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Lerias Vs Ombudsman

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Lerias Vs Ombudsman

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THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 241776. March 23,
2022 ]
ROSETTE Y. LERIAS, PEDRO C.
LLEVARES, JR., MA. LUCINA L.
CALAPRE, JOSEPH A. DUARTE, AND
CATALINO O. OLAYVAR,
PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON.
OMBUDSMAN AND THE FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LOPEZ, J., J.:

The Constitution guarantees that the right of the


people to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The Court has shown that it is a staunch defender of
this constitutional guarantee. However, the
invocation of inordinate delay is not a magical phrase
that when implored would automatically result in the
dismissal of a criminal indictment. The person
claiming that there was unreasonable delay must
clearly show that the source of the lag in the
disposition of their case is solely attributable to the
State's ineptness. After proving that there was
inordinate delay, the burden is shifted to the State to
prove that the delay was justified and that it did not
cause prejudice to the person.

The Case

This is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of


the Rules of Court with an application for a
preliminary injunction, assailing the: (1)
[2]
Resolution dated June 14, 2017, of the Office of
the Ombudsman (OMB) in OMB-C-C-13-0170; and
(2) Order[3] dated April 30, 2018, denying the motion

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for reconsideration.

Antecedents

On June 14, 2017, Field Investigation Office (FIO) of


the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) filed a
complaint for malversation of public funds and
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
(R.A. No. 3019) against Provincial Governor Rosette
Y. Lerias (Lerias), Provincial Agriculturist Eluterio V.
Tibon (Tibon), Provincial Treasurer Pedro C.
Llevares, Jr. (Llevares, Jr.), Inspection Officer Ameo
S. Capistrano (Capistrano), OIC-­Provincial
Accountant Ma. Lucina L. Calapre (Calapre),
Provincial Budget Officer Joseph A. Duarte (Duarte),
and Provincial General Services Officer Catalino O.
Olayvar (Olayvar), all of the Provincial Local
Government Unit (PLGU) of Southern Leyte; Leo P.
Cañeda (Cañeda) of the Region Field Unit VIII of the
Department of Agriculture (DA RFU VIII); and
Clemente CH. Fernandez (Fernandez), sales manager
of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizers Corporation
(Philphos).[4]

The complaint alleged that Lerias et al. conspired to


defraud the government in using P3,250,000.00 to
purchase 4,394 bags of various grades of fertilizers
from Philphos without conducting public bidding, as
required by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184. The
complaint showed that the Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA) had previously accredited two
suppliers of fertilizers in Southern Leyte.[5]

The FIO further averred that on April 29, 2004, the


PLGU Southern Leyte received the first tranche of
the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani from the DA RFU
VII in the amount of P3,250,000.00. On April 30,
2004, Tibon prepared, and Lerias approved, a
purchase request for 4,394 bags of various grades of
fertilizers. On May 5, 2004, Tibon prepared an
unnumbered purchase order signed by Calapre,
Duarte, Llevares, Jr., and Olayvar, and approved by
Lerias. On May 20, 2004, the PLGU Southern Leyte
paid P3,217,381.20 to Philphos. Tibon certified that
there was no suitable substitute of substantially the
same quality of fertilizers available at a lower price.
In the inspection and acceptance report dated May 4,
2004, Capistrano certified that the quantity and
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specification of the fertilizers were acceptable.[6]

Lastly, the FIO claimed that Lerias et al. violated


R.A. No. 9184 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations when they adopted a direct contracting
or single source procurement as an alternative
method of procurement instead of conducting a
public bidding. They allegedly accomplished this by
making it appear that Philphos is the exclusive
manufacturer of the procured fertilizers. The FIO
claims that the FPA has previously accredited two
suppliers of fertilizers in Southern Leyte.[7]

In their joint counter-affidavit, Lerias, Capistrano,


Duarte, and Calapre contended that resorting to direct
contracting is not contrary to law as long as the
conditions provided by R.A. No. 9184 were met.
They explained that Philphos is the exclusive
distributor within Region 8 while Nican Enterprises
and EBR Marketing Corporation are merely
distributors of fertilizers in Ormoc City.[8] They
maintained that directly contracting with Philphos
proved to be more beneficial to the government and it
helped improve the province's overall rice
production.[9] Olayvar echoed the arguments of
Lerias, Capistrano, Duarte, and Calapre.[10]

