Women in Lebanon

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 Women in Lebanon
Living with Christianity, Islam, and Multiculturalism

Marie-Claude Thomas
women in lebanon
Copyright © Marie-Claude Thomas 2013.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-1-137-28198-2
All rights reserved.

First published in 2013 by

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC,
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this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills,
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ISBN 978-1-349-44842-5 ISBN 978-1-137-28199-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137281999

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Thomas, Marie-Claude.
Women in Lebanon : living with Christianity, Islam,
and multiculturalism / Marie-Claude Thomas.
p. cm.

1. Women—Lebanon. 2. Muslim women—Lebanon.

3. Christianity and other religions—Islam. 4. Islam—Relations—Islam.
5. Multiculturalism—Lebanon. I. Title.
HQ1728.T46 2013
305.4095692—dc23 2012036659

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Integra Software Services

First edition: January 2013

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 Contents

List of Figures vii

Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1

Part I Saghbine, a Christian Village: Women, Religion,

and Society
1 Geography and Religious Spaces 15
2 Childhood and Adolescence of Young Girls 31
3 Marriages and the Condition of Married Women 43
4 Adulthood, Married Life, and Women’s Work Outside the
House 63
Interview—Individual Perspectives: Christian Discourse 75

Part II Muslim Lebanese Women and an Islamic

Modernity
5 Islam in Lebanon: An Overview 83
6 Struggle in Modern Islam 103
7 Veiling and Divergent Feminist Voices 117
8 Personal Status Laws in Islam: Sheikh Muhammad Hussein
Fadlallah’s New Tafsir (Exegesis) 133
Interview—Individual and Communal Perspectives: Muslim
Discourse 151

Part III Transformation within a Multicultural Lebanon

9 Modernity, Multiculturalism, and Lebanese Women 159
10 Christian-Muslim Relations, Women, and Religion 169
vi ● Contents

11 Lebanese Women in All Their Diversity: Convergence and

Divergence 183
12 En Route toward a More Inclusive Civil Society 203
Conclusion 215
Notes 221
Bibliography 235
Index 239
 List of Figures

1.1 After-church gathering 30

3.1 Wedding 60
5.1 Lebanon map 84
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 Acknowledgments

The book grew out of my sense of the prominent participation of women

in projects of modernity. I am grateful to my late advisors at the Univer-
sity of Paris 1—Pierre Thillet and Yoakim Moubarac—who supported me
when I suggested the theme of my dissertation on the status of women in my
hometown in Lebanon. My thanks go to Margaret Kamitsuka, who helped
me to expand the basis of my dissertation for this project and encouraged
me in its pursuit. My work has greatly benefitted from conversations with
her, and her insights and comments on parts of the manuscript were par-
ticularly valuable. Her friendship and generosity sustained me throughout
my endeavor. My thanks go to my daughter Joelle Thomas, who has con-
tributed to the project in subtle and practical ways. Her presence during
a trip to Lebanon pushed me to think more clearly and to articulate why
the change taking place in Lebanon matters for the future perspective of
Lebanese women. I particularly thank her for her suggestions and the edito-
rial help throughout this project. She has and continues to be an inspiration
to me. I would also like to thank Michael Fisher and the reviewers who
were generous enough to read parts of the manuscript and bring insightful
comments—Yvonne Haddad for her constructive criticism and Guy Imhoff
for his positive remarks. My thanks go to my former students at Oberlin
College and especially to Rebecca Newman for her editorial help. I also
offer my gratitude to the women and men I interviewed for bigheartedly
sharing their perspectives and time. We used the Arabic language in our con-
versation; I then translated all interviews into English. For privacy reasons,
however, I have not disclosed their real names and instead used given ones.
Finally, I wish to thank the editorial staff at Palgrave Macmillan in preparing
the manuscript for publication.
A different kind of thanks go to my mother, Georgette Gemayel Khoury,
whose resilience and devotion in helping others have inspired much of what
x ● Acknowledgments

I said; my brothers, Paul and Noel Khoury, who were always available to
answer my quests and graciously provided me with documents I needed from
Lebanon; my son, James Thomas, for his technical aid in preparing the pho-
tos and cover art displayed; and, lastly, my husband, Norman Thomas, whose
energy has kept me and this project afloat.
 Introduction

On a Sunday in April 1975, I was visiting a friend in East Beirut. While sipping
fresh lemonade on the veranda, looking at the pine trees of Sin el Fil, hearing the
crickets chirp, and talking about our future in Lebanon, we suddenly heard the
sound of repeated machine gun fire. Terrified, we asked, “What could this be?”
Even as young people, we were aware of the quarrels that sometimes led to clashes
in the western part of Beirut between armed refugee Palestinians and Lebanese
soldiers. Yet this time, the repeated racket was close by, right in the heart of the
Christian area. I ran home as fast as I could, telling myself this incident would soon
be contained. I never envisioned that the consequence of this shooting would be a
ferocious war that would ravage Lebanon for fifteen years and the suffering that
would fall upon the entire Lebanese population.
On the evening news, I learned that the shooting was an exchange between the
paramilitary Phalanges,1 members of the newly restructured Christian political
party al Kataeb, and some Palestinian members of Fatah as they were cross-
ing the Christian area of Ain el Rummaneh in a bus. The following Monday,
we went about our business as usual, and life seemingly returned to normal as
I took the final exams at my university. Yet, as the days passed, similar clashes
occurred. A commando of Palestinians broke into the villa of former Lebanese pres-
ident Camille Chamoun, situated along the Mediterranean Sea, with the aim of
killing him. Fortunately, he was not home, but they destroyed his villa. Seem-
ingly homeless, he moved into the apartment of Lebanese socialite and activist
Maud Fargeallah, which happened to be in the building where my family and
I were living. This temporary invitation lasted more than a decade, until his
passing from old age in the summer of 1986. During this time, my build-
ing transformed not only into the residence of a former president, but also into
the headquarters of the Hizb el-Ahrar, the Lebanese Christian National Liberal
Party.2 Camille Chamoun3 actively participated in the civil war, and in 1976
he became the chief of the Lebanese Front encompassing all Christian militia.
For me, the change meant the positioning of barricades along our street and
militia soldiers in the entrance to our building, even though we did not fully
support the politics of the Christian militia. That also meant that our politi-
cal opponents ordered their militia to shell our area and specifically target our
residence.
2 ● Women in Lebanon

This combination of circumstances obliged me to leave the country. In the begin-

ning, my family and I thought that the situation would settle down after a few
months, or at worst, a year. Thirty years passed before the end of the conflict.
My leaving the country was gradual; in fact, I did not expect it to be permanent.
As the war raged on, I postponed my return from one year to another until I ended
up living in Paris for more than a decade. Then I met my husband and moved to
the United States. I have returned to Lebanon several times to see my mother, father,
and brothers, as well as my extended family and my friends.

A
lthough Lebanon is no longer at war, it is still characterized by the
many religious groups that once fought each other in the streets of
Beirut but have somehow found a way to overcome their differences
for the country’s good. In spite of frequent political dissidence and periodic
spurts of violence, Lebanon today is in many ways different from the Lebanon
I left as a young woman. It has entered the contemporary age but because of
its rich mix of cultural and religious fabrics, it has formulated its own defi-
nition of modernity. The women of my generation were privileged to have
lived in a rather economically prosperous Lebanon and to have intellectually
and creatively embraced the modernity emerging from the integrative Arab
renaissance or Nahda. With a view to unifying—though unsuccessfully—the
different cleavages within the Arab world, the synthesizing discourse of the
Nahda steered away from sectarianism and fragmentation. The philosophi-
cal discourse of the nineteenth-century Nahda incorporated universal values
and made significant contributions on issues pertaining to Arab women.
In the diverse Lebanese society, progress meant openness and collaboration
among Christians and Muslims for a democratic Lebanon that includes all
confessions in the affairs of the state. Modernity for Christian and Muslim
women meant openness toward rationalization, at once taking in Western
culture while treasuring our own heritage. Urban Lebanese women, whether
Christian or Muslim, followed similar paths in their evolution; no one tried
to show the dominance of their own affiliation, at least not overtly.
Today, the Lebanon I knew seems to have been altered; a page has been
turned. A different concept of modernity is emerging; a concept that some
might describe as finding ways to benefit one community at the expense of
the other, while others describe the change as an “enchanted modern.” In the
midst of this evolution,4 Lebanese women of all religious groups are acquiring
and adapting to new roles, while altering existing ones. Hizbullah’s5 women
are embracing a new kind of modernity in which religion and identity are an
integral part, an Islamic modernity based on the Iranian model propagated by
Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1980s. Yet the Western model of modernity has
 Introduction ● 3

not disappeared. How then can one reconcile the two tendencies in a small
country of 10,470 square kilometers?6
Is life better or worse than before? It is often in these terms that one poses
the question of the status of women. The condition of women, in all of the
countries of the world, is a subject currently at the heart of a great deal of
intellectual debate. However, only rarely does one have the occasion to linger
on the experience of a simple villager or urban woman in the midst of trans-
formation, to ask her opinion on the issue rather than to extend abstract
discussions, more so because she has her own say in this matter.
Until now no study has been dedicated to women’s lives in the villages
of the Bekaa in Eastern Lebanon. To sketch a coherent portrait of village
women, one should not lose sight of the fact that rural life relies on tradi-
tions that evolve. No society can persist in a static state, and the notion of
evolution is inherent in every anthropological study. I gathered evidence of
the evolving status of Christian and Muslim Lebanese women based on my
fieldwork in Saghbine and the surrounding villages in the Bekaa, first in 1981
and again in 2008 and 2009. My most recent research also included my par-
ticipant observation of events in Beirut, in particular the legislative elections
in June 2009.
Since my family is native to Saghbine, we spent our summer vacations
there when I was a child. Saghbine is a Christian village in a region made
up of 40 percent Christians and 60 percent Muslims. An economically self-
sufficient and the most socially developed village of the region, its most
striking feature is its cultural evolution and its openness to the outside,
whether to big Lebanese cities or even to the West. Here, the status of women
is close to that of the most evolved districts of Lebanon. Saghbine is one field
of my exploration. This locality allows us to have access to different sections
of the population, ranging from rural women to college students, from the
woman working outside the home to the housewife.
When I did my initial research in the 1980s, I concluded that evolution in
the lifestyles of Lebanese women came from their ability to link their modern
conventions with traditional customs. This allowed women to move from
a state of resignation to a more active role in determining their quality of
life. In addition, I realized that Lebanese women experienced some sort of
transcendental quality in the form of popular religiosity, which gave rise to a
feeling of grandeur in some of them.
This feature is still prevalent given the rise in the status of women, both
Christian and Muslim, in recent decades. Since the 1980s, many Lebanese
men have found work opportunities in Arab countries, and women have suc-
cessfully fulfilled the role of both mother and father. Many women remained
unmarried because many men emigrated to the oil states or the West to work.
4 ● Women in Lebanon

These women have proved to be capable of sustaining themselves and even

financially supporting their families.
Religion has always been a dimension of Lebanese political and social real-
ity. More and more today, and on a global scale, religions inform individual
behavior and dictate state politics. It has become a means of modernization,
an adaptation to globalization. Similarly, the increasing role of women in
Hizbullah has reinforced the Iranian model because “they bear the burden
of cultural authenticity as the markers of public piety. This social weight has
added specific ramifications to their lives.”7 Hizbullah’s women consider the
wearing of the veil as a sign of embracing modernity, as they define it, while
entering the public sphere.
Each time I return I realize that the love of one’s country does not change;
on the contrary, this love reinforces itself after many years of absence. A few
social realities seem shocking at the beginning, such as the saturation of
traffic or the lack of respect for traffic rules. In addition, the increased num-
ber of veiled women coloring the Lebanese landscape signifies an increased
prominence of Islam in a country that was once called the Paris of the
Middle East.
Despite these changes, I feel as if I am reliving the history of a unique
country born at the end of the French Mandate in 1948. In 1943, Christians
and Muslims agreed on the Lebanese Pact, an agreement based on reli-
gious pluralism. Some saw this agreement as successful, insofar as it takes
the cultural and religious diversity of the Arab Muslim zones in the Mid-
dle East into account. Others, however, saw this agreement as the cause of a
Lebanese identity crisis, insofar as the Lebanese formula or sigha does not con-
template anything beyond communitarianism or communalism in the sense
that it demonstrates the limits of the quota system and of all attempts at
unity through community.8 In other words, communalism reflects the pri-
ority of group over national identity in the lives of individuals. As far as
I could observe, however, the international reputation of Lebanon has sur-
vived. Lebanon remains what it has never ceased to be, a country of religious
diversity, entente, and prosperity.
Though this study begins with a particular village, it also encompasses
the neighboring villages and includes snapshots of contemporary Beirut. The
particularity of my focus resides in the fact that Muslim-majority villages sur-
round Saghbine, a Christian village divided between Maronites and Melkites.
This proximity allowed me to compare the evolving status of women in
Saghbine and of Lebanese women in general, including Muslim women.
Does evolution allow the same rhythm for Muslim and Christian women?
What are the motivations that determine their choices? Moreover, what are
the major factors that slow down or impede the improvement of their social
 Introduction ● 5

status? According to my ethnographic observations, Christian and Muslim

Lebanese women sometimes take divergent paths because of different ways of
adjusting to modernity. This difference in perceptions is fueled by disparate
religious beliefs.
In their path to evolution since the nineteenth-century Nahda,9 and
despite a discourse of difference, both Christian and Muslim women have
presented more similarities than differences. The differences in views and val-
ues essentially relate to their respective religious backgrounds. Today, though
Christian and Muslim women find themselves struggling with similar prob-
lems, some Muslim women, inspired by an Islamic-dominated sociopolitical
regional context, are taking a divergent path from their Christian counter-
parts. Regional and global politics provide them with new resources to enter
the public sphere and embrace modernity, which some perceive to be empha-
sizing differences rather than similarities. These women endeavor to reveal
themselves as possible agents of reconstructing Muslim women’s self. Are
there future perspectives for a new kind of coming together that will enhance
the status of all Lebanese women?
The effect of the Islamic modernity movement sweeping the Middle East
since 1979 has impacted different aspects of Muslim Lebanese women’s lives.
The return of religion appears to be a more democratic, grassroots affair that
is surprisingly more in tune with globalization. Today, and in this partic-
ular time in history, modernity is differently interpreted and lived by Shi’i
women. These women no longer see modernity in the Western sense as
progress and as a welcome development. My research indicates two mod-
els for women’s identity: the Islamic modernity model that brings symbols
of religion to the public sphere and the Westernized model adapted to the
particular Lebanese context. The evolution of our society has led to a jux-
taposition of the role of both Christian and Muslim women. My research
strives to make sense of the meaning of this mixed modernity, whether the
current religious resurgence is a passing phase or the adjustment of a secular
civilization in crisis.
The two models are a reflection of two mentalities embedded in the
pluralistic Lebanese mold. I believe that it is still possible for these two
mentalities to find harmony as they evolve, to deepen the solidarity among
Lebanese women and weaken sectarianism. A “United Lebanon” is not a
myth. We hope that our new coming together will deliver Lebanon from
being a land of constant confrontation between two models that are part of
a bigger picture, the regional conflict in the Middle East.10 The moral values
that link the Lebanese people are powerful, and Lebanese women are marked
by a common heritage of Christianity and Islam. The two monotheistic
religions evolved in a common patriarchal society.
6 ● Women in Lebanon

The equality between men and women and the entente between
Christians and Muslims in Lebanon will not come out of the will and actions
of men and women alone or Christians and Muslims alone, but from social
relations and genuine dialogue that facilitate the coming together of all
groups in the face of common civic responsibilities. A change of mentality
is needed for social change and this transformation in women’s rights and
responsibilities must essentially take place in an open society.
What was presented for centuries as the nature of women has often proved
to be a manufactured myth. Indeed, human nature must always manifest
itself in culture. Culture has always supported masculine dominance in war
as well as in the domestic realm. Women, by contrast, were relegated to a
life of silence and resentment. The former era did not understand the com-
plementary order of men and women, together as human beings, destined
to speak in dialogue that allowed for individual gendered accomplishments.
However, some women dedicated their lives to the liberation of their gender
despite the fact that they received a compromised education. In Egypt, Kout
el Kouloub lived the novel that she wrote about women’s liberation at the
onset of the twentieth century.11 In Lebanon, Leila Baalbaki, a former stu-
dent at the American University of Beirut, demanded the right of Muslim
women to really live. She was considered risqué and daring in her themes.
Like other female writers of the prewar generation (before 1975), she shifted
away from politics and social issues in her writings to focus on women’s issues,
thus creating their own space for discussion.

Thesis, Methodology, and Goals

The Lebanese alternative modernities are analyzed within the intersecting
framework of local, regional, and Western histories. The analysis traces the
lives of Christian and Muslim women coexisting in a multicultural society
and facing modernity. Since the Arab Spring has begun to draw attention
to issues of change, modernity, and women’s subjectivity, this book takes
a unique approach to examining and describing the Lebanese “alternative
modernities”; for Lebanese women, it is a state of being characterized by the
relationship between religion and society, tradition and modernity. The trans-
formation taking place illustrates that tradition and modernity can inhabit
the same social universe and reinforce each other at times and be a cause of
dissonance other times. Women from different groups may disagree in their
interpretation of their alternative modernity; this lack of agreement threatens
the unity of the country. This book is unique in that it brings together in a
unified work the theme of women in Christian and Muslim contexts and that
of multiculturalism.
 Introduction ● 7

The methodology is descriptive and analytical. I write as an insider while

taking the responsibility of being self-critical. My ethnographical account is
experimental in the sense that it simultaneously belongs both in the humani-
ties and in the social sciences, and my analysis takes the split of the Lebanese
people into account. My narration will be sensitive to the history and values
of our cultural milieu. As a postcolonial ethnographer, I do not accept with-
out criticism the superiority of Western conceptual categories or advocate for
a Western system for our society; rather, I advocate for a rationale for change
that reflects continuity with the past and the constitution of subjectivities.
Ethnography, like literature, reminds us of our presumptions; ethnography
as a science is debatable since it consists of writing about cultures in a
way that involves telling stories, making pictures, and formulating symbols.
Ethnography explores the construction of a culturally constructed self; the “I”
might shift from the individual to a collective voice, and thus ethnography
could be termed experimental ethnography, navigating between the field jour-
nal and the autobiography. To render women’s subjectivity and separate it
from dominant narratives requires a deconstructive position aware of the dif-
ficulties and challenges arising from being accountable to different audiences.
The changing paradigms and intractable problems encumber the holistic
commitment of ethnography to fully understand a phenomenon. Rather, the
researcher provides a meta-commentary, enacting a state of being in culture
while looking at culture. Thus, experimental ethnography calls attention to
feminist ethnography for the constitution of subjectivities and the risk of
making assumptions, and my account in this research can be read as femi-
nist or experimental ethnography.12 Ethnography belongs simultaneously to
science and the humanities, each having different norms to deal with truth
and fiction; this is unlike the position taken by positivists who argue that
good science is value-free and assume that truth is obtained by emphasizing
objectivity and eliminating subjectivity in judgments and interpretations.
Instead of building a dichotomy, I will adopt a feminist strategy that builds
on my connection with the investigated, using my own biographies and emo-
tions as analytic guides. At the same time, I am aware that this approach can
influence an objective interpretation and make me vulnerable to the biases of
my own cultural assumptions.13 I will strive to be aware, reflective, and critical
of this dynamic rather than allowing it to maneuver my research implicitly.
In “On the Epistemology of Post-colonial Ethnography,” Spickard argues
that since the rise of ethnography in nineteenth century, and decades of colo-
nial expansion, the Russians and the French hired ethnographers to record
their subject’s mores and customs, as well as their political structures and
worldviews hoping that “power/knowledge”14 would help them dominate
the world. Unlike colonial anthropology, sociological ethnography grew out
8 ● Women in Lebanon

of assimilation and a concern for social problems. Ethnography encouraged

the notion that given the right environment and support, the socially dis-
advantaged would become just like us. There are two ways of presenting
the “Other”; anthropological “Others” have usually lived in faraway places,
and have been seen as exotic relics that need preserving while keeping away
because they are not like “Us.” Sociological “Others” are potential friends; we
get to know them in order to change them and make them copies of ourselves.
Postcolonial ethnographers call these ideas imperialistic since they imply
that the West has history and progress while the rest of the world is stuck
in tradition. The colonial so-called objective and scientific ethnography
encouraged this fiction, sustaining the perception that the observer knows
it all. Matters have changed, at least among ethnographers, who rejected the
colonialist-oriented roots of ethnography. “Rather than presenting results as
a series of ‘facts,’ the new ethnography speaks of ‘texts,’ ‘discourses,’ and
‘narratives.’ ” “Rather than taking the role of omniscient narrator, it touts
‘reflexivity,’ ‘pluralism,’ ‘dialogue.’ ”15 One cannot know “the Other” with-
out involving the self and honestly presenting oneself in dialogue with the
informant. Timeless culture will no longer do; rather than pretending to be
a superior observer watching a subordinated observed, ethnographers now
approach the issue of culture from both vantage points. Thus, ethnography
based on the humanities becomes a path of knowledge that attempts to
understand rather than objectify people to explain them; ethnography is
this dual experience of science and humanity intimately and contradicto-
rily bound. Truth and equality become the ideal regulative guide to the
ethnographic researcher that makes progress possible through a dialogue of
cross-cultural encounter rather than a one-way view. My research utilizes
ethnography as a mechanism to enlighten readers, making the issues lived
in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world more personal and more eas-
ily digested. Topics addressing current events such as the Arab Spring are
increasingly in demand; there have been many titles on women and Islam,
and on multiculturalism in Lebanon, but only a few have brought the themes
together in a unified work.
Universalism is dialogue and respect for the voice of the “Other.”
“Universalism is no longer to believe that the West is universal, but the faith
that humans can approach the universal by transcending their limited visions
through dialogue with everyone.”16 What about ethnography’s hidden poli-
tics? We are all human with different blindnesses and strengths, and as truth,
equality has a special kind of ideal, one that pushes us out of our complacency.
Commitment to any social value would add to people’s biases; the beauty of
regulative ideals is that while apparently limiting scientific inquiry, they actu-
ally deepen it. A commitment to truth and equality enables researchers to
 Introduction ● 9

understand the world more completely and their subjects more profoundly.
These ideals are value-laden, as is science, precisely because of this commit-
ment. I do not assume to be free of bias, and in my research, I work to listen
attentively to the voices of the women, then I listen to my own voice carefully
and try to be aware of the biases I hold, which makes a difference in the way
I make sense of what the women are saying. My methodology tries to make
as transparent as possible the bias in my work and in the sources I use for the
reader to assess the information that I am presenting.
Regardless of their sects, Lebanese women are a product of Christianity
and Islam, and my analysis of Christian and Muslim women stems from my
Christian faith as well as my experience of growing up in Lebanon and mix-
ing with Muslim families. Nothing seemed to me more natural than accepting
different ways of worshipping or interpreting God’s message in a slightly dif-
ferent way. Though I grew up in Ashrafieh, the Christian part of Beirut,
my family’s social circles transcended the locality where we lived. My parents
always taught me to respect people regardless of their religion or their clothes.
My father was a lawyer and his clientele included Muslims and Christians,
and in Lebanon where people cherished togetherness and time spent socializ-
ing, it was natural to mix with Muslims, Druze, Alawite, or with any of the
18 sects that constitute the Lebanese fabric, without even being conscious
of the fact. Any difference of religious worship and the usage of religious
expressions while greeting someone seemed so natural to us. The presence of
different faiths among us brought joy, enrichment, and self-reflection to our
own way of life. I should also mention the solid personal friendships that were
established between me and my Muslim friends, which never faded despite
the many years of war that ravaged our common land. I therefore position
myself as practicing the Christian faith within the unique diverse religious
environment of Lebanon.
I began this project in 1980 when I was a doctoral candidate at the Uni-
versity of Paris. At that time, I studied a country marked by violence and
conflict in the early years of the Civil War, which would last until the early
1990s. The role of women in Lebanese society was still traditional. Women
found happiness in marriage, and both men and women perceived work as
secondary compared to the primordial role of the family. Yet even then, the
clash between tradition and progress was under way as the war upset and
overturned the stability of the home.
Although my early research was focused on the life of Christian women
in Saghbine, I could not help but observe how their lives compared to their
Muslim counterparts. At the time of my writing in 1982, the effects of the
Iranian Revolution on Lebanese Shi’i women were not yet evident; I found
its influence to be much more prominent during my second phase of research
10 ● Women in Lebanon

that began in 2008. In the past, the tradition of the veil was almost insignifi-
cant; now, this practice comes out of a resurgence of Islam that has captured
the attention of scholars across the world.
In my more recent phase of research, I strove to identify the points at
which evolutions in Lebanese society and evolutions in the role of women
intersected for both Christian and Muslim women. I asked women if they felt
that society was changing and asked them to elaborate on how they viewed
their role in this transformation. At the heart of this endeavor was my desire
to know how Lebanese women act as agents of change for their own status
and for the evolution of Lebanese society overall. This study identifies ele-
ments of Westernization and the influence of Islamic resurgence on the lives
of both rural and urban Christian and Muslim women. I explore the lifestyle
of these women through my participant observations, in-depth conversations,
and interviews.
During the second phase of research, I updated my data on Christian
women in Saghbine, and I expanded my research base to include the trans-
formation of Muslim women. I visited the southern belt of Beirut, the
location of Hizbullah’s headquarters. I spent the month of June 2009 in
Lebanon to update my fieldwork and to vote in the legislative elections in
which 600 candidates vied for 128 seats divided in parity between Christians
and Muslims. This gave me the opportunity to observe the participation of
Lebanese women in the political realm.
The book is divided into three main parts. Part I provides an overview
of Saghbine, which allows the reader to see that the village is intrinsically a
religious space, having been founded in between two churches. A traditionally
rural zone, situated along one of several sources of water, Saghbine boasts a
population that has been urbanized.
It is important first to depict the natural and social milieu in which the
status of women emerges, for a better interpretation of their evolution. The
geographic, historic, and demographic data presented in the two chapters in
this part provide the concrete background for my broader analysis of gender
and religion in Lebanon in the subsequent parts of the book. In addition, this
part presents the lifestyles and values of rural and urban women of Saghbine.
The first stages of life are described and analyzed, beginning from early child-
hood to adolescence, from motherhood to old age, all against the backdrop
of the complexities of Lebanese culture and society. I analyze the modali-
ties of marriages, the situation of married women and of mothers, aspects of
women’s daily life, widowhood, and women’s work outside the house. Here,
we will see the manifestation of these realities in the interview with Roula, a
single woman who works in the village telecommunication office while tak-
ing care of her aging parents, and later in Part I the portraits of two Christian
 Introduction ● 11

women of the region: Laura, the wife of a former commander in chief of the
Lebanese army and the mother of the current congressional representative of
the western part of the Bekaa, and Georgina, who dedicated her life to charity
work and the foundation of a medical dispensary in Saghbine.
Part II contains our discussion of women in Islam, including the emer-
gence of the Shi’i community, the meaning of the National Pact,17 and the
consequences of wilayat el faqih18 on Lebanon’s future existence. I will under-
line the significance of the new women deputies elected to office in June
2009. Calling to mind the convergence of the past, present, and future, I will
introduce the dilemma of modern Islam, the image of women in the Qur’an,
and the nature of Islamic family law, especially the practice of divorce and
inheritance. Islamic values now have great appeal to Muslims who reflect on
some of their potential abuses as offset by financial safeguards, cohesive fam-
ily life, security, and legal protections. This section also examines the growing
practice of wearing the veil, and the role of women in Hizbullah. Muslim
women speak about these issues in answers to my interview questions: Is the
recent resurgence of the conservative veil a symbol of faith or a symbol of
revolution? Is it a rejection of modernity and if so what kind of modernity?
How has the Islamic revolution affected your life? Moreover, is the wearing
of the veil a barrier to work opportunities? The interviews with Shi’i women
from Mashghara who enrolled in Hizbullah will elucidate these questions.
Part III will examine the influence of multiple religious and cultural tra-
ditions on the evolution of mentalities, whether the change is harmonious
or dissonant for women in Lebanese Christian and Muslim communities.
Since the sixteenth century, Christianity contributed dynamic intellectual and
practical structures of progress in the unique Lebanese “formula.” The chal-
lenge has always been how to blend subtly modern conveniences with old
and vulnerable traditions. The theme of dialogue between religions and cul-
tures has always been at the heart of the Lebanese issue. Lebanon signifies a
real synthesis of the questions related to Arab modernity. Are each religious
group’s international allegiances negatively affecting Lebanese national unity
and sovereignty? It is crucial that the change that is currently taking place con-
tinue this message of progress while maintaining the international vocation
of Lebanon. This research attempts to increase understanding of divergent
points of view rather than portray one side as a detriment to progress. I take
a unique approach in examining and describing Lebanese modernity; here,
the evolution of society is looked at through the lens of women of different
religious communities. My interview with young Shi’i women and the offi-
cial who works at the library annexed to the mosque in Haret Hreik—the
headquarters of Hizbullah in southern Beirut—as well as my interview with
Ustaz, a former high school principle,19 on the transformation of women’s
12 ● Women in Lebanon

lives in the last two decades is included. Also included is my interview with
one of Saghbine’s Maronite priests, who elaborated on the Lebanese message
of religious coexistence, secularism, and the change that took place during
the two phases of my research.
This volume takes into account historic and regional evolution, cultural
identity, and openness to the West to discuss the status of women in Lebanon.
A country of old traditions, multiple languages, a myriad of customs, and
two monotheistic religions comprising 18 religious sects, Lebanon is primar-
ily an expression of history and modern times. The religious element has
recently become a dimension of international reality. Actors on the inter-
national scene have testified to this; this is exemplified by Pope John Paul
II’s statement during his visit to Lebanon in 1997: “Lebanon is more than
a country, Lebanon is a message.” Mohammad Khatami, the former presi-
dent of Iran, identified Lebanon in 2008 as the country of cultural dialogue.
Lebanon constitutes a model rather than a difficult convolution. The aim of
coexistence is to intensify solidarity between Lebanese communities rather
than intensify sectarianism. After all, the Lebanese identity is the product of
a multitude of cultural and religious contributions. The political vacuum of
the civil war years in Lebanon not only promoted a religious identity but also
politicized it to the detriment of a national identity. Keeping in mind the
mission of Lebanon, Muslim and Christian Lebanese women ought to pri-
marily value their national identity while negotiating the delicate compromise
between politics and religion. Pluralism is at the core of the Lebanese idea.
Finally, the current divergence between Christian and Muslim women
related to the religious resurgence is no more than a passing phase, perhaps
an adjustment of a secular civilization in crisis. Fortunately, the majority of
young women believe in the future. Perhaps the future will see a reversal of the
divergence between these two groups and the formation of a more inclusive
civil society and a more unified Lebanese identity.
This book aims to prove that the unity of Lebanon can be looked
at through the lens of the evolution of women. The two topics being
intertwined, the more women’s issues and rights advance, the more the
commonalities found among women of different socioreligious groups, the
more convergence can emerge and be achieved.
 PART I

Saghbine, a Christian Village: Women, Religion,

and Society
 CHAPTER 1

Geography and Religious Spaces

M
any people agree that the villager is a creation of the land that he
or she occupies. In general, there are very few distinctions between
Christian villagers and Muslims villagers from a sociological stand-
point. Yet geography is not the only factor in determining the characteristics
of a village, and the exceptional Christian villages that differ from Muslim
villages are far from rare. Saghbine is one of these striking exceptions. We will
more closely examine how the human aspect of village life presents itself in
its geographic framework.
The morphological study begins with what can be observed and perceived
of the social reality. I begin with a geographical analysis of the region, which
must be studied from the standpoint of the inhabitants who use it and give
it life. Next, I turn to the human geographic characteristics of the region—
how it is constructed, what buildings, including religious ones, are the most
important, and which have a great influence in crafting the destiny of the peo-
ple. Finally, I will describe the religious affiliations and languages of Saghbine.
The goal of this morphological study is twofold: one part will analyze certain
aspects of daily life; the other will examine the status of women, which will
be the subject matter of chapters to follow. But first, to understand women
we need to understand the physical space.

Geographic Location
Spanning 10,400 km2 , Lebanon occupies an honorable position in the eyes of
the United Nations member states. As small as it is, it has never gone unno-
ticed or unappreciated. Although it is a small country on the geographic scale,
its social complexity could characterize an entire world. Yes, it is a world on
a miniature scale, but a complete world, where all stages of civilization exist,
16 ● Women in Lebanon

ranging from societies with low levels of development to their counterparts at

the extreme limit of refinement.
Its shape, harmonious and proportionate, and the existence of a natural
border (most notably in the east) deem Lebanon a geographic entity that is
well-defined and unique. This small country makes up 200 km of the eastern
shore on the Mediterranean Sea. It presents itself as a coastal band, a flat
surface in between the sea and mountains that widens in nine places to form
the planes occupied by the historically prosperous regions of Tyre, Sidon,
Damour, Beirut, Jounieh, Byblos, Batroun, Tripoli, and Akkar.
The mountains are grounded in the coastline, with bases rooted just
inland of the Mediterranean that transform into gently curving slopes, lack-
ing in severity but carefully crafted and constantly reshaped by erosion. These
mountains reach an altitude of 1,800 meters in the south and 3,000 meters
in the north. The rivers caress the countryside with their torrential rhythms
and high speeds from January to June. They cut through deep valleys, carving
limestone as their winding waters make their descent and empty into the sea.1
The limestone plateau, a karst in all of its youthfulness, is covered by snow
for three or four months out of the year. It separates the Mediterranean coast
from the Bekaa Valley. This majestic relief contributes to the asymmetrical
structure of Lebanon. It divides the country into two distinct climates: one
that is gentle and temperate on the shores of the Mediterranean, and the other
that is dry and continental on the vast plains of the Bekaa Valley that span
145 kilometers. The last chain of mountains, the Anti-Lebanon Mountains,
with their supple form, without contrast and without vegetation, collapse at
the horizon of the Lebanese-Syrian border.
The division of the country is based upon five mouhafazat,2 or princi-
palities: Central, Northern, Southern, Eastern Lebanon, and Beirut. Eastern
Lebanon is defined by the demarcation of the Bekaa Valley. From the north
to the south across the continuous mountainous relief, important climate
and sociological differences distinguish between four zones to which the
administrative capitals of the region have given their names.
We begin with Hermel; this zone is formed by a triangle. It spans to the
north of the Bekaa where it occupies the entire Qada’3 of Hermel and the
northern part of the Qada’ of Baalbeck. The triangle is marked with a desert-
like climate, formerly lending to a weak population density that was barely
open to the outside world until 1979, when Musa el-Sadr politicized the Shi’i
of Lebanon and the Iranian Revolution launched the Shi’i in this part of the
Bekaa into the international arena.
Baalbeck is characterized by imposing temples that stand among monu-
mental ruins that represent the legacy of the Roman Empire in the Levant.
Known internationally for its vast and varied horizon, Baalbeck was a
 Geography and Religious Spaces ● 17

destination for thousands of tourists every year, although the stream of visitors
was interrupted during the Civil War. In 1982, 1,500 Iranian revolutionary
guards were sent to this city, specifically to encourage the political movement
of the militant Shi’i of Lebanon who made Baalbeck their base. Although
their headquarters has since moved to Beirut, Baalbeck remains a Hizbullah
stronghold, boasting a museum that greets tourists as they enter the site of
historic ruins.
The capital of the Bekaa is Zahle, found in the center and south of the
Bekaa. The Bekaa used to be characterized by the influence of its Christian
capital, which has since weakened due to the Islamic revival movements and
growing strength of Hizbullah in the surrounding area. Zahle was formerly
known for its economic and agricultural wealth and remains more densely
populated than other parts of the Bekaa.
The tangible differences between the east and west of the Bekaa divide the
region into Charki and Gharbi.4 The Charki comprises about 20 villages with
mostly Muslim and Druze inhabitants, with Christians concentrated in only
two of the villages. By contrast, in the Gharbi, the majority of inhabitants are
Christian and the minority are Muslim. It is worth noting that these villages
boast Christians living with a minority of Sunnis, or Christians living with a
minority of Shi’i. In the Bekaa as well as in all of the villages of Lebanon, you
will seldom find Sunnis and Shi’is occupying the same village.
We have now arrived at Saghbine, a Christian village in the Western Bekaa
on the side of Mount Lebanon. It is economically self-sufficient and the most
socially developed village of the region. Its most striking factor is the cultural
evolution of its population and its openness to the outside. Here, the status
of women is close to that of the most evolved districts of Lebanon.
Saghbine, vast and bountiful in its variety, is built 1,050 meters above sea
level on a promontory resting on the foothills of the Marasty mountain chain.
The seductive curves of the Litani River, which has now been transformed
into a lake, capture the attention and wonder of the travelers who encounter
it. As a modest country village, Saghbine would not evoke the curiosity of
passing travelers if not for its aesthetic qualities. However, an ethnographer or
academic researching the village would find a complex sociological structure
that merits both interest and attention.
The transformation of the Litani River into a lake not only changed the
aesthetics of the Bekaa and the area around Saghbine, but simultaneously
altered the psyche of the residents of the surrounding villages. The majestic
blue color and calmness of the water, so still and beautiful as if it were cap-
tured in a painting, softened the dryness of the climate and the roughness
of Saghbine’s residents. Its inhabitants and visitors do not hesitate to call the
river ferdaws (paradise) because of the warmth of its welcome.
18 ● Women in Lebanon

The etymology of Saghbine remains ambiguous; according to A. Freiha

and A. Morhej, Saghbine, or zu’pin, seems to be derived from the root found
in Aramaic and Hebrew: za’f, which means anger and enthusiasm.5 The pop-
ular etymology deserves attention, because it represents the opinions held by
people of their own village. Residents of Saghbine communally claim that
“Saghbine” is a word with Arab roots; sagh bayn, as it is spelt in Arabic,
means “wise men in between [unwise men].” Yet toponyms usually derive
their names from the character of their location instead of the character of
their inhabitants, especially since these inhabitants have established them-
selves in these places as recently as the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the
characterization of the inhabitants of Saghbine based on the town’s etymol-
ogy seems to hold true: the villagers are known for their physical and mental
strength.

Human Geographic Framework

The physical aspect of the village determined the system of communication
(roads and transport) and the mode of living. Located 75 km from Beirut, it
is connected to the city’s capital by a national route linking Beirut to Chtoura
at the mouth of the Bekaa, followed by small country roads that link Chtoura
to the inner cities of the Bekaa. Saghbine has been linked to the outside world
with modern means of transportation since the 1950s. From the Middle Ages
until the introduction of the automobile in Lebanon, only the national road
from Beirut to Chtoura existed. To access the Western Bekaa, the Ottomans
carved out small country roads that could be traversed by donkeys and horses
in 1830. My grandfather was a notable resident of Saghbine, and in order
to marry my grandmother at the turn of the twentieth century, he had to
take his horse to the village of Zahle to bring his new wife to his village—a
trip that in total took over 20 hours! Today, an average trip from Beirut to
Saghbine takes an hour and a half by car along these same country roads that
were enlarged and covered in asphalt about 50 years ago.
Saghbine’s access to the outside world is pertinent to the sociological devel-
opment of the village because it meant a link to the modernity of Beirut and
opened it up to the influence of the transformation of the role of women in
Beirut’s urban setting. Saghbine thus gained an advantage over other villages
of the Bekaa who lived in relative isolation.
Our village was first populated by small groups of immigrants who entered
intermittently at a less than spectacular rate. These groups were drawn by
the natural resources of the terrain, and most particularly its proximity to
a large water source. The exact date of these migrations is unknown, but
 Geography and Religious Spaces ● 19

it is approximated to have occurred in the second half of the seventeenth

century. The first immigrants were Christians; however, the Superior of the
Saint-Savior Monastery of Saghbine affirms that the Druze were the first to
inhabit this area. The most notable inhabitants were the Jumblatt family,
from whom the Christians bought the piece of land that would become their
village. A document dated in 1862 affirms this purchase and can be found at
the Melkite archdiocese in Zahle. The oldest part of Saghbine is referred to
as Saidat et kherbene, or “Our Lady, the Abandoned,” denoting its founding
for Christians by Christians. According to the Superior, this part of town was
burned down three times by the Druze before 1860. The deir or monastery,
of Saghbine, Saint Savior, was built in two stages; the first floor was built in
1780 and the second floor in 1880. That same year, the Chapel dedicated to
Saint Theresa was also built.6
The year 1824 was declared the year of penitence; residents asked Father
Gabriel El-Khoury, who is my ancestor, to distribute communion in the form
of thin hosts instead of pieces of bread, which was used prior to that occa-
sion. Father El-Khoury distributed communion for three days. The Superior
confirmed the existence of Saghbine as a Christian village in 1836; the evi-
dence comes from the Bishop of Zahle who, in that year, identified a litigation
between two families contending for the administration of the church. The
bishop resolved the question by delegating the responsibility to the waqf or
church endowmen, Christians who, at that time, constituted the majority of
the Lebanese population owned all the lands surrounding the Litani River
until the town of Baaloul. However, as of 1982 at the heart of the Lebanese
Civil War, the same statistics indicated that the same districts of the Bekaa
now comprised 40 percent Christians and 60 percent Muslims.7
Outside the village, whose center consists of two square kilometers, we
find other lands belonging to the territory, which occupy 114,000 dennum,8
or 114,000,000 square meters. According to Henri Mendras, “Le finage
désigne l’espace occupé et ‘juridiquement’ possédé par une collectivité, quel
qu’en soit le mode d’appropriation.”9 The social structure of this town can
be read on the terrain. We can read the history of the groupings of people
who established their lives on this plateau that is limited by the territory of
neighboring villages.
The land of Saghbine is fragmented into parcels that belong to different
landlords; each family owns one of these parcels in every district, forming a
closed collectivity. The indivisibility of the patrimony was the rigor for the
continuity of the family unit and accentuated the supremacy of the head
of the family unit and his ability to rule by his whim. This principle at
present seems to be disappearing, giving way to Roman principles of law
20 ● Women in Lebanon

that stipulates individual and total property ownership with the ability to
divide lands between family members. This rule of equally dividing land has
transformed the social and economic makeup of the village.
Saghbine is the administrative center of the Western Bekaa for the sum-
mertime, boasting a serail, or administrative palace that manages these affairs.
The serail consists of an Office of Family Status, an Office of Finance, and
the local police force and post office.

Religious Spaces
Lebanon is known as an asylum to the different religiously oppressed commu-
nities of the region—whether Shi’i or Maronites. Most Christians established
themselves in the northern part of the country and in the mountains early in
Lebanon’s history, and the Shi’i settled in the south around 1840. The Sunni
came to the prosperous coastal cities and settled there.
Villages in Lebanon were established and grew around monasteries. This
phenomenon instilled the religious nature of the Lebanese people—from
priests and brotherhoods to the sisterhoods and the women and men who
never missed any morning or evening daily prayers, or constantly participated
in all holy sacraments of the Church.
In the past, religious spaces determined social spaces. Saghbine consisted
of two districts: the first began at the current Notre Dame Church and
spanned the abandoned10 Notre Dame chapel, at the south of the village.
The region is open to the surrounding plains and the center of the Melkites.
The second began at the Church of Saint George, situated on a hill over-
looking the village and continuing up the mountain—the center for the
Maronite11 community. It seems that these communities dedicated their
churches to these saints in order to associate the courage and strength with
the Virgin Mary, the symbol of maternity and love. The destiny of the people
of Saghbine was to be representative of Christianity in the Bekaa. Collectively,
the people of the village seem to cohabitate in an intense community, repre-
sented by the closeness of homes built one on top of the other, and expressed
by a collective individualism and a focus on themselves and their community.
Today, the toponym of the region reveals the presence of 24 family groups,
since regions are mainly named after families. Places are also named after nat-
ural resources, most often water, marking its significance. Public names, such
as saha, meaning “public square,” are becoming more common, indicating
the evolution and modernization of society.
Religious spaces in the villages consist of churches, the qontoche, or rectory,
cemeteries, and chapels. In Saghbine, two churches belong to the Maronites:
Saint George, the older of the two churches, is three centuries old. Its
 Geography and Religious Spaces ● 21

antiquity is marked by its two entrance doors: one for men and one for
women, who, until the latter half of the twentieth century, were required to
sit at the back of the church. As villagers pass the church, they often stop to
kiss the blessed stones on the side of the church—a ritual that often leaves red
lipstick marks on the church’s walls. As a little girl, on the way from the house
located at the top of the hill to the public square, I never missed the chance to
accomplish this religious duty. The cornerstone marked with the date of the
church’s construction was removed by some inhabitants following a dispute
between two families over the management of the church; this behavior and
the dominance of the village by large families is an indication of the remnants
of feudalism. However, until recently, this church was only opened for visi-
tors and not for religious services, until Joseph Rouphael, a rich inhabitant
of Saghbine, renovated the church so that it is now open for services. The
second church, also called Saint George, was built 38 years ago to parallel the
church from which it takes its namesake, and to house religious celebrations.
The Melkites also possess two churches dedicated to Notre Dame that
resemble those of the Maronites. This emulation drove them to undertake
and execute the same project. The cornerstone marking the date of the old
church’s construction was also removed due to disputes between Melkite fam-
ilies seeking the management of the church. The construction of the new
church as a second story of the same building was finished a decade ago.
All these churches share the same architecture, constructed of large metic-
ulously carved stones, in a rectangular plan with a terrace on the flat roofs
where the church bells are rung. This bell, sitting on a square frame, is sup-
ported by four pillars joined together by arches and supports a dome and cross
that sit above it. The youngest of the villagers have the honor to ring the bell,
a task that often requires the weight of their full bodies. The sound is car-
ried into the air to summon churchgoers on Sundays. To the villagers, there
is nothing more touching than the sound of these familiar bells to announce
the beginning of mass on Sundays. The bells themselves do not have the same
significance for everyone, as each person is drawn to the bells that represent
their own churches. Yet today, the sounds are more tolerant; both masses are
open to both religious groups, though most villagers remain faithful to their
own churches.
Unlike the exterior, the interior architecture of the churches is totally dif-
ferent. The interior of Saint George reveals the Maronite link to its Western
influence, while Notre Dame reflects its Byzantine heritage. The entryways
of both antique churches were built during the Ottoman Empire; their low
height indicates the measures taken by church builders to prevent the Turks
from entering the church on their horses. The two parishes each possess in
their vicinities a hall and a square that serve as meeting areas for spectators
22 ● Women in Lebanon

and participants at official ceremonies such as weddings, baptisms, memorial

services, and so on.
Other small private churches called cabellas, or chapels, belong to certain
families of Saghbine, emphasizing the importance of religion in day-to-day
life. The main cemetery was formerly located in the north of the village but
then was moved to the south. Only the El-Khoury family, descendants of
Father Gabriel, owns their own cemetery that is situated behind the land
belonging to the family. In Lebanon, Christians are buried in tombs above
the surface of the earth instead of underground. Family members are laid to
rest next to each other in tombs belonging to the family. In general, tombs
are not well-managed, and are only adorned with flowers on the occasion of
a funeral of another family member, or on All Souls Day, the Francophone
version of the Day of the Dead.
A niche dedicated to Saint Theresa at the entrance of the village states
mantakat el mezar, or “visitors’ place”—the name identifying the area sur-
rounding the niche. The term “visitors” indicates visitors of the saint, who
come to her niche to pray. In this Christian village, religious icons are used to
mark places around the town, another indication of the relevancy of religion
to everyday life. The statue of Saint Theresa and the cross on the top of the
dome that envelops her protects the inhabitants and visitors as much as it
protected the women who built them.
This religious context explains the high rate of devotion of the Lebanese
population. Churches are full for masses every Sunday, and even more for
Christmas or Easter celebrations. On Holy Thursday, the faithful visit seven
churches draped for the circumstance by women and receive the host at
each church, in addition to the more widespread practice of having their
feet washed by the priest. The faith of Lebanese women seems to have been
remarkably deep-seated, for both Muslim and Christian women strongly
believe in the power of God. The only difference resides in the fact that
Muslim women still do not attend Mosques for Friday prayers, or other
religious events such as funerals.
The population of Saghbine is Catholic, from the Maronite and Melkite
rites. The people proudly call themselves Lebanese Christians, a title that con-
trasts with their Muslim and Druze neighbors. Like all of the Lebanese, these
villagers come from diverse backgrounds, although it is difficult to pinpoint
their exact origin.
If the purity of a human race is altogether a myth, this notion is particu-
larly evident in this region of incoming winds and intermingling of people.
Our country was “fashioned in history with the lively stones of tormented soil
and of a family of people, for a soul, a culture, a way to be human.”12 To be
honest with history, Corban ascertains that “the church of Arabs is local and
 Geography and Religious Spaces ● 23

disjointed.”13 The most typical example of this situation is that of the church
of Lebanon: covering 10,000 km2 with a million and half Christians, almost
all of the churches of the Orient and the West are represented.
In the realm of Catholic churches, two churches emerge due to
their numerical importance and the age of their installation in Lebanon:
The Maronite Church and the Greek-Catholic Orthodox, or Melkite
Church. The Maronite Church owes its name to a saint originally from
Anchorite named Maron who lived during the second half of the fourth cen-
tury and the beginning of the fifth century. The monastery of Saint Maron,
founded by the disciples of the hermit in the years following his death,
initiated the first headquarters of this community. We now find these dis-
ciples dispersed in the region of Homs on the border of Oronte.14 From
here, the followers gained territory in Northern Lebanon and the Kesrwan
Mountain where they took root and spread. The five Maronite families who
where drawn to the mountain where Saghbine is now located were beckoned
by the need for subsistence. The fertility of the soil and the plains of the
Bekaa promised abundant harvests, and they fertilized the ground to pay the
ouchour, or tax, to the Ottomans.
The Melkite Catholics divide themselves into two autonomous groups;
one group is attached to the Phanar and is known as “Orthodox,” while the
other is faithful to Rome, which has essentially monopolized the Melkite
rite15 since the eighteenth century. After traveling from Houran or Syria,
they settled across the southern and eastern parts of the mountains, and most
notably in the rural parts of Saida, Tyre, and Zahle. Drawn by the same need
for subsistence as the Maronites and in the same century, the Melkites made
their way to Saghbine.
There are some historic vestiges found in the terrain of Saghbine, such as
the grotto Ain el Kamar, which was carved and sculpted by water currents.
The villagers take pride that their town is a part of history, as the first settlers
installed themselves around the grotto at the beginning of the nineteenth
century. As the mountain of Kesrwan became overpopulated, the ancestors of
these villages became sharecroppers for the Druze in the neighboring towns
of Chouf and Rachaya. The history of the village is therefore tied to the needs
of the villagers, who were drawn to the fertile plains of the Bekaa from the
rocky terrain of the Kesrwan mountain—a center that was and still is the fief
for the Lebanese Christians.
In addition to the Maronites and Melkites, a miniscule community
of around 50 Protestants currently occupies Saghbine. The origin of
Lebanese Protestantism goes back to the nineteenth century when British
and American missions were particularly active in the Orient, and their
efforts resulted in the conversion of a few villagers, most of whom were
24 ● Women in Lebanon

originally Greek Orthodox. The Protestant community of Saghbine is linked

to the American Presbyterian Church. They took their dissatisfaction with
the priests of the village on affairs concerning the management of the
church as reasons to change their affiliation. Indeed, a member of the fam-
ily Aboussouan, who was nominated to be wakil el-waqf, or manager of the
pious endowment of the Melkite Church, was accused of stealing funds and
was henceforth discharged of his duty; in order to take revenge, he con-
verted to Protestantism. His daughter married a member of the Mahfoud
family who also adopted this new allegiance. These proselytes allied them-
selves with the Boustany family of Chouf, known for their participation
in the Nahda or the Arab cultural renaissance. With their help, the Protes-
tant Mission was able to enter the education domain of Lebanon, founding
a school in 1870.16 The inhabitants of Saghbine recognized that the Mis-
sion and its method of instruction and level of education both demanded
merit; yet the Mission was not alone in this domain, for the Maronites
and Melkites had already established their own schools. The Mission was
reduced to paying its adherents to maintain their allegiance to Protestantism.
As of late, the Protestant families of Saghbine have a tendency to go
back to their original allegiance to the Maronite or Melkite Church, and
their school has now become a public school in the absence of Protestant
missionaries.
According to Yazigi, the education of women was one of the major endeav-
ors of the Presbyterian Mission, which is also accredited with the foundation
of the first school for girls during the Ottoman Empire, opening in 1833 in
Beirut. After World War I, the schools managed by the Mission spread to
different regions in response to the increased demand for the education
of Lebanese women. In elementary schools, instruction was carried out in
Arabic, with French and English studied as secondary languages. Lessons
and homework, exercises of every type, games and work requiring phys-
ical engagement were administered side by side with the teaching of the
Bible, arithmetic, geography, natural sciences, Arabic reading passages, music,
writing, and more.17
The languages of the educated people, of culture and learning during the
first seven centuries of our era were Greek, Aramaic, and Syriac. The decline
of the Hellenistic and Aramaic cultures was paralleled by the progressive dis-
semination of Arabic culture and language. Syriac was widely used by the
Christians and was adopted as the language to represent this religion, yet was
slowly eliminated by the invasion of Arabic culture and language. Indeed,
the priests recited masses and prayers in Syriac, the ancient language derived
from Aramaic—the language of Jesus. It was not until 1955 that the Arabic
language replaced Syriac in Lebanese Maronite churches, and until now the
 Geography and Religious Spaces ● 25

consecration is still said in Syriac. Arabic become common to all of the people
of different regions of Lebanon and of course, the Middle East, though each
group used it differently with variations of vocabulary and style. The dialect
of Arabic spoken is Saghbine is characterized by the dropping of the letter
qaf, and replacing it with a hamza, or a sound similar to that of an A. By con-
trast, the Druze always pronounce the letter “qaf.” The Lebanese dialect of
Saghbine is clear and extremely articulate; the accents of surrounding villages
differ from that of Saghbine, although villagers joke that these variations were
caused by the water.
The population is organized into nine family groups who each have a pro-
found awareness of their individuality. Villagers refer to their family groups
as “bayt,” which means “our own.” The Maronite community consists of
five ancestral lines subdivided into families, whereas the Melkite community
is organized into four family lines. Protestant families comprise a minority
in the village. Maronites are the most numerous, as Saghbine consists of
62 percent Maronites, 34 percent Melkites, and 4 percent Protestants.
In addition to these family lines, Saghbine boasts a community of nuns
and elementary school teachers who come from all over Lebanon. For 20
years and into the Lebanese Civil War of 1975–1990, the priest of the
Maronite church was from a neighboring village, yet today, the tradition of
the Saghbine El-Khoury family providing the village priest has been rein-
stated. My uncle, an El-Khoury, served as the priest of Saint Maron church of
Beirut—the official Maronite church of Lebanon—for 40 years; I remember
his stories of my ancestors from the El-Khoury family line who were priests of
Saghbine. The Melkites did not always have a priest from their own village;
monks from Saint Savoir would come to administer sacraments and celebrate
mass. Today, the Melkites have a priest from Saghbine.

Demographics and Immigration

The youth of the population of Saghbine is evident; Lebanon in general has
the demographic gift of more births than deaths, and more young people
than older people, according to the mayor’s records. However, his registry is
incomplete because the majority of people who call Saghbine their home-
town live in Beirut. Births in Saghbine and in all of Lebanon increased after
World War I. The war ravaged the citizens of Saghbine, causing famine,
illness, and deaths in a land known for its fertility. The Turks particularly
punished the Maronites, accusing them of having sympathies for France.
Their treasonous allegiance led them to be deprived of rations, supplies, and
any external aid—a fate that was particularly treacherous since the land was
overrun and consumed by locusts. The memory of these years of war still
26 ● Women in Lebanon

resonates with terror in the souls of these villagers, for each family suffered in
some capacity.
The immigration movement is particularly notable in the case of Lebanon,
as any immigration has a significant impact on a very small population.
Christians leaving Lebanon and the Middle East in large number at this time
did not trouble the Turks.
The 1960s were prosperous years in Lebanon. High levels of education and
the rural exodus pushed villagers into the city, marking a period of good eco-
nomic standing until the beginning of the Civil War in 1975. The Lebanese
relocated from the country to the city, instead of leaving the country alto-
gether as was seen in previous years and again on the onset of the Lebanese
Civil War.
“Les montagnes d’Epire et du Liban . . . ont depuis longtemps vécu grâce
à leurs émigrés.”18 The influx of immigrants transforms the social life of the
village. Immigrants compete to throw the best parties and to give the most
extravagant gifts to their family and to the village. This is how we explain
the contrast between a barren landscape, a weak agriculture, rich houses, the
refinement of the social mores, and the knowledge of the world in these
“valleys thought to be isolated from roads and forgotten by those on the
exterior.”19
It is difficult to calculate the number of immigrants who have currently
left Lebanon considering their dispersion across five continents. They are dis-
tributed across the Americas, most notably in the United States, Canada,
Brazil, and Africa, across Australia and Africa, and most recently across the
Middle Eastern nations that produce oil. Not one family knows the exact
number of its members overseas. However, what is sure is that the number
of immigrants, their children, and their grandchildren in different parts of
the world is superior to the number of those in Lebanon. It is said that ten
million Lebanese expatriates are scattered all over the world, while five million
remain in Lebanon. Many families in Saghbine have fewer members in the
village than in foreign countries.
Lebanese immigrants to the United States left in large numbers since the
beginning of World War I in 1914. They adapted to American life and settled
in the New World; some never went back. A number of them acquired a stan-
dard of living that they could not obtain in Lebanon, and reached extremely
high levels of economic success. Villagers of Saghbine claim one of their own
as a prestigious owner of a potato chip industry in Akron, Ohio, where a
street is named after him. Impregnated with the social mores of the Lebanese
countryside and their simple and robust character, they taught their children
the language of their country while learning to speak English. They passed on
their values of the importance of family and lived as they did in their villages
 Geography and Religious Spaces ● 27

in Lebanon. They would marry someone from their village or go back to

Lebanon to find someone from their village of origin. Their children, how-
ever, lost the customs that their parents so vehemently tried to preserve and
replaced them with the Western mode of living. The legacy of the Christian
Lebanese is seen in the abundance of Maronite churches, which are located
in every major city of the United States.
The immigrants to Brazil and Argentina also left Lebanon during World
War I, although these immigrants were less numerous and almost instantly
made fortunes and soon returned to their villages. The reason of their quick
departure seems to be the harshness of the weather, the political instability
of their host countries, and most notably, their inability to fully integrate
themselves into the new society. Immigration to Australia has become more
common in the last two decades. Many young people left their villages and
petty jobs for this New World. Due to their hard work, intelligence, and
resilience, they very quickly rose in the ranks of their enterprises. These immi-
grants frequently return to visit their villages to which they feel an allegiance;
the majority of them hope to return to Lebanon permanently if the political
and their economic situations would permit them to do so.
In addition to Western immigration, a large number of Lebanese immi-
grated to other Arab states. After the Lebanese Civil War, a large number
of Lebanese immigrants chose the Middle East as their destination, with a
concentration of immigrants in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab
Emirates. In the midst of the oil boom, these countries needed engineers,
technicians, and manual labor, and took special interest in the intelli-
gence and loyalty of the Lebanese, to whom they conferred many of their
projects in return for relatively high salaries. Yet these immigrants only
planned to work abroad for a short time in the booming economic cli-
mate and then return to their home country as soon as their fortune was
assured.
Although the number of immigrants is unknown, their wealth has an
influence on the disposable income of the village. Forty percent of the
population is highly dependent upon these remittance payments earned by
relatives abroad, since immigrants financially assist their parents, even if they
are married in their new country of residence. Many immigrants pay for
their relatives to join them overseas for a holiday or special occasion. These
remittances are crucial to sustaining the quality of living of the villagers.
Properties and other goods belonging to those who leave Lebanon are
never rented out, but are left to family members who live in the space by
wakale, or proxy, which gives them the freedom to manage the property and
does not require rent. Naturally, the period in which properties could not be
divided between family members sometimes made this arrangement difficult.
28 ● Women in Lebanon

Yet in this case, a primordial solidarity to the needs of the situation always
took precedence over ancient customs.
In sum, this historical overview places the constitution of Saghbine as a
village in the seventeenth century. People were able to adapt to their envi-
ronment to ensure a sustained livelihood. Because of the roads built relatively
early to open the lines of communication, the population advanced more
than its neighboring villages. The human geography of the village especially
reveals the presence of family groups. This village habitat offers a diversity
of architecture, boasting churches and houses that vary in design and struc-
ture presented in juxtaposition to each other. Ethnically, the village comprises
a Christian population of both Maronites and Melkites. The demograph-
ics show a population that is youthful, a sure indication of social changes,
and evidence one of the major problems confronted by many Lebanese:
immigration.

How Does Modernity Translate to the Women of the Village?

