India's Changing Role in the United Nations

Author(s): Stanley A. Kochanek

Source: Pacific Affairs , Spring, 1980, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring, 1980), pp. 48-68
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia

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 India's Changing Role in the
United Nations

Stanley A. Kochanek

I NDIA'S ROLE in the United Nations and the priority assigned to the
United Nations as an instrument of Indian foreign policy has fluc-
tuated considerably over the past three decades.' At least three dis-
tinct phases of Indian policy toward the U.N. are discernible: an era
of global leadership from 1947 to 1962; a period of low profile from
1962 to the mid-1970s; and an emerging policy of neo-realism which
began in 1976. These shifts in priority have been brought about pri-
marily because of India's changing perceptions of its security needs,
domestic political and economic developments, and changes in the
global international systems, which have combined to affect India's
confidence and ability to shape events.

GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 1947-1962

India emerged on the world scene as an independent actor in

1947 under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru, de-
termined to secure the world's recognition of the place to which it felt
entitled by virtue of its size, population, geopolitical position and an-
cient history and tradition. Despite its limited economic and military
power, India saw itself as a new and significant force on the world
scene and was determined to shape the international environment to
suit its images and needs. In one of his earliest foreign policy pro-
nouncements, Nehru sketched out the basic cornerstones of India's
global policy and the role he expected India to play in the world:

In the sphere of foreign affairs, India will follow an independent policy,

keeping away from power blocks of groups aligned one against the other. In-
dia will uphold the principle of freedom for dependent peoples and will op-
pose racial discrimination wherever it may occur. She will work with other

1 Research for this paper was based partly on interviews with members of both the In
and American U.N. delegations and with personnel in the U.S. Department of State. Financial
support was made available from the Central Fund for Research, College of the Liberal Arts,
Pennsylvania State University. I am deeply grateful for this cooperation and support.

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 India's Changing Role in the United Nations

peace-loving nations for international cooperation and good-will without ex-

ploitation of one nation by another. Towards the United Nations, India's at-
titude is that of whole-hearted cooperation and unreserved adherence in
both letter and spirit and to the charter governing it. To that end, India will
participate fully in its various activities and endeavour to play that role in its
councils, to which her geographical position, population and contribution
towards peaceful progress entitle her.2

Nonalignment, decolonization, an end to racism and apartheid, com-

mitment to the basic provisions of the U.N. Charter and a global
leadership role thus became the focal points of India's U.N. policy.3
India's global leadership was made possible by peace and stability
at home and the breakup of the great-power coalition of World War
II that had dominated the international scene. The United Nations,
created by the victorious allies as an instrument for maintaining
world peace and order, soon became locked into a bitterly divisive
cold war which began slowly to divide the world into two competing
power blocs. Convinced that world peace was essential to Indian de-
velopment and survival, Nehru refused to become involved in this
emerging conflict among power blocs. This policy-which became
known as "nonalignment"--enabled India by the early 1950s to
emerge as a significant mediator between power-blocs and contrib-
uted substantially to India's ability to achieve the global recognition
it sought.
Its first opportunity to play a significant mediating role on the
world scene came during the Korean War. Encouraged by Soviet in-
dications that a ceasefire might be possible in Korea, negotiations to
end the conflict had begun, but soon bogged down over the issue of
the disposition of prisoners of war. Under the leadership of Krishna
Menon, the Indian delegation at the U.N., with the support of the
newly mobilized Afro-Asian group, developed a compromise proposal
to settle the issue. During the 1952 U.N. General Assembly session,
India secured the adoption of its compromise resolution, which ulti-
mately became the basis of a Korean settlement. The success of these
Indian maneuvers marked the beginning of a series of diplomatic ini-

2 Quoted in "India and the U.N.," India News, XVII, No. 31 (October 30, 1978), p. 1
3 For a more detailed account of Indian policy at the U.N. prior to 1970, see Ross Berkes
and Mohinder Bedi, The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations (Stanford
Stanford University Press, 1958); Charles H. Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, A Diplomatic Hi
tory of Modern India (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971); The Indian Council of World Affairs,
India and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1957); T. Rama-
krishna Reddy, India's Policy in the United Nations (Rutherford: Farleigh Dickinson Press, 1968);
S. Rana, "The Changing Indian Diplomacy at the United Nations," International Organization,
24 (Winter 1970), pp. 48-73.

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 Pacific Affairs
tiatives, which enhanced its global leadership role and international
stature. Its Korean initiatives were succeeded by mediating activities
leading up to the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, and to its
even more active role in the Suez Crisis of 1956.4
During the latter period, India further increased its international
stature by becoming deeply involved in the U.N. peace-keeping force
in the Middle East. And Indian troops were later to play an impor-
tant role in U.N. peace-keeping operations in the Congo and Cyprus.
India supported such endeavors, not only by providing troops, but
also by strongly advocating the principle of collective responsibility
on the part of member states to finance these activities.5 At the same
time, however, it opposed the idea of a standing U.N. peace-keeping
force and insisted that such activities be restricted so as not to im-
pinge on national sovereignty.6
In addition to its mediating and peace-keeping roles, India also
became the champion of rapid decolonization and the abolition of
racism. It was, in fact, the first country to raise the issue of apartheid
at the U.N. And it played a significant role in breaking the deadlock
between East and West over admission of new states into the world
body.7
Despite its anti-status-quo stand on many global issues, however,
India's attitude toward the basic structure of the U.N. was funda-
mentally conservative.8 It accepted the organization and distribution
of power in the U.N., as both a guarantee of Indian sovereignty and
independence, and as a check on the numerical superiority of the
U.S. and its western coalition. Thus India supported the charter pro-
vision for a Security Council veto for the great powers, opposed the
U.S. initiative to circumvent the veto through the Uniting for Peace
Resolution, dismissed Hammarskjold's notion of a "U.N. presence" as
interventionist, and opposed all efforts to conduct U.N.-directed
plebiscites as tests of opinion.9
India's procedural conservatism was based both on its com-
mitment to national sovereignty and its desire to protect Indian inter-
ests. Its experience with the U.N. had not always been positive. In the
early years after independence, a whole range of issues, which had