For his part, Tibon alleged in his counter-affidavit


that he retired in December 2004. He denied having
committed the charges against him and stated that the
signatures that appeared in the documents were those
of Daniel Mayorca, the provincial agriculturist who
replaced him.[11]

On the part of Fernandez, he asserted that he had no


personal knowledge of the bidding procedure
conducted by the PLGU-Southern Leyte. He admitted
that he had knowledge of the purchase order with the
caveat that he did not participate in the transaction.
He acknowledged that P3,217,381.20 was paid to
Philphos by the PLGU-Southern Leyte although he
did not personally receive the same and thus, did not
issue the official sales receipt.[12]

Llevares, Jr. and Caneda did not submit any counter-


affidavit despite notice.[13]
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The OMB found probable cause to charge Lerias,


Llevares, Jr., Calapre, Duarte, and Olayvar for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 by
conspiring in releasing the funds in favor of Philphos
without undergoing the correct procurement process.
[14]

The OMB observed that Lerias acted with manifest


partiality when she approved the procurement of
different fertilizers from Philphos without complying
with the requirements of R.A. No. 9184 as to the
conduct of a thorough canvass for similar suppliers.
[15]

As to the liability of Llevares, Jr., Calapre, Duarte,


and Olayvar, the OMB noted that they were in
conspiracy as can be gleaned from their act of signing
the purchase order, disbursement voucher, and other
documents. There was allegedly no proof that they
consulted the resident auditor of the Commission on
Audit (COA) to determine the aptness of the mode
that they undertook.[16]

Tibon was absolved by the OMB as it was


established that the signature appearing above his
name in all the documents was that of Daniel
Mayorca.[17]

Likewise, the OMB saw no wrongdoing on the part


of Capistrano as he was not involved in the
procurement through direct contracting with Philphos
as he merely inspected the delivery of the assorted
fertilizers.[18]

With regard to Cañeda, the OMB found no evidence


that he acted with evident bad faith or with intent to
defraud the government when he signed the
memorandum of agreement representing DA-RFU
VIII. The OMB observed that his participation was
limited to the transfer of funds to the PLGU of
Southern Leyte and that he had no direct participation
in the procurement process.

In relation to Fernandez's culpability, the OMB saw


no basis to charge him together with the other
accused as there was no showing that his signature
appeared in any of the documents attached in the
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complaint.[19]

With respect to the charge of malversation of public


funds, the same was dismissed based on the findings
of the OMB that there was no evidence to show that
Lerias, Tibon, Llevares, Jr., Capistrano, Calapre, and
Duarte misappropriated or allowed any person to
appropriate funds for their personal benefit.[20]

On March 26, 2018, Calapre, Duarte, and Olayvar


filed a joint motion for reconsideration while Lerias
filed a separate motion for reconsideration. They
alleged that the OMB's findings were erroneous due
to the fact that (a) Philphos was the sole manufacturer
of inorganic fertilizer in Region VIII from 1987 up to
November 2012; (b) Philphos had no suitable
substitute; (c) there was no evidence that Nican
Enterprise and EBR Marketing Corporation were
licensed fertilizer distributors in 2004; (d) the terms
offered by Philphos were already inclusive of storage,
insurance, security, and delivery; and (e) the
exclusive distributorship requirement under Republic
Act No. 9184 does not refer to a manufacturer and
does not include subdealers selling at lower prices.
[21]

They further claimed that their signatures in the


purchase order, disbursement voucher and/or check
are part of their regular functions. They maintained
that there was no criminal design and undue injury as
the fertilizers were reasonably and completely
delivered. With regard to Lerias, she stated that her
reliance on her subordinate was justified and
reasonable. Lastly, they argued that their right to a
speedy disposition of their case was violated because
of the fact that the OMB took four years to resolve
the case from the time the complaint was filed in
2013 and 11 years from the time the audit report of
the COA came out.[22]

On April 30, 2018, the OMB denied the motions for


reconsideration.[23]

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners claim that the OMB glaringly abused its


discretion when it indicted them despite the

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unjustified and inordinate delay in the investigation


of the complaint against them.[24] Petitioners
elaborate that the transaction in question happened
way back in 2004 and yet it took 14 years or
specifically until March 23, 2018 to charge them for
an offense.[25]

