70 CR 20 15925 - 2021 07 12 - Memorandum
70 CR 20 15925 - 2021 07 12 - Memorandum
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Plaintiff,
-vs- STATE'S MEMORANDUM
TO RANK THE OFFENSE
TO: Connie Lou Herbst and John Baquero, Assistant Public Defender, 7344 Cedar
Avenue South, Richfield, MN 55423
INTRODUCTION
The Defendant, Connie Lou Herbst, is charged by complaint with one count of Aiding
and Abetting Second Degree Intentional Murder – Not Premeditated, pursuant to Minnesota
Statute § 609.19, Subd. 1(1). In addition, the State recently moved to amend the complaint to
add count two, Aiding and Offender – Accomplice After the Fact, pursuant to Minnesota Statute
§609.495, Subd. 3. The primary offender in the underlying offense is Defendant’s son, Austin
James Herbst. Austin Herbst was charged by complaint with one count of Aiding and Abetting
Second Degree Intentional Murder – Without Premeditation, and entered a straight plea to that
sole count on March 9, 2021. At Austin Herbst’s sentencing hearing on June 4, 2021, the State
recommended a prison commit term of 367 months, which represented a top of the guidelines
sentence based on no criminal history. A presumptive sentence for this offense was 306 months
with no criminal history. The Court sentenced Austin Herbst to prison for 150 months, which
represented a downward durational departure. The Court found that Austin Herbst killed his
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father, the victim, because Austin Herbst believed he had an obligation to protect Defendant,
Defendant subsequently obstructed the investigation into the murder of her husband by
providing false and misleading information to protect her son Austin Herbst, and to cover up his
involvement in the crime. Defendant also hindered the investigation by aiding Austin Herbst in
disposing of the victim’s body and lying about what occurred for years.
On December 3, 2017, the Barron County, Wisconsin, Sheriff’s Office received a call
that a homeowner discovered a human skull in the driveway of his residence, located in rural
Barron County, Wisconsin. At the scene, deputies observed that the skull was human and
appeared to have a bullet hole on the top of it. Deputies conducted a search of the area and
located human remains east of the residence, about 66 feet from the center of 10th Avenue, near
a field along the edge of the woods and adjacent to a field to the east. The remains appeared to
be part of human ribs, backbone, legs and other bones, some clothing, and a full set of dentures.
The remains were devoid of flesh and only skeletal. On December 13, 2017, the human remains
recovered from the field were taken to the Midwest Medical Examiner’s Office in Ramsey,
Minnesota.
concluded that the skull had a contact range gunshot wound. The cause of death was a gunshot
wound to the head. The trajectory was from the decedent’s left to right, front to back and
downwards. The victim was likely a male, likely European (White), but could not exclude some
Asian admixture, 30-65 years of age (greatest likelihood was 35-55), stature 70.5 plus or minus
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On January 11, 2018, the remains were then sent to the University of North Texas,
University of Texas Center for Human Identification, Forensic Anthropology Unit, in Fort
Worth, Texas. In a report dated March 5, 2018, the remains were most likely a male of European
(White) ancestry, 30-65 years of age, estimated stature of 70.5 plus or minus four inches. A
projectile had entered the left parietal; near the midpoint of the sagittal suture, due to a gunshot
wound.
On March 21, 2019, Barron County deputies sent bone samples to DNA Solutions Inc., in
Oklahoma City, OK, for DNA extraction and forensic genealogy using familial DNA. On
February 24, 2020, Barron County detectives received notification for the DNA Doe project, a
nonprofit organization, which uses genealogical research to identify “John and Jane Does,” that
the skeletal remains were believed to have an ancestral link to the State of Wisconsin. On
February 27, 2020, Barron County detectives received information from the DNA Doe Project
that a possible match for the remains was the victim, Gary Albert Herbst, Defendant’s husband
Detectives learned that Gary and Defendant were married in Butternut, Wisconsin; they
moved to Richfield, MN in 1980, and then to Elko New Market in 1981. Gary worked at various
machining jobs in the Twin Cities Metro area, and Defendant worked as a cook. Sometime in
Barron County detectives discovered that Gary was reported as a missing person from
Elko New Market, Scott County, Minnesota. According to the report dated March 25, 2014,
Gary had been missing since July 6, 2013. However, a police report was not filed with the Elko
New Market police until July 6, 2014, twelve months later. Defendant made the report on the
suggestion of Gary’s brother, who was trying to contact him. Defendant reported that sometime
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in early July 2013, Gary came home to their residence at 347 Wagner Way, Elko New Market,
Scott County, Minnesota, and packed some clothing and took $5,000 in cash. He then left in a
grey Honda vehicle driven by an unknown person. Defendant said Gary left his cell phone and
she had not heard from him since. This entire report was intentionally misleading and fabricated.
On February 28, 2020, police officers from Minnesota and Wisconsin located Defendant
and Austin Herbst and obtained known buccal swabs for DNA comparison. Both consented to
x Defendant was at the library when Austin Herbst called and told her that his dad left.
x Defendant returned to the house and found the bedroom had been ransacked.
x Taken from the room was Gary’s clothing, $5000 cash, and a .45 caliber Sig Sauer pistol
x Austin Herbst told Defendant that Gary left in a grey car with an unknown person.
x Defendant said Gary was frequently unemployed and was verbally and physically
x He is the only child of Gary and Defendant and they all lived together at 347 Wagner
x When he turned seventeen or eighteen years old, things got a lot more tense between his
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x He didn’t recall the exact day, month, or year, but his father came home and immediately
x He left and got into a gray or silver pickup, and left behind his own 2010 Chevy
Silverado pickup.
x His mother came home and found some money was missing.
x He has not heard from his dad since and doesn’t know where he is.
On March 16, 2020, results from the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory comparing
Defendant and Austin Herbst’s buccal swab to the DNA profile obtained from the human
remains in Barron County, concluded that it was at least 87 trillion times more likely to observe
the profile from Austin Herbst if the questioned profile from the human remains is from his
On June 16, 2020, Wisconsin officers re-interviewed both Defendant and Austin Herbst.
x When Defendant returned home, she found the money was missing.
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x He was reported missing because Gary’s mother died, and Gary’s family needed to settle
the estate.
x He said he failed to tell the police that he did see the person who drove the pickup truck
when his dad left, and the person was a male with a black shirt and several tattoos.
x He denied he would commit patricide, saying he knew the term from on-line gaming.
x He knew the truth about what happened but would not divulge it at this time.
x When officers confronted her with a car title for Gary’s 2003 Chevy Impala, which was
sold and retitled in Wisconsin, with Gary’s signature and a date of December 2, 2017,
four years after he went missing, Defendant said that Gary routinely pre-signed all his
On June 29, 2020 Wisconsin officers interviewed several neighbors who recalled Gary
when he resided at 347 Wagner Way, Elko New Market, Scott County, Minnesota. One neighbor
reported:
x He lived across the street from the Herbst family for some time.
x Gary was a difficult neighbor; he would frequently yell profanities at neighbors and call
x One rare time he was very sociable and proud after he purchased a new pickup.
x Defendant and Austin Herbst held a garage sale, for which Gary was not present, selling
mostly men’s clothing and various tools. (Gary was a mechanic by profession).
x In subsequent weeks and months, Defendant and Austin Herbst were much more active in
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On June 29, 2020, officers spoke with several other former neighbors of the Herbst’s,
x While Gary was there, they didn’t see many visitors, and didn’t see Defendant or Austin
Herbst go out often. After Gary was gone, they saw Defendant and Austin Herbst going
x When Gary purchased a new truck, he invited one of the neighbors to come over and look
x On August 30, 2013, Defendant and Austin Herbst had a garage sale and sold Gary’s
x In Mid-August 2013 they observed a black pickup parked in the back yard of the Herbst
x Defendant and Austin Herbst loaded something in the back of the pickup, possibly rolled
up carpeting.
x After finishing, they hooked the boat onto the truck and left for about 1-3 days.
x After Defendant and Austin Herbst returned from fishing, they did not see Gary at the
house again.
On June 29, 2020 Scott County Deputies and members of the Minnesota BCA Forensic
Science Laboratory, after receiving permission from the new owners of 347 Wagner Way, Elko
New Market, Scott County, MN, conducted a search of the Herbst’s former home. The current
homeowners told officers that while remodeling the basement in August 2019, they discovered a
stain on the concrete floor that seemed unusual. Officers had a cadaver dog search the residence,
and the dog gave indicators of the presence of human decomposition near the sliding glass door
in the basement, as well as the north wall of the garage. Forensic Scientists did a presumptive
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chemical test for the presence of human blood on the stain on the concrete floor in the basement,
On June 30, 2020, investigators spoke with Gary’s former employer, SG, at RL Tool in
Bloomington, MN. SG confirmed that the last day Gary worked was July 8, 2013, when he
completed his shift at 3:00 p.m. The next day Gary didn’t show up for work, at which point he
On July 9, 2020, officers executed a search warrant at 347 Wagner Way, Elko New
Market, Scott County, MN. The BCA personnel used Luminol, which reacts with blood, in the
residence on the following locations, where they discovered a presumptive positive test:
x The drywall directly next to the stain on the concrete floor in the basement.
x Lower track and door area of the sliding glass door leading out of the basement.
x A small stain on the floor north side of the garage (where the cadaver dog indicated).