4 Rai Singh, "India's Initiatives in United Nations," Indian and Foreign Review, Vol. 15
(November 1977), pp. 13-14.
' Rana, "The Changing Indian Diplomacy," pp. 58-9.
6 Reddy, India's Policy in the United Natzons pp. 108-24.
7T.J.S. George, Krishna Menon (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1966), p. 220.
8 Rana, "The Changing Indian Diplomacy," pp. 55-7.
9 Michael Brecher, India and World Politics (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 308.

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 India's Changing Role in the United Nations

their origins in the partition of the Indian subcontinent between In-

dia and Pakistan, came before the U.N. These issues included the dis-
puted princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir, which
were ultimately incorporated into the Indian Union through the use
of military force.'0 The most persistent of these disputes, of course,
was Kashmir.
India's attempts to project an image of global peacemaker and ad-
vocate of the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means
were thwarted by its lingering disputes with its neighbor Pakistan over
Kashmir. While India considered Kashmir as vital to its interests, how-
ever, it was never able to gain international acceptance of its position.
Thus, the question of Kashmir became a constant irritant and a useful
club for others to wield in countering India's self-declared moral prin-
ciples of international behavior. Ultimately, India became dependent
upon the Soviet veto in the Security Council to prevent actions on the
Kashmir question which it found unacceptable."
India experienced a similar embarrassment over Goa, the small
Portuguese enclave on the West coast of the Indian subcontinent
which Portugal refused to abandon. In December 1961, the Indian
government simply incorporated Goa into the Indian Union by force
of arms. Despite India's attempts to justify its behaviour by depicting
Goa as the last vestige of colonialism on the Indian subcontinent,', its
actions seemed to many to contradict India's continued emphasis on
peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force in inter-
national politics. '
Overall, however, the period from 1947 to 1962 was marked by a
major leadership role for India at the U.N. and on the global scene.
During this period, especially under the leadership of Krishna Menon
from 1952 to 1962, the Indians took an active interest in all U.N. ac-
tivities, and no subject was too small to invoke an Indian speech or
comment. ' There were both tangible and intangible benefits from
this ubiquitous presence. Indian leadership and peace-keeping roles
in the U.N. brought it considerable recognition and global standing.
At the same time, the United Nations also provided India with a vari-
ety of specific benefits. As one of the chief advocates of the principle
of geographic distribution of U.N. Secretariat posts, many Indians

0 Richard Hiscocks, The Security Council (New York: The Free Press, 1973), pp. 168-82
" Rana, "The Changing Indian Diplomacy," p. 65.
12 Hiscocks, The Security Council, p 183.
13Ibid., pp. 182-3.
14 George, Krishna Menon, pp. 221-2.

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 Pacific Affairs

came to occupy high positions in that body. India also secured con-
siderable economic and technical assistance from the U.N. and its
various specialized agencies."'
Under the leadership of Nehru, India enjoyed peace and stability
at home, strong domestic popular support of its foreign policy, and a
rapidly growing domestic economy. Nehru had almost complete free-
dom of action in the formulation of Indian foreign policy, and India's
political and diplomatic leadership was self-confident, vocal, dy-
namic and articulate. Despite the issue of Kashmir, India was com-
mitted to the U.N. system, gave high priority to the U.N. in its for-
eign policy, and sent some of its best intellectual talent to staff its
U.N. mission and the Secretariat. Despite its lack of economic and
political power, the country appeared headed for great-power status
and enjoyed substantial international prestige and recognition.

THE Low PROFILE, 1962-1976

The turning point in India's pursuit of recognition and global

leadership came in 1962 with the occurrence of the India-China bor-
der conflict. 16 The outbreak of large-scale hostilities and India's dra-
matic military reverses dealt a shattering blow to Indian pride and
self-confidence. World reactions to India's plight added to the coun-
try's sense of disillusionment. The nonaligned countries stood aloof,
the U.S.S.R. vacillated, and India was obliged to turn to the Western
bloc for military and political support. Nonalignment and global in-
fluence appeared to be no substitute for military and economic
power. India's apparent helplessness in the wake of Chinese advances
shattered its global image, weakened its domestic political leadership
and resulted in an almost total preoccupation with the quest for secu-
rity." The latter, in turn, further limited India's role as an independ-
ent actor and confined its pursuit of national interest largely to the
bilateral arena.
In the decade and a half following the India-China border con-
flict, India became involved in two wars with Pakistan and entered a
period of political instability, economic stagnation, massive food
shortages and near-famine conditions. The country began to appear

15 Heimsath and Mansingh, A Diplomatic History, pp. 516-27.

16 Rana, "The Changing Indian Diplomacy," pp. 65-73; Reddy, India's Policy in the United
Nations, pp. 35-8.
17 Sudershan Chawla, The Foreign Relations of India (California: Dickinson Publishing Co.
1976), pp. 12-31.

