2. T 70/69 Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to African
to Governor Jobi Hippisley and Council, Cape Coast Castle, dated
3rd September, 1766.
 -223-

gave no definite indication of support for the Fantis. They pointed

out that it was not easy to decide about this, and that they would

try to get the further views of the Board of Trade and Plantations and
1
of Merchants in London, Bristol and Liverpool. Because of this cautious

approach, and the desire not to be involved in African politics, it

was with grave misgivings that the Committee received a report of the

Council's resolution of August, 1772. They immediately consulted the

Board of Trade and Plantations, which expressed disapproval, of the

action taken at Cape Coast Castle. Both the Board and the Committee

regretted that the Governor and Council did not apply to the Dutch

to try and resolve the problem jointly, and pointed out that they had

acted irregularly in committing themselves to support of the Fantis

before doing this. In April and December 1773> the Committee informed

Governor David Mill of this, and ordered him categorically to act in

2
accordance with their letter of 10th December, 1772.

The truth of the matter was that the British officers on the

Gold Coast were in a complete dilemma. In the first place, it was not

easy to work in co-operation with the Dutch, as the Committee bf

Merchants and the Board of Trade and Plantations had supposed. As

Governor Petrie pointed out, the Company's servants believed that on

the Gold Coast, and, indeed, "in every other part of the world where

the Dutch are o u t Neighbours, it has been a maxim in their political

1. T 70/69 Letter from the Committee of the Company of Merchants

trading to Africa to Governor Gilbert Petrie and the Council,
Cape Coast Castle, dated 17th November, 1767-
2. T 70/69 Gommittee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa
to Governor David Mill and Council, Cape Coast Castle, dated
19th April, and 10th December, 1773*
 -224-

conduct from which they seldom if ever err, to aggrandise themselves

with the Natives on whom we are both dependent and supplanting us

to the utmost of their power". Dutch and Ashanti co-operation was

a fact, and it was widely held in Cape Coast Castle that even if the

conquering Ashantis allowed them to keep their forts, the bulk of

the Gold Coast trade would go to the Dutch* On the other hand,

although the Fantis were difficult to deal with from a commercial

point of view, the British had had a long trading connection with
2
them, and it was largely through Fanti assistance that they had been

able to hold their own in the face of bitter rivalry with the Dutch*

Indeed, Governor David Hill summed up the British position well when

he wrote, in 1772, that the Company's servants had a difficult part

to play between the two nations, and neutrality would be the best

course for them to pursue* But, he added, how could they remain

neutral when their forts were situated in the country of one of the

parties concerned?^

Nevertheless, the Europeans ought not to have been worried,

because the evidence suggests that the Ashantis had no intention of

renewing their conflietstwith the Fantis during this period. The army

sent against the Akyems, was intended as a punitive measure, and since

1. ABM 1/1310 Copy of a letter from Governor Gilbert Petrie to the

Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated
6th November, 17&7*
2. For documents relating to early English trade with the Gold
Coast,see J.W. Blake, Europeans in West Africa* 1450-1560*
(Eakhuyt Society. Second Series No.LXXXVTI, 1942)",Vol.II.
3* T 70/31 Governor David Kill, Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee
of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 22nd June
1772. The important British settlements of Cape Coast Castle and
Fort William, Anomabo, were all located in the Fanti country.
 -225-

the Wassas, the Denkyeras and the Twifos had voluntarily reaffirmed

their loyalty to the Asantehene, and had promised to keep open the

trade routes, Ashanti traders could travel to the coast without

difficulty. The major reason, however, seemed to have been that it

was during the period 1768-1772 that an Ashanti army moved northwards
1
and conquered Dagomba.

There is reason to believe that Ashanti had sane kind of

influence in the Dagomba area before the advent of Osei Kwadwo.

Ashanti's thrust into the Gonja area during the reigp of Cpoku Ware

must have had an impact on the Dagcaribas. But this probably amounted

to no more than trading rights up the north-east trade route, through

Salaga and Yendi to Hausaland. Ashanti influence, however, tended

to grow as a result of this, and eventually led to a more effective

invasion. This was possible because Dagomba was weakened by internal

dissensions. It is related that Na Saa Ziblim of Kpatina, a nephew

of Gariba, the King of Dagomba, schemed to gain the throne of

Dagomba, and this resulted in civil war. Na Saa Ziblim then invited

the Ashantis to help him, and Osei Kwadwo, apparently realising the

political and economic benefits which would result from the conquest

of Dagomba, accepted the invitation. Kwame Pete, the Adontehene of

1. I am indebted to Professor Page for furnishing me with the gist

of some versions of Dagomba traditional history which he and
the late Dr. David Tait collected. On earlier traditional
accounts of Dagomba history, hcwever, see F. Tamakloe, A Brief
History of the Dagomba
C.G. Reindorf, History, op.cit.,pp.132-33*
Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty. 1921, pp*34“35*
Prof. Fage believes that the reign lengths of the Dagomba
kings provided by Tamakloe were seme 50-60 years too early.
He places: Na Sa Ziblim 1770-85
Ziblim Bandamda 1785-1809
 -226-

of Kumasi, was detailed to invade Dagomba, and although the Dagombas

opposed the Ashantis with superior numbers, they were eventually

defeated because they wielded bows and arrows, spears and javelin,

whereas the Ashanti were armed with muskets* As a result of this

defeat, Dagomba became a tribute-paying vassal of Ashanti. Kwame

Pete was given the overall charge of the administration but, as

Bowdich discovered, the effective government of the Dagcmba state

continued to be in the hands of its own king and chiefs, who ruled

according to the traditional laws and constitution of the Dagomba

people. But the Dagomba capital and large towns were made to pay
1
each year a handsome tribute to Kumasi.

That it was in the time of Gariba and Osei Kwadwo that

Dagomba became fully tributary to Ashanti, is supported by quite

independent evidence, that of the tradition of the Dagomba Kambonse.

Kambonse is, of course, the Dagomba word for Ashanti, but it also

refers to the musketeers in the.Dagomba army, who were equipped and

trained by Ashanti, and who have Ashanti day names. The Dagomba

Kambonse have their own separate traditions, which suggest that they

were founded in or about 1770.

After the subjugation of the Dagombas, Ashanti's relations

with her neighbours became less turbulent. Although no formal peace

had been concluded between them and the Fantis, Ashanti and Fanti

1. The annual tribute paid by the capital and large towns of

Dagomba in return for Ashanti protection was: 500 slaves,
200 cattle, 400 sheep, 400 cotton cloths, and 200 cotton
and silk clfcths.
Bowdich, Mission... .Ashantee* 1819, pp.320-1. Dupuis also
noted that Ashanti influence carried "great weight" in the
Councils of Dagomba. Dupuis, 1824, op.cit., pt.2, XXXIX
 -227-

traders met freely for the purposes of trade at the markets on the

northern border of Fanti. Trade prospects on the G-old Coast were

so good during the mid-seventies that Governor Mill noted, in 1775*

that "so far from any dispute between the Shan tees and Fantees,

there is now and has been during the course of last year, so free an

intercourse of Trade, that a far greater number of slaves were

exported in 1774 than in any one year....” Again, in November 1777*

the report was that there was peace in the country, and that “slaves

are very plenty".1

The active reigp of Osei Ifoadwo ended in 1777, the Dutch

at Accra heard of his death in November, of that year, and Boakye,

an Ashanti envoy there, had to return to Ashanti because of the

event. The British at Cape Coast Castle also first refer to the
2
event in January 1778. By the end of his reign, the counter-balancing

alliance , aimed at preventing the Ashantis from reaching the coast

for firearms, and thereby checking Ashanti’s further expansion, had

broken up. This was brought about, in part, by the king’s own

exertions, but largely because the alliance itself was on the point

of disintegration. Akyem was defeated, /whilst Denkyera, Wassa and

Twifo voluntarily submitted. In pursuit of this objective, hpwever,

the Ashaitis had to come in conflict with the Fantis, their former

allies, in whose country the Ashanti armyhad encamped. The resultant

tension forced both the Dutch and the British, w hose trade was
Y
1. T 70/32 Letters from Governor Richard Miles, Cape Coast Castle, to the
Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 15 th
April, 1773, end 20th November, 1777*
2. T 70/32 Letters from Governor Richard Miles, Cape Coast Caltle, to the
Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa, dated 19th
and 31 January, 1778, and 2 5 th June, 1778.
 -228-

affeeted by the stoppage of the trade routes, to take cognizance

of the prospect of Ashanti as the dominant political power on the

coast. In the event, the two European nations were forced to take

opposite sides. Whereas the Dutch were not opposed to Ashanti*s

political aims, the British were determined that the seaboard should

be under divided political control, and therefore were inclined to

support the Fantis against Ashanti. Furthermore, since Ashanti

already exercised some kind of authority in the Gonja area, the

defeat of Dagomba made her the dominant political power in the

Northern Region of modern Ghana. This fact mot only made it

possible for Ashanti to have capable fighting men, but also she

became the chief source of slaves in the whole Gold Coast.

