ASSESSING THE COST PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PRIVATIZED PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA
7
A STUDY OF OANDO (UNIPETROL) PLC IN ENUGU STATE
TABLE 0F CONTENT
Title page 1
Approval page 2
Certification 3
Dedication 5
Acknowledgement 6
Table of content 7
Abstract 11
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 Introduction 12
1.1 Background of the Study 12
1.2 Statement of problem 16
1.3 Research questions 17
1.4 Objective of the study 18
1.5 Statement of hypothesis 18
8
1.6 Significance of the study 19
1.7 Scope of the study 20
1.8 Limitation of the study 20
1.9 Definition of key terms 21
CHAPTER TWO
2.0 Introduction 24
2.1 Literature review 24
2.2 The nature and concept of public enterprises 24
2.3 Performance of public enterprises in Nigeria 28
2.4 Problems of public enterprises in Nigeria 35
2.5 Public enterprises privatization in Nigeria 41
2.6 Concept of privatization 52
2.7 Types of privatization 55
REFERENCES 57
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 Introduction 59
3.1 Research Questions 59
3.2 Source of Data 60
9
3.2.1 Primary source of data 60
3.2.2 Secondary source of data 60
3.3 Area of Study 61
3.4 Population of the study 61
3.4.1 Sampling design and technique 61
3.5 Instrument of data collection 63
3.6 Reliability of the test Instrument 63
3.7 Validity of the research instrument 63
3.8 Method of data Analysis 64
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 Analysis of data and testing of hypothesis 66
4.1 Data presentation and analysis 66
4.2 Test of hypothesis 73
4.3 Tabulating the result 84
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CHAPTER FIVE
5.0 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation 86
5.1 Summary 86
5.2 Conclusion 87
5.3 Recommendation 88
BIBLIOGRAPHY 90
APPENDIX I 93
APPENDIX II 94
11
Abstract
Despite an impressive level of privatization activity across Africa and the
upsurge in search of the operating performance of privatized firms in both
develop and developing economies, our empirical knowledge of the
privatization program in Africa is limited. The purpose of this study is to
appraise the post privatization cost and operating performance as well as
accountability of some privatized public enterprises in Nigeria. A survey
research design was adopted for the study, sixty five internal audit and
thirty five accounting. Totally one hundred was randomly sampled and
stratified among the staff of Oando plc Enugu state. Three research
questions and hypothesis tested at 0.05 percent level of significance guided
the study. Frequencies, percentages, mean and standard deviation were
employed to answer the research questions while Z-test statistics were
used to test the hypothesis. It was found that privatization of unipetrol has
led to efficient and improved cost performance, and proper accountability
to share holders. We conclude and recommend among others that effective
cost performance and proper accountability to share holders is very
necessary in privatized public enterprises and that government should prive
the entire necessary enabling environment for the privatized company to
carry out their activities without unnecessarily increasing their cost.
12
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
Privatization of state-owned enterprises has become an important
phenomenon in both developed and developing countries. Over the last
decade, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been privatized at an
increasing rate, particularly in developing countries (DCs). Privatization has
become an important phenomenon in both developed and developing
countries. Over the past decade, privatization attempts have been
occurring at an increasing rate, especially in developing countries. The
compound annual average growth rate was around 10% between 1990 and
2000, with global privatization revenues jumping from $25 billion in 1990 to
$200 billion in 2000. The number of countries that have implemented
privatization policies has exceeded 110, not to mention that privatization
has touched almost every aspect of economic activity (Shadeh, 2002).
Privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has become a key
component of the structural reform process and globalization strategy in
13
many economies. Several developing and transition economies have
embarked on extensive privatization programmes in the last one and a half
decades or so, as a means of fostering economic growth, attaining
macroeconomic stability, and reducing public sector borrowing
requirements arising from corruption, subsidies and subventions to
unprofitable SOEs. By the end of 1996, all but five countries in Africa had
divested some public enterprises within the framework of macroeconomic
reform and liberalization (White and Bhatia, 1998). In line with the trend
worldwide, the spate of empirical works on privatization has also increased,
albeit with a microeconomic orientation that emphasizes efficiency gains
(La Porta and López-de-Silanes, (1997); Boubakri and Cosset, (2001);
Dewenter and Malatesta, (2001) D'Souza and Megginson, (2007). Yet,
despite the upsurge in research, our empirical knowledge of the
privatization programme in Africa is limited. Aside from theoretical
predictions, not much is known about the process and outcome of
privatization exercises in Africa in spite of the impressive level of activism in
its implementation.
14
Current research is yet to provide useful insights into the peculiar
circumstances of Africa, such as the presence of embryonic financial
markets and weak regulatory institution efforts. Most objective observers
agree, however, that the high expectations of the 1980s about the "magical
power" of privatization bailing Africa out of its quagmire remain unrealized
(Adam et al., (1992); World Bank,(1995); Ariyo and Jerome, (1999); Jerome,
(2005).
As in most developing countries, Nigeria until recently witnessed the
growing involvement of the state in economic activities. The expansion of
SOEs into diverse economic activities was viewed as an important strategy
for fostering rapid economic growth and development. This view was
reinforced by massive foreign exchange earnings from crude oil, which
fuelled unbridled Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) investment in public
enterprises. Unfortunately, most of the enterprises were poorly conceived
and economically inefficient. They accumulated huge financial losses and
absorbed a disproportionate share of domestic credit. By l985, they had
become an unsustainable burden on the budget. With the adoption of the
structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1986, privatization of public
15
enterprises came to the forefront as a major component of Nigeria's
economic reform process at the behest of the World Bank and other
international organizations.
Consequently, a Technical Committee on Privatization and
Commercialization (TCPC) was set up in 1988 to oversee the programme. In
the course of its operations, the TCPC privatized 55 enterprises. Sufficient
time has elapsed since the start of reforms to allow an initial assessment of
the extent to which privatization has realized its intended economic and
financial benefits, especially with the commencement of the second phase
of the programme. This is particularly important in view of the lessons of
experience revealing interesting features that may alter earlier notions as
to the most appropriate way to implement privatization programmes
(Nellis, 1999). Concerns about globalization, in some transition economies
(notably the former Soviet Union and Czech Republic) and disappointment
with infrastructure privatization in developing countries are spawning new
critiques of privatization (Shirley and Walsh, 2000). Among the pertinent
issues to be addressed are: What is the extent and pattern of cost
performance and accountability of privatized firm? What have been the
16
results of these performance? Has privatization improved the cost and
accountability of firm? Finally, what policy lessons are to be learned from
the privatization experience so far? These are the issues that come into
focus in the study.
1.2 Statement of Problem
The issue of cost performance and accountability of privatized public
enterprise have been a serious subject of the debate and different interest
group that is the “stakeholders”. The post privatization effect this
enterprise have been the subject of public scrutiny and criticism by the
public and others alike. Majority are of the view that their performance is
not different from the way it was when they were under public enterprise.
In response to this in recent national assembly committee, that was set
up to look into this enterprise partially supported public concern on their
performance. It is against these background that this research is carried
out to determine or find out if these view are true as the research is
intended to look at this research is intended to look at this privatized firms
cost performance and accountability.
17
Public enterprise before their recent privatization where perceived to be
bedeviled by numerous challenges ranging from political interference,
inefficiency in the management of resources, conflict of objectives,
overdependence on subvention for survival etc. these over the years have
been the main source of criticism of public enterprises and the reason why
they are poorly managed . is this issue the same after the privatization o
these enterprises? This study is intended to establish it.
1.3 Research question:
Based on the problem statement and the objective of the study
stated above the study will answer the following questions;
i) Has privatization improved the cost performance and
accountability of this firm as anticipated?
ii) To what extent are privatized firms accountable to shareholders
and other relevant stake holders?
iii) To what level has there been effective checks and balances in
privatized enterprises in Nigeria.
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1.4 Objectives of the Study.
The overriding objective of this study is to evaluate the second wave of
the Nigerian privatization programme spanning 2008-2012. The specific
objectives are as follows:
(i) To examine whether privatization has improved the cost
performance and accountability of privatized firm.
(ii) To assess the extent to which privatized firms are accountable to
shareholders and other relevant stakeholders.
(iii) To determine if there are effective checks and balances in
privatized enterprises in Nigeria.
1.5 Statement of Hypothesis
Ho: Privatization has not led to efficient and improved cost
Performance.
Hi: Privatization has led to efficient and improved cost
Performance.
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Ho: There have been no effective accountability to share holders and other
relevant stake holders.
HI: There have been effective accountability to shareholders and other
relevant stakeholders.
Ho: privatization has not led to effective checks and balances in privatized
enterprises in Nigeria.
Hi: privatization has led to effective checks and balances in privatized
enterprises in Nigeria.
