Introduction

The Return of the Khalifate

This brief survey of the fall of the Khalifate is a reading of
history which opens the discourse of return. Khalifate is not
only fundamental to Islam, it is the necessary foundation of
its power. Idealised concepts of what constitute a proper
Khalif were a Shi'a diversion to guarantee, since it could
always be claimed a specific person was not good enough,
that the task was never taken on. Equally, the Arab claim that
it belongs to the Quraish has not got an absolute authority,
while the historicity of Osmani rule is the highest argument.
The Khilafa must return to the Islamic heartland of Anatolia,
most of all because Sultaniyya was suspended there by coup
d'etat. However appropriate it was in its moment that
moment has gone. It created the second interregnum in
Osmani rule, a brief rupture in Islamic rule, less than a
hundred years. It is not the House of Osman that is at issue,

1
but the return of Sultaniyya to the Islamic heartland of
Istanbul, political core of Islam on the earth today. What other
city can boast 1,200 mosques from which the edhan goes out
five times a day.
Time has unmasked the so-called salafi movement. It can now
be seen as that instrument by which European imperialism
imposed interest-debt banking, territorial annexation, and the
occupation of Arabistan by the British employing their
puppet regime, the criminal Bedouins of the Saud tribe. All
the high-flown and exalted discourse of madhhabs and taqlid
versus ijtihad and ahadith, the whole operation in political
terms meant the destruction of the Khalifate and its political
integrity as well as an end to the Islamic belief in Allah's total
power over existence. As Sultan Abdalhamid II acidly
observed: "If Muhammad Abdu is such a champion of Arab
independence why does he not oppose the British presence in
Egypt?"
Muhammad Abdu, student of the dubious Shi'a figure,
Jamalad-din al-Afghani, who was in fact Irani, is considered
the founder of modern 'fundamentalist' theory. He was
appointed Grand Mufti in 1899, by Lord Cromer (of the
Baring's Bank family) in order to legalise banking which the
Azhar had pronounced haram in 1898. Cromer said of him: "I
suspect my friend Abdu was in reality an agnostic." And of his
salafi movement: "They are the natural allies of the European
reformer." In Cairo the Post-Office Savings Bank was

2
established in 1900 and the Agricultural Bank in 1902.
[Modern Egypt: Cromer, Vol. 2, 1908 ]
Every basic law of Islam that was swept aside, opened the
door to kafir rule, poverty and disgrace. The much vaunted
liberty, fraternity and equality were for an occupying force but
not for the Muslims themselves. Once the Law of the
Dhimmis was abolished it was a matter of time before the
Turkish army was to forbid its soldiers to pray in Jama'at.
The police are to be found at the doors of the Sultan Ahmad
Mosque on Jumu'ah, not at the synagogue or the cathedral.
The people of the Book had always been protected, but in the
end it was the Muslims who were forbidden to celebrate dhikr
in the tekkes, the sufic Shaykhs, guardians of wisdom,
silenced, imprisoned and killed. The turning of the Mevlevi
sufis can be presented to the Catholic (Greek) Queen of Spain
as ballet, yet remains forbidden to Muslims as an act of
meditation.
Slavery, too, must be understood in the Islamic perspective.
Slavery is an inescapable and constant part of the human
situation. Islam does not abolish it, nowhere is that decreed.
The fact is that a significant part of Islamic Law (one quarter
of Al-Muwatta) deals with its strict laws. Islamic Law places
the slave in domestic custody, assuring food and clothing, on a
par with the owner. Most importantly, Islam does not
consider slavery a doom. The slave moves to freedom through

3
marriage or financial ability. Essentially, the slave goes from
the base of society to its highest offices. All the governing elite
of the Osmani state had been slaves. From the wife of
Süleyman the Magnificent to the mother of Sultan
Abdalhamid, the powerful political wives of the Sultan had
been slaves.
It cannot be ignored that slavery, being unavoidable, simply
metamorphoses under a different name, and without any
legal protection whatsoever. The alternative is not 'liberty' any
more than the post-dhimmi situation offered 'fraternity'. The
modern slave is, of course, the refugee. The refugee is doomed
to social degradation, concentration camp status, permanent
non-citizen stateless helplessness. Hong Kong Vietnamese,
Ruanda Hutu, Afghan, Tibetan, Palestinian, and the
slaughtered victims of Sabra and Shatila. They are in
institutionalised slavery, watched over and unrescued by the
U.N. Commission on Refugees.
The so-called liberation of women, far from freeing them has
plunged them into a social chaos, unprotected, the victims
now of serial killers (a quite new phenomenon), rapists - with
rape as a growing social reality already commonplace, wife-
beating and the collapse of the institution of marriage, along
with the acceptance of adultery as socially tolerable. School
children are issued with contraceptives. Abortion - which in
Islam has no legislation pertaining to it,

4
but a dislike of it in custom - is an encouraged norm since it
provides the beauty industry with anti-ageing preparations
derived from aborted placentas. Add to this the advertising
force of Hollywood's misogynistic movies endlessly portraying
women as victims of male rage, and the results are clear to
see. All but total social breakdown, and women unable to
wield significant political power as they did in the Osmani-
Umma.
Lastly, the kafir society's social foundations rest on the
institution of usury, called banking, which with its stock
exchanges and worthless paper money has enslaved the
whole world under the control of a tiny oligarchy of criminal
adventurers, the great banker dynasties. Their corporation
capitalist hegemony has all but destroyed the world's ecology,
and devastated its social and population balance. Far from
bringing 'equality' it has, in its name, guaranteed the
oppression of the world's masses. The responsibility to free
mankind from banking capitalism is the task of mankind's
Middle Kingdom, the one Umma of Muslim peoples. Turkey
must take up its Islamic task, as Ghazi Osman did, and unfurl
the wrapped banner that waits for its hero in the Topkapi.
The purpose of this text is to confirm inescapably that our
defeat was at the hands of the usurers, not the soldiers. No
army can stand against the army of Islam - but no usury can
survive Allah's and Rasul's declaration of war on it either. This
is the message of fear and hope.

5
Mahmut II (1808-39) and the Tanzimat (1839-76)
It is only when one reaches back past Kemal and past the
heroic force of Padishah Abdalhamid II to the Tanzimat
period that one is obliged to examine the years of Mahmut II's
reign. It is there that historically, and from an Islamic
viewpoint, can be viewed the irreversible decline and fall, so
often obscured both by European and Republican writers.
In Europe the outrageous claim is that the decline of the
Osmaniyya set in after Süleyman the Magnificent, although
more realistic modern historians admit this is very odd. As the
ground-breaking work, 'The Imperial Harem' pointedly
observes: "Traditionally, the reign of Süleyman has been
regarded as the apogee of Ottoman fortunes, and the period
initiated by his death in 1566 one of precipitous decline from
which the Empire never fully recovered, despite the fact that
it survived until the end of World War One."
The event of the 'Umma-Empire's demise can be viewed from
two illuminated angles:
One: The triumph of what was called modernism or European
values.
Two: The erosion and abolition of the Islamic ethos.
The official version - and one which ironically climaxes with
Kemal and the Republic as a success-story, is held to by the
present so-called centralised 'democracy' of the Turkish state,
and by the European and American powers. That version of

6
history sees a long decline of Sultanic rule falling into decay,
attempting to modernise its institutions and secularise itself,
but in the end
collapsing only to be 'rescued' by the forceful dictatorship of
Kemal, founder of a national state, and destroyer of the
Khalifate. Unfortunately, the evidence does not support this,
unless you claim that the bad was replaced by the better.
Culturally, this is difficult, morally, impossible. On a level of
the 'nation's' wealth, devaluation has reached almost surreal
status. Kemal's face now glowers from humiliating paper
money covered with the zeroes of million lira denominations.
Something very simple, but cleverly hidden, even by or
especially by Marxists, has to be understood. Throughout the
19th century the technical (first industrial, then electronic)
process evolved in Europe. This event, and here lies the
deception, was not a natural process but a driven set of
activities. What was created? The interlinked series of
technological artefacts and modalities which were set in
motion, initiated and accomplished as a result of a parallel set
of procedures, in themselves utterly separate and different
from the technical project. However, the source of this second
set of actions presented itself as that necessary means to
permit the primary (technical) project to be realised. This
secondary procedure was the issuing of documents, letters,
bonds, 'securities', currencies (in paper) which were self-
defining as the capital base, and activation of the technical

7
transformation.
To further obscure the magical linkage of these capital (let us
not say capitalist) manipulations was the veiled nature of
their source. On the public surface, the technical project was
the 'enterprise' of a 'business' man. He in turn was backed by
his country's ruling system, the national state. Thus it
appeared that 'Britain' wanted the Suez Canal. France and
Germany appeared as competitors. In fact behind the
contractor lay the 'backer' or 'financier' of these grandiose
schemes. This meant that in the end a small group of private
families during this period bit by bit took over power, not only
from government but in the end from business. By the end of
the 20th century the cancer of usury-capital was itself
cellularly self-duplicating. Money - of this numerical,
symbolic kind - now made money. Control and manipulation
had superseded production as the basis of ownership and
wealth.
Since it was not possible to have the railroad unless you had
the capital, it had to be acquired. The rules of the game
insisted that to get the capital you had to be 'like' a capitalist
country. That is to say, Islamic modalities (no feudalism, no
usury, social dominance over jew and Christian) had to be
swept aside, and the modalities of oligarchy and enslaved
masses - i.e. Judeo-Christian capitalism - had to be
introduced. This process can be observed in minute detail
inside Turkey and Egypt, the two key peoples of the 'Umma.

8
The 19th century was to see the dismantling of the guilds
(people power) and the removal from authority of the 'ulama
(the intellectuals).
A jihad-project oriented army had to be swept aside to make
way for a finance- project oriented army which would simply
kill to order without either moral aspiration or the right to
booty (ghanam). So, the Janissaries were abolished, and their
sufic tariqah, the Bektashis. Not reformed, not cleansed of
error, but obliterated, their leaders murdered. Europe was
feeling safer already - to move in to the kill.
Nomocracy - the natural law in Islam - which balanced men
and women, soldiers and sufis, judges and governors, taxation
and welfare - was being split asunder to make way for the
'modern' - autocracy calling itself democracy. With the
Janissaries disbanded and killed, Mahmut began to form an
Imperial Guard on the European model. Army Imams were no
longer appointed by the Shaykh al-Islam but by the Director
of the Imperial Library.
By 1830 the powers felt confident to impose full Greek
independence. On July 5th, 1830, after a three year blockage,
the French conquered Algiers, and began to take over the
country. In Istanbul, Mahmut continued to centralise the
state, increase the bureaucracy, and so too the taxes. The
Grand Vezir became officially, Bas Vekil - Prime Minister. In
the bureaucracy he replaced the traditional fee for a job done

9
(Bahsis) with the enslavement of salaries. And so what had
been an honourable transaction, money paid directly for a job
done, became 'added' to salary as a bribe - bakshish had been
born - the bribe.
Mahmut introduced the French, and still more bureaucratic,
system of municipal government. Again central
administration began to erode the guilds as moral exemplars,
the Imâret as social-services organism, and the Millets which
protected minorities against discrimination. He split the
education system, placing the sciences in one and Islamic
studies in another. No one seemed aware that they were all
being secunded to the new deen of stocks, bonds and
numbers finance. No one studied that. Appropriately, in 1815
Mahmut closed down the village- that-ruled-an-Empire and
moved to the hideous bourgeois capitalist palace,
Dolmabahçe. He began to wear hat, frock-coat and trousers,
establishing a complete continuity with his inheritor to come,
Mustafa Kemal, who, hatted and trousered, would one day die
at Dolmabahçe. After his disastrous reign, Abdalmecit I and
Abdalaziz, the next two Sultans, were in fact only cyphers
whose job it was to seal the order of vezirs and parliaments.
During the instability of the Tanzimat (1839-76) the people
saw 39 different terms as Grand Vezier, 33 as Foreign Minister,
the same position ten times returning to the same man. The
bureaucracy were now the ruling class. Although the Sultan
signed, still it was Mustafa Resit Pasa and his political cronies

10
who decreed. The great Imperial Council had become the
Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (Meclis-i Vâlâ-yi
Ahkâm-i Adliye). Over 90% of its orders were signed
unaltered.
By 1839 all that remained of Islamic law in taxation was the
Cizye (Jizya) on non- muslims, and a sheep tax. 1840 and 1842
saw the inevitable next stage of anti- Islamic legislation, the
introduction of the (Kaime-i Mutebere) haram instrument of
paper money.
Leon and Baltazzi, defined by one shy American historian as
"Two famous Galata moneylenders," created the Istanbul Bank
to make loans to the Government! 1856 saw the arrival of the
mysterious (to this day) Osmanli Bankasi, the Ottoman Bank.
When Mustafa Resit Pasa in 1858 contracted for a new foreign
loan, his creditors not only asked for 60% interest, but further
'reforms'. This confirms the relation
between debt-economy and social engineering I have
indicated. And so the Cizye was then and the previous year
abolished. At the instant the Islamic Law of Jizya was
abrogated in the name of equality between the communities,
the jewish banking system began its expropriation of the
Osmani wealth in earnest, and the Christian political system
began its final dismemberment of the Islamic supra- national
Khalifate. The Muslim citizen had in one instant become
inferior on a sliding scale of shame that would at the end of

11
the 20th century spell being NATO-governed, Israel having fly-
over rights of the territory, inflation at over 100%, and a
useless currency. Official authorisation stamps were
'privatised' into the hands of the 'moneylenders' on October
15th, 1852. The practice continues today.
In 1858 the Arazi Kânûnnâmesi (Land Law) swept away the
anti-feudal protection of Islamic law which kept all land free
of land-barons by returning it to the Sultan as guardian, i.e.
owned by nobody, and set up the basis of bourgeois
ownership. By 1867, June 10th, a law was passed allowing
foreigners the right to own land and property inside the
Osmaniyya.
By 1876, an urgently required issue of paper money without
collateral led to the crisis that deposed Murat V. As in the
modern Republic, for nothing changed, the regular ten-year
coup d'etat was always the follow-up to a devaluation crisis.
Thus, in response to fiscal disaster, one of the greatest Islamic
heroes since the time of the Sahaba, stepped into history at
the young age of 34, Padishah Abdalhamid II. Perhaps also, no
one was to be more slandered and lied about than this good
and gifted leader, slandered by the European imperialists and
later by a state that had to justify its existence by his wrongs.
Almost a hundred years were allowed to go by before the
world had to admit - here was a man of tremendous political
and spiritual genius.

