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Pooja Singhal V Directorate of Enforcement Jharkhand High Court 444671

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20 views17 pages

Pooja Singhal V Directorate of Enforcement Jharkhand High Court 444671

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Md sanir uddin
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI


----
B.A. No. 8937 of 2022
----
Pooja Singhal, aged about 44 years, wife of Shri Abhishek Jha, resident of
Flat No.3, Officers Bunglow, Near Governor House, Morabadi,
P.O.Morabadi, P.S.Bariatu, District-Ranchi ….. Petitioner
-- Versus --
Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India represented by its
Assistant Director (PMLA), having its office at Pee Pee Compound,
Kaushalya Chambers-II, P.O.-Main Road, P.S.Doranda, District-Ranchi
…... Opposite Party
----
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
---
For the Petitioner :- Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Bibhash Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Ashok Gahlot, Advocate
Mr. Sudhansu Singh, Advocate
For the E.D. :- Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Shivam Utkarsh Sahay, Advocate
Mrs. Swati Shalini, Advocate
Mr. Sahay Gaurav Piyush, Advocate
----

6/03.11.2022 Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Amit Kumar Das, the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondent-Enforcement Directorate

(hereinafter to be referred to as „E.D.‟).

The petitioner is seeking regular bail in connection with

ECIR 03 of 2018 (in ECIR/14/PAT/2012 dated 18.05.2012) lodged for the

offence punishable under section 4 of the Prevention of Money

Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as „the Act of 2002‟),

pending in the court of learned Special Judge, PML Act, Ranchi.

The prosecution was lodged alleging therein that the

petitioner was posted as Deputy Commissioner in Khunti district during

the period 16.02.2009 to 19.07.2010 where she was the principal

authority for sanctioning of fund for different development projects. The


2

co-accused Ram Binod Prasad Sinha was posted as Junior Engineer

during that period in Special Division as well as District Board, Khunti and

has stated in his statement recorded under section 50 of PMLA that he

used to pay 5% of the disbursed amount as commission to DRDA and

Deputy Commissioner Office and extra commission of 5% to the

Executive Engineer and Asst. Engineer. He has also stated that the

commission was paid for smooth functioning from beginning i.e.

allocation of work to till end i.e. payment of final instalment. It is alleged

that in the prosecution case that the petitioner being the principal

authority for sanctioning of fund for different development projects, in

connivance with co-accused Jai Kishore Chaudhary,. Executive Engineer,

Special Division, Shashi Prakash, Executive Engineer, District Board,

Rajendra Kumar Jain, Assistant Engineer, and Ram Binod Prasad Sinha,

Junior Engineer, managed to do defalcation of funds in different

development projects. In lieu of the same, she used to obtain the illegal

commission from Ram Binod Prasad Sinha in cash and ignored all the

irregularities and misdeeds by him. Her successor in the office

constituted various inspection teams to assess the value of different

works executed by Ram Binod Prasad Sinha, during his tenure as Junior

Engineer in Special Division, Rural Works Department and as Junior

Engineer in District Board, Khunti, Jharkhand. The reports submitted by

the inspection teams constituted by the successor Deputy Commissioner,

Khunti, established that there were huge differences in the quantum of

funds released to Ram Binod Prasad Sinha and quantity of the completed

work in respective projects. In many cases, it was seen that the

construction work of nominal value was done against withdrawal of

substantial amount allocated for the given project. Consequent to audit

of the work executed by Ram Binod Prasad Sinha at different locations, a

combined embezzlement of Rs.18.06 crores was alleged and in this


3

regard sixteen FIRs have registered in different police stations of Khunti

District and further after due investigation, the charge sheets were filed

in all the aforesaid sixteen FIRs before the competent court. The accused

Ram Binod Prasad Sinha was suspended by the Rural Development

Department, Government of Jharkhand, however, despite his suspension,

he continued working for the department. On the basis of complaints

filed by Shri Dhaneswar Ram and Shri Krishan Mohan Lal, Vigilance

Bureau registered an FIR/complaint vide FIR No.06/2011 dated

23.03.2011 and FIR No.07/2011 dated 23.03.2011 against Ram Binod

Prasad Sinha (A-1) for commission of offences punishable under sections

406, 409, 420, 467, 468 and 471, 477(A) and 120-B of the Indian Penal

Code read with section 13(1) (c) & (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act for