A
 CHAPTER VI
ASHANTI 1777-1807

The change of ruler in Ashanti was not followed up by any

deterioration in Ashanti’s relations with the coastal peoples. In

January 1778, Richard Miles, the Governor of Cape Coast Castle,

referred to ”the death of Zey Cocmah, King of Ashantee1*, and he

expressed the hope that the event would not cause ”any very great

Revolution either in the trade or politics of the country....” In

June of the same year, it was reported that 0seifs death had brought

no change in the favourable commercial position of the Gold Coast.

On the contrary, Osei Kwame, the new Asantehene, had sent messengers

to the King of Wassa requesting him to send messengers to the Fantis

”to learn whether they are amicably disposed towards them and, also,

whether they will accept the presents usually given on the occasion
1
of a King’s death”. Indeed, from a commercial point of view, there

was no need for the Ashantis to create disturbances on the coast.

Ashanti traders travelled along the Wassa and Akyem paths to the coast \

without difficulty. The only trade route still closed to them was the

Assin path which led to the European settlements at Anomabo, Mouree,

Kormantsi and Cape Coast. This was because the Fantis only allowed

the Ashanti traders to reach the markets at the northern borders of

the Fanti country. Even so, there was the possibility that the

Ashanti government could reach a peaceful agreement with the Fantis

to allow the Ashanti traders to reach the forts at Cape Coast,

1. T 7Q/32 Letters from Governor Richard Miles, Governor of Cape

Coast Castle, to the Committee of the Company of Merchants
trading to Africa, dated 19th and 31st January, and 25th June, 1778.
Osei Kwadwo was also kno\vn as Osei Kuma, Osei the Younger, because
Opoku Ware was also known as Osei Opoku.
 -230-

Anomabo and the neighbouring beaches. Indeed, shortly before his

death, Osei Kwadwo apparently undertook such negotiations for, in

1775, he sent messengers to inform the British at Cape Coast Castle

that Hhe wanted to open a market nearer the waterside than before”,

and that the Fantis had already agreed to allow him to do so. The

Ashanti messengers also informed the British that the Asantehene

”is determined to forget all former differences and to live in the

1
strictest amity with the Fantees” .

Nevertheless, there were two main reasons why the Ashantis

wished to maintain good relations with the coastal peoples during

this period. Firstly, in the early 1780*5, the Ashanti kingdom was

in a very disturbed state. According to a report from Cape Coast

Castle, Osei Kwame was a minor when he bacame king, and therefore he

was "governed entirely by his mother” . On the 8th October 1780, the

Governor and Council of Cape Coast Castle noted that it was difficult

to get a proper account of the condition of Ashanti, but that so far

as could be ascertained the Queen Mother’s interference in the

government of Ashanti "has thrown that once populous and powerful

2
country into great disorder so as to weaken it very mpah”• Secondly,

apparently as a result of the disturbances in Ashanti, the tributary

1. T 70/32 Letter from Governor David Mill, Cape Gbast Castle, to

the Committee of the Company of Merchants trading to Africa,
dated the 30th December, 1775*
2. T 70/32 Letter from Richard Miles, Cape Coast Castle, to the
Committee of Merchants, dated the 31st January, 1778.
Ibid., copy of a letter from the Governor and Council at Cape
Coast Castle to the Committee of the Company of Merchants
trading to Africa, dated 8th October, 1780.
 -231-

state of Dagomba seized the opportunity to regain its independence*

In October 1780, and again in February 1781, news reached Cape Coast

Castle that Ashanti was in a state of war and confusion because "a

very powerful people, named Duncoes formerly subjects of the King

of Ashantee11 had revolted, and that "in two or three actions the

Duncoes have had the advantage over the Ashantees”, so that that
1
kingdom was in a very critical situation. It is difficult to know

who were the "Donkos" because this was a general term used by the

Akan-speaking peoples to refer to the peoples of the Norther Region

of modern Ghana, But, according to some versions of Dagomba tradition,

the Dagombas revolted against Ashanti danination during the reign

2
of Na Zibilim Bandamda, a contemporary of Osei Kwame,

By 1783, however, peace had been restored in Ashanti, for

in that year some Ashanti troops entered Appolonia and sacked the

town of "Arvin", whilst Ashanti traders were reported to be at the

European forts at Accra, Moreover, Osei Kwame, who had apparently

gained control of affairs in Ashanti, in the early 1790*s, felt able

to accept an invitation from the Danes at Christiansborg Castle, Accra,

1. C,0,267/20 Copy of a letter from the Governor and Council at

Cape Caost Castle, to the African Committee, dated 3rd
February, 1781.
I1 70/32 Copy of a letter from Governor and Council, Cape Coast
Castle, to Committee, dated 8th October, 1780,
2. Professor J.D. Fage - Personal communication. Fage was told
that during the Dagomba revolt "whitemen Y/ere in Ashanti".
This is hard to believe. But it was likely since it was
during_this period that the Danes sent Hans Borgensen, a
v/hite man, to Kumasi, to solicit Ashanti military help against
the Popos. See pp. X O 9- ^feelcw.
3. T 70/33 Letter from Governor and Council, Cape Coast Castle, to
the Committee of Merchants, dated 9th July, 1783*
to assist them with a body of troops to fight the Little Popos.

The Danish invitation to the Ashantis had its origins in

European rivalry on the coast, and its interaction on African politics

^uring the second half of the eighteenth century, the strip of coast

between Accra and the mouth of the river Volt a became extremely

important for the slave trade. There v/ere two main reasons for

this. Firstly, the hinterland of this coast was dominated by the

Akwamus, who raided the Krepis, the Kwawus and the neighbouring people

for slaves. Secondly, the Ashantis, as we have noted, used the trade

routes through Akwamu to the coast whenever the western trading paths

were closed to them. In view of this fact, the European trading

Companies strove to establish forts or lodges in that area, to

supplement the numerous ships which traded there. In 1764, for

example, Governor William Hutter prayed the Committee of Ilerchants

in London to rebuild their lodge at ”Lay about 14 or 15 leagues to

leeward of Accra". LIutter pointed out that the trade which came to

Accra at that time came mostly from Akwamu, but that v/hen the Akwamus

and other inland traders were prevented from going to Accra by the

Krobos, they y/ent to the Danish fort at Ningo, which lay about 11 or

12 leagues to the east of Accra; or to another Danish factory at

Ada, and, sometimes, to Little Popo. Ee argued that if the English

built a fort at Lay "you would in a great measure cut out all other

nations; for as the path from Aquamboe to Lay, does not go near the

Crobo Hills, and as Lay is situate some leagues nearer the market than

any European settlement in that country, you may from thence judge
 -233-

what advantage you would reap by the situation of your fort"',

furthermore, if it was objected, Mutter wrote, that the Danish

factory at Ada, which was situated on an island in the River Volta,

would still have the advantage of Lay, "I must inform you that by

the course of the River, Lay is nearer Aquamboe than Addah; besides,

this factory of the Danes, which is only a thatched House, is so

badly supplied in goods, and their affairs in general so indifferently

managed, that by far the greatest part of the trade would centre at

Lay: where not only a considerable quantity of ivory would be yearly

bought, but the very best of slaves of any on the Gold Coast called

Cripees". In the 1780* s, too, the Committee was again warned that

the Danes were engrossing the bulk of the trade east of Accra, because

apart from their forts or lodges at Ada, Keta and Little Popo, they

were also "attempting to effect a settlement or factory at Whydah where

their Vice-President was ashore, negotiating treaties with the natives".

