REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2023

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 1891-1900 OF 2019)

Security Printing & Minting Corporation of

India Ltd. & Ors. Etc. … Appellant(s)

Versus

Vijay D. Kasbe & Ors. Etc. …Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

V. RAMSUBRAMANIAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. Challenging a common order passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay, in a batch of writ petitions affirming an

order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, holding that even

those employees working as Supervisors are entitled to Double Over

Time Allowance, the Management of the Security Printing & Minting

Corporation of India1 and others have come up with these appeals.

3.
Signature Not Verified
We have heard Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel
Digitally signed by
POOJA SHARMA
Date: 2023.04.18

appearing for the appellants and Shri R.K. Adsure,

17:54:33 IST
Reason:

1 For short, “Corporation”

1
Shri K. Parameswar and Shri S.S. Deshmukh, learned counsel

appearing for the respondents.

4. The case on hand has a checkered history with fortunes

fluctuating from one side to the other. To the extent necessary, we

shall now trace the history as follows:-

(i) Till the year 2005, the Ministry of Finance, Government of

India had nine production units namely, four India
Government Mints, two Currency Note Presses, two
Security Printing Presses and one Security Paper Mill
under its control. In the year 2006, a wholly owned
Company under the name and style of ‘Security Printing &
Minting Corporation of India Ltd.’ was incorporated on
13.1.2006, for the purpose of taking over the management,
control, maintenance and operations of those nine
production units which were functioning under the
Currency and Coinage Division of the Department of
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of
India. The transfer actually took place with effect from
10.2.2006.
(ii) The transfer of management automatically led to the
transfer of the workforce and along with the assets and
liabilities of the nine production units, the Corporation
also inherited some litigation, including the one on hand.
(iii) Way back in the year 1988, an order dated 21.12.1988
was issued by the Special Officer (Currency & Coinage),
Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance,

2
 Government of India, directing that the shop-floor and the
ministerial staff, falling under the category of non-gazetted
supervisory staff of the Presses and Security Paper Mill
would be compensated for extended hours of work at
certain rates. The order indicated that the category of staff
mentioned therein would be entitled to a special allowance
to be paid in lieu of overtime allowance, at the rate of
Rs.600/- per month for working of 9 hours and at the
rates of Rs.1,000/- per month and Rs.1,400/- per month
for working of 10 hours and 11 hours respectively.
(iv) By a subsequent order issued by the Government of India
on 11.4.2000, it was clarified that the staff whose basic
pay exceeded the ceiling limit of Rs.2,200/- per month in
the pre-revised scales of pay, will not be entitled to any
overtime allowance.
(v) In the year 1988, a group of eight persons working as
Supervisors, Works Engineer, Section Officer, etc., in the
Currency Note Press, Nashik, filed a writ petition on the
file of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ
Petition No.3150 of 1988, claiming overtime allowance. The
writ petition was transferred to Central Administrative
Tribunal in the year 1995. It was tagged along with a few
original applications directly filed before the Tribunal and
by a common order dated 25.7.1997, the Central
Administrative Tribunal dismissed all the applications, on
the ground that it had no jurisdiction to deal with a claim

3
 relating to overtime allowance arising under the Factories
Act, 19482.
(vi) Challenging the said order of the Tribunal dated
25.7.1997, a few writ petitions came to be filed on the file
of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. During the
pendency of the writ petitions, one more group of
supervisory employees (A.K. Biswas and 20 others) filed an
application in O.A. No.26 of 2000 on the file of the Central
Administrative Tribunal claiming the same reliefs. This
application was also dismissed by the Tribunal by an order
dated 19.1.2001 following the order passed on 25.7.1997
in the other cases.
(vii) Therefore, A.K. Biswas and 20 others filed a writ petition
on the file of the High Court. By an order dated 27.1.2005,
the High Court remanded the matter (A.K. Biswas and
others) back to the Tribunal for a fresh consideration.
After remand, the Tribunal allowed the application filed by
A.K. Biswas and others by an order dated 4.4.2005. But
this order was set aside by the High Court in a writ
petition filed by the Union of India, on the ground that an
amendment to Section 70 of the Bombay Shops and
Establishments Act was not considered by the Tribunal.
This order of the High Court remanding the matter back to
the Tribunal for a second time was dated 31.1.2006.
(viii) Following the second order of remand passed by the High
Court on 31.1.2006 in the case filed by A.K. Biswas and
others, the writ petitions already pending and arising out

