Safety Science 154 (2022) 105835

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/safety

A qualitative survey of factors shaping the role of a safety professional

Wim Van Wassenhove a, *, Christian Foussard b, Sidney W.A. Dekker c, David J. Provan c
a
IHEIE, MINES Paris - PSL University, France
b
Consultant Risk Management & Process Safety, Senior Lecturer, Paris, France
c
Griffith University, Australia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Provan et al (2017) conducted a systematic literature review in Safety Science that included more than 100
Professionalization in safety publications of the last 30 years published on the role of the safety professional. This comprehensive review
Organizational role identified 25 factors that shape and influence the role of the safety professional. These factors are organized in
Professional socialization
three categories: institutional, relational, and individual. The review highlighted a dearth of empirical research
into the practice and role of the safety professionals. This article presents the results of a project combining two
objectives: (1) conduct empirical research into the practice and role of the safety professionals; (2) support the
reflection by safety students about their future role in organizations and the factors that will influence that role.
The main contribution of this paper consists in delivering empirical data from a research setup that helped
students to understand more clearly their role as (future) safety professionals. This is achieved through getting
the students themselves engage with Provan’s work and do interviews with practicing safety professionals using
Provan’s categories as inspiration for interview questions and discussion topics. The blending of Provan’s cat­
egories of factors with a role theory was used as a general analysis frame. This work presents several findings: (1)
the factors identified by Provan et al. (2017) can be associated to a theoretical model of factors involved in the
taking of organizational roles by the safety professionals. (2) We can also identify those 25 factors in real pro­
fessional contexts, these factors are pertinent and relevant for safety professionals. (3) The 25 factors are not
independent, some of them are reciprocal related and some of them have dependencies. Those relationships can
give light on how roles of safety professionals are socially constructed. Reflection on those factors is very useful
for future safety professionals (the students), this appeared to be an effective pedagogic process that enhance the
processes of professional socialization of future safety professionals (Foussard et al., 2021). However, this last
point will not be discussed in this paper.

1. Introduction teach as it is conditioned by the interpersonal skills and personality of

the student. Finally, an effective safety professional has a vision about
Training students to become safety professionals ideally involves their function, their role in the company, and even their role in society.
reflection on what a safety professional is, and what their job and pro­ They can become aware of the complexity and nuances of safety pro­
fessional context are about (Van Wassenhove, Foussard, et Denis-Remis fessional practice.
2022). An effective safety professional has a strong technical compe­ The students of the postmaster degree Industrial Risk Management
tence. This is probably the most straightforward aspect of safety man­ (IRM) of Mines Paris PSL University complete courses on technical risk
agement to teach to students. A good safety professional has managerial management, courses on management, courses on communication and
skills to supervise projects, budgets, and teams. An effective safety leadership (Wybo and Van Wassenhove, 2016). But it is necessary to also
professional has developed strong communicational skills. While doing teach them how to combine these capabilities and to make them aware
their job, they will be interacting with many different stakeholders in­ of the factors that will influence their role in their future job. It is
side and outside of the company. This aspect is perhaps more difficult to necessary to give them that vision about themselves, about their

* Corresponding author at: MINES Paris - PSL University, IHEIE – Institut des Hautes Etudes pour l’Innovation et l’Entrepreneuriat, CS 10207 rue Claude Daunesse,
06904 Sophia Antipolis Cedex, France.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (W. Van Wassenhove), [email protected] (C. Foussard), [email protected]
(S.W.A. Dekker), [email protected] (D.J. Provan).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2022.105835
Received 25 June 2021; Received in revised form 18 May 2022; Accepted 23 May 2022
Available online 2 June 2022
0925-7535/© 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
W. Van Wassenhove et al. Safety Science 154 (2022) 105835

colleagues and a clear understanding of their place in an organization. It of definitions of the concept of role. It can be conceived as an internally
contributes to the process of professional socialization of the individual consistent series of conditioned responses (Cottrell, 1942), or as the sum
students (Foussard et al, 2021). Before even being able to teach or of culture patterns (e.g. attitudes, values, behaviors…) associated with a
present those aspects to students and future safety professionals, we particular status (Linton, 1945), or as what a person does as an occupant
must investigate those factors. Provan et al (2017) conducted a sys­ of a position (Newcomb, 1950), or as what the actors do in relation with
tematic literature review in Safety Science that included more than 100 others (Parsons, 1951), or as the expectations concerning others with
publications of the last 30 years published on the role of the safety whom the person interact (Parsons & Shills, 1951) or as a position
professional. This article presents the results of a project combining two differentiated in term of a given social structure (Levy, 1952), or as an
objectives, a main objective and a secondary: (1-main) based on the integrated subset of social norms (Bates, 1956), or as activities which in
work of Provan et al (2017), conduct empirical research into the practice combination produce the organizational output (Katz & Kahn, 1978).
and role of the safety professionals; (2-secondary) support the reflection This inordinate diversity of definitions could be perceived as a pitfall, a
by safety students about their future role in organizations and the factors problem that is the result of methodological weakness, at the same time
that will influence that role. We will put in this article the emphasis on it testifies to the richness and the plasticity of the notion. However, role
the first objective and look for empirical data based on the theoretical cannot be reduced to a catch-all concept if the common assumptions
model of Provan et al (2017). We did not investigate here the impact of underlying these interpretations are made explicit. These assumptions
the reflection by safety students about their future role in organizations, are that roles: (1) can be observed through patterned characteristic be­
but we believe this impact is positive. Our beliefs are founded on ob­ haviors, (2) can be related to social positions (i.e. group of individuals
servations of the students all along the supervision of the project and this who share a mutual identity), (3) are frequently conscious and partially
could be a topic for another publication. directed by other’s expectations, (4) are acquired through socialization
and performing them impact positively or negatively one’s temper, and
2. Literature review: Role theory and the role of the safety (5) are inserted in broader social systems and their consequences con­
professional tributes to their persistence (Biddle, 2013).
This research draws on the role framework developed by Katz and
Provan et al (2017) conducted a systematic literature review on the Kahn (1978). This role framework has greatly influenced the develop­
role of the safety professional. This comprehensive review identified 25 ment of role theory in social science and is one of the most widely read
factors that influence the role of the safety professional (see Fig. 1). The and cited texts (i.e., greater than 22,000 citations) on organizational
identified factors are organized in three categories: institutional, rela­ behavior (Hassard, 1995). Katz and Kahn (1978) state that when
tional, and individual. behavior is patterned, structure is imposed on individuals and comes in
Provan et al. did not specify in their paper what could be understood the form of roles (i.e., as normative standards governing behavior). An
behind the notion of a “role” in an organization. Biddle (2013) provided organization cannot exist when people just “do their own thing” without
ahistorical summary of the notion of role in organizations. The concept any awareness of the behavior of others (Jex & Britt, 2014). We present
of role has been an important field of research in the social sciences to next a perspective from social psychology, an organization as a system of
the point of being considered as a theoretical field in its own right. roles based on Katz and Kahn (1978). Any individual in an organization
Originally perceived as constituting a subfield of anthropology (Banton, can be located among the ensemble of existing relationships and be­
1965), sociology (Turner, 1974) or psychology (Heiss, 1990), a haviors by looking at their assignment which outlines a specific point in
consensus was established to situate the Role Theory (RT) as a branch of the organizational space. In return, the organization can be defined in
social psychology (Biddle, 2013; Constanzo, 1970; Sarbin & Allen, terms of a structure of interrelated assignments and the pattern of ac­
1968). The concept of role as an articulation between theoretical fields is tivities associated between them. Each position can be defined through
relevant since it provides a unique framework to study both the indi­ its connection to others and to the entire system. A collection of expected
vidual and the collective (Rommetveit, 1955; Gordon, 1976) by activities and behaviors tie in with each position and set up the role to be
combining the processes of intrapsychic life and those of social partici­ performed by anyone who would be assigned that position. Conse­
pation (Ackerman, 1951). Used extensively in studies related to the quently, both the aggregate of demands on individuals and the corner­
sciences of education, RT makes sense specifically in situations where stone of social systems, the concept of role links individual and
social demands and internal beliefs coexist. Thus, in the context of organizational approaches. Thus, the organization can be seen as a
studies of safety professionals, this approach offers promising empirical system of roles. Behaviors associated to a role refer to the recurrent
power. Nevertheless, being at a theoretical crossroad induces a plurality actions properly interconnected with the activities of others that lead to

Fig. 1. Institutional, relational and individual factors shaping the practice of a safety professional.