12
Before returning to this light in the darkness of the
Osmaniyya's last days, let us examine the other side of the
underneath of technology - dirty money.
The Fall of the Khalifate
The story begins with the family of the court bankers to the
Grand Duke of Württemberg and the agent of Prince
Löwestein-Wertheim, whose head was Schutzjude Moses
Hirsch. Schutzjude means a jew protected by the ruler. The
19th Century saw the final abandonment of inhibitions
against usury, and thus the evolution of usury banking onto its
path towards political power. Moses' son Jacob bought a
feudal title and thus release from the remaining anti-usury
constrictions applied to jews.
In 1835, son Joel created one of the first mortgage banks with
the Rothschilds as majority shareholders. Brother Joseph was
appointed court banker by Ludwig I in Munich, a position
unchallenged even after the setting up of the Bavarian State
Bank. One of Joseph's sons was Maurice de Hirsch, born in
1831. His mother
was from the Frankfurt bankers, Wertheimer. He was
apprenticed to the the banking house of Bischoffsheim and
Goldschmidt. In 1855 Hirsch married Clara daughter of
Bischoffsheim with a Goldschmidt mother. This house gave
life to some of the leading banks of Belgium and France. Thus
Hirsch's father-in-law was financial adviser of Belgium's King

13
Leopold, handled their Liberal Party's funds, and served the
treasury. His son, Max, married the daughter of the Frankfurt
Rothschilds, and ran his own bank, called Goldshmidt-
Rothschild. The bank basically serviced one major account,
that of Maurice de Hirsch.
In 1858 Hirsch took out Belgian nationality. He participated in
several financial schemes with the adventurer, Lagrand-
Dumonceau, who tried to persuade rich Catholics to
'Christianise' their capital in usurious adventures for high
profit. He was to the 19th Century Christians what 'Islamic'
bankers are to the 20th. Pius IX made him a Papal Count. He
was later sentenced in absentia to 15 years penal servitude for
fraud. Hirsch and Langrand-Dumonceau headed a series of
joint- ventures: Association Générale d'Assurances, Banque de
Crédit Foncier et Industriel, and in 1864 the International
Land Credit Company.
Its directors included Lord Robert Cecil, later Marquess of
Salisbury and British Prime Minister, and the Belgian Foreign
Affairs, Justice and Finance Ministers.
By the end of the 1800's the International Land Credit
Company and its dubious parent entity the Crédit Foncier
were in terminal collapse.
Against this financier-criminality back-ground Hirsch began
to move into that world where politics became transformed
into high finance.

14
By 1868 Hirsch, with Bischoffsheim support, had grabbed the
concession for the East Hungarian Railway, in association
with the Anglo-Austrian Bank. As the earlier banking ventures
collapsed in disaster, Hirsch emerged as the author of an
ambitious scheme, to link Vienna with Istanbul, a distance of
over 1,000 miles. In the next 20 years this great endeavour was
to dominate Hirsch's life in a whirl of robbery, deceit and
intrigue.
The Orient Railway was to link Europe and the Islamic
Osmaniyya. For this to be feasible a unified financial system
had to accompany the railroad as its gauge had to be unified
through Austro-Hungary, Serbia and Turkey. Inasmuch as the
Sultan was impervious to bankers' orders, he had to be
defined as corrupt, intransigent, and most importantly,
backward and unmodern for his resistance not only to the
railroad but its financial mechanisms.
In 1861, the Péreire Brothers' organisation, Crédit Mobilier
founded the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Soon the Rothschilds,
Péreire Brothers and the irrepressible Langrand-Dumonceau
were plotting rail routes to Istanbul.
In 1867 Sultan Abdalaziz and Grand Wazir Fuad Pasha visited
Vienna, and on 31st May 1868 they granted a Langrand-
Dumonceau Association the Orient rail concession. He lost it
by default on 12th April 1869. Five days later it had been
snatched up by Hirsch in an agreement with the Minister of

15
Public Works, Da'ud Pasha, which was sealed by Imperial
Fermén on October 7, 1868.
The Serbs urged Vienna to put the railway through Belgrade,
but both the Osmaniyya and Austro-Hungary wanted it to go
through Bosnia.
It was to run from Istanbul to Edirne, Plovdiv, then Sofia, pass
through Serbia to Bosnia and Sarajevo, before joining the
Austrian Südbahn.
The concessionaire responsible for its construction and
operation, was to receive from the Sublime Porte, an annual
subsidy of 14,000 francs (£560) for each complete kilometre
throughout the duration of the concession: an annual rental
of 8,000 francs (£320) per kilometre from the operating
company, a total representing 10% of the estimated cost of
construction per kilometre.
In 1870, Hirsch set up his own operating company. Hirsch co-
opted French banker Paulin Talabot, chairman of Société
Générale de Paris and Count Kinsky, a co-founder of the
Anglo-Austrian Bank.
Due to this vast international project and intrigue, alongside
other such ventures, each interlaced with another, and all
products of interlinked banking entities, soon London, Paris
and Brussels were inundated with Turkish Bonds, traded at
massive discounts. One survival tactic of Hirsch was an issue

16
of lottery bonds at a low-interest rate, 3%, two points below
the usual Ottoman rate, redeemable at par over 99 years.
There was to be a bi-monthly draw, winning tickets earning
around 600,000 francs (£24,000).
Hirsch, now called Baron Türkenhirsch, set up an
underwriting syndicate, led by Société Générale. The Porte in
Istanbul issued Hirsch with 1,980,000 bonds, nominal value
400 francs, credited to him at 128.50 francs, a little over 32% of
par. In March 1870 Hirsch sold to his syndicate the first series
of 750,000 bonds at 155 francs, which were offered to the
public at 180 francs. This happened during what was termed a
surge of international investment, one of the mysterious
booms that so-called market forces produced. Although the
bonds were taken to be debentures, their only security was
the Porte's promise to pay to the construction company an
annual 28 million franc subvention (over £1,500,000) – for 99
years.
In September 1872, the 1,230,000 bonds that remained were
offered at 150 francs to the syndicate and 170 francs to the
public. But the 'Krach' of 1873 hit. The Türkenlose remained
half unsold, tumbling from 183 francs to 115 francs. Hirsch, of
course, emerged richer, the now familiar figure who gains
wealth from the ruin of others. Hirsch as concessionaire had
£14 million in his hands for construction and a profit on the
Türkenlose of £2 million. The continuing intrigues – I do not
suggest conspiracy merely that continuing series of protocols

17
and contracts around the building of the railroad – involved
the Sultan, Grand Wazir Ali Pasha then Grand Wazir Mahmud
Nedim Pasha, and Ralph Anstruther Earle of the East
Hungarian Railway. The technical projects of modernity, far
from being concrete, physical modules, rationally executed,
were simply the
licences for the movement of non-national, non-specie,
abstract numbers encoded in so-called currencies onto paper
documents – called stocks and bonds.
The Turkish Loan of 1855 moved about Europe with no
tangible connection to the Porte, it floated, abstract and
menacing between Sir Edward Hamilton of the British
Treasury, and the Rothschilds who had issued the so-called
'loan'.
Over the 19th century up until the 1873 Depression the Porte
had been encouraged to borrow in order to cover interest
payments and deficit.
By 1875 Mahmut was forced to declare a moratorium on the
Porte's £200 million debt.
The next move was for the Western Powers to declare Turkey
bankrupt and appoint an International Commission to
represent foreign bond-holders. Turkey, cut off from credit
was driven to unjust taxation of the people. The Serbs rose in
revolt. The Great Powers started to dictate terms. Midhat

18
Pasha was recalled leading to the May 1876 abdication of
Abdalaziz, in turn opening up via the unhappy Murad to the
important figure of Abdalhamid.
The death of the Khalif, the banishment of Midhat, the war
with Serbia, the notoriously, unjustly, named 'Bulgarian
Atrocities' which took no account of the criminal rebels'
actions, all had their driving force in the manipulation of
magical loans, bonds and floatations emanating from so-
called National or Imperial Banks, none of which could boast
a capital foundation in real wealth and owned by the named
country. It was inter-national finance, a non-existent capital
'between' nations, owned in large part by a handful of families
who changed their nationality and acquired their titles with
impressive if shameless ease.
Bosnia and Herzegovina were handed over to Austrian
administration under the Osmani flag. The railroad lay
unfinished. Half of Turkey's sea trade was controlled by
Britain.
At this point Hirsch transferred his operation from Paris to
Vienna, and took out Austrian citizenship. By 1881 Hirsch was
still plotting the completion of the Railway. Now he tried to
link the Austrian State Railway to the Banque de Paris et des
Pays Bas which had appeared after a merger with
Bischoffsheim and Goldschmidt. This bank was directed by
Hirsch's brother-in-law Heinrich Bamberger. The final linkages

19
in the railroad were still not complete. Associates of the
Ottoman Bank, not in any way Ottoman remember, were
called in to the chagrin of Hirsch and it was finally completed,
but by then the Ottoman Debt Commission controlled the
Porte's entire wealth.
The price of reducing a seven day journey from Vienna to
Istanbul to a forty hour one was to lead to the inevitable
destruction of the Islamic Khalifate.
The venture over, Hirsch had to disconnect himself from it,
after lengthy litigation he basically got away with it. Hirsch
received the Grand Cordon of the Osmani Order although
Istanbulis insisted that the Sultan loathed Hirsch and wanted
his
head. Hirsch disposed of his controlling stake in the railway to
a group led by the Deutsche Bank, which had been co-
founded by Ludwig Bamberger, whose brother Heinrich,
married to Hirsch's sister, was the head of Parisbas.
The successors planned to take the railway on to Baghdad. It
was all of course for a train of conquest, fuelled by bits of
paper, called currency and bonds.
Weizmann, Israel's first president recalled that in his family
home in Pinsk hung four pictures: Maimonides, Chekhov, the
Wailing Wall and Baron de Hirsch.
While Hirsch was actively destroying the fabric of the

20
Osmaniyya to become a new type of leader and ruler, the
power elite had another key base inside the Khalifate – Egypt.
It must be remembered that the discrete national entity was
the subject of the inter-nationalists' activities. The points of
wealth-taking were many – the instruments the same,
banking: its elite a few inter-married families, without
national loyalty. Another such predator was Ernest Cassel.
Cassel's interests were wide. He was on the board of the
Shanghai and Hong Kong Bank. With Rothschild he was part
of the Maxim Gun Company incorporated in 1844. He became
part of Vickers, the arms manufacturers. Following a loan to
Uruguay he moved to Scandinavia. With Frederick Warburg,
Jacob Schiff's son-in-law he incorporated the Grängesberg
Oxelösund Traffic Company with capital of £995,000. His
main wealth, however, was to come from Egypt. Under the
Khedive Ismail, two thirds of the country's revenues serviced
debt. Young Cassel working for our friends Bischoffsheim and
Goldschmidt loaned the Khedive Ismail £7 million at 7% to
develop the sugar industry. In 1873 Bischoffsheim's syndicate
won a £32 million State loan also at 7%, in one move
absorbing the whole country's remaining unsecured revenues.
The Khedive was forced to sell his share of the Suez Canal to
the British Government for £4 million and also borrow £8
million from the Anglo-Egyptian Bank.
At the same time the Sultan had to default on his debts. The
Khedive also defaulted, wiping out the Anglo-Egyptian Bank's

21
reserves. The French moved in and set up the Caisse de la
Dette Publique, and expropriated half the country's revenues
of £10 million to hand over to French bond-holders. The
Khedive was reduced to borrowing from Alexandrian Greeks
and jews at 30%.
Politically, the Sultan was obliged to depose the Khedive and
replace him with his son, Tawfiq. The Rothschilds then
stepped in with their version of rescue. They issued £8.5
million Domain Mortgage Bonds as a loan at 5%, in London
and Paris. This devastated the common people, who were
ordered to economise. A nationalist, Arabi Pasha, took control
in a coup d'etat. Here we have the primal model of Arabic and
Turkish response to the usurious trap – deposition and coup
d'etat. When the dust settles the endebtors can then lay down
survival economic terms to the new incumbent or in turn
have him swept away. The so-called Democratic Model
followed this, the perfect governmental deceit to control the
masses in slavery. Still, one hundred years later, the uprising,
terrorism and coup are used alongside elections to assure
bankers are paid.
According to the pro-Egyptian Scawen Blunt, Charles Wilson,
the Finance Minister of the Anglo-French condominium,
dismissed by Ismail went to the Paris Rothschilds and warned
them of the coming debt repudiation. They in turn "in despair
for their millions" as Blunt put it, went to Bismarck. He
threatened to intervene. The Sultan dismissed Ismail and

22
Arabi was paid off. But before Arabi could be de-activated he
had started to fortify Alexandria where the British and French
fleets lay anchored. Thus troops under Sir Garnet Wolseley
were sent in and won the victory of Tel-el-Kebir. The follow-up
was to send to Egypt as British Agent and Consul General,
Major Evelyn Baring, son of Lord Revelstoke and member of
the Lithuanian jewish banking house of Baring. It was this
man's primary task to find a way to make the Egyptian 'ulama
rescind the fatwa denouncing banking as a usurious system.
In the end he was to find his man. Muhammad 'Abdu, the
masonic disciple of the Iranian agitator, al-Afghani. Thus so-
called modernist Islam from its inception was a part of the
strategy to licence the feudal banking system of these few
powerful oligarchs. The rescue loan of 1885 was for £9,424,000
issued in London and Paris by the Rothschilds.
By 1892, Baring's reward arrived in the form of a peerage. As
Lord Cromer he went on to dismantle the power of rule over
commerce that was the foundation of Islam, and replace it
with open acceptance of the usury system of high capitalism
that was in turn called modernity in Europe. At Omdurman,
the British smashed the Islamic army of the Mahdi thanks to
Cassel, for it was achieved with 44 Vickers Maxim guns which
killed 10,000 men against 500 British casualties. Egypt paid for
the operation. Cromer then chose Cassel to fund the Aswan
Dam project. He would assume responsibility to the
contractors. The Egyptians would pay on completion, out of

23
the increased revenue from the Dam, estimated at £2 million
a year. Churchill called it the best investment in all history.
Cassel went on to acquire the Daira Sanieh Estates – one fifth
of all Egypt's cultivatable land. For half a million down, the
other half to be paid over ten years Cassel got the Estates
already optioned by a Sephardi, Raphael Suares. Six years
later, the nominal £1 shares of the limited company were
quoted at £108, the disposables making over £13 million. With
the Daira Sanieh deal behind him, Cassel got a decree
authorising him to set up a National Bank of Egypt. With an
initial capital of £1 million, half from Cassel, the Bank was
established. Among the directors six were local jewish
bankers, others, Cassel brought in, among them Carl Meyer,
fresh from Rothschild, and Vincent Caillard, a relative of
D'israeli who had served 14 years as a commissioner on the
Ottoman Public Debt Administration. The government
commissioner to the National Bank chosen by Cassel was
Victor Harari, formerly Director-General of State Accounts at
the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, one of the few jews to be
both a Pasha and a Knight.
Under Cromer – a Baring, remember – the National Bank gave
birth to the Agricultural Bank of Egypt. After 3 years its £5
nominal shares had risen to £800.
Cassel's banking control of Egypt had effectively pushed
France and the Ottoman Bank out of the country. To
compensate for this loss part of the Entente Cordiale was the