embezzlement of government fund which are also scheduled offences

under the provision of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. It also

transpires that the petitioner Pooja Singhal was found to be depositing

huge amount of cash deposits during the said period. The supplementary

prosecution complaint/charge-sheet reveals that the petitioner has

several accounts in different banks and is keeping two PAN numbers in

her name i.e. (1) ARZPS2447R and (2)AMQPS9964B. It further transpires

that she used to deposit cash in those accounts and convert the cash to

demand draft and then purchased insurance policies for long tenures and

pre-maturely close the policies and utilize the proceeds towards several

investments including Pulse Super-speciality Hospital beneficially owned

by her and her family. The materials submitted by the prosecution

reveals that the search proceedings were conducted at different

locations/premises related to the petitioner and her associates and it is

stated that during the course of search huge cash amounting to Rs.19.76

crores (approx.) was recovered and seized. Apart from that

documents/records/digital devices etc. related to the matter were also


4

found and seized. Some movable properties in the form of high end

vehicles were also found during the course of search from the premises

of Suman Kumar who is a C.A. by profession and associated with the

petitioner and her husband. The legitimate source of such

income/money could not be explained by the accused Suman Kumar, the

same were seized. He disclosed in his statement before E.D that most of

the cash seized from his premises belongs to Pooja Singhal (petitioner),

which was kept in his house and office, on her behalf. Further, the

accused Suman Kumar was also beneficiary of closure proceeds received

by the petitioner Pooja Singhal, which were purchased from the cash

deposited in her account during her tenure as Deputy Commissioner in

Khunti district. They also utilized the proceeds of crime to purchase on

land in the name of Radhey Shyam Fireworks LLP where Pawan Kumar,

who is brother of the accused C.A and the petitioner‟s mother Kamlesh

Singhal were partners and Rs.1.33 crore was given in cash for it which

was part of proceeds of crime collected and accumulated on behalf of the

petitioner. The co-accused Suman Kumar was filing IT returns of

petitioner, since 2012 and managing her finance. He was also auditor for

M/s Pulse Sanjeevani Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. And he was collecting proceeds

of crime on the instruction of the petitioner, in the form of cash from

several individuals and entities, and further on instructions of the

petitioner, he handed over cash to different individuals, such as he gave

Rs.3 crore in cash to a builder Alok Sarawgi of Panchwati Builder for

purchasing land for Pulse Hospital owned by petitioner Pooja Singhal and

her family. He was investing proceeds of crime generated by the

petitioner in various properties. Thus, he knowingly and willingly helped

her to manage her ill-gotten proceed of crime and to get its taint

removed, so that she can project the same as untainted money. The

prosecution complainant reveals that the petitioner married Abhishek Jha


5

in the year 2011, and it is observed that after marriage, Abhishek Jha

made substantial cash deposits in his accounts, which were, in fact, the

part of proceeds of crime generated by his wife Pooja Singhal during her

tenure as Deputy Commissioner of Khunti and Palamau. The total

amount of cash deposited in the accounts of petitioner and her husband

Abhishek Jha combined together is Rs.1.43 crore, which is much more

than the income declared by them in their Income Tax Returns for the

respective financial years. Her husband further laundered the said

proceeds of crime deposited in the account by making a payment of

Rs.43,00,000/- to M/s Usha Construction to purchase first floor of Orchid

Building and where he later started Pulse Diagnostic and Imaging Centre.

He further used the proceeds of crime generated by his wife Pooja

Singhal, the petitioner in furnishing and starting Pulse Diagnostic and

Imaging Centre. It is apparent from the prosecution complaint that by

depositing huge cash, much beyond the sources of his income, and by

incorporating M/s Pulse Sanjeevani Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. assisted the

activity of money laundering by involving himself in the concealment,

possession, acquisition, use, projection as well as claiming the untainted

money. Hence, the prosecution complaint has been filed against the

petitioner and others.

Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the petitioner at the outset draws the attention of the Court to the

directions of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal

Choudhary and Others v. Union of India and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC

929, particularly, the conclusion paragraph no.187(d) of the said

judgment that the Authorities under the 2002 Act cannot prosecute any

person on notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence

has been committed, unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional

police and/or pending enquiry/trial including by way of criminal complaint


6

before the competent forum. He submits that there are sixteen FIRs

against four Engineers in the district of Khunti. He submits that this

petitioner was posted as Deputy Commissioner, Khunti in the year 2009-

2010. According to him, on the basis of these sixteen FIRs, the E.D has

implicated the petitioner and no case has been lodged against this

petitioner. He submits that the petitioner is a responsible I.A.S officer and

was topper in her batch and she is having the highest integrity towards

public service. He submits that the offence was of the year 2009-2010

and now the E.D has arrested this petitioner and she is languishing in jail

with effect from 11.05.2022. By way of referring to Annexure -2 he

submits that the petitioner was also departmentally proceeded on various

charges by way of issuing Prapatra-K and enquiry officer has submitted

enquiry report and the petitioner has been exonerated. He submits that

once on the same facts of charge the departmental proceeding as well as

criminal proceeding are instituted and if in departmental proceeding

there is exoneration, the criminal proceeding is bad in law. To buttress his

argument, he relied in the case of Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v.

C.B.I., (2020) 9 SCC 636, paragraph nos.8 to 13 of the said judgment

are quoted hereinbelow:

“8. A number of judgments have held that the standard of


proof in a departmental proceeding, being based on
preponderance of probability is somewhat lower than the
standard of proof in a criminal proceeding where the case has
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In P.S. Rajya v. State of
Bihar [P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 897] , the question before the Court was posed as follows:
(SCC pp. 2-3, para 3)
“3. The short question that arises for our consideration in
this appeal is whether the respondent is justified in pursuing
the prosecution against the appellant under Section 5(2) read
with Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
notwithstanding the fact that on an identical charge the
appellant was exonerated in the departmental proceedings in
the light of a report submitted by the Central Vigilance
Commission and concurred by the Union Public Service
Commission.”
7

9. This Court then went on to state: (P.S. Rajya case [P.S.


Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] ,
SCC p. 5, para 17)
“17. At the outset we may point out that the learned
counsel for the respondent could not but accept the position
that the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in a
criminal case is far higher than the standard of proof required
to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings. He also
accepted that in the present case, the charge in the
departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is
one and the same. He did not dispute the findings rendered in
the departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of it.”
10. This being the case, the Court then held: (P.S. Rajya
case [P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
897] , SCC p. 9, para 23)
“23. Even though all these facts including the report of the
Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of
the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view
[Prabhu Saran Rajya v. State of Bihar, Criminal Miscellaneous
No. 5212 of 1992, order dated 3-8-1993 (Pat)] that the issues
raised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the
report of the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the
appellant of the same charge in departmental proceedings
would not conclude the criminal case against the appellant.
We have already held that for the reasons given, on the
peculiar facts of this case, the criminal proceedings initiated
against the appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not
agree with the view taken by the High Court as stated above.
These are the reasons for our order dated 27-3-1996 for
allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned criminal
proceedings and giving consequential reliefs.”
11. In Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B. [Radheshyam
Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri)
721] , this Court held as follows: (SCC pp. 594-96, paras 26, 29
& 31)
“26. We may observe that the standard of proof in a
criminal case is much higher than that of the adjudication
proceedings. The Enforcement Directorate has not been able to
prove its case in the adjudication proceedings and the
appellant has been exonerated on the same allegation. The
appellant is facing trial in the criminal case. Therefore, in our
opinion, the determination of facts in the adjudication
proceedings cannot be said to be irrelevant in the criminal
case. In B.N. Kashyap [B.N. Kashyap v. Crown, 1944 SCC OnLine
Lah 46 : AIR 1945 Lah 23] the Full Bench had not considered
the effect of a finding of fact in a civil case over the criminal
cases and that will be evident from the following passage of
the said judgment: (SCC OnLine Lah: AIR p. 27)
‘… I must, however, say that in answering the question, I
have only referred to civil cases where the actions are in
8

