In the Shadow of the Swastika

This book examines and establishes connections between Italian Fascism and
Hindu nationalism, connections which developed within the frame of Italy’s
anti-British foreign policy.
The most remarkable contacts with the Indian political milieu were estab-
lished via Bengali nationalist circles. Diplomats and intellectuals played an
important role in establishing and cultivating those tie-ups. Tagore’s visit to Italy
in 1925 and the much more relevant liaison between Subhas Chandra Bose and
the INA were results of the Italian propaganda and activities in India.
But the most meaningful part of this book is constituted by the connections
and influences it establishes between Fascism as an ideology and a political
system and Marathi Hindu nationalism. While examining fascist political lit-
erature and Mussolini’s figure and role, Marathi nationalists were deeply
impressed and influenced by the political ideology itself, the duce and fascist
organisations. These impressions moulded the RSS, a right-wing, Hindu
nationalist organisation, and Hindutva ideology, with repercussions on pre-
sent Indian politics. This is the most original and revealing part of the book,
entirely based on unpublished sources, and will prove foundational for scho-
lars of modern Indian history.

Marzia Casolari teaches Asian History at the University of Torino, Italy. She
has done extensive research on the relations between Italian Fascism and
Indian radical nationalism, especially Hindu nationalism. She has written
regularly on present politics in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh and more recently
she has been carrying out research on the military and strategic motifs of
India’s partition.
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In the Shadow of the Swastika
The Relationships Between Indian Radical
Nationalism, Italian Fascism and Nazism

Marzia Casolari
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Title: In the shadow of the swastika : the relationships between Indian
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To my mother, to the memory of my father
and to all who are no more.
Contents

Foreword viii
Preface xiv
Acknowledgements xvi
List of abbreviations xviii

1 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism: The early phase 1

2 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 33
3 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 58
4 The Second World War 85
Conclusion 120

Bibliography 122
Index 132
Foreword

This book is based on parts of my PhD thesis. It is the result of a careful

study of primary sources especially from the National Archives of India and
Nehru Memorial Library, in New Delhi, the State Archives of Mumbay and
Kolkata, the Historical Archives of the Italian Ministry of External Affairs in
Rome, the Central State Archives in Rome, the India Office Records, at that
time at Blackfriars, in London, besides several less known but not less
important archives, which are listed at the end of the volume.
Several scholars assumed the fascist character of the Sangh Parivar orga-
nisations, without concretely proving their claims. Only the primary sources
allowed to demonstrate the existence of meaningful connections and influ-
ences between Fascism, Nazism and Indian nationalism. Some features of the
organisations of the Hindu right, their social structure, their ideology, their
racial discourse derives largely from these influences.
Initially, the research that led to the publication of this book appeared to
have as its main subject the foreign policy of fascist Italy and India. However,
it became increasingly clear that Italy’s “Indian policy” was contradictory in
nature. Decisions were taken, but nothing came of them. Contacts were
established, but they did not develop into consistent political project. There
was no general agreement within the fascist leadership about aims and
objectives. The decisions made were taken more frequently owing to the
initiative of individuals, and often the Minister of External Affairs was not
aware of certain developments. However, despite several failures of the Italian
foreign policy in India, it is worth analysing the nature of the contacts
between the men of the fascist regime and exponents of Indian nationalism
and the results that these contacts produced.
If Italy’s “Indian policy” lacked continuity and presented many incongruities,
a number of Indian nationalists developed a growing interest in Fascism. These
men considered the fascist regime as a point of reference and an example to be
followed. This interest grew independently from the fascist regime’s own interest
in Indian nationalist organisations. Indeed, the Italian fascist leadership was
unaware that a number of organisations were engaged in in-depth debates about
Italian Fascism, and looked upon Fascism favourably. The Hindu nationalist
organisations – RSS and Hindu Mahasabha, above all – and other less well
 Foreword ix
known entities such as the Bombay Group, Lokandi Morcha, and the Swastik
League (founded by M.R. Jayakar, himself a leading figure in the Hindu
Mahasabha) were all keenly interested in Fascism.
Subhas Chandra Bose’s relations with the Axis powers, his flight from India
via Afghanistan and related topics have been purposely treated, in this volume,
as a matter of fact.1 Instead, other aspects have been investigated more carefully,
such as Bose’s potential role as a liaison between the Hindu Mahasabha, the
German Consulate in Bombay and Rash Behari Bose in Japan.
Relations between the fascist regime and Pan-Islamic groups in Italy and
Europe have not been examined here. Although the fascist government dedi-
cated much attention to Arab organisations and obtained some results, rela-
tions with exponents of the Indian Pan-Islamic movement were sporadic and
mainly based on personal relations.2 The most significant contact, in this
regard, was perhaps Mohammad Iqbal Shedai, a rather obscure figure, once
close to Barkatullah. Shedai was considered by the fascist regime as an
important leader of the Gadhar Party, while the sources prove that, in actual
fact, he represented not much more than himself.3 Regarding possible con-
tacts between the fascist regime and the wider Muslim political environment
in India, during this research no historical evidence has emerged of contacts
between the fascist regime and exponents of the Khaksar Movement.
The relations between Indian nationalism and Fascism or Nazism should be
seen in the light of the efforts of Indian nationalists to build up non-British
political models and to shape national organisations accordingly. As this
volume aims to prove, these models and organisations were not always and not
necessarily anti-British.
Anyone who credited nationalist organisations with a political role, and
who might provide material aid, was more than welcome. On the other side,
Italy’s growing interests in India must be considered as complementary to the
relations between the fascist regime and the nationalist movements of North
Africa and Western Asia, which occupied a central position in Italy’s foreign
policy, essentially anti-British, at the time.

1 India and Italy’s foreign policy under the fascist regime

From the late 1920s, fascist Italy was eager to gain a foothold in India.
However, Italy was very careful about competing with the British in South
Asia. In Rome, several analysts believed that the fascist regime would last for
a long time. The general view was that the British Empire was declining, and
the Italian Foreign Office was eager to play its part in Britain’s downfall. This
view had political, as well as economic implications. If the British were to
leave, Italian traders and entrepreneurs had to be ready to meet the challenge.
If the British empire collapsed, a quantity of channels would open for new
political influences and economic perspectives.
During the 1920s, there was a widespread feeling, in Italy, that the requests
resulting at the end of World War I had not been met. This feeling was nurtured
x Foreword
by the incoming nationalist propaganda of the fascist movement. France and
Great Britain were seen and described as arrogant, rapacious powers, totally
uninterested in the needs of their previous allies. Italy, on the other hand, was
portrayed as a nation capable of defending the interests of the victims of Anglo-
French greed. The rhetoric of Italian Fascism placed British and French non-
recognition of Italy’s political role on a par with the injustices these powers
inflicted upon their colonies. Consequently, Italy regarded herself as a defender
of the rights and aspirations of colonised countries and people. By presenting
this picture to the world, the fascists found it easier to open up negotiations with
the nationalist movements of Africa and Asia, including India.
When Fascism rose to power, it chose to continue the policy adopted by the
previous government, as far as India and Asia were concerned. The government’s
interest had been limited to the economic sphere alone, and this implied total
recognition of Britain’s prerogatives in the area. This policy was abandoned when
Mussolini assumed direct control of the Foreign Office in 1932, after evicting the
Foreign Minister Dino Grandi, considered too moderate and pro-British. Italy’s
so-called Indian policy was then about to see some major changes. The new trend
meant not only compliance with “the requests of the highest levels of the PNF
[Partito nazionale fascista – National Fascist Party]”, but also with “the need . . . of
an ‘universal Fascism’ among the various fascist intellectual and youth groups”.4
This new radical stance determined a change in Italy’s approach to India. If
until that time the fascist government had been anxious to promote Italian
interests in the Indian subcontinent while carefully avoiding all conflict with
the British, from the early 1930s on, Italy started to seek out the support of
authoritative political figures in India.
“Fascism was presented as a ‘new civilisation’ . . . the standard bearer of a
new economic system capable of healing the wounds inflicted by super-
capitalism.”5 In a lengthy, unsigned report of January 1930, British economic
and administrative affairs in India were described as obsolete. According to
the regime analysts, British rule faced a crisis. Protectionism and political
intransigence were considered a lethal combination for British rule.6 In the
meantime, “the people of India were developing ‘a very high opinion of their
own potential and resources’”.7 The regime started to address directly African
and Asian (including Indian) nationalist movements. A comparison was
drawn between the British and the Latin civilisation. It was pointed out that
Britain herself had felt the influence of Latin culture for hundreds of years:

We therefore find unacceptable the idea of a fundamental opposition

between East and West. It is unacceptable to us precisely because we are a
Latin and a Mediterranean people. Not only geographically but as far as
culture and religion are concerned. Imperial Rome built a bridge between
East and West, and the Catholic Church has continued to do this.
. . . the ties between India and Mediterranean Europe go back through
all history.8
 Foreword xi
A line of continuity was thus found between Italy and Western Asia. Iraq was
described as an “economic dependency of Bombay”. Moreover, it was stated that

the ties between these states of the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle
East, such as Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, and India are not only economic but
also political.
. . . Should India become self-governing, the political significance of
these States will change.
Eastern Mediterranean will once more acquire its former historical
role. And East and West will meet at Rome once more.9

Ultimately, British interests in India had to be weakened if they were also to be

weakened in the Middle East. Only then could Italy expand eastward, toward Asia.
With the start of the Ethiopian campaign, relations between Great Britain and
Italy broke down in India too. The Italian Consulate in Calcutta had in the
meantime effectively produced pro-Italian sentiments in India. The contacts with
the Indian political milieu proved fruitful, and a rather explicit pro-Italian, anti-
British front had been created. This had important repercussions on Indian
public opinion, and contributed to the growth of a non-collaborative attitude
toward the British. Italy’s political propaganda and activities reached their peak
during the period between the Ethiopian War and the Second World War, par-
ticularly in 1938 when, after the Italian General Consulate in Calcutta, another
one was set up in Bombay. The Bombay Consulate was intended as an outpost
in Italy’s attempts to establish links with Marathi nationalism.
Politically, from 1938–39 on, Germany, with its aggressive foreign policy,
gradually took Italy’s place in the minds of the Indian radical nationalists,
above all the Hindu nationalists.
The Second World War and its aftermath ended all Italian ambitions in India.

2 Fascism and Bengali nationalism

The first outpost of Italy’s expansion campaign was Bengal. Among the pro-
vinces of British India, Bengal had always been the most exposed to Western
influences. It was therefore considered the ideal contest for building up poli-
tical bridges. The fascist regime began a propaganda campaign in 1925, when
an outstanding figure as Rabindranath Tagore was singled out for special
attention. Although, as known, the attempt to involve Tagore in Italian poli-
tical affairs was a failure, Italy went ahead.
There were two factors behind the increasing Italian political influence in
Bengal. One was the intense activity of the General Consulate in Calcutta.
The other was the affinity between Fascism and Bengali radicalism. After all,
they shared the same aim: undermining the British rule. Moreover, Bengali
nationalists were attracted by Fascism, which was considered a revolutionary
movement. It was not difficult to cultivate an interest in Italy among young
Bengali students. Those who joined Italian Universities also underwent fascist
xii Foreword
indoctrination. Once back in India, they collaborated with Bengali periodicals,
distributed throughout India, such as the famous Modern Review. Some of these
young men, such as Benoy Kumar Sarkar, went on to reach positions of impor-
tance. Other well-known figures as Tarak Nath Das and Kalidas Nag, and
famous and influential personages such as Subhas Chandra Bose and Rash
Behari Bose, were sympathetic towards Fascism. A number of Indian famous
and less-known figures also wrote on Fascism and Mussolini’s Italy.
The fascist regime’s strategy reached two important goals. Firstly, an
important and influential political leader as Subhas Chandra Bose took up
the fascist line (Bose was in constant contact with Mussolini from 1933 to
1944). Secondly, public opinion in Bengal proved to be pro-Italian. This atti-
tude became of vital importance at the time of the Abyssinian war.

3 Fascism and Hindu nationalism

Unlike the connections with Subhas Chandra Bose and Bengali nationalists,
no long-lasting relationships were established between the fascist regime and
prominent Hindu political leaders. Indeed, the fascist regime displayed a basic
lack of interest in this movement. This attitude was owing to poor knowledge
of the Indian political organisations other than the Congress. However, these
organisations were attracted by fascist ideology and highly appreciated the
supposed organisational capacity of the fascist regime. Published materials,
official records and other documents circulating among various offshoots of
Hindu nationalism prove that the Hindu Mahasabha, the RSS and other
organisations of lesser importance displayed an interest in Fascism from the
1920s right into the 1940s. Articles written by Mussolini and his biographies,
as well as quotations from his writings, circulated within these groups. It
therefore may be concluded not only that there was an awareness of Fascism
but also that the regime was looked upon most favourably.
B.S. Moonje travelled to Italy in 1931, also meeting Mussolini, in order to
study the organisation of the fascist state first hand. Moonje’s visit may be
considered a turning point, since he insisted on structural changes within the
RSS, based on the example of fascist youth organisations.
About 1938, Nazi Germany became the main point of reference for the Hindu
Mahasabha, under Savarkar’s presidency. Germany’s rabid policies regarding race
were taken as the model to be adopted to solve the ‘Muslim problem’ in India.
We may briefly conclude that secular nationalist groups which had direct
dealings with the fascist regime were basically immune to its ideology. This
was owing to the fact that their relations with Mussolini’s Italy were seen
exclusively as a means to an end. Italy projected an image of itself as a power
capable of providing these organisations with the political and logistical
means to oppose British interests. Conversely, the Hindu nationalist move-
ments (at that time, less involved at the international level) did not have the
capacity and the intellectual and human resources to establish relations with
friendly states, who might provide them with concrete aid in their struggle for
 Foreword xiii
power. Furthermore, the emphasis Hindu organisations placed on the ‘race’
issue distracted attention from the colonial issue.
In conclusion, Hindu organisation adopted two main political lines over
the period between 1920 and 1940. On one hand, the ‘race’ issue was max-
imised, finding its fullest expression in the Hindutva discourse, which had
much in common with widespread racial ideas in Europe at that time.
On the other hand, Hindu organisations made remarkable efforts to con-
vince public opinion that the Hindu population lacked a sense of militancy.
According to them, Hindu society should be militarised with an anti-Muslim
scope. From the 1920s onwards, Muslims became then the main target of
Hindu policy, and Muslims started to be perceived and described as more
threatening than the British rulers.

Notes
1 Two excellent studies on the subject have already been published, namely Milan
Hauner, India in Axis Strategy. Germany, Japan, and the Indian Nationalists in the
Second World War, London, 1981 and Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers against the
Raj. A Biography of Sarat & Subhas Chandra Bose, New Delhi, 1990. Both works
provide detailed accounts of events. An interesting collection of documents with an
accurate reconstruction of developments has been provided by T.R. Sareen: Subhas
Chandra Bose and Nazi Germany, New Delhi, 1996.
2 Renzo De Felice, Arabi e Medio Oriente nella strategia di guerra di Mussolini, in
“Storia Contemporanea”, December 1986.
3 Shedai’s influence has been overrated by Italian historians. Renzo De Felice, for
instance, describes Shedai as a key figure. De Felice was led into this error by
Mussolini’s high estimation of Shedai, shared by a number of representatives of the
fascist government: Renzo De Felice, L’India nella strategia politica di Mussolini, in
“Storia Contemporanea”, December 1987. Historical evidence proves that Shedai
received money from the Italian government in exchange for his liaison work with
exiled Arab nationalists in Europe. Unlike Bose, he was almost unknown and he
cannot be considered an influential political figure in India. Up to now, the rela-
tions between fascist Italy and the Indian political environment have been studied
only by Italian contemporary historians, who are not specialised in Indian history
and politics. They did not look into the question of the real consistency of the
Gadhar Party or Shedai’s influence in India. Regarding the political profile of the
Gadhar Party, after the Second World War, its stance was close to Soviet Socialism:
Emily C. Brown, Har Dayal. Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist, New Delhi,
1976, and S.S. Joshi, Hindustan Gadhar Party. A Short History, New Delhi, 1978.
4 R. De Felice, Mussolini il duce. I. Gli anni del consenso 1929–1936, Turin, second
edition, 1996, p. 408.
5 Ibid.
6 Archivio Storico del Ministero degli affari esteri (Historical Archives, Ministry of
External Affairs – ASMAE) Serie Politica (Political Series), Great Britain, 1930, b.
1213, report entitled “La situazione politica in India” (The Political Situation in
India), January 1930.
7 ASMAE, Ibid.
8 ASMAE, Ibid.
9 ASMAE, Ibid.
Preface
Ramachandra Guha

Some years ago, the Economic and Political Weekly published an essay that
shook up the community of modern Indian historians. Its author was an Italian
scholar whom none of us in India had heard of before. Yet, she had greatly
impressed us by the originality and depth of her analysis. Among other things,
her essay had authoritatively demonstrated the close and direct links between
right-wing Hindu groups in India and the Fascist movement in Italy in the 1930s.
Now, the author of that impressive essay has written a still more impressive
book. Marzia Casolari’s In the Shadow of the Swastika substantially expands
upon her EPW essay to present a detailed, wide-ranging and compellingly
readable history of the often startling connections between Indian politics and
European politics in the period between the two World Wars. Based on
intensive research in archives in Italy, England and India, the book is written
with care and authority, with the narrative driven by vivid quotations from
primary sources.
As Casolari argues, Italy’s interest in India was driven in the first instance
by the competitive nature of nationalism in Europe. Italian elites envied the
French and the British for having colonies in Asia; they sought compensation
in expanding their cultural footprint overseas. In India, the efforts of the Ita-
lian Government were focused on the key Presidencies of Bengal and
Maharashtra, the two parts of British India that were the most advanced in a
political and ideological sense. The Italians sent emissaries to these provinces,
who cultivated close ties with leading Bengali and Maharashtrian intellectuals
and activists. Inducements to study the Italian language and to visit Italy were
offered. Indian elites were encouraged to think of the Fascist dictator, Benito
Mussolini, as a decisive and transformative leader, and of Italy itself as being
rapidly modernised and made stronger by his leadership.
Casolari’s book features many unusual and controversial characters—
among them the Italian intellectuals Carlo Formichi, Giovanni Gentile and
Giuseppe Tucci; the Bengali politicians Subhas Chandra Bose, Syama Prasad
Mookerjee and Rash Behari Bose; and the Maharashtrian ideologues K.B.
Hedgewar, B.S. Moonje, and V.D. Savarkar. Casolari’s portraits of these
individuals are very deftly done, with their ideas and actions analyzed against
the backdrop of the national and international politics of the time.
 Preface xv
In the Shadow of the Swastika is an exemplary work of historical scholar-
ship. It is meticulously documented and lucidly written. The tone throughout
is even-handed and judicious; there is absolutely no resort to polemic. That is
because there is no need for that; the comprehensiveness of the book’s
research speaks for itself. There are many surprising, even striking, revela-
tions, which I shall not reveal here, for fear of coming in the way of a direct
dialogue between the reader and the author. Let me only say this; no one who
reads this book will ever think of Hindu nationalism in the same way as they
did before. And they will learn many other interesting and important things
along the way too.
Acknowledgements

The idea of writing this book came from an article published in 2000 by the
Economic and Political Weekly. It was a short but condensed excerpt from my
PhD thesis, focussing on the tie-ups between Italian Fascism and Hindutva.
The tremendous success of that article convinced me that a more complete
historical overview of the relationships and influences between Fascism and
Indian, in particular Hindu nationalism, was required.
This book would not have been possible without the support of Dr. T.R.
Sareen, who at the time of my PhD research was Director of the Indian Council
of Historical Research. His competence with archives and sources went much
beyond the boundaries of Indian institutions, and included British archives.
Special thanks must go to Mrs. Sareen and her wonderful hospitality,
which made me feel at home in Delhi. I will never forget her wonderful cur-
ries, cooked in spite of her being vegetarian.
An affectionate acknowledgement to Professor Michelgugliemo Torri to
whom I am thankful for his mentorship and friendship. The theoretical fra-
mework of my research has been drawn during our conversations. I am par-
ticularly grateful to him for reading and editing the manuscript.
I owe my thanks to the late Professor Giorgio Renato Franci, from the
University of Bologna, with whom I studied Sanskrit for four years. He
warned me not to trust other scholars’ claims and to prove the evidence of
any theoretical assertion.
I cannot forget late Professor A.R. Kulkarni, from Poone, who guided me
through the Marathi archives and records. The lively conversations with him
and Dr. Sareen, always at the restaurant of the India International Center in
New Delhi, enriched my work tremendously.
The late Professor Partha Sarathi Gupta was my supervisor during the first
step of my research, at the beginning of the 1990s. He gave me the information
about the most important unpublished records on which this book is based.
I must thank the staff of the National Archives of India and the Nehru
Memorial Library, in Delhi, Bombay State Archives, the Kesary office in Poone,
the Calcutta State Archives, the India Office Library in London, the Historical
Archives of the Ministry of External Affairs, the Central National Archives and
the Library of the Institute for Africa and Orient (ISIAO), all in Rome.
 Acknowledgements xvii
I must mention Mr. Malkani, for a very stimulating interview with lunch at
his residence in Delhi and Vikram Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar’s grandson,
whom I met in Mumbay in March 1997. He gave me important information
of his grandfather’s role in supporting the creation of Subhas Chandra Bose’s
Indian National Army.
I will never forget Bhanu Kapil and his lovely support and precious pre-
sence in tough situations.
I thank Indian historians, for their political views about Hindutva and their
reconstruction of facts after the Ayodhya demolition.
I am grateful to all who helped me. Lack of space and memory makes it
impossible to mention all of them. This book evolved thanks to several dis-
cussions with colleagues and friends.
In particular, I am thankful to Romila Thapar. I did not expect her warm
appreciation of the article that inspired this book: I believed she was too great
to notice my work, but I was wrong.
Thanks to my Indian friends, for their selfless hospitality, particularly
Eklavya Swami, his wife Neelam and her delicious cuisine. Their children,
who are now grown up and charming girls, enriched my sojourns in Delhi
with their playful presence.
Many thanks to my parents, who supported me, especially from the eco-
nomic point of view.
Great thanks to my son, Ezatoulla, who became part of the family when he
was grown up, but whose attempt to understand my work and whose appre-
ciation I concretely perceive.
And finally my husband, Abderahim, who has always been there, in spite
of all.
List of abbreviations

ACS Archivio Centrale dello Stato (Central State Archives) – Rome

ASMAE Archivio Storico Ministero Affari Esteri (Historical Archives
Ministry of External Affairs) – Rome
IO India Office – London
ISMEO Institute for the Middle and Extreme Orient – Rome
MSS Euro Manuscripts Europe
MSA Mumbay State Archives – Mumbay
NAI National Archives of India – New Delhi
NMML Nehru Memorial Museum and Library – New Delhi
PNF Partito nazionale fascista (National Fascist Party)
1 Italian Fascism and Indian radical
nationalism
The early phase

1 Early contacts between the fascist regime and Indian intellectuals:

Tagore’s journeys to Italy
Relations between fascist Italy and Indian nationalism date back to
1925–26. At that time an exchange of visits took place between Carlo
Formichi (1871–1943), the most illustrious Indian scholar in Italy of the
period, his disciple, Giuseppe Tucci (1894–1984)1 and the Bengali poet,
Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941). Tagore’s visits to Italy had received
remarkable attention from Italian scholars, who wrote several articles
and a volume on the subject.2 However, the political capital the fascist
regime hoped to make out of Tagore’s visits to Italy is a topic which has
been somewhat neglected. The question is of some interest in that it
sheds light on the hopes the fascist government had pinned on cultural
relations between Italian intellectuals, the University of Shantiniketan
and Bengali political circles.
Before dealing with Tagore in Italy and Formichi and Tucci in India, it is
necessary to briefly examine the main events leading up to this exchange.
Contacts between Formichi and Tagore had started up in summer 1921.
Acting as an intermediary was Kalidas Nag (1892–1966), at the time a young
academic and very close to Tagore. Subsequently, Nag became one of the
main supporters of the Italian political activities in India.3 In the early 1920s,
Nag was on the first of his two trips to Europe, where he resided from 1920 to
1923. Tagore visited Italy in 1925, stopping off in Milan, on his way back to
India after a trip to South America. Mussolini wished to invite him person-
ally to Rome. However, for health reasons travelling had become tiring and
Tagore did not wish to prolong his stay. It cannot be ruled out that the advice
of Tagore’s anti-fascist friends had a part in this decision.4 Tagore received an
invitation to lecture at the Circolo filologico (Philological Circle), and on 22nd
January, among other subjects he spoke about Italy as he had seen it when he
was seventeen years old, on his first trip to Europe, and about Italy in 1925.
In his speech, Tagore expressed some opinions that, later on would have been
used against him by the fascist regime:
2 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
You are now suffering. The shadow of the poverty of Europe projects itself
onto the world. You were great when you knew how to love. Now you suffer
because you do not love. Without love, beautiful things cannot be created.
The monotonous mask of a commercial civilisation does not express the
soul. Beauty is born out of patience; and the greedy have none. Where,
today, is a voice to be found which can interpret all humanity?5

Since Tagore had been so cordially welcomed to Italy on this occasion,

statements such as these were not dwelt upon. Although this was a purely
personal visit, Tagore took this opportunity to invite Formichi to India to
lecture at the Vishvabharati University of Shantiniketan. Formichi was to stay
in Shantiniketan from November 1925 to March 1926. Shortly before leaving
for India, Formichi asked Mussolini if he might bring along “some Italian
academics who would be able to organise an introductory course in Italian
culture”.6 The Vishvabharati University should provide living and travelling
expenses for Formichi and the Italian government foot the bill for the young
scholar who was to accompany him.7 The choice soon fell on

an example of the new trend in Indian studies in Italy, Dr. Giuseppe

Tucci, [. . .] assistant librarian at the Chamber of Deputies and a teacher
of Indian Religions at the University of Rome, with a profound knowl-
edge of oriental languages, versatile mind – all in all an honourable
representative of Italian learning.8

Tagore’s visit to Italy occasioned rumours that he might be an opponent of

Fascism. In January 1925, Formichi rushed to Tagore’s ‘defence’.

He was, and is, unaware of the fact that someone wanted to paint him in
anti-fascist colours. I was with Tagore from the time of his arrival at the port
of Genoa until his departure from Venice. I can safely say that Tagore has
nothing to do with political propaganda and would be deeply offended,
indeed shocked, to learn that he might be suspected of encroaching upon the
political life of the country of which he was a guest.9

Formichi was pleased to learn that the misunderstandings which had arisen as
a result of Tagore’s remarks of 22nd and 24th January in Milan had been cleared
up, after a number of interviews in which Tagore expressed favourable opinions
of Italy and Fascism. Formichi, by way of justification, added that he knew

that, as soon as he is up to the journey, Tagore wishes once more to

breathe the healthful air of Italy. It is inadmissible, and does less than
justice to our sense of hospitality, to place Tagore under suspicion in this
way. Tagore is great man and his conduct unimpeachable. He sincerely
loves our country and wishes only to see Italy fulfil its ambitions.10
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 3
Formichi reached Bombay on 19th November and Tucci on 2nd December
1925, and both went immediately to Calcutta.11
From the records, we learn that the most active supporter of this campaign
was “Commendatore” Ciro Trabalza, the Director General of Italian
Schools.12 When these preliminary contacts were being established between
Italian and Indian intellectuals, Mussolini seems to have done little more than
approve Formichi’s and Tucci’s proposals. However, both Formichi and
Tagore were later to call upon Mussolini’s services.13 On 9th December,
Formichi sent Trabalza a lengthy account of the first days of his stay in
Shantiniketan, in which he explicitly referred to the propaganda aims of his
stay in India. Formichi told Trabalza that Tagore would be back in Italy the
following spring,14 and added that Allahabad and

other Indian Universities are asking me to visit and lecture. It is my inten-

tion to travel everywhere in my efforts to promote the cause of Italy. I assure
you [. . .] that our work, in terms of propaganda value, is of inestimable
value. It is my earnest desire that His Excellency, Mussolini, know that I
consider myself a standard bearer, entrusted with the sacred Tricolour of our
nation, a task which redoubles my strength and determination.15

On 7th December Tucci, too, wrote to Trabalza from Shantiniketan, thanking

for his support, and described developments at the Vishvabharati University,
as well as his new teaching duties. Tucci added that he was already active on
the propaganda front:

Apart from a few conferences and lectures, which I will held here on the
history of Italian literature, as well as a number of articles on Italy which
I am working on, I hope to talk in other cities in India, if the occasion
arises. I wish to prove worthy of my mission and of those who sent me
here. I also wish to exalt Italy in the eyes of the citizens of India who are
seeking out new approaches to the West.16

Tucci’s articles were published in the Vishvabharati Quarterly and the Modern
Review.17 At that time, Tucci laid down the foundations of later collaboration
between the Italian General Consulate in Calcutta, the editorial board of the
Modern Review, and the circle of intellectuals, journalists and activists to whom the
journal was addressed. Tucci was fully aware of his role since, as he himself put it,

I have been eager, too, to maintain contacts with the leading intellectual
circles and cultivate relationships based on friendship or at least be on nod-
ding terms with persons who in one way or another represent the most
influential currents of thought here. It goes without saying that should we
wish to forge stronger links with India in the future, it will be that much
easier if we can already count on ties with individuals and groups.18
4 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
The Italian authorities agreed that in his next visit to Italy, Tagore should be
an official guest.19 However, Tucci and Formichi were also in for a reminder:

[. . .] of course, having been delegated such authority, it is I who will have the
last word (hardly necessary as far as the Consul and yourself are concerned,
whose capabilities, circumspection and dedication to our cause are irre-
proachable) as to our conduct in India and with regard to the opinion of the
British. Our task is to propagate our language, culture and learning and
promote Italy in the countries which provide us with hospitality. How this is
perceived is entirely the affair of our hosts. For our part we shall work in
favour of deeper cultural ties with India, but shall distance ourselves from
any comments made in our favour – including those of a political nature on
the part of active groups in what is, after all, a foreign country.20

Formichi left India on 10th March 1926. The differences between how Tagore
perceived relations with Italy and the perceptions and desires of the fascist
regime come to light in the account of Formichi’s activities at the time of his
departure provided by the Consul General in Calcutta.

A moving and pleasant farewell ceremony in Formichi’s honour was held

on the evening of 5th March at Dr. Rabindranath Tagore’s home. In this
austere setting – austere yet becoming in its modesty – the ceremony was
performed very much in accordance with the canon of Indian custom and
clearly took on the character of ritual (songs, floral tributes, precious
gifts, etc.). Dr. Tagore’s farewell speech, addressed to Formichi, was
exemplary for its eloquence . . . [Formichi] sincerely expressed his grati-
tude for all the kindnesses received, and hoped that relations between our
two peoples become more intimate over time.
It was for us, as representatives of Italy, a gratifying and instructive
experience. Our presence in India was warmly appreciated. If Italy, and
Formichi himself, have come out of it with flying colours, all the merit goes
to Formichi and we should be grateful to him for his services to Italy.21

Tagore had different views. The farewell ceremony was celebrated in the
manner traditionally reserved for special occasions. Tagore honoured a dear
friend taking his leave, and expressed genuine feelings, perceived by others as
potentially beneficial to their own political purposes. This should be borne in
mind with reference to the reasons behind the rift that later developed
between Tagore and the Italian representatives.22 Between the ideas and
practices of Fascism and the personal qualities and standing of a man like
Tagore there could be no accord.23 Tagore was not immediately aware of the
true nature of Fascism and Mussolini,24 or of Tucci’s and Formichi’s aims. He
was soon to find out, much to his displeasure. The Italians wanted to make
political capital even out of their gifts. Formichi wrote,
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 5
When he receives honours from important persons such as the British Gov-
ernor, Lord Lytton, British academic, writers and journalists, Mr. Spender,
Mr. Malvine, Lord Simha [sic], the Maharaja of Tripura, German writers and
journalists, the German Consul etc. etc., Tagore heaps praise on these tributes
and their bearers. Although a poet whose message is one of peace, the
admiration he feels for his illustrious visitors is heartfelt. The heroes of art and
of thought cannot but harbour a fellow feeling for the heroes of the field.25

On his return, Formichi presented Mussolini with Tagore’s gift: the ten
volumes of his complete works, two essays by Formichi on religious thought
in India and a volume, Salus Populi, published in Turin in 1908. While pro-
viding an account of his work in India, Formichi seems to have considered
himself a precursor of Fascism.

I confess with some pride that in this work, published so long ago, we
find an anticipation of developments and of a conception of the State
such as Mussolini’s own. The book may only be of curiosity value today,
and yet it is of historical significance. In 1908, amid a storm of protest, I
put forward principles which I see finally gaining ground today.26

After this exchange of gifts, the Italian authorities accorded official recog-
nition to Formichi “for services rendered to the nation”.27 Formichi, for his
part, rallied the press to his side in order that his meeting with Mussolini on
his return receive maximum publicity.28 We may conclude that Formichi was
an ambitious man. Having received such high public recognition, his main
concern was to see Mussolini’s praise in print, and not Tagore’s message.
Mussolini’s favour may be seen as a feather in Formichi’s cap and a stepping
stone to a certain position of power.29
Soon after Formichi’s return, preparations were made for Tagore’s second visit
to Italy. Tagore received an official invitation from the Italian government and
arrived in Naples on 31st May 1926. Alongside Tucci’s collaboration in India
and Formichi’s efforts at home, the Italian authorities in Rome were intent upon
avoiding all possible contacts between Tagore and Italian opponents to the fas-
cist regime. Tagore did meet Benedetto Croce, but it wasn’t easy. The encounter
was practically a clandestine affair. Tagore’s “escorts” did their best to prevent
the meeting, but failed. However, they kept the newspapers out of it. Tagore’s
second visit differed considerably from his first. The intention of the fascist
establishment to make political capital out Tagore’s presence was so evident that
things could only go from bad to worse. The press contributed to this disastrous
situation by distorting the content of Tagore’s interviews. Formichi, Tagore’s
interpreter on these occasions, probably had a hand in this. What the govern-
ment wanted from Tagore was basically a declaration in favour of Fascism. He
made no declarations of this kind, and certainly not the statements which made
their way into the fascist press.30 After Tagore’s return to India, two anti-fascist
friends, Georges Duhamel and Romain Rolland, persuaded him to declare that
6 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
the interviews were false. Tagore also condemned Fascism in an open letter sent
from Vienna on 20th July to the Chancellor of the Vishvabharati University, C.F.
Andrews. The letter was published by a number of Indian daily newspapers.
Formichi was furious, and the incident led to a permanent rift between Formichi
(and the Italian authorities) and Tagore. Furthermore, these developments hin-
dered collaboration with the Vishvabharati University.31 On 15th September,
Formichi wrote a letter to Trabalza in which he confessed that,

I have suffered a great deal and felt much bitterness over the summer
recess. Tagore failed to honour his word. He also went back on his pre-
vious statements and published an article in the Manchester Guardian,
which can only be described as despicable in which he attacked Fascism
and our Duce. He then tried to justify this behaviour by writing me a
cowardly letter in which he explained that he was obliged to make these
declarations to dispel the rumours fostered by our press, which then
spread throughout Europe and India, that he had become a supporter of
the Fascist cause. I was having none of it and I made it quite clear to him
that I considered our friendship over. You were away from Rome at the
time, but I kept the Marquis Paulucci in the picture.
I found Tagore’s article personally offensive since he insinuated that the
interpreter during the interviews with non-English speaking journalists
had distorted his statements in order to create the impression that he
looked upon the Duce and Fascism favourably.
I asked the Marquis Paulucci for permission to reply and wrote an
article based on the facts of the case, which the Manchester Guardian
published on 25th August, in which I proved that Signor Poeta [Mr Poet]
is nothing but a buffoon. I was pleased and grateful that the Duce stood
by me on this in allowing me to show Tagore up for what he is.
However, Tagore’s perfidious behaviour is a painful memory that I
shall carry with me to the grave. His behaviour, in any case, has com-
promised and perhaps even completely undone all our efforts as regards
cultural bridge building between Italy and India to date, the prospects for
which had been so promising.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that we have gained a foothold. The
seed has been sown in India. It is up to us to nurture these relations and
bring them to fruition. We can rule out Tagore and his followers. Actu-
ally, I am writing a book on this painful business. There’s more to India
than Tagore and his cronies. When you return to Rome, call me so we can
discuss the proposal to the Duce concerning Tucci who, in the light of
these events, can no longer stay in Santiniketan, although there is no real
reason why his cultural work should not continue. I admit that I was in a
certain sense relieved that you were away from Rome when everything
came to a head. I was reluctant to inform you of developments because I
didn’t want to disturb you during your much-deserved holidays after a
year’s hard work.
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 7
When we meet, I want to put you fully in the picture and show you
Tagore’s letter and my replies, his libellous article, my denial of his
accusations, and all other documentation you may require.32

Formichi hit back hard, and was not averse to insult. It tells us how much For-
michi had taken his political task to heart and that success in this field was much
more important to him than Tagore’s friendship and esteem, not to mention the
Vishvabharati University. He made no attempt to heal the rift. Indeed, Formichi
immediately set his sights on other potential allies. His behaviour was typical of
the Europe Tagore spoke of in 1925, an aggressive Europe with no qualms about
using force when necessary. This was a mentality which Tagore would have
nothing to do with. He stated, for example:

My mind is passing through a conflict. I have my love and gratitude for

the people of Italy. I deeply appreciate their feeling of admiration for me,
which is so genuine and generous. On the other hand the Italy revealed in
Fascism alienates herself from the ideal picture of that great country
which I should so love to cherish in my heart.33

And precisely with regards to Fascism:

But whatever may be the cause, the methods and the principles of
Fascism concern all humanity, and it is absurd to imagine that I could
ever support a movement which ruthlessly suppresses freedom of expres-
sion . . . and walks through a bloodstained path of violence and stealthy
crimes. I have said over and over again that the aggressive streak of
nationalism and imperialism religiously cultivated by most of the nations
of the West, is a menace to the whole world.34
How different from Formichi! Tagore was uncompromising but not
embittered. The form and content of Tagore’s statements reveal at the
same time an inner struggle and obeisance to the principle that ideals
take first place over crude material gain and political advantage.

Italy’s bumpy start in India came out of the offhand manner in which her
representatives conducted their affairs. Little could be got out of Tagore’s
visit, publicity-wise, either nationally or internationally, so the event was
played down. However, as we have already noted, Italy still looked to India
for support.

2 Giuseppe Tucci’s political mission in India

Giuseppe Tucci gradually replaces Formichi as a key figure in Indo-Italian
political and cultural relations. Formichi himself urged that Tucci prolong his
stay in India for some years more, to complete his studies in Nepal and Tibet
and at the same time continue to ‘promote’ Italy’s ‘image’.35
8 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
Tucci, as a linguist and scholar, consolidated the work put in at Shantini-
ketan but did not neglect his political duties.36 That Tucci should also
undertake more clearly political tasks was agreed upon by Formichi and
others. Paolo Orano, a member of parliament and the author of a biography
of Mussolini37 also wrote personally to the duce, recommending that Tucci
remain in India:

You will appreciate that Tucci’s lectures on Italian language and culture
are helpful in that they generate a certain interest in things Italian and in
the achievements of the fascist Government among Indian intellectuals.
We may say that we have carried out a number of tasks neglected by all
other governments of the past.
Please take the appropriate measures. It is a known fact that the
German government has already expressed concern over the efficacy of
our propaganda activity. We must meet this great challenge, and we have
no finer candidate for the task than Tucci.38

In a word, Italy was eager to win the cultural battle against other European
nations and create a niche for itself that could prove useful in the event the
British were to leave India.
Mussolini’s immediate response to Formichi’s suggestion was to send a
telegram to the Italian Consul General in Calcutta in which he expressed his
“pleasure on learning of revived cultural relations between Italy and India”
and agreed wholeheartedly that Tucci should remain in India. He added that
he would personally make the necessary arrangements.39 Mussolini personally
contacted the Education Minister to impress upon him the importance of
Tucci’s mission and the successes he obtained until that time.40 We learn from
such exchanges that Mussolini’s interest in Formichi’s and Tucci’s work grew
proportionately with his increasing conviction that much was to be gained
politically thereby. The two Italian intellectuals had a political role, and Tucci
was perfectly aware of the political significance of his teaching post at the
Vishvabharati University; which he considered a

thriving centre of Italian studies in India, as testified by the interest

shown in our civilisation and thought.41

The purpose of this propaganda work was to prepare Italian expansion in an

environment that had little to do with culture as such. In an undated note,
probably written in February 1926, it was suggested that Italian should be
taught on a regular basis at the Vishvabharati University.