24
concession to France of Morocco as a – so-called –
protectorate.
Thus the slow parcelling up and dividing into national
'banking' entities of the Umma of Islam, politically defined by
the West as the Ottoman Empire, was itself achieved by a
Judeo-Christian collaboration involving all the great European
Powers. So it was the British government asked Cassel, as part
of the new Entente Cordiale protocols to arrange a loan to the
Moroccan government. Cassel insisted that he had control of
the funds. And so the National Bank of Morocco came into
being. For this achievement Cassel received the Legion of
Honour, a knighthood, and a land grant of over 100,000
Moroccan acres.
By 1888, Siemens of the Deutsche Bank had got a concession
for Anatolian Railways to build a line from Haidar Pasha on
the Asian shore of Istanbul to Ankara, and from Eskishehr to
Konya. By 1896 Siemens was planning to extend the railway to
Baghdad and Basra. It was to this end that Kaiser Wilhelm
made a state visit to Istanbul and onwards to Jerusalem and
Damascus, in 1898. During this visit Kaiser Wilhelm greeted
the Khalif as ruler of 300 million Muslims. In Damascus he
laid a wreath at the tomb of Salahud-din. In 1899 Abdalhamid
signed the Fermân authorising the Imperial Ottoman
Baghdad Railway. Again the same characters emerge pushing
'national' interests – France, Germany, Britain, but of course it
is always a matter of whether loans and contracts are handled

25
by Rothschild, or by Cassel, or by their 'French' cousins.
1907. The Kaiser Wilhelm insists that the Baghdad Railway
concession is in German hands. A year later the Young Turks
revolt against the Sultan occurs. One of their complaints
being the Porte's guarantees for the railroad while army pay
was seriously in arrears. Yet the true ferment that was to shake
the Khalifate was not this foreground personalistic military
mutiny, but the much more resonant inter-bank warfare
between a small set of inter-married families wanting profits
to arrive into their coffers rather than their cousins.
The Ottoman Bank, or 'France' if you are an old-fashioned
historian and the Deutsche Bank or 'Germany' manoeuvred
for placement to build the railway. The Young Turks were on-
line to receive a 'British' loan, that is a Baring's Bank loan.
Cassel immediately countered with an advance of £1.5 million
on a large loan already contracted with the Ottoman Bank for
the following year. In the same month the formation of the
National Bank of Turkey was announced with an initial
capital of £3 million and a further £2 million if a concession
was granted to found a Land Bank, based on Cassel's
successful Egyptian model.
Among the 'National' Bank's directors were Sir Adam Block,
administrator of the Ottoman Public Debt and President of
the British Board of Commerce, various Young Turk leaders
and Lord Revelstoke, formerly let us recall, a Baring, and a

26
Director of Baring's Bank. It was one of the last acts of
Abdalhamid – he signed the Fermân legalising the National
Bank of Ernest Cassel on April 5, 1908. This set in motion
those revolts and counter-revolts that led to the abdication of
Khalif Abdalhamid in favour of his palace prisoner brother.
Meanwhile a £1 million Istanbul municipal loan saw the
National Bank move into action. The Banque de Salonique
and the English jewish brokers, Keyser, fought for the privilege
of the loan.
At this stage the ferocious greed of the bankers had virtually
assured that civic revival would be impossible for the
Osmaniyya.
By 1911, Deutsche Bank had secured the Baghdad Railway as
their project. The Porte signed in March. Meanwhile Djavid
Bey was cooking the debts of the Porte. He sought a new loan
from the Ottoman (so-called) Bank. The French Foreign
Minister insisted on control of the Ottoman state treasury as
security, and full secession of the Maghrib to France. The
French government had no idea that there was a secret
protocol between the Ottoman and Deutsche Banks assuring
the other a 30% participation in any Turkish project. Djavid
Bey ended with a loan for £6 million to be followed by £5
million in 1911 from Crédit Mobilier. That in turn set the
European powers – that is the banking families – one against
the other.

27
The so-called Committee of Union and Progress had drained
the wealth of the nation and replaced it with the usury-debt
system which fatally crippled the state. 'France' – as we still
stubbornly imagine – had the contract to construct a new
road system. Germany was in control of the army. The British
were renovating the fleet. A British inspector-general ran the
Customs Service. While everyone bickered about the terms of
the Crédit Mobilier loan the Porte announced that the
Deutsche Bank had designed a consortium to carry an £11
million loan, secured against Istanbul's customs revenues. To
counter this Cassel proposed the merging of the Ottoman and
National Banks, but he was too late.
The last machinations of Cassel were in the so-called Turkish
Petroleum Company. In a sea of sharks – Royal Dutch Shell,
Gulbenkian, Deutsche Bank, Anglo-Persian Oil – Cassel
fought to get his piece of Mesopotamian oil. Out-bid, Cassel
pulled out. 1914 saw Cassel abandoning his Turkish
exploitation, aware that no more profits could accrue until
some new disaster struck. When Cassel died he declared: "I
had everything in the world that I did not want, and nothing
that I did." (ALLFREY: Edward the VIIth and His Jewish Court)
His daughter, Edwina, married Lord Mountbatten. Among her
many adulteries was the affair with Nehru which assured
favour to Hindu India over the Muslims in the Partition, and
slavery for Kashmir.
All the key banking institutions and methods that took the

28
vast wealth of the Osmani state were to continue their
rapacious progress right to the end of the 20th century. Only
today in this present phase these same families can be seen
leeching the blood of the European Union, Russia, and
America itself, the bankers' final victim - for banking, like
cancer, in the end destroys the host organism.
Sultan Abdalhamid II
Despite the vicious and shameless slanders on Sultan
Abdalhamid II he has remained someone whose greatness
and nobility have survived the so-called historical record.
Indeed, it is a sign of changed times that the man who was
reviled by the English and the French as well as by a Republic
that for its own
mythologising reasons needed to cast him as the reactionary
and the anti- democrat, should today be acknowledged as
"one of the most eminent of all Ottoman Sultans." [Shaw (&)
Shaw: History of the Ottoman Empire, Vol. 2, p. 282] There can
be no argument about the fact that by his genius he governed
the Osmani 'Umma for 33 years, and despite shrinking
frontiers, impossible usury- debts, and extraordinary political
intrigues, ruled over a remarkable late golden- age which saw
cultural and linguistic revival as well as the powerful and
unique rediscovery by his people of their Islamic
responsibility as the heart-land of the 'Umma.
In the end it is the ultimate political collapse of his and

29
therefore THE Khalifate which reveals to us that the issue was
not political in any sense, nor was it part of a negative
dialectic with wicked reactionary Islamic values going down
before rising enlightened modernity. Clearly the Khalifate fell
not to an enemy sword, and not to a historical depassement
by a higher civilisation. It fell to an unsurpassable,
mathematically unmeetable usury-debt, whose interest-
payments alone prevented achieving release from the capital
sums of original endebtment. Loans to pay interest on debts -
these alone might have failed to destroy this greatest of
human civilisations - but for the inescapable deception: that
the technical project came bonded and liaised to interest-debt
mechanisms and institutions which made two phenomena
seem one.
The inexorable and ugly truth remained to punish the rebel
sons not only of the traitor provinces of the 'Umma but in the
end of the Osmani's rump-republic itself. The debt that
Mahmut II had laid on his people like a curse, had continued
to work its evil magic. No political reform could save them
from interest-debt. The abolition of the Islamic society that
was the Osmani reality gave way simply to feudalism and
bourgeois capitalism. Westernised structuralism, Mahmut II's
hideous achievement did not cease its suffocating hold on the
people, neither nobility of rule, nor political Islamic doctrines,
nor republicanism, nor coup d'etatism could break the spiral
of unpayable debt based on paper money and loan-

30
documents.
For the second time in its vast history the Anatolian heartland
had been tricked by a wooden horse. At Troy, the attractive
technical apparatus had disgorged the conquering Greeks. In
the modern epoch the Trojan Horse of technology disgorged
bankers who conquered the great Ghazi civilisation of
Osman.
When Sultan Abdalhamid dismissed his disastrous parliament
and embarked on personal rule, it was autocracy, something
that could never have been said of the House of Osman in
earlier days. Yet from the fatal abolition of Topkapi, a village
running an Empire, Mahmut II doomed the Sultans to
imperial European feudalism. Dolmabahçe was all too precise
a political metaphor for the transformation. Despite getting
out of Dolmabahçe, Abdalhamid could not, so to speak, get
back to Topkapi, for the social modalities had already been
pulverised over one hundred years. Yildiz was his war-ground,
there he pitched his tents. It was to be a losing battle - against
interest rates. Yildiz in the end had to house the massive
bureaucracy endlessly involved in exterior structural
ministries and taxation manipulation.
The Parliament had led to "delays, inefficiency, frustration,
internal weakness, and further defeats and
disintegration." [Shaw (&) Shaw Vol. 2, p.212 ] The young
Sultan had entered his personal rule full of high hopes and

31
wide ambitions. He was open both to the new intellectuals,
like the Young Ottomans, as well as the respected Ghazi
Osman Pasa, who shared his faith in the Khalifate as the
means of rescue. He strengthened the enormously weakened
Seyhulislam with a special House of Fatwa, Bab-i Valayi Fetva
Heyeti. Abdalhamid tried to reform every aspect of the
society, but it was all doomed to fail, the interest-debts
absorbed 80% of state revenues on his ascension to the
Sultanate. The legend that debt was incurred by Sultanic
extravagance is an indication of the cunning of the bankers.
This was patently false, and even the palaces of the last
Sultans hardly scratched the surface of oceanic expenditure
that the economy encompassed. Gallantly, the Sultan tried to
rationalise the burgeoning debt. His Decree of Muharrem, on
Nov. 23, 1881, reduced the unpaid debt and interest from
21,938.6 million kurus to almost half that, 12,430.5 million
kurus. He achieved this by what may be considered the first
major national debt rescheduling programme in a history now
crowded with them - Mexico, Nigeria, Argentina and so on.
Yet the price was that most sinister of institutions, again the
first of its kind, that by the end of the 20th century was so
streamlined that it worked in almost total secrecy under the
cover of inter-national banking institutions like the I.M.F. and
the World Bank, which in this instance presented itself as the
Public Debt Commission, Düyun-u Umumiye Komisyonu. So
remarkable was the Sultan's planning that he managed to
bring the financial situation into order, but he could not

32
throw off the new occupation forces of banking.
In 1888 the Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankasi) was created to
control all agricultural credits, thus soon to become the
largest bank in the country. The dispossession of natural
wealth being the modus operandi of the banking system, the
farmer's loan is the fastest path to transferred ownership
through bankruptcy.
Under Sultan Abdalhamid there was a tremendous upsurge of
cultural activities. Public libraries were founded, and a myriad
of books, journalism and new scholarship came before the
public. One of the most active faculties of the Ottoman
University, Dal ül-Funun-u Osmani, was the Faculty of
Literature which boosted study and renovation of Osmanlica.
The current claim by historians that it was a scene of cultural
renaissance gives the lie to Kemal's claims that the people
were illiterate and the Arabic script an anachronism. Kemal
simply continued his dedicated task of tearing up the Turkish
people's Islamic heritage by its linguistic roots. Semsettin
Sami's monumental Kamüs-i Turki stands as the permanent
evidence of the vitality and Turkish genius of Osmanlica in
the modern epoch. Once the full collapse of the American
hegemony becomes an established fact - at the moment we
only witness its first stage, anarchy, moral collapse and militia
incidents of incipient civil war - Osmanlica stands ready to
supplant English as the lingua franca of the new Islamic
civilisation which will find Turkey at its centre, Turkic states

33
to its North, the African littoral to its East, Persia and India to
its West and Arabistan to its South. Osmanlica is already the
syncretic ur-language of the area, as English was in its day.
This was certainly a fear in English Masonic circles around
Curzon, and A.L. David's important
Grammar of the Turkish Language [London, 1832 ] gave
serious concern to the sophisticated political thinkers who
opposed Islam.
Lord Curzon declared: "Turkestan, Afghanistan, Persia - to me,
I confess, they are pieces on a chessboard upon which is being
played out a game for the domination of the world." At the
turn of the century a most active and virulent freemasonry
was at work, demonstrably so, and beyond the modern
attempts to psychologise the view that it posed a political
threat. The lodges of Salonika and Anatolia, lay at the heart of
resistance to the Khalifate. They in turn linked directly to the
grand lodges of India. India was connected from 1839 with the
lodges of Basra. The Shaykh of Kuwait, then as now, guardian
of the oil installation, was Grand Master of all Mesopotamian
freemasonry, and closely linked to the criminal rebel family of
Abdalaziz ibn Saud.
In any event, the pioneer work to revitalise Osmanlica, and
indeed to strengthen its Turkic core, of the Academy of
Learning, Encümen-i Danis, which commissioned Ahmet
Ceudet and Mehmet Fuat to write a Turkish grammar, has not

34
been in vain. In 1877 Ahmet Vekif published a new Osmanlica
dictionary. All this upsurge of linguistic activity which
reached its climax with Semsettin Sami's masterwork, stands
today ready to be recovered. The State of Israel - carved from
the Osmani-Umma - came into being politically by the re-
invention of Hebrew, a language that had been historically
and linguistically dead for two thousand years. The political
recovery of the Khalifate will be preceded by a return to and
re-activating of Osmanlica.
The well-documented rise of the Young Turks is nevertheless
always characterised as a vital, nationalistic exercise in
modernisation. There is, however, one strand of the
movement which should be noted from our Islamic
perspective. Dasyat Mahmut Pasa (1853-1903), grandson of
Mahmut II and husband of the Sultan's sister, left the palace
and went into exile. His son, Prince Sabaheddin (1877-1948)
broke in turn from the Young Turks to found the Society of
Personal Initiative and Administrative Decentralisation,
Tesebbüs-ü Sahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti. While he
inevitably wanted to depose the Sultan, he stood for a
significant change in society, one that would have undone the
terrible crime of his great-grandfather. He called for the total
dismantling of the centralised state constructed by the
Tanzimat, and a return to the de-centralised or anonymous
nature of the original Osmani social nexus. The significance of
this position is that it is in itself an admission not only of the