2 For short, “1948 Act”

4
 of earliest writ petition of the year 1988 were also allowed
and the matter remanded back to the Tribunal for a fresh
consideration.
(ix) Unfortunately, after the remand, the Tribunal first took up
for consideration O.A. No.26 of 2000 filed by A.K. Biswas
and others and dismissed the same by an order dated
15.9.2006.
(x) After nearly four years of disposal of the application filed
by A.K. Biswas and others, the Tribunal took up all other
applications, pending from 1995 onwards (and one of
which related to the writ petition of the year 1988 and
which got transferred to the Tribunal in the year 1995).
By a common order dated 9.6.2010, the Central
Administrative Tribunal held that the applicants therein
were entitled to Double Over Time Allowance in terms of
Section 59(1) of the 1948 Act. After holding so, the
Tribunal confined the relief, only to a period of two years
prior to the filing of the respective original applications,
insofar as arrears were concerned.
(xi) Aggrieved by the dismissal of their application in
O.A. No.26 of 2000 by the Tribunal by an order dated
15.9.2006, A.K. Biswas and others filed a writ petition in
Writ Petition No.2603 of 2007 on the file of the High Court.
(xii) In the meantime, the Corporation had come into existence
and, hence, the Union of India as well as the Corporation,
along with the India Security Press and Currency Note
Press filed a batch of writ petitions challenging the second

5
 order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated
9.6.2010.
(xiii) In other words, the rejection by the Tribunal of the claim of
one set of employees (A.K.Biswas and others) was the
subject matter of one writ petition and the grant of relief by
the Tribunal in favour of the other group of employees was
the subject matter of a separate batch of writ petitions.
(xiv) By a common order dated 28.6.2018, the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay dismissed all the writ petitions filed
by the Union of India and the Corporation. Coming to the
writ petition filed by A.K. Biswas and others, the High
Court found that the employees were similarly placed and
that they were entitled to the same benefits as given to the
other employees. However, the High Court found that some
of the employees had already compromised the matter with
the Management and that therefore the relief should be
confined only to those employees who had not
compromised. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ
petition filed by A.K. Biswas and others, granting relief
only to those employees who had not compromised the
matter with the management.
(xv) It is against the said common order passed by the High
Court on 28.6.2018 that the Corporation has come up with
the above appeals.

5. From the narration of facts provided above, it will be clear that

the only question which falls for our consideration is: as to whether

6
persons employed as Supervisors are entitled or not, to Double Over

Time Allowance in terms of Section 59(1) of the 1948 Act?

6. For coming to the conclusion that the employees are entitled to

Double Over Time Allowance, the Tribunal started with two

presumptions, namely (i) that the India Security Press, Currency

Note Press and India Government Mint would fall within the

definition of the expression “factory” as defined in Section 2(m) of

the 1948 Act; and (ii) that the employees would fall within the

definition of the expression “worker” as defined in Section 2(l) of the

1948 Act. As a sequitur, the Tribunal held that these Supervisors,

will, in the normal course, be entitled to extra wages for overtime in

terms of Section 59(1) of the 1948 Act.

7. But it was argued on behalf of the Union of India that under

Section 64(1) of the 1948 Act, the State Government was entitled to

make Rules exempting the application of the provisions of Chapter

VI of the Act to certain categories of workers. In exercise of the

power conferred by Section 64(1), the State of Maharashtra had

issued a set of Rules known as Maharashtra Factories Rules, 19633,

Rule 100 of which exempted Supervisors from the application of the

provisions of Chapter VI, provided they were not required to perform

3 For short, “1963 Rules”

7
manual labour or clerical work as a regular part of their duties. In

the light of such a stand taken by the Union of India, the Tribunal,

in the batch of applications decided on 9.6.2010, framed the

following question as arising for consideration:-

“Whether in the facts and in the circumstances

of the cases the applicants in these OAs are
entitled to double OTA under Section 59(1) of the
Factories Act, even after considering the
provisions of Section 64(1) of the Factories Act,
1948 read with the provisions of Rule 100 of
Maharashtra Factories Rule, 1963?”