Indeed, by their long trading connection in this area, the Danes had

come to exercise political influence on the coastal peoples,which

tended to squal the influence wielded by the British and the Dutch on

the coast west of Accra. They forbade the African traders to trade

with the ships and interlopers of other European nations, and they

1. T 70/31 William Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee

of Merchants, dated 10th January, 17&4*
According to the Danish Governor Kipnasse, the slaves
designated "Crepess" (Krepis), fetched higher prices in the West
Indies than even the "DonRos" from the north. See V.G.K.
Kipnasse, Pro Memoriam, dated 26th May 1781, entered in the
Guinea Journal.
2. T 70/33 Copy of a letter from Governor and Council, Cape Coast
Castle, to th& Committee of Merchants, dated 9th July, 1785.
 -234-

often instigated the Africans under their forts to attack the Dutch

and English forts in the neighbourhood. E’er instance, in September

1790, the English reported that some Ningo people and Danish "Company

slaves” led by the second-in-command of the Danish fort at Ningo,

marched to Prampram by night and seized two children of Kofi Bruce,

a mulatto sergeant in the English service, and an Ashanti trader, and

carried them away. The English believed that the seizure of the

Ashanti trader was intended to ”cramp the British trade, and strike

terror in the Ashantees, and other countries to prevent their trading

-j
with the English which ought to remain free and open to both nations”.

Again, in March 1791, the report was that the Danish Governor Biorn

travelled to ”leevvard to endeavour to bring the people of Ada, Padioura

and Aogaga” to grant him an exclusive right to the trade of those

places and to urge them never to trade with the English ships in

future. The peoples of the Lower Volta refused to accede to BiDrn’s

request, and the Governor ordered the destruction of the towns by

2
fire, which was done.
*7
^or these reasons the English also intrigued with the Popos,

the Ketas and the neighbouring peoples to prevent the Danes from

engrossing the whole trade in that area. In 1783> Latse, described as

”a Caboceer of the English Company”, and a number of the principal

chiefs of Little Popo, sent messengers to the Governor of Cape Coast

1. T 7 0 /1 3 6 3 Extract of an account of a Council Meeting held

at Cape Coast Castle on the 4th October, 1790.
2. T 70/1363 Duplicate of a letter from the Council at Cape
Coast Castle, to the Committee of Merchants, dated the
1st March, 1791#
 -235-

Castle, praying him to establish a fart or factory in their town,

in order to "protect them from the encroachments of the Danes",

1
and to prombte the interests of the English Company* Moreover,

according to Governor Biorn, the Ketas and the people of their

fishing towns, Angoja and Pottebra, murdered a Danish factor, Mr*

Thessen, who was returning from a visit to Popo, on the grounds that

the Danes had given protection to "Prince Okaitkee", who claimed the

Popo Stool as the rightful successor to the late Popo king. The Popos

attacked the Danish fort in their town, and forced the factor there

to surrender all the goods and slaves in the fort to them. They then

marched to Aflao, looted the goods in the Danish lodge there, and set

fire to it* The Popos finally joined the Ketas and attacked the
2
Danish fort at Keta.

Because the peoples of the Lower Volta were known to enjoy

the support of the British, the Danes decided to enlist the support

of the Ashantis and the Akwamus to fight them. Biorn sent factor
q /
^ Bans Borg^sen to Osei Kwame, praying him to send between 10,000 and

12,000 armed men to help the Danes against the Popos and their allies.

A second embassy also left Christiansborg Castle for Akwamu to ask

King Akoto for military help. The Akwamuhene was then engaged in

some wars with the neighbouring peoples, so he could not promise any

help to the Danes. Osei Kwame, however, agreed to assist the Danes,

1* T 70/33 Copy of a letter from the Governor and Council at Cape

Coast Castle, to the Committee of Merchants, dated 9th July, 1785»
2. T 70 /13 65 Duplicate of a latter from A.R. Biorn, Christiansborg
Castle, Accra, to Governor Archibald Dalzel, Cape Coast Castle,
dated 6th May, 1792.
 -236-

and be promised to despatch an Ashanti war-lord, Kwansa, with 10,000

troops to the coast, provided the Danes undertook to pay him 500
1
pereguans or 20,000 rix dollars.

The prospect of an Ashanti entry to the coast revived the

British fears that the Ashantis contemplated political domination of

the seaboard. William Roberts, the factor at James Port, Accra, for

instance, declared that 11should the Shan tees come down to Mr. Biornts

assistance (which we have no doubt but they will unless some measures

are adopted to put a stop to them), they will not only stop all

trade but render Mr. Biorn*s power superior to our own, even joined

with the Dutch, and in all probability bring about his much wished
2
for plan of unlimited power over this country from Winneba to Whydah.."

For these reasons, Archibald Dalzel, who had become Governor of Cape

Coast Castle, protested to the Danish Governor to desist ftom inviting

the Ashantis to the coast. Dalzel denounced the territorial ambitions

of the Danes in the Lower Volta area, and declared that he did not

believe that "any nation whatever (the natives excepted) have any title

to the territory of Popo, superior to the British". He pointed out

that the Britich did not acknowledge the sovereignty of the Danes over

Popo, nor their exclusive right to the navigation of the River Volta.

1. V.G-.K. Biorn's Pro Memorialdn Guinea Journal, dated

24th April 1792, and 24th January, 1793•
Xbid., Baron Von Hager, dated 14th March, 1793*
T 70/1565 William Roberts, James Fort, Accra, to
John Gordon, dated 29th March, 1792.
2. T 70/1565 William Roberts, James Fort, Accra, to
John Gordon, dated 29th March, 1792.
 -237-

The British, he wrote, had ;a right to trade on every part of Africa

11not actually possessed by European Powers”, and warned that he

would protect British subjects settled at Popo or 11elsewhere on the

coast of Africa.11 To this, the Danish Governor replied that he

was also determined to protect the interests of the King of Denmark.

in Africa, and ”to preserve European honour and "security” in the

2
Lower Volta area.

Since the Danes were determined to assert their political

sovereignty over the peoples of the Lower Volta, and were equally bent

upon soliciting the help of the Ashantis and the Akwamus to back up

their claims, the British decided to act in concert with the Dutch at

Elmina to check them. On 28th April 1792, Dalzel wrote to Governor

Jacobus De Veer that he had received “repeated advises of the ambitious

designs of the Danish Governor of Christiansborg, an usurper who has

made many encroachments on the rights of the Dutch as well as the

British”, and requested that De Veer should join him in treating .