Practicing religion has remained strong for women from the village. Indeed,
the rural exodus, direct cause of modernization in their lives ameliorating
their education, social relation, and economic opportunities, has not dimin-
ished the spiritual fervor of women; piety does not stand in the path of
modernity. On the contrary, the rural exodus has been changing the face
of churches in the city. In recent history, rural families moved from villages
to the city because of political unrest. They brought with them their piety
and rural traditions of practice, and their high attendance to daily masses.
City churches became filled to the extreme. The increase in demand for
churches caused the Lebanese Christians to build more churches, or renovate
and enlarge existing ones in order to accommodate the increasing number
of faithful. For reunions of main holidays and saint days, women, men, and
children all participate in religious practices; however, women accomplish
the most their religious duties. In the obituary celebration, women partici-
pate more in the prayers, for they recite prayers at the house and around the
deceased body. Unlike the customs in the United States, deceased persons in
Lebanon are kept in the house and buried the next day.
Recently, the Lebanese have spent millions of dollars enlarging churches
and mosques. In the small district of Ashrafieh in Beirut there are ten Catholic
and Orthodox churches. A profound religious aspect has shaped the Lebanese
personality for coexistence, cooperation, and dialogue and does not appear to
be changing any time soon.
A change from traditional practice to modern ones has, however, occurred
in the Maronite Church. Women were earlier forbidden to approach the
 Geography and Religious Spaces ● 29

altar or help the priest in the celebration; these tasks were reserved for
boys and men. Women were required to wear an “écharpe” when entering
churches and to sit in the rear part of the church reserved for them, for
the church was divided by a cloisonné and the front part was designated
for men only. An evolution occurred after Vatican II, which modernized the
Catholic Church and allowed young girls and women to hold incensories,
recite the readings, and even give communion. Christian women are still very
active in spiritual organizations, such as the Sisterhood of the Immaculate
Conception—an organization influenced by the Jesuits.
Finally, immigration, which has been contributing to a higher standard
of living in the village, also brought elements of Western modernization to
the village. First-generation emigrants remain attached to their families and
send financial assistance to help siblings educate their children in private
schools and elderly parents have a dignified old age. The interaction brought
an ineluctable opening to Western modernity, lifestyles, and thoughts.
A modernity welcomed by most villagers who are proudly opening up to
Western ways of life and thinking.
Another important element of modernity is the formation of Public
Square where young men and women can gather although chaperoned by
adults. The Ministry of Education has implemented a new method of educat-
ing the rural population through the use of cinematography projected in the
public square. To my surprise, while in the village in the summer of 2009, the
projection of the movie “Caramel,” a rather feminist movie, a warm and opti-
mistic chronicle depicting modernity tainted with traditions, was watched by
villagers so as to develop critical thinking of young women and men vis-à-vis
traditions inconsistent with the demand of modern times.
This human geographic framework constitutes the basic criteria that will
allow us to discern the evolution in the status of the women of Saghbine,
Lebanese women in general and Muslim women in particular. It was neces-
sary to set the context prior to the analysis to examine women’s daily life in the
space we described. To understand women we need to understand the phys-
ical space. I will now turn to the social structure of the village, and women’s
roles specifically.
30

Figure 1.1 After-church gathering: At the entrance of St. Georges Old Church in 1952, family
members, Saghbine’s villagers, and Muslim villagers from the neighboring villages gather around
the candidate for congress Georges Khoury and his newly wed wife Georgette.
 CHAPTER 2

Childhood and Adolescence

of Young Girls

T
he United Nations proclaimed 1975 as the International Year of the
Woman, in order to promote the new efforts to engage the entire
world in the struggle against “discrimination denoting women as the
victims.”1 The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Orga-
nization (UNESCO) released a balance sheet demonstrating the progress in
the area of women’s rights over the last 30 years and laying out the path for a
future in which women can actually participate in every country of the world
in a social, political, economic, and cultural sense, and most importantly, in
the same capacity as men.
The subject of women’s rights continues to attract much attention, most
notably in the West where the participants of the feminist movement inces-
santly publish document after document on the issue. However, the goal of
this chapter is not to analyze the various internal debates of feminism, but,
rather, to outline the changes in the status of Lebanese women as the woman
of Saghbine experienced them.
To speak of just one concept for women is a pure figment of the imag-
ination that does not have any philosophical significance. The concept of
being concerns men as well as women, although ancient scholars have always
defined humanity by the absolute masculine type, while the woman is held
down by everything that is specific to her sex. “The woman is female by virtue
of a lack of certain qualities,” they claim, “We must consider the character of
women as suffering from a natural deficiency.” Saint Thomas followed suit
by declaring that woman is a “lacking man”—an “occasional being.” For the
existentialists, the woman essentially appears to the male as a sexualized being.
She determines and differentiates herself in relation to men. “She is inessen-
tial in the face of the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute: she is the
Other . . . The category of the Other is as fundamental as her own conscience,
32 ● Women in Lebanon

the alterity or ‘otherness’ is a fundamental category in human thought.”2 His-

tory has bestowed upon the woman her subordination. However, a situation
created over time can be undone and reconstructed in a different way.
Sexism, which is both a mode of behavior and an ideology, perpetuates
the subordination of women. It allows man to maintain his superiority in
addition to ascribing to him his masculine qualities and all the privileges that
come along with it. When looking for support for the justifications for the
most disparate behavior of men, “the [gender disparity] has widened through-
out every period of history . . . texts pretending to be in the fields of religion,
science, history and philosophy . . . have ‘established’ the necessity of the
subordination of women.”3 Arguments of “nature,” “reason,” “justice,” and
“force” have added themselves to the amalgamation. These sophisms yielded
the prejudices of a patriarchal society, as if a true metaphysical inferiority was
weighing down the woman.
Philosophers have added their grain of salt to oppose women—women
are tasked with reproduction, that is to say, the perpetuation of the existing
world, yet, their contribution is still considered subordinate to that of men,
who have the noble charge of production as the sources of all humanity’s
“progress” and of all “advancement.”
Economists, through their “scholarly” speculations on the distinction
between “productive work” and work that is “unproductive,” have built on
this philosophical vision. They have successfully classified the “domestic”
woman as “unproductive,” and society as “dualistic.” Two worlds are in jux-
taposition: one is exterior, public, and masculine and the other, interior,
domestic, and feminine.
In general, this analysis can be verified in many societies and civilizations
including the former Western/Occidental bourgeoisie. Yet, first, we must ask
the question: what do we mean by the status of women in Saghbine? What
we mean is this society’s conception of the status and the role that should
normally fall to a woman. Which tasks are suitable for a woman in the eyes of
society? What are the feminine forms of conduct that the collectivity tolerates,
recognizes, and recommends? This type of concrete questions clarifies our
definition.
The study of women’s status is of particular importance in Lebanon,
because of the margin of variances that are tolerated. Society imposed cer-
tain models of conformity that seemed to narrow when relating to women,
especially in villages, where their choices are restricted. Yet where there is total
conformity, there is always deviance. “The direct character of ‘social control,’
the degree of obligation and the system of sanctions are such that they seem
to speak of an unconscious social contract as opposed to a normative course
of action.”4
 Childhood and Adolescence of Young Girls ● 33

The diversity in ways of life and the conception of women changes from
eye to eye. The conception of the woman as an eternal minor “who leaves the
guardianship of her father to be placed under the guardianship of her spouse”
is truer in the rural milieu than in urban society. The conceptions may also
vary in the same village—from one quarter to another—according to the
level of education of the family, and perhaps most predominately according
to social classes or religious confession.
Furthermore, the reigning ideology instills in women an education such
that they end up wishing the treatment that society has reserved for them.
Those who try to live according to new formulas sacrifice their health and
mental equilibrium.
The close examination of daily life in Saghbine has allowed us to under-
stand the village’s true social reality; it has also permitted us to situate
feminine life within its frame, and to allow us have an intuition regarding
the importance of woman’s situation that we intend to study. Throughout
the various stages of her life, we will see how a woman’s contribution to the
family community makes it dynamic and maintains the group’s permanence.
The rural exodus leads to consequences that are not only simply of sta-
tistical importance. Curbing traditional rural society is not the only effect; it
also fundamentally transforms the social structures and mentalities. Women
city dwellers pride themselves on inventing and incarnating “civilization,”
but rural women refuse at the outset to imbibe these cultural models, which
they judge to be corrupting. Therefore, the problem exists on the level of
mentalities: “The mentality, from a societal point of view, constitutes the
specific mental structure of each civilization, and from an individual point
of view, it is a collection of ideas and of intellectual disposition integrated
in the same individual, connected to each other by logical rapports and
beliefs.”5
Admittedly, traditionalism has many enthusiasts, who say with a sigh:
“La femme se perd, la femme est perdue” [the woman loses her head, the
women is lost/ruined/undone]. They no longer know if they should wish
for this change or not. Where is women’s place in society? What positions
should they occupy? Everything becomes complicated, changing a great deal
and quickly: since certain women live materially and morally in a different
way, they integrate change, accompanying and even organizing it. Tradition-
alists cannot understand why so many women of the younger generation are
ready to renounce their natural right to be wives and mothers for the dubious
privilege of competing with men in professional occupations.
In effect, it is sufficient to encounter certain families to notice that women
are divided into two categories of individuals whose appearances, inter-
ests, and occupations are obviously different—perhaps these differences are
34 ● Women in Lebanon

superficial, or maybe they are destined to disappear. What is certain is that

they exist for the moment with striking evidence.
History has time and again shown us a reality that is particular to rural
societies in Lebanon. Whether Christians or Muslims: the countrywoman’s
situation does not tend to be inferior to that of the man. The woman’s status
in such a society is therefore relatively better. The society of Saghbine was
originally an agricultural community where women participated in produc-
tion. Playing an important role in the economy, they always participated in
men’s responsibilities, were associated with his interests, and shared his prop-
erty; they were respected, and often were the ones who effectively governed.
Oftentimes, they have as much or more moral prestige than their husband,
but their tangible condition is much more difficult because they take part in
agricultural work and carry out hard domestic tasks.
Recently urbanized society has undergone a social mutation including the
transformation of the traditional family structure. In the first phase, the mod-
ification of settlement led to a shift to anonymity among one’s neighbors,
creating the conditions of a new personal identity. This modification affected
all members of the family: adults, adolescents, and children. The accelerated
acculturation phenomenon created generation gaps at the heart of the family,
with misunderstandings on several levels—notably on the moral level/ moral-
ity level. Emancipation of the younger generation, who were more concerned
with truth than with appearance, conflicted with the adult generation’s blind
conventionality. Parents also felt obligated to control their daughters’ outings
and social associations more closely.
“On ne naît pas femme, on le devient” [One is not born a woman, one
becomes it]. This statement does not have to do with what is understood as
biological gender, but with “cultural” gender, which is to say the manner in
which women are looked at with regard to their social status. The way that
she perceives herself as a subject and attempts to actualize the image that she
has of herself through the conditioning lens of an anonymous but present
“other” in her daily activity is what defines a woman.
An outline of the stages that punctuate every human life will help us to
better understand the Saghbine woman’s being in her future development.
An analysis of women’s current conditions, beginning with childhood and
continuing with adolescent development, family education, and school and
university instruction follows. Then we will observe the married woman’s
situation, as well as that of the mother at the center of a family, bringing out
the woman’s role in social life. Finally, we will pass to the stages of maturity
and old age.
Stratifying society on the basis of age allows us to identify certain trends
in conduct that are characteristic of a particular category and situate it in
 Childhood and Adolescence of Young Girls ● 35

relation to others and to the collectivity. The traditional rural milieu as well
as the urban milieu of Saghbine consists of four age groups—childhood, ado-
lescence, married life, and old age—particularly discernible if one examines
the behaviors of the individuals that form them, or of how other individuals
behave toward other groups.

The First Years of Life

The childhood of young girls is happy and carefree, although their births
are less welcome than those of a boy. Mothers closely oversee their children’s
education, reprimanding them for bad manners when necessary. In the first
few years of life, there is not much difference in behavior between boys and
girls. Both seek their parents’ approval and affection, and enjoy being held
and placed on their parents’ laps. Around age three or four, girls appear to
be better treated than their brothers are, since they continue to be cajoled by
their parents, while boys are shown less physical affection. Many boys view
this phenomenon as a rejection by their parents, although it is intended to
teach them independence and virility.
The influence of education and the environment is vital in the child’s
development. In traditional Christian Lebanese rural societies, the young boy
has an advantage during his development because he knows that others will
depend on him, invoking a sense of responsibility and importance. He learns
how to exist in the world through freedom and independence; even harmful
or negative experiences contribute to developing his manliness. In contrast,
young girls experience a conflict between autonomy and existence for others
that begins during their childhood. They learn that in order to be appre-
ciated by others, they must renounce their autonomy; they are treated as a
doll—protected and fragile—because their liberty cannot be freely expressed.
Mothers strive to integrate their daughters into the feminine world: as the
proverb goes, khoudou el banaat min soudour al ‘ammaat, or girls will be the
image of their paternal aunt.6 Mothers also raise their boys, but respect their
masculinity, and boys escape and mature from their mothers’ wings rather
quickly.
The generous mother of Saghbine, who sincerely acts in her children’s
best interest, usually strives to make her daughter a “real woman” because
society will more easily accept a traditional woman. In the village, moth-
ers place young girls in the care of female teachers, impregnate them with
knowledge of the feminine world, and encourage them to read books and
play games that will launch them into their destiny. In short, society fills the
ears of young girls with treasures of womanly wisdom and promotes female
values such as respect for others, soft spokenness, charm, and purity. Until the
36 ● Women in Lebanon

1970s, a traditional mentality emphasized the ability to cook, clean, and help
around the house, yet the onset of urbanization has changed the perception
of women’s capacities. Now, families encourage their daughter to participate
in sports and to succeed academically, although their brothers receive harsher
reprimands than their sisters do. In fact, girls strive for a different type of
success than boys; they strive to retain their femininity while they mature and
try to succeed academically at the same time.
Today’s women experienced a different childhood than their daughters.
They lived in the domestic arena, helping their mothers around the house
from a very young age while mothers excused their boys from any domes-
tic responsibility. This work gave girls an opportunity to affirm themselves
and establish an identity. The oldest sister was given the greatest responsi-
bilities as early as the age of 12—not only helping her mother around the
house, but also helping to raise her younger brothers and sisters—all of which
bestowed upon her a sense of importance and domestic leadership that helped
her assume her adult femininity. However, these responsibilities deprived her
of living a carefree and innocent childhood, becoming an adult as an adoles-
cent. Since her mother asked her to perform tasks within her capabilities, she
did not complain, but, rather, took a sense of pride and shared in solidarity
with adults. She volunteered to be important; she reasoned with those around
her, gave orders, assuming an air of superiority toward her brothers and sisters
and speaking to her mother as an equal.
Despite these compensations, she does not accept her destiny without
regret. In the beginning, she accepts her motherly vocation, but the onset of
her social maturity, academic demands, games, and readings takes her away
from the maternal circle; she understands that men, not women, are the mas-
ters of this world. This revelation inevitably reverses the girl’s perception of
her role. In general, religion helps shape a young girl’s identity, for religious
influences often manifest themselves deeper in girls than in boys. It teaches
them obedience and resignation, using the example of the Virgin Mary as a
model for their terrestrial life.
These Christian rural women consider charming a man’s heart to be a
supreme necessity and central concern. Their quiet occupation around the
house does not require their full mental devotion, and they often find their
mind straying elsewhere, most likely in reveries of romance and marriage.
Their excess of energy and unmet romantic expectations often translates into
impatience, fits of anger, and tears; the latter display becomes a habit that
many women develop because they learned from society to play the victim,
which is simultaneously a protestation against their destiny and a way to make
others aware of their emotions. These displays are not a consequence of the
 Childhood and Adolescence of Young Girls ● 37

mysterious female soul, but rather because of the situation imposed upon
them since their childhood.
Indeed, these young girls will be spouses, mothers, grandmothers; they will
run their houses exactly as their mothers did, and they will take care of their
children the way their mothers raised them. At 12 her story is already written;
she will discover this fact every day as she continues in the footsteps of her
mother. She questions her predetermined future with sadness and accepts the
reality of her upbringing with sorrow. Yet it is with joy that boys continue
to rise to the dignity of manhood. What would have been more desirable for
these future mothers—these young girls—is if their upbringing had taught
them to challenge their destiny, without complacency and without shame.

The Upbringing of Young Girls

The young Lebanese Christian or Muslim girl who lives in a village stays
in the house of her father, or, if he is dead, her brother—whose duty is to
offer her hospitality, until her marriage. In the village, there is a collective
concern for young girls, stemming from either a subconscious surveillance or
simple curiosity. This surveillance goes beyond the family affairs, for every
person in the village considers himself or herself to have the right to question
others about their comings and goings. This interrogation is not abnormal for
both parties concerned, and women commonly ask each other quite intimate
questions. These village societies used to consider it inappropriate for a young
girl to walk alone in the company of a young man, but a greater tolerance for
this behavior has emerged in the present day. Yet young people have many
opportunities to meet each other daily: on the street, at family or religious
celebrations, or at parties hosted by people around the village.
These adolescent years, though sheltered, represent a period of transition
for young girls; the future becomes a concrete reality as she waits to be mar-
ried. Marriage is not only an honorable career, but one that is less tiring than
most others, and it represents the opportunity for a woman to achieve her
integral social dignity and to be an accomplished spouse and mother. This
fate is what her community envisions for her, and this is what she wants
for herself. This dominant mentality still manifests itself today, although the
circumstances of women have changed.
The mothers of today’s generation experienced an uneasy adolescence
because they were forced to conform to traditional expectation and be depen-
dent upon others at an age of hope and ambition—an age where the will to
live and live fully is exalted with great enthusiasm, and when individuals seek
to find their place and purpose in society. In an age where young girls are
38 ● Women in Lebanon

ready to conquer the world, they learn that society will not permit them
to conquer anything, and they must deny themselves their goals since their
future depends on the decisions of men. They must cut off all of their vital
and spiritual aspirations, which explains their difficulty in reattaining some
internal stability and acceptance. Their fragile spirits, tears, and fits of ner-
vousness are less a consequence of psychological fragility than a sign of an
inability to adapt.
As a girl settles into the acceptance of her future, thoughts of a prospective
husband cease to be romantic and she replaces them with practicality. She
focuses on marriage instead of love—accepting that the two are not mutu-
ally exclusive. She no longer conjures up admirable qualities that fashion her
image of her future husband, but replaces this dream with a yearning for sta-
bility. She seeks to take her position in society as a wife and live her life as an
adult woman. Catching a husband becomes an urgent matter. An enormous
social pressure pushes her to find a social place and purpose in her marriage.
With these expectations, it seems natural that she does not strive to create a
place for herself in the world outside of marriage.
Rural families and recently urbanized families with strong ties to their
country origins practice this approach to raising their young and adolescent
girls. Families who are new to the city continue most of their rural traditions
and frequently gather in Beirut in the evenings to talk or play a round of
cards—exactly as they did in the country. Urban families who have a long
history in the city spare their daughters this rigorous education and lifestyle.
Yet such families are few, constituting approximately 30 percent of the popu-
lation. They allow their girls to live in relative openness to the outside world;
the girls are frequently educated in liberal foreign schools in the Western style,
are open to other societies, and acquire a different worldview than that of their
more sheltered compatriots. They raise their children as individuals in line
with the rights of liberty, autonomy, and personal development, regardless of
the child’s gender. Yet must the values that were once proposed to women
in their country of origins be reexamined? What is important is an educa-
tion that teaches pleasant conduct in society, cooperation with peers, and
conviviality—in short, an education that promotes living side by side with
others instead of against them. Most importantly, the family milieu creates a
disposition that thrives in the realm of schools and universities.

The Historic Role of Christians in Education

The most influential factor in changing societies is without a doubt the
level of instruction and culture to which we will now devote our reflection.
In a strict sense, education has many sources, the most obvious of which
 Childhood and Adolescence of Young Girls ● 39

is schooling, but newspapers, the radio, television, Internet, and the skills
and knowledge that one acquires by using technology also bolster education.
The influence of education is decisive and is essential to transforming an
individual’s mentality vis-à-vis traditions.
Even during the childhood of today’s mothers, a majority of Saghbine’s
residents could read and write; today, one would be hard-pressed to find an
illiterate resident. Yet in the midst of doctors, lawyers, and engineers who have
studied at prestigious institutions, combined with the simple agriculturalists,
Saghbine boasts an array of educational levels. The latter may still decode
letters and texts with difficulty, while the former constitute an educational
elite. As in many parts of the world, education is, for the most part, the
privilege of the rich and well to do.
There are three categories of schools in Lebanon: public schools, private
national schools, and private foreign schools. The first category consists of
official schools, commissioned by the government. Religious communities
founded and continue to run most private national schools, with the excep-
tion of a few, which were created by laypeople. Before the Civil War, Christian
and Muslim schools opened in communities with a large number of fol-
lowers of either faith, yet these schools accepted students of all religions.
Since Saghbine and its surrounding villages were predominately Christian,
private schools were all Christian. The lack of Muslim private schools led
Muslim families to send their children to the public schools, which become
by default predominately Muslim, although some still attended Christian pri-
vate schools. Even Muslims from surrounding villages came to the Christian
schools of Saghbine, which was for many years a center for education in
the Bekaa. Yet after the rise of the Lebanese Shi’a population in the 1980s,
Muslim families of surrounding villages stopped sending their children to
Saghbine for schooling. For example, Masghara, a village whose majority is
now Shi’i but that used to be predominately Christian at 60 percent, wit-
nessed an exodus of Christian villagers due to the influence of the Hizbullah
militia on the Christian population of the village. It is now only 5 percent
Christian, but the school run by the Sœurs des Saints-Cœurs is still open to
educate the local Shi’i majority.
Priests and Lebanese religious congregations manage the national private
schools. In contrast, foreign schools have French or Anglo-Saxon back-
grounds, hold classes in French or English, and follow the national school
systems of France or the United States. The majority of foreign schools are
French; in the mountains, religious citizens still run these schools. They differ
from public and nonreligious private schools because they impart an under-
standing of the Western cultural tradition and teach their students to reach
high levels of proficiency in French and/or English.
40 ● Women in Lebanon

Only 5 percent of private schools in the mountains taught English instead

of French until 1970; today around 30 percent of rural private schools teach
classes in English. In Selim Abou’s study on Lebanese bilingual people in his
book Le bilinguisme arabe-français au Liban,7 the education of women was a
luxury in the 1960s and 1970s. Many families often stopped the schooling
of their girls after primary school, assuming that this level of education was
sufficient for the life of a woman. This is no longer the case, for many women
continue to earn college degrees, and the prejudices described by Selim Abou
have diminished tremendously.
Even today, education conceals a cultural and societal reality that a young
woman can question only with difficulty. Regardless of religious affiliation, a
girl’s every act is calculated and her questions are stifled from the age of five.
During adolescence, as she becomes more conscious of her internal struggle
between remaining traditional and embracing modernity, her revolt is often
masked. By the time women reach adulthood, their marital and family situ-
ation largely determines their status in society. These observations are as true
today as they were 20 years ago, at least in rural areas.
Women tended to conform to models of traditional behavior due to soci-
etal pressure during my youth and during my research in the early 1980s.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, women who were pursuing other options
outside the traditional model still felt the need to maintain a facade of con-
formity because of the lasting importance of their families’ reputation and
expectations. Despite huge transformations in Lebanese society, the standing
of the family within the community remains essential, and women’s behavior
remains a reflection of the family’s reputation.
Saghbine is a center of education and therefore a cultural center. Its man-
ner and perspective on educating women used to be dominant in the region,
but its influence is now declining due to the emergence of Shi’i schools
administered by Hizbullah.
After the rise of the Shi’i population in the 1980s and the expansion of
the Jam’iyyat Islamiyya, charitable Islamic associations, Hizbullah has become
deeply involved in the provision of social welfare services, the creation of
charitable, health, and educational services within the framework of a soci-
etal project. Hizbullah opened schools of al Imdad, al Mustapha, and Mahdi
associations in Lebanon, and particularly in the Bekaa Valley, to impact the
education in Lebanon and promote a model of education based on the
culture of itlizam—religious engagement. This undertaking illustrates how
Hizbullah, through its social organizations, functions as any other sectarian
group in Lebanon looking after its own interests in forging a societal change
through education and negotiating a new identity. As a result, two models
of education are being juxtaposed, one model provided by private Christian
 Childhood and Adolescence of Young Girls ● 41

schools integrating Western values and promoting a unified model of iden-

tity and another provided by Islamic schools funded by Hizbullah adopting
Islamic values. The two models of education are currently yielding two differ-
ent models of identity, particularly in shaping a girl’s identity as they enter the
public sphere and in some cases embracing activism. Two parallel systems of
education, one religious and the other secular, are at the root of the bifurca-
tion of society. The modern secular system labeled as a product of European
colonialism and a promoter of the Western-oriented process of modernization
does not reflect a continuity with the Muslim past. These two trajectories of
modernity in the academic and educational system are of great importance in
shaping girls’ identity in their upbringing, and aiming at changing Lebanon’s
identity as the ultimate goal.
 CHAPTER 3

Marriages and the Condition

of Married Women

Regional Overview
Dans toutes les sociétés paysannes, les choix matrimoniaux et la maîtrise de la
terre sont les occasions privilégiées de développer des stratégies savantes et de longue
haleine, puisque ce sont les deux occasions principales ou une incertitude est
introduite dans le système des rapports sociaux . . . Une stratégie d’alliances matri-
moniales et de maîtrise de la terre menée habillement et avec persévérance au cours
de plusieurs générations assure a un lignage prééminence, pouvoir et éventuellement
contrôle sur la collectivité, tandis que des mariages inconsidérés et une gestion inat-
tentive du patrimoine entrainent inévitablement le dépérissement d’un lignage aussi
bien pourvu qu’il soit à l’origine.1

In all country-dweller societies, the matrimonial choices and the control of the
land are the privileged occasions to develop masterly and long-term strategies,
because they constitute the two main circumstances of creating uncertainty in
the social relations system . . . A strategy of matrimonial alliances and control
of the land, conducted with ability and perseverance throughout generations,
ensure preeminence to a lineage as well as power, and eventually control over
the collectivity, whereas unconsidered marriages and a distracted management
of the patrimony inevitably engender the wasting away of a lineage, as flushed
with success the lineage could originally be.

T
he intersection of tradition and modernity is perhaps best exhibited
in the institution of marriage. In a society where the role of women
and family are central components in the debate over modernization,
marriage encompasses both major factors and lends itself to playing an inte-
gral role in determining one’s identity, so much so that our Christian village
saw endogamy as commonplace to preserve a common identity among village
dwellers. Furthermore, the customs surrounding marriage—the ceremony,
44 ● Women in Lebanon

the material exchange, and even the negotiation between families—provided

an opportunity for families to relate to one another as they came together to
celebrate a common custom in their common way. The practice—as both a
religious and social affair—reinforces group identities, and as it has changed
over time, the way that groups relate to one another has also been forced to
evolve.
While a milestone in any individual’s life, marriage is particularly impor-
tant for women—especially in the village. It marks a girl’s graduation into
womanhood, her break from her family and the beginning of a new, indepen-
dent life. While marriage traditions have evolved, the significance of marriage
in a woman’s life remains of paramount importance, and today, still marks
the beginning of an independent life, be it in the villages of the Bekaa or the
high-rise buildings of Beirut. The role of women and family remain central
components of the debate over modernization and progress. Marriage is not
only a societal issue, but a women’s issue, as it defines her status in her society
and her entitlements under the law. Again, we see women at the crux of an
issue that is at the heart of modernity.

The Marriage Tradition

Marriage in most primitive societies presented an economic value of vital
importance.2 In the traditional sense, marriage in itself was a form of
exchange that encompassed material objects, social values, and even women,
whose transfer from one group to another was a general custom. Rights,
properties, goods, and people circulated among groups through a continual
mechanism of giving and taking. Marriage had an all-inclusive character; it
was at once sexual, economic, judicial, and social. This fundamental character
of marriage reveals the dualistic nature of the affair, for in one marriage, two
groups benefit. From an outsider’s perspective, the exchange may seem egal-
itarian, although actually two groups of men arranged the exchange, while
the women—though directly involved in the marriage—were considered as
objects of exchange instead of partners.3
By contrast, groups that placed large importance on the privilege of rank
and fortune saw marriage based on endogamy—marriage within the same
group—as an expression of the preservation of patrimony, or keeping prop-
erties and goods within the family. In other words, marriage is a deliberate or
unconscious measure to keep certain social or economic privileges inside the
group.
However, the practice of endogamy was and is still limited because of the
prohibition of incest. As Germaine Tillion mentions in her book, Le harem
et Les cousins, the importance of the parental system in Lebanon comes from
 Marriages and the Condition of Married Women ● 45

the country’s Mediterranean character. Parental links in Mediterranean coun-

tries are such that Tillion found the justification to call the region république
des cousins, that is, republic of cousins, or république des beaux-frères, that is,
republic of brothers-in-law. According to Tillion, men who live in this system
consider it their duty of solidarity to have good relationships with members of
their paternal lineage—this responsibility is more important than their other
civil and patriotic obligations.4
The prohibition of incest, a common law derived from religious law, acted
as a genetic protection, to prevent the negative biological effects of marriages
from the same bloodline. However, the noble riverains de la Méditerranée 5 —
or residents of the Mediterranean—still ignored the Christian religious law.
In her research, Tillion encountered marriages between uncles and nieces
among old Arab Christians of Lebanon, as well as Lebanese Muslims.
“In Lebanon, I came across marriages between paternal first cousins. [In the
1960s], the clergy required for this type of marriage to have a special
dispensation, although this dispensation was never refused.”6
The ideal marriage kept all the girls of the family for the boys of the same
family. “In the largest part of the Levant, the ideal marriage used to take place
[until the 1960s] between a man and a relative that most closely resembled
his sister without actually being his sister.”7 A man did not seek a woman
physically resembling his sister, but rather a woman to fill the place of his
sister as the lady responsible for the management of his house or other wifely
duties. “This preference is part of the old Arab personality.”8 According to
Tillion, women, like pieces of land, were part of the patrimony, causing the
idea of endogamy to spread throughout the old Arab World.
While no longer a common trend, endogamy persists as a modality of mar-
riage. Why has the practice of endogamy been maintained until the present
day? Many causes seem to have contributed to this preservation. The first is a
result of the refusal to divide the land that was intended for inheritance down
family lines. Minority populations, such as the Christians of the Orient, were
resolved to safeguard their threatened religious identity by procreating with
other members of the same religious group. In addition, one must consider
the vivacity of traditions that remained even among urbanites who continued
to value the endogamic society. “In the South of the Mediterranean, the sim-
ple act of not accepting strangers creates nobility and talk of the ancestors is
enough to instill a sense of pride.”9
One can extend the definition of endogamy to include marriages within
the same religious sect or the same village. While marriages between fam-
ily members have become rare in Saghbine, a strong preference for finding
a spouse within the village community persists, including unions between
members of different Christian sects. In a village society that has lost many
46 ● Women in Lebanon

members to exodus, the population is so reduced in number that the choice

of potential spouses has also diminished, and it has become necessary to
find a partner outside of the religious community or even the village. Nev-
ertheless, the drive to preserve a common identity persists, and marriage
between members of the same religious groups remains tantamount to a social
obligation.

Types of Marriage
Mounir Chamoun presents different kinds of marriage of Lebanon10 that
condense into four main groups:

(a) Marriage of Pressure

The bride or groom’s family exerts a coercive pressure to accept a con-
jugal union that neither individual desires. Although this modality
has become rare in both the rural and urban milieux, in many vil-
lages, those who choose a prospective husband do not even consult
the young bride-to-be. She is literally married against her will. She
loses her dignity and any rebellion makes her appear to be ungrateful.
Social pressure and models that force each of the partners to conform
do not necessarily produce a marriage that is destined to fail. In rural
areas, this type of marriage is more likely to succeed since the young
girl will marry and live just as her mother did. By contrast, in urban
areas, this type of marriage often ends in separation or annulment.
In a conservative milieu, many forced marriages last because of the
initiative of the women, regardless of the behavior of their husbands.
In this society, suffering, patience, and resignation are considered as
essential qualities for women. Even if the number of forced marriages
declines, the Lebanese mentality of “We married the children,” or that
parents and adults are responsible for finding their children’s spouses,
remains.
(b) Arranged Marriages
This type of marriage occurs through indirect pressure and exists on
the assumption that both interested parties are in direct agreement.
In rural settings, families are responsible for the arrangement, and
boys and girls are destined for each other through their respective
parents. The arrangement can also be the work of friends, family, or
even the village priest. In urban societies, marriages arranged by par-
ents are based upon economic interests, where families—especially the
wealthy—search for spouses from prominent, well-to-do families for
their children. In reality, all these marriages are mariages de raison,
 Marriages and the Condition of Married Women ● 47

or marriages of reason, that seem to last in appearance, although

they sometimes turn toward drama and even violence. Some of these
unions grow to be harmonious, but others perpetuate suffering or
hindering of enthusiasm and joie de vivre.
(c) Marriage by Khateefa
Marriage by Khateefa, or marriage by abduction, may be rare, but
remains a practice in villages or by rural people who move to the city.
Those who practice it are usually very young—in their early twenties.
In most cases, this form of marriage is a less elegant way to conclude a
long-awaited arrangement accepted by both parties to avoid the high
cost of village weddings. Their families accept the match, but pretend
to protest it under the mask of the indecency of abduction.
Yet the cases of real abductions are not necessarily fiction. In certain
societies, even if the young girl does not consent to her “kidnapping,”
she finds herself obligated to accept the marriage with her abductor
after having spent just one night outside her house, either because of
her compromised honor or due to the effective and assumed loss of
her virginity.
Though a common practice 60 years ago in villages, men practice
abduction much less frequently today, and young girls have learned
how to conduct themselves in such a situation. Of course, abduction
with the previous consent of the girl and both families is a facade for
an arranged marriage.
(d) Marriage by Free Choice
Marriage by choice of the bride and groom is the type of marriage that
is emerging as a model amidst the disappearance of the more outdated
forms of marriage outlined above. Young people in both urban and
rural areas are increasingly claiming marriage with a person of their
choice as an absolute right. University-educated young adults wish to
marry the way they want and with whom they choose. As early as the
1960s and 1970s, marriage between students who had not finished
their studies and consequently did not have a source of income became
common in Beirut and other cities until the interruption of the Civil
War. This shows a positive evolution in matrimony and is a sign for a
continued positive trend in the future.

Forced marriages have disappeared; marriage by abduction has also disap-

peared except when practiced as a facade of morality by young couples
to obtain parental approval. While arranged marriage still persists, young
women find themselves in a difficult situation due to the demographic change
as a result of years of war that led to the increasing number of unmarried
48 ● Women in Lebanon

women, the law of supply and demand playing against a real free choice for
women. The massive departure of men from the country limited their choice
and somehow forced them to accept what is available regardless of the kind
of modality of marriage.
Endogamy within each community has diminished; for example, in
Saghbine; it remains at approximately 50 percent. Though rural exodus and
emigration have allowed for a greater freedom of choice on matrimony, it is
not rare for young expatriate men or women from Cleveland (where I cur-
rently reside), or in Akron, Ohio (the home for an expatriate community
from Saghbine), to make the trip to the village to find a wife or a husband.
Until now, my visits to the village are met with chides of “it is a loss for
the village that you married an outsider, where were the young men of the
village?”
Exogamy—union between two communities—which has increased from
35 percent in 1982 to 70 percent in 2009, is a sure indication of an evolution
toward the free choice in the modalities of marriage. In general, male domi-
nance is on the decline, but a moral constraint requires a woman to remain
dependent on her husband, as he is without question the head of the nuclear
family. We are witnessing a conflicting situation. First, the change attests that
customs and traditions no longer hold much merit but, nonetheless, serve as
structured gestures for public display. Second, traditions are lending a helping
hand to women in their search for a suitable spouse, the conjectural situation
playing against women.
While divorce is increasingly accepted instead of a life of renouncement,
it is challenged by religious structural constraints, which indicates that the
transformation of women’s subjectivity remains a push and pull of tradition
and modernity. More importantly, as highlighted in the case study of Magda
and Alex, a long overdue needed civil marriage depends on a courageous and
transparent dialogue between the different religious communities to adopt a
civil marriage administered by the civil legislation of the state, guaranteeing
equality and justice for all.

Wedding Traditions and Marriage in Saghbine

A marriage in a rural area provided one of many occasions to create excite-
ment within the village. Allowing a digression into local history, we can
observe an image of tradition that is fading rapidly. Contrary to the usual
simplicity of life in the countryside, planning and preparing for weddings
and other traditional ceremonies are complex, complete with feasts, visits, and
presents. A dignified fiancé never comes to see his fiancée empty-handed. His
future in-laws should reproach him, according to custom, for his “unjustified”
openhandedness.
 Marriages and the Condition of Married Women ● 49

It is customary that mothers or homemakers, whose homes are located on

the processional route, throw handfuls of rice or sugared almonds on the new
couple; young girls even sprinkle eau de cologne or perfume. The community
wishes the newlyweds well, including exclamations of hopes for happiness,
long life, and many children.
Custom dictates that the mother-in-law welcome her newlywed daughter-
in-law in the foyer of her house by offering her a pound of sour dough. The
bride then applies the dough to the top of the lintel, draws two lines in the
shape of a cross, and sticks a few coins in it. The harmony of the household
depends on the traditional speculation that the prosperity of the new home is
proportionate to how well the dough adheres to the stone. Guns are fired into
the air and best wishes pour out from guests. In the entire Orient, Lebanon
in particular, people are profoundly convinced of the effectiveness of well-
wishes for others. Just by shaking hands to greet each other, two villagers
make at least 15 to 25 mutual wishes for good health and prosperity, to name
a few.
Well-wishes at a wedding are usually related to prosperity, harmony, and—
most of all—fertility. Participants exaggerate according to his or her vision for
the couple, wishing them five or six children or an enormous home. Older
and young women alike participate in the common flurry of excitement.
While traditional customs for such occasions have been simplified over the
years to include just the ceremony and reception, the importance of marriage
as a cornerstone to a woman’s—or man’s life—has not diminished. In the old
days, celebrations lasted a whole week and the entire village was invited. This
historic lavishness entailed a considerable expense for the families who were
still participating in the sixties. In the twenty-first century, the last vestiges of
these traditions have fallen away in favor of more European-style weddings.
Here are a few examples of dialectal poetry, addressed by the women of
the village to the newlyweds:

Ya ‘ariss el-‘irss yihlalak Ya ‘ariss congratulations on your wedding

Wa ghanna ‘awiha el-badr kirmalak The moon sang ‘awiha specially
for you
Wa ithanna bi ‘arustak zahret el-ma’rouf Be happy with your ‘arouss the
rose of goodness
Was el-saad youqaf abd ‘a chamalak May happiness take hold on your left side
‘Awiha ya ‘arouss ma’ ‘arissik chterki ‘Awiha ya ‘arouss with your ‘ariss know
to share
‘Awiha la tqaddou el-hayat mu’araki ‘Awiha do not spend your life
quarreling
50 ● Women in Lebanon

‘Awiha betlub lik min Allah as-saade ‘Awiha we ask God to provide you
happiness
‘Awiha watkoun jeztek jeze moubaraki ‘Awiha may your marriage be
blessed!
Farha w’ammait jiretna A joy propagated in our neighborhood
Wou chefna es-saad bdiretna And we felt happiness in our surrounding
Bahr el-roum wal-Atlantik The immensity of “Roum” sea and the Atlantic
Ma bisa’ou farhetna Are not enough to contain (hold) our joy11

In Saghbine, notions of exogamy and endogamy specifically defined the

modes of matrimonial exchange. The long-practiced endogamy linked to feel-
ings of belonging in a community than to belonging to a family. Each of the
two groups, Melkites and Maronites, wanted to keep their young girls for the
young men of their own communities. In this climate, though a few conflicts
ensued, each group felt the need to unite and strengthen in the face of the
opposing group.
After the departure of the Druzes, Saghbine no longer had a few dominant
landowners. Therefore, the type of preferred marriage was frequently between
cousins in order to maintain the ancestral patrimony. Until 1982, 5 percent
of marriages were between cousins, but mostly for reasons of family affection
and not for fortune. Today, the number has dropped to 2 percent, according
to the Maronite priest who leads the church.
Exogamous marriages are unions between the two communities. Individu-
als who had an outsider as a spouse were rare. These marriages occurred with
hopes of safeguarding the inimitability of the village, particularly in Saghbine,
from a distinct perceived threat from surrounding Muslim villages. A clear
“us” and “them” mentality prevailed, and marriage was a tool to assert one’s
unified identity in the face of the other.
The preferred marriage practice is endogamy; having a spouse from the
same village, regardless of his or her religious affiliation, persists at 50 percent.
This attitude is not reflexive, and there is, for instance, some hesitation if a
Greek Orthodox person wants to marry a villager. Today, eight villagers are
even married to Muslims, demonstrating the prevalence of village solidarity—
even over religious affiliation. In such cases, the young bride and groom
ultimately make the decision, which remains subject to their acquiescence
in favor of the parents’ orientations. Parents wish to keep their daughters in
the village, and when a nonindigenous man presents himself as a suitor, their
traditional mentality often dictates that they do not want him to marry their
daughter.
 Marriages and the Condition of Married Women ● 51

How do these preferences for marriage play out in the present day? With
an increasingly shrinking number of villagers, and the cultural and informa-
tional exchange championed by globalization, exogamy has made its way into
even the most remote villages. In the face of different identities, how have vil-
lagers asserted themselves as a common people, sharing customs, traditions,
and values?
The evolution of the economy from an autarchy to a “complementary”
stage, accepting goods from outside the village, has led to external relations,
provoking a parallel evolution of the endogamous matrimonial relations
toward more exogamous ones. Exogamy of the village creates a possible meta-
morphosis, simultaneously a sign and a source of evolution, and Saghbine
finds itself in a society on the path of transformation. Exogamous marriages
seem to be increasing, particularly in milieu of high socioeconomic classes.
In fact, exogamous marriages increased from 35 percent in 1982 to 70 percent
at present, demonstrating how preferences of the past need to be adjusted to
accommodate present-day realities.
Young men tend to marry outside the village, and their sisters are bring-
ing more and more young men from outside the village as well. The
socioeconomic level intervenes indirectly at the starting point of exogamous
relationships by allowing the residential mobility of indigenous citizens; this
mobility is the main reason behind many exogamous marriages. The young
couples, far from being torn between the traditionally rigid matrimonial sys-
tems, have adapted easily to the new mode of urban life and to their recent
need for expansion, stemming from the contact with and prominence of
urban culture.
The evolution of the modalities of marriage in Saghbine represents a cer-
tain equilibrium. The forced marriage has not existed for 50 years. A form
of moral constraint that rural girls do not often associate with young men
remains, and therefore they could not make an authentic “choice” for them-
selves. The first suitor who came received a favorable welcome. For the most
part, the indigenous parents are similar: they care more about the young man’s
work and honesty than about other qualities, and a suitor’s education is a
secondary priority.
Presently, though only for a minority, a type of “arranged” marriage still
persists, but now “free choice” of the couple is imposing itself as the dominant
trend, prevailing over the wishes of the parents. Parents have lost jurisdic-
tion in this area and no longer feel responsible. They, however, are vocal
about their instincts, and fear a bad reputation if their daughter partici-
pates in relations that they assess as “too liberal.” As they see more younger
women and men dating, parents are distressed, but they cannot do anything
about it.
52 ● Women in Lebanon

Marriages takes place, based on love, without any sort of interdiction.

According to the old mores, in which parents would arrange marriages and
impose spouses on their children, children have revolutionized recent mar-
riages through choice. At the moment, children have become those who do
the convincing, often by having recourse to a trustworthy third party; oth-
erwise there is the possibility of a secret departure for one or two weeks
preceding the wedding with the participation of the diocese’s priest. After an
unmarried young woman has spent one night away from her parent’s home,
her reputation, and by extension her family’s reputation, is in danger, and
after spending time with her chosen spouse in that manner, the parents often
concede “defeat.”
Marriages are becoming literally but discretely subjected to the eternal law
of supply and demand, in addition to the boundaries placed on the young
woman by the people in her life. Therefore, young couples—and women in
particular—struggle to acquiesce to customs and traditions while adapting
them to present circumstances. Often, these customs and traditions are rel-
egated to maintaining outward appearances and serve as structured gestures
for public display only.
The equilibrium and evolution of the matrimonial system are justified
through a low rate of separation. Within the 500 families, the village counts
15 separated couples, a rate to 2 percent. This demonstrates the respect
among the indigenous population for the institution of marriage, considered
as the underlying structure of the society. However, Saghbine has seen a mod-
ification in the image of divorce; previously considered a deviance, or a social
disorder, divorce is today considered a possible, but still unfortunate, outcome
of marriage by many young men and women. However, this practice is only
possible in rare cases fixed by the canon law; some young women, more free
and having more connections outside the house, do not resign themselves,
as in the past, to a failed marital life when a grave disagreement separates
them from their husbands. Today, instead of a life of renouncement, they
sometimes prefer a rupture and a construction of another, perhaps improved,
home. The change of this attitude in women toward divorce exists as a result
in the change in their conditions.
Let us end this horizon tour with celibacy. “En Orient, pour un homme
sans femme, il n’y a pas de paradis au ciel et pas de paradis sur terre . . . Si
la femme n’avait pas été créée, il n’y aurait ni soleil ni lune; il n’y aurait pas
d’agriculture et pas de feu.”12 [In the Orient, for a man without a woman,
there is no paradise in heaven nor on earth . . . If woman had not been created,
then there would be neither sun nor moon; there would be neither agriculture
nor fire.] While Oriental Jews and old Babylonians considered celibacy as
a sin, in Saghbine, it remains an abnormal fate. Marriage is therefore the
 Marriages and the Condition of Married Women ● 53

only normalized fate, especially for women. However, the Lebanese respect
religious vocations for women and men as well.

Changes in Marriage due to the Conjunction of Political

and Economic Circumstances
For the current generation, young men and women are increasingly postpon-
ing marriage due to a range of political and economic factors. As of 1996, the
average age of marriage for a Lebanese woman was 28 years old, whereas the
average age was only 23 in 1970.13 In La génération désenchantée, the authors
describe how a context of economic and political uncertainty has created
instability in the equilibrium between the private and professional spheres.
A lack of professional opportunities, reflected in a high unemployment rate
that is notably disadvantageous for young adults and twice as high for young
women as for young men, has resulted in young people delaying the rite of
passage that traditionally marked the entrance into adulthood: marriage, buy-
ing a home, and starting a family. Now, young people spend a longer period
studying at the advanced level, have greater difficulty integrating into the
workforce, and often do not have the means to buy their own home, which
not only delays plans for marriage, but also increases the number of young
people who emigrate in search of opportunities elsewhere.
According to the same study, the number of young Lebanese men and
women who are earning their livelihood abroad, whether permanently or
provisionally, is increasing, but the percentage of young men who emigrate
(43.3 percent) is significantly higher than women (23 percent). Conse-
quently, there is a deficiency of young men of marriageable age (30–50 years
old), which is a major factor in the dramatic increase of unmarried women
over the past several decades. The percentage of single women approximately
doubled from 1970 to 1996 in most age ranges, with the exception of women
under the age 25; for example, 25.1 percent of Lebanese women in the age
range of 25–29 years were single in 1970, but this percentage increased to
46.6 percent as of 1996.
Another increasingly popular option for Lebanese women is to marry for-
eigners. A recent survey of marriages between people of different nationalities
in Lebanon14 reveals that international unions allow women to maintain
the preference for finding a spouse within their religious confessions or
with people of Lebanese origin living in the international Diaspora. Out
of the 17,860 marriages of “mixed” nationality that were included in the
survey between 1995 and 2008, 51.1 percent identified with the Sunni com-
munity, 33.6 percent with the Shi’i community, and 5.6 percent with the
Greek-Orthodox community. It is interesting to note that the prevalence of
54 ● Women in Lebanon

marriages between Lebanese women and men from Arab countries was much
higher among Lebanese Muslim women (Sunni and Shi’i) than Lebanese
Christian women, who married European and Americans in relatively higher
numbers.15 Lebanese women’s clear tendencies to choose husbands living in
other countries who, nonetheless, come from the same religious background,
or in some cases even have origins from the same village, reflect a global-
ization of Lebanese endogamy—an adaption of tradition to modern times.
One could argue that advances in technology facilitate the perpetuation of
the tradition of endogamy.
It is important to note that economic and political instability are delay-
ing marriage for the majority of Lebanese young people and transforming the
understanding of endogamy, but these factors do not diminish the impor-
tance of marriage in this society—adjusting to modern realities but still
maintaining a deeply rooted social value that characterizes the fabric of the
village’s tapestry. The perceived threat of a declining birth rate and an aging
population has made marriage and childbirth a question of survival for young
Lebanese who are concerned for the continued existence of their specific fam-
ily and religious groups and for the future of the nation as a whole. Society
still considers the matrimonial unit as the only legitimate outlet for roman-
tic and sexual relations, and any relationship outside of wedlock is largely
considered morally reproachable.

Religious and Civil Marriages

In Lebanon, as in the rest of the Middle East and in other countries of the
Mashrek and the Maghreb, religious marriage is the only legitimate practiced
institution. For Christian churches, marriage is a sacrament, a union between
a man and a woman that becomes legal in its aim to benefit both people in
their lives together, in the creation of a family and the raising of children—
the only real way to give back to society. The Christian churches are very
much interested in the institution of marriage, for they abolished polygamy
and prohibited divorce on principle by invoking the following gospel text:
“Because of this, man leaves his father and his mother and will attach himself
to his wife; and the two will become one flesh . . . may man not separate what
God has united.”16
In a general sense, there is no authority great enough to dissolve a
Christian marriage. However, much as these rules were put in place to val-
idate marriage,17 marriages could be annulled in the case of the husband’s
impotency, if either the bride or the groom is under the required age or are
discovered to be related, and in other special cases. Yet marriages can take
 Marriages and the Condition of Married Women ● 55

place despite these special circumstances with the permission of the Church,
which is the only institution authorized to give consent in this domain.
Catholic marriage, both Maronite and Melkite, is a sacrament based on
an engagement of mutual consent. The sacrament cannot be dissolved even
if following the marriage ceremony, the man or woman does not fulfill his
or her marital obligations. In the case of serious disagreements, an ecclesias-
tic tribunal verifies the validity of the conditions of the engagement. They
sometimes annul the marriage, but it is also in their power to determine who
keeps the custody of children in the case of a simple separation (until the
age of seven, children are under the custody of their mother) or determine
the payments a spouse must make to support the other in the event of a
separation.
The Orthodox treat marriage and divorce in a much more complicated
way: the clauses of the contract are more detailed, flexible, and more numer-
ous, giving the ecclesiastic tribunal much with which to work. For example,
Catholics consider adultery a cause for separation that does not have to be
permanent, whereas the Orthodox consider adultery grounds for divorce.
Many religious communities exist among the Lebanese people, and mar-
riages between religious groups cause a certain number of religious and legal
problems. Lebanese couples have inherited a legal framework based upon
traditional marriage—where religious laws dictate social arrangements and
make it increasingly difficult for groups with different religious identities
to join forces—creating a new, multicultural, and religiously diverse family
unit. Upon marriage, women enter into their husbands’ religious communi-
ties. When a marriage occurs within the Catholic community, there are few
problems, for the young girls must sign a document to adopt the rite of her
groom. A Catholic-Orthodox marriage follows the same procedure, but if
the two Churches do not have a working relationship with one another, it
can become a problem from a religious angle. Furthermore, when the Ortho-
dox community celebrates a marriage, it is no longer under the rules of the
Catholic Church. In the event of the failure of the marriage, the husband
(Orthodox) can obtain a divorce from his wife, sanctified by the Ortho-
dox Church, although the Catholic woman is still considered married, as the
Catholic Church does not easily grant divorces. To avoid this inconvenient
situation, the Oriental Canon Law in 1949 ruled that, if one of the partners
in a marriage is Catholic, a marriage conducted by an Orthodox priest renders
the marriage void, claiming a vice de forme, or invalid marriage license.18
In the event of any marriage failing, divorce is always a problem. Grant-
ing a divorce lies within the power of the community, religious or civil,
that performed the marriage. In Lebanon, there is an intimate link between
56 ● Women in Lebanon

religious and civil domain, although all divorces pronounced by the religious
authorities have the power to break up a marriage. The power of the Church
is so great that, in the event of a failed marriage, in order to resolve the
situation in both religious and civil realms, many Catholics convert to Ortho-
dox rites to obtain the divorce. Many will then remarry in the Orthodox
Church. Although conversion for the sole purpose of changing marital status
is against Lebanese law, it is still practiced, and in the case of a Catholic to
Orthodox conversion, the marriage under the Catholic Church is no longer
recognized. Religious officials are second to only the Lebanese Constitution
in terms of their power, though religious authorities dictate marriages and
divorces that are recognized in the civil domain—another indication of their
complex connection.

N’est-ce pas la un problème théologico-pratique? La confrontation sereine

de deux traditions, orientales et occidentales, la comparaison entre le cas du
divorce admis par l’epikie des Orthodoxes et la jurisprudence des déclarations
de nullité par les Catholiques, ne permettraient-elles pas de découvrir . . . la voie
que le Saint Esprit suggère à l’Eglise pour maintenir fermement la doctrine de
l’indissolubilité, tout en parant avec miséricorde aux défaillances humaines?19
Is this not a problem of theology and practicality? The sincere confronta-
tion of two traditions, Oriental and Occidental, the comparison between the
case of divorces granted by Orthodox epikies and the jurisprudence of annul-
ments granted by the Catholics—don’t they lead to the discovery of . . . the
way the Holy Spirit suggested to the Church to tightly cling to the doctrine of
indivisibility, even in the light of human deficiencies?

The Greek Orthodox Saint Synode Church of the Antioch Patriarchy decided
on November 12, 1960, to refuse to admit converts who wished to enter the
Orthodox Church to ask for a marriage or a divorce. This decision risked a
paradoxical result: if remarriage became impossible in Christian Churches,
there was always the possibility of converting to Islam in order to “take
another spouse.” There is always the case of those who change their religion
for the sake of marriage and in turn lose their faith: “They cannot ask for a
grandiose mass for their new marriages, for a solemn ceremony cannot come
out of a lie.”20
How do Lebanese couples facing an inevitable divorce challenge the rules
of their respective religious groups that fully control the marriage institu-
tion in Lebanon? How are they able to deal with the agonizing divorce time
leaving women and men frustrated while the country is in the midst of trans-
formation? How do they manage to live between traditional marriage laws
and customs in a society with modern problems and issues?
 Marriages and the Condition of Married Women ● 57

Religious divorces are extravagantly costly given the income per capita in
Lebanon, time-consuming—taking five to seven years—and can be degrad-
ing as the religious judge can have the couples exposing their dirty laundry.
As part of the country’s laws, the civil government automatically upholds the
rulings of the religious courts on the issue of marriage, divorce, and child cus-
tody. For instance, a civil law enforcement can ban someone from traveling
in order to enforce the religious court’s ruling. Related governmental entities
have the power to execute the sentence and in some cases imprison someone
for failing to pay alimony or child support.
What complicates the matter is that in most cases the intentions of the
judges have proven lacking in transparency and fairness. Religious judges have
their own unofficial group of lawyers who are financially close to the judges
and can finalize a divorce in a shorter period of time for an additional cost.
This lack of transparency and corruption is forcing the divorcing couple to
challenge the system in different ways; one of them is to convert to another
Christian sect where the religious judges charge a flat fee less costly than
divorcing in the Maronite, Melkite, and Orthodox Churches. For instance,
the Assyrian Church offers a quick, legitimate, and affordable divorce. More-
over, the divorcing couple has the option to convert to Islam to benefit from
a swift divorce process at a much lower cost.
So what does this mean for the future of a traditional institution facing
modern times? How do young Lebanese men and women find space for
their wants and needs caught between the stitches of a binding social fabric?
In short, how do they attempt to come to terms in their mutual existence?
Take the case of Magda and Alex:

Case Study of Magda and Alex21

During high school, a young man Alex and a young woman Magda from
Ashrafieh fell in love and got married at the age of 22. They lived in the
United States for eight years. Alex was still attending a graduate program in
engineering, and then worked for an engineering firm in Houston, Texas.
They happily went through campus life the first year, the second year things
began regressing slowly, and by the third year Alex began entertaining the
idea of divorce because Magda was overwhelmingly homesick and constantly
complained about not being happy away from her family, particularly her
mother. During this third year, her mother flew from Lebanon for a three-
month visit and after that things started going downhill. The following five
years were so unhappily lived that they both agreed that Magda would go to
Lebanon for a year to be close to her family and then come back. The couple
did not have children at this point.
58 ● Women in Lebanon

After a year, she refused to come back to live in the United States. The
husband’s flourishing business in Houston did not allow him to join her
immediately in Lebanon. Their relationship consisted of visiting each other
every three months, whether in Beirut or Houston. Anyway, her actions
proved later that her intentions were for Alex to stay in the States and send
her money to be on her own and live her own way. In the meantime, her
mother convinced her to have children at any cost; she then visited fer-
tility gynecologists. Finally following continuous treatment, she conceived
twins, a boy and a girl. At this point, after ten years of marriage, she was 32
years old.
Alex agreed on having children in the hope that his wife would come back
to her senses after becoming a mother. Although her excessive grumbling
and nagging forced Alex to ignore her, he was constantly entertaining the
idea of a divorce, but did not act on it. After all, there had been no divorce
in his family, and his conservative upbringing discouraged divorce due to
the negative social and family repercussions. Obviously, Magda kept taking
advantage of the situation. In Houston, Alex felt relieved and had the peace
of mind a long time overdue.
Time proved that Magda’s plans diverged totally from what Alex had
hoped in forming a family, with solid Christian values. She desperately
wanted children to fulfill her motherhood call, and more importantly to tie
Alex up to the marriage because he mentioned several times the possibility
of separating from her. Unconsciously, his first step toward divorce was the
decision to let her go to Lebanon for a year. The idea pleased her and she
went to Lebanon to relive her teenage life, going out and having extramarital
affairs, and imitating her mother’s selfish, inconsiderate, and unfamily-like
way of life.
Soon after the children were born, Alex moved to Lebanon to be more
involved in the children’s lives. At this point, neither had feelings for the
other. Magda had one live-in nanny to take care of the babies and one live-in
housekeeper. Despite Alex’s generosity, her behavior did not improve. On the
contrary, it was strange, and the marriage worsened. She decided to sleep in
a different room and spent a sizable amount of her time on the phone. She
had male friends visiting her in the house claiming to be close friends of her
family. For almost two years, life was strange because of her disrespectfulness
and refusal to play the role of a wife or a mother. The housemaids took care of
the children; Magda did not care about her husband’s well-being and avoided
any contact with his family and yet she wanted him to be close to her family.
She was deeply influenced by her mother Nayla. Her mother had been able
to maintain the image of conservatism and tradition in her own marriage,
 Marriages and the Condition of Married Women ● 59

despite her numerous relations with other men. She was mainly attracted to
rich and politically powerful men.
Alex then hired two private detectives to build up a case based on evidence.
One morning, they called him up and told him that his wife had a man in
her office. He went to face her in order to catch her in the act and to stop
her denial, lies, and pretense that she was the victim in this marital crisis. Her
unfaithful behavior pushed Alex to the edge. He knew that divorce was the
only way out, but that was the most difficult task in the Maronite Catholic
Church.
In 2000, Alex began consulting lawyers and they told him that the process
is expensive; the cost of a divorce ranged from $20,000 to $40,000 depending
on the time required to finalize the divorce, from three to seven years. At that
time, he had financial problems and could not afford this procedure. He had
two options: either convert to Islam to get a quick divorce for little money or
convert to another Christian sect, such as Assyrian, pay a flat fee ranging from
$3,000 to $5,000, and get a quick divorce. Finally, Alex opted for the second
solution for affordability and time saving, and, more importantly, because
the children would remain Christian. Indeed, with the Assyrian Church, they
obtained a divorce within less than a month.
This is one example of how young couples, in the midst of the obvious
corruption in the system, challenge the system and find a way out. To avoid
these religious and legal impasses, the concept of civil marriage has gained
popularity in some circles since the end of the Civil War. A true product of
modernity, civil marriage is still contested in its legitimacy, as it strays from
a long-established custom and questions the formerly inextricable linkages
between society and piety. Nevertheless, the stewards of a new modernity are
driving it forward as their chance of survival in an increasingly economically
and politically challenging time.
In an article discussing how the adoption of civil marriage could be the
initial component of rethinking the role of religion in the Lebanese political
system, Joseph Zoghbi quotes the renowned Lebanese lawyer Phares Zoghbi’s
book A livres ouverts, une vie de souvenir. Phares Zoghbi points out that, in
addition to creating communautés historiques confessionnelles, Article 14 of
the French mandate also included the establishment of les communautés de
droit commun.22 These “civil” communities would be organized and admin-
istered within the limits of civil legislation, and could potentially be used to
grant civil marriages and create one national Lebanese community. One law
would govern all Lebanese citizens. In other words, in conjunction with reli-
gious marriages, which used to have a more personal value since they were
tied to church life and a more profound spiritual life, civil marriage permits
60 ● Women in Lebanon

the generalization of matrimonial monogamy and confessional exogamy that

Lebanon needs to homogenize its social institutions.23
Caught between traditional modes of proclaiming identity through associ-
ation and adapting marriage to modern circumstances, Lebanese couples are
faced with a delicate balancing act in establishing their identities. This situ-
ation, furthermore, disproportionately affects women, whose own identities
and status in society are determined by their marital status. Their response?
Moving away from a religious space to inhabit a secular one, and taking pieces
of a cultural and religious background and marrying them with modern
practices. Couples that want to be modern maneuver within their structural
limitations. Sometimes, the result is empty social customs kept up as a means
for appearance; other times, it may result in the complete abandonment of
one’s religious and traditional identity, as in the case of Magda and Alex.
They play within tradition and modernity as much as they can to bring about
change.
In the United States, two types of union are recognized as “marriage,” one
is civil union and the other is a marriage performed by a religious authority.