On July 28, 2020 Scott County Deputies and New Prague Police Officers executed a
search warrant at Defendant and Austin Herbst’s residence in New Prague, MN. During the
search, the police seized numerous electronic devices. Investigators interviewed Austin Herbst
x They went camping that weekend and there was nothing wrong with the boat motor in
northern Wisconsin at the Turtle Flowage Lake. (Which contradicted Defendant, who
stated they did not go camping because the boat motor was not operable).
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x When asking about the Sig .45 caliber handgun, and safety concerns, Austin Herbst stated
no one would ever get hurt with the gun because it was safe in “60 feet of water” in the
“Flambeau Flowage.”
x Austin Herbst said he would be able to show investigators its approximate location.
x When asked if he threw it from shore or the side of a boat, he stated, he needed to speak
x The last year and particularly the months prior to the summer of 2013, things had gotten
x His father was far more verbally and physically abusive toward his mother.
x He wanted to speak with his mother before he spoke with investigators, and to ask her
Throughout the interview, Austin Herbst never denied involvement in his father’s
homicide.
Defendant then spoke with investigators for about 90 minutes and offered no new
An examination of both Defendant and Austin Herbst’s cell phones revealed that:
x On June 24, 2020 at 10:33 a.m., Defendant texted Austin Herbst, “It was on Channel 9
News last night.” (On June 23, 2020, Barron County Sheriff’s Office issued a press
x On July 18, 2020, at 3:03 p.m., Defendant texted Austin Herbst, “You need to call me
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x On July 18, 2020 at 3:37 p.m., Defendant texted Austin Herbst, “Might have a problem,
they are searching 347. Don’t mean to fuck up your vacation just wanted u to know. It’s
in the paper.” The investigation showed that on July 18, 2020, Austin Herbst was on
vacation with friends at the Flambeau Flowage in Wisconsin. Interviews with Austin
The State will request that Defendant’s offense be ranked at a severity level 9. Between
1981 – 2018, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission has ranked this offense at a
severity level 8 in one hundred cases. It has been ranked at a severity level 9 in forty-two cases.
It has been ranked at a severity level 10 in fourteen cases. It has been ranked as a severity level
11 in four cases. See MSGC 2018 Unranked Offenses: Frequency and Severity of Unranked
ARGUMENT
The State has moved to amend the complaint to charge Defendant with an unranked
offense in Count Two, Aiding an Offender – Accomplice After The Fact, pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§609.495, Subd. 3. The Court “must assign an appropriate severity level for the offense and
specify on the record why that particular level was assigned” prior to sentencing. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.A.4 (Supp. 2017). When assigning a severity level, the Minn. Sent. Guidelines
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“No single factor is controlling nor is the list of factors meant to be exhaustive.” State v.
In Kenard, the Minnesota Supreme Court extracted three elements that justify an
increased severity level, including whether the offender (1) was present at the time of the
underlying offense; (2) participated in some degree in the underlying offense; or (3) readily
In ascertaining the correct severity level for Aiding an Offender - Accomplice After The
Fact, it is noteworthy that the statutory maximum is "not more than one-half of the statutory
maximum sentence of imprisonment or to payment of a fine of not more than one-half of the
maximum fine that could be imposed on the principal offender. Minn. Stat. §609.495, Subd. 3.
In this case, the principal offender is Austin Herbst. Austin Herbst pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to Aiding and Abetting Second Degree Intentional Murder – Without Premeditation.
The statutory maximum for that offense is 40 years imprisonment. Defendant Connie Herbst's
Defendant meets two of the three elements to justify an increased severity level.
Defendant was not present at the time of the underlying offense, according to Austin Herbst’s
factual basis during his plea hearing. However, Defendant participated in some degree in the
underlying offense because she presumably provided the handgun used to murder the victim. In
addition, Defendant readily participated in covering up the underlying offense shortly after it
occurred, and continually lied to investigators on multiple occasions for years following the
murder. Therefore, the State is requesting a severity level ranking of 9. With a zero criminal
history score, the sentence range would be 74 - 103 months. The presumptive commit is 86
months. A ranking of 9 is appropriate given the fact that Defendant readily participated in the
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prolonged cover-up afterward. Her participation in the cover-up was voluntary, continuous,
Premeditation. There is no crime more grave and more final than homicide. In this case,
Defendant's own conduct exhibited a high level of gravity because she was aware that her son
Austin Herbst used her handgun to execute his father while Defendant was away at the library.
After Defendant returned home and her son told her what he had done, Defendant failed to seek
medical attention for the victim, failed to notify authorities, and failed to do anything other than
engage in a years-long cover up of the heinous crime that had occurred. Defendant made the
choice to help a known murderer cover-up his participation in the crime to presumably help him
II. Severity Level Assigned to Any Ranked Offense with Elements that are Similar
In the State’s amended complaint, Count Two charges Defendant under Minn. Stat.
§609.495, Subd. 3. A ranked offense with similar elements would be Aiding an Offender to
Avoid Arrest under Minn. Stat. §609.495, Subd. 1. This is the correct offense for which to
compare the unranked offense; however, a severity level 1 should not be the ranking for
The severity level assigned to Aiding an Offender to Avoid Arrest under Minn. Stat.
§609.495, Subd. 1 is a severity level 1. The maximum penalty for that offense is 3 years and/or
$5000 fine or both. Under the Minn. Sent. Guidelines, it is a presumptive stay of 12 months and
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Aiding an Offender to Avoid Arrest under subdivision 1 can be easily distinguished from
subdivision 3 relate more specifically to aiding an offender that commits a crime of violence.
Crimes of violence include all crimes listed under Minn. Stat. §609.11, Subd. 9. Minn. Stat.
§609.495, Subd. 3 is likely an unranked offense because the offense covers a wide range of
underlying conduct. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.A.4 (comment). Defendant's offense should
not be ranked at a severity level 1 because Defendant participated in some degree in the
underlying offense, and Defendant actively and readily participated in covering up the
underlying offense for years-on-end. Additionally, the legislature intended for convictions under
Minn. Stat. §609.495, Subd. 1(a) to deal with considerably less serious underlying crimes. See
State v. Kenard, 606 N.W.2d at 444. Therefore, it is logical that crimes committed under
subdivision 3 should be given a higher severity ranking. The correct ranking for Defendant's
offense, based on all factors, is nothing less than a severity level ranking of 9.
III. The Conduct of and Severity Level Assigned to Other Offenders for the
Same Unranked Offense and Engaged in Similar Conduct
The last two factors from Kenard are often analyzed together. In this case, Defendant's
conduct should be compared with other offenders that were ranked at a severity level 8 or higher
and compared against offenders that were present or participated in the underlying offense or
participated in the cover up when the primary offender committed a homicide. The court
engaged in similar analysis in Kenard, where it reviewed the four factors suggested in Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 2.A.4 for ranking unranked offenses. Kenard was convicted of Aiding an
Offender under Minn. Stat. §609.495, Subds. 1 and 3. Her offense, under subdivision 1, was
ranked at a severity level 1. Her offense under subdivision 3 was originally ranked at a severity
level 7. After appeal, Kenard's severity level rank was reduced to a severity level 1 because the
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Court found she did not participate in the underlying offense, she was not present when the
underlying offense occurred, and she did not readily participate in the cover-up. Rather, the
Court found her offense to be less serious because the murder was "thrust upon Kenard in her
Defendant's case is similar to Kenard as it relates to the first two factors but differs
greatly on the last two factors. In Kenard, the gravity of the specific conduct underlying the
unranked offense was the same - homicide. The similar ranked offense with which the court
compared the unranked offense was the same - Aiding an Offender to Avoid Arrest per Minn.
Stat. §609.495, Subd. 1(a). Defendant's case differs from Kenard though when looking at the
conduct of and severity level assigned to other offenders for the same unranked offense; and the
severity level assigned to other offenders engaged in similar conduct. In particular, Defendant
did not have to participate in the cover-up; she chose to participate in the cover-up. Defendant's
conduct was voluntary and intentional. Defendant's conduct is also greater in scope and is more
Kenard's conduct was significantly less serious than Defendant’s conduct. Kenard only
helped clean up the victim's blood after the victim was murdered in her home while she was
away. She arrived home with her two small children to find blood splatter everywhere inside her
apartment and a dead body. Thereafter, she held open doors while the victim's body was
removed from her apartment and from the building. She initially provided misleading
By contrast, Defendant readily participated in covering up the underlying offense and her
son’s participation in the offense. Defendant even traveled across state lines to rural Wisconsin
to dispose of her husband’s body. Defendant continuously and actively provided false and
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misleading information from March 2014 at the time of filing her husband’s missing person’s
report, through her arrest in November 2020. This erroneous information included providing
false information to law enforcement investigators from Minnesota and Wisconsin about the
whereabouts of the victim, especially as it pertained to her knowledge of her son’s actions, and
the removal and disposal of the victim’s body. All of her false statements were done to
presumably shield her son from any accountability. These actions show that Defendant was a
Finally, in comparing the severity level assigned to other offenders engaged in similar
conduct, the Kenard Court examined cases involving Arneatrice Shaw (Henn. Cty File No. 98-
123289) - ranked at a level 1, Antonio Brayboy (Henn. Cty. File No. 96-071357) - ranked at a
level 8, Eugene Meyers (Benton Cty. File No. K9096-521) - ranked at a level 8, Sathith
Mevangsaksith (Henn. Cty. File No. 97-015813) - ranked at a level 7, Frank Soman (Ramsey
Cty. File No. K3-96-4229) - ranked at a level 7, and Nickie Frank (Henn. Cty File No. 98-
095728) - ranked at a level 8; and Stacy Koerner (Henn. Cty. File No. 98-095714) - ranked at a
level 8.