The petitioners further point out that: (1) Philphos


was an exclusive manufacturer of inorganic fertilizer;
(2) Philphos does not have subdealers selling at lower
prices; and (3) inorganic fertilizers had no suitable
substitute that can be obtained at more advantageous
terms to the government. These facts were allegedly
supported by the certification issued by FPA
certifying that Philphos was the exclusive
manufacturer of inorganic fertilizers in Region VIII
and the certification issued by the Provincial
Agriculturist Tibon, certifying that there was no
suitable substitute of substantially the same quality of
fertilizers at a lower price.[26]

The petitioners likewise claim that the OMB blatantly


abused its discretion when it excluded the pieces of
evidence submitted to it, in particular: ( 1) the
certification from the FPA that Philphos is the sole
manufacturer of solid inorganic fertilizer in Region
VIII; (2) the certification from Philphos certifying the
fact that it has been the sole manufacturer and
distributor of inorganic phosphate fertilizer in Region
VIII since the company started commercial
operations in 1987; and (3) the certification from
Provincial Agriculturist Tibon, certifying that there
was no suitable substitute of substantially the same
quality of fertilizers at a lower price.[27]

Lastly, two interrelated claims are being objected by


the petitioners. They assert that the complaint that
resulted in the challenged resolution of the OMB was
just a feeble attempt to resurrect recycled charges.[28]
The petitioners also maintain that the principle of
conclusiveness of judgement applies to the complaint
previously filed by Santiago I. Astorga against the
petitioners for the same charge, which was already
dismissed in the case of Astorga v. Lerias, et al.[29]

The OMB through the Office of the Solicitor General


(OSG) counters that the OMB did not commit
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inordinate delay in resolving the complaint to the


prejudice of the petitioners.[30] The OSG posits that
while the audit report dated January 17, 2006 of the
COA RFU VIII found irregularities in the
implementation of the P49,000,000.00 Farm
Inputs/Farm Implements Program (FIFIP), it was
only upon the receipt of the complaint filed on
December 19, 2012 by Associate Graft Investigation
Officer II Gerhard G. Basco when petitioners learned
that their involvement in the FIFIP is the subject of a
case before the OMB. Thus, it was only from such
date that the case became adversarial against them.
[31]

The OSG claims that the OMB did not commit


unwarranted delay when it took the OMB more than
three years after the counter-affidavits were
submitted and for the one month it took to resolve the
motions for reconsideration. The OSG points to the
fact that the case involved eight public respondents
coming from two different offices and one private
respondent based on another location that involved
administrative and criminal aspects. In short, the
OSG postulates that the complaint involved a
complex issue that required a thorough investigation
by the OMB.[32]

The OSG also maintains that the OMB did not


commit grave abuse of discretion when it excluded
the submissions of the petitioners to support their
motions for reconsideration. The OSG points out that
the certifications from the FPA and the Philphos
cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence
since the concerned offices could have easily issued
the same after the complaint was filed against the
petitioners.[33] As to Tibon's certification, the OSG
avers that such is self-serving as he is one of the
respondents in the complaint.[34]

Finally, the OSG avows that the doctrine of


conclusiveness of judgement is not applicable in the
present case. The OSG highlights that OMB Criminal
Cases C-C-07-0142-C and C-C-131070 both
emanated from the failure to conduct public bidding
involving some of the petitioners, the factual
circumstances are entirely different. The evidence on
record in OMB C-C-07-0142-C showed that the

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subject procured goods, Bigante hybrid rice seeds,


were supplied by an exclusive distributor. Unlike in
this case, resort to alternative mode of procurement
was improper.[35]

The petitioners submitted a reply that contains the


same arguments they raised in their petition.

Our Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Bill of Rights, in particular Section 16, declares


the right of all to persons to a speedy disposition of
their cases, to wit:

Section 16. All persons shall have the


right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

With specific application to the OMB, the


Constitution expressly commands it to promptly
resolve complaints lodged before it. Section 12,
Article XI of the Constitution directs:

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his


Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants
of the action taken and the result thereof.

The constitutional duty lodged in the OMB is further


echoed in Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989,
which reads:

Section 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman


and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against
officers or employees of the Government,
or of any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereat, including
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government-owned or controlled
corporations, and enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability
in every case where the evidence warrants
in order to promote efficient service by
the Government to the people.