3
Biorn ”as a disturber of the peace”. After a few days* consultations,

the British and the Dutch issued a statement denying Danish territorial

claims in the Volta area, and denouncing Governor Biorn for inviting

the Ashantis to interfere in the affairs of the coast. The statement

claimed that Popo was a free trade area where both the Dutch and the

1. T 70/1565 A.Dalzel, Cape Coast Castle, to A.R. Bicxrn,

dated 2nd Kay, 1792.
2, Ibid., A.R. Biorn, Chriehiansborg Castle, Accra, to A.
Dalzel, dated 12th May, 1792.
3# Ibid., A. Dalzel, Cape Coast Castle, to Jacobus De Veer,
Governor in' chief of Elmina, dated 28th April, 1792.
 -238-
i

British flags had been hoisted for a long time. Besides, they

empowered lleers Roberts and Lieftinck Mto send a message to the King

of Ashantee to represent the danger to which he would expose himself

by his interference in this business”, Furthermore, Roberts and

a Dutch factor, Coppeling, were sent to Popo in order to Mgive the

1
natives of that town assurances of Anglo -Dutch protection" • As

soon as he learnt of this, Governor Biorn denounced Anglo-Dutch

pretensions and declared that the Danes had had a factory at Popo

for more than a century, and that the Popos had always lived under

the protection of the Danish flag. Apart from this, Biorn argued,

the Popos had received monthly payments of ground rent as well as

"Sundays Custom and New Year1s presents". Also, the Danes had often

assisted the Popos by giving them loans to enable them to buy guns

and powder to wage wars against their neighbours. Furthermore, Biorn

said that no other European nation had had a factory at Popp, and that

"the only trade your respective nation have made at Popo has, and

! always has been, by passing Captains for a short time". Finally, he

j
| pointed out that his invitation to the Ashantis could not be construed
i
i
as being against European interests, because "every nation have a right

and it is a custom to send messengers and presents, etc., etc., to

2
Asianthee".

1# Ibid. Copy of Anglo-Dutch Resolution, dated 3rd I'ay, 1792,

Signed by A. Dalzel and W. Roberts for the Committee of
Merchants and D. Lieftinck and J.H. Sachees, for the Dutch
G-overnor-General De Veer.
I 2, T 70/15© Letters from A.R, Biorn, Christiansborg Castle,
Accra, to A. Dalzel, Cape Coast Castle, dated 6th and
12±h Hay, 1792.
 -239-

Governor Biorn*s claims,, howevep, Mevaporated in smoke”,

because the British Board of Trade and Plantations made strong

representations to the Danish authorities in Copenhagen, and Biorn

7/as recalled* His successor, Andreas Hammer, ?/as instructed to

discontinue negotiations with the Ashantis, which he did, though ”not

without heavy expenses disbursed by the Danes****11.

After the invasion scare of 1792, Ashanti*s relations with

the coastal peoples were more peaceful. The main reason for this was

that, in the late 1790*s, Ashanti was in a very disturbed state. It

would seem that Csei Kv/ame was not ’’the most merciful of the race of

kings” who prohibited many customs that involved human sacrifice as the

Koslems of Kumasi told Dupuis in the early years of the nineteenth

2
century* On the contrary, contemporary evidence suggests that he

was a tyrant whose cruel deeds ultimately plunged the Ashanti kingdom

into civil war* In November 1797* Danish Governor Yfriesberg reported

from Christiansborg Castle, Accra, that there were civil disturbances

in Ashanti* The reasons for this urere that Osei Kwame had killed by

poison Osei Opoku, his brother and heir-apparent to the Ashanti Stool;

that in a similar manner he had murdered another member of the royal

family, called Opoku Amankwa, for no other reason that that the latter

was the most handsome person in Ashanti; and, finally, that the king

had caused to be killed about 1400 or 1500 people who v/ent to Kumasi

to take part in the funeral ceremonies of the murdered princes. For

1. T 7Q/33 Letters from A* DalzeloGape Coast Castle, to the

Committee of Merchants, dated the 12th October, 1792, and
7th February, 1793*
2* Dupuis, Journal .in Ashanti. 1824, P*243*
 -240-

these reasons, "Akranduas", the Queen Hot her, enlisted the support

of a great number of the Ashantis to destool him* Osei Kwame was

arrested and put in irons in his palace, whereas his supporters,

including the king's most trusted "General", were executed. Wriesberg

conmented that there could be no end to the disturbances in Ashanti

until the king died, and he blamed the fetish priests.in Ashanti for
1
the king's tyrannical regime.

The fundamental factors underlying Osei Kwame's unpopularity

were "his attachment to the i.Ioslems and, as it is related,’, his

inclination to establish the Koranic law for the civil code of the

empire". The Ashanti chiefs could not tolerate the adoption of Islam

as the official cult of the kingdom because, as Busia pointed out,

Ashanti religion and, indeed, that of the Akan-speaking peoples as

a whole, "is mainly ancestor-worship"• There were other practical

reasons for its rejection, however. The Kumasi chiefs feared "that

the lloslem religion,. y/hich they well knew levels all ranks and orders

of men, and places them at the arbitrary discretion of the sovereign,

might be introduced, whereby they would lose that ascendancy they

now enjoy. To anticipate tbfe calamity they dreaded, a conspiracy was

entered into".^ In the circumstances, Gsei Kwame, who could not

publicly dare to avow his new faith, fled, with the Golden StooJ. of

Ashanti, to the provincial capital of Dwaben and, failing to return

1. V.G.K. Letter frcm Johan P. Wriesberg, to the Directors,

dated 6th November, 1797* Copy in the Guinea Journal,
N0.365.
2. Dupuis, 1824, p.245*
3. Busia, The Position of the Chief ..,, 1951, p* 2-3
4. Dupuis, 1824, p.245*
 -241-

to Kumasi, he was destooled.

The deposition of Osei Kwame provoked a violent reaction

in the Moslem north-west of the kingdom. Gyaman raised the standard

of revolt in order to restor Osei Kwame to the throne, and the Moslem

Dyula state of Kong lent its support. The allied cavalry crossed

the Tano but the new king of Ashanti, Opoku 11, allowed the invaders

to extend themselves over the grassland area, whilst the Ashanti

armies assBmbled. In a series of battles, the rebels were defeated

with great slaughter, and a number of prisoners taken. Among the

prisoners "were upward of five thousand Moslems, v/ho were distributed

among the provinces and in the capital. In no instance were these

people subjected to the penalty of death, as many of the heathens

2
were, neither were they sold into slavery". The king of Gyaman, who

had initiated the revolt was replaced by that Adinkira who was later
3
to be killed in the Ashanti-Gyaman war of 1819*

........ Nevertheless, there was no Immediate peace in the north-west

of the empire. Opoku II died shortly after the victory against the

Gyamans, arri. this event encouraged further attempts to restore the

L
deposed Osei Kwame to the throne. Osei Tutu Kwame , who succeeded

Opoku, was Immediately faced with a rebellion in western Gonja, from

the Moslem states of Ghofe (Gbuipe) and Ghobagho (Daboya). Banda was

sacked, and its King Fua was slain before the Ashanti forces were able

1. Bowdich, Mission...Ashantee.1819. pp.238-240.

2. Dupuis, 1824, PP *245-7•
3* Bowdich, 1819, PP« 244-3$ Dupuis, 1824, pp.xxvii.
Adinkira1s skull was still retained at Kumasi at the
beginning of this century. See Rattray, Religion and Art.'
1927, P . 132.
4. Osei Tutu Kwame is now more usually referred to as
Osei Asibe Bonsu.
 -242-

to engage the rebel arny. In a series of battles, the Gonjas were

defeated at a place north of Kintampo, and pursued across the river

Volta into their own territory, where the Ashanti army again

attacked them* The chief of Gbuipe was captured, and died in the
1
Ashanti camp. The Gyaman troops, led by Adinkira, extended the
2
campaign northwards, and attacked Bouna* This led to another

uprising in Bondoukou, where an attenpt was made to supplant

Adinkira as king of Gyaman by a nephew of his predecessor, who

3
had earlier sought tefuge in Gbuipe. The Bondoukou rebellion was

I quickly suppressed, and the north-west finally settled down to enjoy

i
i

a period of peace. The underlying factor in its pacification, however,

! appears to have been the execution of Osei Kwame in 1803, or early

! _ 4
\ in 1804, for with that event vanished any immediate hopes of having
i
!