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 India's Changing Role in the United Nations

to the outside world as a helpless giant. As one Indian diplomat put

it:

Our stature at the United Nations is determined not in terms of the epics our
ancestors produced or the temples they constructed but in terms of the food
we cannot produce, the population we cannot control and the borders we
cannot protect without relying heavily on others.18

India's diminished role in the United Nations, however, was not

simply a function of its image. The post-Nehru political leadership
made a deliberate decision to adopt a low profile at the U.N. and
concentrate on speaking out only on those issues deemed vital to In-
dian interests. "9 This change in policy was dramatically implemente
in the 1965 debate on Kashmir. Its long-standing annoyance with the
U.N.'s handling of the Kashmir question having reached a limit,
India decided to make an overt gesture of its disaffection and demon-
strate the degree to which the U.N. was no longer central to its
foreign-policy interests. During the Security Council debates on the
1965 India-Pakistan War, India's Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
dramatically stormed out of the session in response to the intemper-
ate language of Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan's Foreign Minister. This walk-
out, according to a senior Indian diplomat, "was a cautiously calcu-
lated, deliberately planned gesture meant to drive it home to all
concerned that the United Nations does not matter as much as it did
earlier."20 Bilateralism became the guiding principle of Indian for-
eign policy, and the U.N. was used simply as one arena for maintain-
ing such contacts.
India's low U.N. profile, especially on political questions, was
slightly less applicable to its role on economic questions. Its diplo-
macy began to acquire a distinct economic dimension as part of its
emphasis on increased self-reliance. India was the initiator of such
schemes as the International Development Association, UNCTAD,
and the Indian Consortium, and it was one of the early advocates of a
wider role for less developed countries on issues involving aid, trade,
investment and reform of international monetary institutions.2'
When it came to issues of vital interest, however, India was not
silent. From the very beginning, for example, it has refused to lend
its support to U.N. actions on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

18 Rana, "The Changing Indian Diplomacy," p. 71.

'9Ibid., pp. 69-72.
20 Ibid., p. 65.
21'Lawrence A. Veit, India's Second Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1976), p.

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 Pacific Affairs

(NPT). India considers the treaty discriminatory and a violation of its

sovereignty, and has argued that the NPT is based on the principle
that some nations are more responsible than others.22
The period of India's low profile in the U.N. coincided with a pe-
riod of reduced U.N. activity in general. The year 1962 was signifi-
cant, not only because of the India-China border conflict, but also
because of the Cuban Missile crisis, which witnessed the early begin-
nings of detente between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Thus, even if India
had decided to play a more active global role, its opportunities would
have been much more limited than they were in the 1950s. Similarly,
the rapid pace of decolonization was now changing the earlier role
and character of the U.N.-a variety of new regional forums were
being created to handle regional problems; and within the U.N. itself
the Afro-Asian group was larger and more complex, and unity was
much more difficult to achieve.23 In short, the 1960s as a whole saw
major changes in the global system and a general decline in U.N.
actions.

NEO-REALISM: INDIA'S NEW GLOBAL ROLE

India's policy of maintaining a low profile at the United Nations

and other international forums lasted until the mid- 1970s, when, dur-
ing the second half of 1976, it conducted a major review of its foreign
policy. Significant changes in domestic, regional and international
environments convinced Indian decision-makers that they should as-
sign a higher priority to participation in world forums and should
reestablish a more active international role for India. Several major
developments were responsible for these changes in emphasis. In the
first place, the Bangladesh War of 1971 had restored Indian con-
fidence and demonstrated that the nation could no longer be treated
as a weak giant. The war also changed India's perceptions of both its
security needs and its strategic position on the South Asian subcon-
tinent. It was felt that a truncated Pakistan could no longer pose a
credible threat to Indian security, unless it were assisted by the
People's Republic of China-which seemed unlikely. India had es-
tablished itself as the dominant power in South Asia.24
Second, the explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 gave India more

22 Morarji Desai, "Indian Stand on Nuclear Issue Reiterated," Indian and Foreign Review, Vol
15 (February 1978), pp. 7-8; Atal Behari Vajpayee, "India's Foreign Policy to be Genuinely
Non-Aligned," Indian and Foreign Review, Vol. 14 (July 1977), pp. 5-6.
23 Brecher, India and World Politics, pp. 1 10-1 1.
24 Chawla, The Foreign Relations of India, p. 8.
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 India's Changing Role in the United Nations

room to maneuver in its relations with the great powers. It enabled

India to begin to move away from its dependence on Soviet support,
which had been so critical in the 1971 Bangladesh War. At the time
of the signing of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, the Soviet Union
not only promised to intervene if either the United States or China
became involved in the Bangladesh War, but also provided valuable
diplomatic support at the U.N. Three Soviet vetoes in the Security
Council prevented adoption of a resolution which called for a cease-
fire and a return to the status quo at a time when Indian troops were
still engaged in action.25
A third factor which played a significant role in India's reassess-
ment of its foreign policy was the declaration of an emergency by In-
dira Gandhi in June 1975. During the emergency, the arrest of oppo-
sition political leaders, censorship of the press and an overall climate
of fear, effectively silenced almost all domestic critics of the govern-
ment. Midway through the emergency period in April 1976, Mrs.
Gandhi appointed Jagat Mehta as the new Secretary of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.26 Mehta belonged to the new generation of foreign
service officers who had grown up in post-independent India. It was
under Mehta's direction that India embarked upon a series of for-
eign-policy reviews. Among the most important and domestically ex-
plosive initiatives were attempts at reconciliation with China and Pa-
kistan, which led to an exchange of ambassadors with the former and
a resumption of diplomatic relations with the latter.27 There were
other new initiatives in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, as well as
the decision to play a more active role in global affairs.
A fourth factor was the impact of OPEC and the quadrupling of
oil prices. The OPEC example generated a new sense of confidence
among Indians that they, together with people of other developing
countries, had finally acquired economic leverage against the devel-
oped world. They saw the U.N. and its agencies as an important
means of applying that leverage. Although India was one of the hard-
est hit by the oil crisis, its policy-makers shared the belief that a major
change had occurred in global decision-making and decided it was
time for India to reassert its role in world forums.28

25Rajan Menon, "India and the Soviet Union: A New Stage of Relations," Asian Survey,
XVIII, 7 (July 1978), pp. 733-4.
26 Satish Kumar, "The Task at the Foreign Office," The Overseas Hindustan Times
1976, p. 7.
27 See The New York Times, April 21, 1976 and April 25, 1976.
28 See Y.B. Chavan, "United Nations and the 'Third World,' " Indian and Foreign Review, Vo
13 (May 1976), pp. 13-14; Y.B. Chavan, "India has Great Faith in the United Nations," Indian
and Foreign Review, Vol. 14 (November 1976), pp. 6-7.