Factors that caused Brayboy, Myers, Frank and Koerner, Mevangsaksith and Soman to be
ranked higher than Kenard included the offender was either: (1) present at the time of the
underlying offense; (2) participated to some degree in the underlying offense; or (3) readily
participated in covering up the underlying offense. Kenard, 606 N.W.2d at 445. These three
Shaw's case was similar to Kenard's because the offenses were thrust upon each
defendant in their own homes. Other defendants, such as Myers, Brayboy, Frank and Koerner
readily assisted or actively participated in the underlying offenses and therefore, those offenses
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were ranked at a severity level 8. The conduct of those defendants, like that of Defendant, was
Defendant’s case is similar to that of Myers, Brayboy, Frank and Koerner but her actions
are even more serious. Defendant's involvement was more prolonged and more sophisticated.
Defendant's conduct included: (1) knowingly filing a false missing person police report to cover
up the fact that she knew her son murdered her husband; (2) actively assisted her son in
disposing of the victim’s body in rural Wisconsin; (3) misleading police as to her knowledge of
what her son had done; and (4) providing false and misleading information continuously to law
enforcement to presumably protect her son and to help him evade responsibility for what he had
done. To date, even after her son pleaded guilty to the offense, Defendant has never given a
truthful statement of what her son told her he did and her participation in the crime.
Myers conduct was limited as compared to the conduct of Defendant. Myers drove a
stolen van while two others beat the owner of the van severely. Myers then helped the two
others drag the injured victim into the woods where the victim was left to die. Brayboy's
conduct was also more limited. Brayboy denied active participation in the brutal slaying of three
people but acknowledged being present at the scene and helping the perpetrator flee. Both Frank
and Koerner's conduct was more limited than Defendant's conduct. Frank and Koerner each
attempted to conceal a brutal rape and murder of a thirteen-year-old girl. They were called by
the perpetrator after the murder and asked to help dispose of the victim's body. Frank provided
the car, and both helped dispose of the body. Like Defendant, Frank and Koerner readily
assisted the murderer when asked. Unlike Frank and Koerner, Defendant continuously engaged
in conduct to assist the murderer with the cover-up, as the lies and misleading statements were
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Mevangsaksith and Soman's offenses were ranked at a severity level 7, but their offenses
arose as a result of their involvement in less serious underlying offenses. The underlying offense
in their cases was robbery - not murder. Mevangsaksith drove a car for friends who robbed two
people at gunpoint. Soman was present during a robbery and grabbed some marijuana as he and
another fled. Based on these rankings, it is clear that Defendant should not be ranked at a
severity level 7. Defendant’s underlying offense is more serious and her continual involvement
After reviewing the cases analyzed in Kenard, it is clear that Defendant's offense should
not be ranked lower than 8. The State is requesting a severity level ranking of 9. The severity
103 months. Again, if Defendant's offense is ranked at a severity level 9 then the presumptive
Coleman (aka Terrance Terrell Smith)(Henn. Cty. File No. 27-CR-11-480) ranked at a severity
level 8. Isai Flores (Henn. Cty. File No. 27-CR-09-30815) ranked at a severity level 10. Devin
Donald James Thunder (Henn. Cty. File No. 27-CR-08-26831) ranked at a severity level 10.
Jesus Jacobo (Dakota Cty. File No. HA-CR-08-2458) ranked at a severity level 9. Benjamin
Edward King (St. Louis Cty File No. K2-1600428) ranked at a severity level 10.
Terrance Terrell Coleman's case involved a robbery for drugs that ended in a fatal
shooting. Coleman's brother was the gunman. Coleman was present in the vehicle that drove to
meet the victim but was not present in the location of the actual shooting. Coleman lied to police
on more than one occasion and tried to provide an alibi for his brother. Prior to testifying before
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the Grand Jury he provided a truthful statement to police that implicated his brother. Coleman
then testified truthfully before the Grand Jury. Coleman was convicted of violating Minn. Stat.
§609.495, Subd. 3. His offense was ranked at a severity level 8. Clearly, Defendant's conduct is
more egregious because she lied to police numerous times to intentionally mislead the
investigation, and to actively protect her son for the murder she knew he committed; and she has
never provided a truthful statement. Her offense should also be ranked at least a severity level 9.
Devin Donald James Thunder was present at the scene when an associate shot and killed
the victim during a drug deal. He gave three versions of event to police. He was convicted of
violating Minn. Stat. §609.495, Subd. 3. His offense was ranked at a severity level 10.
Isai Flores was present and provided the gun used to shoot a passing motorist in the head.
Flores avoided police to avoid being a witness against the shooter. Flores absconded without
giving a statement to police. The shooter was convicted prior to Flores being apprehended.
Flores was convicted of violating Minn. Stat. §609.495, Subd. 3. Flores's offense was ranked at
Benjamin King was present during the offense and removed money and drugs from the
victim's body after his associate shot and killed the victim. His offense was ranked at a severity
level 10.
Jesus Jacobo was present when the victim was shot and lied to police regarding being
present and regarding the last time he spoke with the shooter. He was convicted of violating
Minn. Stat. §609.495, Subd. 3. His offense was ranked at a severity level 9.
When the Court compares the various aforementioned cases and conduct involved it is
reasonable and fair that Defendant's offense be ranked at a severity level 9. None of the cases
discussed above involve such prolonged participation and level of sophisticated deception as
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Defendant has displayed. Most recently, using the factors in Kenard, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals upheld the severity level ranking of a 9 for a defendant who drove the shooter away
from the scene of a murder. State v. Laster, 2020 WL 1846510 (April 13, 2020) (attached).
Then again, applying the Kenard factors, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the severity
level of 9 for a defendant who helped drive the shooter away from a murder scene while the
shooter still had the firearm. Cooper v. State, 2018 WL 1787689 (April 16, 2018) (attached).
Once the Court examines factors to determine a correct ranking for an unranked offense,
it should also evaluate whether any elements exist to enhance the severity level. Elements
identified in Kenard included whether the secondary offender was: (1) present at the time of the
underlying offense; (2) participated to some degree in the underlying offense; or (3) readily
participated in covering up the underlying offense. State v. Kenard, 606 N.W.2d at 445. These
Defendant technically meets two of the elements to justify an increased severity level.
First, she indirectly participated in the murder because the murder weapon was a handgun that
underlying offense. Her participation in the cover-up was voluntary, sophisticated, prolonged,
and detailed. Her misleading statements to law enforcement were readily consistent. Defendant's
participation was voluntarily and continual with the purpose to help avoid implicating her son as
the murderer; and to protect him from being arrested and held accountable for his crime.
Like Flores (severity level 10), Defendant was presumably trying to avoid being a
witness against the murderer. Like Coleman (severity level 8) and Thunder (severity level 10),
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Defendant gave numerous false and misleading statements. Unlike Coleman, Defendant has
never provided the truth of what happened. Unlike Kenard, Defendant made the choice to
The Court should rank Defendant's crime higher than a level 8 because her conduct was
greater in scope than offenses ranked at a level 8. Her participation was on-going and was much
more elaborate, sophisticated and deceptive than even the other cases ranked at a severity level
10. Defendant told numerous lies, from filing the false missing person police report to
misleading the Minnesota and Wisconsin investigators during her statements on several
occasions. There are no excuses for her conduct. It is not a defense to allege she lied to avoid
implicating herself in the crime. The right against self-incrimination does not equate with the
right to lie to or intentionally mislead police. U.S. v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1049 (5th
Cir. 1994) ("Although the Fifth Amendment protects a person's right to remain silent in response
to an incriminating question, an outright lie is not protected."); see also Bryson v. U.S., 396
U.S.64, 72, 90 S.Ct. 355, 360, 24 L.Ed.2d 264 (1969)(observing that "[a] citizen may decline to
answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully
answer with a falsehood"). The only explanation for all of Defendant's lies and omissions was
that she wanted to cover up her son’s decision to murder his father by shooting him in the head
execution-style while he slept on their living room couch. She wanted to help her son avoid
Defendant made the choice to lie and mislead investigators1. Defendant's lies and
omissions were intended to protect her son, deceive police, and to prevent her son’s
1
This is not the first time Defendant has provided false information to police to protect her son. On November 18,
2014, Austin Herbst was involved in a car accident after he had consumed alcohol. Austin Herbst’s vehicle ended up
in a ditch and he fled the scene. Shortly after the crash, police located Defendant driving a vehicle very slowly in
-20-
70-CR-20-15925
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
7/12/2021 3:41 PM
apprehension on murder charges. All of Defendant’s actions were done with the purpose of
CONCLUSION
Defendant readily participated in the cover-up of a brutal murder, and actively worked to
obstruct the investigation and prosecution of her son Austin Herbst. Her actions were elaborate,
Defendant’s offense of Aiding and Offender – Accomplice After The Fact be ranked at a severity
level 9.
Respectfully submitted,
the area where Austin Herbst’s vehicle was found in the ditch. Defendant lied to police and said she believed Austin
Herbst was currently at home sleeping.