! upon the throne of Ashanti a king who,, although not a.practising

5
Iloslem, was ”a believer at heart”.
i
i
In the circumstances, Osei Tutu Kwame began his reign ”an
i
! avowed eneny to the religion of Islam”. It is related that ”he put
[
| g

j anumber of the ’Prophet1s children* to death in his country” . Since

i
the Koslems of the north-west, and in particular the policy of Kong,
! 7
| was considered ”directly inimical to that of the court of Ashantee”,

1* Dupuis, 1824, p.248.

2. Bowdich, 1819, pp.237*8, and 301.
3. Dupuis, 1824, p.249. Adinkira was considered ”a tool
of the Court of Cocmassy” .
4. Bowdich, 1819, PP.239*40.
Priestley and Wilks, in Journ.Afr.Hist., 19^0, p.95
3. Dupuis, 1824, p.245*
6. Dupuis, 1824, p.98.
7. Bowdich, 1819, p. 181.
Dupuis, 1824, p.xxxvi.
 -243-

Ashanti traders tended not to frequent the north-west trade route.

Instead, in the early nineteenth c entury, the bulk of trade went

through Salaga and Yendi to the Bussa crossing of the Niger, and

so xnto Hausaland.

Nevertheless, whatever had been the severity of Osei Tutu

Kwame!s persecution of the Moslems, his attitude soon changed to one

of toleration, and then of patronage. Ashanti still needed the gold

and ivory of Gyaman, and Kong. Bowdich discovered that the Ashantis
2
"procure most of their ivory from Kongf1, and Dupuis also noticed

that the gold brought down to Ashanti ftom Gyaman was often in solid
3
lumps embedded in loam, and rock. Moreover, Ashanti traders were
4
still visiting the towns beyond Kong, although by circuitous routes.

Moreover, Osei Tutu Kwame, Dupuis reported, "does not neglect to

supplicate the Moslems for their prayers, particularly when anxiety,

when the state council in convened on business of emergency, or when

the national priests or necromancers are unable to solve any problem

5
to the satisfaction of majesty". Indeed, when Osei Tutu Kwame, at

the head of his armies, entered the coast in 1807, to fight the Fantis,

Governor Torrane noticed that he was attended by "many Moors, and every

Asbantee man ha3 a Gregory or Fitiseh, which is a little square cloth

1. According to Dupuis, this was "the track of amity and

alliance", Dupuis, 1824, p.cviii.
2. Bowdich, 1819, p*332.
3. Dupuis, 1824, pt.2, p.lvi.
4. Ibid., pp.xv and cvii.
5* Ibid., p.xi. For a useful summary of the activities of
the Moslems in Ashanti during Osei Bonsu*s reign, see,
I. V/ilks, "Islam in Ashanti", in The Norther FacAbr in
Ashanti History. (Gloucester, 1961), op.cit., "pp.14-29*
 -244-

1
inclosing some little sentences of the Alkoran,* some have many”•

It would seem, however, that the worsening of Ashanti's relations

with the Fantis soon after his accession must have been the main

factor underlying the Asantehene's desire to be on friendly terms

with the Moslem states of the kingdom. Since the Fantis were kncwm

to enjoy the support of the Eritish traders, on the coast, Osei and

his chiefs must have considered that it was necessary to maintain

the Ashanti forces at full strength. Thus it was probably thought

unreasonable to allow internal dissensions to dissipate the military

capacity of the kingdom,

Y/e have indicated that Osei Kwadwo got the Fantis to agree

that the Ashantis should establish a market nearer the coast and,

also, to promise to live in peace with the Ashantis* The Fantis did

not keep their word, for there were a number of occasions when it

was reported that the Fantis had closed the trade routes to Ashanti

traders* For instance, in December 1780, the English reported that

Ashanti traders were at Accra and Appolonia, but that none could go

to Cape Coast Castle and the neighbouring beaches partly because the

Ashantis "will not go on Salt Water", and partly because "the Fantees

will not let them pass through their country"* Again, in 1789, the

report was that the trade routes had been closed, and the Governor of

1* T 70/35Copy of a letter from Governor Colonel George Torrane,

Cape Coast Castle, to the Committee of Merchants trading to
Africa, dated 9th July, 1807*
2, T 70/33 Copy of a letter from Governor and Council, Cape Coast
Castle, to the Committee of Merchants, dated 24th December, 1780.
"Salt Y/ater", of course, is the sea.
 -245-

Cape Coast Castle had sent three officers to \7assa "partly to

satisfy their curiosity, hut particularly to endeavour to convince

Enemery the King of that country of the many advantages that v/ould

avise to both them and the English by sending theirs and the Ashantee

trade to the waterside without the interference of the Fantees".

The report added that the Fantis "are too politick and too powerful

a people, to permit the inland blacks to bring their own Trade to

1
Market anywhere near the Fantee territories". Also, in 1800,

Governor Dalzel noted that "the trading paths have for many months

past been shut up by a misunderstanding between the Fan tees and the

Ashantees", and that this had led to "a great stagnation of trade
2
at Annamaboe where there is much competition". It is clear, the}

that by 1800, frustration in the commercial field, coupled with the

fact that the Ashantis wished to avenge the injustice meted out to

them during the reign of Osei Kwadwo, brought the relations between

the two countries nearer to a final breakdown. A small incident

occurred within the Ashanti kingdom itself which ultimately led to

Ashanti-Fanti conflicts with disastrous results for the latter.

During this period, the Assin country was ruled by three

chiefs: Tsibu (Cheeboo), Aputei and Amo Adae. It is related^ that

1* T 70/33 Copy of a letterfrom Governorand Council, Cape Coast

Castle, to the Committee of Merchants, dated 26th January, 1789*
2. T 70/34 Copy of a letter from A. Dalzel, Governor of Cape Coast
Castle, to the Committee of Merchants, dated 13th October, 1800.
3. This episode is fairly well documented. See e.g.
Dupuis, 1824, pp.250-64. W.W. Claridge, History, 1915, op.cit.
A #B. Ellis, A History of the Gold Coast, (London,1893)
For an eye-witness account, see H. Meredith, Account of the Gold
Coast of Africa,(London, 1812). pp*132-5* Meredith was the
second-in-command at Anomabo fort.
 -246-

a wealthy subject of Amo died, and in accordance with the custom of

the country, he was buried with some gold ornaments, and other

precious stones and beads. Soon afterwards, one of Tsibu1s people

rifled the grave of Amo1s deceased subject, and escaped with the

treasure. Amo appealed to Tsibu and Aputei to punish the culprit,

and to return the stolen goods, but his appeals fell on deaf ears.

Amo then appealed to the Asantehene, and after the matter had been

gone into, it was decided in favour of Amo. Aputei was detained in

Kumasi as a hostage until restitution should be made. He soon made

his escape, and when at liberty, he refused to abide by the decision

of the Ashanti court. Amo then assembled his armies, attacked, and

defeated his enemies. The Asantehene intervened to restore order.

He sent messengers including heralds to settle the differences among

the Assin chiefs, but his msssEngers were killed. After repeated

warnings, vdiich were all ignored, the Ashanti army joined Amo Adae's

forces, and marched on the armies of Tsibu and Aputei. The. latter

party was defeated, and the rebel leaders escaped to Fanti, and

appealed to the Fan$i chiefs for protection. The Asantehene appealed

to the Fantis to return Tsibj* and Aputei, but the Fantis, after a

great meeting held at Abora, refused to accede to the king's request.

The Ashantis then declared war on the Fantis. Between 1806 and 1807

a number of bloody battles were fought between the two peoples. The

Fantis were first defeated at Oboka, in the Abora state, and then fell

1. Oboka (Buinka) is now a small village in the Abora state.

 -247-

back on Abora, the capital. The Ashanti forces advanced and laid

siege to the town, Abora fell, and Ata, the Omanhene of Abora state,

became a prisoner of the Ashantis. The Ashantis then destroyed

Mankessim, and other important Fanti tov/ns, and followed up their

victories by advancing on Anomabo, where a number of the Fantis and

the Assins had sought refuge. After encamping for a short wiile at

Kcrmantsi, where the Dutch factor there apparently sold them some

muskets and powder, the Ashantis moved on Anomabo, defeated the remnant

forces of the Fantis, and then attacked the English fort there,

fatally wounding the factor, Y/hite.