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W. Van Wassenhove et al. Safety Science 154 (2022) 105835

a predictable outcome. The study of a role needs to identify a relevant (arrow 4). There is a correlation between the fact of complying with a
social system and to trace the usual actions that are embedded in the role for an extended time and changes in character (i.e., we become
conversion of specific inputs into an output. To do so, the role expec­ what we do and we un-become what we do not do) as to say that skills
tations of a specific assignment must be understood, as they are core and capabilities wither if not practiced and reinforced. Second, indi­
elements in sustaining the role system and giving rise to the desired role vidual factors act as mediators shaping the relationship between the role
behavior. as sent and the role as received (arrow 5). Whoever has experienced
A role episode (see Fig. 2) is the process by which the expectations of asking the same task to different people has observed that an identical
role senders are connected to the behavior of the focal person (i.e. the sent-role could be often handled in a very distinctive manner as per the
person who is expected to play the role who for the purposes of this interlocutor. Lastly, it follows that some attributes of the safety profes­
research is the safety professional). The first half of a role episode is the sional could prompt the role-senders to establish evaluations into ste­
combination of role expectations (i.e., activities that role senders require reotypes and influence their own behaviors as role donors (arrow 6). A
of the focal person to perform their own roles) with the communication parallel can be established between functions related to individual fac­
of these expectations from role-senders to the focal person. The second tors and Relational factors. The expectations held for and sent to the
half is the combination of the perceptions (i.e., reception including safety professional relies on the quality of the relationship already pre­
possible distortion of the role expectations) and behavior (i.e., the vailing with the role-senders (arrow 9), then interpretation of the sent
received role influence motivations, attitudes and behaviors) of the focal expectations will be mediated by several relational factors (arrow 8) and
person. As the focal person acts, it shows a degree of compliance with finally, the actual behavior of the safety professional feeds back to the
the expectations that eventually support the evaluation of the focal relations with members of the role set (arrow 7). For instance, if one
person by other members of the organization. suddenly and persistently refuses to comply with role sending, it is
Therefore, role-sending and role-receiving relies on four concepts predictable that both evaluation and appreciation of the safety profes­
that influence the role of a safety professional: (1) role expectations (i.e. sional would drastically change. Continuing the adaptation of the Katz
standards to evaluate the behavior of any person who occupies a given and Kahn (1978) role model above, in Fig. 4 we combine the 25 factors
position), (2) sent-role (i.e. communications flowing out from role ex­ that shape the role of a safety professional (Provan et al, 2017).
pectations to influence the safety professional), (3) received role (i.e.
safety professional’s perception of the role-sendings, including its own 3. Methodology
reflective role expectations), and (4) role behavior (i.e. response of the
safety professional to the received leverage). These concepts constitute a The research design involved gathering field data to explore the 25
role episode and involve motivations, cognitions, and behavior split in factors identified by Provan et al (2017). The students of the IRM pro­
two between the role senders (role expectations, sent role) and the safety gram each have an industrial partner and a professional tutor. The
professional (received role, role behaviors). Arrow 1 (Fig. 2) symbolizes methodology was based on qualitative research in the students’ pro­
the process of role-sending, and Arrow 2 the process of feedback by fessional organizations by collecting data using open question in­
which role-senders assess the conformity of the safety professional with terviews. The research methodology started with the 25 factors
their foregoing communications and make ready to set up the next described by Provan et al (2017). The source article, a synthesis of more
episode. than 100 publications, included a general description of the factors and
Using the role episode model of Katz and Kahn, we can now rein­ as such was sometimes prone to several possible interpretations. It was
terpret the 25 factors identified by Provan et al. Fig. 3 propose a model of important for this research to clearly define each factor in a unique way.
factors shaping the role of a safety professional based on the role episode The 32 students were divided into subgroups and each group had a
model of Katz and Kahn (1978). Role expectations (e.g., what the safety limited number of factors to work on. Each factor was clearly defined,
professional is supposed to do, with and for whom…) are determined by presented, and validated in a final workshop together with the students.
a wider organizational context. We indicated this in Fig. 3 by three As a starting point for the interviews, for each factor, a question or an
circles denoting the institutional, individual, and relational factors. We assumption was created. We have adapted in Table 1 a concise inter­
can now see that the 25 factors of Provan et al. indeed influence the role pretation on how one specific factor influences the role of the safety
of a safety professional in their organization. professional with the associated assumption. Nevertheless, even when
Although people have their idiosyncrasies, the structural character­ trying to be as clear as possible, those factors are open to several in­
istic of an organization are sufficiently steady to be treated as dissociated terpretations. We generally choose interpretations or definitions that are
of each specific role-sender. In Fig. 3, the Institutional factors circle stands easily understood by the students as they had to do the field work. It is
for variables such as structure of the organization and of its subsystems also important to specify that the assumptions are not to be considered
(e.g., size, organizational chart, growth…), standards, policies, cul­ as facts nor as established assumptions from literature. The assumptions’
tures… The causative relation between institutional factors and role mean role is to be the starting point for the discussions between the
expectations is conveyed by arrow 3. The Individual factors circle stands students and the safety professionals. Therefore, some assumptions
for long lasting features (e.g., elements linked with character: values, could be seen as contradictory. The definitions and assumptions are all
motivations, sensitiveness, fears, natural propensities…) of the safety constructed from the Provan et al paper and the literature used by
professional as an individual that interfere with the role taking in several Provan et al. Our contribution is to assess those theoretical factors by
ways. First, the role behavior itself impacts personal characteristics submitting them to safety practitioners. One of the difficulties of this

Fig. 2. A role episode ().

adapted from Katz & Kahn, 1978

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W. Van Wassenhove et al. Safety Science 154 (2022) 105835

Fig. 3. A model of factors involved in the taking of organizational roles ().

adapted from Katz & Kahn, 1978

Fig. 4. A model of factors shaping the role of a safety professional.

work was the scope of each factor. When detailing each factor, it students. To evaluate the perception of the safety professionals about the
appeared that each factor has the potential to be studied as a PhD topic, factors shaping their role, the students interviewed 33 experienced
so choices have been made that sometimes narrows considerably the safety professionals in depth (foremost the industrial tutors of the IRM
scope of the factors. students). Participants were selected based on availability and came
The next step was to formulate an open question for each factor to from a variety of sectors: oil & gas, petrochemical, pharmaceutical in­
test our assumptions on the interviewed safety professionals. A final list dustry, transportation, construction. The sample included safety pro­
of factors with definitions, assumptions or hypothesis and an open fessionals with a variety of backgrounds and role orientations. The 33
question for each factor was finalized and agreed on with the group of safety professionals interviewed included 17 males and 16 females

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W. Van Wassenhove et al. Safety Science 154 (2022) 105835

Table 1 Table 1 (continued )