8. After framing the issue as aforesaid, the Tribunal recorded a

finding that the applicants before the Tribunal were doing clerical

work as a part of their regular duties and that therefore they were

excluded from the application of Rule 100 of the 1963 Rules, in view

of the proviso contained therein. In view of the said finding, the

Tribunal held that the applicants before the Tribunal were entitled

to Double Over Time Allowance.

9. In contrast, the very same Tribunal found in its order dated

15.9.2006 in the original application filed by A.K. Biswas and others

that the applicants before the Tribunal were not performing any

manual labour or clerical work as a regular part of their duties and

that therefore by virtue of Rule 100 of the 1963 Rules, they stood

8
excluded from the benefit conferred by Section 59(1) of the 1948

Act.

10. Thus, the Central Administrative Tribunal reached

diametrically opposite findings of fact, in two different sets of cases

filed by employees who were identically placed and discharging

identical duties and responsibilities. The reason why we record this

fact is that in normal circumstances, the High Court exercising

supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226/227 and this Court

exercising jurisdiction under Article 136, will not be inclined to

interfere with the findings of fact recorded by a Tribunal. But in this

case, there are two diametrically opposite set of findings, both of

which cannot co-exist.

11. Keeping the above aspect in mind, let us now proceed to

consider the rival contentions.

12. Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing for the

appellants contended, (i) that a perusal of the list of duties assigned

to the respondents, as reflected by the ACRs clearly show that the

respondents were performing supervisory duties, exercising control

over 50 to 100 workers; (ii) that as per the law laid down by this

Court in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company

9
of India Ltd. vs. The Burma Shell Management Staff

Association & Ors.4, a person whose predominant nature of work

is supervisory, will not be qualified as a workman merely because

he also carries on clerical/mechanical work incidental to his

supervisory work; (iii) that the Tribunal as well as the High Court

failed to appreciate the scope of Rule 100 of the 1963 Rules in the

proper perspective; and (iv) that the Supervisors enjoying higher

scales of pay than workers, cannot claim the benefit of overtime

allowance as extended to workers.

13. In response, it is contended by Shri K. Parameswar, learned

counsel appearing for the respondents, (i) that the decision in

Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company of India

Ltd. (supra) cannot have any application to the case on hand, since

the definition of the expression “workman” under the Industrial

Disputes Act, 19475 is quite different from the definition of the same

expression under the 1948 Act; (ii) that therefore the dominant

nature test propounded in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and

Distribution Company of India Ltd. is not applicable here;

(iii) that the Tribunal and the High Court have found on evidence

that the respondents are performing manual labour or clerical work

4 1970 (3) SCC 378
5 For short, “1947 Act”

10
as a regular part of their duties and, hence, Rule 100 of the 1963

Rules has no application; and (iv) that the findings of fact recorded

by a quasi-judicial tribunal cannot be interfered with lightly.

14. Shri S.S. Deshmukh, learned counsel appearing for some of

the respondents contended, (i) that the proviso to Section 64(1) of

the 1948 Act carves out an exception, in the case of persons

drawing rate of wages not exceeding the limit specified in Section

1(6) of the Payment of Wages Act, 19366, insofar as the claim for

extra wages for overtime work is concerned; (ii) that therefore

Rule 100 of the 1963 Rules has no application to the case of the

respondents in view of the said proviso to Section 64(1); and

(iii) that the Central Administrative Tribunal itself had passed

orders in several applications, in favour of employees identically

placed and working as Supervisors, the details of which are

provided in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit filed by A.K. Biswas

in the above appeals and that therefore the orders of the Tribunal

and the High Court do not call for any interference.