Figure 3.1 Wedding: In 1952, Georgette Gemayel is walking to enter Mar ‘Abda Church in
Bikfaya; Michel Gemayel, her sister Mimi, her mother Ramza, and her mother-in-law to be
Salma accompany her. The colossal gathering surrounding the Church on her wedding day
indicates the popularity she attained in her village from her volunteer work and generosity.
 Marriages and the Condition of Married Women ● 61

A similar conflict is brewing in that marriage, in the religious sense, is more

highly valued by the government than a civil union, carrying benefits such as
better access to joint health care, visitation during times of illness, “married”
tax status, and being able to use the word “spouse.” These couples face many
of the same barriers as Lebanese people are facing, but in a different corner
of the same struggle. They are similarly caught between tradition and the
modern.
In some instances, the separation of religious and civil is more easily
conducted in a Christian milieu. Is it acceptable for a Muslim?
 CHAPTER 4

Adulthood, Married Life, and

Women’s Work Outside the House

M
arriage is the destiny that society traditionally proposes to a
woman. Even today, most women are married, were married, are
preparing to be married, or suffer from not being married. It is
in relation to marriage that one defines the single woman. Therefore, it is
through the condition of a married woman that I will pursue this study of
women in rural Lebanon.
Masculine guardianship is on its way to extinction. However, the epoch
in which we live is still, from a feminist standpoint, a period of transition.
The modern marriage can only be understood through the lens of the past
that it perpetuates. For young girls, marriage is a significant means of inte-
gration into the community, which is why mothers have always sought out
suitors for their daughters. In the first part of the last century, mothers barely
consulted their daughters. The eventual suitors could only catch a glimpse of
them through arranged meetings. Therefore, the young woman appeared to
be absolutely passive; the Arabic expressions regarding marriage reflect that
practice: “the woman was married” becomes “was given by her parents to
marriage,” and just as the phrase “the young man got married,” is expressed
in the vernacular as “he took a wife.”
Even today, the husband remains the chief of the community, and thus
he embodies her in the eyes of society. She takes his name; she is associated
with his church, integrated into his social class, and into his environment;
she belongs to his family, she becomes his “other half.” The religious code,
whichever it is, asks her to obey her husband. He is the one who presents
opportunities for a joint future in society for the pair of them.
Today, marriage, for the most part, continues to follow this traditional
model. Primarily, marriage imposes itself with urgency on the young women
more than on the young men. There are no other alternatives proposed to
64 ● Women in Lebanon

young women of low social standing. In low-income communities, a single

woman remains dependent on her father, her brothers, her brothers-in-law,
and the exodus to the city is not always possible for her. In certain urbanized
communities, young women find themselves in a domain in which they are
unable to earn a living for themselves; in most cases, they stay in their paternal
home, or in the home of a brother or sister. Even in cases where a young
woman is emancipated by her family, the economic privilege held by males
encourages her to prefer marriage to a profession: she searches for a husband
whose position is superior to hers, hoping that he will succeed faster and go
further than she can. Traditional mores still make the sexual emancipation
of single young women difficult. An unmarried woman is still considered a
socially incomplete being, even if she earns a living—a wedding ring on her
finger is needed to win over the integral dignity of another human being and
to exercise the fulfillments of her rights. For all these reasons, many of the
adolescents that I asked about their future prospects answered as they would
have answered in the old days: “I want to get married.”
Marriage requires heavy sacrifices; in particular, it implies a rupture with
the past. Many adolescent women suffer anguish at the idea of leaving their
father’s home. When the event approaches, anxiety intensifies, especially sur-
rounding the few remaining arranged marriages. The wedding ceremony
exposes its universal and abstract significance: a man and a woman are united
according to symbolic rituals with their guests as their witnesses. Alone, they
are two concrete and singular individuals who are facing each other and they
can no longer hide their affection from the world. Indeed, the principle of
marriage is delicate, because it officially transforms an exchange that was orig-
inally founded on a spontaneous impulse into one that is destined to become
deep and full of long-lasting affection, but also complete with rights and
responsibilities to one another and the community.
For a married woman, the home becomes the center of the world. In it, she
will find the ways in which she can express her personality. She will furnish the
home according to an aesthetic that reflects her singular image for her home
while demonstrating her social standard of life. Her home is the expression
of her social worth and her truest self. A woman who does not work outside
commits her care to her home, which gives her immense pride; this sentiment
is not immune to the woman who also works outside the house, as she also
derives responsibility and satisfaction from keeping a warm home that reflects
her character and that of her family. Sometimes, the housewife wears herself
out in the routine. She perpetuates in the present, every day imitates the day
before, and the only hope for the future resides in her children. In the past,
and to a certain extent, in the present, preparing meals is often a more joyful
task than others, for it permits her to go to the market, which is a special
 Adulthood, Married Life, and Women’s Work ● 65

time of day for many women. Despite a myriad of daily chores to occupy her
mind, a woman often finds herself lonely at home when her husband is at
work and her children away.
Thus, the housework done by women does not grant her any autonomy;
on the contrary, it builds dependency on her husband and her children. It is
through them that her existence is justified and validated. Even for the work-
ing woman, having a stable and happy family and home life is still paramount
to her personal and social identity. Loving and generally devoted, she executes
her chores with joy. Approaching these chores begrudgingly would only make
her tasks seem more insipid. A life full of resentment would restrict her to an
inessential role, devoid of emotion like a housework machine.
Entering the family of her husband, women sometimes renounce the her-
itage of their paternal families. The institution of equal partition that has
been in effect since 1959 has not yet entirely removed the custom of favoring
sons to the detriment of girls. Boys continue to keep the family lands and girls
stand down timidly in favor of their brothers’ success. Their families provide
for the girls until their marriages, and in many villages, families still bestow a
trousseau upon their brides in an attempt to elicit admiration from the village
and expose to the future in-laws their own wealth and standing.
Traditions occupied a large space, in particular, concerning girls’ heritage.
Without a doubt, notaries1 have perpetuated, until now, the execution of
wills that permit the preservation of sons’ traditional birthrights, with less
compensation going to daughters. However, one cannot neglect the rapid
evolution in this area in which young women have become significantly aware
of their rights and have begun to claim their share of the estate according to
the legislation. In some cases, the family spirit is so strong that oftentimes girls
resign themselves to sacrificing their rights. The woman’s situation appears to
stem from an “archaic” tradition, a tradition thwarted by three Mediterranean
influences: Roman law, the Napoleonic code, and traditional Catholicism.
In Islam, “eternity in the fire” is promised without any way out to the men
who deprive their wives from their inheritance.
In Lebanon Christian daughters are meant to inherit from their parents
just as their brothers do, according to the civil law enacted in 1959. However,
legal violations against the right to girl’s inheritance until recently were perva-
sive. In fact, one could write entire books on the subject. In many provinces,
officials, customs, and society at large permitted for properties, homes, and
lands to go to sons, particularly the oldest son. Furthermore, some town
administrators appraised land at a quarter of its value, which kept the land
at a low profile and deterred any other potential inheritors from contesting
its passing to the sons. Like judges and notaries, land surveyors considered
this tacit clause to be of utmost importance. While not engrained in civil
66 ● Women in Lebanon

law, the discrimination against women in inheritance has been inscribed and
implemented through custom.
The current transformation in inheritance practice where women have
increasingly more rights indicates a trajectory of modernity initiated by
women acting as agents of change. For example, some sisters are suing their
brothers for taking more his share in lands, real estate, money, or other assets.
This conceptualization of modernity is in line with the necessities of modern
times—women too have expenses and are more and more joining the ranks
of men in land ownership as opposed to the outdated tradition of inher-
itance based on a different balance of rights and responsibilities. Statistics
published by the National Council for Lebanese Women’s Issues (NCLW)
substantiate this transformation. A sample of 433 women encompassing all
age groups and levels of education, working in different fields—from agricul-
ture to medicine—is reflected in the statistics. The survey covered different
geographical areas; 44 percent of the women surveyed reside in Beirut, and
the remaining 56 percent come from the five Mouhafazaat, including the
Bekaa Valley. The survey indicates that on average, 19 percent of work-
ing women own an apartment or home, 9 percent own real estate or land,
4 percent own a company, 2 percent own stock market shares, 40 percent
own a car, and 45 percent own a bank account.2 These new figures not only
indicate an increase of female landowners—but also have implications for the
woman’s perceptions of her rights and independence. They indicate a change
in a woman’s expectations of her rights to inherit—to have her own home
and her own financial assets. These statistics are coupled with related behav-
ior changes, and are more suitable to the modern times. As more and more
women turn to the workforce, their financial independence is reflected in an
accrual of assets, and their example paves the way for other women.

Women’s Work: From Unappreciated Homemakers

to Valuable Contributors
Two different cultural systems, one for men and one for women, have pre-
vailed until the last two decades, but are now in transformation. The two
systems were clearly in conflict, a silent conflict that for men measured value
and prestige with money, skills, and measurable quantities and for women
championed more intangible indicators of quality of life. This made it more
difficult to measure the quality of life of women. While men earned salaries,
rose in ranks in the workplace, and compared themselves to other men by tan-
gible measures, women’s work went unnoticed and unappreciated. In recent
years, women are changing this state of being and doing; they are debating
with men, leaving their homes, listening to one another, talking and working
 Adulthood, Married Life, and Women’s Work ● 67

together in order to harmonize their cultural models and to gather behind

their common goals in order to save a world that will belong to their children.
Indeed, the first generation of feminists shed light on the prejudice of
laws and legislations. Worldwide, feminist activists’ top priorities included
improving legislation, eliminating distortion that undermines the principle
of equality of women and men. Thus, feminists called upon their respec-
tive governments to amend laws in order to align them with international
human rights standards and particularly protocols of political, civil, econom-
ical, social, and cultural rights based on the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1997 by the United
Nation General Assembly. CEDAW, composed of a preamble and 30 arti-
cles, defined what constitutes discrimination against women and set forth an
agenda for national action to end such state of discrimination. The second
generation of feminists focused on eradicating illiteracy, thus advocating for
girls’ schooling at a young age, creating opportunities for higher education or
technical training in order to arm them with the necessary tools to face life.
The third generation of feminists focused on encouraging women to enter
the workplace for an economic benefit: to earn a salary, participate in the
production of the country, and, by the same token, ensure their financial
independence, which in turn liberates them as they become self-sufficient
and participate in sharing the household expenses with men. In this way,
the focus was on encouraging women to specialize in the scientific field,
which in Lebanon provides more opportunities for work and higher salaries.
Women, in general, and, in Lebanon in particular, proved to be outstand-
ing in fields such as medicine, engineering, technology, higher education,
scientific research, and laboratory work. Studies also indicated that educated
women have higher pedagogical skills, which is reflected on the academic
capabilities of their children, as well as in their psychological and social
development. At present, the fourth generation of feminists is adopting a
comprehensive approach based on comparisons with other countries; how-
ever, in this pursuit, they simultaneously acknowledge that generalizations
are dangerous, and sometimes fruitless because each country has its own
history, and even in one country there are differences between geographi-
cal areas, social classes, public services, needs, expectations, perceptions, and
identities.3
For traditionalists in Saghbine and elsewhere, the real role of women used
to be essentially at home. Women were and still are respected, considered
highly as mothers or sisters, as the center of the home. Within these limits, the
traditional woman who is conscious of herself knows how to perfectly create
a dynamic interior world and a social life that corresponds to her aspirations.
Her contribution to work outside the home depends largely on her husband’s
68 ● Women in Lebanon

maturity and progressiveness. Until recently, the husband considered his wife
solely attending to the home as an honor, a symbol of status. However, now
young men hope that their wives are able to find work because the “old for-
mula” of the woman at home no longer corresponds to today’s reality—the
necessity of a dual-income household.
Ten percent of young married women originally from Saghbine were
working in the village and in Beirut as of 1982. In two decades, this statistic
has risen to above 42 percent for women working in Beirut. However, in rural
villages, the number has not changed as drastically, with only 11 percent of
women in the Bekaa Valley (in which Saghbine is located) going to work—
all age segments included—as indicated in the NCLW report. This moderate
increase in Saghbine yet drastic increase in the capital city is indeed attributed
to urban flight, as both men and women in search of work first go to Beirut.
Working the land no longer interests either women or their male counter-
parts, and few devote themselves entirely to that kind of work. Young women
in Saghbine prefer to work in canning factories. A hospital in the neighboring
village of Khurbe offers a spectrum of sought-after employment opportunities
at all levels, as do schools, and therefore, the women of this region can stay
within a domain of traditionally female careers. Today, around 30 women
who live in Saghbine year-round work in the various social service offices of
the local government.
Traditionally, women help their husbands in their shops and businesses.
In Beirut, many couples own their own businesses and hire salespeople out-
side of their families. Generally, the urban setting offers a more diverse
applicant pool, especially in offices, and some women can advance to high
positions in administration or education, but often their promotion oppor-
tunities are limited in the private sector, especially in banks, because men are
still favored for directorial positions. Until 1982, no woman from Saghbine
was in private practice as a doctor or a lawyer, for instance, but many women
still prepared seriously for the possibility of equality in the future. At present,
particularly in Beirut, the magnitude of employment and the development of
new economic private sectors have shifted the options for women to embark
on a nontraditional female career. A new category of women artist of about
1 percent has emerged in Lebanon—because of its liberal general ambience.
Women are moving increasingly toward the private sector, which absorbs
about 39 percent of women workers; only 3 percent are in the public admin-
istrative posts, 18 percent in the educational sector, and 15 percent as business
owners. This significant shift occurred after 1990—or the end of civil war—
when universities added new majors to the curriculum and new opportunities
opened in the private sector due to globalization.
A woman’s salary seriously contributes to improving family life, but the
dominant mentality continues to sanctify the importance of the household
 Adulthood, Married Life, and Women’s Work ● 69

and the notion that a homemaker is better able to care for her children and
home than those who work. In the face of this dilemma to reconcile family
obligations and their capacity and need to participate in the workforce, how
do these women perceive their identity?
In 1981, I conducted a cross-sectional survey with women workers from
different socioeconomic levels. For them, work was a secondary priority next
to their primordial role in the home. Even those who worked outside the
home relied on the informal sector and jobs traditionally reserved for women,
such as teaching and nursing, to glean extra income. These women went
to work cognizant of how their work impacted their relationship with their
husband, and their perceived relationship in the public sphere. At the time,
most women did not use their careers as a means to match their husbands in
breadwinning and income; they still looked inside the home for identity and
fulfillment.
For the majority of women back then, work outside the house was not a
necessity, thus confirming the fact that work was not always a required cir-
cumstance to transcend the “feminine condition.” For them, the work outside
the house did not constitute an obligation; it was a means to help their hus-
bands support their families. Work outside the house did not acquire social
status. However, the possibility for a single woman to integrate into the col-
lectivity through her profession, since marriage has not yet integrated her into
society, has begun to emerge.
Today, the necessity for women to participate in the workplace is unavoid-
able. From a practical standpoint, the needs of families are too great, and
individual incomes are too low to subsist without a dual income. With this
increased need comes a shift in the types of jobs women seek, and they are
increasingly choosing higher-income jobs outside the realm of traditionally
feminine careers. Women are aware that they can have the same careers as
men have, which is evident from the increased prevalence of women doc-
tors, lawyers, and engineers. They are aware that they participate in the
“march”—or advancement of their society—and their contributions in the
public and private sphere are equally valuable. Whereas in the past, women
would not have chosen to work if given the option, today it is no longer
a second priority. In the most recent report by the NCLW on the status of
women, submitted to the UN in accordance with CEDAW, there are equal
numbers of men and women currently seeking employment, with both at
39 percent. The report also noted that more unmarried women are seek-
ing work than married women, as unmarried women see work as a means
to escape their paternal home. This change in attitude indicates a change in
women’s self-perception, and the perception of their role in the world.
Women are increasingly experiencing discrimination against them in the
conditions of employment. According to the NCLW report, 25 percent of
70 ● Women in Lebanon

newly graduated women complained that employers give preference to young

men at the entry level given the uncertainty of a young woman’s continuity
in employment should she marry. Labor laws give benefits to women only
if the husband does not receive such benefits, and employers are reluctant to
hire single women because they have to give them more benefits. Women also
complained about the inequity of salaries between men and women for the
same type of work. Women are negotiating higher salaries as to fulfill their
responsibilities toward their family and to go up in the social ladder. Today,
an average of 92 percent of working women contribute to the household
financial responsibilities.
This emancipation through work and this perception of work as a tangi-
ble liberty are in accordance with the lifestyles of the surveyed women and
their opinions and behaviors. The disconnect between measurements and
indicators in quality of life—segregated by gender—has now resolved itself
with women’s monetary and other contributions to the household. For sur-
veyed women, work is increasingly a fundamental measure of participation
in the world, of self-accomplishment, and of fulfillment. Work enhances self-
confidence, liberation, and the realization of equality with men. However, the
most encouraging aspect in this positive self-perception of women is when
women accept these new challenges with the encouragement of the social
milieu, and mainly fathers and husbands.
This monumental change could not occur with one factor as the only
driving force, but rather, by recognizing that multiple factors demonstrate
their influences and modify the behaviors and models within a society and,
in particular, the status of women. The social milieu is increasingly favoring
and encouraging women’s work outside the home, enabling them to use their
skills, knowledge, and higher education.

Is It Better or Worse for Women in a Society

in Transition?
For women living in the city, a more advanced lifestyle poses other prob-
lems. As society recognizes women’s dignity, accepts their new social role,
and understands their quest for personal equilibrium, women are presently
facing real choices and are capable of exercising their rights to make those
choices. More mothers in particular want to pursue this activity. What once
appeared as a luxury has become commonplace for a great number of young
women. A single income has quickly become insufficient for most couples.
Naturally, the need to increase resources has changed the dynamics of the
house. This new dynamic has provoked a strong presence of women in the
workplace. Such an influx exists because of the magnitude of young workers
 Adulthood, Married Life, and Women’s Work ● 71

in the Lebanese population. Today’s young women are well-organized and

sometimes exhaust themselves, but they maintain their professional respon-
sibilities alongside their maternal ones. This increase in productivity has led
to an evident depreciation of the quality of housework, human relations, and
family life but, more importantly, the time spent together. Family ties are
waning.
Overall, by escaping what was once considered their vocation, women
are no longer strangers to the loss of familial harmony, which traditionally
consisted of the gendered division of roles. Yet a family assured of having
two salaries feels more secure when facing the future. Often, the choice of
whether or not to work is not a decision, but often a conformance with a cer-
tain lifestyle. Some need to work; others choose to work. For a large number
of women, working has become the means of developing their competencies
and their talents. Women have changed, and no one can contest their right
to evolution and progress without being accused of refusing them access to
education and training, without implementing brutal and unjust measures.
Montesquieu noted in 1748 in l’Esprit des Lois: “Leurs forces seraient égales si
leur éducation l’était” or “their forces would be equal if their education were
equal.” Therefore, it is illogical to reproach women for wanting to work after
providing education to them.
Whether living in a village or in the capital, women are diverse: they are
not the same age, they do not have the same aspirations, nor do they have the
same needs. Some are comfortable with women’s traditional conditions, and
others, a larger number, are waiting for a real reform of their outlook. Our
marvelous grandmothers and mothers were women always on the job, con-
stantly helping others, and by existing only for their husbands and children,
their lives became absorbed by these duties and they did not feel as if they had
their “own” lives. Every one of their gestures became an illustration of their
existence for others. They did not seek occasional pauses or even look for per-
sonal satisfaction because their vocation was to please others, to be available
for others.
At present, many men admit that theoretically, for all intents and pur-
poses, a woman is in need of a professional life as well as a family life. That
is the goal of most young women. But the reality is sometimes difficult: there
are not enough nurseries for babies under three years, and kindergartens, all
private, are sometimes relatively expensive compared to the mother’s salary,
and it is in her best interest to stay home. Christian families see a decrease in
their birthrate as a risk, due to the rising demographic Muslim presence, but
it can be difficult for women to balance career aspirations and large families.
Recently, middle-class and wealthy families are increasingly employing inex-
pensive foreign laborers in their homes to maintain the household and care
72 ● Women in Lebanon

for children, and it remains to be seen how this development will affect the
role of women in the household and the education of children.
In light of the diversity of concrete cases, there is no dominant model that
fits everyone, no form of cultural or social imperialism that would be accept-
able in Lebanon’s multicultural context. Life is a succession of opportunities,
and one should seize them to actualize and complete projects about which
one feels strongly. Life is the unexpected, the movement, a certain possibility
of making things as beings evolve. It is above all a way to envision the world
and to adapt to it, contingent on one’s aspirations or needs. There is no crite-
rion, no hierarchy of happiness—nor are there exclusive owners of happiness
in life, no more for men than for women. The only important fact is that life
corresponds to one’s expectations.
Many Carmelites found their happiness in contemplation and
renouncement—elements of the religious life they have adopted. I had
the privilege to attend the ordination of Sister Andrée, the daughter of
my mother’s best friend. In Lebanon, the Carmelite Monastery is located
in Harissa, a picturesque point towering at about 650 meters above the
Mediterranean Sea and overlooking Bay Jounieh; its height and access to
panoramic views of the land and sea make it a gateway to the heavens. This
small congregation of sisters consists of 25 nuns and about 4 novices. For
women, there is no one superior model of fulfillment; each woman finds
her own path according to her own being, her character, her aptitudes,
and her vocation. Women know very well that they have to pay prices for
their choices. Being in command of their lives is a sign of leading a more
responsible life.
Already one can see the transformation: in the past, a nonsalaried woman
was more dignified than a woman who goes out of her house and com-
promises the reputation of her family. Between the diverse chores that they
perform, they search for equilibrium. Sometimes the latter is difficult to
carry on, but this search points to their creativity and vision. Several impor-
tant factors are preventing Lebanese women from attaining this equilibrium
between their professional and family lives. Wage discrimination and a lack
of possibilities for career advancement are discouraging factors for profes-
sional women, though they are amongst the most well-educated in the Arab
world and represent 51 percent of the Lebanese university student popula-
tion. Only 2 percent of professional women hold management positions, and
only 1.5 percent are heads of private enterprises. This lack of opportunity is
also present in the public sector: only 6.1 percent of government employees
are women—20 percent of this group fall in the lowest-pay grade, while only
1.6 percent of women are in the highest echelon.4 Legislation outlining a lim-
ited period of maternity leave may also be a factor that discourages women
from working, especially in the private sector, where the leave period is only
 Adulthood, Married Life, and Women’s Work ● 73

40 days. A consequence of these obstacles is that Lebanon has a lower percent-

age of working women than the average in Arab countries: only 22 percent
of women between the ages of 15 and 64 work (not including women who
work in informal sectors), and this percentage drops progressively after the
age of 30 as women’s domestic responsibilities increase.5

Old Age and Widowhood

The solidity of family links in Saghbine allows for the envisioning of one’s
later years with a certain serenity. As with elderly men, elderly women receive
a great deal of consideration and respect. Rural women continue to perform
housework and take care of their vegetables and fruit trees, and their flowers.
In the village, they serve as consultants on continuing customs. They con-
tribute to the maintenance of traditional mores, or at least, through their
moral authority, impede a rapid evolution toward an occidental lifestyle.
Even those who are widowed or without children remain surrounded by
the extended family and they experience much less isolation than their
counterparts in other societies.
Elderly women find the reason to have faith in religion. Though they assess
their lives as unfulfilled, they see this perceived failure as evidence sent by
God, which allows them to receive a singular visit by His grace. Moreover,
they find themselves again through the presence of their grandchildren. The
grandmother who identifies with her daughter often welcomes her grandchil-
dren with more avidity than the young woman herself. A young mother is
often disconcerted and anxious because of a child’s arrival, whereas the grand-
mother embraces him or her, and more importantly is able to move back 20
years in time vicariously. Therefore, all joys of possession and domination that
she felt in the past through her children are able to emerge again. The grand-
mother holds a warm affection toward her grandchildren; she can play the
privileged role of tenured divinity in their lives, and being free from rights and
responsibilities of discipline, her love for them is a love of pure generosity. She
no longer embodies the abstract justice, or the law of enforcement—a divide
that can result in conflicts between the grandmother and the new parents.
In the city, old women remain surrounded by the family as well. The
village traditions are mildly perpetuated in the capital. Often, children argue
to have their mothers live with them as long as possible, and the mothers
sometimes agree because they want to devote their lives as much as possible to
their children and to the maintenance of their homes. Other elderly women,
less preoccupied by the family—though rare—are enveloped by the social life.
They go out, visit friends, and attend weddings and funerals; the presence of
others fulfills their lives. Some even dedicate themselves to dispensing advice
and criticism to those around them, perhaps as a way to compensate for their
74 ● Women in Lebanon

inaction. They insert their “wisdom” in the lives of those who do not seek it,
particularly their daughters-in-law.
Fortunately, Saghbine’s women have not, as of yet, fallen victim to the
lamentable tragedy of occidental women who feel lonely. There is not yet a
need in Lebanon for organizations that create living environments and social
activities specifically for the elderly, like assisted living facilities and nursing
homes that are becoming prevalent in America and even in Europe. For the
Lebanese women who have traveled and become more open to the exterior
world, they continue to live “cultured” lives in old age that are sufficiently
occupied with social and charitable activities.
It often appears that men are much more devastated by a late widowhood
than women in Lebanon. They receive more advantages from a spouse than
women do, in particular throughout their later years. By this point, the man’s
world has been reduced to the confines of the house, the passage of time
no longer holds the same meaning, and it is his wife who maintains his
daily rhythm. Having outgrown his public functions, men feel unproduc-
tive; but because women still manage the household, they remain necessary
to their husbands, whereas often a husband is only troublesome to an aging
wife. Women take pride in that independence—they finally begin to look
at the world with their own eyes and therefore keep their mind bright and
sharp. Some widows find a new life at this stage, thanks to their children who
have succeeded or to the fortune of their sons-in-law. Satisfied, they accept
going out with their children instead of staying at home each day more easily.
They discover a new youthful frame of mind.
Thus, passivity commonly accepted as an “essential” characteristic of
women proves to be an outmoded assumption. Certain conventional texts
continue to dictate a world in which a clear divide exists between the mas-
culine sphere of activity and the feminine world of passivity and domesticity.
This sentiment is outdated and also fails to take the shifts in gender roles and
perspectives throughout the various phases of life into account. Indeed, sub-
mission, resentment, and inheritance inequality are on the decline; women
are increasingly aware of their rights as they embrace a modern state of being
to bring about change. Women are creatively developing their own strategies
as they maneuver their limitations to surmount day-to-day problems. Increas-
ingly, these strategies are yielding profound changes whose benefits are reaped
by the entire society.
 Interview—Individual Perspectives:
Christian Discourse

Roula: Liberation and Singlehood as Much-Needed

Western Values
Roula is 46 years old; she grew up and attended high school in Saghbine.
She now works for a newly founded telecommunication company. She is
unmarried, and lives with her parents in their home in Saghbine.

What do you think of Muslim girls attending Catholic Schools?

When Muslim girls attend our schools, and Muslims, in general, associate
with us, they just take what is beneficial for them. They associate with us to
elevate their cultural status and to improve their language skills. They only
take what is not in contradiction with their religion, tradition, and heritage.
Those who belong to a higher class constitute a minority, and do not focus as
much on religion.
How would you interpret open-mindedness?
I believe that during this time of political crisis, there is not any. In our
Christian environment, the openness is outwardly restricted to external
appearance and clothing, and does not reach the essential aspect of personal
freedom in the way that it exists in the West. True freedom allows peo-
ple to evolve, but here in this small community, people mind each other’s
business and personal matters. The majority of Lebanese did not change
in a fundamental way. An outward imitation of the West does not lead
us very far. Our societies still have a long way to catch up with Western
societies. Here, they still lack the patriotic sense demonstrated by Western
countries.
How do you envision the role of Arab Christianity?
Christians are open to others and have more patriotism. In general,
Muslims focus more on religion, and as long as religious fanaticism and
76 ● Women in Lebanon

emotional biases exist, there will be no real evolution. Visions of Lebanese

people for their country are very different from those of other coun-
tries. Each community has to admit the existence of the other, who also
fully belongs to the country; each speech ought to focus on all communi-
ties that form the nation. Necessity calls all citizens to reach this level of
awareness.
Could you elaborate on the Islamic Revolution and Globalization?
Muslims learned and adopted Western technologies; they organized them-
selves and built information satellites. The adoption of their own media
spread quickly through the Iranian Revolution in Lebanon, but we are not in
Iran and everyone understands that no community could eliminate another.
This is the pluralistic reality of Lebanon.
Why did the resurgence of the veil occur at this moment in time?
This is their way of safeguarding their religion and traditions. This resur-
gence is happening at this moment as a reaction to secularization, advocated
by most Christians and more importantly, toward the globalization phe-
nomenon. Islamists have reinterpreted religious texts to their own advantage
and are making use of religious dress to concretize their rejection of Western
values and differentiate themselves from Christians who have a long history
of alliance with the West. Christian women played the most important role
through education and involvement in public life in the evolution of the
country. We are no longer the only player; women from different paths have
formed local movements, although because of the financial assistance and
connivance of foreign countries, women from other confessions evolved to
make their voices heard as well. Global and regional events had a humongous
effect on the pluralistic Lebanese fabric. The veil symbolizes their difference
and their way to enter the public sphere; this phenomenon could also be
called sectarianism.
How would you define women’s rights in Saghbine?
The structure of the collectivity and size of the village puts women of my
age bracket in a situation of constant defensiveness. If a woman acts pow-
erfully, they consider her too strong. They say, “She acts like a man.” If she
acts softly, they consider her weak and incapable of holding a position in
the workplace. Here, the trend in conduct requires a careful weighing of
options in relation to the collectivity. The male constituent remains critical.
In case she is strong, it insinuates that her man is weak. Thus, she is obli-
gated to pretend to be obedient; otherwise, she can never thrive in this closed
society.
 Interview—Christian Discourse ● 77

Men still consider this feminist vision as adverse and undesirable. Women
continue to struggle to genuinely enter the political sphere. Although women
possess this sixth sense, or intuition in their intelligence, men keep asserting,
“I am the man.” Usually, women keep quiet, even if they disagree with their
husband’s way of thinking, especially in public. Society will categorize her as
insane and indecent for interrupting, instead of recognizing the validity of
her contribution.
What do you think about education?
Although some families remained conservative, the young generation is cur-
rently taking pleasure in having more freedom. Do not forget that 85 percent
of them are attending universities in Beirut. Circumstances are not as they
used to be, and parents give, although to a limited extent, children the free-
dom necessary in these modern times.
Parents still instill in their children, and particularly in girls, the idea that
marriage is a top priority. Given the changing demographic figures and the
realities of emigration, many young women remain unmarried and members
of society make them feel that they are lacking something in their lives. In my
case, I am financially independent and I have already bought an apartment
in Beirut. Yet, I cannot make my own decision to live alone in Beirut; I can-
not leave my father alone. Young women who live alone constitute a small
minority, and generally, circumstances dictate their situation only when both
parents die. This is how we grew up with emotional torment and guilt, and
this is too much to bear.
A divorced woman who has to live without a male presence is not left
alone. Society bothers her in many ways. I believe that in this regard, the West
is much more rational. They allow women to live their lives without unnec-
essary constraints. Ironically, this contradictory situation is linked to the local
type of thinking that makes Lebanese women go through very difficult times
when parents pass away.
What are your thoughts about marriage and celibacy?
Due to the demographic shift, the percentage of celibacy has increased. Most
young men emigrate and those who remain in the country cannot afford to
start a home, but at least the age constraint does not apply to them. Tradi-
tional constructed rules make it difficult for a man to marry a woman who
is older than he is, regardless of his love and attraction toward her. Our soci-
ety is frustrating through its destruction of hopes. Albeit my accomplishment
in such a small agglomeration and my financial independence, people look
at me through one negative angle, being unmarried. Our women’s libera-
tion has a long way to go compared to the West. Our traditions impede our
78 ● Women in Lebanon

humane evolution; overcoming these barriers is an urgent need. Prejudices

and assumptions lacking humanity are all over the place regarding unmar-
ried women; I feel it in my daily life while interacting with others. Critics
and gossip emerges when romantic relationships begin or end. A woman who
experiences this type of relationship will feel guilty for the rest of her life.
Everyone will always remind her of this digression, through either aggressive
words or strange looks. Sometimes, a woman displays happiness whereas her
reality is very sad.
There are no cultural or entertainment activities for women of my age.
My life consists of doing work for Ogero, the telecommunication company
where I work, or doing housework. I wish there were a movie theater, a the-
ater, or any cultural gathering for poetry reading. Besides going to church
and belonging to an affiliated religious organization, my social life consists
of visiting other people. That is a problem for those who do not like visits.
Although sharing the same unpleasant situation, unmarried women in the
village lack solidarity.
Have you thought of adopting a child?
One should give herself this hope. Society will not offer it. This thought
comes to me from time to time. It is as if, in my environment, humane people
are scarce. I would like to be a mother, but given the village conditions, that
would be selfish and would lead to discrimination toward the child. Finally,
we have to appreciate life with what we have and be positive. Perhaps this is
my mission.
What about friendships between Christians and Muslims?
I currently do not have a Muslim friend. I am open-minded and open to
others. At least, Muslims have more loyalty than Christians do. I do not dif-
ferentiate between Christian or Muslim friendship, what is important is to
feel comfortable with each other. Sometimes an acquaintance of 30 years may
be incapable of understanding you, but sometimes one meeting with a person
suffices for the friendship to be firmly established.
What about old age?
Although nursing homes exist throughout the country, interning an elderly
parent in not yet well accepted. Keeping them at home is seen as the best and
most accepted option.

Roula’s answers deal mainly with binding traditions, repressed desire, and
struggle to be accepted as a full human being. Her precise and strong voice
translates a subtle plea for liberalization and societal challenges. Her evocative
 Interview—Christian Discourse ● 79

description of the collectivity torn between tradition and the West indicates
her hopes for a warm and inviting locale that would understand her feelings
and needs. After all, marriage is not the only means for women to be success-
ful. She confronts society by questioning traditions, which allegedly protect
women, but in reality, demean them. Women are not only victims of men
but of society because women continue to perpetuate the dominant gender
roles in the house.

* * *

Hala’s Thoughts: Sectarianism and Isolationism to the

Detriment of a National Unity
Hala is about 50 years old. She grew up in Mashghara but left Lebanon at the
beginning of the war. She finds that the new generations have no memory of
the ways in which the two communities used to coexist and live together
simply. The new generation, in my opinion she states, sees primarily the
differences between us, which enhances our separation.
One of her relatives owned the only bakery in Mashghara. Prior to the
1980s, he baked 10,000 pounds of flour in order to provide bread for the
entire population, regardless of whether or not they were Shi’i or Christian.
Most importantly, most of the bakery’s employees were Shi’i. Bread was gra-
ciously donated to the needy; and the male member of my family who owned
the bakery never differentiated between his fellow citizens.
When the Hizbullah offered a Shi’i man the means to open a bakery,
all the Shi’i in Mashghara began to boycott my relative’s bakery. Production
was reduced to one single bag of flour. Muslim women would say Istaghfar
Allah, I ask God’s forgiveness for buying bread from the Christians. Many
Christians left, only about 10 percent of Christian families remain, about 300
Christians. Her family is now scattered between the United States, Australia,
and France.
Gradually, Hizbullah islamicized Mashghara, she continued. At the time
of Ayatollah Khomeini, large amounts of money were donated to Hizbullah.
The Party of God opened offices in the village and offered every father with
a young daughter $200 for her to begin wearing the headscarf. The Shi’i
women who used to sell us their milk or vegetables began to look down on us.
During the Raafsangani period in Iran, money became scarce in Mashghara,
and the Muslim women changed and returned to trusting the Christian pop-
ulation. The Ahmadinajat era, similar to the Ayatollah era, poured money
80 ● Women in Lebanon

into Hizbullah, and women are no longer only wearing the headscarf, but
the entire black dress that is popular in Iran. Women from Mashghara who
are now in their fifties had Shi’i classmates who dressed like their Christian
counterparts, but I am now struck to see the children of former classmates
wearing these long black gowns.

Roula and Hala are the given names for my interviewees. I have not disclosed their real names
for privacy reasons.
 PART II

Muslim Lebanese Women and an Islamic Modernity

 CHAPTER 5

Islam in Lebanon: An Overview

L
ebanon, crossroad of cultures and cradle of civilizations, launches a
bridge between worlds. As a land of exchange between the West and
the East, Christianity and Islam have, and will continue to for a long
time, cross through Lebanon. A case in point is West Bekaa, which is made
up of 40 percent Christians and 60 percent Muslims. Muslims belong to
the Sunni and Druze communities, whereas in the Hermel and Baalbeck the
majority of the population is Shi’i or Metwali.1 The Shi’i presence goes back
to the seventh century; at that time, the Muslim community split into Sunni
and Shi’i sects. The Shi’i, who had been reduced to the status of dissenters
after the twelve century, settled in Jabal ‘Amel, part of Mount Lebanon, par-
ticularly in areas between the Shouf qada’ (district) and Northern Galilee, in
the north of the Bekaa valley, and in the towns of Hermel and Baalbeck.
The Sunni, named as such because they claim their authority from the
“Sunna”—that is to say, the tradition of Mohammed—represent orthodox
Islam. They hold a key position on the political and social planes mainly
because they have the privilege of constituting an urban population in
Lebanon, as opposed to the markedly rural majorities of the other two
Muslim groups, the Shi’i and the Druze.
The Drusian sect3 arose in Egypt during the early years of the eleventh
century, and was founded by the disciples of Fatimite Caliph Hakim, of Shi’i
origin. The importance of the Druze community can be judged by the bril-
liant role that it has played throughout the country’s history.4 Big landowners
or small farmers, they have retained a strong feudal structure; today they
make up a significant urban population as well. In the political and business
spheres, a small but cultivated and efficient elite represents the community.
The Druze religion is not very ritualistic, giving less emphasis to the outward
expressions of worship than to moral obligations. The Druze woman’s situa-
tion is quite liberal. The Druze, unlike other Islamic sects, forbid polygamy.
84 ● Women in Lebanon

Akkar

Mediterranean
Tripoli
sea Hermel

Batroun

Byblos Baalbeck

ey

n
no
ll

ba
Jounieh
va

Le
Beirut

ti-
An
Bikfaya a
a Zahle
k
e
B

Saghbine
Saida Mashghara

Syria

Tyr Shab’a
farms

Israel

Figure 5.1 Lebanon map2 : This diagrammatic representation shows the main cities Tripoli,
Byblos, Beirut, Saida, and Tyr stretching along the east side of the Mediterranean Sea as well as
Saghbine in the Bekaa Valley and Bikfaya in the Metn region of Mount Lebanon.

The Druze and most notably the Jumblatt family resided in Saghbine as
landowners before the arrival of the Christians who bought the land from
them and transformed it into their village.5
The new phenomenon of the emergence of the Shi’i community and in
particular of the Party of God, Hizbullah,6 is an outcome of a slow sociopo-
litical maturation process that occurred during the last two decades. What is
the nature of Hizbullah’s rapport with the other components of the Lebanese
social structure? To what extent are Hizbullah’s political decisions an offshoot
of the Iranian raison d’être and even raison d’état? The question is whether
Hizbullah’s motivations are strictly limited to the Shi’i Lebanese commu-
nity considerations, or go beyond the framework of Lebanon to be in line
 Islam in Lebanon: An Overview ● 85

with a larger regional Iranian strategy.7 Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr refers to

the network of Iranian-Lebanese Shi’i as transnational: “By transnationalism
I mean an increasing interconnectedness in human relations across national
borders.”8 Moreover, she invokes closed-door activities directly related to
promoting Hizbullah in Lebanon and of promoting Iran as the Vatican of
Shi’ism. Iran’s funds are poured to the Lebanese Hizbullah to build insti-
tutions as a means to advance the regional Iranian strategy for developing
projects for execution in a Lebanese context.9 Nonetheless, she points out
that in an era of transnationalism, religious identities cannot be studied out-
side their national context. Sabrina Mervin in an article titled “The Iranian
Link” refers to the Hizbullah as an “extension” of the Iranian Revolution.10
Na’im Qassem, vice-general secretary of Hizbullah, introduces a chapter of
his book on Regional and International Relations declaring that the “Iranian
Revolution of February 11, 1979 reverberated as an earthquake across the
region affecting the map of alliances and the extent of hegemony as well as
the very interests of external powers.”11
To understand this political landscape, it is important to examine the his-
torical and sociological elements that paved the way for the birth of the Party
of God in the 1980s. First, a general overview of Lebanese politics is neces-
sary, from the National Pact (1943) to the Doha Accord in 2008 when the
balance of power swung to Shi’i Hizbullah. The discussion will be followed by
a sketch of the Shi’i as a sociopolitical community in Lebanon. Next, the doc-
trine and political elements of Hizbullah and the circumstances that marked
its creation as well as the roots and the guidelines of its actions will be ana-
lyzed. Finally, the effects of the 2009 elections will be examined in relation to
Lebanon’s future with a focus on women’s participation and voice.

Chronology of Lebanon from 1943 to 2008

The National Pact ended up as a compromise between Christian and
Muslim communities. In 1943, Christian Lebanese renounced the French
Protectorate whereas Muslims renounced the fusion of Lebanon with Syria.
The National Pact is a nonwritten agreement giving an Arab image to
Lebanon; thus Lebanon is included as a member in the Arab League, and
divides governmental and administrative power between the three main
religious communities—Christians, Sunnis, and Shi’i—according to the pop-
ulation sizes of each group. The National Pact spelled out the Lebanese
formula sigha based on the census of 1932.12 At this point in time, Christians
outnumbered the other Muslim communities. In 1943, Lebanon gained
independence from France and proceeded to build the Lebanese state.
In 1969, the Cairo Accord allowed the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to
86 ● Women in Lebanon

bear arms and to use Southern Lebanon, called “Fatah Land” at that time, as
a base to launch attacks against the Israeli state. First, the Palestinians con-
trolled Southern Lebanon, forming a Palestinian Army, which mistreated the
Lebanese Shi’i and Christian citizens. Second, the heavily armed Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yasser Arafat, who saw that they could
not liberate the land confiscated by Israel in 1948, used their arms to interfere
with Lebanon’s internal affairs. The PLO thus shifted its focus, occupying
the entirety of Lebanon as a surrogate country.13 This action would have
forced the Christian communities to leave their country if they had not
militarized against the PLO. This solution suited both the Palestinians and
Israelis. By this approach, the Palestinian refugees would have gained a part
of Lebanon as a substitute for their lost home state by declaring part of
Lebanon as a Palestinian state, and the Israelis would live in peace with-
out having to deal with the issue of the return of the Palestinian refugees.
Some sources said this plan, then silently backed by the US Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, was to displace Christians to Canada and the United States,
but there is no written document confirming this plan of action; however, it
was a widely spread public belief. Lebanese Christians militarized themselves
to defend the sovereignty of their country. The Palestinian refugee popula-
tion in Lebanon was about 400,000 versus a Lebanese population of around
3,000,000 in 1975. Thus, a war began between the Lebanese Christians
and the Palestinians, a conflict that would ultimately generate an internal
Lebanese war. The war, which stretched from 1975 until 1990, began after
an armed conflict between a Palestinian commando unit and members of the
right-wing Christian political party, the Kataeb, and other Christian parties.
In 1990 the Ta’ef Accord, which was the agreement between the Christian
and Muslim communities of Lebanon under the Saudi mediation created
in the city of Ta’ef in Saudi Arabia, formally ended the country’s war. This
accord deepened Lebanon’s sectarian system by rearranging its top state lead-
ers’ sectarian control via constitutional amendments. The 1990 constitutional
amendments usurped many of the traditional functions of the Maronite pres-
ident by strengthening the exclusively Sunni-held position of prime minister.
It also decreed that parliamentary seats were to be distributed equally between
Christians and Muslims.
Though the Syrians had been on Lebanese land since 1976, interfering
in its internal affairs, a period of rebuilding the state and reconstruction
transformed Lebanon and put its institutions back at work. This period
lasted about 16 years and reached its peak in 1992 under the leadership of
Rafiq Hariri (prime minister, 1992–1998 and 2000–2004). His assassina-
tion on February 14, 2005, led to the birth of the “Cedar Revolution” and
the Lebanese Intifida.14 The Syrians were urged to stop their meddling in
 Islam in Lebanon: An Overview ● 87

Lebanon’s sovereignty, particularly after the assassination of many prominent

charismatic Lebanese leaders who possessed the leadership qualities to bring
Lebanon back to the path of prosperity, coexistence, and peace.
In 2004, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and his strongest ally, the Druze
Lebanese leader Walid Jumblatt, and others were working on a United
Nations (UN) resolution (1559) to mandate the withdrawal of the Syrian
occupying army in Lebanon. Resolution 1559 would allow the Lebanese to
govern themselves without Syrian dominance in foreign and internal poli-
cies. The Syrians interfered in all Lebanese matters, imposing their decisions
through kidnapping, imprisonment, and even assassination. The first assassi-
nation occurred in the period preceding the withdrawal of the Syrian army
from Lebanon when the international community and, in particular, the
United States, pressured them to leave Lebanese territory. Marwan Hamade,
the advisor of the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, survived the first car bomb
attack, which was followed by numerous other car bomb attacks killing
many influential Lebanese national figures—the cream of the crop—ranging
from members of parliament to government ministers to journalists. Their
common denominator was their opposition to the Syrian regime policy in
Lebanon and their ally Hizbullah in Lebanon.
Among the victims was Samir Kassir, a prominent journalist of the daily
newspaper An-Nahar, characterized by its freedom of speech and its politi-
cal platform for a free and prosperous Lebanon. Another victim was Gebran
Tueni, the son of the prominent Ghassan Tueni. Ghassan’s father was the
founder of An-Nahar, a well-known editor and publisher, like all men in his
family. Ghassan was a former representative of Lebanon in the UN, and a for-
mer secretary for several governments. Ghassan was still the most respected
figure in Lebanese journalism until his passing away in June, 2012. Gebran
represented the Lebanese youth and their vision for a sovereign and indepen-
dent Lebanon; he mainly had the courage to articulate the democratic and
international vocation of Lebanon. Pierre Gemayel, the son of the former
president Amin Gemayel and the grandson of Pierre Gemayel, the founder of
the Kataeb political party, was also assassinated. Women were not immune to
this violence. May Chidiac, a journalist who had the courage to speak up her
mind, was also the victim of the same ordeal, a car bombing. Miraculously,
she survived the attempted assassination but lost an arm and a leg.
The 33-day war was launched in July 12, 2006, in Southern Lebanon
as a response to the disappearance of two Israeli soldiers; Hizbullah claimed
responsibility for that kidnapping and the war began between Hizbullah and
the Israeli army. The Shi’i living in Southern Lebanon evacuated their vil-
lages and moved to southern Beirut, and Hizbullah claimed more rights in
the Lebanese government, invoking its resistance to the Israeli military power
88 ● Women in Lebanon

in defense of Lebanon. In May 2008 the Doha Accord15 swung Lebanon’s

balance of power to Shi’i Hizbullah in exchange for their commitment to
not bear arms against their Lebanese compatriots for internal political inter-
ests. The country, which had lacked a president since November 2008,
elected Michel Suleiman immediately, and a new government was formed
with 11 out of 16 ministries going to the Hizbullah bloc. New parliamen-
tary elections took place on June 7, 2009, and though 58 percent voted
that Hizbullah would have to disarm (against 42 percent for their contin-
ued power) Iran’s Shi’i surrogate Party of God did not do so. In defiance
of two UN Security Council resolutions, Hizbullah’s armed militia won for-
mal national acceptance and the right to possess an independent weapons
arsenal.
Some Middle East sources consider the Doha deal on Lebanon compen-
sation for Hizbullah, its reward for resisting the armed onslaught without
the aid of the Lebanese army. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general
of Hizbullah in Lebanon, often states that the 33-day war marks the most
resounding strategic debacle the West and Israel have experienced since
Hamas’ forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2005 and Israel’s failure to
smash the Shi’i armed strength in 2006.16

The Shi’i Community in Lebanon17

The affirmation of the presence and the identity of the Shi’i as a sociopo-
litical community in the Lebanese makeup followed a long maturation. The
Shi’i community has struggled with great adversity during the contemporary
history of Lebanon.
Under the Ottoman Empire, the rights of Shi’i were not recognized.
In the nineteenth century, the administration divided Lebanon between two
kaimacamats (political and administrative districts), and formed a consulta-
tive council composed of Christians and Druze. In 1845, following conflicts
between religious communities, France and Great Britain, the powers of the
time, interfered and asked the Ottomans to stop the confrontation. Thus, the
Turkish minister of state created in the two kaimacamats a mixed council—
one per community—of judges representing the Maronites, Greek Catholics,
Greek Orthodox, Sunnis, and Druze; the Sunni judge also represented the
Shi’i community. This unfair situation lasted until the fall of the Ottoman
Empire, and practically until 1926 when the Lebanese, under the French
Mandate, recognized the Shi’i community as an entity.18 This recognition
facilitated the proclamation of the Greater Lebanon19 in 1920. The addi-
tion of the peripheral areas to the Petit Liban had considerable effects on the
socioeconomic structure of the new entity of Lebanon.
 Islam in Lebanon: An Overview ● 89

Gap between “Center” and “Periphery” versus Musa el-Sadr

and ‘Ulama Actions
Due to its autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon had known
substantial development in infrastructure, culture, and education. The propa-
gation of private missionary schools and the founding of the two universities,
the American University in 186620 and the Jesuit University in 1875,21 as well
as the broad opening of the country to the West, allowed Lebanon to have
the privilege to be the beacon of cultural and pedagogical light for the entire
region. In the meantime, the infrastructure developed in Mount Lebanon and
Beirut became the de facto capital of the limited Lebanese entity. The Petit
Liban and Beirut particularly benefited from the development of businesses,
industry, medical infrastructure including hospitals, and the transportation
links along the coastal route to Damascus. In 1920, the annexation of Tripoli,
Saida, and the Bekaa Valley to the Petit Liban produced an entity charac-
terized by deep cleavages between the “center,” represented by Beirut and
Lebanon Mountains, and the “periphery,” areas represented by the newly
attached areas. “The periphery” which was directly governed by the Ottoman
Empire, did not benefit from the boost.
The gap remained until 1943 and set up the germ of an unfortunate
social situation. “Periphery” areas remained undeveloped. The Maronite-
Sunni character of the National Pact and the sharing of power instituted
after independence from the French Mandate in 1948 contributed to the
marginalization of the Shi’i community. In addition, the postindependence
political Shi’i leaders were feudal traditional leaders disconnected from the
realities of their constituency.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the implantation of armed Palestinian organi-
zations in Southern Lebanon, the resurgence of Feda’yyin (political zealots)
operations against Israel, and Israel’s retaliation in areas inhabited mostly
by Shi’i added to their misfortune. As a result, a progressive sustained exo-
dus to the city, mainly to the southern suburbs (known collectively as
al-dahiya), added to the Shi’i disadvantaged population. Al-dahiya consti-
tuted the so-called misery belt of the city. It is in this potentially explosive
context that a group of Shi’i ‘ulama who had just received their religious edu-
cation in Najaf or Qom22 disembarked in Beirut. Three of them, Imam Mussa
el-Sadr, Sheikh Muhammed Mehdi Chamesddine, and Sheikh Muhammad
Hussein Fadlallah, were quickly distinguished by their charisma, their reli-
gious culture, and their vision to help their community break away from the
situation of “disinherited” or disowned. Adopting a low profile, they con-
ducted conferences, meetings, and debates in clubs and mosques in mainly
Shi’i zones.23
90 ● Women in Lebanon

Musa el-Sadr was born in Qom, Iran, in 1929 to the prominent Lebanese
el-Sadr family of theologians. His father, originally from Tyre, was Ayatollah
Sadr el-Din el-Sadr. In 1956, Musa el-Sadr moved from Qom to the capital
Tehran and obtained a degree in Islamic Jurisprudence and Political Sciences
from Tehran University. He moved back to Qom and later to Najaf to study
theology and Islamic philosophy. He accepted an invitation to become a lead-
ing Shi’i figure in the city of Tyre in 1960, and quickly became a prominent
advocate of the Shi’i population of Lebanon.24 Using his charisma, the Imam
Musa el-Sadr increased his area of influence, and by the end of 1960s, he
became a political power in his community. In 1967, he was successful in
obtaining permission from the central power to form the High Shi’i Coun-
cil (HSC). This provided the community with an institution able to affirm
the identity and the political presence of the Shi’i. Traditional politicians saw
him as a threat capable of reducing their roles. In spite of their opposition,
Musa el-Sadr created a popular movement, the “Movement of the Deprived,”
with a mission of responding to the political and social aspirations of the Shi’i
community. He particularly focused on the social and economic development
of the southern areas, the Bekaa, and the suburbs of Beirut. One of the tacit
objectives was to shield the community from the growing influence of secular
Pan Arabic movement, leftist movements, and the armed Palestinian orga-
nizations; and to create an alternative to the feudal traditional leaders, who
maintained the community in a state of chronic lethargy.
In February 1974, his discourse marked the birth of the Lebanese Shi’ism:
“Our name is not Metwali, our name is one of refusing, one of vengeance,
those who revolt against all sorts of tyranny. Even if we have to shed our
blood, pay our lives . . . We no longer want good sentiments, but action.
We are tired of words, feelings, and discourses . . . Starting today, I will not
keep quiet if you remain inert.”25
Facing the military escalation in Arkoub in the south of Lebanon, he
secretly created in the 1970s an armed militia trained by Fatah, a Palestinian
militia group. He created the Amal, or “hope” movement, which allowed
mobilization of the Shi’i disinherited into a structured community.26 This
prevented secularized political parties such as the Communist Party, or the
Baas, from winning this population over to their causes. This political cul-
ture and the awakening of the Shi’i community in general paved the way to
the creation of Hizbullah in the 1980s.

The Birth of Hizbullah, the Roots of Its Political Action,

and the Wali el Faqih27
In their analysis, Michel Georgiou and Michel Touma argue that in the 1980s
the emergence of Hizbullah on the Lebanese scene is undoubtedly the fruit
 Islam in Lebanon: An Overview ● 91

of the implementation of the Islamic Republic Revolution in Iran. The Israeli

operation “Peace in Galilee” in 1982 constituted in this context the catalyst
to the creation of the fundamentalist Shi’i party. The context of the dissem-
ination of the party in Lebanon, the importance of the martyrdom cult for
Hizbullah, and finally the main political orientations of fundamentalism are
crucial aspects of this era.
The establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, and the politics of
exporting the revolution, constituted the catalyst for the development of the
circle of fundamentalist influence in the country. When Ayatollah Khomeini
took power in Tehran, small Islamist Shi’i groups were already active in
Lebanon on a small scale. They were mainly formed from the gathering of
the clerical congregation, ‘Ulama of the Bekaa (UB), of Islamic Commit-
tee (IC), and the Lebanese branch of the Iraqi Shi’i party al-da’wa; they had
Sheikh Muhammad Hassan Fadlallah as their spokesperson in Lebanon.28
The “Peace in Galilee” operation in 1982 and the rapid burst of Tsahal29
to Beirut incited small Shi’i groups to conduct attacks against Israel, calling
these attacks operations of resistance. This radical movement was reinforced
in June by the apparition of a dissident group in Amal led by Nabih Berri
(after the death of Musa el-Sadr) in 1978.30
The scale of the Israeli offensive in 1982 forced the leaders of these groups
to put into operation a multipartisan structure. Its foundation and strategies
of actions have three axes: First, Islam as ideology, practice, thought, and faith
constitutes its path of global action for a better life. Second, Sheikh Na’im
Qassem considered the resistance against Israeli occupation as a priority,
which necessitated the creation of an adequate structure for Jihad to mobilize
all necessary potentialities. Third, leadership belongs to the supreme guide
(at the time Ayatollah Khomeini) as the Prophet and Imam’s heir; he defines
the guidelines of action for the Islamic nation, and his decisions are binding.31
As a result of this multipartisan agreement, a committee of nine members
representing the three organizations—UB, IC, and Amal—submitted a doc-
ument known as the “Manifesto of the Nine,” which endorsed the objectives
indicated above to Ayatollah Khomeini to dissolve the three parties to form
one federative party named Hizbullah. Ayatollah Khomeini approved the
document, thus granting his custodianship as the Jurist-Theologian.32 From
1982 to 1985, the process matured and Hizbullah unveiled its program.
This new formation immediately received the political, logistic, and military
support of Iran, sending Revolution Guard experts and armaments through
Syria. They established training camps in the Bekaa to form Hizbullah’s
militia and instilled the martyr cult model in their constituencies.
Between 1982 and 1985, Hizbullah set up its priority to resist Tsahal, the
Israeli army. Despite the inequity of the two forces, Shi’i combatants were
able to harm the Israeli army. That these minor attacks by the Shi’i against
92 ● Women in Lebanon

the Israeli giant were successes can be explained by the notion of martyr-
dom in the Shi’i unconscious. This notion refers to the martyrdom of Imam
Hussein in the battle of Kabala (680), a myth and model that is to be fol-
lowed by each individual, particularly the young, who receive an education
based on the ideal of martyrdom.33 In this vein, Sheikh Na’im Qassem,34
Hizbullah’s deputy secretary general, indicates that people who receive an
education founded uniquely on the search for victory give up more easily
if they realize that victory is distant or uncertain. On the contrary, an edu-
cation based on martyrdom and self-sacrifice increase the efficiency of their
actions. If they die as martyrs, they would accomplish what they vowed to do.
To die as a martyr in service of God’s precepts becomes the supreme honor
for every young Shi’i. The objective is not to win a direct and immediate
military victory but to have the privilege to become a martyr, to self-sacrifice
for the love of God. In addition, life hereafter promises eternal happiness.
To remain attached to this life, motivated by material contingencies, is there-
fore insignificant compared to the honor that represents the martyr to the
service of God. “Victory cometh only from Allah, the mighty, the wise.”35
Mothers themselves sustained the martyr cult. In an interview on
Al-Jazeera news segments called Everywomen, the host interviewed two
Hizbullah women in private, one woman who lost her husband and her own
daughter, Amal, who lost both her father and her husband. Both women reit-
erated the fact that they were supporters of Hizbullah, and Amal added that
in addition to her strong support to the resistance, she hopes that one day
her son will want to join the movement. She makes sure that her son under-
stands how and why his father died, and instills in him a sense of pride for
the martyr of his father and for his country.36
This martyr-oriented view on the value of terrestrial life differs greatly
from the Western view, in terms of the perception of the true meaning of
life, and the conduct toward managing public affairs. Members of Hizbullah
believe that Westerners do not understand the spiritual Islamic orientation.
Therefore, the young combatants sanctified the notion of martyrdom and
based their political resistance on it. Then, after forming their militia and
reinforcing emotional and so-called religious behavior, Hizbullah continued
with their political agenda to gain power in Lebanon.
Until the 1980s Hizbullah kept a low profile about the Israeli occupa-
tion of a large part of the Lebanese territory. Hizbullah came out into the
open in February 1984 following an uprising led by Amal and the Social-
ist Progressive Party of Jumblatt in West Beirut against the president Amin
Gemayel. This uprising allowed Hizbullah to move its institutions to its head-
quarters in the southern suburb of Beirut. In 1985, Hizbullah made public its
political project through an open letter drafted to the oppressed in Lebanon.
 Islam in Lebanon: An Overview ● 93

Hizbullah’s political document summarizes the ideology and the doctrine of

the party. The document declares the theoretical existence of an Islamic state
but also indicates that such project should be based on the premise of free
choice of the population. However, for practical reasons, they explain that
Hizbullah does not intend to establish an Islamic Republic in Lebanon but
wishes to remain attached to Islam and the basis of its action and thought.
Concretely, given the Lebanese reality, their objective is to consolidate the
“multiconfessional” system that would grant all communities equal political
participation.37 In 1992, their decision to participate in the legislative elec-
tions meant their acceptance of being part of the sectarian Lebanese system
despite their dogmatic view. Some consider that accepting the multiconfes-
sional Lebanese system, and even looking toward a serious rapprochement
with non-Muslim groups, means that Hizbullah tailored a nationalist, even a
patriotic agenda without, however, neglecting the resistance.38
Leaders of Hizbullah declared that their support to the multiconfessional
system to the detriment of the Islamic Republic is due to their will to present
to the world the Lebanese formula or sigha as a successful example of convivi-
ality between diverse communities, which is the antithesis of the “Zionist”
project based on the edification of one state for one community.39 They claim
that the Lebanese formula is based on pluralism, respect of diversity, and safe-
guard of liberties. Seeking to be pragmatic, the executive board of the party
asked for the strict application of the Ta’ef Agreement after the elaboration of
a new electoral law maintaining the actual equilibrium between communities.
In addition, the hostility toward the Israeli entity led the party leaders
to declare their total solidarity with the Palestinian people in their (armed)
conflict with Israel. However, they have not explicitly pledged their help and
concrete support to the Transjordan and Gaza population. Hizbullah con-
demns blind terrorism but refuses to condemn the suicide operations carried
by Palestinians. Hizbullah defends its hostile attitude toward the Western
civilization; however, the opposition is not against Western countries as such,
but more toward the “Zionist colonialist attitude.”40
This reasoning causes the Lebanese people to wonder whether Hizbullah’s
priority is given to the “culture of territory” [national by essence] or the
“culture of space” [regional by essence].41 In the latter context, its doctrine
imposes a doctrinal submission of all strategic decisions to the wali el faqih
or the supreme guide of the Islamic revolution Imam Khamenei. The recog-
nition of the supranational and absolute political and religious authority is a
main characteristic of Hizbullah’s doctrine. Wilayat el faqh is for the succes-
sor of the Prophet, or an Imam descent of the Imam Ali to lead the Islamic
nation. Jaafarite Shi’i believe that 12 Imams (Mahdi) existed in history; the
12th disappeared but is still expected to reappear in order to deliver the
94 ● Women in Lebanon

Shi’i from oppression and misery. In the meantime, wali el faqih leads the
community.42
The modern Shi’i trend is rooted in the Islamic Revolution and marks a
historical turn.43 Before the accession of Khomeini, the notion of wali el faqih
did not carry such political importance. The Shi’i cleric in authority has not
held power in a religious community since the time of the Ummayad’s oppres-
sion in the eighth century. Later, in the nineteenth century, religious chiefs
in Najaf decided upon the active participation of the ‘Ulama in political life.
Reformists formed in Najaf constituted the first generation, represented by
Ayatollah Sistani and Khoi, and the el-Sadr and Hakim families represent
the second generation of Shi’i clerics who were dedicated to the emerging
revolution. Since the accession of Ayatollah Khomeini, Shi’i recognizes no
other authority other than wali el faqih. Furthermore, the allegiance to wali el
faqih means fusion between the political and the religious; both are viewed as
authoritative systems. This victory led to the principle of exporting the revo-
lution. The question now is how does the mandatory recourse to wali el faqih
translate to the entire Lebanese multiconfessional population? The Lebanese
Hizbullah recognizes the authority of the wali el faqih, which is mainly facil-
itated by ancestral relations between el-Sadr and Hakim families for strategic
and doctrinal questions. Wali el faqih practically has the Prophet’s authority in
terms of safeguarding the nation’s interests in all matters. In 1992, Hizbullah
had to decide whether or not to participate in Lebanon’s legislative elections.44
The party formed a committee of 12 members to debate the option and made
recommendations and submitted the resolution to the Imam Khamenei who
gave his accord. Should the Lebanese political question conform to the doc-
trinal faith of the Islamic Republic of Iran? Would then any option of war or
peace in Lebanon belong to the domain of the wali el faqih? 45
What is the spatial nature of Hizbullah’s territory (loyalty)? The umma,
or community of Muslim believers, is obviously much larger than the state
of Lebanon. Now, the legitimate political Lebanese debate is to exhort
Hizbullah to give up its arms and to renounce the pursuit of resistance
as an “extrastate” group, outside the army. As it was originally an Islamist
party, its foundation on Lebanese land is directly linked to a factor that
goes beyond the national territory, to the Iranian Revolution. In this case,
the concept of ‘assabiyya46 developed by Ibn Khaldun47 seems to be preva-
lent. Recruitment of combatants is exclusively from Shi’i milieu and Islamist
families preferably. Militants are mobilized through a da’wa (preaching) of
religious nature. Hizbullah evolved as a community insensitive to any territo-
rial Lebanese culture, preferring the regional culture. This might be because
the Shi’i community has always believed itself to be marginalized, and belong-
ing to the regional ‘assabiyya sect in revolt against the local economic and
 Islam in Lebanon: An Overview ● 95

political system. They rejected assimilation to the dominant culture and

exhibited a natural disposition to be liberated of any territorial order imposed
upon them.
Looking to the future, what is Hizbullah’s real allegiance? What are the
limits of the resistance: the territory of Cheb’a farms48 or the liberation of the
seven villages in the Golan, or even Jerusalem? Such resistance and libera-
tion would be in support of other Islamist movements such as Hamas or the
Islamic Jihad.49 Is maintaining a military wing part of its refusal of integra-
tion? Hizbullah maintains a military wing and takes the sovereignty from the
state in Southern Lebanon and the marba’ amni50 in Beirut. This act reveals
a religious ‘assabiyya that integrates the institutions of the state but refuses to
disarm in order to leave the defense of the state to the Lebanese army. Ibn
Khaldun on ‘assabiyya argued that a group in its first stages needs to main-
tain its ‘assabiyya to keep its predominance, and refuse to decline for the sake
of building the nation ‘umran.51 This created complications in the crucial
parliamentary elections held on June 7, 2009, in Lebanon.