At this point, Governor George Torrane, of Cape Coast

Castle, intervened. Torrane had not only promised to hel£> the Fantis,

but also he had actually allowed Tsibu and Aputei to seek refuge in

Cape Coast, promising the Assin chiefs that he would protect them
1
"either by mediation or force of arms". But since the Fantis had

been completely defeated, and the Anomabo fort was on the verge of

capitulation, Torrane decided to treat with the Ashantis. He met

the Asantehene and his chiefs at Anomabo, and after sane discussions,

he handed over Tsibu to the Ashantis, who executed him. Moreover, he

divided up the Assin refugees with the Ashantis, and sold his share

to the slavers on the coast. The Asantehene appeared satisfied, and

he moved eastwards in the direction of Winneba to subdue a section of

the Fantis, under Hkum, the chief of Ekumfi.

1. W.7f. Claridge, History, 1915, P*241

 -248-

The fatuous Torrane has been aptly denounced by sane

historians for his inhuman treatment of the Assins and for his

conduct generally during the negotiations with the Ashantis. Ee

was a typical slave trader, who hoped for "a speedy establishment

of a pax Asantica" in place of the divisions which had existed on

2
the ‘
coast hitherto, and for himself, a brisk trade v/ith the victor.

Besides, Torrane entertained romantic notions of becoming the first

person to discover the source and termination of the Biver Niger.

Ee wrote thus to the African Committee, "I have received a message

fran the King, importing that as soon as the war shall be over, he

will return and form his camp near Annamaboo, to the end, that we

may arrange all points for the future of the country, and the

regulation of the trade;; and here let me observe that an intercourse

sedurely opened with Ashantee, offers prospects of the highest

advantage; and the more so, as the slave Trade is now at an end.

The Ashantees.have ivory and gold in. great abundance, and the Fantees

have ever thrown impediments in the way, so as to prevent their

intercourse with us; but it appears to hold out an object of more

national importance, and one, if I can be the happy instrument of

bringing about, I shall deem my services in Africa not altogether

misapplied. I mean a thorough knowledge of the source of the Niger,

and a direct and safe way of gping to Tombuctu, should any more

adventurers engagg in that research.. This assertion by the chief

1. See e.g. Claridge, History, pp.241 et subsequat.

2. G. Metcalfe, Maclean of the Gold Coast, 1962,op.cit., pp.37 and 44*
3* T 70/35 Oopy of a letter from Governor Colonel George Torrane,
Cape Coast Castle, to Committee of Merchants, dated 9th October,1807.
 -249-

British merchant indicates a fundamental shift in the thinking of

the British traders on the coast regarding the Ashantis. Hitherto

their policy towards Ashanti had been based upon insufficient

knowledge of that kingdom and their desire to have the seaboard

under divided political control so as to further their own trade

interest. The realisation, in 1807, that the king of Ashanti,

unlike the coastal chiefs, had "the strictest regard to his word",

and that all the principal Ashantis seemed "half a century advanced

in civilisation to those people on the waterside", decided the

British to change their attitude towards the Ashantis, and to seek

a working alliance with them. Torrane was invited by Osei Bonsu

to establish a British residency in Kumasi, and the officer appointed

to that post was "on the point of proceeding to the Capital when....

Governor General Torrane died and this laudable undertaking was

relinquished"

The year 1807 was certainly one of the great landmarks

in Gold Coast history. Its importance, however, does not lie in

the fact that it was during that period that "two native states

never before in contact, came face to face, the Fantees having had

no experience of the enemy they were now. to meet". Nor was it the

occasion on which the British were forced to make a choice between

the conflicting parties, and thereby gave rise to the urgent question

1. T 70/35 Copy of a letter fran Governor George Torrane, Cape

Coast Castle, to the Committee of the Company of Merchants
trading to Africa, dated 20th July, 1807-
2. C.0.267/44 Letter from Commodore Sir James Yeoto the
Admiralty, dated 7th November, 1816.
 -250-

1
of the British relationship with Ashanti and Fanti. The events

of that year had their precedents in the eighteenth century. The

significance of 1807 was that it was the year in which Ashanti,

which at the beginning of the eighteenth century was "but lately

2
known” , became the dominant political and economic power on the

whole of theGold Coast. Under Csei Bonsu, Dupuis wrote, ”the

kingdom of Ashantee (north-) west to (south-) east, i.e. from Gaman

to the Volta River, embraces about four degrees of longitude,

including its recent acquirements in the west; and from south to

north, i.e. from Cape Coast Castle to the tributary kingdom of

G-hofan (Buipe) about four degrees latitude”.^ Apart from the original

states, such as Kampong, Dwaben and others, which had been founded

within forty miles radius of Kumasi, Ashanti had no less than twenty-

one tributary states. They included G-yaman, Tekyiman, Dagomba and

Gonja on the one hand, and Denkyera, Wassa, Aowin, Sefwi, Akyem and

Assin on the other, with Akwamu as a dependent ally. Bowdich also

noted that the Comoe river was regarded as the limit of Ashanti

jurisdiction to the north-west, and that, to the north-east, Ghamba.

(Gambaga) the present Mamprussi, was considered "the boundary of the

Ashantee authority” , though Ashanti influence, through the medium of

Dagomba, was held to penetrate as far as the N i g e r O v e r his extensive

1. See e.g. W.W. Claridge, History,19151 op.cit., v ol.1, pp.242-3*

Ward, History, 1958, op.cit., pp.142-5 and 155*
For a useful comment on this see IM1.Priestley "The Ashanti
Question and the British" in Journal of African History,
11, 1, (1961), pp.35-37•
2. W. Bosnian, An Accurate Description,.., 1705* P*69*
3. Dupuis, 1824, pt.2, pp.xxvi.
4. Bowdich, 1819, PP*179, and 181-2. To the south-east the influence
of Ashanti extended to Dahomey, whose king sent an embassy to Kumasi
in the reign of 0Sei Bonsu, Dupuis, 1824, pp. 243-244, and 249.
 -251-

northern and southern territories, Dupuis wrote, the Asantehene

ruled "with unrivalled sway, every king, chief, viceroy or

caboceer, being his absolute and unconditional vassal, as tributaries

or not, and most of them holding their governments by virtue of an

appointment from the Court" *

After 1807, then, the ^old Coast was clearly on the path

to becoming a .1m o n a'r.c..h y ruled by the descendants of Osei

Tutu. r
^hat this did not happen, was due to the intervention of the

British. In 1807, an Act of the British Parliament made it illegal

for British subjects to engage in the African slave trade. By

treaties, foreign nationals were similarly restricted, and an African

Squadron of the British Navy was instituted to seize contraband cargo

that British or foreign vessels might attempt to ship across the

2
Atlantic. The Gold Coast peoples were not British subjects at

that time, and they were clearly not bound by an Act of the British

Parliament. In particular, the basis of Ashanti economy was the

slave trade, and the Ashantis obviously did not understand why the

British had suddenly decided to stop a trade in which they had but

lately participated. Thus in a letter of 22nd September 1817, to

John Hope Smith, Governor of Cape Coast Castle, and President of the

Council of merchants on the Gold Coast, Osei Bonsu undertook not to

renew the war with the Fantis and hoped that the King of England

would "in turn, consider if he cannot renew the Save Trade, which will

1. Dupuis, 1324, pt.2, p.xxvi.

2. Apart from the Act of 1807, another Act was passed, in 1833,
which abolished slavery throughout the British Empire.
J.D. Page, An Introduction to the History of West Africa,
(Cambridge, 2nd ed.)l959, p.100.
 -252-

be good for me”. At an earlier stage of Bowdich*s negotiations,

Amankwatia, the Kontihene of Kumasi, had opposed the signing of a

treaty with the British unless the slave trade was first renewed.