Defining the 25 factors shaping the role of a safety professional. 2011). The assumption made is that a safety professional
Legal regulation Legal regulation is the law that apply to companies and can take the role of a whistle blower in their organization
organizations. Those organizations must comply with the Constructive enquiry Constructive enquiry is relative to developing a culture
law. Increasing goal and risk-based legislation has where clear and open disclosure of concerns is encouraged
coincided with a huge increase in demand for safety and occurs (Rebitt, 2013). The associated assumption is
professionals. The assumption is made that the regulatory that in this kind of culture, operators report more easily
compliance activity of a safety professional increasingly their errors without fearing sanctions.
dominates the tasks and activities of safety professionals ( Senior management The senior management are the individuals at the highest
Dekker, 2014, Olsen, 2014). Safety compliance activity level of management of an organization who have the day-
has expanded from its primary purpose to improve safety to-day tasks of managing that organization. The
within organization to supporting liability management assumption made is that the safety professional relies on
for company officers and meeting bureaucratic senior management to have their support and thus an
requirements not directly linked to managing safety risks ( authority on middle management and operators.
Provan et al, 2017). Safety system The safety system is the safety management system (SMS)
Academic education Academic education is the training of future safety designed to manage safety elements in the organization.
professionals by academic institutions. The assumption The assumption made is that the SMS is used by safety
made is that those academic trainings doesn’t respond professionals to excise an authority on middle
completely to the needs of a safety professional doing their management and operators.
job in real life. Decision rights Decision right in an organization is the power and
Professional Professional accreditation is a validation of expertise and authority a person must impose their decisions. The
accreditation competencies by a professional organization. The assumption associated is that an organization has a higher
assumption made is that this certification guarantees a safety level when the safety professional has the power to
quality level of the safety professionals. directly give instructions to the operators, has the power
Financial objectives Financial objectives are targets of an organization that can on the choice of subcontractors, has the power to decide
be expressed in monetary terms. Finance is implicated in on safety investments and has the power to validate (or
every aspect of a company. The assumption made is that not) operational decisions.
the relation between safety and financial performance Line managers The line managers manage employees who are directly
isn’t clear in companies or in organizations and there may involved in the production or delivery of products, goods
be a goal conflict. and/or services. They represent the lowest level of
Safety measurement Measuring safety isn’t easy. Companies use several management within an organizational hierarchy. The
methods and indicators to make a diagnostic of the safety assumption is that considering the production realities, a
level and to manage safety. The assumption made is that safety professional is ably to make better safety decisions.
companies fear high potential accidents but express their However, a safety professional has difficulties to visualize
goals using largely irrelevant low consequence counting ( those production realities.
Hopkins, 2000; Dekker, 2015). The safety professional has Front line workers Front line workers are the employees who are directly
an important role to play but there is still an on-going involved in the production or delivery of products, goods
debate in the safety literature concerning how to measure and/or services. The assumption is that having a close
safety. Safety professionals may be ill-equipped to manage relationship with the frontline workers, a safety
safety. professional can develop safety solutions that are more
Safety bureaucracy The safety bureaucracy is the stand-alone safety adapted to the reality.
management system. Those systems often structurally Business processes Business processes are all activities that allow to produce a
separate safety requirements and activities from core product or a service. Most of the time organized into three
business processes and systems (Olsen, 2014). These types, operational, management and supporting processes.
safety bureaucracies drive the activities and relationships The assumption we make is that a lack of comprehension
of safety professionals (Swuste et al., 2014). The or a partial comprehension of those processes by the safety
assumption is that the safety bureaucracies (safety professional is limiting their influence in their
management systems) are an obstacle for creating an organization.
efficient safety culture in an organization and particular Relationships The factor relationships refers to the « good » relations,
among the operators. Mostly because the SMS imposes based on honesty and trust, a safety professional must
compliance and discipline. Safety professionals tent to develop with all the stakeholders in order to have an
impose their authority through the SMS. influence on decisions and actions. The assumption we
Safety culture There are many definitions about safety culture (Le Coze, make is that a safety professional who wants to have
2019). A definition we propose for safety culture is the influence in their organization must reinforce their
collective way people think and act about safety in an credibility and must inspire trust.
organization. The assumption made is that the safety Interpersonal skills Interpersonal skills are the way to behave and interact
professional plays an important role in the process of with other stakeholders in the organization that enables
building a safety culture. For this, he must be present for, the safety professional to influence them. The assumption
available for and collaborate with line managers and made is that the safety professional must develop their
operators. skills in communication, in negotiating, problem solving,
Safety structure The safety structure is the structural position (hierarchy) decision making.
of the safety function in the organization. The assumption Organizational Organizational context corresponds to the non-official
made is that this position influences directly the role of a context organization, to the non-official leaders that have a power
safety professional by the importance given to their status of influence on decisions. It also englobes the sensitivities
in the organization. of top management and the challenges of people on
Safety job design The safety job design are the missions the safety operational or workshop level. The assumption made is
professional has under their responsibility. The that this organizational context doesn’t correspond to the
assumption made is that those missions are clearly defined official organization. The safety professional must be
by the organization or company. aware of this.
Speaking up Speaking up is the way people can speak or talk openly Safety beliefs Values, education, and experiences create what we call the
and in a positive way about a problem in their beliefs of a professional. In our case, this contains their
organization with the aim to improve the functioning of visions about safety, organization, and human factors. The
the organization. The assumption made is that a safety safety beliefs are the safety professional’s paradigms of
professional has difficulties to talk openly about safety reality interpretation. Our assumption is that the safety
issues in their organization. professional has the idea/belief that human factor, human
Whistle blowing Whistle blowing is the act of voluntary disclosures of error ou human behavior is the most important causal
inappropriate behavior or decisions to persons in a factor concerning safety events.
position of senior authority in an organization (Sexty, (continued on next page)

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Table 1 (continued ) name of their function and domain of their function (occupational
Knowledge-worker Those skills are related to the safety professional’s health and safety or industrial or process safety). The average duration
skills capacity of knowledge management. It’s their capacity of of an interview was 2 h (mainly performed in 2 times). Nearly a hundred
learning continuously, their capacity of developing a hours of recording by the students have been transcribed. The data for
scientific and critical reflection. The assumption made is each factor or question was grouped and qualitatively analyzed by
that a safety professional has this competency: he learns
continuously, he transmits quality knowledge, he is
groups of students. Through the analysis of verbatim, recurring themes
autocratical and he has a scientific approach. have been identified. Using the role model presented in Fig. 3, linguistic
Domain Safety Safety professionals have knowledge about safety specific markers for different themes were explored to characterize the impor­
Knowledge to their organization’s domain. This knowledge has been tance and type of influence of each factor. It was asked if it was related to
acquired by academic education and professional
role expectations, role transmission, or role behaviors. The dominant
experience. The assumption made is that the safety
professional brings along to operational managers and links between factors have also been made explicit. From this analysis,
workers their technical knowledge about the safety issues an initial test of each assumption and hypothesis was completed.
of the domain. The next step was the development of a multiple-choice question­
Risk Understanding Risk understanding is translated into the knowledge and naire (mcq) to collect more data about each factor and to validate the
mastering of safety management’s concepts, models,
first findings from the interview data analysis. The Centre of Research on
methods and tools. The assumption made is that the safety
professional masters completely those theoretical Risks and Crisis (CRC) has a database with contact emails concerning a
concepts, models, methods, and tools of risk management. sample of safety professionals working in France. A participant
He also is aware and understands the social construction recruitment e-mail was sent to each person in this database on the 22nd
of risk in their organization.
of January 2019 and a reminder e-mail was sent on the 5th of February
2019. The questionnaire was closed on the 18th of February. 147 per­
between 20 and 58 years of age (M = 43 years, SD = 11.2). They had sons responses were received. The students finally presented their
considerable experience as safety professional (M = 17 years, SD = 5.1). research results on the 28th of March 2019 at MINES Paris PSL Uni­
The study took place in France between September 2018 and March versity in front of one hundred safety professionals (written articles, oral
2019. presentations, and posters).
Interview guidelines were developed after a general conceptual un­ After the conference, we reexamined the results to investigate re­
derstanding by the students of the definitions of the factors. The in­ lations between the factors. Students analyzed the factors in an inde­
terviews were conducted by the students using common open-ended pendent way. But the results of the interviews showed a more complex
questions. Each participant met with a specific interviewer and a tape- and interdependent relation between the 25 factors. We present here a
recorded interview was conducted with each subject. Additional de­ first approach to investigate the relations between factors by calculating
mographic questions were asked that included: age, gender, initial a gap matrix to independence (Benzécri, 1973). For this, we analyzed all
training, seniority in the company, seniority in the profession of safety, the transcripts of the interviews to identify the connections between

Table 2
Connections between factors.

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W. Van Wassenhove et al. Safety Science 154 (2022) 105835

factors (Table 2). The results of the survey were not suitable to analyze experienced then it is not necessary. But if you take people from field oper­
dependencies between the factors. ations who are going to do HSE, that’s fine. ». (2) Incorporating a certifi­
cation into the pathways of safety professionals has been described as a
4. Results positive initiative. However, the question of supervision and regulation
of implementation in France was raised: « It should be framed in France.
The following section describes the results synthetically. We used the Everything is legislated but not that … Even if I could turn to HSE without
organization of the factors proposed by Provan et al. (2017) (Fig. 1). training, I think it would have been beneficial to have a degree through ed­
This is a synthesis of the most pertinent results for each factor. For some ucation training. » (3) The accreditation system would be of no use in
factors this was a verbatim, for others the results of the survey data. France. « The field is more educational. As long as the basic training is
Results that were not very pertinent, interesting, or too trivial are not validated by official organizations, it is not compulsory. Professional expe­
mentioned here. rience is much more beneficial for safety. ».