personam and not those where the proceedings or actions are


in rem. Whether a finding of fact arrived at in such proceedings
or actions would be relevant in criminal cases, it is unnecessary
for me to decide in this case. When that question arises for
determination, the provisions of Section 41 of the Evidence Act,
will have to be carefully examined.’
***
29. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the
broad submission of Mr Malhotra that the finding in an
adjudication proceeding is not binding in the proceeding for
criminal prosecution. A person held liable to pay penalty in
adjudication proceedings cannot necessarily be held guilty in a
criminal trial. Adjudication proceedings are decided on the
basis of preponderance of evidence of a little higher degree
whereas in a criminal case the entire burden to prove beyond
all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution.
***
31. It is trite that the standard of proof required in criminal
proceedings is higher than that required before the
adjudicating authority and in case the accused is exonerated
before the adjudicating authority whether his prosecution on
the same set of facts can be allowed or not is the precise
question which falls for determination in this case.”
12. After referring to various judgments, this Court then
culled out the ratio of those decisions in para 38 as follows:
(Radheshyam Kejriwal case [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of
W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] , SCC p. 598)
“38. The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions
can broadly be stated as follows:
(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can
be launched simultaneously;
(ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary
before initiating criminal prosecution;
(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are
independent in nature to each other;
(iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the
adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding for
criminal prosecution;
(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement
Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law to
attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or
Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of
the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon
the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication
proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit,
prosecution may continue; and
(vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where the
allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person
9

held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts


and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the
underlying principle being the higher standard of proof in
criminal cases.”
13. It finally concluded: (Radheshyam Kejriwal
case [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 :
(2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] , SCC p. 598, para 39)
“39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would be to
judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication
proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution is
identical and the exoneration of the person concerned in the
adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it is found on
merit that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act
in the adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person
concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the court.”

Relying on this judgment, he submits that the petitioner

was already exonerated in the departmental proceeding and the

investigation in the said case has already been completed so far the

petitioner is concerned, she may kindly be allowed regular bail. He took

the Court to several paragraphs of the complaint annexed with the bail

petition and by way of referring paragraph no.1.5, he submits that final

form has been submitted against four accused persons and the petitioner

was not there. He submits that at paragraph no.1.6, the details of the

charge sheet has been disclosed in the complaint. By way of referring

paragraph no.2.1 of the complaint, he submits that the petitioner was

posted as Deputy Commissioner, Khunti during period 16.02.2009 to

19.07.2010 and the allegation is made that she managed to defalcation

in different development projects and the amount of defalcation is shown

as rupees 18.06 crores which is not correct. According to him, only a sum

of Rs.61 lakhs was found in the bank account of the petitioner when she

was the Deputy Commissioner, Khunti. By way of drawing the attention of

the Court at paragraph 9.3 of the complaint, he submits that no modus

operandi has been disclosed by the E.D that the petitioner used to

purchase insurance policies and prematurely close that policies and

withdrew the amount, that does not show that the investment made in
10

the insurance policy are the money from the proceeds of crime. He

further draws the attention of the court to paragraph no.11 of the

complaint and submits that the role of the accused in the offence of

money laundering has been disclosed and the points raised against this

petitioner is not correct. He submits that this petitioner herself has

constituted the committee when the irregularity has been brought to the

knowledge of this petitioner. He draws the attention of the Court to

section 45 of the Act particularly the proviso to sub-section 2 of the Act

and by way of referring the proviso he submits that the rigors of section

45 of the Act is not coming in the way of granting bail to the petitioner as

the petitioner is a lady and she is suffering from several ailments. He

submits that on this ground recently the Delhi High Court granted bail to

one Devki Nandan Garg by order dated 26.09.2022 in the case of Devki

Nandan Garg v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2022 SCC OnLine Del.3086.