Bowdich declared that this was impossible, and Amankwatia was

2
”at length overruled, but with considerable difficulty” Since

the British Government urged on by the Humanitarians, and other

interested bodies, were determined to stop the trade, it was almost

impossible for the British to establish peaceful relations with

Ashanti. The British therefore renewed their support for the

coastal peoples against the Ashantis. The outcome of this was

Anglo-Asbanti disputes which culminated in the defeat of the British

and their allies at Nsamankow in 1824, and the defeat of Ashanti

at Dodowa in 1826.

1. Quoted by Bowdich in Mission...to Ashantee. 1819* P«149*

See also Osei Bonsu1s remarks as recorded by Dupuis, 1824,
pp.162-4* And see also Qomment by the King of Dahomey, as
recorded by A. Dalzel, The History of Dahomey. (Londcn,
1793), p.219*
2. Bowdich, 1819, p.106.
3* Bor the relations between British, Ashanti and the coastal
peoples in the nineteenth century, see, among other works,
Ellis, History, 1893> op.ict.
Claridge,*Kistftry, 1915* op.cit., and
F.M. Bournet, The ^old Coast. (2nd ed. London, 1952), pp.16-17*

T
 — 253—

Abbreviations

P.R.O. Public Record Office

A.D.M. Admiralty Papers

C.O. Colonial Office

V.G.K. Vestindiske Guinea Kompagni

v.i.e. West-Indische Compagnie

N.B.K.G. Nederlandische Bezittingen ter Kuste van Guinea

J.A.H* Journal of African History

T.G.C.T.H.S. Transactions of the Gold Coast and Togoland

Historical Society

T.H.S.G. Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana.

J.R.H.S. Journal of the Royal Historical Society.

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 -260-

BIBLIOGRAPHX

Primary Sources

All these Danish documents are in the Royal Archives (Rigsakivet),

Copenhagen:

1. Breve og dokumenter indkomne og udgaede

2. Ibid. 1672-81 1 pkt.
3. Ibid. 1683-84. 1689. 1698-1705 1 pkt.
4. Ibid. 1705 Ha j - 1722 April 1 pkt.
5. Ibid. 1722 Juli 1731 1 pkt.
6. Ibid. 1732-1745 1 pkt.
7. Ibid. 1746-1750 1 pkt.
8. Ibid. 1751-1754 1 pkt.

B. Dokumenter angaende forterne og handelen paa G-uineakysten

1659. 1660-1738. 1 pkt.

C. Relationer om perholdene in Guinea 1733-1748 1 pkt.

D. "Dag-Journaler" fort paa Christiansborg 1698-1705 1 pkt.

■E. ^Diarie-boger11 fort paa Christiansborg 1744-1734 1 pkt*

P. Diarii Bog holden paa forter Chris tiansborg 1733-1761.

G. Gouvernment paa Guinea Kysten Gjeldboger 1752-1761 6 Volumes

Nos. 193-198.
Ibid.."Ne gotie Journal holden paa Portet Chris tansborg"
1755-1760 Nos. 220-221 and 221-224.

H. Vestindiske og Guinea Sager. Dokumenter ved den Guineiske

Journal 1780-1792 1 pkt.

I. Guineiske Journaler 1776-1784 10 Volumes.

Ibid. 1776, 1804-1820 3 Volumes.

J. Guinea Journaler Sager 1806, 1808, 1809, 1810, 1814*

1816, 1817, 1819, 1820 4 pkts.

K. Diverse Dokumenter. Negerhandelen og Slave emancipation

vedkommende 1783-1806. 1 pkt,
 - 261-

Danish, documents in Rigsakivet (contd.)

L. Guineiske Journaler 1755-59; 1759-68; 1760-67;

1764-68; 13 pkt s.

M. Vestindiske og Guinea Sager. Dokumenter ved den Guineiske

Journaler 1780-1792. 1 pkt.

N. Guineiske Kopiboger 1816-1830 7 vols.

0. Vestindiske Journaler 1781-1783

P. Guineiske Journal 1793 1 pkt.

Q. Sekrete Roads Protokoller 1755-62 9 vols.

R. Brevbog holden paa Hovedforted Christiansborg 1755-61 8 vols

S. Negotie Kontraboger for Porterne Christiansborg ceg Prendensborg og

Logien Ada. 1755 1 pkt.

T. Diarii bog, holden paa fortet Christiansborg 1768 -6 9 . 1 pkt.

U. Gagebog holden paa Portet Christiansborg 1766, 1770 2 pkt.

V. Dag journal paa "Predendensberg" • og "Ada” 1767 1 pkt.

Documents in Kongeli^e Bibliotek

A. En budferdig underetning om den indfaldende stridighed immelem det

Hollandske og Danske Gouvernment paa Kysten Guinea i Africa i Aarene
1775, 1776 og 1777. Udalske S. Pollio No. 130.

B. Kengelig Danske Ve'gtihdiske Guineiske Compagnies Participanters

(Samling) Kallske 1Pollio 4 No. 390

C. Instruction for opperhonedet ag det Secrete Road paa Portet

Christiansborg undi Guinea 28th Juli 1728 saavelsomReglement af
31 Marty 1711 samt. ditto af 17 Mai 1735.
 - 262-

All these Dutch documents are in the Algemeen Hijksarchief,

Bleijenburg 7* The Hague.

2 nd West-Indische Compagnie.

Vol.97 Brieven en papieren van de Kust van Guinea

(met register) 1699-1702
Vol. 98 Ibid. 1702-1705
Vol.99 Ibid. 1706-1707
Vol. 100 Ibid. 1707-1709
Volt 101 Ibid. 1709-1712
Vol.102 Ibid.., ; 1713-1714
Vol. 103 Ibid. 1714-1718
Vol.104 Ibid. 1718-1720
Vol. 105 Ibid. 1720-1723
Vol.106 Ibid. 1723-1726
Vol . 107 Ibid. 1726-1727
Vol.108 Ibid. 1728-1730
Vol.109 Ibid. 1730-1733
Vol.110 Ibid. 1733-1736
Vol.111 Ibid. 1736-1740
Vol.112 Ibid. 1740-1741
Vol.113 Ibid. 1741-1749
Vol.114 Ibid. 1750-1760
Vol.115 Ibid. 1761-1764
Vol.116 Ibid. 1764-1767
Vol.117 Ibid. 1767-1768
Vol. 118 Ibid. 1768-1772
Vol.119 Ibid. 1773-1778
Vol.120 Overgehonden stukken 1790/1791 als bylagen van eenmissive
van de Directeur General van 2 August 1791 (met een paa
stukken van 1792)
Vol.122 Contracten met naturellen 1659-1765
Vol.123 Dagregister 16th Hay - 25 Juni 1780
Vol.139 Journal van Jacobus Elet oppercommies en raad ter kuste
van Guinea, Betrekking hebbende op een geschil met den
Konning van Dahomeij (Dahomey) 10th Februari - 18 Mei 1733
(met bijlagen)
 -263-

Vol.124 and Vol. 127 Resolutien van de Directeur General en Raden

B. Archieven van de Nederlandische Bezittingen ter Kust van Guinea

(Dutch Settlements on the Coast of Guinea)
Vol.81 Journal van d*Elmina 1658 -1709
Vol.82 Dagregisters van d*Elmina 1709-1717
Vol . 83 Dagregisters van d ’Elmina 1717-1724
Vol.93 Dagregisters van dlElmina 1726
J. Rijke Onde Archieven 115 Dagboek van Pieter Nuyts 1706-1707
Verzamaling Verspreyde West-Indisch Stukken (Miscellaneous West
Indian papers)
Verzameling Kaarten (Leupen Collectie)
743 Caerte des Landschap Gout Kust in Guinea, van Atsyn (Axim) tot
NingaMouree 25th December, 1629*