In assessing whether the right to speedy disposition


of cases has been violated, the Court has employed
the balancing test. Thus, the following factors should
be considered in determining if there was delay in the
disposition of cases: (1) length of the delay, (2)
reasons for the delay, (3) assertion of right by the
accused, and (4) prejudice to the respondent.[36]

Integrating all relevant jurisprudence on the matter,


the Court, in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan[37] (Cagang),
clarified the mode of analysis in situations where the
right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to
speedy trial is invoked, thus:

First, the right to speedy disposition of


cases is different from the right to speedy
trial. While the rationale for both rights is
the same, the right to speedy trial may
only be invoked in criminal prosecutions
against courts of law. The right to speedy
disposition of cases, however, may be
invoked before any tribunal, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial. What is
important is that the accused may already
be prejudiced by the proceeding for the
right to speedy disposition of cases to be
invoked.

Second, a case is deemed initiated upon


the filing of a formal complaint prior to a
conduct of a preliminary investigation.
This Court acknowledges, however, that
the Ombudsman should set reasonable
periods for preliminary investigation, with
due regard to the complexities and
nuances of each case. Delays beyond this
period will be taken against the
prosecution. The period taken for fact-
finding investigations prior to the filing
of the formal complaint shall not be
included in the determination of
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whether there has been inordinate


delay.

Third, courts must first determine which


party carries the burden of proof. If the
right is invoked within the given time
periods contained in current Supreme
Court resolutions and circulars, and the
time periods that will be promulgated by
the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense
has the burden of proving that the right
was justifiably invoked. If the delay
occurs beyond the given time period and
the right is invoked, the prosecution has
the burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it


must prove first, whether the case is
motivated by malice or clearly only
politically motivated and is attended by
utter lack of evidence, and second, that
the defense did not contribute to the delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the


prosecution, the prosecution must prove
first, that it followed the prescribed
procedure in the conduct of preliminary
investigation and in the prosecution of the
case; second, that the complexity of the
issues and the volume of evidence made
the delay inevitable; and third, that no
prejudice was suffered by the accused as a
result of the delay.

Fourth, determination of the length of


delay is never mechanical. Courts must
consider the entire context of the case,
from the amount of evidence to be
weighed to the simplicity or complexity
of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an


allegation that the prosecution of the case
was solely motivated by malice, such as
when the case is politically motivated or
when there is continued prosecution
despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious
intent may be gauged from the behavior
of the prosecution throughout the
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proceedings. If malicious prosecution is


properly alleged and substantially proven,
the case would automatically be dismissed
without need of further analysis of the
delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of


the accused to the right to speedy
disposition of cases or the right to speedy
trial. If it can be proven that the accused
acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional
right can no longer be invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate


delay, the causes of the delays must be
properly laid out and discussed by the
relevant court.

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of


cases or the right to speedy trial must be
timely raised. The respondent or the
accused must file the appropriate motion
upon the lapse of the statutory or
procedural periods. Otherwise, they are
deemed to have waived their right to
speedy disposition of cases.[38]

"[A] mere mathematical reckoning of the time


involved is not sufficient in determining whether or
not there was inordinate delay on the part of the
investigating officer."[39] This notion is specifically
applicable in cases involving the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and the filing of the
information by the OMB as there is no threshold
period set by any law or rule as the maximum period
for the conduct of preliminary investigation before
the OMB as compared to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the National Prosecution
Service, which has a specific period to resolve.

In the present case, the submission of the counter-


affidavit by the petitioners on September 14, 2013
should be the starting point for the determination if
there is inordinate delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation. This is because at this point the OMB
should now determine if there is probable cause to
file an information against the petitioners. It is thus
wrong for the petitioners to claim that it took 14
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years for the OMB to file the case before the


Sandiganbayan since it is already an established
doctrine that the fact-finding investigations prior to
the filing of the formal complaint shall not be
included in the determination of whether there has
been inordinate delay.[40]

As there is no provision in any statute as to the length


for the resolution of a criminal case lodged before the
OMB, the provisions of Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure shall fill the gap for the
procedure and duration of the determination of
probable cause for the filing of the information in
court.[41] The pertinent provisions of Rule 112 read:

RULE 112
Preliminary Investigation

SEC. 3. Procedure. — The preliminary


investigation shall be conducted in the
following manner:

xxx xxx xxx

(f) Within ten (10) days after the


investigation, the investigating officer
shall determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the respondent
for trial.

SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating


prosecutor and its review. — If the
investigating prosecutor finds cause to
hold the respondent for trial, he shall
prepare the resolution and information.
He shall certify under oath in the
information that he, or as shown by the
record, an authorized officer, has
personally examined the complainant and
his witnesses; that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof; that the accused
was informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against him; and that
he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he
shall recommend the dismissal of the
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complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution,


he shall forward the record of the case to
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or
his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction. They shall act on
the resolution within ten (10) days from
their receipt thereof and shall immediately
inform the parties of such action.

A cursory reading of the provisions of Rule 112


would reveal that the investigating prosecutor or
officer of the OMB has 10 days from submission of
the case for resolution, or upon submission of the
counter-affidavits to conclude the preliminary
investigation and submit their resolution to the
Ombudsman for approval. Upon receipt, the
Ombudsman has, in turn, 10 days from receipt within
which to act upon the investigating officer's
resolution and to immediately inform the parties of
its action.[42]

As earlier discussed, petitioners submitted their


counter-affidavit on September 14, 2013. The
resolution of the OMB finding probable cause to
charge them with violation of R.A. 3019 was
promulgated on June 14, 2017. However, it was
pointed out by the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration filed before the OMB that the June
14, 2017 Resolution was signed by the Team Leader
only on June 29, 2017, then by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon the following day, June 30,
2017. It took seven months for the same to be
approved by then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-­‐
Morales. It is worthy to note that these allegations
were not rebutted in the discussion of the OMB when
it denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration or
in any pleading or submission to this Court.[43]

The Court notes that it took the OMB investigating


officer and the OMB a total of 1370 days or 3 years,
9 months, and 1 day to determine probable cause to
file an information against the petitioners. This is
obviously beyond the period provided for the
determination of whether there is probable cause to
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file an information in the Sandiganbayan. Clearly,


petitioners were able to demonstrate that there was a
delay in the resolution of the preliminary
investigation of the case filed against them as co-
accused and such delay was not attributable to them.
Thus, the burden of evidence shifts to the State to
prove that the delay was justified and not capricious,
malicious, or motivated by political agenda. The
prosecution ought to establish that "[first], it followed
the prescribed procedure in the conduct of
preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of
the case; second, that the complexity of the issues
and the volume of evidence made the delay
inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered
by the accused as a result of the delay."[44]

The Court, after a thorough examination of the case,


finds that the OMB's reason for the lull in the
disposition of the case was not justified. First, it is
undeniable that the prosecution followed the
procedure laid out in Section 4, Rules of Procedure of
the OMB particularly in giving the petitioners the
opportunity to submit their counter-affidavits.
However, as earlier noted the OMB failed to comply
with the time limit for the conduct of the preliminary
conference. This is an obvious deviation from the
Rules of Procedure of the OMB in relation to the
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Second, the justification proffered by the OMB was


flimsy and unacceptable. The April 30, 2018
Resolution of the OMB stated that it was a complex
case since it involved serious allegations of
irregularity in the disbursement of at least
P49,000,000.00 released to different local
government units, nongovernmental organizations,
and/or people's organizations in Region VIII justified
the duration of the fact-finding and preliminary
investigation of the case.[45] The argument of the
State was repeated in its comment submitted to the
Court, wherein it highlighted that the case involved
eight public respondents coming from two different
offices and one private respondent based on another
location that involved administrative and criminal
aspects.[46] The Court rejects the determination of the
OMB that the case involves complex issues; on the
contrary, the case involves a linear or straightforward
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determination that does not require years of


examination. We also observe that the documents
involved were readily accessible and available, and
demanded no forensic examination or any highly
technical evaluation.