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 Pacific Affairs

Especially active in pressing for such a reassessment in 1976 was

Rikhi Jaipal, India's permanent representative at the U.N. Ap-
pointed to his post in 1974, Jaipal was a senior diplomat who had
been associated with Indian U.N. affairs since the Krishna Menon pe-
riod of the early 1950s. Jaipal now began to exercise greater initiative
and leadership in U.N. forums precisely at the time when the U.N.
itself suddenly began to spring back to life under pressure from the
Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G77).
Many of the initiatives undertaken by Indira Gandhi's govern-
ment in 1976 were developed even further under the new Janata gov-
ernment, which came to power in March 1977 after thirty years of
Congress Party rule. The Janata government declared that its policies
of good-neighborly intentions in South Asia, restoration of true non-
alignment, and further rapprochement with China, were all designed
to give India the flexibility and maneuverability to play a more ac-
tive leadership role in global affairs.29
In summary, then, significant changes in the domestic, regional
and international environments in the early 1970s, coupled with
changes in foreign policy leadership, resulted in a more active role for
India in the U.N. and other international forums. This new role,
however, was quite unlike its role of the 1950s. Indian policy and di-
plomacy was now based on a stronger sense of realism and pragma-
tism. India was no longer interested in simply scoring rhetorical
points or commenting on every issue raised in debate. Instead, it con-
fined its diplomatic activity at the U.N. to those issues which were
clearly of direct or indirect concern to India or which might secure
specific direct benefits. Indian diplomats, especially those stationed in
New York, felt that the U.N. provided a unique and effective arena
for India-functioning through the Nonaligned Movement and
Group of 77-to exercise a significant influence on major world eco-
nomic issues. Given the change in its membership, they argued, the
U.N. could now be shaped to reflect the developmental concerns and
priorities of the new majority.30
They felt that in an era of growing detente between the super-

29 Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "India and the Changing International Order," Indian and For
Review, Vol. 15 (February 1978), pp. 10-12; Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "Changing International Or-
der and India's Role In It," Foreign Affairs Record, XXIV (January 1978), pp. 10-16; Inder Jit,
"India Regains its Voice at the U.N.," Indian and Foreign Review, Vol. 15 (January 1978), pp. 19-
20; "Continuity and Change in India's Foreign Policy," India Quarterly 34 (Jan-Mar 1978), pp.
54-75.
30 Rikhi Jaipal, "The United Nations and Developing Countries," Indian and Foreign Review,
Vol. 12 (September 1975), pp. 13-15.

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 India's Changing Role in the United Nations

powers, the U.N. could shift its focus away from security issues and
toward solving world economic and monetary problems. It could act
as a new forum for the participation of the developing countries in
global economic decisions. The developing countries would no longer
be mute spectators while decisions vitally affecting their destinies
were being made elsewhere. India saw the new process as one of col-
lective bargaining in which the developing countries would formulate
their demands at meetings of the NAM and G77 and negotiate these
demands with the developed countries in various U.N. forums.3

U.N. VOTING IN THE 1970s

The new high priority which India now assigns to the U.N. in the
accomplishment of its foreign-policy objectives has been revealed in
its voting behavior in various U.N. forums. The major feature of In-
dia's new posture is the limited number of issues upon which it is pre-
pared to take a stand. Unlike the India of the 1950s, India today
speaks out only on those issues considered essential to Indian interests
and larger foreign policy objectives. On political questions this has
meant abstention or silence on issues directly involving the super-
powers, continued support for its traditional commitment to decolo-
nization, opposition to racism and apartheid, and a strong pro-Arab
stand on issues involving the Middle East. The only new policy initia-
tives have been in the field of disarmament, which was a subject of
direct concern to India's former Prime Minister Morarji Desai, and
on the issue of human rights, which reflected the Janata govern-
ment's reaction to Mrs. Gandhi's emergency rule.32
India's policy of silence on issues which are designed to embarrass
the great powers can be seen in a variety of world forums. For ex-
ample, at the 1976 Colombo Summit of the NAM, India refused to
support a resolution which both called for self-determination and in-
dependence for Puerto Rico and asked the 24-member U.N. Com-
mittee on Decolonization to recommend to the General Assembly
(UNGA) effective measures for decolonization. It also refused to sup-
port a North Korean resolution demanding reunification and the
withdrawal of foreign troops. Similarly, at the 63rd annual ILO Con-
ference in Geneva in 1977, India refused to support a variety of west-

31 Ibid., p. 15.
32 Morarji Desai, "Disarmament: Choice Between Life and Death," Indian and Foreign Re-
view, Vol. 15 (June 1978), pp. 11-14.