4.1.2. Organizational
4.1. Institutional factors
4.1.2.1. Financial objectives. Participants were asked to discuss the
4.1.1. External compatibility of safety performance and financial performance. All
participants agree on the relevance of the subject, and they are aware
4.1.1.1. Legal regulation. Participants were asked to comment if the that two opposing points of view prevail. The first assumes that imposed
constant increase in the regulatory requirements has potentially safety standards and methods hamper the productivity and resources of
changed the approach to safety in organizations. 88% of participants the organization, the second argues that if safety is effective within a
said that there was indeed a change in the approach to safety in orga­ group, then the risks will be minimized, productivity will be increased
nizations caused by an increase in the time they had to devote to and improved financial results. Several persons interviewed tied up a
compliance activity. Some say that increasingly powerful (digital) tools high accident rate that will negatively influence the social climate, but
contribute to lighten the workload. Safety professionals expressed that also partners and customers and ultimately with prejudice to financial
they perhaps prefer to guarantee formal compliance and to avoid legal results. So, some safety professionals suggest giving visibility and
issues than taking care of people: « Organizations are more interested in highlight the importance of safety indicators and their impacts on the
covering one’s back so that they cannot be blamed from a legal point of view. consolidated accounts of a company. Finally, everyone concur that
(…) Unfortunately, it’s not always in the best interest of the individual. » safety and financial performance are closely linked. For all the in­
« The burden of regulatory compliance is becoming more and more important terviewees the safety performance and the financial performance are
in the profession (…). It keeps the guys off the field. ». compatible within the companies. However, most of the financial impact
due to the implementation of safety is not straightaway measurable, it is
4.1.1.2. Academic education. Participants were asked to comment on indirect and takes off over time.
the weaknesses they would have identified in their academic curriculum
or the topics that should be addressed. There is a clear consensus that 4.1.2.2. Safety measurement. Participants were invited to comment on
practical field safety aspects are not sufficiently enough included in the the safety indicators they use. Are they considered adequate and does
curriculum and that some theoretical frameworks can be too distant the Corporate have a satisfactory understanding? The answers fall into
from the practical reality of the safety professional role. « What is clear is three categories: 38% consider the safety indicators satisfactory, 41%
that in the academic part, we do not always learn everything and that there is think the opposite and 21% are mixed. Many criticize companies to use
a gap between what we could taught in initial training on any subject (safety, only the frequency and severity rates as indicators or to have talking
maintenance, etc.) and the reality of the field and the configuration in which statistics. Quantitative features are promoted (e.g., to benchmark be­
one will professionally grow. What is important is to have an academic basis tween competitors) whereas qualitative facet of indicators is totally
that allows you to ask the right questions. » Safety professionals pointed out abandoned. In addition, safety professionals suggest indicators such as
that learning through practice in a company is essential to be effective as rate of compliance with regulations, involvement of managers and staff
a safety professional and it is important to be operationally focused from or the company’s commitment to the safety of employees. Professionals
the beginning of your career. They also suggested that more technical are very skeptical about the appropriateness of appraisal when it comes
training in the work processes of their company would be valuable to to assessing the overall performance of an organization in terms of
better understand the different industrial processes to gain credibility safety.
with operators. It is also emphasized that the advice of the safety pro­
fessional is not always received positively by senior management. The 4.1.2.3. Safety bureaucracy. The opinion of the participants on safety
explanation given by participants is that management decisions will not bureaucracy was gathered under the prisms of conformity control, of the
be based solely on the safety aspect but also on the financial aspects of authority and the possible impediments to the autonomy and the
the company. Safety professional stakeholders are remarkably diverse maturity of the operators. The answers show that bureaucracy is
(e.g., operators, management, customers, suppliers, institutions, etc.) so perceived as necessary in a safety management system. However, the
« Communication, negotiation and persuasion skills are needed to get people control and practice of the safety bureaucratic system contribute to its
to understand things. » For them, it is crucial to be able to tailor the effectiveness. One safety professional says: « Bureaucracy can be a drag.
message according to its audience. But it is necessary to have a minimum of traceability to be able to follow the
actions, in the daily life and in the analysis of the risks which is made
4.1.1.3. Professional accreditation. Professional accreditation is regar­ regularly by all the customers. If we do not have a monitoring system, in case
ded as the validation of skills acquired by safety professionals through of litigation, words fly away, but writings remain. Today, there are tools that
specialized professional bodies.. To this specific point, the term profes­ can dematerialize and facilitate follow-ups. This is an orientation taken by
sional accreditation has been misunderstood by most of the interviewed our company. » Nevertheless, it is pointed out that excessive bureaucracy
of this study. However, the professionals familiar with this system state prevents work for prevention and may create a gap between all pro­
three equally distributed standpoints on professional accreditations and cedures and reality. « There is an immediate procedure to respond quickly
specifically regarding their establishment in France. (1) Accreditations to the needs of regulation, but we miss all the added value that an operator
could bring a diversity and a new approach in business. « People find it could bring us, we miss their vision of this procedure, this vision could make it
good, it’s a guarantee of quality. It depends on your background if you are

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more operational, closer to the ground and reality. We can actually put in constraints of the local management « with communication and adapta­
place procedures that are not adapted, not understood or inconsistent with tion to the schedules of operational managers, involving them in their
what the operators do in the workshops or in their workstations. With con­ approach to safety without adding too much workload. » Communication is
stant increase in bureaucracy (i.e., Safety Management System), we are no about being included in meetings and projects, objectives can be defined
longer in the field, we no longer have human contacts, resulting in fewer jointly through « steering committees that bring together managers and
commitment. But it is essential to formalize work, being capable to deliver it to safety people ». Staying open-minded is a prerequisite, then talk a lot to
regulatory bodies. We should find a balance. ». find fair agreement. Safety professionals consider the constraints of local
supervision with a good knowledge of operational practices. Relation­
4.1.2.4. Safety culture. Participants were requested to specify if safety ships with line managers ensure to have safety objectives aligned with
culture requires a specific presence of the safety professional and the those of the local management: « We must be on the field or in the work­
stakes of communication within the production lines and the hierar­ shop: we see the problems on the field / in the workshop, then we can make
chical line. In other words, to what extent is the improvement of safety decisions. Without a very good knowledge of the field, no one can take good
culture based on safety professionals. For the safety professionals, safety measures. It is essential to understand how they work and what their con­
culture is perceived as a set of ways of doing and thinking through a straints are, we need them, we cannot do anything if line managers are not
participative approach shared between management and operators. It is aware of what needs to be done. Attentiveness to production trades enable to
sustained by the top management, which must be exemplary, so that understand them and help them better. To be a safety expert, you have to
operators become actors of their own safety. Convincing and adhering is know the job in front of you. ».
essential to promote information feedback and to create a shared vision
of risk management within the same entity. 4.2.1.2. Front line workers. Participants were invited to comment on
how the involvement of front-line workers can improve safety and
4.1.2.5. Safety structure. It was asked how does the organizational and whether it is possible to develop more realistic safety solutions through
hierarchical position of the safety function affect the day-to-day work propinquity with them. The convictions of the surveyed group are
and more generally the organization’s safety performance? Most of the crystal clear: the dialogue with front line workers is essential since they
response (66%) came from the fact that the closer the safety department are the first ones exposed to the risks and to the reality of field opera­
is to top management, the more influence it has within the company. tions. « If he is involved, he will go to transmit to others safety at work and
« On our site, safety is directly related to the direction of the site which gives even at home and therefore improve safety, he will have a more critical view
him a greater weight ». Other answers stood out; some think that the of situations that are not ok, he will identify them more clearly, and make
position in the hierarchy has no influence on the work. « The hierarchy of them safer more easily. » Safety systems gain in efficiency and add value
the safety function does not affect my daily work because I have total au­ thanks to technical and practical sharing. In addition, front line workers
tonomy without hindering the organization’s safety performance. » and are more accommodating in respect of the rules and procedures
emphasize the importance of having a position independent of man­ deployed and risk understanding enables a better adaptation of means.
agement for more credibility, but without breaking the communication However, processes can be blocked by a lack of theoretical knowledge in
links with management. « I think that so much that the safety function will terms of safety: « If the operator is not convinced and feel it as an obstacle to
not have a minimum of independence, it will be quite restrained. Although it the way he works, it will not work. For behaviors-based programs or threshold
works in a correct way it may not work as it should ». According to them, effect approaches: it only works if there is a critical mass ».
the hierarchical position does not necessarily influence safety perfor­
mance but rather the way of working. Finally, a minority emphasizes 4.2.1.3. Business processes. Safety professionals are assumed to have
that there is no ideal position in the hierarchy for the safety professional. mostly technical skills but a lack of general understanding of business
processes. 32% of respondents believe that safety professionals lack a
4.1.2.6. Safety job design. Safety job design includes the organizational general understanding of business processes and 27% believe that safety
themes to be taken on duty and the operational tasks to be performed by professionals don’t. 41% of professionals surveyed focused on the fact
the safety professional. It has been questioned if missions as a safety that safety professionals had good technical knowledge and did not
professional were clearly defined and if non-safety tasks are part of the address the topic of business process. Investigation of the answers re­
scope. For an overwhelming majority, the missions and objectives veals a hiatus relative to the hierarchical level of the safety professional.
related to safety are clearly defined and are most often reviewed « An HSE with management relations must have these skills whereas a field
annually. Regarding non-safety missions, positions differ mainly in two safety professional does not need it. » Many believe that it is not a prime
trends. In companies with highly focused systems, safety professionals concern to have this knowledge and that it is rather the field knowledge
do not have missions that are not related to safety. For the second trend, that prevails. An opportunistic style is most often chosen: « We must ask
many non-safety related missions may be associated (i.e. quality, health, some interlocutors to provide us with information on the company’s processes
environment, safety, crisis management, regulatory watch, etc.). It ap­ when we need them. » A minority mentioned the importance of having
pears that the entire panel made it clear that the tasks were well defined skills concerning the business processes to understand the reluctance of
and the expectations clear. the operational staff to apply some safety measures and suggested
recruiting safety professionals who have been executive or production
unit managers to use their proficiency of the issues of a company to
4.2. Relational factors improve safety. Lastly, they believe that « the involvement within board
empower to acquire these skills. ».
4.2.1. Alliance
4.2.2. Authority
4.2.1.1. Line managers. Safety professionals were questioned to under­
stand how the operational constraints of the line managers are consid­ 4.2.2.1. Senior management. Participants were asked about the extent
ered and how safety aspects are integrated into it? The greater part of to which top management support is needed to implement safety prac­
safety professionals considers truthful that the objectives must be tices. A substantial majority (70%) deem that top management support
defined jointly with the line managers. Communication and anticipation is essential for all aspects structuring the organization. « Its role is
are the most mentioned factors and the importance to « work upstream essential because what does not come from the top management will have a
with the people of the profession » to better integrate the constraints of hard time down to the level of the employees ». 20% of the respondents
operations is noticed. Safety objectives are embedded in the operational