1.6 Significance of the study
Giving the substantial number of enterprises that are yet to be
privatized, the study would provide insights into the desirability, feasibility
and sustainability of future reforms. It is envisaged that the policy
recommendations from the study would assist the National Council on
Privatization in correcting the pitfalls embedded in the previous endeavor.
20
The study will assist students and fellow researchers generate
information on cost performance and accountability of firm particularly if it
is relevant to their studies.
In the overall, it is envisaged that the outcome of the study will assist
international, multilateral and donor agencies to identify the felt needs,
thereby facilitating the design of demand-driven policies and programmes
to ensure the success of privatization in Nigeria in particular and sub-
Saharan Africa in general.
1.7 Scope of the study
The scope of the study has been narrowed in order to look at the impact of
cost performance and accountability in the petroleum industry, particularly
in UNIPETROL (now called OANDO plc after privatization). The study will
cover a period of five(5) years ranging from (2008-2012).
1.8 Limitation of study
Like many other research study, this research is confronted with the
following limitations:
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1. Finance - The cost of running any research project is quite expensive. It
ranges from producing questionnaires to be distributed to respondents, the
cost of transporting to the areas where information concerning the project
is to be obtained etc, and this research is not an exception.
2. Time- The time required to complete a research project is often limited
judging from the information required to complete a comprehensive
research work. This research is also affected by time.
3. Problem of confidentiality- The challenge of getting respondents to fill
the necessary research questionnaires is tasking despite the confidence
giving to keep all information obtained from them in utmost confidence.
1.9 Definition of key Terms.
A. Accountability: It is rendering stewardship. It is also the act of being
able to
Shoulder responsibilities and carry the correlative burden of
performance.
In other words it means answerability, blameworthiness, liability and
the
22
Expectation of account-giving.
B. Asset sale: is the transfer of ownership of government assets,
commercial-type enterprises, or functions to the private sector. In
general, the government has no role in the financial support,
management, or oversight of a sold asset. However, if the asset is
sold to a company in an industry with monopolistic characteristics,
the government may regulate certain aspects of the business, such as
utility rates.
C. Competition: occurs when two or more parties independently
attempt to secure the business of a customer by offering the most
favorable terms or highest quality service or product. Competition in
relation to government activities is usually categorized in three ways:
(1) public versus private, in which private-sector to conduct public
business; (2) public versus public, in which public-sector
organizations compete among themselves to conduct public-sector
business; and (3) private versus private, in which private-sector
organizations compete among themselves to conduct public-sector
business.
23
D. Cost: this is the sacrifice rendered for benefit derived. It is seen in
terms of opportunity cost that is the one associated with alternative
forgone.
E. Divestiture: involves the sale of government-owned assets. After
divestiture, the government generally has no role in the financial
support, management, regulation, or oversight of the divested
activity
F. Privatization: privatization implies permanent transfer of control, as
a consequence of transfer of ownership of right, from the public to
the private sector. This definition is perhaps the most common usage
of the term.
G. Public enterprise: any corporation or parastatal established by or any
enactment in which the government of the federation or it agencies
has ownership or equity interest.
H. Public sector: that portion of an economy whose activities (economic
or non economic) are under the control and direction of the state.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Privatization and public sector reform marks what has been termed
as "second generation" adjustment policies, an attempt at distinguishing
them from "'first generation" policies, which focused almost exclusively on
economic stabilization. It could be considered as a program of transition
from a planned economy to a market-based economy and has been
implemented in the developed, less developed and emerging economies.
The degree of implementation for each country could be different,
however, the objectives are very much similar one of which is to improve
the lackluster and unsatisfactory performance of state-owned enterprises.
This chapter aims to review the phenomenon of privatization.
2.2 The Nature and Concept of Public Enterprise
Public enterprises have numerous definitions and there is no single
generally acceptable definition of the concept. Sosna (1983) opined that
there are many reasons why in developed capitalist countries, there is no
single standard definition of public enterprises. Public enterprises were
25
established at different periods, and each epoch naturally brought forth the
types of public enterprises most clearly matching its own conditions.
It is therefore believed that the variation in definition are informed
by the
ideological, values, interests, dispositions and circumstances that brought
public
enterprises into existence. Whatever the controversy and the lack of
uniformity might conjure up, we would however review the viewpoint of
some scholars of public enterprises. For instance, Efange (1987) define
public enterprises or parastatal as institutions or organizations which are
owned by the state or in which the state holds a majority interest, whose
activities are of a business in nature and which provide services or produce
goods and have their own distinct management.
Obadan (2000), Obadan & Ayodele (1998) defined public enterprises
as organizations whose primary functions is the production and sale of
goods and/or services and in which government or other government
controlled agencies have no ownership stake that is sufficient to ensure
26
their control over the enterprises regardless of how actively that control is
exercised.
The basic reason for establishing public enterprises in all economies has
been to propel development. In the opinion of Obadan (2003), the case for
public ownership has often been made on many grounds among which are:
the persistence of monopoly power in many sectors ( meaning that certain
market have the tendency to move towards monopoly power, especially
when technological factors); freedom of government to pursue objectives
relating to social equity which the competitive market would ignore, like
employment and easy access to essential goods and services; capital
formation particularly at early stages to develop Investment in
infrastructure; lack of private incentives to engage in prospective economic
ventures; certain goods that are of high social benefits are usually provided
free or at a price below their cost and the private sector has no incentives
to produce such goods hence the government must be responsible for their
provision; the desire for the government to achieve redistribution by
locating enterprises in certain sectors (areas) especially where private
initiatives are low; and ideological motivation and the desire of some
27
governments to gain national control over strategic sectors or over multi-
national corporations whose interests may not coincide with those of the
African countries or over key sectors for planning purposes.
Other factors that accelerated the growth of Nigeria’s public sector was
the indigenization policy of 1972 as enacted by the (Nigerian Enterprises
Promotion Decree). It was designed to control the commanding heights of
the economy. The policy further provided the much needed legal basis for
extensive government participation in the ownership and control of
significant sectors of the economy. It also reinforced the increasing
dominant of the public sector in the economy.
In spite of the impetus given to public enterprises especially in
Nigeria some criticisms are leveled against them. Their problems are so
enormous that even left the Nigerian public in a state of great
disillusionment. These criticisms vary from lack of profitability and reliance
on large government subsidies. Ogundipe (2002) once argued that between
1975 to 1999, government capital investments in public enterprises totaled
about 43 billion Naira. In addition to equity investments, government gave
subsidies of N11.5 billion to various state enterprises. All these
28
expenditures contributed in no small measure to increased government
expenditures and deficits.
Similarly, public enterprises suffer from gross mismanagement and
consequently resulted to inefficiency in the use productive capital,
corruption and nepotism, which in turn weaken the ability of government
to carry out its functions efficiently (World Bank, 1991). There are
avalanche of literatures that point to the problems of public enterprises
especially in Nigeria. They include, , Sanusi (2001), Obadan (2003), Jerome
(2005). All these scholars have developed growing interest on the
conception and functions of public enterprises and of the need for their
reform
2.3 Performance of public enterprises in Nigeria.
Despite the fact that there are glaring objectives for setting these
enterprise in Nigeria, the court of public opinion do not favor their
performance as most of them are performing at a very minimal level of
efficiency. Despite the huge sums of money pumped into the
establishment, the dreams of the government and members of the public
over these enterprises are yet to be realized. It is the general belief of most
29
Nigerians that SOEs are inefficient. The performance of most public utilities
provides adequate testimony for this inefficiency. Perhaps this informed
Laleye (op cit), who asserted that reports of investigatory panels set up by
government on all the parastatals testified to the fact that inefficiency has
reached scandalous proportions. The huge national investments on the
SOEs justify the general outcry about inefficiency. Unfortunately, this
manifests itself in Nigeria’s moribund educational system, inability to
supply portable water and epileptic supply of electricity, and petroleum
product with its chaotic attendant long queue in Nigerian petrol filling
stations. In the words of Akinkugbe (1996), the hospitals have become
mere consulting clinics with no drugs and dressings. All these inadequacies
make organizational goals to suffer and heap serious problems in the
society.
The efficient performance of most of these public enterprises in
Nigeria business environment are painted beautifully on the pages of
newspapers, television screen, radio jingles and indeed captures attention
on the bill boards along major highways, but in reality their performance
records are subject of embarrassment to the taxpayers. However, in the
30
assessment of the performance of public enterprise, we are likely to be
confronted with one question; How do we assess the performance of public
enterprises in Nigeria? There is usually a problem in trying to assess the
performance of public enterprises. The problem arises from the fact that
unlike private enterprises that are set up with economic objective, public
enterprises may be set up with social consideration. Despite these glaring
difficulties, assessment of public enterprises will be done using some of
these enterprises as microcosm.