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 Pacific Affairs

ern moves citing communist countries for non-compliance with ILO

conventions and statutes.
At the same time, India has been prepared to speak out on those
issues considered vital to its interests, even if its position has been con-
trary to the interests of one or the other of the superpowers. Thus, for
example, India has supported resolutions in the UNGA and else-
where, criticizing U.S. military installations on Guam as part of its
long-standing opposition to foreign military bases. Similarly, it has
defied both the United States and the U.S.S.R. by refusing to sign the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, unless and until the superpowers
also agree to reduce their nuclear arsenals.
India's neo-realism retains the traditional Indian commitment to
decolonization and an end to racism and apartheid. At the 31st ses-
sion of the UNGA in 1976, for example, India supported three resolu-
tions which condemned five Western countries, including the U.S.,
for supplying weapons to South Africa and collaborating with the lat-
ter in nuclear, military and economic fields. Similarly, at the 32nd
session of the UNGA in 1977, India supported four anti-South Africa
resolutions, which called for economic sanctions against South Africa
and assistance for the National Liberation Movements in that region.
These same resolutions also condemned Israel for trading with South
Africa and called upon the U.S. to obtain South African accession to
the NPT and acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards.
India today also maintains its traditional pro-Arab Middle East
policy, which has been designed largely to neutralize Pakistan's ef-
forts to create an anti-Indian bloc of Muslim states. The Indians have
always argued that blocs based on religion have a divisive impact on
world affairs and exacerbate international tensions.33 India's pro-
Arab policies were reflected in its 1974 vote in support of U.N. status
for the PLO, its 1975 vote in favor of the resolution equating Zionism
with racism, and its 1977 vote in support of the establishment of a
secretariat for the Palestinian Rights Committee.
One of the most important recent initiatives of Indian foreign pol-
icy in the U.N. has been in the field of disarmament. Under Morarji
Desai, the Janata government placed a major emphasis on dis-
armament issues.34 At the special UNGA session on disarmament in

33 T.N. Kaul, "Some Reflections on Foreign Policy, Indian and Foreign Review, Vol. 14
(March 1977), pp. 11-12.
3' A.B. Vajpayee, "Continuity and Change in India's Foreign Policy," Indian and Foreign Re-
view, Vol. 15 (June 1978), pp. 12-14.

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 India's Changing Role in the United Nations

July 1978, India tabled two major resolutions demanding an immedi-

ate halt to nuclear testing pending the completion of the test ban
treaty. The objective was to restrain superpower development and
testing of new, improved weaponry. The resolutions were withdrawn,
however, as a result of joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. opposition.35
On economic issues, the Indians have supported the entire range
of resolutions developed by the NAM and the G77 calling for an In-
ternational Decade of Development, a New International Economic
Order (NIEO) and a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties. Indian
economic diplomacy has been both creative and persistent and re-
mained forceful even during its period of low profile. One of the origi-
nators of the idea of UNCTAD, India has continually sought specific
benefits for its trade and exports, a reduction of debts and a greater
voice in international monetary affairs. It has been a key force in
trying to add an economic dimension to the NAM. At the 1976 NAM
Summit at Colombo, for example, it chaired the economic committee
and succeeded in committing the movement to a variety of specific
economic demands.36

INDIA'S NEW DIPLOMATIC STYLE

The new priority assigned to the U.N. in India's foreign policy be-
comes evident as we focus less on the substance of policy and more on
style of diplomacy. Indian diplomats have shown increased willing-
ness to exert a leadership role in various global forums, to propose
diplomatic initiatives and generally to increase India's visibility. This
new diplomatic style has been reflected in issues involving the North-
South dialogue, U.N. organizational affairs, and in security ques-
tions. And the objective of diplomacy has been to produce concrete
results and, where possible, specific benefits for India.

Since 1976 India has played a very active role in the North-South
dialogue. Instrumental in formulating the economic resolutions at the
Colombo Summit of the NAM and in securing repeated affirmation
of those resolutions, Indian leaders have also argued forcefully within
the NAM for a policy of cooperation, rather than confrontation, with
the developed countries. It played a particularly effective leadership
role at the Law of the Sea Conference in securing agreement on issues
of concern to the developing countries.

3 The New York Times, July 5, 1978.

36 M. Shamim, "The Colombo Nonaligned Summit-An Appraisal," Indian and Foreign R
view, Vol. 13 (September 1976), pp. 15-18.

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 Pacific Affairs

In addition, India has begun to reassert its mediating and con-

ciliating roles of the past. During the 1977 UNGA session, for ex-
ample, it was very active in working out a compromise on U.N. fi-
nancing.37 A committee of the U.N. had recommended a higher
assessment for OPEC countries and reduced payments for developing
countries. The proposal also reduced the scale of payments for social-
ist countries while retaining existing levels for the developed coun-
tries. OPEC members objected to the proposed increase on the
grounds that they were still "developing" and should not be expected
to pay higher amounts. The developed countries insisted on the adop-
tion of the committee's recommendation, while the socialist bloc tried
to stay out of the dispute. With the developing countries lending sup-
port to OPEC, the issue was emerging as a North-South conflict.
India prepared a compromise proposal which was ultimately
adopted: it called for OPEC to accept the new scale of U.N. payment
for the year 1977 only, and proposed that the entire scale of assess-
ments be reviewed again and permanent formula be adopted for fu-
ture years. (As a result of this compromise, India's own assessment
dropped from 1.2 per cent of the total U.N. budget to 0.7 per cent.)
India went on to support a proposal introduced by Nepal-and also
adopted-to reduce substantially the assessment for the least devel-
oped countries.38
India's new posture at the U.N. was greatly facilitated by its elec-
tion to the Security Council for a two-year term in 1977. Security
Council membership gave India a number of opportunities to use its
considerable diplomatic skill and talent, and enabled it to play an ac-
tive role on key issues. This skillful style was demonstrated in October
1977, when Rikhi Jaipal, India's permanent respresentative at the
U.N., was elected President of the Security Council for the month of
October 1977. During that month, the Security Council dealt with
three key issues: renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Emer-
gency Force in the Sinai, the Report of the Committee on the Exer-
cise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, and the ques-
tion of South Africa.39
Of the three issues, that of South Africa was the most critical and
offers an excellent illustration of Indian diplomatic style. The African

37 R. Chakrapani, "The Thirty-first Session of the U.N. General Assembly," Indian and For-
eign Review, Vol. 15 (January 1977), p. 18.
38 Ibid.
39 Rikhi Jaipal, "Consensus Making in the Security Council," India and Foreign Review, Vol.
15 (May 1978), pp. 21-3.