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point out that the exemplary top management is mainly necessary for improvement of interactions, involvement at all levels, facilitates
the implementation of good practices. The didactic value of the good problem situations, takes into account the constraints of others…), (4)
behaviors from the management is highlighted: « By being exemplary, we guide (i.e. trust, honesty, knowing the regulatory framework, strong
influence the people a lot by our own behavior, so if the boss of the company field experience…).
demonstrates safety behaviors, if he accepts criticisms and build trustful re­
lationships with people, then the initiatives of safety will be able to succeed ». 4.2.3.3. Organizational context. A vast majority acknowledge that there
10% believe that top management support is especially needed when is indeed an informal organization within their company. « In the soci­
subjects are sensitive. « In the pharmaceutical industry, topics that affect ology of business, there are several informal organizations: social groups that
scientists daily require Top Management support. ». may be business groups, which may be groups of extra-professional activities,
which may be trade union activities. A business is, so to speak, made up of X
4.2.2.2. Safety system. Safety professionals were requested to describe informal groups ». They surmise that this is often beneficial to the com­
how Safety Management Systems leverage the organization and its ac­ pany: « If an informal organization is created, it is because it is necessary for
tors. SMS is mainly perceived (47%) as a working tool (monitoring, the proper functioning of the company. » « It still exists, we cannot write
training, standardization, registration…), and 23% of respondents everything like the procedures but the whole thing is not to have major dis­
believe that it allows to structure the organization, 10% think it gives crepancies between what is officious and what is official. » The essential
them power while at the opposite, 10% find that it imposes to demon­ notion that comes up most often is to know the natural leaders of the
strate the legitimacy of their actions. Very few (6%) see the SMS to company. Knowing these leaders makes it possible to convey messages
ensure the performance of the company or as a vehicle to promote au­ and convince more easily by relying on their natural authority: « It is
tonomy (3%). important to know the network of influence, which constitutes the informal
organization, the people who have a leadership role must be allied to the
4.2.2.3. Decision rights. Does the organization achieve a higher level of safety management because they will be followed without questioning. » The
safety when safety professionals have the power to give instructions informal organization is: « source of information and ways of improve­
directly to operators, over the choice of subcontractors, on safety in­ ment ». It is also a point of contact for people who do not speak to their
vestment decisions? Are they consulted to review and validate opera­ hierarchy. Some even see it as a strategy to « bring neutral people back to
tional decisions? To what extent are the proposals of the safety the safety ». About 10% categorically state that there is no informal or­
professionals considered in all decisions of the company? It is first ganization in their company, that they do not feel it, or even that it could
emphasized that power games are complex, difficult to quantify and be detrimental to the company if it existed. « It does not happen here,
often shady, almost invisible. However, for the majority, their proposals nobody is irreplaceable. The hierarchy is very solid here. » The main argu­
are listened to and considered. A first group of 23% believes that they ment is that too much deviance can be detrimental to the organization,
have appropriate decision rights. Then 51% mention the context (i.e., and that it is important to apply in the field what was previously defined
interest of the proposal, cost / benefit ratio). Only 13% say their pro­ on paper by the formal organization.
posals are not heard. As a rule, « decision-makers hear what is said…. the
main difficulty is to know what are the hot topics regarding the strategy of the 4.2.4. Challenge
company and to balance with the truth of the field. ».
4.2.4.1. Speaking up. As it can be personally risky for a safety profes­
4.2.3. Influence sional without formal authority to express disagreement, surveyed were
asked if it is easy to speak up with everyone about safety concerns in
4.2.3.1. Relationships. Relationship resonates with trust, integrity, and their organization. Two opposite convictions govern the debates since
credibility to influence decision making and forthcoming actions. Par­ 40% think that speaking up is easy and, on the contrary 40% think it
ticipants were solicited to spell out how the safety professional can difficult. 10% prefer to say that it depends mainly on the person opposite
improve interactions with stakeholders. The main features listed to and finally 10% consider it easier and easier. We did note that safety
improve interactions with stakeholders are listening, communication, professionals working in major companies more often say that it is easy
pedagogy, exemplarity, and leadership. We therefore find that the main to tackle safety issues. Most believe that communication and other soft
answers given are in fact interpersonal skills allowing the safety pro­ skills are the main factors in addressing these concerns. « You must
fessional to be credible and trustworthy. « It is extremely important to choose the right interlocutor, the right tone, and so on. But this is human
develop the ability to influence, in the best sense, to be able to convince and relations, not safety. » A minority say that the constant progression of
make people join. » Inspiring confidence and being credible are percep­ safety culture in organizations foster this exchange, notably through
tions of the stakeholders. « The safety people must first be exemplary, then commitment of top management.
must listen to people and not be stubborn to make people work with trust. ».
4.2.4.2. Whistle blowing. Should the safety professional be a whistle­
4.2.3.2. Interpersonal skills. Topics regarding the types of behaviors the blower? Is it easy as a safety professional to report unsafe practices to top
safety professional should demonstrate or avoid to succeed their mis­ management? 40% of respondents consider it easy to issue alerts, 35% of
sions have been raised and associated interpersonal skills have been people believe that it is difficult. 10% say they never did it and 15% did
examined. It emerges that it is crucial for a safety professional to be a not answer the question. A significant proportion says they have no
sound communicator, to have a listening ear, to be credible, honest, and problem denouncing inappropriate practices. With the right language,
straightforward with the set of stakeholders (front line workers, man­ there is no distinction between top management and the rest of the
agers, contractors, regulating bodies, top management…) to perpetuate workforce. A distinction between safety professional and line manager is
the relationship of trust. The most cited interpersonal skills can be ar­ however raised: « For those who are pure HSE, yes, it is quite simple since
ranged into four categories: (1) Leadership (i.e. having the ability and there are no affects or direct links with the interventions! But for line man­
drive to make suggestions, team building, knowledge of stakeholder agers, there is a part of risk taking since they must continue production while
needs, to bring them together and to align on a common objective…), maintaining an acceptable level of risk. » Instead of enforcement or coer­
(2) communication (i.e. sense of listening and being exemplary, cion, those who consider whistleblowing difficult call up the notion of
knowing how to communicate with all the actors, to learn and under­ denouncement. « It’s not easy, it’s informing! I try to solve the problems at
stand the stakes of various stakeholder, to have a powerful speech, to be my level if it’s not enough I’ll see the manager. Otherwise, the top manage­
transparent, introducing to the actors) (3) Facilitator (diplomatic skills, ment if the person continues, as a last resort. It’s definitely not simple. ».