A publication of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2005), painted a
picture of indisputable failure of public enterprises in Nigeria. The
publication explained that, at the inception of the 4th republic in 1999, the
federal government owned a total of 590 public enterprises. The
government controlled most of the petroleum, development banking,
telecommunication (fixed line), power and steels sectors of the economy .It
is instructive to note that over one third of the money the country realized
from the sale of oil since 1973 has been expended on public enterprises .It
was estimated that the federal governments investments in public
enterprises stood at over $100 billion (dollars) in 1996. It was also
31
estimated that about 55% of Nigeria external debts with the Paris club of
creditors were due to funds sourced to establish these public enterprises.
However, the return on those investments averaged less than 2 percent per
annum. The publication further explained that the inefficiency of these
public enterprises is more glaring in terms of the quality of service rendered
when measured against the funds they draw directly or indirectly from the
public treasury. It is estimated that about $4 billion (dollars) was saved in
2004 alone in terms of funds which would have been drawn by the already
privatized enterprises, if they were still unprivatized. Since 1999, the
defunct National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) now Power Holding
Company of Nigeria (PHCN) has collected $10.6 billion (dollars) from the
national treasury to improve its services but power supply had continued to
be epileptic. It is conservatively estimated that the nation may have lost
over $800 million (dollars) due to unreliable power supply by the defunct
NEPA but now PHCN.
The Nigeria Telecommunication Limited attracted operating
subsidies of at least #50 billion between 1975 and 1999 to provide
Nigerians with the world most expensive phone network and a paltry
32
400,000 lines, considered to be the lowest telephone density rates in the
world. In sharp contrast, within seven years of the liberalization of the
telecommunication sector, (MTN, GLO, CELTEL (now ZAIN), ETISALAT,
VISAPHONE, etc) have between them over 80million lines to Nigeria phone
network, without drawing a kobo from the public treasury. Instead, they
have contributed over $100 billion (dollars) in license fees, levies and taxes
(FRN, 2005).
Another indisputable picture of absolute failure was the national air
carrier, the defunct Nigeria Airways. As at 1979 when the military
Administration of General Olusegun Obasanjo handed over power to the
civilian Administration of President Shehu Shagari, the Nigeria Airways has
32 Aircraft in its fleet. Twenty years later, in 1999 when Obasanjo`s
administration took office, the sad story was that there was only one flying
aircraft in the Nigeria Airways fleet. In effect, the 2500 staff of these
enterprises was being paid to service only one aircraft (FRN, 2005).
The state of incompetence, inefficiency and absolute lack of
performance of public enterprises in Nigeria was painted more vividly in the
worse situation of the defunct Nigeria National Shipping Line (NNSL).As at
33
1979, the NNSL owned twenty –four vessels, out of this number, and
nineteen were new vessel. By 1999, the entire vessel was all gone except
one. Nothing shows the lack of transparency in the running of the
organization than the case of the MV Trainer (one of the vessel), which was
sold by the Nigerian Unity Line (NUL), the successor of NNSL for $500,000
(dollars), but was bought back by the parastatal after two years for $2.5
million (dollars) without any renovation done and value added to it.
Eventually the corporation had to expend the sum of $1.5 million (dollars)
to refit the vessels. In May/June 1999, the vessel on its first voyage was
arrested in Spain for not being seaworthy. Indeed by 1999, virtually the
only value the National Unity Line has was its natural carrier status with
only one vessel which is functional. In order to pave way for the
privatization of the enterprise, the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) sold
on a competitive price, the NUL`s one remaining vessel, the MV Trainer, in
2003 for $3,475,991.30.The proceed was utilized in settling all local and
foreign debts as well as paying three years arrears of salaries and terminal
benefits to free it from encumbrances. The Federal Government has finally
divested its 100% equity stake in NUL in December 2005 through the sale to
34
a core investor, Sea force Shipping Company Limited, at a total bid price of
$20million (FRN, 2005).
The status of the Nigeria Railway Corporation was summarized thus:
in transfer, subsidies and waivers, which could have been better invested in
the country`s educational health and other social sectors .There are
virtually no public enterprises in Nigeria today that function well before the
era of privatization.
“While they were created;
“The corporation had a monthly pension bill of #250 million and paid
Monthly staff salary of #200 million including #27 million which was
Expended on the Railway Hospital alone, although it generated only
#30 million a month. This no doubt, made the privatization of the
Corporation inevitable so that the funds which were being pumped
to pay for services not rendered could be ploughed into other areas
of the Nations need” (FRN,2005).
Data obtained from various Government Departments revealed that
in 1998, Nigeria Public Enterprises enjoyed about #256 billion in transfers,
35
subsidies and waivers, which could have been better invested in the
country`s educational, health and other social sectors. There are virtually
no public enterprises in Nigeria today that function well before the era of
privatization. While they were created to alleviate the problem of
inadequacy of the investment funds for starting them and shortcomings of
the private sector in order to accelerate the growth of the Nigeria
economy, many of them have stifled entrepreneurial development and
fostered economic stagnation. Public enterprises have served as platforms
for the promotion of selfish political objectives and consequently suffered
from operational interference by civil servants and political appointees.
They have contributed to income redistribution in favor of the rich over the
poor, who generally lacked the connections to obtain the jobs or contracts
and the goods and services of the public enterprises. These are defects or
abuses which the reform was anchored to correct.
2.4 Problem of Public Enterprises in Nigeria
The problems of public enterprises in Nigeria are many and varied.
Different scholars have tried to identify these problems from different
36
perspectives.. But a more encompassing problem of public enterprises in
Nigeria is well articulated by Obikeze and Obi (2003) as follows;
(a) Incompetent Management and Board: It is the duty of management of
every organization to move it towards the realization of organizational
objectives. It is therefore expected that the management would have the
technical or managerial competence which will assist in this regard.
However, in most Nigeria public enterprises, the appointment of the
management team are not base on skills, knowledge and experience .It is
usually base on political patronage or other primordial consideration. The
effect of this is that most often square pegs are place in round holes
resulting in lack of direction, vision and mission of these enterprises. The
appointment of Board of public enterprises is even worse. While the
management may possess limited skills, the Board in most cases does not
possess any requisite skills. In fact, the major qualification for the
appointment of Board of government parastatal are; failed political
aspirants of the ruling party, party barons, party financiers/contractor
barons and election riggers. Apparently lacking in the knowledge of
management principles, the various Board have been unable to give the
37
desired direction to those public enterprises. The end result has been the
gross inefficiency of most public enterprises in
Nigeria.
(b) Government interference: One of the main reasons for the creation of
public enterprises is to free them from the- day-to-day bureaucratic
bottlenecks of the government. However in actual practice, most political
office holders have seen this public enterprises as being directly under
them, consequently they interfere in their affairs. This interference are
exhibited by the minister/commissioners, Legislative committees,
federal/state executive councils, the vice president/deputy governor,
president/governor with his executive fiat. This incessant interference leads
to distortion of policies, bureaucratic redtapism and erodes the limited
autonomy which these public enterprises are supposed to enjoy thereby
resulting in inefficiency which defeats the essence of their creation.
(c) Conflict of objective: Public enterprises are established as business
organizations that provide essential services. The twin objective of
providing essential services as a public utility and making profit as a
business outfit are simply contradictory. This contradiction has been at the
38
root of non performance of public enterprises all over the world and
Nigeria inclusive. In the case of Nigeria, political office holders who will
want these public enterprises to perform well would still want to use them
to generate high political goodwill at the expense of economic rationality.
Telling PHCN to extend electricity to remote areas where people cannot
pay their bills and still expect PHCN to cover cost is not possible, Housing
government officials in government owned hotels for months without
paying the bills and still expecting the hotels to make profit does not seem
feasible, Locating public enterprises with political consideration and making
such considerations pivotal to their operations will definitely not help them
achieve their economic objectives.
(d)Monopoly: Most public enterprises operate as monopolies before the
era of privatization in Nigeria. It is therefore not surprising that they are
face with the same problems which affects monopolies. The main problems
of monopolies arise from the fact that since they do not have competitors,
they are often not in a hurry to either innovate or offer better services
since they are aware that their customers/ clients have no other
alternative. In Nigeria, PHCN has continued to attract high patronage
39
despite its trademark of epileptic services simply because Nigeria has no
alternative. Naturally when you are sure that your customers will always be
there for you despite the way you treat them, there is this natural tendency
to be impervious to their feelings. This has remained a fact that is general
to most public enterprises in Nigeria.