Effect of the Elections on the Future of Lebanon’s

Existence and Identity
The Lebanese population has become polarized between two camps, the par-
tisans of March 1452 and those of March 8.53 L’Orient Le Jour published an
opinion piece written by Thomas Morus, but that reflected the sentiments
of a larger body of people, titled “Pour les Chrétiens, deux alternatives et
un choix” (“For Christians, two alternatives and one choice”) on May 22,
2009, a few days before the crucial elections. In this article, Morus stated
his belief that this partisanship reflects a polarization because the reasoning
behind it belongs to the past or to unrealistic and irrational future projection.
He believes some Lebanese have lost a major human quality, the capacity
of discernment. Many citizens, even professionals such as doctors, engineers,
and professors, have put aside their reason, and are focused on their personal
interests at the detriment of their children’s future. The question that remains
unanswered for many Lebanese is how a large portion of the population came
to be blinded by hatred or revenge against some deeply rooted politicians.
Indeed, many Christians dislike and hold grudges against politicians such as
the Hariri family, Samir Geagea, Amin Gemayel, Walid Jumblatt, and many
others. Their reasoning is understandable but, Morus argues, they should not
sacrifice the future of the country, because these politicians made a favorable
choice for the country. Morus states that these politicians, regardless of their
past errors, had made the choice for a state of law, for democracy, for civil
liberties and a free economy.
96 ● Women in Lebanon

Morus continues to wonder about the mental state of some of his com-
patriots; how can they sacrifice the future of their descendents just to quiet
down the bitterness of past actions? At this crucial time, reason and logic
should transcend sentiments of settling past transgressions. He claims that
the doctrine of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), which aligned with
Hizbullah, is dangerous and irreversible because Hizbullah has become a
movement fostering regional and world change. Members of the FPM seem
to be unaware of the wolf among the sheep. The danger resides in the fact
that the alliance between Hizbullah and the FPM will lead the Lebanese to a
collective suicide. Logic dictates to vote for candidates working for peace and
for economic growth—even if they occasionally stray from the straight and
narrow—rather than voting for others promising indefinite war in the name
of principles that are foreign to our reality, our culture, and our existence.
The history of politics has precedents of these sorts of alliances, which end
when the most powerful decides to end them and the winner takes all. The
Lebanese people have not forgotten the humiliation they endured during a
period of almost three decades (1976–2005) where the Syrian Secret Service
had access to daily life details. In fact, during this time the Syrian totalitar-
ian regime of the El-Assad family controlled the Lebanese army and received
huge revenues from government-collected taxes. This regime had power over
all the political system and effectively deconstructed our democratic system
by controlling elections; making and unmaking presidents and speakers of
the parliament; and controlled even the judicial system by approving judges’
appointments and assassinating any political figure who opposed their med-
dling in Lebanon’s government. They appointed Syrian army officials as the
head of the Syrian occupational army in Lebanon to oversee all Lebanese
institutions and considered Lebanon as a Syrian province. Since the indepen-
dence of Lebanon in 1943 and the independence of Syria in the same year,
the Syrians did not recognize Lebanon as a sovereign country and refused to
establish an exchange of ambassadors between the two countries. Should Iran,
through Hizbullah, substitute the Syrian regime? Should the country move
towards the unknown future?
Fortunately, most Lebanese agree on a project of peace, progress, and
modernity, and they reject any intention to involve them in the conflicts of
others. Most importantly, they see the future through the prism of hope and
not the prism of revenge and hatred.
I made it a point to come to Lebanon to exercise my civil rights because
I felt Lebanon was threatened. In 2009, I went to Mashghara, my husband’s
hometown, located in the Bekaa Valley to vote. The arch dressed at the
entrance of the city troubled me; it gave me the impression of being in a small
Iranian city. The large arch is filled with pictures of Ayatollah Khomeni and
 Islam in Lebanon: An Overview ● 97

Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, in addition to other Iranian clerics. The tremen-

dous change of the city—so prosperous in the past and almost unrecognizable
now—worried me. Is this a specimen of what other areas of Lebanon will
look like should Hizbullah and its ally the FPM (the March 8 bloc) win the
elections? At this moment, I remembered the strong statement US Vice Pres-
ident Joe Biden made during his recent visit to Lebanon on May 20, 2009.
He reiterated the US determination to be on Lebanon’s side to safeguard
its independence and its total sovereignty, to deploy its legitimate army on
its entire territory totaling 10,452 km2 , and to make free political decisions
without any regional or international interference. I realized the danger of
the March 8 bloc’s project to engage Lebanon in the path of revolutions and
regional wars, to keep it in a state of instability, paralyzing its institutions,
and last but not least to obstruct modernity and progress.
In the 2009 elections, 600 candidates vied for 128 seats divided in par-
ity between Christians and Muslims. The protagonists were made up of the
actual majority, a diversified political entity comprising Muslims, Sunni, most
of the Druze, and a portion of the Christians, and were allied to the moder-
ate Arab world and the Occident. On the other side, the opposition was led
by the powerful Hizbullah, an Islamist Shi’i party and the other portions of
the Christians, the FPM, and a constellation of small pro-Syria parties. The
Christian electorate had the power to move the vote in one way or another.
The political positions of each camp reflected the interplay of regional and
even international power. The actual majority insisted on keeping Lebanon
outside regional conflicts, on keeping good relations with the Arab world and
the Occident, and on going back to the armistice with Israel. On the contrary,
Hizbullah articulated the resistance against Israel as the main struggle facing
Lebanon. For seven years, Hizbullah military power transformed Southern
Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley to a battleground by fighting proxy wars. The
risk of Hizbullah winning the elections would change the face of Lebanon,
and effectively make Hizbullah a state within a state.
Considering the gravity of the situation, Lebanese bishops met in isolation
for three days to discuss the matter. On the eve of the election, the Maronite
patriarch made a strong and decisive statement to the press at this dangerous
moment that threatened the existence of Lebanon, as a pluralist country. He
urged the Christian population to vote for the sovereignty of Lebanon and to
keep its international vocation for coexistence and democracy represented by
the March 14 movement.
On June 8, the outcome of the elections proved that “Christians refuse
to discontinue their historical constants,” according to members of the
March 14 movement.54 Lebanon successfully passed the democratic expe-
rience test. The international community and Arab countries considered this
98 ● Women in Lebanon

important election with great concern, fear, and circumspection. Once more,
Lebanon proved to be on the path of peace and democracy. These elections
are an outcome of a real referendum, a real choice, and a real promise for a
sovereign state, free and independent, and are based on ideals promoted by
the Cedar Revolution. The prevailing peaceful climate contrasts starkly with
the waves of violence and terror, which tended to intimidate the Lebanese
people during the last decades. Therefore, the current minority March 8
bloc, which got 42 percent of the vote, versus the March 14 movement,
which got 58 percent of the vote, must not only formally accept the choice of
the Lebanese people, they should also commit to respecting the democratic
behavior inside and outside legitimate institutions, away from the “logic” of
paralysis and blind adventurism.55 Indeed, Hizbullah and the FPM backed
by Syria and Iran impeded the formation of the new cabinet for six months
due to their military might.
My vote took place in a public school comprising several rooms. Here,
women voted in a different room than men, and Christians voted in a differ-
ent room than Muslims and other minorities. The elections that took place
under the supervision of national and international controllers were demo-
cratic. The young Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud efficiently modernized
the entire electoral system in the American way, coaching and educating
the electoral committees who were managing the process. International and
national observers wrote a satisfactory report on the election. Former US pres-
ident Carter, the head of the international supervision committee, and Khose
Sanshiz, the head of the European supervision committee, joined their efforts
with members of the National Democratic committee to observe the bal-
lots located in different qada’.56 For the first time, legislative elections took
place in one day and in a peaceful and convivial way without interference or
pressure from authorities. In their report, Jimmy Carter and Khose Sanshiz
congratulated Lebanese people for their commitment to the democratic pro-
cess and in particular for their enthusiasm, which was evidenced by the high
turnout that reached an average of 52 percent compared to 37 percent in
2005. The Carter Center encourages electoral reform of all its stakeholders.
They made the following recommendations:

● Increased protection for ballot secrecy through use of official, standard-

ized, preprinted ballots
● Increased independence of electoral authority
● Positive measures to increase the representation of women in parliament
● The adoption of changes aimed at making the electoral system more
representative
 Islam in Lebanon: An Overview ● 99

● Implementation of recent legislation regarding lowering the voting age

and the facilitation of overseas voting
● Steps to ensure equal participation of disabled persons in the electoral
process57

All observers, in particular the Yemenite former prime minister Abdel

Rehman el-Ariani, congratulated Lebanon for the most transparent and quiet
elections in the Arab world. They were satisfied with female participation in
the voting but were a little disappointed by the scarcity of women’s candida-
cies to parliamentary seats. Seven women declared their candidacies: Nayla
Tueni, Beirut 1; Strida Tawk, Becharre in the north, Magda Bridi, Zahle;
Gilberte Zuein, Kesrouan; Ghenwa Jalloul, Beirut 3; Bahia Hariri, Saida;
Norma Ferzli, Bekaa East. Four of them won: Nayla Tueni as a Greek Ortho-
dox from the March 14 movement, Strida Taouk as a Maronite also from the
March 14 movement, Bahia Hariri as a Sunni from the March 14 movement,
and Gilberte Zuein as a Maronite from the March 8 bloc.
Among these female candidates, Bahia Hariri is the only veiled woman.
She occupied the position of Minister of Education and she appeared
unveiled to the public. However, following the death of her brother and
former prime minister Rafiq Hariri, she wore the veil, which, according to
a traditional interpretation of the veil’s meaning, symbolizes modesty and
closeness to God.
As I have demonstrated, religion and politics are closely related in
Lebanon. Our main concern in this study is the impact of an Islamic state on
Lebanese women in general. How has and how will Hizbullah influence the
liberation of women in our societies? I was somehow uncomfortable looking
at symbols and slogans the FPM bloc used in the campaign. On main roads,
a visitor would see on billboards a picture of a pretty woman, looking very
Westernized, and the phrase “Sois belle et vote” (“Be pretty and vote”). Is not
this slogan contradictory to Hizbullah’s religious beliefs and on the steps it
has taken to ensure Lebanese women veil themselves as a symbol of modesty?
During the last few decades, the resurgence in the habit of veiling for Shi’i
women changed the image of Lebanon as a multiconfessional country to that
of a firmly Islamic country.
The veiling phenomenon began in the beginning of the 1990s with
Hizbullah’s emergence. To accelerate the veiling occurrence, Hizbullah paid
as incentive an amount of approximately $300 per month to every woman
and particularly young girls who wore the hijab. Is this a lack of coordination
or just a fundamental difference in the ideology of the two allied parties,
the FPM and Hizbullah? They probably agreed to disagree on this issue.
100 ● Women in Lebanon

Moreover, what does beauty have to do with the vote? A vote should be the
result of a careful thinking and deliberating. Is the FPM targeting only pretty
women? What about less attractive or intellectual women? After ignoring the
majority of female citizens, the FPM was only interested in their vote. Indeed,
the FPM began advocating for changes and reforms; however, nothing in the
platform mentioned or suggested a determination to help Lebanese women
struggling for their right to be considered fully recognized citizens. Many
women discussed feeling deep offense from the FPM slogan. The slogan por-
trays women as objects, whose role is to incite a man’s desire. Here, one can
find a similarity with Hizbullah’s position on veiling.58 Instead of convincing
women to vote for them, the FPM stirred the anger of women and other
feminists.
On the contrary, the March 14 movement showed the picture of a woman
and the slogan “Sois égale et vote” (“Be equal and vote”). This slogan seems
to be more representative of the actual status and interests of the Lebanese
women. Nayla Tueni, the youngest female parliamentary candidate in the
2009 parliamentary elections, demanded a larger participation of women in
general and in all aspects of daily life. On the eve of June 7, the date of the
elections, a journalist interviewing her on the Lebanese television channel
“Future” unexpectedly contacted her grandfather Ghassan Tueni and asked
him what she had to offer and why he endorsed her candidacy. He answered
that she was a capable political candidate seeking her father’s parliamentary
seat; and, in addition, she was the first young female candidate (she was
only 27) representing the needs of the younger generation. He stated that
though her biography was short, her experience was large. She is the head of
An Nahar for youth, a weekly paper founded by her late father Gebran. She
has proved her capability of managing the daily newspaper after the death
of her father, giving her own opinions, and more importantly, giving a pro-
gressive image for the future. Her platform to develop Ashrafieh, a Christian
quarter in Beirut, carried new, better-developed plans than any other area in
Lebanon. She is determined to keep the great image of Lebanon, and adding
the sky, as a metaphor for Lebanon’s purity and representation of the Cedar
Revolution, will remain blue like the rooster of An Nahar.59
The participation of women in the election demonstrates how varied the
situation of women in Lebanon can be. A comprehensive description (of this
variety) of woman in Islam goes beyond the scope of our study. We are limit-
ing ourselves here to a quick study, without entering into the divergences of
opinion between jurists and theologians.
The custom of the veil existed before Islam, but in a more restricted form.
“Il y a encore peu de temps, une femme qui, au Liban, entrait dans une église
sans avoir les cheveux couverts, faisait scandale.” (Little time has passed since
 Islam in Lebanon: An Overview ● 101

a woman who, in Lebanon, entered a church without having covered hair,

made a scandal.)60 Here, one recalls the words of Saint Paul in the first epistle
to the Corinthians, evoking the accepted custom in all of the churches, which
was therefore that of all of the ancient Orient. Today, the veil has been nearly
abandoned by Christian women, but it is still worn by Muslims. For a better
understanding of the resurgence of the veiling phenomenon, the differences
between Christian and Muslim women, we will take a historical look at this
modern debate in the following chapter.
 CHAPTER 6

Struggle in Modern Islam

T
o situate the modern epoch of modern Arab thought, it is
indispensable to describe the sociocultural context and to raise the
question of women’s liberation. During the nineteenth century,
Egypt and Lebanon encountered a great deal of progress during a period
known as the Arab Renaissance. Egypt began to modernize, first, with
Napoleon Bonaparte’s campaign in 1789, then further under the reign of
Mohamed Ali. At the same time in Lebanon, reformers appeared to be
rethinking Islam in modern terms and envisioning the state’s administration
in a way that was more appropriate for the necessity of the times.
This epoch corresponds to European expansionism. During this time, the
Islamic world presented itself as an intellectual hub, which tried to adapt to
new forces, while trying not to lose its “soul,” but not to stay in backward
motion. Muslim Arab intellectuals opened up to Occidental ideas; they tried
hard to adapt them and propagate them in the Orient. Others fought against
imported models of female emancipation, with a sense that men inspire the
ideal of women: deviation is not automatically synonymous with liberation.
In keeping with philosophical, political, and religious ideas, we can dis-
cern in different Muslim countries, and particularly in Egypt, the different
attitudes facing these new cultural acquisitions, attitudes that indicate two
main waves of thought.

Openness to Progress
The objective of the stream of modernization was to bring the Arab world
from a traditional, underdeveloped era to the modern epoch. The three main
positions established in this stream are:

(a) The Nationalist group based on the existence and the future of the
nation, included women in issues of nationalism and culture.
104 ● Women in Lebanon

(b) The Liberal group, based on individual liberty, freedom of thought,

belief and speech.
(c) The socialist group, based on equality and collective justice.

For the modernization stream to give Islam momentum, Muslims needed

to cultivate new sciences and reorganize religious teaching. Initiators of that
stream seemed to welcome Occidental culture, advocating the discipline of
thought that allowed progress, thinking actively in all forms of education, of
women’s liberation, and of the reform of legislation toward modernity.
Against an extremely secular model, Egyptian modernists appeared
respectful of religion. Most of them maintained their Muslin faith above all
and strived to continue their discoveries of the Qur’an. They focused their
efforts on achieving a sense of national renovation, which began with the
struggle for independence. This task required a radical questioning of morals
and mentalities, which were justified then, but constitutes an obstacle today.
To guarantee national independence, it was imperative to give each citizen all
the possibilities to flourish and mobilize in all ways, each mind and pair of
hands, in other words, including the participation of women in all economic,
social, and even political tasks of national construction.
Qassim Amin (1865–1908), a prominent jurist and scholar influenced by
the drive of modernization, approached the problem of social reform through
the question of women’s liberation. The Egyptian society that aspires to redis-
cover its identity, he said, cannot neglect objective necessities of progress that
impose as a primordial condition the liberation of women.1 His originality
as a thinker consisted of the conciliation of the Islamic and modern move-
ments. He accomplished his task by proposing a new way of interpreting the
Qur’anic verses and ascribed the role of women to customs, which are subject
to reform and change.
He poses the problem of women in many arenas. On veiling, he believed
that its practice is evidence or an acknowledgment from men that women’s
will is stronger than that of men. Afraid of seeing women out of their con-
trol, they decided to hide them and make them slaves of this social tradition.
Qassim Amin attempted to incorporate women in society and liberate them
from the veil, which he argued prohibited them from exercising their general,
natural, and necessary functions.
From a religious perspective, change is a consequence of ijtihad, or a per-
sonal process of reasoning to research and understand the scriptures. The
Qur’an, a book that, among other things, examines social relations, consti-
tutes an unbreakable ensemble of the affirmation of faith and sociopolitical
rules of life. The Qur’an is not a closed code of laws. The work of illumination
 Struggle in Modern Islam ● 105

or tafsir is traditionally attributed to the ‘ulama or “people who bind and

unbind.” For Qassim Amin, culture is the sociohistorical application of
Qur’anic teaching. Ancient traditions turned out to be overvalued: instead
of remaining elements of adaptation to the environment, they became ele-
ments of autoconservation and even of rupture. Traditions intensified, but in
a sense broke away from the Qur’anic spirit.
These are the conclusions of the first Arab “feminist” that I found justi-
fiable in 1982 when I first researched the subject. As we will see in the next
chapter, Amin’s critics accused him of conniving with the British and even
accused him of ties with Lord Cromer, the British governor of Egypt during
the colonial era, on matters related to the liberation of Egyptian women.

The Reaction of a “Pure and Hard” Islam

The Islamist group referred also to the Arab Muslim heritage; however, this
time, the interpretation has a fundamentalist sense. Proponents of this move-
ment wanted to save their countries where underdevelopment is incontestably
pervasive. However, the cause, in their eyes, is not the Muslim tradition;
instead, it is the infidelity of Muslims to their own religion and traditions.
Thus, the only way to avoid underdevelopment would be a return to the
sources of Islam in order to rediscover their initial nature, their authentic
personality, and their previous civilization that once allowed them to be the
world’s leader during the Golden Age of Islam. Then, women themselves
would never be free to imitate the Occidental model, but they would keep
their subordinate role toward men, who are and have always been the only
masters in their home.
Today, the Orient suffers from a profound identity crisis. However, this
search for identity confounded with Islam is perceived more as a factor to
protect the society than a search for religious value. The Arab world wants to
conserve its dignity first. But this fundamental requirement can be translated
to two opposing tendencies: on the one hand, the “adult” generations admit
that the idea of the liberation of women, although discretely, is permissible,
but often remain prisoner to the social taboo, aware of the complexity of
the endeavor, not allowing it to change their world. On the other hand, the
“Islamic Revolution” reaches out, especially youth people who are going back
to a more traditional mode and to a “pure and hard Islam,” in reaction to the
image of a corrupted Occident unable to protect its individuals.
The place of women remains fundamental in the dilemma of the modern
Arab world. Yet if we insist on this very important “mutation,” it is precisely
because it is at the center of a discussion of social values of Islam.
106 ● Women in Lebanon

Women in Tradition and the Discourse of the Veil

The history of the veil, also called hijab, indicates an array of symbolism, as
it exists and pervades through different civilizations. Each civilization weighs
the hijab with various levels of significance, through social, religions, and even
traditional symbolism. The hijab even possesses a different meaning within
the same civilization, but at different points in history. Sometimes, it sym-
bolizes the upper refined social class; it is limited to the wives and daughters
of nobles and wealthy members of a given society. In other instances, it sym-
bolizes the suffering of humanity, or the poor and the oppressed. Moreover,
some cultures may view it as a protection of women from the eyes of the
environment. Since the woman represents the virtues and values of a culture
and society, the hijab becomes a protection for the entire society. Consid-
ering the array of meanings related to its wearing, the hijab confers upon
itself more than one definition, each linked to a particular civilization, society,
and time.
In Lebanon, the resurgence of the veil manifests itself mainly in the Shi’i
community. The multiconfessional system and religious and political pressure
led to the revival of Islamic Shi’i traditions as well as Sunni—usuliyya—
inflexible conservatism. Religious authorities from Saudi Arabia as well as
Iran are spending millions of dollars toward the revitalization of their own
religious communities in Lebanon. Sunni and Shi’i communities seem to be
competing in Lebanon, and the influence of religion is obvious, measured by
the number of mosques built in the last decade, and by the reinforcement
of the veil upon Muslim women, in particular Shi’i women, a previously
abandoned custom. Women in each Muslim community wear the hijab in
a particular way. By looking at a veiled women, one can easily differentiate
and recognize their religious affiliation, whether Sunni by covering the hair,
or Shi’i by covering the hair low to the forehead and under the chin. After a
long absence, an expatriate Lebanese who visits Lebanon wonders what the
increased number of veiled women represents. Is it a way to present an Islamic
image of Lebanon, to reposition women in religion and in a political Islamic
identity, a way for Muslim women to enter, free or oppressed, the public and
political space, or to marginalize the Christian communities?
Studies argue persuasively that the recent phenomenon of hijab is rather
modern, not a traditional phenomenon, a result of recent geopolitical and
cultural exchanges that exist on a global scale. It is a product and a reac-
tion to Westernization. Since Islam is historically decentralized, each Muslim
community attempts to establish group identification. In Lebanon, a country
built on the coexistence of different religious communities, communitarian-
ism came to represent the priority of the group over national identity in the
 Struggle in Modern Islam ● 107

lives of individuals. The veil, which has come to symbolize larger issues for
different groups, burdens the intellectual discourse of the veil.
For many years, the question of what it means to be a woman and a
veiled woman and what the veil ultimately represents has been the subject of
heated debate. On one side, some Islamist thinkers and activists envision the
resurgence of the veil as a symbol of faith, of ethical values and even of grass-
roots democracy. It is also characterized as the unintended consequence of
modernization and the conflict between opposing forces favoring and against
globalization. Either way, they stress the powerful impact that the resurgence
has had on the lives of both urban and rural women on a local, regional, and
global level. On the other side, many secular and modern scholars see the veil
as a reversal of all that they consider gains for women’s status. They feel help-
less against the growth and popularity of Islamist movements. Many hoped,
in their efforts of accommodation, to prove that a progressive view is in fact
the essence of Arabic Islamic thought; they see the Islamist resurgence as a
rejection of that view, and the veil as a symbol of that rejection.
In Egypt, for example, the policies Muhammad ‘Ali accelerated social
changes through the modernization of the army, increased revenues, and edu-
cation reforms, and attempted to establish industry, and these policies greatly
affected the status of women. The state’s pursuit of educational moderniza-
tion and the debate over the expansion of education and new professional
opportunities for women added to the necessity of social reform for women.
Reformers drew attention to the importance of looking at how some
classical jurists interpreted the hadith and used the Qur’an to their advan-
tage to subjugate women. In the late eighteenth century, an undercurrent
in the attitude toward women began to gain momentum. Scholars such as
Rif ’at el-Tahtawi, Mohammad ‘Abduh, and Qassim Amin recommended that
reforms be put in place to change Islamic culture’s treatment of women. The
Islamic word at this time was experiencing many changes due to the economic
conquest of Western Europe, allowing the influx of new ideas. Regardless of
these changes, the recommendations incited passionate debates concerning
the reform of laws pertaining to women.2 Tahtawi (1801–1871), an Al-Azhar
graduate, went on a cultural mission to Paris from 1826 to 1831, and upon
his return to Egypt he wrote Talkhiss bariz, in which he eulogized the status
of European women, their education, their behavior, and their participa-
tion in the advancement of society. He advocated that education should be
equal for boys and girls and recommended that public education for women
be identical to that which men experienced.3 The confusion concerning
women’s hichme, or decency, does not come from her being veiled or unveiled,
he stated, but from her education. He valued European’s women occupa-
tions and contributions to their respective countries in many fields such as
108 ● Women in Lebanon

education, commerce, or even as blue-collar workers. With much respect, he

describes the participation of women in social life. He notes that European
women produced important work: some were translators with elegance and
style and others set models in their writings and expressive correspondences.
Consequently, the fact that a man’s beauty resides in his reason whereas a
woman’s beauty resides in her words is commonly accepted in Europe and
thus cannot be applied to Egyptian men and women.4 Tahtawi, a member
of the committee for the reorganization of education, recommended univer-
sal education for girls and women in his book Al-murchid al-amin lita’leem
albanat wal banin and provided an analysis of the benefit of education to
the entire society. “Together, we need to elevate boys and girls to teach
them how to interact. Women need to read and write to be cultured and
to be able to intermingle with men . . . Education will shelter women from
idleness . . . work protects women and more likely to guide her to virtue.”5
His work was the first work in Arabic that advocated reforms in the social
arena that affected women and proposed technological reforms for national
renewal. No steps in this direction were taken until 1832 when a medical
school for female hakimas (doctors) in Egypt subsidized by the state opened
up due to several epidemics, and a need arose for women who could treat
other women. Women were able to give vaccinations, deliver babies, and per-
form examinations as state employees. The active presence of these hakimas
broadened the value of education for girls and proved their ability to compete
with men. Women employed by the government were encouraged to marry
men in the medical schools.
After Tahtawi, the Christian Lebanese Fares al-Shidyaq wrote al Saq in
1855. He argued that the education of women was essential to the country,
and that a woman who occupied her time by educating herself, by reading
and learning, prevented idleness and the invention of ruses. As Tahtawi had
done, Shidyaq wrote in another book Kachf al makhba’ ‘an founoun Europa in
which he observed the situation of women in France and Great Britain. He
then compared French and British women to Egyptian women and analyzed
the attitude of the European men toward women in general. European men
respected the participation of their wives in society.
Abd el-Rahman Kawakibi, a Syrian author and pan-Islamic Arab solidar-
ity supporter, talked about the role of women in education and in society in
general. Known as the initiator of freedom, he called for women to liberate
themselves from ignorance. In his book Um al-qura he noted that “the essen-
tial cause of the backwardness of our country is the situation of our women
who remain ignorant; on the contrary, in our history, our ancestors took half
of their education from their wives, such as Aisha, who gave us half of the
prophet’s teachings.”6
 Struggle in Modern Islam ● 109

The issue took another turn following the development of anthropological

and biological research in the nineteenth century proving that mental capac-
ities of women and men are equal. Butrus al-Bustani, a Christian Lebanese,
notes that in this sense, a human being, male or female, possesses the same
capacity to reason. The difference between sexes cannot provoke a differ-
ence in the capacity of reasoning, and some women are even able to surpass
men through their intellectual prowess.7 Boustani frequently repeated in his
speeches and writings that education is the light that shines into people’s
minds, chasing away the shadow of ignorance, the source of so many evils
still afflicting us today.
In 1873, Egypt established the first government-run school for girls,
but the education of girls ultimately slowed down in 1882 following the
British occupation. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, an Islamic ideologist and polit-
ical activist, began emphasizing the importance of education as a means of
upward mobility and a way for citizens to obtain teaching positions as well
as positions in the administration. Britain did nothing to meet the grow-
ing demand for the education of the Egyptian people. Instead, Lord Cromer
increased tuition according to the increased demand for schools. Private,
missionary, and foreign schools popped up to meet the growing demand.
Mohammad ‘Abduh founded Muslim benevolent societies for girls and boys,
which attracted more students than the government schools did.
Consequently, upper-class women began to step away from traditional
customs and began to experiment with Western styles of clothing. Those trav-
eling to Europe become accustomed to being unveiled, while staying veiled
in lighter, more transparent veils at home. Many critics demonstrated anxiety
over such changes, wondering where it would lead the society.
One of the most influential thinkers who campaigned for reforms in
harmony with Islam in general and education reforms for women in partic-
ular was the Egyptian Muhammad ‘Abduh, who had an extensive following
and was a student of Al-Afghani. ‘Abduh was a committed religious thinker
who argued for the acquisition of “modern sciences” to promote widespread
education.
Mohammad ‘Abduh, an Egyptian Mufti, jurist and liberal scholar,
described a tension between two irreconcilable facts: Islam expressing God’s
will about how men should live and act in society and the irreversible modern-
ization and movement of civilizations compelling men to live in certain ways.
‘Abduh’s purpose was to prove in detail the compatibility between these two
facts, using the principles of Islamic social morality. For ‘Abduh, these princi-
ples helped to limit and control the modern world, for “true civilization is in
conformity with Islam. The laws of social progress and happiness were discov-
ered by Europe, but they are the laws of Islam. Thus, Islam can be dissolved
110 ● Women in Lebanon

into modern thought.”8 The question remains, why did this perfect society in
the end decay? He reports five reasons. First, that extreme Shi’is brought in the
spirit of excess, and a certain type of mysticism obscured the essential nature
of Islam; second, the difference between what was essential and what was not,
the excess of adherence to the outwardness of the law and from it the blind
taqlid, or imitation. Third, for ‘Abduh the spread of taqlid was connected to
the rise of the Turkish power in the umma . . . Fourth, when the ‘ulama were
corrupted, everything in Islam began to decay; the Arabic language lost its
purity, unity was broken, education was perverted and even doctrine was cor-
rupted when the balance between reason and revelation was overturned and
the rational sciences neglected. Finally, when the Islamic nations were losing
their virtues and thus their strength, the nations of Europe were becoming
stronger and more civilized.9
As a leading modernizing politician and reformer, he advocated the acqui-
sition of the knowledge, skills, and intellect of the modern West in order to
promote national and Islamic renaissance. He was in favor of the reform of
marriage practices and for the elevation of the status of women. He stressed
the importance of addressing the misinterpretations of Islam that accumu-
lated over the centuries. He was the first to state that Islam first recognized
the full and equal humanity of women, a concept still argued by Muslim
feminists today. He argued that the West was not the first to realize this,
as Europeans claimed, and that polygamy and divorce were not compatible
with the essential teachings of Islam, monogamy was the Qur’anic ideal, and
demanded society to return to a state of true Islam. In 1880, he published
articles in al-waqaeh al-missriyya and Al-Manar.
Abduh’s reforms met a substantial amount of opposition and criticism.
Conservatives believed that he had made concessions in order to adopt mod-
ern thought that threatened the solvency of Islamic doctrine. He formulated a
Fatwa on questions of public concern. He identified certain traditional con-
cepts of Islamic thought in line with the ideas of now dominant Europe.
In this line of thought, maslaha, or public interest, gradually turned into
utility, shura, or consultation into parliamentary democracy, ijma’, or general
acceptance conferring on precepts of laws into public opinion; Islam itself
becomes identical with civilization and activity, the norms of nineteenth-
century social thoughts. To some extent, the claims of his critics were
legitimate, because despite the fact that ‘Abduh advocated a return to pure
Islam, his actions unintentionally engendered the advancement of secularism.
He successfully fostered the modernization of Arabic thought through the
adherence to ijtihad, meaning individual judgment based on case law or past
precedent and his belief that the Qur’an should be understood as a tool for
human reasoning and not solely as the word of God. Also, he effectively broke
 Struggle in Modern Islam ● 111

down cultural barriers, allowing Muslims to receive aid from non-Muslims so

long as this benefited the overall umma. ‘Abduh’s struggle demonstrated how
difficult the process of modernization was for the Islamic world, but shows
that, in the end, it was possible.
Thus, without intending it, ‘Abduh was perhaps opening the door to the
overflowing of Islamic doctrine and law by inviting all the innovations of
the modern world. He had intended to build a wall against secularism; he
had in fact provided an easy bridge by which it could capture one position
after another. It was not an accident that one group of his disciples were
later to carry his doctrines in the direction of complete secularism. Moreover,
his thought carried out a nationalist element “Non-Muslims belonged to the
nation in exactly the same sense as Muslims, and there should be good rela-
tions between those who differed in religion . . . Muslims should accept help
from non-Muslim in matters of general welfare.”10

Qassim Amin: The Veil as a Western Creation

In 1899, Qassim Amin published his book titled Tahrir al-Mar’a—the liber-
ation of women—which marked the beginning of feminism in Arab culture.
Indeed, Qassim Amin brought attention to the debate and sparked discus-
sions in Middle Eastern and Western countries. Thus, understanding his
arguments for the increase of women’s rights and the arguments of his critics
are imperative in understanding this underlying debate and the struggle for
and against modernization of Muslim women that continues today.
The publication of Qassim Amin’s Tahrir Al-Mar’a—The Liberation of
Women—sparked an intense debate. Amin advocated primary-school educa-
tion for women and reform laws on polygamy and divorce. The reforms he
promoted were not that radical for the 1890s, so why the strong response?
Already the recommendations that Tahtawi and Mohammad ‘Abdu made in
1870 and 1880 incited a passionate debate. By 1890s women’s education had
already begun, state and benevolent religious schools had established primary-
schools education for girls? He championed fundamental social reforms for
Egypt, and called for the change of customs, in particular unveiling. Severely
critiquing Amin, Leila Ahmed wonders why did he consider the veil a sym-
bolic reform, a key element to bring about a general cultural and social
transformation. Qassim Amin, a lawyer, French educated from the upper
middle class, prone to Occidental changes in society, declared that Egyptians
must abolish the veil, change customs and the dress of women, therefore
marking the definition of feminism in Arab culture. The changes he advo-
cated reflected a shift in attitude toward Arabic culture. Considered the first
battle of the veil, it agitated the Arab press, because it marked a new discourse
112 ● Women in Lebanon

in which the veil began to represent larger issues. Issues of class and culture
reflecting the Colonizer and the colonized became a conflict, directly caused
by the British occupation of Egypt in 1882.11
The political encroachment arose, which accused the British of using
Egypt as a supplier of raw materials and of bringing about agricultural
reforms enacted to increase productivity, which resulted in increased prosper-
ity and benefits for some, but created worse conditions for others. It benefited
European residents, the Egyptian upper class, and the new middle class
of rural notables and the Western-educated Egyptians, the new intellectual
elite. Thus, “modern” men displaced religiously trained ‘ulama in positions of
power, traditional knowledge became seen as backward, and legal reforms did
not affect the position of women. The established Mixed Courts with new
codes based mostly on French law bypassed shari’a law, the Hanafi legal opin-
ion of Egypt. Artisans and merchants were unable to compete with Western
products. Rural workers went to urban areas, forming a growing middle class
of men. British administration increased education fees, which created greater
class divisions. Unfair economic and legal privileges for Europeans sparked
anti-Western sentiments. Capitulations exempted Europeans from Egyptian
law and from paying taxes. The conflicting class interests were the facade of
political ideological divisions.
The conflict of those eager to adopt Western ways versus those who
want to preserve Islamic ways appeared in the press. The Lebanese Christian
in Egypt founded the pro-British daily Al-muqattam promoting Western
ways whereas Al-mu’ayyad opposed Western encroachment. Also, Mustapha
Kamil, the leader of the National Party, opposed Western ways as a secu-
lar rather than an Islamic nationalist. The National Party published Al-Liwa
and believed that advancement for Egypt should begin with the expulsion of
the British. Muhammad ’Abduh, leader of the ‘Umma Party, advocated the
acquisition of Western technology and knowledge, while calling for a revital-
ization and reformation of Islamic traditions. His goal was the modification of
Western institutions for an Egyptian context, while gradually bringing Egypt
independence from Great Britain. Muslim men were increasingly exposed to
Western ideas, and the discourse of the veil became as a Western creation. The
Islamic practices for women were embedded in the Western view of “oth-
erness and inferiority.” Travelers and crusaders were the source from which
Western ideas about Islam formed. By the eighteenth century, Western nar-
ratives of women in Islam misconstrued the meaning of customs and viewed
them as symbols of male dominance.
Westerners called for a reforming of native culture, especially with regard
to women. The West believed that religion defined many of the customs
in Arab society toward women. As a result, many missionaries boasted
 Struggle in Modern Islam ● 113

Christianity’s progressive nature toward women and many Europeans fem-

inists urged Muslim women to unveil. Therefore, in Leila Ahmed’s writ-
ing, Qassim Amin in Tahrir Al-Mar’a made assumptions and declared the
inherent superiority of Western ways.
General contempt for Muslims throughout Amin’s text praised European
civilization and called pre-Colonial Egyptian rulers corrupt and unjust,
which upset Egyptian nationalists. Amin characterized the ‘ulama as igno-
rant, greedy and lazy, and mocked their faith.12 Ironically, most vicious attacks
in the text are toward Egyptian women, characterized as unclean, ignorant,
unattractive, unskilled, lewd, and gossiping. “The best man to her is he who
plays with her all day and night . . . and who has money . . . and buys her
clothes and nice things.”13 He adds that Muslim marriage is not based on
love but on ignorance and sensuality.
This ideology supported by missionaries undermined the whole culture
and according to Leila Ahmad, a rumor existed that the book was written at
Cromer’s urgings. Lord Cromer did not demand equality in education even in
his own country, but wanted women to have primary-school education. How
can he be a feminist with this statement? He believed that women needed
some education to fulfill duties as wives, and called for an end to segregation
and to unveiling, arguing that the veil created a barrier against the advance-
ment of society. Girls would forget what they learned in school if they were
veiled and secluded, essentially calling for the Westernization of Muslim soci-
ety. He represented the Arabic reiteration of colonial ideology. Therefore, he
triggered the first major controversy in the Arabic press resulting in more than
30 books and articles responding to the text. Most of the articles were criti-
cal of Amin, primarily for his pro-British positions. Some argue that though
future generations may wish to unveil, it was a current practice, and Amin’s
call to unveil was colonial. The substitution of an Islamic-style male domi-
nance with Western-style male dominance is not a matter of “feminists” and
“anti-feminists,” though some reduce it to this simplification. Amin’s book
marks the beginning of the discourse on the veil as well as the emergence of
an Arabic narrative in response to the colonial narrative. Thus, the veil came
to symbolize the dignity and validity of native traditions: women must veil to
resist Western domination. In addition, the Western discourse and colonial
narrative based on misperceptions and political manipulations added a sym-
bolism to the veil that did not exist previously. The colonial use of feminism
in the East hindered feminist movements within Muslim societies because it
was an adoption of Western culture, as Western economic domination of the
Middle East.
The exposure to Western ideas and the dismantling of social institutions
gave new opportunities for women, benefiting the upper and bourgeois class;
114 ● Women in Lebanon

however, there are undeniable negative consequences to this exposure, as the

issue become a matter of East versus West, rather than right versus wrong.
By adding the political element, it has become harder to reform without
facing dissent.
Considering the complexity of enculturation, Leila Ahmed points out that
there is no important connection between issues of culture and women within
the history of Western feminism. Colonial domination led to rhetoric of
“innately” and “irreparably” misogynist practices of the native culture. The
author adds that Western feminism is not immune from any endocentric
legacy and misogyny, and most importantly it does not call for the abandon-
ment of the entire Western heritage and the wholesale adoption of aspects
of other cultures; rather, it “engages critically and constructively with that
heritage in its own terms.” Enculturation has a determinant result on the
human psyche; since people recreate unconsciously in their own lives part
of their previous enculturation, the substitution of one culture for another
for an entire society cannot be realistic. In the Islamic world and the non-
Western world, those who first proposed a status improvement of women
were attempting to abandon their native culture in favor of another culture’s
beliefs, mainly European. The colonial domination of Europe in the Middle
East made these ideas more pronounced, further encouraging the inclusion of
women in issues of nationalism and culture. Ultimately, the issue of women
forged its way into the context of political reform. In several instances, the
veil became a signifier of the social meaning of gender within the broader
issues of politics and culture.
The Egyptian Supreme Council of Culture organized a six-day
conference14 in Los Angeles, California, on October 23, 1999, hosting 150
scholars and writers from Arab countries and around the world to pay homage
to the renaissance spirit of Muslim reformists a century ago. Panelists noted
that Amin’s thought remains relevant because his view of society can be used
as a “subtext to recover our own and come to terms with the dilemmas
and social muddles” that the Arab word is experiencing. One panelist com-
mented that it was “as if time has not passed in the Arab world.”15 . . . Amin’s
convictions have not lost their credibility and applicability because of the his-
torical relevance of his writing and his society to ours. Selective messages of
his book Tahrir al-Mar’a are fitted to state today’s feminism and planning;
indeed, current women feminists and intellectuals while attempting to reflect
on the nineteenth century examine their own history, struggles, and setbacks
to assess future challenges. How did participants assess Amin’s thoughts on
the subject?
“The reaction to ‘Tahir’ cannot be simply understood on the basis of
Amin’s espousal of Western ideas but rather on how his ideas were played
 Struggle in Modern Islam ● 115

out in Egyptian society at different class levels and shaped by his role as a
judge and a nationalist.”16 The panels agreed that in Tahrir al-Mara’, which
received severe criticism in Egyptian newspapers, Amin focused on aristo-
cratic Egyptian women, who are in great need of education, and maybe he
felt uncomfortable with the way in which women of his circle dealt with Col-
onizers’ women? He considered veiling and seclusion as barriers for Egyptian
women, regardless of their social class; they need to develop the necessary
skills to manage their lives successfully even if they were uneducated. Regard-
less of what social groups and political discourse it served, Amin’s work was
“truly the harbinger of new opportunities for Arab women across class, reli-
gion, ethnicity, and race.”17,18 It opened the way for women’s voices and
different methods of resisting male hegemony, and also for women’s attempts
to renegotiate gender structure. The panel that pursued Amin’s accomplish-
ment found that while calling for an improved patriarchy, he denounced
the cultural backwardness of the harem, which colonialists condemned and
attributed to Islam. They deemed that “Tahrir’ was a political and ideological
commentary about what colonized Egypt is not; namely, inferior and beyond
cultural repair”19 but attributed the practice of the veil to customs that existed
before Islam. His call for a new gender discourse is pertinent since it proves
that women are central to the national economy on social development just
like in advanced European nations.
Moreover, this work is written by a male reformist to Muslim men, espe-
cially the aristocratic class, a social stratum undergoing changes through the
influence of nationalist modernists. The fact that Amin was an aristocrat and
a qadi, or judge, made his work more significant since he possessed the abil-
ity to interpret shari’a and reform Islamic policies of the highest form. He
denounced the religious dignitaries and conservative political leaders who
resisted any attempt to change the old social order. He ascribed the role of
women to customs, which are subject to change and reform, and urged his
fellow men to understand that certain traditions, which served the interests of
their predecessors, have become incompatible with the 1900s. Shari’a, he pro-
claimed, is mutable and capable of accommodating new conditions without
violating the fundamentals of Islam. Finally, Amin’s work opened the way to
a female literary print culture contributing to the awakening of lower-class
women in Egypt. Higher-class women authored biographical dictionaries,
novels, domestic literature, and translated work, whereas lower-class women,
due to their distinct class conditions and personal experiences, had more
modest demands, asking for an incremental limitation of male authority.
 CHAPTER 7

Veiling and Divergent Feminist Voices

T
he construction of the private and the political spheres for Muslim
Arab women is complex and different from that of the West; for
Arab feminists, the “private is political.”1
As per Abderrahim Lamchichi in Femmes et Islam, the universal impor-
tance of equality goes back to the golden age of Islam, yet the Islamic
movement of today is a regression for women in the context of social rights,
education, and employment. He stresses that this regression finds its base
not from Islam as a religion, but from local traditions and repressive polit-
ical regimes, because fundamentalists have manipulated the pillars of their
religion in order to assert this control.2
Nevertheless, all feminists agree that women always foster reform in Islam.
Considering the historical development of the region, it is profusely clear
that Islamic feminism is intrinsically linked to the issue of the veil, and we
cannot discuss Islamic feminism without an explicit discussion of the signif-
icance of the veil. Feminism in Arab society began to develop vigorously in
the twentieth century. This period marks an era when women came into the
political arena, literary circles, and the workforce. With this increased visibil-
ity came two divergent voices of feminism, advocating two roles for women.
The dominant voice of women in Egypt and the Middle East was that of an
elite group of upper to upper middle class women such as Huda Sha’rawi.
Raised bilingually with a French education, she showed interest in assimi-
lating with the progressive lifestyle of the Western woman. The alternative
voice wanted to find a way to have feminism within a “native, vernacular,
Islamic discourse,” validating native customs in order to resist Western dom-
ination. Malak Nassef, raised within the native Arabic culture, resisted the
issue of unveiling, viewing it as a route toward evil because of the poten-
tial for man’s actions toward women who remove the veil. She asked men to
become “moral” and to treat women equally and respectfully. She stated, “It is
118 ● Women in Lebanon

the man’s fault . . . It is men’s moral character that stands in need of improve-
ment . . . Must be wary of men and not assume that all men who write about
women are wise reformers.”3
Huda Sha’rawi founded the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) aiming not
only at educating and raising the intellectual and moral levels of women
but also at reforming laws related to polygamy, divorce, and age difference
between spouses. She kept strong connections with Western feminists, send-
ing delegates to international conferences, and the organizational skills that
developed as a result were able to help create and promote Arab feminism. She
and a delegation of women formed by Saiza Nabawati and Nabawiyya Musa
attended the International Women’s Alliance conference in Rome in 1923.
Upon their return, in a “symbolic act of emancipation,” they removed
their veils and revealed their unveiled selves to the public and their radi-
cal actions brought on a more liberal attitude toward women. The act of
unveiling was significant; it meant supporting gradual reforms toward the
adoption of a Western cultural path and political secular institutions. Women
expressed their freedom and became a dynamic force capable of participat-
ing in Egyptian political life, fighting and winning campaigns for suffrage.
Women demanded equal education and a minimum marriage age for young
girls. Moreover, women rallied for Egypt’s independence. The Western affil-
iation they promoted was criticized and interpreted as “validation of the
western ways as more advanced and more ‘civilized’ than native ways.” In her
analysis, Leila Ahmed claims that type of feminism “the colonization of con-
sciousness . . . in short, would complicate feminism in the Muslim world.”
Upon Huda Sha’rawi’s death in 1947, Ibtihaj Qaddus of Lebanon succeeded
her as president of the EFU.
Another feminist, Zeinab al-Ghazali, continuing in the same vein as
Nassef, sought to create a “path of female subjectivity and affirmation” within
the terms of indigenous culture. As an Islamic feminist, she challenged
patriarchal laws, ideas, and jurisprudence from within a grounded Islamic
framework to reclaim identity and faith in an egalitarian context. She wrote
vividly on the evils of polygamy, forced marriage, and marriage with too
large of an age gap. Her political influence helped establish charities to help
advance awareness on women’s issues.
Two kinds of movements became visible, and the difference between the
two feminist voices derived from a difference in identity perception and sense
of self, as well as psychological and political views, which are still making their
presence known today. One movement is accused, because of being imported
from abroad, of representing a sect, which had different traditions than the
locals, and thus not being accepted by the whole nation. The conflict between
Western and Islamic narratives complicated the issue of veiling, which became
 Veiling and Divergent Feminist Voices ● 119

more significant as time progressed, revealing an issue of identity. The general

tendency in the last few decades has been the return to something native, a
national dress expressing loyalty to religion.
Similarly, in a video titled “Veiled Revolution: Changing lives of women
in the Arab world,” which mainly depicts how women are coping with the
“religious, political, and economic upheavals now transforming the Middle
East,” Elizabeth Fernea speaks of two kinds of movements. One, imported
from abroad, represents different traditions than others and is not accepted
by the whole nation, perhaps because Westernization did not really bring the
desired result expected in development.
For the last 50 years, women have dressed themselves in a Western style;
the short skirt, the uncovered head, and this type of clothing distinguished
them from traditional women who continue to wear long full dresses and
headscarves. However, today middle-class women are covering themselves up
again in the streets of Cairo and other Middle Eastern cities. It began in early
1970s with the Iranian Islamic Revolution.
Fernea interviewed middle-class women of two age groups, and recorded
their responses. A young 25-year-old veiled women shared that she believed
she was obeying the Qur’an by dressing modestly and covering her head.
Another young working woman replied that now more than ever women
must be careful of their reputation. New economic conditions obligate them
to work outside the home in the company of strangers, particularly men.
This new situation requires women to veil themselves in order to be more
comfortable accomplishing tasks and to signal their moral attitude and their
nonavailability for prowling men. The young girl went on to compare herself
to an apple placed in front of a hungry man, a situation considered potentially
sexually dangerous. Moreover, the traditional dress also protects women who
use public transportation, which places them in constant physical contact
with men. Traditional dress conveys the respectability of those who wear it.
Yet another female university graduate speaks highly of this transformation,
greatly admiring the strong-willed young women who are able to wear the
traditional dress and to keep it up. Overall, these women believed that choice
of dress was an individual preference, and that forcing a religion or certain
type of dress on someone was wrong and “extremist.”
Ironically, the granddaughters of the first feminists seem to be “retreating
behind the veil again.” Fernea interviewed the “old fighters” about their feel-
ings on that retreat and its impact on women’s rights and the change that
has resulted. They replied, “Dangerous . . . Now in this era, every Muslim
woman has to work diligently to face and overcome the challenges,” and “It’s
not the veil that protects a woman, it’s her interior, her strength of character.
We saw the first women of Islam. To make us regress again, it’s impossible!”
120 ● Women in Lebanon

“Ce n’est pas le voile qui protège la femme. C’est son intérieur, c’est son carac-
tère . . . Nous voyons les premières femmes de l’Islam. Nous faire revenir en arrière,
c’est impossible!.”
Is a dress so important in a nation’s history? Perhaps when used as a symbol
of revolution, as seen in Lebanon with Hizbullah’s agenda for women. Today,
one wonders whether the resurgence of the veil is a way that women, free or
oppressed, found to enter the public and political domain.
During my field research in Lebanon in the summer of 2007, I inter-
viewed a young 25-year-old woman wearing the headscarf named Nura. She
was sitting next to me at the Jesuit University library. She was an MA stu-
dent majoring in Arabic literature at St. Joseph University, researching for her
thesis on the feminist Christian writer Emily Nasrallah. Her answers on the
issue of the veil indicate more similarities than differences when compared to
the Muslim Egyptian women interviewed by Elizabeth Fernea 20 years ago.
I asked her the following questions: Why are you wearing the veil? What does
it mean to you to be veiled? Would you one day ask your daughter to wear
it? How do you participate in the evolution of your country? In addition, did
Christian schools contribute to the education of Muslim girls?
She responded, “I am a teacher in a public Muslim school,” which aston-
ished me because as far as I know public schools do not have any affiliation
and are open to all Lebanese people regardless of the confession to which
they belong. Private schools are the only ones that indicate their religious
affiliation. She went on to say that she used to go to social gatherings wear-
ing short sleeves, and that was acceptable. Her husband convinced her to
wear the veil two years ago right before their marriage, at which point she
adopted the veil and she is proud of her decision, after all, it is a religious
requirement, and “in no way do I intend to remove it in my lifetime.” She
explained that some women are successful at keeping it on whereas for others
it creates psychological problems, especially if they are forced to wear it. She
mentioned an Egyptian actress who decided to wear the veil but found she
was not being offered roles because of her choice, so she removed it. “If you
work in a Christian company,” she continued, “they will not accept the veil,
so work opportunities for veiled women are very limited. This discrimination
against veiled women is wrong.”

In the event that God gives us a daughter, we will recommend to her that
she wears the veil because God has asked us to do so. Once a woman decides
to wear the veil, she cannot go back on her decision because it goes against
the religion. The veil is a symbol of Islam and not an indication of anti-
western sentiments. We wear it for God only.I participate in the evolution of
my country through my education and work at the school; I am a productive
 Veiling and Divergent Feminist Voices ● 121

member of society and the veil has nothing to do with it. Christian schools
have contributed to educating Muslim girls in the past; they have the merit
and deserve all the credit for it. Now Hizbullah has its own social programs for
girls and women; every confession in Lebanon has its own religious schools,
and they all accept students from other confessions. In the end, whether Sunni
and Shi’i, we are all Muslims; there are no essential differences between us.
What matters is that we say, “we are Muslim”; we all have one religion.

For Nura, the veil does not interfere or prevent her from accomplishing her
daily tasks and her contribution to the evolution of Lebanon. She directs
concern at Christian companies that discriminate against veiled women, thus
limiting their work opportunities.
I belong to a generation that grew up in Lebanon during a time in
which Christians and Muslims did not feel the need to claim identity or
faith through religious symbols. Though Nura explains that the veil is only
a religious requirement, I believe that her veiling in this particular era and
particular regional context is in alignment with spatial requirements tran-
scending the Lebanese territorial reality. The National Pact that defined the
Lebanese entity on its independence day in 1948 does not mention religious
requirements but specifies in its preamble “the abolition of political confes-
sionalism shall be a basic national goal and shall be achieved according to a
gradual plan.” Before that, in Lebanon in the 1940s, associations of women
participated in demonstrations to face the military of the French mandate,
who had imprisoned the leaders of the Independence movement. These
women included Ibtihaj Kaddoura, Najla Saab, Hélène Rihan, Laure Tabet,
and Souraya Adra, who was the first president of the League for Women.
The League participated in the fight for independence, inspired by the belief
that creating an association of “atypical,” nonconfessional women would con-
tribute not only to the universal rights of women, but also to the protection
of the independence movement, which needed the help of all citizens, men
and women. It is thus in 1953, the League of Lebanese Women’s rights was
born.4 One could say that as in other Arab countries, veiling has appeared
in Lebanon among university students as a political, economical, and maybe
protective measure, and has persisted after the emergence of Hizbullah as a
religious and political party.

Woman in the Qur’an and Hadith: Ambivalence

The woman’s status remains ambiguous in Islam: she is a dangerous being
that must be dominated, but at the same time a desirable being that must
be respected; the image of the woman initially appears to be ambivalent.
122 ● Women in Lebanon

Furthermore, the Qur’an is always venerated, but in practice, customs will

not always bear relation to the sacred texts, and there will be as many statuses
and roles for women as there are social classes or groups in different historical
Muslim societies.
In the first place, a woman’s situation varies according to the social class to
which she belongs: certain middle-class Muslim women have as much liberty
as their fellow Christian Arab women and spend their time traveling through-
out the world, while women of modest conditions maintain a subordinated
status. Conflicting class interests underlay political and ideological divisions
such as between those eager to adopt Western ways versus those who want to
adopt Islamic or Islamist ways.
Images of women also contrast depending on whether they live in the
country or in the city. The rural woman, still uncultivated and rough,
plays an important role in a community where she is free to go where
she pleases, working in the fields, helping the men weed, plough, or har-
vest. Here, the women have a certain moral authority that Arab civilization
has never accorded them. On the contrary, the city dweller, the recently
urbanized woman, remains shut away and alienated: this is a consequence
of colonialism—Ottoman followed by European—during which men closed
their houses to forbid foreigners from penetrating the intimacy of the home.
This screen will more or less stop acculturation attempts in the world of
Muslim women.
To be a woman in the Middle East is quite different than in the West, and
the veil has come to symbolize a cultural otherness following the assump-
tions and “Orientalist” construct of the past. The fact is also complicated
because Arab culture is torn between religious tradition, modernization, and
now globalization.

Different Meanings of Hijab over Time: Semantic, Cultural,

and Historical Shift
The current debate of the veil is not a modern phenomenon. As mentioned
before, in order to understand the full concept, we have to consider this prac-
tice in its historical context. From a simple method of proper conduct in
its original context for the Prophet’s wives as well as a status symbol, the
hijab’s meaning has changed. Numerous scholars traced the evolving mean-
ing of the veil through its legal history. They argued that as Islam expanded
into new territories, the Islamic community needed a normative set of laws
to guide gender relations into the newly conquered countries. The empha-
sis was and remains on the utmost model of righteous behavior shown by
the Prophet and his family. Early theologians began debating the meaning
 Veiling and Divergent Feminist Voices ● 123

of the Qur’anic verses, interpreting them as to find the best meaning of the
word hijab as a garment that women ought to wear. In the eighth century, the
classic legal interpretation of the verses resulted in the ‘Abassid period in an
absolute and strict dress code for women. Later scholars debated the extent to
which women’s bodies should be covered, whether the hair, face, arms, hands,
and feet needed such extensive clothing. In the middle ages, Muslim women
were expected to respect the code of lawful dress.
Taking the history into account, it becomes clear that Islamic feminism
is deeply linked to an explicit discussion of the veil. All modernist feminist
writers are compelled to talk about the history of the veil. Fadwa Al-Guindi in
Veil: Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance, analyzing all related concepts in textual
and social contexts to the word hijab, contended that the commonly used
modesty-based code “modesty-shame-seclusion” represents an ethnocentric
imposition on Arab Islamic culture. With regard to an analysis of their con-
textual cultural meanings, the roots of the terms and concepts in the Arabic
language of hishma (h sh m) and sutra (s t r), and related variants tahashshud
(h sh d) and haya’ (h y y) more adequately define the cultural code of the veil
as “sanctity-reserve-respect.”5 The notion of haram represents a key concept
and the most important Arabic root in the Islamic vocabulary (h r m) mean-
ing something prohibited by divine authority. Among terms derived from this
root are the words harim, hurma, maharam. Therefore, haram becomes syn-
onymous with what is not prescribed and sacred. A continuum lies between
what is haram or forbidden and halal (permissible, lawful). Harim becomes
“the part of the home in which women are both privileged and protected
from encounters with non maharam men.” Hurma, best translated to sanc-
tity, in Arab Islamic culture means a respectable woman or wife as the center
of the home and its sanctity. Men and women guard and respect this sanctity.6
To corroborate this idea of “privacy,” men in traditional circles until now will
mumble ya sittar, “O Protector of Privacy,” an attribute of God, to announce
their entry into their own homes, but especially those in which they are
guests.
Barbara Stowasser in Women in the Qur’an, Traditions, and Interpreta-
tion maintains that modern interpretations of Islam accord dignity, honor,
and rights, both spiritual and material, to women in Islam in contrast with
the women’s status in the Arabian Jahilliyya, and also in contrast with past
and present societies, especially the West. Modernists in Islam focus their
criticism on the premodern legal inequalities and the ongoing exploitation
of the Western women in the workplace and as a sexual object, particularly
in the entertainment and advertising industries. Women’s rights in Islam ver-
ify the collective dignity of all Muslims, indeed of the entire Islamic system
that the West and Orientalists had set out to defame.7 What is new is their
124 ● Women in Lebanon

attempt to explore the relationship of “Muhammad the man” to “Muhammad

the Prophet” in doctrinal and psychological terms. They acknowledge that the
Prophet’s wives’ status was elevated to a level of prestige above other females
and as a model for emulation. They saw the wives’ behavior as criteria of
what was “lawful or forbidden” for Muslim women. The criteria were codi-
fied in the writing of early Islamic jurisprudence. In the hadith, the Prophet’s
wives are portrayed both as exemplars of their sex with regard to righteousness
and virtue and as embodiments of female emotionalism, irrationality, greed,
and rebelliousness. This provided both a paradigm for the limits that needed
to be placed on women’s roles in religion and society and a justification
for them.
Therefore, the Qur’anic revelations of restriction directed at the Prophet’s
wives became applicable to all Muslim women, while the human frailties of
Muhammad’s wives were symbolic for all that was wrong with the female sex.
They declared that the Prophet’s actions were tacitly inspired, beyond human
questioning, a source of the divine will, complementary to the Qur’an, and
therefore an infallible “source,” or “root,” of the law. This adoption of the
Prophet as the authority of the law allowed the portrayal of the Prophet’s
wives to be extended to all Muslim women. The Qur’anic revelation estab-
lished the elite status of the Prophet’s wives and became a reality during
their lifetimes. It became a legal paradigm when Muslim scholarly consen-
sus created the Prophet’s consorts as models for emulation (sources of sunna).
During the eighth and ninth centuries, during the time of Islamic conquest,
indigenous patriarchal structures strengthened as an urban middle class of
Muslims emerged. Therefore, virtues exalted from the Mother of the Believ-
ers sanctified the memory of outstanding women and a cultural model for
Muslim female morality formulated by the medieval urbanized and accultur-
ated Islamic scholars. Major components of this paradigm include segregation
and quiet domesticity, modest comportment, seen as invisibility through veil-
ing, ascetic frugality, and devout obedience to God and His Prophet, as well
as wifely obedience.8
Given the importance of the exegetic significance, only a few verses in the
Qur’an address the notion of the veiling of women in public and women’s
seclusion in the home. In verse (33:59) the issue of veiling is addressed, “O
Prophet, tell your wives, your daughters and women believe to wrap their
outer garments closely around them, for this makes it more likely they will
be recognized and not be harassed. God is All-Forgiving, Compassionate to
each.”9 This time, the Qur’an elucidates that the Prophet’s wives should cover
themselves with their cloaks while in public so as not to be mistaken for slaves
and to be potentially harassed in the streets. Thus, veiling offers an indicator
of status and a degree of protection for women.
 Veiling and Divergent Feminist Voices ● 125

Another Qur’anic verse that address the issue of veiling is verse 33:53:
“O believers, do not enter the chambers of the Prophet for a meal unless
given leave, and do not wait around for it to be well cooked. Rather, if invited
enter, and when fed disperse, not lingering for conversation. This behavior
irritates the Prophet, who is embarrassed to tell you, but God is not embar-
rassed by the truth. In addition, if you ask his wives for a favor, do so from
behind the screen; this is more chaste for both your hearts and theirs. You
must not offend the Prophet, nor must you ever marry his wives after him,
for such would be a mighty sin in the sight of God. Whether you reveal a
thing or whether you conceal it, God has perfect knowledge of all things.”10
It is clear that the Qur’an states these directions to avoid speaking to the
Prophet’s wives directly, but rather indicates that it is more proper to speak to
them behind the screen meaning “hijab.” In this context, the hijab is a fixture
within the home providing privacy for the wives. In this sense, seclusion was
a privilege, reflecting the special status of Muhammad’s wives.
Moreover, Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan feminist sociologist, refutes the
old conservative focus on women’s segregation, which is a manipulation of the
sacred text resulting in the institutionalization of male authoritarianism. Her
own understanding of verse 33:53 is that the seclusion of the Prophet’s wives
from public life is a symbol of Islam’s retreat from the early principle of gender
equality, as is the “mantel” (hijab) verse 33:59, which abandons the belief of
social responsibility, and the individual sovereign will of men’s uncontrollable
desires. Specifying Asbab a-nuzul (cause of the revelation) given by al-Tabari,
collector of hadith or the Prophet’s traditions, of the verse 33:53, the hijab,
meaning curtain, was descended to place a barrier between two men, the
Prophet and Anas, and not between a man and a woman.11 Right after the
Prophet’s wedding with Zaynab, the Prophet socialized with all of their guests,
but a small group of tactless guests overstayed their welcome and the Prophet
was impatient to be alone with his new bride. “The Prophet had wed Zaynab
Bint Jahsh. It was my responsibility to invite people to the wedding supper.
I carried out this charge. Many people came. They arrived in groups, one after
the other. They ate and then they departed . . . Zaynab was seated in a corner
of the room. She was a woman of great beauty. All the guests departed except
for three who seemed oblivious of their surroundings . . . He came back to the
nuptial chamber. He put one foot in the room and kept the other outside.
It was in this position that he felt a stir [curtain] between himself and Anas,
and the verse of hijab descended at that moment.”12
Mernissi commenting on this version of the classical al-Tabari hadith says
that the two concepts merged—hijab and sitr. However, this lacks authen-
ticity. Discrediting this particular textual item as inauthentic, arguing that
the Prophet had the reputation of a hakim (wise man), a calm arbiter in
126 ● Women in Lebanon

cases of conflict, “How can we explain such a minor irritation so rapidly

precipitated a draconian decision like that of the hijab, which split Muslim
space in two?13 How far are we from Muhammad’s early vision of gender
egalitarianism?”