-21-
70-CR-20-15925
Filed in District Court
State v. Laster Cases Minnesota] Westlaw
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A19-1216
Filed April 13, 2020
Review Denied July 23, 2020
Cathryn Middlebrook. Chief Appellate Public Defender. Sara J. Euteneuer. Assistant Public
Defender. St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Florey. Presiding Judge; Worke. Judge; and Larkin. Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LARKIN. Judge
*1 On appeal from his conviction and sentence for aiding an offender—accomplice after the
fact, appellant challenges the district court's assignment of severity level nine when
sentencing him for that offense and its denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. We affirm.
FACTS
ln March 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Vance Diwayne Laster Sr.
with aiding and abetting second-degree murder, third-degree murder, first-degree assault,
and second-degree arson.
The complaint alleged that J,Dl and N.P. were shot near a Sauk Rapids residence during the
early morning hours 0t February 16, 2018, and that Laster drove W.W. and N.Jl from the
crime scene in J.Di's vehicle. J.D. died from multiple gunshot wounds. The complaint
alleged that shortly after the shooting, W,W., N.J., and a third person arrived at a gas station
in a vehicle registered t0 P.L. W.W. and N.J. purchased a gas can, filled it with gas. and then
left the gas station without paying for the gas. Less than ten minutes later, the St. Cloud Fire
Department responded to a call of a vehicle on fire nearby, which police later learned was
J.D.'s vehicle.
In June 2018, a grand jury indicted Laster on 15 counts, including first-degree murder,
state agreed to dismiss the other charges and cap Laster's sentence at 158 months of
imprisonment.
At the plea hearing, Laster explained his involvement in the offense as follows. Laster,
W.W.. N.J., J.D., and N.P. drove to a bar ln St. Paul in the late evening hours of February
15, 2018, and drove to J.D.'s sister's house in Sauk Rapids in the early morning hours the
next day‘ Laster was asleep when they arrived at J.D.’s sister’s house, but he woke when he
heard J.D. call his name. Laster saw J.D. outside the vehicle struggling with W.W. Laster
heard a gunshot and opened the door of the vehicle to investigate. Laster saw N.P. get out
of the vehicle during the struggle between J.D. and W.W. and heard additional gunshots.
Laster saw W.W. holding a gun and saw J.D. and N.P. lying on the ground. Laster drove
W.W. and N.J. from the scene in J.D.‘s vehicle, stopped in St. Cloud to switch to an
acquaintance‘s vehicle, and then drove W.W. and N.J. to a gas station in St. Cloud. Laster
denied helping W.W. and N.J. set J.D.’s vehicle on fire. However, Laster admitted that he
saw W.W. holding a gas can when he left the gas station and that he drove W.W. and N.J.
back to J.D.'s vehicle before W.W. and N.J. allegedly burned it. The district court found that
Laster had established an adequate factual basis for his guilty plea, deferred acceptance of
that plea, and scheduled a sentencing hearing.
*2 Before sentencing, Laster submitted a "sentencing motlon," requesting that the district
court assign a severity level of eight to his aiding-an-offender offense, or. in the alternative,
allow him to withdraw his plea. At sentencing, Laster noted that N.J. had only been
convlcted of arson after his trial and received a 23-month stayed sentence. Laster argued
that It was unfair to require him to serve 158 months in prison when the person who was
convlcted of the underlying arson received a much lighter sentence. The district court
assigned a severity level of nine to Lester's alding-an-oflender offense, denied his motion to
wlthdraw his guilty plea, and sentenced him to serve 158 months in prison, consistent with
the plea agreement. Laster appeals.
DECISION
I.
Laster contends that the district court abused its discretion by assigning a severity level of
nlne to the unranked offense of aiding an offender—accomplice after the fact. ‘
Before a dlstrlct court sentences a defendant for a felony-level offense, the district court
must calculate a presumptive sentence based on the severity level of the offense and the
offender’s criminal history. State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 666 (Minn. 2006); see Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 2.C.1 (Supp. 2017) ("The presumptive sentence for a felony conviction ls
found In the appropriate ceil on the applicable [sentencing guidelines] Grid located at the
Intersection of the criminal history score (horizontal axis) and the severity level (vertical
axls)."). Although most offenses have an assigned severity level, certain offenses have not
been assigned a severity level because “(1) the offense is rarely prosecuted; (2) the offense
covers a wide range of undertying conduct; or (3) the offense is new and the severity of a
typical offense cannot yet be determined." Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. 2.A.04 (Supp. 2017).
Aiding an offender—accomplice after the fact is designated as an unranked offense under
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 5.A (Supp. 2017).
When a district court sentences an offense that is designated as an unranked offense. the
court “must assign an appropriate severity level for the offense and specify on the record
why that particular levei was assigned." Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.A.4 (Supp. 2017). When
assigning a severity level. the district court may consider:
b. the severity level assigned to any ranked offense with elements that are similar to the
c. the conduct of and severity level assigned to other offenders for the same unranked
offense; and
Id. “No single factor is controlling nor is the list of factors meant to be exhaustive." State v.
Kenard, 606 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. 2000). This court reviews a district court’s severity-
level determination for an abuse of discretion. Bensch, 707 N.W.2d at 666.
The distric‘ court based its severity ranking, in part, on the gravity of the underlying conduct,
which it described as follows:
The gravity of Mr_ Lester's actions were great in this case. Other cases in which courts
have determined that aiding an offender merits a high severity level, as pointed out in the
State’s memorandum, mention or cite as grounds for the higher sentencing the presence
of the defendant at the time of the underlying offense or his participation in that offense or
his participation in covering [up] the offense.
In this case, l note that we have evidence, and by Mr, Laster's own admissions, he
willingly and intentionally drove off in a car stolen from a man who had just been shot
before his eyes. The shooter of the man that died and of another man who survived was In
the car driven by [Laster] as they fled the scene at high speeds. The shooter presumably
had the gun with him, and Mr. Laster’s actions were of danger to public safety because
the shooter was clearly armed and dangerous at that time.
*3 The defendant, Mr. Laster. not only did not aid those who were shot. but actively and
consciously assisted the murderer of [J.D.] to flee the scene and avoid capture. He
assisted in the destruction of evidence after the crime by facilitating the burning of the car.
He also assisted in the fleeing of the other codefendant from the scene. All of those
actions posed a great risk to public safety.
Laster argues that his conduct, ”while serious, did not justify ranking his offense at a severity
level of nine." He argues that he ”did not anticipate [the] incident.” that "[J.D.] was his friend."
and that “he did not clean the crime scene, provide false information to the police or later
interfere with the investigation.” But as the district court soundly reasoned, Laster “willingly
and intentionally drove off in a car stolen from a man who had just been shot before his
eyes” and helped the shooter flee the scene. Laster "assisted in the destruction of evidence
after the crime by facilitating the burning of the car" by switching vehicles, driving W.W. and
N.J. to the gas station, and then driving them back to J.D.’s vehicle with a gas can. And as
the district court‘s statements suggest, it considered Lester's conduct especially egregious
because there were two victims. Because Lester’s underlying conduct was particularly
grave. the district court appropriately relied on it when assigning a severity level of nine.
I would note that aiding an offender under subdivision 1 of this same statute (Minn. Stat. §
609.495 (2016)] has a severity level of only 1; but, as noted in the case law and is obvious
from the [Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission] notes, the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission considers this offense much more serious than one that would be
sentenced under subdivision 1 of the same statute.
|think that tampering with a witness may be considered comparable as that offense
Involves taking action to obstruct an investigation or conceal evidence of a crime. That is,
under our guidelines, a severity level 9, if it’s aggravated, if it's accompanied by violence
or the threat of violence. Similarly, here, [Laster] took actions to assist the shooter of two
victims to flee the scene of the crime and took actions to destroy evidence that may be
found or discovered in [J.D.’s] car by assisting others in setting that car on fire.
Laster argues that the district court erred by comparing the offense in this case, aiding an
offender—accomplice after the fact, to aggravated tampering with a witness because “[t]
ampering with a witness is a much more serious offense than what occurred here.” Laster
further argues that, unlike witness tampering, the underlying offense here did not involve the
use of “coercion, force or threats of injury to intentionally prevent a witness from testifying”
and that there was "no indication that [he] acted to intentionally obstruct an investigation or
conceal evidence."
*4 According to Kenard, the relevant comparison is between the elements of the unranked
offense and the elements of a ranked offense. See 606 N.W.2d at 443—44 (referring to
element-based similarity between ranked and unranked offenses); see also Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.A.4.b (Supp. 2017) (stating that the court may consider "the severity level
assigned to any ranked offense with elements that are similar to the elements of the
unranked offense”).
A person is guilty of aiding an offender—accomplice after the fact if the person "intentionally
aids another person whom the actor knows or has reason to know has committed a criminal
act, by destroying or concealing evidence of that crime, providing false or misleading
information about that crime, receiving the proceeds of that crime. or otherwise obstructing
the investigation or prosecution" Minn. Stat. § 609.495. subd. 3. A person is guilty of
aggravated first—degree witness tampering if the person threatens great bodily harm or death
to another in the course of intentionally: (1) preventing, dissuading, or attempting to prevent
or dissuade a potential witness from attending or testifying at any criminal trial or
proceeding; (2) coercing or attempting to coerce a potential witness to testify falsely; (3)
retaliating against a person who was a witness at a criminal trial or proceeding; (4)
preventing. dissuading, or attempting to prevent or dissuade a person from providing
information to law enforcement regarding a crime; (5) coercing or attempting to coerce a
person to provide false information to law enforcement regarding a crime; or (6) retaliating
against a person who has provided information to law enforcement regarding a crime. Minn,
Stat. § 609.498, subd. 113(3) (2016). The elements of first-degree tampering with a witness
and aiding an offender—accomplice after the fact are not sufficiently similar for the purpose
of assigning a severity ranking.