(e)Unstable management board: Closely related to the problem of
incompetent management and board is the issue of unstable management
and board of public enterprises in Nigeria. One of the major political
problems that have bedeviled the nation is the problem of political
instability. Since independence in 1960, the country has been ruled by
seven military rulers and has a high numbers of military coup. As expected,
every new administration, be it military or civilian, usually dissolves all
board of public enterprises. Whenever these boards are dissolved, some
top management staff are usually relief of their appointment and a new set
will be appointed. In most cases, before board and management formulate
and implement their policies mid-way, the government that appointed
them will be swept away. The new government dissolves the board and
appoints a new one which in most cases will discard the policies of the old
40
board and management. This has remained a cyclical process that has
scuttled any meaningful growth or improvement of public enterprises in
Nigeria.
(f)The problem of federal character principle: There is no gainsaying the
fact that for any organization to achieve its objectives it must have people
with proven competence. It was on the realization of the need for
competence in organization that Max Weber (the greatest exponent of
bureaucracy) states that “candidates for positions in organization must be
selected on the basis of technical qualification”. However, in the case of
Nigeria public enterprises, recruitment and selection are based on emotive,
primordial and purely sentimental reasoning. The principle of federal
character has compounded the problem since it has legalized nepotism and
segregation in employment in the form of ethnic balancing. Resulting from
this shoddy recruitment criteria, is gross inefficiency in their operations.
Apparently since nobody can give what he does not have, it is therefore not
surprising that the staff of Nigeria public enterprises have not been able to
deliver over the year
41
2.5 Public Enterprises Privatization in Nigeria
In spite of its diminishing size and importance due to privatization,
Nigeria's public enterprise sector is one of the largest in sub-Saharan Africa
in terms of both scale and scope as reflected in the absolute numbers of
enterprises and the contribution to the gross domestic product. Since the
colonial era, public enterprises have assumed increasingly diverse and
strategic development roles in the Nigerian economy. And this was
accentuated during the oil boom of the 1970s and 1980s, when successive
military regimes, buoyed by economic nationalism and massive oil
windfalls, developed a large public enterprise sector encompassing a broad
spectrum of economic activities. These covered large basic industries
(manufacturing, agriculture, services, public utilities and infrastructure).
They included telecommunications, power, steel, petrochemicals, fertilizer,
vehicle assembly, banks, insurance and hotels (Jerome 2003).
Prior to the privatization wave, there were about 600 public enterprises
(PEs) at the federal level and about 900 smaller PEs at the state and local
levels. Shares of employment, value added and gross fixed capital
formation of public enterprises generally exceeded those of other African
42
countries. The estimated 1,500 enterprises accounted for about 57% of
aggregate fixed capital investment and about 66% of formal sector
employment by 1997 as indicated in Table 1. It is estimated that successive
Nigerian governments invested about 800 billion naira (approximately
US$90 billion equivalent) in the PE sector over two decades, which remains
currently one of the largest in Africa.
Table 1: Share of public enterprises (PEs) in the development indicators of selected
African countries by 1997.
Country Number of PEs
Nigeria 600 50% 57% 66%
Côte d'Ivoire 150 n/a 18% n/a
Ghana 181 n/a 25% 55%
Kenya 175 n/a 21% 9%
Tanzania 420 13% 26% n/a
Burkina Faso 44 5% 20% n/a
Senegal 50 9% 33% n/a
= Formal sector only n/a = Not available
Source: Obadan and Ayodele (2005).
Public enterprise deficits have been a major source of fiscal
problems and a drag on growth (World Bank, 2002). In the wake of the
economic recession that began in 1981 following the collapse of oil prices,
43
the activities of public enterprises attracted more attention and underwent
closer scrutiny, much of it centering on their poor performance and the
burden they impose on government finance. The poor financial returns
from these enterprises, against the background of severe macroeconomic
imbalance and public sector crisis, precipitated the concern of government
towards privatization (Obadan 2001). In fact, by 1984 the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) were increasingly advocating for
privatization as a policy tool in Nigeria (IMF 2007). The privatization
programme was subsequently adopted as part of the structural adjustment
programme embarked on in July 1986 by Ibrahim Babangida, who assumed
power in 1985 in a bloodless military coup. On assuming power, Babangida
made clear his resolve to scrap the moribund economic policies of his
predecessor and resumed negotiations with the IMF.
Cognizant of the hostility surrounding the negotiations, he initiated a
three-month national debate on acceptance of the IMF loan and its
attendant conditionality’s. Then, following widespread support for a
rejection of the loan, Babangida launched an economic reform programme
dubbed "the structural adjustment programme" (SAP) in July 1986 as an
44
alternative to the IMF stabilization programme. The programme in its
entirety met and even in some cases surpassed IMF stipulations. In his 1986
New Year budget speech, Babangida announced a halving of statutory
allocations to all economic and quasi-economic parastatals and the
intention of government to divest its holdings in a number of non-strategic
enterprises. Between 1986 and 1998, the regime impetuously liquidated
agricultural commodity boards and the Nigerian National Supply Company
(NNSC), and divested various units of the Nigerian Livestock Production
Company and a commercial agricultural concern with various assets in the
North.
However, this was not backed by policy or institutional framework for
implementation. The first genuine effort in the implementation of the
programme was the inauguration of study groups to review and classify all
public enterprises in Nigeria under the guidance of the World Bank (World
Bank, 2002). The Babangida regime in July 1988 subsequently promulgated
Decree No. 25 on privatization and commercialization after about two years
of dilly-dallying. The decree gave legal backing to and formally initiated
Nigeria's privatization and commercialization programme, thus marking the
45
first comprehensive approach to divestiture, embodying an institutional
focus and a clearer programme. The decree listed 145 enterprises to be
affected by the exercise. A total of 111 enterprises were slated for full and
partial privatization, while 35 others were to be commercialized. The list
was later amended in order to convert five enterprises from partial
privatization to full commercialization; those five were:
a) Nigerian Industrial Development Bank Limited;
b) Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry Limited;
c) Federal Mortgage Bank Limited;
d) Federal Super Phosphate Fertilizer Company Limited; and
e) National Fertilizer Company of Nigeria.
a. According to the decree the programme is expected to:
I. Restructure and rationalize the public sector in order to lessen the
preponderance of unproductive investments;
II. Reorient the enterprises towards a new horizon of performance
improvement, viability and overall efficiency;
III. Ensure positive returns on investments in commercialized public
enterprises;
46
IV. Check absolute dependence of commercially-oriented parastatals on
the treasury and encourage their patronage of the capital market; and
V. Initiate the process of gradual cessation of public enterprises that can
be best managed by the private sector.
In conformity with the provisions of the decree, an 11-person
Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization (TCPC) was
inaugurated on 27 August 1988 with a broad mandate to coordinate the
rehabilitation of government enterprises and oversee Nigeria's privatization
programme. The actual divestiture commenced in the early months of 1989
with the shares of four firms (Flour Mills of Nigeria, African Petroleum,
National Oil and Chemical Company, and United Nigeria Insurance
Company) being issued in the market. The shares were successfully sold
with each issue reportedly oversubscribed. From 1988 to 1993 when the
privatization process was suspended, 55 firms had been privatized by the
TCPC. In the course of its operation, the TCPC adopted five methods of
privatization:
• Public offer of equity shares for sale
• Private placement of equity shares
47
• Sale of assets: • Management buy-outs:
• Deferred public offer
Five enterprises had earlier been converted from privatization to
commercialization, while for 18 others it was decided that no further action
was required for various reasons ranging from duplication in the provisions
of the decree to non-readiness for the exercise (TCPC, 1993). The 22
enterprises left to be privatized were said to be under active preparation
for the exercise. The predominance of public offer was to ensure wider
share ownership and the desire to extend the frontiers and depth of the
Nigerian capital market. In all, the TCPC sold about 1.5 million shares, 4
resulting in the creation of over 800,000 new shareholders. Market
capitalization of the Nigerian Stock Exchange increased from N8 billion to
over N30 billion by September 1992. The privatization programme yielded
gross revenue of about N3.7 billion from the 55 enterprises privatized by
the TCPC. The original investment in these enterprises according to MOFI
records was N652 million, indicating a capital gain of N3.1 billion or nearly
600%. The government also relinquished about 270 directorship positions
in these companies, reducing the scope for wasteful political patronage.
48
The government promulgated Decree No. 78 of 1993, establishing the
Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE), which replaced the TCPC although the
bureau did not affect the privatization of any enterprise.
Government subsequently opted for a new scheme of contract
management and/or leasing of public enterprises to private concerns in
1995 but the proposal was criticized by foreign creditor institutions as being
a poor substitute for outright privatization. Thus, it was never
implemented. Towards the end of 1998, General Abdusalam Abubakar,
who came to power in June following the death of his predecessor, General
Sani Abacha, reaffirmed his commitment to the privatization programme
and launched the current (second-round) privatization drive that promises
to be one of the biggest in Africa. Resumption of the privatization
programme has been one of the pre-conditions set by the IMF for
renegotiating an interim programme that would pave way for a medium-
term economic strategy agreement for Nigeria (Omoleye, 2008).