Dialectical Engagement with God: Authoritarianism and Intended

Ambiguity in the Authoritative Texts of the Qur’an
Taking on the authoritarian issue, El-Fadl discusses the important question of
the motivation behind the laws pertaining to and even “demeaning” women.
There is an absence of a central authoritative entity in Islam, like the Church
in Catholicism or a high authority figure like the Pope to convey God’s will
and to govern the legal structure of the vast religion. God has not revealed
Himself and His nature, but rather his law, the shari’a. The roots of Islamic
law are the Qur’an, a primary source with 6,000 verses perceived as a divine
command. The second root is sunna, or the Prophet’s customs as recorded in
the hadith literature, collected and complied over several generations, and as
some hadiths contradict others, ijma’ or consensus of legal scholars and the
community, is the third root of the law. Consensus involves the Islamic Umma
settling upon certain issues of jurisprudence through discourse and construc-
tive argument. This concept is the cornerstone of the existence of the ‘ulama,
upholders of God’s law. The disagreement on ijma’ led to qiyas as fourth root
of jurisprudence, qiyas being a “syllogistic reasoning” and application of logic
to a situation not explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an and hadith. The final
recourse of Islamic Law and knowledge is “ijtihad,” or the effort of legal rea-
soning by analogy and syllogism reasoning to understand the law revealed by
God through the Prophet. When the four sources do not address a particular
issue, one is to use his or her knowledge of the faith to try to reach a solu-
tion that in his mind or her would be acceptable in light of the religion as a
whole. Therefore, Muslims as scholars or as individuals interpret the teach-
ings of the Qur’an and hadith using common sense and their knowledge of
the values that Islam seeks to instill in its followers. The ultimate goal of the
law is justice ‘adl and qist equity as normative values.
While Shari’a is immutable, the understanding and implementation of
fiqh is changeable and evolving and thus remains open to interpretations by
all. Qur’an and hadith remain firm enough to leave no doubt as to what
is forbidden and what is explicitly allowed. Islam holds people individually
responsible for their own actions. Islamic law remains “vague” enough for fol-
lowers to interpret its doctrines in many ways, allowing it to be the timeless
manifestation of the will of God, and subject to a variety of interpretations in
 Veiling and Divergent Feminist Voices ● 127

accordance with time and place. This allows for a constantly evolving set of
laws and guidance that is thoroughly adaptable to both location and period.
The process of ijtihad involves a dialectal engagement with God since God
speaks to human beings and human beings engage in God’s speech through
interpretation. This dialogue engages an abstract interpretation as well as
action. The ambiguity exists because the Qur’an was intended to guide the
whole world at all times.
However, Khaled El-Fadl questions the concept of authority as imple-
mented in certain periods of Islamic history and argues that the authoritarian
interpretive process has transformed assumptions into final and unchange-
able truths and that Muslims have not struggled much with the ambigu-
ity involved in the dialectical process. The purpose of ambiguity in the
authoritative texts of Islam is of pivotal importance and it is part of the
intended meaning. Ambiguity is purposeful in the processes and dynamics
of Islamic law.
Though one hadith explicitly states, “my community will never agree upon
an error,” this inherent ambiguity opened up space for disagreement and dis-
course within the Islamic community. The disagreement and ijma’ led to
the founding of four Sunni schools of jurisprudence and other Shi’i schools
of jurisprudence within Islam, all named after their respective founders.
Al-Hanafi (699–767) was an Iraqi scholar of Persian extraction and his school
of jurisprudence is the most influential for being the official school of the
‘Abbasid caliphs and the Ottoman sultans. Maliki, (713–795) was an Arab
scholar of Yemeni descent and his school is dominant in Hijaz, Gulf, Sudan,
Andalusia, and North Africa. Al-Shafi’i (767–820) devoted his career to stan-
dardizing the laws using Qur’an, hadith, and analogy. Hanbali (780–855), an
uncompromising hadith collector and traditionalist, avoided ijma’ and used
reasoning by analogy only when Qur’an, hadits, and the legal ruling of his
companions had been exhausted; this is the strictest school of law in Saudi
Arabia. Ja’fari is the Shi’i school of legal codes named after the sixth Imam
Ja’far who used hadiths of Ali and Imams. There are other Shi’i schools such
as Isma’ili and Zaydi. Theoretically, all these schools work to provide a more
religiously egalitarian society, but El-Fadl critiques the religious authoritarian
hermeneutic in Islam, particularly the one that has spread widely after 1975
because the “hermeneutic methodology is highly subjective.”
Scholars who took pride in the ethos of diversity and egalitarianism of
Islam established themselves as orthodoxy in Islam, claiming the need for
unity, tawhid within the system. They resisted change, specifically on issues
and laws regarding women’s duties and rights, closing the door to any ijtihad
and subjecting them to an absolute authority. In the same vein, there were
128 ● Women in Lebanon

cases “apostles” or “unbelievers” being banished if they were to disagree on

that which the rigorist ‘ulama decreed. Indeed, misguided fundamentalism
sidelined the practicality presented by the Qur’an, and gradually the process
was abandoned by the practice of “taqlid,” the blind adherence to the deci-
sions of a religious authority without necessarily examining the scriptural
basis or reasoning of that decision. Increasingly, a rigid system based on
archaic laws and customs supplanted the evolving structure of Islamic law.
Therein lay the reason for the clash of Islam and modernity as time has
progressed according to El-Fadl’s views. This shift in Islamic jurisprudential
paradigm is apparent today in many parts of the Islamic world, where the
laws of the Shari’a, misinterpreted and abused, exist in a manner completely
unsuitable to present times.
This problem of resisting any change only worsened as the fear of Western
influences grew. Anything different from their ideas was stigmatized as being
tainted by Western influence. In the facade of egalitarianism, Muslim jurists
gained a level of authority to set directives in stone under the facade of
egalitarianism.
Authority is being implemented using two techniques that the author
mentions: coercive authority and persuasive authority. Coercive authority
allows a jurist to direct the conduct of a person by using threats, so that
a reasonable person is compelled to follow. Persuasive authority allows the
jurist the ability to guide the beliefs or conduct of a person through trust and
explanation. In general, Muslims rely on jurists’ supposed expertise to shape
their views and understandings. El-Fadl prefers persuasive authority because
an absolute authoritativeness involves an unqualified surrender of judgment
to someone’s perceived expertise. Persuasive arguments place authority on the
jurist, but do not necessarily involve a complete surrender of one’s judgment.
Because human agency is unavoidable to understand Islamic scriptures, the
negotiating process will inevitably be an intricate balance between coercion
and persuasion.
The use of coercive authority has seen a significant rise through the past
years, as many radical jurists—Normativist fundamentalist—have taken to
apply force and coercion through threats and warnings of doom and failure
to seek out their own agenda vis-à-vis radical Islamist terrorism.

Individual Responsibility and Accountability

Islam means complete surrender to God unless shirk14 is involved. Unlike
Christianity, there is no higher agent that exists between God and men who
could absolve one’s sins; all Muslims are accountable for their judgments
and actions. The process of accepting authenticity engages every Muslim to
 Veiling and Divergent Feminist Voices ● 129

investigate diligently which of the jurists or jurisprudential schools to accept.

Engaging in the search of the straight path is a sign of his total submission
to Islam. The qualifications of the jurists is of utmost importance and the
author suggests five “contingencies” to the authoritativeness of the special
agents/jurists before trusting their advice: honesty, diligence, comprehensive-
ness, reasonableness, and self-restraint. “And God knows best” represents
these contingencies well, and a Qur’anic verse reminds them “for you are
nothing but a reminder, you do not control them.” Therefore, if a person has
doubt about a particular piece of advice given to him by a jurist, he should
ask for scriptural evidence and reasoning supporting the ruling. A Muslim
can also reject a ruling if another jurist offers contrary evidence; no jurist has
a monopoly over the truth.

Clashes with Modernity

All modern feminist scholars are obligated to discuss at least one aspect of
women’s laws and its consequences on society. El-Fadl discusses the impor-
tant question of motivation behind the laws pertaining to women. In a
chapter entitled “Faith-Based Assumptions and Determinations Demeaning
to Women,” by means of a critical analysis of the authoritarian interpretative
method, El-Fadl cites the Council for Scientific Research and Legal Opinions
(CRLO), which was established in Saudi Arabia as the official institution
entrusted with issuing Islamic legal opinions. Jurists represent all parts of the
Islamic world. The Saudi government often adopts the legal opinion of the
Council as the law of the land. He discusses traditions cited by the CRLO for-
bidding the mixing of the sexes, employment outside the home, prescription
of the veiling of women, and other determinations stating that the spiritual
status of a woman depends on the extent of her obedience to her husband.
Since textual evidence, relating to nature, role, and fate of women is often
conflicting and complex, El-Fadl believes the classical jurists followed legal
determinations without understanding them.
Jurists cite the Qur’anic verse Nisa’ 4:34: “Men are the maintainers
qawwamun of women.” The Arabic word qawwamun could mean “protec-
tors,” “maintainers,” “guardians,” or “servants” . . . that same word is used in
the Qur’an in one other context, and this is when Muslims are commanded
to be the qawwamun of justice. The word qawwamun is ambiguous and has
different meanings under different contexts. Those adhering to the CRLO’s
ideals take it to mean that the husband has the right to command and dis-
cipline his wife. One could argue what if the woman is providing financial
support; will she become the guardian? What if both of them provide finan-
cial revenue, will they become each other’s guardian? El-Fadl goes on stating
130 ● Women in Lebanon

that nowhere in the Qur’an is the word obedience, ta’ah, used to characterize
a marital relationship. On the contrary, marriage is characterized as a rela-
tionship of companionship and compassion mawwadah wa rahmam, not a
relationship between superior and inferior. The primary role of obedience
does not come from the Qur’an but from a hadith attributed to the Prophet
who reportedly said, “It is not lawful for anyone to prostrate to anyone. But
if I would have ordered any person to prostrate to another, I would have
commanded wives to prostrate to their husbands because of the enormity of
the rights of husbands over their wives.”15 Different transmitters narrate this
tradition in different forms.
Other versions include “By God, a woman cannot fulfill her obligations
to God until she fulfills her obligations to her husband and if he asks for
her [to have sex] while she is on a camel’s back, she cannot deny him.”16
Regardless of what the metaphors mean, “the clear implication is that a wife
owes her husband, by virtue of him being a husband, a heavy debt. In these
traditions, the wife is a husband’s humble servant.”17 These determinations
contribute to the vilification of the moral status of women. “The scholars of
hadith did not demand a higher standard of authenticity for a tradition that
could have sweeping theological and social consequences.”18 Similarly, Ibn
Khaldun quoted, “They did not engage in historical evaluation of traditions
or examine their logical coherence or social impact.”19 These traditions lead
to wakhdh al-damir, the unsettling or disturbing of the conscience; the least
a Muslim could do is to pause to reflect about the place and implications of
these traditions.
Qur’anic discourse did not play a primary role in the determination of the
status of women, but the traditions attributed to the Prophet did. These tradi-
tions are inconsistent with the Qur’anic discourse on marriage. The Qur’an
states in verse 30:21: “From God’s sign is that God creates mates for you
among yourselves so that you may find repose and tranquility with them, and
God has created love and compassion between you.” The Qur’anic verse 2:18
also describes spouses as garments for each other.20
The CRLO interpretation of the following hadith contradicts love and
compassion and the description of spouses as garments for each other as pre-
scribed in the previous verses 30:21 and 2:18 regarding marriage and spouse’s
relations. Versions of prostration and submission and traditions go back to
the controversial figure of Abu Hurayrah who transmitted more hadith than
companions in early Islamic history did, and Muslim scholars admit that his
transmissions contradicted those of companions that are more notable. “The
passage of a woman, donkey, and black dog in front of a man, invalidates
his prayer.”21 The CRLO cites this to prevent women from praying in the
 Veiling and Divergent Feminist Voices ● 131

mosques. While maintaining Islam, which the CRLO represent, this hadith
serves to honor and protect women. Another hadith, “A woman is like a rib.
If you try to straighten her, you will break her. If you accept her the way she
is, you’ll enjoy her, but she’ll remain crooked.”22 The CRLO cites this to rule
that women require understanding and caretaking by men.
Further, hadiths say, “Women are the majority of inhabitants of Hell
because they curse and they slander and are ungrateful to their companions
and are deficient in religion and intellect. The testimony of a man is worth the
testimony of two women.”23 The CRLO insists that there is nothing demean-
ing in this because it is just dealing with the natural inability of women to be
equal to men. It uses the justification that women comprise the majority in
Hell to prevent them from entering mosques and their emotional immaturity
to prevent them from working, traveling alone, driving, or even attending
mosques.
These traditions make the religious salvation of a woman solely contin-
gent on her husband’s pleasure. El-Fadl insists that these traditions require a
conscientious pause, a conflict between the foundational principles used by
the Qur’an and the traditions of subservience and obedience. The Qur’an
talks of love, compassion, friendship, and virtuous women who are obe-
dient to God—not to husbands. Classical and modern jurists argue that
if there is a conflict between the sources, one must reconcile them—not
use one source to trump the other. This is a well-established principle in
Islamic jurisprudence. According to this logic, the CRLO reasoning requires
the establishment of friendship and companionship, but through obedience.
Nevertheless, one should ask the following methodological question: should
traditions of divergent versions (ahadih), or of singular transmissions, which
do not reach the highest level of authenticity, of suspect theological and pro-
found social implications, be allowed to conflict with the Qur’an in the first
place?
El-Fadl proposes that Islamic law must adopt a rationale of proportional-
ity, which would require that only those traditions of the highest degree of
authenticity be recognizable as a foundation in matters of crucial religious or
social implications. One should take the stand of a faith-based objector and
refuse to accept the precedent of traditions. On the basis of rational thought,
the sections of the hadith that demean women must be carefully scrutinized
because of the stubborn institutionalized patriarchy that is likely to play a
predominant role in the authoritarian enterprise that was the origin for many
traditions.24
After these Sunni topical discourses, we will now turn to the new tafsir
of Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. Ayatollah Khomeini designated
132 ● Women in Lebanon

him as the marja’ al-taqlid, source of tradition in 1978; he addressed the

issues of women through his Shi’i doctrinal ijtihad and the political local and
regional reality. His pioneering stand on woman made him a modernizer of
Islam. He provided authoritative advice and fatwas for questions addressed
but not answered by the Qur’an or tradition. The modernity he advocated
is embedded in the principles of Islam, which challenges the universality
of the conceptual theories to Western modernity, and by the same token,
demonstrates that progress could take a different path.
 CHAPTER 8

Personal Status Laws in Islam: Sheikh

Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah’s
New Tafsir (Exegesis)

S
heikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah was born in Najaf, Iraq, to a
prominent religious family descendant of Imam Hassan. In Najaf, he
associated with Shi’i clerics, and particularly with Baqir al-Sadr who was
politically active turning the Shi’i University at Najaf into a center of political
and religious opposition to the Iraqi regime. In 1966, following the repres-
sion of Iran’s ‘ulama by the Iraqi secular regime, he left Najaf to establish
himself in Beirut. He focused on creating a sense of Shi’i communal iden-
tity, and formed an alliance of mutual need with Iran’s emissaries to Lebanon
who provided him with financial support and revolutionary symbols to bring
in the Revolution to Lebanon. He began a successful career as a preacher,
teacher, writer, and social worker, and placed himself in the experience of
the have-nots that later defined his philosophy. He founded the “Brother-
hood,” an Islamic club for the poor residents of Nab’ah, a Beirut suburb,
and promoted grassroots leadership through vigorous education, counseling,
and outspoken sermons calling for an Islamic government to solve Lebanon’s
social and economic problems as well as helping Palestinians in their struggle
against Israel.
While using Western techniques and persuasive arguments in his criticism
of the West, he vividly criticized Western involvement in Lebanon. His mas-
tery of the Arabic language enabled him to communicate Islamic theology in
a simple, clear and concise, and, at times, fundamental way, using prose as
well as poetry. For example, harking on the Marxist framework, he employed
the rhetoric of the oppressed against the oppressor—in his example, the
oppressor was the United States and the oppressed third world countries.
His call resonated well with the community. He saw oppression as a “process
134 ● Women in Lebanon

of dehumanization,”1 negating the freedom that the Qur’an prescribes. He

not only called on the ‘ulama to join the revolution under God against the
tyrannical forces of the world,2 but also called all Arabs and Islamic peoples
and, consequently, the Lebanese nation as a whole to join the revolution.3
In 1972, following the death of Imam Musa el-Sadr,4 the Iranian Ayatollah
Kho’i appointed him as his wakil (deputy) in Lebanon. He founded a large
mabarrat, or charitable institution, in Beirut comprising an orphanage, a
mosque, a women’s cultural center, a school, and a library and devoted
his energy to expanding on the revolutionary ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini.
In return, Ayatollah Khomeini named him the marji’ al-taqlid (source of
tradition, imitation) and he was appointed vice president of the Central
Council of the International Hizbullah in Tehran. Similarly, he grew in polit-
ical significance in Lebanon, becoming President of the Lebanese Council of
Hizbullah, which consisted of the Iranian ambassador, the Lebanese ‘ulama,
and security strongmen responsible for clandestine operations.5
Fadlallah became the spiritual al-murshid al-ruhi, an infallible guide and
the most subtle promoter of the Shi’i cause in Lebanon since the 1980s.
He declared that his allegiances transcended Lebanon to embrace a univer-
sal Islam, and openly declared the indebtedness of the Lebanese Shi’i to the
Iranian Revolution for awakening their Islamic consciousness. He adhered to
the usuli (fundamentalist) tradition of modern Shi’i; a usuli gives authoritative
opinions and advice to individuals facing problems in modern circumstances.
In his ijtihad to reconcile scriptures with modern times, he declared the role
of women in Islam as not static, and laws regarding women were subject
to change. He formulated the Islamic concepts for the new generation of
Shi’i, who in turn, are now carrying Islam far from the blind tradition or
adherence to historical misinterpretation. Interpretation is not absolute, but
open to reinterpretation in the light of current advances in knowledge and
technology.
In Dunya el-Mar’a, Fadlallah referring to verse Nisa’ verse 4:1 states that
men and women share the same soul: “O mankind, fear your Lord Who
created you from a single soul, and created from it its spouse, and prop-
agated from both many men and women. Fear God in Whose name you
make requests one of another, and sever not the ties of kinship. God watches
well over you.”6 Stressing the egalitarian spirit of Islam, women and men,
he argues, share the same soul and benefit from an absolute moral and spir-
itual equality. Weakness is inherent to both men and women as expressed
in Nisa’ verse 4:28. “God is all-Knowing, All-Wise. So also God wishes to
pardon you but those who pursue their passions with you to veer utterly
from your path. Yet God wishes to lighten your burden, for humans were
created feeble.”7 Furthermore, Islamic history departed from this Qur’anic
 Personal Status Laws in Islam ● 135

teaching, but the Caliphate system transformed it into a monarchical one

in order to build ties with non-Islamic neighbors, social habits picked up
from Islamic expansion. The isolation of imams from Islamic life “resulted
in chaotic Islamic society and this led to a progressive suppression of women
into a secondary backward state through unjust, backward laws.”8 The fol-
lowing Islamic movements (referring to the Sunni Caliphate) marginalized
women ordaining them with an inferior status.
What are his thoughts about veiling? It is necessary to regulate relations
between men and women and the hijab is one of the most important indi-
vidual identity protectors. Islam limits individual liberty because excessive
freedom engenders chaos, and this reflects negatively on society. The veil
helps women to control their instincts of seduction, which exercises a seduc-
tive influence on men. In addition, Islam prescribes hijab as a religious duty.
This conservative Islamic response, calling women to cover their face and
arms in accordance with the wives of the Prophet Muhammad and high-
lighted in the Qur’anic Nour verse 24:31, is similarly given in the writings of
Abu al-A’la Mawdudi.9 He insists on a more strict seclusion of women stat-
ing, “Though the veil has not been specified in the Qur’an, it is Qur’anic in
spirit,”10 thus binding the veil to all Muslim women.
In accordance with verse 24:31, the veil or the hijab once was simply a
command of Qur’an, always required for the Muslim woman:

Tell believing women to avert their eyes, and safeguard their private parts, and
not to expose their attractions except what is visible. And let them wrap their
shawls around their breast lines, and reveal their attractions only before their
husbands or fathers, or fathers-in-law, or sons, or sons of their husbands, or
brothers, or sons of brothers, of sons of sisters, or their womenfolk, or slaves, or
male attendants with no sexual desire, or children with no intimate knowledge
of the private parts of women. And let them not stamp their feet to reveal what
they hide of their ornaments.
Believers all! Repent before God that you might succeed.11

This text does not explicitly direct women to wear the veil, the verse permits
a woman to unveil before certain relations, having certain parts of her body
unveiled, but without specification. It could be a call for modesty that men
and women both observed. Nevertheless, a veiled woman would say nothing
about whether she felt liberated or not during that time—it was a tradition
carried out from the Prophet Mohamed’s time and expressed only the socioe-
conomic status of women. In these modern times, strict laws about women’s
dress often indicate the religious orientation of a particular government, such
as Iran and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Turkey forbids women to wear
136 ● Women in Lebanon

the veil in public spaces. Since Ataturk abolished the khalifa in 1926, he
moved the Turkish state as well as Turkish women to a more secular iden-
tity. Some citizens seem to be dissatisfied with the law and consider veiling a
personal choice.
For Fadlallah, the wearing of the veil is not the reason behind the
backwardness of the Arab Islamic reality. Backwardness is linked to the
scientific stagnation and to the political situations imposed upon Muslims
through wars, conflicts and regimes unsupportive of people’s freedom. Sim-
ilarly, no link exists between terrorism and veiling, and words such as
backwardness; the West exploits fundamentalist and terrorists in order to
rouse the international opinion against Muslims and activists.12
For Fadlallah, hijab is a religious requirement regulating gender relations
to preempt improper influences. Hijab derives from modesty, calling women
to hide their femininity, which exerts a seductive and even subversive pres-
sure on men. He calls men to look at women as human beings and not as
women. Hijab constitutes a means to stop potential avenues leading to inhi-
raf, deviation from halal. Veiling had almost disappeared, except in rural areas
or in very conservative families in Lebanon. As a conservative religious leader,
he contributes to the Islamicization of modernity, reinterpreting Islam to be
compatible with modern times while infusing Islamic values to modernity.
Indeed, new opportunities for women, as well as financial necessities, have
pressed them to work outside their home. Becoming part of the workforce,
such a restriction might be protective for women, and those wearing the veil
might feel more comfortable while surrounded by strangers, particularly in
the city. Women need to face modernity in light of the values of their own reli-
gion. Muslim feminists do not assert an individualistic conception of rights,
but argue for respect and legal protection within their religious tradition. Per-
haps the return to the veil is a means to reaffirm their identities in the era of
globalization.
In his book, Ta’amullat Islamiyya Hawla al-Mar’a, rather than asserting an
individualistic conception of freedom and rights emanating from a materi-
alistic philosophy, he condemns an absolute freedom in personal lives and
advocates a responsible form of freedom. He applies to the unity of nature,
term used in Muslim theology to refer to the unity of God, tawhid. Men
and women are both God’s creation and share the same soul.13 Men and
women are both equal human beings and their behavior cannot be left to
their own devices; both genders require guidance. He acknowledges a vision
of regulations in alignment with this unity. Because of the nature of men and
women’s relation to the universe as living organisms as well as their interac-
tions with other members of society, they are active members, influencing
and influenced by the course of events, and they cannot separate themselves
 Personal Status Laws in Islam ● 137

from the lively existence, and each of their movements are part of the cos-
mic organization. As a servant of God, the creator of the universe, they must
obey orders without viewing them as contrary to individual or social interests.
God’s regulations bring harmony and morality that encompasses all aspects
of life, and this is the key in bringing about balance and happiness in life
and the hereafter. Just as a body is best fitted when all its parts function in
perfect harmony, a society functions best when all its parts work together for
the good of the whole. This vision frees men as well as women from the grip
of corruption.14
In this respect, Islam places legitimate moral constraints on sexual rela-
tions between men and women. Islam considers marriage as the “natural
respiration” to human’s instincts and forbids all other form of sexual relations.
Therefore, the mixing of the sexes must be regulated. Fadlallah, as modernizer
taking into account the necessities of modern times, argues that not all mix-
ing of sexes is forbidden; only mixing of sexes that lead to inhiraf, or deviation
and deprivation is forbidden. “Whenever a man and a woman meet, the devil
is their companion.” Unchaperoned meetings between men and women are
not permitted because they potentially lead to sexual relations. Depending on
the nature of the relations, interaction between genders should not be free and
casual. Family honor is the highest moral value and Islam clearly establishes
patterns of behavior: halal (lawful) versus haram (forbidden). Extramarital
and premarital sex is forbidden because it subverts marriage. Islam clearly
defines patterns of behavior to protect women and to avoid situations that
may give rise to haram. Men and women need to avoid being alone. The
wearing of the veil hijab is one of his commendations.
The “verse of choice,” argues Barbara Stowasser, Nur 33:28–29,15 is
addressed to the wives of the Prophet: “O Prophet, tell your wives: If you
desire this present life and its adornments, come let me provide for you and
part with you amicably. But if you choose God and His Prophet and the
Abode of the Hereafter, God has made ready for the righteous among you a
most glorious reward.” Verse 33:32 continues, “O wives of the Prophet, you
are not like other women if you are pious. So do not speak enticingly lest he
who has sickness in his heart lusts after you, but be chaste in your speech,”
immediately followed by verse 33:33 in which the expression “O wives of the
Prophet” does not appear. The form of address is plural and encompasses all
women. “Remain in your homes, and do not display your adornments, as
was the case with the earlier Age of Barbarism . . . God wishes only to drive
away pollution from you, members of the household (ahl al-bayt), and to
purify you, purify you completely.” God will provide double reward for the
righteous or double punishment in case of immoral indecency.16 These verses
played an important role in Islamic legal thought and because of the context,
138 ● Women in Lebanon

Qur’anic exegesis has traditionally understood these verses as addressing the

wives of the Prophet. Today, Normativist Islamists reinterpret the verses as
addressing all Muslim women.
Therefore, the Prophet’s wives are commanded to stay home and avoid
tabarruj, displaying of their adornments. Barbara Stowasser examined the
definition of the word tabarruj and its changing meanings over the ages.
The classical exegesis explains tabarruj as strutting, flirting or coquettishness,
embellishment, the flaunting of bodily charms . . . as it was practiced before
Abraham’s prophethood, when women wore open shirts and revealing gar-
ments. It is also interpreted as a head veil untied allowing glimpses of the
neck ears and earrings, but in general, tabarruj meant the public display of
women wearing revealing garments to show off their physical features, orna-
ments, make-up . . . Today tabarruj means a revealing of any sort such as any
hairstyle, makeup, color for the eyes, manicure. Any Western clothes or cloth
fashioned the western style has come to be considered as a threat to Islamic
society. Thus, “applied to all women, taburruj has come to signify the very
antithesis of hijab in the latter’s extended meaning of a concealing garment
worn outside the house.”17
Fadlallah’s interpretation of the Arabic word tabarruj did not include orna-
ments such as bracelets or necklaces; it specifically means not revealing parts
of the body. He advocates moderation to avoid any provocation by adding
tabarruj, because men’s instincts are prone to inflammation by women’s fem-
ininity. Halal is moderation and haram is to negatively sway one’s instincts.
He even considers plastic surgery to improve a deformed part of the body
permissible. He allows moderate activity by women outside the house, and
he suggested a mental veil hijab dhihni for both women and men to avoid
sexual thoughts or lewd dreams. He even forbids women to walk behind the
coffin in a funeral because of her emotions.
Clearly, Sheikh Fadlallah’s tafsir of the preceding verses transcended the
quoted traditions of seclusion and domesticity defined as core of female social
righteousness, which also signified their exclusion from any institutional-
ized participation in public affairs. On the contrary, the increasing role of
Hizbullah’s women has become a well-acknowledged issue.
Sheikh Fadlallah passed away in May 2010. The religious school of Najaf
decreed a national mourning for three days, and the school of Qom expressed
its profound sorrow. Moreover, the media revealed him as a man of dialogue
and modernity as well as an avant-garde spirit preaching Modern Islam. Mes-
sages of condolences poured; the head of the parliament, Nabih Berri, paid
homage to his wisdom and open mind, a loss for the Islamic/Arab world and
humanity. Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hizbullah, eulogized him as
a father, a guide full of wisdom, and a rampart at all stages in the struggle
 Personal Status Laws in Islam ● 139

against oppression and against occupation. The Sunni Mufti Mohammad

Kabbani saluted the fakih as the upholder of universal values in favor of peace
and dialogue. The Druze Sheikh Akl deplored the disappearance of a symbol
of an enlightened Islam, and a great authority in religion that defended dia-
log and coexistence. Above all, the media addressed him as the champion of
women’s rights in Muslim society.

Family Law in Islam

The ways in which legislators and governments have interpreted the Prophet’s
message and which revelations they emphasize has been historically and still
is disputed, particularly with regard to personal status or family laws. Two
voices in Islam related to gender find themselves at odds; the Orthodox and
Islamist Islam applies literal Qur’anic translation to legislation, while Liberal
Islam advocates a consideration of the social context of the revelations and an
adaptation of these messages to adjust to contemporary realities.
Family laws governing marriage, divorce, polygamy, and inheritance are
the cornerstones of the system of male privilege and these laws, established in
the first three or four centuries of Islam, have remained profoundly resistant
to change and continue to govern gender relations.18 We will now read these
interpretations of the Qur’anic messages in dialogue with Sheikh Hussein
Fadlallah’s views and other liberal contemporary feminists.

Marriage
In rural areas of Lebanon, the Muslim family has remained even more tra-
ditionalist than the Christian family. The authority of the husband and the
father is more tyrannical, the conception of the family more patriarchal, more
endocentric.

The Qur’an attributes the institution of marriage to God Himself: verse 30: 21.
Among His wonders is that He created for you, from among yourselves, spouses
with whom to find comfort, and instilled between you love and mercy. In these
are signs for a people who ponder and reflect.19

However, love is not what brings about the majority of marriages. The hus-
band is in some cases only a substitute, so to speak, for the groom is not
always the man that the forced bride truly desires. This dissociation is not
an accident—it is implied by the conception of the institution itself. The
economic and sexual union of a man and a woman is a matter of transcend-
ing to the level of collective interest, not of assuring individual happiness.
140 ● Women in Lebanon

In these patriarchal systems, marriages in which engaged couples, chosen by

the authority of their parents, do not get to know each other well until their
wedding day still occur today. Marriage is a question of founding the venture
of a life, considered in its social aspect, not just a sentimental whim.
Sheikh Fadlallah recognizes human emotions and does not ask people to
suppress them, but rather, to nurture them in a way approved by God. He
depicts four categories of Love. Platonic love, based on mutual respect, is
in response to the attributes of one’s partner. Physical love in response to
physical attraction is instinctual and leads to sexual craving, and is therefore
forbidden. Spiritual or emotional love is in response to the love of parents,
children, family, and friends that stimulates a need to care and protect; and
finally, sublimated love that leads to adoration of the loved one is not per-
mitted. Love, which emanates from the brain, must be controlled in order
to lead to marriage and family life. While engaged, a couple may have vis-
its, although a chaperone must supervise. However, the prospective husband
has the right to examine his fiancée’s hair, neck, arms, and legs only, not the
entire body, to make sure she is not deformed. In case of prolonged engage-
ment, the couple may undertake mut’a or temporary marriage. Mut’a is legal
and entails a dowry mahr, a waiting period ‘idda of three months for the wife
before she can remarry to determine parenthood in case of pregnancy, and full
inheritance rights for children born from this temporary union. However,
the nature of this limited contract does not include any financial provision
or inheritance rights for the women, and women have the right to refuse it.
Providentially, this type of marriage is declining.
The institution of marriage seeks to protect men and women from sinful
relations and to endorse the formation of families. Marriage requires maturity
and responsibility and, most importantly, the ability to protect and provide
for the family. Sayyed Fadlallah cites the verse Byzantines, verse 30–21, and
states that marriage is a sacred link. Both spouses should listen to God’s call in
instilling happiness in the marriage through a relation of love and affection;
such relation should be based on affection, equality, respect, admiration, and
freedom. Spouses (wives) are accorded the same rights in what is recognized
and suitable, as the Prophet has always manifested respect and love to his
wives.
Classical jurists based their interpretation on verse Cow 2:22820 related to
divorce, in which the Qur’an specifies that men have a degree of advantage
over women and misinterpreted the spiritual and legal meaning of marriage.
Marriage became a contract in which men possessed the women’s bodies, thus
resulting in unfairness for treatment of women; many marriage contracts were
terminated without the consent of women. One would ask where is love and
mercy when a women is forced to wed a stranger? Is not marriage a sacred
 Personal Status Laws in Islam ● 141

union between two free and equal partners who decide to build together their
happiness? To those Fadlallah suggests Baqara verse 2:18721 “It is licit for you,
on a night of fasting, to lie down with your wives. They are a garment to you,
and you are as a garment to them,”22 stating that a marriage founded on love
and mercy is a fulfillment of the human nature as creation of God through
the Qur’anic teaching. Marriage protects and allows women to live in full
harmony with their husbands, and wives are in no way enslaved by their
husbands.
Fadlallah advocates the establishment of a double personality for the wife
as she assumes the dual role of devoted Muslim, and mother and wife,
through good deeds and sacrifices without expecting anything in return.
Thus, a woman fulfills the Islamic call and furthers her spiritual closeness to
God through her devotion to her husband and family. She has to control her
actions and emotions even in cases where her husband fails to fulfill his obli-
gations. She cannot leave the house without her husband’s permission since
the husband has control over his wife in sexual matters and related details.
A Muslim women is obligated to satisfy her husband’s sexual desire, other-
wise she is “disobedient” and punished. The Qur’anic verse Women 4:34
appears to be the single most important verse that regards gender and sex-
ual relationships indicating that men are the qawwamun of women. “Men
are legally responsible for women, inasmuch as God has preferred some over
others in bounty, and because of what they spent from their wealth. Thus,
virtuous women are obedient, and preserve their trusts, such as God wish
them to be preserved. And those may rebel, admonish, and abandon them
in their beds, and smack them. If they obey you, seek no other way against
them. God is Highest and Mightiest.”23 Fadlallah translates this verse to say
that men are the natural leaders and managers of the household and their
wives’ affairs because Allah had made one superior to the other. He states,
“Sex satisfies a natural instinct and one should not be ashamed of satisfy-
ing it.”24 Both a husband and wife must satisfy their spouse’s sexual needs.
Nonetheless, the husband has the right to beat his wife if she does not satisfy
his sexual needs. Beating, or rather controlled gentle beating—as to not cause
fracture or bleeding—becomes necessary if other alternatives have not been
fruitful. The man’s right to discipline derives from his superior knowledge
of what is good and beneficial. Differences due to conception, giving birth,
staying up nights, hard work during the day, and menstruation lead to a state
of weakness in women. Men live free of these burdens and thus possess clear
judgment and intellectual superiority. Shortcomings of women are not a con-
demnation of the female sex; they exist and are understood within the context
of the faith. Islam does not say that women are inferior to men, rather that
they are different.
142 ● Women in Lebanon

Fadlallah delivered a new legal opinion fatwa25 on the issue of the beating
in 2007, allowing a wife to withstand her husband’s physical violence using
analogous violence, beating him back but only in self-defense, thus saving her
from any physical, psychological, and social violence within the household.
Reiterating that Islam has provided the legislation that leads to harmony and
peace and reconciliation between love and harmony on the one hand and the
Byzantines verse 30:21 and qawwama in Women verse (4:34) on the other,
the Qu’ranic foundation of a harmonious marriage, Fadlallah delegates the
right of beating to women, which has so far been exclusively reserved for men.
To remedy women’s physical and legal weakness, he argues, and given the fact
that the right of divorce is only available to men, this fatwa permits women to
take responsibility for their own problems without allowing others to inter-
fere in their marital affairs. The fatwa limits a husband’s excessive or misused
authority. After all, in Islam, beating becomes necessary to remedy women’s
deviance and only after a wife does not respond to her husband’s reproach
or chastisement by sexual abstinence. Thus, the fatwa, continues Fadlallah, is
not contradictory with other ‘ahadith, calling for mutual respect and the wife’s
obedience. The fatwa reinforces the natural right of self-defense for women
when facing unjustifiable violence, and after the wife has explored all legiti-
mate means to prevent her husband from using violence to “better” the state
of their marriage, when in fact, beating is detrimental to their union. Again,
this is her natural and legitimate right to counteract oppression. Finally, he
states that the fatwa in its content and objectives aims to stimulate “think-
ing” before “acting,” thus eroding violence, which in turn, leads to similar
violence, in conformity with hadith “God is gentle, He likes gentleness and
rewards kindness not cruelty.”26
The legal legacy of Islam has “largely ignored the Qur’anic emphasis
on equality and equal justice to women, and is supported by Orthodox
Islam.”27 Some believe that the Islamist position is reactive in nature, in that
it denies itself growth in defense of Western and liberal Islam’s assertion of its
backwardness.
A fruitful argument stated in Sheikh Fadllalah’s Ta’amullat is that each
husband and wife should accept the fact that the spouse does not belong to
the entire family, she/he only belongs to him/her, being his wife, and vice
versa. Patriarchal mores allowed the in-laws, particularly the mother-in-law,
to interfere in the daughter-in-law’s daily life. Books could be written on this
excruciating issue that we, all Lebanese women—Christians and Muslims—
endured and in some cases are still enduring.
As for the controversial issue of zawaj el-mut’a, temporary marriage
allowed only in the Shi’i sect, Sheikh Fadlallah gives the following exege-
sis tafsir: Shi’i fiqh legitimizes this type of marriage in some circumstances
 Personal Status Laws in Islam ● 143

in which a lasting relationship between a man and a woman is unlikely for

reasons of compatibility, lifelong harmony between the spouses, religion, or
beliefs. As protective measure for women, a legal temporary marriage trans-
forms what would be otherwise haram to halal. This legislation “resolves a
sexual desire in a humane manner.”28 Shi’i movements contested this practice
accusing it of being archaic; however, Sheikh Fadlallah believes that creating
rules for illegitimate sexual relations or zina is for the well-being of society,
unlike in Western societies, where illegitimate relations are so abundant. He
goes on to compare the temporary marriage to alcohol. The Cow verse 22:219
“They ask you about wine and gambling. Say: ‘In them both lies grave sin,
though some benefit, to mankind. But their sin is more grave than their bene-
fit.’ ”29 Since benefits from this legislation clearly exceed its disadvantages, the
Shi’i fiqh view this path of interpretation as an obligation. Mut’a is a social
necessity to protect against adultery and prostitution when regular marriages
no longer satisfy sexual needs in case of female frigidity or prolonged travel,
to break the boredom of a regular marriage, or in case of the impossibility
of a regular marriage. Given as a means for sexual release, Fadlallah does not
advise this type of marriage to virgins, because it might be psychologically
damaging and socially detrimental to their reputation and their future; he
rather limits mut’a to widows and divorcees.

Civil Marriage
Civil marriage does not fulfill Islamic regulations and therefore Islam does not
recognize it. Sheikh Fadlallah gives three reasons for the incompatibility of a
civil legislation with Shari’a. First, from a structural standpoint, a civil mar-
riage lacks the requirement of the Islamic method, in which the exchanged
sentences between the newly wed “I marry my soul to you for a dowry of . . . ”
And the groom replies, “I accept this union according to the Sunna (sayings
and doings) of God and the Prophet” This immutable issue of “personal sta-
tus” is part of the ‘ibadat 30 defined by God’s laws; a civil marriage does not
indicate the religious affiliation of the couple. Second, Islam forbids a Muslim
man to marry an atheist woman, but allows him to marry a woman from the
People of the Book accepted by Islam and recognized as a monotheistic reli-
gion. Third, in Islam, the dissolution of a marriage lies in the hands of the
husband or in a situation in which one of the spouses had some abnormality,
such as insanity. The dissolution of a civil marriage is subject to civil laws
relative to a particular country, and thus is incompatible with the personal
status of Islamic laws. In addition, Islam differentiates between religions to
protect Muslims from pressures leading them to inhiraf, or divergence from
the straight path. Islam does not allow a Muslim girl to wed a non-Muslim
144 ● Women in Lebanon

unless he converts to Islam, the rationale being that a Muslim husband cannot
support a non-Muslim wife, a Christian or Jewish husband may be intoler-
ant of his Muslim wife’s faith. This is a protective measure for her Islamic
faith. Christianity and Judaism do not recognize the prophetic message of
Muhammad.31

Divorce
Qassim Amin says, “Divorce is one of the special affects of marriage.”32
Divorce is the juridical-sanctioned rupture of the bond of marriage, which
is to say that its principal effect is to dissolve the conjugal tie and to abolish
all of the spouses’ reciprocal duties and obligations. Muslims accept divorce
because it is an efficient remedy in certain cases. However, it is a matter of
man’s right, whereas a woman cannot divorce without going through a judge
and obtaining her husband’s consent. However, cases in which a woman can
demand a divorce do exist: when the husband is incapable of meeting her
needs, when he is suffering from a mental or physical illness, or when he is
absent over the course of a year. “Divorce is illicit, undesirable in itself, but
permitted due to necessity,”33 and in addition, “repudiation is the worst of
permitted things,” said the Prophet.34
Sheikh Fadlallah evokes verse Nisa’ 4:34 arguing that qawwama applies
only to married life and that men are obligated to protect and provide for
the family. Qawwama is ordained because in the family sphere there is room
for only one manager. Physical and psychological differences between the two
sexes have fixed the choice on men, arguing that women are too emotional
and sometimes irrational. From Cow verse 2:228, “Women have the selfsame
rights and obligations in conformity with fairness, but men are a grade more
responsible than them. God is Almighty, All Wise.”35 The “grade” refers to
the authority of men to divorce, yet men should not abuse their authority and
there is no qawwama on any other issue outside the marriage. This gendered
restriction does not apply to all areas of life.
Liberal Muslim feminist thinker Amina Waddud points out that the
Qur’an does not place any inherent value on men and women and does
not strictly delineate their roles in society. According to her interpretation,
the Qur’an treats women as individuals just as it treats men as individuals,
and the only distinction between the genders is based on taqwa, which she
defines as God-conscious piety.36 In the same vein, Leila Ahmad translates
verse 2:228 as one can earn higher degree, daraja, in Allah’s eyes through
good deeds. The text does not place value on particular deeds, which is left
to social systems. As social systems have tended to value men’s deeds more
highly than those of women, this does not indicate that Allah intended male
 Personal Status Laws in Islam ● 145

superiority over women. Divorce is a lawful option for irreconcilable differ-

ences. Men do not technically have a degree daraja over the female in divorce
procedures as this would demonstrate an inequity in the Qur’an; she indicates
that just because the Qur’an makes no reference to women repudiating their
husbands, this does not mean that they are deprived from this power and that
they cannot do it.
The Shi’i modality of divorce is different from the Sunnis with regard to
the khul’ divorce in which women are delegated the right of divorce. For both
Sunni and Shi’i, the right of divorce falls on the husband unless stipulated
otherwise in the contract and for both sects divorce is despised and considered
as final recourse after exhaustion of all efforts of reconciliation between the
spouses. A wife goes to court to ask the legislator to divorce for the previously
mentioned reasons. In khul’ divorce, peculiar to the Shi’i sect, a wife may
divorce her husband by paying the amount of money agreed upon mahr,
and this type of divorce is irrevocable when the word khul’ is pronounced.
This divorce may be voided if women pronounced khul’ while menstruating.
Finally, the ‘idda, waiting period, must be observed as stipulated for other
regular divorce. During this period, the wife retains her rights and continues
her obligations.
Regarding custody of children, the divorced wife keeps her children until
they are two years old, then the husband claims them. Divorced women’s
duties are limited to the care for the natural need of the children. She has to
consult and have the father’s approval to be able to travel with her children,
use their funds, or decide on their education. In case of the husband’s death,
the wife will have custody unless she declines it and envisages a remarriage.
For Christians, canon laws allow the divorced wife to keep her children until
they are seven. This seems to be slightly less harsh on mothers!

Polygamy
The Prophet Muhammad had multiple wives, and shortly after marrying
Aisha and then Hafsa, the Qur’anic verses revealed a permission of polygamy.
The verses were revealed during a time of heavy battle, and men were encour-
aged to take multiple wives to remedy the concern of widows and orphans,
and therefore should be read as suited to the time of the Prophet and not
necessarily to all times. Verse Nisa’ 4:3 “Marry whoever pleases you among
women- two, three of four; but if you fear you will not be fair to them all, then
one only, or else what you own of slaves. This would be closer to impartial-
ity.” The Qur’an adds in Nisa’ verse 4:129–130, rendering the authorization
nearly impossible, “You will not be able to act equitably with your women,
even if you apply yourself to do so. Do not turn wholly away from her, leaving
146 ● Women in Lebanon

her like one suspended. But if you settle with her amicably and fear God,
God is All-forgiving, Compassionate to each. If a couple separates, God shall
suffice each from His bounty. God is All-Encompassing, All Wise.”37 It is
necessary to be just, and one cannot be. Therefore, the ideal is monogamy,
unless circumstances are such that polygamy constitutes a lesser evil. Simi-
larly, in a hadith, Aisha said to the Prophet, “O God, this is my feat, do no
hate me for what I have and for you do not have.” Polygamy is subject to a
permission accompanied by conditions aiming at rendering it an exception.
If it has not always been this way in practice, it is again due to social tradi-
tion and is contrary to the spirit of Qur’ranic law. Polygamy rarely exists in
Lebanon.

Inheritance
William Montgomery Watt and Leila Ahmad indicate that in Arabia dur-
ing the Prophet Muhammad’s time, a patrilineal system was in the process
of replacing a matrilineal one. The shifting trade routes engendered a grow-
ing prosperity and an intensification of individualism. Men prospering and
amassing considerable amounts of wealth wanted to ensure their inheritance
to their sons, and not simply to an extended family related to daughters and
sisters. This was one of the reasons that led to the deterioration of women’s
rights. Shari’a law thus provided women with a number of rights and by insti-
tuting rights of property ownership and inheritance as well as marriage and
divorce, Islam provided women with certain basic safeguards. Muslim women
retain their own assets.
According to Islamic law, a woman has an absolute right to her property,
which she can use as she pleases if she is of age, without the need for her
husband’s authorization. There is no difference between a man and a woman
in this respect. She can have full possession of her own assets, inherit them,
receive them as gifts, acquire them by working, give them, sell them, and
dispose of them in all legal manner; these rights are inalienable. Her personal
fortune is not a mortgage to pay her husband’s debts.
If the prescriptions concerning inheritance seem to disadvantage her
(Islam limits the daughter’s inheritance to half of that of the son), it should
not be forgotten that besides her financial autonomy gained through her own
assets, she has the right to support, to which the tribunal could oblige her
father, her husband, her son, and so on, as well as to her mahr or dowry, in
the case of separation. This amount is her inalienable property, and she can
take the possessions of her husband if he dies, a personal right to collect it.
These few remarks allow us to realize to what point the spirit of Muslim
law is liberal. The undeniable risk is that the magistrate’s interpretation is
 Personal Status Laws in Islam ● 147

often tainted by the contagion of a sociological milieu still obstructed by

prejudices that have little to do with the Qur’an.
Germaine Tillion has shown how the regulation of inheritance had been
determined to create an endogamic system intended to curb the circulation of
riches by checking the woman’s free choice. This system is worsened further
by the systematic disinheritance of girls/daughters. How far we have come
from true Qur’anic feminism! The custom very frequently requires that the
land and the house pass exclusively to male children. This is justified by the
mentality that it is pure madness to give one’s estate to others, and from
this comes the insistence in the Orient/East on the “preferred marriage” that
qualifies ibn el ‘amm (son of the paternal uncle), to obtain his female cousin’s
fortune.
On the contrary, others disinherit their family to the benefit of the religion
and commit their inheritance to God through a notary act (waqf ).
Effectively, “in Islam as in Christianity, the Mediterranean woman was reg-
ularly despoiled . . . This despoilment currently only survives in some residual
zones; the cause of this evolution must be sought in an economic progress
that brings everything about (notably destroying, more and more, the “well-
being of the family,” and inducing an unceasingly growing number of women
to take on a profession.”38 In this evolution of mentalities, let us note that a
Sunni Lebanese prime minister, Riad Solh, converted secretly to Shi’i to cut
his brothers off from his inheritance in order to hand it down to his daughters
only. In the absence of male heir, a Sunni daughter receives only a third of the
inheritance, the remaining three quarters go to the male branch of the family.
Commenting on family laws, and particularly on Shari’a, Labrusse argues
that for a variety of religious, historic, and sociological reasons, laws of
Muslim countries are those that until a recent date imposed on women a
total personal and patrimonial subjugation . . . . However, from the beginning
of the twentieth century, Islamic law seems to be engaged in the path of new
conception for family and women. Legislators attempt to engage the auton-
omy of the couple vis-à-vis the extended family group, to protect women and
to recognize their personality by way of limiting polygamy, and imposing
a judicial repudiation, or even to authorize women to seek divorce, and to
reinforce her inheritance rights.39
At present, women are contesting conditions of inequality to improve their
position in society, and they are themselves involved in ijtihad to reinterpret
the scriptures in the egalitarian spirit the Qur’an prescribed. Shi’i are increas-
ingly participating in the functions of Hizbullah, in the public sphere as well
as from behind the scenes. However, as a consequence of the civil war and
the power relation of the region, a sectarian identity has solidified. Mod-
ernization has been seen as Westernization, and globalization has aggravated
148 ● Women in Lebanon

behavior as it relates to identity. Western modernity and progress no longer

have one trajectory. It appears that the Muslim world’s immediate response
to the dilemma posed by the need for modernization has become religious, if
not religious radicalism. As Amin Maalouf, a Lebanese writer puts it, “Reli-
gious fundamentalism has not been the immediate, spontaneous, and natural
choice of Arabs and Muslims in general. They were not tempted to go along
that path until all others were blocked. And until, paradoxically that path
itself—the path of atavism and conservatism—had come into fashion and
was “in the air again.”40 As the modern unraveled, Lebanon began facing
alternative modernities. A lack of a unified Lebanese identity has led to the
emergence of sectarian identity categories such as modernity as it relates to
Hizbullah women.

Growing Role of Hizbullah’s Women in Lebanon

Social and political dynamics changed because of the increasing role of
women in the functions of Hizbullah. The United States has labeled
Hizbullah as a terrorist organization because of its objective to resist Israel
and its attack on the US Marine stationed in Beirut in 1983. The party did
engage in violent acts, but at the same time, its social arm became an active
force improving social life for the Shi’i in Lebanon. The 33-day conflict with
Israel in 2006 boosted the presence of Hizbullah in Lebanon because of their
effective response to the growing needs of the conflict-ridden Shi’i popula-
tion, especially in Southern Lebanon and in the dahia, the southern suburb
of Beirut, where their headquarters is located. Hizbullah proved itself to be a
political organization as much as a social one, focusing on societal change that
emphasizes the Shi’i communal identity. The way the Hizbullah spread itself
in the community helped the party communicate its message to the popu-
lation in order to gain support among the younger generation by opening
schools, hospitals, and public welfare programs for the needy and for those
who have lost family members. The party proved its capability to respond to
immediate social and educational needs of the community. As seen in the doc-
umentary 33 Days,41 members of Hizbullah distributed food and medicine to
civilians and combatants during the conflict. Among its various social ser-
vices, the party provided assistance to the family of martyrs, widows, and
orphans. These various services resulted in an increased responsibility and
popularity of the party in Lebanon.
Concerns arose about how these increasing services were performed and
with what kind of workforce. Many members of the party were resistance
fighters and men, but women served an important role in function of the
organization. Women proved to further their position in society and improve
 Personal Status Laws in Islam ● 149

their political participation in the “upper echelons” of Islamist movements

without calling themselves feminists. L’enjeu introduced itself, since it denied
an adherence to Western feminist movements but still emphasized Islamic
values; women looked for real opportunities to become potential leaders.
They rejected an alignment with secular feminist movements, fearing a loss
of support or legitimacy from their social base and the power of the men
who had the power to change the status of women in society. Their goal
was, through their efforts, to appeal not only for advancement of women but
also to a broader social base across social and political classes through the
Islamist movements in which they participated. Furthermore, their participa-
tion proved not only to have furthered their place in the social and political
sphere, but they also proved themselves an indispensable asset to the party
in completing its goals. One could say that Hizbullah’s task to reach out to
a broader base was increasingly accomplished by women who filled impor-
tant positions for the organization; they were the group of people who were
constantly fundraising for the organization, recruiting new members and act-
ing as social workers or an outreach group to those receiving social services.
Likewise, inside their households, they raise their children and support their
spouses, should their husbands choose to become resistance fighters.
In an interview on Al-Jazeera news segments called Everywomen, the host
asked each woman why they remained in dangerous areas, often risking their
lives, to help the resistance, and what it is like being a mother or widow of a
martyr. The host found out that many women are members of the Resistance
Support Association, and as volunteers, they make crafts for sale whose pro-
ceeds go to fund the resistance, they sponsor programs to help outfit soldiers,
and in another sponsorship program, they run an annual iftar. Around 7000
women from different social classes and religions attend this iftar to increase
dialogue, specifically among women, about issues of conflict in Lebanon and
the region as a whole.42
In a different setting, women are increasingly making appearances in the
news media. During another segment of Everywomen, the host interviewed
Zeinab al-Saffar, a news anchor on Al-Manar, Hizbullah’s television channel
in Beirut, accused by some countries as “terrorist television.”43 Zeinab is not
directly involved in the party; however, she sympathizes greatly with the orga-
nization and promotes it through the news channel and through a class that
she teaches in English at the Lebanese University. The Arab-Israeli conflict
affected her personally when her home was destroyed in 2006. She spreads
the ideology of Hizbullah by speaking to others in an academic setting as a
university professor and also thoughtfully through her position at Al-Manar.
The New York Times highlighted the life of Zahra Fadlallah, another
woman who played a crucial role in Hizbullah’s effort in an article from
150 ● Women in Lebanon

August 18, 2006.44 At a very young age, the conflict with Israel greatly
affected Zahra. She was only ten years old when her mother was arrested,
and her brothers and sisters were already deeply involved in the organization.
Later, her fiancé was also a Hizbullah activist. Back then, the party operated
clandestinely through secret missions, and Zahra found inventive ways to
help activists hide weapons and make it through Israeli checkpoints, in order
for them to continue their surreptitious work in Southern Lebanon. Zahra
and her mother heavily engaged themselves in charity work, by baking bread
and cooking food to donate to Hizbullah’s activists. However, toward the end
of the war, both Zahra and her mother were killed in their basement, most
likely from an air strike. Her fiancé buried her in a plot next to her brother in
the fighters’ cemetery because of her assistance to the party’s efforts.
The lives of these women illustrate their greater presence in society and
the changing perspectives of their roles and their crucial involvement in the
Islamic organization. However, these women assert that they hold a different
place in society than men, something like being “separate but equal,” but
they do not want to be like men or perform the same jobs that men do. With
greater recognition of their accomplishments, they wear the veil. They say
that this emanates from a choice and not because they are forced to do so,
as is commonly believed in the West. They do not think that the veil is a
symbol of male dominance, but rather an affirmation of their identity. They
share the same ideological beliefs as men, and although they do not fight on
the battlefields, their work behind the scenes is crucial to the survival of the
organization. Finally yet importantly, they are likely to portray Hizbullah in
a good light, which in turn helps to attract more people to their cause. They
are living their alternative modernities.
Thus, the concept of modernity is not rigid. How a citizen becomes mod-
ernized or how modernity manifests itself changes based on space, time,
religious or philosophical disciplinary approaches, and individual subjectiv-
ities, which lead to different outcome. The living of a theorized modernity
varies from place to place, and in some places like Lebanon, it varies from
one community to another. Modernity becomes this imaginative moment
stemming from new ways of experiencing the world.
Interview—Individual and Communal
Perspectives: Muslim Discourse

I
was interested in the perspectives of both Muslim and Christian women
on the changes that have occurred since the emergence of Hizbullah, and
kept a record of those with whom I spoke. The interactions that follow
provide a discourse that addresses each perspective through the voices of the
women of Lebanon.