15. We have carefully considered the rival contentions.

6 For short, “1936 Act”

11
16. At the outset, it should be noted that the claim of the

respondents for payment of Double Over Time Allowance arose

entirely during the period from 1988 to 2005. Since the

‘Corporation’ was incorporated only on 13.1.2006 and all the nine

production units coming under the control of the Currency and

Coinage Division of the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of

Finance, Government of India were transferred to the Corporation

only with effect from 10.2.2006, the claim of the respondents

obviously arose at the time when they were Central Government

servants. In other words, their claim should be considered to have

arisen only in relation to “service matters” of persons appointed to

“a service in connection with the affairs of the Union” or in relation to

“holders of civil post.”

17. The definition of the expression “service matters”, is provided

in Section 3(q) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 19857 and it

reads as follows:-

“3. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context

otherwise requires,—

xxx xxx xxx

(q) “service matters”, in relation to a person, means all

matters relating to the conditions of his service in
connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State

7 For short, “1985 Act”

12
 or of any local or other authority within the territory of
India or under the control of the Government of India,
or, as the case may be, of any corporation or society
owned or controlled by the Government, as respects—
(i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and
other retirement benefits;
(ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority,
promotion, reversion, premature retirement and
superannuation;
(iii) leave of any kind;
(iv) disciplinary matters; or
(v) any other matter whatsoever;”

18. It is seen from sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of Section 3 extracted

above that any issue relating to remuneration including allowances,

is a service matter. The respondents herein, at least during the

period from 1988 till the year 2006, were either holders of civil posts

under the Union or appointed to the civil services of the Union.

19. This is why the respondents approached the Central

Administrative Tribunal, for the adjudication of their service matter.

The respondents did not go either before the Labour Court

constituted under the 1947 Act or before the Authorities empowered

under other labour welfare legislations, despite Section 28 of the

1985 Act not excluding the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal or

the Labour Court. Keeping this in mind, let us now address a more

fundamental question.

20. Primarily, the terms and conditions of service of persons in the

civil services of the Union or the State and persons holding civil
13
posts under the Union or the State, are regulated either by the Acts

of the appropriate Legislature passed in terms of Article 309 or by

the Rules framed in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to

Article 309 of the Constitution. Therefore, whenever a dispute

relating to a service matter, which includes a claim for allowances,

is raised before the Administrative Tribunal, the primary duty of the

Tribunal is to see what is provided by the relevant Act issued under

the main part of Article 309 or the Rules issued under the Proviso to

Article 309.

21. It must be kept in mind that appointment either to a civil post

or in the civil services of the Union or the State, is one of a status. It

is not an employment governed strictly by a contract of service or

solely by labour welfare legislations, but by statute or statutory

rules issued under Article 309 or its proviso.

22. In fact, the history of civil service in India is more than a

century old and there were Rules in force, such as the Fundamental

Rules and the Supplementary Rules (FRSR) issued way back in the

year 1922, with effect from 1.1.1922. Article 313 of the Constitution

declares that until other provision is made under the Constitution,

all the laws in force immediately before the commencement of the

Constitution and applicable to any public service or post, shall

14
continue in force. This is why the Fundamental Rules of the year

1922 continue to apply even now, to the holders of civil posts and

those in the civil services of the Union or the State.

23. It must also be borne in mind that there are three different

categories of employment, if not more, in the country. They are,

(i) employment which is statutorily protected under labour welfare

legislations, so as to prevent exploitation and unfair labour

practices; (ii) employment which falls outside the purview of the

labour welfare legislations and hence, governed solely by the terms

of the contract; and (iii) employment of persons to civil posts or in

the civil services of the Union or the State. Any Court or Tribunal

adjudicating a dispute relating to conditions of service of an

employee, should keep in mind the different parameters applicable

to these three different categories of employment.

24. Unlike those employed in factories and industrial

establishments, persons in public service who are holders of civil

posts or in the civil services of the Union or the State are required to

place themselves at the disposal of the Government all the time.

Rule 11 of the Fundamental Rules reads as under:-

“Unless in any case it be otherwise distinctly

provided, the whole time of a Government servant is at

15
 the disposal of the Government which pays him, and
he may be employed in any manner required by proper
authority, without claim for additional remuneration,
whether the services required of him are such as
would ordinarily be remunerated from general
revenues, from a local fund or from the funds of a
Body incorporated or not, which is wholly or
substantially owned or controlled by the Government.”