35
adoption of western hierarchical structuralism from the top
down, but also a conscious awareness that the Islamic mode
had been centric - a village (Topkapi) governing an Empire
('Umma) and a family (Sultanic) governing that village. This
permits us to confirm ineluctably, the issue which no-one
seemed able to identify. Not, simply, the acceptance of haram
usury practice, instruments and eventually, institutions
(banks, stock-exchanges, finance ministries) but the deceptive
linkage which implied, "No technology without banker's
licence." For, it was this linkage, this tragically avoidable and
unnecessary linkage, that destroyed the Islamic Osmani
Khalifate.
So it was that the Young Turk regime in the shortest possible
time had surrendered more territory than Sultan Abdalhamid
had been forced to give up since 1882. So, too, later Mustafa
Kemal in his turn despite his National Pact, had to give in
until only the rump of Empire remained. Each ruler, despite
reform after reform, saw further political shrinkage of frontier
and influence. The so- called 'backward' social frame was
utterly smashed. Industry and technology arrived. One thing
continued unabated, indeed, as the years passed, with greater
ferocity, that is, the impoverishing of the people, foreign
ownership, and the devaluation of the paper currency.
In June, 1896, the Zionist leader, Herzl paid a visit to Sultan
Abdalhamid II. In return for Palestine he offered, "To regulate
the entire finances of the Ottoman State." How, it must be

36
asked, was this all but stateless individual without personal
funds, able to make this fabulous offer? How, today, does the
tiny country of Israel, whose population is the same as that of
Togo or the prison population of the U.S.A., control the
world's political agenda? The answer has to be that in a world
of vanishing political state reality another power nexus of
banking was emerging. Rule was no longer determined by
armies and military power alone but by transfer of enormous
capital sums in a numbers-only state, non-existent as specie
in any place. Assembly politics was now local governance and
policing. Power was an instrument of banking hegemony.
After Herzl's visit the Sultan wrote to Phillip de Newlinski, a
friend of the Zionist, "I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it
does not belong to me, but to my people. My people have won
this Khalifate by fighting for it with their blood, and have
fertilised it with their bones. We will again cover it with our
blood before we will allow it to be torn from us... The
Osmaniyya belongs not to me, but to the people... Let the Jews
save their billions. When my Empire is partitioned they may
get Palestine for nothing. But only our corpse will be divided. I
will not agree to vivisection."
In 1908, the first Zionist office was opened in Palestine,
disguised as a bank of the House of Rothschild.
In 1908, Sultan Abdalhamid II was deposed, and effectively,
although it was to totter on until 1924, Osmani rule was
brought down. 1922 saw the separation of Sultaniyya from

37
Khalifate, two years later it was totally abolished. The Second
Interregnum of the Osmani Sultaniyya had begun.
Mustafa Kemal
The persistent question remains forever:- since he was a
Macedonian and not a Turk, why was he so passionately
determined to forge a racially pure Turkish nation? It has to
mean that, far from having a positive haltering nationalism as
motivating factor, he was driven by a purely negative impulse:
to break up the supra-national Islamic 'Umma and abolish the
remnants of non-feudal Islamic law. His Tanzimat
predecessors had introduced bourgeois capitalism, it
remained for him to impose a new bureaucratic class of
rulers. In short, the perfect totalitarian police state, which was
in that time the bankers' dream model-state. It was Paraguay.
It was Mexico. It was Argentina. Modernism means medieval
feudalism plus a fashion industry. Usury capitalism plus a cult
of the new. A further question will not go away. Since
Kemalism is dictatorship and thus inimical to democracy, why
does its symbolism still underpin the modern republic?
Unless, of course, dictatorship has never gone away.
Another serious charge should be that the much vaunted
Erzurum Congress which defined a sovereign nation state's
frontiers - always presented as the act which itself prevented
dismemberment - was itself an act of surrender. It abjectly
submitted to the key allied demands which were for the oil-

38
rich and strategic Arabistan, Egypt and Syria. It did save a
rump of the Turkish-speaking Osmani- Umma, but it also
surrendered the vast Arabic territories of Islam to its deadly
enemy, England. Also, the view of the Osmani-Umma held by
Kemal was identical to that held by Balfour, Curzon, et al. Had
the Kemalist faction been loyal to their own oath of
allegiance, they could have added military power to the
Sultan's insistence on a unified Islamic entity. The truth was
that Turkey was strong in 1918, while the Allies were utterly
exhausted and bankrupted by the slaughter on the Western
Front. Churchill's praise of Kemal, in 'The World Crisis', far
from being a tribute, is, rather, a sinister seal of approval.
Halide Edib supported an American mandate. The King-
Crane Commission had proposed a tripartite mandate
dividing up Turkey into Armenia, Constantinople and
Anatolia, while Kemal, the heroic opponent of European
hegemony, was open to the American plan if it was renamed
as 'American Aid.' It was the State Department, not Kemal,
who rejected the Commission's Plan. The collapse of the
French at Marash remains further proof, if it were needed,
that the Allies could not sustain a Turkish war. But while the
National Pact declared its function was 'to save the Sultanate,
the Khalifate and the country' - each day showed more clearly
a very different agenda.
The first Kemalist parliament in Ankara which opened on
Friday, 23rd April, 1920, was both an essay in shameful

39
hypocrisy and ruthless realpolitik. The official announcement
declared that parliament would open with Jumu'ah in the Haji
Bayram Mosque. "All the honourable deputies will take part,
in the course of which the light of the Qur'an and the edhan
will pour out on the muminun." Over two days there was to
be, not only a complete recitation of the Qur'an, but also the
whole of Imam al-Bukhari's 'Sahih' collection, together with
du'as for the liberation of the exalted person of the Sultan-
Khalif from foreigners. A Mevlud was to be celebrated. All this
from a man who planned to abolish the edhan, the Arabic
Qur'an, the Mevlud, the Tariqas, the 'Ulama and the Khalifate
itself. How very different from the French modernist
revolution which openly declared its secularism and regicide.
At the end, and from the beginning, this is the case - for or
against Kemalism. Kemal wanted to sweep away 'the past' and
bring the rump of the world-state of the Osmani-Umma into
'the present'. His politique was to vest power totally with 'the
people'. In that sense he was a man of his time. He was the
little, ordinary, declassé official who wanted to rule, totally,
without counsel or council. Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Franco -
and Kemal. The face of the bloody 20th century. Their
modernism, now blessedly, out-of-date. Old-fashioned.
Finished. Irrecoverable. To be pro-Hitler today is to own an
Alsatian dog, be a vegetarian, and insult jews, and daub their
poor tombs with paint. To be a
Stalinist is to long for parades and K.G.B. supervision, hold

40
congresses, and be proud of Chernobyl. To be a Franquista is
to wear an arm-band, love the priests, and fear the
freemasons. To be a Fascist is a nostalgia for 'modernism' -
even futurism, electric trains and Roman architecture. And
Kemalism - has it not, like Franquismo, suffered a sea-change
and turned into helpless submission to American hegemony,
TV, and NATO?
1920, and as Kemal took power, 5 Turkish lira equalled £1
sterling. Today his inheritance is nearly bankrupt, with £1
sterling worth 100,000 Turkish lira, and that on a daily sliding
inflationary scale. If 5 Turkish lira to the pound is taken to be
the devalued state of the Khalifate, crippled by the trickery of
western banking - what are we to make of seventy years of
Kemalism - his face still on the paper currency - except abject
surrender to the kafir banking hegemony.
It was the enemy's iniquitous 'Treaty of Sevres' that secured
Kemal his power over the new Republic of Turkey. As Nazi
socialism was a direct result of the Versailles Treaty, so too did
secular Kemalism owe its success to the Allies' arrogant
dictation of terms. To negotiate independence required
Russian countering of western ambitions. On 16th March, 1921,
another sinister aspect of Kemalist value-free politique was
manifest. Kemal and Stalin signed the Treaty of Moscow,
securing a national eastern border to the Republic and cutting
off Azerbaijan and the Khanates from their Osmani links,
paving the way for the later Stalinist genocide. Nevertheless,

41
things having reached this nadir - and that need never have
happened - Kemal's days of glory were in the repulse of the
Greeks at the Battle of the Sakarya. Yet that great victory
resulted in a Franco- Turkish Treaty that ceded rights over
stretches of the Baghdad Railway. Further Turkish victories on
the Smyrna front against the Greeks again showed Kemal's
talents as a commander, but of course he was considerably
helped by the fact that the Greek Commander-in-Chief,
General Hajianestis was a schizophrenic who thought his
body was made of glass and that his legs would break if he
stood up. It was inevitable that the last conflict should take
place at Chanak with Churchill thundering, guilty about his
Gallipoli debacle, and Curzon, as ever, cautious and
diplomatic. In a sense the Chanak crisis could be seen as
Kemal's most impressive achievement, assuring his
acceptance by the Allies as the new dictator of the new
republic. After Chanak, the way was open for the abolition of
the Osmani dynasty. It was not merely Sultaniyya that Kemal
wanted to destroy but the complete Islamic social nexus.
In assessing what Kemal did - apply the coup de grâce - it
must be understood what had already been done, and
therefore that for which he should not be blamed.
From an Islamic, therefore Osmani, point of view, Khalifate
was corrupted at every point there was a denial of shari'at.
The collapse of intrinsic power implies Allah's withdrawal of
His power because His slave has been disobedient. Power is a

42
borrowed attribute. The Sultan's responsibility is shar'ic: just
weights and measures, gold and silver in correct weight, and
usury forbidden. From the beginning of the 19th century,
Christian and jewish modalities began to creep in. Sultan
Mahmut II (1808-1839) authorised a debasement of coinage
on 72
occasions in a 31 year reign. As we have noted paper money
(kaime) carrying interest was introduced in the 1839/40
Treasury crisis. The instruments of usury had begun the work
of destruction. From 1855-1875 the Derçâh-i Alî contracted 14
usurious foreign loans based also on usurious bonds, so by
1875 was forced to declare bankruptcy. It must be noted that
the term bankruptcy, meaning broken by the bank, is the
modern equivalent of the old military term, unconditional
surrender. One might also define a loan on interest, militarily,
as a siege on a desired city.
The categorical imperative was that parliament was essential
to banking hegemony, thus adopting the political form of
assembly administration in itself implied an end to Sultanic
rule and its amazing patterns of consultation and mutual
responsibility. Significantly, when the great genius of
Abdalhamid II took command, he knew that his real task was
to push back the institutions of democracy which, pretending
to be rule by the people, represented obedience to financial
imperatives. Along with the suspension of Assembly politics
came the great Sultan's other action - to leave the hideous

43
Dolmabahçe and move to Yildiz, which with its complex of
kiosks, was a modern Topkapi, although, tragically the
capitalist inroads of the state had swollen the bureaucracy
way beyond the non- centralist mode of the Osmaniyya in
earlier days. The deposition of Sultan Abdalhamid, may Allah
be merciful to him, was in truth the end of Khalifate. After
him the Osmani ruler was reduced to the condition of a
constitutional monarch.
So, to bring the Islamic Khalifate down it only required Kemal
to dismiss the Constantinople government. It is worth
examining some of the text of Kemal's abolition document.
He said: "Sovereignty and Sultanate are taken by strength, by
power and by force. It was by force that the sons of Osman
seized the sovereignty and Sultanate of the Turkish nation:
they have maintained this usurpation for six centuries. Now
the Turkish nation has rebelled and has put a stop to these
usurpers, and has effectively taken sovereignty into its own
hands."
Let us examine this rhetorical stuff. Osman did not seize the
sovereignty and Sultanate. He did not see himself as Sultan,
but rather as Ghazi, or warrior fighting in the way of Islam. He
ruled in the manner of his day, and his followers would not
have known what on earth Kemal was talking about. Nor did
he rule the Turkish nation. There was absolutely no concept
then of the nation-state - a modern doctrine that followed
1789. Osman did not usurp - if so, who did he usurp? You

44
cannot usurp a populace. If they did for six centuries then the
populace must be shamefully weak - hardly the case with the
powerful Osmani- Umma. Next - the Turkish nation had not
rebelled. First the Young Turks and then Kemal were the
rebels. Kemal had not only given a personal oath of loyalty to
the Sultan, but he had made many pronouncements in the
name of defending that same Sultaniyya. This can now be
seen as ruthless deception. Whoever had taught him in his
native Salonika had taught him well - to loathe Islam and
aspire to a 20th century secular dictatorship. Now it is
inescapable that Hitler, Kemal, Stalin, Mussolini and Franco
were all the same, aesthetic 'national' characteristics aside. All
were plebeian. All claimed to be the voice and force of their
people. All were absolute dictators. All ensconced themselves
in the palaces of the
overthrown leaders. All murdered their political opponents
on a mass scale. As Kemal added in his deposition text,
referring to those who might oppose it, "Some heads may roll
in the process." They certainly did. The session of deputies
that declared the Osmani Sultaniyya finished was brought to a
close with the prayer recited in Turkish. The Allies were
delighted. Kemal had done what they had not dared to do.
After the exile of Vahid-ed-Din, Khalifate minus Sultaniyya
was given to Abdalmecid II, who had been marginalised by
Sultan Abdalhamid because of his unpolitical and over-
aesthetic character. At his installation the usual if shortened

45
rituals were observed, except that the sword of Osman was
withheld from him. Already salat was in Turkish.
The next act of Kemal was a further surrender of the
sovereignty he in turn had 'usurped'. He granted the principle
of free passage through the Straits, thus internationalising
them. After that came the racist exchange of populations
between Greece and Turkey.
The Treaty of Lausanne faced Ismet with that formidable
imperialist, Curzon. The negotiations broke down. The time
had come for Kemal to disband parliament. In setting up a
new Assembly package Kemal was able to limit and define
what conditions would make a political party accessible.
From that day to this the new 'nation' that the 'people' had
seized were dictated to about what issues they could decide
democratically. On 24th July, 1923 the Treaty was signed. Now
Mosul was pared away for good, even if its annexation was
delayed on paper.
At least the Treaty sealed 'national' borders and cleared
foreign troops from her soil. After six hundred years of the
Osmani-Umma being a world power, Turkey settled down to
its new status as a third world country, saddled with a
dictatorship pretending democracy, and incurable inflation.
Kemal declared Turkey a Republic, confirmed by 158
unanimous votes but with over 100 abstentions on 29th
October, 1923. The untrammelled power he gained had never

46
been held by any Osmani Sultan. It remained only to abolish
Khalifate as he had swept away Sultaniyya. Khalifate went,
and with it the Shaykh al-Islam and, in final obedience to
capitalism and feudal law, the great Islamic method of awqaf -
its social welfare system - was abolished and its wealth and
properties confiscated. Abdalmecid left Turkey on the Orient
Express, the financial instrument of his dynasty's destruction.
1924 - the short anti-Islamic interregnum had begun.
With Khalifate abolished in Constantinople, Hussain of the
Hijaz, now with the English-awarded title of King, declared
himself Khalif of the Muslims. However, just as Kemal
remained, strangely, a hero of the European powers, so too did
that other anti-Islamic rebel against the Khalifate, Ibn Saud.
Hussain was not acceptable to either Muslim or kafir. Egypt
and India convened in Cairo an Islamic Congress, 'To decide
on whose shoulders the Islamic Khalifate ought to be placed.'
It met under the Egyptian Shaykh al-Islam, on May 13th, 1925,
in the Al-Azhar.
This important Congress declared the Khalifate of
'Abdalmecid illegal, and bay'at to him worthless. The
Kemalists in withdrawing Sultaniyya and granting it to their
National Assembly had, "Reduced the Amir 'Abdalmecid to
the status of a purely Ruhi Caliph." The statement continued,
"By this act the Turkish government introduced a bid'ah
which was without precedent in Islam. They followed this up
by another innovation: the abolition of the office of the