Relying on Kenard, Lester argues that aiding an offender under Minn. Stat. § 609.495, subd.
1(a). a severity-leveI—one offense, is the most similar ranked offense. 606 N.W.2d at 443~44.
Kenard was convicted of aiding an offender—accomplice after the fact based on her efforts
to conceal a murder. Id. at 441. She cleaned the crime scene. held doors open so the
murderer could dispose of the body. and initially provided false information to the police. Id.
at 443. The district court assigned a severity level of seven when sentencing Kenard. Id. at
441. On appeal. the supreme court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in
assigning a severity level of seven in part because the district court "did not indicate on the
record what factors, if any, it considered when it assigned offense severity level [seven] to
Kenard’s offense" and it was therefore “almost impossible for a reviewing court to evaluate
the [district] court's exercise of discretion." Id. at 442-43.
The supreme court went on to analyze the appropriate severity level for Kenard's offense. Id.
at 443-44. The supreme court determined that "[tJhe ranked offense most similar to Kenard’s
offense [was] alding an offender under Minn. Stat. § 609.495, subd. 1(a)," which was ranked
at severity level one under the guidelines. Id. The supreme court noted that the primary
differences between aiding an offender under Minn. Stat. § 609.495, subd. 1(a). and
offender—accomplice after the fact under Minn. Stat. § 609.495. subd. 3. are "that
subdivision 3’s application is limited to certain enumerated offenses while subdivision 1 ls
not so limited; and that subdivision 3 provides that those convicted thereunder may be
sentenced to up to one-half of the statutory maximum of the aided offense.” Id. at 444. The
supreme court reasoned that based on those differences. the legislature obviously
“considers convictions under subdivision 3 more serious than those under subdivision 1.“ Id.
*5 ln analyzing the appropriate severity level for Kenard’s offense, the supreme court
considered the severity rankings assigned in six other cases of aiding an
offender—accomplice after the fact. Id. In four of the cases, the underlying offense was an
attempted or completed murder and the district court assigned a severity level of eight. Id. at
444-45. ln the other two cases, the underlying offense was a robbery and the district court
assigned a severity level of seven. Id. at 445. Because at the time of Kenard the highest
severity level was ten, and not eleven as it is now, severity levels of seven and eight were
similar to what would now be severity levels eight and nine. Compare Minn. Sent. Guidelines
IV (Supp. 1997) (providing presumptive sentences of 48 and 86 months of imprisonment,
respectively, for severity levels seven and eight when a person has a criminal-history score
of zero), with Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (Supp. 2017) (providing presumptive sentences of
48 and 86 months of imprisonment, respectively, for severity levels eight and nine when a
person has a criminal-history score of zero).
The supreme court explained that in each of the six cases, "the offender was either present
at the time of the underlying offense, participated to some degree in the underlying offense,
or readily participated in covering up the underlying offense." Kenard, 606 N.W.2d at 445.
The supreme court contrasted those circumstances with Kenard's offense, noting that she
was “neither present at the time of, nor participated in, [the] murder" and "did not choose to
become involved in concealing [the] murder, rather she walked into her own home with two
young children to find blood on the walls and floor and took steps to hide the murder from
her 4-year old son.” Id. The supreme court concluded, “\Mth these cases in mind, we
remand to the [district] coun for a determination of the severity level of Kenard's offense.
consistent with this opinion.” Id.
Laster argues that “[iln contrast to the cases examined in Kenard, while [he] was present
when the victims were shot, he did not participate in the offense or readily participate in
covering up the offenses.“ The record refutes that argument. Again. Laster admitted that he
drove the murderer from the crime scene—using me victim’s car—and then facilitated the
destruction of the victim's car. Laster's conduct is akin to the conduct involved in the four
attempted or completed murder cases discussed in Kenard and therefore warrants a similar
ranking.
Conduct and Severity Level Assigned to Other Offenders for Same Unranked Offense
The district court explained that it had "reviewed the records maintained by the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission for other persons that have been sentenced for the
offense of aiding an offender, accomplice after the fact in the years between 2015 and
2017.” The district court noted that "three of those offenders who were sentenced for that
crime were assigned a severity level 7 by the sentencing court. six have been assigned a
severity level 9; and nine offenders were assigned a severlty level 8."
Laster argues that a severity level of nine was "only assigned in a minority of the cases" that
the district court considered. Laster further argues that his conduct was significantly less
serious than the conduct of other defendants who have been convicted of aiding an
offender—accomplice after the fact. Again. he relies on Kenard, 606 N.W.2d at 445, In
support of that arguments As explained above, that reliance is unavailing because a higher
ranking Is justified when his conduct is compared to Kenard’s.
Moreover. the state points out that this court recently affirmed the district court’s assignment
of a severlty level of nlne in a case involving very similar conduct. In that case, Cooper v.
State. the defendant went into a residence to retrieve personal belongings No. A17-0994,
2018 WL 1787689, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 16, 2018), review denied (Minn. June 27, 2018).
Another person entered the residence and shot a third person. Id. The defendant left the
residence. aware that the third person had been shot. Id. As the defendant pulled away, the
shooter Jumped into the defendant’s vehicle. Id. Even though the defendant believed he was
the shooter and that he likely had the gun in his possession, the defendant drove the shooter
to his home. Id. The defendant pleaded guilty to aiding an offender—accomplice after the
fact and the district court assigned a severity level of nine. Id. This court affirmed. reasoning
that the district court correctly described the defendant’s conduct as extremely serious and
that the offense was similar to the "aiding-in-a-murder offenses" described in Kenard. Id. at
*6 ln sum. unlike the circumstances in Kenard, the district court here made a record showing
that Itconsidered the relevant permissive factors and provided sufficient reasons for its
assignment of severity level nine to Lester’s offense of aiding an offender—accomplice after
the fact. That severity level corresponds with assignments for similar conduct in comparable
cases, and it is appropriate given the gravity of Lester's conduct. The district court did not
abuse its discretion by assigning a severity level of nine.
ll.
Laster contends that the “district court abused its discretion by denying [his] pre-sentencing
motlon to withdraw his guilty plea.”
"A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” Slate v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). However, withdrawal is permitted in two
circumstances. Id. First, "[a]t any time the court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty
plea upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Second, "[i]n its
discretion the court may allow the defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence
if it is fair and just to do so." ld., subd. 2. Although the district court considered Laster’s plea-
withdrawal motion under both the manifest-injustice and fair~and—just standards. his
arguments on appeal are limited to the falr—and-just standard.
Although the fair-and-just standard is “less demanding than the manifest injustice standard.
it does not allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea for simply any reason." State v. Theis.
The fair and just standard requires district courts to give due consideration to
two factors: (1) the reasons a defendant advances to support withdrawal and
(2) prejudice granting the motion would cause the State given reliance on the
plea. A defendant bears the burden of advancing reasons to support
withdrawal. The State bears the burden of showing prejudice caused by
withdrawal.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97 (citations and quotation omitted). Appellate courts review a
district court’s decision to deny a plea-withdrawal motion under the fair-and-just standard for
abuse of discretion. “reversing only in the rare case.” Id. (quotation omitted). "Guilty pleas
facilitate the efficient administration of justice. and more than a change of heart is needed to
withdraw a guilty plea." State v. Lopez. 794 N.W,2d 379, 382 (Minn. App. 2011).
Laster argues that the “severity level nine and 158-month cap agreed to in the plea
agreement were excessive and inconsistent with the interests of justice in this case"
because N.J. received a “stayed 23—month sentence.” Laster complains that although he
“was not convicted of any of the actual offenses, but merely of aiding an offender after the
fact," his “sentence ls notably more severe than the sentence [N.J.] recelved, despite [N.J.’s]
key role in the arson and destruction of the decedent's vehicle." Laster argues that it would
have been fair and just to allow hlm to withdraw his plea based on N.J.’s sentence.
The facts of this case are similar to those in State v. Townsend. 872 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. App.
2015). Townsend agreed to plead guilty to an amended offense of aiding an offender after
the fact for a murder committed by a codefendant and to testify against that codefendant. Id.
at 761. Before Townsend was sentenced, he testified at the codefendant’s trial, and the jury
found the codefendant not guilty. Id. Townsend moved to withdraw his guilty plea under the
manifest-injustice and falr-and-just standards based on the codefendant's acquittal. Id. at
761-62. The district court denied Townsend’s plea-withdrawal motion. Id. at 761.
*7 On appeal, Townsend‘s “sole reason for asking to withdraw his plea" under the fair-and-
Just standard was that he “faceldl punishment for an after~the~fact role in a murder that a jury
determined could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 764. This court rejected
that argument for two reasons. Id. First. we explained that the offense of aiding an
offender-accomplice after the fact did not require that the other person actually be
convicted of the crime. Id. Second, we reasoned that “Townsend had the opportunity to
present his case to a jury but chose to waive his trial rights to take advantage of a favorable
plea negotiation." Id. We determined that "[tjhe district court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that Townsend’s realization that he made a bad bargain did not provide him with
a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea.” Id.