25. In the light of the above Rule, there was actually no scope for

the respondents to seek payment of Double Over Time Allowance. It

is needless to say that no benefit can be claimed by anyone dehors

the statutory rules. Unfortunately, the Central Administrative

Tribunal completely lost sight of those Rules, and the distinction

between employment in a factory and employment in Government

service, despite the Union of India raising this as a specific issue in

paragraph 12 of the counter filed in O.A. No.428 of 2005 before the

Central Administrative Tribunal.

26. The claim of the respondents before the Tribunal was not

based on any statutory rule but based entirely upon Section 59(1) of

the 1948 Act.

27. Persons who are not holders of civil posts nor in the civil

services of the State but who are governed only by the 1948 Act,

may be made to work for six days in a week with certain limitations

as to weekly hours under Section 51, weekly holidays under Section

52, daily hours under Section 54, etc. Workers covered by Factories

16
Act do not enjoy the benefit of automatic wage revision through

periodic Pay Commissions like those in Government service.

Persons holding civil posts or in the civil services of the State enjoy

certain privileges and hence, the claim made by the respondents

ought to have been tested by the Tribunal and the High Court, in

the proper perspective to see whether it is an attempt to get the best

of both the worlds.

28. Admittedly, the State Government is conferred with the power

under Section 64(1) to make exempting Rules. In exercise of the

power so conferred, the State of Maharashtra has framed Rule 100,

which reads as follows:-

“Rule - 100:
PERSONS DEFINED TO HOLD POSITION OF
SUPERVISION OR EMPLOYED IN A CONFIDENTIAL
POSITION.

(1) In a factory the following persons shall be deemed

to hold position of supervision or management within
the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 64, provided
they are not required to perform manual labour or
clerical work as a regular part of their duties namely:
(i) The Manager, Deputy Manager, Assistant
Manager, Production Manager, Works Manager
and the General Manager;
(ii) Departmental Head, Assistant Departmental
Head, Departmental in-charge or Assistant
Departmental in-charge;
(iii) Chief Engineer, Deputy Chief Engineer and
Assistant Engineer;
(iv) Chief Chemist, Laboratory incharge;
(v) Personnel Manager, Personnel Officer;
(vi) Labour Officer, Assistant Labour Officer;

17
 (vii) Welfare Officer, Additional Welfare Officer or
Assistant Welfare Officer;
(viii) Safety Officer;
(ix) Security Officer;
(x) Foreman, Chargeman, Overseer and
Supervisor;
(xi) Jobber in Textile Factories;
(xii) Head Store Keeper and Assistant Store
Keeper;
(xiii) Boiler Sarang or such Boiler Attendants
who are in-charge of a battery of boilers and are
only required to do supervisory work;
(xiv) Any other person who in the opinion of the
Chief Inspector, holds a position of supervision
or Management and is so declared in writing by
him.”

29. Apparently, the post of Supervisor is included in Rule 100, as

a post exempted from the application of the provisions of Chapter

VI.

30. But the claim of the respondents is that the proviso embedded

in Rule 100(1) makes the exemption inapplicable to those who are

required to perform manual labour or clerical work as a regular part

of their duties.

31. On a question of fact as to whether the respondents are

required to perform manual labour or clerical work as a regular part

of their duties, the Tribunal has reached diametrically opposite

conclusions, one in the case of A.K. Biswas and others and the

other in the case of remaining set of employees.

18
32. The chart of duties indicated in the ACRs does not show that

the respondents are required to perform manual labour or clerical

work as a regular part of their duties.

33. The High Court fell into an error in holding that the

performance of certain functions, such as setting right

malfunctioning of feeder, side-lay, double-sheet detector, photocell,

etc., to ensure uninterrupted running of the machinery, are manual

functions. But we do not think so.

34. In any case, the respondents, who are holders of civil posts or

in the civil services of the State till the year 2006, could not have

claimed the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VI of the 1948 Act,

dehors the service rules.