The government must take advantage of our favourable position by

instituting the chair on a permanent basis. It would greatly benefit rela-
tions between Italy and India. It goes without saying that trade is always
preceded by intellectual exchange.42
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 9
It was also suggested that Tucci should travel around India and elsewhere
before going back to Italy.43 The Italian Consul General in Calcutta made
this quite clear when he referred to

a complex programme of work requiring lengthy study and research both

in Indian (Nepal, the northern provinces etc.) and perhaps in other Far
Eastern countries.44

Tucci was seen to be furthering the cause of

Italian studies while at the same time engaging in intellectual propaganda

work already in progress.45

It was decided to await the end of the academic year before transferring Tucci
elsewhere. The invitation from the University of Dacca couldn’t have come at
a better time. Tucci was asked to lecture on Buddhism there. Tucci raised no
objections. Dacca was an important University and the Chancellor was also
the Governor of Bengal.46
Unlike Formichi, Tucci managed to keep out of the fray and maintain
relations with Tagore and his circle.47 As he explained in January 1927, some
time after he had taken up his post in Dacca,

I don’t think the Tagore affair need impinge upon possible relations
between the two countries. Much can be done outside the circles linked in
one way or another to Tagore.48

When Tucci reached Dacca, he embarked upon a project for the institution of
study grants for youngsters who wished to study in Italian Universities.
Through his efforts, this project received official backing and developed
accordingly. He stressed the need for direct cultural contacts between Italy
and India insofar as,

If we manage to bring youngsters to our Universities, prospects will be

opened up for long-lasting cultural contacts which will bear fruits also
after my departure.49

He also noted that Italy’s great rival in India, Germany, was moving along
similar lines. It was, he thought, imperative that Italy rise to the challenge and
compete with other nations in India, if she was to gain a ‘sphere of action’
there. The Italian Consul General in Calcutta called for the institution of four
or five advanced study grants for young Indians who wished to go to Italy.50
In the meantime, Tucci combined his teaching activities with promoting the
image of Italy and of Fascism in India. The prospect of strengthening links
with local political and intellectual circles was always before him.
10 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
Notwithstanding the distance and the still all too few contacts between our
countries, after two years in Bengal and daily contacts with the men who
most faithfully reflect the cultural life of today’s India, I assure you that
there is a growing interest in Latin and especially Italian culture, mainly
among the youths. Recent developments have brought Italy into the lime-
light; they also encourage a move away from the plane of pure ideality and
favour collaboration of a more practical nature. Your Excellency’s example
is much admired by India’s youth, above all now that a book in Bengali
tongue has been published, “Mussolini and Today’s Italy”, which the most
popular periodical here (“Prabasi”) recommends to its readers.51

Tucci’s impression was that Indian youths were critical of the British model
and were interested in what “Latin culture” might offer. It was surely no mere
coincidence that the Association “Union Indo-Latine”, favouring cultural
exchange, should be set up in Calcutta. This Association “concretely worked
toward a rapprochement between India and the Latin world”.
An effective exchange programme involving students and teachers capable
of attracting Indian scholars to Italian Universities rather than to French or
German ones had to be set up. With this aim in mind, Tucci collaborated
with the Istituto fascista di cultura (Fascist Cultural Institute) to win over the
“intellectual movement coming to the fore in India”.52
Tucci’s report was circulated among the Italian authorities, who in turn
expressed the desire that

the proposals drawn up by Tucci, in an attempt to render cultural

exchange between the two countries more fruitful over time, be carefully
considered by the Ministry.53

Tucci’s proposals did receive attention, and Tucci may be seen as the pioneer and
driving force behind a systematic approach to cultural relations between the
fascist regime and India. Although there is much in common between these
measures and the dealings which led to the exchange of visits between Formichi,
Tucci and Tagore, this later phase did not come up against the obstacles
encountered earlier. Tucci’s plans proceeded by degrees and met with growing
success right up to the outbreak of the Second World War.
The first sign of Tucci’s success was when one of his students, Pramatha
Nath Roy, applied to the Ministry of National Education in 1928 for a grant
to attend the University of Rome, using special funds set aside by a decree of
1923. Roy, who had until then taught Sanskrit at a college in Dacca had
begun to show an interest in Italian culture. He went on to translate the
works of various well-known Italian writers, and essays on the fascist philo-
sopher, Giovanni Gentile.54 At the end of the year, Tucci drew up a report
and mentioned Roy for the first time.55 In the meantime, Roy started his
translation of Mussolini da vicino, the already mentioned biography, written
by Paolo Orano.
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 11
56
Roy stayed in Italy during the academic year 1929–30. With this journey,
he wished to “gain deeper knowledge of the language and literature of Italy at
a University of the Kingdom”.
In the meantime, after his second year in Dacca, Tucci concluded that he
had already

done much, and there is good reason to be satisfied. However, in Cal-

cutta, where I have only been occasionally, I could do more, and, where
conditions permit, organise something permanent.57

Tucci planned two courses in Calcutta for 1929, one on Italian literature and
history, and another on fascist legislation.58
With regard to activities of a more openly propaganda-oriented nature,
Tucci saw his role in the following terms:

My knowledge of both English and Bengali and my qualifications as a scho-

lar of Indian culture have brought me into contact with the cream of Indian
society, and it is in these circles that Italy’s image can be best promoted with a
view to quashing those false, preconceived ideas all too frequently bandied
about concerning Italy and the conditions prevailing there.59

Tucci’s stay in India saw him engaged in a number of activities such as

teaching, research, political and propaganda work and trips to the Himalayas.
Indeed, there were no dividing lines between these activities. Tucci was not
one to passively put into practice the ideas of others. He wanted to make his
own personal contribution to the fascist regime’s plans for India and was
admirably placed to do so.
The existing studies on the topic tend to prove that Tucci was rather inde-
pendent from the fascist regime and that he used his political links to do his
studies in India and the Himalayan area. On the contrary, the records prove
that he was engaged by the regime and paid for his mission. In other terms,
promoting fascist Italy in India, not only culturally but politically, was his
job. It is therefore difficult to deny his professional dependence on and poli-
tical deep connection with the fascist regime.60

3 Culture as a means of political expansion

At the beginning of the 1920s, several Government officials had already reached
their own conclusions as to how inroads might be made into the Indian sub-
continent. In August 1929, Gino Scarpa, the Italian Consul General in
Colombo,61 told the Ministry of External Affairs that he firmly believed

that Britain will lose ground here and that it is therefore necessary to
show our face and forge close links with the peoples [of India].
12 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
. . . Nowadays, among the continental nations – excluding Russia –
Italy is the country which attracts most attention. . . . Also because of a
lack of means at my disposal, I have only been able to establish personal
relationships, and not just the occasional lavish social function. I might
almost say I have befriended influential figures both British and Indian.
The Indians are very pleased that I am interested in their customs and
religions because they see in it something that it not a mere form or
courtesy.
. . . And these relations might serve as a bridge and a starting point for
any further propaganda work we may wish to initiate.
I firmly believe the most useful moves should be made in Italy.
By this I mean that as many tourists from these areas as possible
should go to Italy and, most of all, students.62

The need was felt to beat off France and Germany, who were very active also
on the cultural front. It was thought that as many Indian students as possible
should be attracted to Italian Universities since, as Scarpa put it, they repre-
sented “tomorrow’s ruling class”.

Rome must become the intellectual hub of the Mediterranean and the
bridge between East and West. Many kingdoms and empires have fallen
by the wayside, but Rome’s ideal mission endures through the centuries.
The so-called opposition between East and West which hobbles the
Anglo-Saxon mentality never found a place in Rome. Rome achieved
greatness through trade between, and domination over, these large por-
tions of humanity.63

These thoughts appear to anticipate the tones and content of Mussolini’s

famous inaugural speech pronounced for the Istituto per il Medio ed
Estremo Oriente (ISMEO) (Institute for the Middle and Far East) on 22nd
December 1933.
Scarpa was also engaged in negotiations for the inclusion of Italian in the
curricula of a number of Indian schools. We may therefore conclude that
Tucci’s work was in harmony with the aspirations of various government cir-
cles in Rome. Many of the measures taken in the field of culture, with Tucci
as the main actor, paved the way for enduring relations with politically
minded intellectuals and nationalists. By this time, Tucci had become the only
true spokesman of the fascist regime in India, and, more importantly, the only
link with local political circles.
The Italian consul in Calcutta sent a report drawn up by Tucci (addressed
to the duce and the Foreign Office and Ministry of National Education) with
his own assessment of Tucci’s activities.

He is highly thought of both by the Indians and the British.

 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 13
He has a lively mind, and has therefore come to understand not only
the philosophy but also the mentality of these people. He has used the
past to understand the present and the present to understand the past; he
has not been blinded allurements of philology [sic] and is a valuable asset
in any prospective attempt at cultural penetration of India on the part of
the government.
I think these five years and Tucci’s own studies have laid the founda-
tions of his relations with India.
I trust the government will provide him with the opportunity to take
up his studies in India at some time in the future and establish a school in
Italy such as would make Rome a centre of Indo-Buddhist studies. This
would be a most positive development and would provide a focal point of
attraction for all Asians, in India and the Far East.64

These were the premises behind the Institute for the Middle and Far East.
Among the aims of this institute (presided over by one of the few leading
intellectuals who had embraced Fascism, Giovanni Gentile, and directed by
Giuseppe Tucci) was the encouragement of cultural exchange between Italy
and a number of Asian countries and co-ordination of activities concerning
Asia. An undeclared aim of the Institute was the political indoctrination of
young scholarship holders arriving in Italy from various parts of Asia.
In 1930, a few months before returning to Italy, Tucci provided an account
of his activities up to that time and a plan of action for the future. After
mentioning the many works translated from Italian into Bengali by his stu-
dents at Shantiniketan, Dacca and Calcutta, he stated that P.N. Roy, to whom
we have referred above,

at present teaches Italian free of charge at the University of Calcutta,

Post Graduate Department, and hopes that our government will in some
manner repay him for the many services he has rendered.65

Furthermore, Italian was officially recognised as a facultative subject for

examination at the University of Calcutta, thanks to the mediation of the new
Italian Consul-General in Calcutta, Antonio Arrivabene, and the support of
Surendra Nath Das Gupta (1885–1952), already at that time an illustrious
professor at the University of Calcutta and a collaborator of the fascist
regime on the cultural exchange front.66 At Das Gupta’s insistence, the Uni-
versity of Calcutta agreed to change its rules and accept Italian as a subject
for examinations on condition that the Italian government sent examiners
there. Roy, who could by now speak and write Italian fluently, also took on
this duty. During the spring of 1933, he was appointed professor of Italian
literature at Benares.67 Roy and his like were extremely useful assets in the
campaign to win Indian students over to Fascism. Roy received the (con-
siderable) monthly sum of more or less 700 liras from the Foreign Office in
Rome for his work at these two prestigious universities between 1934 and
14 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
1935.68 Apart from his teaching activities, Roy was also actively engaged in
fascist propaganda in Indian journals. He published various articles on Italy
and Fascism in the Modern Review,69 and a book, Mussolini and Cult of the
Italian Youth brought out by the Modern Review in 1932.
The consolidation of cultural exchange was necessary in order not to “lose
the fruits of all that has been done”. Citing France and Germany (which
already handed out study grants to Indian students), Tucci once more insisted
that the Italian government had to do likewise, and not abandon the field – as
had already happened with two students he had proposed. “Italian institutes
and the private companies”, it was hypothesised, should set up a number of
scholarships for Indian students while the Consul-General would decide upon
the selection procedure. Bilateral cultural exchange on a larger scale was con-
sidered an absolute priority, since

All messages of good will directed at some of the most eminent men of
letters and of the sciences in India would undoubtedly be much to our
advantage. An invitation to an Indian scientist come to Italy on his travels,
or an honorific degree at one of our universities, might well lead to the
same in India, to the benefit of scholars active in the same fields.70

Italy was justified in its interest in India because

India is one of the largest countries of the East and, whatever the future
has in store for this country, it has enormous potential and resources. If
the New Italy turns her back on India, she does so at her peril.71

The new Institute for the Middle and Far East, ISMEO, was seen as a means
of consolidating the work already done at that time.

4 The fascist regime and Bengali intellectuals

When ISMEO was being founded, contacts had already been made between the
Italians and Calcutta intellectuals (including the university). One of the key go-
betweens was Kalidas Nag. In the meantime, after his first meeting with Formichi,
Nag had become an active promoter of a programme for the economic emanci-
pation of India “from the British yoke”. This programme involved training
youngsters at universities and institutes and in private European companies to
build up an entrepreneurial class capable of initiating industrialisation, considered
a vital stepping stone on the path toward post-colonial independence.72 Tucci was
an ideal link in the chain, and in 1933 he and Nag entered into correspondence
after a long period of silence dating back to the Tagore affair. Tucci, for his part,
was confident that once the student exchange programme he had so coveted had
finally been set up Indians would come forward. Nag had already had dealings
with the Deutsche Akademie73 and, in 1931, founded the India Bureau, an orga-
nisation whose task it was to disseminate and generate interest in Indian culture
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 15
and traditions above all among what Kalidas Nag called India’s “sister countries”
(neighbouring countries which had undergone India’s influence). The India
Bureau published India and the World, “An organ of Internationalism and Cul-
tural Federation”, with Nag himself as editor.74 In 1930 and 1931, Kalidas Nag
went often to Italy and spoke with officials at the Foreign Office.75 The Italian
government considered Nag an ally. During the period in which ISMEO was
being set up, he was appointed the representative in India of the inter-university
organisation, Istituto Interuniversitario di Roma. Furthermore, since the summer
of 1931, Nag had been placing Indian students at the University of Perugia.76
While ISMEO was being set up, Nag, as director of the India Bureau and repre-
sentative in India of the Istituto Interuniversitario di Roma, had become actively
involved in establishing contacts between Italy, the University of Calcutta, and
local intellectual and political circles.
The following letter from Nag to Giovanni Gentile (6th June 1933)77
clearly illustrates the nature of these contacts:

As the representative for India at the Istituto Interuniversitario di Roma, I

wish to introduce my friend and colleague, P.N. ROY, M.A. who wishes to
visit Italy for the purposes of completing his doctoral thesis on Indo-Italian
culture and consolidating relations between our two Nations. ROY had the
privilege of studying Italian under S.E. Tucci in person during the latter’s
stay in Bengal. My own university, the University of Calcutta was the first to
organise a systematic course made up of weekly Italian language and lit-
erature lessons. ROY conducted the Italian Seminar. Not only did he
manage to inculcate in students his own very real enthusiasm; he also wrote
important articles in our main newspapers, thereby propagating Italian
thought and letters. ROY has also written an excellent book, “Mussolini
and Cult of the Italian Youth”, published enthusiastically by my brother-in-
law, Ramananda Catterji [sic], former director of the MODERN REVIEW
[in capitals in the original] based in Calcutta.
ROY is still a close collaborator of the Italian Consul-General in Calcutta
and of other friends of ours who are working toward creating permanent
intellectual relations between India and Italy. The Istituto Italiano per il
Medio ed Estremo Oriente and its special Indian sections, the Hindusthan
Association and the India Bureau, owe their existence to your own efforts
and the noble efforts of the government. At this most opportune time, ROY
is planning to come to Italy for a two-year stay; and I am sure the efforts of
such a trustworthy colleague will contribute greatly to our common cause. I
advised him to collaborate closely with you, the genius who guides all intel-
lectual and educational movements in today’s Italy. I would therefore be
most grateful to you if you could facilitate his work as much as possible.78

From the early 1930s on, fascist sentiment was growing at the Modern
Review. The activities of the Italian consulate in Calcutta and pro-Italian
propaganda work also contributed to this state of affairs. Relations with
16 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
politically minded intellectuals in Bengal had developed considerably, also
involving leading figures such as Syama Prasad Mookerjee (1901–53).79
Mookerjee, a leading Hindu nationalist and founder of the Jana Sangh, was
also chancellor of the University of Calcutta from 1934 to 1938. In a letter to
Gentile, Tucci described Mookerjee as “our most important collaborator” in
Calcutta, together with Das Gupta.80 A letter from Nag to Gentile dated 8th
June 1933 indicates that Nag had personally had a hand in setting up
ISMEO, since he had made specific proposals as to its structure.81
Benoy Kumar Sarkar and Tarak Nath Das were also contacted. An in-
depth biographical study of Benoy Kumar Sarkar (1887–1949) reveals his ties
with the fascist regime.82 There is no need to examine Sarkar’s career at
length here. However, we may mention his revolutionary sentiments as a
young man, and his ties with Lala Lajpat Rai, Rash Behari Bose and the
Berlin Committee. Between 1914 and 1925, Sarkar had spent some time in
Europe, the United States and Japan. He journeyed to Italy twice, in 1924
and 1925, residing at Bolzano with his Austrian wife. During this period, he
entered into correspondence with Formichi (whose work on the politics of
ancient India he admired) and was also able to witness first-hand the early
years of Fascism. When Matteotti was murdered, he sided with Amendola
and the anti-fascist liberals.83 Sarkar then came to admire Fascism and what
he thought was the economic miracle it had brought about. He viewed the
fascist electoral reform favourably, without understanding its implications,
and drew parallels between Italy and India. As a ‘second class’ European
power, Italy stood at the halfway point between the more highly developed
nations and those which had been left behind. He therefore saw Italy as a
country that was closer to India than the other more advanced European
powers could ever be.84 Especially in later life, Sarkar was not a political
activist, at least with regard to Indian affairs and he stood apart from the
nationalist struggle. It must be said that, despite his relations with the fascist
regime (and very concrete relations with fascist officialdom), he was not a
dyed in the wool fascist. True, Sarkar, as opposed to Tarak Nath Das and
Kalidas Nag, Sarkar was the only Indian to consider accepting a highly
prestigious public role within the framework of the fascist regime, as director
of the Istituto Italo-Indiano. He was encouraged to make this move, initially,
by a number of members of the fascist executive, namely the directors of the
institute for promoting exportation, Istituto per le Esportazioni (INE). He
even received Mussolini’s support. The institute that Sarkar and the INE had
in mind was seen as ancillary to ISMEO.85 The priorities of the Istituto Italo-
Indiano lay in the fields of economics, education and training, and not politics
(which was, together with culture, ISMEO’s sphere, properly speaking).
Sarkar was even briefly considered for the post of director of ISMEO. Tucci
advised against this – this is a highly significant detail – since he believed the
director should have “the broadest field of action”. He also pointed out the
“inappropriateness of an Indian as head of an institute”.86 One plausible
explanation for Tucci’s move was that he wanted the post for himself.
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 17
We are not interested in establishing to what extent Sarkar compromised
himself with the fascist regime, or whether he was indeed a fascist.87 Rather, we
are interested in the fascist regime’s perception of Sarkar’s role and the roles of
others who had ties with ISMEO and, more in general, the fascist regime’s atti-
tude toward Indians residing in Italy who had established links with political
circles there, with a view to creating alliances. Analysis of developments reveals
quite clearly that the Indians whom the fascist regime rallied to its side were at
the same time the targets and agents of an Italian propaganda campaign directed
at India toward the end of the 1930s. What the fascist regime needed, at least
during the first half of the 1930s, was a group of individuals who could be used to
favour expansion in India. These individuals were members of a nascent entre-
preneurial class whose development, it was hoped, would be such that Italy
might stand out as India’s major partner in dealings regarding government con-
tracts and openings for investment. Italy’s efforts were also directed at a future
political élite that would look favourably upon Italian business interests, ideally
based on relations of an exclusive nature. These were the future entrepreneurs of
India who were now economic students and scholarship holders arriving in Italy.
The political élite was seen as consisting of persons already active and, where
possible, influential. Sarkar, as a politically minded intellectual and academic,
and others of similar standing, were considered as useful potential allies of the
fascist ‘India policy’. When a director had to be chosen for ISMEO, and Tucci
was finally appointed, this did not mean breaking off relations with Sarkar.
Sarkar never knew that the Foreign Office investigated his behaviour and atti-
tudes with the aid of the Italian consulate in Calcutta.88 He was unaware of the
fact that they considered him “both morally and politically” untrustworthy.89 We
have no way of knowing whether the investigation was part of a smear campaign
started up to keep Sarkar out or whether Sarkar’s political sympathies were
found not to be up to fascist expectations. It has already been noted that he had
at a certain stage sided with the liberals. Furthermore, his idea of founding an
organisation that in a certain sense might be seen as a rival to ISMEO may well
have been looked upon with some suspicion in fascist government circles. After
all, it was a dependency of the Foreign Office. In any case, Sarkar, who was
unaware of all these intrigues, continued to write on fascist Italy’s economic
system.90 He also taught one of the ISMEO scholarship students at the Uni-
versity of Calcutta, and in 1938, at the very height of the Italian propaganda
campaign, Sarkar stood by his Italian associates.
The early years of Tarak Nath Das (1884–1958) are well documented, but
not his later life. Tarak Nath Das frequented revolutionary groups and was a
member of the Anushilan Samiti. In 1906 he travelled to Japan and San
Francisco, where he enrolled at the University of California, Berkeley. In
1907 – with two other leading figures of the nationalist revolutionary
movement, Ram Nath Puri and Pandurang Khankhoje – he founded the
Hindustan Association and its journal, Circular-i-Azad (Freedom Circular).
The organisation and its periodical were set up in order to promote the
nationalist cause and its methods among Indian residents in the United States
18 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
and Canada. It also sought the support of American radicals. The periodical
was a short-lived affair, but Das (who in the meantime had become the
movement’s leader) now set up a revolutionary periodical, Free Hindustan. He
worked for some time at the United States Immigration Office in Vancouver
but had to resign after the Canadian government had filed a protest in
Washington as a result of the periodical’s rabidly anti-British stance. Tarak
Nath Das then dedicated himself totally to propaganda work and established
contacts with Indian revolutionaries based in London and Paris. During the
First World War, he was a member of the Berlin Committee, and trained
Indian prisoners with a view to conducting anti-British disruptive activities. In
1916 he set up branch offices of the Pan-Asiatic League in China and Japan,
and joined the Young Hindustan Association of Constantinople, which had ties
with the Berlin Committee. At the end of the war, what with the disbanding
of the Berlin Committee, Tarak Nath Das returned to the United States
where he founded the Friends of Freedom for India Society, which established
ties with the Gadhar Party. In 1922, one of the directors of the Berlin Com-
mittee, Viredranath Chattopadhyaya, asked Tarak Nath Das to help him
reorganise an Indian national revolutionary committee which, among others,
included Rash Behari Bose and Barkatullah. Das obtained American citi-
zenship by naturalisation in 1914, and lived out the rest of his days there.91
We know little of his later life. However, it is clear that he was influential
among Indians residing in Europe, above all among students with whom he
had established ties via the Deutsche Akademie, the Hindustan Association
and ISMEO. We have a testimony from Taraknath Das himself, concerning
his role as Hindustan Association-ISMEO go-between:

I have waited for more than ten years in order to promote Indo-Italian rela-
tions and for the first time I have gone into the question of a rapprochement
between Italy and India with the Member of Parliament, Signor Tittoni, Pre-
sident of the Senate, whose writings are considered today the guiding light
behind fascist foreign policy. I have been to Italy on various occasions and
have discussed the prospect of an organic and ordered approach to organising
such activities. In any case, I would inform you that the Hindustan Associa-
tion was set up by Indian students in Italy with the enthusiastic support of
Italian friends and above all of Prof. Tucci and the Baron Ricciardi. . . . I wish
to stress once more that Hindustan Association is entirely the work of Indian
students in Rome who deserve as much assistance as possible from Indians
interested in Indo-Indian intellectual co-operation.92

Das liaised between the fascist regime, nationalists travelling through Europe
and Indian students. He played an active part in pro-Italian propaganda work
and stood by Italy over the more controversial issues. He defended Italy’s
conduct in Ethiopia and considered it a desperate attempt to counter British
imperialism. He believed India stood to gain from any successful attempt at
undermining Britain’s position in Africa.93
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 19
Tarak Nath Das’ collaboration with the Modern Review represented the
high point in the promotion of the image of Fascism in India. He had always
been more of a ‘politician’ than Sarkar, and the topics he chose to write on
were more openly political.94 Tarak Nath Das had been a revolutionary as a
young man, but during the early 1930s he had become a moderate. As we
shall see in the following chapter, while in the United States, Das also main-
tained contacts with Hindu nationalists.
By providing liaison between the fascist regime and the Bengali intelligen-
tsia the young scholarship holders, such as Monindra Mohan Moulik, and
the aforementioned P.N. Roy, may be rightly considered collaborationists. As
opposed to other individuals who had already politically made a name for
themselves in India, and who, before coming to Italy, had already accumu-
lated experience in political and intellectual circles, these youngsters, so to
speak, fresh out of college. They were more malleable, and their prolonged
stays in Italy (a requirement of their studies) exposed them to fascist indoc-
trination. Furthermore, the privileges they enjoyed could only inspire a cer-
tain gratitude toward the fascist regime. Moulik, a student of Sarkar’s, went
to Italy in 1934 on a University of Rome political sciences scholarship. He
had been much recommended by Nag and Syama Prasad Mookerjee. Toward
the end of the 1930s, Moulik too, was to play his part in the regime’s propa-
ganda activities in India.95 According to Justo Giusti del Giardino, the Italian
acting Vice Consul in Calcutta, in a report to the Ministry,

the Mayor of Calcutta, the Chancellor of the university, and Prof. Nag
enthusiastically commended Moulik to me. I have met him and believe
their recommendations are fully justified. After his year of work at the
University of Rome, he will aid us considerably in spreading our ideas,
and developing Italian trade and economic openings here in India.96

We shall see in the following chapters that Moulik was to be considered one
of the key players in Italy’s propaganda work in India during the Ethiopia
crisis and after.

5 Subhas Chandra Bose and Fascism

Among all Bengali personalities who entered into contact with the fascist
regime, Subhas Chandra Bose was the most prominent. Bose had been a
long-time admirer of the fascist regime and the changes it had purportedly
brought about. In all likelihood, Bose aimed at establishing contacts with the
fascist government. The contacts already established by Italian representatives
and personalities with Indian intellectual and political circles may well have
led to Bose’s involvement.
Subhas Bose was appointed Mayor of Calcutta on 23rd September 1930.
That year he had been arrested and freed a few days before taking office. As
Mayor, Bose was able to promote a vaguely socialistic programme, to improve
20 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
basic services and the living conditions of the people. Bose’s campaign was
inspired by the indications provided by C. R. Das in 1924 and aimed at
improving schools, building new houses, roads, and infrastructures. He devo-
ted particular attention to the needs of the poor. The model was that of the
advanced societies of Europe, and, above all, those governed by socialists. In
his inaugural speech, Bose made an explicit reference to Fascism, which he
considered a form of socialism, its perfect version indeed:

[. . .] I would say that we have here in this policy and programme a

synthesis of what Modern Europe calls Socialism and Fascism. We have
here the justice, the equality, the love which are the basis of Socialism,
and combined with that we have the efficiency and discipline of Fascism
as it stands in Europe today.97

A few years later, in The Indian Struggle, Subhas elaborated his idea of a com-
bination of the principles of socialism and Fascism, as the bedrock of an ideal
political and governmental system. Bose had always been an admirer of Western
thought. During his imprisonment, he had access to English translations of two
Italian political works, Bolshevism, Fascism and Democracy by Francesco Nitti,
in the English edition of 1927, and Ivanoe Bonomi’s From Socialism to Fascism,
published in London in 1924.98 The negative aspects pointed out by these Italian
intellectuals failed to shake Bose’s positive attitude toward Fascism. The nega-
tive features of Fascism were not useful to the synthesis between the good sides
of both, Fascism and socialism, which Bose aimed at build up. Like the Marathi
nationalists, Bose saw Fascism as a means of creating an efficient organisation of
society, based on order and discipline.
However superficial this view may have been, Bose shared none of the racist
and communalistic ideas of the Hindu nationalists. On the other hand, he also
criticised Jawaharlal Nehru’s view, according to which the world was faced with a
choice between communism and Fascism and that there was no compromise
between these two systems. Bose was convinced that a synthesis between Fascism
and communism would take place in the future, creating a new era in world his-
tory. He felt that India might be the stage upon which this union might take place.

[…] the Indian awakening is organically connected with the march of

progress in other parts of the world and facts and figures have been
mentioned to substantiate that view. Consequently, there need to be no
surprise if an experiment, of importance to the whole world, is made in
India – especially when we have seen with our own eyes that another
experiment (that of Mahatma Gandhi) made in India has roused pro-
found interest all over the world.
In spite of the antithesis between Communism and Fascism, there are
certain traits common to both. Both Communism and Fascism believe in
the supremacy of the State over the individual. Both denounce parliamen-
tary democracy. Both believe in party rule. Both believe in the dictatorship
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 21
of the party and the ruthless suppression of all dissenting minorities. Both
believe in a planned industrial reorganisation of the country. These common
traits will form the basis of the new synthesis. That synthesis is called by the
writer ‘Samyavada’ – an Indian word, which means literally ‘the doctrine of
synthesis or equality’. It will be India’s task to work out this synthesis.99

Bose went on to explain why communism could never take root in India.
Firstly, Communism had no sympathy for nationalism, whereas the Indian
movement was a nationalistic movement. Some (but not all) economic prin-
ciples of communism might enjoy considerable popularity in India. On the
other hand, the communist anti-religious approach was totally inappropriate
to the Indian context, where religion plays a prominent role.
In a letter to Divekar, Bose very briefly summed up the theory of samya-
vada, describing it as the guideline for future political action in India.

You are quite right when you say that the present situation is extremely
depressing. We are at the end of one phase of our movement and natu-
rally when there is an ebb-tide, all the filth is exposed to your eyes. . . .
The old parties are all played out. Our hope lies in a new party. That
party may grow out the Congress Socialist Party or it may not. I believe
that the present struggle between Communism and Fascism in Europe is
bound to lead to a higher synthesis which I call Samyavada.100

On 17th January 1935, a second edition of Bose’s book was published in India
and London, in English. Scarpa mentioned the book in a note to the Foreign
Office, and enclosed an article of 7th September 1934, Fascism Comes to India.101
The Italian authorities were not only aware of Bose; but they also admired him.

6 Subhas Chandra Bose’s journey to Italy

The chance to know Italy first hand came in early 1933. The official reason
for Bose’s visit to Italy was to obtain medical treatment for the tuberculosis
he had contracted in jail. The British authorities suspected that ‘medical rea-
sons’ was an excuse. They were uneasy at Bose’s presence in Europe. They
considered it very likely that Bose would soon get in touch with other Indian
revolutionaries and plan activities potentially very harmful to British inter-
ests.102 At first, the British authorities tried to prevent his departure. However,
later on they decided to authorise his departure for Europe.
Bose left Bombay on 22nd February 1933 on the Lloyd Triestino steamship,
Gange, arriving in Venice on 6th March, after a brief stopover in Brindisi.103
Bose records that he was warmly welcomed by the Indian community in Italy:

We reached Brindisi on the 5th March and on arrival I was greeted with
a message of welcome and good wishes on behalf of the Hindustan
Association of Rome.104
22 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
Bose was a celebrity not only among the Indians residents in Italy. Indeed he was
well known also to the Italian authorities, who treated him as an important guest:

Before we reached the Port, the agents of Lloyd Triestino Company who
had arrived on board, came up to my cabin accompanied by the Purser
and informed me that [he] had received instructions from Rome to look
to my comforts at the time of disembarking and they wanted to know
what they could do for me. Soon after this, the manager of Lloyd Tries-
tino company also arrived on board and after welcoming me, informed
me that he had instructions from the Italian consul to see that I was well
looked after. The Customs formalities were waived in my favour and I
could disembark at once and leave for my hotel.105

Bose was accompanied to his hotel by a representative of the shipping com-

pany and was greeted with military salutes along the way at two check-
points.106 He was pleased at this welcome:

Returning the salute, I began to wonder how strange it was that a man who
had been harassed and persecuted by policemen in his own country should
be saluted by policemen in a foreign land, where he was a stranger.107

This reception, so different from the way Bose had been treated in his homeland,
was probably bound to influence his later decision to turn to Italy for aid.
The day after his arrival and the various formalities, Bose was too weak
and did not feel up to a visit to Venice. However, he could not avoid the
journalists. Once more, Bose was surprised by his unexpected celebrity:

What struck me was the remarkable grasp which the representatives of

the Italian press had of the Indian situation and the fairly correct infor-
mation which they had of the prominent public men in our country. The
next day the Italian papers of Rome, Milan, Bologna, Florence and
Venice came out with long notes on the Indian political situation.108

On 8th March, Bose left for Vienna, where he was welcomed by the local com-
munity of Indian students. Thus, Bose began his three-year journey in Europe.
Bose was in Germany in August 1933, where he paid a visit to the Italian
Embassy in Berlin. D.B. Banerjea, a professor at Berlin University, accom-
panied him. An official of the Italian Embassy wrote a record of the visit:

Mr Chandra Bose and Prof. Bannersea [sic] declared that they were not
disciples either of Gandhi or of Tagore, since they did not believe either
in the strategy of passive resistance or in civil disobedience. They were,
instead, active revolutionaries. Obviously, I told them that, since these
questions regarded the internal affairs of India, of course, I could make
no comment.
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 23
They also told me that they wished to go to Rome and study Fascism
and the corporative system. They expressed a wish to meet up with the
competent royal authorities to be facilitated in this task.109

A hand-written note dated 26th August 1933 contains the suggestion that
Bose and Banerjea contact the propaganda office of the Ministry of Cor-
porations, and that the Foreign Office be kept out of the affair. Another note,
dated 28th August, confirms this plan:

[. . .] telephone call to [. . .] Propaganda Office at the Ministry of Corporations

with names of the visitors. I indicated that the visit should not be made offi-
cially known and that Bose’s and Bannersea’s [sic] requests should be sent on
to those institutions of the Regime that they might wish to study. The Minis-
try of Corporations wants to know when to expect them in Rome.110

Toward the end of the year, Bose returned to Italy. He participated in the
organisation of the Congress of Oriental Students, planned in coincidence
with the inauguration of the Istituto per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Insti-
tute for Middle and Extreme Orient – ISMEO), in December 1933.111 Italian
and English records do not contain much information on the subject. Italian
authorities did not want that the British government came to know about
their collaboration with a controversial person like Subhas. On the other
hand, British authorities gave very little publicity to these facts, as proved by
the very limited amount of strictly confidential records on the subject.
According to a note dated 29th December 1933:

His indirect involvement in the Congress was most useful since the
Indians who received his aid and advice managed to hamper all efforts to
turn the Congress into a prevalently Muslim organisation. They also
insisted on Rome as their Permanent Office and on our collaboration.112

Bose had cooperated with Tucci to create this Permanent Office in Rome.113 The
British authorities were aware of Italy’s relations with Asian countries and
observed carefully the developments behind-the-scenes of the Oriental Students’
Congress. They constantly watched Bose’s activities in Italy and in their informal
notes to the British Foreign Office and the Italian Ministry of External Affairs
they expressed concern over Bose’s supposed pro-communist leanings, noticed
also by the Italian authorities.114 The British informants described Bose’s ties
with international and Indian communist organisations and with M.N. Roy.
However, the Italian authorities did not seem to be impressed by such informa-
tion and Bose was given a free hand to meet Mussolini. At the end of December
1933 he requested and obtained a meeting with the duce. The meeting took place
on 6th January 1934. The delay was due to the official visit in Rome of Sir John
Simon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It was decided to postpone the
meeting after his return to Britain.115
24 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
Among Italian sources, there are no records about the meeting, but it is men-
tioned in a letter from Bose to Lothar Frank, who had been his host in Berlin:

Mussolini asked Subhas Bose during his conversation: ‘Do you really and
firmly believe that India will be free soon?’ When Bose said ‘yes’, Mus-
solini asked him again: ‘Are you for reformist or revolutionary methods
for achieving Indian independence?’ Bose said in reply that he preferred
revolutionary to reformist methods. Mussolini said, ‘Then indeed you
have a chance.’ Continuing the discussion, Mussolini told him: ‘You must
immediately prepare a plan for such a revolution and you must work
continuously for its realisation.’116

In 1934, Bose requested two more meetings with the duce. A second meeting
took place on 28th April, while the third one should take place in November, but
was called off since Bose had to return to India, because his father was dying.117
Bose’s visits to Italy did not have an official character. However, the fact
that Bose and Mussolini met so frequently, and the account of the first
meeting, suggest that, as an erstwhile revolutionary himself, Mussolini must
have nurtured a sincere fellow feeling for Bose. The choice of Bose, among
other Indian leaders, as the spokesman of Indian nationalists in Italy, seems
to depend mostly on Mussolini. In the following years, Mussolini considered
Bose as the representative of Italy’s “Indian policy”. The duce did not forget
Bose even at the odd time of the Italian Social Republic.118
Italian authorities, and Mussolini himself, were interested in establishing lines
of contacts with influential Congress leaders. The Congress was the only Indian
political organisation they were truly interested in. They rightly reckoned the
Congress to be the most representative body of the majority of Indians, and the
only organisation that could oppose the British. The effectiveness of anti-British
activities depended exclusively upon the involvement of the Congress.
During his first three years in Europe Bose was primarily concerned with
observing the situation and seek out potential Indian allies for Italy’s “Indian
policy”. His early journeys were useful for closer connections over the years.
Italy’s first outpost in India, in all senses, was Bengal. The foundations laid
over the period we have considered created inroads toward a wide spectrum of
the Indian political circles. From the early 1930s on, ties were established with
other exponents of Indian nationalism, especially the Hindu wings. The fascist
regime varied its tactics according to circumstances and to whom it specifically
dealt with. Bengal, as an Italian ‘outpost’ in India, was a valuable asset during
the intense propaganda campaign occasioned by the war in Ethiopia.