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4.2.4.3. Constructive enquiry. All respondents emphasize the inherent unnecessary. « Technical side doesn’t need to be mastered by safety pro­
complexity of sanction. What should we punish and how? The notions of fessionals to perform their duties”.
error, violation and negligence are constantly coming back. All the
safety professionals questioned judge punitive methods as harmful and 4.3.2.3. Risk understanding. Based on their experience, participants
obsolete. They mainly cause fear, interfere with feedback, and promote were asked what theoretical models of risk management are imperative
overriding something important in terms of safety. « Workers will pay in their daily operational practice. « There is a whole package to be a safety
more attention to eliminating all paper footprints and will be more hesitant to professional: one cannot improvise off the cuff. So, yes, a theoretical model is
report near-miss, but ordained to take part in vigilance, they will sabotage the essential! » 75% credit that a theoretical model is essential for risk
system by saturating it with false alerts and inopportune events. » It emerges management on their daily practice. « Theoretical models are necessary to
that it is important for employees to report such information and should control the risks. However, they must be adapted to the field of activity in
be encouraged to do so. Feedbacks can be done via safety commission, which they are set up. » 15% point out that there is no standard model for
steering committee, internal audits or by specific tools designed to trace a given activity but that regulation step in to control risks. Only 5% do
this kind of intelligence with respect of anonymous. not mention any model. Many models (e.g., Bird Pyramid, Bradley Curve
…), methods (e.g., HAZOP, FMEA, PHA, Cause tree, Ichikawa …) and
tools (JSA, risk assessment document, regulations …) are alluded.
4.3. Individual factors
5. Discussion
4.3.1. Belief
In this part, we will discuss the results concerning the factors, their
4.3.1.1. Safety beliefs. Participants were called upon to explain what
possible impact on the role behavior of the safety professional but also
key factors condition safety. The participants responses all involve a
the relations between the factors. To illuminate those relations, a gap
combination of technical, organizational, and human factors. If we
matrix to independence was calculated. We refer to Benzécri for the
count the occurrences, the technical factors hold 20% of the speeches
methodology (Benzécri, 1973).
and the organizational and human factors respectively each dwell 40%.
Three kinds of beliefs have been identified: (1) Beliefs regarding hazards
and risks. « Some workers consider the safety measures as an impediment to 5.1. Institutional factors
their capacity to complete production goals. Even if they are aware of risks,
they assume that they can deal with it to get the job done. They may think that 5.1.1. External: Legal regulation, academic education, professional
whatever the risks, they must fulfill production targets to keep their jobs, in accreditation.
that way go in for at-risk behavior of their own free will. » At all levels of the Participants were asked to comment if the constant increase in the
organization, one can observe flawed perceptions about hazards (e.g. « it regulatory requirements has potentially changed the approach to safety
is inherent to business »). (2) Beliefs regarding accident causation such as in organizations. The responses showed that laws and regulations allow
overconfidence (e.g., « I’m qualified, it won’t go down »), fatalism (e.g., « to structure safety better and to build on common bases, but the regu­
if one is meant to get hurt, then one will… »), effect of exposure (e.g., « it latory burden has become such that it requires a significant mobilization
takes a couple of seconds, I am coping to it »). (3) Beliefs regarding risk of resources manage it (i.e., financial, human, organizational…). Safety
management. professionals perceive legal regulation to influence both role expecta­
tion and role behaviors. Safety professionals could thus be more inten­
4.3.2. Capabilities ded to guarantee formal compliance and to avoid legal issues than taking
care of people. This coincides with results of other studies (Van Was­
4.3.2.1. Knowledge worker skills. Safety professionals were asked how senhove et al. 2022).
they keep their knowledge up to date to perform their missions. Self- Participants were asked to comment on the weaknesses they would
learning (34%) is much appreciated: « Today we find a lot of data, lots have identified in their academic curriculum or the topics that should be
of information on lessons learned, teaching aids, reviews made by external addressed. There is a clear consensus that field safety implementation
professionals, websites from reference organizations. » Regulatory watch is aspects are not enough sufficiently included in the curriculum. Many
mentioned (27%) as an important support: « We must be interested in the additional links to other topics appear for all people interviewed: on the
regulatory part which evolves often and a lot, we spend a significant part of technical side, the quantification and modeling of hazardous phenom­
our time there. » Informal talks with coworkers (27%) foster professional ena can be missing to understand the risks, on the legal side, case studies
network, one can call in case of problems or requests for advice, to share on the use of regulation could be taught, general business knowledge,
good practices. It endeavors better decision-making. Audits and especially the history of globalization, seems to be essential to under­
benchmarks (12%) are evoked as means to « obtain diversity of points of stand the situation of today’s businesses and associated issues. Man­
view, increase curiosity and transverse missions to see other things and thus agement decisions will not be based solely on the safety aspect but also
questioning ». on the financial aspects of the company. It is therefore important to be
able to understand how a company operates through the various de­
4.3.2.2. Domain safety knowledge. To what extent should the safety partments that make it up, e.g. finance, accounting, marketing, human
professional master the technical aspects of the industry in which he resources, engineering. The safety education curriculum could thus be
operates? A clear majority values domain safety knowledge. 36% expanded to include units relevant to the operation of a company. Safety
consider essential to know how to master all the technical aspects of professional stakeholders are remarkably diverse (e.g., operators, man­
their branch and 26% consider important to have the basics. Credibility agement, customers, suppliers, institutions, etc.) so it is crucial to be able
is the main reason given: « Credibility would suffer if one were not a to tailor the message according to its audience. This confirms the already
minimum technical. It is important to know how to kick around with the established fact that the knowledge necessary for the practice of the
contractors: talk over vapors, chemical risk, etc. » 29% consider that it is safety professional covers a wide spectrum (Van Wassenhove et al.
foremost to surround oneself with the right people. « Everything is going 2022). The discussions with safety professionals consistently concluded
well thanks to the correspondents who are on site and who have the knowl­ that there were significant gaps or voids in the content of academic
edge. Afterwards, to go further, you need to know the system and the orga­ education. The topics considered to be missing relate to many of the
nization: then risks can be mitigated, and necessary actions can be taken other factors that are the subject of the present study. It appears that
much sooner. » At last, only 10% consider that in depth knowledge is academic education does not seem to directly influence role

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expectations or role behavior, and at the same time misses an oppor­ safety bureaucratic system contribute to its effectiveness. Safety pro­
tunity to support safety professionals with the capability to positively fessionals are expected to lead in the development and the administra­
influence the other factors shaping their role as a safety professional. tion of safety management system, which is often independent of the
Professional accreditation is regarded as the validation of skills ac­ company’s core business processes and management systems. Seen as
quired by safety professionals through specialized professional bodies. bureaucracy administrators, safety professionals are sometimes walking
The term professional accreditation has been misunderstood by most of over a minefield due to their bad reputation among front-line operators.
the interviewed. Historically, in France, the influence of personnel Writing safety policies and procedures, documentation, and auditing
qualification schemes from professional bodies is rather thin and safety management can lead to excess red tape, which is perceived as
recognition goes a long way by the diploma. Thus, the term accredita­ one of the major barriers to creating an effective safety culture (Dekker
tion has been more or less understood as certifications given internally 2015). The SMS bureaucracy sway the nature of safety professionals’
within companies. It is not possible to conclude here because the French relationship with other actors in the organization and influences the
context in which the survey was conducted is very specific. Professional overall performance of complex systems.
bodies do not have the same influence as in Anglo-Saxon cultures for Participants were requested to specify if the safety culture requires a
instance. Access to the profession is unregulated and the importance of specific presence of the safety professional and the stakes of communi­
the initial diploma remains firmly in mindsets. Anyway, we did not find cation within the production lines and the hierarchical line. In other
any evidence to infer short-term changes in the field of accreditation of words, to what extent is the improvement of safety culture based on
the safety professional in France. safety professionals? Surprisingly, unlike research-based literature, the
full profession in France seems to have a fairly clear and similar idea of
5.1.2. Organizational: Financial objectives, safety measurement, safety what is a safety culture approach. This is probably the result of the work
bureaucracy, safety culture, safety structure, safety job design and communication of ICSI (Institut pour une Culture de Sécurité Indus­
Participants were asked to discuss the compatibility of safety per­ trielle, 2021) in France. Safety culture is perceived as a set of ways of
formance and financial performance. Two opposing points of view doing and thinking through a participative approach shared between
prevail. The first assumes that imposed safety standards and methods management and operators. A unanimous consensus highlights the
hamper the productivity and resources of the organization, the second importance of exemplary leadership and the central role of the front-line
argues that if safety is effective within a group, then the risks will be worker on safety. Here, role expectations are clearly drawn, the safety
minimized, productivity will be increased and improved financial re­ professional is to be a spearhead and a driver of safety culture. Role
sults. This diversity of representation about possible correlations be­ behaviors must be shaped by exemplarity, commitment, and power of
tween safety and finance can be found in the literature (Bryant 1999, persuasion. A tremendous amount of evidence shows that the way the
Mottel et al 1995, Swuste 2008). Good management of safety prevention role is played shapes strongly relationships with all stakeholders.
would positively influence the behavior of employees and give rise to a It was asked how does the organizational and hierarchical position of
virtuous circle, where the workforce of the company will be more the safety function affect the day-to-day work and more generally the
committed in their work and will gain in efficiency. On top of that, in­ organization’s safety performance? Influence and efficiency are related
vestments in reliability of systems also increase productivity and to the position in the hierarchy: the more the safety professional is close
therefore financial performance. Among the biggest challenge for a to the top management, the more influence. This therefore dictates the
safety professional is the way financial performance is expressed. It is recognition of the status granted to the safety professional. Status is
generally expressed over a short period of time or modeled on the results associated with distinctive beliefs about the expectations of those having
of the previous year, while safety at work is intended on future hits. status and not the intrinsic characteristic of man but of social organi­
Thus, to be understood, it is vital for a safety professional to succeed in zation. (Linton, 1945). What matters is not what one really is, but what
speaking the same language as the financial director, links between people believe one to be. Status defines who a person is; whereas role
financial performance and safety must be revealed. At present, it seems defines what such a person is expected to do. Safety structure influence
to be very complicated to “sell” safety at work to top management indirectly the role of safety professional by the mediation of the status.
without talking money. The more safety professionals are considered in From this perspective, role is often said as the individual’s dynamic
the organization and included in its strategy, the better they work, and adaptation of the status.
risks of financial losses are managed in the long run. Given role expec­ Safety job design includes the organizational themes to be taken on
tations, it is very infrequent for financial goals to be given to the safety duty and the operational tasks to be performed by the safety profes­
professional. Finance and safety relations are felt unclear within com­ sional. From one company to another, the variability of the tasks
panies. The impact on role behavior is mainly reflected in the need to assigned to the safety professional is impressive and many non-safety
justify relentlessly the usefulness of safety-related expenditures. missions can be part of the role expectations. The implications for role
Safety measurement is a highly controversial subject because the behaviors are related to the organization and allocation of resources to
way of measuring impacts the very definition of the observed object. carry out the different assignments.
Companies are criticized to use only the frequency and severity rates as
indicators or to have talking statistics. Safety professionals do not 5.2. Relational factors
question management’s understanding of the indicators, but rather the
relevance and the definition itself of these indicators. Professionals are 5.2.1. Alliance: Line managers, front-line workers, business processes
very skeptical about the appropriateness of appraisal when it comes to Located at the interface between top management and operations,
assessing the overall performance of an organization in terms of safety. the safety professional must reconcile conflicting objectives. Consid­
The associated role expectations are twofold, the safety professional is ering the interests of line managers is essential if one wants to achieve
on the one hand guarantor of the process of safety measurement and, on one’s ends. Role behaviors will be marked by how to grasp operational
the other hand under the imposition of performance goals. This double constraints and are highly contingent on field experience. The
expectation generates role ambiguity resulting from the inconsistencies complexity of finding the balance between the firmness necessary to
related to be both judge and jury. respect the standards and the flexibility required to foil unenforceable
The opinion of the participants about safety bureaucracy was gath­ approaches may lead the safety professional to be perceived struggling
ered under the prisms of conformity control, of the authority and the in picturing the constraints of production.
possible impediments to the autonomy and the maturity of the opera­ The dialogue with front line workers is deemed essential since they
tors. The answers show that bureaucracy is perceived as necessary in a are the first ones exposed to the risks and to the reality of field opera­
safety management system. However, the control and practice of the tions. The role expectations from the front-line workers are quite strong,