47
Khalifate." The Congress called on the world's Muslims, "To
work together for the establishment of the Khalifate."
It is interesting to note that the first Kurdish revolt was against
Kemalism, racism and the abolition of Khalifate. Kurdish
resistance was the inevitable response to a uni-cultural state
that excluded them and their language. The uprising ended
with over forty leaders condemned to hang, nine of them Sufi
Shaykhs.
On 5th June, 1926, the final protocols ceded Mosul to the
English, cropping the final Osmani-Umma territory from its
motherland and condemning it to continuous suffering from
that day. In August of the same year, at Kastamonu, he
outlawed Sufism. He declared, "Turkey cannot be the land of
Shaykhs, Dervishes or Disciples." Moulay Abdalqadir al-Jilani,
may Allah be pleased with him, had declared, "He who does
not have a Shaykh as a master, will have Shaytan as a master."
The Izmir Trials and executions were soon to demonstrate
what happened to people under a leader who took no
guidance from any source.
Next in line for destruction was the Osmanlica - one of the
world's great syncretic languages. It straddled Arabic and
Persian with a Turkish core. Its vast vocabulary boasted over
300,000 words. It was Islam's lingua franca. It, of course, was
written with a modified Arabic script. Kemal called Arabic,
"These incomprehensible signs," which is hardly one of his

48
most exalted statements. It perhaps ranks with his Kastamonu
pronunciamento: "Trousers on our legs, shirt and tie, jacket
and waistcoat - and of course, to complete these, a cover with
a brim on our heads. I want to make this clear - this head-
covering is called 'a hat'!" Incidentally in his desperate rush
westwards, no one presumably, had dared halt him to point
out that the waistcoat was a Persian invention, with a Persian
name in France - le gilet! In November, 1928, the new script
became law. It brought Turkey no nearer Europe, but it did
distance it from its own neighbouring Arab and Persian
cultures. Today Japan with its 'incomprehensible script' has
the strongest currency in the world and is a leader of
computer technology.
Needless to say Kemal's fiscal policies were true to the form of
his fellow 20th century dictators. Sugar, salt, tobacco, matches,
alcohol, petrol and shipping became state monopolies. Kemal
took the money India's Muslims had raised for him to defend
the Islamic homeland, and used it to form a bank. Four
national banks were created. Thus Kemal was to be the Father
of Usury Banking on a national scale. The Ottoman Bank
remained, and remains, in elusive private and foreign hands.
Kemal gave his people the disastrous plague of banking, as he
opened the Is Bank, Sumer Bank, Central Bank and Eti Bank.
Thus, in complete ignorance of the implications he had now
rooted on Turkish soil, what until then had been an alien
creeper, the suffocating power of the world banking system.

49
Its
beginning implied its lethal end - that is, the day state banks
were privatised and ownership itself slipped from the hands
of the helpless resident nation.
Kemal's attempt at two party democracy was in turn to fail.
Opposition in Turkey meant the return of the fez, Arabic
script, salat, in short, Islam. Naqshbandi, and devout Muslims,
rioted. Over a hundred went on trial. Executions, torture,
prison - the secular litany was recited. Kemal tried to revive
the country's failing economic programme. Mahmud Celal
Bayar was appointed Minister of Economics. He had been the
creator of those first banks. In one of his more forthright
statements Kemal said of him: "I gave him a bag of gold - and
he gave me a bank!"
His last anti-Islamic reform was the abolition of patronymic
identification: so-and- so son of so-and-so. This adopting of
fixed names was essential for banking practice. The English
were later to impose it on their rebel province of Arabistan,
renamed after the criminal Ibn Saud, as Saudi-Arabia.
Kemal died in, as he had ruled from, the Dolmabahçe Palace,
the seat of the Western conquest of the Osmani dynasty.
Perhaps his oddest legacy is that everything is still done in his
name, even things he legislated against, such as his
prohibition on the Army from interfering in politics. More

50
than any other political figure of the dreadful 20th century, he
reveals the truth that in the age of banking hegemony, the
political leader has been simply the servant of the banks, and
the enslaver of his own people to their power and ownership.
As for his beginnings, there is doubt. His family were almost
certainly Shi'a by inheritance, as they were by name. As for his
end, history can claim benefit from him, and a harm that itself
was cleansing.
The Osmani Model
Serîat - Fixed and clear, the basis of Islamic practice, from
Qur'an, Sunna and 'Amal.
Kânûn - Equivalent in effect to the two poles of ijtihad or new
judgments in fiqh: Al-maslahat ul-mursalah and saddu'dh-
dhara'i. Kânûn thus was obliged to fit within the shar'ic
parameters.
Kânûn has 3 categories:
On specific issues [the main body]
For specific regions or groups.
General rulings - Kânûnnâme.
Kânûn emerged as decrees from the Sultan: Fermân - 'What
the Sultan decrees is the Sultan's law.'
Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror, laid down the two
Kânûnnâmes - the Kânûn-I- Osmânî - that first systematised
basic laws. This summarised earlier decrees and

51
defined current usage. Various Sultans restructured these
according to the times. As Sultan Mehmet had said: "Let my
sons who follow me strive for its improvement."
The key ruling was: 'The Reâyâ and the land belong to the
Sultan.'
The Sultan as Khalif represented (stood in for: [khalafa])
Allah's sovereignty. Thus, the people were not, as in modern
slave-democracies, considered merely as 'the masses' or as a
pseudo-mystical totalitarian entity, 'the people'. Rather, they
were the flock of the shepherd. Innocent, pure, and to be
defended and protected, meriting compassion.
The land's 'belonging' to the Sultan, meant that at source
feudalism was barred from evolving with time. It prevented
the amassing of provincial estate power and landlordship. It
protected the Vakîfs [Awqaf] from similar abuse. Forced
labour and services stood forbidden except in exception.
demanding Fermân. The collection of zakat was also
protected from local military exploitation of the local
population in a far place.
From the time of Süleyman the Magnificent a Kânûnnâme or
Silistra states:
"In a situation concerning which the Kânûnnâme contains no
clear written command, the Kâdî should officially refer the
matter to the capital. Acting in accordance with the command
that arrives, he should make a decision solving the problem.

52
He should record this decision in his register and act
according to it." Osmani law existed in a state of continuous
development. Hundreds of annotated Kânûnnâmes
demonstrate this fact. No accused person could be punished
without the Kâdî's written judgment. Even the Sultan was
obliged to submit to the Kâdî's decision. Abuses of respect for
the Serîat could be righted by a Sultanic issue of an
Adaletname, a rescript putting right a provincial malpractice.
The Sufi, Sari Saltuk advised Osmân Gâzî:
"Be just and equitable: Do not provoke the curses of the poor:
Do not mistreat your subjects. Keep watch over your Kâdîs
and Governors. Act justly, so that you may stay in power and
retain the obedience of your subjects."
Topkapi
'After the time of the Dhu'r prayer the band played so that the
people might come and eat.'
Sultan Mehmet declared at the Conquest: "Henceforth, my
throne is Istanbul."
The palace had two zones: Inner - Enderûn and Outer - Bîrûn.
Over the Council Chamber was erected a tower called the
Mansion of Justice. All justice stemmed from the protector of
the protecting Serîat, the Sultan. And all in justice came
before him to be put right. It was not a theocracy, ruled by
priests. It was not an autocracy, ruled by a dictator. It was a
NOMOCRACY in which the Nomos, or social pattern of

53
justice, ruled.
Joining the two zones was the Bab-üs Saadet. Here, the Sultan
received the people, consulted and governed, overlooked
justice, received the ambassadors. It was not a royal residence,
but rather, a royal village and hub from whose almost non-
existent centre - The Sultan - remained, as the wheel of the
great 'Umma- Community revolved.
It must be emphasised that the two foundations of the
Osmani rule cannot be understood through the terminology
and thought structure of European ideology. Actually it is a
society that in itself negates the European model, and had to
be destroyed by it, since its efficacy and high culture and
stability was a permanent demonstration of superiority. Now
in the epoch when the sick man of Europe is Europe itself and
its mutant offspring, America, it can be recognised that virus
modernism in the end destroys the host organism.
Inflationary monopoly bankism is now utterly devastating
Europe as it once laid waste to the Osmaniyya. It is clear that
the model of the Osmaniyya, purified of its deviations, and
renewed by a return to its ur-model, Madinah, is the road to a
vitalised future rescued from the ecological and human
disaster of the now defunct 20th century.
It will be observed that all European models of state are
essentially identical. It is a fiscal state, based on unjust taxes.
It is evolutionary feudalism, ending in superstates, dictators,

54
and debtor-slave masses. It is mechanistic and pre-
determined to self-destruct. It arrives in end-game at bank-
ruptcy, global war - two in forty years - penitentiary nations,
police autocracy, terrorism and mass drugging of an under-
class. Without value - both morality and money, as well as life
itself.
The power of the Sultan, and thus of the whole society
depended on two mobile processes of wealth and value. It will
be seen that these two energies are diametric opposites to
their European assessment and practice.
Zakat and the Kul
Both these processes are guarded in both SERIAT and
KÂNÛN, by a set of restrictive rulings that maintain justice
and compassion.
Zakat is limited to one fifth of wealth, and is mainly payable
in gold and silver. It cannot tolerate or use paper, promissory
and debt-receipt notes and bonds. The Zakat not only taxes
wealth for society's benefit, but it pre-defines the obligation
for a non-usurious currency of intrinsic value, like gold. It also
permits an extra tax on minority groups, people of the Book,
jews and Christians, to both guarantee their protection, and
prevent their usurpation of Muslim rule. In that sense Zakat is
also a protection for the jews from a Christian genocide, and a
protection from the jews by prohibiting their altering
financial law to permit usury. This is called the Law of the

55
Dhimmis. While it was in place, these minorities were not
only safe but flourished. When they overthrew it with the
legend of 'equality' they destroyed the Muslims, acquired the
vast wealth of the Osmaniyya, and reduced its people to
crippling poverty and inflation (150% at present) while
shamelessly selling Osmani artefacts in the world's auction
houses for fabulous sums of money.
Zakat and Cizye [Jizya], then, are the foundational taxation of
the community, on the Muslim and the Dhimmi.
The other force dynamising the society is that of the Kul. The
Kul is bonded. The free are not bonded. The free are a settled
secure basis of society. That society in its growth and energy
moves out and fights to expand. In its success it takes
prisoners. They are bonded. However, this bondage far from
being a degradation and social doom, is itself an instrument
not just of social mobility but of rising to the very height of
political expression and power. The Wazir came from the Kul.
The present society, now in terminal collapse, 'abolished' war
and at the same time created refugees. The 'peace' in its stifled
upheaval, vomited up millions of helpless people and cast
them into vast concentration camps or dumped them in
favelas on the edge of already brimming mega-cities. These
people are condemned to a life lower than that of Czarist
serfs, without future, or hope of release. They have become a
norm.

56
The Serîat which permits four wives and forbids intercourse
without it, or ownership of the partner, by that principle
declares that there cannot be sexual pleasure divorced from
the human bond of provision. The woman is assured that she
will be housed and clothed and fed. So in war as in love. There
is no victory without responsibility. The conquered are
bonded. Not isolated in prison camps, to die of mutual
murders and despair, or end up in forced labour. The defeated
are bonded to individuals, into houses and service. The
married are not separated. The Ghazi - leader is entitled to
one-fifth of the bonded. On this grouping the energy and
genius and artistic glory of the Osmaniyya was founded.
Sinan, the world's master architect, Sultan Süleyman's mosque
builder, began life as a bonded child. From the Kul came the
elite administration, Kâdîs and Wazirs.
Every three or seven years around a thousand boys would be
collected from the Kul population, this being part of the
Sultan's Khums, or fifth of the booty. This was the DEVSIRME.
In Istanbul the first selection picked the IÇOGLANS - pages to
serve the palace. These received palace education, the rest
went into the - Janissary Corps. From 2 to 7 years they were
trained in the Turkish language and behaviour, and then came
a second selection called ÇIKMA. The best entered the
Greater and Lesser Chambers of Topkapi and the rest joined
the Kapikulu Cavalry divisions. Their education then
consisted of riding, archery, wrestling and fencing as well as a

57
craft or art.
Temperament and capacity were carefully assessed. Some
were passed on to study serîat to become Imams and Kâdîs,
others became scribes.
This system produced what one of its members defined as
"The warrior statesman, the loyal Muslim, at the same time a
man of letters, of polished speech and honest morals."
The pages served in the HÂS ODA, HAZINE, KILER and
SERFERLI ODA - i.e., Privy Chamber, Treasury, Larder, and
Campaign Chamber. The forty pages of the Privy Chamber
directly attended the Sultan. The HÂS ODA BASI, the Chief of
the Privy Chamber was the closest person to the Ruler. In 1522
Süleyman I elevated his HÂS ODA BASI to be the VEZIR-I
AZAM, Grand Vizier. Sultan Murad II treated his Kul as his
own brothers. Thus the pejorative term slave cannot truly be
applied to the Kul, as they were a favoured elite, although
bonded to owners. Manumission and marriage were also
paths of advance open to them, thus in the main cities, legally
freed Kul formed the richest and most influential group of all.
The women of the Kul were formed in the same educational
pattern as the males, but were not subject to the DEVSIRME.
When they first arrived at the palace they were known as
ACEMIS ['Ajamis], illiterates. Under a trained woman
guardian, the KAHYA KADIN, they grew up to be cultured and
groomed women. They learned the 'usul of the law,

58
embroidery, sewing, dancing, music, calligraphy and reading.
They attained to three stations, SÂGIRD, GEDIKLI, and USTA,
being guild terms of apprenticeship to mastery. From the
Gedikli the Sultan could make his choice of partners, who
then attained the title of Hâseki. The four legal spouses had
the privilege title of Kadin and were the most favoured.
Süleyman the Magnificent married his Russian slave (so-
called today) Roxelana. All these women lived at a very
cultured and creative level. They financed the building of
mosques, hospitals and madrasahs. Most of the palace girls in
turn married the young pages and went off with them to serve
in provincial cities. In 1688 the Kul system was defined by a
French writer, Rycaut as, "if well considered and examined,
one of the most politic constitutions in the world."
The Harem in turn was the exact opposite of the lewd sexual
fantasy conjured up by European writers and travellers. Far
from being a sink of decadent sexual indulgence, it was a
rigorous and variegated educational system which produced
the elite women, all with significant influence, and
expression, who shaped the destiny of a vast Islamic
community.
Thus, Topkapi was not a palace in the western sense, any more
than its Kul were slaves in the western sense. Indeed, it is only
when we achieve the balanced viewpoint of Islam, that one
can see it for what it was. Topkapi was like a village. It was like
Madinah. It was the Guardian of the Deen. Justice,