Notes
1 Formichi and Tucci are dealt with in more or less all the available studies concern-
ing the Indian policy of the fascist regime. Particularly worthy of note are Renzo De
Felice, “L’India nella strategia politica di Mussolini”, Storia Contemporanea,
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 25
December 1987, and Valdo Ferretti, “Politica e cultura: origini e attività dell’IS-
MEO durante il regime fascista”, in Storia Contemporanea, October 1986, as well
as the pertaining studies cited below.
2 Gianni Sofri provides a brief, very lively account of Tagore’s visit to Italy in his
volume Gandhi in Italia, Bologna, 1988, pp. 30–32. Sofri clearly shows how the
fascist regime attempted to make political capital out of Tagore’s stay in Italy.
For a portrait of Tagore and an overview of his relation with Italy, see Mario
Prayer, “Internazionalismo e nazionalismo culturale. Gli intellettuali bengalesi e
l’Italia negli anni Venti e Trenta”, supplement no. 1 to Rivista degli Studi
Orientali, Rome, 1996, p. 13. This is undoubtedly the most precise account of
events, alongside Vito Salierno’s article, “Tagore e il Fascismo. Mussolini e la
politica italiana verso l’India”, in Nuova Storia Contemporanea, September–
October 1998, pp. 63–80.
3 Prayer, ibid., p. 17.
4 Salierno, “Tagore e il Fascismo”, pp. 65–66, 67–68 and 70.
5 Ibid., p. 67 and p. 70. This was most probably the speech published in Vishvab-
harati Quarterly, III, 1, April 1925, pp. 1–10, under the title, “The Voice of
Humanity”. Mario Prayer briefly mentions it, “Internazionalismo”, p. 19, but
not the venue. He also dates the speech 24.1.25 and not 22.1.25.
6 SMAE, Archivio Scuole (School Archives), 1923–28, b. 667, file 5, letter from
Formichi to Sua Eccellenza Benito Mussolini, 14.10.25 and letter dated 21.10.25
(no letterhead) in which Formichi requested an audience with the duce. Both
before he left and on his return Formichi was received by Mussolini. This prac-
tice of briefing and debriefing with Mussolini, so to speak, became a habit.
7 ASMAE, ibid.: from the “Promemoria per il Capo di Gabinetto di S.E. il Minis-
tro” (Memorandum for the Principal Private Secretary of His Excellency the
Minister), 12.11.25, we learn that Tucci’s journey to India and his stay there were
financed from a fund of 35,000 liras, drawn from a sum obtained from foreign
propaganda work.
8 ASMAE, ibid.
9 ASMAE, ibid.
10 ASMAE, ibid.
11 ASMAE, ibid., communiqué n. 1448 B-53, from the Italian Consulate-General
in Bombay, 3.12.25 to Commendatore Ciro Trabalza, Director General of Italian
Schools. The Bengali nationalist journal, Forward, also published a message
from Mussolini congratulating Formichi and Tucci on their appointments. Mus-
solini added that he hoped cultural relations between Italy and India would
strengthen: ASMAE, ibid., article enclosed with report no. 1637/101, from the
Consulate-General of Calcutta, 25.11.25 to the Minister. Forward also published
summaries of the lectures on philosophy Formichi held in Calcutta shortly before
leaving for Italy.
12 Practically all Tucci’s and Formichi’s correspondence from Shantiniketan was
addressed to Trabalza. Formichi wrote to him from Brindisi on 3rd November
1925, when he was about to leave for India. As soon as he reached Shantiniketan
on 7th December 1925, Tucci wrote a letter, thanking Trabalza for his aid. Both
Tucci and Formichi were delighted that matters had been arranged according to
their wishes. This correspondence is in ASMAE, ibid.
13 As soon as Formichi reached India, on 25th November 1925 Tagore sent a tele-
gram to Mussolini thanking for his support and for the gift of five hundred
books. ASMAE, ibid.: the letter to Mussolini was enclosed with a letter to Tra-
balza from Tagore’s son, Rathindranath, involved in the administration of the
Vishvabharati University.
14 Apparently, Formichi was trying to arrange Tagore’s second visit to Italy right
from the start of his stay in Shantiniketan. This is confirmed by the fact that he
26 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
and Tagore discussed the trip on 8th December 1925 (See V. Salierno, “Tagore e
il Fascismo”, p. 70: Salierno quotes Formichi’s book, India e Indiani, Milan,
1929, p. 243).
15 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 667.
16 ASMAE, ibid.
17 ASMAE, ibid., letter from Formichi to the Italian Consul General in Calcutta,
Pervan, 21st February 1926, containing an account of his activities during his
stay in Shantiniketan.
18 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, 1929–35, b. 858, Tucci’s report to Mussolini, dated
24.11.26, enclosed with a letter from the Consul General Pervan to the Ministry,
28.12.26.
19 The Italian government wanted this to be an official visit. Tagore was initially
against the idea but finally agreed: see Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, pp. 19–20.
Also ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 667, 15.5.26, Report n. 3865/70, to the Gen-
eral Secretary, signed by Trabalza, and report n. 667/67, Calcutta, 17.5.26, from
the Italian General Consulate to the Ministry.
20 ASMAE, ibid., draft of a letter to Formichi, 19.1.26, headed “Illustre e caro
Professore” (Dear Illustrious Professor). At that time, the Italian authorities were
careful not to provoke the British. This was, as already said, the Italian policy up
to the time of the Ethiopian campaign. However, a certain ambiguity may be
noted in the words Italians used to describe this policy. During the years leading
up to the Second World War, the Italians became more and more openly anti-
British. Given the special relations between Britain and India, the messages the
fascist regime sent out were more ambiguous here than in other areas of Italian
foreign policy.
21 ASMAE, ibid., report no. 410/41, from the Italian General Consulate in Cal-
cutta, 11.3.26, to the Foreign Office.
22 Tagore’s farewell address to Formichi (written personally by Tagore and pub-
lished in booklet form) reveals once more that Tagore, morally speaking, stood
head and shoulders over Formichi: ASMAE, ibid., Vishva-Bharati Farewell
Address to Professor Carlo Formichi, Calcutta, 9.3.26, enclosed with report no.
410/41, from the Italian Consulate-General in Calcutta, 11.3.26, to the Foreign
Office.
23 Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, p. 12.
24 Tagore, for instance, described Mussolini in positive, somehow enthusiastic
terms, as a “personalità creatrice” (creative personality): see M. Prayer, ibid.,
p. 22.
25 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole b. 667, letter of 21.2.26 from Formichi to Pervan.
26 The emphasis is Formichi’s; ASMAE, ibid., 7.4.26 letter from Formichi to Tra-
balza. The books were then sent on by Mussolini to the Minister of Education
for use at the Oriental School of Rome: letter dated 2.5.26 from the Minister of
Education, Pietro Fedele, to Mussolini.
27 ASMAE, ibid., report to the Minister, 1.5.26, also referring both to Tagore’s
books and Formichi.
28 These requests were made fairly insistently in a letter to the General directorate
of Italian Schools, 16.4.26. In his Report to the Minister, no. 4258/7, 20.5.26,
Trabalza suggested that Mussolini make out a special payment to Formichi of
5,000 liras. Both documents are to be found in ASMAE, Archivio Scuole b. 667.
29 The matter was settled amicably by means of a courteous reply from the Direc-
tor General of Italian Schools to Formichi dated 23.4.26. It was stated that the
situation would be rectified and that Formichi’s requests would be met.
30 See Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, pp. 20–21, 29–30, Salierno, “Tagore e il Fas-
cismo”, pp. 71–80, Sofri, Gandhi in Italia, pp. 31–32.
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 27
31 The reference is to the institution of a committee for encouraging such exchanges
and to the idea of creating a Vishvabharati scholarship of 50 rupees for Italian
students: Prayer, ibid., p. 20.
32 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 667.
33 ASMAE, ibid.
34 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 858, “Tagore on Fascism and Mussolini”, in For-
ward, 24.8.28, enclosed with no. L215/95, Calcutta, 25.8.26, from the Italian
Consulate-General to the Ministry. Enclosed, is also a Memorandum to the
Minister, an unsigned and undated draft of which is to be found in the file,
probably written in September, and an undated report signed by Trabalza to the
Under-Secretary of State.
35 ASMAE, ibid., report n. 323/27, Calcutta, 20.2.26, to the Foreign Office. The
Italian Consul General in Calcutta provided an assessment of Tucci’s work and
requested that Tucci’s activities receive encouragement. With regard to Tucci’s
research in the Himalayas, he suggested contacts with the Italian missionaries in
Assam, who, since they were close to the Tibetan border, might be of help to
Tucci in locating Buddhist manuscripts.
36 Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, p. 41 and ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 858, file “Dacca
(Indie) Università”, Report from Tucci to Mussolini, Dacca, 24.11.26, enclosed with
a letter from the Consul General, Pervan, to the Ministry, Rome, 28.12.26.
37 The title of the biography was Mussolini da vicino (Mussolini, close up), trans-
lated into Bengali in 1928 by a student and close collaborator of Tucci in India,
Pramatha Nath Roy: ASMAE, ibid., annual report on Tucci’s activities in 1927–
28 drawn up about the end of 1928. Roy received a scholarship to study in Italy
and went on to play a key role in propaganda work favouring Italy’s cultural
policy toward India.
38 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 858, letter from Paolo Orano to Mussolini,
23.1.26.
39 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 667, outgoing telegram, no. illegible, 8.4.26.
40 ASMAE, ibid., signed draft of letter from Mussolini to Pietro Fedele, Minister
of Education, 4.5.26.
41 ASMAE, ibid., Shantiniketan, 23.2.26 from Tucci to Trabalza.
42 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 858.
43 The Italian Consul General in Calcutta suggested this from the very outset. In
the report dated 25th August 1926 referred to above, he suggested a new
appointment for Tucci, and urged that he remain in India. In his report to the
Under-secretary of State, Trabalza informed that according to the Government’s
final decision Tucci should receive an academic post elsewhere. A telegram from
Minister of External Affairs, Dino Grandi, to the Italian General Consulate in
Calcutta contained an order to the effect that Tucci’s mission was considered to
have ended, and requested that the Consulate to indicate other posts and tasks
for Tucci. ASMAE, ibid., outgoing telegram no. 5541/20 of 17.10.26.
44 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 667, report dated 21.3.26.
45 ASMAE, ibid.
46 ASMAE, ibid., incoming telegram no. 5558, Calcutta 18.10.26 from the Con-
sulate to the Ministry. Tucci was to receive monthly payments of 600 rupees
(approx. 4,200 liras) with a further 200 rupees from the University of Dacca:
incoming telegram no. 5775, Calcutta, 27.10.26, from the Consulate to the
Ministry, and a telegram to the principal private secretary of the Minister, no.
8867/133, 30.10.26, signed by Trabalza. Funds totalling 35,000 liras earmarked
for expenses when Tucci left Italy for his stay in Shantiniketan. Expenses incur-
red by Tucci in India were as follows: 9,345.90 liras for the journey, 65,000 for
the mission itself (5,000 liras per month), from December 1925 through Decem-
ber 1926: Memorandum for the Principal Private Secretary of the Minister, no.
28 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
856/9, 29.1.27, signed by Trabalza. Tucci received 22,532.40 lira, gross as pay-
ment for his services in 1927: ASMAE, ibid., communiqué n. 876/2, 31.1.27, to
the Consulate General in Calcutta.
47 M. Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, pp. 35–39.
48 ASMAE, ibid., letter from Tucci to Trabalza, 11.1.27.
49 ASMAE, ibid.
50 ASMAE, ibid., report no. 498/59. The request was sent on 12.2.27 by the newly
appointed Italian Consul General in Calcutta, Ugo Tommasi, to the Foreign
Office.
51 ASMAE, ibid., Report to the Foreign Secretary, 9.10.27, with an accompanying
letter to the Italian Consul-General in Calcutta, 11.10.27. Many works on Fas-
cism and Mussolini were being published in India during the late 1920s. Many
articles dealt with the features of Fascism and the new direction taken by Italian
politics under the fascist regime. Among the periodicals, the most interested in
fascist Italy and its regime were mainly from Bengal and Maharashtra, the two
most radical provinces of India, from the political point of view.
52 The Italian community in Calcutta gradually forged closer links with Indian
nationalists in Bengal. Furthermore, its propaganda activities reached a peak
during the campaign in Ethiopia.
53 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 667, report no. 2271/299, Calcutta, 13.10.27 from
the Italian Consulate General in Calcutta to the Minister and a Memorandum
for the Under-secretary of State. The contents of the report were included in a
memorandum drawn up by the General Directorate of Italian Schools, 17.11.27.
54 A leading philosopher and fascist, Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944), played a key
role in the reform of the Italian public education system. Gentile remained
faithful to the fascist party in 1943 and supported the Social Republic despite the
fact that, at that time, he was less favourably viewed by the fascists. Over and
above his declining status within the ranks of the fascist regime, he was killed at
his home in Florence on 15th April 1944.
55 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 667, undated end-of-the-year report, enclosed with
report no. 2570/238, Calcutta, 18.11.28, from the Italian Consulate General to
the Ministry.
56 Roy had to postpone his trip to Italy until the next year. This was because the
Italian Consul General was anxious that the university’s Italian course continue
under Roy’s guidance. ASMAE, Archivio Scuole 1929–35, b. 990, Borse di
Studio, Gran Bretagna, n. 11264, from the Ministry of National Education to
the Foreign Office, 14.6.30 and n. 1085/76, from the Consulate-General in Cal-
cutta to the Foreign Office, 23.6.32.
57 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 858, report no. 1752/130 from the Consulate Gen-
eral, Calcutta, 5.8.29, to the Foreign Office.
58 ASMAE, ibid. In 1929 Tucci was not teaching at Benares, as Prayer erroneously
believes (“Internazionalismo”, p. 40). However, he may have held a number of Ita-
lian language and literature lectures. This is corroborated by a report of March 1931
deposited at the Fondazione Gentile and in ASMAE, Raccolta Generale (RG), b. 7,
file 13, dated 16.3.31. From the job records in ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 667, it
would appear that Tucci taught only in Calcutta and Dacca.
59 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 858, report 5.8.29.
60 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 667, Memorandum for the Principal Private Secretary
of the Minister, no. 856/9, 29.1.27, signed by Trabalza: Tucci was to receive monthly
payments of 600 rupees (approx. 4,200 liras) with a further 200 rupees from the
University of Dacca: incoming telegram no. 5775, Calcutta, 27.10.26, from the
Consulate to the Ministry, and a telegram to the principal private secretary of the
Minister, no. 8867/133, 30.10.26, signed by Trabalza. Funds totalling 35,000 liras
earmarked for expenses when Tucci left Italy for his stay in Shantiniketan. Expenses
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 29
incurred by Tucci in India were as follows: 9,345.90 liras for the journey, 65,000 for
the mission itself (5,000 liras per month), from December 1925 through December
1926 Tucci received 22,532.40 liras, gross as payment for his services in 1927, cor-
responding to approximately 18,000 euro, a remarkable amount for the time, con-
sidering that in 1925 the yearly wage of a school teacher or a government officer was
7,000 liras: ASMAE, ibid., communiqué n. 876/2, 31.1.27, to the Consulate General
in Calcutta.
61 Gino Scarpa was one of the key figures of the so-called Indian policy of fascist
Italy. He began his career as director of the Economic and Foreign Information
Office. After a mission to Russia, in 1922 his book, La Russia dei Sovieti
(Soviet’s Russia) was published by the Lega italiana per la tutela degli interessi
nazionali all’estero (the Italian League for the protection of Italian interests
abroad). The book analyses the general situation in Russia, including economy,
finance, the state of the industries and foreign trade. This interest in Russia was
perhaps the result of the socialist past of this young official of the Ministry of
External Affairs. Scarpa then became a republican, and his name is to be found
in the files concerning subversives. His name was finally taken off this list in
1925. See Sofri, Gandhi in Italia, pp. 27–30 and De Felice, “L’India nella strate-
gia politica”, p. 315, who quotes police sources (Archivio Centrale dello Stato –
State Central Archives, hereinafter ACS – Ministero dell’Interno, Direzione
generale Pubblica Sicurezza, Divisione Affari generali e riservati, 1939, A1 file
“Scarpa Guido”; ibid., Div. Polizia politica, file “Scarpa Luigi detto Gino”).
During the spring of 1922 Gino Scarpa headed an Italian trade delegation
accompanying a diplomatic mission to Afghanistan. Toward the end of Septem-
ber 1922, Scarpa left for Bombay, after his appointment, in the spring or summer
of 1922, as Trade Attaché at the Bombay General Consulate. The British
authorities noticed Scarpa in Afghanistan and were decidedly wary of him. Their
fear was “that he will try to maintain connection from India with Bolshevist
Legation at Kabul and his activities should be carefully watched”: India Office
(hereinafter IO), L/P&S/10/987, telegram 222, Shimla, 20.9.22 and minute of the
Secret Department of 23.10.22; telegram 250, dated Peshawar, 21.10.22 and from
British Minister, Kabul, signed by Maconachie, to the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs. Also IO, L/P&S/12/81: the file is entirely dedicated to Gino
Scarpa, and above all the secret report dated 18.6 (probably 1934), stamp (ille-
gible), to a certain Butler. An interesting note from British intelligence is dated
15.6.31 (this is fully reproduced – see document 1 of the Appendix). For further
information on Scarpa’s movements and other details see National Archives of
India (NAI), New Delhi, Commercial Department, 1017 G(I), 1923, letter of
24.5.22 from the Italian Embassy, London to Lord Curzon, letter dated 15.7.23,
from the Italian Embassy to Balfour, signed by De Martino, and a note from the
Foreign and Political Department dated 9.10.22. During this period, the British
authorities could hardly have imagined that Scarpa would indeed make trouble
for them, not because of any communist leanings but as an accredited agent of
the fascist regime.
62 ASMAE, AP, Gran Bretagna, 1929, b. 1207, report no. 186, 13.8.29, from the
Italian General Consulate, Colombo to the Foreign Office.
63 ASMAE, ibid.
64 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 858, report of 3.12.30.
65 On Roy, see Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, pp. 50, 60 and 78.
66 Archivio Scuole, b. 858, report of 3.12.30.
67 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, b. 990, Borse di Studio, Gran Bretagna, report no.
843/78, from the Italian Consulate, Calcutta, 19.4.33, to the Foreign Office.
68 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole 1929–35, b. 947, Spese, file Calcutta.
30 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
69 Giovanni Papini, June 1933, India and Italy: A Plea for Cultural Cooperation,
November 1933 and Eleven Years of Fascism, January 1934.
70 ASMAE, Affari Commerciali 1930–31, Indie Inglesi, pos. 55, report to His
Excellency the Chairman of the Italian Academy, Darjeeling, 4.3.30, enclosed
with report no. 884/62, from the Italian Consulate-General, Calcutta, 1.4.30, to
the Foreign Office.
71 ASMAE, ibid.
72 Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, p. 60.
73 As we learn from a leaflet published by the Deutsche Akademie in the private
papers of M.R. Jayakar in Delhi, said academy provided scholarships to Indian
students at the finest universities in Germany. Indian scholars had an opportu-
nity to meet personages such as Helmut von Glasenapp and Karl Haushofer, the
famous expert on geopolitics: NAI, Jayakar Papers, microfilm, r.n. 94. In 1934
the Deutsche Akademie opened a branch in Calcutta, in order to foster relations
between Germany and India: Milan Hauner, India in Axis Strategy: Germany,
Japan and the Indian Nationalists in the Second World War, London, 1981, p. 58.
74 ASMAE, RG, b. 7, booklet published by the India Bureau: the India Bureau had
ties with the Institute of International Education in New York, the National
Council of Education in Washington, Berkeley University, the Institute of Indian
Civilisation in Paris, the Università per stranieri (university for foreign students)
in Perugia, the Kern Institute in Leida, the Deutsche Akademie in Munich, the
National University in Peking and the Imperial University in Tokyo.
75 Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, p. 62.
76 See Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, p. 63, and ASMAE, RG, b. 7, from Kalidas
Nag to the Italian Consul in Calcutta, Edoardo Pervan, 15.6.31 and 19.9.31, and
to Emilio Pagliano, 12.9.31 and 19.9.31.
77 Fondazione Gentile, Corrisp. da terzi a Gentile (missives to Gentile), Carelli
Mario file: Mario Carelli, soon to become the librarian at ISMEO, translated
into Italian from the original English Nag’s letter sent by Nag, as director of the
India Bureau, to Gentile.
78 Roy later became a member of the organising committee of the Confederazione
degli Studenti Orientali in Rome and the Federazione degli Studenti Indiani, also
in Rome: Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, p. 93.
79 Information on Mookerjee is to be found in Balraj Madhok, Portrait of a
Martyr: Biography of Dr. Shyam Prasad Mookerji, Bombay, 1969.
80 Fondazione Gentile, Corrisp. da terzi a Gentile (missives to Gentile), file Tucci
Giuseppe, undated letter in all probability written around the year 1935.
81 See appendix, doc. 7.
82 Giuseppe Flora, Benoy Kumar Sarkar and Italy, “Occasional Papers on History
and Society”, Centre for Contemporary Studies, Nehru Memorial Library, New
Delhi, 1994.
83 B.K. Sarkar, The Politics of Boundaries and Tendencies in International Rela-
tions, vol. I, Analysis of the Post-War World Forces, first edition, Calcutta, 1926,
cited by Flora, Benoy Kumar Sarkar and Italy, pp. 14–21 and 74n.
84 Flora, ibid., p. 25, citing the work by Sarkar mentioned above.
85 Flora, pp. 35–65, Ferretti, “Politica e cultura”, pp. 783–84, p. 788.
86 ASMAE, RG, b. 7, memorandum for His Excellency the Minister, 13.4.31.
87 Flora dwells on this issue in the section entitled “Was Sarkar a fascist?”, Benoy
Kumar Sarkar and Italy.
88 ASMAE, RG, b. 7, outgoing telegram no. 3951/19, from the Foreign Office,
2.5.31, to the Italian Consulate in Calcutta.
89 ASMAE, ibid., incoming telegram no. 3228, from the Italian Consulate in Cal-
cutta, 5.5.31 the Foreign Office, Rome, also cited by Flora, Benoy Kumar Sarkar
and Italy, p. 56.
 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism 31
90 Without considering references included in other works relating to separate
questions, Sarkar’s works concerning Italy, Fascism and the fascist economic
system are as follows: “Italo-Indian Intercourse”, India and the World, Aug.
1932; “Contacts with Economic Italy (1929–1931)”, Journal of the Bengal
National Chamber of Commerce, June–Dec. 1932; “Public Works in Fascist
Italy”, Calcutta Review, October 1933; “The Creation of Small Landowners in
Fascist Italy”, ibid., January 1934; “Giorgio del Vecchio on Anti-Legislation
Movements”, ibid., Aug. 1934; “Trade Balance and Public Finance: the Experi-
ence of Fascist Italy”, ibid., June 1935; “The Paretian Circulation of Elites
Examined”, ibid., Jan.–March 1936; “Economic Italy during the First Years of
the Fascist Regime”, ibid., April 1938; “The State in Neo-Idealism”, ibid., Sept.
1938; “Volpe versus Croce regarding Italian Political History”, ibid., Dec. 1938;
“Industrial Planning and Economic Autarchy”, ibid., Aug. 1939; and the chap-
ter, “The Transition in Italy to an Industrial State”, in Economic Development –
Snaphots of World Movements in Commerce, Economic Legislation, Industrialism
and Technical Education, Madras, 1926.
91 T.R. Sareen, Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad (1905–1920), New Delhi,
1979, pp. 65–68, 121,124, 151, 167 and 252; Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, pp. 85–92.
92 Fondazione Gentile, Corrispondenza da terzi a terzi (missives not personally
addressed to Gentile), letter from Das to Roy.
93 T.N. Das, “An Internationalist on the Italo-Abyssinian Dispute”, Modern
Review, October 1935, cit. in Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, p. 92.
94 The following articles on Italy appeared in the Modern Review: “England has no
debt to Italy but not to India”, September 1925; “Italy’s Air Force”, July 1926;
“Italy’s Vigorous Maritime Policy”, December 1926; “New Italy and Greater
India”, June 1931; “The New Greater Italy and Signor Mussolini”, (?); “Cavour
as a Liberator and Unifier of Italy”, May 1933.
95 The extant literature does not provide significant information on Moulik’s pub-
lications in India, despite the fact that Moulik supported the cause of fascist
Italy during the Ethiopian war. His stance clashed with that of others in India
belonging to various political currents. The author received this information
from Moulik’s daughter, Achala. With regard to Moulik’s stay in Italy, see M.
Prayer, “L’intervista Gandhi-Mussolini: pagine ‘italiane’ dal diario di Mahadev
Desai”, in Storia Contemporanea, February 1992, pp. 78–79, Prayer, “Inter-
nazionalismo”, pp. 64–65, and Ferretti, “Politica e cultura”, p. 797.
96 ASMAE, RG, 1934, b. 32, file 13, report no. 1952/255 of 8.10.34.
97 Calcutta Municipal Gazette (CMG), 27.9.30, quoted by Leonard A. Gordon,
Brothers Against the Raj. A Biography of Sarat & Subhas Chandra Bose, New
Delhi, 1990, p. 234.
98 Ibid., pp. 235 and 674–75.
99 Subhas Chandra Bose, La lotta dell’India 1920–1934 (The Indian Struggle), first
edition in Italian, translated and published by ISMEO, Florence, 1942, pp. 300–01.
100 NAI, Private Papers, Subhas Chandra Bose Papers, letter to Divekar, 18.5.35.
101 ASMAE, AP, India, b. 3, 1934–35, Fasc. Rapporti Politici (Political reports file),
Appunto per la Dir. Gen. AP (Notes for Office of the Director General), Rome,
11.1.35; the enclosed article was published by The Osaka Mainichi and The
Tokyo Nichi Nichi. This proves that Subhas Chandra Bose was already popular
in Japan in this early stage of his liaison with authoritarian political systems.
102 IO, L/P&J/7/792 Pt I, telegram no. 1646, 11.4.27 and noted from the Public and
Judicial Department the Secretary of State, 15.12.32.
103 NAI, Subhas Chandra Bose Papers, Letters from S. C. Bose to Divekar, 15.3.33.
As yet, little is known about Divekar. He sent funds from India to Bose in
Europe and provided assistance during his journey.
32 Italian Fascism and Indian radical nationalism
104 This and the following passages concerning Bose’s arrival in Italy are to be found
in Bose’s letters to Divekar, NAI, Private Papers. Information on the relatively
unresearched Hindustan Association in Rome is limited to a note drawn up by
ISMEO which, we are informed, contributed to the founding of this group. See
IO, L/P&S/12/81, Intelligence file dated 31.7.1933, enclosed with a letter of
6.8.33. The note, which provides detailed information on Gino Scarpa and Ita-
lian activities, is provided the appendix (document 2). This is the second part of
the note of 15.6.31, cited above (see appendix, document 1). See also the minutes
of the first meeting of the Istituto per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 26.5.33
(Fondazione Gentile, Enti, b. 3 ISMEO, fasc. 9, Varie).
105 NAI, Private Papers.
106 These details were included in a letter to the Amrita Bazar Patrika published on
25.3.33. Another letter accompanied by a brief editorial comment, Honoured in
Land of Mussolini, provides a detailed account of Bose’s stay in Italy. The letter and
the editorial comment were published by Liberty (25.5.33). Regarding Bose’s wel-
come by the Italian authorities: ASMAE, SP, India, b. 3. The Foreign Office, with
express telegram n. 205974, 27.2.33, informed the Prefect of Venice that, according
to the instructions received from the Italian Consul General in Calcutta, while in
Italy Bose should be provided assistance “in a strictly non-official capacity”. In his
reply, the Prefect stated that he had delegated this task to the Director of the local
branch of the insurance company, Lloyd Triestino (letter no. 619, dated 4.3.33).
107 NAI, Private Papers.
108 NAI, ibid.
109 ASMAE, SP, India, b. 3, “express telegram n. 3374/1481”, from the Italian
Embassy in Berlin to the Ministry of External Affairs, 11.8.33.
110 ASMAE, ibid.
111 Both events have received much attention from Italian historians, especially in
the essays cited above, by De Felice and Ferretti, respectively.
112 ASMAE, Gab., pos.7, Udienze (meetings), Subhas Chandra Bose. Regarding
Bose’s collaboration with the organisers of the first Congress, see a note “Per Sua
Eccellenza il Capo del Governo” (for His Excellency the Head of the Govern-
ment) dated 23.1.35.
113 Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, p. 278.
114 IO, L/P&S/12/107 and L/P&S/12/81, report from the British Ambassador in
Rome to Sir John Simon of 2.2.34 (appendix, document 10 nell’originale) and a
report on Scarpa and Italian activities, dated 31.7.1933. Again on Bose’s political
ideas, ASMAE, Gab., pos.7, file in English headed “Subhas Chandra Bose”, sent
to the Foreign Office on 16.1.34.
115 ASMAE, Gab., pos.7, cit, Note of 29.12.33 and “Pro-Memoria” (Memorandum)
drawn up by Aloisi for Starace, 29.12.33.
116 Sisir Kumar Bose and Alexander Werth (ed.), A Beacon Across Asia, New Delhi,
1973, quoted by Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, p. 278.
117 ASMAE, Gab., pos. 7, cit, documents of April 1934 and letter from Bose to Mus-
solini, 29.11.34, accompanied by a note dated 3.12.34 addressed to the duce, with a
very brief report on Bose. De Felice mentions these circumstances briefly on pp.
1324–25 of the article already mentioned above. The article is somewhat imprecise,
for instance when it reports that Bose had not attended the congress of December
1933. Not only was Bose there, but he was elected chairman of the congress.
118 The so-called Social Republic represented the decline of Italian Fascism, after 25th
July 1943. When the “Gran Consiglio” (the Grand Fascist Council) discharged Mus-
solini, several of his faithful comrades stood by the duce and followed him to Salò, on
the Lake of Garda, where he set up his headquarters. Italy was thus cut in half. The
north came under the control of the fascist Republican Government (Italian Social
Republic) and central and southern Italy came under the Badoglio government.
2 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism

1 Building the network: early contacts with Hindu nationalism

Italians made every possible attempt to establish ties with Indian political and
intellectual circles. The previous chapter described the early contacts between
the regime and Bengali nationalism. In the same period the regime organised
important events where the representatives of the fascist regime had the
occasion to meet leading exponents of Hindu nationalism. Between Decem-
ber 1928 and January 1929 the Lega Navale Italiana (Italian Naval league)
organised a three-month cruise in India and Ceylon.1 Members of Italian
high society and aristocracy – including industrialists, businessmen, politi-
cians, and, above all, Edda Mussolini, the duce’s daughter – took part in this
trip. The high point of the cruise was Benares. A conference was held at the
Benares Hindu University, with the Chancellor, Madan Mohan Malaviya,
two hundred professors and “all the students” attending. The theme was
“Fascism and the Duce”.2 A similar cruise was organised in September 1932
by the company I Grandi Viaggi (Great Tours), based in Milan.3 Once more,
the cruise passengers included a number of Italian aristocrats, industrialists,
high level professionals, politicians and “representatives of the most impor-
tant categories of intellectuals”.4 Although this time there were no personal-
ities like Edda Mussolini, the Italian and Indian press dedicated more space
to this tour.5 Again, at the Universities of Benares and Calcutta celebrations
and gala dinners were organised. As already pointed out, Indian intellectuals
were considered an important resource. Given the political role of the Benares
Hindu University (BHU) and the political standing of Malaviya, no real
distinction can be made between the political repercussions of the event and
its cultural significance.6
It should be noted that the most important currents of political Hinduism
had already spontaneously developed an interest in Fascism during the late
1920s. It is hard to assert whether Fascism had a part to play in the birth of
militant organisations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS). The
structural similarities between these organisations and the fascist militias are
striking, and have been noticed by practically all observers of the RSS.
Hedgewar’s ‘official’ biographers felt obliged to declare that
34 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism
some critics compared this arrangement to the Fascist army of Mussolini.
But the Sangh had no need to derive its inspiration from any such per-
verted foreign model; it modelled itself on an ideal Hindu family.7

The RSS method of recruitment was practically identical to that of the Balilla
youth organisation in Italy. Shaka members, for instance, were grouped
according to their age (6–7 to 10; 10 to 14; 14 to 28; 28 and older). This is
amazingly similar to the age bands of the hierarchical organisation of the
fascist youth organisations, with its subdivision of boys and young men in
Figli della Lupa, Balilla, Avanguardisti, and Camicie Nere (Sons of the She-
Wolf, Balilla, Avant-gardists and Blackshirts). The hierarchical ordering of
RSS members, however, came after the organisation was founded and may
well have been derived from Fascism, as we shall see.
Initially, the RSS must have been very closely modelled on the akharas, the
Bengali gymnasiums where martial arts and paramilitary training were per-
formed – and the secret societies founded in Maharashtra by young militants
close to Tilak, including the Savarkar brothers.8 It is also a known fact that
the decision to found the RSS was taken by a small group of individuals, all
belonging to the same political environment. Apart from Hedgewar, the
group of founders of the RSS included B.S. Moonje, L.V. Paranjipe, Babarao
Savarkar, and a certain Tholkar. All were members of the Hindu Maha-
sabha.9 Before founding the RSS in autumn 1925, Hedgewar met Vinayak
Damodar Savarkar, at the time confined at Ratnagiri, and asked his advice on
how to set up the organisation.10
Although the decision to found the RSS was taken by local political circles,
the members of these groups must have been fairly interested in developments
outside India. Italy’s recent history and the remarkable events witnessed there,
of course, had not escaped the attention of Indian public opinion, including
Marathi and Hindu nationalists.

2 Italian Fascism in Marathi publications

If Hedgewar read one of the leading daily newspapers in Maharashtra,
Kesari, he must have been aware of the political changes taking place in Italy
and, however vaguely, he would also have learned something of their nature.
Between 1924 and 1935 Kesari regularly published articles on Italy, Fascism
and Mussolini. Furthermore, other publications on the fascist regime and the
duce were also being distributed in India. These works were mainly in Italian
and were translated into local languages.
What impressed the Marathi journalists was the socialist origin of Fascism
and the regime’s apparent capacity to transform Italy from a backward country
to a top ranking world power. Indians could not know, then, that there was
actually very little truth behind the demagogic rhetoric of the fascists. Moreover,
Indian journalists were convinced that Fascism had restored order in a country
previously upset by political tensions. In a series of editorials, Kesari described
 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 35
the passage from liberal government to dictatorship as a shift from anarchy to a
social order in which strife had no more reason to exist.11 In column after
column, Kesari described the political reforms carried out by Mussolini, like the
substitution of the elections with the nomination of the members of Parlia-
ment,12 and the replacement of Parliament itself with the Gran Consiglio del
Fascismo (Grand Council of Fascism). Mussolini, who was an enemy of
democracy, had firmly established the principle of dictatorship according to
which “one man’s government is more useful and more binding” for the nation
than institutional democracy.13 All this is strikingly similar to the RSS’s principle
of “obedience to one leader” (ek chalak anuvartitva).
In a long article of 13th August 1929, “Italy and the Young Generations”, it
was stated that the younger generations in Italy had wrested the reins of power
from their elders, leading to a “fast ascent of Italy in every field”. The article
went on to describe at length the organisation of Italian society according to
fascist models. The sense of discipline pervading Italian youth was explained in
terms of a strong attachment to religious principles. Italians responded to the
call of their faith. Their defence of the institution of the family was considerable,
also reflected in a respect for traditional values. A recent movement in favour of
divorce, for instance, disappeared after the rise of the fascist regime. The article
described the measures adopted by the fascist government to protect the family,
like the tax imposed on single people. Women had no voting rights and they did
not claim them. According to the article, Italian youths thought that the ideal
environment for women was the home. The article focused then on the fascist
youth organisations, the Balilla and the Avanguardisti.
One might wonder how the Indian press could be so well informed about
recent developments in Italy. One source, in all likelihood, was an Italian
pamphlet in English, The Recent Laws for the Defence of the State (1928).14
The National Militia, defined here as “the bodyguard of the Revolution”,
received special attention, alongside the restrictive measures adopted by the
new fascist order, namely the ban on “subversive parties”, limitations to the
press, expulsion of “disaffected persons” from public administration, and,
finally, the death sentence.
Significantly, the shift from the Liberal phase to Fascism tout court is
described by the pamphlet in strikingly similar terms to those employed in the
articles described above:

This step [the shift to Fascism] has struck a death blow to the thread-bare
theories of Italian liberalism, according to which the Sovereign State
must observe strict neutrality towards all political associations and par-
ties. This theory explains why in Italy the Ship of State was drifting
before the wind, ready to sink in the vortex of social dissolution or to be
wrecked on the rocks of financial disaster.15

Another inspiring source for the literature published in Kesari was D.V. Tah-
mankar, the newspaper’s London correspondent and a great admirer of
36 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism
Mussolini. In 1927 Tahmankar published a book entitled Muslini ani Fas-
hismo (Mussolini and Fascism), a biography of the dictator, with several
references to the organisation of the fascist state, the fascist social system,
fascist ideology, and Italy’s recent past. One chapter was entirely dedicated to
fascist society and its institutions, and especially the youth organisations.
By the late 1920s, the fascist regime and Mussolini had many supporters in
Maharashtra. The aspects of Fascism, which appealed most to the Hindu
nationalists, were, of course, the supposed shift of Italian society from chaos to
order, and its militarisation. This patently anti-democratic system was con-
sidered a positive alternative to democracy, seen as a typical British institution.
A subtext of this literature was the parallel between Fascism and the
Risorgimento, Italy’s struggle for unification. Marathi nationalists, and the
radicals in general, saw Fascism, which was ushering in a state organised
along rational lines, as the final chapter of the epic experience represented by
the Italian Risorgimento.

3 B.S. Moonje’s trip to Europe

The way the political literature described fascist Italy was exciting, and it is
hardly surprising that a number of influential Hindu nationalists should be
tempted to go and personally see the achievements of the fascist regime.16
On his return from the first Round Table Conference, in the spring of 1931,
B.S. Moonje left for a tour around Britain and Europe, with the intention of
staying in Italy for some time. This was undoubtedly a turning point in RSS’s
development. The journey was carefully planned to take in educational and
military institutions in Britain, France, Germany and Italy.
On 3rd October 1930, N.B. Parulekar, head of the International Institute of
India, sent Moonje copies of a dozen letters of introduction for contacts in
Europe,17 including one to Fritz Grobba.18 Early on in his career, Grobba
had been the German Chargé d’Affaires in Kabul, and at the end of 1923 he
had already gained a reputation as one of the leading experts on Arab ques-
tions. At the time of Moonje’s visit to Europe he was head of German Con-
sulates in the East. In 1941 he became chief of the Office for the Middle
Eastern Affairs at the German Foreign Office.19 Toward the end of the 1930s,
Grobba was one of the key figures in German foreign policy in Arab coun-
tries and India. Most probably, at the time of these letters he was already an
influential figure.
Parulekar’s letter of introduction described Moonje’s role within the Hindu
Mahasabha as follows:

This Body represents the millions of Hindus of the country and Dr.
Moonje is its leading spirit.20

With regard to Moonje’s visit and the reasons behind it, Parulekar added:
 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 37
You know at present there is a growing tendency in India to build edu-
cational and commercial relations with countries other than Great Brit-
ain. Particularly the desire to develop such relations with Germany is
strong and, I am sure, it is bound to lead to the benefit both of India and
Germany. Dr. Moonje will be travelling as our representative and would
like to make contacts with men in educational and industrial lines in
which case I am sure your assistance will be greatly valued. If it is possi-
ble for him to meet representatives of German manufacturers in a con-
ference and also German educators, I am sure, such gatherings will be
valuable for the building of contacts between these countries. We should
like to open up a few chances of work for students who would know
German machines as it is difficult to supply such technicians in India and
therefore it works against a wider use of such imported machinery. Then
again we are interested in making contacts with German scholars, leaders
of culture and political thought and I should request you to try what you
possibly can in introducing Dr. Moonje to respective people.

The aim of Parulekar’s Institute, with an office in Berlin and two in New
York, was to promote social relations between India and the world at large,
also in the fields of cultural activities and education.
Grobba replied to Parulekar in November:

I have written to Dr. Moonje and hope he will inform me in time about
his arrival. I will be very pleased to discuss the matters proposed in your
letter with him and to render him all possible facilities during his stay in
Germany.21

In October 1930, Moonje corresponded with a certain Penelope Betjeman, as

confirmed by a single letter in the records (a reply from Mrs Betjeman), dated
22nd October.22 In itself, this letter would be of little importance, were it not for
the fact that it mentions Scarpa, whose address Moonje had sent to Mrs Betje-
man, and to Tucci. Mrs Betjeman hoped one day to study under Prof. Tucci. It is
clear from the letter that both Moonje and Mrs Betjeman knew Tucci and
Scarpa. However, only Tucci was to play a part in Moonje’s tour in Italy.
The main moving force behind the organisation of Moonje’s trip to Europe
was Tarak Nath Das, who on 16th November 193023 wrote to Moonje urging
him to visit Italy and Germany. Das also asked Moonje to keep him informed
as to developments so that he might arrange visits to German institutes of
higher education.24 Tarak Nath Das had been a member of the Deutsche
Akademie since 1927. Das himself was also eager to meet Moonje. At the end
of December, Tarak Nath Das wrote to M.R. Jayakar,25 a leading member of
the Hindu Mahasabha, to inform him that the Deutsche Akademie would be
most pleased to be of assistance to Moonje in Munich, and arrange visits to
German cultural institutions and meetings with several personalities.
38 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism
At the end of January 1931, immediately after the Round Table
Conference, between 23rd January and 14th February 1931 Moonje visited
British schools, institutions and arms manufacturing plants, thanks to the
collaboration of the British authorities.26 He left then for Paris, where he
stayed from 15th to 23rd February. Here, too, he was mainly interested in
military institutions training schools, rather than tourist sights. After Paris,
Moonje stopped off briefly in Brussels, where he was accompanied by a guide,
a certain Miss Pommeret (who had also accompanied him in Paris and who
he was to meet up with again in Italy). Moonje reached Germany on 25th
February. The British authorities in Berlin provided him with assistance to
organise visits and meetings. On 27th February, he met Grobba, and on the
next day started a round of visits which took in youth organisations, sports
facilities, sporting organisations, military institutions and schools. Moonje
and Grobba met on at least three other occasions, on 28th February, 5th and
7th March, together with members of the German army staff. Moonje was
more impressed by the grandeur of the German institutions and organisations
than anything he had seen in France and Britain.27
On 1st March 1931, Moonje wrote to Tarak Nath Das, announcing that he
would soon be in Italy. He provided indications as to his movements and the
length of his stay. On 6th March, Das, in Florence at the time, wrote to Tucci
to inform him of Moonje’s arrival, adding:

I hope that during his stay in Rome he will meet responsible Italian sta-
tesmen and educators and those who will be able to explain the Fascist
Militia system from Balilla up to him.28

In his letter, Tarak Nath Das took the opportunity to make a number of
proposals:

Regarding the steps to be taken to promote cultural relations between

India and Italy, I have given considerable thought, and I wish to suggest
that as the next year is going to be the 10th anniversary of the Fascist
Revolution in Italy, it will be a very [sic] wonderful if some Italian scholar
go [sic] to India to deliver a course of lectures on “Italy Since the World
War” before various Indian universities. By this, India will be greatly
benefited, because a large number of Indian scholars and students will
have the opportunity to learn something about the great experiment in
government and all walks of life now being carried on in Italy.29

Politics and culture blend once more. Tucci had brought P.N. Roy, one of his
former students at the University of Calcutta, to the University of Naples as
his assistant. Das therefore proposed that the University of Calcutta should
return the favour by asking a scholar from Italy to India to lecture on Italian
History, especially on the early post-war years. He also expressed the hope
that the University of Calcutta might start up an Italian History course. Das
 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 39
had discussed this point with Formichi and was hopeful that Tucci would
agree. Tucci informed the Ministry of External Affairs about Tarak Nath
Das’ proposals.30 Das was described as “a great friend of Italy” who “has
disseminated much information on modern Italy in his studies and articles”, a
“person who is sincerely working toward a convergence between our two
countries, both culturally and in practical terms”. Tucci proposed that any
Indian University that might wish to send an invitation of this kind, should
do so “via private channels . . . in view of the politically delicate nature” of
such a move. The main concern was the possible reaction of the British
authorities, keenly aware of the political implications of such exchanges.
Tucci went on to describe Moonje, due shortly in Rome:

Moonje is pro-British. He was a participant at the Conference of

London, and he is likely to be selected as the person responsible for
bringing about a reform of India’s armed forces.
The Balilla organisation and pre-military training have been very much
the centre of attention in India. These are urgent issues which India must
come to terms with very soon . . .
Moonje . . . will soon be with us in Italy . . . It is also in our own
interest that he be given an opportunity to study how our organisations
work, and he should receive all due assistance.31

4 In Italy: B.S. Moonje’s meeting with Mussolini

After stopping off in Prague and Vienna, Moonje set out for Italy on 10th
March. After a one-day visit to Venice, on 12th March he went on to Flor-
ence, where Miss Pommeret joined him the following day. He also met Tarak
Nath Das at Hotel Washington, where Das was staying with his wife. Moonje
recalled the meeting as follows:

Dr. Das looks about 50 years of age and has preserved his health quite
unlike a Bengali, but his wife . . .
We had long conversations: Dr. Das complained that he has ruined his
whole life in the service of India from the time of agitation of the Parti-
tion of Bengal but no Indian who comes to Europe ever cares to meet
him or enquire about him. Much less help him. His wife took care to tell
me that she helps him with her own money which she freely spends on
the propaganda which Das carries on in favour of India’s Freedom. He
asked me to do certain things in India to enlist the simpathy [sic] of
America. I said that he should write to me in detail in India and I shall
do my best.32

Apart from this meeting, Moonje spent his journey in Florence in sightseeing.
On 14th March he left for Rome, where he put up at the hotel Albergo
Venezia.
40 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism
On 16th March, he went to the British Embassy where he met the ambas-
sador. The ambassador contacted immediately the Foreign Office, applied for
the authorisations Moonje required to visit the military schools and requested
a meeting with Mussolini. The required visits were to the Scuola Militare di
Roma (Rome Military School), Scuola di Cultura Fisica di Roma (Rome
School of Physical Culture), the Ospedale Militare di Roma (Rome Military
Hospital), the Accademia Navale di Livorno (Livorno Naval Academy), C.R.
E.M.at La Spezia, the Scuola dei Cadetti (Cadets School) at Caserta, and the
Scuola per meccanici (Mechanics School) at Capua.33
Moonje met Tucci during the afternoon of 16th March. In his notebook,
Moonje wrote a colourful, but unflattering portrait of this, to his mind, rather
pretentious Italian scholar:

Proff. [sic] Tucci was introduced to me by letter by Dr Taraknath Das. He

know (sic) Sanskrit well and tries to speak on occasions in Sanskrit. He
was for 5 years in India travelling in Tibet and Nepal, collecting manu-
scripts in Buddhistic philosophy and literature of which he has got a fine
collection which he calls unique in Europe. His face did not impress me;
neither his manner of conversation or acting which appeared to me as
fussy and sentimental. He said he loves India as his home of culture and
though a Roman Catholic by birth, he is practically, he said, he is [sic] a
Buddhist. He has converted one of his rooms into something looking like
a temple with the image of Buddha and several other images of Gods and
Godesses in the Buddhistic mithology [sic]. He is at present editing a
Buddhistic manuscript which he describes as of rare excellence. . . .
The Professor promised to see the Foreign Minister this evening to
secure permission for my visiting the military schools.34

On 17th March, Moonje met the War Minister, who informed him that he would
be able to visit a number of military schools the following day. On 18th March, the
Departmental Staff of the Ministry of External Affairs informed Moonje that the
head of the government would receive him the following day, at 6.30 p. m.35
On 18th March, Moonje, started his day with a visit to St. Peter’s church
and the Military Museum. In the afternoon, in the company of the Colonel at
the Supreme Command, Gandin, Moonje visited the Collegio militare (Mili-
tary College). Moonje observed

It is an Institution for the training of Cadets. It gives both Civil and Military
Education. Military training is compulsory for every Italian. We saw the boys
under physical training and drill. It did not impress me. The discipline and
organisation are not so strict as in Sandhurst. The boys too did not appear so
well developed physically as the British, French or the Germans. In short the
general atmosphere did not strike us as that of the Sandhurst . . .36

He did not know that the best had yet to come.