He further submits that looking into the ailments of Mr. P. Chidambaram,

the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has also granted bail in the case of

P.Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC

791 and he refers to paragraph no.23 of the said judgment, which is as

under:

23. Thus from cumulative perusal of the judgments


cited on either side including the one rendered by the
Constitution Bench of this Court, it could be deduced that
the basic jurisprudence relating to bail remains the same
inasmuch as the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the
exception so as to ensure that the accused has the
opportunity of securing fair trial. However, while
considering the same the gravity of the offence is an
aspect which is required to be kept in view by the Court.
The gravity for the said purpose will have to be gathered
from the facts and circumstances arising in each case.
Keeping in view the consequences that would befall on
the society in cases of financial irregularities, it has been
held that even economic offences would fall under the
category of grave offence and in such circumstance while
considering the application for bail in such matters, the
Court will have to deal with the same, being sensitive to
the nature of allegation made against the accused. One
11

of the circumstances to consider the gravity of the


offence is also the term of sentence that is prescribed for
the offence the accused is alleged to have committed.
Such consideration with regard to the gravity of offence is
a factor which is in addition to the triple test or the tripod
test that would be normally applied. In that regard what
is also to be kept in perspective is that even if the
allegation is one of grave economic offence, it is not a
rule that bail should be denied in every case since there is
no such bar created in the relevant enactment passed by
the legislature nor does the bail jurisprudence provides
so. Therefore, the underlining conclusion is that
irrespective of the nature and gravity of charge, the
precedent of another case alone will not be the basis for
either grant or refusal of bail though it may have a
bearing on principle. But ultimately the consideration will
have to be on case to case basis on the facts involved
therein and securing the presence of the accused to stand
trial.

On these grounds, he submits that the petitioner deserves

regular bail, who is languishing in jail from 11.05.2022.

Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondent Enforcement Directorate(E.D)

submits that the petitioner is a senior I.A.S officer of the State of

Jharkhand and once she is granted bail, there is every likelihood that she

will temper with the evidence. He further submits that on the last

occasion the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has directed the E.D. to

disclose as to by what time further investigation will be concluded and

pursuant to that he has taken instruction and it has been informed that

within further six months time the investigation shall be concluded. He

submits that atleast till completion of the investigation she may not be

allowed regular bail. Mr. Das, the learned counsel appearing for the

respondent E.D. draws the attention of the Court to paragraph no.6.1 of

the complaint and submits that brother of her C.A., Suman Kumar,

namely Pawan Singh and mother of this petitioner, namely, Kamlesh

Singhal were partners in a firm in which a huge amount of Rs.1.33 crore

was invested in cash which has come in the said paragraph. He further
12

draws the attention of the Court to paragraph no.7.3 which is statement

of one Vijay Goel who was the contractor of the building for Pulse

Hospital which is owned by Abhishek Jha who is the husband of this

petitioner. He submits that Alok Sarawgi has disclosed in paragraph

no.7.5 that he has received an amount of Rs.3 crores in cash in the year

2016 from Suman Kumar on the instruction of Abhishek Jha for the

purpose of selling the land. By way of referring to paragraph no.7.6 he

submits that Sidharth Singhal who is brother of this petitioner has also

confessed about receiving of cash statement from Suman Kumar –

accused no.7 on one occasion. He further submits that this petitioner has

not filed Income Tax Return for the year 2008-09, 2009-10 and 2010-11.