Laster similarly "had the opportunity to present his case to a jury but chose to waive his trial
rights to take advantage of a favorable plea negotlafion." See id. The fact that he now
believes he made a bad bargain given the sentence N.J. received after trial does not
establish a fair-and~just reason to withdraw his guilty plea. See id.; see also Lopez. 794
N.W.2d at 382 (stating that "more than a change of heart is needed to withdraw a guilty
plea").
iii.
In prose supplemental briefs. Laster claims (1) that the sentence he received was
“excessive and unjust” given his conduct and (2) that the district courtjudge who sentenced
hlm was biased because that judge “had previously signed warrants that were used in this
case" and “was the judge presiding over the trial."
Laster’s argument that the sentence he received was excessive and unjust is addressed in
our discussion of the arguments in his principal brief.
As to Lester’s argument that the
sentencing judge was biased, "[p]revious adverse rulings by themselves do not demonstrate
judicial basis." Harmon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008). Lester's bias argument
therefore does not provide a basis for relief.
Affirmed.
All Citations
i
Footnotes 5
1 We address the issues in the order that they were presented to this court.
Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. 2002) ("In light of a court‘s discretion in
sentencing, the sentencing guidelines were created to assure uniformity,
proportionality, rationality. and predictability in sentencing”). An examination of
sentences imposed for unranked offenses in unpublished cases may be
necessary to achieve that goal.
Improve Westlaw
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SELECTED TOPICS
Court of Appeals of Minnesota. Aprfig?&¥8r Afigl 9pm? tnDNW MwlrNN2§lg ®E$78$§89A8R§9$§3x 4 pages)
Secondary Sources
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. §
State statutes or ordinances requiring
480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). persons previously convicted of crime
Court of Appealsof Minnesota. to register with authorities
Hennepin County District Court, File Nos. 27-CR-14—5026, 27—CR—14—5025 34 Am. Jun Trials 1 (Originally published In
1987)
...Thls article discusses matters relevant to
Attorneys and Law Firms the criminal defense of sex offenders, in
which the prosecution has strong but not
Bradford Colbert, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) overwhelming evidence of guilt. Experienced
trial lawyers are aware of the
sentenced Cooper to 134 months in prison. The district court incorporated the state's State of Colorado Ex Rel. Ken Salazar,
Attorney General, And the 41 States
memorandum regarding the justification for the level-nine ranking as part of its sentencing and Territories of Alabama, Arizona,
order. Connecticut, Delaware. The District of
Columbia‘ As Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, The State of Alaska
In January 2017, Cooper filed a petition for postconviction relief, requesting that a "correct" Florida, Georgia, Hawaii. lllinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana.
severity level be assigned to the offense. The district court denied Cooper's petition,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
concluding that the district court appropriately exercised its discretion by adopting the state's Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
sentencing memorandum regarding justification for the severity-level—nine ranking. This
Jersey, New York
appeal followed.
2002 WL 1308561
Glenn Gt Godfrey, Bruce M. Botelho v. John
DECISION Doe l, Jane Doe, John Doe Ii: State of
Cooper argues that he should be resentenced using a lower severity level. The district court California ex rel, Bill Lockyer, Attorney
General, State of Colorado ex rel, Ken
denied Cooper's challenge to the severity-level assignment in a petition for postconvictlon Salazar, Attorney General
relief. This court reviews a denial of postconvlction relief for an abuse of discretion. State v. Supreme Court of the United Slates
May so, 2002
Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 357 (Minn. 2012). ln doing so, this court reviews the
.,.FN[* Additional States, Territories and
postconvlction court‘s legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Counsel Listed on inside Cover] The Amici
v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712. 718 (Minn. 2011). This court reviews a district court's States tile this brief pursuant to Rule 37 ol the
Bonga
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
severity-level determination for an abuse of discretion. State v. Berlsch, 707 N.W.2d 660. States. This brief is respec...
666 (Minn. 2006).
See More Briefs
*2 Here, Cooper pleaded guilty to aiding an offender after the fact, an unranked offense. Trial Court Documents
When a dlstrlct court sentences an unranked offense, the court "must assign an appropriate
0.8. v. Gladish
severity level for the offense and specify on the record why that particular level was
2007 WL 6467626
assigned." Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.A.4 (2012). ln doing so, the district court may consider
UNlTED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Brian
the following factors: (1) “the gravity of the specific conduct underlying the unranked GLADISH.
United States District Court. N.D. lndlana.
offense;” (2) "the severity tevel assigned to any ranked offense with elements that are similar
July 18, 2007
to the elements of the unranked offense;" (3) "the conduct of and severity level assigned to
...THE DEFENDANT: pleaded guilty lo count
other offenders for the same unranked offense;" and (4) "the severity level assigned to other (s) pleaded nolo contenders lo count(s)
offenders engaged ln similar conduct.” Id.; Stale v. Kenard, 606 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. which was accepted by the court. X was
found guilty on count(s) 1 and 2 after a plea
2000). No single factor is controlling and the list of factors is not exhaustive. Kenard, 606 of not guilty. The defendant ls adlu...
N.W.2d at 443.
U.s. v. Webster
The district court adopted the state's sentencing memorandum. which analyzed the factors 2014 WL 8662499
considered in assigning a severity level to an unranked offense. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Ronald
WEBSTER, Defendant.
United States District Court, N.D. Alabama,
As to the first factor—“the gravity of the specific conduct underlying the unranked Apr. 02, 2014
offense"-the district court found that Cooper's conduct was “extremely serious” because ...The defendant. RONALD WEBSTER, was
represented by David S. Luker. On motion of
Cooper was present at the time of the shooting and he drove Gomez away from the scene. the United States, the court has dismissed
The district court‘s findings are supported by the record. counts 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 916,17,16,19,
and 20. The defendant pleaded gu...
Gomez shot J.H. in the residence while Cooper was there. Cooper drove Gomez away from
U.S. v. Pratt
the scene. believing that Gomez shot J.H. Cooper admitted that he should have known that
2017 Wt. 11572159
Gomez left with the gun; thus, Cooper assisted in removing evidence from the scene and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Daphne
knew that doing so would assist Gomez in avoiding prosecution. And Cooper did not report PRATT.
United States District Court, D. South
the crime to police. These facts support the district court's determination that Cooper's
Carolina.
conduct was “extremely serious." July 26, 2017
pleaded guilty to count 1 of the Second
As to the second factor—“the severity levelassigned to any ranked offense with elements Superseding indictment on November 30,
2016. pleaded noio conlendere to counl(s)
that are similar to the elements of the unranked offense"—the district court. citing Kenard,
__
aiding an offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.495. subd. 1(a) (2012). Noting that See More Trial Court Documents
section 609.495, subdivision 1(a), dealt with “considerably less serious undertying crimes,"
the district court relied on characteristics of an offender's conduct identified in Kenard that
would justify a higher severity level, including the offender‘s presence at, participation in. and
covering up of the underlying offense. The district court found that Cooper was present
during and assisted in covering up the shooting. As described above, this finding is
supported by the record.
As to the third factor—"the conduct of and severity level assigned to other offenders for the
same unranked offense"——the district court listed several cases cited in Kenard in which
offenders were convicted of violating section 609.495, subdivision 3 and received severity-
level rankings of seven and eight? The district court noted that the severity levels in these
comparable cases predated a modification to the sentencing guidelines that led to the
increase of severity levels, making an offense previously ranked at seven now ranked at
eight. See Taylor v. Slate, 670 N.W.2d 584, 587 n.3 (Minn. 2003). Vlfith the increase of the
severity levels, a level seven or eight ranking would now be an eight or nine ranking.
*3 We are also persuaded that Kenard supports a level-nine ranking. There are six cases
cited in Kenard, divided into two groups based on the predicate offenses—robbery and
murder. 606 N.W.2d at 444—45. The aiding-in—a—robbery offenses were assigned severity
level seven. Id. at 445. The aiding»in—a-murder offenses were assigned severity level eight.
Id. at 444—45. One of the murder cases is Brayboy. Id. at 444; see State v. Patterson, 587
N.W. 2d 45, 47—48 (Minn. 1998) (discussing Brayboy's conduct). Brayboy admitted to being
present during the murders and helping the perpetrator flee the scene. Kenard. 606 N.W.2d
at 444. Brayboy's offense was assigned a severity level eight. Id. Similarly, Cooper was
present at the scene and helped Gomez flee. Cooper's offense was assigned severity level
nine. Under the current sentencing scheme Brayboy's offense would be assigned a severity
level nine as well.
Finally, as to the fourth factor—"the severity level assigned to other offenders engaged in
similar conduct"—~the district court found that Cooper's conduct was analogous to the
conduct of the offender in State v. Solorzano—O’Brien, who received a severity level ten
No. A10—1514, 2011 WL 1237554, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 5, 2011), review denied
[ranking
(Mlnn. June 28, 2011). In that case. the offender, a high—ranking gang member, drove four
codefendants to threaten or harm an alleged member of a rival gang. State v. Patina, 3 No.
ADS—1005, 2009 WL 2225440, at *1 (Minn. App. July 23, 2009), review denied (Minn. Oct.
20, 2009). The vlctlm was lured outside and one of the codefendants shot and killed him. Id.
The appellant pleaded guilty to aiding an offender after the fact for the benefit of a gang. Id.