Muslim Perspectives
In July 2010 while visiting Mashghara, I met and spoke with several Shi’i
women who were invited to the Hizbullah party headquarters. My mother
and I were dropped off by a taxi at the building’s entrance, greeted by warm
and welcoming women’s voices; much to my surprise, two of the women
were wearing a black chador, Iranian style, from head to toe. While I was
growing up in Lebanon 30 years ago, I went to Mashghara and the women
were dressed quite differently; the traditional conservative attire, especially
that for young women, struck me as a change. Nonetheless, the young women
welcomed us into a lovely guest room and had even prepared petits fours,
French cookies, and maamoul, a Lebanese pastry, for our meeting.
The man who arranged the meeting did not leave the room during our
conversation; he listened very carefully to both my questions and the women’s
responses. The women seemed pleased to have a visitor from the neighbor-
ing Christian village who was interested in learning more about the various
societal changes that they have faced as Shi’i women since 1982, and they
took pride in their ability to have worked toward ameliorating their social
conditions.
As members of Hizbullah, these women have relations with Saghbine.
The wife of the Christian parliamentary representative sends invitations for
events in the village and the women of Mashghara in turn reciprocate. They
attend Christian funerals and sometimes weddings. The Muslim women of
Mashghara interact a great deal with Christian women, often because their
152 ● Women in Lebanon

husbands work side by side with Christian men, and also in organizing din-
ners for the village or Zajal parties—a popular dialectical poetry founded on a
sharp musical tone—or even for marathons. The common activities under the
auspices of the municipality encourage unity. The women of Mashghara do
not feel a sense of being oppressed by their religion; they feel a sense of being
able to be religiously committed and simultaneously embrace modernity.
Life has certainly changed in Mashghara after the arrival of Hizbullah in
1982. From an educational perspective, after Hizbullah was founded in 1982,
the Najah school that is affiliated with the charitable Imdad organization
was funded by Ayatollah Khomeini. The majority of children in Mashghara
currently attend this school. Previously, the women shared that in addition to
attending the public schools in Mashghara, 90 percent of Shi’i girls attended
the Christian school run by the Sisters of the Sacred Heart, which used to
be for girls only, but has since become coeducational like the public schools.
However, the Shi’i school is coeducational until fourth grade, after which
time boys and girls are educated separately.
There are now about 100 young women from Mashghara attending an
institution of higher education. Much like in the United States, a master’s
degree or even a doctorate degree has become haja darouriyya, a necessity,
they said. Although work opportunities are still scarce for women, the goal
of educating young women is for her to find a suitable position to financially
assist her family, while not restricting her from her responsibilities to raise
children. The mother’s professional presence has a positive impact on her
children and on her own self-worth, and women discuss respecting their hus-
bands more because they are able to help their families financially in a suitable
job. Moreover, there are a rather large number of women in their forties who
are just now able to go to college because they married and began their fam-
ilies at an early age, usually between 14 and 17 years. This practice marks a
significant change in traditional Shi’i values and gender roles manifesting in
practice.
One woman, who has three children, attended college, majored in phi-
losophy, and graduated. As a Muslim woman, she shared that her goal is to
capture and embrace this time, without forgetting that family is the basis
of society and that her role as a mother is to form a family that is full of
knowledge and awareness, which in turn contributes to a righteous society.
With education more accessible to women, the Center for Islamic Stud-
ies, ma’had al ulum al Islamiyya, has a branch in the West Bekaa for women
16–50 years old for continuing education, as well as the Islamic Univer-
sity in Khalde. Both offer courses of study in religious studies on the
Islamic doctrine and the five pillars of Islam. A private university can offer
a doctorate in Islamic studies, which can teach tafsir and ijtihad, explanation
and reinterpretation of the Qur’an.
 Interview—Muslim Discourse ● 153

Another organization, the Organization for the Memorization of the

Qur’an, jamiyat li tahfiz al Qur’an, emerged as a means of supporting the
memorization of the Qur’an for children and other interested adults. Imdad
also funds it, in order to prepare people to commit to living life according to
the Qur’an.
Organization of the Martyr, mu’asasat el shahid, is a recreation center with
special pools for young women and place for artisan work. Children of mar-
tyrs attend school alongside all other children, receiving no special treatment.
The face of marriage has changed with Hizbullah. Ninety percent of mar-
riages today are of free choice. Khatife, abdication, is very rare because the
pressure that was formerly placed on girls is almost nonexistent today. Parents
are much more focused on their children’s happiness. To their knowledge, just
one case of khatife occurred during the last decade in Mashghara.
Social constraints, dawabit, have lessened. For instance, before 1982, most
girls’ schooling ended at high school without a second thought; college was
never considered. Parents were afraid to send their daughters to colleges in big
cities alone. The Lebanese University opened colleges in Zahle and at first this
was a wonderful opportunity for women to attend courses there, with only a
short commute. However, the branch in Zahle did not offer all majors and
some women needed to go to Beirut to pursue their studies. Those who now
attend college in Beirut live in foyers, student housing for women, near the
Lebanese University campus. Parents are involved in the roommate selection
process, and an inspector from Hizbullah monitors the building.
The university setting offers young women more opportunities to meet
their ‘ariss, or husband-to-be, and others meet their future husband in a reli-
gious milieu in the city. Ninety-nine percent of girls bring the young man
back to their parents’ house, and parents tend to be agreeable to their daugh-
ter’s choice, unless the family has a strong reservation or the young man seems
questionable in some way. Many families still view four children as the ideal
number, even in the face of the rising cost of living.
The Women’s Food Market, Mard Qurawi, has also been a welcome addi-
tion in Mashghara. Every year, homemakers or women who do not hold jobs
outside the home prepare all kinds of muna, or supplies, as provisions for win-
ter, such as cracked wheat, lentils, grains, dried herbs, dried fruit, jams, and
other necessities, in addition to handmade needlework or artisan local work,
all of which is usually made by older women in the community. Through
the market in which both Muslim and Christian families participate, they sell
their products for a profit. Even some books of well-known authors, such as
Nasri Sayegh, Fawaz Trabulsi, and Hasan ‘Awada, from Mashghara are sold at
the market.
In the face of a variety of societal changes, there has also been a return
to hijab. One woman spoke of her mother, who did not wear the veil and
154 ● Women in Lebanon

who used to live in Mexico. Now, she says, her mother is wearing it, and she
is proud to wear it, thanks to Imam Khomeini. She believed that the West
should not influence Mashghara, and that hijab is a way to protect girls, and
sees it as a part of the Imam revolution. The women discussed the roots of
Islam and the Qur’an. They felt that the revival of the Qur’an is in their best
interest. Most girls now grow up wearing the hijab, and they do not think
twice or think of removing it. Hijab is not seen as a barrier to cultural life.
Even in the swimming pool, women wear their cloth and headscarf and feel
comfortable.
Faith, the women agreed, is rooted in the doctrine, not in the customs.
Women feel that their existence is meaningful, and they gain respect from
their environment, and the ways in which they exist in their environment,
including wearing the hijab from the young men with whom they can con-
verse to a certain extent. Relations between men and women have limits, and
the way a woman interacts and her behavior engender respect from her sur-
roundings. Women are impacted by many factors: school, societal ambience,
and the environment. One woman’s daughter recently turned five and asked
her mother if she could wear the veil, a request that comes from her upbring-
ing and seeing the veil being modeled in a positive light by women in her life.
Young men that are raised with the same religious upbringing appreciate and
require this behavior.
Relations between Christians and Muslims have improved significantly
recently. One woman commented lightly that the Christian sisters in the
schools assure the parents that there is no alcohol in the cake so that they, as
Muslims can eat it, an appreciation and awareness of customs from both sides.
Following the last municipal elections and the accord between the March 8
Coalition and Hizbullah, unity and friendship returned to Mashghara. This
accord is reflected in women’s organizations and other various collabora-
tions. Muslim doctrine does not dictate separation; on the contrary, there
is a need to be united while waiting for the mahdi, the Shi’i hidden Imam,
to come. Women recounted having friends before 1982, when the war with
Israel separated them from their friends, but now women describe feeling
united again. The political situation strained relationships in the past. Differ-
ences are still poignant among politicians, but among regular people, many
problems have dissipated. The war had a significant impact, al hamdu lillah,
Grace be to God, and now, Christians and Muslims alike are working toward
unity. Everything changed, people have begun to value culture, and dona-
tions for education and social assistance are plentiful. Young men even left
their university studies to help protect the women during the transition.
The divorce rate has declined to 5 percent in Mashghara, mainly because
of the free choice now available in marriage. For Sunni, the man needs only
 Interview—Muslim Discourse ● 155

to repeat talka, or “I divorce you,” three times to his wife before two witnesses
for the divorce to take place. For Shi’i, a witness is not necessary for a mar-
riage contract, and a divorce is more complicated, and in some cases, such
as pregnancy, a divorce cannot be granted. In addition, after a divorce, an
‘idda, or waiting period, of three months is necessary for the spouses before
he or she may remarry. If, in a moment of anger, a man says that he wants
to divorce without really intending it, he has to bear the responsibility of his
words. Women can stipulate conditions in the marriage contract, in case she
finds a situation in which she would like to ask for a divorce. There is a legal
Ja’fari1 court in the West Bekaa.
Marriage in the Shi’i rite requires the writing of the contract, katb el kitab,
at home, and then registration in the Shi’i court that administers matters of
personal status laws and in the governmental agency. Rights are common and
equal for both men and women. Awareness, good upbringing, education are
essential, and divorce is the worst thing for God.
Second marriages are rare in the West Bekaa compared to the south.
Women in the cities, especially Beirut, have more freedom than in smaller
communities. They find that their reputation and how they are perceived by
others are important, and whereas in Beirut one may benefit from certain
anonymity, Mashghara has a committed religious community that pays close
attention to matters of legality and compliance with the shari’a law.
Women in Mashghara prefer marrying Shi’i men, although the women
knew of others who had married Sunni men. By and large, Muslim women
avoid marrying Christians to prevent a potential ideological crisis, as they
phrased it. There is no conflict if a young Shi’i man wishes to marry a
Christian woman, as she is expected to convert to Islam. Generally, this type
of marriage is more successful in couples that are less religiously committed
than others.
Gender equality regarding inheritance also abides by a certain cultural
norm. The rule is that a brother may inherit a share double than that of
his sister. The reasoning is societal; men bear the responsibility to provide
financially for the family. A woman can use her inheritance as she pleases and
the law does not require her to spend it on her household or family.
Caring for the aging adults is a task most often undertaken by their chil-
dren. Nursing homes exist, although that is viewed as the worst solution for
an elderly parent, especially for women. In the event that an aging mother’s
children live away from her, the children will usually hire a nurse to care
for her, and the children visit her as often as they are able. However, Islamic
upbringing stipulates that children are to have their mothers in their homes
as they age. Teaching explicitly states that, one should never dismiss his or her
parents; God’s mercy is transferred from parent to child.
156 ● Women in Lebanon

One of the first phrases learned for prayer is: God forgive me, and forgive
them and have mercy on them in recognition of the way in which they raised
me. In saying these prayers five times daily, many children are not able to
have their aging parents live outside of their homes.
A mother’s relationship with her son is usually strong and is as strong
as possible with the daughter-in-law, depending on certain circumstances.
For daughters who work outside the home, they are able to provide some
financial assistance to their parents, which is a moral obligation. Often, par-
ents feel as much affection for a son-in-law as for their own biological sons.
In Mashghara, a man is expected to build an annex to his house for aging
parents.
Mothers and daughters-in-law often have few problems, especially if
mothers-in-law abide by Muslim teachings. Even if the daughter does not
particularly care for her, she is obligated to support her according to scrip-
ture, although she is able to avoid contact as much as possible if necessary.
She should, however, be cautious and not hurt or offend her in-laws. Prob-
lems do, however, arise and various organizations, jam ‘iyyat, hold groups for
young women aimed at discussing these sensitive issues to avoid escalating
situations that could lead to divorce. Parents always advise their daughters to
respect and support their mothers-in-law, and although many people resolve
their domestic problems independently, some seek advice from the Sheikh.
The women described conflict with their in-laws as a process of learning when
to keep their mouths shut.
Modernity and traditions continue to coexist in Mashghara and elsewhere
in Lebanon. However, these women, in contrast with Christian women, are
not at all interested in a secular society. For them, religious thought, on both
the individual and institutional levels, are an integral part of the construction
of their alternative modernities. Women are now, through becoming change
agents in their communities, taking center stage in the movement toward
modernity as prescribed by Hizbullah. These women articulated their sub-
jectivities and reformulated their societal and familial role based on Islamic
teaching and the ways in which notions of modernity and their pieties inter-
sect, which shapes their quotidian lives. Through discussing female roles
through the life cycle and changes that have emerged through the found-
ing of Hizbullah, a more accurate portrait of life in Mashghara became clear
to me through their recounting of personal and observed experiences.
 PART III

Transformation within a Multicultural Lebanon

 CHAPTER 9

Modernity, Multiculturalism,
and Lebanese Women

June 16th, 2008. As we landed on the runway in Beirut, everyone on the plane
started clapping. One woman who we had met during our Paris layover to learn
she was from Panama, started singing a Fairouz song “I missed you and I didn’t
forget you.” I had tears in my eyes. Everyone was excited to be home. At the airport,
there was a huge crowd of people waiting outside baggage claim, with flowers and
gifts. We had the impression that everyone was celebrating a homecoming.
As I expected, on the way home, my daughter discovered that traffic was chaos. As we
walked around Ashrafieh, we noticed the juxtaposition of old and new buildings.
Ashrafieh has become a field of development; there was not an inch of land left
unused. Nonetheless, I felt a joyous pagaille and this oriental insouciance that hid
something grave. Once we walked on this land, we felt the permanent presence of
the past.
June 22, 2008—A day that symbolically concretizes Lebanon’s vocation: Lebanon is
a country of mission, annunciation, openness and cooperation, for the beatification
of the venerable Abouna Yaacoub el-Haddad.
We left the house at 9:00 and walked to downtown Beirut where we found hundred
of pilgrims going towards the stage, set for the holy mass in the middle of “place
des Martyrs” surrounded by beautifully well-restored old buildings. Despite these
renovations, Beirut boasts a union of old and new buildings that characterizes the
city’s past. The altar is placed 500 meters away from the Sunni mosque built in
the 1990s at the instigation of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. It is a
beautiful, huge Mosque indeed, but it overshadows Saint George Maronite church,
the symbol of the Christian Lebanon since its edification in the nineteenth century.
On this June 22, 2008, His Eminence the Cardinal Jose Saraiva Martins, the
congregation’s prefect for the Saints causes and a delegate of Pope Benedict XVI,
made a special trip to Beirut to celebrate the mass of the bearable beatification.
160 ● Women in Lebanon

Abouna, or Father Yacoub, who became a member of the Capucins order in 1893,
propagated the third order and became adviser to ten thousand “tertiaires” or secular
brothers and sisters. In 1937, he followed the footstep of Saint Francis of Assisi by
helping elderly priests. A group of young girls generously offered to assist them. These
young women became the heart of a new congregation. In December 8, 1930, Day
of the Immaculate Conception, they became nuns under the name of “Franciscans
of the Cross.”
This day was a premiere because of the modification of a church’s tradition. His
sanctity Benedict XVI just decreed a new law stipulating that the Vatican will
beatify the venerable in their own country and join members of the Catholic Church
in proclaiming saint. This new arrangement saved thousands of Lebanese, clergies
and officials from making a pilgrimage to Rome. A few years earlier, Saint Rafka,
another Lebanese saint was also beatified, but in Rome, where religious dignitaries
and thousands of believers made the trip to the capital of Catholics to celebrate the
Beatification in the Vatican.
The service concluded with words of a nun belonging to the Sisterhood of the Cross.
This nun, this woman, had the honor of presenting a relic of Abouna Yacoub to
the representative of the Vatican. In her speech, she first addressed the Christian
President Michel Suleiman, then the Shi’i Speaker of the House Nabih Berri, and
the Sunni Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, then the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah
Sfeir, and her brothers and sisters. She said that Lebanon’s land is a land of sanctity.
My mother reiterated this sentiment upon our arrival to Lebanon. Upon hearing of
our concern for our safety, she said, “Fear not, Lebanon is a sacred land, and you
will be safe.”
Perhaps the most important segment of the speech occurred when the sister spoke
about the intersection of religion and politics. She explained that Lebanon is
founded on the intersection of civilizations, and although these civilizations may
clash often, these clashes ultimately create a convergence. With an increasing num-
ber of clashes occurring, the convergences become stronger. Lebanon is the smallest
country in which the blood of all Lebanese was mixed up, but Lebanon is bigger
than the biggest country measured by the strength of these sons and daughters, she
added. Lebanon is a country of peace and love to all his children. Humanity and the
coming together of the divine religions of faith and mission is Lebanon’s foundation.
The celebration ended and a few minutes later, for the Muslim noon prayer we
heard the muezzin from the new mosque delivering al shahaddah “la Ilaha il
Allah, Muhammad rasul Allah” (None has the right to be worshiped but God, and
Muhammad is the Messenger of God), and moved on to reciting the appropriate
Qur’anic verses.

I
reconnected with the Lebanon of my childhood, of my parents, of our
ideal. The Lebanese had chosen a constructive coexistence between the
different religious communities that form the Lebanese texture. I rejoiced
 Modernity, Multiculturalism, and Lebanese Women ● 161

hearing that the specificity of my country is still alive. My joy was short-lived,
as other disturbing thoughts emerged in my mind. Is the moderate Lebanese
formula still able to preserve our common land? Is that compromised solution
between moderate Christians and Muslims able to withstand radicalism? Are
not we living in an era of admeasure?
My recent returns to Lebanon shook my belief in the possibility of a uni-
fied Lebanese national identity. My perspective stems from my upbringing
in a family committed to the Christian faith, a family that produced a priest
for many generations, and from the French education I acquired growing up
in the Christian area of Beirut. Therefore, my model of modernity for intel-
lectual, social, and political progress was the universal Occidental Western
model in the Hegelian sense.
Upon my return to Lebanon in 2008, I realized that I had to reassess
the understanding of the dominance of Western tradition in the Lebanon
that I once knew. My understanding of the liberation and emancipation of
women through a Western lens seemed obsolete in the sea of veiled women
I encountered at the airport and on the way to my home to a Christian district
of Beirut. I began to ask myself what identity these women were trying to
project upon themselves and how this new self-perception would translate
to the identity of Lebanon. Would this phenomenon change the image and
identity of Lebanon? How could a veil change the identity of a country?
What does this increased visibility of veiled women mean for the women
themselves? Is not the wearing of a veil a sign of so-called backwardness?
I decided to deepen my analysis of the concept of modernity to make sense
of this change.
The concept of modernity emerged in Europe in the sixteen century as
a real, progressive and necessary evolution of the mind. Philosophy in the
eighteenth century surpassed theology as the dominant practice to achieve
supreme knowledge and attain the truth. The history of humanity was no
longer explained through revelation or religious messages, but instead, as a
progression of the human mind of which revelation was a necessary stage.
Revelation was neither the end of history nor the final establishment of
an immutable frame in which religion gives life to humankind any longer.
The modern mind embodies the fulfillment of the Enlightenment project.
In his elaboration of the self-consciousness of Geist or Spirit, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, a German philosopher (1770–1831),1 reconciled the ratio-
nalism of the Enlightenment and the Romantic reaction to the excess of
Enlightenment for the modern Western mind. He formulated arguments
and laws of history to aid in understanding the necessity of the historical
process. These same laws allowed a better understanding of God’s mind
than the clergy did. Consequently, in his attempt to comprehend history
162 ● Women in Lebanon

philosophically, he secularized the Western mind and liberated men from

medieval superstitions and clerical supervision. He argued that the move-
ment of history was going in one direction and that no one could reverse it.
The movement demonstrated effects of objective forces that transcend human
subjectivity, as if Hegel accomplished reconciliation between the Divine and
the Secular.
Hegel forged a synthesis between tensions born from the confrontation of
the religious traditional spirit and the concomitant movement emerging from
the discovery of the New World, and of other civilizations.
Hegel argued that the importance of religious wars resides in their “liber-
ating” nature for the human mind in the movement of history. Similarly, his
conciliate vision is respectful of both religion and the movement for devel-
opment of the rational human mind. Thus, religion became only a small
component of the human experience. Hegel explained religion as an instru-
ment of progress providing the human mind with strength and rationality.
For the German sociologist and political economist Max Weber,2 religion is a
response to a social need for an explanation of the creation of the world and
its order. Therefore, humans insist on the process of rationalization, trying
to construct an “ideal type” of society for each historical period, leading to
the rule of religious hierarchies that tweaked and molded themselves to suit to
each society. Because of the neocolonial contextual influence of his time, Max
Weber considers religion as a truth with the presumption of a superiority of
the monotheistic religions. Contrary to Protestantism, the French concept of
laïcité in Catholic society aims at separating the religious and public spheres,
confining faith and religious practice to the private sphere. The religious
should not interfere in the management of the city affairs. This major dif-
ference, between Protestantism and Catholicism, reemerges today with force
to accommodate the diversity of religious identities announcing the “return
to the religious.” Yet religion always adapts to changes of the time, acquiring
sophistication and abstraction through the “process of rationalization” that
characterizes the modern world. Max Weber interprets this evolution as the
“disenchantment,” or the secularization of the world. Religion indeed had
lost its aura and became an observable science; above all, European society
no longer perceived it as the way to absolute truth. However, this change in
religion is not necessarily paralleled with an evolution of spirituality. On the
contrary, and paradoxically, our contemporaries, in search of a spiritual exis-
tence, look past religious institutions and dogmas to question the rationality
of organized religion.
The most prominent ideologies of the nineteenth century, socialism,
Marxism, and nationalism, have marginalized religion from the political
 Modernity, Multiculturalism, and Lebanese Women ● 163

order. Yet with this separation stems a new alienation and even a loss of
identity, of roots. The sense of identity crisis is precisely the question of the
profound aspiration of human beings, beginning with problems linked to
Eros and Thanatos, sexuality and death, the position of men confronted with
transcendence and aspiration toward the infinite; particularly the problem
of recognizing humanity’s relationship with a spiritual being. From anguish
to suffering, men attempt to perfect their human nature and master what is
finite. This problematic nature of identity involves the destiny of each human
being as well as all of humanity. Yvonne Haddad argues that for “Normativist”
Muslims, past authority is valid for the present and the future; “they refuse
to compromise on identity.” For them, religion is the central part of life and
even the totality of life.3 In the light of this loss of identity, Hannah Arendt,4
perceiving modernity as a crisis of culture and authority following the fall
of the Roman Church that had guaranteed for centuries the continuity of
the Greco-Romaine, Judeo-Christian foundation, acknowledges a return to
religion. Today’s crisis is essentially political. The decline of the Occident
consists in the decline of the Roman Trinity in the religion, the tradition, and
the concomitant degradation of the specifically Roman foundations of the
political sphere. Revolutions are gigantic tentative means for men to restore
these foundations, to be linked again to tradition and to reestablish, through
the formation of new political corps, what for many centuries gave dignity
and grandeur to the daily affairs of the people. “For to live in a political
realm with neither authority nor the concomitant awareness that the source
of authority transcends power and those who are in power, means to be con-
fronted anew, without the religious trust in a sacred beginning and without
the protection of traditional and therefore self-evident standards of behavior,
by the elementary problems of human living-together.”5
Indeed, the course of modern history followed a trajectory that leads it
away from religion in a way that will end in a world that is unequivocally
secular. Following the Hegelian philosophy, societies today should be less reli-
gious than they were 30 years ago, but if we accept the analysis of Max Weber
and Hannah Arendt, we are to believe that the return of the question of reli-
gion is inherent to our contemporary era. We have seen that in many parts
of the world, namely, the Middle East, religion is an integral part of personal
and group identities. Societies that are even more secular are characterized by
the way their founding principles choose to incorporate religion. We must
define modernity to include the relationship between religion and society.
There are a number of models for this relationship, but which is the correct
model for Lebanon, a country characterized by its unique sigha or political
formula.
164 ● Women in Lebanon

It Is Possible that Today’s Modernity Is in Fact Characterized

by a Return to Religion?
In contemporary writings of Islam, the rise of Western power engendered
restrictions for Dar el-Islam from its broad expanse; this rise means that
the Western influence would become the guiding principles and norms to
Muslims on what is seen as acceptable. Although some have welcomed
the influence of the West, others insist that its alien nature is unwelcome;
Muslims must remain true to their heritage. Thus, the crisis of the mod-
ern world is inherent to contemporary writings, particularly the challenging
of authority of Islam in believers’ lives. An outpouring of new historical
interpretations emerged to give a new significance to history. History is the
recognition of the past and its role in helping people understand God’s pur-
pose for the present. History drives “Muslims to a dynamic participation in
the destiny of the world through re-appropriation of their God-Given respon-
sibility to guide the world in Islam.”6 In order to be part of the process, one
should be actively involved in shaping the present to reflect God’s purpose.
For modern Muslims, the past is crucial to the present; past and present,
recognition of the divine and action combine to form an integrated whole.
Yvonne Haddad articulates two views of modern Muslims, Normativists and
Acculturationists, advocating the need to reform the conditions for Muslims.
Normativists affirm that Islam achieved its zenith in the past, and this present
cultural system rejects innovation or change as inherently mistrusted. For
Normativists, Islam is a living organism whose living experience of faith is
being drained by alien Western culture; they complain that colonial conquests
carved and divided the Muslim world. Acculturationists attempt to provide
a new ethos to Islam, viewing Islam as a living organism that is suffocating
in its struggle to adapt to new contemporary realities. Their standpoint on
the past reflects their stance; Acculturationists see religion as one of the fac-
tors that make up the fabric of culture, whereas Normativists see culture as a
product of Islam; the authority of the past is valid for the present and future.
Religion is totality of life, and if Muslim can reappropriate the ideal past,
they could ascend the world anew, but because missionaries and Orientalists
blamed Islam for the decline of the Arab world, their views are subject to
scrutiny. Orientalists argued that the Greek and Roman philosophers as well
as other religions influenced shari’a and that the desire for territorial expan-
sion and material gain motivated the spread if Islam. This criticism sparked
the contemporary apologetic literature in the defense of Islam, emphasizing
the danger of foreign attempts to attack the faith by creating a deep divide
between Islam and its Muslim followers. They address all accusations and
attempt to purify Islam from all mistakes and human contamination.
 Modernity, Multiculturalism, and Lebanese Women ● 165

Muslim secularist reformers since the nineteenth century attempted to iso-

late the cause of the decline. They recognized that pure Islam may not be a
deterrent to progress; however, they argued that Islam should be relegated
to the private and individual realm. Dependence on religion and blind tra-
ditions acts as an impediment to progress; the secular nature of European
society could be a cure for the decline; religion has been restrictive because
the ‘ulama condemned every step of reform as a move away from Islam.
Secularists believe that modernizing in the Western way—secularizing, indus-
trializing, and acquiring Western know-how—would help Arab countries to
talk off.
In 2004, a French law banned the wearing of the veil in public schools,
defined as a “conspicuous sign” indicating religion affiliation. France is a
secular state and the meaning of the veil appeared to challenge the French
republican values of equality, liberty, and fraternity, the secular democracy, as
well as the national identity. Muslims, accusing the French law to be targeted
at their particular religious group and the traditions that define their culture,
have challenged la laïcité, the French secularism. France considers Islam at
odds with French republicanism, which embodies secularism and individu-
alism. Muslim identity remains within the community, and the liberation
of women is not seen as freedom from the oppression of men. Normativists
refer to the cosmic dimension and women’s liberation would be a rebellion
against God and His order for the world. They want to protect Islam from the
immorality and decadence of Western cultural patterns; their goal is to build
a strong united nation of Islam committed to the religious ideology of Islam,
which is seen as the path of salvation of the world. Many Muslims appear
to respond favorably to the return to religion as the root of their heritage; so
what is the nature of France’s secularist philosophy?
The concept of French laïcité constitutes a major difference between
France and the United States, which adopted the Anglo-Saxon concept of
multiculturalism. Laïcité is the attempt to separate the religious and public
spaces and to confine faith and religious practice to the private sphere so that
it does not interfere with the state government. Laïcité is the separation of
church and state in which the state remains officially neutral in the religious
domain, particularly in the sector of public education. Since religion belongs
in the private sphere, the government forbids any ostentatious exterior reli-
gious sign or symbol such as the veil, a cross, or a Jewish yarmulke in a public
place.
I believe that these two concepts fit properly in their two countries.
In fact, this difference is rooted in the founding principles of each model.
The objective of laïcité as mentioned in the French constitution is to avoid
any element of potential social division. The French prefer “republican
166 ● Women in Lebanon

universalism” to “American multiculturalism.” Not surprisingly, Americans

prefer multiculturalism and interpret laïcité as an infringement on religious
freedoms. However, French laïcité comes about as a reaction to the many
years of Church involvement in state affairs, from a period during which reli-
gious power threatened French government. In contrast, the United States
was founded to be a pluralistic society, created for those persecuted for
their religious beliefs, so that they may live freely in the New World. I ask
myself how Lebanon fits between these two models; it is a pluralistic and
multicultural society like the United States, in which the public practices and
recognizes many religions. Yet at the same time, church and state are inextri-
cably linked, the distribution of power in government is based upon religious
alignment. It uses multiculturalism as a means to accommodate the diversity
of religious identities. Yet, is multiculturalism contributing to the “return to
religion” as a political tool? What elements can be taken from the French and
American models to create an authentically Lebanese national model?
The religious phenomenon has now taken over as the utmost concern of
the world. Since September 11, 2001, the national political dialogue in the
United States has shifted in order to emphasize religious values and the role of
religion in peoples’ lives. In France, people are now debating models of inte-
gration like American multiculturalism and laïcité because of the increasing
prominence of Muslim immigrant communities in France, whereas before,
the dialogue was primarily about economic models, like socialism. In social
gatherings, people passionately discuss their thoughts for or against the wear-
ing of the veil, and talk about terrorism and its links to Islam, or about the
Judeo-Christian heritage versus the Muslim or Arab Muslim world.
Similarly, Lebanon is a stronghold of coexistence and religious convivial-
ity that is today marked, more than ever, by religious pluralism. People define
themselves as Christians and Muslims, as Maronite, Sunni, and Shi’i. Con-
versations revolve around interpretation of one Qur’anic Sura or another, the
American Army in Iraq and Afghanistan, the emergence of the Cedar Revo-
lution, the competition for power between Sunni and Shi’i, and, recently, the
outcome of the legislative elections of June 2009.
What a change in our universe! What has caused the change that has
taken place so rapidly? Thirty years ago, I seldom saw this hair accessory.
One might wonder why the majority of Shi’i women are making themselves
publicly visible by wearing the veil, when the Shi’i women at my time were
often secular, to the point where even some became members of the commu-
nist party. Thirty years ago, mothers advised their daughters to take off the
veil; today, daughters adopt the veil with or without their mothers’ approval.
I began to wonder if this return to religious symbols is a consequence of the
pluralistic Lebanese formula, and if the Lebanese multiculturalism requires
 Modernity, Multiculturalism, and Lebanese Women ● 167

some safeguards. Have the Shi’i of Lebanon found new forms of religious
and political authority that could be legitimate and sustainable? Most of the
twentieth-century philosophies in the West express a crisis of identity pre-
dicting a return to the literal interpretation of religious sources, and making
the Mediterranean Orient a place of mystical pilgrimage. What do these new
statements of religious identity in Lebanon mean for Christian and Muslim
women?
In order to begin to address these questions, it is necessary to have a firm
understanding of the differing interpretation of modernity. Tensions among
these varying interpretations are responsible for the crisis of the Lebanese
identity. Lebanon has always been characterized by multiculturalism—a phe-
nomenon that has contributed to the success of the United States, but that has
somehow led to the unrest in Lebanon over the past few decades. As Lebanon
has evolved both intrinsically and because of the changes in the region, so too
has the role of modernity and concepts of cultural identity. It seems that we
are now in a period of divergence—mentalities are constantly transforming,
and the final outcome remains unclear, but it is certain that women will have a
key role to play in the future of their religious groups and the Lebanese nation.

Christian Perspective
Abouna is one of the priests who served in Saghbine, putting him in a prime
position to observe religious life in the village and surrounding area. I asked
him to describe the role of women in the local religious context, is today’s
modernity characterized by a return to Religion, and what are his thoughts
on secularism. Here is his response:

Is Secularism Possible?
Yes, for it is happening gradually. However, the Lebanese civil society is so embed-
ded in the prevalent religious mentality in all confessions that it will take a long
time to change. There is no secularization without religion. This task would
indicate the separation of politics from religion, but without breaking up with
religion. Lebanon’s system is closer to American secularism, which is characterized
by the coexistence of many confessions and religions. In America, we call this phe-
nomenon multiculturalism. The French called their form of secularism “laïcité,”
which has led to the French slogan “je suis croyant mais non pratiquant,” which
means “I am a believer but not a practitioner.”
How about ‘Assabiyya7 ?
On Assabiyya, he stated that it is strongest in Sunni and Shi’i communities, and
is more powerful than the Christian ‘Assabiyya. A group of Al-Qaeda and another
168 ● Women in Lebanon

group of Hizbullah members are present in Bar Elias in the Bekaa; Bar Elias is
on the way to Saghbine from Beirut. This is significant because while the Kataeb
Party of the Christian Phalange once held this group, it is no longer represented
there. The influence of ‘Assabiyya is rather negative on the Lebanese population to
say the least.

His account stresses that Christian institutions have always been central in
the development of Christian villages. Changes caused by new economic and
political conditions have not deterred religious devotion—emigration, urban-
ization, and the expansion of other sects’ influence in areas like education have
not hindered the building of new churches or the continuation of Christian
education. The role of women within the Church has also become more open
and active. Since the end of the Civil War, numerous accounts of people hav-
ing mystical and miraculous visions of the Virgin Mary and other Saints have
spread throughout the region, and many are interpreting these visions as a
foretelling of the Messiah’s return. Meanwhile, Lebanese Christian women
are not representing their faith through their style of dress; on the contrary,
Abouna attests that more and more Christian women are abandoning the
traditional value of modesty.
Because of religion’s profound impact on Lebanese life, it is obvious that
Abouna cannot imagine the importance of religion diminishing in people’s
personal lives, even if Lebanon may be moving in the direction of a more
secular model.
For the advent of a Lebanese civil society, common civil laws are pri-
mordial to the homogenization of the confessional seats. The advent of the
Lebanese Civil society and the equality of civil laws are primordial. The pre-
dominant mood of the Arabs had been secular prior to the last two decades;
the national identity includes Christians and Muslims without pointing at
differences in faith, without polarization. A discourse of coexistence in which
we form a community of polity in the national sense with respect and
understanding without coercion is the attitude that we need.
One of the traditional defining elements of modernity is its self-referential
binary of secularism and religion. The reality has become far more compli-
cated than this binary way of thinking, and more important elements have
emerged than religion as civil society has progressed, especially in a pluralistic
a country as Lebanon.
 CHAPTER 10

Christian-Muslim Relations,
Women, and Religion

H
ow are these developments affecting women in Saghbine and
throughout other parts of the country?1 I conducted an updated
fieldwork in Lebanon in the summers from 2008 to 2010. I spent
the summer of 2008 in Beirut, and from there I traveled to different cities and
villages in order to examine first-hand the changes, to analyze them in terms
of Western modernity as well as in terms of Islamic resurgence that occurred
recently in the lives of urban and rural women there.

The Christian Perspective

Interview with Ustaz (Professor)
Ustaz has served as a high school teacher in the public school in Saghbine
for many years; he stresses the importance of dialogue. I interviewed him to
learn more about the changes that occurred in the status of women in the
area taking into account the factor of religion.

What are the changes that occurred in Saghbine over the last twenty years?
Lebanon and Saghbine, during this period, were lacking stability—we were dev-
astated by war and Israeli invasion and retreat. It is difficult to explain the change
of what is still alive, since I live it and see it every day. I have been a high school
teacher in this village for many years. In our high school, ninety percent of girls
move on to higher education. In fact, the majority of our students are girls, since
many young men have left to work. The lifestyle of the women of the pre-war
generation, women who used to bake homemade bread, who used to wash laun-
dry by hand, does not exist anymore. Today, the difference between a mother
and her daughter is less profound than in antiquity, the wall of authority that
170 ● Women in Lebanon

characterized parents in the past is on the path to disappearance. I taught two

generations and am in contact with people in both. Although girls are more edu-
cated today than in previous years, there are fewer women working in fields, so few
that they do not call their specialty. Neither the government, nor the universities,
nor the organizations of Lebanon are preparing opportunities for the new gener-
ation. The old bourgeois elite is still in place, working for their own advantage.
The elite control the reigns of government, even now, after the war.
What are the consequences for the women of Saghbine?
Life is not normal for these young girls. For example, marriage is and has always
been based on the relationship between families. Emigration caused the departure
of many young men. Young men come from Canada and Australia, and some from
Akron, Ohio, to Saghbine in order to find a bride. For example, the graduating
class of 2000 consisted of 15 girls and no men. Now, in 2008, only three of them
are married—a statistic demonstrating that disproportion of men to women in
this village.
Another consequence is imbued in their lifestyles—women have more freedom
than ever before. If you look at the hotel and pool of Saghbine for example—girls
used to stay at home and never use the swimming pool, but now, the pool area is
filled with rural girls enjoying their afternoons.
In your opinion, how is the evolution taking place, based on this freedom?
The evolution is taking place in a backwards way. Children of wealthy families
have more facilities and understand the principles of diplomacy in their average
relationships. Girls from more humble families, for the time being, do not have
this basis for social behavior; they lack guidance from their parents. But I think
with time, they will learn.
In Saghbine, differences in social classes still exist. In conversation, I have heard
people say, “Who are you? When did you emerge?”
Is Westernization taking place here?
Yes. It comes mainly from Beirut to here. For Christians, everything that comes
from the West is completely accepted. These last decades have been characterized
by separating people. Muslims and Christians organize some meetings, but in my
opinion, these meetings are superficial, because Muslims believe that they are the
basis of Lebanese society. However, Christians have been on this land for thou-
sands of years, but some Muslims consider us as Dukhala’ 2 . . . For example, I am
competent in the field of education, and the other teachers recognize it. How-
ever, in my meetings with directors from Mashghara (a town dominated by Shi’i),
I feel that I do not have the right to talk. Our dream as Christians is to remain
on our land and to live in peace with them. The Pope’s ambassador came to
Saghbine to encourage Christians to remain on their land. He visited the Convent
 Christian-Muslim Relations, Women, and Religion ● 171

of the Sisters of the Holy Family of Lebanon. As far as we are considered, we

have good relations with Druzes, Sunnis and Shi’is, for we deal with them in
commerce. However, there is no interdependence or social relationship; we have
nothing against them and they have nothing against us. In the last twenty years,
the immigration from Mashghara to Canada consisted of 18 percent of the village’s
Christians. In 1986, because of the political situation, people left Saghbine to go
to Beirut, and from Beirut, many fled to Canada and Australia. Most of these
fleers were members of the Kataeb (right wing Christian Phalange Party) and of
the Lebanese armed forces. When Israel left in 2000, Amal and Hizbullah rose in
power in Mashghara. Today, Lebanon as a sovereign, independent country does
not exist. Lebanon is a democratic country characterized by multiculturalism, but
our government is filled with contradictions. It is as if Lebanon is living on life
support; this is not a real life. Who protects its Christian people? Patriarch Sfeir?
But he kept his conservative mentality and some blame him of not having a vision
for all Christians.
Unfortunately, Christians are leaving. In Palestinian territories, there are very
few of them. In Iraq, they all left. There are very few in Jordan. The power of
Christian Arabs is on the decline due to immigration.
What do you think of the coexistence of Saghbine with other Muslim
village?
The Usuliyya or fundamentalism, does not serve coexistence and cooperation. Life
in Saghbine is becoming a bit indecent and lacks unity among its villagers. Girls
now frequent the town square, a venue that was previously frequented by men.
These girls stay up to all hours of the night and their nights are not always
innocent. In the Christian schools of Saghbine, the number of Muslim students
has been decreasing lately, since Hizbullah built its own school for Muslims. The
schools were formally sixty percent Christian and forty percent Muslim; the ratio
today is 95 percent to 5 percent. These demographics are weakening the coexistence
between Christians and Muslims. I used to know all the families of Mashghara
and I visited most homes. Since 1985, everything has changed. For example, if
there is a death in a Shi’i family, Christian families no longer visit the house of
the deceased to offer their condolences. Every community has its own life. Pre-
viously, the businessman Albert Karam played the role of the mediator between
different families and communities. Everyone respected him. When he died, only
a small number of Shi’i timidly offered their condolences, although in years passed,
the entire Shi’i community would have attended his funeral. The Shi’i now has
their own mediators who are one of them; it is not necessary that this person be
a Christian. By contrast, all Mashghara people, regardless of religion, attended
the funeral of Rafik Debbs, a Christian, twenty-five years ago. The situation then
allowed for this unity.
172 ● Women in Lebanon

How does this change reflect on Muslim women in Mashghara?

The Shi’i Muslim woman was also influenced by the ideology of Hizbullah.
My female students who formally shook hands with me now refrain from this
type of greeting. The more courageous students have told me that they no longer
can. These same women are now wearing a veil. 1986 was a turning point for the
wearing of the veil. I do not think that they wear the veil out of respect for their
faith; each girl is being paid for wearing the veil. There is no longer interaction
with the Christians. However, I think that if the political, social, and religious
climate changes, they will change with it.
Even the Sunni in the Qar’on village, in which violence did not occur, a moral
isolation developed between the communities—as if one of the communities said
to the other, “we don’t need you.” In Jib Janine and around it, the Muslims built
castles, but these castles remain uninhabited and do not have a soul. The social
life of the Christians in Jib Janine has changed; Muslims no longer walk behind
the coffin at Christian funerals, as they once did. Instead, they sometimes offer
their condolences by a visit to the deceased’s home.
After the assassination of the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, the Sunni
became more isolated. What I mean to say is that there were no more opportu-
nities for inter-religious discussion. Although the leaders are open to the West, the
followers are still extremists. Therefore, there is no change of mentalities; there are
sometimes superficial political alliances, but deep inside, the mentality is scary.
We cannot talk about openness in the western Bekaa. My field is education,
and we have common lands—our water is shared, our markets are shared—
but it seems that they want to develop their own resources and meeting places.
It seems that they do not want to deal with the Christians. What is unfortu-
nate is that social life between Christians and Muslims has very little interaction,
especially when it comes to women. There used to be invitations for Christian
women to celebrate Muslim holidays, but now, both sides do not accept the other’s
invitation. There is a rejection of the other community; everything has become
politicized.
Between 1992 and 2004, we created an association for the development of
education in Saghbine. We were able to fundraise from many foreign embassies,
and we distributed this money to every village. However, the Muslims interpreted
our charitable actions as having a political motive.
I am pessimistic about Muslim women, because they are isolating themselves
geographically; they just want to be connected to those of their own religion, soci-
ety, and culture. Prejudices are predominant. The nuns of Bar Elias have three
cars for Muslims who attend their schools. The nuns distinguish these children as
Muslim in front of the other children, which is an indirect form of discrimina-
tion. The children interact in school, but the distinction always exists to prevent
certain closeness. This distinction has always existed, but is more profound today.
 Christian-Muslim Relations, Women, and Religion ● 173

We need some movements of awareness. We need a pure openness admitting that

their message is a divine message, although we Christians do not believe in the
prophecy of Muhammad.
How do women participate in this development of religious
isolationism?
When Christians talk about Saint John, we refer to him as a Prophet—in fact, he
is more important than a Prophet. No woman ever gave birth to a more important
Prophet than Saint John, for he prepared the way for the Lord. If the Qur’anic
verses did not recognize Mary and Jesus, God knows what would have happened
to us Christians. However, they do not believe in Jesus Christ as the son of God,
because they cannot accept the idea that God has a son, and they consider this as
heresy. Muslims always say Alla’h Akbar, which means “praise be to God,” mean-
ing that nothing resembles God in his power. In fact, there are no images of God
in Islam, and Christ is supposed to be the reincarnation of God—you see how this
cannot be accepted. As Christians, we have facilitated the apparition of Islam,
because we were divided. The propagation of Islam took place by force; Muslims
paid 50,000 rials to someone to convert to Islam—in fact, they still do. Every
woman must have children in order to increase the number of Muslims. If we
return to history, we see that Syria was only Christian, and the Umayyad mosque
used to be the church of Saint John. If it were not for Syria and the Syrian peo-
ple, Islam would not have propagated, because the Syrians guided Muslims to
Indonesia and even to Russia.
I do not want to say the coexistence means Utopia, but today, we cannot talk
about open dialogue between a professor and a student, especially if they belong
to different religions. Again, we need a profound and efficient awareness from the
elite and from Christian foundations. Maybe positivism will lead to more posi-
tivism, but certainly, continued refusal will result in complete rejection.
From an educational standpoint, there is a regression. Critical thinking is no
longer appreciated and encouraged. The educational program has an influence on
all students, especially women, since the majority of students are girls. Previously,
our education system was modeled after the French program, with required read-
ings from many French, Western-oriented others. Today, these readings are not
mandatory.
A new government has just been formed, but it includes just one woman—
the Secretary for Education, Bahia Hariri. She is the sister of the late
Prime Minister Hariri. What do you think about this nomination?
This woman has already played a positive role on education. She participated in
the Parliamentary educational commission. She is a dynamic person and influ-
enced Islam in the entire region, not only in Lebanon. At that time, she was not
veiled, and now, she is. She decided to wear the veil after the assassination of her
174 ● Women in Lebanon

brother as a form of mourning, and she will wear it until the International Court
brings to justice his assassins. She is a committed Muslim woman.
A Christian woman does not show a commitment to her religion in the same
way. She can be a judge, a wife of a judge, or the wife of a cabinet member, or a
cabinet member. What is important to her is a fulfilling social life—she just wants
to live and be happy. When she participates in a discourse with Muslim women,
the discussion is not really profound, although the Lebanese woman is capable of
treating a more significant subject matter. She has many predispositions, and the
existence of her intuition combined with her reason deems her more capable than
a man.

Discourse
As we saw in Part I, life has changed dramatically for women in Saghbine
over the past 20 years: women have more freedom and educational oppor-
tunities, but they are still limited by a lack of professional opportunities.
Ustaz (professor) does an excellent job of identifying the obstacles in improv-
ing Christian-Muslim relations: a mutual distrust and an isolationist attitude
within both groups are limiting interactions in schools and communities that
used to foster interreligious dialogue. An environment that fails to promote
critical thinking and open-mindedness prevents women from rising above
these challenges.
Obviously, Arab Christians are beginning to feel threatened by the shift in
demographics that is altering the historical balance of power in Lebanon.
Now seen as a minority, they are consulted and included less and less in
government, as we see in Ustaz’s personal experience with the educational
system. When combined with perceived and real resentment from other
groups and economic hardship, it is no wonder Christians are being called
to hold their ground to discourage abandoning their lands and forsaking
their sacred spaces. Greek-Catholic Patriarch George III affirmed the impor-
tant obligation of Lebanese Christians to stay and participate in a homily
in 2007:

The Providence cares for Lebanon in order for it to remain, in our Arab Orient,
a cradle of civilizations and of religions . . . The Lebanese take responsibility for
their own name just like in the name of all of their co-believers in the Arab
world. If the Christians and the Muslims succeed at preserving conviviality in
Lebanon, to live the model of unique confessional relationships, the entire Arab
world would also be ensured of the success of this pluralistic model. One could
also say that the success of dialogue between civilizations and of religions in the
Arab Orient and in the entire world depends on the success of the Lebanese
model.
 Christian-Muslim Relations, Women, and Religion ● 175

The Shi’i Perspective

The 33-day conflict with Israel in 2006 boosted the presence of Hizbullah
in Lebanon because of their effective response to the growing needs of the
conflict-ridden Shi’i population, especially in Southern Lebanon and in the
dahiya, the southern suburb of Beirut, where their headquarter is located.
Hizbullah proved itself as much a social organization as it is a political orga-
nization. It opened schools, libraries, hospitals, public welfare programs for
the needy and those who lost a family member. Moreover, the party provided
help to family of martyrs, widows, and orphans. The need for a new kind of
workforce to perform these additional services gave women the opportunity
to participate in the functions of the organization. The role of Hizbullah
women resulted in an increased responsibility and popularity of the Shi’i
women in Lebanon.

Interview with Sayyid (Honorific Title)

Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah,3 the prominent Lebanese Shi’i marja’,
founded a large Mabarrat (charitable institution) in Haret Hreik, Beirut,
comprising an orphanage, a mosque, a school, and a library. In July 17, 2008,
I interviewed al Sayyid, an official of the Library.

Currently, what is the role of Hizbullah’s women in Lebanon?

Woman is changing according to the conditions of society. There is a fundamen-
tal change in habits and traditions. Women used to cry upon the death of their
sons; however, now the son is considered a martyr and a mother receives con-
gratulations from her neighbors instead of condolences. More importantly, women
now wash and dress their sons in preparation for their burial, and this change
is the result of suffering endured for a long time.4 The conflict with Israel in
Southern Lebanon destroyed our homes more than four times. They bombed our
country several times, and this violence created resentment, rancor, and hatred
against the Israelis. Women and their sons cannot forget nor leave the Resistance,
for they do not want to live in humiliation. These women will continue to be
like this until the border is protected. All these women lived in a time of war
and change. Therefore, the political, social and security situation taught women
to count on themselves—they do not rely on men—which elevated them to a
level that resembles that of a very educated woman. Women learned patience, an
important feature of Muslim women.
Women also learned responsibility, especially after the departures of men to
other countries to find work—a new phenomenon in Lebanon for all religious
groups. Women fortified their personality to face different difficulties of life. In my
176 ● Women in Lebanon

opinion, the liberation of women is not an irrelevant question—in fact, women

have more rights than men.
What is the impact of the Islamic Revolution in Iran on Lebanese women
in general and on Shi’i women?
No, we are the ones who influenced the Iranians.
How?
The link between the Lebanese Shi’i from Iran is first based on our common doc-
trines and religious practices. There is a certain centrality in Iran because Shi’ism
is the religion of the majority and the religion of the state. Since the Lebanese
brought Shi’ism to Iran, we regard Iran’s help as a just return from history.5
The resilience of women and their willingness to face problems is stronger in
Lebanon than in Iran. For example, if Lebanese women are forced to live without
water or electricity, they will find a way to survive, whereas Iranian women do
not have these problems. Not only the Shi’i, but also all communities in Lebanon
suffered from war. We have a different political situation here. We are the ones
who sent Shi’ism to Iran from the ‘Amel Mountains long time before the Iranian
revolution. However, the Islamic Revolution contributed to the political situation
in Lebanon.
Now, the Islamic Revolution has become a global issue. Historically, there has
been resistance. For example, Imam Hussein showed us the highest model of mar-
tyrdom and sacrifice. Mothers now equate the sacrifices of their sons to that of
Hussein; they believe that their martyred sons are on the same level as his exam-
ple. Sayyid Mussa El-Sadr founded a political organization called Amal, or Hope,
a movement to help the disinherited from all religious groups liberate themselves
from poverty in all of Lebanon. The military branch of this political movement
(also called Amal) was founded as a reaction to the Israeli occupation. Sayyid
Musa El-Sadr’s slogan became “Assilah Zinat Al-Rijal”—“Weapons are man’s dec-
oration.” He added that he was against the idea of Tawtin—the naturalization
of the Palestinian refugees as citizens of Lebanon. Outsiders interpreted these two
slogans to mean that we are terrorists. However, originally, these movements were
the direct cause of the occupation of Lebanon. The Jews nationalized their religion
and refused coexistence with other religions.
How do Shi’i women participate in the evolution of their country?
In general, women can participate in all aspects of life by elevating their level
of education. This education comes in addition to the characteristics of women
that we value, such as patience during the struggle that Lebanon is currently fac-
ing. Today, there are no differences between young men and women. I have four
children—two girls and two boys. The four of them are Ph.D. students. There
 Christian-Muslim Relations, Women, and Religion ● 177

is really no difference between them. There is no gender-based discrimination for

seeking higher-level education in our religion. The Shi’i people, through educa-
tion, entered the world of technology and now use it very well. This evolution
is also due to the father, who accepted that his daughters be educated. A girl can
learn any subject . . . she is responsible being and works in difficult times, and men
admit the role of women in affairs of life. Religion is not against this development.
Through the Islamic civilization, the Umayyad appropriated Islam under their
own interpretation of the doctrines. They incorporated Greek logic and reasoning
into their doctrinal interpretations. However, the Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq, founder
of the Ja’fari sect 6 of Shi’ism, gave religious and jurisprudential roots to Islam. He
propagated the Islamic civilization through his own interpretation and claimed,
“Ask for knowledge, even in China,” and “the seeker of knowledge has guardian
angels protecting him.” When his sect took Christian prisoners, he would force the
outsiders to educate three Muslims, and then release them. This anecdote demon-
strates the importance of education in the Islamic tradition.
The Prophet Mohammad placed emphasis on reading and research in order to
find the best solutions to the problems facing his contemporary society. He awak-
ened dormant societies in the Arab world. Unfortunately, his version of Islam
was misconstrued. In addition to woman’s responsibility to educate herself, she
has the responsibility to work outside of the house, just like men, since Lebanon
gave women the opportunity to evolve. She participates in the evolution of society.
Although society has liberated women from her role as simply a domestic, these
circumstances come at a high cost to society, for enemies surround Lebanon. The
Shi’i woman can work in a bank, can be a doctor—she works everywhere. How-
ever, her relationship with God does not concern anyone else, and remains in the
private domain.
At the mosque next to this library [founded by Sheikh Muhammad Hussein
Fadlallah], the Sayyid 7 gives speeches that are open to all sects. The mosque is not
only a place for prayer, but it also facilitates education and lectures. It boasts a
section designated for women. The Sayyid discusses and analyses problems faced
by the faithful in a cultural light. The Cultural Islamic Center invites doctors and
scientists from all faiths, including Christians, to a dialogue without constraints.
What Is the Meaning of Hijab? 8
It is a concept of tasatur, which in Arabic, could mean, to cover, to hide, disguise,
or to protect. We also took the concept from the Virgin Mary, who was also veiled.
The concept of the veil existed even before Islam’s inception during the Roman
times. The veil was worn at the time of our Prophet and has become part of the
Islamic principle. The veil is now a social symbol that conceals the beauty of the
woman in order to avoid temptation.
178 ● Women in Lebanon

Do you have specific educational, political, or social programs for women

in Lebanon?
We do not have any particular programs in Lebanon. When the woman has all
the capacities to work, she has the same status as a man. Sometimes, she even rises
above him. Through this library, we discovered how capable our women are. Any
Shi’i woman is very open and capable if she is in an atmosphere that is conducive
to education. She can discover other cultures, and still protect her own culture;
she interacts with the other, accepts it and benefits from it. We are also capable of
forgiving the other.
In most of our work, especially that which has an educational aspect, girls play
the most important role. They attend educational seminars in which they excel.
In the workforce, women are taking the positions that men used to fill. However,
our women expect to earn less money.
I saw many veiled girls at the Jesuit University researching in the Uni-
versity Library. When I was a young girl in Catholic school, I also had
Muslim classmates who were not veiled. Are there many Christian stu-
dents in Muslim schools?
Yes, although the percentage is very low. The war forced these children to attend
our schools. However, the percentage of Muslim girls going to Christian schools
and universities is by far higher. Our schools have improved tremendously and are
equal to Christian schools. In the baccalaureate program, the top three students
were from a Shi’i high school.
What do you think of the influence of the Christian Arab?
The Christian Arabs went to Egypt and asked for “Arabization.” They partic-
ipated in the Arab Renaissance in the nineteenth century. Christians were the
first people (along with the Muslims) to protect the Arabic language. Until today,
the Christians are just as proficient as Muslims in the Arabic language, and are
capable of the same assimilation of the Arabic language.
Do you admit that Arab Christianity contributed to the evolution of the
country?
Certainly, because Christians are closer to the West than we are, their relationship
started in the sixteenth century. They enriched the country. This is natural and
we admit it.
What is being adopted now—the American or the European Curriculum
in schools?
Europe is opening up to the Arab culture. Currently in Lebanon, the influence
of the American curriculum is stronger, since the European curriculum is fading.
Now Muslims are learning to use instruments—a western phenomenon. Even
the fundamentalists are using the organ or the piano for reciting Islamic hymns.
 Christian-Muslim Relations, Women, and Religion ● 179

We use western tools as long as they are in concordance with our interests—we do
not tax these means as evil. We are participating in globalization.
Is the process of globalization helping women to reaffirm their Islamic
identity?
The development of woman is linked to her society. The Gulf society did not give
woman a role. Last year, women earned a right to vote. In Saudi Arabia, women
still do not drive. Kuwait has given women civil rights, but women have yet to
earn political rights. Iran is the first Arab country in terms of women’s rights,
for the deputy to the President is a woman. In Lebanon, we benefit from more
evolution than any other Arab country. Our women have freedom and respect.
In the same family, there are two sisters, where one may wear a veil and the other
does not—she is free to do as she pleases. Lebanon does not have honor killings
that exist in Jordan. In Jordan, if a brother senses any sense of guilt in his sister,
he is free to kill her. In 90% of these cases, the girls are innocent.
The agreement between the “National Freedom Movement” party of Michel
Aoun9 and Hizbullah released the anxiety and apprehension between the two
bodies. During the July 2006 war, we were pleased to see that Christian women
were cooking and caring for Shi’i victims of war. This collaboration casts a gleam
of hope for the future cooperation of both sides. In the time of danger, we came
together. At the American University of Science and Technology that is in the heart
of Ashrafieh, 70 percent of the students are Muslim.
I have a friend in Cleveland who refuses to marry her daughter to an
American because he is Christian. In this case, the Christian husband
would have to convert to Islam. Why?
This is true. A man who marries a Muslim girl must convert to Islam. How-
ever, a non-Muslim woman who marries a Muslim man can keep her religious
identity. A Christian does not admit the prophecy of Mohammad, but we admit
the prophecy of Issa (Jesus) and Moses. Therefore, elements of Christianity and
Judaism are accepted by our religion, although the former and the latter do not
accept some elements of our religion. In marriage, man’s power is stronger than
that of a woman. When a Muslim man gets married, women are not required to
become Muslim because the man’s religion supersedes women convictions. How-
ever, a man who married a Muslim girl is obligated by religion to convert to Islam.
Can you please expound on the tradition of the Iftar 10 ?
The objective of the Iftar is to feed the orphans. In Lebanon, orphans used to sell
Chiklets. Now, the idea of social equilibrium—not exactly charity—is developing
in Islam. It dictates that every Muslim should take charge of one orphan. Simulta-
neously, this concept of thaqafa11 is seen throughout Lebanon, as most foundations
support orphans.
180 ● Women in Lebanon

Do you have any relations with the Foundation for the Handicapped in
Beit Shabab, a Catholic organization?
Muslims participate in it by the thousands. Here, the Christians and Muslims
have strong religious ties, since many Muslims are sent to this institution and
Christians are caring for them.
What do you think of the coexistence of Christians and Muslims in
Lebanon?
No community can eliminate the other. If we continue to live together, side by
side, Lebanon will become the most developed country in the world—just give
Lebanon the opportunity! We have to live together! Lebanon is characterized by
our national unity.
Some Muslim women are making solemn vows to Christian saints—for exam-
ple, many Muslim women have promised Saint Charbel that if he gave them a
son, they would have their boy wear his robe for three months. This demonstrates
the unity among Christians and Muslims.
Another example: my daughter studies in Canada, where she has a Christian
friend. They decided that if ever my daughter’s friend attends our mosque,
she would wear her cross, whereas my daughter would attend her mass wear-
ing her veil. The Lebanese living overseas do not take into account Ta’ifiya
(communitarianism)—what is paramount is that we are all Lebanese.
The path of Bin Laden damaged Islam, and Islam is really innocent of Bin
Laden’s atrocities. September 11 does not help Muslims; it painted the ugliest pic-
ture of our beloved faith, and we now have to fight this picture. Every veiled
woman is not Bin Laden; some Muslims are really suffering from Bin Laden’s
actions.
I’ve heard about the Mahdi 12 fighting along with the Shi’i during the 2006
war. Can you tell me about this?
In Bint Jbeil, a tree was cut down, and in the same area, 23 young men died
as martyrs. When the villagers set out to replace the tree, they found 23 green
branches growing around the tree stump. It was a miracle.
In the Shi’i religion, we are still waiting for al-Mahdi. His coming will prop-
agate peace on earth and the disappearance of oppression. The idea of a savior is
becoming more popular, since so many Lebanese mothers in the south of Lebanon
live in poverty and desolation. They attach to the idea of a divine force coming
to relieve them of their current despair. All faithful believe in these divine forces.
However, although we accept the possibility of divine intervention, we need to be
realistic and face our problems by refusing oppression and humiliation. We cannot
sit and wait in inaction while expecting divine forces to work for us. We must live
our reality and spread justice; otherwise, ignorance will invade us. Israel is an
enormous power, but we know that in the end, God will give victory to his people.
 Christian-Muslim Relations, Women, and Religion ● 181

Clearly, Sayyid interprets the role of Shi’i women primarily within the context
of Hizbullah’s struggle against Israel. While there are many similarities with
the other interviewees’ opinions in terms of women’s opportunities in educa-
tion and their capabilities to perform as well as men in the workplace, Sayyid
emphasizes the Shi’i woman’s position within the Resistance movement as the
mothers of combatants—a source of pride and empowerment for them. The
conflict with Israel has also made Shi’i women strong and self-reliant, and the
absence of men in traditionally masculine occupations due to emigration and
war has obligated women to be proactive and to work outside the domestic
sphere. In Sayyid’s interpretation of Shi’ism, women are still “weaker” than
men in some ways: their religious convictions are “superseded” by those of
their husbands, they accept earning lower wages than men, and they cover
themselves to avoid being a temptation for men.
Sayyid acknowledges the legacy of Christian Arabs in Lebanon. He also
points out that Shi’i are working to educate themselves and adopt new tools
so that they can attain a similar level of development, without compro-
mising their identity or beliefs. In his opinion, positive relations between
religious sects are not only necessary for Lebanon, but also advantageous
for national development and for the evolution of women. Furthermore, he
cites many examples of cooperation that may be overlooked in other analyses
of Muslim-Christian relations: collaboration on social projects and disaster
relief efforts, opportunities for dialogue in mosques and cultural centers, and
student interactions in institutions of higher learning.

Alternative Modernities
The future of modernity has two faces; one that is held by the Muslims of
Lebanon and the other by the Christians. The Muslim vision of modernity
includes a return to traditional roles and expressions of faith, a vintage
approach to rejuvenating society. The Christian approach views modernity
in an adaptive context, in which integration is favored over insularity. Cer-
tain Muslims hold on to secularism, although under the cultural influence
from the global Islamist resurgence, a secular Muslim society is diminishing
in favor of a state that adheres more closely to religious ideals as set forth by
the Qur’an. The impact of this divergence from secularism was apparent to
me during the interview I conducted with the group of women at Hizbullah
headquarters; I remarked by the collectivist standpoint they have adapted,
which inhibits them from engaging in criticism of either their own group or
others. By contrast, the remaining Christian society views constructive cri-
tique, both of itself and of other groups, to be essential in order to promote
progress and stimulate growth.
 CHAPTER 11

Lebanese Women in All Their

Diversity: Convergence and
Divergence

H
ow can one portray Lebanese women in all their diversity? Not
all women wear the veil, and many allegations exist that all Arab
women are the same. Westerners often believe that all Arab women
are veiled, illiterate, secluded, demure, oppressed, and belong to conservative
sects of Islam. While there is an unbalanced equilibrium between men and
women in the Middle East, women always know how to bounce back from
the trials in their lives and not become downtrodden and miserable. Each
woman has the potential to actualize her own life according to her upbring-
ing and dreams and hopes to inspire others. The world is beginning to learn
that there are both Christians and Muslims in the Arab world, and within
those two groups, a great amount of diversity exists in women, but their
commonalities are what makes the women of this region such fierce samples
of a strong culture.

Beirut—Poem by Nadia Tueni

This poem was read on March 14, 2006, at the demonstrations of the Cedar
Revolution to stand for civilizations, nonviolence, and appreciating the rich
history of Lebanon and its role in the Middle East, despite the imminent
chaos. This poem, written by Nadia Tueni, mother of Gebran Tueni assassi-
nated in December 12, 2005,1 is now symbolic of the Cedar Revolution and
is read frequently in reference to those times.

Beirut
A thousand times dead, a thousand times relived . . .
In Beirut each idea resides in a house
184 ● Women in Lebanon

In Beirut each word is an ostentation.

In Beirut one unloads thoughts and caravans,
pirates of spirit, priestesses or sultans,
So be it religious, or sorceress
be it both, be it pivot
of the sea door or of the Levant’s gates
be it bloody or water blessed
be it innocent or murderous
In being Phoenician, Arab or on a relaying way
In being Levantine with multiple vertigos
like these unfamiliar flowers fragile on their stems
Beirut is the last sanctuary in the Orient
Where man can always dress himself in robes of light.2

Nadia Tueni is a perfect example of the diversity of Lebanese woman. Her

father, a Druze diplomat and writer, Mohamad Ali Hamadé, married a
European Christian woman, and Nadia was raised between the two dom-
inant religions in Lebanon and also between two languages. She became a
poet at the convergence of two cultures: Western and Middle Eastern. She
married a Greek Orthodox man, a journalist, Congressman of Beirut, and
Ambassador of Lebanon to the United Nations from 1977 to 1982, Ghassan
Tueni. Ghassan was the son of the founder of the An-Nahar newspaper, the
most widely distributed Arabic daily newspaper, among the few that valued
freedom of speech. An-Nahar remains the most influential newspaper in the
Middle East. Their son, Gebran, was also a well-known writer for An-Nahar
and often said, “I am half Muslim half Christian in a country where one’s
religion was sometimes more important than one’s nationality.”
Having ties to many different confessions helped Nadia represent the
unique diversity of Lebanon, instead of insular separations of religious groups.
From her unique standpoint, she was able to be a progressive, open, and wel-
coming force in the Lebanese literary world. She won numerous awards for
her writing, including being accepted by l’Académie Française and went on to
receive their Order of La Pléiade and the Prix Said Akl in Lebanon. Further-
more, she had a traditional upbringing but challenged roles as she grew up.