In Martinez III v. People,[47] a case involving a


charge for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019
in relation to the local government's purchase, We did
not accept the excuse tendered by the State when We
declared:

The representation by the OSG that the


Office of the Ombudsman had
investigated the present case in
conjunction with the other Fertilizer Fund
scam cases did not sufficiently justify the
close to five years spent in conducting the
preliminary investigation. There was no
allegation, to start with, that the
petitioners had conspired with those
involved in the other so-called Fertilizer
Fund scam cases, which might have
explained the long period necessary for
the preliminary examination. The delay
was really inordinate and oppressive
considering that the informations
ultimately filed against the petitioners did
not appear to have resulted from a
complex preliminary investigation that
involved the review of voluminous
documentary and other evidence.
Moreover, the petitioners were only
initially charged for their non-compliance
with COA Circular No. 96-003 that
concerned accounting and auditing
guidelines on the release of fund
assistance to NGOs and people's
organizations. Under the circumstances,
the protracted preliminary investigation
by the Office of the Ombudsman
evidently ran counter to the aforecited
express constitutional mandate to
promptly act on complaints filed with it.
[48]

Similarly, in Javier v. Sandiganbayan,[49] a case part


of the so-called fertilizer fund scam, We rejected the
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oft-repeated excuse by the State that the standstill in


the disposition of the case was brought by the heavy
work load of the OMB. We elucidated as follows:

At this juncture, it is well to point out that


the Ombudsman cannot repeatedly hide
behind the "steady stream of cases that
reach their office" despite the Court's
recognition of such reality. The Court
understands the reality of clogged dockets
— from which it suffers as well — and
recognizes the current inevitability of
institutional delays. However, "steady
stream of cases" and "clogged dockets"
are not talismanic phrases that may be
invoked at whim to magically justify each
and every case of long delays in the
disposition of cases. Like all other facts
that courts take into consideration in each
case, the "steady stream of cases" should
still be subject to proof as to its effects on
a particular case, bearing in mind the
importance of the right to speedy
disposition of cases as a fundamental
right.

In Catamco v. Sandiganbayan Sixth Division,[50] We


noted that a preliminary investigation that lasted for
more than two years is not justified despite the
number of the persons being the subject of the
investigation, the pertinent portion of Our ruling
provides:

Moreover, a perusal of the Ombudsman's


Resolution and the Informations filed
against petitioners shows that the issues in
this case are simple, straightforward and
are easily determinable considering that
only one transaction is involved. There
was also no allegation that petitioners
herein had conspired with those involved
in the other so called "Fertilizer Fund
Scam" cases. In fact, the Ombudsman's
primary findings that petitioners violated
the Procurement Law and that the
transaction was made with undue haste
are mere reiterations of the audit findings
and previous issuances of the COA. While
a meticulous review and verification of
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documents may have been necessary


given the number of respondents in this
case, a protracted investigation of more
than two (2) years from the time the last
counter-affidavit was filed is still quite
unreasonable especially considering
that, at the end of the day, the
Ombudsman merely relied on, and even
adopted as its only facts, the audit
findings and previous issuances of the
COA. In this light, the Ombudsman's
delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation against all respondents was
clearly unjustified.[51]

Third, We find that there was prejudice suffered by


the petitioners on account of the OMB's delay in the
disposition of their case.

The Court discussed in Cagang[52] the nature and


extent of prejudice in relation to the right to speedy
disposition of cases in this manner:

The prosecution must likewise prove that


no prejudice was suffered by the accused
as a result of the delay. Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan defined prejudice to the
accused as:

Prejudice should be assessed


in the light of the interest of
the defendant that the speedy
trial was designed to protect,
namely: to prevent oppressive
pre-trial incarceration; to
minimize anxiety and concerns
of the accused to trial; and to
limit the possibility that his
defense will be impaired. Of
these, the most serious is the
last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system.
There is also prejudice if the
defense witnesses are unable
to recall accurately the events
of the distant past. Even if the

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accused is not imprisoned


prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on
his liberty and by living under
a cloud of anxiety, suspicion
and often, hostility. His
financial resources may be
drained, his association is
curtailed, and he is subjected
to public obloquy.