 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 41
Compulsory military training later on became a leitmotiv in Moonje’s
engagement in favour of the “Indianisation” of the Indian army. On several
occasions, he underlined the necessity to introduce compulsory military
training in India.
The next day Moonje visited the Scuola Centrale di Educazione Fisica
(Central School of Physical Education) and the Accademia Fascista di Edu-
cazione Fascia (Fascist Academy of Fascist Training), where he saw fencing
and jujitsu matches. He then went to the Olympic Stadium, at the time under
construction, which, the colonel assured him, would soon be the largest in
Europe. Moonje then visited the Mussolini Forum, also under construction.
Finally, after lunch, Moonje visited the Balilla organisations, the Legione
Marinara Caio Duilio (Navy Legion Caio Duilio), with youths from the
Balilla and Avanguardisti organisations, and the Legione Monti, this too with
youths from the Balilla and Avanguardisti organisations. Here he witnessed
ordinary physical training displays and training with rifles and machine guns.
After these visits, Moonje began to take a greater interest in these institu-
tions, and was full of praise for the paramilitary exercises he had seen:

The Balilla Institutions and the conception of the whole organisation

have appealed to me most, though there is still not discipline and orga-
nisation of high order. The whole idea is conceived by Mussolini for the
military regeneration of Italy. Italians, by nature, appear to be ease-loving
and non-martial like the Indians generally. They have cultivated, like
Indians, the works of peace and neglected the cultivation of the art of
war. Mussolini saw the essential weakness of his country and conceived
the idea of the Balilla organisation.37

Moonje, too, like other Indian political exponents and intellectuals, pointed
to certain similarities between Italian and Indian society, between the char-
acter of respective populations and similar factors prevailing in both societies.
He digressed at length upon the meaning of the term Balilla. It was the
nickname of a young Genoese patriot who had provoked a revolt against the
invaders by throwing a stone at an Austrian. This episode must have held
some special message for Moonje, who pointed out that

This organisation is therefore given this name of Balilla to infuse the spirit of
patriotism and love of independence amongst the boys and girls of Italy38

He then added a few notes on compulsory paramilitary training:

This Balilla training is practically compulsory and the State is the most
influential patron. The State provides a part of the fund, while the public
generally, in appreciation of the movement subscribe large and small
amounts. Nothing better could have been conceived for the military
organisation of Italy.
42 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism
Moonje returned to the theme of cultural affinities between Italy and India:

The name Fascist is derived from a Latin proverb which means that a
small sticks [sic], so long as they are separate from each other, can be
easily broken but when they are tread [sic[ together into a bundle, they
become unbreakable. There is a Sanskrit proverb conveying the same
meaning i.e. a blade of grass is of no account but when several such are
wound up into a rope they acquire such strength that they can tie an
elephant to a post.39

About the symbol of the ‘fascio’ and its meaning:

The idea of Fascism vividly brings out the conception of unity amongst
people. India and particularly Hindu India need some such Institution for
the military regeneration of the Hindus: so that the artificial distinction
so much emphasised by the British of martial and non-Martial classes
amongst the Hindus may disappear. Our Institution of Rashtriya
Svayamsevak Sangh of Nagpur under Dr Hedgewar is of this kind,
though quite independently conceived. I will spend the rest of my life in
developing and extending this institution of Dr Hedgewar all trough out
[sic] the Maharashtra and other provinces.40

This passage is particularly meaningful, for at least three reasons. In the next
pages it will be seen that Moonje, once back in India, started to improve the
RSS and its strength and to found a military school that was strictly con-
nected with the RSS. Secondly, this record is one piece of evidence (others will
be examined in the next pages) that Moonje was the connecting element
between the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha. Finally, this record provides
clear evidence that after his trip to Italy and his visit to Italian paramilitary
bodies, Moonje modelled the RSS according to the features of the fascist
organisations.
The diary goes on with the description of the Balilla organisation. Moonje
was most impressed when Col. Gandin informed him that 7,500 youths
received basic military training in Italy:

I was charmed to see boys and girls well dressed in their naval and mili-
tary uniforms undergoing simple exercises of physical training and forms
of drill . . . I was very much impressed with the conception of the
movement.41

Toward the end of 1931, Gandhi, too, saw the Balilla at work and, unlike
Moonje, was not impressed.42
Oddly enough, Moonje forgot to mention his meeting with Mussolini that
day, but he gave a detailed account on 20th March. Given the importance of
the document, it is entirely reproduced here.
 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 43
I forgot to mention in my yesterday’s note that I got a letter dated 18th from
the Foreign Office at Rome saying that H.E. Premier Signor Mussolini will be
pleased to see me at Palazzo Venezia at 6.30 p. m. on 19th. Accordingly I
went with the Colonel quite in time to the palace. Miss Pommeret brushed my
cap and coat and trousers and cleaned my boots with her own hands. I
expressed my gratefulness to her for her solicitude that I may appear smart
and well dressed before the much-talked of Italian personality and statesman
as a representative of Indian aspiration. The Palace is one of the old historic
buildings and has big halls. I was soon called in. Signor Mussolini was sitting
alone at his table at one of the corners of one of the big halls. As soon as I was
announced at the door, he got up and walked up to the door to receive me. I
shook hands with him saying that I am Dr Moonje. He knew everything
about me and appeared to be closely following the events of the Indian
struggle for freedom. He seemed to have great respect for Gandhi. He sat
down in front of me on another chair in front of his table and was conversing
with me for quite half an our [sic]. He asked me about Gandhi and his
movement and pointedly asked me a question – “If the Round Table Con-
ference will bring about peace between India and England”. I said that if the
British would honestly desire to give us an equal status with other dominions
of the Empire, we shall have no objection to remain peacefully and loyally
within the Empire: otherwise the struggle will be renewed and continued.
Britain will gain and be able to maintain her premier position amongst the
European Nations if India is friendly and peaceful towards her and India can
not be so unless she is given Dominion Status on equal terms with other
Dominions. Signor Mussolini appeared impressed by this remark of mine.
Then he asked me if I have visited the University. I said I am interested in the
military training of boys and have been visiting the Military Schools of Eng-
land France and Germany. I have now come to Italy for the same purpose
and I am very grateful to say that the Foreign office and the War office have
made good arrangements for my visiting these Schools. I just saw this morn-
ing and afternoon the Balilla and the Fascist Organisations and I was much
impressed. Italy needs them for her development and prosperity. I do not see
anything objectionable though I have been frequently reading in the news-
papers not very friendly criticism about them and about your Excellency also.
Signor Mussolini – What is your opinion about them?
Dr Moonje – Your Excellency, I am very much impressed. Every aspiring
and growing nation needs such organisations. India needs them most for her
military regeneration. During the British Domination of the last 150 years,
Indians have been waved away from the military profession but India now
desires to prepare herself for undertaking the responsibility for her own defence
and I am working for it. I have already started an organisation of my own,
conceived independently with similar objectives. I shall have no hesitation to
raise my voice from the public platform both in India and England whenever
occasion may arise in praise of your Balilla and Fascist organisations. I wish
them good luck and every success.
44 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism
Signor Mussolini – who appeared very pleased – said – Thanks but
yours is an uphill task. However, I wish you every success in return.
Saying this he got up and I also got up to take his leave. I brought
forward my hand to wish him good bye but he said – Not yet, I will see
you off at the door. He walked up to the door and warmly shook hands
with me wishing me good bye and good luck. I walked out of the room
and the door was closed on me.
So ended my memorable interview with Signor Mussolini, one of the
great men of the European world. He is a tall man with broad face and
double chin and broad chest. His face shows him to be a man of strong
will and powerful personality. I have noted that Italians love him. I was
told by Colonel that when the Fascist Revolution succeeded and Musso-
lini marched on Rome with his Fascist organisation and over throwing
the former Govt. became himself the Premier, he called on the King and
said – I am your most loyal and obedient servant. How noble and how
selflessly patriotic!43

It should be taken for granted that, as with the meeting with Gandhi,44
Mussolini and Moonje spoke in English together.
On 20th March the visits went on. The first was to the Scuola Militare
Centrale, in Civitavecchia, which included training classes for infantry and
officers and engineering courses. On his way from a place to another, Moonje
could observe the countryside around Rome. His remarks on the people are
of some interest. Once more, the theory of specific affinities between India
and Italy, was foremost in his mind:

The country-side and the country-people not very different from the
Indian country-people and country-side. They are like the Indians simple
and not so imperialist as the English. Agriculture is done both by horse
and by oxen but the village headmen or owner of agriculture and some
times [sic] shepherds also were seen to be riding their country horses
while supervising the agricultural works of labourers or tending the
sheep. Our Indian agriculturists have entirely given up horse-riding. It is a
pity. We must carry on a propaganda for reviewing horse riding.45

Italy was less organised and disciplined than Britain. Moonje considered Italy
a still tradition-bound nation and, compared with more advanced European
nations, one he could identify with more easily.
That same day, Moonje visited the Scuola di Cavalleria (Cavalry School) at
Tor di Quinto, near Rome, and on 21st March he had a tourist sightseeing of
the capital, in the company of Colonel Gandin and Miss Pommeret. On the
same evening he left for Naples, where he visited the schools at Caserta and
Capua. On 23rd March, Moonje boarded the Aquileia, bound for Bombay,
arriving 7th April.
Tucci met Moonje the following June, and noted:
 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 45
For the preparation of the masses, the Indian leaders want to import
fascist techniques of organisation. Dr. Munji came to Italy after the
Conference of London to study the Balilla and our youth enrolment. The
Balilla has aroused considerable interest in India, but the only informa-
tion they have is second hand. It is quite clear how important a fascist
youth organisation in India would be to us.
Also, with regard to the army, the general impression is that Munji will
become the Minister of War in India. Over and above his specific role as
Minister of War, we must keep an eye on this movement. We must forge
links with the leaders of this movement and be prepared for all eventualities.
A free India will have to re-organise and fit out its army.46

To sum up, a few more words should be spent on Moonje’s meeting with
Mussolini. The duce seemed to be careful. Above all else, he was interested in
sounding out the nationalists and their stance with regard to Great Britain.
This was not a time for concrete proposals. There was nothing official on
Moonje’s trip to Italy or his meeting with the duce. Unfortunately, as opposed
to the Ghandi meeting, and indeed most of Mussolini’s audiences, there is no
official account of this exchange. Although the meeting lasted even longer
than that between Mussolini and Gandhi, nothing particularly significant
appears to have transpired. The fact that Moonje met the duce is an impor-
tant aspect for the Indian historiography. Furthermore, the nameless organi-
sation “quite independently conceived” mentioned by Moonje during the
conversation with Mussolini could only be the RSS. It is interesting to see
Moonje presenting the RSS as his own creation. His links with the RSS had
always been close, and the alliance had strengthened in the meantime. Firstly,
Hedgewar grew up, as it were, under the Moonje’s protective wing.47 It was
Moonje who maintained the young Hedgewar and brought him into his own
household when he had no one to turn to, and Moonje who sent Hedgewar to
the National Medical College in Calcutta, rather than have him take up an
academic career. In Calcutta, Hedgewar was to receive training in revolu-
tionary action under the watchful eye of trusted Bengali militants.48 The ties
between Moonje and Hedgewar were meant to last, and deeply influenced
both Moonje’s and Hedgewar’s later decisions and experiences in the political
arena. From 1927, when Moonje became the chairman of the Hindu Maha-
sabha, the two organisations became even closer. Moonje invited the RSS to
attend the annual meeting held at Ahmedabad and put its militia through its
paces in public. On this occasion, Hedgewar managed to meet up with Hindu
Mahasabha leaders from all over India.49 Furthermore, Hedgewar was secre-
tary of the Hindu Mahasabha between 1926 and 1931.50 Relations between
these two organisations reached their high point during Moonje’s vice-pre-
sidency of the Hindu Mahasabha (1931–33).51
The meeting between Moonje and Mussolini was bound to influence future
developments within the Hindu nationalist movement. However, it is odd that
nothing immediate came out of that meeting as far as the fascist regime was
46 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism
concerned. True, another important member of the Hindu Mahasabha, Madan
Mohan Malaviya, did travel to Italy in December 1931 with the Mahatma
Gandhi. It is not known if he attended the meeting with Mussolini. In any case,
the press, which concentrated on Gandhi, ignored Malaviya, and his presence is
an almost completely unknown detail, both in India and Italy.52
Although there was no immediate follow-up to Moonje’s Italian trip, its
impact on the future development of Hindu militancy can hardly be
underestimated.

5 “Militarise Hindu Society”

Back in India, Moonje kept his promise, and immediately set about his pro-
jects for the foundation of a military school and the re-organisation of mili-
tant Hindus in Maharashtra. He wasted no time. As soon as he reached
Poona, he was interviewed by The Mahratta. Regarding military reorganisa-
tion of the Hindu community, he stressed the need to “Indianise” the Army
and expressed the hope that conscription would become compulsory and an
Indian would be put in charge of the Defence Ministry. He also made clear
references to Italy and Germany:

In fact, leaders should imitate the Youth movement of Germany and the
Balilla and Fascist organisations of Italy. I think they are eminently
suited for introduction in India, adapting them to suit the special condi-
tions. I have been very much impressed by these movements and I have
seen their activities with my own eyes in all details.53

Fascism soon became a subject of public debate and Hedgewar himself was among
the promoters of a campaign in favour of the militarisation of the Indian society.
On 31st January 1934, Hedgewar chaired a conference dealing with Fascism and
Mussolini, organised by Kavde Shastri. Moonje’s speech closed the event.54
A few months later, on 31st March 1934, a meeting was arranged between
Moonje, Hedgewar, and Laloo Gokhale. The subject was, again, how to
militarily organise the Hindus along Italian and German lines:

Laloo – Well you are the president of the Hindu Sabha and you are preaching
Sanghathan of Hindus. It is ever possible for Hindus to be organised?
I said – You have asked me a question of which exactly I was thinking
of late. I have thought out a scheme based on Hindu Dharm Shastra
which provides for standardization of Hinduism throughout India . . .
But the point is that this ideal can not be brought to effect unless we have
our own swaraj with a Hindu as a Dictator like Shivaji of old or Mus-
solini or Hitler of the present day in Italy and Germany. But this does not
mean that we have to sit with folded hands untill [sic] some such dictator
arises in India. We should formulate a scientific scheme and carry on
propaganda for it.55
 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 47
Moonje’s trip to Italy, did not – as was instead the case with Subhas Chandra
Bose and other nationalists – lead to any further co-operation between Hindu
nationalism and the fascist regime. However, these contacts were important
from the ideological and organisational angle.
As already pointed out, immediately after his return to India, Moonje
made the first steps toward the foundation of a military school. This was his
main activity, besides the political militancy within the Hindu Mahasabha.
Back from his European tour, he explained his plan to several personalities,
and spoke about it in public occasions. The result of Moonje’s activity was
the foundation of the Bhonsla Military School, in 1934.56 For this purpose,
the same year, he began to work at the foundation of the Central Hindu
Military Education Society, whose aim was

to bring about military regeneration of the Hindus and to fit Hindu

youths for undertaking the entire responsibility for the defence of their
motherland57

to educate them to the Sanatan Dharma, and to train them “in the science
and art of personal and national defence”.58 It should be concluded that
Moonje’s programme was entirely devoted to Hindu society, and not to
Indian society as a whole.
The other function of the Military Education Society was that of facilitat-
ing the diffusion of military education and supporting the foundation of new
schools. At the time of the foundation of the school and the Society, Moonje
publicly admitted that his idea of militarily reorganising Hindu society was
inspired by the “Military Training Schools of England, France, Germany and
Italy”.59 Moreover, there is an explicit reference to fascist Italy and Nazi
Germany in a document circulated by Moonje among those influential per-
sonalities who might be expected to support the foundation of the school.60
Right from the first lines it was stated that:

This training is meant for qualifying and fitting our boys for the game of
killing masses of men with the ambition of winning Victory with the best
possible causualties [sic] of dead and wounded while causing the utmost
possible to the adversary.61

Moonje does not give any clear cut indication as to his “adversary”, was it an
external enemy, the British, or the ‘historical’ internal Muslim enemy.
A lengthy dissertation follows, on the relation between violence and non-vio-
lence. In it, many examples from Indian history and Hindu holy books are
mentioned, all drawn on to justify the idea of organised violence and militarism.
On the contrary, non-violence was considered a cowardly form of abdication of
responsibility.
Moonje’s views corresponded almost perfectly with Mussolini’s:
48 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism
The same thought is repeated though in a more forceful and direct lan-
guage by Signor Mussolini, the maker of modern Italy. When he says:
“Our desire for peace and collaboration with Europe is based on mil-
lions of steel bayonets.”62

He went on to quote Mussolini’s Doctrine of Fascism,

“I absolutely disbelieve in perpetual peace which is detrimental and

negative to the fundamental virtues of man, which only by struggle reveal
themselves in the light of the sun.”
“War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts
the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it.”
“It [?] Fascism – believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of
perpetual peace. It thus repudiates the doctrine of Pacifism which is born
of renunciation of the struggle and an act of cowardice in the face of
sacrifice.”63

Moonje added that these considerations did not aim at legitimating a climate
of civil war. As opposed to the Indian situation, where the British were
responsible for the maintenance of the public order, peace should rise from
the self-defence of a militarily organised nation and not from the fear of
stronger enemies.
Italy and Germany offered further examples of this belief:

His Majesty, the King of Italy, says:

“Italy wants the longest possible period of peace but the greatest
guarantee for a peace is the efficiency of the Italian armed forces.
The Government was striving to augment the efficiency of forces, which
depends upon the cadres, materials and the unity of command. Efforts must
be made to improve the physique of the Italian youths and their preliminary
training in order to raise the level of soldierly efficiency”.64

Moonje also quoted a booklet entitled Wehrwissenschaft (Military Science), by

Ewald Banse, an obscure professor at the Brunswick Technical High School:

“The starting point of the book is that war is inevitable and certain and
that it is imperative to know as much about it and to be as efficient as
possible . . . the mind of the nation, from childhood on must be impreg-
nated and familiarized with the idea of war”, because, the Professor says:
“The dying warrior dies more easily when he knows that his blood is
ebbing for his National God”.65

The spirit of the last sentence is surprisingly akin to the one of the main
principles of Hindu nationalism.
 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 49
For practical examples, Moonje returned again to the example of Italy and
its military and paramilitary organisations, and reported what he had seen
with his own eyes. He described in detail the structure of the Figli della Lupa
(‘She Wolf ’s Children’), the Balilla and the Avanguardisti. He asserted that
these organisations could provide paramilitary training to the male popula-
tion from the age of 8 up to 18, when the youths became ‘Young Fascists’.
Italy was therefore in a position of having “command of 6,000,000 trained
and disciplined men ready to face any emergency”.
The result was that

The Balillas are taught to build up moral character and take the first
steps towards becoming soldiers.66

As a consequence,

There will thus be no longer any distinction between the citizen and the
soldier between the civilian and the man in uniform.67

Of course, nowadays it is well known that, in spite of a supposedly remark-

able number of militarily trained citizens, Italy lost the war. Moonje was
apparently unaware of the true facts. Military training in Italy was poor. The
determination of the Italian people was mostly in Mussolini’s imagination,
and social cohesion at a low ebb.
Fascist ideas had been taken up by many Hindu nationalists, at least in
Maharashtra. The above-mentioned article had been printed in the form of a
pamphlet and distributed among the people Moonje tried to involve in his
project, and, in all likelihood, also reached a wider public.68 Fascism must
have met with a certain amount of approval among Hindu and radical poli-
tical circles, although it is hard to establish how popular it was.
The idea behind the school was “the military regeneration of the Hindus
irrespective of their castes or sects”.69 Moonje was concerned that the so-
called “martial races and castes” might be weakening:

Looking at the present conditions of Hindus from this point of view, it

cannot be denied that the physical development of our boys is at a low-
ebb, and the martial instinct is practically extinct in most of them.70

This, according to Moonje, was a threat to Hindu society, especially in compar-

ison with the martial qualities of the Muslims, so well represented in the army.
The concern over the lack of military training among Hindus was due to
the fact that the majority of the population was Hindu. Hence,

no movement for Swaraj could be said to be soundly based where the largest
and most influential community, the Hindus, is designated as non-martial.71
50 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism
Initially, Moonje seemed to believe that the Hindu Mahasabha would serve as
the main means of military training among the Hindus. This idea was illu-
strated in the document, “General Scheme of the Hindu Mahasabha Military
Schools for the Military rejuvenation of Hindus”.72 Although undated the
document can be placed in the early 1930s, perhaps 1932. It can be con-
sidered an early piece of Moonje’s theorisation on military education. This
theoretical construct would later find a practical application at the school set
up by Moonje as a model for similar bodies of varying sizes and importance
emerging in the main centres in Maharashtra, like Nagpur, Poona and Nasik.
Moonje’s school was in all respects like a secondary school. Over and
above the traditional curriculum of the Anglo-Indian education system,
however, it included

compulsory training in physical exercises, organised games, infantry drill,

rifle practice, swimming, riding, horsemanship, the indigenous exercises
and arts of self-defence, such as wrestling, lathi play, sword play etc., and
generally in the science and art of modern warfare in its elementary
aspect under trained teachers.73

It was Moonje’s intention that these “trained teachers” should be recruited

from the “Hindu Sewak Sangh”,74 to make sure that they were “imbued with
the spirit of the Hindu movement inaugurated by the Hindu Mahasabha”.75
Moral teachings, based on Hindu traditions and on Indian “sacred books”,
first and foremost, the Bhagavadgita, but also the Ramayana and Mahabharata,
not to mention the works of the masters of epic and devotional literature
(Ramdas, Tulsidas and Tukaram). It was hoped that this literature would
“inculcate ideas of common brotherhood of ‘Purn-Hindutva’” in the youths.76
The school should be conceived like a military camp, in which strict dis-
cipline was to prevail.
Moonje reckoned that an institute for 300 youngsters, with facilities such as
a swimming pool and stables, would cost approximately 150,000 Rs. The
school was to be financed by donations and monthly fees paid by the students
(from 20 to 300 Rs).77
The public relations campaign aimed at potential sponsors reached its high
point in 1936. During this period, Moonje had established contacts with var-
ious royal families from Indore, Travancore, Bikaner, Vizagapathnam, Kash-
mir and Barodacol An appeal was also made to the Maharajas of
Mahabaleshwar, Miraj and Patiala, the princess Kamala Devi of Gaikwad, as
well as the Maharajas of Udaipur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bundi, Koha, Dholpur
and Palampur, some of whom made donations.78 At the same time, Moonje
had established contacts with a number of British personalities, especially in
army circles, where Moonje sought technical advice. One such contact was
Major Rend, Military Secretary of the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir
Robert Cassels, with whom Moonje had entered into correspondence. There
may have been some fellow feeling between the two. Cassels was Moonje’s
 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 51
superior. Moonje was indeed a member of the examinations board of Sand-
hurst Academy in India. Moonje was interested, above all, in establishing
contacts with the Viceroy, Lord Willingdon first, and then Lord Linlithgow.
Cassels and the Viceroy made small donations (100 Rs) and declared that
they were on the whole in favour of the project.79
Apart from the difficulty in raising sufficient funds, Moonje had to face other
difficulties. Originally, the school was to be in Nagpur, but there was no land
available. At last, a site was found in Nasik, and building began in early 1937.
The Bhonsla Military School was inaugurated in the spring-summer of 1938.80
Moonje had finally reached his objective. Of course, the context was dif-
ferent, but the values and practices that Moonje considered the roots of
military education were more or less those of the akharas and the secret
societies. The RSS had contributed to the dissemination of these ideas among
Hindus, although as an organisation, it maintained a secretive character and
strict selection procedures. The institutions for military education, the RSS
and other bodies had complementary roles and all contributed to disseminate
among the largest possible part of the Marathi Hindu society traditional
values and militant spirit.
The links between the RSS, the Hindu Mahasabha and the military institutions
connected with Moonje were fairly close. Hedgewar was a member of the board of
governors of the aforementioned Central Hindu Military Education Society,81
together with Jayakar, Kelkar, Aney and Khaparde (all leading members of the
Hindu Mahasabha) and, of course, Moonje. The chairman was Shreeman Motilal
Manakchand, also known as Pratap Seth, and the vice-chairman was Khaparde.82
The rules of this new society included a provision whereby if it were to be dis-
banded, all real estate and other properties including liquid assets and donated
goods were to be devolved to the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh. 83
British sources confirm the existence of close links between Moonje and the
RSS, as well as the fascist character of the latter. According to an Intelligence
Report of 1933, “Note on the Rashtrya Swayam Sewak Sangh”, Moonje had
re-organised the Sangh in the Marathi speaking districts and in the Central
Provinces in 1927. The report, describing the activity and the character of the
RSS, warned that

It is perhaps no exaggeration to assert that the Sangh hopes to be in future

India what the “Fascisti” are to Italy and the “Nazis” to Germany.84

The RSS had at this time 66 branches and approximately 6,000 members. Its
influence was spreading toward the United Provinces and Bombay, and in
July 1931 an office was opened up in Benares.
During the meeting of 24th–26th September 1932, the Hindu Mahasabha
passed a motion praising Hedgewar for his success in building up a strong Hindu
organisation. The meeting urged RSS to open up offices throughout India. It
was in fact noted that no new offices, as such, had actually been opened.
52 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism
Furthermore, we learn from this paper firstly that the RSS, by its very nature,
was opposed to Gandhian non-violence. We also learn that Hedgewar saw the
RSS as a means of collective self-defence, while Moonje had other ideas:

Dr Moonje went even further by favouring offence rather than defence,

and advocated a policy of “STRIKE FIRST”.85

During the second round of the Bombay and Suburban Hindu Sabha Con-
ference, held in Bombay on 23rd and 24th June 1934, the RSS came in for
praise once more:

This conference congratulates Dr. Hedgewar of Nagpur, for the great service
he has been rendering to the Hindu Cause by organising a volunteer corps
called the ‘Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’ wherein Hindu youths of all
castes from Brahmins to the so called untouchables are being trained with a
view to prepare the Hindus, the premier community in India, to be able to
discharge their prime duty of undertaking the sole responsibility for the
defence of India, with or without the cooperation with others.
This Conference appoint [sic] the Commitee [sic] of the following per-
sons to carry on the work of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in
Bombay and Suburbs . . .86

The list included 15 names, among which were N.D. Savarkar and N.C.
Kelkar. This is further documentary evidence of close and warm relations
between the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS.
The developments described above indicate that Moonje’s militarisation plans
had been put into practice. Both the Hindu Mahasabha (though the personal
efforts of one of its leading figures) and the RSS contributed to Moonje’s cause.
It is also quite clear that these initiatives were all vitally important elements of a
general campaign aiming at creating militant Hindus, and indeed more and
more Hindus responded to the call over the following decade.

It is, however, capable of being used for any purpose the organisers decide
on, and is a potential danger. The Sangh is essentially an anti-Muslim
organisation aiming at exclusively Hindu supremacy in the country.87

Finally, it is clear who was the “adversary” mentioned in the document

quoted above: it was the internal Muslim enemy, rather than possible external
enemies, and much more than the British rulers.

Notes
1 ACS, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (Prime Minister’s Office – PCM),
1940–43, b. 3002, letter no. 50 of 11.1.28, from the Chairman (Presidente) of the
Lega Navale Italiana, Cito Filomarino, to Mussolini; letter no. 154, 3.2.28, from
 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 53
the Secretary General (Segretario Generale) of the Lega Navale, to Hon. (Onor-
evole) Giunta, Undersecretary of State at the Prime Minister’s Office (Sottose-
gretario di Stato alla Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri) Note for His
Excellency the Chief of State, 15.2.29.
2 For information on the two journeys, see ASMAE, RG, b. 7, note dated Rome,
8.10.31 (in this document it was also suggested that a number of Round Table
Conference participants should be invited to Italy).
3 Società Geografica Italiana (Italian Geographic Society – SGI), Archivio Ammi-
nistrativo, b. 99, letter from the head office of the company, Grandi Viaggi, to the
Società Geografica Italiana, 1.9.32, and letter dated 4.9.32 from Vacchelli to a
certain Biagio Gabardi.
4 SGI, ibid., undated draft letter from the Chairman of Grandi Viaggi to the Italian
Consul General in Bombay, Renato Galleani d’Alliano.
5 The newspapers, Giornale d’Italia, Popolo d’Italia, and Il Messaggero announced
the cruise on 12th October, 12th and 13th October, and 20th October 1932,
respectively. Indian newspapers in English concentrated on the importance of the
travellers. The Times of Ceylon of 18th January published an article on the cruise.
The file contains cuttings from The Times of India (15.12.32), The Evening News
(Bombay, 21.12.32) and The Statesman (Delhi, 30.12.32): SGI, ibid., file a.
6 For full documentation on Madan Mohan Malaviya, including a political portrait, a
description of the part he played in founding the BHU and the political role of the
BHU see Alessandra Consolaro’s excellent Madre India e la Parola: la definizione della
hindi come lingua e letteratura nazionale e le università “nazionali” di Benares (Mother
India and the Word: definition of Hindi as national language and literature and the
“national” Universities of Benares), degree thesis, Pisa, May 1999. Unfortunately, due
to a lack of collaboration in Benares, and limited access to sources regarding Malaviya
and the local political and cultural scene (given to scholars on a selective and discre-
tionary basis), Consolaro was unable to fully assess the relations between Malaviya and
the fascist regime, or his personal attitude toward Italian Fascism. However, this is the
most complete study available on the political role of the BHU.
7 B.V. Deshpande and S.R. Ramaswamy, Dr. Hedgewar the Epoch-Maker, Banga-
lore, 1981, p. 112.
8 Stanley A. Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of
Modern India, Berkeley, 1962, p. 123.
9 D. R. Goyal, Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, New Delhi, 1979, p. 59. Highly cri-
tical, Goyal has displayed great care in handling these historically significant
details. The account provided by Goyal was procured from Paranjipe himself, who
mentioned the foundation of the RSS in a commemorative article published by the
Kesari on 5th July 1940, immediately after Hedgewar’s death.
10 Deshpande and Ramaswamy, Dr. Hedgewar, p. 82.
11 The details are in Kesari, 13.5.24, 24.6.25, 10.11.25 and 24.11.25. The content of
these articles is presented here in summary form after translation from Marathi by
a young Indian colleague.
12 Ibid., 17.1.28
13 Ibid., 17.7.28: the article quotes a speech by Mussolini without specifying its date.
14 A copy of the pamphlet is in NAI, Foreign and Political Department, 647 G 1927.
15 NAI, ibid.
16 Both before and after the advent of Fascism, at some stage during their journeys to
Britain, many Indians stopped off in Italy. At first, this was because Italian boats
coming to Italian ports provided the most convenient form of transport from India
to Britain. Indians could take advantage of the journey to see Italy, a country
renowned for its beauty. The changes introduced by the fascist regime were bound
to arouse people’s curiosity and attract visits from politicians, irrespective of their
ideals or standing.
54 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism
17 Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi, Subject file n. 16.
18 This letter, also dated 3.10.30, was addressed to F. Grobba, Berlin, Will-
helmstrasse: both are enclosed to a letter from Parulekar to Moonje.
19 R. De Felice, “Arabi e Medio Oriente nella strategia di guerra di Mussolini”, in
Storia Contemporanea, December 1986, p. 1273. See also, by F. Grobba, Manner und
Machte im Orient. 25 Jahre diplomatischer Tatigkeit im Orient, Gottingen, 1967.
20 NMML, Moonje Papers, f.n. 16.
21 NMML, ibid., letter from Parulekar to Moonje, 21.11.30. Parulekar passed the
message on to Moonje. He also provided the names of addresses of other possible
contacts in Europe and in the United States. Moonje never went to the United
States.
22 The file contains no copies of Moonje’s letters to Penelope Betjeman, but only the
lady’s missives to Moonje.
23 NMML, Moonje Papers, f.n. 16: at this time, Tarak Nath Das was residing in New
York, and was special correspondent for Liberty, a Calcutta paper, and Deutsche
Presse-Korrespondenz a Hanover paper. He also worked for the Modern Review,
the Calcutta Review and The Nihon, in Tokyo.
24 NMML, ibid., letter of 28.11.30 from Tarak Nath Das to Moonje. At the end of
November Das had already made a few contacts, such as Prof. Aufhauser, an
Indian scholar at the University of Munich.
25 NMML, ibid., from Tarak Nath Das to Jayakar, 26.12.30. M. R. Jayakar’s Papers
at the National Archives in Delhi include a leaflet from the Deutsche Akademie.
26 For a detailed account of the trip to Europe, see Moonje’s personal notebook, in
NMML, Moonje Papers, microfilm, Diary, r.n. 1, 1926–31.
27 ibid., 28.2.31.
28 ASMAE, RG, b. 7.
29 ASMAE, ibid.
30 ASMAE, RG, b. 7, Rome, 12.3.31, not headed, addressed to “Eccellenza” (Excel-
lency), sent to Ministero degli Esteri (Ministry of External Affairs), enclosure to
letter from Tarak Nath Das to Giuseppe Tucci.
31 ASMAE, ibid.
32 NMML, Moonje Papers, microfilm, Diary, r.n. 1, 1926–31
33 ASMAE, Gab. 47, Pos.7, Udienze (meetings), 1930–33, b. 27, letter (in French)
from British Embassy to Signor Rossi Longhi, Ministero degli Affari Esteri (Min-
istry of External Affairs), 16.3.31.
34 NMML, Moonje Papers, microfilm, Diary, r.n. 1.
35 ASMAE, Gab. 47, n. 1102, 18.3.31, answer to request no. 1078, submitted 16.3.31
by Gabinetto del Ministro (Minister’s Departmental Staff): Moonje mentions this
document in his private diary.
36 NMML, Moonje Papers, microfilm, Diary, r.n. 1.
37 NMML, ibid.
38 NMML, ibid.
39 NMML, ibid.
40 NMML, ibid.
41 NMML, ibid.
42 Much has already been written on Gandhi’s visit to Italy, and it will not be dealt
with here, apart from the following brief summary. Gandhi was in Italy from 11th
to 13th December 1931, he too on his return from the Round Table Conference.
The Mahatma met the duce and talked briefly with him. He met various perso-
nages in Rome and visited the Opera Nazionale Balilla. He watched the Avan-
guardisti being drilled, listened to fascist anthems, and was welcomed by guards of
honour. As the champion of non-violence, Gandhi was somewhat disconcerted by
all this. He then made no reference to his Roman journey at any time thereafter.
Gino Scarpa had organised the visit. For a systematic, detailed account of the
 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 55
visit, see Sofri, Gandhi in Italia. For an unusual behind-the-scenes account of the
meeting between the duce and Gandhi, see Mario Prayer, “L’intervista Gandhi-
Mussolini: pagine italiane dal diario di Mahadev Desai”, in Storia Con-
temporanea, February 1992.
43 NMML, Moonje Papers, microfilm, Diary, r.n. 1.
44 Sofri, Gandhi in Italia, p. 59.
45 NMML, ibid.
46 ASMAE, Archivio Scuole, 1929–35, b. 858, 29.6.31 to an unidentified ‘commen-
datore’, probably Trabalza.
47 Walter K. Andersen and Shridhar D. Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron. The
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism, Boulder, Colorado, 1987, p.
31.
48 Deshpande-Ramaswami, pp. 14–32. According to the two authors, Hedgewar’s
role was as intermediary between the Anushilan Samiti and revolutionary groups
in Nagpur.
49 Andersen and Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron, p. 39.
50 NAI, Home Political Dept., 28/8/1942, Intelligence Report, headed Rashtriya
Swayam Sewak Sangh, dated 7 March 1942.
51 IO, L/I/1/1465, biographical note, “Dr. Balkrishna Shivram Moonje. (Vice-Pre-
sident of the Hindu Mahasabha)”, undated, enclosed with a letter from the Infor-
mation Department, 8.4.42, signed Miss F. M. Sinton, to C. M. Green, Reuter.
52 Sofri, Gandhi in Italia, p. 30 and p. 33.
53 The Mahratta, 12.4.31, Dr. B. S. Moonje on Round Table Conference. Special Inter-
view for ‘The Mahratta’, paragraph entitled “National Militia”. An account of
Moonje’s tour of Europe is to be found in M.N. Ghatate, “Dr. B. S. Moonje – Tour of
European Countries”, in N. G. Dixit, ed., Dharmaveer Dr. B. S. Moonje. Com-
memoration Volume. Birth Centenary Celebration 1872–1972, Nagpur, 1972, p. 68.
54 NMML, Moonje Papers, microfilm, Diary, r.n. 2, 1932–36.
55 NMML, ibid.
56 Moonje had already shown some interest in the question of military education by
the end of 1920s. He was in favour of the “Indianisation” of the army. In 1927 he
worked at the foundation of the Aeroclub of India. In 1929 he was appointed to
the selection committee examining candidates to Sandhurst Military Academy. In
the same year he founded the Rifle Association in Nagpur. NMML, Moonje
Papers, microfilm, Letters, r.n. 7, 1926–28.
57 NMML, Moonje Papers, Subject Files, n. 24, 1932–36, document entitled “The
Central Military Education Society”, undated, most probably written in 1935.
58 NMML, ibid.
59 NMML, Moonje Papers, Subject Files, n. 23, 1934–36, Report of the progress of
the Work of the Society from 1st January, 1935 to 15th August 1936.
60 NMML, Moonje Papers, Subject Files, n. 25, 1935, “Preface to the Scheme of the
central Hindu Military Society and its military school”. Document undated, but
certainly drafted in 1935.
61 NMML, ibid.
62 NMML, ibid.
63 NMML, ibid.
64 NMML, ibid.
65 NMML, ibid.
66 NMML, ibid.
67 NMML, ibid.
68 The printed copy of this script is in NAI, Jayakar Papers, microfilm, f.n. 6, r.n. 2.
69 NMML, Moonje Papers, f.n. 24, 1932–36, “General Scheme of the Hindu Maha-
sabha Military Schools”, also undated, but most probably written in 1935.
56 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism
70 NMML, Moonje Papers, f.n. 23, “Prospectus of Bhonsla Military School Nagpur
Established 1934”.
71 NMML, ibid.
72 NMML, Moonje Papers, f.n. 24.
73 NMML, ibid.
74 It is not clear whether Moonje, referring to the Hindu Sewak Sangh, was thinking
of the RSS or Hindu militants in general, including voluntary Hindu associations.
75 NMML, Moonje Papers, f.n. 24.
76 NMML, Moonje Papers, f.n. 23, “Prospectus”.
77 NMML, Moonje Papers, f.n. 24, “General Scheme . . .”.
78 NMML, ibid., microfilm, Letters, r.n. 11, Part I 1936–1947. Moonje corresponded
with royal families between April and July 1936. On 24.7.36 in a letter to Ranade,
he complained about the donations made by Marathi princes: “There is one more
point that the Princes of Maharashtra should bear in mind in this respect and it is
this that if the Maharashtra Princes were to pay such small donations as of Rs
1000/ then what right have we to expect higher donations from the Princes of
Northern India and Kathiawar.” The reason for Moonje’s concern is disclosed in
the previous lines of the document: “. . . if for want of money the enterprise were
to fail the whole Maharashtra and the whole Hindu Community would be thor-
oughly discredited before the eyes of the government”. Therefore, “I had appealed
to the Princes of Maharashtra for at least Rs 5000/ each”.
79 NMML, ibid., 18.3.36 from Moonje to Major Rend and 19.3.36; from New Delhi,
to Bertand Glovey. Moonje requested a meeting and mentioned a letter of intro-
duction from the Viceroy’s Private Secretary; New Delhi, 19.3.36, to General Sir
Robert Cassels, with a general statement as to his intention to set up the school.
Cassels sent a message of support with a small donation and Moonje thanked him.
Press Statement 21.3.36, on the meeting with the Viceroy and the Viceroy’s appre-
ciation. Letter to the Viceroy, New Delhi, 22.3.26, in which Moonje thanked the
Viceroy for the donation of 200 Rs. Press Statement 10.4.36, regarding Sir Robert
Cassels’ message of support to Moonje and Cassels’ donation of 100 Rs. Sir
Robert Cassels stated that schools of this kind would be vitally important for a
future Indian Army. In a letter of 10.4.36 from Nagpur, Moonje wrote to Cassels
thanking him for the cheque and informing him of the Press Statement. Letter,
New Delhi, 19.4.36 to the Viceroy’s Private Secretary and, enclosed, dated 19.4.36,
a personal letter to Lord Linlithgow with a request for support for the school, as
already done by his predecessor, Lord Willingdon. Regarding the position of the
British autorities about the foundation of Moonje’s military school, see D.
Rekhade, “Bhonsla Military School”, in Dixit, Dharmaveer, p. 74.
80 NAI, Jayakar Papers, letter from Moonje to Jayakar, 23.2.37 and undated letter
with no heading, referring to the inauguration of the school. The correspondence
reveals that Jayakar had made many donations (1,000 Rs in June 1936 and 10,000
Rs between summer 1937 and summer 1938): Moonje thanked Jayakar by letter
on 7th June 1936, and in two letters, one also of 7.6.37 and the other dated
26.5.38. Moonje exorted him also to make donations of 5,000 Rs each time. Since
Jayakar was a leading figure of the Hindu Mahasabha, it is important to note that
he was so much in favour of Moonje’s plans for militarisation and the military
school. Finally, these financial details give an idea of the extent of the Hindu
Mahasabha’s involvement in the campaign for militarisation.
81 NMML, Moonje Papers, microfilm, Letters, r.n. 10, Bombay, 20.8.35, to Vishva-
nath Rao Kelkar.
82 NAI, Jayakar Papers, “Constitution of the Central Hindu Military Education
Society”, appendix to description in summary form of “The Central Hindu Military
Education Society”, sent by Moonje to Jayakar as enclosure to a letter dated 9.7.35.
 Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism 57
83 “The Central Hindu Military Education Society”, a copy of which is to be found
among Jayakar’s Papers, as well as in NMML, Moonje Papers, f.n. 24.
84 NAI, Home Political Department, 88/33, 1933. This view is contrary to Jaffrelot’s
interpretation, according to which “As distinct from Nazism, the RSS’s ideology
treats society as an organism with a secular spirit, which is implanted not so much
in the race as in a socio-cultural system… Finally, in contrast to both Italian Fas-
cism and Nazism the RSS does not rely on the central figure of the leader”.
Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, New Delhi, 1996,
pp. 63–64.
85 NAI, ibid.
86 Maharashtra State Archives (hereinafter, MSA), Bombay, Home Special Dept.,
355 (73) D pt. II, Report, “Second Session of the Bombay and Suburban Hindu
Sabha Conference”, Bombay City, S.B., June 25th.
87 NAI, Home Political Department, 88/33, 1933, “Note on the Rashtrya Swayam
Sewak Sangh”.
3 Italy’s Indian policy across the
Ethiopian war