59
governance and fatwa came out from it. It produced scholars,
artists, administrators, Kâdîs, craftsmen, soldiers and
governors. While that dynamic centre maintained its
equilibrium and fulfilled its obligations to drive and
determine social activity and jihad at the periphery, the
'Umma of the Osmanliyya was safe.
Shams-ad-Din, the Egyptian doctor of Sultan Bayezid I wrote
(1389):
"Early in the morning the Ottoman ruler would sit on a wide,
raised sofa. The people stood some distance away, in a place
from which they could see the Sultan. Anyone who had
suffered a wrong would come to him and state his complaint.
The case was judged immediately. Security in the land is such
that
nowhere will anyone touch a fully-laden camel whose owner
has left it unattended."
In 1475 Mehmet the Conqueror ceased to preside in person
over Imperial Council meetings. To fulfil his obligation,
however, he had a grated window opened onto the House of
Justice, which overlooked the proceedings. Murad III would
leave his listening post and sit at the back of the Chamber if
he felt people were not being served in justice. Ahmad I often
sat in on the cases being heard. Again, it was in the
fluctuations of this practice that the health of the Osmaniyya
lived, weakened and finally was broken by the closing of
Topkapi and the imprisoning of the Sultans in the bourgeois

60
Palace of Dolmabahçe. It was placing the Sultans in this
palace, which at the same time broke the Islamic heart of
rulership and assured the Sultans' being seen as oriental
versions of the Bourbons, that rendered them fit targets for a
1789-type revolution.
The Sultans had a practice of moving among the people to
learn their difficulties and assess their state. It was a tradition.
Süleyman the Magnificent dressed as a Sipâhî and Sultan
Ahmad II dressed as a Mevlevî dervish to mix with the people.
The Grand Vizier had to check market prices on the stalls and
report back to the Sultan.
All complaint could feed back to Topkapi. Sipâhîs and Yeniçeri
too had the right of complaint. In 1588 Murad III's Vizier had
permitted debased coinage, worth half, to be used in payment
of the military. They obtained a fetvâ from the seyhülislâm
declaring this haram, went to Topkapi and demanded the
death of Mehmed Pasha, the guilty Vizier. From his window,
under ministerial counsel, the Sultan ordered the execution of
his Grand Vizier, and the Chief Defterdâr, Head of the
Treasury.
Every decision was taken with long and protracted
consultation. The Grand Vizier would preside over the
Consultative Council, before the Sultan, other viziers, military
commanders and local advisers. On occasion such Councils
deposed the Ruler.

61
Three domains governed society. The political, judicial and
financial. The viziers supervised the political sphere. Two
KÂDIASKERS, the Judical, and the DEFTERDÂRS, the
Finances. The NISANCI was the Guardian of the Tugra, the
Sultan's signature.
The balance of these powers assured the success of the
Khalifate. The Grand Vizier could not command the Aga of
the Yeniçeri. He in turn was appointed directly by the Sultan.
The greatest power independent of the Grand Vizier, however,
was the 'Ulema. The Kâdîaskers of Anatolia and Rumelia, with
power to appoint and dismiss Kâdîs, were responsible for the
application and administration of the Serîat. The ulema's
supreme head was the Sehülislâm, as the Grand Vizier was the
Executive Chief. Thus these two and the Sultan, sometimes
with a fourth powerful influence, that of the Wâlide Sultan,
the Sultan's mother or a senior wife, interacted and balanced
each other, limiting and tuning individual drives to power. To
these four may be added a fifth hidden power, adding yet
another influence, guidance, and pull, that of the Sultan's
Shaykh. Every Sultan had a Sufi Seyh who served as his
spiritual instructor. At various times this task fell to a Seyh
from a different order. Murad III's spiritual guide was Seyh
Süccâ, a Halvetî. Other sultans had Naksbendî teachers. Sultan
Abdalhamid II followed a Seyh from North Africa of the
Shadhiliyya Order.

62
The end result of the quintuple counterbalancing of energies
at the centre of the power nexus was something utterly alien
to autocracy, rendering dictatorship impossible. It was in
everyone's interest that the ship should sail in all weathers.
That it did so for hundreds of years is the proof of its efficacy.
Since we here demonstrate the utter falsity of the European
view of the Osmaniyya's genius in social order it must follow
that their version of its collapse also is tainted and a
deception. Before examining this crucial modern issue more
must be said about the remarkable way in which its domains
were governed.
As in Topkapi, so in provincial government. The same
equilibria, the same separation of tasks to avoid power
slipping out of access.
In the province, the Bey represented the executive authority
of the Sultan. He came from the military elite. The Kâdî
represented the legal authority of the Sultan. He came from
the 'Ulema elite. The Bey could not inflict a punishment
without first receiving the Kâdî's judgment.
The Kâdî, in turn, could not execute his own sentence. In
applying Serîat and Kânûn. the Kâdî was independent of the
Bey.
Each administrative unit, or Sanjak, that is area under the
Sultan's standard, was ruled by its Sanjak Beyi, or Governor.
Later a Beylerbeyi was appointed to head their number as

63
territory expanded. After 1590 the Beylerbeyiliks, then named
Eyalets were limited in size. Within these units a complex
system of zakat collection and expenditure took place. This
was called the Timar system and being squarely based on
Islamic law was utterly devoid of feudalism or its tendencies.
At the heart of the utterly qualitative difference that lies
between the Islamic Osmaniye and the Judo-Christian Roman
Empire is to be found the financial motor of the Zakat-Timar
method. The Christian model is pre- determinedly feudal.
Admit the principle of land ownership, move it by the
mechanism of primogeniture, gigantise it by the trick of usury
and you move inevitably from mercantile exchange to
monopoly capitalism . The bourgeois society is the result. The
Islamic model, itself a war against usury, offers a dynamic of
constantly expanding trade, following the opening up of
territories by jihad.
All land belonged to the Sultan, i.e. the land belonged to
Allah, held in trust for the good of the people. The main
exception was the Vakîf land, already set aside for good works.
If a Vakîf fell defunct it would revert to the Sultan. In 1528
about 87% of land was Mîrî, or owned by the Sultan. The
decline of this anti- feudal principle was considered by
Osmani writers as one of the main reasons for the Khalifate's
decline.
Just as Topkapi was the motor of the vast Khalifate of the
Osmani, so too the cities and towns had a dynamic energising

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series of centres. This uniquely Islamic model lies at their
heart. It is this - institution is precisely not the word - this
organism which allows us to say that yet again European
terminology cannot define the method of the Osmani
civilisation. This organic form was called the Imâret. Here, in
its pristine perfection can be recognised the Madinan original
pattern. Madinah, meaning in Arabic the Place of the Deen,
was the name given by Rasul, Allah bless him and grant him
peace, to the basic model of society ordered him by Allah the
Exalted. It was based on two centres. The mosque and the
market. Islam can only exist if both of these run under Allah's
and Rasul's commands.
The Imâret, with all the genius and adaptability of the
Osmani, rulers and peoples, is the historical response to the
original commands.
Imâret - now cynically called 'Mosque Complex' by European
so-called scholars - consisted of mosque and market,
madrasah, hospital, fountain, caravanserai - to house visiting
traders, hamam, mill, dye-house, soup kitchen.
Imâret was set up as vakîf under Serîat law. Thus every
Osmanli city had both great mosque and Bedestan, or covered
market side by side. This was the Madinan Islamic foundation
of the Khalifate.
The Bedestan constructed in 1340 by Orhan Gâzî, is today the
centre of the city's commerce. Only in what was called 'The

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Modernisation' of the Republic it has been reduced to the
bourgeois equivalent of a mall. This was nothing less than one
of the instruments of destruction injected by European
bankers into the Osmaniyya.
In 1459 Mehmet the Conqueror authorised the building of
Imârets by important men in the country. He himself built a
great mosque with eight madreses, a children's school, a
library, a hospital, a refectory and two travellers' hotels, each
taking 160 visitors. Six hundred students attended the
madreses.
The neighbourhood poor were all fed from its kitchens. The
hospital had two doctors, an eye specialist, a surgeon and a
pharmacist. Nurses and cooks prepared food under medical
supervision. It took in those who could not afford to pay or
buy medicine. Two more hospitals were added. One for
women only. All this was paid from Vakîf income. Hotel food
and lodging was free for three days. By 1546 there were 2, 517
Vakîfs founded in Istanbul apart from those created by the
Sultan's family. Today there and 1,200 functioning mosques in
Istanbul, but as a result of the disastrous smashing of the
Islamic form of society demanded of the Republic by
European bankers, the Vakîfs were nationalised and closed
down, to help pay interest loans that had been floated to
launch the so-called secular and modern Republic. Half a
century later, inflation stands at 150%, unemployment soars
and the social services that are left diminish day by day.

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It is worth mentioning in this context the case of Sarajevo.
One customary process was to build a road and a bridge
leading to a city, their upkeep secured
by an Imâret near the bridge. Under the Osmaniyya in Bosnia-
Herzegovina 232 inns, 18 caravanserais, 32 hotels, 10 bedestan
and 42 bridges were built. The famous Mostar Bridge was built
in 1566. The Sarajevo Kozja Bridge and the Trebinje Bridge
were built around 1550. Sarajevo itself grew up around the
Imâret founded by its Governor, Isâ Bey. Sarajevo was
exempted from zakat. Troops could not enter the city. It was
virtually an independent City-Republic under the Sultan's
protection. Under the influence of the Macedonian masonic
agitation, this city at the turn of the century was demanding
its independence. On breaking with the Sultaniyya of the
Muslims it was annexed by the Christian Austrians. It was
attacked and suffered genocide by Serb nationalists. It was
occupied by Nazi Germany. It was subjugated into
communism under Tito. By the time the war with Serbia and
Croatia broke out, their Islam was almost obliterated. As their
suffering began again they were tragically forced to learn the
funeral prayer to bury their dead with honour. They are now
virtually the property of world banking institutions. This has
been their Liberte, Fraternite, Egalite.
The final bonding threads of the civic cloth of the Osmaniyya
is the active presence in society of the guilds. Again self-
regulating and not ruled from outside like trade-unionism is

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with its separate capitalist leadership and wealth. The guilds
were based on master-student teaching, standards of work,
and chivalric loyalty. The guild masters with government
officers under the eye of the Sultan himself fixed the Ihtisab
regulations, fixing and adjusting prices and assuring quality,
thus all trade was under Serîat limits. This applied to weights
and measures and Treasury coinage. This was Osmani
actualisation of the D'ua of the Messenger, may Allah bless
him and grant him peace: "Oh Allah, protect Madinah, bless it
in its dirham and its dinar: its sa'a and its mu'ud." That is, in
the authenticity of its coinage and its weights and measures.
In bourgeois monopolist Europe the coinage as we all know is
worthless. In a recent supermarket checking 50% of goods
tested had been under-weighed.
While the guild system flourished, the whole society
flourished. It was only with the nineteenth century that the
guilds began to be eroded. The strong bourgeoisie with its
destructive greed and immorality, in the place of the honour
and spiritual brotherhood of the guilds, helped in the
downfall of a whole equitable society.
This tremendous social tapestry in all its intricacy of brilliant
detail and splendour of design represented a much greater
and higher human society than the inherently flawed and self-
conflictive bourgeois model of Europe.
In order to achieve its brief historical moment of superior

68
power, the European culture had to sign a pact with the devil.
Indeed, this was the insight of its greatest genius, Goethe, who
died a Muslim. In his master-work 'Faust' he tells of how
technical mastery came with a price from Shaytan. That price
was not itself technical. In other words Europe was not
destroyed by industrial development. No, the pact was that by
it, it gained mastery over the world. The price was, quite
literally, the price. It was only by usury, by replacing gold coins
with printed paper that the scientific knowledge could be
bought.
The other great European genius, Wagner, confirmed this by
retelling an ancient German legend. The Ancient Gods had
built their great palace from which to rule the world, Valhalla.
To pay for it they stole the Ring made from the Rhine's gold.
To rule it was necessary to place the world's gold in a cave,
guarded by a dragon. Then, with only the magic Ring, world
domination was possible. The price was that whoever took the
Ring was cursed to die and could never be loved. The way to
destroy the tyranny of the Ring and its owners was to return
the gold to the river with the Ring. At that moment Valhalla
went up in flames and the Ancient Gods were destroyed.
Europe, in the eyes of its two greatest visionaries, had signed a
pact, world domination, by controlling and blocking usage of
the world's natural wealth, not through battle and fighting,
but through usury and the ruin of peoples.

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It achieved this end. It has dominated the whole world. But
now, the curse is beginning to fall on them. What they had
visited on the world's people has now come home to them
bringing a special and terrible destruction.
The Osmaniyya was not defeated and destroyed by war. It was
infiltrated and eroded over 150 years with a quite new and
dazzling deception. Thinking it was somehow winning for
itself 'modernity' - that is, technique - it signed away its
wealth. It agreed to pay the price. The price was a whole
civilisation built on superior, truer lines.
At the end of the 'magic' period - from 1924-1974, only half a
century, it was clear that the people had been cheated.
Democracy turned out to be dictatorship. Parliament had no
power. The money was worthless. The magic paper lira of
modernity, had gobbled up the gold and given it to the banks.
The dinar was no longer in the hands of the people. In 1532,
for example, 14,000 gold dinars were sent out from Istanbul
with the Hajji's caravan as a gift to Makkah and Madinah.
Under the banner of the Rasul, may Allah less him and grant
him peace, the Islamic Khalifate had placed Turkey, as the
fatherland of the 'Umma, and over all nations. After 1924,
Turkey was step by banker's step relegated to near third world
status with a society in crisis and unstoppable inflation, kept
from disaster only by regular ten year cycles of coup d'etat
under banker's orders, followed by devaluation.