He submits that cash deposited in different financial years and they were

over and above the salary of this petitioner and other legitimate income

and those were not declared by her in her Income Tax return for the

respective periods. By way of drawing attention of the Court to paragraph

no.9.1 of the complaint, he submits that this petitioner has opened

different bank for specific purpose of depositing the cash and after

depositing the cash she used to close the bank accounts after

withdrawing the amount. He submits that in paragraph no.9.1 the date of

opening of the bank account and closing of bank account has been

disclosed and the cash deposit are also there which comes to

Rs.84,64,098/- total seven accounts and 13 policies. By way of drawing

attention of this Court to paragraph no.7.2.3, he submits that total credit

in the bank account Pulse Sanjeevni Health Care Pvt. Ltd. comes to more

than total turn-over of the company in respective financial yeas which

has come in the investigation. He submits that even a departmental

enquiry was also initiated against her for the said allegations, however,

the enquiry on her part was delayed due to her powerful position and

designation. Mr. Jay Kishore Choudhary (accused no.4) has stated in his
13

statement that Investigating Officer (Jharkhand Police) of Khunti case

has also written in the case diary that there is specific evidence of

involvement of the Deputy Commissioner–petitioner in the defalcation of

Govt. funds, and her role would be investigated after consulting the

higher officials. He further submits that a huge cash amount has also

been deposited in the bank account of Abhishek Jha who happened to be

the husband of this petitioner. He submits that he is having instruction

that maneuvering were being made of having a false medical certificate

of Angiography of this petitioner, however, that has not been happened

due to presence of officers of the respondent-E.D. He draws the

attention of the Court to page 306 of regular bail petition dated

18.05.2022 and submits that she was examined by Medical Officer of the

State and she was found well oriented stable and she was not having any

medical issue. She was found healthy. He submits that the case relied by

Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioner in the case of Ashoo Surendra Nath Tiwary(supra) is not

helping this petitioner as in the case in hand the charges in departmental

proceeding and this proceeding are completely different. He submits that

the modus operandi was adopted by this petitioner by way of purchasing

the insurance policy and to fraudulently close the same, withdrew the

amount and invest it to another place. He draws the attention of the

Court to paragraph no.280, 281 and 282 of the case in the matter of

Vijay Madanlal Choudhary(supra) and he submits that the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court has also held that if it is established in the court of law

that the crime property in the concerned case has been rightfully owned

and possessed by him, such a property by no stretch of imagination can

be termed as crime property and ex-consequenti proceeds of crime

within the meaning of section 2(1)(u) as it stands today. On the other

hand, in the trial in connection with the scheduled offence, the Court
14

would be obliged to direct return of such property as belonging to him.

He submits that stage will come once the trial is concluded. He referred

to paragraph 282 of the said judgment, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has

observed that even the offence is reported to be of scheduled offence

only in that eventuality the property recovered by the authorized officer

would partake the colour of proceeds of crime under section 2(1)(u) of

the 2002 Act, enabling him to take further action under the Act in that

regard.

In reply Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel appearing

for the petitioner submits that Abhishek Jha who is husband of the

petitioner was staying at Australia before the marriage with the petitioner

which has taken place in the year 2011. He submits that Abhishek Jha is

concerned it is for him to disclose his income as he is also one of the

accused and on that ground the bail of the petitioner may not be

rejected.

In view of the above submission of the learned counsels

appearing on behalf of the parties, the Court has gone through the

contents of the complaint case which is annexed with the regular bail

petition. In reading the entire complaint case there are allegations

against this petitioner who happened to be a senior I.A.S officer of the

State of Jharkhand to deposit a huge cash amount. A sum of Rs.01.33

crore has been in the form of cash in the name of brother of her

Chartered Accountant and mother of this petitioner has been also found

to be invested which has come in the investigation. Thus, it cannot be

said that the petitioner was not using the proceeds of crime in light of

section 2(1)(u) of the Act. There is no doubt that even if the allegation is

one of the grave economic offence it is not a rule that the bail should be

denied in every case since there is no such bar under the relevant

enactment passed by the Legislature nor does the bail jurisprudence


15

provides so as has been discussed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the

case of P.Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13

SCC 791, but at the same time the consideration will have to be on case

to case basis on the facts involved therein and seeking the presence of

the accused to stand trial. The bail are being granted on certain

conditions in appropriate cases and the object of putting such conditions

should be to avoid possibility by the person hampering the investigation.