1 Bengal as the outpost of pro-Italian propaganda during

the Ethiopian war: Subhas Chandra Bose as spokesman of the
Italian cause in East Africa
On 2nd October 1935, Italian troops invaded Ethiopia. As usual in highly
dramatic circumstances, Mussolini announced the break out of the hostilities
from the balcony of his headquarters in Palazzo Venezia, in Rome. He pro-
nounced a strongly rhetorical speech, informing Italians that “A solemn hour
is about to sound in the history of the fatherland”. Mussolini justified the
invasion of Ethiopia on the basis that Italy did not get its fair share of terri-
tory after the First World War, when the redistribution of the African colo-
nies was decided. The conquest of Abyssinia would make up for this loss.
Immediately after the outbreak of the hostilities, as promised in case of an
attack on Abyssinia, the Society of the Nations imposed economic sanctions
on Italy. Besides the sanctions, resumed during the summer of 1936, for sev-
eral months the Italian invasion of Ethiopia obtained universal criticism. It
was one of the most serious international crises Italy faced at that time.
It was precisely at this stage that close relations between the Italian government
and Indian nationalist circles were to prove their worth. When Italy found herself in
an uncomfortable situation, at the international level, especially in colonised coun-
tries,1 the fascist regime chose to champion the cause of the oppressed peoples of
the world. The Italian propaganda, at this time, had a double standard: while other
colonial powers, especially Britain and France, were sharply criticised, Italian
colonial ambitions were justified and defended. This contradiction had been evi-
dent for some time. From the last half of the 19th century on, Italy’s colonial
interests became increasingly stronger. The rise of the fascist regime added fuel to
these ambitions. Besides, the regime tried to establish good relations with Arab and
Asian nationalists. Italy presented herself as a ‘civilising’ nation, opposite from
Great Britain and France, whose colonial policy was mere exploitation of their
dominions. The question of whether the nationalist leaders of these countries
actually believed Mussolini and his officials is out of discussion here. However
opportunistic she might seem, Italy had managed to create a sphere of influence in
certain Asian countries, and she was determined not to sacrifice this position.
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 59
Before the Ethiopian crisis, there were no tensions toward Italy from Indian
public opinion or the British authorities. Public reactions, including protests in
various parts of India, came to the fore only after the Italian invasion.2 The later
stages of the crisis had already led to press criticism. The Italian authorities in
Italy and India immediately took action and organised their own counter-pro-
paganda campaign. The fascists had prepared for this eventuality before the
invasion and disseminated pro-Italian propaganda as soon as the war broke out.
Paradoxically, as a result of the war Italy managed to gain a firmer
foothold in India, thanks to this strenuous pro-Italian campaign. The ties
established at this time were to prove useful over the next few years.
The Abyssinian war offered to the supporters of Italy’s Indian policy the
chance to intensify the anti-British campaign started in the previous years. For
the first time the regime adopted an openly anti-British stand. The target of fas-
cist political activities in India was prominent, politically engaged intellectuals,
especially Bengali intellectuals. Bengal and its political circles represented, since
approximately three decades, the avant-garde of intense anti-British activities.
Moreover, the Bengali revolutionary tradition matched with the radical, violent
character of the fascist regime. The first contacts were established with Indian
students and scholars living in Italy or elsewhere in Europe.
On 13th January 1934, the Italian Consulate-General issued a 10-rupee
scholarship for professors of Italian language at the University of Calcutta.
The appointment was given to Emilio Benasaglio, in the summer of 1935.3
The British described the Italian courses at the University of Calcutta in
the following terms:

The creation of the post of Professor of Italian in the Calcutta University

thus takes on none too pleasant a political aspect, for if, as one may
reasonably assume, Benasaglio is the agent through whom the Consul-
General is carrying on his political propaganda (and there is plenty of
secret information on this point which is substantiated by our watch
reports) his unique opportunities for such works amongst the University
cannot be gainsaid.4

According to the British authorities, the Italian Consulate in Calcutta wished

to create a state of friendship between itself and those classes of Indians

from whose ranks the revolutionary forces were chiefly drawn.5

Amiya Chakravarti was in Italy in 1935 as president of the Indian and Sin-
hala Students’ Federation. He contributed greatly to the Italian anti-British
propaganda.6 Chakravarti, a philosophy teacher, had once been a close col-
laborator of Tagore, for whom he was secretary for six years, and had also
worked in this capacity for the Vishva Bharati University. There are a number
of reports written by the Italian authorities on Chakravarti’s personality and
political activities:
60 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
Up to the present, Prof. Chakrawarty’s (sic) relations with Italian cultural
circles have been excellent. As President of the Indian Students’ Federa-
tion, he has distinguished himself at all times in his efforts to facilitate
our propaganda work and promote the understanding of Italian civilisa-
tion among his fellow Indians.7

The official who drew up this file also noted that Chakravarti was most
impressed by the “Programma di collaborazione fra Oriente e Occidente”
(programme of co-operation between East and West) launched by the duce on
the occasion of the first Congress of Oriental Students in 1933. He also
helped to organise the second Congress of Oriental Students in December
1934. As president of the Indian and Sinhala Students’ Federation, he
favoured the transfer of its head offices from Vienna to Rome. Chakravarti
was in Italy at the time, attending a “cultural meeting organised by the Fed-
eration”, at Ortisei.8
During the anti-Italian campaign, the fascist authorities took note of
Chakravarti’s views regarding the Abyssinian question:

We are well aware of the fact that the campaign so capably orchestrated
by vested interest presents the political issue concerning Italy and Abys-
sinia as a racial issue, concerning all the peoples of Asia and Africa.
Gandhi himself has taken part in this movement, and has done nothing
but repeat his long-held views on the equality between races.
We learn from the Indian press that this campaign has gained con-
siderable ground and that the pro-Italian feelings which had come to the
fore over the last few years have in fact been practically expunged.
Only very few people (such as Subhas Bose and Prof. Chakrawarty)
(sic) have been able to see the situation in its true light. . . .
Prof. Chakrawarty is well aware of the true situation and is also fully
aware of the damage done by this anti-Italian campaign.
At the moment, he is anxious to receive fresh confirmation of his own
personal convictions from an authoritative source that Italy’s actions are
not inspired by racist ideals of any kind and that Italy intends to continue
with her programme of collaboration with the peoples of Asia.9

It was also pointed out that Chakravarti

wishes to explain to Your Excellency the Chief of the Government the

state of relations between East and West in relation to the Italo-Abyssi-
nian war.
Alongside Subhas Chandra Bose, the well-known nationalist leader,
Chakravarti is one of the few Indian intellectuals capable of under-
standing Italy’s position with regard to Abyssinia, who does not share the
anti-Italian attitude now prevailing in India.10
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 61
It was also stated that:

He is perfectly aware of the fact that Indians, believing to statements

concerning Italian presumed hostility against coloured races, thereby
strengthening British opposition to us, are playing into British hands and
renewing their age-old ties of serfdom.

The above notes were forwarded with other information to Mussolini on 22nd
August 1935. They referred also to Chakravarti’s request that the duce himself
provide assurances that the Italian government had no intention to change its
attitude toward Asia:

May I ask Your Excellency permission to repeat, in Your name, that the
Italo-Abyssinian war has not altered nor will it alter the statements con-
tained in Your Excellency’s appeal from the West to the East for reciprocal
understanding and collaboration, an appeal made without making distinc-
tions of believe or race, which established cultural and civil equality? May I
believe that current events have not changed the premises for that colla-
boration between East and West, which Italy desires?
. . . an assurance of this kind on the part of Your Excellency, however
brief, would be broadly disseminated in order to curb the anti-Italian
propaganda campaign now taking place in Asian countries, conducted
mainly by British agents.11

In January 1935 Chakravarti obtained his first audience with the duce, toge-
ther with delegates from the Federation who were meeting for the fourth time
in Rome. Chakravarti’s application for a further audience with the duce, in the
summer, was successful.
There is no record of the January meeting, but reference is made to it
elsewhere in the file. British documentation also shed light on both meetings:

The fact, however, that Italy was maintaining contact with the Indian
nationalists was further corroborated by information received from a
secret source in August, 1935, to the effect that Amiya Chakravartty, the
President of the Indian Students’ Federation in Europe, had, after visiting
Subhas Bose at Karlsbad, interviewed Signor Mussolini in Rome to dis-
cuss the admission of Indian students into Italian Universities.12

Although Chakravarti was a figure of secondary importance, he did act as

liaison between the fascist regime and a number of very high ranking Indian
nationalists and was the bearer of Mussolini’s invitation to Nehru in late
February-early March 1936.13
The Foreign Office had been looking into the Indian nationalist movement
and its representatives. The correspondence dating from spring 1936 to the
beginning of 1937 contains detailed reports on Bose and his political activity
62 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
up to the time of his arrest in 1936, and on Nehru, whom, had he not turned
the invitation down, Mussolini would have been pleased to meet. In August
1935, Nehru travelled through Italy on his way to Switzerland where his wife,
who had health problems, was under medical care. Nehru was welcomed in
Brindisi by local fascist representatives. The regime was very interested in
Nehru. He was more radical than Gandhi and more famous than Bose:
according to the regime’s view, if Nehru were to have taken a less intransigent
view of fascist Italy and its colonial policy, Italy’s image in India would have
benefited enormously.14 Bose himself might have been “useful . . . for his
contacts with the Pan-Indian Congress”.15 As already pointed out, Italy’s
intention was to establish friendly contacts and create an alliance with the
Congress. Liberals, socialists, the Communist Party, the “Muslim parties” and
the Congress, defined the “Nationalist Party”, were held up for comparison in
a document entitled “Note on the main Indian parties”. The note, full of
generalisations and errors, describes Bose and Nehru as

the two main political figures coming to the fore within the Indian
nationalist Party after Gandhi, who has withdrawn from active struggle.16

Although he disapproved of Fascism, Nehru would have met the duce, more
out of curiosity than anything else. However, he rightly feared that while the
Abyssinian issue was at its height, a meeting with Mussolini would only
benefit the Italians, from the propagandistic point of view.17
Vittorio Amadasi, secretary of the Scuola Orientale in Rome and the review
Jeune Asie, and politically active among Asian students, was to be sent to Karls-
bad, where Bose was undergoing treatment for tuberculosis. Italians wanted Bose
to contact the leaders of the Indian nationalist movement and explain to them

the political motives behind the Abyssinian question which are undoubt-
edly advantageous with regard to the Indian question.18

Bose could also use his influence with a number of nationalist newspapers and
win them over to the Italian cause. Bose was supposed to work with Amiya
Nath Sarkar, the assistant secretary of the Indian Students’ Federation, to
draw up plans with Subhas, who was about to leave to India.
In November 1935, Bose published two articles, one in Amrita Bazar
Patrika and the other in the Modern Review.19 The first paragraph of the
article published by the Modern Review was entitled What is that Lesson, and
opened as follows:

It is this that in the 20th century a nation can hope to be free only if it is
strong, from a physical and military point of view . . .

Reading this statement, it seems that Bose supported the Abyssinian cause.
However, after looking into the history of Abyssinia, from the time of
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 63
Napier’s defeat (1868) and thereafter, Bose compared the situation in 1935
with the Libyan campaign of 1911. Like the Libyan campaign, the Abyssi-
nian war might break down into a broader conflict, at the European level.
Further in his article Bose described the developments which led up to the
Abyssinian war in clear anti-British terms. Italian policy in Ethiopia was
described as a reaction to British imperialism.

The enthusiasm for the sanctions of the League of Nations does not arise
from a love of peace or a desire to champion Abyssinia. The British
Imperialists are hiding their concern behind these ‘righteous’ aims in
order to win the support of opinion which is devoted to the League and
to the cause of peace. It is actually using enthusiasm for peace to prepare
the British people for Imperialist war.20

After looking into strategic questions, Bose turned to the relations between
India and Abyssinia. He warned his nationals against British attempts to
exploit for their own ends the pro-Abyssinian feelings expressed by the Con-
gress. He was bitterly opposed to the British decision to send Indian troops to
Abyssinia to protect Indian and British citizens there.21 Bose criticised the
justifications made by the British and observed that

Indian troops were sent with the idea of committing Indian support to
British policy in Abyssinia and on the other hand, to remind Italy that
the vast resources of India are behind Great Britain.22

Since a European conflict looked very likely in August and September, it was
equally likely that India would be dragged in. The risk the nationalist cause
faced was that

. . . if war had broken out in Europe, Great Britain would have emerged vic-
torious – thanks to the resources of India – but Abyssinia would have shared
the fate of Palestine and India would have continued enslaved as before.23

The situation described by Bose was opposite to the reality. He laid the
emphasis on British cunning and distracted his readers’ attention from Italy’s
aggression of Abyssinia. Somewhere in the article, Bose criticised also Italian
imperialism and Italy’s conduct in Abyssinia. If he had been openly pro-Ita-
lian, he might well have had his article proscribed. It was of vital importance
to him, instead, to direct public opinion toward a discussion of British colo-
nial policy rather than of Italy’s behaviour. He hoped to mitigate the effects of
the anti-Italian campaign. Significantly, Bose provided no indications as to
how Indian public opinion might manifest its solidarity toward the Abyssi-
nian cause avoiding that such solidarity was exploited by the British.
According to Bose’s views the Abyssinian question had a secondary role,
while his priority was criticising British interests. Furthermore, Bose’s attitude
64 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
might be seen as an indirect appeal to Indians to adopt a neutral stance,
rather than support the British (anti-Italian) cause. In any case, it seems that
Bose was able to “change the anti-Italian line adopted by the well-known
Calcutta newspaper, Forward”.24

2 The Italian propaganda in Bengal between the Abyssinian

war and the Second World War
Besides the publication of Bose’s article, a strong pro-Italian propaganda
started up with the support of the Italian Community in India, backed by the
Italian Consulate General in Calcutta. The intention was to direct Indian
public opinion toward a neutral stance in order to hinder the British in any
attempt to militarily involve India in the Abyssinian affair. The British policy
was criticised, while Italy was described as the only possible alternative.
The Italian Community distributed pamphlets and typed leaflets in English,
issued on a regular basis, at times almost daily. The pamphlets, nearly all of
which were on Abyssinia, appeared fairly regularly between October 1935 and
May 1936.25 Some of these publications described exclusively the contemporary
situation in Ethiopia, while others had a historical perspective. This second type
of publication dealt with the recent relations between Italy and areas of interest
for her, not only Eastern Africa or Libya, but also Tunisia, which the journalist
Alessandro Lessona went so far as to define as an extension of Sicily. This lit-
erature described the various stages of the Italian colonisation in Africa were
examined, while events and agreements were presented as part of a well-founded
tradition and in such a light as might justify Italy’s rights in that area. Italian
friendship with Ethiopia was emphasised, as well Italy’s peacekeeping, protec-
tive, civilising policy in favour of local populations:

[. . .] she [Italy] felt able to bring the most valuable aid to Ethiopia for the
development of her many unexplored resources and to assist her on the
path of final progress towards higher forms of civilisation.26

This idea was taken up at length in the pamphlet Slavery in Abyssinia.

The natural beauty of the country makes it one of the most picturesque
parts of the African continent and a future of great prosperity is in store
for Ethiopia, owing to the resources of the soil and mineral wealth, if it
were not for the backward state of civilisation as it exists there at present.
Ethiopia is, in fact, an anachronism among the nations of the XX cen-
tury, held together by a system of feudal Government and with slavery as
the basis of economic life.

Twelve Years of Fascism, signed by P. Roy (undoubtedly Pramatha Nath

Roy), stands out from the other publications in that it does not deal with
Abyssinia. Instead, it gives an account of the twelve intervening years since
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 65
the rise of the fascist regime. Roy emphasised those aspects which had most
favourably impressed Indian public opinion, namely the presumed capacity of
Fascism to transform a backward country such as Italy at that time into an
advanced nation, the social organisation of Fascism, and what Roy described
as a strengthened sense of discipline among the population. He returned to
the subject of the “Balilla”, the “Avanguardisti”, the training camps, the
uniforms, and that sense of discipline he so much admired. He pointed at the
assistance offered to mothers and infants as examples of the high level of
development of the fascist society. Roy’s rhetoric was so deeply imbued by
fascist ideals that it would be hard to distinguish it from the language used by
the regime’s official writers. Roy wrote, for instance,

I will conclude this article by answering a question. What has been the
effect of twelve years of Fascism upon the spirit of the race? In my book
on Mussolini I wrote that it was as yet early for Fascism to produce any
moulding effect upon the mentality of the race. But now a generation
seems to have arisen with a distinct Fascist mould of the mind. Twelve
years of ceaseless effort which Fascism has made to train the race has not
gone in vain.

The literature distributed by the Italian Community in Calcutta used every

possible subject to draw out a powerful message, in order to put in a favour-
able light Fascism and Italy’s position in Ethiopia. Considering the wide dis-
tribution of the propagandistic literature published by the Italian Community,
it must have been effective in reaching people, if not in influencing their opi-
nions. Apart from the pamphlets, leaflets were printed more frequently and
more widely distributed. In all likelihood, this campaign started in Summer-
Autumn 1935. Unfortunately, only a few of these leaflets were dated and
therefore no precise account of this campaign can be provided. However, it
lasted for about one year.27 The campaign was launched by an open, undated
letter bearing the following announcement:

A few Italians, resident in India and sincerely attached to her, have deci-
ded to diffuse as widely as possible, among the public of this Country,
informations [sic] about various questions which are of interest to their
Country and to try to make a modest contribution towards explaining
the events in which Italy has a share. . . .
This work was necessary at a moment when a section of the Indian
Press, not always thoroughly acquainted with all the facts of the Abyssi-
nian question, did not spare Italy the coarsest of invectives and the gra-
vest of charges, attempting in this way to cast a shadow on the relations,
always marked with correctness and cordiality, between the two nations
whose economic interests are complemental to one another without ever
coming to clash.28
66 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
The letter was followed by a paper entitled The [sic] Fascism: Here is the
Enemy, signed by C.R. (i.e. Civis Romanus), a recurring pen name in this
series. The enemies of Fascism were

the Asiatic communism, the German socialism, the English liberalism,

the French democracy, the universal free-masonry.29

According to the author, all the above mentioned groups exploited the Abys-
sinian affair to discredit Fascism. The Italo-Abyssinian war was, instead,
described as a war of liberation.

The war which is going to meet a stupefied [sic] world is a war of vindi-
cation, the war of Fascism and of the Duce, necessary to our national
existence, the war of toiling civilisation against barbarism and slavery.
Italy, tried by centuries of oppression, wanted to become, and actually
became, a military nation, even more a warlike nation.30

According to the article, Fascism was responsible for Ethiopia’s improved eco-
nomic conditions, and this was the evidence of Italy’s good intentions in Africa.
The other bulletins rebuked the Society of Nations, Great Britain, and their
policies with regard to the Abyssinian crisis. Other pamphlets had a more evident
propagandistic character, like the Plan for a Superior School of Islamic Culture in
Tripoli,31 in which emphasis was laid upon a supposed good side of Italy’s military
involvement in Africa and of the fascist activities abroad. This literature aimed at
showing Italy’s civilising mission, not only in Africa but also in Asia.
At this stage a question should be raised about the expected results of this
propaganda. In the final part of the leaflet The Foundation of the Problem32 a
chapter, “Neutrality”, posed the question, “What does Italy expect from other
countries?”. There is but one answer, neutrality – namely, no arms and mili-
tary equipment for Abyssinia:

It also means abstention from any step whatsoever which, under the guise
of the most humanitarian and international intentions, only encourages
the intransigence and aggressiveness of Abyssinia [. . .]

The intention was to encourage Indian public opinion to oppose any policy
which might be detrimental to Italy.
Also the effects of this campaign should be evaluated. The Italian Consul
General in Calcutta, Guido Sollazzo, wrote

We have been more successful than I dared imagine. The tired lie of a racist,
anti-Asian Italy has been exposed at last. All the newspapers which have dealt
with the question have conceded that I was demonstrably right. And yet
others fought shy of the proofs I presented […] and stuck to the position of
their so-called solidarity with the black savages so described by the Duce.33
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 67
Sollazzo overestimated his own influence: in fact, the local daily newspapers
were most critical of Italy during the summer of 1935. However, more lenient
opinions did emerge, later, in September. All main papers in India condemned
Mussolini’s arrogance, as manifested in his request to the Society of Nations
for an Italian mandate over Abyssinia. Indian press and public opinion were
fully aware that the duce was absolutely determined to have Abyssinia and
were very sensitive towards the racist motivations put forward by Italy with
regard to her claims on Ethiopia.34
In September, the press was more interested in the debate at the Society of
Nations and the various stages of the crisis, which was moving fast toward
the point of no return. On 17th December, the Italian Consul General in
Bombay, Galleani d’Agliano, noted that,

generally speaking, the comments on the Italo-Ethiopian conflict are less

forthright and more moderate.35

Right from the outbreak of the hostilities, the Italian Consulate General in
Calcutta issued leaflets, mostly dated between October and December 1935.
They contained reports of the military operations and the state of interna-
tional negotiations. From 18th October 1935, the Italian representatives also
despatched to the local dailies, telegraphic agencies and foreign Consulates
news broadcast in English by Radio Littorio Press. The main recipients were
the Star of India, the Advance36 and, last but not least, the Forward.
According to the reaction of the British authorities in India, the Italian
campaign must have been effective. The British had kept a close eye on
developments and immediately realised that the so-called “Italian Commu-
nity” was basically a front for the activities of the General Consulates in
Calcutta and Bombay. In November, the British authorities noticed a quali-
tative change of the Italian propaganda and they had already a clear idea of
the activities carried out by fascist emissaries:

On the other hand the Italian Consul sends a weekly account of Italian
news (culled from Italian papers) to the local press for publication. These
weekly pro-Fascist writings are generally taken from the “Corriere della
Sera” of Milan and Populo [sic] d’Italia of Rome, two important Fascist
organs. One Mukherjee, an employee of the Italian Consulate, and Pra-
matha Roy (who has come to India after having studied at the oriental
Institute of Rome) are translating these passages from the above men-
tioned newspapers.
The “Advance” and the “Forward” are publishing these Italian reports
which are styled as “War News via Rome”. Amiya Sarkar who has been
staying in Rome for some time, is writing pro-Fascist articles to the
“Amrita Bazar Patrika” . . . It is said that Sarkar’s articles are inspired
from Fascist sources.
68 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
2. The so-called “bulletins” which were sent to Indian publicists like
Prof. Benoy Sarkar and Kalidas Nag, have now lost their novelty so it
is said that the Italian Consul is using the method of propaganda
alluded to above. The Italian newspapers “Corriere della Sera” and “Il
Populo [sic] d’Italia” are sent to the Forward at the suggestion of
Subhas Bose. These journals are rabidly anti-British and they will
certainly contain full reports of anti-British demonstrations organised
by Fascist organisations in Italy. . . .
In this tense situation, the Italian Consul’s weekly despatches to the
local press will cause much excitement. So long the nationalist papers
“Forward”, “Advance” and “A.B. Patrika” were condemning Italy. Now
that Italy is determined to flout the League and Europe single-handed,
the Indian publicists and agitators are beginning to lionise Mussolini,
specially [sic] as he is indulging in all sorts of anti-British sentiments.37

At the beginning of February 1936 the British authorities made an in-

depth investigation of Italian activities since 1933. They were interested in
Scarpa’s contacts with Bengali nationalists and Kalidas Nag, “with whom
he was arranging to send Indian students to Rome”.38 At that time, India
Tomorrow, a periodical of the All Bengal Students’ Association, published
a number of articles in favour of the fascist regime and its policy. At the
same time, Kalidas Nag, in his India and the World, encouraged Indian
students to visit Italy and to travel there on Italian ships. On Scarpa’s
return to Italy, his successor, the newly appointed Italian Consul General,
Guido Navarrini resumed the contacts with Kalidas Nag, who acted as an
intermediary between the Italian Consulate General and the local political
environment.
The publications disseminated by the Italian Community were printed in
Calcutta by the Saraswati Press, the Indian Daily News Press and the
Mukharji Press, and in Benares by the Uttara Press. The Saraswati Press was
considered “a nationalist organisation”. The Indian Daily News Press belon-
ged to the Forward, and the Uttara Press was owned by Asit K. Mukharji,
who also published the periodical Bishan.39 The Italian Consul General wrote
a number of these leaflets himself. These were

distributed and circulated through various channels but, although some

were handed over by prominent citizens who have no anti-British feelings
at all, most of them came to us through secret sources.40

The anti-British tone of this semi-clandestine literature spurred the British to

conduct an enquiry. At the end, they concluded:

[…] we got reliable and corroborated information that the Italian Consul-
General was definitely directing this propaganda campaign.41
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 69
The police trailed Benasaglio. The post office box number was registered in
his name: proof that there was no Italian community in India; it was nothing
but the Italian Consulate itself.
The British authorities, on their hand, spotted two main strategies behind
the Italian propaganda. The first strategy aimed at establishing and strength-
ening links with the most radical local nationalists. According to the infor-
mation collected by the British authorities, in December 1935

the Consul, while interviewing some Indian nationalists, suggested that

the Indians should resort to “direct action” in order to exact their power
and to oppose the Governor and the Government. He said that it was
men like Sarat and Subhas Bose of whom India stood in most need at the
moment, and that India should resort to class collaboration in order to
overthrow British Imperialism.42

The Italian Consul General then expected the Bengali nationalists, whom he
met on a fairly regular basis, to oppose the sanctions and promoted a “Fascist
League” in India, with direct links with the Consulate. The League was then
to become “a large and powerful political unit”. The Indians were to be given
the impression that a presence was emerging in their country alternative to
the British, if not opposed to them.
Secondly, according to the British observers, the Italian representatives
tried to strengthen existing links with the Bengali nationalist press. In
November 1935, the British authorities came to know that Sollazzo had
financed the Forward, in exchange for articles in favour of Italy.
In March 1936 the British intelligence service had no doubts that the Italian
Consul General was planning to found a monthly review with the collaboration of
Asit Mukharji’s Bishan and the Forward. The agreement was that the Italian
Consul should write under a pen name. Benasaglio, who supervised the imple-
mentation of the project, introduced Mukharji to the German Consul, Wachen-
dorf. The Italian Consul General also requested (and obtained) Wachendorf’s
collaboration. Benasaglio intended to present Mukherji also to the Japanese
Consul, since he believed that the Italian, German and Japanese governments
were being unfairly treated by the Indian press. It was decided that the periodical
(more than 60 pages) should initially have at least 200 subscribers.43
On 5th September 1935, the Consul General wrote the following letter:

[…] since the General Consulate has a functioning receiving station, daily
updates from the Italian news service will be sent to the General in Cal-
cutta, the Royal Legation in Kabul, the Consular office in Karachi, to
Commendatore Massone in Simla, to the Consular correspondent in
Goa, to all Italian missions, and to the Kolar Branch of the Fascist Party.
Every two or three days, according to the importance of the news
items, bulletins will be sent out to the above mentioned destinations and
to the universities, schools, companies and famous persons.44
70 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
Items were sent also to the local newspapers for publication. Among these
journals, the most favourable to Mussolini’s Italy was “the new nationalist
organ, non socialist, the Daily Sun”, followed by the Bombay Chronicle, the
Hyderabad Bulletin and the periodical The Indian Liberal. Distribution was
fairly widespread and all the means available were used. The promoters of
this propaganda aimed at reaching high level targets, as proved by several
pamphlets printed by the Italian Community in India.45
The British intelligence noticed the anti-British tone of the Italian propa-
ganda campaign:

‘Sanctions’ were the direct result of the British policy, and the Abyssinian
conquest was an economic issue over which Italy would be prepared to
fight against England if the latter provoked her by economic
strangulation.46

The war bulletins released by the Consulate, besides the news from the front,
contained unrelenting attacks upon Great Britain. These were duly recorded
by the British authorities.

The Italian Consul has been publishing more anti-British news and
comments after the Italian annexation of Abyssinia. The Consul thinks
that the Indians should emphasise the fact that English prestige has
received a terrible setback at the hands of Mussolini.47

The British authorities suspected that the duce was personally involved in
the propaganda activity of the Italian Consulate General in Calcutta:

The Consul pointed out that Mussolini is very much interested in the growth
and progress of the Nationalist movement in India; and Mussolini has been
thinking of granting many more scholarships to the Indian students for studies
in Rome. And Mussolini regularly reads the Indian Nationalist journals.48

Finally, the British authorities requested the removal of the Italian Consul
General and that his assistant be expelled from India.49 The Consul General
left India on 29th September 193650 and was replaced by Camillo Giuriati.51
As soon as he reached Calcutta, Giuriati condemned the conduct of his pre-
decessor and insisted that he had no intention to engage in pro-fascist and
anti-British propaganda.
The replacement of the Italian Consul General took place when the tensions
provoked by the Abyssinian crisis were gradually dissolving and the anti-British
propaganda was interrupted. These two factors contributed to improving the
overall relations between Britain and Italy, however Italian representatives did
not abandon their inroads into the Indian press or the contacts with local poli-
ticians and the British authorities soon noticed the strong anti-British feelings of
the new Consul General. They came to know that the Italian Consul had
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 71
established contacts with a number of local nationalist leaders to whom he dis-
tributed propaganda material. Giuriati also tried to pressurise the nationalist
press of Calcutta and Bombay into boycotting Reuters in favour of the Italian
agency, Stefani. He took steps to obtain better prices than those offered by
Reuters.52 The Italian Consul General invited the representatives of the Nation-
alist Press, the Amrita, the Hindustan Standard and the Advance to go every day
to the Consulate to personally verify the quality of the Stefani agency news
reports, broadcast initially only to the Italian Consulate.53 The Italian diplomat
was also in contact with the editor of the Forward, with a journalist based in
Calcutta who worked for the National Call, printed in Delhi. The journalist
published news from Italy, duly vetted by the Italian government, in exchange
for advertising from Italian companies. Another contact was a correspondent of
the Hindu, from Madras.54
According to a British report of March 1938,

[Negotiations . . . have taken place between a representative of the

Amrita Bazar Patrika (who happens to be a dismissed Indian Police
Officer) and the Italian Consul-General.
The main points that emerge are that the Consul General is trying
a to introduce the Stefani News Agency to the Indian national Press;
b indirectly to influence commercial journals against trade agreements
within the British Empire; and
c to influence selected nationalist papers in favour of Italian propaganda
by promising them advertisements from Italian commercial concerns.55

The Consul General wanted “editors of Indian nationalist journals to publish

articles based on materials to be supplied by the Italian Consul General”.56
The Italian Consul General in Calcutta tried to exceed the action of the Ita-
lian Community in India by disguising propaganda activities as cultural ones. He
decided to open up an office of the Dante Alighieri Society, a renowned asso-
ciation, whose official mission was to promote Italian culture world-wide. Cal-
cutta’s branch of the Society was also supposed to have political purposes:

The committee of the Society is to be formed of disaffected Indians of

pro-Italian tendencies.57

The Dante Alighieri Society in Calcutta, the Bangiya Dante Sabha; was founded
on 18th March 1938. One of the two presidents was Benoy Kumar Sarkar, and
one of the two honorary secretaries was Monindra Mohan Moulik.58
The Consul General was also thinking of getting in touch with the Muslim
community: Benoy Kumar Sarkar suggested him (with whom he was “on inti-
mate terms”) to set up an “Asiatic Society” in Calcutta. One of the objectives of
the Society was to provide information in India on Arab countries,59 while “the
Society’s aims and objectives are in consonance with Fascist ideals”.60 However,
nothing came out of this idea.
72 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
All these manoeuvres were expensive. Transferring the advertising from the
Statesman to the Amrita required the payment of 1,000 rupees per month.
The Calcutta branch of the Dante Society cost 200 rupees per month. The
Italian lectureship at the University of Calcutta amounted to 100 rupees
(approx. 700 lira) per month.61
The British authorities, who continued to carefully watch the activities of
the Italian Consul General, came to the conclusion that:

He could undoubtedly find a number of Indians quite sufficient for his pur-
poses who, while not necessarily being particularly pro-Italian, would be
glad to use any material that he provided in order to embarrass the British.62

In 1938 the Italian Consul in Calcutta tried to involve not only Subhas, but
also his brother Sarat, who was politically engaged as well. According to the
British Intelligence,

Comm.63 Giuriati is an ardent admirer of Subhas Bose and . . . he

regards his “Indian Struggle” as more important than Gandhi’s or
Nehru’s autobiographies. The Consul-General has been promised an
introduction to Sarat Bose by the latter’s private secretary.64

On 18th June

Prakash Mallik, Sarat Bose’s private secretary, discussed Congress politics

with Comm. Giuriati and received Fascist propagandist literature from him.65

Between the Ethiopian war and the Second World War the Italian political
activities in India increased and extended to Bombay, in the attempt to
involve Marathi political exponents.

3 The role of the Italian Consulate General in Bombay in the

second half of the 1930s
As the Ethiopian crisis reached its height, a new General Consulate was
opened up in Bombay. The political milieu in Bombay and in Maharashtra
was as radical as in Bengal. Since summer 1935, the Bombay office had
“intensified counter-propaganda activities as a measure against the hostile
campaign carried out by the local press and in public places”.66 The two
Consulates General worked together on this activity. The Bombay Consulate
General had “created a propaganda fund with donations from companies and
fascist elements based in Bombay” and sent to Calcutta “not less than 150/-
Rupees every month”.67 Bombay used this sum to produce propaganda
material to be distributed among “traders and intellectuals” in the area.
There was also a special bureau
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 73
which depends directly from the local office of the Fascist Party, set up
and supervised by myself, and issues propaganda . . . which in a certain
sense may be considered more timely and appropriate than Calcutta’s,
with regard to this jurisdiction. I make use of radio bulletins and other
news items I have access to.68

The Italian Consulate General in Bombay had increased its role since the
summer of 1938, when Mario Zanotti Bianco was appointed Consul General.
Mario Carelli, former secretary and librarian of ISMEO arrived in Bombay on
28th June 1938. He was responsible for further activities directed by the Italian
Consulate General. The day after his arrival, Carelli wrote a letter to Giovanni
Gentile, at that time president of the ISMEO, and outlined his plans.

I contacted the Royal Consul, Commendatore Mario Zanotti Bianco and

his wife, who were and will be most helpful. They believe my mission here
of the utmost importance. We are considering to revive the Casa degli
italiani (the house of Italians) and, if we are through and circumspect, we
hope it will function as a branch of the Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed
Estremo Oriente [Italian Institute for Middle and Far East].
Yesterday I went to the St. Xavier College, part of the local University,
to take contacts and fix agreements with the Jesuits who run it. They
appointed me as Professor of Italian.
All this will take some time, and the official Italian course will not
start, I believe, until January 1939. At the moment, there will be certainly
at least a preparatory course, which I will hold.69

Only a few months later, in October 1938, Carelli informed Gentile of the
progress made:

I must thank you for entrusting me with this mission in Bombay, which is
promising. My Italian course up to now has been successful and I have
met fine students who might prove most deserving of scholarships in the
future and well follow in Moulik’s. Italian culture here is highly appre-
ciated and its promotion would be easier if our casa d’Italia (house of
Italy) would be better equipped and more attractive. In any case, things
are moving. For the coming season (November-March) I am preparing a
number of lectures on art to be held here and in other intellectual circles.
In the last days I lectured on education in Italy in a local school and had
the opportunity to describe your reform. It was a great success. The lec-
ture was followed by a lively debate, all very friendly, and I was asked to
held [sic] other lectures on Italy.70

According to a document of the end of 1938,71 Carelli was looking beyond

the regional boundaries and had contacted the Consulate General in Calcutta
to co-ordinate the activities of the two Italian Consulates General and the
74 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
respective local political circles. The following passage deserves to be quoted
at length, since it sheds light on the networks that representatives of the fas-
cist regime tried to establish in India. After referring to the need for more
consistent exchanges between Italy and India, Carelli outlined a detailed plan:

c) scholarships. A number of Indians who were keen to visit Italy by their

own means or sent by ISMEO came to me for information. One of these
is the Principal of the Hindu College at Surat. Another is a writer on
religious matters, who will meet His Excellency Tucci in Bombay. With
regard to ISMEO scholarships to Indians, I can say, under my own
responsibility, that I will be able to find suitable persons for these scho-
larships. For better assurance, always under my responsibility, I can
arrange direct correspondence with ISMEO for these persons. The
Consul Geneneral should take the final decision, only after examining
them carefully.
d) information and general advice. With Prof. Dasgupta, I have also
looked into the Petech affair.72 and I have already written on this matter
to the Deputy General Secretary in Calcutta on 10.11.38. As I pointed
out in my report to the Minister (see enclosed), I believe that Calcutta is
a fertile field for Italian cultural expansion in India. If Dr Petech would
be sent here, we would be advantaged to have a young representative of
the Italian culture and a passionate scholar of India.
Cultural propaganda in Calcutta might also benefit from the aid of Dr.
Monindra Mohan Moulik. If it is true that to be successful any initiative
must have the right man for the right job, he can be considered the best
result obtained by ISMEO. Moulik so deeply transformed during his stay
in Italy that now, back in India, in his country, known for its capacity to
absorb people, he feels uncomfortable and talks always of his desire to
return to Italy. He is one of the few, perhaps the only, Indian I met who
seems to understand Italy and who has become both intellectually and
passionately infused with our spirit and culture. He recently wrote in the
Modern Review an article on Gabriele d’Annunzio in which he displayed
a knowledge of the poet that many Italians might envy.
As already said, I met Prof. Das Gupta in Calcutta. He appears to be
very pleased with the honour received from the University of Rome and
would like to confer a similar one upon our Vice-President.
The activity of the ISMEO was brought up and praised during the
debate that followed two of my three lectures in Calcutta. At my second
lecture, the chairman went so far as to declare that today, persons wish-
ing to study Buddhism should not come to India, but go to Italy and
study at ISMEO, under the guide of His Excellency Tucci.
Your name is known at the Ramakrishna Mission, and was warmly
reminded by the director of the Ramakrishna Mission at Khar, Swami
Sambhuddhananda.73
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 75
Among the students of the Italian courses in Bombay a certain Madhav
Kashinath Damley was particularly promising. Carelli suggested him as a
translator into Marathi of the English version of Mussolini’s Dottrina del
Fascismo. The book was published in summer 1939 in instalments in the
Marathi weekly founded by Damley, the Lokandi Morcha (Iron Front). The
publication costed 2,800 Italian lira.
Only the instalments of 8th, 15th and 22nd June are available in the
archives.74 These instalments were a faithful translation of the first thirty
pages of Mussolini’s work, where he explained the basic doctrines of Fascism.
Later issues were to contain the next chapters. The first page of the 8th June
issue published also the translation of the article entitled “New Measures in
Favour of Italian Workers”, written by Virginio Gayda, a famous Italian
journalist of this period. The translation of a pamphlet by Antonino Pagliaro
was published by the Lokandi Morcha in five instalments between 6th July
and 10th August 1939. Unfortunately, there are no copies in the archives. On
27th July an article written in English, by Mario Carelli, “The Institution of
the House of the Fasci & Corporations”, was published.75 The author argued
that the House of the Fasci and the Corporations represented the people’s
interests better than the parliament, which was made up of men who were far
from the corporative interests of the people. Members of parliament drew up
laws concerning economy and society, exclusively on the basis of their
authority rather than out of their practical experience. Carelli argued that the
parliament could issue only contradictory and chaotic laws. The parliamen-
tary reform which led to the institution of the House of the Fasci and
Corporations was described as the backbone of the social revolution made by
the fascist regime:

Old fashioned parliamentary regimes mix groups or party interests with

those of the nation and take special care in the electoral equality of the
citizens, while the corporative system endeavours to bring about an actual
equality in the masses by filling the gaps dividing them.

Thus:

Lack of executive power and party struggle in other States are symptoms
of the decay of political bodies doomed to die and to be replaced by new
ones which will better satisfy the political, social and economic needs of
our country.