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 India's Changing Role in the United Nations

states had submitted four resolutions which had to be considered by

the Security Council. They called for the imposition of an arms em-
bargo against South Africa, specifically stipulating that the action be
taken under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, dealing with threats to
the peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression.'H The embargo
was being justified on the grounds that the political situation in
South Africa had become a threat to the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. The resolutions also called for revision of
licensing arrangements, and restrictions on investments and trade
with South Africa. Despite clear indications that the Western coun-
tries would veto such actions, the African group insisted on a Security
Council vote.
As President of the Security Council, Jaipal pressed for a com-
promise that might avoid a confrontation and produce concrete re-
sults. He drafted his own resolution based on the African text but
containing only those elements which he felt the Western bloc could
be persuaded to accept-or at least not veto. Once this Indian draft
resolution had been circulated informally for comments among the
delegates, Jaipal then encouraged the African and Western bloc to
meet to discuss the text of the resolution, even though neither party
found it acceptable.
At the informal meeting which ensued, the West submitted its
own draft resolution largely under U.S. initiative, strongly criticizing
the system of apartheid and recent repressive acts of the South Afri-
can government. It also called upon all states to review their eco-
nomic relations with that nation and to establish codes of conduct for
companies doing business with South Africa, designed to abolish ra-
cial discrimination. The resolution, however contained three provi-
sions unacceptable to the African bloc. First, although the resolution
sought to make mandatory the existing voluntary arms embargo, it
avoided specific reference to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, even
though it used some of the language of that chapter. Second, the
Western resolution stressed the acquisition of arms by South Africa as
the basis of its threat to peace, rather than citing the entire system of
apartheid. Finally, the Western resolution would invoke a mandatory
arms embargo for only six months. As a result of these objections, the
meeting ended in a deadlock.
These informal discussions, however, led the African bloc to be-

40 A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prenti

1977), p. 409.

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 Pacific Affairs

lieve that it was in a stronger tactical position than in fact was the
case. It was convinced that the Western bloc would abstain rather
than use its veto to defeat the African resolution. Unwilling to com-
promise, the African delegates insisted on forcing a Security Council
vote. Although convinced that their assessment was inaccurate,
Jaipal decided to call a meeting of the Security Council and permit
an immediate vote on the African resolutions. Three of the resolu-
tions were vetoed by the U.S., Britain, and France.
Following the vote, Jaipal immediately suspended the Security
Council meeting for informal consultations, and circulated a revised
version of his original compromise resolution. The Africans refused to
consider it, but the move secured support from members of the non-
aligned bloc and a promise of neutrality from the U.S.S.R. The West-
ern bloc, anxious to neutralize the political damage caused by their
vetoes of the African resolutions, agreed to accept the Indian draft
resolution with slight modification. With permission of the Indian del-
egation, moreover, Western delegates decided to circulate the modi-
fied Indian draft resolution under their own sponsorship. The maneu-
ver threw the African bloc off balance. After additional consultation
and modifications, a consensus draft resolution emerged, which was
then passed unanimously by the Security Council. For the first time
in its history, the U.N. took action against a member state under
Chapter VII.1

CONSTRAINTS ON INDIA'S GLOBAL ROLE

As in the past, India's ability to play a major role in international

forums has been heavily dependent upon its relations with its imme-
diate neighbors. India's espousal of certain norms of international be-
havior has continually been undercut by its diplomatic, political and
military disputes with its neighbors. The Kashmir issue has been a
continual source of embarrassment. Indian actions in Goa, Bangla-
desh and Sikkim have also placed Indian diplomats on the defensive.
The post-Bangladesh era has not witnessed an end to all these diffi-
culties-in fact, new issues have emerged. For example, following the
assassination of Sheikh Mujib of Bangladesh in 1977, Indian relations
with the new republic deteriorated seriously. The new leadership of
Bangladesh decided to internationalize its long-standing dispute with
India involving the diversion of water from the Ganges River to help
reverse the silting of the port of Calcutta. The Indians had built a

4' Jaipal, "Consensus Making," pp. 22-3.

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 India's Changing Role in the United Nations

barrage across the river on the Indian side of the border, and Bangla-
desh claimed India was depriving it of valuable water needed for irri-
gation. India argued that the U.N. system should not be burdened
with disputes which are best handled on a bilateral basis. The non-
aligned group attempted to mediate and persuade the two countries
to try to solve their differences on their own. And, indeed, following
another coup in Bangladesh the issue was finally settled through bi-
lateral negotiations.
Similarly, India's long-standing dispute with Pakistan has contin-
ued to surface in different ways at the U.N. At the 3 1st session of the
UNGA in 1976, for example, Pakistan renewed its proposal for the es-
tablishment of a nuclear weapons free zone for South Asia. India and
Bhutan voted against the resolution, but Pakistan received the sup-
port of Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.42
In short, India's ability to play a role on the world scene is very
much affected by its relations with nearby countries. The April 1978
coup in Afghanistan, the current turmoil in Iran, the continued lack
of political stability in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the general
sense of uneasiness among India's neighbors over its nuclear capac-
ity-all of these factors will act as potential restraints on India's
global involvement. It is hardly coincidental that its decision to play
a more active global role has been accompanied by greater efforts to
achieve detente with its neighbors.43 The success of India's efforts in
this regard will determine the degree of its freedom of action in global
affairs.
India's emerging global leadership role, however, is still in its
early phases of development, and, beyond the constraints just dis-
cussed, it faces several potential obstacles. In the first place, India's
maneuverability is severely limited in cases of superpower agree-
ment. This was clearly demonstrated at the special UNGA session on
disarmament, when Indian initiatives were blocked by the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. Although India has succeeded in resisting both American
and Soviet pressures to sign the NPT, its dependence on enriched
uranium shipments from the U.S. has become one of the major re-
maining irritants in Indo-U.S. relations.44