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The Osmaniyya is not dead. It has only slept. As the Russians
have awakened from the hell of communism which seemed a
world force in 1917 now too, Turkey awakens to its own
inheritance as guardians of all the Muslims.
Western philosophy lies dead, as announced by Heidegger.
There is no choice now but to lift up Rumi's Mathnawi, the
text that transvalues all the values of thought. As the Tekkes
again open up in Istanbul and other cities, so too must they be
opened in Europe and Arabistan. We are the only force today
that can revitalise the future. We must recognise the high task
Allah has called us to - seize the moment. Live this age as its
masters and as Allah's slaves - with love of the greatest
Mujahid, salla-llahu alayhi wa salem.
The Second Interregnum
The Cairo Conference quite correctly declared the separation
of Sultaniyya and Khalifate both illegal and impossible
Islamically. Thus the removal of Sultaniyya in itself is not
something any Turkish state can legislate. It is, by definition,
an Islamic matter. The political dismemberment of the
Khalifate was dependent on the clinical surgery which
removed the Hijaz from the Islamic body. The instrument of
this operation was the criminal family of Ibn Saud. The
English spy, Shakespeare informed the Foreign Office, "The
Wahhabi Amir is a weapon to fight the Turks with." Their task
was, "to render the position of the Turks on the Arabian coast

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of the Gulf untenable."
The Ibn Saud family were undoubtedly puppets of British
imperialism. Only recently released Foreign Office documents
revealed that Churchill had secured a £20,000 payment for
Abdalaziz ibn Saud, with the precise purpose of pre- empting
the growth of the so-called Pan-Islamic movement, which was
nothing other than the rallying of the Islamic 'Umma to
defend the Khalifate.
In 1818 the Egyptian army under Ibrahim Pasha had captured
Abdallah ibn Saud and sent him in chains to Constantinople.
Rather than execute him as a rebel, which he was, the Sultan
handed him over to the 'ulama. They declared him an extreme
zindiq. He was publicly beheaded. Thus the Saudi tribal
rebellion and usurpation which at its inception required
British military support and at its collapse, American, began
in ignominious kufr.
Ibn Saud got his kingdom and his salafi 'ulama got command
of the Haramayn. They destroyed almost every tree in Makkah
and Madinah in their real estate adventures, now one third of
the land in Makkah is owned by jewish American
corporations. They let the peninsula be carved up into
separate states, fought each other, and fell inexorably under
American dominance. There are Hindu temples to the
monkey god in the Emirates, communists in Yemen, and
rabbis in Riyadh. Arabistan lies under foreign occupation.

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Iran, a banking-based republic, boasts only the first shahadah
on its flag. Syria, its satellite, is governed by an Alawite tyrant,
Iraq by a mass-murderer whose rhetoric is anti-Israel but
whose victims are Muslim. Egypt, Algeria, Sudan - all the
vaunted Arab nations lie prostrate and defeated. Each oil
state, separate and cut-off from alliance, has been bankrupted
or reduced to chaos: Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Arabia, Kuwait, even
little Bahrain. Each once a rebel state against the Islamic ruler,
each now a pawn in the hands of its own enemy. In London,
King Fahd poses with his mentor (and inventor) the English
monarch, a large cross around his neck - Guardian of the
Haramayn. The hell of Lebanon and Palestine and the curse of
Zionism, these are but the fruits, the bitter fruits of Arab
betrayal and rejection of Islamic rule.
The Arab people were poisoned by the vitriol of Shi'a hatred,
the hatred of sovereignty and leadership and manly power.
The theology that fuelled salafism in all its forms, Arab
nationalism, socialist and monarchic, secularism as
philosophy and social programme can be traced back to the
muwahhid doctrines of the rationalist Shi'a and the Mahdist
rejection of practical and simple human rulership -
Sultaniyya. A rejection based on an oriental cult of holy
motherhood and the slaughter of males set up around the
martyr 'Ali and his 'holy family', ruled over by the weeping
mother, Fatima. History has not disappointed them. They
have succeeded. Their world is in ruins. Their sons are dead in

73
futile suicide, dynamite strapped to their bellies, paper money
in their pockets, devaluing as they explode. They have
everything to weep about - and nothing achieved.
Ibn Saud's family and Mustafa Kemal both fulfilled the most
extreme ambitions of the enemies of Islam. A son of Saud
appropriated to himself the Sultan's title, Guardian of the
Haramayn. In this act separating Sultaniyya from Deen, a
parallel act to Kemal's separation of Sultaniyya from Khilafa.
The last and final disaster for the 'Umma would be to permit
the creation of Makkah and Madinah as protected city states
under 'international' rule. This is already on the agenda of the
kuffar once they have removed the Saudi family from power,
as they intend, having now outlived their function. The Hijaz
must, inevitably, be taken back under the protection of
Islamic rule.
Both Kemal and Ibn Saud declared war on the Sufi awliya,
shuyukh and turuq. This has been the key factor of both
Kemalist atheism and Saudi anti-Prophetic belief. Kemal did
not believe in God. Ibn Saud did not believe in Rasul. No
Wahhabi will permit his body to be buried in Madinah, oh
blessed news! Kemal denied Tawhid, and the Saudis
confirmed it but denied the Rasul. Thus, they dismantled the
fiqh in the name of the ahadith. Fiqh means applied law. They
abolished the Shari'at. Their end was, of course, to betray
tawhid, sanction archeology of ancient idols, invite the kuffar

74
to occupy the land, and bring rabbis to Arabistan for the U.S.
troops.
It is an epoch that has passed. The energy that drove the
kuffar axis to attempt world government is collapsing through
internal contradictions, not even through just opposition and
war.
In this age power is re-emerging not only in the Islamic
heartland of Turkey, but in the newly awakening Turkic lands
that now exist free from Russian tyranny. The abolition of the
Khalifate cannot be laid at the door of the banal figure,
Mustafa Kemal. Its end was brought about initially by one of
its own - as if to demonstrate man's inherent vulnerability -
Sultan Mahmut II. From this Islamic perspective Kemal
merely brought the matter to its logical conclusion. And, as
happens in history, what Kemal thought was his most
powerful act of obliteration - the closing of the Tekkes and the
outlawing of the Tariqas - was what assured the ultimate
triumph of Islam. A hidden army of Bektashi, Qadiri,
Naqshbandi, Shadhdhili and Mevlevi Shaykhs called the
people back to Dhikr.
The return of the Khalifate is inevitable. Continuity demands
that it is a purified and revitalised Osmani rule. By that I mean
the Shari'at and Kânûn Law and its modalities, revised and
strengthened to meet the new world situation. Whether it is a
Sultan of the house of Osman is not at all the issue - that it is

75
their inheritance
which is enthroned that is all that matters. And it is not a
Turkish issue alone. It is the affair of all of us - the 'Umma as it
draws together.
The Road to Khilafa
A Warning
The first matter to be grasped if there is to be social renewal is
how to measure and think societal patterns. The disastrous
'method' of collapsed westernism is called critical analysis. Its
essential fraudulence lies in its ability to deconstruct
everything yet never submit itself and its own evaluation to
the same method. Westernism can now be seen to be the
author of concentration camps, computerised state control,
Chernobyl, global pollution, liquidation of species, invention
of a third sex (psychologised eunuch class), ineradicable
super-viruses, and mega-cities. This method's greatest danger
lies not just in what it has produced but rather in what it is
determined to prevent. In short, by applying absolutist,
utopian analyses of past societies it pre-empts a return to
them, even if redesigned. Yet its promised future rational
efficacious society, itself an idealist fantasy, has never
emerged, as, planning it plunges the world into deeper and
deeper suffering.
Thus the case against Khalifate is made by indicating the
obvious errors of its society, as if it too SHOULD have been

76
perfect to justify its existence.
There is no perfect human society, and the ills must be
weighed against vigour, harmony and growth. A vivid example
of this is the current denunciation of the Osmani House for
killing brothers, even sons, who might claim the throne, while
it is not argued to abolish democracy due to the long list of
assassinated presidents.
Firstly, one must start from the realistic premise that since the
highest thinking of westernism is nihilism, it means that all
that this society approves and forces on the human species is
itself doomed to failure.
Democracy is a cynical deception, providing a totalitarian
police state, manned by an irresponsible dictator whose
motivation can in the end only be personal power. One
English ' Prime Minister' over ten years shattered the social
and moral fibre of the nation but left power with her
worthless son listed among the world's richest men. To be
American President you must start as a millionaire, and then
uniquely depend on the financial elite's backing.
It is not only the bureaucracy that indicates tyranny but the
existence of a political class in itself. This outdated structure
can now be seen as the foundation of the banking system. A
super-state is merely a bank account. What prevents Basque,
Scottish, Kashmiri, Bosnian, Kosovan, Macedonian, Chechen,
Catalan independence is not the mysteriously irrational and

77
thus 'sacred' constitution, but rather that that document
enshrines a body of people as a debt-entity. Free Scotland,
truly free it, and who will pay its 'share' of the national debt?
Nationalism as census is bankism, pure and simple.
Muhyi'd-din ibn al-'Arabi defined a nation as an area where a
specific language is spoken.
Nothing, absolutely nothing can save westernism, and its
collapse, already medically identifiable, is inevitable from
within. Reformism cannot rescue it. The last phase of banking
capitalism, which has thrived on external conflicts and
experimental variants, communism, cantonism, colonialism,
now being global must implode in its final historical
moments.
The recovery of society, of human relatedness, of hope and
success is dependent on a postlude to nihilism. Nietzsche
called this the transvaluation of all values. The same
philosopher's 'god is dead' never implied atheism, as
Heidegger brilliantly explained. It was the false psychologised
theology of judeo-Christianity that he pronounced dead. He
said:
"...the Crusaders fought against something they would have
done better to lie down in the dust before - a culture
compared with which even our nineteenth century may well
think itself very impoverished....Christianity, alcohol - the two
great means of corruption....For in itself there should be no

78
choice in the matter when faced with Islam and
Christianity....'War to the knife with Rome! Peace, friendship
with Islam.'" He further states: "If Islam despises Christianity,
it is a thousand times right to do so: Islam presupposes men..."
So it was that the great philosopher in rejecting categorically
the judeo-Christian axis, called for a transvaluation of all
values, and that could only mean in the end, the embracing of
Islam.
The first warning, therefore, is against those who think at this
late fatal stage of westernism that they can float the old tired
arguments that emanated from masonic lodges from
Edinburgh to Salonika a hundred years ago about the 'old
fashioned' and the 'outdated', about the magically 'modern'
and the 'new'. Apply their famous critique to them. Surely by
now the creaking philosophy of the Encyclopaedists, the
Masons, the Sect (Economists), and the Secularists is dismally
old-fashioned, outdated. Do we want to be dragged back into
the eighteenth century?
The second warning concerns the avoidance of 'modernism'
in its Islamic doctrinal form. Neçip Fazil in his great work, 'Ulu
Hakan', has outlined with devastating clarity the masonic
system's attack on the Khalifate. The crucial element is that
the Salonika lodges in preparing their Young Turk coup d'etat
were at the same time linked to the Young Azharis, the rebel
modernist 'ulama of Al-Azhar.

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The silsilah of crime must be understood, for its inheritors can
never restore Islam, their raison d'etre having been from the
beginning, its destruction.
Let us schematise this briefly. Ibn Taymiyya noted that if you
wish to know what is the cause of human, intimate, conflict
you must go to its source in the Qur'an - that is, in the story of
Sayyiduna Adam and Hawa. Equally if you wish to
understand conflict in the Islamic community you must go to
its source in the Fitnat al-Kubra.
The attempt to dislocate and dislodge power from the Islamic
Khalifate failed. Since legitimacy could not be defeated it was
necessary to surpass it with an image of invincible power. The
doctrine of Khilafa (being, of course, Khilafa and Sultaniyya)
had to be metaphysically defeated instead. Thus the doctrine
of the Mahdi implied the illegitimacy of existing rule in the
name of an occult ruler in the Unseen. More extremely, it
predicated rule as a future promise instead of a present
reality, and worst of all it rejected historical rule as
unacceptable because imperfect while it projected perfect
rule into the future. So its ultimate doctrine insisted on no
historical Sultan when it was needed in the present and
substituted the forlorn hope of metahistorical sultanate at the
end of time when in fact it would be no longer needed.
This is the true essence of the Shi'a rebellion. Not, after all,
anything to do with legitimacy of inheritance. Uniquely it

80
presents itself as the party of no leader, no power, no rule, no
justice. In its place it offers a Zakat collecting priesthood
without a leader or a societal identity. The Mahdi doctrine
precludes sultanate. It is a mirror doctrine of the orthodox
jewish one built around waiting for the Messiah. Its
implication is that rulers and state are unjust, but one day - at
the end - justice will come. However, that dialectic may exist
between jews and Christians, for to them the jews are
persecuted, religious, and enslaved, while the Christians are
Caesar and the Roman state, but it cannot be posited as an
Islamic one. With the event of Allah's revelation on His
Messenger, blessings and peace of Allah be on him, and the
functioning of the law in Madinah in his lifetime and that of
the first three Khalifs, a new model of rule has been
established. It is not a state in the structuralist sense, at all. Or
if it is a state it is a quite new ecological model that conforms
to fitra, or natural ways. It is this that the 'Umayyads, then the
Andalusian Murabitun and finally the Osmanis put into
practice, flawed, in flux, but while it lasted moving towards
and away from the median Madinan template.
The historical lesson for Muslim governance is clear and
consistent. Adherence to the justice of Shari'at, and the
'Umma are under divine protection. Every declension from
what is ordered by Divine command brings weakness or
defeat. The clipping of the gold dinar, or abandoning the law
of the Dhimmis, is the road to ruin. Cessation of jihad or

81
abandonment of the Islamic gold dinar spell the collapse of
the pillar of Zakat and the end of Islamic power.
So it was that as the Salonika masons subverted the young
military officers and led them to betray their own oath of
loyalty, so the masonic 'ulama of British- occupied Egypt
began to issue false legal judgements not in accord with
Shari'at but with masonic doctrine.
The silsilah of shame began, as we have indicated, with Saud,
the zindiq traitor beheaded in Istanbul on orders of the
Shaykh al-Islam. The bedouin was killed but the evil doctrine
of the Wahhabis continued. While pretending to purify the
Deen it was uniquely calling for the overthrow of the Khalif of
the Muslim 'Umma. To do this it basically had to reject the
fiqh, and pretend that its
secondary source was textual and not legal precedent or
practice. Rejection of fiqh was the total denial of Shar'ic
rulings, therefore of Sultaniyya. It was Makkah without
Madinah. That means, Shi'a.
These ideas of national independence reached the Arabs
through British crown agents. Ibn Abdalwahhab had in his
time travelled the peninsula with a British agent. The man
who cleverly linked rebellion against Khalifate with colonial
rebellion against Europe was the notorious Jamalad-din al-
Afghani, the Shi'a activist from Iran. A dedicated mason, he
recruited the young 'alim, Muhammad Abdu into his Lodge in

82
Cairo where he in turn met and befriended the jewish banker-
governor, Lord Cromer, of the Baring family. His student in
turn was Rashid Reda, who issued a string of fatwas
accommodating Islamic law to western imperatives, social
and financial. In turn from him stem the key figures of sub-
Shi'a modernism, Maududi and Hasan al-Banna. From al-
Banna, Sayid Qutb who opposed Nasser. It must in turn be
recalled that Nasser's deadly enemies were Israel, France and
Britain. Nasser nearly achieved the expulsion of the British-
installed Saudis in Arabistan.
Basically their disastrous muwahhid doctrines, strongly allied
to and financed by the Saudi usurpers, have in this century
plunged the Muslims inexorably into political disaster and
collapse.
Their final cynical achievement was the establishment of so-
called 'Islamic Banks' siphoning off the wealth of the Muslim
peoples into the worthless haram system of usury banking
and usury instruments of number-based exchange. The
collapse in disaster of the falsely named 'Islamic Movement'
from Algeria and Egypt to Pakistan is parallel to its masonic
mother's and modernist/nationalist father's demise.
Renewal
Renewal in Islam demands a quite new recovery of the
original model of Madinah to be set in motion and applied.
What are its parameters? They are known and unarguable.