All these English documents are in the Public Redord Office, Londons

A. T 70 Series (Records of the African Companies)

1. Extract of letters from Africa and the West Indies. .'
2-4. Ibid. 1707-1713; 1712-1715; 1720-1732.
5“7. Abstracts of letters frcm Africa to the Roya}. African Company
1705-1722.
13. Letters from Africa and West Indies 1703-1704.
18. Letters from Africa, West Indies and Amsterdam 1704-1715*
19. Ibid. 1714-1719.
23* Letters from Africa and the West Indies 1719-1724
26. Ibid. 1706-1720

30. 1753-1762 )
31. 1762-1773 (
32. 1773-1781
Inward letter Books
33. 1781-1799
34. 1799-1806
35. 1807-1813
36. 1813-1818

39. 1771 Concerning the State of Trade in Africa

40. 1816-1817 )
41. 1017-1818 . ) Ashanti Mission
42.. 1817 April-Sept)
 -2 6 4 -

50. 1685-1698 )
51. 1698-1703 ) Africa; Hour e Letter Books
52. 1703-1715 ) Copies of letters sent by the Royal Fission to
53. 1720-1728 ) the coast of Africa* December 1685-5th April 1658,

54, 1728-1740 Cape Coast Castle.

66. 1720 July-1737 ) Instructions to Chief Agents in Africa

67- 1737-1750 )
68 • 1749-1751 Letters between various servants of the company
in Africa and the captains of certain ships ,
Contains also ’’Description of the of the forts
belonging to Europeans on the North, South and
East coasts of Africa.

69. 1764-87
70. 1787-93
71. 1793-99
1790-1808
73. 1808-1815
74. 1815-1818 1
75- 1664-1672 Royal Adventurers

155. 1770-1776
156. 1780 Reports of Select Committees.
157. 1780
158. 1780

159. 1784

160. 1791-92 )
161. 1792 ) Reports of Select Committees
162. 1779 )
176. After 1756 Report on money granted to the old Company and
on the condition of the Forts at a recent
inspection.

177. 1777 ’’Return from the Commissioners for Trade and

Plantations to the House of Commons”.. .’’relatirg
to the general state of the Trade to Africa.

974. 1752-1755

975. 1756-58 ) Accounts - Day Books

976. 1755-61 ) James Fort Accra
977. 1762-65, 1767
978. 1768-1772
979. 1773-1781 )
 -265-

980 . 1782-1786 )
581. 1787-1792 ) Accounts - Day Books
982. 1793> 1795-1800 J James Port -"-ccra
983 . 1801-1806 )
984. 1807-1813

Trade

1229. 1685-1889 Cape Coast Castle Warehouse Book

1230. 1687-1691 -ditto-
1231. 1732-1733 Gape Coast Castle goods received, delivered
and Mastered
1232. 1740-;741 Goods in charge of Charles Blad7/ell
1240. 1791-1797 Accra: Receipt and expenditure, (ledger
"Form) Stock bought and expended) etc*
1263* 1735-1768 Annual Register of number of slaves exported
from Accra.
1262m 1772-1776 Slave barters by R* Miles at Tantumquery,
Accra and Anemabu
1267- 1791-1792 1Blacks* Ledger
1268. 1791-1792 Slave barters; giving payments of customs
at Accra.
1269. 1791-1792

IS : “ *■ *

Private Books
1466. 1730 ) Accra etc* Copy-Book of diaries.
I46 8 . 1777-78 Diary at Cape Coast Castle
1476* 1758-50 ) Letters to, from and relating to John Roberts
1477. 1751-52 ) etc.

*^8. 1765 N Letters from John Roberts

1780
1479* Letters to and from Richard Miles; six books
1480* 1778-9, 1779-80 Rough Journal of Cape Coast 0astle and a lit tie
of Accra.
36 5 *) Cane Coast Castle Accounts and Journals - 1679-1691
385.) 1720
14 63 . Cape Coast Castle Memorandum Book 1703-1704
1464 * William Baillie*s Commender Diary and Accounts
 - 266 -

Detached Papers

1515. Prior to 1750

1516. 1750, 1751
1517. 1751
1518. 1752
1519. 1752, 1753
15 20 . 1753
1521 . 1753
15 22 . 1754

1523. 1755
1524. 1755, 1756
1525. 1755, 1756
1526. 1756
1527. 1757
15 28 . 1757, 1758
1529/ 1758-1819
1606
 -267-

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Marees, P. de Besehrijvinge end Iiisterische verhael van het Gout

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Ratelband, K.A. V&Jf Dag registers van het Kosteel Sao Jorge de Mina
(ElminaT aan de Goudkust, 1645-1647• Linschoten-
I^ejiigingj. 1953*
 -268-

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Reindorf, C. C. History of the Gold Coast and Asante 2nd Edition

Basle n.d.

Roeraer, L. F. Tilforladelig Efternetning om K.ysten Guinea,

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Rattray, R.S. Ashanti Law and Constitution, (Oxford 1929}*

Religion and Art in Ashanti (Oxon 1927)*

Ashanti (Oxon 1923).

Tribes of Ashanti Hinterland (Oxon 1932*)

Smith, W. MA Voyage to Guinea in 1726 in Astley1s Collections

Volume 2.

Villault, S. flAbstract of a Voyage to the Coast of Africa

and Gtyinea in 1666 in ^saley's Volume II.

Ward, W. E. F. A history of Ghana (London 1958)•

Wilks, I The Northern Factor in Ashanti Hidfory (Gloucester

196 l) and in Journal of African History Volume II,
I, 196 I pp. 25-34

"Akwamu and Otublohum; An eighteenth century

Akan Marriage Arrangement” in Africa Volume XXIX
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Balmer, W.T. A History of the Akan peoples of the Gold Coast

(London, and Cape Coast 1926).

BolviH, E.W. The Golden Irade of the Moors (London 1958)

Blake, J.W. European beginnings in Y/est Africa (London

1937).

Boxer, C. R. Four centuries of Portuguese Expansion 1415-

1823
Johannesberg 1961

Race Relation in the Portuguese Colonial Empire

1415-1825 (Oxford 1963)
 -269-
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Beecham, John Ashantee and the Gold Coast (London 184l).

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and Holland (London 1962 ).

Claridge, V/. W. A history of the Gold Coast and Ashanti 2 volumes

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Coolhas, W. Ph. A critical survey of studies on Dutch Colonial

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Cruickshank, B. Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast, (London 1853).

Crone, C. R. Voyages of Cadamasto Hakkluyt Society Series

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Dam, Van P. Beschryvinge Van de Oostindische Compagnie,

( s-Gravenhage, 1931)•

Davies, K. G-. The Royal Africa Company (London 1957).

D&nguah, J. B. "The Akan Claim to Origin from Ghana" in West

African Review Vol. XXVI. November and December
1955 -

Akim Abuakwa Handbook (London 1928).

Ellis, A. B. History of the Gold Coast of West Africa

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 -270-

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The Ilyth of the Negro Past (New York, 1940)

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Larsen? K. De Danske :i Guinea (Copenhagen, 1918).

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"English Establishments on the Gold Coast in

Ti’R.E.S. 4th series Vol. V (London, 1922)

Llaree, J.A. de Reizen ap en Beschrijvinge van de Gaudkust van

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 - 271-

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1815-1850 M.A. Theses submitted to the
University of London, 1935*

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submitted for degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
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Wilks, Ivor "The Rise and Fall of a West African Empire:

Ar/amu 1650-1750 - an unpublished M.A. Thesis in
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 -272-

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Dubois, W.E.B. The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to

the United States of America 1638-1870 (New
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Page, J. 0. An introduction the history of West Africa

(Cambridge, 1955)

Lloyd, C • The Navy and the Slave Trade, (London, 1944)

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Guinea (Trondh^em 1754)

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