In his national broadcast of October 1998, General Abubakar
announced that his government would privatize refineries, petrochemical
and bitumen production, and tourism in addition to the spillovers from the
49
first-round privatization. The legal framework of the second privatization
programme was put in place with the promulgation of the Public
Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Decree No. 28 of 1999.
This decree provides for a reorganized institutional framework that
included the establishment of the Bureau of Public Enterprises as the main
organ for the execution of the privatization and commercialization
programme, full privatization of 25 public enterprises in oil, cement,
banking, agro-allied, motor vehicle assembly and hotel businesses, and
partial privatization of 37 enterprises in sectors ranging from
telecommunications to sugar companies. However, the responsibility for
implementing the programme was left to the incoming civilian
administration.
On assuming office in June 1999, the Obasanjo administration
signaled its strong commitment to privatization of state-owned enterprises
as a critical element of its strategy for economic recovery and accelerated
growth. Under the 1999 Privatization and Commercialization Act, the
federal government established the National Council on Privatization (NCP)
to oversee the privatization programme. The Act made the Bureau of Public
50
Enterprises (BPE) the implementing agency and secretariat of NCP. The NCP
is chaired by the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Its
members include all Cabinet ministers and top government officials with
overall economic policy functions. These include the Minister of Finance,
the Chief Economic Adviser and Minister of Planning, and the Governor of
the Central Bank. The NCP also co-opts the concerned sector minister
responsible for a given PE when decisions are made on the privatization of
that enterprise and on related sector policies. Under the three-phase
privatization programme announced by President Obasanjo in July 1999,
the FGN has set the goal of divesting about 100 PEs through privatization or
commercialization. These include major PEs in the productive sectors, in
services and in infrastructure. They cover the following sectors:
(a) Manufacturing: cement, vehicle assembly, machine tools, pulp and
paper, sugar mills, aluminum smelting, steel, petrochemicals, and oil
refineries;
(b) Services: hotels, oil marketing, and financial institutions and banking;
and
51
(c) Infrastructure: telecommunications, power, ports, railways, air
transport, airport passenger handling and freight forwarding.
Significant progress has been made with implementation of phase
one of the privatization programme, with the sale of government
shareholdings in eight PEs including two cement companies and two banks.
The FGN has made important progress in preparation of the
telecommunications and electric power reform programme. This includes
adoption of a new National Telecommunications Policy, opening the sector
fully to competition in 2001, and a National Electric Power Policy. Some
Nigerians are opposed to the programme, however. As the World Bank
(2001) notes: While the Obasanjo administration is strongly committed to
an accelerated privatization programme, significant stakeholder groups are
resisting the reforms. These include PE [public enterprise] managers and
employees, senior government officials and civil servants, notably in
sectoral ministries, who perceive that their current power and perquisites
will be reduced as the privatization programme is implemented. In the
National Assembly, a range of politicians view privatization as a threat to
national sovereignty, and an unwarranted reduction in the role of the state.
52
The strongest opposition has emerged from labor unions, particularly
in the utilities sector. In part, such opposition is due to adherence to often-
outmoded economic thinking. This situation is further complicated by the
deep-seated ethnic and regional differences in Nigerian society, which can
complicate the sale of public enterprises generally, and in particular of PEs
located in different regions, unless it is fully supported by the local elite and
local population. The situation was heightened by the lack of a credible
privatization process, absence of a popularly acceptable regulatory
framework and total neglect of issues relating to social safety nets among
others.
2.6 Concept of Privatization
Different authors define privatization differently. Some authors
define
Privatization narrowly and some others define privatization broadly.
Burman and Kikeri, (2007) define privatization narrowly to mean the
transfer of a majority of ownership from states to private sectors by the
sale of ongoing concerns or assets following liquidation. To further the
understanding of Privatization, Ogunlalu (1999) in Asaolu and Oladele
53
(2006) conceives Privatization as the transfer of shares ownership or sale of
shares owned by government in public enterprises to the private funds.
Privatization of shares makes the enterprises to become public companies
and this facilities easy transferability of shares (Asaolu and Oladele, 2006).
Hanke (1987) in Jerome (2005) defined privatization as a transfer of assets
and services functions from public to private hands. These authors
emphasize activities ranging from selling state-owned enterprises to
contracting out public services with private contractors. Thus, privatization
is the transfer of ownership fully or partially from governments to private
sectors through various methods such as direct sales, share issues, leasing,
etc. Some other authors look at privatization as a wider phenomenon
comprising of interrelated activities that reduce the government ownership
and control of enterprises and that promote private sector participation in
the management of state-owned enterprises.
Vickers and Wright (1998) in Jerome (2005) view privatization as an
umbrella term for a variety of different policy that are loosely linked which
mean the strengthening of the market at the expense of the state. Hartley
and Parker (2006) define privatization as “the introduction of market forces
54
into an economy in order to make enterprises to work on a more
commercial basis. They mean that privatization includes denationalization
or selling off state-owned assets, deregulation (liberalization) competitive
tendering, as well as the introduction of private ownership and market
arrangements in the ex-socialist states.
In Nigeria privatization, The Privatization and Commercialization Act
of 1988 and the Bureau of Public Enterprises Act of 1993 defined
privatization as the relinquishment of part or all of the equity and other
interests held by the Federal Government or any of its agencies in
enterprises whether wholly or partly owned by the Federal Government. It
could also be referred to the changing status of a business, service or
industry from state, government or public to private ownership or control.
Occasionally, the term privatization is to include the use of private
contractors to provide services previously rendered by the public sector.
Based on these various definitions of privatization discussed above, this
study uses the definition of privatization which is a bit narrow that is Share
issue privatization (SIP, hereafter). In this definition, privatization includes
55
the transfers of a full or partial government ownership to private ownership
through the sale of equity in the capital market.
2.7 Types of Privatization:
The literature is filled with descriptions of the types of privatization.
For now, Hebdon and Gunn (1995) in Jerome (2005) identify the following
four most common types of privatization:
1) Public/Private Partnerships: This occurs when public funds are used to
stimulate private sector investment. An example would be a public
transportation system where the buses are owned and maintained by a
private firm that is paid with government funds for the services it provides.
2) Cessation of Service/Commercialization: This occurs when a government
ceases to provide a public service altogether, leaving it to the private
sector, if they feel they can make a profit doing so, to provide the service at
a fee charged directly to the public as opposed to a government agency.
3) Sale of State Owned Enterprises (SOE): Selling public assets (e.g., golf
courses, convention centers, airports, Conrail in 1987) can produce a
onetime fiscal windfall to a community, at the expense of a future stream
56
of income. Recently as a result of the Department of Defense Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) activities, some former military
installations have been sold to the highest bidder
(4) Contracting Out: contracting out involves the provision of public
services literally from A to Z (i.e. administrative support to zoo keeping)
through contracts with private firms. While the service is provided by for-
profit companies as well as by non-profits (e.g., much social service
contracting), the government remains responsible for service quality and
delivery.
57
REFERENCES
Ariyo, A. and A. Jerome (1999). “Privatization in Africa: An appraisal”.
World development.
Beck, T, R. Cull and A. Jerome. (2005) “Bank privatization and efficiency in
Nigeria Empirical evidence”. Journal of banking and finance.
Chong, Alberto and Florencro Lopez-de Silaanes (2003). “The truth about
privatization in latin America”.
D’Souza J. and W. L. Megginson (1990). “The financial and operating
performance of newly privatized firms during the 1990’s” Journal of
Finance, 54.
Jerome A. (2002). Public Enterprise Reform in Nigeria. Evidence from the
telecommunications industry, AERC Reseaech Paper No. 129, African
Economic Research Consoitium Nairaobi, Kenya. Http:// www.
Aercafrica.org/documents/rp129.pdf.
Jerome A. (2005) “Privatization and regulation in South Africa; An
evaluation” Chapter 6 in Edmund Amann, ed, Regulating
58
Development Evidence from Africa and Latin America. North
thampton, Massarhusttes, and Cheltenham, Uk:Edward Elgar
Publishing Ltd.
La Porta R. and F. Lopez de-Silances (1997) “Benefits of privatization;
Evidence from Mexico” NBER Working Paper No. 6Z15. National
Bureau of Economic Research, Cam Bridge, massachuttes.
Obadan M. I. (2000). Privatization on Public Enterprise in Nigeria; Issues and
Conditions for success in the second round. NCEMA Monography
Series, No 1. National Centre for Economics Management and
Administration (NCEMA), Ibadan, Nigeria.