Section 45 of the Act is no more res-integra. In recent decision by the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Gautam Kundu v. Directorate

of Enforcement, (2015) 16 SCC 1 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has

occasioned to examine paragraph nos.28 to 30, which reads as under:

28. Before dealing with the application for bail on merit,


it is to be considered whether the provisions of Section 45 of
PMLA are binding on the High Court while considering the
application for bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. There is no doubt that PMLA deals with the
offence of money-laundering and Parliament has enacted
this law as per commitment of the country to the United
Nations General Assembly. PMLA is a special statute enacted
by Parliament for dealing with money-laundering. Section 5
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 clearly lays down
that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not
affect any special statute or any local law. In other words,
the provisions of any special statute will prevail over the
general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in case
of any conflict.
29. Section 45 of PMLA starts with a non obstante clause
which indicates that the provisions laid down in Section 45 of
PMLA will have overriding effect on the general provisions of
the Code of Criminal Procedure in case of conflict between
them. Section 45 of PMLA imposes the following two
conditions for grant of bail to any person accused of an
offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of more than
three years under Part A of the Schedule to PMLA:
(i) That the prosecutor must be given an opportunity to
oppose the application for bail; and
(ii) That the court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused person is
not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit
any offence while on bail.
30. The conditions specified under Section 45 of PMLA
are mandatory and need to be complied with, which is
16

further strengthened by the provisions of Section 65 and also


Section 71 of PMLA. Section 65 requires that the provisions
of CrPC shall apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act and Section 71 provides that the
provisions of PMLA shall have overriding effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained
in any other law for the time being in force. PMLA has an
overriding effect and the provisions of CrPC would apply only
if they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
Therefore, the conditions enumerated in Section 45 of PMLA
will have to be complied with even in respect of an
application for bail made under Section 439 CrPC. That
coupled with the provisions of Section 24 provides that unless
the contrary is proved, the authority or the Court shall
presume that proceeds of crime are involved in money-
laundering and the burden to prove that the proceeds of
crime are not involved, lies on the appellant.

Therefore, the conditions as embodied under section 45 of

the Act will have to be complied even in respect of application for bail

made under section 439 of the Cr.P.C. There are allegations against this

petitioner of laundering a huge amount of money which has come in the

investigation and it has been elaborately discussed therein. The Hon‟ble

Supreme Court has considered the economic offence in the case of

„Subrata Chattoraj v. Union of India’, reported in (2014) 8 SCC

768, Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v.C.B.I., reported in (2013) 7 SCC

439 and Union of India v. Hassan Ali Khan, reported in (2011) 10

SCC 235 and gist of those judgments speak of that economic offences

having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds

need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting

the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat

to the financial health of the country. The allegation prima facie suggest

that it has direct link with the “proceeds of crime”. In that, the property

derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to notified

offences, termed as scheduled offence, is regarded as tainted property

and dealing with such property in any manner is an offence of money-

laundering. The modus operandi as adopted by the petitioner disclosed


17

that she first open bank accounts for short duration, then deposited huge

cash into it, then converted those cash into demand drafts to purchase

insurance policies of longer durations and prematurely closed those

policies to bring back liquidity in her accounts for further investment. She

used to invest the same either in the form of capital infusion by her

brother Siddharth Singhal and her husband Abhishek Jha who is also an

accused in their company M/s Pulse Sanjeevani Healthcare Private Ltd.

Huge amount of cash amounting to Rs.73.81 lakhs was deposited in her

various ICICI bank accounts.

It has also been submitted that false certificate was tried to

be obtained on the medical ground to obtain the benefit of medical

certificate as has been submitted by Mr. Das, the learned counsel and

she has not been able to succeed due to presence of the authority of the

Enforcement Directorate). At page 306, the medical report suggest that

she was well oriented stable and fit medically and psychologically.

Admittedly, the petitioner is a senior I.A.S officer of the

State of Jharkhand. In the departmental proceeding she has been

exonerated. The Court does not want to make any comment on that

exoneration as this Court is only considering the regular bail application

of the petitioner.

In view of the influence of this petitioner, the apprehension

of the Enforcement Directorate-E.D with regard to tempering with the

evidence cannot be ruled out. In view of the above reasons and analysis,

the Court is not inclined to grant regular bail to the petitioner at this

stage.

Accordingly, this bail petition being B.A.No.8937 of 2022 is

dismissed.

( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)

SI/,

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