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W. Van Wassenhove et al. Safety Science 154 (2022) 105835

they are centered on proficiency and credibility of the safety profes­ taking the role. It seems out of question to behave in the role aligned
sional. Being visible on the field, getting involved in daily operations are with role expectations without a great proficiency of a wide range of soft
required if one does not want to be considered as a paper-pusher or a skills (e.g., communication, negotiation, facilitation, conflict resolution,
dead weight. It is therefore essential for the professional to maintain the decision-making, assertiveness …).
focus of the discussion to obtain the desired information and make Is the prescribed enough to run a business? Do the elements defined
adequate decisions. by prescriptions match with reality? Does a person described as on duty
The topic business process has been addressed with the assumption has eventually the power and ability to run a decision? Differences be­
that safety professionals have mostly technical skills but lack general tween plans and reality apply for organizational context. The organi­
understanding of business processes. The results tend to validate the zational context is the place where job as prescribed is transformed into
hypothesis (Chang et al, 2012) pointing the lack of holistic under­ job as done. To overcome unavoidable formal inconsistencies and still
standing of a company that would limit the influence of safety pro­ get the job done safely, an excellent knowledge of the organization is
fessionals on decision-makers. Business processes knowledge is not vital. Efficiency passes through the control of the cogs of the informal
explicitly part of the role expectations, which leads almost half of the organization where fine tune role behaviors by the game of alliances.
panel to lose interest in the subject. However, the fine knowledge of the
company’s cogs enables to adjust its behavioral strategies to optimize its 5.2.4. Challenge: Speaking up, whistle blowing, constructive inquiry
influence capabilities. As it can be personally risky for a safety professional without formal
authority to express disagreement, surveyed were asked if it is easy to
5.2.2. Authority: Senior management, safety system, decision rights speak up with everyone about safety concerns in their organization.
Support from the top management is considered of paramount Anyway, to do so many interpersonal skills that are not taught during
importance. The safety professional is not being able to play one’s role the university years are required. This set the problem of young safety
without the buttress of executives. Exemplarity is abundantly cited, the professionals who cannot make themselves heard. They often rely only
disastrous effects of the slightest failure on those matters are unani­ on their technical skills to improve the organization. To be heard, it is
mously called up. Role behaviors are irremediably subject to the adage necessary to be aware of the impact that information can have on the
“walk the talk”. different parties of the company and this capacity can only be acquired
The effective implementation of safety management systems in­ through hands-on experience. We did note that safety professionals
volves considerable work from everyone. Role expectations are that working in major companies more often say that it is easy to tackle
safety professionals are both warrantors and drivers of the safety system. safety issues. Most believe that communication and other soft skills are
While they could impose their authority through SMS and influence the main factors in addressing these concerns. “When two men always
decision-making at their own benefit by relying on bureaucratic pro­ agree, one of them is unnecessary” (Wrigley Jr, 1931). Organizations are
cesses, it seems that the use of soft power is preferred. Finally, role be­ complex edifices combining different interests and conflicting goals
haviors include making sense of the system to promote commitment and (Mintzberg, 1989). Each profession lobbies for itself to achieve its ends.
support closely the deployment of the safety system on the field. To succeed in operating safely, the safety professional must play the role
Does the organization achieve a higher level of safety when safety of countervailing powers to balance any questionable requirements from
professionals have the power to give instructions directly to operators, production or management. To achieve this, it is necessary to speak up
over the choice of subcontractors, on safety investment decisions? Here wisely and demonstrate a combination of toughness and diplomacy.
we are at the articulation between role and responsibilities. Decisions “Whistleblowing is an act of voluntary disclosure of inappropriate
rights influence the role expectations between authority and influence. behavior or decisions to persons in a position of senior authority in an
By granting important rights, one associates important responsibilities organization” (Sexty, 2011). Should the safety professional be a whis­
(e.g., the safety professional becomes the ultimate decision-maker and is tleblower? Is it easy as a safety professional to report unsafe practices to
authoritative to ensure the adjudication regarding safety). Conversely, top management? Difficulty in differentiating an informant (i.e., moti­
more limited decision rights led to advisor status that would influence vated by personal convictions, such as wanting to take revenge or
consensus outside the formal decision-making process. As a result, this putting someone in trouble for profit) and a whistleblower (i.e., in good
involves role behaviors where they negotiate with stakeholders until faith and good intentions) makes the subject thorny. Depending on the
alignment is achieved. system of reference values (i.e., serving the company or serving the
society), two opposing positions emerge, one considers the loyalty and
5.2.3. Influence: relationships, interpersonal skills, organizational context the respect of the chain of command, the other considers superior in­
Relationship resonates with trust, integrity, and credibility to influ­ terests and endorses the transmission of information to official bodies,
ence decision making and forthcoming actions. Without opposition, it is associations, or the media against the advice of the hierarchy. According
firmly recognized that good relationships extensively rely on interper­ to this last perspective, more than an advisor, the safety professional
sonal skills. Observable behaviors (e.g., technical ability, organization, must blame et denounce inappropriate practices.
rigor, proactivity, presence in the field, manage conflicts, firmness …) In your company, can employees report malfunctions or errors
are cited with an order of magnitude ten times lower. Testimonies related to safety without fearing sanction? The entire panel emphasizes
demonstrate the deeply relational nature of the work of safety profes­ the inherent complexity of sanction. What should we punish and how?
sional. Nothing is possible without successful integration into the com­ The notions of error, violation and negligence are constantly coming
pany’s community. Connected to a huge variety of stakeholders, back. All the safety professionals questioned judge punitive methods as
adaptation agility is critical and requires the mastery of umpteen harmful and obsolete. This is in line with the just culture approach of
interpersonal skills. Relationship troubles may arise due to role ambi­ Sidney Dekker (Dekker et Breakey 2016)One expected role of a safety
guity (i.e., being judge and jury on some potentially conflicting topics). professional is to relentlessly challenge the organization with the
In some cases, it is possible to observe a phenomenon of role distance ambition of enhance safety. To do so, stimulation of an unlatched at­
(Goffman, 1975) to cope with conflicting injunctions. mosphere (i.e., via acceptance of the disagreement of other stake­
Topics regarding the types of behaviors the safety professional holders) is uttered as a privileged pathway. Role behaviors however
should demonstrate or avoid to succeed have been raised and associated often include dealing with unpopular statements and one should be
interpersonal skills have been examined. The matter of the credibility of highly ready to manage strain between the parties.
the safety professional seems to be an obsession, it keeps coming back
whatever the topic is. More than facts or observable actions, the credi­
bility of the safety professional is gauged on the way one goes about

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5.3. Individual factors 5.4.2. Most spontaneously mentioned factors