Shirley M. (1999), “Experience with Privatization: A new Institutional
Economics Perspective”, paper prepared for presentation at the
Biannual Research Workshop, 5 December.
Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization (TCPC), 1993.
Final report. Two the presidency, Abuja.
World Bank; (1991). “Nigeria Privatization Support programme.
59
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0 Introduction
This chapter explained how the research study was carried out by
identifying the appropriate research design employed in the study. It
equally describe the population of the study, research instrument to be
used, sample and sampling procedure, data collection methods, the
method of data analysis, and among other relevant issues.
3.1 Research methodology
The design of the study is the description of various processes to be
undertaken for the successful completion of the work. A survey method
was adopted to obtain data from the respondent. In order to ensure the
accuracy of this method the researcher used questionnaire personally
administered on the respondents.
60
3.2 Source of data collection
The data for this research work was sourced using both primary and
secondary method of data collection.
3.2.1 Primary sources of data.
The primary data or the study unit regarding with information is to
be collected on first hand basis. This data will be gathered from data
supplied by respondents of the questionnaire and interview which serves
the desired information and personal observation.
3.2.2 Secondary source of data
The source gathered for this research includes: journals, textbooks,
magazines, bank statements for the year, seminar papers e.t.c. other
sources are bulletins, authorized gazettes, financial statement for the year
e.t.c. most of the materials were accessed from universities library, state
library, and private sources.
61
3.3 Area of study.
the research work has a wide range of study intended to cover public
enterprise in Nigeria in reference to oando fuel station due to the time lag
and location.it is located at new haven junction enugu-state.
3.4 Population of the study.
Since one the major enterprises in the Nigerian petroleum sector is Oando
plc, the population of the study is the entire organization. However, for the
purpose of this study and the need to establish a realistic population and
sample size, the staff strength of Oando plc used is one hundred and (100)
staff.
3.4.1 Sampling Design and technique
In determining the sample design for the work, a well structured
questionnaire was designed which contained about sixteen (16) questions.
The questionnaire was divided into two sections, A and B. This
questionnaire was developed by the researcher and administered to the
staff of Oando plc.
62
The sample size for the research work was determined using yaro yamani
formular which is as stated
n=
where n= sample size
N=total population size
e=margin of error (5%)
1=constant
n=
n=
n=
= 99.8
= 100
63
3.5 Instrument for data collection.
For the purpose of this study, the researcher used questionnaire as a direct
instrument for data collection. The questionnaire was structured in
multiple choice terms from which the respondents responded to their
choosed options available.
3.6 Reliability of the test instruments
The research instrument administered to the population were reliable
because the respondent were consistent in answering the questions that is
if the result obtained were consistent then the respondent gave the same
answers to many of the research questions.
3.7 Validity of the research instrument
The questionnaire is designed to elicit responds on impact of public
financial statement on shareholders’ investment decision. The measuring
instrument is valid because the researcher succeeded in achieving the
objective which is to test whether the research design is capable of eliciting
the required response from the respondent.
64
3.8 Method of data analysis.
Data related to this research work where analyzed using percentage and
simple statement as referred to the information collected from
respondents through research questionnaire delivered as represented in a
tabular form.
Thus, a parametric statistical testing tool, 2 tests was used to test
hypothesis about the difference between means of the groups. The formula
for the 2 test statistical tool is stated below:
x1 x2
Z
s12 s 22
N1 N2
Where xi and x2 are means of two groups of sample
S1= standard deviation of population 1
S2= standard deviation of population 2
N1= size of sample from population 1
N2=size of sample from population 2
65
A five likert scale was used to award point to each specific question
responded by the respondents. The favorable statement are scored as
follows:
Strongly agreed (SA) – 4
Agreed (A)- 3
Disagreed (D) – 2
Strongly disagreed (SD) – 1
DECISION RULE
Reject the null hypothesis (H0) and uphold alternative hypothesis (H1) if the
2calculated value exceeds the 2- critical otherwise do not reject the null
hypothesis.
66
Chapter Four
4.0 Analysis of data and Testing of Hypothesis.
This chapter deals with the statistical analysis of data collected for
this study and the testing of hypothesis.
4.1 Data Presentation and Analysis
For the purpose of this research Hundred (100) questionnaires were
distributed to accounting and sales department of Oando Plc in Enugu
state, Nigeria in the proportion of 65 questionnaires to internal auditors
and 35 questionnaires to the accounting department.
For an in-depth analysis of this research work on ten point questionnaire
statement was raised, distributed and responded to by the respondents.
The responses from respondents to the questionnaire were represented in
figures and percentages respectively as this stated in the tables below.
67
QUESTIONNAIRE 1
Emphasis on cost performance by privatized enterprises has helped to
reduce unnecessary waste and improved profitability.
Table 4.1: the responses and percentage of responses from respondents, to
questionnaire one.
RESPONSES PERCENTAGES (%) RESPONSES
RESPONDENTS
SA A D SW NO Total SA A D SW NO Total
INTERNAL
20 15 19 6 5 65 20 15 19 6 5 65
AUDIT
ACCOUNTING 17 7 5 2 4 35 17 7 5 2 4 35
Total 37 22 24 8 9 100 37 22 24 8 9 100
QUESTIONNAIRE 2
To a reasonable extent privatized organization has improve its cost
performances
Table 4.2: The responses and percentages of responses from respondents
to questionnaire two.
RESPONSES PERCENTAGES (%) RESPONSES
RESPONDENTS
SA A D SW NO Total SA A D SW NO Total
INTERNAL
35 15 6 4 5 65 15 10 11 20 9 65
AUDIT
ACCOUNTING 3 10 5 15 2 35 3 10 5 15 2 35
Total 38 25 11 19 7 100 18 20 16 35 11 100
68
QUESTIONNAIRE 3
There have been effective checks and balances in the privatized enterprises
compared to when it was public.
Table 4.3: The responses and percentages of responses from respondents
to questionnaire three.
RESPONSES PERCENTAGES (%) RESPONSES
RESPONDENTS
SA A D SW NO Total SA A D SW NO Total
INTERNAL
30 20 10 3 2 65 25 20 5 5 10 65
AUDIT
ACCOUNTING 10 9 5 6 5 35 10 9 5 6 5 35
Total 40 29 15 9 7 100 35 29 10 11 15 100
QUESTIONNAIRE 4
Due to privatization, there have been serious reduction of fraud in the
enterprises.
Table 4.4: The responses and percentages of response from respondents to
questionnaire four.
RESPONSES PERCENTAGES (%) RESPONSES
RESPONDENTS
SA A D SW NO Total SA A D SW NO Total
INTERNAL
25 10 15 10 15 65 25 10 15 10 5 65
AUDIT
ACCOUNTING 10 10 9 4 2 35 10 10 9 4 2 35
Total 35 20 24 14 7 100 37 20 24 14 7 100
69
QUESTIONNAIRE 5
Privatization has now led to effective accountability of revenue and assets
by the staff of the organization.
Table 4.5: The responses and percentages of responses from respondents
to questionnaire five.
RESPONSES PERCENTAGES (%) RESPONSES
RESPONDENTS
SA A D SW NO Total SA A D SW NO Total
INTERNAL
25 10 15 10 5 65 25 10 15 10 5 65
AUDIT
ACCOUNTING 10 8 10 5 2 35 10 8 10 5 2 35
Total 35 18 25 15 7 100 35 18 25 15 7 100
QUESTIONNAIRE 6
Due to privatization, organizations now pay proper attention to its
shareholders wealth maximization and other stakeholders.
Table 4.6: The responses and percentages of responses from respondents
to questionnaire six.
RESPONSES PERCENTAGES (%) RESPONSES
RESPONDENTS
SA A D SW NO Total SA A D SW NO Total
INTERNAL
30 20 6 4 5 65 18 13 8 17 9 65
AUDIT
ACCOUNTING 11 5 7 6 6 35 11 5 7 6 6 35
Total 29 18 15 23 15 100 29 18 15 23 15 100
70
QUESTIONNAIRE 7:
Privatization public enterprises now carryout corporate social
responsibilities.
Table 4.7: The responses and percentages of responses from respondents
to questionnaires seven 7
RESPONSES PERCENTAGES (%) RESPONSES
RESPONDENTS
SA A D SW NO Total SA A D SW NO Total
INTERNAL
35 15 5 6 4 65 35 15 5 6 4 65
AUDIT
ACCOUNTING 14 5 3 6 7 35 14 5 3 6 7 35
Total 49 20 8 12 11 100 49 20 8 12 11 100
71
QUESTIONNAIRE 8
To a reasonable extent the rank of the cost performance of the
organization has improved.
Table 4.8: The responses and percentages of responses from respondents
to questionnaire eight (8).