Traditional Women in the Face of Modernity: Still Successful

Rural Life
B. C. was a rural agriculturalist, born around 1910 in Saghbine. She spent
her life working the land, continuously selling her crops in addition to
taking on her household responsibilities, which were always her pleasure. Her
 Diversity: Convergence and Divergence ● 185

relationship with the land marked her physiology; she could no longer stand
still, and she walked with her shoulders hunched or with her back completely
inversed. This explains that her world is essentially determined by the land,
that is, by planting and harvesting, and by the heavens, that is, by thanking
the Creator.
She is an example of a truly ambitious woman. Her parents died during
World War I, and from that point, at a very young age, it became necessary for
her to work for the family, which gave her strength, vigor, and, above all, self-
determination. “My only joy and my only satisfaction is to see my children,”
she told me. Married young, she had ten children, five of whom died during
childbirth and the life of one daughter ended after an olive harvest. In 1982,
when this interview took place, in spite of her old age, she continued to
work the land, and she still had a cow, and continued to sell fresh milk and
traditionally prepared cheese that she made herself. Completely self-sufficient,
even while struggling with physical limitations and tragedy, B. C. exemplifies
the inherent strength of Lebanese women.

In the City
Laura: The Perfect Lady of the House
Laura3 is an urban woman from Saghbine, born around 1920. She is the
example of the perfect Lady of the House. She completed her childhood and
primary studies in Zahlé at the Sisters of the Sacred Hearts (Soeurs de Saints-
Coeurs), and completed her secondary studies at the college of Antoura, a
boarding school near Beirut. In 1932, she returned to Zahlé following the
death of her father and devoted herself to the care of the home and her broth-
ers. During that time, she would meet at the parish as a member of the Legion
of Mary. Once a month, she organized receptions at her home. She invited
young girls her age, and sometimes, young men as well. She attended the
majority of invitations extended to her in Zahlé, while reading novels, plays
and reviews for leisure.
In 1937, her family moved to Beirut, where Laura lived like she did in
Zahlé, where her acquaintances would follow her every move. She went out
to the theater to see comedies and tragedies and to the Casino of Lebanon
where her brother worked. During the summer, with her neighborhood, she
went swimming. She also returned to the village where nights with her friends
often became walks to nabeh el-khraïzet,4 eating and walking, but always in
the presence of her brothers.
In 1941, she married a lieutenant. They had to ask for an exemption
from patriarch because her deceased father was the godfather of her fiancé.
186 ● Women in Lebanon

A grand wedding in Beirut reunited the whole village that made the trip for
the occasion and their acquaintances from the city.
In 1942, their first son was born, followed by two others three and ten
years later. Her husband was absent from the birth of his first son. He was
sent by the army in the Syrian campaign as a military topographer to draw
the new borders of Syria, which had recently been amputated from the city of
Alexandrite and its surrounding areas. In spite of the absence of her husband,
she assumed all the work of her household and the responsibilities of her
child. The couple lived comfortably; they had the same mentality, were gen-
erous, constantly received and attended important invitations because of the
assignments given to her husband. He obtained the command of the Lebanese
Artillery during the independence of the Lebanese army . . . the more the
situation progressed, the more the house became open.
In 1968, when her husband was stationed in Tripoli, she had to open a new
home and establish new contacts with personalities of Northern Lebanon.
Then in 1970, he was appointed to Washington as a military attaché. They
lived in the Lebanese way more than adapting to an American life and
invitations followed through.
In 1971, he retired for a few months and then was appointed Commander
in Chief of the Lebanese Army. Then, she had to assume more duties of
a larger house. Her sociability was at its height during holidays; she visited
nearly all of the wives of the other officers.
This woman is the perfect lady of a house, as an officer’s wife and as the
mother of a model family; with a reputation for honesty, benevolence, and
extreme generosity. Today, her husband is retired, but this does not stop her
from receiving important people. They still visit the United States and France
where they stay with their two sons. Their third son is an officer in the navy,
commander of the Port of Jounieh, the only port that remains in the hands
of the Lebanese Army.
I wrote this portrait in 1982. In the meantime, her older son has become
the congressional representative of the West Bekaa, her second son reached
the highest level in the army, then retired to be nominated the director of the
Lebanese custom. The youngest son spent years in Dallas and later worked for
many years in Cairo for US Agency for International Development (USAID).
Unfortunately, she and her husband recently passed away.
Outside of these exceptional situations, we should ask if, beyond this
diversity of concepts of woman, one could release Lebanese particulars for
an anthropologic reflection:
Original traits of Lebanese women emerge from their human behavior
that remains traditionalistic. Among traditions that women did not give up is
hospitality. This virtue remains from a more patriarchal time. The hospitality
 Diversity: Convergence and Divergence ● 187

that astonishes and causes outsiders’ admiration and merits recognition, and
which might encounter disdain in other countries, has been preserved in the
village today, fortunately. The new roads and the media have shattered the
framework linked to nature, but the sense of hospitality remains alive and
expected. For author Jean Corbon, “We are here less in a civilization of dom-
ination, more in a welcoming one. The greatness and the vulnerability of
our region that comes partially from this vocation that comes from the land:
being in open relationships rather than in a dominant autarky.”5
To establish oneself in the city is synonymous with civilization. Urban-
ization has created new models for relationships within couples and families;
the most difficult aspect for a family in transition and for every new national
modernization project is the condition of women and all the nuances we
foresee. The actual trend is still struggling with modernism. Modernism? Yes!
But women are still questioning the framework of ancestral traditions, and
without any disdain for everything that is Lebanese. They ameliorate their
edifice’s facade, bring comfortable accommodations, but without modifying
the solid foundation. “We, the women, our walls are good too,” women say.
Lebanese know that civilization is neither a matter of science, nor a question
of scientific application. They do not believe in importing a civilization as
it exists in another country. “There are fatalities of race, climate, physiologi-
cal and psychological heredities against which everything collapses.”6 For that
matter, it is a challenge to conform modern conveniences to the most ancient
and vulnerable customs.
The importance of group cohesion allows adding another aspect of the
urban phenomenon. Inhabitants of large cities are not yet urban residents
but rather urbanized rural people. As in the village, they gather insularly in
districts. Consequently, their behavior is the same as in the village with their
health, human warmth, solidarity, and most importantly their attachment
to traditional behavior. Thus, the common cultural basis of all Lebanese,
whether Christians or Muslims, comes from the difficult promotion of the
woman, the precarious independence of newly married homes, the freedom
of professional orientation or adolescents’ vocation, and the sense of honor
and values of prestige that are still predominant.
However, as pragmatic as we are with our sense of the immediate, there
is something more profound, more humane, and more divine at the same
time; it is the attachment to religion. The sense of the hereafter lives in the
Lebanese. “Its vast range of values might sometimes divert them, but does not
blow out their thirsts of the transcendent.”7 From here, the preeminence of
values of intuition rises up over the positive facts and the value of authority
triumphs over critical standards. Faith is nothing more than this intuition
resting on an authority.
188 ● Women in Lebanon

But in Lebanon, the religion that is more preserved in rural areas has a
more faithful companion in this passion of freedom, which was and remains,
in the face of diversity of confessions, an element of unity. Sincere religion,
profound religion—religion is more profound and more sincere for the peas-
ant. From here comes the devotion of women, and particularly the rural
woman, who experiences a real devotion without wavering. The Lebanese
people who preserve the religious faith, even sometimes mixed with supersti-
tions, have more of a future than a dissolute society, where indifference and
incredulity have dried up the hearts of the people.

Georgina: The Paradigm of Devotion

Georgina8 belongs to the urban bourgeoisie. Her father, originally from
Bikfaya, a large picturesque mountain village, just east of Beirut, left Lebanon
on the eve of the outbreak of World War I. Besides the harsh times that
the Lebanese endured under the Ottoman Empire, a plague of grasshop-
pers ravaged Lebanon, leaving almost no crops for the population’s survival.
Moreover, his mother died and his father remarried. Feeling hopeless on all
fronts, he envisaged emigration and embarked on an unknown journey. He
sailed from the Lebanese shore to wherever the boat was going. The boat
landed in Marseille, and from there he embarked on another ship that trav-
eled south on the Atlantic Ocean and reached the Senegalese shore. From
there, he began a tough life in a foreign place but was soon able to adapt and
courageously made his way through in a foreign continent. From beginnings
as a simple fabric merchant, he founded a business that developed quickly
and reached many different African countries. He began importing fabric
from Manchester, England, to sell it in the African countries. His business
expanded to the Ivory Coast and to French Guinea. He also met a Lebanese
emigrant in Guinea, Ramza, and married her. Ramza’s brothers were promi-
nent in the Lebanese community. One brother represented Guinea at the
United Nations at the time, and her other brother was honorably decorated
and solemnly titled by the pope as a representative of the Saint Sepulcher.
This decoration is given to those who have achieved highest humane act of
charity. The couple had four children and Georgina was the third child.
Georgina was born in Senegal in 1928. Senegal was a French colony at the
time, and she grew up in a loving family environment. Following her early
childhood in Africa, she and her brother and sisters were sent to boarding
schools in Lebanon. Her brother attended the Jesuit School for Boys in Beirut
and Georgina and her sisters attended the School of the Sisters of the Holy
Family in Bikfaya. A driven student, she accomplished her studies success-
fully and attained the Baccalaureate level—an accomplishment for a woman
 Diversity: Convergence and Divergence ● 189

at that time in Lebanon. The nuns who ran the school instilled in her a pro-
found sense of a transcendental devotion and a discipline in the practice of
her faith, and to this day, Georgina attends services daily. She thought about
her religious vocation and even considered becoming a nun, but ultimately
opted for a civil life with an emphasis on religion as well as on social and
charitable work.
She learned to play the piano during her childhood education, and after-
ward she played the organ in churches for Sunday masses. She enjoyed reading
books of saints and memorizing French and Arabic poems. She went with her
friends to the movie theater and went wherever the Sisters took her on field
trips in Lebanon. Her parents came every summer from Africa to check on
their children.
When the four children reached high school, their mother came to
Lebanon and they were able to live together as a family, an experience they
had been missing since childhood. Their father had to stay in Africa most of
the time to manage his commerce but often came to Lebanon to spend time
with them. During one of his visits, he decided to pull his son Melhem out of
high school and take him back to Africa; he needed help and wanted to show
his son how to become a man. Melhem, a fine student, resisted his father’s
decision; he deeply wanted to finish his remaining two high school years, but
ultimately had to submit to his father’s decision. This departure impacted him
for the rest of his life. His love for reading and learning continued throughout
his life, never failing to nurture his mind whenever possible.
Georgina, at that point, lived in a beautiful house with breathtaking
scenery overlooking the Mediterranean Sea, with the smell of pine trees in
the center of Bikfaya, and enjoyed being with her mother and sisters. The
preparation for the Festival of Flowers occupied her for an entire month in
the summer, decorating vehicles with thousands of colorful flowers and fruits.
After graduation, she decided to move to Paris since her brother was splitting
his time between Africa and Paris. She enjoyed life in Paris and took advan-
tage of what the city had to offer. She attended art history courses at the
Louvre and was fascinated by the way in which professors taught their sub-
ject on sight. She also drew and painted for pleasure. Outside art, she took
primary care and later more advanced nursing courses. Although in a tradi-
tional way, she enjoyed life in the City of Light, the two years that Georgina
spent in Paris had a profound impact on her, and I believe that she had hard
time readjusting to life and society in Lebanon upon her return. Against her
will, one day she had to comply with her family’s decision that she was to
return to Lebanon, get married, and settle down. The mentality of the time
was “What would life in Paris grant her? Isn’t marriage the ultimate goal for
a young woman?”
190 ● Women in Lebanon

In 1952, she married a handsome lawyer, Farid, from Saghbine. Ambi-

tious and drawn to politics, he looked for a suitable and dignified wife and
Georgina’s father’s wealth probably made her a more desirable candidate.
Besides his European features, Farid had a warm voice and Georgina enjoyed
listening to him sings religious canticles. The wedding was a large Maronite
religious ceremony in Bikfaya at Mar ‘Abda church, for which many people
assembled from Bikfaya, Saghbine, Baalbeck, and Beirut. Besides Farid’s fam-
ily, a large number of the Saghbine population made the two-hour trip to
attend the ceremony. Political supporters from other areas, particularly a Shi’i
group, from the Dandach family and their constituencies from Baalbeck, as
well as members of the Bar and judges from Beirut attended the wedding.
After the solemn religious ceremony, while the bride and groom exited the
church, the Dandach members fired a submachine gun as a sign of honor
to Farid and in celebration of the wedding, which scared the inhabitants of
Bikfaya, not yet used to hearing gunfire, at least in 1952, many years before
the civil war.
The couple went then to Saghbine where a spectacular banquet and cele-
bration lasted for an entire week. The event was the occasion to gather all
the inhabitants of the entire Bekaa Valley, East and West, Christians and
Muslims. Behind the scenes, the inhabitants of the women’s village were the
ones who made the grandiose gathering possible; they continuously cooked
and served elaborately prepared dishes to the guests arriving in groups for the
entire week.
Georgina and Farid began a rather promising life in Beirut. Their first
son was born in 1953, and later one daughter and two boys were born. For
the christening of her oldest son Boutros, 12 bishops from different parts of
Lebanon from the Maronite and Melkite rites participated in the ceremony.
Boutros, after all, was the grandson of a notable of Saghbine whose diplomacy
and savoir faire allowed him to gain the Ottoman governor Wali el Sham’s
trust and avoid catastrophes and even saved compatriots from being hanged.
From a fabulous beginning and happy childhood, the seventies brought
unforeseen suffering. From a good-looking young man by Hollywood stan-
dards, a skin problem expanded and ravaged Boutros’s appearance. Although
French doctors from the St. Louis Hospital in Paris gave him a couple years,
Boutros’s suffering lasted until 2005 when he passed away. Georgina always
comforted him and never failed to provide him with whatever he needed with
pleasure and a smile. She accepted his death with dignity and courage. His
picture is on her night table; she prays for his soul when she wakes up in the
morning and in the evening before she goes to sleep.
Georgina gave birth to her youngest son on December 24 at midnight.
She still recounts the event, identifying with Mary who gave birth to Jesus.
 Diversity: Convergence and Divergence ● 191

Her son came into the world while she could hear the church bells ringing;
Georgina considered it a holy sign from the heavens. The extended family
gathered after midnight mass at the hospital where she gave birth. Joy and
congratulations filled her heart.
Her marital life was not perfect; Farid’s appearance attracted other women
and he sometimes cheated on her. Even though she was suffering in this aspect
of her life, watching other women never leave her husband alone, she contin-
ued to take care of her children and her home so that life would be as normal
as possible. After all, divorce was not an option for her like for other women
of her generation. Instead of complaining about her husband’s infidelity, she
channeled her energy toward social work and helping those who were less
privileged than she was.
Driven by an innate sense of mission, she looked for ways to help others.
Realizing that Saghbine and the surrounding areas lacked medical care, she
envisioned a way to start a dispensary clinic in order to help impoverished
people. Social security or a public health center did not exist at the time.
Building on the medical knowledge she acquired while in Paris, she asked the
priest to provide her with a room in the Qontoch,9 which he did with plea-
sure and transformed it to a modest dispensary furnished with one table, two
chairs, and a few shelves of medication. She contacted one of the rare med-
ical doctors in the area to have him complete a weekly visit hour, which he
did. The Mouvement Social, an organization founded by Monsignor Gregoire
Haddad, provided the dispensary with medicine; Georgina actively developed
her project through fundraising events that she organized in Beirut.
To ensure a daily medical service, she entrusted the dispensary to the Sis-
ters of the Sacred family. The charge was then delegated to Sister Eugedia
who until this day continues overseeing these services. Her project proved
to be successful in helping not only Saghbine inhabitants, but also all of the
surrounding Muslim and Christian areas. Financial help poured in from emi-
grants and locals. In October 2009, the Saghbiniote organized a festival to
honor her vision and accomplishment as well as those of Sister Eugedia and
Doctor Safi who also devoted their lives to this noble vocation. At age 86,
Georgina stood up and made a speech recounting the sequence of events that
led to the undertaking of this lifelong project and expressing her thanks for
their thoughtfulness and appreciation.
Her sense of mission is also manifested through her volunteer work for
Saint Vincent Charity, work that she began during the first years of the civil
war. Her work consists of being in contact with displaced needy families, flee-
ing bombardment in Beirut. She assesses their needs and makes sure that help
is appropriately provided on a monthly basis. Georgina has a great capacity
to listen to other women recounting their harsh conditions and with genuine
192 ● Women in Lebanon

love she gives her humble advice and uses her creativity to find ways through
her connections to make a difference where and when needed with great joy.

Caramel: Warm and Optimistic Chronicles Depicting

Modernity Tainted with Traditions
Despite recent regional influence and the memory of the hideous war,
Lebanese woman continue more than ever before to be characterized as Dolce
Vita for their luxurious and self-indulgent lifestyles, particularly after experi-
encing the cruel years that the civil war inflicted on them. Socialites and
hard workers at the same time, they personify a subtle mix of tradition and
modernity, and their creation continues to astonish.
The hardworking and creative film director Nadine Labaki was born in
Baabdat. She studied media at the Jesuit university, Saint Joseph University,
in Beirut. She later participated in a televised Lebanese talent show Studio el
Fan, similar to American Idol, which aired in the early nineties. She directed
music videos for Carla, an amateur singer, who became a famed presenter on
the Rotana music channel. The videos she directed, such as Akhasmak Ah for
Nancy Ajram featuring an Egyptian woman serving and entertaining male
customers in an Egyptian café, made her a controversial but popular figure in
the world of music media. Although contentious, Nadine justified the char-
acter as a “powerful and attractive female figure.” The next three music videos
she developed for Nancy Ajram, Ya Salaam portraying the life of a sad star,
Lawn ‘Uyunak portraying a fantasy wedding, and Inta Eih recounting a heart-
breaking drama, revealed Nancy’s singing and acting talent. Because of the
enormous popularity the videos received, they won honors for best music
videos and both women, Nadine and Nancy, became increasingly successful.
Nadine explored acting in the movie Bosta (bus) in which her acting
talent came forward and contributed to the success of the movie. In the
film, through Nadine’s character, along with former schoolmates who went
through years of war, they aimed to introduce a new blend of music with
dabkeh, the traditional folkloric Lebanese dance. They pioneered a new genre
of dabkeh coupled with a techno beat that they performed in their native vil-
lages through festival events. Bosta exemplified a way for the young people
to bring a modern turn to the past and reestablish contact with the multiple
identities of the country. Interestingly, the film relates the change of dabkeh to
the evolution and change of mentalities. Traditionalists in the film reacted to
their innovation referring back to the Lebanese heritage and indicating that
without roots, this style of music and dance is nothing, and condemned this
new type of dabkeh for distorting well-seeded traditions. Life, dreams, and
hope ultimately prevail in the film.
 Diversity: Convergence and Divergence ● 193

In 2007, Nadine’s talent culminated in her feature-length directorial debut

Caramel, in which she also acted as one of the main characters. Caramel is an
Oriental dough, soft and malleable, sweet and sour. Nadine puts forward a
feminine vision of the Lebanese society, and the idea that sweet and bitter
implies the difficulties that five women encounter in their daily life. Nadine
presents life vignettes, sometimes sad, sometimes happy, of five Lebanese
women at different ages and religious confessions who interact in a beauty
salon in Beirut. This feminine universe allows all sorts of confidence, all emo-
tions; each character represents an aspect of Lebanese society in its modernity
as well as in its traditions. In a sensual and chaste atmosphere, the compelling
characters, through charm and finesse, challenge the condition of women
in Lebanon. Love, men, sex, beauty, and marriage are the principal themes
discussed with a common joie de vivre and omnipresent humor. Layale is
trapped in a bland relationship because the older man she truly loves is mar-
ried. The older man causes her pain, the relationship progresses, and she tries
to distance herself from the situation. Nisrine is concerned about not being
a virgin for her marriage; she struggles to find ways not to shame her family
with her secret. Jamale is divorced and takes care of her two children, and
she is obsessed with the realities of aging and the prospect of having plastic
surgery. Rima, quiet and reserved, does not show any interest in love until she
is attracted to a woman, Siham, and she then wonders about homosexuality
and the nature of their relationship, which needs to remain a secret.
Each of them has internal struggles and they battle daily with hopes to
surmount them. For instance, Rose, a tailor, sews in a store next to the salon.
At age 55, she turns down a romantic relationship because she has already
devoted her life to the care of her older sister, who is mentally unbalanced.
A pivotal scene suggests a devoted religious life when Rose and her sister are
saying their evening prayer reciting the rosary. In prayer, they transcend their
daily struggles and on an equal level, they worship God, the creator, and
thank him for his blessings.
Although this cinematically beautiful film was produced in modern
Beirut, undertones of past traditions persist. One scene shows Nisrine and
her fiancé talking in their parked car when a police officer comes to question
them about their status and what they are doing at night. They tell the truth,
saying that they are engaged, but the police officer brings them down to the
police station, since they are not married.
The shooting took place in 2006 during a time of independence and hope,
at least before the 33-day war, when Beirut was bombarded again. Although
Nadine does not explicitly mention the war, its memory remains the main
background, conditioning a strong desire for life and excessive hopes. Despite
the political and military context, Caramel is a hymn to Beirut, highlighting
194 ● Women in Lebanon

an evolving society, torn between tradition and modernity. While Caramel

brings to light future hopes, it also points to the fragility of the condition of
women in Lebanese societies, while withstanding the bitter realities of daily
life. While social pressures do not constrain the women in the film, these
pressures do exist, but in the face of these obstacles, the women triumph
because of their inner strength, and the sisterhood that exists between these
five women prevails.

Expressions of Lebanese Women: Hikayat (Stories) of Lebanese

Women Writers and Commonalities between East and West
I had the blissful opportunity to teach a course I developed, titled Modern
Arab Thought, at Oberlin College. One aspect of the course dealt with the
reforms and status of women in the Arab world. I asked my students about
their thoughts, opinions, and reactions when picturing Modern Arab women,
and I assigned articles about the women of Hizbullah, the Hikayat book10
that gives Lebanese women a creative voice, and the movie Caramel for them
to read and watch for a class discussion. The specific assignment’s emphasis is
on the status of Muslim and Christian Lebanese women in all their diversity.
The common response was that the American students envisioned veiled and
mysterious women who have few individual rights; another response depicted
Arab women as members of extremist Muslim groups. These representations
do not include all women in the Arab countries, particularly all Lebanese
women, but rather a faction of women in the Arab world. Throughout the
semester, students became aware of the rapid transformation of Arab soci-
eties currently under way as they came to realize that perceptions of Arab
women are shifting around the world, and that the advances of modern Arab
women are significant. Arab women obtained crucial civil rights and free-
doms in the second half of the nineteen century. Governments granted them
the right to vote, to work outside the home, the choice to unveil or veil as they
pleased, and they have made important social and political strides. Many of
their accomplishments might have gone unheard of because female novel-
ists in Arab society had a hard time making their way in the literary world.
Hikayat is a compilation of short stories by Lebanese women with a wide
range in age, including established writers as well as emerging ones. The sto-
ries in Hikayat cover the postwar period in Lebanon, which addresses a variety
of female issues and themes. Although the writings refer to the war and blame
conflicts on politics, the stories are nonpartisan and not politically charged.
Students informed me that they were surprised by how much they enjoyed
reading the stories.
 Diversity: Convergence and Divergence ● 195

Students agreed that the book presents a different look at women’s issues
and their daily struggles, and that as soon as they opened the book they felt
an outpouring of emotion, and it was almost as if they were being liberated
by reading the short stories. I will elaborate on three hikayat because of their
creative content woven to the war and memory theme. Confusion, fear, and
similar underlying can be felt across national and ethnic borders
The Green Bird by Emily Nasrallah is a story of a man who during the
civil war lost his home, his gifted son, and took refuge in an apartment of the
city whose owners left for Europe. As many refugees, there were many people
living in small spaces, fleeing bombardments and slaughters from Southern
Lebanon. Despite their modest living, the father had managed to finance his
son’s university studies to become a doctor. The entire family had hope for
a better life upon the son’s graduation and bright future. As expected, he
would put his sisters through schools, help his father and mother financially.
Tragically, his parents witnessed a bomb that killed him; he “exploded,” they
said. The father spent the entire night gathering his son’s remains, mixed with
blood, keeping him warm in a cold night and talking to him . . . The father
lost the “last of his rational mind in that pool of blood.” In addition, his
uprooting from his home village added to his deteriorating state of mind.
Since then, he sits, immobile, on a cement block in Beirut waiting, his eyes
continuously moving and searching for the “green bird” to come back.
Power of Death by Etel Adnan addresses the intersections of love, confu-
sion, fear, and desire. A young man, Wassef, leaves Damascus to pursue higher
education in Sweden. He meets a Swedish student Erica at the university in
Stockholm and overpoweringly falls in love with her. They are both com-
pletely smitten and give everything they can to one another. Consequently,
the powerful relationship has an immense moral and physical impact on both
of them. The intensity of their love is as if fiction became reality. Unex-
pectedly, Wassef decides to return to Damascus; he informs Erica just a day
before his departure, despite the pain he inflicts on her. Back home, he pur-
sues a career, marries an indigenous woman, and leads a traditional local life.
As Wassef puts it, “I buried myself in Damascus, in work, then in a marriage
which was interrupted.” Forty years later, a sudden awakening makes him
go back to Stockholm to see Erica again, but he then learns that she passed
away two weeks earlier. At this moment, he realizes that he turned his back to
the only happiness he had ever experienced. He would now give anything to
understand why he gave her up, and he wonders if a defeat must have been
destined for him. A deep truth hidden in himself reemerged after Erica’s death
and exclaims, “We only see things that do not exist, don’t we?” She was “the
source of desperation that I felt but never formulated: our relation transient
196 ● Women in Lebanon

in essence, an absolute with no roots in this world.”11 For the rest of his life,
he searched for and chased after younger women who would remind him of
Erica or capture the ghost of Erica through their smiles. Confused, he entered
the chaos of love, alternating between happiness and desperation.
Red Lips by May Ghoussoub raises the theme of refugees in a broader
sense. The red color elucidates a survival reflex on a dark journey. May
Ghoussoub exhibits that Red is what burns within each individual. The
author depicts the life of a novice nun living in an isolated convent where
she and two of her female friends, Joumana and Nada, retreated to prepare
for the Baccalaureate exam, as was the custom in the 1960s and 1970s. May
Ghoussoub walks the reader through the different meaning of the red color.
In ancient Egypt, women stained their lips with red using henna or berry
juice. The connotation of red ranges from absolute, pure, dazzling to mys-
tery of life, from transgression to energy of life. In this novice nun’s life, red
becomes the color of fire and blood, the color of the soul, the libido, and the
heart. Red also embodies the enthusiasm of youth releasing excitement but at
the same time red proclaims the spoils of the dialectic between Heaven and
Earth. Red suggests the desirable and the forbidden. Red warns, stirs vigi-
lance, and release anger. Red is the color of Hells’ fire as well as the devil’s
laughter.
These stories illustrate the strong voices of the characters that are personal,
vibrant, and courageous enough to be sexual. The use of words and images
come alive while reading, and the language and form are very expressive
and detailed. Most importantly, these short accounts express communali-
ties between Eastern and Western women. During wartime, it is easy to lose
track of individuals and their experiences and struggles in times of crisis, but
these short stories are rich in insightful details, psychological depth, and cross-
cultural encounters. They force the reader to remember that statistics on the
news cause people to grieve, cry, and express it in a different way, some of
them through writing.
As in Caramel, Hikayat reiterates the commonalities between Lebanese
and Western women. In their evolution and journey to modernization,
Lebanese women share the same preoccupations as Western women. Despite
the fact that Caramel tackles these universal feminine themes, one can per-
ceive them as tainted with traditions and social and religious mores that
still exist.

Leila Baalbaki: Ana Ahya

The UNESCO designated Beirut as the “World Capital of the Book” for
2009, and therefore Beirut has been the scene of an explosive cultural year,
 Diversity: Convergence and Divergence ● 197

especially for Arab and francophone culture. This designation is a recognition

of the quality of its production and the prevalence of books, promoting read-
ing as well as emphasizing the essential regional role of publication; reading
is seen as a vector of dialogue.
Leila Baalbaki made a reappearance in Lebanon at this particular time.
The Dar al-adab publishing house signed a contract with her to reedit her
novels, marking a comeback after a 35-year hiatus. Who is Leila? She belongs
to the prewar generation, since she was born in 1936 in Southern Lebanon to
a traditional Shi’i family. Her grandfather, a faqih, taught villagers readings of
the Qur’an and Arabic writing to the children of the village. At an early age,
Leila was exposed to a myriad of prose pieces, and read Nahj al-balagha (The
Path of Eloquence) written by Ali Bin Abi Taleb, the fourth Khalifa, whose
work is a pillar in Arabic rhetoric.
Her father, Ali al-Hajj Baalbaki, is also a zajalist poet. Zajal is a popular
dialectical poetry, founded on a sharp musical tone, which is determined by
the rhythm of the language. This style of performance poetry is always the-
atrical. Growing up in such an intense literary environment prepared her well;
at an early age, Leila was able to convey the poetry she heard many times into
romantic prose. Later, she attended the Jesuit University to study Oriental
Literature, and to ensure her independence, she accepted a post as a secretary
in the Lebanese parliament. She then became a journalist, writing for various
newspapers. Leila also lived in Paris from 1959 to 1961 and began studies at
the Sorbonne that did not culminate in a degree. The existentialist movement
of the time and the French cafés attracted her more than university life, and
she earned herself the nickname of Françoise Sagan of Lebanon. As many of
us did, she left the country at the outbreak of the Lebanese war in 1975 to
establish herself in London, abandoning the literary scene.
She belonged to a generation that marked the renewal of Arabic literature
in the sixties. In 1958, Leila wrote her first novel Ana Ahya!,12 at 22 years.
Her book echoed the spirit of the time through its themes of liberation and
emancipation, considered provocative because of its modern literary style.
Ana Ahya was greeted with immediate success in Lebanon and the entire Mid-
dle East. In 1961, Ana Ahya was translated into French (Je vis!) and it seduced
a large French public as well. Through her novel, Leila represented the tradi-
tional Muslim society of which she was a member. The novel is her exclama-
tion of life; she wanted to liberate herself from the rigid and retrograde mores
of her milieu. Ana Ahya caused Leila to develop a reputation of a “rebel.”
The novel recounts the wanderings of a young girl, Lina, in the streets of
Beirut West in search of freedom. She has no respect for her father, who made
a fortune through dubious transactions, or for her mother, who is content
with her work as a housewife and entirely submissive position toward her
198 ● Women in Lebanon

father. Lina falls in love with a young Iraqi student at the American Univer-
sity of Beirut where they are both studying. She thinks of him as a young
progressive, believing in equality of women, but she soon realizes that he is
a traditional Oriental male who considers her anarchist and not suitable to
become a good wife to him. Desperate and shocked, she attempts to com-
mit suicide, throwing herself between a car and a tramline. Lina does not die,
which allows her to reflect on her life and gain perspective on her experiences.
Although a mark of desperation, the revolt through a suicide attempt
also becomes the bearer of new hopes, perhaps an act of liberation. Forty
years later, the message of Ana Ahya rings true because Lebanese women have
not yet fully obtained their rights of independence. Besides some facades of
freedom, women still feel a profound existential malaise.
Her third novel, Safinat Hanan ila al qamar, is banned for detracting pub-
lic morals. Leila was arrested and subjected to interrogations regarding her
morals and views. Luckily, the lawsuit ended peacefully and the tribunal
found her not guilty, the processes demonstrating that “the situation of a
female author is trivial,” and thus not worth all of the attention and resources
used to investigate it.
It is not a question of rewriting the history of the Arab woman’s emanci-
pation. Everything is happening as if the Arab woman has refused henceforth
to be eternally sacrificed, as if she finally wanted “to live,” to use Leila
Baalbaki’s cry of protest and affirmation . . . For the Arab woman, emancipa-
tion always entails confronting social censorship. The words “’aar” [disgrace]
and “’aïb” [shame] recur like an insistent leitmotif in women’s and Arab
feminist literature.
Undeniably, the Arab woman of today is discovering the possible dimen-
sions of life. This is providing us with a literature that is devilishly feminine
but so profound, so expressive, and at times so captivating. The rebellion
of women is becoming an explosion of protests against injustice and loss.
It expresses itself under the form of the dialect of give and take. The Arab
woman, eternal giver, is finally reclaiming reciprocity. She also wants to
receive, which is an admirable goal.
The Arab woman intends to abandon the idea of the illusory kingdom of
mothers, and it is not to a mythical reign that she aspires, but to an affirmative
and positive one. She intends to affirm the potential of her talent, to live. Such
is the rally cry of Muslim women who are advancing in society.

Rebellion of Shi’i Women: The Novelist Hanan Al-Shaykh

Hanan al-Shaykh belongs to a more recent generation of Lebanese female
authors. Born into a Shi’i family, she grew up in conservative and modest
 Diversity: Convergence and Divergence ● 199

Ras el Nabeh. She became a journalist after receiving an education at the

Ahliyya High School for Girls. She wrote for al-Hasna, a women’s magazine,
and later for An-Nahar, a prestigious newspaper before she became a full-time
fiction writer. She moved to Saudi Arabia in 1976 as a result of the Civil War,
where she stayed until 1982.
During that time, she wrote what is considered one of her most remark-
able works, an modified autobiography, Hikayat Zahra (The Story of Zahra)
in 1980. The novel chronicles the story of a woman named Zahra dur-
ing the Lebanese Civil War, in which Zahra’s family sends her to Africa to
recover from two abortions and a nervous breakdown, where she avoids sex-
ual advances by her uncle by marrying one of his associates. Finding herself
trapped in a loveless marriage, Zahra returns to a ravaged Beirut, where she
falls in love with a sniper who shoots at passersby. Because of its explicit sexual
content, the novel was banned in most Arab countries, and at the time, no
publisher in Lebanon would accept the work, so al-Shaykh published it with
her own money.
Al-Shaykh published several other novels, and is considered a very impor-
tant contemporary female author. She contributed to the Lebanese feminist
movement, because al-Shaykh was anything but traditional, and she chal-
lenged society’s expectations of her as a woman in the literary field. Her
characters always experience tidal waves of emotions: inferiority, hatred, and
confusion, much like how al-Shaykh describes her own life. Her works, writ-
ten in Arabic, have been translated into English, French, Dutch, German,
Italian, Danish, Spanish, Korean, and Polish, even though at the time of their
publication they were banned.

Haifa Wehbe: The Oriental Charm beyond Listening

One afternoon, while the television was on and I was doing other things,
I found myself half-watching the Oprah Winfrey show, where she was intro-
ducing remarkable women of the world. I was shocked to hear Oprah
accurately recognize and declare Haifa Wehbe as the most well-known singer
and most beautiful woman from the Arab world.
Haifa, a young Shi’i woman, evolved as a representative sex symbol for the
entire Middle East. With a group of other young Lebanese singers such as
Nancy Ajram and Nicole Saba, they embodied their own concept of songs
incorporating elegance and beauty. A well-known fact is that Lebanese stars
know how to promote themselves. They incarnate the Arab beauty with
all its magic through their big expressive eyes and their attractive figures.
As Khaled Youssef,13 Egyptian director and screenwriter, puts it, “They care
about every millimeter of their bodies and let stylists value their beauty.” They
200 ● Women in Lebanon

easily respond to evolution—seen here as Western characteristics since clips of

Shakira and Jennifer Lopez are largely transmitted in the Arab World through
satellite channels—while always keeping in mind their Oriental roots. Their
singing goes beyond an auditory experience to include images of beauty
and fascination. They believe that talent alone is not enough, and there-
fore emphasize beauty and exquisiteness in their performances. Moreover,
Lebanese singers know how to take advantage of new technology. They com-
missioned their own websites, creatively managing and promoting their music
and persona. There is no doubt that Lebanese stars are pioneering the art of
celebrity in the Arab world. They are part of the lineage of charm coming
from the Cedar country and they top the Arab music charts, particularly in
Egypt where Egyptian young talent emulates the vision and stage presence of
their Lebanese counterparts. Lebanese singers delight in the fact that Lebanon
prides itself on being the most open society in the Arab world. They definitely
offer an escape from daily life, which is full of tension and politics, whether
in Lebanon or elsewhere in the Middle East.
Haifa Wehbe was born in a rural village in Southern Lebanon to a Shi’i
Lebanese father and an Egyptian mother. She enjoyed listening to pop and
rap music as a girl, and at age 16, she won a small beauty context in Southern
Lebanon and was later voted Miss Lebanon in 1995 and gained fame across
the Arab world as a fashion model. Currently, she is in her thirties and the
Arab media considers her as one of the leading sex symbols of the Arab world.
She is also featured in Pepsi Cola commercials with the famous soccer player
Thierry Henry. In 2006 People’s Magazine named her as one of the 100 most
beautiful women. She won many Arab awards for her singing, including the
prestigious Golden Lion Award in Egypt.
Haifa lost a brother in 1982 during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. She
openly sides with Hizbullah; during a concert in Lebanon, she attacked
Israel for attacking civilians and congratulated Hassan Nasrallah for his stand
against Israel. In 2007, in celebration of the presidential election of Michel
Suleiman in downtown Beirut, she wore a tee shirt with the picture of the
newly elected president and sang a Fairuz song “Ya Hawa Beirut” (Love of
Beirut), a nostalgic song written during the Civil War that refers back to the
“glorious days” of Lebanon, prior to 1975.
So many women are open to showing their beauty and they do not all
dress modestly in public. They voice their concerns and are not ashamed of
being comfortable with being sexy. And in their process of modernizing, they
are creating identities for themselves. The Lebanese media, although it does
an excellent job portraying women as beautiful and attractive, has not been
doing much for promoting women’s capacity to participate in other spheres of
 Diversity: Convergence and Divergence ● 201

society, like politics. In order for those women who wish to move away from
a sexualized image of women to do so, the media must be able to portray
women in a more neutral light. This is to say that while women, just like
men, can be desirable, attractive, and talented; they can also be smart, driven,
and motivated toward change for the country. An image, for example, of the
female citizen who works to help her family, who fights for the liberty and
independence of her country or against the societal violence, is the image of
an equally valuable Lebanese woman.

Women of my country—Nadia Tueni

Women of my country
the same light hardens your body,
the same shadow calms it;
softly melancholic in your metamorphoses.
The same pain cracks your lips
and your eyes are set by a unique goldsmith.
You,
who reassure the mountain
who make men believe they are men,
and ashes they are fertile,
and the landscape that it is immutable.
Women of my country,
you, who in the chaos find what is lasting.14

Each woman has her own way of life, her own creative way of solving
problems, whether traditional or modern. All of these women, despite their
religious differences, all seek to inspire young girls to better the world around
them through example and see the humanity in each other, despite the rag-
ing conflicts around them. Between women of the same religion and between
women of different religions in Lebanon as elsewhere, it is important to search
for our communalities, a stepping stone to building a harmonious world,
a common humanity, which is more important than disaccords and differ-
ences. The issues that women face are the same regardless of whether they
are Christian or Muslim, from the East or from the West, and even young
or older.
It is true that although Middle Eastern women seem different from
Western women in styles of dress, language, values, and ideas about war, there
are still many convergences between them. Christian women find themselves
torn between the Orient and the Occident; they are accused of betraying
both cultures, when in truth, they are searching for ways to bridge the gaps
between these two diverse cultures. Not only is the Middle East changing,
202 ● Women in Lebanon

but the globalized world is also changing and bringing its ideas and univer-
sal values together. This aids in the advancement of women in modern Arab
societies and in the world as a whole. However, we are still waiting for the
time when we will all be able to learn to accept our differences as societies,
cultures, and nations and unite under our commonalities to work together
for the advancement of all women.
 CHAPTER 12

En Route toward a More Inclusive

Civil Society

Traditions and the Transformation of Mentality

The existence of tradition is palpable, and its influence unquestionable.
By definition, in a traditional community, there is a functional balance
between the diverse aspects of social and economic life, and, consequently,
any change is unforeseen. This extreme functionalist image is a sketch that
emphasizes the fundamental tendency of tradition to create equilibrium in
the social system.
Traditions have withstood the test of time due to a mysterious interior
force, especially when a divine hand enforces them. Only through changes in
every type of person—man or woman, young or old—can the influence of
traditions be weakened.
The moral homogeneity of a village is questioned through transformations
in each person’s lifestyle. The real changes, promulgated by the rural exodus,
disrupted the mentality shared within a community, which is shaped by tra-
ditions. The mentalities that were once unequivocally approved by society are
now perceived as unfavorable and sarcastic.
“Tradition, in its etymological sense, is the translation, the transfer from
a trustee to another, and the transmission of a product—in the first judicial
sense—it is the transfer of a notion, or a way of behaving and acting.”1 It is
so socially ingrained that it goes unnoticed. Yet, aren’t the best known things
always the least analyzed? It is important to familiarize oneself with this para-
dox and take the time to notice what, in the eyes of all, seems so “natural”
that no one notices it.
There is no traditional knowledge that does not reflect on the entire per-
sonality, or that does not proceed from a mental or physical activity that
engages (at least seemingly) the entire personality. The methodical character
204 ● Women in Lebanon

of traditions is not a result of a previous agreement of minds, of an unlikely

social contract, but from what we propose to name social empiricism—the
empiricism of individuals engaged in coherent groups, thereby creating an
individual empiricism that is constantly submitted to a collective surveillance.
The real school of traditions was made up of certain stable and very coher-
ent types of lifestyles where the transmission of what is lived is expressed
through an oral transmission from mouth to ear, and is thereby heard by
everybody.
“Women are by excellence the guardians of the old tradition of the sen-
sitivity of the system of belief for the entire society.”2 Through their active
presence in family life, and their educational role, they guarantee the perma-
nence of a solid foundation of individual and social virtues. The cohesion
and continuity of the collective identity rests on them. We never forget to
emphasize and value the traditional “virtues” of the young girl, the sister, the
spouse, the mother in poetics, and literary writings.

The Mentalities
“Mentality constitutes the dynamic and lively synthesis of each society.”3 It is
common to the members of the same civilization, and it is the most resistant
link that connects the individual to his group. The nature of mentality lends
itself to stability since conviction is an involuntary fact; our mentality stands
between the universe and ourselves like a prism. There exist close rapports
between our mentality and our physical organism because being a real part of
society means sharing its enthusiasm and repulsions. Subgroups are formed
when culture is located outside the popular comprehension; hence, an intel-
lectual difference of opinion is created between classes that are not always
entirely caught up.
Social groups exhibit the need to project their aggressive instincts on other
groups. History shows that, in general, religious, ethnic, nationalist, political,
or economic minorities are either dominant and in power, or persecuted; they
are promised to be either the elite or the marginalized.
Rivalries, accusation, and antipathies from one village to another, from
one religion to the next, ideological and political hatred—they all seem to
constitute a necessary component of mentalities. At its extreme, this nega-
tivity often leads to war, civil or foreign, which offers a sort of exit that is
a collective sublimation, pleasant and catastrophic to the paroxysm of social
impulsions. Perhaps in the future the progress of social science will show us
how to surmount destructive impulsions that stem from the clash of negative
social forces, or at least how to channel them toward other ends.
 En Route toward a More Inclusive Civil Society ● 205

In general, complex societies are more open to innovations. On the

other hand, primitive societies are often xenophobic, opposed to diversity,
and closed to change. They are meticulously attached to their rituals and
traditions. They have a tendency to exhibit what Bergson used to call
closed civilizations, hostile to innovation, exchanges, and imitation. However,
Bergson has contrasted them with open societies in terms of outside influ-
ences as well as creativity developed within the community. Open societies
characteristically allow divergences and varieties in opinion. Likewise, they
more easily produce original individuals, and personalities capable of superior
creativity.
It is incontestable that the politics of the ruling social class dictate the trend
of demographic and economic evolution in certain countries vis-à-vis others.
These classes jealously reserve all important positions to their own posterity.
The phenomenon of the renewal of the elite, in which it is impossible for
highly talented members of the lower class to ascend to any position of con-
sequence, cannot take place. This lack of movement within the elite explains
the tendency of our societies toward stagnation. It is necessary to recall that
the caste system is founded on a familial ideology and on a doctrine that
places heredity above any other personal quality. Through history, most peo-
ples have known similar forms of hierarchy, and now, necessity requires that
they be surmounted.
“We cannot talk about variations of mentalities until our mindsets are
modified.” In Lebanon, new techniques (media, social media, radio, films,
etc.) are promulgating the disappearance of the particularistic and folkloric
way of life under the influence of the knowledgeable civilization. A special
phenomenon to the social logic: in the domain of technical or technological
inventions, the inventions are accumulated, but in terms of value, inventions
can be substituted. Since we are dealing with largely affectionate beliefs, one
belief excludes the other. Over the course of the last few years, there have
been great efforts to enact a particular psychological technique to transform
children and young people into radicals. On the contrary, we cannot talk
about moral invention unless individuals start to question and refuse what is
contrary to conformist engagement.
In certain cases, the rate at which common sense can develop is astonish-
ing. For example, the suffrage of women and their access to political rights
seemed an absurdity until recent years. Today, this notion has been incor-
porated into the mainstream, and we would judge it absurd to question it.
A profound change of men and women’s mentality has created this new atti-
tude. We have passed the point of no return. Some are rejoicing, and others
are in regret.
206 ● Women in Lebanon

Frequently, changes in social structure are not even perceived or inter-

preted until they degenerate into a catastrophic event. They are the brusque
discharge of a slowly developing phenomenon. It is the quickly surfacing
solution of a long-meditated problem.
The existence of unequal development in the compartments of the men-
tality has caused significant problems and drama throughout the course of
human history. Consequently, institutions only partially accept innovations
and discoveries because of barriers in contrary beliefs or the survival of exist-
ing mentalities. The inequalities in the development of mentalities lead to
equally ineffectual social development, and to the emergence of real social
atrocities.
This is why the necessity of action is important for women. They do not
accept discrimination—the vestige of a tradition that has become foreign to
them. They desire to live in equal opportunity without having to ask for it as
a particular protection. They do not ask for the subtle privileges demanded
by men, but are astonished that they have yet to acquire them. They want to
ask because they believe that it is possible that, regardless of sex, it is possible
for each person to choose his or her role in a society that respects the dignity
and the responsibility of all.

What was for centuries presented, lived and psychologically integrated as

realities dictated by natural law (e.g. the status of women), is now being
discovered as a possible contingency propagated by the authority—political,
theological, philosophical, scientific etc.—of cultural norms. Today, we have
the question of deconstructing all traditional cultures to unveil their mecha-
nisms of transvestitism, the mask of true reality . . . this instigates a will to act
for the emancipation of the human condition, to transform the heaviness of
a stereotyped tradition that . . . we are required to radically rethink the human
condition outside still dominant mythologies and ideologies.4

Toward a More Inclusive Civil Society

In 1943, Lebanon acquired its independence from the French mandate.
The Lebanese constitution that followed specifies the political system as a
parliamentary democracy, conferring that the elected parliament represents
the legislative branch, which has the duty to remedy errors and inaccura-
cies. Moreover, a “confessional quota” is embedded in our democracy and
manifested in the other two governmental branches, executive and legisla-
tive, as well as in all administrative institutions. As a result, political and
social reforms require consensus between all confessions that are an integral
part of the Lebanese pluralistic political system. This plurality of confessions
made way for enrichment for the country on the cultural and social level,
 En Route toward a More Inclusive Civil Society ● 207

making Lebanon the most democratic and open society in the Arab world.
Unfortunately, the contrary side of this pluralistic system manifested itself
in the many confrontations and divisions that exploded in civil war that the
Lebanese endured. The 18 confessions in Lebanon mean 15 personal status
laws directly affecting women’s lives living in this rather chaotic situation,
making it difficult to create a truly inclusive civil society without contra-
dicting other groups, in which religion is a positive aspect of identity and
culture.
Being either Christian or Muslim, we are confronting similar challenges
due to different personal laws. The different daily lives of women have been
affected by the progress made in the last three decades. The growing place of
Lebanese women is clearly noticeable in the social, economic, and political
arenas. The League of Lebanese Women’s Rights (LLWR) was founded in
1953, the year in which Lebanese women obtained the right to vote under
the presidency of Camille Chamoun. Linda Matar5 presided the League that
same year and fought for women’s rights in Lebanon and the Arab World
until 2000. For a half century, she dedicated her life for the women’s struggle
and oversaw reforms that made the League become a vocal element for civil
society. She led campaigns for women to run for office, and she herself ran
unsuccessfully for the legislative elections in 1996 and 2000. Marie-Claire, a
French magazine, voted her as “the 100 women who are moving the world.”
In addition to the League’s effort, today, newly formed NGOs are present in
Lebanon to implement effectively awareness programs aiming at correcting
the system’s deficiencies. All of these efforts exist with hope for change and
aim to help the situation of Lebanese women in their struggle.
How do the situations of Christian and Muslim women present them-
selves in Lebanon? In a violent uprising, like the one encountered by Leila
Baalbaki, or in a evolution that opens the future and does not dismiss the
best aspects of tradition? We hold on to positive elements, in spite of the dif-
ficulty of a complete synthesis between the old Oriental mentality and the
influence of the Occident.
From a familial perspective, an ancient mentality that welcomes the birth
of a boy and disapproves the birth of a girl unfortunately still widely pre-
vails. The Arabic word for child is walad (boy), a basic discrimination
that intensifies through a young woman’s teen and adult years. Our analy-
sis in Chapter 2 indicates that education does not instill in girls the same
aspiration to exist in the world through freedom and independence as for
boys. Girls experience a conflict between autonomy and existence; the family
social and religious environment is the major factor determining the situ-
ation of women. An important discrimination translated into law is that a
Lebanese woman married to a non-Lebanese man cannot legally bequeath
208 ● Women in Lebanon

her nationality to her child, whereas a Lebanese man who marries a non-
Lebanese woman is able to transfer the Lebanese citizenship to his wife one
year following their union, and ipso facto, their children obtain Lebanese
citizenship.
The free choice of a spouse that has become a reality in both the urban
and rural Christian milieu is still making its way in Muslim milieu, first
in the city among the wealthy and then toward the rural areas at a more
modest pace. Although a consequence of patriarchy, this aspect of family life
contributes to discrimination between women and men. Muslim women’s
increased awareness of their own dignity is translated into their social role,
as seen in Hizbullah’s women and in their determination to contribute
to religious interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith. Polygamy is almost
nonexistent and repudiation is in regression. Druzes have always practiced
monogamy.
The existence of many personal law statuses is an impediment to mixed
marriages between the different confessions that coexist. Although the shari’a,
in terms of divorce, confers same possibilities for women and men, the reality
is quite different. Men obtain a divorce much more easily than women are
able to.
As for inheritance, Muslim males inherit a portion that is double that
of what their sisters receive. Although Christians have changed antiquated
inheritance laws in the sense of equality between women and men, practically
secret negotiations remain in the sense of preserving the heritage in the family.
In addition, a Lebanese woman, whether Christian or Muslim, who marries
a spouse from outside their confession, encounters problems, discrimination,
and a difficult life ahead.
For a more inclusive civil society, a promulgation of civil personal law
statuses for all Lebanese citizens will seek to remedy this unequal situation
between women and men, as well as between women of different confessions.

From an Educational Perspective

The characteristics of education for a young rural Christian girl are the same
as those for a young Muslim girl. However, Muslim girls are more controlled,
care more about others’ impressions of them, and guard their reputations
more zealously. Muslim girls who studied in Saghbine’s Christian schools no
longer shake hands as a greeting. This education of recluse engenders timidity
about which Christian classmates complain. Muslim girls work seriously in
class, but openness is still lacking; they need to have relations with society,
particularly with young men. In comparison, a young Christian woman feels
more dignified, more respected in her milieu, more active, and consequently
more liberated. She has more opportunities to meet young men.
 En Route toward a More Inclusive Civil Society ● 209

Though not as rigid as in rural areas, Muslim education in cities remains

somehow closed. Society is generally more rigorous with girls, and less
scrupulous with boys. However, in bourgeois family, girls are brought up
almost the occidental way. They enroll in the American or Saint Joseph Uni-
versities. Other girls coming from milieus that are more modest attend the
Lebanese University, and scholarships allow them to continue their studies
overseas, similar to Christian women. The late prime minister Rafik Hariri
awarded scholarships for numerous outstanding Lebanese students, both
male and female, granting them the opportunity to study abroad, regardless
of their confessional sect. From the future intellectual elite currently receiv-
ing this common education, our coming together will emerge more strongly
than ever before in a more profound understanding of our major common
religious, cultural, and national heritage.
Private and public schools are present in different Lebanese regions.
However, because of the civil war and the political conditions in South-
ern Lebanon, studies show a higher degree of illiteracy among women at
28 percent.6 Modest families consider sending their boys to school first as a
priority. This phenomenon brought a number of NGOs to organize sessions
on alphabetization in rural areas. On the other hand, the opposite phe-
nomenon exists in urban areas, seen in the increasing number of highly skilled
and educated women—doctors, engineers, lawyers, judges, journalists—and
more than 70 percent of educators are women.
Pedagogy in Lebanon does not work toward the unification between dif-
ferent confessions; on the contrary, programs push toward divisions between
confessions, and there is an emphasis on having a sense of belonging to one
confession rather than creating and basking in a national identity. A major
problem is that programs offered are sometimes different for different con-
fessions. Programs that present the history of Lebanon are contradictory,
depending on the confession of the founder of the school. Although edu-
cation of citizenship is available and provides students with civic concepts,
this civic education remains a superficial gesture toward progress. Civic
knowledge remains academic and students lack the experience of true democ-
racy. The system does not encourage debates or political discussion, nor has
research begun on inclusion of different perspectives yet. Teacher’s emphasis
is usually more on memorization, and in some cases on indoctrination. The
educational system shows a clear impregnation of the current political and
religious system. They accept the political system founded on confessions
independently of the principle of personal merit. Young girls have a tendency
to participate in social and civil actions, but remain more ideologically con-
servative than young men, particularly in regard to making choices related to
mixed marriage. The sense of belonging to a confession supersedes the sense
of belonging to the Lebanese state.
210 ● Women in Lebanon

Women’s work was largely elaborated upon in Chapter 4. The LLWR orga-
nization and other NGOs worked closely with local syndicates to ratify laws
on the status of working women from a legal perspective. These ratifications
positively influenced the women’s situation at work but did not abolish all
discriminations, such as family compensation, tax deductions, and maternity
leave. A law ratified in 2000 promotes equity in salaries, more than seven
weeks for maternity leave, and protection in cases of sexual harassment, but
has not yet yielded the expected results. In the public sector too, women
remain in the lower echelon. In both sectors, women are subjected to injus-
tice, because tax laws make provisions for a higher imposition for married
women than married men.
IndyAct, an NGO based in Beirut, supported a campaign against sex-
ual harassment on April 25, 2010.7 A group of feminists took the initiative
to launch a sexual harassment campaign to increase awareness of this issue.
The public has historically not considered sexual harassment as a problem
but rather as part of the “culture” construct of the country. Scarce statistics
exist on the subject. The Ministry of Social Affairs revealed in 2007 that three
complaints per week are filed for sexual harassment and rape. Activists believe
that these numbers do not reflect actual cases, and suspect that the reality is
greater. Since the issue remains taboo, activists’ slogan is “Talk about it with-
out shame.” The message is to encourage victims to file complaints. Victims
are usually scared to talk about the subject because society continues to sys-
tematically place overused blame on them, saying that it was “because you
come home late at night, or because of the way you were dressed, or because
you provoked them.”
Female victims have no recourse to any authority to protect themselves.
Indeed, there is no law that explicitly states that sexual harassment is an
offense or misdemeanor. At the administration commissionership, police offi-
cers tend to mock female victims of sexual harassment and domestic violence
when they have the courage to complain. Rapists can escape punishment
if they marry their victims. Victims of sexualized violence are completely
silenced, requiring a polar shift in Lebanese mentality of these issues, and by
extension, gender equality in general, because after all, Lebanon is considered
an open society by the rest of the Middle East and the entire world.

From a Political Perspective

Although in Lebanon, politics is synonymous with the politico-confessional
crisis, women are interested in politics. Through their work, whether in cre-
ating schools, enhancing health conditions, or asking for improvement in
work conditions, they participate in the political life. A direct and greater
 En Route toward a More Inclusive Civil Society ● 211

participation in the political sphere is, nonetheless, crucial for women; their
voices must be heard, and they are the ones who should help to make
decisions for the future.
In 1996, Lebanon ratified the “International Convention for the Elimi-
nation of All Discrimination Against Women,” promulgated by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in December 1979, but with a few exemp-
tions regarding equal rights in marriage, custody of children, and adoption.
This document was a good start for the entire process moving away from a
discriminatory society. The LLWR and the National Council for Lebanese
Women reinforced the struggle of the feminist movement, and today the
National Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination brings together
approximately 60 organizations and important individuals, both women and
men, in this movement.
In the executive branch, there is only the Ministry of Social Services that
deals with women and family issues. An urgent need exists for the creation
of services that relate directly to the situation of women at the ministerial
level—Ministries of Labor, Justice, Health, Information and Culture—Those
services will ensure the applicability of decisions and recommendations of
NGOs that are currently active on the ground.

Women and Organizations

In Lebanon, members of the first organizations came from wealthy social
classes; they were educated and driven toward social work. Their activities
were limited to help the needy and provide medical care. Today’s NGOs work
toward literacy and professional formation.
The League for Lebanese Women’s Rights was born in 1947. Women who
participated in the struggle for independence, manifesting in the streets ask-
ing that the French Mandate be terminated, created the League in 1947.
In 1948 the first action of the League was to celebrate the International
Women’s Day, for which an enormous number of women came out to partic-
ipate. In the Grand Theater in downtown Beirut, the women were surprised
to find themselves encircled by a military force, under the pretext that the
celebration was imported from abroad. Despite the confrontation, the cel-
ebration continued, and women protested in the streets against the actions
of the government. March 8 is no longer “imported from abroad,” since in
1975, the United Nations adopted this date as International Women’s Day.
Today, many religious charitable organizations linked to a particular confes-
sion as well as many NGOs work to supplement the failing efforts of the
government (Hizbullah, Dar al-Makassed el Islamiyya, St. Vincent de Paul,
Caritas). Organizations and over 30 NGOs that address women’s issues, such
212 ● Women in Lebanon

as discrimination, violence against women, female quotas for parliament, and

other social and national problems, are on the rise.
Certain NGOs are addressing issues of violence against women. A study
completed in 2008 of a sample of 300 women showed that 87 percent
reported verbal abuse, and 86 percent reported physical violence. The United
Nations, which completed the study for the Arab Women’s Network,8 defined
verbal abuse as name-calling (“cow,” “dog,” “animal”). Physical abuse was
defined as a beating with various household materials: a stick, hands or legs,
rope, and sometimes these beatings also included burning with a coffee pot,
iron, hot water, or choking them in a bucket of cold or hot water. Ninety
percent of women described their resulting symptoms in a way that could be
classified as psychological abuse, manifesting itself in anxiety, fear, distrust,
neglect and humiliation in their daily lives. Fifty-five percent of women also
reported sexual abuse by their husbands, through adultery, forcing their wives
to participate in group intercourse or through violence in sexual encounters.
Husbands also deny their wives of money allowance driving them to file for
divorce; in fact, 65 reported an aspect of economic abuse, having their salaries
taken from them, not being given access to properties and assets, being forced
to quit their jobs that provide them with dignity and purpose.
Many difficulties exist for women, such as ones stemming from precon-
ceived notions and obstacles around electoral laws. In March 8, 2008, Mirna
Atallah, a member of the NGO National Democratic Institute (NDI), an
American association bringing together experts and patricians from all around
the world to effectuate formation sessions in different regions of the globe
about the theme of democracy, was mentioned in an article for L’Orient Le
Jour.9 NDI provides services called “schools of campaigning” for women to
become candidates for legislative or municipal elections. These focus groups
aim to thoroughly prepare women who envision political carriers but who
have had difficulties breaking through. Mirna Atallah cited the following
obstacles coming from women themselves: “fear—mothers warn daughters
not to do get involved in the dangerous domain of politics, death might be
the outcome . . . reputation—linked to the notion of poorly seen by soci-
ety . . . fund raising—a method of campaigning still considered a form of
begging.” Most NGOs work in the domain of women empowerment, consol-
idating their economic role within an active society. Nonetheless, NDI seeks
ways to attract women to embrace participation in politics without fear.
The electoral process presents a great deal of financial possibility, about
$300,000 for campaigning, which is not accessible to every candidate; it
is difficult to break into a well-established political party to receive such
funding. Fouad Boutros, former Minister of Internal Affairs, presided over
the electoral commission and advocated the implementation of a 30 percent
 En Route toward a More Inclusive Civil Society ● 213

female quota10 on electoral lists of the proportional mode. Hopefully, through

this legislation, women will become more visible in politics because of laws
for financing women’s campaigns.
The question remains as to whether women in politics would be more
open or tolerant than men. Solidarity between women is still lacking, which
is to say that women, although they encounter many of the same discrimina-
tions and struggles in Lebanon both today and historically, have not yet truly
embraced the role they can serve for each other, but, rather, remain loyal to
their religious or ethnic groups. Even within the same religious group, women
lack solidarity with one another.