Thls court affirmed the severity-level ranking because the appellant was the oldest of the
codefendants and exercised influence on the others, the appellant was in the car when the
codefendants lured the victim outside, the appellant instructed the others to stay silent and
[misled the police, and the victim's family feared gang retaliation. So/orzano—O’Brien, 2011
WL 1237554. at *1—2. Similarly, Gomez was Cooper‘s stepson; thus. there was a level of
influence. Gomez was a gang member. Cooper was present during the shooting. And
Cooper assisted Gomez in avoiding arrest and prosecution.
ln Slate v. Sklplntheday, this court affirmed the district court's decision to assign a severity
level eight for the crime of accomplice after the fact to firstdegree murder. 704 N.W.2d 177,
183 (Minn. App. 2005), aff’d. 717 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 2006). in that case. the appellant went
with three lndlvlduals to a party where rival gang members would be present. Id. at 179. An
argument arose between the individuals who arrived with the appellant and other party
attendees. resulting In three individuals being shot and one being killed. Id. The appellant
was present during the shootings but did not participate in them. Id. The appellant fled in a
car with the shooters, advising the driver: "You didn't see anything." Id. The police stopped
the vehicle and the appellant removed the ammunition from the gun and hid it and the gun In
separate locations. Id. He also denied involvement in the shootings and misidentified an
lndivldual In the vehicle to protect him from an arrest warrant. Id.
Similarly, Cooper was present during the shooting and he fled in a vehicle with Gomez.
Although Cooper did not personally hide the weapon, he admitted that he should have
known that Gomez was in possession of the weapon when they fled; by driving Gomez from
the scene, he was removing evidence and assisting Gomez in avoiding prosecution.
In sum, the district court considered the Kenard factors and provided sufficient reasons for
its severity-level assignment. Cooper's offense was assigned a severity level nine, a ranking
that corresponds with assignments for similar conduct in comparable cases. See State v.
Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. 2002) (stating that the sentencing guidelines
promote “uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing“). The district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Cooper's petition for postconvlcticn relief.
*4 Affirmed.
All Citations
Footnotes
i.
1 Gomez was charged with first- and second-degree murder and felon in
possession of a firearm. State v. Gomez, No. A15—0128, 2016 WL 363403, at
*1 (Minn. App. Feb. 1, 2016), review denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 2016). Ajury
Since Kenard, this court has released several unpublished opinions affirming
severity»level assignments of eight and nine for the offense of aiding an
offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.495, subd. 3, including: State v.
Wilson. No. A15—1001, 2016 WL 1396803, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 11, 2016)
(present in vehicle during drive-by shooting that injured two women and
concealed firearm, assigned severity level eight), review denied (Minn. June
29, 2016); State v. Oldenburg, No. A09—1273, 2010 WL 2161028, at *1 —2
(Minn. App. June 1, 2010) (aware of boyfriend‘s plot to murder, assisted in
disposing of body, lied to police, and concealed/destroyed evidence, assigned
severity level nine); In re Welfare of T.J.W., No. AO7—1014, 2008 WL 224013,
at *3, *11 (Minn. App. Jan. 29, 2008) (presentduring murder, participated in
attack preceding murder, covered up murder, and misled investigators,
assigned severity level eight), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26. 2008); In re
Weifare of OH, No. C0—02——900, 2003 WL 457233, at *3 (Minn. App. Feb. 25,
2003) (chased victim with intent to cause harm, present during murder, and
concealed gun, assigned severity level eight). Although not precedentiai, these
cases are persuasive.
m1 MINNesorA
SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION
m‘fi MINNeSOTA
SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION
COMMISSION MEMBERS
Kelly Lyn Mitchell, Chair and Public Member
Christopher Dietze n, Associate Supreme CourtJustice (Retired), Designee ofthe Chief J ustice of the Minnesota
Supreme Court
Valerie Estrada, Corrections Unit Supervisor, Hennepin County Community Corrections & Rehabilitation
Abby Honold, Public Member
Tonja Honsey, Public Member
Michelle A. Larkin, Minnesota Court of Appeals Judge
Kevin Mark, FirstJudicial District CourtJudge
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender
Salim Omari, Saint Paul Police Sergeant
Peter Orput, Washington County Attorney
Paul Schnell, Commissioner of Corrections
COMMISSION STAFF
NathanielJ. Reitz, Executive Director
Nicole Jas person, Research Analyst
Kathleen Madland, Research Analyst Intermediate
Linda McBrayer, Management Analyst 4
Jill Payne, Senior Research Analysis Specialist
Anne Wall, Senior Research Analysis Specialist
Table of Contents
lntrod uction
Case Volume
Case-Level Information
Appendicg 22
Table 1. Frequency and Severity of Unra nked Offenses, Sentenced 2013—2018 by Year, and Sentenced 1981—
2018 in Total
Introduction
The Sentencing Guidelines Commission assigns severity-level ra nkings to felony offenses to indicate offense
seriousness. In determining how, or whether, offenses should be assigned a severity level, the Commission will
consider how district courts have generally sentenced the offenses, along with the maximum penalty
established by the Legislature, rankings for similar crimes, and other relevant information. The Commission has
intentionally left a number of felony offenses unra nked.
When crimes are unranked, it may be because they are so seldom charged that no sentencing patterns are
discernible, because they are new crimes that are not easily compa rable to existing offenses, or beca usethe
offense encompasses such a wide range of behavior that it is best to allow the sentencing court discretion in
determining the severity level.
When an offense is unranked, the court must assign an appropriate severity level for the offense and specify on
the record why that particular level was assigned. This ranking process is described in greater detail in Appendix
1, ”Unranked Offenses," on page 22.
The following section describes the sentencing practices for unra nked offenses in general, detailing the
frequency of each unranked offense and the severitylevel(s) assigned to it by sentencing courts. Due to the
offense’s unique nature, the sentencing practices for Aiding an Offender, Accomplice After the Fact—one of the
most commonly occurring unra nked offenses—are detailed in a sepa rate section that begins on page 8.
The data in Table 1 represent a summaryof unra nked offenses sentenced between 1981 and 2018. lfthe
severity level of an offense is listed as ”N/A," then no case has ever been sentenced under the Guidelines in
which that offense was the most serious offense sentenced. Currently ranked, but formerly unranked, offenses
are not reported here. 2 Because 421 of the 1,625 unra nked offenses sentenced between 1981 and 2018 are no
longer unranked, a total of 1,204 cases are shown in Table 1.
1
Minnesota courts sentenced 18,284felony offenders in 2018.
1
Effective August 1, 2006,third-degree criminal sexual conduct (Minn. Stat. § 609.344 subd.1(a)),fourth—degree criminal
sexual conduct(Minn. Stat. § 609.345,subd.1(a)), use of minors in a sexual performance (Minn. Stat. § 617.246), and
possession or dissemination of child pornography(Minn. Stat. § 617.247) are no longer unranked offenses. These offenses
are now ranked on the Sex Offender Grid. information onthe ranking ofthese offenses committed priorto August 1, 2006,
can be obtained by submittinga data requestto the MSGC office.
To obtain any of the data below for specific years or for additional details not provided in this document, please
contact the Sentencing Guidelines Commission at 651-296-0144 or submit a data request at
https://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/contact/data-requests.isp.
Table 1. Frequency and SeverityofUnranked Ofi‘enses, Sentenced2013—2018(by Year) and 1981—2018(in Total)
.‘e’ié.;1.;'
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$133; 2 4
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* These rankings representthe severity levels in effect on/afterAugust 1, 2002. On that date, a new Severity Lewl 7 was
inserted in the Sentencing Guidelines Grid, with old severity levels7, 8, 9, and 10 becoming 8, 9, 10, and 11.
1 19
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Accomplice After Fact ** 3 2 1 2 ‘2 37
subd. 3
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*
These rankings rep resentthe severity levels in effect on/after August 1, 2002. On that date, a newSeverityLevel 7 was
inserted in the Sentencing Guidelines-Grid, with old severity levels7, 8, 9, and 10 becoming 8, 9, 10, and 11.
**
For details and case-level information regardingthis offense. referto the section that begins on page 8.
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609 or 497
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25
* These rankings representthe severity levels in effecton/afterAugust 1, 2002. On that date, a new Severity Level 7 was
inserted in the Sentencing Guidelines Grid, with old severity levels7, 8, 9, and 10 becoming 8, 9, 10, and 11.
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5 2
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3 2 1 1 4
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These rankings representthe severity levels in effecton/afterAugust 1, 2002. On that date, a newSeverityLevel 7 was
inserted in the Sentencing Guidelines Grid, with old severity ieveis7, 8, 9, and 10 becoming 8, 9, 10, and 11.
** Between 1981 and
2018, there were 1,626 u nranked offensa. Because 421are no longer unmnked, the "1981—2018
TOTAL CASES" totals 1,205.
The statutory maximum penalty for Aiding an Offender, Accompiice Afterthe Fact, is dependent on the crime
the offender has alleged to have aided. According to the statute, the accomplice may be sentenced to not more
than one-half of the statutory maximum sentence that could be imposed on the principal offender for the crime
of violence listed under Minn. Stat. § 609.11. subd. 9. (See Table 4 for a complete list of possible underlying
criminal acts.) Becausa this is an unranked offense, the sentencing court must assign a severity level prior to
pronouncing the sentence. (SeeAppendix 1, "Unra nked Offenses,” on page 22.)
case Volume
Figure 1 displays the number of offenders who were sentenced between 2001 and 2018 with Aiding an
Offender, Accomplice After the Fact, as the most serious offense sentenced.3There were 20 cases sentenced
under this statute in 2018. There have been, on average, 23 cases peryearsince 2001.