RESPONSES PERCENTAGES (%) RESPONSES
RESPONDENTS
SA A D SD NO Total SA A D SW NO Total
INTERNAL
15 25 6 4 5 65 15 25 6 4 5 65
AUDIT
ACCOUNTING 13 9 10 2 1 35 13 9 10 2 1 35
Total 28 34 16 6 6 100 28 34 16 6 6 100
72
QUESTIONNAIRE 9
The general performance of the privatized public enterprises has been
improved compared to whom it was government owned.
Table 4.9: The responses and percentages of responses to questionnaire
nine (9).
RESPONSES PERCENTAGES (%) RESPONSES
RESPONDENTS
SA A D SW NO Total SA A D SW NO Total
INTERNAL
25 15 7 11 7 65 25 15 7 11 7 65
AUDIT
ACCOUNTING 10 5 6 6 8 35 10 5 6 6 8 35
Total 35 20 13 17 15 100 35 20 13 17 14 100
73
QUESTIONNAIRE 10
The general performance of enterprises in terms of cost and accountability
has been highly satisfactory.
Table 4.10: The responses and percentages of responses from respondents
to questionnaire ten.
RESPONSES PERCENTAGES (%) RESPONSES
RESPONDENTS
SA A D SW NO Total SA A D SW NO Total
INTERNAL
23 15 4 21 2 65 23 15 4 21 2 65
AUDIT
ACCOUNTING 11 6 4 9 5 35 11 6 4 9 5 35
Total 34 21 8 30 7 100 34 21 8 30 7 100
4.2 Test of Hypothesis
The hypothesis earlier stated chapter one would be tested in this chapter
for rejection or acceptance the hypothesis is to be tested using the Z test
for uncorrelated data.
x1 x2
Formula Z
s12 s 22
N1 N2
Where
74
Z = test statistics
x1 = mean of sample 1
x 2 = mean of sample 2
S1 = Standard deviation for sample 1
S2 = Standard deviation for sample 2
n1 = Sample size for sample 1
n2 = Sample size for sample 2
Hypothesis One
Privatization has not led to efficient and improved cost performance.
Table 4.15: Mean Computation of internal auditor’s responses to test the
hypothesis.
X f fx
Strongly Agree 4 35 140
Agree 3 15 45
Disagree 2 6 12
Strongly Disagree 1 4 4
No opinion 0 5 0
0 65 201
75
x 201
Mean x1 3 .1
N 65
Table 4.16: Computation of standard deviation of internal auditor’s
responses to test the hypothesis.
X F x x x1 x12 F(x1)2
4 35 4 – 3.1 = 0.9 0.81 28.35
3 15 3 – 3.1 = 0.1 0.01 0.15
2 6 2 – 3.1 = 1.1 1.21 7.26
1 4 1 – 3.1 = 2.1 4.41 17.64
0 5 0 – 3.1 = 3.1 9.61 48.05
101.5
f ( x1 ) 2
Variances S 2
N 1
101.5
S12
65 1
S1 1.585
S1 1.258
76
TABLE 4.17: Mean computations of accountant’s responses to test the
hypothesis
X F Fx
Strongly Agree 4 3 12
Agree 3 10 30
Disagree 2 5 10
Strongly Disagree 1 15 15
No opinion 0 2 0
Total 0 35 67
fx 67
Mean x2 1.91
N 35
TABLE 4.18: Computation of Standard deviation of accountants responses
to test the hypothesis.
X F x x x1 x12 F(x1)2
4 35 4 – 1.91 = 4.3681 13.1043
2.09
3 15 3 – 1.91 = 1.1881 11.881
1.09
2 6 2 – 1.91 = 0.0081 0.0405
0.09
1 4 1 – 1.91 = - 0.8281 12.4215
0.91
0 5 0 – 1.91 = - 3.6481 7.2965
1.91
77
44.7 44.7
S 22
35 1 35 1
S 22 1.3147
S2 1.3147
S1 = 1.146
x1 = 3.1 x 2 = 1.91
S1 = 1.258 S2 = 1.146
N1 = 65 N2 = 35
Computing the Z – Test
x1 x2
Z
s12 s 22
N1 N2
3.1 1.91 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19
Z 4.76
(1.258) 2
(1.146) 2
1.583 1.313 0.024 0.038 0.062 0.25
65 35 65 35
78
DECISION:
Since the Z – Calculated value 4.76 is greater than Z – critical value 1.98 at
an infinite degree of freedom and 0.05 percent level of significance we
reject the null hypothesis (H0) and uphold the privatization has led to
efficient and improved cost performance.
Hypothesis Two
There have been no effective a accountability to shareholders and other
relevant stake holders
Table 4.19: Mean computation of internal auditors’ responses to test the
hypothesis.
X F Fx
Strongly Agree 4 30 120
Agree 3 20 60
Disagree 2 10 20
Strongly Disagree 1 3 3
No opinion 0 2 0
Total 0 65 203
fx 203
Mean x1 3.1
N 65
79
Table 4.19: Computation of standard deviation of internal to audit
responses to test the hypothesis
X F x x x1 x12 F(x1)2
4 18 4 – 2.22 = 3.1684 57.0312
1.78
3 13 3 – 2.22 = 0.6084 7.9092
0.78
2 8 2 – 2.22 = 0.0484 0.3872
0.22
1 17 1 – 2.22 = - 1.4884 25.3028
1.22
0 9 0 – 2.22 = - 4.9284 44.3556
2.22
134.986
f ( x1 ) 2 134 .986 134 .986
Variance S 2
S12 2.109 S1 2.109 1.45
N 1 65 1 64
80
Table 4.21: Mean computation of accountings responses to test the
hypothesis
X F Fx
Strongly Agree 4 11 44
Agree 3 5 15
Disagree 2 7 14
Strongly Disagree 1 6 6
No opinion 0 6 0
Total 35 79
fx 79
Mean x 2 2.25
N 35
Table 4.22: Computation of standard deviation of accountants
X F x x x1 x12 F(x1)2
4 11 4 – 2.22 = 1.5 2.25 24.75
3 5 3 – 2.22 = 0.5 0.25 1.25
2 7 2 – 2.22 = -0.5 0.25 1.75
1 6 1 – 2.22 = -1.5 2.25 13.5
0 6 0 – 2.22 = -2.5 6.25 37.5
77.75
f ( x1 ) 2 77 .75 77 .75
Variance S 2
S12 2.286 S1 2.286 1.512
N 1 35 1 34
x1 = 3.07 x 2 = 2.25 S1 = 1.45 S2 = 1.512
81
N1 = 65 N2 = 35
Table 4.23: Computation of standard deviation of internal auditors’
responses to the hypothesis
X F x x x1 x12 F(x1)2
4 30 4 – 3.1 = 0.9 0.81 24.3
3 20 3 – 3.1 = -0.1 0.01 0.2
2 10 2 – 3.1 = -1.1 1.21 12.1
1 3 1 – 3.1 = -2.1 4.41 13.23
0 2 0 – 3.1 = -3.1 9.61 19.23
69.05
f ( x1 ) 2 69 .05 69 .05
Variance S 2
S12 1.0789 S1 1.0789 1.038
N 1 65 1 64
Table 4.25: Mean computation of accountants’ responses to test the
hypothesis.
X F Fx
Strongly Agree 4 10 40
Agree 3 9 27
Disagree 2 5 10
Strongly Disagree 1 6 6
No opinion 0 5 0
Total 0 65 83
82
fx 83
Mean x 2 2.37
N 35
Table 4.25: Computation of standard deviation of accountants’ responses
to test the hypothesis.
X F x x x1 x12 F(x1)2
4 10 4 – 2.37 = 2.6569 26.569
1.63
3 9 3 – 2.37 = 0.3969 3.5721
0.63
2 5 2 – 2.37 = - 0.1369 0.6845
0.37
1 6 1 – 2.37 = - 1.8769 11.2614
1.37
0 5 0 – 2.37 = - 5.6169 28.0845
2.37
70.1715
70.17 70.17
S 22 2.063
35 1 34
S 22 2.063 1.436
S1 = 1.436
x1 = 3.1 x 2 = 2.37
S1 = 1.038 S2 = 1.436
83
N1 = 65 N2 = 35
Computing the Z – Test.
x1 x2
Z
s12 s 22
N1 N2
3.1 2.37 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73
Z 2.659
(1.038) 2 (1.436) 2 1.0774 2.0620 0.0165 0.0589 0.0754 0.2745
65 35 65 35
Decision:
Since the Z – Calculated value 2.659 is greater than z – critical value 1.98 at
an infinite degree of freedom and 0.05 percent level of significance, we
reject null hypothesis (H0) and uphold alternative hypothesis (H1) which
states that privatization has led to effective checks and balances in
privatized enterprises in Nigeria.