In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan:

Lest it be misunderstood, the right to


speedy disposition of cases is not merely
hinged towards the objective of spurring
dispatch in the administration of justice
but also to prevent the oppression of the
citizen by holding a criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time.
Akin to the right to speedy trial, its
"salutary objective" is to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate
defense he may interpose. This looming
unrest as well as the tactical
disadvantages carried by the passage of
time should be weighed against the State
and in favor of the individual.[53]

The Court concludes that the 1370 days utilized in


the conduct of the preliminary investigation
prejudiced the petitioners as they were put in an
intermediate state of waiting. Even if petitioners were
not preventively imprisoned, they suffered agonizing
anxiety, inconvenience, and expenses to hire their
counsel of choice for the protracted determination of
their culpability by the OMB. The petitioners, mostly
public officials, may be rejected promotion or
appointment due to the stigma that the case brings to
them. As to Lerias, the perception of her performance
while in public office was gravely eroded even if this
was her first time to be the subject of a criminal
investigation. In this case, after timely submitting
their counter­-affidavits with the attached documents
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seeking to prove that they have not committed any


administrative or criminal wrongdoing when they
collectively approved the purchase of the fertilizers
from Philphos, the OMB should have resolved with
haste the determination of their culpability.

Lastly, the Court finds that petitioners timely invoked


their rights at the earliest possible time as it was one
of the main points raised in their motion for
reconsideration.[54]

As there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of the


preliminary investigation and in relation to the
resulting damage or prejudice that such delay caused
to the petitioners, their right to the speedy disposition
of their case was violated. Thus, the complaint filed
against them should be dismissed with prejudice
against the State.

WHEREFORE, the Court NULLIFIES and SETS


ASIDE the Resolution and Order promulgated by the
Office of the Ombudsman on June 14, 2017 and April
30, 2018 in OMB-C-C-13-0170. The Court
DISMISSES OMB-C-C-13-0170 on the ground that
the Office of the Ombudsman violated the right of the
petitioners Rosette Y. Lerias, Pedro C. Llevares, Jr.,
Ma. Lucina L. Calapre, Joseph A. Duarte, and
Catalino O. Olayvar to the speedy disposition of their
case.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and


Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 3-37.

[2]Penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution


Officer II Feliz Marie M. Guerrero-Manlangit, Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer IV Teresita P.
Butardo-Tacata and Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
Gerard A. Mosquera; id. at 43-55.

[3]Penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution


Officer III Charmaine C. Ruiz; id. at 86-92.

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[4] Id. at 44.

[5] Id. at 45.

[6] Id. at 45-46.

[7] Id. at 46.

[8] Id. at 47.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 48.

[11] Id. at 47.

[12] Id. at 48.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. at 48-49.

[15] Id. at 49.

[16] Id.

[17] Id. at 51.

[18] Id. at 52.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id. at 87-88.

[22] Id. at 90.

[23] Id. at 91.

[24] Id. at 14.

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[25] Id. at 15.

[26] Id. at 21-22.

[27] Id. at 24-25.

[28] Id. at 28.

[29] Id. at 30-32.

[30] Id. at 463.

[31] Id. at 466.

[32] Id.

[33] Id. at 468.

[34] Id. at 469.

[35] Id. at 476.

[36]Daep v. Sandiganbayan-Fourth Division, G.R.


No. 244649, June 14, 2021. See also Magante v.
Sandiganbayan, 836 Phil. 1108, 1124-1125 (2018);
Martinez III v. People, October 1, 2019, 921 SCRA
242, 251; People v. Sandiganbayan (First Division),
August 19, 2019, 914 SCRA 445, 459; Campa, Jr. v.
Paras, G.R. No. 250504, July 12, 2021; and
Mamansual v. Sandiganbayan (5th Division), G.R.
Nos. 240378-84, November 3, 2020.

[37] 837 Phil. 815 (2018).

[38]Id. at 880-882. (Emphasis supplied and citation


omitted)

[39]Magante v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 36, at


1127.

[40] Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, supra note, 37 at 880.

[41] See Mamansual v. Sandiganbayan (5th Division),

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supra note 36.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Rollo, pp. 61-62.

[44] Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 37, at 881.

[45] Rollo, p. 90.

[46] Id. at 466.

[47] G.R. No. 232574, October 1, 2019, 921 SCRA


242.

[48] Id. at 252-253. (Citations omitted)

[49] G.R. No. 237997, June 10, 2020.

[50] G.R. No. 243560-62 & G.R. Nos. 243261-63,


July 28, 2020.

[51] Id. (Emphases and underscoring supplied,


citation omitted)

[52] Supra note 37.

[53] Id. at 874-875. (Citations omitted)

[54] Rollo, p. 90.

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