Figure 1. Number of Ojj‘enders Sentencedfor Aiding an Ojj‘ender, Accomplice After the Fact, 2001—2018
4
5
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35
30
25
20
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
3
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelina Commision (MSGC) monitoring data are offende r-based, meaning cases re present
offenders rather than individual charges. Offenders sentencedwithin the same countyin a one—month period are generally
counted onlyonce, based on theirmostserious offense.
Case-Level Information
The following two ta bles (Table 2 and Table 3) list detailed case-level information for Aiding an Offender,
Accom plice After the Fact offenders. Table 2, which contains data for cases sentenced in 2015 through 2018,
records the underlying criminal act and its severity level, but only if those facts are apparent on the face of the
criminal complaint, plea petition, or other court record.‘ When those facts are not apparent, details of the
underlying offense are left blank. lnTable 3, which contains data for cases sentenced from 2001 through 2014,
details of the underlying offense are not recorded, but district court case numbers are provided for those who
wish to obtain more information from court records.
In both tables a single asteriskindicates a redacted record with juvenile criminal history, and ”12‘" equals 12
months and one day.
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Hennepin CR1628407 6 3 Commit
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exceed statutory maximu m) with State v. Wilson, No. [115-1001, 2016WL 1396803 (Minn.App. Apr. 11, 2016)
(unpublished) (statutory maximum in this case was 90 months).
1.1
2018 Unranked Ofenses Report
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Hennepin CR1339166 6 1 Stay 27
2014
Hennepin CR1327073 6 5 Commit 51
Hennepin CR1331433 9 0 Commit 86
Hennepin CR1318611 5 5 Commit 43
Hennepin CR1320832 9 1 Commit 98
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Appendices
Appendix 1. How the Guidelines Work
In General
Minnesota's guidelines are based on a grid structure. The vertical axis of the Grid represents the severity of the
offense for which the offender was convicted. The horizontal axis represents a measure of the offender’s
criminal history. The Commission has ranked felony level offenses into eleven severity levels. Offenses included
in each severity level are listed in the Severity Reference Table in the MinnesotaSentencing Guidelines and
Commentary.
The criminal history index measures the offender’ s prior record and consists of four measures of prior criminal
behavior: (1) a weighted measure of prior felony sentences; (2) a limited measure of prior misdemeanor/gross
misdemeanor sentences; (3) a limited measure ofthe prior seriousjuvenile record; and (4) a ”custody status“
measure which indicates if the offender was on probation or parole when the current offense was committed.
The recommended (presumptive) guideline sentence is found in the cell of the sentencing grid in which the
offender’s criminal history score and severity level intersect. The Guidelines recommend imprisonment in a state
prison in the non-shaded cells of the grid.
The Guidelines generally recommend a stayed sentence for cells in the shaded area ofthe applicable Grid.
When a sentence is stayed, the court typically places the offender on probation and may require up to a' year of
local confinement (i.e., local correctional facility, county jail or workhouse) as a condition of probation. Other
conditions such as fines, restitution, community work service, treatment, house arrest, etc. may also be applied
to an offender's sentence. There are, however, a number of offenses that ca rrya presumptive prison sentence
regardless o'fwhere the offender is on the applicable Guidelines Grid (e.g., offenses involving dangerous
weapons which carry mandatory minimum prison terms, and drug and burglary offenses).
The number in the cell is the recommended length of the prison sentence in months. As explained above,
sentences in shaded boxes are generally stayed probationary sentences. For cases in the non-shaded cells of the
applicable Grid, the Guidelines also provide a narrow range of months around the presumptive duration that a
judge may pronounce and still be within the Guidelines.
Un ranked Offenses
Some felony offenses are designated as unranked offenses. An unra nked offense typically has one or more of
the following characteristics: (1) the offense is rarely prosecuted; (2) the offense covers a wide range of
underlying conduct; or (3) the offense is new, and the severityof a typical offense cannot yet be determined.
Minn. Guidelines Section 2.A.4 contains the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy for unranked offenses. When
sentencing an unranked offense, the court must assign an appropriate severitylevel for the offense and specify
on the record why that particular level was assigned. The court may consider, but is not limited to, the following
factors:
lt is not possible to fully explain all of the policies in this brief summary. Additional information on the Guidelines
is available by contacting the Commission's office. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary is
available online at http:/jmn.gov/5entencing-guidelines.
Felony DWI 66 72
. . . . 54 60
F of a 7 36 212 [4'8
@1333}:525330" 46-64 51-72 57-79 62-84 2- 3
Assault, 2nd Degree - 39 45 51 57
B r l , 'l t D egree (0 “WM d 6 211 33
34-46 39-54 44-61 49-68
”Dig-"”9;
Residential Burglary 33 38 43 48
5 18 23 218
Simple Robbery 29-39 33-45 37—51 41-5 7
. . 24 27 30
N onresrden tla l B urg lcry 4 1;! 118 21
21—28 2332 26-36
. 19 21 23
Th eft Crzmes(0 ver 31 5,000) 3 1323 ills 135' i157.
77—22 18 25 20%?
Theft Crimes ($5,000 or less) 21
Check Forgery ($25 i—$2,500)
2 192': 113 I15 1
18-25
2
Minn. Stat. § 244.09 requires that the Guidelines provide a range for sentences that are presumptive commitment to state
imprisonment of15% lower and 20% higher than the fixed duration displayed, provided that the minimum sentence is not less
than one year and one day and the-maximum sentence is not more than the statutory maximum.See section 2.C.1-2.
Degree— 1(a)
CS C 3rd Degree—(c) (d)
48 62 76 90 1 17 1 53 1 80
(g)(h)(i)(j)(k)(l)(m)(n)(o)
Prostitution; Sex Trafficking 2nd 41-57 53-74 65-91 77-708 100-140 131—780 153-1802
Degree— 70
CS C 2nd Degree—(a) (b)(g)
CS C 3rd Degree—(a)(e)(fi or(b)with
ref. to subd. 2(1) 60 70 91 1‘19 140
Dissemination of Child 51— 60-84 78- 109 102— 142 7 79-168
Pornography (Subsequent or by
Predatory Offender)
CS C 4th Degree—(c)(d)
‘
h i k l m n o
60
‘
1
Uggflhgg g: Zigzag geiformance
(in)
51 72 (£893 8;-01220 -2120 2
Dissemination of Child
Pornography2
CS C 4th Degree—
(a)(b)(e)(f),' CS C 5th Degree; 45 59 77 84
Possession of Child Pornography
39-54 51—70 6692 72—700
(Subsequent or by Predatory
Offender)
CS C 3rd Degree—(b) with subd. 2(2);
Indecent Exposure 39 51 60
Possession of Child Pornography, 34-46 44-60 5 7-60 2
Solicit Child for Sexual Conduct2
. . 121 14 16 18 24 30 36
Registration Of Predatory Offenders 7‘21 74 721 76 74- 79 76-27 27_28 26-36 3143
12‘=One year and one day
1
Presumptive commitment to state imprisonment. Sex offenses under Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 2, have mandatorylife
sentences and are excluded from the Guidelines.See section 2.E, for policies regarding those sentences controlled by law.
including conditional release terms forsex offenders.
Presumptive stayed sentence; at the discretion of the court, up to one year of confinement and other non-jail sanctions can be
imposed as conditions of probation. However, certain offenders in the shaded area ofthe Grid may qualify for a mandatorylife
sentence under Minn. Stat.§ 609.3455, subd.4. See sections 2.C and 2.E.
2
Minn. Stat. § 244.09 requires that the Guidelines provide a range for sentences that are presumptive commitment to state
imprisonment of15% lower and 20% higher than the fixed duration displayed, provided thatthe minimum sentence is not less
than one year and one day and the maximum sentence is not more than the statutory maximum.See section 2.C.1-2.
Prostitution; Sex Trafficking is not subject to a 90-month minimum statutorypresum ptive sentence so the standard range of
3
15% lower and 20% higher than the fixed duration applies. (The range is 77—108.)
86 98 11 O 1 22 1 34 146 1 58
Agsgfisgfgeggzulg
’ Degree D9
74 *_ 103 84*_ 117 94*._ 132 104 *_ 146 714 *_ 160 125 *_ 175‘ 135 *_ 789
Manufacture o1'Any Am t. Meth
Controlled Substance Crime, ist 65 75 85 95 105 1 1 5 125
.
D8
Degree 56 *— 78 64*-90 73*- 702 81*~1 14 90*— 126 98*- 138 107*- 150
8
2nd Degree 5 8-8 1 6 7-93 75— 105 84—1 17 92- 129
-
Controlled Substance Crime, 51h 21
D2 g
Degree 78—25
*
Lower range may not apply. See section 2.C.3.c(1) and Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subdivisions 3(c) 8L 3(d).
1
121=0ne year and one day
I —-vm Presumptive stayed sentence; 'at the discretion of the court, up to one year of confinement and other non-jail sanctions can
be imposed as conditions of probation. However, certain offenses in the shaded area of the Grid always carry a presumptive
A
commitment to state prison. See sections 2.C and 2.E.