84
4.3 Tabulating the Result
Hypothesis One
Respondents x w N Z- Z– Decision
Calculate Critical
Value
Internal 3.1 1.258 65 4.76 1.96 Reject H0
Audit
Accounting 1.91 1.146 35
Hypothesis Two
Respondents x w N Z- Z– Decision
Calculate Critical
Value
Internal 3.01 1.45 65 2.43 1.96 Reject H0
Audit
Accounting 2.25 1.512 35
85
Hypothesis Table
Respondents x w N Z- Z– Decision
Calculate Critical
Value
Internal 2.1 1.038 65 2.659 1.96 Reject H0
Audit
Accounting 2.37 1.436 35
86
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION.
5.1 Summary
This study assesses cost performance and accountability in the
privatization of public enterprises in Nigeria. The findings of the study are
summarized in itemize forms as follows;
a) It was discovered that privatization of Unipetrol has led into efficient
and improved cost performance. This also in tender on the general
perception that privatization of public enterprises will improve cost
performance and enhance organizational profitability.
b) Empirical evidence has shown that enterprises that relates with her
shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors and even community
where they operate performs significantly. Result of these findings
confirms this as it was discovered that Oando Plc relates very well
with all relevant stakeholders.
87
c) It was also discovered that privatization has led to effective cheek
and balances in privatized enterprises in Nigeria.
5.2 CONCLUSION
The following conclusions were made from the findings of this study;
Privatization of Oando Plc has led to improved cost performances and
effective cheeks and balances.
a) There is availability of proper cheek and balances of shareholders as
to improve better productivity. Management is encouraged to make
decisions based on the information provided by the management
accountant. This is because if management should adhere to the
above statement, they will enhance proper accountability to
shareholders and maximize profits as well.
b) After examined in details the assessment of cost performance and
accountability in privatized public enterprises, one can conclude that
privatization has led to improvement of general performance of the
enterprise.
88
c) Based on the findings, it was concluded that privatization of
Unipetrol has led to efficient and improved cost performance. And
enhanced organizational profitability.
d) Based on the findings, one can also conclude that privatization brings
a strong and effective accountability to shareholders and other
relevant stakeholders.
5.3 RECOMMENDATION
The researcher wish to make the following recommendations;
a) Government should provide the entire necessary enabling
environment for the privatized company to carry out their activities
without unnecessary increasing their cost.
b) The enterprises still need close supervision to enhance compliance to
the regulatory requirement and compel them to satisfy the needs of
their relevant stakeholders when necessary.
c) It is often said that agencies of regulation must themselves be
regulated in order to ensure that the tool of reform does not become
corrupt itself, the bureau of public enterprises should build processes
89
mechanism into its function to adhere to transparent procedure,
open bidding, rules and regulations and international best practices
in the privatization exercise. In this way, the Nigerian public
stakeholders and civil society organization will know who is bidding
for which enterprises, how the selection procedure of bidders are
concluded and at what price.
These recommendations will be at immense value and guide to the
National Council on Privatization (NCP) the bureau of public enterprises
(BPE), and all the stakeholdreers in the Nigerian enterprises in general and
PHCN in particular, on the need to privatize public enterprises to propel the
Nigerian economy to a greater leap forward in.
90
BIBLOGRAPHY
Ariyo, A., & Jerome, A. (1999). Privatization in Africa: An appraisal of World
development. Abuja: Macsons Publishing Ltd.
Beck, T., Cull, R., & Jerome, A. (2005). Bank privatization and efficiency in
Nigeria: Empirical evidence Journal of banking and finance. New York:
smithe publishers.
Boyelco, M., Shelter, A., & Vishing, R., (1996). A theory of privatization.
Economic Journal. Westernberg: Nileason And Co Inc.
Chong, A., & Florencro, L. S. (2003). The truth about privatization in Latin
America.
Http://iicg.com.yale.edu/workings_/papers/privatization_in_la.pdf.
[Viewed on 5th December 2003].
Jerome, A. (1996). Public Enterprises Reform in Nigeria; Expectations,
Illusions and Reality. Economic Reform and Macroeconomic
Management in Nigeria. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
Jerome, A. (2005). Privatization and Regulation in South Africa; an
Evaluation: Regulating Development Evidence from Africa and Latin
America. Massachusetts: Uniedward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
La Porta, R., & Lopez, F. (1997). Benefits of privatization; Evidence from
Mexico. NBER Working Paper No. 6Z15. National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Gazzeberaeu Inc.
Nash, M., & Randenbough, V. (1994). The financial and Operating,
Perofrmance of newly privatizated firms, An International Empirical
Analysis. Journal of Finance. 49 (2). Houston: Databiscal Publishers.
Nellrs, J. (1999). Time to Rethink Privatization in Transition Economics:
International Finance Corporation (ICT) Discussion Paper No. 38. The
World Bank. Washington D. C: world Bank Publishing Press.
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Obadan, M. I. (2000). Privatization on Public Enterprise in Nigeria: Issues
and Conditions for Success in the Second Round. Ibadan, Nigeria: Ups
press Ltd.
Sachs, J., Zinnes C., & Eliat, Y. (2000). The gains from privatization in
Economics: Is a Change of Ownership Enough! (AER II Discussion
Paper No. 63 Harvard Institute for International Development.
Massachusetts: Cambridge Publishers.
Shirley, M. (1999). Experience with Privatization: A new Institutional
Economics Perspective, Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Biannual
Research Workshop, 5 December. Houston: Databiscal Publishers.
Shirley, M. & Walsh, P. (2000). Public verses Private Ownership. The
Current State of the Debate. Policy Research Laboring Paper
No.2420, the World Bank. Washington D. C.: World Bank Publishing Press.
Vickers, J. & Yarrow, G. (1988). Privatization: An Economic Analysis. Cam
Bridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
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92
APPENDIX I
Department of accountancy,
Faculty of management and,
Social sciences,
Caritas University,
Amorji-Nike,Emene.
Enugu State P.M.B 01784
19th June, 2013.
Dear Respondent,
ASSESSING THE COST PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PRIVATIZED PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA.
I wish to solicit for your assistance on the above research topic to
enable me complete my project as partial fulfillment for the award of
degree. I am a student of the department of accountancy caritas university,
Enugu.
The study is purely for academic purpose and whatever information
obtained will be used for the research only and shall be treated with
utmost confidentiality.
Thanks for your anticipated corporation.
Yours sincerely
Abah Ojoma Jennifer
93
APPENDIX II
QUESTIONNAIRE
INSTRUCTION: Please fill in the space provided by ticking (-----) against the
information that is applicable to you.
SECTION A
a) Sex: Male ( ) Female ( )
b) Age: 20 – 30 ( ) 31 – 40 ( ) 41 – 50 ( ) and above
c) Marital status: Married ( ) Single ( ) Divorced ( )
d) Status;
Top level manager
Middle level manager
Lower level manager
e) How long have you served in this work?
1 – 4 years ( )
5 – 9 years ( )
10 – 19 years ( )
f) Educational qualification;
MBA/MSC ( ) BSC/HND ( ) OND/NCE ( )
SECTION B
SA – Strongly agreed
94
A – Agreed
D- Disagreed
SD – Strongly disagreed
NO – No opinion
g) Emphasis on cost performance by the privatized public enterprises
has helped to reduce unnecessary waste and improve profitability
SA ( ) A ( ) D ( ) SD ( ) NO ( )
h) To a reasonable extent, privatized organization has improved its cost
performance
SA ( ) A ( ) D ( ) SD ( ) NO ( )
i) There have been effective checks and balances in privatized
enterprises compared to when it was public.
SA ( ) A ( ) D ( ) SD ( ) NO ( )
j) Due to privatization, there have been serious reduction of fraud in
the enterprises.
SA ( ) A ( ) D ( ) SD ( ) NO ( )
k) Privatization has now led to effective accountability of revenue and
asset by the staff of the organization.
SA ( ) A ( ) D ( ) SD ( ) NO ( )
l) Due to privatization, organization now pays proper attention to its
shareholder wealth maximization and other stakeholders.
SA ( ) A ( ) D ( ) SD ( ) NO ( )
m) Privatized public enterprises now carry out corporate social
responsibilities.
SA ( ) A ( ) D ( ) SD ( ) NO ( )
n) To reasonable extent, the rank of the cost performance of the
organization has improved.
95
SA ( ) A ( ) D ( ) SD ( ) NO ( )
o) The general performance of the privatized public enterprises has
been improved compared to when it was government owned.
SA ( ) A ( ) D ( ) SD ( ) NO ( )
p) The general performance of the firm in terms of cost and
accountability has been highly satisfactory.
SA ( ) A ( ) D ( ) SD ( ) NO ( )