Right from the beginning of his activities, Damley became a target of the
British authorities who, in the autumn of 1939, forced him to close down his
periodical after he had published an article which the local government
considered subversive. The authorities demanded bail from Damley, which he
didn’t pay, and publication was interrupted.
76 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
Damley was a Chitpavan Brahmin from Poona, living in Bombay, whose
journal was printed at his father’s printing shop. According to the description
given by the British authorities:

He holds extreme political views and believes himself to be a follower of

B.G. Tilak… He openly says that he is enamoured of the history of Italy
and Nazi Germany.76

The description made by the Italian Consul completes the picture:

Of fascist ideas, he founded an organisation to which he has given the

name “Iron Guards” inspired by our own, albeit modified to fit in with
the conditions prevailing in India.
He and his friends wore the black shirt, the first Blackshirts in India.
The growth of this organisation has been compromised by the out-
break of the war.77

Damley had been close to the Vyayamshala or Physical Culture Institute in

Poona. He was a typical exponent of the Marathi militarist culture. The
British knew that he had established contacts not just with the Italian Con-
sulate and especially with Carelli, but also with the German Consulate. Here
Damley was in touch with the official in charge of the information service, a
certain Lesczynski,78 who was also the representative of the German News
Agencies. Lesczynski liaised also with Savarkar.
Fascist and Nazi intrigues in Bombay were soon discovered by the local press,
which made much ado about this news. The Bombay Chronicle published a long
article in two instalments entitled “Anti-Comintern over India” (22nd and 24th
June). The first instalment had the subtitle, “Background of Nazi Fascist Propa-
ganda”, and the second “How Communalism is Exploited by Fascists and
Nazis”.79 Both articles pointed out that Nazist and fascist ideas did not appeal
much to Indian public opinion at large, which was still strongly influenced by the
Congress. However, these ideas had a certain consensus among the ranks of radi-
cal nationalism, and they contributed to fomenting the communalist tensions.80

[. . .] the communalists – specially the more militant among them – have

shown definite sympathies for the Fascist ideology. . .
The Nazis’ glorification of the “Aryan” race is erroneously interpreted by
militant Hindus as a vindication of their own doctrine of race and caste. The
adoption of the old Hindu symbol of the Swastika by the Nazis is regarded by
them as a manifestation of the proximity of Hitler’s philosophy to Hinduism.81

The second instalment disclosed the relations between the leaders of the
Hindu Mahasabha, the Japanese Consulate and Indians exiled in Japan.
About fascist ideological influence on the Marathi militant environment, the
article warned:
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 77
Here and there, however, one may find small organisations which are run
on near-fascist lines and are thus potentially dangerous. The Military
School and various Physical Culture centres run by Hindu Communalists
are obviously inspired by the example of fascist storm troops.82

To confirm the description by the Bombay Chronicle, it should be remem-

bered that in Bombay the Swastik League existed. It was founded on 10th
March 1929 by a group of wealthy local professionals and by M.R. Jayakar,
who became also its chairman.83 The League published a monthly bulletin,
the Swastik Herald and, from 16th April 1934, it also had an office in the
centre of the town. The Swastik League, like other paramilitary groups,
organised drills, sports events and parades. The League aimed at creating a
voluntary, paramilitary corps for Hindu self-defence in case of aggression
from Muslim “hooligans”. The organisation was equipped with ambulances
and first aid, in order to face emergencies during communal riots. The orga-
nisation provided Hindus with any possible instrument to face inter-commu-
nal tensions. As with other organisations of the same kind, the Swastik
League made little differentiation between defence and aggression. It openly
followed the example of fascist paramilitary organisations:

In the near future, our G.O.C. intends to form a Cadet Corps, consisting
of boys between the age of 15 and 18 years. The training which these
cadets will receive will ultimately enable them to join the League’s
Volunteer Corps . . .
This reminds us of a picture published in the Sunday Chronicle on the 28th
instant, showing two of Sgr. Mussolini’s “Baby Soldiers” remaining on sentry
duty at the entrance of their annual encampment at Camp Dux, where the
young members of the Avan Guardista [sic], a youth organisation of Italy for
boys from 14 to 18 years of age, get first hand acquaintance with the tools of
war. Neither we nor our cadets can expect to be able to get such a direct
training, but all the same, the efforts to train a boy in military discipline will
never be wasted and will in course of time make that boy an ideal volunteer.84

Only in 1940, when Nazism had shown its true nature, did the League feel it
should abandon the swastika as a symbol. In the issue of July-August 1940,
the Swastik Herald published an article with the title Hitler and the Swastik
League, which stated that “The symbol ‘Swastik’ stands for Germany and
Germany, at present, is Hitler” and continued by pointing out the differences
between the League’s ideological background and Nazist values:

Hitler discriminates between Aryans and non-Aryans between Germans

and Jews. The League, though it is a purely Hindu organisation, does not
make a difference between the Hindus and the non-Hindus. . . . Hitler has
many enemies, the League cannot have any. He is revengeful; the League
is forgiving and tolerant. He is violent and wild; the League is not. He
78 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
thinks and acts in terms of destruction. He has destroyed many families,
many nations: nay, the peace of the world. Armed to teeth he is running
amuck. The League stands for construction. He is an enemy of humanity.
The League is a saviour of humanity. It has saved thousands of human
lives. Its ambulance is most efficient.

The article ended with an appeal to the government to allow organisations

such as the Swastik League to arm themselves and form a voluntary militia
against the threat of Nazism.

4 The image of Fascism and Nazism in the Indian official press

in the late 1930s
In the late 1930s, the Indian official press showed a great interest in Italy, as
proved by the reports sent by the Bombay and, to a lesser extent, Calcutta
Consulates to the Foreign Office in Rome regularly, more or less weekly,
between 1937 and 1939.85
The main newspapers paid particular attention to Italian facts or to inter-
national affairs concerning Italy. The accounts were unbiased, sometimes
articles were directly or indirectly critical, and sometimes ridiculed Italy, the
fascist regime and its figures. This kind of press cannot be compared with the
pro-fascist one and the level of information it provided was high. Italian
propaganda had no meaningful effects on the official newspapers, the only
ones that could reach Indian masses. After all, the British were still in control
of the Indian political situation. Between 1937 and 1939, The Times of India,
the Sind Observer, the Bombay Sentinel, the Evening News and the Daily
Gazette continued to deal with incoming events, like the consequences of the
Ethiopian war, its effects on the Abyssinian people and on the Italian
economy, Italian economic self-sufficiency and its consequences, the Spanish
Civil War, the Anglo-Italian relations, and those between Italy and Germany,
rearmament in these two countries, the meeting between Hitler and Musso-
lini. The Anti-Comintern pact, the Rome-Berlin “Axis” and their effects on
the balance of power in Europe had a remarkable space in Indian newspapers.
By autumn 1937, many believed there would be a war involving the entire
world and India had to prepare for it.
A selection of the news of 1937 proves how Indian newspapers and, con-
sequently, Indian public opinion were fully aware of the atrocities committed
by Nazism and Fascism. On 28th June, Illustrated India provided a detailed
account of the murder of the Rosselli brothers.86 “What Fascism Means” was
the title of an article published by the Kaiser-i-Hind, from Bombay, of 19th
September.87 It denounced the ill-treatment and persecution of Jews and
political opponents in Germany:

Fascism is the enemy of science, of rationalism, of educational progress.

. . . Fascism kills, tortures and terrorises.
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 79
The racial laws passed in Italy in 1938 and following discriminations and
purges, anti-Semitism burgeoning not only in Germany, but also in Italy, all
this news soon reached India. The Times of India of 25th August even sug-
gested that Italian and German agents were behind the increasing of terrorist
actions in Palestine.88 The Palestinian question and the Italian and German
foreign policies in the Middle East were carefully examined by the Indian
press in English.
Besides opinions on anti-Semitism in Italy, the Indian press also published
descriptions of Italian society, so different from the image of the country that
the fascist regime tried to promote. One of the most meaningful examples of
how common was the awareness about the real nature of Fascism is the
summary made by the Italian authorities of an article published by the Hin-
dustan Standard of 7th December 1938. The Italian atmosphere was described
in the following terms:

The correspondent gives a picture of Fascist Italy which humiliates the

Italian People. He sees only mourning clothes and sadness on the face of
every citizen on the road. Fear silences the souls of the people who look
like enchained… Poverty everywhere. The workers’ wages are poor and
heavily taxed. The workers and the middle classes do not have enough to
eat and the food is poor. Referring to Italian volunteers in Spain, the
correspondent claims that they could hardly be called “volunteers”, since
they are forcefully enrolled . . .89

The Illustrated Weekly, a widely distributed Indian magazine, on 4th Decem-

ber 1938 published the article “Dictatorship. What it offers: The Inevitable
End”. With regard to control and limitations imposed by the fascist regime
on personal freedom, it stated that

Dictatorship involves not merely misery for its subjects, but also their
steady and relentless degradation. Card-index, finger-print, microphone
and all other devices of detection and organisation which the machine
age has put at the service of criminology become on a vaster scale the
instruments of criminal government.

From the end of 1938, as fascist ideology had enormously increased its
influence over Europe, more and more articles in India came out against
totalitarian regimes, which were described in gloomy terms. In the same year,
there was much consternation over German expansionism and Nazi ambi-
tions toward Central-Eastern Europe. Oddly enough, the Sudeten question
received more attention than the Anschluß itself.
As war clouds gathered, anxiety increased on what position India should take.
However, it was quite clear that the Congress Party line would prevail. In other
terms, India should support Great Britain in its struggle against the Axis powers.
80 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
The duce’s pictures were very common in the press. He appeared in differ-
ent situations, while doing several activities, both private and public. He was
often portrayed in demagogic postures. The Amrita Bazar Patrika of 26th
November 1937 published a picture of Mussolini in plain clothes and with his
arm raised in the Roman salute in front of the crowd in Piazza Venezia,
during the celebrations for the King’s birthday. During the summer of 1938,
all main Indian dailies published the famous photos of a shirtless Mussolini
harvesting in the fields in the countryside around Rome. Other pictures por-
trayed him when, at the end of the harvest, he spoke to the masses.
Mussolini and the institutions of the fascist regime were well known in
India. Information was available for anyone. It was possible to have first-hand
news on the main events involving Italy and Germany and, to a lesser extent,
on Italy’s internal situation. Also the crimes perpetrated by the regime were
therefore known.
Towards the beginning of the Second World War, most probably as a result
of the propaganda carried out by Italian representatives and in spite of the
efforts of the British counterpropaganda, Fascism had become a fundamental
reference point for Hindu right- wing nationalism.

Notes
1 Giuliano Procacci, Dalla parte dell’Etiopia. L’aggressione italiana vista dai movi-
menti anticolonialisti d’Asia, d’Africa, d’America, Milan, 1984.
2 Ibid. pp. 47–48.
3 Benasaglio had been in India for 16 years. At first, he headed a company import-
ing Italian goods which closed down because of the great depression, then worked
for the trade and tax company S. K. Sawday, based in Calcutta. He then became a
customs agent for the firm Firpo. He lived always in very precarious conditions.
He acted for a long time as honorary vice-consul: NAI, ibid., letter from the pro-
prietor of the firm, Sawday to Metcalfe, 9.8.36 and a detailed note by the Foreign
and Political Department, 17.8.36.
4 NAI, ibid.
5 NAI, ibid.
6 ASMAE, Gab., pos.7, Udienze (meetings), Chakravarti Amya, handwritten letter
from Vittorio Amadasi to an unidentified count, 19th August [1935].
7 ASMAE, ibid., unsigned, undated biographic file headed “Prof. Chakrawarty”; an
identical hand-written copy was enclosed with the previous letter.
8 ASMAE, ibid., report no. 91, unsigned and undated, probably drawn up in
August, 1935. Chakravarti was an ambiguous person, and the Italian authorities
came to believe he was a British agent. This is unlikely, given his liaison work
between the fascist regime and leading Indian nationalists. Regarding Italian sus-
picions, see “express telegram n. 572/80”, from the Consulate-General in Calcutta,
9.2.38, to the Foreign Office: the document specifies that Chakravarti was an
“agente dell’Intelligence Service” (an intelligence agent). The Italians also sus-
pected that Chakravarti was liaising with British pacifists and Rev. Andrews.
9 ASMAE, ibid.
10 ASMAE, ibid.
11 ASMAE, ibid.
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 81
12 NAI, Foreign and Political Department, 280 N 1936, “Note on the connection of
the Italian Consul-General in Calcutta with pro-Italian and anti-British propa-
ganda”, dated 7.2.36 and signed by M.K. Johnston, Deputy Commissioner of
Police, Special Branch Calcutta.
13 Procacci, Dalla parte dell’Etiopia, p. 60.
14 With regard to Mussolini’s invitation, which reached Nehru through Amiya
Chakravarty, see Procacci, Dalla parte dell’Etiopia, p. 60. Regarding Mussolini’s
intention to meet Nehru, see R. De Felice, L’India, pp. 1319–20. Information on
Bose and Nehru is in the respective personal files, ASMAE, Gab., pos.7. “Bose”
file is undated, but most probably drawn up in early 1937. With regard to Nehru,
see the document headed, “Alcuni punti che può esser utile tener presente nel
colloquio con Nehru” (notes which should be borne in mind during the conversa-
tion with Nehru), of 7.3.36, quoted by De Felice, ibidem.
15 ASMAE, Gab., pos.7, unsigned, unheaded note addressed to Mussolini, dated
15.2.36. The document is entirely quoted by R. De Felice, ibidem, p. 1326.
16 ASMAE, ibid. This undated document was drawn up in 1937.
17 This is pointed out both by Procacci (pp. 60–61) and De Felice (pp. 1319–20). Both
historians quote a well-known piece of Nehru’s autobiography. A number of refer-
ences to Fascism and fascist imperialism are to be found in Nehru’s Selected Works.
Nehru’s and the Congress views of Fascism and Italy’s role in international affairs,
over the period between the Italo-Abyssinian war and Spanish Civil War up to the
time of the Anschluss and on until the start of the Second World War are well docu-
mented (see records held by the All India Congress Committee at NMML, and above
all among the Foreign Department records: files: no. 39–1936; 40–1936; 4–1937; 12
(III)-1938; 19–1938; 31–1938; G-21–1926; AICC-1927 (3–9); G-71–1938; O.S. 40–
1940; FD-7(I) 1936; FD-7(II) 1938; FD-9 1936; FD-11 1936; FD-12B 1936).
18 ASMAE, Gab., pos.7, note to Foreign Office, 6.9.35: the file also contains two
documents of the British Embassy in Rome of 24.8.35 and 27.8.35 and one to the
Foreign Office of 8.8.35.
19 Procacci, Dalla parte dell’Etiopia, p. 52, mentions the article appeared in the
Amrita Bazar Patrika without providing its date of publication or title. The second
article, “The Secret of Abyssinia and its Lesson” is dated 15.10.35, but came out
the next month.
20 Subhas Chandra Bose, La lotta dell’India 1920–1934 (The Indian Struggle), first
edition in Italian, translated and edited by ISMEO, Florence, 1942, p. 573.
21 See NAI, Foreign and Political Department, 389 N 35, 445 N 35 and 456 N 36 for
information on these contingents and a special corps to protect the British legation
in Addis Ababa.
22 S.C. Bose, La lotta dell’India, p. 576.
23 S.C. Bose, ibid., pp. 576–77.
24 ASMAE, Gab., pos.7, note to Mussolini, 15.2.36.
25 Ethiopia Today, by Niliacus (a pen name); Slavery in Abyssinia: Italy and the
People of Asia by Guido Sollazzo; Twelve Years of Fascism, by P. Roy; Italy and
Africa, written by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alessandro Lessona;
Anti-Abolitionist Ethiopia, also by Niliacus; Italy and Abyssinia; Italy and Abyssi-
nia (1897–1935); America and Italo-Ethiopian Controversy; Italo-Abyssinian Dis-
pute before the League of Nations; Speech of Baron Aloisi Head of the Italian
Delegation to the League of Nation’s Assembly of October 9, 1935; Islam and
Ethiopia, signed by Paolo Balbis; The League of Nations and the Chances of War,
by Manfredi Gravina; Comment upon a Speech, by Luigi Villari; Italy on March,
by Corrado Zoli; Italy and Eritrea: Yesterday and Today, by Gen. Anacleto
Bronzuoli; Twilight of Geneva. These publications have been gathered together in a
volume and may be consulted at the library of the Italian Ministry of External
Affairs in Rome.
82 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
26 A. Lessona, p. 14.
27 A number of the mentioned publications are in NAI, Foreign and Political
Department, 612 N, 1935 and 532 N 1935; others under ASMAE, AP, India, b. 4.
28 NAI, ibid., 532 N 1935.
29 NAI, ibid.
30 NAI, ibid.
31 NAI, 612 N 1935.
32 NAI, ibid., Bulletin n.7.
33 ASMAE, AP, India b. 4, letter of 26.8.35 from Italian General Consulate in Cal-
cutta to the Press and Propaganda Ministry (c.c. Foreign Office and Italian
Embassy in London). The letter dealt with a bitter argument with Rev. Andrews, a
professor at Shantiniketan and a friend of Tagore and Gandhi, whose political
views were very much in line with Gandhi’s. In an article published in the Allaha-
bad Leader of 5.8.35 Andrews sharply criticised the racist views Mussolini expres-
sed in his interview published by the Echo de Paris on 21st July 19.35. The Italian
Consul General in Calcutta felt obliged to reply with an article under his own
name, published by Forward on 17 August.
34 ASMAE, ibid., press file from Sollazzo to the Ministry of External Affairs, dated
9th August.1935, including press clippings from the following newspapers: Ananda
Bazar Patrika, Amrita Bazar Patrika, Hindustan Times, The National Call, The
Mussalman, Civil and Military Gazette, Leader, Star of India, Forward and
Statesman.
35 ASMAE, ibid., “express telegram n. 98”, from the Italian Consulate-General in
Bombay to the Press and Propaganda Ministry and Foreign Office.
36 ASMAE, ibid., and “express telegram n. 2717”, dated 31st October 1935, from the
Italian General Consulate in Calcutta to the Press and Propaganda Ministry,
Ministry of External Affairs and Italian Embassy in London.
37 NAI, 612 N 1935, Intelligence record entitled “Statement of C.112 dated the 6th
November '35”.
38 NAI, Foreign and Political Department, 280 N 1936 and IO, L/P&S/12/1536,
“Note on the connection of the Italian Consul General in Calcutta with pro-Italian
and anti-British propaganda”, dated 7th February 1936 and signed by M.K.
Johnston, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Special Branch, Calcutta. It is worth
noting that information contained in this document was the subject of a long letter
(n.843-P.S.) from G. F. Hogg, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, sent on 26th February 1936. The
British authorities in London were fully informed as to developments. Most prob-
ably they had not underestimated the potential dangers of this situation.
39 Extract from the Statement of C-112 dated 2.3.36: NAI, Foreign and Political
Department, 179 X 1936 and 280 N 1936. A letter in the latter file, dated 11th
January 1936, from the Italian Consul-General to the publisher of the Bishan, A.
K. Mukharji, alludes to possible publication of an English version of this period-
ical to which the Italian Consul might contribute “indirectly to the modest limit,
possible to me”. The Consul may have gained full control of the periodical in
March.
40 NAI, ibid.
41 NAI, ibid.
42 NAI, ibid.
43 NAI, ibid.
44 ASMAE, AP, India, b. 4, letter n. 49, from the General Consulate of Italy in
Bombay, 5 September 1935, to the Foreign Office (c.c. Ministry for Press and
Propaganda).
45 NAI, Jayakar Papers, microfilm, r.n. 23, Italo-Abyssinian War.
 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war 83
46 NAI, Foreign and Political Department, 179 X 1936 and 280 N 1936, note dated
7th February 1936.
47 NAI, ibid., extract of 14th May 1936 in an Intelligence Bureau note dated 23rd
May 1936.
48 NAI, External Affairs Department, 17 N 37, note drawn up by the Bengali police
in December 1936 on the basis of the views expressed to the publisher of the
Amrita Bazar Patrika by the Italian Consul in Calcutta.
49 NAI, 280 N 1936, records of the period February–September 1936.
50 NAI, ibid., telegram of 3rd October 1936 from Bengal Darjeeling to Foreign Simla
and identical telegram, with the same date, from Viceroy, Simla to Secy of State for
India, London.
51 NAI, ibid., 19th September 1936 from Benasaglio to Chief Secretary to the Gov-
ernment of Bengal. At the end, Benasaglio’s expulsion was revoked: telegram of
23rd September 19.36 from the Italian Consul General, Sollazzo, to Foreign Secy
India Govt. and telegram of 25th August 1936 from Viceroy, Simla, to the Secre-
tary of State for India, London.
52 NAI, External Affairs Department, 649 X 1937, a copy of the report drawn up by
the Intelligence Bureau, dated 23.11.37.
53 NAI, 79/38, note dated 6.1.38.
54 AI, ibid., note 2.7.38, , abstracts of reports of May 1938 and 6.6.38, 31.5.38,
23.6.38
55 NAI, Home Political Dept., 137/38, 1938, dated note 21.3.1938, signed by Bam-
ford. This document is quoted also by Flora, Benoy Kumar Sarkar, pp. 60–61.
Giuriati managed to convince a number of Italian firms and shipping companies to
publish their advertisements in the Amrita Bazar Patrika instead of The States-
man: NAI, ibid., Summary dated 19.3.38.
56 NAI, ibid.
57 NAI, Home Political Dept, 79/38, 1938 “Note on Italian Activities in India”,
6.1.38
58 ISMEO, Carte Formichi (Formichi Papers), pamphlet issued by the Bangiya
Dante Sabha, including plans for meetings and conferences held in the Society
headquarters between March 1938 and January 1939.
59 NAI, Home Political Dept, 79/38, 1938, “Note on Italian Activities in India”,
6.1.38.
60 NAI, ibid., summary of a report dated 25.6.38, in “Note on the political intrigues
of the Italian Consulate-General in Calcutta”, 2.7.1938.
61 NAI, Home Political Dept., 22/37/39, undated note entitled “Expenditure of For-
eign money in India”.
62 NAI, 137/38, note dated 2.4.38, signed J. Hennessy.
63 The complete word is Commendator.
64 Extract of a report dated 10.6.38, contained in NAI, 79/38, note 2.7.38.
65 NAI, ibid., report dated 23.6.38.
66 ASMAE, AP, India, b. 4, letter n. 49, from the General Consulate of Italy in
Bombay, 5 September 1935, to the Foreign Office (c.c. Ministry for Press and
Propaganda).
67 ASMAE, ibid.
68 ASMAE, ibid.
69 Fondazione Gentile (Gentile Foundation), Corrispondenza da terzi a Gentile
(Correspondence from third subjects to Gentile), file Carelli Mario, undated letter
(datable 29.6.38).
70 Fondazione Gentile, Correspondence, 11.10.38.
71 Gentile Foundation, Correspondence from third subjects to Gentile, “Relazione del
Prof. Mario Carelli, bibliotecario dell’I.S.M.E.O., inviato in missione a Bombay”
84 Italy’s Indian policy across the Ethiopian war
(report by Prof. Mario Carelli, ISMEO librarian, on his misson to Bombay), to Gio-
vanni Gentile, Bombay, 29.11.38, quoted by Prayer, “Internazionalismo”, p. 64.
72 Luciano Petech is a famous Italian scholar of ancient Indian languages and culture.
73 Fondazione Gentile, Correspondence, 29.11.38.
74 On 15th and 22nd June the weekly published two front-page articles on trade
unions in Germany.
75 ACS, Ministero della Cultura Popolare (Ministry of Popular Culture – Min-
culpop), 17 bis, file 26, Gran Bretagna (Great Britain), part 14, Royal Consulate
Bombay, report n. 1904/St.3, from the Italian Consulate, Bombay, 4 August 1939,
to the Ministry of Popular Culture. A copy of the article is also to be found in
Maharashtra State Archives (MSA), Home Special Dept., 830 (I) 1939.
76 MSA, Home Special Dept., 830 (I), note dated 11th July 1939.
77 ACS, Minculpop, 17 bis, report n. 2298/St.3, from the Italian Consulate, Bombay,
4 October 1939, to the Ministry of Popular Culture.
78 MSA, 830(I), letter from Chief of Police in Bombay to M. K. Johnston, Assistant
Director, Intelligence Bureau, 12th July 1939.
79 Copies of the two articles are to be found in MSA, Home Special Dept., 830 (I) 1939
and ASMAE, AP, India, file n. 10, 1939, enclosed with Indian press report no. 84,
sent by the Italian Consulate in Calcutta to the Foreign Office on 17th June 1939.
80 Both articles assert that Fascism and Nazism had made an impact upon the minds of
Muslim radical groups such as Khaksars, in northern India. However, there no
records proving direct contacts between these groups and nazist or fascist organisa-
tions or exponents. The impression is that references, on the part of Indian Muslim
political organisations, to nazist or fascist ideas were sporadic, and more implied than
direct. This was not the case with the Hindus, who openly admitted owing their
ideological and organisational inspiration to Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany.
81 How Communalism, see note 79.
82 Ibid.
83 NAI, Jayakar Papers, microfilm, r.n. 135, record entitled “A Short History of the
League for seven Years (10 March 1929 to 10 March 1936)”, undated but pro-
duced in March 1936, most probably a circular to be distributed on the anniver-
sary of the foundation of the Swastik League.
84 NAI, ibid., r.n. 13, copy of the Swastik Herald of 7th November 1934.
85 The records are represented by a great amount of news clippings from Indian
newspapers, especially from those printed in the Bombay Presidency, sent mainly
from the local Italian Consulate and, to a lesser extent, from the Calcutta Con-
sulate. These papers are collected in ASMAE, AP, India, b. 5, 1937, b. 6, 1937–38,
b.9, 1939.
86 ASMAE, AP, India, b. 5, abstract of an article whose title was translated into
Italian as “Luridi riflessi sul Fascismo” (Dirty speculations on Fascism) enclosed
with express telegram n. 1969/323, from the Italian General Consulate in Calcutta,
8th July 1937, to the Ministries of External Affairs and Popular Culture and to the
Italian Embassy in London. On 23.9.37, the Bombay Sentinel carried the article,
“Murder of Italian Exiles”, ASMAE, AP, India, b. 6, enclosure to bulletin no. 460/
3568, from the Italian Consulate-General in Bombay to various recipients, includ-
ing the Foreign Office (24.9.37).
87 ASMAE, ibid.
88 ASMAE, AP, India, b. 7, 1938, enclosed with bulletin no. 227/3203, from the Ita-
lian Consulate in Bombay, 25th August 1938 to various recipients, including the
Foreign Office.
89 ASMAE, AP, India, b. 8, 1938, enclosed with express telegram n. 5531/726, from
the Italian General Consulate in Calcutta, 21st December 1938, to various reci-
pients, including the Foreign Office.
4 The Second World War

I did not meet Savarkar personally, though I certainly experienced his remark-
able influence, and I came into contact with many other Indian leaders in
Berlin, Constantinople, and Kabul. Indeed the German members of my Mis-
sion in Kabul were led to pursue our own strategic aims against the British rule,
and we were so struck by the profound patriotism of our Indian friends that we
had only India’s fate in mind, and Afghanistan became merely a geographical
starting point for the general struggle for India’s freedom.
Savarkar’s unswerving attitude carried us through the most formidable
struggles and his conduct was an example to all us. . . .
Savarkar deserves such a memorial in the light of precedence given to
Mahatma Gandhi and Pundit Nehru.1

1 Savarkar, president of the Hindu Mahasabha

After a 26 year-long detention, Vinayak Damodhar Savarkar was uncon-
ditionally released on 10th May 1937.2 He was elected president of the
Hindu Mahasabha at the party meeting held at Ahmedabad, a few days
after his release. Savarkar kept this position until 1942. Over his long
permanence at the head of the party, he could develop a specific political
line which, on one hand, was deeply leader-oriented, while, on the other
hand, it represented a remarkable evolution if compared with the previous
party policy.
Although Moonje had been president only for a year, his influence over the
party had also been strong and it can be said that he continued to virtually
lead the party until Savarkar took over.3 Moonje’s militaristic vision of Hindu
nationalism was shared by Savarkar right from the first years of the latter’s
exile at Ratnagiri. As head of the party, Savarkar maintained this policy,
although he added other elements, more in keeping with his personal back-
ground and ideas. Savarkar’s political thought can be defined as a kind of
radicalism with socialist leanings. He came across these ideas spontaneously,
along his political path, and adopted some of them. Although he had with-
drawn from Indian politics for many years, he probably came to know about
86 The Second World War
Italian facts from the Indian press that, as already seen, devoted a constant
attention to Italian politics. He might have been also aware of the Italian
activities in India.
Savarkar expressed his views about violence during a meeting with some
journalists, short after his release, on 25th June 1937 at the offices of the
Kesari. According to the police report on the subject,

He further said that . . . he was still of opinion that independence could

only be achieved through an armed revolution and the socialist would
not flinch to take up to arms, at the proper time. . . . It was therefore
welcome that socialism had been progressing in the Congress ranks. If
Socialists stood for the abolition of all religions in the world, he would be
the first man to join them. But if they aimed at the abolition of Hindu
religion only, he would oppose them, even though he was in agreement
with their economic and political ideology.4

Relations between the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS were as important as
ever. Right from his release, Savarkar attended meetings and made public
speeches, often to students. Most of these meetings were organised by local
RSS offices. Militants took part in these events in numbers and sometimes
Savarkar thanked them publicly.5 Neither could Hedgewar’s role be forgotten,
mentioned on several occasions by Savarkar in his speeches:

[. . .] congratulating the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh of Dr. Hedge-

war of Nagpur on its work and discipline.6

This tribute to the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh continued in the following
years. On 29th July 1939, Savarkar spoke in front of approximately 5,000, people
during the Guru Purnima celebrations organised by the RSS in Poona.7 Several
years later, during a RSS Officers’ Training Camp held in Poona between 27th
and 29th May 1943, in the presence of Golwarkar, who had taken Hedgewar’s
place at the head of the RSS, of Moonje, of his brother, Babarao and in front of
about 5,000 people (approx 1,000 were women), V. D. Savarkar, who was no
more president of the Hindu Mahasabha,

expressed his pleasure to see the display by Swayamsevaks in great

number and said that he was proud to see the branches of the Sangh
spread throughout India during his visits to various places. . . . He was
pleased to see the Hindu Youths, boys and girls, joining the institutions,
based on Hinduism, in great number.8

During these meetings, militants collected funds for donations to their newly
released leader. At the already mentioned 1943 Training Camp, Savarkar
celebrated his 61st birthday. On this occasion the Hindu leader received a
donation of about 180,000 rupees. The sum was made up of donations from
 The Second World War 87
9
Hindu organisations, the municipality of Poona and private individuals. A
few days before, in Bombay, Savarkar received a gift of 61,000 rupees.10 Other
large sums were donated by members of Hindu organisations at the towns he
visited during one of his political campaigns in the same period. In early
June, Savarkar was in Ahmedabad, invited by the Gujarat Provincial Hindu
Mahasabha. He received a similar sum there (the exact figure is not
specified).11
These public meetings were the ideal venue for Savarkar to explain
the ideas he had held for a long time, namely the impossibility to achieve the
unity between Muslims and Hindus, or his ideal of a Hindu nation. He
underlined that Hindus should arm themselves and organise from the military
point of view. “Militarise Hindudom and Hinduise All Politics” is the well-
known slogan, created, supported and disseminated by Savarkar. Passages
such as the following provide a clear picture of these two main tendencies in
Savarkar’s political thought:

You should not abandon Hinduism, even if you are offered Kingdom of
India. Hinduism and Independence are inter-dependent. The second
point is that you should all take military education. In my time I used to
practice lathi at midnight outside the village Nasik.12

The affinity with the project realised by Moonje was evident and Savarkar
underlined it clearly:

At present I see that many students know lathi practice and drill but now
they must go a step further and learn military education, for starting
which, I congratulate Dr. Munje.13

He concluded by saying that Germany had once done the same.14

2 Savarkar, Fascism and Nazism

According to a police report of a meeting held in a small village in early
February 1938, Savarkar, speaking to about 800 people, urged that Hindu
society should militarise. He told his listeners that:

All nations were preparing Arms and Mussolini had armed even children
with rifles.15 Savarkar was fairly outspoken in his views concerning
India’s international relations with countries other than Britain. He had
been released and had made his return to the political scene during in the
period between the signature of the Rome-Berlin Axis and Japan’s deci-
sion to join it. The exponents of the radical nationalism, as it will be
better explained in the following pages, appreciated this alliance and had
a very favourable attitude to the Axis powers.
88 The Second World War
On 1st August 1938, in Poona, Savarkar talked to more than 20,000 people. The
topic of his speech was “India’s foreign policy”. The following excerpts are
transcriptions of the main points he made on that occasion, as summarised in a
press statement issued by the Bombay office of the Hindu Mahasabha.

He observed India’s foreign policy must not depend on “isms”. Germany

has every right to resort to Nazism and Italy to Fascism and events have
justified that those isms and forms of Governments were imperative and
beneficial to them under the conditions that obtained there. Bolshevism
might have suited Russia and Democracy as it is obtained in Briton [sic]
to the British people.16

According to Savarkar, each political system of government was appro-

priate to the nature of the respective populations. Savarkar criticised Nehru’s
view regarding the attitude India should adopt toward the Axis powers.

Who are we to dictate to Germany, Japan or Russia or Italy to choose

a particular form of policy of Government simply because we woo it
out of academical [sic] attraction? Surely Hitler knows better than
Pandit Nehru does what suits Germany best. The very fact that Ger-
many or Italy has so wonderfully recovered and grown so powerful as
never before at the touch of Nazi or Fascist magical wand is enough to
prove that those political “isms” were the most congenial tonics their
health demanded.
India may choose or reject a particular form of Government, in accor-
dance with her political requirements. But Pandit went out of his way when
he took sides in the name of all Indians against Germany or Italy. Pandit
Nehru might claim to express the Congress Section in India at the most. But
it should be made clear to the German, Italian, or Japanese public that [. . .]
Hindu Sanghatanists in India whom neither Pandit Nehru or [sic] nor the
Congress represents, cherish no ill-will towards Germany or Italy or Japan
or any other Country in the World simply because they had chosen a form
of Government or constitutional policy which they though [sic] suited best
and contributed most to their National solidarity and strength.17

Savarkar actually defended Germany regarding the Sudetenland question:

[. . .] as far as the Czechoslovakia question was concerned the Hindu

Sanghatanists in India hold that Germany was perfectly justified in unit-
ing the Austrian and Sudeten Germans under the German Flag.
Democracy itself demanded that the will of the people must prevail in
choosing their own Government. Germany demanded plebiscite, the
Germans under the Czechs wanted to join their kith and kin in Germany.
It was the Czechs who were acting against the principle of democracy in
holding the Germans under a foreign sway against their will. . . . Now
 The Second World War 89
that Germany is strong why should she not strike to unite all Germans
and consolidate them into a Pan-German state and realise the political
dream which generations of German people cherished.18

On the eve of the Second World War, Savarkar felt he should publicly declare
what should be the approach of the Hindu organisations toward other
nations:

Any nation who helps India or is friendly towards her struggle for free-
dom is our friend. Any Nation which opposes us or pursues a policy
inimical to us is our foe. Towards those who do neither, India must
maintain an attitude of perfect neutrality refusing to poke her nose
unnecessarily into their internal or external policy.19

This speech was published by the famous German newspaper Volkischer

Beobachter, with a certain delay, on 30th November 1938.20
Only under Savarkar’s presidency the Hindu Mahasabha formulated its
own foreign policy, similar to the Congress line, inspired by Nehru. However,
among foreign political actors, Savarkar chose possible allies who were dif-
ferent from Nehru’s ones.
Savarkar’s reference to the German minorities in Czechoslovakia was a
clear comparison to the Indian situation. Speaking at Poona on 11th
October 1938,21 to approximately 4,000 people Savarkar went on, stating
that, if there were to be a plebiscite in India, Muslims would choose to
side with Muslims and Hindus with Hindus. He believed that neighbourly
relations between peoples, even over hundreds of years, was not enough to
forge a nation, since “The common desire to form a nation was essential
for the formation of a nation.”
It should be also noticed that after Savarkar’s appearance on the political
scene, the Hindu-Muslim relations took a more radical character. Savarkar
considered the policy adopted by the Muslim League as the main respon-
sible of the growth of separatist feelings among the Muslim community.
Many of Savarkar’s speeches reflected his belief that separation between
Hindus and Muslims was already a matter of fact. This kind of political
dialectic inflamed the sectors of the public opinion who were close to the
Hindu political organisations and led them to separatist feelings, similar to
those shared by the Muslims.
Between 1938 and 1939 the reactions of the Anti-Nazi League, the Con-
gress, and the progressive press toward German anti-Semitism and German
politics showed that Indian public opinion and the nationalist leaders were
fairly well informed about the events in Europe. If Bose, Savarkar and
others looked favourably upon racial discrimination in Germany or did not
criticise them, it cannot be said, to justify them, that they were unaware of
what was happening.
90 The Second World War
The great anti-Jewish pogrom known as “the Night of Broken Glass” took
place on 9th November 1938. In early December, pro-Hindu Mahasabha
journals published articles in favour of German anti-Semitism. This stance
brought the Hindu Mahasabha into conflict with the Congress which, on 12th
December, made a statement containing clear references to recent European
events. Within the Congress, only Bose opposed the party stance. A few
months later, in April 1939, he refused to support the party motion that Jews
might find refuge in India.22 Savarkar and the Hindu Mahasabha had a
similar opinion.
In sharp contrast with the Congress line, in occasion of a public meeting
held at Malegaon in the autumn 1938, Savarkar dealt at length with the
‘Jewish problem’ in Germany. According to him, India should follow the
German example to solve the ‘Muslim problem’:

A Nation is formed by a majority living therein. What did the Jews do in

Germany? They being in minority were driven out from Germany.23

Some time later, when the Congress passed the already mentioned motion,
during a public meeting held at Thana, at the presence of local RSS voluntary
workers and supporters, Savarkar stated that:

In Germany the movement of the Germans is the national movement but

that of the Jews is a communal one.24

On 29th July, in Poona, speaking about Hindu-Muslim relations, Savarkar

quoted the German anti-Jewish policy as an example:

Nationality did not depend so much on a common geographical area as

on unity of thought, religion, language and culture. For this reason the
Germans and the Jews could not be regarded as a nation.25

Without a common cultural, linguistic, and religious background, not even

Hindus and Muslims could reach the national unity. Muslims would just have
to accept being a minority whose rights depended upon the magnanimity of
the Hindu majority.
During the 21st congress of the Hindu Mahasabha held in December 1939,
Savarkar once more drew parallels between the ‘Jewish problem’ in Germany
and the ‘Muslim problem’ in India:

[. . .] the Indian Muslims are on the whole more inclined to identify

themselves and their interests with Muslims outside India than Hindus
who live next door, like Jews in Germany.26

On the basis of this principle,

 The Second World War 91
Just as the land of Germans is Germany . . . even so we must have it
indelibly impressed on the map of the earth of all times to come “Hin-
dustan” – the land of the Hindus.27

Ideas of this kind circulated beyond the Hindu Mahasabha, within the
broader Hindu political milieu. Golwarkar’s well-known statement is almost
coincident with Savarkar’s views:

German national pride has now become the topic of the day. To keep up
the purity of the nation and its culture, Germany shocked the world by her
purging the country of the Semitic races – the Jews. National pride at its
highest has been manifested here. Germany has also shown how well-nigh
impossible it is for races and cultures, having differences going to the root,
to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindustan
to learn and profit by.28

Golwarkar went further than Savarkar and even considered the possibility of
denying the Muslims citizens’ rights:

[. . .] in one word, they [Muslims] must cease to be foreigners or may

stay in the country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation claiming
nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment,
not even citizen’s rights.29

It is well-known that Golwarkar’s idea of nation was inspired by Johann

Kaspar Bluntschli, “an exponent of German ethnic nationalism” and author
of The Theory of the State.30
Hindu public opinion was continuously exposed to statements of this kind,
disseminated by any possible mean. The Mahratta of 6th January 1939 pub-
lished the article ‘The Savarkar Method of rejuvenation of the Hindudom.
New Drive in Hindu Thought and Action’. Savarkar’s concept was repeated:
“Germans are the nation in Germany and the Jews are a community”– more
or less the same words used by Savarkar.
The Second World War had broken out only a few months before, and the
Hindu Mahasabha’s policy was already influenced by the new international
atmosphere.

3 The Hindu Mahasabha and the Axis powers at the outbreak

of the Second World War
It is worth of interest to examine the Hindu Mahasabha policy during the
months leading to the outbreak of the Second World War and immediately
after. As war became more and more likely, Germany’s increasingly explicit
anti-British policy presented this nation as a possible ally for the Hindu
Mahasabha. Among the key elements to understand the Hindu Mahasabha
92 The Second World War
policy at that time are the well-documented relations between Savarkar and
Rash Behari Bose,31 who had lived in Japan for many years.
Soon after his arrival in Japan, on 5th June 1915, Rash Behari established links
with the German Consulate in Shanghai. On one hand he was engaged in liaising
with Indian revolutionaries expatriated in Japan and in the United States and, on
the other, in sending small consignments of arms to India on a regular basis.
In 1917 Rash Behari met Tarak Nath Das. In 1924 he founded the Indian
Independence League, whose role during the Second World War was to prove
most important. Rash Behari had created the slogan, “Asia for Asians”, and
firmly believed that Indian independence would pave the way for the indepen-
dence and freedom for other countries in Eastern Asia. India was a sort of bridge
for a vast Pan-Asiatic movement, stretching from the Middle to the Far East. In
1934 the Italian showed some interest, although rather careless, in Rash Behari
Bose. The Italian ambassador in Tokyo had been attracted by Rash Behari’s
periodical, The New Asia, published by the association bearing the same name.
The magazine aimed at “the complete independence for Asia”.32 It published
brief bulletins and comments concerning international politics and paid parti-
cular attention to questions relating to India, to the British policy, and to the
Middle East. Tarak Nath Das was the correspondent from Europe.
Italian sources provide information on Rash Behari’s early days in Japan.
In May 1934, the Italian Embassy in Tokyo sent to the Ministry of External
Affairs a report which, among other information, disclosed the connections
between Rash Behari and the local political context:

[. . .] following British insistence he was extradited . . . without the aid of the

“ronin” (a sort of errant knight) Mitsuru Toyama, president of the “Asso-
ciation of the Black Dragon” . . . a very powerful fellow, guardian of ancient
Yamato warrior traditions, and the terror of the ministries. Toyama took
Bose in as a house guest, and the police dared not arrest him. Mr. Bose then
married the daughter of a wealthy trader in Tokyo and became a subject of
the Emperor of Japan. He is one of the most ardent supporters of the cause
of freeing Asia from “the yoke of the white man”. The liberation should
obviously take place under Japan’s leadership.33

A record of February 1934 provides information on the Panasiatic movement,

Toyama and the Association of the Black Dragon.