35. Though the decision in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and

Distribution Company of India Ltd. is heavily relied upon by

Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing for the

appellants, we do not think that the same has any application to the

case on hand. This is for the reason that the definition of

“workman” in Section 2(s) of the 1947 Act specifically excludes

persons employed in a supervisory capacity. But such an exclusion

19
is not there in the definition of the very same word “worker” in

Section 2(l) of the 1948 Act.

36. The distinction can be well understood if these definitions are

presented in a tabular form side by side:-

Definition of “workman” in Definition of “worker” in Section

Section 2(s) of the Industrial 2(l) of the Factories Act, 1948
Disputes Act, 1947

2. Definitions.—In this Act, 2. Interpretation.—In this Act,

unless there is anything unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or repugnant in the subject or
context,— context,—

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

(s) “workman” means any person (l) “worker” means a person

(including an apprentice) employed, directly or by or
employed in any industry to do through any agency (including a
any manual, unskilled, skilled, contractor) with or without the
technical, operational, clerical or knowledge of the principal
supervisory work for hire or employer, whether for
reward, whether the terms of remuneration or not, in any
employment be express or manufacturing process, or in
implied, and for the purposes of cleaning any part of the
any proceeding under this Act in machinery or premises used for a
relation to an industrial dispute, manufacturing process, or in any
includes any such person who other kind of work incidental to,
has been dismissed, discharged or connected with, the
or retrenched in connection with, manufacturing process, or the
or as a consequence of, that subject of the manufacturing
dispute, or whose dismissal, process but does not include any
discharge or retrenchment has member of the armed forces of the
led to that dispute, but does not Union;
include any such person—

(i) who is subject to the Air Force

Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the
Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or
the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957);
or
(ii) who is employed in the police
service or as an officer or other

20
 employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a
managerial or administrative
capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a
supervisory capacity, draws
wages exceeding ten thousand
rupees per mensem or exercises,
either by the nature of the duties
attached to the office or by
reason of the powers vested in
him, functions mainly of a
managerial nature.

37. Sub-clause (iv) of clause (s) of Section 2 of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, is conspicuously absent in the corresponding

provision in the 1948 Act. Therefore, we would not place our

conclusion on the basis of the decision in Burmah Shell Oil

Storage and Distribution Company of India Ltd.

38. Similarly, the argument of Shri S.S. Deshmukh, learned

counsel appearing for the respondents based upon the proviso to

Section 64(1) of the 1948 Act read with Section 1(6) of the 1936 Act,

cannot distract our attention. In any case, Section 1(6) of the 1936

Act as it stood before the Amendment Act 41 of 2005 which came

into effect on 9.11.2005 reads as follows:-

“1. Short title, extent, commencement and

application.—

xxx xxx xxx

21
 (6) Nothing in this Act shall apply to wages payable in
respect of a wage-period which over such wage-period,
average one thousand six hundred rupees a month or
more.”

39. But in the case on hand, the distinction made by the

Government of India in their Office Order dated 21.12.1988 related

to persons drawing a basic pay of more than Rs.2,200/-. Therefore,

the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, were not applicable to

the respondents herein and as a sequitur, the Proviso to Section

64(1) of the 1948 Act cannot be pressed into service.

40. Thus, we find (i) that the Tribunal as well as the High Court

did not consider the distinction between persons in Government

service and those in private service and the effect of the statutory

rules upon the conditions of service of the respondents, including

their liability to work for extra hours; (ii) that the Tribunal reached

diametrically opposite findings of fact in respect of persons holding

similar supervisory posts; and (iii) that therefore, the orders of the

Tribunal and the High Court are unsustainable.

41. In view of the above, all the appeals are allowed and the

impugned order of the High Court is set aside. However, we find

that some of the employees have retired, some have passed away

and in respect of some who have passed away, the appeals have

22
been abated. Therefore, even while allowing the appeals and setting

aside the impugned order of the High Court, we direct the

appellants not to effect any recovery from those to whom payments

have already been made. No order as to costs.

Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of accordingly.

…………………………….. J.
(V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN)

………………………….. J.
(PANKAJ MITHAL)

New Delhi;
April 18, 2023

23