Participation of Women in Legislative Elections

The participation of women is crucial in all fundamental political changes.
The right to vote and to hold public office was originally accorded to educated
women only by the executive branch in 1953, even though both educated and
noneducated men were allowed to vote. Women protested, claiming that this
inequality was truly discriminatory, and women’s associations including the
LLWR protested the decision. The argued that, first, the law did give the right
to illiterate men to vote and furthermore that women were not responsible for
their lack of literacy at the time because of the sporadic existence of public
schools, and the financial situations of some families who could not afford
to send their daughter to private schools. Later that same year, all women
became voting members of Lebanese society.11
Women are rather absent from the political sphere, except for a myriad of
sorrow female heiresses who are acting out of their responsibilities to continue
their husband’s legacies. A remarkable trend has emerged in which widows of
assassinated or deceased political figures enter the public domain soon after,
where these women are elected based on the prevalence of the sympathy vote.
Some link this to the conservative environment heir of the Muslim tradition
that surrounds Lebanon. Women have been eligible candidates for legislative
elections since 1953, but it was in 1963 that Myrna Boustani became the first
woman to enter the parliament. She was elected to complete her late father’s
term. Other women ran for legislative elections but society and the confes-
sional electoral laws proved to be barriers to their success. Similarly, when
parliament opened in 1991, Naila Muawad was elected after the assassination
of her husband, who was the president-elect. In 1992, three women entered
the parliament, Naila Muawad, Bahia Hariri, the sister of Rafiq Hariri, and
Maha Khoury. Maha Khoury was elected by chance, because in her district,
all other candidates boycotted participation in the election. In 1996, Nouhad
Soueid reentered the parliament, the first time was after the sudden death of
214 ● Women in Lebanon

her husband. Militant women who do not belong to a political family, or do

not have the financial means have a hard time running as candidates and they
are often not taken seriously.12
In 2005, many female candidates ran in different regions, but most of
them did not succeed. However, their courage brought out the wind of
change that took hold of all domains of Lebanese society. After the with-
drawal of the Syrian army, a liberating wind gave the impression to all
categories of society that everything was possible. The wives who inherited
political posts—Solange Gemayel, Naila Moawad, Bahia Hariri—somehow
succeeded. Bahia had to surmount many obstacles to prove to her masculine
colleagues that she was capable of doing her work well and in some cases
doing a better job than they could do. In 2009, Solange Gemayel and Naila
Moawad ceded their candidacy to their sons who were elected. From seven
women who declared candidacy, four of them—Naila Tueni, Strida Tawk,
Bahia Hariri, and Gilberte Zuein—won, because of either their politically
influential families or their vast wealth.
Lebanon has been a model that shines because of its ingenuity but is also
a disappointing model, seen through its political failures. A good Lebanese
citizen is someone who respects and implements the aspects of life that make
Lebanon unique. This specificity does not only derive from the richness of its
glorious past, but it also derives from the talent of one’s fellow citizens, and
mainly from the respect for and tolerance of others. A good citizen does not
judge others based on their confession or social class; after all, our diversity
is our richness. Lebanon has everything to become the model country of
coexistence and liberty. A good citizen belongs to Lebanon first and above all.
Lebanon is a model of conviviality, consensual agreement, accordance, and
harmony. Currently, we are increasing our awareness and forming new reflec-
tions about the meaning, extent, and dimensions of the Lebanese formula
sigha.13 This new reflection stems from the identity crisis seizing the Arab
world, which is facing accelerated modernization and globalization. The out-
dated political structures of most Arab countries are not adaptable to our
time. Despite the inherent weaknesses in our political leaders, the failure of
our sigha is mainly due to external regional, political, and religious factors.
Lebanon has always been and will remain an example of democracy, liberty,
and tolerance to all Arab countries because of the presence of both Christians
and Muslims and the necessity that they coexist.
 Conclusion

D
espite the real unity that the Arabic language and culture bring,
Lebanon is geographically at the crossroads of civilizations. Depend-
ing on which periods one considers of its history, Lebanon is either
dominated, in painful tensions or in moments of balance. It is truly unique
in its synthesis of war and peace—with few examples of instances where the
two have been mutually exclusive.
At the moment, the world is dominated by masculine values of con-
frontation, which produces anxiety and worry, especially in Lebanon. The
Arab Spring, fueled by frustration, and injustice now calls for more femi-
nine values—collaboration, peacekeeping, and unity—to ensure an inclusive
and progressive transition. While the Arab Spring has not prompted regime
change in Lebanon, it has called upon civic protestors to take to the streets
to protest for unity—namely, for the need to move away from a religiously
fueled sectarianism toward secularism.
Undoubtedly, the sectarian Lebanese system led to the politicization of
religion; indeed, this political dimension gave the means to make way for
the political cast to compete for power sharing, and consequently implicating
the intervention of external forces, which redefined modernity with a sacred
foundation. This new modernity has implications for the status of women
and the organization of society. This sectarian mechanism also undermines
our common living together for which we are fighting.

A New Generation, A New Vision

At the center of the movement for change are young Lebanese women and
men. College students from around the country are joined together in their
call for laïcité, a French form for secularism. In April 12, 2012, for the com-
memoration of the civil war in Lebanon, the laïc Club, a student organization
at the American University of Beirut, articulated the importance of laïcité to
guarantee equality and freedom for all Lebanese citizens by drawing a direct
link between the sectarian system and the civil war. They warned against the
216 ● Women in Lebanon

confessional system and its hindering effects on the edification of the rule of
laws in the state. “The role of laïcité in the edification of a State with rule of
law is not an illusion. The illusion is to believe that the confessional system
can be sustained.”1
Every sect has its own idea of Lebanon, and the Lebanese find ways around
and against each other to negotiate their idea and make it triumphant. Fortu-
nately, the new generation has a high level of awareness and sensitivity of the
dangers of the confessional system, and they are confident that the only path
ahead in protecting each sect, and particularly minority groups, is a path of
open discussion and a shift toward national unity in a civil society. The dif-
ferent minorities that form the Lebanese fabric are the richness of the country
as well as its raison d’être.

Secular, Not Sectarian

For many Lebanese, the old French saying plus ça change, plus c’est la même
chose, or “the more things change, the more they stay the same” is largely due
to the political stalemates and outbursts of violence caused by sectarianism.
In the face of divisiveness, secularism presents itself as the long-term sus-
tainable alternative to preserve a free, sovereign, democratic, and pluralistic
Lebanon. There are more than 70 NGOs in Lebanon and the young peo-
ple, especially women, work to change their positions within society, both
Christian and Muslims alike.
Can Lebanon make progress while the sectarian system keeps it divided?
For instance, as I mentioned in Chapter 12, in Lebanon, domestic violence
is not considered a crime, and the law does not recognize rape within mar-
riage a crime. Nasawiya, a Beirut-based NGO, has drafted a law for unified
protection against domestic violence victims in 2010, which was passed to
the Lebanese Parliament and the Department of the Interior. A subcommit-
tee was formed in the Parliament during that time to address the draft law,
and the committee added a small clause to the existing legislature. However,
the draft law sat within the Department of the Interior and the Parliament
for a significant amount of time without going into effect. Why the delay?
Because one member, a Shi’i member of Hizbullah, added a clause indicating
that “a woman can appear in a civil court only if the religious courts allow
it.”2 His statement clearly indicates that religious law should take precedence
over the jurisprudence and laws of the state. In reaction, several NGOs and
feminist collectives mobilized in January 2012 to protest before the Lebanese
Parliament and the Department of the Interior in downtown Beirut, drawing
more public attention to the issue.
Similarly, Dar el-Fatwa, the Sunni High Religious Council, criticized the
legitimacy of this draft law, citing that this project opens the door to harm
 Conclusion ● 217

for Muslim women. They believe the law refuses women the existing rights
that they have in the religious court, also believing that this project con-
forms to a Western mentality that does not correspond with societal values,
endangers the traditional nuclear family unit, and denies a father the right
to educate his children, and specifically girls, who are most in need of his
protection. The Sunni court believes that this law would have a psychological
impact on the Muslim children who will see their mother defying the moral
authority of their father. The organization denounced the creation of new
punishable crimes such as the rape of a spouse and refused the interference of
the police in family affairs, and, furthermore, against the use of minors as wit-
nesses. Like the Shi’i, they declared this law to be dangerous, for many of the
same reasons, not wanting the state to interfere with private matters. In this
interpretation of modernity, the state cannot interfere in private laws, despite
pressing human rights issues surrounding the subject. Most importantly, in
this interpretation, religious law has clout in a civil space. John Donahue
argues that when economic and social development is perceived as threats to
the integrity of identity, fundamentalist religious views are seen by some as a
refuge from the onslaught of change.3 Yvonne Haddad also states, “One won-
ders whether the shift in affirmation of religious models for the role of women
is an attempt to maintain a status quo in a society that is changing rapidly, or
whether it is a traditional Islamic attempt at recapturing an ‘idealized reality’
in a situation of flux.”4 Change is inevitable and engrained in our culture, but
fundamentalists attempt to resist the natural trajectory of changes in society,
calling for a return to religious roots to reestablish an authentic identity. They
resist change to cling to structural power, or to redirect the future back toward
the past. And the other alternative involves dismantling the cultural tools for
moving forward.
The network of the pro-secular NGO Laïque Pride members in Beirut
and around the world organized simultaneous protests across national lines—
raising the issue of secularism to the international level. On May 15,
2011, Laïque Pride members marched in Beirut, and, simultaneously, their
Lebanese expatriate counterparts marched in many major international cities
including London, Brussels, Copenhagen, Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver,
and Washington, D.C. Protestors demonstrated a communal spirit, as young
women walked with white Western wedding veils and T-shirts that read “Civil
Marriage.” Laïque Pride currently supports two draft laws—one to amend the
Lebanese Personal Status laws that prohibit women from passing on their cit-
izenship to their children; the other is the draft law cited above, and provides
more protection for women suffering from domestic violence. Laïque Pride
is just one example of many Lebanese NGOs and civil society organizations
that believe that citizenship means rights, obligations, and protection for all,
and that secularism is the only way to achieve that objective.
218 ● Women in Lebanon

March 2012 announced the first all-female police unit of the Interior
Security Forces (ISF). These 610 Lebanese women will assume full police
responsibilities in July 2012. Todd Robinson, a US official attending the cer-
emony of this first female officers-in-training showing their newly acquired
skills stated that “this program is designed to support reform in the Lebanese
law enforcement sector by strengthening the capacity of the ISF to enforce
the rule of law in Lebanon and to protect the Lebanese people.”5 Indeed, this
unit of women challenged physical and moral barriers as well as stereotypes
common to the Arab world, and in practice, their successful performance will
mark the formal integration of women in security forces. Already rumors are
spreading that they will prove more capable than men in reinforcing the law.
It is important to note that by the ISF uniform code prohibit any show-
ing of religious symbol while on duty. Muslim women who wear the veil
are not exempt from the ISF code. This first policewomen unit evidences
that Lebanon is a unifying country not a dissonant one. Women are actively
embracing their role as agents of change and are succeeding in their new roles.
There is no doubt that women can also successfully assume leadership roles,
and there is need to create opportunities to open that journey that will expand
female leadership around the world and unify the Lebanese society through
the empowerment of women.
The religious diversity in Lebanon has been a source of an undeniable rich-
ness. Lebanon, with its deep diversity, summarizes the world in its richness
and problems. We had the chance to live this diversity despite the difficulties
it brought. In order to ensure a peaceful religious pluralism, an intercommu-
nity debate on civil life in Lebanon as well as an intense reflection on the
advantages and advantages of the religious and the temporal imposes itself.
How then do we apply the conditions of such a separation while respecting
the rights of all communities? This question has no clear answer, but it will
define the future of Lebanon as a peaceful nation or a fragile state.
Is it not the task of women, who biologically carry life, and are always
close to the most concrete forms of this life, to struggle against the forces
of divisiveness that are operative in the world and prominent in Lebanon?
One could almost say that this country, through its openness, has already
presented certain feminine traits. Is not Lebanon’s mythical heroine Europe,
the Phoenician virgin taken away by Zeus, whose name became eponymous
of a continent searching to become a community? After her, did not Elissa,
through her audacity and her patient ingenuity, become the founder of a
new city, the African Carthage? Moreover, was it not this same Carthage that
nourished and grew the daring explorer departed such as Hannibal?
Admittedly, women become more efficient in the public, moral, and polit-
ical spheres; their new responsibilities now forbid them from considering
 Conclusion ● 219

submission as an immutable attitude. They wish to utilize their feminine val-

ues not only for output, but also for a broader humanism. The evolution that
we are witnessing does not signify the disappearance of feminine pluralism:
Diverse women often have, in their thoughts and behaviors, different and
complementary attitudes toward change.
It is in service to these values of diversity that we must deploy our creativ-
ity. The time has come to challenge accepted values and to open ourselves to
the fundamental questions of cultural, religious, and political diversity that
comprises the uniqueness of Lebanon. We need to accept our differences and
others who differ from us in order to achieve a more sustainable existence
under one Lebanese identity. There are hopes that more involvement from
NGOs and participation in local organizations will help unify Lebanon and
increase a sense of solidarity.
Common civic responsibilities will bring Muslims and Christians, and
by extension, the men and women of both groups, together to facilitate
improved social relations and a true degree of equality for all, regardless of
gender or religious affiliation. The new generation is attempting to rewrite
the personal laws and in their action are reinforcing the idea that a “Uni-
fied Lebanon” is becoming less and less of a myth as time goes on. As the
mentalities of the Lebanese people begin to intersect, and the prospect of sol-
idarity becomes a reality, and the deepening of the meaning of “modernity”
includes a place for religious resurgence adjusted for life in a secular civiliza-
tion. The mission of Lebanese women, regardless of religion, is developing to
more prominently feature national identity as a means of self-identification,
instead of focusing primarily on group affiliation. However, politics and reli-
gion are the Scylla and Charybdis between which these female activists must
negotiate in order to positively achieve the Lebanese ideal of pluralism.
Lebanon holds the torch of civilization in the Arab world through its mes-
sage of openness and implementation of elements that pave the way to a more
inclusive civil society. Together, Christians and Muslim women will uphold
the torch of civilization to save the Great Lebanon, and spread the message of
unity to the entire turbulent region. Herein lies our alternative constructive
modernity that paves the way for good citizens to obey one set of rules and
civil laws.
 Notes

Introduction
1. Paramilitary militia headed by Pierre Gemayel. For further information, see
William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Oxford: Westview Press,
2000), 372–376.
2. Known also as the Tigers, Camille Chamoun’s own private Christian political
party.
3. In the 1950s Camille Chamoun was committed to Lebanon’s Western orientation
while an increasing number of Muslims were attracted to Nasser Pan-Arabism.
See Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 326–327.
4. This term is controversial and evokes different meanings. I use it in the sense of
gradual transformation/progress by women’s efforts to respond to the demand of
contemporary times. Evolution is the development of men’s/women’s latent capa-
bilities, which under the action of favorable circumstances are certain to occur at
a certain time. This definition implies that development is a continuum and
opens the terrain for the formation of subjectivities, particularly among women
and activists.
5. Hizbullah, the Party of God, had formed in Lebanon following the Iranian revo-
lution. Its motto was taken from the Qur’an (58:22) perceived as against the Party
of Satan (Qur’an 58:19–20). For further information, see Chapter 5, Part II.
6. For more information, see Part III, Chapter 9.
7. Lara Deeb, An Enchanted Modern (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2006), 20.
8. Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity (USA: Penguin Book, 2003), 146.
In Lebanon, the quota system divides governmental and administrative power
between the three main religious communities according to their numerical
number. Though the quota system respects the law of numbers, it is carried
to its extreme and does not provide safeguards for the minorities. Thus, each
community feels inadequately represented and thus perceives the system to be
unjust.
9. Nahda is the Arabic word for renaissance. Lebanon is known as the cradle of the
Arab Renaissance and a center of dialogue of cultures and religions. Together the
churches’ bell towers and the mosques’ minarets sounds resonate.
222 ● Notes

10. Joseph Maila, head of “Pole Religions” at the Quai d’Orsay (“Le Liban symbolise
jusqu’à la déchirure les contradictions du monde arabe”), interviewed by Carole
Dagher for L’Orient-Le Jour, October 21, 2009, Beirut. Lebanon represents a
real synthesis of all questions related to the Arab contemporary reality as Arab
countries struggle to embrace a necessary modernity. Lebanon symbolizes their
contradictions at the expense of its own split.
11. For further information, see Chapter 6, Part II. 20
12. Kamala Visweswaran, Fictions of Feminist Ethnography (Minnesota: University of
Minnesota, 1994), 17–39.
13. Landers Spickard and McGuire, Personal Knowledge and Beyond, Reshaping the
Ethnography of Religion (New York: New York University Press), 195–201.
McGuire argues that “good” evidence should not distort the respondent’s experi-
ences, beliefs, and feelings; he poses the question of how research can be grounded
as truth while using interpersonal interactions and indicates that introspection as
a strategy can be valuable.
14. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interview and Other Writings, 1972–
1977, edited and translated by Colin Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon, 1972).
The reorganizing of knowledge means recreating an epistemological ensemble
that defines the conditions and limits of the development of each field of knowl-
edge. Truth becomes the creation of the process that discovers it, and in the
modern world, power, and knowledge are inextricably linked.
15. Spickard and McGuire, Personal Knowledge, 239.
16. Ibid., 239.
17. National Pact of 1943. Maronite President Bechara el-Khuri and Sunni Prime
Minister Riyadh el-Solh worked out a compromise solution to the problem
of Lebanese sectarianism and regional identity: Christians accepted Lebanon’s
Arab identity and Muslims renounced the merger with other Arab states. More
importantly, the pact spells out a formula of sectarian representation in the
parliament.
18. Authority given to the succession of the prophet, or an imam (descent of the
imam Ali), to lead the Islamic nation.
19. For more information, see Chapter 10, Part III.

Chapter 1
1. Toufic Touma, Un village de montagne au Liban (Paris: Mouton & Co. La Haye
1948), 10.
2. An administrative district.
3. A subnational administrative district.
4. Charki means “East” and Gharbi means “West.”
5. Anis Freiha, Mo’jam asma’ el-moudon wal koura el-loubnaniyya (Beirut: Maktabat
Loubnan, 1972), 103. Afif B. Morhej, I’raf Loubnan (Beirut: n.p. 1965).
6. See annex photograph of the monastery.
 Notes ● 223

7. Antione Khoueiry, Zahle malhamat soumoud wa boutoula (Beirut: Markaz

el-Ilham), 1982.
8. One dennum = 1,000 m2 . Land used to be measured by how much of it can be
worked in one day of labor.
9. “Finnage, or limits of a communal territory, creates a ‘space that is legally owned
by a collectivity of people who manage it.’ ” Henri Mendras, Sociétés Paysannes
(Paris: Armand Colin, 1976), 35.
10. The Chapel was abandoned in March 16, 1956, after an earthquake.
11. The Maronites are the most influential Christian community in Lebanon. They
affirmed their communion with the Catholic church in the twelfth century, and
in 1584 they founded the “Maronite college” in Rome. The Patriarch of Antioch
and the Middle East Monsignor Nasrallah Sfeir is currently the head of the
Maronite Church. His headquarters is in Bkerke on a mountaintop overlook-
ing the Mediterranean. Maronites played an essential role in the creation of the
“Great Lebanon” following the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
12. Jean Corbon, L’Eglise des Arabes (Paris: Edition Cerf, 1977), 29–33.
13. Ibid.
14. Known as Nahr el ‘Asl in Arabic, Oronte is a river located at the Syrian border
with Turkey where the city of Antioch is located. Antioch, currently a Turkish
city, occupied an important place in history as the center of the Hellenic Orient,
then the third city in importance after Rome and Alexandria when conquered by
the Romans in 64 b.c. Evangelized by Christians from Jerusalem, namely, Saint
Paul and Saint Barnabas, Antioch became a religious metropolis with Saint Peter
as its first bishop. The Persians conquered it in 540, Arabs in 636, Byzantines
in 969, and the Seljoukides in 1084. The first Crusaders in 1098 conquered it
and transformed it to a principal frank city, Mamlouks reconquered it in 1268,
and the Ottomans in 1516. Placed under the French mandate in 1920, Antioch
became Turkish territory again in 1939.
15. Religious affiliation.
16. Jamil M. Yazigi, “American Presbyterian Mission Schools in Lebanon” (Master’s
thesis, Education Department of the A.U.B. Beirut, 1964), 69.
17. Yazigi, “American,” 91–92.
18. “The mountains of Epire and of Lebanon . . . always lived because of Lebanon’s
immigrants.” Henri Mendras, Sociétés Paysannes (Paris: Armand Colin, 1976),
146.
19. Ibid.

Chapter 2
1. Courrier de l’Unesco, March 1975, Year XVIII.
2. Simone De Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe (Paris: Gallimard coll. Idées, 1949), 1:
16–19.
3. Roger Garaudy, Pour l’avènement de la femme (Paris: Albin Michel, 1981), 18–38.
224 ● Notes

4. Alouche Richard, “L’image de la femme à travers le romain libanais,” Travaux et

Jours, no. 47 (Beirut, 1973), 73–90.
5. Gaston Bouthoul, Les mentalités (Paris: P.U.F., 1971), 30–31. “La mentalité, du
point de vue de la société, constitue la structure mentale spécifique de chaque
civilisation; et du point de vue du sujet, elle est un ensemble d’idées et de dispo-
sitions intellectuelles intégrées dans le même individu, reliées entre elles par des
rapports logiques et des rapports de croyance.”
6. Hana Abi Rached, Mu’gam al-amtal (Beirut: Da’irat al-ma’rif, 1954), 73.
7. Selim Abou, Le bilinguisme arabe-français au Liban (Paris: Presse Universitaire de
France, 1962), 101.

Chapter 3
1. Henri Mendras, Sociétés Paysannes (Paris: Armand Colin, 1976), 79.
2. Claude Levi-Strauss, Les structures élémentaires de la parenté (Paris: Mouton &
Co., 1967), 135.
3. Ibid., 136.
4. Germaine Tillion, Le harem et les cousins (Paris: éd. du Seuil, 1966), 8.
5. Ibid., 71.
6. Ibid., 120.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Mounir Chamoun, “Problèmes de la famille au Liban,” Travaux et Jours, no. 25
(Beyrouth 1967), 27–30.
11. Translation, Marie-Claude Thomas.
12. Claude Levi-Strauss, Les structures, 47.
13. University Saint Joseph, La génération désenchantée, L’Orient-Le Jour, 2002.
14. L’Orient Le Jour, “L’Appartenance communautaire dicte largement les mariages
des Libanaises à des étrangers,” July 20, 2009.
15. A closer examination of these unions reveals that Lebanese Sunnis tended to
choose foreign spouses that are Palestinian refugees, Syrian, or Egyptian; Shi’i
women often married Iraqis, Syrians, or Egyptians; and Christian women most
often chose Syrian, American, French, and to a lesser extent Palestinian or
Egyptian husbands.
16. Gospel According to Matthew 10: 1–12.
17. Hanna Malek, Al-ahwal, Al-shakhsiyya wa-mahakimuha fil-tawa’if al masihiyya fi
Suriyya wa Lubnan (Beirut: Dar el Nashr, 1972), 96.
18. Robert Clément, Le mariage chrétien au Liban (Paris: Etudes, 1981), 665–678.
19. Ibid., 674.
20. Mounir Chamoun, Problèmes, 39.
21. Alex and Magda are the given names for this case study. I have not disclosed their
real names for privacy reasons.
22. Phares Zoghbi, “Le Mariage civil et la laïcité,” L’Orient Le Jour, August 12, 2009.
 Notes ● 225

23. Mounir Chamoun, Le Mariage, 39: “à côté du mariage religieux qui prendrait
alors la valeur d’un signe d’engagement plus personnel dans la vie de l’Église et
d’un désir de vie spirituelle plus profonde, le mariage civil permettrait la générali-
sation du régime matrimonial monogamique et l’exogamie communautaire dont
le Liban a besoin pour homogénéiser ses assises sociales.”

Chapter 4
1. In the United States, each state provides licenses to citizens interested in becoming
a notary public. The application process requires simple criteria and the term of a
notary public is only four years. In Lebanon, as in France, the criteria for becoming
a notary public are more demanding for this prestigious profession. The candidate
must have a Master’s degree in Law, and the Department of Justice nominates the
notary public for life. The latter administers his/her functions in the private sector.
2. Fadia Kiwan, Al-adwar al-ijtima’iyya lilmar’a al-’amila fi kul min el-Ordon wa
Suriyya wa Lubnan (Beirut: NCLW, 2004), 105.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Chapter 5
1. Term used in Lebanese dialect to refer to Shi’is.
2. Lebanon map by Marie-Claude Thomas.
3. The Druze focus on absolute monotheism and refer to themselves as
Muwahhidun (Unitarians). The details of the faith are secret and shared by a
small number of the community the ‘uqqal (enlightened), which includes men
and women since the earliest days. Women’s issues set the Druze apart from
other Muslim sects. Polygamy and temporary marriage (mut’ah) are forbidden,
and women can initiate divorce proceedings. The Druze also believe in the
transmigration of souls, or taqannus.
4. Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Lebanon (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 8.
5. See Chapter 1, Human Geographic Framework.
6. Hizbullah had formed in Lebanon and became an influential Shi’i political party
following the Iranian Revolution.
7. Michel Hajji Georgiou and Michel Touma “L’émergence du Hezbollah,
aboutissement d’un lent processus de maturation sociopolitique,” L’Orient Le
Jour, July 29, 2006, Etudes, 6.
8. Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi’ite Lebanon (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2008), Preface XV.
9. Ibid., 182–183.
10. Sabrina Mervin, Le Hezbollah état des lieux (France: Actes Sud, 2008), 74–85.
11. Na’im Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2005), 235.
226 ● Notes

12. William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Westview Press, 2000), 219–225.
13. Though controversial, this was the Christian analysis and conviction of the
situation. Selim Abou, Béchir Gemayelou L’Esprit d’un Peuple (Paris: Edition
anthropos, 1984), 47–49. See William Cleveland, The Lebanese Civil War, 1975–
1990, 372–379. Pierre Gemayel, head of the paramilitary Phalange Kataeb, and
former President Camille Chamoun, leader of his militia, the Tigers, realizing
that the government and the army were inept to take decisive actions against the
Palestinians decided to take it themselves.
14. Lebanese Intifida, or the Cedar Revolution, means “shaking off ” and describes
the popular uprising of the Lebanese against Syrian’s meddling in Lebanon’s
sovereignty, beginning in February 2005 following the assassination of former
Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Popular mottos of the movement were
Hurriyya, Siyada, Istiqlal (Freedom, Sovereignty, Independence), and Haqiqa,
Hurriyya, Wahda wataniyya (Truth, Freedom, National unity).
15. The Emir of Qatar invited all Lebanese political parties to Doha. He convinced
them to reach an agreement to elect a new Lebanese president. Lebanon had had
no president for six months.
16. Almanar.com, “In Any Other Clash We Will Attain a Historic Victory,”
February 6, 2010, http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id
(accessed February 6, 2010). Hizbullah members also identify this 33-day war
as the “Divine Victory.”
17. This chronology and analysis echoes Michel Hajji Georgio and Michel Touma’s
approach.
18. Lebanon was under French Mandate from 1918 to 1845.
19. “The first political division France imposed was the creation of Greater Lebanon
in 1920. To the old mutasarrifiyah of Mount Lebanon, France added the coastal
cities of Tripoli, Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut; in addition, France removed the fertile
Bekaa valley from Syrian jurisdiction and placed it within the frontiers of the
expanded Lebanese State.” Cleveland, A History, 213.
20. The American University of Beirut became coeducational in 1922; currently, its
student body is 52 percent male and 48 percent female. “About the University:
Facts and Figures,” American University of Beirut, http://www.aub.edu/about/
facts.html (accessed January 25, 2010).
21. The mission of the Unversité Saint-Joseph is to encourage the interfaith dia-
logue through biculturalism and multilanguages. “Mission de l’USJ,” Université
Saint-Joseph,http://www.usj.edu.lb/en/files/mission.html(accessed January 25,
2010).
22. Najaf is a religious center of the Shi’i located in Iraq, south of Baghdad, and six
miles west of Kufa. The shrine of Imam Ali, a seminary, and the grand mosque
of Kufa where Ali was assassinated are among its historical sites. Qom, a small
town south of Teheran, is the leading center of Shi’i theological seminaries. Pil-
grims arrive daily to the gold dome shrine of Fatimah, sister of the eighth Imam.
In the 1960s Qom became a place of resistance to the governance of the Pahlavi’s
 Notes ● 227

state. Qom has become a center of religious and political activities since the
Iranian Revolution in 1977–1979. Qom is home to prominent Shi’i leaders. See
Esposito, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World (New York: Oxford, 2009)
volume 4, 213–216 and 459–463.
23. Georgiou and Touma, “L’émergence,” 6.
24. Shaery Eisenlohr, Shi’ite, “Was Musa el-Sadr Iranian or Lebanese?” Accent
vs. genealogy, 128–130. Esposito, Islam, 186–191. “The Imam Musa
Sadr,” al-mashriq.com, http://almashriq.hiof.no/Lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/
musa-sadr (accessed February 6, 2010). Musa el-Sadr was seen as a moderate
figure asking Christians to give up some of their power and while pursu-
ing ecumenism between religious groups. He cofounded the Social Movement
with the Catholic archbishop Grégoire Haddad (1960). He was an opponent
of Israel but also attacked the PLO for harming Lebanese civilians with their
attacks. In August 1978, he mysteriously disappeared during a visit to Libya. The
Lebanese Shi’i came to see him as a spiritual leader, a religious hero, and a worthy
descendant of Hussein, a martyr and “Vanished Imam.” His niece is married to
Mohammad Khatami, former president of Iran.
25. “Notre nom n’est pas ‘metwali,’ notre nom estcelui du refus (‘Rafedun’), celui
de la vengeance, celui de ceux qui se révoltentcontretoutetyrannie. Mêmesi nous
devons le payer de notre sang, de notre vie . . . Nous ne voulons plus de beaux
sentiments, mais de l’action. Nous sommeslas des mots, des états-d’âmes, des dis-
cours . . . A partird’aujourd’hui, je ne me tairai pas sivousrestezinertes.” Georgiou
and Touma, “L’émergence,” 6.
26. Qassem, Hizbullah, 14–15.
27. Rule of Shi’i jurisprudent. See Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shi’te Lebanon
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 104–109, 142–143.
28. Qassem, Hizbullah, 15–20.
29. The Israeli army led by General Ariel Sharon.
30. Nabih Berri participated in the “Committee of Salvation” formed by former
Maronite president Elias Sarkis, along with the Sunni prime minister Chafiq
Wazzan, the Maronite Bechir Gemayel, and the Druze Walid Jumblatt.
31. Qassem, Hizbullah, 19.
32. Ibid., 20.
33. Ibid., 43–49.
34. Georgiou and Touma, “La naissance du Hezbollah, et les racines de son action
politique,” L’Orient Le Jour, August 1, 2009, 5.
35. Qassem citing Surah 3, al’Umran, verse 126 in Hizbullah the Story, 48.
36. Everywomen, Women of Hizbullah Part 1, YouTube, April 3, 2009.
37. Ibid., 30.
38. Ibid., 187–191, 207–208.
39. Hassan Nasrallah, “Manifesto of Oct. 30, 2009,” Almanar.com, http://almanar.
com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=113293&Language=ar (accessed January
10, 2010).
40. Qassem, Hizbullah, 170.
228 ● Notes

41. Georgiou and Touma, “Hezbollah entre ‘culture de l’espace’ et ‘culture du

territoire,’ ” L’Orient Le Jour, August 4, 2009, 6.
42. Qassem, Hizbullah, 270.
43. Ibrahim Amin el Said, Al Bayan el-Ta’sisi li Hizbullah, Beirut: February 16,
1985.
44. The right-wing Christians, who were against the Syrian army occupation of
Lebanon, boycotted the 1992 Lebanese Parliamentary elections. As a result,
the majority of the elected members of the parliament turned out to be
pro-Syrian.
45. Georgiou and Touma, “Hezbollah entre ‘culture de l’espace,’ ” 6.
46. Familiar in pre-Islamic era, the term refers to social solidarity based on blood
relations. ‘Assabiyya unites a group of people against strangers and at the same
time reinforces the values of the group.
47. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 22–24.
48. Farms located in Southern Lebanon at the border of Israel.
49. Different Jihad organizations with different objectives, strategies, and targets
spread. These organizations have been increasingly recognized as fundamental-
ist. For instance, the Palestinian Jihad Movement appeared in 1979 claiming
responsibility for attacks against soldiers and Israeli civilians.
50. Square in Beirut that is secured by Shi’i presence.
51. Georgiou and Touma, “Hezbollah,” 6.
52. The March 14 Alliance is named after the date of the Cedar Revolution that
marks the popular uprising following the death of former prime minister Rafiq
Hariri. This coalition of political parties and independents in Lebanon, led by
Saad Hariri, son of Rafiq Hariri and current prime minister, as well as Samir
Geagea, the president of the Christian Lebanese Forces, call for sovereignty over
all Lebanese territories.
53. The FPM of Michel Aoun left the Alliance (March 14 was not an established
alliance back then) before the 2005 general elections due to major disagreements
and became part of the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance in 2006. The FPM is one of
the allies of Hizbullah.
54. An Nahar, “Al Intikhabaat fi el mizan el masiHi,” July 9, 2009, 1.
55. Ibid.
56. A subnational administrative district.
57. “Carter Center Commends Lebanon’s Successful Elections; Notes Shortcomings
and Encourages Continued Reform,” CarterCenter.org, http://cartercenter.org/
news/pr/lebanon-statement-060809.html?printerFriendly=true (accessed Febru-
ary 2, 2010).
58. See later chapter on veiling in Part II, Chapter 6.
59. An Nahar, “Sadiq Caricature,” cartoon, June 9, 2009, 24. See the blue caricature,
a symbol of the March 14 movement. The blue symbol represents the peaceful
blue sky of Lebanon.
60. Germaine Tillion, Le harem et les cousins (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1966), 163.
 Notes ● 229

Chapter 6
1. Qassim Amin, Al-A’mal al-kamila li-Qassim Amin, Al mar’a al jadida (Beirut:
Al-mu’asasa el-‘Arabiyya lil-diraasaat wal nashr, 1976), 178.
2. Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 144–145.
3. Rifa’at el-Tahtawi, Takhliss al-ibriz (Beirut: Al-mu’asasa el-‘arabiyya lil-diraasaat
wal nashr, 1973), 258.
4. Rifa’at el-Tahtawi, Takhliss, 105.
5. Al-murshed al-amin lil banat wal banin (Beirut: Al-mu’asasa el-‘arabiyya lil-
diraasaat wal nashr, 1973), 393.
6. Abd el-Rahman Kawakibi, Oum el Qura (Beirut), 157.
7. Butrus al-Bustani, “Discourse on the Education of Women,” Actes de l’Association
Syrienne (Beirut, 1852).
8. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in a Liberal Age (New York, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1983), 162.
9. Ibid., 151.
10. Ibid., 15.
11. Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender, 164.
12. Ibid., 156.
13. Ibid., 158.
14. Malek Abi Saab and Rula Jurdi Abi Saab, “A Century after Qassim Amin,”
Al-Jadid, Winter 2002.
15. Ibid., 1.
16. Ibid., 2.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

Chapter 7
1. Marina Da Silva, “Entre religion et politique,” Le Monde Diplomatique, 2006,
Monde Arabe, Femmes, Islam, Europe.
2. Abderrahim Manchini, Femmes et Islam, L’impératif universel d’égalité (Paris:
L’Harmattan, 2006), 25.
3. Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 79–183.
4. For more details, see Chapter 12.
5. Fadwa Al-Guindi, Veil, Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance (New York: Berg, 2000),
82–83.
6. Al-Guindi citing Graham-Brown, Sarah 1988: 71–21, in Images of Women: The
portrayal of Women in Photography of the Middle East, 1860–1950. London Quar-
tet Books., “Women are at the center of the family and its sanctity, and hence the
term extends to the family in general, as commonly used in verbal greetings and
inquiries about health.” 85.
230 ● Notes

7. Barbara Stowasser, Women in the Qur’an, Traditions, and Interpretation

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 120–121.
8. Stowasser, Women, 118.
9. Ibid., 344.
10. Tarif Khalidi, The Qur’an Sura 33:53 (New York: Viking, 2008), 343–344.
11. Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite, translation of Le Harem Politique
(New York: Perseus Books Publishing L.L.C., 1991), 92.
12. Mernissi citing Tabari Tafsir, Dar al-Ma’rifa ed, volume 22, 87.
13. Ibid., The Veil, 87–89.
14. Shirk vs. tawhid : shirk means worship of idols or joint worship to God; on the
contrary, tawhid emphasizes that Muslims must proclaim and worship one God
alone.
15. Tradition cited in Khaled Abou El-Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name (UK: One World
Oxford, 2001), 211.
16. Ibid.
17. El-Fadl citing al-Jawzi, Speaking, 212.
18. El Fadl, Speaking, 218.
19. El Fadl, citing Ibn Khaldun, Aby Zayd’ Abd al- Rahman b. Muhammad
(1333–1406)d. Al-Muqaddimah, An Arab Philosophy of History. He is unique
among the thinker of Islam; he explained the process by which power is seized
and maintained, the changes it undergoes, and the product of successful power,
which is civilization or Umran, the life of city. History is rooted in his philosophy,
and he argues that early theologians often accepted the authenticity of traditions
with problematic and social implications. Thus, the isnad (the chain of transmis-
sion for a tradition traced back to Prophet Muhammad) analysis is insufficient,
and the matn (substantive content of a hadith) analysis is imperative, 218.
20. El-Fadl, Speaking, 214. See Chapter 8, Fadlallah tafsir, 12.
21. Ibid., 224.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 225.
24. El-Fadl, Speaking, 209–232.

Chapter 8
1. Lamia Rustum Shehadeh, The Idea of Women in Fundamentalist Islam (Florida:
University Press of Florida, 2003), 194–196.
2. Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short Story (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2007), 36.
3. Sabrina Mervin, Le Hezbollah: état des lieux (Paris: Cursives, 2008), 248.
4. For more information, see Chapter 5.
5. Shehadeh, The Idea of Women, 194.
6. Khalidi, Tarif, The Qur’an (New York: Viking—Penguin Group, 2008), 62.
7. Ibid., 66.
 Notes ● 231

8. Shehadeh, The Idea, 199.

9. A Muslim prolific contemporary theologian, ideologue, and politician who has
played a significant role in the politics of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,
and South Asia, and the South Asian communities of the Persian Gulf, Great
Britain, and North America.
10. Barbara Stowasser, Women in the Qur’an (New York: Oxford University Press,
1994), 128.
11. Khalidi, The Qur’an, 284.
12. Fadlallah, Dunya al-Mar’a (Beirut: Dar al-Malak, 2005), 140–141.
13. Verse (4:1) And God created you of the same soul and from it created a spouse.
14. Muhamad Hussein Fadlallah, Ta’amullat Islamiyya Hawla al-Mar’a (Beirut: Dar
al-Malaak), 26–30.
15. Khalidi, The Qur’an, 341.
16. Stowasser, Women in the Qur’an, 97–98.
17. Ibid., 98.
18. Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 241.
19. Khalidi, The Qur’an, 328.
20. Khalidi, The Qur’an, 31. “But men are a grade more responsible than them.”
21. Ibid., 25.
22. Fadlallah, Ta’mullat, 90–96.
23. Khalidi, The Qur’an, 66–67.
24. Fadlallah, Ta’mullat, 119.
25. Fadlallah, Fatwa limuwaajahat al’inf dud al-mar’a, Maqaalaat no. 244, Fadlallah’s
library 2007.
26. Ibid.
27. Ahmad, Women, 67.
28. Fadlallah, Ta’mullat, 139.
29. Khalidi, The Qur’an, 29.
30. ‘ibadat indicates worship laws versus maslaha that indicates public interest.
31. Fadlallah, Ta’mullat, 136–138.
32. Qâsim Amin. al-A’mal al-kamila, Tahrîr el-mar’a (Beirut: Al-Mu’assas el-‘arabiya
lil-dirâsat was nasr, 1976), 95.
33. Ibid., 104.
34. Eva de Vitray Meyerovitch, “La femme musulmane devant la loi,” Monde
Diplomatique, Le dossier de France, Pays Arabes.
35. Khalidi, The Qur’an, 31.
36. Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Women (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), 63.
37. Khalidi, The Qur’an, 77.
38. Germaine Tillion, Le harem, 178. “Dans l’Islam comme en chrétienté la
femme méditerranéenne a été régulièrement spoliée . . . Cette spoliation ne survit
actuellement que dans des zones résiduelles, la cause de cette évolution doit être
cherchée dans un progrès économique qui entraîne tout [détruisant notamment,
232 ● Notes

de plus en plus, le ‘bien de famille,’ et amenant un nombre de femmes sans cesse

croissant à exercer une profession].”
39. C. Labrusse, Droit de la Famille, Droit Musulman, Encyclopedia Universalis E-F,
909–910.
40. Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 83.
41. Dir. Mai Masri, 33 Days, Arab Film Distribution, Al-Jazeera documentary
Channel, DVD, 2007.
42. Everywomen, Women of Hizbullah Part 1, YouTube, April 3, 2009.
43. Ibid. Women of Hizbullah Part 2.
44. Sabrina Tavernise, “A Girl Life Bound Close to Hezbollah,” The New York Times,
August 18, 2006.

Interview—Individual and Communal Perspectives:

Muslim Discourse
1. Ja’afari is the Shi’i school of jurisprudence.

Chapter 9
1. G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of History (London: George Bell and Sons, 1878),
466–477.
2. Frederic Lenoir, Petit traite d’histoire des religions (France: Plon, 2008), 338–339.
3. Yvonne Haddad Yazbeck, Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History (Albany:
State University of New York, 1982), 9.
4. An influential German Jewish political theorist (1906–1975). She examines the
modern world through a philosophical knowledge of the past.
5. Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books, 1993),
140–141.
6. Haddad Yazbeck, Contemporary, 5.
7. Ibn Khaldun, a prominent Muslim historiographer and historian 1302–1406,
introduced this term, which refers to social solidarity based on blood relations.

Chapter 10
1. I have not disclosed the real names of my interviewees for privacy reasons. Sayyid
is a common honorific title and Ustaz means professor.
2. Literally: alien, extraneous, or foreign, in this case, a sense of “other.”
3. Ayatollah Khomeini designated Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah in 1978
as the marja’ al-taqlid—source of tradition or imitation.
4. Traditionally, members of the family do the corpse washing, with males wash-
ing the bodies of males and females washing the bodies of females. This new
phenomenon of mothers washing and preparing their martyr sons signifies the
courage and pride of martyrs’ mothers.
 Notes ● 233

5. The Iranian Shi’ism was founded by the ‘Ulema from the ‘Amel Mountain in
Lebanon. Every Shi’i person, and in particular, the clerics of the Islamic sphere,
are aware of this episode of doctrinal history. In this environment, they perceive
Iranian help as a just return from history, as the ‘Ulema Shi’ism is the most
authentic form of Shi’ism.
6. Sixth Imam or leader in the line of Ali who founded the Shi’i school of law in
749.
7. Sayyid is a honorific title used for the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad in
the male line of Hasan and Husayn; still the Sayyids today constitute a respectable
class in Muslim societies endowed with spiritual and social supremacy.
8. Hijab means veil and its synonyms.
9. Michel Aoun, a Christian leader and ally of Hizbullah.
10. Iftar is the Arabic word for meal breaking fast in the month of Ramadan.
11. Thaqafa means culture.
12. In Shi’i rite, the Mahdi is the awaited Messiah to bring peace, justice, and unity
to a world torn by corruption.

Chapter 11
1. More information available on Gebran Tueni in Part II, Chapter 5, 7.
2. All poems can be found in Nadia Tueni, Les Oeuvres Poétiques Complètes (ed. Dar
An-Nahar, 1986). Translated by Marie-Claude Thomas.
3. Laura is a given name; I have not disclosed the real name for privacy reasons.
4. Café/restaurant located close to the river.
5. Jean Corbon, L’Eglise des Arabes (Paris: éd. du Cerf, 1977), 77–78. “Nous sommes
ici moins dans une civilisation de domination que d’accueil. La grandeur et la
vulnérabilité de notre région viennent en partie de cette vocation qui monte de
la terre: Etre en relations ouvertes plus qu’en autarcie dominatrice.”
6. Robert Abdo, La famille Libanaise (Beyrouth: éd. des Lettres Orientales, 1943),
68. “Il ya des fatalités de race, de climat, des hérédités physiologiques et morales
contre lesquelles tout vient échouer.”
7. Ibid., 70.
8. Georgina is a given name; I have not disclosed the real name for privacy reasons.
9. Qontoche or rectory.
10. Roseanne Saad Khalaf, Hikayat Short Stories by Lebanese Women (London:
Telegram, 2006).
11. Saad Khalaf, Hikayat, 77.
12. Leila Baalbaki, Je vis, trad. Michel Bardot (Paris: ed. du seuil, 1958), 167.
13. Youssef directed Haifa Wehbé’s leading performance in the film Dokkam Shihate.
14. Translated by Marie-Claude Thomas.

Chapter 12
1. André Vargnac, Civilisation traditionnelle et genre de vie (Paris: Albin Michel,
1948), 293.
234 ● Notes

2. Mohammed Arkoun, L’Islam hier-demain (Paris: éd. Buchet/Chastel, 1978), 227.

3. Gaston Bouthol, Les mentalités (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), 11.
4. Arkoun, L’Islam, 135–136.
5. Linda Matar, “La Femme Libanaise: Sa Situation et Son rôle,” llwr.org/ . . . /conf-
laicite-10-mars-2007_Linda_Matar (accessed May 29, 2012).
6. Ibid.
7. Les Libanaises se rebiffent contre le harcèlement sexuel, L’Orient-Le Jour,
April 25, 2010.
8. Shadow report on the implementation of Beijing Platform in (Egypt, Jordan,
Palestine, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon), 15 years from Beijing Plat-
form, 55.
9. L’Orient-Le Jour, March 8, 2008.
10. The Fourth Congress organized by the United Nations in 1995 in Beijing
asserted the necessity of giving 30 percent of seats in parliament to women by
2005.
11. Matar, “La Femme Libanaise.”
12. Ibid.
13. Sigha: the national pact.

Conclusion
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Century,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 15, No. 4, 427–442, October
2004, 230.
4. Yvonne Haddad Yazbeck, Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1982), 67.
5. Al-Arabiya.net, “Lebanon Unveils First All-Women Police Unit,” May 29, 2012
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 Index

Abduh, Mohammad, 107–12 nahda, 2, 5, 221

Abou, Selim, 40 qawwamun origins, 129
Aboussouan family, 24 Saghbine origins, 18
Adra, Souraya, 121 tabarruj, 138
Ahmad, Leila, 111, 113–14, 118, Tahtawi and, 108
144, 146 walad, 207
Ahmadinajat, Mahmoud, 79 Arafat, Yasser, 86
Akl (Sheikh), 139 Aramaic language, 18, 24
Al-Guindi, Fadwa, 123 Arendt, Hannah, 163
Ali (Imam), 226 Ariani, Abdel Rehman el, 99
Al-Qaeda, 167 Assabiyya, 167–8, 228
al-Sadiq, Imam Ja’far, 177 Ataturk, Kemal, 136
Al-Shaykh, Hanan, 198–9 ‘Awada, Hasan, 153
Amin, Qassim, 104–5, 107, 111–15,
144 Baalbaki, Leila, 6, 196–8, 207
An-Nahar (newspaper), 87, 100, 187, Baalbeck, 16–17, 83–4, 190
199 Bekaa
Aoun, Michel, 179, 228 agriculture, 23
Arab League, 85 capital, 17
Arab Spring, 6, 8, 215 education, 39–40, 152
Arabic language el-Sadr and, 89–90
Abduh and, 110 France and, 226
al-Shaykh and, 199 geography of, 16–17
Amin and, 111, 113 Hizbullah and, 40, 96–7, 168
Baalbaki and, 197 human geographic network, 18–20
Christianity and, 178 Islam and, 83
culture and, 215 marriage and, 44, 68
education and, 24–5 religion and, 20, 83, 190
Fadlallah and, 133, 138 Saghbine and, 17
hijab origins, 123, 177 ‘Ulama and, 91
Islam and, 110 women in, 3, 11, 66, 68, 99, 152,
literature and, 197 155, 172
marriage and, 63 Bergson, Henri, 205
modernization of, 110 Berri, Nabih, 91, 138, 160, 227
240 ● Index

Biden, Joe, 97 women and, 4–6, 9–12, 29, 34, 36,

Boustani, Butrus al, 109 112–13, 121–2, 147, 169–81,
Boustani, Myrna, 213 191, 194, 201, 207–9
young girls and, 37
cabellas, 22–3 civil unions, 60–1
Cairo Accord (1969), 85 Civil War, Lebanese
Caramel (film), 29, 192–4, 196 Chamoun and, 1
Carmelites, 72 education and, 26, 68, 209
Carter, Jimmy, 98 in film/literature, 192, 195, 199–200
Catholicism, 29, 55–6, 59, 65, 75, immigration and, 26–7
88, 126, 160, 162, 174, 178, 180, marriage and, 47, 59
223, 227 political climate and, 12
Cedar Revolution, 86, 98, 100, 166, religion and, 12, 19, 25
183, 226, 228 secularism and, 207, 215
celibacy, 52, 77 tourism and, 17
Chamoun, Camille, 1, 207, 221, violence and, 9
226 women and, 40, 147, 207
Chamoun, Mounir, 46 Committee on the Elimination of
Chidiac, May, 87 Discrimination Against Women
Christian National Liberal Party, 1 (CEDAW), 67, 69
Christian Phalange Party, see Phalanges communalism, 4
party communitarianism, 4, 106, 180
Christianity, in Lebanon Corbon, Jean, 187
Beirut and, 1 Council for Scientific Research and
Bekaa and, 17, 83, 190 Legal Opinions (CRLO), 129–31
birthrate and, 71 Cromer (Lord), 105, 109, 113
churches, 27–8, 159
divorce and, 145 Dagher, Carole, 222
education and, 35, 38–41, 120–1 Dandach family, 190
elections and, 95, 97–8, 100–1 Dar el-Fatwa, 216
identity and, 166–7 demographics and immigration,
immigration and, 26 Lebanon, 25–8
inheritance and, 65 divorce, 11, 48, 52, 54–9, 77, 110–11,
Islam and, 2–6, 15, 85–6, 88, 108–9, 118, 139–40, 142–7, 154–6, 191,
128, 151–6, 161, 184, 187, 193, 208, 212, 225
214, 216, 219 Doha Accord (2008), 85, 88
liberation and singlehood, 75–9 Druze, 9, 17, 19, 22–3, 25, 50, 83–4,
marriage and, 43, 45, 54, 56–9, 61, 87–8, 97, 139, 171, 184, 208, 225
139, 144 Dunya el Mar’a, 134
militia, 1
Phalanges party, 1 Egypt, 6, 83, 103–5, 107–9, 111–15,
religious spaces, 20, 22–4 117–18, 120, 178, 192, 196,
Saghbine and, 17, 19, 28, 84 199–200
sectarianism and isolationism, 79 Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU), 118
secularism and, 167–8 El-Assad family, 96
veiling and, 106 El-Fadl, Khaled, 126–9, 131
 Index ● 241

el-Haddad, Abouna Yaacoub, 159–60 Hariri family, 95

El-Khoury family, 22, 25 Hariri, Bahia, 99, 173, 213–14
El-Khoury, Gabriel, 19 Hariri, Rafiq, 86–7, 99, 159, 172,
el-Sadr family, 94 209, 213, 226, 228
el-Sadr, Baqir, 133 Hassan (Imam), 133
el-Sadr, Musa, 16, 89–91, 134, Hegel, G.W.F., 161–3
176, 227 Henry, Thierry, 200
exogamous marriages, 50–1 High Shi’i Council (HSC), 90
hijab, see veiling
Fadlallah, Muhammad Hussein, 89, 91, Hikayat Zahra (The Story of Zahra),
131, 133–4, 136–44, 175, 177 199
Fadlallah, Zahra, 149–50
Hizbullah
family law, 11, 139, 147
Baalbeck and, 17
Fargeallah, Maud, 1
Bekaa and, 17
Fatah, 1, 85, 90
Fatwa, 110, 132, 142 birth of, 90–5, 221, 225
feminism, 7, 29, 31, 63, 66–7, 77, 100, charity and, 40, 79, 211
105, 110–11, 113–14, 117–32, Christians and, 39
136, 139, 144, 147, 149, 198–9, FPM and, 96–9
210–11, 216 growing role of Lebanese women in,
France, 7, 24–5, 39–40, 79, 85, 88–9, 148–50
108, 111–12, 161–2, 165–6, 186, headquarters, 10, 11
225, 226 Iran and, 85, 134
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), Israel and, 175, 181
96–100, 228 marriage and, 153
Freiha, Anis, 18 Mashghara and, 39
French Mandate, 4, 59, 88–9, 121, 206, National Freedom Party and,
211, 223 179
political influence, 84–5, 87–8,
Geagea, Samir, 95, 228 154, 171
Gemayel, Amin, 87, 92, 95 schools and, 40–1, 152
Gemayel, Pierre, 87 secularism and, 216
Gemayel, Solange, 214 Shi’i and, 40, 79, 84, 90, 147
geographic location, Lebanon, 15–18 women and, 2, 4, 11, 99–100,
Georgina, 188–92 120–1, 138, 147–8, 151, 158,
Georgiou, Michel, 90 172, 175, 194, 208
Ghazali, Zeinab al, 118 human geographic framework, Lebanon,
globalization, 4–5, 51, 54, 68, 76, 107, 18–20
122, 136, 147, 179, 202, 214 Hussein (Imam), 176
Greek Orthodox Church, 24, 50, 53,
56, 88, 99
Green Bird, The, 195 ijtihad, 104, 110, 126–7, 132, 134, 147,
152
Haddad, Gregoire, 191, 227 Imam revolution, 154
Haddad, Yvonne, 163–4, 217 inheritance, 11, 45, 65–6, 74, 139–40,
Hamade, Marwan, 87 146–8, 155, 208, 214
Hamadé, Mohamad Ali, 184 Interior Security Forces (ISF), 218
242 ● Index

Iran Jumblatt, Kamal, 87, 92

el-Sadr and, 90 Jumblatt, Walid, 87, 95, 227
Hizbullah and, 84–5, 88, 98
Islam and, 2, 96–7, 106, 133–5 Kaddoura, Ibtihaj, 121
Khatami and, 12 Kamil, Mustapha, 112
Khomeini and, 2 Kataeb party, 1, 86–7, 168, 171, 226
Lebanon and, 84–5, 106, 176 Kawakibi, Abd el-Rahman, 108
Raafsangani and, 79 khalifa, 136
women and, 4, 79, 135, 151, 176, Khamenei, Imam, 93–4
179 Khatami, Mohammad, 12
see also Iranian Revolution Khateefa, 47
Iranian Revolution Kho’i, Ayatollah, 134
Baalbeck and, 16–17 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 2, 79, 91, 94, 96,
Hizbullah and, 85, 94 131, 134, 152, 154, 232
Islam and, 91, 94, 133–4 Khoury, Maha, 213
Lebanon and, 9, 76 Khuri, Bechara el, 222
Shi’i and, 16–17, 176 Kissinger, Henry, 86
women and, 119–21, 176 Kouloub, Kout el, 6
Iraq, 91, 127, 133, 166, 171, 198, 226
Islam La génération désenchantée, 53
chronology in Lebanon from Labrusse, C., 147
1943–2008, 85–8 League for Lebanese Women’s Rights
civil marriage and, 143–4 (LLWR), 121, 207, 211
divorce and, 144–5 League for Women, 121
elections and, 95–101 Lebanese Pact, 4
family law and, 139 Litani River, 17, 19
Hizbullah and, 90–5
inheritance and, 146–8 Maalouf, Amin, 148
Liberal, 139, 144 Mahfoud family, 24
marriage and, 139–43 March 14 movement, 95, 97–100,
openness to progress, 103–5 183, 228
polygamy and, 145–6 March 8 coalition, 95, 97–100, 154,
reaction of “pure and hard” Islam, 211–12
105 Maronites, 159–60, 166, 190, 223, 227
Shi’i community in, 88 churches, 27, 159
veiling and, 111–15 divorce and, 57, 59
women and, 106–11, 117–32 influence in Christian community,
see also Hizbullah; Qur’an 223
Islamic Revolution, see Iranian marriage and, 50, 55, 190
Revolution modernity and, 29, 160
National Pact and, 89
Ja’fari, 127, 155, 177 Ottoman Empire and, 88
Jesuit University, 89, 120, 178, political influence, 89, 97, 99
192, 197 religious spaces and, 20–5
Jesuits, 29, 188 Saghbine and, 4, 12, 28
Jumblatt family, 19, 84 secularism and, 166
 Index ● 243

Ta’ef Accord and, 86 National Pact (1943), 85

Turks and, 25 nongovernmental organizations
marriage (NGOs), 207, 209–12, 216–17,
arranged, 46–7 219
case study, 57–61
celibacy and, 52, 77 old age, women and, 73–4
changes due to political and Oriental Canon Law, 55
economic circumstances, 53–4 orphans, 134, 145, 148, 175, 179
civil unions, 60–1 Ottoman Empire, 18, 21, 23–4, 88–9,
exogamous, 50–1 122, 127, 188, 190, 223
free choice, 47
by Khateefa, 47
Palestine Liberation Organization
pressure, 46
(PLO), 86, 227
religious and civil, 54–7
Pan Arabic movement, 90
in Saghbine, 48–53
Party of God, see Hizbullah
tradition of, 44–6
patriarchy, 5, 32, 115, 118, 124, 131,
types of, 46–8
139–40, 186, 208
Martins, Cardinal Jose Saraiva, 159
Phalanges party, 1, 168, 171, 226
martyrdom, 91–2, 148–9, 153, 159,
political parties
175–6, 180, 232
Communist, 90, 166
Matar, Linda, 207
Melkites, 4, 19–25, 28, 50, 55, Kataeb, 1, 86, 168, 171
57, 190 Lebanese Christian National Liberal
Mendras, Henri, 19 Party, 1
Mernissi, Fatima, 125 National Freedom Party, 179
Mervin, Sabrina, 85 National Party, 112
Moawad, Naila, 214 Shi’i, 91, 97
modernity, women and, 28–30 Socialist Progressive, 92
monotheism, 5, 12, 143, 162, 225 see also Hizbullah
Morhej, Afif B., 18 polygamy, 54, 83, 110–11, 118, 139,
Morus, Thomas, 95–6 145–7, 208, 225
mouhafazat, 16, 66 Pope Benedict XVI, 159
Movement of the Deprived, 90 Pope John Paul II, 12
Muawad, Naila, 213 Protestantism, 23–5, 162
Musa, Nabawiyya, 118
Qaddus, Ibtihaj, 118
Nabawati, Saiza, 118 Qassem, Na’im, 85, 91–2
Nahda, 2, 5, 24, 221 Qur’an
Nasrallah, Emily, 120, 195 authoritarianism and intended
Nasrallah, Hassan, 88, 97, 138, 200 ambiguity in, 126–8
Nasrallah, Hussein, 138 Christianity and, 173
Nassef, Malak, 117–18 clashes with modernity, 129–32
National Council for Lebanese Women’s divorce and, 144–5
Issues (NCLW), 66, 68–9 education and, 152–3, 197
National Democratic Institute (NDI), Fadlallah and, 134–5
212 family law and, 139
244 ● Index

Qur’an—continued sitr, 125

individual responsibility and, 129 see also veiling
inheritance and, 147 Solh, Riad, 147, 222
marriage and, 110, 139–42 Spickard, James, 7
modern interpretations of, 104–5, Stowasser, Barbara, 123, 137–8
110, 152, 166 Suleiman, Michel, 88, 160, 200
modernity and, 181 Sunnis, 17, 20, 53–4, 83, 85–6, 88–9,
polygamy and, 145 97, 99, 106, 121, 127, 131, 135,
secularism and, 104 139, 145, 147, 154–5, 159–60,
veiling and, 107, 119, 122–6, 134–5 166–7, 171–2, 216–17
women and, 11, 107, 121–2, 138, Syria, 16, 23, 84–7, 91, 96–8, 108, 173,
154, 208 186, 214, 223, 224, 226, 228
Syriac language, 24–5
Raafsangani, Akbar Hashemi, 79
religious spaces, Lebanon, 20–5 Ta’amullat Islamiyya Hawla al-Mar’a,
136, 142
Rihan, Hélène, 121
Ta’ef Accord (1990), 86, 93
Roman Empire, 16, 19, 65, 164,
Tabet, Laure, 121
177, 223
Tahtawi, Rif ’at el, 107–8, 111
Rouphael, Joseph, 21
Tawk, Strida, 99, 214
terrorism, 93, 98, 128, 136, 148–9,
Saab, Najla, 121 166, 176
Sadr el-Din el-Sadr, Ayatollah, 90 Tigers, 221, 226
Saffar, Zeinab al, 149 Tillion, Germaine, 44–5, 147
Saidat et kherbene, 19 Touma, Michel, 90
salaries, 67–8, 71 Trabulsi, Fawaz, 153
Sanshiz, Khose, 98 Tueni, Gebran, 87, 233
Sarkis, Elias, 227 Tueni, Ghassan, 87
Saudi Arabia, 27, 86, 106, 127, 129, Tueni, Nadia, 183–4, 201, 233
135, 179, 199 Tueni, Naila, 99–100, 214
Sayegh, Nasri, 153
serail, 20 ‘ulama, 89–91, 94, 105, 110, 112–13,
Sfeir, Nasrallah, 160, 223 126, 128, 133–4, 165
Sha’rawi, Huda, 117–18 United Arab Emirates, 27
Shaery-Eisenlohr, Roschanack, 84 United Nations
Shari’a, 112, 115, 126, 128, 143, ambassadors, 184, 188
146–7, 155, 164, 208 CEDAW and, 67, 69
Shawn, Landers, 7 Hizbullah and, 88
Shidyaq, Fares al, 108 Lebanon’s membership in, 15
Shi’i, 5, 9, 11, 16–17, 20, 39–40, 53–4, Resolution 1559, 87
79, 83–94, 97, 99, 106, 110, 121, UNESCO, 31, 196
127, 132, 133–4, 142–3, 145, women and, 67, 211–12
147–8, 151–2, 154–5, 160, 166–7, United States
170–2, 175–81, 190, 197–200, education and, 39, 152
216–17 Hizbullah and, 148
Sistani, Ayatollah, 94 Lebanese immigrants in, 26, 57–8,
Sister Andrée, 72 79, 86, 186
 Index ● 245

Lebanon and, 79, 86, 133 modernity and, 4, 129–32

marriage and, 60 outlawing of, 135–6, 165
multiculturalism and, 165–7 Qassim Amin on, 104, 111–15
notaries public, 225 Qur’an and, 121–2, 135–8
Palestinians and, 86 resurgence of, 76, 99–100
Syria and, 87 study of, 11, 104
USAID, 186 symbolism, 99
tradition and discourse of, 106–11
“Veiled Revolution,” 119 Turkey and, 135–6
veiling Virgin Mary and, 177
authoritarianism and, 126–8 as Western creation, 111–15
Christianity and, 177–8, 180 Western views of, 194
different meanings of, 122–6
divergent feminist voices and, Waddud, Amina, 144
117–21 wakil el-waqf, 24
diversity and, 183 wali el faqih, 90–5
Fadlallah on, 135–8 Wali el Sham, 190
France and, 165–6 Wazzan, Chafiq, 227
globalization and, 179 Wehbe, Haifa, 199–202
hajib, 99, 106, 122–6, 135–8, 153–4, widows, 10, 73–4, 143, 145, 148–9,
177 175, 213
Hizbullah and, 100 World War I, 24–5, 27, 188
identity and, 150, 153–4, 161
individual Yaacoub el-Haddad, Abouna, 159–60,
responsibility/accountability 167–8
and, 128–9 Yazigi, Jamil M., 24
Interior Security Forces and, 218
Islam and, 10, 11, 99–101 Zoghbi, Joseph, 59
Laïque Pride and, 217 Zoghbi, Phares, 59
Lebanon and, 172, 173 Zuein, Gilberte, 99, 214