42 Chakrapani, "The Thirty-first Session," p. 26.

4 R.D. Kwatra, "Closer Links with Asian Neighbors," Indian and Foreign Review, Vol. 14
(September 1977), pp. 10-12.
44 Charles H. Heimsath, "The Nuclear Energy Issue in U.S.-Indian Relations." Paper for
the Mid-Atlantic States Regional Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington,
D.C. (October 28, 1978).

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 Pacific Affairs

India's failure to solve its basic economic problems will also

weaken its global role. Increased industrial and agricultural produc-
tion is essential to control domestic inflation, satisfy rising expec-
tations and curb domestic unemployment. It is also essential to pre-
vent massive dependence on external economic and food aid.
A further potential obstacle to India's global leadership is the in-
stability of the non-aligned movement and the G77.45 The NAM is
constantly threatened by disunity due to the large number of bilat-
eral disputes among its members, involving divergent political orien-
tations and conflicting economic interests. Thus, for example, while
India is primarily interested in pressing the developed countries for
debt relief, it has little to gain from demands for stabilized com-
modity prices.
It is clear that India's relations with China are critical to any fu-
ture Indian global leadership role. An easing of tension will provide
India with greater flexibility, for so long as India sees China as a po-
tential threat, it will have to maintain its close Soviet connection,
which in turn will inhibit its diplomacy with Southeast Asian coun-
tries, Japan and the U.S.
Finally, the "neo-realist" features of India's current foreign policy
are under heavy attack from intellectuals at home, who wish to see
India return to its pre-1962 position of positive world leadership.
They criticize the conservatism of India's professional diplomats, the
lack of imagination of Indian political leadership and the cynical de-
mands of the narrowly-based elites of the developing world for a big-
ger slice of the international pie.46 They wish to see major reforms at
home and greater initiative on such problems as the Middle East, dis-
armament, and a variety of other new global issues.47

AN ASSESSMENT OF INDIA'S CHANGING ROLE IN THE U.N.

An overall assessment of India's changing role in the U.N. cannot

be made solely in terms of policies, priorities and votes. Although the
U.N. is primarily an instrument of national foreign policy, it is also
an independent diplomatic arena with its own set of norms and val-
ues and styles of behavior. A nation's performance and influence thus
cannot be measured solely in terms of such objective criteria as for-

4 See Inder Malhotra, "Non-Alignment: From Belgrade to Belgrade," Indian and Foreign
Review, Vol. 15, No. 21 (15 August 1978), pp. 15-16.
46 Romesh Thapar, "A Qualitative Change," Seminar (February 1975), pp. 18-21.
47 Romesh Thapar, "External Continuities," Seminar (January 1978), pp. 75-8.

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 India's Changing Role in the United Nations

mal roles, committee memberships and speeches, but must also in-
clude less tangible factors such as leadership, diplomatic style and
policy content.
Objective measures of India's role in the U.N. reflect a consid-
erable amount of activity and widespread recognition of India as an
important member state. India has been associated with the U.N.
from its inception and has therefore developed a considerable degree
of experience. It has held a variety of key positions in the U.N. system
over the years. An Indian was elected President of the General As-
sembly as early as 1953, India has been selected as a non-permanent
member of the Security Council four times, and has been elected as a
member of the Economic and Social Council eight times. India has
also been a member of the Commission on Human Rights since 1947,
was a founding member of UNESCO, and has received special recog-
nition for its role in the fight against racism and its support for de-
colonization.48 The overall priority assigned to the U.N. by successive
Indian governments is reflected in the large size of the permanent In-
dian mission to the U.N. and its activities in a variety of U.N.
agencies.
Such objective measures of size, participation and activities as are
reflected in formal U.N. proceedings, however, do not tell the full
story. The real measure of India's influence in the U.N. is not re-
flected in the formal records, debates and proceedings, but rather in
the more informal activities and interchanges where Indian diplo-
mats showed considerable skills at an early stage. Nehru, seeking a
global leadership role for India, entrusted his close confident Krishna
Menon with the responsibility of acting as India's spokesman at the
U.N. Menon was known for the quality of his intellect, wit, and for-
midable diplomatic skills.49 His close relationship with Nehru was
based on friendship, his ability to echo Nehru's policies, his grasp of
the nuances of Nehru's thoughts and objectives, his ability to translate
these thoughts into concrete proposals, and his close identification
with Nehru's socialist ideology.50 Because of his proximity to Nehru,
Menon enjoyed wide latitude and acted as India's global trouble-
shooter, negotiator and mediator on a wide range of issues. He also
acted as a forceful and vocal spokesman for Indian sovereignty and
independence. Although his style tended to irritate key western lead-

48 "India and the U.N.," India News, XVII, No. 31 (October 30, 1978), p. 1.
4 George, Krishna Menon, pp. 221-3.
50 Michael Brecher, Nehru (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 572-5.