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Firstly - Humanism has finished in total inhumanity. Now, we
must forget future promises of happiness in this world's
Utopia, and declare that there is no power but from Allah the
Mighty, the Great. This is the certainty that empowers us to
act. We know this from the Messenger, who taught us by the
gift of Revelation in Qur'an, and his Practice. Thus, we declare:
There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of
Allah. Submission is to this.
Secondly - We establish Salat and payment of Zakat. Jumu'ah
and the two 'Eids with Ramadan must be established by
command. Zakat must be taken (not given) under authority.
For this the Amir is necessary. Zakat, in turn cannot be
collected unless payment is by the Islamic gold dinar,
according to the ahkam of Qur'an. Thus the minting of coins
of specified weight is the indication of the Islamic ethos'
existence. It is this act which indicates that power lies in the
Muslims' hands, as it did when Abu Bakr As-Siddiq went to
war to force Zakat payment.
The minting of the Islamic dinar by a Muslim leader, and
collection, by power, of Zakat in it, is the foundational event
for the return of the Islamic Khalifate. What may start in any
place on the earth must end in Makkah, with its guardianship
being restored to the Islamic Khalif. The protection of the
Haramayn must follow, even if only after a time, as happened
with the Rasul, then the Umayyads and then the Osmaniyya.

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From this it follows that the mosques must be led by unpaid
Imams, with personal exceptions only, not under dependency,
thus free to teach the Deen. The establishment of the Jumu'ah
is another act of Sultaniyya.
Once the Salat and Zakat are established for the people, usury
by legal implication is abolished. This means for us both the
abandonment of paper money and the institutions of theft:
banks, stock exchanges and credit card systems.
It is necessary for the establishment of the complete ethos of
Islam that there is an 'Amir. From the authorisation of
Jumu'ah onwards, each obligation of Deen requires an
empowered order. Thus leadership is an inescapable part of
genuine Islam. Jumu'ah was not a Shi'a practice until the
recent events in Iran and is still denounced by its orthodox
'ulama.
Now, the political framework of banking enslavement requires
the ideological imperatives: super-state, national boundaries,
census statehood, a national debt to private banks, and an
'elected' government to police the people. This totalitarian
model of high capitalism disguised as populism is sustained
by the religious myth that market-forces are fluid,
unpredictable, and predetermined to inflate paper currency
values. In the democratic model, power does not belong to the
people but to the expropriators of land and commodities
whose wealth has been acquired by market manipulation and

85
bankruptcy mechanisms.
The establishment of the sovereign Islamic 'Umma is
dependent on the rejection of the current usurious finance
system and its instruments and institutions. It follows that the
tyranny of democracy will then collapse. Far from being 'the
best system we have' - it is the worst. Allied to it is the
insidious institution of a professional political class in turn
dependent on an ongoing bureaucracy. This ghastly, ritualised
practice, assembly politics, is a historically failed method
which really masks absolutist control by an unelected elite of
bankers.
Firstly, Islamic worship under an independent Imam. A
jama'at. Secondly, the need of the people to obey Allah and
His Messenger, Allah bless him and give him peace. This
demands a leader.
The energy of 'ibadah, and delight in it, generates a spiritual
need. That need in turn, by Allah's bounty, throws up a man
with the courage to step forward. This is not an awaited,
apocalyptic, end-of-time figure, a Mahdi. Rather he is the one
who raises high the banner of Islam. This is the role of the
Sultan. The destined authority of Islam was decreed by Allah
to remain in Turkey. It has stayed there, weak and strong for
over six hundred years. The rope has been severed only the
length of one lifetime. It is immensely easy to recover.
Our enemies have put together a pseudo-nation out of an

86
ancient, two thousand year old tribal franchise, and revived a
language utterly dead for the same time span. All this they
achieved by the introduction of a third party between two
trading partners, who offered firstly to service the exchange,
and later hold its capital sums, and lastly to keep these sums
and proffer in their place a paper promissory note.
Our return to the Qur'anically licensed fitra tradition of value
instruments of exchange, and the recovery of the ur-language
'Osmanlica, which evolved to serve the Ummatun Wasatun
stretching from the Balkans to India, and since its root-
Turkish is alive, only needs study to be revitalised as a lingua-
franca - these two events - will assure our triumph.
It is the complete pattern of Islamic imperatives here outlined
that will bring about victory. There is no 'fundamentalism' in
all this, that was a false, and in the end un-Islamic, doctrine,
its components devoid of fiqh. The best way forward would be
to restore an utterly reformed Osmani rule. Reformed not as
in the disastrous masonic Tanzimat, but in the Madinan
sense, a restoration of source practices in justice and trade.
There is no escaping, therefore, the facts: that this Deen was
born of a Divine permission to carry out Jihad, and that our
glorious Muslim Osmani heritage began not with President
Osman, but Ghazi Osman, may Allah bless his family and
their future.
In any event the great prize will go to the one who raises high

87
the banner of Islam. To him will go the promised victory. The
Shi'a wait for the Mahdi. Obedient to the Revelation and its
bearer, we do not wait. We act. We prepare. We trust in Allah
and by the intensity of our niyyat and our high expectation,
the times will raise up from among us someone worthy of the
hour.
Postface
"A vast country...could never return to the state of nature after
having for more than five centuries borne the yoke of laws.
Revolutions change the political contract but they never
break the bonds of the social contract. The first is founded
only on fear or prejudice. The habits and interests of all assure
the eternal duration of the second." Edward Gibbon
"On the Medes"
This judgment of the great historian can be applied to the
Osmani-'Umma. The political contract of Kemalism has come
to an end and the social contract of Islam has re-emerged.
Declaration
The issue of Khalifate is of primordial importance. It is fard
'ayn, and necessary for the completion of many obligatory
acts of Deen such as Jihad, Zakat and authority for the two
'Eids, the protection of weights and measures, as well as the
minting of the golden dinar and other coinage. It is the
foundation of the Deen
and in itself comprises Sultaniyya and Hakamiyya. It exists by

88
force, under order from Allah the Exalted, the Great, and
following, being the continuity of leadership after Nabawiyyat
by the Khulafa Rashidun. It is known that there are breaks in
the chain of Khilafa, but that after a time in a particular place
the authority revives. Thus it passed from the 'Umayyads to
Andalusia and after them to the Osmani. It has remained in
their exemplary hands until very recently. Then, on 4th
November, 1922, the Administration of Constantinople was
taken over in the name of the Great National Assembly by
Re'fat Pasha, and the Osmani Government and all its organs
ceased to exist.
On the 17th November, the ex-Sultan-Khalif, Mehmed
Vahidu'd-din Khan sought asylum on board the British
battleship, Malaya. On the 20th he arrived at Malta and then
went on to Makkah. The Vekil of the Sher'ieh in the Great
National Assembly issued a fetva declaring that he had
forfeited the office of Khalif, and that a new bay'ah was
necessary.
On the 18th November the Assembly unanimously voted that
the fetva rendered Khilafa vacant and so went on to elect
Abdulmejid Effendi, the second son of the murdered Sultan
Abdalaziz.
On the 19th November this election of Khalifate was
communicated by the President of the Turkish government,
Mustafa Kemal to Abdalmejid Effendi.

89
On the 24th November the investiture and bay'ah took place.
On the same day the new 'Khalif' issued a proclamation to the
Islamic world.
On March 3rd 1924 after a five hour debate a law was passed,
by the same body which had sworn allegiance only a year and
a half earlier, which abolished the Osmani Khalifate
altogether and ordered the whole Osmani Imperial Family
into forced exile. This infamous law, Law 431, was the unique
labour of Mustafa Kemal, who throughout his life had made
so many public and passionate declarations of loyalty to his
Sultan. In a telegram to the President of the Council of
Ministers Ismet Pasha (Inönü), Kemal said: "The Khalif
himself and the whole world must know in categoric manner
that the Khalif and the office of Khalif as they are now
maintained and exist have in reality neither a material nor a
political meaning or any right of existence...The dignity of the
Khalifate can have no other importance for us than that of an
historical memory."
The traitor 'King' Hussain of the Hijaz claimed the Khalifate in
Amman on March 11th 1924. However, both the Muslim
leadership in India and Egypt rejected his English-backed
claim.
In March, 1925 a Congress was held in Cairo under the Shaykh
al-Islam, Chief Mufti of Egypt, and the Shaykh al-Azhar.
The Congress confirmed Khalifate as leadership over Deen

90
and Dunya, and administration of the 'Umma. It guaranteed
justice and the function of Islamic Shari'ah. It also declared
Abdalmejid's Khalifate illegal and without claim to bay'ah
since the Turkish government had withdrawn Sultaniyya from
him,
reducing him to a Ruhi Khalif, an un-Islamic position. They
declared: "By this Act the Turks introduced a bid'ah which was
without precedent in Islam. They followed this up by another
innovation: the abolition of the office of Khalifate."
Thirteen countries attended, Turkey and Iran were absent.
Faced with the evil fait accompli, the Congress nevertheless
insisted: "That the Islamic Khalifate in conformity with the
prescriptions of the Shari'at is capable of realisation." It
further declared: "That this Congress makes an appeal to all
the Muslims in the world, and exhorts them not to neglect the
issue of the Khalifate which is the secret and the manifest of
Islam itself, but to work together for the establishment of the
Khalifate."
The Congress also noted that the instrument of division
among the Muslims which had permitted this disaster was the
European doctrine of nationalism. What it failed to grasp, for
it was too early in its evolution, was that banking and not just
frontiers delineated the nation-state as a debt-receptor to a
private and dynastic banking elite. The time has now come to
open the new Islamic era. Declaration

91
WE DECLARE:
That the instrument of liberation of the Muslim masses lies in
the rejection of haram paper currency and its financial
institutions in preference for the use of value-inherent gold,
silver, and commodity exchange.
That the gold dinar is, as Ibn Khaldun insisted, a part of the
Revelation, with Qur'anic and Madinan authority, and is
necessary for the halal execution of Zakat, dowry, and trade
itself.
That the authority of Zakat, Jihad, the two 'Eids, and just
coinage depend on amr and so Khalifate must be established.
That no condition be imposed on the declared Khalif, such as
race or family, or perfection of character, but only his
upholding and sustaining of what Allah and His Messenger,
Allah bless him and grant him peace, has ordained.
That in accord with Islamic practice over the centuries, local
governance of whole peoples may be sustained by amirate,
sultanic power will be its defender and ultimate arbiter in
Jihad and Zakat.
That those opposing the magnetic impulse to unity and
wealth and success among the Muslims will be opposed and
unmasked and removed.
That there should be one Islamic High Command overseeing
all Islamic military operations and their strategies, assuring
also that they fulfil the known laws of ghazwat and Jihad.
That the ghazis, the shuyukh, and the 'ulama, along with the
local governors, sustain a unified field of energy, activity and

92
collaboration.
That the Khalif will be declared, enthroned, protected and
victorious, this being the purpose, meaning and glory of our
lives and our hereafter.
That all this is by the Power of Allah. La ghaliba illa'llah.
APPENDIX
Ottoman Artefacts
Auctioned at Sotheby's, London, 25 April 1996. (Chairman:
Alfred Taubman, Vice-Chairman: Max Fisher)
Prices (Auctioneers' estimate) in catalogue prior to sale. Top
estimate given, a figure often surpassed, sometimes doubled
or trebled at auction.
76. Iznik Pottery Dish: circa 1575 AD: 32 cms. £15,000
77. Iznik Pottery Dish: circa 1575 AD: 31 cms. £30,000
78. Large Iznik Pottery Jar and Cover: circa 1575 AD: 27 cms.
£80,000
86. One Iznik Pottery Tile: circa 1575 AD: 26.7 cms. x 16 cms.
£7,000
90. One Iznik Pottery Tile: circa 1560-70 AD: 31.2 cms. x 30.7
cms. £9,500
94. An Embroidered Silk Brocade Textile: 16th century: 162 x
65 cms. £10,000

93
100. A Copper-gilt Ewer: 18th century: 31.5 cms. £30,000
132. A Polychrome-painted Wood Interior: circa 1800 AD:
Walls A and C: 4.3 m. x 3.22 m. Wall B: 3.91 m. x 3.22 m.
£60,000
Thus the kuffar elite bid against each other to possess even
the smallest domestic ware of the Osmani, and value it so
highly that only they buy it among themselves. We have sold
our treasured patrimony for worthless paper bonds. As
Mustafa Kemal said: "I gave him gold and he gave me a Bank."
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Allfrey: Edward VII and His Jewish Court (Weidenfeld 1991)
Contains astonishing data on European banking and its
politics.
I. Bozdag: Sultan Abdülhamid'in Hatira Defteri (Pinar 1992)
Important text of Abdülhamid Khan's private journal.
W. Fazil: Ulu Hakan 2. Abdülhamîd Han (Büyuk Dogu 1994)
The essential work for modern Muslims. After republican and
western invention comes a masterly study by Turkey's great
Islamic scholar. A key book.
H. Inalcik: The Ottoman Empire (Weidenfeld 1973)
The great revisionist work that swept aside previous histories
by recourse to original Osmani documents and records. Now
required reading for activists despite his strange inability to

94
understand the tariqas.
P. Kinross: Ataturk (1965 Weidenfeld)
The so-called 'objective' biography is in fact a hagiography by
a fellow-mason. This book gives the 'official version', happily
looking away from the quarter million hanged in his national
purges. Kemal is still to be de-constructed.
A. Osmanoglu: Babam Sultan Abdülhamid (Selçuk Yayinlari
1994)
A personal record by the great Khan's daughter. Contains
details of his zuhd and near poverty giving the lie to kemalist
slanders.
L. Peirce: The Imperial Harem (Oxford 1993)
A scholarly survey of the social dynamics of Osmani women.
Utterly shatters the French fantasy of concubinage.
S. and E. Shaw: History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern
Turkey, 2 vols. (Cambridge 1977)
Well researched. Accepts the Orientalist version of 'Decline
and Fall' but is a mine of information. Lacking in knowledge
of Islamic practices and mores. The first western appreciation
of the great Sultan Abdalhamid.
Sotheby's: (1996) Sale Catalogue: Islamic and Indian Art.

95