The Pan-Asiatic movement in Japan is an extension of the movement for

Sino-Japanese unification. . . . The campaign for the “liberation of the Asian
races from white oppression” was revived after the Russo-Japanese war in
which, for the first time, a Western power was beaten by an Eastern one.
Heart and soul of this movement is the ronin Mitsuru Toyama . . . and his
reactionary, nationalist association, the Black Dragon.34

Furthermore:
 The Second World War 93
After the developments in Manchuria and Japan’s decision to abandon the
League of the Nations, the activities of the Pan-Asiatic movement increased,
also as a result of the government support. The so-called Monroe Doctrine
for Asia has been put forward. Politicians, army officers and writers are
uttering the new sentence “Asia for Asians”. One nationalist writer, Mr.
Hajime Hosoi . . . has organised with the help of the leaders of many “right
wing parties” . . . “The Young Asia League” . . . Its slogan is “Asia for
Asians” and its aim is a continent-wide union of Asian countries.35

The former Foreign Minister of Japan, Yoshizawa, Mitsuru Toyama, the

Mayor of Tokyo, the Ministers of Education and of Overseas Affairs as well
as the Legations of Afghanistan and Persia supported the League.
Rash Behari was involved with the Japanese right wing from the beginning.
It is not possible to know if the correspondence between Rash Behari and
Savarkar started during the latter’s period of confinement, immediately after
he was released, or in 1938. Actually, the first recorded correspondence
between the two dates back to 7th March 1938. Furthermore, at least two of
Rash Behari’s letters were published by Savarkar in The Mahratta.36 It was
expected that, after the publication of Rash Behari’s letters,

All Hindu Sanghatanists in India find themselves strengthened in their

views and activities to see you advocating the cause of Hindu Sanghatan
and taking up such a far seeing and insighted [sic] view of the Indian
situation Political and Social.37

Rash Behari Bose’s views and those of the Hindu Mahasabha were so similar
that Savarkar invited Rash Behari to send a message to the Hindu Maha-
sabha congress to be held in Nagpur on 28th December 1938.38
In the summer of 1938, Rash Behari had already told Savarkar that he
intended to open an office of the Hindu Mahasabha in Japan. It was to be

an authorised international mouth piece of the Hindu Mahasabha and

Hindudom as such in Eastern foreign countries.39

Savarkar approved Rash Behari’s proposal, encouraged him to put it in

practice, and advised him about what to do. Savarkar pointed out that the
Hindu Mahasabha offices abroad were to depend directly from the head-
quarters. 40 At this time, Savarkar also tried to liaise with the Italian, German
and Japanese Consulates in India. He hoped they could publish the press
communiqué related to his speech of 1st August in the respective countries.
For this task, Savarkar engaged Jugalkishor Birla,41 elder brother of the well-
known Calcutta industrialist, Ghanshyam Das Birla, who was a very keen
supporter of the Hindu Mahasabha. A copy of the press statement was sent
to Rash Behari too, not only to publish it in the local newspapers but also to
forward it to the Japanese government.42
94 The Second World War
While there is no archival evidence of any contacts between Savarkar and
the Italian Consulate or Consulate officials, plenty of records are available,
showing Savarkar’s connections with German agents. From November 1938
on, Savarkar had been writing to two German agents, G. L. Lesczczynski –
representative of the German News Agencies – and a certain P. Pazze. The
latter was fronting as a manager of a company based in Bombay,43 but he was
involved in propaganda activities orchestrated by the German Consulate.
These two fellows arranged the publication of Savarkar’s speech in the Volk-
ischer Beobachter. However, before going ahead with the publication,
Lesczczynski wanted to know how big was the party headed by Savarkar, in
order to know “exactly what amount of influence the Hindu Maha Sabha
wields in the country, the strength of its membership etc.”. On 22nd Novem-
ber, the party headquarters promptly informed Lesczczynski that:

So far as the Hindu Mahasabha is concerned it is an All India organisa-

tion representing Hindus just as the Moslem League represents the Mos-
lems. Its membership runs [sic] several thousands.44

Over the next few months, the relations between Germany and the Hindus
increased. In early December, Malekar sent Leszczynski a copy of an article
published in an unspecified “Marathi leading Daily”, in which Germany’s
conduct over the Jewish question was described in favourable terms. Two days
later, Leszczynski sent Savarkar a complimentary copy of Mein Kampf. 45
Germany and Japan were attracting the attention of radical nationalists to
a greater extent than Italy. Both, Germany and Japan, were well armed and
were capable to destroy Great Britain. Hindu nationalists admired the
German political system while, after its victories in China following the
invasion of 1937, Japan was seen as the champion of Asian nations in their
struggle against the Western powers. In a letter dated 9th July 1939, Rash
Behari Bose drew Savarkar’s attention to the increasing military might of
Japan and its success in China:

Japan considers it her God-sent mission to drive out British influence not
only from China but from the whole Asia eventually. I therefore hope
that the Indians, particularly the Hindus, will co-operate with Japan for
this object.46

In 1939 The Mahratta, now a periodical, published several articles on Ger-

many and Italy. The territorial claims of both nations were defended, while
British and French intransigence was seen as the main cause of Germany’s
annexation of Central Europe as well as the Italian invasion of Albania.47
The journal provided detailed accounts of the growing strength of the Rome-
Berlin Axis and the relations between the two countries. They had approa-
ched each other because both had been subject to an ‘encirclement policy’.48
According to the Berlin correspondent of the journal,
 The Second World War 95
Totalitarian States are eager not to have a war, but they want justice. The
democratic countries of England and France have taken nearly everything
and they will not brook any opposition. . . . Germany and Italy . . . are doing
their best. They have themselves made many guarantees and non-aggression
pacts to other States. The present German-Italian act is their chef-d’oeuvre,
and a fitting reply to the actions of England and France.49

On 8th and 15th December 1939 the article “Failure of Democracy and Rise
of Fascism” was published in two instalments. The topics were similar to
those already examined by the Kesari in the 1920s. The rise of Fascism was
described as a response to the crisis of the democratic systems. After provid-
ing an account of the early years of the fascist regime, the writer concluded
that Fascism was the only political force capable not only of overcoming the
crisis of the democratic system, but also the incapacity of reformers and
revolutionaries “of giving the new form to the society”. Fascism could only
be born out of the failures of socialism. Beyond all negative aspects of Fas-
cism – including the use of violence – Mussolini was seen as “a Fascist leader
possessing the most realistic political vision”. Although the sanghatanists
continued to show a great deal of interest on Fascism, by the spring of 1939,
Germany became the main point of reference of the Hindu Mahasabha, at
the international level. On 25th March 1939, the party spokesman stated:

Germany’s solemn idea of the revival of the Aryan culture, the glorifica-
tion of the Swastika, her patronage of Vedic learning and the ardent
championship of the tradition of Indo-Germanic civilization are welcomed
by the religious and sensible Hindus of India with a jubilant hope. Only a
few socialists headed by Pandit J. Nehru have created a bubble of resent-
ment against the present Government of Germany, but their activities are
far from having any significance in India. The vain imprecations of
Mahatma Gandhi against Germany’s indispensible [sic] vigour in matters
of internal policy obtain but little regard in so far as they are uttered by a
man who has always betrayed and confused the country with an affected
mysticism. I think that Germany’s crusade against the enemies of Aryan
culture will bring all the Aryan nations of the World to their senses and
awaken the Indian Hindus for the restoration of their lost glory.50

A month later, on 23rd April, Savarkar felt obliged to reply to the message
from Roosevelt to Hitler and Mussolini. In his cablegram, Savarkar told the
American president:

If your note to Hitler actuated by disinterested human anxiety for safe-

guarding Freedom and Democracy from Military Aggression pray ask
Britain too to withdraw her armed domination over Hindustan and let her
have free and selfdetermined Constitution. Great nations like Hindustan can
surely claim at least as much international justice as small nations do.51
96 The Second World War
Savarkar wanted a copy of his message to be distributed to all German, Ita-
lian and Japanese press agencies and delivered to Hitler in person. A leading
member of the Hindu Mahasabha, Indra Prakash, personally sent the mes-
sage to Leszczynski. Unable to contact the Italian and Japanese Consulates in
Calcutta, he sent copies directly to the Prime Minister of Japan and to Mus-
solini. Leszczynski sent a copy to Hitler. Indra Prakash requested Rash
Behari Bose to distribute the message to the Japanese news agencies.52

4 Subhas Chandra Bose: back in Italy

When the Italian authorities received information that Bose was about to
return to India, in February 1936, they sent a representative to Paris to
ask Bose to pay a short visit to Italy and, eventually, meet the duce. The
fascist regime was interested in collaborating with Bose because “Bose’s
influence in India has never ceased to be massive”.53 He was running,
together with Nehru, for the presidency of the Congress at Luknow. This
increased his importance. The meeting with Mussolini took place on the
last day of Bose’s stay in Italy as a guest of the Italian government, which
met his expenses.54 As usual for most of Mussolini’s meetings, there is no
record of the talks. It is however possible to notice that Bose’s journey in
Europe was influenced by his links with Italy and his relation with the
duce, whom Bose met at all special occasions, especially before and after
his departures, arrivals, movements.
Bose’s first trip to Europe paved the way for his further activities. Later,
during the war, Bose had to change his strategy, adapting it to the new
circumstances provoked by the war and their repercussions on the Indian
situation.
Subhas Chandra Bose left Italy on 27th March 1936 and on 8th April
he reached Bombay, where he was immediately arrested. He was released
in the spring of 1937. Over the summer months, before his second brief
trip to Europe toward the end of the year, Bose went to the Himalayas
and meditated upon recent developments in international relations,
prospects for the future, and the role he was to play. Japan’s aggression
on China brought him to side emotionally with China. Bose was, never-
theless, aware that Japan’s military strength was the consequence of the
birth of an Asian power, capable of threatening the interests of the
Western powers in Asia.

Japan has done great things for herself and for Asia. Her re-awakening at
the dawn of the present century sent a thrill throughout our Continent.
Japan has shattered the white man’s prestige in the Far East and has put
all the Western imperialist powers on the defensive. . . . She is extremely
sensitive – and rightly so – about her self-respect as an Asiatic race. She is
determined to drive out the Western powers.55
 The Second World War 97
Right the day after his arrival, on 25th January 1938 Subhash received a
letter from Rash Behari, who congratulated him for his appointment as pre-
sident of the Congress. Rash Behari drew up a list of what he thought the
Congress’s priorities should be:

What is now wanted for the Congress to lead the country correctly is to
have revolutionary mentality. . . . The fetish of non-violence should be
discarded and the creed should be changed. Let us attain our goal
through all possible means: violence or non-violence. The non-violence
atmosphere is simply making Indians womanly men. . . . The Congress
should devote attention to only one point, i.e. military preparedness. . . .
The Congress should agitate for control of the Army first, all branches of
Army. . . Strength is the real need . . . I think Mr. Moonji has done much
more than the Congress by establishing his military school.
Indians should first of all be the masters of the Army. They must
secure the right to bear arms.56

Rash Behari’s point of view is coincident with Savarkar’s political believes.

However, Rash Behari had a broader political vision, he looked at an inter-
national dimension which went far beyond the Indian borders:

The Congress should support the Pan-Asia movement. It should not

condemn Japan without understanding her motive in the Sino-Japanese
conflict. Japan is a friend of India and other Asiatic countries. Her chief
motive is to destroy British influence in Asia. She has begun with China.
The Congress ought to have a world look [sic]. International situation
should be studied and utilised for India’s benefit and interests. We should
make friends with Britain’s enemies. This should be our foreign policy . . .
Interest is always the basis. Japan is at present the eyesore of England,
Russia and America for obvious reasons . . . . The Congress had made a
great mistake by carrying on anti-Japanese movements. We should
remember that a time may come when England will shake hands with
Japan and control India pointing to [sic] Japan the anti-Japanese activ-
ities of the Indians in Japan’s hour of trial. It is now the best policy for
the Indians to support Japan and utilise this opportunity to increase their
influence in world politics extract [sic] as much concessions from Britain
now as possible.57

As far as democracy was concerned:

For a subject country dictatorship is absolutely necessary in a freedom

movement. As in time of war dictatorship is indispensable, at present in
India’s struggle for freedom dictatorship is equally indispensable.
Democracy is all right in peace time, but if it is observed in war time,
disaster is surely to overtake that country.58
98 The Second World War
The postscript of Rash Behari informed that a book by Subhas Chandra Bose
(probably The Indian Struggle) had been translated into Japanese and published in
a local periodical, evidence that Subhas Chandra was rather popular in Japan.59
On 22nd December 1938, Subhas met in Bombay two representatives of the
foreign branch of the national-socialist party, Oswald Urchs and Dr. F. Wul-
festieg. Urchs sent an account of the meeting to Berlin and observed that
Bose had expressed his reservations over the Nazi racial policy. Bose also felt
that Germany might be angling for an agreement with Great Britain. He was,
of course, eager to know precisely what Germany’s intentions were toward
India. Although Urchs had already advised his superiors that Bose was an
element to be reckoned with, until that time, no one in Berlin had given ser-
ious consideration to starting a collaboration with the Bengali leader.60
Within the Congress rumours began to circulate regarding contacts
between Bengali extremists and the Italian and German authorities. These
rumours soon reached the party leaders:

The weekly “Forward” published in Calcutta is rapidly becoming the

mouthpiece of propaganda on behalf of Italy, and to a lesser extent, on
behalf of Germany. Dr. Kalidas Nag, who was invited to become the
editor of this paper, also approached the Japanese Consul General for
some subsidy in return for publishing Japanese anti-British propaganda.
Lala Dina Nath of the daily “National Call”, who lives in Calcutta,
visited the Italian Consulate for regular publication of Italian news. The
“Amrita Bazar Patrika” is negotiating with the Italian Consul General to
become the mouthpiece of pro-Italian propaganda.
The Italian Consul General is reported to be in touch with the Con-
gress President who should, in his opinion, “make an end of Gandhian
non-violence, make the Congress a powerful youth organisation”.61

Although his name was not mentioned, the reference to Subhas Chandra Bose is
clear. Although the document is undated, it is well-known that Neta-ji was elec-
ted President of the Congress for a second term during the Tripuri session, in
March 1939. Since Subhas is referred to as the president, the note can be dated
to the period between his re-election and resignation, in May 1939. Most prob-
ably these suspicions led Gandhi to oppose Bose’s re-election at the Tripuri ses-
sion and, as a consequence, to Bose’s decision to leave the Congress.62
Nehru, who had tried to negotiate, corresponded with Subhas during the
spring of 1939. Their exchange shows to what extent the positions of the two
leaders regarding the international questions had more weight than the inter-
nal policy of the party. In a letter to Nehru of 28th March, Bose passionately
supported his views on the international situation and used provocative tones:

In international affairs, your policy is perhaps more nebulous. I was

astounded when you produced a resolution before the Working Commit-
tee sometime [sic] ago seeking to make India an asylum for the Jews.
 The Second World War 99
Foreign policy is a realistic affair to be determined largely from the point
of view of a nation’s self-interest. . . . Now, what is your foreign policy,
pray? Frothy sentiments and pious platitudes do not make foreign policy.
It is no use championing lost causes all the time and it is no use con-
demning countries like Germany and Italy on the one hand and on the
other, giving a certificate of good conduct to British and French Imperi-
alism. . . . I have been urging . . . everybody . . . including Mahatma
Gandhi and you, that we must utilise the international situation to India’s
advantage and . . . present the British government with our National
Demand in the form of an ultimatum.63

On 3rd April Nehru replied:

The fact that in international affairs you held different views from mine
and did not wholly approve our condemnation of Nazi Germany or
Fascist Italy added to my discomfort.64

5 The Second World War

On 7h September 1939, at the start of the war, a certain Mandlekar wrote
Savarkar a long letter in which he outlined the stance to be taken at the
Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha planned for 10th September.
The subject of the meeting was the recent international developments. Man-
dlekar suggested that

no reference should be made to the justice or otherwise of the claim of

residents of Danzig to return to the Reich; for, in principle we shall have
to support the action of the Germans of Danzig; not that we should
denounce this but then under no circumstances can we take part in this
War on the side of British.
Hindu Sabha should declare an attitude on Neutrality . . .65

This stance was highly ambivalent. Mandlekar suggested neutrality with regard
to Germany, but not an open opposition to the British government. This thin
dive was to underpin the later, decidedly ambivalent, policy of the Hindu
Mahasabha, not only regarding the international situation and the war, but also
the internal politics and the relations with the government. The two issues were
intertwined.
At the Working Committee of 10th September, the Hindu Mahasabha
expressed its position of neutrality toward Germany, as agreed previously:

The Working Committee does not believe in the claims of any Power
among the belligerent Nations engaged in the present War in Europe of
which are themselves Imperialistic in character and outlook, to the effect
100 The Second World War
that it has been actuated solely by moral and altruistic considerations
apart from its own national self-interest.66

The Committee went on to make demands which would have to be fulfilled as

soon as possible, in order to allow India to face the emergency provoked by
the war. The fulfilment of these requests was considered as a preliminary
condition for a collaborative attitude toward the British.

As the task of defending India from any military attack is of common concern
to the British Government as well as ourselves and as we are unfortunately
not in a position today to carry out that responsibility unaided, there is ample
room for whole hearted co-operation between India and England.67

The ambivalence of the Hindu Mahasabha could hardly be more evident.

While, on one hand, Britain’s reasons for entering into the war were condemned as
fake and egoistic, on the other the Hindu Mahasabha was prepared to collaborate
with the British to defend India. Initially, the Working Committee demanded also,
as another condition, Britain’s recognition of a central government of India, with
full powers. On this specific point, the Hindu Mahasabha compromised. Other
requests were a programme of military training for the Indian population and the
‘Indianisation’ of the army, to be completed as soon as possible. There should be
no more discrimination between the so-called “martial” and “non-martial clas-
ses”. The Hindu Mahasabha also called for changes to the Arms Act, according
to the laws applying in the Great Britain, the recruitment, at the national scale, of
territorial forces and paramilitary groups of university students and the institution
of military organisations in the provinces where they were absent. Furthermore, a
larger number of cadets should be enrolled in the military academies. The gov-
ernment was also required to modernise the industrial manufacturing of arms, so
that India should not depend on other nations and could equip its own army.
It should be remembered that, later on, the Hindu Mahasabha concentrated
its efforts on the creation of a Hindu National Militia, which enrolled into its
ranks only young Hindu men, from eighteen to forty years old. The document
went on criticising the Muslim League and accusing it of taking advantage of the
international crisis to promote the interests of the Muslim community alone.
Also the Congress was blamed, not only for not representing Hindus but also for
having dealings both with the League and the government behind the back of the
Hindu Mahasabha. The latter portrayed itself as the only political organisation
capable of representing the interests of the majority of Indians, in opposition to
the Congress and the League.
After the Working Committee had presented its resolution, the leaders of the
Hindu Mahasabha concentrated immediately on the key issue of organising a
national militia. On 15th September, Moonje sent a letter to a number of some
party cadres to inform them of the program presented at the Working Commit-
tee decisions taken and to request them to take part in the meetings to put the
program into practice.
 The Second World War 101
On 27th September, Moonje sent out a circular letter to invite the party
members to a meeting in Poona planned for 8th October. He described the
role of the organisation to be founded:

I have the pleasure in bringing to your notice a resolution of the Hindu

Mahasabha for the organisation of the Hindu Militia in the country for
the purpose of taking part in the defence of India both from external and
internal aggression, whenever an occasion of emergency may arise during
the course of the Anglo-German War.
. . . I believe that it will be quite in the fitness of things, in view of the
historic All-India Military leadership of the Maharashtra, that a begin-
ning should be made in the Maharashtra; so that the lead may be taken
up by the whole of India afterwards.68

Who else could be this “internal” enemy, if not the Muslims and the Congress?
Records are very clear, on this aspect. In an appeal bearing as a title the name of
the new militia, Rama Sena, Moonje listed the main differences between the
Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress. The Congress held to a non-violent line,
which Moonje considered a “cult of the charkha”. On the other hand, the
Muslim League and other more radical Islamic groups such as the Khaksars and
Khudai Khidmatgars, were re-organising along paramilitary lines. The Hindu
Mahasabha, in its efforts to represent the Hindu majority, differed from the
Congress but had not fallen victim to the “Sectarian Communal fanaticism”
displayed by the Muslims. Nevertheless, Moonje observed, caution was required:

But there is one worry which is meenacingly [sic] uppermost in its mind at
the present moment and that is – what will happen if, in the mutually
antagonistic and clashing ideologies, the Charka were to come into conflict
with the Rifle . . .?69

Moonje did not exclude the threat of civil war, caused by a possible clash between
non-violent Gandhians and armed Muslims. According to him, the Hindu Maha-
sabha had no alternative, but taking up arms and forming a corps of voluntary
fighting men. As first step, the Working Committee was asked to draw up a list of
organisations already engaged in the military training of the youths, and to select
among them only the most suitable for the new militia.70 The correspondence of
October 1939 between Moonje, Hedgewar, General Nanasahib Shinde from
Baroda, Khaparde, and a certain Jadhava71 discloses the main mission of the mili-
tia which, as described in the records, should have an anti-Muslim character.
Moreover, the RSS was to play a leading role in its organisation. The prospect of
defending India from possible aggressions of the Axis powers is not mentioned.
General Shinde, in a letter to Moonje dated 16th October, was happy to inform
him that Sikandar Hayat Khan, leader of the Unionist Party in power in Punjab,
was no longer alone in his task to organise 50,000 men for the defence of India. On
18th October, Moonje’s reply contained an explicit reference to the RSS:
102 The Second World War
I am glad to note that you have approved of my idea of a Hindu National
Militia for Maharashtra as is being organized by the Hindu Mahasabha.
I have been myself thinking of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and
I am corresponding with their leader. They may have their peculier [sic]
difficulties and the point is that the Militia should be organised under
these circumstances whether the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh can
undertake the task or not.72

Moonje’s own military school could play a part in organising the militia.

I can make arrangement of training free of charge . . . seargents [sic] in

my School. . . . After these Seargents are trained they will be located in
different centres throughout the Maharashtra and they will recruit and
train Militias in their own centres and will keep a register of their own;
besides a consolidated register of all such centres would be kept in the
central office.73

The same day, also on behalf of Shinde, Moonje wrote to Hedgewar asking
to join forces with him. Moonje intended to discuss all these questions on the
occasion of his meeting with Hedgewar, planned for the end of the month in
Nagpur. The RSS, thus, had the chance to fulfil its aim: militarise Hindu
society at the expense of the Muslims.
Also on 18th October, Moonje wrote also to Khaparde and warned that

the Moslems are making themselves a nuisance. The Congress Govern-

ment will not stand up but will yield to them. We cannot expect any
consideration at the hands of the Congress Government. We shall have to
fight both the Government and the Moslems just as the Khaksars are
doing in the U.P. The Hindu Mahasabha will give its support to such
fights as the Muslim League is supporting the Khaksars: you must pre-
pare the volunteers in your towns. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
may be useful and handy.74

On 27th October, a Lahore militant informed Moonje that:

We have at present in Punjab several Dals and Sanghs, the total number
of members of which is approximately about 50,000; but they are not
working under a single organisation. There are Rashtriya Sevak Sangh,
Atma Sangh, Mahabir Dal, Seva Sangh and Akali Dal working under
different leaders. They have a sort of military organisation. The Akali
Dal is armed with swords: but the others have other weapons. The
Rashtriya Sevak Sangh has only lathies. The first thing to do is to bring
all these sanghs on a uniform basis working under a single leadership
though not of one man but of a council.75
 The Second World War 103
The Hindu radical organisations were armed, albeit in some cases in a rudi-
mentary manner and there was, at least in Punjab and Maharashtra, a cli-
mate of mobilisation. A force of 50,000 men was significant, even if they were
only trained militants and not proper soldiers.
Among all opinions in favour of the creation the Hindu contingents, the
only dissonant voice was that of a certain Jadhava, who wrote to Moonje on
19th October 1939:

To form two separate Militias based on religious differences is to invite a

communal quarrel every now and then. The Mahomedans are competent
to form a united body. The Hindus are by nature fissipari [. . .] their
Militia will hardly form a compact body. I am afraid of serious difficulties
after the Militia come into existence.
I think that an Indian Militia irrespective of caste or creed should be
organised.76

More than a year earlier, the British authorities expressed doubts, with regard to
Moonje’s military school, which were similar to those expressed by Jadhava. On
17th May 1938 the Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland, had told the Vice-
roy that, although the school had been founded with the intention of enrolling
students from all communities, it had become an exclusively Hindu institution.77
The Secretary of State was only partially reassured by the fact that the Viceroy and
the Commander-in-Chief had officially approved the founding of the school.
However, Linlithgow had come to regret his earlier decision to support the school.

I am by no means enthusiastic about this venture, but when I came here

it had already reached a stage at which it would have been undesirable
and difficult for me to dissociate myself wholly from it, more particularly
as Chetwode has given Moonje a very strong public commendation and
Willingdon had not only commended the project but had given a dona-
tion. I have confined my association with it to a donation of the same size
of Willingdon’s, and to somewhat jejune and carefully guarded messages
on two occasions . . . While Moonje claims that its primary object is to
serve as a feeder to the I.M.A., its Articles of Association specifically
state that its object is to give instruction to Hindu youth, &c.; and I am
myself apprehensive that it is likely to develop on Hindu communal lines.
But I have not taken this too seriously, for I think the prospect of
Moonje’s getting all the money he wants or of ever being able to make
anything of his College is insufficiently great to justify us in feeling any
very marked concern. His whole object, of course, has I suspect been to
produce a counterblast to Aligarh.78

The Hindu National Militia was not to be. However, preparations for the
reorganisation of the Hindu community along paramilitary lines were to have
an effect on future developments.
104 The Second World War
Also Rash Behari Bose expressed his views on the militarisation issue. At
the end of October 1939, he wrote to Savarkar and explained which stand the
Hindu Mahasabha should adopt and which prerogatives the Hindu society
should have, once this had been reorganised. Rash Behari’s wish was that
India created an alliance with Japan and China to form a Pan-Asiatic front,
opposed to the British rule.

I am glad to know that the Hindu Maha Sabha sympathises with Japan
in her attempt to rid China of foreign influences. A new government is
shortly going to be established in China, and it will co-operate with Japan
against British influence. As soon as it is established, you should, if pos-
sible, in your capacity as the President of the Hindu Mahasabha, send a
letter of congratulation to it. Efforts should be made for Hindu-Buddhist
solidarity among India, China and Japan.79

By reorganisation of the Hindu society Rash Behari meant standardisation

of religious practices and people’s customs, and militarisation.

The old ways of thinking and doing would be of no avail. Especially the
Hindu community must discard the old ways and adopt new ways and
methods. There should be standardisation of customs, manners, food, dress,
religious ceremonies etc. There should be a well organised corps of Hindu
volunteers in every village, town and city under the Hindu Maha Sabha
whose duties would be to educate and protect Hindus and Hinduism.80

Also Rash Behari acknowledged the relationship between Hinduism and

militarisation, and supported the Hindu Mahasabha choices. On the other
hand, he attacked the Congress and Gandhi, whose influence on Indian pol-
itics he considered “pernicious”. Rash Behari insisted that democracy was of
no use to the struggle for independence:

Indians generally speak of democracy without fully understanding the

significance of the word. No nation has been able to attain freedom
through democracy. It is through autocracy that nations secure their
freedom and expansion. For preserving the interests of a country,
democracy is all right. But for development, progress and expansion,
autocracy is absolutely indispensable.81

Savarkar, on his part, worked to obtain political results. At the beginning of

October 1939, the Viceroy invited to a meeting in Delhi the leaders of the
most important political groupings, Gandhi, Jinnah, Savarkar, Ambedkar,
Subhas Chandra Bose, and a number of representatives of less important
organisations, as well as exponents of the native states. The meeting between
the Viceroy and Savarkar took place on 9th October. Linlithgow provided the
Secretary of State with an account of Savarkar’s proposals.
 The Second World War 105
The situation, he said, was that His Majesty’s Government must now
turn to the Hindus and work with their support. After all, though we and
the Hindus had had a good deal of difficulty with one another in the
past, that was equally true of the relations between Great Britain and the
French and, as recent events had shown, of relations between Russia and
Germany. Our interests were now the same and we must therefore work
together. Even though now the most moderate of men, he had himself
been in the past an adherent of a revolutionary party, as possibly, I might
be aware. (I confirmed that I was). But now that our interests were so
closely bound together the essential thing was for Hinduism and Great
Britain to be friends; and the old antagonism was no longer necessary.
The Hindu Mahasabha, he went on to say, favoured an unambiguous
undertaking of Dominion Status at the end of the war. It was true, at the
same time, that they challenged the Congress claim to represent anything
but themselves.82

As to the possibility that Congress ministers might resign, as threatened,

Savarkar commented that “he could produce much better men to fill the
places so vacated”. This sentence confirms that the Hindu Mahasabha was
perfectly willing to accept government posts and collaborate with the gov-
ernment. Savarkar assured that

With the Congress out of the way and the general governmental situation
in a state of dissolution, they might be able to produce some extremely
good advisers.83

Savarkar also wanted to know if the Viceroy was considering taking on

Muslim advisers, to face the political crisis that was likely to come about if
Congress members were to resign. As the meeting drew to a close, the Viceroy
asked Savarkar “whether I could look for some general support from the
Mahasabha in relation to whatever might be done at the Centre”.84
Savarkar replied that

without asking public opinion he was disposed to think that the answer
would be “Yes”, once the Mahasabha knew the scheme.85

Regarding militarisation, Savarkar remarked:

. . . the importance of military training for Hindus and the repeal of

the Arms Act; of a national militia; of compulsory military training
for the educated youth of the Hindu community, and the readjustment
of the plan of recruitment for the ordinary Indian Army in favour of
Hindu classes at present without a real chance of securing admission
to the Army.
106 The Second World War
It was of the out most importance, he said, that we should chastise the
frontier tribes now. . . . But the chastisement must be with Hindu troops,
the only troops on which we could rely!86

At the time, Savarkar had still in mind the Italian model. On 21st January
1940, at a meeting attended by about 4,000 participants, while addressing the
issue of military training and how this was to be imparted, he informed the
listeners that “In Italy a man from his boyhood up to old age is given Mili-
tary training.”87
In 1940, the Viceroy decided to extend the membership of the Executive
Council to prominent Indians, representing significant sectors of the society. He
also decided to create the War Council with representatives from the main poli-
tical forces in India. While the Congress refused to take part, the representatives of
the Hindu Mahasabha and the League agreed to participate in the preparatory
meetings to define the terms of the presence of their members to the Councils.88
The Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha’s, chaired by Moonje, held in
Bombay on 22nd September 1940, approved the following resolution:

In view of opportunity that present war offers for general militarization of

Hindus and organisation of system of India on sound modern lines so that
India may be converted into self-contained defence unit, Mahasabha is pre-
pared whole-heartedly to work out schemes of expansion of Executive Council
and War advisory Council but on honourable terms of equity and justice. . .89

It is well known that, when the Viceroy promised that no powers would be
transferred to a system of government without the consent of a wide range of
powerful sectors of the Indian political scene, the Working Committee of the
Hindu Mahasabha replied with a resolution where it declared it would toler-
ate no violation of Hindu interests (and not the interests of all Indians).90
The remarkable correspondence exchanged between Moonje, Savarkar and
the Viceroy in 1940 illustrates the fierce competition between the Hindu
Mahasabha and the League over the seats to be reserved to their representa-
tives within the Councils. Each party controlled the results obtained by the
opposing front in view of future constitutional developments in India. In
those days, Moonje made full use of the power conferred upon him as vice-
president of the Hindu Mahasabha and had a prominent role in the negotia-
tions with the Viceroy. On 19th August, Savarkar provided Lord Linlithgow
with a list of Hindu Mahasabha members for inclusion in the prospected
Executive Council. The list included Moonje and Shyama Prasad Mookerji.91
In a letter of 26th September the Viceroy, Moonje remarked that the Hindus

will be in a position to give immensely large help both in men, material and
intellect than the Muslim League can hope to do, in organising the defence
of India, on modern scientific lines. . . . Thus, Hindustan and Britain are
allied together in unshakable bond of union for long long years to come.92
 The Second World War 107
The government ignored the insistent demands of the Hindu Mahasabha to
provide the Hindus with arms. It decided not to ease up the restrictions in
force at that time or to increase the quantity of arms for military or para-
military schools and organisations. As proved by the voluminous corre-
spondence between Savarkar and the Viceroy throughout 1941,93
militarisation was the other side of the collaboration offered by Hindu
Mahasabha to the government. The Hindu Mahasabha pointed out that
institutional collaboration and defence of the nation could turn in favour of
Britain’s position in India. This strategy was the new version of the old
responsive co-operation. The Hindu Mahasabha historians believe that
Savarkar shared Tilak’s political vision, according to which a specific end
could be reached by several means.94 In the presidential speech held in
1942, Savarkar publicly declared that

the policy of Responsive Cooperation . . . covers the whole gamut of

patriotic activities from unconditional cooperation to active and even
armed resistance.95

This position is contradictory and objectionable. It is hard to deny the colla-

borationist attitude of the Hindu Mahasabha.
The keystone to understand the ambiguity of the Hindu Mahasabha’s role
in Indian national struggle is militarisation. According to biased accounts, the
collaboration offered by the Hindu Mahasabha to the British aimed at pro-
viding the Hindu masses with arms and military training which would other-
wise be beyond their reach, given the restrictions in force. These arms might
be used against the British, at the right moment or if the occasion came.96
The British were fully aware of these possible intentions.97 Various measures
were taken and they refused to allow the Hindu Mahasabha to arm itself or
to repeal the Arms Act. According to some scholars sympathetic to the Sangh
Parivar, in the 1940s Savarkar was working toward an aim he had cherished
since the early 20th century: gathering as many arms as possible and rising up
against the British when the right moment came.98

6 Re-writing history: different interpretations of the meeting

between Subhas Chandra Bose and Savarkar
To confirm this interpretation, Hindu right-wing scholars point out a circum-
stance where Savarkar openly supported a possible alliance with the Axis powers.
The episode is the meeting between, Savarkar and Subhas Chandra Bose, which
took place in Bombay on 22nd June 1940.99 During the meeting, Savarkar sug-
gested that Bose should go to Europe and ask for support from the Axis powers.
There is some discordance about the date of the meeting. According to
police records, it was on 22nd June, while according to other sources it took
place on 29th June and was secret. Savarkar disclosed it on the occasion of
the disbanding of the Abhinav Bharat, in 1952.100 In spite of the secrecy of
108 The Second World War
the meeting, it was registered, as always, by the British authorities and also
the press noticed it. The Times of India of 24th June 1940 published the arti-
cle ‘Communal Unity Move. Mr. Bose’s effort in Bombay’, where it was
reported that

Mr. Bose had also talks with Mr. V.D. Savarkar, President of the All
India Hindu Mahasabha, at the latter’s residence at Dadar on Saturday
evening. It is understood that the discussions related to the present poli-
tical situation in the country and the steps the Hindu Mahasabha and the
“Forward Bloc” should take in co-operation with other parties. The
results of the talks, it is stated, were not encouraging.101

According to the police,

Subhas Chandra Bose arrived in Bombay on June 22nd and had discus-
sions with M. A. Jinnah and V. D. Savarkar with a view of exploring the
possibilities of co-operation between the Forward Bloc and the Hindu
Mahasabha respectively. Bose’s efforts were apparently productive of no
result. The Bombay Forward Bloc endeavoured to arrange a meeting on
June 23rd at which Subhas Chandra Bose would speak, but it was
necessary to abandon the meeting on account of lack of support.102

The two leaders had already met in 1938 in Calcutta. On that occasion,
apparently, Savarkar told Bose that he had decided to return to revolutionary
activities.103
Archival sources contain no reference to the meeting. However, according to a
version accepted by pro-Hindu authors, Savarkar told Bose that the situation of
the moment was similar to the conditions prevailing during the First World
War.104 Now, it seemed again possible to create a liberation army. According to
this reconstruction, Savarkar would have informed Bose about the news received
from Rash Behari, who had reasons to believe that Japan would enter the war by
the end of the year.105 This might be the right time for an invasion of India on
the part of soldiers equipped with modern Japanese and German arms.
According to this account, Savarkar had suggested that Bose take command of
the Indian prisoners of war in Italy and Germany, proclaim India’s indepen-
dence and, as soon as Japan declared war, invade India from Burma or the Gulf
of Bengal. The nationalists serving under the British ranks and the paramilitary
groups were to spearhead the advance of the liberation army. Savarkar informed
Bose about the British intention to arrest him soon and suggested that, like Rash
Behari, he seek refuge in Europe or Japan.
This account of the meeting follows real historical developments so closely
that it may well be a fabrication. According to a more reliable version, based
on the eyewitness account of Savarkar’s bodyguard, a certain Shri Kasar,
Rash Behari asked Savarkar to lead a revolt he was planning in the Far East
or to send someone suitable in his place. Savarkar refused to take on this
 The Second World War 109
responsibility but suggested three suitable people, Moonje, Subhas Chandra
Bose and Tarasingh.106 Another reconstruction is that, on two occasions,
Rash Behari sent missives to Bengali revolutionaries requesting Subhas’ pre-
sence in Japan.107 Subhas Chandra Bose had been liaising with the Japanese
representatives in Calcutta since 1938 and sent an emissary to Japan to meet
Rash Behari, in order to inquire about the real intentions of Rash Behari and
the Japanese.108 Whichever version is correct, it is hard to say that Savarkar
suggested Bose contact the Japanese, since Subhas had been contemplating
Japan as a possible ally already in 1937.
From his side, Bose mentioned his meeting with Savarkar in The Indian
Struggle and observed that the president of the Hindu Mahasabha seemed
unconcerned about the international situation. Savarkar’s main priority, Bose
believed, was rather the military training of the Hindus and their conscription in
the British army in India.109 On the other hand, on 25th June 1944 Bose, during
a Radio Singapore broadcast, spoke about Savarkar in the following terms:

When due to misguided political whims and lack of vision almost all the
leaders of the Congress party have been destroying all the soldiers in
Indian Army as mercenaries, it is heartening to know that Veer Savarkar
is fearlessly exhorting the youths of India to enlist the Armed Forces.
These enlisted youths themselves provide us with trained men and sol-
diers for our Indian National Army.110

The debate about the supposed talks between Bose and Savarkar and their
subject reminds another similar event, the meeting Bose twice tried to orga-
nise with Hedgewar, in 1939 and on 20th June 1940, the day before Hedge-
war’s death. According to the two biographies of Hedgewar, one in Hindi and
one in English,111 Bose and Hedgewar did not meet on either occasion
because Hedgewar was seriously ill. The founder of the RSS died on 21st
June 1940. Bose engaged the general secretary of the RSS, G. M. Huddar, to
arrange the meeting with Hedgewar. According to Huddar, Hedgewar was
not at all interested to meet Bose.112 Furthermore, when Hedgewar tried to
meet Bose in 1928 in Calcutta, during the annual session of the Congress,
Bose met Hedgewar just for a few minutes. At that time, indeed, Hedgewar
was an unknown local leader. Bose’s comment, at the end of the meeting,
was: “the Hindu society is almost a dead society. I don’t think it can again
become active and militant”.113
In conclusion, it seems that Bose had never been a particularly keen sup-
porter of Hindu nationalism. His own idea of nationalism was secular.114 The
INA, for instance, enlisted Indians regardless of their religious beliefs, and it
included a number of Muslims.
How to explain, then, the discrepancies between biased literature, eye-
witnesses and official records? According to some authors, Bose minimised
the meeting in order to protect Savarkar from possible suspicions. Bose was a
self-declared revolutionary, constantly watched by the police. However, when
110 The Second World War
The Indian Struggle was published in 1942, Bose was already in Europe, while
Savarkar was in India. Had Bose admitted that he had been instructed by
Savarkar, the latter might have suffered as a consequence.
There is enough reason to doubt the veracity of the reconstruction of the
meeting between Bose and Sarvarkar. Last but not least, there are no references,
in Savarkar’s correspondence, of a plan to join forces with a foreign power.
It should be remembered that Savarkar disclosed the subject of the meeting four
years after Gandhi’s assassination, when the image of the Hindu Mahasabha was
damaged from its heavy implication in the incident. Worsening the position of the
Hindu Mahasabha was the charge of collaboration with the British.
Some scholars believe that this interpretation of the events was sponsored
by the RSS in an attempt to indirectly attack Nehru and rehabilitate Bose,
who, at that time, had become rather unpopular among the Hindus.115
However, this interpretation completely overlooks the fundamental diver-
gences between Savarkar and Bose over the Muslim question. Bose had
always been close to the Muslims and had occasionally collaborated with
them, much to the displeasure of the Hindu nationalists.
It is therefore more likely that Savarkar, acting on behalf of Hindu militant
circles, tried to legitimise their objectionable stance. Associating his own image
with that of an Indian leader whose prestige stood unchallenged, such as Subhas
Chandra Bose, presenting himself as Netaji’s mentor and guide, Savarkar tried
to rehabilitate his position and that of Hindu radical nationalism.
Savarkar was probably considering the possibility of calling upon the national-
ists enlisted and trained in the British army and to revolt. He actually admitted his
intention. Although there is no proof that Savarkar stood behind Bose, it cannot
be ruled out that, on Bose’s return, the Hindu nationalists might have supported
him. Certainly, both Savarkar and the Hindu nationalists knew of Bose’s plans.
According to a memorandum drawn up by British Intelligence of 1st February
1941, Sarat Chandra Bose and a number of unidentified Hindu Mahasabha lea-
ders were informed about the intentions of Subhas, and the plans Rash Behari and
Raja Mahendra Pratap were preparing with the Japanese aid.116
It may be concluded that, at least at that time, Savarkar was more interested in
obtaining government and administrative posts for the Hindu Mahasabha, than
getting involved in an armed revolt. With the war in full swing, during the period
leading up to the Quit India Movement, Savarkar and the Hindu Mahasabha, as
was their wont, wavered and were ambivalent. Shortly after Japan’s declaration
of war and Japanese troops attacked Rangoon on 14th December 1941, Savar-
kar publicly declared that a joint effort was required to defeat “Japan and her
Fascist allies in Europe”.117 Just two months later, on 17th February 1942,
Savarkar stated that if Japan approached the Indian border with the intent to
invade and declared it would be ready to grant India its independence, this would
inflame Indians. He advised the British to do whatever they could to convince
the Indians that by fighting by Britain’s side they were striking out for their
freedom. Savarkar repeated this message in the resolution passed by the Working
Committee held at Lucknow on 28th February and 1st March 1942.118
 The Second World War 111
7 Toward independence
The response of the Hindu Mahasabha to the failure of the Cripps mission is
to be found in a letter from Savarkar to the Viceroy, dated 5th July 1942.
With regard to independence, Savarkar repeated what he had already stated
in February.