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 Pacific Affairs

ers who saw him as an apologist for the Soviet Union, there was no
doubt in anyone's mind that he was an extremely effective spokesman
for Indian interests.5'
The Nehru-Menon relationship, however, was unique and has
never been duplicated. Nehru's successors have never achieved the
same dominant role in foreign policy, and India's U.N. diplomacy
has become the preserve of professional diplomats. Moreover, the en-
tire global and domestic environment had changed radically. Lal
Bahadur Shastri, Nehru's immediate successor, did not share Nehru's
global perspectives and was much more concerned with India's do-
mestic, economic and security problems. Even though Indira Gandhi
inherited her father's concern for global affairs, she had neither the
inclination for nor grasp of international issues to shape a global pol-
icy in the same way. Moreover, like Shastri, she was preoccupied with
domestic, political, economic and security problems and was forced
to focus her attention primarily upon bilateral relations with major
powers and India's neighbors. Morarji Desai, Mrs. Gandhi's succes-
sor, attempted to shift the balance somewhat and was especially con-
cerned with the moral issue of global disarmament. Charan Singh,
head of India's caretaker government, had little interest in foreign
policy issues. Thus, India's leaders have varied their emphases and
shaped foreign policy to meet changing needs.
Under Shastri, Mrs. Gandhi, Morarji Desai, and Charan Singh,
India's permanent mission at the U.N. has been staffed and led by
professional diplomats. While the delegation enjoys a certain status
because of its size, past experience, and level of expertise, its actual in-
fluence depends heavily upon the personality and skill of its leader. It
is not solely an accident that the end of India's "low profile" period at
the U.N. coincided with the appointment of Rikhi Jaipal as head of
the Permanent Mission in 1974. A great admirer of Krishna Menon,
he established an especially strong reputation among U.N. represen-
tatives as an extremely able and effective diplomat.
Indian influence at the U.N., however, does not depend entirely on
the presence or absence of particular personalities. Indian diplomats
in general are known for their command of the language of diplo-
macy and their ability to handle ambiguity-a style that tends to re-
flect the bargaining, pragmatic character of Indian political culture.
These capabilities have greatly facilitated their success in developing
compromises on complex issues. They are, therefore, sought out as

51 Brecher, India and World Politics, pp. 309-10.

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 India's Changing Role in the United Nations

draftsmen and have earned a reputation as compromisers. Indian

diplomats are also known for their parliamentary skill, hard work
and intellectual capabilities. These traits combine to give Indians
considerable influence in informal discussions and negotiations which
are so essential to the functioning of the entire U.N. system. Yet none
of this activity appears in the public record. Their behind-the-scene
role is further enhanced by the large number of Indians occupying
key positions in the U.N. Secretariat-people who can provide help-
ful advice and information on an informal basis to Indian representa-
tives.
Overall, India's representatives at the U.N. enjoy much more free-
dom of action than representatives of major powers, because most is-
sues considered by the U.N. do not affect vital Indian interests. They
are in a position, therefore, to pursue the less tangible stakes within
the U.N. system-enhancing national image, winning or losing face,
avoiding national embarrassment, and developing a collegial reputa-
tion. Furthermore, they are less subject to the more tangible pressures
felt by their colleagues back home. Thus, not only do Indian diplo-
mats tend to earn standing, status and prestige among their col-
leagues within the U.N. setting, they also tend to see themselves at
the center of focus of the Foreign Office. This attitude results in se-
vere conflicts between headquarters and field.52
In the final analysis, leadership at the U.N. hinges on a delega-
tion 's ability to initiate or not initiate actions or compromise pro-
posals. Representatives must consider the broad dimensions of their
national policies and the priorities assigned to the U.N. as an in-
strument of those policies. National policies, of course, vary according
to the priorities set by the political leadership at home, their primary
preoccupations, and the state of the nation's bilateral relations espe-
cially with the major powers. Thus, for example, basic Indian policies
on such issues as racism, decolonization and non-alignment are rela-
tively well-known and constantly invoked. Initiatives on other issues
may depend on the priorities of the government of the day and the
state of bilateral relations. Thus, for example, under Morarji Desai,
the Indian delegation placed a major emphasis on disarmament is-
sues, and the delegation received its instructions directly from the
Prime Minister's office. Similarly, while the delegation kept silent on
issues on human rights during the Indian emergency from 1975 to
1977, it has again begun to speak out on the subject.

52Ibid., p. 112.

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 Pacific Affairs

The state of a nation's bilateral relations also affects its U.N. dip-
lomatic activity. If the Indian government wishes to improve rela-
tions with a superpower, then Indian delegates will more readily offer
their services to assist in the development of compromise proposals
and agreements. Similarly, it will not do or say things which would
embarrass that country. On the other hand, if relations are cool, it
need not be so sensitive to great-power needs.
India's role and standing in the U.N. have thus fluctuated consid-
erably over the past thirty years. At the same time it has yet to
achieve the global recognition to which it feels entitled by virtue of
size, population, geo-political position and ancient traditions and her-
itage. Its global ambitions have been severely hampered by its secu-
rity problems and slow pace of development. India remains a poten-
tial rather than an actual great power, and Indian diplomacy of the
1970s reflects the country's limited capabilities.
The massive victory of Indira Gandhi in the January 1980 Indian
elections has restored a strong and stable government in New Delhi.
However, the new uncertainties in South Asia arising from the tur-
moil in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan53 and the American response
to these events may substantially restrict India's freedom of action in
global affairs.

Pennsylvania State University, U.S.A.,January 1980

5 For an excellent assessment of the impact of recent regional and political developments
on Indian foreign policy see Walter K. Andersen, "India in Asia: Walking on a Tightrope,"
Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 12 (December 1979), pp. 1241-53. I wish to thank the author for
allowing me to see a draft of this article and also for his helpful comments on this paper.

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