The factor that comes up most often even when it is not the subject
5.3.1. Belief: Safety beliefs evoked is relationships (10 occurrences) to be compared to the 7 oc­
Participants were called upon to explain what key factors condition currences of interpersonal skills. Then, senior management returns 9
safety. Companies encompass standards, aligned with their core values times, then legal (7 times including 5 related to institutional factors).
about work, people and performance, that shape the global risk man­ This is not without surprise, Guennoc et al (2019) shows that OHS
agement framework. These beliefs set up the foundations for deciding specialist deal with many topics and theirs are primarily relational ac­
acceptability of risks. Safety professionals seems to be mainly attentive tivities. Accreditation, safety job design, speaking up and whistle
to the human dimension and to the organizational dimension of man­ blowing are never mentioned outside the explicit questions on these
agement systems. Compliance appears to be significant part of their role items.
behaviors and it is not clear if this the consequence of the belief of its
usefulness to ensure safety. Safety is typically attributed to operational 5.4.3. Factors in reciprocal relations
elements. (e.g., time pressures, handiness of proper tools, availability Only six pairs of factors are in reciprocal relations (safety bureau­
and condition of equipment, PPE…) and to a lesser extend to manage­ cracy & legal regulation, front line worker & safety culture, knowledge
ment features (e.g., little concern for safety, flawed planning, priority on worker skills & academic education, knowledge worker skills & rela­
productivity, …). Beliefs influence senders, transmission, and behaviors. tionship, domain safety knowledge & relationship, safety belief & risk
understanding). This finding could be explained regarding closer the six
5.3.2. Capabilities: Knowledge working skills, domain safety knowledge, pairs of factors. Safety bureaucracy and legal regulation are in fact
risk understanding closely related as the safety bureaucracy is often a result of a process to
Safety professionals were asked how they keep their knowledge up to satisfy legal compliance. Safety bureaucracy has been driven by regu­
date to perform their missions. Although it is expected being always up lation, liability, and insurance arrangements, outsourcing, and con­
to date, safety professionals have little use of academic research. While tracting, and technologies for surveillance and data storage (Dekker,
in constant quest for information about practices, it seems that the in­ 2014). But even when governments do take a step back for regulation,
terest is more in ready-made recipes or on-the-shelf tools rather than a internal bureaucracy can grow considerably (Storkersen et al, 2020).
reasoned foundation of knowledge supported by scientific accuracy. The pair « front line worker and safety culture » is not a surprise either.
This questions the very interpretation that the safety professional makes A common approach for safety culture is the Behavior Based Safety
of the expectations of roles that are sent, the way in which he receives approach. This way of conceiving the concept of safety culture is very
the role. orientated towards the front-line worker and their safety education.
To what extent should the safety professional master the technical Scientific literature is very prolific about safety culture and the BBS
aspects of the industry in which he operates? The quality of the scientific approach. This approach has found its way to the industry by the means
and technical knowledge base of the safety professional influences how of professional consulting companies which reflects in our results.
one will develop the representations of the role expectations (arrow 5). Critics can be formulated towards the BBS approach (Dekker, 2015).
As with factors relationship and interpersonal skills, the idea of credi­ Knowledge worker skills and education are reciprocally related.
bility is again highlighted and is displayed as heavily dependent on Those knowledge worker skills are necessary to maintain and continue
domain safety knowledge. the education of the safety professional. The more the professional has a
Based on their experience, participants were asked what theoretical solid education, the more he will have developed those abilities to learn
models of risk management are imperative in their daily operational when in activity. Knowledge worker skills are also reciprocal to the
practice. One of the role expectations is to optimize the distribution of factor relationship. We can explain because that one doesn’t learn
available resources according to the criticality of the different risks. « alone » but it’s in the professional interactions that learning situations
Since risks are inherently uncertain and set in the future, the ability to occur, and that information is transferred and shared. Relationship is
represent them is contingent on a theoretical model of safety. Role be­ also linked to domain safety knowledge. Considering the precedent two
haviors of the safety professional will be very dissimilar hanging on the pairs of factors, we can explain that the (technical) knowledge of the
underlying models guiding the analysis and representation of risks. domain is obtained by relationships with fellow employees of the or­
ganization. The last pair of reciprocal factors is safety belief and risk
5.4. Relations between factors understanding. We can explain this by underlining that to understand
risk, underlying models and ideas are necessary. Swuste et al (2020)
During the interviews, when a factor was discussed, participants concluded in their recent Safety Science paper that between 1988 and
mentioned other factors during their discussion which seemed naturally 2010 no new theories were published on accident processes of occupa­
or obviously connected. Following the analysis of the interview tran­ tional accidents (review of safety literature in English and Dutch). Since
scripts, 89 links were highlighted on the 25 factors which corresponds no fundamental new accident causal theories are proposed in the last 30
on average to 3.52 relationships per factor. For each factor, there are year in science, we can understand that accident theories taught in
between 1 and 10 links to other factors. Conversely, each factor has been safety education programs are still largely based on models that go back
mentioned between 0 and 10 times during the interviews. These re­ to the safety contributions of the years 50 to 70. Those models and
lationships between the factors are displayed in Table 2, when safety theories are influenced by « beliefs ». One of those beliefs - a world
professionals talk about a factor on the y-axis, they make links with without suffering is desirable and achievable - is the underlying idea of
factors of the x-axis. Analysis of the connections between the factors the zero-accident vision or vision zero approach for occupational safety
enabled to identify several interesting points. (Zwetsloot et al, 2013; Zwetsloot et al, 2020). Dekker et al (2014) argue
that this way of risk understanding is depending on a Western salvation
5.4.1. Factors that lead to the greatest number of topics narrative, a product of Judeo-Christian thinking. So, we see that those
Academic education is the factor that has caused the most digression two factors can’t go one without the other. This is also highlighted in the
to other factors (9 times: pointing to 2 institutional factors, 5 relational next paragraph, where we describe the dependencies between factors. A
factors and 3 individual factors, these latter represent capabilities in gap matrix to independence (Benzécri, 1973) was calculated. It high­
full). Safety bureaucracy raised 7 factors (5 relational and 2 institutional lights the dependencies between two factors (Table 3). Three pairs of
which are safety culture and legal regulation). very strong dependencies are spotlighted (academic education & re­
lationships, business process & safety structure, risk understanding &
safety beliefs). Five pairs of strong dependencies are pointed up

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Table 3
Gap matrix to independence.

(financial objectives & safety measurement, safety structure & decision Reflection on those factors is useful for future safety professionals
rights, safety job design & legal regulation, senior management & line (the students). Even for working safety professionals, reflecting on the
managers, whistle blowing & line managers). Ten pairs of robust de­ role-shaping factors give them a vision about themselves, about their
pendencies are also shown up (legal regulation & safety system, aca­ colleagues and a clear understanding of their place in an organization.
demic education & financial objectives, professional accreditation & risk This enables them to be more aware of their position (and power) in
understanding, line managers & safety system, senior management & their professional organization and eventually, being more proactive.
front-line workers, decision rights & business process, interpersonal The students argued that these detailed professional practice discussions
skills & knowledge worker skills, organizational context & Relationship, about safety in a broad sense with their industrial tutor with the help of
constructive enquiry & organizational context, knowledge worker skills several open questions were very rewarding for both parties. It enabled
& academic education). the student also to form a deeper personal connection with their in­
dustrial tutor. This could be an effective pedagogic process that would
6. Conclusion and perspectives be advantageous to develop further in the future. It is an element that
could enhance the processes of professional socialization of future safety
The work presented in this paper is based on the 2017 Safety Science professionals (Foussard et al., 2021) and needs further research.
Paper of David Provan and Sidney Dekker: « Bureaucracy, influence and Future research could also investigate the feasibility of indicators for
beliefs: A literature review of the factors shaping the role of a safety profes­ the (newly promoted) safety professional which enable them to analyze
sional ». The results presented are obtained from interviews with safety and understand their role and status in a particular organization. This
professionals and they give a complementary view on the 25 theoretical knowledge could be of importance to the safety professional to help
factors identified in the source paper. them accomplish their professional missions to the best in their orga­
The main contribution of this paper consists in delivering results nization. Indeed, the analysis of the safety professional’s role-shaping
from a research setup (the interviews) that investigates empirically the factors is an alternative way to tackle the problem of defining,
25 factors influencing the role of safety professionals. This is achieved analyzing, and evaluating safety culture (Schulman, 2020) in an
through getting safety students themselves engage with Provan’s work organization.
and do interviews with practicing safety professionals using Provan’s
categories as inspiration for interview questions and discussion topics. CRediT authorship contribution statement
The blending of Provan’s categories of factors with a role theory was
used as a general analysis frame. The results are of interest to share in Wim Van Wassenhove: . Christian Foussard: Writing – review &
the research community and are the object of this article. This work editing, Writing – original draft, Methodology, Investigation, Formal
presents several findings: analysis, Conceptualization. Sidney W.A. Dekker: Writing – review &
editing, Methodology. David J. Provan: Writing – review & editing,
(1) We can identify in literature several factors that influence and Methodology, Conceptualization.
shape the role of the safety professional. These factors can be asso­
ciated to a theoretical model of factors involved in the taking of Declaration of Competing Interest
organizational roles by the safety professionals.
(2) We can also identify those 25 factors in real professional contexts: The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
these factors are pertinent and relevant for safety professionals. interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
(3) The 25 factors are not independent. Some of them are reciprocal the work reported in this paper.
related and some of them have dependencies. Those relationships
can give light on how roles are socially constructed and need to be
investigated furthermore.

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W. Van Wassenhove et al. Safety Science 154 (2022) 105835

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