To be plain, the Japanese or the Germans can only promise Indepen-

dence for India after the conclusion of the War. If but the British Gov-
ernment promises unequivocally to grant that very Independence added
to co-partnership in the Indo-British-Commonwealth on equal terms, the
Japanese and the Germans would be surely deprived of the only stunt
they can utilise today with some effect against England so as to nullify
the democratic objective which Britain professes to defend and maintains
to be the cause which forced the War on her.119

This was a rather indirect way of telling the British that if independence were
to come to India after the war, then it was better to accept German and Japanese
offers and reach independence with their help, even after the war. Declarations
of this kind must have been influenced by the Japanese invasion of the Andaman
Islands in March 1942. This event must have also determined the refusal of the
Hindu nationalists to take part in the Quit India Movement. Japan’s military
might have given to the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha the tangible sensation
of the Allies’ imminent fall. This idea incentivised the Hindu Mahasabha to
negotiate with the future, possible victors, the Axis powers. The Hindu wavering
attitude of the Hindu Mahasabha was also based on the belief, widespread not
only among the Hindus, that the British would be obliged to leave India. There
was therefore no more need to adopt a coherent collaborative attitude, but it was
more advisable to explore possible alternatives.
It is hard to assess if the militarisation process to which cooperated the
Hindu Mahasabha, the RSS and a host of other smaller associations, groups
and local military schools, obtained tangible results. It is also impossible to
quantify the number of people who actually took part to this process since,
apart from the military schools, membership of these organisations was
secret. No information is available regarding the efficacy of the campaign of
Hindus’ enlistment in the army and it is impossible to establish if the recruits
figures, within that community, grew.120 The paramilitary strength of the RSS
can be indirectly measured by the uneasiness the British authorities began to
show toward the RSS potential force, at the beginning of the 1940s. The
British suddenly realised they had, up to that moment, underestimated the
RSS potential. According to an Intelligence report of March 1943,121

Provinces, particularly the Central Provinces, Bihar, the United Provinces,

Bombay and the Punjab, regard the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh as a
harbourage of considerable potential danger. Alliance with the Hindu Maha
112 The Second World War
Sabha, extending in degree to the latter’s control, is not doubted, although
this has not been proved. The Sangh has been described as the Hindu
answer to the Khaksars; it is anti-British; it has shown signs of pro-Japanese
bias; in its organisation and behaviour Fascist tendencies are obvious.122

The British authorities were considering banning the RSS annual training
camps.
A report of March 1942 provides some details about the extension of the
RSS and the number of adherents, which grew uninterruptedly between 1936
and 1941. The RSS had 200 branches and 25,000 members in 1936; 350
branches and 40,000 members in 1938; 500 branches and 60,000 members in
1939, 700 branches and 80,000 members in 1940; 700 branches and 150,000
members in 1941.
Furthermore,

The volunteers are organised in military formations – platoons, compa-

nies and battalions – and strict discipline is maintained.123

It is not possible to ascertain how many of these militants would have joined
the INA, if the occasion came. The documents contain no reference to this
aspect and witnesses in favour of this hypothesis are subsequent to the facts.
Moonje, speaking in Nagpur on 11th November 1945 on the Indian
National Army Day, suggested that, at a certain moment, conditions could
have been favourable to support, from within the country, Bose’s possible
invasion of India:

If there had not been such a religious and fanatical propaganda of Non-
Violence during the last 25 years since Mahatma Gandhi came into the
Congress and if the programme of Militarisation as propounded by the
Hindu Mahasabha would have been carried on with impetuous enthu-
siasm all round and if the recruits in the Army, instead of being con-
demned as mercenaries as they were by the Congress leaders, had been
sent into the Army with the joint blessings of the Congress and the
Hindu Mahasabha, who can describe what would have happened in India
on this side of the line of invasion of India through the Indo-Burma
frontier of Babu Subhas Chandra Bose?124

However, Moonje pronounced this speech when the war was over.
In those years India a huge reserve of militants came out in India who, at
the right moment, could become a rudimentary army, perhaps poorly armed
and equipped, but perfectly capable of engaging in pressure and intimidation
against the enemies.
In the 1940s, the RSS still cultivated totalitarian leanings. A report of May
1942 provides an account of a speech given to volunteers in a training camp
in Poona:
 The Second World War 113
Dr. P.C. Sahasrabudhe addressed the volunteers on three occasions. On 4.5.42
he announced that the Sangh followed the principle of dictatorship. Denoun-
cing democratic Government as an unsatisfactory form of Government, he
quoted France as a typical example and, praising dictatorship, he pointed to
Japan, Russia and Germany. He particularly praised the Fuehrer principle of
Germany. On 21.5.42 he drew attention to the value of propaganda, quoting
Russia and Germany as examples, and again extolled the virtues of the
Leader principle, citing Mussolini’s success as a further example.125

On the basis of the observations mentioned in the last few pages, it is possible
to draw out some conclusions. Considering the strength and the extension of
the RSS from the early 1940s on, two aspects emerge which require particular
attention. The first aspect is represented by the progressive growth of the RSS,
right from its foundation. This was probably due to the adoption of a sys-
tematic work at the grass-root level. As already pointed out, between 1936
and 1941 the RSS had grown almost four-fold in terms of branches and, in
terms of membership, six-fold. The second aspect is represented by a couple
of questions that arise spontaneously: who was the enemy? Was militia used
against any one? Unfortunately, this militia became effective during the par-
tition, when the Sangh Parivar forces massacred the Indian citizens belonging
to the ‘enemy’ community.
This concept of ‘enemy’ made the whole difference between Indian nation-
alism and Hindu nationalism. The wide range of streams of the Indian
nationalism, from the revolutionaries to the Muslim League and the Congress
had, at least for a time, the British as their enemy. It is true that from the late
1930s the Muslim League began to develop its objectives, diverging from the
Congress policy. It cultivated systematically the idea of forming a Muslim
state. However, these objectives never embraced the idea of fratricide. The
creation of a Muslim state did not entail the oppression of the Hindus. Indian
Muslims, rightly or wrongly, considered the foundation of their own state as
reparation for the inadequacy of a policy which did not properly represent the
interests of the Muslim community. The aggressive anti-Muslim discourse of
the Sangh Parivar and the violent climate that it contributed to fostered the
secessionist tendencies within the Muslim minority. In a word, anti-Muslim
smear campaigns contributed as much to partition as the call for a separate
state that gradually became widespread among Indian Muslims.
The writings of the Sangh Parivar often draw comparisons between the
Khaksars and Hindu paramilitary organisations. As in the 1930s, the Hindus
continuously warned that militias were counteracted by the Muslims, who
were better organised. The Khaksars were made out to be more powerful
than they actually were. In fact, the Khaksars played a secondary role in
Indian politics and they cannot be compared to the Hindu organisations in
terms of size and extension, especially after the partition. True, it was a
combative organisation, fascinated by Mussolini, but there is no evidence of
contacts between the Khaksars and the fascist regime.
114 The Second World War
The other Indian nationalists, the communists under M. N. Roy, the Congress,
and the revolutionaries aimed at just one objective: putting an end to the colo-
nial rule. The only real differences between these forces laid in the methods to be
adopted, the priorities and the strategies. Subhas Chandra Bose himself, who
had established close contacts with the fascist regime and the third Reich and
was influenced by the fascist ideology, was impervious to anti-Muslim senti-
ments. In Europe, he had close links with Pan-Islamic nationalists and, as poin-
ted out above, a number of Muslims were enlisted in his INA.
The nature of Bose’s relations with the totalitarian regimes is still open to
debate and will perhaps never be entirely clear. There can be little doubt,
however, that he entertained with the Axis powers an opportunistic relation-
ship. On the basis of the principle ‘my foe’s foes are my friends’, Italy, Ger-
many and Japan could be India’s friends, at least until the British Raj had
collapsed. Unfortunately, it will never be possible to know what would have
happened had Subhas reached India, or had the Japanese invaded.

Notes
1 Vidya Sagar Anand, preface to Savarkar, A Study in the Evolution of Indian
Nationalism, London, 1967. The quotation is from Otto von Hentig, a high rank
official at the German Ministry of External Affairs during the 1920s and 1930s.
He played an important role in organising anti-British activities of the German
government among Indian revolutionaries, acting as liaison on behalf of the
German government in its relations with Indian revolutionaries. During the
Second World War, von Hentig, with Grobba and Niedermayer, undertook the
task to revive the anti-British revolutionary activities performed by the Gadhar
Party and the Pan-Islamic movement during the First World War.
2 After his involvement in the assassination of Sir Curzon Wyllie, Savarkar was
sentenced to transportation to Port Blair jail until 1960. In 1923 his punishment
was commuted into life confinement in Ratnagiri, and definitely cancelled in
1937.
3 This is confirmed by Indra Prakash, a member of the Hindu Mahasabha since
1927, in his Hindu Mahasabha: Its Contribution to India’s Politics, Delhi, 1966.
Moonje’s role is dealt with on pp. 46–47: “Dr. Moonje’s regime lasted for about
six years. Although different persons were invited to preside over the consecutive
sessions of the Hindu Mahasabha, Dr. Moonje virtually controlled the destiny of
the Hindu Mahasabha.”
4 MSA, Home Special Dept., 60 D (g) Pt.II, 1937, Intelligence report, “Meeting of
V. D. Savarkar with journalists on the morning of 25.6.37”, undated but clearly
drawn up on the same day of the meeting.
5 See MSA, ibid. records from June and July 1937.
6 MSA, ibid., extract from the Bombay Secret Abstract for week ending 15.1.38,
headed “Hindu Affairs”.
7 MSA, Home Special Dept., 60 D (g) Pt.III 1938, “Extract from the Bombay
Province weekly letter No. 31, dated 5th August 1939”. The Guru Purnima is a
festival dedicated to the figure of the spiritual master.
8 MSA, Home Special Department, 1009 III 1942, police record, “A summary
report of the concluding ceremony of the Officers’ Training Camp of the Rash-
triya Swayam Sevak Sangh, at Poona on the 27th May 1943”.
9 MSA, ibid., note dated 10.6.43
 The Second World War 115
10 MSA, ibid., report dated 31st May “V.D. Savarkar’s 61st Birthday Celebrations”
and report of 5.6.43, “V. D. Savarkar: 61st Birthday Celebrations of”. Savarkar
received the donation from V.V. Kelkar and P.B. Bhave, respectively chairman
and publisher of the Adesh from Nagpur, during a meeting organised by the
Dadar Hindu Sabha.
11 MSA, ibid., damaged report, lacking the date, “Hindu Sabha Camp (Shibir)”.
12 MSA, Home Special Dept., 60 D (g) Pt.II 1937, “Summary report of the meet-
ing held in the Tilak Smarak Mandir on behalf of Poona students”, 3.8.37.
13 MSA, ibid.
14 MSA, ibid.
15 MSA, ibid., “Extract from [. . .] Secret Abstract for the week ending 12.2.38”.
16 NMML, Savarkar Papers, microfilm, Roll no. 23, part 2, Miscellaneous Corre-
spondence Jan. 1938–May 1939, “Press Note issued by the Hindu Mahasabha
Office Bombay Branch”, undated. Savarkar’s speech is also briefly summarised
in MSA, 60 D (g) Pt.III, “Extract from the weekly confidential report of the
District Magistrate, Poona, dated the 11th August 1938”. The Italian Consul in
Calcutta provided a fairly detailed account of the speech as published by the
Ananda Bazar Patrika of 3rd August, in the abstract “Critiche al viaggio di
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in Europa” (Critique of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s trip
to Europe): ASMAE, AP, India, b. 7, 1938, report from Indian newspapers,
enclosed with express telegram no. 3489/46, from the Italian Consulate in Cal-
cutta, 12 August 1938, to the Ministry of External Affairs.
17 NMML, ibid.
18 NMML, ibid.
19 NMML, ibid.
20 NMML, Savarkar Papers, microfilm, R. n.1, part 2, March 1937–May 1938: the
version in English of the article published by the Volkischer Beobachter tallies
with the press statement mentioned above.
21 MSA, 60 D (g) Pt.II 1937, “Extract from the weekly confidential report of the
District Magistrate, dated the 21st October 1938”.
22 Milan Hauner, India in Axis Strategy. Germany, Japan and the Indian National-
ists in the Second World War, London, 1981, pp. 66–67.
23 MSA, Home Special Dept., 60 D(g) Pt.III 1938, “Translation of the verbatim
speech made by V. D. Savarkar at Malegaon on 14.10.1938”.
24 MSA, ibid., “A report on the meeting held on 11.12.1938”.
25 MSA, Home Special Dept., 60 D(g) Pt.III 1938, “Extract from the B.P. weekly
letter n.31, dated 5th August 1939”.
26 A summary of Savarkar’s speech during the 21st session of the Hindu Maha-
sabha was published in the Bombay Chronicle of 29.12.1939.
27 Bombay Chronicle, ibid.
28 Madhav Sadashiv Golwarkar, We, or Our Nationhood Defined, Nagpur, 1939, p.
37.
29 ibid., p. 52.
30 Cristofhe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, New Delhi, 1996,
pp. 32 and 53–54.
31 The best-known biography of Rash Behari Bose is Uma Mukherjee, Two Great
Indian Revolutionaries, Calcutta, 1966, especially pp. 97–162.
32 Some copies of The New Asia are to be found in Italy: ASMAE, AP, Giappone,
b. 6, 1934, fasc. Movimento Panasiatico (Pan-Asiatic movement), enclosed with
express telegram no. 410/255, dated 16 May 1934, signed by Auriti.
33 ASMAE, ibid.
34 ASMAE, ibid., express telegram no. 166/113, from the Italian Embassy in
Tokyo, 24 February 1934, to the Ministry of External Affairs, signed Auriti.
35 ASMAE, ibid.
116 The Second World War
36 NMML, Savarkar Papers, microfilm, roll n. 23: a letter of 23 May 1938 referring
to the letter of 7 March 1938 was sent to Rash Behari Bose by the Secretary of
the Hindu Mahasabha Bombay office. The document contains also a reference to
a Rash Behari Bose’s letter published by The Mahratta and in other maratha
journals in spring 1938. A second letter dated 11 July 1938 from Rash Behari to
Savarkar, published by The Mahratta, is referred to in an unsigned letter, dated
11 August 1938 to the publisher of the newspaper, Gajanrao Ketkar, and in
another letter dated 18 August 1938, to Rash Behari Bose, from the Secretary of
the Hindu Mahasabha, J. D. Malekar, Bombay office.
37 NMML, ibid., 18 August 1938.
38 NMML, ibid., letter from Savarkar to Bose, 14 November 1938, signed Pre-
sident Hindu Maha Sabha.
39 NMML, ibid., 18 August 1938.
40 NMML, ibid., letter 14 November 1938.
41 NMML, ibid., letter from Savarkar to Birla, 2.11.38, hand-signed V. D. S.
42 NMML, Savarkar Papers, r.n. 23, letter from the secretary of the Hindu Maha-
sabha to Rash Behari Bose, 4 November 1938.
43 NMML, ibid., letter from secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha to Pazze, 19.11.38,
thanking Pazze for passing the press statement containing Savarkar’s speech of 1st
August on to the German Consul. On the same date, Leszczynski informed Malekar
by letter that he had received the press statement sent to Pazze on 10 November 1938.
44 NMML, ibid.
45 NMML, ibid., letter from Malekar to Leszczynski, 7.12.38, and Leszczynski’s
reply, 9 December 1938. The content of file no. 3, ASMAE Gab. 409, consists of
a copy of Savarkar’s The Indian War of Independence of 1857. It is not clear
whether the Italian Ministry of External Affairs acquired the volume at that time
or later, when Bose returned to Europe in the early 1940’s. However, it is worth
noting that the Italian authorities perhaps did not completely ignore Savarkar
and his activities.
46 NMML, Savarkar Papers, microfilm, Roll n. 12.
47 The Mahratta, 28 April 1939, “Why Italy Invaded Albania?”, 26 May 1939,
“How Germany’s National Socialism Arose?” and “Inciting Mussolini Against
Hitler”.
48 The Mahratta published two articles on the relations between Italy and Germany,
on 19th May and 2nd June 1939, respectively “Germany – Rome Axis Strength-
ened” and “German-Italian Pact concluded. Reaction to Encirclement Policy.”
49 ibid., 2 June 1939.
50 The statement, in Auswartiges Amt-Politischen Archiv (AA-PA, Bonn)/Pol.VII,
Statement by the spokesman of the Hindu Mahasabha, 25.3.1939, is mentioned
by Hauner, India in Axis Strategy, p. 66.
51 NMML, Savarkar Papers, r.n. 23.
52 NMML, ibid., Roll n. 4, S.n. 8: letter from Leszczynski to Indra Prakash, 27
April 1939; two letters from Indra Prakash to Savarkar, dated respectively 28
April and 4 May 1939. A translation of the message to Roosevelt made by the
Italian Consulate General in Calcutta is in ASMAE, AP, India, b. 10, Notiziario
indiano (Indian bulletin) n. 2 (dal 16 al 30 aprile–1° maggio 1939). The record is
in the bulletin of 25April.
53 Translation of the author.
54 ASMAE, ibid. Meeting registered on 27 March 1936: note dated 2 April 1936,
confirming that the Ministry was to pay for Bose’s stay at the Grand Hotel.
55 S.C. Bose, Japan’s Role in the Far East, published in the Modern Review summer
1937, reprinted in Through Congress Eyes, Allahabad, 1938 (?), quoted in Leonard
A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj: A Biography of Sarat & Subhas Chandra
Bose, New Delhi, 1990, pp. 329–30.
 The Second World War 117
56 A copy of this letter, intercepted by the police, is in NAI, Home Political Dept.,
32/2/38, Criminal Investigation Dept., Special Branch, Lucknow, U.P., 12.2.38.
Gordon, who quotes this document on p. 371 of his volume, believes the letter
never reached Subhas. This is unlikely, because the letter was published as an
appendix to Crossroads, by S.C. Bose.
57 NAI, ibid.
58 NAI, ibid.
59 Unfortunately, it is not possible to establish whether there was any regular con-
tact between the two leaders. The correspondence published by the Netaji
Research Bureau in Calcutta does not include other letters between Subhas Rash
Behari. Likewise, since researchers not belonging to the Netaji Research Bureau
are not permitted to examine this correspondence, it is impossible to know
whether Subhas and Rash Behari were in epistolary contact before the second
world war.
60 Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, pp. 370–71, and Hauner, India in Axis Strat-
egy, pp. 69–70. The latter includes in the appendix (pp. 644–53) the report that
Urchs sent to Berlin.
61 NAI, Sardar Patel Correspondence, Microfilm, Reel n. 21 Undated, untitled note
which, in the file, follows a document dated 23.3.39. The records contained in
the file date to 1939.
62 M. Hauner, India in Axis Strategy, p. 70, confirms that suspicions over possible
contacts between Bose and Axis officials may have determined the opposition of
Gandhi and of the Congress leadership to Bose’s re-election as president.
63 This letter, published in S.C. Bose, Crossroads, is quoted by Gordon, Brothers
Against the Raj, p. 384.
64 This letter, published in A Bunch of Old Letters, New Delhi, 1958, is quoted by
Gordon, ibid., p. 382.
65 NMML, Savarkar Papers, microfilm, r.n. 12.
66 NMML, Moonje Papers, Subject Files, n. 51.
67 NMML, ibid.
68 NMML, ibid.
69 NMML, ibid., “The Rama Sena, Hindu Mahasabha. Appeal”, signed by
Moonje, undated, but most probably written after the resolution of 10th
September.
70 NMML, ibid., account of the meeting held in Poona on 8 October 1939. The
document is undated, but it bears the handwritten note “October 1939”.
71 NMML, ibid., letter from General Nanasahib Shinde to Moonje, 16.10.39 in
reply to Moonje’s letter of 11 October; Moonje’s reply of 18 October; two letters
of 18 October from Moonje to Hedgewar and Khaparde; 19 October Jadhava to
Moonje in reply to a letter from Moonje of 17 October; finally Moonje’s reply of
24 October 1939.
72 NMML, ibid.
73 NMML, ibid.
74 NMML, ibid.
75 NMML, ibid.: reply to Moonje’s letter of 17 October; the signature is not
readable.
76 NMML, ibid. As far as the author of the letter is concerned, Jadhava, it was not
possible to find any information about him.
77 IO, Mss Eur 125/5, 1938, Letters from the Secretary of State for India.
78 IO, ibid., Letters to the Secretary of State for India, 19 May 1938.
79 MSA, Home Special Dept., 1009, 1939–40, Intelligence report entitled “Hindu
Maha Sabha: Activities of –”, dated 2 November 1939.
80 MSA, ibid.
81 MSA, ibid.
118 The Second World War
82 IO, Mss Eur F 125/8 1939, Letters to the Secretary of State for India: this letter
is dated 7 October, but the account of the meeting with Savarkar is in a post-
script of two days after that meeting.
83 IO, ibid.
84 IO, ibid.
85 IO, ibid.
86 IO, ibid.
87 MSA, Home Special Dept., 60 D(g) Pt.III, document headed, “A summary
report of the meeting held at Kalyam on 21.1.1940”.
88 IO, Mss Eur F 125/9 1940, Letters to the Secretary of State for India, letter dated
1 September 1940. Amery succeeded Zetland as Secretary of State for India.
89 IO, Mss Eur F 125/28 1939–40, Telegrams to the Secretary of State for India,
telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of State, 23 September
1940. Savarkar enclosed a copy of the resolution in a letter dated 25 September
to the Viceroy, in which he confirmed that party was ready to collaborate with
the government and to take part in the expanded councils: Mss Eur F 125/122
1940, Correspondence with Persons in India.
90 IO, Mss Eur F 125/28, telegram from the Governor General to the Secretary of
State for India, 25 September 1940.
91 IO, Mss Eur F 125/122.
92 IO, ibid.
93 IO, Mss Eur F 125/123 1941, Correspondence with Persons in India.
94 S. V. Bhalerao’s, “Savarkar. His Socio-Political Thought and Leadership”, sub-
mitted to the Nagpur University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Faculty of Social Sciences, pp. 234–35. The academic year is not specified but the
study dates back to the middle of 1990s.
95 The passage quoted by Bhalerao is to be found in the collection of Savarkar’s
speeches, Hindu Rashtra Darshan, Bombay, 1949.
96 Dhananjay Keer, Veer Savarkar, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1988 p. 257. Savar-
kar’s nephew, Vikram, agreed with this version during an interview with the author
of early March 1997, as did both Bhalerao and Vishvas Savarkar, the latter in “Veer
Savarkar, I.N.A.’s Source of Inspiration”, contribution to the commemorative
volume, Savarkar, published by the Savarkar Darshan Pratishthan, Bombay, 1989.
This interpretation is shared by Uma Mukherjee, Two Great Indian Revolutionaries,
pp. 159–60 and Khare, Political Memoirs, 1959, p. 52.
97 Keer, ibid., p. 259.
98 Bhalerao, “Savarkar. His Socio-Political Thought and Leadership”, pp. 213, 218,
220–21, 224, 235.
99 Also confirmed by Keer, Veer Savarkar, p. 260.
100 Vishvas Savarkar, “Veer Savarkar, I.N.A.’s Source of Inspiration”, p. 147.
101 MSA, Home Special Dept., 1023 1939–40.
102 MSA, ibid., S. A. dated 29.6.40, Forward Bloc.
103 Bhalerao, “Savarkar. His Socio-Political Thought and Leadership”, p. 234.
104 Vishvas Savarkar transcribes the conversation between the two leaders as if it
was a quotation from V.D. Savarkar’s own words. Nevertheless, he omits to
mention his sources and does not specify if they were a notebook or an eye-
witness account. Therefore, this version cannot be relied upon. Certainly, an
account of the conversation is contained in the volume in Marathi, Veer Savar-
karanchi Abhinav Bharat Sangata Samayinchi Utkrishta Bhashane, selected
speeches by Savarkar published by Abhinav Bharat.
105 Japan entered the war eighteen months later than predicted by Rash Behari.
106 Bhalerao, “Savarkar. His Socio-Political Thought and Leadership”, pp. 221–22. This
is by far the most authoritative of the quoted sources cited, because his work is correct
 The Second World War 119
from the historiographical point of view. Unfortunately, Bhalerao provides no indica-
tion of the circumstances of his interview with Savarkar’s bodyguard.
107 Uma Mukherjee, Two Great Indian Revolutionaries, pp. 160–61.
108 Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, p. 416.
109 Bhalerao, “Savarkar. His Socio-Political Thought and Leadership”, p. 221.
110 Ibid., p. 223, Vishvas Savarkar, “Veer Savarkar, I.N.A.’s Source of Inspiration”,
p. 151. Rash Behari praised Savarkar in similar terms during a radio broadcast
quoted by Keer, Veer Savarkar, p. 350. Unfortunately, Keer does not provide the
date for the broadcast but does note that the message was published by Free
Hindustan on 27 January 1946.
111 Respectively, B.V. Deshpande and S.R. Ramaswamy, Dr. Hedgewar the Epoch-
Maker, Bangalore, 1981, pp. 175–76, who also briefly mentions the meeting with
Savarkar, and C.P. Bhishikar, Keshav: Sangh Nirmata, New Delhi (year not
specified), pp. 58–59, quoted by D. R. Goyal, Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh,
New Delhi, 1979, p. 52.
112 Goyal, ibid., pp. 53–54.
113 Ibid., pp. 51–52.
114 For confirmation, see Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, Hitler’s Priestess. Savitri Devi,
the Hindu-Aryan Myth and Neo-Nazism, New York and London, 1998, p. 90.
115 Goyal, Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, p. 85.
116 IO, R/3/21, attachment to a letter of 1st February 1941 from the Deputy Com-
missioner, J.V.B. Jannvrin, to G.H. Puckle, Assistant Director, Intelligence
Bureau, New Delhi.
117 NMML, Savarkar Papers, microfilm, r.n. 17, letter (illegible signature) from the
Prime Minister’s Office, 15 December.1941: with reference to the declaration
released by Savarkar on 14 December, after the Japanese captured Rangoon, the
president of the Hindu Mahasabha was required to do nothing that might add to
the government’s difficulties.
118 NMML, ibid., r.n. 24.
119 IO, Mss Eur F 125/124 1942, Correspondence with Persons in India.
120 At the moment of writing this book, the documents held by the Indian Ministry
of Defence, the only sources which might clarify these aspects, were still
inaccessible.
121 NAI, Home Political Dept., 28/8/1942, Intelligence Bureau Report, dated
27.3.43, containing an account of the Fourth Security Conference held in
Nagpur on 8th and 9th March 1943.
122 The fascist tendencies of this organisation are also mentioned in NAI, Home
Political Dept., 28/3/43. This file contains several police reports.
123 NAI, Home Political Dept., 28/8/1942, Intelligence Report, 7 March 1942,
124 NMML, Moonje Papers, Speeches, f.n. 90, “Summary of Dr. Moonje’s speech
delivered on the occasion of observance of the Indian National Army Day at
Nagpur as organised by the Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha, on 11th of
November 1945 at the Nagpur Town Hall”.
125 NAI, 28/8/1942, “Summary of a report on the officers’ Training Camp of the
Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh held in April/May 1942 at Poona”. A copy is
also to be found in MSA, Home Special Dept., 822 IInd 1940–41.
Conclusion

A purely academic approach would suggest restricting these concluding

remarks to the evaluation of the Italian foreign policy in India and its results.
However, this is not the scope of this book. The tremendous impact that
Fascism and Nazism had on Hindu nationalism and their long-lasting effects
on present Indian politics oblige us, as scholars, to take a stance on the rela-
tionship between history and politics and promote an unbiased interpretation
of the present through the lens of history.
Italian foreign, anti-British policy in India was a digression on the main-
stream Italian foreign policy of that time, represented, in brief, by some fun-
damental steps, as the alignment to Nazi Germany, the accession to the Axis
and the pursuit of colonial aims in Africa.
This book focuses on the relationship of both Bengali and Marathi Hindu
nationalism with Fascism and Nazism. However, while the Bengali political
culture after the Second World War remained essentially progressive and anti-
fascist, the Hindu political forces cultivated and fostered their fascist and
Nazi legacy far beyond the war period.
If the Italian foreign policy in India obtained meaningless practical results and
did not succeed in undermining the British grip over India, in spite of the Italian
planners’ intentions it had a great influence at least on a meaningful part of the
Indian political environment, namely the Hindu radical political forces.
Italian policy makers did not sense the enormous perspectives that the fasci-
nation of Fascism over Hindu political circles could open up. Italian planners
underestimated the strength of these forces, since they strived unsuccessfully for
developing a liaison with the Congress and with those political organisations
that they perceived as more vocal and influential, like the Bengali ones.
The impact of Fascism on Hindu nationalism was impressive either from the
organisational or from the ideological point of view. B.S. Moonje’s declaration,
after his meeting with Mussolini in 1931, of his intention to mould the RSS
according to the features of the fascist organisations is evidence that the para-
military character of the RSS has been largely inherited by Italian Fascism.
Moreover, the political militancy raised within both the RSS shakas and the
organisations of Fascism, the balilla and the avanguardisti, was directed against
an internal enemy, the antifascists and the political adversaries and opponents in
 Conclusion 121
Italy, the Muslims in India. Both fascist and Hindu organisations pursued the
internal enemy’s persecution, up to its elimination.
The organisational structure of the RSS and, in general, of all organisations of
the Sangh Parivar is inherently violent, as violent was that of the fascist organisa-
tions: violence was cultivated and performed, it was enacted, and the militants,
right from youth, were indoctrinated to use and practice political violence. So, the
reproduction of fascist organisational models by the Hindu militant organisations
was not just a matter of structure and methods, but of ideology as well, and the
adoption of those methods and ideas was a conscious one: Bose, Hedgewar,
Savarkar, Moonje, Golwarkar were certainly informed about the brutal side of
Fascism and Nazism, because the British press provided very complete informa-
tion to the Indian public opinion and depicted in a very complete way the true face
of Fascism and Nazism. Moreover, Bose knew Italy and Germany from within.
A debate is going on regarding the nationalist character of the Hindu radical
organisations: if we intend nationalism to mean anticolonial struggle, in the
sense adopted by the Congress, this aspect is not predominant in the Hindutva’s
experience in the colonial times. Nevertheless, if we use this term to define a
political movement whose objective was to build up a nation, Hindu nationalism
was nationalism, because it had the objective to build up a nation, along the lines
of European cultural nationalisms. In this way it was very similar to Fascism, but
especially to Nazism, in its aspiration to construct a nation on ethnic and racial
foundations, pursuing the idea of ‘purity’. Savarkar’s Hindutva is the proof.
Today, when the BJP is in power and the Sangh Parivar is as strong as never
before in Indian history, it is possible to confirm Nehru’s definition of Hindu
nationalism as “an Indian version of Fascism”. But we can go further and define
today’s Sangh Parivar as an Indian version of Nazism. The heavy discrimina-
tions, persecution, violence and segregation imposed by the BJP government and
by the Hindutva forces on Indian Muslims recollect the theories, methods and
practices adopted by fascist and nazi dictators and their followers.
The public speeches of present Indian political leaders, with their obsessive
references to the Muslims as inherently different, in spite of the latter’s convinced
and often declared belonging to the Indian nation, are clearly inspired by Savarkar
and Golwarkar, who are admittedly considered and frequently mentioned by
Hindutva activists as the fathers of Hindu India. Moreover, the Citizenship Act,1
enforced when this book was about to go to print, sadly remembers Golwarkar’s
statements of 1939, regarding the denial of citizens’ rights to Indian Muslims.

Note
1 This law was approved by the Indian parliament on 11 December 2019 and became
effective on 10 January 2020, among an uproar of protests and violent clashes. It
provides that only Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christians who fled per-
secutions from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh and enter India before 31
December 2014 are eligible for Indian citizenship. Muslims are excluded.
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East and West
Forward
Il Corriere della Sera
Il Giornale d’Italia
Il Popolo d’Italia
Il Sole
India and the World
Kesari
La Lega Italiana
La Lega Navale
L’Esplorazione Commerciale
L’Italia Coloniale
Modern Review
Oriente Moderno
Relazioni Internazionali
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Rivista Commerciale d’Oriente
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Index

Abyssinian war see Ethiopian war 104, 105–7, 111–12; Savarkar-Bose

anti-Semitism 78–9, 89–91 meeting 107–8, 109, 110
Arrivabene, Antonio 13
Axis powers/Rome-Berlin Axis 78, 87; Calcutta 11; Dante Alighieri Society 71,
and Hindu Mahasabha 91–6 72; Mayor of 19–20; University of 13,
15, 16, 17, 33, 59, 72; see also Italian
Benares Hindu University 33 Consulate General, Calcutta
Benasaglio, Emilio 59, 69 Carelli, Mario 73–5, 76
Bengali intellectuals 14–19; see also Bose, Central Hindu Military Education
Subhas Chandra Society 47, 51
Bengali pro-Italian propaganda 58–72 Chakravati, Amiya 59–61
Berlin Committee 16, 18 communism/socialism 20–1, 76, 86
Berlin University 22–3 Congress 24, 62; Bose presidency 96–9;
Bianco, Mario Zanotti 73 Fascism and Nazism 88, 89, 90; and
BJP 121 Hindu Mahasabha, conflicts between
Bombay Chronicle 76–7 100, 102, 104, 105, 106, 109, 112;
Bose, Rash Behari 92–3, 94, 97–8, 104 Indian nationalism and Hindu
Bose, Subhas Chandra 19–21; Axis nationalism 113, 114
powers and British Raj 114; Ethiopian Congress of Oriental Students 23, 60
war and pre-Second World War Croce, Benedetto 5
Italian propaganda 61–4, 72; journey cultural/political exchanges 9–10, 11–14,
to Italy 21–4; meeting with Savarkar 38–9, 71, 74–6
107–10; second visit to Italy and
Congress presidency 96–9 Dacca, University of 9, 11, 13
Britain/British colonialism: and Bose visits Damley, Kashinath 75–6
to Italy 21, 23, 24; Indian nationalism Dante Alighieri Society, Calcutta 71, 72
and Hindu nationalism 113–14; Italian Das, Tarak Nath 17–19, 92; Moonje tour
foreign policy in India 120; Italian of Europe 37, 38–9, 39
invasion of Ethiopia/pre-Second World Das Gupta, Surendra Nath 13
War propaganda 58, 59, 63–4, 67–9, democracy, critiques of 95, 97, 104
70–1, 72, 80; Italian political and
cultural mission in India 8, 11, 14; Ethiopian war and pre-Second World War
Japan, China and Pan-Asian movement years: Bengal pro-Italian propaganda
94, 97, 104; and Moonje European tour 58–72; Fascism and Nazism in Indian
38; suppression of Fascist publications official press 78–80; role of Italian
75–6 Consulate General, Bombay 72–8
Britain/British colonialism and Hindu
Mahasabha (Second World War) Fascism see Italian Fascism
99–100; militarisation policy 100, 103, Fascist Cultural Institute 10
 Index 133
First World War 18, 58 Italian Embassy, Tokyo 92
Formichi, Carlo 1; invitation and visit to Italian Fascism and Hindu nationalism:
India 2–3, 4–5, 8; and Tagor 2, 6–7 early contacts 33–4 (see also Moonje,
Forward (newspaper) 64, 67, 68, 69, B.S.); enduring impact 120–1; Marathi
71, 98 publications 34–6
France: colonialism 58; cultural influence Italian Fascism and Indian nationalism
12, 14; Moonje visit to 38; Second 1–7; Bengali intellectuals 14–19 (see
World War 95, 113 also Bose, Subhas Chandra); culture
as means of political expansion 11–14;
Gandhi 42, 43, 45, 46, 60, 98, 104, 110 political mission in India 7–11
Gentile, Giovanni 10, 13, 15, 73–4 Italian Naval League/Great Tours
Germany (Nazism): and BJP 121; Bose cruises 33
visit to 22–3; condemnation in Indian
official press 78–9; cultural influence Japan 76, 94, 96, 98, 108, 109, 110, 114;
12, 14; Hindu nationalist connections Pan-Asiatic movement 92–3, 97, 104;
and support for 94, 95–6, 98; Moonje and Rome-Berlin Axis 87
visit to 36–7, 38; neutrality policy,
Second World War 99–100; Savarkar Kesari (newspaper) 34–6, 86, 95
support for 87–91; Swastik League/
Swastik Herald 77–8; youth Leszczynski, G.L. 94, 96
organisations 46, 47, 48
Giuriati, Camillo 70–1 Maharashtra 34, 36, 46, 49, 72, 101,
Golwarkar, Madhav Sadashiv 86, 91, 121 102, 103
Grobba, Frit 36, 37, 38 Mahasabha see Hindu Mahasabha
Malaviya, Madan Mohan 33, 46
Hedgewar, K.B. 33–4, 45, 46, 51, 52, 86, Marathi: militarist culture 76–7;
101, 102 publications 34–6; translations 75
Hindu Mahasabha: presidents see militarisation/paramilitary training
Moonje, B.S.; Savarkar, Vinayak 46–52, 120–1; defence against Muslim
Damodhar; and RSS 34, 42, 45, 86–7, aggression 47, 52, 77–8, 101; and
101–2, 111–13; see also under Second independence movement 86–7,
World War 111–14; Second World War 87, 100–3,
Hindu National Militia plan 100–3 100–7, 106, 112; see also Rashtriya
Hindustan Association 17–18 Swayamsemwak Sangh (RSS)
Hitler, Adolf 77–8, 95–6 Modern Review 3, 14, 15–16, 19, 62–3
Mookerjee, Syama Prasad 16, 19
independence movement: “Asia for Moonje, B.S. (Hindu Mahasabha
Asians” 92–3; militarism 86–7, 111–14 presidency and influence): European
Indian nationalism and Hindu national- tour 36–9; Italian tour and meeting
ism 113–14; see also Italian Fascism with Mussolini 39–46; militarisation of
Indian Nationalist Party 62 Hindu society 46–52, 85, 87, 100–3,
Indian and Sinhala Students’ Federation 106, 112
59–60 Moulik, Monindra Mohan 19
Institute for the Middle and Far East Muslim League 89, 100, 101, 113
(ISMEO) 12, 13, 14, 15, 16–17, 23; Muslim-Hindu relations 47, 52, 77–8,
Bombay 73–5; and Hindustan 89, 90–1, 100, 101, 110, 113;
Association 18 contemporary 121
International Institute of India 36–7 Mussolini, Benito 1, 3, 5, 8;
Italian Consulate General, Bombay 67, anti-democratic reforms 35;
72–8 biographers 8, 10, 36; Ethiopian war
Italian Consulate General, Calcutta 3, 4, 58, 61–2, 67; inaugural speech 12;
8, 9, 12–13, 14, 15, 17; Ethiopian war meeting with and influence on Moonje
and anti-British propaganda 59, 64, 42–4, 45–6, 47–8; meetings with Bose
66–72, 73–4 23–4, 96; meetings with Chakravati 61;
134 Index
photographs in Indian press 80; Savarkar, Vinayak Damodhar (Hindu
translation into Marathi 75 Mahasabha presidency) 85–7, 93, 94,
Mussolini, Edda 33 99; contemporary influence 121; Fas-
cism and Nazism 87–91; meeting with
Nag, Kalidas 1, 14–15, 19, 68 Bose 107–10; meeting with Viceroy
Nagpur 42, 50, 93, 102, 112 104–6; and Roosevelt 95–6
Naples, University of 38–9 Scarpa, Gino 11–12, 21, 68
Nasik 50; Bhonsla Military School 47, 51 Second World War: Hindu Mahasabha
Nazism see Germany (Nazism) and Axis powers at outbreak of 91–6;
Nehru 61–2, 88, 89, 98–9, 121 Hindu Mahasabha Working
non-violence: Congress 101; rejection of Committee resolution and ambiguous
47–8, 52, 97, 112 stance 99–107; return of Bose to Italy
and Congress presidency 96–9;
Orano, Paolo 8, 10 towards independence 111–14; see also
Savarkar, Vinayak Damodhar (Hindu
Pan-Asiatic movement, Japan 92–3, Mahasabha presidency)
97, 104 socialism/communism 20–1, 76, 86
Parulekar, N.B. 36–7 Society of Nations 58, 67
Philological Circle, Milan 1–2 Sollazzo, Guido 66–7, 69
political expansion see cultural/political Sudetenland question 88–9
exchanges Swastik League/Swastik Herald 77–8
Poona 46, 50, 76, 86–7, 88, 89, 90, 101,
112–13 Tagore, Rabindanath 1–2, 4–7
Tahmankar, D.V. 35–6
Rashtriya Swayamsemwak Sangh (RSS) Trabalza, Ciro 3, 6
33–4, 35, 36, 42, 45, 51–2, 110, 120–1; Tucci, Giuseppe 1; Moonje and Das in
and Hindu Mahasabha 34, 42, 45, Italy 37, 38–9, 40, 44–5; political
86–7, 101–2, 111–13 mission in India 7–11, 12–13, 14;
Rome: Instito Interuniversitario di Roma Sarkar and ISMEO 16, 17; and Tagor
15; University of 10–11, 19 affair 9; visit to India 3, 4
Rome-Berlin Axis see Axis powers/
Rome-Berlin Axis United States: Das in 17–18, 19; Savarkar
Roosevelt, F.D. 95–6 cablegram to Roosevelt 95–6
Roy, Pramatha Nath 10–11, 13–14, 15,
19; in Italy 38; Twelve Years of Vishvabharati University, Shantiniketan
Fascism 64–5 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 13

samyavada, theory of 21 youth/paramilitary organisations:

Sangh Parivar 121 Germany 46, 47, 48; Italy (Balilla and
Sarkar, Benoy Kumar 16–17 Avanguardista) 35, 36, 41–2, 43, 45,
46, 47, 48, 49, 65